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平成30年度短期招聘研究員
コンラン教授の紹介と報告概要
経済学研究科教授

根岸毅宏

2018年10月２日（火）から23日（火）にかけて、本学大学院の短期招聘研究 員 を 利 用 し、 ジ ョ ー ジ メ イ ソ ン 大 学 公 共 政 策 学 部（George Mason
University, School of Policy and Government）の T. コンラン（Timothy J.
Conlan）教授を招聘した。
コ ン ラ ン 教 授 は、1977－85年 に 連 邦 政 府 Advisory Commission onIntergovernmental Relations、1985－86年に連邦上院議会政府間関係小委員会 の ス タ ッ フ と し て 働 き、1987年 か ら George Mason University の 助 教（Assistant Professor）、1990年 に 准 教 授（Associate Professor）、2000年 から教授（Professor）になっている。
専門分野は、政府間関係論や連邦制である。たくさんある研究業績の中で、著書を紹介すると次の４つになる。
Timothy J. Conlan, Paul L. Posner, David R. Beam, Pathways of Power: TheDynamics of Contemporary Federal Policy Making , Georgetown
University Press, 2014.
Timothy J. Conlan, Paul L. Posner, Intergovernmental Management for the

21st Century , Brookings Institution, 2008.
Timothy J. Conlan, From New Federalism to Devolution: Twenty-fiveYears of Intergovernmental Reform, Bookings Institution, 1998.
Timothy J. Conlan, Margaret T. Wrightson, David R. Beam, Taxing Choices:
The Politics of Tax Reform, Congressional Quarterly, 1990.
Timothy J. Conlan, New Federalism: Intergovernmental Reform from76
Nixon to Reagan, Brookings Institution, 1988.
コンラン教授は、本学に滞在する間に研究活動の一環として、次のようなテ ー マ で、 ３ 度 の 報 告 を 行 っ た。 第 １ 回 は “American Federalism andPublic Finance” で あ る。 第 ２ 回 は、“Decentralization and American
Intergovernmental Relations” で あ る。 第 ３ 回 は、“American Federalismand the Trump Administration” である。
各回の概要と内容は以下のようである。
第１回は、平成30年10月15日（月）５時限に1303教室で、本学学部生、大学院生及び教員を対象に、「アメリカの連邦制と財政」のテーマで、アメリカの連邦制の基礎的な内容に関するレクチャーを行った。コンラン先生が連邦政府に重点を置きながらアメリカの連邦制、財政制度について説明し、その対比を意識しながら、筆者である根岸が日本の制度や仕組みを説明するという形を取り、初学者にも分かりやすい内容とした。
レクチャーの目次は、① The Structure of US Federalism（アメリカの連邦制の基礎的な構造）、② Fiscal Federalism in the United States（アメリカの財政連邦主義）、 ③ Borrowing and Public Finance in the US FederalSystem（ 連 邦 制 に お け る 財 政 と 公 債 ）、 ④ Politics and Public Attitudes
Towards Deficit Spending（ 財 政 赤 字 に 対 す る 政 治 と 世 論 ）、 ⑤ Future
Trends and Fiscal Challenges（財政上の課題と今後の展望）である。
第２回は、10月15日（月）６時限に3405教室で、本学学部生、大学院生及び教員を対象に、「アメリカの政府間関係と分権システム」をテーマに、アメリカの政府間関係における分権的な仕組みをレクチャーした。三階層（連邦・州・地方）の政府についてそれぞれの機能、役割を説明した上で、政府間関係の仕組みを説明した。さらに、中央集権的傾向が強くなる最近の傾向を紹介した。
講演の目次は、① The Decentralized Structure of American Federalismand Intergovernmental Relations（アメリカの連邦制の分権的な構造と政府平成30年度短期招聘研究員コンラン教授の紹介と報告概要

77間関係）、② Policy Diversity in ａ Decentralized System（分権システムと政策の多様性）、③ The Theory and History of Decentralization in America（アメリカの分権システムの理論と歴史）、④ The Trend Toward Greater
Centralization over time（ 集 権 的 な 政 府 間 関 係 の 傾 向 ）、 ⑤ Continuing
Diversity in ａ More Uniform System（より統一のシステム下での多様性の確保）である。
第３回は、10月17日（水）0502大学院演習室で、本学学部生、大学院生及び教員を対象に、「アメリカの連邦制とトランプ政権」をテーマに、アメリカの連邦制にトランプ政権がどのような影響を与えているのかに関するレクチャーを行った。印象的であったのは、第１に、連邦政府でも年金や医療への支出が増えて財政赤字が生まれ、それが年々増加すると予想されていること、第２に、トランプ政権の減税により歳入が減り、連邦政府の財政赤字をより大きなものにすることが予想されていること、第３に、この財政赤字の累積が将来に大きな影響を与えることである。
講演の目次は、① Many Trump Administration policies break establishednorms and are ideologically extreme（確立された路線の崩壊とそれからの大きな逸脱）、② Such policies are accelerating vertical polarization in theU.S. federal system（連邦 - 州間の政策の相違の拡大）、③ Trump policies
are also generating increased intergovernmental conflict（トランプ政権の政策による連邦 - 州間の対立の拡大）④ Long term implications include ａmore conservative Supreme Court and deficit-induced fiscal stringency（保守的な連邦最高裁と財政的な逼迫の長期的な影響）、 ⑤ The upcoming
elections may temper but will not reverse these trends（中間選挙による影響）である。
以下は、第３回の報告の要約である。

