GCOE Discussion Paper Series
Global COE Program

Human Behavior and Socioeconomic Dynamics
Discussion Paper No. 334

Are Chinese workers from the one-child-policy
generation selfish in a group? Evidence from worker
surveys in six major Chinese Cities

Yoshihiko Kadoya and Yoshio Sano

April 2014

GCOE Secretariat
Graduate School of Economics

OSAKA UNIVERSITY

1-7 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka, 560-0043, Japan

April 2014

Are Chinese workers from the one-child-policy
generation selfish in a group? Evidence from worker
surveys in six major Chinese Cities*
Yoshihiko Kadoya†

Yoshio Sano‡

Abstract
Many claim that Chinese people born after the one-child policy of 1979 are very
individualistic or even selfish. This research tested the hypothesis that Chinese workersof the one-child-policy generation have difficulty working in a team, addressing theabsence of nation-wide evidence. Using workers’ surveys, for the first time, across six
major Chinese cities, the results denied the hypothesis, at least in the workplace.
JEL classification: J8, M20, R1
Keywords: one-child policy, chinese economy, labor farce quality, foreign direct investment*

This research used micro data from the Preference Parameters Study of Osaka University’s 21stCentury COE Program ‘Behavioral Macrodynamics Based on Surveys and Experiments’ and its
Global COE project ‘Human Behavior and Socioeconomic Dynamics’. I acknowledge theprogram/project’s contributors: Yoshiro Tsutsui, Fumio Ohtake, and Shinsuke Ikeda.
†
Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya University. Address: Furo-cho Chikusa, Nagoya 4648601
Japan. Email: yoshi.kadoya@soec.nagoya-u.ac.jp‡
Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya University. Address: Furo-cho Chikusa, Nagoya 4648601
Japan. Email: sanoyoshio@soec.nagoya-u.ac.jp1Introduction
Are Chinese workers from the “one-child-policy” generation individualistic or evenselfish? Many scholars claim so. Detsch (2006) states that people in China today worry
about creating a generation of “little emperors.” Crowell and Hsieh (1995) describe,“This generation of one-child policy will be the most self-centered in Chinese history
and will turn traditional Chinese ethics and morality on their hands.” Chee (2000)
explains the phenomena: the era of the only child coincides with a period of economic
prosperity in China; so, Chinese families have unprecedented purchasing power, andtheir children may exert a bigger influence on family purchases than any children in theworld do.
On the other hand, foreign direct investors seem to be fond of hiring Chinese workers
from the one-child-policy generation. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in China has been
rapidly increasing over the last two decades (Figure 1). FDI has jumped radically,
particularly since 1997, when the first wave of children from the one-child-policy
generation reached the age of 18 and many entered the job market. As a result, China is
now the world’s number-one producer of more than 100 consumer goods (Ying, 2005)
and it is often described as the “factory of the world.” Of course, China’s tradederegulation policies and its membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) since2001 partly explain its success. However, if the workers that belong to the
one-child-policy generation are selfish, how has the FDI increased dramatically in the
manufacturing field, which demands and values group work?
Little research answers this question. No research compares workers’ individualism
between those from the one-child-policy generation and others. Moreover, the researchthat describes the self-centeredness of the one-child-policy generation relies heavily on
indirect evidence (e.g., the one-child-policy generation is more spoiled than othergenerations). This paper aims to address the absence of research to answer theabove-mentioned question; the evidence is based on analyses of workers’ surveys in six
major Chinese cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Wuhan, and Shenyang.

