Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 8, 2023
Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, and Mason Clark
October 8, 2023, 5pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map isupdated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasionof Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces
daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive
monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on October 8. ISW will coversubsequent reports in the October 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
NOTE: ISW has added a new section on Russian information operations and narratives
to the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, found at the end of the update.
Russia advanced legal mechanisms to reform the Leningrad Military District as part ofongoing large-scale military reforms. The Russian federal portal of draft regulatory legal acts
published a presidential decree on October 8, prepared by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD),
which proposes stripping the Northern Fleet (NF) of its status as an “interspecific strategic territorialassociation.”[1] Russian state media noted that the proposal indicates that the NF will no longer be a
separate military-administrative unit equal to a military district, suggesting that the NF and its fourconstituent regions (The Komi Republic, Arkhangelsk, and Murmansk oblasts, and the Nenets
Autonomous Okrug) will be transferred to the reformed Leningrad Military District.[2] Russian
military analyst Yuri Fedorov noted that the recreation of the Leningrad Military District suggests that
Russia is preparing for possible conflicts with Baltic states and NATO.[3] The Russian military merged
the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts into the Western Military District in 2010.[4] The MoD
created the Northern Fleet in 2014 out of territory covered by the Western Military District, and Russian
President Vladimir Putin made the NF a military-administrative unit equal to a military district starting
January 1, 2021.[5] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu proposed the recreation of the Moscow and
Leningrad Military Districts on the basis of the Western Military District (reversing the 2010 and 2014changes) in December of 2022, and confirmed that these military districts were under active formation
as of August 2023.[6] The MoD’s decision to re-divide the WMD indicates Russia sees the need torestructure its forces facing NATO and likely posture on the Finnish border, although it remains unclear
how Russia will be able to mobilize, train, and organize these forces into new military district-level
formations.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and marginallyadvanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 8. Geolocated footage published on October
8 shows that Ukrainian forces made limited gains north of Novoprokopivka (14km south of Orikhiv),and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced near Kopani (10km southwestof Orikhiv).[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved partial successnortheast of Andriivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainianforces continued attacks near Andriivka, and Kurdyumivka (11km southwest of Bakhmut).[8] Russian
and Ukrainian sources reported that deteriorating weather conditions are impacting both Russian andUkrainian operations across the theater. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel
1

