GCOE Discussion Paper Series
Global COE Program

Human Behavior and Socioeconomic Dynamics
Discussion Paper No. 364

Can We Steer Income Comparison Attitudes by Information
Provision?: Evidence from Randomized Survey
Experiments in the US and the UK

Hitoshi Shigeoka and Katsunori Yamada

March 2015

GCOE Secretariat
Graduate School of Economics
OSAKA UNIVERSITY
1-7 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka, 560-0043, Japan

Can We Steer Income Comparison Attitudes by Information
Provision?: Evidence from Randomized Survey
Experiments in the US and the UK∗
Hitoshi Shigeoka†

Katsunori Yamada‡

Abstract
Economists have long been concerned that negative attitudes about relative income reducesocial welfare. This paper investigates whether such attitudes can be mitigated by a simple
information treatment. Toward this end, we conducted an original randomized online survey
experiment in the US and the UK. As a baseline result, we ﬁnd that UK respondents compare
their incomes with others’ at a much higher rate than US subjects do. Additionally, we
ﬁnd that our information treatment—suggesting that comparing income with others may
diminish their welfare even when income levels are actually increasing—made respondents
compare incomes more, rather than less. Interestingly, we ﬁnd such eﬀects only among UK
respondents. The mechanism for this among UK respondents seems to be driven by those
who are initially less comparison-conscious becoming more comparison-conscious, indicatingthat our information treatment gives moral “license” to make comparisons by informing that
others actually do.

Keywords: income comparison, information treatment, randomized survey experiments,
inter-country survey, discrete choices approach

JEL classiﬁcations: C9, D1, D3.
∗

Yamada acknowledges ﬁnancial supports from JSPS research fund (24683006). We are grateful to Andrew

McGee, Erik Kimbrough, and seminar participants at Osaka Prefecture University, Simon Fraser University, Tohoku
University, Kyoto University, and Academia Sinica for their suggestions and comments. Any remaining errors areours.
†
Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC V5A1S6, CANADA.
Email: hitoshi shigeoka@sfu.ca‡
Faculty of Economics, Kindai University, 228-3, Shin-Kami-Kosaka, Higashi-osaka City, Osaka 577-0813,
JAPAN. E-mail: kyamada@kindai.ac.jp1

1

Introduction

Economists have long been concerned that a tendency to compare own income with others’ income
may reduce social welfare.1 Recent studies have shown that relative income comparison negatively
impacts job satisfaction (e.g., Clark and Oswald 1996; Card et al. 2012), happiness (e.g., Luttmer
2005; Ferrer-i Carbonell 2005), health and longevity (e.g., Marmot 2004; Eibner and Evans 2005),
and risk of suicide (Daly et al. 2013).2 If welfare losses from income comparisons are indeed
signiﬁcant, any governmental interventions that alter such attitudes may have large welfare consequences.3
This paper investigates whether an individual’s income-comparison attitudes can be mitigatedby simple information treatment. Toward this end, we conduct an original randomized online
survey experiment in the US and the UK. Our dataset is nationally representative in each country,
which is an important virtue of our sample. About 4,500 respondents from each country are
randomized into treatment and control groups, with information treatment as the intervention.
We inform participants in the treatment group that people tend to compare their incomes withthat of others, and that such behaviors may diminish happiness even when absolute income isactually increasing. Note that we do not provide any subjective judgment; that is, we do notsuggest that people should stop comparing incomes for the sake of better social welfare.
We employ the following strategy to quantify income-comparison attitudes. In line with theoretical studies of income comparisons, such as Abel (1990), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002),
Dupor and Liu (2003), and Liu and Turnovsky (2005), we consider a utility function with a parameter that captures eﬀects of income comparisons. We then estimate the parameter in the
random utility model framework by applying obtained data from a discrete choices approach: participants choose among alternative combinations of hypothetical monthly income amounts, bothfor themselves and their reference persons.4
1
See, for example Veblen (1899); Duesenberry (1949); Easterlin (1974, 1995, 2001); Hamermesh (1975);
Akerlof and Yellen (1990); and Clark et al. (2008).
2
Note that others’ income levels per se can have positive eﬀects on welfare. For example, Clark et al. (2009)
argue that high income levels of neighbors may have positive impacts on life satisfaction when they serve as social
capital to the community.
3
In order to identify if governmental interventions could be beneﬁcial, researchers have to establish a welfare
criterion. See Loewenstein and Ubel (2008) and Benjamin et al. (2014b) for thoughtful discussions on this point.
Our strategy in this paper is rather simple that we assume welfare loss due to income-comparisons could becharacterized with a parameter of utility function.
4Note that income comparison is one form of social preference among many. Diﬀerent aspects of social preferences include altruism, egalitarianism, reciprocity, and trust (e.g., Fehr and Falk 1999; Fehr and Schmidt 1999;
Charness and Rabin 2002; Fisman et al. 2007, Andreoni and Bernheim 2009; Andreoni and Rao 2011; Horton et al.
2011; Rand 2011; Hossain and Li 2014). Our approach is diﬀerent from that in the large strand of literature onsocial preferences using game-theoretical frameworks. Unlike these game-theoretical frameworks, we do not consider
strategic interactions among respondents. This feature is actually important if we want to estimate parameters ofutility functions that can be used for drawing macroeconomic-welfare implications of income-comparisons.

2An alternative and traditional way of measuring income-comparison attitudes is to directly
ask a question such as “How important is it for you to compare your income with other people’s
incomes?”5 Despite its apparent simplicity, inter-country analysis based on such subject evaluations
is problematic when these countries do not share the same rule of assessments and sense of scale(King et al. 2004). For example, it is diﬃcult to compare a score of ‘3’ in the US and score of ‘6’in the UK from subjective evaluations. Additionally, it is diﬃcult to draw any cardinal inferencesfrom such ordinal survey responses. The main advantage of our approach is that we estimate aparameter of a utility function, which is cardinal and thus comparable across countries.6
Our results can be divided into two parts. The ﬁrst part of the paper documents the baselinecountry diﬀerences in income-comparison attitudes as measured before our information intervention(so that the responses are not contaminated by the information treatment). This baseline result is
important itself, as no previous inter-country studies of income-comparison attitudes are available
with non-subjective evaluation data, even limiting the study to levels of comparison attitude; here,
we provide these results and extend them with the results of changes from external interventions.
We ﬁnd that respondents from the UK exhibit much stronger income-comparison attitudes (i.e.,
are much more jealous) than those from the US, possibly indicating that welfare loss due to income
comparison may be more severe in the UK than in the US. The diﬀerence is large and statisticallysigniﬁcant, and it is robust to control of observable individual characteristics, such as age, gender,
education, and own income.
After documenting these baseline country diﬀerences, the second half of the paper reports
the results from our information treatment. Overall, we ﬁnd that information treatment makes
subjects compare even more (i.e., become more jealous), not less. This result indicates that our
information treatment guided subjects in a direction that may reduce welfare.
Notably, we ﬁnd such eﬀects for only the UK sample. This result suggests that the information
treatment makes the UK participants compare themselves against others more, even though thebaseline results show that UK participants compare more than US participants do. Hence, country
diﬀerences are present in not only absolute levels of income-comparison attitude but also responses
from external intervention. In terms of the magnitude, our information treatment changes theincome-comparison attitude by one-tenth of the mean of the control group in the UK. This eﬀect
is robust to number of sample selections. To avoid respondents who answered without care or those
who left the surveys open for days, we exclude those responses. In addition, we limit the sample tothose who correctly answered the veriﬁcation question to ensure that respondents understood the5

For example, the subject chooses among 0–6, where 0 corresponds to “Not at all important” and 6 corresponds
to “Very important.”
6
There are some recent experimental studies examining concordance of results from choice data and those fromsubjective evaluations data. See, for example, Benjamin et al. (2012), Benjamin et al. (2014a), and Perez-Truglia(2015).

3

contents of the information provided. Such sample selections aﬀect our estimates only negligibly.
Finally, to shed light on the mechanism of information treatment guiding participants in an
undesirable direction, we examine the heterogeneous eﬀects among UK subjects—which we ﬁnd
as the main eﬀect—focusing especially on baseline income-comparison attitude as measured before information treatment. Interestingly, our results are driven by those who are initially lesscomparison-conscious, rather than by those who are initially jealous. This result suggests that
our information treatment raises the salience of income comparison by making the recipients moreaware of income comparisons, rather than making people realize its negative consequences. Consequently, our information treatment might have provided a “moral license” to compare income
with others by informing that other people actually do so.
Overall, our ﬁndings suggest that there is some scope for governmental intervention to aﬀect
deep preference parameters such as income-comparison attitudes through information treatment.
However, our results also imply that aﬀecting the deep parameters in a desired direction may be
diﬃcult. Given our results, the government may do better to explicitly suggest that people shouldstop comparing each other because it is a “bad” thing to do. Apparently, this is a much stronger
message than our current information treatment. Further discussion will be required about how
strong such messages should be and what information the government should convey to alter
income-comparison attitudes in a favorable direction.
A paper closely related to our study is Card et al. (2012). In that study, employees were
provided with access to information on co-workers’ wages, and the study examined whether thisaﬀected job satisfaction and job-seeking behaviors. The major diﬀerence of our study from thatstudy is that we examine changes in preferences instead of changes in behavior; we made thischoice because behavior is aﬀected not only by preferences but also by many other environmental
factors (e.g., peer eﬀects).
This paper is also closely related to an emerging strand of literature that examines the eﬀects ofrandomized information treatment on individual preferences. For example, some studies have examined the eﬀect of information treatment on preferences for redistribution (see e.g., Cruces et al.
2013; Kuziemko et al. 2015; Zilinsky 2014). To the best of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst paper
to examine, in a non-laboratory setting, the eﬀect of information treatment on individuals’ deepparameters, such as income-comparison attitudes, rather than on policy preferences.7
Here, the long tradition of neoclassical economics takes preferences as deep parameters andassumes that they are not altered by external interventions (Stigler and Becker 1977). However,7

A handful of lab experiments have examined the eﬀects of information treatment on individual preferences. For
example, Benjamin et al. (2010) made ethnic identity salient for laboratory subjects and examined how it aﬀected
time and risk preferences. Chen and Li (2009) measured the eﬀects of induced group identity on social preferences
in a laboratory setting.

