2‑2

2 Telecommunication Radio Broadcast

Architecture of Data Network for the Tokyo
2020 GamesKUROMIYA Takayuki

In the Olympic and Paralympic Games it is essential to establish a highly reliable data network for the stakeholders torealize the safe and secure operation of the Games In the Olympic and Paralympic Games Tokyo 2020 we revised theconfiguration of the past Games and constructed three logical networks divided by users and applications This article
summarizes the concepts and implementation methods for ensuring the efficiency reliability flexibility and scalability ofthe data network for the Games taking into account the service characteristics that are particular to the Games The
article also examines key architectural points for the Olympic and Paralympic Games Tokyo 2020
Keywords：Data Centre WAN LAN Security Remote Access VPN Wi‑Fi

1．Introduction

independent networks separately for each of the various
systems and services involved in Games operations It

When the Organising Committee developed the data

was also assumed that the requirements of the many

network that would serve as the operational infrastruc-stakeholders using the network would continue to be

ture for the Olympic and Paralympic Games Tokyo 2020

added and changed until just before the Games so we(Tokyo 2020 Games) it was required not only to provide

paid attention to the flexibility and scalability of therobust and stable services that would not interfere with

network to absorb these changes in requirements

Games operations but also to keep up with the highly

On the other hand because of its large scale the basic

uncertain Games planning and stakeholder usage

design had to be completed more than two years before

requirements until just before the actual event Follow-

the Games taking into account the lead time required foring these subjects the basic policy was to ensure thatits verification and construction The basic design of theconstruction and operation costs are appropriate (effi-

data network for the Games was completed in April 2018

ciency) availability and security are assured (reliabil-

actually but the requirements had not been completedity) and changes can be made flexibly (flexibility andat that time and the assumed parameters werescalability) The system was architected and built‑in

calculated based on information mainly from pastcooperation with the NTT Group the telecom serviceGames

partner of the GamesFirst from the standpoint of efficiency the system
was designed to be superimposed on a single large‑scaleThis article introduces the architecture of the data
network for the Games built on these backgrounds fromboth physical and logical perspectives

network which is highly reliable rather than providing

2．Physical Network
KUROMIYA Takayuki
Technology Services Bureau The Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic
and Paralympic GamesThe Journal of The Institute of Electronics Information and Communication Engineers Vol 105 No 8 Supplement pp 22‑31 August 2022
© 2022 The Institute of Electronics Information and Communication Engineers

22

21

Overall Configuration of the Infrastructure

In consideration of efficiency through improved
operability and standardized security policies external

THE JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE OF ELECTRONICS INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ENGINEERS

Figure 1 Overview of the Core Configuration of the Data Network for the Games
via DC (with exceptions)A star topology to connect the venues and the Internet

communications such as Internet connections were

width of 100 Gbit/s and we adopted a 20 Gbit/s Internet

routed through Data Centres (DC) in principle As aaccess service that was expandable to make it flexible

result the server system was centralized in the DC

and scalable enough to absorb a variety of userwhich was a hub to connect the various venues with arequirements (Figure 1)

star topology

However some telecom services on this communica-

The DCs themselves were also made redundant withtion network such as CATV (video distribution) Pressa Primary Data Centre (PDC) in Tokyo and a Secondary

Plus (photo data transmission) and CCTV (security

Data Centre (SDC) in Saitama to ensure the reliability ofsurveillance cameras)

the entire data network for the Games

communication data with specific venues other than the

The backbone had sufficient capacity with a band-required a large amount of

DC If that traffic was to go through the DC further
WAN access line bandwidth and consequent higher
performance equipment (i e■be required at the DC

Terminology

additional modules) shall
Therefore

these telecom

Dark fiber
Optical fibers laid by telecommunications
carriers and leased in fiber units The user (borrower) is
responsible for maintenance and management such as fault
detection
MPLS
Multi‑Protocol Label Switching A technologythat adds labels to packets to achieve high‑speed transmission over a network without referring to IP headers
IDS/IPS Custom Signatures
Intrusion Detection System/Intrusion Prevention System : A system that creates its
signatures to provide accuracy speed and coverage forattacks that cannot be detected or prevented by security
vendorsʼ signatures
UTM
Unified Threat Management Unified Threat
Management integrates and manages multiple security
countermeasures to protect the network from various threats
in web access and e‑mailservices were exceptionally designed in a star topology■

functions accommodated would not be divided up

with a specific venue as a hub for each service to reduce
equipment costs
22

Data Centre Configuration

The data centre (DC) had to integrate communications from all venues and to provide connectivity to theoutside of the Games network DC was one of theessential components for providing basic network
services (L2 authentication DHCP DNS etc ) to eachvenue requiring a robust and flexible design
As described in section 2 1 PDC and SDC were
established as a disaster countermeasure

