C ALE Discussion Paper No.6
August, 2011

BALANCING SURVEILLANCEBETWEEN NEEDS OFPRIVACY AND SECURITY:
CCTV IN JAPAN AND ENGLAND
Jonathan Oram

Nagoya University
C e n t e r for Asian Legal Exchange

Master’s Thesis Paper:
BALANCING SURVEILLANCE BETWEEN NEEDS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY:
CCTV IN JAPAN AND ENGLAND

Jonathan Oram
Nagoya University
August 2011

Disclaimer: the opinions expressed in this thesis are the author’s own and do not represent
those of the Metropolitan Police Service.

Contents
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................ 3
Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................................................... 4
1.1 Purpose and Methodology .......................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Main Findings ........................................................................................................................... 5
1.3 Overview .................................................................................................................................. 6
Chapter 2: Literature Review ............................................................................................................ 8
2.1 Crime Levels ............................................................................................................................. 8
England ...................................................................................................................................... 8
Japan ........................................................................................................................................ 14
Impact upon CCTV .................................................................................................................... 20
2.2 CCTV ..................................................................................................................................... 22
Definition .................................................................................................................................. 22
England .................................................................................................................................... 22
Japan ........................................................................................................................................ 25
Is CCTV effective? ..................................................................................................................... 31
2.3 Privacy.................................................................................................................................... 33
Definition .................................................................................................................................. 33
England .................................................................................................................................... 34
Japan ........................................................................................................................................ 39
Impact upon CCTV .................................................................................................................... 44
2.4 Surveillance............................................................................................................................. 45
Definition .................................................................................................................................. 45
England .................................................................................................................................... 47
Japan ........................................................................................................................................ 55
Impact upon CCTV .................................................................................................................... 63
Chapter 3: Current Legislation ....................................................................................................... 65
3.1 UK – current legislation ........................................................................................................... 65
The Tort Breach of Confidence .................................................................................................... 65
Human Rights Act 1998 .............................................................................................................. 66
Data Protection Act 1998 ........................................................................................................... 68
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 ............................................................................... 71
Privacy Impact Assessments ....................................................................................................... 74
CCTV Codes of Practice............................................................................................................. 75
Other relevant legislation / regulations ........................................................................................ 77
The effect of Legislation on CCTV Use ........................................................................................ 78
Relevant Court Cases ................................................................................................................. 80

1

3.2 Japan – current legislation ........................................................................................................ 82
Overview................................................................................................................................... 82
Constitution............................................................................................................................... 82
Criminal Procedure Law ............................................................................................................ 84
Control of Personal Information ................................................................................................. 87
Penal Law and Petty Breach Act ................................................................................................. 90
Police Act.................................................................................................................................. 91
Daily Life Safety Regulations ...................................................................................................... 92
Court Interpretations ................................................................................................................. 93
CCTV Policies ......................................................................................................................... 100
Suggestions for Specific Legislation .......................................................................................... 103
Problems with Privacy Protection ............................................................................................. 105
3.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 105
Chapter 4: Analysis of CCTV in Practice ...................................................................................... 107
4.1 Surveys and Studies into CCTV use ........................................................................................ 107
UK.......................................................................................................................................... 107
Japan .......................................................................................................................................114
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 123
4.2 CCTV usage in practice .......................................................................................................... 125
Japan ...................................................................................................................................... 125
England .................................................................................................................................. 129
4.3 Should citizens be concerned about CCTV? ............................................................................. 142
Chapter 5: Recommendations and Suggestions ............................................................................. 145
5.1 Limitations of research ........................................................................................................... 145
5.2 Findings and recommendations ............................................................................................... 145
Main findings .......................................................................................................................... 145
General Recommendations ....................................................................................................... 146
Specific Suggestions for Police Use of CCTV ............................................................................. 147
Recommendations for Japan ..................................................................................................... 147
Recommendations for England ................................................................................................. 148
5.3 Suggestions for Further Research ............................................................................................ 149
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 150

2

Abstract
This thesis looks at the current state of privacy and surveillance in Japan and England andasks if Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) is being used appropriately and effectively. The
thesis considers cultural, societal and historical factors in Japan and England that haveinfluenced public perception, legislation and practice concerning privacy and surveillance.
Research for this study includes interviews with Japanese and English police and archival
material in English and Japanese. The research indicates that CCTV is effective when used inconjunction with other measures and when there is a clear purpose but does not achieve theaim of preventing crime. The thesis makes recommendations to improve surveillance practicewhile protecting the balance between security and privacy.
Disclaimer: the opinions expressed in this thesis are the author’s own and do not represent
those of the Metropolitan Police Service.

3

Chapter 1: Introduction
In recent years, the UK has seen an increase in use of surveillance through databases andpublic space CCTV leading to a reduction in people‘s privacy.1 Function creep of existing
surveillance tools has further raised concerns about the effectiveness of current legislation inprotecting citizen‘s civil rights. 2 A new coalition government came into power with amandate to give citizens back freedoms and civil liberties lost under the previous
government.3 However, intrusive surveillance continues and in some cases is being expanded
under the new government.4
In Japan, increased surveillance in public spaces by both local volunteer groups and
CCTV, combined with fears of increasing crime and terrorism, has led to concerns thateveryone in Japan is now viewed as a potential criminal. Japan has one of the smallest percapita police services in the world, but one of the lowest numbers of crimes per police
officer.5 Japan‘s traditional focus on crimes instead of criminals,6 was aimed at reducing
opportunities for people to commit crime and has resulted in mass surveillance from thepolice, businesses, and most worryingly, local citizen groups. Recently citizens have begun tolose freedom of action in public due to public space design, volunteer crime patrols, security
guards, and CCTV. Yuki Furuta said that Japan is not a surveillance society, but a ‗managed
society‘ which silently restricts people‘s actions and choices.7
Bruce Phillips asserted that ‗privacy‘ is not simply an abstract notion, and privacy
intrusions have ‗concrete, real-world consequences.‘8 On the other hand, Amitai Etzioni said
that ‗the common good is being systematically neglected out of excessive deference to1

Wood and Ball, ―A report on the surveillance society.‖

2

McCahill, The Surveillance Web, 187 (noting in 2002 that although CCTV systems were ostensibly there
for the purpose of prevention and detection of crime, their use often mutated and became a tool for management
and other unforeseen purposes).
3―Clegg promises 'power revolution'.‖ BBC online, 19 May 20104―‗Surveillance state‘ fear as government revives tracking plan.‖ The Guardian online, 21 October 2010.

5

Miyazawa, ―Learning lessons from the Japanese experience: A challenge for Japanese criminologists,‖

114.
6

Kusuda-Smick, Crime Prevention and Control in the United States and Japan, 4-7; Also, see ―Regular
Opinion Poll.‖ 9 January 2008. (asking respondents if they felt punishment in Japan was severe, appropriate or
light? 1% said severe, 30% said appropriate, and 59% said light. see:
http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/2008/poll-08-31.htm).
7

Furuta, ―New Trends in Crime Control,‖ 61.

8

Phillips, ―Privacy in a ‗surveillance society‘.‖4

privacy.‘ 9 Is a loss of privacy through surveillance something that people should beconcerned about, or does it result in an increase in safety and security that justifies the
reduction in freedom? Concerns with CCTV and privacy invasions raise questions overpractical implementation of surveillance and legal protection, and also the extent to whichcitizens should have a right to privacy.

1.1 Purpose and Methodology
This paper answers three questions. Does CCTV invade our privacy, what are the differences
between Japan and England that impact upon CCTV use, and how should CCTV be used? Inorder to answer these questions, the author carried out both field work and archival research.
In England, the author interviewed high level police officers who have had a direct impact on
CCTV use and policy. Observations of CCTV use and operation were carried out at theCentral Control Room and Empress State Building in London during the Notting Hill
Carnival 2010, and the author also spent three days on a certified CCTV operator training
course in London. In Japan, the author met police officers in charge of national CCTV
implementation for the National Police Agency, visited a pilot scheme in Kanagawa
Prefecture, gained access to the Tokyo Metropolitan Police CCTV control room, had meetings
with the manager of Nagoya Police‘s CCTV scheme, visited one shopping mall in Nagoya
carrying out interviews with the staff and manager of the CCTV system, and interviewed thehead of a Chonaikai (Neighbourhood Association). Archival research included English andJapanese material on privacy, surveillance, CCTV, legislation, court cases, and contemporary
opinions of scholars and activists. A limited number of interviews were carried out withJapanese, English, and international students in early stages of the research to gain a personal
perspective on how surveillance was viewed by real people from different parts of the world.
Because different research was carried out in England and Japan, the thesis‘s conclusions are
more limited than if the research was identical.

1.2 Main Findings
This thesis shows that common perceptions about a ‗unique‘ Japanese culture being
responsible for Japan‘s low crime rates were wrong. However certain characteristics ofJapanese society have led to the proliferation of CCTV and local volunteer groups resulting in
9Etzoni also claimed that ―immoderate champions of privacy have not merely engaged in rhetorical excesses
but that these excesses have had significant and detrimental effects.‖ Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy, 4,7.

5

a vast surveillance web covering most aspects of public life. The research suggests thatneither the English nor the Japanese like being under surveillance, but at the same time people
in both nations view CCTV as a benevolent crime prevention measure. In Japan, thiscontradiction may be due to CCTV‘s promotion as ‗crime prevention cameras‘, while inEngland this may be due to the generally positive media coverage and government and local
councils‘ mass implementation of CCTV.
Furthermore, this thesis shows that although CCTV alone does not amount to aninvasion of privacy, it has the potential to invade people‘s privacy in public, and regularly
does in practice. This thesis suggests that while CCTV can play a useful role in crime
detection, it is rarely effective in reducing or preventing crime so it should no longer be seenor promoted for crime prevention, but concentrated on use as a criminal investigation tool.
The discussion on CCTV needs to move away from questioning its effectiveness at preventing
crime and ask how effective it is at investigating crimes, and apprehending and convicting
criminals.
The thesis recommends reining in the use of CCTV and other surveillance methods inboth Japan and the United Kingdom. Some ways to gain control of CCTV in Japan would beto adopt an independent Information Commissioner‘s Office (ICO) and increase the period ofretention for recorded images. In the UK, the power of the ICO should be increased and
CCTV operator training improved.
This thesis does not make substantial suggestions for new legislation for two reasons:firstly, there is a concern that both Japan and England are turning into managed societies
where new laws regulating privacy invasion may have the opposite effect and actually legalise
the infringement of privacy; secondly, the argument is put forward that the courts are the bestplace to deal with the regulation of CCTV and protection of privacy. This would avoid rashpolitical legislation regulating CCTV based on its use as a crime prevention tool instead of acriminal investigation tool.

1.3 Overview
The thesis is divided into five chapters with chapter 1 representing the introduction andgeneral background. Chapter 2 describes the crime situation in Japan and England and theinfluence this may have on CCTV. The second chapter further discusses in turn CCTV,
privacy, and surveillance, at each stage covering Japan and England separately then drawing
comparisons and conclusions relevant to CCTV use and implementation. Chapter 3 looks atlegislation relevant to privacy and CCTV and compares various view points on its suitability

6

in the present day. This chapter also includes a number of relevant court cases to show how
the courts are interpreting legislation. Chapter 4 first analyses previous surveys andquestionnaires in both Japan and England to get a picture of both how people on the groundview CCTV and privacy, and how it is actually implemented in practice. Then results ofinterviews with police in Japan and England are laid out and discussed. Finally, Chapter 5
makes suggestions for changes to current use and recommends further research.

7

Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Crime Levels
England
Crime Figures
There are two ways to measure crime rates in the UK: the British Crime Survey (BCS) andpolice recorded crime.10 The BCS shows that, since its figures began in 1981, there was asteady rise in crimes until the 1990s, peaking in 1995, and then decreasing through to 2007
when the lowest ever figures were recorded. BCS crime figures in 2010 were less than half ofthe 1995 figure.11 Despite the decrease, BCS figures showed there were still approximately
9.6 million crimes against household residents in England and Wales in 2008.12
Police recorded figures showed an increase in crime from 1981 until the early 1990s,
then a slight decrease to 1999 when the counting rules changed, resulting in a slight increase
to 2002. In 2002 the government brought in new crime recording rules, further increasing thefigures, but since then there has been a steady decrease from a peak of 5.6 million crimes in2004 to 4.3 million in 2010.13 Police recorded data for homicide (615) in 2008 were thelowest in over 20 years. Firearms offences decreased by 22% from 2003 levels. The risk ofbeing a victim of crime in 2008 was 21.5%, down from 23% in 2009 and 40% in 1995. 3% of
adults had been the victim of a violent crime in 2010.14 The 2009 report showed that Englandand Wales had a homicide rate of 1.4 per 100,000 and property related crime represented 71%
of police recorded crime.15 Police recorded crime showed a decrease in all the main crime
categories in from 2009 to 2010, except for sexual offences. In 2010 there were 871,700
crimes of violence against the person; 54,500 sexual assaults; 75,100 robberies; 540,700
10Police recorded crime does not cover some crimes included by the BCS, such as victimless crimes as
drugs offences. Furthermore, due both police recording techniques changing periodically and changes in levelsof reporting to police, it is sometimes not possible to do a direct comparison with previous years‘ rates. The BCS
on the other hand carries out face-to-face interviews with around 45,000 people over the age of 16 in Englandand Wales and so includes crimes not recorded to the police. The BCS is seen as a more reliable indicator of thetrue level of crime and the general trend, but both sets of figures are required to get a clear picture of crime levelsin the UK.
11

Home Office, Crime in England and Wales 2009/10: Findings from the British Crime Survey and police
recorded crime (Second Edition), 2 (BCS statistics results are based on interviews between April 2009 andMarch 2010; police recorded statistics are for the financial year 2009-2010, running from April 09 to March 10).
12

Ibid.

13

Ibid.

14

Ibid., 17.

15Home Office, Crime in England and Wales 2008/09: Findings from the British Crime Survey and police
recorded crime, 16.

8burglaries; 92,300 thefts from the person; 152,300 fraud/forgery; 806,700 criminal damage;and 235,000 drugs offences. The total recorded crime was 4,338,600 crimes.16

Theories of crime
Under the classical theory, individuals with free will make rational choices and commit crime
when the potential gain outweighs the potential cost. Whether or not to commit a crime can bedecided by looking at the probability of being caught, the potential punishment, and the speed
at which one is brought to justice. In order to make the costs outweigh the gains, the justicesystem must increase the certainty of being caught, impose a severe but fitting punishment,
and bring prosecutions promptly.17
Positivism, on the other hand, challenges the idea of the criminal‘s behaviour as being
rational and suggests that criminals are influenced by factors outside their own control. The
theory suggests focusing on understanding and rehabilitating the offender.18 This theory canbe seen in practice in the work of the probation service and restorative justice.19
The ‗routine activities theory‘ suggests that crime occurs when there are motivatedoffenders, suitable targets, and a lack of capable guardians.20 This theory points to societal
changes since WWII leading to people being away from their homes more often and so unable
to protect their belongings, resulting in increasing the risk of becoming targets of crime.21
In 1999, Simon Field looked at economic factors to explain crime rates and showedthat property crime was closely related to economic growth. He suggested that when personal
consumption grows quickly property crime tends to slow or reverse as people are less likely
to resort to criminality. 22 He also showed that in the long run this provided greater
16

Home Office, Crime in England and Wales 2009/10: Findings from the British Crime Survey and police
recorded crime (Second Edition), 18.
17

Harries, ―Modelling and predicting recorded property crime trends in England and Wales - a retrospective,‖558-559; Joyce, Criminal justice, 1-4.
18

Joyce, Criminal justice, 5-6.

19

Mantle, Fox, and Dhami, ―Restorative Justice and Three Individual Theories of Crime,‖ 11.

20

For the effect of CCTV on guardianship see: Surette, ―The thinking eye,‖ 157 (noting that CCTV may
reduce guardianship by local people as they feel the government is watching out for them. Conversely, CCTV
may increase the guardianship of an area by the police and therefore increase security).
21

Harries, ―Modelling and predicting recorded property crime trends in England and Wales - a retrospective,‖

559.
22

Field, Trends in Crime Revisited.

9opportunities for theft and burglary resulting in a fluctuating equilibrium. Field explained the
reduction in crime from the early 1990s was due to three factors: firstly, the recession in theearly 1990s initially caused a rapid increase in the rate of property crime, but due to an
equilibrium effect, this gradually began to diminish; secondly, the recession reduced
consumer spending which reduced the ‗stock of consumer goods‘ thereby reducing theopportunities for theft and burglary; and thirdly, the number of young males in the population
had been steadily decreasing since the early 1980s. He found that neither unemployment nor
prison population size showed any positive correlation, but other factors that may influencecrime such as criminal justice policy, crime prevention measures, and parenting were difficult
to analyse.
Chris Hale agreed in general with Field‘s results regarding the impact of consumption
on crime, but found that short term fluctuations were also influenced by police numbers andconviction rates.23 Hale further discovered that while unemployment did not explain longterm trends, it had a significant impact on short term fluctuations of crime, specifically withburglary and theft but not with robbery, and that the impact was asymmetric.24 That is, theincrease in crime due to an increase in unemployment was larger than the decrease in crime
due to a decrease in unemployment. Hale suggested that this might be due to criminal habits
remaining when the economy grows, and put to better use due to the increase in personal
consumables.25 Field said that economic growth when invested in public improvements often
led to a reduction in crime, but when it resulted in an increase in consumption of ‗stealable‘
goods, this led to an increase in crime.26 Hale reasoned that it is necessary to fund crime
prevention strategies at all levels due to the increase in potential targets as economic growthcontinues.27
Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi posited, in 1990, that culture was not a
deciding factor in crime rates, but rather short-sighted pursuit of self-interest, the absence ofself-control, and lack of concern for the long term consequences of one‘s actions. 28 They
further said that self-control arises from socialization, current circumstances, and family
23Hale, ―Crime and the Business Cycle in Post-War Britain Revisited,‖ 696.

24

See: Ibid., 694; However, see: Han, ―Economic Analyses of Crime in England and Wales,‖ 694 (showing
a negative correlation between employment and murder rate and suggesting this may be due to a reduction ininteraction between would be offenders and victims).
25

Hale, ―Crime and the Business Cycle in Post-War Britain Revisited,‖ 694.

26

Field, Trends in Crime Revisited, 16.

27Hale, ―Crime and the Business Cycle in Post-War Britain Revisited,‖ 696.

28

Ibid., 178.

10

upbringing.
Prior to 1979 there was a postwar consensus between the main UK political parties
about crime control. However during the 1979 election, Margret Thatcher promoted theConservative Party as the party that would be tough on crime. When the Conservatives came
to power that year, the groups on the periphery of society found themselves the targets ofcrime control. The government no longer attempted to control crime through reforming socialchange but instead focused on the control and punishment of offenders. These controls
included bringing prosecutions at an earlier stage in a criminal‘s ‗career‘, increasing the use of
imprisonment, introducing legislative sanction for social misbehaviour, and linking crimewith moral values resulting in social exclusion of the vulnerable and people not conformingwith society‘s expectations.29
During the 1980s, criminology began to shift emphasis from trying to understand why
criminals commit crime to trying to predict future criminal patterns and finding strategies toreduce their occurrence. The shift to trying to prevent crime before it occurred led to an
uptake of crime prevention schemes and the introduction of ‗Neighbourhood Watch‘30, CCTV
and increased cooperation between different agencies.31
The Labour government in 1997 took a ‗zero-tolerance‘ approach to crime andattempted to tackle the symptoms as opposed to the causes.32 However, even though thezero-tolerance approach was picked up by the media, this approach has been shown to behighly questionable as a method of reducing crime.33 Labour policy changed in 1998 andproblem-oriented and intelligence-led policing was brought in to add an element of crime
prevention. Furthermore, neighbourhood and reassurance policing began to be promoted by
the government.34 The media continued to play a role in presenting a misleading image of29

Joyce, Criminal justice, 40-43.

30‗Neighbourhood Watch‘ is a voluntary organisation that aims at making communities safer. The first
scheme in the UK was formed in 1982. There are currently around 10 million members. For the official website:
http://www.neighbourhoodwatch.net/. The Metropolitan Police state on their website that members of thescheme are ‗absolutely not . . . expected to patrol the streets‘:
http://www.met.police.uk/crimeprevention/neighbor.htm.
31

Joyce, Criminal justice, 44-45.

32

Minton, Ground Control: Fear and happiness in the twenty-first century city, 145-148 (noting that the
shadow home secretary in 1995 Jack Straw {soon to be a prominent government minister in the Labour Party}
visited New York to visit the mayor Rudy Giuliani who was implementing a ―zero-tolerance‖ approach to crime.
Straw returned to the UK and proclaimed that if Labour won the next election the Labour Party would also adopt
this strategy.).
33

Punch, Zero Tolerance Policing.

34

Joyce, Criminal justice, 134-141.

11

rising crime that fitted in with the government‘s tendency to increase crime fighting
measures.35
In 2010 a coalition government came into power claiming that a radical reform of thecriminal justice system was required, reducing bureaucracy and increasing police
accountability.36 Since coming into power, the government have announced large budget cutsthat will reduce financing for the police by 20% by 2014-15. Counter-terrorism policing will
be prioritised and a new national crime agency will be formed to provide more coordinatedpolicing throughout the UK.37 The coalition aims to keep frontline services visible, whichmeans that there may be significant cuts in funding for investigating crime.38 It is unclear
what effect the new government‘s policies will have on crime; however, with unemployment
set to rise in the short term,39 and a decrease in police funding, there may be a noticeable risein theft related crime over the next few years.

Threat of terrorism
The UK has seen terrorism related to the IRA‘s struggle over Northern Ireland since the 1970s.
However the recent wave of terrorism, including the London bombings on 7 July 2005 (7-7),
and the attempted bombings two weeks later, is significantly different to the IRA‘s bombing
campaigns. Despite the IRA‘s decision to end their armed struggle in 2005, 40 and no
successful major attacks in England since 2005, there remains concern that there is still asubstantial danger from terrorism from both dissident IRA terrorists and Al Qaeda inspired
terrorists.41

35

Minton, Ground Control: Fear and happiness in the twenty-first century city, 136-139 (referring to acomplaint about the BBC headlines between 2004-2007 ―cherry-picking rises in crime‖. The complaint wasupheld by the BBC‘s Editorial Complaints Unit. See: http://www.mediahell.org/pressrelease240407.htm).
36

HM Government, The Coalition: our programme for government, 13-14.

37

HM Treasury, HM Spending Review, 54-55.

38―Spending Review 2010: key points at a glance.‖ The Guardian online, 20 October 2010

39

Philpott, Does Britain face a prolonged jobs deficit?, 4 (disputing government figures and forecasting
unemployment rates increasing from 8.1% in 2010 to 9.5% in 2012); Economic and fiscal outlook, 60-63 (noting
an improved forecast from its June 2010 report and expecting a peak in unemployment in mid 2011 and then asteady decrease through 2015).
40―IRA says armed campaign is over.‖ BBC online, 28 July 2005.

41―MI5 warns Britain facing double terrorism threat.‖ The Guardian online, 24 September 2010. (noting thatas on December 2010, the threat of an international terrorist attack in the UK was 'severe', and the risk of aterrorist attack related to Northern Ireland was 'severe' in Northern Ireland and 'substantial' in Great Britain.;
There are five threat levels: critical, severe, substantial, moderate, and low. See:

12

In 2006, William Shughart analysed the history of terrorism and concluded that thedecisions at the end of the First World War, specifically the ‗un-kept promises‘ by thesuperpowers, including the UK, were largely responsible for terrorism since 1945.42 He notedthat while there have been fewer incidents over the past 20 years incidents had become morelethal, mainly due to the strategy of ‗Islamist terrorists‘ to inflict high casualties.43 Dealing
with the upsurge in lethality leads to difficulties for the government. If the government
imposes measures that are either draconian, or tends to target certain members of the
population, the public will view the government as repressive and give weight to terrorists‘
claims that the government is oppressive.44 However, as the Director General of the Security
Service (MI5), Eliza Manningham-Buller, explained, in November 2006, the security services
must not be complacent. She said that there were over 200 groups consisting of 1,600
identified individuals that MI5 were aware of who were actively engaged in plotting terrorist
attacks in the UK. Furthermore, the UK security services had, between July 2005 andNovember 2006, prevented five major attacks in the UK.45 These conspiracies against the UK
indicate that the terrorist threat remains high.
Gordon Woo said, in 2002, that Britain was a popular location for ‗Islamic militants‘
due to liberal asylum and extradition laws and the widespread protection of civil liberties.46
Recent years had seen a tightening of these laws and thereby a reduction in the number ofterrorist attacks; however, Woo suggested that this was due to terrorists lying low until
security measures eased, ‗civil liberties lawyers intervene‘, and public awareness declines.47
Due to the asymmetric capabilities, the ‗optimal strategy‘ for terrorists is to wait for aweakness in the state‘s defence to appear, randomise targets, undertake comprehensive
surveillance, and avoid aiming at high security targets.48
Richard Jackson claimed, in 2007, that the discourse to date on ‗Islamic terrorism‘ was
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/current-threat-level/ ; However, there were also claims that thethreat is lower than is commonly thought. See: ―The low risk of terrorism: We're safer than we think.‖ The
Economist online, 24 November 2010. and ―Somalia tops terrorism risk list, Yemen danger up.‖ Reuters online,
15 November 2010. (stating that the UK was the 46th country most at risk from terrorism, France was the 44 th,
the US 33rd, Russia 10th , Canada 67th, Germany 70th ).
42

Shughart, ―An analytical history of terrorism, 1945–2000,‖ 14.

43

Ibid., 30.

44

Ibid., 12.

45

Manningham-Buller, ―The new protective state,‖ 67-68.

46

Woo, ―Quantitative Terrorism Risk Assessment,‖ 9.

47

Ibid., 10.

48

Ibid., 10-12.

13neither new, nor helpful.49 He suggested that the common perception that ‗Islamist terrorists‘
were fanatical, driven by religion, and irrational, led to the conclusion that they could not be
negotiated with and therefore the only possible measures were coercive, repressive, andpunitive.50 Furthermore, the assumption that home-grown terrorists were radicalised due to alack of integration, alienation, and the influence of ‗Jihadists‘ led to Muslim communities
being seen as potential terrorist breeding grounds, 51 increasing the chance of thesecommunities coming under surveillance. Jackson suggests that the ‗Islamic terrorism‘
discourse allowed the government to increase surveillance and police powers in the name ofnational security. However, he also gave credence to studies that claimed the threat ofreligious based terrorism is ‗overexaggerated‘, and noted a study that showed 95% of suicide
attacks were related to a secular and strategic goal of ending foreign occupation, not due toreligious motivations.52 Jackson concluded that ‗Western counter-terrorism policies‘ have led
to political grievances that provided justification for further terrorist attacks. 53 Jeremie
Wattellier similarly asserted that ‗harsh procedure-stripping rules‘, employed to datethroughout European legal history, do not stop terrorism, but instead just reduce civil liberties
and reduce the government‘s legitimacy.54
However, as Peter Hennessy noted in 2007, terrorists ‗are determined to conceal . . .
what they intend to do.‘,55 therefore countering terrorism has become intelligence-based withthe difficult task of discovering and disrupting well-hidden terrorist cells. 56 With theOlympics to be held in London in 2012, the risk of terrorism remains high within the UK, andespecially in the capital.

Japan
Crime Figures
The NPA‘s report on crime figures show crime decreasing yearly since peaking in 2004 with
49

Jackson, ―Constructing Enemies,‖ 397,413.

50

Ibid., 409, 421.

51

Ibid., 411.

52

Ibid., 416-421.

53

Ibid., 424.

54

Wattellier, ―Comparative Legal Responses to Terrorism: Lessons from Europe,‖ 1,7.

55

Manningham-Buller, ―The new protective state,‖ 70.

56

Hennessy, ―The new protective state,‖ 15.

14

2.2 million crimes. In 2009 there were approximately 1.3 million crimes in Japan.57 The
police recorded figures for 2009 in England and Wales showed a decrease between this period
as well; however, there were significantly more crimes than in Japan. The population ofEngland and Wales is 54 million people compared to Japan‘s 127.5 million, which equates toapproximately one crime per hundred people in Japan compared with about one crime per 9
people in England and Wales in 2008/09.

Japan as a nation with low-crime rates
Until recent years, people generally believed that Japan was a safe country; however, incurrent times, both the media and the general public think Japan is becoming moredangerous.58 Other observers believe that Japan is still a safe, low-crime country and thescaremongers exaggerate Japan‘s problems for their own purposes. 59 National media
coverage of crime has perpetuated the perception that Japan is no longer safe, regardless ofcrime statistics.60 In 2009 Hiroshi Nishihara opined that citizens call for robust action when
they believe that crime is increasing and safety decreasing.61 However, because steps takenby the government have usually dealt with perception of crime and not the reality, they have
had little effect, leading to calls for stronger measures. According to Otani (2006), specific,
gruesome, but unrepresentative incidents have had policy changing impacts on society and led
to further legislation.62 In 2006, Won-Kyu Park explained that the overall crime rate in Japan
had been gradually increasing since 1974, reaching its highest rate since the end of WWII in
2001.63 Other scholars have shown that since the 1990s there was a steady downward trend in
57

National Police Agency, 2009 Crime Statistics, 12.

58

Hamai and Ellis, ―Crime and criminal justice in modern Japan: From re-integrative shaming to popular
punitivism‖ (noting how perception of decreasing safety by the general public, and focusing on crime by the
media has led to stricter public views on dealing with offenders).
59

Murakami Wood, Lyon, and Abe, ―Surveillance in Urban Japan,‖ 554 (asserting the media and politicalright focus on small short term rises in crime without putting the rise in context with ―massive historicaldecline‖).
60

On 10 June 2008 an Asahi Shimbun opinion poll found that overall 44.9% of people were uneasy about
crime and safety in Japan, 39.2% of men, and 50.5% of women. Another survey by Yomiuri Shimbun in March
2008 found that 48% of respondents thought public safety has gotten worse, and 37.8% ‗relatively worse‘ inrecent years. See www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/2008/poll-08-6.htm
61

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 29.

62

Otani, What are Surveillance Cameras Looking at?, 137; ―Tracking plan invites humiliation.‖ Japan
Times online, 27 March 2005; ―Paedophile to hang for killing Nara girl.‖ Japan Times online, 27 September
2006.
63

Park, Trends in crime rates in postwar Japan: a structural perspective, v.

15

crime.64 In fact, Park contended that the increase was due to theft related offences, and thatthe rates for other crimes actually decreased.65 Other countries have looked to Japan‘s low
crime rate to see if crime fighting methods can be transplanted; however, even Japanesecriminologists were uncertain why Japan‘s crime rate was so low.66 There had been scantqualitative or empirical research looking at the causes of Japan‘s low crime rate; instead theresearch had been general, speculative, and anecdotal.67
Until the late 1920s, it was commonly considered that Japan had low crime due toeconomic, demographic, and administrative factors. Only recently have scholars pointed out
culture as a determining factor.68 Raymond Lamont-Brown asserted in 1995 that due to Japan
being predominantly middleclass with few social extremes, family units taking collective
responsibility, and a competitive education system, Japan remained one of the safest places tolive. 69 Peter Preston (2000) found that the low rate was due to an efficientneighbourhood-based police, prosecution, and judiciary; a culture of conformity; and soft
authoritarianism infused in society.70 A study by Koji Yamaura in 1982 showed that income
inequality, tertiary industry, and fluctuating population increased the crime rate, while
expenditures on police equipment and operations leads to a decrease in crime. Howeverneither the rate of total crimes to solved crimes nor population concentration showed any
significant effects.71 In 2000, Park looked at 52 studies concerning the low crime rate inJapan and found that the most often mentioned factors were cultural, legal or administrative,
demographic or geographic, and socio-economic.72
The explanation of cultural influences for a low rate of crime flourished in the late1970s. Academicians identified a number of factors indicative of Japanese society and64

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 22.

65

For a description of misleading crime figures for child abuse in Japan, see: Goodman, Family and Social
Policy in Japan, 133-151.
66

Miyazawa, ―Learning lessons from the Japanese experience: A challenge for Japanese criminologists,‖
105; also see: Gottfredson and Hirschi, A General Theory of Crime, 169 (noting that differences in institutions,laws, and other factors mean that it is not possible to know whether differences in crime between societies are
due to causal factors or political or cultural factors).
67

Park, Trends in crime rates in postwar Japan: a structural perspective, 1.

68

Ibid., 62.

69

Lamont-Brown, ―Aspects of Modern Policing in Japan,‖ 133.

70

Preston, Understanding Modern Japan, 126.

71

Miyazawa, ―Learning lessons from the Japanese experience: A challenge for Japanese criminologists,‖

114.
72

Park, Trends in crime rates in postwar Japan: a structural perspective, 6.

16

national character, including group orientation, law abidingness, vertical society, resilience of
informal social control, social cohesion, 73 shame culture, 74 dependency, 75 and thewillingness to work hard.76 The theory of culture is also known as nihonjin-ron (theory of theJapanese),77 and is still used today to assert that traditional social values and informal social
control unique to Japan are the causes of the low and declining rate of crime. However, theconcepts in nihonjin-ron are conceptually ambiguous with no clear definitions as the theory
relies on anecdotes and similar works without drawing on empirical data.78
Hiroki Noma argued in 2009 that research and publications about nihonjin-ron only
looked at differences between Japan and other countries and not similarities, leading toJapanese and international scholars seeing Japan as unique.79 Even as recently as 2005, Aso
Taro, then Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications, said: ‗Japan, a country with one
culture, one civilization, one race, one language, is a country like no other.‘ 80 This myth of‗uniqueness‘ led to the belief that only the Japanese could understand Japanese society,81 and73

Ibid., 10 (explaining that social cohesion within society was seen as coming from the homogeneousness ofJapanese society, leading to a lower rate of crime resulting from either racial or social tensions due to a clash of
cultures. This lack of heterogeneity was seen as an advantage in crime prevention in Japan.).
74

Ibid., 8 (noting that shame is often seen as the dominant emotion in Japan which arises from constantintrospection of one‘s own thoughts and actions in relation to one‘s peers).
75

Takeo Doi explains that the Japanese word ―amae‖, roughly translated as ―dependence‖ but what Doi
defines as ―passive love‖, is central to Japanese behaviour. He claims that there is no equivalent term in English
and concludes that ―if, then, there is nothing corresponding to it in the languages of the West, one must conclude
that there is an obvious difference between the Westerner and the Japanese in their views of the world and theirapprehension of reality.‖ Doi, The anatomy of dependence, 21,67.
76

Park, Trends in crime rates in postwar Japan: a structural perspective, 7.

77

See: Marfording, ―Cultural Relativism and the Construction of Culture.‖

78

Park, Trends in crime rates in postwar Japan: a structural perspective, 46-49 (asserting that whilenihonjin-ron exaggerated differences between Japan and other countries, its detractors often overemphasise
diversity within Japan, thus the reality was actually somewhere in between); Burgess, ―The ‗Illusion‘ ofHomogeneous Japan and National Character: Discourse as a Tool to Transcend the ‗Myth‘ vs. ‗Reality‘ Binary‖(asserting that while nihonjin-ron exaggerated differences between Japan and other countries, its detractors often
overemphasised diversity within Japan, thus the reality was actually somewhere in between).
79

Noma, ―How unique is Japanese culture? A critical review of the discourse in intercultural communication
literature.‖
80

Burgess, ―The ‗Illusion‘ of Homogeneous Japan and National Character: Discourse as a Tool to Transcendthe ‗Myth‘ vs. ‗Reality‘ Binary.‖81

Doi also implied that non-Japanese are unable to understand the Japanese: ―if there was anything unique
about the Japanese psychology it must be closely related with the uniqueness of the Japanese language . . . . The
typical psychology of a given nation can be learned only through familiarity with its native language. The
language comprises everything which is intrinsic to the soul of a nation.‖ Doi, The anatomy of dependence,
14-15.

17

resulted in discouraging foreigners from scientifically examining Japan‘s control of crime.82
Park concluded that the culturalist theory did not explain the significant changes incrime rates since the end of WWII. If culture was the determining factor, crime rates shouldhave been relatively constant over time.83 Furthermore, Sugimoto showed that the Japanesesense of ‗middleclassness‘ was neither unique nor distinctive. Sugimoto found that othercountries had a higher rate of ‗middleclassness‘ than Japan, including Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Singapore, and the USA.84 Park claimed that the Japanese were no
more group oriented, consensual, or harmonious than other cultures.85 He asserted that thecultural theory was a myth that was advanced by economic and political elites in Japan tofurther their own interests, and was both misleading and unhelpful in explaining crime rates
and trends in post Second World War Japan.86
A critical economic theory of crime was seen by Park as the most important factor in
explaining Japan‘s postwar crime rates and patterns.87 Thus, low crime rates resulted fromlow unemployment rates, a high general educational level, and relative economic equality,
combined with general economic affluence, and low military spending. 88 The social benefits
that arose from the rapid postwar growth greatly increased the standard of living for mostJapanese people, leading to legitimate employment and reducing the need to resort to crime tomake money.89 Further evidence for the impact of economic factors can be seen by the rise incrime rates from the 1970s, showing how Japan appeared to be following the earlier trends ofother advanced countries.90
The ‗deterrence and social control‘ theory explained that the effective functioning of
informal and formal social control in Japan was responsible for the low level of crime. The
informal social controls included the family, school, and structure of the business environment.
The formal controls included an effective, efficient and fair criminal justice system91 with
82

Park, Trends in crime rates in postwar Japan: a structural perspective, 50.

83

Ibid., 1-2, 47-48.

84

Sugimoto, An Introduction to Japanese Society, 37.

85

Park, Trends in crime rates in postwar Japan: a structural perspective, 46-47.

86

Ibid., 49.

87

Ibid., 54.

88

Ibid., 10-12.

89

Ibid., 52-53.

90

Ibid., 56.

91

Utsuro, ―Does crime pay in Japan?‖ (explaining that there was a strong probability of a criminal sanction18

strict control on guns and drugs. Moreover, formal controls required a professional andcompetent police that had good relations with the community; 92 legally unconstrained
criminal justice personnel; 93 and a well organized and structured criminal justiceadministration.94
The high formal and informal costs of committing crime in Japan were seen as
deterring a large proportion of crime, and therefore keeping the crime rates down.95 However,Park‘s analysis of the statistics indicated that, with the exception of theft, deterrence showed
little evidence for any overall effect on crime rates. The upward trend for theft related
offences since the 1970s was in contrast to the gradual downward trend for bodily injury, rape,robbery, and murder. Furthermore, a large percentage of cases in Japan did not go to court due
to police and prosecutor discretion, suggesting that the fear of punishment was not always adetermining factor for low crime rates in Japan.96
Park‘s analysis of crime statistics indicated that the level of material living standards
was the most relevant factor in explaining the level of crime in Japan, followed in order ofimportance by social wages, clearance rate, and conviction rate.97 Economic prosperity, in
combination with the high possibility of criminal sanction, was a good indicator of the crime
rate in postwar Japan. The increase in theft followed the trend to economic prosperity, and thecertainty of conviction for more serious offences combined with the overall increase in living
standards for normal Japanese people explained the downward trend in other more serious
offences. Cultural factors such as age structure, social bonding, and informal social control
were the least likely to explain the trends.98 There was no substantial evidence that cultural
factors had any effect on crime rates and should therefore be discounted as having any impact
and resulting social disadvantage due to the high clearance rate and loss of face, as most crimes became known,even if the offender was not sentenced).
92

Ibid.(discussing community policing based on the koban system which focuses on quick response to
emergencies, where police attend 110 calls within four minutes); However, see: Cao, ―Confidence in the police
between America and Japan Results from two waves of surveys,‖ 140,147 (analysing studies that showed theJapanese have lower level of confidence in their police than Americans).
93

Park, Trends in crime rates in postwar Japan: a structural perspective, 12-17.

94

see: Alarid and Wang, ―Japanese Management and Policing in the Context of Japanese Culture,‖ 602(showing how groupism has permeated through to management within the police in Japan to create a stable,
efficient, and hard working police service).
95

Park, Trends in crime rates in postwar Japan: a structural perspective, 58.

96

Ibid., 119-120.

97

Ibid., 161.

98

Ibid.

19

on crime trends in Japan, along with the idea that a low crime rate is due to somethinguniquely Japanese.99

Threat of terrorism
In 1994, the terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo released sarin gas killing seven people and injuring
500 more. In March 1995 the same group released sarin gas on the Tokyo undergroundnetwork killing twelve people, serious injuring fifty, temporary blinding 1,000, and overall
injuring 5,500.100 Abroad, Japanese nationals have been kidnapped and murdered by terroristgroups, and Japanese embassies occupied by terrorists. 101 Although Japan has not been
subject to attacks from militant Islamist groups, as in some other countries, Japanese
numbered among the victims of the 1993 attack on New York World Trade Centre, the 1997
attack in Luxor, Egypt, the 9/11 attacks, and others lost their lives in bombings in Indonesia
and Bali.102 Furthermore, there have been reports that terror attacks have been planned onJapan by Al Qaida.103 In 2007, Murakami et al. pointed to Tokyo as a prime target for an
attack due to the concentration of people and buildings,104 however being a viable target anda likely target are significantly different. Hideyuki Osawa and Go Koyama suggested in 2009
that, compared with other countries, Japan had not given sufficient attention to terrorism
legislation, and that current laws were piecemeal and weak, and in need of in order to provide
real protection for Japan.105

Impact upon CCTVPark found that Japan‘s low crime rate was due to a high level of material living standards,social wages, and efficiency of the judiciary, and not related to a ‗unique Japanese culture‘.
99

Ibid., 163.

100

Osawa and Koyama, Freedom and Security: Individual Countriy’s Theory and Practice, 12.

101

Ibid., 16-20.

102

Ibid., 28-29.

103

Ibid., 20-21; Ferguson, ―Al Qaeda‘s Threat to Japan: Tokyo's Wake Up Call To The War On Terrorism.‖;
National Police Agency, ―The Threat of International Terrorism against Japan,‖ 8.
104

Murakami Wood, Lyon, and Abe, ―Surveillance in Urban Japan,‖ 552.

105

Osawa and Koyama, Freedom and Security: Individual Countriy’s Theory and Practice, 4-22 (noting thatafter individual terrorist attacks, Japan introduced specific legislation to deal with, for example hijacking,making chemical weapons, and subversive activities. The ―Subversive Activities Prevention Law‖ restricts
activities such as demonstrations, publishing material, meetings).

20

Crime statistics showed that media focus on short term fluctuations and individual heinous
crimes was misleading, and the common conception in Japan that crime was getting worse
was incorrect. The perception that Japan was no longer safe, that crime was rising, andterrorists were knocking at the door led to an increase in crime prevention volunteer groups
and CCTV. However, these perceptions did not hold up. Japan remained a safe country inwhich to live, with a falling crime rate, and it was highly unlikely to be attacked by terrorists.
There were concerns that an increased use of modernised surveillance such as CCTV could
undermine and destabilise the relative peace and order present in Japan.106 Given the low andfalling crime rates, relative low risk of a terrorist attack and the potentially destabilising effecton Japanese society, there is little justification for increased surveillance and CCTV in Japan.
However, Park‘s finding that a high possibility of criminal sanction reduced crime indicates
that, if CCTV can be shown to be effective in investigations and attaining convictions that
otherwise would not have been possible without CCTV, cameras may be justified for use as acrime prevention tool in certain circumstances.
The UK had a significantly higher crime rate than Japan, although crime had beenfalling since 1995. Terrorism had beset the UK since the 1970s and there is a high chance offurther attacks from both IRA dissidents and Al Qaeda inspired groups. The risk of terrorism
to the UK is unlikely to disappear due to the deep-seated causes, as explained by Shughart,
continuing overseas operations by UK‘s armed forces, and the high level of protection for
civil liberties within the UK. Field and Hale found economic factors and unemployment,
rather than police-led ‗crime prevention‘ methods, to have had a significant impact on crime
rates. This indicates that increased surveillance will also be unable to prevent most crime, andother measures are necessary. Two areas that may be an exception to this are crime in car
parks107 and terrorism. Likely rises in unemployment in the UK in the coming years may leadto an increase in crime rates. This could also lead to calls for further measures to be
introduced, and greater use of CCTV. While increased CCTV use might be justified for crimes
in car parks and tackling terrorism, it is unlikely to justify an increase as a general crime
prevention tool.

106

David Leheny and Sida Liu, ―The Politics of Crime, Punishment, and Social Order in East Asia,‖ 249.

107

Welsh and Farrington, Making public places safer, 112.

21

2.2 CCTV
Definition
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) is a system of cameras, with or without a recording device
that sends an image to a limited set of monitors and is not publically broadcast. In Japan theterm ‗CCTV‘ is not used, instead it is split into two separate categories: 108 Bouhan Camera(crime prevention cameras), where images are recorded but not monitored in real time; andKanshi Camera (surveillance cameras) where images are recorded and monitored in real timeby a human operator.109 Japanese systems generally claim to be Bouhan Camera systems.