4

recent literature suggests that individuals’ preferences may be altered by large negative shocks, suchas early-life ﬁnancial experiences (Malmendier and Nagel 2011; Giuliano and Spilimbergo 2014),
ﬁnancial crises (Guiso et al. 2013), changes in both macroeconomic events and household-level labor market outcomes (Krupka and Stephens 2013), conﬂicts or violence trauma (Voors et al. 2012;
Callen et al. 2014), and natural disasters (Eckel et al. 2009; Cameron and Shah 2015; Hanaoka et al.
2014).8 This paper is in line with recent literature suggesting that individual’s deep parameters
may be altered.
Finally, this paper is also related to a small but growing body of literature that uses online
platforms that allow random allocation of questionnaires across subjects.9 Most such papers use
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online labor market in the US (e.g., Horton et al. 2011;
Kuziemko et al. 2015) as an online platform. Our platform, which we describe in detail later,
is another promising platform because we can balance on age, gender, and education. In our
survey, subjects between the ages of 20 and 65 are selected by stratiﬁed random sampling in sucha way that the cohort proﬁles of our sample mirrors the US and UK census data for age, gender,
education, and geographic distribution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes our original randomized online survey experiments. Section 3 reports the baseline diﬀerences in income-comparison
attitudes between the US and the UK. Section 4 reports the ﬁndings from information treatment.
Section 5 discusses the potential explanations for the ﬁndings, and Section 6 concludes.

2

Survey Experiment

2.1

Data collection

Our original survey experiment consists of three parts.10 The ﬁrst part starts with 12 questions
about socio-economic variables such as age, gender, race, educational attainments, and total pretax income in 2013. This is followed by 7 questions about respondents’ subjective values. For thesake of clarity, the exact phrases for the ﬁrst 12 questions were taken from the World-Value-Survey(2012) whenever available. The questions on subjective values included questions about happiness,the intensity of comparisons of income with others, information on whose income would they bemost likely to compare their own with (comparison benchmark), and the predicted income of the8

See also Becker et al. (2012) for a review.
There are a few studies in political science/economy that conducted survey experiments with random allocations of questionnaire across subjects (e.g., Horiuchi et al. 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Di Tella et al. 2012;
Naoi and Kume 2011).
10
See Appendix A1 for a ﬂow chart. Survey questionnaires for the US and the UK are available as a supplemental
online material at http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2015/DP0930som.pdf.
95

comparison benchmark. These questions were borrowed from Clark and Senik (2010). The second
part uses four repeated discrete choice questions regarding environmental policy, which were takenfrom Viscusi et al. (2008). Data obtained from this part are not used in this paper. The ﬁnal partstarts with measuring income-comparison attitudes through hypothetical income questions before
information treatment as a baseline. We explain how we measure income-comparison attitudes in
Section 2.3. After assessing baseline attitudes, we provide the randomized information treatment
to respondents as detailed in Section 2.2. Finally, we measure income-comparison attitudes again.
Our online survey experiment was carried out from March 24 to April 3 (11 days). As clearly
documented in Horton et al. (2011), ”[t]he validity of economics experiments depends heavily upontrust, particularly subjects’ trust that the promulgated rules will be followed and that all statedfacts about payment are true.” As was the case in our previous original internet-based survey withJapanese subjects, reported in Yamada and Sato (2013), Nikkei Research, Inc., who maintains
sample pools in the US and the UK and upholds high research ethics, was chosen to administer
the survey. To maintain the quality of the data, Nikkei Research, for example, excludes so-called
mindless subjects, such as those who provide the same answer to all questions in any block of
discrete-choice questions. The company also excludes observations when the time to ﬁnish thesurvey is too short (< 4 min). In each country, subjects between the ages of 20 and 65 areselected, using stratiﬁed random sampling such that the cohort proﬁle of the sample mirrored thenational census statistics on age, gender, education, and geographical distribution.
In the invitation email sent to registered candidates, we specify that the survey is being conducted for research purposes and that the anonymity of subjects is completely secured. We also
inform them that the survey should take about 15 minutes to complete. If candidates wish toparticipate in the survey, they are instructed to click a link in the email, which directs them toour stand-alone survey website, written in HTML. At the start of the survey, they are informedthat they can withdraw their participation at any time and that they cannot return to previously
answered questions. The payment for the survey is USD1.5 for US respondents and GBP1 for
UK respondents. Payment is only available upon completion of the survey. The survey took respondents 13.4 minutes on average, which is an average hourly wage of roughly USD6.7 for US
respondents and GSB4.5 for UK respondents. There are roughly 4,500 respondents in the US
sample and about the same number in the UK sample. As we explain later, because we have twotreatment groups, respondents are categorized into three groups for each country, and the sample
size of each group is around 1,500 people.
We take several steps to ensure the validity of the results. First, we limit the sample to
only residents in the US and the UK by asking respondents if they are US or UK residents atthe beginning of the survey. Second, to avoid mindless subjects or those who left the survey

6

open for days, we exclude such subjects in the robustness checks described in Section 4.3. To
prohibit subjects from mindlessly skipping through the questions, we enforce answering for all
but one question by not allowing respondents to proceed to next question unless they ﬁll in theanswers.11 Third, we ask a veriﬁcation question to ensure that people understand the contentsof the information provided right after our information treatment. When a respondent answers
incorrectly on the veriﬁcation question, we show the same ﬁgure and instruction one more time, andask the same veriﬁcation question again. In one of the robustness checks described in Section 4.3,
we limit the sample to those who correctly answered the veriﬁcation question.

2.2

Information treatment

Our objective for information treatment is to alert our respondents to the existence of the hedonic
treadmill in relation to income comparisons. To this end, we prepared a ﬁgure on the famous“Easterlin paradox,” indicating that income growth has not been accompanied by an increase inhappiness score. Then, we follow the literature in suggesting that this happens because people
compare their income levels with those of others, and consequently an increase for all does notincrease the happiness of anyone. We choose this ﬁgure—while being well aware that the paradox
is not accepted by all academics—because the story, illustrated with only two time-series plots ofincome and happiness data, is one of the most simple and intuitive ﬁgures for allowing recipientsto understand the possible negative consequence of income comparison.12 Additionally, the ﬁgure
itself is easy to understand and should not require a high cognitive skill, even among generalsubjects who are not familiar with economics.
In our survey experiment, there are two treatment groups (Treatment 1 and Treatment 2). We
describe each treatment in order.
The ﬁrst treatment group is only provided the Easterlin paradox ﬁgure, accompanied by thefollowing very short descriptions of the observation.
[W]hile real income per capita increases sharply, happiness showed essentially no trend
and has remained constant over time. From this ﬁgure, it looks as if individuals in the
United States are in the “ﬂat part of the curve” with additional income buying little, ifany, extra happiness.

11

The only question that respondents could skip was Q7A, which asks “What do you think was your referencegroup’s personal TOTAL income, before taxes, last year (2013)?” We allow this exception due to the potential riskof resistance to reporting other’s income. However, this exception does not seem to pose any issues since there were
only 11 (resp., 12) people who did not answer this question in the US (UK) sample.
12This “paradox” is challenged by Stevenson and Wolfers (2008, 2013), Sacks et al. (2012), and Bond and Lang(2014). However, the scientiﬁc validity itself is not a problem for our research.

