Georgetown University
Volume 7 • Issue 1

Winter 2010

A Publication of the Center for

Defeatingthe Demagogue

In This Issue

Foreign Policyin the Obama
Administration
2 Message from the Director
By Barak Hoffman
3 The United States and Mexico:
Prospects for Convergence on
Critical Issues During the
Obama Administration
By Brandon Valeriano
5 What is the Future
for Democracy Promotion?
By Jack Santucci

23 Call for Submissions

Book Reviews

Democracy and Civil Society

By Michael Signer
Return of the Demagogue
emocracy’s ancient archenemy, the demagogue, is alive and well. In
February 2007, Hugo Chávez, President of Venezuela, pushed a billthrough Venezuela’s General Assembly that gave him the right to ruleby decree, creating in essence a fresh new tyranny in the Western Hemisphere. In recent years in Russia, President (and now Prime Minister)
Vladimir Putin has consolidated his power and established a quasi-authoritarianstate, while enormous majorities of Russians have cheered the new autocrat. In Iran,President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad attacks Israel’s right to exist and threatens tocreate a nuclear arsenal, while strengthening the authoritarian rule of the country’s
governing clerical elite. In Zimbabwe in 2008, President Robert Mugabe refused toallow a democratically elected opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, to take office,employing violence to turn back his supporters. In Bolivia in 2005, President Evo
Morales led violent riots in the streets before winning election as that country’s
first indigenous president. In Gaza, the terrorist group Hamas [Continued, Page 20]

Promoting Democracy in Egypt
By Dina Guirguis

8		 America and the World
by Zbigniew Brzezinski and
Brent Scowcroft
9		 Follies of Power: America’s Unipolar
Fantasy by David P. Calleo
10		 Great Powers: America and the World
After Bush by Thomas P.M. Barnett
12		 The Limits of Power by Andrew
Bacevich13		 After Bush: The Case for Continuity
in American Foreign Policy by
Timothy J. Lynch and Robert S.
Singh14		 The End of Alliances by Rajan
Menon

E

ven though President Obama’s
historic speech in Cairo last June
was widely perceived as a “homerun,” the sections of the speech on democracy were riddled with ambiguity
and ambivalence. It left many people
wondering what, practically speaking,the fate of democracy promotion under
the current administration would be,particularly in Egypt. Until the speech,
little more than silence had come publicly from the Obama administrationon the issue of democracy promotionin the Middle East, which led many
to believe that the failures of the Bushadministration in this regard had definitively closed that door for a while.
In fact, the few early signs that camefrom the administration indicated aconspicuous attempt to undo Bush’s
democracy promotion efforts and tore-establish strong diplomatic ties with
U.S. “allies” in the region around the 3D’s: development, defense, and diplomacy. This new policy of “pragmatism”
was underscored when Obama contacted Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
on the first day of his presidency toconsult on the Arab-Israeli conflict, as
well as by Secretary of State Clinton’s
remarks during a March visit to Egypt
mentioning her friendship with the
Mubaraks and downplaying the country’s serious human rights violations.
Despite this seeming retreat, some activists continued to hope, counting on
President Obama’s personal experience
as a community [Continued, Page 16]

From the Director

Barak Hoffman

Foreign Policyin the Obama
Administration
The Obama administration inherited a number offoreign policy crises. In the near term, the administration must address the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,
Iran’s determination to develop nuclear power, and a
global recession. Beyond these exigent concerns, theadministration faces a diverse range of foreign policy
challenges, such as climate change, terrorism, and settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. All of this is taking
place in a context where U.S. power is in relative decline
and other powers, primarily China, are rising. While
the administration may have been looking forward
to developing a new foreign policy vision, the urgent
issues the administration must address are likely toconstrain these ambitions.
We have thus devoted this issue of Democracy andSociety to foreign policy in the Obama administration.
We have two thematic articles advocating that the
Obama administration redesign democracy assistancestrategies and two papers that urge changes to the
U.S.’s bilateral relationship with Egypt and Mexico.
We also review six new books on foreign policy suggestions for the Obama administration. The rangeof the policies they advocate reflects the number ofchallenges the administration faces, their diversity,and disagreements over the sources of the problem
and solutions to them.

2

Our two papers on democracy assistance strategies
encourage the Obama administration to redesign these
programs. Each paper starts with the same premise,that the Bush administration’s militarization of democracy assistance programs was counterproductive,
but they reach different conclusions. Michael Signer of
the New America Foundation argues that the U.S. mustground democracy assistance programs with the ideathat the people are the guardians of democracy. Signer
maintains that programs focus too much on building

institutions and too little on cultivating democraticvalues. Jack Santucci, alum of the MA in Democracy
and Governance Program and currently at the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, believes
the problem lies elsewhere and thus derives a different
conclusion. Santucci argues that current democracy
assistance programs developed during the peak of
U.S. power and programs reflect that assumption.
Santucci argues that U.S. strategies need to adapt to aworld where the U.S. will face challenges to its global
dominance and where political instability is likely torise, in part, because of it. Santucci argues that the
U.S. must change its democracy assistance policies toreflect its diminished capacity as a global power andgreater need for allies.
The two country analyses focus on how the Obamaadministration can improve its bilateral relationshipwith two strategically important countries, Egypt and
Mexico. Dina Guirguis, Executive Director of Voices
for a Democratic Egypt, is dismayed that the Obamaadministration has decided to listen to the Government of Egypt, and not the people. She argues this isa short-sighted strategy because while the Egyptian
Government may have succeeded in stamping out
democratic opposition, support for democracy in
Egypt is strong, but currently silent. Guirguis worries
that if the Obama administration sides with the Government of Egypt, not the people, it risks alienating
the Egyptian people from the U.S. and squandering
an opportunity to catalyze democratic reform in the
Middle East. Brandon Valeriano of the University of
Illinois at Chicago urges the Obama administration toreengage with Mexico. Despite sharing a long borderand being the U.S.’s second largest trading partner, theBush administration neglected the country’s importance to the U.S. Since Mexico and the U.S. currently
have similar positions on a number of issues of mutual
importance, primarily drugs, immigration, and terrorism, Valeriano argues now is an opportune time
for the Obama administration to solidify its policies
with Mexico on these vital issues.
Broadly speaking, five of the six books we review argue
that the Obama administration ought to change thedirection of U.S. foreign policy, but differ, to varying
degrees, on the nature of the problem as well as the solution. The varied responses reflect the complex world
the administration faces. Andrew Bacevich, David
Calleo, and Paul Musgrave argue that the U.S. global
military presence is unsustainable. Bacevich suggests
the nature of the problem lies in demands for highlevels of economic consumption. Calleo indentifies the
U.S. desire to be a global super-[Continued, Page 22]

Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil Society

The United States and Mexico:
Prospects for Convergence on Critical Issues
During the Obama Administration
support will be critical to resolving these outstanding foreign
policy problems.

By Brandon Valeriano

A Moment of Opportunity
Since the 9/11 attacks, the foreign policy focus of the UnitedStates has been directed away from regional concerns towards
problems outside the Western Hemisphere. Latin America
has been virtually ignored by recent presidential administrations, and the problem is becoming chronic. While
Columbia gets some attention, relations with our neighborand number two trading partner to the south wither. Whatof U.S. – Mexican relations? What hope is there for progresson critical issues of concern, and what can be achieved byPresident Obama?
This article, based on recent research by Valeriano and Powers (2010) on American and Mexican public perceptions,explains why now is the time to deal with the significant
and pressing problems that occupy U.S. foreign relations
with Mexico. Because public views in both countries areconverging in the realms of terrorism, drug trafficking, andimmigration, the moment is ripe to deal with these issues.
The shift towards democracy, openness, and public consultation on pressing issues within Mexico suggests a momentof opportunity for the Obama administration to engage it.
Since this convergence may only be temporary, failure toengage Mexico immediately will prevent the resolution ofthese pressing issues while engendering anger and continued
frustration because the United States continues to ignore themaintenance of an important international relationship. This
article concludes by suggesting some of the policy options
open to the Obama administration.

The State of Public Perceptions
Despite disagreements over a few major issues like NAFTA
and Iraq that have soured bilateral relations, there is significant agreement between the publics of Mexico and theUnited States over several other important areas. Public
views in both countries converge around the issues of immigration, terrorism, and drug trafficking. In fact the public
and elites in Mexico are more concerned with terrorism
and drug trafficking than are the public and elites in the
United States. People in both the United States and Mexico
are optimistic that the issues of immigration, terrorism, anddrug trafficking can be solved if proper attention is focusedon solutions and international coordination. Recognizing
the linkages among these issues and mobilizing this mutual
Democracy

Perhaps the most important issue is terrorism. Obviously,
for the United States terrorism has been a critical problem
since 9/11. The major focus of U.S. foreign policy has been to
tackle this problem in the Middle East, yet it should equally
look in its own backyard for solutions to security problems.
If the United States is going to achieve domestic security, it
must first achieve secure borders. Achieving secure borders
does not mean simply building walls to keep out Hispanic
immigrants. It means strengthening screening processes atboth borders, fixing port security, and remaining vigilant to
the threat that comes through air traffic. While no terrorists have yet crossed through the southern border, it is stillcritical to ensure security at all points of entry.

Latin America has been virtuallyignored by recent presidential
administrations, and the problem
is becoming chronic.
The Mexican and American publics hold similar and stableviews regarding terrorism. Both groups view terrorism as a
critical threat at levels of 70 to 80 percent. The high level ofconcern among the Mexican public might be surprising, but
one must consider they are neighbors to the biggest terrorist
target in the world and have experienced their own incidents
of domestic terrorism. Since both publics view the issue
as critical, it seems prudent that both states work together
towards intelligence sharing and stable borders.
This takes us to our next issue: immigration. U.S. perceptions focus on immigration as a critical internal problem,
but it is also a major concern for Mexico. A slight majorityof Mexicans believe that the problem of immigration into
the United States is a predicament that the Mexican statemust deal with, not the United States. Mexicans only accountfor approximately 30 percent of incoming immigrants; asubstantial number of those who come through the U.S.’ssouthern border crossed through Mexico from other nations.
Consequently, Mexico has many of the same immigration
problems as the United States. Instead of playing the blame
game, public convergence on this issue indicates the twoSociety Volume 7 • Issue 1

Winter 2010

3

The United States and Mexico • Valeriano

countries should work together to ameliorate this mutuallypressing concern.
The final issue on which both Americans and Mexicans agree
is that drug trafficking, which is related to immigration by
the mutual practice of border smuggling, is a major problem
for their respective countries. As much as 89 percent of the
Mexican public views drug trafficking as a critical threat,
while 63 percent of the American public views the issue asan ‘important’ threat. The ills associated with the practice
are just as evident in Mexico as in the United States, since
Mexico is a major point of transit for illegal drug smuggling
operations. Negative societal effects include rising violence,
corruption, and criminality.

