C ALE Discussion Paper No.7
September, 2011

Framework of the ASEAN Plus
Three Mechanisms Operating in theSphere of Economic Cooperation
Prof. Dr. Vyacheslav V. Gavrilov

Nagoya University
C e n t e r for Asian Legal Exchange

Center for Asian Legal Exchange (CALE)
Nagoya University, Japan

Framework of the ASEAN Plus Three Mechanisms
Operating in the Sphere of Economic Cooperation

Prof. Dr. Vyacheslav V. Gavrilov
Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

3

INTRODUCTION

3

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF APT FRAMEWORK ORIGIN
AND DEVELOPMENT

6

A. Creation of APT

6

B. Stages of APT Members’ Economic Cooperation

9

1. Period between 1997 and 2007

9

2. Period from 2007 to present

15

II. INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM OF APT COOPERATION

18

A. Nature of APT Institutional Mechanism

18

B. Units of APT Institutional Mechanism in Economic Cooperation

21

1. Formation of the APT economic institutional framework21

2. Functional features of the APT’s institutional structures

27

III. RULE-MAKING ACTIVITY WITHIN THE APT FRAMEWORK33

A. Essence of the International Rule-making Processes

33

B. Rule-making Mechanism of APT

35

C. Normative Sources of APT Members’ Economic Cooperation

42

1. Political instruments

42

2. Legally binding agreements

46

CONCLUSION

51

Appendix I

53

Appendix II

54

Appendix III

57

Appendix IV

58

2

ABSTRACTThis paper is devoted to the analysis of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) grouping as a specific form ofcooperation among the East Asian countries. It contains a brief historical overview of the APT creation
process and reveals the content of the main stages of its member states‟ economic cooperation. By theexample of institutional and rule-making mechanisms, operating within the APT‟s economic sphere, thepaper shows the main differences that distinguish this grouping from various international
intergovernmental organizations which possess international legal personality. The paper provides
information on a detailed characteristic of these mechanisms‟ nature and content, and evaluates theireffectiveness in solving problems and challenges faced by APT.

INTRODUCTION

It is undoubtedly that in the XXI century the economic development of the Asia-PacificRegion (APR) will largely determine the main directions of both the development and the
dynamics of evolution of the world economy as a whole. 1 Even today, many Asia Pacificcountries show economic growth, far surpassing the growth rates of the other regions‟
economies.2 Such state of things is determined, inter alia, by the presence in APR of activelyfunctioning international institutions and instruments, whose activity is designed not only todevelop a joint position of their member states on the prospects of their economic cooperation,
but also to create all necessary legal and institutional mechanisms for its assuring anddevelopment.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) holds a special place among theseregional structures. It is determined by the peculiarities of ASEAN‟s international legal
personality, on the one hand, and by the role it plays in East Asian economic integration, on theother.3 Despite the fact that the ASEAN Charter, which entered into force on 15 December 2008,
stated that “ASEAN, as an inter-governmental organisation, is hereby conferred legal
1

At present, APR (in its broadest geographical sense) accounted for 44% of the Earth population, over 60% of
global gross domestic product (GDP), 66% of accumulated foreign direct investment and more than half oftotal world trade. See Agababyan E.M., “General Characteristic of Regional Economic Development” in AsiaPacific: Regional Issues, International Organizations and Economic Groupings (Moscow: East-West, 2010) at
197-198.
2
For example, GDP of Asian countries is growing now by 6% per year on an average. It is in two times fasterthan the growth of the global economy as a whole. Furthermore, average annual growth rate of China's GDP
was more than 10% during the last two decades. See Voznesenski A.D. ed., "Great East Asia": World Politics
and Regional Transformations (Moscow: MGIMO, 2010) at 25-33.
3ASEAN constantly and rightly emphasizes its centrality in the evolving regional architecture and in its
objectives to promote economic partnership with the external partners. See e.g., Chairman's Statement of the
18th ASEAN Summit, Jakarta, 8 May 2011 “ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations”, paras
43, 49, 97 and 101, online: < http://www.asean.org/Statement_18th_ASEAN_Summit.pdf>.

3personality”, 4 this association does not fully conform to the characteristics of a typicalintergovernmental international organization.
It is particularly reflected in the process of rule-making, which exists in ASEAN and isbased on consultation and consensus more than on formal procedures, as well as in the
documents adopted by ASEAN, their legal force and mechanisms of their implementation. The
feature of ASEAN as an international legal person also is that this entity, as a rule, is greater than
the sum of its member-states in the sphere of internal issues but it is still less than such sum inrespect of many directions of ASEAN's external relations. 5 Nevertheless there are some
exceptions to the general rule that ASEAN is not a good interlocutor with external actors. A
significant one is the ASEAN Plus Three forum, which functions as a coordinator of cooperation
between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and three East Asian Nations of China,
Japan and South Korea.6
The root cause of such exception existence is that the acquisition of foreign capital andsecuring of export markets remain very important for the development of ASEAN countries,
along with the capital provision and intra-regional markets securing. That is, it was vital for
ASEAN to obtain financial assistance from external partners and thereby increase the level ofoverall cooperation.7 China, Japan and South Korea in this sense are the most important figures
for ASEAN countries, as they are, firstly, quite close to them geographically and culturally,
secondly, have the financial and economic capacity to provide the necessary assistance and, inthe third, they are interested in developing successful cooperation with ASEAN.
This interest is mainly based on the aspiration of the core states of Northeast Asia (NEA)8
to steadily increase their political and economic influence on the countries of Southeast Asia
(SEA), to expand sales markets in the ASEAN states and to develop industrial and financial
cooperation with them. Besides, NEACS quite successfully exploit the opportunities of both
ASEAN and APT for their own bilateral and tripartite relations adjustment. The latter

4

Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 20 November 2007 (entered into force 15 December2008), art. 3, online: < http://www.aseansec.org/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf>.
5
See for details e.g., Simon Chesterman, “Does ASEAN Exist? The Association of Southeast Asian Nations as
an International Legal Person” (2008) 12 SYBIL 199.
6
Ibid. at 210.
7
Kazushi Shimizu, “Deepening of Intra-ASEAN Economic Cooperation and Expansion Throughout East
Asia” in Tamio Nakamura ed., East Asian Regionalism from a Legal Perspectives: Current Features and a
Vision for the Future (London and New York: Routledge, 2009) at 12-13.
8
Northeast Asia is usually understood as a region comprising Mainland China and Taiwan, Japan, Korea(North and South), Russia and Mongolia. At the same time China, Japan and South Korea are often seen as thecore states of NEA (NEACS).

4

circumstance has significant value because still there is a lack of solid and effectively working
institutional system of interstate cooperation in NEA.9
The ASEAN Plus Three grouping is a unique institution. From the legal point of view it
cannot be defined either as an international intergovernmental organization or as an organ ofsuch organization. In other words APT does not possess its own international personality. But at
the same time nowadays the forum has a sophisticated organization structure and its decisions
are of great practical importance for the development of political and economic relations in EastAsia.
For its more than ten-years-old history, APT managed to achieve significant success on
its way towards the assistance in coordinated economic growth, acting as an authoritative forum
for exchange of views between the states‟ leaders, officials and experts. The formulation ofnumerous declarations, plans of actions and agreements became a result of ASEAN Plus Threeforum activity. These documents have normatively traced the strategic outlook of the region‟s
economic advancement and defined the basic mechanisms of its implementation in suchimportant spheres as trade and investments, energy, agriculture, technological transfer anddevelopment, intellectual property, transport and tourism, environmental protection, etc.
The above mentioned regulatory documents‟ study, systematization and analysis are ofutmost academic and practical interest from two points of view. First of all, it is connected with
the necessity of such documents legal force precise definition and with the nature of their
obligatory impact on the states‟ and other subjects‟ way of behavior by virtue of the fact that the
majority of APT documents are of specific character as compared to traditional legal regulators
for the international economic relations and to the other international law sources.
Moreover, besides all the above mentioned, the characteristic of the normative regulationof APT members‟ economic cooperation, the release of its weak and strong aspects, and theadvancement of the request for such normative regulation perfection are important in order togive an outlook for East Asia states‟ economic cooperation and to ensure the effectiveness ofinternational mechanisms essential for such cooperation realization. At last, the examination of
structure, as well as forms and methods of APT institutional mechanism working have aconsiderable interest in this sense.
This paper examines the framework of APT's rule-making and institutional mechanisms,
operating in the field of its member-states' economic cooperation. It is divided into three sections.
The first one provides historical background of the origin, stages and main directions of
economic cooperation between the APT countries. The second section discusses APT‟s
9

See for details e.g., Kent Calder and Min Ye, The Making of Northeast Asia (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2010) at 27-53.

5

institutional structures designed to enable the elaboration, adoption and implementation of its
documents. The third section analyzes the nature and types of normative sources, which
determines the ASEAN economic cooperation with China, Japan and South Korea. Finally, there
are the summary and the main findings of the paper in the conclusion.

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF APT FRAMEWORK ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT

A. Creation of APT

From the late 1980s, moves to strengthen regional consolidation have gained momentum invarious parts of the world. These moves led to the creation of the European Union (EU), theNorth American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Southern Common Market (Mercosur).
This moves stimulated regionalism in Pacific Rim with the launching of the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989. However, a regional grouping involving East Asian
nations alone did not evolve in the early 1990s, although practical economic linkages throughtrade and investment deepened and expanded. Since the mid-1990s, East Asian states have foundmore interests in creating a stronger manifestation of regional ties and developing multilateral
institutions for this objective.10
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad was one of the first, who suggested theidea of East Asian countries grouping. Addressing 23rd ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in
Kuala Lumpur in October 1991, he noted that ASEAN on its own is not strong enough to protect
free trade. In connection with this he stressed the need to work together with the East Asian
Economies through the formation of the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) which will be
GATT-consistent, compatible with APEC, and not detrimental to ASEAN's cohesiveness. 11
From Mahathir‟s point of view

East Asian regional organization where the members would be entirely Asian would help
promote Asian tolerance and belief in non-interference in the domestic affairs of other

10

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, The Political Economy of Regionalism in East Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2008) at 1.
11
The 23rd ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting, Malaysia, 7-8 October 1991, online:<http://www.aseansec.org/6126.htm>.

6

countries. […] An East Asian regional grouping would centrality strengthen the bargaining
clout of all the countries within it, small and big.12

However, this idea has met resistance from the USA, which feared that EAEG would
become a rival for the newly formed APEC and that the creation of such a structure without the
involvement of the Western nations would reduce the U.S. influence in the region. James Baker,
who was then the U.S. Secretary of State, visited South Korea and Japan and told them not tohave anything to do with the proposal. Certain ASEAN countries were also advised not tosupport EAEG. As a result, the East Asian Economic Group was not created.13 It gave Mahathir
Mohamad the reason to speak about the existence of double standards: “It would seem in the U.S.
view that while European countries could get together, and Canada, the U.S. and Mexico could
form NAFTA, East Asian countries were not even to be allowed to talk to each other”.14
But a few years later, the project of East Asian regionalism was revived. Awareness of
growing economic interdependence in the region and frustration in existing international
financial and economic institutions have pushed the countries of the East Asia to the practicaldecision of the establishment of their own structure. First Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), which
was held in Bangkok in 1996 and was attended by the countries from EU and East Asia (ASEAN,
China, Japan and South Korea), became one of the catalysts on the way to such decision. During
this summit the leaders of the Asian countries held joint discussions in order to elaborate
common position in the format of ASEAN +3.
A joint meeting of the heads of ASEAN member countries along with the leaders ofChina, Japan and South Korea, during which the decision on the creation of ASEAN Plus Threegrouping was made, took place in December 1997 in Kuala Lumpur. Since then, APT summits
have been held annually. At the 2nd Summit in December 1998, several specific proposals were
submitted in relation to regional economic cooperation in East Asia. For instance, Japanproposed the „New Miyazawa Initiative‟, China proposed a conference by the APT to discuss
financial issues and South Korea proposed the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG: an organization
to study East Asian regional cooperation).15
The grouping was institutionalized by November 1999. Its first joint communiqué wasreleased at the 3rd APT Summit in Manila. This document was called „Joint Statement on East

12

Mahathir Mohamad, “Let Asians Build Their Own Future Regionalism” (2006) Global Asia Vol. 1 No 1 at
15.
13
Artyom Lukin, Integration Processes and Institutions in the Asia-Pacific Region: Policy, Economy, Security(Vladivostok: FENU Publishing House, 2009) at 80.
14
Supra note 12 at 13.
15
Supra note 7 at 13.

7

Asia Cooperation‟ (Manila Statement) and for the first time determined the main objectives,principles and further directions of APT countries cooperation.16
The following eight priority areas for the joint efforts were specified in the Manila
Statement: 1) economic cooperation; 2) monetary and financial cooperation; 3) social and humanresources development; 4) scientific and technical development; 5) cultural and information; 6)
development cooperation; 7) political security; and 8) transnational issues. In the sphere of
economic cooperation, APT participants agreed to strengthen their efforts in order to accelerate
trade, investments, technology transfer, encourage technical cooperation in information
technology and e-commerce, promote industrial and agricultural cooperation, strengthen small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), promote tourism and encourage active participation in thedevelopment of growth areas in the East Asia. Relevant national Ministers and their senior
officials were named responsible for Manila Statement implementation.
Eight years later, in November 2007 at the 11th Summit of ASEAN Plus Three in
Singapore the Second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation called „Building on theFoundations of ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation‟ was adopted.17 This Statement had to ensure
the renewal of strategic and practical guidance for APT process future development. The APT
Cooperation Work Plan (2007-2017), in which the key measures for the deepening of East Asian
countries cooperation over the next decade were highlighted, was welcomed during with summit
as well. 18 The Work Plan set out four new areas of APT cooperation, amongst others – namely
rural development and poverty eradication, disaster management, minerals and women issues.
As it has been pointed out “this Work Plan is formulated to serve as the master plan to enhance
ASEAN Plus Three relations and cooperation in a comprehensive and mutually beneficial
manner for the next ten years (2007-2017)”.
The aforesaid allows dividing the history of APT's development into two main stages.
The first one covers the period from the date of APT creation until 2007. The second lasted fromthe date when the Second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation was adopted till the present
time. Let us consider more details of these stages, bearing in mind the sphere of economic
cooperation between APT members.

16

Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation, 28 November 1999, online: <http://www.aseansec.org/5301.
htm>.
17
Second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation ‘Building on the Foundations of ASEAN Plus Three
Cooperation’, Singapore, 20 November 2007, online: <http://www.aseansec.org/21099.htm>.
18
ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Work Plan 2007 – 2017, Singapore, 20 November 2007, online:<http://www.aseansec.org/21104.pdf>.

