The Japan Society Review
Book, Stage, Movie, Arts and Events Review

Editor: Sean Curtin
Managing Editor: John Toppon...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Issue 25 Volume 5 Number 1 (February 2010)

Contents(1) Conflict and Change: Foreign Ownership and the Japanese Firm
(2) Japan’s Silk Road Diplomacy(3) A Doomed Man (運命の人)(4) Gaea Girls (ガイア・ガールズ)(5) Alfred East Lyrical Landscape PainterWe kick off our first issue of 2010 reviewing a fascinating
new book by George Olcott, “Conflict and Change:
Foreign Ownership and the Japanese Firm.” The author
looks at three foreign owned Japanese companies
and compares them to three regular firms. The bookprovides some thought-provoking insights into
Japanese employment patterns, gender equality, ....................................................................................................
attitudes towards shareholders along with a host ofConflict and Change:other topics. As a byproduct key characteristics of theForeign Ownership andcontemporary Japanese company are highlighted,
the Japanese Firmmaking this an extremely useful piece of research.
Moving further afield, “Japan’s Silk Road Diplomacy”
by George Olcott
is a new work on Tokyo’s foreign policy toward thestill relatively little known Central Asian states. Japan’sCambridge University Press,
involvement in this increasingly important geopolitical
2009, 279 pages including
region has intensified in recent years, culminating inindex, Hardcover £55.00
2006 with a visit by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
ISBN 978-0-521-87870-8
to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This book explains
Review by Sir Hugh Cortazzi
Tokyo’s regional involvement to date and how it isThree firms were studied
likely to develop. Fumiko Halloran explores the new
by George Olcott in thisand immensely popular four volume tale by Toyoko
well researched book, theseYamazaki, “Doomed Man” (運命の人). Yamazaki weaves
were Shinsei Bank (formerlya really gripping tale out of the so called “Nishiyama
the Long Term Credit Bank),
Incident” involving the leaking of some confidential
documents relating to the secret political agreement Chugai Pharmaceutical Co and Nissan. He compares the trio
which helped to secure the return of Okinawa. She of firms, which are controlled by foreign capital, with threealso writes about the sad history of Okinawa, linking it firms in the same lines of business which are not identified.
to the current controversy about relocating Futenma The main themes (chapters) cover how different Japanesebase. Susan Meehan gives us her verdict on the award- firms are in their recruitment and training, lifetime employment
winning documentary movie Gaea Girls, which follows and career patterns, reward systems, female employees, as
the incredibly grueling training of a group of would-be well as organisation and the decision-making process. The
Japanese women wrestlers. Sir Hugh Cortazzi rounds study is only concerned with white-collar workers.
off this issue with a look at a new book on the painterOlcott in his introduction tells readers how when he was
Alfred East.
working for S.G. Warburg in Tokyo one Japanese company
asked him to give advice on a brochure they had prepared for
Sean Curtin
foreign investors. When he looked at the draft he was struckby the absence of any reference to shareholders. When hepointed this out, his Japanese interlocutors said “Naruhodo”[Oh yes, of course, but it had not been of course for themin the past!]. In the last few years Japanese firms have been....................................................................................................
forced to pay greater attention to shareholders but many
New reviews
Japanese firms, like some British banks, although in their casewww.japansociety.org.uk/resources/the-japan-society-review
it is only the top employees and directors for whom the bankArchiveseems to be run, still seem to be managed primarily for the
http://www.japansociety.org.uk/reviews_archive.html
employees.
We are grateful to our regular reviewers:
Sir Hugh Cortazzi
Simon Cotterill
William Farr
Fumiko Halloran
Mikihiro Maeda

Susan Meehan
Takahiro Miyao
Ian NishBen-Ami Shillony
Tomohiko Taniguchi

Japanese firms have been forced by the bursting of the
bubble and increased competition to modify the post-war
structure of life-long employment, decision-making byconsensus through the “ringi” system, payment largely by
seniority, and subordination of women. One modification