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Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian drone and aviation activity has decreased in the past few days
due to poor weather.[9] Russian milbloggers claimed that deteriorating weather conditions in the
Bakhmut and Zaporizhia directions are impacting Ukrainian offensive operations as well as Russian
aerial reconnaissance operations.[10] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya
Yevlash reiterated that poor weather may impact drone and aviation operations but that the weather
will
not
halt
Ukraine’scounteroffensive.[11]Russian forces are intensifying mining efforts in the Robotyne-Verbove area and seek to
fix Ukrainian forces on areas of the front away from western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian
milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have begun remining previously cleared areas on the
Robotyne-Verbove line (10km south to 18km southeast of Orikhiv) to achieve tactical surprise.[12] The
milbloggers claimed that heavy Russian mining and remining efforts have disrupted the movement ofheavy Ukrainian cargo and equipment in these areas in recent days. A prominent Kremlin-affiliatedmilblogger claimed that Russian forces intensified tactical offensive operations in several areas of thefront beyond Zaporizhia Oblast in order to stretch Ukrainian defenses and divide Ukrainian
attention.[13] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun statedthat Russian forces are trying to fix Ukrainian forces in the Avdiivka and Marinka directions andprevent
them
fromdeployingreservestothe
Zaporizhia
direction.[14]Russian sources are highlighting apparent fault lines between regular Russian forces
and irregular formations of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR). A Russian milblogger
claiming to be a Buryat soldier fighting in the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade [MRB] (36th Combined
Arms Army, Eastern Military District) responded on October 7 to a post published by anothermilblogger on August 13 that accused the 37th MRB of abandoning their positions around
Novodonetske (in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia border area) during Ukrainian attacks that ultimately
liberated the village, leaving only elements of the DNR “Kaskad” operational tactical combat formation
to defend the area.[15] The Buryat milblogger refuted this story and claimed that “Kaskad” conducts asmall part of combat activities on the front while regular Russian troops shoulder more of the offensive
burden, and derided other DNR units for having positions far behind frontline areas held by regularunits.[16] The milblogger also claimed that DNR units have low skill levels and that regular Russian
troops distrust them.[17] The allegations made by this milblogger against DNR formations suggest that
there is continued friction between DNR forces and regular Russian forces, which is likely to further
complicate efforts to integrate DNR forces into the regular Russian military as part of ongoing militaryreforms.[18]Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat expressed concern over ananticipated Russian Shahed 131/136 drone strike campaign against Ukraine this winter.
Ihnat stated on October 8 that Russian forces have increased the intensity of Shahed strikes recently,as Ukrainian officials previously warned.[19] Ihnat stated that Russian forces used 1,000 Shaheddrones during the 2023-23 heating season but used a record 500 drones during September 2023 alone,indicating that Ukraine needs to prepare seriously for Russia’s 2023-24 winter drone strike campaign.
Ihnat noted that Ukraine is gradually replacing Soviet air defense systems with Western-provided
systems and intends to use these systems to protect Ukrainian energy facilities, port infrastructure,grain silos, and other critical infrastructure against Russian drone strikes this winter. Ihnat added that
Russian authorities want to increase the production of Shahed drones domestically but cannot
overcome their reliance on Iran for certain technologies and spare parts required for production.[20]2Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) observed satellite imagery
showing that rail traffic between North Korea and Russia “dramatically” increased since
Russian President Vladimir Putin met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un on
September 12-17.[21] CSIS’ Beyond Parallel project found that satellite imagery captured on
October 5 showed an “unprecedented” 73 freight railcars at the North Korea’s Tumangang Rail Facility.
Beyond Parallel noted that previous satellite images showed a maximum of approximately 20 railcars
at the Tumangang facility at once over the past five years. Beyond Parallel also observed shipping
crates/containers and equipment laid out in the open at the main warehouse area at the Tumangang
facility, although the contents of the transported goods remain unclear. Beyond Parallel remarked thatthe external characteristics of the containers and equipment are different from those observed during
the past five years at the facility and assessed that it is “probable that these shipments are, or include,
munitions and artillery.” Russian milbloggers and sources amplified Beyond Parallel findings in the
Russian information space without confirming or denying the possibility of North Korean arms supplies
to Russia.[22] ISW previously assessed that Putin may be open to some forms of technological anddefensive cooperation with North Korea in return for North Korean artillery ammunition as long as
suchcooperationdoes
nottrigger
secondarysanctionsagainstRussia.[23]The Russian federal government continues to disenfranchise certain ethnic minority
federal subjects (regions) while selectively empowering others. Radio Liberty’s TatarBashkir service Idel Realii amplified an opinion piece written by Tatar activist Ruslan Aisin on October
8 which criticizes the implementation of a new Tatarstan state national policy as federally enforced“feudalism.”[24] Aisin noted that the new policy dropped a provision on “strengthening Tatarstan
identity,” which Aisin emphasized is aimed at Russifying ethnically diverse populations living in the
Russian Federation, and claimed that the Russian federal government likely prompted the provision’s
removal.[25] Aisin remarked that the removal of this provision is meant to deprive ethnic minority
regions of their ability to empower their own cultures, languages, and traditions but questioned why
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov is allowed to publicly promote Chechen traditions andidentity.[26] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Kremlin have recently signaled explicit
support for Kadyrov and his style of rule in Chechnya despite increased interethnic tensions within
Russian society and the military.[27] The suggestion that Russian federal policy is purposefully trying
to disenfranchise Tatar identity while simultaneously empowering Kadyrov indicates that the Kremlin
is interested in rewarding the ethnic minority regions that are the most overtly loyal to the Kremlin andprovide the Kremlin with substantial military manpower for the war in Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
•
•
•

•
•

3

Russia advanced legal mechanisms to form the Leningrad Military District as partof ongoing large-scale military reforms.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut andmarginally advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 8.
Russian forces are intensifying mining efforts in the Robotyne-Verbove area andseek to fix Ukrainian forces on areas of the front away from western Zaporizhia
Oblast.
Russian sources are highlighting apparent fault lines between regular Russianforces and irregular formations of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR).
Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat expressed concern overan anticipated Russian Shahed 131/136 drone strike campaign against Ukraine
this winter.
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•

•
•

•

4

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) observed satellite
imagery showing that rail traffic between North Korea and Russia “dramatically”
increased since Russian President Vladimir Putin met with North Korean
dictator Kim Jong Un on September 12-17
The Russian federal government continues to disenfranchise certain ethnic
minority federal subjects (regions) while selectively empowering others.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-SvatoveKreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, western
Donetsk Oblast, and on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border on
October 8 and reportedly advanced in some areas.
Prague-based Russian-language outlet Current Time reported on October 8 thatthe number of desertion cases within the Russian military has increased.