Future Paths and Recommendations
There is an unprecedented opportunity for the reconsideration of strategy in bilateral relations between the UnitedStates and Mexico. Change in both countries allows forthe pursuit of new avenues of cooperation. The shift inforeign policy goals by Obama is evidenced by increasing
consultation, engagement of international institutions, andinternational negotiation. The reinvigorated desire by the
Felipe Calderon administration to solve pressing domestic
issues such as drug trafficking and corruption also creates
the opportunity for change in bilateral relations. Yet, it seems
that pathways to progress are being ignored in favor of focusing on other foreign policy problems. Is there willingness on
the American side to engage and deal with pressing mutual
concerns? Our neighbor to the south is a critical ally in the‘war’ on drugs, immigration, and terrorism, yet little has
been done to press the advantage of public support revealed
by recent opinion polls.
The time is ripe for action. Improvement in bilateral relations is not a hope but a critical need in line with both states’
national interests. The issues of terrorism, immigration, anddrug trafficking remain critical problems on both sides ofthe border. A large proportion of Mexicans are even willingto give the United States some role in border security inexchange for protection against outside threats.

4What specific options can be pursued? Probably the mostpressing and effective option would be to establish a coordinated regional regime to stop or limit drug trafficking inNorth America. While the United States has extended much
effort to tackle the problem in Columbia and other statessuch as Panama, it has done little to deal with the issue in
Mexico. The United States cannot even seem to coordinate
policy with Canada and Mexico on legal drugs, let alone
illegal ones. The time has come to deal effectively with the
problem on both sides of the border, and a regional security
regime would be an effective measure to deal with coordination and consultation dilemmas.

In combination with a regional regime to tackle the issue ofdrug trafficking, the United States, along with Mexico, shouldseek to deal more effectively with port, air, and land bordersecurity. The focus should not be on economic migrants,
who do not pose a security threat, but on criminal enterprisesthat seek to infiltrate various holes in the border. The mainthreat that comes from the south is organized terrorist anddrug collectives, not families seeking economic opportunity.
Drugs or terrorists are not going to walk across the border;
they are going to come through organized transportation
networks.
A final suggestion is to increase the number of legal immigrants allowed into the United States from all southern countries, to expedite the process of acceptance, and to decrease
costs for these migrants. Eliminating the legal immigration
backlog will remove much of the burden migration places on
Mexican society. Allowing more Mexicans and other Latin
Americans into the United States through legal means would
decrease the profitability of illegal underground operations
by removing the need for their existence. Increasing the flowof migrants through legal methods will mean fewer people
will be stuck in limbo in Mexico and push them to remainin their home countries during the application process. Increasing the number of legal immigrants will also allow forthese new actors to participate legally in American society
and decrease the perception that they are criminals.
A majority of the Mexican public has a positive view of theUnited States. The same cannot be said of the American
public’s and elite’s view of Mexico. Pundits rant night afternight on TV of the ills funneled into the United States from
Mexico. The reality is that the problems are the responsibility of both sides and can only be solved through mutual
cooperation and burden sharing. The politics of blame arestifling the course of bilateral relations between the UnitedStates and Mexico. If the convergence of views on important policy issues is to be taken advantage of, we must takeaction now.
Brandon Valeriano is an Assistant Professor of Political Scienceat the University of Illinois at Chicago, where he focuses much of his
research on issues in international relations, international conflict,and Latin America.
Reference
Valeriano, Brandon and Matthew Powers. Forthcoming 2010. “United Statesand Mexico: Convergence of Public Policy Views in the Post 9/11 World.”
Policy Studies Journal.

Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil Society

What is the Future
for Democracy Promotion?
By Jack Santucci

a legislature, a strong party is a check on the power of anincumbent government. During an election, it offers votersan alternative if they choose to “throw the bums out.”

here are hints of pessimism in the democracy
business. Despite its ostensible centrality to U.S.
foreign policy since 2001, democracy promotion
has not created very many free countries since then. According to Freedom House, the global share of electoral
democracies stopped growing in 2005. Practitioners reportincreasing hostility to their work, and some missions
have had to shut down. Finally, under President Obama,
many see ‘stability promotion’ winning a quiet war overdemocracy assistance.

Civil society programs have similar ends. Some are designed
to build explicitly political organizations. These NGOs aremeant to identify misconduct in the behavior of governments
and parties. Apolitical groups also have ultimately politicalroles as barometers for the effects of public policies.

Introduction

T

What explains the apparent impotence of this industry?
One common answer is that the bravado and hypocrisyof George W. Bush ruined its credibility with the developing world. By equating democratization with war in Iraq,
Bush made a benign project militant. The secret prisonsand torture of a Global War on Terror, moreover, made our
motives suspect.1
I suspect democracy promotion’s observed inﬁrmity results
more from its misapplication. In the very period that U.S.
inﬂuence on other states was declining, we increasingly
worked in more difficult cases. The problem with this becomes stark if we consider the world for which democracy
promotion was designed. We still need democracy promotion, but we need to accept its limits.

The nature and origins of democracy promotion
All governance reform programs ultimately require willfulrotation of government through free elections. While this is
obviously true of democracy promotion, the same applies tocontemporary foreign aid. Both types of programs assume
that governments will tolerate the opposition those programs
engender. This is because those programs were conceived
during the United States’ unipolar moment.

Policy instruments
The instruments of development aid are all designed to foster limited government and electoral accountability. These
include party-building programs traditionally associatedwith groups like the National Democratic and International
Republican Institutes. The dual purpose of a political party
is to be loyal opposition and government-in-waiting. In
Democracy

Programs designed to strengthen legislatures are also inherently oppositional. In presidential systems, the point is toanimate systems of checks-and-balances. In parliamentary
ones, effective support staffs and procedures help loyal oppositions do their work.

Despite its ostensible centrality to U.S.
foreign policy since 2001, democracy
promotion has not created very many
free countries since then.
As technical and apolitical as they would like to be, governance reform practitioners are essentially in the same business as democracy promoters. Bad governance has politicalroots. Poor economic management, patronage in the civil
service, and corrupt public goods provision all can shore
up the political machines of elected offcials. This is why wemake reform a prerequisite for foreign aid disbursements.
For governance programs to work, elected offcials often haveto behave in ways that hurt their re-election prospects.

Ambitions and origins
These policy instruments grew out of — and therefore verymuch reﬂect — America’s unipolar moment. From about
1989 until recently, the United States could influence thebehavior of other governments, their relationships with otherstates, and how they treated the populations they governed.
Aid conditionality and democracy assistance were productsof this period.
Before the fall of the Soviet Union, foreign aid was essentiallya tool of containment. As the superpowers competed forclient states, transfers of wealth shared the same toolbox as
raw coercion, covert operations, and military assistance. The
United States did not really care about democracy or even

Society Volume 7 • Issue 1

Winter 20105

What is the Future for Democracy Promotion? • Santucci

healthy economies. The goal was having a stronger networkof allies than the Soviet Union.
With the end of superpower rivalry, the United States realized it could invest less in foreign countries and attachthat investment to high moral ends. Governments in poor
countries no longer could turn to the Soviets for subsidies.
The Castro government in Cuba, for example, decided thatthe end of the Comecon necessitated a “special period” ofnational austerity. If a leader wanted foreign cash, he now
had to govern the American way.

American capacity to promote
democratic governance…is waning.
At the same time, U.S. need to secure
peace and economic well-being,is rising.
Democracy promotion as we know it grew out of the unipolar moment. Sensing the untenable contradictions instate socialism, U.S. decision-makers set up the National
Endowment for Democracy and its ancillary party institutes.
Francis Fukuyama declared “the end of history,” arguingthe process of dialectical materialism had culminated inliberal democracy. With social evolution having selectedout all other regime types, all that remained was to kill off
the laggards. This was democracy promotion’s theoreticalmooring.
Just as the end of the Comecon strained the Castro regime,
leaders in less tightly controlled societies variously opened
up to democracy programs in return for development aid.
NDI could help Otpor antagonize the ex-communist regime
in Serbia because Slobodan Milosevic’s security apparatus
saw its future in the graces of Western Europe. Egypt grudgingly welcomed foreign reformers. Gone were the days ofSoviet-funded Aswan Dams. In return for American military
assistance, Hosni Mubarak would have to entertain American
democracy agitators.

6

Speaking at the National Endowment for Democracy in
2003, George W. Bush captured the spirit of this moment.
“It is no accident that the rise of so many democracies took
place in a time when the world’s most inﬂuential nation wasitself a democracy.”

