Intragenerational Mobility between the Regular and
Non-Regular Employment Sectors in Japan:
From the Viewpoint of the Theory of Mobility Regime*
Yoshimichi Sato
(Tohoku University)
Abstract
This paper studied intragenerational mobility between the regular and non-regular
employment sectors in Japan by analyzing the dataset of the 2015 SSM Survey from theviewpoint of the theory of mobility regime. The Japanese mobility regime consists of Japaneseemployment
practices,theJapanese
welfare-employment
regime,andthemale-single-breadwinner model. This regime places male regular workers at the core of thelabor market while pushing female non-regular workers to its periphery, and suppresses job
turnover. However, it is thought that globalization, the shift to a service industry, and neoliberallabor policies have weakened the regime. From these theoretical perspectives, I analyzed thejob histories of this study’s respondents by using discrete-time logit models while selecting for
gender. The main findings of the analysis are as follows: (1) The Japanese mobility regime isstill strong and influential. As predicted, male regular workers at the core of the labor market(i.e., those working at large firms and in the public sector) are less likely to transition to the
non-regular employment sector than their counterparts at the market’s periphery (i.e., thoseworking at small and mid-sized firms). However, this study unexpectedly discovered thatfemale regular workers at the core of the labor market are also less likely to move to the
non-regular employment sector than their counterparts at the market’s periphery. (2) The
prevailing regime is changing, but not necessarily weakening. Movement from regular to
non-regular employment is more likely to occur at the time of this study than it has been
historically, while movement from non-regular to regular employment is less likely. An
exploration of the social mechanisms that are creating this asymmetrical change could lead to amore detailed analysis of the Japanese mobility regime, and could also provide a substantive
contribution to the advancement of the theory of mobility regime.
Keywords: The Japanese mobility regime, Non-regular workers, Event history analysis*

This research was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP 25000001, 15H03405, and16K13406. I thank the 2015 SSM Survey Project members for their productive comments.

―65―

1. Non-regular workers in Japan and the Theory of Mobility Regime
Attention is often brought to the deteriorating situation of non-regular workers incontemporary Japan. Wages for these workers are much lower, their job security isworse, and their social security benefits are less than that of their counterparts in theregular employment sector. From an international perspective, these workers sharecommon features with workers in precarious situations in other advanced industrial
countries (cf. Campbell and Price 2016), but the difficulty of becoming a regular worker
is exceptionally high in Japan. For example, Sato (2013) calculated the local odds ratioof mobility between regular and non-regular workers using the 2009 Labor Force
Survey, which was conducted by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications. According to this research, the ratio is 6.17, which means that theodds of getting a regular job for individuals who were regular workers in the previous
year is 6.17 times higher than the odds for those who were non-regular workers during
the same period. This is evidence that the mobility barrier between the non-regular andregular employment sectors is very high in Japan. Other scholars have also reported thesignificance of this mobility barrier (Genda 2008).
Why is this mobility barrier so high and persistent? I argue that applying thetheory of mobility regime as proposed by Diprete (2002) to the study of the Japaneselabor market will aid in answering this question. The crux of my argument asserts that
intragenerational mobility is not an independently arising phenomenon. Rather, this typeof mobility occurs in the institutional arrangements of the labor market and the generalconventions of society. Thus, different institutional arrangements result in different
patterns of intragenerational mobility, which explains, for example, the lower job
turnover rate in Japan as compared to that in the U.S. (this is later explained in detail).
I assume that the Japanese employment practice, the Japanese
welfare-employment regime, and the male-single-breadwinner model are theinstitutional arrangements that affect intragenerational mobility in Japan. Based on
observations of Japanese factories, Abbeglen (1958) proposed that the Japaneseemployment practice consists of the long-term employment practice, the seniority-based
wage scheme, and company unions. The first two components suppress job changes
because of the following mechanism: If an employee leaves a company and obtains
employment at another company, their seniority does not transfer. It then becomesprobable that this employee’s wages will decline. Since employees expect this to occur,
they are less likely to seek new employment. The third component (i.e., company
unions) excludes non-regular workers. Only regular workers have been qualified as―66―

