436

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Syllabus.

384 U. S.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA.

No. 759. Argued February 28-March 1, 1966.Decided June 13, 1966.*"
In each of these cases the defendant while in police custody wasquestioned by police officers, detectives, or'a prosecuting attorney
in a room in which he was cut off from*the outside world. Noneof the defendants was given a'full and effective warning ot his
rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all four casesthe. questioning elicited oral admissions, and in three of themsigned statements as 'well, which were admitted at their trials.
All defendants were convicted and all convictions, except in No.
584, were affirmed on appeal. Held:
1. The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, stemming from questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after' a person has been taken into custody orotherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any ignificant way,
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective tosecure the Fifth Amendment's jrivilege against, self-incrimination.
Pp. 444-491.
(a) The atmosphere and environment of incommunicado
interrogation as it exists today -isinherently intimidating andworks to undermine the privilege against self-incrimination. Unless adequate preventive measures are taken to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings,, no statement obtained
from the defendant can truly' be the product of his free choice.
Pp.445-458.
(b) The privilege against self-incrimination, which has had
a long and expansive historical development, is the essential mainstay of our adversary system and guarantees to the individual the'right fo remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will,"' during a period of custodial inter*Together with No. 760, Vignera v. New York, on' certiorari to
the Court of Appeals of New York and No. 761, Westover v. UnitedStates, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for theNinth Circuit, both argued February 28-March 1, 1966; and No.
584, California v. Stewart, on certiorari to the Supreme Court ofCalifornia, argued February 28-March , 1966.

• MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

Syllabus.

rogation 'as well as in the courts .or during the course of otherofficial investigations. Pp. 458-465.
(c) The decision in Escobedo v.' Illinois, 378 U. S. 478,stressed the need for protective devices to make the process ofpolice interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege. Pp.
465-466.
(d) In the absence of other effective measures the following
procedures to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege must be
observed: The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be
clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and thatanything he says will be used against him in court; he must be
clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer andto have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if heis indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Pp.
467-473.
(e) If the individual indicates, prior to or during questioning,that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease; if
he states that he wants an attorney, the questioning must cease
until an attorney is present. Pp. 473-474.
(f) Where an interrogation is conducted without the presenceof an ahtorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden'rests on
the Government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly andintelligently waived his right to counsel. P. 475.
(g) Where the hidividual answers some questions during incustody interrogation he has not waived his privilege and may
invoke his right to remain silent thereafter. Pp. 475-476.
(h) The warnings required and the waiver needed are,.in theabsence of- a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement, inculpatory or exculpatory, made by adefendant. Pp. 476-477..
2. The limitations on the interrogation process required for theprotection of the individual's constitutional rights should not cause
an undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement,
as demonstrated by the procedures of the FBI and the safeguards
afforded in other jurisdictions. Pp. 479-491.
3. In each of these cases the statements were obtained undercircumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege against self-incrimination. Pp. 491-499.
98 Ariz. 18, 401 P. 2d 721; 15 N. Y. 2d 970, 207 N. E. 2d 527; 16
N. Y. 2d 614, 209 N. E. 2d 110; 342 F. 2d 684, reversed; 62 Cal.
2d .571, 400 P. 2d 97, affirmed.

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Counsel.

384 U. S.

John J. Flynn argued the cause for petitioner in No.
759. With him on the brief was John P. Frank. Victor
M. Earle III argued the cause and filed a brief for -petitioner in No. 760. F. Conger Fawcett argued the cause.
and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 761. Gordon
Ringer, .Deputy Attorney General of California, argued
the cause for petitioner in No. 584. With him on thebriefs were Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, andWilliam E. James, Assistant Attorney General.
Gary K. Nelson, Assistant Attorney General of Arizona,argued the cause for respondent in No. 759. With himon the brief was Darrell F. Smith, Attorney General.
William I. Siegel argued the cause for respondent in No.
760. With him on the brief was Aaron E. Koota. Solicitor General Marshall argued the dause for the UnitedStates in No. 761. With him on the brief were AssistantAttorney General Vinson, Ralph S. Spritzer, Nathan
Lewin, Beatrice Rosenberg-and Ronald L. Gainer. William A. Norris, by appointmeht of the Court, 382 U. S.
952, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in
No. 584.
Telford Taylor, by special leave of Court, argued thecause for the State of New York, as amicus curiae, in allcases. With him on the'brief were Louis J. Lefkowitz,
Attorney General of New York, Samuel A. Hirshowitz,
First Assistant Attorney General, and Barry Mahoney
and George D. Zuckerman, Assistant Attorneys General,joined by the Attorneys General for their respective
States and jurisdictions as follows: Richmond M. Flowersof Alabama, DarrellF. Smith of Arizona, Bruce Bennett
of Arkansas, Duke W. Dunbar of Colorado, David P.
Buckson of Delaware, Earl Fairclothof Florida, Arthur,
K. Bolton of Georgia, Allan G. Shepard of Idaho, William G. Clark of Illinois, Robert C. Londerholm of
Kansas, Robert Matthews of Kentucky, Jack P. F.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
Opinion of the Court.

436

Gremillion of Louisiana, Richard J. Dubord of Maine,
Thomas B. Finan of Maryland, Norman H. Andersonof Missouri, Forrest H. Anderson of Montana, Clarence
A. H. Meyer of Nebraska, T. Wade Bruton of North
Carolina, Helgi Johanneson of North Dakota, Robert Y.
Thornton of Oregon, Walter E. Alessandroni of Pennsylvania, J. Joseph Nugent of Rhode Island, Daniel R.
McLeod of South Carolina, Waggoner Carr of Texas,
Robert Y. Button of Virginia, John J. O'Connell of Washington, C. Donald Robertson 'f WeBf Virginia, John F.
Raper of Wyoming, Rafael Hernandez C]olon of Puerto
Rico and Francisco Corn6iM of thi Virgin Islands.
Duane R. Nedrud, by 'special leave of Court, argued
the cause for the National District Attorneys Association,as amicus curiae, urging affirmance in Nds. 759 and 760,
and reversal in No. 584. With him on the brief was
Marguerite D. Oberto.
Anthony G. Amsterdai, Paul J. Mishkin, Raymond L.
Bradley, Peter Hearn and Melvin L. Wulf filed a brief
for the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae,
in all cases.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of

the Court.
The cases before us raise questions which go to theroots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence:
the restraints society must observe consistent with theFederal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime.
More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected tocustodial police interrogation "and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his
privilege under the Fifth- Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

We dealt with, certain phases of this problem recentlyin Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964). There, as
in the four cases before us, law enforcement officials took
the defendant into custody and interrogated him in apolice station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively advise him of hisright to remain silent or of his righit to consult withhis attorney. Rather, they confronted him with analleged accomplice who accused him of having perpetrated a murder. When the defendant denied the accusation and said "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it," theyhandcuffed him and took him to an interrogation room.
There, whilehandcuffed and standing, he was questioned
for four hours until he confessed. During this interrogation, 4the police denied his request to speak to his attorney, and they prevented his retained attorney, who had
come to the police station, from consulting with him. At
his trial, the State, over his objection, introduced theconfession against him. 'We held that the statements
thus made were constitutionally inadmissible.
This case has been the subject of Judicial interpretation ahd spirited legal debate since it was decided two
years ago. Both state and federal courts, in assessing
its implications, have arrived at varying conclusi~ns.1
A wealth of scholarly material has been written tracing
its ramifications and underpinnings.2. Police and proseCompare United States v. Childress,347 F. 2d 448 (C.A. 7th Cir.
1965), with Collins v. Beto, 348 F. 2d 823 (C.A. 5th Cir. 1965).
Compare People v. 'Dorgdo, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P. 2d 361, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 169 (1964) with People v." Hartgraves, 31 Ill. 2d 375, "202N. E., 2d 33 (1964).
2See, e. g., Enker & Elsen, Counsel for tie Suspect: Massiah
v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 Minn. L. Rev. 47(1964); Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police
Interrogation, 25 Ohio St. L. J. 449 (1964); Kamisar, Equal Justicein the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure,in Criminal Justice in Our Time 1 (1965); Dowling, Escobedo and1MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

Opinion of the Court.

cutor have speculated on its range and desirability.'
We granted certiorari in these cases, 382 U. S. 924, 925,
937, in order further to explore some facets of the problems, -thus exposed, of applying the privilege against selfincrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give
Beyond: The Need for a Fourteenth Amendment Code of Criminal
Procedure, 56 J.Crim. L., C. & P. S. 143, 156 (1965).
The complex problems also prompted discussions by jurists. Compare Bazelon, Law, Morality, and Civil Liberties, 12 U. C. L. A.
L. Rev. 13 (1964), with Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Codeof Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 929 (1965).
3
For example, the Los Angeles Police Chief stated that "If thepolice are required ... to . . . establish that the defendant wasapprised of his constitiltional guarantees of silence and legal c6unsel prior to the uttering of any admission or confession, and that
he intelligently waived these guarantees ... a whole Pandora's
box is opened as to under what circumstances : . . can a defendant
intelligently waive these rights .... Allegations that modem criminal investigation can compensate for the lack of a confession oradmission in every criminal case is totally absurd!" Parker, 40
L. A. Bar Bull. 603, 607, 642 (1965). His prosecutorial counterpart, District Attorney Younger, stated that "[I]t begins to appear
that many of these seemingly restrictive decisions are going to contribute directly to a more effective, efficient and professional levelof law enforcement." L. A. Times, Oct. 2, 1965, p. 1. The former
Police Commissioner of New York, Michael J. Murphy, stated of
Escobedo: '"What the Court is doing is akin to requiring one boxer tofight--by Marquis of Queensbury rules while permitting the other tobutt, gouge and bite." N. Y..Times, May 14, 1965, p. 39. The
former United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, David* C. Acheson, who is presently Special Assistant to the Secretary of
the Treasury (for Enforcement.), and directly in charge of the Secret
Service and -the Bureau of Narcotics, observed that "Prosecution
procedure has, at most, only themost remote causal connection withcrime. Changes in court decisions and prosecution procedure would
have about the same effect on the crime rate as an aspirin would haveon a tumor of the brain." Quoted ix Herman, supra, n. 2, at 500,
n. 270. Other views on the subject in general are collected in Weis"berg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View,
52 J. Crim. L., C. & P. S.21 (1961).

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement
agencies and courts to follow.
We start here, as we did in Escobedo, with the premisethat our holding is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized
and applied in other settings. We have undertaken athorough re-examination of the Escobedo decision andthe princip]es it announced, and -e reaffirm it. Thatcase was but an explication of basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution-that "No person . . . shallbe compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself," and 'that "the accused shall . . . have theAssistance of Counsel"--rights which were put in jeopardy in that case through official overbearing. These
precious rights were fixed in our Constitution only after
centuries of persecution and struggle. And in the wordsof Chief Justice Marshall, they were secured "for ages
to come, and . . . designed to approach immortality as
nearly as human institutions can approach it," Cohens v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 387 (1821).
Over 70 years ago, our predecessors' on this Court
eloquefitly stated:-"The maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had
its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial andmanifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused
persons, which [have] long obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts
from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of
additional barriers for the protection of the people
against the exercise of arbitrary power, [were] notuncommon even in England. While the admissions
or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily andfreely made, have always ranked high in the scaleof incriminating evidence, if an accused person -be
asked to explain his- apparent connection with acrime under. investigation, the ease with which theMIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

Opinion of the Court.

questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial
character, the temptation to press the witness unduly,- to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant,to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into
fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident
in many of the earlier state trials, notably in thoseof Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to giverise to a demand for its total abolition. The change
in the English criminal procedure in that particular
seems to be founded upon iio statute and no judicial
opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescenceof the courts in a popular demand. But," however
adopted, it has become, firmly embedded in English,
as well as in American jurisprudence.. So deeply
did the iniquities of the ancient system impress
themselves upon the minds of the American" colonists'that the States, with one accord; made a denial of
the right to question an accused person 'a part oftheir fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in
England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothedin this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment." Brown v. Walker, 161 -U. S:
591, 596-597 (1896).
In stating the obligation of the judiciary to apply these
constitutional rights, this. Court declared in Weems v.
United States, 217 U. S. 349, 373 (1910):"... our contemplation cannot be only of what has
been but of what may be. Under any other rule aconstitution would indeed be as easy of application
as it would be deficient in 'efficacy and power. Its
general principles would have little value and be con'verted by precedent inrt6 impotent and lifelessformulas. Rights declared in words might be lostin reality. And this has been recognized. The

444

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

meaning and vitality of the Constitution have developed against narrow and restrictive construction."
This was the spirit in which we delineated, in meaningful language, the manner in which the constitutionalrights of the individual could be enforced against overzealous police practices. It was necessary in Escobedo,
as here, to insure that what Was .proclaimed in the Constitution had not become but a "form of words," Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. . 385, 392(1920), in the hands of government officials. And it isin this spirit, consistent with our role as judges, that we
adhere to the principles of Escobedo today.
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity
in the pages which follow but briefly stated it is this:the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory .or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use ofprocedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation;
we mean questioning initiatedby law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.4
As for' the procedural safeguards to be employedi unlessother fully effective means are devised to inform accused
persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures
are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must
be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he-does make may be used as evidence against
him, and'that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may-waive effectuation of these rights,,provided the waiver ismade voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
4 This is what *e~meant in Escobedo when we spoke -of ap investi-

gation which had focused on an accused.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

Opinion of the Court.

process thit he wishes to consult with an'attorney before
speaking there'can be no. questioning. likewise, if theindividual, is alone and indicates in any manner that hedoes not wish to be interrogated, the police may notquestion him. The mere fact that he may have answeredsome questions or volunteered some statements on his
own does not deprive -him of the' right -to refrain fromanswering any further inquiries until he has consulted
with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
I.

The constitutional issue we decide in each of these cases
is the admissibility 6f statements obtained from a defendant questioned while iri custody or othekwi'se deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way. In each, thedefendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, ora prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off
from the outside world. In none of these caseswas thedefendant given a full and effective warning of his rights
at the outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases,
the questioning elicited oral admissions, and in three ofthem, signed statements as well which were admitted attheir trials. They all thus share salient featuresincommunicado interrogation of individuals in' a policedominated atmosphere, resulting in self-iicriminatingstatements without full warnings of constitutional rights.
An understanding of the nature and setting of thisin-custody interrogation is essential to. our decisions
today. The difficulty in depicting what transpires atsuch interrogations stems from the fact that in this country they have largely taken place incommunicado. From
extensive factual studies undertaken in the early 1930's,
including the famous Wickersham Report to Congress'by a Presidential Commission, it is clear that police violence and the "third degree" flourished at that time.5
5 See, for example, IV National Commission on Law Observanceand Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (1931)

446

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

In a series of cases decided by this Court long after thesestudies, the police resorted to physical brutality-beating, hanging, whipping-and to sustained and protracted
questioning incommunicado in order to extort confessions2 'The Commission oh Civil Rights in 1961 foundmuch evidence to indicate that "some policemen still
resort to physical force to obtain confessions," 1961
Comm'n on Civil Rights Rep., Justice, pt. 5, 17. The
use of physical -brutality and violence is not, unfortunately, relegated to the past or to any part of the country.
Only recently in Kings County, New York, the police
brutally beat, kicked and placed lighted cigarette buttson the back of a potential witness under-interrogation
for tle purpose of securing a statement incriminating athird party. People v. Portelli, 15 N. Y. 2d 235, 205
N. E. 2d 857, 257 N. Y. S. 2d 931 (1965)."[Wickersham Report]; Booth, Confessions, and Methods Employedin Procuring Them, 4 So. Calif, L. Rev. 83 (1930); Kauper, Judicial
Examination of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30
Mich. L. Rev. 1224 (1932). It is significant that instances of thirddegree treatment of prisoners almost invariably took place duringthe ]Zeriod between arrest and preliminary examination. Wickersham Report, at 169; Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345, 357 (1936). See
also Foote, Law and Police Practice: Safeguards in the Law' ofArrest, 52 Nw. U. L. Rev. 16 (1957).
6Brown v. Mississippi,297 U. S.278 (1936)'; Chambers v. Florida,
309 U. S. 227 (1940); Canty v. Alabama, 309 U. S. 629 (1940);
White v. Texas, 310 U. S.530 (1940); Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U. S.
547 (1941); Ward v. Texas, 316 U, S.547 (1942); Asharaft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944); Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S.401(1945); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U. S. 556 (1954). See also Williams
v. United States, 341 U. S.97 (1951).
7
In addition, see People v. Wakat, 415 Ill.
610, 114 N. E. 2d 706(1953)'; Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F. 2d, 59 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1958)(defendant suffering from broken bones, multiple bruises and injuries sufficiently serious to require eight months' medical treatment
after being manhandled by five policemen); Kier v. State, 213 Md.
556, 132 A. 2d 494 (1957) (police doctor told accused, who was

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.436

Opinion of the Court.

The examples given above are undoubtedly the exception now, but they are sufficiently widespread to be theobject of concern. Unless a proper limitation uponcustodial interrogation is achieved--such as these decisions will advance-there can be no assurance that practices of this nature will be eradicated in the foreseeable
future. The conclusion of the Wickersham Commission
Report, made over 30 years ago, is still pertinent:"To the contention that the third degree is necessary to get the facts, the reporters aptly reply in thelanguage of the present Lord Chancellor of England(Lord Sankey): 'It is not admissible to do a greatright by doing a little wrong.....
It is not sufficient to do justice by obtaining a proper result byirregular or improper means.' Not only does theuse of the third degree involve a flagrant violationof law by the officers of the law, but it involves also
the dangers of false confessions, and it tends to makepolice and prosecutors less zealous in the search for
objective evidence. As the New York prosecutor
quoted in the report said, 'It is a short cut and makes
the police lazy and unenterprising.' Or, as anotherofficial quoted remarked: 'If you use your fists, you"strapped to a chair comj~letely nude, that heproposed to take hairand skin scrapings from anything that looked like blood or spermfrom various parts of his body); Bruner .v. People, 113 Colo. 194,156 P. 2d 111 (1945) (defendant held in custody over two months,

deprived of food for 15 'hours, folced to submit to a lie detector
test when he wanted to go to the toilet); People v. Matlock, 51 Cal.
2d 682, 336 P. 2d 505 (1959)(defendant questioned incessantly

over an evening's time, made to lie on cold board and to anawer
questions whenever it appeared he was getting sleepy). Other cases
are documented in Americma Civil Liberties Union, Illinois Division,
Secret Detention by the Chicago Police (1959)'; Potts, The"Prelim-

inary Examinatiod and "The Third Degree," 2 Baylor L. Rev. 131(1950); Sterling, Police Interrogation and the Psychology of Con-

fession, 14 J. Pub. L. 25 (1965).

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

are not so likely to use your wits.' We agree withthe conclusion expressed in the report, that 'The
third degree brutalizes the police, hardens the prisoner against society, and lowers the esteem in which
the administration of justice is held by the public.'" IV National Commission on Law Observanceand Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law
Enforcement 5 (1931).
Again we stress that the modern practice of in-custodyinterrogation is psychologically rathef than physicallyoriented. As we have stated before, "Since Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, this Court has recognizedthat coercion can be mental as well as physical, and thatthe blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an
unconstitutional inquisition." Blackburn v. Alabama,
361 U. S.199, 206 (1960). Interrogation still takes placein privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this in turnresults in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goeson in the interrogation rooms. A. valuable source of information about present police practices, however, may
be found in various police manuals and texts which document procedures employed with success in the past, andWhich recommend variotts other effective tactics.8 These8

The manuals quoted in.the text following are the most recent andrepresentative of the texts currently available. Material of the same
nature appears in Kidd, Police Interrogation (1940); Mulbar, Interrogation (1951); Dienstein, Technics for the Crime Investigator
97-115 (1952). Studies concerning the observed practices of thepolice appear in LaFave, Arrest: The Decision To Take a Suspect
Into Custody 244-437, 490-521 (1965); LaFave, Detention for
Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current Practices, 1962
Wash. U. L. 9, 331; Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-FromArrest to Release or Charge, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 11 (1962); Sterling,supra, n. 7, at 47-65.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.436

449

Opinion of the Court.

texts are used by law enforcement agencies themselves
as guides.' It should be noted that these texts professedly present the most enlightened and effective means
presently used to obtain statements through custodialinterrogation. By considering these texts and other data,
it is possible to describe procedures observed and notedaround the country.
The officers are told by the manuals that the "principal psychological factor contributing to a successfulinterrogation is' privacy-being alone with the person
under interrogation." 10 The efficacy of this tactic has
been explained as follows:"If at all 'practicable, the interrogation shouldtake place in the investigator's office or at lekst ina room of his own choice. The subject should be
deprived of every psychological advantage. In his
own home he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware of his rights and0
The methods described in Inbau. & Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (1962), are a-revision and enlargement of material presented in three prior editions of a predecessor text, -Lie
Detection and Criminal Interrogation (3d ed. 1953). The authors
and their associates are officers of the Chicago Police Scientific Crime
Detection Laboratory and have had extensive experience in writing,lecturing and speaking to law enforcement authorities 'over a 20year period. They say that the techniques portrayed in their manuals reflect their experiences and are the most effective psychologicalstratagems to employ during interrogations. Similarly, the techniques described in O'Hara, Fundamentals of Criminal Investigation(1956), were gleaned from long service as observer, lecturer in policescience, and work as a federal criminal investigator. All these texts
have had rather extensive use among law enforcement agencies andamong students of police science, with total sales and circulation ofover 44,000.
10hIbau & Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (1962),
a' 1.

