Social Design Engineering Series

SDES-2021-6

Deliberative forms of democracy and intergenerationalsustainability dilemma

Pankaj Koirala
School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology

Raja Rajendra Timilsina
School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology

Koji Kotani
School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology

24th June, 2021

School of Economics and Management
Research Institute for Future Design
Kochi University of Technology
KUT-SDE working papers are preliminary research documents published by the School of Economics and Management jointly with the ResearchCenter for Social Design Engineering at Kochi University of Technology. To facilitate prompt distribution, they have not been formally reviewed
and edited. They are circulated in order to stimulate discussion and critical comment and may be revised. The views and interpretations expressedin these papers are those of the author(s). It is expected that most working papers will be published in some other form.

Deliberative forms of democracy and intergenerationalsustainability dilemma
Pankaj Koirala*,†,‡ Raja Rajendra Timilsina*,† Koji Kotani*,†,§,¶,||
June 24, 2021

Abstract
Intergenerational sustainability (IS) has emerged as the most serious social problem reflecting climate change and accumulation of public debt in modern democratic societies, undermining the potential interests and concerns of future generations. However, little is known about
whether or not deliberative forms of democracy with majority voting helps support at maintaining IS by representing future generations’ potential interests and concerns. We instituteintergenerational sustainability dilemma game (ISDG) with three forms of decision-making
models with majority voting and examine how they maintain IS in laboratory experiments.
In ISDG, a sequence of six generations is prepared where each generation consisting of threesubjects is asked to choose either maintaining IS (sustainable option) or maximizing their own
generation’s payoff by irreversibly costing the subsequent generations (unsustainable option)with anonymous voting systems: (1) majority voting (MV), (2) deliberative majority voting(DMV) and (3) majority voting with deliberative accountability (MVDA). In MV and DMV,
generations vote for their choices without and with deliberation, respectively. In MVDA, generations are asked to be possibly accountable for their choices to the subsequent generations
during deliberation, and then vote. Our analysis shows that decision-making models with only
majority voting generally does not address IS, while DMV and MVDA treatments induce more
and much more generations to choose a sustainable option than MV, respectively. Overall, theresults demonstrate that deliberation and accountability along with majority voting shall benecessary in models of decision making at resolving IS problems and representing future generations’ potential interests and concerns.

Key Words: democracy; decision-making; majority voting; deliberation; intergenerational accountability; intergenerational sustainability; experimental research; future generations* School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology†

Research Institute for Future Design, Kochi University of Technology
Institute for Integrated Development Studies§
Corresponding author, E-mail: kojikotani757@gmail.com¶
Urban Institute, Kyusyu University||
College of Business, Rikkyo University‡

1

Contents
Nomenclature

2

1

Introduction

3

2

Theoretical section

5

3

Experimental design
3.1 Experimental setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1.1 Intergenerational sustainability dilemma game (ISDG) . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1.2 Social value orientation (SVO) and psychological factors . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 Experimental procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11
11
11
14
14

4

Results

16

5

Discussion & conclusion

20

Nomenclature
IS

Intergenerational Sustainability

ISD

Intergenerational Sustainability Dilemma

ISDG Intergenerational Sustainability Dilemma GameMV

Majority Voting

DMV Deliberative Majority Voting
MVDA Majority Voting with Deliberative Accountability
IAIntergenerational Accountability

NE

Nash Equilibrium

SVO Social Value Orientation
KUT Kochi University of Technology
RA

Research Assistants

JPY

Japanese Yen

2

1

1

Introduction

2

People generally consider democracy to be a better option than some authoritarian system,

3and believe that it represents people, their interests and concerns (Przeworski et al., 1999, Fiorino,

4

2018, MacKenzie and Caluwaerts, 2021). With this belief, contemporary societies have adopted

5democracy and succeeded in achieving various economic, social and political objectives, such as

6poverty reduction, job creation, education and improvements in health-care facilities. However,7

modern democratic societies face intergenerational sustainability (IS) problems, such as climate

8change, resource sustainability, public debt accumulation and environmental pollution, and these9

problems are reported to affect future generations’ welfare (Shearman and Smith, 2007, Gonzalez-

10

Ricoy and Gosseries, 2016, Hansen and Imrohoroglu, 2016, Steffen et al., 2018, Caney, 2018,

11

Bamber et al., 2019). IS problems arise when the current generation fails to consider the interests

12and concerns of future generations into their decision-making processes under a democratic system

13(Thompson, 2010, Gonzalez-Ricoy and Gosseries, 2016, MacKenzie, 2018).

14

Literature reports that some features of democracy, such as election cycles, the dominance of15

political interests and the existence of some myopic voters, develop short-term tendencies (or pre-16

sentism) in people’s attitudes and behaviors, inducing the current generation not to consider future

17

generations (Smith, 2003, Thompson, 2010, MacKenzie and O’Doherty, 2011, MacKenzie, 2016,18

2018, Saijo, 2020). The short-term tendencies in democracy are exacerbated, especially when19

people become autonomous and alienated from societies with limited social interactions, making

20

themselves myopic (Jacobs and Matthews, 2012, List et al., 2013, Saijo, 2020). There are upris-

21

ing voices and demands to address IS problems so that future generations’ welfare, concerns and22

voices should be reflected in the current practices of democracy (Mansbridge, 2003, Caney, 2018,23

Bogacki and Letmathe, 2021). Public protests around Greta Thunberg can be considered such an

24

example for future generations’ voices in relation to climate change (Bogacki and Letmathe, 2021).

