Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis
Project:
Direct-acting solenoid valves
2/2 way 6013-*-***, 2/2 way 6027-*-*** and 3/2 way 6014-*-***,
Pilot-operated solenoid valves
2/2 way 0290-*-*** and 2/2 way 5404-*-***,
3/2 way 6518-*-***, 3/2 way and 5/2 way 6519-*-***,
3/2 way and 4/2 way 5470-*-***

Customer:
Bürkert Werke GmbH & Co. KG
Ingelfingen
Germany

Contract No.: Buerkert 19/07-048
Report No.: Buerkert 12/10-097-C R001
Version V4, Revision R1, March 2020
Philipp Hanzik

The document was prepared using best effort. The authors make no warranty of any kind and shall not be liable inany event for incidental or consequential damages in connection with the application of the document.
© All rights on the format of this technical report reserved.

Management summary
This report summarizes the results of the hardware assessment carried out on the solenoid
valves 6013-*-***, 6014-*-***, 6518-*-***, 6519-*-***, 5470-*-***, 0290-*-***, 5404-*-*** and6027-*-***. Table 1 gives an overview of the different versions that belong to the consideredsolenoid valves.
The mechanical assessment consists of a Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostics Analysis(FMEDA). A FMEDA is one of the steps taken to achieve functional safety assessment of adevice per IEC 61508. From the FMEDA, failure rates are determined and consequently the
Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) is calculated for the device. For full assessment purposes all
requirements of IEC 61508 must be considered.
Table 1: Version overview

6013-A-***1

2/2 way threaded port G 1/8" – G 3/8" general purpose compact solenoid valve;when de-energized, normally closed

6014-C-***

3/2 way threaded port G 1/8" – G 1/4" general purpose compact solenoid valve;when de-energized, outlet A pressure relieved (normally closed)

6014-D-***

3/2 way threaded port G 1/8" – G 1/4" general purpose compact solenoid valve;when de-energized, outlet B pressurized (normally open)

6518-C-***

3/2 way solenoid valve; pilot-operated; DN 8 and 9; flow rate: 1300 l/min; G 1/4
port connection; when de-energized, port 2 exhausted

6518-D-***

3/2 way solenoid valve; pilot-operated; DN 8 and 9; flow rate: 1300 l/min; G 1/4
port connection; when de-energized, port 2 pressurized6519-H-***

5/2 way solenoid valve; pilot-operated; DN 8; flow rate: 1300 l/min; G 1/4 port
connection; when de-energized, port 2 pressurized, port 4 exhausted

6519-W-***

5/2 way solenoid valve; pilot-operated; DN 9; flow rate: 1300 l/min; G 1/4 port
connection; when de-energized, port 2 pressurized, port 4 exhausted

6519-W-***

3/2 way and 5/2 way solenoid valve; pilot-operated; DN 6; flow rate: 900 l/min;
NAMUR flange interface

5470-G-***

4/2 multi-way valve; servo-assisted; DN 4; flow rate: 300 l/min; G 1/8 ø 6 mm
port connections

290-A-***

2/2 way valve; Servo-assisted diaphragm valve, DN50, flow rate: 266 l/min;
G1¼ port connections

5404-A-***

2/2 way valve; Servo-assisted piston valve, DN32/40, flow rate: 600 l/min; G 2
port connections

6027-A-***

2/2 way valve; Direct-acting plunger valve, AC19 DN13, flow rate: 66 l/min; G
1/2 port connections

For safety applications only the described valve functions have been considered. All otherpossible valve functions are not covered by this report.
Bürkert Werke GmbH & Co. KG and exida together did a quantitative analysis of the solenoid
valves 6013-*-***, 6014-*-***, 6518-*-***, 6519-*-***, 5470-*-***, 0290-*-***, 5404-*-*** and6027-*-*** to calculate the failure rates using Profile 2 2 of exida‘s component database (see[N2]) for the different mechanical components.
The solenoid valves 6013-*-***, 6014-*-***, 6518-*-***, 6519-*-***, 5470-*-***, 0290-*-***, 5404-*1 *** stands for the different certifications carried out on the considered solenoid valves.
2 See appendix 3 for detailed definitions.

© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik, Albert Gegg

Buerkert 12-10-097-C R001 V4R1.doc; November 22, 2013
Page 2 of 3

*** and 6027-*-*** are considered to be Type A3 elements with a hardware fault tolerance of 0
and can be classified as 2H devices when the listed failure rates are used. When 2H data isused for all of the devices in an element, then the element meets the hardware
architectural constraints up to SIL 2 at HFT=0 for low demand mode applications or SIL 2/ SIL3 at HFT=1 for high and low demand mode applications. If Route 2H is not applicablefor the entire element, the architectural constraints will need to be evaluated per Route 1H.
The following table shows how the above stated requirements are fulfilled under worst-caseassumptions.

3 Type A element:“Non-complex” element (all failure modes are well defined); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of
IEC 61508-2.

© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik, Albert Gegg

Buerkert 12-10-097-C R001 V4R1.doc; November 22, 2013
Page 3 of 3

Table 2: Summary – IEC 61508:2010 failure rates
safe

dangerous

PL 4(calculated according
ISO 13849-1:2015, Table 2)6013-A-***

62 FIT

70 FITe

6014-C-***

62 FIT

70 FITe

6014-D-***

62 FIT

77 FITe6518-C-***

62 FIT

277 FITd6518-D-***

62 FIT

287 FITd6519-H-***

62 FIT425 FITd6519-W-*** (3/2 way)

62 FIT

411 FITd6519-W-*** (5/2 way)

62 FIT

421 FITd5470-G-***

55 FIT

231 FITd290-A-***

52 FIT

87 FITe5404-A-***

87 FIT

66 FITe6027-A-***

40 FIT

54 FITe

The failure rates are valid for the useful life of the solenoid valves 6013-*-***, 6014-*-***,
6518-*-***, 6519-*-***, 5470-*-***, 0290-*-***, 5404-*-*** and 6027-*-*** (see Appendix 2).

4 The Performance Level (PL) is not based on B

© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik, Albert Gegg

10d values or any cyclic tests but is based on dangerous.

