5‑1

5 Cyber Security

Summary of Cyber Security Activities
at the Tokyo 2020 Games
SAKA Akira

IBAYASHI Hiroaki

The Olympic and Paralympic Games are the focus of worldwide attention and are subject to a wide variety of cyberattacks at every Games On the other hand the increasing use of various IT technologies such as the expansion of cloudcomputing environments is progressing year by year making it difficult to control cyber security risks This article
introduce how Cyber Security Team of the Organising Committee managed the cyber security risks for the entire system
related to the Olympic and Paralympic Games Tokyo 2020 including the environment of the Games officials and how thegovernment and related parties contribute to the future legacy of the Games for Japan
Keywords：Tokyo 2020 Games Cyber attacks Security governance1．Foreword

security measures to be an important issue since its
establishment it formed the Cyber Security Depart-

The Olympic and Paralympic Games Tokyo 2020

ment an independent division with dedicated members(hereinafter referred to as “Tokyo 2020 Games”) had toand established the Security Operation Centre (SOC)be held without spectators at most venues due to theheaded by the CISO which coordinates the various

effects of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‑19)

bureaus of the Organising Committee across the board

HoweverIn this and following articles the Cyber Security

as announced by the IOC (International

Olympic Committee)

3 05 billion unique viewers

worldwide watched the Games on TV and digital

Department and SOC are referred to as the Cyber
Security Team

platforms and new technologies and digital innovations

As attack methods become more sophisticated andenabled more fans to “interact” with the games The

their objectives more diverse and attackers are said toGame was the most engaged Game to date (1) Cyberbe dominantsecurity was indispensable for the Games to be held withactivities in order to protect systems and ensure theparticipation from all over the world via digital platforms

success of the Games As a challenge for the Tokyo 2020in the COVID‑19 There were many cyber attacks forGames

the past games which could affect the operations andappropriate risk controls with proper understanding of

the Tokyo 2020 Games got a total of 450 million security

the characteristics of the Games and on the construction

events and blocked them during the Gamesand maturation of the system operation for these risk

The Organising Committee had considered cyber

it is important to surpass attackersʼ

we had worked on the implementation ofcontrols This article and this special issue “5‑2 Cyber
Security Governance of the Tokyo 2020 Games” (2) “5‑3Solutions for Cyber Security Challenges of the Tokyo

SAKA Akira
The Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic GamesIBAYASHI Hiroaki
The Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games

2020 Games” (3) “5‑4 Cyber Security Operations for the

The Journal of The Institute of Electronics Information and Communication Engineers Vol 105 No 8 Supplement pp 249‑253 August 2022

Attacks during the Tokyo 2020 Games” (5) will introduce© 2022 The Institute of Electronics Information and Communication Engineers

Tokyo 2020 Games” (4) and “5‑5 Responding to Cyberthe approach of how the Cyber Security Team thoughtSpecial Issue : Technology and Innovation in the Olympic and Paralympic Games Tokyo 2020249

about prepared for and organized the system
In addition a list of terms used in the chapter five (5‑1
to 5‑9) of this special issue and their explanations areprovided after this article (page …) for your reference

3．Approach to the Tokyo 2020 Games
Based on these threats we the Cyber Security Teamdecided approaches to security measures
First we clarified the targets to be protected There

when reading the chapters 5

were very large and diverse targets including the

2．Cyber Threats to the Games
Before introducing our efforts we introduce the cyberthreats related to the Games

environment managed by the Organising Committee
which was the core of the Games operations

theenvironment of partners and suppliers related to theGames operations and the critical infrastructure envi-

First cyber crimes targeting economic interests areronment that supported the Games It was necessary tomentioned Fake tickets unauthorized websites selling

clarify who protect where and how to ensure that all

related goods phishing through fake websites andenvironments were protected properly in each of theseinformation theft through fake access points had beenenvironments Second we thoroughly established gover-frequently observed in the past Games The Organisingnance system to ensure that security measures were

Committee could not ignore these activities so it had to

implemented without fail and that a quick response forconstantly gather information and take action as soon as

the incidents were enabled at the Games time

it found them In addition targeted ransomware attacks

For the environment managed by the Organising

became active in 2020 requiring thorough protection

Committee which was the core of the Games operation

including the supply chain as well

we analyzed threats and selected various security

Another example is the obstructive activities for thesolutions that utilized advanced technologies to prevent

purpose of political propaganda In the past most ofadvanced attacks Furthermore we established security

these attacks were access interference and falsification

operation team early and trained them to maximize thefor the official websites of the Games sponsors hostuse of the solutions and matured the operational quality

cities and other related organizations However as

through practical exercises and daily incident response

attack methods have become more sophisticated they

to the wide variety of incidents The following is ahave changed and evolved to include system and datasummary of these efforts

destruction through intrusion and hijacking of Gamessystems as was the case at the PyeongChang 2018

