For Inclusive and Dynamic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa

JICA Research Institute

For Inclusive andDynamic
Developmentin Sub-Saharan Africa

For Inclusive andDynamic Developmentin Sub-Saharan Africa

June 2013

JICA Research InstituteCover Photos:
Kenshiro Imamura, Minako Mochida-Matsukawa (first row from top, from left
to right)
Kenshiro Imamura (second row)
Akio Iizuka (third row)
Akio Iizuka, Atsushi Shibuya (forth row, from left to right)
Shinichi Kuno (bottom row)

JICA Research Institute10-5 Ichigaya Honmura-cho Shinjuku-ku Tokyo 162-8433, JAPANTEL: +81-3-3269-3374 FAX: +81-3-3269-2054
Copyright ©2013 Japan International Cooperation Agency Research InstituteAll rights reserved.

For Inclusive and Dynamic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
Contents
List of Contributors�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ⅲ
Foreword������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ⅳ
Acknowledgements��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ⅵ
Executive Summary		For Inclusive and Dynamic Development in Sub-SaharanAfrica: Challenges and Responses������������������������������������������������ 1
		Hiroshi KatoIntroduction and Overview

Chapter 1:	
Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive andSustained Growth in Africa: Prospects and Challenges ����� 21

		Kei Yoshizawa

Part Ⅰ: Rural Development and Food Security

Chapter 2:	Boosting Sustainable Agricultural Growth in SubSaharan Africa���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 73

		Koji Makino

		Keijiro Otsuka

Chapter 3:	How Promising Is the Rice Green Revolution in SubSaharan Africa?
- Evidence from case studies in Mozambique, Tanzania,
Uganda, and Ghana����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 99
Chapter 4:	The Inclusive Development Approach among Farmers,
Private Partners and Government through the Promotionof Responsible Investment for Agricultural Development�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������119

		

Koji Makino

		Jiro Aikawa

Chapter 5:	Initiatives of SHEP and SHEP UP- Capacity development of small-scale farmers forincreased responsiveness to market needs �������������������������� 143iPart Ⅱ: Economic and Social Transformation

Chapter 6:	Industrial Development of Africa– JICA’s commitment at TICAD IV and its follow-up����� 173

		

Go Shimada, Toru Homma and Hiromichi Murakami

		Yasuo Fujita, Ippei Tsuruga, and Asami Takeda

		Kaori Matsushita		Ikuo Takizawa

		

Kazuro Shibuya

Chapter 7:	Policy Challenges for Infrastructure Development in
Africa- The way forward for Japan’s Official Development
Assistance (ODA) ............................................................................... 195
Chapter 8: Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI) ������������������� 225
Chapter 9:	Toward Universal Health Coverage in Africa- Achieving MDGs with equity, and beyond������������������������ 247
Chapter 10:	Challenges in Educational Development in Africa and
JICA’s Approach.................................................................................. 267

Part Ⅲ: Resilience for Inclusive and Dynamic Development

Chapter 11:	Countermeasures against Climate Change in Africa������ 301

		Tomonori Sudo		

Ryutaro Murotani

Chapter 12: State-building and Conflict Prevention in Africa�������������� 329

Part Ⅳ: South-South Cooperation for Knowledge Exchange

Chapter 13:	South-South and Triangular Cooperation for SubSaharan Africa’s Development- With special emphasis on knowledge exchange andco-creation............................................................................................... 351

		Appendices

Shunichiro Honda, Hiroshi Kato, and Yukimi Shimoda

Appendix 1: The TICAD Process and Japan���������������������������������������������������� 391
Kei Yoshizawa
Appendix 2: Japan’s Official Development Assistance to Africa 20002011. ........................................................................................................... 402

Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 415
ii

List of Contributors:
Jiro Aikawa

Senior Advisor, JICA

Yasuo Fujita	Executive Advisor to the Director General,
Credit Risk Analysis and Environmental
Review Department, JICA
Toru Homma

Senior Advisor, JICA

Shunichiro Honda

Research Associate, JICA Research Institute

Hiroshi Kato

Director, JICA Research InstituteKoji Makino	Deputy Director General, Rural Development
Department, JICA
Kaori Matsushita	Deputy Director, Planning and TICAD Process
Division, Africa Department, JICA
Hiromichi Murakami	Deputy Director General, Industrial
Development and Public Policy Department,
JICA
Ryutaro Murotani

Research Associate, JICA Research InstituteKeijiro Otsuka	Professor, National Graduate Institute for
Policy Studies
Kazuro Shibuya	Senior Education Specialist, Human
Development Network, World Bank
Go Shimada

Research Fellow, JICA Research Institute

Yukimi Shimoda

Research Associate, JICA Research InstituteTomonori Sudo

Research Fellow, JICA Research InstituteAsami Takeda

Research Assistant, JICA Research Institute

Ikuo Takizawa	Director, Health Division 1, Human
Development Department, JICA
Ippei Tsuruga	Research Officer, Research Program Division,
JICA Research InstituteKei Yoshizawa	Advisor to the Director General, Africa
Department, JICA

iii

Foreword:
It is with great pleasure that I bring this volume to publication, a reportsummarizing JICA’s experience with, and knowledge of, sub-SaharanAfrican development. Drawing on literature surveys, empirical research
and/or practical cases from JICA’s on-the-ground experiences, thevolume contains chapters that address, collectively, a range of issues of
special pertinence to Sub-Saharan Africa’s development. It starts withdiscussions on how to transform the agricultural and rural sector. It thendiscusses the need to diversify the economic structure, which should be
buttressed by infrastructure and human resource development. Twochapters discuss how to prepare for and respond to shocks and threats,such as climate change and political instability. Finally, the volume also
contains a chapter on mutual learning through South-South andtriangular cooperation, along with a historical overview of the TICAD
process.
Sub-Saharan Africa is much richer than it was twenty years ago, when
the TICAD process began in 1993, and the continent is likely to continue
its remarkable growth in the coming years and decades. We mustacknowledge, however, that there remain cautious observers who point
to the precarious sides of its development, such as sluggish poverty
reduction, a declining manufacturing sector, a weak job market, andincreasing inequalities among various segments of society. Theseobstacles must, and in my view can, be overcome with careful policies by
the leaders and peoples of Africa, with continued support from theinternational community.
If this is the challenge that is facing Africa’s development today, the issue
to be discussed at TICAD V and beyond is how to sustain robust
development over the long term, such that the benefits are shared widely
both within and across countries. That is the view underpinning thecurrent volume, which we titled For Inclusive and Dynamic Development in
Sub-Saharan Africa. “Inclusive and dynamic development” has been partof JICA’s corporate mission statement since its organizational rebirth in2008, and we believe it is an important prerequisite for human security.
Japan has been a consistent supporter of African development, andJICA, as chief implementing agency of Japan’s development
cooperation, has been devoting considerable effort to that cause. Weiv

have compiled this report in the hope that it will help us share our views,
noteworthy cases, and practical knowledge, with a wide range ofdecision makers and practitioners involved in the development of SubSaharan Africa. I hope you will enjoy reading it.
Akihiko Tanaka
President
JICAv

Acknowledgements:
This Report has been prepared by a team organized at the JICA ResearchInstitute and comprises the members whose names are on the list of contributors.
The team benefited greatly from a wide range of consultations, chiefly done
through occasional workshops. The team wishes to thank the participants inthese workshops, which included academics, policy researchers, andgovernment officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and JICA’s staff members
both in Tokyo Headquarters and elsewhere.
Our special thanks go to John Page, Homi Kharas and Laurence Chandy, all at
the Brookings Institution, who kindly took the time to review the wholemanuscript and provided the team with enormously useful and insightful
suggestions and comments, without which this volume would not have taken
this shape. Our thanks also go to Professor Keijiro Otsuka of the National
Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), who not only provided the teamwith useful comments on the chapters on agriculture but also contributed achapter of his own.
We are grateful also for the professionals who provided us with comments byparticipating in our workshops as commentators and in writing. They are, inalphabetical order: Mitsugi Endo (University of Tokyo), Katsumi Hirano(Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO), Norichika Kanie (Tokyo Institute ofTechnology), Izumi Ohno (GRIPS), Kenichi Ohno (GRIPS), Tetsushi Sonobe(GRIPS), Motoki Takahashi (Kobe University), Kenji Shibuya (University ofTokyo) and Kazuhiro Yoshida (Hiroshima University). We have also received
insightful views from development partners at the African Development Bank,
the United Nations Office of South-South Cooperation, and the World Bank. Last
but not least, I would like to thank all the authors, the editorial team and theother staff of the JICA Research Institute, comprising Ippei Tsuruga, YasuhikoSato and Yoshiko Isozaki, for the tireless effort they have dedicated to thisproject.
While we truly appreciate the contributions from these collaborators, and havedone our best to incorporate their suggestions and comments, we, the authors of
the essays, are solely responsible for any errors, omissions and deficiencies that
may remain. I hasten to add that the views and opinions expressed in thisvolume are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official
views of the organizations they belong to or are affiliated with.
Hiroshi Kato
Director
JICA Research Institutevi

Executive Summary:
For Inclusive and Dynamic Development in
Sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges and Responses
Hiroshi Kato

1. What Is This Volume and What Is Its Purpose?
This volume is a compilation of JICA staff members’ views on SubSaharan African development1, as well as the views of the leadresearcher of a research project being conducted at the JICA ResearchInstitute.2
The chapters vary in their approaches and frameworks. In terms of
methodology, some rely primarily on literature reviews, others on caseanalyses, and the rest on empirical research. In terms of message, someoffer recommendations to all the stakeholders of African development,
while others offer recommendations for consideration by the Japanese
government. Though varied, however, the common thread running
through them is the desire to share JICA’s experiences on the groundand/or its research findings with various stakeholders, in order to enrich
the international debates on African development.
The plan of this volume has been formulated keeping in mind theongoing discussion on TICAD V. Specifically, the chapters have been
prepared so that collectively they would address the major themes of theconference, which are, as of March 2013, as follows: (1) Robust andSustainable Economy, (2) Inclusive and Resilient Society, and (3) Peace

1. This volume chiefly addresses the developmental challenges of Sub-Saharan Africancountries, based on the understanding that firstly, although they are much wealthier and are
dynamically developing, they still need strong international attention; and that secondly,
even though they do share certain development challenges with their North African peers,
SSA countries are faced with substantially different and serious developmental challenges.
2. As such, the views expressed herein do not necessarily represent the official views of theJapan International Cooperation Agency (JICA.), though the authors have been encouraged
to incorporate comments they have received during the internal peer review.

1

Executive Summaryand Stability.3 This report could also contribute to the discussion on thepost 2015 agenda since Africa will be the major target region.

2. Africa’s Challenge: Inclusive and Dynamic Development
Africa today is much wealthier and is developing much more
dynamically than it was twenty years ago, when the TICAD process
started in 1993. Currently, more than 23 Sub-Saharan African countries(including Sudan) have become categorized as middle-income countries
with per capita GDP greater than $1,000. If seen as a single country,
Africa is already a middle income country with per capita GDP circa$1500. And given the high price of food and natural resources likely toremain into the foreseeable future, it is not at all too ambitious to predicta high growth rate of the African economy in the coming years or
decades. The African Development Bank predicts that, on certain
assumptions, per capita GDP of Africa will be close to $4,000 in 2040, an
income level comparable to Indonesia today.
The progress is not limited to income growth measured in terms of GDP.
As the overview chapter (Ch. 1) summarizes, over the past decades, thecontinent has claimed a number of successes. These include, among
others:✓✓ Modest but symbolic progress in poverty reduction, with thepoverty rate falling below 50% for the first time, and Africa’s
poverty headcount falling for the first time since the start ofofficial records keeping in 1981.
✓✓ Large reductions in infant and maternal mortality.
✓✓ Large gains in enrollment of primary education.
✓✓ Improved macroeconomic stability (low inflation, rising domestic
resource mobilization, good fiscal health), and,✓✓ A reduced incidence of conflict.
The question is how to sustain such robust African growth of Africa forthe long term; let us be reminded quickly that the long term prediction
cited above by the African Development Bank is based on theassumption that a growth rate of close to 5% is maintained for 30 years
3. Important issues such as financial markets, urbanization, demographic changes andnatural resource management have had to be left out; we will try to address them at another
time.

2

For Inclusive and Dynamic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Challenges and Responses

between 2010 and 2040, which can actually be quite a bold assumption.
Past experience shows that the economic growth rate of SSA has notbeen very stable. Skeptics point to the lack of improvement ingovernance indicators, insufficient good job opportunities, falling levelsof manufacturing, little productivity growth in agriculture, sluggish
progress in learning achievement in schools, and inadequate service
delivery systems, including health, increasing vulnerability against
climate change; and the list goes on.
In view of this, one cannot agree more with the organizers of the TICAD
for choosing the themes of the upcoming conference: (1) Robust andSustainable Economy, (2) Inclusive and Resilient Society, and (3) Peaceand Stability. These three agenda items are intricately linked, and failurein achieving one of them will inevitably affect the performance of Africa
in the other two.
It is based on the above that we have titled this small volume “For
Inclusive and Dynamic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Thissummarizes a widely shared conviction at JICA (and perhaps elsewhere)that Africa must continue developing dynamically by reducing thevulnerability of its economic structure (hence “Dynamic Development”
is indispensable), while at the same time such dynamic development
must be realized in such a way that disparities between the rich and poor
do not expand beyond a tolerable threshold; and that everybody insociety is given opportunities to take part in the productive process(hence “Inclusive Development” is also imperative).4
The phrase “Inclusive and Dynamic Development” has been JICA’s
mission statement since its rebirth as a new JICA in 2008, coinciding with
TICAD IV. Ever since, we have been working hard in Africa to realize
this ideal with our partners around the world, and today we are ready towork harder than ever before with our African and international
partners to achieve this same ideal.

3.Emerging Challenges
The biggest news at TICAD V is that in the period since 2008 Africa has
4. Our view shares perspectives with the debate which has been described in terms of acontrast between “Big development” and “Small development (Woolcock 2012).

3

Executive Summary

continued to maintain its good track record of economic growth, despite
the worst global financial crisis in half a century. This in itself is cause forcelebration, but should not be a source of complacency. As the essay
contained in Chapter 1 makes clear, the sources of Africa’s sustained
growth remain quite limited, and Africa’s growth appears vulnerable.
The three major challenges identified below share a common underlying
cause. Seen from an Asian perspective, structural change in Africa since
its growth “turn around” in 1995 has been very limited. Agricultural
productivity has been largely stagnant. The region’s share ofmanufacturing in GDP is less than one half of the average for all
developing countries, and it is declining; and FDI remains almost whollyin natural resources. Three significant risks appear to threaten theregion’s sustained progress for 2013-2018.
Jobs and poverty
Africa is not creating enough jobs to absorb the 10-12 million young
people entering its labor markets each year. Today, according to theAfrican Development Bank, less than one fifth of Africa’s young workers
find wage employment. Unemployment in Sub-Saharan Africa seems
low. In 2009 it was about six percent. This is not because Africa is doing
well at generating wage-paying jobs. Eighty percent of job seekers findthemselves in informal employment, self-employment or family labor.
These are not good jobs. In 2011, eighty-two percent of African workers
were classified by the ILO as working poor. The sources of Africa’s
recent growth – improved economic management, strong commodity
prices and new discoveries of natural resources – are not job creators.
The region’s lack of “good” jobs – those capable of paying good wages
and offering the potential to acquire skills – has also meant thatcompared with other developing regions, especially East Asia, growth
has not resulted in rapid poverty reduction. Africa has the lowest
elasticity of head count poverty to growth of any developing region. Jobs
and poverty are closely linked, and will need to be urgently addressed.
New discoveries of natural resources
Ironically, one of the main drivers of Africa’s current economic success
may prove its long term undoing. New resource discoveries since 2008
have redrawn the map of natural resource rich economies across thecontinent. Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda have all4For Inclusive and Dynamic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Challenges and Responses

recently had major discoveries of hydrocarbons, and newly resource richeconomies are likely to increase in the future. Africa is richly endowedwith metal and non-metal minerals, as well as energy resources.
Although precise data are not available – principally because much of
the continent is under-explored – it is likely that Africa hosts about 30
per cent of the world’s mineral reserves.
In Africa, countries dependent on oil, gas, and mining have tended tohave weaker long run growth, higher rates of poverty, and higher
inequality than non- mineral dependent economies at similar levels of
income. But geology is not destiny. Some societies have succeeded inharnessing natural resources for sustained increases in production,
while others have not. The long run success or failure of resource richeconomies depends on the choices made as to how resource riches will
be used. Making the right choices with respect to public financial
management and strategies for economic diversification will become
increasingly important for a growing number of countries and theirdevelopment partners.
Lack of export dynamism
For poor Asian countries the export has been the main source of rapid
growth. There is persuasive evidence that what an economy makes
matters for its long-term development. More diversified economies tend
to have higher levels of income, and economies that produce and export
more sophisticated goods tend to grow faster. Africa has had little export
success: manufactured exports per person are less than 10 per cent of theaverage for low income countries. Industry in Africa has declined as ashare of both global production and trade since the 1980s. Africa as awhole has become a net importer of food and of agricultural products(FAO 2012).
While manufacturing is most closely associated with rapid export
growth, there are also “industries without smokestacks” in agriculture
and services that can create export dynamism. Investors in theseindustries, however, do not see Africa as an attractive location. Domestic
private investment has remained at about 11 percent of GDP since 1990.
This is well below the level needed for rapid export growth.
Diversification into new products and markets will be a daunting
challenge for both resource poor and resource rich economies alike.
Breaking into non-traditional export markets will demand a coordinated5Executive Summary

set of public investments, policy reforms and institutional innovations
more characteristic of Asian than African economies.

4. Appropriate Responses
The essays contained in the volume offer insights into a wide range of
JICA’s operational engagements in Africa. From these, three areas ofactivity have been selected to demonstrate Japan’s distinctive role as adevelopment partner, and offer the potential to address the threechallenges described above.
Transforming agriculture
Given Africa’s projected increase in food requirements and the limits toextensive agricultural growth, progress in agricultural yields is vital.
Increasing yields and adapting to climate change will require African
farmers to have access to new varieties of crops that are better adapted tothe changing agro-climatic conditions. Chapter 3 makes a persuasive
case that existing improved varieties in rice – originally developed for
Asia – offer the potential for significant yield increases in Africa, if
coupled with appropriate farming technologies and inputs. Japan
should continue to take a leadership role both in the dissemination ofexisting technologies and in the development of new technologies.
Agricultural innovations alone will not be sufficient to transform African
agriculture. A large number of complementary institutional and policy
reforms will be needed. Agricultural innovation systems will need toadapt to cover a range of activities from development of new,appropriate agricultural technologies to the dissemination of goodpractices, and to the development of value chains. Investments in
irrigation and a shift from dry land to irrigated agriculture will also be
required. The essays in this volume show how Japan is responding tothose challenges; Chapter 4 introduces a farming as business approachfor value chain development through the empowerment of small scale
farmers commonly called SHEP; Chapter 5 explains agricultural
inclusive development by encouraging private responsible investment;
and Chapter 11 describes how to make agriculture more resilient toclimate change.
Entering these value chains will require public actions to improve6

For Inclusive and Dynamic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Challenges and Responses

logistics capability. Physical infrastructure is particularly important at
points of export (airports and seaports) and in connecting production
centres to ports (roads and railways). The two essays that cover the
Nacala corridor in Mozambique (Ch. 5 and 8) illustrate one approach tothis problem.
Building capabilities in industry and service delivery in education andhealth“Firm capabilities” – the know-how and working practices used in
production – largely determine quality and productivity. Globally firms
compete in capabilities. As the essay on industrial development (Ch. 6)
argues, Africa needs higher capability firms to join the global game.
Value chain relationships between local firms and foreign investors(FDI) are a good way to learn global best practice. Thus, policies andinstitutions for attracting FDI are a key capability building tool.
Capabilities can also be taught through management training.
Despite substantial increases in budget commitments, the essays on
education and health (Ch. 9 and 10) show that there have not beencommensurate improvements in social sector outcomes. Service delivery
remains poor. Educational quality and health service coverage are aparticular concern. While better service delivery has a direct relevance toattainment of the MDGs, it can also – as illustrated by the East Asian
Miracle countries – be an important component of a “shared growth”
strategy to address poverty.
Strengthening infrastructure
Japan has been a consistent – and often lonely – advocate for the need tofocus development assistance on infrastructure. As Chapter 7 reports,
firm level studies in Africa highlight infrastructure deficiencies as asignificant barrier to greater competitiveness. Sub-Saharan Africa lags at
least 20 percentage points behind the average for low income countries
on almost all major infrastructure measures. In addition, the quality ofservice is low, supplies are unreliable, and disruptions are frequent andunpredictable.
As the essays illustrate, infrastructure directly affecting thecompetitiveness of traded goods producing activities has been
neglected. Road infrastructure has received only inadequate attention.
While increasing investments in the power sector must be emphasized,
7

Executive Summary

for improved industrial and export performance, investment ininfrastructure in the area of trade logistics must also be promoted.
Japan’s efforts to improve connectivity through physical infrastructure
and institutional reform – such as one stop border posts – represent
major contributions to improving trade logistics (Ch. 8).
The Nacala project – and to some extent the Mombasa corridor – go evenfurther. These have the potential to become regional Special Economic
Zones5 – often called “growth corridors” – developed around key
natural resource investments and associated infrastructure (ports, roads,
power projects). Developing growth corridors is attractive for threereasons. First, they emphasize the complementarities between transport
infrastructure and resource- or agriculture-based projects within aregion, and highlight the possible complementarities between
investment projects (for example, agriculture and agro-processing).
Second, the approach can help to solve coordination problems between
investments in related projects, increasing the prospect of rapid private
sector responses to infrastructure improvements. Third, it is possiblethat in resource concentrated zones, the bulk of capital spending on
infrastructure (both transport and power) can be financed by the
resource projects themselves.

5. The Features of Japan’s Cooperation
The chapters that deal with JICA’s specific projects and programs
capture some of the salient features of JICA’s approach to giving aid andsupporting transformation. Three features seem to stand out.
The first is an emphasis on scaling up, which could take a variety ofroutes and methods. The programs in agriculture (CARD initiative,
SHEP, and Win-Win-Win approach) all illustrate attempts to scale up
desirable actions. Projects of School Based Management and Teachers’
training (Ch.9), as well as the introduction of Kaizen to hospitalmanagement (Ch.10) are examples of gradual expansion of activities
proven effective initially in one country. Also, the emphasis on the use ofsouth-south cooperation (Ch.13) as an instrument for propagating and
5. While traditionally defined special economic zones (SEZs) are reported to have a mixed
record (WDR 2013: p.221), regional SEZs or regional development corridors as advocatedhere are based on a different concept.

8For Inclusive and Dynamic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Challenges and Responses

institutionalizing successful interventions embodies horizontal scalingup
The second feature is the emphasis on learning and continuous
improvement, the importance of which Japan has learned through its
own history of development. Chapter 3 argues for the applicability of the
Asian rice cultivation techniques to Africa; the chapters on industrial
development (Ch. 6) and health (Ch. 9) illustrate the attempt to impart
successful Japanese management practices – such as Kaizen and total
quality control – to firms of all sizes, and to adapt them to service
providers in health. The efforts to promote FDI described in Chapter 6,
speaking to the need to develop effective institutions to attract FDI to
Africa, are an example of sharing experiences of Asia and Japan; andagain, various and developing practices of South-South and triangularcooperation are instruments of knowledge sharing and co-creation.
And thirdly, though perhaps not unique to Japan’s cooperation, many
projects and programs have attempted to combine financial resources
and knowledge transfer, in view of realizing comprehensive
cooperation. This feature is particularly salient in infrastructure (Ch. 7
and 8), but is also highlighted in projects in other areas such as
agricultural development (Ch. 5) and climate change (Ch. 11).

6. General Chapter Summary
Following the overview chapter (Ch.1), the essays in the volume canroughly be divided into two categories. There are analytical chapterswhich examine various aspects of the transformation process that are
pivotal for Africa. Second, there are more programmatic chapters which
describe JICA’s approaches to supporting transformation in partnercountries
The analytical chapters, respectively, ask how agricultural productivity
can be enhanced (Ch. 2 and 3), look at the challenges in infrastructuredevelopment (7); explore what it would take to achieve universal accessto health care (9), discuss how to improve quality of education (10),assess the challenges of building resilience to climate change (11), andexplore how the capacity and legitimacy of the state can be strengthened
to mitigate potential conflict risks (12).
9Executive Summary

The more programmatic chapters share JICA’s experiences in agriculture(Ch.4 and 5), industrialization (6), infrastructure (8), and South-Southand triangular cooperation (13).
Chapter 1: 
Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive andSustained Growth in Africa: Prospects and Challenges (Kei
Yoshizawa)
This chapter attempts to give an overview of recent development in
Africa as a prologue to the subsequent chapters.
The basic view of the chapter on Africa is that while the recent higheconomic growth in Africa is appreciated, an economic transformation iscalled for. A transformation is needed to break away from the current
dependence on primary products, from inadequate and uneven progressin poverty reduction, and from the alarming trend of the increase in theworking age population and unemployment, with a transformation
toward a more diversified economic structure that enables inclusive andsustained economic growth.
In terms of development strategies, the author argues for what he calls a“diversified and customized approach for development.” He means that
now as different countries are starting to follow different development
paths, differentiated approaches should be applied to countries withdifferent needs. He also emphasizes the importance of a regional
approach, which has consistently been an important agenda issue
throughout the TICAD process.
Chapter 2: Boosting Sustainable Agricultural Growth in Sub-SaharanAfrica (Koji Makino)
This chapter serves as a stage setter for the following three chapters (3through 5) on agriculture. It argues that JICA/Japan has been
cooperating and will continue to cooperate with its African partners
using four approaches. The first one is productivity increase on specificcommodities of strategic importance in Africa, exemplified by the CARD
initiative launched at the time of TICAD IV in 2008. The third is anapproach that attempts to take advantage of the private sector in
agricultural development, while at the same time increasing the
productivity and hence the earnings of small scale famers. An exampleof this approach is the Mozambique-Brazil-Japan tripartite cooperation
titled ProSAVANA. And the third is an attempt to encourage small
10For Inclusive and Dynamic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Challenges and Responses

farmers to be more sensitive and responsive to market signals, theeffectiveness of which has been proven by JICA’s experience in Kenya.
Finally, he states that JICA will continue to build up resilience of African
agriculture against risks such as climate change and food price hikes.
Chapter 3: How Promising Is the Rice Green Revolution in Sub-SaharanAfrica? - Evidence from case studies in Mozambique,Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana (Keijiro Otsuka)
This chapter is written by Professor Keijiro Otsuka of the National
Graduate Research Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) of Japan, andleader of an empirical investigation by the JICA Research Institute on thepossibility of rice production expansion in the countries participating in
the CARD initiative.
Starting with his premise that Sub Sahara Africa (SSA) needs a Green
Revolution, the author argues that the most promising path forachieving a Green Revolution in SSA is through the development oflowland rice production. To support this claim, he presents two sources.
The first is a macro level analysis: comparing SSA and Asia, he argues
that there remains ample room for productivity improvement in rice.
And second, he argues that the research conducted in Mozambique,Tanzania, Uganda and Ghana demonstrates that a significant increase in
per hectare yield is possible both in irrigated and rain-fed areas bycombining certain rice production techniques, which the author calls“Asian type production techniques” like bunding and leveling, together
with the use of high yielding modern variety seeds and the applicationof fertilizer.
Chapter 4: 
The Inclusive Development Approach among Farmers,
Private Partners and Government through the Promotion of
Responsible Investment for Agricultural Development (Koji
Makino)This chapter starts by recognizing that investments both by the private
sector and by farmers are essential for agricultural development, andargues that the issue is how countries can manage to secure “responsible
investment” in agriculture. Specifically, the author argues thatappropriate measures to promote responsible investment should bedesigned and put into practice in accordance with internationally agreed
norms.

11

Executive Summary

The chapter then introduces the case of the project entitled“ProSAVANA.” A project of national priority for Mozambique, it aims tocontribute to the improvement of income among inhabitants in the
Nacala Corridor, suited to agricultural production but inhabited bymany small scale farmers. The project intends to build up agricultural
inclusive development models through dialogues with farmers and civilsocieties under the government’s ownership.
Chapter 5: Initiatives of SHEP and SHEP UP- Capacity development of small-scale farmers for increased
responsiveness to market needs (Jiro Aikawa)This chapter reports an encouraging outcomes being observed in a JICA
supported project called SHEP and SHEP UP in Kenya, on developing
the capacities of small-scale farmers. The idea is to help them be more
responsive to the signals from the market and, at the same time, capableof strategically planning their production, and putting such plans into
implementation. To that end, the project has devised a carefully
designed model to motivate the farmers and provide appropriate
assistance to help them overcome the information asymmetry and to
upgrade their production and marketing techniques.
The achievements so far have been very encouraging: the unit yield andincome of the farmers participating in the project increased dramatically.
Encouraged by the success of the project, the model is being scaled up
nationwide.
Chapter 6: Industrial Development of Africa– JICA’s commitment at TICAD IV and its follow-up(Go Shimada, Toru Homma and Hiromichi Murakami)
To address the de-industrialization issue in SSA, this chapter argues formeasures of promoting industry for the creation employment and added
value, for private sector development, and for promotion of foreign
direct investment.
The paper then looks at the history of three cases of cooperation projects
that have been developing since TICAD IV in 2008. The idea
underpinning these projects is that state has a role to play in promoting
economic growth while maintaining equity, an idea that was stressed at
the symposium held in 2008 as a side event to TICAD IV, participated inby African leaders as well as Prof. Stiglitz of Columbia University.
12

For Inclusive and Dynamic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Challenges and Responses

Presented in the paper are two projects in Ethiopia, one concerningindustrial policy dialogue and productivity improvement, and the otherquality and productivity improvement (Kaizen), as well as a project inZambia for investment promotion and diversification entitled “Triangleof Hope.”
Chapter 7: Policy Challenges for Infrastructure Development in Africa- The way forward for Japan’s Official Development Assistance(ODA) (Yasuo Fujita, Ippei Tsuruga, and Asami Takeda)
This chapter proposes three recommendations for the government ofJapan, based on an analysis of data provided by the Infrastructure
Consortium for Africa (ICA) and JICA’s internal information.
First, it argues that reallocation of resources to needier sectors,
particularly to the power sector, is a high priority. Secondly, the chapter
argues that the Japanese government may wish to expand its financial
support for the operation and maintenance of infrastructure, which is atpresent left as the responsibility of recipient governments. And thirdly,
the authors recommend more support for governance and management
reform of public utilities; especially, the paper calls for intensified efforts
to create effective organizations, like government agencies and public
utilities in which, with appropriate external support, positive andimmediate achievements can be expected in their organizational
reforms.
Chapter 8: Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI)(Kaori Matsushita)
This chapter begins with a summary of the current situation of transportof goods in Africa and an overview of the CBTI development in thecontinent, and then introduces the three approaches that Japan has been
pursuing for the development of CBTI, with specific examples.
The first is corridor development, one example of which is the project inan area connecting the Mombasa Port (Kenya) and inland countries of
Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. It aims to upgrade the functions of thePort of Mombasa along with the development of roads connecting theport with the three countries, thereby encouraging the transport ofgoods as well as economic activities in the region. Another example ofthis approach is the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique, aiming to develop
an area connecting the Nacala Port and the inland countries of Malawi
13

Executive Summary

and Zambia. The second approach is pursuing border formalities
facilitation, through the introduction of One Stop Border Posts (OSBP), asystem that neighboring countries jointly conduct immigration, control
customs clearance and quarantine. And the third approach aims toharmonize the transport rules and regulations across the borders, toalleviate problems arising from different regulations on road traffic on
both sides of the borders.
Chapter 9: Toward Universal Health Coverage in Africa- Achieving MDGs with equity, and beyond (Ikuo Takizawa)
While noting that SSA has experienced quite impressive strides in
improving a number of health indicators, this paper warns that there is aconsiderable disparity in the pace of progress within and among
countries, and we cannot be complacent with the status quo.
Now that equity in terms of essential health service coverage isbecoming a major issue, the paper argues that it is increasingly necessary
to focus on health system issues, and especially equity in access andfinancial protection, which, together, call for concerted efforts toward
universal health coverage (UHC). As well, in making efforts toward
UHC, the chapter calls for a paradigm shift in the usage of development
assistance for health (DAH). Specifically, it is argued that DAH should
be provided more strategically and catalytically in a way to increase theallocation of domestic resources for health. Secondly, DAH should also be
provided in a way to improve the management of health systems andprograms.
Challenges in Educational Development in Africa andChapter 10: 
JICA’s Approach (Kazuro Shibuya)
While acknowledging significant advancement in education in Africa,
the author states that challenges remain, first in the persistent disparity
among and within countries, and second in the quality of education. The
paper points out as well that higher education in the African continent isalso inadequate.
Taking note of the shifts in the international education agendas fromthose of “Education for All” to “Learning for All,” the author discusses
the validity of approaches that Japan has developed that are consistent
with such globally shared trends in education and different needs ofpartner countries. These include those for the improvement of school
14

For Inclusive and Dynamic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Challenges and Responses

management and strengthening of teacher training. The author alsoemphasizes that JICA could play a role in facilitating feedback from thegood practices on the ground to education policymakers in the central
government, with its comparative advantage as a donor covering a wide
spectrum of activities from the ministry level to local governments andcommunities levels.
Chapter 11: Countermeasures against Climate Change in Africa(Tomonori Sudo)
This chapter discusses the challenges and potentials of Africa in terms ofclimate change. The paper argues, on the mitigation side, that though
Africa is a region where the level of greenhouse gas emissions is thelowest in the world, ample possibilities for mitigating the climate change
effect exist, especially in view of the robust economic growth foreseen
for the continent in the coming decades. Such possibilities lie in energy
and transportation, and forest management.
On the adaptation side, the author lists, among others, three major
challenges. First, measures to reduce the agricultural sector’svulnerability must be strengthened because of its high dependency on
rainwater and the inadequate product distribution system. Equallyserious risks that warrant attention are those associated with natural
disasters such as floods, droughts, coastal erosion, and mudslides. And
third, water resources management is also a huge challenge in view of an
unstable and insufficient water supply, the expansion of agriculture,industry and other sectors. The presence of international rivers in thecontinent also calls for effective cross border water resource
management systems.
Chapter 12: State-building and Conflict Prevention in Africa(Ryutaro Murotani)
This chapter argues that post-conflict state-building processes must
focus not only on public safety but also on assuring people’s livelihood;
livelihood improvement is necessary in order for people to perceive thedividend of peace and to accept the state as legitimate. In dealing withhumanitarian crises, these perspectives for long-term institution
building have to be introduced in the early stages of emergency
responses to humanitarian crises.
The chapter then shares some research findings to identify important
15

Executive Summary

factors of building up the state’s legitimacy, as well as some examples of
JICA’s projects helping to improve people’s livelihood, states’ capacities,
and eventually the people’s trust of government institutions,contributing to improved state legitimacy.
Chapter 13: South-South and Triangular Cooperation for Sub-SaharanAfrica’s Development- With special emphasis on knowledge exchange and cocreation(Shunichiro Honda, Hiroshi Kato and Yukimi Shimoda)
This chapter looks at South-South cooperation (SSC) and Triangular
Cooperation (TrC) for SSA development. SSC has a long history startingin the 1950s. Since its genesis, Africa, along with Asia, has played aleading role in its promotion. The TICAD process has played an
important role since 1993 in promoting the momentum of SSC.
The paper pays special attention to knowledge exchange and co-creation
through SSC and TrC. Drawing on the cases of TrC supported by JICA,
the paper demonstrates that there are a number of possible ways ofencouraging knowledge exchange and co-creation, from highly
institutional models to more flexible ones, where institutionalarrangements develop over time as the network among the participants
develops. The paper also argues that knowledge sharing and co-creation
should not be monopolized by a small number of actors but is apossibility to all aspiring countries and organizations.
Appendix: The TICAD Process and Japan (Kei Yoshizawa)
This essay looks back at the 20 years since the first TICAD in 1993. It
traces how the TICAD process has contributed to ever-changing
development issues in Africa, with each of the quinquennial meetings
focusing on different issues and the priorities of the time. It also gives
attention to the institutional development of the process, including
result-focused orientation demanding action plans with numericaltargets, and its follow-up mechanism. The author finds the significanceof the whole process in its development as an open international forum,
through which ideas and concepts such as the respect of African
ownership, human security, and south-south cooperation have been
incorporated into the debate on African development.

16

For Inclusive and Dynamic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Challenges and Responses

References
FAO [Rakotoarisoa, M. A., M. Iafrate, and M. Paschali]. 2012. Why has
Africa become a net food importer? Explaining Africa agricultural andfood trade deficits. Rome: Trade and Markets Division, FAO.
Woolcock, M. 2012. Dueling development visions: Shaping the WorldBank for the future. Let’s talk development: A blog hosted by the WorldBank’s chief economist, April 13.
http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/duelingdevelopment-visions-shaping- the-world-bank-for-the-future.
World Bank. 2012. World development report 2013: Jobs. Washington,
DC: World Bank.

17

Introduction and Overview

Chapter 1:
Achieving Economic Transformation for
Inclusive and Sustained Growth in Africa:
Prospects and Challenges
Kei Yoshizawa

Summary<Current status of development in Africa>•• The economic growth rate in Africa since 2000 has generally been
good, driven in many countries by commodity exports, mainly
energy and mineral resources, and helped by the progress ineconomic reforms and generally stable political conditions. However,
poverty reduction is slow, unemployment, especially among youths,
is serious, and progress is steady but slow in many MDGs.
•• Under such circumstances, achieving economic transformation –transformation from dependency on the export of energy and natural
resources into a more diversified economic structure – is imperative,
so that economic growth becomes more robust and the benefits arewidely shared by the poor, and most notably the young. In otherwords, a transformation of the economic structure is needed toenable inclusive and sustained economic growth in Africa.
<For achieving economic transformation and inclusive, sustained
growth in Africa>•• Productivity improvement in agriculture, Africa’s major production
sector, is urgently needed; this should be promoted by the public
sector as well as by the increased participation of the private sector inboth agriculture and its related agro-industries.
•• A slump in manufacturing has continued for many years. Efforts topromote industrial development should be intensified, learning froma number of successful cases in Africa as well as from experiencesfrom other continents, particularly Asia.
•• Africa has a rich human capital to be developed and mobilized in the
coming decades to achieve inclusive and sustained growth. Investingin effective education and healthcare system is imperative to increase21

Chapter 1

labor productivity and per-capita income. Creating sufficient anddecent employment is critial to mobilize the increasing working-age
population to growth.
<Toward a differentiated and customized approach for development>
The continent-wide regional integration perspective, which has been
one of the principles underpinning the TICAD process, is important andmust be further promoted. Along with this, however, the widening
diversity of situations and stages of development among countries must
be taken into consideration. Therefore, in working out its Action Plan for
TICAD V, African leaders and their partners must make sure that eachcountry is encouraged to seek differentiated and customized
development strategies to meet its specific needs, while strongly
upholding the perspective of regional integration and cooperation.

1. Current Status of Development in Africa

1.1 Rate of economic growth
In recent years, the growth of African economies has received increasing
attention. Between 2003 and 2008, the rate of economic growth in Africa,
including North Africa, was maintained at a high level, between 5.3% ~
6.2%. With a small variation, it has continued to grow at a stable pace:
3.1% (2009) → 5.0% (2010) → 3.4% (2011) → 4.5% (2012 – estimate) →4.8% (2013 – estimate) (OECD et al 2012, p.243). The growth in 2009 wasaffected by the global recession and the financial crisis in 2008. Unlike
the long slump after the oil shocks of the 1970s, however, the African
economy showed a rapid recovery in 2010, a remarkable shift away fromits dependence on the economies of developed countries in the past. It isalso worthwhile noting that while the growth rate in sub-Saharan Africa
was 5.1% (IMF 2012b, p.88), that of North Africa was 0.5% (OECD et al.
2012, p.24), which shows a remarkable slowdown in growth in North
African countries, generally due to the area’s political turmoil.

22

Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges

Figure 1. Change in the rate of economic growth of Africa (2001 ~ 2013)(OECD et al. 2012, P.16)

Such economic growth has been possible mainly due to price hikes inenergy and mineral resources since 2000. Mckinsey Global Institute(MGI) estimates that the sum of the increase in earnings from the exportof energy and mineral resources and government spending on energy
and mineral resource development accounted for 32% of economic
growth in 2000-2008 (MGI 2010, p.2). Hirano (2009, p.220) estimates that
78.2% of the exports of sub-Saharan African countries in 2006, excludingSouth Africa, were from the mining sector and that there has been astrong correlation between the oil prices and the GDP (in nominal US
dollars) of sub-Saharan Africa (correlation coefficient of 0.902 (19702007)) (ibid, p.202).1 It is expected that the prices of energy and mineral
resources will exceed the pre-2009 levels and the favorable economic
environment for African countries will continue for the time being,
accordingly (OECD et al. 2012, p.17, IEA 2012).
While oil-exporting countries2 have benefited a lot from the above pricehikes, oil-importing countries are also growing strongly with an
economic growth rate similar to oil-exporters. While the rate of
economic growth of oil-exporting countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is
6.0% ~ 7.1%, that of oil-importing countries (except South Africa) is 5.8%
~ 6.0% (IMF 2012b, p.88).
1. See also Hirano (2013) pp.76-80 for updated information.
2. IMF (2012a) defines Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, Nigeria and South Sudan as oil-exporting countries, and the others as oil-importers.

23

Chapter 1

The prices of agricultural commodities also have been on a strong
upward trend since the early 2000s (IMF 2013). However, a number ofthe oil-importing countries, which have been growing strongly, as
mentioned above, have not benefited from these favorable external
conditions, as the terms of trade of the non-resource-rich fast growers3
had been remaining stable or declining since the early 1990s (Figure 2).
This trend has been continuing despite strong and sustained growth
except in Mali (IMF 2012 pp.99). Hirano (2009, pp.205-213) also suggeststhat the impact of the price hikes in agricultural raw materials andedibles on growth rates have been important but much weaker thanthose of energy and metals since the 1990s.
IMF (2008) notes that, while the fast growers4 have had a variety ofexperiences with their terms of trade as in Figure 2, the most importantfactor for the fast growers has been a significant increase in total factor
productivity, and that this underscores the role of strong policies andbroad reforms by the fast growers, especially non-resource-richcountries (pp.26-27, p.30, pp.41-42). IMF (ibid p.31) also suggests thatgrowth opportunities based on geography and endowments are notnecessary conditions for fast growth based on recent experiences among
fast growers in Africa.
Benno Ndulu et al. (2007 p.16) and Jorge Arbache et al. (2007 p.41, 2008
pp.27-28) also argue that the role of policy reforms undertaken in Africa
since the 1990s was the most important growth factor since the late
1990s. They also suggest that the quality of policy and governancematter a great deal for growth, rather than initial conditions ofgeography and natural resources, which matter mostly for income
levels, not for growth.
Collier and O’Connell (2007), however, propose a classification of SubSahara African countries into three groups reflecting their initial
geography and natural resource conditions: resource-rich, coastal
resource-scarce, and landlocked resource-scarce (p.8) and suggest that adifferent policy choice for growth is required to overcome the
3. See footnote 4.
4. IMF (2008) defines “fast growers” as countries which had average annual real per capita
GDP growth above 2.25% for 1995-2007. The group includes 4 oil exporters (Angola, Chad,
Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria), 2 resource-rich countries (Botswana, Sao Tome and Principe),and 11 non-resource-rich countries (Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda) (pp.26-27, p.53).

24

Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges

disadvantages for each group in terms of geography and natural
resources (pp.55-58).
As above, the views on the role of initial geography and natural resource
conditions for growth, especially those of landlocked resource-scarcecountries, are mixed. Collier (2007) defines “landlocked with badneighbors” as one of the major development traps in Sub-Saharan Africa
and argues that growth in landlocked resource-scarce countries depends
strongly on the performance of the neighbors. IMF (2008 p.31) notes thatthe growth acceleration of the five landlocked and non-resource-rich fast
growers5 may be partly explained by improvements in their neighboringhigh-growth coastal economies, which are increasingly pulling theirlandlocked neighbors. IMF (2012a p.27), however, estimates that thespillover effect from South Africa and Nigeria through trade, investment
and finance is growing but the role of EU, US, Chinese and Indian
markets continues to be the most important for the majority of Africancountries.6
Figure 2. Sub-Saharan Africa Terms of Trade since late 1980s(IMF 2008, p.33)

5. Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, Rwanda, Uganda (ibid p.31)
6. In regard to the role of the spillover effect through intra-regional trade, IMF (2011a)
estimates the ratio of intra-regional trade to the total amount of trade by Sub-Sahara Africa
still remained at 14% in 2010, while WEF et al. (2011, p.17) and Afrika and Ajumbo (2012)
argue that informal cross border trade (ICBT) is also to be considered as important as official
intra-regional trade despite difficulties in data collection and analysis (see Section 1.8 of thischapter).

25

Chapter 1

The biggest constraint to economic growth in Africa is politicalinstability (including civil war, conflicts and political unrest). The rate of
economic growth of the 12 fragile countries7 in sub-Saharan Africa was
2.3%8 in 2011; this figure was affected by the unrest in the Cote d’Ivoire,9a figure significantly lower than that of the entire sub-Saharan Africa of
6.3% (IMF 2012a, p.76). The slowing down of the economic growth ofNorth African countries caused by political turmoil also shows themagnitude of political risk (OECD et al. 2012, p.24).
Table 1. Growth rate by type of countries in Africa (%)
Calendar year
Sub-Saharan Africa
Oil-exporting countries
Middle-income countries, excluding South
AfricaSouth Africa
Low-income countries, excluding fragile
countries
Fragile countries
North Africa
Africa total

2010
5.3
6.6
6.5

2011
5.2
6.3
8.2

2012
5.0
6.7
5.6

2013
5.7
6.0
5.9

2.9
6.4

3.1
5.5

2.6
5.9

3.0
6.1

4.2
4.1
5.0

2.3
0.5
3.4

6.6
3.1
4.5

6.5
4.0
4.8

(Prepared by the author based on IMF 2012a, p.76 and OECD et al. 2012, pp.24, 243)

1.2 Economic relationship with foreign countries (trade, foreign direct
investment, emigrant remittances and foreign aid)
Currently, the international balances of trade, foreign direct investment,
remittances and foreign aid receipts are all surplus in contrast to the1990s when Africa was plagued by debt problems and a deficit in its
international balance from weak commodity prices. In 2005, foreign
direct investment exceeded the amount of foreign aid for the first timeand it was said that “Africa has become a target for investment and not a
subject for aid”. This does not mean, however, that Africa no longer
needs aid; the most recent statistics show that foreign aid amounts to$47.9 billion (2010), a figure comparable to the surplus of $48.4 billion
7. IMF (2012a) defines Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe,
Togo and Zimbabwe as the Fragile States in sub-Saharan Africa.
8. Growth rate of Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 was -4.7%.
9. It is expected, however, to recover rapidly after 2012 due to improved political stability inCôte d’Ivoire.

26

Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges(2010) in foreign direct investment, and $38.0 billion (2009) inremittances. (OECD et al. 2012, p.261, p.263 and p.281)
Figure 3. Change in foreign direct investment, emigrant remittances and foreign
aid in Africa (2000 ~ 2012)(OECD et al. 2012, p.41)

The fiscal balance continues to show a deficit both in oil-importing andoil-exporting countries because of their expanded public spending
policy after the financial crisis in 2008. It is expected that while oilproducing countries will improve their fiscal balance (to about 2% ofGDP) through the improvement in oil prices, non-oil-producing
countries will continue to show a higher budget deficit (to about 5% ofGDP) (OECD et al. 2012, pp.32-33). Although fiscal and monetary
policies have been generally tightened, the budget deficit still continues.
High inflation has been observed in Eastern Africa resulting from the
expansion of government spending on infrastructure investment andsoaring food prices in the “Horn of Africa”. The levels of budget deficits
and borrowing are under control at the moment, but some non-oilproducing sub-Saharan countries depend on foreign aid to financegovernment spending and international balance payments. Overall, it
continues to be a challenge for African countries to control and manage
their budget deficits and public debt. (IMF 2012b, pp.11-13)
Foreign direct investments are focused mainly on energy and natural
resource development. Investments in energy and natural resource
sectors are focused on Western Africa (e.g., Nigeria, Ghana
27

Chapter 1(development of new oil fields)), in Southern Africa (e.g., Angola), and inCentral Africa (e.g., Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of theCongo), while investments in Northern Africa have dropped by 42%
over the previous year ($9.48 billion in 2011) due to the political turmoil.
However, there are signs of diversification in foreign direct investment,10
such as growing investments in the ICT sector since the 2000s, andstrong investment in non- oil-producing countries like Morocco ($3.44
billion, 2011) (OECD et al. 2012, p. 44).11 Ernst & Young (2012) alsosuggests a growing share of manufacturing and service sectors in FDI
into Africa12 as an important lead indicator of a broader process of
economic diversification from dependence on natural resources andcommodity prices.
1.3 Progress of economic reform
Economic reform in African countries is progressing. Although theaverage CPIA13 score for 38 IDA-eligible countries in sub-Saharan Africa(= 3.2) is a bit lower than that of countries in other areas (= 3.4), the levelof economic reforms in African countries, excluding fragile countries(=3.514), is mostly similar to that of developing countries in other areas(=3.615). The trend for improvement in CPIA scores in fragile countries isalso remarkable16 and economic reforms in Africa as a whole are
10. Nishiura and Fukunishi (2008) reports the following six industries as major areas offoreign direct investment in Africa other than energy and mining: Automobile (South Africa),
Horticulture (Kenya, Ethiopia, Zambia), Garment (Lesotho, Swaziland, Kenya,
Madagascar), Aluminum (Mozambique), Retail Trading (South Africa, Zambia, Malawi),
Mobile Phone.
11. Morocco was nominated as the “Top Investment Destination for 2012” by the Financial
Times. (OECD et al. 2012, p.44). World Bank’s Doing Business 2012 introduced Morocco as
the country that most improved its ranking (ranked 115 ⇒ 94) (World Bank 2012d, p.13).
12. Ernst & Young (2012, pp.27-28) suggests the following key findings on the FDI into Africa
during 2003-2011: i) The share of the FDI capital that has gone into the extractive sector is
27.6%, ii) Over 50% of the FDI projects have been in the service sector, iii) 70% of the FDI
capital has gone into manufacturing and infrastructure sectors, iv) the manufacturing sector
alone accounts for 40% of all new FDI-related job, v) 64% of the FDI capital invested in the
manufacturing sector has gone into processing and beneficiation-type activities in theextractive sectors.
13. Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rates countries against a set of 16
criteria grouped in four clusters: (a) economic management, (b) structural policies, (c)policies for social inclusion and equity, (d) public sector management and institutions.
14. The average CPIA score of non-fragile countries (21 countries).
15. The average CPIA score of non-fragile countries in other areas.
16. When compared between 2009 and 2011, the number of countries that showed an
improvement in CPIA scores was 8 out of 21 Non-Fragile States in 2009, and 10 out of 17
Fragile States in 2011.

28

Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges

progressing. (World Bank 2012c. p.5)
Seventy-eight percent of sub-Saharan countries implemented some
economic reforms in 2010 and 2011, an improvement from the average
56% between 2006 and 2011; it is widely recognized that the speed of
economic reforms has considerably increased (Figure 4). Countries thathave raised the Doing Business ranking by implementing reforms in
more than three items include Morocco (115 ⇒ 94), Sao Tome andPrincipe (174 ⇒ 163), Cape Verde (129 ⇒ 119), Sierra Leone (150 ⇒ 141)
and Burundi (177 ⇒ 169) (World Bank 2012d, p.1 and p.13).
Despite the progress in economic reforms, the absolute level of theirbusiness environment still remains low with many challenges still to beaddressed. Out of 183 countries, 43 of 51 African countries score below
94th among 183 countries ranked in the Doing Business Report 2012;
improvement in the business environment in African countries is still
constrained.
Ernst & Young (2012), however, points out the need to bridge theperception gap among world investors and business leaders many ofwhom still view Africa as being a more challenging place to do businessin than other emerging market regions, despite the fact that 14 Africancountries are ranked ahead of Russia, 16 ahead of Brazil and 17 ahead ofIndia in the above Doing Business rankings (pp.5, 10).
Figure 4. Progress of economic reforms in sub-Saharan Africa(World Bank 2012d, P.1)

29

Chapter 1

1.4 Good governance and anti-corruption
UNECA (2009, p.1 and p.12) measures the progress on governance inAfrica by using the benchmarks of the first edition of the Africa
Governance Report in 2005. It concludes that economic management,
pro-investment policies and efficiency of the tax system have made somenotable progress; however, corruption has made no progress or amarginal decline of the corruption control index. This shows that
corruption remains the most important challenge to the eradication ofpoverty, the creation of a predictable and favorable investment
environment and in general, socio-economic development in Africa.
UNECA and AU (2011, p.4) reports that the socio-economic and politicalcost of corruption in Africa was estimated at over $148 billion per year in
2004, which is equivalent to three times the amount of the current
foreign direct investment into Africa in 2010, and that 50% of tax
revenue, 25% of the continent’s GDP and that $30 billion in aid for Africa
are eaten up by corruption. World business leaders raise corruption as
the second most problematic factor for doing business in Africa,
following lack of access to financing (WEF 2011, p.12). Out of all the 53
countries in the African continent except South Sudan, 48 countries17 are
ranked below 50 in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2012, whichshows that public institutions need to be more transparent and powerful
officials more accountable in these countries (Transparency International2012).
Many experts suggest a variety of measures to combat corruption in
Africa; however, their views are mixed, as follows:➢➢ UNECA (2009, p.235) proposes three priority areas for Africancountries: 1) strong institutions including parliament, judiciary,
office of auditor-general, public procurement system, anti-corruption
bodies, etc., ii) powerful anti-corruption constituency with civilsociety and media, and iii) better remuneration for public servants to
reduce petty and grand corruption undermining all the development
and anti-corruption efforts.
➢➢ Hanson (2009, pp.5-6) of the US Council on Foreign Relations is
suspicious about the effects on African governments brought bydonor intervention in an anti-corruption context, while reserving
evaluation on some anti-corruption practices such as Millennium
Challenge Corporation (MCC), and Extractive Industries
17. Five countries ranked over 50 in the CPI 2012 are Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius,
Rwanda, and Seychelles.

30

Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges

Transparency Initiatives (EITI).
➢➢ Global Integrity (2011) suggests that the “implementation gap”
between progress in anti-corruption frameworks and results should
be addressed more since the implementation gap in many countries,
including those in Africa, is widening. It also notes that theestablishment of an anti-corruption agency is relatively ineffective instrengthening transparency and accountability.
➢➢ Some academics are very pessimistic about combatting corruption;
Collier (2007) raises “Bad Governance in a Small Country” as one of
the four major Development Traps that African countries suffer from.
Moyo (2009) insists on cutting off foreign aid which, she argues, hasbrought corruption rather than development to Africa.
Across these discussions, the following could be noted as a broad andminimum consensus on corruption in Africa: i) corruption isundoubtedly the most pressing governance and development challengethat Africa is confronted with today (UNECA and AU 2011, p.3), ii) the
progress of anti-corruption is quite slow or making no progress (UNECA
2009, p.1), iii) effective measures and actions are urgently needed.
1.5 Economic growth and poverty reduction
The percentage of the population living below $1.25 a day in subSaharan Africa has decreased and is expected to continue as follows: 58%(1990) ⇒ 59% (1995) ⇒ 51% (2005) ⇒ 47.5% (2008) ⇒ 38% (estimate for2015) (IMF 2011a, p.14, World Bank 2010a, p.11). In addition, the numberof people in poverty in sub-Saharan Africa decreased by 8 million from2005 to 2008. The World Bank reports that this was the first time that theabsolute number (not the rate) of people in poverty in sub-SaharanAfrica decreased since the Bank began to record poverty-related
statistics (World Bank 2012a).
However, sub-Saharan Africa18 as a whole is unlikely to achieve the
MDG target of halving the poverty rate in 1990 by 2015 (from 58% in
1990 to 29% by 2015) (UNECA et al. 2012, p.3, Table 6). While four
countries19 in Sub-Saharan Africa have already achieved the target, andfive countries20 are expected to achieve it, the other countries are lagging
18. North Africa, by contrast, has already achieved the goal of halving the proportion of the
population living in poverty (5%) in 1990 by 2015; the rate was lowered to 2% (2008) (United
Nations 2012).
19. Cameroon, Kenya, Mauritania and Senegal
20. Central Africa, Ethiopia, Ghana, Seychelles and Swaziland

31

Chapter 1

behind (World Bank 2010a).
Figure 5. Proportion of Population Living in Poverty in sub-Saharan Africa andother regions (1990-2008)(UNECA et al. 2012 p.3)

IMF (2011a) suggests that in sub-Saharan Africa the relationshipbetween per capita GDP growth and poverty reduction is weak, and that
it is imperative to realize economic growth in such a way to further
accelerate poverty reduction. IMF (2011a) also notes that in high-growth
sub-Saharan countries,21 an increase by 1% in the growth rate
corresponds to a decrease by about 1% in the poverty reduction rate,showing a clear relationship between economic growth and poverty
reduction. And according to case studies on some of the high-growth
sub-Saharan countries, job creation in the agricultural sector has a highimpact on poverty reduction.
However, it is reported that no such relationship between economic
growth and poverty reduction was observed in low-growth sub-Saharancountries.
When compared with Asia, the poverty reduction effect of economic
21. IMF (2011a) defines high-growth countries as countries with an average annual growthrate of real GDP per capita of over 2.25% during 1995 and 2010. Low-growth Sub-Saharancountries are those other than the high-growth countries.

