2020
BASEL III PILLAR 3DISCLOSURE

AS AT 30 SEPTEMBER 2020
APS 330: REMUNERATION DISCLOSURE

ANZ Basel III Pillar 3 disclosure

September 2020

Important noticeThis document has been prepared by Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ) to meet its
disclosure obligations under:
the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) Authorised Deposit-taking Institutions
Prudential Standard (APS) 330: Public Disclosure as applicable to ANZ; andthe Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) Supervisory Policy Manual CG-5: Guideline on a Sound
Remuneration System (HKMA Guidelines) as applicable to ANZ’s Hong Kong (HK) branch.
This disclosure was prepared as at 30 September 2020. ANZ has a continuous disclosure policy, underwhich ANZ will immediately notify the market of any material price sensitive information concerning theGroup, in accordance with legislative and regulatory disclosure requirements.

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ANZ Basel III Pillar 3 disclosure

September 2020

Remuneration Disclosure
Basis of DisclosureThis document presents:
 the 2020 financial year (2020) remuneration disclosures of Australia and New Zealand Banking
Group Limited (ANZ), as required by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA)
Authorised Deposit-taking Institutions Prudential Standard (APS) 330: Public Disclosure; and the 2020 remuneration disclosures of ANZ, relating to ANZ’s Hong Kong (HK) branch as requiredby the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) Supervisory Policy Manual CG-5: Guideline on aSound Remuneration System (HKMA Guidelines).
The disclosures contained in this document are based on information that is consistent with information
provided to ANZ’s external auditor. However, the information provided is for regulatory disclosure
purposes, rather than statutory financial reporting disclosures, and may not be comparable to otherinformation disclosed by ANZ. Additional information on ANZ’s remuneration policies and structures iscontained in the ANZ 2020 Annual Report.
Bodies that oversee Remuneration
The ultimate responsibility for the sound and prudent management of remuneration at ANZ rests with the
ANZ Board (Board). The Board is assisted in overseeing remuneration matters, including adherence to ANZ
remuneration policies and practices, by the Board Human Resources Committee (HRC).
As at 30 September 2020, the HRC consisted of six members, all of whom are independent Non-Executive
Directors1. The HRC met six times during the 2020 financial year. Committee fees for the HRC chair for the2020 financial year were AUD 57,000 and for HRC members were AUD 29,000.
The purpose, powers and duties of the HRC are set out in the HRC Charter. The HRC pays particularattention to the remuneration of the senior executive population, the highest paid individuals, individuals
who could have a material impact on ANZ’s financial soundness, the remuneration structures of individuals
who perform a risk and financial control role, and adherence to the Australia and New Zealand Banking
Group Limited Remuneration Policy (ANZBGL Remuneration Policy).
The ANZBGL Remuneration Policy applies to all ANZ employees globally2, including:

Senior Managers
Senior Managers (at the ANZ level) are the Responsible Person roles as detailed in ANZBGL’s
Remuneration Policy. ANZ’s current Responsible Persons are the CEO, Group Executive Committee(ExCo) members and other key roles identified in ANZ’s Fit and Proper Policy. For 2020, ANZ had
a total of 21 Senior Manager roles (no movement in individuals who hold these Senior Manager
roles); 24 roles in 2019 (26 individuals due to movement in roles).



Material Risk Takers
MRTs (at the ANZ level) are any other persons (not covered by the Senior Manager definition
above), for whom a significant portion of total remuneration is based on performance and whose
activities, individually or collectively, may affect ANZ’s financial soundness as determined by the
Board Risk Committee. For 2020, ANZ had a total of 32 MRT roles (34 individuals due to movement
in roles); 35 roles in 2019 (no movement in individuals who hold these MRT roles).