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Table of Contents
Management summary .................................................................................................... 2
1

Purpose and Scope ................................................................................................... 7

2

Project management .................................................................................................. 8
2.1 exida............................................................................................................................ 8
2.2 Roles of the parties involved ........................................................................................ 8
2.3 Standards / Literature used .......................................................................................... 8
2.4 Reference documents .................................................................................................. 8
2.4.1 Documentation provided by the customer .......................................................... 8
2.4.2 Documentation generated by exida.com .......................................................... 10

3

Description of the analyzed module ......................................................................... 11
3.1 2/2 way solenoid valve 6013-*-***............................................................................... 11
3.2 3/2 way solenoid valve 6014-*-***............................................................................... 12
3.3 3/2 way solenoid valve 6518-*-*** and 5/2 way solenoid valve 6519-*-***................... 13
3.4 4/2 way solenoid valve 5470-G-*** ............................................................................. 15
3.5 2/2 way Servo-assisted diaphragm valve 0290-A-*** .................................................. 16
3.6 2/2 way Servo-assisted piston valve 5404-A-*** ......................................................... 17
3.7 2/2 way direct-acting plunger valve 6027-A-*** ........................................................... 18

4

Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis ..................................................... 19
4.1 Description of the failure categories ........................................................................... 19
4.2 Methodology – FMEDA, Failure rates ......................................................................... 21
4.2.1 FMEDA ............................................................................................................ 21
4.2.2 Failure rates..................................................................................................... 21
4.2.3 Assumptions .................................................................................................... 22

5

Results ..................................................................................................................... 23
5.1 Air quality failures ....................................................................................................... 23
5.2 2/2 way 6013-A-*** solenoid valve.............................................................................. 24
5.3 3/2 way 6014-C-*** solenoid valve ............................................................................. 25
5.4 3/2 way 6014-D-*** solenoid valve ............................................................................. 26
5.5 3/2 way 6518-C-*** solenoid valve ............................................................................. 27
5.6 3/2 way 6518-D-*** solenoid valve ............................................................................. 28
5.7 5/2 way 6519-H-*** solenoid valve ............................................................................. 29
5.8 NAMUR 6519-W-*** (3/2 way – C) solenoid valve ...................................................... 30
5.9 NAMUR 6519-W-*** (5/2 way – H) solenoid valve ...................................................... 31
5.10 4/2 way 5470-G-*** solenoid valve ............................................................................. 32
5.11 2/2 way Servo-assisted diaphragm valve 0290-A-*** .................................................. 33
5.12 2/2 way Servo-assisted piston valve 5404-A-*** ......................................................... 34
5.13 2/2 way direct-acting plunger valve 6027-A-*** ........................................................... 35

6

Using the FMEDA results......................................................................................... 36
6.1 Example PFDAVG calculation....................................................................................... 36© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

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7

Terms and Definitions .............................................................................................. 38

8

Status of the document ............................................................................................ 39
8.1 Liability ....................................................................................................................... 39
8.2 Releases .................................................................................................................... 39
8.3 Release Signatures .................................................................................................... 39

Appendix 1: Possibilities to reveal dangerous undetected faults during the proof test .. 40
Appendix 2: Impact of lifetime of critical components on the failure rate ....................... 41
Appendix 3: exida Environmental Profiles .................................................................... 42© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

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1 Purpose and Scope
This document shall describe the results of the mechanical assessment carried out on thesolenoid valves 6013-*-***, 6014-*-***, 6518-*-***, 6519-*-***, 5470-*-***, 0290-*-***, 5404-*-***
and 6027-*-***The FMEDA builds the basis for an evaluation whether the described solenoid valves 6013-****, 6014-*-***, 6518-*-***, 6519-*-***, 5470-*-***, 0290-*-***, 5404-*-*** and 6027-*-*** meet the
average Probability of Failure on Demand (PFDAVG) requirements and the architectural
constraints / minimum hardware fault tolerance requirements per IEC 61508. It does notconsider any calculations necessary for proving intrinsic safety.

© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

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2 Project management
2.1 exida
exida is one of the world’s leading product certification and knowledge companies specializing
in automation system safety and availability with over 300 years of cumulative experience infunctional safety. Founded by several of the world’s top reliability and safety experts fromassessment organizations and manufacturers, exida is a global company with offices aroundthe world. exida offers training, coaching, project-oriented consulting services, internet-based
safety engineering tools, detailed product assurance and certification analysis and a collectionof on-line safety and reliability resources. exida maintains a comprehensive failure rate andfailure mode database on process equipment.

2.2 Roles of the parties involved
Bürkert Werke GmbH & Co. KG

Manufacturer of the solenoid valves 6013-*-***, 6014-*-***,
6518-*-***, 6519-*-***, 5470-*-***, 0290-*-***, 5404-*-*** and6027-*-***.

exida

Performed the hardware assessment.

Bürkert Werke GmbH & Co. KG contracted exida in February 2013 with the update of the
FMEDA of the above mentioned devices.

2.3 Standards / Literature used
The services delivered by exida were performed based on the following standards / literature.
[N1]

IEC 61508-2:2010

Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable
Electronic Safety-Related Systems, 2nd edition[N2]

Mechanical Component
Reliability Handbook, 4th
Edition, 2016

exida LLC, Electrical & Mechanical Component
Reliability Handbook, Fourth Edition, 2016 (pending
publication, not publicly available at the time of thisreport)2.4 Reference documents
2.4.1 Documentation provided by the customer[D1]

DS6013-Standard-EU-EN.pdf

Data sheet 6013-*-***[D2]

DS6014-Standard-EU-EN.pdf

Data sheet 6014-*-***[D3]

DS6518-Standard-EU-EN.pdf

Data sheet 6518-*-*** and 6519-*-***[D4]

DS0290-Standard-EU-EN.pdf

Data sheet 0290-*-***[D5]

DS5404-Standard-EU-EN.pdf

Data sheet 5404-*-***[D6]

DS6027-2-way-Comp.-EUEN.pdf

Data sheet 6027-*-***[D7]

US_6519_NAMUR.pdf

Data sheet 6519-*-*** NAMUR[D8]

DS5470-Single-EU-EN.pdf

Data sheet 5470-*-***[D9]