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384.U. S.

more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions or criminal
behavior within the walls of his home. Moreover his family and other friends are nearby, theirpresence lending moral support. In his own office,the investigator possesses all the advantages. The
atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the forcesof the law.""
To highlight the isolation and unfamiliar surroundings,
the manuals instruct the police to display an air of confidence in the suspect's guilt and from outward appearance to maintain only an interest in confirming certain
details. The guilt of the subject is to be posited as afact. The interrogator should direct his comments toward the reasons why the subject committed the act,
rather than court failure by asking the subject whether
he did it. Like other men, perhaps the subject has hada bad family life, -had an unhappy childhood, had too
much to drink, had an unrequited" desire for women.
The officers are instructed to minimize the moral seriousness of the offense, 12 to cast blame on the victim or on

society.13 These tactics are designed to put the subject
in a psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what the police purport. to know alreadythat he is guilty. Explanations to the contrary are
dismissed and discouraged.
The texts thus stress that the major qualities an interrogator should possess are patience and perseverance.
'1Oqlara, supra, at 99.
2Inbau & Reid, supra, at 34-43, 87.

For example, in Leyra

v. Denno, 347 U. S. 556 (1954), the interrogator-psychiatrist told
the accused, "We do sometimes things that are not right, but in a
fit of temper or anger we sometimes do things we aren't reallyrespbnsible for," id., at 562, and again, 'eknow'that morally youwere just in anger. Morally, you are not to be condemned," id.,

at 582.
's Inbau & Reid, supra, at 43-55.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

Opinion of the Court.

One writer describes the efficacy of these -characteristics
in this manner:"In the preceding paragraphs emphasis has beenplaced on kindness and stratagems. The investigator will, however, encounter many situations where
the sheer weight of his personality will be the deciding factor. Where emotional appeals and tricks-are
employed to no avail, he must rely on an oppressive
atmosphere of dogged persistence. He must interrogate steadily and without relent, leaving the subject no prospect of surcease. He must dominate his
subject and overwhelm him with his inexorable will
to obtain the truth. He should interrogate for aspell of several hours pausing only for the subject's
necessities in acknowledgment of the need to avoid
a charge of duress that can be technically substan:tiated. In Aserious case, the interrogation may continue for days, with the required intervals for foodand sleep, but with no respite from the atmosphereof domination. It is possible in this way to induce
the subject to talk without resorting to. duress or
coercion. The method should be used only when
the guilt of the subject appears highly probable." 14
The manuals suggest that the suspect be offered legal
excuses for his actions in order to obtain an initial admission of guilt. Where there is a suspected revenge-killing,for example, the interrogator may say:"Joe, you probably didn't go out looking for thisfellow with the purpose of shooting him. My guessis, however, that you expected something from him
and that's why you carried a gun-for your own
protection. You knew him for what he .was, nogood. Then whien you methim.he probably started
using foul, abusive langusage and he gave some indi1

O'ara, supra, at 112.

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

cation that he was about to pull a gun on you, andthat's when you had to act to save your own life.
That's about it, isn't it, Joe?"
Having then obtained the admission of shooting, theinterrogator is advised to refer to circumstantial evidence
which negates the self-defense explanation. This should
enable him to secure the entire story. One text notesthat "Even if he fails to do so, the inconsistency between
the subject's original denial of the shooting and his present admission of at least doing the shooting will serve todeprive him of a self-defense 'out' at the time of trial." 16
When the techniques described above prove unavailing, the texts recommend they be alternated with a showof some hostility. One ploy often used has been termedthe "friendly-unfriendly" or the "Mutt and Jeff" act:". .. In'this technique, two agents are employed.
Mutt, the relentless investigator, who knows the subject is guilty and is not going to waste any time.
He's sent a dozen men away for this crime and he's
going to send the subject away for the full term.
Jeff, on the other hand, is obviously a kindhearted
man. He has a family himself. He has a brother
who was involved in a little scrape like this. He
disapproves of Mutt and his tactics and will arrange
to get him off the case if the subject will cooperate.
He can't hold Mutt off for very long. -The subject
would be wise to make a quick decision. The technique is applied by having both investigators present
while Mutt acts out his role. Jeff may stand by
quietly and demur at some of Mutt's tactics. When
Jeff makes his plea for cooperation, Mutt is notpresent in the room." 17
15"-hbau & Reid, supra, at 40.
Is Ibid.
17 O'Hara, supra, at 104, Inbau & Reid, supra, at 58-59.
See
Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315 (1959). A varianf on the tech-

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.436

Opinion of the Court.

The interrogators sometimes are instructed to induce
a confession out of trickery. The technique here is quite
effective in crimes which require identification or which
run in series. In the identification situation, the interrogator may take a break in his questioning to place thesubject among a group- of men in a line-up. "The witness or complainant (previously coached, if necessary)studies the line-up and confidently points out the subject
as the guilty party." 18 Then the questioning resumes"as though there were now no doubt about the guilt of
the subject." A variation on this technique is called thereverse line-up":"The accused is placed in a line-up, but this time
he is identified by several fictitious witnesses or victims'who associated him with different offenses. It
is expected that the subject will become desperateand confess to the offense under investigation inorder to escape from the false accusations." 19
The manuals also contain instructions for police on
how to handle the individual who refuses to discuss thematter entirely, or who asks for an attorney or relatives.
The examiner is to concede him the right to remainsilent. "This usually has a very undermining effect.
First of all, he is disappointed in his expectation of an
unfavorable reaction on the part of the interrogator.
Secondly, a concession of this right to remain silent imnique of creating hostility is one -of engendering fear. This isperhaps best described by the prosecuting attorney in Malinsks v.

New York, 324 U. S. 401, 407 (1945): "Why this talk about being
undressed? Of course, they. had a right to undress tim to lookfor bullet scars, and keep the clothes off him. That was quite
proper police procedure.

That is some more psychology-let him

sit around with a blanket' on hih, humiliate him there for awhile; let him sit in the comer, let. him think he is going to get ashellacking."

28 0'Hara, supra, at 105-106.
19
Id., at 106.

0CTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

presses the subject with the apparent fairness of his
interrogator." "' After this psychological conditioning,
however, the officer is told to point out the incriminating
significance of the suspect's refusal to talk:"Joe, you have a right to remain silent. That's
your privilege and I'm the last person in the world
who'll try to take it away from you. If that's theway you want to leave this, 0. K. But let me ask
you this. Suppose you were in my shoes and I werein yours and you called me in to ask me about thisand I told you, 'I don't want to answer any of yourquestions.' You'd think I had something to hide,and you'd probably be right in thinking that.
That's exactly what I'll have to think about you,and so will everybody else. So let's sit here andtalk this whole thing over." 21
Few will persist in their initial refusal to talk, it is said,
if this monologue is employed correctly.
In the event that the subject wishes to speak to a relative or a:n attorney, the following advice is tendered:"[T]he interrogator should respond by suggestingthat the subject first tell the truth to the interrogator himself rather than get anyone else involvedin the matter. If the request is for an attorney,
the interrogator may suggest that the subject savehimself or his family the expense of any such professional service, particularly if he is innocent of
the offense under investigation. The interrogator
may also add, 'Joe, I'm only looking for the truth,and if you're telling the truth, that's it. You canhandle this by yourself.' 22Inbau & Reid, supra, at 111.
,,o
21 Ibid.
22

Inbau & Reid, supra, at 112.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

Opinion of the Court.

From these representative samples of interrogation
techniques, the setting prescribed by the manuals andobserved in practice becomes clear. *In essence, it is
this: To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent
distraction and to deprive him of any outside support.
The aura of confidence in his guilt undermines his will
to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived story thepolice seek to have him describe. Patience and persistence, at times relentless questioning, are employed. To
obtain a confession, the interrogator must' "patiently
maneuver himself or his quarry into a position fromwhich the desired objective may be attained." 23 Whennormal procedures fail to produce the needed result; thepolice may resort to deceptive stratagems such as giving
false legal advice. It is important to keep the subject
off balance, for example, by trading on his iisecurity'about himself or his surroundings. The pblice thenpersuade, trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights.
Even without employing brutality, the "third degree"or the specific stratagems described above, the very factof custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals..2 4
Inbau & Reid, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation 185(3d ed. 1953).
24 Interrogation procedures may even give rise to a 'false confession. The most recent conspicuous example occurred in New
York, in 1964, when a Negro of limited intelligence confessed to two
brutal murders and a rape which he had not committed. When
this was discovered, the prosecutor was. reported as saying: "Callit what you want-brain-washing, hypnosis, fright. They made him
give an untrue confession. The only thing I don't believe is that
Whitmore was beaten." N. Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1965, p. 1, col. 5.
In two other instances, similar events had occurred. N. Y. Times,
Oct. 20, 1964, p. 22, col. 1; N. Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1965, p. 1, col. 1.
In general, see Borchard, Convicting the Innocent (1932); Frank& Frank, Not Guilty (1957).
23

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

This fact may be illustrated simply by referring to threeconfession cases decided by this Court in the Term immediately preceding our Escobedo decision. In Townsend
v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), the defendant was a
19-year-old heroin addict, described as a "near mental
defective," id., at 307-310. The defendant in Lynumn v.
Illinois, 372 U. S. 528 (1963), was a woman who confessed to the arresting officer after being importuned to"cooperate"- in order to prevent her children from being
taken by relief authorities. This Court as in those cases
reversed the conviction of a defendant in Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503 (1963), whose persistent request
during his interrogation was to phone his wife or attorney.25 In other settings, these individuals might haveexercised their constitutional rights. In the incommunicado police-dominated atmosphere, they succumbed.
In the cases before us today, given this background,
we concern ourselves primarily with this interrogation
atmosphere and the evils it can bring. In No. 759,
Miranda v. Arizona, the police arrested the defendantand, took him to a special interrogation room where they
secured a confession. In No. 760, Vignera v. New York,the defendant made oral admissions to the police after
interrogation in the afternooti, and then signed an inculpatory statement upon being questioned by an assistant district attorney later the same evening. In No.
761, Westover v. United States, the defendant washanded over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation by
25

In the fourth confession case decided by the Court in the 1962
Term, Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963), our disposition made it
unnecessary to delve at length into the facts. :The facts of the
defendant's case there, however, paralleled those of his co-defendants,
whose confessions were found to have resulted from 6ontinuous andcoercive interrogation for 27 hours, with denial of requests for friends
or attorney. See United States v. Murphy, 222 F. 2d 698 (C. A.
2d Cir. 1955) (Frank, J.); People v. Bonino, 1 N. Y. 2d 752, 135
N. E. 2d 51 (1956).

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

457

Opinion of the Court.

local authorities after they had detained and interrogated
him for a lengthy period, both at night and the following morning. After some two hours of questioning, thefederal officers had obtained signed statements from thedefendant. Lastly, in No. 584, Californiav. Stewart, thelocal police held the defendant five days in the stationand interrogated him on nine separate occasions before
they secured his inculpatory statement.
In these cases, we might not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms.
Our concern for adequate safeguards to protect precious
Fifth Amendment rights is, of cburse, not lessened in
the slightest. In each of the cases, the defendant was
thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run throughmenacing police interrogation procedures. The potentiality for compulsion is forcefully apparent, for example,in Miranda, where the indigent Mexican defendant wasa seriously disturbed individual with pronounced sexual
fantasies, and in Stewart, in which the defendant was
an indigent Los Angeles Negro who had dropped outof school in the sixth grade. To be -sure, the records
do not evince overt physical coercion or patent psychological ploys. The fact remains that in none of thesecases did the officers undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to insurethat the statements were truly the product of free choice.
It is obvious that such an interrogation environmentis created for no purpose other than to subjugate theindividual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation. To be sure,
this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity.26 The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our
26 The absurdity of denying that a confession obtained under thesecircumstances is compelled is aptly portrayed by an example in Pro-

.458

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

Nation's most cherished principles-that the individual
may not be compelled to incriminate himself. Unlessadequate protective devices are employed to dispel thecompulsion inherent in custedial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendaht can truly be theproduct of his free choice.
From the foregoing, we can readily perceive an intimate connection between the privilege against selfincrimination and police custodial questioning. It isfitting to turn to history and precedent underlying the
Self-Incrimination Clause to determine its applicability
in this situation.
II.
We sometimes forget how long it has taken to establish
the privilege against self-incrimination, the sources fromwhich it came and the fervor with which it was defended. Its*roots go back into ancient times.2 7 Perfessor Sutherland's recent article, Crime and Confession, 79 Harv.
L. Rev. 21, 37 (1965):"Suppose a well-to-do testatrix says she intends to will her property to Elizabeth. John and James want her to bequeath it to theminstead. They capture the testatrix, put her in a carefully designed
room, out of touch with everyone but themselves and their convenient 'witnesses,' keep her secluded there for hours while they
make insistent demands, weary her with contradictions of her assertions that she wants to leave her money to Elizabeth, and finallyinduce her to execute th will in their favor. Assume that John
and James are deeply and correctly convinced that Elizabeth isunworthy and will make base use of the property if she gets her
hands on it, whereas John and James have the noblest and mostrighteous intentions. Would any judge of probate accept the will
so procured as the 'voluntary' act of the testatrii?"
27
Thirteenth century commentators found an analogue to theprivilege grounded in thn Bible. "To sum up the matter, the principle that no man is to Ne declared guilty on his own admission isa divine decree." Maimf6fiides, Mishneh Torah (Code of JewishLaw), Book of Judges, Laws of the Sanhedrin, c. 18, 6, III YaleJudaica Series 52-53. See also Lamm, The Fifth Amendment andIts Equi'ialent in the Halakhah, 5 Judaism 53 (Winter 1956).

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

Opinion of the Court.

haps the critical historical event shedding light on its
origins and evolution was the trial of one John Lilburn,a vocal anti-Stuart Leveller, who was made to take theStar Chamber Oath in 1637. The oath would havebound him to answer to all questions posed to him on
any subject. The Trial of John Lilburn and John
Wharton, 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1637). He resisted theoath and declaimed the proceedings, stating:"Another fundamental right I then contended for,was, that no man's -conscience ought to be racked byoaths imposed, to answer to questions concerning
himself in matters criminal, or pretended to be so."Haller & Davies, The Leveller Tracts 1647-1653,
p. 454 (1944).
On account of the Lilburn Trial, Parliament abolishedthe inquisitorial Court of Star Chamber and went further
in giving him generous reparation. The lofty principles to which Lilburn had appealed during his trial
gained popular acceptance in England.2 8 These sentiments worked their way over to the Colonies and were
implanted after great struggle into the Bill of Rights. 2
Those who framed our Constitution and the Bill of Rights
were ever aware of subtle encroachments on individual
liberty. They knew that "illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing . . .by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure." Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 635(1886). The privilege was elevated to constitutional
status and has always been "as broad as the mischief
281See Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn.
L. Rev. 1, 9-11 (1949); S Wigmore, Evidence 289-295 (McNaugh-ton- rev. 1961). See also Lowell, The Judicial Use of Torture,
Parts I and II, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 220, 290 (1897).
"9See Pittman, The Colonial and 'Constitutional History of thePrivilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 Va. L. Rev. 763(1935); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S.422, 445-449 (1956)(DOuGLAS, J., dissenting).

-460

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

against which it seeks to guard." Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 562 (1892). We cannot depart fromthis noble heritage.
Thus we may view the historical development of theprivilege as one which groped for the proper scope ofgovernmental power over the citizen. As a "noble principle often transcends its origins," the privilege has comerightfully to be recognized in part as an individual's substantive right, a "right to a private enclave where he maylead a private life. -That right is the hallmark of ourdemocracy." United States v. Grunewald, 233 F. 2d556, 579, 581-582 (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U. S.
391 (1957). We have recently noted that the privilege.against self-incrimination-the essential mainstay of out
adversary system-is founded on a complex of values,
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 55-57, n. 5
(1964); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U..S. 406, 414-415, n. 12(1966), All these policies point- to one overriding
thought: the constitutional foundation underlying the.
privilege is the respect a government-state or federalmust accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.
To maintain a "fair state-individual balance," to require
the government "to shoulder the entire load," 8 Wigmore,
Evidence 317 (McNaughton rev. 1961), to respect theinviolability of the human personality, our accusatory
system of criminal justice demands that the government
seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence
against him by its own independent labors, rather thanby the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his
own mouth. Chidmbers v. Florida,309 U. _'. 227, 235238 (1940). In sum, the privilege is fulfilled only when
the person, is guaranteed the right "to remain silent-unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of
his own will." Malloy v, Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 8 (1964).
The question in these cases is whether the privilege
is fully applicable during a period of custodial interroga-

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

Opinion of the Court.

'tion. In this Court, the privilege has consistently been
accorded a liberal construction. Albertson v. SACB, 382
U. S. 70, 81 (1965); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S.
479, 486 (1951); Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U. S. 71,
72-73 (1920); Counselman v. Hitchock, 142 U. S. 547,
562 (1892). We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal compulsion
exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custodyquestioning. An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic
forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to
speak in the isolated setting of the police station may
well be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where .there are often impartial observers to guard
against intimidation or trickery3 0
This question, in fact, could have been taken as
settled in federal courts almost 70 years ago, when, in
Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 542 (1897), thisCourt held:"In criminal trials, in the courts of the UnitedStates, wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue
is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment . . . commanding that no person 'shall becompelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.'"
In Bram, the Court reviewed the British and American
history and case law and set down the Fifth Amendment
standard for compulsion which we implement today:"Much of the confusion which has resulted
from
the effort to deduce from the adjudged cases what
30 Compare Brown v. Walker, 161

United State3, 349 U. S. 155 (1955).

U. S. 591 (1896); Quinn v.

462

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the.Couft.

384 U.S.

would be a slifficient quantum of proof to show thata confession 'was or was not voluntary, has arisen
from a misconception of. the subject.'to which the"proof must address itself. The rile is not that inorder to render a statement admissible the pro.ofmust be adequate to establish that the particularcommunications contained in a statenent wirb voluntarily made, but it must be sufficient to establish-that the making of the statement was voluntary;that is to say, 'that from the causes, which the law
treats as legally sufficient to engender i1 the mindof the accused hope or .fear in respect to the crime
charged, the accused was not involuntarily impelled
to make a statement, whQn' but for the improper
influences he would have remained silent ....
" 168
U. S., at 549. And see, id., at 542.
The Court has adhered to this reasoning. In 1924,
Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote for a unanimous Court inreversing a conviction resting on a compelled confession,
Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1. He stated:"In the federal courts, the requisite of volufitariness is not satisfied by establishing merely that theconfession was not induced by a promise or a threat.
A confession is voluntary in law if, and only if, it
was, in fact, voluntarily made. A confession may
have been given voluntarily, although it was madeto polihe officers, while in cust_..4y, and in answer
to an examination conducted by them. But a confession obtained by compulsion, must be excluded
whatever may have been the character of the compulsion, and whether the compulsion was appliedin a -judicial proceeding or otherwise. Bram v.
United States, 168 U. S. 532." 266 U. S., at 14-15.
In addition to the expansive historical development of
the privilege and the sound polic-ies which have nurtured

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436-

Opinion of the Court.

its evolution, judicial preceden" thus clearly establishes
its application to incommunicado interrogation. In fact,
the Governmient concedes&this point as well establishedin No..761, Westover v. United States, stating: "We havethat it is possible for a suspect's Fifth
no doubt.
Amendment'right to be violated during in-custody questioning by a laW-enforcement officer."
Because of the adoption by Congress 6f Rule 5 (a) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and this Court's
effectuation of that Rule in McNabb v. United States,
318 U. S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354
U. S. 449 (1957), we have had little occasion in the past.quarter century to reach the constitutional issues in deal.ing with federal -interrogations. These supervisory rules,
requiring production of an arrested person before a cornmissioner "withou*t unnecessary delay" and excluding evidence obtained in. default of that statutory obligation,
were nonetheless responsive to the same considerationsof Fifth Amendment policy that unavoidably face us
noW as to the States. In McNabb, 318 U. S., at 343-344,
and in Mallory, 354 U. S., at 455-456, we recogriizbd both
the dangers of interrogation and the appropriateness ofprophylaxis stemming from the very fadt of interrogation
itself.32
Our decision in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964),
necessitates an examination of the scope of the privilege
in state cases as well.. In Malloy, we squarely-held the
31 Brief for the United States, p. 28.