U.S. leverage declines
Earlier that year, China launched its ﬁrst manned space
mission, and a heat wave in Europe killed 21,000. On one
hand, emergent sources of wealth and inﬂuence enable autocrats to snub conditioned U.S. assistance. On the other,environmental change portends global instability that theworld’s policeman may not be able to manage. Factors likethese diminish U.S. control of world events.
Poor countries whose leaders do not want to reform can rely
on other powers for economic support. Crackdowns are one
possible outcome of transitional moments, but one must pay
the troops if they are to crack down. A decade ago, Slobodan
Milosevic’s army abandoned him because its well-being lay
with a new regime. In the present, Robert Mugabe has beenable to use Chinese assistance to maintain the allegianceof his security apparatus. More recently, Chinese aid ﬂows
have allowed Fijian military dictator Voreque Bainimarama
to refuse to hold democratic elections, making costless his
country’s expulsion from the Paciﬁc Islands Forum.2
Possibly aware of this limitation, the U.S. government has
slashed aid to Egypt by 60 percent. While military support
remains stable, most of the decrease has been in governanceassistance. The goal here is to keep an ally regardless of
its democratic credentials. This shift of priorities recalls
our Cold War footing: unconcerned about the content ofgovernance so long as it favors U.S. strategic interests. In
Egypt, in other words, the U.S. has backed away from its
unipolar outlook.
While the availability to dictators of relativist patron states
is diminishing American leverage, factors exogenous to thesystem of states may do the same. Here I am thinking ofclimate change, dwindling fossil fuel reserves, and a global
population boom.
Over the course of the next decade, several changes in humanity’s material condition are likely. According to the National Intelligence Council,3 dry areas will become drier,temperate zones warmer and wetter, sea levels higher, andfossil fuel reserves smaller. All this will occur as some countries industrialize, others de-industrialize, populations grow,and technologies evolve. There will be price shocks to oilmarkets as advanced countries replace fossil fuels. Governments in oil-exporting countries will experience sharp
revenue declines. There will be natural disasters in coastal
cities, and atolls will go under water. Increasing numbers
will seek decreasing supplies of drinking water. Looking togovernments to replace what had been plenty, even people
in old democracies like Australia will ﬂee to overcrowding
cities.
In short, many countries will become difficult to govern
if not wholly ungovernable. It is difficult enough to havecorrupt leaders accept electoral defeat. Crises of governancebrought on by environmental disaster will only enhancetheir incentives for predation and violence.

Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil Society

What is the Future for Democracy Promotion? • Santucci

Going forward

What is the strategy, then, for advancing democracy in closed
societies?

Perhaps the question should not be how to adapt democracy
assistance but how to promote stability. In a recent article,4Charles Kupchan and Adam Mount imply that shifts in
the international system mean the United States should
replace the “freedom agenda” with an “autonomy rule” thatappeases states with good-enough records on human rights
and development. When we set aside the question of how
to adjudicate ‘good enough,’ we can extract their core point:needing the good will of rising powers, the United Statesshould stop harassing autocrats and abandon democracy
promotion for its own good.
Their hyperbole undercuts insight. American capacity topromote democratic governance on the frontiers of freedom,
like so many other desirable behaviors by foreign governments, is waning. At the same time, U.S. need to secure peaceand economic well-being, is rising.
Contrary to Kupchan and Mount, however, there is no needto abandon democracy promotion or governance reform.
Many leaders in many countries do want to go down theliberal democratic path.5 Because of that, political parties,
civil societies, watchdog groups, free media, and independent businesses are evolving in those states. To the extent
that these conditions improve, liberal democracies become
more robust.
These are the countries where the unipolarity-inspired
instruments of governance reform and democracy assistance — not democracy promotion — can have an impact.
By doing the same work they have for the last two decades,
NDI and the World Bank can catalyze ongoing democratization processes. What these organizations have to offer
is technical know-how, which is a resource where there aregovernments willing to cooperate.
Controversy over elections in Honduras show that there isa role for this work. Here is a country whose leaders complied with its institutions, whose people saw their value,
and whose democracy was therefore consolidating. Due tothe absence of clear presidential impeachment provisions,however, Honduras and its neighbors disagreed on the legitimacy of elections and, more fundamentally, how to restore
constitutional governance. In this country, attentive technicalassistance might have precluded this impasse.

The nature of the intervention should depend on the obstacle. In states that are failed or failing, the obvious aim
is establishing government. Because stateness is logicallyprior to democracy, it does not make sense to work in theseplaces.
In other places, government is bad, but socioeconomic conditions are worse. Russia and Turkmenistan are two countries where wealth and its sources are too concentrated forany meaningful liberal order to emerge. Here, donors can
support democracy movements by fostering independent
centers of wealth and power in each society.
In a ﬁnal set of states, the socioeconomic conditions forliberal democracy are right or close to being so, but government refuses to liberalize. In these cases, covert activities may
be necessary to link reformers and soft-liners.

Conclusion
Every people must ﬁght its own revolution. Practitioners
have long subscribed to the mantra that “democracy cannot
be transplanted,” but reversals of late have made it palpable.
This does not mean the democracy project is bankrupt. Democracy assistance has always been valuable, but assistanceis not the same thing as democracy promotion. While we
may fail to promote political change in the hard cases, weknow we can support it in others.
Jack Santucci is a 2009 graduate of Georgetown’s Democracy andGovernance program working in international development.
Endnotes
1 Thomas Carothers. 2008. “Does Democracy Promotion Have a Future?”in Democracy and Development. Kit Publishers.
2 Ed Johnson. 2009. “Fiji, Facing Suspension From Pacific Forum, Rejects
Elections,” Bloomberg. May 1.
3 National Intelligence Council. 2008. Global Trends 2025: A Transformed
World.
4 Charles Kupchan and Adam Mount. 2009. “The Autonomy Rule.” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Spring.
5 Thomas Melia. 2008. “Back to the Future: Mobilize the Democratic Faction.” Freedom House.

There is no way, however, for the conventional instruments
to adapt to the challenges of hard cases. They were born of aworld where the preponderance of inﬂuence rested with one
state. That world is gone. The United States simply does nothave the leverage — military, economic, or otherwise — topry open regimes.

Democracy

Society Volume 7 • Issue 1

7Winter 2010

Book Reviews
America and the World by Zbigniew Brzezinski
and Brent Scowcroft


Review by Paula Louise Olearnik

Follies of Power: America’s Unipolar Fantasy
by David P. Calleo

Review by Ally Adams-Alwine

Great Powers: America and the World After
Bush by Thomas P.M. Barnett


Review by Paul Musgrave

The Limits of Power by Andrew Bacevich


Review by Fouad Pervez

After Bush: The Case for Continuity in
American Foreign Policy by Timothy J. Lynch
and Robert S. Singh

Review by Jean Schindler

The End of Alliances by Rajan Menon


America and the World by Zbigniew Brzezinski and
Brent Scowcroft
Review by Paula Louise Olearnik

8America and the World is a formidable
book. It threads together a discussionof the future of U.S. foreign policy withanecdotes from a lifetime of travel andpolitical experience. The reader is a
privileged participant in an unscripted
conversation between two former National Security Advisors, Zbigniew
Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft. Masterfully directed by Washington Post
columnist David Ignatius, the book is organized by regional
discussions bookended by an evaluation of how we got to
our present situation as well as policy prescriptions for theincoming president.
Brzezinski and Scowcroft bring a lifetime of foreign policy
experience to bear on the question of the future of America’s
foreign policy. However, at times it seems the real hero of
the book is David Ignatius. His wonderfully provocative
questions do not allow either of his interlocutors to get

Review by Nicholas Morinaway with pious truisms. Brzezinski and Scowcroft can only
be commended for their measured, optimistic and largely
bi-partisan stance, but at times their gentle optimism is toomuch motivated by a desire to avoid difficult questions. Ignatius pushes them out of their role as distinguished statesmen
and forces the pair to squarely face the threats to American
hegemony. For example, he confronts their optimistic view of
U.S.-China relations, reminding them that raw materials arein finite supply and that the Chinese have proven themselves
to be ruthless in their trade dealings with Iran and othercountries contrary to the wishes of the U.S. He compels
them to provide evidence that China is not on a collisioncourse with the U.S. Brzezinski fires back that the U.S. isalso ruthless and self-interested. He, like Scowcroft, does not
indulge in a romanticised vision of the U.S. in the world, butargues that ruthless competition does not necessarily leadto imperial ambitions. On the contrary, both men make theclaim that a realistic understanding of our ever globalizing
world leads us to understand that rampant imperialism is
not compatible with stable economic growth.
The truth revealed in America and the World is that both
Scowcroft and Brzezinski eschew characterization under oneof the ‘isms’ and if they can be called realists, then they arecertainly not of the structural kind. They take very seriously

Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil Society

Book Reviews

the cultural contexts of the regions in question and realizethat blanket solutions are impossible to implement.

surface of an interesting debate about the human condition,
sustainability and a more universal form of solidarity.

This is not to say that both men are in complete agreement
all of the time. This is most evident in their discussions of
Iraq, Afghanistan and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
They are most sharply divided over how best to carry out
America’s War on Terror. Brzezinski is convinced that theAmerican military presence is only perpetuating instability and that the troops should be withdrawn as soon as issafely possible. Scowcroft, keeping to the Republican position, argues that a premature withdrawal from Iraq and
Afghanistan would only precipitate a bloody grasping for
power between national groups after America’s departurefrom the region.

Moreover given the discussion of cultural dignity, two noticeable absences from the discussion are Africa and Latin
America. It is somewhat disconcerting that in a volume
entitled America and the World there is a complete failure
to discuss two of its most populous continents. More worrying is the suspicion that this omission was not due tolack of space, but lack of concern for these two areas of
the world.

Looking beyond challenges for American policy at the regional level, the two men recognize a need to adapt to thepost-Cold War era. They discuss a new ‘culture of fear’ anda tendency to towards isolationism, which, they warn, will
not serve America well. The paradox of American societyis that it is the most globally engaged but also one of themost parochial. Thus, one of the important roles of the nextpresident, according to Brzezinski, will be to educate theAmerican public about new global realities.