8

B. Stages of APT Members’ Economic Cooperation

1. Period between 1997 and 2007

One important feature of East Asia is that in this region, cooperative and integrative
initiatives are undertaken through „pragmatic functionalism‟. „Pragmatic‟ means that cooperative
initiatives are need-driven actions that produce immediate and realistic products. Such an actionoriented, result-based approach is conducive to fostering a continuous willingness for further
cooperation. Towards this objective, non-political, functional areas are selected for cooperation
because these areas easily produce practical outcomes. The pragmatic functional approach issuitable for East Asia because it is characterised by diversities. 19 The above indicatedcircumstances have determined two main lines of cooperation which became the focal points for
APT grouping straight after its formation: the strengthening of regional financial stability andliberalization of APT member states‟ trade relations.
Through the experience of the Asian Currency Crisis in 1997, East Asian countries
learned the lesson that their monetary authorities should undertake the regional currency
cooperation. That is why in May 2000, the „Chiang Mai Initiative‟ (CMI) was agreed upon at the
APT Finance Ministers Meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand.20 It established a network of bilateralswap and repurchase agreements for managing currency crisis in a member country. Although
CMI was an extension of the ASEAN Swap Arrangements signed in 1977, it was a new
development in monetary and financial cooperation for the East Asian Region. CMI provides the
supply of immediate short-term swap facilities to participating ASEAN member countries withtemporary international liquidity problems. Under the arrangements, US dollars shall be
exchanged against the domestic currency of a requesting participant.21
Three years later, APT countries agreed to make efforts to develop regional bond markets
at both domestic and regional levels under the „Asian Bond Market Initiative‟ (ABMI). The
development of these bond markets was expected to strengthen the financial systems of APT
members “by better utilizing the aggregate savings in the region and minimizing the risk ofmaturity and currency mismatches”.22 Lastly they also agreed to creation of regional monetary
units.
19

Supra note 10 at 14.
The Joint Ministerial Statement of the ASEAN + 3 Finance Ministers Meeting, 6 May 2000, Chiang Mai,
Thailand, online: <http://www.aseansec.org/635.htm>.
21
Supra note 7 at 13, 21.
22
The Joint Ministerial Statement of the ASEAN + 3 Finance Ministers Meeting, 7 August 2003, Makati,
Philippines, online: <http://www.asean.org/15032.htm>.
20

9Due to the above mentioned initiatives the countries of APT received ability to use theircommon huge financial resources more effectively, obtained additional guarantees against
periodically arising crises and reduced regional dependence from the Western financial markets.
Fully understanding that the coordination of monetary policies must be accompanied by
the coordination of economic policies, ASEAN Plus Three countries, in addition to CMI andABMI initiatives, confirmed the importance of the 'Economic Review and Policy Dialogue'(ERPD), which is cooperation to strengthen regional economic and financial surveillance. But
the task of ERPD remains limited to the detection of irregularities to give early warning to thecountry in trouble.23
The APT work on trade liberalization between its member countries, in the first period of
its development, became another important ASEAN Plus Three branch of activity. At the 2001
APT Summit, the report of EAVG was submitted. The report contained key proposals andconcrete measures to broaden East Asia cooperation. One of them was devoted to East Asia Free
Trade Area (EAFTA) establishing. A year later, the task of EAFTA creation was reaffirmed in
the Final Report of the East Asia Study Group (EASG), submitted to the 6th APT Summit inPhnom Penh, among other nine important medium-to-long-term measures to move East Asian
cooperation significantly forward. As it was noted in this document «EASG recommends that the
governments of East Asian countries consider the establishment of an EAFTA as a long-term
goal, taking into account the variety of differences in developmental stages and the variedinterests of the countries in the region».24
Bearing in mind the idea of a united free trade zone creation within East Asia as a longterm goal and looking into the possible ways and stages of its construction, APT members
followed the path of bilateral preferential trade agreements (PRAs) creation. As Hidetaka
Yoshimatsu notes

their interests in PTAs began as bandwagoning with and hedging against intensive trends ona global scale. At the same time, East Asian states might find value in formal PTAs as thebase for stimulating further economic transactions, as well as for political and social linkages
and further cooperation.25

23

Takao Suami, “Community Policies in the Draft Charter of the East Asian Community: How Will Regional
Cooperation Be Organized within the Community Framework” in Tamio Nakamura ed., East AsianRegionalism from a Legal Perspectives: Current Features and a Vision for the Future (London and New
York: Routledge, 2009) at 226.
24
Final Report of the East Asia Study Group, ASEAN+3 Summit, 4 November 2002, Phnom Penh, Cambodia,
online: <http://www.aseansec.org/viewpdf.asp?file=/pdf/easg.pdf>.
25
Supra note 10 at 14.

10

China acted as the initiator of such practical approach. This country was in the process of
its economy strengthening after WTO accession in 2001, and became more confident in respectof the regional trade cooperation issues. At the 6th ASEAN-China Summit in November 2002,
ASEAN and Chinese leaders signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation between ASEAN and China. This agreement both became a legal instrument ofgovernment in relation to ASEAN-China economic cooperation and laid down overriding
principles and general pattern for ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA). The Framework
Agreement contained guidelines and principles, scope and modalities for establishing a free tradearea taking into account the different levels of development between ASEAN countries andChina.26
The Framework Agreement provided, inter alia, the Early Harvest Programme (EHP),
which committed ASEAN and China to reduce their respective tariffs for certain products fromJanuary 2004. All products that were not covered by the EHP were put into the normal track andsensitive track. The timetable for tariff elimination in the normal track would be completed by2010 for the old ASEAN members and by 2015 for the new ASEAN members. In addition,
China agreed to extend most-favoured-nation (MFN) status to the new ASEAN members who
were not yet WTO members, and to implement capacity-building and technical assistance tothese members. The strengthening of ASEAN-China cooperation in the areas of trade in services,
investment, agriculture, electronic commerce, technology transfer, dispute settlement mechanism
etc. was also stipulated in the Framework Agreement.27
Practical considerations in the subsequent negotiations required slight changes in theframework agreement. In October 2003 and December 2006, Protocols to Amend the
Framework Agreement were signed. These amendments aimed to further regulate theacceleration of tariff reduction and elimination for products under the EHP and finalize the rulesof origin. At the 8th APT Summit in November 2004 in Vientiane, ASEAN and China endorsed
the Agreement on Trade in Goods and the Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the
Framework Agreement. The Agreement on Trade on Goods contained operational rules andannexes that consist of the lists of products under the normal and sensitive tracks, safeguard
provisions, general and security exceptions, and the recognition of China‟s market economy
status. In July 2005, China announced the expansion of the scope of special preferential tariff
treatment for Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. In January 2007, leaders from China and ASEAN

26

Qingjiang Kong, “China‟s WTO Accession and the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area: The Perspective of a
Chinese Lawyer” (2004) 7 J. Int'l Econ. L. 836 at 853.
27
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Between ASEAN and the People's
Republic of China, Phnom Penh, 4 November 2002, online: <http://www.aseansec.org/13196.htm>.

11

signed the Trade in Services Agreement under the Framework Agreement. Thus, China took thelead in developing a free trade area with ASEAN, and provided various incentives for the new
ASEAN members. The negotiations have steadily advanced from the framework agreement tomore specific agreements.28
Steps made by South Korea on its path of trade liberalization with ASEAN were largely
similar to those of China. The Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
and Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism under this Framework Agreement weresigned between them at the 9th ASEAN-Korea Summit on 13 December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur.
The Framework Agreement covered the establishment of ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area
(AKFTA) through a number of additional agreements on the trade in goods, trade in services andinvestment as well as the development of treaty countries‟ cooperation in the sphere of relations.
In accordance to this document Korea, following China, undertook to provide MFN status to all
ASEAN countries which are not WTO members as well.29
Specific terms of AKFTA establishing in regard of each contracting party were identified
in the Agreement on Trade in Goods under the ASEAN-Korea Framework Agreement, which
was signed by nine ASEAN Member Countries and South Korea on 24 August 2006 in Kuala
Lumpur. Thailand signed the Protocol on the accession to this agreement later at the 14th
ASEAN Summit on 27 February 2009. Moreover, for the development of Framework
Agreement provisions, the ASEAN-Korea Agreement on Trade in Services was signed on 27
November 2007 in Singapore.
Japan carefully watched the progress of China and Korea in the integration spaceformation with ASEAN, but moved along this path with more caution, preferring to conclude
bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with specific ASEAN countries individually. This can beprobably explained by the fact that Japan, unlike China, has never been an ardent proponent ofregional economic integration and has evinced anxiety about the rise of regionalism. Japan
worried that heightened trade protectionism and regional economic groupings will have negative
impact on international free trade. 30 But as the sense of regionalism grew and the trend ofregional integration deepened in various parts of the world, including East Asia, the overall
approach of Japan‟s foreign economic policy also has underwent some changes.

28

Supra note 10 at 111.
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Among the Governments of the Member
Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of Korea, Kuala Lumpur, 13
December 2005, online: <http://www.aseansec.org/18063.htm>.
30
Lai Foon Wong, “China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN Relations during the Post-Cold War Era” (2007) 1 (3)Chinese Journal of International Politics 373 at 389.
29

12

As a result, Japan and ASEAN leaders signed a Joint Declaration and Framework fortheir comprehensive economic cooperation respectively in 2002 and in 2003, and they agreed toestablish ASEAN-Japan free trade area in principle by 2012. Developing these arrangements,
ASEAN and Japan signed the Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership on 14 April
2008. It was comprehensive in scope, covering trade in goods, trade in services, investment andeconomic cooperation. The Agreement stipulated the strengthening of economic ties between
ASEAN and Japan and creation of a larger and more efficient market with greater opportunities
in this region. It entered into force on 1 December 2008.31
Besides the conclusion of PTAs between the ASEAN member countries and the Plus
Three countries, which were seen as future EAFTA building blocks, sectoral cooperation
actively developed inside APP grouping at that period. Such cooperation became more and morediversified and multi-layered from year to year, covering new areas of APT members joint
efforts (Table 1). For the purpose of its institutional support under the annual ASEAN Plus Threesummit framework, East Asian nations also created a series of ministerial and senior-levelmeetings, which multiplied and diversified mechanisms for consultation and cooperation.32 For
example, APT countries began to hold annual meetings of their Ministers of Economic, Finance,
Energy, Environment and other as well as APT senior officials‟ and experts‟ meetings in mainareas of cooperation, in addition to the initial APT Foreign Ministers‟ Meeting. The setting up of
the ASEAN Plus Three Unit at the ASEAN Secretariat in December 2003 also promoted thestrengthening of the institutional base of cooperation within the APT grouping.

Table 1 Expanding the Scope of APT Cooperation (2000-2004)

31
32

Area of Cooperation

Year of Establishment

1

Political and Security

2000

2

Economic, Trade and Investment

3

Finance and Monetary

4

Agriculture, Fishery and Forestry

5

Human Resources

6

Science and Technology

7

Environment

8

Tourism

9

Culture and Art

2001

2002

2003

ASEAN-Japan Dialogue Relation, online: <http://www.aseansec.org/5740.htm>.
Supra note 30 at 386.

13

10

Energy2004

11

Health12

Information Technology and Communications

13

Social Welfare and Development

14

Transnational Crime and Counter-Terrorism

15

Youth

Source: http://www.aseansec.org/AR05/PR-partnership.pdf

One of the most significant events at the end of the first period of APT development
occurred at its 9th Summit in December 2005, when the „Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the
ASEAN Plus Three Summit‟ was adopted. The Declaration summed up the results of thetraversed path and outlined the future directions of APT development. At the same time the APT
members reiterated their “common resolve to realize an East Asian community as a long-termgoal that would contribute to the maintenance of regional and global peace and security,prosperity and progress” and declared that they were “convinced that the ASEAN Plus Three
process will continue to be the main vehicle in achieving that goal, with ASEAN as the driving
force and with the active participation of the ASEAN Plus Three countries in order to promote a
sense of shared ownership”.33
In January 2007, at the 10th APT Summit the heads of the states agreed on the expansionof APT cooperation to the following new areas: women, poverty alleviation, disastermanagement and minerals. They welcomed EAFTA as a fruitful avenue of integration. At thesame time, they noted that it was necessary to continue to examine other possible FTA
configurations such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), which first meeting was held in 2005.
Thus, the main results of the first period of APT development were the determination of
the priority directions of its member-states cooperation and creation of the necessary institutionalbase for such cooperation ensuring. As they were aware of being the subjects of one region, theAPT countries together learned to resist crises, to harmonize their policies in economic, politicaland social spheres, and to simplify their relationships in trade and investment. In addition to that,for the reasons of 'pragmatic functionalism', they clearly determined for themselves the shortterm and the long-term tasks and resolved them sequentially using the most appropriate methods
and means, including, among other things, the possibilities of the ASEAN +1 mechanism.

33

Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the ASEAN Plus Three Summit, Kuala Lumpur, 12 December 2005, online:<http://www.aseansec.org/18036.htm>.

14

2. Period from 2007 to present

The 11th APT Summit, which took place in November 2007 in Singapore, became thestarting point for the second period of development. The Second Joint Statement on East Asia,'Building on the Foundations of ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation' (SJS), and 'ASEAN Plus Three
Cooperation Work Plan 2007-2017' (AWP), which had special importance for the further
progress of APT, were adopted there.
These documents have clearly demonstrated that cooperation between APT countries hasreached a new level, and began to pursue the aim of solution of much more important andcomplicated tasks than ever before. It suffices to compare the text of the First and the Second
joint statements on East Asian Cooperation to be sure it is right. For example, in the Manila
Statement of 1999 the APT countries “agreed to promote dialogue and to deepen and consolidate
collective efforts with a view to advancing mutual understanding, trust, good neighborliness andfriendly relations, peace, stability and prosperity in East Asia and the world”. At the same time inthe similar Statement of 2007, the East Asian countries declared the formulation of much more
ambitious goals. As they emphasized in this document:

We reiterated that East Asian integration is an open, transparent, inclusive, and forwardlooking process for mutual benefits and support internationally shared values to achieve
peace, stability, democracy and prosperity in the region. Guided by the vision for durable
peace and shared prosperity in East Asia and beyond, we will stand guided by new economic
flows, evolving strategic interactions and the belief to continue to engage all interested
countries and organisations towards the realisation of an open regional architecture capableof adapting to changes and new dynamism.34

SJS determined the scope of APT future cooperation, which would include, but not belimited to, the following four enlarged areas: 1) political and security; 2) economic and financial;3) energy, environment, climate change and sustainable development; 4) socio-cultural anddevelopment. Each of these areas has a qualitatively new content. This fact can be proven, forexample, by the description of the prospects of APT members' economic cooperation, which
provides the unification of their efforts topromote economic growth and sustainable development towards a more prosperous East
Asia with a free flow of goods and services and easier movement of capital and labour by
34

Supra note 17.