HK branch
With respect to ANZ’s HK branch:oSenior Management and Key Personnel (relative to the HK branch) – Senior Management
includes those who are responsible for oversight of firm-wide strategy or activities or thoseof material business lines. Key Personnel includes those whose duties or activities involve
the assumption of material risk or the taking on of material exposures. For 2020, ANZ’s HK
branch had a total of 14 Senior Management and Key Personnel roles (16 individuals due
to movement in roles); 11 roles in 2019 (14 individuals due to movement in roles).

Throughout the course of the year the HRC has made all remuneration-related decisions andrecommendations to the Board independently of management. The HRC also has free and unfettered accessto ANZ employees and to relevant external providers, when required.

1

The ANZ Board Chairman is an ex-officio member of the Committee and does not receive a Committee member fee.
Except employees within ANZ Bank New Zealand Limited and its subsidiaries, who are covered by the ANZ New
Zealand (NZ) Remuneration Policy.

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September 2020

During 2020, the HRC and management received information from the following external providers: Aon,
Ashurst, EY, Mercer Consulting (Australia) Pty Ltd and PricewaterhouseCoopers. This information related
to market data, market practices, legislative requirements and the interpretation of governance andregulatory requirements.
Design and Structure of Remuneration Processes
The ANZBGL Remuneration Policy provides the HRC and management with a consistent framework for
managing remuneration and remuneration-related matters. Where overseas legislative/regulatory
requirements for foreign-owned financial services companies exceed the ANZBGL Remuneration Policy
requirements, the ANZBGL Remuneration Policy has adopted specific country addendums or a local/country
specific policy (e.g. New Zealand (NZ) who operate under the ANZ NZ Remuneration Policy) to apply the
local legislative requirements to any impacted employees in the relevant jurisdiction.
ANZ’s remuneration framework addresses:
Remuneration mix and market positioning;
Fixed and variable remuneration;
Downward adjustment (malus) of deferred remuneration;
Shareholding guidelines and hedging prohibitions;
Independence of Risk and Financial Control Personnel;
Requirements for other ANZ APRA Regulated Entities and Registered Superannuation Entity
Licensees and NZ, United Kingdom (UK), HK, Indonesia and China based employees; andEngagement of remuneration consultants.
The objective of the ANZBGL Remuneration Policy is to shape ANZ’s remuneration strategies and initiatives
in line with the ANZ Reward Principles and applicable legal requirements. Our Reward Principles support
the achievement of ANZ’s purpose and strategy through programs that:
Attract, motivate and keep great people;

Reward our people for doing the right thing having regard to our customers and shareholders;
Focus on how things are achieved (values, culture and risk) as much as what is achieved(performance); and
Are fair and simple to understand.
Performance and remuneration outcomes for all Risk and Financial Control Personnel are determined by
the appropriate reporting manager within these functions directly, and not the business that the individual
supports. This ensures individuals are remunerated independently of the business they oversee.
The ANZBGL Remuneration Policy in its current form was first introduced in February 2010 to comply with
APRA’s Prudential Standard CPS 510: Governance (CPS 510). An effectiveness review of the ANZBGLRemuneration Policy is conducted by management on an annual basis and the outcomes are reviewed by
the HRC and Board to ensure that it remains appropriate for its intended purpose, and is compliant with
the APRA Prudential Standard and the specific overseas legislative/regulatory requirements for foreignowned financial services companies where relevant. The HRC reviewed the ANZBGL Remuneration Policy
in 2020 and made the following updates: changes to our performance management approach and to the
ANZ Incentive Plan (ANZIP), including its variable remuneration components, deferral approach anddelivery. The HRC and Board have determined that the ANZBGL Remuneration Policy and its specificcountry addendums remain appropriate for their intended purpose and are compliant.
Remuneration at ANZ
Individual remuneration at ANZ is comprised of fixed remuneration and variable remuneration.
Fixed remuneration
Fixed remuneration is designed to reward individuals for their skills and experience, and the accountabilityof their role. Fixed remuneration is reviewed annually to ensure ANZ’s remuneration remains competitivein the markets in which it operates, having regard to local market practices and affordability.
Variable remuneration
ANZIP is the variable remuneration plan operating across ANZ and is designed to align performance to
ANZ’s strategic objectives and annual operating plan, fairly reward our people for doing the right thing
having regard to our customers and shareholders, and align remuneration with prudent risk taking
providing relevant employees with ‘at-risk’ reward component(s) designed to drive performance in boththe short-term and medium to long-term. The Board decides the CEO’s variable remuneration outcomesseparately to help mitigate potential conflicts of interest.
ANZ’s variable remuneration is designed to take into account the following:
The outcomes of business activities;
The risks related to the business activities taking into account, where relevant, the cost of theassociated capital;
The time necessary for the outcomes of those business activities to be reliably measured;