Special Issue : Technology and Innovation in the Olympic and Paralympic Games Tokyo 2020

but the23

Figure 2 PDC Configuration with All Equipment Redundant
To assure stable operation of the PDC independently the enclosures andpower supplies of all devices in the PDC are redundant to ensure reliability (The SDC is omitted in this figure )between the two DCs and the PDC shall be operated

redundancy and CPN (see 3 1 (independently under normal circumstances For thiswork) existed in the venue were mandatory or not) Competition Net-

reason all equipment in the PDC should be redundant(Table 1) IBC and MPC of the “main venues” in Table 1

and even within the equipment all line cards interfaces

refer to International Broadcast Centre and Main Press

and power supplies were redundant to ensure reliability

Centre respectively The venue patterns are described(Figure 2) We decided that redundancy within the SDC

in section 2 4

would not be required for cost‑effectiveness At the

Especially at important venues such as competition

Games time 45 racks for the PDC and 20 for the SDC

venues there were not only two WAN lines installed but

were working

also redundancy was thoroughly implemented at allaccess sections NTT receiving stations relay sections

23

Wide Area Network (WAN) between Venues

and receiving equipment to ensure network reliability

In the past Games WAN was sometimes built up from

Figure 3 shows an overview of the configuration ofscratch laying dark fiber (Terminology) to connect the venues

Pattern 1 (large‑scale venues such as IBC and MPC) as

For the Tokyo 2020 Games however high‑quality andan example

highly reliable network services provided by NTT East

In the case the distance between two venues was

and West were available and from the perspective of

sufficiently close and they could share the network

construction and operation costs we combined threedevices at the venues we defined it as a “precinct venue”

types of commercial line service ranging from 1 toand integrated WAN access lines and extended LAN for

100 Gbit/s to connect between venues and DCs

greater efficiency In some venues that had existing

For the connection to each venue the bandwidth was

Internet access available we used VPN technology toestimated according to the size and role of the venue

connect to the PDC by using those facilities without

based on the past Games experience and we used

installing an exclusive data network for the Games

different access line services considering whether the24

We adopted MPLS (Terminology) in the backbone of the

THE JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE OF ELECTRONICS INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ENGINEERS

Table 1
Pattern

Access Line
Bandwidth

WAN Circuits and Major Venue Patterns

WAN Redundancy

CPN

Number of
VenuesMajor venues

Data network for the Games (connected to DC)
1

100 Gbit/s

Yes different stations

Yes

3

IBC MPC2

10 Gbit/sYes different stations

Yes

34

Competition Venue

3

10 Gbit/s

Yes same station

No

3

IOC Hotel

4

1 Gbit/s

Yes different stations

Yes

4

Local Qualifying Venue

5

1 Gbit/s

Yes same station

No

4

Office6

1 Gbit/s

No

None

6

Bus depot

1 Gbit/s──

28

Vehicle waiting area

15

General hotel

Internet
7
8

Use existing facilities at the venue

Figure 3 Brief Overview of the Pattern 1 Venue
Important venues such as the Competition
Venue ensured reliability by making all WAN/LAN components redundant

WAN between the DC and the venues referring to its

simultaneously the key point is to standardize theoperational experience and scalability in past Games

design and operation

The WAN routers at each venue worked as MPLS‑VPN

rather than individual optimization for each venue

provider edges and used OSPF routing Priority control

Based on this concept as shown in Table 1 we created

was applied to the backbone while bandwidth control

several venue patterns selected device models for each

was not applied to the access section providing a circuit

pattern and utilized them as a reference design towith sufficient bandwidth

minimize the number of exceptional cases

aiming for total optimization

The effectiveness of this patterning and standardiza24

Venue Patterning

tion was developed as the Games approached Even

Connectivity to the event data network was required
not only at competition venues

when a change for the network configuration in one

but also at non‑venue was required due to a sudden additional require-competition venues such as operation centres training

ment from stakeholders just before the Games we didvenues and facility sites which were a mixture of large

not need too much time for re‑design because we should

and small venues

only expand the network to the other venue that had a

However in an environment such as the Olympic andsimilar pattern At the same time necessary equipment