To the 'same effect. see

Brief for the United States, pp. 40-49, n. 44, Anderson v. Uni.ted
States, 318 U. S. 350 (1943) ; Brief for the United States, pp. 17- -,McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943).
. 32 Our decision today does not indicate in any manner,of Lourse,that these rules can be disregarded. When federal officials arrest an
individual, they must as always comply with the dictates of th,,congressional legislation and cases thereunder. See generally, Hogan"& Snee, 'The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and -Rescue, 47 Geo. L. J. 1 (1958).

"464

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

privilege applicable to the States, and held that the substantive standards underlying the privilege applied withfull force to state court proceedings. There, as in Murphy
v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52 (1964), and Griffin v.
California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965), we applied the existing Fifth Amendment standards to the case before us.
Aside from the holding itself, the reasoning in Malloy
made clear what had already become apparent-that thesubstantive and procedural safeguards surrounding admissibility of confessions in state cases had become ex-.
ceedingly exacting, reflecting all the policies embeddedin the privilege, 378 U. S., at 7-8.11 The voluntarinessdoctrine in the state cases, as Malloy indicates, encompasses all interrogation practices which are likely to exert
such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from33 The decisions of this Court have guaranteed the same procedural protection for the defendant whlither his confession was used
in a federal or state court. it is now axiomatic that the defendant's
constitutional rights have been violated if his conviction is based,
in whole or in part, on an involuntary confession, regardless of its
truth or falsity. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534, 544 (1961);
Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1 (1924). This is so even if there
is ample evidence aside from the confession to support the conviction, e. g., Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 404 (1945); Brainv. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 540-542 (1897). Both state andfederal courts now adhere to trial procedures which seek to assurea reliable and clear-cut determination of the voluntariness of theconfession offered at trial, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964);
United States v. Carignan, 342 U. S. 36, 38 (1951); see also Wilson
v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 624 (1896). Appellate review isexacting, see Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199 (1960).' Whether his conviction
was in a federal or state court, the defendaht may secure a postconviction hearing based -on the alleged involuntary character of
his confession, provided he meets the procedural re.quirements, Fay
v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293(1963). In addition, see Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S.
52 (1964).

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

465

Opinion of the Court.

making a free and rational choice."4 The implicationsof this proposition were elaborated in our decision in
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, decided one week
after Malloy applied the privilege to the States.
Our holding there stressed the fact that the police had
not advised the defendant of his constitutional privilege
to. remain silent at the outset of the interrogation, andwe drew attention to that fact at several points in thedecision, 378 U. S.,-at 483, 485,491. This was no isolated
factor, but an essential ingredient in our decision. The
entire thrust of police interrogation there, as in all thecases today, was to put the defendant in such an emotional state as to impair his capacity for rational judgment. The abdidation of the constitutional privilegethe choice on his part to speak to the police-was notmade knowingly or competently because of the failure
to apprise him of his rights; the compelling atmosphereof the in-custody interrogation, and not an independent
decision on his part, caused the defendant to speak.
A different phase of the Escobedo decision was significant in its attention to the absence of counsel during thequestioning. There, as in the cases today, we sought a
protective device to dispel the compelling atmosphereof the interrogation. In Escobedo, however, the police
did not relieve the defendant of the anxieties which they
had created in the interrogation rooms. Rather, they
denied his request for the assistance of counsel, 378 U. S.,
at 481, 488, 491.11 This heightened his dilemma, and34

See Lisenba v. California,314 U. S. 219, 241 (1941); Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944); Malinski v. New York,.324 U. S.
401 (1945); Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315 (1959); Lynumn
v. Illinois, 372 U. S. 528 (1963); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S.
503 (1963).
35The police also prevented the attorney from consulting withhis client. Independent of any other constitutional proscription,
this action constitutes a violation of the Sixth Amendment right tothe assistance of counsel and excludes any statement obtained in its

466

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

made his later statements the product of this compulsion.
Cf. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 514 (1963).
The denial of the defendant's request for his attorney'
thus undermined his ability to exercise the privilegeto remain silent if he chose or to speak without any intimidation, blatant or subtle. The presence of counsel,
in all the cases before us today, would be the adequate
protective device necessary to make the process of police
interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege.
His presence would insure that statements made in thegovernment-established atmosphere are not the productof compulsion.
It was in this manner that Escobedo explicated anotherfacet of the pre-trial privilege, noted in many of the
Court's prior decisions: the protection of rights at trial."
That counsel is Dresent when statements are taken froman individual during interrogation obviously enhances
the integrity of the fact-finding processes in court. The
presence of an attorney, and the warnings delivered tothe individual, enable the defendant under otherwisecompelling circumstances to tell his story without fear,
effectively, and in a way that eliminates the evils in theinterrogation process. Without the protections flowing
from adequate warnings and the rights of counsel, "allthe careful safeguards erected around the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or any other witness, would
become empty formalities in a procedure where the mostcompelling possible evidence of guilt, a confession, would
have already been obtained at the unsupervised pleasureof the police." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 685 (1961)(HARLAN, J., dissenting).
Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380
U. S. 400 (1965).
wake. See People v. Donovan, 13 N. Y. 2d 148, 193 N. E. 2d 628,
243 N. Y. S. 2d 841 (1963) (FuId, J.).
: In re Groban, 352 U. S. 330, 340-352 (1957) (BLACK, J., dissenting); Note, 73 Yale L. J. 1000, 1048-1051 (1964): Comment,
31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 313, 320 (1964) and authorities cited.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

Opinion of the Court.

III.
Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth
Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal
court proceedings and serves to protect persons in. allsettings in which their freedom of action is curtailed inany significant Way from being compelled t6 incriminate
themselves. We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons
suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's
will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would
not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat thesepressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise theprivilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be
adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and theexercise of those rights must be fully honored.
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the privilege which might be devised
by Congress or the States in the exercise' of their creative
rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot say that
the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any
particular solution for the inherent compulsions of theinterrogation process as it is presently conducted. Ourdecision in no way creates a constitutipnal straitjacket
which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is-it intended to have this effect. We encourage Congress andthe States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of ourcriminal laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused
persons of their right of silence and in assuring acontinuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards must be observed.
At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected
to interrogation, he must first be informed, in clear and468

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent.
For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed
simply to make them aware of it-the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise. More
important, such a warning is an absolute prerequisite
in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation
atmosphere. It is not just the subnormal or woefully
ignorant who succumb to an. interrogator's imprecations,
whether implied or expressly stated, that the interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained or thatsilence in the face of accusation is itself damning andwill bode ill when presented to a jury.17 Further, thewarning will show the individual that his interrogators
are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose
to exercise it.
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to
our system of constitutional rule and the expedient ofgiving an adequate warning as to the availability of theprivilege so simple, we will *notpause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of hisrights without a warning being given. Assessments of
the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on infors1 See p. 454, supra. Lord Devlin has commented:"It is probable that even today, when there is much less ignorance
about these matters than formerly, there is still a general belief
that you must answer all questions put to you by a policeman, orat least tlat it will be the worse for you if you do not." Devlin,
The Criminal Prosecution in England 32 (1958).
In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize
an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when
he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may
not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed
his privilege in the face of accusation. Cf. Griffin v. California, 380
U. S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 8 (1964); Comment, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 556 (1964); Developments in the LawConfessions, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935, 1041-1044 (1966). See also
Brain v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 562 (1897).

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
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Opinion of the Court..

mation as to his age, education, intelligence, or priorcontact with authorities, can never be more than specu-

lation; 38 a warning is a clearcut fact. More important,whatever the background of the person interrogated, awarning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable
to overcome its pressures and- to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that.
point in time.
The warning of the right to remain silent must be
accompanied by the explanation that anything said can
and will be used against the individual in court. Thiswarning is needed in order'to make him aware not onlyof the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual moreacutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system-that he is not in the presence of persons
acting solely in his interest.
The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one
merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators.
Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth
Amendment privilege under the system we delineate
today. Our aim is to assure that the individual's right tochoose between silence and speech remains unfetteredthroughout the interrogation process. A once-statedwarning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself sufficeto that end among those
who most require knowledge of their rights. A mere
(1942), and the recurrent inSee generally,itnecessitated.
quiry into special circumstances
Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 219 (1962).
38 Cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

warning given by the interrogators is not alone sufficientto accomplish that end. Prosecutors themselves claimthat the admonishment of the right to remain silent without more "will benefit only the recidivist and the professional." Brief for the National District Attorndys
Association as amicus curiae, p. 14. Even preliminary
advice given to the accused by his own attorney can beswiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process., Cf.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 485, n. 5. Thus, theneed for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult withcounsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel
present during any questioning if the defendant sodesires.
The presence of counsel at the interrogation may serve
several significant subsidiary functions as well. If theaccused decides to talk to his interrogators, the assistanceof counsel can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness.
With a lawyer present the likelihood that the police willpractice coercion' is reduced, and if coercion is nevertheless exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court. The
presence of a lawyer car also help to guarantee that theaccused gives a fully accurate statement to the police andthat the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution
at trial. See Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433, 443-

448 (1958) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting).
An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. While such request affirmatively
secures his right to have one, his failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver. No effective waiver ofthe right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized uniess specifically made after the warnings we here
delineate have been given. The accused who does notknow his rights and therefore does not make a request

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

Opinion of the Court.

may be the person who most needs counsel. A; theCalifornia Supreme Court has aptly put it:"Finally, we must recognize that the impositionof the requirement for the request would discriminate against the defendant who does not know his
rights. The defendant who does not ask for counsel
is the very defendant who most needs counsel. We
cannot penalize a defendant who, not understanding
his constitutional rights, does not make the formal
request and by such failure demonstrates his helplessness. To require the request would be to favor
the defendant whose sophistication or status had
fortuitously prompted him to make it." People v.
Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 351, 398 P: 2d 361, 369-70,
42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 177-178 (1965) (Tobriner, J.).
In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 513 (1962), we
stated: "[I] t is settled that where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be furnishedcounsel does not depend on a request." This proposition
applies with equal force in the context of providing
counsel to protect an accused's Fifth Amendment .privi9 Although the role oflege in the face of interrogation.
counsel at trial differs from the role during interrogation,
the differences are not relevant to the question whether arequest is a prerequisite.
Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation mu~t be clearly informed -that he laas the rightto consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer withhim during interrogation under the system for protecting
the privilege we delineate today. As with the warningsof the right to remain silent and that anything stated
can be used in evidence against him, this warning is anabsolute prerequisite to interrogation. No amount of
39See Herman, The Suireme Court and Restrictions on Police
Interrogation, 25 Ohio St. L. J. 449, 480.(1964).

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion -of the Court.

384 U. S.

circumstantial evidence that the person may have beenaware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead. Only
through such a warning is there ascertainable assurance
that the accused was aware of this right.
If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistanceof counsel before any interrogation occurs, the authorities
cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on the basisthat the individual does not have-.or cannot afford a retained attorney. The fifiancial ability of the individual
has no relationship to the scope of the rights involved
here. The privilege against self-incrimination securedby the Constitution applies to all individuals. The needfor counsel in order to protect the- privilege exists forthe indigent as well as the affluent. In fact, were we tolimit these constitutional rights to those who can retain
an attorney, our decisions today would be of little significance. The cases before us as well as the vast majority of confession cases with which we have dealt in thepast involve those unable to retain counsel. ' Whileauthorities are not required to relieve the accused of hispoverty, they have the obligation not to take advantage
of indigence in the administration of justice.4 Denial
40 Estimatesof 50-90% indigency among felony defendants havebeen reported. Pollock, Equal Justice in Practice, 45 Minn. L. Rev.
737, 738-739 (1961); Birzon, Kasanof & Forma, The. light toCounsel and the Indigent Accused in Courts 6f Criminal Jurisdictionin New York State, 14 Buffalo L. Rev. 428, 435 (1965).
4
1 See Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansionsof American Criminal Procedure, in Criminal Justice in Our Time1, 64-81 (1965). As was stated in. the Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal
Criminal Justice 9 (1963):"When government chooses to exert its powers in the criminal area,
its obligation is surely no less than that of taking reasonable' measures to eliminate those factors that are irrelevant to just administration of ,ie law but which, nevertheless, may occasionally affect.
determinations of the accused's liability or penalty. While govern-

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

Opinion of the Court.

of counsel to the indigent at the time of interrogation
while allowing an attorney to those who can afford one
would be no more supportable by reason or logic than thesimilar situation at trial and on appeal struck down in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), and Douglas
v. California,372 U. S. 353 (1963).
In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of theextent of his rights under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigenta lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Without
this additional warning, the admonition of the right toconsult with counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if he has one
or has the funds to obtain one. The warning of a rightto counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms thatwould convey to the indigent-the person most often
subjected to interrogation-the knowledge that he too
42
has a right to have counsel present. As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and of the general rightto counsel, only by effective and express explanation to
the indigent of this right can there be4 3 assurance that hewas truly in a position to exercise it.
Once .warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manment may not be required to relieve the accused of his poverty, it
may properly be required to minimize the influence of poverty on
its administration of justice.'
42 Cf. United States ex rel. Brown v. Fay, 242 F. Supp. 273, 277(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1965); People v. Witenski, 15 N. Y. 2d 392,
207 N. E. 2d 358, 259 N. Y. S. 2d 413 (1965).
. While a warning that the indigent may have counsel appointed
need not be given to the person who is known to have an attorney
or is known to have ample funds to. secure one, the expedient ofgiving a warning is too simple and the rights involved too important
to engage in ex post facto inquiries into financial ability when there
is any doubt at all on that score.

474

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

ner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that hewishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease."At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise
his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken
after the person invokes his privilege cannot be otherthan the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.
Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of
in-custody interrogation operates, on -the individual to
overcome free choice ihi producing a statement after
the privilege has been once invoked. If the individualstates that he wants an attorney, the interrogation mustcease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with theattorney and to have him present during any subsequent
questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney
and he indicates that he wants one before speaking topolice, they must respect his decision to remain silent.
This does not mean, as some have suggested, that eachpolice station must have a "station house lawyer" present
at all times to advise prisoners. It does mean, however,that if police propose to interrogate a person they must
make known to him that he is entitled to a lawyer andthat if he cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided
for him prior to any interrogation. If authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel during a reasonable period of time in which investigation in the field iscarried out, they may refrain from doing so withoit violating the person's Fifth Amendment privilege so long as
they do not question him during that time.
44

If an individual indicates his desire to remain silent, but has an
attorney present, there may be some circumstances in which further
questioning would be permissible. In the absence of evidence ofoverbearing, statements then made in the presence of counsel might
be free of the compelling influence of the interrogation process andmight fairly be construed as a waiver of the privilege for purposesof these statements.

MIRANDA 'v. ARIZONA.
436

.475

Opinion of the Court.

If the interrogation continues without the presence ofan attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden
rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or
appointed counsel. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U. S.478,
490, n. 14. This Court has always set high standardsof proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304U. S. 458 (1938), and we re-assert thesestandards as applied to in-custody interogation,; Sincethe.State is responsible for establishiig the isolated circumstances under which the interrogation takes placeand has the only means of making available corroborated
evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation, the burden is rightly on its shoulders.
An express statement thai the individual is willing to
make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waivei.
But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply fromthe silence of the accused after warnings are given, or
simply from the fact that a confession vis -in fact
eventually obtained. A statement we made in Carnleyv. Cochran, 369 U. S.506, 516 (1962), is applicable here:"Presuming waiver from a silent record' is impermissible: The record must show, or there must be
an allegation and evidence which show, that an
accused was offered counsel but intelligently andunderstandingly rejected te offer. 'An ,thing lessis not waiver."See also Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942).
Moreover, where in-custody interrogation is involved,
there is no room for the contention that the privilege iswaived if the individual answers some questions or gives

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

some information on his own prior to invoking his rightto remain silent when interrogated. 5
Whatever the testimony of the authorities as towaiver of rights by an accused, the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before a statemerit is made is strong evidence that the accused did
not-validly waive his rights. In these circumstances thefact that the individual eventually made a statement is
consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so.
It is inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege. Moreover, any evidence
that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into
a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did
not voluntarily waive his privilege. The requirement of
warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply
a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.
The warnings required and the waiver necessary inaccordance with our opinion today are, in the absence ofa fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility bf any statement made by a defendant. No distinction can be drawn between statements which are
direct confessions and statements which amount to "admissions" of part or all of an offense. The privilege
against self-incrimination protects the individual frombeing compelled to incriminate himself in any manner;
it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination. Sim45

Although this Court held in Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S.
367 (1951), over strong dissent, that a witness before a grand jury
may not in certain circumstances decide to answer some questions
and then refuse to answer others, that decision has no application to
the interrogation situation we deal with today. No legislative or
judicial fact-iinding authority is involved here, nor is there a possibilityhat the individual might make self-serving statements of which
he could make use at trial while refusing to answer incriminatingstatements.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

Opinion of the Court.

ilarly, for precisely the same reason, no distinction may
be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements
alleged to be merely "exculpatory." If a statement madewere in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never
be used by the prosecution. In fact, statements merely
intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often
used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate
untruths in the statement given under interrogation andthus to prove guilt by implication. These .statements are
incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word andmay not be used without the full warnings and effective
waiver required for any other statement. In Escobedo
itself, the defendant fully intended his accusation ofanother as the slayer tobe exculpatory'as to himself.
The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege against selfincrimination when the individual is first subjected topolice interrogation while in custody at the station orotherwise deprived of hi freedom of action in any significant way. It is at this point that our adversary system ofcriminal proceedings commences, distinguishing itself at
the outset from the inquisitorial systerh recognized insome countries. Under the system of warnings we dglineate today or under any other system which may be devised and found effective, the safeguards to be -erected
about the privilege must come into play at this point.
Our decision is not int)nded to hamper the traditional
function of police officers in investigating crime. See
E8cobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 492. When an individual is in custody on probable capse, the police may,-of course, seek out evidence in the'feld to be usbd attrial against him. Such investigation may include inquiry of persons tot under restraint. General on-thescene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or. other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding'
process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of478

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

'384U.S.

responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever
information they may have to aid in law enforcement.
In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent
in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present. 8
Iii dealing with statements obtained through interro.gation, we do not purpprt to find all confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper element in law
enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of theprivilege while an individual is in custody is not whether
he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit ofwarnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement that police stop a person
who enters a police station and states that he wishes toconfess to a crime, 4 or a person who calls the police tooffer a confession or any other statement he desires tomake. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barredby the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is notaffected by our holding today.
To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by theauthorities in any significant way and is subjected toquestioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is-jeopardized, Procedural safeguards must be employed to46

The distinction and its significance has been aptly desdribed in
the opinion of a Scottish court:"In former times such questioning, if undertaken, would be con-.
ducted by police officers- visiting the house or place of business ofthe suspect and there questioning him, probably in the presence ofa relation or friend. However convenient the modem practice may
be, it must normally create a situation very unfavourable to thesuspect." Chalmers v. H. M. Advocate, [1954] Sess. Cas. 66, 78(J. C.).
47 See People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 354, 398 P. 2d 361, 371,

42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 179 (1965).

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA,
436

479

Opinion of the Court.

protect the privilege, and unless other fully effectivemeans are adopted to notify the person of his right ofsilence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be*
scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that
he has the right to remain silent; that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has theright to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning-if he so desires. Opportunity t txercise"these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and suchopportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly
and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer
questions or make a statement. But unless and until
such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained8 as a result ofinterrogation can be used against-him.4
IV.

A recurrent argument made in these cases is thatsociety's need for interrogation outweighs the privilege.
This argument is not unfamiliar to this Court. See, e. g.,
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1940).
The whole thrust of our foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Constitution has prescribed the rightsof the individual when confronted with the power ofgovernment when it provided in the Fifth Amendmentthat an individual canndt be compelled to be a-.witnets
against himself.' That right, cannot be abridged. As
Mr. Justice Brandeis once observed:"Decency, security and liberty alike demand thatgovernment officials shall. be subjected to the same
48 In accordance with our holdings today and i, Escobedo v. INinoi8, 378 U. S. 478, 492, Crooker v. California,357 U. S. 433 (1958)
and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504 (1958) are not to be followed

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen.
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law
scrupulously. -Our Government is the potent, theomnipresent teacher' For good or for ill, it teaches
the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker,
it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To
declare that in the administration of the criminal
law the' end justifies the means . . .would bring
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face."
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 485 (1928)(dissenting opinion)."In this connection, one of our country's distinguishedjurists has pointed out: "The quality of a nation's civilization can be largely measured by the methods it usesin the enforcement of its criminal law." 1oIf the individual desires to exercise his privilege, he
has the right to do so. This is not for the authorities
to decide. An attorney may advise his client not to talkto police .until he has had an opportunity to investigate
the case, or he may wish to be present with his client
during any police questioning. In doing so an attorneyis merely, exercising the good professional judgment hehas been taught. This is not cause for considering theattorney a menace to law enforcement. He is merely
carrying out what he is sworn to do under his oathto protect to the extent of his ability the rights of his
49

In quoting the above, from the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justjse

Brandeis we, of course, do not intend fo pass on the constitutionalquestions involved in the Olmstead case.
50
Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 26 (1956)..