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ANZ Basel III Pillar 3 disclosure

September 2020

Behaviours which demonstrate ANZ’s Values and the delivery of outcomes that are fair and ethicaland in the best interests of our customers and aligned with ANZ’s purpose and Code of Conduct;andApplicable legal and regulatory (including prudential) requirements.

As part of the design methodology, the following components are considered:Measures of performance;
The mix of forms of remuneration (such as fixed and variable components, and cash and equityrelated benefits); andThe timing of when the individual becomes eligible to receive payment.
ANZIP has two key components:Group Performance Dividend (GPD):oAll permanent ANZ employees (excluding the CEO, ExCo and the Group General Manager
Internal Audit (GGM IA)), will be eligible to receive a GPD subject to meeting minimum
standards of performance and behaviour.
o
The GPD is determined and allocated based on Group performance only.


At Risk Pay (ARP):o
A small proportion of permanent ANZ employees will be eligible to receive an additional
discretionary allocation of variable remuneration based on Division, business andindividual performance, subject to meeting minimum standards of performance andbehaviour.

Variable remuneration for the majority of employees is based on the overall performance of the Group
only, replacing individual bonuses. This change addresses many of the concerns about ‘bonus culture’raised in the final report of the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and
Financial Services Industry, and forms part of wide ranging reforms for 2020 as to how ANZ reward,
recognise and manage the performance of employees.
For MRTs who are also UK MRTs, the ratios between fixed and variable remuneration do not exceed 1:1.
To determine and approve the ANZIP variable remuneration pool (which includes the GPD and ARP
components), the Board considers a range of factors – it is not a formulaic outcome. Considerations include:the balance between financial and non-financial performance (ANZ’s Group Performance
Framework) and the long-term (strengthening the bank);the balance of stakeholder needs and impacts (e.g. shareholders, customers and the community);
the current environment, the quality of results and our Reward Principles.
Under the 2020 Group Performance Framework, performance against expectations was evaluated using a
range of objective indicators and subjective considerations including management input on work
undertaken, evidence of outcomes realised and lessons learned, and with consideration given to theoperating, regulatory and competitive environment. The Group Performance Framework includes thefollowing key performance categories:
Risk and Reputation (modifier 0% to 110%) – adherence is measured through a range ofrisk indicators such as regulatory breaches, audit issues, risk culture, customer remediation
progress, community and reputation sentiment and breaches of primary metrics in the Group Risk
Appetite Statement;
Customer (35% weight) – includes indicators focused on enhancing the experience of ourcustomers, such as service quality and reliability, delivery of innovative customer solutions, andmeasures of customer feedback and perception;
People and Culture (30% weight) – includes indicators related to employee diversity,
engagement, and capability, and our Accountability and Consequence framework.
Financial and Discipline (35% weight) – includes strategy execution, profitability, returns,
and funding and liquidity indicators.
Due to the emergence of the significant economic and social impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, in 2020
the Board determined that while the performance objectives included in the 2020 Group Performance
Framework remained directionally appropriate, the pandemic demanded a material shift in focus for thesecond half of 2020 resulting in a sharpened emphasis on some key objectives and a shift of focus within
others.
These in-year adjustments occurred through the lens of ANZ’s purpose-led approach to managing through
COVID-19 to:Protect our people, customers, shareholders and ANZ, including strengthening our operational
resilience;
Adapt to the changing environment;
Engage even more proactively with our stakeholders; andPrepare for the future.