England
The rise in the ubiquitous use of CCTV in England was neither inevitable nor sudden. Initially,
the police were not involved in either Home Office policy or local implementation.110 The
police were reluctant to promote or encourage the use of such techniques for fear of bothbeing seen as ‗Big Brother‘, and potential legal constraints for its use in courts. Local councils
on the other hand were quick to see the supposed benefits of CCTV, both for crime control
and other local issues.111 In 2002, Mike McCahill cited the slogan for Glasgow‘s city-centre
CCTV system as being indicative of the times: ‗CCTV doesn‘t just make sense – it makes
business sense.‘112 Benjamin Goold noted the impact of a claim made by Margret Thatcher
during the 1979 election that Britain was in a state of disorder with rampant crime, and theConservatives were the ‗party for law and order‘. The politicization of crime led to successive
governments increasing the rhetoric about how crime should be tackled and order brought tosociety. Political parties had to be seen to be taking a hard line, and CCTV was a visible
108―Nagoya Crime Prevention Camera Centre Blog: The difference between ‗crime prevention cameras‘ and‗surveillance cameras‘ (名古屋防犯カメラセンターのブログ: 防犯カメラと監視カメラの違い).‖ (Bouhan
cameras (crime prevention cameras) are used to prevent crime and their images are recorded for play back at alater time. On the other hand, kanshi cameras (surveillance cameras) are normally monitored live and thecameras can be moved by operators when necessary. 防犯カメラは防犯のために使い録画の画像を再生して観るのは、緊急時のみです。監視カメラはというと、常にライブ映像を観れる状態にし、 尚且つ非常時に録画画像を観ることが出来るように設置いたします)109

Kanshi systems were often classified as Bouhan systems by the operators due to the purpose of thesystem: if a systems‘ purpose was only to prevent and deter crime, and not to follow suspicious people oractivities, then it was classified as a Bouhan system, even if an operator was constantly monitoring images fromthe cameras.
110

Goold, CCTV and Policing: Public Area Surveillance and Police Practices in Britain, 69.

111

Ibid., 83.

112

McCahill, The Surveillance Web, 13.

22

positive step.113
Norris, McCahill, and Wood described four separate stages towns go through withusing CCTV. These stages depend on socio-economic, legal, fiscal, and political factors:
1. ‗Private Diffusion‘: unsophisticated, unmonitored systems in the private sector;
2. ‗Institutional Diffusion in the Public Sector‘: systems in key public institutions; still
simple and not routinely monitored;
3. ‗Limited Diffusion in Public Space‘: small systems funded by the government withdedicated staff for monitoring, often increase rapidly in size and sophistication; and4. ‗Towards Ubiquity‘: extensive sophisticated systems providing comprehensive
coverage of large areas, integrated with other systems.114
The Metropolitan Police in London first requested to use a live TV feed in 1947 for aroyal wedding. However the private sector and other public institutions took the lead in using
CCTV. It was used for traffic light operations in 1950, crowd monitoring in 1960, on the
London Underground in 1961,115 and by 1963 had made headlines in the retail sector after
CCTV was used to catch shoplifters. By 1969 14 police services nationwide had CCTV, andin the early 1970s, on the Underground (Northern Line) in London, cameras were installed todeal with assaults on staff. The first large scale public space surveillance system was createdin Bournemouth in 1985 in response to the IRA‘s attempt to assassinate Margret Thatcher andher Cabinet the previous year. By 1991 ten cities had CCTV systems; however, it was not
until the early 1990s that the use of cameras began to grow exponentially.
In 1993 grainy black and white images of the abduction of a toddler Jamie Bulger
were picked up by CCTV cameras and replayed on TV for a number of weeks.116 Although
CCTV did not prevent the abduction and subsequent murder, the use of such cameras became
seen by the government and the general public as a panacea for all crime related activity, andthe Bulger incident is viewed as playing a major role in public acceptance of CCTV in the UK
in the 1990s.117 The ‗City Challenge Competition‘ was launched soon after this incident by
the Home Secretary with £5 million of funding, leading to 106 separate crime prevention
113

Goold, CCTV and Policing: Public Area Surveillance and Police Practices in Britain, 30.

114

Norris, McCahill, and Wood, ―Editorial. The growth of CCTV.‖

115

McCahill and Norris, Urbaneye: CCTV in London, 7.

116

See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/1999/dec/16/bulger2

117

Norris, McCahill, and Wood, ―Editorial. The growth of CCTV,‖ 111.

23

schemes employing CCTV.118 Further competitions in the mid to late 1990s led to over 580
new schemes119 bringing spending on CCTV to 75% of the total crime prevention budget
between 1996 and 1998.120 Norris et al. estimated funding on CCTV between 1994 and 2004at £4 to 5 billion.121 McCahill suggested that this competition allowed the government to‗govern at a distance‘, but at the same time keep ‗the centralised state machine more powerfulthan before.‘122
Norris et al. argued that political and fiscal aspects often had far more to do withCCTV growth than hard evidence of crime prevention. In addition, media reporting of CCTV
and surveillance had a large impact on public opinion. In 2002, Leman-Langlois stated thatthe ability of any technology was often exaggerated in the press due a 'lack of expertise', a'misunderstanding of the technology', and a 'complacent regard for the ready-made headline',
all of which created the 'myth of unbeatable crime-fighting technology'.123 Leman-Langlois
provided the city of Hull in Canada as an example where four cameras were installed in anarea suffering alcohol related crimes. The cameras were used by the police for dispatching
officers and identifying offenders. These cameras did not however have any impact on
reduction of crime. Crime was only reduced when the bars in the area were forced to closeearlier than before, indicating that CCTV cameras had little, if any deterrent effect.124
In 2010, in London, there were approximately one million cameras of which around
42,000 were directly controlled by the police, local council, or transport organisations.125
Transport for London (TFL) 126 stated that CCTV ‗remains an essential component ofprotecting the system from terrorism and providing essential intelligence to the police and118

McCahill, The Surveillance Web, 39-52.

119―Editorial. The growth of CCTV,‖ 112.

120

Welsh, ―Surveillance for Crime Prevention in Public Space,‖ 499,500.

121

Norris, McCahill, and Wood, ―Editorial. The growth of CCTV,‖ 112.

122

McCahill, ―Beyond Foucault: Towards a contemporary theory of surveillance,‖ 225.

123

Leman-Langlois, ―The Myopic Panopticon: The social consequences of policing through the lens,‖
Perpetual experimentation.
124

Ibid.

125

Transport for London had at least one dome camera on each of its 8,500 buses, 13,000 cameras on theunderground, 12,000 cameras on the train system and 1,300 cameras on roads and tunnels. Local councils ran
approximately 7,400 cameras, with the borough with most cameras running 1,113 cameras.
126

TFL is a local governmental body responsible for transport in London. It is split into three main bodies:
underground, over-ground rail, and Surface transport. See: http://www.tfl.gov.uk/corporate/about-tfl/3273.aspx
for information on TFL‘s safety and security measures.

24

security services.‘127 Despite this, the Home Office and The Association of Chief Police
Officer128 acknowledged that there had been little research undertaken to determine theimpact of CCTV on the investigation of crime so anecdotal evidence had to be relied on.129
The Home Secretary from 1993 to 1997, Michael Howard, admitted that it was not theeffectiveness of CCTV that was the most important factor, but that the public wanted it, andthat it made them feel safer. 130 The House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 131
suggested that there should be more research to analyse the effectiveness of CCTV before
additional funds were allocated.132
In 2002, McCahill and Norris estimated that the number of CCTV cameras in the UK
was at least 4,285,000, of which 75% were illegal. 133 These estimates were based on
extrapolating figures from one London borough, and whilst the number of cameras may havebeen over-estimated, in the proceeding eight years CCTV continued to proliferate in the
United Kingdom. The ICO 2010 report listed new concerns with CCTV, including its use inschools to monitor teachers and check on employees.134 Freedom of Information requests
showed that council run CCTV cameras increased from 21,000 in 1999 to 59,753 in 2009.135
The organisation Big Brother Watch claimed that while there was a place for CCTV, little
tangible proof existed of its use in tackling crime.136

Japan
Surveillance cameras can now be seen in a variety of public institutions such as train stations,
roadways, private but publically accessible locations such as convenience stores, and
127

House of Lords Constitution Committee, ―Surveillance: Citizens and the State,‖ 77.

128

See: http://www.acpo.police.uk ACPO ‗leads and coordinates the direction and development of the police
service in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.‘
129

House of Lords Constitution Committee, ―Surveillance: Citizens and the State,‖ 80.

130

Goold, CCTV and Policing: Public Area Surveillance and Police Practices in Britain, 35.

131

See: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmhaff.htm

132

House of Lords Constitution Committee, ―Surveillance: Citizens and the State,‖ 81.

133

McCahill and Norris, Urbaneye: CCTV in London, 20.

134

Information Commissioner‘s Office, Information Commissioner’s report to Parliament on the state ofsurveillance, 28, 50.
135

Big Brother Watch, Big Brother Is Watching: The first comprehensive analysis of the number of CCTV
cameras controlled by local authorities in Britain in 2009.
136

Ibid., 3.

25

restaurants, and residential complexes. Fear of terrorism had further accelerated the pace andrange of CCTV implementation.137 Whenever a crime occurred in Japan, attention always
turned to CCTV.138
Two murder cases that occurred in 2003 are instructive in describing the discrepancy
between the perception of CCTV and the reality. On 20 June 2003 in Yokohama a nine year
old boy was thrown from a 15 floor apartment block and a 68 year old woman was
assaulted.139 One day after police published images of a suspect from the apartment block‘s
cameras the suspect handed himself in and confessed to the crimes.140 In July 2003 in
Nagasaki, a four year old girl was kidnapped and murdered by a twelve year old boy who
took her to the top of a car park and threw her off resulting in her death.141 40 minutes after
the girl went missing, a CCTV camera 150 metres from the scene of the murder, captured animage of the boy leading the young girl away. 142 In these cases, CCTV assisted inapprehending the offender, but did not prevent the crime. The CCTV cameras were called
Bouhan Camera (crime prevention cameras), but they failed in their stated purpose –preventing crime. However, because such cameras proved useful in investigation, they wereseen as a success by the government and the general public.
Although CCTV has been used by the police and private businesses for many years inJapan, the main changes have happened in the past decade. In 1994, the NPA established the
Local Safety Bureau, and in 2004 a ‗local safety action plan‘ was implemented where eachtown would have a dedicated department for ensuring safety and run in conjunction with thepolice.143 Since 2001, the use of CCTV in underground shopping centres increased, andDavid Lyon and Yasuhiko Tajima claimed there was evidence to suggest that this was due tofears over the 9-11 bombings.144
In recent years ATMs have become common place in convenience stores, leading to anincreasing need for security, of which CCTV is now an integral measure. In Nagoya, on 1
October 2001, CCTV was installed in a Circle-K convenience store by the Aichi Prefectural
137

Ishimura, ―Legal Regulation of Surveillance Camera,‖ 223.

138

Otani, What are Surveillance Cameras Looking at?, 108.

139

―Man says he threw boy from 15th floor.‖ Japan Times online, 2 April 2006.

140

Otani, What are Surveillance Cameras Looking at?, 108-109.

141―Security cameras aid in crime fight, but at a cost.‖ Japan Times online, 15 July 2003.

142

Otani, What are Surveillance Cameras Looking at?, 109-110.

143

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 20.

144

Lyon, Tajima, and Shimizu, Surveillance After 9/11, 249.

26

Police.145 The cameras were not constantly monitored, but only viewed after an incident, or
when the store staff pressed a panic button to alert the police, who then could monitor thecameras by remote.146 In 2003, Kotani stated that the police approved of the use of CCTV atconvenience stores because the cameras recorded 24 hours a day and were installed inthousands of stores, creating a vast surveillance web.147 The head office of the 7/11 franchisesaid that their cameras were installed under the guidance and request of the police, and thatthey handed over the recorded images when requested for criminal investigations.148
Kasuo Handa criticised the ease with which police could obtain recordings.149 He
noted that the police had for a long time pushed the image of convenience stores as a type of
secondary koban (or police box). The installation of CCTV in convenience stores was started
by Aichi with their ‗Convenience Store Local Safety Information System.‘ 150 By 2003, Aichi
had 2,500 convenience stores, all of which were seen as ‗Safety Stations‘ and had installed
cameras on the behest of the Police. 151 As of November 2010, the 7/11 chain had 574 storesin Aichi and 12,942 stores nationally.152
The first place that concentrated the use of CCTV in one area was Kamagasaki, Osaka.
The cameras were monitored 24 hours a day and functioned as both surveillance and crime
prevention cameras. 153 The police watched and recorded, and would intervene when it
appeared a serious crime would occur, or a situation was getting aggressive. The area had anillegal gambling problem, but the police tended not to intervene in low-level crime, andinstead only became involved with violent or serious offences. Otani stated that this impliedthat the cameras were not there to assist in apprehending criminals, but rather as a tool for
maintaining public peace. He stated this indicated that it was policy to value public peace andorder over crime prevention and reduction.154

145

Kotani, ―Rapid Increase in use of Surveillance Cameras by the Police,‖ 200.

146

Ibid., 201.

147

Ibid.

148

Handa, ―The Fear of Surveillance Cameras,‖ 211-212.

149

Ibid., 211.

150

Konbiniensu sutoa chiiki anzen jouhou shisutemu (コンビニエンスストア地域安全情報システム)

151

Handa, ―The Fear of Surveillance Cameras,‖ 212.

152

Seven-Eleven Japan, http://www.sej.co.jp/company/en/n_stores.html

153

Otani, What are Surveillance Cameras Looking at?, 113.

154

Ibid., 114.

27

Lyon et al. criticised the rapid increase in Police use of CCTV in recent years andlooked at its use in Kabukicho where the rate of crime was 185 times Tokyo‘s average.155 In
2001, the Japanese government spent 320,000,000 yen on the installation of CCTV camerasin Kabukicho to prevent and measure crime. The Tokyo Metropolitan Police installed 50
cameras in places with a high probability of crime.156 Kotani said that the scheme wasbrought in without a proper pilot scheme being run. He further asserted that the cameras
installed in Kabukicho did not meet the standards of a Tokyo High Court ruling and were
therefore illegal.157 The Tokyo High Court ruling158 concluded that CCTV cameras must
only be installed when:
1. The location is recognised as having a high crime rate;
2. There is evidence the cameras will work, or they are being used in an emergency;
and
3. The recording of images is according to society‘s expectations and desires.159
On 26 March 2002, the Super Crime Prevention CCTV Scheme160 went live and waspromoted nationally by the police. 161 A 2003 police report about the system justified
implementation due to a significant increase in crime from 1998 to 2002 (robbery, rape,snatch theft, forcible indecency).162 Two years previously a gruesome crime had occurred
where witnesses were unable to provide good evidence, leading to calls for CCTV to be
implemented in the vicinity. Kotani claimed that the reasoning behind the scheme set a
dangerous precedent, as the police would be able to use this reason in almost all locations.163
Public money was set aside by the scheme for a total of ten locations.164 The specific155

Lyon, Tajima, and Shimizu, Surveillance After 9/11, 249-250.

156

Kotani, ―Rapid Increase in use of Surveillance Cameras by the Police,‖ 191-195.

157

Ibid., 197.

158

Judgement of Tokyo High Court, 1 April 1988. 東京高栽判決昭和 63 年 4 月 1 日

159

Kotani, ―Rapid Increase in use of Surveillance Cameras by the Police,‖ 196.

160

Suupaa bouhantou (スーパー防犯灯)
http://www.keishicho.metro.tokyo.jp/seian/spbouhan/spbouhan.htm
161

Shimizu, ―Development and Problems of the ‗Life Security Regulations‘,‖ 236.

162

Tokyo Public Safety Committee (東京都公安委員会) and Japan Police Chiefs, ―Maintenance and Use of
Emergency Reporting System (Super Crime Prevention) 2003.‖
163

Kotani, ―Rapid Increase in use of Surveillance Cameras by the Police,‖ 198 see also:<http://www.alpha-net.ne.jp/users2/knight9/setagaya.htm>.
164

Tokyo Public Safety Committee (東京都公安委員会) and Japan Police Chiefs, ―Maintenance and Use of28

locations were to be chosen according to crime figures and other relevant factors; but Kotani
said this was not always done.165 The purpose of the cameras was clearly stated from thestart: to prevent thefts, robberies, sexual offences, and other serious crime.166 There were 17
cameras placed approximately 80 metres apart over 1.5 km. Each camera had a button on thepost that when pressed would alert the police and set off an alarm. The police could view
images from cameras in the vicinity and potentially catch or acquire an image of a suspect.167
At the end of May 2002, the police began using facial recognition at Narita and Kansai
airports. 168 In May 2006, CCTV with facial recognition capability was installed in
Kasumigaseki underground station.169 The National Transport Ministry promoted the system.
Police participated in the consultation stage as observers. The system had been previously
installed in the state of Florida, USA in 2001; however, by 2003 the police found that thecameras had no positive impact on crime prevention. Florida police announced that it did notlead to any cases of identifying criminals or any arrests.170 Meanwhile, the Kasumigaseki
system was installed at the entrance gates in the tube station. Tajima said that Kasumigaseki
was a location where privacy concerns were greater than anywhere else in Tokyo as thestation was used by police, judges, lawyers, accused persons, others visiting these institutions,and people attending public meetings. Many of these people had a heightened sense ofconcern for privacy and would be uneasy about the government recorded their presence andstoring their images.171
Shigehiko Itou said that that the facial recognition system was a violation of the rightto one‘s own image under Article 13, and that Japan had become a surveillance society as
described by George Orwell, even if under the auspices of a friendly, beautiful, and freedemocratic society.172 The system was to be introduced and tested during the holidays when
the only people travelling through the station would be part-time workers, therefore, theEmergency Reporting System (Super Crime Prevention) 2003‖ Hokkaido, Miyagi, Yamagata, Tokyo, Niigata,
Fukuyama, Aichi, Osaka, Kagawa, and Okinawa.
165

Kotani, ―Rapid Increase in use of Surveillance Cameras by the Police,‖ 200.

166

Ibid., 198.

167

Ibid., 200.

168

Ibid., 201-204.

169

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 20.

170

Opposition to Surveillance Society Association, ―Face Recognition System: An Introduction,‖ 73-74.

171

Ibid., 74.

172

Ito, ―Proposal to the Transport Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport,‖ 75,80.

29

transport ministry claimed, it would not impact upon ‗normal people‘s‘ privacy.173
In November 2005, the ‗Against surveillance society association‘,174 under Tajima,carried out a survey about the facial recognition system at the Japanese Diet. They surveyed
50 members and found that 35 opposed it, six approved, and nine were undecided. 175
However, the survey was not representative of the entire Diet, as the Diet consists of 480
members of the House of Representatives, and 242 members of the House of Councillors.
Furthermore, the survey was carried out when the Diet was in recess. The weaknesses of thesurvey mean that the results should be treated with caution.
The N-System was installed in 1986 by the NPA at important roads around Japan.
Within Tokyo, the system identified suspect cars and took images of drivers and passengers.
The N-System could also collect information for public security and be used by the police tofollow cars and deal with traffic and major incidents. It was successfully used to tracesuspects of the Sarin gas attack in 1995.176
A number of problems have been noted with the N-System. Firstly, there were noexact details about the number or locations of the cameras. By 2006, there were supposed to
be 700 locations, however this may have been a significant underestimation and the number
may have expanded into the thousands.177 Secondly, the cameras not only took pictures ofnumber plates, but also of the faces of the driver and occupants. 178 The information whencombined could lead to privacy invasion, especially when linked up with the driving licencedatabase.179 Thirdly, because the N-System was commonly known to have led to the arrest of
the leader of the Sarin gas attack in 1995, the system had become significantly lesseffective. 180 Finally, Otani said that because each camera location cost approximately
100,000,000 yen, citizens should have a right to know camera locations, how they are used,
and what happens with the images. Otani acknowledged that making this public would enablecriminals to evade detection; however he argued that as tax payer‘s money was used,transparency was important, and it would be better for a few criminals to avoid detection than173

Ibid., 79.

174

Kanshi shakai wo kyohi suru kai (監視社会を拒否する会)

175

Ito, ―Proposal to the Transport Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport,‖ 78.

176

Lyon, Tajima, and Shimizu, Surveillance After 9/11, 249.

177

Otani, What are Surveillance Cameras Looking at?, 120.

178

Sakurai, ―Current N-System Prosecutions,‖ 216.

179

Otani, What are Surveillance Cameras Looking at?, 120.

180

Ibid.

30

for all road users to have their images collected and stored.181

Is CCTV effective?
CCTV was usually seen by advocates as serving the community and providing safety. 182 In
reality, the effect on crime prevention had not been a decisive factor in their continued use or
implementation. Both Japan and England had reached the point where public acceptance of
CCTV, instead of empirical research, was used to justify further implementation. However it
was the promotion of CCTV through political and media policies that led to public acceptance,
not effectiveness in preventing crime. Research showed that cameras were not effective atachieving their accepted purpose.183 Lyon et al. wondered if CCTV was used because thegovernment desired an automatic way to watch over citizens. 184 Kouji Ishimura
acknowledged that surveillance cameras did have a deterrent and detective effect, but the lackof clear rules and regulations resulted in people gradually losing their freedom and dignity.185
Ray Surette saw the evolution of CCTV from human based monitoring to computer
software enhanced monitoring leading to further concerns. Surette asserted that systems that
rely on human monitoring are limited by four problems: data swamping, profiling, boredom,and voyeurism. 186 These could be overcome by replacing the human element with anautomated system. Although this may at first appear preferable, as computers are morevigilant and observant, surveillance would become be more extensive and intensive.187 The
increase in effectiveness would lead to cameras being of greater use in crime prevention anddetection.188 Due to the heightened intrusive nature, Surette recommended that the newgeneration of cameras should be restricted to tackling crime, and when CCTV is used forother purposes the minimum possible technology that achieves the cameras‘ purpose shouldbe employed.189
181

Ibid., 122-123.

182

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 23.

183

Goold, CCTV and Policing: Public Area Surveillance and Police Practices in Britain, 37.

184

Lyon, Tajima, and Shimizu, Surveillance After 9/11, 248.

185

Ishimura, ―Legal Regulation of Surveillance Camera,‖ 224.

186

Surette, ―The thinking eye,‖ 160.

187

Ibid., 164.

188

Ibid.

189

Ibid., 165.

31

Both the English and the Japanese police considered CCTV to be more useful forinvestigation and police deployment than crime prevention. However, policing in England andJapan was very different, and the powers police have to deal with suspects also differ. Patrol
officers in Japan did not generally have the widespread problems associated with drug abuseas in many inner city areas of England. Japanese police powers of search, detention, and arrest
were significantly less than British police officers. Furthermore, criminal acts in Japan were
not often as overt as in England. Police in England dealt with a lot of low level crime andincidents through proactive patrols involving stop and search tactics. Public space CCTV wasmore effective in recording crimes occurring openly in public areas. It was also more useful topolice officers on the street when they were dealing with dangerous situations, both in terms
of knowing what was happening when on route by communicating directly with CCTV
control room staff, and in watching over them when they were dealing. CCTV in Japan did
not provide this functionality due to the difference in types of crime, policing methods, andrestrictions on monitoring of CCTV. In Japan CCTV has been used as a management tool
more than a crime prevention tool as can be seen by its use in Kamagasaki and the N-System.
One area that CCTV could be used effectively in Japan is on the train network due to the highincidence of sexual assault on crowded trains.190 CCTV would greatly increase the risk ofdetection and apprehension to the offender and could reduce the rate of this type of offence.
Michael Greenburger suggested in 2006 that CCTV should be installed throughout the US
transport system as a deterrence to terrorists,191 however this may not be appropriate forJapan due to the difference in terrorist threat level between Japan and the US.
London had more CCTV cameras than any other city in the world; however, it was notable to prevent the bombings in London on 7 July 2005.192 The ICO 2010 report clearlystated that CCTV in the UK was relatively ineffective in preventing or detecting crime, or
maintaining public order.193 Despite the lack of evidence as to CCTV‘s effectiveness inpreventing crime, it was acknowledged by the ICO as being useful in investigating crimes andcarrying out surveillance for intelligence purposes.

190

Kearl, Stop Street Harassment, 81-82 (noting that in 1994, 75% of women in their 20s and 30s in Osaka
had been sexually assaulted on public transportation. After women-only cars on trains were introduced in 2000, a
2004 survey in Tokyo showed that the percentage dropped to 64% by 2004; however, the numbers haveapparently been increasing since 2006.).
191

Greenberger, ―The Need for Closed Circuit Television in Mass Transit Systems.‖

192

Otani, What are Surveillance Cameras Looking at?, 111.

193

Information Commissioner‘s Office, Information Commissioner’s report to Parliament on the state ofsurveillance, 21.

32

2.3 Privacy
Privacy, like an elephant, is more readily recognized than described. (JBYoung, 1978)
A right without description is a right without protection. (Gary Bostwick
1976)
Definition
Only since the late 19th century have scholars attempted to define privacy as a distinct concept
separate from social custom; until then, ‗people simply knew what it was‘.194 In 1874 Sir
James Fitzjames Stephen said that 'to define the province of privacy distinctly is impossible,
but it can be described in general terms‘.195 Privacy specialist Richard Hixson noted thatprivacy was hard to define because it was both a subjective and personal concept.196 Hixson
further stated that attempting to make a comprehensive definition caused the concept to growand become ‗unwieldy‘197, and clear definitions were required otherwise personal privacy was
unlikely to enjoy sufficient legal protection.198
The Lords Select Committee noted in 2009 that ‗there is no accepted legal definitionof privacy . . . and both the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and UK courts havedeclined to offer a definition, preferring to judge the right on a case by case basis.‘ 199 Most
observers tend to reject the idea of a comprehensive definition of privacy and instead attempt
to split it into different areas. In 2002, Daniel Solove said that privacy law had often beenineffective due to the difficulty in defining privacy, and he recognised that attempts toconceptualize privacy were fraught with difficulties.200 Solove declined to give a definition ofprivacy, and instead argued for a pragmatic approach, starting with a bottom-up understandingof privacy grounded in real world situations as opposed to starting from an abstract top-down
approach.201 In 2006, Solove said that ‗privacy cannot be discussed independently from

194

Hixson, Privacy in a Public Society, 6.

195

Pratt, Privacy in Britain, 53.

196

Mills, Privacy, 20.

197

Hixson, Privacy in a Public Society, 68.

198

Ibid., 46.

199

House of Lords Constitution Committee, ―Surveillance: Citizens and the State,‖ 123.

200

Solove, ―Conceptualizing Privacy,‖ 1090.

201

Ibid., 1126-1129.

33

society‘ and that it was an ‗umbrella term‘ that covered a wide variety of concepts.202
Although neither Japanese nor English law specifically defined privacy, at an abstractlevel it can be described as ‗the extent to which one has control over one‘s own personal
information.‘ In England, ‗personal data‘ was defined by the Data Protection Act (DPA) as
data that relates to a living individual who could be identified from that data, or from that dataand other information that the data controller was likely to come into possession of during
their work.203 According to Bainbridge, data was not personal just because someone‘s namewas associated with it, rather, the data had to be personal and ‗biographic in a significant
sense‘ and the data had to have the subject as focus of the information rather than subject
being merely incidental. 204 From court rulings, personal data included photographs andmoving images.205 The Japanese legal system described personal information as informationthat would enable the identification of a specific individual by name, date of birth, or otherdescription contained in such information.206

EnglandAffairs that are commonly considered private were often in the past considered public.207
Professor Ferdinand David Schoeman argued that an expectation of privacy only arose when
there was a ‗high degree of social and economic specialization‘, as this allowed people to live
independently from groups that they had to rely on in the past.208 In the past, society did not
see privacy as an important concept.209 The demands of society, legislation, and judicial
202

Solove, ―A Taxonomy of Privacy,‖ 485.

203

In a 2003 European Court of Justice ruling, information about a person‘s phone number, occupation,
hobbies, and medical conditions was included in ‗personal data‘.
204

In Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746, the court found that ‘personal data is―information that affects [an individual‘s] privacy, whether in his personal or family life, business or
professional capacity‖.‘ Bailey and Taylor, Bailey, Harris & Jones, 609-610; Bainbridge, Data Protection Law,
47-48.
205

Bainbridge, Data Protection Law, 41-42.

206

Article 2(1), Act on the Protection of Personal Information, Act No. 57 of May 30 2003

207

Schoeman, Privacy and Social Freedom, chap. 7: The ascent of privacy (giving the example of Europe
during the early part of the 18th century, where when a single mother was giving birth, the midwife was boundby duty {the Midwife‘s Oath of 1726} to demand the name of the father before any help would be given;married couples would be stripped naked by attendants on their wedding night and placed on a bed in front of
witnesses to ensure the marriage was consummated).
208

Ibid.

209

Ibid., 127.

34

decisions had only recently evolved a distinct concept of privacy. Until modern times, privacy
was being protected incidentally through the rights of property, life, and liberty without
separate, specific legislation.
The argument for a distinct right to privacy was first taken seriously after Warren and
Brandeis wrote ‗The Right to Privacy‘ in 1890 in reaction to increasing press intrusion.
Warren and Brandies claimed that everyone should own the ‗facts relating to his private
lives‘210 and that ‗the individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be given
to the public.‘211 They noted the pernicious impact of technology, seeing it as a threat topeople‘s private lives.212 Around the same time, Herbert S. Hadley also argued for a right toprivacy, but said that when people voluntarily enter a public place, they should have no
expectation of such a right.213 Hadley thought that the right to privacy should be createdthrough parliament enacted legislation, while Warren and Brandeis believed that the right toprivacy should evolve through the courts to allow it to adapt to the times.214
In 1979, Walter Pratt argued that the cases Warren and Brandeis quoted as evidence ofa right to privacy were in fact misinterpreted and actually proved that a distinct right toprivacy did not exist at the time of the Warren and Brandeis article, and any privacy
protection was only ancillary to decisions based on clear breaches of trust and property
rights.215 Pratt countered that Warren and Brandeis‘ argument was compelling but that they
were wrong to claim that a right to privacy could be deduced from court decisions, as allreferences to a right to privacy up to that time were obiter and not ratio.216 The lack of a rightto privacy could also be evinced from the decisions of other judges around that time, forexample in 1865 George Wilshere said ‗it is to be remembered that privacy is not a right.

210

McWhirter and Bible, Privacy as a Constitutional Right, 76.

211

Warren and D. Brandeis, ―The Right To Privacy by Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis.‖212

Ibid.―Numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that ‗what is whispered in thecloset shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.‘‖
213

Hadley explained that people cannot expect to have a right to privacy when in public: ―When an
individual goes among people, when he walks along the streets in the sight of all who care to look upon him hehas waived his right to the privacy of his personality.‖ McWhirter and Bible, Privacy as a Constitutional Right,
77 .
214

Ibid.

215

Pratt said that: ―The decisive failure of the article is its inability to establish the existence of precedentthat would protect inviolate personality, or the right to be let alone, or the right to privacy.‖ Pratt, Privacy in
Britain, 31-34.
216

Ibid., 34,36; For a description of ―ratio and obiter‖ and how to find the ratio, see: Cownie, English legal
system in context, 92-99.

35

Intrusion on it is no wrong or cause of action.‘217 Warren and Brandeis‘s article should
therefore not be seen as evidence of the existence of a general right to privacy in the late 19th
century.
Arguments about privacy in England did not exist in a coherent form before the end of
the First World War. Conscription and rationing had shown people the positive and negativesides of being enumerated. The increasing use of the national census just prior to the start of
the Second World War led to stronger calls for a right to privacy.218 In 1944, ViscountTemplewood said that ‗the uniqueness of European civilization is that it is based ―upon the
sanctity of human personality and upon the development of the individual soul‖.‘219 In 1948,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 12) expanded upon this: ‗No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks.‘220 Article 17 of The International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights qualified this point specifying that the interference must not be ‗unlawful‘.221
There was a fundamental shift in attitudes222 in the second half of the 20th century
where concern about privacy invasion shifted from an intrusive press to an intrusive
government.223 Dystopian novels abounded,224 and comparisons of government action to
Orwellian visions became more common.225
The first comprehensive legislative proposal on privacy was Lord Mancroft‘s ‗Rightof Privacy Bill‘, in 1961.226 Although the bill received strong support among the House of217

Pratt, Privacy in Britain, 59.

218

Ibid., 84.

219

Ibid., 85.

220

Mathiesen, ―The viewer society: Michel Foucault‘s ‗Panopticon‘ revisited,‖ 86.

221

Seipp, ―English Judicial Recognition of a Right to Privacy,‖ 350.

222

Ibid., 345.

223

Pratt, Privacy in Britain, 143.

224

Such as ‗We‘ (1921), ‗A Brave New World’ (1931), ‗Kallocain‘ (1940), and ‗Nineteen Eighty-Four‘(1949).
225

Newspapers wrote about the use of computers to control traffic in London: ―Motorists are to be controlled
by Big Brother traffic computers.‖[Daily Sketch 19th November 1963]
226

Pratt, Privacy in Britain, 138 (noting that the bills stated purpose was: ―to give every individual such
further protection against invasion of his privacy as may be desirable for the maintenance of human dignity
while protecting the right of the public to be kept informed in all matters in which the public may be reasonably
concerned.‖).

36

Lords, the Lord Chancellor did not consider it suitable for legislation.227 In 1983, Seipp said
that attempting to introduce legislation was difficult because ‗statutory language proved much
more susceptible to attack on definitional grounds than did the imagined pronouncements offuture courts.‘228 Government minister Eric Fletcher said at the time that a ‗proposal to createa statutory right to privacy would raise wide and controversial issues, including the liberty ofthe press.‘229
In 1967 Alexander Lyon unsuccessfully introduced a right of privacy bill asserting that‗there ought to be in the law a right to be left alone if one wishes to be left alone.‘ Lyon
defined privacy as: ‗the right of any person to preserve the seclusion of himself, his family or
his property from any person.‘230 Lyon thought that the danger to personal privacy was notfrom the press but rather from technology.231 In the same year the British section of theInternational Commission of Jurists232 began a long term study of privacy. The following
years saw a proliferation of unsuccessful bills attempting to tackle different aspects ofprivacy.233 In one of these bills, Lord Windlesham asserted in 1969:
the individual has a right to know of and to limit the circulation of information about
himself. This, I suggest, is the most practical way of considering the relationshipbetween personal information and the right of the individual to privacy. It is in thissense an ingredient of the individual‘s right to privacy and one that should not be
infringed without the showing of an overriding social need and…protective
safeguards.234
The 1969 'Right of Privacy' bill by Brian Walden gave examples of what a right theright to privacy should include without giving a specific definition. 235 The Younger
227

Seipp, ―English Judicial Recognition of a Right to Privacy,‖ 346.

228

Ibid., 329.

229

Pratt, Privacy in Britain, 157.

230

Ibid., 161.

231

Alexander Lyon said that: 'It seems to me, that the real threat to liberty in our highly complicated,civilised, modern society, is the invasion of privacy by all who have the apparatus to do so without in any way
trespassing on the property of the person, which is about the only right that the English citizen has to defend.'
Pratt, Privacy in Britain, 168 .
232

http://www.icj.org

233

Seipp, ―English Judicial Recognition of a Right to Privacy,‖ 347.

234

Pratt, Privacy in Britain, 179.

235

Ibid., 180 (asserting that this included the right for a person, his family, home, communications,relationships, communications, and business affairs to be protected from intrusion).

37

Committee was set up soon after to investigate if there was a need for legislation to protect
people from intrusions from 'private persons, organisations, or companies'. The committee
was not formed to investigate invasion of privacy by the government, even though this wasthen seen as the biggest threat to privacy.236 The committee conceived of the right of privacy
as having two main aspects: substantive autonomy, and informational autonomy.237
The concept of substantial autonomy included freedom from intrusion upon oneself,one‘s home, family and relationships and concerned the ability to choose how to live one‘s
life. Informational autonomy was the right to control the flow of personal information about
oneself.238 If an individual was unable to control the flow of their own information then thiswas likely to influence their behaviour.239 Personal relationships and intimacy depended on
the ability to ensure that information about relationships was not widely disseminated without
consent or knowledge, and so informational autonomy was vital to substantive autonomy.
Informational autonomy is not unqualified, and actions of an official nature as part of a public
office do not hold the same level protection as private actions due to the requirement oftransparency that holding public office entails.240
Alexander Lyon, discussing the Younger Committee‘s recommendations, admitted thatthe concept of privacy was vague, but said that for the purpose of the law that ‗privacy is what
the law says it is.‘241 Writing in 1982, Seipp noted that it was surprising that neither the
courts nor parliament had taken up the task of creating the right for privacy in its own right.242
In Kay v Robertson (1991),243 Glidewell LJ stated (echoing George Wilshere in 1865) that ‗It
is well-known that in English law there is no right to privacy, and accordingly there is no rightof action for breach of a person‘s privacy.‘244

236

Ibid., 184.

237

Bailey and Taylor, Bailey, Harris & Jones, 523.

238

Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Fourth Edition, 805.

239

Ball and Webster state that ‘a transparent self is a non-self ' and that surveillance ―strips the self of its
independence and autonomy‖ Ball and Webster, The Intensification of Surveillance: Crime, Terrorism and
Warfare in the Information Age, 14.
240

Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Fourth Edition, 806.

241

Pratt, Privacy in Britain, 197.

242

Seipp, ―English Judicial Recognition of a Right to Privacy,‖ 325-326.

243

Kay v Robertson [1991] FSR 62, Court of Appeal

244

Bailey and Taylor, Bailey, Harris & Jones, 524.

38

There was no traditional general right to respect for privacy in UK law.245 Instead,other areas of law had incidentally provided privacy protection, such as trespass, breach ofconfidence, copyright, and defamation. Before the Human Rights Act (HRA) was introduced
in 1998, privacy interests that were not protected under other legislation had no protection.
The lack of specific legislation meant that protection was ‗piecemeal, inadequate andindirect‘.246 The HRA Article 8 was the first piece of legislation that specifically protected
UK citizens‘ privacy.247 Citizens then became able to directly hold the government to accountfor invasions of privacy and the government was required to hold private institutions to thesame standards as the public sector.248

Japan
The Meiji Constitution contained two articles that provided privacy protection: Article 25
protecting against entry and search of a person‘s house, and Article 26 protecting the secrecyof correspondence.249 Intellectuals in Japan first began talking about privacy in 1935 when
Sanji Suenobu wrote an article about how secret information was protected indirectly in the
UK and directly in the US.250 In 1954 Judge Kawahara defined privacy as ‗the right to limit
the reporting of one‘s personal affairs.‘251 He explained that the nature of this right was ‗theright to be let alone‘, consisting of the right to not be assaulted, detained, or maliciously
prosecuted.252 The number of court cases dealing with privacy issues increased gradually andduring the late 1950s, while Japan was going through a technical revolution academicians
began to question public freedoms and rights and the role of the constitution in protecting
privacy.
245

Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Fourth Edition, 807.

246

Bailey and Taylor, Bailey, Harris & Jones, 524.

247

However, the European Court seemed to feel that the UK already protected individuals‘ privacy
sufficiently: In Spencer (Earl) v UK the Court dismissed Spencer‘s claim that the UK had failed to protect his
privacy interests as he had not exhausted all domestic remedies. This indicates that the court felt the UK alreadyhad a privacy law and as a common law country, the courts should develop this right.
248

Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Fourth Edition, 808.

249

Adams, Murata, and Orito, ―The Japanese sense of information privacy,‖ 12-13.

250

Ehara, The right to Privacy: A comprehensive analysis, 47-49.

251

Kawahara, Freedom of Expression and Publication, 122 [shiji ni kansuru houdou wo seigen suru kenri
私事に関する報道を制限する権利]
252

Ehara, The right to Privacy: A comprehensive analysis, 47-48; Kawahara, Freedom of Expression andPublication, 122-126.

39

In 1959, the translation of Warren and Brandeis‘s article into Japanese increased theinterest in the debate on privacy.253 Journalism that intruded into people‘s private lives was acause of concern, prompting public discussions about how to protect privacy.254 The highprofile nature of the ‗After the Banquet‘255 incident in 1961 brought the discussion to greater
prominence for the public. Since the 1970s the mass media paid greater attention to thedebate,256 and in the 1970s the government unsuccessfully attempted to introduce a citizen
identification system sparking privacy protests.257
Takeru Ehara described the approaches of three professors towards privacy: Koji Sato,
Masanari Sakamoto, and Hitoshi Saeki. In 1970, Sato focused on the protection of civil rights
under the constitution and said that until then all previous approaches were wrong. Sato said
that for humans, protection of privacy was an essential and basic need with regards to love,emotion and trust but the concept of a ‗right to be let alone‘ was too wide. The right to privacy
should be limited to one‘s feelings and emotions, personal information, and personality.258 In
1972 Professor Sakamoto distinguished ‗privacy‘ from ‗the right to privacy‘ and said that thebenefit of privacy to individuals was threefold: firstly, the protection of accuracy,completeness, and contemporariness; secondly, freedom to learn and collect information
anonymously; and finally, acknowledgement of the value of information. These benefits werelimited to circumstances that were about the individual concerned, and not to information thatconcerns others.259 In 1974 Saeki looked at privacy from the perspective of criminal law andwrote about libel and privacy. Saiki saw a problem with using libel law to protect people‘s
privacy as libel law was usually used for only a small section of society and was notapplicable to the majority of people. A right to privacy should not be conditional on one‘splace in society but on individuals regardless of status. A right to privacy should avoid
looking to only protect society as a group of individuals and look at the protection of theindividuals that make up the society.260

253

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 36; However, Kawahara translated parts of Warren and
Brandeis‘ paper in 1935. See: Kawahara, Freedom of Expression and Publication, 123-124.
254
255

Ehara, The right to Privacy: A comprehensive analysis, 47-49.
宴のあと Utage no ato(See Section 3.2 Court Interpretations for a description of the case.)

256

Ehara, The right to Privacy: A comprehensive analysis, 50-53.

257

Lawson, ―Japan‘s New Privacy Act in Context,‖ 94.

258

Ehara, The right to Privacy: A comprehensive analysis, 50-51.

259

Ibid., 51-52.

260

Ibid., 52.

40

In 2003, Takehiro Ohya also commented on the inappropriateness of libel laws forprotecting privacy, stating that fines or public apologies, which may be suitable for libel cases,
would only increase the privacy intrusion on the plaintiff.261 He further said that privacy
cannot be restored once it has been taken.
Dean Barnlund claimed, in 1989, that a typical Japanese ‗public self‘ was muchsmaller than an American‘s ‗public self‘, and therefore when in public, the Japanese tended
not to expose personal information, express personal opinions, or do private actions. 262
Therefore, for Japanese, being watched in public did not raise as many concerns as perhaps inAmerica.263 Drawing a line between private and public was difficult, as what was private forone person may have been public to another.264 Doi suggested that while there is a clear
distinction between ‗inner‘ and ‗outer‘ for Japanese people regarding social relationships,
there is no clear line between what is private and public.265 In 2006, Kiyoshi Abe stressedthat this confusion was compounded by the difference in the opinions about the extent towhich intrusions into public and private life could be justified.
People often have a conflicting, paradoxical demand to live happily and freely while
being watched-over in terms of safety.266 Actions and choices in public spaces are to a large
extent dependent on the physical environment, although the influence of external factors isoften subtle. Changes in public spaces, both physical structure and usage, are generally
planned and designed.267 Changes in the physical appearance of a public place transformed
the way space is used and the behaviour and responses of people using the space. In adroitly
designed public spaces, people become less aware of their loss of freedom.268
As regulations and administrative plans increase, the leeway for people to act freely
and retain their privacy decreases.269 People‘s actions are on the one hand being controlled

261

Ohya, ―Privacy and Intention.‖

262

Barnlund, Public and Private Self in Japan and the United States, chap. 2: Public and Private Self.

263

A national opinion poll carried out in June 2007 found that 2.4% of respondents (out of 3000) had
experienced an invasion of privacy. http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h19/h19-jinken/index.html
264

Nakamasa, Can “Freedom” be Defined?, 159.

265

Doi, The anatomy of dependence, 40-44.

266Abe, The Managed Space Paradox: Surveillance and Freedom, 6.

267

Ibid., 7.

268

Ibid.

269

Nakamasa, Can “Freedom” be Defined?, 159.

