Evaluation of the Attitudes Between the Constitutional Tribunal
and the Parliament in Myanmar【Special Features：The Role of Constitutional Review Bodies in the Asian Post- Authoritarian
Democratization Process. A Comparative Perspective】

Evaluation of the Attitudes Between the Constitutional Tribunal
and the Parliament in Myanmar
MAKINO Emi

Abstract
This paper examines the role of the Constitutional Tribunal of the Union, Republic of theUnion of Myanmar (hereafter, the Tribunal), primarily focusing on parliamentaryinteractions and independence in political deliberations. The Tribunal was established in2011, and it was the first independent organization for constitutional review in Myanmar.
After half a century of the military authoritarian regime and in the circumstances ofcomplicated transition, the newly established Tribunal has been expected to adjust the power
among three branches of power; executive, legislative and judicial. A closer look at the
Tribunal’s recent activities and progress in adjudicating political issues and acting as anindependent referee between relevant political actors reveals this body’s inability to perform
adequately the role it has been assigned.
In 2012, the parliament widely opposed the Tribunal’s decision and initiated theimpeachment of all nine members. In 2013, the parliament also amended the Constitutional
Tribunal Law which limited the effectiveness to apply the decisions of Tribunal only to allcases transferred from ordinary courts. The amendments increasingly weakened the scope of
the Tribunal and eventually, questioned whether it might play any positive role in the
democratization of Myanmar as stipulated by the 2008 Constitution.
After the impeachment of all members, the Tribunal has been facing the lack of judicial
independence and cannot function as a referee among the political actors. The Tribunal
could deal with only a limited number of cases since its establishment in 2011, and isapparent that it is highly reluctant to reject initiatives of the current regime. Indeed, there aresome incidents when the Tribunal issued unconstitutional judgments, which could prove
positive in terms of the regional legislation powers and protection of minority rights.
However, the trends of distrust against the Tribunal is widely recognized after the NLD(National League for Democracy) regime came into power. In such circumstances, when the
Tribunal acts as a support agent for one political actor against others, the role of the Tribunal
in future democratization becomes highly controversial.

Assistant Professor, Center for Asian Legal Exchange, Nagoya University.
The auther would like to extend her gratitude to Dr. Ma Ma Thant and Ms. Ja Pu of Nagoya University Myanmar Japan Legal
Research Center for their support with preparation of cases’ summary of the Tribunal. Any errors of fact or analysis are the sole
responsibility of the autor.

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Contents
I.

History of Constitutional Review

II. Functions and Duties of the Tribunal
III. Judicial Independence Crisis on the ‘Union Level Organization’ case
IV. Losing the Tribunals Competence through the Amendment of Constitutional
Tribunal Law
V. The Tribunal’s Reaction to Union-Regional Disputes and Minority Rights
VI. Analyzing the Tribunal’s PerformanceVII. Conclusion

I. History of Constitutional Review
Myanmar established the Tribunal in 2011 under the Constitution of the Republicof the Union of Myanmar (hereafter, the 2008 Constitution) under the slogan of a statecontrolled democracy and peaceful transition from a military to civilian rule. It was thefirst time in the constitutional history of the state when policymakers vested the powerof constitutional review to an independent institution.
Until 1948 Myanmar remained as a British colony. After gaining independence inJanuary 1948, it adopted the parliamentary democratic system stipulated by theConstitution of the Union of Burma (hereafter, the 1947 Constitution). The 1947
Constitution authorized the Supreme Court to exercise the highest judicial power1, andthe Supreme Court could declare opinions on constitutional questions by the requestsof the President2. From 1948 to 1964, 41 cases have been dealt with at the Supreme
Court regarding constitutionality3.
After the Coup d’etat by the General Ne Win in 1962, Myanmar set up thegovernment with a strong military component at the top of its political system.
1 Section 136(1) of the 1947 Constitution.
2 Section 151(1) of the 1947 Constitution.
3 This information is based on the author’s interview with the Tribunal officials in April 2019 (Nay Pyi Taw,

Myanmar).