union members. This practice of exclusion has partially contributed to the constructionof the barrier preventing non-regular employees from seeking regular employment.
The theory of welfare-employment regime assumes that society secures the
livelihood of its members through welfare and employment, and that the balance
between welfare and employment varies from society and society (Esping-Andersen
1990; Imai 2011). Imai (2011) points out that the salient feature of the Japanese
welfare-employment regime is “welfare through employment.” This means thatcompanies provide their employees with welfare packages. For example, companies
cover half of their employees’ pension and health insurance premiums. Furthermore,some companies provide their employees with housing. One caveat should be
mentioned, however. These ample welfare packages are usually reserved for regular
employees; companies do not typically offer them to non-regular employees. Because ofthis difference in labor cost between regular and non-regular employees, companies
tend to replace regular employees with non-regular employees if possible. This practicehas contributed to an increase in the proportion of non-regular workers in contemporary
Japan.
The family male-single-breadwinner model reinforces the Japaneseemployment practice in the labor market, and vice versa. Male regular employees show
their loyalty to companies by working long hours and accepting company transfers in
exchange for regular employment status and ample welfare packages. However, it
would be difficult for these employees to maintain such loyalty without the help of an
at-home domestic partner. That is, at-home partners perform most of the householdchores, and tend to be housewives or part-time workers to secure sufficient time forhomemaking. This sexual division of labor has increased the share of female
non-regular workers in the labor market, most of whom are married women.
The reviewed features of the Japanese mobility regime can thus far besummarized as a regime that places male regular workers at the core of the labor market,
pushes female non-regular workers to the periphery of the market, and suppresses job
turnover. This regime was strong and influential during Japan’s period of high economic
growth (1955-1973), but has recently weakened.
Globalization, a shift in the industrial structure from heavy to service-oriented
practice, and neoliberal labor policies are major factors that have weakened theJapanese mobility regime. Globalization has increased the opportunity cost forcompanies adhering to the Japanese employment practice. Through such adherence,these companies would lose the opportunity to find a better labor force at a cheaper costoutside Japan. The shift to a service industry has increased the share of non-regular―67―

workers who are not protected by labor unions. Neoliberal labor policies have also
contributed to increases in both flexibility in the labor market and, eventually, in the
proportion of non-regular workers. For example, the Temporary Dispatching Work Law
was enacted in 1986. This law involves a series of revisions that have led to an increasein the number of dispatched workers, which is a type of non-regular employment (Imai2011).
These changes have made the labor market more flexible, but they have notaffected all of its segments. Rather, regular workers at large firms and in the public
sector are still protected by the Japanese employment practice. By contrast, non-regular
workers at the periphery of the labor market are experiencing increased flexibility. Sato(2010) called this situation “the coexistence of stability and increasing flexibility.” This
coexistence also makes it difficult for non-regular workers to move to the regular
employment sector.

2. Hypotheses
As pointed out in the previous section, the core of the labor market is still intact, while
flexibility is increasing at the periphery. Male workers at large firms and in the public
sector are at the market’s core (Nomura 1994), while female workers, workers at small
and mid-sized firms, and non-regular workers are concentrated at the periphery. Thus, I
focused on gender and firm size to derive hypotheses on intragenerational mobility
between the regular and non-regular employment sectors.
Furthermore, distinct time periods should be considered in this type of study
because, as abovementioned, the Japanese mobility regime has weakened over time.
Thus, I will use four time periods in this study. Those are the high economic growth
period (1955-1973), the slow economic growth period after the oil crises (1974-1984),
the bubble economy period (1985-1991), and the post-bubble economy period(1992-2015). The main components of the Japanese mobility regime are the Japaneseemployment practice, the Japanese welfare-employment regime, and themale-single-breadwinner-model. It is commonly accepted that this regime wasestablished during the high economic growth period (Brinton 1993). Since then, theregime is thought to have weakened. Thus, I will use the high economic growth period
as the reference point for the statistical analysis in Section 4.