Review by Ally Adams-Alwine

In a variety of different contexts Scowcroft and Brzezinski
distance themselves from the hawkish neo-con method of
conducting foreign policy. They are convinced that America
should not be in the business of imposing its values andstandards on the rest of the world; whether in the form of
democracy or more nebulous concepts such as freedom
and dignity. However, one question to which Ignatius only
alludes, but which requires further examination is whether
authoritarianism can provide peace and prosperity just as
well as democracy. Both men realise that the imposition of
democracy and liberal Western values is not only culturally
insensitive, but in many cases it may even be impossible
since the nation in question’s history, culture and religion
may be completely antithetical to that required by liberal
democracies. However the discussion never attempts toreach a deeper understanding of the limits of democracy.
It does not ask what America might be able to learn fromthe rest of the world.
These shortcomings hint at the books biggest weaknesses,
which are apparent in the discussion of the “politics of cultural dignity” in chapter seven. The chapter’s departure fromthe previous regional discussions is a welcome attempt toengage questions of political theory and the ethical norms
underlying international relations. Its shortcoming, however,is it lacks the level of sophistication found in the discussionsof international politics. Sounding quasi-Hegelian, Brzezinski argues that you have to have a sense that what you aredoing is somehow in tune with the mysterious unravellingof history. Both he and Scowcroft only begin to scratch the
Democracy

Follies of Power: America’s Unipolar Fantasy byDavid P. Calleo

In Follies of Power, author David Calleo
asserts that senior officials guiding U.S.
foreign policy are enamored of a dangerous unipolar fantasy. In this fantasy,
America is the world’s preeminent superpower, whose strength and sovereignty are needed to bring stability to
the international arena. Noting shifts
in the global distribution of power suchas the rise of China and the enlargement of the European Union (EU), Calleo argues that thisworld view is misguided and increasingly dysfunctional ina plural world order. Continuing to pursue a unipolar vision,
he warns, is weakening our ability to respond appropriately
to new threats and emerging challenges, and risks alienating
friends and enemies alike.
The majority of the text is devoted to a systematic deconstruction of America’s unipolar fantasy, in an effort to provethat such a worldview is deeply flawed. Calleo begins by
rejecting the assumption of many U.S. officials that theend of the bipolar Cold War system inevitably meant thata unipolar world led by America would follow. That such a
conclusion was drawn is seen as evidence of an unwavering
belief that American power is limitless and good. Identifying this belief as a source of the hegemonic ambitions andunipolar tendencies in U.S. foreign policy, Calleo analyzes
the nature and extent of American power — hard, soft, economic, and moral. Highlighting numerous examples that fiscal mismanagement and unsustainable policies have shaped
the perceived sources of U.S. strength, such as our legendary
military and a once robust capitalist economy, he finds thispower to be falsely inflated along every dimension.
Calleo goes on to explain that America’s unipolar fantasy
is now actively detrimental to our interests because many
countries, especially our allies in Europe, now favor a multilateral approach to international actions. In a masterfulSociety Volume 7 • Issue 1

Winter 20109

Book Reviews

overview of Western political thought, Calleo outlines theorigins of this divergence. Domestically, most advanced
states adopted by the start of the 20th century constitutionalmodels balancing liberal rights with reasonable security
and improved standards of living due to capitalism-fueled
growth. However, limiting instability within these systems
also required protectionism and neomercantilist policies,
producing a “Hobbesian” view of international relations as
every country fended for itself. Calleo asserts that in forming the European Union (EU), Europe has bridged this gap
between the principles governing states internally and thosethat govern the state system. In contrast, the U.S. continues
to pursue unilateral policies that are incompatible withinternational stability because it has not moved on fromthis Hobbesian focus. Maintaining this world view weakens
the U.S., because other countries view it as illegitimate, andbecause it overstretches our resources. According to Calleo,
efforts to expand American power globally through unilateral policies have also led to an extreme concentration of
power in the federal government at the expense of the states.
While this is not discussed in great detail, the implicationis that, in addition to undermining our interests abroad,our unipolar fantasy also threatens our domestic balanceof power.
Calleo concludes that a multilateral system is needed to manage the challenges of a plural world and suggests an outlineof what the ideal system might look like. He compares the
merits of “Old America” and “New Europe” as potential
models, and posits that the EU offers more useful lessons
because it brings to an interstate system the same constitutionalist theories that have traditionally been used to manage
conflict within states. This creates a regional superstructurethat reduces conflict by maintaining a collaborative balanceof power. Transposing this to a global system, he envisions
a framework that blocks hegemony by any one state, withstrong institutions that encourage cooperation and mutual
appeasement by providing a forum for states to constantly
negotiate their roles and responsibilities within the larger
system.

10

Despite designating the EU as the more successful of theworld’s two great interstate experiments, Calleo warns that
Europe and the U.S. both face challenges which can only beovercome through cooperation. Specifically, he sees each as a
critical force balancing the power of the other both internallyand externally, providing a structure which is currently lacking in the global system. Because they are allies who sharestrong constitutionalist traditions, the U.S. and Europe together can achieve an effective balance through a cooperative
relationship. In the past, America stabilized Europe during
the postwar era, providing the security needed to cooperate and achieve internal unity. Today, Calleo sees an equallyvital role for Europe in balancing the extreme power of the
U.S. federal government to create a stable global system. To
accomplish this, both sides of the West are advised to lookbeyond their postwar experiences to embrace a revitalized
transatlantic relationship.
While Calleo does a fine job of pinpointing specific flawsin America’s unipolar fantasy, his suggestions on how to
overcome this problematic world view lack similar detail andclarity. For example, if Europe and the U.S. have worldviews
as divergent as Calleo seems to suggest, it is unclear what
would motivate either side to “retune their political imaginations” as they are called upon to do. As Calleo himself
points out, America’s past mistakes have not cured us of
our unipolar fantasy. The only suggestion offered for why
the present may be different is a vague hope that the newadministration may create a window of opportunity fora more multilateral world view. Calleo is similarly elusive
in explaining his idea that the EU can balance the internal
political system in the U.S., leaving the reader wishing for
more concrete details on how this could occur.
Follies of Power provides an informative and timely analysisof the forces driving American policies in the international
arena. The idea that the world has changed and that the
U.S. is long overdue for policy reform is not a new one, andcountless other books touch on the forces Calleo discusses
here. What sets Follies of Power apart is Calleo’s rare ability
to combine both breadth and depth of knowledge. Whilethe book itself provides few concrete recommendations, itdoes provide readers with a uniquely holistic understandingof the international arena, and delineates an invaluable listof lessons to inform future policies.
Great Powers: America and the World After Bushby Thomas P.M. Barnett
Review by Paul Musgrave

Thomas P.M. Barnett’s 2004 bestseller
The Pentagon’s New Map was a usefuland entertaining guide to thinking
about geopolitics. Linking the metaphors of the Information Age to thepolitical conflicts of the twenty-first
century, PNM offered a set of metaphors that he hoped would turn Americans away from a view of international
relations that focused on war and testsof strength toward seeing how a broadly liberal and tradeoriented policy could supply the security Americans craved
after September 11, 2001.
Although comfortable with the broad outlines of George W.
Bush’s transformation strategy, Barnett promised a futurethat did not rely on Hail Mary passes, such as the invasionof Iraq, to finally make the world safe for democracy. Instead, he was honest about what he saw as the long, hard,

Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil Society

Book Reviews

and intrinsically difficult task of bringing less-developed
and unstable countries (the “Gap,” in Barnett-speak) into
the global economic and political system maintained by theUnited States and other wealthy countries (the “Core”).
Since PNM’s publication, he has continued to write in thisvein. The most recent book-length product of this effort isGreat Powers: America and the World After Bush. For readersof PNM, there are no profoundly new arguments to be found.
Barnett still presents a theory of international relations inwhich economics matters more than military force; in which
the United States is a pivotal state, able to choose its foreign
policy more or less unilaterally; and in which U.S. leadershipis crucial for achieving a desirable policy outcome. Barnett
intends to apply these axioms to the problems of American
grand strategy in the post-Bush era.
His views on the Bush administration are unapologetic.
Where others have seen disaster, Barnett sees good intentions
and poor execution. He still lauds the Bush administration’s“real strategic imagination regarding development issues,”
such as its scuttling of the Kyoto Treaty; equally, he lauds
Bush for his “display of audacity and hope” in launching the
Iraq war to topple Saddam Hussein, spark a democratic revolution in the Middle East, and draw terrorists into a conflict
away from the American homeland.1 But he recognizes thatthe administration created an “untenable long-term burden,”largely by never seeking to share the benefits of hegemony
with the rest of the world.
Accordingly, Barnett’s prescription for the Obama administration and its successors is, largely, do what the Bush administration tried to do, but be smarter about it. In a twenty-first
century twist on Norman Angell’s 1911 bestseller The Great
Illusion, which argued that war had become unprofitable
and thus impossible, Barnett argues that war has become so
economically disastrous that we must make it impossible.
Achieving security for the United States and the rest of theworld requires using principally economic measures, sincearmed force is too blunt to be of use against the complex
societal factors that nurture destructive nationalism andfoster the development of terrorist networks.
Doing so, Barnett explains, requires American policymakers
to draw on the lessons of American history. He contends thatthe economic infrastructure that developed after the signingof the U.S. constitution created not just wealth, but security
for the United States. Thus, the United States should now
work to deepen economic linkages around the world while
also supporting the long-term movements toward freedom,development, and the rule of law. As Barnett puts it, “We
are modern globalization’s source code — its DNA. As theworld’s oldest and most successful multinational economic
and political union, we remain the planet’s most communicable ideology — its most potent insurgency.”2

Democracy

Achieving that goal will require, among other things, increased defense spending and a willingness to intervenein other countries, which is par for the course for rightof-center foreign-policy writing. But Barnett also urges
American policymakers to realize that they have to compete
for influence in the world in a game they may lose — eventhough they will write the game’s rules. If the rest of theworld perceives the rules to be fixed in America’s favor,
then a backlash is inevitable. That reaction, Bennett warns,
could prove far more costly than sustaining a rules-based
framework that might result in the United States letting
others take first place from time to time.
Barnett’s book, however, is both more interesting and more
frustrating than such straightforward summaries make it
seem. It is an at times an unstructured ramble throughAmerican history and foreign policy thinking, blending equalparts original insight, informed speculation, and responses toother bestselling authors, such as Fareed Zakaria and Doris
Kearns Goodwin. One wishes that the references of Teamof Rivals had been trimmed either to make room for more
original analysis or simply to save trees’ lives.
Its greatest failings, however, are stylistic. Unlike PNM, which
presented and justified a new analytic framework for understanding world affairs, Great Powers takes for granted that its
audience is well-versed in Barnett’s lexicon. Consequently,
the reader who has not mastered the Barnett oeuvre at times
feels adrift. Too many sentences in the book read like this one(an actual quotation, from page 349): “America needs to create a SysAdmin-industrial complex that’s just as hungry forpreconflict/postdisaster opportunities as our long-standing
military-industrial complex is for big war.”
The analogies and metaphors that illuminated in PNM obscure Barnett’s argument in Great Powers. In part, this may
be because Barnett has become a one-man think tank since
PNM appeared. His web site, www.thomaspmbarnett.com,
overflows with his thoughts (the truly initiated not only readhis blog but listen to a 9-hour interview between Barnett andconservative talk-show host Hugh Hewitt, for instance). It
is more likely that Barnett’s writing has become turgid withjargon because Barnett’s way of thinking about strategy ismore novel than his recommendations about strategy. It issurely sensible to urge Washington to engage China, deter
Russian adventurism, and work to develop poor countries.
But it is hardly a revelation.
1

And all of this in the space of two pages, pp. 10-11.