7

Figure 1 displays a screenshot of our ﬁrst treatment for the US case. We prepared UK-speciﬁc
ﬁgures for the UK case. Note that this ﬁrst treatment conveys only facts with data and does not
explain the implications of this ﬁgure.
The second treatment group sees exactly the same ﬁgure and short description that the ﬁrst
treatment group sees, but we additionally add the following short description as a possible explanation for the observed relation.
It has been suggested by researchers that this happens because people tend to compare
their income levels against the incomes of others. As long as people compare theirincome against the incomes of others, increasing everyone’s income increases the happiness of no one.
It is apparent here that we add two pieces of information. The ﬁrst sentence points out
people’s tendency to compare their income with others’, while the second one points out thepossible negative consequences for welfare of such income comparisons. Here, it should be stressedthat we do not provide a critical view of making income comparisons for the sake of greater welfare(e.g., “you should not covet”). Instead, we follow a libertarian paternalistic method of intervention(Sunstein and Thaler 2003; Thaler and Sunstein 2003), leaving the freedom of how to digest the
information in the hands of recipients.
It is not certain a priori whether our information treatment will cause recipients to compare
more or less with others (i.e., to become more or less jealous). On one hand, since we point out
not only people’s tendency to compare with each other but also its possible negative consequences,
recipients who are made aware of the hedonic treadmill of income comparisons may stop comparing
with others. On the other hand, if our information treatment results in giving a “moral license”
to compare with others by informing that others actually do so (because we are living in a material world), then recipients—especially those who were initially less conscious about others—maycompare more after our information treatment.
We provide the control group with information unrelated to income comparisons: a ﬁgure on
the extent of Arctic sea ice in February over the last 35 years. Appendix Figure A1 is a snapshotof our information treatment for the control group. We also give some explanations for the ﬁgurethat include roughly the same number of words as the treatment groups to give the same level ofcognitive burden. We use responses from people who receive this placebo treatment to assess thediﬀerential response rates between treatments and control groups, and to take account for fatigue
eﬀects in the survey experiment.
After the information treatment, we ask a very simple veriﬁcation question to ensure that the
subjects understand the provided information.13 For those who incorrectly answer the veriﬁcation
13

For Treatment 1 and Treatment 2, the question is “While real income per capita has increased sharply, the8question, we repeat the same question again after showing the same ﬁgure and descriptions one
more time. As the content in the information treatments is simple, 76.6 percent of respondents
answer the veriﬁcation question correctly on the ﬁrst attempt, with 87.2 percent answering correctlyon the ﬁrst or second attempt.14 Importantly, the accuracy rates among diﬀerent treatments arevery similar: 87.6, 88.5, and 85.3 percent for Treatment 1, Treatment 2, and Control, respectively.15
Although evidence of this is indirect, it is reassuring that our information treatment seems toprovide similar cognitive burdens.
Because the content of the information provided necessarily diﬀers by treatment group, one
common concern is that attrition may diﬀer by treatment group as well. Among those who initiatedthe survey, the attrition rate as a whole was 15.3 percent for the US, and 17.9 percent for the
UK.16 Among those who withdrew participation before completion, only 12.7 (resp., 13.3) percent
of subjects did so after they received information treatment in the US (UK) case. Also, attrition
that happened after the treatment does not seem to qualitatively diﬀer by type of treatment.
Speciﬁcally, among 106 (resp., 131) respondents who initiated participation but withdrew after
the information treatment in the US (UK) case, 30.0 (27.4) percent of belonged to Treatment 1,
34.0 (35.9) percent to Treatment 2, and the rest, 35.8 (36.6) percent, to Control. The slightly lower
attrition rate for Treatment 1 may reﬂect that the instructions were shorter by two sentences thanthose in Treatment 2.17 Overall, attrition does not seem to drive our results.

2.3

How to measure income-comparison attitudes: a discrete choice
approach and a random utility model

We describe how we measure the sign and magnitude of income-comparison attitudes from data of
discrete choice questions. As stated earlier, income-comparison attitudes are measured twice forthe same individuals, before and after information treatment. Respondents are asked to choose
between two alternative situations, where each situation is a combination of hypothetical monthly
income amounts for both themselves and their reference persons (comparison benchmark), keeping
trend of happiness has been [blank]” and the choices are among “increasing”, “constant” (correct answer), and“decreasing”. For the control group, the question is “The winter month trends of the Arctic Sea ice extent havebeen [blank]”, and the choices are among “increasing”, “constant”, and “decreasing” (correct answer).
14
We take this high accuracy rate of the small quiz as fairly good. Rand (2011) reported that at least 80 percent ofexperiment participants in MTurk were not merely making random selections on survey questions, which is similar
to our ﬁgures.
15
In the same vein, the accuracy rates at the ﬁrst attempt are 76.8, 78.7, and 74.4 percent for for Treatment 1,
Treatment 2, and the control group, respectively. We did not repeat this veriﬁcation question more than twice.
16
For example, the overall attrition rate in Kuziemko et al. (2015) using MTurk was 22 percent.
17
In terms of the number of respondents, the diﬀerence between treatment groups 1 and 2 in those who withdrew
after receiving the treatment was only 4 in the US case and 11 in the UK case. Unfortunately, we do not haveinformation on individual characteristics for those who withdrew from the survey, and so we cannot examine
diﬀerential attrition by individual covariates.

9

in mind that the price levels in the two situations are the same. Respondents also have theoption to choose “don’t know/cannot answer,” following the suggestions by Arrow et al. (1993)
and Haaijer et al. (2001).18
To improve the realism of our hypothetical income questions, we elicit information on each subject’s comparison benchmark and impose the answers in the screens on discrete choice questions.19
Table 1 presents the breakdown of comparison benchmarks chosen by US and UK respondents. In
the table, the top-ﬁve choices of comparison benchmark are the same between the US and the UK.
The highest fraction is “I don’t compare,” at 29 percent for US respondents and 27 percent for UK
respondents. This is followed by work colleagues, average people in the US/UK, close friends, andfamily members, in that order; each choice represents roughly 10–20 percent. These top 5 choices
make up 85.3 (resp., 87.5) percent of all choices for the US (UK). Interestingly, this pattern almost
replicates the pattern found in the corresponding table of Clark and Senik (2010) for 18 European
countries.
Before the subjects begin responding to repeated discrete choice questions, they are shown ascreen displaying the following instructions.
In the following screens we show your hypothetical monthly income (before tax). Also
displayed in the same screen is your reference group’s monthly income (before tax).
Suppose that these are the current situations of your monthly income (before tax) andyour reference group’s monthly income (before tax).
In the subsequent screens, we ask subjects to answer hypothetical discrete choice questions tochoose among two situations, using the following format.
Comparing situation 1 and situation 2 shown in the ﬁgures, which is more preferable
to you? Suppose that the price levels in the two situations are the same. Please choose
from the following options.
Each choice comprises two situations, with each situation deﬁned by two attributes: monthly
pre-tax income of respondents and that of the comparison benchmark. The income levels are chosen
18
Arrow et al. (1993) and Haaijer et al. (2001) pointed out the importance of including a no-choice option in
hypothetical choice questions. In the main analysis, we remove the no-choice selections from consideration. An
alternative way is to interpret them as showing indiﬀerence between the two situations, rather than a failure tounderstand the survey question. Unfortunately, we have no information about the true reason why the no-choice
option was chosen.
19
The choice sets for the comparison benchmark are: 1. neighbors; 2. classmates from your school days; 3.
close friends; 4. family members; 5. family members of your children’s classmates; 6. work colleagues; 7. averagepeople in the country; 8. Friends or acquaintances other than the above; 9. others; 10. “don’t know”; 11. “I don’t
compare.” For those who answer either 9, 10, or 11 in the question of comparison benchmark, we encourage anincome comparison with a reference group of “someone like you,” suggesting to respondents that “in psychology,
however, it has been known that people tend to compare themselves, if anything, with those with the same agegroup, gender, and academic background as themselves.”

10

on the basis of actual pre-tax monthly income quintiles in the US (resp., UK): USD900 (GBP1,000),
USD1,800 (GBP1,500), USD2,900 (GBP2,000), USD4,900 (GBP3,000), and USD7,200 (GBP4,000).20
As a snapshot of such an example, Figure 2 asks subjects to choose among situation 1, where own
income is USD900 with reference group income of USD4900, and situation 2, where own income
is USD1800 with reference group income of USD2900.
Such discrete income choice questions are repeated six times both before and after the information treatment (i.e., a total of 12 times) for each respondent. We prepared a total of 25 variationsof choice questions, and 12 of those 25 are randomly assigned to each participant. Hence, no participant answers the same question twice. Appendix Table A1 presents all 25 variations of choicequestion used in this study. The details of how we constructed these hypothetical discrete choicequestions are described in Appendix A2.
From respondents’ choices of preferred income scenarios in our hypothetical choice questions,
we estimate parameters of a utility function in the random utility model framework. We assume
that respondents choose the income situation that oﬀers them higher utility. Following Abel
(1990), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), Dupor and Liu (2003), and Liu and Turnovsky (2005),
we consider the constant relative risk aversion-type utility function U , given by(1)U=(y ȳ γ )1−ρ,
(1 − ρ)where y is own income level and ȳ is income level of others.21 The parameter γ reﬂects the attitudeof income comparisons. Jealousy is reﬂected in γ < 0, and altruism in γ > 0. When γ = 0, there
is no income comparison.
The distribution of parameter γ is estimated by using a mixed logit model and maximizing the
likelihood of observing subjects’ choice patterns (Train 2009). We ﬁrst estimate the distributionof γ for all respondents. Then, the value of γ for each respondent is obtained by ﬁnding the pointin the distribution corresponding to each respondent from the choice patterns. Appendix A2 gives
full technical details for the estimation method (see also Yamada and Sato 2013).
Some remarks about our approach to measuring attitudes of income comparison through a
discrete choice approach are in order.22 Our approach is diﬀerent from eliciting subjective evalu20
The sources of income distributions are the Current Population Survey 2013 for the US and the Survey of
Personal Incomes 2011–2012 for the UK.
21
Other theoretical macroeconomic studies that focus on preference externalities include Fershtman et al. (1996)
and Corneo and Jeanne (1999).
22
See also Solnick and Hemenway (1998), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), Alpizar et al. (2005), andCarlsson et al. (2007) investigated the intensity of social comparisons via hypothetical choice questions. The choice
format in these studies, however, did not allow researchers to estimate a parameter of a utility function for each
respondent. Carlsson et al. (2009) conducted discrete choice question on income comparisons with repeated choicequestions, although their interest was not in the distribution of income-comparison attitudes.