32

Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges

growth is modest in sub-Saharan countries; in high-growth Asian
countries, an increase by 1% in the growth rate corresponds to a decreaseby 2.3% in the poverty reduction rate.
This shows that more efforts are required in Sub-Saharan Africa to makegrowth more inclusive and to enable more people to enjoy the fruits ofgrowth.
1.6 Demographics, employment and urbanization
It is expected that the population and working-age population will
increase in the coming decades in Africa. As of 2008, the youth
population (aged 15-24) and that of working-age people were 200
million and 550 million, respectively. The working-age population isincreasing by 2.7% every year and is expected to reach 1.7 billion andovertake that of China and India by 2040 (OECD et al. 2012, p.99).22 In
most African countries, unemployed youths account for 60% of all theunemployed, and the youth unemployment rate is double the adultunemployment rate (ibid. p.100). As 72% of youths have an income ofless than $2 a day (ibid. pp.99-100), it is imperative to reduce poverty
among youths through job creation. In addition to unemployment,
underemployment and working poverty are also to be addressed as lowskilled and low-wage employment are so broad in Africa especially in
the informal sector.
The employment situation in Africa varies depending on the situation ofindividual countries, but generally, there is a tendency that higher
income per capita is associated with a lower employment rate of theworking-age population (OECD et al. 2012, p.108 and Figure 6). In lowincome sub-Saharan African countries,23 the employment rate of theworking-age population is about 70%, which is comparable to China andBrazil. However, employment in low-income countries has a weak
impact on poverty reduction and human resource development becausea large part of employment is in the informal sector that depends on low22. African Development Bank Group (2011) estimates that the working-age population in2010 was 399 million people with a growth rate of 3.5%, and the working-age population in
2040 will be in the range of 1.07 billion ~1.12 billion people.
23. Based on the Statistics by the World Bank in 2011, low-income countries (LICs) (less than
$1.025 per day) include Kenya, Ethiopia, DRC, Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique, while
lower-middle-income countries (LMICs) ($1.026 – 4.035 per day) include Cameroon, Ghana,
Egypt, Morocco, and Nigeria, and upper-middle-income countries (UMICs) ($4.036 –$12.475 per day) include Angola, Algeria, Gabon, South Africa, and Tunisia, etc.

33

Chapter 1

skilled, low-wage labor. On the other hand, in middle-income subSaharan African countries,24 the employment rate of the working-age
population is much lower, below 50%, and therefore, a quantitative
improvement of employment is strongly needed rather than quality
improvement. As the youth unemployment rate is quite high,25 it isimperative to promote youth employment for new entrants in the labormarket. (OECD et al. 2012, p.100).
Figure 6. Comparison of the employment rate of the working-age population bycountry income groups in Africa and others(OECD et al. 2012, P.108)

Figure 7 below shows that higher educational record, including
vocational training, does not necessarily contribute to a decrease in theunemployment rate; conversely, a higher educational record tends to be
associated with higher rates of unemployment in middle-income
countries. This means that the improvement in the education system orlabor market legislation alone will not suffice; massive creation of
employment opportunities driven by the private sector is called for, toaccommodate the increasing number of youths and their improving
educational records.
There is also a number of challenges in terms of the quality of education,
especially the employability of graduates, ranging from basic education
to higher education, and both in levels and content. While the24. Including both lower-middle-income countries and upper-middle-income countries.
25. 23.4% in North Africa (3.8 times higher than the adult unemployment rate), and 48% in
South Africa (2.5 times higher than the adult unemployment rate)

34

Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges

enrollment rate for primary and secondary education has beenremarkably improved, the low quality of education, or a decline inquality in some countries, has been growing as a major challenge. It isreported that the average academic achievement of sixth-grade children
in sub-Saharan Africa is at the same level as that of second-grade
children in OECD countries.26 In addition to the lack of basic literacy andnumeracy, the achievement test scores of students in some Africancountries have dropped when compared to those in the 1990s (MGI 2010,
pp.20-21). Also pointed out is the lack of practical skills and knowledge
in school education curriculum, as well as a mismatch between the
educational content and employment needs (OECD et al. 2012, pp.141144).
Figure 7. Comparison of the employment rate by education andcountry income groups in Africa(OECD et al. 2012, P.142)

Urbanization in Africa, which is expected to rapidly spread, is to beaddressed as a major urgent policy challenge. Urban population levels in
Africa have been consistently increasing since the 1950s. In 2009, 395
million people, equivalent to about 40% of the population were living inurban areas, and the number is increasing by about 13 million annually(UN HABITAT 2010). The increase in the urban population in sub-26. See Chapter 10 of this volume.

35

Chapter 1

Saharan Africa is consistent even during low growth periods,27 as shownin Figure 8. The insufficient government measures to address
urbanization have been exacerbating difficulties such as urban poverty,
prevalence of slums, and informalization of the urban economy, which
are becoming more critical issues to be tackled by African governments
and the international community.28
Figure 8. Urban demographics in Africa (1950-2050)(UN HABITAT 2010 P.1)

The presence of the informal sector has been a buffer to absorb theincrease in the urban population and working-age population. So far,however, the response of the international community and Africancountries to the increase of the informal sector has been insufficient. The
dependence on the informal sector may deepen difficulties in urban
areas, lead to the further expansion of low wages, low-skilled labor andvulnerable employees.
27. In Africa, from 1970 to 1995, GDP per capita fell by 0.7% annually, but the urban
population increased by 4.7% annually. This is reported as “urbanization without economic
growth” (Watanabe 2010). As will be mentioned in Chapter 2, although the cropland per
capita of the agricultural population in Africa has been decreasing, the increase of the rural
population cannot be absorbed in agriculture, resulting in the above continuous population
shift to urban areas. In addition, though experts’ views are varied, it is also possible thatmodernization in agriculture could accelerate the increase in the urban population, since, assome argue, that the improvement in agricultural productivity produces a surplus in the
agricultural labor force rather than an increase in employment in the non-agricultural sectors
in rural areas (Ranis and Gollin 2012).
28. In the case of Kenya, 60% of the urban population of Nairobi (3.36 million (2007)) live inslums and the informal sector accounts for 60% of overall employment in the country. The
unemployment rate in the slums of Nairobi is 26% and that of youths (15-24 years) andwomen is even higher, reaching 49%; this situation is reported to have contributed to the riots
after the presidential election in early 2008 (Watanabe 2010, p.137).

36

Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges

The creation of sufficient formal sector employment is an imperative for
Africa in order to achieve sustained economic growth, reduce poverty,
and develop and make use of human resources to support its future.
Employment is to be created by improving the business environment,i.e., management of local small to medium-sized businesses,
development of infrastructure (particularly, stable power supply),
improvement of access to finance, promotion of capital investment,
improvement of labor productivity, promotion of human resource
development, and employment creation that can result in an increase in
per capita income. (OECD et al. 2012, pp.135-140)
The informal sector, where most Africans work and will continue towork, plays an important role in poverty reduction and equitable
growth. The World Bank (2011c, pp.9-14) argues that even rapid growthof the formal sector is unlikely to keep pace with the growing number of
new entrants to the labor market since private wage employment in theformal sector has a very limited share in the labor market of low-income
African countries.29 The cross country analysis (Figure 9) suggests thatthe ratio of household enterprise employment to total employment
increases rapidly with growth of GDP per capita and surpasses theincrease of wage employment, by absorbing employment shifting out offamily farming, the most dominant type of employment in most lowincome African countries. Against this background, World Bank (2011c)
suggests that raising productivity and income in the informal sector,
notably household enterprises,30 should be recognized as an important
challenge of employment in low-income African countries.

29. In the case of Uganda in 2003-2006, although wage employment grew at 13% per annum, it
only accounted for 20% of the new jobs created. In the case of Tanzania in 2000-2005, private
wage employment grew at 11.2% per annum, which was surpassed by household enterprise
employment growth at 12.9% per annum.
30. World Bank (2011c, p.14) also notes that more “formality” of household enterprise may
not be the answer when the cost and benefits of more regulation are carefully considered. It
also notes that legal regulations on household enterprises, as well as local taxes imposed onthem, exist in many African countries.

37

Chapter 1

Figure 9. Cross Country Analysis of Distribution ofPrimary Employment by Type(World Bank 2011c, p.10)

1.7 Current situation and future expectations for achieving main goalsof MDGs
According to the assessment of the progress of MDGs in Africa (UNECA
et al, 2011 and 2012), Africa has recorded remarkable progress in theareas of the primary education enrollment rate, gender equality in the
primary education enrollment rate, improvement in the literacy rate of
15-24 year olds, women’s participation in political decision-making,immunization for children, prevention of the spread of tuberculosis and
HIV/AIDS and the decrease in the malaria mortality rate. A remarkabledecrease has also been observed in the under-five infant mortality rate in
post-conflict countries.
However, progress is slow in other areas: in halving the poverty rate,
creating productive employment and decent work, and reducing hunger
and malnutrition. Youth unemployment is also high. Although theprimary education enrollment rate has risen, the primary education
38

Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges

completion rate has not risen enough to match the enrollment rate
progress. The gender equality in secondary education and higher
education is off track. Despite a substantial improvement, the access tosafe drinking water target is unlikely to be achieved by 2015. The
progress in improving access to sanitation is extremely slow.
The MDGs 2012 Progress Chart (United Nations 2012) shows that subSaharan Africa has only two goals that it is likely to achieve by 2015:“Equal girl’s enrollment in primary education” and “Halt and begin toreverse the spread of HIV/AIDS”. The other 14 goals are assessed as“Progress insufficient to reach the target if prevailing trends persist.”
With respect to the “Reduce maternal mortality by three quarters,”
though, the prospects are improving.31 In North Africa, 9 of the 16 goals
are within the “Target already met or expected to be met”, but the “Haltand begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS” is classified as “Noprogress or deterioration”.
As shown above, the progress of MDGs varies by goal and by country,
and it is difficult to make sweeping statements about the development
goals and policies for Africa beyond 2015. The following, however, arecommon and major challenges remaining in the post-2015 era:➢➢ Acceleration of poverty-reducing policies or implementation ofadequate policies (job creation, agriculture and ruraldevelopment) toward inclusive growth.
➢➢ Initiatives to address the quality of education to upgrade andenhance the curriculum to meet society’s needs, while
maintaining momentum toward the quantitative improvement
toward universal basic education.
➢➢ Expansion of access to health services in the field of infectious
disease control and maternal and child health, and further
expansion of access to safe drinking water and sanitation facilities.
➢➢ Continuation of support for achieving MDGs beyond 2015 incountries which will not have achieved them, with diversificationof programs and approaches to adapt to conditions of different
countries and regions.

31. The progress on this goal was assessed as “No progress or deterioration” in Progress
Chart 2011, while the assessment in the 2012 edition improved to “Progress insufficient toreach the target if prevailing trends persist.”39

Chapter 1

1.8 Diversification of trade partners and the progress of intra-regional
integration
Until the 1990s, the African economy used to be heavily dependent on
the European market; however, since the 2000s, economic ties have beenstrengthened with emerging countries (particularly, China, India andBrazil). As a result, the trade with these emerging countries and intraregional trade have come to account for 50% of exports and over 60% of
imports (IMF 2011a, p.39).
Intra-regional trade has come to account for about 14% due to thedevelopment in intra-regional economic integration (ibid p.41).
Advancements in this respect are facilitated by development of regional
infrastructure, promotion of a customs union and common market byregional economic communities (RECs) and elimination of non-tariffbarriers. The advancement of intra-region trade is making some African
economies less vulnerable to external shocks. For example, EAC
countries, which are more dependent on intra-regional trade and arediversified in terms of trade partners compared to countries in other subregions, are considered to be more resilient to external economic shocks
than countries in other sub-regions; EAC countries experienced arelatively moderate slowdown of economic growth following thefinancial crisis in 2008, with their growth rate reaching 4.7% in 2009.
(WEF et al. 2011, p.16-17)
Despite difficulties in data collection and analysis, informal cross border
trade (ICBT) is also quite extensive within Africa. For example, in
Uganda, informal exports in 2009 ($1.56 billion, all of which is forneighboring countries) were equivalent to formal exports ($1.57 billion,
44% of which is for neighboring countries) (WEF et al. 2011, p.17). Afrikaand Ajumbo (2012) estimates that ICBT is a source of income for 43% of
Africa’s population, and stands at $17.6 billion per year in the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) region, accounting for 20% of
GDP in Nigeria and 75% in Benin.

40

Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges

Figure 10. Change of trading partners of Sub-Saharan Africa(IMF 2011a, p.41)

1.9 Development risks in Africa
Having looked at the current situation, as well as the challenges toeconomic growth and the achievements of MDGs since the 2000s, we
now move to see the risk factors for Africa, among the most notable ofwhich are political instability, global economic downturn, climatechange and food security as well as debt sustainability.
1.9.1 Risk of political instability
Political risks, including the possibilities of civil wars and politicalturmoil, exemplified in the “Arab Spring” in North Africa, pose thebiggest risk to economic and social development in Africa. While anumber of civil wars and conflicts have been settled thanks to the effortsof African countries throughout the African Union and the support ofthe international community, there is always a risk of recurrence. With
this recognition, efforts must continue by individual countries as well as
by regional and international communities to support the peacebuilding, reconstruction and state-building of conflict-affected orconflict-prone countries. And, in the longer term, countries must achieve
inclusive growth for socio-economic stability, since, as seen in the case of
the Arab Spring, at the root of political and social unrest lies people’s
discontent about persistent unemployment and disparities.
1.9.2 Risk of the impacts of a global economic downturn
Africa always faces the risk of economic slowdown caused by a global
41

Chapter 1

economic downturn such as the financial crisis in 2008, and the recent
Euro crisis. Countries with close links to the global economy tend to bestrongly affected by such external shocks. South Africa, for example,
which has close economic ties with Europe, recorded a considerable
slowdown in its growth rate following the financial crisis in 200832 andthere is similar concern in countries in North Africa where export andtourism revenue strongly depends on Europe.33 Also, as we saw in theprevious section, Africa is coming to have closer ties with emerging
countries like China, India and Brazil. Any economic downturn in these
economies will inevitably affect Africa’s economy.
1.9.3 Risk of climate change and food insecurity
While Africa is the region with the least amount of GHG emissions, it is
the region most vulnerable to climate change. The risk of climate change
in Africa was widely recognized in COP17, which was held in
Johannesburg in 2011, and owing to the drought in the Sahel region andthe Horn of Africa during 2011-2012. At the Camp David Summit in May
2012, G8 and African Leaders agreed upon forming a New Alliance forFood Security and Nutrition in Africa.
UNFCCC (2007 pp.18-20) highlights some impacts of climate change in
Africa on key sectors including: increasing risk of drought, flooding, andinundation due to sea-level rise in the coastal areas; increasing water
scarcity and stress; loss of agricultural land and declining production ofsubsistence crops; increasing infectious diseases such as malaria,
tuberculosis and diarrhea; malnutrition for both adults and children;
loss of biodiversity; and damage to coastal infrastructure.
The annual cost of adaptation in Sub-Saharan Africa is estimated at$16.9-18.9 billion (2010-15),34 which is lower than those of East Asia andPacific ($19.5-28.7 billion) and Latin America and the Caribbean ($16.822.5 billion); however, in terms of share of GDP, Sub-Saharan Africa
32. South Africa’s average growth rate was 4.9% during the 5-year period between 2004-2008.
It dropped to -1.5% in 2009, and is expected to recover only to 3.0% in 2013. (IMF 2012a, p.76).
33. OECD et al. (2012 p.33) reports that a 1% decline in the economic growth rate in OECD
countries will cause a 0.5% decrease in economic growth in Africa and a 10% drop in export
revenue in Africa.
34. In sector analysis, water supply and flood protection ($6.2-6.6 billion), coastal zone ($4.0
billion) and agriculture ($3.3 billion) are the important sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa. The
cost of infrastructure is forecast to increase significantly from $1.1 billion (2010-19) to $6.0
billion (2040-49).

42

Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges(0.70%) is much higher those of East Asia and Pacific (0.20%) and Latin
America and Caribbean (0.30%) (World Bank (2010b)).35
The Copenhagen Accord, which was agreed in COP15 in December
2009, recognizes Africa as the most vulnerable developing region forwhich enhanced action and international cooperation on adaptation isurgently required, and also funding for adaptation will be prioritized in
the future climate change financing mechanism, which aims at
mobilizing $100 billion per year by 2020 (para 3, 8). The High-Level
Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (2010), established by the
UN Secretary-General in February 2010, also suggests that grants andhighly concessional loans are crucial for adaptation in the mostvulnerable countries including those in Africa (pp.5, 10). Against thisbackground, the African Development Bank Group (2011) proposes toestablish the African Green Fund to complement existing instruments
and enhance the ability of African countries to respond to Climate
Finance challenges.
Africa has the potential for mitigating the negative impact of climatechange. It is endowed with a variety of abundant natural renewableenergy resources such as hydro, geothermal, solar and wind power,
though much of this potential remains to be developed. Climate change
mitigation will increasingly be a challenge for the continent, for it will
have to expand its energy production to meet the continent’s everincreasing demand coming from growing economies and increasing
populations.
Africa could improve its energy efficiency by taking such measures as
the development of renewable energies, installation of high-efficiency
natural gas and coal-fired power plants, and reduction of powertransmission loss. Outside the power sector, Africa can also contribute to
the mitigation of climate change by conserving the tropical rainforests of
the Congo Basin and in other areas, and by developing energy-efficienturban transportation networks.
1.9.4 Debt sustainability
Sub-Saharan countries are employing cautious debt management
policies, and debt sustainability has continuously improved. The ratio of
35. World Bank (2010b pp.1, 13) also notes that flexible policies and more research are needed
due to the imprecision of existing studies and models providing a wide range of estimates.

43

Chapter 1

the external public debt over the GDP of sub-Saharan countries has
significantly improved from 31.0% in 2004 (55.8% when South Africa
and Nigeria are excluded) to 9.7% in 2011 (18.5%, ibid.). Especially, theimprovement between 2004 and 2007 was significant36 due to the debt
reduction in the mid-2000s which has led to a considerable reduction in
the debt burden. In addition, the outstanding debt has continued to
decline since the late 2000s.37 It should be noted, however, that theoutstanding debt of oil-importing countries excluding South Africa as of2011 is 24.0%, which is much larger than the 4.8% of oil-exporting
countries (IMF 2012b, p.112 and Table 9).
Table 2. Outstanding government debt of sub-Saharan countries (% of GDP)
Calendar year

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20102011

Whole of sub-SaharanAfrica

31.8

23.0

14.6

12.1

11.2

12.1

10.0

9.7

Excluding Nigeria andSouth Africa

55.8

45.2

31.0

24.4

20.9

22.6

19.2

18.5

Oil-exporting countries

38.8

20.3

6.8

6.6

5.3

6.1

5.4

4.8

Oil-importing countries 61.1
(excluding South Africa)

52.4

38.2

30.0

27.2

28.0

23.9

24.0

(Prepared by the author based on IMF 2012b, P.112)

The sustainability of African debt is not an immediate concern, but it
depends to a great extent on the macro-economic policy, fiscal policy,
and debt management ability of each country. According to the IDA
traffic lights (fiscal 2012/2013), the number of countries in high or
medium risk regarding debt sustainability (red and yellow) accounts forthe majority among IDA-eligible countries in Africa38 and thus, it isnecessary to monitor the performance of each country. Also important is
to keep track of the borrowing trend from emerging non-Paris Club
countries, such as China, and also borrowings from international
financial markets through bond issuance, etc.

36. 31.0% in 2004 (55.8% excluding South Africa and Nigeria) ⇒12.1% in 2007 (idem 30.0%)
37. 12.1% in 2007 (30.0% excluding South Africa and Nigeria) ⇒ 9.7% in 2011 (idem 18.5%)
38. Red: 7 countries, Yellow: 14 countries and Green: 15 countries

44

Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges

2. Toward the Structural Transformation of African Economies
and the Achievement of Inclusive and Sustained Growth

2.1 Medium to long-term prospects of African economies
Since the 2000s, while maintaining economic growth primarily led by
the export of energy and mineral resources, Africa has also diversified
trading partners and regions, deepened intra-continent regional
economic integration, expanded the internal market, increased middle
class consumers, and improved fiscal and monetary policies as well as
debt management. These structural changes seem to have made theAfrican economy more resilient to external shocks, such as sharp
declines in energy and resource prices.39
Based on the assumption that the current economic growth willcontinue, the African Development Bank Group (2011a) envisions theAfrican economy and society in the year 2040 as follows:40➢➢ Assuming an economic growth rate of 4.9% to 5.5%, its GDP willgrow from $1.7 trillion in 2010 to $5.9 trillion in 2040, while theGDP per capita will grow from $1,667 in 2010 to $3,733 in 2040,
reaching the range between today’s Indonesia ($2,974) and China($4,328).
➢➢ The population growth rate will drop from 2.27% in 2010 to 1.37%
in 2040, but the total population will increase from 1.03 billion in2010 to 1.59 billion in 2040, which will exceed the prospective
population of both China and India in 2040 (estimated to bearound 1.5 billion).
➢➢ The working-age population (aged 15-64) will increase from 400
million in 2010 to 1.07 billion in 2040, and the ratio of the workingage population over the total population will increase from 40%(2010) to 67% (2040). This is comparable to the current rate of theworking-age population of Asian countries which are thought toenjoy a demographic dividend (JICA 2008, p.26).
➢➢ The number of middle class people41 whose daily income ranges
from $4 to $20 (equivalent to an annual income of $1,460 to $7,300)
39. IMF (2011a p.7) remarks “the region’s recent sustained strong growth represents a sharp
break with the past, when the region lagged far behind other parts of the developing world.”
40. The forecast is a 50-year forecast until 2060. Here, we are presenting the estimate in 2040.
There are 2 types of simulations, i.e., High-Case Scenario and Low-Case Scenario and thefollowing is all based on Low-Case Scenario.
41. Mckinsey Global Institute defines the middle class in a more precise manner: as ahousehold with an annual income of more than $5,000, which is a threshold where
expenditure other than the necessities of daily life such as food increases, and forecasts thatthe number of middle class households will increase from 85 million in 2010 to 128 million in2020 (MGI 2010, pp.3-4).

45

Chapter 1

will increase from 360 million in 2010 to 620 million in 2040; andthe ratio of middle class people over the total population will
increase from 34% (2010) to 38% (2040). However, the percentageof the population with daily income of less than $1.25 will only
decrease from 44.15% in 2010 to 37.77% in 2040; if this forecast
comes true, the poverty reduction target of MDGs (to halve thepoverty population rate of 1990 (58%) to (29%) in 2015) will not be
achieved even in 2040 (African Development Bank Group 2011a,p.70).42
2.2 Prospects for the transformation of African economies
As shown above, even with the assumption of 30-year, continuous
economic growth of 5%, in 2040, as much as 37.77% of the total
population in Africa will still be living on a daily income of less than
$1.25. Given this kind of gloomy prediction on the one hand, and thebrighter-looking forecast of GDP per capita close to $4,000 on the other, it
will be critically important for the African economy to realize “sustained
growth” and “inclusive growth,” which will allow the broader
population as well as the poor and vulnerable to enjoy the fruits ofeconomic growth in the next few decades.
In order to make such economic development a reality, Africa needs torealize the following:➢➢ Transformation from an economy dependent on energy andmineral resources into an economy led by new leading sectors
such asi) agricultural sector revitalized through agricultural productivity
improvement resulting in increased agricultural production andgrowth of agro-industries and agro-business,ii) labor-intensive manufacturing industries, especially local
industries that respond to increasing demand from the emerging
middle class consumers and regionally integrated market, andiii) modernized and private-sector-led service sector combinedwith highly educated human capital, innovative technology andbetter quality of service delivery.
➢➢ Provision of employment for a rapidly growing, working-age
42. The African Development Bank Group states that it is necessary to achieve economic
growth of over 7% on average in order to produce rapid poverty reduction. In this redar (note:
what does ‘redar’?), the growth rate of this forecast is insufficient (African Development
Bank Group 2011, p.12).

46

Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges

population, especially for youths, through fostering of the
manufacturing and service sectors.
➢➢ Equitable income distribution: through job creation, and increasein per capita income through improving labor productivity andagricultural productivity. This must be accompanied by thedevelopment and effective use of human capital and thestrengthening of social services and a social safety net for the poorand vulnerable.
➢➢ Infrastructure development: to support increasing demand fortransport, energy and water driven by long-term economic
growth, population growth and improvement in living standards.
The necessary amount of investment is to be mobilized to fulfill
the estimated funding gap of $40 to $50 billion per annum (WorldBank 2008).
In the following sections, the term “transformation” is used to mean achange in economic structure, which, as described above, will
simultaneously bring about the shift from the dependence on energy
and mineral resources through the diversification of growth sectors andtrading partners (hereafter termed as “sustained growth”), and theenjoyment of the fruits of growth by a broader population throughemployment and social services (hereafter termed as “inclusive
growth”).43
We will now discuss the diversification of sources of wealth (i.e.,
agriculture, manufacturing and service sector) in sections 2.2.1 through2.2.3, and the investment in human capital and its use (i.e., education,
employment and labor productivity) in section 2.2.4.
2.2.1 Potential of African agriculture
Unlike agriculture in Asia and Latin America, African agriculture has
not gone through the transition process to modern agriculture andadoption of agricultural technology through the Green Revolution, andagricultural land productivity improvement has been stagnant. The
increase in food demand due to population growth has been met so far
by the expansion of cultivated land and increased food imports. As
43. IMF (2012a), based on the definition that the Structural Transformation is the shift ofworkers from low to high average productivity activities and sectors, P.51), analyzes the
structural transformation of sub-Saharan Africa by taking the labor mobility between sectors
as the main indicator. IMF (2012a) also indicates some good examples of structuraltransformation such as: Burkina Faso (agriculture), Tanzania (manufacturing), Namibia(manufacturing), Mauritius (service industry) and Kenya (service industry) (idem, P67-71).

47

Chapter 1

African governments have not tended to prioritize agriculturalmodernization since their independence, farmers have returned to stable
cultivation of subsistence crops since the economic slump in the 1970s(Hirano 2009, pp.109-102), and the cropland per capita of the agricultural
population decreased by 40% between 1960 and 2003. However, as
agriculture is still the main sector in Africa, accounting for 32% of theGDP, it is critical to improve productivity through the introduction ofmodern agricultural technology for achieving sustained growth in the
African economy.44
MGI (2010) estimates that, with 60% (590 million ha) of the world’s
uncultivated arable farmland (970 million ha in total),45 Africa has thepotential to increase its current agricultural production from $280 billion(2010) to $500-880 billion in 2030, through enhancing agricultural landdevelopment, increasing agricultural productivity and transitioning tohigh-value-added crops. The Coalition for African Rice Development(CARD),46 which aims at doubling rice production in sub-Saharan Africa
from 14 million tons in 2008 to 28 million tons by 2018, shows good
progress toward the achievement of the above goal with the productionof 18.4 million tons in 2010.47
In recent years, investment in agriculture by the private sector is
growing, which has the potential to bring productivity improvement,
new technology, agricultural land expansion, supply chain and value
chain development, etc., resulting in comprehensive development ofagricultural production and creation of added-value. One example ofefforts to take advantage of private sector investment is a regional
development program in Mozambique supported by the Japanese
government (JICA) to promote agriculture in the Nacala Corridor in thenorth of the country. In a similar context, the G8 Summit held in CampDavid in May 2012 announced a joint action plan, “New Alliance forFood Security and Nutrition”, backed by G8 and African countries for
44. See also Hirano (2013), pp.123-127, Takahashi (2010), pp.145-203, and chapters 2 and 3 ofthis volume.
45. Sudan (72 million ha), Democratic Republic of Congo (66 million ha), Angola (53 millionha), Zambia (53 million ha), Mozambique (49 million ha), Central African Republic (45million ha), etc. (MGI 2010).
46. Joint initiative of 23 African countries and 11 institutions centered on JICA and AGRA
(Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa) a private organization formed by African farming
experts, following TICAD IV Yokohama Action Plan for doubling rice production in 10 years.
47. For more detailed discussions on the CARD initiative, see chapters 2 and 3.

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Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges

the purpose of promoting private investment in African agriculture anddissemination of agricultural technology.
On the other hand, large farmland acquisition by the private sector may
cause conflicts over land and water resources with local populations andfarmers. To prevent such risks, a framework for the protection of therights of local populations and farmers is needed to create anenvironment benefitting both private investors and local populations
and farmers.48 Government should play an important role in creatingsuch investment climate, in addition to its traditional roles such as in theprovision of economic and technical assistance to local farmers and in
agricultural technology development and dissemination.
Agriculture can boost the African economy. Despite the low
performance of exports (cocoa, coffee, and tea) since the 1990s,49
encouraging cases are emerging in export promotion throughdeveloping new products with new technology, such as horticultural
products in Eastern and Southern African countries. Also encouraging is
the expansion of the intra-African market50 due to economic growth; thiscan bring a huge business opportunity for exports within the continent.
The expansion of agricultural production could boost the developmentof the agro-industry and agro-business such as agro-processing, foodprocessing, distribution, transportation, and finance, leading to rural
employment and improvement of the livelihood of the non-farming
population, which accounts for half of the total population in rural areas.
It could also lead to foreign currency savings through reducing food

48. As an example of such an initiative, a set of Principles for Responsible Agricultural
Investment (PRAI) was proposed by the Japanese government and adopted at L’Aquila G8
Summit in April 2009.
49. The share of agricultural exports from Sub-Saharan Africa in world agricultural tradedecreased from 5.4% (1995-97) to 2.7% (2006-08). Such sluggish development may be
attributable not only to the stagnation of agricultural productivity, but also to high indirect
costs such as transportation costs, underdeveloped infrastructure and business environment(WEF et al. 2011, pp.18-19).
50. For example, MGI (2010) reports that food products and beverages markets are expected
to grow from $369 billion in 2008 to $544 billion in 2020 (p.39). CAADP Pillar II Experts
Reference Group (2009) notes that demand in local and regional urban food markets across
Africa is expected to increase from US$50 billion to US$150 billion in 2000-2030, while foreign
demand for agricultural commodities and high-value exports is projected to grow from
US$11 billion to US$20 billion in the same period (p.21).

49

Chapter 1

imports, which exceed that of Japan.51
African agriculture has significant potential but faces various
development challenges. To summarize, it should be remembered thatthe vision of the original Comprehensive Africa Agriculture
Development Programme (CAADP) in 200352 remains relevant to thecurrent major challenges of African agriculture. It is also to be noted thatthe market-oriented approach and the small-scale farmers’ approach,which are discussed in the following chapters 4 and 5, respectively, areboth to be addressed in a balanced and integrated manner as describedin the original CAADP.
2.2.2 Potential of African manufacturing industry
Manufacturing is important for the African economy due to thefollowing reasons: for the diversification of its economy, reduction of
external vulnerability, job creation for the working-age population(especially for youths), improvement in the trade balance, notably for
non-oil-producing countries with trade deficits, etc. The potential for
manufacturing in Africa stems mostly from the prospective market
expansion due to economic growth, increasing population, growing
middle class consumers, increasing working-age population and effectof the future demographic dividend.53 The MGI (2010) states that theconsumption markets within Africa have already reached $860 billion(2008), which are equivalent to those of India and Russia. It also
estimates that they will grow to $1.38 trillion in 2020, and the number of
middle class households with an annual income of over $5,000 is
expected to increase from 85 million in 2008 to 128 million in 202054
51. According to FAO data, agricultural exports from Africa amount to $34.2 billion (2009),
agricultural imports to Africa amount to $53.2 billion (2009), and with a deficit amounting to$19.0 billion. Agricultural imports exceed that of Japan ($35.7 billion). 45% of rice and 85% of
wheat consumed in Africa are imported in 2009 (WEF et al. 2011, p.19).
52. The vision for agriculture is that the continent should, by 2015: attain food security (interms of both availability and affordability and ensuring access of the poor to adequate foodand nutrition); improve the productivity of agriculture to attain an average annual growthrate of 6%, with particular attention to small-scale farmers; especially focusing on women,
have dynamic agricultural markets between nations and regions; have integrated farmers
into the market economy; including better access to markets, with Africa to become a net
exporter of agricultural products, achieve the more equitable distribution of wealth; be a
strategic player in agricultural science and technology development; and practiceenvironmentally sound production methods. (NEPAD 2003 p.9)
53. Please see MGI (2010), IMF (2011b)
54. IMF (2011b) also features an article on the expansion of the internal market and the middle
class in Africa.

50

Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges(ibid).
In fact, in recent years, manufacturing exports in Africa are increasing toneighboring countries in the continent. For example, the value of exportsof eight African countries55 increased from $1.5 billion in 2000 to $10
billion in 2008, and the proportion of manufactured exports in totalexports increased as follows: Kenya: 21% (2000) → 37% (2008), Uganda:
6% (2000) → 30% (2008), and Senegal: 27% (2000) → 30% (2008). The
main export items are processed fuels, food, chemical products, clothing
and cosmetics (MGI 2010).
However, manufacturing in Africa has not emerged from the 1980s
slump and it accounts for less than 10% of GDP in many Africancountries.56 In terms of the share of world exports for developing
countries and regions, East Asia showed rapid growth of 3.3% (1980) ⇒8% (1995) ⇒ 14% (2008), and other regions are also generally in theprocess of expansion. By contrast, Africa has experienced a modest
expansion of 1.3% (1990s)⇒1.6% (2000s) and moreover, it is due mainly
to the export of primary products (WEF et al. 2011, pp.3-4). The share ofindustrial products of sub-Saharan countries in world trade is declining,where light industrial products showed a decline of 1.2% (1980) ⇒ 0.9%
(2008) and heavy industrial products showed a marginal increase of
0.3% (1995-97) ⇒ 0.4% (2000-2008) (WEF et al. 2011, p.15-20).
The slump in manufacturing in Africa is attributed to various factors:
underdeveloped infrastructure (especially, power and transportation),
inadequate business environment, relatively high labor cost (excluding
the informal sector), low education, health and sanitation levels,
insufficient financial access, high socio-political risks, and so on. It is
important to comprehensively address these issues; particularly in subSaharan countries, high indirect costs due to the underdevelopment of
infrastructure, business environment and financial systems are reported
to be the main causes of high manufacturing costs, although the issue ofhuman capital such as insufficient education and relatively high laborcosts are also raised. (WEF et al. 2011, p.12, OECD et al. 2012, p.21)
55. Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia56. In the following 11 countries, the manufacturing industry accounts for 15-20% of GDP:
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, South
Africa, Tunisia and Zimbabwe. (OECD et al. 2012).

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Chapter 1

In 1980s’ Asia, having overcome these constraints (except labor costs),
economic growth through the development of labor-intensive industry,
poverty reduction through job creation and increases in per capita laborproductivity and income were achieved simultaneously. The Asianexperience in development provides rich experience and lessons to bereferred to for African development. Africa may take advantage of theincreasing working-age population and improving education levels,
while addressing issues such as high cost in manufacturing, service
reliability in logistics and energy supply. Consistent investment isneeded in infrastructure and human resource development and increating an enabling business environment to meet the needs of industry.
However, Africa now finds itself in a quite different environment fromwhat it was in the 1980s and 1990s, when Asia began to rapidly grow.
Today, as low-wage, labor-intensive export industries have developed
nearly all over the world except Africa, Africa has some disadvantages in
the international business environment for promoting labor-intensive
industries.57 As Noman and Stiglitz (2012) states, there is no policy
package that fits all countries, so adopting one specific development
strategy in Africa, such as low-wage, labor-intensive export industrial
development, is to be avoided.58 While the Asian experience might be auseful reference, African countries must be flexible and selective inpolicy formulation to fully take advantage of their respective
comparative advantage and resource endowments, such as theavailability of raw materials and the level of local labor costs.
2.2.3 Potential of the service sector in Africa (Trade, transportation,
telecommunications, finance)
The service sector’s59 share of total GDP in Africa has increased from
44.4% in 1980 to 53.1% in 2009. (World Bank 2011a). This is in sharp
contrast to other sectors: the share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries60
in total GDP in Africa has decreased from 17.2% in 1980 to 13.1% in 2009,

57. IMF (2012a) p.62-63
58. Noman and Stiglitz (2012) p.40
59. Including wholesale and retail trade (including hotels and restaurants), transport, andgovernment, financial, professional, and personal services, such as education, health care,real estate, and all other branches of economic activities that are not included in agriculture,
forestry and fisheries and industry sectors (World Bank 2011a, p.136).
60. Including forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as crop cultivation and livestock
production. (World Bank 2011a, p.135)

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Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges

and that of the industrial sectors61 likewise has decreased from 38.4% to33.8%, and the manufacturing sector from 10.7% in the 1980s to 8.5% in
the 2000s (ibid).
While the service sector’s increasing share in GDP is helped by the
relative slump in other sectors, the sector is expanding thanks to
growing private sector participation facilitated by deregulation and cost
reduction through technology innovation. A typical example is themobile phone service, which is expanding rapidly, as thetelecommunications sector is a “high growth sector” comparable toenergy and resource sectors. Demand in the trade and transport sectors
is also expanding, presumably due to the increase in logistics caused byeconomic growth, rapid increase in final consumption expenditure62 andthe expansion of the intra-African market.
IMF (2012a) refers to Kenya as a good example of the development of theservice sector. In Kenya, the contribution of the service sector to GDP
was strong, ranging between 2 and 5% in 2005-2011, while that ofagriculture and manufacturing stagnated, with less than 2% or negative
growth rates. This was made possible by, along with the country’s
relatively high education standards, the increasing demand fortransport, telecommunications and financial services against the
backdrop of Eastern African regional integration and strong ICT service
exports; ICT accounted for over 10% of the service exports of the country
during 2007-2011.
Within the service sector, lagging behind is the financial sector, except inSouth Africa， Mauritius，Tunisia，Morocco，Cape Verde，Namibia,
Nigeria, Egypt, and Kenya;63 the importance of developing the financial
sector in Africa is to be emphasized for the mobilization of domestic
capital for investment, particularly in view of a substantial expansion innational savings that is expected to occur thanks to the demographic
61. Including mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, gas, and water (World Bank
2011a, p.136).
62. Final consumption expenditure per capita in Africa increased as follows (US dollars:
nominal): 541 (1980s) ⇒ 586 (1990s) and ⇒756 (2000s), in particular it soared in the late 2000s(600 (2003) ⇒ 1,082 (2009)). This trend is seen both in Sub-Saharan countries (487 (2003) ⇒ 864(2009)) and in North Africa (1,179 (2003) ⇒ 2,240 (2009)). (World Bank 2011a)
63. In these countries, the ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP, a proxy of financial
market development, exceeded 30% in 2009 (World Bank 2011a p.65).

53

Chapter 1

dividend in the coming decades.64
Transformation of the service sector will have far-reaching impacts onother sectors: it will not only help facilitate the modernization of
traditional services through encouraging technological innovation andmarket integration and deregulation, but it will also improve
productivity, strengthen competitiveness and encourage investment andreduce costs in agricultural and industrial sectors. To make this happen,
however, African countries need to enhance the supply of highly skilledhuman capital through higher education in science and engineering.
They also need to take measures to address the sector’s current overdependence on the informal sector65, which contributes little to humanresource development.
2.2.4 Investment in human capital (education, employment, laborproductivity)66
Africa needs to develop education not only in quantity but also – andmore importantly – in quality. Quantity-wise, many African countries
have made substantial strides in basic education; many have introduceda policy of free primary education since the 1990s, resulting in the
improved net enrollment rates in primary and secondary education
rising from 58% (1999) to 76% (2009), and from 19% (1999) to 29% (2009),
respectively. Quality-wise, however, much remains to be done, for theacademic performance of children is still quite low in Africa. This needs
to be urgently addressed given the plausible correlation between the rateof economic growth of a country and academic achievement of school
children.67
Higher education and vocational technical education in Africa areundergoing rapid development. However, here again, a lot of challenges
still remain; they include: the improvement of the basic quality ofeducation and research, securing employment of graduates (refer toFigure 7 in Section 1.6), and the issue of the ‘brain drain’. Added to theseis the need to satisfy the changing and growing demand for highly
64. Currently, the national savings rate is around 15% over the GDP.
65. According to Watanabe (2010), the informal service sector accounted for 34% of
employment in Nairobi in 2002 and the formal service sector 4%. The informal sector
accounts for nearly 90% of employment for the whole of the service sector, including formal
and informal sectors.
66. For discussions on physical infrastructure development, see Chapter 7 of this volume.
67. See Chapter 10 of this volume.

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Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges

skilled labor from the newly growing service sector including ICT, andto cope with the needs of the globalizing environment. The current
system of higher education and vocational training, including the stockof teaching faculties, seems incapable of satisfying these changing
demands of society, and needs to be systematically reviewed andimproved upon.
There are indeed mounting expectations and needs for improved humanresources in Africa on the one hand and, on the other, there has been asteady improvement in the supply of better-educated human resources.
Under these circumstances, the most critical issue is to provide sufficient
employment to young people who possess improved academic
capabilities. This is becoming a huge challenge both in low- and middleincome countries. Low-income countries, where the informal sector
accounts for the majority of employment, are often unable to provide
appropriate job opportunities that are on a par with the skill levels ofbetter-educated youths; the informal sector is also weak in providing theworkers with opportunities to further upgrade their skills. In middleincome countries, by contrast, unemployment of highly educated youths
is a serious problem, resulting from the mismatch between the needs ofindustry and the qualifications of graduates coming from higher
education and vocational/technical education. (See Figure 7 in Section
1.6).
These immense challenges appear to require comprehensive approaches
that look simultaneously at the supply and demand sides of humanresources, for the above-mentioned puzzle can be solved only by thecoordination of investment in human capital (education) and its effectiveuse (employment). World Bank (2012e) cites an example of acomprehensive promotion program of employment and laborproductivity in Ethiopia; it reports that policies that address the labormarket (like deregulation and vocational training), private sector
productivity (like company managers’ training), and the industry as awhole (like industrial promotion measures) are called for.
Also encouraging might be to look at the effects of various humancapital development measures on the academic ability andemployability of children and youth. Such measures include, forexample, promotion of pre-primary education, incentivizing of parents
to educate children (e.g., conditional cash transfers, meal provision
55

Chapter 1

schemes, and scholarships), childhood nutrition and health support(e.g., parasite control), and prevention of sexually transmitted infections(e.g., provision of contraceptives and promotion of family planning).
The effectiveness of these interventions on education and employment
are being clarified with massive empirical studies, providing useful
insights on policy.68 Policy debate on human resource development andemployment may have a lot to gain from learning from the achievementsof such studies.

3. African Development beyond TICAD V: Toward a Differentiatedand Customized Approach for Development
The approach based on intra-regional integration responding togeographical proximity and common interests of neighboring Africancountries has been attempted in various ways.69 Since the 2000s, its
importance has been newly highlighted in New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD 2001), and the African Union and Regional
Economic Communities (RECs)70 are promoting a variety of regional
integration programs and initiatives including cross-borderinfrastructure development and promotion of intra-regional trade. Thisdevelopment perspective through regional integration and cooperationmust be the central thrust in African development.
However, countries are quite varied; as seen above, since the 2000s, somecountries have achieved steady economic growth and social
development, while others are still in need of continued assistance on
their way towards achieving MDGs and/or post-conflict state-building.
Thus, the needs for development have come to be increasingly
diversified and complicated. Given these variances, it is important that
African countries adopt policies best suited to their different needs. The
68. See, for example, Bertrand and Crepon (2012).
69. Many of the regional economic communities (RECs) include regional cooperation
mechanisms founded in the early 1960s to 1970.
70. The African Union Commission established close cooperation with the following 8
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as one of the pillars of the basic strategies of 20092012: Community of Sahel Saharan States (CEN SAD), Common Market for Eastern andSouthern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community ofCentral African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)Intergovernment Authority for Development (IGAD), Southern African Development
Community (SADC) and Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA). (African Union Commission
2009)

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Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges

international development community must make sure that individual
countries are given sufficient policy space to pursue their developmental
goals, recalling that their policy recommendations since the days ofstructural adjustments in the 1980s have often been criticized as being
too rigid with no policy space for African governments. Actually, similararguments calling for customized or differentiated approaches forcountries at different stages are emerging with respect to the discussions
on the post-2015 development agendas; the argument goes that different
targets must be provided for countries and areas that are likely toachieve MDGs by 2015 and those which are not (UNECA et al. 2011).
It is expected that the action plans to be adopted at TICAD V will
incorporate these diversified and complicated development needs. In
working out these plans, African countries and their partners, while
upholding the perspective of regional integration and cooperation, must
make sure that African countries are encouraged to seek differentiatedand customized development strategies to meet their specific needs.
These two approaches, i.e., the regional integration approach and the“differentiated and customized approach” must be the central
philosophy underpinning the upcoming new TICAD V Action Plan.
3.1. Regional integration approach
The regional integration approach comprises a variety of programs,
includingcross-borderinfrastructuredevelopment,
corridordevelopment, intra-regional trade promotion, support to regional
economic communities (RECs), and rural infrastructure development.
African Union, NEPAD and RECs are positioned as central promoters ofthe most important initiatives for regional integration, such as theProgram of Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), and Action
Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade.
The importance of regional integration was also highlighted in the
TICAD IV Yokohama Action Plan.71 Various partners of Africa have been
supporting moves along the lines of this approach. Japan and JICA havebeen providing support to regional infrastructure development and“one stop border posts (OSBP)” as their flagship projects listed in the
Action Plan;72 the African Development Bank Group considers regional
71. See the section of “accelerated growth” and “infrastructure” of TICAD IV Yokohama
Action Plan
72. For more details of the OSBP, see Chapter 8.

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Chapter 1

integration as a strategic priority at the regional level in its mid-termbusiness strategy 2008-2012 (African Development Bank Group 2008,p.11); the World Bank considers regional integration as a key instrument
to implement its African regional strategy, in addition to responses to
middle-income countries and fragile states (World Bank 2011b, pp.2931).
The perspective of regional integration must also be incorporated inindividual countries’ development planning. In other words,
governments and donors must make sure that their development
strategies are worked out so that they promote the interests not only of
the country but also of neighboring countries in the region. Formulation,prioritization and sequencing of development projects must take into
consideration their regional integration effects; for example, Kuchiki(2010, p.121) is proposing the formation of industrial clusters in
Mozambique and its neighboring region based on the experience in theindustrial cluster policy in Northern Vietnam and in the Eastern
Seaboard Development Plan in Thailand.
Rural areas are also to be incorporated into the regional integration
approach to enhance urban-rural connectivity and to develop
agricultural potential, by investing in rural infrastructure such astransport, telecommunication and irrigation, strengthening access tomarket, finance and technology, and creating employment inagricultural and non-agricultural sectors in rural areas. Only one-thirdof Africans living in rural areas are within two kilometers of an allseason road, compared with two-thirds of the population in otherdeveloping regions (World Bank 2011d). In this context, theComprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP)
proposes the Framework for the Improvement of Rural Infrastructure
and Trade-Related Capacities for Market Access (FIMA) as the second
pillar of CAADP.
3.2. Differentiated and customized approach
While maintaining the regional integration perspective, countries mustpursue customized strategies to meet their specific needs. Though not
exhaustive, the following are proposed for countries under different
circumstances:58

Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges

3.2.1. Development challenges in fragile states
While many African countries are starting to show high economic
growth rates, some other countries lag behind, and some are still on their
way to post-conflict state building. Many of these countries are called“fragile states.” Though there is no single effective prescription for thedevelopment of such countries, several points are worthy of
consideration. First, short-term humanitarian assistance in theimmediate aftermath of conflict and long-term development assistancefor state building must be coordinated to avoid any gap between the
two. Second, states must have the capacity to provide their citizens withbasic services such as food, health, and education, along with the ability
to secure law and order; the former is very important for the state to be
regarded as legitimate by its people.
With this in mind, support for countries in fragile situations must
incorporate not only assistance for improved governance such as therestoration of political stability and strengthening of security sectors, butalso a well-balanced economic and social assistance program in thefields of infrastructure development, job creation and food security as
well as healthcare.73
3.2.2. Development challenges in resource-rich countries
As IMF (2012b) defines 20 Sub-Saharan countries as Resource Intensive
Countries74 and notes that several countries75 are expected to soon join
the ranks of significant natural resource exporters, given recent
discoveries and exploration results, “Mineral Governance” (World Bank
2012b) is newly focused as a major development challenge of Africa.
The debate on the “resource curse” is still going on. Paul Collier (2007)
cites a natural resource trap or resource curse as one of the fourdevelopment traps76 preventing Africa from escaping poverty. WorldBank (2012b), on the other hand, maintains that there is hardly any
73. For more detailed discussions on state-building in fragile states, see Chapter 12 of thisvolume.
74. 7 countries (Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
Nigeria) as oil-exporters, and 13 countries (Botswana, DRC, Guinea, Central African
Republic, Ghana, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia,
Zimbabwe) as other-resource intensive countries (IMF2012b, p.62). In North Africa, Algeria
and Libya are traditional oil-exporters and Morocco is a phosphate-exporter.
75. Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritania, Mozambique, South Sudan, Sudan, andUganda etc. are expected to be new resource-exporters in the IMF ranking.
76. The other three development traps are: conflict trap, landlocked with bad neighbors, andbad governance in a small country.

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empirical data that endorses the resource curse theory77 and calls forpolicy initiatives directed at sustained development by making use ofabundant resource-derived revenue in order to achieve the economic
development and growth of resource-rich countries.
Even supposing, as Paul Collier (2007) indicates, a negative impact ofsome degree of natural resource exports on economic development andgrowth, it should be possible to promote economic development andgrowth through a combination of effective policies.78 Such policies can
include: effective use of resource revenues generated from natural
resources for productive investment in infrastructure and humancapital; strengthening of transparency and accountability for resource
revenue spending and prevention of corruption; and robust fiscal policy
and prudent public investment policy. Thus, there must be strong needs
for assistance for resource-rich countries for their policy system reforms,
strengthening of governance, and diversification of economic structure.
In addition, the private sector is greatly interested in resource-richcountries and they, too, have a strong interest in the improvement of theinvestment climate, comprising, most importantly, of well-developed
infrastructure and capable human resources, stable macroeconomic
management, and accessible long-term development financing. Thus,
there is strong demand in the private sector for increased public support
measures for resource-rich countries, which could be promoted either
through official development assistance (ODA) or through publicprivate partnership arrangements. Such support measures could
contribute directly to business environment improvement, or, as a longterm initiative, could help reduce investment risks through improvedsocio-economic stability through social development and diminishedsocial disparities.
77. Lederman and Maloney (2008) reviewed the past empirical analysis on the resource cursethat regarded the indicators such as the ratio of resource exports to GDP or to the total exports
as a proxy of the degree of resource dependence. As a result of reviewing the analysis method
and using the net resource exports per head of the working population, they reported that
there was a positive correlation between the degree of resource dependence and GDP per
capita and that the per capita resource exports have a positive impact on GDP per capita.
78. The Commission on Growth and Development (2008, p.80) argues that the problem is not
the resources themselves, but how the proceeds (or “rents”) are handled. It also suggests theExtractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as a successful initiative jointly managed
by a broad coalition of governments, companies, industry associations, investors, the World
Bank, and non-governmental organizations like Transparency International and Global
Witness (p.81).

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Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges

3.2.3. Comprehensive yet differentiated approach for countries withvarying performances with respect to MDGs79
Since MDGs were agreed on in 2000, a lot of effort has been made toward
their achievement, receiving broad international support. Overall, these
efforts have resulted in significant advancement in many countries andare to be highly appreciated. However, these efforts toward MDGs
inevitably tended to concentrate on the achievement of indicators andnumerical goals itemized in the MDGs, resulting in insufficient resource
mobilization for objectives not explicitly included in the MDG
framework, such as income disparity, quality of primary education,
health systems improvement, climate change and governance. Also,
there was a tendency for policymakers’ attention to be focused on theoverall achievement of the targets, resulting in insufficient attention
being paid to disparities among and within countries.
The upcoming post-2015 development agenda should be agreed on insuch a way that individual countries are encouraged to pursue theirdevelopment goals. Such country-wise development goals should bebased primarily on the country’s achievement of the goals in 2015. In the
post-2015 era, countries must be guided by a comprehensive yet simple
and easy-to-understand framework of development norms like thecurrent MDGs. They must, at the same time, be allowed to flexibly
pursue their development agenda, employing development policies
most appropriate for their needs.
Though quite challenging, the international community must seek adevelopmental framework that has this comprehensiveness andflexibility to allow development policies to be selected to meet differingand complicated needs and to incorporate the country’s various
developmental conditions.
As the post-2015 development agenda will be so broad including
inclusiveness, equity and sustainability of economic growth, quality ofeducation and health services, addressing climate change challenges andenvironmental sustainability, peace and security for development,
transparency and accountability of governance, Human Security is
expected to be an overarching principle to lead and promote the post79. The discussion in this clause is mainly based on preliminary discussions on the post-2015
agenda in UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda (2012) andUNECA et al (2012).

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Chapter 1

2015 development agenda across the broad needs and areas of the post2015 agenda, by focusing on empowering people, managing downside
risks and addressing vulnerability and resilience in a comprehensive
manner.80

Concluding Remarks
We have broadly looked at the current situation and future challenges ofAfrican development, with the focus on “inclusive and sustained
growth.” More detailed discussions will follow in the subsequent
chapters on agriculture, industry, infrastructure, health, education, theenvironment, state-building and South-South cooperation.
The needs and challenges of African development are increasingly
becoming more diversified and complicated. Despite this, TICAD V
must come up with a simple, clear, forward-looking proposal, as well as
a powerful message establishing a path for collective and individual
actions for African development, and provide policy makers and aid
practitioners with guidance so that they can respond appropriately andeffectively to such diversified and complicated challenges and needs for
African development.

80. In regard to the concept and action agenda of Human Security, please see the final reportby Commission on Human Security (2003), co-chaired by Ms. Sadako Ogata and Mr.
Amartya Sen.

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Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and Sustained Growth inAfrica: Prospects and Challenges

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Part Ⅰ:

Rural Development and Food Security

Chapter 2:
Boosting Sustainable Agricultural Growth in
Sub-Saharan Africa
Koji Makino

In transformation of the global food security, agriculture in Africa isdynamically and rapidly developing. This chapter tries to review
African Agriculture, to identify its challenges, and then shares recent
topics of agricultural development such as investments, resilience issue
and CAADP. Finally it discusses JICA’s support for African agriculturaldevelopment with an eye toward TICAD V. This chapter provides a
general overview for subsequent three chapters as an introduction.

1. Overview of African Agriculture

1.1 Global food security surrounding Africa
In recent years, agricultural and food issues have been attracting much
more attention in the international arena. The G20 meeting held inFrance in June 2011 placed these issues at the top of its agenda, andadopted the Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture.
Meanwhile at the G8 meeting held in the United States in 2012,
agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa was discussed, it being
the region most susceptible to food crisis. These issues have beenfrequently brought up in the media in the past. But why are theydrawing so much of the international community’s attention now? It is
primarily due to the record-breaking rise in international food prices andconcerns over food security (Figure 1).