25

Representation of future generations’ voices in decision-making processes is claimed to be

26

challenging under a democratic system (Strandberg, 2008, Fishkin, 2009, Gronlund et al., 2009,27

Geissel and Newton, 2012, Dangelico and Pontrandolfo, 2013, MacKenzie, 2016, Stoiciu and3

28

Gherghina, 2021). In numerous democratic countries, children and/or women are not permitted

29

to vote in elections, and it highlights that underrepresentation of some groups other than future

30

generations emerge as a general social problem. Such an underrepresentation problem is present

31

in IS problems, such as climate change, where future generations cannot participate in the current

32

decision-making process as they are yet to born (MacKenzie, 2018, Shahen et al., 2021). It affirms

33that a democratic system may need some new devices, innovations, reforms or transformations for

34

addressing the underrepresentation as not only social but also IS problems (Geissel and Newton,

35

2012, Gonzalez-Ricoy and Gosseries, 2016, Elstub and Escobar, 2019b,a, Allegretti, 2014, Picker-

36

ing et al., 2020). A group of scholars argues that deliberative forms of democracy can influence the37current generation to consider future generations and their potential interests and concerns, possi-

38

bly inducing them to be more sustainable or future-oriented (Gronlund et al., 2010, MacKenzie,392018). However, little is known how deliberative forms of democracy with voting can resolve IS

40

problems and represent future generations’ potential interests and concerns.

41

We systematically examine how two deliberative forms of democracy with majority voting en-42

hance IS as compared to majority voting without deliberation. One of the specific IS problems

43

is described by “intergenerational sustainability dilemma” (ISD), which is a situation where the44

current generation chooses to maximize (or sacrifice) its own benefits without (or for) considering

45

future generations, compromising (or maintaining) IS (Kamijo et al., 2017, Shahrier et al., 2017b,

46

Shahen et al., 2021). Thus, we institute intergenerational sustainability dilemma game (ISDG)

47

with three forms of decision-making models with majority voting by experimentally manipulating48

prevoting components and examine how they maintain IS in laboratory experiments. In ISDG,

49

a sequence of six generations is prepared where each generation consisting of three subjects is50

asked to choose either maintaining IS (sustainable option) or maximizing their own generation’s

51

payoff by irreversibly costing the subsequent generations (unsustainable option) with anonymous

52

voting systems: (1) majority voting (MV), (2) deliberative majority voting (DMV) and (3) ma-

53

jority voting with deliberative accountability (MVDA). In MV and DMV, generations vote for54

their choices without and with deliberation, respectively. In MVDA, generations are asked to be4

55

possibly accountable for their choices to the subsequent generations during deliberation, and then56vote. Our analysis shows that decision-making models with only majority voting generally does57

not address IS, while DMV and MVDA treatments induce more and much more generations to58choose a sustainable option than MV, respectively. Overall, this study contributes to the literature59

by demonstrating that deliberation and accountability shall be necessary in decision-making mod-60

els with majority voting at resolving IS problems. The message can be considered important when61

democratic countries and societies seek to address intergenerational fairness and/or justice along

62

with an underrepresentation problem of future generations as argued by Caney (2018).

63

2

Theoretical section

64

The concept of democracy is too broad to cover in the limited space of a single study and there

65

exists numerous definitions of democracy (May, 1978, Elliott, 1994, Przeworski et al., 1999, Dahl,

66

2001, Diamond and Plattner, 2006). For example, May (1978) defines “democracy as a respon-

67

sive rule qua necessary correspondence between acts of governance and the desires with respect

68

to those acts of the persons who are affected.” Przeworski et al. (1999) defines democracy as a69

form of rules, and Dahl (2001) refers to democracy as actual governments that meet the following

70

criteria: effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, agenda control and in-71

clusions of adults. Regardless of the aforementioned variations, it appears to takes two main forms:

72(i) direct democracy and (ii) representative democracy. Direct democracy allows people to equally73

and directly participate in the decision-making process, such as discussion, voting or other acts of74

politics, and the examples include electronic, participatory and/or deliberative forms of democracy

75(Przeworski et al., 1999, Geissel and Newton, 2012, Warren, 2017, Haas, 2019). Representative76

democracy allows people to participate indirectly in the decision process and choose the represen-

77

tatives that make decisions on behalf of them. The examples include parliamentary and presidential

78

forms of democracy (Przeworski et al., 1999, Diamond and Plattner, 2006). This study focuses on

79

deliberative forms of democracy with voting in a class of direct democracy, considering that it is5

80

the first step to analyze their effects on human behaviors in IS under laboratory settings.

81

Several scholars have attempted to characterize democracy through models of decision making

82(Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996, Austen-smith and Feddersen, 2006, Jackson and Tan, 2013). The

83

model of decision making is defined as a function which takes the votes (or choices) as input from84

the members in a group or society, delivering a collective decision as output (List, 2018). The

85

model of decision making is claimed to consist of two components (i.e., components of models of86

decision making): (1) Prevoting component – a prior environment for people to engage, communi-

87

cate and discuss socially on the common concerns, issues and agendas; and (2) Voting component

88– a rule that aggregates individual independent choices to a collective decision (Austen-Smith89

and Banks, 1996, Jacobs and Matthews, 2012, List, 2018). Deliberation and voting are regarded90

as components of the decision-making models, and majority voting is widely adopted (Warren,

912017). Literature suggests two main models of deliberative decision making: a pure deliberation

92

model where participants deliberate and reach (or aim to reach) consensus for a collective deci-

93sion without individual voting; and a mixed model of deliberation where participants deliberate

94

and make a collective decision through individual voting (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996, Jacobs

95

and Matthews, 2012, List et al., 2013, List, 2018). Some theories suggest that deliberation (i.e.,

96

pure deliberation model) can play the following roles: (i) it enhances responsiveness to the people,

97

groups and agendas (Warren, 2017); (ii) it connects people’s preferences to a collective will by

98

potentially generating epistemic and ethical goods through their reasons and arguments (Estlund,99

2009, Mercier and Landemore, 2012, Landemore, 2013) and (iii) it helps to make a collective

100

decision by agreements and commitments to the decision (Habermas, 1984, Elster, 1997, Haber-101mas, 1994, Chambers, 2003, Mansbridge, 2003, Delli Carpini et al., 2004, Mansbridge et al., 2010,

102

MacKenzie, 2018, MacKenzie and Caluwaerts, 2021). Warren (2017) argues that deliberation is103

weak to be able to represent some groups, such as young and ethnic groups, suggesting that some104

supplementary or complementary components, such as voting, may be necessary.