15

promoting economic liberalisation, economic integration, transparency and free tradeconsistent with WTO agreements, pursuing structural reforms, encouraging investment,
promoting transfer and upgrading of technology, protecting intellectual property rights,
improving research and policy-making capacity […]35

The fact that the 'institutional support and relations with wider cooperative frameworks'
were for the first time indicated in this Statement as a separate sphere of cooperation can also bedeemed a distinctive feature. Within this direction the APT countries agreed, inter alia, toestablish an ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Fund, to strengthen the ASEAN Plus Three Unit of
the ASEAN Secretariat and to enhance cooperation projects through rationalization and pursuingsynergy.
The APT Cooperation Work Plan was adopted in order to achieve the goals andobjectives set forth in the Second Joint Statement. This document is formulated to serve as themaster plan to enhance ASEAN Plus Three relations and cooperation in a comprehensive andmutually beneficial manner for the period of 2007-2017. 36 AWP contains concrete priority
activities and flagship projects, which should be included by relevant APT sectoral bodies intheir respective programs and plans of action for the further implementation. As it was
mentioned in SJS: “Progress in the implementation of the Work Plan will be monitored by the
ASEAN Plus Three Directors-General and reported to the annual ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial
Meeting and ASEAN Plus Three Summit”. It is also estimated that AWP will be subject to a
mid-term review and may be revised for purposes of more efficiently and effectively
accomplishing the purposes of SJS.
The Section „B‟ of AWP is devoted to economic and financial cooperation. It indicatesdetailed measures, by the use of which the APT states can enhance their collaboration andstrengthen their joint efforts in the areas of trade and investment; finance; standards andconformance; intellectual property rights; transport; tourism; food, agriculture, fisheries andforestry; minerals; SMEs; information and communication technology (ICT); and development
cooperation. Among the most important measures mentioned in this section, the completion of
the ASEAN+1 FTAs negotiations and ensuring of their smooth implementation; the continuationof efforts towards construction region wide FTA; the facilitation of trade through the customs
procedures improving; the harmonization of IP law and systems; the conducting ofcomprehensive studies on the possible establishment of an East Asia Investment Area by

35
36

Ibid.
Supra note 18.

16

expanding the ASEAN Investment Area; the development of a regional liquidity support
mechanism and many others can be named.
In general, the ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Work Plan showed the APT countries‟
high-degree readiness to deal not only with intra-regional issues but also with the external ones
and to act during the decision making process as a whole unit. Confirmation of this view comes,
for example, from the 'Joint Press Statement on ASEAN +3 Cooperation in Response to the
Global Economic and Financial Crisis', which was adopted in Bangkok on 3 June 2009.
During last three years the progress of the APT countries‟ finance and monetary
cooperation was steady and continued with the focus on the implementation of the Chiang Mai
Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) and ABMI. At the 13th APT Summit held in October 2010,
the Leaders welcomed the realization of CMIM on 24 March 2010 and the operationalization of
the APT Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) in early 2011. The AMRO will be located in
Singapore to monitor and analyze regional economies, which contributes to the early detection ofrisks, swift implementation of remedial actions, and effective decision-making of CMIM. The
APT countries also welcomed the establishment of the APT Bond Market Forum (ABMF) andthe Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility (CGIF).37 The adoption of the ASEAN Plus Three
Comprehensive Strategy on Food Security and Bio-energy Development and the elaboration of
the APT Emergency Rice Reserve Agreement as well should be noted among the other important
initiatives taken over the recent years.
APT countries also have come a long way in the study of ways and means of their traderelations liberalization. After two EAFTA reports examination (i.e. the Phase I and Phase IIreports), it was decided to continue this problem research within the four APT special working
groups: on the rules of origin, tariff nomenclature, custom procedures, and economic cooperation.
In this case two possible formats for the further collaboration are studied in parallel: theestablishment of EAFTA and organization of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East
Asia (CEPEA).
During the second period of APT cooperation development, the NEACS individual
cooperation with the ASEAN members also obtained its next step forward. The ASEAN-China
and ASEAN-Korea agreements on investment under the respective framework agreements oncomprehensive economic cooperation were signed respectively on 15 August and 2 June 2009.
Moreover ACFTA and AKFTA were put into practice on 1 January 2010. Beside this, thenormative regulation of the cooperation between China, Japan, South Korea and ASEAN in
various fields, found its reflection in numerous joint declarations, memorandums of37

Overview: ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation, online: < http://www.aseansec.org/16580.htm>.

17

understanding and plans of action, designed and signed by the officials of these countries. 38
Their analysis shows that the interaction between NEACS and ASEAN has reached a level ofstrategic partnership and develops rapidly in many areas.
Thus, since the process began in 1997, the ASEAN Plus Three process has broadened anddeepened. Cooperation is now being pursued in more than twenty areas, having a priority
importance for the East Asia countries. For the years of their cooperation the APT countries
created a solid legal and institutional framework which ensures the formulation andimplementation of their joint objectives. In order to create the rules of their economic
cooperation they have adopted dozens of documents, from political declarations to legal
agreements. There are also 64 mechanisms coordinating APT cooperation: 1 summit, 16
ministerial, 23 Senior Officials, 1 Directors-General, 17 technical level meetings and 6 othertracks meetings. 39 Mentioned documents and institutions have their own specific character incomparison with the acts and organs of typical international organizations. That is why it isnecessary to enlarge upon these features.

II. INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM OF APT COOPERATION

A. Nature of APT Institutional Mechanism

The characteristic feature of the present-day international rule-making process is in thetrend to increase the participation of international bodies and organizations in it. International
institutions achieve this in two main ways.
Firstly, they render assistance to the states in the process of agreements‟ and otherdocuments‟ working out, and often serve as the initiators of such acts elaboration. Organizational
capability of international institutions helps the countries to find an agreed decision more easily,
and, as a consequence, they greatly accelerate the procedure of agreements acceptance. Manyinternational organizations have a special mechanism, subdivisions of which are engaged infuture normative acts preparation and examination. Such documents are then to be considered
and approved by the respective international organization, or by a specially convened
international conference. In the latter case, international organizations usually provide theconference with various kinds of services and technical assistance, realized by their subsidiarybodies and secretariats. It is obviously that by doing this the international institutions do not38

The detailed list of main ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Japan and ASEAN-Korea bilateral documents in theeconomic area presents in Appendixes II-IV to this paper.
39
Supra note 37.

18

carry out the real rule-making functions and perform the actions which can be defined as
supporting or quasi-normative.
In contrast to the above mentioned, the second way is to create by the internationalorgans or organizations their own binding regulations. It can be, for example, international
agreements with their participation or resolutions and declarations, adopted by international
institutions within the scope of their competence. However, certain international structure canrealize the rule-making functions only if it meets at least two requirements: it should have its
own international legal personality and it should be entitled by its member-states to create its
own legal and political acts.40
It is clear that ASEAN Plus Three does not match these conditions. This grouping does
not have a charter which might confirm the APT status of independent subject of international
relations and international law. Moreover, all APT statements and declarations virtually are thedocuments of its member-states. These facts show that APT must not be considered as a subject,which vote is different from the votes of its participants, but as a platform to facilitate theelaboration and adoption of ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea joint decisions. Besides, theAPT members, by all appearances, are not going to change the status quo, restricting themselvesto continual statements concerning the necessity "to strengthen the ASEAN Plus Three Unit of
the ASEAN Secretariat".
In my opinion, there are several possible explanations of such state of things. First of all,it is worth remembering that in this case it is referred to the countries, most of which prefer tobuild their relations with partners on the base of the principles of informality and consensus. Thisconsensus approach has become known as the ASEAN Way 41 which, in many instances, is
opposite to formal legalism of most Western international institutions. Describing its
peculiarities, Paul Davidson noted that

[this] concept involves processes including intensive informal and discreet discussions
behind the scenes to work out a general consensus which then acts as the starting pointaround which the unanimous decision is finally accepted in more formal meetings, rather
than across-the-table negotiations involving bargaining and give-and-take that result in deals

40

For details see Vyacheslav Gavrilov, The UN and Human Rights: Mechanisms of Creation and Realizationof Legal Acts (Vladivostok: FENU Publishing House, 1998) at 38-48.
41
A similar approach to decision making process is also used by some other international institutions, attended
by ASEAN, such as, for example, APEC and East Asia Summit.

19

enforceable in a court of law. The “ASEAN way” relies to a large extent on the personal
approach in contrast to the Western way of dependence on structures and their functions.42

Consensus prevents the danger of hegemony and guarantees the right of vote even to theweakest members. Adherence to the principle of consensus requires a non-confrontational andcompromise approach, allowance of differences and willingness to find a mutually acceptablebasis for understanding.43 Obviously such a mechanism may not always be used within "rigid
and formal" international institutions, which have their international legal personality and taketheir decisions by the majority of votes.
Another reason of APT‟s being among the "institutions without legalization" isdetermined by low functional needs of its members in such legalization. Given the distinctions
between the countries in the region, even from one another, much less the rest of the world, theEast Asian countries have faced lower demands for international law and institutions. 44
Furthermore, there is a huge asymmetry of power among member-states pursuing regional
integration and so far there is still no consensus on the final goal of integration.45 It is worthy ofmention that the majority of APT countries appreciate their sovereignty and consistently standfor non-interference in the internal affairs of the states.
The above gives grounds to assert that the institutional framework of APT will remain
relatively weak in the nearest future in comparison, for instance, with the respective mechanismsof universal inter-governmental international organizations. Nowadays, there is no objective as
well as subjective preconditions for its nature and content fundamental change.
The current APT institutional framework fully corresponds to the aims and format of thisgrouping, which was originally created as a platform to promote collaborative projects and tosustaining the solidarity necessary for increasing the mutual understanding among members, but
not as an organization which independently determines the way of development for its members.
That is why the institutional mechanism of APT was established just to coordinate the activity of
the East Asia countries, and its units cannot adopt decisions legally binding for its member-states.
Today, ASEAN Plus Three is a forum, a stage to develop joint positions on issues, first of all, of
economic integration and its member states are interested in having such a tool for their joint

42

Paul J. Davidson, “The ASEAN Way and the Role of Law in ASEAN Economic Cooperation” (2004) 8
SYBIL 165 at 167.
43
Supra note 13 at 59-60.
44
José E Alvarez, “Institutionalised Legalisation and the Asia-Pacific „Region‟” (2007) 5 NZJPIL 9 at 16.
45
Nam-Kook Kim, “Europe and East Asia: Holistic Convergence or Fundamental Skepticism” in Nam-Kook
Kim ed., Globalization and Regional Integration in Europe and Asia (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.,
2009) at 87.

20

international policy implementation which will be positive for them by being voluntary and nonmandatory.
Thus, the APT members

prefer to develop a system of coordinated regulatory networks and mutual recognition. Thisapproach is more flexible and might allow ASEAN [NEACS] countries to maintain theirrespective national laws and regulations as well as their legal requirements, if they are
consistent with and complementary to the ASEAN [APT] integration schemes, and if they
are implemented harmoniously to facilitate regional integration.46

Of course, there are some elements of subordination within the APT institutionalframework, but generally it has a coordination rather than subordination nature. It currently
includes a large number of multilevel and branched bodies, meetings and groups, practicallycreated in all areas of APT activity. Now we turn to a more detailed description of their systemand practices in the sphere of economic cooperation.

B. Units of APT Institutional Mechanism in Economic Cooperation

1. Formation of the APT economic institutional framework

Despite the fact that the first discernible event, that has consolidated the ASEAN Plus
Three members, was their leaders‟ summit in December 1997, informal meetings between theirforeign ministers had been organized even before it. During the 27th ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting (AMM) in Bangkok in July 1994, ASEAN foreign ministers met with the foreign
ministers of China, Japan and South Korea at the so-called informal '6+3' lunch, the firstministerial encounter combining Northeast and Southeast Asia. The 1996 AMM in Jakarta
reached an agreement that henceforth the meetings of the ASEAN plus China, Japan and South
Korea would be included in the programme of all ASEAN Ministerial Meetings.

The informal lunches and the unofficial gatherings at the ministerial meetings helped
ASEAN and the ministers and the officials of the three Northeast Asian states to establish
mutual institutional connections, creating an atmosphere conductive to an open and frank
discussion of regional issues. This discreet but ongoing process by which the ministers
46

Lawan Thanadsillapakul, “Legal and Institutional Frameworks for Open Regionalism in Asia: A Case Studyof ASEAN” in Tamio Nakamura ed., East Asian Regionalism from a Legal Perspectives: Current Features
and a Vision for the Future (London and New York: Routledge, 2009) at 135.

21

became accustomed to dealing with each other helped to generate a growing consciousnessof a shared East Asian identity, which in turn laid the basis for the ASEAN+3 framework.47

While the East Asian concept was becoming increasingly accepted, Singaporean prime
minister in 1995 and Malaysian foreign minister in 1996 suggested that ASEAN members should
invite three NEACS leaders to take part in an informal summit. The first such summit was heldin 1997 in Kuala Lumpur.
But, in fact, the APT forums began in quite a low-key way. No joint statement was issued
by the first APT informal summit meeting. Instead of that, separate statements were made by
ASEAN and each of the NEACS leaders. Moreover, the term „ASEAN Plus Three‟ was used
only rarely and cautiously at the first two meetings, much less in the agenda for the meeting. At
first, among the APT members was not consensus on the periodicity of their meetings as well.
Only at summit in 1998, a consensus was reached that APT summit meetings would be convened
annually back-to-back with ASEAN formal and informal summits. The leaders also resolved that
the ASEAN Plus Three meeting should not be formalized and that the process should the
pursued at various levels.48
The first step towards achieving this objective was made in March 1999, when the APT
Deputy Finance Ministers and Deputy Central Bank Governors gathered for their first meeting in
Hanoi in order to «exchange views on the ways to monitor short-term capital flows and on thesubject of international financial architecture».49 Later such meetings began to be carried out atthe level of the APT finance ministers once a year.
However, the idea of 'multilevel interaction' among the APT members took its shape after
the adoption of the Manila Statement in 1999. Paragraph eight of this document defined two
types of institutions, which, in addition to the leaders' summits, were aimed to realize the East
Asia cooperation in the various areas: the meetings of APT ministers and their senior officials.50
Since 2000 such meetings have been held annually by the ministries of foreign and economic
affairs of the APT member countries. Later, while the APT sphere of action was expanding, themeetings of ministers and senior officials have also been held in other areas of cooperation(Table 2).
47

Takashi Terada, “The Birth and Growth of ASEAN+3” in Bertrand Fort and Douglas Webber eds., Regional
Integration in East Asia and Europe: Convergence or Divergence? (London and New York: Routledge, 2006)at 222.
48
Ibid. at 224-230.
49
Chairman's Statement of the First ASEAN + China, Japan, Korea (ASEAN+3) Deputy Finance Ministers
and Deputy General Bank Governors Meeting, Ha Noi, Viet Nam, 18 March 1999, online:<http://www.aseansec.org/6336.htm>.
50
Supra note 16.