2

p. 2.

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Book Reviews

The Limits of Power by Andrew Bacevich
Review by Fouad Pervez

Andrew Bacevich’s latest book, The Limits of Power, provides a novel critiqueof post-World War II American foreign
policy. Bacevich argues that three crises,
all of our own making, have combined
to create the difficulties America faces
today. Instead of adopting a realist
viewpoint, Bacevich states that we haveinstead opted for hubris, and thisthreatens our national security.
First, the economic crises of the 1970s left America witha choice: curb our consumption or deploy power to force
others to oblige our appetites. President Carter failed toconvince Americans to scale back consumption, and Reagan
ushered in an even more decadent era of “more” when hewon the presidency. American consumption required deployment of power, either through coercive diplomacy or aheightened military presence, to ensure access to resources,
particularly oil. This sent both government spending and the
U.S. deficit skyrocketing. Over time, consumption required
increased American troop levels in the Middle East to ensure
oil security, which ultimately played a part in that region’s
increased instability.
Most striking to Bacevich is the notion that the U.S. government has urged its citizenry to consume without any
sacrifice. In order to sustain its consumption, America must
use military power, yet we are often asked to do nothing
in return– in fact, the Global War on Terror (GWOT), a
major military escalation, occurred concomitantly withtax cuts. Bacevich sees this pursuit of both guns and butter
as indefensible.
The second major crisis is political. Instead of national security based on checks and balances, power post-World War II
became increasingly consolidated in what Bacevich dubs the“imperial presidency.” The national security apparatus has
become an oligarchy run by political elites who maintain thestatus-quo of American global primacy. Those who criticize
this vision are attacked.

12

Despite America’s superpower status, Bacevich shows that
post-WWII foreign policy was centered on paranoia. Paul
Nitze was one architect of this fear, which he carried forward
in National Security Council Report #68 (NSC 68). This
report, which Nitze heavily influenced, shaped U.S. foreign
policy throughout the Cold War and is still influential today.
NSC 68 exaggerates the Soviet threat, and Nitze, master offear, used it to permanently militarize U.S. foreign policy.

Bacevich sees Paul Wolfowitz as Nitze’s heir. Wolfowitz
militarized the Pax Americana and used the 9/11 attacks
to unleash the U.S. military. The 2003 invasion of Iraq canbe seen as the culmination of these efforts, as it illustrates
America’s going to war with almost no restrictions.
Given the abysmal results of the militarization of foreign
policy, its historic lack of opposition troubles Bacevich.
The national security power elite consistently misinterprets
reality, inflates threats, and tries to evade public scrutiny. As
Allison’s (1971) organizational culture model would predict,the national security apparatus advances its own interests,
whether or not those interests are best for America. Bacevich
supports this with the example of the Bay of Pigs. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff endorsed the operation primarily because
they counted on its failing and hoped it would lead to theconventional invasion of Cuba, which was their preferredstrategy. They thought the failure would force President
Kennedy to back the invasion he strongly opposed. Similarly, the Bush administration stacked the apparatus withmediocre but pliant individuals to create minimal internal
opposition and conflict. This ensured the apparatus wascompletely on board with the administration, rather thanbeing an independent institution. Those who were critical,
like General Shinseki, were dismissed.
Finally, Bacevich notes the military crisis. Over time, U.S.
military strategy has increasingly focused on complete
dominance in order to satisfy national over-consumption.
Bacevich finds this military overstretch to be seriously flawed.
For one, armed force does not solve all problems, as the
GWOT has illustrated. With expanded goals and stagnant
numbers, a soldier is asked to be both “cop and social worker”(135). In addition, Bacevich sees a problem with professionalsoldiers. Americans may be willing to support aggressive
foreign policy, but very few actually enlist in the military.
This has resulted in the rise of private military contractors,
which has heightened the disconnect between the citizenry
and the military, and negatively impacts Americans’ notionof civic duty. It also partly explains the lack of opposition
to the new vision of U.S. foreign policy.
Like the political leaders who were not punished for theirover-reaching, militarized solutions, military leaders makemistakes for which they are rarely held accountable. Bacevichhighlights major errors made in the Persian Gulf War, thefighting in Somalia, and the conflict in Kosovo. Despite
America’s focus on military solutions, there is often no real
strategy. Generals in Iraq, particularly Gen. Tommy Franks,
failed to incorporate political context, regional power dynamics, or regional history into their plans. Yet major internal critiques did not address these issues. This is somethingboth the political and military crises have in common: whenmajor mistakes are made, only minor modifications areproposed. Reform always enhances the national security
apparatus, never scales it backGeorgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil Society

Book Reviews

In this book, Bacevich connects multiple issues to American
aggression abroad. He directly or indirectly addresses several
well-researched topics, including the security dilemma, military overstretch, organizational culture, domestic coalitions,and imperialism. He incorporates these in a strong argument that warns about the nature of U.S. foreign policy. Asa historian, he does well not to make this a polemic against
the Bush administration, but instead rightfully notes thehistorical roots of these problems. This is sobering accountshould be read carefully by those who believe President
Obama can transform U.S. foreign policy. A transformation
requires addressing all three crises Bacevich points out, and
it is unclear whether this is something Obama can, or evenwants, to do.
As a result of the three crises he enumerates, Bacevich sees
America moving on a dangerous path by pursuing a heavily
militarized foreign policy, while not addressing our three
self-made crises that threaten the long-term security of ournation. For Bacevich, the key is to live within our means.
If we do not do that, we will necessarily go abroad looking
for monsters to destroy.
After Bush: The Case for Continuity in American
Foreign Policy by Timothy J. Lynch and Robert S. Singh
Reviewed by Jean Schindler

Discussion of Bush-era foreign policy
is still controversial and sometimes
emotional. Like parents looking askanceat an unloved child, neither realists nor
liberal internationalists want to recognize their contribution to “neoconservative” thinking. The wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq became deeply associated withan unpopular President, but the issues
that drew the U.S. into them, as well as
the questions surrounding the legitimacy of democracy
promotion, have not gone away with his exit.
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, an energetic defense of theBush Administration’s foreign policy has come from academics outside of the U.S. With After Bush: The Case forContinuity in American Foreign Policy (written before the2008 election), British political scientists Timothy Lynch
and Robert Singh argue that Bush’s foreign policy was itself
compatible with longstanding American foreign policy, andthat future administrations should continue it. The main
reason for this continuity is that the American promotionof “fundamental freedoms” is an extension of American
national identity and the “ideological premise of the UnitedStates itself.” This can be seen in the War of Independence,
the Civil War, WWII or the Cold War. On the other hand,

Democracy“amoral” policies such as détente have had a “short shelflife” and little success.
Accordingly, they argue, while the Bush foreign policy isadaptable, it should remain largely unchanged because thetradition of confronting challenges to American values isnecessary now that the U.S. is engaged in a “Second Cold
War,” a generational struggle with jihadist Islam in many ways
similar to the West’s struggle with the communist bloc.
The authors look at major influences on American foreign policy attitudes, including geography, commerce, and“moralism-legalism.” They also delve effectively into thevarious ideas that have combined to form U.S. foreign policy,
including isolationism, liberal internationalism, and realism.
They show convincingly that it is not unusual for the U.S.
to act unilaterally when policymakers are confronted withquestions of vital national security. Many of their arguments are oft-made neoconservative points explained in acompelling way. For example, they stress that regime change
is a regular occurrence in U.S. foreign policy, exemplified
by state overhauls in the Southern Confederacy, Japan, andGermany.
The authors also resurrect memories of the debates that
raged in the 1990s over American foreign policy. The 1999
bombing of Serbia was just as “unmoored” from international law as the 2003 Iraq invasion, and yet is remembered as a successful U.S. action. Lynch and Singh argue
that American foreign policy has long been made up of “àla carte multilateralism and flexible friendship” rather thanan unswerving commitment to international organizations
and law, making Bush unremarkable in this regard. Lynchand Singh do good work in articulating the ideas that madeneoconservative policy prescriptions initially so attractive
to many. Critics too often caricature neoconservative policy
as the attitude of “invade now, ask questions later,” when
in fact it has academic and conceptual underpinnings thatneed to be addressed seriously.
At the same time, however, this leads to one of the book’s
two main weaknesses. While their bibliography is impressive,
there are a great many points and issues that Lynch and Singhexplore only minimally. This book could easily have been athousand pages long, but even given space constraints they
could have provided more depth on some issues.
Related to this is the book’s other weakness. Not only does
the text leave some issues underexplored, but the authors
make broad generalizations and points with little context,
which undermines the strength of their arguments. While
this is often a problem with any “big idea” book on foreign
affairs, After Bush has more of this than should be expectedin such a broad work. While it is a strong entry in the debate amongst public intellectuals, the book falls short of its
potential as an academic work.