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Furthermore, this government adhered closely to the socialist ideology. The
Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (hereafter, the 1974
Constitution) was adopted in 1974. According to the 1974 Constitution, people
represented the sovereign powers of the State, and the People’s Assembly, a single
chamber legislative organ represented by people, exercised such sovereign power and,additionally, delegated organs of state power4. Analogically to other socialist states, thePeople’s Assembly could exercise constitutional interpretation and determine thevalidity of the acts of executive authorities 5 . The newly adopted 1974 constitution
stipulated relevant provisions on constitutional control.
The military government established a dictatorial rule in 1988 amid forced
oppression of public movement for the country’s democratization. The 1974
Constitution was suspended in 1988, and the military seized all the power. The multiparty general election was held in 1990 and the National League for Democracy(NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi, a pro-democracy activist, got about 80 percent ofvotes, while the military-backed party won only 10 seats out of 485. However, themilitary junta refused to transfer the power to the NLD and insisted that the country’s
prioritized political task was to prepare the constitution. The military government set
up the National Convention to draft the new constitution in 1993. It worked over thedraft about 15 years with a long interval between 1996 and 2004 caused by the NLD
boycott. Despite the undemocratic drafting process, the government announced that the2008 Constitution was adopted with 92.48% of people’s consent by the nationalreferendum in May 2008. Eventually the new constitution came into force in January
2011.
In March 2011, almost after the half-century of the military regime, President
Thein Sein formed a civilian government. This initiative came as a pseudodemocratization, as Thein Sein had a long military career. Furthermore, the Union
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the military-backed party, occupied theParliament seats. In addition to the USDP parliament members, the 2008 Constitution
allocates 25 percent of seats for the military members. The recent Myanmar’s political

4 Section 12 of the 1974 Constitution.
5 Section 200 of the 1974 Constitution.

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landmark is the 2015 general election, a first openly competitive election since 1988 inwhich the NLD won a supermajority of seats at the parliament. The non-militarypresident Htin Kyaw was elected, and the NLD regime started in March 2016.
The 2008 Constitution states that the country aims genuine, disciplined multi-party
democratic system 6 , and the legislative, the executive and the judicial branch areseparated and exert reciprocal control, checks, and balances among themselves7. Hence,
after half a century of the authoritarian military regime and in the circumstances ofcomplicated transition, the newly established Tribunal has been expected to adjust thepower among three branches.
II. Functions and Duties of the Tribunal
The Tribunal related provisions appear within the 2008 Constitution’s Chapter on
Judiciary. This chapter also includes the provisions for ordinary courts and CourtsMartial. The Constitutional Tribunal of the Union Law (hereafter, the Tribunal Law)
was promulgated in 2010 based on the 2008 Constitution, and it came into force on the
day when the 2008 Constitution came into effect. According to the Section 322 of the2008 Constitution, the primary functions and duties of the Tribunal are; to interpret theprovisions of the Constitution, to scrutinize the constitutionality of laws promulgatedby the union and regional level parliaments, and the actions of the executive authoritiesof the union and regional governments8. The Tribunal is also entitled to decide on
constitutional disputes and disputes related to the rights between the Union andregional authorities, and among regional authorities. The Tribunal only deals withenacted laws and does not examine bills before enactment, and subordinate laws, suchas rules, regulations, and notifications. The Tribunal has the power to conduct bothabstract and concrete constitutional review.

6 Section 7 of the 2008 Constitution.
7 Section 11 of the 2008 Constitution.
8 The Union constitutes seven regions, seven states, and union territories. The Regions are the areas predominantly

resided by the ethnic Burmese, and the States are the areas dominated by ethnic minorities with their ethnic names,such as Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Chin, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan (Section 49 of the 2008 Constitution). Myanmar
introduced the quasi-federal system, and the Regions/ States are conferred the autonomy to some extent under the2008 Constitution.