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Figure 1. FAO Food Price Index

Source: FAO (as of July 2012)

Since 1990 when the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) began
measuring the Food Price Index, it experienced a sharp increase in 2008
followed by a sharp decline after the Lehman shock, and reached its
peak (the nominal highest value) in February 2011. Even though there
were signs of slight stability in 2012, the effects of serious drought in the
United States, the world’s largest food exporter, became apparent in
July; therefore it is presumed that food prices would increase in the nearterm.
The steep rise in world food prices can be caused by the following shortterm and structural factors:① Short-term (shock) factors➢➢ Crop damage caused by poor weather and natural disasters(drought, flooding, typhoons, etc.)➢➢ Overheated investment (financialization of agriculturalcommodities)➢➢ Increases in energy costs (rising costs of transportation andinput goods, such as fertilizer)② Structural factors➢➢ “Thin” and volatile international market structures (lower
export rates compared to mineral or industrial products, andthe concentration of exporting countries and regions)➢➢ Demand increase in emerging countries (cereal import volume
tripling from 1990 in China and India; cereal consumption inboth countries accounts for about 40 percent of the total74

Boosting Sustainable Agricultural Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa

volume of cereal production in the world)➢➢ Medium and long-term constraints on the supply side(constraints on the area of arable land and water resources,
slowing in agricultural productivity, effects of climate change,etc.)➢➢ Pressure of demand increase due to expansion in biofuel
production.
According to estimates by the United Nations and the FAO, the world
population, which is expected to reach 9.1 billion in 2050 (7 billion as of2012), will require a 70 percent increase in food production by that time.
With this situation surrounding global agriculture and food supplies,
poor countries that need to import their food are the ones most affected.
Sub-Saharan Africa has the largest number of such countries. It istherefore no exaggeration to say that agricultural and food issues
discussed in the international arena are significant problems for Africa.
In the midst of rapid globalization, it should be kept in mind that global
issues have a direct impact on Africa. High food prices in recent years
have caused the attention of African governments, donors, andinternational organizations to “return” to agriculture and food security.
This has led them to attempt to reform agricultural policies and mobilize
resources; this has also motivated domestic and foreign farmers andfirms to increase their production, beginning with investment
incentivization from private sectors. This can be regarded as anopportunity in some respects, and it is quite timely and appropriate forthe international community, including Japan, to re-strengthen theirefforts to increase food production in sub-Saharan agriculture.
1.2 Overview and challenges in African agriculture(1) Overview
In Africa, agriculture is the principal source of wealth and of poverty
reduction. Agriculture has a strong presence in Africa, accounting for 64
percent of its employment, 34 percent of its GDP, and its growth explains
one-third of economic growth (World Bank 2008). Facing the mostserious starvation in the world with a 27 percent starvation rate (FAOWFP 2012), tackling agricultural development for African foodproduction is an immense challenge.
The real GDP growth rate for the agricultural sector remained low with a75

Chapter 2

2.2 percent average between 2002 and 2006, but it showed a recovery
trend with a 4.4 percent average between 2007 and 2011 (Figure 2). Grain
production in Africa tripled from 1961-1963 to 2008-2010 (UNDP 2012)
mainly because of an expansion in the harvested areas (Figure 3), while
agricultural productivity itself (cereal yield per hectare) stagnated with
only slight growth (Figure 4). This contrasts with Asia, which achieved
its green revolution and substantially increased its production mainly on
the basis of steady improvements in its agricultural productivity.
Figure 2. Agricultural Growth Rate in Sub-Sahara Africa

Source: World Bank World Development Indicator

Figure 3. Increases in Cereal Production in Sub-Saharan Africa Come More from
Expanding Harvested Area than from Boosting Yields,
1961–1963 to 2008–2010

Source: UNDP 201276

Boosting Sustainable Agricultural Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa

Figure 4. Cereal Yields Stagnated for Decades in Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: UNDP 2012

Even though Africa supposedly has room for expansion of land devoted
to agriculture on average compared to other regions, uncultivated areasthat can be easily cultivated are shrinking and arable land is increasingly
marginalized due to pressure from population growth. The cultivatedland per agricultural worker has steadily decreased by 59 percent from1960 to 2009 (World Bank Institute). Less favored land was being
cultivated and fallow periods were shortened, causing negative impacts
on land productivity since soil fertility was not restored over time.
In other words, although Africa increased its production throughexpansion of cultivated land in the past, the decrease in per-capita
cultivated land due to population pressure and stagnant land
productivity resulted in a 13 percent reduction in per-capita cereal
production between 1961-1963 and 2008-2010. (During the same period,a 44 % increase in Asia and a 48 % increase in South America wereexperienced. Thus, Africa will need to swiftly improve its agricultural
productivity in order to expand its agricultural production in the years
ahead.
The rapid increase in food consumption demand was caused by strong
population pressure and economic growth, which resulted in an
imbalance between domestic supply and demand. This led to higher
dependency on imports as the demand was compensated by quickly
77Chapter 2

boosting the volume of cereal imports for Africa (Figure 5). This would
cause even more serious limitations on foreign currency reserves ofAfrican countries. Dependence on imported wheat is at 74 percent andimported rice is 41 percent (2010 statistics; OECD-FAO 2011). Food
expenses account for 50 to 70 percent of each household’s budget, muchhigher than that of families in other regions. As a result, somevulnerability to external conditions, such as price hikes and poor
weather, can be observed both at the national and household budget
levels. Figure 2 above shows volatile fluctuations in agricultural growth
rates, indicating instability of agricultural production in Africa.
Figure 5. The Trade Deficit in Cereals Has Widened for Sub-Saharan Africa overthe Past Four Decades

Source: UNDP 2012

(2) Challenges
Why has Africa failed to achieve sufficient improvement in its
agricultural production? Reasons for the failure include various factors
such as: delay in development and dissemination of appropriatetechnologies; input (seeds, fertilizer, machines, etc.) supplies; lack ofirrigation systems; lack of efficient value chains or markets; soil
degradation; lack of financial access; limited public and private
investments; and capacity problems in government administrations.
These challenges will be discussed below.
In Africa, insufficient research and development for improving
78

Boosting Sustainable Agricultural Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa

agricultural productivity and quality persist due to constraints onbudgets, organizations, personnel, and so on. Also the connection
between research institutes at the central level and regionalorganizations is weak, resulting in an insufficient application of research
results to conditions of different regions, translating them into
technologies usable on site. It is also necessary to widely disseminate
appropriate new technologies among farmers via agricultural extension
workers and through other channels. However, in Africa, there are issuesof budget constraints, the limited number and quality of the extension
workers, underdeveloped dissemination systems, and a lack ofappropriate curriculum and teaching materials.
Since water sources (precipitation) are regionally concentrated withlarge seasonal and annual variations and are affected by climatechanges, irrigation plays a significant role in enabling stable use of waterand improving productivity. However, African agriculture depends
largely on rainwater, and only 4 % of its cultivated land is provided withirrigation systems. (A significantly lower level when compared to theMiddle East and North Africa with 33 % and Asia with approximately 30
to 40 %). As well, the rate of fertilizer usage is low, with 13 kilograms per
hectare, compared to other regions which use between 73 and 190
kilograms. The usage rate of improved varieties of cereal in Africa
remains at 24 percent, despite a sign of increase, and is still low incomparison with the rate of 45 to 85 percent in other regions (WorldBank 2008).
A series of value chain processes needs to function smoothly anddynamically in agriculture- that is: “input → production → processing(post-harvest handling) → transportation and storage → sale anddistribution.” Promotion of improved seeds and the use of fertilizationin regions other than Africa were accompanied by the development of avalue chain, including building irrigation systems, rural roads, sales
infrastructure, financial services and markets, leading to theimprovement of productivity and increases in production.
In Africa, however, this process is being hampered by various obstacles,
such as inadequate infrastructure, enormous losses due to insufficient
post-harvest technologies, lack of financial access, undeveloped market
facilities and functions, and delays in governmental regulatory reforms.

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Take infrastructure as an example; the paved road ratio in Africa is only
18 percent (33 to 59 percent in other regions), and the electrification ratio
remains at 33 percent (62 to 93 percent in other regions) (UNDP 2012).
Two-thirds of the African rural population is living in areas that have
low potential for agriculture, or poor market access, or both, while thecorresponding number for South Asia is only 25 % (World Bank 2008).
As a result of the structural adjustments in the 1980s, the system of
public agencies providing farmers with access to land, credit, insurance,
inputs, and cooperative organizations was dismantled (World Bank
2008). It was expected that once excess government intervention wasgone, private-sector-led market mechanisms would become more active
and effectively function in place of the previous system. In Africa,
however, this was not fully accomplished. Governments should play animportant role together with private sectors in agriculture. In thiscontext let us recall that Asian governments allocated 20 percent or moreof their public expenditure when promoting the green revolution,
whereas Africa spent only 5.6 percent (2005-2009 average) (UNDP 2012).
Thus, Africa needs to devote more effort to increasing allocation of its
public investment towards agriculture.

2. Recent Topics on Agriculture in Africa

2.1. Agricultural investments
It has been observed that foreign agricultural investments in Africa areon the rise, being stimulated by high food prices in recent years. As moredata on land investments is becoming available lately, we will present an
overview of agricultural investments in recent years as well as issues
relating to them.1
Throughout developing countries, it is estimated that land investments
covering a total of 70.9 million hectares in 1,155 projects have been
approved or were in the process of approval by the governments of
those countries over the 10 years from 2000 to 2010. Africa accounts for
48 % of the total investments followed by 40 % in Asia and 9 % in Latin
America. Much of the investment in Africa (36 %) comes from Asia.
1. The discussions in the following paragraphs rely on data from the Land Matrix Project, theworld’s largest scale database of international land transactions. The Project is run by a groupof organizations, including the Agricultural Research for Development (CIRAD), a French
agricultural research center, the University of Bern, and the International Land Coalition(ILC), with support from the European Union and other parties.

80Boosting Sustainable Agricultural Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa

Investments in Africa (based on the area size) can be broken down into
the following purposes: 55 % for biofuel, 13 % for food crops, and 6 % forforests; thus agriculture-related investment accounts for 74 % of theentire investment in Africa. The large area-wise share of investment forbiofuel can be explained by the interest of developed countries inmeasures against climate change, and by the fact that these investments
tend to employ extensive farming resulting in a large area-perinvestment. In comparison, investments for food crops, though perhaps
more numerous, tend to have smaller area-per-investment figures.
In terms of investment trends over the past 10 years, investments had
been on the rise since 2005, peaked in 2009 triggered by the food pricehikes in 2008, and rapidly slowed due to the Lehman shock in 2010. It is
expected that investment will continue to rise in the future.
Several factors must be behind the growth of agricultural investments.
On the investors’ side, the reasons include: concern for food security andthe need for an alternative area for biofuel production; the appreciationof the value of African land as an investment target after the financial
crisis; and the increasing potential of its forest resources, including thatof emissions trading. In this kind of environment, African countries havethe opportunity to attract more investments and welcome investors ingeneral.
Agricultural investments can have both advantages and disadvantages.
Some important ones can include the following:(1) Possible Advantages➢➢ As a result of the introduction of new agricultural technologies,
productivity and quality improve. Acquisition of foreign
currency, and an increase in tax revenues can be expected.
➢➢ Development of value chains, such as improvement in the
agricultural infrastructure as well as social services(construction of schools, clinics, etc.) and improved market
access can be expected.
(2) Possible Disadvantages➢➢ Disputes over land and water resources may occur between
investors and local residents. There is a possibility that local
residents who originally used the land, etc. may lose their rights
due to a weak legal system. In particular, women tend to be81

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affected negatively.
➢➢ The use of mechanized farming has a low job creation effect;
moreover the use of imported inputs has only a limited ripple
effect on relevant local industries.
➢➢ Profits generated by investments are not equally distributed.
As an international response to these agricultural investments, theCommittee on World Food Security (CFS), a standing committee of the
FAO, has compiled the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (VGGT), with afocus on securing the rights of small-scale farmers, endorsed in May
2012. Japan has also led the effort to establish guidelines for promoting
responsible international agricultural investments ensuring that noforced displacement takes place, and that the process is transparent. A
draft of the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI)
has been prepared while more discussions are held for finalizing thedraft proposals.

82Boosting Sustainable Agricultural Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa

Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI)
Principle 1: Existing rights to land and associated natural resources arerecognized and respected.
Principle 2: Investments do not jeopardize food security but rather
strengthen it
Principle 3: Processes relating to investment in agriculture aretransparent, monitored, and ensure accountability by all stakeholders,within a proper business, legal, and regulatory environment.
Principle 4: All those materially affected are consulted, and agreements
resulting from consultations are recorded and enforced.
Principle 5: Investors ensure that projects respect the rule of law, reflect
industry best practice, are economically viable, and result in durable
shared value.
Principle 6: Investments generate desirable social and distributional
impacts and do not increase vulnerability.
Principle 7: Environmental impacts of projects are quantified andmeasures are taken to encourage sustainable resource use, while
minimizing the risk/magnitude of negative impacts and mitigating them.

The important point is to establish a win-win relationship advantageous
to both investing firms/individuals and small farmers throughagricultural investments; and it is crucial to incorporate such a mutually
benefitting structure into the programs and project designs. Various
measures must be taken to assure such development, including that ofgovernment regulatory reform, the strengthening of farmer support
systems, and continued support from the international community.
2.2. Vulnerability/resilience
From 2010 to 2011, the Horn of Africa region was affected by a serious
drought, leaving approximately 10 million people in severe foodinsecurity. The Sahel region in West Africa still suffers from the impact ofdrought today. Due to its dependency on rainwater and underdeveloped
distribution systems, Africa is traditionally vulnerable to shocks, such as
drought and floods. It has periodically suffered a great deal of damage,and the cycle has been more irregular in recent years, while precipitation
itself is in decline (Figure 6).
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Figure 6. Rainfall Has Declined Most in Sub‑Saharan Africa,
1951–1980 to the 2000s

Source: UNDP 2012

The general risks in African agriculture consist of:① Climate and natural disaster risks② Biological and environmental risks such as pests and soil
degradation③ Market risks such as high or low food and input prices andseasonal supply and demand variations④ Logistics and infrastructure risks such as transportation,communication, energy, and sales networks⑤ Management and technical risks of farmers or firms(cultivation, inputs such as seeds and fertilizer, finance, etc.)⑥ Policy and system risks in governments⑦ Political and security risks
To reduce risks or respond to the occurrence of shocks, governments
have developed systems with support from donors, and achieved
certain positive results. In Ethiopia, for example, an early warning
system has been developed. This system, including the Productive Social
Safety Net Programme covering 7.8 million people (somewhat less than
10 percent of its population as of September 2011) has been created, andworked well in the serious aforementioned drought in the Horn ofAfrica.

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Boosting Sustainable Agricultural Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa

In addition to such direct and expedient approaches, it is essential overthe medium and long terms to build up the society’s capability - that is
the society’s “resilience”- to withstand such shocks and, once they occur,
to minimize their damage. Such medium and long term measures may
also include increasing production in highly productive areas in order toquickly distribute food to affected areas via a distribution network whenshocks occur; securing water at the community level; and theintroduction of crops and cultivation methods that are resistant tonatural disasters.
Unfortunately, the emergency humanitarian support and medium andlong-term approaches tend to be planned and carried out independentlyof one another by government departments and donors, sometimes withavoidable overlaps. To overcome this tendency, there have been someattempts to coordinate all parties to create efficiency and synergistic
effects, such as the Nairobi Declaration from the Summit on the Horn ofAfrica held in September 2011.
2.3. International frameworks for African agricultural development
Starting with the 2008 G8 Toyako Summit and the 2009 G8 L’Aquila
Summit, global leaders expressed alarm at the effects of food price spikes
and agreed on taking decisive action for ensuring food security, while
recognizing the importance of providing support to Africa, considered
to be the most vulnerable region. Various efforts have been made on a
global scale since then to promote food security and sustainableagricultural production while taking into account actions primarily for
Africa. However, lack of sufficient policy coordination among them still
remains a challenge which needs to be strategically addressed. Here aresome of the strategies taken by the international community:(1) The Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture from the2011 G20 Summit in France.
In 2011 several working groups on agricultural and food security were
set up within the G20 framework including member countries,
international agencies, and governments of developing countries, somefrom Africa. As a result of their active discussions, a ministerial
declaration entitled “The Action Plan on Food Price Volatility andAgriculture,” consisting of the following points, was adopted prior to
the G8 Summit in Cannes:① Improve short and long-term agricultural production and85

Chapter 2

productivity to respond to increasing demands for agriculturalcommodities② Improve market information and transparency to respondfurther to the needs of governments and economic operators③ Increase confidence in international markets, prevent foodmarket crises more efficiently, and strengthen international
policy coordination for responding to the crises④ Especially in the poorest countries, improve and develop risk
management tools to be used by governments, firms, andfarmers for establishing the capability to manage and easerisks accompanying food price volatility⑤ Improve functioning of agricultural commodity derivatives
markets
This declaration was a major milestone in the sense that it reviewed all of
the existing efforts, and then adjusted them according to their mutual
consistency and level of strategy, simultaneously clarifying insufficient
points and suggested actions, and identifying monitoring methods andimplementing agencies in a comprehensive manner. Many of the specificprojects and initiatives supported or suggested in the declaration are
currently in progress or under preparation. The importance of rice inAfrica and the Coalition for African Rice Development (CARD),
supported by Japan (the Japan International Cooperation Agency, JICA),
are included in the Action Plan and both are recognized as significant
initiatives.
(2) The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition from the 2012
G8 held in the United States
In May 2012, the G-8 Action on Food Security and Nutrition wasannounced at the G8 Camp David Summit held in the United States, anda commitment was made with the announcement of the New Alliancefor Food Security and Nutrition in support of Africa. This is a framework
aiming to pull 50 million people out of poverty over the next 10 years
through promoting private and public investments; advancing technicalinnovations, risk management, and other tasks; and promoting
agricultural development in Africa. Six countries, Tanzania, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Mozambique, Cote d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso were selected aspilot countries.
Since 2011, the Grow Africa Agricultural Investment Forum has been86

Boosting Sustainable Agricultural Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa

held (in November 2011 and May 2012) under the leadership of theWorld Economic Forum (the Davos conference) for the promotion ofprivate investments in agricultural fields as a major pillar of African
development. The New Alliance incorporates actions of Grow Africa
and is a positive step towards strengthening the promotion of private
investments.
It can be said that the New Alliance reinforces the weaker part of actions
taken by the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development
Programme (CAADP), to promote private investment. Cooperation
frameworks (agreements) to be created for execution at the level of eachcountry will include government commitments for improving
investment environments, prospects for donor funding for relevant
fields, and detailed statements of intent from the private sector forinvestments. As such, it is drawing attention as the first attempt forgovernments, donors, and the private sector to share cooperative
frameworks.
(3) CAADP
The Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme(CAADP) is an African initiative and framework aimed at revitalizing
African agriculture. It is specified as a program to achieve growth infood security, nutrition, and rural income, in the Maputo Declaration
adopted at the Assembly of the African Union (AU) held in Maputo in
July 2003. The Maputo Declaration consists of goals for African countries
to: achieve economic growth, end hunger, reduce poverty, and work on
agricultural reforms pertinent to policy and capability issues in African
agriculture, targeting an annual average growth rate of 6 % in
agricultural fields by 2015. It also includes a decision to allocate 10 % of
the national budget in each country to agricultural programs.
Specifically, the goals are to be accomplished by achieving the following
four pillars:① Improve land and water management (expanding the area of
farmland under a sustainable land and water resource
management system)② Improve market access (expansion of market access throughdevelopment of rural infrastructure and improvement in trade
and transaction related measures)③ Fight hunger through expansion of food production (increase87

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food supplies and reduce hunger by improving productivity ofsmall-scale farmers and improve responses to food crises)④ Promote agricultural research and dissemination (improve
agricultural research systems for disseminating appropriate
new technologies and strengthen support enabling farmers to
employ the technologies)
The main process entails: holding a roundtable meeting in each country
first; signing a strategic agreement called a compact between thegovernment and donors for comprehensive agricultural development;
and then creating an investment plan laying out detailed actions andcosts. (As of November 2012, 40 countries have been involved in the
CAADP process, and 30 of them have signed compacts while 27 of them
have developed investment plans.)
In Africa, there have been some attempts at creating agricultural sector
programs to be managed within the framework of the Sector WideApproaches (SWAPS), accomplishing certain positive results. However,some of these did not necessarily match with the actions taken under agovernment’s own budget and had weak ties with investments inrelated fields such as rural infrastructure development. In view of theseexperiences, CAADP can be regarded as a comprehensive strategic
framework for organizing and integrating existing policies, programs,
and cooperation frameworks in each country. Nonetheless, compacts
and investment plans that have been already shared tend to look more
like shopping lists itemizing necessary policies and actions, without due
consideration for such factors as investment environment. To make themtruly useful for strategic planning, more work is deemed necessary inorder to narrow down the measures, assign priorities, improve theaccuracy of cost accumulation, sort out timeframes and steps, andstrengthen the collaboration with private investors.

3. Direction of Support in TICAD V

Having looked at the global circumstances surrounding Africa as well assome recent topics in African agriculture, we turn now to a discussion of
JICA’s support for African agricultural development with an eye
towards TICAD V.
3.1 Direction of JICA’s support (overview)
The share of agricultural support in the total amount of official
88Boosting Sustainable Agricultural Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa

development assistance by all donors in Africa kept shrinking until 2004
when it was reversed; then the average share was 6 %. Meanwhile, Japanwas consistent in its support for African agriculture, devoting an
average 11 % of its budget for agriculture during the same period.
As we saw earlier, agriculture still has a strong presence in Africa, where
64 percent of households depend on it and it accounts for 34 percent ofAfrica’s GDP. Agriculturral growth has a high poverty reduction effectby its effects (more than twice as much as that of other sectors (WorldBank 2008)) and the continent has a comparative advantage in it.
Overall, it can be thought of as an excellent source of increasing wealthand of poverty reduction.
Now that the possibility of production increase by land expansion has
become limited, every possible attempt must be made to improve
agricultural productivity. As before, JICA will place the improvement ofagricultural productivity and support for production expansion at thecenter of its support program at TICAD V and beyond. Also emphasized
in JICA’s support is the development of value chains, covering both
upstream (such as inputs production) and downstream (such as postharvest and distribution) activities, for achieving improved productivity
and expanded production. JICA will provide support whilestrengthening its partnerships with private firms as agents. It is also
important that small farmers themselves make efforts in marketing andbuilding highly profitable farming systems. Agricultural investments in
Africa are on the rise in recent years, and by leveraging this trend, a winwin relationship between firms and small farmers should be developed
so that it leads to their production expansion and income improvement.

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Figure 7. The direction of JICA’s support to agriculture

Meanwhile, to deal with negative risks, since African agriculture does
depend on rainwater and is vulnerable to shocks including climatechange and drought, as well as price fluctuations, it is essential toprovide support for strengthening the resilience of African agriculture.
In promoting such measures, JICA will take into consideration themutually reinforcing relationship between productivity improvement
and reduction of vulnerability; increased productivity is expected to lead
to better resilience, and vice versa. With all of these measures, JICA isdetermined to contribute to the achievement of the annual agricultural
growth rate of 6 % and to help to establish the continent’s food security,
as agreed to in the Maputo Declaration by the AU in 2003. These are thebroader points of discussion regarding the direction of support for
Africa, at the core of which is assistance for small farmers.
There are several core approaches towards putting these policies inpractice. The first is the support for the expansion of rice production;
taking advantage of Japan’s strength in rice production, JICA willcontinue to support CARD (the Coalition for African Rice Development)in terms of commodity-based productivity improvement andproduction expansion. The CARD initiative aims at doubling riceproduction by 2018. The second is the promotion of the inclusive
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Boosting Sustainable Agricultural Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa

development approach among the government, farmers and private
partners by means of the promotion of Responsible Investment for
agricultural development. This approach aims to facilitate synergistic
effects among the partners, with an aim towards attracting investmentsfrom the private sector and improving the production and livelihoods ofsmall farmers. The third approach is named “the Smallholder
Horticulture Empowerment Project (SHEP) approach,” aimed atachieving a better livelihood for small-farmers through improving theirmarket access. Fourthly, to strengthen the resilience of African
agriculture, JICA will attempt to develop irrigation and food reserve
systems, and to strengthen the community capacity development fromthe bottom-up, while exploring the possibility of introducing various
innovative schemes such as weather index insurance. It also aspires tomaking intellectual contributions leading to innovative solutions
through, for example, sharing of experiences in Asia in food reserve
systems. Figure 8 summarizes these approaches and activities.
Figure 8. Japan’s Focus for Agriculture / Food Security under TICAD V

Over the years, JICA has continuously provided support for improving
the productivity of small farmers with numerous successful
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achievements, and a substantial body of knowledge and know-how has
now been accumulated. This emphasis on productivity improvement,
JICA’s consistently-held principle, seems to be being re-evaluated in thedevelopment community; those donors who used to prioritize thedevelopment of value chains by leveraging market mechanisms over the
support for production, seem to be increasing their support for
production and productivity improvement, especially after the foodprice spike of 2008. Arguably, JICA’s approaches and past achievements
are gaining renewed recognition.
In the sections that follow, we will have a closer look at the four
approaches outlined above.
3.2 Coalition for African rice development (CARD) (doubling riceproduction)
Rice consumption has rapidly increased in Africa, and its import has
risen accordingly, bringing more pressure for foreign currency
constraints. (The share of rice in the total amount of cereal imports in2010 was about 40 percent (OECD-FAO 2011).) Rice is one of the few
cereals among major cereals in Africa that have a high potential for
expansion of its production in the region. In TICAD IV held in 2008, JICA
and the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) jointly
announced the launch of the Coalition for African Rice Development(CARD), with a goal of doubling rice production in Africa in the 10 years
ending in 2018. This is an international platform for promoting ricedevelopment, comprising international organizations and donors suchas the World Bank and the International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD); research institutes such as the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI), the Africa Rice Center (AfricaRice), the Japan
International Research Center for Agricultural Sciences (JIRCAS); nongovernmental organizations, and South-South cooperation countries(such as Vietnam).2 CARD countries consist of a total of 23 Africancountries that are divided into a first group of 12 countries withrelatively high importance of rice in the country/region, and a second
group of 11 countries catching up with the first.
Within the CARD framework, each country has set up a task force forrice cultivation development and drawn up its National Rice
2. For the discussion of the CARD initiative as an example of South-South cooperation, see
Chapter 13.

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Boosting Sustainable Agricultural Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa

Development Strategies (NRDS), with relevant agencies providing
support on the basis of the NRDS. JICA has mainly provided support for
productivity improvement, including dissemination and expansion of
appropriate cultivation technologies and seeds (such as the New Rice for
Africa (NERICA)) among farmers and dissemination staff; JICA iscarrying out about 60 projects as of August 2012 (including training inJapan). Rice production is steadily making progress from a baseline of 14
million tons prior to CARD to 18.41 million tons as of 2010.
JICA plans to steadily cooperate with the first group of participating
countries as well as to increase support for the second group, expanding
comprehensive support covering the development of value chains, andstrengthening cooperation with private firms and other partners (theUnites States, South Korea, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, andBRAC).
3.3 Inclusive development approach among Governments, farmers
and private partners through the promotion of responsible
investment for agricultural development
The Mozambique agricultural development program of triangularcooperation between Japan, Brazil and Mozambique (ProSAVANA)
offers an agricultural development program with an aim of achieving abetter livelihood for small farmers and the promotion of agriculturalinvestments by the private sector, and to create their synergistic effects.
Along with specific policy suggestions made at a national level in thedraft of the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI)
led by Japan, attempts towards realizing synergistic effects ofagricultural development and distribution infrastructure development
hold unique additional values in Africa.
For increasing the agricultural productivity of small farmers and theirearnings, not only the refining of their technologies but also theimproving and reforming of value chains both upstream (inputs such as
seeds and fertilizer) and downstream (post-harvest handling,
distribution, etc.) are essential. Private firms play a great role as main
players in this effort, and their investments must be increased. JICA willattempt to expand its approach for similar development in countries
with potentials for future agricultural investments.

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3.4 Smallholder horticulture empowerment project (SHEP) approach:reform in small farmer’s approach from “selling after harvesting”
to “harvesting to sell”
Currently, the second phase of SHEP (SHEP UP) is in progress in Kenyawith the goal of carrying it out nationwide. It has achieved doubled
earnings for farmers by inducing a change in their management model a change from one based on the mindset of “selling crops after
harvesting” to the one based on “harvesting to sell,” and has been wellreceived by the Kenyan government and other donors. This is a marketoriented type approach that encourages small-scale farmers to performtheir own market research to select crops to be sold and learn marketcompetitive cultivation technologies, instead of harvesting crops first
and then looking for a place to sell. As a result of promoting women’s
active involvement in farming with this approach, men and women
have worked together to achieve more efficient farming. This case waspresented in the meeting of the DAC Network on Gender Equality in
2011, receiving high praise from its participants.
Using this success as a foothold, JICA will seek to further generalize andconsolidate the approach to be expanded as a regional program with
SHEP in Kenya as a base, supplemented by training in Japan.
3.5 Toward strengthening resilience
In recent years, African agriculture has been exposed to increasing risks,such as climate change and food price hikes, and the resilience ofcountries and communities, i.e., their response capabilities against theserisks must be strengthened. Since the severe drought in the Horn ofAfrica in 2011, JICA has been administering regional programs, whichattempt to resolve the gap between humanitarian support and mediumterm development to assure human security of the people. The idea ofthe programs is to help people to be “independent players in theeconomy” rather than “subjects of social protection.” Specifically,
programs are offered to pastoralists and others for strengthening theirresilience (response capability) against drought in their communities in
Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. A similar project is underway in West
Africa.
JICA hopes to implement similar projects and, at the same time, provide
support in building irrigation facilities and develop capacity for
operating and maintaining them for the effective management and use
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Boosting Sustainable Agricultural Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa

of water. It also hopes to provide more support in establishing networksof small-scale food reserves with high mobility. Furthermore, it may bepossible for JICA to contribute to food reserve system development (atthe regional level), such as the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) on the basis of experiences in the ASEAN Plus Three
Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR). JICA intends to consider support
for innovative systems such as weather index insurances. As stated, JICA
will take into consideration the mutually reinforcing relationshipbetween productivity improvement and the reduction of vulnerability.
Increased productivity is expected to lead to better resilience, and viceversa.

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References
Anseeuw, W., L. Alden Wily, L. Cotula, and M. Taylor (International
Land Coalition). 2012. Land rights and the rush for land: Findings of the
Global Commercial Pressures on Land Research Project. Rome:International Land Commission.
FAO, and WFP. 2012. The state of food insecurity in the world 2012. Rome:
FAO.
FAO, IFAD, IMF, OECD, UNCTAD, WFP, World Bank, WTO, IFPRI, andUN HLTF. 2011. Price volatility in food and agricultural markets:
Policy responses. Policy report prepared for November 2010 G20
leaders summit meeting.
Hirano, K., ed. 2003. Afurika keizai-gaku sengen [Toward the economics of
Sub-Saharan Africa]. Tokyo: JETRO.
Humphrey, J. 2003. Commodities, diversification and poverty reduction.
Paper presented to FAO Symposium on the state of agriculturalcommodity market research, Rome, December 15–16.
Jaffee, S., P. Siegel, and C. Andrews. 2008. Rapid agricultural supply
chain risk assessment. Commodity Risk Management Group,
Agriculture and Rural Development Department, World Bank.
JICA Rural Development Department. 2011. Kadaibetsu shishin: nōgyokaihatsu, nōson kaihatsu [Thematic guidelines on agriculturaldevelopment and rural development]. Tokyo: Japan International
Cooperation Agency.
Kitagawa, K., and M. Takahashi, eds. 2004. Afurika keizai-ron [Economics
for Africa]. Tokyo: Minerva Shobo.
OECD, and FAO. 2011. OECD-FAO agricultural outlook 2011–2020. Paris:
OECD; Rome: FAO.
Oxfam. 2010. Horn of Africa risk transfer for adaptation. HARITA
quarterly report: October 2010–December 2010.
Sonobe, T., and M. Fujita. 2010. Ricchi to keizai hatten [Location andeconomic development]. Tokyo: Toyo Keizai.
Takahashi, M. 2005. Afurika no nōgyō teitai to seifu no yakuwari[African agricultural stagnation and roles of government]. In
Afurika keizai jisshō bunseki [Empirical studies on the African
economy], ed. K. Hirano. Tokyo: JETRO.
UNDP. 2012. Africa human development report 2012: Toward a food secure
future. New York: UNDP, Regional Bureau for Africa.
United States Department of Agriculture. 2012. World agricultural supply
and demand estimates.
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Vermeulen, S., and L. Cotula. 2010. Making the most of agriculturalinvestment: A survey of business that provide opportunities forsmallholders. Rome: FAO; London: International Institute forEnvironment and Development.
Webber, C. M., and P. Labaste. 2009. Building competitiveness in Africa’s
agriculture: A guide to value chain concepts and applications.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank. 2008. World development report 2008: Agriculture fordevelopment. Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank. [Deininger, K., and D. Byerlee, with J. Lindsay, A. Norton,
H. Selod, and M. Stickler.] 2011. Rising global interest in farmland: Can
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Bank.

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Chapter 3:
How Promising Is the Rice Green Revolution in
Sub-Saharan Africa?
- Evidence from case studies in Mozambique,Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana1
Keijiro Otsuka

1. Introduction
While the population continues to grow rapidly, the pace of area
expansion has slowed down considerably in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
due to the gradual exhaustion of uncultivated areas. On average,
cultivated land per farming population has declined by about 40% sincethe 1960s and value added per worker now averages around 12% below
1980 levels. Investments in the development of new technologies havedeclined in recent years even though their adoption rates are low
compared to other regions. In order to reduce widespread and persistentrural poverty in SSA, it is imperative to increase food production byincreasing the productivity per unit of land.
We believe that what is urgently needed in SSA is a Green Revolution,
which has successfully increased rice and wheat yields in tropical Asia
over the last several decades. In Asia, small farmers actively adopted
new improved technologies (David and Otsuka 1994), and there is no
reason to assume that small farmers in SSA will not adopt new profitable
technologies (Otsuka 2006; Otsuka and Kijima 2010). Yet the appropriate
strategies to realize a Green Revolution in SSA are still unclear. Recent
studies edited by Otsuka and Larson (2013), which compare theexperience of the Asian Green Revolution with current grain farming in
SSA, suggest that lowland rice is the most promising grain. This is
1. This is a result of a research project being conducted at JICA Research Institute toempirically analyze how best the CARD initiative (See Chapter 2, Section 3) can serve toincrease rice productivity and reduce poverty. I am heavily indebted to its members, namely
Yoko Kijima, Kei Kajisa, Yuko Nakano, and Takeshi Sakurai. I would also like to thank JICA
Research Institute for the intellectual and financial support it provided for this project.

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essentially because high-yielding rice technology can be directlytransferable from tropical Asia to SSA (Estudillo and Otsuka 2012;
Nakano et al. 2012).
This is illustrated by Figure 1, which compares changes in grain yields
over time in India and SSA and their differences between the tworegions. India is chosen for comparison because among Asian countries
India is agro-climatically similar to SSA and, hence, cropping patterns
are not so different (Tsusaka and Otsuka 2013a, 2013b).2 Several
important observations can be made. Firstly, grain yields were generally
similar between India and SSA in the early 1960s before the Green
Revolution began, which indicates that the difference in agro-climaticconditions alone cannot explain the large yield difference between thetwo regions at present. Secondly, the yields of sorghum and millet did
not increase much even in India and the yield gap between the tworegions is nil, which suggests that the potential of a Green Revolution inthese crops is limited in SSA. Thirdly, the current yield gap is substantial
in the case of wheat and rice, even though their yields increased
appreciably in SSA. Since wheat can be produced primarily in atemperate zone, its potential production area is more limited than rice in
SSA due to the dominance of a tropical climate. Thus, rice is likely to be
critically important for the expansion of grain production in SSA.
Furthermore, rice consumption has been increasing dramatically in thisregion in the past few decades. Lastly, the yield gap is only modest inmaize, even though maize is the most important crop in SSA in bothproduction and consumption. It is likely that the productivity gain in themaize sector in SSA from a technology transfer from Asia will not belarge.
Although rice looks a promising crop from the aggregate data, microlevel evidence is needed to substantiate the argument that rice is themost promising crop in SSA. The first purpose of this study is to analyze
the potential of a rice Green Revolution in SSA based on recently
completed cases studies of rice-growing households in Mozambique,

2. For example, sorghum and millet are grown in many countries in SSA but primarily in
India in Asia. Analytically, however, a comparison between tropical Asia as a whole and SSA
does not lead to major changes in our discussion (Estudillo and Otsuka 2012).

100

How Promising Is the Rice Green Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa?
- Evidence from case studies in Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana

Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana.3 The second purpose is to draw up the
implications of an effective strategy for a rice Green Revolution in SSA.
We believe that, if successful, a rice Green Revolution can be a role modelfor Green Revolutions in other grains, particularly in maize production.

2. Is Asian Rice Technology Transferable to SSA?
Asian rice technology. Although the rice yield is still low in SSA, weshould not overlook the fact that it has increased from 1.25 tons per
hectare in the early 1960s to 1.8 tons per hectare in the late 2000s. In
tropical Asia where lowland rice production dominates, the rice yield
before the Green Revolution was 1.5 tons per hectare (see Figure 1).4
Also, note that half of the rice area in SSA is upland, where the yield issubstantially lower than in lowland paddy fields (Balasubramanian et al.
2007). Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that if new technology is not
introduced and production is carried out under rain-fed conditions, thelowland paddy yield will range from 1.0 to 1.5 tons per hectare. We also
hypothesize that the average rice yield has increased in SSA primarily
due to the introduction of Asian-type improved rice technology.5
We focus on lowland rice, not upland rice, primarily because theprospect for a large improvement of the yield is much greater forlowland rice than upland rice. We also did not encounter upland rice,
such as NERICA (new rice for Africa), in our study sites except in
Uganda. Kijima et al. (2006, 2008, 2011) found that NERICA is potentiallyhigh-yielding but sensitive to rainfall and that the rate of discontinuationof NERICA adoption is also high, indicating that NERICA was grown in
unsuitable areas or that sustainable management was not wellunderstood by farmers. Also, the NERICA yield is exceptionally high in
Uganda compared with other countries in SSA (Otsuka and Larson2013). The tentative conclusion of this study is that upland rice is notparticularly promising, even though there were great expectations for3. Senegal is also included in this project but the data collection has been delayed, so its
analytical results will be reported later. Note, however, that according to our preliminary
survey, the average irrigated rice yield in the Senegal River basin exceeds 5 tons per hectare,which is comparable to the irrigated yields in Asia.
4. Nearly half of the paddy fields were irrigated in Asia but the difference in yield between
rain-fed and irrigated areas was not large before the advent of MVs.
5. This is consistent with the results of a review of rice farming in SSA by Balasubramanian etal. (2007).

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the impact of NERICA on the upland rice yield.
The Green Revolution in Asia is alternatively called the seed-fertilizer
revolution because the engine of growth was the development anddiffusion of fertilizer-responsive, high-yielding modern varieties (MVs)of lowland rice (David and Otsuka 1994). It is also important to realizethat paddy fields were bunded and leveled almost without exception in
Asia when the rice Green Revolution began.6 Bunding is needed to store
water in the paddy fields to reduce weed growth, whereas leveling isnecessary for even growth of rice plants and germination of directly
broadcasted seeds. In other words, these production practices are
essential for water and weed control and healthy growth of lowland rice
plants. Draft animals or tractors are usually used for bunding andleveling, but they are often not used in SSA, as will be shown shortly. No
less important than these production practices is straight-row
transplanting, which provides space for weeding. Instead oftransplanting, direct seeding can be adopted without sacrificing yield if
paddy fields are bunded and leveled well and if herbicide is used.
Herbicide, however, may not be available or may be too expensive, evenif available in SSA. In the African setting, direct seeding is not generally
recommended and transplanting is the generally preferred option. A
major contribution of this study is to establish that these improved
production practices are highly complementary to improved seedfertilizer technology.
The case of Mozambique. Table 1 compares yields and production practices
across rain-fed and irrigated areas in Mozambique (Kajisa andPayongayong 2011a, 2011b). Thirty-three villages in 9 districts in
Zambezia and Sofara provinces in the Central region are chosen as
representative rain-fed areas in this country, whereas the Chokwe
irrigation scheme in the southern region is chosen as the irrigated study
site. As in other countries in SSA, the irrigated area accounts for a small
proportion of paddy area in this country. Furthermore, MVs are seldom
adopted, chemical fertilizer is not used, and animal and tractor use is nil
in rain-fed areas. Under such conditions, the rice yield is very low andunstable with the average being a mere 1.1 tons per hectare, which isconsistent with our expectations. The yield per hectare is not very high
6. There is no clear evidence on the prevalence of bunding and leveling in paddy fields in Asia
in the 1960s and 1970s. My argument is based on interviews with rice scientists who worked
in Asia in the 1970s.

102How Promising Is the Rice Green Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa?
- Evidence from case studies in Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana

in the Chokwe irrigation scheme either, mainly because the irrigation
facilities are not well maintained. In fact, the top 20% of farmers, whoreceive adequate water, adopt MVs, and apply fertilizer, achieve a rate ashigh as 3.9 tons per hectare. Note that popular MVs are old MVs
developed in Nigeria (ITA312) in the late 1970s by crossing Asian MVs
and African local varieties.7 This clearly shows that there has been noattempt to transfer new Asian-type varieties to Mozambique. The yield
could be higher if more modern improved MVs had been disseminatedin Chokwe.
The case of Tanzania. The case of Tanzania is more revealing (Table 2). The
three major rice growing districts with distinctly different production
environments were chosen for this study. First, the average yield in rainfed areas ranges from 1.6 tons per hectare in the Shinyanga region to 2.0
tons per hectare in the Morogoro region, which is much higher than inrain-fed areas in Mozambique. This relatively high yield in rain-fed
areas in Tanzania can be attributed, at least partly, to some adoption ofMVs, some chemical fertilizer application, and the adoption of some
improved production practices. Second, the yields are considerably
higher in irrigated areas. The adoption rate of MVs is very high in the
Morogoro region, whereas chemical fertilizer use is high in the
Morogoro and Mbeya regions. Note that there is no tradition of riceproduction in Tanzania, so even “traditional varieties” are imported
improved varieties from abroad. This would explain why the yield is ashigh as 4.6 tons per hectare under irrigated conditions in the Shinyanga
region, even though the adoption rate of MVs is very low. Third, theadoption rates of bunding and leveling are close to 100% in irrigatedareas, which seems to help explain the considerably high yields in
irrigated areas in Tanzania. Thus, it is clear that a combination of
improved seeds, improved production practices, and irrigation leads tosignificantly high yields, resulting in a “mini” Green Revolution in thiscountry.
The case of Uganda. The importance of improved production practices canalso be clearly seen from the case study of basically rain-fed areas in the
Eastern Region in Uganda (see Table 3), as reported by Kijima, Ito, andOtsuka (2011, 2012). Note that Bugiri and Mayuge were sites of aparticipatory rice training program offered by JICA, whereas no such
7. To our surprise, C4, which was developed in the early 1960s by the University of thePhilippines, Los Banos, was adopted in 22% of the paddy fields in Chokwe.

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training was offered in Bukedea and Pallisa. Also note that thedemonstration of a simple irrigation scheme was implemented only in
Bugiri. Roughly speaking, the difference between Bugiri and Mayuge isdue primarily to the presence of irrigation in the former, whereas a majorpart of the difference between Burigi-cum-Mayuge and Bekedea-cumPalissa is due mainly to the implementation of a rice training program in
the former areas, even though some yield differences can be attributed todifferences in agro-climate. In Bugiri, where Asian-type MVs are
adopted in more than 40% of paddy fields, the yield and the number of
improved production practices adopted are positively correlated,indicating that MVs and improved production practices arecomplementary. Considering that chemical fertilizer is not applied in
Uganda, the yield of more than 4 tons per hectare is impressively high,indicating the high potential of rice yields in this country due torelatively high precipitation and fertile soil. It is likely, however, thatsuch high yield is unsustainable, unless fertilizer is applied to maintainsoil fertility.8 The yield in Mayuge is reasonably high if all four improved
production practices are adopted. In contrast, the yields are much lower
and variable regardless of the adoption of improved practices in
Bekedea and Palissa. Even if improved production practices are
adopted, whether they are adopted properly can be questioned, as theseareas were not covered by the training program. The average yield inthese two sites is 1.8 tons per hectare, which is not low compared withother rain-fed areas in SSA. A critically important finding of the Uganda
case study is that the rice training program encouraged the adoption of
improved production practices and improved the profitability of rice
farming (Kijima, Ito, and Otsuka 2012).
It must be pointed out that the rain-fed area in Uganda is located at thebottom of a valley. Although it is rain-fed, its production environment isfavorable for lowland rice production, because the soil is fertile andmoist. In my observations, such production environments are abundantin SSA, and most have been unused until recently. Probably for riceproduction such rain-fed area is more favorable than rain-fed areas in
Asia, most of which are located in flat areas. The Northern Region in
Ghana is another example of a rain-fed area at the bottom of a valley
with mild slopes, which has huge potential to increase rice production.
8. In the Doho irrigation scheme located in the Easter Region, the rice yield is about 3 tons per
hectare, even though double cropping of rice has been practiced for a few decades withoutchemical fertilizer (Nakano and Otsuka 2011).

104

How Promising Is the Rice Green Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa?
- Evidence from case studies in Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana

The case of Ghana. The case study in Northern Ghana is unique in that it
compares the rice farming performance between villages where the
Lowland Rice Development Project (LRDP) was implemented andvillages where no such project was implemented (deGraft-Johnson et al.
2012). Twenty project villages and 40 non-project villages were selected
randomly for this study and in each village 20 rice-farming households
were surveyed.9 Out of 40 non-project villages, 20 are located within a
20-kilometer radius of any of the project villages and the other 20 are
located beyond the 20-kilometer radius. The former are called “nearby
villages” and the latter “remote villages.” The LRDP, which was
implemented from 1998 to 2003, was designed to promote thedissemination of MVs, chemical fertilizer use, bunding, leveling, anddibbling.10 Aside from the practice of dibbling, the four technologies are
essential components of Asian Green Revolution technology. Thus, in asense, the purpose of LRDP was to transfer Asian Green Revolution
technology to SSA. Transplanting was not recommended because thisarea suffers from floods and seedlings cannot survive under submerged
conditions.
According to Figure 2, improved technologies were seldom adopted
before the implementation of the LRDP. During the LRDP
implementation period they were adopted primarily in the projectvillages, whereas they were diffused to nearby villages after the LRDP
period, suggesting technology spillovers from the project to othervillages. The adoption rates of new technologies are generally low inremote villages.11 It is clear that the adoption rates of both MVs andchemical fertilizer are equally high, which indicates the strong
complementarity between fertilizer-responsive MVs and fertilizer.
Leveling is adopted by about half of the sample farmers at present,
whereas bunding and dibbling are not widely adopted. Anotherimportant observation is that the rate of dis-adoption, i.e., adoption in
the past but discontinuation later, is high for dibbling. According to our
respondents, dibbling is highly labor-intensive, and this is the major
reason for dis-adoption. Thus, we suspect that dibbling may not beappropriate technology in this region.
9. Reliable data were obtained from 545 households.
10. Dibbling is a crop establishment method in which seeds are planted in holes created bysticks. Dibbling is not needed, if paddy fields are well bunded and leveled so thatbroadcasted seeds are germinated well.
11. Socio-economic conditions are very similar between the project and nearby villages,
whereas the remote villages are far from the capital city and endowed with large land areas.

105

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Table 4 summarizes the technology adoption, paddy yield, labor use,
and the factor share of labor. It is clear that the rice yield is lowest among
non-adopters of new technology, which is 1.5 tons per hectare and falls
in the expected range under rain-fed conditions without newtechnologies. The yield becomes higher as larger amounts of newtechnologies are adopted. It is interesting to observe that an average
yield of 2.6 tons per hectare among full-package technology adopters isalmost identical to the average lowland rice yield under rain-fed
conditions in Asia in the late 1980s reported by David and Otsuka (1994).
This indicates that the yield potential under rain-fed condition in SSA is
not inferior to that in tropical Asia. While it is true that labor use perhectare becomes larger with increases in the adoption of newtechnologies, the factor share of labor tends to decline, which indicatesthat new technologies are not labor-using.
In sum, our case studies demonstrate large potentials to increase rice
yields in SSA by disseminating Asian Green Revolution technology.
Although we did not discuss in detail in this article, our case studies
indicate that new technologies are not only productive but also
profitable. In short, Asian rice Green Revolution technology is directlytransferable to SSA.

3. Key Questions
Before recommending further dissemination of new technologies, wemust ask a few key questions. The first question is whether the benefit of
new technologies accrues to small farmers. If these new technologies are
adopted primarily by large farmers, their contribution to poverty
reduction is limited, because it is small farmers who suffer from poverty(Yamano, Otsuka, and Place 2011). The second question is what the
major constraints are on the adoption of new technologies. In order todisseminate new technologies to wide areas, we have to remove such
constraints.
Commonly our case studies do not find any significantly positive effectof farm size on technology adoption. In the case of Ghana, it has anegative and significant effect on the adoption of dibbling, which ishighly labor-intensive. In both irrigated and rain-fed areas inMozambique (Kajisa and Payongayong 2011a, 2011b) and Uganda
106How Promising Is the Rice Green Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa?
- Evidence from case studies in Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana(Kijima, Ito, and Otsuka 2011), the effects of farm size on paddy yields
are found to be negative, implying that the yield per hectare is higher on
smaller farms. These findings are consistent with the negative
correlation between farm size and yield widely observed in SSA recently(Larson et al. 2012), which can be explained by the higher intensity offamily labor on smaller farms.12 While the effect of farm size on riceincome per hectare is negative and significant in Tanzania (Nakano andKajisa 2012), no effect on profit is found in Uganda and Ghana (Kijima,
Ito, and Otsuka 2012; deGraft-Johnson et al. 2012). Thus, there is noevidence that new rice technologies particularly favor large farms. On
the contrary, they seem to be conducive to equitable distribution ofincome in rural communities in SSA by offering expanded work
opportunities for family labor, which is a major resource of poor small
farmers. This is consistent with the observations in Asia that the impactsof the rice Green Revolution technology are neutral with respect to farm
size (David and Otsuka 1994).
While irrigation is found to be an important determinant of rice yield,
there is no evidence that it is necessary for the adoption of newtechnology. Considering that rain-fed areas dominate in SSA, a criticallysignificant finding of this study is that the improved rice technologies
have significant impacts on the rice yields under rain-fed conditions.
Judging from the results of studies in the rain-fed areas of Uganda andGhana (Tables 3 and 4), it seems possible to increase rice yield by 50 to100% by adopting the improved technologies. In order to increase therice yield much further, irrigation is needed. Whether irrigation
investment pays is an important issue to be examined carefully.
The finding that training activities with demonstration plots are effectivein the dissemination of the new rice technologies in Uganda and Ghana
suggests that a major constraint on the wider adoption of the newtechnologies is the farmers’ lack of knowledge on new technologies.
According to the case study in Ghana (deGraft-Johnson et al. 2012), thespillover effects of new technology adoption in the project villages on the
adoption in non-project villages are significant in the case of bunding
and leveling but not in the case of MVs and fertilizer applications. The
authors argue that this is due to the fact that while the bunding and12. Monitoring of hired labor in a spatially wide environment in agriculture is costly, so thatthe endowment of family labor relative to farm size is the critical determinant of crop yield(Hayami and Otsuka 1993).

107

Chapter 3

leveling are visible and imitable, the know-how on appropriate
cultivation of MVs with fertilizer cannot be easily copied. If this is true, it
may be a good idea to set up a relatively small number of demonstration
plots compared with the number of locations where training programs
are offered.
Kijima et al. (2011) find that the dis-adoption rate of NERICA is very high(i.e., in the vicinity of 50%). This is either because NERICA wasdisseminated to unsuitable areas for production or because sustainable
management was not well understood by farmers. Indeed, there is theindication that yields of NERICA decline over time due to thedeterioration of self-produced seeds or soil quality. In either case, themajor problem is that appropriate production knowledge of NERICA
was not disseminated to rice farmers.
It is clear that the absence of an effective extension system is a major
constraint on the rice Green Revolution in SSA. In Ghana, even though
the LRDP was an effective program, similar programs have not been
implemented for nearly 10 years. In Uganda, the geographical coverageof the training program is very small. It is worse in Mozambique where
no extension program for rice farming has been carried out. Actually,
there are a very small number of agricultural extension workers in SSA.
Furthermore, only a few of them are knowledgeable about rice farming.
Unless we invest in the capacity building of extension workers, thetarget of CARD (Coalition for African Rice Development), that is the
doubling of rice production in ten years from 2008, may not be achieved.
Another possible constraint on technology adoption is the lack of credit.
Kajisa and Payongayong (2011) argue that the lack of credit access leads
to the insufficient application of chemical fertilizer as well as hired laboruse in the Chokwe irrigation scheme in Mozambique. Similarly, Nakano
and Kajisa (2011) report that the access to formal credit is an important
determinant of fertilizer use, but not MV adoption in Tanzania. MV
seeds can be self-produced and, hence, credit access is unlikely to beimportant in MV adoption. While improving access to credit is likely to
be important to increase fertilizer application, it is also remarkable torealize that considerably high rice yields are achieved without
functioning credit markets in our four study sites. Therefore, it seems
fair to conclude that improved credit access is desirable but not essential
for the improvement of rice yields in SSA. Furthermore, according to our108How Promising Is the Rice Green Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa?
- Evidence from case studies in Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana

ongoing research in the Mwea irrigation scheme in Kenya, which is alarge irrigation scheme consisting of 12,000 hectares with wellmaintained facilities, rice yields are as high as 5 to 7 tons per hectare andcredits are supplied not only by agricultural cooperatives but also by ricetraders, as in many rice growing areas in Asia. It may well be that large
demand for fertilizer induces the development of informal credit
markets, where standing crops serve as the role of credit.

4. Concluding Remarks
The four case studies we have reviewed in this article clearly
demonstrate that in order to realize the rice Green Revolution in SSA,
high-yielding MV seeds, application of fertilizer, and the adoption ofbunding and leveling are essential. We found that very high yields are
realized in some irrigated areas in Tanzania and Uganda and reasonably
high yields are achieved in some rain-fed areas in Tanzania, Uganda, andGhana. Commonly in these areas, Asian type-MVs as well as bunding
and leveling practices are adopted. These findings indicate that Asianrice technology can be directly transferable to SSA.13 On the other hand,
there are many areas in SSA where unimproved varieties are adopted,
chemical fertilizer is not used, and paddy fields are not bunded andleveled. In such areas, the rice yield is low and ranges from 1.0 to 1.5 tons
per hectare, which is close to rice yields in Asia before the Green
Revolution. These observations strongly indicate that a strategic priority
on the capacity building of extension specialists on rice andstrengthening extension activities for rice production will be warranted,
in order to realize a rice Green Revolution in SSA.
So far, however, inadequate resources have been allocated to the capacity
building and extension. Unless more resources are allocated to these
activities, the efforts to realize a rice Green Revolution in SSA are boundto fail.
Since MVs are fertilizer-responsive, once they are adopted, demand for
fertilizer will increase, which, in turn, will increase the demand for
credit. Similarly, since MVs are more productive under irrigatedconditions, adoption of MVs will increase the demand for irrigation
13. Asian varieties, however, are susceptible to yellow mottle virus, which is unique to SSA.
Thus, MVs tolerant to this virus must be developed urgently (Balasubramanian et al. 2007).

109

Chapter 3

water. Thus, the benefit and cost of credit programs and irrigation
projects must be carefully reassessed, while considering the large
expected gains in productivity and profitability of rice farming in SSA.
We have been conducting research on lowland rice production partly
because it is the most promising crop and partly because the success ofthe developing rice sector in SSA can provide a model for a successful
Green Revolution in SSA. According to Otsuka and Larson (2013),
profitable and productive maize technology is yet to be established.
Indeed, although maize is the single most important crop in SSA, we
seldom observed impressively high maize yields anywhere in SSA. It
seems to us that the prerequisite for a maize Green Revolution is thedevelopment of truly profitable and productive maize seeds andfarming practices for this crop. Once such technology is developed, it
will trigger the change towards the maize Green Revolution in SSA. It is
our hope that successful development of the rice sector can be a rolemodel of the Green Revolution in other crops in this region.