105

Past literature has examined the influence of the mixed model (i.e., deliberation is supple-

106

mented by individual voting) on human behaviors and the problem of underrepresentation for

6

107

some groups by conducting surveys or controlled experiments (Strandberg, 2008, Dietz et al.,108

2009, Gronlund et al., 2009, Goeree and Yariv, 2011, Gherghina and Geissel, 2017, 2020, Setala,109

2017, Setala et al., 2020). Luskin et al. (2002) conduct deliberative polls in UK and find that110

deliberation affects public preferences on some policies. List et al. (2013) find that the deliber-

111

ation before voting brings a higher proximate single-peakedness in voters’ preferences than the112

majority voting only utilizing deliberative polls data. In experimental studies, for example, Simon

113

and Sulkin (2002) analyze the role of deliberation, concluding that deliberation enhances equitable114

outcomes for intra-generational members. Goeree and Yariv (2011) experimentally evaluate the115

effects of deliberation under various decision-making rules and demonstrate that it improves the116

efficiency of institutional decisions. Persson et al. (2012) analyze people’s behaviors through field

117

experiments and find that deliberation with voting increases perceived legitimacy of democratic

118

procedure compared to non-voting. Ideally, deliberative forms of democracy should come with119

active participation of stakeholders and it may be necessary to include possible underrepresented

120

groups in a decision-making process (Habermas, 1996). Stoiciu and Gherghina (2021) analyze the121role of deliberation for underrepresentation problems, finding that it promotes inclusion of opin-

122

ions from women, various social strata, ethnic and other minorities. However, another group of123

studies points out that deliberation may not be sufficient to resolve underrepresentation of some124groups, especially young and uneducated people (Dalton et al., 2001, Jeydel and Steel, 2002, Gron-

125lund et al., 2009, Strandberg, 2008, Gherghina and Geissel, 2017, 2020, Setala, 2017, Setala et al.,126

2020, Barbosa, 2020).

127

In the context of IS problems, future generations tend to be underrepresented in collective

128

decision making (MacKenzie, 2016, 2018, Bogacki and Letmathe, 2021). The difficulty arises

129

because future generations can neither communicate nor represent their voices with the current

130

generation, especially when they do not have overlapping life time. For instance, climate change

131

problems shall adversely affect future generations that are not born yet, however, such unborn

132

future generations do not have any means to convey what they want to the current generation in133

the decision-making process. Several researchers have empirically and experimentally studied IS

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problems, employing some decision-making models of deliberation and/or voting (Fischer et al.,135

2004, Setala et al., 2010, Himmelroos and Christensen, 2013, Hauser et al., 2014, Sherstyuk et al.,136

2016, Fochmann et al., 2018, Kamijo et al., 2019, Nakagawa et al., 2019, Dryzek and Niemeyer,

137

2019, Katsuki and Hizen, 2020, Pandit et al., 2021, Bogacki and Letmathe, 2021, MacKenzie and138

Caluwaerts, 2021). Gronlund et al. (2009) compare people’s knowledge and opinions on long-run

139

energy politics under traditional face-to-face and online deliberation, suggesting that both settings

140

enhance only people’s knowledge. Setala et al. (2010) conduct pre-post surveys and deliberation141

on people’s knowledge for the use of nuclear power plants, finding that deliberation promotes

142

their knowledge than without deliberation. Himmelroos and Christensen (2013) examine public143

opinions on the use of nuclear power plants through conducting quasi-experiments, demonstrating

144

that deliberation with high-quality arguments brings people’s opinion changes. Hauser et al. (2014)

145

analyze groups behaviors for IS by conducting intergenerational goods games and suggest that146

voting reduces the exploitation of resources by restraining defectors. MacKenzie and Caluwaerts

147(2021) conduct online experiments and analyze group decisions for climate policies, showing that148

deliberation induces groups to support the policies.

149

Another group of studies focuses on how ISD can be resolved by deliberation or some institu-

150

tions to represent future generations through conducting ISDG laboratory and/or field experiments

151

under non-overlapping generation settings. Kamijo et al. (2017) conduct ISDG laboratory exper-

152

iments with a student subject pool and show that introduction of a imaginary future generation

153(IFG) who are assigned to represent future generations in deliberation enhances IS. Shahrier et al.

154(2017b) and Timilsina et al. (2021) conduct ISDG field experiments using a subject pool of the155

general public in urban and rural areas of Bangladesh and Nepal, respectively, and show that rural

156

people choose sustainable options much more often than do urban ones. Shahrier et al. (2017a)

157

further conduct ISDG field experiments in Bangladesh with subjects of urban people, demonstrat-

158

ing that future ahead and back mechanism (FAB that asks people to take the standpoint of future

159

generations and to think about their requests to the current generation) induces people to choose160

sustainable options. Timilsina et al. (2019) conduct ISDG field experiments with a subject pool of

8

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general people in Nepal and conclude that intergenerational accountability (IA that asks people to162

be accountable for their decisions to future generations) is effective at maintaining IS. Katsuki and163

Hizen (2020) address people’s behaviors under some voting rules in laboratory settings, finding

164

that they fail in enhancing IS. Overall, these studies demonstrate that some attempts and institu-

165

tions (with deliberation), such as IFG, FAB and IA, shall be able to address underrepresentation of166

future generations as well as to maintain IS.

167

In political science, accountability refers to a responsibility of decision makers on behalf of168

people spanning the obligations to report, explain and answer for the resulting consequences where169

people can sanction (or reward) the decision makers (Przeworski et al., 1999). Accountability holds

170

when decision makers and receivers are engaged in two-way communication, and it is established

171

that people become fair and/or just when they are accountable for their decisions (Tetlock, 1983,

1721985). In the context of IS problems, such a two-way communication between the current and173

future generations is not always possible especially in the long-run perspective of non-overlapping

174

generations (Shahen et al., 2021), and the only possible communication path is unidirectional or

175

one-way communication from the current to future generations. Given this state of affairs, this176

research suggests IA mechanism along with deliberation in which people in the current generation177

are asked to be accountable for their decisions and leave their written reasons & advice to future178

generations, hypothesizing that IA brings fair and sustainable decisions of the current generation

179

for IS.