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Generally, constitutional review systems are considered as the continental law
product. Since the British colonial rule in the 19th century, the legal system ofMyanmar has been influenced by the British Common Law system. As a result of thesocialist and military authoritarian regimes impact, Myanmar obtained hybrid aspects
from both the continental and common law systems.
Only a limited number of public actors can submit petitions for constitutional
review to the Tribunal directly, namely, the President, the Speaker of the Union
Parliament (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw), the Speaker of the House of Representatives (Pyithu
Hluttaw), the Speaker of the House of Nationalities (Amyotha Hluttaw), the Chief
Justice, and the Chairperson of the Union Election Commission 9 . Additionally, theChief Ministers of regional executive bodies, the Speakers of regional legislature, theChairperson of the Self-Administered Area, and more than ten percent of the Unionlevel parliament representatives can access to the Tribunal indirectly10. Constitutional
Tribunal does not stipulate actio populais. Therefore, individuals cannot directly lodge
their petitions to the Tribunal and thus, cannot quash public actions and statutes. It isonly the Supreme Court which has authority to forward cases to the Tribunal11.
III. Judicial Independence Crisis on the ‘Union Level Organization’ case
The first three cases submitted in 2011 and 2012 touched upon theunconstitutionality in the area of the executive authority. In the Submission No. 1/
2011, the critical issue was the constitutionality of the judicial power conferred to the
sub-township administrative officers to adjudicate minor criminal cases by the
Ministry of Home Affairs, which was exercised in the previous military regime. The
Tribunal agreed to the Supreme Court’s claim that the judicial power is only vested in
the judiciary. In the Submission No. 2/ 2011, the Tribunal decided that unequal status
for Ministers of the National Affairs at regional level entitled to the emoluments,
allowances, and insignia was unconstitutional and they should be treated equally toother ministers in the Regions and States. The President requested to review this
9 Section 325 of the 2008 Constitution.
10 Section 326 of the 2008 Constitution.
11 Section 17 of the Tribunal Law.

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decision; however, the Tribunal rejected it since the resolution was final andconclusive which found itself in the Submission No. 2/ 2012. The Tribunal opposed
the executive power to play an essential role as check and balance at the early stage.
The incident threatening judicial independence occurred in 2012, so-called the‘Union Level Organization’ case. According to the 2011 set of laws on Union
Parliament, the House of Representatives and the House of Nationalities (hereinafter,
the Union level legislature),12 each house of the Union level legistature is eligible toestablish the committees, commissions and bodies to actively carry out legislative
activities under own authority. The Union level legislature claimed their status as the‘Union Level Organization’ which have greater authorities such as the right to submit
the bills to the Union level legislature13, and to attend and take part in discussions atparliamentary sessions with the permission of the Speakers14 . President Thein Sein
submitted the petition to the Tribunal to clarify whether or not such Committees havethe ‘Union Level’ status. The 2008 Constitution mentions about the ‘Union Level
Organization’ several times; however, it does not provide any clear definition. The
Tribunal decided that the ‘Union Level Organization’ should be appointed by the
President with the approval of the Union Parliament. Simultaneously, the Tribunal
ruled that those actors who were not appointed by the President, but merely establishedunder the parliament by its own will, could not be considered as the ‘Union Level
Organization’. Subsequently, the legislature widely opposed the Tribunal’s decision,and initiated impeachment of all nine members. This step came out following thelegislature’s opinion that the Tribunal intended to restrict its power. President Thein
Sein and the military representatives in the parliament opposed to the impeachment,
and the Tribunal members finally resigned voluntarily in September 2012.
This incident has arisen from a political conflict between the President and thelegislature. The result could be a victory of the legislature, however, it caused a severe
infringement of judicial independence. The parliament uses the means of impeachment

12 The Union Parliament consists of the House of Representatives (a lower house with 440 seats) and the House of

Nationalities (an upper house with 224 seats).
13 Section 100(a) of the 2008 Constitution.
14 Section 77(c), Section 112(c) and Section 144 of the 2008 Constitution.