110How Promising Is the Rice Green Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa?
- Evidence from case studies in Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana

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Increasing rice production in Sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges andopportunities. Advances in Agronomy 94 (1): 55–133.
David, C. C., and K. Otsuka. 1994. Modern rice technology and income
distribution in Asia. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
deGraft-Johnson, M., A. Suzuki, T. Sakurai, and K. Otsuka. 2012. On thetransferability of the Asian Rice Green Revolution to rain-fed areas
in Sub-Saharan Africa: An assessment of technology intervention in
Northern Ghana. Mimeo, National Graduate Institute for Policy
Studies.
Estudillo, J. P., and K. Otsuka. 2012. Lessons from the Asian Green
Revolution in Rice. In Otsuka and Larson 2013.
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Kajisa, K., and E. Payongayong. 2011b. Potential of and constraints on
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Rice Green Revolution: Evidence from Uganda. Mimeo, Universityof Tsukuba.
Kijima, Y., N. Ito, and K. Otsuka. 2011. On the possibility of a lowland
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ed. T. Yamano, K. Otsuka, and F. Place. Dordrecht: Springer.
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of NERICA rice in Uganda. World Development 39 (3): 77–86.
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112

How Promising Is the Rice Green Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa?
- Evidence from case studies in Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana

Table 1. Paddy yields and production practices in Mozambique

Yield per ha (tons)

Chokweirrigation
scheme2.1

Use of MVs (%)

Rain-fed areas in central region
Bottom 1/3 Middle 1/3

Top 1/3

0.3

0.8

2.2

92

0.0

0.0

3.0

Fertilizer use (%)

52

0.0

0.0

0.0

Plots with bund (%)

100

52

41

43

Animal use (%)

48

0

2

5

Tractor use (%)

55

2

5

2

No. of sample
households

176

66

66

65

113

Chapter 3

Table 2. Rice yields, the use of modern inputs and improved production
practices by region and irrigation status in Tanzania
Morogoro

Mbeya

Shinyanga

Rain-fed Irrigated Rain-fed Irrigated Rain-fed Irrigated
Paddy yields (t/ha)

2.0

3.8

1.6

3.5

1.7

4.6

Share of modern
varieties (%)
Chemical fertilizer use(kg/ha)Improved practices

17.8

87.5

0.0

2.1

1.9

13.1

11.7

40.4

10.7

31.7

0.9

0.0

Share of bunded plots(%)
Share of leveled plots (%)

8.2

84.8

16.3

89.6

95.3

100.0

22.0

69.6

38.5

78.1

87.6

100.0

4.4

47.8

3.8

22.9

6.4

0.0

182

46

104

96

234

10

Modern inputs use

Share of straight row
transplanting plots
No. of sample
households

114How Promising Is the Rice Green Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa?
- Evidence from case studies in Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana

Table 3. Rice yields (ton/ha) according to the cultivation practices adopted in
September 2008 – August 2009 in Uganda a
4 practices

4.13

All

Bugiri

3 practices

3.20

2 practices

4.47

Mayuge Bukedea

Pallisa

2.89

1.22

0.37

4.15

1.89

---

1.54

2.25

3.07

2.00

3.95

2.26

1 practice

1.81

2.30

1.91

1.89

1.38

Non-adopters

1.33

---

0.79 b

1.42

0.66 cFertilizer use

7.55c

7.55 d

---

---

---

Adoption of MVs (%)

19.6

43.8

40.0

5.0

1.6

No. of sample households

300

75

75

75

75

a. The numbers show the means for the rice yield in tons per hectare. The adoption of 4 practices means
bunding, leveling, proper timing of transplanting, and straight-row planting.
b. Only 1 observation.
c. Only 3 observations.
d. Only 4 observations.

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Chapter 3

Table 4. Technology adoption, paddy yields, labor inputs,
and factor share of labor in Northern Ghana
Partial adoption
Modern Some
ModernSome
inputsmoderninputs,modernNo
Fullinputs bunding, inputs, adoption
adoption onlya
andbunding
leveling
andleveling
47
84
37
349
78
63
No. of households(8.6)(15.4)(6.8)(64.0)(14.3)(11.6)(%)
Yield (ton/ha)

1.46

1.70

1.95

1.98

2.33

2.59

Labor (days/ha)

102

152

187

204

238

264

Factor share oflabor (%)

61.5

62.6

54.6

52.8

49.5

47.6

a. Modern inputs refer to the adoption of MVs and chemical fertilizer application.
b. Factor share of labor is the total cost of labor divided by the total value of production.

116

How Promising Is the Rice Green Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa?
- Evidence from case studies in Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana

Figure 1. Grain yields in India and SSA, 3-year moving averages.

Figure 1a. India
Yield (Ton/ha)
Rice
Wheat

Maize

MilletSorghum

Source: FAOSTAT

Figure 1b. SSA
Yield (Ton/ha)
Wheat
Rice
Maize

Sorghum
MilletSource: FAOSTAT

117

Chapter 3

Figure 2. Adoption of new technologies before, during, and after the Lowland
Rice Development Project (LRDP) in Northern Ghana.

118

Chapter 4:
The Inclusive Development Approach among
Farmers, Private Partners and Government
through the Promotion of Responsible
Investment for Agricultural Development
Koji Makino

1. Investment in Agriculture by the Private Sector

1.1 The role of the private sector in agriculture
For robust development, the agricultural sector needs to have wellfunctioning value chain systems consisting of input (seed, fertilizer,
machinery, etc.) → production → processing and shipment →transportation and storage → sales and distribution. Such value chain
development has been behind the development of agriculture in Asiaand other areas, where the widespread use of improved seeds andfertilizers was subsequently accompanied by the development of value
chains stretching from production to distribution, resulting in
productivity improvement and production expansion. Such systems,
however, are seriously underdeveloped in Africa.
For example, the use of improved seeds and fertilizers as input goods is
not widespread among many of the small scale farmers in Africa because
they are either too expensive or simply unavailable locally and also
fertilizer responding seeds have not yet been well developed except forrice and wheat. Low productivity persists due at least partly to lagging
mechanization, although the dependence on family labor does
contribute to employment. The post-harvest processing of agricultural
produce also poses a problem. A significant amount of crops is lost or
wasted, for example, in rice production, due to farmers’ poor grain
threshing and drying techniques as well to the poor techniques of rice
millers, who in many cases are equipped with inadequate millingmachines.
Another problem is distribution. Some farmers are placed in a weak
position as sellers of their own products. Though they do have a desire
119Chapter 4

to market their products at the highest possible price, without adequate
storage facilities, they have difficulty to adjust the timing of the sales, nor
do they have marketing channels to rely on other than a small number ofbrokers or intermediaries that come to them to buy up their produce. It isobserved in fields, thus, they sometimes end up selling the products tobrokers at less than optimal prices.
In developing such value chains, the private sector could play a criticalrole in Africa, as in many other areas. While the government could
facilitate the process by providing incentives through subsidies and by
developing financial systems, it is primarily the role of the private sector
to supply improved seeds and fertilizers, and to provide post-harvest
processing and distribution services. One cannot overemphasize theimportance of the roles of the private sector in the reduction of poverty
by means of productivity improvement and livelihood betterment offarmers, including small scale farmers.
1.2 Investments in agriculture
The promotion of private sector activities in agriculture requires
investment, and for that, investment both by the private sector as well as
by farmers needs to be encouraged. Investment in agriculture could
have a high socio-economic spillover effect, as growth in agriculture issaid to have a poverty reduction effect twice that of other sectors (WorldBank 2008).
The government will continue to play an important role in fulfilling
functions that the private sector or the market cannot fully provide.
These include, for example, development of improved seeds anddissemination of agricultural technologies, development of
infrastructure, and the development of an enabling environment forinvestment, as well as the promotion of land reform. When a ‘green
revolution’ was achieved in Asia, the governments in Asia allocatedmore than 20 % of government spending to agriculture (UNDP2012). In
Africa, however, the allocation to agriculture is only 5.6 % (average
between 2005 and 2009) and it is only about half of the targeted 10 % of
the CAADP (Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development
Programme). In this context the need for efforts to promote private
investment is apparent, along with more efforts to increase government
spending on African agriculture.

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The Inclusive Development Approach among Farmers, Private Partners andGovernment through the Promotion of Responsible Investment for
Agricultural Development

Despite its importance, however, agricultural investment must be
promoted with caution. Particularly those investments in the productive
sectors such as crop production, fuel crop production or forestry
development often require the acquisition of extensive farmlands, andsuch acquisition of land can lead to conflicts over land and water
resources between private companies and local inhabitants. In extreme
cases, situations (often dubbed as ‘land grabbing’) arise where small
farmers are removed from the lands they traditionally owned. There aremany reports of such cases: in one case, an area of land stretching overtens of thousands of hectares was leased to a private company forgrowing plants and planting trees for biofuels without local people’s
prior knowledge, who, according to the plan, were to be obliged torelocate. In other reported cases, land lease contracts have become
effective with an authorization by the government, but the land has beenleft unused for a long period of time without actual development.
This is indeed a difficult issue, but the author is of the view that it is not
an all or nothing type of question on which there are only twoalternatives, i.e., whether private investment in agriculture in Africa is tobe promoted or not. Rather, what is important is to promote appropriate
investment and restrain inappropriate investments in line with theVoluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land,
Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security and thePrinciples of Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI) both of which
are touched on later. This middle ground approach must be pursued
because, as mentioned earlier, the private sector plays the primary role inproviding input goods and post-harvest processing as well as
distribution.
Interviews conducted recently with government officials of Africancountries generally indicate that they believe they must promote thoseinvestments that will benefit local communities and agricultural growth,
while excluding inappropriate ones. They also say that for this purpose,
they are prepared to make efforts for the establishment and registrationof ownership of farmers’ lands and for the improvement in land
management capacity. If that is the African governments’ policy, donors
should actively help governments in pursuing their efforts to improvetheir capacity for agricultural investment administration, land
management, and agricultural investment programs formulation, as
well as for system and/or regulatory reforms.
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Chapter 4

In promoting private sector participation in agriculture, one interesting
business model is what is called the “Inclusive business model” (FAO
2012). It has been drawing attention in the agricultural production sector,
where private companies become engaged in production by actively
involving small farmers, while providing them with various services
and inputs; these are meant to improve the productivity and livelihoodof the contracted small farmers, while increasing production andcorporate profits. One example is the case of a company that operates achicken farm where the company makes a contract with farmers andprovides them with well-bred chicks, gauges (cages for rearing) and
feed, in addition to providing training on breeding technology. Anotherexample is a case where beer factories (companies) commission groupsof farmers to produce raw materials such as barley and corn and at thesame time provide them with various services and supports: input
goods such as seeds and fertilizers, extension services by their staff, andthe installation of small-scale warehouses. These cases illustrate that thiskind of partnership between private firms and farmers can not only help
farmers to improve productivity and obtain benefits (surplus) evenwhen the input cost is deducted from the sales, but also help thecompany to increase production and profits. In the future, this and otherkinds of business models that involve farmers’ participation in an
inclusive manner will be worth supporting.
1.3 Formulation of international rules on investments in agriculture(1) Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Land,
Fisheries and Forests
Countries with weak land governance tend to be targeted for global land
investment, and in such countries the rights to land and livelihood of
local residents are likely to be threatened. The need for the establishmentof an international guideline for supporting governance of natural
resources of each country, including lands, has been voiced and theCommittee on World Food Security (CFS), a standing committee of the
FAO, has led the formulation of Voluntary Guidelines on the
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in theContext of National Food Security (hereinafter guidelines).
These guidelines are positioned as a practical and comprehensive guidefor the governance of land and other natural resources, to be used bygovernments, communities and the private sector for complementing
similar existing international or regional initiatives and policies of each122

The Inclusive Development Approach among Farmers, Private Partners andGovernment through the Promotion of Responsible Investment for
Agricultural Development

government. The work to develop the guidelines started in 2009, andthey were officially approved in May 2012. The contents of theseguidelines are as follows:
Contents of Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance ofTenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food
Security
Part 1: Preliminary
1. Objectives
2. Nature and scope
Part 2: General Matters
3. Guiding principles of responsible tenure governance4. Rights and responsibilities related to tenure
5. Policy, legal and organizational frameworks related to tenure
6. Delivery of services
Part 3: Legal Recognition and Allocation of Tenure Rights and Duties
7. Safeguards
8. Public land, fisheries and forests
9. Indigenous peoples and other communities with customary
tenure systems
10. Informal tenure
Part 4: Transfers and Other Changes to Tenure Rights and Duties
11. Markets
12. Investments
13. Land consolidation and other readjustment approaches
14. Restitution
15. Redistributive reforms
16. Expropriation and compensation
Part 5: Administration of Tenure
17. Records of tenure rights
18. Valuation
19. Taxation
20. Regulated spatial planning
21. Resolution of disputes over tenure rights
22. Transboundary matters
Part 6: Responses to Climate Change and Emergencies
23. Climate change
24. Natural disasters
25. Conflicts in respect to tenure of land, fisheries and forests
Part 7: Promotion, Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation
123Chapter 4(2) Principles of Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI)At the G8 L’Aquila Summit in July 2009, Japan proposed theestablishment of a platform for discussing the development of aguideline to promote transparent and responsible international
investment in agriculture that does not involve land confiscation. In
order to develop a joint proposal on principles and best practices forinternational agricultural investment, the summit declaration contained
the commitment by the G8 countries to address the issue with eachpartner country and world organization.
Based on the senior officials meeting (roundtable) on the promotion of
responsible international investment in agriculture, which wasorganized as a side event to the United Nations General Assembly by
Japan and co-sponsored by the World Bank, FAO, IFAD and UNCTAD in
September 2009, the World Bank, FAO, IFAD and UNCTAD jointly
announced the draft of “Principles of Responsible Agricultural
Investment (PRAI)” (refer to the box in Chapter 2 for the draft contentsof Principles) in February 2010. Currently, discussions are under way toapprove the draft in the Committee on World Food Security (CFS). At thesame time, a pilot project to substantiate the draft is being implemented
through Japan’s funding to the World Bank.
1.4 The inclusive development approach among farmers, private
partners and government through the promotion of responsible
investment for agricultural development
1.4.1 Direction of the Approach
JICA considers it important to help promote responsible investments
and restrain inappropriate investments in line with the Voluntary
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries
and Forests in the Context of National Food Security and the Principles
of Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI). The following areconcrete measures that JICA is prepared to promote, which can be taken
as a single intervention or in combination.
(1) Support for the formulation of agricultural development programs
and institutional reforms aiming at benefiting both farmers and privatecompanies and which protect the interests of small farmers
Support for the formulation of agricultural development programs
targeted at specific areas. Such programs will, as a matter of course, bebased on the analysis of both the natural environment and the economic
potential of the area, but at the same time will aim at nurturing core124

The Inclusive Development Approach among Farmers, Private Partners andGovernment through the Promotion of Responsible Investment for
Agricultural Development

farmers, increasing employment of small scale farmers and introducing
appropriate sustainable technologies. Typically such programs will
include recommendations of crops to be cultivated in the area andagronomical technologies to be introduced, the details of which
will be planned through dialogue with farmers’ organizations andNGOs. JICA will also provide support at the policy level for the
improvement of the land tenure system and of theadministration’s capacity to manage investment and land. JICA
will also support governments with such policy measures asderegulation of investment and protection of intellectual property.
(2) Support for the development of technology infrastructure in target
areas
Technical support including the introduction of appropriate seeds andthe development and diffusion of cultivation and soil conservation
technologies based on the careful analysis of the natural environment,social and economic situation and administrative systems of target areas.
This will allow farmers and companies to enhance productivity
and reduce risks in technology adoption and investment. These
supports should also be designed to help improve theadministrative capacity of the public sector and regulatory
systems to enhance the environment for productivity
improvement.
(3) Support for the promotion of investments by agriculture relatedcompanies (such as suppliers of seeds, fertilizers, agricultural
machinery, and distributors, etc.) for the development of value chains.
Support for potential investors - both local and foreign companies - inobtaining information regarding the agricultural potential andagriculture related investment opportunities in the country throughworkshops and other means. When an investment plan prepared byany interested company is judged as having potential benefit suchas for poverty reduction of farmers, it will be supported withresearch and project cost subsidies. Further, if judged useful,support will be provided for value-chain-related research on
specific agricultural products and/or agriculture relatedindustries, the findings of which will be published for reference bya wide range of potential investors.

125

Chapter 4(4) Development of infrastructure for transportation and distribution
Support for the development of transportation and distribution networks
to smoothly and efficiently distribute agricultural products fromproducers to consumers or between markets. These include, fortransportation: trunk roads, rural roads, ports, etc., and for
distribution: facilities of wholesale and retail markets, storage andrefrigeration and product delivery/collection facilities. This
support could also include the development of a system ofagriculture-related information - such as market information –accessible to farmers. Support in the operation and maintenanceof these infrastructures may also be included.
(5) Demonstration and application of inclusive models that will benefit
both farmers and companies
Support for the demonstration and application of “win-win” businessmodels that will contribute both to an increase in farmers’ income and in
private firms’ corporate income. This support can take a variety offorms, in which farmers can collaborate with companies either on
their own or as a group. Specifically, support for this purpose
could include the provision of input goods such as improved seedvarieties and fertilizers as well as technical support and diffusion
services using pilot farms. With these, the support aims at the
improvement of farmers’ productivity and an increase incorporate production. This support can be accompanied byassistance of the government in developing regulatory
frameworks on the incentive (or penalty) system, and contract
formats for promoting the inclusive business model.
1.4.2 Points to Consider in the Implementation of the Approach
Below is a summary of various points to be considered in theimplementation of the above approach, including those mentioned
earlier.
•• For livelihood improvement in and poverty reduction among
farmers in Africa, and particularly small scale farmers, the role ofthe private sector and private investment is indispensable. The
problem, however, is that there are actually cases of inappropriate
investments, to which reality we must not turn a blind eye. Thus,
the course of action for Africa is to promote responsible
investment and restrain inappropriate investment in conformity
with principles such as the PRAI.
126

The Inclusive Development Approach among Farmers, Private Partners andGovernment through the Promotion of Responsible Investment for
Agricultural Development•• It is essential to have a dialogue with the local people and the civilsociety in the target areas who know their areas and their own
needs, and to reflect their needs in the project design and its
implementation. The government, for its part, has an importantrole to play with respect to research and development, system
reforms, and development of infrastructure. With these in mind,
the farmers, residents of the area, and civil society and thegovernment must sit together for a balanced discussion.
•• Infrastructure development is essential for the development ofvalue chains. Its physical development must be accompanied by
the institutional and management capacity development needed
to support it, which tends to lag behind. Thus, efforts tosynchronize these components are important.
•• Investment in agriculture in developing countries tends tofluctuate: it has increased rapidly, pushed by a sharp rise in foodprices; dropped temporarily following the Lehman shock in 2008,
and now it is coming back. In view of this volatility, somemeasures for its stabilization should be considered, such as
through public finance systems for mid- and long-term
investment stability.
•• While it is important to invite investments of international privatecompanies, what is more important is to foster the local private
sector, including small and medium sized companies.
•• As a prerequisite for effective program implementation, it isessential to develop human resources both in the public andprivate sectors, which are in short supply in Africa.
•• Agricultural development, especially that which is supported by
the inclusive development approach, can help to reduce poverty
and improve the health of mothers and children; and hence
contribute to the gender issues. It is important and useful toincorporate such points of view and components in order toaddress such needs.

2. The Triangular Cooperation Program for Tropical Savannah
Agricultural Development among Japan, Brazil andMozambique (ProSAVANA-JBM)
This section discusses the ProSAVANA-JBM program in Mozambique asa concrete example of the inclusive development approach among127

Chapter 4

farmers, private partners and government through the promotion of
responsible investment for agricultural development.
2.1 Background of the program
The Nacala Corridor situated in the northern part of Mozambique
originates from the port of Nacala on the Indian Ocean coast andtraverses from east to west leading to Kuanba and Mandimba in theprovince of Niassa via Nampula, the capital of the province with thesame name. The corridor is connected with inland Malawi and Zambia.
In recent years, the corridor has been positioned as one of the region’s
most important development corridors by the Government ofMozambique, the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) of theAfrican Union.
The tropical savanna zone that spreads through this corridor receives acertain amount of rainfall and has extensive arable land for agriculture.
Its potential for increasing agricultural production, therefore, is veryhigh. Approximately 720,000 farming families (2.56 million people), who
account for about one quarter of all the farmers in the country, aredistributed throughout the area. The average land area per household in
the tropical savanna zone, however, is 1.0 hectare, which is below thenational average of 1.3 hectares, and the poverty rate is higher than otherareas. The number of small farmers who own less than 1.0 hectare ofland accounts for about 60 percent of all the farmers in the area and those
who own less than 2.0 hectares of land account for about 90 %.
Many farmers engage in traditional farming methods, which result inpoor productivity both for subsistence and commercial crop production.
Even for medium to large scale farmers, their agricultural technologies
are not advanced and productivity is not high. Naturally, the question
arises as to why the area, which is said to have such high potential,
cannot sufficiently realize this potential. As a matter of fact, there are
numerous and diverse problems in agriculture in the area, which are also
common to other areas in the country and other countries in Africa. The
summary of these problems is as follows:1	There is no comprehensive agricultural program covering thewhole of the Nacala Corridor and there is no strategic
coordination among individual development programs, which
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The Inclusive Development Approach among Farmers, Private Partners andGovernment through the Promotion of Responsible Investment for
Agricultural Development

results in inefficiency.
2 There is a lack of modern farming technology.
3	Land area per household is too small and farming largely depends
on rainwater.
4	Markets and distribution systems (infrastructure and systems) are
underdeveloped.
5	Access to input goods such as fertilizers, improved seeds,
agricultural machinery, etc., is difficult.
6	Agricultural diversity and the agricultural processing industry
are underdeveloped.
7 Farmers are poorly organized or not organized.
8	Finance and insurance systems are underdeveloped, resulting in alack of access to funds for farmers, which further increases theirvulnerability.
9	There are land related issues. Only 20 to 30 % of land is registered.
Customary law and modern law are not integrated. The
administrative capacity for land management is low.
10	Systems of agricultural extension services are underdeveloped.

129Chapter 4

In an area where such a variety of problems need to be urgently
addressed, it is essential that a comprehensive and strategic agriculturaldevelopment program is planned and promoted. It is also an urgent
matter to develop adequate agricultural technologies and spread themamong the farmers, promote adequate private investment for theenhancement of agriculture related industries, and to improve
agricultural productivity and increase production through thedevelopment of value chains. Against such a backdrop, the triangularcooperation program ProSAVANA-JBM has been agreed on and is being
implemented.
2.2 Partnership between Japan and Brazil
The Government of Japan and the Government of Brazil started
triangular cooperation in 1985 and concluded the Japan Brazil
Partnership Program (JBPP) in 2000 in order to launch a new initiative
for promoting a new form of triangular cooperation. A series of technicalcooperation projects (triangular cooperation projects) between Japanand Brazil and involving a final beneficiary country in Africa was started
in 2007, covering such global issues as food security, infectious disease
control, and countermeasures against climate change.
Japan, through JICA, supported agricultural development in the130

The Inclusive Development Approach among Farmers, Private Partners andGovernment through the Promotion of Responsible Investment for
Agricultural Development

Cerrado (region) of Brazil for over 20 years from the late 1970s andcontributed to the transformation of the area once called a “barren land”
into one of the world’s leading agricultural areas. The basic cooperation
framework for ProSAVANA-JBM, targeted at the Nacala Corridor, wasagreed upon by JICA, the Brazilian Agency for International
Cooperation (ABC) and the Ministry of Agriculture of Mozambique in
September 2009, taking advantage of the experience and knowledge
regarding agricultural development in tropical savanna acquired in thedevelopment of the Cerrado of Brazil.
There are some similarities in terms of agronomy between the savannahzone of Mozambique and the Cerrado of Brazil. For this reason, someindividual technologies and know-how acquired in the Cerrado, such as
tropical varieties of major temperate grains and cultivation systems, areconsidered applicable in Mozambique. As another possibility, thetechnology developed to improve acidic soils in Brazil could also be
effective for the improvement of the salt (crop nutrients) leached soils insome parts of Nacala. Other helpful experiences acquired in the Cerrado
include: the process of technological innovations at the initial stages ofdevelopment; organizational reforms; development of value chains; andenvironmental conservation measures.
Notwithstanding all these, it is impossible to simple-mindedly apply the
agricultural development model of the Cerrado as it was developed in
Brazil to the Mozambican savannah zone; there are many differences in
the natural environment, such as water, geography, soils, and vegetation,and the social, economic and administrative systems. The project does
not in any way attempt such mechanical transfer of technology orexperiences.
Rather, under these circumstances, what is attempted is to build a new
development model for the Nacala Corridor of Mozambique utilizing
the know-how and technologies of Brazilian people and organizations
that have experienced many trials and errors in the development of the
Cerrado, and Japan’s many years of experience gained in supporting theprocess. In the process, the project will certainly take advantage of anumber of individual technologies developed in the Cerrado,
exemplified above.
In fact the project has abundant resources of technologies and131

Chapter 4

experiences at its disposal: EMBRAPA (Brazilian Agricultural Research
Corporation), one of the world’s leading agricultural research institutes;
JIRCAS (Japan International Research Center for Agricultural Sciences),
which has supported the Cerrado process over many years; FGV(Getulio Vargas Foundation), a world-renowned think tank; MDA (theMinistry of Agricultural Development) and EMATER (the Institute ofTechnical Assistance and rural Extension of Brazil) with ample
experience in program coordination for the promotion of family farming
and farmer participatory systems; the SENAR (National Service of Rural
Learning) with abundant resources in vocational training modules andteaching methods in farming villages; and JICA with the accumulated
experience and know-how of support to Africa over many years, that
can also mobilize technologies and the international expertise ofJapanese development consultants.
2.3 Objectives and characteristics of the program
The objectives of the ProSAVANA-JBM are to contribute to the poverty
reduction of farmers, improve food security, and enhance economic
development. This consists of promoting agricultural development byimproving productivity and developing value chains through thepromotion of adequate private investment in the Nacala Corridor, which
is making poor development progress despite its high potential fordevelopment and increased agricultural production. The target area issituated from 13 degrees to 17 degrees latitude south in the northern partof Mozambique. At present, 19 districts in the three provinces of
Nampula, Niassa and Zambezia in the Nacala Corridor are considered
as target areas for development.
For successful agricultural development in the area, well-functioning
value chains must be in place, including supplies of input goods, postharvest processing, and distribution both on the upstream anddownstream of production, which, in itself, must be upgraded throughthe improvement of farmers’ technology and farming methods. For thispurpose, JICA will support the introduction of crop varieties suitable to
the Nacala Corridor, as well as the development and diffusion ofcultivation and soil conservation technologies. At the same time, it will
support the Government of Mozambique in developing acomprehensive master plan for agricultural development focused on thedevelopment of a value chain including adequate investment planningand land use as well as system reforms targeted at the whole of the132

The Inclusive Development Approach among Farmers, Private Partners andGovernment through the Promotion of Responsible Investment for
Agricultural Development

Nacala Corridor. It is the aim of the master plan to propose system
reforms to promote responsible investment and restrain inappropriate
investment.
The “Nacala Corridor Development Program” is the key Japanese aid
program in Mozambique. In combination with support for building an
agricultural development model through ProSAVANA-JBM, Japan
provides technological and financial support that will contribute to thedevelopment of infrastructure such as trunk roads for distribution andports for export and import. At the same time, with a view to achieving
inclusive growth, the development of educational infrastructure andhealth infrastructure, as well as improvement in water access will besupported. In other words, the “Nacala Corridor Development
Program” and ProSAVANA-JBM are characterized by (1) triangularcooperation between Japan, Brazil and Mozambique based on
accumulated past experience, (2) comprehensive support for the wholeof the value chain including not only production but also distribution,(3) cross sectoral support including agriculture and infrastructure, and(4) a synergistic WIN-WIN effect among farmers and companies. These
characteristics correspond to all the issues included in the inclusive
development approach among farmers, private partners andgovernment through the promotion of responsible investment for
agricultural development referred to in Section 1.4. In addition, theprograms will be able to deal with many of the agriculture problems in
the Nacala Corridor mentioned in Section 2.1.
As mentioned earlier, this program presupposes the participation ofprivate investment in the future and, bearing this in mind, many
activities have already been carried out such as international seminars
and public and private joint missions comprising members from Japan,
Brazil and Mozambique. With these activities, the program expects towork out more specific and realistic development programs beyond a
simple blueprint plan.
2.4 Description of the projects
In its first stage, ProSAVANA-JBM aims to consolidate the technologies
and administrative capacity bases for the whole program. This stage willcomprise three main technological cooperation projects: Improving
Research and Technology Transfer Capacity for Nacala Corridor
Agriculture Development, Support for Agricultural Development
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Chapter 4

Master Plan for the Nacala Corridor, and Establishment of a
Development Model at the Community Level through Nacala Corridor
Agricultural Development.
In its second stage, the program’s aim shifts to the implementation of thetechnologies, development models and/or projects that have beendeveloped, demonstrated and/or proposed in the first stage incooperation with the private sector. Financial assistance is also
envisaged at this stage. This second stage will be initiated even before
the completion of the first stage. Activities for the development of
infrastructure, such as the construction of trunk roads, will be carriedout throughout the two stages. As a matter of fact, the term “stage”
simply indicates the gradual shifts of focus of activities, and individual
work will be performed flexibly. The ProSAVANA-JBM program will be
put into practice with full coordination among the government, farmers,
private sector, NGOs and other parties involved in the development, as
well as international development organizations.
A summary of individual projects is outlined below:• First stage[Improving Research and Technology Transfer Capacity for Nacala
Corridor Agriculture Development] – Period of cooperation: 20112016 (5 years)
This project aims to build a technical foundation. It aims atstrengthening research systems at the agricultural experiment station
for the northeast in the province of Nampula, and that of thenorthwest in the province of Niassa. It is also aimed at transferring to
the pilot farmers around the stations adequate soil improvement aswell as cultivation technologies that will have been developed basedon prior investigations and evaluation of the natural resources andsocial and economic situation of the Corridor.
[Support for Agricultural Development Master Plan for Nacala
Corridor] – Period of cooperation: 2012-2013 (1.5 years)
This is a project aimed at formulating a master plan for agriculturaldevelopment that will contribute to social and economic
development in the Nacala Corridor area with a view to promoting asustainable agricultural production system (value chain) andreducing the poverty of small scale farmers. In a context where anumber of foreign and domestic companies have already expressed
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Agricultural Development

interest in investing in agriculture in the area, the project allows theplanning of an adequate development project based on the Principles
of Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI) and takes theinitiative in institutional reforms for land use and social environment
consideration, which will eventually restrain inappropriate
investment. It is the aim of the project to urge the private sector,
government and donors to swiftly invest in projects with high socialand economic effects.
[Establishment of a Development Model at the Community Level
through Nacala Corridor Agricultural Development] – Period ofcooperation: 2013 – 2018 (6 years)
This is a project aimed at establishing an inclusive agriculturaldevelopment model according to the various scales of farming. It also
aims at helping such farmers and farmers’ organizations that haveadopted the inclusive model to actually increase production throughthe intensification of the agricultural extension service. It is the aim of
the project not only to help the government improve the currently
inadequate agricultural extension service, but also to foster core
farmers, and to demonstrate and disseminate business models withhigh social benefits led by companies and farmers’ groups.
• Second stage
The second stage is basically the application and expansion stage ofthe developed technologies, verified development models, or
proposed development programs in cooperation with farmers’groups, the private sector (promotion of investment) and thegovernment, with enhanced capacity to manage and support the
programs. JICA will provide support for the scaling up of funds andsupport for capacity building for project coordination.
• Common projects between the first stage and second stage(development of infrastructure)·· Support Project for the Formulation of an Economic Development
Strategy for the Nacala Corridor·· Nampula-Cuamba Road Upgrading Project·· Montepuez-Lichinga Road Upgrading Project·· Cuamba-Lichinga Road Upgrading Project·· Ile-Cuamba Road Bridge Construction Project·· Urgent Rehabilitation Project of Nacala Port
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Chapter 4·· Nacala Port Development Project·· Construction of Secondary Schools in the Nampula Monapo
Primary Teachers Training School Project·· Construction of the Nacala Health Science Institute
2.5 Points to consider
As mentioned earlier, though there are many similarities in terms ofagronomy between the savannah zone of Mozambique and the Cerradoof Brazil, there are a lot of differences in the natural environments andsocial, economic and administrative systems. This makes it impossible tosimply transfer the agricultural development model of the Cerrado as it
was developed in Brazil to the Nacala Corridor area. What needs to beachieved is to provide support for the building up of a new agriculturaldevelopment model that will meet the needs of Nacala under theownership of the government and the farmers and for this, the capacity
and individual technologies acquired in the development of the Cerrado
can be taken advantage of. In implementing the program, it is very
important to maintain sufficient dialogue with local farmers who know
best about their land and at the same time are the biggest beneficiaries of
ProSAVANA-JBM, in order to reflect their views and opinions in the
project implementation.
Another point of caution is that support for agricultural development
programs like the one in the Nacala Corridor must be placed in theperspective of national policy, for there are institutional and policy
matters that affect individual projects. A simple example is that landtenancy of up to 1,000 hectares is granted by the provincial governor, but
if the area is larger than that up to 10,000 hectares, the grant must be
made by the Minister of Agriculture, and beyond that, the grant must be
made by the Council of Ministers. Thus, the central government must be
appropriately involved.
The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, which was agreed
upon at the G8 meeting in the US in May 2012, is a framework whereby
agricultural development in Africa is enhanced through the promotionof private investment in compliance with the principles of responsible
agricultural investment and voluntary guidelines, and Mozambique is
one of the six target countries. The cooperation framework created forthe execution of this New Alliance (agreement) includes land policy,
institutional reforms on investment, and considerations for small
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The Inclusive Development Approach among Farmers, Private Partners andGovernment through the Promotion of Responsible Investment for
Agricultural Development

farmers. Acting as a co-chair with the US, Japan has supported theformulation of this cooperation framework; JICA is prepared to becontinuously involved in supporting such reforms at the central
government level.

3. Conclusion
This chapter has argued for the usefulness of the inclusive development
approach among farmers, private partners and government through thepromotion of responsible investment for agricultural development,
based on the discussion in Section 1, which stressed the importance ofthe private sector and its investment in agriculture. Section 2 discussed
the ProSAVANA-JBM program in Mozambique as a concrete case of thisapproach including a detailed explanation, meaning and points toconsider.
In recent years, JICA has been accumulating a wide range of experiencein similar cases such as in the Philippines where stakeholders, including
distributors, formed a banana industry cluster around a core groups of
farmers; a case in Pakistan where a project aimed to improve theproductivity of small livestock farmers and include them in a value
chain; cases in Nigeria and Uganda where projects aimed to improve thepost-harvest processing of rice millers; and a case in Burkina Faso wherea project aimed to formulate a market oriented agricultural master plan.
As mentioned in section 1.4, the inclusive development approach canencompass a wide range of variations, and they could be applied todifferent needs flexibly, either as a single intervention measure or used in
combination, and drawing on actual experiences accumulated in many
countries. .
Recently in the international arena, research and discussions related tothe problems and effectiveness of investment in agriculturaldevelopment, and in particular, related to inclusive models (often called
win-win business models), are becoming active, and a number ofpractical projects have come to be conducted. To contribute to suchintellectual exercises, Japan has provided funding to the World Bank andis supporting empirical studies on the usefulness of the principles of
responsible agricultural investment. JICA must learn from the findingsof this and other research and cases for its own support projects in the137Chapter 4

future. JICA must also contribute to policy development and system
reforms by actively participating in international initiatives such as the
New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition and Grow Africa whilelearning from the knowledge and experience of its international
partners.
The discussions so far have been focused on the field of agriculture. If welook at international cooperation in a broader perspective, the relative
presence of ODA (Official Development Assistance) has declined over
the years as a result of a rapid expansion of overseas direct investment
and flows of private funds such as from the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation, or aid other than ODA provided by emerging countries
such as China and Brazil (Kharas, Makino and Jung 2011). So, what is therole to be played by ODA? The answer may be that it could play the roleof a catalyst, going beyond simple aid, towards bringing together
diverse players and developing countries and actively urging theplayers to get involved in these countries in an appropriate manner.
Consistent with this orientation, there have been operational andorganizational changes within JICA to promote collaboration with theprivate sector; for example, JICA now has the Private Sector Partnershipand Finance Department, which provides support for research expenses
for overseas investment and investment promotion. JICA is also
deepening cooperation with emerging countries such as China, Brazil
and Indonesia. Given these movements, perhaps the business model andproject we have been discussing- the inclusive development approachand the ProSAVANA-JBM project – must be understood in that larger
perspective.
Finally, I would like to reiterate the critical role of the private sector in
agricultural development as an engine for economic growth andreducing poverty, through the improvement of productivity andbetterment of the farmers’ (and especially small farmers’) livelihood. For
it to happen, I have argued that private investment in agriculture must
be promoted. True, private investment in the agricultural sector can takea variety of forms, and some of them can cause negative impacts on local
residents and farmers. Under such circumstances, the appropriate andrealistic course of action for African governments must be to promoteresponsible investments and restrain inappropriate investments in linewith the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure
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The Inclusive Development Approach among Farmers, Private Partners andGovernment through the Promotion of Responsible Investment for
Agricultural Developmentof Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security
and the Principles of Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI). They
could employ a variety of policies to achieve an improvement ininvestment quality; for example, they could adopt measures such as theprovision of incentives such as tax cuts and credits. Putting into practicethese steps is an urgent matter for African countries, and theirinternational partners, including bilateral donors like Japan, andinternational organizations, should provide adequate support. The
challenge is enormous, and while fully recognizing the difficulty of thetasks at hand, we, Africa’s partners, must listen carefully to the voices ofAfrican governments and local farmers, and proceed with our support
activities in an open manner.

139

Chapter 4

References
Anseeuw, W., L. Alden Wily, L. Cotula, and M. Taylor (International
Land Coalition). 2012. Land rights and the rush for land: Findings of the
Global Commercial Pressures on Land Research Project. Rome:International Land Commission.
Cotula, L., Vermeulen, S., Leonard, R., and Keeley, J. 2009. Land grab ordevelopment opportunity? Agricultural investment and international
land deals in Africa. Rome: FAO; London: IIED; Rome: IFAD.
FAO. 2012. Trends and impacts of foreign investment in developing country
agriculture: Evidence from case studies. Rome: FAO.
FAO, and WFP. 2012. The state of food insecurity in the world 2012. Rome:
FAO.
Government of Mozambique. 2010. Strategic plan for agriculturaldevelopment 2010–2019 (PEDSA 2010–2019). Maputo: Ministry ofAgriculture, Government of Mozambique.
Humphrey, J. 2003. Commodities, diversification and poverty reduction.
Rome: FAO.
Jaffee S., P. Siegel, and C. Andrews. 2008. Rapid agricultural supply
chain risk assessment. Draft framework and guidelines,
Commodity Risk Management Group, Agriculture and Rural
Development Department, World Bank, June 13.
JICA, and MAPA. 2002. Japan-Brazil agricultural development cooperation
programs in the Cerrado region of Brazil: Joint evaluation study, generalreport. Tokyo: JICA; Brasília: MAPA.
JICA. 2010. Preparatory study on triangular cooperation programme for
agricultural development of the African tropical savannah among Japan,
Brazil and Mozambique (ProSABANA-JBM). Tokyo: JICA.
JICA Research Institute. 2012a. Cerrado agriculture: A model of sustainable
and inclusive development. Tokyo: JICA-RI.
JICA Research Institute. 2012b. Scaling up South South and triangularcooperation. Tokyo: JICA-RI.
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan. 2009.
Roundtable (meeting) on the “Promotion of responsible
international investment in agriculture” held at the time of the UN
General Assembly. [In Japanese.] http://www.maff.go.jp/j/kokusai/kokkyo/ round_table/index.html.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2009a. Senior officials meeting on
the promotion of responsible international investment inagriculture: Overview and Evaluation. [In Japanese.] http://www.
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Agricultural Developmentmofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/food_security/090926_gh.html.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2009b. Senior officials meeting on
the promotion of responsible international investment inagriculture: Chairman’s summary. [In Japanese.] http://www.
mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/food_security/pdfs/090926_gs.pdf.
OECD, and FAO. 2011. OECD-FAO agricultural outlook 2011–2020. Paris:
OECD; Rome: FAO.
UNDP. 2012. Africa human development report 2012: Toward a food secure
future. New York: UNDP, Regional Bureau for Africa.
Vermeulen, S., and L. Cotula. 2010. Making the most of agriculturalinvestment: A survey of businesses that provide opportunities forsmallholders. Rome: FAO; London: International Institute forEnvironment and Development.
Webber C.M., and P. Labaste. 2009. Building competitiveness in Africa’s
agriculture: A guide to value chain concepts and applications.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank. 2008. World development report 2008: Agriculture fordevelopment. Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank. [Deininger, K., and D. Byerlee, with J. Lindsay, A. Norton,
H. Selod, and M. Stickler.] 2011. Rising global interest in farmland: Can
it yield sustainable and equitable benefits? Washington, DC: World
Bank.

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Chapter 5:
Initiatives of SHEP and SHEP UP- Capacity development of small-scale farmers1
for increased responsiveness to market needs
Jiro Aikawa2

1. Background Leading to A Market-oriented Approach
According to the World Development Report 2008, the poverty rate
among farmers is affected by access to market, along with other factors
such as climate. The Report features improvement in market access andpromotion of market participation by small-scale farmers as important
poverty reduction measures. To realize these, the Report called formeasures to improve farming techniques, sustained water and soil
management, improvement in public extension services, capacity
development of human resources, and infrastructure development.
Governments and development partners are realizing that group
marketing, rather than individual marketing by small-scale farmers,
encourages market participation. A hurdle discouraging farmers’participation in the market is the information gap between the marketersand farmers. These market players have abundant information about
product supply and demand – information many small-scale farmers
don’t have access to.
Supply of and demand for horticultural products tend to increase witheconomic growth. Kenya’s GDP has grown more than other African
1. The term “small-scale farmers” as used in this chapter refers to farmers with a farmland
ownership of less than 2 hectares following the term’s usage in Kenya. In the projects that will
be discussed in the chapter, the average area of farmland owned by the target small-scale
farmers and dedicated exclusively to horticultural crops was less than 0.4 hectares.
2. I would like to thank Ms. Etsuko Ikeda and Ms. Fumie Saijo of OPC as well as Ms. Hiromi
Ikeda of HANDS for the data for the tables and figures for this report. Mr. Naoki Hashimoto,Ms. Harue Kitajima and Mr. Mitsuhiro Kato, JICA experts of the SHEP UP, contributed to thepaper by providing the author with a variety of information. I would like to take thisopportunity to thank them.

143Chapter 5

countries, and likewise the supply of vegetables has grown more rapidly
than in other East African countries, a trend comparable to the vegetablesupply trend in Asia since the 1990s (see Figure 1). The recent increase indemand for horticultural products in Africa seems to have been due tothe diversification of food consumption brought about by the economic
growth and increasing middle-income consumers.
Figure 1. Change in supply of vegetables in Asia, Eastern Africa, and Kenya

Vegetables Supply Quantity(kg/capita/year)

However, farmers have certain problems: compared to grain production,horticulture is labor-intensive, requiring finer techniques and bigger
inputs, e.g., seed, fertilizer and pesticides, though its land profitability ishigh if properly managed. The selling prices of horticultural products
are affected by market fluctuations because of low storability. On theother hand, horticulture is important not only as a means of developing
cash crops, but also as a means to improve people’s nutritional
condition.
Thus, some African countries stress the need for converting from thesubsistence- oriented approach into more commercially oriented
agriculture. For example, Kenya has formulated a policy for “modern
and competitive agriculture based on innovation and commercial
thinking” in its “Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS)(2010-2020)”, aimed to “strengthen competitiveness of agricultural
products and business, improve productivity and promotecommercialization.” In addition, the policy of the Ministry of144

Initiatives of SHEP and SHEP UP- Capacity development of small-scale farmers for increased responsivenessto market needs

Agriculture of Kenya advocates “Farming as Business”.
Among the various challenges in improving small-scale farmers’ market
access, their capacity development (discussed in the subsequent sections) is
an important factor.

2. Overview of SHEP and SHEP UP

Background for the implementation of the projects
Horticulture is a promising sub-sector of Kenya because of the country’sfavorable environment. According to data from the Horticultural Crops
Development Authority in Kenya, the sector has achieved an averageannual growth rate of 20% since the 2000s.
However, the producers, and particularly small-scale farmers, who
produce more than 60% of horticultural products traded in the country,
are facing problems: weak organizations, low production, limited
marketing channels, unstable selling prices, and underdeveloped
production infrastructure, so their income remains low (Dolan 2010).
In order to improve the situation, the Kenyan Government conceived theidea of a project to address these challenges, and requested theGovernment of Japan to implement a technical cooperation project
aimed at strengthening the organizational management capacity ofsmall-scale farmers. Thus, the “Smallholder Horticulture Empowerment
Project” (SHEP) was launched in November 2006.
Overall, the SHEP has been successful, doubling the income of targeted
small-scale farmers through activities such as market surveys byfarmers, strategic selection of crops to plant, development of actionplans by farmers’ groups, and technical assistance.
Encouraged by the effectiveness of the project’s model, the Kenyan
Ministry of Agriculture set up the “Smallholder Horticulture
Empowerment and Promotion Unit” (SHEP Unit). The objective was tosupport small-scale horticulture farmers using the SHEP project model.
In support, Japan, through JICA, has been implementing a five-year
technical cooperation project: “Smallholder Horticulture Empowerment
and Promotion Unit Project” (known as SHEP UP3), since 2010. This
3. The initiatives and outcome of the SHEP and SHEP UP were presented in the Camp David
Accountability Report of the G8 held at Camp David in 2012.

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project aims at the organizational development and capacity
development of the SHEP Unit.
Activities of SHEPThe SHEP project was implemented for three years from November 2006
and covered areas from the western and central part of Kenya: thecounties of Bungoma (Western Province), Kisii (Nyanza Province),
Nyandarua (Central Province) and Trans-Nzoia (Rift Valley Province),
chosen because of the widespread poverty therein despite their highpotential for horticulture cultivation. The Kenyan organizations
responsible for the project were the Horticulture Division under the
Ministry of Agriculture, and the Horticultural Crops Development
Authority.
The project aimed at developing the capacity of smallholder horticulture
farmer groups and verify if it actually brought about the net income
increase of the members of the smallholder horticulture farmer groups
supported by the project.
The initial step of the project was to sensitize the stakeholders to theproject’s idea and familiarize them with the market-oriented approach(the SHEP approach). To do so, the project organized “Sensitization
Workshops,” where briefings were given to the participants, including
ministerial officials, provincial, district and divisional staff, extension
officers, and targeted farmers.
Next was to survey the condition of the horticultural production of thearea as well as the farmers’ capacities. The survey collected data on
horticultural crop production,4 production techniques,5 and the farmers’groups’ capacity as an organization.6 This survey provided data for the
project and an opportunity for the farmers to be better acquainted with
their own farming and for the groups to understand their current status.
Secondly, the project organized opportunities where the model farmers’groups and stakeholders related to horticulture could meet in the“FABLIST Forum: Farm Business Linkage Stakeholder Forum.” The
4. Such as on cultivation area, yields, production costs, sales prices, and income by crop
planted in the previous year.
5. This covered various aspects of production techniques being used by the farmers.
6. This measured the current level of organizations, using Group Empowerment Indicators(GEIs), which allows the evaluation of organizational capacity in terms of leadership,cooperation among members, and gender structure.

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Initiatives of SHEP and SHEP UP- Capacity development of small-scale farmers for increased responsivenessto market needs

stakeholder participants included suppliers (seed, fertilizer and agrochemical and agricultural equipment companies), agro-processing
companies, financial institutions, agricultural research institutes, retaillenders, government agencies and NGOs. Each of them displayed
products and provided information. The farmers’ group representatives
and extension officers visited the booths to hold business talks andunderstand the horticulture market environment. Stakeholders were
provided with profiles of the participating farmers’ groups7 and viceversa. This was intended to facilitate exchange and interaction among
the participants.
After the forum, the project held a “Joint Extension Staff and Farmers
Dual (2) Gender Training” (JEF2G Training) targeted at the
representatives from model farmers’ groups and extension officers.
Since women were responsible for about 70% of the farming activities,
the same number of men and women were to be invited from the model
farmers’ groups. The program mainly focused on training comprising
modules such as market survey, crop selection, problem analysis andgender awareness training.
After the training, “Group Exercises” were held to put into practice thelessons learned. These group exercises consisted of performing a market
survey led by the farmers’ representatives who had taken part in the
training with the assistance of an extension officer. Based on the survey
results, the participants selected what crops to produce, and formulated
an action plan for marketing them at reasonable, profitable prices.
Subsequently, the project organized the “Facilitators’ Training for
Farmers’ Demand-Driven Extension” to provide extension officers withthe knowledge and techniques needed to support the model farmers’groups in putting into practice the action plans.
The training even contained modules on road maintenance using sandbag technology: it was included because the participators had to know
how to maintain roads, which often deteriorate during the rainy season.
Implementation of road maintenance was positioned as part of the
project outcome, and thus it was encouraged as a village-wide activity
involving local communities led by the model farmers’ groups.
In this manner, capacity building of extension officers was performed
through demand-driven technical training to meet the needs of the
farmers’ groups.
7. The data included the name of the group, location, number of farmer members, contact
information, cultivation items, yields, income, all collected from the Baseline Survey.

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After the training, the trained extension officers began teaching thetechniques learnt to the model farmers’ groups to help them materialize
their action plans. This was done through “In-field Training,” allowing
the farmers to acquire the knowledge and techniques needed for the
production of the crops selected.
Taking nearly a year, the activities were implemented in two periods,
dividing the farmers’ groups in the 4 target counties into two groups of
42 and 80. The number of farmers of each group ranged between 15 and50, with the average being 24. The project monitored the status ofproduction and cultivation technique of horticultural crops of the model
farmers’ groups in a manner similar to the baseline survey.
Activities of SHEP UP
The SHEP Unit supports small-scale horticulture farmers throughactivities developed in the SHEP. JICA has been supporting the SHEP
Unit since its establishment with a project called SHEP UP.
Activities developed in the SHEP are now being implemented in the
country’s 8 provinces in 4 cycles, with 2 provinces being covered per
year. In each province, the activities cover 10 districts. These districts
were selected based on the scores they got on the submitted proposals.
Each district had five target farmers’ groups.8 To promote the replicationof the SHEP approach, the project envisaged that the district staff would
implement activities on their own, using the resources of the district andprovide support for other farmers’ groups, and by working together
with the SHEP Unit.
Two new practices have been introduced since the implementation of the
SHEP UP. One had to do with the selection of the target districts. Before,
they were selected by the central government on certain criteria without
involving district staff. Since the SHEP UP, however, a new system wasintroduced whereby interested districts must submit a proposal to theProvincial Director of Agriculture. The proposals were evaluated by the
SHEP UP in accordance with criteria including the interest andmotivation of district staff, depth of understanding of the SHEP
approach, and the district’s horticultural cultivation potential. The final
8. This seemingly small number of farmer’s groups per district is due to the size of each
district being reduced through the country’s administrative reform.

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Initiatives of SHEP and SHEP UP- Capacity development of small-scale farmers for increased responsivenessto market needs

selection decision was made by the Selection Committee in theProvincial Agricultural Office.
The second new practice was the “Organizers’ Training on the BasicSHEP Approach,” aimed at the staff of the selected districts. It is mainly
intended to provide training on the SHEP Approach planning andimplementation of the activities, and the development of a work planand budget for the continuous implementation of the activities. As partof the training, district staff visited high-performing model farmers’groups. On the final day of training, the participants took the“Examination on the Basic SHEP Approach.”
While there has been no fundamental change in the structure of activities
developed by the SHEP, the contents have been revised on-site. By theend of 2012, around 460 farmers’ groups have taken part in the project in
60 districts and 6 provinces.
The table below shows a summary of the SHEP and SHEP UP.

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Table 1. Smallholder Horticulture Empowerment Project (SHEP) andSmallholder Horticulture Empowerment andPromotion Unit Project (SHEP UP)
SHEPSHEP UP

PeriodNovember 2006 ~ November 2009 March 2010 ~ May 2015 (five(3 years + a follow-up period of 4 years)
months)Target area

22 districts (4 provinces), mainly
in Western Kenya

80 districts across Kenya(basically 10 districts each from 8
provinces)

Targetfarmers

About 2,500 (122 groups)

About 20,000 (640~800 groups)

Implementation SHEP team composed of 6
institutions
dedicated staff assigned from the
Ministry of Agriculture and theHorticultural Crops Development
Authority

SHEP UNIT (12 dedicated staff
assigned by the Ministry ofAgriculture and the Horticultural
Crops Development Authority) of
Horticulture Division, Directorateof Crops Management of the
Ministry of Agriculture

Overallgoal

Livelihood of horticulture
smallholders in implementing
districts is improved.

Improved livelihoods ofsmallholder horticulture farmers
in the target districts

Project goal Developed capacity of thesmallholder horticulture farmers’groups supported by the Projects.

Effective support system forhorticulture smallholders
nationwide is established.

Outcome1. The SHEP Approach is adopted
by the Unit and become ready for
implementation.
2. Farmers’ groups’ income fromhorticulture produce is improved.
3. The SHEP Approach is properly
replicated by the implementing
districts based on the Outcome 2.
4. Information Management
System for the SHEP Approach isestablished.

1. Target groups (smallholder
horticulture farmers’ groups) gain
bargaining power in marketing
their produce.
2. Target groups increase theproduction of better quality crops.
3. Target groups develop capacity
to improve rural infrastructure for
production and transportation.

Characteristics Development andimplementation of a series ofapproaches from organizing to
productivity improvement for
improving horticultural-related
income of small-scale farmers.

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Provision of support to the SHEPUNIT established by the Ministryof Agriculture of Kenya to spreadthe SHEP approach across thecountry.

Initiatives of SHEP and SHEP UP- Capacity development of small-scale farmers for increased responsivenessto market needs

3. Survey on Income from Horticulture in the SHEP

1) Method (baseline survey and periodical monitoring)
The project started with a baseline survey targeted at 3,6239 individual
farmers belonging to 154 farmers’ groups in the target counties. It was
conducted in May and June 2007, 7 months after the launch of the
project. The survey was intended to obtain data on a sampling basis tounderstand the current condition of the areas at the beginning of the
project, where most of the farmers were engaged in horticulture as theirprimary farming activity. The survey items included cultivation area,
yield, selling prices and costs of horticultural products grown in theprevious year as well as income from them. The survey was conductedby the district staff in the target areas and they were assisted by theirproject counterparts.
The final monitoring was carried out in October 2009 just before thetermination of the SHEP project period. The survey covered a total of
2,177 individual small-scale farmers belonging to 114 of the 122 model
farmers’ groups from which data could be obtained in a similar mannerto the baseline survey. About 80% of the 114 farmers’ groups, that is, justover 70% of the 2,177 farmers, had been covered in the baseline survey.10
2) Results
As shown in Table 2, the average per group horticulture-related net
income of the 154 organizations that took part in the baseline survey was
536,257 Ksh, and the average per farmer net income of those who
belonged to these groups was 22,642 Ksh. In October 2009, the average
per group horticulture-related net income of the 114 organizations was
900,030 Ksh, showing a 67% increase over the baseline survey; while theaverage per-farmer net income was 47,131 Ksh, showing a 106% increaseover the baseline survey. While income increased for both men andwomen, the gap between them fell from 31% at the time of the baseline
survey to 15%11 at final monitoring.12
9. In the Baseline Survey, farmers not belonging to the groups or farmers with poor activity
results also took part. So, there is a difference in the total number of farmers before and after
the survey. That is, the Baseline Survey data is an average including members of the model
farmers’ groups and non-model farmers’ groups.
10. As some names were illegible, the number is approximate.
11. Husbands and wives cultivated and owned different farmland. Generally, husbands
cultivated crops with high cashability and wives grew crops for subsistence.
12. A gender survey conducted after the start of the project revealed that many farmers had aseparate household budget according to gender.