180

In some real-life decision-making contexts, societies deliberate and conclude with majority

181

voting on some salient and/or long-term problems, such as Brexit (in UK) and other instances.

182

For examples, countries (e.g., Ireland and Iceland), political parties (e.g., Alternativet Party of

183

Denmark, Czech Pirate Party of Czech and Demos Party of Romania), country representatives

184(e.g., UN) and officials follow deliberation and/or voting for making decisions whose influence185

affect future generations in the long run (Geissel and Newton, 2012, Vodova and Voda, 2020, Gad,

186

2020, Gherghina and Geissel, 2020, Gherghina and Stoiciu, 2020). In summary, not only the lit-

187

erature but also real-world social movements reveal that underrepresentation of future generations

9

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is considered a fundamental problem for democracy and IS (Habermas, 1984, 1994, Chambers,

189

2003, Mansbridge, 2003, Delli Carpini et al., 2004, Warren, 2017, MacKenzie, 2018, MacKenzie

190

and Caluwaerts, 2021). To address the problem, we hypothesize that deliberation and/or IA induce

191

people in the current generation to represent future generations’ interests and concerns (or to be fair192

and/or just across generations), enhancing IS. Specifically, this research examines how two models

193

of deliberative decision making with individual voting enhance IS as compared with individual

194

voting without deliberation by conducting laboratory experiments. The following hypotheses are

195

posed:

196

197

198

199

• Hypothesis 1: Intragenerational deliberation and individual voting results in higher IS than
only with individual voting.
• Hypothesis 2: Intragenerational deliberation with intergenerational accountability and individual voting results in higher IS than only with individual voting.

200• Hypothesis 3: Intragenerational deliberation with intergenerational accountability and indi-

201

vidual voting results in higher IS than only with intragenerational deliberation and individual202

voting.

203

One important measurement is the frequency in generation sustainable choice and it is consid-

204

ered a good approximation of IS. To answer the three hypotheses, we empirically compare and205

characterize the frequencies in generation sustainable choice across three models of decision mak-206

ing by including other control variables (SVO, sociodemographic factors and others) that will be

207

discussed in the following section of experimental design.

208

From a game theoretical view, choosing an unsustainable option is a Nash equilibrium (NE)209

strategy as well as a dominant strategy for each generation in ISDG, because it maximizes their210

own payoff, irrespective of how other generations chose in the past and will choose in the future

211

within the same sequence. On the other hand, all allocations in ISDG are Pareto optimal in the212

sense that every allocation cannot be Pareto improved by any other feasible allocation. For exam-

213

ple, when every generation keeps choosing an unsustainable option, the resulting allocation is still
10

214

considered Pareto optimal. These features of ISDG arise from the fact that the current generation

215

unidirectionally affects future generations, representing how it is challenging to maintain sustain-

216

ability (Kamijo et al., 2017, Shahrier et al., 2017b, Saijo, 2020, Katsuki and Hizen, 2020). There

217

exists a unique allocation that leads to sustainability and maximizes the sum of payoffs for all the218

generations (i.e., social welfare) in ISDG. When every generation keeps choosing a sustainable219

option, the resulting allocation shall be considered socially desirable by not only maintaining sus-

220

tainability but also maximizing the sum of payoffs for all generations. The theoretical prediction

221

suggests that people choose an unsustainable option and fail to maintain IS under ISDG in any

222

models of decision making. However, some behavioral and experimental studies in economics

223

establish that people do not always follow NEs and dominant strategies in some situations (McK-224

elvey and Palfrey, 1992, Binmore, 1994, Ochs, 1995, Goeree and Holt, 1999, Charness and Rabin,225

2002, Holt and Roth, 2004, Garcia-Pola et al., 2020).

226

3

Experimental design

227

3.1

Experimental setup

228

We conducted laboratory experiments by following intergenerational sustainability dilemma229

game (ISDG), a social value orientation (SVO) game and questionnaire surveys for each subject’s

230

critical thinking disposition, empathic concern and sociodemographic information. Experiments

231

were carried out in the laboratory of the Kochi University of Technology (KUT) with a total of 312

232

Japanese students, including 145 female and 167 male, aged between 18 and 23. The subjects were233

recruited from the student subject pool of KUT with various specializations, such as economics,

234

engineering, management and natural sciences.

235

3.1.1

Intergenerational sustainability dilemma game (ISDG)

236

We implement ISDG following the laboratory and field experiments of Kamijo et al. (2017)237

and Shahrier et al. (2017b). Building upon previous ISDG experiments, we add a new element of

11

238

individual voting mechanism to the experimental design, the details of which are discussed later239

in this section. ISDG consists of a sequence of six generations. A “generation” is a group of three240

members, while in a “sequence,” six chronologically arranged generations share the same resource

241(X) one after another. In ISDG, each generation is asked either to maintain intergenerational sus-

242

tainability (IS) by choosing option B (sustainable option) or to maximize their own generation’s

243

payoff by choosing option A, imposing an irreversible cost to the subsequent generations (unsus-

244

tainable option). By choosing option A, each generation receives a share of X. On the other hand,245

the generation receives a share of X − 900 by choosing option B.

246

We randomly assign each generation to the 1st, 2nd, . . . and 6th generations, respectively. The

247

current generation’s decision affects the subsequent generations such that subsequent generations’248

shares decline irreversibly and uniformly by 900 when the current generation chooses option A,

249

otherwise not. For instance, suppose that X = 3600 and the 1st generation chooses option A.