2

Figure 1: Foreign Direct Investment in China
100
90
80
70
60
50
40

Billion USD

30
20
10
0

Source: China Foreign Economic Statistical Yearbook (2010)

Literature Review
Many studies claim that the one-child-policy generation is selfish when compared toother generations, but such arguments rely heavily on indirect evidence. Crowell andHsieh (199, p. 50), as mentioned earlier, described the one-child-policy generation as
little emperors, because only children were reputed to use temper tantrums to get theirparents to buy them what they wanted. Many studies endorsed a part of the argument.
For instance, parenting in one-child families was more child-centered than in families
with multiple children (Chow and Chen, 1994; Chow and Zhao, 1996). Only children
received more toys and lucky money and were more likely to have a bank account(Chow and Zhao, 1996). However, some studies doubted the relationship between theconcentrated attention of parents and the selfishness of children. According to Davis andSensenbrener (2000), most parental purchases in China were directed toward theirchildren’s educational needs, such as lessons and toys for good grades, and thepurchases for children did not exceed those for adults.
Moreover, empirical studies of the personalities of only children have produced mixed
results. According to Shanghai Preschool Study Group (1980), the teachers in Shanghaipreschools rated the personalities of only children more negatively than they rated thoseof children with siblings. However, the results from 115 studies analyzing thecharacteristics of only-children, published between 1925 and 1984, fail to support the3

negative stereotypes of the only-child (Falbo, 1987). In fact, compared to offspring fromother configurations, only-children in the study scored significantly higher on a varietyof character outcomes, such as locus of control, autonomy, leadership, and maturity.
Poston and Yu (1985), analyzing a survey of 1069 children in Changsha, endorsed theclaim, suggesting that single children were more co-operative than those with siblings
were. No research has investigated the characteristics of only-children with anation-wide sample; this paper addresses the absence of research responding to thequestion.
The workforce that foreign direct investors can employ in middle management and asworkers is important to them (Wakayama, Shinntaku & Amano 2012). Managementfrom the western countries often find it difficult to form groups of workers due to classbias, the philosophy of self-discipline, and attitudes of non-commitment andinvolvement avoidance (Hao & Fong, 2000). Successful management of operations
depends largely on the employee’s collaborative attitude in a team. Through the study of
sixty-two manufacturing Chinese-Western joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries
in China, Björkman & Xiucheng (2002) showed clear co-relations between humanresource management integration and high organizational performances. With that inmind, the possibly individualistic attitude of the workers who belong to the
one-child-policy generation would significantly influence the business perspective forforeign direct investors.
MethodTo investigate if the workers from the one-child-policy generation have difficulty
working in a team, the study utilized data from Osaka University’s “Preference andParameter Study” for 2011/2012. The study conducted face-to-face interviews withindividuals and households in six major Chinese cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou,
Chengdu, Wuhan, and Shenyang, from December 23, 2011 to January 21, 2012. The
target respondents were adults aged 20 to 70 years old. A Multistage Sampling andAllocation Method was used. First, the study set predicted numbers of responses basedon the target population in each district using the Statistical Yearbook. Then, the study
randomly selected an area in each district. Finally, using the Kish Grid method, thestudy chose the individuals from the families for interviews. From the data set, thecurrent research chose 644 observations of employed respondents who had no missing
answers.

4

The study began with a simple comparison of how much the respondents’ agreed withthe following statement: “At work, I should follow the opinion of the group.”(Completely Disagree = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 = Completely Agree). Respondents’ low scores(e.g., close to 1) indicated that the respondents had difficulty working in a group andvice versa. The study first compared the average score between the workers thatbelonged to the one-child-policy generation (e.g., the workers born after the one-childpolicy of 1979) and the workers that belonged to another generation (e.g., the workers
born prior to 1979). As indicated in Figure 1, contrary to the expectation, the workers
born after 1979 scored slightly higher than those born prior to 1979 did.
Additionally, the study compared scores internationally. The Preference Parameter
Study for 2011/2011, used in this research, was an international survey that asked
participants to respond to the same statement in Japan and the United States. Even
compared to the other two nations, the Chinese workers born after 1979 scored thehighest.
Figure 2: Suitability for Group Work
4.5
4