has been that a higher proportion of employees have beentaken on as temporary workers who can more easily belaid off in a recession and whose benefits and salaries arelower than those of permanent staff. There has also been
greater attention to shareholders as one of the stakeholders
in the company, but it is clear from Olcott’s study that evenin the Japanese firms controlled by foreign capital, there
is considerable reluctance to adopt western or perhaps
we should say Anglo-Saxon ways of doing business andemploying staff.
It would be wrong to condemn the whole Japanesesystem because of its undoubted weaknesses. It did bringstability and engendered loyalty. Its emphasis on equality
helped to ensure harmony. Despite its weaknesses andover-hierarchical bureaucratic structures Japanese firms
especially in manufacturing have generally retained
their competiveness, have continued to maintain theirinvestment in research and development and generally
managed to increase productivity. They did not always
provide happiness and job satisfaction (some firms wereruthless in sending employees hither and thither without
considering the implications for their families) but they
did provide job security and reasonable rewards. Japanesefirms under the old system would not dismiss anyone forincompetence, but would rather relegate them to thewindow. This was expensive and meant that the ambitious
young employees often felt frustrated but the average
employee was probably happier in the old style Japanese
firm than in one run more on Anglo-Saxon lines.
The old system had, however, to change with globalisation.
Deregulation became necessary to ensure that Japanesecompanies modernised to meet the changing patternsof world trade. Japan had to accept foreign capital andknowhow and this inevitably meant at least some elementsof foreign management style.
Olcott’s book shows that Japanese firms under foreign
ownership can become more profitable and possibly better
employers, but there is no single formula for how best to
do this and change cannot be effected overnight. Much
depends on the individuals involved and their sensitivity
in handling the inevitable culture clashes. But these need
not involve ‘conflict,’ a word in the author’s title which is
misleading.
Olcott quotes (page 248) a Nissan manger as saying: “Youneed to have for this kind of alliance people who are reallyopen to other cultures, very globally minded, with a lot of
understanding of different points of view.” This clearly applies
to both the foreign investor and the Japanese company
involved. The author provides a list of the conditions for
success (page 256) which should, as he says, be self-evident,
but some intelligent people, foreigners and Japanese alike,sometimes, because of prejudice or obstinacy, fail to see theobvious. Of these conditions perhaps the final one provides
the key: “an understanding that learning is a two-way
process, that the local operation almost certainly will havesomething to teach the rest of the global organisation.”
2

Those responsible in foreign companies contemplating
investment in Japanese companies should read this bookbefore plunging in with their wellington boots.

Japan’s Silk Road
Diplomacy Paving the Road Ahead
edited by Christopher
Len, Tomohiko Uyama
and Tetsuya Hirose
Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute & Silk Road Studies
Program (Institute for
Security and Development
Policy), Washington/
Stockholm, 2008,
Paperback.
ISBN: 978-91-85937-46-2
Review by Sean Curtin
It is not quite two decades since the former Soviet Union’s
secluded Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) declared
independence. Yet in the last twenty years their geopoliticalprofile has dramatically risen. Japan was relatively late torecognize their global significance, thus its regional strategy
emerged at a gradual pace. This substantive new work
gathers together the research of ten leading experts, whochart Japan’s Central Asian foreign policy and provide acomprehensive overview of Tokyo’s evolving regional
approach.
During the Soviet era Central Asia barely registered in theJapanese consciousness, Tomohiko Uyama notes “Soviet
Central Asia was never an object of great interest to Japanesediplomacy (page 106).” Consequently, post-Soviet Japanese
engagement in Central Asia was relatively slow to take shapeand can be divided into roughly three segments. Theseare phase one (i) spanning 1992-1997 (Japan’s initial policy
towards Central Asia), phase two (ii) covering 1997-2004(PM Hashimoto’s Eurasian Diplomacy/Silk Road Diplomacy)and phase three (iii) running from 2004 to the present (PMKoizumi’s Central Asia Plus Japan initiative).
The first period commences with the independence of thefive Soviet republics in 1992 and ends in 1997. Perhaps not
surprisingly, in the first five years Tokyo focused relatively
little attention on the region. Although the break-up of theSoviet Union afforded Japan an opportunity to engage
with a re-emerged Russia and the new cluster of postSoviet independent states, its initial efforts floundered.
This was largely because foreign policy was too fixated on
Russia, downgrading initiatives and policy towards Central
Asia. Tokyo’s keenness to resolve its decades-long territorial
dispute with Moscow over the Northern Territories (South
Kuril Islands), which the Soviet Red Army occupied at theIssue 25 Volume 5 Number 1 (February 2010)