Paralympic Games where multiple competitions are held

could be quickly deployed by converting spare equip-

Special Issue : Technology and Innovation in the Olympic and Paralympic Games Tokyo 202025

ment from other nearby venues

and as a result no venues experienced schedule delays

The Technology Operation Centre (TOC) which

in installation

centrally managed trouble handling during the Games
time needed to know the configuration of each venue

3．Logical Network

and its status in real‑time and this patterning enabled
prompt and accurate restoration measures to be taken incooperation between the TOC and venues when trouble

31

Logical Partitioning of the Games Data Network

After discussions with Atos

the integrator

wedefined the data network for the Tokyo 2020 Games as

occurredconsisting of the following three logical networks
25

Construction of LAN within the Venue

Since many of the Tokyo 2020 venues used existing（） Competition Network (CPN)buildings and facilities we were required to carry out

This network is necessary for using the systems

the network installation after installing temporary

required for operating the Games and the competition

facilities (power supply fixtures etc ) at each venue

High availability and reliability are of utmost impor-resulting in a short construction period of one to twotance and logical isolation from other networks and themonths In particular the large venue such as MPC

Internet is mandatory Atos determined the communica-

where the actual length of tenancy was very limited wetion requirements and security measures and NTT

had to meet the tight time constraints by using free time

installed and operated the network based on theseon weekends and late at night to install cables little byrequirements

little in the backyard that could not be seen about six（

months before the GamesIn addition if we were required some changes in） Back Office Network (BON)

This is an office network for Tokyo 2020 Organising

service requirements or additional cabling after the startCommittee staff to use business applications Internet

of use there would be limited time to implement themaccess printers etc

before the Games

number of staff members continued to increase toward

Thereforein consideration of

to carry out their work As thea standard

the Games the BON needed to be flexible enough to

configuration was adopted as much as possible in the

expand its capacity accordingly Many servers providing

LAN as well as the pattern of the venue

business applications were installed and the communica-

availability

scalability

and operability

Table 2 shows the total amount of equipment andtion requirements between servers and clients werematerials installed in the LAN construction for all

implemented by the “Allowlist” method The system also

venues including the Athletes Village as the representa-

had a multi‑layered security defense system includingtive of large venues and the National Stadium which

endpoints to reduce and avoid various security risks

was the largest venue among the competition venues
To construct these facilities in a short period and at（） Olympic Technology Network (OTN)

multiple geographically separated venues simultane-

The OTN is a network that serves as the infrastruc-ously a total of approximately 2 000 workers worked

ture for accommodating various telecommunication

day and night until the last minute before the Games

services and systems provided by each FA (Functional
Area the organising committeeʼs internal event management function) for stakeholders other than spectators

Table 2

Amount of Equipment and Cables Installed

Since the number of users is large and various usage

Total ofall venues

Athletes
Village

National
Stadium

Racks

1 400

106

92

simple as possible And as the systems using this OTN

Routers150

2

2

are implemented individually they are grouped andFirewalls

150

2

2

logically divided by VRF (Virtual Routing and Forward-

L3 Switches

500

14

4

ing) to assure the independence of each systempatterns are possible the configuration should be kept as

L2 Switches

7 000

814

373

Wi‑Fi AP11 1005 080

270ptical fiber

1 400 km

46 km

134 kmBased on the security policy of the Tokyo 2020 GamesUTP cable

4 450 km

233 km

460 kmthe CPN/BON/OTN were each segmented into eight

26

32

Zone Design and Inter‑zone Communication

THE JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE OF ELECTRONICS INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ENGINEERS

zones (Table 3) and inter‑zone communication was

on external networks and attacks from the inside basedstrictly managed by the Allowlist as shown in Table 4 In

on what is now known as a zero‑trust concept

the OTN

we integrated some zones (Shared and

All telecommunications equipment had been fortified

Unmanaged) in consideration of the characteristics ofwiththe services provided and redefined separately for theCommitteeʼs Configuration Standard and took counter-

Shared Internet and the Dedicated Internet

measures at Layer 2 and Layer 3 against malicious

unifiedhardening

using

the

Organisingattacks
33

Security Measures

The communication control was implemented based

The Olympic and Paralympic Games are particularly
vulnerable to cyber‑attacks

on the inter‑zone communication flow described in 3 2

and it was a massiveby the Allowlist which permitted only the minimum

challenge how to protect against cyber‑attacks There-

necessary communication As a result this list totaled

fore as shown in Table 5 security threats and their

400 000 lines

countermeasures were studied and designed and we

The management and operation of this list wereadopted a suitable solution for each In particular we

significantly complicated but we coped with this bypaid attention to avoid the reputational risks of thedevising process management and auditing methods

attackers like leakage of sensitive information attacks

For details please refer to 2‑3 of this special issue
The security measures taken for each logical network
are summarized below