6013-BG01.pdf

Diagram “2/2–Wege–Ventil” 6013 BG01 index G of
22.08.02[D10] 6013 Id. Nr. 142 301.pdf© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

Parts list 6013 material no. 142 301
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[D11] 6014-BG01.pdf

Diagram “3/2–Wege–Ventil” 6014 BG01 index G of
07.03.05[D12] 6014 NC Id. Nr. 126 403.pdf

Parts list 6014 NC material no. 126 403[D13] 6014 NO Id. Nr. 460 624.pdf

Parts list 6014 NO material no. 460 624[D14] 6518-BG01.pdf

Diagram “3/2–Wege–Pneumatikventil” 6518 BG01
index C of 14.08.01[D15] 6518 NC Id. Nr. 139 442.pdf

Parts list 6518 NC material no. 139 442[D16] 6518 NO Id. Nr. 132 462.pdf

Parts list 6518 NO material no. 132 462[D17] 6519-BG01.pdf

Diagram “5/2–Wege–Pneumatikventil” 6519 BG01
index C of 14.08.01[D18] 6519-BG03.pdf

Diagram “3/2– u. 5/2– Pneumatikventil NAMUR
Flanschanschluss” 6519 BG03 index C of 11.09.03[D19] 6519-BM03.pdf

Diagram “3/2– und 5/2–Wege Pneumatikventil NAMUR
Flanschanschluss” 6519 BM03 index C of 24.03.98[D20] 6519 Id. Nr. 456 978.pdf

Parts list 6519 material no. 456 978[D21] 0475-BG01.pdf

Diagram “5/2–Wege–Pneumatikventil” 0475 BG01
index B of 15.05.95[D22] 0475-BG02.pdf

Diagram “3/2–Wege–Pneumatikventil WWC” 0475
BG02 index C of 23.01.96[D23] 0475-BG03.pdf

Diagram “3/2–Wege–Pneumatikventil WWD” 0475
BG02 index B of 15.05.95[D24] 0475-BM04-BG08.pdf

Diagram “3/2– und 5/2–Wege–Pneumatikventil NAMUR
Flanschanschluss” 0475 BM04 of 18.09.95[D25] V013-BG01.pdf

Diagram “Armatur kpl.” V013 BG01 index G of 11.05.99[D26] V014-BG01.pdf

Diagram “Armatur kpl.” V014 BG01 index E of 11.05.99[D27] Zeichnung G1 668 446.pdf

Diagram “Armatur” G1 668 446 of 14.06.05[D28] 5470 Id. Nr. 458352.pdf

Parts list 5470 material no. 458 352[D29] SIL 2 valves 12.01.06.doc

Overview of available certificates for the consideredvalves[D30] MOM_Buerkert_exida_201310-09.pdf

Minutes of Meeting, Version 2.0 of 10.09.2013[D31] Typ_0290_SK04.pdf

Diagarm 0290 Doc. ID: 9000470622; DN32/40; Aug.
2019

[D32] Typ_0290_Stückliste.pdf

Partlist 0290; Doc. ID: 9000471455; Aug. 2019

[D33] Typ_5404_SK04.PDF

Diagram 5404; Doc. ID: 9000469479; Jul. 2019

[D34] Typ_5404_Stückliste.pdf

Partlist 5404; Doc. ID: 9000469492; Jul. 2019

[D35] Typ_6027_SK04.PDF

Diagram 6027; Doc ID. 9000470114; Jul. 2019

[D36] Typ_6027_Stückliste.pdf

Partlist 6027; Doc. ID: 9000470117; Jul. 2019

The list above only means that the referenced documents were provided as basis for the
FMEDA but it does not mean that exida checked the correctness and completeness of these
documents.

© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

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2.4.2 Documentation generated by exida.com[R1]

FMEDA_V8_6013NC_V2R0.efm of 03.04.13[R2]

FMEDA_V8_6014NC_V2R0.efm of 08.04.13[R3]

FMEDA_V8_6014NO_V2R0.efm of 08.04.13[R4]

FMEDA_V8_6518NC_V2R0.efm of 08.04.13[R5]

FMEDA_V8_6518NO_V2R0.efm of 08.04.13[R6]

FMEDA_V8_6519H_V2R0.efm of 08.04.13[R7]

FMEDA_V8_6519W3-2_V2R0.efm of 19.04.13[R8]

FMEDA_V8_6519W5-2_V2R0.efm of 19.04.13[R9]

FMEDA_V8_5470G_V2R0.efm of 25.04.13[R10] FMEDA_V9_0290A_V1R0.xlsx of 05.02.2020[R11] FMEDA_V9_5404A_V1R0.xlsx of 05.02.2020[R12] FMEDA_V9_6027A_V1R0.xlsx of 05.02.2020[R13] 2H Nachweis_R001.zip of 05.03.2020© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

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3 Description of the analyzed module
The solenoid valves 6013-*-***, 6014-*-***, 6518-*-***, 6519-*-***, 5470-*-***,0290-*-***,
5404-*-*** and 6027-*-***, are considered to be Type A elements with a hardware fault toleranceof 0.

3.1 2/2 way solenoid valve 6013-*-***
Circuit function

SymbolA: 2/2-way valve, normally closed

The direct-acting 2/2 way solenoid valves 6013-*-*** are based on a modular concept
comprising three basic elements: Valve body, pushover coil and standard cable plug. The valve
assembly consists of a body to which the armature guide tube containing the plunger, seals andsprings is attached. The coil is pushed over the guide tube and thus isolated from the medium.
The medium is only in contact with the valve internals and body.

Figure 1: Assembly drawing© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

Buerkert 12-10-097-C R001 V4R1.doc; March 05, 2020
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3.2 3/2 way solenoid valve 6014-*-***
Circuit function

SymbolC: 3/2-way valve, when de-energized, outlet A
pressure relieved

D: 3/2-way valve, when de-energized, outlet B
pressurized
The direct-acting 3/2 way solenoid valve 6014-*-*** are based on a modular concept comprising
three basic elements: Valve body, pushover coil and standard cable plug. The valve assembly
consists of a body to which the armature guide tube containing the plunger, seals and springs is
attached. The coil is pushed over the guide tube and thus isolated from the medium. The
medium is only in contact with the valve internals and body.