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Table 2. Horticulture-related net income:per farmers’ group and per farmer (men and women) (Ksh*1)
Farmers’
Groups

Farming
households

Men

Women

Baseline Survey(May and June 2007)

536,257(154)*2

22,794(3,623)

26,642(1,940)18,359(1,683)

Final Monitoring(October 2009)

900,030(114)

47,131(2,177)50,221(1,111)

42,711(1,066)*1*2

Exchange rate as of January 2013 (1USD = 84.5Ksh)
The numbers in parentheses shows the number of farmers’ groups and that offarming households

4. Essence of Success of the SHEP
Though incomplete in the absence of control groups, the simple analysis
above indicates the likelihood that the SHEP has been useful inimproving the net income of farmers who participated in the project.
Based on that assumption, the following sections will try to identify thefactors that may have been behind the performance of the farmers
practicing the SHEP approach; they are: the introduction of marketoriented agriculture, improvement of farming efficiency, introduction of
appropriate techniques, and the utilization of existing administrative
structures.
1) Introduction of market-oriented agricultureFirst and foremost, it was the introduction of market-oriented
agriculture that seems to have been very effective in improving the net
income of the farmers. The most fundamental change was observed in
the farmers’ mindset. With the project, the farmers’ attitude towardmarketing was transformed from passive to more positive, or from theone based on the mindset of “harvest (crops) first and then sell”, to theone based on the mindset of “harvest (strategically) to sell.” To nurturesuch attitudes, the project encouraged the farmers to conduct market
surveys and problem analysis as well as to create action plans bythemselves. To that end, the project encouraged the farmers, forexample, to consult on their own such materials as “A Market
Facilitator’s Guide to Participatory Agro-enterprise Development”
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Initiatives of SHEP and SHEP UP- Capacity development of small-scale farmers for increased responsivenessto market needs(Ferris, et al. 2006) of the CIAT (The International Centre for Tropical
Agriculture), rather than directly feeding them with periodical market
information.
Especially, the market survey was found quite instrumental in helping
the farmers. According to the final evaluation report prepared at the endof the SHEP, 56% of 276 farmers and 70% of 40 extension staff responded
that they found the market survey important as a technique to help
increase income (JICA 2012). Actually, the market survey received thehighest evaluation score among the 15 training contents evaluated by the
respondents. The market survey enabled the target farmers to knowwhat crops are selling best, how prices fluctuate by season and how
much of their products of what quality can be marketed at what timing.
Through market surveys, farmers also became acquainted with multiple
buyers to deal with. Based on such knowledge, farmers started to selectcrops that they believed would yield greater profits and to decide whento produce them. In other words, they were now able to visualize
potential buyers and expected profits when they start sowing. Being able
to negotiate with multiple buyers, their position in relation to them also
strengthened, and they became more organized, once they realized thatcollective marketing works to their advantage. There were cases wheresome groups of farmers, though unsuccessful at their initial attempts,
eventually succeeded in increasing income through market surveys andcultivation of adequate crops. All this indicates that the introduction ofmarket-oriented agriculture played a significant role in increasing thefarmers’ income.
2) Improvement in farming efficiency: an effective approach to genderand useThe SHEP emphasized gender-related activities, and at its initial stage,
the project devised plans for gender-related activities.13 The project not
only provided training opportunities to women who were responsible
for more than 70% of horticultural work, but also encouraged men(husbands) who still had the upper hand in the household to understandthe role of women in farming. That is, explanations with illustrations
were provided to men about gender consideration and code of conductthat would benefit all the family members. In both the SHEP and SHEP
UP, as part of gender-related activities, the project performed a series ofawareness-enhancing exercises that included the introduction of a daily
13. This job was facilitated by Japanese short-term gender experts.

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activity calendar and a list of gender–based division of labor inhorticulture, and an analysis of access to and control of resources bygender. In order to overcome gender-related obstacles for increasing
income, the project also encouraged the farmers’ groups to develop theirgender action plans. By providing training on family budgeting, theproject also emphasized the importance for the husbands and wives tohave talks about domestic finance. This helped the farmers to savemoney necessary for the next season such as fertilizer and seeds, andcontributed significantly to their horticulture production.
According to the evaluation at the end of the SHEP, 40% of 276 farmers
who responded to the questionnaire found gender-related activities as
having contributed to the increase in production and income, giving it
third place among the 15 training contents in terms of importance. The
gender-related activities encouraged husbands, who used to be farmmanagers, and wives, who used to be laborers, to become management
partners, and contributed to a fairer division of household labor among
them leading to efficient farming (JICA 2012).
3) Introduction of appropriate techniques
Various techniques were introduced in the project. They were simple
and applicable, using materials easily available to the farmers. In fact, in
Kenya, a country where they have reached a certain level oftechnological know-how at the research station, the issue was not how todevelop new technologies, but how to validate existing technologies
from the farmers’ perspective and put them to practical use. Based on
this understanding, the project focused on the introduction of techniquesthat were “immediately usable the moment they were learned,” such as
the technique for correct planting using twine. The guidance on thesetechniques was provided jointly by Kenyan experts with abundant
experience in horticulture-related guidance and Japanese experts who
could provide advice from an outsider’s point of view. Even whenintroducing technologies quite new to the farmers, the project made surethat they would be applicable with the materials and techniques alreadyexisting locally; such technologies included road maintenance using
sand bags (“Do-no,”), fermented organic manure (“BOKASHI”), andeasy-to-handle weeding tools.
In both projects, the policy was never to force the use of specifictechniques from outside but to inspire the farmers to be motivated into
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Initiatives of SHEP and SHEP UP- Capacity development of small-scale farmers for increased responsivenessto market needs

introducing new techniques before they are taught about thetechnologies. With this policy, the project saw steady introduction of
new techniques by the motivated farmers, which resulted in the increaseof crop yield. As shown in Tables 3 and 4, the yield of horticultural crops
increased; for example, tomatoes in Bungoma County registered a 396%
increase, and onions in Kisii County a 596% increase. The crop yield
increased in other areas as well (Kitajima et al. 2011). These increases inyield significantly contributed to income increases for farmers.
Table 3 Change in yield by unit area in three key crops in Bungoma County

*3
*4

Item

April 2007
(kg/10a)

October
2009(kg/10a)

Rate of
Increase(No. farmers’ groups/total
no. of farmers’ groups)*3

Tomato1,157.1(±53.7)*4

4,577.0(±429.9)

296%

17/30

Kale

876.1
(±16.5)

3,212.9(±256.9)

267%

11/30

Onion

671.0
(±19.0)799.9(±170.0)

19%

9/30

Number of farmers’ groups that selected the above items as priority crops after the market survey.
Mean ± standard error

Table 4 Change in yield by unit area in three key crops in Kisii County
April 2007
(kg/10a)

October
2009(kg/10a)

Rate of
Increase(No. of farmers’ groups/total
no. offarmers’ groups)

Tomato1,451.2(±32.0)*6

4,250.0(±333.7)

193%

16/31

Traditional
Vegetable*5607.6(±2.8)

1,716.1(±135.2)

183%

8/31

Onion

418.7
(±13.1)

2,189.5(±380.1)

424%

6/31

Item

*5
*6

Leafy vegetable called Black Nightshade.
Mean ± standard error4) Utilization of existing administrative structure (establishment of
SHEP Unit)
Both projects were designed to fully take advantage of the country’s
existing administrative structure for extension services. This project’s
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architecture was chosen on the obvious assumption that the activities
introduced by the projects would continue after the end of the project. By
adding nothing new and complicated to the existing routines, thisstructure helped local administrators to continue pursuing theiractivities. At the time of the start of SHEP (2006), the flow of extension
services consisted, from top to bottom, of the Ministry of Agriculture,
Provincial Office of Agriculture, District Agricultural Office, Divisional
Agricultural Office and frontline extension officers. The roles of each ofthese actors in the project were determined so that the project activities
may not deviate from their respective day-to-day responsibilities.
In the SHEP, however, the project team was established as a special unit
for the project made up of Japanese experts and full-time staff assigned
from the Ministry of Agriculture. Just before the completion of the SHEP,
the “SHEP Unit” or the “Smallholder Horticulture Empowerment andPromotion Unit” was established at the Ministry of Agriculture of
Kenya. The mandate of the Unit is to support small-scale farmers acrossthe country using the SHEP approach. The Unit will continue the project
after the end of JICA’s involvement.

5. Philosophy behind the SHEP Approach

Use and application of the motivation theory
The basic concept behind the SHEP approach is the motivation theory.
By applying it, the projects introduced a mechanism in which the roles
and responsibilities of the different actors (from the Ministry ofAgriculture at the top down to the farmers) are clarified, and to allow
each of the actors to spontaneously undertake actions. This mechanism
is consistent with the discussion going on in the international arena inrecent years about ownership and capacity development.
The structure of the project activities has been based on the motivation
theory of Deci et al. (1995) in order to guarantee that the project activities
will continue and expand with increasing creativity, moving toward theachievement of the ultimate goal. Deci classified motivation into
intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation and concluded that
intrinsically motivated activities are sustainable. Amabile (1996) argued
that while extrinsic motivation deprives people of creativity, intrinsic
motivation leads to creativity.

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Initiatives of SHEP and SHEP UP- Capacity development of small-scale farmers for increased responsivenessto market needs

In projects like SHEP, external actors like project staff and Japaneseexperts have no choice but to start by providing the people they workwith with extrinsic motivation. Thus, assuming the arguments of Deciand Amable to be correct, the critical question was how to start with theprovision of extrinsic motivation and shift to a situation where thetargeted actors become intrinsically motivated and keep up their own
creativity. To that end, the projects incorporated a variety of measures foreach activity to encourage the smooth transition to intrinsic motivation.
In the process, the following motivating factors were used: (1) selfdetermination: self-determination easily encourages subsequentdevelopment of ownership; (2) affinity motivation: creation of a mutual
relationship encourages positive actions; (3) sense of achievement andfeeling of competence: the sense of achievement that one feels after
spontaneously solving a problem, and the feeling of competence that
one feels when recognized by others when contributing to thecontinuation and further development of actions. It often happens thatwhen an intrinsically motivated person receives an excessive reward
from outside, the reward becomes his/her objective and the intrinsic
motivation decreases (this is called the undermining effect). The project
carefully planned its activities in such a way that the participants’
intrinsic motivation would not be adversely affected; for example,
material inputs were limited only to those cases where they wereabsolutely needed, like in the demonstration of technologies.
In this manner, the project’s approach is based on the motivation theory
and it was intended and designed so that an activity causes changes in a
stakeholder’s mind and behavior, and a chain of such changes will
eventually make him/her intrinsically motivated. This transition of
stakeholders from being extrinsically motivated to intrinsicallymotivated does not only contribute to the attainment of the project goal,
but also to the securing of the sustainability of activities after the end of
the project. Intrinsically motivated stakeholders, including the farmers
and those who support them, will be able to tap their potential to thefullest, and to pursue their activities with creativity.
Design of activities in logical sequences
Having the motivation theory as its conceptual base, the project’s
activities were designed such that the individual activities form a clear
and firmly connected chain of achievements and subsequent steps; inother words, the activities are sequenced so that once a participant
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Chapter 5completes an activity, he/she is expected to have reached a certain level,
based on which he/she will be facing a next activity step. Broadly, thisconsists of two steps. In the first step, a project participant is provided
with an opportunity to raise his/her awareness. Such opportunities
included, for farmers, for example, a match-making forum forstakeholders involved in the horticulture industry; the opportunity of
conducting a market survey by farmers’ groups itself constituted an
opportunity to enhance their awareness of the outside world; andactivities related to different gender-based roles in the household
mentioned above also provided an opportunity.
The second step was for the participants to work out, based on enhanced
awareness, a plan of action for improving the current situation andimplement the plan. The project participants got assistance from the
project in their plan-making and implementation of such plans. Throughthis series of events, including awareness building, planning of actions
and their implementation, participants’ capabilities were graduallystrengthened (JICA 2012).
To make sure that this kind of sequence happens, SHEP and SHEP UP
projects instituted a detailed work procedure that leaves no logical gaps
between the individual activities or outcomes. For example, a farmer ispresented with a visible goal such as an increase in his/her profit
through the sale of horticultural crops. He/she will then be encouraged
to steadily go forward by taking the steps to achieve the goal. Further,
they were enabled to envision how, when and where their own crops
will be traded through the match-making forum and market surveys.
The project visibly displayed the steps to follow for achieving suchgoals, and provided the farmers with the necessary skills in taking such
steps.
Using this kind of mechanism, overall, the projects provided the farmers
both with the motivation and necessary skills to realize their targets.
And that kind of steady support for farmers through the project wasmade possible by designing the activities in a sequence where the steps
are logically connected with one another, as will be explained in the next
section.

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Initiatives of SHEP and SHEP UP- Capacity development of small-scale farmers for increased responsivenessto market needs

6. Internal and Behavioral Changes in Activities of the SHEP and
SHEP UPThis section will look at how the individual activities of the projects
helped, step by step, the cycle mentioned above: enhancing awarenessand motivation, and acquiring skills to realize the goals. Detailed
information is shown in the Appendix.
Figure 2 is a diagrammatic illustration of the development of farmers’
intrinsic motivation and skills. The thick red line shows the enhanced
intrinsic motivation formed in farmers by the series of activities
described in the table in the Appendix, and the green dotted line, thechange in their skills level. Initially, the progress of both the levels of
intrinsic motivation and improvement in skills was slow, in the period
from the Sensitization Workshop through FABLIST Forum (matchmaking) to the market survey practice in the JEF2G Training. Then,farmers’ skills improve significantly when they conducted the market
survey. Subsequently, farmers’ intrinsic motivation was significantly
enhanced when they determined, on their own, the target crops to
produce based on the result of the market survey they had conducted.
This, in turn, increased awareness and motivated the farmers to morethoroughly learn techniques in the In-field Training. When the farmers
succeed in marketing their products, this successful experience further
promoted their sense of competence, leading to even more enhanced
intrinsic motivation. Thus, the whole process can be described as aninteraction between enhanced intrinsic motivation and increased skills
levels complementing and reinforcing each other, leading to sustained
growth.

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Figure 2. Relationship between farmers’ motivation and skills in
the SHEP Approach

7. The enabling Conditions for the SHEP Approach and Future
Challenges
There are several conditions that enabled the SHEP approach to produce
encouraging results.
First, the role of the Ministry of Agriculture of Kenya was significant in
the success of the SHEP and the effective promotion of the SHEP UP
activities. The Ministry of Agriculture of Kenya understood, up-front,that the key to success was the improvement of the abilities of the
farmers and the staff of the Ministry. It was fully aware that it takes acertain amount of time for people’s capacity to develop, including
intrinsic motivation, and that any hasty and/or excessive provision ofmaterial incentives such as agricultural materials and equipment may
actually hamper such intrinsic motivation/capacity development.
One lesson from this experience is that it is necessary for the government
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Initiatives of SHEP and SHEP UP- Capacity development of small-scale farmers for increased responsivenessto market needs

to distinguish what to do or not to do. The government must have a clear
vision on the roles to be played by the administration and farmers(private sector), to achieve long-term sustainable development. After all,agricultural support is a form of industrial support. For it to be effective,
the administration must have a deep understanding how commercial
agriculture works.
The SHEP approach, which has been successful so far in Kenya, may notalways be successful in other conditions. Several factors seem to haveworked behind the SHEP’s performance. In the first place, in terms ofnatural conditions, the target areas were suitable for horticultural
cultivation with respect to rainfall, sunshine, temperature and soil
conditions (Figure 3 and Figure 4). Obviously, this approach would nothave achieved the same results in more adverse conditions.
Figure 3. Precipitation in Africa and
SHEP target areas

Figure 4. Temperature in Africa and
SHEP target areas

Socio-economically, the target area had a high population density
compared with other parts of Kenya or other African countries (Figure 5
and Table 5). A high population density means high intra-regional
consumption, providing the buyers, brokers and processors with anadvantage. It also made public extension services efficient. Highpopulation density allowed buyers, brokers and processors to purchase161

Chapter 5

products in bulk, and the administration to efficiently provide training
opportunities to a large number of farmers. The number and quality ofexisting horticulture-related private enterprises, including brokers, isalso an important factor to help drive the approach. In Kenya, which has
a long horticultural industry history and high potential, private
enterprises are conducting business to varying degrees, and that hashelped the SHEP approach achieve its objectives.
Figure 5. Population density in Africa
and the SHEP target areas

Table 5. Population density of Kenya
and the SHEP target areas
Population Density
Target areas of SHEP

367.9

Kenya

66.4

Kenya National Bureau of Statistics(August 2010) ‘2009 Kenya Populationand Housing Census’

Any project intending to develop horticulture using the activities similar
to those of the SHEP must consider the external conditions mentioned
above and adjust the activities in accordance with the situation of thetarget country/region.
Although it is important to take into consideration the varieties ofexternal conditions under which projects are implemented, it is possible
to apply the gist of the SHEP approach to any project, not necessarily on
horticulture but on other crops and for other purposes like irrigation
management; the series of activities shown above or a part of them andthe underlying philosophy are applicable to a wide range of projects. For
example, in a small-scale irrigation project, the project might select target
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Initiatives of SHEP and SHEP UP- Capacity development of small-scale farmers for increased responsivenessto market needs

counties for small-scale development, using the proposal system used
for the selection of districts implementing the SHEP UP. This process
would ensure that the selected counties will be willing to manage thefacility voluntarily after their initial development.
There are a number of examples of actual agricultural development that
support the validity of the SHEP approach. In Japan, for example, therole of advanced farmers and agricultural cooperatives was significant
in developing clusters of producers to meet the market needs. And
generally, it seems that for a business to succeed there should be a proper
relationship between the state and the private sector including farmers.
Such cases of productive collaboration between the state and the private
sector could be used as a reference for the implementation of the SHEP.
The SHEP UP activities are currently being scaled-up across the country.
They are also expanding across national boundaries: the personnel who
have been trained and qualified in the SHEP and SHEP UP would assist
other African countries as experts. In addition, interested parties inAfrican countries could be invited to Kenya for field visits and training.

8. Summary and Conclusion
The SHEP and SHEP UP are good cases highlighting the importance of
capacity development of stakeholders, including small-scale farmers, in
improving the market access of small-scale farmers in Africa. The
projects helped the farmers to improve their situation by encouraging
them to do various activities including their own market survey. The
projects also bridged the gap between market-related personnel andfarmers, which brought about benefits to both parties: market-related
personnel became able to buy products that met their standards at an
appropriate time, and farmers to obtain profits by supplying suchproducts. In the process, farmers were supported by the administration.
Overall, the project was an attempt to comprehensively address theissues facing horticultural farmers in Kenya. The project helped thefarmers acquire the habit of securing the marketability of the products
before starting to grow a crop, which was a necessary undertaking forthem in view of the low storability of horticultural crops. The project also
introduced gender-related activities, which also significantly
contributed to the improvement in their farming methods.
The SHEP and SHEP UP started with the premise that horticultural
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farming is an industry, no matter how small the scale of the market as awhole or the farming of individual farmers. Based on that premise, theprojects developed a series of activities to encourage the farmers todevelop behavior to respond to the needs of the market, using it both as
the starting point of their strategy as well as their ultimate goal.
As mentioned earlier, many African countries are encouraging their
farmers to transform their current subsistence-oriented agriculture into a
more commercially-oriented venture. However, small-scale farmers in
Africa did not know how to achieve it, though they had been conducting
farming as a business unit based on rational decision making. The
project filled this gap. A remark by the District Agricultural Officer in the
SHEP UP accurately describes the characteristics and effects of theinitiatives of the project: “Although the philosophy of ‘Farming as
Business’ had been repeatedly stated by the Ministry, we did not knowwhat we could do about it. The SHEP UP, however, has taught us how to
implement it at the field level.”
Since the 1990s, many donors have been providing support for value
chain development. Their support had tended to focus on thedownstream part of the supply chain from production through to sales,or the portion close to post-harvest processing and sales. By contrast, theSHEP and SHEP UP provided support to small-scale farmers with every
step from production through to sales, covering various aspects of theactivities in ways that are adoptable by the farmers.
In doing so, the project always put the farmers at the center in designing
its activities and refining its methods. “Does it move the people?” – thiswas the question that was repeatedly asked all through the project. From
this perspective, and referring to the motivation theory, the project
designed its activities in sequences of steps firmly connected with one
another by causal relations and logic. This “people-centered”
perspective has been applied to all activities. For example, whenchoosing a technology to recommend to farmers, the project thoroughly
examined its desirability from the farmers’ point of view: in terms of
their merits, contribution to income gains, and technical sustainability.14
14. One reason why this perspective could be uncompromisingly applied may have been thebusiness model of JICA’s technical cooperation that emphasizes interaction and joint work
among people. In this case, it was the interaction among farmers, Kenyan administrators andJapanese experts that made the “people-centered” approach possible.

164Initiatives of SHEP and SHEP UP- Capacity development of small-scale farmers for increased responsivenessto market needs

However, one may say that in essence there is nothing new in theactivities and approaches established in the SHEP and SHEP UP: forexample, the importance of capacity development through enhanced
motivation had long been emphasized as an essential component oftechnical cooperation; logically coherent project structure is an ABC ofdevelopment project design. It was perhaps the combination of thesebasics that made the SHEP successful in helping small-scalehorticultural farmers to double their income, and the SHEP UP be
adopted as an authorized administrative mechanism.
A combination of existing knowledge can sometimes create something
new. Take, for example, the “iPhone” and “iPod” of Apple Inc. It is said
that the materials and technologies used in these new gadgets were not
newly invented by Apple Inc. or Steve Jobs (Kitani 2012). They have,
however, achieved great success by combining existing materials andtechnologies, and anticipating the needs of the times. In an interview,
Steve Jobs said that an innovation does not necessarily mean inventing a
new thing or new technology, but it comes about by transforming a
combination of existing technologies and ideas into a new technology, a
product or a service (Gallo 2011). In the same vein, probably, the secret ofthe success of the SHEP and SHEP UP lies in the fact that it combined theconcept of capacity development, which is the basic premise of Japanesetechnical cooperation, with careful planning of activities based on thefirm logical sequence of activities and the motivation theory.

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References
Amabile, T. M. 1996. Creativity in context. Boulder: Westview Press.
Deci, E. L., and R. Flaste. 1995. Why we do what we do: Understanding selfmotivation. New York: Putnam’s Sons.
Dolan, C. S., and K. Sutherland. 2010. Gender and Employment in the
Kenya horticulture value chain. Globalisation and Poverty,
Discussion Paper 8.
Ferris, S., et al. 2006. A market facilitator’s guide to participatory agroenterprise development. Kampala, Uganda: CIAT (The International
Centre for Tropical Agriculture).
Gallo, C. 2011. The innovation secrets of Steve Jobs. [In Japanese.] Tokyo:
Nikkei BP.
Japan International Cooperation Agency. [Harada, K.] 2007. Short-term
gender specialist job completion report on the Smallholder Horticulture
Empowerment Project in the Republic of Kenya. Tokyo: JICA.
Japan International Cooperation Agency. 2012. Project completion andevaluation report on Smallholder Horticulture Empowerment Project in
the Republic of Kenya. Tokyo: JICA.
Kitajima, H., and J. Aikawa. 2011. Project trial compliant with marketingin Kenya (2). Japanese Society of Tropical Medicine supp. vol. 109: 95–
96.
Kiya, T. 2012. All success begins with a concept. [In Japanese.] Tokyo:
Diamond.
Republic of Ghana. 2006. Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy:
FASDEP II (2007–2012).
Republic of Ghana. 2011. Medium-Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan:
METASIP (2011–2015).
Republic of Kenya. 2009. Agricultural Sector Development Strategy: ASDS
(2010–2020).
Republic of Rwanda. 2009. Strategic Plan for Agricultural Transformation:
SPAT (2009–2012).
USAID, and Republic of Kenya [Development and Training Services,Inc.]. 2012. Multi-stakeholder evaluation of agriculture and livestock
value chain activities in Kenya. Arlington, VA: Development andTraining Services.
World Bank. 2008. World development report 2008. Washington, D.C.:
World Bank.

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The Provincial Offices of Agriculture became more
active in providing support for district-level
activities. The District Agricultural Officers also
became more active in engaging themselves invarious activities such as the determination ofmodel farmers’ groups.

The Provincial Directors of Agriculture (PDA)
came to feel a stronger sense of responsibility forthe project, by taking the role of selecting theimplementing districts. The District Agricultural
Officers (DAOs) of the selected districts felt proudof their district having been selected for the project,
and their motivation regarding activities wasenhanced.

For the selection of districts to be covered in the
project, a system was introduced to select theimplementing districts based on a set of criteria: thelevel of the understanding of their roles andresponsibilities as well as their motivation to carryout the SHEP Approach and activities. In theprocess, the agricultural potential of the districts
was also taken into consideration.

Training was given to district staff on the concept of District staff came to feel more confident in theirability to implement the project activities, as they
the SHEP Approach and on the series of activities
deepened their understanding of the training
from preparation to implementation.
content. They also became more motivated toward
the project activities. When they passed theexamination and received the certificate ofcompletion, they had a stronger sense of selfcompetence.

2)
Selection of
implementing
district3)
Organizers’
Training of
the Basic
SHEP
Approach

District staff understood their roles and acquired
the techniques to allow them to smoothly
implement the activities.

Behavioral change
By learning the necessary skills for the project, suchas for drafting a proposal, governmental officials
became ready to implement their job (activities)
with a sense of ownership and skill. Extension
officers and farmers’ group representatives shared
the information obtained in the Sensitization
Workshop with other farmer members of the model
farmers’ groups.

Internal change
The stakeholders (participants) of the project cameto feel close to the project, and their sense ofcommitment to the project activities was elevatedbecause they were able to understand what actions
they have to take, and to envision the road ahead tosuccess. People in administration, on their part,
understood that the project was not a separate
enterprise unrelated to the Ministry’s normal
activity. The farmers’ group representatives were
proud of having been selected as the groups’
representatives.

Activity

The first of the activities in the project was called“Project Sensitization Workshops.” Its aim was tomake sure that stakeholders at all levels, fromgovernmental officials to farmers, understand theideas of the project, its activities, and their
responsibilities. This workshop brought forthchanges of various sorts in the participants(stakeholders) of the project,

1)
Project
Sensitization
WorkshopInternal Change and Behavioral Change in each activity of SHEP and SHEP UP

Appendix (See Section 6)

Initiatives of SHEP and SHEP UP- Capacity development of small-scale farmers for increased responsivenessto market needs

167

168
The model farmers’ group representatives shared
the information obtained in the forum with othermembers of the groups. The model farmers’ groups
started to get in contact with businesses and they
became able to obtain more market information.
They acquired bargaining power by gaining agreater understanding of the buyers’ services andthe products handled by them. Their business
opportunities expanded by having more buyers todeal with.
Participants acquired skills for a number ofactivities, especially skills for the implementationof market surveys and action plan making. The
model farmers’ group representatives andextension officers taught the skills acquired during
the training to other members of the model
farmers’ groups. Extension officers actively visitedand provided guidance to model farmers’ groups.
Farmers implemented their gender action plan
aimed at improving horticulture income. Also,
farmers started to manage their household budget
through collaboration of husband and wife.
Extension officers became aware of the importanceof gender-related training and imparted such skills
onto other farmers’ groups.

The farmers’ representatives were proud of having
been selected. Participating farmers and extension
officers became aware that agriculture, andespecially horticulture, is a business with a lot of
potential, and came to have more positive
prospects about their future.

The model farmers’ group representatives were
proud of having been selected. The farmers andextension officers had an opportunity to get toknow one another by receiving training together,while feeling peer-pressures from other farmers’groups and districts. Through exercises during thetraining, they became aware of the challenges they
were facing and felt confident of their abilities toovercome them.
Farmers became aware of gender disparities inhouseholds through enlightenment training andunderstood that they were being an obstacle for theincrease in horticulture income. In addition, they
became conscious of the importance of the conceptof household budgeting and management.
Extension officers recognized the importance ofgender-related training.

An opportunity to exchange business information
was provided. The participants were:representatives of model farmers’ groups (twomales and two females), extension officers incharge of the model farmers’ groups, andstakeholders related to the area’s horticulturalindustry.

This was training focused on market survey andaction plan making. Participants were one maleand one female representative of each model
farmers’ group as well as an extension officer incharge of the group.

This comprised of training focused on theawareness enhancement of such issues as thegender-based division of labor, access to andcontrol of resources, and roles in daily activities bygender, done in a workshop style. Also, a genderaction plan was developed for solving genderrelated problems for increasing income fromhorticulture. And household financial management
training was conducted in order for husbands andwives to jointly manage household earnings.

6)
Joint
Extension
Staff andFarmers
Dual (2)GenderTraining

7)
Genderrelated
training

Extension officers acquired the ability to collectexact data and put the data into practical use.
Farmer members acquired the skills to keep awritten record about their farming. Model farmers’groups made efforts to improve their group inaccordance with the Group Empowerment
Indicators (GEIs).

A survey was conducted to assess the current status Extension officers became aware of the needs forthe implementation of the Baseline Survey. Modelof the model farmers’ groups and their individual
farmers’ groups and farmer members became
members.
aware of the farming status and current problems
facing their groups.

5)
Matchmaking
Forum(FarmBusiness
Linkage
Stakeholder
Forum)

4)
Baseline
SurveyChapter 5

Extension officers acquired the basic techniques forhorticultural production as well as specifictechniques and knowledge that were needed by
farmers. Moreover, they trained model farmers’groups using the distributed extension materials.
In addition, they actively undertook in-fieldtraining sessions for model farmers’ groups.

Farmers learned techniques to solve their problems
and put them into practice. Extension officers
became more active in implementing theirextension work, using the abilities they haveacquired to lead training.

Extension officers became confident in providing
support to farmers and their sense of competence
was enhanced.

Farmers, having learned techniques to solve theproblems they were facing, felt their needs weresatisfied. In addition, farmers came to have astronger sense of trust toward the extension
officers. Extension officers had a sense ofcompetence through being appreciated by thefarmers who participated in the training.

Based on the action plan prepared by model
farmers’ groups, training was provided toextension officers focused on the techniques to
produce target crops that satisfy market needs, andspecific techniques required by model farmers’groups. Readily usable extension materials(“KAMISHIBAI”) were distributed on site.

Extension officers provided guidance to model
farmers’ groups on the techniques they acquired in
9) in line with the action plan.

Farmers, either individually or collectively through Farmers felt satisfied at having been able to sell
their farmers’ groups, sold their products using the their products at a reasonable price, and their senseof self-competence increased, leading to further
sales channels they had become acquainted with.
enhancement of motivation. Even those who could
not earn as much income as they wanted took theresult as a challenge that could be overcome
because they had developed decision making skills
and a sense of ownership.

9)
Training ofextension
officers(Facilitators’
Training for
Farmers’
DemandDriven
Extension)

10)
In-field
Training

11)
Selling the
produceModel farmers’ groups that achieved successful
results continued to practice with similar activities
while constantly improving them. Less successfulmodel farmers’ groups, too, continued theiractivities, learning from their experiences.

Model farmers’ groups acquired the ability to
implement a series of actions and implement
activities in accordance with the action plan.
Extension officers also provided support inaccordance with the action plan.

Model farmers’ groups felt enhanced motivationby having determined the target crops bythemselves. The sense of ownership washeightened by having developed their own action
plan. They came to have a clearer image ofachieving an income increase by envisioning thegoal of marketing their crops at an appropriate
price. Extension officers recognized the usefulnessof this method by having observed the farmers
practice the series of activities.

After completion of the JEF2G Training of 6), eachmodel farmers’ group undertook a market survey,
selected target crops and made action plans withsupport from an extension officer.

8)
Marketsurveys andaction plan
making byfarmers’groups

Initiatives of SHEP and SHEP UP- Capacity development of small-scale farmers for increased responsivenessto market needs

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Part Ⅱ:

Economic and Social Transformation

Chapter 6:
Industrial Development of Africa– JICA’s commitment at TICAD IV and its
follow-up
Go Shimada, Toru Homma, and Hiromichi Murakami

1. Introduction
In the 1960s, there were high hopes for newly independent Sub-SaharanAfrican countries. At that time, Africa was economically better off thanAsia. In 1970, Zambia’s GNI per capita was $432 and that of Malaysia,$392 (at current prices), indicating that the Zambian economy was doing
better than Malaysia’s. In 1968, Gunnar Myrdal published Asian Drama,
which was very pessimistic about the development prospects of Southand South East Asia.
Almost a half century later, however, the situation has reversed andAsian economies have surpassed African economies. In 2011, GNI per
capita was $9,656 for Malaysia and $1,425 for Zambia. This leads to aquestion: What were the reasons for this divergence between the tworegions? This question was one of the issues heavily discussed at TICAD
IV.
After TICAD IV, building on its analytical work concerning the Asian
growth experience and African development, JICA enhanced support ofindustrial development to follow up the meeting. JICA has launched acomprehensive approach to support African industrial development,i.e., combining policy-level support with concrete project assistance toprivate sector development. Such initiative has matched the challenges
and priorities of African development today, as well as the politicalcommitment of African leaders, and has developed into tangible actions
in Ethiopia and Zambia, among others.
This chapter will first discuss the need for the industrial development of173

Chapter 6

Africa in order to achieve its sustainable economic growth, touching
upon issues such as youth unemployment, de-industrialization
processes, diversification of economic structure, and investment climate
improvement. It will then examine strategies to tackle these challenges
and the strong determination of African leaders to industrialize. These
will be followed by three cases of JICA’s cooperation for Africa since
TICAD IV, which include (1) research of the Asian experience andAfrican development, (2) industrial policy dialogue and quality andproductivity improvement (kaizen) in Ethiopia, and (3) support forinvestment promotion and economic diversification (“Triangle of Hope”
approach) in Zambia.

2. Possibilities and Challenges – Necessity of Industrial
Development of Africa
Africa’s long-term prospects for growth are good. The Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU) (2012) has forecast that average growth of theregional economy in 2013-16 will be around 5% a year. The economic
performance of Sub-Saharan Africa, as Figure 1 shows, has been better
than that of most developed countries.
There are challenges, however, to sustain this economic growth. First,
the youth population in Africa (including North Africa) is rapidly
expanding, with close to 200 million people aged between 15 and 24.
Although the expansion means a demographic bonus in the future andwill make Africa a huge market by 2050, it also means that creating jobs
for the younger generation will be a critically important issue.
Otherwise, the dividend could become a curse. This has an important
bearing on political stability as well as inclusive growth in the region.

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Industrial Development of Africa– JICA’s commitment at TICAD IV and its follow-up

Figure 1. Africa’s sustainable GDP growth(Source: International Monetary Fund (2012), World Economic Outlook Database, October 2012)

Second, despite the importance of the industrial sector in creating jobs,
the employment share of this sector in Sub-Saharan Africa was only
10.6% of the overall population in 2009 (ILO 2011). Furthermore, theshare of the manufacturing sector as a percentage of GDP has been
declining since the 1980s (Figure 2) (Page 2012 and Page 2013). Industrial
development is the key to creating more productive jobs, transforming
the economic structure from rural agriculture-based economies to morediversified economies with much larger industrial and service sectors.1
This includes light manufacturing, such as the agro-processing industry,
which adds value to primary products.

1. Benin et al. (2010) estimates that agriculture’s share of GDP fell at an average annual rate of almost
7% between 2003 and 2009.

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Figure 2. Share of manufacturing in GDP(Source: Lin 2012)

Third, to transform the Sub-Saharan African economy, private sector
development needs to be promoted. In a large number of Sub-SaharanAfrican countries, the general operating environment for the private
sector remains difficult, with more complex and expensive regulatory
processes and weaker legal institutions, compared with any otherregions (World Bank and IFC. 2012), and the manufacturing sector is stillweak.
The fourth issue concerns foreign direct investment (FDI) promotion.
Even though Africa has largely been enjoying an investment increasesince 2000, most investment goes into the natural resources or mining
sector. As Table 1 shows, the top 20 African countries that have thelargest inward stock of foreign direct investment in 2011 are mainly
natural resource-rich countries, and just 10 countries count for almost
80% of the investment amount into Africa. This means investment in
Africa is highly concentrated and in specific sectors.

176Industrial Development of Africa– JICA’s commitment at TICAD IV and its follow-up

Table 1. FDI inward stock in 2011, top 20 African countries (mil $)(Source: by this author based on data from UNCTAD World Investment Report 2011 and 2012)

Figure 3 shows that a gradual sectoral shift of investment is taking place.
Investment in the service sector is emerging in particular. Contrary to
popular perception, investment in primary industry is declining in thelong run. This trend, however, does not necessarily mean a decline in thepresence of primary industry. For example, coke and petroleum
products are emerging in the manufacturing sector and many
investments in the manufacturing sector play a supporting role for the
extractive industry. UNCTAD (2012) describes this shift of investment as
a diversification of natural resource-related activities rather than adecline of the extractive industry. This indicates that the industrial
structure still heavily depends on natural resources.
Diversification of economic structure is imperative. First, natural
resource-rich countries must diversify their economies to correct theirover-dependency on their given endowments (natural resource curseand Dutch disease) and promote other sectors with more job creation
effects, such as the manufacturing and service sectors. Resource-poor
countries, on the other hand, need to diversify their economies bydeveloping local industry, adding value to agricultural products (valuechain development).2 To make these strategies work, African countries
also need to diversify investment.

2. The One Village One Product Program (OVOP) could be one of the effective approaches.

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Figure 3. Value of greenfield investments in Africa, by sector, 2003–2011(Source: UNCTAD 2012).

(Billions of dollars)

3. Africa’s Leaders’ Determination to Industrialize – Accelerated
Industrial Development of Africa (AIDA)
Africa’s leaders have shown strong determination to industrialize theircountries. One occasion at which such determination was articulated
was the January 2008 African Union Summit that focused on the
Industrial development of Africa. The African Union (AU) (2008)
adopted the Action Plan for the Accelerated Industrial Development ofAfrica (AIDA). This is the declaration by African leaders for national
development through industrial development. 3“[I]t is Africa’s turn.... No country or region in the world has achieved
prosperity and a decent socio-economic life for its citizens without thedevelopment of a robust industrial sector” (AU 2008:1).
AU (2008) emphasized that the crucial factors for African industrial
development are, among others, general skills, stimulating productivity,
promoting investment, providing infrastructure, technology transfer,and upgrading enterprise operations.
Development partners must increase their support for industrial
development, aligning their support with the African initiative. JICA has
3. In line with such determination of African leaders for industrial development, there havebeen support activities from African academics; the establishment of the African Center for
Economic Transformation (ACET) in 2007 by K.Y. Amoako is an example of the initiatives
from the academic side to support governments with rigorous policy research and advice ontransforming their economies.

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been aligning its assistance to AIDA, and as a part of the AIDA
monitoring process, in 2010, JICA and its partner, the National Graduate
Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), were invited to make presentationsin the Addis Ababa meeting organized by the AU and the Economic
Commission for Africa (ECA) to introduce Japan’s SME development
policy (ECA 2010; Shimada 2010). This illustrates the growing interest in
Asia’s development experience on the part of Africa, especially in termsof Asia’s industrial development.
There are numerous constraints for industrial development, ranging
from lack of basic education to infrastructure. In the next two sections,
we will focus on two aspects. One is how to make realistic strategies forindustrial development. The other is how to promote more FDI,
especially for non-resource-based sectors.

4. Development Strategies toward Industrial Development
At TICAD IV, held when there was a growing interest among African
leaders in the Asian development experience, the JICA ResearchInstitute organized a symposium on “Economic Development in Africa
and the Asian Growth Experience.”4 The symposium aimed to hear
African leaders’ insights on the relevance of the Asian experience inaccelerating economic growth in Africa. The symposium particularly
highlighted the role of the state in promoting economic growth while
maintaining equity through appropriate public policy.5 Professor Stiglitz
emphasized the relevance of the Asian lessons to strike a good balance
between the state and the market (JICA 2008a).
Following TICAD IV and the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit, held in
4 . The symposium featured several eminent African leaders as panelists: H.E. Jakaya Mrisho
Kikwete, President of the United Republic of Tanzania and Chairman of the African Union;
H.E. Meles Zenawi, the late Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia;
H.E. Joachim Alberto Chissano, former president of the Republic of Mozambique; and Dr.
Donald Kaberuka, President of the African Development Bank Group. Professor Joseph
Stiglitz of Columbia University also joined the discussion via a video link. Mrs. Sadako
Ogata, then President of JICA, served as Chairperson.
5 . The main points of the discussion in the symposium were as follows. It was noted that
Africa is certainly growing; but the challenge is how to sustain accelerated growth. For thispurpose, Africa needs to have an appropriate development strategy in which government isgiven more policy space to design a practical strategy that suits the unique situations in
respective African countries.

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Japan just one month after TICAD IV, JICA started several initiatives tofollow up on Japan’s commitment to Africa at the two meetings. One ofthem is research collaboration between the JICA Research Institute andProfessor Stiglitz’s Initiative for Policy Dialogue (IPD) with the latePrime Minister Meles of Ethiopia participating. The research aimed toopen a debate on facilitating economic growth and poverty reduction in
Africa by applying Asia’s development lessons, and also to promote a
more active role of governments in economic policies. The publishedresults of the research called for fresh approaches to learn the lessons
from successes both within and outside Africa, particularly drawing on
the experiences of Asia.6 While they maintain there is no policy packagethat fits all sizes, they argued that at the center of the policy misstep inAfrica was a failure to get the balance right between the state and themarket.7
After a JICA-IDP meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the then Prime
Minister Meles made two requests to JICA (Ohno 2011; Shimada 2010;
Kuwajima 2011). One of these requests was to help formulate industrial
development policy. The other proposal was to support and nurture
private companies. In response to these requests by the Prime Minister,
JICA has taken a comprehensive approach to the issue of industrial
development in Ethiopia.
JICA’s comprehensive approach is based on the assumption that as thefollowing figure shows, industrial development needs a multifaceted
policy and actions (Shimada 2013).

6. The research resulted in the publishing of a book, which was brought out by Oxford
University Press (Noman et al. 2012), titled “Good Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking
Development Strategies.”
7. This book addressed the following important questions: Why has the overall economic
growth performance of Africa been disappointing during the past 50 years? More
importantly, what are the policy options for reversing that trend? What are the possibilities
and policies for Africa?

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Industrial Development of Africa– JICA’s commitment at TICAD IV and its follow-up

Figure 4: Comprehensive approach to industrial development

First, at the policy level, macro-policy such as a five-year development
plan must be in place to set the overall policy goal and plan. A lack ofclear policy and plan on the part of the government generates a sense of
uncertainty among the private sector, resulting in less-than-optimal
investments.
Second, in addition to the five-year development plan, detailed sectorial
policy and SME development policy are needed to provide more precise
guidance for policy implementation.
Third, at the private firm level, human capital accumulation (learning) isessential to improve productivity. There are two types of knowledge thatneed to be learnt. One is new skill/technology, and the other ismanagement capabilities. These two components are inseparable forsuccessful industrial development.
With the above comprehensible approach in mind, in response to thetwo requests from the late Prime Minister Meles, JICA started its
initiatives. Regarding the first request, in partnership with GRIPS
Development Forum, JICA decided to conduct a policy dialogue with
Ethiopian authorities on the country’s industrial development. Hand inhand with the policy dialogue, regarding the second request, JICA
initiated a project on quality and productivity improvement (kaizen),
aiming to improve productivity in the industrial sector in Ethiopia(Shimada 2011; GRIPS Development Forum 2011).

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4.1 Industrial policy dialogue and productivity improvement inEthiopia
The policy dialogue with Ethiopian authorities, headed by the Prime
Minister, covered issues from the policy level to actual implementationon the ground. The dialogue started with “policy visions,” which is an
overall long-term policy guidance. The visions included Agricultural
Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) and Democratic
Developmentalism (DD), which are the guiding principles that theEthiopian government has been adhering to. Discussions then moved
toward the five-year development plan, “the Plan for Accelerated andSustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) (2005-2009),” andculminated in a debate over the new five-year plan, “the Growth andTransformation Plan (GTP) 2010/11-2014/15.” Also discussed weresector policies such as those for basic metals and engineering industries.
The sector survey provided a useful reference in the design of anindustrial master plan.
The dialogue tried to fill in the gap in terms of the mindset andmethodology of industrial policy making, mostly based on international
comparison of good practices in Asia such as Japan, the Asian Tigers,
and ASEAN. It was pointed out that self-study, learning from neighbors,and trial and error are the factors commonly found in the Asianexperience. Further, it was argued that simply copying specific policies
of an Asian country would not be a solution. The understanding wasthat there is a set of policy menus for industrial policy, and specificpolicies should be selected and adjusted to the unique conditions of eachcountry, creating a climate of collaboration for Private-Public
Partnership (PPP) (Ohno, K. 2011 and 2012).
Another factor emphasized as important was the coordination among
government ministries in formulating industrial policy (Ohno, I. 2011).
This coordination was the key to the success of Asian countries. In Asia,
the functioning coordination mechanism among the government
bureaucracy as well as with the private sector helped to makedevelopment policy making transparent and accountable, and to avoid
the politicization of the process.
Based on the policy dialogue, the GTP expanded the policy scope toinclude the promotion of import-substitution industries. The new Microand Small Enterprise (MSE) Development Strategy also encourages the182Industrial Development of Africa– JICA’s commitment at TICAD IV and its follow-up

introduction of the kaizen concept.8
4.2 Quality and productivity improvement (kaizen)
The kaizen project started in October 2009, together with the policy
dialogue.9 Kaizen is a Japanese word that in this context refers to“continuous improvement” of productivity and quality without
additional cost, promoted in a participatory process and through abottom-up approach. Various instruments are used, such as the working
environment improvement methodology called “5S”: Seiri (orderliness),
Seiton (tidiness), Seiketsu (cleanliness), Seisou (cleaning up), and Shitsuke(discipline); these terms are normally referred to in English as Sort, Set in
Order, Shine, Standardize, and Sustain.
Japan itself introduced productivity and quality improvement in 1955 at
the start of the country’s era of rapid economic growth, learning from thebusiness management tools from the United States. This management
practice method has spread among Japanese companies operating inJapan and abroad. JICA has also offered assistance to spread the practiceof kaizen to many developing countries in Asia. In 1983, JICA started
cooperation with Singapore’s National Productivity Board (NPB), which
evolved into the present SPRING-Singapore. After the success of the
project, cooperation expanded to Thailand, the Philippines, Hungary,Brazil, Tunisia and Ethiopia, among others (Ueda 2009).
In terms of sustainable private sector development, the introduction ofmanagement tools is critical. Otsuka and Sonobe (2011) explain thisprocess as follows (see Figure 5): once a new business is established, thepioneer receives sizable profits. The success of the pioneer firms will
attract imitators to the industry, and in this way an industrial cluster isformed. During the early period when profits are reasonably high,entrepreneurs are not interested in introducing new ideas andknowledge. However, with more companies entering the industry,
profitability of the firms starts to decrease. Without introducing new
ideas and knowledge to improve operations, especially management
tools, the profitability of many firms will decrease, making it impossible
for them to continue business, and as a result, the number of companies
8. In a meeting, the late Prime Minister evaluated the JICA-GRIPS exercise as “filling theknowledge gap.”
9. Before JICA’s initial technical assistance, the Kaizen Unit was created in the then Ministryof Trade and Industry (now the Ministry of Industry), and local kaizen leaders were devoting
themselves to kaizen promotion.

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will decrease (as shown by the dotted line in Figure 5). Many empiricalstudies have proven that management skill improvement is the key forcluster development (Sonobe and Otsuka 2011; Sonobe et al. 2011). This
is why the Government of Ethiopia and JICA-GRIPS agreed to start
introducing kaizen as a component of the country’s industrial
development.
Figure 5. An illustration of industrial cluster development patterns in terms ofchanging profitability and the number of firms.

(Source: Otsuka and Sonobe 2011)

To provide guidance on the kaizen approach, a team comprising JICA
and Ethiopian experts visited a total of 30 selected private
manufacturing companies, each of which received 10 consultation visitsfrom the team. The team’s method was not to give readily available
solutions to the problems that the companies had, but to ask themquestions on what the companies needed to think about to improve theiroperations. After the 10 consultations, extending over a half-year, as
Table 2 shows, the 30 firms had obtained an average benefit of Ethiopian
Birr (ETB) 500,000 (equivalent to around $30,030). Given that the average
number of employees was 402 per company, the pilot project generated abenefit of ETB 1,240 ($74.5) per head, which almost equaled theprevailing gross monthly wage ($75). Various quantitative data on
successful cases are shown in Table 2. The highest benefit to a single
company was ETB 3.25 million, around $195,195.

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Industrial Development of Africa– JICA’s commitment at TICAD IV and its follow-up

Table 2: Quantitatively measured results from the kaizen pilot project
Company

Notable results

Overall

Average quantitative benefit of ETB 500,000 ($30,030)
per company.
Given that the average number of employees is 402
per company, the average benefit per head is ETB
1,240 ($74.5), which is comparable to the prevailinggross monthly wage ($75).

Company A (Metal)

Recovered ETB 118,995 ($7,146) as additional value.
Per-head value is ETB 1,000 ($60).

Company B (Metal)

Reduced lead time from two weeks to one week.

Company C (Textile)

Halved time wasted by 780 min./month for a certain
process and 624 min. for another process.

Company D (Chemical) Reduced overproduction waste by 50%.
Increased motion and movement by 100%.
Company E (Agro)

Additional production of 12,000 liters/day, which
accounted for ETB 204,000 ($12,252)

Company F (Metal)

Regained reusable materials worth ETB 2,400,000($144,144), compared to company capital of ETB
770,000 ($46,246). Per-head regain is ETB 58,500($3,513).

Company G (Agro)Identified, repaired, and reused machinery andequipment worth ETB 3,250,000 ($195,195), compared
to company capital of ETB 20,000,000 ($1,201,201).
Per-head benefit is ETB 9,420 ($566).

(Source: By this author)

Figure 6 shows pictures taken before and after the project. The top-left
pictures show the disorganized stock conditions before kaizen, and thepictures on the right, the conditions after kaizen. Everything became
easier for factory workers to manage. They no longer needed to waste
time in looking for misplaced materials. The bottom pictures show asmall improvement at a metals factory, where they simply installed atable. With this table, workers could do away with heavy lifting work,
thus reducing wasted time and effort.

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Figure 6: Visual comparison of before and after the pilot project(Source: By this author)

There are also challenges. The pace of progress is different among
companies participating in the kaizen movement. The key lies in thecorporate mindset. Workers should actively participate in improving
productivity and directors have to listen to the workers’ voices.
Leadership is indispensable to thoroughly apply such a working
method.
It must be highlighted that this success has been brought about by the
initiatives of Ethiopian experts, who work enthusiastically with factory
workers at private companies to improve their operations. This
management skill was new to the Ethiopian experts before the project,
but after the project, six out of nine experts who worked for the project
became classified as consultants, authorized as competent in providing
consultancy services, and three experts were classified as assistantconsultants.
The initial project successfully ended in June 2011, including the kaizen
dissemination plan. Encouraged by this achievement, the Ethiopian
Government, in October 2011, established the Ethiopian Kaizen Institute(EKI), under the Ministry of Industry, with 65 technical staff. The
institute is the world’s first ever governmental institute that has the termkaizen in its name. The Ethiopian Government and JICA began the Phase
2 Kaizen Project in November 2011 for capacity building of EKI and186

Industrial Development of Africa– JICA’s commitment at TICAD IV and its follow-up

related organizations in order to disseminate kaizen throughout thecountry. This project is expected to contribute to establishing a system todisseminate kaizen in Ethiopia in a sustainable manner.
JICA’s cooperation to support kaizen in Ethiopia was the first case of its
kind in Sub-Saharan Africa. The experience and the results of this projectwill form a useful basis for further projects in other African countries in
the future.
Though not a magic wand, kaizen could be a useful method that willcontribute to private sector development in Africa; if appropriately
introduced, it will bring about changes in motivation and consciousness
and help the acquisition and/or creation of knowledge and skills in theprocess for effective production and quality management.
To support the kaizen approach in other countries in Africa, it is crucial tosecure an empirical base to provide a rationale for the conditions underwhich the approach will be functional and effective, and to identify what
constraints should be overcome. From such a point of view, a greater
emphasis on scientific analysis of individual projects with appropriate
data is warranted.

5. Investment Promotion and Diversification through “Triangleof Hope” Approach in Zambia
Turning now to investment promotion and diversification, which areother important factors for economic transformation, we would like topresent a case study from Zambia. Zambia has been struggling to put an
end to its over-reliance on mineral resources and to diversify its
economy, as suggested in the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP)
formulated in 2011. The promotion of FDI in various sectors is
considered one of its solutions. Zambia has been addressing this issue,
and JICA has been supporting the comprehensive approach towards
investment promotion, through the project called “Triangle of Hope
(TOH),” that contributes to economic diversification.10 The “triangle”
represents a tripartite combination of (1) government will, (2)streamlining public administration, and (3) private sector participation.
The idea was devised by Dato’ J. Jegathesan, who was the former
10. JICA’s assistance was first initiated as the “Project for Triangle of Hope, Strategic Action
Initiative for Economic Development (TOH-SAIED)” (referred to as the Phase 1 Project)
implemented from 2006 to 2009. Then the Phase 2 Project called the “Zambia Investment
Promotion Project – Triangle of Hope – (ZIPP –ToH)” followed from 2009 until 2012.

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Deputy Head of the Malaysian Industrial Development Agency (MIDA)
and JICA consultant for the project.11
Impacts and contributions of the project are summarized as follows(JICA 2012b; Homma 2013). First, the project successfully brought 9
investment projects to Zambia. (One of the investments is worth over$200 million. These investments include Africa’s first mobile phonefactory; a large-scale university invested in by Malaysian investors; anda hospital project invested in by an Indian medical enterprise group.)
Second, the project diversified investment from the mining sector
towards non-traditional sectors such as education and health. Third, theproject contributed to improvement of the Doing Business environment.
For example, Zambia was identified as the world’s 7th top reformer inDoing Business 2011 (World Bank and IFC 2010). Fourth, the projectcontributed to a dramatic increase of FDI inflow (FDI inflow for 2011
became 4 times larger than that of 2006). Last but not least, the project
enhanced the capacity of the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) as aninvestment promotion agency and improved services for investors.12
To achieve these results, a strong government will was initiated by thelate President Dr. Levy Patrick Mwanawasa. Under his direction, 12
taskforces were formulated and 12 Action Agendas were prepared fordevelopment of 12 diversified areas.13
Throughout its cooperation period, the project focused on capacity
building by the Zambian Government, in particular ZDA. The capacity
building streamlined public administration on investment approval byreforming the investment application process, preparing manuals/
guidelines, establishing one-stop shops, monitoring processes by tracer
studies and others. It also aimed at promotional activities such as
11. MIDA was renamed as the Malaysian Investment Development Authority in 2011.
12. ZDA was established under Zambia’s Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry bymerging five governmental agencies, namely Zambia Privatisation Agency, Zambia
Investment Centre, Export Board of Zambia, Zambia Export Processing Zones Authority andthe Small Enterprises Development Board. Although the ZDA has multiple functions, thebasic function to promote inward FDI as the investment promotion agency (IPA) does not
significantly differ from other countries’ IPAs which are exclusively established forinvestment promotion purposes.
13. The twelve areas are as follows: education, medical and health, tourism, agriculture,
cotton, banking and finance, air cargo hubs and inland ports, government streamlining,
information and communication technology (ICT), Multi Facility Economic Zone (MFEZ),
mining and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME).

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Industrial Development of Africa– JICA’s commitment at TICAD IV and its follow-up

dispatching targeted investment promotion missions for Malaysia,
India, South Africa and Japan and preparing promotional materials suchas guidebooks, websites and sector/project profiles. The missions weresometimes implemented in the form of public-private joint missions.
These activities contributed to further private sector participation in
investment in Zambia even in the sectors which were not traditionallyconsidered to be associated with private investment.
The TOH approach shows the importance of integrated efforts at thepolicy making level and implementation level to promote investments.
This is an innovative approach and the difference from prior efforts inthis area. It is also suggested that the TOH approach, including
investment diversification, could serve as one of the solutions for
African natural resource-rich countries which need economic
diversification.

6. Ways forward
As we have seen, the keys to sustainable economic growth in Africa areindustrial development (job creation), doing business improvement, andinvestment diversification. This chapter examined strategies to tackle
these challenges and African initiatives for industrial development,
AIDA, taking up cases of JICA’s cooperation for Africa, which include(1) the analytical work of the Asian experience and African
development, (2) industrial policy dialogue and quality andproductivity improvement (kaizen) in Ethiopia, and (3) support forinvestment promotion and economic diversification (“Triangle of Hope”
approach) in Zambia. These results of the projects designed andimplemented as follow-up activities after TICAD IV imply that theseapproaches should be scaled up after TICAD V in accordance with
AIDA. The international community is expected to support this African
initiative.
The subsequent chapters will discuss the role of infrastructure. Without
soft and hard infrastructure, such as Special Economic Zones (SEZ),
roads, bridges, electricity and operational systems for industrial
promotion, it is impossible to industrialize. Infrastructure is also very
important to encourage the private sector, including Japanesecompanies, to invest more in Africa. In the process of the development of189

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Asia, this ODA-FDI linkage worked very well in countries such as
Thailand and Vietnam.

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ECA. 2010. Joint ECA/AUC/UNIDO experts group meeting on theimplementation strategy for the Accelerated Industrial
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Ethiopia.
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purojekuto shuryoji hyoka chosa [Report on the terminal
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Industrial Development of Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
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nid=753.

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Chapter 7:
Policy Challenges for Infrastructure
Development in Africa - The way forward forJapan’s Official Development Assistance(ODA)
Yasuo Fujita, Ippei Tsuruga and Asami Takeda

This chapter examines how Japan’s ODA can more effectively assist
Africa’s infrastructure development in consideration of acomprehensive study by the donor consortium. It recommends thatJapan should consider, as short-term measures, sectoral reallocation of
its assistance, financial assistance for maintenance, and management
reform of public utilities, while supporting various reforms from a longterm perspective.