31

Games

there is an

To protect the Games from cyber attacks not only theincreasing number of methods that target the supply

systems built by the Organising Committee but also thechain first compromising the systems of parties andenvironment of the related parties and the criticalthen using them as foothold to attack the main systems

infrastructure supporting the Games must be compre-

To protect the systems from these attacks zero trust

hensively protected The Organising Committee itself

designs and thorough protections that include thewas a large organization consisting of a total of 52 Games

Organising Committeeʼs systems and related criticalmanagement functions and the systems used by each of

infrastructure environments are demanded

these functions were becoming increasingly complex due

In terms of intrusion routes

Thorough GovernanceIn addition to the above attention must also be paid toto the diverse use of IT such as cloud computing

attacks on new technologies introduced in recent Games

environments So penetration of security were verysuch as those aimed at tampering with IoT devices

important In addition as attacks became more sophisti-(drones robots facial recognition surveillance cam-

cated countermeasures based on the zero‑trust secur-

eras etc ) The methods and objectives of attacks are

ity design became essential for a wide range of targets

constantly changing and various new types of attacks

without omission To address this issue the Cybersuch as Emotet and PetitPotam were launched during

Security Team had developed a number of security

the preparation period for the Games It is essential forpolicies and standards to ensure a certain level of

security operations to keep up with new risks andsecurity quality Furthermore the team had establishedcontinuously add appropriate countermeasures

a governance structure to ensure that security measures
were implemented without omissions by making application of security policies and standards mandatory at

250

THE JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE OF ELECTRONICS INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ENGINEERS

various phases of system development and by providing

The details of this policy are introduced in this special

security checks and security reviews to confirm theirissue “5‑3 Solutions for Cyber Security Challenges of theapplication status Details are presented in this special

Tokyo 2020 Games” (3)issue “5‑2 Cyber Security Governance of the Tokyo 2020
Games” (2)33

Maturity of Security Operations

Security solutions are not meaningful if they are32

Selection of Security Solutions

merely implemented It is also essential to set up a

The environment managed by the Organising Com-mechanism to appropriately coordinate each solution

mittee which is central to the operation of the Games

optimize the settings to maximize the performance of

had a special and complex configuration there were 4

each solution and mature the operation team to masterdomains known as Backoffice Network (hereinafter

the use of each solution

referred to as “BON”) used by the Organising Committee members for their work

As a mechanism to link solutions we had utilized

Competition Network

SIEM and other means and set up the environment that

(hereinafter referred to as “CPN”) connecting the

could detect the signs of the attack immediately ThisvenuesOlympic Technology Network (hereinafter

enabled real‑time monitoring and visualization of risks

referred to as “OTN”) that accommodated various

and cyber attacks and also enabled prompt response toservices such as the dedicated VLANs of the people

any incidents that might occur during the Games In

involved in the Games and a group of Web sites locatedaddition an operational infrastructure was created toon the Internet Based on the characteristics of eachenable the smooth deployment of IoC (Indicator of

domain optimal security solutions were selected andCompromise) obtained from the partner organizations to

implemented

operation teams

In the BON and CPN domains important systems

In order to mature the operation team we improved

directly related to the Games operation were located andthe technical capabilities of team and sophisticated ourmany PCs of related parties were connected Therefore

security solutions through a combination of actual

many solutions were implemented from the viewpoint ofoperations and practical exercises during the Pre‑Gamessophisticated communication control inside the network

periodand defense in depth design In addition to them basedphishing campaign targeting Games officials occurred inon the zero‑trust approach we implemented thoroughJanuary 2020 which was a preparatory activity of the

One example of the actual operations is aauthority hierarchization and minimization systematic

attackers

blocking of attacker behavior and malicious operations

reaffirming the effectiveness of the solutions imple-

installing EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) andmented and reaffirming the awareness of the operation

NDR (Network Detection and Response) to detectteam for the Games It was important to be aware that

suspicious behavior and SIEM (Security Information

attack methods are constantly becoming more sophisti-

and Event Management) to correlate and analyze thosecated and brushed up the security measures andlogs

operations of the Games operating environment by

This was a very useful experience inIn the OTN the balance between convenience andkeeping up with global incident cases and the latest

security was necessary because various devices brought

attack methods The breaches of enterprises and cloudin by the parties concerned

service providers were often reported By learning from

For the network we adopted a blocking list method

such incidents and repeatedly evaluating how eachthat blocks known malicious communications rather

solution would react to a similar attack on the Organisingthan a permission list method that allows the minimum