250

Then, the 2nd generation will face a game in which they receive 2700 and 1800 for choosing

251

options A and B, respectively. However, if the 1st generation chooses option B, the second gen-252

eration faces the same decision environment as that of the 1st generation faces. That is, when the253

1st generation chooses option B, the 2nd generation faces the game receiving 3600 and 2700 by

254

choosing options A and B, respectively. Following the same rules, the game continues for the255

subsequent generations (i.e., between ith and i + 1th generations) in a sequence. Hence, option B

256

can be considered the “sustainable option,” whereas option A is the choice that compromises IS

257

and can be considered as the “unsustainable option.”258

In the experiments, the 1st generation starts the game with a share of X = 3600 experimental

259

points, by choosing option A, the generation earns 3600 points, where by choosing option B, the260

generation earns 2700 points. Consequently, members of this generation split the points equally

261

among themselves and each member earns 1200 points by choosing option A and 900 points by262

choosing option B as a generation share, respectively. ISDG experiment is designed in a way that263

the 5th and 6th generations possibly face the situation in which options A and B are associated264with zero and negative shares, respectively. When the generations from the 1st to the 4th choose

12

265

option A, then the 5th generation will face the game in which they receive generation shares of266

zero points and −900 points by choosing options A and B, respectively. If the generation’s share267

is negative, say, −Z, each generation member will receive the equal points of −Z/3. When the268

subjects receive negative points, each of them needs to refund Z/3 points to the experimenter. In

269such situations, the points of Z/3 are deducted from each member’s participation fee of 600 points

270

so that individual payoff becomes at least nonnegative (See appendix).

271

As shown in figure 1, we prepare three treatments namely, (1) majority voting (MV), (2) delib-272

erative majority voting (DMV) and (3) majority voting with deliberative accountability (MVDA)

273

that are as follows:274• MV (base group treatment): Three members in a generation are asked to cast their anony-275

mous and independent votes for option A or option B. The members in a generation see the276faces of each other, but they are not allowed to communicate before they vote. After each277

member’s voting, the generation decision between options A and B is made by majority rule.

278

Specifically, the majority rule means that the generation decision is made as A (or B) if two

279

or all three members vote for option A (or option B).

280• DMV: Three members in a generation are asked to deliberate over choosing between options

281

A and B up to 10 minutes before they vote. After that, the members cast their anonymous

282

and independent votes for option A or option B. The generation decision is made by majority

283

rule as in MV.

284• MVDA: Three members in a generation are asked to deliberate and collectively provide

285

reasons & advice for their possible generation decision to the subsequent generations over286

choosing between options A and B up to 10 minutes. When the generations are not the287

1st one, they receive reasons & advice from the previous generation(s) before deliberation.

288

After that, the members cast their anonymous and independent votes for option A or option

289

B. The generation decision is made by majority rule as in MV and DMV.

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290

Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 can be statistically examined and tested by comparing the likelihood for

291

generations to choose a sustainable option B between the two treatments (Hypothesis 1: MV

292

versus DMV, Hypothesis 2: MV versus MVDA and Hypothesis 3: DMV versus MVDA).
[Figure 1 about here.]

293

294

3.1.2

Social value orientation (SVO) and psychological factors

295

We use the “slider method” to identify the subjects’ social preferences by understanding their296

social value orientation (SVO) (Murphy et al., 2011). SVOs are already well established to be297

stable for a long time (See, e.g., Van Lange et al. (2007) and Brosig-Koch et al. (2011)). The slider298

method consists of 6 items where each subject is asked to share an amount of money or points

299with another subject. Each item consists of nine pairs of distributions for self and the other. The

300

average allocation of oneself As and average allocation for the Ao are computed from all 6 items.

301

Then, 50 is subtracted from As and Ao to shift the base of the resulting angle to the center of302(As −50). We combine
the circle (50, 50). The index of a subject’s SVO is given by SVO = arctan (Ao −50)

303“altruist (SVO > 57.15◦ )” and “prosocial (22.45◦ < SVO < 57.15◦ )” types into a single category304

of “prosocial;” “individualist (−12.04◦ < SVO < 22.45◦ )” and “competitive (SVO < −12.04◦ )”305

to “proself” as it is often done in psychology research for presenting results in a simple way. The

306

subjects are informed in detail that their total payoffs from the SVO game are dictated by their own

307

and anonymous pair’s choices. The subjects are instructed about the game rules, points and total

308

payoffs they receive from the game. The subjects perform the SVO tasks individually and submit

309

their sheets to research assistants (RAs). RAs calculate the total payoff by randomly matching310

between the subjects from the same days session.

311

3.2

Experimental procedures

312

The first author administered the experiments with research assistants (RAs). One session

313

comprises ISDG, SVO, sociodemographic questionnaires and payments. For each session, 18

14

314

subjects (= 6 generations) were gathered at an instruction room, and one treatment among MV,315

DMV and MVDA was randomly assigned (Figure 2). We announced that no communications

316

were allowed without any permission. Then, the 18 subjects read and watched written and video317

instructions for ISDG. We also made an oral presentation, conducting Q&A and quizzes for double-

318

checking subjects’ understanding. Unless the subjects correctly answered, we did not proceed319

to ISDG. At the beginning of ISDG, each subject drew a chip from a bag to determine his/her

320

sequence (i), generation (j) and individual IDs (k). Each chip displays a letter (e.g., P, Q, R)

321

corresponds to i · j - k (Figure 2). In each session, the i takes one letter out of three from {P, Q, R}

322

and j takes one number out of {j 0 , j 0 + 1} for j 0 = {1, 3, 5} (e.g., j = {1, 2} when j 0 = 1;323

j = {3, 4} when j 0 = 3). In figure 2, for example, P 1 and P 2 corresponds to j 0 and j 0 + 1 when324

j 0 = 1 for the sequence i = P . The k takes one number out of {1, 2, 3} as an individual ID in a325

generation. The subjects whose generation IDs belong to a class of i · j 0 (e.g., P 1, Q1, R1) first326

moved to different game rooms and went through ISDG. Those with i · j 0 + 1 (e.g., P 2, Q2, R2)

327

stayed in the instruction room and filled out SVO and questionnaires, while waiting. Second, the328

subjects with i · j 0 + 1 moved to the game rooms and went through ISDG as the next generation,

329

after confirming that the subjects with i · j 0 finished and were ready to get back to the instruction

330

room to complete SVO and questionnaires. In this step, we were careful about the routes and331

logistics in the way that the subjects with i · j 0 + 1 neither meet those with i · j 0 nor find which332

room each subject in the previous generation was in.