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ANZ Basel III Pillar 3 disclosure

September 2020

Performance objectives within each division are strategically aligned to the Group Performance Framework.
Individual performance is assessed based on both behaviours relating to ANZ’s Values, ANZ’s Code of
Conduct and – where applicable – ANZ’s leadership behaviours and the Banking Executive Accountability
Regime (BEAR); and outcomes delivered against objectives. Where appropriate, adjustments will be madeto an individual’s performance assessment and variable remuneration outcome, to reflect conduct which
doesn’t meet the expected standards.
Delivery of variable remuneration
Mandatory deferral of a significant portion of variable remuneration places an increased emphasis on having
a variable structure that is flexible, continues to be performance linked, has significant retention elements
and aligns the interests of employees to shareholders to deliver against strategic objectives.
CEO, ExCo and GGM IA
2020 variable remuneration is delivered as follows:
Delivered as

CEO

ExCo1

CRO
and GGM IA

Mandatory
Deferral period

Cash

50% of Annual
Variable
Remuneration

25% of variable
remuneration

33% of variable
remunerationn/aDeferred shares orshare rights

50% of Annual
Variable
Remuneration

25% of variable
remuneration

33% of variable
remuneration

Four years withstaggered vesting2

50% of variable
remuneration5

34% of variable
remuneration

Four years

Performance rights3 100% of Long Term
Variable(or deferred share
Remunerationrights4)

Other Employees
Variable remuneration is delivered in cash up to the mandatory deferral threshold. In 2020:If an employee’s variable remuneration is below AUD100,000 (or local currency equivalent), thenthe variable remuneration is paid in cash.
If an employee’s variable remuneration is at or exceeds AUD100,000, then 60% mandatorydeferral will apply to the entire variable remuneration award.
oOf the variable remuneration award:
40% will be paid in cash (no deferral);
20% will be deferred as ANZ equity for 1 year6;

20% will be deferred as ANZ equity for 2 years6; and
20% will be deferred as ANZ equity for 3 years6.
The HRC reviews the thresholds at which mandatory deferral is applied, the quantum of variable
remuneration which is subject to deferral and the time period over which deferral occurs.

1

Excluding Chief Risk Officer (CRO)
From the date the Board approves the variable remuneration, deferred shares or share rights will vest:- For the CEO and ExCo (excluding CRO): 40% after one year, 30% after two years, 20% after three years and 10%
after four years.
- For the CRO and GGM IA: 30% after one year, 30% after two years, 20% after three years and 20% after four years.
3
A face value methodology is used to determine the number of performance rights allocated. 2020 performance rights
granted in November/December 2020 are divided into two tranches: Tranche 1 (75%) ANZ Total Shareholder Return(TSR) relative to a select financial services comparator group and Tranche 2 (25%) ANZ TSR against ANZ Compound
Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) TSR target set by the Board.
4
The CRO and GGM IA receive deferred share rights, instead of performance rights, to preserve the independence intheir respective roles.
5
Performance rights face value at full vesting.
6
Subject to the relevant conditions of grant, the deferral period from the date of grant to the vesting date may be lessthan the deferral period specified; however will be at least 1, 2 or 3 years from the end of the financial year that thevariable remuneration award relates to.
25ANZ Basel III Pillar 3 disclosure

September 2020

UK MRTsFor MRTs who are also classified as UK MRTs and who do not meet the ‘de minimis’ rule1, are eligible toparticipate in ANZ’s variable remuneration plans where applicable for their role, and payments will bemade in accordance with the UK’s PRA Remuneration Code requirements as below (for performance
years beginning on or after 1 October 2017), depending on what type of UK MRT they are:(a) MRT - PRA
Senior Manager2
Deferred Amount(b) MRT - Risk
Manager3(c) MRT –Not (a) or (b)At least 60% for variable remuneration equal to or greater than GBP
500,000.
At least 40% for variable remuneration less then GBP 500,000.