―68―

2-1. Hypotheses on Intragenerational Mobility from Regular to Non-regular
Employment
Regarding mobility between the regular and non-regular employment sectors, I
propose two competing hypotheses on the effects of firm size, and two additional
competing hypotheses on the effects of time period.
Hypothesis 1-1: Male regular workers at large firms and in the public sector areless likely to become non-regular workers than their counterparts at small andmid-sized firms. By contrast, the probability of a female regular worker
becoming a non-regular worker is not affected by firm size.
This hypothesis was derived from the abovementioned difference between the core andthe periphery of the Japanese labor market. Male regular employees at the market’s core
are still protected by the Japanese employment practice, while their counterparts at the
periphery are not. This leads to the difference in probability of becoming a non-regular
worker between regular workers at large firms and in the public sector and those at
small and mid-sized firms. By contrast, female workers are placed at the market’s
periphery regardless of firm size. Thus, there is no difference in the probability of
becoming a non-regular worker among female regular workers.
Hypothesis 1-2: Female regular workers at large firms and in the public sector
are less likely to become non-regular workers than their counterparts at small
and mid-sized firms. By contrast, the probability of a male regular worker
becoming a non-regular worker is not affected by firm size.
This hypothesis is the reverse of Hypothesis 1-1, and is derived from the strength of theJapanese mobility regime. That is, the regime is so strong that even male regular
workers at small and mid-sized firms are under its influence. Therefore, there is nodifference in the probability of becoming a non-regular worker among male regular
workers. If the regime is very strong, it might also cover female regular workers if theywork for large firms or in the public sector, which would lower the probability of their
becoming non-regular workers.
The next two hypotheses are about the effect of time periods.
Hypothesis 2-1: The probability of a male regular worker becoming a
non-regular worker increased during the post-bubble economy period, but the―69―

status of female regular workers is not affected by time periods.
This hypothesis was derived from the same mechanism as that of Hypothesis 1-1. The
Japanese mobility regime that has protected male regular workers has weakened. Thisoccurred most significantly during the post-bubble economy period. Thus, theseworkers were more likely to become non-regular workers during this period thanpreviously.
Hypothesis 2-2: The probability of a female regular worker becoming a
non-regular worker increased during the post-bubble economy period, but thestatus of male regular workers is not affected by time periods.
This hypothesis was derived from the same mechanism as that of Hypothesis 1-2. Male
regular workers have been protected by the Japanese mobility regime at each time
period, while female regular workers, who are at the periphery of the labor market, areaffected by the increasing flexibility that began to occur during the post-bubble
economy period.
2-2. Hypotheses on Intragenerational Mobility from Non-regular to Regular
Employment
I propose three hypotheses on intragenerational mobility from the non-regular to
the regular employment sector based on the theory of the Japanese mobility regime.
Hypothesis 3: The probability of becoming a regular worker for both male andfemale non-regular workers is not affected by firm size.
“Being non-regular workers” is a sort of social status in Japan (cf. Arita 2016). Thus,
non-regular workers are placed at the market’s periphery regardless of if they are men or
women or the size of their firm.
Hypothesis 4: The probability of becoming a regular worker for both male andfemale non-regular workers decreases when firm size increases.
While Hypothesis 3 is about the size of workers’ current firms, this hypothesis is about
the entry barrier. It is more difficult for non-regular workers to enter large firms or the
public sector as regular workers during their mid-careers than it is to enter small and―70―

mid-sized firms. This is because most of the large firms and the public sector are still
under the strong influence of the Japanese mobility regime. Therefore, the entry barrier
to these areas is higher than it is at small and mid-sized firms.
Hypothesis 5: The probability of becoming a regular worker for both male andfemale non-regular workers increased more significantly during the post-bubble
economy period than previously.
As abovementioned, it is thought that the Japanese mobility regime weakened during
the post-bubble economy period while the labor market became more flexible. Thus, it
is possible that non-regular workers found it easier to obtain regular jobs during thisperiod than previously.

3. Data and Methods
I used the dataset from the 2015 Social Stratification and Social Mobility National
Survey (hereafter, the 2015 SSM Survey) to examine the empirical validity of thisstudy’s hypotheses. 1 The 2015 SSM Survey was conducted using nationwide
representative samples in Japan. The samples were from individuals between 20 and 79
years of age. There were 7,817 respondents, and the response rate was 50.1%.
The dataset from the survey contains the job histories of respondents, which
can be used for my analysis of intragenerational mobility between the regular andnon-regular employment sectors. Information on job history was contained in awide-type data format, so I converted it to a long-type data format so that discrete-time
logit models could be applied.2 I focused on job histories from before respondents
became 55 years of age to avoid the effects of mandatory retirement.
I analyzed the job histories of men and women separately because theirpositions are segregated in the labor market. Two dependent variables were used in themodels. Those are the hazard probability of moving from the regular to non-regular
employment sector, and moving from the non-regular to the regular employment sector.
An event is defined as the mobility from regular to non-regular employment, or thatfrom non-regular to regular employment.
Four independent variables were used to examine the hypotheses. Those are the1