41

and managed, but at the same time they appear to be able to act freely. 270 In such situations
the question arises whether people really have freedom or not. If public spaces are designed toreduce the choices of the individual and to impose certain behaviour, or prevent certain
actions, then the reduction of personal choice due to design may be as much of an intrusion
into personal freedom as directly legislating against actions.271 As public places become moresurveilled and managed, ones expectation of privacy while in public is greatly reduced.272
In 2009, Professor Nishihara posited that it was very hard to define, or discern
privacy‘s core.273 However he also maintained that it could be defined by the inclusion ofboth the right to be let alone and to have control over personal information.274 Nishihara
claimed that ‗the right to be let alone‘ arose from the improvement in camera technology,
whilst the right to control over one‘s information arose from improvements in computer
technology. The introduction of CCTV cameras into town centres combined both camera andcomputer technology, jointly having a larger impact on privacy.275 In 2006, Professor Tajima
defined privacy as ‗information about one‘s private life. Such information should not, without
justification be made public by a third party . . . .‘276
Ehara claimed, in 1991, that Japanese and Americans thought differently about
privacy.277 He believed that in Japan, privacy was strictly limited to excluding others fromentering one‘s room without consent and preventing another from discovering or publishing
personal secrets. However, a wider interpretation of privacy requires people to have individual
and not group identities, which Ehara insists was not common to Japan.278 Takeo Doi claimed,
270

Abe, The Managed Space Paradox: Surveillance and Freedom, 9.

271

Ibid., 11, 26.

272

Monahan, Surveillance in the Time of Insecurity, 95 (noting that in gated communities, residents resented
the way surveillance encouraged them to conform and act in a way that would not bring attention to themselves).
273

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 2 (Not being able to find the core of [the right to privacy]「Puraibashii ken no kakushin」wa nakanaka mitsukaranakatta. 「プライバシー権の核心」はなかなか見つからなかった。).
274

Ibid., 39.

275

Ibid., 41-42.

276

Tajima and Saito, Extreme Surveillance Society and Freedom: Conspiracy, Facial Recognition System,
and National Registration System, 4(shiseikatsjou no jouhou. Koushita jouhou wo togai kojin no ishi ni
mototsukazuni midarini tasha ni kaiji sarenai kenri wo puraibashii ken to ii . . . . 私生活上の情報。こうした情報を当該個人の意思に基づかずにみだりに他者に開示されない権利をプライバシー権といい ・・・).
277

Ehara, The right to Privacy: A comprehensive analysis, 391.

278

In a 2009 poll about Japanese society of 5,890 respondents, 56.6% said people should be more concernedwith ‗country‘ and ‗society‘, 33.5% said their own lives; 56.7% thought it was more important for the country to
succeed, 27.8 thought it was more important for themselves. See:42in 1971, that privacy did not develop traditionally in Japan due to the Japanese concept ofamae (dependency). 279 He further claimed in 1985, that the Japanese had a strong but
different concept of the ‗individual‘.280 Accordingly, the individual was a distinct member ofa group but ‗consciousness of the self as an individual‘ was not a new concept.281 However,Hayashi and Kuroda found in 1997, that Japanese people were just as individualistic as
Americans when they thought in English.282
Differences in Japanese and Western culture often led to the claim that the Japanese
did not have an equivalent word for ‗privacy‘.283 Adams et al. stated that this argument goesback to 1946 when Benedict talked about the lack of privacy in Japanese communities in her
book The Chrysanthemum and the Sword.284 The claim that the Japanese do not have a wordfor ‗privacy‘ was faulty for a number of reasons. Firstly, the word ‗privacy‘ had been
incorporated into Japanese as a word of foreign origin as puraibashii. The word ‗privacy‘ andpuraibashii are therefore necessarily directly related in meaning.285 This can also be seen in
English in the same way that English contains many words of foreign origin. 286 Secondly,
because there is little agreement on what the word ‗privacy‘ means in English, it is difficult to
say that the Japanese meaning is different to the English meaning. Thirdly, while there may
not have been a specific word for ‗privacy‘ prior to the word puraibashii being introduced, it
has been a common term for many decades now, and to claim that the Japanese don‘t have aword for ‗privacy‘ is like claiming that the English don‘t have a word for Karaoke or Karate.
Finally, the adoption of a word of foreign origin into a culture does not prove the

http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h20/h20-shakai/3.html.
279

Doi, The anatomy of dependence, 39.

280

Doi, The Anatomy of Self, 56.

281

Adams, Murata, and Orito, ―The Japanese sense of information privacy,‖ 7.

282

Hayashi and Kuroda, Japanese Culture in Comparative Perspective, 118.

Lyon, Tajima, and Shimizu, Surveillance After 9/11, 246(Eigo no ippanteki youhou de iu 「puraibashii」
to pittari ichi suru kotoba ga, nihongo ni wa nai to iu koto da. 英語の一般的用法でいう「プライバシー」とぴったり一致する言葉が、日本語にはないということだ ).
283

284

Adams, Murata, and Orito, ―The Japanese sense of information privacy,‖ 2.

285

However see: Murata and Orito, ―Rethinking the concept of the right to information privacy‖ Murata andOrito claim that Japanese people often use the word puraibashii without understanding its meaning clearly andsee it as more of a subjective concept than ―Westerners‖.
286

In the meikyou kokugo jiten (明鏡国語辞典) dictionary, puraibashii is defined as ‗Something related tooneself, one‘s own life, individual‘s secrets, the right not to be subjected to interference from another.‘ (shiji,shiseikatsu. Kojin no himitsu. Mata, sorega tanin kara kanshou, shingai sarenai kenri. 私事・私生活。個人の秘密。また、それが他人から干渉・侵害されない権利)

43non-existence of the concept that the word defines prior to its adoption by that culture.287
Adams et al. claimed that Japan had ‗a strong sense of informational privacy . . .
which had long been part of the culture,‘ and that the recent trend to create legislation in thisarea was due to a break down in social norms that previously protected privacy. 288 Lawsonsuggested that ‗a right to privacy resonated deeply in Japanese society‘, and recent trends toconceptualise and legislate in this area were due to ‗public demand and political will‘, and not
because the concept did not exist in the past.289 Lawson noted that the right to privacy inJapan was not just transplanted from abroad, but was the result of a ‗vibrant, indigenous
political process.‘ 290 She suggested that the new data protection laws enacted in 2003
heralded privacy as a new societal value,291 and that this new focus on privacy protection
may be used to infer that Japan was beginning to move from ‗friendly authoritarianism
towards functioning constitutional democracy.‘292

Impact upon CCTV
Specific protection for privacy is a relatively new concept, and while the history of its
emergence differs between Japan and the UK, the Japanese and English now have a very
similar conception of privacy. However attitudes towards public spaces and the tendency tocarry out private acts in public are significantly different. Japanese tend to show more care
and attention to public spaces than in England, and when people go against these norms, forexample, putting out rubbish on the wrong day, or vandalising a public place, there is
widespread condemnation, to a greater extent than in England. The Japanese are also muchless personal in public. For example, opinions and actions tend to be held back and the shame
culture inhibits people from conducting private acts, such as kissing or openly arguing inpublic.293 Such strict norms for acting in public in England are much rarer.

287

Adams, Murata, and Orito, ―The Japanese sense of information privacy,‖ 2.

288

Ibid.; Murata and Orito, ―Rethinking the concept of the right to information privacy.‖289

Lawson, ―Japan‘s New Privacy Act in Context,‖ 89.

290

Ibid., 98.

291

Ibid., 90.

292

Ibid., 101.

293

Doi said that the Japanese ―sense of shame originates in awareness of the eyes of the outside world and isdirected in toward the self.‖ Doi, The anatomy of dependence, 53.

44

These attitudes to privacy in Japan and England impact upon attitudes to CCTV in two
main ways. Firstly, the ‗I‘ve got nothing to hide so I‘ve got nothing to fear‘ argument 294 isstill adhered to by most people, both in Japan and England. However, because people inEngland are more likely to conduct private acts in public places, CCTV is more likely tocapture a private act, and English people are therefore more likely to be concerned aboutpublic space CCTV. In Japan, because people do not generally do private acts in public, even
if there are cameras, the cameras would be less likely to record private actions. Secondly,
expectations of conformity and exclusion for those who act differently mean that people who
act within normal social boundaries are likely to support measures, such as CCTV, that would
disproportionately target those who do not follow Japanese norms. Therefore, CCTV in Japanis more likely to be accepted by the majority and less likely to invade the majority‘s privacy,
but less likely to be accepted by the minority and more likely to invade the minority‘s privacy.
Leon Wolff argued that Japan was comprised of a strong civil society with a healthy debate
over human rights issues, so it would be wrong to suggest that Japanese citizens would
blindly accept the imposition of CCTV against their will.295 It could be argued that the strong‗civil society‘ provides protection for the rights of the majority, but not foreign residents or
those who are not members of mainstream Japanese society.296

2.4 Surveillance
The right to be left alone may not sound a very exciting freedom, but it is the one
about which the British people care most. (Brian Walden, 1970)
Definition
Although the word surveillance was originally viewed as a word of terror in France,
surveillance was also seen as a vital aspect of society during the middle ages to prevent the
spread of the plague.297 Currently its current use evokes different feelings in different people.
For someone living under a totalitarian regime the word brings feelings of repression,
294

Solove, ―‗I‘ve Got Nothing to Hide‘ and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy.‖

295

Wolff, ―The Future of Human Rights Regulation in Japan.‖296

In an interview with a Chonaikai (Neighbourhood Association) leader, during a Neighbourhood
Association meeting organised by the association and the police, citizens and the police had expressed concern
about foreigners committing crime; however, there was no representation from the ‗foreign‘ community, and it
does not appear that the foreign communities had been consulted about the perceived problem. This indicatesthat the ‗strong‘ civil society protects the resident Japanese, while distancing themselves from the relatively
weak foreign community.
297

Foucault, Discipline and punish, 195-200.

45

oppression and fear, and reinforces the lack of balance between state and individual. 298 For
people living under the constant threat of terrorism or crime, the word can bring feelings ofcomfort and security.299 For political activists surveillance can be seen as anti-democratic.300
Boyne contended that surveillance grew out of danger and fear. 301 Foucault describedsurveillance as the accumulation of coded information and the supervision of individuals by
someone in a position of authority.302 Marx suggested that there was not a suitable word in
English that conveyed the ‗full meanings of surveillance‘, and said the closest one could get
was ‗superwatching‘. 303 For the purpose of this thesis, surveillance, and its Japanesecounterpart Kanshi, can be described as the monitoring, observing or listening to persons,their movements, their conversations or their other activities or communications, whether inreal time or after the event, by either a person or machine.
Ball and Kirstie divided surveillance into four categories: categorical suspicion,
categorical seduction, categorical care, and categorical exposure.304 Categorical suspicion
refers to policing aspects of surveillance and its use in combating and preventing crime.
Categorical seduction refers to collection of information by corporations on users spending
habits for marketing purposes. Categorical care refers to health and welfare systems wheredata is collected regarding people receiving benefits and requiring medical attention. Finally,
Categorical exposure refers surveillance by the media of people in the spotlight.

298

In group discussions on privacy and surveillance, participants from Myanmar expressed concern atgovernment surveillance stating that ‗If its [surveillance] in Myanmar then it‘s definitely a problem‘.
299

In the above discussion, a participant from India stated ‗In Delhi when I‘m out of my home, anything canhappen to me, so if it can provide safety or security then I really do not mind. When if I‘m at an accident andthere is a hit and run case and the guy escapes and maybe there will be a camera they can track down his car andthen get compensation. There are many factors, people do not think about the positive things I feel. They really
do not. If you had a shop, if you had a store, maybe someone is stealing clothes, or shoplifters I mean there is a
car accident there is a camera‘.
300

Haggerty and Samatas claim that citizens need a space 'comparatively free of governmental oversight ifthey are to engage in political action. Surveillance is therefore anti-democratic to the extent that it prevents
individuals from coming together to identify common interests, forge alliances and develop political strategies.'
Haggerty and Samatas, Surveillance and Democracy, 4-6.
301

Boyne, ―Post-Panopticism,‖ 241.

302

McCahill, ―Beyond Foucault: Towards a contemporary theory of surveillance,‖ 211.

303

Marx and Muschert, ―Personal Information, Borders, and the New Surveillance Studies,‖ 379.

304

Ball and Webster, The Intensification of Surveillance: Crime, Terrorism and Warfare in the Information
Age, 7-9; Marx first introduced ―categorical suspicion‖ in 1988: Marx, Undercover: Police Surveillance inAmerica, 291; Lyon first described ―categorical seduction‖ in 2001; and Ball and Webster introduced―categorical care‖ and ―categorical exposure‖ in 2003.

46

EnglandEvolution of surveillance
Government surveillance is not a new concept but has been in existence since at least the
1500s. However surveillance is now often carried out by the central state rather thanlocally.305 Collection of personal information in the national census was not originally used tokeep track of people, but to ensure that those carrying out the census did not fabricate
information.306 Later, the census was used as evidence of good management of the state.307
Civil registration, detailing the life, birth and death of the population was also not seen as
subjecting the general population to control or surveillance, but holding local authorities toaccount and ‗freeing the working classes from disease and poverty.‘308 Similarly, duringindustrialisation, the collection of personal information was seen as creating rights forindividuals.309
The establishment of the police force in London in 1829 heralded in a new age of'surveillance', but the police relied on their physical presence to watch out for crime instead of
the collection of information.310 With the decline of the British Empire, there was an urgent
need to focus on the health of the growing British population, leading to the General Register
Office coming under greater control from the central government. After Britain stopped
sending its convicts abroad, there was an increasing problem with the reintegration of
offenders into society. The 1879 Prevention of Crime Act brought in the Convict Supervision
Office who supervised convicts. The collection of data on former convicts was the beginningof the police systematically storing information centrally for the purpose of control.311 The
police set up units to collect information on those considered dangerous to the state. The rise305

Higgs, ―The Rise of the Information State: The development of central state surveillance of the citizen in
England, 1500 - 2000,‖ 10; However, see: Ball, Webster, and Lyon, ―Surveillance after September 11, 2001,‖
20-21 (questioning whether surveillance is a centralized power or a dispersed assemblage); Furthermore, Balland Webster argued that ―today‖s surveillance . . . [is] more pervasive and less centralized than might have been
imagined by earlier proponents of panopticism.‘ Ball and Webster, The Intensification of Surveillance: Crime,
Terrorism and Warfare in the Information Age, 6.
306

Higgs, ―The Rise of the Information State: The development of central state surveillance of the citizen in
England, 1500 - 2000,‖ 11.
307

Ibid., 12.

308

Ibid., 13.

309

Ibid., 15; However, Lyon claimed that measures ―intended to ensure equality‖ could also ―provide
opportunities for authoritarian or arbitrary treatment‖ Lyon, ―Identification, surveillance and democracy,‖ 34 .
310

Higgs, ―The Rise of the Information State: The development of central state surveillance of the citizen in
England, 1500 - 2000,‖ 14.
311

Ibid., 18.

47

of the welfare state increased the use of and need for databases and information about people
which, Edward Higgs claimed, was evidence of social improvement rather than social
control.312 Currently, surveillance is carried out routinely on individuals and groups within
the UK who are deemed by the government as a threat to national security. 313 Keith Laidler
suggested, in 2008, that the government had constantly failed to protect citizens‘ personal
information, and any increase in surveillance by the government would lead to increasing, andgreater intrusions into people‘s privacy.314

The Panopticon
The panopticon was a prison design that encouraged self control through the uncertainty of
not knowing whether or not a person was being watched by a guard. By constantly
conforming to the rules, the prisoner would gradually incorporate these rules internally andbecome an ideal, reformed prisoner. For the panopticon to be effective the population undersurveillance must be both rational and share a ‗homogenous base of knowledge‘. If theprisoners are either ignorant or irrational the panopticon is unlikely to have the desired
effect.315
This form of prison was never realised, but the idea of the panopticon has been
incorporated into the designs of many factories and management strategies since first
discussed by Jeremy Bentham in 1785, and is now used to draw analogies with modern-day
surveillance society. The concept of panopticism can be seen from the point of view of theobserver or the observed. The observer uses the panopticon to observe, gather information,
carry out data management, and control the surveilled of a population. The observed see thepanopticon as causing them to focus on their self-discipline, tend towards normalization andsubjectification, and soul-training.316
Bentham saw the Panopticon as being not only applicable to the prison, but also
throughout society;317 that is, a means by which the functions of the government could be
312

Ibid., 16.

313

Manningham-Buller, ―The new protective state,‖ 70.

314

Laidler, Surveillance Unlimited: How we’ve become the most watched people on Earth, 214-220.

315

Simon, ―The Return of Panopticism: Supervision, subjection, and the new surveillance,‖ 409.

316

Ibid., 406.

317

For example, workhouses and factories where labour productivity was notoriously inefficient. It wasthought that workers would work harder if they knew they might be being watched and would not slack off.

48

realised.318 Bentham envisioned this idea as a general panacea for society‘s troubles thatwould also indirectly give people ‗basic civil and political liberties and the freedom to live
without fear.‘319
Bentham did not believe in natural rights not specifically provided for by law, instead
he equated the term ‗right‘ with ‗legal right‘.320 In 1968, Manning explained that it was a‗mistaken conviction‘ to say that a government ought never to interfere with the rights that it
created itself.321 Therefore, if the government had granted people a specific right, for example,
privacy, but later decided that it was deleterious to society, then the government would bejustified in taking away this right in the name of creating a better functioning society.
Bentham thought that the true object of human desire was not liberty but security. Thus for
Bentham the state represented the ‗cradle of law‘, and the work of law was security and notliberty.322
Bentham‘s ideas have been described as being ‗as destructive to freedom as they are torights,' the panoptic as leaving ‗no privacy and no tolerance for the deviant‘, and Bentham
himself as being caught up in an ‗obsession with it he had forgotten the dangers orunrestrained power; devices of such monstrous efficiency [that have] left no room forhumanity.'323 However, Boyne explained that the panopticon originated in social architecture
as well as prison design, and it was out of concern for the welfare of the criminal andvulnerable, rather than as an oppressive method of control.324 Margaret DeLacy suggested
that the panoptic prison was actually designed to lessen the hardships of the prisons of thetime.325 Bentham‘s prison also eventually had an effect on Japanese prison designs, whichchanged their names to kangoku (surveillance gaol).326
Michael Foucault noted a significant change in the 18th century from which theanonymous royal subjects were gazing at the powerful monarchy to subjects being under the318

Manning, The Mind of Jeremy Bentham, 88.

319

Semple, Bentham’s prison, 22.

320

Jeremy Bentham, Works III 334-5; Bentham describes such a contradictions as: like 'round square', 'a sonthat never had a father', 'a species of cold heat', 'a sort of dry moisture', a 'kind of resplendent darkness
321

Manning, The Mind of Jeremy Bentham, 43.

322

Long, Bentham on Liberty: Jeremy Bentham’s idea of liberty in relation to his utilitarianism, 215.

323

Semple, Bentham’s prison, 3. Quotes are from Himmelfarb, Manning, and S.R.Letwin respectively

324

Boyne, ―Post-Panopticism,‖ 238.

325

Semple, Bentham’s prison, 13.

326

Murakami Wood, Lyon, and Abe, ―Surveillance in Urban Japan,‖ 553.

49

gaze of powerful, but invisible rulers.327 Simon believed, in 2005, that there was a divergenceof views regarding whether or not modern day surveillance was more or less panoptic thandescribed by Foucault,328 depending on whether panopticism was interpreted from the pointof the observer or the observed.329 The panopticon appears to break down as a metaphor for
present day society when the conditions of enclosure, isolation, and training that are
constituent parts of the panopticon are viewed. The panopticon relies on enclosure, but urban
streets allow extensive mobility and permeability through boundaries. The population cannot
be isolated because it cannot be contained, and the training effect from self control under the
panopticon, cannot be enforced on such a mobile population. The consequences of ‗being
seen without being able to see‘ cannot be felt as people are able to move freely and have often
left an area before any consequences would be felt by those under surveillance. Simon
therefore perceived the panopticon as being inapplicable beyond the confines of total
institutions.330
As surveillance becomes more common and people become aware of its presence, a
panoptic effect can be seen in society. People are able to understand what behaviour is
expected of them and conform to avoid attention. However, this may simply be causing themto feign conformity while under surveillance.331 The panopticon relies on making all acts
visible and having a realistic threat of retribution for any transgression.332 In institutions
where surveillance is not total, as in present day society, neither are all acts visible, nor isthere a realistic threat of retribution. Therefore people are able to act, for a large part, in theknowledge that they are not being watched. People who would break the rules will therefore
not be subjected to the self-control inducing effect of constant surveillance.333 On the other327

Semple, Bentham’s prison, 10.

328

Foucault said that the ―universally widespread panopticism enables [the exercise of power], on theunderside of the law, a machinery that is both immense and minute, which supports, reinforces, multiplies theasymmetry of power and undermines the limits that are traced around the law.‖ Foucault, Discipline and punish,
223.
329

Simon, ―The Return of Panopticism: Supervision, subjection, and the new surveillance,‖ 403.

330

Ibid., 411.

331

Ibid., 410-411.

332

Leman-Langlois described the Panopticon as: ―The idea of self-imposed transformation and discipline
only truly works if we assume that the ‗inmates‘ are rational in the classic Enlightenment sense. This implies that,as they weigh the costs and the benefits of their future actions, they always perceive the consequences of being
seen, recorded and eventually punished, as serious costs.‖ Leman-Langlois, ―The Myopic Panopticon: The social
consequences of policing through the lens,‖ Introduction.
333

Simon explains: ―self discipline begins only when the prisoner cannot imagine a means of escape. Once
there is nowhere to hide, it makes more sense to conform but as soon as the prison walls are gone, the system
becomes more difficult to manage.‖ Simon, ―The Return of Panopticism: Supervision, subjection, and the new
surveillance,‖ 410, 416.

50

hand, as surveillance becomes common in all spheres of life, the ability for an individual toescape the gaze of an invisible observer decreases.
The 'Oligopticon', described by Bruno Latour in 1998,334 attempted to conceptualise
the conundrum of trends towards more panopticism in some segments of society and less inothers. The Oligopticon allows for the observers to see with absolute clarity a small subset of
behaviour of the observed.335 This differs from the panopticon where the observer is able toview everything. The panopticon only works if the observer can see everything and theobserved are not able to hide anything.336 However, with the Oligopticon, the observer isunable to see everything, and the effect of paranoia on the observed is not felt because
surveillance is neither total nor constant.
In 1997, Mathiesen described the ‗Synopticon‘ as the ‗many seeing the few‘. He said
that it came into being through the evolution of mass media, combined with panopticism(where the few see the many), as leading to a two-way 'viewer society'.337 Synopticism andpanopticism have evolved and grown together and institutions and technologies are now
simultaneously both synoptic and panoptic.338
Although society may not be a panoptic state as described by Bentham, modern day
surveillance appears to approach his description. As recently as 2010 David Omand suggested
that society was approaching a panoptic state due to the accumulation of measures which
individually are justifiable, but when taken together amount to creating an ‗all-seeing state
where surveillance is so widespread as to provide a new form of social control.‘339 The
synopticon and the oligopticon provide more accurate descriptions of current society and canbe seen as later stages in the evolution of the panopticon.

Surveillance Society
In 2000, Haggerty and Ericson noted Orwell's vision of Big Brother and Foucault's
panopticon as two dominant metaphors for understanding contemporary surveillance.
334

Latour and Hermant, Paris ville invisible, 28.

335

Boyne, ―Post-Panopticism,‖ 254.

336

Foucault explains that ―It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be seen, thatmaintains the disciplined individual in his subjection.‖ Foucault, Discipline and punish, 187.
337

Mathiesen, ―The viewer society: Michel Foucault‘s ‗Panopticon‘ revisited.‖

338

Ibid., Parallels, 3.

339

Omand, Securing the State, 110.

51

Haggerty and Ericson explained that Orwell's idea, while frightening, does not come close towhat is technologically possible in the modern day. Furthermore, in Nineteen-Eighty-Four340
the ‗proles‘ were not the ones subject to surveillance, but in the present day it is the ‗proles‘
who are often subject to surveillance. Haggerty and Ericson also felt that Orwell only saw thegovernment as potential users of intrusive surveillance, but today it is the private sector that
often leads in the field of surveillance technology and application.341 Gary Marx showed in1985 that the idea of a total surveillance state where the government can exert total control
and the public are under constant intrusive surveillance was an illusion: ‗Government agentsare clearly limited in the surveillance and physical coercion they can carry out, but they are
free to create the impression of police omnipresence and omnipotence.‘342
Higgs contended that the rise of central state surveillance was not due to a change in
the nature of society, but rather a change in the nature of the state and the context in which it
functioned. 343 Terrorism in the UK since the 1970s has impacted on the profusion ofsurveillance and CCTV within England. The change this brought about in people‘s
expectations of daily life created a change in what citizens wanted and what they were willingto allow the state do to in their name.
The world‘s first DNA database was established in 1995, initially holding the DNA
profile of anyone who had been charged with an offence. Since 2004 this has been extended
and now anyone who is arrested and detained in police custody for a recordable offence will
have their DNA taken and profile stored indefinitely.344 Currently approximately five million
people have their profiles stored on database, although one million of these have not been
cautioned, charged, or convicted of any offence.345
Since Al Qaeda began its campaign, the nature of both individual nations and theinternational community had changed with strong measures becoming the accepted norm.
Haggerty and Ericson maintained that whilst the poor may have found themselves undersurveillance by social and welfare agencies, the middle and upper class were surveilled by340

Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four.

341

Haggerty and Ericson, ―The Surveillant Assemblage,‖ 261-262.

342

Marx, ―The Surveillance Society: The threat of 1984-style techniques,‖ 59.

343

Higgs, ―The Rise of the Information State: The development of central state surveillance of the citizen in
England, 1500 - 2000,‖ 23.
344

House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, The National DNA Database: Eighth Report of Session
2009-10, 5.
345

Ibid., 7.

52other agencies, for example, credit card and insurance companies.346 Haggerty and Ericson
coined the term the ‗disappearance of disappearance‘ to show that it was becoming
increasingly difficult for people to remain anonymous and avoid falling under surveillance ofvarious organisations.347 They were concerned with the trend to attempt to digitise every
aspect of life leading to the creation of ‗data doubles‘ where ‗flesh is reduced to pure
information‘348 asserting that:
We are only now beginning to appreciate that surveillance is driven by the desire to
bring systems together to combine practices and technologies and integrate them into alarger whole. It is this tendency which allows us to speak of surveillance as an
assemblage, with such combinations providing for exponential increases in the degreeof surveillance capacity.349
Boyne suggested that developments in public sphere surveillance dwarfed those in theprivate sector,350 and that because surveillance was tied up with the social structures of awelfare state, any deep criticism of surveillance as a principle would ‗have to imply a critiqueof social democracy and social welfare simultaneously . . . .‘351 Boyne further believed thatcriticizing surveillance ‗would appear to demand nothing less than complete withdrawal fromsociety.‘352

Recent trends
While the police are traditionally seen as the organisation with the responsibility for patrolling,
maintaining peace and safety and watching the community, recent years have seen a host of
new groups becoming involved in such activities. Jonathan Merritt noted, in 2010, that theincrease in providers of policing services may be due to a decrease in secondary and tertiary
agents of control such as park keepers, bus conductors, and local community groups that
previously provided ‗natural surveillance‘. These non-police agents effectively prevented

346

Haggerty and Ericson, ―The Surveillant Assemblage,‖ 273.

347

Ibid., 275.

348

Ibid., 269.

349

Ibid., 265.

350

Boyne, ―Post-Panopticism,‖ 249.

351

Ibid., 242.

352

Ibid., 253.

53

many incidents from escalating to a level requiring police intervention. 353 The Special
Constabulary, consisting of volunteer civilians with police training and powers, although inexistence since 1831, rapidly expanded in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Public calls forpolice to deal with low level crime further led to local authorities funding local community
patrols to carry out work that would otherwise take such officials away from other aspects ofpolicing.
By July 1998, 18 out of 43 police forces in England and Wales ran their own patrol
schemes. In 2002, paid civilian Street Wardens were introduced, by local councils, whocarried out patrols and could act as professional witnesses in court to assist prosecutions. The
Police Reform Act of 2002 gave police chiefs the right to appoint civilians to certain roles andled to the formation of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs). By March 2010 there
were 16,685 PCSOs nationwide and 15,505 Special Constables.354 There were significant
concerns that training has been insufficient and inadequate for the new agents such as
PCSOs.355 Joyce found in 2006 that the development towards plural policing had led to astate where the ‗responsibility for crime prevention had been ―hived off‖ from the central
state and had become intimately associated with the objective of community safety.‘ 356 In
addition, a vast private security industry consisting of security guards, and detectives had
proliferated. 357 The growth and popularity of a variety of policing and security bodies
indicates that concerns with surveillance should not be limited to governmental organisations
such as the police. The Information Commissioner‘s 2010 report on the surveillance society(ICO 2010 report) said that the effect of the surveillance society on the UK was not only aloss of privacy, but also a loss in trust.358

353

Merritt and Stack, ―W(h)ither the PCSO? Police perceptions of the Police Community Support Officer‘srole, powers and future directions,‖ 733.
354

Sigurdsson and Dhani, Police Service Strength: England and Wales, 31 March 2010.

355

Merritt and Stack, ―W(h)ither the PCSO? Police perceptions of the Police Community Support Officer‘srole, powers and future directions,‖ 745.
356

Joyce, Criminal justice, 139.

357

Ibid., 166-173.

358

Information Commissioner‘s Office, Information Commissioner’s report to Parliament on the state ofsurveillance, 13.

54

JapanEvolution of surveillance
Surveillance has long played an important role in Japanese society,359 and has been aroundsince long before Western influence arrived.360 Rural relationships necessitated building trust
and mutual responsibility among villagers as people were held responsible for the actions of
those around them. During the Tokugawa era different castes were separated in different partsof cities with movement strictly regulated and areas split up into various neighbourhoods,
each with barriers, gates, and watch towers. Common people did not experience privacy, butrather constant monitoring by employers and home owners.361 The constant threat and dangerof fire led to a parallel surveillance network under control of the local community. 362 Setsuo
Miyazawa expressed the view in 1989 that Japanese society had evolved to encourage
conformity, which was likely to have had a big influence on their reception of and attitudes
towards surveillance.363
Before WWII, the Japanese government was small but powerful.364 After the war, asJapan rapidly developed, administration and the role of the government also increased. Japan
became a world leader in industry and technology, and people found themselves underincreasing examination as part of an information society. 365 Japan‘s information society
started from public plans, not from private business interests and this led to concerns about
the collection and use of personal information by the police and local government forsurveillance purposes.
Despite rapid economic and social changes through the 20th century, Japanese society
retained many of the characteristics of its traditional society, leading to a greater acceptance ofsurveillance than in the West.366 For example, police officers make biannual house visits to359

Murakami Wood, Lyon, and Abe, ―Surveillance in Urban Japan,‖ 556.

360

Ibid., 563.

361

Ogura, ―Electronic government and surveillance-oriented society,‖ 272.

362

Murakami Wood, Lyon, and Abe, ―Surveillance in Urban Japan,‖ 556.

363

Miyazawa, ―Learning lessons from the Japanese experience: A challenge for Japanese criminologists,‖

107.
364

Lyon, Tajima, and Shimizu, Surveillance After 9/11, 245.

365

However, Webster explains Anthony Giddens's argument that all societies have been 'informationsocieties' from the beginning, so whilst the role of information has taken on increasing importance, there isnothing fundamentally different about the current state of society. see: Webster, Theories of the informationsociety. 202
366

Johnson, ―Japanese Version of Community Corrections: Volunteer Probation Officers and Hostels,‖ 194.

55

gather information about occupants, what the family makeup is, and check if there are any
suspicious people in the neighbourhood.367 A survey published by the National ResearchInstitute of Police Science in 1986 showed that two-thirds of respondents accepted the official
explanation (that such canvassing was needed to help provide public services) for house visitswith only one percent saying the visits were unnecessary. Miyazawa referred to Ames (1981),
who reasoned that the real purpose for the home visitations was for use in potential future
criminal investigations. Miyazawa added that most people would probably accept this use
because most people do not think that they will ever be on the receiving end of such aninvestigation. However, collecting information for potential use in future investigations was
not the stated reason for the house visits, and therefore people‘s personal information was
being used for purposes for which they had not given their consent.368
Residents of Japan were also kept under surveillance through identification schemes.
There was one form of identification for foreigners called the Alien Registration Card System,and two for Japanese citizens: Koseki and Juki-net.369 An ID card has been imposed on
foreigners resident in Japan since before WWII and has evolved into the ‗Alien Registration
Card System‘ making non-Japanese both more visible and more traceable than Japanesecitizens.370 A foreign resident in Japan may be fined up to 200,000 yen if found without theirregistration card, and up to one year in gaol for refusing to show it when requested by
officials.371 There were plans in 2005 to introduce new cards for all foreigners, but the plans
were shelved due to concerns about excess surveillance.372 In 2004, David Lyon explained
how legislation on terrorism, introduced in October 2001, greatly increased surveillance inJapan.373 Lyon argued this extra surveillance could be used to increase discrimination on
foreigners.374
367

National Police Agency, ―Japanese Community Police and Police Box System,‖ 244; Murakami Wood,
Lyon, and Abe, ―Surveillance in Urban Japan,‖ 554. However, the author of this thesis has talked with a numberof Japanese residents who have never had a visit from the police, therefore it is unlikely that this practice isstrictly adhered to.
368

Miyazawa, ―Learning lessons from the Japanese experience: A challenge for Japanese criminologists,‖

118.
369

Ogasawara, ―A tale of the colonial age, or the banner of new tyranny? National identification card
systems in Japan,‖ 94.
370

Ibid., 94-95.

371

Ibid., 101.

372

―IC cards planned to track 'nikkeijin'.‖ Asahi Shimbun, 20 December 2006

373

Lyon, Tajima, and Shimizu, Surveillance After 9/11, 247-251.

374

Ibid., 247-248; cf: Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy, 131-132 (asserting that universal identifiers would
eliminate discrimination in some areas); Lyon, ―The border is everywhere: ID cards, surveillance and the other,‖

56

The national registration for citizens began in Japan in 1871 with the Koseki Act, andfocused on family units as opposed to individuals.375 Family units took responsibility for theactions of all members of their unit encouraging self-conformity and lateral surveillance ofother family members.376 The government could use Juki-net to access information including
name, address, date of birth, gender, history of data changes, and an 11-figure ID number.377
The government claimed that the heads of all the districts and committees requested newlegislation to help improve management of citizen‘s information along the lines of Juki-net.
However, a survey by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations disputed this conclusion, andshowed there was actually very low enthusiasm for the Juki-net system.378
Due to significant opposition, the government said Juki-net would be limited to 92
administrative purposes; however, a few months after the bill was passed, this was expanded
to 264 purposes.379 Protests came initially from Suginami Ward in Tokyo where a survey
showed 72% of people were against the implementation of Juki-net.380 In an Asahi Shimbun
opinion poll, 86% of respondents said that they feared their personal information would beeither leaked or misused. 70 assemblies and 29 mayors passed resolutions demanding its
postponement, three towns refused to implement the system, and the mayor of Yokohama said
citizens could decide for themselves. When the system went live, 4.1 million citizens were notincluded.381 By March 2008 the associated ID card was being used by only two percent of the
population.382
Otani claimed, in 2006, that Juki-net was clearly useful for a small section of society
who was constantly moving as it simplified administrative acts. Because Juki-net allowed asignificant amount of information about an individual to be immediately gleaned there wereconcerns it might result in further discrimination and surveillance of naturalised Japanese

75 (countering Etzioni‘s stance and claiming that Etzioni ignores the ―broader context‖).
375

Ogasawara, ―A tale of the colonial age, or the banner of new tyranny? National identification card
systems in Japan,‖ 96.
376

Ibid., 96-98.

377

Ibid., 103.

378

Japan Federation of Bar Associations, The Day Privacy is Lost, 79.

379

Ogasawara, ―A tale of the colonial age, or the banner of new tyranny? National identification card
systems in Japan,‖ 104.
380

Lyon, Tajima, and Shimizu, Surveillance After 9/11, 254.

381

Japan Federation of Bar Associations, The Day Privacy is Lost, 82, 83.

382

Murata, Orito, and Adams, ―The Development of Japanese Data Protection,‖ 113.

57

citizens with foreign ancestry.383 Otani pointed out that the system justified neither the costto the tax payer nor the privacy intrusion.384 The Japan Federation of Bar Associations foundthat this type of system existed nowhere else in the world, and the Japanese chose a systemthat was considered too intrusive by others.385

Neighbourhood Associations and Volunteer Patrols
Neighbourhood associations, or Chonaikai in Japanese, have been a steady part of Japanesesociety since the 1400s, and they played a significant role in mobilising the general
population during the Second World War. Although the associations were dismantled during
the American occupation force after the war, they were reinstated shortly after and they stillplay a significant role today. The head of a Nagoya neighbourhood association explained that
their existence had little to do with grassroots support, but was driven from local government
level.386 The association head said that membership was voluntary; however, opting out
would result in certain inconveniences, and most people just ‗went along‘ with the association
when required. The associations had three main roles: planning and preparation for the longexpected Tokai earthquake, recycling, and issues related to crime. There were once monthly
crime prevention patrols on a Saturday afternoon between 4pm and 5pm by the heads of thelocal associations (usually middle-aged and elderly residents), and the association had
meetings with the police and other members regarding crime prevention. The association headacknowledged that the ‗sense of communal responsibilities and civic duties‘ is not felt by themembers of the associations, but rather ‗generated top-down by the local government‘.387
Furthermore, there has been a delegation of duties to the ‗voluntary‘ neighbourhood
associations from the local government for functions that are generally accepted as being the
local government‘s responsibilities.
Volunteer crime prevention may be part of a local neighbourhood association‘s
responsibility, or new groups may be formed. Organisations have sprung up to protect theircommunities, conducting patrols for safety and security and carry out surveillance.388 The
383

Otani, What are Surveillance Cameras Looking at?, 127.

384

Ibid., 125-126.

385

Japan Federation of Bar Associations, The Day Privacy is Lost, 84.

386

In December 2010, the author of this thesis interviewed the head of a Neighbourhood Association about
the role and responsibility and the attitude towards Neighbourhood Associations from residents. The
neighbourhood consisted of 260 households in Nagoya city.
387

Ito, ―‗Civic Duty‘ for Community Development: The Need for Duty-based Approaches?,‖ 3.

388

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 28; Shimizu, ―Development and Problems of the ‗Life58

volunteer patrols are usually carried out in conjunction with the police and local authority.389
The number of volunteer groups has grown significantly in recent years. In 2003 there were
3,056 groups, which grew to 8,079 in 2004, and 19,515 groups by 2005. Of these, 45.7% wererun in conjunction with the police, and 32.8% received training from the police. By 2005
almost 1.2 million citizens were involved with volunteer groups, double the number in
2004.390 Shimizu stated in 2003 that there was a worry that society was entering a panopticalor Orwellian state, and that the concern was not surveillance by the state but instead the movetowards citizens carrying out surveillance on themselves.391

Influence of Terrorism
Surveillance is rapidly being used to deal with detectible terrorist activity and is based upon
using sophisticated technology.392 North America and Europe preceded Japan in installing
data collection and high tech systems, however Japan has followed suit. Terrorism is not new
to Japan. The sarin attack on Tokyo underground has not lost its significance and many inJapan are aware of the risk and reality of terrorism. The large earthquake in 1995 also had a
big impact on Japan, and the combination of the attack and disaster led to calls for thegovernment to do more to protect citizens.393 Prior to the 1995 Sarin attack, surveillance was
generally used for administration and had gradually expanded as technical capabilities
increased. The attack was seen as a failure of surveillance as the group was being watched at
the time and had already carried out two previous attacks. 394 Prior to 9-11 Japan treaded
carefully in conducting surveillance, but after the attacks, the government become moreaggressive in its surveillance network.395
Prime Minister Koizumi presided over new regulations on surveillance and extending
the use of the Self Defence Force (SDF) that were quickly enacted,396 in turn creating
Security Regulations‘,‖ 236.
389

Shimizu, ―Development and Problems of the ‗Life Security Regulations‘,‖ 237.

390

http://www.npa.go.jp/safetylife/seianki55/katsudo_jyokyo/keissei_jyokyo.html

391

Shimizu, ―Development and Problems of the ‗Life Security Regulations‘,‖ 239.

392

Lyon, Tajima, and Shimizu, Surveillance After 9/11, 241.

393

Ibid.

394

Murakami Wood, Lyon, and Abe, ―Surveillance in Urban Japan,‖ 554.

395

Lyon, Tajima, and Shimizu, Surveillance After 9/11, 242.

396

Tajima, ―Japan: Moving Towards a Surveillance Society,‖ 9.

59

increased opposition and resistance.397 After the Madrid bombing in March 2004 Koizumi
said: ‗There is a possibility of a terrorist attack everywhere…we all need to recognise theneed for greater protection.‘ Masahiko Shimizu insinuated that the possibility of an attack on
the Japanese arose through Japan‘s decision to provide support for American foreign policy.
Shimizu described that instead of the government taking responsibility for security, Koizumi
informed the public that it was their responsibility to protect themselves.398
Tajima worried, in 2006, that Japan was quickly leaning towards a constant wartime
footing, in direct confrontation with Japan‘s peace orientated constitution.399 Although the
installation of cameras had increased rapidly since events such as 9-11 and the 7-7 London
attacks, there were still people who said that more needed to be done to ensure Japan was
ready to deal with a terrorist attack.400 Recent legislation targeting terrorism enacted in late2004 under the Emergency Public Peace and Order Programme gave significantly more
power to conduct surveillance than was previously possible:
 Police given stronger powers to collect and analyse personal information, increase
border security, airports and transport networks, tackle cyber-terrorism, greater
emergency powers, increase restrictions on foreigners, set up of a special
anti-terrorism unit, and increase cooperation with local authorities.
 Government given greater power to collect biometric data at airports, restrict importof materials that could be used for bomb making, and impose restrictions on
foreigners at hotels and in financial matters.401
Shimizu and Itoh maintained that the possibility of a terrorist attack in Japan arose from thecooperation with America‘s ‗war on terror‘. Therefore these two scholars concluded, in orderto prevent terrorist attacks in Japan, instead of increasing surveillance on citizens, theJapanese should cease cooperation with the USA in its military operations and withdraw all
SDF personnel.402

397

Lyon, Tajima, and Shimizu, Surveillance After 9/11, 243.

398

Shimizu, ―Police and Government Measures for Tackling Terrorism,‖ 71-72.

399

Tajima, ―Japan: Moving Towards a Surveillance Society,‖ 11-13.

400

Ibid., 11.

401

Shimizu, ―Police and Government Measures for Tackling Terrorism,‖ 68-71 (keisatsu, seiji no [terotaisaku] 警察・政治の「テロ対策」).
402

Ibid., 72; Ito, ―Proposal to the Transport Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport,‖ 76.

60

Recent trends
Otani claimed that the ‗broken window‘ theory approach has dominated Japanese policing inrecent years. 403 This approach looked to reduce crime in high crime areas throughzero-tolerance policing on criminals and criminal acts in these areas. However, in 2007,
Lombardo and Lough showed that the broken window theory did not have a strong deterrent
effect.404 Instead, when introduced into an area that was a hot bed of criminal activity, it only
temporarily moved it on to a different location. Kamagasaki took a different approach todealing with crime.405 Kamagasaki had suffered a high-rate of minor crimes such as illegal
gambling, but the main worry was the threat to public order from violence when people
congregated in the streets. The police had maintained extensive CCTV coverage in the area
but tended to ignore small crimes and only intervened when there was a danger of publicdisorder. The police used surveillance to attempt to contain crime in Kamagasaki and not
move problems on to other places. Otani says that this was akin to ‗caging the crime problem‘in Kamagasaki, that is, building a fence around the problem and dealing with it, as opposed toexporting crime elsewhere.406
In 2006, Abe said that the evolution of surveillance in recent times could becharacterised in a number of ways:407 from guarding people to watching over people for theirsafety;408 from prohibition to freedom; from detection to prevention; from ‗discipline ofactions‘ to ‗management of public spaces‘;409 and an increase in apathy towards surveillance.
In 2008, Midori Ogasawara said that another major trend was sorting of the population into
the categories of ‗terrorist‘ or ‗innocent‘, where the innocent are viewed as having thepotential to commit acts harmful to the state justifying mass surveillance of the general
population.410 Due to economic fluctuations, contract workers, of whom a high percentage
403

Otani, What are Surveillance Cameras Looking at?, 116.

404

Lombardo and Lough, ―Community Policing,‖ 131.

405

Otani, What are Surveillance Cameras Looking at?, 115.

406

Ibid., 117.

407

Abe, The Managed Space Paradox: Surveillance and Freedom, 35-38.

408

Ibid., 26(Kinshi kara jiyuu; 「kanshi no manazashi ga 「mihari」de wa naku 「mimamori」toshiteukeirerareru you ni natta haikei ni wa, kanshi no arihou jitai no henbou mo shiteki dekiru.」禁止から自由;「監視のまなざしが「見張り」ではなく「見守り」として受け入れられるようになった背景には、監視のあり方自体の変貌も指摘できる).
409

Ibid., 27-28.