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA:
436

481

Opinion of the Court.

client. In fulfilling this respqnsibility the attorneyplays a vital role in the administration of criminal- justiceunder our Constitution.
In announcing these principles, we are not unmindfulof the burdens which law enforcement officiali must bear,often under trying circumstances. We also fully recognize the obligation of. all citizens to aid in enforcing thecriminal laws. This Court, while protecting individual
rights, has always given ample latitude to .law enforcement agencies in the legitimate exercise of their duties.
The limits we have placed on the interrogation process
should not constitute an undue interference with a proper
system of law enforcement. As We have noted) our decision does not in any way preclude police from carryingout their traditional investigatory functions. Althoughconfessions may play an important role in some convictions, the cases before us present graphic examples ofthe overstatement of the "need" for confessions. In
each case authorities conducted interrogations ranging
up to five days in duration despite the presence, throughstandard investigating practices, of considerable evidence
against each defendant:5 1 Fuither examples are chronicled in our prior cases. See, e. g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 518-519 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U. S. 534, 541 (1961); Malinski v. New-York, 324
U. S. 401, 402 (1945).-2
51 Miranda,

Vignera, and Westover were identified by eyewitnesses.
Marked bills from the bank- robbed were found in Westover's car.
Articles stolen from the victim as well as from several other robbery victims were found in Stewart's home at the outset of theinvestigation.
52Dealing as we do here with. constitutional standards in relation
to statements made, the existence of independent corroborating evi-

dence produced at trial is, of course, irrelevant~ o our decisions.
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 518-519 (1,963); Lynumn v.

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

It is also urged that an unfettered right to detention
for interrogation should be allowed because it will often
redound to the benefit of the person questioned. When
police inquiry determines that there is no reason to believe that the person has' committed any crime, it is said,
he will be released without need for further formal procedures. The person who has committed no offense,
however, will be better able to clear himself after warnings with counsel present than without. It can be assumed that in'such circumstances a lawyer would advise
his blient tW talk freely to'police in order to clear himself.
Custodial interrogation, by contrast, does not necessarily afford the innocent an opportunity to clear themselves. A serious consequence of the present practice of
the interrogation, alleged to be beneficial for the innocent is that many arrests "for investigation" subject large
numbers of inn6cent persons to detention and interrogation. In one of, the cases before us,. No. 584, California
v. Stewart, police held four persons, who were in the
defendant's house at the time of the arrest, in jail for
five days until defendant confessed. At that time they
were finally released. Police stated that there was "'noevidence to connect them with any crime." Available
statistics on the- extent of this practice where it iscondoned indicate that these four are far from alone
andin being subjected to arrest, prolonged detention,
53
interrogation without the requisite probable cause.
Illinois, 372-:.U. S. 528, 537-538 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365
U. S. 534, 541 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199, 206(1960).
13See, e. g., Report and Recommendations- of the [District ofColumbia] Commissioners' Committee on Police Arrests for Investigation (1962); American Civil Liberties Union, Secret Detention by
the 'Chicago Police (1959). An extreme example of this practiceoccurred in the District of Columbia in 1958. Seeking three "stocky"
young Negroes who had robbed a restaurant, police rounded up 90
persons of that general description. Sixty-three were held overnightMIRANDA v. ARIZONA;
436

483

Opinion of the Court.

Over the years the Federal Bureau of Investigation
has compiled an exemplary record of effective law en-.
forcement while advising any suspect or arrested person,at the outset of an interview, that he is not required tomake a statement, that any statement may be usedagainst him in court, that the individual may obtain theservices of an attorney of his own choice and, more recently, that he has a right to free counsel if he is unable
to pay. 4 A letter received from the Solicitor General in
response to a question from the Bench makes it clearthat the present pattern of warnings and respect for the
before being released for lack of evidence. A man not among the 90.
arrested was ultimately charged with ,the crime. Washington Daily
News, January 21, 1958, p. 5, col. 1; Hearings before a Subcommitteeof the Senate Judiciary Committee on H. R. 11477, S. 2970, S. 3325,
and S. 3355, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 1958), pp. 40, 78.
54 In 1952, J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal 'Bureau of
Investigation, stated:"Law enforcement, however, in defeating the criminal, must maintain inviolate the historic liberties of the individual. To turn backthe criminal, yet, by so doing, destroy the dignity of the individual,
would be a hollow victory.
"We can *have the Constitution, the best laws in the land, and themost honest reviews by courts-but unless the law enforcement profession is steeped in the democratic tradition, maintains the highest
in ethics, and makes its work a career of honor, civil liberties willcontinually-and without end-be violated ....
The best -protection of civil liberties is an alert, intelligent and honest law
enforcement agency. There can be no alternative.
Special Agents are taught that any suspect or arrested person, at the outset of an interview, must be advised that he is not
required to make a statement and that any statement given can beused against him in court.. Moreover, the individual must be informed that, if he desires, he may obtain the services of an attorneyof his own choice."
Hoover, Civil Liberties and Law Enforcement: The Role of theFBI, 37 Iowa L. Rev. 175, 177-182 (1952).

484

OCTOBEI TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

rights of the individual followed as a practice by the
FBI is consistent with the procedure which we delineate
today. It states:"At the oral argument of the above cause, Mr.
Justice Far as asked whether I could provide certain information as to the practices followed by theFederal Bureau of Investigation. I have directed
these questions to the attention of the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and am submAtting herewith a statement of the 'questions andof the answers which we have received.
"'(1). When an individual is interviewed by agentsof the Bureau, what warning is given tohim?
"'The standard warning long given by Special
Agents of the FBI to both suspects and persons
under arrest is that the person has a right to say
nothing and a right, to counsel, and that dny .statement he does make may be used against him in
court. Examples of this warning are to be foundin the Westover case at 342 F. 2d 684 (1965), andJackson v. U. S., 337 F. 2d 136 (f964), cert. den.
380 U. S. 935.
"'After passage of the Criminal Justice Act of1964, which* provides free counsel for Federal defendants unable to pay, we added to our instructions
to Special Agents the requirement that any person
who is under arrest for an offense under FBI jurisdiction, or whose arrest is contemplated following
the interview, must also be advised of his right to'free counsel if he is unable t pa y, and the fact thatsuch counsel will .be 'assigned by the Judge. At thesame time, we broadened the right to counsel warn-

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.436

Opinion of the Court.

ing to read counsel of his own choice, or anyone 'elsewith whom he might wish to speak.
"'(2) When is the-warning given?'"'The FBI warning is given to a suspect at thevery outset of the interview, as shown in the Westover case, cited above. The warning may be 'given
to a person arrested as soon as practicable after thearrest, as shown in the Jackson case, also cited above,and in U. S. v. Konigsberg, 336 F. 2d-844 (1964),
cert. den. 379 U. S. 933, but in any event it must
precede the interview with the person for a confession or admission of his own guilt.
" '(3) What is the Bureau's practice in the eventthat (a) the individual requests counsel and(b) counsel appears?
"'When the person who has been warned of hisright to counsel decides that he wishes to consult
with counsel before making a-statement, the interview is terminated at that point, Shultz v. U. S.,
351 F. 2d 287 (1965). It may be continued, however, as to all matters other than the person's own
guilt or innocence. If he is indecisive in his request
for counsel, there may be some question on whether
he did or did not waive counsel. Situations of thiskind must necessarily be left to the judgment of theinterviewing Agent. For example, in Hiram v,
U. S., 354 F. 2d 4 (1965),' the Agent's conclusion,that the person arrested had waived his right, tocounsel was upheld by the courts.
"'A person being interviewed and desiring to consult counsel by telephon must be permitted to doso, as shown in Caldwell v. U. S., 351- F. 2d 459(1965). When counsel appears in person, he ispermitted to confer with his client in private.

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Coun.

384 U. S.

"'(4) What is the Bureau's practice if the individual
requests counsel, but cannot afford to retain
an attorney?
"'If any person being interviewed after warningof counsel decides that he wishes to consult withcounsel before proceeding further the interview isterminated, as shown above. FBI Agents do notpass judgment on the ability of the person to pay forcounsel. They do, however, advise those who havebeen arrested for an offense under FBI jurisdiction,or whose arrest is contemplated following the interview, of a right to free counsel if they are unable topay, and the availability of such counsel from theJudge.' " The practice of the FBI can readily be emulated bystate and local enforcement agencies. The argumentthat the FBI deals with different crimes than are dealt
with by state authorities does not mitigate the significance of the FBI experience."
The experience in some other countries also suggeststhat the danger to law enforcement in curbs on interrogation is overplayed.. The English procedure since 1912
under the Judges' Rules is significant. As recently
55 We agree that the interviewing agent must exercise his judgment
in determining whether the individual waives his right to counsel.
Because of the constitutional basis of the right, however, the standard
for waiver is necessarily high. And, of course, the ultimate responsibility for resolving this constitutional question lies with the courts.
50 Among the crimes within the enforcement jurisdiction of the
FBI are kidnapping, 18 U. S. C. § 1201 (1964 ed.), white slavery,
18 U. S. C. §§ 2421-2423 (1964 ed.), bank robbery, 18 U. S. C.
§ 2113 (1964 ed.), interstate transportation and sale of stolen property,. 18 U. S. C. §§ 2311-2317 (1964 ed.),,all manner of conspiracies,
18 U. S. C. § 371 (1964 ed.), and violations of civil rights, 18
U. S. C. §§ 241-242 (1964 ed.). See also 18 U. S. C. § 1114 (1964ed.) (murder of officer or employee of the United States).

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

Opinion of th-e Court.

strengthened, the Rules require that a cautionary warning be given an accused by a police officer as soon as hehas evidence that affords reasonable grounds for suspicion; they also require that any statement made be
given by the accused without questioning by police.5"
57 [1964] Crim. L. Rev., at 166-170.

These Rules provide in part:"II. As soon as a police officer has evidence which would afford
reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person has committed an
offence, he shall caution that person or cause him to be cautioned
before putting to him any questions, or further questions, relating
to that offence.
"The caution shall be in the following terms:"'You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so
but what you say may be put into writing and given in evidence.'"When after being cautioned a person is being questioned, or elects
to make a statement, a record shall be kept of the time and place
at which any such questioning or statement began and ended and of
the persons present.

"(b) It is only in exceptional cases that questions relating to theoffence should be put to the accused person after he has been charged
or informed that he may be prosecuted.
"IV. All written statements made after caution shall be taken in
the following manner:"(a) If a person says that he wants to make a statement he shallbe told that it is intended to make a written record of what he says.
"He shall always be asked whether he wishes to write down him-self what he.wants to say; if he says that he cannot write or thatlie would like someone to write it for him, a police officer may offer
to write the statement for him. ...
"(b) Any person writing his own statement shall be allowed to
do so without any prompting as distinct from indicating to him whatmatters are material.
"(d) Whenever a police officer writes the statement, he shall takedown the exact words spoken by the person making the statement,
without putting any questions other than such as may be needed toOCTOBER. TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

The right of the individual to consult with an attorney
during this period is expressly recognized."
The safeguards present under Scottish law may be" even greater than in England. Scottish judicial decisions
btr use in evidence of most confessions obtained throughIn India, confessions made topolice interrogation."police not in the presence of a magistrate have been exmake the statement coherent, intelligible and relevant to the material'
matters: he shall not prompt him. "The prior Rules appear in Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in
England 137-141 (1958).
Despite suggestions of some laxity in enforcement of the Rules anddespite the fact some discretion as to admissibility is invested in thetrial judge, the Rules are a significant influence in the English criminal law enforcement system. See, e. g., [1964] Crim. L. Rev., at
182; and articles collected in [1960] Crim. L. Rev., at 298-356.
58 The introduction to the Judges' Rules states in part:"These Rules do not affect the principles"(c) That every person at any stage of an investigation should be
able to communicate and to consult privately with a solicitor. Thisis so even if he is in custody provided that in such a case no unreasonable delay or hindrance is caused to the processes of investigation[1964]"or the administration of justice by his doing so ....
Crim. L. Rev., at 166-167.
5 As stated by the Lord Justice General in Chalmjr*-.v. H. M.
Advocate, [1954] Sess. Cas. 66, 78 (J. C.):"The theory of our law is that at, the. stage of initial investigation
the police may question anyone with a view to acquiring information which may lead to the detection of the criminal; but that, when
the stage has been reached at which suspicion, or more than suspicion, has in their view centred upon some person as the likely
perpetrator of the crime, further interrogation of that person becomes very dangerous, and, if carried too far, e. g., to the pointof extracting a confession by what. amounts to cross-examination, theevidence of that confession will almost certainly be excluded. Oncethe accused has been apprehended and charged he has the statutory
right to a private interview with a solicitor and to be brought before
a magistrate with all convenient speed so that he may, if so advised,emit a declaration in presence of his solicitor under conditions whichsafeguard hifn against prejudice."

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

Opinion of the Court.

eluded by rule of evidence since 1872, at a time when
it operated under British law. 0 Idenftical provisions
a.ppear in the Evidence Ordinance of Ceylon, enacted in
1895.1 Similarly, in our country the Uniform Code of
Military Justice has long provided that no suspect may
be interrogated without first being warned of his rightnot to make a statement and that any statement hemakes may be used againsT him.2 Denial of the rightto consult counsel during interrogation has also been proscribed by military tribunals. 3 There appears to havebeen no marked detrimental effect on criminal law enforcement in these jurisdictions as.a result of these rules.
Conditions of' law enforcement in our country are sufficiently similar to permit reference to this experience asassurance that lawlessness will not result from warning
an individual of his rights or allowing him to exercise
them. Moreover, it is consistent with our legal systemthat we give at least as much protection to these rights
as is given in the jurisdictions described. We deal in
our country with rights grounded in a specific requirement of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution,
60 "No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against

a person accused of any offence." Indian Evidence Act § 25.
"No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custodyof a police officer unless it be made in the immediate presence of a
Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person." Indian Evidence Act § 26. See 1 Ramaswami & Rajagopalan, Law of Evidencein India 553-569 (1962). To avoid any continuing effect of policepressure or inducement, the Indian Supreme Court has invalidated
a confession made shortly after police brought a suspect before amagistrate, suggesting: "[I]t would, we think, be reasonable toinsist upon giving an accused person at least 24 hours to decide
whether or not he should make a confession." Sarwan Singh v.
State of Punjab, 44 All India Rep. 1957, Sup. Ct. 637, 644.
1 I Legislative Enactments of Ceylon 211 (1958).
62 10 U.-S. C. § 831 (b) (1964 ed.).
6- United States v. Rose, 24 CMR 251 (1957); United States y.
Gunnels, 23 CMR 354 (1957).

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

whereas other jurisdictions arrived, at their conclusions
on the basis of principles of justice not so specificallydefined.64
It is also urged upon us that we withhold decisionon this issue until state legislative bodies and advisorygroups have had an opportunity to deal with these problems by rule making.6 5 We- have already pointed outthat the Constitution does not require any specific codeof procedures for protecting the privilege against selfincrimination during custodial interrogation. Congress
and the States are free to develop their own safeguards
for the privilege, so long as they are fully as effective as
those described above'in informing accused persons of
their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it. In any event, however, the issues
presented are of constitutional dimensions and must be
determined by the courts. The admissibility of a statement in the face of a claim that it was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights is an issue theresolution of which has long since been undertaken by
this Court. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574 (1884).
Judicial solutions to problems of constitutional dimension have evolved decade by decade. As courts havebeen presented with the need to enforce constitutionalrights, they have found means of doing so. That was our
responsibility 'when Escobedo was before us and it is our
64

Although' no constitution existed at the time confessions were

excluded by rule of evidence in 1872, India now has a written constitution which includes the provision that "No person accusedof any offence'shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."
Constitution of India, Article 20 (3). See Tope: The Constitution'of India 63-67 (1960).
clBrief for United States in No. 761, Westover v. United States,
pp. 44-47; Brief for the State of New York as amicus curiae, pp.
35-39. See also Brief for the National District Attorneys Associa-tion as amicus curiae, pp. 23-26.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

Opinion of the -Court.

responsibility today. Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule-making or
legislation which would abrogate them.
V.
Because of the nature of the problem and because of
its recurrent significance in numerous cases, we have tothis point discussed the relationship of the Fifth Amendment privilege to police interrogation without specificconcentration on the facts of the cases before us. We
turn now to these facts to consider the application tothese cases of the constitutional principles discussed
above. In each instance, we have concluded that statements were obtained from the defendant under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards forprotection of the privilege.
No. 759. Miranda v. Arizona.
On March 13, 1963, petitioner, Ernesto Miranda, wasarrested at his home and taken in custody to a Phoenix
police station. He was there identified by the complaining witness. The police then took him to "Interrogation
Room No. 2" of the detective bureau. There he wasquestioned by two police officers. The officers admitted
at trial that Miranda was not advised that he had a rightto have an attorney present."0 Two hours later, the6 Miranda was also convicted in a separate trial on an unrelatedrobbery charge not presented here for review. A statement introduced at that trial was obtained from Miranda during the sameinterrogation which resulted in the confession involved herp. At therobbery trial, one officer testified that during the interrogation hedid not tell Miranda that anything he said would be held against
him or that he could consult with an attorney. The other officer
stated that they had both told Miranda that anything he said would
be used against him and that he was not required by law to tellthem anything.

492 "

4 OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

officersemerged from the interrogation room with a written confession signed by Miranda. At the top of thestatement was a typed paragraph stating that th6 confession was made voluntarily, without threats or promisesof immunity and "with full knowledge Of my legal rights,
understanding any statement I make may be usedagainst me." 11
At his trial before a jury, the written confession was
adniitted into evidence over the objection of defense
counsel, and the officers testified to the prior oral confession made by Miranda during the interrogation.
Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape. He
was sentenced to 20 to 30 years' imprisonment on eachcount, the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda's constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining theconfession and affirmed-the conviction. 98 Ariz. 18, 401
P. 2d 721. In reaching its decision, the court emphasized heavily the fact. that Miranda did not specificallyrequest counsel.
We reverse. From the -testimony of the officers andby the admission of respondent, it is clear that Miranda
was not in any way apprised of his right to consult withan attorney and to have one present during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself effectively protected in any other, manner.
Without these warnings the-statementi were- inadmissible. The mere fact that he signed- a statemenf whichcontained a typed-in clause stating that he had "fullknowledge" of his "legal rights" does not approach theknowing and intelligent waiver required to' relinquish con
stitutional rights. Cf. H-aynes-v. Washington, 373 U. S.
67 One of the officers testified that he read this paragraph to,Miranda. ' Apparently, however, he did'not do so until after Mirandahad confessed orally.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

Opinion of the Court.