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Book Reviews

For example, in building their argument that the U.S. should,
as a rule, act in concert with an English-speaking alliance,
they contrast Spanish and Australian reactions to terrorist
attacks to illustrate a values divide. But they do not provide
sufficient context. The 2004 Madrid bombing occurred days
before national elections, and the government compounded
the bombing’s political effect by falsely blaming Basque terrorists. While opinion polls do find stronger anti-American
sentiment in Spain than in Australia, the contrast the authors
should draw may not be so much based on culture as onpolitical skill and luck.
Broad generalizations also make their analysis appear simplistic at times. Their table on page 21 showing an ebb andflow of isolationism in U.S. foreign policy lists 1918-1940 asa period of national introversion. However, the consensus
among historians of that period is that the U.S. government
was fairly active in global affairs throughout the first decade
after WWI and did not really withdraw until the very end of
the 1920s. Other periods the authors list as introverted are
likewise the subject of contention among political historians. This may simply be the result of neither author being ahistorian; they approvingly quote Frederick Jackson Turner,
whose 1893 work on U.S. expansion has been superseded.
While these weaknesses do not discredit their “Case forContinuity,” it does distract from it.
It is still too early in the Obama administration to offer
more than a tentative assessment of its policies in light ofthis book’s arguments. The administration seems to have
dropped human rights as a pressure point in U.S. relations
with China, indicating a shift towards “realism” and awayfrom the promotion of freedom. But no matter how the current administration’s policies develop, After Bush: The Casefor Continuity in American Foreign Policy is worth reading.
Lynch and Singh make a vigorous case for promoting stableregimes that are not only friendly to the U.S., but friendly
to U.S. political values. The national debate on the natureof U.S. involvement in the world is far from over, and while
the neoconservative view is out of style now, it may not be
out forever.

14

The End of Alliances by Rajan Menon
Review by Nicholas MorinAmong the many books published inrecent years evaluating U.S. grand strategy, it is refreshing to find one that asks
readers to do more than imagine aworld with new and evolving challenges. The End of Alliances reassesses
the value of one of our most successfulforeign policy tools: our vast networkof permanent alliances. Rajan Menon
argues that the conditions that gave riseto these alliances, namely the security challenges associatedwith the Cold War, have since changed and our alliances are
becoming increasingly obsolete. While Menon’s call for thecreation of a new grand strategy absent formal militarycommitments is likely to create more problems than it solves,
his analysis highlights how vulnerable the U.S.’s most important alliances are in a constantly changing world.
Menon begins his book with a familiar warning that thecurrent landscape of power and a capabilities necessitates
a new U.S. grand strategy. Containment, although historically successful, is unlikely to help future administrations
deal with the problems facing the U.S. in a post-Cold War
world. Unfortunately for Menon, other authors (Charles
Kupchan, Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, John Ikenberry toname only a few) have better articulated the need for reappraising our role in the world by elucidating the emergenceof new threats and, equally important, the disappearanceof old ones.
Menon stands out however, by utilizing these changes tocall for an assessment of the durability and relevance of U.S.
alliances. He notes that for 169 years—the time between the
Declaration of Independence and the end of World War
II—the U.S. avoided long-term alliances in favor of flexible
military alignments, restraint, and adept diplomacy. Only
with the onset of the Cold War did the U.S. embark on a
new strategy of “permanent peacetime alliances, an international circuit of military bases, the deployment of tensof thousands of American troops abroad, and guarantees
to defend an array of countries across Eurasia” (p.45-46).
In order to assess the continued utility of alliances, which
Menon argues are both costly and obsolete, he examines
three of our most important: the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), Japan and South Korea.
The three chapters follow similar formats, allowing readers
to see themes common among the alliances: their origins,
successes, difficulties and most problematically, Menon’sview of their dispensability. His chapter on NATO is hisstrongest. After detailing its origins, Menon examines thegrowing fault lines within the alliance, pointing particularly

Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil Society

Book Reviews

to disagreements over U.S. involvement in Iraq. In providing
evidence on growing transatlantic tensions and emerging
differences, Menon is correct in his underlying observation,that “America’s power stands unrivaled, but in the absence of
the Soviet Union, Europe is freer than ever before to defy theUnited States, and will remain so”(p. 67). Menon’s weakness,
however, is that he looks past evidence of the continued valueof NATO in favor of evidence of its disunity. Afghanistan isa notable example of this, and one that he cites as indicative of NATO’s weakness. But while levels of assistance bymember nations is varied and NATO’s performance has
been less than stellar, non-U.S. NATO forces still accountfor roughly one-third of all troops in Afghanistan. This is
not an insignificant number.
Menon’s analysis is decidedly realist, but admirably, he showsa willingness to reach outside its traditional confines inorder to capture alternative factors that affect alliances. For
instance, he points to societal changes in Japan and South
Korea — namely generational shifts that have led to a growing assertiveness and a willingness to use force in Japan andthe growing perception that American security policies andmilitary presence are counterproductive in Korea — that arelikely to increase calls for political autonomy and decrease
U.S. influence. Menon sees this less as a tragedy than as anopportunity to reassess, and ultimately withdraw from alliances that no longer serve U.S. interests and allies that are
increasingly capable of providing for their own security.
If the success of The End of Alliances is Menon’s analysis of
the role of alliances and his warnings of their future frailty,
its greatest liability is his vision of a grand strategy purposefully absent these alliances. Menon argues that the U.S.
must eschew military commitments and rediscover flexible
ways to engage the world in a restrained manner. Nevertheless, abandoning alliances for alignment is more likely toantagonize our allies and incite worries that America is anunrestrained, hegemonic threat. For although Menon calls
for flexible, creative diplomatic solutions, other countries arelikely to view that flexibility as discarding multilateralism forunilateralism, shared values for self-interest, and restraint for
assertiveness. At a time when American power and policies
engender resentment and resistance, the U.S. should be waryof discarding institutions that have preserved order for solong, and fear a world where powerful countries align withnew, and perhaps unwanted alternatives.

exchanging strategic information between member-states.
Instead, the reader is constantly left asking why, if the conditions have so dramatically changed, these alliances persist
in spite of their irrelevance? Menon, despite clear and well
reasoned analysis, never provides a detailed picture of thecausal mechanisms involved in explaining how alliances
actually end.
Ultimately The End of Alliances succeeds in examining thecircumstances that led to the creation of our alliances andthe problems they are likely to encounter in a world withchanging capabilities, interests and threats. It stumbles,
however, in the development of a pragmatic and nuanced
post-containment grand strategy.

COMING SOON

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in our next issue:

Democrats, Dictators,
and Demonstrators:
Sharing Strategies on
Repression and Reform
See the Call for Submissions
on page 23

Moreover, while Menon is correct to conclude that an asymmetry of costs exists within our alliances, he repeatedly
underestimates their value. He writes that alliances are “thecodification of an anachronistic and iniquitous allocationof burdens, benefits, and hazards” (p. 131). But hegemonic
powers have long utilized their capacity to shoulder costs
in order to extract values necessary both in maintaining
supremacy and in fostering order. NATO, for example, serves
as a powerful forum for discussing military matters and in
Democracy

Society Volume 7 • Issue 1

15Winter 2010

Promoting Democracy in Egypt • Guirguis

Guirguis, Continued from Page 1

organizer and his campaign’s rhetorical commitment tohuman rights and dignity.

The Present
Despite the Obama administration’s relative quiet regarding democracy assistance, it has mostly continued Bush-era
programs. In its 2010 budget request, the administration
asked for a 10 percent increase in its Middle East democracy
and governance programs. But Egypt is the exception tothis trend. During the congressional appropriations processin March and the president’s subsequent budget request,
democracy-related funding for Egypt was cut by an unprecedented 60 percent.
Some analysts believe that the Obama administration isheaded toward eliminating democracy assistance to Egypt
in favor of efforts to aid development. A few prominent
Middle East scholars have come out publicly in favor ofthis trend, arguing that democracy assistance to Egypt has
failed, and that U.S. aid should be funneled solely into economic development efforts. They argue that the exclusive
focus on development will lead to concrete advancementsin the social, economic, and educational spheres, creating an
informed and engaged citizenry that could more effectively
drive democratic reform. But while it is true many of thedemocracy support programs under Bush were naïve andpoorly designed, that is a weak argument for abandoning
them completely. On the contrary, the failures in advancing
democratic reform under the Bush administration warrant
greater engagement now on political reform, especially since
Egypt is a remarkably influential country in the region.

Looking Ahead
Egypt, with its population of 80 million, is the trendsetting
heart of the Arab and Muslim worlds. As home to Jews,
Baha’is, Shi’ites, and the largest Christian population in the
Middle East, Egypt was until the early to mid 20th century
a symbol of vibrant (albeit imperfect) pluralism.

16

But now it is a breeding ground for religious intolerance.
Egyptian society, fueled by a government complicit in increased sectarianism, has adopted a worldview that is increasingly centered on religion. Under the Mubarak regime,
sectarianism has witnessed unprecedented growth, culminating in acts of violence against religious minorities andmarked by government unwillingness to address inequalities
substantively or extend the equal protection of the law to
all religious minorities.
And since the assassination of President Sadat 28 years ago,
Egypt has been ruled by emergency laws which suspend thebasic rights of the people. Torture, arbitrary detentions, andunwarranted military tribunals of civilians all combine tofuel extremist sentiment and popular sympathy for it.
Meanwhile, the Mubarak regime derives its international
legitimacy from a false political dualism that offers theinternational community only two choices for Egyptian
governance: the current regime, or Islamic extremists. Thisdichotomy does not represent Egyptians’ real political beliefs;
more than 77 percent of Egyptians refused to vote in thelast parliamentary election because they were not offered
a middle way. The regime has destroyed all secular, liberalpolitical parties that might present a stronger appeal to the
population. This crisis of political leadership is exacerbatedby the fact that there is no official plan for presidential succession in Egypt and Gamal Mubarak, the president’s heir
apparent, is not popular. This uncertain future, combinedwith serious economic instability, minimal state legitimacy,
and rising social discontent due to chronic mismanagement across the government, refutes the argument that the
Mubarak regime is the only stable option.
At the same time, U.S.-backed autocrats like Mubarak continue to feed the ideology of extremists not just in Egypt,
but across the region. Rhetoric decrying Arab autocrats’
mistreatment of their peoples is a permanent feature of
the speeches of figures like Osama Bin Laden and Hassan
Nasrallah, because they know it resonates powerfully withthe peoples of the region.
Internationally, Egypt has become active in a growing network of alliances among dictators, acting to block efforts toensure international human rights enforcement in entities
like the United Nations (UN). Recently, Egypt banded withother autocracies to reject the Democracy Coalition Project’s
application to gain consultative status at the Economic andSocial Council of the UN.
While the U.S-Egyptian alliance is important and often
mutually beneficial, Mubarak has delivered little in termsof substantive advancement on regional peace with Israel.
Mubarak has also failed to deliver on internal development,as Egypt has witnessed regression on numerous development
indicators under Mubarak’s 28-year tenure.
If the West wants — as do many Egyptians — a credible alternative to the religiously inspired political movements in
Egypt, a true commitment to decreasing sectarian tensions,and a stable partner in promoting regional interests andpeace, it must support democratic forces in their efforts toorganize and carve out an inclusive and participatory political space. Not only is support for the legitimate democratic
aspirations of the Egyptian people in the strategic interest of
the United States, but backtracking now on democracy promotion simply rewards the regime for its brutal crackdown
against secular democracy activists and sends demoralizing

Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil Society

Promoting Democracy in Egypt • Guirguis

signals to those sacrificing on the ground to bring aboutchange. It also hampers the efforts of the U.S. to regain
its credibility among the people of the region. There is no
reason why pursuing strategic interests should come at theexpense of sound and effective democracy promotion policies; in fact, seeking both simultaneously will be mutually
reinforcing.