3.89

3.86

3.37

3.5

3.3

3

2.41

2.25

2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
all

born after
1979
China

all

born after
1979
Japan

all

born after
1979
USA

Nonetheless, one should not simply conclude that Chinese workers from the one-childpolicy are suitable for group work, for two reasons. First, the statement used to measure
the suitability for group work was very subjective and often difficult to compareinter-culturally because the tendency of the answer varied, depending on the culture.
That is, in one culture, people tended to score definite choices (e.g., 1 or 5 in this case),5whereas in another culture, people usually tried to avoid definite choices. Second, thestudy did not control for the basic attributes of respondents. Many factors, such as sex,
educational background, and income may have affected a respondent’s suitability forgroup work. The study needed to control these variables in order to avoid possible
sampling bias.
Table 1 shows the variables. The dependent variable was how much the respondents
valued group decisions (group). The independent variables were the dummy variable ofthe one-child policy (onepolicy) and the controlling variables, including gender (male),age (age), marriage status (spouse), educational background (educ), tenure (emphis),and company size (emp300). Researchers applied an ordered-probit estimation.
Table 1: Variable Definition
Variable

Definition

group

Respond to the following statement: “At work, I should follow theopinion of the group.” (Completely Disagree=1, 2, 3,4,5=Completely
Agree)

male

Male=1, Female=0

age

Age

onepolicy

born after the implementation of the one-child policy = 1, otherwise = 0

spouseMarried = 1, otherwise = 0

educYears of schoolingmsalaryMonthly salary (Chinese Yen)emphisYears of employment (Median value of the questionnaire’s choices)

emp300

Employer has 300 or more employees = 1, otherwise = 0

Results
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables. The average number of years of
employment among the observations is 9.67, with the average age being 37.61. The
most observations are likely at the level of mid-manager. For that reason, the averagemonthly salary, 3609 CNY, is higher than the nation-wide average, about 2,000 CNY(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2012). An important aspect of this data is that
more than half of the respondents were born after the implementation of China’s
one-child policy of 1979. According to Crowell and Hsieh (1995: 50), theone-child-policy generation would be the most self-centered in Chinese history, as they6

were pampered and raised as the only child in the family. How to cope with the workers
from this generation becomes very important for foreign direct investors as thegeneration gradually occupies the majority of the labor force in China.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Obs

group

3.86

0.81

1

5

644

male

0.55

0.50

0

1

644

age

37.61

11.27

19

68

644

onepolicy

0.61

0.49

0

1

644

spouse

0.78

0.42

0

1

644

educ

11.84

2.83

0

16

644

msalary3609.32528.2

800

30000

644

emphis

9.67

8.91

0.5

40

644

emp300

0.22

0.41

0

1

644

Table 3 illustrates the estimation results. Model 1 shows the results from allobservations. Model 2 shows the results from the observations in secondary industry,whereas Model 3 indicates the results from the observations in tertiary industry. The
results of the observations from primary industry are omitted, because of the shortage ofthe sample (N=19).
Based on the results, the variable onepolicy did not significantly affect group. That is,
Chinese workers from the one-child-policy generation were not necessarily selfish ingroups. This also applied to Model 2 and Model 3. The hypothesis of “little emperors”
was denied in the workplace. The factor that made Chinese workers suitable for group
work was spouse for Model 1 and Model 3, and msalary for Model 2. The results might
indicate that workers behave better when they need to be more responsible at home. On
the other hand, there might be a causality issue with the msalary factor in Model 2. One
does not know if the workers receive higher salaries because they behave well in theworkplace or if they behave well because they receive higher salaries from theemployer.

7

Table 3: Estimation Results
Model 1: All
group

Model 2: Secondarygroup

Model 3: Tertiarygroup-0.0481(-0.54)0.108(0.54)-0.0869(-0.85)age

0.00566(0.81)

0.00196(0.15)

0.00742(0.86)

onepolicy-0.126(-0.83)-0.0317(-0.09)-0.156(-0.90)

spouse0.265**(2.23)-0.183(-0.66)

0.349***(2.58)

educ0.00353(0.22)

0.0198(0.52)-0.00251(-0.13)msalary

0.0000288(1.63)

0.000100**(2.50)

0.00000659(0.31)

emphis

0.00204(0.35)

0.00815(0.80)