.503, 512-513 (1963); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 601(1948) (opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS).
No. 760. Vignera v. New York.
Petitioner, Michael Vignea, was picked up by New
York police on October 14, 1960, in connection with therobbery three days earlier of a Brooklyn dress shop.
They took him to the 17th Detective Squad headquartersin Manhattan. Sometime thereafter he, was taken to
the 66th Detective Squad. There a detective questioned
Vignera with respect to the robbery. Vignera orally
admitted the robbery to the detective. The detective
was asked on cross-examination at'trial by defense counsel whether Vignera was warned of his right to counsel
before being interrogated. The prosecution objected tothe question and the trial judge sustained the objection.
Thus, the defense was precluded from making any showing that warnings had not been given. While at the 66th
Detective Squad, Vignera was identified by the store
owner and a saleslady as the man who robbed the dress
shop. At about 3 p. m. he was formally arrested.
The police then transported him to still another station,
the 70th Precinct in Brooklyn, "for detention." At11 p. m. Vignera was questioned by an assistant district attorney in the presence of a hearing reporter whotranscribed the questions and Vignera's answers. This
verbatim account of these proceedings contains no statement of any warnings given by the assistant district
attorney. At Vignera's trial on a charge of first degreerobbery, the detective testified as to the oral confession.
The transcription of the statement taken was also introduced in evidence. At the conclusion of the testimony,
the trial judge charged the jury in part as follows:"The law doesn't say that the confession is void orinvalidated because the police officer didn't advise- the defendant as tohis rights. Did you hear what494.. OCTOBER TERM,1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

I said? I am telling you what the law of the State
of New York is."Vignera was found guilty of first degree robbery. He
was subsequently adjudged a third-felony offender andsentenced to 30 to 60 yeals' imprisonment.68 The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate
Division, Second Department, 21 App. Div. 2d 752, 252
N. Y. S. 2d 19, and by the Court of Appeals, also without
opinion, 15 'N. Y. 2d 970, 207 N. E. 2d 527, 259 N. Y. S.
2d 857, remittitur amended, 16 N. Y. 2d 614, 209 N. E.
2d 110, 261 N. Y. S. 2d 65. In argument to the Courtof Appeals, the State contended that Vignera had no
constitutional right to be advised of his right to counsel
or his privilege against self-incrimination.
We reverse. The foregoing indieates that Vignera
was not warned of any of his rights before the questioning by the detective and by the assistant district attorney.
No other steps were taken to protect these rights. Thus
he was not effectively apprised of his Fifth Amendment
privilege or of his right to have counsel present and hisstatements are inadmissible.
No. 761. Westover v. United States.
At approximately 9:45 p. m. on March 20, 1963, petitioner, Carl Calvin Westover, was arrested by local policein Kansas City as a suspect in two Kansas City robberies.
A report was also received from the FBI that he waswanted on a felony charge in California. 'The local authorities took him to a police station and placed him
in h line-up on the local charges, and at about 11:45 p. m.
he was booked. Kansas City Police interrogated West68 Vignera thereafter successfully attacked the validity of one ofthe prior convictions, Vignera v. Wilkins, Civ. 9901 (D. C. W. D.
N. Y. Dec. 31, '1961) (unreported), but was then resentenced as asecond-felony offender to the same .term of imprisonment as theoriginal sentence. R. 31-33.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436'

495

Opinion of the Court.

over on the night of his arrest. He denied any knowledge of criminal activities. The next day local officers
interrogated him again throughout the morning. Shortly
before noon they informed the FBI that they were
through interrogating Westover and that the FBI could
proceed to interrogate him. There is nothing in therecord to indicate that Westover was ever given any
warning as to his rights by local police. At noon, three
special agents of the FBI continued the 'interrogation
in a private interview room of the Kansas City Police
Department, this time with respect to the robbery of asavings and loan association and a bank in Sacramento,
California. After two or tvo and one-half hours, Westover signed separate confessions to each of these tworobberies which had been prepared by one of the agents*during the interrogation. -Ai trial one of the agents
testified, and a paragraph on each of the statements
states; that the agents advised Westover that he did nothave to make a statement, that any statement he madecould be used against him, and that he had the right tosee an attorney.
'Westover was tried by a jury in federal court and convicted of the California robberies. His statements wereintroduced at trial. He was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, the conviction was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the, Ninth Circuit. 342 F. 2d 684.
We reverse. On the facts of this case we cannot findthat Westover knowingly and intelligently waived his
right to remain silent and his right to consult with counsel prior to the time he made the statement.69 At the
69 The failure of defense counsel to object to the introduction of
the confession at trial, .noted by the Court of Appeals and emphasized by the Solicitor General, does not preclude our considerationof the issue. Since the trial was held prior to our decision in
Escobedo and, of course, prior to our decision today making the

-"

496

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

time the FBI agents began questioning Westover, he
had been in custody for over 14 hours and had beeninterrogated at length during that period. The FBI
interrogation began immediately upon the conclusion of
the interrogation by Kansas City police and was conducted in local police headquarters. Although the twolaw enforcement authorities are legally distinct and thecrimes for which they 'interrogated Westover were different, the impact on him was that of a continuous period
of questioning. There is no evidence of any warning
given prior to the FBI interrogation nor is there any
evidence of an articulated waiver of rights after the FBI
commenced its interrogation. The record simply showsthat the defendarkt did in fact confess a short time after
being turned over to the FBI following interrogation by
local police. Despite the fact that the FBI agents gave
warnings at the outset of their interview, from Westover's point of view the warnings came at the end of theinterrogation process. In these circumstances an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights cannot be assumed.
We do not suggest that law enforcement authorities
are precluded from questioning any individual who has
been held for a period of time by other authorities andinterrogated by them without appropriate warnings.. A
different case would be presented if an accused were taken
into custody by the second authority, removed both intime and place from his original surroundings and thenadequately advised of his rights and given an opportunity
to exercise them. But here the FBI interrogation was
conducted immediately following the state interrogationin the same police station-in the same compelling surroundings. Thus, in obtaining a confession from Westobjection available, the failure to object at trial does not constitutea waiver of the claim. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Angelet v.
Fay, 333 F. 2d 12, 16 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1964), aff'd, 381 U. S. 654(1965). Cf. Ziffrin, Inc. v. United State, 318 U. S. 73, 78 (1943).

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
Opinion of the Court.

436

over the federal authorities were thebeneficiaries of thepressure applied by the local in-custody interrogation.
In these circumstances the giving of warnings alone was
not sufficient to protect the privilege.
No. 584. Californiav. Stewart.
In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch
robberies in which one of the victims had died of injuries
inflicted by her assailant, respondent, Roy Allen Stewait,
was pointed out to Los Angeles police as the endorser ofdividend checks taken in one of the robberies. At about
7:15 p. m., January 31, 1963, police officers went to
Stewart's house and arrested him. One of the officers
asked Stewart if they could search the house, to which
he replied, "Go ahead." The search turned up various
items taken from the five robbery victims. At the timeof Stewart's arrest, police also arrested Stewart's wifeand thrc,. other persons who were visiting.him. Thesefour wei

jailed along with Stewart and were interro--.

gated. ,tewart was taken to the University Station of
the Los Angeles Police Department where he was placedin a cell. During the next five days, police interrogated
Stewart on nine different occasions. Except during thefirst interrogation session, when he was confronted
with an accusing witness, Stewart was isolated with hisinterrogators.
During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart admitted that he had robbed the deceased and stated that
he had .ot meant to hurt her. Police then brought
Stewart before a magistrate for the first time. Since
there was no evidence to connect them with any crime,
the police then released the other four persons arrested
with him.
Nothing in the record specifically indicates whether
Stewart was or was not advised of his right to remainsilent or his right to counsel. In a number of instances,

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of the Court.

384 U. S.

however, the interrogating officers were asked to recounteverything that was said during the interrogations.
None indicated that Stewart was ever advised of hisrights.
Stewart was charged with kidnapping to commit robbery, rape, and murder. At his trial, transcripts of thefirst interrogation and the confession at the last interrogation were introduced in evidence. The jury foundStewart guilty of robbery and first degree murder andfixed the penalty as death. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of California reversed. 62 Cal. 2d 571, 400 P. 2d97, 43 Cal. Rptr.. 201. It held that under this Court's
decision in gscobedo, Stewart should have been advisedof -his right to remain silent arid of his right to counsel
and that it would not presume in the face of a silent
record that the police advised Stewart of his rights.,0
We affirm.7 1 In dealing with custodial interrogation,
we will not presume that a defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and that his privilege. against
self-incrimination has been adequately safeguarded on arecord that does not show that any warnings have been
given or that any effective alternative has been employed. Nor can a kn6wing and intelligent waiver of70

Because of this disposition of the case, the California Supreme

Court did not reach the claims that the confession was coerced bypolice threats t'o hold his ailing wife in custody until he confessed,that there was no hearing as required by Jackson v. Denno, 378
U. S.368 (1964), and that the trial judge gave an instruction condemned by the California Supreme Court's decision in People v.
Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 388 P. 2d 33, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964).
71 After certiorari was granted in this case, respondent moved todismiss on the ground that there was no final judgment from which
the State could appeal since the judgment below directed that he be
retried. In the event respondent was successful in obtaining an
acquittal on retrial, however, under California law the State would
have no appeal. Satisfied that in these circumstances the decision
below constituted a final judgment under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3)(1964 ed.), we denied the motion. 383 U. S.903.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

499

Opinion of CLARK, J.

these rights be assumed on a silent record. Furthermore,
Stewart's steadfast denial of the alleged offenses througheight of the nine interrogations over a period-of five days
is subject to no other construction than that he was compelled by persistent interrogation to forgo his Fifth
Amendment privilege.
Therefore, in accordance with the foregoing, the judgments of the Supreme Court of Arizona in No. 759, of
the New York Court of Appeals in No. 760, and of the
Court of Appeals for the NinthCircuit in No. 761 arereversed. The judgment of the Supreme Court ofCalifornia in No. 584 is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
MR. JbsTM " CLARK, dissenting in Nos. 759, 760, and'
761, and concurring in the result in No. 584.
It is with regret that I find it necessary to write inthese cases. However, I am unable to join the majority.
because its opinion goes too far on too little, while mydissenting brethren do not go quite far enough. Nor can
I join in the Court's criticism of the present practicesof police and investigatory agencies as to custodial interrogation. The materials it refers to as "police manuals" 1
are, as I read them, merely writings in this field by professors and some police officers. Not one is phown by therecord here to be the official manual of any police department, much less in universal use in crime detection.
Moreover, the examples of police brutality mentioned by
the Court 2 are rare exceptions to the thousands of cases
ILE. g., Inbau & Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions(1962); O'Hara, Fundamentals of Criminal Investigation (1956);
Dienstein, Technics for the Crime Investigator (1952); Mulbar,"
Interrogati6n (1951); Kidd, Police Interrogation (1940).
2 As developed by my Brother HAMAN, post, pp. 506-514, suchcases, with the exception of the long-discredited decision in Brain v.
United States, 168 U. S. 532 '(1897), were adequately treated interms of due proeess.

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of Cr,.uu. .T.

384 U.S.

that appear every year in the law reports. The police
agencies-all the way from municipal and state forces tothe federal bureaus-are responsible for law enforcement
and public safety in this country. I am proud of theirefforts, which in my view are not fairly characterized by
the Court's opinion.
The ipse dixit of the majority has no" support in ourcases. Indeed, the Court admits that "we might notfind the defendants' statements [here] to have been
involuntary in traditional terms." Ante, p. 457. In
short, the Court has added more to the requirements thatthe accused is entitled to consult with his lawyer andthat he must be given the traditional warning that hemay remain silent and that anything that he says .may
be used against him. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478,
490-491 (1964). Now, the Court fashions a constitutional rule that the police may engage in no custodialinterrogation without additionally advising the accusedthat he has a right under the Fifth Amendment to thepresence of counsel during interrogation and that, if
he is without funds, counsel will be furnished him.
When at any point during an interrogation the accusedseeks affirmatively or impliedly to invoke his rights tosilence or counsel, interrogation must be forgone or postponed. The Court further holds that failure to follow
the new procedures requires inexorably the exclusion of
any statement by the accused, as well as the fruits thereof.
Such a strict constitutional specific inserted at the nerve
center of crime detection may well kill the patient."
3 The Court points to England, Scotland, Ceylon and India as
having equally rigid rules. As my Brother HARLAN points out, post.
pp. 521-523, the Court is mistaken in this regard, for it overlooks
counterbalancing prosecutorial advantages. Moreover, the require-ments of the Federal Bureau of Investigation do not appear fromthe Solicitor General'.

letter, ante. pp. '484-486, to be as strict as

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

Opinion of CLARx,

J.

Since there is at this time a paucity of information andan almost total lack of empirical knowledge on the practical operation of requirements truly comparable to thoseannounced by the majority, I would be -morerestrained
lest we go too far too fast.
II.
Custodial interrogation has long been recognized as
ccundoubtedly an essential tool in effective law enforcement." Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 515(1963). Recognition of this fact should put us on guard
against the promulgation of doctrinaire rules. Especially is this true where the Court finds that "the Constitution has prescribed" its holding and where the lightof our past cases, from Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574,

(1884), down to Haynes v. Washington, supra, is tothose imposed today in at least two respects: (1) The offer of counsel is articulated only as "a right to counsel"; nothing is said about
a right to have counsel present at the custodial interrogation. (Seealso the examples cited by the Solicitor General, Westover v. UnitedStates, 342 F. 2d 684, 685 (1965) ("right to consult counsel");Jackson v. United States, 337 F. 2d 136, 138 (1964) (accused "entitled to an attorney").) Indeed, the practice is that whenever thesuspect "decides that he wishes to consult with counsel before making
Whena statement, the interview is terminated at thai point ....
counsel appears in person, he is permitted to confer with his clientin private." This clearly indicates that~the FBI does not warn that
counsel may be present during custodial interrogation. (2) The
Solicitor General's letter states: "[T]hose who have been arrested
for an offense under FBI jurisdiction, or whose arrest is contemplated following the interview, [are advised] of a right to free counsel if they are unable to pay, and the availability of such counsel
from the Judge." So phrased, this warning does not indicate thatthe agent will secure counsel. Rather, the statement may well beinterpreted by the suspect to mean that the burden is placed upon
himself and that he may have counsel appointed only when brought
before the judge or at trial-but not at custodial interrogation. As
I view the FBI practice, it is not as broad as the one laid down
today by the Court.

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
Opinion of CLARK, J.

384 U. S.

the contrary. Indeed, even in Escobedo the Court neverhinted. that an affirmative "waiver" was a prerequisite
to questioning; that the burden of proof as to waiver
was on the prosecution; that the presence of counselabsent a waiver-during interrogation was required; that,a waiver can be withdrawn at the will-of the accused;that counsel must be furnished during an accusatory
stage to those unable to pay; nor that admissions andexculpatory statements are "confessions." To require
all those things at one gulp should cause the Court tochoke over more cases than Crooker v. California, 357
U. S. 433 (1958), and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504(1958), which it expressly overrules today.
The rule prior to today-as Mr. Justice Goldberg, theauthor of the Court's opinion in Escobedo, stated it in
Haynes v. Washington-depended upon "a totality ofcircumstances evidencing an involuntary . . .admissionof guilt." 373 U. S., at 514. And he concluded:"Of course, detection and solution of crime is, atbest, a difficult and arduous task requiring determination and persistence on the part of all responsible
officers charged with the duty of law enforcement.
And, certainly, we do not mean to suggest that allinterrogation of witnesses and suspects is impermissible. Such questioning is undoubtedly an essential
tool in effective law enforcement. The. line between
proper and permissible police conduct- and techniques and methods offensive to due process is, atbest, a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases suchas this where it is necessary to make fine judgments
as to the effect of psychologically coercive pressuresand inducements on the mind and will of an accused. . . . We are here impelled to the conclusion,from all of the facts presented, that the bounds ofdue process have been exceeded." Id., at 514-515.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

503

Opinion of CLARK,J.

III.
I would continue to follow that rule. Under the"totality of circumstances" rule of which my BrotherGoldberg spoke in Haynes, I would consider in-each casewhether the police officer prior to custodial interrogation
added the warning that the suspect might have counsel
present at the interrogation and, further, that a court
would appoint one at his request if he was too poor toemploy counsel. In the absence of warnings, the burden
would be on the State to prove that counsel was knowingly and intelligently waived or that in the totality of
the circumstances, including the failure to give thenecessary warnings, the confession was clearly voluntary.
Rather than employing the arbitrary Fifth Amendment rule 4 which the Court lays down I would follow themore pliable dictates of the Due Process Clauses of theFifth and Fourteenth Amendments which we are accustomed to administering and which we know from ourcases are effective instruments in protecting persons inpolice custody. In this way we would not be acting in
the dark nor in one full sweep changing the traditionial
rules of custodial interrogation which this Court has forso long recognized as a justifiable and proper tool inbalancing individual rights against the rights of society.
It will be soon enough to go further when we are able toappraise with somevhat better accuracy the effect ofsuch a holding.
I would affirm the convictions in Miranda v. Arizona,No. 759; Vignera v. New York, No. 760; and Westover v.
United States, No. 761. In each of those cases I fnd
from the circumstances no warrant for reversal. In
my view there is "no significant supnort" in our cases for theholding of the Court today that the Fifth Amendment privilege, in
effect, forbids custodial interrogation. For a discussion of this point
see the dissenting opinion of my Brother WHITE, post, pp. 526-531.
4In

504

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
HARLAN, J., dissenting.

384 U. S.

Californiav., Stewart, No. 584, I would dismiss the writof certiorari for want of a final judgment, 28 U. S. C.
'§ i257 (3) (1964 ed.); but if the merits are to be reached
I would affirm on the ground that the State failed tofulfill its burden, in the absence of a showing that appropriatp warnings were given, of proving a waiver or a
totality of circumstances showing voluntariness. Should
there be a retrial, I would leave thi State free to attempt
to prove these elements.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART and

MR. JusTIcE WHITE join, dissenting.

I believe the decision of the Court represents poor
constitutional law and entails harmful consequences forthe country at large. How serious these consequences
may prove to be only time can tell. But the basic flaws
in the Court's justification seem to me readily apparent
now once all sides of the problem are considered.
I. INTRODUCTION.

At tite outset, it is well to note exactly what is required- by the Court's new constitutional code of rules
for confessions. *The foremost requirement, upon which
later admissibility of a confession depends, is that a fourfold warning be given to a person in custody before heis questioned, namely, that he has a right to remainsilent, that anything he says may be used against him,that he has a right to have present an attorney during
the questioningi and that if. indigent he has a right to'a lawyer without charge. To forgo these rights, someaffirmative statement of rejection is seemingly required,
and threats, tricks, or cajolings to obtain this waiver are
forbidden. If before or during questioning the suspectseeks to invoke his right to. remain, silent, interrogation must be f6rgone or cease; a request for counsel

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

HARLAN,J., dissenting.

brings about the same result until a lawyer is procured."
Finally, there are a miscelany of minor directives, forexample, the burden of proof of waiver is on the State,admissions and exculpatory statements are treated justlike confessions, withdrawal of a waiver is always
permitted, and so forth.1
While the fine points of this scheme are far less clear
than the Court admits, the tenor is quite apparent. The
new rules are not designed to guard against police brutality or other unmistakably banned forms of. coercion.
Those who use third-degree tactics and deny them 'in
court are equally able and destined tb lie as skillfully
about warnings and waivers. Rather, the thrust of the
new rules is to negate all pressures, to reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect, and ultimately to discourage.
any confession at all. The aim in short is toward "voluntariness" in a utopian sense, or to view it from a different
angle, voluntariness with a vengeance.
To incorporate this notion into the Constitution requires a strained reading of history and precedent and adisregard of the very pragmatic concerns that alone may
on occasion justify such strains. I believe that reasoned
examination will show that the Due Process Clauses provide an adequate tool for coping with confessions andthat, even if the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination be invoked, its precedents taken as a whole
do not sustain the present -rules. Viewed as a choicebased on pure policy, these new rules prove to be a highly
debatable, if not one-sided, appraisal of the competinginterests, imposed over widespread objection, at the verytime when judicial restraint is most called for by thecircumstances.
in this opinion is directed to the main questions
decided by the Court and necessary to its decision; in ignoringsome of the collateral points, I do not mean to imply agreement.
1 My discussion

506

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
HAnLAN. J., dissenting.

384 U. S.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL PREMISES.
It is most fitting to begin an inquiry into the constitutional precedents by surveying the limits on confessions
the Court has evolved under the Due Process Clause of
the -Fourteenth Amendment. This is so because thesecases show that there -exists a workable and effectivemeans of dealing with confessionsin a judicial manner;because the cases are the baseline from which the Court
now departs and so serve to measure the actual as
opposed to the professed distance it travels; and because
examination of them hel reveal how the Court hascoasted into its present position.
The earliest confession cases in this Court emerged
from federal prosecutions and were settled on a nonconstitutional basis, the Court adopting the common-law
rule that the absence of inducements, promises, andthreats made a confession voluntary and admissible.
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574; Pierce v. United States,
160 U. S. 355. While a later case said the Fifth Amendment privilege controlled admissibility, this proposition
was not ,itself developed in subsequent decisions! The
Court did, however, heighten the test of admissibility infederal trials to one of voluntariness "in fact," Wan v.
2Thecase was Brain v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 .(quoted,
ante, p. 461). Its historical premises were afterwards disproved by
Wigmore, who concluded "that no assertions could be more unfounded." 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 823, at 250, n. 5 (3d ed. 1940).
The Court in United States v. Carignan, 342 U. S. 36, 41, declined
to choose between Bram and Wigmore, and Stein v. New York,346 U. S. 156, 191, n. 35, cast further doubt on Brain. There are,however, several Court opinions which assume in dicta the relevanceof the Fifth Amendment privilege to confessions. Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 475; see Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. UnitedStates, 371 U. S. 341, 347. On Brain and the federal confession
cases generally, see Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 Harv.
L. Rev. 935, 959-961 (1966).

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

HARLAN,J., dissenting.