I thank the 2015 SSM Survey Management Committee for allowing me to use the SSM data.
I thank Tokio Yasuda of Kansai University for providing the 2015 SSM Survey Project memberswith an SPSS syntax for converting the data. I also referred to Mugiyama (2006) to create thelong-type data for analysis.
2―71―duration time as the baseline hazard function, firm size at t-1, firm size at t, and time
period.3 Duration time was measured by the interval of time (in years) that had passed
since a respondent entered a job. Duration time was converted to dummy variables
expressing each year in logit models. Firm size was measured by the number of
employees in the firm. Firm size at t was used to examine Hypothesis 4.
The risk sets for analysis are defined as follows. In the analysis of mobility
from regular to non-regular employment, a person enters the risk set when they becomea regular worker. Then, if they become a non-regular worker, an event occurs.
Otherwise, the data is judged as right-censored. In the analysis of mobility from
non-regular to regular employment, a person enters the risk set when they become anon-regular worker. Then, if they become a regular worker, an event occurs. Otherwise,
the data is judged as right-censored.

4. Results
4-1. Intragenerational Mobility from the Regular to Non-Regular Employment
SectorDescriptive statistics are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics (Mobility from Regular to Non-Regular Employment)
Observations%

Eve n t
No
Yes
Total

119,907959
120,866

99.21
0.79
100

Ge n de r
Male
FemaleTotal

76,81244,054
120,866

63.55
36.45
100

Firm size at t - 1
1-99
100-999
1000>= or public sector
Total

42,97428,24944,891
116,114

37.01
24.33
38.66
100

Pe riodHigh economic growth period
Slow economic growth period
Bubble economy period
Post-bubble economy period
Total

20,241
23,472
19,05758,096
120,866

16.75
19.42
15.77
48.07
100

Duration of time after entering the regular employment
Observations
Mean
Sd.
120,866
13.364
9.751

Min.
1

Max.
40

The mobility from unemployment to non-regular worker to regular worker is also an importantresearch topic. See Moriyama (2018) for a detailed analysis of this mobility.

3

―72―

Table 2 shows the results of five discrete-time logit models for males. Model 1
uses only dummy variables for duration time as the baseline hazard function.
Coefficients for dummy variables are omitted in the table to save space. In Model 2,
firm size at t-1 as an independent variable is added to Model 1, while Model 3 adds time
period to Model 1. Model 4 uses both firm size at t-1 and period as independent
variables. In Model 5, the jobs-to-applicants ratio is added to Model 4. This is a control
variable to determine whether the effect of time period exists after controlling for
economic situations in the labor market.
The effect of firm size at t-1 is clear in Model 5. As firm size increases, maleregular workers are less likely to move to the non-regular employment sector. The
coefficient for the post-bubble economy period is the largest among those for the time
periods in Model 5.
Table 2 Discrete-Time Logit Models (Mobility from Male Regular to Non-Regular Employment)
Constant
Duration time
Firm size at t -1
1-99
100-999
1000>= or public sector
PeriodHigh economic growth period
Slow economic growth period
Bubble economy period
Post-bubble economy period
Jobs-to-applicants ratio# of observations# of samples
Log pseudolikelihood
Pseudo R 2*** p <0,01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1

Model 1
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.017 ***
0.012
(omitted)

Model 2
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.022 ***
0.016
(omitted)ref.
0.719 **
0.292 ***

Model 3
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.004 ***
0.003
(omitted)

0.103
0.048
ref.
1.748 **
1.563
3.968 ***

69,2703,168-1724.146
0.048

69,2703,168-1690.568
0.067

69,2703,168-1688.212
0.068

0.433
0.435
0.829

Model 4
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.006 ***
0.005
(omitted)ref.
0.672 ***
0.299 ***

0.097
0.049

ref.
1.808 **
1.585 *
3.888 ***

0.448
0.442
0.810

69,2703,168-1656.680
0.086

Model 5
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.004 ***
0.003
(omitted)ref.
0.668 ***
0.298 ***
ref.
2.076 ***
1.580
4.366 ***
1.519
69,2703,168-1655.367
0.086

0.096
0.049

0.556
0.440
0.996
0.395

Table 3 shows the results of the same five discrete-time logit models forfemales. Similar results are shown in Model 5.
The results shown in Tables 2 and 3 mean that Hypotheses 1-1 and 1-2 arepartially supported. Both male and female regular workers at large firms and in the
public sector are less likely to become non-regular workers than their counterparts at
small and mid-sized firms. By comparing the values of the coefficients for large firms
and the public sector in Tables 2 and 3 (0.298 and 0.473, respectively), female regular
workers could be more likely to become non-regular workers than their malecounterparts. However, I believe that these results show the strength of the Japanese
mobility regime.