0.00385(0.48)

emp300-0.120(-1.13)-0.0684(-0.35)-0.149(-1.08)-2.303***(-6.00)-0.957(-1.41)-2.265***(-5.22)-1.136***(-3.58)0.0629(0.09)-1.179***(-3.16)-0.142(-0.46)1.590**(2.36)-0.187(-0.51)153
0.02

1.222***(3.31)
472
0.01

group
male

cut1
_cons
cut2
_cons
cut3
_cons
cut4
_cons
N
Pseudo R2

1.304***(4.15)
644
0.01

t statistics in parentheses*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Conclusion
Many claim that Chinese people born after the one-child policy of 1979 are very
individualistic or even selfish. This research tested the hypothesis that Chinese workersof the one-child-policy generation have difficulty working in a team, addressing theabsence of nation-wide evidence. Using workers’ surveys, for the first time, across six
major Chinese cities, the results denied the hypothesis, at least in the workplace.
The research has limitations. First, this paper regarded Chinese workers solely as a“labor force.” Certainly, following group decisions is quite important for the workers at
a factory, for example. However, that is not necessarily the case if the worker is an8

entrepreneur or an independent sales person. As the data set did not include information
about the respondents’ job titles, the study did not control that factor. Second, the data
were collected only from urban areas (i.e., six major cities). The results might not be thesame for rural areas.
Nonetheless, this research is quite important. Although the success of foreign direct
investment heavily relies on the quality of the local workers, the widespread stereotype
of one-child-policy generation workers had not been examined in China, the mostpopular FDI destination in the world. This paper tested the hypothesis for the first time,using workers’ surveys across six major cities, and it concluded that the stereotype is
not supported, at least in the workplace. Although this study has limitations, and thedata were collected in six major cities only, the controversial nature of the
one-child-policy generation and the lack of available empirical evidence from theworkplace demand that researchers begin to construct a better understanding of thisdispute. This paper contributes to that construction of knowledge and insight.

9Reference
Björkman, I. & Fan, X. Human Resource Management and the performance ofWestern firms in China, International Journal of Human Resource Management 13:
6, Sept 2002 (pp. 853-864). Routledge

Chee, B.W. L. (2000). Eating snacks, biting pressure: Only children in Beijing. In J.
Jung (Ed.), Feeding China’s little emperors: Food, children and social change,(pp. 48-70). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Chow, E. N., & Chen, K. (1994). The impact of the one-child policy on women and thepatriarchal family in the People’s Republic of China. In E. N. Chow & C. W. Bersheide(Eds.), Women, the family and policy (pp. 71-98). Albany: State University of New York
Press.
Chow, E. N., & Zhao, S. M. (1996). The one-child policy and parent-child relationships:
A comparison of one-child with multiple-child families in China. International Journalof Sociology and Social Policy, 16 (pp. 35-62).
Crowell, T., & Hsieh, D. (1995). Little emperors: Is China’s one-child policy creating asociety of brats? Asiaweek, 21, (pp. 44–50).
Davis, D. S., & Sensenbrenner, J. S. (2000). Commercializing childhood: Parental
purchases for Shanghai’s only child. In D. S. Davis (Ed.), The consumer revolution in
urban China (54-79). Berkeley: University of California Press.
Falbo, T. (1987). Only children in the United States and China. Annual Review of
Psychology, (p. 7, pp. 159-183).
Hao, R., Fong, A., “Really-How Do Chinese Team?” (2002) Performance Improvement
Volume 39 Number 10. (pp. 39-44).