78

報告概要

American Federalism and the Trump Administration
byTimothy J Conlan
George Mason University

Paper prepared for Presentation
Faculty and Graduate Student Workshop
Kokugakuin UniversityTokyo, Japan
October 19, 2018

平成30年度短期招聘研究員コンラン教授の紹介と報告概要

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American Federalism and the Trump Administration
The presidency of Donald J. Trump has been precedent setting in many
respects. As a political outsider with little knowledge of government, hewas able to capture the presidential nomination of a major political party,
win election, and lead an astonishing conversion of that party’s posture intoa divisive blend of conservative economics and ethno-populism.

Aspresident, he has repeatedly broken long established norms of behavior andpublic policy, including a dismissive attitude towards the rule of law, awillingness to undermine the established international order and traditional
American alliances, a propensity to take extreme positions with little
factual support or strategic analysis, and a willingness to lie openly andcommunicate those lies directly to his political supporters.
While many of these characteristics are widely recognized and discussed,
the expression of these characteristics in the context of Americanfederalism has been relatively overlooked. That is a significant omission,
because the federal system is the single most important feature of domestic
governance in the United States, and the implications of Trump
Administration policies for intergovernmental relations and systemic
performance are considerable.

To date, Trump administration policies areaccelerating vertical polarization in the U.S. federal system, generating highlevels of intergovernmental conflict, and shifting the future of the federal
system in a much more conservative direction.

Each of thesedevelopments, as well as the potential impact of the forthcoming
congressional elections, are reviewed and discussed below.
Breaking Norms in Intergovernmental Politics and Policy

80
Most of the attention given to Donald Trump’s repeated breaking of
established norms has focused on his undermining of the rule of law andhis dismissive attitude toward established international commitments andalliances.1 His willingness to pull out of existing agreements such as
NAFTA, the Iran nuclear agreement, and the Paris Climate Accords are
representative of this approach. However, the latter case also highlights
the overlooked but important intergovernmental dimensions of Trump
Administration departures from established and widely accepted policies.
The domestic counterpart of Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Accords
has been his administration’s dramatic program of deregulation inenvironmental policy.

His administration reversed the Obamaadministration’s rules for reducing carbon emissions from electric power
plants, rolled back emissions targets for automobiles, and approved drillingin the Alaska Arctic Wildlife Refuge.2 Such decisions represent dramatic
shifts in policy that have engendered bipartisan criticism, and they are
significant from a federalism perspective because environmental laws are
generally implemented through a federal-state partnership. The federal
government sets minimum national air and water pollution standards, andthese are largely enforced by the states, with some flexibility to adapt tolocal conditions.3 Yet, in the implementation of the Clean Air Act, theTrump administration is not only easing national standards, it is seeking to1

 teven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: CrownSPublishing, 2018).
2
See, for example, Lisa Friedman and Brad Plumer, “E.P.A. Announces Repeal ofMajor Obama-Era Carbon Emissions Rule,” New York Times, Oct 9, 2017, p. A1;
and The Coalition for Sensible Safeguards, The War on Regulation at https://sensiblesafeguards.org/.
3 Denise Scheberle, Federalism and Environmental Policy: Trust and the Politics ofImplementation, 2nd Ed. (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2004).

平成30年度短期招聘研究員コンラン教授の紹介と報告概要

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roll back California and other states’ option to exceed federal pollution
standards—a feature of environmental policy that dates back to thefoundational law in this policy field: the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970.4
Environmental protection is not an exceptional case.