1. Introduction
Infrastructure1 development in Africa is generally lagging behind otherparts of the world, though there are variations between countries andsectors (see Section 2), hampering economic growth2 and poverty
reduction (for example, Calderón and Servén 2010). One of the serious
problems was that the real picture of infrastructure in African countries
could not be seen due to lack of data, preventing policy interventions
and investment.
The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA)3 conducted Africa
infrastructure country diagnostic studies and published a flagshipreport titled Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation in late 2009
1. In this chapter, infrastructure includes: power; transport (roads, seaports, airports, andrailways; water supply and sanitation; information and communication technology (ICT);and irrigation.
2. As pointed out in Chapter 6, infrastructure development would promote economic growththrough industrial development while removing the cost penalties of economic activities.
3. ICA was established in 2005, following the G8 Gleneagles summit at which assistance for
Africa was one of the main agenda topics. For details of ICA, see http://www.icafrica.org/
en/

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Chapter 7(hereinafter referred to as AFD-WB 2009). The values of this report
include that current status and problems are analyzed throughquantitative data; that infrastructure needs and funding gaps are
estimated by sector and country type; and that policy interventions areprioritized through cost-benefit analyses. At the same time, however, it
reveals that Africa’s infrastructure challenges are overwhelming andcomplex, and require sustained and concerted efforts by Africancountries, regional organizations, and development partners.4
This chapter aims to discuss what Japan’s ODA should place its
emphasis among recommendations of AFD-WB 2009 in donor
community’s concerted efforts, in order to effectively contribute toaddress Africa’s infrastructure challenges.5 This exercise is useful
because infrastructure has always been one of the priority areas forJapan’s assistance for Africa to boost the region’s economic growth as in
the TICAD IV Yokohama Action Plan 2008, and Japan has provided
financial resources and technical assistance.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the current
status of infrastructure development through available statistics; Section
3 reviews Japan’s recent ODA for infrastructure in Africa; Section 4
discusses the future direction of Japan’s ODA; and Section 5 is theconclusion.

2. Overview of Infrastructure Development in Africa

2.1 Current infrastructure in Africa
Table 1 shows the current status of infrastructure development in Africa
based on available statistics such as World Development Indicators(WDI) of the World Bank, and the Global Competitive Index (GCI) of theWorld Economic Forum (WEF). The countries are categorized into fivegroups6 – North Africa, middle income countries, oil exporting
4. Development partners here include non-traditional funders such as China, Korea. Figure 2
shows their great contribution to infrastructure development.
5. Therefore, this chapter focuses only on how Japan’s ODA can better meet Africa’s
infrastructure development needs; and does not directly consider the interests of Japaneseindustries in infrastructure business in Africa.
6. This chapter adopts the categorization of countries of IMF 2011, 80, which is a little different
from AFD-WB 2009, 51. Fragile countries are low-income countries that face particularly
severe development challenges, such as weak governance, limited administrative capacity,
violence, or the legacy of conflict (AFD-WB 2009, 51).

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countries, low-income nonfragile countries, and low-income fragile
countries7 - because they are different in infrastructure development andchallenges. This section basically focuses on sub-Saharan African (SSA)
countries because the quality and quantity of infrastructure in North
Africa and small, middle-income island countries, including Mauritius
and Seychelles, are relatively higher in almost all the sectors. As shownin Figures A1 to A6, there is generally a positive correlation between
infrastructure development and GDP per capita, but, the degree ofcorrelations is different across infrastructure sectors.8 This suggests thatthe countries can improve some infrastructure regardless their income
levels. The current situation of Africa’s infrastructure by sector is asfollows:
Power: Power is by far Africa’s largest infrastructure challenge, with 30
countries facing regular power shortages (AFD-WB 2009, 5) and morethan half of the population having no access to electricity except inNorth Africa, Mauritius and South Africa. SSA countries have low ratesof electrification – the average rate for SSA countries is only 32%,
compared to the average of low and middle income countries (LMIC)
throughout the world, which is 74%. As for electricity consumption percapita, the average of SSA countries is only 517kWh, which issubstantially lower than the world LMIC average (1,527kWh), with the
exception of South Africa (4,532kWh) and Libya (4,170kWh).
Furthermore, SSA countries’ rate of electric power transmission anddistribution loss9 (11.2%) is almost the same as the world LMIC average(11.1%). The loss is higher in the whole of the African region particularly
in middle-income (35%) and oil-exporting countries (24%), indicating
operating inefficiency of power utilities.
Transport: The average roads pavement ratio in SSA countries is only
19% compared with the world LMIC average of 45%. The road pavement
ratio in oil-exporting countries is very low. In addition, regarding roaddensity (total road length per land area), the figures in many Africancountries are lower than the world LIMC average (21.5 km/100km2). It
is urgent that African governments should address the poor condition
7. Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries are subdivided to the latter four groups.
8. The road pavement ratio and the electricity power consumption per capita are morecorrelated with per capita income. The electricity power consumption and distribution
losses, improved access to water sources, agriculture irrigation land, and mobile
subscription per 100 are less correlated with per capita income. (Figures A1 to A6)
9. Measured in percentage of electricity power output (World Bank.2012a)

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and low density of their road networks. In addition, to keep the road
network in good condition, maintenance is another challenging task inAfrica since it requires huge investment. Infrastructure development ofother transport modes such as airports, seaports and railways in Africa
face same challenges and ineffective linkage between different transportmodes, declining air connectivity, poorly equipped ports and aging rail
networks are key problems facing Africa’s transport system (AFD-WB
2009, 233).
Water supply and sanitation (WSS): Only 61% of SSA countries’
population has access to safe drinking water, which is below the world
LMIC average of 86% and MDG’s target rate of 75% by 2015. The rates
are below 50% in Somalia, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of theCongo, Madagascar, Mozambique and Niger. Urban and ruraldisparities are also prominent – more than half of the rural population
has no access to safe water in SSA countries. Access to adequate
sanitation is even worse. Only 30% of the population in SSA countries
lives in households with access to adequate sanitation and the rate islower in rural areas. There are 12 low-income countries where more than
90% of the population has no access to adequate sanitation in rural areas.
Irrigation: While more than two-thirds of Africans rely on agriculture fora living, the average amount of arable land developed for irrigation is
only 6% for a selected 28 African countries, compared with 39% in Asiaand nearly 30% in Latin American countries (Bluffstone and Kohlin 2011,6). Low levels of irrigation mean that few SSA countries can sustain yield
increases, even with abundant rainfall (UNDP 2012). The amount in
Egypt is exceptionally high (99.7%) since Egypt’s agriculture depends
entirely on irrigation. Further improvement is an urgent requirement forsustainable food production in Africa.
Information and communication technology (ICT): Approximately
three-quarters of the world’s inhabitants have access to mobile phones(World Bank 2012b, 23). The number of mobile subscriptions in use
worldwide has grown from 1 billion in 2000 to over 6 billion in 2012, of
which nearly 5 billion are in developing countries (ibid.). This trend isalso true for some African countries. The number of mobile
subscriptions per 100 people has increased dramatically since 2000; in
2010, North Africa (111 subscriptions) and some middle-income
countries exceeded the world average (78 subscriptions). As for the
penetration of telephone lines and the Internet, Africa still has low rates
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especially in oil-exporting countries and low-income countries,
suggesting the digital divide is a critical issue. It is still essential for
African governments to develop the telecommunications sector.
2.2 Infrastructure by country groups
The infrastructure challenge differs among country type (Table 1). North
Africa showed the highest level of infrastructure in quality and quantity
in all the sectors. However, its electricity consumption per capita is stillinsufficient (average 1,751kWh per capita) compared with the world
average (2,807kWh), though it exceeds the world LMIC average (1,527
kWh). As for the middle income countries in Africa, further
improvement in both quality and quantity in the energy sector isnecessary; and particularly, the rate of electric power transmission andloss is the highest among all the country groups (35%), due to the highfigure for Botswana (79%).
Recent economic growth in Africa is attributed to price hike in energy
and mineral resources10 and oil exporting countries play a great role ineconomic growth of Africa. However, infrastructure development in oil
exporting countries is stagnant, despite their higher GDP per capita andabundant natural resources revenue.11 In particular, the level ofinfrastructure stock and quality in the transport sector are lower than
low income countries. In addition, oil-exporting countries significantly
lag in terms of quantity and quality in electricity services. Therefore,
considering how to allocate additional fiscal resources from natural
resources to infrastructure effectively (particularly in transport andenergy sector) is urgent.
The low income African countries are facing a severe situation in all thesectors of infrastructure. The available data shows that there is no
significant difference in infrastructure between fragile and non-fragile
countries. In particular, power is the largest infrastructure challenge,
especially in non-fragile countries (average rate of access to electricity is
only 23% and electricity consumption per capita is the lowest, 240kWh),and both quantity expansion and quality improvement are urgent
requirements.

10. Refer to Introduction of this report.
11. This is because they used most of their revenue from oil exports for debt repayment (AFDWB 2009, 76).

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Table 1. Infrastructure in African countries

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Chapter 7

2.3 Infrastructure and a country’s competitiveness
It is useful to see the perception of private businesses regarding
infrastructure as one of the key components to a country’s
competitiveness. WEF 201112 shows that almost all African countries areassessed as inferior to the world average in terms of quality except
Tunisia, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Gambia and Rwanda (Figure1). Poor infrastructure quality in oil-exporting countries is noticeable
mainly due to the poor reliability of the electricity supply. The
infrastructure index ranking shows 24 out of 33 African countries areranked below 100 out of 142 surveyed countries. It is obvious that thepoor infrastructure quality of SSA countries negatively affects acountry’s global competitiveness.
Figure 1. Infrastructure quality of selected African countries

12. WEF 2011 covers 33 African countries.

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2.4 Infrastructure spending needs and funding and efficiency gaps
Infrastructure of all sectors is substantially underdeveloped in Africa,
though variations exist between countries and sectors. Special attention
should be paid to the power sector (by sector), and to the low income
countries (by country groups). According to AFD-WB 2009, the cost ofaddressing Africa’s infrastructure needs for 2006 through 2015 amounts
to US$93 billion a year, about one third of which is for maintenance(Table 2).
Africa’s annual infrastructure spending (2001 to 2006)13 is estimated at
US$45.3 billion. 66% of the overall spending is financed by the domestic
public sector, and the rest, 34%, (US$15.5 billion) is from externalsources, where the share of ODA is 7.9%, non-OECD financiers 5.5% andprivate sector 20.7% (AFD-WB 2009, 8-9).
Given infrastructure annual spending needs (US$93.3 billion) and theannual existing spending (US$45.3 billion), the annual financial gap isestimated at US$48 billion, comprising of an efficiency gap (US$17
billion) and funding gap (US$31 billion). Electricity is the sector most in
need of additional funding, followed by WSS and irrigation. These havean aggregate need of US$23 billion while ICT and transport receive morethan their needs (Table 2).
Table 2. Africa’s infrastructure spending needs, and funding andefficiency gaps, 2006-1514

13. The study identifies four major financial sources including: domestic public sector, ODA
from OECD member countries, non-OECD countries like China, India and the Arab states,and private sector; and sum up their spending on the capital investment and O&M inelectricity, ICT, irrigation, transport, water supply and sanitation and cross-sector projects(AFD-WB 2009, 66-67).
14. AFD-WB 2009 (66-67) identifies four major financial sources including: domestic public
sector, ODA from OECD member countries, non-OECD countries like China, India and theArab states, and private sector; and sum up their spending on the capital investment andO&M in electricity, ICT, irrigation, transport, water supply and sanitation and cross-sector
projects.

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3. Trend of Financial Resources for Infrastructure and Japan’s Aid

3.1 Infrastructure financing source and gap
In response to financial needs, the financial commitment of externalsources rapidly increased from 2005 to 2010 (ICA 2011, 20). In addition,
the share of the power sector, whose financial gap is the largest among
the sectors (Table 2), accounted for 44% in 2010 (ICA2011, 22). The shareof Japan’s ODA in 2010 was 5% of total commitments by externalsources, or 10% of commitments by ICA members (Figure 2). This
increasing trend regarding Japan’s commitment is a recent phenomenon
because the high indebtedness of African countries prevented loan
assistance until 2005, and political instability and conflicts hampered
new infrastructure investment. Japan has waived debt repayments for
African countries under the international debt relieve initiatives,15 andcommenced the Enhanced Private Sector Assistance for Africa (EPSA)
initiative in 2005, pledging US$1 billion in ODA loans to Africa for five
years. TICAD IV in 2008 has also contributed to speed up infrastructureassistance.
Figure 2. ICA Members Financial Support for African Infrastructure

3.2 Japan’s infrastructure assistance
A more detailed picture of Japan’s ODA for Africa’s infrastructure isreviewed through the original database of yen loans and grants for 2005
15. For Africa, Japan waived debt repayments amounting to JPY 765.3 billion (ODA debt JPY
440.2 billion and non-ODA JPY 325.1 billion) from 2003 to 2011 (MOFAJ 2011).

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to 2011, and technical cooperation (TC) for 2005 to 2010 constructed fromthe JICA project database.16 The data for grants or loans is based oncommitments in the period (as of the signing of the Exchange of Notes),
while that of TC is on an actual disbursement basis.17 The loans andgrants assistance is usually provided for new capital investment or
rehabilitation projects; in addition, the loan projects often include thecapacity building components of executing agencies. Japan’s TC is
provided as grants, and includes project formulation studies, thedispatch of experts, training of recipient government officials, andprovision of equipment.
3.2.1 Japan’s loans and grants assistanceJapan’s ODA loans/grants average annual commitment (2005-2011) for
Africa’s infrastructure amounts to Yen 77.8 billion (65%) out of the total
annual commitment of Yen 119.0 billion18 (Table 3). Out of this annual
average commitment for infrastructure, North Africa receives Yen 30.2
billion (39%) and SSA countries receive Yen 47.5 billion (61%). As for the
proportion between loans and grants, while loans accounts for 96% inNorth Africa, in SSA countries the loan/grant proportion is almost equal(loans 52% and grants 48%), reflecting the different income levels andborrowing capacity of the two groups (Table A2, Figure 3).
Regarding the sectoral breakdown (Africa total), transport has thelargest share (38%), followed by power (32%) and WSS (23%). In North
Africa, power is the largest (37%), followed by WSS (31%) and transport(24%). In SSA countries, transport represents a much higher share (46%),
followed by power (29%) and WSS (19%) (Table A2, Figure 4).

16. Although the JICA project database covers all ODA loan projects, it does not cover all
grants and TC projects. Nevertheless, it is sufficient to review the overall picture of Japan’s
grants and TC assistance because of the substantial coverage of the JICA database.
17. The data is on a calendar year basis. The sectoral category is in accordance with that ofOECD-DAC. Since TC projects are basically on a shorter implementation period, the time lagof commitment and disbursement is generally small.
18. The total commitments include ODA loans amounting to JPY 7.4 billion (annual average
2005-2011) to African Development Bank (AfDB) for private sector -lending programs, whichcannot be broken down to individual infrastructure sectors.

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Table 3. Japan’s Financial Commitment Regarding Africa’s Infrastructure

Figure 3. Modality Share of Japan’s Financial Commitment Regarding Africa’s
Infrastructure

Source: Compiled by author from JICA project database

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Policy Challenges for Infrastructure Development in Africa - The way
forward for Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA)

Figure 4. Sectoral Share of Japan’s Financial Commitment Regarding Africa’s
Infrastructure

Source: Compiled by author from JICA project database

Figure 5. Sectoral Trend of Japan’s Financial Commitment Regarding
Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: Compiled by author from JICA project database207

Chapter 7

We will review Japan’s ODA loans/grants regarding infrastructure in
SSA countries in more detail. While the annual commitments of loans/grants noticeably fluctuate, the commitment to the power sector in 2010
was quite high (Figure 5). This increase was because several projectloans, which had been under preparation, were provided in this single
year. Within the transport sector, road and bridge projects account for
75%, while seaports receive 25%. As for the proportion of loans andgrants, it is almost equal in transport; 77% of the commitment in power
is by loans; and WSS is mostly funded by grants (89%). This difference ofloan/grant proportion by sector is mainly due to the different economic
and financial returns of these sectors because both African countries andJapan prefer using grants to lower return projects.
Within SSA countries, the eastern Africa region (11 countries) accounts
for 61%, followed by the southern African region comprising 15
countries (22%). This is because the western and central Africancountries include more fragile states and oil producing countries. As tothe country’s income categories, the low-income non-fragile countries(15 countries) received 77%, and the shares of the other three categories
are between 7% and 8%. The low income non-fragile states are the main
target of infrastructure assistance because of their income levels andabsorption capacity. Low-income fragile states received a small share of
infrastructure assistance (7%), which is for transport and WSS funded
only by grants, because of serious constraints owing to peace and orderissues, debt sustainability, and aid absorption capacity.
3.2.2 Japan’s technical cooperation (TC)The annual average disbursement of TC (2005-2010) amounts to Yen 30.4
billion, of which 20% is for infrastructure, and 80% is for noninfrastructure (Table 4). This is in sharp contrast to the loan/grantassistance which is used for upfront infrastructure investment. The
sectoral breakdown of TC for infrastructure shows another contrast withthe loan/grant assistance. WSS has the largest share (36%), followed bytransport (27%) and irrigation (18%); and far less input into power (9%).
Geographically, 84% of TC goes to SSA countries, so, the sectoral
breakdown of SSA countries is almost the same as that of the African
total as mentioned above. Within SSA countries, the share for western
Africa is higher in TC (21%) than in loans/grants (14%) (Table A3).
Distribution among the income groups is dominated by the low income
non-fragile states (75%), and the other groups’ shares are between 6 and208

Policy Challenges for Infrastructure Development in Africa - The way
forward for Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA)

10%, which is almost the same pattern as that for loan/grant assistance.
Table 4. Japan’s Technical Cooperation Regarding Africa’s Infrastructure

Figure 6. Sectoral Share of Japan’s Technical Cooperation Regarding Africa’s
Infrastructure

Source: Compiled by author from JICA project database

It is natural that the sectoral breakdown of TC does not coincide withthat of loan/grant assistance, because there are TC projects which areclosely related to investment projects and those which are not, as
follows:➢➢ TC is closely related to capital investment supported by loans/grants: pre-investment studies, capacity building of executing
agencies, dispatch of experts, etc.
➢➢ When it is premature or difficult to implement investment projects
due to economic and/or capacity constraints of countries, TC is
provided mainly for efficiency improvement, for training ofgovernment officials, project identification, master planning,209

Chapter 7

provision of equipment, etc.
However, it may be reasonable to reallocate the TC resources to fulfill theefficiency gaps of Africa, which is one of the targets of assistance throughTC, since the efficiency gaps of infrastructure is clearly estimated by
AFD-WB 2009. As Table 2 shows, the efficiency gap is the largest in the
power sector (US$6 billion annually), followed by transport and WSS,
while the allocation of Japan’s TC is weighted on WSS, transport andirrigation in order.
Figure 7. Sectoral Trend of Japan’s Technical Cooperation Regarding
Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: Compiled by author from JICA project database

3.3 Policy implications
Japan’s recent allocation of loan/grant assistance does not appear tomatch the spending needs or funding gap across the infrastructure
sectors as in Table 2. Japan’s loan and grant assistance for investment
purposes is dominated by the transport sector, which is estimated tohave a financial surplus by the AFD-WB 2009. Japan’s TC, which can
improve efficiency and facilitate infrastructure investment throughcapacity development and project preparation, is provided for the WSS(36%) and transport (27%) sectors in SSA countries. As seen in Table 2,
the power sector in Africa has the largest funding and efficiency gaps
among the sectors. Since private investment is playing a major role in the
power sector (ICA2011), it does not necessarily mean that public funds,
including Japan’s ODA, should be used for capital investment in power
projects. In addition, Japan’s ODA has strengths and emphasis in certain
sectors, including WSS (particularly in TC) and transport (both in loans/
210Policy Challenges for Infrastructure Development in Africa - The way
forward for Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA)

grants and TC). However, it would be appropriate to consider how
Japan’s ODA – loans, grants, and TC – can better contribute to improve
infrastructure investment in needy sectors such as power, and to more
effectively remove infrastructure inefficiencies.
4. Policy Challenges Regarding Infrastructure Development in Africa
and Future Direction of Japan’s ODA
It appears that there is room for Japan’s ODA to take more into accountthe recommendations of the AFD-WB 2009 (Box) for promoting
infrastructure development in Africa. The most important characteristicof the recommendations of AFD-WB 2009 is the emphasis on closing
efficiency gaps in Africa’s infrastructure, though most of therecommendations are common to other parts of the world.19 All of theserecommendations are essential for infrastructure development in Africa,and should be pursued in the long term. This section discusses three key
issues that Japan should urgently consider based on the analysis of
Section 3 in relation to the recommendations (Box). The three issues are
selected according to the following general criteria: they are areas where(i) African countries’ needs are unmet; (ii) higher development impact is
expected; and (iii) development impact is realized relatively in a shortperiod of time, though we do not underestimate the importance of longterm interventions.
Box: 10 recommendations by AFD-WB 2009
1. A
 ddress Africa’s infrastructure efficiency gap as a pressing policy
priority
2. Make greater efforts to safeguard maintenance-related spending
3. Tackle inefficiency through institutional reform
4. Include line ministries and budgetary processes in theinstitutional reform agenda
5. Use administrative and regulatory reforms to get full value fromexisting infrastructure
6. Pursue regional integration to reduce infrastructure costs
7. Take a spatial view of infrastructure development priorities
8. Rethink infrastructure social policy
9. Find practical ways to broaden access to infrastructure services
10. Close the infrastructure funding gap
Source: AFD-WB 2009

19. For example, see twelve recommendations of ADB-JBIC-WB 2005 ( xlvi – lvi) for East Asia.

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4.1 Rethinking of sectoral allocation of Japan’s ODA
The transport sector, especially roads, has received the largest share ofJapan’s ODA. While Japan’s country assistance strategies for Africancountries give emphasis on infrastructure development, there is no clear
policy on the allocation of funds between the sectors. Since Africa’s
infrastructure needs and funding gaps are estimated, it is time to rethink
the allocation of Japan’s ODA so that needy sectors can receive more
support for more investment and efficiency improvement. In fact, JICA
has recently been increasing loan/grant assistance to the power sector,
and project preparation in Africa’s power sector has been strengthened
as shown in the increase of TC in the power sector (Figures 5 and 7).
Nevertheless, we do not mean that Japan’s grant/loan assistance should
immediately and directly go to financing power sector investment
projects. It should be noted that the power sector (particularly power
generation) is one of the few sectors which can expect capital investmentby the private sector even in low-income countries (Leigland 2010).
Japan’s ODA to the power sector needs to be more carefully examined bysub-sector, as follows:➢➢ Power generation: The possibility of private sector capital
investment should always be explored in power generation
projects. For this purpose, JICA should assist with the preparationof bankable projects through TC, regardless of whether they will
be financed by the private or public sectors. When private capital
investment is not possible, JICA should provide loans/grants forcapital investment. Areas for Japan’s ODA financing forinvestment would include: thermal plants in which private
investors are not interested, renewable energy projects (e.g.,geothermal and wind-power) whose investment risk is usuallyhigher than conventional thermal plants; and hydropower
projects which require social and environmental considerations.
Some recent project examples include a geothermal project in
Kenya and a wind power project in Egypt.
➢➢ Transmission, distribution and rural electrification: These subsectors would qualify for public sector funding because theprivate sector is less interested due to generally low commercial
viability. Assistance both for project preparation and investment
would be necessary.
In a hydropower project in Uganda, while the power station is invested
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in by the private sector, the associated transmission lines are funded by
JICA and AfDB through concessional loans. This sort of division of labor
between private and public funds is common in power projects in Asia.
On the other hand, it is difficult to expect private sector capital
investment in the WSS and irrigation sectors due to low commercial
viability; and, therefore, public financing is expected to close the funding
gap. In WSS, while Japan’s ODA appears to place emphasis on efficiency
improvement through TC, the low access rate to WSS is a serious
problem (Section 2), suggesting room for Japan’s assistance for WSS
investment. Likewise, raising productivity in agriculture is essential for
Africa’s food security and economic transformation. Irrigation facilities
are a vital component, together with improved inputs including
fertilizers as shown in the green revolution in Asia. JICA should consider
the possibilities of supporting new investment through loan/grantassistance in these two sectors.
Lastly, there is an important caution to be placed on the reallocation ofJapan’s assistance among the sectors. The estimation of the funding gaps
is made on the assumption that current spending continues (Table 2). If
all development partners shift from the transport to other sectors at
once, there is the risk that the transport sector would be in deficit. In
addition, as in Section 2, there are variations in infrastructure between
sectors and countries and the infrastructure deficits of sub-sectors(particularly, roads, ports and railways) within the transport sector vary.
Therefore, sectoral reallocation needs coordination with recipient
countries and other development partners, and a careful review of
infrastructure needs and gaps in each country should be undertaken. (Ifthe current resource allocation to the transport sector is reconsidered, theprioritization of spending is necessary within the transport sector,
including emphasis on regional connectivity discussed in Chapter 8,
financial support for road maintenance in the next Sub-section 4.2, andreallocation between transport sub-sectors.)
4.2 Financial assistance for maintenanceJapan has always emphasized the importance of maintenance ofinfrastructure over the years through TC projects (e.g., roadmaintenance) and ex-post evaluation of projects. Japan’s ODA, however,
do not finance operation and maintenance expenditures, which shall beshouldered by recipient countries through their budget and user
charges. Japan’s assistance for strengthening infrastructure maintenance213

Chapter 7

has been through capacity building of maintenance techniques, financial
management, etc., through technical assistance and overseas training.
Japan only provides budget support, which possibly finances
maintenance expenditures, on a limited basis in Africa, almost all in
Tanzania.
JICA’s ex-post evaluations found financial weaknesses in JICA-assisted
infrastructure projects at the operation and maintenance stage in
Africa.20 JICA 2011 and 2012 include post-evaluations of fourteen (14)infrastructure projects funded by loans or grants in Africa. Out of 8
projects whose sustainability is rated “medium,” six (6) projects (43%),
which are rated “medium,” have problems related to insufficient budget
allocation or low cost recovery at the operation and maintenance stage.21
Ultimately, there are only two financing sources for infrastructure
investment, operation and maintenance: tax and user charges.22
Therefore, in order to have the financial resources for infrastructure,
governments, developers and service providers need to adopt costreflective tariffs when service charges are collected, and exert tax
collection efforts to cover the cost in the case of non-revenue generating
projects. Careful attention should be paid to affordability by poorer
sections of society, for example, through designing targeted subsidy
schemes and adopting more cost effective technologies. In the long run,
Japan’s ODA should help developing countries in Africa take the selfhelp approach
In the short run, however, Japan should reconsider its approach tostrengthening maintenance in Africa. The finding that insufficientbudget and cost recovery caused insufficient maintenance in JICAfunded projects means that non-financial capacity building alone cannot
address insufficient maintenance. Japan’s financial assistance formaintenance, through (sector) budget support or sector program loans,
20. Insufficient maintenance due to insufficient budget and low cost-recovery is a problem
common for most developing countries (JICA 2012).
21. In JICA post-evaluation, the rating of “sustainability” is in three grades: high, medium
and low. Out of the 14 evaluated projects, 6 projects get high ratings and 8 projects get
medium ratings regarding sustainability. There are no low-rated projects regarding
sustainability in JICA 2011 and 2012.
22. “Financiers – whether the private sector, or official lenders and donors - can change therequisite time profile of taxes or user charges by providing financing in the form of loans orequity, but eventually those loans need to be repaid or remunerated.” (ADB-JBIC-WB 2005,
30)

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can play an important role in the sustainability of infrastructure.
In addition, the financing of maintenance would have some advantages
over new investments given the current situation in Africa: higher returnand quicker impact. While a new investment project takes time fromproject preparation to completion, maintenance investment generally
requires a shorter time because of minimal environmental
considerations, a shorter time for contractor selection, less technicalcomplexities, etc. Particularly, the economic return for road maintenancein SSA countries is quite high (138.8%) according to AFD-WB 2009 (7071). If this statement is combined with the argument in Sub-section 4.1 –sectoral reallocation of resources – the policy implication is that a portionof the funds for new road investment should be shifted to roadmaintenance.
Before embarking on financial assistance for maintenance in Africa, there
are two important considerations. First, it can and should be selective interms of recipient countries and sectors. As in JICA 2011 and 2012, itshould be noted that 57% of projects still have no problem with budget
allocation or cost recovery. In addition, capacity constraints on the Japanside and fiduciary risks of recipient countries should also be taken into
account. Countries and sectors for financial assistance regarding
maintenance should be carefully selected in consideration of capital
investment projects in the past and if there are on-going projects. Second,
Japan should have a phase-out policy from this type of assistance sincemaintenance cannot be supported forever. It has to be undertaken
together with capacity development TC for budget management,
infrastructure asset management, and maintenance techniques.
4.3 Assistance regarding management reform of public utilities
Three recommendations of AFD-WB 2009 (Nos. 3 to 5 of the Box) are
regarding institutional and regulatory reforms. AFD-WB 2009 also findsthat governance reform of public utilities is more successful in countries
where broader governance reforms are in progress, and that somecountries do well despite broader governance reform being delayed(106-108). The latter finding is consistent with the argument of pockets ofeffective agencies in weak governance states – “it is well established thateven in countries that have poor governance and a weak public sector,
exceptional well-functioning government and government supported
agencies do exist”(Leonard 2010).
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While there is no doubt that broader governance reform should be
pursued, it would take time to produce results due to the political
economy of African countries. Therefore, a realistic approach would bethat while broader governance reform is executed, efforts should bemade to create effective organizations which are expected to produce
positive results through organizational reforms in the short run.23 Japan
should identify government agencies and public utilities of past,ongoing, and/or future Japan ODA projects, and should consider
support for internal management and organizational reforms, and cost
recovery mechanisms.

5. Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed the current status of infrastructure, and recent
Japan ODA projects, and discussed three issues that Japan’s
infrastructure assistance should consider in light of the findings andrecommendations of AFD-WB 2009. We have suggested rethinking
resource allocation between sectors, financial assistance for
infrastructure maintenance, and the organizational reform of executing
agencies.
One of the strengths of Japan’s ODA is that it can contribute both toaddress efficiency gaps and to close funding gaps through the threemodalities: loans, grants and TC. These three modalities can beeffectively used for various types of countries and sectors, depending on
the stages of infrastructure development and the country’s needs. One
important note is that loan assistance is indispensable to increase Japan’s
financial support to Africa’s infrastructure. In view of the fact that thehigh indebtedness of some African countries hampered Japan’s
infrastructure assistance, it is essential to pay careful attention to debt
sustainability issues to sustain Japan’s infrastructure assistance. In close
coordination with other development partners, it would be more
effective to reconsider Japan’s infrastructure assistance strategy in Africawith new data and findings, and to take one step further by setting up an
infrastructure assistance strategy for individual countries.
23. Some pockets of effective organizations in weak governance states were created throughlong-term management practices and strong organizational culture. This sort of effective
organization cannot be created over a short period of time (Fujita 2011).

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forward for Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA)

References
Asian Development Bank (ADB), Japan Bank for International
Cooperation (JBIC), and World Bank. 2005. Connecting East Asia: A
new framework for infrastructure. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Referred to as ADB-JBIC-WB 2005.
Bluffstone, R., and G. Köhlin, eds. 2011. Agricultural Investment andProductivity. Washington, DC: REF Press.
Calderón, C., and L. Servén. 2010. Infrastructure and economic
development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of African Economies 19,
no. suppl. 1: i13–i87.
Foster, V., and C. Briceno-Garmendia, eds. 2009. Africa’s infrastructure: A
time for transformation. Paris: Agence Française de Développement(AFD); Washington, DC: World Bank. Referred to as AFD-WB 2009.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2012. World economic outlook.
Washington, DC: IMF.
Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA). 2008. ICA annual report 2007.
Tunis: African Development Bank (AfDB).
ICA. 2009. ICA annual report 2008. Tunis: AfDB.
ICA. 2010. ICA annual report 2009. Tunis: AfDB.
ICA. 2011. ICA annual report 2010. Tunis: AfDB.
International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID). 2010. ICID
member countries data. http://www.icid.org/imp_data.pdf(accessed August 10, 2012).
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 2011. Annual evaluation
report 2010. Tokyo: JICA.
JICA. 2012a. Annual evaluation report 2011. Tokyo: JICA.
JICA. 2012b. JICA project database (accessed July/August 2012).
Leigland, J. 2010. PPI in poor countries: How to increase private
participation in infrastructure management and investment.
Gridlines series No. 51, Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory
Facility (PPIAF), c/o World Bank, Washington, DC.
Leonard, D. K. 2010. ‘Pockets’ of effective agencies in weak governancestates: Where are they likely and why does it matter? Public
Administration and Development 30:91–101.
Fujita, Y. 2011. What makes the Bangladesh Local Government
Engineering Department (LGED) so effective? Complementarity
between LGED capacity and donor capacity development support.
JICA-RI Working Paper No. 27, JICA Research Institute, Tokyo.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFAJ). 2011. Wagakuni no217

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saimukyusaisochi (Koutekisaimu menjogaku) (Gaisanchi). [InJapanese.] http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ gaiko/oda/seisaku/
keitai/enshakan/saimuhouki.html (accessed August 14, 2012).
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2012. Africa humandevelopment report 2012: Toward a food secure future. New York:UNDP, Regional Bureau for Africa.
World Bank. 2012a. World development indicators database. http://
data.worldbank.org/ data-catalog/world-development-indicators(accessed July 12, 2012).
World Bank. 2012b. Information and communications for development 2012:
Maximizing mobile. Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Economic Forum (WEF). 2011. Global competitiveness report 2011–2012. Geneva: WEF.

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Annex Tables and Figures
Table A1. Classification of countries219

Table A2. Modality Share of Japan’s Financial Commitment on Africa’s Infrastructure by Sector

Chapter 7

220

Table A3. Japan’s Technical Cooperation on Africa’s Infrastructure

Policy Challenges for Infrastructure Development in Africa - The way
forward for Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA)

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Chapter 7

Figure A1. Log of roads, paved (% of total roads)

Source: World Bank 2012a

Figure A2. Log of Electricity power consumption (kWh per capita)

Source: World Bank 2012a222

Policy Challenges for Infrastructure Development in Africa - The way
forward for Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA)

Figure A3. Log of electric power transmission and distribution losses (% ofoutput)Source: World Bank 2012a

Figure A4. Log of Improved access to water sources (% of population withaccess)

Source: World Bank 2012a223

Chapter 7

Figure A5. Log of Agriculture irrigated land (% of total arable land)

Source: ICID2010

Figure A6. Log of Mobile subscription per 100 people

Source: World Bank 2012a224

Chapter 8:
Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI)
Kaori Matsushita

Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI) is indispensable toeconomic activities in Africa. However, the high cost of distribution due
to the limited capacity of infrastructure facilities and inefficientcustoms/cross-border formalities constrains economic and social
development in Africa. Under the circumstances, TICAD IV, held in May
2008, designated regional infrastructure development as a key task andhave been striving to improve both the physical and software sides of
CBTI in Africa in order to improve the efficiency of physical distribution.
This report summarizes the current situation of trading and physicaldistribution in Africa, discusses the importance of CBTI, and proposes a
course of action for assisting CBTI.
Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI) is defined as follows:1 CBTI
is a comprehensive and necessary infrastructure for cross-bordertransportation between countries. Such infrastructure includes physicalinfrastructure such as ports, railroads, main roads, transshipment
facilities, border facilities including one-stop border posts (OSBPs),
weigh bridges (vehicle weight measuring scales), and inland container
depots (ICD), all of which constitute international transit corridors. CBTI
also includes legal systems related to various cross-border matters, suchas cross-border traffic regulations (police check), customs, international
agreements, quarantine, and bond/security systems, as well asorganization control/legal systems for smooth operation andmaintenance of physical infrastructure.

1. The Current Conditions of Trading and Physical Distribution
and Issues of Cross Border Transport Infrastructure in Africa
1.1 Trading/physical distribution
The value of exports in the whole of Africa including North Africa

1. This is based on the definition in JICA “Cross Border Transport Infrastructure Feasibility
Study Phase 3 (Project Study)” (March 2009)

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rapidly increased from 2003, dipped in 2009, and reached 594.2 billion
dollars in 2011 (433.3 billion dollars for the Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA)
region) (Figure 1). The ratio of exports to Europe has been high, but
recently trading with emerging countries including China and India has
been expanding. Africa has been attracting global attention as a regionrich in fuel and mineral resources, and the development of its resources
has taken off and caused the export volume to surge.2 The value ofimports increased from 481.5 billion dollars in 2008 (342.1 billion dollars
for the SSA region) to 559.5 billion dollars in 2011 (404.1 billion dollars
for the SSA region). Trading in Africa is on the rise and increased from12.03 billion dollars in 2000 (8% of total trading volume) to 62.48 billion
dollars in 2010 (12% of total trading volume).
Figure 1. Transition of African Export Value by Destination (1999–2011)

There are many issues concerning the time and cost of importing andexporting by countries in Africa. According to the Logistic Performance
Index (LPI) in the world, which is an analysis of indexes related to
2. According to 2011 data, fuels and minerals account for 64% of import value.

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Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI)

import, export, and trading of 155 countries in the world (IBRD/WB,
2012), the highest ranked country in the SSA region is South Africa (23rd)
followed by Benin (67th), Botswana (68th), and Malawi (73rd). Other
countries in the SSA region were ranked below 80th.
The number of documents, days, and costs required for export andimport in the SSA region is higher than the world average (Table 1).3
Complicated port paperwork, lack of information sharing systems,
delays in introducing IT, and excessive check points along the routes
prolong the time for physical distribution and cause delays in cargotransportation. Especially, figures for inland countries4 such as Burundi,
Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Niger, Rwanda, andZimbabwe are particularly poor. Thus, there is a critical need to reducethe days and cost requiring for physical distribution in inland countries.
Table 1. Number of Documents, Days, and Cost required for Import and Export
RegionEast Asia/Pacific
East Europe/Central
Asia
South America/
Caribbean
Middle East/North
AfricaOECD High-income
Countries
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
World Average

ExportNumber of Required
Documents Days

Import

Cost
Number of Required
Cost(US$/ Documents Days
(US$/
Container)
Container)
923
7
22
958
2,134
8
29
2,349

6
7

21
26

6

17

1,268

7

19

1,612

6

19

1,083

8

22

1,275

4

10

1,028

5

10

1,080

8
8
6

32
31
22

1,603
1,990
1,470

9
9
7

33
37
24

1,736
2,567
1,742

Source: Doing Business, June 2012, World Bank(http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/trading-across-borders)

Reasons for long transport time and high transport cost vary from region
to region. Major bottlenecks include insufficient capacity and the
3. Compared to the averages in the SSA region for 2006 and that for 2012, days required forexport have reduced from 36 to 31 and for import have reduced from 45 to 37, showing a
gradual improvement.
4. For example, the maximum days required for import is 101 days in Chad, the minimum is
10 days in Mauritius, the maximum import cost is 8,255 dollars in Chad, and the minimum is577 dollars in Sao Tome and Principe.

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inefficient physical distribution system of ports. For example, theholding time at ports is 2 to 3 days for regions with efficient physicaldistribution systems, less than 7 days for Asia, North Africa, the Middle
East, and Latin America, but 14 days on average for the SSA region(IBRD/WB, 2012). JICA (2009) calculated the economic cost (necessary
expenses are added to the cost based on the required time for the cargo)
for exporting a 40ft container from Mombasa in Kenya to Kampala in
Uganda. The result showed that the cost at ports accounted for 31.6%(1,666 dollars) of the entire economic cost by road transport and 69.6%(4,402 dollars) of the entire economic cost by rail transport. Nathan
Associates (2011) evaluated the cost, required time, and reliability ofports, railroads, and border facilities for physical distribution in the
North Corridor and Central Corridor, and found that scores for ports
and railroads were lower than those for roads and border facilities.
Figure 2. Comparison of Economic Cost of Transport(40ft container from Mombasa in Kenya to Kampala in Uganda)

Source: JICA, 2009

1.2 Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI)
Many transport infrastructures in the SSA region were built anddeveloped as corridors connecting ports with hinterlands for exporting
resources and agricultural products in the colonial period.
Since African countries gained independence in the 1960s, the conditionsof roads, railroads, and ports in each country have deteriorated due to228

Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI)

insufficient skills and funds for maintenance as well as damage to roadsurfaces caused by overloaded vehicles. As for railroads, in addition toaging freight vehicles and tracks, the volume of traffic has decreased on
many lines due to operational reasons including failure of theconcessions. The use of containers at ports was introduced in the early
1990s in Africa, but the development of roads and ports to handle thephysical distribution of large containers has not kept pace.
The necessity of CBTI development in the SSA region was recognized in
the 1970s. Aid agencies and regional economic communities (RECs) in
Africa have pointed out the necessity of a “corridor approach” thatdevelops interregional physical infrastructure and legal/proceduralsystems in an integrated manner. For example, the Trans-Africa
Highway was proposed in 1971, the Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy
Program in 1987, the Spatial Development Initiative in 1996, and theCorridor Diagnostic Study of the Northern and Central Corridors of East
Africa (CDS) in 2011, as outlined below.
BOX(1) Trans Africa Highway (TAH)
The concept consists of nine corridors traversing Africa lengthwise andcrosswise (total length of 56,683 km), and was proposed in 1971. In 2003, theUnited Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), African
Development Bank, and AU examined the development status of the TAH andaddressed the needs for TAH development, maintenance, and control by
securing funds for each country along the route. Since then, development of
the TAH has been promoted mainly by the African Development Bank.
(2) Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP)
This was established in 1987 through the combined efforts of the World Bankand UNECA. The SSATP has identified eight important regional economic
corridors for developing transportation corridors from inland areas to eachlarge-scale international port. The SSATP itself mainly conducts research ontransport infrastructure development and formulates strategies and politicalmeasures. Under the strategy, each donor and cooperative agency, mainly theWorld Bank, supports individual infrastructure issues.

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Chapter 8(3) Spatial Development Initiative (SDI)The SDI is a concept proposed in the industrial development strategy of South
Africa in 1996. Not only physical corridors such as roads, railroads, bridges,
ports, and inland channels but also electric power, resources development,
and industry policy were comprehensively considered. The New Partnershipfor Africa’s Development (NEPAD) took up this approach and has proposed a
program for broad-ranging regions.
Figure 3. Major interregional corridors in Africa

Source: JICA, 2010

(4) Corridor Diagnostic Study of the Northern and Central Corridors of East
Africa (CDS)
Starting in 2009, the corridor diagnostic study of the Northern and Central
corridors of the five EAC member countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda,
Rwanda and Burundi) was conducted with the support of USAID and DFID.
In the study, priority projects were specified based on the results of analyzing
the physical performance of ports, railroads and roads in two target corridors
and also forecasts for 2030.
230

Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI)(5) Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA)
In 2010, the African Union Council decided to formulate PIDA, which
provides a guideline for comprehensive infrastructure development in thewhole of Africa. Studies were conducted mainly by the African Union
Commission, African Development Bank, and NEPAD, and PIDA wasapproved by the African Union Summit in January 2012. In the transport
sector, 24 programs (worth 25.4 billion dollars in total) that should be given
priority to go forward by 2020 were selected based on the analysis of theAfrican Regional Transport Integration Network (ARTIN), TAH, and 40
important corridors, 19 ports, and 53 airports. PIDA is an innovative programthat was started by African initiatives. Relevance with PIDA is desired for the
future development of regional infrastructure. Following approval by AU,
NEPAD and the African Development Bank have been introducing PIDA to
stakeholders throughout the world. It is necessary to pay particular attention
to the future formulation and implementation of the project.

In addition to infrastructure development efforts, it is important toconsider “Aid for Trade (AfT).” AfT activities promote technicalassistance related to trading, supply-side assistance including
improving production capacity and developing distribution
infrastructure, and structural adjustment related to the deregulation of
trade by initiatives of the World Trade Organization (WTO), OECD, and
the World Bank. A regional comparison of assistance to Africa showsthat the amount committed has greatly increased since 2002, doubling by
2009 to reach 13 billion dollars. Most of the resources have been used forthe development of trade-related capacity and infrastructure (Figure 4).
According to a case study analysis, an increase in AfT leads to anincrease in export volume and reduction of import cost.5 Especially in
Africa, it is effective to reduce the cost of container transport (OECS/
WTO, 2011). Trade facilitation in the SSA region is expected to bepromoted through this initiative.

5. A doubling of AfT related to infrastructure increases import volume by 3.5%, and adoubling of AfT related to trade facilitation decreases import cost by 5%. (OECD/WTO, 2011)

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Figure 4. Aid for Trade by Region and Category, Transition of Commitments(2002 – May 2009)

Also, the World Bank and the African Development Bank implemented
the East Africa Trade Transport Facilitation Project (EATTFP) in four
countries in East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda) andprovided assistance for improving systems related to CBTI including
railroads, roads, ports, customs, borders, and weigh bridges of two
major corridors. USAID conducted a feasibility study of OSBP
development of major borders in East Africa and also assisted inestablishing OSBP for railroads at the Malaba border between Kenya
and Uganda. Great Britain implemented Trade Mark East Africa (TMEA)
and Trade Mark South Africa (TMSA) and assisted in regional
integration such as assistance in enforcement of Tripartite that unites
three RECs, COMESA, EAC and SADC, and improvement of the tariff
system.
Recently, countries in Africa formed Regional Economic Communities(RECs)6 with neighboring countries to take measures for facilitating
6. The Africa Union has authorized the following eight agencies as RECs: (1) The Communityof Sahel-Saharan States (Cen-Sad), (2) Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa(CMESA), (3) East Africa Community (EAC), (4) Economic Community of Central African
States (ECCAS), (5) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), (6)Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), (7) Southern African Development
Community (SADC), and (8) Union of Maghreb Arab (UMA).

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Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI)

trade and physical distribution and regional integration. Issues to befocused on and progress of economic integration differ among the RECs,
but they have promoted discussion and harmonization related toregional infrastructure studies, formulation of development plans,harmonization of regulations, standardization of cross borderformalities, union of customs tariffs, and the common market. In recent
years, they play an important role in the implementation of the CBTI
development programs supported by aid agencies. The increasing tradevolume in Africa shown in Figure 1 confirms that regional integration ismoving forward.7 Since 2010, discussions on establishing an African
Continental Free Trade Area (C-FTA) have been held in the African
Union (UNECA, 2012). CBTI is extremely important to support theefforts by countries in Africa to accomplish economic growth.

2. Japan’s Contribution to Cross Border Transport Infrastructure
Development

Including the period before TICAD IV, Japan has strived to develop
infrastructure in Africa in cooperation with the international community.
Below are cases that are especially closely linked to CBTI. Japan has
focused on three approaches: corridor development, facilitating borderformalities (OSBP assistance and customs capacity improvement), andinstitutional development of cross border transport systems.
2.1 Corridor development(1) Mombasa port and port area road development project(North Corridor)
This is a project to improve CBTI by integrally developing Mombasa
Port in Kenya and roads to strengthen the regional corridor to inland
countries. Mombasa Port is the only international trading port in Kenya
and is among the largest in East Africa.8 It functions not only as animport and export base in the country but also as a gateway to the North
Corridor connecting to Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. With steadyeconomic growth in Kenya and East Africa since 2003, the volume ofcargo handled at Mombasa Port has been increasing and reached 695,000
7. However, many RECs are funded by contributions from member countries. There aremany issues related to promoting interregional integration because RECs do not have legal
force over their own project budgets or member countries.
8. In entire Sub-Saharan Africa, the capacity of the Mombasa Port is placed in fifth after
Durban and Cape Town in South Africa, Lagos in Nigeria, and Abidjan in Cote d’lvoire (JICA,
2009).

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TEU in 2010 even though the annual container handling capacity is only
450,000 TEU,9 causing issues such as ships having to wait at sea forloading and unloading and the prolonged storage of unloaded
containers. It is necessary to improve the capacity to handle large
container vessels, accessibility to ports, and operational efficiency.
Regarding port area roads, traffic congestion on the road connecting
Mombasa Port to the North Corridor is already serious, and is expected
to worsen after 2016 when a new container terminal that is being built by
an ODA loan project is completed. The only transportation from thecenter of Mombasa including the port to the southern part of the city is
by ferry which crosses the channel. This is hindering the development of
the southern city region and the physical distribution toward Tanzania.
Backed-up physical distribution caused by undeveloped infrastructure
at Mombasa Port and port area roads is hindering economic growth in
Kenya and inland countries in East Africa. There is an urgent need tofacilitate physical distribution through infrastructure development.
To solve such problems, Japan decided to implement the “Mombasa Port
Development Project” (L/A signed in November 2007) and “Mombasa
Port Area Road Development Project” (L/A signed in June 2012). These
two projects will develop a container terminal where large container
vessels can come alongside the pier, a road connecting the new container
terminal to the North Corridor, and roads to Mombasa Port (road length25.51 km, two long bridges, and one elevated bridge) to increase thecapacity of Mombasa Port.

9. TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit): Cargo volume converted into the number of 20-footcontainers.

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Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI)

Figure 5.

Figure 6.

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When the Port Development project is completed, the container volume
that can be handled at Mombasa Port will increase from 480,000 TEU in2006 to 990,000 TEU in 2017, more than double that in 2006. A significant
increase of material handling capacity is expected (see Table 2).
Table 2. Expected Benefits of Mombasa Port Development Project
Index

Reference Value(Result in 2006)

Container cargo volume480,000 TEU

Target Value (2017)[2 years after projectcompletion]
990,000 TEU

Total tons of vessels
enteredRatio of container shipping(annual)Vessel waiting time

9 million GT

15.43 million GT

62%

73%

1.49 days/vessel

1.0 day/vessel(2) Nacala Corridor in Mozambique
In the Nacala Economic Corridor located in northern Mozambique, there
are expectations for natural resource development of coal in Tete
Province, agricultural development using the vast land and abundant
water resources in Nampula Province, Niassa Province, and Zambezia
Province, and industrial development based on the potential of Nacara
Port, which is a natural good port. Development of the Nacala Corridor
will provide a dependable transport link from Nacala Port not only to
Nampula Province with the largest population in Mozambique andNiassa Province but also to inland Malawi and Zambia at moderate
prices. Expected benefits include increased physical distribution innorthern Mozambique, economic vitalization of widespread areas,
improvement of living standards, and reduction of poverty.
Comprehensive development of the Nacala Corridor under the Nacala
Corridor Development/Improvement Program is being conducted, as
shown in Table 3.10 The main project, “Tropical Savannah, Agriculture
Development Program, Japan – Brazil – Mozambique Triangular
Cooperation (ProSAVANA-JBM),” is intended to enhance agricultural
production capacity in Mozambique using the experience in agricultural
10. Projects in education, water supply, and health fields are implemented or planned inaddition to infrastructure and agriculture projects, to attain comprehensive development of
the entire region.

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Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI)

development of Cerrado in Brazil and to establish an economic modelthat benefits not only food security but also small-scale farmers.11 In the
Nacala Corridor development, cooperation between governments andprivate sectors in the three countries of Japan, Brazil, and Mozambique isemphasized, and the activities are focused on maximizing mutual
benefits.12
Table 3. Infrastructure Projects of Nacala Corridor in Mozambique
Project Name
Expected Result(Cooperation Type)
Montepuez and Lichinga Paving, improving and expanding the width of 201
Road Project (loan)
km of road, which is part of the 516-km nationalroad connecting Montepuez to Lichinga and related
infrastructure improvement
Nampula and Cuamba
Road improvement between Nampula in Nampula
Road Upgrading Project Province and Cuamba in Niassa Province (building(loan)
approximately 350km road and six bridges)
Road development and replacing 13 bridges
Project for Construction
between Ile and Cuambaof Bridges on the Road
between Ile and Cuamba(grant)Mandimba and Lichinga Road improvement of 88.88-km road between
Road Project (loan)
Mandimba and Lichinga
Project for Urgent
Improvement of yard capacity for storing new
Rehabilitation of Nacala containers
Port (grant)
Container cargo volume: 89,714 TEU (2011) →161,590 TEU (2017)
Nacala Port Development Increase of cargo handling volume at Nacala Port
Project (loan)‧ Total cargo volume: 16.39 million tons (2011) →47.38 million tons (2019)‧ Container cargo: 89,714 TEU (2011) → 234,000
TEU (2019)11. For more discussions on this project, see chapter 5 of this volume.
12. http://www.jica.go.jp/topics/news/2012/20120514_02.html

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Figure 7. Cooperation Projects of Nacala Corridor in Mozambique

Source: Compiled from various JICA project documents

2.2 Facilitation of border formalities(1) One stop border posts (OSBPs)
Border posts are installed at many cross border points in the SSA region
to conduct immigration control and customs clearance, screening, andquarantine. There are many time-consuming border points to be crossed,
for the following reasons:(1) Insufficient agreements between countries(2) Complicated paperwork that differs from country to country(3) Delay in computerizing documents(4) Quality and moral issues of cross border officials(5) Undeveloped cross border facilities
One stop border post (OSBP) have been introduced as a solution to these
problems. In this system, neighboring countries at a border jointly
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Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI)

conduct immigration control, customs clearance, and quarantine at the
one-stop border post. These tasks are handled separately at present.
The experience of OSBP at three places (Chirundu, Malaba, andNamanga) in the SSA region is introduced below.
Chirundu (Zambia/Zimbabwe)
Chirundu is at the border between Zambia and Zimbabwe and is locatedon the North-South Corridor. The border is important for the transportof inland mineral resources such as copper produced in Zambia to
Durban Port in South Africa and Beira Port in Mozambique. Japan has
implemented assistance by drawing up a bilateral agreement between
Zambia and Zimbabwe, grant aid assistance for the Chirundu Bridge
Construction Project, and the Chirundu Border Related Facility
Construction Project by providing non-project grant collateral funds anddispatching volunteers. Many partners have participated in this project.
The World Bank conducted the baseline study13 which analyzed thetraffic volume and reasons for delays at Chirundu. The British DFID
allocated a project manager and introduced ICT. Such cooperation
related to facilities and personnel was accumulated in 2009, and the first
OSBP in Africa started operating after an OSBP-related legislative bill
was enacted in the two countries.14
The effectiveness of the OSBP has been confirmed. For example,
regarding the number of passing trucks, 225 trucks passed per day in2007 (120 north-bound trucks, 105 south-bound trucks) but 380 trucks
passed per day in 2011 (200 north-bound trucks, 180 south-boundtrucks) (JICA/EAC, 2011). As for time taken to cross the border, that forpassenger cars was reduced from 1–2 hours to 20 minutes, that for buses
from 2 hours to 1 hour, and that for trucks from 1–2 days to less than 1
day. Future challenges are to fully utilize introduced facilities,
standardize customs formalities, and promote further cooperation
between the agencies of the two countries.
Malaba (Kenya/Uganda)
Malaba is an important border between Kenya and Uganda in the North
Corridor. The first OSBP exclusively for railroads in East Africa was
13. Barney Curtis, “The Chirundu Border Post: Detailed monitoring of transit times”, SSATP
Discussion Paper No. 10, World Bank, 2009.
14. Zimbabwe One Stop Border Posts Control Act, No. 21 of 2007 and Zambia One Stop
Border Control Act, No. 8 of 2008.

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established in 2007 at Malaba based on a bilateral agreement concludedby the governments of Uganda and Kenya in 2006. Malaba is one of thetarget sites of “Capacity Building for the Customs Administrations of theEastern African Region (Phase 2)”, a technical assistance project by JICA.
Major activities of this project are introduction of a customs clearance
system necessary for operating the OSBP (Real Time Monitoring System
and Cargo Control System: RTMS/CCS) and capacity building throughtraining of joint border monitoring and customs clearance work (tariffclassification and customs valuation).
As a result of introducing the OSBP, the time required for railroad
crossing has been reduced from 4-7 days to 2 hours. For road cargo, thetime was reduced from 4 days to 3 hours (JICA/EAC, 2011).15 The
improvement of yard and customs facilities and the implementation of
24-hour operation and joint customs screening by the two countries forsome items (12 items accounting for 30% of all cargo) have influenced
such improvement.
The handling of extra-territorial rights and administration (management
and execution) under the bilateral agreement is an issue for the OSBP at
Malaba.16 The further development of systems is planned.
Namanga (Kenya/Tanzania)
Namanga on the border of Kenya and Tanzania is located on the corridor
connecting Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, and Arusha, the central city ofnorthern Tanzania. Namanga is used for 41% of exports from Kenya to
Tanzania and 20% of exports from Tanzania to Kenya. In the yen-loan“Arusha-Namanga-Athi River Road Development Project” Japan willbuild 104.3 km of road between Arusha and Namanga on the Tanzaniaside, which is part of the international main road (240 km long)connecting Arusha in Tanzania to Athi River in Kenya, and will also
develop infrastructure related to OSBP. This project is co-financed by theAfrican Development Bank, which has provided loans for road
construction on the Kenya side (135.7 km) and part of the Tanzania side,
15. The Trade Mark East Africa “Review of the impact of trade facilitation instruments”, 2012
introduces other ex post valuation of OSBP in Malaba (shortened from 3 days to 3 hours, andfrom more than 12 hours to 6 hours on average).
16. For example, regarding criminal investigations of violations of the Immigration Control
Law, such as large-scale tax evasion, smuggling, and handling of prosecuted defendants, it is
not clearly stipulated which country’s authority should seize the articles and arrest anddetain the defendant (JICA, 2009).