end of WWII, resulted in an overemphasis on relations with
the Kremlin. Stalemate on the issue finally snapped Tokyoout of its myopia and turned its gaze towards the newly
independentcountriesofCentralAsia.Itsinadequateresponsein the early post-independence period allowed China tomake significant political and economic strides, signingvarious bilateral agreements and resource cooperationaccords. Due to historic factors Russia also enjoyedconsiderable political and economic clout in the region. Whilecounterbalancing the influence of both Beijing and Moscow
was one foreign policy object, the region’s abundant oil
and gas reserves also offered a possible solution to Tokyo’s
challenging energy diversification strategy (see chapter 9 by
Kuniko Shimao).
By 1997 Japanese diplomats had finally begun to grasp
properly the true geopolitical importance of Central Asiaand the Caucasus region. If Japan wished to remain a global
player, it could not afford to fall further behind Russia andChina on its regional doorstep, consequently it decided to
upgrade its strategy.
In this new atmosphere Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro
Hashimoto introduced the concept of “Eurasian Diplomacy”
and more specifically “Silk Road Diplomacy” in a speechdelivered in 1997. He outlined Japan’s foreign policy not
only towards Russia and China but also significantly towards
the nascent Central Asia states (“Silk Road Diplomacy”) andCaucasus region. Hashimoto set out a vision in which Japan
would strive to improve its relations with these young
nations with the aim of fostering political and economic
stability. Tokyo would assist in integrating them into theinternational community, and so contribute towards theestablishment of a “peaceful Eurasian continent” throughenhanced cooperation. Hashimoto dramatically declaredthat it was time for Japan to craft a new Eurasian diplomatic
perspective, one which would be “viewed from the Pacific”
rather than “from the Atlantic.” Christopher Len states, “thisstrategy sought to promote the idea that Japan as an Asianstate could play a leading role in influencing Eurasian affairs”(page 31). Hashimoto’s Silk Road Diplomacy set a clear
course and a substantive relationship gradually began totake shape. While the new policy was in reality not so radicallydifferent from previous policy, the Hashimoto initiative gave
it an enormous boost and the “Silk Road Diplomacy” projectprovided the necessary framework to take an invigorated
policy forward (see Chapter 10 by Hirose Tetsuya).
As bilateral ties strengthen, Tokyo searched for new initiatives
to take relations to a higher level. It was even suggested thatJapan should join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO) which was founded in 1996 and initially comprised
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan (theShanghai Five). When Uzbekistan later joined it was renamed
the SCO (see Chapter 4 by Akihiro Iwashita). However, theSCO idea was rejected and Japan in consultation with theCentral Asia states decided to inaugurate its own body.
The establishment of the “Central Asia Plus Japan” initiative
under the Koizumi administration signalled the next phase inTokyo’s Central Asia strategy.
Issue 25 Volume 5 Number 1 (February 2010)

Prime Minister Hashimoto in Central Asia

In 2004 the Central Asia Plus Japan initiative was launchedin a speech by Foreign Minister Yuriko Kawaguchi,
signalling another important milestone. Christopher Len
observes, “In essence, the Central Asia Plus Japan initiative
is a continuation of the Silk Road Diplomacy set out in1997” (page 40). He further comments, “Japan’s initiative
was welcomed by the Central Asian governments. This isbecause Japan’s efforts and contributions complemented
the primary objectives of the Central Asian regimes, namely,
regime survival, economic growth and state autonomy”(page 41). Tomohiko Uyama believes the policy “is basedon Japan’s experience with ASEAN, a relative success in thehistory of Japanese diplomacy” (page 112).
Japan’s Official Development Assistance 2005 Report
explained its Central Asia policy objectives, stating they
were based on two pillars: “(1) to further enhance efforts
to strengthen bilateral relationships and develop closer ties
between Japan and each Central Asian country, and (2)to advance dialogues with the entire Central Asian regionin order to promote intraregional cooperation aiming atfurther development of the Central Asian countries” (page39). The report also clarified that the enterprise (including
Turkmenistan as an observer), was “initiated with theobjective of materializing the second pillar.”
In August 2006, in the penultimate month of Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi’s administration, he visited Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan, the first such visit by a serving Japanese PM.
Some sceptical observers viewed Koizumi’s trip as primarily
an attempt to secure energy resources for Japan combinedwith an effort to counterbalance the regional influence ofChina and Russia. However Timur Dadabaev is convinced
it was much more, marking a significant milestone. He
writes “Koizumi’s visit to Central Asia exceeded all previous
efforts of Japanese diplomacy and aimed to accomplish abreakthrough in relations with regional states” (page 130).
2006 saw the emergence of another significant strand in
the regional policy weave with the launching of the Arc
of Freedom and Prosperity (AFP) initiative. The Ministry ofForeign Affairs (MOFA), under the then Foreign Minister
Taro Aso, described the AFP as a new pillar for Japanesediplomacy. Aso, who later served as Prime Minister (24September 2008 – 16 September 2009), enthusiasticallysupported the idea. Yuasa Takeshi comments, “Foreign
Minister Aso Taro himself was one of the driving forces
behind the AFP initiative. He used it to make not only3