410

Ogasawara, ―A tale of the colonial age, or the banner of new tyranny? National identification card
systems in Japan,‖ 93.

61

was foreigners, were always at risk of losing their jobs. Handa posited that foreigners were
therefore constantly viewed as potential offenders and found themselves under surveillance.411
Mobile phone technology developed by the Japanese telecommunications company
KDDI Corporation can now monitor and record minute movements, indicating what theholder is doing. KDDI has been talking with a Japanese employment agency about its use
with cleaners and security guards. KDDI claim that this technology was ‗not about curtailing
employees‘ rights to privacy. We‘d like to think our creation more of a caring, motheringsystem rather than a Big Brother approach to watching over citizens.‘412 The ICO 2010
report noted how in England there had been a shift from the ‗positive and caring aspects ofsurveillance‘ towards the more harmful aspects.413 Japan may be a few years behind England,but it is likely that there will be a similar shift in the upcoming years.
Through town planning, open spaces are becoming the norm in restaurants, shopping
malls, and streets. Open spaces are perfect for CCTV cameras as they provide no obstructions
to their line of view creating no spaces to hide from their gaze.414 Abe said surveillancecameras in public spaces were not guarding over people as a guard watches a prisoner or ateacher watches over a bad student, but watching over citizens benevolently the way a parent
watches over a child out of care and affection, making sure that nothing bad happens. 415 Abe
said that as the number of cameras increases, the need for justification also increases. Withfew cameras there was minimal invasion of privacy, so there was not much concern or needfor opposition; however, with the rapid trend towards ubiquity, cameras had become an
accepted part of daily life. The extent of privacy intrusion was much larger, and the need forprotection much greater, but as they became a normal part of life, opposition was seen as lessnecessary.416 Over the past few years, opposition to surveillance had increased and camemainly from lawyers, journalists, academics, labour unions, and civic groups.417

411

Handa, ―The Fear of Surveillance Cameras,‖ 213-214 Also, see Yomiuri Shimbun opinion poll March
2008 showing 40.3% of respondents who thought Japan has become less safe thought that this was in part due toan increase in foreigners.
412―Mobile phone allows boss to snoop.‖ BBC online, 10 March 2010.

413

Information Commissioner‘s Office, Information Commissioner’s report to Parliament on the state ofsurveillance, 15.
414

Abe, The Managed Space Paradox: Surveillance and Freedom, 18-19.

415

Ibid., 22.

416

Ibid., 24.

417

Lyon, Tajima, and Shimizu, Surveillance After 9/11, 252.

62

In 1999 the Act on Wiretapping for Criminal Investigation418 was enacted in Japanand sparked a large scale controversy.419 Although the law was aimed at cannabis, gun crime,
violent crime, murder, and illegal immigration, it also allowed the police to monitor phones,
faxes and email. In May 2002, the Ministry of Defence made a list, including personal
information, of people who had made requests to them. The government had a list of everyone
who had complained or protested against government policy.420 The next year (2003), it was
revealed that for many years the Self Defence Force (SDF) had been compiling data fromover 550 local governments on boys and girls of military age.421
It is asserted by Lyon et al. that Japan had become a surveillance society where
personal information was collected, used, controlled, and managed, and people were watched,followed and discriminated against. In daily lives people‘s actions and choices were
scrutinised in minute details, and they often find themselves categorised.422 There wereconcerns about the trend towards social sorting and the lack of transparency in the use of
surveillance by the government. Fortunately most surveillance is bureaucratic or for businessefficiency, however once systems are in place they had the potential to become usednefariously.423 The lack of clear guidelines and legal restrictions led to increasing opposition,and government actions, such as those of the Ministry of Defence, caused an understandable
fear in the minds of citizens.

Impact upon CCTV
Surveillance in Japan and the UK evolved separately and for different reasons. In some
aspects, surveillance in Japan was greater in the past than the present. However, as of 2010,
neither Japan nor England could be described as a panoptic society. Surveillance was not
all-encompassing. In Japan the widespread use of citizens to police their own communities
decreased Japanese residents‘ expectation of privacy while out in public; and in the UK the418

Law number: Act No. 137 of 1999 [Hanzai sousa no tame no tsuushin bouju ni kan suru houritsu. 犯罪捜査のための通信傍受に関する法律]
419

Lyon, Tajima, and Shimizu, Surveillance After 9/11, 252.

420

Ibid.

421

Ibid.

422

Ibid., 255-257.

423

cf: Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy, 126-131 (arguing that systems such as ID cards do not turn ademocratic society into a totalitarian society, but rather when governments neglect public safety, law and order,
and work opportunities).

63

use of local councils to carry out intrusive surveillance on citizens has been a cause of great
concern. In both Japan and the UK, the threat of terrorism has helped increase citizens‘
acceptance of invasive surveillance and the mass implementation of CCTV, leading towards
both societies taking on aspects of the panopticon.
Media portrayal of rising crime, along with increased mobilisation of citizens,
crystallized the idea that there was a crime problem. In Japan, the mass participation involunteer policing schemes (1% of the Japanese population) meant that conducting
surveillance and being under surveillance was seen as a normal and a fundamental part ofsociety vital to public safety. The increase in surveillance by volunteer policing schemes
resulted in residents not only accepting the use of CCTV, but requesting it for their own safety.
In England citizens also participated in crime prevention, but it was more formalised and did
not have the local characteristic of Japan‘s volunteer groups.
Research carried out in the UK by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation424 found thatwhen extra security measures were added in areas with relatively low crime, residents'
feelings of security and safety decreased.425 Torin Monahan found that when CCTV wasinstalled, people reasoned that the cameras must have been brought in because there was a
problem with crime, leading to increasing fear of crime, regardless of crime levels.426 Thus,
extra CCTV may result in a decrease in feelings of safety and security, even when crime isactually decreasing, and, as the ICO 2010 report suggests, a reduction of overall trust insociety.
An increase in surveillance and use of CCTV could be justified by either an increasein the threat of terrorism or to bring more offenders to justice. However in both England andJapan, it appears that surveillance was increased not when there was evidence for its necessity,
but rather simply whenever authorities were able to bring it in and whenever people accepted
its use. Furthermore, as Phillips explained in 1997, it was flawed logic to claim that moresurveillance necessarily meant a safer and more secure society.427 Law enforcement andcrime related surveillance should be undertaken by the government, carried out only whennecessary and proportionate and effective, and with the minimum intrusion possible on
people‘s personal lives.

424

A UK based charity that conducts research and publishes papers on social problems in the UK. See:
http://www.jrf.org.uk/about-us
425

Crawford, Lister, and Wall, Evaluation of a contracted community policing experiment (Summary), 4.

426

Monahan, Surveillance in the Time of Insecurity, 11.

427

Phillips, ―Privacy in a ‗surveillance society‘,‖ Avoiding the death of privacy.

64

Chapter 3: Current Legislation
Privacy is a non-renewable resource. Once you lose it, it cannot be regained orregenerated. (Phillips, 1997)
3.1 UK – current legislation
In the UK, the four main sources of regulation for surveillance and protection of privacy are:
The Tort Breach of Confidence, The Human Rights Act 1998, The Data Protection Act 1998,
and The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.428 The Ministry of Justice claimed
that the current legislation was sufficient for both ‗current and future needs‘.429 Conversely, aHouse of Lords Special Committee said in 2009 that ‗at present, there are few restrictions on
the use of public area CCTV cameras in the UK.‘430 Privacy and surveillance academician
David Murakami Wood agreed by proposing that the current pace of technological changemeant existing legislation and incremental improvements were insufficient and newlegislation was required.431

The Tort Breach of ConfidenceThis act provides a remedy for unauthorised use or disclosure of certain confidential
information when there is a duty to keep the information secret. A public authority candisregard its duty of confidence in certain circumstances.432 Three conditions are required toprove a breach of confidence: 1) The information should be sensitive, non-trivial, and not in
the public domain or easily accessible elsewhere; 2) An obligation of confidence must haveexisted. This obligation does not have to be explicit, but can be obvious throughcircumstances; and 3) Use of the information must have been unauthorised. This need not be
dishonest nor must it necessarily result in any damages.433 Eric Metcalfe of JUSTICE434
428

House of Lords Constitution Committee, ―Surveillance: Citizens and the State,‖ 118.

429

Ibid., 119.

430

Ibid., 213.

431

Ibid., 119-120.

432―When there is a legal requirement to do so . . . ; where there is an overriding duty to the public to doso . . . ; and where the person to whom the information applies has given their consent.‖ Performance andInnovation Unit (PIU), UK: Privacy and data-sharing - The way forward for public services, sec. A.61.
433

Ibid., sec. A.60.

434

JUSTICE say they are ‗an all-party law reform and human rights organisation working to improve thelegal system and the quality of justice.‘ See: http://www.justice.org.uk/enterb/index1.html.

65stated that since the HRA, courts had begun to develop and use the common law breach ofconfidence principles as a more general remedy for breaches of rights under the HRA.435

Human Rights Act 1998
Article 8 of the Human Rights Act (HRA),436 entitled the ‗Right to Respect for Family Life‘
only allows individuals to bring a claim for privacy invasion against a public authority(known as the vertical effect). However, Article 6(1) states that: ‗it is unlawful for a publicauthority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.‘ This means that a
court as a public institution has to act compatibly with Article 8. Article 8 is therefore notlimited to requiring simply that an individual should be simply left alone but instead, Article 6
forces a positive obligation on the state authorities to ensure citizens‘ convention rights areprotected.437
The positive obligation from Article 6 leads to a ‗horizontal effect‘ where the courts
are obliged to enforce individuals‘ convention rights, even in disputes between two private
parties.438 The government can also be held to account when they have not provided adomestic remedy for privacy intrusions carried out by a non public body.439 The horizontal
effect has attracted controversy as the convention rights were commonly seen as providing
protection for the individual from the state;440 however, Bailey and Taylor noted that it could
not have been the intention of the legislators to provide no relief in disputes between private
parties.441
In addition, the act provides qualified protection for private and family life, home,and correspondence. These rights are subject to infringement by the government when inaccordance with the law, in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and necessary in a democratic society.
The ECtHR defined the phrase ‗necessary in a democratic society‘ as corresponding to a
‗pressing social need‘ and ‗proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued‘.442 A breach of
435

House of Lords Constitution Committee, ―Surveillance: Citizens and the State,‖ 127.

436

http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980042.htm

437

Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Fourth Edition, 804.

438

Bailey and Taylor, Bailey, Harris & Jones, 37.

439

Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Fourth Edition, 819.

440

Bailey and Taylor, Bailey, Harris & Jones, 38-39.

441

Ibid., 516.

442

Ibid., 519.

66

privacy under the HRA does not rest on a simple distinction of location between public andprivate,443 but rather a breach must involve private information, not originally in the publicdomain, and when there was no public interest in knowing the information. The personal or
private quality of information can be assessed by looking at what the owner and or originatorintended to do with the information.444 Information can also be classified as private when areasonable person would consider it ‗obviously private‘, for example, medical treatment,
weddings, and daily-life activities.445 Information is public when it is either known to many
people, or is in the public domain.446 However, if information is in the public domain but isonly known to a limited number of people and further publication would result in greater
dissemination thus causing further privacy-invasion related damage by being re-published,
then this information still retains some confidentiality.447
The Law Commission also found that ‗information was not in the public domain if ―it[was] only accessible to the public after a significant contribution of labour, skill ormoney‖.‘448 Confidential information was not protected if the public interest served bydisclosing the information outweighs the interest in preserving its confidentiality. 449 The
courts have ruled that persons holding public office cannot have the same expectation of aright to privacy in public, and their actions are likely to come under greater scrutiny than the
average person. However, the courts have also shown that public figures have a right toprivacy when they are not carrying out a public function and when the activity being exposed
is of no relevance to their role or suitability for public office.
Just because an action takes place in public, this does not mean that the action‘sprivate nature is removed. Everyday activities such as taking a walk or going to work, andeven very personal and intimate activities, like attempting suicide, can and often do takeplace in public.450 According to the courts, it is the private nature of the activity that makes
it private, not the location where it occurs.451 Furthermore, the requirement to show an
443

Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Fourth Edition, 822,823.

444

See Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2005] EWCA 595

445

Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Fourth Edition, 879-884.

446

See Blair v Associated Newspapers (Case no HG0001236), unreported

447

Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Fourth Edition, 886-887.

448

Ibid., 889.

449

Ibid., 916.

450

Ibid., 894.

451

Ibid., 895.

67

obligation of confidentiality has been removed452 and now a duty not to publish information
can be imposed simply by the nature of the information.453
The Lords Special Committee said that the HRA was not able to provide protection
from ‗over-zealous surveillance‘, and support should be given to groups whose privacy may
diminish through mass surveillance. 454 The Committee stated that Article 8 should beclarified in its applicability to privacy and surveillance, as those carrying out surveillance did
not have a good understanding of what was proportionate and necessary. Thus the test of
proportionality and necessity was an ineffective safeguard.455
Currently, there are domestic regulations in place for surveillance that circumvent the
HRA and allow local councils and police to conduct intrusive surveillance. The ambiguity in
the HRA is not the problem, but rather domestic legislation that provides public authorities
the legal power to carry out activities that would otherwise infringe Article 8.

Data Protection Act 1998
The 1995 EU Data Protection Directive obliged member states to incorporate its provisions
into domestic laws to facilitate the freedom of movement of personal data throughout theEuropean Union.456 The UK implemented the Data Protection Act (DPA)457 in response. It
was seen by Fenwick as an act ‗of immense significance in terms of protecting the privacy of
personal information,‘458 and increased the scope of the DPA 1984 Act, covering manual aswell as computerised files. This act was also the first statutory regulation that covered public
space CCTV.459
The DPA is aimed at preserving informational autonomy and directly addresses theprivate sector. This goes beyond the HRA obligations which only have an indirect and452

Confidential material is private information that a reasonable man would deem to be confidential due toeither its nature or because it has clear commercial value.
453

Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Fourth Edition, 913.

454

House of Lords Constitution Committee, ―Surveillance: Citizens and the State,‖ 136.

455

Ibid., 4: Legal Regulation and Safeguards, paragraph 142.

456

Bainbridge, Data Protection Law, 5.

457

http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980029.htm

458

Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Fourth Edition, 921.

459

Taylor, ―Regulating Big Brother,‖ 2.

68uncertain effect on the private sector.460 The act only covers personal data held in a filingsystem, electronic or otherwise and if the data is readily accessible.461
The act makes it a criminal offence to: 1) Possess personal information without
notifying the relevant authorities; 2) Allow or partake in unauthorised access of personal
information; or 3) Require an individual to make a Subject Access Request regarding
convictions and cautions for employment purposes. 462 The Information Commissioner‘s
Office (ICO) enforces these regulations and provides guidance to individuals andorganisations over their rights and obligations.
The ICO exempts systems from the DPA under certain conditions: firstly, provided
that the cameras are never used remotely to zoom in, or directed for the purposes of seeing
what particular people are doing; secondly if they are never used for monitoring staff
behaviour; and finally, if the images are not given to other bodies (except the security service
and the police). If images contain any personal information and undergo any processing either‗wholly or partly by automatic means‘, then this comes under data protection law. Therefore,
if a web-cam is set up to take and download pictures on to the internet, and the images include
personal data, then the whole process falls under DP law.463
The ICO‘s guidance states that: ‗The simple rule of thumb is that you need to decide
whether the image you have taken is aimed at learning about a particular person‘s activities.‘
The law is concerned with the intention of the operator when the cameras were set up andwhen they are operated. Images, even if they are not classified as ‗personal data‘ at the time ofcapture, can become personal data if their use changes.464 Lillian Edwards suggested this was
unsatisfactory because the processing requirements should start from the moment ofcollection, ‗not post hoc.‘465 The ICO 2010 report also raised concerns about data protection
law, stating that protection of personal information ‗continues to lag behind the motivation

460

Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Fourth Edition, 936.

461

Bainbridge, Data Protection Law, 43,44.

462

See sections 21, 55, and 56 respectively. The final obligation, section 56, is however not in force atpresent, as it is seen as more important that certain jobs, e.g. looking after children, old people etc… only
employ staff without certain convictions.
463

Edwards, ―Switching Off the Surveillance Society?,‖ 15.

464

For example, an image of a celebrity captured on London‘s congestion zone cameras is initially not
personal data as it is incidental to the purpose of the cameras, however if this image is then sold to a newspaper,the data becomes personal as it is the personal character of the image that is now the subject of the photo.
465

Edwards, ―Switching Off the Surveillance Society?,‖ 14.

69

and capability to exploit it.‘466
In order to comply with the DPA, CCTV schemes must ensure that they acquireconsent from those being watched for processing of their image. 467 Where consent may bepart of an employment contract, the consent must be ‗freely given and specific and informed‘.
Where the CCTV user is a store with cameras covering public streets, they have to display
suitable signs indicating the identity of the person responsible for the scheme, the purpose ofscheme, and who to contact about the scheme. If a CCTV camera is not accompanied with asign and is not for crime prevention or detection, it is classified as a covert system.468
When cameras are for crime prevention or detection, the images need to be suitable for
evidential purposes and situated suitably to provide clear facial images; otherwise the system
is not fit for purpose and may breach DPA rules.469 The images must only be used for the
purpose specified and this must have been notified to the ICO. If the operator wants to add
another reason for the using the cameras they must resubmit their information to the ICO.
There is no specific time limit for retention of images, but guidelines say this should theminimum time necessary, which will differ between institutions.470
The act does not provide substantive rights to individuals to take action in courts;
instead the act is enforced by the ICO. Individuals must lodge a complaint with the ICO who
can launch an investigation and, if a breach is proved, serve a notice of enforcement. 471 Thereare exemptions under the 1998 Act for national security and domestic purposes. If personal
data is processed for prevention or detection of crime, then there is exemption from the firstdata protection principle and from the subject access provisions.472 An exemption from all of
the data protection principles applies when it is ‗required‘ for safeguarding national
security.473 Bainbridge questioned whether the use of the word ‗required‘ was relevant, as inmost other provisions of the Act the word ‗necessary‘ was used instead. Bainbridge suggested
466

Information Commissioner‘s Office, Information Commissioner’s report to Parliament on the state ofsurveillance, 6.
467

Edwards, ―Switching Off the Surveillance Society?,‖ 16-18.

468

Taylor, ―Regulating Big Brother,‖ 4.

469

Ibid., 5.

470

For example, any incidents at a pub will probably quickly come to the attention of the landlord, therefore
seven days is reasonable; banks will need to keep their images for longer as financial crimes/queries often takelonger to come to notice, and therefore three months is more reasonable.
471

House of Lords Constitution Committee, ―Surveillance: Citizens and the State,‖ 146-147.

472

Section 29 DPA 1998

473

Section 28 DPA 1998

70

that this may mean that deciding whether the exemption should apply or not became asubjective test rather than an objective test.474 Under the DPA, data does not have to becollected lawfully when it is for the purpose of tackling crime or collecting taxes;475 however,conditions for processing still apply.
There have been few prosecutions under the DPA, effectively weakening the effect of
the legislation, in spite of the self regulation that many organisations undergo.476 The DPA
has been criticised for its complicated nature by the Lord Chancellor, who in 2004 stated that‗the problem about the Data Protection Act is that it is almost incomprehensible.‘477 Nick
Taylor found, in 2007, that outside the public sector the dominant factor influencing CCTV
operation was not the DPA, but rather operational efficiency due to the complexity of thelegislation and the lack of enforcement options available. The lack of influence of the DPA
has resulted in poor public knowledge of the rights and obligations under the act. Taylor
claimed that the DPA has had a limited effect on the use of CCTV.478 This was a dubious
claim as CCTV policies routinely state that the DPA applies to their use of cameras and theprocessing of images, and while there may be a poor understanding of its specific details, it
continues to play a central role in the creating and amending of CCTV usage and guidelines.

Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
Prior to RIPA479, invasions of privacy by covert surveillance were occurring on the basis ofnegative liberties where the state was free to do anything that the law did not forbid.
Therefore, as there was no legal right to privacy, the government did not need a specific legal
power to justify laws that invaded privacy.480 The HRA changed this due to the requirementthat any interference must be ‗in accordance with the law,‘ making it necessary to introduce astatutory basis for state surveillance.481
RIPA covers directed or intrusive covert surveillance, but does not apply to overt
474

Bainbridge, Data Protection Law, 164-165.

475

Ibid., 166.

476

Ibid., 9.

477

The Guardian, 18 October 2004

478

Taylor, ―Regulating Big Brother,‖ 48.

479

http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000023.htm

480

Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Fourth Edition, 1059.

481

Ibid.

71

surveillance unless the subject is unaware of being observed.482 Surveillance carried out on
unidentified individuals as a response to unforeseen circumstances is not covered by RIPA but
is part of everyday policing and does not need specific authorisation. Therefore, when a
CCTV operator notices an individual acting suspiciously and follows them on camera for ashort while, this is outside the remit of RIPA. However, if the surveillance continues beyond areasonable point, it stops being general observation and becomes directed surveillance, andresults in the application of RIPA. The Covert Surveillance Code of Practice says483 that
where a person‘s Article 8 rights are likely to be effected by continued surveillance,
authorisation for directed surveillance should be requested from a Designated Person (DP).484
Directed surveillance can be carried out by any public authority that specifies at least
one DP who is then able to authorise surveillance.485 The DP must decide for each application
whether the surveillance activity is necessary and proportionate. The DP must consider
whether there is any danger of incidental invasion of privacy and if during the surveillance
operation, there is any incidental intrusion of privacy, the officers carrying out thesurveillance must inform the DP to allow the DP reassess the situation, and if necessary
amend or withdraw authorisation.
There are seven grounds that are listed and different public authorities are limited todifferent subsets of these grounds for authorising surveillance.486 The police can use thegrounds of national security, prevention or detection of crime or disorder, in the economic
well-being of the UK, in the interests of safety, and for protecting public health. Intrusive
surveillance can only be carried out under the following three grounds and upon authorisation
by senior authorising officers or the Secretary of State:487 1) in the interests of national
security; 2) for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime; and 3) in the interests ofthe economic well-being of the United Kingdom.488
The former chief of the Covert Investigation Peer Review Group told the Lords Select482

Williams, Surveillance and Intelligence Law Handbook, 128.

483

Covert Surveillance Code of Practice paragraph 2.3

484

Williams, Surveillance and Intelligence Law Handbook, 131.

485

This power is also conferred on officers more senior to those specified as DP‘s

486

Williams, Surveillance and Intelligence Law Handbook, 134-137.

487

For the Police a Surveillance Commissioner must approve the authorisation before it becomes effective.
If the case is urgent if can be temporarily internally approved, but the Surveillance Commissioner must be
notified as soon as is practicable. If the Surveillance Commissioner considers that the information can beobtained by less intrusive means, authorisation will be withheld.
488

Williams, Surveillance and Intelligence Law Handbook, 143.

72

Committee that ‗the use of covert surveillance is indispensable to the police‘, and that there
was a high level of public support for surveillance when there was a good balance between
privacy and safety. 489 However there have been a number of concerns raised with thelegislation that deals with police surveillance.
The introduction of RIPA may have had the impact of reducing the effectiveness of the
HRA in the area of privacy protection, because if there was no RIPA then many of thewould-be non-statutory powers of surveillance would have been challengeable under HRA
Article 8.490 In addition, Fenwick noted that the different levels of authorisation required for
directed and intrusive surveillance may breach the HRA.491 There are concerns that RIPA
does not enforce proportionality on surveillance but rather masks the activities and prevents
an in-depth scrutiny of operations because public authorities are able to self authorize most of
their surveillance operations.492 The Lords Select Committee have voiced concerns about thelack of judicial oversight for surveillance by public authorities and suggested that a suitablesystem should be introduced to deal with this problem.493
Authorisation for directed surveillance is only required when it is ‗likely to result inthe obtaining of private information about a person‘. However, the courts have said that‗private life considerations may arise once any systematic or permanent record comes into
existence.‘ 494 This court statement means that if a CCTV camera records, stores andprocesses data, the recorded information may be considered private and so invoke RIPA.495
The regulations are criticized as being unclear and often leading to authorisation being
requested when not required, and not requested when required.496
A review of RIPA in 2004 found that it had ‗several ambiguities and deficiencies andhad been implemented poorly.‘ Nick Gargan, former Chair of the Covert Investigation Peer
Review Group, said that RIPA had been difficult to implement and that it created ‗an489House of Lords Constitution Committee, ―Surveillance: Citizens and the State,‖ 86.

490

Taylor, ―State surveillance and the right to privacy,‖ Privacy and covert surveillance.

491

Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Fourth Edition, 1074.

492

Ibid., 1098.

493

House of Lords Constitution Committee, ―Surveillance: Citizens and the State,‖ 163.

494

PG and JH v United Kingdom (25/12/2001) European Court App. 44787/98 (ruling that covert recordingof a conversation in a police detention cell was a violation of Article 8)495

Bailey and Taylor, Bailey, Harris & Jones, 593-594.

496

Ibid., 594.

73

excessive burden of unnecessary bureaucracy.‘ 497 The police also appear to seek RIPA
authorisation for surveillance that was not intended to be under the remit of the legislation.498
Chief Surveillance Commissioner Sir Christopher Rose has defended this ‗unnecessary
bureaucracy‘ saying that the paperwork required for covert surveillance leaves an ‗impeccable
paper trail . . . that helps everyone.‘ Rose also suggested that the deficiencies were due toinexperienced officers rather than faulty legislation.499

Privacy Impact Assessments
Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA)500 arose in the mid 1990s in the USA and Australia. They
are not simply legal compliance checks, but rather look at wider implications of a system orlegislation with regards to privacy. They require the organisation looking to implement asystem to ask ‗should we be doing this‘ as well as ‗can we do this‘.501 The onus is put on the
promoter and implementer of a system to show that their system is not harmful before
unleashing it on the public.502 The Lords Select Committee recommended any organisation
conducting surveillance or personal data processing system to carry out a PIA. This PIA
should be carried out preferably prior to a project‘s start to ensure there is a realistic impact on
the project; or if the activity has already begun then either an audit or a compliance check to
see if there are problem areas to be tackled.503 They are now mandatory in all UK central
government departments.504 Currently PIAs are restricted to the public sector; however there
have been calls for PIAs to be carried out in the private sector. The ICO 2010 report further
recommended a PIA to be carried out on any new legislation that may engage concerns about
increased collection and exploitation of personal information. PIAs may indicate the need forsunset clauses in controversial legislation.505

497

House of Lords Constitution Committee, ―Surveillance: Citizens and the State,‖ 153-154.

498

Bailey and Taylor, Bailey, Harris & Jones, 594.

499

House of Lords Constitution Committee, ―Surveillance: Citizens and the State,‖ 157-158.

500

Information Commissioner‘s Office, ―Privacy impact assessment (PIA).‖

501

Linden Consulting Inc, Privacy Impact Assessments: International Study of their Application and Effects,

502

Ibid., 5.

503

House of Lords Constitution Committee, ―Surveillance: Citizens and the State,‖ 103.

2.

504

Warren et al., ―Privacy Impact Assessments,‖ 1-2 (recounting how the loss of child benefit records
prompted a Cabinet Office review whose resulting report mandated PIAs for central government departments).
505

Information Commissioner‘s Office, Information Commissioner’s report to Parliament on the state of74

According to a 2007 report that analysed PIAs in a number of different countries, PIAs
were most effective when part of a system of incentives, sanctions, review, and whencombined with external consultation.506 Initial evaluations found that organisations often
described their systems at too abstract a level, often missed issues that could have asignificant privacy impact, wanted to collect more information than was required for their
purpose, and also often failed to have a plan to deal with any privacy issues.507 Since the UK
implemented PIAs, the Netherlands, Norway, and Mexico have shown interest in the UK‘s
PIA methodology.508

CCTV Codes of PracticeHome Office Codes of PracticeDue to changes in technology, and the way CCTV use has changed, an updated code ofpractice was published in 2008.509 The stated purpose is to ensure organisations follow the
DPA and reassure people that their privacy is being protected. The code of practice covers theuse of CCTV in the following circumstances:
1. ‗Seeing what an individual is doing, e.g. monitoring in a shop or on the street;
2. When there may be an action in relation to an individual, for example handing theimages over to the police to investigate a crime; and3. Using the images of an individual in a way that will affect their privacy, forexample passing images on to a TV company.‘510
The codes make a number of suggestions to be followed to ensure that a system is setup andrun appropriately: CCTV should only be used when it is proportionate to the problem it is designed todeal with; otherwise its use would be inappropriate;surveillance, 7.
506

Linden Consulting Inc, Privacy Impact Assessments: International Study of their Application and Effects,

29-30.
507

Ibid., 29.

508

Warren et al., ―Privacy Impact Assessments,‖ 5.

509

Information Commissioner‘s Office, ―CCTV Codes of Practice.‖

510

Ibid.

75

 The presence of all cameras must be made clearly known, and if cameras are to be
used in locations or under circumstances where there is a greater expectation ofprivacy, for example, in public toilets extra effort should be made to ensure thatthose coming under surveillance are aware of the cameras; They must not record conversations between members of the public;
 It should not be possible for third parties to intercept images.; Members of public who request access to images of themselves captured on CCTV
must be provided access to images within forty days; If one of the justifications for using CCTV is prevention/detection of crime and theimages are likely to be needed in court, then it is essential that the images can beprovided simply to law enforcement agencies. If this can‘t be done, then the
purpose for which the CCTV has been installed is likely to be undermined; and Images should be retained for the shortest period necessary, depending on thecircumstances and situation in which the cameras are being used.511

Camden Council Codes of Practice
The London Borough of Camden published their CCTV Codes of Practice in November
2001.512 These codes of practice state that it is ‗a necessary, proportionate and suitable tool tohelp reduce crime, reduced the fear of crime and improve public safety.‘513 The codes also
clarify eight objectives of the CCTV system in order to justify the processing of data as
follows:
1. ‗To help reduce the fear of crime;
2. To help deter crime;
3. To help detect crime and provide evidential material for court proceedings;
4. To assist in the overall management of the London Borough of Camden andselected adjacent geographical boundaries with the London Borough of Brent;

511

Ibid.

512

In conjunction with Brent Council and the Metropolitan Police

513

Camden Council, ―Camden Council CCTV Code of Practice,‖ 1.2.1.

76

5. To enhance community safety, assist in developing the economic well being of the
London Boroughs of Camden and Brent and encourage greater use of district
centres;
6. To assist the Local Authority in its enforcement and regulatory functions;
7. To assist in Traffic Management; and8. To assist in supporting civil proceedings which will help detect crime.‘514
Although the code specifies that the system will operate in accordance with all therequirements and principles of the HRA and the DPA, Camden‘s code is a broad outline thatjustifies almost any use of the cameras and their images. An annual report on the scheme is bemade available to the public every year, and it is also to be periodically reviewed
independently every two years: ‗to establish whether the purposes of the system are being
complied with and whether objectives are being achieved, and the results used to develop the
specified purpose and objectives of the scheme.‘515 Furthermore, inspections of the system
will take place six times a year by independent persons without prior notice. As part of theaudit, operators may be required to justify their viewing or recording of any individuals orproperty.

Other relevant legislation / regulations
The following laws are also relevant to CCTV implementation in the UK: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (S64A): A police constable has the power
to a photograph a person outside a police station when they have been arrested for
an offence.516
 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996: Police-generated or
police-acquired images relevant to an investigation must be kept for a minimum
retention time to prevent destruction of evidence that could be used in court.517
 Freedom of Information Act 2000: The public have the right of access topublically held information including positions of publically funded cameras and514

Ibid., 1.3.1.

515

Ibid., 5.1.

516

Police and Crime Standards Directorate, Guidance for the Police Use of Body-Worn Video Devices, 12.

517

Ibid., 11.

77

any images stored by the cameras. Requests can be declined in the name ofnational security, criminal investigations, law enforcement, or if personal
information would be disclosed.
 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (S 163): Local councils areauthorised to install CCTV to record visual images of any events occurring on
any of the land in their area to promote the prevention of crime or the welfare of
the victims of crime.
 Local Government Act 1972 / Local Government Rating Act 1997: The Local
Government Act 1972 gives the council the power to do anything coincidental tothe discharge of the council‘s functions.518 The Local Government Rating Act
1997 gives local councils the power to install and maintain equipment to help
prevent and detect crime and grant money to police authorities.519
 Crime and Disorder Act (S17): The council must to do all that it reasonably canto prevent crime and disorder in its area.520
 The Private Security Industry Act 2001 (PSI): The PSI regulates the securities
industry and requires CCTV operators to obtain a public space CCTV
surveillance qualification and licence before operating any public space CCTV
cameras.521

The effect of Legislation on CCTV Use
The ECtHR has given the opinion on what they consider normal uses of CCTV:
the normal use of security cameras per se, whether in the public street or on premises
such as shopping centres or police stations, where they serve a legitimate andforeseeable purpose, do not raise issues [in relation to private life].522
Nick Taylor insisted that this was not the case, and said that overt surveillance should be

518―Local Government Act 1972,‖ 111.

519

―Local Government and Rating Act 1997,‖ 31.

520―Crime and Disorder Act 1998,‖ 17.

521

See Chapter 4 for a description of an SIA CCTV training course the author undertook.

522

Taylor, ―Proportionality and the use of video surveillance in the United Kingdom.‖78

legally regulated according to the HRA Article 8.523
The use of CCTV is directly regulated by the DPA and the CCTV Codes of Practice.524
RIPA only applies to CCTV use when it is used covertly and is either directed or intrusive.
The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 regulates local authority in the use of CCTV
installations for general surveillance purposes; however, if there is no perceived invasion ofprivacy, then the HRA will not apply.525 The ECtHR‘s comments gave guidance as to when
the HRA will apply:
The monitoring of the actions of an individual in a public place by the use ofphotographic equipment which does not record the visual data does not, as such, giverise to an interference with the individual‘s private life. On the other hand, therecording of the data and the systematic or permanent nature of the record may giverise to such considerations.526
Therefore when images are recorded there may be an interference with an individual‘s privacy,
and because this is only allowed when provided for by law, its use must be regulated. There isa danger that providing specific legislation for CCTV will in effect legalise the invasion ofprivacy by CCTV. There are already concerns that RIPA has had this effect on covert use ofcameras.
Because CCTV evidence is generally highly reliable, it is unlikely to be excluded atcourt even when someone‘s Article 8 rights had been infringed in the process of obtaining thefootage.527 Thus the police are unlikely to adhere to Article 8 when it prevents them securing
evidence to gain a conviction.528

523

Taylor, ―State surveillance and the right to privacy.‖

524

Bailey and Taylor, Bailey, Harris & Jones, 577.

525

Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Fourth Edition, 1068.

526

Bailey and Taylor, Bailey, Harris & Jones, 508.

527

Ibid., 578.

528

Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Fourth Edition, 1077, 1289-1290; See also ―Khan v UK
(1999) 27 EHRR CD 58; (2000) 8 BFRC 310‖, where a listening device was placed by the police on the outside
wall of the home of a known drug dealer, and Khan, while visiting, admitted importing a large quantity ofheroine from the drug dealer. The Court of Appeal agreed that the police had trespassed and breached Khan‘s
Article 8 rights; however, the crime was serious enough to counter balance the manner in which the police
gained the evidence.

79

Relevant Court Cases
In Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers (2004),529 pictures were covertly taken of Naomi
Campbell attending Narcotics Anonymous and published along with details of her struggle
with addiction to illegal drugs. Campbell claimed a breach of privacy and the case reachedthe House of Lords where it was dismissed on the grounds that it was in the public interest
due to her previous public statements that she was not a drug user. Lord Hoffmann said thatwhilst he thinks anyone has the right to take a photo of another person in public, with orwithout their consent, and that this was not in itself enough to amount to an invasion ofprivacy, this right did not extend to publishing them to ‗the world at large.530 Lord Hope of
Craighead said that ‗the taking of photographs in a public street must…be taken to be one ofthe ordinary incidents of living in a free community‘, and that one could only complain of aninvasion of privacy if they were not incidental to the picture, but rather the focus and goal of
the photo.531 Baroness Hale of Richmond said that just because a photo was taken covertly,
it did not make it confidential – it was the nature of the activity that determined whether it
was private or not.532 The case was complicated by Campbell‘s repeated false public claims
that she was not a drug user.533 These false public claims were enough to provide a public
interest (see below) in knowing the information, and the media was seen as having a right topublish information that directly disproved a falsehood that had been publically proclaimedby the applicant. If Campbell had not publically lied about her drug addiction, the courts
would have likely found in her favour.
In Blair v Associated Newspapers (unreported),534 the publication of an article by the‗Mail on Sunday‘ newspaper was deemed as not having removed the confidentiality of theinformation it published, even though thousands of people may have read the article. Thisruling indicates that publishing material that is already in the public domain may still attract
liability, if the initial publication breached Article 8.
In Peck v United Kingdom (2003),535 the dissemination of a video of an activity that529

Campbell v MGN[2004] 2 WLR 1232; [2004] 2 AC 457

530

Bailey and Taylor, Bailey, Harris & Jones, 550.

531

Ibid., 553.

532

Ibid., 557.

533

Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Hoffmann and Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Hale ofRichmond, , and , Lord Carswell, House of Lords - Campbell (Appellant) v. MGN Limited (Respondents), para.
38.
534

Blair v Associated Newspapers (Case no HQ0001236) (unreported)

535

Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41

80

took place in public was ruled to violate Article 8. The applicant, Peck, was captured on local
council CCTV wandering down a high street with a knife just before attempting to commit
suicide by slashing his wrists. The captured images were given to a media company andwere shown on national TV to deter crime and promote CCTV, but without either his consent
or his being identity masked.536 The judge dismissed the applicant‘s claim for judicial
review saying that while he sympathised with the invasion of privacy:
unless and until there is a general right of privacy recognised by English law . . .
reliance must be place on effective guidance being issued by Codes of Practice orotherwise, in order to try and avoid such undesirable invasions of a person‘s privacy.
Peck took the case to Strasbourg where the court decided that the council‘s disclosureinterfered with the applicant‘s Article 8 rights to respect for private life because the image of
his actions had been shown to a much greater degree and in more detail than would havebeen possible by a passerby who happened upon the actual event.
The court deemed that the council could and should have taken steps to mask theidentity of the applicant or sought his consent. The applicant did not argue that his image
being captured on CCTV was an invasion of his privacy, and he even acknowledged that thefootage allowed the police to be alerted which probably saved his life; however, theconsequent dissemination of the footage was an unacceptable invasion of privacy. 537 If Peckhad committed a criminal offence then the court would have probably found the release of
the images justified if there was a good enough reason, for example to help trace or identify
the offender.
However, in this case though Peck had clearly committed a crime by being inpossession of a knife in a public place, the release of the images was not related to tracing or
identifying him, as he had already been apprehended by the police. 538 The court‘s decision
established that a public body breaches Article 8 when it publically releases private
information about an individual without their consent. This decision would also apply to a
public broadcaster, such as BBC, but it is unclear if it would also apply to a private
broadcaster.539

536

Edwards, ―Switching Off the Surveillance Society?,‖ 22-24.

537

Bailey and Taylor, Bailey, Harris & Jones, 508.

538

Bainbridge, Data Protection Law, 168.

539

Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Fourth Edition, 819.

81

In Von Hannover v Germany (2006)540 Princess Caroline of Monaco was subjected
to repeated paparazzi intrusion into her daily life and took a claim for breach of privacy to
the German courts. The courts decided that there was no intrusion as she was a ‗figure ofsociety par excellence‘ and had to tolerate this kind of publication. This was despite the factthat she did not undertake any public engagements or duties on behalf of the state. She took
her case to the ECtHR claiming a breach of Article 8. The court determined that there had
been a breach ruling that private life ‗includes a person‘s physical and psychologicalintegrity‘ and Article 8‘s primary intention was to ensure that people are able to develop theirown personality and relations with others without outside interference when the activity falls
within the scope of private life, and even when it occurs in public.541 The court went on to
say that: ‗the decisive factor in balancing the protection of private life against freedom of
expression should lie in the contribution that the published photos and articles make to adebate of general interest.‘ The court decided that the photos that the applicant wascomplaining about made no such contribution to a debate of general interest as the Princess
exercised no official function, and the published information was solely about her private life.
Thus the public did not have a legitimate interest in knowing such information about theapplicant even if she was well known and the pictures were taken while she was in a public
place.542

3.2 Japan – current legislation
Overview
Japan does not have a specific ‗privacy‘ law nor is privacy directly mentioned in theconstitution. Furthermore no law exists specifically addressing CCTV.543 However a right toprivacy can be seen through court interpretations of the constitution and new legislation on
data protection.

Constitution
In a report published in December 1945, by the chief of the legal department charged with540

Von Hannover v Germany (2006) 43 EHRR 7

541

Bailey and Taylor, Bailey, Harris & Jones, 511.

542

Ibid., 515.

543

Kotani, ―Rapid Increase in use of Surveillance Cameras by the Police,‖ 195.

82

drawing up the Japanese Constitution, one of the rights desired for inclusion was privacy. 544
Legal scholars generally accept that Article 13, which secures the right to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness, also includes the right to privacy.545 Annette Marfording argued that theclause in Article 13 specifying that ‗all the people shall be respected as individuals‘ was indirect conflict with Japanese cultural norms and contradicts the notion of group identity that iscommonly promulgated in Japan.546 Some commentators also noted that although Article 13
theoretically provided comprehensive protection for privacy, in reality protection was weak
and insufficient.547
The right to privacy enshrined in the constitution can be found in the following
articles: Article 13: Ehara said that the two phrases: ‗people should be respected as
individuals‘, and ‗the pursuit of happiness‘ were comprehensive and contained the concept ofprivacy.548 These rights were limited by the public good, which was often interpreted as
ensuring a balance with other human rights. Some commentators have argued that individual
clauses contained the right to privacy, while others have said that the right to privacy comesfrom the combination, and the comprehensive nature of Article 13.
Articles 13, 21, 23, 33, 35, and 38: The right to privacy is protected as part of a
combination of articles. Article 21—a person‘s communications must remain secret; Article
23—academic freedom is guaranteed; Article 33—protection from arrest without warrant;
Article 35—a person should be free in their homes from entry, searches and seizures without
warrant; and Article 38—protection from forced confessions and testifying against oneself.
There was also a theory that Articles 33 and 35 were based on the 4th Amendment of the US
constitution which protects citizen‘s privacy.549
Due to difficulties amending the Japanese constitution, the right to privacy, along withother newly claimed rights, have to be extrapolated from different ambiguous articles. The
majority of privacy claims have used Article 13 as a base; however, due to the article‘s lack ofclarity, practical application is difficult. This difficulty leads to the mistaken claim that theconcept of privacy is neither fully understood nor protected.

544

Ehara, The right to Privacy: A comprehensive analysis, 64-77.

545

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 34.

546

Marfording, ―Cultural Relativism and the Construction of Culture,‖ 439-440.

547

Japan Federation of Bar Associations, The Day Privacy is Lost, 78.

548

Ehara, The right to Privacy: A comprehensive analysis, 67.

549

Ibid., 68.

83

Criminal Procedure Law
The Code of Criminal Procedure regulates criminal investigations by the police. Article 1
states that the purpose of the codes is to ‗reveal the true facts of cases and to apply and realize
criminal laws and regulations quickly and appropriately, while ensuring the maintenance of
public welfare and the guarantee of the fundamental human rights of individuals.‘550 This
makes clear from the start that there must be a balance between the use of power byinvestigatory bodies to investigate crimes and the protection of people from the abuse oroverstretch of power. Articles 197, 218, and 220 indicate how Criminal Procedure Law
regulates police use of CCTV in Japan.551
Article 197 Section 1 is a general rule for investigation and can be understood asallowing any measure that is proportionate and appropriate to be employed in a criminal
investigation.552 The article states that: ‗such examination as is necessary to achieve its
objective may be conducted; provided, however that compulsory dispositions553 shall not beapplied unless special provisions have been established in this code.‘ This is understood torule out using methods of investigation that infringe the rights of individuals against their will.
Masahito Inoue explained that, regarding the taking of pictures, compulsory dispositions
would clearly include taking pictures of people in their homes with high powered lenses orinfrared sensors. In these circumstances people would not be easily viewable to the public andwould therefore have a high expectation of privacy in their actions, and therefore intrusion
upon it would be a ‗compulsory disposition‘. Inoue said that the argument is not so clear cut
when talking about taking pictures of people in a public place. He said that when in public
people still do not appreciate having their photos taken without their consent; however, inpublic, actions taken by individuals are in full view of the public and therefore they cannot
550

Article 1 The purpose of this Code, with regard to criminal cases, is to reveal the true facts of cases and to
apply and realize criminal laws and regulations quickly and appropriately, while ensuring the maintenance of
public welfare and the guarantee of the fundamental human rights of individuals. Dai 1 jou: Kono houritsu wa,
kenji jiken ni tsuki, koukyou no fukushi no iji to kojin no kihonteki jinken no hoshou to wo mattoshitsutsu, jian noshinsou wo akaraka ni shi, keibatsuhourei wo tekisei katsu jinsoku ni tekiyou jitsugen suru koto wo mokuteki tosuru. 第一条: この法律は、刑事事件につき、公共の福祉の維持と個人の基本的人権の保障とを全うしつつ、事案の真相を明らかにし、刑罰法令を適正且つ迅速に適用実現することを目的とする。
551

Articles 106 and 107 describe provisions for search and seizure by the court during the trial phase.