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Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI)

consulting expenses, and OSBP facilities on the Kenya side.
The same as Malaba, Namanga is also a target site of “Capacity Building
for the Customs Administrations of the Eastern African Region (Phase2).” It is planned to develop OSBP operation manuals for the crossborder related agencies including customs, quarantine bureaus, andimmigration bureaus and OSBP facility administrative rules to enable
OSBP to operate smoothly when the facilities are completed.
Based on the experience at Malaba and Namanga, EAC compiled the“OSBP Source Book,” a practical guidebook, with the support of JICA.
This source book outlines steps necessary for establishing OSBP andindicates points for developing organizational and institutional systems,
simplifying cross border formalities, designing facilities, andintroducing ICT. After the completion of the EAC, workshops related to
the OSBP source book were held in SADC in Southern Africa and
UEMOA in Western Africa, and a local-version source book, which
incorporates the actual conditions in each region, has been compiled.
The book is expected to be upgraded based on detailed information,cases, and lessons in each country and to be used in the future.
Photo: Workshop related to OSBP Source Book (2011)

241

Chapter 8(2) Capacity Development of Customs on the Borders of East Africa,
Nambia and Botswana
As described in the previous section, JICA is implementing a project for
improving the customs ability on the borders of five East Africancountries as well as Nambia and Botswana. The abolishment of tariffs in
the region and the introduction of common external tariffs were realized
in the five East African countries by 2010. At present, work is underway
on building a common market. As cooperation for facilitating trade in
the region, since 2007 JICA has implemented “Capacity Building for the
Customs Administrations of the Eastern African Region” to introduce
RTMS/CCS and provide training (Master Trainer Program) for training
instructors on customs duties including the tariff classification andcustoms valuation.
On the border of Mamuno/Trans-Kalahari between Botswana andNambia, the “Project for the Establishment of the One Stop Border Post(OSBP) between Botswana and Namibia at Mamuno/Trans Kalahari
Border Post” has been implemented since 2010. The border is becoming
increasingly important because the border connects Walvis Bay inNambia and Johannesburg in South Africa, and the route connects North
America, Europe, and Southern Africa with shorter times and distances.
Both Botswana and Nambia have strategic intentions to establish amodel case of OSBP in the region in order to lead the negotiations withother countries in the future. Although the initial project plan has beenreviewed because of the belated approval of the bilateral agreement
between the two countries, OSBP is expected to be steadily introducedwith the support of the Project.
2.3 Harmonization of cross border transport system
In many regions in Africa, overloaded vehicles constantly travel on the
paved roads, damaging the road surface. However, appropriate
measures to control overloaded vehicles cannot be taken because
regulations differ from country to country. Furthermore, there are issues
such as shortages of appropriate vehicle weighing machines andfacilities and lack of cooperation by transportation companies. In
response, the EAC has studied a legal framework of regulations on
overloaded vehicles since 2010 with the support of JICA (JICA, 2011).
As a result of discussions on harmonizing regulations, five member
states agreed on 23 items, including vehicle gross weight limit (56 tons)242

Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI)

and interlink vehicles (full length of up to 22 m permitted on only
specified routes), to build the foundation of institutionalization. Goingforward, institutionalization at the EAC will be undertaken by thefollowing process. The EAC assembly will approve an EAC law thatdefines broad principles of vehicle regulation, and the EAC Council willproclaim domestic laws and ordinances that stipulate detailed
operational and administrative matters. The EAC laws and ordinances
will supersede conflicting domestic laws and ordinances in member
states.17 This is a strong and immediate mechanism for establishing aharmonized institutional system.

3. Direction of Cooperation in TICAD V

3.1 Lessons(1) Comprehensive corridor development considering the entire corridor
Obviously, trade promotion and economic growth can be achieved only
by combining a wide range of policies for them, of which CBTI
development constitutes only a part. CBTI development must be
positioned in a comprehensive corridor development framework thattakes into consideration industrial development, resource development,
and trade promotion of the entire supranational area.
As mentioned above, Japan has undertaken a project at Mombasa Port in
Kenya with a view to benefiting the entire North Corridor andstimulating the economy in the Mombasa region. In addition, regarding
the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique, Japan has worked oncomprehensive corridor development linked to agricultural andresource development with the cooperation of governments and private
sectors, aiming to improve the economic performance of the entire
corridor and deliver benefits to poverty groups. The approach aiming
for synergy effects by programming multiple issues will serve as a usefulreference for future projects.
(2) Importance of a three-way approach involving infrastructuredevelopment, institutional development, and human resource
development
To improve CBTI, key requirements are not only the development of
conventional infrastructure such as ports, roads, and railroads, but also
assistance in development systems and appropriate operation of
17. Based on subparagraphs (4) and (5) of Article 8 in EAC law

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regional agreements and domestic regulations, as well as humanresources development of cross border officials (customs, immigration,
quarantine, cross border police, etc.) and the private sector (customs
clearance agencies, transportation companies, etc.) are important. As forcustoms, as implemented in Japan’s technical assistance projects, anapproach designed to improve capacity in accordance with theinternational standard by cooperating with the international agency, theWorld Custom Organization (WCO), seems to be effective.
(3) Cooperation with Regional Economic Communities (RECs)
When improving the systems (regional agreements, customs systemstandardization, harmonization of traffic laws, bond system, etc.) notedin (2) above, a legal framework covering multiple countries needs to be
introduced. In Africa, RECs have already been established in regionswith social and economic connections, and institutional improvement
activities are being carried out in each region. Therefore, focusing on
CBTI in cooperation with RECs will deliver benefits to business more
effectively and efficiently.
3.2 Direction of future cooperation
The population of Arica is expected to continue increasing. It is
important to facilitate trade by developing CBTI in order to develop
industry and thus contribute to employment creation and regional
development and also to satisfy the demands of the expanding market.
Future efforts should target comprehensive corridor development byintensively allocating resources to corridors with high development
potential in order to promote a shift from resource-dependent economies
to a versatile and advanced regional industrial structure. As specificassistance measures for CBTI, it will be effective to form a cooperation
structure in order to enhance port functions which are bottleneck in thephysical distribution system, to develop the transport infrastructure topromote industrial and agricultural development using regional
resources, and to assist in facilitating cross border formalities.

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Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI)

References
African Development Bank. 2011. African economic outlook 2011. Paris:
OECD.
African Union Commission, African Development Bank, and Economic
Commission for Africa. 2012. Programme for Infrastructure
Development in Africa (PIDA). Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African
Union Commission.
Arvis, J., R. Carruthers, G. Smith, and C. Willoughby. 2011. Connecting
landlocked developing countries to markets. Washington, DC: WorldBank.
Foster, V., and C. Briceno-Garmendia. 2010. Africa’s infrastructure: A time
for transformation, Washington, DC: World Bank.
Hirano, K. 2009. Issues in Africa: World history of development
assistance. Tokyo: Nippon Hyoronsha.
Japan International Cooperation Agency, and East African Community.
2011. One stop border post source book. n.p.
JICA Africa Department. 2009a. Preparatory study report of Western
Africa comprehensive OSBP assistance program formulation.
Study prepared for JICA, Tokyo, March.
JICA Africa Department. 2009b. Report of preparatory study of physicaldistribution improvement cooperation in the border area between
Tanzania and Rwanda including Rusumo Bridge. Report prepared
for JICA, Tokyo.
JICA Africa Department. 2011. Report of African development strategy
review session. Report prepared for JICA, Tokyo.
JICA Economic Infrastructure Development Department. 2009. Project
study: Final report. Report on Cross Border Transport
Infrastructure Feasibility Study Phase 3, prepared for JICA, Tokyo.
JICA Industry Development, and JICA Public Policy Department. n.d.
Project materials, Capacity Building for the Customs
Administrations of the Eastern African Region, Phase 2.
JICA Industry Development, and JICA Public Policy Department. n.d.
Project materials, Project for the Establishment of the One Stop
Border Post (OSBP) between Botswana and Namibia at Mamuno/
Trans Kalahari Border Post.
JICA Social Development Department. 2008. Final report of study(project study) of how the transport infrastructure assistanceshould be in Africa. Report prepared for JICA, Tokyo, March.
JICA. 2010a. Preliminary study on the Southern Africa Growth Belt:
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Chapter 8Integrated regional transport program. Report prepared for JICA,
Tokyo.
JICA. 2010b. Project study of regional transport infrastructure (ports/
railroads) in Sub-Saharan Africa. Study prepared for JICA, Tokyo.
JICA. 2011. Study for harmonization of overload vehicle control in the
East African Community. Study prepared for JICA, Tokyo.
Nathan Associates, Inc. 2011. Corridor Diagnostic Study of the Northernand Central Corridors of East Africa. Report submitted to the Task
Coordination Group, Corridor Diagnostic Study of the Northernand Central Corridors of East Africa, April.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
and World Trade Organization (WTO). 2011. Aid for trade at a glance
2011: Showing results. Paris: OECD.
Trade Mark East Africa. 2012. Review of the impact of trade facilitation
instruments. n.p.
World Trade Organization. 2012a. World trade report 2012. Geneva: World
Trade Organization.
World Bank. 2012b. Connecting to Compete 2012: Trade logistics in the global
economy; The logistics performance index and its indicators.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank. n.d. World development indicators. Online database.
http://data.worldbank.org/
data-catalog/world-developmentindicators.
World Bank, and International Finance Corporation. 2013. Doing business2013: Smarter regulations for small and medium-size enterprises.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 2012. Assessing
regional integration in Africa V: Towards an African continental free
trade area. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: UNECA.

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Chapter 9:
Toward Universal Health Coverage in Africa-Achieving MDGs with equity, and beyond
Ikuo Takizawa

1. Health in Africa: Steady Improvement
The African continent, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), continues
to be the focus of global health discourse today. Approximately, 1/5 ofglobal tuberculosis deaths, 1/2 of child and maternal deaths, 2/3 ofdeaths due to AIDS-related causes and 90% of malaria deaths areconcentrated in SSA, which counts for only slightly more than 10% of the
global population (Table 1).
Table 1. Disease burdens (Share of Sub-Saharan Africa in global health issues)

Howev er, many African countries have witnessed an accelerated
reduction of maternal and child mortality in the last decade. According
The author would like to thank Prof. Kenji Shibuya for his insightful comments for the draft
paper. Special appreciation goes to Kiyoshi Kodera, Satoru Watanabe, Masakatsu Komori,Taro Kikuchi and other colleagues in JICA for their valuable input. The author, however, issolely responsible for the views expressed in the text.

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to the latest estimates by UN agencies, the average annual rate of
reduction (AARR) in under-five mortality, for which 4.4% or more isrequired to achieve MDG 4 (reduction of child mortality by 2/3 between
1990 and 2015), increased from 1.5% (1990 – 2000) to 3.1% (2000 – 2011) in
SSA. The AARR for maternal mortality, for which 5.5% or more isrequired to achieve MDG 5 (reduction of maternal mortality by 3/4
between 1990 and 2015), increased from 1.4% (1990 – 2000) to 3.9% (2000– 2010). As a result, there are significant reductions in the number ofdeaths both of children and mothers. The number of children who die
before the age of five in SSA decreased from 3.8 million in 1990 to 3.3
million in 2011 despite the increase in the number of births. The annual
number of mothers who die of pregnancy-related complications in SSA
decreased from 192,000 in 1990 to 162,000 in 2010 (Table 2).
Table 2. Accelerated progress (Changes in child and maternal mortality in SSA)

Progress was also made in infectious disease control. The number of new
HIV cases in SSA has continued to decline since the mid-1990s. The
annual number of deaths due to AIDS-related causes in SSA peaked at
1.7 million in 2005 and has been declining ever since, even though abetter chance of survival increased the number of people living withHIV from 20.5 million in 2001 to 22.9 million in 2010. The number ofmalaria cases in the WHO Africa region stood at 174 million in 2010,
down from the peak of 191 million in 2005. The number of malaria
deaths peaked at 748 thousand in 2004 and has been declining ever since.

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Toward Universal Health Coverage in Africa-Achieving MDGs with equity, and beyond

The steady progress in health improvements was founded on the bold
policy initiatives of African countries to strengthen the health systems toensure physical and financial access to essential health services. Rapid
expansion of high impact health interventions fueled by an increase indevelopment assistance also contributed, as is described in a later
section. For example, the Community-based Health Planning andService program in Ghana, Health Extension Program in Ethiopia, andHealth Surveillance Assistant in Malawi are good examples of country
initiatives in improving physical access to essential health services of theunderserved population. Cases such as the Mutuelles de Santé(Community-based Health Insurance Scheme) in Rwanda and the
National Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana are gaining international
attention as examples of publicly organized financial protection schemes
which achieved high population coverage in low income settings in SSA.
Performance-based financing is being introduced in many countries as a
strategy to increase service coverage and quality, triggered by successstories from Rwanda and Burundi.
It is generally recognized that improvement in health will increase theacademic performance of children and productivity of adults. There aresome studies which indicate linkage between an increase in life
expectancy with an increase in GDP. Improvement in health will reducethe cost of medical expenditures, therefore minimizing the risk of
impoverishment due to high expenses. Health is the foundation forhuman security. The TICAD V process, in principle, needs to be built on
those achievements in the past decade and should promote thecontinuation and further expansion of many good works which havealready been started in Africa.

2. Health in Africa: Remaining/Emerging Challenges
Even though there is a clear indication of a steady improvement inhealth in Africa, there is a large disparity in the pace of progress. Many
countries in SSA continue to struggle in ensuring physical access toessential health services to the population. Ensuring financial protection
especially for the poor is the common challenge for both SSA and North
African countries.
As for MDG 4, only about 1/4 of the countries in Africa (13 out of 54),249

Chapter 9

including all five countries in North Africa, are likely to achieve thetarget (Figure 1). While AARRs of those 13 countries for 1990 – 2011
exceeds 4.0%, about 2/3 of the countries (35 out of 54) fall short of 3.0%
and can be classified as medium or low performers.
Figure 1. Progress toward MDG 4

The prospect for the achievement of MDG 5 is more challenging. There
are only four countries which exceed AARR of 5.5% and 3/4 of thecountries (39 out of 52 for which internationally comparable data isavailable) do not even reach 4.0% (Figure 2).1

1. Taking into consideration the situation, it is quite relevant to keep health-related MDGs
even beyond the target year of 2015, at least for the countries in SSA, in order to maintain thecurrent momentum.

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Toward Universal Health Coverage in Africa-Achieving MDGs with equity, and beyond

Figure 2. Progress toward MDG 5

Increased disparity in health status and health service utilization withincountries is emerging as another equity challenge. According to
UNICEF, in SSA, 76% of births in urban areas are attended by skilled
birth attendants (SBAs) compared to only 40% in rural areas. Disparity
among different income groups is also significant, with 85% of the births
among the richest 1/5 of the population attended by SBAs, compared toonly 27% for the poorest 1/5. According to available data, healthdisparity among different income groups tends to be larger among thecountries with low service coverage, even though a relatively large
disparity can be found even in some countries with high service
coverage.
Figure 3 compares both inter- and intra-country disparity in use of
essential health services, measured in proportion of births attended by
SBAs, according to income groups. These are the countries identified ashigh performers for both child and maternal mortality reduction in thepreceding analysis. The figure reveals a classic pattern of unequal healthcare use by income level. When the country is in an early stage ofdevelopment, service use is low and disproportionately concentrated in
the richest segment of the population (like in Ethiopia and Eritrea). As
average service use increases, an increase in the middle and poorer
segments of the population is observed (like in Madagascar, Morocco
and Egypt); however, the disparity in the poorest segment persists (likein Algeria).
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Figure 3. Disparity by economic status

It is striking to note the significance of disparity in utilization of essential
health services by income level in these countries. In fact, the level ofservice use for the richest segment is almost the same regardless of thenational average. Explicit targeting and strong political commitment isneeded to address such inequality to realize truly inclusive development(Box 1).

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Toward Universal Health Coverage in Africa-Achieving MDGs with equity, and beyond

Box 1: Inclusive development in the making? Cases for Rwanda andMalawi
The two countries in Figure 3, Rwanda and Malawi, show a different andclearly more equitable pattern in utilization of essential health services. Even
though they might have an advantage in physical access due to highpopulation density, both governments made a strong commitment to improvethe delivery of essential services. At the same time, both countries adopted
measures to remove financial barriers for the poor and needy either by
insurance or fee exemption.

The figure above compares the changes over time in the under-five mortality
rate (U5MR) by income groups for those two countries, using a series of
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data. In both countries, the poorer
segments of the population are benefiting proportionately more in terms ofchild mortality reduction, which means that the income disparity in U5MR is
reducing over time. Similar patterns are observed in other countries like
Ghana, Zambia and Tanzania. Even though further analysis is needed ondiverse country experiences and causal relations with the choice of healthpolicies, efforts to ensure physical and financial access to essential healthservices by the poor may be a policy instrument which can effectively realize
inclusive development, one of the core goals for TICAD V.

Health financing is also emerging as a major development challenge.
The Task Force on Innovative International Financing for Health
Systems suggested that a health expenditure of 44 US dollars per capita
on average is required in order to achieve adequate population coverage253

Chapter 9with essential health services in low and middle income countries for theachievement of health-related MDGs. While 11 countries in SSA spent
more than 150 US dollars per capita on health in 2009, seven countries
spent less than 20 US dollars per capita.
According to the WHO, the risk of impoverishment due to high medical
bills significantly increases when the proportion of out-of-pocket
payment (OOP) to total health expenditure (THE) exceeds 20%. In the 25
African countries out of 51 countries for which internationallycomparable data is available, OOP occupies 40% or more of THE (Figure4). Without proper intervention, there is a risk that the proportion of
OOP in THE increases as economic development continues in Africa. It
is important to note that a high proportion of OOP and the risk of
impoverishment due to high medical bills are serious problems even insome of the North African countries such as Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia,
where physical access to essential health services is less of a problem.
The risk of impoverishment due to high medical bills, together with thelack of other social safety nets, could be a threat to social stability in thosecountries.
Figure 4. Financial risk

A recent study confirmed that there is a large disparity among low andmiddle income countries in terms of essential health service coverage,
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Toward Universal Health Coverage in Africa-Achieving MDGs with equity, and beyond

not only in Africa. It is also suggested that broader health coverage
generally leads to improved overall population health, particularly forthe poor. Considering the achievements so far and the remaining andemerging challenges, it is increasingly necessary to focus on healthsystem issues especially equality in access and financial protection,
which, together, call for concerted efforts toward universal healthcoverage (UHC). It is expected that action toward UHC will further
accelerate the progress toward health-related MDGs, more inclusively
benefiting the poor and the socially disadvantaged. It is essential for
most of the countries in SSA to address physical, financial andsociocultural barriers simultaneously. The absolute lack of humanresources for health, one of the major issues brought up in TICAD IV,
continues to constrain efforts toward UHC, even though countries aretaking initiatives to improve the situation as sited in Section 1. The focus
in North African countries should be given to the expansion of financial
protection and better targeting of the poor.
In addition, there is increasing concern that non-communicable diseases(NCDs) and injuries are on the rise both in North African countries withadvanced demographic and epidemiological transitions and the low
income countries in SSA. These transitions also call for more resilient
health systems with better financial protection. Transformation or reorganization of health systems and the active participation ofcommunities will be needed to provide promotional/preventive
services and long-term/rehabilitative care which requires a significant
degree of self-management by patients.

3. Development Assistance for Health in Africa
In response to the global commitment to MDGs and the series of
initiatives which came out of the G8 Summits and other political arenas,
development assistance for health (DAH), particularly for SSA,
significantly increased in recent years. Participation of non-traditional
actors such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and theestablishment of large-scale global health funding mechanisms such as
GAVI and GFATM, together with the increase in bilateral commitment
including emerging donors, contributed to the increase. According toestimates by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, DAH for
SSA increased from 1.1 billion US dollars in 2000 to 8.1 billion US dollars
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in 2010 in real terms. It is most likely that the rate of increase slowed
down toward the end of the TICAD IV period.
The increase in DAH made a significant contribution in expanding thecoverage of essential health services, which in turn contributed to thesteady reduction of maternal and child mortality, and mortality andmorbidity from major infectious diseases. Increased DAH contributed
especially to expanding coverage of essential interventions related tofocused health programs which address specific health conditions.2
Coverage of such interventions as long-lasting nets for malaria
prevention, artemisinin-based combination therapy for malaria
treatment, anti-retroviral therapy for HIV-infected people, HIVcounseling and testing, immunizations for children, together with otheressential life-saving interventions, expanded remarkably in SSA
supported by focused DAH.
The Government of Japan (GOJ) also significantly increased DAH to
Africa based on the commitment made at TICAD IV. The total amount ofgrant aid and technical assistance provided for Africa since the Japanese
fiscal year (JFY) 2008 amounted to 47 billion yen as of the end of JFY2011,
surpassing the commitment of 43 billion yen. The GOJ through JICA
supported the training of 203,671 health personnel by the end of
JFY2010, against a commitment of 100,000, and improved 3,935 healthfacilities by the end of JFY2011, against a commitment of 1,000.3
JICA focused its assistance on the most challenging regions in Ghana(Upper West), Kenya (Nyanza), and Senegal (Tambacounda andKedougou). What was originally started as a pilot scheme was scaled up
to benefit the whole of Tanzania (regional health and hospitalmanagement). The scaling up of geographically focused assistance isalso being undertaken in Kenya and Senegal. Regional hospital
networks were upgraded through combined capital and technicalsupport in Uganda. Information systems to monitor human resources
for health were introduced in Tanzania and South Sudan that cover theentire nation for the first time in those countries. Regional networks forhealth systems management were strengthened through the partnershipwith the African Health Leadership and Management Network
2. It is estimated that 50% of global DAH is allocated to MDG6 (control of infectious diseases).
Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems, op cit.
3. Data provided by JICA (as of Nov. 2012)256

Toward Universal Health Coverage in Africa-Achieving MDGs with equity, and beyond(AHLMN), a network of higher training and research institutions in
Africa with a focus on health systems management. A network in HRH
management was established for Francophone countries. Assistance wasalso provided to improve the management of focused programs like HIV
and AIDS control in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, and tuberculosis
control in Kenya and Sudan, in collaboration with funding support
coming from GFATM and other sources (Box 2).
Box 2: Expanding service coverage through better management andcoordinated investment: JICA’s experiences
In Ghana, JICA partnered with the Ghana Health Service (GHS) in the scalingup of Community-based Health Planning and Service (CHPS) in the Upper
West Region, one of the most remote and disadvantaged areas in the country.
CHPS was promoted by the government as a means to deliver essential healthservices to under-served communities; however, the expansion was slow due
to multiple constraints. JICA provided technical assistance to the regional
health office of GHS and other relevant stakeholders for strengthening
capacity in program management and community mobilization, while
supporting CHPS facilities and health centers and referral hospitals throughthe provision of medical equipment at the same time. This support wasprovided in alignment with government policy, support from other partners,
and contributed to the accelerated expansion of CHPS coverage in the region.
In Tanzania, JICA worked with the National AIDS Control Programme(NACP) for quality improvement of HIV- and AIDS-related services. JICA’s
technical assistance facilitated the standardization of HIV testing andcounseling and STI care and treatment services, involving all the major
partners working in the area. The products were adopted by NACP as national
standards and disseminated nationwide using grants from GFATM and byother collaborating partners. The project now assists the strengthening of the
M&E framework through a combination of comprehensive supportive
supervision and clinical mentoring, which cut across HIV- and AIDS-related
services and programs. A similar approach was promoted in Madagascar.

Despite the steady expansion of essential life-saving interventions andimprovement of health status, resources are not enough to deliver thoseinterventions to all the people in need, particularly the poor. As Africancountries expand their health services to geographically andsocioeconomically hard-to-reach population groups, the unit cost ofservice delivery is likely to increase, creating an additional burden on the257

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health systems. The progression of demographic and epidemiologicaltransitions and the increase in NCDs and injuries can be another threat
to the already over-stretched health systems of many African countries.
However, a further increase in DAH seems very challenging considering
the current global economic situation, at least for the near future. Whileefforts to strengthen global solidarity to save lives and ensure access by
all to essential health services in Africa should be continued, a paradigm
shift is also needed in the TICAD V process. Firstly, DAH should beallocated more strategically and catalytically in a way to increase theallocation of domestic resources for health by African countries. As
many countries in Africa are now experiencing stable economic growth
and are able to benefit from a demographic bonus, health systems need
to be strengthened with a long-term vision to establish functional andsustainable social protection mechanisms. Secondly, DAH should be
provided in a way to improve the management of health systems andprograms. There is growing attention globally regarding improving the
productivity and efficiency of health sectors through better
management, reflecting the difficult economic situation and escalation of
medical expenses. A growing body of evidence is being produced that
improvement in management can actually increase the outputs andimprove the quality of health services (Box 3). Proper management of thepooled fund may become another area of development concern. Thirdly,
DAH should be provided in a manner to encourage private investmentin the health sector. The private sector is already a vital partner in thedelivery of health services in many African countries. As economic
growth continues, the prospect for regarding the health sector as anindustry, i.e., source of income, innovation and employment, will
increase. Even though the role of the public sector and government
regulation is essential, particularly on the health financing side in orderto achieve pro-poor health systems, an environment should be created to
attract more investment from the private sector in service delivery andtechnological innovations.

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Toward Universal Health Coverage in Africa-Achieving MDGs with equity, and beyond

Box 3: Improving service outputs through better management at thehealth facility level and beyond
JICA is working in partnership with Sri Lanka in applying management
methodologies developed in Japanese manufacturing industries, i.e., 5S(participatory work environment improvement) – kaizen (continuous quality
improvement) – TQM (total quality management), to improve hospitalmanagement in over 15 countries in Africa. One of the early pilot hospitals,
Mbeya Referral Hospital in Tanzania, succeeded in reducing patient waitingtimes, reducing excessive supply stock, and increasing hospital income
through better processing of insurance claims, through the implementation ofself-motivated kaizen activities. In addition to the documentation of
performance improvements through kaizen activities in various departments,
the impact of the approach on health professional satisfaction and motivationis under evaluation.
JICA supported the management improvement of Nyanza Province in Kenya,
working with local partners such as the Great Lakes University of Kisumu.
The pilot districts demonstrated a significant increase in the utilization of
essential health services, even though a rigorous assessment is needed toquantify the effect of project intervention. The positive changes inmanagement practice were highly appreciated by the national government
and efforts are now being made to scale-up the support to benefit the entire
country in collaboration with other partners. In Tanzania, JICA-supported
managerial capacity development of Regional Health Management Teams(RHMTs) was instrumental in triggering the regular allocation of funds to the
RHMTs from budgetary support provided by other development partners.

Taking into consideration the situation, it is quite relevant that the
TICAD V process and its Plan of Action continue to focus on theachievements of health-related MDGs since most of the countries in SSA
are unlikely to achieve those by 2015, even with the accelerated progressin the past decade. However, increased attention should be paid to themore equitable distribution of the progress to address the remaining andemerging disparities in utilization of essential health services.
UHC can be a unifying theme for the TICAD V process. It has a strong
pro-poor focus by calling for equitable access to health services andbetter financial protection, a challenge common to countries in both
North Africa and SSA. Achievement of UHC requires strong political259

Chapter 9

leadership and effective and efficient mobilization of domestic resources
for health including the partnership with the private sector. It requires acoordinated effort of both national governments and development
partners. By focusing on UHC, new development partners such as
BRICS can be brought on board for coordinated DAH to Africa. As these
are the countries which recently achieved UHC (e.g., Brazil and China)
or which are currently in the process of achieving UHC (e.g., India andSouth Africa), their experiences are full of vital lessons for the Africancountries in question.
There are many challenges with UHC as a development agenda. Firstly,even though it has a universality as mentioned before, UHC needs to bepromoted in accordance with the evolving capacity and resource
constraints of individual countries. In accordance with the definition by
the WHO, UHC should be regarded as a direction, rather than a definite
goal.4 There exists a large disparity among African countries in terms of
their position toward UHC. Strategies tailored to the demographic,
epidemiological, historical, political and economic context of eachcountry should be deployed. In many countries in SSA, physical,
financial and sociocultural barriers need to be addressed first, or
simultaneously at least, with financial protection. In North Africancountries, financial access and better targeting of the poor should beprioritized.
Another challenge with UHC is measurement. Even though UHC is also
attracting attention in the post-MDG discussion, there is no consensus
yet on how to measure the progress toward UHC. Measures for UHC
should probably be selected from health status indicators (i.e., MDG-likeindicators), health service coverage indicators (e.g., proportion of births
attended by SBAs and immunization coverage), and the indicators forfinancial protection (e.g., incidence of impoverishing healthexpenditure, proportion of OOP to THE) to capture its multiple
dimensions.
UHC also faces a challenge because of its ‘narrow’ focus on healthcarerather than health itself. It is widely recognized that health is notproduced by healthcare alone. Interventions regarding the social
determinants of health are needed to address the root causes of ill health.
4. It is difficult to meet the entire health care needs of the population at an affordable cost evenin developed countries. UHC is an endless endeavor.

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Toward Universal Health Coverage in Africa-Achieving MDGs with equity, and beyond

Improvement in water and sanitation alone can have a significant impact
on people’s health particularly in the African context. It is important tomake sure that those issues are adequately addressed in the discourse of
the relevant sectors.

4. Japan’s Actions in TICAD V Process
Japan’s role in promoting UHC in Africa can be significant. Japancelebrated its 50th anniversary of the achievement of UHC in the form of
universal health insurance in 2011. Japan’s experience with UHC and its
implications were published in a series of scientific papers for the benefitof a global audience. Japan played a major role in the global policy
process to bring health systems strengthening onto development
agendas through the G8 Toyako summit in 2008. There is a strong
political leadership to promote UHC in the global health discourse andthrough the TICAD V process.
Financial capacity in increasing pooled funding and its population
coverage is a key to progress toward UHC. Efforts to increase overallfunding are needed. Japanese DAH is expected to play a catalytic role inthe mobilization of domestic resources for UHC in Africa, depending on
the evolving capacity of individual countries. However, an increase infunding alone will not be sufficient. Japanese DAH should also be
provided in a way to regain a ‘can do’ attitude among political andtechnocratic leaders in Africa, which will be the moral foundation for the
progress toward UHC.5 UHC is a long-term endeavor which requires
continuous fine tuning of complex elements. Country experiences,including the one of Japan, commonly pointed out a critical importanceof the roles of national political and technocratic leaders in the entire
5. It was Professor Francis Omaswa, founding Executive Director of the Global Health
Workforce Alliance (GHWA) and former Director General for Health Services of the Ministryof Health, Uganda, who pointed out the loss of the ‘can do’ attitude among political andtechnocratic leaders as a cause for slow progress in health development in Africa. He says,“many political and technocratic leaders lost the confidence and the ‘can do’ attitude that wasprevalent just before and after independence.” And then he maintains “the answer lies ingrowing a critical mass of individuals and institutions in each and every country that are
active change agents, who are in the regular habit of using good evidence to support policy
development by their governments and at the same time are able to hold their governments
to account,” and “the answer also lies in growing the capacity of ministries of health to act as
good stewards of health systems.” Omaswa F. Reclaiming the ‘can do’ attitude in the deliveryof health services in Africa. Africa Health 2010; July: 7.

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process. Building on the achievements and outcomes in the TICAD IV
process, JICA can contribute to the capacity development of African
leaders and financial mobilization for UHC through the following
assistances:(1) Capacity development for health systems management throughregional networking and country-focused assistance
JICA can provide assistance for the capacity development of Africancountries in health systems management, through the creation of aregional knowledge base and through the strengthening of country
institutions, organizations and individuals.
JICA can contribute to creation of a regional knowledge base for UHC
through, its ongoing partnership with AHLMN. AMREF as a hostorganization of AHLMN and JICA, in collaboration with theGovernment of Kenya, is now offering regional training on healthsystems management. The program has the potential to serve as aplatform for knowledge sharing and informed policy choices for HSS
and UHC. Opportunities exist to work with other development partners
through Harmonization for Health in Africa (HHA) and other networks
with similar objectives to broaden the impact.6
Improving health systems management at a country level can promote
UHC through strategic planning, better targeting and more effective,
efficient and accountable use of resources. Better health systems
management can improve the performance of focused programs.
Improving management can encourage decision making and problem
solving at all levels of health systems, which cultivates professional
satisfaction and motivation. JICA can extend the management assistanceprovided for national ministries of health and local health offices incountries like Kenya, Senegal and Tanzania to wider geographical areas
or to other countries. In Kenya, for example, discussion among therelevant stakeholders is ongoing to scale up the management assistanceprovided to one province to the entire country, in line with the progressof decentralization under the new constitution. JICA can also support
management improvement at the service delivery level, through thecontinued application of the 5S-kaizen-TQM approach in hospitals andother health facilities. These assistances are expected to contribute to
6. Other networks that have focused on UHC include the Joint Learning Network sponsoredby the Rockefeller Foundation and SHIELD based in the University of Cape Town.

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Toward Universal Health Coverage in Africa-Achieving MDGs with equity, and beyond

sustainable improvement in health systems performance whencombined with financing interventions to incentivize better performance(i.e., performance/results-based financing) which are being tried andintroduced in many countries in Africa.
(2) Capacity development for management of focused health programs
targeting MNCH, infectious diseases and other emerging health needs
JICA can support countries with focused health programs, such as
MNCH, major infectious disease control and other emerging healthneeds. Efforts should be made to produce synergistic effects with largescale funding for focused programs coming from other development
partners.
Despite the accelerated expansion of essential interventions for MNCH
and infectious disease control in Africa, gaps in service use will remain.
In addition to the financial contributions by GOJ to the global funding
mechanisms such as GFATM and GAVI, JICA can support thestrengthening of the program management capacity of the national andlocal institutions to deliver better services. Assistance such as thestrengthening of country-led donor coordination mechanisms,
standardization and harmonization of various technical guidelines andtools, integration and unification of M&E frameworks, conducting
implementation research and impact evaluations, and the strengtheningof laboratory capacity and external quality control mechanisms (fortuberculosis and other infectious disease control) can be provided as partof the efforts to improve program management.
(3) Facilitate mobilizing financial resources for UHC
In combination with the assistance to strengthen the capacity for both
health systems management and focused programs management, JICA
can provide assistance to mobilize financial resources for UHC in
accordance with the evolving capacity of individual countries.
It is essential that the African countries take leadership roles and makepolitical decisions to mobilize more domestic resources for health inorder to move toward UHC. Sound government financing, either
through a general budget and/or insurance schemes, is indispensable inorder to maintain health systems accountable to the health needs of thepoor and their financial protection. However, many African countries
will continue to face fiscal constraints even with sustained economic
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growth at least for the near future. There has been a remarkable increasein DAH to Africa, in particular to SSA. However, the major part of thefunds is allocated to focused interventions such as HIV and AIDS,
malaria, and other infectious disease control. Even though there are
efforts to increase DAH allocation to the health systems strengthening,such as the establishment of a joint funding platform by GAVI, GFATM
and the World Bank, the progress is slow.
JICA can provide financial assistance to eligible African countries
through a best mix of grant and loan facilities in accordance with the
evolving capacity of individual countries. Such assistance should be
provided catalytically to facilitate government initiatives to increase
domestic financing for health and expand pooled funding. It should be
provided in a way to promote better management practices ingovernment officials and health service providers. It should be catalytic
to promote investment and innovations from the private sector.
Combination with the support for management improvement, andcoordination with support from other development partners is essential.

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References
Barros, A. J. D., C. Ronsmans, H. Axelson, et al. 2012. Equity in maternal,
newborn and child health interventions in Countdown to 2015: A
retrospective review of survey data from 54 countries. Lancet
379:1225–1233.
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health. 2001. Macroeconomics andhealth: Investing in health for economic development. Geneva: WHO.
Dorgan, S., D. Layton, N. Bloom, et al. 2010. Management in healthcare:
Why good practice really matters. London: McKinsey & Company.
Hafner, T., and J. Shiffman. 2013. The emergence of global attention to
health systems strengthening. Health Policy and Planning 28:41–50.
Ikeda, N., E. Saito, N. Kondo, et al. 2011. Japan: Universal health care at
50 years 1; What has made the population of Japan healthy? Lancet
378:1094–1105.
Ikegami, N., B. K. Yoo, H. Hashimoto, et al. 2011. Japan: Universal healthcare at 50 years 2; Japanese universal health coverage; Evolution,achievements and challenges. Lancet 378:1106–1115.
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation. 2012. Financing global health2012: the end of the golden age? Seattle: IHME.
Logie, D. E., M. Rowson, and F. Ndagije. 2008. Innovations in Rwanda’s
health system: Looking to the future. Lancet 372:256–261.
Moreno-Serra, R., and P. C. Smith. 2012. Does progress towards
universal health coverage improve population health? Lancet
380:917–923.
Nyonator, F. K., J. K. Awoonor-Williams, J. F. Phillips et al. 2005. The
Ghana Community-based Health Planning and Services Initiative
for scaling up service delivery innovation. Health Policy andPlanning 20 (1): 25–34.
Sebastian, M. S., and H. Lemma. 2010. Efficiency of the health extension
programme in Tigray, Ethiopia: a data envelopment analysis. BMC
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biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/10/16 (accessed August 1, 2011).
Takizawa, I. 2012. Health development in Africa: Accelerated
improvement of health status and recommendations for Japan’s
development assistance. [In Japanese.] Journal of Japan International
Health Society 27 (1): 27–46.
Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems.
2009. Constraints to scaling up and cost: Working group 1 report.
Geneva: International Health Partnership.
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UNICEF. 2012. State of the world’s children 2012. New York: UNICEF.
WHO, UNAIDS, and UNICEF. 2011. Global HIV/AIDS response: Epidemic
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report 2011. Geneva: WHO.
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WHO. 2012b. WHO global health expenditure atlas. Geneva: WHO.

266

Chapter 10:
Challenges in Educational Development in
Africa and JICA’s Approach
Kazuro Shibuya

Introduction
This chapter looks at the challenges that Africa1 faces in education, anddiscusses JICA’s policies toward its development. Section 1 discusses thecurrent and overall situation of education in Africa (Sections 1.1 and 1.2).
The chapter will then discuss specific challenges for countries atdifferent educational developmental stages because, obviously,
countries at different developmental stages must have different
developmental strategies depending on their respective prioritized goals(Section 1.3). As a precursor to later discussions, Section 1.4 will have abrief look at future challenges toward 2015 and beyond.
Section 2 discusses JICA’s approach toward educational development in
Africa. In its efforts to contribute to education in Africa, JICA has
conceived a few development models based on its policy focus and its
comparative advantage built on Japan’ experience in education andhuman resources. Such development models will be intensively
discussed in this paper while JICA can provide various and wide-range
support for educational development in Africa
Finally, combining the discussions in previous sections, Section 3 willattempt to suggest some policy options for consideration by African
leaders and their partners participating at TICAD V.

The author would like to thank Prof. Kazuhiro Yoshida for his insightful comments for thedraft paper. Special appreciation goes to Kiyoshi Kodera, Hiroshi Kato, Nobuko Kayashima,
Jun Sakuma, Mitsuko Kumagai, Kazuhiro Tambara, Jun Kawaguchi and other colleagues in
JICA as well as the World Bank for their valuable input.
1. Since sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is faced with very serious challenges, much of the
discussion in this chapter will largely be on SSA. The challenges of North African countries,
however, will be dealt with as appropriate.

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1. Current State of Education Development in Africa andChallenges Faced
This section has an overview of education development in Africa: basic
education and post-basic education.
1.1 Current state of basic education in Africa and remaining challenges
Overall, there has been a substantial advancement in access to primaryeducation in Africa. Since the World Conference on EFA (Education forAll), in Jomtien, Thailand, in 1990, which called for universal access toprimary education as a fundamental human right, many Africancountries have introduced various policies to achieve universal primaryeducation with support from international aid agencies and NGOs. As aresult, the net enrollment rate in primary education, one of indicators
measuring achievement of the second MDG, improved from 58% (1999)
to 77% (2010) and, consequently, the net enrollment rate in secondary
education also increased from 19% (1999) to 29% (2009) (Refer to Figure
1).
Figure 1. Changes in the enrollment rate in primary education and secondary
education

Source: UNESCO USI Data 2010268

Challenges in Educational Development in Africa and JICA’s Approach

Also, there has been an advancement with regard to elimination ofgender disparities in primary and secondary education, i.e., Goal 3 of the
MDGs; the male-female ratio of the gross enrollment ratio at the primarylevel improved from 100:85 (1999) to 100:93 (2010) in Sub-Sahara Africa.
This seems to have been achieved thanks to efforts to improveeducational access for the females through the construction of schools inremote areas and the provision of scholarships, as emphasized in MDGs
and EFA (UN, 2012). Thus, there has been a massive improvement inenrollment in basic education.
However, even with such improvements in basic education enrollment,
the fact remains that many African countries lag far behind the world
average (NET primary: 91%, NET Secondary:82%) and that of SouthWest Asia (NET Primary: 93%, NET Secondary: 75%); in addition, large
disparities persist between urban and rural areas and among different
income groups within countries. (GPE report 2012) More attention
needs to be paid to these remaining challenges.
In contrast to rapid quantitative expansion, the quality of education, as
represented by the learning achievement of children, remains low. An
illustration of this can be found in the performance of some Africancountries in TIMSS,2 which measures the achievement in science andmathematics of fourth and eighth grade children. In the 2011 test,
participants from Africa, namely Botswana, Ghana and South Africa, areplaced lowest among participating countries, as shown in the figure on
the below.

2. Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study

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Figure 2. Poor quality of basic education in Africa(Left: TIMSS; Right: SACMEQ)

As one can see by looking at the SAQMEC data,3 in which two of thethree countries listed in the TIMSS score (Botswana and South Africa)
are on a par with other countries, one has to assume that the learningachievement of children in most African countries remains low byinternational standard. And in particular, among various aspects oflearning achievements, the low level of basic literacy and numeracy inearly grades at the primary education level is a major concern. In Kenya,
for example, a survey (UWEZO, 2011) found that the level of basic
literacy and numeracy of about 50% of fourth graders is only equivalent
to what the Kenyan curriculum requires of the second graders. It has
also been reported that the learning achievement of sixth graders in
Africa, on average, is only equivalent to that of second graders in OECD
countries (GPE, 2012). Such general insufficiency in basic literacy andnumeracy at lower grades is reported to hinder children’s learning oversubsequent years, resulting in the deteriorating general costeffectiveness of educational investment in Africa (Brookings Institution2011). Why, in Africa, does the quality of education remain low, or why,
in some countries, is it decreasing, despite various inputs made bygovernments and their development partners for the quantitative
expansion of education? To understand this, one has to look back at thepolicies introduced toward the achievement of EFA, along with theirpolicy intentions and consequences. After the introduction of the MDGs
3. Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality

270Challenges in Educational Development in Africa and JICA’s Approachand the World Conference on EFA, Dakar, Senegal, both in 2000,
universal primary education aiming at 100% enrollment and completion
became the top priority for education policy in many countries; thegovernments were subsequently requested to work out their educational
sector plans to clarify specific courses of action for the realization ofthese goals.
However, mostly African countries could not provide the quality
learning environment (schools, teachers, teaching and learning materialsetc.) to cope with the rapid expansion of access in basic education. Thismay have led to the deterioration of the quality of education during thatera. This was observed even in those countries that participated in the
EFA/Fast Track Initiative (FTI).4 The FTI was established in 2002 as amulti-donor fund for the purpose of providing financial and technicalsupport for the planning process of these sector plans and to fill in thefinancing gap between the education sector resource requirement andthe domestically available education budget. “The indicative
framework” which FTI presented was referred to in the process of sector
plan formulation by respective countries. They were benchmark figures
such as the following: “Education share of budget defined as publicrecurrent spending on education as % of total public recurrent
discretionary spending is approximately 20%,” “Primary education
share of education budget is approximately 50%,” “Recurrent spending
on items other than teacher remuneration as % of total recurrent
spending on primary education is 33%,” “Average annual salary ofprimary school teachers divided by GDP per capita is 3.5”,5 “Pupil–
teacher ratio in publicly-financed primary schools is 40 to 1,” and an“Percentage of repeaters among primary school pupils is less than 10%.”
However, many of the sector plans thus formulated did not necessarily
turn out to be realistic in the context of each country; they tended to beover-ambitious given the insufficient capacities of understaffededucation administration both at central and local levels, and the low
capabilities of and insufficient incentives for teachers/staff on the
ground. Thus, many problems arose such as delays in executing
education budgets and in the supply of educational materials to schools.
4. Of the 45 countries involved in the FTI’s support for educational sector planning andapplication for necessary funds, 28 of these countries are in Africa. Therefore, more than halfof the countries within Africa are participating in the FTI. EFA/FTI has turned to be the
Global Partnership for Education since 2011.
5. In Bruns et al. (2003), sample data for this indicator ranges from 0.6 to 9.6.

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Apart from these constraints, the shortage of additional financing madeavailable was also among obstacles that prevented the expected
progress. As a result, adequate facilities and materials were not madeavailable to schools and students, both of whose number increased
rapidly as a result of the free primary education policies. All this resulted
in a deterioration of the learning environment (Cambridge Education, etal. 2009).
This hasty application of the indicative framework of FTI to theeducation sector plans without deliberate consideration of the country
context could have been one factor that inadvertently brought thedeterioration of the quality of teachers. This happened because many
countries quickly increased the number of teachers to live up to theindicative pupil-teacher ratio and other indicators of the FTI: teacher
salaries were lowered, more teachers were employed on a term-contract
basis on lower salaries, teachers’ training periods were shortened, andenrollment requirements for teacher training programs were lowered inorder to rapidly increase the number of licensed teachers (Aidan 2010,
TISSA 2007). It is not only in the FTI participating countries but other
non-FTI participating African countries as well that the deterioration of
the quality of teachers occurred. Thus, it is worthwhile to further
examine what education policies has been introduced and what were
their consequences in such non-FTI participating countries.
It is also reported that the sudden increase of teachers with lesser
qualifications has resulted in the deterioration of the social status andreputation that teachers used to enjoy among community residents andparents (Felix 2005). It appears that teachers’ dissatisfaction with theirsalaries and benefits have actually lowered their motivation, thus
resulting in poor service delivery typically indicated by a high absentee
rate and limited teaching time. These problems were actually predicted;
as early as 2003 in the World Bank report (Bruns et al. 2003), which
served as a theoretical background paper for the FTI’s indicative
framework.
These developments, resulting in the deterioration in the learning
environment (lack of school facilities, textbooks, and teaching materials),
the poor quality of teachers and their services, are behind the poor
learning performance of children, even with increased access.
In addition to these policies, many countries have attempted to promote272

Challenges in Educational Development in Africa and JICA’s Approachthe decentralization of their educational management aiming to improvethe efficiency of administration and finance in education; it was also
expected that decentralization would enhance the accountability ofeducation to parents and community residents, thereby improving thequality of service delivery. As part of the policy, governments
established what are called “school management committees” mainlycomprising headteachers/teachers, parents, local community members
and local government officers (local government or local branch of
Ministry of Education), with the expectation of increased local
participation in education and hence increased efficiency in school
management.
Oftentimes, however, the school management committees have not beenfunctioning as expected due to the government’s inability to provide
sufficient budget allocation, clear delineation of the functions andmandates of the committees, and the insufficient ability of the schoolcommittee members. As such, and for other reasons as well, many
schools supported by the school management committees ended up
with inadequate facilities and teaching staff, failing to provide theeducation needed by children and their parents, who eventually lostinterest in supporting such poorly performing schools. Thus, notreceiving appropriate support from either the government or from thecommunity, the quality of education at such schools eroded.
It is as a result of these inadequate policy developments that Africa’s
current level of educational quality remains sub-optimal. Many
indicators point to the need for further efforts: a high dropout rate (30%),high repetition rate (15%), and low completion rate in primary education(67%) (compared to the world average of 2.5% (2010), 9.1% (2009) and
91% (2010), respectively). Continuous efforts to solve these problems areneeded.

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1.2 Current state of post-basic education in Africa and remainingchanges
We now turn to post-basic education (upper secondary and higher
education).
In recent years, African countries have experienced rapid economic
growth; however, this has not solved how to make best use of the youthin Africa for its industrial development. The youth in Africa still has
higher share of the unemployment than the adults. In addition, the large
majority of the youth are underemployed and occupied in low
productivity household enterprises (AfDB 2011).
Figure 3. Enrollment rate in upper secondary education and its relevance toeconomic development

Source: Yoshida (2012)274

Challenges in Educational Development in Africa and JICA’s Approach

Figure 4. Relationship between quality of upper secondary education andeconomic growth

Source: Hanushek 2007

Under these circumstances, the challenges in post-basic education in
Africa lie in improving the current net secondary education enrollment
rate of 29% (2009), enhancing the quality of education, and making
secondary education (or post-basic education) including skills
development more relevant and responsive to the needs of the society so
as to produce more qualified human resources to support much-neededindustrialization. Such efforts for the improvement in the supply ofskilled labor must proceed in tandem with efforts in industrial
development and labor policies. Africa also needs to cultivate top-level
human resources who will move on to higher education and go on toplay leading roles in industry. Thus, in a number of ways, post-basic
education must be enhanced both in terms of quality and quantity tobuild up human capital to meet the changing and increasing needs ofAfrica.
Figure 3 represents the relationship between the enrollment rate inupper secondary education and economic growth (GNI per capita). This
infers a correlation whereby countries with higher GNI per capita have ahigher enrollment rate in upper secondary education. In addition, thequality of education, namely, the extent to which students absorb thecontent of the education they receive, is largely related to the economic
development of each country. Hanushek asserts that there is a275

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correlation between the learning achievement in math (level of 15 yearolds) and economic growth (annual growth rate of GDP) as indicated in
Figure 4; and that in addition to the quantity of education (number ofschooling years), the quality of education (attained learningachievement) is also an important element in economic development(Hanushek and Wößmann, 2007).
Let us now turn to higher education. In terms of the higher education
enrollment rate, Africa, with an average rate of only 6%, lags far behind
other regions, let alone North America and Western Europe with a 70%.
With the recent progress of the globalization of higher education, thecross-border movement of students has become easier. In Africa, it has
been reported that approximately 5.9% of the students receiving higher
education study abroad (Table1). Compared to other regions, the African
continent has a relatively higher percentage of students who study
abroad.
Table 1. Number of students who study abroad in other regions (2010)

Source: UNESCO UIS data (2011)

These low enrollment rates, as well as the relatively high mobility ofstudents, can at least in part be accounted for by the insufficiency inhigher educational institutions within the African continent, in terms of276

Challenges in Educational Development in Africa and JICA’s Approachboth quality and quantity; they are not sufficient to meet the region’s
needs, thereby causing a brain drain of scarce and competent humanresources as they seek opportunities of higher education in other regions
and not coming back after their study. As a result, there is a severe
shortage in the number of researchers in Africa, which in turnundermines the ability to produce new knowledge and promote
innovation, particularly in science and technology (Figure 5).
Figure 5. Number of researchers per 1 million people (2007)

Source: UNESCO 2010

1.3 Diverse stages of educational development in African countries
So far, we have looked at the 54 countries in Africa collectively, but
obviously, the stages of educational development vary across countries.
To put this diversity in perspective, I would like to propose acategorization of the countries into four groups, by the levels ofachievement on three scales: the net enrollment rate in primaryeducation, the primary education completion rate, and the net
enrollment rate in secondary education. However, please note that thiscategorization is intended to have a quick overview of African countries
from the criteria of three leading indicators related to the access (the net
enrollment in primary and secondary education) and the quality of theeducation system (primary completion rate). This may not be an
ultimate way of classification of African countries at different
educational development stages nor excludes the importance of
secondary and higher education as well as that of the quality
enhancement of teaching and learning in each Zone. Each country could
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select its prioritized areas depending on the country context, and theeducation sector plan which discussed and agreed between thegovernment and the local education group of development partners.
Figure 6. African countries as categorized by major outcome indicators

Source: Created by the author based on UNESCO 2007

Zone 1 consists of countries in which the primary education net
enrollment rate is less than 70%. These are countries in whichquantitative expansion of primary education enrollment could be stilla high priority. This category includes many countries with a low GDP
per capita.6
Zone 2 consists of countries in which the primary education net
enrollment rate is 70% or higher and, at the same time, the primaryeducation completion rate is less than 70%. For these countries,
improving the completion rate by improving the quality of education
could be the main challenge. This zone includes countries in southeast
Africa, such as Malawi, Ethiopia, and Mozambique.
Policy measures to be adopted for countries in Zones 1 and 2 must take
into account the vast difference in income levels among them. Also, theefficiency of the countries’ educational administration and finance must
6. French-speaking countries, such as Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad, happen to fall into thiscategory; some argue that this is in part due to the educational systems in these countries
where instruction at schools is done only in French starting in the first grade; it is argued that
this system seems to be creating a language barrier for children resulting in low enrollment
and completion rates in these countries (K. Robert 2009).

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be looked at; countries at similar income levels and all with a fairly
reasonable level of public expenditure in education can sometimes
display considerably different achievement results in the primaryenrollment rate.
Zones 1 and 2 also include post-conflict countries such as the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and South Sudan; policy measures in thesecountries must be designed and implemented with careful attention
being paid to the history and other social, cultural and economic
backgrounds.
Zone 3 includes countries with a primary education completion rate of
70% or higher, but in which the net enrollment rate in secondary
education is less than 60%. This zone represents countries in which
improving the enrollment rate in secondary education could be madea priority, and includes countries that are more socially andeconomically stable than those in Zones 1 and 2, such as Kenya,
Tanzania, Uganda and Ghana.
Zone 4 includes countries in which most people have completed
secondary education, and in which enrollment in higher education has
been achieved to a certain extent; this zone includes the Maghrebcountries in northern Africa, South Africa and Namibia. In thesecountries, industries are diversified and economic structures have beendeveloped to some extent; the enrollment rates in primary andsecondary education have been improved to some extent, and the focus
has shifted to enhancing higher education.
In summary, countries in different categories have different
development challenges, and even among the countries that are
categorized as being at similar developmental levels, specific challenges
differ from country to country. African governments and theirdevelopment partners must be flexible in devising development/
support measures taking into consideration the stages of educational
development and their local context in each country.
1.4 Future global agenda for educational development in Africa
One of the main issues in debates on educational development toward
the MDG target year of 2015 and beyond is how to achieve “Learning forAll,” a concept that calls for the assurance of the quality of learning not279

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limited to the primary education level, but at all levels from pre-primary
up to post basic education. This would be a concept that goes beyond themuch used interpretation of “Education for All” concept, which ismainly aimed at universal primary education. More specifically, there
are three main arguments about “Learning for All” : (1) providing
education for children in rural areas, female students, disabled children,and ethnic minorities without disparity, encouraging out-of-school
children to attend school and enhancing the quality of learning; (2)making early child development (ECD) interventions as well as early
grade learning at lower primary school grades (including ensuring thelearning achievement of children in early-grade literacy and numeracy);and (3) improving education linked to the employment and thecultivation of human resources (human resources and researchers whoare engaged in science and technology).
Africa needs to pursue these agendas while continuing its steady efforts
to address the challenges that we saw earlier. Specifically, efforts must
continue for the improvement in the completion rate in primaryeducation and the resultant increase in the enrollment into secondary
education, which, in itself, needs to be expanded with the construction ofschools and enhancement both in the quantity and quality of teachers.
For the mainstreaming of Learning for All in Africa, various
development partners have been already actively working.
In their support toward achieving Learning for All, many development
partners seem to place strong emphasis on policy making by mobilizing
budget support, including lending, with policy recommendations. One
example is an initiative by the World Bank. As part of its new strategy(Education Strategy 2020), the World Bank is starting an initiative
including the construction of a policy benchmarking database called
SABER (the Systems Approach for Better Education Results). The idea
behind the initiative is the emphasis on the importance of systematic
support in informed policy making that is supported by the analysis andunderstanding of what policies are needed to produce the expected
policy outcomes (such as improvement in enrollment rate, completionrate, and learning achievement) using inputs (such as schools, trainingof teachers, etc.). Another example of a policy support instrument iswhat is called results-based financing that development partners like theWorld Bank and DfID of the UK are promoting. This funding mechanism
requires the achievement of pre-determined policy goals by the recipient
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Challenges in Educational Development in Africa and JICA’s Approachdeveloping countries as a prerequisite for the disbursement of funds.