Figure 2: Assembly drawing© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

Buerkert 12-10-097-C R001 V4R1.doc; March 05, 2020
Page 12 of 42

3.3 3/2 way solenoid valve 6518-*-*** and 5/2 way solenoid valve 6519-*-***
Circuit function

SymbolC: 3/2-way valve, in de-energized position port
2 exhausted

D: 3/2-way valve, in de-energized position port
2 pressurized

H: 5/2-way valve, in de-energized position port
2 pressurized, port 4 exhausted

The pilot-operated 3/2 way solenoid valve 6518-*-*** and 5/2 way solenoid valve 6519-*-***
feature are high switch reliability diaphragm driven seat valves. A compact solenoid valve type
6014 with push-over coil is used as pilot. Types 6518 and 6519 can be used as single valves oras serial blocks.

Figure 3: Assembly drawing 3/2 way solenoid valve 6518-*-***© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

Buerkert 12-10-097-C R001 V4R1.doc; March 05, 2020
Page 13 of 42

Figure 4: Assembly drawing 5/2 way solenoid valve 6519-H-***The Type 6519 NAMUR valve can be operated as a 5/2–way or 3/2–way valve through thevarious mounting positions of the changeover plate on the side.
The NAMUR flange interface allows easy assembly on different pneumatic actuators on the
spot.

Figure 5: Type 6519 NAMUR EEx m© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

Buerkert 12-10-097-C R001 V4R1.doc; March 05, 2020
Page 14 of 42

3.4 4/2 way solenoid valve 5470-G-***
Circuit function

Symbol

G: 4/2-way valve, when de-energized,
pressure inlet port 1 connected to outlet port
2, outlet port 4 exhausted
The solenoid valve 5470-*-***includes high switch reliable diaphragm seat valves as 3/2 and 4/2
way version. The valve consists of three modules, valve body with servo-diaphragm, plungers
and seat seals as well as numerous connection possibilities for the ports.

© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

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Page 15 of 42

3.5 2/2 way Servo-assisted diaphragm valve 0290-A-***
Circuit function

SymbolA: 2/2-way valve, Servo-assisted, normallyclosedThe 0290-*-*** valve is a servo-assisted solenoid valve of the S.EV series. The valve opens
without differential pressure. The opening process is supported by the fixed coupling of thediaphragm to the plunger. In the process, the integrated 'soft-kick' function opens in a mannerthat is gentle on the material. Various diaphragm material combinations are available dependingon the application. The range of housings is rounded off by stainless steel versions. The
solenoid coils are encapsulated with a chemically resistant epoxy. 'Kick and drop' electronics
are molded into all DC versions for reduced electrical power consumption.

Figure 6: Type 0290 assembly drawing© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

Buerkert 12-10-097-C R001 V4R1.doc; March 05, 2020
Page 16 of 42

3.6 2/2 way Servo-assisted piston valve 5404-A-***

Circuit function

SymbolA: 2/2-way valve, Servo-assisted, normallyclosedThe 5404-*-*** valve is a servo-assisted piston valve available in NC and NO versions. A
minimum differential pressure is required for the valve switching function. The solenoid coils are
molded with high-quality epoxy resin.

Figure 7: Type 5405 assembly drawing© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

Buerkert 12-10-097-C R001 V4R1.doc; March 05, 2020
Page 17 of 42

3.7 2/2 way direct-acting plunger valve 6027-A-***

Circuit function
A: 2/2-way valve,closedSymboldirect-acting,normally

Valve 6027-*-*** is a direct-acting plunger valve. The stopper and plunger guide tube arewelded together to enhance pressure resistance and leak-tightness. Various seal material
combinations are available depending on the application. The coils are molded with chemicallyresistant epoxy. An optional sliding ring bearing increases the service life with dry gases.
Special seal technology is used for high-pressure applications

Figure 8: Type 6027 assembly drawing© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

Buerkert 12-10-097-C R001 V4R1.doc; March 05, 2020
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4 Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis
The Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis was done together with Bürkert Werke
GmbH & Co. KG and is documented in [R1] to [R9].

4.1 Description of the failure categories
In order to judge the failure behavior of the solenoid valves 6013-*-***, 6014-*-***, 6518-*-***,
6519-*-*** and 5470-*-***, the following definitions for the failure of the products wereconsidered.
Fail-Safe State

6013-A-***The fail-safe state is defined as the output being closed without
electrically operated (circuit function A).
6014-C-***,
The fail-safe state is defined as the output being closed without
electrically operated (circuit function C).
6014-D-***The fail-safe state is defined as the output being open without
electrically operated (circuit function D).
6518-C-***The fail-safe state is defined as the output being closed without
electrically operated (circuit function C).
6518-D-***The fail-safe state is defined as the output being open without
electrically operated (circuit function D).
6519-H-***The fail-safe state is defined as port 2 being pressurized (1 -> 2),
port 4 being exhausted (4 -> 5) and port 3 being closed without
electrically operated (circuit function H).
6519-W-*** (3/2 way – C)
The fail-safe state is defined as circuit function W (3/2 C) where
port 2 and 4 are exhausted (2,4 -> 5) and port 3 is blocked without
being electrically operated.
6519-W-*** (5/2 way – H)
The fail-safe state is defined as circuit function W (5/2 H) where
port 2 is pressurized (1 -> 2), port 4 is exhausted (4 -> 5) and port
3 is closed without being electrically operated.
5470-G-***The fail-safe state is defined as circuit function G where port 2 ispressurized (1 -> 2) and port 4 is exhausted (4 -> 3) without being
electrically operated.
0290-A-***The fail-safe state is defined as the output being closed without
electrically operated (circuit function A).

© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

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5404-A-***The fail-safe state is defined as the output being closed without
electrically operated (circuit function A).
6027-A-***The fail-safe state is defined as the output being closed without
electrically operated (circuit function A).
Safe

A safe failure (S) is defined as a failure that plays a part in
implementing the safety function that:a) results in the spurious operation of the safety function to put the
EUC (or part thereof) into a safe state or maintain a safe state;or,b) increases the probability of the spurious operation of the safetyfunction to put the EUC (or part thereof) into a safe state or
maintain a safe state.