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5

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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are wellcovered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we areassessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects ofthese criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population andspecifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian
violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity eventhough we do not describe them in these reports.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and pushwestward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture theremainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast andnorthern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk area on October 8 and reportedly
recently advanced. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Lyman Pershyi(12km northeast of Kupyansk), the Synkivka rail station (8km northeast of Kupyansk), on the
Tymkivka-Ivanivka line (18-20km east of Kupyansk), and on the Orlyanka-Yahidne line (21-22km
southeast of Kupyansk)on October 7.[28] ISW has observed no confirmation of this claim, however.
Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked near Petropavlivka (7km east of
Kupyansk), Synkivka, and Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kuypyansk) on October 8.[29] The Ukrainian
General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled multiple Russian attacks near Synkivka andIvanivka (20km east of Kupyansk).[30] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya
Yevlash stated that Russian forces have increased their use of aviation in the Kupyansk-Lyman
direction to support increased offensive operations in these areas and compensate for their lack ofartillery.[31]
Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Svatove-Kreminna line on October 8 and recently
marginally advanced. Geolocated footage posted on October 7 shows that Russian forces advanced
along a roast east of Makiivka, Luhansk Oblast (22km northwest of Kreminna) to positions just under
two kilometers from the outskirts of the settlement.[32] Russian milbloggers made competing claims
about Russian advances near Makiivka; one milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached theoutskirts of the settlement, while another claimed that Russian forces advanced to within 600 metersof the settlement, and a third claimed that Russian forces remain just over one kilometer from thesettlement – all inconsistent with ISW’s furthest observed Russian advance in the area, approximately
two kilometers from the settlement.[33] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces madeunspecified advances near Makiivka and that Russian forces ultimately aim to push Ukrainian forces
to the west bank of the Oskil River, an objective that Russian forces are likely too degraded to achieve
in
the
near
term.[34]6

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Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted unsuccessful offensive operations on the Kupyansk-SvatoveKreminna line on October 8. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces
repelled Ukrainian attacks near Orlyanka in Kharkiv Oblast; Novoselivske (15km north of Svatove),
Makiivka, and Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna) in Luhansk Oblast; Torske (14km west of
Kreminna) in Donetsk Oblast; and in the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna).[35] A
Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Torske.[36]7Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023

8

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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture theentirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut on October 8 and reportedly advanced.
The Ukrainian General Staff and other Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian forces had
partial success northeast of Andriivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[37] The Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian
attacks near Andriivka.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are trying to bypass
Kurdyumivka (11km southwest of Bakhmut) from the northeast and attacking in the direction of
Zelenopillya (12km southwest of Bakhmut) to do so.[39] The milblogger also noted that Ukrainianforces have recently shifted their efforts towards Kurdyumivka in order to capture the remaining
tactical heights south of Bakhmut.[40] Another milblogger reported that there are fewer significant
Ukrainian movements in this area due to deteriorating weather conditions and heavy rain, which isinhibiting
the
use
of
aerialreconnaissance.[41]
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks to regain lost positions near Bakhmut on October 8
and reportedly made limited advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces
repelled Russian attacks southwest of Bakhmut near Andriivka and Klishchiivka and northwest of
Bakhmut near Bohdanivka (6km northwest).[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces arecounterattacking on the northern flank of Bakhmut and pushed Ukrainian forces back near Berkhivka(directly northwest of Bakhmut) and attacked towards Dubovo-Vasylivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut)
and Yakovlivka (12km northeast of Bakhmut).[43]9Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023

