●Messages from Departments and Centers of NILIM
Ports and harbors to help ensure recovery from both the Great
East Japan Earthquake and the deteriorated Japanese tradeenvironment
Dr. SUZUKI Takeshi, Director of Port and Harbor Department(Keywords) The Great East Japan Earthquake, trade environment, international distribution, Japan’s economic
growth
1. Ports and Harbors Damaged by the Great East
Japan Earthquake
The Great East Japan Earthquake of the 11th ofMarch, 2011 caused outsized ground motions andtsunamis, inflicting tremendous damage in ports andharbors along the Pacific coast of Tohoku. Ports andharbors almost entirely stopped functioning under theeffects of the following factors: deteriorated port andharbor wave protection functions due to collapsedseawalls, sea routes clogged with stranded shippingand floating/piling of disaster debris and othermaterials, impaired berthing functions because ofleaning/subsided quay walls, loading and unloading
activities obstructed by collapsed/impaired materials
handling equipment (Photo 1) or subsidence or loss offlatness of aprons, difficulty storing goods due to thedestruction of sheds/warehouses, roads clogged withdisaster debris, etc.
2. Influence of Damage to Ports and Harbors
Disaster-stricken ports and harbors stopped
functioning and this had huge impacts on economic
activities in Tohoku and Northern Kanto areas.
Livestock raising had been one of the coreindustries in Tohoku and many of the region’s farmers
reared cattle. Tsunami stopped functioning of grain
wharfs and silos at harbors in Tohoku, and adjacent
feed mills were also devastated. So cattle were indanger of dying by the disruption of the supply of feed.
In response, feed producers in Hokkaido and Kyushu
rapidly increased outputs and provided supplies toTohoku by way of harbors alongside the Japan Sea
coast.
Also, as oil refineries and terminals located at
harbors in Tohoku or Kanto stopped functioning, thefuel supply stagnated, resulting in fuel shortages attransport facilities and in households and businessoffices. To tackle this situation, oil refineries
throughout the nation increased production andtransported their products by sea or by rail (Figure 1).
Various other forms of emergency transportation
were adopted, and marine transport in particular isthought to have been far more effective than otherforms of transportation. We must quickly conduct
research to learn how to prepare for or deal withdisasters by making use of such experiences with aview to saving lives from the Tokai, Tonankai, Nankai
Earthquake or an inland earthquake directly
underneath the Tokyo metropolitan area.

Photo 1. Collapsed Unloaders at Soma Harbor

Oil Refineries in
北海道の精油所
Hokkaido
Maritime
海上輸送
Transport

Rail

鉄道輸送
Transport

Oil Refineries in
西日本の精油所
Western Japan

精油所（機能停止）
OilRefineries (Out Of Operation)
OilTerminals (Out Of Operation)
油槽所（機能停止）
OilTerminals (In Operation)
油槽所（稼働）Figure 1. Alternative Provision Routes ofPetrochemical Products after the Quake
Income bearing industries will be necessary whenpeople resume their normal daily life one year after
the earthquake and tsunami (March, 2011). We alsoneed to quicken the pace of the regeneration offactories in the harbor areas along the Pacific coast ofTohoku, which were broadly and terribly damaged by●Messages from Departments and Centers of NILIM

70

\/$30
2011

80
2010

9040
2009

10050

200860

2007

110

2006

12070

2005

80

2004

1302003

4. Enhancing International Competitiveness ofPorts and Harbors
Japan lags behind the other East Asian nations in
the competition to increase the size of ports and iseven in danger of losing primary container routes toprosperous East Asian ports accommodating
themselves to the global trend of enlarging vessel
sizes.
Japan must enhance its port competitiveness and, by
doing so, drive competitive advantage of our economy
and thus reduce the cost of importing consumer goods.
Also, we have to capture growth in Asia and plug it
into revitalization of our domestic economy. To
achieve these goals, we will have to take steps toquickly give our ports the ability to handle larger
vessels and improve corresponding services. In lightof Japan’s severe budget conditions, it will benecessary to carefully select feasible ports and then toconcentrate investments in them. With these in mind,
the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport andTourism chose two regions as “international containerstrategic ports” in August 2010. MLIT also took steps
to select “international bulk strategic ports” in May
2011.
The Japanese government is also in the process of90