diplomatic appeals, but also proposals to distinguish hisvision regarding the contemporary situation in Eurasia and(roughly) diplomatic strategy” (page 48).Takeshi is generally
positive towards Aso, describing him as a man who“announces his own ideas in simple words to Japanesecitizens” (page 50), ironically a quality he was criticized
for when prime minister. The AFP initiative stressed theimportance of “value-oriented diplomacy.”
Aso’s keenness for the idea was demonstrated when in
June 2007 he published a book of his own speeches andmonologues, “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity [自由と繁栄の弧], (Gentosha, 2007).
Uyama makes an interestingobservation about AFP,
stating “is a fundamental
departure from traditional
Japanese diplomacy in thesense that it places strongemphasis on ‘universal
values’ such as democracy,
freedom, human rights, therule of law, and the market
economy” (page 114).
Timur Dadabaev believes
the proper functioning of
the policy holds the key to
自由と繁栄の弧
deepening ties (page 140),
while Erica Marat stresses people to people exchanges
within the AFP initiative (page 99).
By Japanese standards, Aso enjoyed a relatively long stintof two years at MOFA (31 October 2005 – 27 August 2007)
which enabled him to promote the idea vigorously. However
it was not sufficient time to bring the AFP concept to“maturation” and after Aso was replaced as Foreign Minister
the initiative was not pursued under the administrationof Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda (26 September 2007
– 24 September 2008) and his Foreign Minister, MasahikoKōmura. Yuasa Takeshi observes, “the AFP appears to havebeen withdrawn as a main initiative of Japanese foreign
policy. Since then, the AFP as a regional concept has hardly
ever been discussed” (page 47). Surprisingly, this situation
did not change when Aso succeeded Fukuda to thePremiership in September 2008, but the overriding focus
of Aso’s administration was mainly devoted to dealing withthe dire economic situation and trying to stave off almost
inevitable electoral defeat from a buoyant opposition. If
Aso had won the August 2009 election, he may well have
refocused on the policy he promoted so enthusiasticallywhen Foreign Minister.
It is too early to evaluate Japan’s diplomatic achievements
under the AFP framework and how they will evolve under
the new administration of Prime Minister Yukio Hatayama
and his successors. The new Democratic Party of Japan
government has yet to set out its own vision for Central
Asia. The book takes us up to the Fukuda administrationof 2008, Christopher Len gives Tokyo a fairly favourable
assessment up to this point, “Japanese efforts to engage the4

Central Asian leaderships andto help the region develop
links with the rest of the world,
beyond Russia and China,
should be acknowledged
as a significant contribution
by this Asian nation andbe supported” (page 46).
Niklas Swanström is equally
positive, stating that Japan“has an important role toplay in balancing Russia andChina, and in guiding theCentral Asian economies
closer towards greater
openness” (page 156).
Taro Aso launches the Arc of
Freedom and Prosperity
However, there will almost
certainly be many challenges
ahead as Japan seeks to consolidate its position in Central
Asia. This invaluable book provides an excellent basis forunderstanding how its foreign policy may develop andinterpreting Tokyo’s stance towards this pivotal region.

A Doomed Man[運命の人]by Toyoko Yamazaki[山崎豊子]
Bungei Shunju, April-June
2009, 4 volumes, 256
pages per volume, ¥ 1524
each.
volume 1:
ISBN 978-4163281100;
volume 2:
ISBN: 978-4163281209;
volume 3:
ISBN: 978-4163281308;
volume 4:
ISBN: 978-4163281407,
			

Review by Fumiko Halloran

The author, known for her best sellers on the corruption of
power and social injustice, has come out with a novel that
explores the political dynamics surrounding the return of
Okinawa from the U.S. to Japan in 1972. Thinly disguised as
fiction, the book is based on research and interviews. Even
the real names of the politicians, diplomats, and journalists
are easy to guess from the fictional names in the novel.
The tale focuses on “The Nishiyama Incident,” or “The
Return of Okinawa Agreement Confidential Document
Leak Incident,” a scandal that is still alive. In 2007, Takichi
Nishiyama, a former reporter for the Mainichi Shimbun who
was a central figure in the scandal, filed a civil suit against
the Japanese government to overturn the verdict in a trialthat found him guilty of obtaining confidential government
Issue 25 Volume 5 Number 1 (February 2010)