Table 3

Security Zones Definition

Zone

Definition（） Security Measures for CPN/BON

DMZAn external zone for assets being exposed tozones hosting 3rd party devices

Edge

An external zone for assets requiring outboundconnectivity to 3rd party devices

TrustedThe “default” trusted zone most assets usedinternally in the network are in this zone

targeted attacks In addition we conducted a correlation

SecureThe most secure and isolated zone reserved forsensitive data storage

logs and implemented a detection function using flow

ManagedThe zone including all assets which owned by andoperated by Organising Committee staff orassimilated

tions between terminals to improve the detection

SharedThe zone including all assets which owned by
Organising Committee connected to ODN (including through a VPN see 2 3 6) but not
operated by Organising Committee and instead
used by 3rd parties

Unmanaged

The zone including all unmanaged (i e 3rd party
owned) end‑user devices

Untrusted

All other assets and 3rd party network includingInternet

We implemented a multi‑layered defense in the
network with multiple security measures including the
DNS layer application layer and endpoints to counter
analysis of security information and event management
information for Layer 2 repetitive malicious communicacapability of security threats In the BON used by theorganising committee staff a proxy was installed to SSL
traffic decryption to the Internet

providing audit

function by URL filtering anti‑virus and Sandbox NTT
had implemented a mechanism to create and apply its
IDS/IPS custom signatures (Terminology)

for threats that

could not be detected by the standard functions of
security equipment thereby enhancing detection and

Table 4 Security Zones Flow Design
Allowable/unallowable intercommunication between the segregated zones isdefined where “Yes” is allowed “No” is not allowed and “Avoid” indicates that IT services should be designed not to require
using the related traffic flow↗

SecureTrustedDMZ

EdgeManagedSharedUnmanaged

Untrusted

Secure

Yes

Yes

Avoid

Avoid

No

No

No

No

Trusted

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

DMZ

No

Yes

Yes

Avoid

Avoid

Avoid

Avoid

Avoid

Edge

No

Yes

Avoid

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Managed

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Avoid

No

No

Yes

Shared

No

No

Yes

No

No

Avoid

Yes

Yes

Unmanaged

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Avoid

Yes

Untrusted

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

N/A

Special Issue : Technology and Innovation in the Olympic and Paralympic Games Tokyo 202027

Table 5

Security Threats to Be Considered and Countermeasures
Security Countermeasures

SecurityThreats

Examples ofCyber Attack

Hijacking ofuser
privilegesetc

・Attacks exploiting vulnerabilities
Acquisition of
authorization/authentication
information
throughmalware infection

Use ofcloud/ISP services
・Cloud‑based
DNS
communication
control・Spoofing

Information
theft

All Internet
connectivity
disconnected
or delayed

・External
communication ofstolen information
after malware
infection

Security features
to be deployed on
the network

Considerations for Network
DesignConsiderations for Network
Operation

・ACL
・URL filter
・IPS/IDS(including custom
signatures)・Anti‑virus
Sandbox・SSL decryption
AD authentication

・NAPT/NAT uRPF
・Zone design IP address
design・Logical network
segregation by VRF/VLAN
・Communication control
within the same VLAN andbetween VLANs
・Server fortification Data
encryption

・SIEM security operations
・ID/password
management
・Visualization of communication inside the data network
・Vulnerability
management of servers/network
devices・Flow information analysis(Security detection)

─・Network log tracking
environment(Syslog internal DNS NTP
FW etc )・Terminal authentication
user authentication
・DHCP AD・SIEM security operations
・Two‑factor authentication
for remote access・ID/password
management

・ACL
・URL Filter
・IPS/IDS
・SSL decryption
AD authentication

─・SIEM security operation
・Flow information analysis(security detection)

・Wireless LAN
countermeasures(countermeasures againstrogue APs)
・Encryption of remote
access communication formaintenance──・Cloud‑based
DNS
communication
control・Sniffing packet
by man‑in‑the‑middle attacks
etc