552

Article 197: With regard to investigation, such examination as is necessary to achieve its objective may
be conducted; provided, however, that compulsory dispositions shall not be applied unless special provisions
have been established in this code. Dai 197 Jou: Sousa nit suite wa, sono mokuteki wo tassuru tame hitsuyou na
torishirabe wo suru koto gadekiru. Tadashi, kyousei no shobun wa, kono houritsu ni tokubetsu no tei no aru baaide nakereba, kore wo suru koto ga dekinai. 第百九十七条: 捜査については、その目的を達するため必要な取調をすることができる。但し、強制の処分は、この法律に特別の定のある場合でなければ、これをすることができない。
553

強制の処分 kyousei no shoubun

84

expect the same level of privacy as when in one‘s own home.554 This does not mean thatpeople have absolutely no right to privacy when in public; however taking photos of people inpublic is not necessarily a compulsory disposition.555 Inoue does however claim that when
the police take photos in public without a warrant, and there are insufficient reasons to justify
the recording, this would be classed as a compulsory disposition.556
Article 218(1)557 grants permission for a police officer, public prosecutor‘s assistant
officer, or a public prosecutor to take pictures558 of individuals as a compulsory method
provided there is a warrant. In this case, where a warrant has been granted for the use ofcameras in the investigation, CCTV will not breach Article 197, as the granting of a warrant
will satisfy the requirement that the special provisions—provided for in the code—have been
followed.559 Article 218(2)560 allows pictures to be taken of individuals without a warrant
who have been detained and placed under physical restraint.561 This can be described as
554

Inoue, ―任意捜査と強制捜査の区別,‖ 49.

555

井上, “任意捜査と強制捜査の区別,” 49(stating: 'Gaitou koudou wo shiteiru hito no shashin satsuei
wa, kyousei shobun to made wa ienai.' 街頭行動をしている人の写真撮影は、強制処分とまではいえな
い。).
556

井上, “任意捜査と強制捜査の区別,” 49 (stating: 'Jouki no youna gaitou koudou wo suru hito no
mureijou no shashin satsuei mo kyouseishobun ni zoku suru to iu koto ni narou.' 上記のような街頭行動をする人の無令状の写真撮影も強制処分に属するということになろう。）.
557

Article 218 (1) A public prosecutor, a public prosecutor's assistant officer or a judicial police official may,
if necessary for investigation of an offense, conduct search, seizure or inspection upon a warrant issued by ajudge. In such cases, the inspection and examination of a person shall be conducted upon a warrant for physicalexamination. Dai 218 Jou (2): Kensatsukan, kensatsujimukan mata wa shihoukeisatsushokuin wa, hanzai no
sousa wo suru ni tsuite hitsuyou ga aru toki wa, saibankan no hassuru reijou ni yori, sashiosae, sousaku matawa kenshou wo suru koto ga dekiru. Kono baai ni oite shintai no sousa wa, shintai sousa reijou niyoranakerebanaranai. 第二百十八条 検察官、検察事務官又は司法警察職員は、犯罪の捜査をするについて必要があるときは、裁判官の発する令状により、差押、捜索又は検証をすることができる。この場合において身体の検査は、身体検査令状によらなければならない。
558

写真・撮影 Shashin / Satsuei

559

Niwayama explains that the photographing of an individual's image is a new form of compulsory
disposition: ’Kojin no youbou no satsuei ha [atarashii ruikata no kyouseishobun]' 個人の容貌の撮影は「新しい類型の強制処分」 See:浩也 and 庭山, “写真撮影と肖像権,” 86.
560

Article 218(2): In cases where a suspect is placed under physical restraint, his/her fingerprints or
footprints may be taken, his/her height or weight may be measured and his/her photographs may be taken
without the warrant set forth in the preceding paragraph, only when he/she is not stripped naked. Dai 218 Jou(2):Shintai no kousoku wo ukereiru higaisha no shimon moshiku wa ashigata wo saishu shi, shinchou moshiku wa
taijuu wo sokutei shi, mata wa shashin wo satsuei suru ni wa, higaisha wo hadaka nishinai kagiri, zenkou no
reijou ni yoru koto wo youshinai. 第二百十八条(2): 身体の拘束を受けている被疑者の指紋若しくは足型を採取し、身長若しくは体重を測定し、又は写真を撮影するには、被疑者を裸にしない限り、前項の令状によることを要しない。
561

Niwayama, ―写真撮影と肖像権,‖ 86.

85

permitting the use of compulsory method without a warrant; although it clearly does not cover
the use of CCTV in public spaces of individuals or groups of individuals who have not beenarrested, detained, or suspected of any offence.562 Article 220(1)[ii] 563 and 220(3) 564
permit photographs to be taken during the course of an arrest – that is, as a compulsory
method without warrant.
Inoue explains that if there is no warrant, then CCTV must only be used if its use does
not infringe an individual‘s rights; otherwise its use would be contrary to Article 197.565
Crime control methods that may be seen as infringing certain rights when used for somecrimes will be justified when used in crimes of a graver nature. In the Kyoto Gakuren casepolice photographed, without warrant, demonstrators who had neither been arrested nor werein the process of being arrested. 566 This decision can be seen as setting the limits forphotographing persons in public under the ‗non-compulsory‘ classification. The case showed
how the specific circumstances of individual incidents will determine the extent to whichinvasive methods of investigation can be employed—that is, whether or not the methods ofinvestigation are proportional. The concept of proportionality applies to both compulsory andnon-compulsory dispositions. Police are thus able to employ cameras in public as long as they
can show that their use is appropriate and proportionate to the specific circumstances. The
concepts of proportionality and appropriateness do not however allow a compulsory method
562

Matsudai, ―写真撮影,‖ 76.

563

Article 220 (1) When a public prosecutor, a public prosecutor's assistant officer or a judicial police
official arrests a suspect pursuant to the provision of Article 199 or arrests a flagrant offender, he/she may, if
necessary, take the following measures. The same shall apply, if necessary, to cases where the suspect is arrested
pursuant to the provision of Article 210: (ii) Search, seizure or inspection on the spot at the arrest. Dai 220 Jou(1): Kensatsukan, kensatsujimukan mata wa shihoukeisatsushokuin wa, dai 199 jou no kitei ni yori higisha wo
taihou suru baai mata wa genkou hannin wo taihou suru baai ni oite hitsuyou ga aru toki wa, hidari no shobun
wo suru koto ga dekiru. Dai 200 Jou no kitei ni yori higisha wo taihou suru baai ni oite hitsuyou ga aru tokimo,
douyou de aru. (ii) taihou no genba de sashiosae, sousaku mata wa kenshou wo suru koto. 第二百二十条 検察官、検察事務官又は司法警察職員は、第百九十九条の規定により被疑者を逮捕する場合又は現行犯人を逮捕する場合において必要があるときは、左の処分をすることができる。第二百十条の規定により被疑者を逮捕する場合において必要があるときも、同様である。 二 逮捕の現場で差押、捜索又は検証をすること。
564

Article 220 (3): For the measures set forth in paragraph (1), a warrant need not be obtained. Dai 220(3):Dai 1 ko no shobun wo suru ni wa, reijou wa, kore wo hitsuyou toshinai. 第二百二十条(３): 第一項の処分をするには、令状は、これを必要としない。
565

Inoue, ―任意捜査と強制捜査の区別,‖ 51.

566

Judgement of Supreme Court Grand Bench, December 1969. 最高栽大法廷判決昭和 44 年 12 月 24 日
(Whereby the taking of photos at a demonstration was ruled as justified due to the risk of public disorder andproper procedures not being followed in organising the demo. This is different from ruling that the police had ablanket justification in filming in public regardless of circumstances. See Below, section 3.2:Court
Interpretations)86

of investigation to be used if it is not specifically permitted by a provision in the code,
regardless of the circumstances. From the provisions in the criminal procedure code, and theSupreme Court decisions in 1969 567 and 2008 568 , the photographing of individuals insituations not described in the criminal procedure code may only take place when thephotographing is non-compulsory and proportional. CCTV in public places is now generally
recognised as being both non-compulsory and proportional.

Control of Personal Information
Due in large part to the difficulty with encoding Japanese characters on computers, large scale
processing of information was not possible in Japan until the mid-1990s. Therefore, there waslittle need for extensive laws, concerning protection of personal information, akin to those in
the US and EU. Until the late 1980s and early 1990s most information was recorded by hand,and business relied on trust and relationships, so people were not too concerned about thesafety of information as they only imparted important information to those they could trust.
The successful encoding of Kanji on computers quickly led to an increased networked society
and information passing between people who did not have solid relationships built on trust.
Legal regulation of data became necessary to fill this gap and provide protection for
individual‘s privacy.569
In 2004, Alan Westin noted that since 2001 there had been over 50 cases of dataleakages by businesses reported in the media in Japan, resulting in just a few victims toseveral million victims. The specific damage to individuals was usually brushed over throughpublic apologies so the actual impact was usually neither understood nor appreciated by the
public. Westin suggested that this may have been because criminals had not yet taken
advantage of such data leaks as was common in other countries, although there wereindications that this may soon change.570 These trends show how important data protection
laws have become in Japan in recent years.
In December 1988, Japan enacted the Act on Protection of Personal Information
Pertaining to Electronic Data Processing Held by Administrative Organs571. This act was
567
568

Judgement of Supreme Court Grand Bench, December 1969. 最高栽大法廷判決昭和 44 年 12 月 24 日
Judgement of Supreme Court 2nd Petty Bench, 15 April 2008. 最高裁第二小法廷決定平成 20 年 4 月 15日
569

Mikami, Shimizu, and Shinden, Q&A Data Protection Law, 2; Murata, Orito, and Adams, ―The
Development of Japanese Data Protection,‖ 102-104, 106.
570

Westin, ―Data Leakage and Harm.‖

571(Act No. 95 of 1988) Gyousei kikan no hoyuu suru denshi keisan kishori ni kakaru kojin jouhou no hogo87amended and replaced by the Act on Protection of Personal Information Held byAdministrative Organs in 2003 and was significantly influenced by the 1980 OECD
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.572 Lawson
stated that a direct cause of the implementation of new legislation was large scale resistance tothe Basic Resident Registers Act 1999, which led to the government actively introducing
measures instead of relying on individuals to bring cases before courts.573
Individual districts throughout Japan also brought in their own guidelines, andregularly referred to the eight clauses in the OECD guidelines.574 In 2003 Japan introduced
data protection laws, in no small part to comply with European Union regulations onexporting data. 575 The laws enacted by Japan were: Act on the Protection of Personal
Information; 576 Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative
Organs; 577 Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by Independent
Administrative Agencies, etc…; 578 and the Act for Establishment of the Information
Disclosure and Personal Information Protection Review Board.579
Lawson concluded that the implementation of privacy law (through data protectionlaw) was ‗an overwhelming success.‘580 In contrast, Murata et al. discovered that as of 2010
there had been no significant prosecutions under the data protection laws even though there
were numerous data protection breaches, therefore the laws and enforcement in place wereinsufficient. 581 Murata and Orito also found, in 2008, that due to the rapid change inni kansuru houritsu. 行政機関の保有する電子計算機処理に係る個人情報の保護に関する法律
572

Yamada, Yamagishi, and Katsumi, ―A Comparative Study of the Information Security Policies of Japanand the United States,‖ 224.
573

Lawson, ―Japan‘s New Privacy Act in Context,‖ 97, 106.

574

Japan Federation of Bar Associations, The Day Privacy is Lost, 74-75.

575

Murata, Orito, and Adams, ―The Development of Japanese Data Protection,‖ 100.

576

Law number: Act No. 57 of 2003 Kojin jouhou no hogo ni kan suru houritsu. 個人情報の保護に関する法律577

Law number: Act No. 58 of 2003 Gyousei kikan no hoyuu suru kojin jouhou nohogo ni kan suru houritsu.
行政機関の保有する個人情報の保護に関する法律
578

Law number: Act No. 59 of 2003 Dokuritsu gyousei houjin nado no hoyuu suru kojin jouhou ni kan suru
houritsu. 独立行政法人等の保有する個人情報に関する法律579

Law number: Act No. 60 of 2003 Jouhou koukai, kojin jouhou hogo shinsakai secchi hou. 情報公開・個人情報保護審査会設置法
580

Lawson, ―Japan‘s New Privacy Act in Context,‖ 95.

581

Murata, Orito, and Adams, ―The Development of Japanese Data Protection,‖ 119.

88

technology, regulations based on the 1980 OECD guidelines were unlikely to be suitable forthe current situation.582 Data protection laws have may not have been able to stop breaches todate due to the lack of criminal sanctions enforceable on breaches in the private sector.
Akihiro Otani argued that because in Japan people thought that that public servants‗do not do bad things‘, data protection laws were formulated to be strict against citizens andeasy on public servants.583 This argument was backed up by a 2008 Opinion poll by Yomiuri
Shimbun, where only 19.2% of respondents said that they wanted to have greater rights to
information from governmental agencies, and only 17.7% said that they wanted greater
protection of personal information or privacy.584
Takehiro Ohya claimed that Tajima‘s perception of surveillance concentrated only on
the distinction and clash between Government and Citizens, and ignored the more important
sphere of society and the increasing role of business as a purveyor of surveillance.585 Daniel
Solove similarly argued that focusing on government surveillance avoided the real danger –that of one‘s personal information being secretly collected by other actors in society that did
not on the surface appear dangerous, but whose actions were less transparent or accountable
than the government.586 Former Chief of National Police Research Centre, Masahiro Tamura,referred to research from Kyoto University in 1980 that showed the Japanese public viewed
police as the most trustworthy protectors of citizen‘s freedoms and civil rights, above thejudiciary; and in fact people distrusted the media and private businesses.587 Therefore, incontrast to Murata, Orito, and Otani‘s opinions, not only was the private sector lessaccountable than the public sector, but it was less trusted. This would indicate that the greatest
risk to personal data is from the private sector and not the public sector.
In 2010, Yamada et al. said that due to concerns from the public and citizen‘s groups
the government was limited to monitoring information for criminal investigations, and heavily
restricted on interception of information for ‗intelligence‘ purposes.588 Therefore, while thedata protection laws appeared to be weak, other countries gave significantly more power to582

Murata and Orito, ―Rethinking the concept of the right to information privacy,‖ 4.

583

Otani, What are Surveillance Cameras Looking at?, 134.

584

Yomiuri Shimbun, ―Yomiuri Shimbun March 2008 Opinion Polls (P08-06),‖ 28.

585

Ohya, What is Freedom? Surveillance Society and the Dissapearance of the “Individual,” 89-90.

586

Solove, ―‗I‘ve Got Nothing to Hide‘ and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy,‖ 756.

587

Tamura, ―Submission of a Problem,‖ 74.

588

Yamada, Yamagishi, and Katsumi, ―A Comparative Study of the Information Security Policies of Japanand the United States,‖ 224-225.

89

the government to monitor citizen‘s information. Etzioni suggested that restricting thegovernment‘s ability to carry out surveillance may result in increasing the government‘s needto exert control on society. This means that the consequence of increasing citizen‘s privacy
may be an increase in government control over society.589
Murata et al. noted, in 2010, that there had been a ‗significant shift in policy‘ with
non-public bodies covered by data protection laws in recent years. 590 The new laws
specifically require all companies that hold information on 5,000 or more individuals to use
secure information handling systems and to be able to deal with complaints and requests.
There are concerns however that because there is no independent body to provide oversightand the lack of opportunity for individuals to take action means that there is little real
protection for individuals.591
An independent body such as the Information Commissioner‘s Office would provide
added protection for citizens. Currently, under Article 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
the police are able to use CCTV in public without a warrant when it does not infringe therights of individuals; however this leads to a specific problem: if the police say that they are
not infringing individuals‘ rights, they don‘t require a warrant to use CCTV. However it canbe argued that the police should not be left to make this judgement call as the cameras arebeing employed by the police themselves to further their investigation, and therefore should
be regulated by a body independent from the investigation. The courts alone are not able to beeffective as they only come into play when an investigation reaches trial or when the police
apply for a warrant. This role can therefore be played by an Independent Commissioner‘s
Office who can ensure that police use of CCTV is appropriate and proportionate when it isbeing considered for use and when it is being used in all cases that would not initially require
court assent. This would mean that cases that make use of CCTV that reach trial will be muchless likely to have video evidence rejected by the courts due to an infringement of a suspect‘srights as the ICO would ensure CCTV is only used in appropriate and proportionate
circumstances where individuals‘ rights are not inappropriately infringed.

Penal Law and Petty Breach Act
Privacy is also dealt with under penal law. Privacy can be invaded under the following crimes:
589

Etzoni said: ―the best way to curtail the need for governmental control and intrusion is to have somewhat
less privacy.‖ Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy, 213.
590

Murata, Orito, and Adams, ―The Development of Japanese Data Protection,‖ 98.

591

Lawson, ―Japan‘s New Privacy Act in Context,‖ 99.

90

defamation, insults, breaking into a residence, unlawful opening of letters, unlawful
disclosure of confidential information, and the prohibition of looking into another‘sresidence.592

Police Act
Article 1 of the Police Act states that the purpose of the Act is to protect individuals‘ rights
and freedoms and maintain public safety and order.593 Article 2 Paragraph 1 states that it isthe duty of the police to protect the life, physical safety, and property of individuals, and they
have the responsibility to prevent, suppress, and investigate crime, arrest suspects, regulate
traffic, and maintain safety and order in public.594 Using paragraph 1, the police can justify
the use of CCTV in public spaces as a method of preventing, suppressing, and investigating
crime, and maintaining safety and order. However, further to the duties enumerated inparagraph 1, paragraph 2 states that the execution of these duties must be applied in a fair andimpartial manner and protect individual‘s constitutional rights and freedoms.595 This means
592

Ehara, The right to Privacy: A comprehensive analysis, 116-131 (刑法 230 条：名誉毀損罪
Defamation; 231 条：侮辱罪 Insults; 130 条：住居侵入罪 Breaking into a Residence; 133 条：信書開披罪Unlawful opening of letters; 134 条：秘密漏漏洩罪 Unlawful disclosure of confidential information; 軽犯罪法
1 条 23 号：他人の住居ののぞき見の禁止).
593

Dai 1 Jou: Kono houritsu wa, kojin no kenri to jiyuu wo hogo shi, koukyou no ansen to chitsujou wo iji
suru tame, minshuteki rinen wo kichou to suru keisatsu no kanri to unei wo hoshou shi, katsu, nouritsuteki nisono ninmu wo suikou suru ni taru keisatsu no soshiki wo sadameru koto wo mokuteki to suru. 第一条: この法
律は、個人の権利と自由を保護し、公共の安全と秩序を維持するため、民主的理念を基調とする警察の管理と運営を保障し、且つ、能率的にその任務を遂行するに足る警察の組織を定めることを目的とする。[This law is to protect individuals‘ rights and freedoms, maintain public safety and order; based on theprinciples of democracy the police shall manage and administer security; furthermore, these duties shall be
purposefully carried out efficiently by the police.] (note – this is the author‘s translation, as there is no officialtranslation for this law at present)594

Dai 2 Jou(1): Keisatsu wa, kojin no seimei, shintai oyobi zaisan no hogo ni ninji, hanzai no yobou,
chinatsu oyobi sousa, higisha no taiho, koutsu no torishimari sonota koukyou no anzen to chitsujo no iji ni ataru
koto wo motte sono sekimu to suru. 第二条(1): 警察は、個人の生命、身体及び財産の保護に任じ、犯罪の予防、鎮圧及び捜査、被疑者の逮捕、交通の取締その他公共の安全と秩序の維持に当ることをもってその責務とする。[The police have the duty to protect the life and physical security of individuals and theirproperty, prevent, repress, and investigate crime, arrest suspects, regulate traffic, and maintain safety and order inpublic.] (note – this is the author‘s translation as there is no official translation for this law at present)595

Dai 2 Jou(2): Keisatsu no katsudou wa, genkaku ni zenkou no sekimu no hani ni kagirareru beki mono deatte, sono sekimu no suikou ni atte wa, fuhenfuto katsu kouheichuusei wo mune toshi, iyashikumo nihonkemmpou
no hoshou suru kojin no kenri oyobi jiyuu no kanshou ni wataru nado sono kengen wo ranyou suru koto ga
attehanaranai. 第二条(2): 警察の活動は、厳格に前項の責務の範囲に限られるべきものであって、その責務の遂行に当っては、不偏不党且つ公平中正を旨とし、いやしくも日本国憲法の保障する個人の権利及び自由の干渉にわたる等その権限を濫用することがあってはならない。[The police are strictly
limited to the duties listed in the previous paragraph. In carrying out these duties, the police must be impartial
and fair and protect individuals‘ rights and freedoms as protected by the Japanese constitution and not interfere91that the police are not free to use any methods in tackling crime that violate the constitution,
but are required to adhere to the limits set out in the constitution. The police can look to court
decisions to see cases where the use of CCTV to tackle crime has been ruled constitutional or
unconstitutional to limit their use of cameras under this act.

Daily Life Safety Regulations
In 1994 the police established an association to deal with public safety and security and crime
prevention and promoted the establishment of ‗Daily life safety regulations‘.596 The level of
implementation differed around the country with some prefectures, towns and cities having
extensive regulations, and others having none.597 The first authority to introduce regulations
was Chiyoda Ward in Tokyo on 1 October 2002 with the slogan ‗Rules from manners‘.598 The/regulations included measures to prevent littering, smoking, dog fouling, and suggested thatCCTV should be installed in residential areas where many people have access.599 The first
regulations contained only around five to ten articles; however, recent regulations now
contain over 40 articles, with a large increase in the number of prohibited acts and proscribedpunishments. Regulations must be clearly stated along with their purpose, and the police andresidents must be consulted about their implementation.600 One regularly mentioned clauseconcerns the occasion when the installer of a CCTV system does not consult the head of thepolice before installation, they will be subject to an administrative sanction.601
Shimizu said that the introduction of new regulations was controversial and hequestioned their necessity,602 noting that results from the previous ten years about crime andperceptions of crime and safety showed that there was actually a downward trend.603 Shimizu
with these rights or abuse their power.] (note – this is the author‘s translation as there is no official translation forthis law at present)
596

Seikatsu anzen jourei 生活安全条例

597

Shimizu, ―Development and Problems of the ‗Life Security Regulations‘,‖ 231-233.

598

Manaa kara ruuru e マナーからルールへ

599

Shimizu, ―Development and Problems of the ‗Life Security Regulations‘,‖ 230-231.

600

Ibid., 234-235.

601

Ibid., 236.

602

Ibid., 233-234.

603「Toukyouto anzen, anshin machi-dukuri yuushika kondankai」de houkoku shita kadai: hanzai no zouka totaikan chian de atta.「東京都安全・安心まちづくり有識者懇談会」で報告した課題：犯罪の増加と体感治安であった。

92said that while civil rights should be extended, this should not necessarily be done throughpromulgating more laws, as this may reduce people‘s civil rights. 604 He explained that under
Article 31 of the Constitution, no one may be punished except by procedures set out by
law; 605 however, if the laws are significantly increased in scope and range, then theconstitution would provide protection to repressive and intrusive laws.606 Shimizu said thatthrough regulations such as the ‗Daily life safety regulations‘, Japanese society waseffectively subcontracting out surveillance of citizens from the police to the citizens
themselves, and the promoting of surveillance cameras through laws and regulations may
actually reduce privacy protection.607

Court Interpretations
Most cases concerning governmental authority actually invading citizen‘s privacy have been
focused on issues related to people‘s photos and fingerprints, wiretapping, and collecting,using, and making public personal information. A number of cases show how the concept has
been applied in recent decades. As Japan is not a common law country, judicial decisions do
not set precedents in theory; however decisions are often followed in practice.
The Tokyo District Court ruling on 28 September 1964 in the After the Banquet
case
is seen as reifying the right of privacy in Japan.609 A novel was written about arelationship between a politician and a woman, which was clearly based on a real life608

politician and his ex-wife; however the real-life politician did not give his consent to the
publication. The plaintiff claimed that his privacy was invaded and requested compensation
and a public apology. The judge accepted the plaintiff‘s request in part, establishing a right toprivacy. The case set down three tests for a privacy claim:
1. It has to be true, or seemingly true and about one‘s private life;
2. An average person should feel that they would not want the information publicallypublished, or an average person would feel mental anguish or unease if it was made604

Shimizu, ―Development and Problems of the ‗Life Security Regulations‘,‖ 237-238.

605‗No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except
according to procedure established by law‘
606

Shimizu, ―Development and Problems of the ‗Life Security Regulations‘,‖ 238.

607

Ibid.

608

Judgement of Tokyo District Court, 28 September 1964. 東京地栽判決昭和 39 年 9 月 28 日

609

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 44.

93

publically known; and3. The information was not publically known by the average person, and the
publication caused distress to the person in question.610
Professor Nishihara claimed that it was not correct to extrapolate from this decision,
outlined above, to claim that there was a general right to privacy because firstly, at the time it
was relatively easy to gather and publish information, secondly, the case was based on
publication, rather than privacy, and finally, the case did not specify at what point thecollection of information became an invasion of privacy.611
One element of a right to privacy is the invasion of one‘s right to their own image andcan be seen from the judgement by the Osaka High Court on 30 May 1964 in a caseconcerning pictures being taken of demonstrators at a protest.612 The court referred to theAfter the Banquet case and said that privacy was the right of the individual to conduct his or
her life without interference from others and an essential part of a private act was to not havesuch an act told to the world without one‘s consent. In addition, the police are limited, by
Article 2, paragraph 2 of the police act, to not under any circumstances invade the rights ofpeople that are protected under the constitution, including that of privacy.613
The first case that looked at the constitutionality of recording individuals withsurveillance cameras was in December 1969 with the Kyoto-fu Gakuren Jiken.614 In this case,the police took pictures at a public demonstration of student protesters at a rally, for which apermit had not been obtained. The use of cameras to take protestors pictures was contested;
however the Supreme Court ruled that while people have the right to not have their photos
taken, in this case, because the protest was not properly organised, the police were justified intheir actions.615 The judges indicated that this was an exception to the general right tophotographic privacy.616 The court viewed the use of CCTV in this case as proportionate, due
to the event not being properly organised and the risk of public disorder, and furthermore as a
non-compulsory method of investigation, therefore not invoking Article 197 of the Code of610

Ibid., 44-45.

611

Ibid., 45.

612

Judgement of Osaka High Court, 30 May 1964. 大阪高栽判決昭和 39 年 5 月 30 日

613

Ehara, The right to Privacy: A comprehensive analysis, 69.

614

Judgement of Supreme Court Grand Bench, December 1969. 最高栽大法廷判決昭和 44 年 12 月 24 日

615

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 46.

616

Adams, Murata, and Orito, ―The Japanese sense of information privacy,‖ 13.

94

Criminal Procedure. However, this ruling suggests that the use of cameras would have beenclassified as compulsory, and therefore neither appropriate, proportionate nor sanctioned by
Article 197 if the demonstration had been properly organised and there had been no
established risk of public disorder. This implies that CCTV is likely to be seen as infringing
individuals‘ rights and be unlikely to be justifiable when there is no identified risk of crime ordisorder.
The court in Kyoto-fu Gakuren Jiken acknowledged that the essence of freedom inpeople‘s private life was to be protected from police and government action, and freedom inindividual‘s private lives includes the right to not have a person‘s photograph or image taken
without consent or just cause. The police may not invade a person‘s privacy without just cause,
no matter to how small an extent.617 At the time of the decision, the Supreme Court was tilted
towards the protection of public welfare, and thus such privacy concerns were often relegatedbelow public safety.618 However Nishihara posited, in 2009, that Japan was no longer undersuch pressure, and there should be more attention addressed to privacy concerns caused by the
spread and ubiquity of surveillance cameras.619
On 14 April 1981 Supreme Court Justice Itoh, ruling on a case where the Kyoto city
government had given details of the criminal record of a citizen to a lawyer,620 said: ‗personal
information which the subject does not wish to be known to others should receive theprotection of the courts for the sake of their privacy.‘ This ruling had the effect of making pastconvictions private information.621
In another ruling in October 1984, the court ruled on a case where a Taiwanese man
who worked for Japan during the war was listed as having deserted his post and argued that
this was wrong and wanted the records changed.622 The court found that the record was rightand dismissed his case, but the ruling resulted in recognising the right of an individual to havethe false or wrong data held by the government amended or removed if that information could
cause damage to the individual through its false nature.623
617

Ehara, The right to Privacy: A comprehensive analysis, 70.

618

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 46.

619

Ibid., 47.

620

Judgment of Supreme Court 3rd Petty Bench, 14 April 1981. 最高栽第三小法廷判決昭和 56 年 4 月 14621

Adams, Murata, and Orito, ―The Japanese sense of information privacy,‖ 14.

622

Judgment of Tokyo District Court, 30 October 1984. 東京地栽判決昭和 59 年 10 月 30 日

623

Adams, Murata, and Orito, ―The Japanese sense of information privacy,‖ 14.

日95Fukuoka High Court in 1986 said that whilst there was no clear provision specificallyfor privacy, the constitution protected freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, secrecyof correspondence, freedom from search and seizure without warrant.624 From these rights, aright to privacy could be derived. The same judgement also looked at the taking of
fingerprints and ruled that this was covered by this right to privacy and that it was an invasionof one‘s private life.625
In February 1986, the Supreme Court ruled on the Obis case.626 The court referred to
the Kyoto-fu Gakuren Jiken case and decided that speed cameras which take pictures of
speeding cars and the occupants did not violate the constitution.627
In April 1994, Osaka Police installed cameras in 15 locations for crime prevention in
Kamagasaki and were able to monitor various public areas. Residents in the area requested
the police to remove the cameras, arguing three main issues:628 Firstly, the legal basis for
installation and use of CCTV cameras; secondly, whether people‘s privacy was being invaded
and people‘s right to their own image; and thirdly, whether protection of ‗privacy‘ wasbeneficial, and whether invasion of privacy was a problem. Osaka District Court found thatout of 15 camera locations, one was an invasion of privacy and the offending camera wasordered removed, recognising the right to privacy when in public.629
Regarding the first issue, the court found that five grounds were required to be met for
CCTV to be installed and used: clear purpose, concrete reasons for its necessity, appropriate,
effective, and the system is used suitably. For the second issue, the judge referred to Kyoto-fu
Gakuren Jiken case where a recording could not be justified to simply deter crime andtherefore there was no justification for recording the plaintiff.630 The judgement pointed tothe danger of overuse of surveillance and CCTV. Nishihara proposed that the ruling shouldhave gone further as even without recording images, people‘s civil rights were being invaded
by the use of the cameras.631 For the third issue, Nishihara says that although one‘s privacy
624

Judgement of Fukuoka High Court, 26 December 1986. 福岡高栽判決 61 年 12 月 26 日

625

Ehara, The right to Privacy: A comprehensive analysis, 71.

626

Judgement of Supreme Court 2nd Petty Bench, 14 February 1986. 最高栽第二小法廷判決昭和 61 年 2
月 14 日627

See: http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/js_20100319115502679085.pdf

628

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 48－52.

629

Judgement of Osaka District Court, 27 April 1994. 大阪地栽判決平成 6 年 4 月 27 日

630

Hanzai yobou mokuteki de no rokuga wa yurusarenai. 犯罪予防目的での録画は許されない

631

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 50.

96

cannot be strictly controlled when in public this does not mean that all aspects of privacy arelost in public locations, or that the benefits of privacy can be altogether abandoned. In April
2008, a Supreme Court ruling632 was handed down, stating that the use of crime prevention
cameras was acceptable for conducting criminal investigations into crimes such as robbery or
murder, in places such as pachinko parlours, or on streets where there was likely to be a large
congregation of people.633 This meant that police surveillance could be carried out legallywhen there was no specific information about a crime occurring, but just when there was ahigh probability of crime.
In March 1998, a group of activists took the government to court claiming that the
N-System was an invasion of people‘s privacy. 634 The group pointed out as issues ofcontention the right to one‘s own image, the control of personal information, and the freedomof movement.635 The government contested the first point by saying that only the number
plate was recorded and the cameras did not record images of people‘s faces, therefore thesystem did not violate the ‗right to one‘s own image‘ The government further said that once
the images had been recorded they were kept for a specified time and then deleted.
Management and use of data was strictly controlled, so privacy was not invaded.
The government dismissed the freedom of movement claim saying that there was noright of ‗freedom of movement‘ secured by law and, the N-System did not restrict people‘s
movement. Furthermore, drivers were obligated by law to display their vehicle‘s number
plate; so they did not have any freedom of control over this information, hence the N-System
did not violate any law specified in the claim.636 On 6 February 2001 the first instance court
dismissed the claim that the N-System was recording, storing, or managing images in an
illegal manner.637 Although they court referred to Article 13, they did not specifically refer to‗privacy‘. The court said that even if people‘s images were taken, recorded and stored, thiswas in and of itself not necessarily a violation of Article 13. As for restricting freedom of
movement, the court said that the purpose and the implementation of the specific instance of632

Judgement of Supreme Court 2nd Petty Bench, 15 April 2008. 最高裁第二小法廷決定平成 20 年 4 月 15633

See: http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20080417160757.pdf

634

Sakurai, ―Current N-System Prosecutions,‖ 217.

635

Ibid., 217-218.

636

Ibid., 218-219.

637

Judgement of Tokyo High District Court, 1 June 1999. 東京地栽判決平成 13 年 6 月 1 日

日

97

surveillance had to be taken into account, and in this case its use was reasonable.638
In 2002, a novel called ‗The Fish Swimming in the Stone‘639 was banned frompublication due to concerns that it would cause significant mental anguish to one of thecharacters portrayed in the book.640 A 2004 ruling went down the same route in granting an
injunction on the publication of an article about the divorce of the daughter of a politician on
the grounds that it would cause her harm. Initially the injunction was granted provisionally.641
This injunction was then challenged the next day, but the ruling was upheld.642 A further
appeal was made and the injunction was lifted by the Tokyo High Court. 643 The decision tolift the injunction was confirmed by the Supreme Court as it was ruled that its publication
would not cause irrevocable damage.644
In November 1998, a lecture at a private university in Tokyo (Waseda University) was
attended by a Chinese politician. Around 1,400 students attended and gave their names,
addresses, matriculation numbers, and phone numbers to the organisers. The organisers
submitted this list to the Tokyo Metropolitan Police without gaining the consent of thestudents. The court was asked if this was an invasion of privacy. The first court dismissed thecase as it did not meet the criteria set in the After the Banquet case as it did not have any
concrete adverse effect upon the plaintiffs. However, in September 2003, the Supreme Court
overturned the ruling and said that when information is given to a third party, the person
initially collecting the information must get the consent of the individual for the information
to be so handed over.645 This could be done by getting people to simply tick a ‗consent‘ box.
The consent ruling leads to further questions about what does it mean to obtain someone‘s
consent when the circumstances are not as obvious as the Waseda University case, forexample, how can a person determine if they have the consent of someone who is walking

638

Sakurai, ―Current N-System Prosecutions,‖ 220-222.

639

Ishi ni oyogu sakana. 石に泳ぐ魚

640

Judgement of Supreme Court 3rd Petty Bench, 24 September 2002. 最高栽第三小法廷判決平成 14 年 9月 24 日641

Provisional Disposition of Tokyo District Court, 16 March 2004. 東京地栽定平成 16 年 3 月 16 日

642

Ruling of Tokyo District Court, 19 March 2004. 東京地栽決定平成 16 年 3 月 19 日

643

Ruling of Tokyo High Court, 31 March 2004. 東京高栽決定平成 16 年 3 月 31 日

644

Adams, Murata, and Orito, ―The Japanese sense of information privacy,‖ 14.

645

Judgement of Supreme Court 2nd Petty Bench, 12 September 2003. 最高栽第二小法廷判決平成 15 年 9月 12 日98

down the street to record them on CCTV646
In May 2005, the Kanazawa District Court ruled647 that Juki-net violated Article 13
because it did not allow people to opt-out.648 Tajima claimed that the ruling did not show that
Juki-net itself was against the constitution, but only that it was unconstitutional to force itupon people who opposed it.649 However, Tajima said that just because people have notvoiced their opposition this does not mean that they have explicitly given up their right toprivacy. 650 In December 2006, the Nagoya High Court reversed the Kanazawa Court‘sdecision saying:651 ‗Various security measures are in place to protect personal informationand the system doesn‘t violate the plaintiff‘s right to privacy, hence it doesn‘t contravene
Article 13 of the constitution.‘652 Another case in May 2005 in Nagoya District Court foundthat Juki-net was constitutional,653 and was upheld by Nagoya High Court in February 2007,
which ruled that Juki-net did not infringe the constitution even though it contained personal
information.654 The Judge said: ‗It cannot be said that information for identity confirmation is
information that requires a high degree of confidentiality . . . . There is little likelihood theright to privacy will be violated.‘655
In February 2004, the Osaka District Court judged Juki-net to be constitutional;656
however this was overturned in November 2006,657 when the Osaka High Court judged thatholding personal information on Juki-net of people who did not want to be listed was an
infringement of privacy, and ordered the elimination of the ID numbers of those who

646

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 55.

647

Judgement of Kanazawa District Court, 30 May 2005. 金沢地判平成 17 年 5 月 30 日

648

Privacy International, ―Japanese Court Rules ID System Unconstitutional.‖

649

Tajima, ―Japan: Moving Towards a Surveillance Society,‖ 15.

650

Ibid., 15-16.

651

Judgment of Nagoya High Court Kanazawa Branch, 11 December 2006 名古屋高栽金沢支部判決平成18 年 12 月 11 日
652

―Court overturns Juki Net ruling on personal data.‖ Yomiuri Shimbun, 11 December 2006.

653

Judgment of Nagoya District Court, 31 May 2005. 名古屋地栽判決平成 17 年 5 月 31 日

654

Judgment of Nagoya High Court, 1 February 2007. 名古屋高栽判決平成 19 年 2 月 1 日

655―Privacy Right Violation Said Unlikely: Juki Net constitutional, high court rules.‖, Japan Times online, 2
February 2007.
656

Judgment of Osaka District Court, 27 February 2004. 大阪地栽判決平成 16 年 2 月 27 日

657

Judgment of Osaka High Court, 30 November 2006. 大阪高栽判決平成 18 年 11 月 30 日

99

requested not to be included on Juki-net.658
On 6 March 2008, the Supreme Court gave a final ruling on the Kanazawa, Nagoya,
and Osaka cases together,659 and judged that Juki-net did not infringe Article 13, and that
Article 13 was limited to preventing the disclosure of personal information to third parties.660

CCTV Policies
National Police Agency
The National Police Agency (NPA) did not have a CCTV policy; instead, each individual
jurisdiction had their own policy. As of 2010, the policy used for the pilot scheme in
Kawasaki City, Kanagawa was being used as a model.661 The NPA was also looking at
creating a unified CCTV policy. The policy stated that the purpose of the system was to see if
CCTV was appropriate and effective. The cameras were used in public spaces to prevent
crime, prevent people becoming victims, find out about a crime as quickly as possible when
one occurs, promptly pursue criminals, and help victims after a crime.
The CCTV system had a privacy enhancing feature that automatically blacked out
residential areas such as windows and verandas.662 The cameras were placed in areas where
they would be effective, such as parks, shopping streets, public roads. Privacy had to be taken
into account when choosing installation sites. Access to the system was strictly limited toranks of Sergeant and above and then to the minimum possible. Data was to be deleted after
seven days, but this could be extended if the data was needed for a criminal investigation.

Tokyo Metropolitan Police
The Tokyo Metropolitan police‘s CCTV policy was last updated on 27 February 2002 and658

Ogasawara, ―A tale of the colonial age, or the banner of new tyranny? National identification card
systems in Japan,‖ 104.
659

Judgment of Supreme Court 1st Petty Bench, 6 March 2008. 最高栽第一小法廷判決平成 20 年 3 月 6日
660

Ogasawara, ―A tale of the colonial age, or the banner of new tyranny? National identification card
systems in Japan,‖ 104; see also http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20080306142412.pdf.
661

Kanagawa Prefectural Police, ―Kanagawa Prefecutural Police Street Camera System Policy.‖

662

The author of this thesis viewed this in use at Kawasaki city police headquarters.

100

consists of seven articles.663 The policy stated its purpose was to ensure the camera system
would be used appropriately. The system was used to prevent crime, prevent people becoming
victims, and reduce the chance of crime occurring. The presence of cameras was to be clearlymarked. The upmost care was to be taken to not invade citizen‘s privacy. Recorded images
were to be used to the minimum necessary, and any use of images was to be reported to Tokyo
Metropolitan Public Safety Commission.

Aichi prefecture
Aichi prefecture did not have a CCTV policy or guidelines; however, most individual cities
and towns had their own guidelines.664 The Aichi police had their own CCTV policy which
was updated last on 11 March 2005.665 The policy‘s stated purpose was to maintain public
security and order while protecting citizen‘s civil rights through preventing crimes andpreventing people from becoming victims. The cameras were to be clearly placed in areas
visited by vulnerable persons or where the police suggested. The chief of police was to takeresponsibility to ensure that the system did not invade individual privacy and that the recorded
images were used to the minimum possible during criminal investigations. Every six months
the chief of police would publically report on the use of recorded data.

Chiyoda Ward
The first policy was enacted on 26 November 2003. This has been amended twice with thelatest version enacted on 17 May 2010.666 The purpose of the camera system was to create acomfortable, safe, and secure living environment, and to prevent crime. The policy noted in
its introduction that there were concerns with human rights invasions and that its use wascontroversial and that there was need for sufficient protection, hence the need for a policy.
There must be an individual who is clearly designated as taking responsibility for the scheme.
The policy stated that taking into privacy concerns, cameras would be placed in appropriate
locations and images would not be leaked. Images would be deleted according to a prescribedtime limit unless used for a criminal investigation. The cameras would only record images ofpublic streets and roads, and not without reason target individuals or peer into shops. The
663

Tokyo Public Safety Committee 東京都公安委員会, ―Street Crime Prevention Camera Policy.‖

664

Nagoya, Komaki, Inazawa, Yatomi, Tokai, Obu, Chita, Okazaki, Tahara.

665

Aichi Prefecture Public Safety Committee, ―Street Crime Prevention Camera System Policy.‖

666

Chiyoda Ward Office, ―Chiyoda Ward Crime Prevention Camera Policy.‖101

policy had to be made public and the police would be consulted about the use and installation.
If the CCTV cameras were used inappropriately or the police requested them to be stopped,
the cameras had to be stopped immediately and measures taken to address concerns. Finally,
if a privacy problem occurred, all persons connected to the camera installation would bear
responsibility.

Nagoya Shopping Centre
The shopping mall has had cameras since November 1978, and as of 20101, had 61 cameras(four dome, 57 fixed).667 Three could record to VHS with the images kept for one week. The
shopping centre‘s security was contracted out to a security company who managed thecameras and carried out uniformed patrols. There was a special monitoring room staffed 24
hours a day, 365 days a year. The cameras monitored suspicious behaviour, emergencies,
vulnerable persons, and were used in emergencies.
The system manager at the mall explained that there was rarely any trouble in the
shopping mall and it was not used to target or move on people. Security staff had one monthtraining in security and disaster work before starting work, and biannual refresher courses,
including CCTV operation. The layout of the CCTV control room meant the monitors arevisible to anyone who enters the control room; therefore, entry to the control room wasrestricted. This also meant that the CCTV operators knew that how they are using the cameras
may be seen by other members of staff. This informal surveillance could encourage good
CCTV use. However no official supervision of the monitoring occurs during operation of thecameras. The centre wanted to update their systems as their current system is from the late1970s. They recently updated their CCTV policy:
1. Purpose: Maintain safety, security, and public order, and prevent crime;
2. Monitoring and use of images: During normal circumstances, one security guard isposted in the control centre to monitoring cameras; during emergencies, the camera
may be fixed or used to follow and record a situation. Two main staircases‘ cameras‘
images are normally recorded, changeable according to circumstances.;
3. Recording playback: To protect privacy, recorded images shall not be played backwithout justifiable reasons. If playback is necessary, Article 4 must be followed;

667

On 30 June 2010 the author visited an underground shopping mall in the centre of Nagoya to view the
CCTV system and interview CCTV operator staff and supervisors.

102

4. Playback procedures: a) letter of request must be sent to the manager of the centre;b) either the manager or a member of staff delegated by the manager must supervise
the playback; c) in case of emergency any staff member may authorise andsupervise playback; d) playback for maintenance purposes does not require thenormal procedures to be followed;
5. Secrecy of recordings: The content of all recordings must not be revealed; and6. The centre will cooperate accordingly if there are problems with the system.