11ations, which is an alternate to the conventional way of measuring income-comparison attitudes.
In the conventional approach, answers to a direct question, such as “How important is it for you
to compare your income with other people’s incomes?”, are used to infer the intensity of income
comparison (Clark and Senik 2010). Although this is a simple and convenient way of measuring
attitudes, our discrete choice approach has several advantages. First, it is a drawback of the conventional method that there is no straightforward way of making meaningful comparison acrossindividuals on the basis of subjective evaluation if respondents do not share a common rule forassessment and a common scale (e.g., a score of 3 and a score of 6 may represent equivalent feelings
between to respondents).23 In fact, King et al. (2004) point out the incomparability of answers
to inter-country surveys when such subjective evaluations are employed. Second, it is diﬃcult
to draw any cardinal inferences from ordinal survey responses. In contrast, because we measurea parameter of utility function for each respondent, we can safely compare income-comparison
attitudes between respondents, and it is straightforward to draw cardinal inferences about welfare
from our results.

3

Results from baseline data

3.1

Summary statistics

Table 2 provides summary statistics from the US and UK samples. The questions about individual
characteristics are asked at the beginning of the survey. Columns 1 and 4 of the table show that
average age is 41 years-old for both samples. Both samples overrepresent white respondents (at73 percent and 90 percent in the US and the UK, respectively). More than half of respondents are
married; 7.8 (resp., 10.2) percent of respondents are immigrants to the US (UK).
We compare these summary statistics with national statistics in terms of age, gender, andeducation. Columns 2 and 5 present the national values, as found by the most recent census in the
US (column 2) and the UK (column 5). We are trying to match the population characteristics byusing stratiﬁed random sampling, and we note that the age and gender distributions are similar
to those in the national statistics; this contrasts with many studies that rely on potentially biased
samples from sources such as MTurk. It is rather unfortunate that those in the lowest education
category in both countries are underrepresented in our data. To deal with the underrepresentationof those with lower educational attainments, we reweighted our sample so that it matches thecensus across 40 cells for gender (2), age bracket (4), and education categories (5). Columns 3
23

See Daly et al. (2013) for a critical view of subjective evaluations, in particular happiness studies. Anotherﬂaw of direct questions is that it will give subjects incentives to misrepresent true responses. Many people dislike
thinking of themselves as comparison-conscious, and they therefore underestimate the degree to which they careabout other’s income. This resembles the purchase of moral satisfaction in Kahneman and Knetsch (1992).

12and 6 show the reweighted sample distribution. In general, reweighting makes quantitatively little
diﬀerence to the analyses presented below. Therefore, we report the unweighted results throughout
the paper (weighted results are available upon request).

3.2

Country diﬀerences in income-comparison attitudes

We ﬁrst document the country-level diﬀerence in the baseline income-comparison attitudes asmeasured before the information treatment (hereinafter, γ0 ). Our approach of using discrete choicequestions can make a unique contribution to inter-country analysis on income-comparison attitudes
because we do not rely on subjective evaluations in estimating such attitudes. Furthermore, evenfrom subjective evaluation data—a parsimonious method of measuring the intensity of income
comparison—there seems to have been no previous evidence for a diﬀerence in the intensity ofincome-comparison attitudes between the US and the UK.24
Figure 1 plots the distribution of baseline income-comparison attitude γ0 for the US and the
UK separately. The distribution for the UK is apparently shifted to the left from that of the US,
indicating that the average γ0 for the UK is much lower than that of the US. Recall that the higher
values indicate less jealousy. This result suggests that respondents in the UK are more jealousthan those in the US.
We can obtain the same results by regression. In column 1 of Table 3, our measures of incomecomparison attitude γ0 are regressed on the UK dummy, which takes a value of one for respondents
in the UK sample. The intercept is the average value for the US, and the use of the UK dummy
captures the diﬀerence between the US and the UK sample. Column 1 shows that the averages forγ0 are 0.056 and −0.129 (= −0.185 + 0.056) in the US and the UK, respectively. The value for the
US is close to zero, suggesting that subjects in the US do not care much about others’ income.25 In
contrast, the average γ0 for the UK has an opposite sign and a much larger magnitude, suggestingthat UK respondents are much more jealous than US respondents. The UK dummy of −0.185 is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.26
To see whether the between-country diﬀerence in income-comparison attitudes is simply a24
Clark and Senik (2010) use subjective evaluation data on attitudes of income comparison from European Social
Survey (round3) but information of the US is missing. Also World Values Surveys 2010–2012 (question V96) ask
about the perception of income equality and egalitarianism. However, the question, albeit capturing an aspect ofsocial preferences, is not about the intensity of income comparisons25
This result is consistent with results in Alesina et al. (2004) showing that people in the US do not care about
inequality as much as people in European countries. Our results echo recent ﬁnding by Luttmer and Singhal (2011),
suggesting that part of the preference for redistribution can be explained by cultural determinants that may notchange much over time.
26
We conﬁrmed that this US–UK diﬀerence does not stem from the diﬀerence in absolute income levels chosen in
the discrete income choice questions across countries. Speciﬁcally, we re-estimated γ with replacing the UK income
level by the corresponding US income level (e.g. replacing GBP1,000 by USD900, GBP1,500 by USD1,800 and soon); the obtained estimates were quantitatively very similar (results are available upon request).

13

consequence of the sample diﬀerences between the US and the UK, we included individual controls
in addition to the UK dummy. Column 2 in Table 3 shows that the coeﬃcient of the UK dummy
is barely aﬀected, and it is still statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Notably, other individual
characteristics do not well predict income-comparison attitudes. An exception is ethnicity/race.
Respondents who identify as Asian seem to be more jealous than those who identify as white (whichis the omitted category). Nonetheless, the result gives some assurance that individual covariates
do not have much predictive power for deep parameters such as income-comparison attitude.
While we cannot completely exclude the possibility that our results on the UK dummy are
driven by other unobserved individual characteristics, this result may serve as a supportive evidenceof a well-known endogenous growth model by Cole et al. (1992) which attributes the diﬀerence inthe economic growth rates between the US and the UK, two countries with very similar economic
fundamentals, to the diﬀerence in social preferences. Our study is the ﬁrst evidence that document
the US–UK diﬀerences in income-comparison attitudes measured in the discrete choice approaches.
As a separate exercise, we also conﬁrm that our measures of income-comparison attitudes areindeed in line with an alternate and parsimonious measure of intensity of income comparisons. In
our survey, we have one traditional self-reported measure concerning intensity of the comparison
with others. The exact question is “How important is it for you to compare your income with otherpeople’s incomes?”, and the answer takes values from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates “don’t compare”,
and 5 indicates “compare intensively”. Thus the higher the value is, the more they compare toothers. Column 3 in Table 3 adds this variable into column 2. It is reassuring that this variable
is highly correlated with our income comparison measures in the expected sign. Nonetheless, it
is again noteworthy that subjective evaluation data contains above-mentioned drawbacks when
researchers want to use it for the comparison purposes. Note also that this relationship is just a
simple correlation as both variables are choice variables.

4

Results from information treatments

After establishing the between-country diﬀerence in our measures on income-comparison attitude,
we now move onto our second set of results, those on information treatments.

4.1

Balance check

Before describing the results, we verify that randomization was correctly performed. One common
way to check is to compare the initial individual characteristics across the groups and make surethat these variables are balanced. Table 4 provides the results of checking for balance, presented
separately for the US and UK samples. The means for each treatment group and the control group14

are shown together with the p-values for the null hypothesis that the means are the same acrossthe three groups.27
The results show that overall both the US and UK samples are balanced. Out of 32 variables
examined in Table 4, only ﬁve variables are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across the groups(p < 0.10).28 Also, it is reassuring that the baseline γ0 is balanced across groups in each country.
In the regression analysis below, some speciﬁcations control for these individual characteristics.
As shown below, our estimates are barely aﬀected by imposing these controls, which are shown
later, further reconﬁrming that randomization was successful.

4.2

Estimation

Since this is a randomized survey, the econometric model is very straightforward. We simply
estimate the following equation:0(2)γi = α + β1 T reat1i + β2 T reat2i + Xi π + ²i

where γi is the income-comparison attitude of individual i as measured after information treatment.
T reat1i and T reat2i are dummy variables indicating membership in Treatment 1 and Treatment 2,
respectively. These treatment dummies measure the diﬀerences in γ between the treatment groups0

and the control group (which is the omitted category). Xi is a vector of pre-determined individual
controls. We always include the baseline γ0 as measured before the information treatment toincrease the precision; this helps because the baseline γ0 is highly correlated with γ measured after
information treatment.29 In some speciﬁcations, we also add age, gender, and education to further
gain eﬃciency. Since baseline γ0 and individual characteristics are uncorrelated with treatment
status, inclusion of these variables should not aﬀect our estimates. We also report the diﬀerencein β1 and β1 with associated standard errors to examine whether the eﬀects of two treatments are
diﬀerent.