─

─

・DoS attacks
exploiting
vulnerabilities

─・IPS/IDS─・Vulnerability
management of server/
network equipment

・DDoS attacks

・DDoS
countermeasures
by ISP・IPS─・ACL deployed when
mitigation bandwidth isexceeded・Bandwidth
shortage on
WAN circuit atvenues──・Logical network
segregation by VRF/VLAN
・Communication control
within the same VLAN andbetween VLANs
・Rate Limit/QoS
deployment

・Flow information analysis(Visualization ofcommunication inside thedata network)

・BGP routehijacking───・Operation handling by ISP(specific contract)

・Attacks on
external DNS

・Cloud migrationof authoritative
name server
・Cloud migrationof cache DNS──・Handling by authoritative
name server provider
・Handling by cache DNS
providerprotection capabilities

implemented to ensure the availability of the service In
addition to network access restrictions blocking mali-（） Security Measures in OTN

cious communications by DNS and security detection

The OTN had a wide variety of applications and it

using flow information were introduced among thewas necessary to select security measures to bemeasures applied in the BON It enabled the avoidance28

THE JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE OF ELECTRONICS INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ENGINEERS

Figure 4 Deployment of Security Solutions
Multiple security solutions deployed in a multi‑layer and necessary blocking configuration
put in each time by analyzing detected security eventsof attacks from OTN‑connected terminals to external

promptly coped with all incidents on the Games data

networks and the detection of malicious communications

network

to internal servers and the Internet
In implementing each solution as shown in Figure 4① to ⑦

we adopted a multilayer defense and multi‑

We must perform these tasks continuously without
depending on the failure of a specific function of theGames data network

Considering cyber security

vendor approach and selected products from different

attacks which were assumed to be the greatest threat

manufacturers for multiple layers against DDoS attacks

the main components of the management network were

DoS attacks targeted attacks and so on In operation

closed with physically independent Furthermore since

the firewalls and UTM (Terminology) devices at the entrance

it is a significantly important network because it reaches

and exit of each network detected some security events

all communication devices in the Games network it has

and we analyzed flow information collected at multiple

implemented the same level of security measures as thepoints to minimize security risks by applying blocking

main body of the Games data network in terms ofconfiguration as Denylist to unauthorized flows

Allowlist control

These security measures through strict communica-

ment

log monitoringand internal control

endpoint manage-

As a result

we couldtion requirement management visualization and careful

perform remote configuration changes of communication

auditing were the cornerstones of a robust data network

devices and verification of the settings when responding

for the Games

to user requirements at the venue securely and smoothly
by network monitoring from the TOC

34

Management Network

In addition although not used during the whole GamesWe implemented the “management network” totime we also prepared a backup network to ensure that

efficiently perform a series of operation and maintenancethe event of a failure of the management network itself

tasks such as prompt issue detection and restoration by

would not disrupt the operation and maintenance work

monitoring the normality of its components so that we
Special Issue : Technology and Innovation in the Olympic and Paralympic Games Tokyo 2020

29

35

Wireless LAN (Wi‑Fi)

network for the Games at each venue until just before

Wireless LANs (Wi‑Fi) are in greater demand thanthe Games (April‑May 2021) And implementation of

wired LANs and the provision of an adequate Wi‑Fi

remote access to the BON was necessary to conduct

environment for all parties involved was considered

preparatory work at each venue for test events which

essential for the success of the Tokyo 2020 Games

were to be held in the summer of 2019

We installed a Wireless LAN Controller (WLC) in the

For the security level enhancement

this remote

DC for integrated management of all Wi‑Fi access points

access VPN system required multi‑factor authentication(APs) and scalability in channel design when additional

combining SSL certificatespasswords

and phone

notifications to mobile terminals when connecting as

APs were needed
Because of the wireless nature of the Wi‑Fi network

well as quarantine based on how the OS patch antivirus

there was much concern about its availability andsoftware and pattern file were applied in the PC The

performance so we introduced an integrated manage-

system also performed quarantine based on the OS patch

ment system that could detect rogue APs and checkapplication

signal strength and heat maps

pattern file and disconnects the VPN or updates theantivirus software activationand theHowever since the Wi‑Fi in the Athletes Village wasclient terminal if necessary In addition the personal

predominantly used by athletes to connect only to thefirewall function installed on the terminals applied

Internet we incorporated the Wi‑Fi service for small

appropriate policies and we implemented an Always‑on

offices provided by NTT as part of the OTN rather thanfeature to force remote access when we ran the PC

central management by the WLC This enabled theoutside the office

reduction of equipment costs for APs (as shown in TableIn this way we had implemented a flexible and secure

