Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros
August 24, 2024, 8:20pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on August 24. ISW will coversubsequent reports in the August 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia’s rear are
crucial for degrading Russian military capabilities throughout the theater, and the liftingof restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons would allow Ukrainianforces to strike a wide range of significant targets undergirding Russia’s war effort. An
unnamed senior Biden administration national security official reportedly stated thatUkrainian strikes with Western-provided weapons against targets within Russia would
not be effective because the Russian military has redeployed military aircraft from
Russian airbases near Ukraine — but this assessment ignores how Russian forces areleveraging sanctuary space in deep rear areas within Russia for a wide array of
infrastructure
besides
airfields
tosupportmilitary
operations
againstUkraine. Politico reported on August 23 that an unnamed senior Biden administration national
security official stated that Russian officials have moved some targets out of range of Western-provided
Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles and that Ukrainian forces only have a limited supply of thesemissiles.[1] An unnamed administration official also reportedly stated that Russian forces have moved
90 percent of the aircraft that conduct glide bomb strikes from Russian airspace away from airfields
within range of Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles.[2] ISW has observed confirmation ofredeployments of Russian aircraft to airfields out of range of Western-provided long-range weapons;
and the reported decreased Russian aviation activity throughout the theater is consistent with reportsthat Russian forces have been redeploying aviation assets.[3]The redeployment of Russian air assets from Russian air bases in range of ATACMS does
not remove the utility of using ATACMS against other Russian military targets,however. ISW assesses that there are at least 250 military and paramilitary objects in Russia within
range of ATACMS missiles that the United States has provided Ukraine. The United States currently
prohibits Ukrainian forces from using ATACMS missiles to strike military targets in Russia, however,and only allows strikes using US-provided HIMARS equipped with GMLRS — at maximum permitting
Ukraine to strike only 20 out of the 250 objects it could strike with ATACMS. Only 17 of these 250
objects are airfields, and it is unlikely that the Russian military has redeployed assets away from all theother 233 objects to the same degree as it has reportedly done with aviation assets.

1

Copyright© Institute for the Study of War, 2024

US officials’ comments centered on Russia’s redeployment of air assets have so far largely ignored the
majority of targets in range of ATACMS that Ukrainian forces could strike if US prohibitions werelifted. Many of the 233 military and paramilitary objects in range of ATACMS are large military bases,
communications stations, logistics centers, repair facilities, fuel depots, ammunition warehouses, andpermanent headquarters that would be extremely difficult or impossible to quickly redeploy assets fromor rapidly harden. ISW has not collected open-source evidence of redeployments of military assets fromthe majority of Russia’s rear areas. The mass redeployment of assets away from such facilities would
present significant challenges to Russian logistics throughout the theater, and open sources and US
officials have not indicated that Russian forces have engaged in such logistical upheavals. Such
disruptions to Russian logistics throughout the deep rear would have also constrained ongoing Russian
offensive operations throughout the frontline, and ISW has not observed evidence of such widespread
logistical constraints. The 233 Russian military and paramilitary objects within ranges of ATACMS
missiles that are not airfields support Russian command and control (C2), intelligence, reconnaissance,
2

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

logistical, and repair support for Russian forces fighting in Ukraine and in Kursk Oblast, and theassessment that there is no utility in granting Ukraine the ability to use ATACMS in Russia on the basisof limited redeployments of air assets from some airfields ignores these facilities. Any assessment thatargues that there is no point in allowing Ukraine to strike targets in Russia on the exclusive basis of air
asset redeployments is incomplete without also accounting for the hundreds of other facilities
supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine and would thus be incorrect.
ISW presents satellite imagery of some of these facilities below to illustrate the intrinsic difficulty ineither adequately protecting or redeploying assets away from such facilities at scale.