Committee and whether the current configuration would

necessary communications For endpoints we focused

be sufficient to protect us we were able to improve ouron promptly detection and response rather thanability to detect new threats and keep the risk underblocking

control By repeating these evaluations we improved

For the Web site domain we adopted a policy of

our ability to detect new threats and kept controllingensuring uniform security by utilizing a CDN (Content

risks In addition we used practical exercises to mature

Delivery Network) and its optional functions such as

the system for events that would not occur on a daily

WAF (Web Application Firewall) while each site would

operation Cyber war games were conducted to simulate

implement security measures tailored to its own needs

possible attacks on the Tokyo 2020 IT systems during

Special Issue : Technology and Innovation in the Olympic and Paralympic Games Tokyo 2020251

the Games disaster recovery exercises were conductedpromoted maturity of security operations

to confirm recovery procedures under the assumption of

Although there was a seven‑year preparation perioda large‑scale failure and technology rehearsals were

between the establishment of the Cyber Security

conducted to simulate actual Games operations throughDepartment and the Tokyo 2020 Games the time andvarious scenarios The participants were able to confirm

resources were always limited due to cost constraints

their preparedness for a large‑scale security incident

Even in such a situation the success of the Games was

At Tokyo 2020 Games 450 million security eventsfrom external network were detected

due to the fact that we aimed to control cyber security

but theserisks within the expected range developed a threat

preparations enabled us to successfully protect the

information sharing structure over the extensive ICTGames environment Details are presented in this special

environment for the Games constantly addressed theissue “5‑4 Cyber Security Operations for the Tokyo 2020

early signs of attack and made maximum preparations

Games”(4)and “5‑5 Responding to Cyber Attacks during

to surpass the attackers who evolve every day

the Tokyo 2020 Games” (5)5．Japanʼs Efforts and Legacy
4．Review of the Tokyo 2020 GamesThe IOC took an unprecedentedly high level of

The Cyber Security Team prepared utmost for theinterest in cybersecurity and provided a variety ofcyber threats and approached the Games with minimal

support in response to concerns that the systems of theassumed risks through thorough governance implemen-

Organising Committee and partner companies weretation of optimal solutions based on the characteristics of

disrupted at the PyeongChang 2018 Winter Games This

the Games environment and efforts to enhance opera-

includes Cyber Assurance Programme which covered

tional maturity

the domains that were assessed due to their criticality to

During the Games various events occurred including

the delivery of the Games such as Energy CATV

website attacks receipt of suspicious e‑mails zero‑day

Website/Mobile App

vulnerabilities

Transportation IoT and Autonomous vehicles

large numbers of login attempt toOrganising Committee staff accounts

suspicion ofrelated organizationʼs account breaches

In 2013OMS/ODS

Omega Systems

the Japanese Government also held thesuspicious“Liaison Conference of the Ministries and Agencies

websites distributing competition recordings websites

concerned with the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic

selling counterfeit goods and the publication of entranceGames” (Note 1)

websites leading to suspicious websites However we

Secretary (Administrative Affairs) and in 2015 thewere able to successfully complete the Games without“The Headquarters for the Tokyo 2020 Olympic andany incidents that would have affected the operation of

Paralympic Games” (Note 2) chaired by the Prime Ministerit

was established In 2014 a Security Executive CommitThe biggest success factor was the early establish-

chaired by the Deputy Chief Cabinet

tee chaired by the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary forment of a security governance system and the prepara-

Crisis Management was establishedand a Cybertion based on the zero‑trust design for a wide range of

Security Working Team chaired by the Councillor

environments related to the Games Governance is based

Cabinet Secretariat (Deputy Director General ofon three basic principles : visualization of risks minimi-

NISC (Note 3)) was set up under the Security Executive

zation of uncontrollable risks and elimination of unex-

Committee to ensure cyber security of the Games inpected risks and assurance of business continuity whencooperation with relevant ministries and agencies In

faced with imminent risk In addition to these principles

2017 the Security Information Center was established in

the Cyber Security Team paid close attention toconfirming that what was designed to protect the Gameswas correctly implemented This policy was based on
the fact that the dependencies between systems were
becoming less visible due to the use of cloud environments and other factors which were increasing risks
that could not be controlled This careful confirmation
increased awareness among the parties involved and252(Note 1) Based on the decision of the Chief Cabinet Secretary on
October 11 2013
(Note 2) Basis for establishment is Article 2 of the Act on Special
Measures for the Olympic Games Tokyo 2020 and the Paralympic Games
2020 Tokyo (Act No 33 of 2015)(Note 3) Cabinet Cyber Security Center The English name is National
center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity(Note 4) “Basic Security Strategy for the Tokyo 2020 Games ” Decisionof the Security Executive Committee March 21 2017