National Bureau of Statistics of China. (2012), China Populations & Employment
Statistics Yearbook 2012, China Statistics Press, Beijing.
Poston, D. L., & Yu, M.-Y. (1985). Quality of life, intellectual development andbehavioural characteristics of single children in China: Evidence from a 1980 survey inChangsha, Hunan Province. Journal of Biosocial Science, (p. 17). (pp. 127-136).
Shanghai Preschool Education Study Group. (1980). "Family education of only
children," Chinese Woman 5: (pp. 16-17).
Wakayama, T., Shintaku, J., Amano, T., (2012). What Panasonic learned in China,
Harvard Business Review, December 2012.
YING Fan, (2005). “Made in China”. Brand Strategy, Apr, Issue 191

10April 2014

Are Chinese workers from the one-child-policy
generation selfish in a group? Evidence from worker
surveys in six major Chinese Cities*
Yoshihiko Kadoya†

Yoshio Sano‡

Abstract
Many claim that Chinese people born after the one-child policy of 1979 are very
individualistic or even selfish. This research tested the hypothesis that Chinese workersof the one-child-policy generation have difficulty working in a team, addressing theabsence of nation-wide evidence. Using workers’ surveys, for the first time, across six
major Chinese cities, the results denied the hypothesis, at least in the workplace.
JEL classification: J8, M20, R1
Keywords: one-child policy, chinese economy, labor farce quality, foreign direct investment*

This research used micro data from the Preference Parameters Study of Osaka University’s 21stCentury COE Program ‘Behavioral Macrodynamics Based on Surveys and Experiments’ and its
Global COE project ‘Human Behavior and Socioeconomic Dynamics’. I acknowledge theprogram/project’s contributors: Yoshiro Tsutsui, Fumio Ohtake, and Shinsuke Ikeda.
†
Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya University. Address: Furo-cho Chikusa, Nagoya 4648601
Japan. Email: yoshi.kadoya@soec.nagoya-u.ac.jp‡
Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya University. Address: Furo-cho Chikusa, Nagoya 4648601
Japan. Email: sanoyoshio@soec.nagoya-u.ac.jp1Introduction
Are Chinese workers from the “one-child-policy” generation individualistic or evenselfish? Many scholars claim so. Detsch (2006) states that people in China today worry
about creating a generation of “little emperors.” Crowell and Hsieh (1995) describe,“This generation of one-child policy will be the most self-centered in Chinese history
and will turn traditional Chinese ethics and morality on their hands.” Chee (2000)
explains the phenomena: the era of the only child coincides with a period of economic
prosperity in China; so, Chinese families have unprecedented purchasing power, andtheir children may exert a bigger influence on family purchases than any children in theworld do.
On the other hand, foreign direct investors seem to be fond of hiring Chinese workers
from the one-child-policy generation. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in China has been
rapidly increasing over the last two decades (Figure 1). FDI has jumped radically,
particularly since 1997, when the first wave of children from the one-child-policy
generation reached the age of 18 and many entered the job market. As a result, China is
now the world’s number-one producer of more than 100 consumer goods (Ying, 2005)
and it is often described as the “factory of the world.” Of course, China’s tradederegulation policies and its membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) since2001 partly explain its success. However, if the workers that belong to the
one-child-policy generation are selfish, how has the FDI increased dramatically in the
manufacturing field, which demands and values group work?
Little research answers this question. No research compares workers’ individualism
between those from the one-child-policy generation and others. Moreover, the researchthat describes the self-centeredness of the one-child-policy generation relies heavily on
indirect evidence (e.g., the one-child-policy generation is more spoiled than othergenerations). This paper aims to address the absence of research to answer theabove-mentioned question; the evidence is based on analyses of workers’ surveys in six
major Chinese cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Wuhan, and Shenyang.

2

Figure 1: Foreign Direct Investment in China
100
90
80
70
60
50
40

Billion USD

30
20
10
0

Source: China Foreign Economic Statistical Yearbook (2010)