3

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

4

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

5

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

6

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

Ukrainian forces do not have to strike every single Russian military and paramilitary
object in Russia within range of Western-provided weapons to start generating
significant operational pressures on the Russian military. The lifting of the current Western
restrictions would generate a serious Ukrainian long-range strike threat that would force a decision
point on the Kremlin and likely prompt the Russian military command to significantly reconfigure
assets throughout the deep rear to protect against Ukrainian strikes. Ukraine's successful use of
HIMARS against Russian logistics, C2, and aviation facilities in occupied Ukraine in Summer and Fall
7

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

2022 eventually forced the Russian military to disperse many of these assets, causing disruptions to
Russian operations throughout the theater and significantly contributing to Russia’s pace of advancegrinding to a halt by late 2022.[4] Russian forces have since appeared adapted many of their logistics
systems in occupied Ukraine to protect against Ukraine's long-range strike capabilities at the expenseof sacrificing logistical efficiency in part by offloading many requirements to military and paramilitaryfacilities out of range of HIMARS and within sanctuary space in Russia.[5] Russia also deployed air
defense and electronic warfare assets to protect vulnerable targets against Ukrainian precision fires,degrading the effectiveness of those fires. It is unlikely that Russian forces have been hardening all
facilities in Russia against potential Ukrainian strikes or dispersing assets throughout the deep rear atscale without a pressing threat to do so. Persistent Ukrainian drone strikes into the Russian rear havethreatened some of these facilities but not to the extent that would compel the Russian militarycommand to consider the highly disruptive process of redeploying logistics and support systems at
scale. Bringing Russia’s rear areas under threat would likely also prompt the Russian military command
to make decisions about how to allocate its limited air defense and electronic warfare assets to protect
a largest geographic area.
The Russian military could seek to avoid such redeployments in the event of lifted Western restrictions
by heavily concentrating air defense and electronic warfare assets to protect military and paramilitaryfacilities in the rear, although it is not clear if Russian forces have the available air defense assets to doso. Ukraine's drone strike campaign against Russia has illustrated that many rear areas within Russia
have poor air defense coverage or none at all.[6] Russian forces would likely have to redeploy air
defense and electronic warfare assets from all over Russia as well as from the frontline in Ukraine togenerate the necessary protection coverage for rear areas in Russia within range of Western-provided
weapons, possibly setting conditions for Ukraine to scale up aviation operations of its own along thefrontline. The lifting of the restrictions would therefore allow Ukraine to start striking
significant Russian military targets while also immediately forcing a decision point on
Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military command about theallocation of limited air defense and electronic warfare assets and the configuration of
Russian military logistics and support systems across the theater and the deep rear.
Recent successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian military targets within ATACMS
range with Ukraine’s own domestically produced precision weapons demonstrate thatUkraine still has a requirement to conduct strikes that lifting the US restrictions could
help fill. Ukrainian forces have been able to develop deep-strike capability throughout two and a halfyears of war primarily with long-range strike drones and partially with modified Neptune anti-ship
missiles. Ukrainian strike campaigns with domestically-produced weapons pushed the Black Sea Fleet(BSF) out of the western Black Sea and most recently, Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries
compelled the Kremlin to entertain negotiations for a possible moratorium against strikes on Ukraine's
own energy infrastructure. Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian ammunition
depot near Ostrogozhsk, Voronezh Oblast on August 24, sparking fires in the area and reportedly
causing at least three explosions. [7] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR)
reported that this large depot contained artillery and tank shells, small arms rounds, and surface-to-air
missiles for the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (responsible for the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminnaline).[8] This facility is within range of ATACMS fired from Ukrainian-controlled areas of Kharkiv
Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on August 24 that Ukraine has produced
8