4.3

Basic results

Table 5 provides the results for estimating (2) separately for the US and the UK. Odd-numberedcolumns show the estimates without individual controls other than baseline γ0 . Even-numbered
27

This presentation of the balance check follows Table 2 in Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011).
Note that we deﬁne “low-educated” as having educational attainment less than or equal to “some college” inthe US, and less than level 2 qualiﬁcation in the UK.
29
Alternatively, we can take the ﬁrst diﬀerence of γ before and after the information treatment. We do nottake this approach because the ﬁrst-diﬀerence approach arbitrarily forces the coeﬃcient on γ0 to be −1. Since thebaseline γ0 is balanced, the results from the ﬁrst-diﬀerence approach are quantitatively similar (results available
upon request).
28

15

columns show estimates with individual controls included to increase eﬃciency.30 The estimatesbarely changes in both speciﬁcations, suggesting that randomization works well. First two columns
show results for the US and the next two columns show the results for the UK. Column 1 in Table 5
demonstrates that none of the treatments have much eﬀect on income-comparison attitudes in the
US sample. Adding the covariates in column 2 has no eﬀect on the estimated treatment eﬀects.
The magnitudes of the estimates are very small and far from statistically signiﬁcant, suggestingthat neither information treatment has an impact on income-comparison attitudes among US
respondents.
In contrast, columns 3 and 4 show that although Treatment 1 has no impact, Treatment 2 isnegative and marginally statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.10), suggesting that Treatment 2 makes
the UK respondents more jealous. The coeﬃcient of −0.012 on Treatment 2 dummy translates
into the worsening of income-comparison attitudes by one tenth of the mean of the control group(−0.127).31 The last two rows in column 4 show that the diﬀerence between the two treatments
is only marginally signiﬁcant. As shown in Section 5.1, however, the results mask a heterogeneous eﬀect among UK respondents, and a proportion of UK respondents are indeed signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced by the second treatment.
Three things are worth mentioning. First, it is interesting that Treatment 1 did not have any
impact on either group. This result suggests that simply showing the observed data on income
and happiness is not suﬃcient to aﬀect attitudes toward income comparison. While the context
is diﬀerent, this result echoes the recent ﬁnding of Kuziemko et al. (2015) that displaying datawith a highly skewed income distribution was not suﬃcient to aﬀect preferences for redistribution.
Second, Treatment 2, which add only two sentences to Treatment 1, aﬀects the income-comparison
attitudes of some UK respondents, but the eﬀect is in an undesired direction. In Section 5.1, we
discuss in more detail why we think that Treatment 2 directed those respondents in such a direction.
Third, it is striking that our information treatment makes only UK respondents more jealous, eventhough the UK respondents are already more jealous of others at the baseline than US respondents.
Hence, country diﬀerences lie not just in absolute levels of income-comparison attitudes but also
in responses to external intervention. The US participants do not appear to care about others’
income at all and thus the information treatment has no impact, while the UK participants aremuch more malleable.32
30
Speciﬁcally, we added a dummy for age (in years), gender, ethnicity/race dummies, a marriage dummy, animmigrant dummy, education dummies, employment dummies (unemployed, full-time worker, and chief earner), a
dummy for being a parent, and log income (in USD).
31
The reweighted estimates are slightly bigger in magnitude. The estimate on a Treatment 2 dummy becomes−0.018 with standard error of 0.008. The diﬀerence between the estimates of Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 becomes−0.017 with standard error of 0.009.
32
These results are consistent with those of Kuziemko et al. (2015) demonstrating that most policy preferencesamong MTurk subjects in the US are relatively ﬁxed.

16

4.4

Robustness

We verify the robustness of our results here. The eﬀect of Treatment 2 on the UK respondents
is robust to a number of sample selections. Table 6 summarizes the results. To ease comparison,column 1 in Table 6 repeats the estimates from column 4 in Table 5. Since adding controls does
not have any appreciable eﬀects on our estimates, we report the estimates with controls in the restof the paper to improve eﬃciency.
First, responses from mindless subjects were excluded. Speciﬁcally, we excluded observations
from those whose time to take the survey was below the 5th percentile or above the 95th. Column
2 in Table 6 shows that the estimates for Treatment 2 are hardly changed by this.
Next, we limit the sample to those who correctly answer the veriﬁcation questions. Whilethe correctness in the veriﬁcation question is slightly correlated with educational attainment (notshown), our results are robust to such sample selections. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 6 present
the estimates with limiting the sample to those who answer correctly on either the ﬁrst or second
veriﬁcation question (88.3 percent of the UK sample) and to those who answer correctly on theﬁrst veriﬁcation question (79.2 percent of the UK sample), respectively. The magnitudes of theestimates are essentially unchanged, although column 4 for Treatment 2 loses statistical signiﬁcancedue to the smaller sample size.

5

Discussion

5.1

Heterogeneous eﬀects of information treatment

Here, by investigating heterogeneity in the treatment eﬀects, we discover some potential mechanisms that could explain why Treatment 2 makes the UK respondents more jealous, rather thanless, in making income comparisons.33 Of course, other explanations may account for the observation, and we do not view our explanations as deﬁnitive.
As mentioned repeatedly, Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 diﬀer by only two sentences. The
ﬁrst of the two sentences added in Treatment 2 points out people’s tendency to compare theirincome with others’, while the second sentence points out the possible negative consequences ofsuch income comparisons on welfare. Given our empirical results, we conjecture that our subjects
weighted the ﬁrst sentence more than the second and as a result they become more jealous after33

We also examined the heterogeneous eﬀects among the UK subjects on other dimensions. We found that
Treatment 2 has larger eﬀects among female, highly educated, and young subjects. However, except for malefemale diﬀerences, these were not signiﬁcant, though age was statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. We also
investigated the eﬀects through choice of comparison benchmark, but we did not obtain any meaningful diﬀerences,
partly due to the smaller sample size once we stratiﬁed the sample by comparison benchmark (all results available
upon request).

17Treatment 2. Namely, the ﬁrst sentence, “It has been suggested by researchers that this happens
because people tend to compare their income levels against the incomes of others,” heightens
the salience of income comparison and ends up directing the focus towards others’ income levels.
Consequently, our information treatment might have provided the moral license to compare by
informing that others actually do so. If this is indeed the case, we are likely to ﬁnd larger eﬀects of
information treatment among the subjects who did not care much about others before information
treatment.
To investigate this possibility, we ﬁrst examine the heterogeneous eﬀects according to thebaseline γ0 , which is measured before our information treatment. Consistent with our conjecture,columns 1 and 2 in Table 7 show that our results on Treatment 2 are mostly driven by those who
did not initially care about others’ incomes. While the estimated eﬀect of Treatment 2 among those
who are initially more jealous (baseline γ0 is below median) is −0.004 and far from statisticallysigniﬁcant, the same estimate among those who are initially less jealous (baseline γ0 is above
median) is −0.020 and signiﬁcant (p < 0.05). The latter estimate is large and corresponds to aroughly 20 percent change in income-comparison attitudes from the control mean. Unfortunately,
the diﬀerence between the two estimates is not statistically signiﬁcant at the conventional level(χ2 (1) = 1.62, p = 0.203), and thus we cannot exclude the possibility that the two estimates are
the same.
Second, as Duesenberry (1949) and others argue, the income comparison can be asymmetricdepending on income positions. Thus, we examine whether the eﬀects diﬀer by perception ofrelative position to others’ income. In our survey, we ask subjects to answer the level of own income(ysurvey ), as well as the level of expected income of the comparison benchmark (ȳsurvey ). Then, we
divide the sample into three subgroups: own income is lower than that of comparison benchmarks(ysurvey < ȳsurvey ), own income is higher than that of comparison benchmarks (ysurvey > ȳsurvey ),and own income is the same level as that of the comparison benchmarks (ysurvey = ȳsurvey ).34
Columns 1, 4, and 5 in Table 8 show that our results are driven mainly by those who statedthat their own income levels are greater than those of their comparison benchmarks (column
5). Importantly, we control for own income in all the speciﬁcations. This result suggests thatwhile their superior income position initially makes them relatively indiﬀerent to others’ income,information treatment directs them to be more conscious of others’ income. In fact, as shown inthird to last row in Table 8, the control mean of γ among those who are initially optimistic about
their income position (−0.111) is smaller (i.e., less jealous) than both those who are pessimistic
34

Note that ȳsurvey is collected before information treatment, although we are well aware that ȳsurvey is still achoice (and endogenous) variable. Alternatively, the reference income can be the average income of individuals inthe same regions, which some other studies use (e.g., Luttmer 2005). However, in our study, Table 2 shows that
only 1.2% percent of subjects in the UK choose neighbor as the reference group. Of course, this fraction may be alower bound since the reference groups in other categories such as close friends may include neighbors.