22

Table 2 Establishment of APT ministers and senior officials meetings
Area of Cooperation

LevelsYear

Frequency

Ministers and Senior Officials Meetings
1

Macroeconomics/

Finance Ministers

1999

AnnualCurrency/ FinanceVice-Ministers of Finance Ministries 2002

Twice a year

and Deputy Governors of Central
Banks
2

3

Policy Coordination

Economic/ Trade/

Foreign Ministers

2000

AnnualSenior Officials

2000

Twice a year

Economic Ministers

2000

AnnualSenior Officials

2000

Three times a

Investment

year
4

5

6

7

8

9

Agriculture/ Fishery/

Ministers

Forestry

Forestry

LabourEnvironment

Tourism

Culture and Arts

Social Welfare

onAgricultureand 2000

AnnualSenior Officials

2001

AnnualLabour Ministers

2001

Biannual

Senior Officials

2001

AnnualEnvironment Ministers

2002

AnnualSenior Officials

2004

AnnualTourism Ministers

2002

AnnualSenior Officials

2002

Twice a year

Ministers of Culture and Arts

2003

Biannual

Senior Officials

2003

Biannual

Ministers of Social Welfare and 2003

Every

Development

years

Senior Officials
10 Transnational Crime

2003

AnnualMinisters of Public Security, Interior, 2004

BiannualInternal Security

11 Energy

12 Information Technology

Senior Officials

2003

AnnualMinisters of Energy

2004

AnnualSenior Officials

2002

AnnualIT Ministers

2004

Ad hocSenior Officials

2003

Annualand Communication

23

three

13 Health

14 Science and Technology

15 Youth

16 Information

Health Ministers

2004

Biannual

Senior Officials

2003

Biannual

Ministers for Science2006

Ad hocSenior Officials

2006

Ad hocMinisters on Youth2007

Biannual

Senior Officials

2004

N/A

Ministers Responsible for

2009

N/A

2009

N/A

Information
Senior Officials
Senior Officials Meetings
1

Natural Disaster

Senior Officials

2006

Annual2

Minerals

Senior Officials

2006

Annual3

Women

Senior Officials

2006

N/A

4

Rural Development and Senior Officials

2006

Biannual

2009

N/A

Poverty Eradication
5

Education

Senior Officials

Source: ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Database, http://www.aseansec.org/22206.pdf

In accordance to APT leaders' arrangements, the discussing of regional, international
political and economic questions along with the digest of present and future directions for APT
cooperation were added to the issues of APT foreign ministers‟ and their senior officials‟ annual
meetings. In its turn, potential and current projects of cooperation in different areas, proposed by
the member countries, were considered at the meetings of sectoral ministers and officials. In caseof need, special expert groups or additional meetings of the APT officials were established inorder to examine the acceptability of such projects or, vice-versa, to monitor theirimplementation.
Because of CMI (CMIM) and ABMI adoption and development, the institutionalframework of the APT cooperation in its financial sector is currently one of the most developed.
Here, in addition to Finance Ministers meetings, the regular meetings of Finance and Central
Bank Officials have been held since 2000 in order to review the Chiang Mai Initiative
implementation process. The institutional mechanism for the Asian Bond Markets Initiative
realization is even more branched. By the 2003 APT meeting, six voluntary working groups had
been established in this field to further discuss a range of key issue areas, such as a credit
guarantee mechanism in order to develop regional bond markets.

24

Following the new ABMI Roadmap endorsed by the 11th APT Finance Ministers
Meeting in Madrid in May 2008, the four ABMI Working Groups have evolved into Task Forces
addressing the four key areas namely: 1) promoting key issuance of local currency-denominatedbonds; 2) facilitating the demand of local currency-denominated bonds; 3) improving regulatory
framework and 4) improving related infrastructure for the bond markets. There is the Technical
Assistance Coordination Team, which provides technical assistance in bond markets to themembers concerned. One of the key initiatives under the ABMI framework is the establishmentof the Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility aimed at supporting the issuance of local
currency-denominated bonds in the region.51
There also exists the APT special Research Group, within the frame of which the officialsof the member states‟ finance ministries and central banks discuss the long-term and mid-term
challenges for further regional financial cooperation, drawing on the intellectual resources of theregion's research institutions. Since the establishment of the Research Group in 2004, a networkof 22 such research institutes in the APT countries has been established, resulting in the conductof major studies focusing on financial stability issues. For instance, in 2009/2010, the Researchgroup has concluded research on two topics namely: 1) Ways to Promote Foreign Trade
Settlements Denominated in Local Currencies in East Asia; and 2) Regulation and Supervision
for Sound Liquidity Risk Management for Banks. 52 All such studies‟ findings andrecommendations are discussed and endorsed by the APT finance ministers.
A large number of working and research groups were created under the control of APT
economic ministers for detailed study and monitoring of the projects in the fields of trade,investment and other areas of economic cooperation. Among them are, for example, the e-APT
Working Group, which serves as a forum for ICT collaboration between ASEAN and Northeast
Asia; the Join Expert Group for Feasibility Study on EAFTA; the APT Project of Logistics
Cooperation for Future Trade Facilitation; the APT Project of Cooperation for Internationally
Comparable Statistics and others. Special four ASEAN Plus Working Groups were also set up.
They were tasked to look into the recommendations in the studies on the East Asia Free Trade
Area and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia in parallel.
Similar structures were formed within the APT grouping and in other areas ofcooperation, as well as in the 'ASEAN+1' format, where there are separate meetings in different
levels of all ASEAN members and one of the three non-ASEAN members in the APT
framework: ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Japan or ASEAN-Korea. Besides, the APT was a goodbasis for the institutionalization of relations among the Northeast Asian countries.
51
52

ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting (AFMM), online: <http://www.aseansec.org/19588.htm>.
Ibid.

25

The ASEAN+3 mechanism provided the Northeast Asian countries with valuable
opportunities to develop their own institutions. The tripartite summit was organised on thefringes of the ASEAN+3 summit meeting. These talks offered an easy and natural
opportunity for the gathering of the three leaders. […] The meetings of trilateral foreign
ministers and economic ministers were also organised on the fringe of the ASEAN+3
ministerial meetings. The ministerial meetings at the ASEAN+3 level provided additionalchances to exchange views and opinions for ministers and senior officials from the three
Northeast Asian countries. Moreover, China, Japan and South Korea developed their own
cooperative schemes by taking advantage of the ASEAN+3 framework.53

Despite the large number of various meetings and working groups, which provide thecooperation between the APT countries, the level of such cooperation's legalization remains low,
because there is still no permanent international body to coordinate the work of APT institutional
structure. In this case we are dealing with the situation where the 'conference diplomacy' 54 has aclear priority over the 'diplomacy of international institution'. Nevertheless, the question,
concerning the creation of APT secretariat, repeatedly arose while this grouping was working.
Initially, the cooperation in the APT framework has been dealt with in the External
Relations and Coordination Bureau in the ASEAN Secretariat. But in 2001, Malaysia proposed
to establish an APT secretariat and one year later it was intended to offer seed funding in theamount of 10 million US dollars to cover the first five years of its operation. Senior officials of
the other ASEAN members expressed reservations on Malaysia‟s proposal, insisting that they
preferred to strengthen the ASEAN Secretariat in order to promote cooperation in the APT
framework. ASEAN Secretariat also showed its support in the question of the APT Unit setting
up within itself. It considered that the creation of APT Unit is more feasible than to establish
another new bureau such as an APT Bureau relating to the shortage of ASEAN Secretariat staff
and budget.55 As a result, the participants of the 8th APT Summit in Vientiane “welcomed thesetting up of the ASEAN+3 Unit in the ASEAN Secretariat” in 2003 and “expressed the need to53

Supra note 10 at 70.
See for details Sanae Suzuki, “East Asian Cooperation through Conference Diplomacy: Institutional Aspectsof the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Framework” (2004), Working Paper, Institute of Developing Economies,
APEC Study Center, JETRO, Tokyo, online: <http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Apec/pdf/
2003_07.pdf>.
55
Ibid. at 8-9.
54

26

strengthen the ASEAN+3 Unit in coordination and implementation of the cooperation andwelcomed the Plus Three countries assistance to the Unit”.56
Instituting of the regular APT Directors-General Meetings (DGM) was a kind ofalternative to a new secretariat establishing. They were endorsed by the ASEAN Plus Three
Foreign Ministers on 30 July 2002 as a coordinating mechanism to ensure coherence, efficiency
and progress of the APT process. The inaugural meeting of the APT Directors-General was heldin Seoul, Korea on 30 August 2002. Later, in accordance to the Second Joint Statement on East
Asia of 2007, the APT Directors-General were entrust with the responsibility to monitor theprocess of the APT Cooperation Work Plan implementation and to inform the annual meetingsof the foreign ministers and summits of APT about its success.
In 2009, the leaders of the APT countries came to the conclusion that the role andresponsibility of the APT DGM as a monitoring and coordinating body of the ASEAN Plus
Three Process would be transferred to the ASEAN‟s Committee of Permanent Representatives
and the ambassadors of China, Japan, and Korea to ASEAN.57
2. Functional features of the APT’s institutional structures

Taking into account the above, it should be noted that although the ASEAN Plus Threegrouping is fairly defined as 'institution without legalization', at the same time it has a welldeveloped institutional framework. We will not find any contradictions within this statement if
we, following many present-day researches, will associate the existence of international
institutionalization primary-level not with an independent international body creation but withthe agreed behavior among the members of the group.
As Yoshinobu Yamamoto notes: “If nations repeat the same or similar behavior in
relation to each other, we can say that the institution exists”.58 He distinguishes six levels of
institutionalization, depending on the degree of the joint states‟ behavior harmonization and its
incidence. There are no institutions and nations that behave solely on the basis of narrow
national interests at the first level. The second level is characterized by the presence of thecircumstances under which the states repeatedly balance each other by virtue of alliances and inorder to maintain peace. The balance of power here “is considered to be an institution defined by
56

Chairman‟s Statement of the 8th ASEAN+3 Summit, Vientiane, 29 November 2004, online:<http://www.aseansec.org/16847.htm>.
57
Chairman‟s Statement of the 12th ASEAN Plus Three Summit, Cha-am Hua Hin, Thailand, 24 October
2009, online: < http://www.aseansec.org/23594.htm>.
58
Yoshinobu Yamamoto, “Institutionalization in Northeast Asia: Is outside-in regionalization enough?” inMartina Timmermann and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama eds., Institutionalizing Northeast Asia: Regional Steps towards
Global Governance (Tokyo, New York, Paris: United Nation University Press, 2008) at 22.

27

patterned behavior”. In addition to agreed behavior, nations create sets of rules and norms inspecific topic areas, being at the third level of institutionalization. The next level can be definedas „governance without government‟ when, in addition to rules and norms, a special framework
is created to solve a wide range of common problems through a variety of means and by avariety of actors. “If governance is taken further, we achieve an authoritative decision-making
body within a certain set of issue area (government without state) and, finally, an authoritativedecision body including foreign and military affairs that comes close to the state”.59
Thus, the level of interstate relations‟ institutionalization is variable and is determined by
the real needs of these states‟ interaction for common goals and common problems achievement
and solving. Besides, the current level of institutionalization in many respects determines thenature and content of norms and rules created by nations. The development is possible here too:from the absence of rules to the norms of soft law, and from the soft law to the imperative normsof hard law. In this case, however, it should be borne in mind that the use of hard law norms forthe regulation of relations among states, as well as the use of intergovernmental organization
format for the provision of individual countries cooperation is not the only correct choice. In
some cases, arrangements can be much more effective than the norms of international
conventions, and the „conference diplomacy‟ will bring more results than the work ofinternational body which possess international legal personality. Therefore, the evaluation of
success and effectiveness of cooperation between different states cannot be done solely on thebasis of institutional level, which was reached by the relevant countries, or on the grounds of thenature of norms governing their relations.
The above-mentioned fully refers to the ASEAN Plus Three grouping. It is our opinion
that the degree of its institutionalization corresponds approximately to the fourth level in the
Yamamoto‟s scale. An authoritative international decision-making organ is not created in thiscase, but there exists a vast network of meetings, working groups and other institutions, which
operate on governmental and non-governmental levels and provide coordination of the member
states activity in a wide spectrum of areas of common interest. It seems that such „governancewithout government‟ is optimal now for East Asian countries which have a need for moving
forward together, especially in economic area, but at the same time are not ready to sacrifice
their sovereignty and to submit to another subject. The format of the structures, which forms the
APT institutional framework, and the content of their activity fully meet the expectations andneeds of its members as well.

59

Ibid. at 22-23.