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

and successfully fielded the "Palyanytsia missile-drone" for the first time, and Ukrainian Strategic
Industries Minister Oleksandr Kamyshin stated that Ukrainian forces used this "missile-drone" to hit
an unspecified Russian military facility in occupied Ukraine.[9] Ukrainian officials have not provided
details on the drone's range or technical specifications but did confirm that this weapon meets thetechnical specifications of both a drone and missile, and Zelensky called it a "new class of weapon."[10]Some US officials assess that the Russian military will likely need to redeploy significant
forces from Ukraine and/or operational reserves to repel Ukrainian forces from Russian
territory. The New York Times (NYT) reported on August 23 that unspecified US officials assess that
Russia likely needs 15 to 20 brigades — at least 50,000 troops — to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk
Oblast.[11] The US assess that the Russian military would likely need to redeploy significant elementsfrom Ukraine or draw on operational reserves accumulated for its planned summer 2024 offensive
effort to Kursk Oblast, or both, to successfully retake territory. ISW has already observed reports that
the Russian military has redeployed elements of several Russian battalions, regiments, and brigades
mostly from lower priority sectors of the frontline to Kursk Oblast.[12] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ)
reported on August 17 that a source familiar with the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast stated that
Russian forces have redeployed roughly 5,000 personnel from unspecified areas in Ukraine to Kursk
Oblast by August 14 and assessed that Russian forces would likely need over 20,000 properly trained
personnel to retake territory in the area.[13]Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations within their salient in Kursk Oblast on
August 24, and neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made any significant claimed
advances. Some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recaptured Borki (southeast of Sudzha), but
a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that these reports are unconfirmed.[14] A
milblogger claimed that fighting also continued southeast of Borki near Spalnoye, Krupets, andKamyshnoye.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to bypass
Korenevo by attacking near Olgovka and that Russian forces also repelled attacks near Komarovka(southwest of Korenevo) and Snagost.[16] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces areattacking near Malaya Loknya (north of Sudzha) Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (northeast of Sudzha), andRusskaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha).[17] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black
Sea Fleet [BSF]), Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz, and likely elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle
Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 22nd Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD])
are reportedly defending Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha) from Ukrainian assaults with small
infantry groups and armored vehicle support.[18] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces
repelled a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group near Kamyshevka (northeast of Malaya
Loknya).[19]9Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

10

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

Ukrainian open-source intelligence project Frontelligence Insight published satellite imagery on
August 24 indicating that Russian forces are rapidly building field fortification defensive lines southand southwest of Kurchatov (west of Kursk City).[20] The satellite imagery captured on August 14 and18 indicates that Russian forces rapidly developed and began reinforcing a trench line near Dolgiy(south of Kurchatov) between August 14 and 18.[21] Frontelligence Insight also reported that Russianforces may be extending these defensive lines into windbreaks that would conceal these defensive lines
from view in satellite imagery.[22]Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky commented on some of the objectives of the
Ukrainian operation into Kursk Oblast on August 24. Zelensky characterized the Ukrainian
operation into Kursk Oblast as a spoiling attack that successfully prevented Russian forces fromattempting to encircle part of Sumy Oblast and seize Sumy City.[23] A Russian attack into Sumy Oblast
would likely have been part of the ongoing Russian theater-wide attempt to stretch Ukrainian forces
across the entire frontline to pressure overall weakened Ukrainian defenses.[24] Russian forces
attempted to divert and fix Ukrainian forces by launching an offensive operation into Kharkiv Oblast
on May 10 while maintaining the existing tempo of offensive operations in eastern Ukraine, and theRussian military may have assessed that opening a new front in Sumy Oblast would further weaken
Ukrainian forces defending throughout the theater.[25] A Russian attack into Sumy Oblast would haveallowed Russian forces to maintain the theater-wide initiative, would have forced the Ukrainian
military to defend in an additional sector of the frontline, and could have forced the Ukrainian militarycommand to reassess their defensive prioritization. Ukrainian forces instead conducted a spoilingattack into Kursk Oblast and seized the battlefield initiative in this sector of the frontline.[26]Ukraine and Russia conducted their first prisoner of war (POW) exchange since the
Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. Russian and Ukrainian sources announced on August 24
the 55th official POW exchange between the two countries since the beginning of Russia’s full-scaleinvasion of Ukraine.[27] The United Arab Emirates mediated the exchange that reportedly occurred ata border checkpoint in Belarus, which saw Russia and Ukraine return 115 POWs each.[28] The
Ukrainian POWs primarily included servicemembers who fought in Mariupol, while Russian
milbloggers claimed that all the Russian POWs were conscripts that the Ukrainian forces captured
during the recent Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.[29]Key Takeaways:

11•

Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia’s rearare crucial for degrading Russian military capabilities throughout the theater, andthe lifting of restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons would
allow Ukrainian forces to strike a wide range of significant targets undergirding
Russia’s war effort.

•

An unnamed senior Biden administration national security official reportedly
stated that Ukrainian strikes with Western-provided weapons against targets
within Russia would not be effective because the Russian military has redeployed
military aircraft from Russian airbases near Ukraine — but this assessment
ignores how Russian forces are leveraging sanctuary space in deep rear areas

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

within Russia for a wide array of infrastructure besides airfields to support
military operations against Ukraine.