documents. He demanded compensation for damaging
his reputation but the court rejected his claim, citing the
expiration of the pertinent statute.
The beginning of the tale stretches back almost four decades.
In 1971, negotiations between the U.S. State Department and
the Japanese Foreign Ministry over the return of Okinawa
were intense. Prime Minister Eisaku Satoh was determined toachieve the reversion, declaring that Japan would not be freeof the wartime trauma without the return of Okinawa.
In the novel, Ryota Yuminari (Nishiyama in real life) is a starreporter for Maiasa Shimbun (Mainichi Shimbun) who has
broad contacts with politicians and officials. Overconfident
and arrogant, Yuminari does not hesitate to play gameswith sources and information. He has an investigative
reporter’s instinct for finding big stories, particularly when
officials try to hide information.
An unsolved issue in the negotiations is payment for
returning property requisitioned by the U.S. forces. The
Japanese government expects the U.S. to pay for restoring
property to usable condition. Otherwise, U.S. forces would
leave behind concrete structures and damaged land. Earlier,in 1961, the U.S. had paid for restoring farmland to its original
condition. This time, however, the State Department tells
the Japanese that the U.S. Congress is in no mood to pay $4
million (about 1 billion yen at the exchange rate then) as the
U.S. government had pledged that no further compensation
would be paid to the Japanese.
The Japanese balk, pointing out that the Japanese
government had already agreed to pay U.S.$320 million
to buy American utility, water, and financial corporations,to pay severance to base workers, to cover the cost ofremoving nuclear weapons, and to cover the cost fortransporting American forces elsewhere. Prime Minister
Satoh insisted that $4 million should be paid by the U.S. sothat the Japanese government could avoid criticism thatJapan had “bought” the return of Okinawa.
To preclude the $4 million issue from becoming the last
obstacle to reversion, in the book the American Embassy’s
Minister Sneider (Richard Sneider being his actual name inreal life) proposes to establish a trust fund with Japan’s $4
million, out of which compensation would be paid to theproperty owners, thus avoiding Congressional scrutiny.
Minister Sneider tries to persuade the reluctant Japanesenegotiators that appearances are more important thansubstance in this instance.
Further, Sneider demands that Foreign Minister Aichi (Kiichi
Aichi in the real world) write a letter to Ambassador Meyers
saying the Japanese government intends to pay $4 million to
the U.S. for compensating the property owners in Okinawa.
He assures the Japanese that the letter would remain
confidential. Otherwise, Sneider warns that prospects forthe return of Okinawa may be at risk; he suggests that
the State Department officials believe in a solid U.S.-Japan
alliance but the Senate and the Pentagon are concernedthat the return of Okinawa may reduce the effectiveness of
the U.S. military presence in Asia.
Issue 25 Volume 5 Number 1 (February 2010)

Foreign Minister Aichi meets U.S. Secretary of Defense Rojard(actual name Melvin Laird) in Paris at an OECD conference.
Pressed with the demand from Sneider and a time table forannouncing the conclusion of the Okinawa negotiations,
the Japanese team in Tokyo sends confidential cables
to the foreign minister in Paris outlining the American
demands. At a press conference in Paris, the foreign ministryannounces the conditions of the agreement, saying the
U.S. will compensate Okinawan property owners-without
mentioning the secret agreement that the money will
come from the Japanese government.
In June 1972, the signing ceremony for the return of Okinawa
is televised via satellite in Washington and Tokyo.
During the Diet debate on the ratification of the agreement,
the reporter Yuminari obtains drafts of three top secretcables from Tokyo to Paris from a source in the foreign
ministry; they clearly indicate the scheme for the trust
fund. He writes articles based on these cables but without
revealing documentary evidence.
Frustrated that exposing thetrust fund does not develop
into a major issue, Yuminari
meets with a member of
the Japan Socialist Party,
Hiroshi Yokomizo (Takahiro
Yokomichi in the real politicalworld) who is eager to use
Yuminari’s information to
attack PM Sabashi (Satohin our universe). Yuminari
shows copies of the cables
to Yokomizo but did notgive them to him. In thenext Diet debate, the prime minister, the foreign minister,and the foreign ministry’s director general of the America
bureau all deny the existence of a secret agreement.
Yuminari decides then to give copies of the cables to
Yokomizo, believing he can protect his source and still
deliver evidence of government deception. Yuminari warns
Yokomizo not to show the copies in public but Yokomizo
does so anyway. In addition, photocopies appear in a rival
newspaper.
An eruption ensues and an investigation into the sourceof the leaked cables is launched. PM Sabashi is furiousthat the fiasco has interrupted the smooth sailing of Dietratification. Sabashi calls the Director General of the Police
Agency to demand that Yuminari be found criminallyresponsible. Sabashi’s ambitions include winning a Nobel
Peace Prize for the return of Okinawa and he will not accept
all his work and effort being thwarted by a journalist.
At this juncture a sexual scandal involving Yuminari comes
into the story. A secretary, Akiko Miki (Kikuko Hasumi inour reality), of a senior foreign ministry official, stuns her
superior when she confesses that she is Yuminari’s source.
She voluntarily submits herself to the police.
5