...the Mubarak regime derives its
international legitimacy froma false political dualism that offers
the international community
only two choices for Egyptian
governance: the current regime,or the Islamic extremists.
How to Move Forward
As critical as development assistance is, the truth is thatdevelopment aid has allowed an autocratic and corrupt
regime to prevent the formation of an open society thatwould foster homegrown economic development, foreign
investment, and democratic citizen engagement. Meanwhile,effective support for political reform in 2004 and 2005 had
the concrete effect of assisting the formation of precisely
the robust constituency for change and growth that would
successfully drive positive reform if sustained.
While change comes from within, it can be supported fromthe outside, and giving up on democracy promotion programs and policy in favor of “technical assistance” would
simply consolidate the extremely unpopular status quo.
As Egyptians continue to sacrifice for a freer society, if the
U.S. and the community of democracies remain neutral
on issues of democracy in Egypt, this will amount to a defacto endorsement of the repressive and ultimately unstablestatus quo.
The early success, and ultimate failure, of U.S. pressures on
Egypt in 2005 proved one very important fact: strong verbal
support for political reform and for the efforts of activists,
coupled with consistent (non-military) action, is an effective tool for democracy promotion. This type of democracy
promotion is compatible with other U.S. interests; at nopoint during this brief opening did Egyptian cooperation
on vital U.S. regional interests stop.
In order to avoid charges of interventionism, the U.S. and
the West should not take the side of particular political actors, but instead support reforms that enjoy wide support
among the population. These include reforms that Mubarak
Democracy

himself pledged to undertake in his last presidential campaign, like repealing the emergency law and other restrictive
legislation; upholding the rule of law and an independent
judiciary; lifting the restrictions on political parties andcivil society; supporting a free media; and increasing governmental accountability. While programs that aid impoverished farmers are essential and should continue, no lesscritical are governance programs aimed at promoting basic
rights and a peaceful transition to democracy. Democracy
versus development assistance should not be viewed as azero sum game.
Other ways of moving forward include helping to effect amore genuine political process that entails a leveling of theplaying field to eliminate the current dichotomy of autocrats
versus theocrats and encourages a more accurate representation of the Egyptian political landscape. This will require
applying pressure to eliminate laws and practices that restrict
the registration and operation of civil society organizations,political parties, and other political forces. This may include
Islamists, provided that they are committed to the democratic process beyond mere rhetoric and demonstrate respect
for the rule of law, human rights, and equality of all citizens
before the law. The process of expanding Egypt’s politicalspace should ultimately contribute to the participation ofdiverse candidates in the upcoming parliamentary electionsin 2010, as well as the presidential election of 2011. Western
powers should push for transparency along with local andinternational monitoring in both elections.
The U.S. administration should also establish a regular forum within the new U.S.-Egyptian strategic dialogue thatis dedicated to addressing issues of political reform. This
forum should monitor and engage regularly with the Egyptian government beyond the normal scope of work of theState Department and its embassies. In addition to working
on broad reforms and tracking progress, this forum should
defend human rights activists both publicly and privately
when they are persecuted. It should also include regularconsultations with independent civil society actors.
Efforts to promote political reform are most successful whenpursued in a multilateral framework. The relationship Egypt
enjoys with Europe avoids some of the pitfalls associatedwith an exclusive U.S.-Egypt relationship, and Europe has
had past success in supporting Egyptian civil society. Europe
and the U.S. should join forces to create positive incentives
for reform. This multilateral framework for human rights
protection should include international organizations andnon-governmental actors. Joint action should be directed
at pressuring Egypt to abide by its existing treaty and convention commitments, with positive incentives built in foradherence to those commitments. Undoubtedly, this entails
the U.S. and participating governments setting an example
themselves. For instance, Obama’s renewal of the U.S. policyof no tolerance for torture helps restore U.S. credibility andSociety Volume 7 • Issue 1

Winter 201017

Promoting Democracy in Egypt • Guirguis

moral standing and allows the application of this kind ofpressure.
Because the Egyptian government has been successful installing on reform in the past, the U.S. government should
consider offering new financial incentives such as tradeadvantages in exchange for advances in political reform.
Well-crafted but tough incentives along the lines of theHelsinki Accords, which led to the fall of dictators in Eastern
Europe, should also be considered as a model. Benchmarks
for advancements should be based on those of international rights organizations or be intelligently negotiated,and should be tied to an established time table. Progress on
those benchmarks should be closely monitored and gauged
by the proposed political reform forum within the strategic
dialogue. Egypt’s inclusion in the global market and its status
as a key diplomatic player on the world stage should be tied
to its commitment to democracy and human rights.

The challenge with Egypt is real, and will require serious,
ongoing commitment, including financial support. Withan upcoming presidential succession in Egypt, now is thetime to transfer Obama’s words into real action, and demonstrate support for the legitimate aspirations of Egyptians
for freedom. This will have important ramifications not justfor Egyptian society, but for broader regional and global
security goals.

Dina Guirguis is executive director of the Washington-based Voices
for a Democratic Egypt, a non-profit organization dedicated topromoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

...if the U.S. and the communityof democracies remain neutral on
issues of democracy in Egypt,
this will amount to a de facto
endorsement of the repressive, andultimately unstable status quo.
Conclusion
Advocating on behalf of democracy and human rights activists in Egypt should be an essential element of a comprehensive U.S.-Egyptian relationship, not simply an abstractrhetorical device that is meant for public relations. A pluralistic and democratic Egypt will result in a strong andreliable partner in promoting regional peace and stability.
Supporting the aspirations of Egyptians for a democraticnation that respects human rights and is guided by the ruleof law would have swift, positive, and enduring ramifications
for the entire Middle East.

18

The “results vs. rhetoric” approach the Obama administration seems to have espoused has yet to deliver on concrete
results. The administration should consider the strengths ofpublic diplomacy when necessary, and should also make astrong effort to convey its backroom diplomatic efforts onthese issues to activists. The conveyance of positive signals
from the administration on these issues to the Egyptian
people and to the Egyptian regime is not to be underestimated at a time when activists are in dire need of support,
both moral and financial, and when events significant to U.S.
interests, such as upcoming elections, are quickly arriving.

Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil SocietyDefeating the Demagogue • Signer

Signer, Continued from Page 1

gained power in 2006, lifting up minor demagogues suchas Khaled Mashal, the group’s political leader. Around theworld, from Belarus to Uzbekistan, authoritarian leaders
are on the rise and freedom is retreating.
In most of these cases, the leaders threatening to convert
democracy into tyranny are demagogues: political figures
who fashioned themselves as leaders of the masses and who
would go to almost any extreme to hold and expand theirpower. And in most cases, they are capitalizing on a powerfulsentiment that surged through the world during the Bushpresidency, gathering nations and groups together against
America and Americans, often with a militaristic bent.

Democracy Fatigue
At the same time the demagogue has returned, the resolve tofoster democracy abroad is weakening in America. A number of prominent recent books have questioned America’s
standing in a post-Bush world, from Fareed Zakaria’s The
Post-American World to Parag Khanna’s The Second World.
Such works envision a world where America has dramaticallylost its influence, and where we must accede to the loss ofboth practical and moral authority as a result of the Bushyears. Equally as troubling, public opinion polls show theAmerican public becoming increasing skeptical of the valueof promoting democracy abroad.
We must challenge this new phenomenon of “democracy fatigue.” Too much is at stake. Democracy is a driving factor inhumanity’s efforts to escape the tragedies of our shared past.
The story of demagogues opens the door to a broader underlying story about the possibility of progress for humanity.
Demagogues, like the proverbial canary in a coal mine, alert
us to a deeper paradox that has plagued human society sinceclassical times: as democracy expands, it increases the potential for its own destruction. In other words, demagogues
are a symptom rather than a cause. When they emerge, it isbecause the people, rather than using their freedom, theirwits, and their self-restraint to select leaders who would
ensure liberty for the ages, willingly hand over their power
to a leader who enslaves them. Democracy self-destructs,
and the most hopeful and optimistic of dreams — a system
based on pure freedom, and on possibility itself — becomesthe most monstrous of nightmares.
20

To counter the threat of demagogues, we need to reclaim
democracy as a primary goal of our foreign policy, but witha new heart — constitutionalism. As Alexis de Tocquevilledescribed most powerfully in his study of American democracy, constitutionalism is a living culture of political values
among ordinary people that (1) promotes the individual’s
private sense of self-worth and responsibility for democ-

racy’s success and (2) publicly operates as a countervailingpolitical force on those who would gather power and breakrules in doing so.7 In other words, the people themselves
hold the ultimate answer to democracy’s paradox. If thepeople dedicate themselves to the rule of law, they will defy
the demagogue. If, on the other hand, the people are moreinterested in the roller-coaster of the demagogue’s ambitions than their own small part in maintaining the rule oflaw in their own nation, democracy can disintegrate into
authoritarianism, corruption, and murder.