12•

The redeployment of Russian air assets from Russian air bases in range of ATACMS
does not remove the utility of using ATACMS against other Russian military
targets, however.

•Ukrainian forces do not have to strike every single Russian military andparamilitary object in Russia within range of Western-provided weapons to start
generating significant operational pressures on the Russian military.

•

Recent successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian military targets within
ATACMS range with Ukraine’s own domestically produced precision weapons
demonstrate that Ukraine still has a requirement to conduct strikes that lifting the
US restrictions could help fill.

•Some US officials assess that the Russian military will likely need to redeploy
significant forces from Ukraine and/or operational reserves to repel Ukrainianforces from Russian territory.

•

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations within their salient in Kursk
Oblast on August 24, and neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made any
significant claimed advances.

•

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky commented on some of the objectives of
the Ukrainian operation into Kursk Oblast on August 24.

•

Ukraine and Russia conducted their first prisoner of war (POW) exchange since
the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.

•Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

•

Kursk Oblast officials announced the creation of the BARS-Kursk volunteer
detachment on August 24 and stated that the detachment will fight solely within
Kursk Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

13

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are wellcovered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we areassessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects ofthese criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population andspecifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian
violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against
humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
•

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)•

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international borderwith Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City•

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and pushwestward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast•

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast•

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis•

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign•

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts•

Russian Technological Adaptations•

Activities in Russian-occupied areas•

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts•

Russian Information Operations and Narratives•

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push
Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach
to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Fighting continued north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City in
Vovchansk on August 23 and 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[30] A Russian
milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks northwest of Vovchansk near
Hatyshche and Ohirtseve but that Russian forces repelled the attacks.[31] The Ukrainian Kharkiv
Group of Forces reported that Russian forces near Hlyboke have intensified drone reconnaissance
operations and reinforced their forward positions.[32] Elements of the "Yary" heavy sniper group of
the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue
operating in the Kharkiv direction.[33]14

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

15

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture theremainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast andnorthern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 24
but did not make confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacks northeast of Kupyansk near
Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka,
Kurylivka, and Stelmakhivka; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Druzhelyubivka, Novosadove,and Nevske; and west of Kreminna near Terny and Torske on August 23 and 24.[34] A Russian
milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted localized counterattacks near Novovodyane(northwest of Kreminna) and seized some positions in the past week, and a Ukrainian brigade operatingon the Svatove-Kreminna line recently reported that it conducted a counterattack and advanced two
kilometers deep to degrade the offensive capability of elements of the Russian 20th Combined Arms
Army ([CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) operating in the area.[35]16Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

17

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture theentirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 24, but there were no
confirmed changes to the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted
offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske;
and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Spirne on August 23 and 24.[36] Elements of the Russian”Sumrak” Battalion are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[37]18Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

19

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on August 24, but there were no
confirmed changes the frontline. Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces advancednear Kalynivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar) and within Zhovtnevyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar), but
ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[38] Russian forces continued offensive operations
northeast of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; south of Chasiv Yar near
Stupochky; and near Chasiv Yar itself on August 23 and 24.[39] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne(VDV) Division are operating near Chasiv Yar, and elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and Volunteer Corps are operating
just north of Chasiv Yar in the Orlove forest area.[40]20Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

21

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk amid continued offensive operations in the area on
August 24. Geolocated footage published on August 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced
to the eastern outskirts of Toretsk.[41] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk;
northeast of Toretsk near Dyliivka; and south of Toretsk near Nelipivka and Niu York on August 23 and24.[42] Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR]
Army Corps [AC]) reportedly continue to operate near Niu York.[43]22Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk amid continued Russian offensive operations in thearea on August 24. Geolocated footage published on August 23 indicates that Russian forces advanced
into eastern Karlivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and northeast of Mykolaivka (southeast of
Pokrovsk).[44] Additional geolocated footage published on August 24 indicates that Russian forces
advanced in the southeastern outskirts of Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[45] Russian
milbloggers claimed on August 24 that Russian forces advanced to and seized the Novohrodivka City
Council in the center of the town.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced eastof Novohrodivka and south of Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk) and seized Krasnyi Yar (immediately
southwest of Hrodivka) .[47] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russianforces continued offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka, Myrolyubivka, Zelene Pole,and Hrodivka and southeast of Pokrovsk near Kalynove, Krutyi Yar, Novohrodivka, Ptyche, Mykolaivka,
Mykhailivka, and Karlivka on August 23 and 24.[48] Elements of the Russian 1st “Slavic” Brigade (1stDNR AC) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[49]23