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against the Tribunal members’ unsatisfied decision. It implicates risks that the Tribunal
members cannot decide cases independently.
IV. Losing

theTribunals

Competence

throughtheAmendmentofConstitutional Tribunal Law
The Tribunal consists of nine members. Three of the members chosen by the
President, three by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and three by the
Speaker of the House of Nationalities, with the subsequent approval of the Union
Parliament15. Term of the members of the Tribunal is five years, which makes it thesame as the term of the Union Parliament16 and the President17. Such term is relatively
short compared to other countries. In particular, the risk of such short term is related tothe politically motivated appointments of members and highly possible influence onthem by the ruling party.
The candidate members must have legal practice experiences such as judge,
prosecutors or advocates for certain period prescribed in the 2008 Constitution.
However, if the President considers the candidate as a suitable jurist, he or she can be
nominated as a member18.
The President should nominate the Chairperson of the Tribunal among the ninecandidates19; however, the first amendment of the Tribunal Law in 2013, requires suchnegotiation with the Speakers of the House of Representatives and the House of
Nationalities to take place beforehand. In the hearing process, the attendance of the
Chairperson is mandatory20, and the decisions of the Tribunal would be passed by the
majority vote, including the Chairperson21. The Chairperson has great authority andinfluence upon the decisions. The 2013 amendment is the outcome of the ‘Union Level

15 Section 321 of the 2008 Constitution.
16 Section 335 of the 2008 Constitution.
17 The President shall be elected right after the parliaments have been formed.
18 Section 333(d)(iv) of the 2008 Constitution.
19 Section 327 of the 2008 Constitution.
20 Section 20 of the Tribunal Law.
21 Section 22(d) of the Tribunal Law. To pass the interpretation and opinion of the Tribunal, it dose not require the

Chairperson’s consent as long as it is approved with majority vote (Section 22(c) of the Tribunal Law).

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Organization’ case, as a result of which the Union Parliament gained more influenceon the nomination of the Chairperson of the Tribunal. The Tribunal initiated reamendment of the Tribunal Law in 2014, to nominate the Chairperson solely by the
President without the consultation with the legislature; however, such attempt failed22.
The 2014 amendment only included some clarification on procedure, and technical andterminological modifications.
The 2013 amended law also stipulates that the Tribunal members should report theperformance of their functions and duties to the President, Speakers of the House ofRepresentatives and the House of Nationalities who have been elected members. The
Tribunal members should not be controlled by anybody, otherwise this amendment canbe considered as an infringement of judicial independence. Hence, this amendment has
limited certain Presidential competency regarding the Tribunal.
The decisions of the Tribunal are final and conclusive 23 . When the Tribunal
declares law as unconstitutional, the relevant law becomes invalid upon the prescribed
procedure and immediately expected to be amended. However, not all laws areamended after they are declared as unconstitutional because the legislative branchmight not be satisfied with the decisions. Additionally, the first amendment of the
Tribunal Law in 2013, Section 25 which stated that “the decisions of the Tribunal shallhave an effect on the relevant Government departments, organizations, and persons or
the respective region” was deleted in favor of the provision stating that “only thosecases sent from the ordinary courts shall be applicable to all cases” 24. This amendment
resulted in the degradation of the competency of the Tribunal’s judgments.
V. The Tribunal’s Reaction to Union-Regional Disputes and Minority Rights
It does not mean that the Tribunal is totally useless in terms of theConstitutionalism in Myanmar. Myanmar is a multi-ethnic state which introduced aquasi-federal system to protect minorities’ rights based on the 2008 Constitution.
22 Khin Khin Oo, “Judicial Power and the Constitutional Tribunal: Some Suggestions for Better Legislation Relating

to the Tribunal and its Role”, in Andrew Harding & Khin Khin Oo (ed.), Constitutionalism and Legal Change in
Myanmar, Hart Publishing, 2017, p. 201.
23 Section 324 of the 2008 Constitution and Section 24 of the Tribunal Law.
24 Section 23 of the Tribunal Law.