United States, 266 U. S. 1,- 14 (quoted, ante, p. 462),
and then by and large left federal judges to apply thesame standards the Court began to derive in a string ofstate court cases.
This new line of decisions, testing admissibility by the
Due Process Clause, began in 1936 with Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, and must now embrace somewhat
more than 30 full opinions 'of the Court.3 While thevoluntariness rubric was repeated in many instances, e. g.,
Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596, the Court neverpinned it down to a single meaning but on'the contrary
infused it with a number of different values. To travel
quickly over the main themes, there was an initial emphasis on reliability, e. g., Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547,
supplemented by concern over the legality and fairness ofthe police practices, e. g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U. S. 143, in an "accusatorial" system of law enforcement,
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 54, and eventually byclose attention to the individual's state of mind and capacity for effective choice, e. g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370
U. S. 49. The outcome was a continuing re-evaluationon the facts of each case of how much pressure on the4suspect, was permissible.
3 Comment, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 313 & n. 1 (1964), states that by
the 1963 Term 33 state coerced-confession cases had been decided
by this Court, apart from per curiams.'S
Spano v. New York, 360
U. S. 315, 321, n. 2, collects 28 cases.'
4Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention,- Interrogation and theRight to Counsel, 66 Col. L. Rev. 62, 73 (1966): "In fact, the con-

cept of involuntariness seems to be used.by the courts as a shorthand to refer to practices which are repellent to civilized stardardsof decency or which, under the circumstances, are thought to apply
a degree of pressure to an individual Ohich unfairly impairs his
capacity to make a rational choice." See .Herman, The Supreme
Court and Restrictions. on Police Interrogation, 25 Ohio St. L. J.
449, 452-458 (1964);' Developments, supra, n. 2, at 964-984.

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
HARLN, J., dissenting.

384 U. S.

Among the criteria often taken into account were
threats or imminent danger, e. g.; Payne v. Arkansas, 356
U. S. 560, physical deprivations such as lack of sleep or
food, e. g.,.Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433, repeated or extended.interrogation, e. g., Chambersv. Florida,309 U. S.
227; limits on access to counsel or friends, Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433; Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504,
length and illegality of detention-under state law, e. .g.;
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, and individual
weakness or incapacities, Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U. S.
528. Apart from direct physical coercion, however, nosingle default or fixed combination of defaults guaranteed
exclusion, and synopses of the cases would serve little use
because the overall gauge has been steadily changing,usually in the direction of restricting admissibility. But
to mark just what point had been reached before the
Court jumped the rails in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S.
478, it is worth capsulizing the then-recent case of Haynes
v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503. There, Haynes had been
held some 16 or more hours in violation of state law
before signing the disputed confession, had received nowarnirigs of any kind, and despite requests had beenrefused access to his wife or to counsel, the police indicating that access would be allowed after a confession.
Emphasizing especially this last inducement and rejecting some contrary indicia of voluntariness, the Court ina 5-to-4 decision held the confession inadmissible.
There are several relevant lessons to be drawn fromthis constitutional history. The first is that with over 25
years of precedent the Court has developed an elaborate,
sophisticated, and sensitive approach to admissibility ofconfessions. It is "judicial" in its treatment of one caseat a time, see Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568, 635(concurring opinion of THE CHIEF JusTcE), flexible inits ability to respond to the endless mutations of fact
prese, ed, and ever more familiar to the lower courts.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

HARLAN, J., dissenting.

Of course, strict certainty is not obtained in this developing process, but this is often so with constitutional principles, and disagreement is usually confined to thatborderland of close cases where it matters least.
The second point is that in practice and from time totime in principle, the Court has given ample recognition
to society's interest in suspect questioning as an instrument of law enforcement. Cases countenancing quite sig-'
nificant pressures can be cited without difficulty,5 and thelower *courts may often have been yet more tolerant. Of
course the limitations imposed today were rejected bynecessary implication in case after case, the right towarnings having been explicitly rebuffed in this Court
many years ago. Powers v. United States, 223 U. S. 303;
Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613. As recently as
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 515, the Court
openly acknowledged that questioning of witnesses andsuspects "is undoubtedly an essential tool in effective law
enforcement." Accord,. Crooker v. California, 357 U. S.

43, 441.
Finally, the cases disclose that the language in manyof the opinions overstates the actual course of decision.
It has been said, for example, that an admissible confession must be made by the suspect "in the unfetteredexercise of his own will," Malloy v. Hogan,378 U. S. 1, 8,
and that "a prisoner is not 'to be made the deluded in5trument of his own conviction,' "-Culombe v. Connec*ticut, 367 U. S. 568, 581 (Frankfurter, J., announcing the
Court's judgment and an opinion). Though often repeated, such principles are rarely observed in full measure. Even the word "voluntary" may be deemed someASee the cases synopsized in Herman, supra, n. 4, at 456, nn.
36-39. One not too distant example is Stroble v. California, 343
U. S. 181, in which the suspect was kicked and threatened after his
arrest, questioned a little later for two hours, and isolated from alawyer trying to see him; the resulting confession was held admissible.

510

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
HARL x, J., dissentin'.

.384 U. S.

what misleading, especially when one considers many of
the confessions that have been brought under its umbrella. -See, e. g., supra,n. 5. The tendency to overstate
may be laid in part to the flagrant facts often before the
Court; but in any event one must recognize how it has
tempered attitudes and lent some color of authority to
the approach now taken by the Court.
I turn now to the Court's asserted reliance on the Fifth
Amendment, an approach which I frankly regard as a
trompP l'oeil. The Court's opinion in my view reveals
no adequate basis for extending the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination to the police station.
Far more important, it fails to show that the Court's newrules are well supported, let alone compelled, by Fifth
Amendment precedents. Instead, the new rules actuallyderive from quotation and analogy drawn from precedents under the Sixth Amendment, which should properly
have no bearing on police interrogation.
The Court's opening contention, that the Fifth Amendment governs police station confessions, is perhaps not
an impermissible extension of the law but it has little
to conimend itself in the present circumstances. Historically, the privilege against self-incrimination did not bearat all on the use of extra-legal confessions, for which
distinct standards evolved; indeed, "the history.of thetwo principles is wide apart, differing by one 'hundredyears in origin, and derived through separate lines ofprecedents . . . ." 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2266, at 401(McNaughton rev. 1961). Practice under the two dodtrines has also differed in a number of important respects.'
6 Among the examples given in 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2266, at
401 (McNaughton rev. 1961), are these: the privilege applies toany witness, civil or criminal, but the confession rule protects only
criminal defendants; the privilege deals only with compulsion, while
the confession rule may exclude statements obtained by trick or
promise; and where the privilege has. been nullified-as by the
English Bankruptcy Act-the confession rule may still operate.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.436

HARLAN,J., dissenting.

Even those who would readily enlarge the privilege
must concede some linguistic difficulties since the Fifth
Amendment in terms proscribes only compelling any person "in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
Cf. Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in Criminal
Justice in Our Time 1, 25-26 (1965).
Though weighty, I do not say these points and similar ones are conclusive, for, as the Court reiterates, theprivilege embodies basic principles always capable ofexpansion.7 Certainly the privilege does represent a protective concern for the accused and an. emphasis uponaccusatorial rather than inquisitorial values in law enforcement, although this is similarly true of other limitations such as the grand jury requirement and the reasonable doubt standard. Accusatorial values,.however, have
openly been absorbed into the due process standard governing confessions; this indeed is why at present "thekinship of the two rules [governing confessions and selfincrimination] is too apparent for denial." McCormick,
Evidefnce 155 (1954). Since extension of the generalprinciple has already occurred, to insist that the privilege
applies as such serves only to carry over inapposite historical details and engaging rhetoric and to obscure thepolicy choices to be made in regulating confessions.
Having decided that the Fifth Amendment privilege
does apply in the police station, the Court reveals thatthe privilege imposes more exacting restrictions thandoes the Fourteenth Amendmen's voluntariness test.8
7 Additionally, there are precedents and even historical arginnentsthat can be arrayed in favor of bringing extra-legal questioning
within the privilege. See generally Maguire, Evidence of Guilt§ 2.03,at 15-16 (1959).
8
This, of course, is implicit in the Court's introductory-announcement that "[o]ur decision in Mallny v. Hogan, 378 -U. S. 1 (1964)[extending the Fifth Amendment frivilege to the States] necessitates

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
HARLAN. .. , .dissenting.

384 U. S.

It then emerges from a discussion of Escobedo that theFifth Amendment requires for an admissible confessionthat it be given by one distinctly aware of his right not
to speak and shielded from "the compelling atmosphere"of interrogation. See ante, pp. 465-466.. From these key
premises, the Court finally develops the safeguards ofwarning, counsel, and so forth. I do not believe thesepremises are sustained by precedents under, the Fifth
Amendment.9
The more important premise is that pressure on thesuspect must be eliminated though it be only the subtle
influence -of the atmosphere and surroundings. The
Fifth Amendment, however, has never been thought toforbid all pressure to incriminate one's self in the situationls covered by it. On the contrary, it has been heldthat failure to incriminate one's self can result in denialof removal of one's case from state to federal court,
Maryland v. Soper, 270 U. S. 9; in refusal of a militarycommission, Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83; in denialof a discharge in bankruptcy, Kaufman v. Hurwitz, 176
F. 2d 210; and in numerous other adverse consequences.
See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2272, at 441-444, n. 18(McNaughton rev. 1961); Maguire, Evidence of Guilt§ 2.062 (1959). This is not to say that short of jail or
torture any sanction is permissible in any case; policy
and history alike may impose sharp limits. See, e. g.,an examination of the scope of the privilege in state cases as well."Ante, p. 463.

It is also inconsistent with Malloy itself, in which

extension of the Fifth Amendment to the States rested in part on
the view that the Due Process Clause restriction on state confessionhas in recent years been "the same standard" as that imposed infederal prosecutions assertedly by the Fifth Amendment. 378

U. s, at 7.
9I lay aside Escobedo itself; it contains no reasoning or evengeneral conclusions addressed to the Fifth Amendment and indeed
its citation -in this.-regard seems surprising in view of Escobedo's
primary reliance on the Sixth Amendment.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.436

HARLAN,.513

J., disenting.

Griffin v. California,380 U. S. 609. However, the Court's
unspoken assumption that any pressure violates theprivilege is not supported by the.precedents aid it. hasfailed to show why the Fifth Amendment prohibits thatrelatively mild pressure the Due- Process Clause permits.
The Court appears similarly wrong in thinking thatprecise knowledge of one's rights is a settled prerequisite
under the Fifth Amendment to the loss of its protections.
A number of lower federal court cases have held that
grand jury witnesses need not always be warned of theirprivilege, e. g., United States v. Scully, 225 F. 2d 113,
116, and Wigmore states this to be the better rule fortrial witnesses. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2269 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 379
U. S. 443, 451-452 (waiver of constitutional rights bycounsel despite defendant's ignorance held allowable).
No Fifth Amendment precedent is cited for the Court's
contrary view. There might of course-be reasons apartfrom Fifth Amendment precedent for requiring warningor any other safeguard on questioning but that is a different matter entirely. See infra, pp.. 516-517.
A closing word must be said about the Assistance ofCounsel Clause of the Sixth .Amendrhent, which is never
expressly relied on by the Court but whose judicial precedents turn out to be linchpins of the confession rules
announced today. To. support its requirement of aknowing and intelligent waiver, the Court cites Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, ante, p. 475; appointmentof counsel for the indigent suspect is tied to Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, and Douglas v. California,
372 U. S.353, ante, p. 473; the silent-record doctrine isborrowed from Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, ante,
p. 475, as is the right to an 'express offer of counsel, ante,
p. 471. All these cases imparting glosses to the Sixth
Amendment concerned counsel at trial or on appeal.
While the Court finds no pertinent difference between
judicial proceedings and police interrogation, I believe.

OCTOBER TERML 1965.
HARLAN. ,]., dissenting.

384 1'. S.

the differences are so vast as to disqualify wholly the
Sixth Amendment precedents as suitable analogies in thepresent cases."
The only attempt in this Court to carry the right tocounsel into the station house occurred in Escobedo, theCourt repeating several times that that stage was no less"critical" than trial itself. See 378 U. S., 485-488. Thisis hardly persuasive when we consider that a grand jury
inquiry, the filing of a certiorari petition, and certainly thepurchase of narcotics by an undercover agent from aprospective defendant may all be equally "critical" yetprovision of counsel and advice on that score have neverbeen thought compelled by the Constitution in suchcases. The sound reason why this right is so freely extended for a criminal trial is the severe injustice risked byconfronting an untrained defendant with a range oftechnical points of law, evidence, and tactics familiar
to the prosecutor but not to himself. This danger shrinks
markedly in the police station where indeed the lawyer
in fulfilling his professional responsibilities of necessity
may become an obstacle to truthfinding. See infra,n. 12.
The Court's summary citation of the Sixth Amendment cases here seems to me best described as "thedomino method of constitutional adjudication'...
wherein every explanatory statement in a previous opinion is made the basis for extension to a wholly different
situation." Friendly, supra, n. 10, at 950.
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS.

Examined as an expression of public policy, the Court's'
new regime proves so dubious that there can be no due
Since the Court conspicuously does not assert that the Sixth
Amendment itself warrants its new police-interrogation rules, there
is no reason now to draw out the extremely powerful historical andprecedential evidence, that the Amendment will bear no such meaning. See generally Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal
Procedure, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 929, 943-948 (1965).
10

MIRANDA v: ARIZONA..
436

HARLAN,J., dissenting.

compensation for its weakness in constitutional law.
The foregoing discussion has shown, I think, how mistaken is the Court in implying that the Constitution. has
struck the balance in favor of the approach the Court
takes. Ante, p. 479. Rather, precedent reveals that the
Fourteenth Amendment in practice has been construed
to strike a different balance, that the Fifth Amendment
gives the Court little solid support in this context, andthat the Sixth Amendment should have no bearing at
all. Legal history has been stretched before to satisfy
deep needs of society. In this instance, however, theCourt has not and cannot make the powerful showingthat its new rules are plainly desirable in the context ofour society, something which is surely demanded before
those rules are engrafted onto the Constitution and imposed on every State and county in the land.
Without at all subscribing to the generally black picture of police conduct painted by the Court, I think it
must be frankly recognized at the outset that policequestioning allowable under due process precedents may
inherently entail some pressure on the suspect and may
seek. advantage in his ignorance or weaknesses. The
atmosphere and questioning techniques, proper and fairthough they be, can in themselves exert a tug on the suspect to confess, and in this light "[tio speak of any confessions of crime made after arrest as being 'voluntary'or 'uncoerced' is somewhat inaccurate, although traditional. A confession is wholly and incontestably voluntary only if a guilty person gives himself up to the law
and becomes his own accuser." Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U. S.143, 161 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Until today,
the role of the Constitution has been only to sift out
undue pressure, not to assure spontaneous confessions.11
See supra, n. 4, and text. Of course, the use of terms like volun-

tariness involves questions of law and terminology quite as much asquestions of fact. See Collins'v. Beto, 348 F. 2d 823, 832 (concurring opinion); Bator & Vorenberg, supra, n. 4, at 72-73.

516

OCTOBER TERM. 1965.
HARLAN.

T., di..entin-.

384 U. S.

The Court's new rules aim to offset these minor pressures and disadvantages intrinsic to any kind of police
interrogation. The rules do not serve due process interests in preventing blatant coercion since, as I noted
earlier, they do nothing to contain the policeman who isprepared to lie from the start. The rules work for reliability in confessions almost only in the Pickwickian
sense that they can prevent some from being given 'atall. 12 In short, the benefit of this new regime is simply
to-lessen or wipe out the inher 'nt compulsion and inequalities to which the Court devotes some nine pages ofdescription. Ante, pp. 448-456.
What the Court largely ignores is that its rules impair,
if they will not eventually serve wholly to frustrate, an
instrument of law enforcement that has long and quite
13
reasonably been thought worth the price paid for it.
There can be little doubt that the Court's new code
would m~rkedly decrease the number of confessions. To
warn the suspect that he may remain silent and remind
him that his confession may be used in court are minor
obstructions. To require also an express waivei by thesuspect and an end to questioning whenever he demurs
1_The Court's vision of a lawyer "mitigat [ing] the dangers of untrustworthiness" (ante, p. 470) b " witnessing coercion and a,sisting
accuracy in the confession is largely a fancy; for if counsel arrives,
there i rarely going to be a police station confession. Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 59 (separate opinion of Jackson, J.): "[A]ny
lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to
make no statement to police under any circumstances." See Enker &Elsen, Counsel f6r the Suspect, 49 Minn. L. Rev. 47, 66-68 (1964).
13 This need is, of course, what makes so 'misleading the Court's
comparison of a probate judge readily setting aside as involuntary
the will of an old lady badgered and beleaguered by the new heirs.
Ante, pp. 457-458, n. -26. With wills, there is no public interest savein a totally free choice; with confessions, the solution of crime is acountervailing gain, however the balance is resolved.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA:
436

.517

HARLAN, J., dissenting.

must heavily handicap questioning. And to suggest or
provide counsel for the suspect simply invites the endof the interrogation. See,,supra, n. 12.
How much harm this decision will inflict on law enforcement cannot fairly be predicted with accuracy.
Evidence on the role of confessions is notoriously incomplete, see Developments, supra,n. 2, at 941-944, and little
is added-by the Court's reference to the FBI experienceand the resources believed wasted in interrogation. See
infra, n. 19, and text. We do know that some crimes
cannot be solved without confessions, that ample expert
testimony attests to their importance in crime control, 4
and that the Court is taking a" real risk with society's
welfare in imposing its new regime on the country. The
social costs of crime are too great to call the new rules
anything but a hazardous experimentation.
While passing over the costs and risks of its experiment, the Court portrays the evils of normal police questioning in terms which I think are exaggerated. Albeit
stringently confined by the due process standards interrogation is no doubt often inconvenient and unpleasant
for the suspect. However, it is no less so for a man to
be arrested and jailed, to have his house searched, or tostand trial in court, yet all this may properly happen to
the most innocent given probable cause, a warrant, or anindictment. Society has always paid a stiff price for law
and order, and peaceful interrogation is not one of thedark moments of the law.
This brief statement of the competing considerations
seems to me ample proof that the Court's preference ishighly debatable at best and therefore not to be read into
4

See, e. g.r the voluminous citations to congressional committee
testimony and other sources collected in Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U. S. 568, 578-579 (Frankfurter, J., announcing the Court's
judgment and an opinion).

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
HARLAN-. J., dissenting.

384 U. S.

the Constitution. However, it may make the analysis
more graphic to consider the actual facts of one of thefour cases reversed by the Court. Miranda v. Arizonaserves best, being neither the hardest nor easiest of the
5four under the Court's standards.
On March 3, 1963, an 18-year-old girl was kidnappedand forcibly raped near Phoenix, Arizona. Ten days
later, on the morning of March 13, petitioner Miranda
was arrested and taken to the police station. At thistime Miranda was 23 years old, indigent, and educatedto the extent of completing half the ninth grade. He
had "an emotional illness" of the schizophrenic type,according to the doctor who eventually examined him;
the doctor's report also stated that Miranda was "alert
and oriented as to time, place, and person," intelligent.within normal limits, competent to stand trial, and sanewithin the legal definition. At the police station, thevictim picked Miranda out of a lineup,, and two officers
then took him into a separate room to interrogate him,
starting about 11:30 a. m. Though at first-denying his
guilt, within a short time Miranda gave a detailed oral
confession and then wrote out in his own hand andsigned a brief statement admitting and describing thecrime. All this was accomplished in two hours or lesswithout any force, threats or promises and-I will assume
this though the record is uncertain, ante, 491-492 and nn.
66-67-without any effective warnings at all.
Miranda's oral and written confessions are now held
inadmissible under the Court's new rules. One is entitled to feel astonished that the Constitution can beread to produce this result. These confessions were oba seasoned criminal was-practically given theof warnings and did not heed them. The
complement
Court's fullStewart case, on the other hand, involves long detention and successive questioning. In Vignera, the facts are complicated and therecord somewhat incomplete.
'15In Westover,MIR.NDA v. ARIZONA.
436

HARLAN,

519

J., dissenting.

tained during brief, daytime'questioning conducted by
two officers and unmarked by any of the traditional indicia of coercion. They assured a conviction for a brutal
and unsettling crime, for which the police had and quitepossibly could obtain little evidence other than the victim's identificatilns, evidence which is frequently unreliable. There was, in sum, a legitimate purpose, noperceptible unfairness, and certainly littlerisk of injustice in the interrogation. Yet the resulting confessions,and the responsible course of police practice they represent, are to be' sacrificed to the Court's own finespun
conception of fairness which I seriously doubt is sharedby many thinking citizens in this country. q
The tenor of judicial opinion also falls well short of
supporting the Court's new approach. Although Escobedo has widely been interpreted as an open invitation tolower courts to rewrite the law of confessions, a significant heavy majority of the state and federal decisions
in point have sought quite narrow interpretations.17 Of
216"[J]ustice, though due to the accused, is dde to the accuser also.
The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed toa filament. We are to keep the balance true." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 122 (Cardozo, J.).
17 A narrow reading is given in: United States v. Robinson, 354
F.'2d 109 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Davis v. North Carolina, 339 F. 2d 770(C. A. 4th Cir.); Edwards v. Holnan, 342 F. 2d 679 (C. A. 5thCir.); United States ex rel. Townsend v. Ogilvie, 334 F. 2d 837(C. A. 7th Cir.); People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill.
2d 375, 202 N. E.
2d 33; State v. Fox. Iowa -, 131 N. W. 2d 684; Rowe v. Commonwealth, 394 S. W. 2d 751 (Ky.); Parker v. Warden, 236 Md.
236, 203 A. 2d 418; State v. Howard, 383 S. IV. 2d 701 (Mlo.); Beanv. $tate, Nev. -, 398 P. 2d 251; State v. Hodgson, 44 N. J.
151, 207 A. 2d 542; People v. Gunner, 15 N. Y. 2d 226, 205 N. E.
2d 852; Commonwealth ex rel. Linde v. Maroney. 416 Pa. 331, 206
A. 2d 288; Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 131 N. W. 2d 169.
An ample reading is given in: United States ex rpl. Russo v.
New Jersey, 351 F. 2d 429 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Wright v. Dickson,

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
HARLAN,J., dissenting.