10

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Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks on the Donetsk CityAvdiivka line on October 8.
Russian forces continued ground attacks on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka line on October 8 and reportedly
advanced. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel
Oleksandr Shtupun reported that Ukrainian forces repelled 20 Russian attacks near Avdiivka (directly
north of Donetsk City), on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Pervomaiske, and on thesouthwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka, Krasnohorivka, and Novomykhailivka.[44]Shtupun also noted that Russian attacks in the Avdiivka and Marinka directions are meant to distract
Ukrainian forces and prevent the transfer of Ukrainian reserves to the Zaporizhia direction.[45] A
Russian milblogger posted footage reportedly of Russian “Storm-Z” units training somewhere in the
Avdiivka direction.[46] Other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces recently managed to occupy
new positions in northern Marinka and had partial success near Krasnohorivka (the settlement northof Avdiivka).[47]11Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023

12

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Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline
positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Ukrainian forces continued offensives in western Donetsk Oblast and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast
border area on October 8 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Russian Ministry of Defense(MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks
northeast of Mykilske (4km southwest of Vuhledar and 33km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), west of
Novodonetske (11km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), west of Staromayorske (8km southwest of Velyka
Novosilka), and north of Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[48] A Russian milblogger
claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked in an unspecified forest belt likely west ofStaromayorske, are trying daily to improve positions north of Pryyutne with decreasing intensity, andare attempting to regain lost positions west of Novodonetske.[49] The UK MoD assessed that the Velyka
Novosilka sector of the frontline has been relatively quiet for the last four weeks and that Ukrainianforces liberated at least 125 square kilometers on this frontline.[50] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces
liberated nearly 215 square kilometers in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area since the start ofthe counteroffensive in June 2023. The UK MoD also observed that Ukrainian operations in the Velyka
Novosilka area have successfully fixed elements of the 5th and 36th Combined Arms Armies (CAAs) of
the Eastern Military District (EMD) and some unspecified airborne elements to the area.[51]
Russian forces counterattacked in western Donetsk Oblast and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast
border area on October 8 but did not make any confirmed territorial gains. A Russian milblogger
claimed that Russian Spetsnaz and motorized rifle units have captured almost a dozen Ukrainian
positions and pushed Ukrainian forces from an unspecified “strategically important settlement.”[52]The milblogger added that elements of the Russian 34th Separate Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, Southern
Military District [SMD]) are operating in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. Anothermilblogger claimed that elements of the 43rd Separate Special Purpose Company (29th CAA, EMD) are
operating north of Mykilske.[53] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled
10 Russian assaults near Vodyane (6km northeast of Vuhledar and 34km east of Velyka Novosilka) and
Zolota Nyva (10km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[54]13Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023

14

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Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 8 and madelimited territorial gains north of Novoprokopivka (14km south of Orikhiv). Geolocated footage
published on October 8 indicated that Ukrainian forces made limited advances along the T-0408
highway on Novoprokopivka’s northern outskirts.[55] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed thatUkrainian forces continue to attack towards Kopani (10km southwest of Orkhiv) and made someadvances.[56] The milblogger added that the Russian fortified defensive line is located northeast andsoutheast of Kopani and that Ukrainian forces also unsuccessfully attacked Russian positions on theoutskirts of Novoprokopivka and on the approaches to Verbove (16km southeast of Orikhiv).[57] The
milblogger observed that Russian forces have been unsuccessful in cutting off flanks of Ukrainian forces
advancing towards Novoprokopivka and Verbove throughout the week but that Ukrainian forces did
not make significant advances.[58] Another Russian milblogger claimed that intense battles are
ongoing on the Robotyne (11km south of Orikhiv)-Verbove line and that Russian artillery fire repelled
two Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups northwest of Verbove.[59]15Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023

16

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Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russianforces continue to strengthen their defenses around Tokmak and that the city has become a fortresssurroundedbycirculardefensivelines.[60]Russian sources continued to discuss Ukrainian operations across the Dnipro River and near theAntonivsky Bridge in Kherson Oblast. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces
continued to consolidate positions on the Dnipro River delta islands on the east (left) bank of the riverand are achieving partial success.[61] The milblogger specified that Ukrainian forces do not have aserious bridgehead in the area, however. Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces still holdpositions under Antonivsky Bridge and that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance units occasionally
venture to Oleshky (7km east of Kherson City) using the bridge as a cover.[62]Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted
to strike the Dzhankoi rail station with a modified S-200 missile on the evening of October 7.[63]17Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023