Equity / Cash

The deferred and non-deferred portion will be paid at least 50% in equity
with the remaining amount in cash.

Vesting Period fordeferred portion

7 years from award
with no vesting until 3
years after award vesting no faster thanpro-rata at the end ofeach year on and after
the 3rd year.

Vesting Period fornon-deferred
portion

Vests immediately at grant.

Retention Period fordeferred and nondeferred portion

Equity (both deferred and non-deferred) will be subject to a Retention Periodof 12 months from vesting.

Malus

All unvested awards are subject to reduction, including to zero, using malus.

Clawback

All vested awards will be subject to recovery using clawback.

Clawback Period

7 years from award. Can be increased to at least
10 years in certain circumstances.4

5 years from award vesting no faster thanpro-rata at the end ofeach year.

3 years from award vesting no faster thanpro-rata at the end ofeach year.

7 years from award.

Certain requirements of the UK’s PRA Remuneration Code relating to the structure of an individual’s remuneration do
not apply to a UK MRT who meets the ‘de minimis’ rule. This is where variable remuneration is less than 33% of total
remuneration and total remuneration is less than GBP 500,000.
2
Senior Managers are MRTs who perform a PRA senior management function.
3
Risk Managers are MRTs who do not perform a PRA senior management function, but whose professional activities
meet the qualitative criteria set out in Article 3(1) to 3(9), 3(10) (but only by virtue of being responsible for acommittee referred to therein), 3(13) or 3(15) of the EU MRTs Regulation.
4
Circumstances are where: (a) the firm has commenced an investigation into facts or events which it considers could
potentially lead to the application of clawback were it not for the expiry of the clawback period; or (b) the firm has been
notified by a regulatory authority that an investigation has been commenced into facts or events which the firm
considers could potentially lead to the application of clawback by the firm were it not for the expiry of the clawback
period.
1

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ANZ Basel III Pillar 3 disclosure

September 2020

China MRTs
To ensure compliance with the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission Supervisory
Guidelines on Sound Compensation of Commercial Banks [Yin Jian Fa (2010) No.14], deferralarrangements for MRTs who are also classified as China MRTs are as followed:
For the most senior
China MRT roles

If the deferred percentage of variable remuneration, as calculated inaccordance with ANZ’s standard deferral arrangements is:
 at or exceeds 50% of variable remuneration, then ANZ’s standard deferralarrangements apply; or is less than 50% then mandatory deferral will apply as follows:o
50% will be paid in cash (no deferral); ando
50% will be deferred as ANZ equity evenly over 1, 2 and 3 years.

For other China MRT
roles

If the deferred percentage of variable remuneration, as calculated inaccordance with ANZ’s standard deferral arrangements is:
 at or exceeds 40% of variable remuneration, then ANZ’s standard deferralarrangements apply; or is less than 40% then mandatory deferral will apply as follows:o
60% will be paid in cash (no deferral); ando
40% will be deferred as ANZ equity evenly over 1, 2 and 3 years.