333[Figure 2 about here.]334

One RA was present in each game room, and three subjects in a generation were guided to take335

their respective independent seat according to the individual IDs and to check their understanding

336

about the prevoting procedures per treatment (See figure 1 for the detailed procedures per treat-337ment). The members were also guided to observe the previous generations’ decisions and their

338

payoffs between options A and B on a white board in the room. When subjects were in the 1st339

generation, the RA told them that they did not have any previous generation. After confirming the

15

340

understanding and situations associated with payoffs in ISDG, subjects went through all the pro-341

cedures per treatment under the RA’s support, and each subject anonymously and independently

342

voted for option A or option B. The RA counted their votes, announcing the generation decision343

by majority voting rule in each room. The three subjects recorded their individual and generation

344

decisions and returned to the instruction room, finalizing the remaining tasks, such as SVO and so-

345

ciodemographic questionnaires. Finally, the subjects received their payments with some exchange

346

rates according to their decisions. The payment for each subject was calculated as a summation of347

his/her earnings from the (i) participation fee, (ii) ISDG with 1 point = 2 JPY and (iii) SVO game348

with 1 point = 1 JPY where each subject receives on average 300 JPY, 1970 JPY and 900 JPY, re-349

spectively. In total, 17 sessions were completed and 312 subjects (or 104 generations) participated350

where one session was conducted with 24 subjects.

351

4

Results

352

Table 1 presents the definitions and descriptions of sociodemographic and psychometric vari-353

ables used in the analyses. A total of 312 (104) subjects (generations) participate in the experiments354

with 105 (35), 99 (33) and 108 (36) in majority voting (i.e., MV), deliberative majority voting (i.e.,355DMV) and majority voting with deliberative accountability (i.e., MVDA) treatments, respectively

356(See table A3 in appendix). Similarly, 46.47 % female subjects participate in the experiments, and357

the percentages are 51.42 %, 43.43 % and 44.44 % in MV, DMV and MVDA treatments, respec-358

tively. These facts reflect that there is a proper gender balance across the treatments. Past literature359

establishes that gender affects attitudes and behaviors and might bring differences in preferences360

between males and females in some contexts of economic decision making (Croson and Gneezy,3612009).

362[Table 1 about here.]

363

Table 2 presents the frequencies and the percentages of generation choices between options

364

A and B in ISDG by treatments. As shown, only 2 (5.71 %) of the total 35 generations choose
16

365

option B in MV. Among the 33 generations, 4 (12.12 %) choose option B in DMV. Of the total

366

36 generations, 10 (27.78 %) choose option B in MVDA. The results show that generation choices367

of option B are higher in DMV and MVDA than those in MV. To test whether the distributions

368

of generation choices between options A and B are independent of the treatments, we perform369

chi-squared (χ2 ) test by taking the following pairs: MV vs. DMV, MV vs. MVDA and DMV vs.

370

MVDA, using the frequencies as summarized in table 2. A null hypothesis is that the distribution of371

generation choices between options A and B are the same for each pair of treatments. The results

372

reject the null hypothesis for MV vs. MVDA. However, we fail to reject the null hypotheses for373

MV vs. DMV and DMV vs. MVDA. Overall, the results confirm that the distributions of the374

generation choices between options A and B in MVDA are different from those in MV.

375[Table 2 about here.]376

For a robustness check, we apply nonparametric test by considering the correlation among377

the observations of generation choices within a sequence. To this end, we cluster the generation

378

choices at a sequence level. There is a total of 19 sequences, six each in MV and DMV, while there379

are seven in MVDA. We calculate the average for each sequence of generations that choose option

380

B and run Mann-Whitney test to confirm the null hypotheses that the distributions of the averages

381

for the sequences are the same in each pair of treatments. We find that the distributions of averages

382

for the sequences of generations that choose option B are different and significant at 1 % for MV

383

vs. DMV, MV vs. MVDA, and DMV vs. MVDA, respectively. Overall, the generations in DMV

384

and MVDA appear to choose option B more often than those in MV treatment.

385[Table 3 about here.]

386

Finally, to characterize the effects of treatments on generation choices of option B, we run

387

logit regression by taking generation choices between options A and B as the dependent variable

388

that takes unity when a generation chooses option B, otherwise zero. The independent variables389

are the treatment dummies (DMV and MVDA), a number of prosocial members in a generation390(prosocial), average critical thinking disposition, average empathic concern and average personal
17

391

distress and gender (a number of females in a generation). Since generation decisions are taken at392

the generational level, we take an average or a summation of independent variables for the analyses

393(See the definitions of independent variables in table 1). We report the marginal effects of the treat-394

ment dummies and other independent variables from models 1 to 3 in table 3. The marginal effects395

of the treatment dummies can be considered causal due to their random assignments Angrist and

396

Pischke (2009). In model 1, we present the marginal effects of the treatment dummies. In model

397

2, we add a number of prosocial individuals in a generation. Finally, in model 3, we further add

398

other sociodemographic variables, such as gender, average critical thinking disposition, average399

empathic concern and average personal distress, for a robustness check.

400

Models 1, 2 and 3 in table 3 show that the marginal effects of DMV on generation choices

401of option B are economically and statistically significant (P = 0.076). They demonstrate that402

the generations in DMV have 7 % higher probability of choosing option B than those in MV,

403

holding all other factors fixed. We also find that the marginal effects of MVDA on generation

404

choices of option B are economically and statistically significant (P < 0.01), reflecting that the405

generations in MVDA have 13.8 % higher probability of choosing option B than those in MV.