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Indeed, the Tribunal has an experience of dealing with some cases relevant to theunion and regional disputes, and ethnic minority issues.
As mentioned above, the unequal treatment to the National Races Affairs Ministersof the Region or State was declared as unconstitutional (Submission No. 2/ 2011), andthe related law was amended to adjust inequality. In the Submission No. 1/ 2014, it
was examined whether or not the appointments of National Races Affairs Ministers for
Lisu and Rawan races in Kachin and Shan State were in conformity with theConstitution. The national races which constitute more than 0.1 percent of the
population in the Union and have not obtained the State or Self-Administered Area,
can elect one representative at the regional parliament and such appointee can serve as
the National Races Affairs Minister 25 . The Tribunal supported the decision of theUnion Election Committee which allowed one elected representative for Lisu andRawan races, and they decided that the appointments were in conformity with theConstitution.
Submission No. 3/ 2012 is known for scrutinizing the legislative jurisdiction of theUnion and regional legislature. The Mon Development Committees Law promulgatedby the Mon State Parliament contradicted to the Union leveled 1993 Development
Committees Law which, in turn, was enacted before the 2008 Constitution came into
force. The 1974 Constitution adopted the centralized state structure under thephilosophy of socialism; however, in the 2008 Constitution Myanmar introduced theunion system, which enables the regional authorities to practice certain executive andlegislative functions. The 2008 Constitution provided the legislative power of theUnion and regional legislature in Schedule I and II respectively. The Tribunal declaredthat the Mon Development Committees Law, which is related to the development
affairs, was under the jurisdiction of regional legislature according to the 2008
Constitution. The 1993 Development Committees Law is still valid because thetransitional provisions in the 2008 Constitution stipulated that existing laws remain in
operation until repealed or amended by the Union Parliament if it is not contrary to theConstitution 26 . The Tribunal advised the Union Parliament to invalid the 1993

25 Section 161(c) of the 2008 Constitution.
26 Section 446 of the 2008 Constitution.

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Development Committees Law and ruled the Mon Development Committees Law was
not in conformity with the Constitution. The Tribunal’s decision, which supported theregional parliaments’ legislation against the Union laws may be considered as anovelty considering the actual situation with constitutional review in Myanmar.
The constitutional petition usually guarantees to the parliamentary minorities astanding to bring cases to the constitutional court to protect their rights. However, theopposite case happened in Myanmar. In the Submission No. 1/ 2015, the Tribunal
stated that the National Referendum Law which targeted whether to amend theconstitution or not was indeed found as unconstitutional. In particular, this law granted
a right to vote at the referendum to the holders of the temporary registration cards
known as the white cards27. They had participated in all military-orchestrated elections
held in Myanmar from 1936 to 2010, and voted for their representatives to theparliaments and state assemblies. They also had the right to vote in the 2008referendum for the adoption of the 2008 Constitution28. White cards holders are mainly
Rohingya Muslim people, who reside in a border area with Bangladesh. The 1982
Citizenship Law provides that the full citizen is an individual who had settled in
Myanmar territories before 1823 when the British rule started. The ethnic problem has
been derived from the British ‘divide and conquers policy’ towards Burmese and nonBurmese people. Authorities in Myanmar do not consider Rohingya people as citizensof Myanmar and, therefore, issues them white cards which automatically makes themstateless, and thus highly vulnerable. The Tribunal decided that the white card holders
are not citizens of Myanmar, and therefore, must not have voting rights.
The Constitutional Courts are often designed as the mechanism for protecting therights of the minority. This case clearly shows that the Tribunal in Myanmar does not
function as such. Indeed, the 2008 Constitution grants the rights to vote only to thecitizens. However, similarly to the case of Mon State Development Committees Law,
the Tribunal could consider the case in line with the past customs which would haveeventually allowed Rohingya minorities to participate in the political affairs and evenrecommend the legislature to correct the 1982 Citizenship Law.
27 Their holders are those who reside in Myanmar but do not have full citizenship rights.
28 Nural Islam, Rohingya and Nationality Status in Myanmar, in Ashley South Marie Lall, Citizenship in Myanmar:

Ways of Being in and from Burma, Chiang Mai University Press, Thailand, 2018 p. 267.