Dangerous

A dangerous failure (D) is defined as a failure that plays a part in
implementing the safety function that:a) prevents a safety function from operating when required(demand mode) or causes a safety function to fail (continuousmode) such that the EUC is put into a hazardous or potentiallyhazardous state; or,b) decreases the probability that the safety function operates
correctly when required.

Dangerous Undetected

Failure that is dangerous and that is not being diagnosed byinternal or external diagnostics (DU).

Dangerous Detected

Failure that is dangerous but is detected by internal or external
diagnostics (DD). These failures may be converted to the selected
fail-safe state.

No effect

Failure mode of a component that plays a part in implementing thesafety function but is neither a safe failure nor a dangerous failure.
Component that plays no part in implementing the safety function
but is part of the circuit diagram and is listed for completeness.

No part© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

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Page 20 of 42

4.2 Methodology – FMEDA, Failure rates
4.2.1 FMEDAA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a systematic way to identify and evaluate theeffects of different component failure modes, to determine what could eliminate or reduce thechance of failure, and to document the system in consideration.
A FMEDA (Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis) is a FMEA extension. It combines
standard FMEA techniques with extension to identify online diagnostics techniques and thefailure modes relevant to safety instrumented system design. It is a technique recommended togenerate failure rates for each important category (safe detected, safe undetected, dangerous
detected, dangerous undetected) in the safety models. The format for the FMEDA is anextension of the standard FMEA format from MIL STD 1629A, Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis.

4.2.2 Failure rates
The failure rate data used by exida in this FMEDA is from a proprietary mechanical component
failure rate database derived using field failure data from multiple sources and failure data fromvarious databases. The rates were chosen in a way that is appropriate for safety integrity level
verification calculations. The rates were chosen to match operating stress conditions typical of
an industrial field environment similar to profile 2 of exida‘s component database (see [N2]). It is
expected that the actual number of field failures due to random events will be less than thenumber predicted by these failure rates.
For hardware assessment according to IEC 61508 only random equipment failures are ofinterest. It is assumed that the equipment has been properly selected for the application and isadequately commissioned such that early life failures (infant mortality) may be excluded fromthe analysis.
Failures caused by external events however should be considered as random failures.
Examples of such failures are loss of power, physical abuse, or problems due to intermittent
instrument air quality.
The assumption is also made that the equipment is maintained per the requirements of
IEC 61508 or IEC 61511 and therefore a preventative maintenance program is in place toreplace equipment before the end of its “useful life”. Corrosion, erosion, coil burnout etc. areconsidered age related (late life) or systematic failures, provided that materials and technologies
applied are indeed suitable for the application, in all modes of operation.
The user of these numbers is responsible for determining their applicability to any particularenvironment. Accurate plant specific data may be used for this purpose. If a user has datacollected from a good proof test reporting system such as exida SILStatTM that indicates higher
failure rates, the higher numbers shall be used. Some industrial plant sites have high levels ofstress. Under those conditions the failure rate data is adjusted to a higher value to account forthe specific conditions of the plant.

© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

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Page 21 of 42

4.2.3 Assumptions
The following assumptions have been made during the Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic
Analysis of the solenoid valves 6013-*-***, 6014-*-***, 6518-*-***, 6519-*-***, 5470-*-***, 0290-****, 5404-*-*** and 6027-*-***.
•

Failure rates are constant, wear out mechanisms are not included.

•

Propagation of failures is not relevant.

•Sufficient tests are performed prior to shipment to verify the absence of vendor and/or
manufacturing defects that prevent proper operation of specified functionality to productspecifications or cause operation different from the design analyzed.

•

Materials are compatible with process conditions and process fluids.

•

The Mean Time To Restoration (MTTR) after a safe failure is 24 hours.

•

All devices are operated in the low demand mode of operation.

•

External power supply failure rates are not included.

•

Practical fault insertion tests can demonstrate the correctness of the failure effects assumed
during the FMEDAs.

•

Clean medium is applied to the valve.

•

The valves are installed per the manufacturer’s instructions.

•

Only the described versions and circuit functions are used for safety applications.

•

Manual override must not be used for safety applications.

•Clean and dry operating air is used per ANSI/ISA-7.0.01-1996 Quality Standard for
Instrument Air.

© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

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5 Resultstotal consists of the sum of all component failure rates. This means:total = SD + SU + DD + DU
SFF = 1 – DU / total
MTBF = MTTF + MTTR = (1 / (total + no part + no effect)) + 24 h
According to IEC 61508 the architectural constraints of an element must be determined. Thiscan be done by following the 1H approach according to 7.4.4.2 of IEC 61508-2 or the 2H
approach according to 7.4.4.3 of IEC 61508-2.
The 1H approach involves calculating the Safe Failure Fraction for the entire element.
The 2H approach involves assessment of the reliability data for the entire element according to
7.4.4.3.3 of IEC 61508-2.
This assessment supports the 2H approach.
The failure rate data used for this analysis meets the exida criteria for Route 2H, see Section
6.2. Therefore, the direct-acting solenoid valves 6013-*-***, 6014-*-***, 6518-*-***, 6519-*-***,
5470-*-***, 0290-*-***, 5404-*-*** and 6027-*-*** can be classified as 2H devices when the listed
failure rates are used. When 2H data is used for all of the devices in an element, then theelement meets the hardware architectural constraints up to SIL 2 at HFT=0 for low
demand mode applications or SIL 2 / SIL3 at HFT=1 for high and low demand modeapplications. If Route 2H is not applicable for the entire element, the architectural constraints
will need to be evaluated per Route 1H.
As the solenoid valves 6013-*-***, 6014-*-***, 6518-*-***, 6519-*-***, 5470-*-***, 0290-*-***,
5404-*-*** and 6027-*-*** are only one part of an element, the architectural constraints should
be determined for the entire final element.

5.1 Air quality failures
The product failure rates that are displayed in this section are failure rates that reflect thesituation where the device is used with clean filtered air. Additionally, contamination from poor
control air quality may affect the function or air flow in the device. For applications where theseassumptions do not apply, the user must estimate the failure rates due to contaminated air andadd this failure rate to the product failure rates.

© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

Buerkert 12-10-097-C R001 V4R1.doc; March 05, 2020
Page 23 of 42

5.2 2/2 way 6013-A-*** solenoid valve
The FMEDA carried out on the 2/2 way 6013-A-*** solenoid valve leads under the assumptions
described in sections 4.2.3 and 5 to the following failure rates:
Table 3: Summary for 6013-A-*** solenoid valve - IEC 61508:2010 failure rates

Failure category

Failure rate [FIT]Fail Safe Detected (SD)

0

Fail Safe Undetected (SU)

62

Fail Dangerous Detected (DD)

0

Fail Dangerous Undetected (DU)

70

No effect102

No part56

Total failure rate of the safety function (Total)
MTBF© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

132
395 Years

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Page 24 of 42

5.3 3/2 way 6014-C-*** solenoid valve
The FMEDA carried out on the 3/2 way 6014-C-*** solenoid valve leads under the assumptions
described in sections 4.2.3 and 5 to the following failure rates:
Table 4: Summary 6014-C-*** solenoid valve - IEC 61508:2010 failure rates

Failure category

Failure rate [FIT]Fail Safe Detected (SD)

0

Fail Safe Undetected (SU)

62

Fail Dangerous Detected (DD)

0

Fail Dangerous Undetected (DU)

70

No effect102

No part157

Total failure rate of the safety function (Total)
MTBF© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

132
293 Years

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Page 25 of 42

5.4 3/2 way 6014-D-*** solenoid valve
The FMEDA carried out on the 3/2 way 6014-D-*** solenoid valve leads under the assumptions
described in sections 4.2.3 and 5 to the following failure rates:
Table 5: Summary 6014-D-*** solenoid valve - IEC 61508:2010 failure rates

Failure category

Failure rate [FIT]Fail Safe Detected (SD)

0

Fail Safe Undetected (SU)

62

Fail Dangerous Detected (DD)

0

Fail Dangerous Undetected (DU)

77

No effect90

No part156

Total failure rate of the safety function (Total)
MTBF© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

139
299 Years

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5.5 3/2 way 6518-C-*** solenoid valve
The FMEDA carried out on the 3/2 way 6518-C-*** solenoid valve leads under the assumptions
described in sections 4.2.3 and 5 to the following failure rates:
Table 6: Summary 6518-C-*** solenoid valve - IEC 61508:2010 failure rates

Failure category

Failure rate [FIT]Fail Safe Detected (SD)

0

Fail Safe Undetected (SU)

62

Fail Dangerous Detected (DD)

0

Fail Dangerous Undetected (DU)

277

No effect640

No part143

Total failure rate of the safety function (Total)
MTBF© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

339
102 Years

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5.6 3/2 way 6518-D-*** solenoid valve
The FMEDA carried out on the 3/2 way 6518-D-*** solenoid valve leads under the assumptions
described in sections 4.2.3 and 5 to the following failure rates:
Table 7: Summary 6518-D-*** solenoid valve - IEC 61508:2010 failure rates

Failure category

Failure rate [FIT]Fail Safe Detected (SD)

0

Fail Safe Undetected (SU)

62

Fail Dangerous Detected (DD)

0

Fail Dangerous Undetected (DU)

287

No effect673

No part134

Total failure rate of the safety function (Total)
MTBF© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

349
99 Years

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Page 28 of 42

5.7 5/2 way 6519-H-*** solenoid valve
The FMEDA carried out on the 5/2 way 6519-H-*** solenoid valve leads under the assumptions
described in sections 4.2.3 and 5 to the following failure rates:
Table 8: Summary 6519-H-*** solenoid valve - IEC 61508:2010 failure rates

Failure category

Failure rate [FIT]Fail Safe Detected (SD)

0

Fail Safe Undetected (SU)

62

Fail Dangerous Detected (DD)

0

Fail Dangerous Undetected (DU)

425

No effect953

No part134

Total failure rate of the safety function (Total)
MTBF© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

487
73 Years

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Page 29 of 42

5.8 NAMUR 6519-W-*** (3/2 way – C) solenoid valve
The FMEDA carried out on the NAMUR 6519-W-*** (3/2 way – C) solenoid valve leads under
the assumptions described in sections 4.2.3 and 5 to the following failure rates:
Table 9: Summary NAMUR 6519-W-*** (3/2 way – C) solenoid valve- IEC 61508:2010 failure rates

Failure category

Failure rate [FIT]Fail Safe Detected (SD)

0

Fail Safe Undetected (SU)

62

Fail Dangerous Detected (DD)

0

Fail Dangerous Undetected (DU)

411

No effect879

No part133

Total failure rate of the safety function (Total)
MTBF© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

473
77 Years

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5.9 NAMUR 6519-W-*** (5/2 way – H) solenoid valve
The FMEDA carried out on the NAMUR 6519-W-*** (5/2 way – H) solenoid valve leads under
the assumptions described in sections 4.2.3 and 5 to the following failure rates:
Table 10: Summary NAMUR 6519-W-*** (5/2 way – H) solenoid valve - IEC 61508:2010 failure rates

Failure category

Failure rate [FIT]Fail Safe Detected (SD)

0

Fail Safe Undetected (SU)

62

Fail Dangerous Detected (DD)

0

Fail Dangerous Undetected (DU)

421

No effect859

No part133

Total failure rate of the safety function (Total)
MTBF© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

483
77 Years

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5.10 4/2 way 5470-G-*** solenoid valve
The FMEDA carried out on the 4/2 way 5470-G-*** solenoid valve leads under the assumptions
described in sections 4.2.3 and 5 to the following failure rates:
Table 11: Summary 5470-G-*** solenoid valve - IEC 61508:2010 failure rates

Failure category

Failure rate [FIT]Fail Safe Detected (SD)

0

Fail Safe Undetected (SU)

55

Fail Dangerous Detected (DD)

0

Fail Dangerous Undetected (DU)

231

No effect724

No part3

Total failure rate of the safety function (Total)
MTBF© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