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Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat
power without conducting general mobilization)
Prague-based Russian-language outlet Current Time reported on October 8 that the number ofdesertion cases within the Russian military has increased.[64] Current Time reported that “Go Throughthe Forest,” a Russian organization that helps Russian citizens avoid mobilization, has observed anincreasing number of Russian servicemen deserting since May 2023. The increase in desertion cases isreportedly due to the Russian military beginning to allow contract servicemen to take vacations in late
April and May, which many servicemen never returned from. Current Time stated that the Russian
military refuses to give vacations to mobilized personnel.
The Kherson Oblast occupation military registration and enlistment office announced continued efforts
to discourage draft evasion in occupied Kherson Oblast on October 7.[65] The office announced several
new and increased fines related to military registration, including fines against: employers who fail to
notify employees subject to conscription and send them to assembly points; employers who fail toprovide the office with lists of employees liable for military service; employers who fail to update theoffice on the dismissal of an employee liable for military service; locals who fail to fulfill their militarytransport duties; and locals who violate the requirement to register for military service.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative
control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russiansociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on October 8 that Ukrainian partisans provided informationthat helped Ukrainian forces conduct several successful strikes against Russian rear areas within thepast week, including strikes against a Russian military headquarters in the Kherson direction, several
ammunition
depots,andconcentrationsofRussianmilitary
personnel.[66]Occupation authorities reportedly continue to seize the property of Ukrainian civilians in occupied
Ukraine to allocate to Russian military personnel. Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated on
October 8 that occupation authorities in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast are evicting local Ukrainians andhousing Russian servicemen in their homes.[67] Fedorov stated that occupation authorities are also
distributing plots of land in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to Russian servicemen as a reward for military
service. Fedorov added that occupation authorities have reduced pension payments for locals in
occupied Ukraine by several thousand rubles and stated that some government employees have notbeen paid or have only been paid a fraction of their salaries for the last month and a half.[68]RussianInformation

Operations

andNarratives:

Russian milbloggers continued to exploit Hamas’ attacks in Israel to further Russian information
operations on October 8 intended to reduce US and Western support to Ukraine.[69] Russian
milbloggers ludicrously claimed that Hamas is using Ukrainian-provided weaponry against Israel.[70]The Ukrainian Military Media Center quickly identified these claims as a Russian information operationand noted that Ukraine’s Western partners closely monitor weapons and military equipment supplied
toUkraine.[71]19

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Russian sources gloated and claimed on October 8 that increased Western attention on Israel will likely
draw attention and aid away from Ukraine.[72] Russian sources increasingly focused on the Hamas
attacks in Israel, continuing to impact the detail on the Russian war in Ukraine available for ISW’s daily
assessments.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence inBelarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and WagnerGroup activity in Belarus)
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) released images on October 8 of Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) peacekeeping forces, reportedly including troops from Belarus, Russia,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, conducting military exercises at the Edelweiss training center in Kyrgyzstan
as
part
of
the
“Indestructible
Brotherhood-2023"
exercise.[73]
ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in
Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus andother Russian actions in Belarus.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly
available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western
reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and othergeospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
intheendnotesof
each
update.

[1] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/08/10/2023/652296d99a79476b050c179f; https://tass dot ru/armiya-iopk/18943037 ; https://regulation.dot gov.ru/Regulation/Npa/PublicView?npaID=142508[2] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/08/10/2023/652296d99a79476b050c179f; https://tass dot ru/armiya-iopk/18943037 ; https://regulation.dot gov.ru/Regulation/Npa/PublicView?npaID=142508; https://www.rbc dot
ru/rbcfreenews/5edace8a9a7947754b6f3504[3] https://t.me/agentstvonews/4306[4] https://www.fontanka dot ru/2010/09/01/142/[5] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/5edace8a9a7947754b6f3504[6] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/16655079; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensivecampaign-assessment-january-17-2023; https://t.me/mod_russia/23498; https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovoMinistra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-na-tematicheskom-selektornom-soveshchanii-07-03; https://telegra dot
ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-RF-na-zasedanii-Kollegii-Minoborony-Rossii-08-09[7] https://x.com/MilitaryLabb/status/1711073089583202635?s=20;
https://x.com/MilitaryLabb/status/1711070833446154283?s=20; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/54424;
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1711066828808540185?s=20; https://t.me/wargonzo/15556[8]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Renw8hvquP3roNbH9PFxnKnfji4NciqcETP8HURZSqnS62qv
KXYA71h7Q3aZSjgwl;