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

24

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

Fighting continued west of Donetsk City on August 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the front
in this area. Fighting continued near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka on August 23 and24.[50] Elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operatingnear Krasnohorivka.[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City on August 24, but there were
no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 24 that Russian forces
advanced in Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City), but ISW has not observed confirmation ofthis claim.[52] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kostyantynivka, Vodyane,
Katerynivka, and Vuhledar on August 23 and 24.[53]Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast
border area on August 24. Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Eastern
Military District [EMD] and Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) continue to operate in the DonetskZaporizhia Oblast border area near Razliv (north of Velyka Novosilka).[54]Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline
positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 24, but there were no
confirmed changes to the frontline. Fighting continued northwest of Robotyne near Novoandriivka andShcherbaky on August 24.[55]25Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

26

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Kherson direction on August 24.

27

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian militaryand civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted limited missile strikes against southern Ukraine on the night of August 23 to
24. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Kh-22 cruise missiles at Snake
Island (northwestern Black Sea).[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces launched anunspecified number of Onyx cruise missiles against Odesa Oblast, although ISW has not observed
confirmation of this claim.[57]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat
power without conducting general mobilization)
Kursk Oblast officials announced the creation of the BARS-Kursk volunteer detachment on August 24
and stated that the detachment will fight solely within Kursk Oblast.[58] The Kursk Oblast
Administration published an advertisement for the volunteer detachment promising recruits that they
will only perform tasks within Kursk Oblast, sign a six-month contract, and receive salaries similar to
Russian personnel serving in Ukraine.[59] Russian officials likely aim to use the Ukrainian incursion
into Kursk Oblast as a recruitment tool and may hope to offset pressures for additional redeployments
to Kursk Oblast by committing newly generated forces to defensive operations.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective:
innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Introduce

technological

Nothing significant to report.
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense
industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, andinternational partners)
ISW is suspending publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts until further notice.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative
control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russiansociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Nothing significant to report.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence inBelarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and WagnerGroup activity in Belarus)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly
available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western
reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other28

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/23/ukraine-biden-weapons-restrictions-00176210[2] https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/23/ukraine-biden-weapons-restrictions-00176210[3] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1816561523210191258;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august22-2024[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessmentoctober-29;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaignassessment-april-15-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Feb%203%20Russian%20Offensive%20Cam
paign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russianoffensive-campaign-assessment-october-172023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessmentfebruary-28-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaignassessment-may-12-2024[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101723 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russianoffensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2024[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040324 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march30-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaignassessment-january-21-2024[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessmentaugust-17-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-edition-campaignassessment-ukraine%E2%80%99s-strike-campaign-against-crimea;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-navaloperations-black-sea[8] https://x.com/KOvsianyi/status/1827357077649416427;
https://x.com/KOvsianyi/status/1827357081516519732; https://x.com/KOvsianyi/status/182735708
4683251799; https://t.me/gusev_36/2670; https://t.me/gusev_36/2671; https://t.me/gusev_36/26
73; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/9690; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/08/24/voyiny-gurmou-pidirvaly-u-rosiyi-sklad-boyeprypasiv-z-raketamy-i-snaryadamy/;
https://t.me/DIUkraine/4305;
https://t.me/DIUkraine/4306;
https://gur.gov
dotua/content/sviatkovyi-hurkit-rozvidnyky-pidirvaly-velykyi-sklad-boieprypasiv-na-rosii.html;
29