―73―

Table 3 Discrete-Time Logit Models (Mobility from Female Regular to Non-Regular Employment)

Constant
Duration time
Firm size at t -1
1-99
100-999
1000>= or public sector
PeriodHigh economic growth period
Slow economic growth period
Bubble economy period
Post-bubble economy period
Jobs-to-applicants ratio# of observations# of samples
Log pseudolikelihood
Pseudo R 2*** p <0,01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1

Model 1
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.011 ***
0.011
(omitted)

Model 2
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.014 ***
0.015
(omitted)ref.
0.824 **
0.471 ***

Model 3
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.003 ***
0.003
(omitted)

0.080
0.051
ref.
1.484 **
2.515 ***
3.358 ***

37,0983,354-3070.202
0.020

37,0983,354-3042.264
0.028

0.257
0.420
0.490

37,0983,354-3014.640
0.037

Model 4
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.005 ***
0.005
(omitted)ref.
0.760 ***
0.473 ***

0.075
0.052

ref.
1.520 **
2.580 ***
3.365 ***

0.264
0.431
0.492

37,0983,354-2987.567
0.046

Model 5
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.004 ***
0.004
(omitted)ref.
0.759 ***
0.473 ***
ref.
1.601 ***
2.572 ***
3.514 ***
1.180
37,0983,354-2987.088
0.046

0.075
0.052

0.286
0.430
0.530
0.194

The results in Tables 2 and 3 also show that Hypotheses 2-1 and 2-2 arepartially supported. Both male and female regular workers were more likely to become
non-regular workers during the post-bubble economy period than previously. Thisimplies that the effects of globalization, the shift to a service industry, and neoliberallabor policies on the Japanese mobility regime are stronger than the expectations set
forth in the hypotheses.
4-2. Intragenerational Mobility from the Non-Regular to Regular Employment
SectorDescriptive statistics are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics (Mobility from Non-Regular to Regular Employment)
Observations%

Even t
No
Yes
Total

29,444892
30,336

97.06
2.94
100

Ge n derMale
FemaleTotal

5,560
24,77630,336

18.33
81.67
100

Firm size at t - 1
1-99
100-999
1000>= or public sector
Total

14,2495,002
6,539
25,790

55.25
19.4
25.35
100

Firm size at t
1-99
100-999
1000>= or public sector
Total

13,9985,014
6,361
25,373

55.17
19.76
25.07
100

PeriodHigh economic growth period
Slow economic growth period
Bubble economy period
Post-bubble economy period
Total

1,796
3,455
3,828
21,25730,336

5.92
11.39
12.62
70.07
100

Duration of time after entering the non-regular employment
Observations
Mean
Sd.
30,336
7.905
6.390

―74―

Min.
1

Max.
40

Table 5 shows the results of six discrete-time logit models for males. In Table 5,Models 1-5 are the same as Models 1-5 in Table 2 with the exception of the dependent
variable, which is the hazard probability of non-regular workers becoming regular
workers. Model 6 uses firm size at t instead of firm size at t-1 to examine Hypothesis 4.4
Model 5 in Table 5 shows that firm size at t-1 does not affect the hazard
probability of becoming a regular worker, and that the probability became lower during
the post-bubble economy period. Model 6 in this table also shows similar patterns.
Table 5 Discrete-Time Logit Models (Mobility from Male Non-Regular to Regular Employment)
Constant
Duration time
Firm size at t -1
1-99
100-999
1000>= or public sector
Firm size at t
1-99
100-999
1000>= or public sector
PeriodHigh economic growth period
Slow economic growth period
Bubble economy period
Post-bubble economy period
Jobs-to-applicants ratio# of observations# of samples
Log pseudolikelihood
Pseudo R 2*** p <0,01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1

Model 1
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.077 **
0.080
(omitted)

Model 2
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.080 **
0.083
(omitted)
ref.
0.841
0.977

Model 3
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.099 **
0.106
(omitted)

Model 4
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.101 **
0.108
(omitted)
ref.
0.871
1.012

0.139
0.139

0.145
0.148

Model 5
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.131 *
0.141
(omitted)
ref.
0.880
1.007