2 the Athletes Village alone accounted for more thanremote access VPN as of the summer of 2019 when

40% of the total number of APs at all venues)

preparation activities for the Games were in full swing at

In some cases a higher‑than‑expected number of Wi‑

each venue As the number of teleworkers at home

Fi terminals were connected simultaneously in some

surged in 2020 with the spread of the COVID‑19

venues resulting in deficient performance and connec-

infection

tion difficulties

became the most critical to help us survive thewhich we manually adjusted andresolved eventually Please refer to 2‑4 of this special

this remote access service unintendedly

unprecedented postponement of the Games by a year
Due to the declaration of a state of emergency in April

issue for more details
Wi‑Fi technology is advancing rapidly We had to re‑2020

nearly all of the approximately 3 500 staff

examine the product version in cases where themembers were connected simultaneously (Figure 5)

connection method assumed in the design phase did notfrom their homes

match the specifications of the latest terminals brought

maximum number of simultaneous connections to be

while we initially expected thein at the venue and we could not absorb it by any
configuration changes Even for a temporary establishednetwork for an event it is critical to keep up with newtechnologies when the operation period gets longer
36

Remote Access VPN

In the organising committee

which was rapidly

expanding in preparation for the Games we introduced aremote access VPN so that staff members could connect
to the BON for their work even when they were out of
the office Terminal authentication was mandatory toconnect to the BON and L2 authentication was required
for the data network for the Games in offices and venues
while remote access VPN authentication from outside
the office
Due to operational cost and construction period
constraints we planned not to install an official data
30

Figure 5 Maximum Number of Simultaneous Remote Access
VPN Connections
The figures plotted for the day with thelargest number of simultaneous connections in each month In
April 2020 almost all staff were to use remote access so additional
licenses were procured quickly to accommodate this change

THE JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE OF ELECTRONICS INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ENGINEERSaround 2 500

We quickly established a telework

beginning it could be possible that the Games data

environment for the staff by procuring additional

network would have been designed and implemented

licenses and making capacity design changes including

with a different architecture However the postpone-

revising the split tunneling target to improve perform-

ment of the Games by one year did not result in fatal

ance Please refer to 2‑6 and 2‑9 of this special issue forflaws or significant design revisions and the network

details

was able to operate stably with the same architecture as
initially designed until after the postponement It was

4．Summary/Conclusion

only thanks to many engineers of the telecommunication
service and equipment partners of the Tokyo 2020

The most important aspect of the data network

Games who contributed their expertise and knowledge

developed for the Tokyo 2020 Games was to ensure

to design and deploy the network considering thereliability through stable operation while considering

flexibility and easy operations

efficiency For this reason we did not deliver the latest

The IOC initially warned us that “the Olympics istechnologies basically but were very conscious of

NOT a technology showcase ” and the data network for

implementing technologies with practical experience In

the Games and its design engineers who would play aaddition since various parties from around the world

fundamental role in the Games had faithfully adhered tobrought in a wide variety of terminals the architecturethat warning and provided the infrastructure to support

itself had to be flexible enough to meet their require-

the Games

ments and the engineers operating it had to be able toinvisibly

respond quickly and reliably

They had been working steadily andPlease refer to 2‑6 of this special issue for the actual

However when the postponement of the Games cameout we suddenly had to figure out the massive issue of

operations and performance of the data network during
the Tokyo 2020 Games time

how we should keep the data network for the Games that
had already started the operations toward the summerof 2020 for one more year We evaluated and analyzed
various risks which equipment and services becoming
obsolete and cyber‑attacks being higher developed andimplemented appropriate countermeasures after considering its cost and lead time As a result we could keep
operating the data network for the Games without any
problems until 2021 which contributed to the success of
the Games
If the Games had been scheduled for 2021 from the(Received February 28 2022 ; Revised March 15 2022)

KUROMIYA Takayuki
Mr Kuromiya received his M S in Information Science and Technology from Tohoku
University in 1998 and joined Nippon Telegraphand Telephone Corporation (NTT) in the same
year Since then he has been engaged mainly in
the implementation and operation of a dedicated global network for manufacturing enterprises In January 2015 he was seconded to theTokyo 2020 Organising Committee as the
Director of Telecom Business Promotion
Technology Services Bureau㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇㍇

Special Issue : Technology and Innovation in the Olympic and Paralympic Games Tokyo 202031