Yuminari is summoned for police questioning but by thetime he arrives, the police have a full confession from Mikiand Yuminari is arrested. He is charged with having “aided
and abetted” a public servant to disclose confidential
matters. Yuminari spends 10 days in jail before being
released on bail.
The incident ignites wide press coverage, roiling public
opinion, and stirring outrage among journalists who makeYuminari a hero for fighting to protect news sources andthe right of free expression against government pressure.
His newspaper hires lawyers. Other newspapers support
Yuminari on the need to protect sources, criticizing thegovernment’s deception, and asserting the public’s right toknow.
When the trial opens in the Tokyo District Court, however,the prosecution discloses that Yuminari and Miki, a married
woman, had had intimate relations. The implication isthat Yuminari obtained top secret information by taking
advantage of their relationship. Yuminari asserts that it
was a relationship between consenting adults and henever pressed her to supply information; rather, she gave
documents to him as a favour.
But the damage is done and public opinion turns against
him. Maiasa editorials are unable to justify the way Yuminari
obtained confidential information. Support for Yuminari
and his newspaper plummet. Public outrage damages thepaper’s reputation and subscriptions drop as it is boycotted.
The defence team tries to emphasize the public’s right toknow, dismissing the sexual relations as irrelevant. Seniorforeign ministry officials deny the existence of a secretagreement, claiming loss of memory about the three cables.
Prosecutors, aware of the displeasure of the prime ministerand the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, are relentlessin chasing Yuminari while the defence team paints thegovernment as a powerful machine trying to deny thepress access to information that should shed light on major
issues of state.
The Tokyo District Court, in which three judges without ajury make rulings, finds Yuminari not guilty but rules that
Miki has violated the civil service code. She is sentenced
to six months in prison with one year of probation. The
prosecutors appeal Yuminari’s not guilty verdict to theTokyo Superior Court where the first verdict is overturned
and Yuminari is sentenced to four months in prison and
one year on probation.
Miki begins to paint herself as a victim of Yuminari’s sexual
harassment. She collaborates with a reporter of the Shukan
Shincho weekly magazine and appears on television talkshows. Yuminari remains silent even though his lawyers urge
him to treat Miki as a hostile witness. Yuminari’s marriage
breaks up, he resigns from his newspaper, and goes into his
family business of produce supply in Kyushu as he preparesfor a trial at the Supreme Court. That court, however, refuses
to hear the case, ending his hope of clearing his name. He
ends up selling his family business and becomes addicted
to gambling on horses and binge drinking.
6

Several years later, Yuminari
finds himself in Okinawa
after having been rescued
from a suicide attempt
on a ship heading toward
Okinawa and retreats into
seclusion. Gradually hebegins to reconstruct hislife by getting involved with
Okinawans who still carry
the scars from the battles of1945 in which one in three
Okinawans were killed.
After that terrible ordeal
they then had to live for decades under the iron rule ofAmerican forces.
In 2000, the Kyokunichi Shimbun (Asahi in our realm)
reports that a professor at Ryukyu University has discovereda memorandum between Minister Sneider and Director
General of America Bureau Magoroku Yoshida (real nameBunroku Yoshino) in the National Archives in Washington,
D.C. It outlines the scheme of the trust fund. Yuminari’s
suspicion is now proven but Yoshida continues to deny
there was such an agreement even though his initials are on
the document. The novel ends with reconciliation between
Yuminari and his wife at the Peace Memorial Museum insouthern Okinawa.
The author of the novel writes in an afterword that most of
the former foreign ministry officials involved in the Okinawa
negotiation declined to be interviewed. In 2006, however,Hokkaido Shimbun interviewed Bunroku Yoshino, theformer director general of the America Bureau who signed
a memorandum on the secret agreement. He admitted its
existence and said he lied on orders from Foreign Minister
Yohei Kono when the Asahi story broke out. Yoshino’s
motivation to finally come clean is not clear, but at the ageof 86, he talked in detail about the negotiations.
The $4 million compensation was a small portion of the $685
million the Japanese government paid to the U.S. Yet that
small deception ruined the lives of Nishiyama and his family,
Kikuko Hasumi and her husband, and several senior Mainichi
editors. The Mainichi Shimbun never recovered from theboycott and its subsequent decline in subscriptions. Several
foreign ministry officials suffered from reprimands. Perhaps
the real victims were the property owners in Okinawa who
received only $1.4 million, not $4 million, in compensation.
This four volume novel is a page turner that skilfully weaves
historical narrative with complex characters and humandrama. In the background is the theme of arrogancewithin Japan’s bureaucracy that does not take into accountpersonal suffering in the larger scheme of foreign policy.
That bureaucracy is indifferent to the need for a healing
process for the Okinawans who suffered from the Japanesemilitary during the war, then from the American military in
the post-war period. Yamazaki, herself a former reporter for
the Mainichi Shimbun, looks hard at the role of the press inpolitics.
Issue 25 Volume 5 Number 1 (February 2010)