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https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qLSQxKXNCvpBiTVix6nJjsEu4YjX5Wasv9CSTtgVbeprzR4sHq
WGJZmpMyHfdZeNl; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/10/08/ukrayinski-vijska-prodovzhuyut-nastupalnuoperacziyu-pivdennishe-bahmuta/; https://t.me/mod_russia/31261: https://t.me/wargonzo/15556[9] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/10/08/na-tavrijskomu-napryamku-vorog-znyzyv-aktyvnist-aviacziyi-taartyleriyi-a-doshhi-zavazhayut-zastosuvannyu-bpla/[10] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/3847 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/12641 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/11226[11] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/10/08/protyvnyk-aktyvno-zastosovuye-aviacziyu-na-lymano-kupyanskomunapryamku-illya-yevlash/[12] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/3847 ; https://t.me/polk1430/1308[13] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/99801[14] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/10/08/na-tavrijskomu-napryamku-vorog-znyzyv-aktyvnist-aviacziyi-taartyleriyi-a-doshhi-zavazhayut-zastosuvannyu-bpla/[15] https://t.me/rezhimbe/3582 ; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1710754965747110336;
https://t.me/milinfolive/105002 ; https://t.me/rezhimbe/3575 ; https://t.me/rezhimbe/3578[16] https://t.me/rezhimbe/3582 ; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1710754965747110336[17] https://t.me/rezhimbe/3582 ; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1710754965747110336[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2023[19] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/10/08/yakshho-za-mynulyj-opalyuvalnyj-sezon-vorog-za-6-misyaczivzastosuvav-ponad-1000-shahediv-to-nyni-vin-vypuskaye-yih-500-za-misyacz-yurij-ignat/[20] https://suspilne dot media/589301-slovaccina-ne-nadsilatime-ukraini-vijskovu-dopomogu-zagibel-sekretara-vnovij-kahovci-592-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1696776025&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ;https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/10/08/yakshho-za-mynulyj-opalyuvalnyj-sezon-vorog-za-6-misyacziv-zastosuvavponad-1000-shahediv-to-nyni-vin-vypuskaye-yih-500-za-misyacz-yurij-ignat/[21] https://beyondparallel.csis.org/dramatic-increase-in-dprk-russia-border-rail-traffic-after-kim-putin-summit/[22] https://t.me/rosich_ru/49752 ; https://t.me/grey_zone/20974 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/107980;
https://t.me/andriyshTime/14057 ; https://t.me/rusbrief/162293[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-sept-16-2023[24] https://www.idelreal dot org/a/32625649.html; https://t.me/idelrealii/31143[25] https://www.idelreal dot org/a/32625649.html; https://t.me/idelrealii/31143[26] https://www.idelreal dot org/a/32625649.html; https://t.me/idelrealii/31143[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar100323; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100223[28] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/11078 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/27025[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/15556; https://t.me/dva_majors/26985; https://t.me/wargonzo/15578