28

The analysis presented above shows that three main levels can be singled out within the
APT framework. Each of them is responsible for solving its own task. The first level is the levelof APT's development strategy determination. It covers annual summits of the member states‟
leaders, which have become the most important organizational form of the grouping work. The
results of such meetings can be found in declarations and statements, which determine theobjectives and future directions of APT activity, as well as the measures for their implementation.
As it was mentioned above, among the most significant documents the Joint Statement on East
Asia Cooperation of 1999, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the ASEAN Plus Three Summit of2005 and the Second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation of 2007 can be called.
Leaders meetings, taking place in an informal atmosphere, give the heads of state an
excellent opportunity to exchange their views not only on the issues, inscribed on the official
agenda of APT, but also about a wide range of other important regional and global problems. An
important advantage of leaders meetings is that just the fact of their presence in annual calendar
makes government officials act more responsibly towards the implementation of the initiatives,
previously proposed by the leaders, and focuses their attention on the problems of APT and theentire region. The political weight of the summits makes it possible to overcome bureaucratic
barriers and to solve difficult issues, which sometimes cannot be resolved at the ministerial or
lower levels.
The second level of the APT institutional framework can be defined as the level of„operational management‟ of the processes, taking place in this grouping, and the projects,
realizable within its limits. It is the level of the APT ministers meetings, among which the annual
meetings of economic ministers are the most important in the economic sphere. The APT
countries‟ financial and monetary cooperation is coordinated, respectively, at the level of theirfinance ministers meetings. The same approach applies to the other areas of common interest.
The most important tasks of the APT economic ministers‟ consultations are to determine
the priority directions of the APT member states cooperation in this area, to approve their joint
economic projects and to monitor them. For example, at the second meeting in 2000, the APT
members‟ economic ministers identified the following priority areas for cooperation:
strengthening efforts in accelerating trade, investment and technology transfer; encouraging
technical cooperation in information technology and e-commerce; and strengthening small andmedium sized enterprises (SMEs) and supporting industries.60

60

Joint Press Statement of the 2nd Meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers and the Ministers of People‟s
Republic of China, Japan and Republic of Korea, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 7 October 2000, online:<http://www.aseansec.org/607.htm>.

29

Furthermore, the third APT economic ministers‟ meeting in 2001 adopted six economic
projects. After the third meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan in 2002, their number increased to 12,
and after the tenth ministerial meeting in 2007 up to 25.By this time they have covered a wide
range of areas including information technology, small and medium-sized enterprises, standards
and quality conformance, environment, and logistics management. The APT economic ministers
closely watch the progress of each project's implementation and consider the question of each ofthem at every meeting.
Clearly understanding the necessity of broad approval of all such projects by the APTparticipating countries, the ministers endorsed the criteria for their adoption and implementation.
As it was mentioned at the Joint Press Statement of the 2nd Meeting of the APT Economic
Ministers on 7 October 2000:

The Ministers considered and endorsed the following criteria for deciding on project
proposals to implement the priority areas of cooperation:(i) Projects should be regional in nature and benefit all member countries under theframework of the AEM+3 cooperation;(ii) The projects could be implemented with the participation of as many member countries
as possible (based on 13-X principle). However, these projects should involve, at theminimum, participation by any two (2) ASEAN member countries and any two (2) countries
from People‟s Republic of China, Japan and Republic of Korea;(iii) Projects should be implemented on a cost-sharing basis. Nevertheless some flexibility
could be provided to the new members of ASEAN namely Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar
and Viet Nam; and(iv) Project proposals should be approved by the Senior Economic Officials.61

The “13-X principle”, mentioned in paragraph (ii), has a decisive importance for themechanism of economic projects implementation. It means that the concerned projects can belaunched even if some of the members are not ready for or resist the implementation of thoseprojects. The project is desirable to be implemented by all the members of APT (“13”), but, atthe same time, this principle encourages the participation of as many members as possible.
Furthermore, it also allows some members (“X”) not to participate in the projects. 62 Thus, on the
one hand, the project should be approved by a maximum possible number of the APT members
for its implementation but, on the other hand, the refusal of any of these member countries toparticipate in such a project will not put any insuperable obstacles for its realization. Later in
61
62

Ibid.
Supra note 54 at 20.

30

2005 “the ministers endorsed the recommendations of the senior officials on measures toenhance management of economic cooperation projects and that all economic cooperation
initiatives and projects shall have a common unifying vision towards an East Asian
Community”.63
The meetings of the member states‟ senior officials, which are responsible for thepractical implementation of various projects and programs within specific areas of economic
cooperation, make the core of the third level of the APT functioning, which can be defined as thelevel of research and implementation. As a rule, these officials appear to be the heads or deputy
heads of ministerial departments. In the scope of their competence, they carry out all thenecessary measures for the preparation of annual ministers meetings, for the working agenda
formation and documents drafting, as well as for the recommendations drawing up. Besides, theysupervise and coordinate the work of the working and study groups and other units of APT. The
work of senior officials and functional groups results in reports, which they submit to higher
APT institutions for consideration and approval.
Another important feature of the APT institutional framework is the active use of nonstate actors‟ and organizations‟ possibilities in order to achieve the goals of this grouping. In
other words, participating countries, in their desire to find common ground and effective
solutions, do not only rely on the facilities of their governmental structures (Track I), but also
attract the intellectual potential of individual researchers and institutions, which are not bound by
any formal limits of political expediency or national interests (Track II). In my opinion, suchapproach to Track I and Track II unification, which is also broadly used in other institutions andorganizations in Asia-Pacific Region, significantly increases the practical value and applicabilityof the decisions taking by the APT structural units.
Among the most famous institutions of the Track II, which activities had a significant
impact on the work of APT, were East Asia Study Group and East Asia Vision Group,
recommendations of which have largely determined the strategy of the grouping development, as
well as East Asia Business Council, Network of East Asian Think-tanks, Economic ResearchInstitute for ASEAN and East Asia and others. A large number of individual experts and nongovernmental research organizations have been also involved in the deepening of the APT
members cooperation within the „ASEAN +1‟ format.
Thus, instead of having formal organizational structure, APT has formed an interestingbroadly-structured institutional framework, which is composed of three levels of cooperation: 1)
63

Joint Media Statement of the Eight ASEAN Economic Ministers and the Ministers of People‟s Republic ofChina, Japan and Republic of Korea Consultation (AEM Plus 3), Vientiane, 29 September 2005, online:<http://www.aseansec.org/17783.htm>.

31

the level of strategic development; 2) the level of operational management; and 3) the level ofresearches and implementation of joint projects. In order to be implemented any project or
initiative, proposed by a member state, shall more or less go through each of these levels and,
and, as a result, obtain other APT participants‟ approval. Such scheme, that converts “the idea of
one into coordinated behavior of many” and, moreover, includes non-state actors, substantiallyraises the importance of APT as a regional center for the effective cooperation on a wide range
of issues. In addition, the informality of the APT structures allows the states, which are not readyyet or do not want to present their ideas and plans for grouping members‟ consideration, toimplement them within the „ASEAN +1‟ or other mechanisms.
At the same time, APT remains to be an example of intergovernmental form ofcooperation, guided and controlled by its member states, in accordance with the objective needsof their development and development of the whole region. However, the above mentioned
shows that APT cannot serve as a confirmation, for example, of the neofunctionalism theory,
which emphasizes that any integrative action in one sector steps down actions in related sectors,
and this integration process creates new problems that can be solved only by further cooperation.
Sequentially, according to this theory, the beginning of cooperation in technical and noncontroversial issues would lead to cooperation in high politics areas, and eventually general
integration would be achieved by a whole new range of supranational institutions.64
The alternative theory, developed from the critiques of neofunctionalism and known asintergovernmentalism, cannot be fully applied to APT as well. It points to heads of state andgovernment as central and ultimate players, and argues that regional integration can best be
understood as a series of bargains between heads of government backed by a small group ofministers and advisers in a region.65 As Hidetaka Yoshimatsu notes, “intergovernmentalism has
been contrasted with supranationalism in explaining the principal factors promoting the
integration process, and deals with the „thick‟ international institutions. Intergovernmentalism
also puts stress on relative power among states and the dominant role of the largest states in the
integration process”. 66 As it was argued above, cooperation within the APT framework has
another basis and involves the participation of both public and private actors of different levels
and nature.

64

See for details e.g. Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).
65
See for details e.g. Paul Taylor, “Intergovernmentalism in the European Communities in the 1970s: Patterns
and Perspectives” (1982) International Organization 36 (4) at 741–66.
66
Supra note 10 at 63-64.

32

III. RULE-MAKING ACTIVITY WITHIN THE APT FRAMEWORKThe ASEAN Plus Three forum, like any other international institution, was created,maintained and strengthened to achieve certain common objectives of the member states. It was
shown above, how APT, while solving specific issues within the economic area, tried to reducetransaction costs and to create an infrastructure and business event locations for the member
states to take joint actions in order to deal with a variety of issue. But at the same time, “giventhat the basic purpose of institutions is to achieve common purposes, we have to pay close
attention to how institutions (a set of rules and norms) influence the behavior of their member
states - which is related to the issue of internationalization of the norms and compliance with therules established by the institution”.67
Bearing this circumstance in mind, the third part of the paper will be devoted to theexamination of the rule-making mechanism, operating within the APT framework. The
classification and specific characteristics of various regulatory documents, adopted by the
structural units of APT and its member states, will also be presented here. However, before we
proceed any further, it is necessary to give a brief outline of the international rule-making
process nature and content.

A. Essence of the International Rule-making Processes

The main feature of the international rule-making process is that in it, unlike the similar
national rule-making procedures, a legislative body, which could approve the rules andregulations obligatory for all subjects, is absent. 68 Existing international bodies, which areentitled to make decisions binding on the states (for example, the UN Security Council or theEuropean Court of Human Rights), act only in the legal norms application sphere, but not in thesphere of their creation. Therefore, the international norms are created by the states themselves
and appear to be a result of their wills harmonization. Such harmonization may be achieved
through a variety of forms and methods in bilateral and multilateral negotiations, international
conferences and organizations or just by the agency of interstate communication everyday
practicing. The results of such coordination are the rules, agreed and fixed by the states in certain
documents, or the rules, which had not been fixed in them, but have become the norms ofcustoms.

67
68

Supra note 58 at 23-24.
European Union is an only exception here in respect of a number of issues.

33

There are two key stages of the states‟ wills harmonization within the international rulemaking process. During the first, the harmonization of wills on the norms‟ content takes place. In
this context, depending on the number of contracting countries, the presence or absence ofcontradictions in their attitude towards the subject of agreement and area of cooperation, in
which this agreement will be created, the relevant norm can have concrete or abstract character,be mandatory or dispositive. The detail of the international rules of conduct elaboration, as wellas the level of their obligatoriness can also be determined by the goals and tasks, set by the states
and realizing the rule-making process.
During the second stage, the harmonization of the states‟ wills on the agreed norms‟ legal
force determination takes place. Its main content is that the states recognize the binding power ofinternational instruments (or customs), containing such norms. This process is called opinio juris.
After its completion, new international treaties, conventions and other sources of internationallaw appear. However, the creation of sources of international law is not the only result of theinternational rule-making process. If the states did not pass the stage of opinio juris, the rules,
which impose legal obligations upon them, cannot be created. In this case norms and documents
appear which regulate the behavior of states and other actors, but not at the legal level. Such
instruments do not have the nature of international treaties but of arrangements, and their norms
have a political force rather than a legal one.
Thus, norms and documents of different nature and content can be a result of theinternational rule-making process: from abstract and dispositive political declarations toimperative self-executing legal international treaties, which have a direct effect on the territoryof participating countries. As it was emphasized above, in each case the rule-making process isdetermined by a created document destination and by an achieved level of coordination ofcontracting states' positions concerning its content and mechanism of its implementation. In
some cases, regulation at political level may be preferable to legal and in other cases only alegally binding document can be required.
Nevertheless, a distinguishing feature of recent decades has been a considerable increasein the number of international political documents in comparison with international treaties andother international legal acts. The opinion exists that states have lost their enthusiasm forinternational treaties‟ conclusion. Moreover, self-executing treaties containing not abstract but
concrete obligations is the least popular now because the framework document can beconveniently interpreted in domestic act.69 As the famous Russian scholar Georgy Tunkin notes,
69

Vorob‟ev V., “International personality of APEC” in Vyacheslav Gavrilov ed., Michailov's Scientific
Readings of 2010. Actual Problems of the Theory and Practice of International Law (Vladivostok: FEFU
Publishing House, 2011) at 23.

34

this tendency can be explained by two main reasons: 1) the necessity of the rule-making activity
intensification at the international level, which cannot be achieved nowadays exclusively throughan ordinary process of international treaties‟ conclusion; and 2) the drive of states to create
norms, which do not impose strict legal obligations on them but, at the same time, have someregulatory effect on their behavior.70 At the same time, practice shows that sometimes politicalnorms are more effective and states follow them with more prudence in comparison with legal
norms.
A detailed examination of this problem is not the task of this paper. Therefore, it justshould be mentioned that it is prospectless to talk about the undoubted advantages of legal norms
over the political ones or vice versa. Each result of the international rule-making process,depending on the circumstances, has its strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, they should not be
opposed to each other but skillfully combined in order to solve the challenges facing theinternational cooperation today. It would seem that the ASEAN Plus Three grouping follows
precisely this path.

B. Rule-making Mechanism of APT

Possibilities and content of the APT rule-making mechanism's activity, like mechanismof any other institutional entity, are determined by the needs of its member states and by thepeculiarities of their relationships. Even quick and shallow analysis of these features shows that
the APT member states at the present time are not ready to create an extensive network ofinternational treaties in the main trends of cooperation. The reason of this, in particular, is that
there still exist a lot of diversities and differences in East Asian regional identity development.