Suggestions for Specific Legislation
Westin suggested in 2004 that new privacy legislation should be enacted in Japan before data
mining and fraud based on identity theft becomes a problem as in other countries.668 Murata
and Orito concluded that granting ownership of personal information to data subjects was notpractical, and might in fact be harmful. Murata and Orito advised a new concept where acertain amount of ownership should be relegated to the data controller who then takes on
responsibility to protect the data in a ‗socially favourable manner‘.669 On this basis, Murata
and Orito said a right to privacy should consist of the following five rights of a data subject:
1) to ensure accurate and recent personal data are collected; 2) ensure that these data are
stored in databases managed by the collecting organisation; 3) ensure the data is protectedfrom improper disclosure; 4) ensure the data is used to promote the subject‘s own welfare;and 5) terminate the use of personal data.
Moreover, Murata and Orito also recommended that the following six obligations to
be imposed on data collectors: 1) collect accurate and recent data according to sociallyauthorised rules; 2) store this data; 3) disclose, transfer, and share this data according tosocially authorised rules; 4) use the data to promote the data subject‘s welfare against asocially authorised valuation standard; 5) terminate the use of stored personal data uponrequest from the data subject; and 6) disclose the methods of personal data management
according to socially authorised rules. 670 These suggestions are problematic due to thesubjective nature of ‗socially authorised rules‘ which will vary in different countries. Given
that information crosses international borders regularly, such ambiguous wording in a privacy
act would probably not grant sufficient guarantees for information security for other668

Westin, ―Data Leakage and Harm.‖

669

Murata and Orito, ―Rethinking the concept of the right to information privacy,‖ 6.

670

Ibid., 6-7.

103

countries.671
Ishimura made recommendations for specific CCTV legislation. He believed thattaking pictures of people without their permission must be justified and the reasonstransparent, so the purpose and object of the surveillance must be clear. Ishimura suggested
general principles should be legislated for nationally, with specifics regulated for local
bodies.672 Regulating bodies should have the responsibility to either accept a system, or if thesystem needs to be altered, to provide guidance and advice to the system implementer to assist
the system passing the requirements. The fundamental principles need to be clearly stated andshould include:
1. Appropriate, fit for purpose system with a stated function;
2. The presence of cameras should be made clear;
3. The CCTV provider should have clear and enforceable responsibilities;
4. Recorded images should only be used for the specified purpose unless consent isgained from individuals in the images;
5. Images should be stored safely;
6. There should be a procedure of dealing with complaints;
7. Certain exceptions should apply for news, arts and science, religious activities, andcriminal investigations;
8. An independent CCTV evaluation and reporting system should be in place; and9. New systems must register with the appropriate authorities.673
These suggestions would not only increase the accountability of systems and bring someconsistency, but also allow for differences in local populations‘ needs and desires. The
inclusion of an independent CCTV evaluation and reporting system would bring much needed
pressure on system implementers to uphold people‘s privacy.

671

Cockfield, ―Legal Constraints on Transferring Personal Information across Borders: A Comparative
Analysis of PIPEDA and Foreign Privacy Laws,‖ 53-54 (noting significant compliance costs for firms
transferring information to countries with lower levels of privacy protection).
672

Ishimura, ―Legal Regulation of Surveillance Camera,‖ 226-229.

673

Ibid., 226-228.

104

Problems with Privacy Protection
Ehara wrote that although there was a strong argument for the right to privacy to be found in
Article 13, there were a number of problems.674 For example, if privacy was accepted as abasic, fundamental right, then this could conflict with and limit other rights. A problem could
also arise over how to apply the right. In order to protect an individuals‘ privacy, thegovernment will occasionally exercise their power, but this power may invade people‘s
privacy.675 In addition, when the government provides protection from personal information
being collected and used, this would clash with the government‘s need to govern and conduct
investigations.676 Lastly, although the clause ‗freedom to personal life‘,677 was mentioned ina number of court decisions the courts have not gone into detail about exactly how and why
privacy is protected in this clause. Nor was it clear exactly how or why the ‗right to one‘s
image‘ is related to ‗freedom to personal life‘.678
Furthermore, many interpretations by the courts discuss what a right to ‗the pursuit ofhappiness‘ means. One of the problems with Article 13 has been the use of the article injustifying other rights such as environmental rights, portrait rights, and publicity rights. The
difficulty with amending the constitution has led to the over use of Article 13 and resulted insome ambiguity with its relation to certain rights such as privacy. However, the lack of clarity
for privacy in the constitution does not mean that the Japanese sense or understanding ofprivacy is ambiguous.

3.3 Conclusion
Welsh and Farrington stated, in 2009, that the most difficult but important questions to answer
about CCTV legislation were ‗how can its effectiveness be improved, and how could CCTV
be less intrusive?‘679 Arthur Cockfield found in 2010 that having strong privacy law was
674

Ehara, The right to Privacy: A comprehensive analysis, 71-73.

675

The Civil Code Articles 709 and 710 provide protection from other individuals: 709 requires anindividual who has infringed another‘s rights to compensate the other; and 710 requires compensation to beprovided for damages to property, body, reputation, and liberty.
676

See Constitution Article 35 and 38. Article 35 gives protection in one‘s home to entry, searches, andseizure unless by warrant; article 38 protects individuals from forced confessions or being compelled to testify
against oneself.
677

Shiseikatsu you no jiyuu. 私生活用の自由

678

Ehara, The right to Privacy: A comprehensive analysis, 72.

679

Welsh and Farrington, Making public places safer, 113.

105

irrelevant if the law was not enforced. 680 The ICO 2010 report said that existing dataprotection and privacy laws were inadequate, and ‗Surveillance cannot be effectively
constrained without a more rigorous regime of law, supervision and enforcement.‘681 Felix
Stalder suggested that attempting to protect privacy through defensive privacy protection isbound to fail, and that what is required is holding to account those whose actions may invoke
privacy concerns.682 Although other countries have stand-alone CCTV legislation,683 calls
for specific laws for surveillance in Japan or the UK should be treated with caution for threereasons:
Firstly, technology is moving too quick for legislation to catch up, so legislation that issuitable for the current generation of cameras is unlikely to be able to cope with unpredictableissues that arise with subsequent models. Flexible guidelines that can be updated annually or
when required would be better suited for CCTV. Secondly, current privacy and data protection
laws provide adequate protection. Problems with CCTV are related to privacy, and producing
new legislation or regulations would result in overlapping legislation and potentiallyconflicting interpretations. The courts in both Japan and the UK have in recent years used theright to privacy to deal with CCTV. This is likely to be the best route for providing acomprehensive route for regulation of CCTV because court decisions are more likely to deter
police from acting in ways that courts have ruled illegal, and the culmination of judgements
will provide unambiguous guidelines for police use that provide specific examples of when
CCTV use is acceptable and when it is not. Finally, any new regulations may lead to a
reduction in citizens‘ privacy, as has occurred with the adoption of RIPA.

680

Cockfield, ―Legal Constraints on Transferring Personal Information across Borders: A Comparative
Analysis of PIPEDA and Foreign Privacy Laws,‖ 51.
681

Information Commissioner‘s Office, Information Commissioner’s report to Parliament on the state ofsurveillance, 46-47.
682

Stalder, ―Privacy is not the antidote to surveillance.‖683

Bainbridge, Data Protection Law, 261 Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal have laws specifically for video
surveillance; ―Germany and the Netherlands have specific provisions for sound and image data.‖

106Chapter 4: Analysis of CCTV in Practice
4.1 Surveys and Studies into CCTV use
UK
Council-run and police-run CCTV control centres
In a 2004 Benjamin Goold conducted observations and interviews at council-run andpolice-run CCTV control centres. He found that often CCTV was implemented where there
was high fear of crime as opposed to high crime rates. One of the local authority managers hespoke with said:
the figures actually didn‘t justify that within the surveillance area we should havecameras there . . . . There are other places within the town that ought to, but thecouncil did a survey, and people‘s perception of crime in the town – the fear of crime –actually got the council to actually put in a town system.684
Police-led and council-led schemes resulted in significant differences in the working
relationship between the CCTV operators and the police. Operators in police led schemes had
closer working relations with such authorities. These operators were better able to understandthe pressures the police came under, more motivated about their jobs, and they felt more
appreciated. Conversely, in council led schemes, operators felt unappreciated and often werecritical of police handling of incidents, and the police felt that operators wasted police timewith minor incidents and were unable to do simple tasks such as use the police radio
properly.685
There were also differences in how operators in police-led and council-led schemes
target subjects for surveillance.686 Police led operators said that they had learned to ‗read thesigns‘ from police officers and that by interacting with the police they were more aware oftrouble spots and would keep an eye on these areas and people within these areas. 687 The
reasons for continuing surveillance of targets were different; in council led schemes 21% ofcontinued surveillance occurred for ‗no obvious‘ reason, compared with only 3% in police led
schemes.
Police led schemes were much more likely to continue surveillance on a target for
684

Goold, CCTV and Policing: Public Area Surveillance and Police Practices in Britain, 82.

685

Ibid., chap. 5.

686

Ibid., chap. 6.

687

Ibid., 147-149.

107

reasons of order and safety than council led schemes. This became significant when the initial
targeting and the continued targeting reasons were combined. In council led schemes, 22% of
initial targeting was categorical, that is, based on stereotypes, and the surveillance continuedfor ‗no obvious‘ reason 68% in of cases. In police-led schemes there was 18% initialcategorical targeting, with 10% continued surveillance for ‗no obvious‘ reason.688 This meansthat 14.6% of surveillance in council led schemes consisted of operators following someone
on camera based on stereotypes for longer than was justifiable, compared with only 1.8% in
police-led schemes.
Goold noted that although police-led schemes tended to claim, from both police andoperators, that there was a good, productive relationship, this was not apparent in practice. In
reality, only a small number of surveillances resulted in a call to the police, and of those thatwere reported to the police, only around half resulted in deployment – of 133 surveillances
only ten (7.5%) resulted in a call to police, and only six (4.5%) in a deployment. Although low,
this was much higher than in council led schemes, where out of 243 surveillances only threewere called in to the police (1.2%) and only one (0.4%) resulted in a deployment. Thiscounters the claim that council led scheme operators waste police time on minor calls.
However, both sets of figures call into question the effectiveness of CCTV.
Goold also postulated that CCTV had very little impact on shift policies or policing
strategies or CID practice; however, he found that it did have a significant impact on
deploying officers to crime scenes and collecting evidence.689

CCTV on Oxford Street, London
Ian Chappell conducted an analysis in 2001 of a Metropolitan Police Service survey690 into
CCTV implementation in Oxford Street, London. 691 Chappell found that CCTV had abeneficial impact on crime in Oxford Street, but due to the short follow up period, the results
were questionable. Displacement of both the effect of CCTV and crime was difficult to assess,and diffusion was not accounted for.692
The majority of businesses felt that CCTV provided no benefit, even though 40% were688

Ibid., 151-153.

689

Ibid., 37, 201.

690

PIB3 Research & Survey Unit Charter Unit, DM CCTV Evaluation.

691

Chappell, ―Sleuth or Spectator.‖

692

Ibid., 43.

108

happy with police support for the scheme.693 The majority of the police felt that CCTV was
useful in assisting with incidents (48% very useful, 30% fairly useful, 3% not very useful, and
19% not applicable).694 Surveys of public opinion showed that almost everyone interviewed
in Oxford Street acknowledged that CCTV helped to reduce crime, and those who were awareof the presence of the system said they felt significantly safer. The crime statistics showed thatcrime fell by 13%; however, prior to CCTV implementation there was already a noticeable
downward trend in crime rates. Chappell suggested that the figures showed that the notices
for CCTV acted as a deterrent from committing crime on streets, and displaced crime fromthe street into shops. Chappell concluded that the introduction of CCTV to Oxford Street wasa positive move, but could be more effective with further training for police and greaterpublicity of the presence of CCTV.

CCTV in towns, housing estates, transport networks, and car parks
Welsh and Farrington analysed 41 CCTV schemes in town centres, public housing estates,
public transport networks, car parks, and residential areas. They found that ‗CCTV [if well
publicized] . . . may prevent crime because potential offenders are deterred by their increased
subjective probability of being detected.‘695 However, the installation of cameras resulted in ahigh social cost (invasion of privacy) and victims were given a false sense of security insituations they would otherwise have exercised caution. They also found that the presence of
CCTV might increase reporting of crime by the public and recording of crime by police.696
Welsh and Farrington analysed 22 separate town/city centre CCTV schemes, out of
which CCTV had a desirable impact in ten schemes, mixed impact in one, null impact in five,uncertain impact in one, and undesirable impact in five. The researchers found little evidenceof displacement or diffusion of benefits.697 When the British schemes were analysed inisolation from the others, there was an average 10% crime reduction compared with control
areas.698 There was a desirable effect on violent crime in only three of the studies (overall noeffect on violent crime), and the crime on which CCTV had its biggest impact was vehicle
693

Ibid., 66.

694

Ibid., 67.

695

Welsh and Farrington, Making public places safer, 36.

696

Ibid., 41.

697

Ibid., 61.

698

Ibid., 65.

109

crime where there was an average of 26% reduction in crime. Overall, CCTV had asignificant desirable effect on crime of 16%, 37% of the schemes showed a desirable effect,
56% showed no significant effect, and 7% showed a significant undesirable effect.699
The use of CCTV had a significant impact on vehicle crime in car parks, especiallywhen used in conjunction with other interventions.700 On the other hand, city centres andtransport schemes, measuring a much larger range of crimes did not have a significant effecton crime. Also, CCTV appeared to result in social exclusion of vulnerable or marginalised
people resulting in greater isolation and less access to available help services.701 Welsh andFarrington suggested some reasons why some schemes were successful and others were not:
 The average follow-up for studies in the UK was 15.9 to 16.1 months, compared to
9.6 months for the other schemes, therefore the other schemes may not have been
given enough time to see if they worked;
 None of the schemes outside the UK used other intervention measures; The UK had a high level of public and political support compared to the US; and The failure of non-UK schemes may be due to undesirable media coverage.702

CCTV in a northern English city
Mike McCahill conducted research on a recession hit city in the north of England with apopulation of 250,000 people. His research involved over 60 interviews, visits to 20 CCTV
control rooms, including 144 hours of CCTV observations in two shopping malls, and 24
hours observation in a high-rise housing scheme.703 McCahill found that although systems
were often linked together to create a ‗surveillance web‘,704 the human element played a bigrole in the effectiveness of a system.705 He observed that acquaintances of offenders were699

Ibid., 74-75.

700Ibid., 112.

701

Ibid., 113; Monahan found that Surveillance systems ―contribute[d] to the construction of marginalidentities for target populations‖ Monahan, Surveillance in the Time of Insecurity, 147.
702

Welsh and Farrington, Making public places safer, 119.

703

McCahill, The Surveillance Web, 22-30.

704

Ibid., 99.

705

Ibid., 92.

110

watched even if they had done nothing wrong.706 In addition, the background of the CCTV
operators and where they felt they were in society had an impact on how they acted tosituations.707
Mike McCahill saw the use of CCTV by local councils and private businesses as ameans to clean up ‗undesirables‘ from popular areas and having the effect of reducing the‗democratic public space‘ in city centres, leading to public spaces becoming ‗pseudo-public‘
spaces, where local business interests override those of the public.708 McCahill concluded
that there was increasing segregation of groups to give the favoured in society greater security
in their own community spaces, and keep the unfavoured isolated in their own
communities.709

CCTV in a railway station, shopping mall, and on a public CCTV network
McCahill and Norris carried out a study on a public CCTV network, a mainline railway
station, and two shopping malls.710 They interviewed managers and operators and carried out
120 hours of observations in a CCTV control room and found large differences between
implementation, use, and effectiveness. The crime rate statistics were inconclusive and not themain focus of the study. This study was most useful for observations of the CCTV operatorsand how they went about their work.
McCahill and Norris found there were four types of CCTV operators. Firstly, the‗techno-work embracer‘ defined as an operator who is proactive and looks for crimes inprogress and is knowledgeable about the system. Secondly, the ‗techno-work-avoider‘,
defined as an operator who avoids work at all costs and is unable to use any of the systems
effectively. Thirdly, the ‗work embracer‘, defined as an operator who is hard working, but
unable to work effectively in the control room due to difficulties, for example, language
problems. Finally, the ‗work avoider‘, defined as an operator who was technologically able,
but rarely used CCTV proactively rather just waiting for incidents to occur before doing
anything. There were also three types of responses to a request of assistance to the CCTV
controller: 1) Provide assistance to guards on the floor that will be helpful; 2) Acknowledge
706

Ibid., 122,148.

707

Ibid., 164.

708

Ibid., 15.

709

Ibid., 19.

710

Norris and McCahill, ―CCTV: Beyond Penal Modernism?‖.

111

message and provide token response, but not do anything; and 3) No response at all(avoidance).
The researchers found that cameras were used increasingly to exclude ‗undesirables‘from various locations, and was very limited in its use as a crime prevention tool.711 The
researchers interviewed a Crime Watch Manager in a South London borough, who said thathaving police in the control room was of great help as it helped improve the effectiveness ofthe system as ‗the police know who their looking for. They‘ve got people who they‘re looking
for even before they‘ve done something.‘712
The effectiveness of CCTV was found to be directly related to the type of worker thatwas operating the CCTV at the time.713 Techno-work embracers were very effective in
deploying staff to incidents and keeping a track of what was happening in a location.
However all the other type of workers resulted in ineffective use of CCTV. During the 120
hours of observations by the researchers, there were only 84 targeted surveillances, equating
to around five per eight hour shift, of which only 35% were proactive – one every four hours.

Survey of 14 CCTV schemes
In 2005, Gill et al. surveyed fourteen CCTV schemes (four urban areas, seven residential
areas, and three miscellaneous areas). Gill et al. found that although each scheme had CCTV
as a common denominator, each was unique and suggested that it made little sense to talk of
CCTV as a single measure.714 Only two of the studies showed a statistically significant
reduction in overall crime, but there were ‗pockets of successful CCTV operation‘ generally
relating to specific crimes.715 In one of the urban settings, the majority of the reduction incrime occurred between system installation and when the system started operation, indicatingthat it was the installation that provided the deterrent, not the operation of cameras.
Gill et al. claimed that it was unlikely that CCTV could lead to a significant increased
detection of crime through immediate arrest due to the difficulty of pursuing targets on CCTV
711

Ibid., 433.

712

Ibid., 435.

713

See also: Smith, ―Behind the Screens: Examining Constructions of Deviance and Informal Practices
among CCTV Control Room Operators in the UK‖ (showing how CCTV operators conducted targetedsurveillance according to stereotypes, found it hard to concentrate, rarely caught incidents on camera, and wereconstantly bored and unmotivated at work).
714

Gill et al., The impact of CCTV: fourteen case studies, 1.

715

Ibid., 43.

112

and directing officers to them.716 Overall CCTV‘s impact was variable. Gill et al. concluded
that CCTV could only work effectively taking individual circumstances into account andwhen used alongside other measures.717

Public perceptions of surveillance
In October 2007 Oliver Murphy carried out a quantitative report into perceptions ofsurveillance in the UK public. He led twelve 2-hour group sessions of six individuals, split
according to age and location. The participants were generally accepting and supportive of
public space CCTV. The majority of people saw CCTV as watching for and probably
preventing crime.718 It was seen as benefiting law-abiding citizens, reducing crime, bringing
criminals to justice, and making people feel safer when in public.719 Concerns were raised bya number of participants, specifically Belfast residents, who expressed distaste with being
watched by the authorities, and black, minority, and ethnic (referred to in the UK as BME)
participants who noted that they were often targeted. 720 Furthermore, most participants
believed that despite the mass use of CCTV the crime rate was still rising, and could notunderstand why this would be the case. Despite these concerns, people still believed it was
effective, and because they also believed that when it was controlled by the police it was used
responsibly and kept them safe. 721 Murphy asked about perceptions of ‗Neighbourhood
Watch‘, which was not brought up by anyone as a surveillance issue, but no one viewed it as aform of surveillance. People reasoned that it was local, not systematic, and the information
obtained was not passed on to the authorities. People further reasoned that Neighbourhood
Watch was necessary due to fewer visible police on the streets.722

716

Ibid., 5.

717

Ibid., 43.

718

Murphy, A Surveillance Society: Qualitative Research Report, 15.

719

Ibid., 16.

720

Ibid., 17.

721

Ibid.

722

Ibid., 19.

113

JapanIkebukuro Tokyo, CCTV Cameras
In 2004, The Tokyo Metropolitan Police commissioned a survey to interview 100 people723
about whether security could create a safe environment with peace of mind. 724 35
respondents lived in Ikebukuro and 65 were from outside the vicinity. Of those subjects who
were from Ikebukuro, 74% knew about the cameras and 26% were unaware. Meanwhile, of
those subjects who were from outside the area, 51% were aware and 49% were unaware (total
59% aware, 41% unaware).
For those who were aware of the cameras, they were asked how they knew, 32% said
they had seen the cameras, 31% had heard from local shops, 15% from television or news,
15% from family members or friends, 8% from CCTV notices indicating their presence, and
8% from local government news. Everyone was asked if safety has improved since theinstallation of cameras: 49% said yes, 37% said there had been no change, 14% didn‘t answer,
and no one said that safety had gotten worse.
Those who said safety had improved were asked why: 61% said people canvassing
pedestrians had decreased, 41% said they felt safer, 33% said that fliers had decreased, 14%
said there was less graffiti, 14% said there were fewer illegally parked cards, 12% said
suspicious persons were less common, only 2% said that bike thefts had decreased or policesirens were less frequent, and only 8% said that robbery had decreased.
All subjects were asked if they thought ‗crime prevention cameras‘ were effective increating a safe and secure environment: 90% said yes, 5% said they were unsure, and 5% said
no. Those who said ‗yes‘ were asked why they thought so. 67% said there were fewer crimes
now, 61% said cameras are useful when a crime occurs, 38% said they felt safer whentravelling, 22% said the image of the area had improved, 20% said the cameras had helped
keep the environment clean; and 1% said that criminals appear to be aware of the cameras.
From those surveyed who said cameras were not effective, 60% said that crime hadn‘tdecreased, 40% that it hadn‘t helped clean up the environment, and 20% said that they gave
the area the appearance of having a high rate of crime. No one mentioned privacy concerns
even though they were given the choice. Everyone was asked what measure has a high effect723

70 males, 30 females; 2 in their teens, 14 in 40s, 19 in 30s, 9 in 40s, 26 in 50s, 22 in 60s, 8 above 70
years old. No public servants.
724

Heisei 16 nen Ikebukuroku ni kamera secchi go no ankeeto. 平成１６年池袋地区にカメラ設置後のアンケート (2004, Survey about CCTV installed in Ikebukuro. The results of the survey were photocopied forthe author by Police Inspector Shirai. There is no online version of the survey.)114

on protecting safety. 82% said police patrols, 47% said an increase in ‗crime prevention
cameras‘, 42% said improved street lighting and crime prevention lamp posts, 34% said local
volunteer patrols, 30% said more kobans being open and staffed, 22% said community eventsand activities, 20% said information being made public about crimes, 16% said the use of the
110 emergency police number,725 15% said police crime prevention advice, 8% said the useof rape alarms, and one person said that crime prevention cameras have an effect on people
passing through the area.

Attitudes of shopkeepers and customers towards CCTVIn December 2003, a survey was carried out by Kimihiro Hino and Osamu Koide to ascertain
the opinions of shopkeepers and customers towards CCTV.726 160 shops were chosen, with95 respondents split into an experiment group and a control group. The previous year, due toan increase in thefts and arson, the experiment group installed 26 cameras. They wanted touse the cameras to deter crime, monitor for annoying behaviour, and record images for use
after an offence. They were not allowed to use them for monitoring, and the process forrecording was limited.
Both the experiment group and the control group had approximately 10% higher
expectations for CCTV than security companies for crime prevention effectiveness, but feltthat security companies would be easier to use than CCTV. Approximately 35% of bothgroups felt no unease with cameras taking pictures, 30% felt some unease, 25% felt areasonable amount of unease, and about 6% significant unease. 70% of the experimentalgroup thought that regulations for CCTV use were necessary compared with only 60% of thecontrol group. 24% of the experimental group thought that the cameras should be monitoredcompared with 50% of the control group. Hino concluded that it was necessary to have proper
standards for CCTV use, and that they must be clear. He also suggested that it was vital toboth evaluate the implementation and carry out other measures simultaneously.

Attitudes to CCTV installed in public places
A web survey in March 2008 by Kimihiro Hino, Takahito Shimada and Ayami Hino, with
2,827 respondents asked about the attitudes towards the location and implementer of725

The ‗110‘ number in Japan is the emergency number for the police, like 999 in the UK, or 911 in the US.

726

Hino, Hino, and koide, Attitude toward CCTVs in Shopping Streets: Questionnaires to Shopkeepers andCustomers.

115

CCTV.727 Opposition to residential CCTV was four times higher than town CCTV, and there
was a greater feeling of unease with private run CCTV than government run CCTV. In orderof acceptance to such use was; government or police (highest), followed by business or store
groups, neighbourhood associations, apartment managing firms, NPOs, local businesses
acting independently, and lastly individuals (lowest). Males were more opposed than females
to CCTV implementation. CCTV had approximately 80% acceptance, if it helped reduce thefear of crime and assisted in criminal investigations and approximately 75% acceded if it
helped reduce crime and anti-social behaviour.

Effect of surveillance on residents’ fear of crime
A survey carried on in April 2008 by Kimihiro Hino and Ken Shibata looked at residents‘ fearof crime and found that security guards, followed by CCTV decreased feelings of anxiety. 728
Alarms were the least likely to lower residents‘ fear of crime. The results showed that 47% of
people thought CCTV to be very effective, 41% quite effective, 8% not very effective, 2% not
at all effective, and 2% did not answer. This is in comparison to security guards which 67%
felt were very effective, and 27% quite effective; and alarms which 27% thought were very
effective, and 45% quite effective.

Attitudes to CCTV use by Waseda University students
Nishihara conducted a ten-question survey out with students at Waseda University between
July and October 2008 about the use of surveillance cameras:
The first two questions were about the location of cameras used by non-police andpolice. The students were mainly against cameras covering entrances to homes, club activity
rooms, toilet entrances and exits. Half of the students were against cameras being installed inuniversity buildings. A majority of students were ‗okay‘ with cameras run by the police in
Kabukicho, video rental shops, and underground stations. When asked about police or
security staff monitoring apartment blocks and hallways, there were significantly moreconcerns with police than security staff.729

727

Hino, Shimada, and Hino, Citizens’ Attitude to CCTV Installed in Public Places: in the view of Who
installs Where.
728

Hino and Shibata, ―Effect of Surveillance Facilitated by Design on Residents‘ Fear of Crime.‖

729

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 60-61.

116

The third question asked students about what CCTV use they would accept, assuming
they were at an underground station in Tokyo. Most students answered that they would accept
surveillance cameras if used with police officers, but more than half would not accept
randomly programmed cameras that can pick up sound, and more than 90% of students
thought that cameras that can match information730 were an invasion of one‘s privacy. Many
students also worried about whether they would be distinguished from criminals.731
The fourth question asked the students what were desirable and undesirable uses ofcameras. A large percentage agreed with the following uses: collecting evidence after anincident; providing a trail or evidence when a crime occurs; preventing accidents and crimes
from occurring; preventing or dealing with emergencies. The following uses were seen as
undesirable: just for appearance; to view or watch over young people and schools; forindividuals to guard their own areas; as a hobby. Many students did not like the idea of unseen
individuals conducting surveillance. However, they wanted to know that CCTV could bothexonerate them if they were innocent, and catch offenders if they were victims.732
Questions five and six asked students what information universities and the police
should be allowed to collect about individuals. Students did not object to the following
collection of information: for the university: address, phone number, mail address, health andillness history, family information, school history, library usage, part-time job, employment
history, and university club attendance; for the police: crime and traffic violation monitoring.
Students objected to the collection of information about relationships, friends, schedule,
personal contact information, political or religious views, and video rental history.733
Question seven asked about collection and use of personal data. 80% of students feltthat use of their personal information for things outside the initial purpose was an invasion of
their privacy. 70% felt that publishing their information was an invasion of their privacy while
50% felt that monitoring or recording by police was an invasion of their privacy.734
Question eight asked the students concerning how people should be made aware of thepresence of cameras. The students noted that clear notification was important to prevent
invasion of privacy. However, if a criminal is able to avert detection due to the notification of730

Jouhou macchingu. 情報マッチング

731

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 61-62.

732

Ibid., 62-63.

733

Ibid., 63-67.

734

Ibid., 67-69.

117

the cameras, then the purpose of the camera is not being realised, causing a conflict between
obtaining evidence and protecting privacy.735
Question nine asked the students if security was more important than privacy. 50％
agreed, and 40% said they couldn‘t choose. Over half the students said they did not trust thepolice to carry out surveillance.736
Question ten asked how extensive CCTV regulation should be applied to public
surveillance schemes. There were very few students who said either that all surveillancecameras should be outlawed or there should be no regulations. Almost all students said that
there should be some form of regulation in the use of such surveillance.737
Nishihara surmised three points: firstly, the understanding of most of the students ofprivacy was similar to idea ‗the right to be let alone;‘738 secondly, because the conception ofprivacy was ambiguous, perception of privacy differed between students; and finally, seeing
how privacy is affected in society is difficult as privacy can be a flowing concept due to rapidchanges in technology. 739 Nishihara‘s suggestions for protecting privacy through CCTV
regulation were: Privacy should be given a clear description;
 CCTV systems should have clear, understandable and published standards;
 CCTV should be regulated and controlled and responsibility taken at different
levels, that is, the national government controls the prefectures who control thecities who control the towns;
 Signs indicating the presence of cameras should be obvious and clear; Individual cameras position and performance should be made publically available;
 There should be a transparent system for complaints. If a complaint is upheld, theoffender should be required on pain of sanction to conform; and If the residents of an area decide they do not want CCTV, the CCTV operator must
735

Ibid., 70.

736

Ibid., 70-71.

737

Ibid., 71.

738

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 72 (Hitori de hotteoite morau kenri. 一人で放っておいてもらう権利).
739

Ibid., 79.

118

enter into consultations with the opponents. If the operator refuses to comply, thegovernment must ensure the cameras are removed.740

Attitudes of CCTV in Suginami Ward, Tokyo
Due to increasing crime in recent years cameras were installed in Suginami.741 A survey ofsome residents in December 2007 in the area found that 95% of people felt that CCTV
cameras were able to prevent crime. 70% of residents also thought that there should bestandards and regulations for the cameras, so a meeting of specialists was set up, and based on
the outcome of discussions regulations were established.742 The system manager was alsointerviewed by researchers, working under Nishihara, who asked the following questions:743
1. Following the regulations, has any advice been given regarding bad or wrong
CCTV camera set up?
2. Have there been any complaints or grievances about the system by local residents?
3. Have the regulations created any problems or indicated that there is room for
improvement?
The system manager answered all three questions with ‗nothing particular‘744. Nishihara
reasoned that either people have opinions but remain silent, or are unaware of the cameras. He
proposed the idea that people may be oblivious to surveillance and have ‗sleep-walked‘ into asociety where cameras are so ubiquitous that people no longer notice them.745
Researchers also interviewed the manager of a system on the local railways. The
CCTV system was installed in 1998, partially in response to the Tokyo sarin gas attack. The
cameras were used for emergencies as well as crime reduction. The images were notmonitored in real time unless there was an incident in progress. Images were retained for 30days but the system did not record sound. The manager said: ‗When something unusual
happens the cameras are used. Because citizen‘s lives are important and in order to deal with
740

Ibid.

741

Between 1998 and 2002, the number of crimes increased by 160%. See
http://www2.city.suginami.tokyo.jp/library/file/sg_cmrkg02_03.pdf
742

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 6-7.

743

Ibid., 6-11.

744[Toku ni nai]「特に無い」

745

Nishihara, Surveillance Cameras and Privacy, 17.

119threats to their safety from those who would do harm, CCTV is a necessary tool.‘ 746 The
manager also said that cameras were used to deal with people‘s feelings of anxiety and lack ofsafety as it was believed that this would instil feelings of safety in people.747
Interviews were carried out at a Karaoke bar and a Manga Coffee shop by the
researchers under Nishihara. 748 At the Manga shop, cameras were installed for crime
prevention. The system manager would not answer how many cameras were kept or for how
long the images were stored, claiming that answering could reduce the effect of thecameras.749 The cameras were not monitored and no sound was recorded. The Karaoke bar
installed ten cameras for crime prevention, emergencies and police investigations. Images
were kept for three months and then automatically written over. The cameras were monitored
at the front desk and/or at the office. Some of the cameras could record sound.

Crime prevention activities in Aichi-prefecture
In 2010, Aichi prefectural government released a report on crime prevention activities
including the use of CCTV. The report stated that although a target had been set to reduce thenumber of crimes by 20,000 by the end of 2011, which would be a 5% decrease year on year,
over the past two years there had been an increase in crimes.750 The report acknowledged thatin order to create an environment where crime did not readily occur, it was imperative to
discuss the limits of power and actions that should be permissible. The researchersinterviewed 482 persons (97% response rate out of 497 persons) between 3 August and 20
August 2010 by internet and post.751 The survey included the following questions:
Question 1: In order to create peace of mind through security and safety, what is mostimportant? (Only one answer)752 75.5% said prevention of crime, 6.8% strengthen controlof the environment; 4.6% take measures to deal with natural disasters; 4.4% prevent traffic
746

Ibid., 13.

747

Ibid., 15.

748

Ibid., 15-16.

749

Bouhan jouno tsugou no tame kotaeraremasen. 防犯上の都合のため答えられません

750

Aichi Prefectural Government, Prefectural government monitor questionnaire report: Towards crime
prevention and security consciousness, 1.
751

48.3% male, 51.7% female; 15.7% 20s, 21.3% 30s, 18.5% 40s, 16.3% 50s, 28.2% 60s+

752

Anzen de anshin shite kurasutame ni mottomo juuyou na koto wa nan da to omoimasu ka? (Kaitou wa
1tsu made). 安全で安心して暮らすために最も重要なことは何だと思いますか。 （回答は 1 つまで）120

accidents; 3.3% protect food supply; and 3.9% other. The same percentage of men and womenchose prevention of crime, and there was a slight preference for this measure for those in their
30s then other age groups. There was a significantly higher percentage of those over 60
wanting increase in control over the environment.
Question 2: What do you think about safety in your local area compared with twoyears ago? (Only one answer)753 41.5% said there had been no change; 7.1% a little better;
3.1% better; 0.8% much better; 34.6% a little worse; 10.8% much worse. 48.7% of womenthought it had got worse, or a little worse, compared with 41.3% of men. People in their 20s
and 30s were least likely to think things had improved; people above 60 were most likely tothink things had got better.
Question 3: For those who answered the second question above with ‗got much better‘or ‗got better‘, please explain why? (Only two answers) 754 50.9% said because neither
themselves nor someone close to them had been the victim of any crime; 47.2% said becauseof an increase in crime prevention patrols; 28.7% because their local area had become more ofa crime prevention environment; 20.8% because there were fewer reports of crime; 13.2%
because there were more police patrols; 9.4% because the police or local council have said
there was less crime. There was a wide variety in answers depending on age.
Question 4: For those who answered the second question above with ‗got a little worse‘or ‗got worse‘, please explain why. (Only two answers) 755 46.1% said because they orsomeone close to them had been a victim; 40.6% because there were still many reports ofcrimes; 35.6% because the police or local government had said so; 24.2% because their local
crime prevention environment had gotten worse; 21.5 because there were fewer police patrols;
and 7.8% because there weren‘t that many crime prevention patrols.

753

Anata ga osumai no chiiki no chian wo izen (2 nen hodo mae) to kurabete dou natteiru to omoimasuka?
(Kaitou wa 1tsu made). あなたがお住まいの地域の治安を以前（2 年ほど前）と比べてどうなっていると思いますか。（回答は 1 つまで）754

Toi 2 ni de, [1 totemo yoku natteiru], [2 yoku natteiru] mata wa [3 sukoshi yoku natteiru] to kotaeta katani wo kikishimasu. Yokunatta riyuu ni tsuite kisai shite kudasai. (kaitou wa 2 tsu made). 問 2 で、
「1 とても良くなっている」、「2 良くなっている」または「3 尐し良くなっている」と答えた方にお聞きします。
良くなった理由について記載して下さい。
（回答は２つまで）。
755

Toi 2 de, [5 sukoshi waruku natteiru] mata wa [6 waruku natteiru] to kotaeta kata ni kikishimasu.
Warukunatta riyuu ni tsuite kisai shite kudasai. (kaitou 2tsu made).
問 2 で、「5 尐し悪くなっている」または「6 悪くなっている」と答えた方にお聞きします。悪くなった理由について記載して下さい。（回答は２つまで）。

121

Question 5: What measures do you take to prevent crime? (Multiple answers okay)756
84.6% said locking doors; 33% said they got information about how to prevent crime; 13.3%
said they used items such as immobilisers and CCTV; 12% said they used buzzers (rapealarms); 6.8% said they did nothing.
Question 6: What would you most like the local government to do to prevent crime?
(Only one answer)757 38.2% said that CCTV should be installed in parks and parking lots;
36.9% said that specific crime prevention advice should be given to local areas; 7.3% said
crime prevention volunteer groups should be given appropriate tools; 20% gave other reasons.
Split by age group, CCTV in public spaces, above 60s were least likely with 28.3%; the most
likely was 30s (47.5%), then 40s (42.4%), then 50s (38.8%), then 20s (38%).
Question 7: What do you think about ‗crime prevention cameras‘ in public spaces?
(Only one answer)758 70.8% said they were necessary and approve; 12.4% said they didn‘tfeel the need for them, but did approve; 7.7% said they had no opinion; 6.4% said they werenecessary, but didn‘t approve; and 2.5% said they were not necessary and so didn‘t approve.
By age, the lowest percentage who expressed direct approval was the 20s group with 73.3%,
and the highest the 50s group with 88.8%.
Question 8: Regarding the outbreak of crime, what kind of information do you thinkhits closer to home? (Only one answer)759 35.5% said photographs, 27.2% said maps, 23.9%
said written information, 10.6% said graphical, and 3.1% said other.
Question 9: Do you want to participate in local crime prevention patrols? (Only one
answer)760 35.9% wanted to but couldn‘t due to work commitments; 18.5% wanted to but
didn‘t know how to get involved; 12% had no intention to participate; 10.4% said they wouldin the future; 9.8% said they were currently participating; and 7.7% said they might. People intheir 20s (28.2%), followed by 30s (14.9), 50s 11.3%), 40s (6.5), over 60s (5.8%) had no756

Anata no totteiru bouhan taisaku ha nan desuka? (Kaitou wa ikutsu demo). あなたのとっている防犯対策はなんですか。（回答はいくつでも）。
757

Jichitai ni taishite, mottomo nozomu bouhan taisaku wa nan desu ka? (Kaitou wa 1tsu). 自治体にたいして、最も望む防犯対策は何ですか。
（回答は１つ）。
758

Koukyou no ba ni okeru bouhan kamera no secchi ni tsuite dou omoimasu ka? (Kaitou wa 1tsu). 公共の場における防犯カメラの設置についてどう思いますか。（回答は１つ）
759

Hanzai hassei joukyou ni tsuite, dono you na jouhou ga yori mijika ni kanjimasu ka? (Kaitou 1tsu). 犯罪
発生状況について、どのような情報がより身近に感じますか。
（回答１つ）
760

Anata wa, chiiki ni okeru bouhan patorooru katsudou nado ni sanka shitai to omoimasuka? (Kaitou wa
1tsu) あなたは、地域における防犯パトロール活動等に参加したいと思いますか。（回答は 1 つ）

122

intention of helping; People participating in patrols increased with age: 60s (17.4%), 50s(8.8%), 40s (8.7%), 30s (5.9%), 20s (2.8).

Conclusion
In the UK, surveys and studies into the effectiveness of CCTV showed that there was a small
positive correlation between installation of CCTV and reducing crime rates. However, Welsh
and Farringdon added a caveat that the effectiveness depended on location and using thesystem in conjunction with other measures as such cameras were generally not enough of adeterrent to a criminal to be an effective prevention method.761 Alone, CCTV has a minimal
impact on crime rates and should not be seen or promoted as a panacea for prevention ofcrime.
On the other hand, CCTV used as part of a larger strategy has been shown to beeffective and should be promoted when the circumstances and location are demonstratively
suitable. In the UK, CCTV tends to target certain sections of society: usually minorities, theless well off, and the young. Such targeting might not be done consciously or intentionally,
but results in disproportionate surveillance of vulnerable groups. For example, the installationof cameras in a predominately Muslim neighbourhood in Birmingham under anti-terrorism
legislation, and the perception that CCTV operators disproportionately monitor young black
men indicates that CCTV is not always used appropriately. In order to avoid accusations ofracism, operators purposely monitored other people to create a balance. However, as the
subject under surveillance is being selected purely on the base of race, this is an unjustifiable
use of a surveillance system. The multicultural character of the UK and the concerns with
racism lead to inappropriate use of monitored CCTV.
In Japan, Abe says that surveillance at present is not about guarding citizens but
watching over them to prevent others from causing harm. However, this benevolent use of
surveillance only applies to Japanese citizens. CCTV and other forms of surveillance are
increasingly cementing a ‗them and us‘ attitude whereby surveillance protects Japanesecitizens from criminals, and foreigners, who are increasingly branded as criminals, areguarded over by the cameras.
Most Japanese associate with the section of society that needs to be protected and so
are happy for the surveillance web to be widened and strengthened. The section of society thatfeels branded as criminal or potentially criminal finds that the surveillance web not acting
761

Welsh and Farrington, Making public places safer, 118.

123

benevolently, but as a probation officer. Most CCTV in Japan is not currently monitored,
however if it becomes monitored in the future, there is a real danger that it would also be useddisproportionately against non-Japanese for two reasons: Firstly, surveillance for crime
prevention purposes monitoring staff will look for abnormalities in Japans relatively
homogenous society762 as foreigners are often instantly recognisable, either due to their skincolour (for non Asians) or dress sense (non Japanese Asians) or behaviour in pubic (notmaintaining a public façade). Therefore non-Japanese will generally be singled out forsurveillance, even if they have done nothing to arouse suspicion beyond not conforming toJapanese norms. Secondly, the common perception that foreigners are a direct cause forincreasing crime will lead to institutional racism resulting in increasing monitoring of
foreigners.

sex,

763

Institutional discrimination in Japanese and British society, based on both race andmeans that the installation and monitoring of CCTV needs to be regulated to

specifically counter issues associated with a society comprised of a wide variety of people.764
The ICO 2010 report raised concerns that social sorting through ‗joined-up government,utility and services outsourcing, pressure from technology corporations and the ascendency ofactuarial practices‘ have resulted in different groups of people being treated differently by thestate, with life-changing consequences. 765 This problem needs to be addressed throughappropriate training for CCTV operators including reducing stereotypes and increasing theability to spot criminal activity.
The results from the Japanese surveys showed that CCTV was widely accepted andpeople were generally content with such surveillance; however, at the same time people
express concern with being watched. In total these mixed feelings established a large amountof confusion over using CCTV with the general public. The UK surveys found large
762

However, see: Sugimoto, ―Class and Work in Cultural Capitalism: Japanese Trends‖ (saying that theperception of Japan as a homogenous society was flawed, with variations in ethnicity, and social and financial
status. Sugimoto said that some of this increase in social inequality was due to the aging characteristic of Japan
which exaggerated the class differences).
763

Institutional discrimination occurs when the culture, procedures, and policies of an organisation
inherently discriminate against a group of people due to different groups‘ needs not being taking into accountwhen the systems were set up. See:
https://czone.eastsussex.gov.uk/schoolpersonnel/payandconditions/equalopportunities/Documents/discrimination_definitions_download.pdf
764

Monahan, Surveillance in the Time of Insecurity, 113-117 (noting that because men aredisproportionately employed as CCTV operators, cameras are often used for voyeurism, and result in womenbeing targeted for reasons other than protection or suspicion of crime).
765

Information Commissioner‘s Office, Information Commissioner’s report to Parliament on the state ofsurveillance, 39.

124difference in effectiveness and privacy invasion depending on system set up. These results
suggested that it was important to both understand what a system‘s regulations were and how
a system functioned on a day-to-day basis to determine whether or not a system was invading
privacy.