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xgeUrWHNgSKBXncVbGZRvQ2CkXkrh7
1rMDY28APCBzjByVseT6jZb5LP4wink93Ml?__cft__[0]=AZVyVu7jWQQy6p1_9ouL9Dn47M9uJCc
UqfUo5z8zT3y0n2pg35NFSyuTl5b7jVTx9Zi6lM7FNlk_19eSq8gRQkaGfZzA83wql-dI5bkp4Cpt9Rkc_xfn9bJ2ohcEmpcP0f0DqFiCjsNXqicR1Tfq0s5l3mHvSv2Tnh_60IdsgRxtVwWhX8s08mD15kzlwCwOBYBQAGM1MmPEVWel3hAt3I&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R[9] https://t.me/DIUkraine/4305[10] https://mildot
in.ua/uk/news/v-ukrayini-rozrobyly-raketu-dronpalyanytsya/; https://t.me/zalizni_zminy/2404;
https://armyinform
dot
com.ua/2024/08/24/ukrayina-vpershe-zastosuvala-svoyu-novu-zbroyu-raketu-dron-palyanyczya/[11] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/08/24/ukrayina-vpershe-zastosuvala-svoyu-novu-zbroyuraketu-dron-palyanyczya/[12] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/23/us/politics/ukraine-incursion-russia-buffer-zone.html[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082024 ; https://www.understandin
gwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2024[14] https://www.wsj.com/world/behind-ukraines-russia-invasion-secrecy-speed-and-electronicjamming-188fcc22 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaignassessment-august-18-2024[15] https://t.me/rybar/63017; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14458; https://t.me/warhistoryalco
nafter/181131; https://t.me/motopatriot/26621[16] https://t.me/dva_majors/50528[17] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/75494; https://t.me/dva_majors/50528; https://t.me/rosich_russia/65683;[18] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58486;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14467;
https://t.me/dva_majors/50528

https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18806;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/75494;[19] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58486;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14467;
https://t.me/dva_majors/50528

https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18806;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/75494;[20] https://t.me/rosich_russia/65683[21] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1827080166297973186[22] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1827080166297973186[23] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1827080166297973186[24] https://t.me/uniannet/142968

30

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russiainitiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051824[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august11-2024[28] https://t.me/osirskiy/821; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/08/24/ukrayina-povernula-zrosijskogo-polonu-115zahysnykiv/; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/11439; https://t.me/tass_agency/268189 ;https://t.me/mod_russia/42539; https://t.me/mod_russia/42542 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/42547; https://t.me/tass_agency/2681
89 ;https://t.me/mod_russia/42539; https://t.me/mod_russia/42542 ;https://t.me/mod_russia/42547 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantni
ka/14460; https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/moscow-kyiv-exchange-attacks-ukrainemarks-independence-anniversary-113119381[29] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/38989; https://t.me/tass_agency/268189 ;https://t.me/mod_russia/42539 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/42542 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/42547[30] https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2024/08/24/world-ukraine-russia-prisonerexchange/8731724513394/; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-set-swap-115prisoners-uae-official-says-2024-0824/; https://t.me/milinfolive/129112; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14460 ;[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RRyiXr6H2yQ1RVqCbjpu9EAVrDxUD
wqAV77oQiQMcUL2SuUF3aWcgAVdEuj7VJ7fl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/p
fbid0RKkfiJ587uhpvZVLY3BfywwCLda4MyydfGnUZcLK9tR5C1phuxSsSTpFbzqzEZEHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gkHzGM76Pkx2yDQouisV88cThoejgAMChLCLvQzVK
hVFnEc6vvpx61JVryxV7Dwvl; https://t.me/otukharkiv/900; https://t.me/wargonzo/21722[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14442[33] https://t.me/otukharkiv/900[34] https://t.me/milinfolive/129105[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RKkfiJ587uhpvZVLY3BfywwCLda4My
ydfGnUZcLK9tR5C1phuxSsSTpFbzqzEZEHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbi
d0RRyiXr6H2yQ1RVqCbjpu9EAVrDxUDwqAV77oQiQMcUL2SuUF3aWcgAVdEuj7VJ7fl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gkHzGM76Pkx2yDQouisV88cThoejgAMChLCLvQzVK
hVFnEc6vvpx61JVryxV7Dwvl; https://t.me/notes_veterans/19089[36] https://t.me/notes_veterans/19089;
https://suspilne
dotmedia/kharkiv/819571-tretasturmova-brigada-zaavila-pro-kontrnastup-na-harkivsini-so-vidomo/;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august22-2024
31