The part about Yuminari
living in Okinawa in the
fourth volume is somewhat
contrived. Neither Yamazaki
nor Nishiyama mentions
that he actually lived
in Okinawa. The fourthvolume gives much space
to the collective suicides by
Okinawan civilians after theAmerican landing in 1945.
It dwells on the American
military
bases
that
Okinawans have endured
and the crimes committed
by American soldiers. Yamazaki intends to drive home
the harsh reality of life in Okinawa for Japanese readers
who are unfamiliar with its history but she may be faulted
for possible overkill in the novel.
The return of Okinawa was hailed by the Japanese
government as marking the end of the wartime trauma.
The U.S. government asserted it was evidence of thedemocratic processes in which the former warring
nations agreed on the peaceful reversion of occupied
territory. But the Okinawans themselves were excluded
from the negotiations even though they allied themselveswith Japan’s opposition parties and the activists who
criticized, distrusted, and rejected the approaches ofboth governments.
For those who criticize the U.S.-Japan alliance, the belief isstrong that Okinawans will not be at peace so long as theAmericans stay there. Since the U.S. military is not likely toleave Okinawa, peace of mind will not come to Okinawans.
At the same time, Okinawa’s economy depends on thebases and subsidies by the Japanese government. Life goeson but Okinawa’s history is still an open wound in U.S.-Japan
relations. For that reason, Toyoko Yamazaki’s novel will be
widely read.

Gaea Girls[ガイア・ガールズ]
directed by Kim
Longinotto & Jano
Williams
2000, 100 minutes(Available on DVD from 25
January 2010 as double
release: Gaea Girls/Shinjuku
Boys).
Review by Susan Meehan
Building on the success of “Divorce Iranian Style” and“Shinjuku Boys,” Longinotto and Williams spent threemonths in Japan filming female pro-wrestlers ‘interned’ atIssue 25 Volume 5 Number 1 (February 2010)