4.2 CCTV usage in practiceJapan
NagoyaBetween 1975 and 1979 18 police-run CCTV cameras were installed in Nagoya. These weresplit into three zones and run by separate police stations. They were not actively monitored or
proactively used by police, but only sporadically viewed from local kobans in the event of anincident. The number of cameras increased in 2005 and the images began to be recorded,
although the police did not confirm the total number currently in use. In one of the kobans theauthor visited, the monitor was displayed in the full view of any members of public whoentered the koban. The police sometimes used the monitor prior to attending an incident if thecameras showed the relevant area.
Images recorded on the police cameras were stored for 24 hours at the koban, and atNaka Ward Police Station for two weeks. This is in contrast with local council cameras whereimages were stored for only one week. Local council cameras were never monitored, andaccess to the images was restricted to a select number of individuals.766 Installing CCTV in
Japan was very expensive. Each camera had to be attached to a specially installed concrete
post of a certain height and special cables needed to be laid. Aichi police did not employ any
individuals to monitor the cameras in real time over privacy concerns and costs. Every six
months the police reported on the use of CCTV to a public safety committee.
The police767 explained that in Nagoya CCTV was seen as having three effects:
prevent crime, reduce fear of crime, and assist criminal investigations. The police state thattheft from motor vehicles reduced by a greater rate in areas where CCTV was installed whencomparing crime figures pre-installation and post-installation. The police stated that theeffectiveness of CCTV was measured by crime rates because people wanted simple answers
and figures, and this was possible to do for crime rates, but much harder to do for what CCTV
766

In Sakae, only three people have access.

767

The names and positions of the police interviewed during the research remain anonymous for thispublication.

125

was predominately used for – investigation – even though crime rates were not a suitablemeasure. To date, there have been no incidents caught on camera resulting in the police
deploying and making an arrest. There are no figures on the effectiveness of CCTV ininvestigations; however the police claim that it has become a useful tool in investigating
incidents.

Tokyo – Metropolitan Police
In 2010, there were five areas covered by police-run CCTV in Tokyo with a total of
160 cameras installed between 2002 and 2007. The police also had a CCTV van that could go
to areas as required and transmit real time images back to the station. There were 141 dome
cameras, 18 static cameras, and 1 high definition CCD camera. Local businesses ran a total of
3,032 cameras spread throughout 191 separate areas. The police did not have right of accessto the control rooms or the cameras, but could view recorded data upon request.
The majority of police-run cameras were dome cameras because they took up asmaller amount of disk space compared to static cameras in relation to the area that they
covered.768 The CCTV system did not use facial recognition technology at the time of theauthor‘s visit, because regulations required cameras to be at a height of least 4.5 metres fromthe ground in public spaces and 3.5 metres from the pavement on pavements, creating anangle that made it difficult to get suitable images of people‘s faces. Furthermore, the main
purpose of the cameras was for crime prevention not offender detection. The images from thepolice cameras were relayed to six police stations and simultaneously to the Metropolitan
Police Headquarters. They could be viewed and searched by the individual stations for 24hours, after which a request had to be made to Police Headquarters. The dome cameras moved
automatically according to preset programming and the monitoring officers watched thescreens and reacted if necessary or if required to by police requesting their assistance.
All the images generated by the 160 cameras were stored in the Police Headquarters
for seven days and then deleted. Theoretically the images could be held for up to one month,or occasionally longer for a complex investigation, but only with good reason. Seven days
was chosen as the time limit because this was the recommended period for privacy protection
by a panel of university professors, lawyers, and privacy experts. This also cut down on
storage space. Every month the police were required to report at a public meeting on how thecameras had been used.
768

Four separate static cameras would be required to cover the area that can be covered by a single rotating
dome camera.

126

Hiroyuki Kotani argued that the time that the process that the Tokyo Metropolitan
Police was able to extend retention of images was ambiguous and without sufficienttransparency or accountability. Kotani stated that the process of making a simple request to
the system manager does not provide sufficient transparency or accountability of the police.769
Takehiro Ohya criticized Kotani‘s stance, saying that the process was clear and data was notstored unless the proper procedures were followed. Furthermore, data would automatically bedeleted unless a specific request justifying the retention was made in writing from the chief ofthe requesting department.770 Ohya claims that any extension would not be sought arbitrarily
but only when a case justified the extended retention of data, and therefore Kotani‘s fear ofpolice requesting and receiving permission to retain data for long periods was ungrounded.
The police 771 said that their cameras were not ‗surveillance‘ cameras but‗crime-prevention‘ cameras. They explained that their cameras were not used to findsuspicious persons, or to watch high crime areas, but rather to deter criminals by the presenceof the cameras; provide evidence for criminal prosecutions after a crime had occurred; andmonitor the location of an incident when police were in attendance.
In four of the five areas crime decreased from pre-implementation levels. The range ofcrime decrease was from 21% to 67%. In one area, Ueno 2-Chome, a rise in crime of 1%
occurred after the installation of cameras. The police explained that crime was steadilydecreasing throughout Tokyo, however not by as much as the areas covered by CCTV. The
police were unaware of any studies looking at either displacement or diffusion of the effect of
CCTV and due to financial constraints there were no plans to increase the number of police
CCTV cameras in Tokyo.

Tokyo – National Police Agency (NPA)The National Police Agency is currently running a pilot scheme for CCTV in Kawasaki Cityin Kanagawa. The town is split down the middle by overland train tracks, with cameras set up
on one side of the train tracks and the other side was left as the control area to check fordisplacement. The police were comparing adjacent areas for diffusion; however, they were notcomparing similar non-adjacent areas. The system became operational at the end of 2009 andreached its total number of 50 cameras in March 2010.
769

Kotani, ―Rapid Increase in use of Surveillance Cameras by the Police,‖ 195.

770

Ohya, What is Freedom? Surveillance Society and the Dissapearance of the “Individual,” 135.

771

The names and positions of the police interviewed during the research remain anonymous for thispublication.

127

The majority of cameras were dome cameras with full pan/tilt/zoom functionality. The
images from the cameras were transmitted to the police station CCTV room, to which alimited number of police officers had access. The positions for the cameras were chosen
according to crime rates and areas where there was a high level of unease about crimes
against young persons and females. The cameras were monitored sporadically by the police
unless an alarm rang on the CCTV system indicating an incident was occurring. The alarm
would ring automatically when computer software picked up one of the following
circumstances: a vehicle travelling in the wrong direction down a street; a group of people
gathering together, perhaps indicating either a fight or lots of people showing concern over an
injured person; and when an object that had been moving, stopped moving for a few minutes,
for example, a drunken or injured person who is staggering around and then falls over anddoesn‘t move.
The system can search for people over a specified time period and location given
height and clothes colour. These functions are currently undergoing testing and haven‘t beenbrought into use yet. The cameras have a masking feature that prevents them looking into
people‘s private property. There are two forms: matrix and total black out. Even when thecameras are moved, the masked area remains. This worked smoothly, but could be improved
as it also blacked out some publically accessible areas time due to the inflexibility of therectangular masking feature. The area covered by the cameras contained numerous snack bars
and according to the police sergeant explaining the system, there were no problems witheither customers complaining about their images being taken going into these places or shop
owners or workers complaining.772
Kawasaki was chosen for the pilot because it was the only location that did not have a
CCTV system in use at the time and would therefore be better able to show the effect of
implementation. One of the police officers involved in national CCTV implementation773
acknowledged that the results of the pilot scheme may therefore not be applicable to otherareas that already had some CCTV presence, but that running it in Kawasaki would showwhether implementing a camera based security system in an area that was yet to have CCTV
made a difference to crime rates.
Before the system was introduced a survey was carried out by the NPA to ascertain
people‘s thoughts and concerns about such uses of cameras. 91% of people said that they772

The police specifically mentioned that although the cameras were covering areas where there were snackbars and other less reputable businesses, the cameras were not being used to conduct surveillance on thesebusinesses.
773

The names and positions of the police interviewed during the research remain anonymous for thispublication. The author visited Kawasaki city in Kanagawa, where the NPA is running a pilot scheme.

128agreed with the system. This was higher than the police expected. The NPA will carry out afollow up survey and the results will be published in April 2011. In the Journal of Police
Science, the former chief of the National Police Research Centre Masahiro Tamura discussed
the level of confidence Japanese people have in the police. He explained that people havemore trust in the police than the judiciary to uphold freedom and human rights. He further
discussed the general acceptance of CCTV by the population and referred to a survey774 thatshowed 89% acceptance. Using these results, it can be argued that police use of CCTV is be
accepted and trusted by the public.775

England
CCTV use in Counter Terrorism
Andy Hayman776 commented on the usefulness of CCTV in keeping the UK safe:
One thing is for sure: despite the concerns of civil-liberties groups, the surveillancesociety of CCTV cameras, listening devices and data-bases . . . is paying off big-time
when it comes to catching criminals and terrorists.777
Hayman noted that CCTV was a vital starting point for the investigation in the immediate
aftermath of the 7 July 2005 bombings in London, and how getting images as quickly as
possible enabled the police to find out what happened and what to do next.
Two hours after the bombings a three-phase system to begin the investigation of thebombings was put in place.778 The first phase was the ‗Trawl Phase‘ which consisted ofcollecting CCTV systematically for areas using a grid system. Officers were given a packcontaining maps, statements, questionnaires to take details of what CCTV system was used,exhibit bags, quality assurance forms to ensure that sufficient details were taken about thelocation and contact details and system. This stage was very resource intensive. The second
774

Asahi Shimbun, 27 January 2004. 朝日新聞平成 16 年 1 月 27 日

775

Tamura, ―Submission of a Problem,‖ 74; However, see: Cao, ―Confidence in the police between America
and Japan Results from two waves of surveys,‖ 149 (concluding that ‘the public in Japan do not rate theirpolice as high as the American public. The surveys used were from the 1981 and 1991 World Values Surveys).
776

Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police at the time of the bombings in London in 2005.

777

Hayman and Gilmore, The Terrorist Hunters, 314.

778

The author interviewed a number of police officers regarding the use of CCTV in counter-terrorism. The
names and positions of the officers have been kept anonymous. Topics discussed were CCTV use inapprehending the nail-bomber David Copeland, investigating the 7-7 bombings, tracking down the attemptedbombers on 21 July 2005, and issues surrounding CCTV use.

129

phase was the booking-in procedure. This needed to be organised efficiently as there were asignificant number of video tapes and hard-drives,779 potentially with evidence of othercrimes captured. The third phase was the viewing system. Only five officers were used forviewing because, as the police explained, it was more important to have good quality staff
who pay close attention to detail than a high number of staff.
A number of problems and challenges were mentioned in using CCTV effectively forinvestigations. Deciding how much CCTV to collect during the early stages of the 7-7
investigation was a difficult decision. If they collected too much, it would have taken too longto search through all the tapes, and if they had collected too little, vital evidence may havebeen lost. CCTV covering the previous six months was chosen because many terrorist acts areoften planned and reconnaissance carried out months in advance, and vital clues to theconspirators and those helping the conspirators may only show up in the early stages of a plot.
Many businesses and locations with CCTV did not store data going back this far, but where
possible the police seized as much recorded information as possible.
CCTV throwing up false leads also led to problems. During the early stages of theinvestigation, CCTV images of the four 7-7 bombers entering the train station at Luton,
showed a fifth man with a backpack running in just afterwards who appeared to be with them.
The police thought this might have been a fifth bomber, and as only four bombs had gone off
there were concerns that another bomber was on the loose. The suspect was actually unrelated
to the bombings, but confirming this resulted in valuable resources being diverted away fromthe main investigation.
A number of problems were encountered due to the widespread use of CCTV in
London. For example, in London there were 26 bus companies and 85 bus garages working
over 32 boroughs, each with their own systems, creating downloading and viewing problems.
Furthermore, the number and location of cameras constantly changes so it is often notpossible to know the exact CCTV coverage of each location. Therefore it is necessary to send
officers to the scene of an incident to carry out door-to-door checks for CCTV availability.
There were also technical difficulties encountered during the investigation. For
example, some CCTV systems were often unable to record when downloading or copying
data.780 Other cameras weren‘t recording at the time of the bombings because either they779

Approximately 58,000 in total (combination of tapes and hard-drives)
For example, Waterloo station had 60 cameras, it would take one minute to download one minute offootage, and only one camera‘s images could be downloaded at a time. Therefore it would take 60 minutes todownload one minute from all the cameras and 60 hours to download one hour from all the cameras at thestation.
780

130

hadn‘t recently been checked;781 or because they appeared to be working but actually weren‘t
recording.782 If the police find a camera is faulty, but do not report this to the CCTV managerof the faulty system, the police may be liable for damages if a crime occurred that would havebeen caught on the camera. There were also many cameras that were not fit-for-purpose.
These included cameras that employed a time lapse function which tended to miss vital
information and not allow useful examination, such as gait analysis. Many cameras were low
quality with grainy images. Images from low quality cameras have low investigatory andevidential value. Finally, cameras that were in places with unsuitable surrounding lighting
rendered images unusable.
Concerns were also raised about public acceptance of CCTV, for example, manysystems did not live up to the expectations of the public. The public expected that if there wasa camera, it would be recording evidential-quality images, and become aggrieved when thecamera images were insufficient. A few years ago, dummy cameras were installed in crime
hotspots in West London, but victims of crime complained when they discovered thatprosecutions were not possible because the crime was not captured on camera.
The police found during the 7-7 and 21-7 investigations that CCTV was able tohighlight forensic opportunities and other lines of inquiry that would not otherwise have been
apparent. CCTV was recognised as an important tool for investigations but doubts were raised
as its sole use in deterring or preventing crime. Furthermore, the use of CCTV by local
councils for trivial investigations such as putting out rubbish or for revenue collection gave
citizens a reason to complain about its use.783
A number of recommendations were suggested for improving the use of CCTV. Firstly,
an up-to-date handbook listing the different CCTV systems in regular use should be kept fortechnicians who attend shops and businesses to retrieve images. Secondly, images should be
781

For the 7/7 bombings, the camera on the 30 bus where the bomb went off was not working, so they did
not get an image of the bomber – the bus had three types of recording systems, but none of them worked.
782This occurred with the Stockwell shooting incident where some of the cameras appeared to be recording
but weren‘t. This fuelled speculation of a police cover-up.
783

The National Council for Civil Liberties, ―Liberty‘s response to the Home Office consultation on the
RIPA 2000: Consolidating Orders and Codes of Practice,‖ 16-17 (noting how in 2007-2008 only 154 out of 470
local authorities used RIPA, indicating that the majority of authorities don‘t use the powers. Furthermore those
who used RIPA often did so without a clear understanding. This suggests that local authorities don't need thepowers in the first place.); ―Councils‘ surveillance powers curbed‖, The Guardian online, 4 November 2009.
(reporting that under reforms by the home secretary in November 2009, junior council officials are to loseauthority to order surveillance operations); ―Letters: Council surveillance.‖ The Guardian online, 26 May 2010.
(stating that surveillance is used by local councils only after authorisation by high level officials have taken into
account issues of privacy). Information Commissioner‘s Office, Information Commissioner’s report toParliament on the state of surveillance, 16,22 The ICO report also states that local authorities use of RIPA isoften non-proportionate and it should be considered whether their RIPA authorisation should be stripped.

131

retained for as long as possible, and a minimum of one month. The 7-7 bombers had come to
London ten days before the bombings to carry out reconnaissance and were captured by
CCTV.
Andy Hayman heralded the usefulness of CCTV in counterterrorism: ‗it was the
CCTV pictures that gave us the strongest insight into what had happened on the day.‘ 784 He
acknowledged concerns, but said that CCTV was generally accepted by the public:
Civil-liberty groups still complain, but the wider public seems to accept that there arecameras everywhere. CCTV is part of everyday life and people expect it to be aprincipal means of investigation – they‘d be angry if we didn‘t use it to catch
criminals.785
Hayman concluded that it was a vital tool in catching terrorists and keeping the UK safe:
When it comes to catching the terrorist, I‘d say that, alongside financial, mobile-phoneand computer data, CCTV is our primary means of investigation and a key source forcreating lines of inquiry. Despite its presence…it‘s amazing how often criminals are
oblivious to it.786

CCTV for Major Events
This section covers use of CCTV during the Notting Hill Carnival (Carnival) on 29 and 30
August 2010. The Carnival is the second largest street carnival in the world and attracts
crowds of around one million revellers.787 It is a major policing operation with around 5,000
police officers involved in patrolling the event, 788 and has seen significant policing
challenges in recent years.789

784

Hayman and Gilmore, The Terrorist Hunters, 139.

785

Ibid., 140.

786

Ibid.

787

http://www.thenottinghillcarnival.com/

788

http://www.met.police.uk/nottinghillcarnival/

789―Mob runs amok at Notting Hill Carnival.‖ The Times online, 26 August 2008.

132

Central Control Room – Lambeth
The Central Control Room, known internally as GT,790 was the largest CCTV control room inEurope and was used for policing large events such as festivals, marches, and summits.791
The CCTV images were transmitted to a special CCTV control room within GT that was only
accessible to authorised personnel. In the CCTV room there were at least two operators at all
times, as well as private contractors to deal with technical problems. The monitoring staffs
were not police officers but rather police staff technicians. The main role of these technicians
was to ensure that the images were focused and clear. The techs were constantly checking
images from different cameras, and when there was a focusing, colour, or lighting problem,
instructed the relevant camera operator to adjust the cameras accordingly.
The cameras appeared to be used for five main purposes: 1. controlling traffic; 2.
aiming on fixed points such as hotspots and problem places; 3. following suspicious
behaviour or gang movements; 4. crowd control; and 5. watching police when they attend an
incident. The monitoring that occurs at GT was primarily for traffic, crowd control, and police
deployment, whilst crime related surveillance was carried out at Empress State Building.
The police officer in charge of traffic at the Notting Hill Carnival (Carnival) said thatCCTV was very useful for monitoring and directing traffic and he could not imagine
coordinating traffic for events or marches without CCTV.792 He said that whilst some images
used black-out features to prevent operators looking into private property, the operators weretrusted to not do anything inappropriate. There was little direct supervision of the monitoring,
because officers knew that they had to be able to justify everything they viewed with thecameras.793
The commanding officers for the event were able to view CCTV of the event from
790

Gumm, ―New London CCTV Control Room designed to thwart terrorists.‖
http://www.info4security.com/story.asp?storycode=4113985
791

On 29 August 2010 from 15:00 to 24:00 the author attended Central London Control Room during theNotting Hill Carnival, and on 30 August 2010 from 11:00 to 24:00 the author attended a specially constructed
CCTV monitoring room in Empress State Building. The author had unhindered access to these facilities and wasable to speak with senior officers, supervisors, and operators at both locations.
792

However, he said that the system did have problems. For example, how to choose which camera‘s image
is being shown on the monitor requires an operator to navigate a confusing hierarchical system of street names,
whereas it would be much easier to have the position of the cameras shown pictorially on a map where they canbe chosen by pressing on the relevant camera location. The sergeant informed the system implementers during
the consultation phase, but due to financial constraints, the current system‘s specifications were chosen.
793

Operators know that whatever they are looking at may be on the big wall, and if they are doing anything
inappropriate there is a good chance it will be picked up. One of the technicians said that there is usuallyjustification for all their monitorings, but sometimes things can look suspect due to the high positioning of thecameras.

133

images captured from cameras set on buildings and a camera mounted on a police helicopter.
From these images, and from reports coming in from units on the ground, the command wasable to deploy police according to where they were most needed and relieve them when not
required. Furthermore, when crowds started to form, road closures could be put in place, andbottle-necks relieved by opening up closed off streets. Without the CCTV this would result in
confusion and inaccuracies. The CCTV gave a bird‘s eye view of the whole event and madedeployment significantly more efficient.

Experiences from the Technicians
The technicians mentioned three main problems with the current use of CCTV by the police.
Firstly, the CCTV equipment was supplied by four separate companies; therefore when there
were malfunctions, it was not always obvious which company was responsible. Contractual
constraints meant that was not likely to be a problem that could be resolved in the near future.
Secondly, unqualified and untrained operators made basic operating errors so only trained
technicians should control the cameras. Finally, one of the operators thought that it would begood to have some legal training prior to starting and whilst working with CCTV. The
operator said that technicians picked up useful techniques and knowledge when working withthe police; however having specific training would be useful and increase the effectiveness ofthe cameras.

Effect of the Cameras on the Public
Members of the public who were not involved in criminal activity did not appear to be awareof the cameras. Drug dealers and gang members would regularly look up at the cameras andcheck their actions and positions accordingly. Even though suspects were aware of thecameras, and would often hide their faces using bandanas, hats, and hoods just before
committing an offence, they appeared to be oblivious to the fact that they were often being
watched in the lead up to the crime with their images and descriptions recorded, along withpictures being taken of them putting on their disguises.
One Japanese person interviewed for this thesis had attended the carnival and was
initially shocked to learn of the extensive CCTV monitoring of the event.794 The interviewee
794

The author of this thesis carried out 2 one-to-one structured interviews with two Japanese people resident
in London. The interviews covered the interviewees‘ attitudes towards privacy, surveillance, and CCTV, and thedifferences between their experiences in Japan and London regarding these issues.

134professed to not have seen any signage indicating the use of CCTV and did not like the ideaof being watched by cameras throughout the event.

Empress State Building (ESB)
Due to an oversight in planning, the Central Control Room at Lambeth did not have an area
specifically set aside for CCTV monitoring for crime. An area has to be found each year formonitoring the carnival and other special events. All of the CCTV monitoring equipment iscurrently rented through a number of different companies. The system used in 2010 was on afive year deal, costing ₤550,000 and is only used for three days a year. There were two
3-terabyte hard drives that simultaneously record the same images from all the cameras incase one of them fails. There were problems in the past when images were stored on hard
drives rusted after three years and became unreadable.795
One of the police officers working at the carnival said that CCTV was used very
proactively by police officers at ESB to follow and target criminals and was especially goodat catching pick pockets. Another useful function was the ability to put together fast time
information packs with information on suspects currently at the event, including pictures ofthem taken on that day. These information packs were then distributed during briefings to
officers working on the ground. This was a significant improvement on having to rely on
custody imaging796 where individual pictures may have been taken some time ago, and withdifferent clothes, hairstyle, eye wear, or clothes. The use of CCTV at Notting Hill has had asignificant impact on policing operations and has also led to a significant reduction incomplaints against the police.797
In 2010 year there were twenty CCTV monitoring officers, reduced from 35 theprevious year due to budgetary cuts. This had an impact on the effectiveness of the CCTV
system. For example, a cut in staff has had an impact on monitoring. Each operator was given
the responsibility of four cameras within a specific sector. The cameras were assigned toensure that each operator had a similar work load. This assignment was advantageous because
no operator was overloaded with work, but disadvantageous because it was harder to track
795

This was a significant problem as the images are kept for seven years.

796

Custody imaging is photos of offenders taken at a police station upon arrest.

797

A high percentage of complaints are either false, malicious, or the police action is actually reasonable inthe circumstances. When there is video evidence of the incident, this can be shown to the complainant, and the
majority of complaints can then be dropped. On the other hand, when a complaint is confirmed by the CCTV
evidence, then the police are able to act quickly and deal properly with the officer(s) involved.

135

subjects when they moved, and reduced the clarity of who was covering what area. One of thesenior operators recommended that each officer should only have one camera to monitor.
Craig Donald made similar recommendations based on a survey in Cape Town which foundthat detection rates decreased when the number of cameras monitored increased. His researchreferred to casinos where five cameras per operator were found to be the ideal number.798
Each monitoring officer had a display monitor, split into four images, a lap-top
computer, a CCTV controller, and access to CAD.799 The lap top showed the real time images
from one of the cameras shown on the monitor‘s main screen, which could be changed, and at
the press of a special button, a snap shot was taken and saved onto the laptop. Each sector(consisting of a number of monitoring officers and a sergeant), had at least one officer orpolice staff who input real time information of interest, that the monitoring officers call out,
onto a police database system called CRIMINT.800 This database can also have images linked
from the lap-tops.
In the main control room at GT, an officer reads the entries and keeps Gold (the officer
in charge of policing the event) informed allowing Gold to make informed decisions about
deployments accordingly. When a crime is viewed on a monitor‘s screen, images that havebeen captured on the lap-top are then sent through to a specific ‗crime-fighting‘ unit working
on the same floor, along with a CRIMINT of details of what happened. This would then be
put together into a file to be actioned at a later date. After the Carnival finished, the tapes
would be taken away and viewed in slow time by a special unit looking for crimes, andanalysing in detail the CRIMINT reports and matching faces with names to aid prosecution.
One of the senior officers explained that there was rarely a problem with privacy
issues, such as peering into people‘s private property, or leering at women, as all operators
knew what not to do due to extensive experience in the police. During big events like Notting
Hill there was also constant monitoring of the images on camera by the Independent Police
Complaints Commission (IPCC) who would immediately question the operator of a camera if
they saw something that appears inappropriate.801

798

Donald, ―The Right People,‖ 14.

799

Computer Aided Dispatch – radio system used by police to enable communication between officers on
the street and staff in a control room.
800

CRIMINT is an extensive database with police intelligence ranging from sightings of suspicious
individuals and movements of known criminals to details of low level public disorder.
801

One of the supervisors mentioned that he had previously questioned one of the operators who appeared to
be looking into a public house. However, it turned out that two of the people in the pub had been chucking thingsat people in the street, so the operator was looking at the suspects, which is an acceptable use of the cameras.

136

The senior operator felt that CCTV was generally accepted in London, especially as
the police made it clear with big signs that cameras were in place and being used. He also said
that they had a deterrent and a disruptive effect on crime. He deduced this from seeing actionsof criminals changing their behaviour in front of the camera when they realised the presenceof CCTV.

CCTV use by local police
Goold argued that CCTV has had a limited impact on policing. Goold found no evidence tosuggest that local police had incorporated CCTV into overall policing strategy. 802 He
suggested this may be due to lack of upper management providing guidance to local sergeants
and inspectors or to police practices such as patrol routes, shifts, and the supposed need for
officers to be in the public eye.803 On the other hand, the police claim that CCTV had brought
down response times, increased officer safety, helped better manage resources, and helped
deal with hoax calls and complaints against police.804 However, CCTV sometimes increased
police work load as it picked up incidents that otherwise would not be reported, although
there is no evidence to suggest that police deployment had increased as a result of CCTV.805
Such surveillance appears to have influenced police interaction with the public.
Goold noted that two-thirds of interviewed officers said that the presence of cameras
had made them ‗more careful‘ when dealing with incidents. 806 The Independent Police
Complaints Commission (IPCC) used footage from such cameras in 300 successful
complaints against police officers in 1999 alone.807 Sergeants and Inspectors have been
known to warn officers that their actions were often visible to the cameras and they should
therefore be careful when out on patrol to protect themselves against complaints. This has
resulted in some police being overly cautious when dealing with incidents and, in police led
CCTV schemes, operators moving cameras away from police when requested.808
Aside from council run CCTV, police utilise this form of surveillance in a number of802

Goold, CCTV and Policing: Public Area Surveillance and Police Practices in Britain, 168.

803

Ibid., 170.

804

Ibid., 172.

805

Ibid., 175-176.

806

Ibid., 180.

807

Ibid., 185.

808

Ibid., 189.

137

ways, including: VIIDO, Body Worn Video, Automatic Number Plate Recognition, CCTV
attached to drones, and in police stations. VIIDO uses CCTV images to identify offenders
caught on camera. This unit‘s research apparently shows that convictions are made in 70% ofcases where CCTV is used in court. DCI Mick Neville said in May 2009 that when CCTV istreated as a forensic discipline, 20% of crime are solved using CCTV, compared to almost nil
in areas where it is not given as much weight.809
Body Worn Video (BWV) is a camera that is fitted either to a police officer‘s helmet
or clothes and can record sound and video when attending an incident. The cameras werepiloted in 2005 and 2006, and by 2010 were being used by 16 out of 32 London boroughs.810
Police attending an incident turn on the camera from the moment they are deployed, and themicrophone picks up updates that the officers receive on the radio. The device remains
switched on until the incident has finished and enables the courts to have a much clearer
picture of both the police officer‘s actions and decisions, and the behaviour of suspects andvictims during an incident. It is supposed to increase police accountability, reduce disorderly
behaviour, and increase successful prosecutions.
In comparison to traditional police gathering methods such as from written notes,
sometimes taken many hours after an incident has occurred, evidence from BWV is far moreaccurate and enables courts to see and hear what occurred more clearly.811 The pilot study‘saims and objectives were to firstly, reduce bureaucracy, improve sanction detections, andstreamline the criminal justice system; secondly, reduce challenges to police officer evidence
in court; thirdly, increase early guilty pleas, reducing wasted police officer and court time; andfinally, reduce the number of malicious complaints against police officers.812
The pilot study found that there was an increase in charge or summons from 10.2% 15% and an increase in sanctioned detections from 29% - 36.8%. Furthermore complaints
against police were reduced by 14.3% (and no complaints against police wearing cameras).
There was a reduction in 22.4% in officer time on paperwork and an increase of 9.2% inofficer patrol time. In terms of crime rates, there was a 10% reduction in attrition rate forviolent crime sanctioned detections and significant increase in detections in all crime types
except drugs.813
809

Neville, ―Making it work,‖ 18.

810

MPS, ―Body-worn video cameras.‖

811

Police and Crime Standards Directorate, Guidance for the Police Use of Body-Worn Video Devices, 7.

812

Ibid., 30.

813

Ibid., 50-64.

138

The Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) system uses cameras either
mounted on fixed points on roads, or on mobile police vehicles. The cameras read number
plates captured on special CCTV cameras and stores them digitally as a string of characters tosave storage and aid processing.814 In 2010, up to 14 million images were stored each dayfrom the 10,000 ANPR cameras around the UK. Within a short time after the 21/7 bombingsin London, the MET sent out every ANPR vehicle available to start logging vehicle
movements. At the time of deployment, the police did not know what vehicle, if any, was usedby the suspects; retrospective analysis would allow them to build up a picture of movements
if they later found details of a suspect‘s vehicles.815
In mid 2010 there was significant controversy over around 150 ANPR cameras being
installed in two predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods of Birmingham. The cameras were
justified by the police and local council to the public on the grounds of dealing with
anti-social behaviour; however it transpired that they were funded through anti-terrorism
money, leading to speculation that the Muslim community were being unfairly targeted.816 A
survey in 2006 suggests reasons why Muslim communities might be singled out: the survey
found that out of the 1.6 million Muslims in the UK, 56% believed the government should domore to deal with terrorism, 50% felt the intelligence services had the right to infiltrate
Muslim organizations, 13% viewed the 7-7 bombers as ‗martyrs‘, and 7% considered that
suicide attacks could be justified on British civilians.817
Murphy found in his 2007 quantitative study that ANPR was widely accepted and seen
as a valuable tool in dealing with crime and terrorism.818 The ICO 2010 report suggested thatwhile the use of ANPR to monitor violent protests was probably justified, this probably did
not extend to its use to record and monitor peaceful, law-abiding protesters.819 Home Office
Minister Baroness Neville-Jones announced on 3 June 2010 that ANPR will be reviewed,
looking at its impact on civil liberties.820
814

CCTV Advisory Service, ―An Introduction to ANPR - CCTV Information.‖

815

Hayman and Gilmore, The Terrorist Hunters, 189.

816

―Birmingham ANPR cameras aimed at Muslims.‖ The Guardian online, 7 June 2010.

817―Muslim Britain split over 'martyrs' of 7/7‖ (the survey interviewed 1,131 Muslim adults aged 18 andover by telephone).
818

Murphy, A Surveillance Society: Qualitative Research Report, 18-19.

819

Information Commissioner‘s Office, Information Commissioner’s report to Parliament on the state ofsurveillance, 40.
820―Home Office to review ANPR.‖ Kable online, 8 June 2010
http://www.kable.co.uk/home-office-reviews-anpr-numberplate-recognition-08jun10139

In recent years the police have begun to use of flying drones with CCTV. These drones
fly silently at a height of around 60-100 metres and are hardly perceptible.821 The 2010 ICO
report said that they represented a greater threat to privacy due to their mobility and ability to
track and monitor in real time.822
CCTV in police custody823 is now common in the main custody room where suspects
are brought after arrest and in police detention cells.824 The cameras ensure that a record is
kept of all actions taken by and towards a prisoner from the moment they enter the custody
area. This helps ensure police accountability, and prove or disprove police complaints. The
cameras also provide evidence in case a prisoner, or police officer, commits a crime while incustody. Recently a police sergeant in Wiltshire, UK was gaoled for an assault on a detaineethat was captured on the custody CCTV.825

CCTV Operator Training (SIA)
Craig Donald, an expert on human factors related to CCTV, says that the most importantfactor in effectiveness of CCTV is the people monitoring the cameras, and the second mostimportant is creating the right working environment and ensuring the staff have suitableknowledge.826 Public Area CCTV operators must by law attend 30 hours of classroom basedteaching, pass two exams and a criminal background check and then pay for an SIA licence
before using a public space CCTV system.827
The author of this thesis enrolled in an SIA accredited training course for an SIA
Public Area CCTV Surveillance qualification in August 2010. The following is based on theauthor‘s personal experience at this training course. The reader should be aware that this may
not be representative of all CCTV operator training schemes.

821―Police make first-ever arrest using unmanned drone.‖ Daily Mail online, 12 February 2010; ―Unmanned
drones may be used in police surveillance.‖ The Guardian online, 24 September 2010.
822

Information Commissioner‘s Office, Information Commissioner’s report to Parliament on the state ofsurveillance, 38.
823‗police custody‘ is the area where arrested persons are detained within a police station.

824

McCahill and Norris, Urbaneye: CCTV in London, 11.

825―Cell assault sergeant facing sack.‖ BBC online, 5 September 2010.

826

Donald, ―The Right People,‖ 14.

827

Level 2 Working in the Private Security Industry [code CT154] and Level 2 Working as a CCTV
Operator [code CT159]

140

There were four students, including the author, enrolled on the SIA CCTV course. One
was a male with an IT post-graduate degree from India who came to England to find better
work. He was attending the course while applying for IT jobs. Another was a Nigerian male
who had been in the UK for one year working as a security guard. He had a SIA door
supervisor qualification828 and decided to attempt the CCTV qualification to enhance his job
prospects. From his experience it was very hard to find regular door work and even harder toobtain CCTV work. He intended to make some money in the UK before returning to his homecountry. The last student was a male from London who had been working in the security
industry for five years for a large London department store. His job included using store
CCTV and door work. He was on the course as the SIA had informed the department store
that all employees doing security work would have to be qualified from 2011.
Material provided to students on the course was comprehensive, covering all relevant
legislation, technical and ethical matters. 829 The quality of instruction was poor,
unprofessional, and unsuitable for preparing a CCTV operator. The trainer was also inaccurate
and unprofessional throughout the course. The course did not adequately prepare an operator
to work either effectively or efficiently as a CCTV operator. The material provided sufficientlearning material, and, provided the teaching and practical learning was up to scratch, is asuitable base for a training course. However, only the author read the material prior to thecourse date, and each of the other students admitted that they had only briefly skimmed thematerial before the course ended. If the course had been taught over thirty hours and nottruncated, it would have been possible to ensure that students had a good knowledge of thematerial.
The research into the SIA training course only looked at one course, and so may not be
representative of other SIA training courses; however it indicated that there was a problem
with the implementation of SIA training and monitoring of approved courses.830
828

The SIA Door Supervision qualification licences the holder to work as a door supervisor, but not as a
CCTV operator.
829

CCTV Pack (77 pages): Introduction to the roles and Responsibilities of the CCTV Operation and other
CCTV Staff; Codes of Practice, Operational Procedures & guidelines; CCTV Equipment and its Operation;
Control Room Communications & Access Control; Legislation [DPA, HRA, RIPA, FoIA, P&CEA, CPIA,];
Dealing with Incidents; CCTV Surveillance Techniques; Fire and Emergency Procedures; Health & Safety at
Work; Basic CCTV equipment terminology.
Working in Security Industry Pack (40 pages): Roles and Responsibilities; Customer Care & Social Skills;
The Law – England & Wales; Health and Safety at Work; Fire Awareness; Emergencies; Communications &Reporting.
830

A letter describing the problems with the course and training was sent to the qualification awarding body
shortly after the completion of the course and the author received his qualification paper. The awarding exam
body sent an email shortly after stating that they take this matter seriously and would be investigating the claims.

1414.3 Should citizens be concerned about CCTV?
Although courts have granted protection to individual‘s privacy, it has become far harder toescape the gaze of CCTV and other forms of surveillance while in public. The main concerns
expressed about CCTV are regarding police use; however, from the research carried out inthis thesis, in both Japan and England, police use of CCTV does not amount to an invasion ofprivacy warranting such concerns.
Data protection and privacy played a deciding factor in restricting the retention of
CCTV images in Japan to one week. This is an unnecessary restriction that provides nogreater protection to people‘s privacy, but rather reduces the chance that evidence may begathered in police investigations. In the UK, data protection scandals have tended to berelated to personal information held in long term databases, not short term storage of photos
or videos from public cameras.831 CCTV that records and stores images for a specified
limited period of time before being deleted, and whose images are only viewed for criminal
investigative purposes should not be seen as an invasion of privacy. However, with the
exception of use in criminal investigations, if CCTV images are viewed, transmitted, or usedin any manner that the person in the images has not expressly consented to, this could amountto an invasion of privacy.832
In both Japan and England, CCTV has been used conscientiously by the police, andthis research found no immediate causes for concern. The regulations in place limiting accessto cameras, the professional nature of the police involved in CCTV monitoring, and therelative transparency of the use of CCTV by the police should allay fears that the police
conduct mass surveillance in an Orwellian fashion. Furthermore, the use of cameras by thepolice tended to be for investigation after an offence, and so there was little real time‗surveillance‘ carried out. The main exception to this was during large scale events in England.
During the Notting Hill Carnival, extensive surveillance was carried out by a team of officers
tasked with finding offenders and obtaining photographic evidence of crimes. The cameras
were not used to spy on members of public or in any other inappropriate manner.

831―Previous cases of missing data.‖ BBC online, 25 May 2009. (noting losses of data such as: details about
100,000 members of the armed services, information on all 84,000 prisoners in England and Wales, child benefit
details covering 7.25 million families); ―Whitehall warns of new data leaks.‖ BBC online, 29 October 2009.
(noting recent leaks from areas dealing with national security); ―Timeline: Sensitive papers lost.‖ BBC online, 19
July 2004. (noting losses of data such as: details of a new weapons system, the loss of 1,933 government
computers)
832―Spain MP photo used for Bin Laden.‖ BBC online, 16 January 2010.

142

Facial recognition software may result in unjustifiable intrusion of individual‘s
privacy; specifically that of ex-offenders or people stored on a database who had not been
convicted of any crime. Lucas Introna and David Wood said in 2004 that seemingly mundane
decisions about algorithmic design in facial recognition systems may lead to significant bias
in how systems are used and the type of people who are more likely to be picked out by thesoftware.833 They further noted that the imbedded nature of facial recognition software makes
inspection and evaluation of its functioning difficult.834 In 2010, David Omand, former UK
Cabinet Officer Security Coordinator, predicted that CCTV may soon see the application ofpattern recognition technology to both recognise wanted individuals and tag an image of asuspect and follow them through a transport system.835 If a CCTV system attempts to match
people‘s images with a database of current suspects this could be seen as a justifiable invasionof privacy of the suspects. However, if the system tries to match faces with a database ofpeople with previous, but spent, convictions, then this could be seen as an unjustified
intrusion into citizen‘s privacy, especially if they are being targeted in preference to people
not on a police database.
Another potential cause for concern is if cameras are hidden or their presence is notmade clear in public places. If there is clear signposting stating where the camera is sited, its
purpose and what it is monitoring, then it will generally not amount to an invasion of privacy,
provided the purpose is clearly stated, unambiguous and has a narrow scope. Some of thecodes of practice for CCTV schemes are however vague and wide ranging, 836 leading toconcerns that CCTV may be used inappropriately, specifically in England by local councils
conducting surveillance on citizens for relatively trivial issues.
Ohya claimed that the increasing role of business as a purveyor of surveillance is thegreatest danger in Japan, not the government.837 Daniel Solove similarly argued that focusing
on government surveillance avoids the real danger – that of one‘s personal information being
secretly collected by other actors in society that don‘t on the surface appear dangerous, butwhose actions are less transparent and accountable than the government.838 Monahan asserted
that while the public sector is committed to the ‗public good‘, the private sector is committed
833

Introna and Wood, ―Picturing Algorithmic Surveillance,‖ 254-255.

834

Ibid., 183.

835

Omand, Securing the State, 109.

836

Goold, CCTV and Policing: Public Area Surveillance and Police Practices in Britain, 106.

837

Ohya, What is Freedom? Surveillance Society and the Dissapearance of the “Individual,” 89-90.

838

Solove, ―‗I‘ve Got Nothing to Hide‘ and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy,‖ 756.

143

to profit and do not have the obligation to work for the good of society. He said that there is
therefore greater reason to be concerned about the ‗privatization of surveillance andsecurity.‘839
The majority of cameras in Japan and England were run by non-police organisations,
therefore raising greater concerns about privacy. A number of factors increase the chance thatCCTV will invade citizens‘ privacy. For example, real time monitoring, operators using thecameras to follow people, images being stored and labelled, persons in images being named,people‘s images passed to third parties or the general public, images being purposefully stored
beyond minimum retention time, and the use of facial recognition technology.
The training and qualification scheme for public space cameras did not adequately
prepare operators for carrying out surveillance in public. Research by Goold and McCahill
showed that operators used cameras inappropriately and ineffectively on many occasions. The
lack of well trained, knowledgeable operators means that non-police CCTV cameras may
regularly invade people‘s privacy. In addition, local council run cameras were often used for
purposes beside prevention and detection of crime. Therefore citizens would be right to haveconcerns about local council CCTV systems.
CCTV continues to flourish throughout Japan and England, but the majority of this is
non-police use. While the research shows that police use of CCTV does not raise major
concerns, the use of CCTV by non-police does show cause for concern. Furthermore, because
non-police CCTV generally also cover areas where there are police cameras, it is not possible
to say that certain areas are free from CCTV privacy intrusion. Therefore, it can be argued
that the extensive presence of non-police CCTV throughout Japan and England gives
justifiable cause for concerns about privacy intrusion by CCTV.
Etzioni listed four criteria that can be used to determine if a measure that invades
privacy is in balance with the ‗common good‘: firstly, there must be a ‗well documented andmacroscopic danger‘; secondly, other non-privacy restricting measures must have alreadybeen tried; thirdly, the measure must be minimally intrusive; and fourthly, there are no otherless intrusive measures that could be used.840 According to Etzioni‘s criteria, CCTV as iscurrently used in society does not appear to be in balance with the common good.

839

Monahan, Surveillance in the Time of Insecurity, 149.

840

Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy, 12-13.

144

Chapter 5: Recommendations and Suggestions
The proliferation of CCTV in recent years led to concerns that citizens‘ right to privacy was
being pushed aside in favour of national security. The current trend towards increasing camera
coverage indicates that a reduction in the number of cameras is unlikely in the future, so it isimportant to ensure that the cameras in place are used responsibly. This thesis set out toanswer three questions: Does the use of CCTV amount to an invasion of privacy? What are
the differences between Japan and England that are relevant to the use of CCTV? And, howshould CCTV be used in Japan and England?

5.1 Limitations of researchThis thesis had a number of limitations. The author was not able to carry out identicalfield-work in each country due to access issues to local council CCTV rooms and private
businesses in England. Furthermore, due to the difference in police use of CCTV in Japan andEngland, the police interviewed in both countries did not have equivalent officers in eachcountry. Another problem was the lack of available archival material about Japan in either
Japanese or English, compared to material on England.841
The author was able to make use of Japanese works, however there has beensignificantly more research undertaken on the situation in England, and many of the Japanese
works refer to American and English commentators when discussing privacy, surveillance,
and CCTV. Finally, within the UK the author was only able to carry out interviews with policein London; therefore, although the archival research included other areas of the UK, thefieldwork research was limited to London. These limitations meant that some topics coveredin Japan were not covered in England, and vice-versa, so some of the conclusions requirecaution in making a full assessment.

5.2 Findings and recommendations
Main findings
The findings of this research suggest that firstly, neither CCTV nor the storage of images
amount to an invasion of privacy, but several factors can lead to breaches of privacy. These
factors include real time monitoring, use of cameras and images outside the purpose of the
CCTV system, insufficient training of camera operators, use of cameras to follow people, and841

Murakami Wood, Lyon, and Abe, ―Surveillance in Urban Japan,‖ 551.

145

images being made public. Secondly, while the concept of privacy is similar in Japan andEngland, attitudes to public space, crime rates, public participation, and guidelines for storing
images indicate that CCTV is more likely to flourish, but less likely to be effective in Japan.
Thirdly, CCTV is used ineffectively in both Japan and England, and there is little evidence toback up its stated purpose of preventing crime. The application of CCTV should continue forinvestigation of crime but not for crime prevention.