THE JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE OF ELECTRONICS INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ENGINEERS

the National Police Agency to provide necessary

be utilized throughout Japan in the future

information to relevant organizations including theOrganising Committee (Note 4) In April 2019 the Cyber
Security Response Coordination Center

which wasReferences
(

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(

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operated by the NISC was established in the Cabinet
Secretariat and it was decided that threats and incidents
related to cybersecurity at the Games would be shared
incident response etc would be carried out in cooperation among the relevant organizations in cooperation
with each other And they conducted the monitoring tohandle incidents for the public infrastructure and related
environment around the Games to cooperate with otherrelated organizations (6) The Cyber Security Response
Coordination Center coordinated support for response toincidents conducted cyber incident response exercises
shared cyber threat informationand provided an

information sharing platform (JISP : Japan cyber‑security Information Sharing Platform)

The Organising

Committee also participated in these efforts

andpromptly shared information with government agencies
security‑related organizations

critical service pro-International Olympic Committee, “Olympic Games Tokyo 2020
watched by more than 300 million people,” December 8, 2021.
https://olympics.com/ioc/news/olympic-games-tokyo-2020-watchedby-more-than-3-billion-people (viewed January 31, 2022)
H. Ibayashi, K. Tamai, M. Onishi, and Y. Nojiri, “5-2 Cyber Security
Governance of the Tokyo2020 Games,” Journal of IEICE, vol. 105, no.
8, supplement, pp. 255-263, Aug. 2022.
K. Tamai, Y. Nojiri, N. Hosoda, and H. Ibayashi, “5-3 Solutions for
Cyber Security Challenges of the Tokyo 2020 Games,” Journal of
IEICE, vol. 105, no. 8, supplement, pp. 264-271, Aug. 2022.
M. Onishi, N. Hosoda, K. Nakanishi, and H. Ibayashi, “5-4 Cyber
Security Operations for the Tokyo 2020 Games,” Journal of IEICE, vol.
105, no. 8, supplement, pp. 272-278, Aug. 2022.
M. Onishi, N. Hosoda, K. Nakanishi, and H. Ibayashi, “5-5 Responding
to Cyber Attacks during the Tokyo 2020 Games,” Journal of IEICE,
vol. 105, no. 8, supplement, pp. 279-284, Aug. 2022.
NISC Tokyo 2020 Group, “Cyber Security Measures for the Tokyo
Games and Future Action Policies.”
https://www.nisc.go.jp/active/2020/index.html (viewed February 2,
2021)“Cyber Security Strategy,” Cabinet Decision on September 28, 2021.
https://www.nisc.go.jp/materials/index.html (viewed February 2,
2022)(Received February 9 2022 ; Revised March 23 2022)

viders sports‑related organizations and others through
JISP(For details

see “3 3 Organising Roles with

Government Agencies” in this special issue “5‑2 Cyber
Security Governance of the Tokyo 2020 Games” (2))
The Cyber Security Strategy approved by the Cabinet
on September 28

2021

describes the efforts of

information sharing and collaboration by the public andprivate sectors in cooperation as part of the framework
development of the National CSIRT (CSIRT/CERT)

SAKA Akira
Akira SAKA joined the National Police
Agency in 1981 He was a visiting fellow at
WCFIA Harvard University and a professor
at Graduate School of Media and Governance
Keio University from 2008 to 2010 He served
as CISO of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic andParalympic Games Organising Committee He
is CISO of the Digital Agency Director of theJapan Cybercrime Center (JC3) and Executive Director of the Public Policy ResearchInstitute (CPP)The strategy aimed to raise the overall level of Japanʼscyber security not only during large‑scale international
events but also during normal times by utilizing theknowledge and know‑how gained from the operational
experience and risk management activities for the
Tokyo 2020 Games It also included the sharing of
knowledge gained from the Tokyo 2020 Games tocontribute to the international community (7) The cyber

IBAYASHI Hiroaki
Hiroaki IBAYASHI has been working in theservice development of cloud and security
businesses at NTT Communications Corporation since 2014 and has been seconded to theTokyo 2020 Organising Committee as the
Director of Cyber Security Department Technology Services Bureau During the Games hewill be responsible for the overall security
operations in the SOC

security measures taken at the Tokyo 2020 Games will㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇

Special Issue : Technology and Innovation in the Olympic and Paralympic Games Tokyo 2020253