18(−0.124) and those who stated the same income as others (−0.137).35
We further investigate whether the distance between own income and that of others matters, assuggested by Ferrer-i Carbonell (2005). Speciﬁcally, for each subgroup, we estimate the following
speciﬁcation, which is a variant of the main speciﬁcation (2):0γi =α + β1 T reat1i + β2 T reat2i + Xi π
+ θ1 {T reat1i × (ln ysurvey − ln ȳsurvey )} + θ2 {T reat2i × (ln ysurvey − ln ȳsurvey )} + ²i ,(3)where we add the interactions of each treatment with the diﬀerence between ln ysurvey and ln ȳsurvey .
Interestingly, column 6 shows that Treatment 2 makes those who are initially optimistic about
their income position (ysurvey > ȳsurvey ) more comparison-conscious as the distance between own
income and that of others becomes greater. While it is speculative, this result is consistent withthat of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) on loss-aversion. Column 2 shows that such a pattern is notobserved among whose stated income is lower than that of the comparison benchmark.
These results do not depend on the speciﬁcation of the diﬀerence between own income andothers’ income. Instead of taking the diﬀerence in log income, we also take the ratio of own
income to others’ income, ysurvey /ȳsurvey , as in Watson and McLanahan (2011). Column 7 inTable 8 demonstrates that the estimates using this measure show a very similar pattern to thosein column 6, where diﬀerence in log income is used.
In sum, although we acknowledge that each piece of evidence is not suﬃcient on its own, theweight of the evidence taken all together supports the hypothesis that Treatment 2 makes theincome comparisons more salient to our UK respondents, and that those who initially pay lessattention to others’ income levels became more comparison-conscious and jealous. Consequently,
we suggest that we may have provided a form of moral license to compare with others by informingthat other people actually do so. Such eﬀects are exacerbated by the magnitude of perceived
diﬀerence between own income and that of peers, but the eﬀects are limited to those who thinkthat their own income level is higher than others’, possibly reﬂecting loss aversion.

5.2“Paternalistic” intervention

The aim of this experiment is to examine whether government can alter income-comparison attitudes to improve welfare, and, if so, whether this is easy. For the ﬁrst question, our results
indicate that it is indeed possible to change income-comparison attitudes by providing simple
35

The empirical evidence on the direction of income comparison is mixed. While Ferrer-i Carbonell (2005) ﬁnds
evidence that income comparison is upward looking, McBride (2001) ﬁnds evidence that it is the other way around.
Our evidence is more consistent with that of Ferrer-i Carbonell (2005) , since those whose income was lower thanothers tended to compare more (upward) than those whose income was higher than others (downward).

19

pieces of information.
However, for the second question, our respondents were actually guided in a direction of decreased welfare. Importantly, we did not tell the participants in our information treatments thatthey should stop comparing with each other for the sake of better welfare. In this sense, our approach is similar to a paternalistic mode of intervention (Thaler and Sunstein 2003; Sunstein andThaler 2003), as we leave the freedom of how to digest the information in the hands of recipients:
when for some reasons individuals cannot choose the best option that would provide them with thehighest welfare among available options, authorities should steer their choices in directions thatwill improve own welfare without limiting freedom of choice. Note that our intervention is intended
to directly aﬀect preferences—not behaviors and choices—unlike previous studies of paternalistic
intervention such as Thaler and Sunstein (2003) and Sunstein and Thaler (2003). Also, our intervention happens to be asymmetrically paternalistic (Camerer et al. 2003) in the sense that those
who are already income-conscious are not aﬀected, while those who are initially less jealous are
more aﬀected.
Thus, our results may serve as one illustration of a point discussed in Sunstein and Thaler(2003), which documents the diﬃculty in guiding agents in a desired direction by information
treatment.36 Given our results on information treatments, governments may want to take thefurther step of explicitly warning of the risk of the hedonic treadmill of income comparisons, doing
so to mitigate the welfare loss from such attitudes. The degree of directness and explicitness, aswell as what information the government should provide, is beyond the scope of this paper but
warrants further investigation.

6

Conclusion

This paper investigates whether we can alter income-comparison attitudes by providing simple
but intuitive information suggesting that making income comparisons may reduce welfare. To
this end, we randomly assigned respondents to online surveys to diﬀerent information treatments.
Speciﬁcally, we showed a ﬁgure suggesting that people’s tendency to compare incomes is a cause ofhappiness remaining unchanged, even as we are getting richer on average. We found that providing
such information made respondents in the UK even more jealous, but we did not ﬁnd any eﬀect
on US respondents. Our ﬁndings suggest that there is some scope for governmental intervention
to aﬀect deep preferences, such as income-comparison attitudes. However, our results also imply
that aﬀecting deep parameters in a desired direction may be diﬃcult.
36

Thaler and Benartzi (2004) provide some examples of successful governmental “paternalistic” interventions. For
example, see Madrian and Shea (2001), Choi et al. (2002), Downs et al. (2013), and Wisdom et al. (2010). Noteonce again that these examples aim at changing choices, rather than preferences.

20

There are a couple of limitations to our study. First, we cannot examine the lasting eﬀect of
our information treatment due to data limitation. It is possible that such information treatment
can alter income-comparison attitudes in the short term only.37 However, it seems unlikely to see
long-term eﬀects where there are no short-term eﬀects. Second, although our studies indicate thepossibility that government can probably aﬀect income-comparison attitudes, we cannot show how
to direct the income-comparison attitudes in a desired way. Providing more direct and stronger
information—stressing that making income comparisons is, indeed, a bad thing to do—could be
more eﬀective than our information treatment. These questions leave room for future research.

37

Few papers tested the duration of eﬀects from informational survey experiments. The evidence is mixed. For
example, Druckman and Nelson (2003) found that their results disappear within ten days while Kuziemko et al.
(2015) found that their eﬀects lasted one month after the information treatment.

21

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28

Figure 1: Information treatment for treatment group 1 (US case)Note: For the UK case, the US ﬁgures in USD are changed to the UK ﬁgures in GBP, and all
the terms “United States” in the sentences are changed to “United Kingdom”.

29Figure 2: Snap shot of a discrete choice problem (the US case)Note: For the UK, the ﬁgures in USD are converted to GBP equivalents. On top of thisquestion, the comparison benchmark (i.e., who to compare with) chosen by each subject is shownwith the aim of making the comparison more realistic.

30

Figure 3: Distribution of γ0 (baseline)

Note: The bin size is 0.05 in both graphs. The vertical line corresponds to the value of zero.
The total sample size is 4,587 for the US and 4,500 for UK. For the US, the mean, standard
deviation, minimum, and maximum are 0.056, 0.146, −1.019, and 0.965, respectively. For the UK,
the corresponding values are −0.130, 0.126, −0.974, and 0.737, respectively. See the main text
and Appendix 2 for a description of how to estimate the distribution of parameter γ.

31

32

Observations
Percentage

Observations
Percentage

Observations
Percentage

Observations
Percentage

52
1.20%

109
2.40%

765
17.00%

687
15.00%

201
4.50%
Average people in the US/UK

173
3.80%

Classmates of yourschool days

100
2.20%

102
2.20%

689
15.30%
Friend or acquaintance544
11.90%

Close friends

47
1.00%

52
1.10%

395
8.80%
Others540
11.80%

Family members

139
3.10%

227
4.90%

27
0.60%
Don’t know

14
0.30%

Family members of yourchildren’s classmates

1,195
26.60%

1,336
29.10%

890
19.80%
Don’t compare

803
17.50%

Work colleagues

Note: The comparison benchmark is the reference group to whom each subject compares their income. The exact question in the survey is “Whose income
would you be most likely to compare your own with? Please choose one of the groups”. Total sample size is 4,587 for the US and 4,500 for the UK.

UK

US

UK

US

Neighbor

Table 1: Comparison benchmark

Table 2: Summary Statistics

VariableMale
Age (in years)
Age (<24)
Age (25–34)
Age (35–49)
Age (50–64)
Educ 1
Educ 2
Educ 3
Educ 4
Educ 5White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other race
MarriedImmigrant
Unemployed
Full-time worker
Chief earner
Have kids
Log income (USD)
Observations

No weight(1)
0.521
41.423(13.013)
0.118
0.240
0.318
0.324
0.029
0.236
0.404
0.230
0.101
0.733
0.097
0.099
0.044
0.028
0.510
0.078
0.118
0.409
0.616
0.571
10.259(0.975)
4,587

US
Census
(2)
0.495

0.153
0.215
0.330
0.300
0.123
0.300
0.295
0.190
0.092

-

Weight(3)
0.495
41.474(12.789)
0.115
0.225
0.346
0.314
0.120
0.300
0.289
0.195
0.096
0.727
0.098
0.113
0.036
0.027
0.513
0.079
0.145
0.373
0.592
0.591
10.161(0.989)4,587

No weight(4)
0.496
41.051(12.722)
0.114
0.242
0.346
0.298
0.067
0.104
0.202
0.263
0.365
0.900
0.022
0.002
0.052
0.024
0.614
0.102
0.085
0.423
0.585
0.599
10.109(0.915)4,500

UK
Census
(5)
0.483

0.188
0.208
0.332
0.271
0.164
0.165
0.187
0.158
0.324

-

Weight(6)
0.482
41.277(12.717)
0.115
0.227
0.362
0.296
0.169
0.164
0.179
0.148
0.341
0.898
0.022
0.002
0.048
0.031
0.623
0.097
0.101
0.400
0.566
0.616
10.058(0.913)4,500

Note: All ﬁgures, except for age (in years) and log income (in USD), are percentages for each category. Educ 1, 2,
3, 4 and 5 correspond to “Less than high school graduate”, “High school graduate”, “Some college or associate’s
degree”, “Bachelor’s degree”, and “ Advanced degree” in the US. In the UK, Educ 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 correspond to“No qualiﬁcations”, “Level 1 qualiﬁcations”, “Level 2 qualiﬁcations”, “Level 3 qualiﬁcations”, and “Level 4
qualiﬁcations and above”, respectively.