Model 6
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.131 *
0.141

0.146
0.147
ref.
1.102
0.963

ref.
0.768
0.968
0.726
3,471
587
-1025.857
0.041

3,471
587
-1025.278
0.042

**

0.159
0.219
0.118

3,471
587
-1023.382
0.044

ref.
0.774
0.973
0.733
3,471
587
-1022.969
0.044

*

0.161
0.221
0.122

ref.
0.716
0.991
0.693 **
0.752
3,471
587
-1022.242
0.045

0.154
0.225
0.117
0.189

ref.
0.700 *
0.984
0.679 **
0.734
3,471
587
-1022.287
0.045

0.203
0.163

0.150
0.223
0.116
0.187

Table 6 shows the results of the same six discrete-time logit models for females.
Model 5 in Table 6 shows that female non-regular workers at mid-sized firms at t-1 are
more likely to become regular workers than their counterparts at small and large firms,
while Model 6 shows that they are also more likely to become regular workers at
mid-sized firms at t than their counterparts at small and large firms at t. Models 5 and 6
shows that female non-regular workers are less likely to become regular workers during
any period after the high economic growth period.
The results in Tables 5 and 6 mean that Hypotheses 3 and 4 are only valid formale non-regular workers. Female non-regular workers at mid-sized firms in the labormarket have more opportunities to become regular workers. The theory of the Japanese
mobility regime assumed a significant separation between small/mid-sized firms andlarge firms/the public sector. However, the study of the mechanisms that produce
mobility for female workers between mid-sized firms is an interesting future research
topic.

4

Firm size at t and firm size at t-1 were not included in the model simultaneously because ofmulticollinearity.

―75―

Table 6 Discrete-Time Logit Models (Mobility from Female Non-Regular to Regular Employment)
Constant
Duration time
Firm size at t -1
1-99
100-999
1000>= or public sector
Firm size at t
1-99
100-999
1000>= or public sector
PeriodHigh economic growth period
Slow economic growth period
Bubble economy period
Post-bubble economy period
Jobs-to-applicants ratio# of observations# of samples
Log pseudolikelihood
Pseudo R 2*** p <0,01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1

Model 1
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.041 ***
0.029
(omitted)

Model 2
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.038 ***
0.028
(omitted)
ref.
1.206
1.051

Model 3
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.074 ***
0.055
(omitted)

Model 4
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.071 ***
0.052
(omitted)
ref.
1.250
1.071

0.149
0.124

*

0.156
0.127

Model 5
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.085 ***
0.065
(omitted)
ref.
1.253
1.071

*

Model 6
Odds ratio
Robust SE
0.089 ***
0.068

0.157
0.127
ref.
1.304
0.778

ref.
0.585
0.491
0.563
17,0452,021-1985.173
0.023

17,0452,021-1984.061
0.024

**
***
***

0.127
0.108
0.099

17,0452,021-1979.878
0.026

ref.
0.575
0.478
0.543
17,0452,021-1978.324
0.027

**
***
***

0.125
0.106
0.097

ref.
0.539 ***
0.479 ****
0.516 ***
0.834
17,0452,021-1977.934
0.027

0.122
0.106
0.096
0.171

**
*

ref.
0.537 ***
0.476 ****
0.523 ***
0.832
17,0452,021-1973.255
0.029

0.170
0.104

0.121
0.106
0.098
0.171

Hypothesis 5 was not supported. To the contrary, mobility from the non-regular
to regular employment sector became difficult during the post-bubble economy period.

5. Conclusions and Discussion
This study shows that the Japanese mobility regime still protects regular workers atlarge firms and in the public sector. It was assumed that only male regular workers werepart of this regime, but the results of the discrete-time logit models show that female
regular workers are also under its influence. In this sense, the regime is stronger than I
expected.
Meanwhile, the regime is changing, but it is not necessarily weakening.
Mobility from regular to non-regular employment was more likely to occur during thepost-bubble economy period, while movement from non-regular to regular employment
was less likely during the same period. Exploring the social mechanisms that createdthis asymmetric change would lead to a more detailed analysis of the Japanese mobility
regime, and would also make a substantive contribution to the advancement of thetheory of mobility regime.
Three tasks should be addressed in future research. First, as mentioned inFootnote 3, the effects of unemployment should be considered. Second, mobility fromeither regular to non-regular employment or non-regular to regular employment rarely
occurs (see Tables 1 and 4). Thus, methods that properly deal with this issue should be
introduced to the analysis (King and Zeng 2001). Third, although mobility between theregular and non-regular employment sectors rarely occurs, some workers experience
this more often than others. To properly deal with the differences between these types ofworkers, multilevel modeling should be considered (Teachman 2011).

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