East Asians may agree on peace, coexistence, prosperity and progress, but they disagree, forinstance, on human rights and democracy. [These facts] reflect a normative order of East
Asian regionalism with several features: democracy is not a normative value for regionalorganizations; national sovereignty should not be sacrificed for a regional order; and Asian
regionalism is a progress of elite-led, market-driven and ideologically biased movement
against the West. These Asian normative ideas have informed and affected regionalization in
East Asia, as illustrated by the developments of Asian intergovernmental forums […] andinformal networks between non-governmental organizations.71
70

Tunkin G., Law and Force in the International System (Moscow: International Relations, 1983) at 58.
Baogang He, “Normative Regionalism in East Asia” in Martina Timmermann and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama eds.,
Institutionalizing Northeast Asia: Regional Steps towards Global Governance (Tokyo, New York, Paris:
United Nation University Press, 2008) at 70.
71

35

Taking this into account, there are no prospects in the nearest future for a normative
development of Asian countries, including APT, towards the acceptance of pooling theirsovereignty, as it was seen in a case of Europe. Quite the contrary, the development of East
Asian regionalism reveals a completely different approach to this issue. Rather than poolingsovereignty, national sovereignty has been strengthened in process. From the beginning, East
Asian regionalism has been based on respect for and consolidation of national sovereignty and it
was an attractive incentive to encourage national leaders to support and push regionalism.
Besides, their colonial past has made ASEAN states “sensitive to relinquishing any degree ofnational sovereignty, and, given their current weak position in world politics, sovereignty is seen
as necessary to prevent foreign powers from intervening in their domestic affairs”. 72 That is why
the preference of East Asian states to be independent rather than bound by a supranational power
is a deep sentiment among Asian peoples. 73
The above once more explains why APT has not been created in the form of aninternational organization with a supranational authority, and why its institutional framework is
first of all designed to coordinate independent states‟ activities and does not have a rigid
subordination structure. Another consequence of these circumstances is that the results of the
APT rule-making activity in most cases have political rather than legal nature. In other words,
the APT member states prefer to harmonize their wills only within the first stage of theinternational rule-making process and very rarely reach the stage of opinio juris.
Commenting on this situation, Tamio Nakamura notes that “the East Asian style offlexible political arrangement may be seen as a feasible and pragmatic way to reach region-wideagreements against the background of the huge diversity of East Asian states in their economies,
political systems and socio-cultural traditions”.74 That is why, according to some researchers,
most of the East Asian regional mechanisms do not necessarily constitute legally binding
reciprocal commitments, or instruments for their enforcement. Moreover, “it is to be expectedthat institutions in the region will remain relatively weak. ASEAN Plus Three will not be an
exception, given the existing differences in national interest and the limits to the institutional
capability of the countries in the region”.75

72

Ibid. at 71.
Supra note 46.
74
Tamio Nakamura, “Proposal of the Draft Charter of the East Asian Community: An Overview and the Basic
Principles” in Tamio Nakamura ed., East Asian Regionalism from a Legal Perspectives: Current Features anda Vision for the Future (London and New York: Routledge, 2009) at 198.
75
Tsutomu Kikuchi, “The Political Economy of „East Asian‟ Cooperation: Towards Better Regional andGlobal governance” (2002) The Japanese Economy 29 (3) at 15.
73

36

On the other hand, there are some misgivings that without proper political and legal
mechanisms to reinforce agreements, flexible agreements could soon and substantially lose theireffectiveness and credibility.

Flexible visionary arrangements between states that insist on their unqualified sovereignty,
would allow member states to act according to their convenience, and not according to theplans that they had earlier agreed upon. If diversions from agreements because of reasons ofconvenience happen frequently, the credibility of the agreements would be substantiallydamaged; there would be fewer prospects for the few remaining rules and principles in theagreements maturing to be principles and norms universal to the East Asian region.76

It is obvious that there is some truth in these misgivings. However, it seems that much
more fears will be caused by a situation when a rigid and legally binding treaty will be concluded
between states, which do not have the desire or ability to implement its provisions. In the sameway, a supranational body to oversee international instruments implementation, invested withwide powers, can be created. But its work will be ineffective until it is supported by therespective states. Therefore, the effectiveness of a certain international normative instrument will
depend not only on its nature, form and even content but, first of all, on its conformity with thereal wills of the participating states and on the current level of their relations development. 77
With the course of time these indicators will change, and, consequently, the nature and content
of international instruments, adopted by states, will also be changed. A good example of this is
ASEAN. Its member states began their collaboration in 1967 with the adoption of politicaldeclarations. In 2007 they endorsed the ASEAN Charter – a legally binding international
agreement, which had granted an international legal personality to this organization.
It may happen that the same future is expected for APT. Meanwhile it works on today
problems and uses different mechanisms and procedures which meet the realities of its member
states‟ present-day relations. Nevertheless, even nowadays, its role as a framework for East
Asian cooperation is essential. This forum serves to create possible patterns of dialogue andcooperation, and thus to promote mutual confidence-building through an intergovernmental
network within the region. These efforts are critically important for the diversity of the regional
76

Supra note 74 at 202.
Therefore, it is necessary to agree with José E Alvarez, who writes: “There is considerable truth to the
proposition that states cooperate (or not) depending on whether they perceive that it is in their interests to do so,and this must surely apply to some extent when it comes to choosing whether or not to engage in formal treatymaking or legalised dispute settlement. But seeing the choice to legalise from the standpoint of rational choicetheory does not lead to the conclusion that “Asian” legalisation does not occur. On the contrary it suggests thatsome Asian/Pacific governments may sometimes, on some issues, find it in their interests to legalise”. Supranote 44 at 22.
77

37

countries, and essential for the avoidance of a certain North-South division within East Asia. It isalso important that private actors and transnational bodies within the APT framework such as
multinational corporations, transnational groups, and social movements, contribute to better
governance for the future East Asian community building.78
Thus, if APT and other Asia-Pacific international institutions prefer to carry out theiractivities with the help of various committees, meetings and working groups, including nongovernmental representatives, and by virtue of non-binding declarations‟ adoption, thereby
demonstrating an example of low legalization. It does not mean that they show an explicit„aversion to legalization‟ or offer to move away from international organizations possessing
international legal personality. 79 It simply means that they go their own way of
institutionalization and normative ensuring of their member states‟ cooperation and just correct itwhen necessary.
Generally speaking, this path can be defined as ‘Down-Up way’. At first, during a long
period of time, a common position among the states on a specific issue is developed at the lower
level, and then the first steps towards its solving are made. The countries elaborate institutionaland normative mechanisms to improve their collaboration in the respective area only after theappearance of a joint movement through this path and if necessary. This approach is significantly
different from the position of Europe and North America, which clearly demonstrate theiradherence to formal procedures and high level of legalization. Their behavior in this case can be
defined as ‘Up-Down way’, when creation of institutional structures and elaboration of rules andnorms at the highest level are put on the first place. The work on the desired goal implementation
begins only after the mentioned frameworks are created and only in accordance with them. Such
implementation is realized by the subjects of lower levels, whose behavior must conform to thereached agreements. Therefore, the degree of these subjects‟ discretionary power and freedom ofactions are relatively low.
One of the key features of the „Down-Up way‟ is the wide use of a decision-making
principle on the basis of consensus, which is also typical for APT. At the first APT summit in1997, its members did not discuss whether to regularize the summits. Therefore, the proceduresof the meetings holding such as formalities of filing documents and decision-making rules were
not settled during the first summit. But, step by step the members have recognized that the APT
framework relies on the consensus decision-making in its meetings.

78

Supra note 75 at 19.
See more about that in Alison Duxbury, “Moving Towards or Turning Away from Institutions? The Futureof International Organizations in Asia and the Pacific” (2007) 11 SYBIL 177.
79

38

The consensus approach to the decision-making came from Malay terms musyawarah
and mufakat, which relied largely on an unhurried way of common ground finding in order togain informal understandings or loose agreements.

Musyawarah, the process of decision-making through discussion and consultation, andmufakat, the unanimous decision that is arrived at, are associated with the traditional
approach to decision-making in the region and have played a role in village politics for
centuries and, culturally, can be identified as part of the regional social system.80

As the former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, has commented, “we havemade progress in an Asian manner, not through rules and regulations, but through musyawarah
and consensus”.81
Nowadays the principle of consensus is fairly often utilized by international organs andconferences. It means that the decision will be made only if all participants agree. Consensus
does not always stand for a unanimous consent and support: it is primarily the absence ofobjections. Therefore, according to the consensus procedure, decisions are often postponed if
there is any objection. The means for these objections overcoming within the consensus
decision-making process largely depends on the kinds of agreements to be reached.
Two typical examples can be singled out to illustrate this situation. The first is theestablishing of mutual understanding that will be recorded in „declarations‟ or „chairman
statements‟. In these documents, the members declare their willingness to cooperate but do not
specify what measures shall be implemented. The decisions made by virtue of willingness ormutual understanding are taken by consensus both when the opposing members can overcome
their objections and when conflicting sentences of the documents are adjusted in order to satisfy
those members. However, this case permits different interpretations and understandings of the
documents by different members and leads to „pseudo-consensus‟.82 The second case “concerns
making decisions on agreements that require implementation by the members. Such agreements
are likely to be decided by consensus if the members attempt to find compromises by changing
implementation procedures in order to satisfy opposing members”.83
Since the APT framework relies on the consensus decision-making, examples of twocases described above can be found in its decisions. The first case, where decisions, which
80

Supra note 42.
Joint Communique of the Fifteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 14-16 June 1982, online:<http://www.aseansec.org/3677.htm>.
82
Johan Kaufmann, Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory Analysis (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996) at
29.
83
Supra note 54 at 30.
81

39

illustrate mutual understanding, are taken by consensus, can be revealed at all three levels of the
APT institutional framework: from working and experts groups to ministerial and leaders
meetings. However, the leaders‟ summits are the most famous and significant in this sense. They
operate as the channels, which help to exchange views and gain understanding at the highest
level, and adopt statements and declarations, which outline prospective ways and areas forcooperation. However, disagreements are possible even with such broad framework of the states‟
positions. That is why reaching a consensus may require some correcting in order to satisfy the
opposing members. Suzuki Sanae gives an interesting example in this regard.

At the 1999 ASEAN+3 summit, the Philippines insisted on including its initiative of an East
Asia Security Forum in the joint statement. This initiative aims to institute the ASEAN+3
summit as a political and security forum. But, some ASEAN+3 members objected to this
proposal and supported utilizing the existing political and security mechanisms such as the
ARF. Faced with objections, the Philippines changed its proposal from establishing theASEAN+3 as a new forum for political and security issues to including such issues on theagenda of ASEAN+3 meeting (Baja 2000); there was general agreement on this revised
proposal.84

By the nature of the first type decisions, the APT members can strike a compromise
relatively easy in this case by the use of unprincipled mutual concessions or just by the revisionof declarations or statements. The negative point here is that such documents can be differently
interpreted by the participants. Another situation arises when APT considers documents anddecisions which require measures‟ elaboration for their implementation. It is obvious that these
instruments should be less open to onerous interpretation. Therefore, the process of consensus
achieving is much more complex in this case and it requires serious efforts in order to reach acompromise among the contracting parties. Institutional arrangements, which decrease the levelof disagreements among the participants or even the number of these participants, can also be
used.
Multi-level and dynamic institutional mechanism of APT, which brings together theefforts of public and private entities and can be adapted to find an agreed decision on any levelof the problem‟s specification, is perfect for a compromise achieving goal. But if the level ofdisagreements is too significant and joint efforts fail to arrive at a coordinated decision, othermechanisms for the member states‟ positions coordination can be used within APT. Among themthe „13-X principle‟ can be named, which is used during the APT economic projects preparation
84

Ibid. at 31.

40

and launching. The Chiang Mai Initiative is also an interesting example of different rule-making
schemes' combination within APT. It was approved by all members of the grouping, but its
implementation procedures had to rely on signing bilateral swap agreements among them.
Another feature of APT institutional and normative mechanisms is that they allow unrestricted
implementation of its decisions that create a positive example for the others.
The EAFTA project is among the normative acts, in respect of which the APT countries
still cannot reach an agreement. Despite the fact that the necessity of such agreement elaboration
has been discussed practically since the foundation of APT, it has not been adopted yet. Among
the reasons for this are: different levels of economic development of the contracting countries,
their diverse industrial and agricultural specialization, as well as the contradictions of national
interests associated with it.
Nevertheless, the work in that direction has been insistently and purposefully carried out
for more than ten years with the use of the possibilities of various levels bodies and institutions,and with the discussion of alternative options such as Comprehensive Economic Partnership in
East Asia. There is no doubt that the progress will be reached in this direction as well. In somespecified sense, the success, achieved nowadays in signing and implementation of bilateral free
trade agreements and a series of related documents among NEACS and ASEAN, can beindicative of this statement.
The above-mentioned enables us to come to the conclusion that the APT rule-making
mechanism quite successfully solves the issues faced by this grouping and corresponds to thecurrent level and nature of its member-states relationship. Basing on a wide range of multi-level
methods and means of the states‟ wills harmonization, this mechanism enables to pass this way„down-up‟ and, therefore, to elaborate a decision that will have a real benefit to all contracting
parties. That is why the APT rule-making mechanism is based on the principle of consensus, inaccordance with which the decisions can be adopted only if there is no objection from the eachmember of the grouping.
But this principle can be realized differently, depending on the type of decisions and theircontent. Therefore, in the case of acts adoption, which requires the approval of detailed
implementation measures, the principle of consensus can be combined with other rule-making
and institutional mechanisms and procedures. This is another advantage of the APT framework,
which permit the use of those methods and tools that are better suited for a particular problem
solving.

41

C. Normative Sources of APT Members’ Economic Cooperation

As it was emphasized above, the maintenance and development of economic cooperation
among the APT members is a „cornerstone‟ of its activity, and APT was created, basically, forthis purpose. At the same time, as practice shows, the international normative regulation ofinterstate economic cooperation covers two key areas: 1) resource transfer management, 2)
determination of legal regimes for such resources‟ cross-border movement. In the first case weare talking about the regulation of relations between states and international organizations
regarding exchange of goods (including investments and objects of intellectual property) andservices. The second sphere deals with the establishment and change of customs, currency, tax
and other regimes and procedures applicable to these resources.85 All these relations are within
the scope of international economic law, among the sources of which treaties and customs, aswell as the soft law can be named. But in contrast to other areas of public international law,international economic law tends to be positive rather than customary.86
Despite the fact that APT, to a wide extent, coordinates the interstate cooperation in thesphere of international economic law, the results of this grouping rule-making activity can berelegated to its sources only to a small extent, because the most significant of them are political
documents. Bearing in mind the current level of economic relations between the APT members,
as well as the features of its institutional and rule-making mechanisms, it seems to be quite
natural. Nevertheless, successful examples of legally binding agreements‟ conclusion between
the East Asian countries in the economic domain, as was already described above, has alreadyexisted for ten years within the „ASEAN +1‟ format.
However, in any case, both political and legal documents, concluded within the sphere of
APT economic activity, have normative nature, and, consequently, exercise regulatory effect on
the states‟ conduct. That is why, it is essential to consider their meaning and content in moredetails.

1. Political instruments

Units of the APT institutional structure issue a large number of different documents:
reports of working and expert groups, summary reports of senior officials‟ meetings and joint
ministerial statements or chairman‟s statements, which are a result of sectoral ministers‟
meetings and meetings of the APT leaders. These acts contain information on the amount of the85
86

Kuzmin E., International Economic Law (Moscow: Prospect, 2007) at 26-29.
Steve Charnovitz, “What is International Economic Law?” (2011) 14 J. Int‟l Econ. L. 3 at 5.