Literature Review
Many studies claim that the one-child-policy generation is selfish when compared toother generations, but such arguments rely heavily on indirect evidence. Crowell andHsieh (199, p. 50), as mentioned earlier, described the one-child-policy generation as
little emperors, because only children were reputed to use temper tantrums to get theirparents to buy them what they wanted. Many studies endorsed a part of the argument.
For instance, parenting in one-child families was more child-centered than in families
with multiple children (Chow and Chen, 1994; Chow and Zhao, 1996). Only children
received more toys and lucky money and were more likely to have a bank account(Chow and Zhao, 1996). However, some studies doubted the relationship between theconcentrated attention of parents and the selfishness of children. According to Davis andSensenbrener (2000), most parental purchases in China were directed toward theirchildren’s educational needs, such as lessons and toys for good grades, and thepurchases for children did not exceed those for adults.
Moreover, empirical studies of the personalities of only children have produced mixed
results. According to Shanghai Preschool Study Group (1980), the teachers in Shanghaipreschools rated the personalities of only children more negatively than they rated thoseof children with siblings. However, the results from 115 studies analyzing thecharacteristics of only-children, published between 1925 and 1984, fail to support the3

negative stereotypes of the only-child (Falbo, 1987). In fact, compared to offspring fromother configurations, only-children in the study scored significantly higher on a varietyof character outcomes, such as locus of control, autonomy, leadership, and maturity.
Poston and Yu (1985), analyzing a survey of 1069 children in Changsha, endorsed theclaim, suggesting that single children were more co-operative than those with siblings
were. No research has investigated the characteristics of only-children with anation-wide sample; this paper addresses the absence of research responding to thequestion.
The workforce that foreign direct investors can employ in middle management and asworkers is important to them (Wakayama, Shinntaku & Amano 2012). Managementfrom the western countries often find it difficult to form groups of workers due to classbias, the philosophy of self-discipline, and attitudes of non-commitment andinvolvement avoidance (Hao & Fong, 2000). Successful management of operations
depends largely on the employee’s collaborative attitude in a team. Through the study of
sixty-two manufacturing Chinese-Western joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries
in China, Björkman & Xiucheng (2002) showed clear co-relations between humanresource management integration and high organizational performances. With that inmind, the possibly individualistic attitude of the workers who belong to the
one-child-policy generation would significantly influence the business perspective forforeign direct investors.
MethodTo investigate if the workers from the one-child-policy generation have difficulty
working in a team, the study utilized data from Osaka University’s “Preference andParameter Study” for 2011/2012. The study conducted face-to-face interviews withindividuals and households in six major Chinese cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou,
Chengdu, Wuhan, and Shenyang, from December 23, 2011 to January 21, 2012. The
target respondents were adults aged 20 to 70 years old. A Multistage Sampling andAllocation Method was used. First, the study set predicted numbers of responses basedon the target population in each district using the Statistical Yearbook. Then, the study
randomly selected an area in each district. Finally, using the Kish Grid method, thestudy chose the individuals from the families for interviews. From the data set, thecurrent research chose 644 observations of employed respondents who had no missing
answers.

4

The study began with a simple comparison of how much the respondents’ agreed withthe following statement: “At work, I should follow the opinion of the group.”(Completely Disagree = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 = Completely Agree). Respondents’ low scores(e.g., close to 1) indicated that the respondents had difficulty working in a group andvice versa. The study first compared the average score between the workers thatbelonged to the one-child-policy generation (e.g., the workers born after the one-childpolicy of 1979) and the workers that belonged to another generation (e.g., the workers
born prior to 1979). As indicated in Figure 1, contrary to the expectation, the workers
born after 1979 scored slightly higher than those born prior to 1979 did.
Additionally, the study compared scores internationally. The Preference Parameter
Study for 2011/2011, used in this research, was an international survey that asked
participants to respond to the same statement in Japan and the United States. Even
compared to the other two nations, the Chinese workers born after 1979 scored thehighest.
Figure 2: Suitability for Group Work
4.5
4