286
113 Years

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5.11 2/2 way Servo-assisted diaphragm valve 0290-A-***The FMEDA carried out on the 2/2 way 0290-A-*** solenoid valve leads under the assumptions
described in sections 4.2.3 and 5 to the following failure rates:
Table 12: Summary Servo-assisted diaphragm valve 0290-A-*** - IEC 61508:2010 failure rates

Failure category

Failure rate [FIT]Fail Safe Detected (SD)

0

Fail Safe Undetected (SU)

52

Fail Dangerous Detected (DD)

0

Fail Dangerous Undetected (DU)

87

No effect / No part
Total failure rate of the safety function (Total)
MTBF© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

83
139
517 Years

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5.12 2/2 way Servo-assisted piston valve 5404-A-***The FMEDA carried out on the 2/2 way 5404-A-*** solenoid valve leads under the assumptions
described in sections 4.2.3 and 5 to the following failure rates:
Table 13: Summary Servo-assisted piston valve 5404-A-*** - IEC 61508:2010 failure rates

Failure category

Failure rate [FIT]Fail Safe Detected (SD)

0

Fail Safe Undetected (SU)87

Fail Dangerous Detected (DD)

0

Fail Dangerous Undetected (DU)

66

No effect / No Part
Total failure rate of the safety function (Total)
MTBF© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

183
153
341 Years

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5.13 2/2 way direct-acting plunger valve 6027-A-***The FMEDA carried out on the 2/2 way 6027-A-*** solenoid valve leads under the assumptions
described in sections 4.2.3 and 5 to the following failure rates:
Table 14: Summary direct-acting plunger valve 6027-A-*** - IEC 61508:2010 failure rates

Failure category

Failure rate [FIT]Fail Safe Detected (SD)

0

Fail Safe Undetected (SU)

40

Fail Dangerous Detected (DD)

0

Fail Dangerous Undetected (DU)

54

No effect / No Part
Total failure rate of the safety function (Total)
MTBF© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

210
94
381 Years

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6 Using the FMEDA results
It is the responsibility of the Safety Instrumented Function designer to do calculations for theentire SIF. exida recommends the accurate Markov based exSILentia tool for this purpose.
The following section describes how to apply the results of the FMEDA.

6.1

Example PFDAVG calculation

The following results must be considered in combination with PFDAVG values of other devices ofa Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) in order to determine suitability for a specific Safety
Integrity Level (SIL).
An average Probability of Failure on Demand (PFDAVG) calculation is performed for a single(1oo1) 5/2 way 6519-H-*** solenoid valve with exida's exSILentia tool. The failure rate data
used in this calculation are displayed in section 5.7 (worst-case results). A mission time of 10
years has been assumed, a Mean Time To Restoration of 24 hours and a maintenancecapability of 100%. Table 15 lists the results for different proof test interval considering a proof
test coverage of 99% (see Appendix 1).
Table 15: PFDAVG values
T[Proof] = 1 year

T[Proof] = 2 years

T[Proof] = 5 years

PFDAVG = 2.02E-03

PFDAVG = 3.86E-03

PFDAVG = 9.34E-03

For SIL1 the overall PFDAVG shall be better than 1.00E-01. As the 5/2 way 6519-H-*** solenoid
valve is contributing to the entire safety function it should only consume a certain percentage ofthe allowed range. Assuming 10% of this range as a reasonable budget it should be better thanor equal to 1.00E-02. The calculated PFDAVG values are within the allowed range for SIL 1
according to table 2 of IEC 61508-1 and do fulfill the assumption to not claim more than 10% of
the allowed range, i.e. to be better than or equal to 1.00E-02 for a proof test interval of 1 year.
The resulting PFDAVG graph generated from the exSILentia tool for a proof test of 1 year isdisplayed in Figure 9.

Figure 9: PFDAVG value with proof test interval of 1 year
© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

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Page 36 of 42

6.2 exida Route 2H Criteria
IEC 61508:2010 2nd edition describes the Route 2H alternative to Route 1H architectural
constraints. The standard states:"based on data collected in accordance with published standards (e.g., IEC 60300-3-2: orISO 14224); and, be evaluated according to• the amount of field feedback; and• the exercise of expert judgment; and when needed• the undertake of specific tests,
in order to estimate the average and the uncertainty level (e.g., the 90% confidence interval or
the probability distribution) of each reliability parameter (e.g., failure rate) used in thecalculations."
exida has interpreted this to mean not just a simple 90% confidence level in the uncertainty
analysis, but a high confidence level in the entire data collection process. As IEC 61508:2010
2nd edition does not give detailed criteria for Route 2H, exida has established the following:
1. field unit operational hours of 100,000,000 per each component; and2. a device and all of its components have been installed in the field for one year or more;
and3. operational hours are counted only when the data collection process has been audited
for correctness and completeness; and4. failure definitions, especially "random" versus "systematic" are checked by exida; and5. every component used in an FMEDA meets the above criteria.
This set of requirements© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

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Page 37 of 42

7 Terms and Definitions
FIT

Failure In Time (1x10-9 failures per hour)

FMEDA

Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis

HFT

Hardware Fault Tolerance

Low demand mode

Mode, where the demand interval for operation made on a safety-related
system is greater than twice the proof test interval.

MTTR

Mean Time To Restoration

PFDAVG

Average Probability of Failure on Demand

SFF

Safe Failure Fraction summarizes the fraction of failures, which lead to asafe state and the fraction of failures which will be detected bydiagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action.

SIF

Safety Instrumented Function

SIL

Safety Integrity Level

Type A element“Non-complex” element (all failure modes are well defined); for details
see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2

T[Proof]

Proof Test Interval© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

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8 Status of the document
8.1 Liability
exida prepares FMEDA reports based on methods advocated in International standards. Failure
rates are obtained from a collection of industrial databases. exida accepts no liability
whatsoever for the use of these numbers or for the correctness of the standards on which thegeneral calculation methods are based.
Due to future potential changes in the standards, best available information and best practices,
the current FMEDA results presented in this report may not be fully consistent with results thatwould be presented for the identical product at some future time. As a leader in the functionalsafety market place, exida is actively involved in evolving best practices prior to official releaseof updated standards so that our reports effectively anticipate any known changes. In addition,
most changes are anticipated to be incremental in nature and results reported within theprevious three year period should be sufficient for current usage without significant question.
Most products also tend to undergo incremental changes over time. If an exida FMEDA has notbeen updated within the last three years and the exact results are critical to the SIL verification
you may wish to contact the product vendor to verify the current validity of the results.