42

executed work, approved and implemented projects, introduced initiatives or undertaken
researches. Therefore, they obviously reflect the achievement of a certain level of states‟
positions harmonization in specific areas of cooperation. However, at the same time, these
documents do not have normative character and cannot serve as sources for the states‟ conduct
regulation, even at the political level. The reason for this is that they do not have any rules ornorms, with which the APT members could check their behavior. In other words, these
documents are designed to demonstrate the progress, achieved by the APT members, tothemselves or to the outside world, but they fail to be normative sources for such relations‟
regulation and development.
Within the APT format, only joint statements of the member states and documents
annexed to them have such a nature. Among them are the Joint Statement on East Asia
Cooperation of 1999, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the ASEAN Plus Three Summit of 2005,
the Second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation and ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Work
Plan of 2007. Content of these documents has already been analyzed above in detail, that is why
we will make just a few remarks about their purpose and normative framework as for thepromotion of economic cooperation among the APT members.
For example, in the Manila Statement of 1999 the following four main tasks were set andsolved:1. The objective reasons, which determine the importance of the APT members‟
cooperation deepening, were identified, and related benefits for the participating
countries were shown.
2. The list of priority areas for the APT members‟ cooperation, in which economic andfinancial cooperation has been put on the first place, was agreed. Moreover, the list of
more specific projects and tasks was given on each direction and that greatly increased
the practical significance of the Statement.
3. The APT institutional and rule-making mechanisms‟ basic parameters were fixed. Amongsuch mechanisms special importance was given to consultative and cooperative processesof the states‟ wills harmonization, as well as to the meetings of leaders, ministers andsenior officials.
4. The APT member states‟ commitment to pursue the implementation of this Statement,
and the principles, according to which this commitment must be carried out, were
defined.87

87

Supra note 16.

43Thus, the Manila Declaration of 1999 represents a classic normative document, which
possesses political nature, and can be clearly defined as the result of international rule-making
process, within which the participants have harmonized their wills, concerning certain rules ofconduct, and have incurred a political commitment to implement them.
Such political obligations of the APT member states were to a lesser extent expressed in
the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 2005. But even here we can find their “common resolve torealize an East Asian community as a long-term goal”; further recognition “the important role
played by the ASEAN Plus One processes to the overall cooperation within the APT
framework”; and confidence “that the growing interactions among the APT countries will help
promote greater dialogue and collective efforts to both harness opportunities and meet thechallenges posed by a fast-changing and globalizing world”.88
In the Declaration the APT members also, among other things, clearly showed theircommon intention to “continue to hold the ASEAN Plus Three Summit annually in conjunction
with the ASEAN Summit in order to guide and provide political momentum to East Asian
community building under the APT cooperation”; to “speed up the implementation of short-term,
medium and long-term measures of the EASG Final Report”; and to “conduct regular exchange
of intellectuals, members of think tanks, religious personalities and scholars”.89 That is why itshould be noted that the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 2005, on the one hand, reaffirmed thegoals and objectives of the APT grouping, which had been consolidated in the Manila
Declaration, and, on the other hand, identified new pivot points for its members‟ cooperation.
Another important document containing political commitments of the APT members was
the Second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation of 2007. 90 The higher level of mutual
understanding and specification in each of the four above-mentioned areas of the APT members‟
positions harmonization was reached there. This particularly concerns a more precise definitionof the APT objectives in the modern context, acknowledgement of the significant contribution
made by „ASEAN +1, and „+3‟ countries to overall cooperation within the APT framework as
well as more comprehensive determination of the future scope of the APT cooperation andcreation of a more detailed mechanism for the SJS purposes‟ implementation.
The basis of this mechanism is the APT Cooperation Work Plan 2007-2017, which was
adopted together with SJS. It contains specific priority activities and flagship projects, whichshall be implemented by relevant sectoral bodies through their respective programs and plans ofaction. It should be also noted that the AWP peculiarity was not only in the determination of the88

Supra note 33.
Ibid.
90
Supra note 17.
8944list of no longer general but specific cooperation projects, but also in the establishment of states
obligations for their realization. In this regard AWP provides that “the APT countries shallpursue […] joint actions and measures as well as capacity building activities, through closer
consultation and coordination with sectoral bodies, in accordance with their respective law andregulations”.91
The diversity of the APT members‟ interstate cooperation provided an opportunity forthem to elaborate common solutions and mutual political obligations also in other formats.
Among them, as it was repeatedly emphasized above, cooperation within the frameworks of„ASEAN +1‟ is of particular importance. A large number of documents defining the perspectivelines of the contracting states‟ cooperation and specific methods and tools for such cooperation
promotion and development were accepted within this format as well. Among the mostimportant are the following: the Joint Declaration of the Leaders of ASEAN and Japan on theComprehensive Economic Partnership of 2002; the Joint Declaration of the Heads ofState/Government of ASEAN and the People's Republic of China on Strategic Partnership for
Peace and Prosperity of 2003; and the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation
Partnership between ASEAN and the Republic of Korea of 2004. At the same time, special plansof action were adopted (ASEAN-China in 2004 and 2010; ASEAN-Korea in 2004) in order tofacilitate the implementation of these documents, just as in the case with SJS. Despite the factthat the cooperation within the „ASEAN+1‟ format in a number of areas, including the economic
sphere, was regulated in these documents in more detail, generally these instruments did not
differ from the APT documents by their nature and implementation mechanisms.
Finally, among the most important political documents at this time defining the purposes,
direction and scope of the East Asian states‟ behavior in their mutual relations are the Joint
Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation among the People's Republic of China,
Japan and the Republic of Korea, which was issued by the three leaders at their fifth summit in
October 2003 in Bali. This China-initiated declaration recognized that a solid foundation should
be laid for the promotion of the tripartite cooperation among NEACS and stated that “China,
Japan and Korea share responsibilities to maintain regional peace and stability and promotecommon development for all countries”. 92 It also identified 14 areas, including trade andinvestment, where triangle cooperation should expand and deepen “in a steadfast manner,
starting with easier projects and gradually expanding the scope and depth of this cooperation”.
The leaders also reached an agreement to set up a three-party committee to study, plan,91

Supra note 18 at 1.
Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation among the People's Republic of China, Japanand the Republic of Korea, Bali, 7 October 2003, online: <http://www.aseansec.org/15284.htm>.
92

45

coordinate and monitor cooperation activities and to submit progress reports to subsequentsummit meeting.

2. Legally binding agreements
If joint statements and reports contain information on the dynamics of the APT members‟
wills harmonization process and declarations represent the documents of a general nature
containing these members‟ political commitments, then legally binding agreements are the resultof a full-scaled international rule-making process, which consists both of the stage of the wills
harmonization regarding the rules of conduct (norms) and the stage of the wills harmonization
concerning such norms validation. In this case, states are “legally bound by a rule orcommitment in the sense that their behavior thereunder is subject to scrutiny under the generalrules, procedures, and discourse of international law, and often of domestic law as well”. 93
Moreover, legal norms, in contrast to political norms, as a rule, “unambiguously define theconduct they require, authorize, or proscribe”.94
Making legally binding agreements, states bind themselves by stricter obligations and canbe brought to various forms of liability for their violations. That is why it is an important
decision and should be based on a firm and objective foundation motivating states to make it.
The financial crisis of 1997 played a pivotal role for East Asia countries in this sense. It
increased their awareness of and confidence in the need for regional cooperation to avoid anothercrisis and to promote regional economic growth. As a result the ASEAN Plus Three grouping
was created, which began to take active participation in the process of its members‟ economic
cooperation development. But in order to arrive at real results in this direction it was not enoughto make just political arrangements, which were examined above. Specific steps to liberalize
trade, promote investment and technical cooperation required relevant normative support, which
could be achieved just through legal instruments. All that served as a stimulus for the conclusionof a large number of international legally binding agreements by Asian countries in the form of
economic free trade agreements or economic partnership agreements (EPA).
Explaining the difference between them, Shujiro Urata notes that “under an FTA,
members remove tariff and non-tariff barriers on trade among themselves while maintaining
their own tariff and non-tariff barriers on trade with non-members”. In its turn, EPA “not only

93

Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Shidal,“The Concept of Legalization” (2000) International Organization 54 (3) at 401.
94
Ibid.

46

includes removing tariff and non-tariff barriers, but also liberalizes foreign direct investment(FDI), and provide for trade and FDI facilitation, economic and technical cooperation”.95
The idea of an FTA covering all East Asian countries arose right after the formation of
APT. At the summit of this grouping in 1998,

the leaders decided to set up the East Asia Vision Group to study the long-term vision foreconomic cooperation. The group have presented the leaders with recommendation including
the establishment of an East Asian Free Trade Agreement […] The Expert Group, which was
set up at the recommendation of ASEAN+3 Economic Ministers, presented its
recommendations to the Economic Minsters in 2006 to start the process in 2007 toward
establishment of an East Asian FTA. The recommendations by the Expert Group, however,were not adopted and the Expert Group was asked to conduct further study.96

At the present time, the study of this problem is still ongoing and therefore, within APT,
the real steps for the EAFTA conclusion have not been done yet. The main reason for this is thepresence of strong opposition from non-competitive sectors in each APT member country. The
political and economic contradictions between NEACS also prevented them from a trilateral
FTA creation in accordance with the proposal of China, which it had made to Japan and South
Korea in 2002. The process of international economic agreements conclusion between the APT
countries was much more successful within the „ASEAN +1‟ format, which required much lessefforts to harmonize their positions and to elaborate mutual legal obligations.
It was China that succeeded most in this area. When China joined WTO in 2001, it
established an access to the global market and started to pursue regional strategies by using
FTAs. China signed a framework agreement on comprehensive economic cooperation with
ASEAN in November 2002, treating it as a group. Responding the ACFTA, Japan quickly
approached ASEAN with a proposal to work out a Japan-ASEAN FTA, but the agreement oncomprehensive economic partnership between them was signed not until April 2008. South
Korea followed these movements and set up FTA with ASEAN in 2005. Now these treaties
together with other international agreements, which specify and complement their content, haveformed a solid legal basis for the economic cooperation between ASEAN and NEACS.
Therefore, it is important to briefly review such documents‟ characteristics and content, paying
95

Shujiro Urata, “Free Trade Agreements: A Catalyst for Japan‟s Economic Revitalization” in Takatoshi Ito,
Hugh Patrick and David E. Weinstein eds., Reviving Japan’s Economy (Cambridge and London: The MIT
Press, 2005) at 386.
96
Shujiro Urata, “Exclusion Fears and Competitive Regionalism in East Asia” in Mireya Solis, Barbara
Stallings and Saori N. Katada eds., Competitive Regionalism: FTA Diffusion in the Pacific Rim (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) at 46-47.

47

special attention to the subject of these agreements, the nature of obligations that they impose on
the contracting states, and the way of disputes resolution fixed in them.
One of the characteristic features of free trade agreements, concluded between ASEAN
and NEACS, is that they are comprehensive in their content. As such, these agreements arecalled Framework Agreements on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation (ASEAN-China and
ASEAN-Korea), or Agreements on Comprehensive Economic Partnership (ASEAN-Japan).
“These new types of FTAs […] include facilitation of foreign trade, liberalization and facilitationof FDI, economic and technical cooperation, in addition to trade liberalization, which is included
in traditional FTAs”.97 Furthermore, the agreements pay particular attention to the developmentof economic and technical cooperation between ASEAN and NEACS because many countries of
the region are developing and they need economic and technical cooperation in order to promote
their growth.
That is why each of the treaty concerned contains an additional list of agreed priority andprospect areas for the future economic cooperation of the contracting parties. For example,
Article 7 of ACFTA identifies the following five priority sectors of cooperation: a) agriculture;b) information and communications technology; c) human resources development; d)investment; and e) Mekong River basin development. Moreover, it also stipulates thatcooperation between ASEAN and China “shall be extended to other areas, including, but notlimited to, banking, finance, tourism, industrial co-operation, transport, telecommunications,
intellectual property rights, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), environment, bio-technology,
fishery, forestry and forestry products, mining, energy and sub-regional development”. 98
Nineteen lines of economic cooperation similar to the above-mentioned were determined in
AKFTA, and thirteen – in the respective agreement signed between ASEAN and Japan.99
Comprehensive character of the relevant FTAs caused the framework character ofobligations, which these agreements impose on the contracting states, as well as theseobligations‟ different nature and content, depending on the particular area of cooperation. For
example, in the area of trade in goods, all three FTAs and additional agreements connected withthem (agreements on trade in goods, special annexes etc.) stipulate the obligations of thecontracting states on tariff rates‟ and non-tariff barriers‟ reducing (eliminating). The level ofsuch reduction depends on the sort of goods these rates and barriers are applied to. Moreover, theadaptable time schedule of these obligations discharge by the state parties, depending on the97

Ibid. at 47.
Supra note 27.
99
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership among Member States of ASEAN and Japan, Bandar
Seri Begawan, 14 April 2008, online: <http://www.aseansec.org/agreements/AJCEP/Agreement.pdf>.
98

48

level and peculiarities of their economic development, is also fixed in the agreements. Such an
approach is quite effective because, on the one hand, it imposes legal obligations on all parties tothe agreements to liberalize trade, but on the other hand, it takes into account the possibilities ofindividual states to perform them.
Another situation exists in the area of trade in services and investment. In this case, FTAs
stipulate only very general obligations of states to liberalize trade in services, including theelimination of discriminatory measures, existing among them, as well as to create a liberal,facilitative, transparent and competitive investment regime with business-friendly environment.
Specific legal and institutional measures, which should be undertaken by states to meet thesegoals, were reflected in the agreements on trade in services and investment, which wereconcluded among ASEAN, China and South Korea respectively in 2007 and 2009. Suchagreements between ASEAN and Japan have not been signed yet.
Commitments of the parties in other areas of economic cooperation, which have foundtheir reflection in international economic agreements between ASEAN and NEACS, aresufficiently wide in content as well. Exact dates and arrangements are not fixed in these
agreements, but, nevertheless, it is stipulated that the parties shall undertake specific economic
cooperation projects and implement capacity building programs and technical assistance in orderto adjust the economic structure of the ASEAN countries and expand their trade and investment
with NEACS. Moreover, FTAs provide for a special implementing committee (sub-committee)
creation, which, inter alia, will monitor such projects and programs, as well as for the conclusionof additional agreements on the various areas of economic cooperation. In their turn, suchagreements shall include timeframes for the performance of commitments fixed therein. By now,
several of such agreements had already been concluded between ASEAN and China. They arecalled „memorandums of understanding‟ and contain specific measures designed to strengthen
cooperation between the parties especially in the fields of agriculture, standards, technicalregulations and conformity assessment, intellectual property.
Finally, it should be noted that international economic agreements between ASEAN andNEACS provide for the establishment of a formal dispute settlement mechanism (DSM), which
is one of the mandatory general conditions of interstate relations‟ legalization. 100 The
achievement of such an arrangement in respective FTAs is quite remarkable, because theavoidance of formal legal mechanisms for the process of dispute resolution for many years has
been considered to be one of the main features of East Asian regionalism.