3.89

3.86

3.37

3.5

3.3

3

2.41

2.25

2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
all

born after
1979
China

all

born after
1979
Japan

all

born after
1979
USA

Nonetheless, one should not simply conclude that Chinese workers from the one-childpolicy are suitable for group work, for two reasons. First, the statement used to measure
the suitability for group work was very subjective and often difficult to compareinter-culturally because the tendency of the answer varied, depending on the culture.
That is, in one culture, people tended to score definite choices (e.g., 1 or 5 in this case),5whereas in another culture, people usually tried to avoid definite choices. Second, thestudy did not control for the basic attributes of respondents. Many factors, such as sex,
educational background, and income may have affected a respondent’s suitability forgroup work. The study needed to control these variables in order to avoid possible
sampling bias.
Table 1 shows the variables. The dependent variable was how much the respondents
valued group decisions (group). The independent variables were the dummy variable ofthe one-child policy (onepolicy) and the controlling variables, including gender (male),age (age), marriage status (spouse), educational background (educ), tenure (emphis),and company size (emp300). Researchers applied an ordered-probit estimation.
Table 1: Variable Definition
Variable

Definition

group

Respond to the following statement: “At work, I should follow theopinion of the group.” (Completely Disagree=1, 2, 3,4,5=Completely
Agree)

male

Male=1, Female=0

age

Age

onepolicy

born after the implementation of the one-child policy = 1, otherwise = 0

spouseMarried = 1, otherwise = 0

educYears of schoolingmsalaryMonthly salary (Chinese Yen)emphisYears of employment (Median value of the questionnaire’s choices)

emp300

Employer has 300 or more employees = 1, otherwise = 0

Results
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables. The average number of years of
employment among the observations is 9.67, with the average age being 37.61. The
most observations are likely at the level of mid-manager. For that reason, the averagemonthly salary, 3609 CNY, is higher than the nation-wide average, about 2,000 CNY(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2012). An important aspect of this data is that
more than half of the respondents were born after the implementation of China’s
one-child policy of 1979. According to Crowell and Hsieh (1995: 50), theone-child-policy generation would be the most self-centered in Chinese history, as they6

were pampered and raised as the only child in the family. How to cope with the workers
from this generation becomes very important for foreign direct investors as thegeneration gradually occupies the majority of the labor force in China.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Obs

group

3.86

0.81

1

5

644

male

0.55

0.50

0

1

644

age

37.61

11.27

19

68

644

onepolicy

0.61

0.49

0

1

644

spouse

0.78

0.42

0

1

644

educ

11.84

2.83

0

16

644

msalary3609.32528.2

800

30000

644

emphis

9.67

8.91

0.5

40

644

emp300

0.22

0.41

0

1

644

Table 3 illustrates the estimation results. Model 1 shows the results from allobservations. Model 2 shows the results from the observations in secondary industry,whereas Model 3 indicates the results from the observations in tertiary industry. The
results of the observations from primary industry are omitted, because of the shortage ofthe sample (N=19).
Based on the results, the variable onepolicy did not significantly affect group. That is,
Chinese workers from the one-child-policy generation were not necessarily selfish ingroups. This also applied to Model 2 and Model 3. The hypothesis of “little emperors”
was denied in the workplace. The factor that made Chinese workers suitable for group
work was spouse for Model 1 and Model 3, and msalary for Model 2. The results might
indicate that workers behave better when they need to be more responsible at home. On
the other hand, there might be a causality issue with the msalary factor in Model 2. One
does not know if the workers receive higher salaries because they behave well in theworkplace or if they behave well because they receive higher salaries from theemployer.

7

Table 3: Estimation Results
Model 1: All
group

Model 2: Secondarygroup

Model 3: Tertiarygroup-0.0481(-0.54)0.108(0.54)-0.0869(-0.85)age

0.00566(0.81)

0.00196(0.15)

0.00742(0.86)

onepolicy-0.126(-0.83)-0.0317(-0.09)-0.156(-0.90)

spouse0.265**(2.23)-0.183(-0.66)

0.349***(2.58)

educ0.00353(0.22)

0.0198(0.52)-0.00251(-0.13)msalary

0.0000288(1.63)

0.000100**(2.50)

0.00000659(0.31)

emphis

0.00204(0.35)

0.00815(0.80)

0.00385(0.48)

emp300-0.120(-1.13)-0.0684(-0.35)-0.149(-1.08)-2.303***(-6.00)-0.957(-1.41)-2.265***(-5.22)-1.136***(-3.58)0.0629(0.09)-1.179***(-3.16)-0.142(-0.46)1.590**(2.36)-0.187(-0.51)153
0.02