384 U. S.

the courts that have accepted the invitation, it is hard
to know how many have felt compelled by their best
guess as to this Court's likely construction.; but none of
the state decisions saw fit to rely on the state privilege
against self-incrimination, and no decision at all has
gone as far as this Court goes today."
It is also instructive to compare the attitude in thiscase of those responsible for law enforcement with theofficial views that existed when the Court undertook
three majdr revisions of prosecutorial practice prior tothis case, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U. S. 643, and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335.
In Johnson, which established that. appointed counselmust be offered the indigent in federal criminal trials, theFederal Government all but conceded the basic issue,
which had in fact been recently fixed as Department ofJustice policy. See Beaney, Right to Counsel 29-30,
36-42 (1955). In Mapp, which imposed the exclusionary
rule on the States for Fourth Amendment violations,more than half of the States had themselves alreadyadopted some such rule. See 367 U. S., at 651. In Gideon,
which extended Johnson v. Zerbst to the States, an amicus
brief was filed by 22 States and Commonwealths urging
that course; only two States besides that of the respondent came forward to protest. See 372 U. S., at345. By contrast, in this case new restrictions on police
336 F. 2d 878 (C. A. 9th Cir.); People v. Dorado,,62 Cal. 2d 338,
398 P. 2d 361; State v. Dufour; -R. I. -,

206 A. 2d 82; State v.

Neely, 239 Ore. 487, 395 P. 2d 47, mQdified, 398 P. 2d 482.
The cases in both categories are those readily qvailable; there arecertainly many others.
Is For instance, compare the requirements of the catalytic case of
People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P. 2d 361, with those laid
down today. See also Traynor, The Derils of Due Process in
Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657,
670.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

HARLAN.

-521

J., dissenting.

questioning have been opposed by the United States andin an amicus brief signed by 27 States and Comihonwealths, not including the three other States which areparties. No State in the country has urged this Court
to impose the newly announced rul6s, nor has any State
chosen to go nearly so far on its own.
The Court in closing its general discussion invokes thepractice in federal and foreign jurisdictions as lending
weight to its new curbs on confessions for all the States.
A brief r6sum6 will suffice to show that none of thesejurisdictions has struck so one-sided a balance as the
Court does today. Heaviest reliance is placed on the
FB3I practice. Differing circumstances may make thiscomparison quite untrustworthy,"D but in any event the
FBI falls sensibly short of the Court's formalistic- rules.
For example, there is no indication that FBI agents mustobtain an affirmative "waiver" before they pursue theirquestioning. Nor is it clear that one invoking his rightto silence may not be prevailed upon to change his mind.
And the warning as to appointed counsel apparently indi-.
cates only that one will be assigned by the judge when
the suspect appears before him; the thrust of the Court's
rules is to induce the suspect to obtain appointed counsel
before continuing the interview. See ante, pp. 484-486.
Apparently American military practice, briefly mentionedby the Court, has these same limits and is still less favorable to the suspect than the FBI warning, making no
mention of appointed counsel. Developments, supra,
n. 2, at 1084-1089.
The law of the foreign countries described by the Court
also reflects a more moderate conception of the rights of"The Court's obiter dictum notwithstanding, ante, p. 486, there
is some basis for believing that the bcaple of FBI criminal work

differs importantly from much crime within the ken of local police.
The skill and resources of the FBI may also be unusual.

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
HARLAN . J., dissenting.

384 U. S.

the accused as against those of society when other data
are considered. Concededly, the English experience ismost relevant. In that country, a caution as to silence
but not counsel has long been mandated by the "Judges'
Rules," which also place other somewhat imprecise limitson police cross-examination of suspects. However, in the
court's discretion confessions can be and apparently quite
frequently are admitted in evidence despite disregard ofthe'Judges' Rules, so long as they are found voluntary
under the common-law test. Moreover, the check thatexists on the use of pretrial statements is counterbalanced by the evident admissibility of fruits of an illegal
confession and by the judge's often-used authority tocomment adversely on the defendant's failure to testify."
India, Ceylon and Scotland are the other examples
chosen by the Court. In India and Ceylon the generalban on police-adduced confessions cited by the Court issubject to a major exception: if evidence is uncovered bypolice questioning, it is fully admissible at trial alongwith the confession itself, so far as it relates to the evidence and is not blatantly coerced. See Developments,
supra, n. 2, at 1106-1110; Reg. v. /?amasamy [1965] A, C.
1 (P. C.). Scotland's limits on interrogation do measure
up to the Court's; however, restrained comment at trial
on the defendant's failure to take the stand is allowed thejudge, and in many other respects Scotch law redresses
the prosecutor's disadvantage in ways not permitted inthis country.2 1 The Court ends its survey by imputing
20 For citations and discussion covering each of these points, see
Developments, supra, n. 2, at 1091-1097, and Enker & Elsen, supra,n. 12, at 80 & n. 94.
21 On comment, see Hardin, Other Answers: Search and Seizure,
Coerced Confession, and Criminal Trial in Scotland, 113 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 165, 181 and nn. 96-97 (1964). Other examples are less stringent search and seizure rules and no automatic exclusion for violation; hem, id., at 167-169; guilt based on majority jury verdicts, id.,
at 185; and pre-trial discover, of vidence on both sides, id., at 175.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
-436

H.xnAx. J., dissenting.

-added strength to our privilege against self-incrimination

since, by contrast to other countries, it is embodied in a
written Constitution. Considering the liberties the Court
has today taken with constitutional history and "precedent, few will find this emphasis persuasive.
In closing this necessarily truncated discussion of policy.
considerations attending the new confession rules, somereference must be made to their ironic untimeliness.
There is now in progress in this country a massive re-examination of criminal law enforcement procedures ona scale never before witnessed. Participants in thisundertaking include a Special Committee of the Ameri-can Bar Association, under the chairmanship of Chief
Judge Lumbard.of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circut; a distinguished study group of the American
Law Institute. headed by Professors Vorenberg and Batorof the Harvard Law School; and the President's Commissioii on Law Enforcement and Adiiinistration of
Justice. under the leadership of the Attorney General of

the United States.*-'Studies are also being conductedby the District of Columbia Crime Commission, theGeorgetown .Law Center, and by others equipped to dopractical research. - There are, also signs that legislatures in some of the States may be preparing to

re-examine. the problem before 11s.24
2-' Of particular relexance is the ALI's drafting of a -Model Codeof Pre-Arraignent Procedure, now in its fiizt tentative draft.
While the ABA and National Commission studies have wider scope,
the former is lending its advice io the ALI project :nd the executive.
director of the latter is one of the reporters for the Model Code.
" See Brief for the United States in lWestor r. p. 45. The N. Y.
Times, June 3, 1966, p. 41 (late city ed.) reported llhat the Ford
Foundation has awarded S1,100,000 for a five-year study of arrest.s
and confe,sions in New York.
24 The New York As. embly recently passed a bill to require certain warnings before an admissible confe,-sion is taken, though therules are les strict than are the Court's. N.'. Titnes, May 24. 1966,
p. 35 (late city ed.).

524

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
HARLAN, J., dissenting.

.

384 U. S.

It is no secret that concern has been expressed lestlong-range and lasting reforms be frustrated by thisCourt's too rapid departure from existing constitutional
standards. Despite the Court's disclaimer, the practicaleffect of the decision made today must inevitably be tohandicap seriously sound efforts at reform, not least byremoving options necessary to a just compromise of competing interests. Of course legislative reform is rarely
speedy or unanimous, though this Court has been morepatient in the past.2 5 But the legislative reforms when
they come would have the vast advantage of empiric9
data and comprehensive study, they would allow experimentation and use of solutions not open to the courts,
and they would restore the initiative in criminal law
reform to those forums where it truly belongs.
IV. CoNcLusroNs.
All four of the cases involved here present express
claims that confessions were inadmissible, not becauseof coercion in the traditional due process sense, but solely
because of lack of counsel or lack of warnings concerning counsel and silence. For the reasons stated in thisopinion, I would adhere to the due process tst and reject
the new requirements inaugurated by the Court. On thispremise my disposition of each of these cases can bestated briefly.
In two of the three cases coming from state courts,
Miranda v. Arizona (No. 759) and Vignera v. New York(No. 760), the confessions were held admissible and noother errors worth comment are alleged.by petitioners.
25The Court waited 12 years after Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25,
declared privacy against improper state intrusions to be constitutionally safeguarded before it concluded in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S.
643, that adequate sta'e remedies had not been provided to protect
this interest so the exclusionary rule 'was necessary.

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436. . 525

HARLAN. J., dissenting.

I would affirm in these two cases. The other state caseis California v. Stewart (No. 584). where the statesupreme court held the confession inadmissible and reversed the conviction. In that case I would dismiss thewrit of certiorari on the ground that no final judgment isbefore us, 28 U. S.. C. § 1257 (1964 ed.); putting aside
the new trial open to the State in any event, the confession itself has not even been finally excluded since theCalifornia Supreme Court left the State free to show
proof of a waiver. If the merits of the decision in
Stewart be reached, then I believe it should be reversed
and the case remanded so the state supreme court may
pass on the other claims available to respondent.
In the federal case, Westover v. United States (No.
761), a number of issues are raised by petitionler apartfrom the one already dealt with in this dissent. None ofthese other claims appears to me tenable, nor in this context to. warrant extended discussion. It is urged thatthe confession was also inadmissible because not voluntary even measured by due process standards and because
federal-state cooperation brought the 'McNabb-Mallory
rule into play under Anderson v. United States, 318 U. S.
350. However, the facts alleged fall well short of coercion in niy view, and I believe the involvement of federal agents in petitioner's arrest and detention by theState too slight to invoke Anderson. I agree with theGovernment that the admission of the evidence now protested by petitioner was at most harmless error, and two
final contentions-one involving weight of the evidence
and another improper prosecutor comment-seem to me
without merit. I would therefore affirm Westover's
conviction.
In conclusion: Nothing in the letter or the spirit of
the Constitution or in the precedents squares with theheavy-handed and one-sided action that is so precipi-

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
WHrm, J., dissenting.

384 U. S.

tously taken by the Court in the name of fulfilling its
constitrtional responsibilities. The foray which the
Court makes today brings.to mind the wise and farsighted
words of Mr. Justice Jackson in Douglas v. Jeannette,
319 U. S. 157, 181 (separate opinion): "This .Court isforever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of -collapsingwhen one story too many is added."
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN
and MR. JusTICE STEWART join, dissenting.

The proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination forbids ifi-custody interrogation without thewarnings specified in the majority opinion, and withouta clear waiver of counsel has no significant support in
the history of the privilege or in the language of the'Fifth Amendment. As for the English authorities andthe common-law history, the privilege, firmly establishedin the second half of the seventeenth century, was neverapplied except to prohibit compelled judicial interrogations. The rule excluding coerced confessions matured
abput 100 years later, "[b]ut there is nothing in thereports to suggest that the. theory has its roots in-theprivilege against self-incrimination. And so far as thecases reveal, the privilege, as such, seems, to have been
given effect only in judicial proceedings, including thepreliminary examinations by authorized magistrates."Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34
Minn. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1949)..
Our own constitutional provision provides that no
person "shall be 6ompelled in any criminal case to be a
wit res;3 against himself." These words, when "[c]onsilered in the light to be shed by grammar and the dictionary . . .appear to signify simply that nobody shall beMIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

WHITE, .J., dissenting.

compelled to give oral testimony against himself in acriminal proceeding under way in which he is defendant." Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction -of
the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1,, 2.
And-there is very little in the surrounding circumstancesof the adoption of the Fifth Amendment or in the provisions of the then existing state constitutions or in statepractice which would give the constitutional provision
any broader meaning. Mayers, The Federal Witness'
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Constitutional or
Common-Law? *4 American Journal of Legal History
107 (1060). Such a construction, however, was considerably Rarrower than the privilege at common law, andwhen eventually faced with the issues, the Court extended the constitutional privilege to the compulsory
production of books and papers, to the ordinary witness
before the grand jury and to witnesses generally. Boyd
v. United States, 116 'U. S. 416, and Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547. Both rules had solid support incommon-law history, if riot in the history of our own
constitutional provision.
A few years later the Fifth Amendment privilege wassimilarly extended to encbmpass the then well-establishedrule against coerced confessions: "In criminal trials, inthe courts of the United States, wherever a question
arises whether a confession is-incompetent because notvoluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of theFifth Amendment to the Constitution of the UnitedStates, commanding that no person 'shall be compelled.
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.'"
Bram ,v. United States, 168 U. S. 532j,. 542. Although
this view has found approval in other cases, Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 475; Powers v. United States,
223 U. S. 303, 313; Shotwell v. United States, 371 U. S.
341, 347, it has also been questioned, see Brown v. - ississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 285; United States v. Carignan,

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
WHITE,

J1., dissenting.

384 U.S.

342 U. S. 36, 41; Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156,191.
n. 35, and finds scant support in either the English or
American authorities, see generally Regina v. Scott,Dears. & Bell 47; 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 823 (3d ed.
1940), at 249 ("a confession is not rejected because of
any connection with the privilege against self-crimination"), and 250, n. 5 (particularly criticizing Brain); 8Wigmore, Evidence § 2266, at 400-401 (McNaughton rev.
1961). Whatever the source of the rule excluding coerced
confessions, it is clear that prior to the application of
the privilege itself to state courts, Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U. S. 1, the admissibility of a confession in a state criminal prosecution was tested by the same standards as wereapplied in federal prosecutions. Id., at 6-7, 10.
Bram, however, itself rejected the propositiofi which
the Court now espouses. The question in Brain waswhether a confession, obtained during custodial interrogation, had been compelled, and if such interrogation
was to be deemed inherently vulnerable the Court's-inquiry could have ended there. After examining theEnglish and American authorities, however, the Court
declared that:"In this court also it has been settled that the merefact that the confession is made to a police officer,
while the accused was under arrest in or out ofprison, or was drawn out by his questions, does notnecessarily render the confession involuntary, but
as one of the circumstances, such imprisonment orinterrogation may be- taken into account in determining whether or not the statements of the prisoner
were voluntary." 168 U. S., at 558.
In this respect the Court was wholly consistent with priorand subsequent pronouncements in this Court.
Thus prior to Bram the Court, in Hopt v. Utah, 110
U. S. 574, 583-587, had upheld the admissibility of a

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

529

WHITE, J., dissenting.

confession made to police officers following arrest, therecord being silent concerning what conversation had
occurred between the officers and the defendant in the
short period preceding the confession. Relying on Hopt,
the Court ruled squarely on the issue in Sparf and Hansen
v. United States, 156 U. S. 51, 55:"Counsel for the accused'insist that there cannot
be a voluntary statement, a free open confession,
while a defendant is confined and in irons under anaccusation of having committed a capital offence.
We have not been referred to any authority in support of that position. It is true that the fact of a
prisoner being in custody at the time he makes aconfession is a circumstance not to be overlooked,
because it bears .upon the inquiry whether the con-'fessiQn was voluntarily made or was extorted bythreats or violence or made under the influence offear. But confinement or imprisonment is not in
itself sufficient to justify the exclusion of a confession, if it appears to have been voluntary, and was
not obtained by putting the prisoner in fear or bypromises. Wharton's Cr. Ev. 9th ed. §§ 661, 663,
and authorities cited."
Accord, Pierce v. United States, 160 U. S. 355, 357.
And in Wilson v..United States, 162 U. S. 613, 623,
the Court had considered the significance of custodialinterrogation without any antecedent warnings regarding
the right to remain silent or the right to counsel. There
the defendant had answered questions posed by a Commissioner, who had failed to advise him of his rights, andhis answers were held admissible over his claim of involuntariness. "The fact that [a defendant] is in.custodyand manacled does not necessarily render his statement
involuntary, nor is that necessarily the effect of popular
excitement shortly preceding....
And it is laid down

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
WHIT', J., dis.senting.

384 U. S.

that it is not essential to the admissibility of a confession that it should appear that the person was warned
that what he said would be used against him, but on thecontrary, if the confession was voluntary, it is sufficientthough it appear that he was not so warned."
Since Bran, the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation has been frequently reiterated.
Powers v. United States, 223 U. S. 303, cited Wilson
approvingly and held admissible as voluntary statements
the accused's testimony at a preliminary hearing eventhough he was not warned that what he said might beused against him. Without any discussion of the presence or absence of warnings, presumably because suchdiscussion was deemed unnecessary, numerous other cases
have declared that "[tj he mere fact that a confession wasmade while in the custody of the police does not render
it inadmissible," McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332.
346; accord, United States v. Mitchell, 322 U. S. 65,
despite its having been elicited by police examination,
Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1, 14; United States v.
Carignan, 342 U. S. 36, 39. Likewise, in Crooker v.
California,357 U. S. 433, 437, the Court said that "thebare fact of police 'detention and police examination in
private of one in official state custody' does not render
involuntary a confession by the one so detained." Andfinally, in Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504, a confession
obtained by police interrogation after arrest was held voluntary even though the authorities refused to permit thedefendant to consult with his attorney. See generally
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568, 587-602 (opinionof Frankfurter, J.); 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 851, at 313(3d ed. 1940); see also Joy, Admissibility of Confessions
38, 46 (1842).
Only a tiny minority of our judges who have dealt
with the question, including -today's majority, have considered in-custody interrogation, without more, to be a
violation of the Fifth Amendment. And this Court, asMIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

WHITE, J., dissenting.

every member knows, has left standing literally thousands of criminal convictions that rested at least in parton confessions taken in the course of interrogation by
the police after arrest.
II.
That the Court's holding today is neither compelled
nor even strongly suggested by the language of theFifth Amendment, is at odds with American and English
legal history, and involves a departure from .a longline of precedent does not prove either that the Court
has exceeded its powers or that the Court is wrong or
unwise in its present reinterpretation of the Fifth
Amendment. It does, however, underscore the obvious--that the Court has not discovered or found the law
in making today's decision, nor has it derived it fromsome irrefutable sources; what it has done is toi makenew law and new public policy in much the same waythat it has in the course of interpreting other great clausesof the Constitution.' This is what the Court historicallyhas done. Indeed, it is what it must do and will continue
to do until and unless there is some fundamental change
in the constitutional distribution of governmental powers.
But if the Court is here and now to announce new andfundamental policy to govern certain aspects of ouraffairs, it is wholly legitimate to examine the mode ofthis or any other constitutional decision in this Court
and to inquire into the advisability of its end productin terms of the long-range interest of the country. At
the very least the Court's text and reasoning shouldwithstand analysis and be a fair exposition of the constitutional provision which its opinion interprets. De'Of course the Court does not deny that it is departing fromprior precedent; it expressly overrules Crooker and Cicenia, ante,
at 479, n. 48, and it acknowledges that inthe instant "cases we might
not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary in
traditional terms," ante, at 457.

OCTOBER TERM. 1965.
WiirrE, J., dissenting.