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Notably, the 2008 Constitution integrates three basic principles; the nondisintegration of the Union; the non-disintegration of national solidarity; and theperpetuation of sovereignty. Hence, one may observe that national integration is themost prioritized mandate in Myanmar, whereas the protection of minority rights is anignored principle under the Myanmar-styled Constitutionalism.
VI. Analyzing the Tribunal’s Performance
Since the establishment of the Tribunal in 2011, the Tribunal produced a small
number of cases. In particular, the Tribunal initiated only 15 cases within the last nine
years. It is a very limited number, especially taking into consideration the fact the NLD
considers itself as the first ‘democratic’ government after half a century of military rule.
It is believed that the role of Tribunal increases if the democratization progresses;
however, up to date Myanmar demonstrates a totally opposite effect. The NLD
considers that a separate body like the Tribunal poses a threat to democracy, whereas
the Supreme Court can be better trusted to exercise judicial review29.
Because of the NLD’s distrust, the Tribunal produced only four cases under the
NLD government. The first case was related to the appointment of the Tribunal
members (Submission No. 1/ 2016). The President can appoint a person who is, in his
opinion, ‘an eminent jurist’. After two of the members recommended by the Speakers
of House of Representatives and House of Nationalities did not meet the criteria forbeing nominated as Tribunal members, the Speakers decided to nominate them under
the title of ‘an eminent jurist’. Notably, the Tribunal Law stipulates that only the
President can select ‘an eminent jurist’ even if the candidates do not meet thequalification. In this regard, the NLD government insisted that the President could
eventually apply ‘an eminent jurist’ to all nine judges after obtaining the list of
nominees. The Tribunal dismissed the case by pointing that it was a result of conflict
between the Constitution and the Tribunal Law.
There were two cases in 2019, and both of them touched upon the constitutional
amending process. The Joint Committee on Amending the 2008 Constitution (hereafter,
29 National League for Democracy, Analysis and Recommendations for the 2008 Constitution (June 2014), as cited

in Dominic Jerry Nardi “How the Constitutional Tribunal’s Jurisprudence Sparked a Crisis” in Andrew Harding &Khin Khin Oo (ed.), Constitutionalism and Legal Change in Myanmar, Hart Publishing, 2017, p. 187.

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the Joint Committee) was established in February 2019 under the Notification No. 15/
2019, and was comprised of 45 members. The main task of the Joint Committee was toreview the 2008 Constitution, submit the report with their findings to the Union
Parliament, and prepare amendment bills after the Union Parliament approve theirreport30. Another committee named the Joint Committee to Scrutinize the Second Bill
Amending the Constitution (hereafter, the Scrutinizing Committee) was established on
the same day under the Notification No. 14/ 2019 to review and scrutinize the Second
Amendment Bill submitted by the 143 parliament members including USDP
representatives. In the first case (Submission No. 1/ 2019), it was submitted whether or
not the Second Amendment bill should be discussed with the Joint Committee’s
upcoming bills. In the second case (Submission No.2/ 2019), the Tribunal examinedthe constitutionality of establishment of the Joint Committee. The critical issues ofboth cases refer to the interpretation of Section 435 of the 2008 Constitution, which
provides that bills submitted by more than 25 percent of the total number of the Union
Parliament should be considered at the Union Parliament. The Tribunal dismissed bothof the cases, and supported the NLD’s opinion to continue the Joint Committee’s
duties.
In general, constitutional courts are established to limit or balance the activities ofthe executive and the legislative branches, and expected to work as neutral arbitrators
among the two branches. Under the Thein Sein era, the Tribunal was primarily a forum
for dialogue between the president, the legislature and members of parliament fromethnic political parties31. Under the Thein Sein government, there was tension between
the President and the legislature and conflicts were often brought to the Tribunal. Mostof parliament members viewed constitutional review as a threat to the Union
Parliament’s law-making authority32.
Constitutional designers are interested in governing models after the adoption of a
new constitution, and they seek to design institutions that maximize their ability to
30 The Joint Committee submitted two bills to the Union Parliament on January 23, 2020, and it was revoked on