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

[37]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RKkfiJ587uhpvZVLY3BfywwCLda4My
ydfGnUZcLK9tR5C1phuxSsSTpFbzqzEZEHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RRyiXr6H2yQ1RVqCbjpu9EAVrDxUDwq
AV77oQiQMcUL2SuUF3aWcgAVdEuj7VJ7fl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbi
d0gkHzGM76Pkx2yDQouisV88cThoejgAMChLCLvQzVKhVFnEc6vvpx61JVryxV7Dwvl[38] https://t.me/wargonzo/21734[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14465; https://t.me/motopatriot/26633[40]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RKkfiJ587uhpvZVLY3BfywwCLda4My
ydfGnUZcLK9tR5C1phuxSsSTpFbzqzEZEHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RRyiXr6H2yQ1RVqCbjpu9EAVrDxUDwq
AV77oQiQMcUL2SuUF3aWcgAVdEuj7VJ7fl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbi
d0gkHzGM76Pkx2yDQouisV88cThoejgAMChLCLvQzVKhVFnEc6vvpx61JVryxV7Dwvl[41] https://t.me/rusich_army/16737; https://t.me/milinfolive/129125[42] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=946360087257909; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/182
7366209945301199; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6508[43]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RKkfiJ587uhpvZVLY3BfywwCLda4My
ydfGnUZcLK9tR5C1phuxSsSTpFbzqzEZEHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RRyiXr6H2yQ1RVqCbjpu9EAVrDxUDwq
AV77oQiQMcUL2SuUF3aWcgAVdEuj7VJ7fl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbi
d0gkHzGM76Pkx2yDQouisV88cThoejgAMChLCLvQzVKhVFnEc6vvpx61JVryxV7Dwvl[44] ttps://t.me/wargonzo/21728;[45] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6505; https://t.me/Kyiv11obmp/71;
https://t.me/jagers68/99;
https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1827143109441884567; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6507[46] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1827403444145061954; https://t.me/shershni68/212[47] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58491;[48] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27759; https://t.me/divgen/53262; https://t.me/shershni68/212; https://
x.com/Bielitzling/status/1827403444145061954 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/134704 ;https://t.me/epoddubny/20831[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RKkfiJ587uhpvZVLY3BfywwCLda4My
ydfGnUZcLK9tR5C1phuxSsSTpFbzqzEZEHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RRyiXr6H2yQ1RVqCbjpu9EAVrDxUDwq
AV77oQiQMcUL2SuUF3aWcgAVdEuj7VJ7fl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbi
d0gkHzGM76Pkx2yDQouisV88cThoejgAMChLCLvQzVKhVFnEc6vvpx61JVryxV7Dwvl[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/42544[51]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RKkfiJ587uhpvZVLY3BfywwCLda4My
ydfGnUZcLK9tR5C1phuxSsSTpFbzqzEZEHl
32

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024

; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RRyiXr6H2yQ1RVqCbjpu9EAVrDxUDwq
AV77oQiQMcUL2SuUF3aWcgAVdEuj7VJ7fl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbi
d0gkHzGM76Pkx2yDQouisV88cThoejgAMChLCLvQzVKhVFnEc6vvpx61JVryxV7Dwvl[52] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/134723[53] https://t.me/wargonzo/21722[54]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RKkfiJ587uhpvZVLY3BfywwCLda4My
ydfGnUZcLK9tR5C1phuxSsSTpFbzqzEZEHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RRyiXr6H2yQ1RVqCbjpu9EAVrDxUDwq
AV77oQiQMcUL2SuUF3aWcgAVdEuj7VJ7fl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbi
d0gkHzGM76Pkx2yDQouisV88cThoejgAMChLCLvQzVKhVFnEc6vvpx61JVryxV7Dwvl[55] https://t.me/voin_dv/10438[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RKkfiJ587uhpvZVLY3BfywwCLda4My
ydfGnUZcLK9tR5C1phuxSsSTpFbzqzEZEHl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21722[57] https://t.me/kpszsu/18152[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/50548[59] https://t.me/astrapress/62667 ; https://t.me/horizontal_russia/39367

33

Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2024