Downward adjustment (malus)
All deferred remuneration ANZ award to an employee remains at risk and is subject to ANZ’s on-going andabsolute discretion to adjust this downward (malus) (including to zero) at any time. ANZ may exercise thisdiscretion, for example, where: there is a need to protect the financial soundness of ANZ or to meet regulatory requirements orthere has been a material failure of risk management or controls within ANZ; the employee has acted fraudulently or dishonestly, failed to act with due care, skill and diligence,or failed to comply with ANZ Group policies (including the Code of Conduct), processes ordirections;
 the employee is responsible or accountable, directly or indirectly, by virtue of their role or seniority
for an occurrence/event which has had an adverse impact on ANZ; there has been misconduct and the employee was involved directly or indirectly, failed to takeadequate steps, could be considered responsible due to their seniority, or the decision to award
or grant the deferred remuneration was made on the basis of misinformation.
Further, if the Accountable Persons have failed to comply with their accountability obligations under the
BEAR, their deferred remuneration will be reduced by an amount that is proportionate to the failure, as
required by BEAR.
An employee’s deferred remuneration is also subject to ANZ’s on-going and absolute discretion to further
defer the vesting. Where ANZ exercises this discretion, the vesting date is postponed and will not vest
unless and until ANZ determines it should vest.
Before any scheduled vesting of deferred remuneration, the Board (for the CEO, ExCo and other specified
roles) and/or the Consequence Review Group (for other employees) considers whether downward
adjustment (malus) or further deferral should be applied.
For MRTs who are also UK or China MRTs, where remuneration has vested (and during the retention period
for UK MRTs) and:the employee participated in or was responsible for conduct which resulted in significant losses tothe firm, or failed to meet appropriate standards of fitness or propriety (or both); or
there is reasonable evidence of employee misbehaviour or material error; or
the firm or the relevant business unit (or both) suffers a material failure of risk management;
the Board has the on-going and absolute discretion to recover and/or request repayment of vested variable
remuneration in any circumstance that it determines is reasonable.

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ANZ Basel III Pillar 3 disclosure

September 2020

Current and Future Risks
ANZ has a Group-wide risk management framework which provides the methodology and tools required todeal with the full range of risks managed within ANZ, both at the Group level and individual business level,and provides the means to prepare for emerging risks.
Risk appetite is set using both qualitative and quantitative measures across the major risk classes including
liquidity, market, financial, credit and operational risk (including risks with compliance, conduct ortechnology drivers) to ensure business objectives and performance are measured and monitored on a riskadjusted basis and within appetite.
To ensure consistent monitoring year on year, the Board considers performance against a number of factors
to determine the ANZIP variable remuneration pool, including the Group Performance Framework andeconomic profit (a risk-adjusted financial measure). This helps to ensure that the variable remuneration
pool is shaped by risk considerations. The CRO and Chief Financial Officer review and provide input to theBoard/HRC on the ANZIP variable remuneration pool.
The ANZBGL Remuneration Policy ensures the design, monitoring, measurement and determination of
remuneration outcomes occur with consideration against the risk management framework.
The design and operation of all variable remuneration plans are required to adhere to a set of policy
principles and governance standards which require the approval of the Finance, Risk, and Talent andCulture functions.
Individual variable remuneration awards are made on the basis of a risk adjusted view of performance,
including performance against any financial and non-financial elements relevant to each individual’s role.
However, if the assessment of performance subsequently proves to be inaccurate or incorrect, the unvested
deferred awards can be adjusted downward as outlined in the Downward adjustment (malus) section.

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ANZ Basel III Pillar 3 disclosure

September 2020

Quantitative Disclosures for ANZ Senior Managers and Material Risk Takers
The following quantitative disclosures are provided with reference to the ANZBGL Remuneration Policy andcurrent practices, and include individuals who met the definitions of ANZ Senior Manager or MRT at any
stage during the financial year.
Table 1 (APS 330, Table 22 (h) and 22 (j)): Remuneration - fixed, variable and other
remuneration (AUD)
Table 1 provides a view of how remuneration is paid or communicated to individuals, and is consistent with
the Variable Remuneration Awarded and Actual Remuneration Received tables in the 2020 Remuneration
Report.
Specifically, fixed remuneration relates to amounts for/paid during the financial year and variable
remuneration relates to the communicated cash and equity values for the financial year.
This approach has been chosen over the Statutory Remuneration Disclosure approach (i.e. the inclusion of
cash variable remuneration for the financial year and also the accounting expense of prior year variable
remuneration share-based payments in the financial year) as it provides greater transparency to the valuecommunicated to individuals for the financial year.
All Senior Manager and MRT deferred remuneration is deferred into equity except for MRTs who are also
UK MRTs, who receive deferred remuneration 50% in cash and 50% in equity.
No guaranteed bonuses, sign-on awards or termination/severance payments1 have been paid/granted in
the financial year to Senior Management or MRTs, except for one role in 2020 who received an ex-gratia
payment upon termination. The termination payment has not been disclosed below to ensure
confidentiality.
Financial Year 2020
Senior Management
Number of people
Fixed remuneration (cash – non-deferred) AUD ’000