General Recommendations
The present use of CCTV should be labelled and portrayed as ‗crime investigation cameras‘,reflecting its actual application – crime investigation. This would have two major effects:
firstly, it would stop implementers and proponents from having to justify schemes as
preventing or reducing crime and allow them to concentrate on increasing their effectivenessat assisting criminal investigations; secondly, such a name would allow people to understandthat CCTV does not prevent crime or keep one safe, but that people need to remain vigilante
and take responsibility for both their own safety and look after those around them. This is
more relevant to Japan where the name bouhan camera is misleading. The Japanese nameshould be changed to sousa camera or kensa camera 842 (investigation camera), wheninvestigation is the main use of the camera; it should be kanshi camera (surveillance camera)
when monitored, and remain bouhan camera (crime prevention camera) only when it has thiseffect.843
Cameras, for the most part, should not be used for crime prevention. If a camera isactively used to try and prevent crime, this would entail giving cameras the ability to predict
who is going to commit a crime, where, and when. This would result in more sophisticatedsystems using profiling, which could disproportionately affect certain sections of society.
Using cameras for crime prevention may also lead to blanket surveillance and treat everyone
as a potential criminal in order to try and prevent all crime. There should be exceptions forusing CCTV as crime prevention tools for large scale events and in areas that aredemonstratively crime hotspots.
Public area surveillance for large scale events and crime hotspots should be monitored
only by either certified security personnel with appropriate training or the police. The training
and certification process in England currently only pays lip service to the training of
842

Sousa kamera or kensa kamera. 捜査カメラ or 検査カメラ

843

Abe, The Managed Space Paradox: Surveillance and Freedom, 32-33.

146

surveillance operators. Therefore, the training and qualification system for CCTV operators
needs strengthening. Japan does not currently monitor most cameras, and so there is currently
no need to provide such training. Police monitoring was strictly controlled and only certain
personnel are allowed access or control of cameras. If this changes then a clear training
framework may be required.
CCTV should only be used in circumstances where it can be shown to be bothnecessary and effective, and then only used in conjunction with other measures. These
measures may include improved street lighting, high visibility police patrols, posters
indicating the presence of the cameras, and regular media proclamations of the use of CCTV
to catch and convict criminals.

Specific Suggestions for Police Use of CCTV
For large events in both countries, officers in charge of policing events should have access toa hand-held device with images transmitted directly from relevant cameras to enableapprehending identified offenders. Major hotspots should be covered by numerous cameras
from different angles to deal with offender‘s carrying out offences out of the gaze of cameras.
CCTV should be utilised more by patrol teams and CCTV operators should brief relief
teams each shift or set of shifts. Such briefings would allow operators to see the officers they
are working ‗with‘ and understand their needs and issues, and also give them a chance to feelappreciated. These exchanges would also give the police a better understanding about what isgoing on in the borough from CCTV operators who have a bird‘s eye view of what happens in
the area. For each shift, at least one police officer should spend down time in the CCTV room
watching and learning and getting to see what is going on and getting to know the CCTV
operators.

Recommendations for JapanFirstly, CCTV should be renamed sousa camera (criminal investigation camera) from thepresent term bouhan camera (crime prevention camera). Such a name change would indicate
to people what the cameras are being used for, and reduce people‘s reliance on CCTV for
personal safety. Secondly, image storage should be increased from one week to one month.
Provided the images are stored securely and not arbitrarily viewed, there is no difference inprivacy invasion whether they are stored for one week or one month, but the difference ininvestigatory usefulness may be significant. Thirdly, there should be a reduction in public

147participation in volunteer crime patrols and surveillance. Japan‘s low and declining crime rate
does not justify mass citizen participation in surveillance of their neighbourhoods or blanket
use of CCTV; but, rather leads to an unjustifiable reduction in freedom of action with little
benefit in added security and increases fear of crime. Fourthly, a limited number of cameras
should be installed on the train network for use during rush hours to deal with sexualassaults 844 . Fifthly, there should be an independent body tasked with overseeing dataprotection breeches and the use of CCTV, similar to the ICO in England; and finally, privacy
impact assessments should be required for every public space CCTV scheme.845

Recommendations for England
Firstly, use of CCTV in public spaces should be restricted to police-led schemes, the police
and the security services. If this does not happen, then local council use of CCTV should bestrictly limited and open to judicial oversight and public scrutiny.846 RIPA authorisation
should be removed from local councils to prevent councils conducting unjustified surveillanceon citizens. If the incident under investigation is serious enough to require surveillance thepolice should be involved who could then use RIPA.847 In the UK, there is high public
acceptance for CCTV due to its use in criminal investigations and apprehending criminals;
however local councils‘ uses for trivial matters has caused widespread condemnation. Local
councils should be allowed to use cameras for town management purposes, but not for crime
prevention without the cooperation of the police.
Secondly, CCTV operator training should be revamped. CCTV operators carrying out
surveillance in public spaces should be trained thoroughly including being taught relevant
legal knowledge and moral issues about conducting surveillance. Thirdly, all monitored
surveillance should be subjected to inspections. With police surveillance, this could be doneby the Independent Police Complaints Commission, and with local councils and private
businesses, the ICO. This could take the form of random dipping of recorded images to checkfor inappropriate monitoring behaviour.
Fourthly, CCTV should not be sold as a crime prevention measure, but as an844

痴漢

Chikan (sexual assault)

845

Lawson, ―Japan‘s New Privacy Act in Context,‖ 104 (explaining that individuals and businesses do havea ―progression of avenues‖ to have complaints heard, however not through an independent body).
846

Hayman and Gilmore, The Terrorist Hunters, 345.

847

Murakami Wood, ―How would you like your surveillance?.‖ (noting the use of RIPA by local authorities
to check on couples applying for local school places)

148

investigative tool. Crime rates may be used to justify using CCTV cameras, but CCTV
effectiveness should not be judged by subsequent rates of crime; instead effectiveness shouldbe evaluated by the impact the cameras have had on obtaining convictions. Fifthly, the UK
might consider Japan‘s system of allowing local viewing of recordings for only 24 hours, after
which viewing requires the permission and cooperation of police headquarters. This could
greatly reduce privacy concerns in England. Sixthly, any legislation brought in to regulate
CCTV should undergo a Privacy Impact Assessment and be subject to a sunset clause. In
preference to new legislation, existing data protection and privacy laws should be used morerobustly and greater enforcement power given to the ICO.848

5.3 Suggestions for Further Research
Further research should focus on the use of CCTV in criminal investigations. Anecdotally,
CCTV has become a vital tool in police investigations and counter-terrorism. Research into
CCTV as a crime prevention tool should move away from looking at how effective CCTV isat reducing crime rates and begin to focus on how CCTV is actually used. Studies on theapplication of these cameras may be more difficult than looking at their effect on crime rates,
but there are a variety of questions that warrant further research. For example, does CCTV
increase the number of confessions at an early stage of an enquiry? Does CCTV help narrow
the scope of investigations to more effectively deploy investigative resources? How effective
is CCTV evidence in court? How many people are found guilty/innocent on the basis of
CCTV evidence, where they would have been found innocent/guilty otherwise? Another areathat warrants research is looking at ‗place managers‘, that is, the common use of security
guards, and parking attendants that are in plain view outside many buildings in Japanese
towns and may have had an impact on Japan‘s crime rate. Valuable research could be carriedout regarding their effectiveness at keeping crime rates low, and their role as surveillance
actors, and whether this would be suitable for England.

848

Information Commissioner‘s Office, Information Commissioner’s report to Parliament on the state ofsurveillance, 47 The ICO suggest that there should be new positive legislation in areas where this is absent.

149

Bibliography
Abe, Kiyoshi. 阿部潔 "Kuukan kanri shakai: kanshi to jiyuu no paradokkusu." 空間管理社会―監視と自由のパラドックス [The managed space paradox: surveillance and freedom].
Shinyousha 新曜社, 2006.
Adams, Andrew A., Kiyoshi Murata, and Yohko Orito. “The Japanese sense of information
privacy.” AI & SOCIETY 24, no. 4 (August 19, 2009): 327-341.
Aichi Prefectural Office. 愛知県 "Kensei monita ankeeto houkokusho: teema [bouhan

katsudo e no shiki]" 県政モニタアンケート報告書：テーマ「防犯活動への意識」[Prefectural government monitor questionnaire report: Towards crime prevention andsecurity consciousness]. houkokusho 報告書 [report], November 2010.
http://www.pref.aichi.jp/cmsfiles/contents/0000035/35265/houkokusyo22-3.pdf.
Aichi Prefecture Public Safety Committee. 愛知県公安委員会. "Gaitou bouhan camera

shisutemu no unyou ni kansuru kitei" 街頭防犯カメラシステムの運用に関する規定[Regulations for use of the street crime prevention camera system]. March 11, 2005.
http://www.som.pref.aichi.jp/d2w_reiki/41797530000100000000/417975300001000000
00/41797530000100000000.html.
Alarid, Leanne Fiftal, and Hsiao-Ming Wang. “Japanese Management and Policing in theContext of Japanese Culture.” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies& Management 20 (1997): 600.
Bailey, Stephen, and Nick Taylor. Bailey, Harris & Jones: Civil Liberties Cases, Materials,

and Commentary. 6th ed. OUP Oxford, 2009.
Bainbridge, David. Data Protection Law. XPL Law, 2005.
Ball, Kirstie, and Frank Webster, eds. The Intensification of Surveillance: Crime, Terrorism

and Warfare in the Information Age. London: Pluto, 2003.
Ball, Kirstie, Frank Webster, and David Lyon, eds. “Surveillance after September 11, 2001.”
In The Intensification of Surveillance: Crime, Terrorism and Warfare in the

Information Age, 16-26. London: Pluto, 2003.
Barnlund, Dean C. Public and Private Self in Japan and the United States: Communicative150Styles of Two Cultures. Rep. Intercultural Pr, 1989.
Big Brother Watch. Big Brother Is Watching: The first comprehensive analysis of the numberof CCTV cameras controlled by local authorities in Britain in 2009. Big Brother Watch,2009. http://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/cctvreport.pdf.
Boyne, R. “Post-Panopticism.” Economy and Society 29, no. 2 (2000): 285-307.
Burgess, Chris. “The 'Illusion' of Homogeneous Japan and National Character: Discourse as aTool to Transcend the 'Myth' vs. 'Reality' Binary.” The Asia-Pacific Journal 9, no. 1(March 1, 2010). http://www.japanfocus.org/-Chris-Burgess/3310.
Camden Council. “Camden Council CCTV Code of Practice,” November 2001.
Cao, Liqun. “Confidence in the police between America and Japan Results from two waves ofsurveys.” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 28,
no. 1 (2005): 139-151.
CCTV Advisory Service. “An Introduction to ANPR - CCTV Information.” CCTV Information,
n.d. http://www.cctv-information.co.uk/i/An_Introduction_to_ANPR.
Chappell, Ian. “Sleuth or Spectator: A study of the impact of CCTV on Oxford Street.” Masterof Arts, London: Brunel University, 2000.
Chiyoda Ward Office. 千代田区. "Chiyodaku bouhan kamera secchi ni kan suru kihon

houshin" 千代田区防犯カメラ設置に関する基本方針 [Chiyoda Ward crime prevention
camera installation policy]. Chiyodaku 千代田区, May 17, 2010.
http://www.city.chiyoda.lg.jp/service/pdf/d0012144_2.pdf.
Cockfield, Arthur J. “Legal Constraints on Transferring Personal Information across Borders:
A Comparative Analysis of PIPEDA and Foreign Privacy Laws.” In Surveillance,

Privacy and the Globalization of Personal Information: International Comparisons,edited by Elia Zureik, L. Lynda Harling Stalker, Emily Smith, David Lyon, andYolande E. Chan, 50-70. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press,
2010.
Cownie, Fiona. English legal system in context. 4th ed. Oxford ;;New York: Oxford University

151Press, 2007.
Crawford, Adam, Stuart Lister, and David Wall. Evaluation of a contracted community

policing experiment (Summary). Text/html. Joseph Rowntree Foundation, October 8,2003.
http://www.jrf.org.uk/publications/evaluation-contracted-community-policing-experim
ent.
“Crime and Disorder Act 1998.” Text, n.d.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/37/section/17.
David Leheny, and Sida Liu. “The Politics of Crime, Punishment, and Social Order in East
Asia.” Review-article, October 26, 2010.
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-102209-152957?pre
vSearch=allfield%253A%2528japan%2529&searchHistoryKey=.
Doi, Takeo. The anatomy of dependence. Translated by John Bester. Tokyo: Kodansha
International, 2001.
Doi, Takeo. The Anatomy of Self. Kodansha International, 1985.
Donald, Craig. “The Right People.” CCTV Image: Official Publication of the CCTV User Group,
no. 2009 (May 2009).
http://www.cctvimage.com/downloads/CCTV_Image_33_May_2009.pdf.
Edwards, Lilian. “Switching Off the Surveillance Society? Legal Regulation of CCTV in theUK.” In Reasonable Expectations of Privacy? Eleven country reports on camera
surveillance and workplace privacy, edited by Sjaak Nouwt, Berend R. de Vries, andCorien Prins. Asser Press. 2005.
Ehara, Takeru. 榎原, 猛. "Puraibashii ken no sougouteki kenkyuu" プライバシー権の総合的研究 [The right to privacy: A comprehensive analysis]. houritsu bunkasha 法律文化社,
1991.
Etzioni, Amitai. The Limits of Privacy. Basic Books, 2000.
Fenwick, Helen. Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Fourth Edition. 4th ed. Oxon:
Routledge-Cavendish, 2007.

152

Ferguson, Joseph. “Al Qaeda's Threat to Japan: Tokyo's Wake Up Call To The War On
Terrorism.” Terrorism Monitor 2, no. 2 (January 30, 2004).
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=26252.
Field, Simon. Trends in Crime Revisited. Home Office Research Study. London: Home Office,1999. http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/hors195.pdf.
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish : the birth of the prison. Translated by Alan Sheridan.
Harmondsworth Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1991.
Furuta, Yuki. “New Trends in Crime Control.” In Crime Prevention and Control in the UnitedStates and Japan, edited by V. Kusuda-Smick, 60-64. Juris Pub Inc, 1989.
Gill, Martin, Jenna Allen, Jane Bryan, Deena Kara, Ross Little, Sam Waples, Angela Spriggs,
et al. The impact of CCTV: fourteen case studies. Home Office Online Report. Home
Office, 2005. http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/rdsolr1505.pdf.
Goodman, Roger. Family and Social Policy in Japan. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge
University Press, 2002.
Goold, Benjamin J. CCTV and Policing: Public Area Surveillance and Police Practices in

Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Gottfredson, Michael R., and Travis Hirschi. A General Theory of Crime. Stanford University
Press., 1990.
Greenberger, Michael. “The Need for Closed Circuit Television in Mass Transit Systems.”

Law Enforcement Executive Forum. University of Maryland Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 2006-15 (February 2006): 151.
Haggerty, Kevin D., and R.V. Ericson. “The Surveillant Assemblage.” British Journal of

Sociology 51, no. 4 (2000): 605-622.
Haggerty, Kevin D., and Minas Samatas. Surveillance and Democracy. 1st ed. Oxon:
Routledge-Cavendish, 2010.

153

Hale, Chris. “Crime and the Business Cycle in Post-War Britain Revisited.” British Journal of

Criminology 38, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 681-698.
Hamai, Koichi, and Thomas Ellis. “Crime and criminal justice in modern Japan: From
re-integrative shaming to popular punitivism.” International Journal of the Sociology

of Law 34 (2006): 157-178.
Han, Lu. “Economic Analyses of Crime in England and Wales.” Phd. Doctor of Philosophy,
Birmingham, 2009. http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/584/3/han10PhD.pdf.
Handa, Kazuo. 飯田和夫. “Kanshi kamera no kyofu" 監視カメラの恐怖 [The Fear of

Surveillance Cameras]. In Juukinetto to kanshi shakai 住基ネットと監視社会[Juki-net and Surveillance Society], edited by Yasuhiko Tajima, Hiroshi Yamamoto,and Takao Saito, 206-216. Nippon Hyoronsha 日本評論社, 2003.
Harries, Richard. “Modelling and predicting recorded property crime trends in England andWales - a retrospective.” International Journal of Forecasting 19 (2003): 557-566.
Hayashi, Chikio, and Yasumasa Kuroda. Japanese Culture in Comparative Perspective.
Praeger Pub, 1997.
Hayman, Andy, and Margaret Gilmore. The Terrorist Hunters. Bantam Press, 2009.
Hennessy, Peter. “From Secret State to Protective State.” In The new protective state :government, intelligence and terrorism, 1-42. London ;;New York: Continuum, 2007.
Higgs, E. “The Rise of the Information State: The development of central state surveillance ofthe citizen in England, 1500 - 2000.” In Surveillance, 1:7-29. 1st ed. Oxon: Routledge,
2009.
Hino, Kimihiro, Ayami Hino, and Osamu koide. Attitude toward CCTVs in Shopping Streets:

Questionnaires to Shopkeepers and Customers. Reports of the City Planning Instituteof Japan, May 2004. http://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/cpijreports/3-1/0/23/_pdf.
Hino, Kimihiro, and Ken Shibata. “Effect of Surveillance Facilitated by Design on Residents'
Fear of Crime: Questionnaire for residents in 2 detached housing areas with different
types of surveillance.” J. Archit. Plann 73, no. 626 (April 2008): 737 - 742.

154

Hino, Kimihiro, Takahito Shimada, and Ayami Hino. Citizens' Attitude to CCTV Installed in

Public Places: in the view of Who installs Where. Reports of the City Planning
Institute of Japan, November 7, 2008.
http://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/cpijreports/7-3/0/45/_pdf.
Hixson, Richard F. Privacy in a Public Society: Human Rights in Conflict. Oxford Univ Pr(Txt), 1987.
HM Government. The Coalition: our programme for government. Whitehall, London: Cabinet
Office, May 2010. http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/409088/pfg_coalition.pdf.

HM Spending Review. HM Treasury, October 2010.
http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sr2010_completereport.pdf.
Walker, Alison, John Flatley, Chris Kershaw, and Debbie Moon. Crime in England and Wales

2008/09: Findings from the British Crime Survey and police recorded crime. Home
Office, July 2009. http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs09/hosb1109vol1.pdf.
Home Office. Crime in England and Wales 2009/10: Findings from the British Crime Survey

and police recorded crime (Second Edition). Home Office Statistical Bulletin. Home
Office, July 2010. http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs10/hosb1210.pdf.
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee. The National DNA Database: Eighth Report ofSession 2009-10. London: House of Commons, March 8, 2010.
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2010/mar/uk-hasc-dna-report.pdf.
House of Lords Constitution Committee. “Surveillance: Citizens and the State,” n.d.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/18/1806.htm.
Information Commissioner's Office. “CCTV Codes of Practice,” 2008.
Information Commissioner's Office. Information Commissioner's report to Parliament on thestate of surveillance. Update to 2006 Report on Surveillance Society. Information
Commissioner's Office, November 11, 2010.
http://www.ico.gov.uk/~/media/documents/library/Corporate/Research_and_reports/su
rveillance_report_for_home_select_committee.ashx.

155

Information Commissioner's Office. “Privacy impact assessment (PIA),” July 3, 2009.
http://www.ico.gov.uk/for_organisations/topic_specific_guides/pia_handbook.aspx.
Inoue, Masahito. “Nini Sousa to Kyousei Sousa no Kubetsu" 任意捜査と強制捜査の区別. [Thedifferences between voluntary investigation and compulsory investigation] In Keiji
Soshou Hou no Souten 刑事訴訟法の争点 [Disputes in criminal procedure], edited byKouya Matsuo, 42-43. 3rd ed. Houritsugaku no souten shiriisu 6 法律学の争点シリー
ズ 6 [Legal disputes series 6]. Yuhikaku 有斐閣, 2002.
Introna, Lucas D., and David Wood. “Picturing Algorithmic Surveillance: The politics of facialrecognition systems.” Surveillance & Society 2, no. 2 (2004): 177-198.
Ishimura, Kouji. 石村耕治. “Kanshi kamera no houteki tousei" 監視カメラの法的統制[Legal Regulation of Surveillance Camera]. In Juukinetto to kanshi shakai 住基ネッ
トと監視社会 [Juki-net and Surveillance Surveillance Society], edited by YasuhikoTajima, Hiroshi Yamamoto, and Takao Saito, 223-230, Nippon Hyoronsha 日本評論社,
2003
Ito, Sanae. “'Civic Duty' for Community Development: The Need for Duty-based Approaches?.”
Church House, Westminster, 2010.
Ito, Shigehiko. 伊藤茂彦. “kokkousho e moushiire" 国交省へ申し入れ [Proposal to the
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport]. In Chou kanshi shakai to jiyuu 超監

視社会と自由 [Surveillance Society and Freedom], edited by Yasuhiko Tajima andTakao Saito, 75,80. Kadensha 花伝社, 2006.
Jackson, Richard. “Constructing Enemies: 'Islamic Terrorism' in Political and Academic
Discourse.” Government and Opposition 42, no. 3 (6, 2007): 394-426.
Japan Federation of Bar Associations. 日本弁護士連合会. "Puraibashii ga nakunaru hi" プラ

イバシーがなくなる日 [The day privacy died]. Akashi-shoten 明石書店, 2003.
Johnson, Elmer H. “Japanese Version of Community Corrections: Volunteer Probation
Officers and Hostels.” In Comparative and International Criminal Justice Systems:

Policing, Judiciary and Corrections, edited by Obi Ebbe, 185-198.
Butterworth-Heinemann Ltd, 1996.

156

Joyce, Peter. Criminal justice : an introduction to crime and the criminal justice system.
Portland Or.: Willan Pub., 2006.
Kanagawa Prefectural Police 神奈川県警察. “Kanagawa ken keisatsu gaitou bouhan kamera

shisutem unyou youkou" 神奈川県警察街頭防犯カメラシステム運用要綱 [Kanagawa
prefectural police street crime prevention camera system usage policy]. keisatsuchou
警察庁, December 22, 2009. http://www.npa.go.jp/safetylife/seianki8/3shiryo_2.pdf.
Kawahara, Shun'ichiro 河原, 畯一郎. "Genron oyobi shuppan no jiyuu" 言論及び出版の自由[The freedom of expression and publication]. Yuhikaku 有斐閣, 1954.
Kearl, Holly. Stop Street Harassment: Making Public Places Safe and Welcoming for Women.
ABC-CLIO, 2010.
Kotani, Hiroyuki. 小谷洋之. “kyuuzou suru keisatsu no kanshi kamera" 急増する警察の監視

カメラ [Rapid Increase in use of Surveillance Cameras by the Police]. In Juukinetto tokanshi shakai 住基ネットと監視社会 [Juki-net and Surveillance Society], edited by
Yasuhiko Tajima, Hiroshi Yamamoto, and Takao Saito, 192-206. Nippon Hyoronsha
日本評論社, 2003.
Kusuda-Smick, V. Crime Prevention and Control in the United States and Japan. Juris Pub
Inc, 1989.
Laidler, Keith. Surveillance Unlimited: How we've become the most watched people on Earth.
Cambridge: ICON, 2008.
Lamont-Brown, Raymond. “Aspects of Modern Policing in Japan.” Police Journal 68 (1995):
133.
Latour, Bruno, and Emilie Hermant. Paris ville invisible. Translated by Liz Carey-Libbrecht.
[Institut Synthelabo?], 1998.
http://www.bruno-latour.fr/virtual/PARIS-INVISIBLE-GB.pdf.
Lawson, Carol. “Japan's New Privacy Act in Context.” UNSW Law Journal 29, no. 2 (2006): 88- 113.

157

Leman-Langlois, S. “The Myopic Panopticon: The social consequences of policing through thelens.” Policing and Society 13, no. 1 (2002): 43-58.
Linden Consulting Inc. Privacy Impact Assessments: International Study of their Applicationand Effects. Loughborough University: Information Commissioner's Office UK,
October 2007.
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/corporate/research_and_reports/priva
cy_impact_assessment_international_study.011007.pdf.
“Local Government Act 1972.” Text, n.d.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1972/70/section/111.
“Local Government and Rating Act 1997.” Text, n.d.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1997/29/section/31.
Lombardo, Robert, and Todd Lough. “Community Policing: Broken Windows, Community
Building, and Satisfaction with the Police.” Police Journal 80 (2007): 117.
Long, Douglas G. Bentham on Liberty: Jeremy Bentham's idea of liberty in relation to his

utilitarianism. University of Toronto Press, 1977.
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead, Baroness Hale ofRichmond, and Lord Carswell. House of Lords - Campbell (Appellant) v. MGN Limited(Respondents) (House of Lords 2004).
Lyon, David. “Identification, surveillance and democracy.” In Surveillance and Democracy,
edited by Kevin D. Haggerty and Minas Samatas, 34-50. 1st ed. Oxon:
Routledge-Cavendish, 2010.
Lyon, David. “The border is everywhere: ID cards, surveillance and the other.” In Global

Surveillance and Policing: Borders, security, identity, edited by Elia Zureik and Mark
Salter, 66-82. Devon: Willan, 2008.
Lyon, David, Yasuhiko Tajima 田島泰彦, and Tomoko Shimizu, and 清水知子. "9-11 ijou nokanshi" 9・11 以後の監視 [Surveillance after 9-11]. Akashi-shoten 明石書店, 2004.
Manning, D. J. The Mind of Jeremy Bentham. Longmans, Green and Co., 1968.

158

Manningham-Buller, Eliza. “The International Terrorist Threat to the United Kingdom.” In

The new protective state : government, intelligence and terrorism, edited by Peter
Hennessy, 66-74. London ;;New York: Continuum, 2007.
Mantle, Greg, Darrell Fox, and Mandeep K. Dhami. “Restorative Justice and Three
Individual Theories of Crime.” Internet Journal of Crime (2005).
http://www.internetjournalofcriminology.com/Mantle,%20Fox%20&%20Dhami%20-%
20Restorative%20Justice.pdf.
Marfording, Annette. “Cultural Relativism and the Construction of Culture: An Examinationof Japan.” Human Rights Quarterly 19, no. 2 (May 1997): 431-448.
Marx, Gary T. “The Surveillance Society: The threat of 1984-style techniques.” In

Surveillance, edited by Benjamin J. Goold, 1:45-59. 1st ed. Oxon: Routledge, 2009.
Marx, Gary T. Undercover: Police Surveillance in America. University of California Press,
1989.
Marx, Gary T., and Glenn W. Muschert. “Personal Information, Borders, and the New
Surveillance Studies.” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 3, no. 1 (12, 2007):375-395.
Mathiesen, T. “The viewer society: Michel Foucault's 'Panopticon' revisited.” In Surveillance,
1:189-209. 1st ed. Oxon: Routledge, 2009.
Matsudai, Goue. “Shashin Satsuei" 写真撮影 [Taking Photos]. In Keiji Soshou Hou no Souten

刑事訴訟法の争点 [Disputes in criminal procedure], edited by Kouya Matsuo, 76-77.
3rd ed. Houristugagku no Souten Shiriisu 6 法律学の争点シリーズ 6 [Legal disputes

series 6]. Yuhikaku 有斐閣, 2002.
McCahill, Michael, and Clive Norris. On the Threshold to Urban Panopticon? Analysing the

Employment of CCTV in European Cities nd Assessing its Social and Political Impacts.
Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Hull, June 2002.
http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp6.pdf.
McCahill, Mike. “Beyond Foucault: Towards a contemporary theory of surveillance.” In

159

Surveillance, 1:209-235. 1st ed. Oxon: Routledge, 2009.
McCahill, Michael. The Surveillance Web: The rise of visual surveillance in an English city.
Cullompton: Willan, 2002.
McWhirter, Darien A., and Jon D. Bible. Privacy as a Constitutional Right: Sex, Drugs andthe Right to Life. Greenwood Press, 1992.
Merritt, Jonathan, and Steven Stack. “W(h)ither the PCSO? Police perceptions of the Police
Community Support Officer’s role, powers and future directions.” Policing: An

International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 33, no. 4 (2010): 731-749.
Mikami Akiteru 三上明輝 , Kanji Shimizu 清水幹治, and Masaki Nitta

新田正樹. "Q&A

kojin jouhou hogo hou" Q&A 個人情報保護法 [Q&A personal information protectionlaw]. 3rd ed. Yuhikaku 有斐閣, 2005.
Mills, Jon L. Privacy: The Lost Right. Oxford Univ Pr (Txt), 2008.
Minton, Anna. Ground Control: Fear and happiness in the twenty-first century city. London:
Penguin Books, 2009.
Miyazawa, Setsuo. “Learning lessons from the Japanese experience: A challenge for Japanesecriminologists.” In Crime Prevention and Control in the United States and Japan,
edited by V. Kusuda-Smick, 104-135. Juris Pub Inc, 1989.
Monahan, Torin. Surveillance in the Time of Insecurity. New Jersey: Rutgers University
Press, 2010.
MPS. “Latest News: Body-worn video cameras.” Metropolitan Police Service, April 18, 2008.
http://www.met.police.uk/news/body_worn.htm.
Murakami Wood, David. “How would you like your surveillance?.” Guardian News, November
6, 2009.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/nov/06/surveillance-cou
ncil-ripa-laws.
Murakami Wood, David Lyon, and Kiyoshi Abe. “Surveillance in Urban Japan: A critical160

introduction.” Urban Studies 44, no. 3 (March 2007): 551-568.
Murata, Kiyoshi, and Yohko Orito. “Rethinking the concept of the right to information
privacy: a Japanese perspective.” Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics

in Society 6, no. 3 (2008): 233?245.
Murata, Kiyoshi, Yohko Orito, and Andrew Adams. “The Development of Japanese Data
Protection.” Policy & Internet 2, no. 2 (August 18, 2010): 95.
Murphy, Oliver. A Surveillance Society: Qualitative Research Report. Information
Commissioner's Office UK, September 22, 2007.
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/corporate/research_and_reports/surv
eillance_report_v6_final.pdf.
"Nagoya bouhan kamera sentaa no burogu: bouhan kamera to kanshi kamara no chigai" 名古屋防犯カメラセンターのブログ: 防犯カメラと監視カメラの違い [Nagoya crime
prevention camera blog: the difference between crime prevention cameras andsurveillance cameras], n.d. http://tribunity.net/article/32119491.html.
Nakamasa, Masaki. 仲正昌樹. "[jiyuu] wa teigi dekiru" 「自由」は定義できる [Can privacy be

defined?]. Bajiriko バジリコ, 2007.
National Police Agency. 警察庁. "Heisei 21nen no hanzai" 平成 21 年の犯罪 [2009 Crime

Statistics], 2009. http://www.npa.go.jp/toukei/keiki/hanzai_h21/PDF/H21_ALL.pdf.
National Police Agency. 警察庁. “Japanese Community Police and Police Box System.”
National Police Agency, 2004.
www.npa.gov.jp/english/seisaku1/JapaneseCommunityPolice.pdf.
“The Threat of International Terrorism against Japan.” National Police Agency: Focus 271(2005): 8-10.
Neville, Mick. “Making it work.” CCTV Image: Official Publication of the CCTV User Group,
no. 2009 (May 2009).
Nishihara, Hiroshi. 西原, 博史. "Kanshi kamera to puraibashii" 監視カメラとプライバシー[Surveillance cameras and privacy]. Seibundoh 成文堂, 2009.

161

Niwayama, Eiyuu. “Shashin satsuei to Shouzou ken" 写真撮影と肖像権 [Taking photos andthe right to one's image]. In Keiji Soshou Hou no Souten 刑事訴訟法の争点 [Disputes
in criminal procedure], edited by Kouya Matsuo, 1:86-87. Houritsugagu no Souten
Shiriisu 6 法律学の争点シリーズ 6 [Legal disputes series 6]. Yuhikaku 有斐閣, 1979.
Noma, Hiroko. “How unique is Japanese culture? A critical review of the discourse inintercultural communication literature.” Journal of International Education in

Business 2, no. 2 (2009): 2-14.
Norris, C., and M. McCahill. “CCTV: Beyond Penal Modernism?.” British Journal of

Criminology 46 (2006): 97-118.
Norris, C., M. McCahill, and D. Wood. “Editorial. The growth of CCTV: A global perspectiveon the international diffusion of video surveillance in publicly accessible space.”

Surveillance & Society 2, no. 2 (2004): 110?135.
Office for Budget Responsibility: Economic and fiscal outlook. London: Office for Budget
Responsibility, November 2010.
http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/d/econ_fiscal_outlook_291110.pdf.
Ogasawara, Midori. “A tale of the colonial age, or the banner of new tyranny? National
identification card systems in Japan.” In Playing the Identity Card: Surveillance,

Security and Identification in Global Perspective, edited by Colin J. Bennett andDavid Lyon, 93 - 111. 1st ed. Routledge, 2008.
Ogura, Toshimaru. “Electronic government and surveillance-oriented society.” In Theorizing

Surveillance: The panopticon and beyond, edited by David Lyon, 270-296. Cullompton:
Willan, 2006.
Ohya, Takehiro 大屋雄裕. “Puraibashii to ishi" プライバシーと意思 [Privacy andIntention].” Houritsujihyou 法律時報 75, no. 8 (June 2003): 20-25.
Ohya, Takehiro. "Jiyuu to wa nanika - kanshi shakai to [kojin] no shoumetsu" 自由とは何か―

監視社会と「個人」の消滅 [What is Freedom? Surveillance Society and theDisappearance of the 'Individual']. Chikumashobo 筑摩書房, 2007.

162

Omand, David. Securing the State. C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2010.
Opposition to Surveillance Society Association. “kaoninshou shisutemu no dounyuu jiken towa" 顔認証システムの導入事件とは[Face Recognition System: An Introduction]. In
Choukanshi shakai to jiyuu 超監視社会と自由 [Surveillance Society and Freedom],edited by Yasuhiko Tajima and Anata Saito, 73-74. Kadensha 花伝社, 2006.
Orwell, George. Nineteen Eighty-Four. London: Martin Secker & Warburg, 1949.
Osawa, Hideyuki, and Go Koyama. 大沢, 秀介, and 剛 小山. "Jiyuu to anzen - kyakkoku noriron to jimu" 自由と安全―各国の理論と実務 [Freedom and security: individual
countries theory and practice]. shogakusya 尚学社, 2009.
Otani, Akihiro. 大谷, 昭宏. "Kanshi kamera wa nani wo miteiru no ka" 監視カメラは何を見ているのか [What are surveillance cameras looking at?]. kadokawa 角川書店, 2006.
Park, Won-Kyu. Trends in crime rates in postwar Japan: a structural perspective. The Law
and Political Science Series of the University of Kitakyushu. 20. Morioko City, Iwate
Prefecture, Japan: Shinzansha Co, 2006.
Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU). UK: Privacy and data-sharing - The way forward for

public services. United Kingdom, April 11, 2002.
http://www.epractice.eu/files/media/media_626.pdf.
Phillips, Bruce. “Privacy in a 'surveillance society'.” University of New Brunswick Law

Journal 46 (1997): 127-138.
Philpott, John. Does Britain face a prolonged jobs deficit? London: Chartered Institute of
Personnel and Development, July 2010.
http://www.cipd.co.uk/NR/rdonlyres/604232F1-B858-46F7-9B43-A90C83CB4498/0/52
98_Work_Audit.pdf.
PIB3 Research & Survey Unit Charter Unit. DM CCTV Evaluation. Draft Report. London:
Metropolitan Police, May 1999.
Police and Crime Standards Directorate. Guidance for the Police Use of Body-Worn Video

Devices. Home Office, 2007.

163

Pratt, Walter F. Privacy in Britain. Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses,
1979.
Preston, Dr Peter W. Understanding Modern Japan: A Political Economy of Development,

Culture and Global Power. Sage Publications Ltd, 2000.
Privacy International. “Japanese Court Rules ID System Unconstitutional.” Privacy

International, May 30, 2005.
http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-228843&als[theme]=National%20ID%20Cards.
Punch, Maurice. Zero Tolerance Policing. Policy Press, 2007.
Sakurai, Mitumasa. “N Shisutemu kiso no genjou" N システム起訴の現状 [Current N-System

Prosecutions]. In Juukinetto to kanshi shakai 住基ネットと監視社会 [Juki-net andSurveillance Society], edited by Yasuhiko Tajima, Haku Yamamoto, and Anata Saito,
216-223. Nippon Hyoronsha 日本評論社, 2003.
Schoeman, Ferdinand David. Privacy and Social Freedom. Cambridge ;;New York NY
USA: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Seipp, David J. “English Judicial Recognition of a Right to Privacy.” Oxford Journal of Legal

Studies 3 (1983): 325.
Semple, Janet. Bentham's prison : a study of the panopticon penitentiary. Oxford ;New
York: Clarendon Press ;;Oxford University Press, 1993.
Shimizu, Masahiko. “[Seikatsu anzen jourei] no tenkai to mondai ten" 「生活安全条例」の展開と問題点 [Development and Problems of the 'Life Security Regulations']. In
Juukinetto to kanshi shakai 住基ネットと監視社会 [Juki-net and SurveillanceSociety], edited by Yasuhiko Tajima, Haku Yamamoto, and Anata Saito, 230-241.
Nippon Hyoronsha 日本評論社, 2003.
Shimizu, Masahiko. “Keisatsu, seiji no [tero taisaku]" 警察・政治の「テロ対策」 [Police andGovernment Measures for Tackling Terrorism]” In Choukanshi shakai to jiyuu 超監
視社会と自由 [Surveillance Society and Freedom], edited by Yasuhiko Tajima and164

Anata Saito, 68-72. Kadensha 花伝社, 2006.
Shughart, William F. “An analytical history of terrorism, 1945?2000.” Public Choice 128, no. 1(7, 2006): 7-39.
Sigurdsson, Jenny, and Amardeep Dhani. Police Service Strength: England and Wales, 31

March 2010. Home Office Statistical Report. Home Office, July 22, 2010.
http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs10/hosb1410.pdf.
Simon, R. “The Return of Panopticism: Supervision, subjection, and the new surveillance.”

Surveillance and Society 3, no. 1 (2005): 1-20.
Smith, G. J.D. “Behind the Screens: Examining Constructions of Deviance and Informal
Practices among CCTV Control Room Operators in the UK.” Surveillance & Society 2,
no. 2 (2004): 376-395.
Solove, Daniel J. “A Taxonomy of Privacy.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 154, no. 3(January 2006): 477-560.
Solove, Daniel J. “Conceptualizing Privacy.” California Law Review 90 (July 2002):
1087-1155.
Solove, Daniel J. “'I've Got Nothing to Hide' and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy.” San

Diego Law Review 44 (2007): 745-772.
Stalder, Felix. “Privacy is not the antidote to surveillance.” Surveillance and Society 1, no. 1(2002): 120-124.
Sugimoto, Yoshio. An Introduction to Japanese Society. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press,
2002.
Sugimoto, Yoshio. “Class and Work in Cultural Capitalism: Japanese Trends.” The

Asia-Pacific Journal 40, no. 1 (October 4, 2010).
http://japanfocus.org/-Yoshio-Sugimoto/3419.
Surette, Ray. “The thinking eye: Pros and cons of second generation CCTV surveillancesystems.” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 28,

165

no. 1 (2005): 152-173.
Tajima, Yasuhiko 田島泰彦. “Kanshi shakai ni mukau nippon" 監視社会に向かう日本[Japan: Moving Towards a Surveillance Society]. In Choukanshi shakai to jiyuu 超監
視社会と自由 [Surveillance Society and Freedom], edited by Yasuhiko Tajima andTakao Saito, 9-16. Kadensha 花伝社, 2006.
Tajima, Yasuhiko 田島泰彦, and Takao Saito 斎藤貴男. "Choukanshi shakai to jiyuu -kyoubouzai, kaoninshou shistutemu, juukinetto wo tou" 超監視社会と自由―共謀罪・
顔認証システム・住基ネットを問う [Extreme Surveillance Society and Freedom:
Conspiracy, Facial Recognition System, and National Registration System]. Kadensha
花伝社, 2006.
Tamura, Masahiro 田村正博. “Mondai teiki" 問題提起 [Submission of a Problem].

Keisatsu-gaku Ronshu 警察学論集 [Journal of Police Studies] 61, no. 8 (August 2008):
67-79.
Taylor, Nick. “Proportionality and the use of video surveillance in the United Kingdom.”Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2009.
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/gazette/vol70n4/video-eng.htm.
Taylor, Nick. “Regulating Big Brother: The UK Approach.” SSRN eLibrary (July 11, 2007).
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=999686.
Taylor, Nick. “State surveillance and the right to privacy.” Surveillance and Society 1, no. 1(2002): 66-85.
The National Council for Civil Liberties. “Liberty's response to the Home Office consultationon the RIPA 2000: Consolidating Orders and Codes of Practice.” Liberty, July 2009.
http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy-09/liberty-s-response-to-the-ripa-c
onsultation.pdf.
Tokyo Public Safety Committee, and Japan Police Chiefs. 警視庁生活安全部長, and 各道府県
警察本部長. “Heisei 15nen gaitou kinkyuu tsuuhou shisutemu (suupaa bouhan) no

seibigyo ni tsuite gaitou kinkyuu shisutemu" 平成１５年度街頭緊急通報システム（スーパー防犯）の整備事業について街頭緊急通報システム [Maintenance and Use of
Emergency Reporting System (Super Crime Prevention) 2003]. Keishichou 警視庁,

166

September 3, 2003.
http://www.npa.go.jp/pdc/notification/seian/seianki/seianki20030903.pdf.
Tokyo Public Safety Committee. 東京都公安委員会. “Gaitou bouhan kamera shisutemu ni

kansuru kitei" 街頭防犯カメラシステムに関する規定 [Street crime prevention camera
regulations]. Keishichou 警視庁, February 21, 2002.
http://www.keishicho.metro.tokyo.jp/sikumi/kunrei/seian_pdf/seisou/001.pdf.
Utsuro, Hideo. “Does crime pay in Japan?.” In Crime Prevention and Control in the UnitedStates and Japan, edited by V. Kusuda-Smick, 75-76. Juris Pub Inc, 1989.
Warren, Adam, Robin Bayley, Colin Bennett, Andrew J. Charlesworth, Roger A. Clarke, andCharles Oppenheim. “Privacy Impact Assessments: The UK Experience (2009),” 2009.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1606762.
Warren, Samuel, and Louis D. Brandeis. “The Right To Privacy." Harvard Law Review, 4:5,
1890.
Wattellier, Jeremie. “Comparative Legal Responses to Terrorism: Lessons from Europe.”

Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 397 (Winter 2004): 1-19.
Webster, Frank. Theories of the information society. Routledge, 2002.
Welsh, Brandon C. “Surveillance for Crime Prevention in Public Space: Results and Policy
Choices in Britain and America.” Criminology & Public Policy 3 (2003): 497.
Welsh, Brandon C, and David Farrington. Making Public Places Safer: Surveillance andCrime Prevention. Oxford ;;New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Westin, Alan F. “Data Leakage and Harm.” Privacy Exchange, May 2004.
http://www.privacyexchange.org/japan/dataleakEd.html.
Williams, Victoria. Surveillance and Intelligence Law Handbook. OUP Oxford, 2006.
Wolff, Leon. “The Future of Human Rights Regulation in Japan.” Human Rights Defender 12,
no. 3 (2003): 15-17.

167

Woo, Gordon. “Quantitative Terrorism Risk Assessment.” The Journal of Risk Finance (Fal
2002): 7-14.
Wood, D. M, and D. M Ball. “A report on the surveillance society.” Surveillance Studies

Network, UK, Sep 14 (2006).
Yamada, Yasuhide, Atsuhiro Yamagishi, and Ben T. Katsumi. “A Comparative Study of theInformation Security Policies of Japan and the United States.” Journal of National

Security Law & Policy 4, no. 1 (2010): 217-232.
“Yomiuri Shimbun March 2008 Opinion Polls (P08-06),” March 2008.
www.mansfielddn.org/polls/2008/poll-08-06.htm.

168Jonathan OramJonathan Oram studied comparative law andobtained his LLM at Nagoya University between 2009 and2011. He gained a BSc in Artificial Intelligence andComputer Science from Edinburgh University in 2000 andthen taught English in Sendai on the government sponsored
JET scheme. In 2005 Jonathan joined the Metropolitan
Police in London and was posted to Camden boroughwhere he spent two years on emergency response team in
the area hit by the July 7th bombings. In 2007 he thentransferred to a proactive team in Camden Town tacklinggang related crime. In 2008 Jonathan took a career breakfrom the police and won a scholarship from the Japanese
government to study the differences between policing inJapan and the UK. In April 2011 he returned to work in acentral London borough.

C ALE Discuss i on P ap er No. 6
BALANCING SURVEILLANCE BETWEEN NEEDS OF PRIVACY AND
SECURITY: CCTV IN JAPAN AND ENGLAND
AuthorJonathan Oram

Published byCenter for Asian Legal Exchange (CALE)
Nagoya University464-8601 Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku, Nagoya, JAPAN
Tel: +81 (0)52-789-2325
Fax: +81 (0)52-789-4902
http://cale.nomolog.nagoya-u.ac.jp/ja/

Issue date

31 August, 2011

Printed by

Nagoya University Co-operative Association© All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the priorpermission of the publisher.

170

C A L E D i s c u s s i o n P a p e r No.6 (August, 2011)
Nagoya University
C e n t e r f o r A s i a n L egal Exchange