100

Supra note 93.

49

In relations between ASEAN and Japan, such mechanism was fixed in their Agreement
on Comprehensive Economic Partnership of 2008. In their turn, ACFTA and AKFTA stipulated
for these purposes the conclusion of special agreements on dispute settlement mechanism, whichwere signed respectively in 2004 and 2005. As a general rule, these three DSMs were intended toresolve all disputes between the parties concerning the interpretation or application of respective
FTAs. For these purposes the parties, first of all, should act by mutual consultations, conciliation
or mediation. If these measures fail to settle a dispute, DSMs provide for the creation of special
arbitral tribunals or panels. The agreements stipulate the process of these bodies‟ creation andactivity, including the rights of third parties, which can have a substantial interest in a dispute.
According to FTAs, the decisions of arbitral tribunals or panels shall be final and binding for theparties.
Agreements on investments between ASEAN, China and South Korea stipulate anotherkind of DSM when a dispute arise “between a Party and an investor of another Party concerning
an alleged breach of an obligation of the former Party […], which causes loss or damage to theinvestor in relation to its investment with respect to the management, conduct, operation, or saleor other disposition of an investment”.101 According to the agreements, the parties to a disputeshall, as far as possible, resolve it through consultations and negotiation. Where this disputecannot be resolved through such procedures it “may be submitted to the courts or administrative
tribunals of the disputing Party provided that such courts or tribunals have jurisdiction over suchclaims or for the arbitration”.102 Besides, according to the choice of investor, a dispute may besubmitted under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
Convention and the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings or under some otherfamous international dispute settlement mechanisms.
Although DSMs of the „ASEAN+1‟ international economic agreements are less legalistic
in nature than the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and sometimes they leave more discretionto the political bodies of East Asian countries, their establishment is a proof of growing legalism
in the field of international economic cooperation and a promising development towards a moretransparent approach to dispute settlement in the region. 103 The same can be said of the otherprovisions of international economic agreements concluded between ASEAN and NEACS. By
now, they had laid a firm and predictable foundation for long-term cooperation in East Asia. And
101

Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between
ASEAN and the People's Republic of China, Bangkok, 15 August 2009, article 14 (1), online:<http://www.aseansec.org/22974.pdf>.
102
Agreement on Investment Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
Among the Governments of the Member Countries of ASEAN and the Republic of Korea, Jeju-Do, Republic ofKorea, 2 June 2009, article 18 (5), online: <http://www.aseansec.org/22973.pdf>.
103
Supra note 42 at 173.

50

there is no doubt that over time these agreements will become region-wide through their further
development within the APT institutional and rule-making mechanisms.

CONCLUSION

The undertaken study allows coming to a conclusion that the ASEAN Plus Threegrouping has significant features in comparison with „typical‟ international organizations.
Among the most important of them are: the lack of the APT international legal personality;
multilevel and coordination character of its institutional units‟ activity, which does not assume
the possibility of taking decisions legally binding for the member states; the consensus-based
rule-making mechanism, which uses the „Down-Up way‟ and generally focuses on political
documents‟ adoption and elaboration. The following Table 3, which is based on the scheme
provided by José E Alvarez, 104 illustrates these and some other points in this respect.
Table 3 Differences between ‘Typical’ International Organizations (TIO) and APT

TIOInternational Legal

APT

 Yes

 No

Personality
 Top-down
Organization

hierarchyorgansof Multilevelnetworkofcoordinating units Formal Informal

 State/public Multiple levels of government

Central Actors

officials
 Multiple public and private actors

104

 Up-Down way

 Down-Up way

Rule-making

 Static

 Iterative/repeat learning

Process One-shot Experimental

 Rigid & fixed Promotes innovation

 Centralized Decentralized

Nature of Command and control

 Coordination

Normative

 Rigid and fixed Flexible and adaptable

Instruments

 Uniform rules

 Diversity

Supra note 44 at 27.

51

In other words, the APT framework is a shining example of „governance without
government‟ and can be defined as a system, which governance is relation-based rather thanrule-based. Such governance represents an informal approach to international cooperation,
placing greater reliance on informality and relations between the parties. It relies on personal
relationship of the actors to establish the parameters of their cooperation; agreements are basedon mutual relations of the actors, and depend on their knowledge of and familiarity with eachother. Formalities are avoided, and the maintenance of good relations is relied on for the„enforcement‟ of commitments.105
However, it does not mean that the APT members demonstrate an „aversion tolegalization‟ and that their cooperation is chaotic and has no regulatory foundation. On thecontrary, the level of their relationship‟s legalization increases gradually and constantly with the
expansion of the range of issues, on which the APT members come to a common ground, andwith the narrowing of the development gap between them. The APT members just do not want to
run ahead. That is why, for the coordination of their cooperation, they elaborate and use only
those normative documents, which have the nature and character corresponding to real needs of
the APT members and, more importantly, to their opportunities. Depending on the circumstances,in one case, it can be joint statements and political declarations, in the other – detailed andlegally binding international agreements. The latter are especially used for the APT members‟
economic cooperation supporting, which, by virtue of such agreements, is expanding from year
to year and is becoming more and more transparent and predictable.

105

Paul J. Davidson, “The Role of International Law in the Governance of International Economic Relations in
ASEAN” (2008) 12 SYBIL 213 at 214.

52

Appendix I

LIST OF MAIN APT DOCUMENTS

1999


Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation, 28 November 1999 (3rd APT and the 3rd Informal
ASEAN Summits, Manila, Philippines).

2001


Report of the East Asia Vision Group “Towards an East Asian Community: Region of Peace,
Prosperity and Progress”, 5 November 2001 (7th ASEAN Summit and the 5th APT Summit,
Brunei Darussalam).

2002


Final Report of the East Asia Study Group, 4 November 2002 (8th ASEAN Summit and the
6th APT Summit, Phnom Penh, Cambodia).

2003


Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation among the People's Republicof China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, Bali, 7 October 2003.

2005


Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the ASEAN Plus Three Summit, Kuala Lumpur, 12 December
2005 (11th ASEAN Summit and the 9th APT Summit).

2007
Second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation “Building on the Foundations of ASEAN
Plus Three Cooperation”, 20 November 2007 (13th ASEAN Summit and the 11th APT
Summit, Singapore).



ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Work Plan 2007 – 2017, Singapore, 20 November 2007
(13th ASEAN Summit and the 11th APT Summit, Singapore).

2010


Luang Prabang Joint Declaration on ASEAN Plus Three Civil Service Cooperation, Luang
Prabang, Lao PDR, 29 October 2010.

53

Appendix II

LIST OF MAIN ASEAN-CHINA DOCUMENTS

Agreements:

2002


Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Between ASEAN and thePeople's Republic of China, Phnom Penh, 4 November 2002.

2004


Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Between

ASEAN and the People’s Republic ofChina, Vientiane, Lao PDR, 29 November 2004.


Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation between ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China, Vientiane, 29 November
2004.

2007


Agreement on Trade in Services of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation between ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China, Cebu, Philippines, 14
January 2007.

2009

Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation between ASEAN and the People's Republic of China, Bangkok, 15 August 2009.

Protocols:

2003
Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
Between ASEAN and the People's Republic of China, Bali, Indonesia, 6 October 2003.

2006


Second Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China, Cebu, Philippines, 8
December 2006.

54



Protocol to Amend the Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China,
Cebu, Philippines, 8 December 2006.

2010


Second Protocol to Amend the Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement
on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and the People's Republic ofChina, Kuala Lumpur, 29 October 2010

Others:2001
Forging Closer ASEAN-China Economic Relations in the 21st Century. A Report Submitted
by the ASEAN-China Expert Group on Economic Cooperation, 7th ASEAN Summit,
Bandar Seri Begawan, 5-6 November 2001.

2002


Memorandum of Understanding between ASEAN Secretariat and the Ministry of Agricultureof the People’s Republic of China on Agricultural Cooperation, Phnom Penh, 2 November
2002.

2003


Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of ASEAN and the People's Republic ofChina on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, Bali, Indonesia, 8 October 2003.

2004


Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnershipfor Peace and Prosperity (2005-2010), Vientiane, 29 November 2004.



Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of the Member Countries of
ASEAN and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Transport Cooperation,
Vientiane, 27 November 2004.

2007


Memorandum of Understanding between ASEAN Secretariat and the Ministry of Agricultureof the People’s Republic of China on Agricultural Cooperation, Cebu, Philippines, 14
January 2007.

2009


Memorandum of Understanding on Establishing the ASEAN-China Centre, Cha-Am HuaHin, Thailand, 25 October 2009.
55



Memorandum of Understanding between ASEAN and China on Strengthening Cooperationin the Field of Standards, Technical Regulations and Conformity Assessment, Cha-Am HuaHin, Thailand, 25 October 2009



Memorandum of Understanding between ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field ofIntellectual Property, Cha-Am Hua Hin, Thailand, 21 December 2009.

2010
Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnershipfor Peace and Prosperity (2011-2015), Ha Noi, Viet Nam, 29 October 2010.

56

Appendix III

LIST OF MAIN ASEAN-JAPAN DOCUMENTS

Agreements:

2008

Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership among Member States of ASEAN andJapan, Bandar Seri Begawan, 14 April 2008.

Others:2002


Joint Declaration of the Leaders of ASEAN and Japan on the Comprehensive Economic
Partnership, Phnom Penh, 5 November 2002.

2003


Framework for Comprehensive Economic Partnership between ASEAN and Japan, Bali,
Indonesia, 8 October 2003.

2005


Joint Statement of the Ninth ASEAN-Japan Summit – Deepening and Broadening of ASEANJapan Strategic Partnership, Kuala Lumpur, 13 December 2005.

57

Appendix IV

LIST OF MAIN ASEAN-KOREA DOCUMENTS

Agreements:

2005


Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Among the Governmentsof the Member Countries of ASEAN and the Republic of Korea, Kuala Lumpur, 13
December 2005.



Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism Under the Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Among the Governments of the Member Countries of
ASEAN and the Republic of Korea, Kuala Lumpur, 13 December 2005.

2006


Agreement on Trade in Goods Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive
Economic Cooperation Among the Governments of the Member Countries of ASEAN and theRepublic of Korea, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 24 August 2006.

2007


Agreement on Trade in Services under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive
Economic Cooperation among the Governments of the Member Countries of ASEAN and theRepublic of Korea, Singapore, 21 November 2007.

2009

Agreement on Investment Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation Among the Governments of the Member Countries of ASEAN and the Republicof Korea, Jeju-Do, Republic of Korea, 2 June 2009.

Protocols:2009
Protocol on the Accession of the Kingdom of Thailand to the Agreement on Trade inServices Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
Among the Governments of the Member Countries of ASEAN and the Republic of Korea,
Cha-am, Thailand, 27 February 2009.

58



Protocol on the Accession of the Kingdom of Thailand to the Agreement on Trade in Goods
Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Among theGovernments of the Member Countries of ASEAN and the Republic of Korea, Cha-am,
Thailand, 27 February 2009.

Others:2004


Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation Partnership between ASEAN and theRepublic of Korea, Vientiane, 30 November 2004.



ASEAN-Republic of Korea Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on
Comprehensive Cooperation Partnership, Vientiane, 30 November 2004.

2007


Memorandum of Understanding on Establishing the ASEAN-Korea Centre between theMember Countries of ASEAN and the Republic of Korea, Singapore, 21 November 2007.



Letter of Understanding among the Parties to the Agreement on Trade in Services under the
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation among the Governmentsof the Member Countries of ASEAN and the Republic of Korea, Singapore, 21 November
2007.

2009


Letter of Understanding for the Amendment of the Product Specific Rules set out inAppendix 2 of Annex 3 of the Agreement on Trade in Goods under the Framework
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation among the Governments of theMember Countries of ASEAN and the Republic of Korea, Bangkok, Thailand, 15 August
2009.

2010


Joint Declaration on ASEAN-Republic of Korea Strategic Partnership for Peace andProsperity, Ha Noi, Viet Nam, 29 October 2010.

Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-Republic of Korea StrategicPartnership for Peace and Prosperity (2011-2015), Ha Noi, Viet Nam, 29 October 2010.

59

Vyacheslav V. Gavrilov, PhD, SJD, Professor of Law.
Was born in Nakhodka (USSR) in 1963. He is a heard of the International
Law Chair and manager of the Master Programs of School of Law at the Far
Eastern Federal University (Vladivostok, Russia). He received his PhD in
Juridical Sciences from Kazan State University in 1994 and his JSD in 2006. The
title of his doctoral dissertation was “International and Internal Legal Systems:
Notion and Main Directions of Interaction”. He is the author of many scientificpublications devoted to actual problems of international public and private law,
including two monographs and textbooks International Private Law: Course of
Lectures; International Law. Special Part (in co-authors); and International andInterstate Protection of Human Rights (in co-authors). His articles were
published in such authoritative Russian and foreign legal magazines, as State andLaw, Journal of Russian Law, Moscow Journal of International Law,
International Public and Private Law, Law and a Policy, The Russian Year-Bookof International Law, Eurasian Law Journal, Soochow Law Journal, Asia Law
Review and Cuadernos Constitucionales. He was invited as a speaker and has
participated in numerous of international conferences and programs in the US,
France, Hungary, Taiwan, Spain, Indonesia Malaysia, Philippines and Cambodia.
He is also a member of the Executive Committee of the Russian Association ofInternational Law, member of Asian Society of International Law and co-founder
and attorney of the Board of Lawyers Etalon in Vladivostok.
From May to August of 2011, he was invited to the Center for Asian
Legal Exchange (CALE) at Nagoya University, Japan as a Visiting Professor andconducted the research project “Framework of the ASEAN Plus Three
Mechanisms Operating in the Sphere of Economic Cooperation”.

C ALE Discuss i on P ap er No. 7
Framework of the ASEAN Plus Three Mechanisms
Operating in the Sphere of Economic Cooperation
AuthorProf. Dr. Vyacheslav V. Gavrilov

Published byCenter for Asian Legal Exchange (CALE)
Nagoya University464-8601 Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku, Nagoya, JAPAN
Tel: +81 (0)52-789-2325
Fax: +81 (0)52-789-4902
http://cale.nomolog.nagoya-u.ac.jp/ja/

Issue date

30 September, 2011

Printed by

Nagoya University Co-operative Association© All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the priorpermission of the publisher.

60

CALE Discussion Paper No.7 (September, 2011)
Nagoya University
C e n t e r f o r A s i a n L egal Exchange