33

Table 3: Individual characteristics and γ0 (baseline)

Outcome: γ0 (baseline)UK(1)-0.185***(0.003)(2)-0.186***(0.003)0.005(0.003)-0.000(0.000)-0.009(0.006)-0.008(0.007)-0.023***(0.007)0.015(0.009)0.002(0.003)0.006(0.006)0.002(0.003)-0.002(0.005)-0.004(0.004)-0.002(0.004)-0.006*(0.003)-0.000(0.002)

0.056***(0.002)
0.316
9,087

0.064***(0.019)
0.317
9,087

Male
Age (in years)
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other race
MarriedImmigrants
Low educated
Unemployed
Fulltime worker
Chief earner
Have kids
Log income (USD)
Intensity of comparison
Constant
R-squareObservations(3)-0.185***(0.003)0.005(0.003)-0.000(0.000)-0.008(0.006)-0.007(0.007)-0.022***(0.007)0.015(0.009)0.002(0.003)0.008(0.006)0.002(0.003)-0.002(0.005)-0.003(0.004)-0.002(0.004)-0.005(0.003)0.000(0.002)-0.004***(0.001)0.071***(0.019)
0.318
9,087

Note: All explanatory variables, except for age (in years) and log income (in USD), are dummy variables. The
reference group for race is white. “Low educated” is less than or equal to “some college or associate’s degree” inthe US, and less than or equal to “level 2 qualiﬁcations” in the UK. “Intensity of comparison” can take values from1 (don’t compare) to 5 (compare intensively). Signiﬁcance levels are ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.

34

35

(2)
0.061
(0.146)0.523(0.500)41.599(12.964)0.741(0.438)0.098(0.298)0.103(0.304)0.034(0.182)0.015(0.121)0.518(0.500)0.071(0.258)0.666(0.472)0.134(0.341)0.406(0.491)0.608(0.488)0.574(0.495)10.267(0.977)
1,555

(1)
0.050
(0.153)0.515(0.500)41.394(13.035)
0.723(0.448)0.099(0.298)0.096(0.295)0.051(0.220)0.025(0.156)0.511(0.500)0.077(0.266)0.689(0.463)0.103(0.304)0.403(0.491)0.618(0.486)0.577(0.494)10.259(0.953)
1,488

(3)
0.056
(0.139)0.525(0.500)41.274(13.048)0.733(0.443)0.095(0.293)0.098(0.297)0.046(0.210)0.021(0.143)0.502(0.500)0.086(0.281)0.653(0.476)0.115(0.319)0.418(0.493)0.623(0.485)0.561(0.496)
10.252(0.995)
1,544

Control

0.914

0.630

0.673

0.659

0.028**

0.530

0.300

0.678

0.137

0.061*

0.807

0.909

0.520

0.781

0.860

p-value(equality of
all groups)
(4)
0.106
(5)
-0.131(0.124)0.501(0.500)41.013(12.473)
0.916(0.278)0.015(0.123)0.003(0.052)0.045(0.208)0.021(0.142)0.615(0.487)
0.099(0.299)0.366(0.482)0.088(0.284)0.429(0.495)0.604(0.489)0.612(0.487)
10.116(0.947)
1,498

Treatment 1(6)-0.127(0.130)0.502(0.500)41.192(12.906)
0.892(0.310)0.028(0.164)
0.000
0.000
0.054
(0.226)0.026(0.160)0.613(0.487)0.095(0.293)0.381(0.486)0.083(0.276)0.415(0.493)0.582(0.493)0.583(0.493)10.086(0.901)
1,487

UK
Treatment 2(7)-0.131(0.123)0.484(0.500)40.950(12.792)
0.890(0.312)0.023(0.150)0.005(0.068)0.057(0.233)0.024(0.154)0.614(0.487)0.112(0.315)0.371(0.483)0.083(0.276)0.424(0.494)0.568(0.495)0.601(0.490)10.125(0.897)
1,515

Control

0.470

0.261

0.131

0.723

0.841

0.717

0.294

0.992

0.599

0.314

0.037**

0.070*

0.036**

0.865

0.545

p-value(equality of
all groups)
(8)
0.651

Note: Columns (4) and (8) provide the p-values of the joint test of equality. See Table 3 for abbreviations. Signiﬁcance levels are ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05,
and ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.

Observations

Log income (USD)

ParentChief earner

Full-time worker

Unemployed

Low educatedImmigrant

Married

Other race

Asian

Hispanic

Black

White

Age (in years)Male

γ0 (baseline)

US
Treatment 2

Treatment 1

Table 4: Sample balance across treatments

Table 5: Basic results

Outcome: γTreatment1
Treatment2
Controls
Control meanR-squareObservations
Treatment1 – Treatment2

US
(1)
(2)
0.001
0.001
(0.006) (0.006)-0.003-0.003(0.006) (0.006)
No
Yes
0.025
0.025
0.001
0.005
4,587
4,587
-0.004-0.005(0.006) (0.006)

UK
(3)
(4)
-0.001-0.001(0.007) (0.007)-0.012* -0.012*(0.007) (0.007)
NoYes-0.127-0.127
0.003
0.008
4,500
4,500
-0.011 -0.011*(0.007) (0.007)

Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions control for baseline γ0 , even those labeled as including“no” controls. Controls for covariates further include a dummy for sex, age (in years), each race dummy, a dummy
for married, a dummy for immigrant, each education category dummy, a dummy for unemployed, a dummy for
fulltime worker, a dummy for chief earner, and a dummy for being a parent as well as log income (in USD).
Control mean is the mean value of γ for the control group. The last two rows report the diﬀerence between theestimates of Treatment 1 and Treatment 2, with the standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels are∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.

36

Table 6: Robustness checks (UK sample)

Outcome: γTreatment1
Treatment2
Controls
Control meanR-squareObservations
Treatment1 – Treatment2

Baseline (whole sample)(1)-0.001(0.007)-0.012*(0.007)
Yes-0.1270.008
4,500-0.011*(0.007)Time(2)-0.002(0.007)-0.012*(0.007)
Yes-0.1270.007
4,088-0.010(0.007)

Quiz 1(3)
0.002(0.007)-0.012*(0.007)
Yes-0.1270.010
3,974-0.014**(0.007)

Quiz 2(4)
0.007(0.007)-0.010(0.007)
Yes-0.1270.015
3,567-0.018**(0.007)

Standard errors are reported in parentheses. See Table 5 for list of controls. Control mean is the mean value of γ
for the control group. The last two rows report the diﬀerence between the estimates of Treatment1 andTreatment2, with the corresponding standard errors in parentheses. Column (2) (Time) excludes observations
whose duration time is below the 5th percentile or above the 95th. Columns (3) (Quiz 1 ) and (4) (Quiz 2 ) limit
the sample to those who correctly answered either the ﬁrst or second veriﬁcation questions (88.3 percent of thesample) and those who answered correctly on the ﬁrst veriﬁcation question (79.2 percent of the sample).
Signiﬁcance levels are ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.

37

Table 7: By Baseline γ0 (UK sample)
Outcome: γTreatment1
Treatment2
Controls
Control meanR-squareObservations

Baseline γ0
Below median (more jealous) Above median (less jealous)
(1)
(2)
0.003
-0.005(0.009)(0.010)-0.004-0.020**(0.009)(0.010)Yes
Yes-0.151-0.102
0.013
0.014
2,250
2,250

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. See Table 5 for list of controls. Control mean is the meanvalue of γ for the control group. For columns (1) and (2), note that the lower the baseline γ0 , the more jealous the
subject initially is. For columns (3) – (5), others’ income is the subjects’ expectation about the income of theircomparison benchmark. Signiﬁcance levels are ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.

38

39

Own vs. others’ income
ysurvey = ȳsurvey
ysurvey > ȳsurvey
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
-0.004-0.022-0.031-0.040(0.011)(0.021)(0.028)(0.025)-0.008-0.037*0.014
0.017(0.011)(0.021)(0.028)(0.027)0.016(0.034)-0.099***(0.036)0.009(0.008)-0.028***(0.009)-0.137-0.111-0.111-0.111
0.010
0.038
0.054
0.061
1,598
485
485
485

Note: ysurvey is own income, and ȳsurvey is the subjects’ expectation of income for their comparison benchmark. Standard errors are reported inparentheses. See Table 5 for a list of controls. Control mean is the mean value of γ for the control group. Signiﬁcance levels are ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.