The Trump

Administration has proposed a variety of draconian immigration policies
that often intersect with state and local government authorities in law
enforcement and social services. Such policies include the so-called “Muslimban,” sharp reductions in refugee admissions to the U.S., proposed
reductions in legal immigration, a proposed “wall” on the Southern border,
and draconian family separations within the country and at the border.
The administration is also pursuing welfare policies that break with longestablished norms and practices, such as new and onerous workrequirements for many recipients of Medicaid and nutrition programs.
And it has advanced tax law changes that appear to target high tax statesthat elect Democrats—part of a broader propensity to seek policies andpractices that punish political enemies.5
Accelerating Vertical Polarization and Intergovernmental Conflict
All of the aforementioned policies, and others, have provoked serious
intergovernmental conflict and accelerated the propensity toward verticalpolarization in the U.S. federal system.
4

The trend toward partisan

 ob Egelko, “Trump attack on California’s emission standards faces legal battle,”B
San Francisco Chronicle, August 2, 2018, p. B1.
5
Alan Greenblatt, “Federal-State Relations: Is Partisanship Putting Governance atRisk?” CQ Researcher 28:16, April 27, 2018, pp. 365-388.

82
polarization is a well known phenomenon in American politics. But suchpolarization is usually conceived in horizontal terms—between the parties
in Congress and between the President and Congress under divided party
government. Such horizontal polarization is very real, as evidenced by thewidening ideological gap between Democrats and Republicans in Congress.6
However, there is also a growing and significant vertical dimension ofpartisan polarization that is shaping federal-state relationships in importantways, and Trump administration policies are exacerbating this form ofpolarization.
Vertical polarization emerged as a prominent feature of American politics
during the Obama administration.

Particularly after conservative

Republican victories in the 2010 elections, significant federal-state conflicts
emerged between Republican controlled states and the Democratic
administration in Washington across a range of issues.7 Many Republican
dominated state governments refused to implement health insurance
reforms and the expansion of Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act—atthe cost of tens of billions of dollars in federal aid and the denial of services
to millions of citizens--and more than twenty Republican state Attorneys
General sued to have the law declared unconstitutional by the SupremeCourt. Some Republican governors also refused economic stimulus funds
during the Financial Crisis, and others sued to block new environmental
regulations.8 At the same time, officials in states controlled by Democrats

6

Christopher Hare and Keith T. Poole, “The Polarization of Contemporary American
Politics,” Polity 46 (July 2014): 411-429.
7
Timothy J. Conlan and Paul L. Posner, “American Federalism in an Era of Partisan
Polarization: The Intergovernmental Paradox of Obama’s ‘New Nationalism,’”
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 46 (Summer 2016): 281-307.

平成30年度短期招聘研究員コンラン教授の紹介と報告概要

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enthusiastically embraced and implemented all of these policies.
Such vertical polarization has become even more contentious under
President Trump, although the roles of Republicans and Democrats havebeen reversed. Now a conservative populist Republican administration ismeeting resistance and law suits from Democratic states. Thus, many socalled “blue” (Democratic) states have vowed to adhere to the goals of theParis Climate accords and have adopted state policies that will reducecarbon emissions. Many have sued the federal government to block
Trump’s rollback of Clean Air standards. So-called “sanctuary” cities andstates have refused to allow local law enforcement officials to cooperatewith newly aggressive federal efforts to arrest and deport illegal
immigrants, even though such cooperation was often customary in the past.
Other Democratic states have sued to block Trump administration efforts
to restrict implementation of the Affordable Care Act. And, finally, many
blue states fought efforts to change federal tax laws in ways that penalize
high income earners in high tax states, and they are suing to overturnportions of that law.9 In short, intergovernmental conflict and partisan
polarization have continued and increased under the Trump administration,and the traditional twentieth century model of “cooperative federalism” israpidly eroding.
A “Devolution Revolution”? The Long Term Implications of the TrumpAgenda
8 imothy J. Conlan, Paul L. Posner, and Priscilla Regan, eds., Governing Under
T
Stress: Managing Obama’s Stimulus Program, (Washington: Georgetown
University Press, 2017).
9For more details, see Greenblatt, “Federal-State Relations.”84
Projections of long term policy and institutional change are always
challenging; conditions evolve, leaders change, and decisions can bereversed. Nevertheless, the Trump agenda has the potential to produce
substantial changes in the American federal system if it is sustained andfully implemented.

This includes substantial decentralization and asignificantly reduced role for the national government. Even if it is only
partially implemented, important elements of the Trump agenda--including
large scale federal tax cuts and changes in the makeup of the Supreme
Court--promise to be difficult to reverse.
In fiscal policy, the Trump administration has sought—and partiallyobtained—policy changes which imply significant devolutionary effects.
Reductions in personal and corporate income tax rates, adopted as part of
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, will reduce federal revenues by an
estimated $1.9 trillion over the next decade.10 Combined with the growthof federal pension and health programs for an expanding elderly population,
this will place tremendous stress on future funding for aid to state andlocal governments.