1.222***(3.31)
472
0.01

group
male

cut1
_cons
cut2
_cons
cut3
_cons
cut4
_cons
N
Pseudo R2

1.304***(4.15)
644
0.01

t statistics in parentheses*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Conclusion
Many claim that Chinese people born after the one-child policy of 1979 are very
individualistic or even selfish. This research tested the hypothesis that Chinese workersof the one-child-policy generation have difficulty working in a team, addressing theabsence of nation-wide evidence. Using workers’ surveys, for the first time, across six
major Chinese cities, the results denied the hypothesis, at least in the workplace.
The research has limitations. First, this paper regarded Chinese workers solely as a“labor force.” Certainly, following group decisions is quite important for the workers at
a factory, for example. However, that is not necessarily the case if the worker is an8

entrepreneur or an independent sales person. As the data set did not include information
about the respondents’ job titles, the study did not control that factor. Second, the data
were collected only from urban areas (i.e., six major cities). The results might not be thesame for rural areas.
Nonetheless, this research is quite important. Although the success of foreign direct
investment heavily relies on the quality of the local workers, the widespread stereotype
of one-child-policy generation workers had not been examined in China, the mostpopular FDI destination in the world. This paper tested the hypothesis for the first time,using workers’ surveys across six major cities, and it concluded that the stereotype is
not supported, at least in the workplace. Although this study has limitations, and thedata were collected in six major cities only, the controversial nature of the
one-child-policy generation and the lack of available empirical evidence from theworkplace demand that researchers begin to construct a better understanding of thisdispute. This paper contributes to that construction of knowledge and insight.

9Reference
Björkman, I. & Fan, X. Human Resource Management and the performance ofWestern firms in China, International Journal of Human Resource Management 13:
6, Sept 2002 (pp. 853-864). Routledge

Chee, B.W. L. (2000). Eating snacks, biting pressure: Only children in Beijing. In J.
Jung (Ed.), Feeding China’s little emperors: Food, children and social change,(pp. 48-70). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Chow, E. N., & Chen, K. (1994). The impact of the one-child policy on women and thepatriarchal family in the People’s Republic of China. In E. N. Chow & C. W. Bersheide(Eds.), Women, the family and policy (pp. 71-98). Albany: State University of New York
Press.
Chow, E. N., & Zhao, S. M. (1996). The one-child policy and parent-child relationships:
A comparison of one-child with multiple-child families in China. International Journalof Sociology and Social Policy, 16 (pp. 35-62).
Crowell, T., & Hsieh, D. (1995). Little emperors: Is China’s one-child policy creating asociety of brats? Asiaweek, 21, (pp. 44–50).
Davis, D. S., & Sensenbrenner, J. S. (2000). Commercializing childhood: Parental
purchases for Shanghai’s only child. In D. S. Davis (Ed.), The consumer revolution in
urban China (54-79). Berkeley: University of California Press.
Falbo, T. (1987). Only children in the United States and China. Annual Review of
Psychology, (p. 7, pp. 159-183).
Hao, R., Fong, A., “Really-How Do Chinese Team?” (2002) Performance Improvement
Volume 39 Number 10. (pp. 39-44).

National Bureau of Statistics of China. (2012), China Populations & Employment
Statistics Yearbook 2012, China Statistics Press, Beijing.
Poston, D. L., & Yu, M.-Y. (1985). Quality of life, intellectual development andbehavioural characteristics of single children in China: Evidence from a 1980 survey inChangsha, Hunan Province. Journal of Biosocial Science, (p. 17). (pp. 127-136).
Shanghai Preschool Education Study Group. (1980). "Family education of only
children," Chinese Woman 5: (pp. 16-17).
Wakayama, T., Shintaku, J., Amano, T., (2012). What Panasonic learned in China,
Harvard Business Review, December 2012.
YING Fan, (2005). “Made in China”. Brand Strategy, Apr, Issue 191

10