MRTs

21

34

20,048

17,840

Variable remuneration
Number of people

19

30

7,080

9,320

Cash (deferred) AUD ’000-

392

Shares and share-linked instruments (non-deferred) AUD ’000-

588

12,482

13,435

Cash (non-deferred) AUD ’000

Shares and share-linked instruments (deferred) AUD ’000

Financial Year 2019
Senior Management
Number of people
Fixed remuneration (cash – non-deferred) AUD ’000

MRTs

26

35

18,642

8,187

Variable remuneration
Number of people

18

33

9,179

5,792

Cash (deferred) AUD ’000-

118

Shares and share-linked instruments (non-deferred) AUD ’000-

177

17,244

7,036

Cash (non-deferred) AUD ’000

Shares and share-linked instruments (deferred) AUD ’000

1

Non-contractual items.

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ANZ Basel III Pillar 3 disclosure

September 2020

Table 2 (APS 330, Table 22 (i) and 22 (k)): Deferred remuneration exposed to implicit andexplicit adjustments (AUD)
Values have been calculated using a 1-day volume weighted average price (VWAP) of ANZ shares onvesting date (paid out)/30 September 2020 (outstanding), multiplied by the number of shares/rights (facevalue). Reductions are determined comparing these values to the allocation value at grant. All outstanding
deferred remuneration is exposed to ex post explicit and implicit adjustments.
Explicit adjustments reflect lapses, due to performance conditions not being met and/or due to cessationof employment. Implicit adjustments reflect share price reductions in the value of equity from grant.
In 2020 and 2019, all Senior Managers and MRT deferred remuneration was deferred into equity, except
three UK-based employees who receive their variable remuneration half in equity and half in cash inaccordance with UK regulatory requirements.
Financial Year 2020
Senior Management

MRTs

Deferred remuneration paid out
Vested cash $’000
Vested shares and share-linked instruments $’000

-

461

6,555

12,518

Outstanding deferred remuneration
Unvested cash $’000-

794

41,567

19,215

Total reductions due to ex post explicit adjustments $’000(9,248)(1,638)

Total reductions due to ex post implicit adjustments $’000(21,777)(8,415)

Unvested shares and share-linked instruments $’000
Deferred remuneration reductions

Financial Year 2019
Senior Management

MRTs

Deferred remuneration paid out
Vested cash $’000
Vested shares and share-linked instruments $’000

395

744

10,627

4,362

Outstanding deferred remuneration
Unvested cash $’000

192

1,295

62,076

37,609Total reductions due to ex post explicit adjustments $’000(13,255)(1,437)

Total reductions due to ex post implicit adjustments $’000(1,228)(351)

Unvested shares and share-linked instruments $’000
Deferred remuneration reductions

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ANZ Basel III Pillar 3 disclosure

September 2020

Quantitative Disclosures for ANZ HK branch
The following quantitative disclosures are provided with reference to the ANZBGL Remuneration Policy andcurrent practices, and include individuals who met the definition of Senior Management and Key Personnel
for ANZ HK branch at any stage during the financial year.
Table 3 (HKMA CG-5 (k) and (m)): Remuneration - fixed, variable and other remuneration (HKD)
Table 3 provides a view of how remuneration is paid or communicated to individuals:

Fixed remuneration relates to amounts for/paid during the financial year.
Variable remuneration relates to the communicated cash and equity values (fair value) for the financialyear.
No guaranteed bonuses, sign-on awards or termination/severance payments1 have been
paid/granted/awarded in the financial years 2020 and 2019 to Senior Management and Key Personnel for
the ANZ HK branch, except for one role in 2019 who received an ex-gratia payment upon termination. The
termination payment has not been disclosed below to ensure confidentiality.


Financial Year 2020
HK Senior Management
and Key Personnel
Number of people

16

Fixed remuneration (cash – non-deferred) HKD ’000

38,897

Variable remuneration
Number of people

15

Cash (non-deferred) HKD ’000

6,013

Cash (deferred) HKD ’000-

Shares and share-linked instruments (deferred) HKD ’000

5,380

Total variable remuneration HKD ’000

11,393

Total Remuneration HKD ’000

50,290Financial Year 2019
HK Senior Management
and Key Personnel
Number of people

14

Fixed remuneration (cash – non-deferred) HKD ’000

25,372

Variable remuneration
Number of people

11

Cash (non-deferred) HKD ’000

6,161

Cash (deferred) HKD ’000-

Shares and share-linked instruments (deferred) HKD ’000
Total variable remuneration HKD ’000

9,557

Total Remuneration HKD ’000

1

3,396
34,929Non-contractual items.

11

ANZ Basel III Pillar 3 disclosure

September 2020

Table 4 (HKMA CG-5 (h), (i), (j), (l)): Deferred remuneration (HKD)
Values have been calculated using a 1-day volume weighted average price (VWAP) of ANZ shares onvesting date (paid out)/30 September 2020 (outstanding), multiplied by the number of shares/rights (facevalue). Reductions are determined comparing these values to the allocation value at grant.
Performance adjustments reflect lapses, due to performance conditions not being met and/or due tocessation of employment.
Financial Year 2020
HK Senior Management
and Key Personnel
Deferred remuneration
Unvested outstanding deferred remuneration (Cash) HKD ’000
Unvested outstanding deferred remuneration (Shares and sharelinked instruments) HKD ’000
Vested outstanding deferred remuneration (Shares and share-linked
instruments) HKD ’000
Awarded deferred remuneration HKD ’000

10,186
6,873

Paid out/vested deferred remuneration HKD ’000

6,121

Remuneration reductions
Deferred remuneration reduced through performance adjustments’000
Total reductions due to ex post explicit adjustments HKD ’000

(602)
(602)

Total reductions due to ex post implicit adjustments HKD’000
Total outstanding deferred remuneration exposed to ex post explicit
and/or implicit adjustments HKD’000
Total outstanding retained remuneration exposed to ex post explicit
and/or implicit adjustments HKD’000(3,318)
10,186
Financial Year 2019
HK Senior Management
and Key Personnel

Deferred remuneration
Unvested outstanding deferred remuneration (Cash) HKD ’000
Unvested outstanding deferred remuneration (Shares and sharelinked instruments) HKD ’000
Vested outstanding deferred remuneration (Shares and share-linked
instruments) HKD ’000
Awarded deferred remuneration HKD ’000
Paid out/vested deferred remuneration HKD ’000

9,476
1,987
2,269

Remuneration reductions
Deferred remuneration reduced through performance adjustments’000
Total reductions due to ex post explicit adjustments HKD ’000
Total reductions due to ex post implicit adjustments HKD’000
Total outstanding deferred remuneration exposed to ex post explicit
and/or implicit adjustments HKD’000
Total outstanding retained remuneration exposed to ex post explicit
and/or implicit adjustments HKD’000

12

(541)
(746)
(85)
9,476
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ANZ Basel III Pillar 3 disclosure

September 201812