Constitutionalism
Before we get to policies that can foster a constitutional
conscience, we first need to flag the danger of a quest for asilver bullet. The history of democracy promotion is riddledwith policymakers’ infatuations with particular ideas thatwill make democracy take hold immediately. These fads haveincluded elections, civil society, rule of law, decentralization,
and anticorruption. Democracy promotion organizations
proceeded, willy-nilly, to build and fund thousands of these
programs in developing nations around the world — sometimes without regard for whether they actually created theconstitutional culture that was really needed. All such approaches suffer from the same flaw, that democratization isamenable to magic bullets. If we convert our desire to makedemocracy work into a spiritual, even religious, quest, we
will neglect the very ordinariness of successful constitutionalism. And the demagogue who understands the advantage
the ordinary has over the extraordinary will always be able
to find the seams in democracy and rip it apart.
With this cautionary note firmly in mind, we move to thequestion of how to increase constitutionalism around theworld through our foreign policy. We should take action in
the following ways.
 Civic education. With little or no training in basic constitutional values, children will more likely be educated in
the values of authoritarianism and anti-Americanism. We
should increase educational programs through a sweeping
effort to train students across the world in constitutional
values and inculcate these values at an ethical level.
 Market economics. Acting as a consumer cultivates thepractice and expectation of exercising sovereignty, as
citizens think of themselves as individuals in control of
their own choices. Market practices also help citizens takeon the habits and values of trust and compromise.
 Sharing the vision. America should commit to spreading
the vision of constitutionalism. Our leaders should makea distinct effort to share our foundational ideals of theactive pursuit of political freedom, the free exchange ofideas between citizens, and the tolerance of dissent in theirinteractions with the people of the world. These actions

Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil Society

Defeating the Demagogue • Signer

will reveal the confidence of the constitutional experimentand how citizens take part in it, without fear of reprisal,
and with the self-reliance of a citizen who fully shoulders
the burden of a constitutional society.
 Election training. People need training in actual elections
because elections can be intimidating to new voters and, as
in any new activity, information and practice can make agreat difference. The administrators of the election processitself need support and training, as well — in conducting
impartial elections, helping less-skilled citizens maketheir choices, preventing pressure tactics, and generally
cultivating public confidence in the elections.
 Respect. We can expand constitutional democracy bysharing our own tolerance and the broader message
that constitutional democracy succeeds when the citizens embrace and respect debate, rather than reject it.
One concrete policy is to allow the Voice of America, theUnited States’ international broadcast agency, to include
opposing viewpoints.
 Direct engagement. The United States needs to broadly
engage directly with the peoples of the world, enlistingthem in the constitutional enterprise and helping themto bypass, where possible, prudent, and desirable, theelites and structures that otherwise would block themfrom sharing these values.
 Tailor constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is an artifact of
culture and belief. We therefore need to begin where thepeople are and accept that constitutionalism will naturally
differ from place to place. Historically, political scientists
have determined that norms for civil liberties can vary
dramatically from country to country and that politicalculture mediates how people understand democracy.
 A world of individuals. The deeper underlying value of a diverse constitutionalism is a recognition—and embrace—of the pluralism of the world. A pro-constitutionalism
foreign policy will view other nations and groups notprimarily as calcified categories that operate in an unchanging, preset manner, but more fundamentally asgroups of individuals, each of whom possesses the samecharacteristics that we do.
 Increased civilian capacity. We should create a substantial
new corps of civilian professionals who can help cultivate
constitutionalism around the world. Expert professionals would deploy to weak and failing states. They would
promote democracy and address humanitarian issues byworking directly with civilian populations. They would
be the advance guard of a United States that’s newly committed to cultivating a constitutional culture among thepeoples of the world.

Democracy

 Lead by example. Finally, we should take the simple but
profound step of denying demagogues what they seek themost — an easily hated enemy to agitate the masses against.
Any garden-variety demagogue can exploit another nation’s belligerence, and it takes only arrogance or stupidity — or both — to play into their hands. It’s a deceptively
obvious point. If we want the world’s nations — and thepeople who live in them — to desire democracy, thesepeople must themselves not resent, fulminate against, andattack history’s greatest democracy. This means American
power, both in theory and in application, must become an
authority that works with the peoples of the world, rather
than threatening and demanding things from them.

Now Is the Time to Act
Understanding how to stop the demagogue is especiallypressing today. Other countries are losing faith in America’s
ability to do good through democracy, and the American
people themselves today are flirting with isolationism, turning away from the engagement that marked America’s greatest foreign policy successes during the previous century. Yet,democracy’s demagogue problem matters for America’s
national security interest. We are today still generally considered the most powerful nation in the world. Most Americans
agree we should do what we can to remain in that position.
The question — with a new president, a new century, anda new horizon — is what we use this power for. To regain
our stature and become a source of admiration and leadership for the world — the “city on a hill” that John Winthrop
first invoked aboard the ship Arbella in the seventeenth
century — we need to fully comprehend both the majesty
and complexity of our accomplishment. Sharing the successof the American democratic experiment demands restraint
and self-discipline instead of braggadocio and belligerence.
In our promotion of democracy, from the rhetoric of ourleaders to the substance of our governmental programs to
the actual efforts undertaken, we need to stop grasping fora metaphysical democracy that magically solves its own
problems and instead begin cultivating constitutionalism.
An exemplarist foreign policy of democracy promotion
through constitutionalism would view the peoples of theworld as members of a great partnership with us. In helping
guide them toward the constitutional values that we know
work well from our own experience, we should understandthat we are in a direct relationship with them, both throughthe policy of our government as well as through the basic humanity we all share. When we look at other nations that wehope will seek freedom, we should therefore also see millions
of people like us — working, thinking, talking, acting, withgovernments responding to them (or not), as they demand it.
These people in this global mirror will look back at us witheyes as intelligent, as discerning, and as open as ours. Likeus, they will try to resolve the basic paradox of the humancondition that generates demagogues: that democracy, leftSociety Volume 7 • Issue 1

Winter 201021

Defeating the Demagogue • Signer

to its own devices, can produce not constitutionalism but
tyranny. And like us, they will choose freedom, if they havethe education, the understanding, and the constitutional
values they need.
But they will turn on freedom — and on us — if they are
not enabled to defend themselves and a demagogue arises
to take advantage. Given a momentary opportunity, hewill take hold and invade the body politic. The demagogue
will never let go and will never disappear. Only vigilanceamong the people will keep him at bay and expand thereign of liberty. America can help save democracy in its
eternal struggle with the demagogue. We can help slow, if
not stop altogether, the cycle of regimes. And we can add
to the victories of humanity’s better angels over our own
worst demons. Our unique position in the community ofnations, and our extraordinary history, demands, once again,that we strike out on the path to true freedom.

Elect

to receive theelectronic version of
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Excerpted from Demagogue by Michael Signer. Copyright 2009by the author and reprinted by permission of Palgrave-MacMillan,
a division of MacMillian Publishers Limited. All rights reserved.

Hoffman, Continued from Page 2

power as the source of the problem and Musgrave argues it
derives from the increasing cost of war. All three believe theU.S. can no longer sustain its aspirations for global military
dominance. Rajan Menon contends that U.S. military alliances, such as NATO, are obsolete relics of the Cold War, andmaintains the U.S. should pursue flexible alliances derived
from the nature of the problem it is trying to solve. Finally,
America and the World is a set of discussions between twoformer National Security Advisors, Zbigniew Brzezinski
and Brent Scrowcroft, moderated by the Washington Posts’s
David Ignatius. Although Brzezinski and Scrowcroft disagree
on much, they agree on the importance of bi-partisanshipin U.S. foreign policy, that too many policy makers still see
the world through a Cold War mentality, and that the U.S.
has become excessively frightened by terrorism.

22

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Timothy Lynch and Robert Singh are contrarians to the above
analyses. They see far more continuity than change in George
W. Bush’s foreign policy, arguing that unilateral military action, regime change, and inconsistent commitment to multilateralism has been typical U.S. foreign policy for decades.
I want to thank my able editors, John Morrill and Lindsay
Robinson. John and Lindsay will be graduating the MA program at the end of the spring semester. I wish them the bestof luck and am certain they will have promising careers.

Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil SocietyCall for Submissions

W

e are seeking well-written, interesting submissions of 8002000 words on the themes below, including summaries
and/or excerpts of recently completed research, new publications, and works in progress. Submissions for the issue are due
Friday, February 26, 2010.

Volume 7 • Issue 2

issue theme

Democrats,
Dictators, andDemonstrators:
Sharing
Strategies on
Repression and
Reform

Democracy assistance practitioners and scholars focus attention on
linkages primarily between international donors and recipients ingovernment or civil society. These relationships are important focifor understanding the process of “political learning,” but many othermechanisms are less understood. Strategies for repression and reformare being shared across borders, and a broader framework is required
to capture these linkages.

Two potential mechanisms for international cooperation on democratic reform appear understudied. First, advances in technology andcommunications reduce barriers to cooperation between civil society
actors and allow them to share best practices on reform. So called“twitter revolutions” in Iran and Xinjiang earlier this year for example
demonstrate the ability of new technologies to connect demonstrators to the global community. The existence of these interactions is
acknowledged, but systematic understanding of how this cooperation
occurs and its potential to influence reform is not yet developed. Second, regional organizations are increasingly
involved in promoting international standards of behavior, including democracy. The African Union spoke out
strongly against the military coup leaders in Guinea, while the Organization of American States condemned thecoup in Honduras. More broadly, democratic values are embodied in the charters of multilateral organizations as
varied as the EU and ASEAN. However, the role of these organizations in furthering reform, and their relationship with domestic actors, both governments and civil society, warrants additional study.
Democrats and demonstrators are not the only ones learning. Democrats must contend with cooperation between their authoritarian adversaries. Authoritarians are learning to manage access to technology, cooperating inregional organizations, and providing alternatives to democratic governance models. Cooperation between authoritarian governments is assumed, but the mechanisms through which it occurs remain largely unknown.
This issue of Democracy and Society looks to broaden our understanding of cooperation among both reformers
and authoritarians at the levels of high and low politics. We welcome all submissions that illuminate these interactions, their impact on democratization, and the implications they carry for democracy assistance strategies.
Please email submissions (MS Word preferred) to editor@democracyandsociety.com. Endnotes preferred. Please
include your name, department or organization, title, and contact information.
For additional information, please visit http://www.democracyandsociety.com or contact editor@
democracyandsociety.com.

Democracy

Society Volume 7 • Issue 1

Winter 201023

Graduate Fellows
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Directors of
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ProgramDaniel Brumberg
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