2002

3. Deterioration in Trade Environments of JapanThe Japanese trade environment is quite severe.
The Japanese trade balance fell in 2011 (Figure 2) due
mainly to its stagnated exports and increased energy
imports. Exports were dragged down by debt crises in
European countries, declining trade volumes among
Asian countries as a result of the negative impact on
the US economy of the Lehman shock after effects,
the unprecedentedly high yen, suspended operations ofnuclear power plants after the Great East Japan
Earthquakes, parts shortages affected by the floodingin Thailand, restriction on electric use, hike in electriccharges, rising energy prices, labor costs and social
welfare expenses of firms which are perceived to beexpensive by world standards, and the subsequent
overseas transfers of offices. We fear that deteriorating
Japanese competitiveness and overseas transfers ofoffices might continue, and that more overseas
transfers might result in lower domestic employment
and tax revenues. Therefore, it is essential for us todevelop an environment in which firms can maintaintheir offices in Japan.

stepping up its trade liberalization to reinforce
international competitiveness of Japanese firms
through various measures such as overcoming
tariff-related disadvantages (Figure 3). Provided that
trade liberalization advances, the Japanese tradeenvironment will significantly change.
To promptly and precisely respond to tradeliberalizationand other changes in tradeenvironments, it is necessary to grasp economic
conditions of the countries concerned, barriers againstinternational transport and transactions, fuel prices,management
policies
ofshipping
firms,
performances/dimensions of vessels,
maintenancestatus of maritime and land infrastructure, and so on. It
is also necessary to predict the speed of changes in
two-way distribution flows between ports, vessel
size/performance, frequency of port calls and cargovolume flows at each distribution port. We in the Portand Harbor Department are firmly determined topursue our forecasts and analyses in an attempt toachieve our aims.

Exports, Imports(trillion yen)
輸出，輸入（兆円）

tsunami. So we have to effectively and promptly
restorethedistributionfunctionsanddisaster-prevention functions which factories or otherentities require. We need to solve a number ofproblems to make that happen.

Year年
Exports輸出Imports
輸入\/$

Figure 2. Trade Value and Japanese Yen to 1 USD
CEPA India
インド
EAFTA

CJK FTA Japan,
日中韓FTA中国 China,
韓国 Korea
日本

Indonesia,
フィリピン
AFTA インドネシア
the Philippines,
タイ
ラオス ミャンマー
Thailand, Laos,
カンボジア
Myanmar, Cambodia

HongKong,
ロシア
香港
台湾
FTAAP Russia,

Taiwan,パプアニューギニア
Papua New Guinea

Singapore,
シンガポールBrunei,ブルネイ
Vietnam,ベトナム
Malaysia
マレーシア

ニュージーランド
New Zealand,
オーストラリア
Australia

Chile, Peru,
米国 States,
チリ ペルーTPP United
Canada,Mexicoカナダ メキシコ

CJK
FTA: Free日中韓自由貿易協定
Trade Agreement
TPP:
Trans-Pacific Partnership
日中韓FTA：
TPP： 環太平洋経済連携協定
between China, Japan and FTAAP: Free Trade Area of the
AFTA： ASEAN自由貿易地域
FTAAP： Asia-Pacific
アジア太平洋自由貿易圏
Korea
EAFTA： ASEAN
東アジア自由貿易協定
CEPEA： Comprehensive
東アジア包括的経済連携協定
CEPEA:
Economic
AFTA:Free Trade AreaPartnership
EAFTA:
East Asia Free Trade Area
（ASEAN+3）（ASEAN+6）in East Asia
(ASEAN+6)(ASEAN+3)

Figure 3. Free Trade Areas IncludingJapan