January 28, 2020, as it completed its duties.
31 Melissa Crouch, Dictators, democrats, and constitutional dialogue: Myanmar’s constitutional tribunal,

International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 16, No. 2, p.423.
32 Dominic Jerry Nardi, “How the Constitutional Tribunal’s Jurisprudence Sparked a Crisis”, in Andrew Harding &Khin Khin Oo (ed.), Constitutionalism and Legal Change in Myanmar, Hart Publishing, 2017, p. 188.

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govern under the new constitutional order. Constitutional court can act as an insurance
for electoral losers, and Ginsburg calls it as ‘the insurance model of judicial review’33.
In Myanmar, this theory is not applicable. The term of the Tribunal member is thesame as the President and the Union Parliament. Between 2011 and 2016, some cases
were filed as unconstitutional; however, the Tribunal never opposed the NLD
government. Especially after the constitutional crisis caused by the ‘Union Level
Organization’ case, it is difficult for the Tribunal to act as a checks and balances
institution, particularly when it comes to the interactions with the legislative branch of
power. If the Tribunal issues the judgments to which the parliament disagrees, theparliament can take an impeachment action against the Tribunal’s members. The
Tribunal cannot decide cases independently, and the trends of ignoring the Tribunal
spreads among the opposition parties at parliaments, especially after the NLD
government took power in 2016.
The NLD has introduced a position of a state councilor for its leader Aung San
Suu Kyi, which de facto gave her supreme political power. It eventually raises many
justified concerns and critics among parliament members regarding the contradictions
with constitutional provisions and inability of the Tribunal to adequately react to thematter. In such circumstances, when the Tribunal acts as a support agent for one
political actor against others, the role of the Tribunal in future democratization is very
unclear.
VII. Conclusion
Since 1962 when the military junta took power, the constitutional review
mechanism has been absent, and no mechanism was in place to perform the functionsof the checks and balances towards the executive and legislative power. For a longtime under the authoritarian regime, the separation of powers was denied, and the
judicial body could not control the actions conducted by the executive and legislative
bodies. The 2008 Constitution introduced the Tribunal as an independent body for the
first time in the constitutional history.
33 Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asia, Cambridge University Press,

2003, pp. 24-25.

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One of the critical factors of constitutionalism is to limit the executive andlegislative authorities, according to the constitution. At the early stage, the Tribunal
opposed the executive authorities; however, the 2012 crisis between the President andthe legislature yielded the judicial independence infringement. Their independence has
been weakened, and they could not be considered as ‘the insurance model’ to hold thepolitical power after the political changes.
Furthermore, the vital role of the Constitutional Courts is the protection of
citizens’ rights. The cases brought to the Tribunal are mainly disputes among thepolitical elites. The drafters of the 2008 Constitution viewed the Tribunal
predominantly as a forum to resolve intra-elite disputes, but not to protect fundamental
rights or to constrain government power34. The Tribunal deals with the constitutional
disputes among the political elites, and elites are not concerned about the citizens’
rights. It is difficult to assert that the Tribunal can act effectively to protect the rights ofminorities.
It can be concluded that the Tribunal acts as the supporter of the current politicalactors, and cannot perform functions of a mechanism which would contribute to thedevelopment of the democracy and protection of fundamental rights in Myanmar.
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Gabriela Marti, “The Role of the Constitutional Tribunal in Myanmar’s Reform
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Khin Khin Oo, “Judicial Power and the Constitutional Tribunal: Some Suggestions for
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and the Parliament in Myanmar

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