406

In summary, deliberation and accountability (i.e., DMV and MVDA treatments) result in higher

407

percentages of option B choices than without deliberation (i.e., MV treatment). The results support

408

hypotheses 1 and 2, being consistent with the theories related to deliberation, such as “the theory of409

communicative actions,” advocating that deliberation among the participants along with reasoning410

helps achieve better social outcomes (Habermas, 1984).

411

We conduct further analysis by running logit regressions to estimate the IA effect on generation

412

choices of option B. For this, we take DMV treatment dummy as the base group, excluding the413

observations in MV. Our result shows that the generations in MVDA are 5 % more likely to choose

414

option B than those in DMV (See table A5 in appendix). The result can be interpreted as an

415

additional effect of IA on generation choices of option B. This result supports our hypothesis (3)416that intragenerational deliberation with intergenerational accountability (i.e., MVDA treatment)

417

results in higher percentages in generation choices of option B than does deliberation (i.e., DMV

18

418

treatment). Note that generation members in MVDA need to deliberate about the reasons & advice

419

for their possible decision between options A and B. We realize that those who choose option B

420

have often written “we should not harm others,” and/or “we feel bad to hurt others, therefore, we

421

have chosen option B.” as part of their reasons & advice. Such statements imply that IA might422

have influenced the generation members to be sympathetic with and/or take future generations’423

perspective, choosing option B. On the other hand, generations that choose option A have typically424

written “we choose option A since it gives us more points,” and “we should think about ourselves,425

not about others,” reflecting their self-maximization motives. Overall, IA appears to function as426

a one-way communication device via receiving and giving reasons & advice over generations for

427

maintaining IS in comparison with DMV treatment where such a communication opportunity is428

missing.

429

Models 2 and 3 in table 3 show that a number of prosocial members per generation is eco-430

nomically and statistically significant (P < 0.01) (See also table A4 in appendix). The results431

demonstrate that the generations are 11.2 % more likely to choose option B with an increase in432

prosocial members per generation. The results are consistent with previous studies that find the433

positive influence of prosociality on people’s behaviors for IS (Hauser et al., 2014, Shahrier et al.,434

2017b, Kamijo et al., 2017, Timilsina et al., 2017). The result in table 3 shows that the genera-

435

tions are 1.9 % more likely to choose option B when the average empathic concern of generation436

members increases by one additional point (P < 0.01). Our result is consistent with previous find-437

ings, showing that empathic concern induces people to value others’ benefits (Kirman and Teschl,

438

2010, Artinger et al., 2014, Font et al., 2016). The result shows that the generations are 1.6 % less439

likely to choose option B with an additional unit increase in average personal distress of a gener-

440

ation members, implying that personal distress might induce people to make more unsustainable

441

choices (Sapolksy, 2017).

19

442

5

Discussion & conclusion

443

We institute ISDG with three forms of decision-making models by experimentally manipulat-444

ing prevoting components and examine how they maintain IS in laboratory experiments. Game445

theory predicts that generations choose an unsustainable option in ISDG, and our results in the446base group (MV) are in line with the prediction. Other two models of deliberative decision making

447(i.e., DMV and MVDA) are found to be more effective than MV. We also find that a majority of448

generations still chooses an unsustainable option in all treatments. The results imply that main-449

taining IS shall be very challenging with majority voting, especially when generations are neither

450

biologically nor socially connected, i.e., non-overlapping generation. However, when deliberation451

and one-way communication (IA) from the current generation to future generations are introduced

452

along with majority voting, generations choose to be sustainable.

453

Deliberative theories and the associated empirical studies reveal that the effect of deliberation454

is context-specific as argued before, and it is well known that the deliberation effect can be either

455

positive or negative to have a socially desirable outcome (Habermas, 1994, Pettit and Rabinowicz,

456

2001, List, 2006, MacKenzie, 2018, Delli Carpini et al., 2004, Warren, 2017). Delli Carpini et al.

457(2004) summarize that deliberation can be ineffective or counterproductive in some situations.

458

Game theory also predicts that a majority of people should choose an unsustainable option as

459

suggested by NE and dominant strategies. These facts imply that ISDG can be interpreted to be one

460

specific situation where deliberative forms of democracy with voting does not have a huge positive461

effect on IS. The interpretation appears to reflect our results that the percentages of generations

462

that choose a sustainable option in DMV and MVDA treatments remain low around 12.12 % and463

27.78 %, respectively.

464

We conjecture that people in MVDA treatment are engaged more seriously in deliberation

465

than those in DMV treatment through being accountable (i.e., writing and leaving their reasons &466

advice to future generations, i.e., IA mechanism), inducing people to choose a sustainable option.

467

We raise the three possible channels: (i) warm-glow (or guilt aversion), (ii) legacy motive (as468

a cooperator) and (iii) moral commitment (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006, Thompson, 2010,
20

469

Fox et al., 2010, MacKenzie, 2018, Wade-Benzoni, 2019). First, people in the current generation

470

may feel warm-glow or guilt aversion by leaving nice reasons & advice to future generations

471

associated with a sustainable option choice (MacKenzie, 2018). Second, IA might have functioned472

as a one-way communication device for the current generation to have a legacy motive of being473

a cooperation initiator or successor, giving an opportunity of receiving and sending generations’474

decisions with reasons & advice (Kotre, 1996, 1999, Timilsina et al., 2019, Wade-Benzoni, 2019).

475

Third, IA might have triggered people to have a moral commitment across generations in the sense476that being accountable is known to signify fairness and/or justice concerns in people’s judgment477

and decisions (Tetlock, 1983, 1985, Self et al., 2015). Thompson (2010) and MacKenzie (2018)478

also argue that children and/or future generations are main subjects of such a moral commitment.