3S4I T. S.

cisions like these cannot rest alone on syllogism, metaphysics or some ill-defined notions of natural justice.
although each will perhaps play its part. In proceeding
to such constructions as it now announces, the Court
should also duly consider all the factors and interests
bearing upon the cases, at least insofar as the relevantmaterials are available; and if the necessary considerations are not treated in the record or obtainable fromsome other reliable source, the Court should not proceed
to formulate fundamental policies based on speculation
alone.
III.
First, we may inquire what are the textual and factualbases of this new fundamental rule. To reach the result
announced on the grounds it does, the Court must staywithin the confines of the Fifth Amendment, which forbids self-incrimination only if compelled. Hence thecore of the Court's opinion is that because of the "compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from [a] defendant [in custody] can truly
be the product of his free choice," ante, at 458, absent theuse of adequate protective devices as described by the
Court. Hbwever, the Court does not point to any sudden inrush of new kinowledge requiring the rejection of
70 years' experience. Nor does it assert that its novel
conclusion reflects a changing consensus among state
courts, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, or that a succession of cases had steadily eroded the old rule and proved.it unworkable" see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335.
Rather than asserting new knowledge, the Court concedesthat it cannot truly know what occurs during custodialquestioning, because of the innate secrecy of such proceedings. It extrapolates a picture of what it conceives
to be the norm from police investigatorial manuals, published in 1959 and 1962 or earlier, without any attempt
to allow for adjustments in police practices that may

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

WHTE,

J., dissenting'.

have occurred in the wake of more recent decisions ofstate appellate tribunals or this Court. But even if therelentless application of the described procedures could
lead to involuntary confessions, it most assuredly does
not follow that each and every case will disclose this kindof interrogation or this kind of consequence. - Insofar as
appears from the Court's opinion, it has not examineda single transcript of any police interrogation, let alone
the interrogation that took place in any one of these cases
which it decides today. Judged by any of the standards
for empirical investigation utilized in the social sciences
the factual basis for the Court's premise is patently
inadequate.
Although in the Court's view in-custody interrogation
is inherently coercive, the Court says that the spontaneous product of the coercion of arrest and detention isstill to be deemed voluntary. An accused, arrested on
probable cause, may blurt out a confession which will be
admissible despite the fact that he is alone and in custody, without any showing that he had any notion of hisright to remain silent or of the consequences of his admission. Yet, under the Court's rule, if the police ask
him a single question such as "Do you have anything tosay?" or "Did you kill your wife?" his response, if there isone, has somehow been compelled, even if the accused has
2 In fact, the type of sustained interrogation described by the.

Court appears to be the exception rather than the rule. A surveyof 399 cases in one city found that in almost half of the cases theinterrogation lasted less than 30 minutes. Barrett, Police Practices
and the Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 Calif. L. Rev.
11, 41-45 (1962). Questioning tends to be confused and sporadic
and is usually concentrated on confrontations with witnesses or new
items of evidence, as these are obtained by officers conducting theinvestigation. See generally LaFave, Arrest: The Decision to Takea Suspect into Custody 386 (1965); ALI, A Model Code of PreArraignment Procedure, Commentary § 5.01, at 170, n. 4 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1966).

534

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
WHITE,J., dissenting.

384 U. S.

been clearly warned of his right to remain silent. Common sense informs us to the contrary. While one may
say that the response was "involuntary" in the sense thequestion provoked or was the occasion for the response
and thus the defendant was induced to speak out when
he might have remained silent if not arrested and notquestioned, it is patently unbound to say the response iscompelled.
Today's result would not follow even if it were agreed
that to some extent custodial inferrogation is inherently
coercive. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 161(Jackson, J., dissenting). The test has been whether
the totality of circumstances deprived the defendantof a "free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse toanswer," Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 241, andwhether physical or psychological coercion was of sucha degree that "the defendant'i will was overborne at
the time he confessed," Haynes v. Washington, 373
U. S.503, 513; Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U. S. 528, 534.
The duration and nature of incommunicado custody, thepresence or absence of advice concerning the defendant's
constitutional rights, and the granting or refusal of requests to communicate with lawyers, relatives or friends
have all been rightly regarded as important data bearing
on the basic inquiry. See, e. g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U. S. 143; Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503.1
3 By contrast, the Court indicates that in applying.this new.rule
it "will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given." Ante,at 468. 'The reason given is that assessment of the knowledge ofthe defendant based on information as to age, education, intelligence,or prior contact with authorities can never be more than speculation, while a warning is a clear-cut fact. But the officers' claim thatthey gave the requisite warnings may be disputed, and facts respect. ing the defendant's prior experience may be undisputed and be ofsuch a nature as to virtually preclude any doubt that the defendant
knew of his rights. See United States"v. Bolden, 355 F. 2d 453

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

WHITE, J., dissenting.

But it has never been suggested, until today, that suchquestioning was so coercive and accused persons so lacking in hardihood that the very first response to the very
first question following the commencement of custody
must be conclusively presumed to be the product of an
overborne will.
If the rule announced today were truly based on aconclusion that all confessions resulting from custodialinterrogation are coerced, then it would simply have norational foundation. Compare Tot v. United States, 319
U. S. 463, 466; United States v. Romano, 382 U. S. 136.
A fortiori that would be true of the extension of the rule
to exculpatory statements, which the Court effects aftera brief discussion of why, in the Court's view, they must
be deemed incriminatory hut without any discussion of
why they must be deemed coerced. See Wilson v. UnitedStates, 162 U. S. 613, 624. Even if one were to postulatethat the Court's concern is not that all confessions induced by police interrogation are coerced but rather thatsome such confessions are coerced and present judicial
procedures are believed to be inadequate to identify theconfessions that are coerced and those that are not, it
would still not be essential to impose the rule that the
Court has now fashioned. Transcripts or observers could
be required, specific time limits, tailored to fit the cause,
could be imposed, or other devices could be utilized toreduce the chances that otherwise indiscernible coercion
will produce an inadmissible confession.
On the other hand, even if one assumed that there
was an adequate factual basis for the conclusion that
all confessions obtained during in-custody interrogation
are the product of compulsion, the rule propounded by(C. A. 7th Cir. 1965), petition for cert. pending No. 1146, 0. T.
1965 (Secret Service agent); People v. Du Bont, 235 Cal. App. 2d844, 45 Cal. Rptr. 717,. pet. for cert. pending No. 1053, Misc.,
0. T. 1965 (former police officer).

536"

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
WHITE

J., dissenting.

384 U. S.

the. Court would still be irrational, for, apparently, it is
only if the accused is also warned of his right to counsel
and waives both that right and the right against selfincrimination that the inherent compulsiveness of interrogation disappears. But if the defendant may notanswer without a warning a question such as "Where
were you last night?" without having his answer be acompelled one, how can the Court.-ever accept his negative answer, to the question of whether he wants to consult his retained counsel or counsel vhom the court will
appoint? And why if counsel is present and the accusednevertheless confesses, or counsel tells the accused to 'tell
the truth, and that is what the accused does, is the situation any less coercive insofar as the accused is concerned? The Court apparently realizes its dilemma of
foreclosing questioning without the necessary warnings
but at the same time permitting the accused, sitting inthe same chair in front of the same policemen, to waive
his right to consult an attorney. It expects, however,that the accused will not often waive the right; and if it
is claimed that he has, the State faces a severe, if not impossible burden of probf.
All of this makes very little sense in terms of the compulsion which the Fifth Amendment proscribe . That
amendment deals with compelling the accused himself.
It is his free will that is involved. Confessions and incriminating admissions, as such, are not forbidden evidence; only those which are compelled are banned. I
doubt that the Court observes these distinctions today.
By considering any answers to any interrogation to becompelled regardless of the content and course of examination and by escalating the requirements to prove
waiver, the Court not only prevents the use of compelled
confessions but for all practical purposes forbids interrogation except in the presence of counsel. That is, insteadof donfining itself to protection of the tight against com-MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

WHITE,J., dis.-enting.

pelled self-incrimination the Court has created a limited
Fifth Amendment right to counsel-or, as the Court
expresses it, a "need for counsel to protect the Fifth
Amendment privilege .... ." Ante, at 470. The focus
then is not on the will of the accused but, on the will ofcounsel and how much influence he can have on the accused. Obviously there is no warrant in the Fifth
Amendment for thus installing counsel as the arbiter ofthe privilege.
In sum, for all the Court's expounding on the menacing atmosphere of police interrogation procedures, it has
failed to supply any foundation for the conclusions it
draws or the measures it adopts.
IV.
Criticism of the Court's opinion, however, cannot stopwith a demonstration that the factual and textual bases
for the rule it propounds are, at best, less than compelling. Equally relevant is an assessment of the rule's
consequences measured against community values.
The Court's duty to assess the consequences of its action
is not satisfied by the utterance of the truth that a valueof our system of criminal justice is "to respect the inviolability of the human personality" and to require government to produce the evidence against the accused byits own independent labors. Ante, at 460. More thanthe human dignity of the accused is involved; the humanpersonalfty of others in the society must also be preserved. Thus the values reflected by the privilege are
not the sole desideratum; society's interest in the generalsecurity is of equal weight.
The obvious underpinning of the Court's decision is a
deep-seated distrust of all confessions. As the Court
declares that the accused may not B-e interrogated without counsel present, absent a waiver of the right to counsel, and as the Court all but admonishes the lawyer toOCTOBER TERM, 1965.
WHITE, .J., dissenting.

384 U. S.

advise the accused to remain silent, the result adds up
to a judicial judgment that evidence from the accusedshould not be used against him in any way, whether compelled or not. This is the not so subtle overtone of theopinion-that it is inherently wrong for the police togather evidence from the accused himself. And this isprecisely the nub of this dissent. I see nothing wrong
or immoral, and certainly nothing unconstitutional, in
the police's asking a suspect whom they have reasonablecause to arrest whether or not he killed his wife or in
confronting him with the evidence on which the arrest
was based, at least where he has been plainly advisedthat he may remain completely silent, see Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 499 (dissenting opinion). Until
today, "the admissions or confessions of. the prisoner,
when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked
high in the scale of incriminating evidence." Brown v.
Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 596; see also Hopt v. Utah, 110
U. S. 574, 584-585. Particularly- when corroborated, as
where the police have confirmed the accused's disclosureof the hiding place of implements or fruits of the crime,
such confessions have the highest reliability and significantly contribute to the certitude with which we may
believe the accused is guilty. Moreover, it is by nomeans certain that the process of confessing is injurious
to the accused. To the contrary it may provide psychological relief and enhance the prospects for rehabilitation.
This is not to say that the value of respect for the inviolability of the accused's individual personality shouldbe accorded no weight or that all confessions should beindiscriminately admitted. This Court has long read theConstitution to proscribe compelled confessions, a salutary rule from which there should be no.retreat. But I
see no sound basis, factual or otherwise, and the Court
gives none, for concluding that the present rule against
the receipt of coerced confessions is inadequate for theMIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

WIITE, J., dissenting.

task of sorting out inadmissible evidence and must be
replaced by the per se rule which is now imposed. Even
if the new concept can be said to have advantages ofsome sort over the present law, they are far outweighedby its likely undesirable impact on other very relevant
and important interests.
The most basic function of any governmefit is to provide for the security of the individual and of his property.
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S_ 451, 455. These ends
of society are served by the criminal laws which for themost part are aimed at the prevention of crime. Without' the reasonably effective performance of the task of
preventing private violence and retaliation, it is idle totalk about human dignity and civilized values.
The modes by which the criminal laws serve theinterest in general security are many. First the murderer
who has taken the life of another is removed from thestreets, deprived of his liberty, and thereby prevented
from repeating his offense. In view of the statistics onrecidivism in this country I and of the number of instances
4 Precise statistics on the extent of recidivism are unavailable, inpart because not all crimes are solved and in part because criminal
records of convictions in different jurisdictions are not brought together by a central data collection agency. Beginning in 1963, 1.iwever, the Federal Bureau of Investigation began collating data on"Careers in Crime," which it publishes in its Uniform Crime 'Reports. Of 92,869 offenders processed in 1963 and 1964, 76% had
a prior arrest record on some charge. Over a period of 10 years
the group had accumulated 434,000 charges. FBI, Uniform Crime
Reports--1964, 27-28. In 1963 and 1964 between 23% and 25%of all offenders sentenced in 88 federal district courts (excluding
the District Court for the District of Columbia) whose criminal
records were rpported had previously been sentenced'to a term of
imprisomhent of 13 .months or more. Approximately an additional
40% had a prior record less than prison (juvenile record, probation
record, etc.). Administrative Office of' the United States Courts,
Federal Offenders in the United States District Courts: 1964, x, 36(hereinafter cited as Federal Offenders: 1964); AdministrativeOCTOBER TERM, 1965.
WHITE,J., dissenting.

384 U. S.

in which apprehension occurs only after repeated offenses,
no one can sensibly claim that this aspect of the criminal
law does not prevent crime or contribute significantly tothe personal security of the ordinary citizen.
Secondly, the swift and sure apprehension of those who
refuse to respect the personal security and dignity of theirneighbor unquestionably has its impact on others who
might be similarly tempted. That the criminal law iswholly or partly ineffective with a segment of the population or with many of those who have been apprehended
and convicted is a very faulty basis for concluding that
it is not effective with respect to the great' bulk of our
citizens or for thinking that without the criminal laws,
Office of the United States Courts, Federal Offenders in the UnitedStates District Courts: 1963, 25-27 (hereinafter cited as Federal
Offenders: 1963). During the same two years in the-District Court
for the District of Columbia between 28% and 35% of those sentenced had prior prison records and from 37% to 40% had a priorrecord less than prison. Federal Offenders: 1964, xii, 64, 66;
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Offenders
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia:
1963, 8, 10 (hereinafter cited as District of Columbia Offenders:
1963).
A similar picture is obtained if one looks at the subsequent recordsof those released from confinement. In 1964, 12.3% of persons onfederal probation had their probation revoked because of the commission of major violations (defined as one in which the probationer
has been committed to imprisonment for a period of 90 days or'more, been placed on probation for over one year on a new offense,or has absconded with felony charges outstanding). Twenty-three
and two-tenths percent of parolees and 16.9% of those who had
been mandatorily released after service of a portion of their sentence likewise committed major violations. Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States and Annual
Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the UnitedStates Courts: 1965, 138. See also Mandel et al., Recidivism Studied
and Defined, 56 J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 59 (1965) (within five
years of release 62.33% of sample had committed offenses placing
them in recidivist category).

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.
436

WHITE, J., dissenting.

or in the absence of their enforcement, there would be no
increase in crime. Arguments of this nature are notborne out by any kind of reliable evidence that I haveseen to this date.
Thirdly, the law concerns itself with those whom it
has confined. The hope and aim of modern penology,
fortunately, is as soon as possible to return the convict
to society a better and more law-abiding man than when
he left. Sometimes thete is success, sometimes failure.
But at least the effort is made, and it should be made to
the very maximum extent of our present and futurecapabilities.
The rule announced today will measurably weaken theability of the criminal law. to perform these tasks. It
is a deliberate calculus to prevent interrogations, to reduce the incidence of confessions and pleas of guilty andto increase the number of trials.' Criminal trials, no
Eighty-eight federal district courts (excluding the District Court
for the District of Columbia.) disposed of the cases of 33,381 criminal defendants in 1964. Only 12.5% of those cases were actuallytried. Of the remaining cases, 89.9% were terminated by convictions upon pleas of guilty and 10.1% were dismissed. Stated differently, approximately 90% of all convictions resulted from guilty
pleas. Federal Offenderg: 1964, supra, note 4, 3-6. In the District
Court for the District of Columbia a higher percentage, 27%, went
to trial, and the defendant pleaded guilty in approximately 78%
of the cases terminated prior to trial. Id., at 58-59. No reliable
statistics are available concerning the percentage of cases in which
guilty pleas are induced because of the existence of a confession orof physical evidence unearthed as a result of a confession. Un.
substantial.
doubtedly the number of such cases is
Perhaps of equal significance is 'the number of instances of known
crimes which are not solved. In 1964, only 388,946, or 23.9% of
1,626,574 serious known offenses were cleared. The clearance rate
ranged from 89.8% for homicides to 18.7% for larceny. FBI, Uniform Crime Reports-1964, 20-22, 101. Those who would replaceinterrogation as an investigatorial tool by modem scientific investigation techniques significantly overestimate the effectiveness of present
procedures, even when interrogation is iniluded.

542 'OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
WHITE, J., dissenting.

384 U.S.

matter how efficient the police are, are not sure bets forthe prosecution, nor should they be if the evidence is notforthcoming. Under the present law, the prosecution
fails to prove its case in about 30% of the criminal cases
actually tried in the federal courts. See Federal Offenders: 1964, suprd, note 4, at 6 (Table 4), 59 (Table 1);
Federal Offenders: 1963, supra, note 4, at 5 (Table 3);
District of Columbia Offenders: '1913, supra, note 4,
at 2 (Table 1). But it is something else again to remove
from the ordinary criminal case all those confessions
which heretofore have been held to be free: and voluntary acts of the accused and to thus establish a new constitutional barrier to the ascertainment of truth by the
judicial process. There is, in my view, every reason tobelieve that a good many criminal defendants who otherwise would have been convicted on what this Court has
previously thought to be the most satisfactory kind ofevidence will now, under this new version of the Fifth
Amendment, either not be tried at all or will be acquitted
if the State's evidence, minus the confession, is put to thetest of litigation.
I have no desire whatsoever to share the responsibility
for any such ihpact on the present criminal process.
In some unknown number of cases the Court's rule
will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the-streets and to the environment which produced him, torepeat his crime whenever it pleases him. As a conse-quence, there will not be a gain, but a loss, in humandignity. The real concern is not the unfortunate consequences of this new decision on the criminal law as an
abstract, disembodied series of authoritative proscriptions, but the impact on those who rely on the publicauthority for protection and who without it can only
engage-in violent self-help with guns, knives and thehelp of their neighbors similarly inclined. There is, ofMIRANDA v. ARIZONA.436

WHITE, J., dissenting.

course, a saving factor: the next victims are uncertain,
unnamed and unrepresented in this case.
Nor can this decision do other than have a corrosive
effect on- the criminal law as an effective device to prevent crime. A major component in its effectiveness inthis regard is its swift and sure enforcement. The easier
it is to get away with rape and murder, the less the deterrent effect on those who are inclined to -attempt it.
This is still good common sense. If it were not, weshould posthaste liquidate the whole law enforcement
establishment as a useless, misguided effort to control
human conduct.
And what about the accused who has confessed orwould confess in response to simple, noncoercive questioning and whose guilt could not otherwise be proved?
Is it so clear that release is the best thing for him inevery case? Has it so unquestionably been resolved thatin each and every case it would be better for him not to
confess and to return to his environment with no attemptwhatsoever to help him? I think not. It may well bethat in many cases it will be no less than a callous disregard for his own welfare as well as for the interests of
his next victim.
There is another aspect to the effect of the Court'srule on the person whom the police have arrested on
probable cause. The fact is that he may not be guilty
at all and may be able to extricate himself quickly andsimply if he were told the circumstances of his arrest andwere asked to explain. This effort, and his release, must
now await the hiring of a lawyer or his appointment by
the court, consultation with counsel and then a session
with the police or the prosecutor. Similarly, where probable cause exists to arrest several suspects, as where thebody of the victim is discovered in a house having several
residents, compare Johnson v. State, 238 Md. 140, 207 A.
2d 643 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 1013, it will often

544

OCTOBER TERM, 1965.
WHITE, J., dissenting.

384 U. S.

be true that a suspect may be cleared only through theresults of interrogation of other suspects. Here too therelease of the innocent may be delayed by the Court's
rule.
Much of the trouble with the Court's new rule is that
it will operate indiscriminately in all criminal cases,
regardless of the severity of the crime or the circumstances inv6lved. It applies to every defendant, whether
the professional criminal or one committing a crime of
momentary passion who is not part and. parcel of organized crime. It will slow down the investigation andthe apprehension of confederates in those cases wheretime is of the essence, such as kidnapping, see Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 183 (Jackson, J., dissenting); People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 446, 398 P.
2d 753, 759 (1965), those involving the national security, see United' States v. Drummond, 354 F. 2d 132,
147 (C. A. 2d Cir.- 1965) (en banc) (espionage case),pet. for cert. pending, No. 1203, Misc., 0. T. 1965; cf.
Gessner v. United States, 354 F. 2d 726, 730, n. 10(C. A. 10th Cir. 1965) (upholding, in espionage case,trial ruling that Government need not submit classified
portions of interrogation transcript), and some of those
involving organized crime. In the latter context the lawyer who arrives may also be the lawyer for the defendant's
colleagues and can be relied upon to insure that no breachof, the organization's security takes place even though
the accusedmay feel that the best thing he can do is tocooperate.
At the same time, the Court's per se approach may not
be justified on the ground that it provides a "bright line"
permitting the authorities to judge in advance whether
interrogation may safely be.pursued without jeopardiz•ing the admissibility of any information obtained -as aconsequence. Nor can it be claimed that judicial timeand effort,. assuming that is a relevant consideration,

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA.436

WHITE, J., dissenting.

will be conserved because of the ease of application of
the new rule. Today's decision leaves open such questions as whether the accused was in custody, whether
his statements were spontaneous or the product of interrogation, whether the accused has effectively waived his
rights, and whether nontestimonial evidence introduced
at trial is the fruit of statements made during a prohibited interrogation, all of which are certain to prove
productive of uncertainty during investigation and litigation during prosecution. For all these reasons, if further restrictions on police interrogation are desirable atthis time, a' more flexible approach makes -much more
sense than the Court's constitutional straitjacket which
forecloses more discriminating treatment by legislative
or rule-making pronouncements.
Applying the traditional standards to the cases before
the Court, I would hold these confessions voluntary. I
would therefore affirm in Nos. 759, 760, and 761, andreverse in No. 584.