8.2 Releases
Version History: V4R1:

Authors:

Added valves 0290-*-***, 5404-*-***, 6027-*-***; Assessmentchanged from route 1H to route 2H; March 2020
V3R2:
Additional valve added, November 22, 2013
V3R1:
Editorial changes; May 2, 2013
V3R0:
Updated according to IEC 61508:2010 2nd edition; May 2, 2013
V2, R1.0: Additional valves added; January 30, 2006
V1, R1.0: Released version; December 9, 2005
V0, R2.0: Internal review comments incorporated; December 5, 2005
V0, R1.0: Initial version; November 11, 2005
Philipp Hanzik

Review:

V0, R1.0: Rachel Amkreutz (exida); December 1, 2005

V0, R2.0: Otto Walch (Bürkert); December 9, 2005
Release status: Released to Bürkert Werke GmbH & Co. KG

8.3 Release Signatures

Philipp Hanzik, Safety Engineer

Dipl.-Ing. (Univ.) Stephan Aschenbrenner, Partner, CEO© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

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Page 39 of 42

Appendix 1: Possibilities to reveal dangerous undetected faults during theproof test
According to section 7.4.5.2 f) of IEC 61508-2 proof tests shall be undertaken to reveal
dangerous faults which are undetected by diagnostic tests.
This means that it is necessary to specify how dangerous undetected faults which have been
noted during the FMEDA can be detected during proof testing.
Appendix 1 shall be considered when writing the safety manual as it contains important safety
related information.
The proof test consists of a full stroke of the solenoid, as described in Table 15.
Table 16 Steps for proof test

Step
1

ActionBypass the safety function and take appropriate action to avoid a false trip.

2

Send a signal to the solenoid to perform a full stroke and verify that this is achieved.

3

Inspect the solenoid for any visible damage or contamination.

4

Remove the bypass and otherwise restore normal operation.

It is assumed that this proof test will detect 99% of possible “du” failures in the device.

© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

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Appendix 2: Impact of lifetime of critical components on the failure rate
According to section 7.4.9.5 of IEC 61508-2, a useful lifetime, based on experience, should beassumed.
Although a constant failure rate is assumed by the probabilistic estimation method (see section
4.2.3) this only applies provided that the useful lifetime of components is not exceeded. Beyond
their useful lifetime, the result of the probabilistic calculation method is meaningless, as theprobability of failure significantly increases with time. The useful lifetime is highly dependent on
the component itself and its operating conditions – temperature in particular (for example,
electrolyte capacitors can be very sensitive).
This assumption of a constant failure rate is based on the bathtub curve, which shows the
typical behavior for electronic components. Therefore, it is obvious that the PFDAVG calculationis only valid for components which have this constant domain and that the validity of thecalculation is limited to the useful lifetime of each component.
It is assumed that early failures are detected to a huge percentage during the installation period
and therefore the assumption of a constant failure rate during the useful lifetime is valid.
Based on general field failure data, a useful life period of approximately 10 to 15 years or longer
is expected for the valves.
When plant experience indicates a shorter useful lifetime than indicated in this appendix, thenumber based on plant experience should be used.
Major factors influencing useful life are the air quality, ambient temperature and the air
circulation around the solenoid.
It is the responsibility of the end user to maintain and operate the valves per manufacturer’s
instructions. Furthermore, regular inspection should show that all components are clean andfree from damage.
If the assessed solenoid valves are used with clean air in an ambient with air circulation (draftair) and an ambient temperature average of 40ºC, then a lifetime of 10 years is expected.

© exida.com GmbH
Philipp Hanzik

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Appendix 3: exida Environmental Profiles
exida Profile

1

2

3

4

5

6

Description(Electrical)

Cabinetmounted/ClimateControlled

Low Power
Field
MountedGeneralField
MountedSubseaOffshore

N/A

no selfheating
GeneralField
Mountedself-heating
GeneralField
MountedSubseaOffshore

Process
WettedC3
also
applicablefor D1

C3
also
applicablefor D1

N/A

C3
also
applicablefor D1

N/A

30°C

25°C

25°C

5°C

25°C

25°C

60°C

30°C

45°C

5°C

45°C

Process
Fluid
Temp.

5°C

25°C

25°C

0°C

25°C

N/A

5°C

40°C

40°C

2°C

40°C

N/A

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0-95% NonCondensing
10 g
2g

0-100%
Condensing
15 g
3g

0-100%
Condensing
15 g
3g

0-100%
Condensing
15 g
3g

0-100%
Condensing
15 g
3g

G2

G3

G3

G3

G3

0.5 kV
1 kV

0.5 kV
1 kV

0.5 kV
1 kV

0.5 kV
1 kV

0.5 kV
1 kV

10V /m
3V/m
1V/m
6kV

10V /m
3V/m
1V/m
6kV

10V /m
3V/m
1V/m
6kV

10V /m
3V/m
1V/m
6kV

10V /m
3V/m
1V/m
6kV

Description(Mechanical)

IEC 60654-1 Profile

Average Ambient
Temperature
Average Internal
Temperature
Daily Temperature
Excursion (pk-pk)
Seasonal
Temperature
Excursion(winter average vs.
summer average)
Exposed to
Elements/Weather
Conditions
Humidity5
Shock6
Vibration7
ChemicalCorrosion8
Surge9Line-Line
Line-GroundEMI
Susceptibility10
80MHz to 1.4 GHz
1.4 GHz to 2.0 GHz
2.0Ghz to 2.7 GHz
ESD (Air)11

Cabinetmounted/ClimateControlled
B2

N/A
N/A
N/A
Compatible
Material

N/A

N/A
N/A

5

Humidity rating per IEC 60068-2-3
Shock rating per IEC 60068-2-27
7Vibration rating per IEC 60068-2-6
8Chemical Corrosion rating per ISA 71.04
9Surge rating per IEC 61000-4-5
10
EMI Susceptibility rating per IEC 6100-4-3
11
ESD (Air) rating per IEC 61000-4-2
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