479

Nearly 60 % of the countries and four billion people of the world have adopted democratic insti-

480

tutions in the last century (Roser, 2018). Most of these democratic countries and populations rely481

on anonymous voting to make important social or political decisions that have future consequences482

for the subsequent generations without requiring deliberation and accountability. Importantly, it is483

very likely that societies and countries will continue voting as a democratic mechanism in future484(Hill, 2013). In the real world, however, there are several examples of deliberation and account-

485

ability practices (See Geissel and Newton (2012), Vodova and Voda (2020), Gherghina and Geissel486(2017), Gad (2020), Stoiciu and Gherghina (2021)). Some mini-publics, local assemblies (called

487“gram shabhas”) and ad hoc committees are reported to be successful in development activities by488

introducing deliberation practices in collective decision making, materializing their social goals

489(MacKenzie and O’Doherty, 2011, Geissel and Newton, 2012, Ban et al., 2012, Warren and Gastil,490

2015, Parthasarathy and Rai, 2017, Setala, 2017, Setala et al., 2020). Wales has attempted to in-

491

stitutionalize public accountability for future generations’ wellbeing that can be considered one

492

example of accountability practices in public policy (Davies, 2016, 2017). To resolve not only493

for IS but also for the problem of underrepresentation of future generations, it shall be necessary494

to institutionalize deliberation and accountability, as far as democracy remains as a main form495

of political systems (Gad, 2020, Stoiciu and Gherghina, 2021). Although it would be challeng-

21

496

ing to implement large-scale deliberative and accountability processes, there are several advanced

497

technologies that could enable this, such as social media and online platforms (Strandberg, 2008,

498

Gronlund et al., 2009). It is our belief that deliberation and accountability are integral elements499

for human societies to transition to be sustainable, and it shall be possible when technologies are500

integrated with democratic systems.

501

Finally, we note some limitations and possibilities for future research. First, we should not502

overlook that generations fail in ensuring IS under three models of decision making, implying

503

that some drastic change or new forms of social institutions along with democracy may be nec-

504

essary as discussed in literature (Kamijo et al., 2017, Shahrier et al., 2017b, Saijo, 2019, Bogacki

505

and Letmathe, 2021, Saijo, 2020). Second, we only consider direct democracy as experimen-

506

tal treatments in this research. However, in the contemporary world, representative (or indirect)507

democracy is popular. It is important to examine IS under some forms of indirect democracy in508

the future. Third, as posited by Habermas, the deliberation in our experiment does not satisfy

509

the “ideal speech” condition (Habermas, 1984, 1994), and the number of generation members is

510

limited to be three. Future studies should be able to investigate IS by extending the deliberation

511

conditions, such as the number of generation members. Fourth, this study includes only Japanese512

students from the student subject pool of KUT so that the effects of treatments can be under or513

overestimated. Future studies in this domain should examine IS by taking subjects from a general514

public pool for external validity. These caveats notwithstanding, we believe that this work is an

515

essential step as experimental research, suggesting how two forms of deliberative democracy can

516

enhance IS and represent potential interests of future generations.

22

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List of Figures
1
2

A flow chart of procedures for a subject to participate in the experiment. . . . . . . 32
A flow chart of the procedures for one session. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

31

Figure 1: A flow chart of procedures for a subject to participate in the experiment.

32

Figure 2: A flow chart of the procedures for one session.

33

List of Tables
1
2
3

Definitions & descriptions of the variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
The frequencies and percentages of generation choices between options A and B
by treatments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Marginal effects of independent variables on the probability of option B choice inlogit regressions (base group = option A choice). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

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Table 1: Definitions & descriptions of the variables.
Variables
Dependent variables
Choice B

Definitions & descriptions
A dummy variable that takes 1 if a generation chooses option B;
otherwise, 0.

Independent variables
Treatment dummies (Base group = MV)DMVA dummy variable that takes 1 if a generation is in DMV treatment;
otherwise, 0.
MVDA
A dummy variable that takes 1 if a generation is in MVDA treatment;
otherwise, 0.
Sociodemographic and psychometric variables
Prosocial
A number of members in a generation whose social value orientation iscategorized as “prosocial.”
Gender
A number of female members in a generation.
Empathic concern
Summation of a subject’s empathic concern measured in 5-points Likert
scale, ranging from 0 to 28 points.
Personal distress
Summation of a subject’s personal distress measured in 5-points Likert
scale, ranging from 0 to 28 points.
Critical thinking disposition Summation of subject’s critical thinking dispositional scale measured
from 5-points Likert scale, ranging from 13 to 65 points.

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Table 2: The frequencies and percentages of generation choices between options A and B bytreatments.
Frequency and percentage of option B choice
Choices A or B

MV (N = 35)

DMV (N = 33)

MVDA (N = 36)

Overall (N = 104)AB

33 (94.29 %)2 (5.71 %)

29 (87.88 %)
4 (12.12 %)

26 (72.22 %)
10 (27.78 %)

88 (84.62 %)
16 (15.38 %)Subtotal

35 (33.66 %)

33 (31.73 %)

36 (34.61 %)

104 (100 %)Note: MV vs. DMV (χ2 = 0.867, P= 0.352), MV vs. MVDA (χ2 = 6.151, P

0.106)

36= 0.013) and DMV vs. MVDA (χ2 = 2.610, P =Table 3: Marginal effects of independent variables on the probability ofoption B choice in logit regressions (base group = option A choice).
Option B choice
Model 1Model 2Model 30.064*(0.038)0.221***(0.042)0.087**(0.040)0.140***(0.036)0.070*(0.040)0.138***(0.036)0.116***(0.016)

0.112***(0.016)−0.016(0.016)0.019***(0.006)−0.016**(0.007)1.964×10−4(0.006)

104

104

Independent variables
Treatment dummies (base group = MV)
DMV
MVDA

Sociodemographic and psychometric variables
Prosocial
GenderEmpathic concern
Personal distressCritical thinking disposition
104

Observations (generations)

Note: (1) Standard errors clustered at the sequence level are in parenthesis, (2) ***P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.10 and (3) Marginal effects are calculated at thesame means of independent variables.

37