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[30]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0uUow5A4Di2g21xhmkC25AQpjqNL5TdvDicqFTwg5iiz7iwD24j
R8uK7pBtmXzPbSl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Renw8hvquP3roNbH9PFxnKnfji4NciqcETP8HURZSqnS62qv
KXYA71h7Q3aZSjgwl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qLSQxKXNCvpBiTVix6nJjsEu4YjX5Wasv9CSTtgVbeprzR4sHq
WGJZmpMyHfdZeNl[31] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/10/08/protyvnyk-aktyvno-zastosovuye-aviacziyu-na-lymano-kupyanskomunapryamku-illya-yevlash/[32] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/4464; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/5821;
https://www.facebook.com/100080854364388/posts/pfbid02UdrUjBzoUG5ozz82D3gVh3sWkUroyeFc8zSWVW11Sn6S
XjrXbCZ5ZQypmTZdCxhl/?app=fbl; https://x.com/doppelot/status/1710918536783151139?s=20[33] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/23058; https://t.me/notes_veterans/12641;
https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/11078 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/27025[34] https://t.me/wargonzo/15578; https://t.me/wargonzo/15556[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/31261[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/26985[37]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Renw8hvquP3roNbH9PFxnKnfji4NciqcETP8HURZSqnS62qv
KXYA71h7Q3aZSjgwl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qLSQxKXNCvpBiTVix6nJjsEu4YjX5Wasv9CSTtgVbeprzR4sHq
WGJZmpMyHfdZeNl; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/10/08/ukrayinski-vijska-prodovzhuyut-nastupalnuoperacziyu-pivdennishe-bahmuta/[38] https://t.me/mod_russia/31261[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/15556[40] https://t.me/wargonzo/15578[41] https://t.me/rusich_army/11226[42]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Renw8hvquP3roNbH9PFxnKnfji4NciqcETP8HURZSqnS62qv
KXYA71h7Q3aZSjgwl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qLSQxKXNCvpBiTVix6nJjsEu4YjX5Wasv9CSTtgVbeprzR4sHq
WGJZmpMyHfdZeNl[43] https://t.me/wargonzo/15578[44]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Renw8hvquP3roNbH9PFxnKnfji4NciqcETP8HURZSqnS62qv
KXYA71h7Q3aZSjgwl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qLSQxKXNCvpBiTVix6nJjsEu4YjX5Wasv9CSTtgVbeprzR4sHq
WGJZmpMyHfdZeNl; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/10/08/na-tavrijskomu-napryamku-vorog-znyzyv-aktyvnistaviacziyi-ta-artyleriyi-a-doshhi-zavazhayut-zastosuvannyu-bpla/

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[45] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/10/08/na-tavrijskomu-napryamku-vorog-znyzyv-aktyvnist-aviacziyi-taartyleriyi-a-doshhi-zavazhayut-zastosuvannyu-bpla/[46] https://t.me/dva_majors/26981[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/15578; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/99801[48] https://t.me/mod_russia/31262; https://t.me/mod_russia/31268[49] https://t.me/voin_dv/5362[50] https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1710893366387310836?s=20[51] https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1710893366387310836?s=20[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/54382[53] https://t.me/voin_dv/5356[54]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Renw8hvquP3roNbH9PFxnKnfji4NciqcETP8HURZSqnS62qv
KXYA71h7Q3aZSjgwl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qLSQxKXNCvpBiTVix6nJjsEu4YjX5Wasv9CSTtgVbeprzR4sHq
WGJZmpMyHfdZeNl[55] https://x.com/MilitaryLabb/status/1711073089583202635?s=20;
https://x.com/MilitaryLabb/status/1711070833446154283?s=20; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/54424;
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1711066828808540185?s=20[56] https://t.me/wargonzo/15556[57] https://t.me/wargonzo/15556[58] https://t.me/wargonzo/15578[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/3847[60] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/10/08/na-tavrijskomu-napryamku-vorog-znyzyv-aktyvnist-aviacziyi-taartyleriyi-a-doshhi-zavazhayut-zastosuvannyu-bpla/[61] https://t.me/wargonzo/15578[62] https://t.me/rybar/52900[63] https://t.me/rybar/52867; https://t.me/mod_russia/31248[64] https://t.me/idelrealii/31144; https://www.currenttime dot tv/a/rossiyane-kotorye-pytayutsya-vernutsya-s-frontaili-dezertirovat/32626661.html[65] https://t.me/VKherson84/28; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/14556[66] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/zavdyaky-partyzanam-na-tot-syly-oborony-uspishno-nanosyat-udary-po-ob-yektahrosiyan/[67] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/3436

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[68] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/3438[69] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2023[70] https://t.me/sashakots/42651 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/17669 ; https://t.me/rsotmdivision/11088 ;https://t.me/rusich_army/11223[71] https://t.me/militarymediacenter/3347; https://t.me/militarymediacenter/3348[72] https://t.me/batalyon_vostok/210 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/8740 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/3824 ;https://t.me/agentstvonews/4305 ; https://t.me/agentstvonews/4305 ; https://t.me/rybar/52901 ;https://t.me/dva_majors/26990[73] https://t.me/modmilby/32700

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