Control meanR-squared
Observations

Treatment2 ×(ysurvey /ȳsurvey )Treatment1 ×(ysurvey /ȳsurvey )Treatment2 ×(ln ysurvey − ln ȳsurvey )Treatment1 ×(ln ysurvey − ln ȳsurvey )Treatment2

Treatment1

ysurvey < ȳsurvey
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.004
-0.0080.016(0.009) (0.013) (0.017)-0.009-0.010-0.006(0.009) (0.013) (0.017)-0.012(0.010)-0.002(0.010)-0.026(0.031)-0.006(0.031)-0.124-0.124-0.124
0.017
0.018
0.017
2,417
2,405
2,405

Table 8: Own vs. others’ income (UK sample)

Appendix A1

Flow chart of questionnaire

The structure and the ﬂow of the experiment is as follows.
1. Background socioeconomic questions including age, gender, race, education, income, andwork status
2. First discrete choice questions, to measure baseline income-comparison attitudes before information treatment
3. Randomized treatment, providing information on income and happiness shown solely to thetreatment group and unrelated information to control group (as shown in Figure A1)
4. Second discrete choice questions, to measure income-comparison attitudes after information
treatment

1Appendix A2

Technical appendix

Appendix A2.1

Construction of hypothetical discrete choice question

First, we explain how we constructed our choice questions. Using the monthly income distributionsin the US and the UK as bases, ﬁve levels of attributes are set. The two attributes (own income andreference income) and ﬁve possible income levels for each attribute provide 25 potential variationsin the income situation scenario. In the literature of choice experiments, these scenarios are called
alternatives.
Researchers have to make their own choices about which alternatives to use in survey questions
and which to discard. Following Louviere et al. (2000), we conducted orthogonal planning in choosing the alternatives to be used in choice questions. This method eﬀectively pairs multidimensionaland multiple-level attributes in alternatives and provides an experimental plan with the greatest
amount of information using the least number of observations. Further, by employing orthogonalplanning, we can avoid multicollinearity problems in the regressions of the random utility model,
which is explained later, because the independent variables in the regressions become orthogonal.
We used SPSS Conjoint (ver. 20.0) for orthogonal design of alternatives in this study.
Next, we constructed choice sets consisting of pairs of alternatives and the no-choice option.
By the requirement of orthogonal design, we generated two diﬀerent alternative vectors, each ofwhich consists of 25 pairs of own income levels and reference income levels.1 Finally, choice sets,with a no-choice option, are created by pairing two alternatives, one of which is taken from one
alternative vector and the other of which is chosen from the other alternative vector. The pairing
strategy is at the discretion of the researchers, but all the variations must be used and the same
alternative cannot be used twice. Because the orthogonality in the alternative matrix is maintainedfor each row permutation, we can arbitrarily pair alternatives to meet the requirement.
As documented in Huber and Zwerina (1996) and Viscusi et al. (2008), it is ideal if the choice
design can be paired so as to balance the utility of each alternative. One diﬃculty in choice
experiments of income comparisons, however, is that an increase (resp., decrease) in a referencegroup’s income does not necessarily mean that there is a decrease (increase) in one’s own utility
level; as such, we did not exclude the possibility of altruistic preference. Given these constraints,
our best strategy for pairing alternatives is as follows.
Suppose we have the scenario S = (x, y), where x denotes the level of one’s own income and yis others’ income. Then, qualitatively, candidates of paired scenarios consist of the following eightvariations: (x, y+), (x, y−), (x+, y), (x+, y+), (x+, y−), (x−, y+), (x−, y), and (x−, y−), where1

As such, in the social average task, 25 alternatives out of 25 potential variations had to be used to meet therequirement of orthogonal design.

2

x+ means some value greater than x and x− means some value smaller than x, and similarly for
y. We do not exclude the possibility of altruism a priori, so there are no a priori dominant choices
for S from these eight alternatives. We then made pairs such that these eight situations appear
as evenly as possible. Using the procedures discussed here, we were able to eﬃciently obtainparameter estimates. Table A1 shows the set of questions we used in the survey. Each respondent
answered 6 randomly assigned questions out of the 25 total questions.

Appendix A2.2

Random utility model and empirical method

Here, we introduce the econometric foundation of how subjects’ choice data can be used to estimate
the sign of coeﬃcients and intensity of income comparisons. To analyze decisions in hypotheticalchoice experiments, we use a random utility model framework. It is assumed that subjects choose
an income situation because they obtain higher utility from that situation than from the otheravailable situations. When there are two situations (A and B, for example as in this study), andif they chose A rather than B, then the choice data is recorded as 1 for A and 0 for B, along withthe levels of the explanatory variables (own income level and reference income level in this study).
These pieces of information constitute the observation for regression analyses.
Now, we assume N subjects who answer T (≥ 1) repeated choice questions. The utility ofsubject n when s/he chooses situation i at question t ∈ T , Uitn consists of observable componentsof the explanatory variables Vitn and unobservable components ²itn , so that utility can be viewed
as Uitn = Vitn + ²itn . Utilities from observable components are assumed to be linear combinations∑Kof each variable as Vitn =k=1 βk Xik , where k = 1, · · · , K(K ≥ 2) represents the variety of
explanatory variable (K = 2 in this study), Xk denotes the levels of the kth explanatory variables,and βk measures the marginal utility of each variable. In the following analysis, the vector β ≡(β1 , · · · , βK ) that maximizes the log likelihood function of observed choice patterns by subject isthe estimator for mixed logit model regressions. Following McFadden (1974), ²itn is distributed
according to an independent and identical distribution of extreme value type 1 (IIDEV1) withvariance σ 2 .
The logit formula of choice probability Pitn for subject n choosing situation i from the set ofsituations St (the choice set) in question t ∈ T can be written as
Pitn = prob(Uitn > Ujtn , ∀j 6= i ∈ St ) = prob(²jtn − ²itn < Vitn − Vjtn , ∀j 6= i ∈ St ).
In McFadden (1974), it was shown that Pitn = exp(λVitn )/∑√j∈S exp(λVjtn ), where λ = π/

6σ isa scale parameter.
Finally, a dummy variable ditn is deﬁned, taking a value of 1 if subject n chooses situation i3for question t ∈ T , and 0 otherwise. Together with the logit formula of choice probability Pitn , thelog likelihood function of repeated choices observed in experiments can be written as
LL(β) =∑∑∑
ntditn ln Pitn .

i∈St

In this paper, we consider a case where the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) does
not hold.2 We then obtain distributions f (βi ) of some parameters in β across subjects by thefollowing method. We specify that f (β) is a normal distribution function with its parameter set
ML
as θ, following Train (2009). The choice probability function Pitn
for the mixed logit model can∫be written as
ML
Pitn
=

Pitn (β)f (β|θ)dβ,

where Pitn is the logit choice probability in the conditional logit model given β. The value of θ
can be obtained via simulation to maximize the simulated log likelihood function3
SLL(θ) =

∑∑∑
n

t

ML
ditn ln Pitn.

i∈St

Next, we specify the shape of the utility function for our purpose here. Individuals derive
utility not only from their own income X1 = y but also from the income of those in the comparison
benchmark X2 = ȳ. From textbook assumptions, we suppose that subjects value attribute ypositively. We consider the constant relative risk-aversion-type utility function as
(1)

V =

(y ȳ γ )1−ρ,
(1 − ρ)where ρ > 0. The parameter γ regulates the intensity and sign of relative utility and is the central
topic of this study. If γ < 0, then the individual has jealousy. If γ > 0, then the individual has analtruistic preference, whereas if γ = 0, there is no income comparison. We take the logarithms ofboth sides in Equation 1 to obtain(2)

ln Vni = (1 − ρ) ln yni + (1 − ρ)γ ln ȳni − ln(1 − ρ).

Using maximum-likelihood estimation, we obtain the point estimates for ln y and distributions of
the coeﬃcients for ln ȳ.4 Finally, we obtained individual parameters of income comparisons γ bydividing the individual coeﬃcient of (1 − ρ)γ by the average eﬀect of (1 − ρ). The individual2

We assume that the error term is independently and identically distributed, as in the conditional logit model.
See Section 6 of Train (2009) for details.
4
See Revelt and Train (1998) for details on this procedure.

3

4

coeﬃcient of (1 − ρ)γ can be obtained by applying the inverse Bayesian formula to the estimateddistribution of the coeﬃcient and the choice pattern of the individual subject (Train 2009).

References
Huber, J. and K. Zwerina, “The importance of utility balance in eﬃcient choice designs,”
Journal of Marketing Research 33 (1996), 307–317.
Louviere, J. J., D. A. Hensher and J. D. Swait, Stated Choice Methods: Analysis andApplications (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
McFadden, D., Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior in P. Zarembka (ed.)
Frontiers in Econometrics (Academic Press, 1974).
Revelt, D. and K. Train, “Mixed Logit With Repeated Choices: Households’ Choices Of
Appliance Eﬃciency Level,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 80 (November 1998), 647–
657.
Train, K., Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation, 2nd edition (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2009).
Viscusi, W. K., J. Huber and J. Bell, “Estimating discount rates for environmental quality
from utility-based choice experiments,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 37 (2008), 199–220.

5

Figure 1: A1: Information treatment for control group (US case)6

Table 1: A1: Choice sets of discrete income choice questions

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q6
Q7
Q8
Q9
Q 10
Q 11
Q 12
Q 13
Q 14
Q 15
Q 16
Q 17
Q 18
Q 19
Q 20
Q 21
Q 22
Q 23
Q 24
Q 25

Situation 1
Own income Ref. income
4
3
5
5
5
4
5
1
5
3
5
2
2
3
4
4
3
3
4
2
3
2
4
1
3
5
4
5
1
4
2
5
2
1
1
5
2
2
1
2
1
3
3
4
3
1
1
1
2
4

Situation 2
Own income Ref. income
3
1
3
5
4
5
5
3
5
4
5
1
4
4
5
2
4
3
1
1
2
2
3
2
3
4
5
5
2
3
1
4
4
2
3
3
4
1
2
5
1
2
2
4
1
5
1
3
2
1

Note: 1= USD900 (GBP1,000), 2= USD1,800 (GBP1,500), 3= USD2,900 (GBP2,000), 4= USD4,900 (GBP3,000),
and 5= USD7,200 (GBP4,000). Each subject answers 12 randomly assigned questions (6 questions before
information treatment and 6 after information treatment) out of the 25 possible questions.

7