With the exception of Medicaid (the federally

subsidized health care program for the poor and disabled people) suchfederal aid programs are already shrinking as a share of GDP, and such
shrinkage is likely to accelerate in the absence of new federal revenues. Infact, dramatic cuts and terminations of many of these federal aid programs
would already be in place if Congress had adopted President Trump’s
proposed budget, but thus far Congress has deferred action on many ofthem. 11 President Trump and Republican majorities in Congress did10 ongressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2018 to 2028,C(Washington: Congressional Budget Office, April 2018).

平成30年度短期招聘研究員コンラン教授の紹介と報告概要

85

support reductions of 25% in Medicaid spending over the next decade,however. Only the defection of a tiny handful of Republican Senators,
along with unified Democratic opposition in the Senate, prevented this fromhappening. The proposal for major cuts and restructuring of Medicaid
failed by a single vote.
Recent federal tax law changes have also created obstacles to statesraising their own taxes to fund threatened social programs. Caps on how
much state and local tax payments citizens can deduct from their income
subject to federal taxation will raise the marginal cost of state and local
taxes and increase pressure to reduce them over time. This is particularly
important in higher tax states that support larger public expenditures andwhich tend to vote Democratic.

At the same time, rollbacks of federal

regulations for environmental and consumer protections will devolve moreof those regulatory decisions to the states, where interstate competition forjobs and capital increase incentives to keep regulatory standards low.
From both a fiscal and regulatory perspective, then, Trump administration
policies promise to promote a “race to the bottom” between the states,
favoring state reductions in both taxes and regulations.12
Finally, the Trump administration and Senate Republicans have worked
together to remake the federal judiciary and to install a much more11

 enter on Budget and Policy Priorities, The 2019 Trump Budget: Hurts Struggling
CFamilies, Shortchanges National Needs, (Washington: Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, February 2018), at www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/the-2019trump-budget-hurts-struggling-families-shortchanges-national-needs
12David M Konisky and Neal D Woods, “Environmental Federalism and the Trump
Presidency: A Preliminary Assessment,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 48(July 2018): 345–371.

86conservative Supreme Court. Because federal judges serve terms for life,
this promises to have far reaching effects on both public policy and federalstate relations. With two Supreme Court appointments in just his first twoyear in office, Trump has been able to build what promises to be the mostconservative majority on the Supreme Court since the 1930s. Based on thelegal doctrines these justices advocate, this new majority promises to makedecisions that will weaken federal government authority considerably.
These decisions are likely to include limiting the scope of the federal
government’s powers to regulate interstate commerce, elevate the burdenof proof for federal regulators, erode voting and civil rights protections forminority groups, and enlarge the sphere of state sovereignty under the
10th Amendment. 13
Implications of the 2018 Elections
The trajectory toward devolution outlined above may be slowed by thisyear’s congressional elections. Currently, Democrats are favored to win
control of the U.S. House of Representatives, although such projections arealways uncertain.14 If they do, this will have important consequences.
Democrats are poised to open a range of investigations and aggressively
utilize their oversight authority of the Trump Administration. They will
also be in a position to block new decentralizing legislation. Depending on
the outcome of current investigations of the 2016 election, they may evenpursue impeachment of President Trump.
13I lya Somin, “Federalism and the Roberts Court,” Publius: The Journal ofFederalism, 46 (Summer 2016): 441-462.
14
Nate Silver, “Forecasting the race for the House,” at https://projects.fivethirtyeight.
com/2018-midterm-election-forecast/house/平成30年度短期招聘研究員コンラン教授の紹介と報告概要

87

However, by themselves, the midterm elections will only have limited
effects on several aspects of the devolutionary agenda outlined above. Thetax cuts will remain locked into place at least until Democrats are able togain control of both chambers of Congress and the Presidency. Even then,raising taxes is always far more difficult than cutting them.

More

immediately, if Democrats fail to win a majority in the Senate thisNovember, as currently appears likely, then the Senate’s confirmation ofadditional conservative judges and cabinet officials will continue apace.
Trump will retain control over the Executive Branch, and the Constitution
grants presidents enormous authority over defense, foreign policy,personnel, and the administrative state.
Finally, whatever happens in future elections, Trump may have done
lasting damage to political norms and practices, the rule of law, andAmerica’s standing in the world.15 This damage may be mitigated by
future elections and the behavior of future leaders, particularly if there is awholesale repudiation of Trump’s methods and behavior by the generalpublic. But, so far, he has retained a solid base of support, especially within
the Republican party, and he has inspired a coterie of other politicians toemulate his behavior. Such supporters represent a minority of the generalpublic, but if they remain loyal, a wholesale repudiation of Trump becomesless likely. Even if it occurs, once good will has been expended, it is a hardand slow process to regain it. This may be Trump’s ultimate legacy, infederalism and beyond.

15 homas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even Worse than it Was: How theTAmerican Constitutional System Collided with the Politics of Extremism,” (NewYork: Basic Books, 2016).