the Gaea Girls’ stark boot camp, unobtrusively allowing
stories to evolve in documentary style. ‘Gaea Girls’
corresponds to a sumo wrestlers’ ‘stable’ or training centre,
perhaps, and the young girls sacrifice any independence,
freedom and privacy they may have in their all-consuming
quest to become top wrestlers. They sleep in bunk beds inless than salubrious conditions and train all the time.
Early on in the documentary we witness a stomachchurning pro-wrestling match (many more follow) in which
the women fighters don’t hold back – from belly-flopping
onto the prostrate adversary, already flattened and knocked
to the ground by powerful drop kicks to the face and body;to pulling one another’s hair and to using a lit burner on theother’s face, the violence is extreme and no punches arespared. At this point I was ready to leave the cinema andthe scenes of women with blood-caked hair, split lips andblood-splattered faces well behind, but thought I would be
rewarded by seeing the film through to the end.
The documentary goes on to focus on Takeuchi, a budding
wrestler in her late teens whose abiding ambition it is todebut as a professional. Takeuchi has to pass a tough trial,
i.e. undergo a series of bouts against the rest of the Gaea
Girls to prove her mettle and to this end is constantly
training. Early on in the documentary Takeuchi comes
across as a spirited personality excitedly revealing that she
wants to become a pro-wrestler in order to prove herself
and become “somebody,” but becomes rather taciturn andtroubled as the film progresses and her training intensifies.
Takeuchi’s commitment - given the tough training, thebrutal telling off by top wrestler and mentor Chigusa
Nagayo, a powerfully built woman and advocate of ‘toughlove’ who has taken this group of young girls under her
wings - is truly incredible. Failing her first trial, Takeuchi is
not allowed to become professional as, not cutting themustard, she would discredit the Gaea Girls. The pasting
she receives during the punishing trial bouts and the abuse
she receives from Chigusa for not fighting back are hard to
stomach.
All in all I did not fully regret watching the film in its entirety as
the documentary is original in focusing on and highlighting
a little-known aspect of Japan and the characters are
truly interesting. What I really wanted to know, however,7was where these girls had come from and what had set
them on the path to train in such a violent, nasty andbloody sport, albeit it a popular one given the number ofenthusiastic followers and spectators. What would theirlives have become otherwise and what were they trying toprove? What illusions did they have about pro-wrestling?
What did their families say, if anything? Were they runningaway from something? Sadly, these questions were left
unanswered.
In the Q&A following the screening at the Renoir Cinema
on 31 January 2010, Longinotto said that pro-wrestling can
be a vehicle for young Japanese women to do something
for themselves; it is this which I found most difficult toswallow. To my mind the poor girls in the documentary
were nothing more than indentured wrestlers at bootcamp living on a pittance, being physically and visually
abused and encouraged to become professional, no
doubt, in order to rake in money for Gaea and bring themmore exposure and sponsorship. It is hard to believe thatthe girls had many other options in life.
Takeuchi eventually does turn professional, most certainly aresult of the depletion of new recruits through absconding,and does not last long. In her debut professional bout she
is left reeling by the Gaea Girls’ own Satomura and only
manages to fight a few more months, we were told at the
Q&A, before retiring and finding work at a petrol station
These seem to be impressionable girls without many
options, somehow lured in by an almost cultish outfit
masquerading as a sporting centre. Perhaps fame andglamour are attained in some cases, but at what senselesscost.

Alfred East Lyrical
Landscape Painterby Paul Johnson and
Kenneth McConkey
Sansom and Company,
Bristol, 2009, 1444 pages
including illustrations,bibliography and index.
Hardcover £19.95
ISBN 978-1-906593-33-9
Review by Sir Hugh Cortazzi
Sir Alfred East RA (1844-1913) was a founder memberof the Japan Society in 1891. He was commissioned by
Marcus Huish, director of the Fine Art Society in New
Bond Street in 1888 to “paint the landscape of Japan.” Hetravelled to Japan with Charles Holme and Lazenby Liberty
who were also fascinated by Japan. East’s diary of this visit
was published in 1991 under the title A British Artist in
Meiji Japan (edited by me and published by In Print). As
Paul Johnson writes in this volume “Many of the subjects
painted by East …were the typical sites of interest to foreign
visitors but some were pure landscapes. East saw through8

European eyes, of course,
but what was unique about
his pictures when comparedwith those of other visiting
British artists was theatmosphere he created withhis skilled use of watercolour
to produce translucenceand to capture the rain andmists and the various moodsof the landscape as theychanged with the weather.”Ten paintings by Alfred East
are reproduced in this book.
I was particularly struck withthe following picture entitled“An Angry Night” which even in this reproduction shows
his use of colour and shade:
East was born in Kettering in 1844 as the son of a bootmaker and he started in business with his brother who
was twenty years his senior. He developed gradually intoa landscape painter. Apart from painting English scenes hetravelled widely in Europe and the United States. He later
became a decorator, etcher and educator. Reproductionsof his paintings in this volume are divided into sections
entitled “Earlier British pictures,” Japan, France, Italy, Veniceand Sicily, Spain and Egypt and Later British works.
The introductory part of the book covers his life and career
until his death in 1913. His relationships with the Royal
Academy and the RBA are discussed. Kenneth McConkey
writes about “East and the Edwardian Grand Tour” in an
essay entitled “Picturesque Imperialist.” East may nothave achieved the highest accolades from the critics
but Edmund Gosse who was a leading critic of the early
decades of the twentieth century declared at the openingof the Kettering Gallery, which East created, that he wasan artist “who was first and last a painter of exquisite
distinction and full of originality.”

Next Issue:
The Year of No Moneyin Tokyoby Wayne Lionel
AponteIn the next issue of the Japan
Society Review we will belooking at Wayne Lionel
Aponte’s book, The Year of
No Money in Tokyo.

Issue 25 Volume 5 Number 1 (February 2010)