2. JICA-supported Projects and their Comparative Advantage
Over the years, Japan has been undertaking extensive international
cooperation in education. The following sections will introduce three of
JICA’s approaches, which are currently being actively pursued withencouraging outcomes, especially in the African context. The first two
are specific models of educational development: the first one having to
do with school-based management (Section 2.1) and the second one with
the improvement of the quality of education through teacher training(Section 2.2). Following that, Section 2.3 will introduce JICA’s attempt tolink the experiences on the ground and policy making at the centrallevel.
2.1 Improvement of school management for a better educational
environment
At the center of measures for improving access to education has been theconstruction of more schools. However, recently, in addition to thephysical aspect of access, the significance of educational management
has been highlighted as a key area of intervention. Educational
management includes, at the central level, formulating a policy
framework, securing appropriate budget allocation, improving
administrative and fiscal capacities (budget preparation and execution),and information systems development such as EMIS (Education
Management Information Systems). At the local level, interventions
include transfer of authority over personnel and budgetary issues tolocal educational administrative bodies as part of decentralization
policies, improving administrative and fiscal capacities (budget
preparation and execution), and improvement of school management.
Among these, one approach that is receiving increasing attention inrecent years is school-based management (SBM); SBM basically aims atenhancing the efficiency and quality of school management by holding
individual schools more accountable through facilitating parents/
community members’ participation in school management. As a vehicle
to encourage participatory school management, the school management
committee is set up, comprising of pupils’ parents, community members
as well as school principals, teachers and local education administrators.
Originating in World Bank projects in Latin America – projects withencouraging outcomes – this SBM has come to be widely practiced in
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many parts of the world, including Africa.7
In fact, school management committees have been established in many
countries in Africa. Oftentimes, however, such committees are notproperly functioning for various reasons: sometimes the committee
members could not fully understand their mandates and responsibilities
due to the lack of the government’s efforts to provide necessary
guidance and support in the management of the committees; or the local
educational administration did not get involved as they should; and atother times, school management committees did not have the capability
to fulfill their expected functions owing to lack of proper training
opportunities.
In order to help correct such situations, JICA has been trying to introduce
the SBM in Africa with special emphasis on making the school
management committees functional. The “School for All” projects
implemented in four French-speaking countries in west Africa (Niger,
Mali, Burkina Faso and Senegal) are based on the idea that if school
management committees are organized and operated in such a way thatthey appropriately accommodate the pressing needs of pupils’ parents
and community members, they can serve to positively change themindset of the people toward education and contribute to theimprovement of the educational environment, including the resultant
improvement in enrollment rates. (For a more detailed description of the
projects, refer to Box 1).
In Niger, the number of school management committees (COGES in
French acronym) based on the model generated by the support fromJICA has been expanded, and is currently increasing across the nation.
As the extensive development of functioning COGES, the primaryeducation enrollment rate and completion rate have been improved(Figure 7).

7. So far, only a few attempts have been made to evaluate the impact of school-based
management (SBM) in Africa (e.g., an Extra Teacher Program (a program in which schools areauthorized to employ contract teachers directly) in Kenya) (Patrinos et al. 2011). More workneeds to be done to collect evidence as to what kind of approach leads to what kind of impact
in SBM, as SBM can take a variety of forms depending on the levels and width of mandates
given to school management committees and/or school principals.

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Figure 7. Acceleration of access to schools after the extensive establishment offunctioning COGES

Source: Created by JICA based on educational statistics of the government of Niger

Box 1. “School for All” Project in Niger

In its support for the government of Niger, JICA started the “School for All”
project in 2004 to promote effective SBM and to improve the educational
environment. Prior to the Project, the government of Niger enacted legislationin 2003 that the school management committees be established at each school.
However, the school management committees had not been functioning and
not responding to potential demand from parent and community members.
The project started with an analysis of the reasons behind the sub-optimalfunctions of the school management committees existing at that time. The
project team spent several months conducting school surveys on 140 schools
in target districts as well as awareness surveys of pupils’ parents andcommunity members as well as local administrators involved in education.
They also tried to learn from the experiences from the preceding projects byother donors. These surveys revealed that the fundamental reason of the thendysfunctional school management committees was weak support and sense ofparticipation from parents and community members; they were not led tofoster a sense of ownership toward the school management committees,
whose leading members as well as the scope of activities were decided in a
top-down, opaque manner.

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Thus, based on the discussions between the Nigerien and Japanese project
members, it was agreed to incorporate into the project the following activities
to make school management committees more functional:(1) Introduction of the system of democratic ballot-type election of leaders tomake the selection process more transparent and democratic; this was deemednecessary to make sure that competent leaders with full support from thecommunity are elected;(2) Implementation of awareness- and motivation-enhancing activities; thiswas done, for example, by organizing seminars on the necessity ofparticipating in decision making through attending community assembly
meetings; and by encouraging parents and community members to work out
school action plans and making contributions to their implementation (either
through monetary contributions or otherwise), stressing that all the project
activities are just to supplement their own initiatives;(3) Nigerien-led project management and implementation; this was stressedas critically important not only in view of the strengthening of Nigeriens’
capacity, but also, and more importantly, to allow the Nigerien side to nurturethe sense of true ownership of the whole activity as an endeavor they have toshoulder. Practically, the project made sure that major project activities, suchas the organization of seminars and monitoring, were led and/or conductedby the Nigerien project members and administrators without depending on
expatriate experts;.
(4) Transparent information sharing; documents and information such as
school action plans prepared by different school management committees
were made open for transparent information sharing and mutual learning.

This cooperation expanded in scale and advanced in status over time; it
started, in 2004, with approximately 130 targeted primary schools in apilot province and then expanded the coverage to 2,800 schools in two
provinces in 2007. In that year, the model for the school management
committees developed by this project was officially approved as agovernment policy and was subsequently expanded on a national scaleusing World Bank funds. As of August 2012, school management
committees have been established in all of the approximately 14,000
primary schools in eight provinces throughout the country, and of thesecommittees, nearly 90% have formulated school action plans andmobilized funds of 155,000 F CFA per committee (2 billion F CFA
nationwide) (source: JICA-supported School for All project in Niger).
They are contributing to the improvement of school environments bymobilizing funds and local labor, which are used for school facility
improvement, and the purchase of textbooks and teaching materials.
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Trials to improve the quality of education or the conducive conditions
that are necessary for quality improvement have also taken place. Over
60% of the committees are also involved in the organization of extra andnighttime classes to allow pupils to have additional learning time,
resulting in an increase of 200 hours of learning time on average. This
achievement can be significant in view of the fact in Niger where, whileregulations demand 960 hours of instruction per year, many schools had
ended up satisfying only 50 to 60% of that requirement.
2.2 Strengthening teacher education for improving quality of students’learning
The second approach that JICA has been promoting in Africa is the
improvement of the quality of education, attempted throughenhancement of in-service teacher training (INSET).
As has been repeatedly pointed out throughout this chapter, improving
the quality of education in Africa is as important as its quantitative
expansion, as the poor quality of education (or learning by children) is
one of the major factors causing high dropout and repetition rates inprimary and secondary education in Africa.
The quality of an education system can be affected by many factors: thecurriculum (objectives, content, sequence, etc.), quality and availabilityof textbooks and teaching materials, and the amount of learning time.
And equally, or perhaps even more important, is the quality of teachers,
which is considered as having a major impact on the quality of teachingand students’ learning outcome. The quality of teachers depends on anumber of factors: first, for securing the basic quality of teachers, there
must be a clear definition and standardization of what is required ofteachers in the first place, according to which qualified candidates must
be recruited and trained before they start working. Second, in school andclassrooms, teachers must be guided appropriately by the leadershipfrom the school’s principals, monitored for their performance and, whennecessary, assisted and mentored. They must be appropriately
motivated and incentivized in terms of salaries and benefits, and also
must be given opportunities to improve their teaching skills.
JICA’s approach has to do with the last approach listed above, i.e., thesupport for teachers in maintaining and upgrading their knowledge andteaching skills through the development of in-service teacher training285

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systems. JICA’s flagship project in improving the teachers’ quality is the
SMASE project, which is short for the “Strengthening of Mathematics
and Science Education.” The project is premised on two conceptual
thrusts.
The first is the idea that science and math education in Africa must be
upgraded by introducing a student-centered approach to the lessons in
the classrooms. In science and math classrooms in Africa, typically,teachers rarely undertake experiments or use teaching materials;
instead, they write on blackboards and talk “at” their students, while thestudents simply listen and take notes. This way of conducting classes,
often called “Chalk & Talk,” is common. Taught this way, students tend
to develop a passive attitude in class without any willingness to engage
with other students or think on their own. This passive learning attitudeof students has often led to low achievements in knowledge acquisitionin or understanding of the subjects taught. Based on this observation
JICA has recognized the need to transform the teaching style of teachers
in such a way that students are encouraged to participate in group
activities, create hypotheses, do experiments, and to think on their own;
here the teacher’s role is to support the students to learn.
The second premise of the project is the idea that INSET could be aneffective opportunity through which teachers can be motivated to brush
up their knowledge and skills. One advantage of INSET programs is thattraining participants – teachers – can apply what they learn in training totheir classes, easily, and immediately (For more details, see Box 2). The
need for the strengthening of math and science education was judged asof particular importance because they are generally believed to bedifficult subjects to learn, and in fact students perform poorly in thesesubjects, as demonstrated by the low pass rate in national exams.
Finally, collaboration with other development partners are taking place
under the education sector plans in each country. For instance, in
Ethiopia, JICA-supported in-service teacher training for science andmathematics teachers project is in well-coordinated partnership with the
GEQIP program, which is a comprehensive quality improvement
program of the Ethiopian government using pool-fund financed by theWorld Bank and other development partners. While JICA provides
technical expertise for the INSET implementation and monitoring
system as well as the training content in pilot areas, the GEQIP program286

Challenges in Educational Development in Africa and JICA’s Approachcovers other non-pilot areas supporting the expenses of the INSET
implementation and its monitoring.
Box 2. Approaches toward the improvement of the quality ofeducation in science and math education (SMASE)8
JICA’s development model for the improvement of the quality of science andmath education (SMASE) focuses on the development of INSET programs andsystems.
The exercise is premised on three key components. The first is the education
principle commonly called “ASEI-PDSI.”9 Developed originally in Kenya,
ASEI-PDSI is an educational paradigm that has guided the project’s activities
to transform the traditional teacher-centered teaching method into a more
student-centered, activity-oriented teaching/learning method. The second
component was in-service teacher training known as the cascade method; thisis a method whereby knowledge and teaching skills can be conveyed, throughmultiple-layer training programs, from the master trainers at the center toindividual teachers on the ground in a relatively short period of time. And
thirdly, the project placed strong emphasis on ownership by the recipient
governments; the project made sure that its activities were implemented
within the existing institutional framework and budget of the government,
without excessively relying on funding from external sources.
Guided by these concepts and management principle, the activities thatoriginated in Kenya have been expanded to other African countries, while
flexibly adapting its project contents to the circumstances in each country (asof November 2012, SMASE projects are implemented in 13 countries).
Whenever a SMASE project gets started in a country, the project activities
would start with a thorough check and analysis of the actual situation, needsof teachers and issues in schools through visits to schools/classrooms andbaseline surveys on children’s learning achievements. Based on theseanalyses, the project team would then proceed to plan and implement
teachers’ training programs with a number of trials and errors. The ultimate
goal is to create sustainable in-service teacher-training programs that would beplanned, operated, and monitored by local professionals.
8. For details of the project, see, Ogwel et al (2008), and Ishihara (2012).
9. ASEI-PDSI is explained as a guiding principle of the SMASE projects that “involves
providing meaningful teaching Activities focused on Student learning mainly
Experimental/practical work and Improvising resources when necessary. The PDSI
approach embraces orderly steps of executing learning activity by first Planning for theactivity, then Doing it while Seeing, observing with intent to evaluate and then finally
Improvising on the process.” (Ogwel et al. 2008)

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Over the years, the SMASE projects have increased the variety of the kinds oftraining programs to meet various and/or changing needs of different schools
and teachers and countries. One was a system of post-training follow-up
school visits, introduced not only to verify the usefulness of the contents of the
training programs but also to help the ex-training participants to best apply
their newly learned knowledge and skills in their class. Also introduced wereschool-based teacher training programs (lesson study) and regional training
programs to complement the main cascade training. JICA has supported theestablishment of cascade teacher training programs in Kenya, Malawi,
Nigeria, and many other countries. Content-wise, the projects have been
supporting the introduction of various materials such as reference books forteachers and workbooks for students in addition to ASEI-PSDI training
programs.
Thus, SMASE projects have been instrumental in supporting African
governments in developing a wide range of alternatives for the upgrading of
science and math teachers. Overall, these activities can be said to havecontributed, at the macro level, to the establishment of a country’s system ofcontinuous professional development and, at the micro level, to thedevelopment of capabilities of a countless number of teachers who have beenenabled to guide their pupils with their newly acquired teaching methods andskills.

Looking back at what JICA has been doing, it appears that one of JICA’s
comparative advantages in international cooperation in education may
reside in its ample body of experiences and practical knowhow that it
can offer for use and consideration by governments and theinternational community for policy formulation.10 The importance of
science and math education is widely shared among the governments
and their partners.11 Capitalizing on its experience in this field, JICA is
prepared to further strengthen its cooperation for the development ofscience and math education in Africa. It is prepared to strengthen its
contribution both in practice on the ground and for national-level policy
formulation, fully utilizing the already established network for

10. In a report on mathematics and science education in the East African Community (EAC)
countries (World Bank, 2011), JICA is referred to as an agency that enhances teachers’
pedagogical capabilities.
11. The World Bank and African Development Bank regard mathematics and scienceeducation as being essential to sustainable economic growth that utilizes science andtechnology.

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mathematics and science education in Africa (SMASE-Africa12), now
covering 34 countries.
2.3 JICA’s approaches that link policy and practiceDifferent actors in international cooperation have different comparativeadvantages and business domains. Some primarily work on the ground
implementing specific projects and programs, and others concentrate on
advocacy and policy making. While not many seem to be involved inboth, JICA is one of such development partners trying to cover both
domains of support for policy making and practice on the ground. Overthe years, JICA has developed its cooperation strategy comprising threecomponents: (1) model and content building, (2) capacity developmentof stakeholders, and, (3) support for informed policy making.
The first component, model and content building, refers to the activities
through which models of educational development and educational
contents are developed, tested on the ground and proven for theireffectiveness. The typical examples of the first component are thefunctional school management committee, the in-service teacher
training, and the teaching methods for student-centered lessons; thesehave been proven to yield maximum benefits on the ground in different
local contexts. The second component, capacity development of
stakeholders, refers to the activities geared to the capacity developmentof educational administrative officers, national and local trainers,
principals, teachers, and school management committees, and manyothers, who are both developers as well as users of the above-mentioned
models and contents. And the third component, support for informed
policy making, refers to the activities leading to policy making andsystems development on a larger scale needed to scale up andinstitutionalize the good practices on the ground.
Obviously, education policies are introduced, for example, to determinea certain course of action to achieve a certain pre-determined outcome,such as improving the quality of learning and the primary education
completion rate. Oftentimes in Africa, however, policies such as sector
development plans tend to be disconnected with the reality on the
ground, in terms of the goals, objectives, and available resources without
12. SMASE-Africa is working as a network of 34 countries in Africa to share knowledge andexperience and conduct south-south cooperation for science and mathematics education
among the member countries.

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taking into account stakeholders’ capacity. As a result, many policies end
up facing problematic outcomes.
To narrow this gap between policy and practice, it is imperative tounderstand the reality on the ground and rigorously analyze the causes
and contexts of the issues. Then it is critical to identify the potential gaps
between what the policymakers’ understand/believe/envision andwhat is actually happening or will likely happen on the ground after the
adoption of the policy. For this gap-filling, careful surveys and researchmust be conducted, and to supplement them, additional information
obtained through the implementation of actual projects could beenormously useful. As a development partner with hands-on experienceof project implementation, JICA could be in the position to transform an
ample body of tacit and non-tacit knowledge of the reality on the groundto best practices and knowledge which could help the policymakers tomake informed decisions. This is the notion which JICA should pay
more serious attention to in terms of the global policy dialogues amonginternational community as well as local education groups in eachcountry.
There are already several cases where national level policies have beenformulated, supported or substantiated by knowledge accumulated on
the ground: in Niger and Mali, for example, the JICA-supported modelof school management committees was tested on the ground and cameto be proven effective and applicable in the context of the two countries;
the models were subsequently adopted as a national policy and havebeen expanded nationwide.
Concurrently, efforts are underway to distill these experiences further
into the formulation of policy frameworks. As part of such effort, JICA iscollaborating with the World Bank’s SABER furnishing the latter with
the information on the ground related to SBM, indicating the gap
between policies and practices, and presenting evidence on a workablemodel at the school level. These exercises could lead to the developmentof various policy tools, such as a set of indicators with which to measure
the real impacts or interim outcomes of various actions, including
systems reform by the government; if developed, these indicators could
be used as disbursement indicators in result-based financing.

290Challenges in Educational Development in Africa and JICA’s Approach

3.Towards TICAD V and beyond
The preparatory process for the TICAD V is in progress. While thechallenges are enormous and varied across countries and regions, theconference must come up with clear, prioritized policy messages focusedon a set of agendas according to which African governments and theirpartners can make concerted efforts toward their achievement. In theauthor’s view, the outcome document of the conference, Yokohama
Action Plan, must highlight the following as the two pillars of the policy
message: (1) scaling up of quality basic education, and (2) strengthening
education that contributes to sustainable growth.
The first pillar, scaling up of quality basic education, demands fullenrollment in basic education as well as the improvement in thecompletion rate in basic education, particularly primary education; thisgoal is to be achieved through the improvement of the quality of basic
education, the increase in secondary education enrollment withexpanded school facilities, and the provision of quality secondary
education so that students can acquire advanced knowledge andpractical skills for higher education or employment. The policy message
should also pay due consideration to equity in terms of urban-rural,gender, and income disparities.
The second pillar, strengthening education that contributes tosustainable growth, demands that quality secondary education, andparticularly that in mathematics and science, be expanded on the top ofsolid basic education. Added to this, higher education must also be
expanded to foster, particularly, human resources in science andengineering. Technical and vocational education must also be
strengthened to provide opportunities to learn skills leading to higher
employability of the working-age population.
JICA is prepared to contribute to the concerted efforts of the African
governments and the international community, and take measures asshown below, which are combinations of the business models shown
above and other models and/or modes of cooperation that JICA has at
its disposal.

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Chapter 10

For the first pillar: scaling up of quality basic education◆ Enhancing support for “School for All” Project
JICA will continue to expand the model developed in the “School forAll” project. Here, with the project model, functional school
management committees accompanied by strong parent/community
participation, transparent election of its representatives, and mutual
learning among school management committees , and continuous
monitoring by local education administrators, JICA could proceed its
expansion in the following manner:, (1) scaling up from the pilot
activities to a nationwide operation, and (2) further improving thequality of learning (i.e., securing extra learning time, introducing
supplementary teaching materials to ensure basic numeracy) incountries where the project is already implemented. And, of course,
the expansion of the model can entail (3) starting projects in newpartner countries. JICA is of the view that the models developed in
the School for All projects have been proven effective in bringing
benefits for those who are in rural and disadvantaged areas, thus cancontribute to the policy message to be agreed on in TICAD V.
◆ Construction of school facilities and teacher training institutions
JICA will continue its support of the construction of schools, while
fully taking into account the demand/supply of qualified teachers,
and the need for reducing urban-rural, income, and genderdisparities. For example, providing girls’ toilets in schools is very
important to reduce gender disparity in education. In addition, JICA
will continue its support for constructing teacher training institutions
to help produce more qualified teachers. JICA is also prepared tocontribute more to the policy making processes through various
dialogue channels to offer recommendations on the allocation plan ofqualified teachers and continuous capacity development of teachers.
For the second pillar: strengthening education that contributes tosustainable growth◆ Strengthening teacher training (particularly in science andmathematics)
JICA will further reinforce its support for teacher training based on
the achievements thus far. In so doing, JICA will continue targeting,in particular, mathematics and science subjects, as these are292

Challenges in Educational Development in Africa and JICA’s Approach

important subjects for developing human resources for realizing
sustainable growth, and yet are difficult for students to master.
Toward the same goal, JICA will, in particular, make further use of its
already-established network for strengthening mathematics andscience education in Africa, namely SMASE-Africa, currently
covering 34 countries. Using its various models and menus, JICA will
support the capacity building of teachers in its partner countries. A
big advantage of SMASE-Africa is that it is a network that enables
South-South knowledge exchange and co-creation among
participating countries, with the help of which JICA could partnerwith those partner countries that otherwise are not within easy reach.
◆ TICAD human development framework
JICA will support sustainable growth in Africa by reinforcing
cooperation in science and technology. Typical examples of support
for the promotion of higher education include those for the Jomo
Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT) and the
Egypt-Japan University of Science and Technology (E-JUST). Backed
by a consortium of Japanese universities, the projects would support
the upgrading of higher education in these institutions to benefit not
only the students of the two countries but also many aspiring
students in the whole of the African continent. In addition, JICA willcontinue to maintain the provision of scholarships.
For enhancing vocational training, JICA will continue its support for
related institutions, such as the ones that JICA has supported in
Senegal and Uganda, which are establishing regional centers of
excellence (COEs). Such COEs would play active roles in promoting
intra-region study programs by receiving students from other
African countries.
Differentiated approaches are needed for countries facing different
challenges. As illustrated in Figure 6 in Section 1.3, African countries
could be grouped into four groups. Subsequently, earlier in thissection, the two important policy messages that TICAD V is likely tocome up with, has been identified:(1) quality of basic, especiallyprimary, education, and (2) the need to intensify human resources
development for sustainable growth. Finally, four major approaches/interventions for educational development in Africa that JICA could
intensify in the coming years have been highlighted. Needless to say,293

Chapter 10

all these approaches and interventions should be put into practice inharmony with the sector development framework of the country andin consistent with the budgetary (government) and financing(overall) framework. For instance, producing more teachers without
an effective deployment plan or a resource back-up will not improve
the situations. Figure 8 shows how JICA’s approaches/interventions
could correspond to major policy challenges in each Zone. This does
not mean to limit area and types of JICA’s support for each Zone.
Specific areas and types of support could be discussed and agreed
upon through policy dialogues at each country.
Figure 8. JICA’s support corresponding to stages in education development in
AfricaSource: Created by author

For partner countries belonging to zones 1 and 2, the first two of JICA’sapproaches are to be vigorously pursued. For these countries, the major
challenges are to improve the primary education enrollment rate andimprove the primary education completion rate. Thus, the constructionof primary schools and teacher training institutions will contribute to
the improvement of such indicators. This approach will be pursued withparticular consideration for various social disparities. The “School forAll” Project will also be intensified vis-à-vis these countries. The
activities under this approach can improve, in addition to theimprovement of enrollment in primary education, both the completion294

Challenges in Educational Development in Africa and JICA’s Approach

rate as well as the quality of primary education. Countries in zones 1 and2 also have to address the challenges in the secondary education level, towhich strengthening teacher training must be stressed, and inparticular, in science and math that can serve as a foundation for the
students’ logical thinking abilities and general learning capabilities.
For countries in Zone 3, improving the enrollment rate in secondary
education is a challenge, and for these countries, JICA could pursue,
among others, support through the construction of school facilities andteacher training institutions, especially for secondary schools andteacher training institutions; more secondary schools are needed toaccommodate an increasing number of pupils who are to complete
primary education; and teacher training institutions for supplying
qualified teachers to meet increasing demands. For countries in Zone 3,
strengthening teacher training (particularly in science andmathematics) is important, since knowledge on science and math is abasic need for human resources for further professional training,
employment and eventually for the country’s sustained growth. And
finally, countries in this stage of development need to nurture humanresources competent in science and technology, who will lead thecountry’s industrialization; hence, support for higher education andtechnical/vocational education will be provided through the TICAD V
human development framework.
Zone 4 consists of countries that are already beyond the issues ofenrollment or completion rates up to secondary education, with asignificant portion of students advancing to higher or vocational
education. An issue for these countries is how to develop highly
qualified human resources, particularly in science and technology, bydeveloping a system of quality higher education. For these countries,
support through the TICAD V human development framework would
be the main vehicle of cooperation.
In sum, JICA could furthermore commit to work in partnership underthe education sector program in each country, and contribute to global
policy dialogues as well as those in local education group with proactive
and concrete actions and solutions, which could link between policy andpractice.

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Concluding Remarks
This chapter started with an overview of the current challenges in
educational development in Africa (Section 1), and then looked at someof JICA’s established models of development in education (Section 2).
Combining these, the paper argued for a possible policy direction that
JICA could employ in line with the policy message that would be agreed
on at the TICAD V meeting (Section 3). As I see it, JICA has been active inprogram implementation on the ground, and also, recently, increasingly
keen to contribute to policy debate at the country and international
levels. Capitalizing on its comparative advantage that can link policy
and practice, JICA has a lot to contribute to educational development in
Africa. The challenges ahead of us are still enormous, and JICA should
continue providing support for the realization of sustainable growth inAfrica in partnership with a broad range of actors both from Japan andabroad.

296

Challenges in Educational Development in Africa and JICA’s Approach

References
African Development Bank (AfDB). 2011. AfDB’s human capitaldevelopment strategy (2012–2016): One billion opportunities;
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Aidan, M. 2010. Teachers in Anglophone Africa: Issues in teacher supply,
training, and management. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Brookings Institution. 2011. A global compact on learning. Report
prepared by the Center for Universal Education, Brookings
Institution.
Bruns, B., A. Mingat, and R. Rakotomalala. 2003. Achieving universal
primary education by 2015: A chance for every child. Washington, DC:
World Bank.
Bruns, B., D. Filmer, and H. Patrinos. 2011. Making schools work: New
evidence on accountability reforms. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Cambridge Education, et al. 2009. Mid-term evaluation of the EFA Fast
Track Initiative, draft synthesis report, volume 2, annexes: Annex C;
The FTI indicative framework and the UPC target. Fast Track
Initiative evaluation report, contracted by the World Bank.
Felix, E. 2005. The neglected heart of educational development: Primaryteacher education strategy in Malawi. Journal of Education for
Teaching 31 (1): 25–36.
Global Partnership for Education. 2012. Results for learning report 2012.
Washington, DC: Global Partnership for Education.
Hanushek, A., and L. Wößmann. 2007. The Role of Education Quality in
Economic Growth. Policy Research Working Paper 4122, WorldBank.
Ishihara, S. 2012. Network-type cooperation: Strengthening ofmathematics and science education in Western, East, Central, andSouthern Africa (SMASE-WECSA) Network. In Scaling up SouthSouth and triangular cooperation, ed. H. Kato. Tokyo: JICA ResearchInstitute.
Japan International Cooperation Agency. 2005. JICA thematic guidelines:
Basic education. Tokyo: Japan International Cooperation Agency.
Kaplan, R. B. 2009. Language planning and policy in Africa, volume 2:
Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria and Tunisia. Clevedon, UK:
Multilingual Matters.
Ogwel, A., J. Odhiambo, and S. Kibe. 2008. Impact of SMASSE INSET on
students’ capacity through improved teaching and learning in the297Chapter 10classroom.
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465278/Impact_of_
SMASSE_INSET_on_Students_Capacity_through_Improved_
Teaching_and_Learning_in_the_Classroom.
SACMEQ. 2005. Reports on the quality of education SACMEQ. http://
www.sacmeq.org/ reports.htm (accessed in December 2012).
TTISSA. 2007. Teacher Education Policy Forum for Sub-Saharan Africa
report. Report of the Teacher Education Policy Forum for SubSaharan Africa, UNESCO Headquarters, Paris, November 6–9.
UNESCO. 2011. EFA global monitoring report 2011. Paris: UNESCO.
United Nations. 2012. Millennium development goals report 2012. New
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Uwezo. 2011. Uwezo Kenya 2011: Are Our Children Learning? Annual
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World Bank. 2011a. Learning for all: World Bank Group Education Strategy
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World Bank. 2011b. A regional exploration of pathways towardharmonization of math and science curriculum in the East African
community. Discussion Paper.
Sawada, Y., and T. Ishii. 2012. Do community-managed schools facilitatesocial capital accumulation? Evidence from the COGES Project in
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Department of Education, Manila, April 26.

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Part Ⅲ:

Resilience for Inclusive and Dynamic
Development

Chapter 11:
Countermeasures against Climate Change in
AfricaTomonori Sudo

1. Introduction
Climate change is already a reality; various phenomena such as rises in
global average temperature, floods and drought due to changes inprecipitation, an increasing number of large-scale typhoons, hurricanes
and cyclones and other extreme weather events have been observed,
and, in the long run, rises in sea level caused by the melting of glaciersand ice sheets in the Antarctic, and many other serious phenomena
could be realized. IPCC (2007) predicts that greenhouse gases (GHGs)
will continue to increase, leading to serious climate change unlessappropriate actions are taken promptly. The effects of climate change
could threaten human lives, damage the social capital and the fruits ofdevelopment that both advanced and developing countries haveaccumulated over the decades and centuries.
Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to climate change,
since in addition to being adversely affected by the consequences ofclimate change such as torrential downpours, drought, the submerging
of low-altitude areas due to a rise in sea level and so on, their physicaland social capital is not sufficiently developed to adapt to climatechange. African continent and other least developed countries (LDCs)
and small island developing states (SIDS) are countries of particularconcern for their vulnerability to climate change, as many of their
inhabitants depend on the natural environment for their livelihoods, andthose are already vulnerable even under the current climate conditions.
Thus, climate change will introduce new risks to the Continent, in
addition to current environmental and socioeconomic stressors.
On the other hand, Africa contributes the least to ongoing global
warming, while advanced countries, as well as China, India, and other301

Chapter 11

emerging countries, have attained economic growth while emitting large
amounts of the GHGs that accompany industrialization.
A number of studies on the impact of climate change, mitigation andadaptation and other climate -related activities have been implemented
in developing countries. Many developing countries have analyzed therisks caused by climate change and have formulated mitigation andadaptation policies, which have been submitted as National
Communications to the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (UNFCCC 2012).
Climate change issues are also a critical development agenda, anddevelopment partners have worked to mainstream climate change
issues into their development cooperation policies and strategies. The
OECD has developed policy guidance to integrate climate change
adaptation into development cooperation (OECD 2009). The World Bank
featured climate change issues in its 2010 World Development Report(World Bank 2010), noting that although climate change is one of many
issues that developing countries face, “Left unmanaged, climate change
will reverse development progress and compromise the well-being ofcurrent and future generations.”(World Bank 2010: 37)
Japan has been an active player in the international community in its
effort to combat climate change. In1997, the Japanese government
announced a new initiative named the “Kyoto Initiatives,” advocating
proactive assistance to developing countries for countermeasuresagainst climate change. Of particular note for Africa, the Yokohama
Action Plan, compiled at TICAD IV in 2008, discusses “Addressing
Environmental Issues and Climate Change,” along with the need topromote measures for mitigating or adapting to climate change, water
resources conservation, hygiene, and education for sustainable
development (ESD).
JICA has worked to support countermeasures against climate change in
Africa based on the Yokohama Action Plan, at the same time revising the“Direction of Low Carbon and Resilient Development Cooperation by
JICA” (JICA 2012). JICA is offering assistance to developing countries intheir countermeasures against climate change while advocating threebasic policies: (1) climate compatible sustainable development; (2)comprehensive assistance utilizing an array of schemes; and (3)302Countermeasures against Climate Change in Africa

collaboration with development and climate partners.
Against this backdrop, this chapter discusses the challenges and theways to address climate change in Africa. Section 2 gives an overview ofthe general discussion on the importance of such countermeasures;
Section 3 summarizes the effects of climate change in Africa and thesituation regarding GHG emissions; Sections 4 through 6 will discusschallenges and opportunities regarding climate change, respectively
focusing on mitigation measures (Section 4), adaptation measures(Section 5); and on funding, technologies and market mechanisms
related to countermeasures against climate change (Section 6). Finally,
Section 7 proposes five recommendations for the direction ofinternational cooperation to be pursued at TICAD V and beyond.

2. Dealing with Climate Change

2.1 Impacts of climate change
Developing countries are highly vulnerable to natural disasters;
according to a report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC) published in 2012, over 95% of the people killed in natural
disasters between 1970 and 2008 lived in developing countries. They
suffer not only in terms of human causalities; the economic losses indeveloping countries caused by natural disasters between 2001 and 2006
were smaller than losses in developed countries in absolute terms, butwere higher in low-income countries as a percentage of GDP (about0.3%) than they were in advanced countries (below 0.1%) (IPCC 2012).
As shown in Section 1, various phenomena caused by climate change
will affect to the developing countries severely. Therefore,
countermeasures against climate change need to include adaptation
alongside with measures to mitigate exposure to the effects of climatechange (mitigation). Here, “adaptation” refers to strengthening capacity(adaptive capacity) to reduce the vulnerability of people and natural
systems to risks related to climate change.
2.2 Mitigation and adaptation
Mitigation includes introducing renewable energy, promoting energy
conservation, reducing the methane gas generated from livestock waste,
and increasing CO2 sequestration by afforestation, reforestation andforest conservation, and so on. However, these measures must be
promoted in such a way that they do not impair the benefits of303

Chapter 11

development. Therefore, governments need to formulate appropriate
plans and strategies to balance both development policies andmitigation policies at the national and sectoral level. In addition,
governments also need to establish socioeconomic systems where
resources are utilized efficiently and effectively, and to promote
development and deployment of low-carbon technologies that allow
these plans and strategies to be realized.
Measures to deal with the effects of climate change (adaptation) include
strengthening adaptive capacity against the increasing number of
meteorological disasters, and infrastructure development to deal withthe medium- to long-term impact of climate change. However, theimpacts of climate change are influenced by such diverse factors andcannot be fully foreseen. Thus, such adaptation measures need to beconsidered based on the features of the regions, sectors, andcommunities concerned, along with nationwide measures. In order tosteadily pursue adaptive measures in developing countries, thegovernments need to formulate National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) andother appropriate strategies and plans at the national and sector level.
When formulating these plans, it is desirable to take into consideration
the results of scientific analyses, such as impact assessments, backed up
by scientific data. However, due to the uncertainty of the impacts ofclimate change, formulating policies based on a precautionary approachand a “no regrets policy” will be required, in a way that suits thedevelopment needs of developing countries.
Furthermore, the governments need to take into consideration the risk of“maladaptation” that exacerbates the vulnerability to climate change,
when they design plans and projects. That is, without appropriate
measures to avoid maladaptation, the adaptation plan and/or project
may make the region (or other region) vulnerable further. Therefore,
adaptive measures need to be examined with sufficient caution during
implementation in order to prevent maladaptation, after discerning thevulnerability of the targeted strata and how they are affected by climatechange.

3. Africa and Climate Change

3.1 Greenhouse gas emissions in Africa
As a region, Africa has among the world’s lowest greenhouse gas
304

Countermeasures against Climate Change in Africa(GHGs) emissions and contributes the least to climate change. The
percentage of global GHGs emissions emitted in Africa is lower than thatof any other region. In 2005, the total GHG emissions from the African
region were only 6% of the global total. Moreover, GHG emissions in the
African region are 2.56 tons per capita, which is less than half the global
average of 5.85 tons per capita (WRI-CAIT 2012).
At individual country level, however, some countries have large
emissions. For example, per capita emissions from Equatorial Guinea,
the Central African Republic, Libya, Gabon, South Africa, Seychelles,
Angola, and Botswana exceed the global average.
Figure 1. Africa’s Percentage of Global GHG Emissions

WRI-CAIT (2012)

Figure 2. GHG Emissions per Capita in African Countries

WRI-CAIT (2012)

On the other hand, 585 million people (about three-quarters of the
population in Sub-Saharan Africa) cannot access modern energy, and ofthese people, about 85% live in rural areas and use firewood and otherbiomass fuels for cooking and so on. Furthermore, about 30 countries
suffer from a chronic shortage of electricity.
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Chapter 11

However, energy demands are expected to rise due to the rapid
economic growth and population increase in recent years. It should be
noted that if African countries choose to depend on fossil fuels to meetthese energy demands, GHG emissions from Africa will increasesignificantly (World Bank 2012).
In addition, GHG emissions due to land-use and/or land use change arecomparatively high in some countries. Those will be increased by further
land-use change from forest to farms to address increasing food demand
due to population increase.
3.2 Impact of climate change in Africa
Africa is one of the regions most impacted by climate change. Table 1
summarizes climate change trends in Africa and their future impact. In
Africa, the temperature has risen by 0.5ºC compared to 100 years ago,
and impacts of El Niño and La Niña phenomena have been aggravated
due to global warming. Also, the impact of climate change on incomes is
estimated to reach 1.9–2.7% of GDP. In addition, about 75–250 million
people will be threatened due to through increased water stress, andadditional 80 million people be at risk of malaria.
Table 1.
Trends

Impacts-Africa is warming: Africa is 0.5ºC
warmer than it was 100 years ago.

-Increased water stress: 75-250 million
more Africans will be at risk of water
stress by 2025; arid and semi-arid
lands are likely to increase by up to8%; 25–40% of animal species innational parks in sub-Saharan Africa
are likely to be become endangered.

Tendency toward greater extremes:
global warming will exacerbate El
Niño and La Niña effects.

-Vulnerability is rising: the income
effects of climate change areapproximately 1.9–2.7% of GDP in
Africa.

-Food insecurity: parts of the Sahara
are expected to suffer agriculturallosses of up to 7% of GDP.

-Uncertainty remains: the precise
effects of climate change on Africa are -Threats to health: an additional 80
million people will be at risk of
not well understood at the country
malaria.
level, due to the fact that very few-Sea level rises: coastal zones,
countries have their own climate
especially in East Africa, will facechange scenarios and riskincreased flooding with theassessments.
adaptation bill reaching 10% of GDP.
Source: Adapted from World Economic Forum (2008).

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Countermeasures against Climate Change in Africa

Climate change seems to have already begun to take its toll in Africa. In
the past several decades, the average rainfall in Sub-Saharan Africa has
shown a decreasing trend. Compared to the monthly rainfall between
1951 and 1980, the average amount in the 2000s has decreased by asmuch as 7 mm. The reduction ratio is 2.5 times that of Asia and morethan 10 times that of Latin American and the Caribbean countries. The
instability and decrease in rainfall poses a food security threat to Africa,
where over 90% of agriculture depends on rainfall (UNDP 2012).
Also, Africa is a region where abnormal temperatures, droughts,
wildfires, and other climatic disasters take place at the second highest
frequency in the world, after East Asian and the Pacific. Even thoughother natural disasters such as floods and violent storms occur lessfrequently here than in other areas, their number has increased at thesecond highest rate in the world and the affected population has tripled
in the past decade (UNDP 2012).
Climate change is believed to aggravate the frequency and intensity of
extreme weather phenomena. There are concerns that this in turn could
have serious impacts not only on agriculture and water resources, butalso on ecological systems and gene resources, as exemplified by the
expansion of disease vector habitats and the extinction of plant andanimal species (IPCC 2011).

4. Mitigation Measures in Africa

4.1 Challenges and opportunities regarding mitigation measures inAfricaAs noted above, Africa contributes the least to ongoing global warming,
while advanced countries, as well as China, India, and other emerging
countries, have attained economic growth while emitting large amountsof the GHGs that accompany industrialization. In many Africancountries, where economic development and poverty reduction are themost urgent issues, expectations are high that economic development
and poverty reduction will be realized by following the same path
toward industrialization as these advanced and emerging countries,
while effectively utilizing their own resources in the region. Moreover,there is an urgent need for improved access to energy in view of the factthat three-quarters of the population in the region have not had access toenergy and have endured chronic electricity shortages, and also because
307Chapter 11energy demands are expected to increase as the economy andpopulation grow.
Thus, although the lack of economic infrastructure development is an
important challenge for Africa, this situation may be an opportunity for
Africa to move toward greener and more sustainable development, in amanner unlike that adopted by the advanced and emerging countries.
Africa has a potential to develop renewable clean energy. For example,
Africa holds 15% of the global hydroelectric power generation potential,
but only about 10% of this has been developed (World Bank 2012).
Besides hydroelectric power generation, there is also high potential forphotovoltaic power, solar thermal power, wind power, geothermal
power, and biomass energy. By utilizing these resources effectively, therisks accompanying fluctuations in the international price of crude oiland other fossil fuels may be reduced. In addition, there is a potential for
Africa to improve efficiency of energy/resource use by leapfrogging tomore efficient technologies and infrastructure.
Africa also has great potential for carbon sequestration and storage. The
tropical forests in Africa’s Congo Basin constitute the second largest sucharea in the world. However, these forests have been continuing to shrink
and deteriorate due to farmland conversion, excessive logging, forest
fires, and other factors. According to the FAO, the global forest area
shrank by about 13 million hectares a year on average between 2000 and2010, which is equivalent to one-third of Japan’s national land area. Of
this, Africa accounts for 3.4 million hectares (FAO 2010). The need toconserve forests, where these natural resources and carbon are stocked,
has increased. The Congo Basin is an effective carbon sequestration andstorage resource, and is also high in biodiversity. Congo Basin may bebenefitted by Introducing Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES), such as
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation plus
conservation, the sustainable management of forests and enhancementof forest carbon stocks (REDD+), since PES could add new economic
value to natural resources which has not yet been appropriately valued.
The sections that follow present a sector-by-sector discussion of thechallenges and opportunities related to mitigation measures.

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Countermeasures against Climate Change in Africa

4.2 Energy sector
Improving access to energy is important in view of making progress inindustrialization, the poverty reduction accompanied by industrial
development, and expanding opportunities to access education andmedical services. In order to address increasing in energy demands, thegovernments need to consider stable energy supply while also attending
to preventing pollution and conserving the natural environment.
Africa also has abundant potential for renewable energy, as exemplified
by the photovoltaic power and solar thermal power that could beobtained from the ample sunlight in the Sahara Desert and surrounding
areas, the geothermal energy found mainly in the Great Rift Valley, thecopious source of hydroelectric energy found mainly along large
international rivers, and the wind power capacity found mainly along
the coastal areas. Crude oil and other fossil fuels have also been found in
the region. Those resources could help the government to establish a low
carbon society, if the government promotes proactive use of renewableenergy and the cleaner use of limited fossil fuel resources appropriate to
the economic and technology level of each country.
In addition, GHG emissions could be reduced if a more efficient andstable power supply were made possible by developing of efficient
power transmission networks and regional power interchange systems
based on power pooling. In remote regions, access to energy could be
improved by utilizing small-scale power generation by hydroelectric
power, solar power, wind power, and biomass power, as well as
independent small-scale grids. However, the use of low-carbon energy
requires efforts on the user side such as energy conservation in addition
to those on the supplier side. Energy users in rural areas need to convert
the traditional types of fuel and methods to modern and more thermallyefficient methods.
To support African countries’ efforts toward increasing their energy
efficiency, JICA has assisted in renewable energy projects including wind
power generation in Egypt and geothermal power generation in Kenya,
research to utilize solar energy in the Sahara Desert, and thedevelopment of efficient power transmission and distribution networks
in Tanzania and Cameroon, and so on.

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4.3 Transportation and urban sectors
Developing the transportation infrastructure is also important topromote economic growth. On the other hand, economic growth could
lead to increasing fuel demands and GHG emissions as roadtransportation demands increase. If the development of high-trafficarterial roads is insufficient, the increased traveling time caused bytraffic jams could hinder economic growth and lead to excessive fuelconsumption. Also, if the transportation infrastructure is vulnerable tothe foreseeable natural disasters due to climate change, the transport ofnecessary goods could be impaired in times of disaster, and economic
activities could be impeded until recovery is achieved. Therefore, theintroduction of low-carbon transportation systems that have sufficientresilience to withstand disasters need to be considered when examining
transportation system development.
JICA has assisted African countries in transport infrastructure in various
ways: one typical example is the development of arterial roads such as
the Nacala Corridor of Mozambique; another is logistics improvement
by developing one stop border posts to reduce congestion at borders.
Urbanization has progressed rapidly in major urban areas. Urban plans
should be revised by reallocating urban functions more efficiently,
according to the development stage of the city, and in the medium- tolong-term, disasters-resilient low-carbon urban development should beattempted. As such medium- to long-term projects, the introduction ofrailroads and Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems may be possible options
mainly in large- and medium-scale cities.
4.4 Forest management
As discussed above, Africa has an abundance of diverse forest resources,
as exemplified by the Congo basin, which is the world’s second largest
area of tropical forests. Forest conservation is important for increasing
the water-retention capacity of the soil and mitigating the scale andfrequency of natural disasters, in addition to retaining a resource forabsorbing GHGs. In other words, forest conservation is expected to haveboth mitigating and adaptive effects. On the other hand, Africa has oneof the highest percentages of forest reduction in the world. The
percentage of forest coverage in the Sub-Saharan region fell from 31.2%
in 1990 to 28.1% by 2010. This reduction is attributed to the excessive
exploitation of forest resources caused by population growth, the310Countermeasures against Climate Change in Africa

accompanying fulfillment of basic needs, and economic development, as
well as the conversion of forests to other uses (AUC et al. 2012).
Mitigation measures with the aim of reducing GHGs by curbing forest
reduction in developing countries were on the agenda for the first timeat the 11th meeting of member countries to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (COP11).
Subsequently, Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest
Degradation (REDD) was officially adopted as one of the topics forconsideration under the Bali Action Plan at COP13, and it was decided in
the Copenhagen accord at COP15 to pursue the development of a
REDD+ framework.
The introduction of Payments for Ecosystem Services, such as carbon
sequestration and storage by forest resources (REDD+), is expected toprovide an incentive for forest conservation in the Congo basin andother places where forest destruction is underway.1
In forest conservation, it is important for the policy makers and project
developers to consider residents who depend on forest resources fortheir livelihoods. It is also important for the government to steadily
promote the sustainable use of forest resources in a way that contributes
to sustainable forest management, poverty reduction, and regional
development. Communities that depend on forests for their subsistence
have sometimes used appropriate forest conservation techniques as partof their regional traditions. These indigenous technologies could also be
used for effective forest conservation. Also, for reviving deteriorated
forests, sustainable forest management needs to be promoted by trading
sustainably produced lumber, along with planting and replanting trees
in Africa and other areas.

5. Adaptation Plans in Africa

5.1 Challenges and opportunities for adaptation plans in Africa
There is growing concern for Africa about extreme weather, such as thehistorical drought in the Horn of Africa in 2011, and on food security.
Even if a significant reduction in CO2 is realized globally, it will still takea long time for GHG concentrations in the atmosphere and the climate
system to stabilize, and the adverse effects from future climate change
1. JICA has assisted in forest conservation programs in the Congo Basin, Gabon, Ghana,
Malawi, and other countries.

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could expand. Especially in Africa, where many of the poor live in rural
areas and depend on natural resources for their livelihoods, including
rain-fed farming, the impact of climate change is a huge threat toachieving inclusive development, since poor people will mainly beaffected by the impact of climate change Water resources are not justused for drinking water and cultivating food for subsistence, but also formany other uses, including for power generation and as industrial
water. In addition, in urban areas, due to rapid urbanization andpopulation increases, improvements in urban infrastructure such as
water supply, sewerage and drainage systems have been delayed, andmeasures to combat floods are also urgently required. From thisviewpoint, it is necessary for the governments to consider appropriate
water resource management including management of forest as sourceof water, improvements in food productivity, improvements in watersupply and sewerage systems, and the appropriate reuse of water
resources as cross-sectoral theme.
Another threat to development posed by climate change is loss ofdevelopmental dividend due to the increase in natural disasters. The
higher frequency of natural disasters and their increased intensity may
lead to a loss in the human, social, and natural capital that has beenamassed thus far, and could wipe out all the efforts to reduce poverty
that have been made to date. This makes efforts to prevent disasters andreduce their impacts essential to securing the benefits of development..
Furthermore, responses to future climate must be considered withregard to existing infrastructure as well as in the creation of new
infrastructure. For example, an irrigation facility would require theinstallation of water-saving equipment so as to withstand the adverse
effects of changes in precipitation brought by climate change. For
developing countries to create a society and economy capable ofwithstanding the effects of medium- to long-term climate change, theestablishment of climate-proof infrastructure will be required.
In many cases, water resource management and disaster prevention will
require a cross-border response. Especially in Africa, with its many
international rivers, cooperation among watershed nations is important.
Since this is an area where benefits are maximized through cooperation
as opposed to through settlement by disputes, a policy dialogue among
countries and the formation of cooperative groups involving various
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stakeholders, such as private enterprises, citizen organizations, andcommunities, could maximize benefits, as well as accelerate regional
unification, which in turn could lead to expanding markets and new
business opportunities (AfDB 2012).
To tackle those challenges and to take an advantage of opportunities,
African countries need to improve climate information for informed
decision making, tailored solutions including development of early
warning system, seasonal forecasts and regional level climate change
projections.
The sections that follow will discuss, sector-wise, the challenges andopportunities concerning response measures.
5.2 Agricultural sector
Being dependent on rainwater and lacking adequate distribution
systems, Africa has traditionally been very vulnerable to shocks such as
droughts and floods. For example, between 2010 and 2011, the Horn ofAfrica region suffered a severe drought, and more than 10 million people
faced a serious food crisis. While the region has periodically suffered
severe damage in the past, in recent years the rainwater cycle has
become more irregular, and the amount of actual precipitation is falling.
Agriculture is a source of wealth and poverty reduction in Africa, as
discussed in Chapter 2. Indeed, the share of employment in agriculture
is 65% in the region, and still constitutes a large 32% share of GDP, onethird of the economic development factor (World Bank 2008). In the past,
Africa increased production by expanding its cultivated acreage;
however, cultivated acreage per capita has been declining due todemographic pressure, and, coupled with stagnant land productivity,
this has resulted in a drop in grain production per capita.
Economic growth and strong demographic pressure have caused foodconsumption needs to expand rapidly, worsening the domestic supply
and demand balance and increasing its dependency on food imports. In
other words, Africa is highly vulnerable to external conditions such as a
sharp increase in international food prices and bad weather
accompanied by climate changes.
Although improvements in agricultural productivity are urgently
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required in Africa, improving productivity alone will not necessarily
make the region less vulnerable or more resilient. Further measures
should be considered for the government and farmers; for example,
agricultural infrastructure development such as irrigation facilities tohelp farmers adapt to climate change, development of crop andcultivation methods, and the introduction of agricultural techniques
adaptive to climate change. JICA is helping to improve the cultivation
system to respond to the droughts and floods caused by climate change.
The private sector will play an important role in assisting local farmers
to improve their productivity and enhancing the commercial values ofthe products through their investment and technology transfer, making
their agricultural product competitive in the market. Particularly,
foreign agricultural investments are needed in strengthening the
production capacity of developing countries, and it is important for thegovernments to continue promoting this.2 On the other hand, if plans arepoorly structured and implemented, international agriculturalinvestment could have unintended negative effects on the politicalstability of the recipient nation, as well as on its social cohesion, humansecurity, sustainable food production, food safety on a household level,
and environmental protection. It may also lead to local residents losing
access to resources they depend on. Furthermore, land transactions are avery sensitive issue. In Africa, where laws and regulations concerning
land use are not well established and where communal land use is a
traditional norm, international land transactions can trigger a serious,
emotionally charged backlash. At the L’Aquila Summit in 2009, the G8
nations highlighted the Promotion of Responsible Agricultural
Investment, a comprehensive approach to promoting global agriculturaldevelopment through increased investment while mitigating thenegative effects of international agricultural investment. In September
2009, the “Principles of Responsible Agricultural Investment that
Respects Rights, Livelihoods, and Resources,”3 consisting of sevenprinciples, were announced.4 The expectation is that throughagricultural investments conducted in line with these principles,
agricultural infrastructure will be developed and technology to improve
agricultural productivity by sustainable methods will be introduced
2. See Chapter 4 of this volume for more detailed discussion on investments in agriculture.
3. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/food_security/pdfs/besshi3.pdf
4. Refer to the Knowledge Exchange Platform for Responsible Agricultural Investment (RAI),
https://www.responsibleagroinvestment.org/rai/.

314

Countermeasures against Climate Change in Africa(refer to Chapter 3).
Since the agricultural sector is the most vulnerable to climate change,
another idea would be to establish a structure to cover losses fromclimate aberrations, such as a climate index insurance policy.
5.3 Disaster prevention and reduction
In recent years, many African countries have been hit by large-scale
natural disasters, such as floods, droughts, coastal erosion, andmudslides. With the increasing frequency of natural disasters, the risks
they pose and their influence on social and economic development arealso rising. However, their effects are varied, and a case-by-case
response is required. At the UN World Conference on Disaster
Prevention in 2005, the Hyogo Framework for Action was adopted as aninternational framework for disaster prevention. In accordance with the
Hyogo Framework for Action, it is important for the governments toestablish disaster prevention plans in line with the priority that eachcountry places on them.
To respond to large-scale disasters accompanying future climate change,
meteorological and climate observation capabilities must be improved,
and an early warning and evacuation system structure constructed on
the bases of an accurate meteorological and climate change forecasting
system. In addition, there is a need to improve climate change risk
management capabilities in infrastructure development at a sector level,such as agricultural development, water resources management, andtraffic, to mainstream disaster prevention and the rapid recovery fromdisasters.
In addition to conducting disaster prevention training in Africancountries, JICA is cooperating in programs to enhance response
capabilities in countries including Benin, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, andLesotho, helping to increase their resistance to natural disasters.
Hosono (2012) points out that there are three kinds of gaps between thecapabilities required for disaster prevention and the actual levels of suchcapabilities, which are (1) the level required for addressing expected
impact of disaster (a disaster scenario), (2) the level required for a levelexceeding a disaster scenario, and (3) the level required to respond tolong-term changes. To close these gaps, there are cases in which the315

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traditional techniques handed down in the community or thetechnologies used in other developing countries are more favorable thanthe latest technology. In such cases, cooperation through South-South
cooperation or triangular cooperation may be effective.
To respond to a temporary shortage of funds in case a massive disasteroccurs, systems such as standby-type loans and insurance could be
utilized as safety nets.
5.4 Water resources management
Water resources are an important component in almost all development
sectors. Among others, water demand is expected to increase due to the
expansion of agricultural and industrial production and the energy
sector as well as increasing demand of safe water supply for human
lives, while the changes in precipitation accompanying climate change,
and the decreased water retention capability due to the reduction offorest resources are all likely to cause an unstable water supplies. Africa
has not been able to fully develop the potential of its rich renewable
water resources (UNECA et al. 2011). Therefore, developing thesepotential renewable water resources and appropriately managing water
resources are important issues for Africa.
Africa has a number of international rivers like the Nile and the Congo,
and approximately three-quarters of its surface water resources,
estimated at 4.6 trillion cubic meters annually, are concentrated in eight
major international rivers (World Bank 2009). This makes it essential toconduct cross-border water resource management and to establish
master plans and enhance governance to conduct optimal Integrated
Water Resource Management (IWRM) for each watershed, which would
include the appropriate development of surface and ground water andthe purification and recycling of industrial and living discharge water.
Africa has established an Africa Water Vision for 2025, which aims toprovide an environment in which all people will have equal access towater resources, be able to use these for power generation andagriculture, create an enabling environment for IWRM, and integrate
regions based on watersheds (UNECA et al. 2011).
Reservoirs can be an effective response to an unstable water supply(World Bank 2009). However, a safe water supply will have a different
meaning for urban and rural areas. In urban areas, improvements in the316Countermeasures against Climate Change in Africa

water supply system will be required to deal with the increase inpopulation caused by the inflow of people into the areas. On the other
hand, since many people lack access to safe water in rural areas, one
urgent issue for the governments is to establish in these communities asystem and infrastructure for a stable supply of safe water. JICA iscurrently assisting rural water supply projects in Djibouti and Ethiopia.

6. The Funding, Technology, and Market Mechanisms Associatedwith Climate Change Measures
The demand for funds to implement these measures is huge. As
discussed in Chapter 7, there is a high demand for funds forinfrastructure improvement in Africa. AFD-WB 2009 calculated theinfrastructure funding needs for 2006–2015 to be US$93.3 billion, and thefinancial gap between this amount and that already expended to be
US$48.0 billion. Of this, the funding gap, excluding the efficiency gap(US$17.0 billion), was calculated at US$31.0 billion (AFD-WB 2009).
According to an estimate by the AfDB 2011, the funding needs
accompanying climate change measures will be around US$9–12 billion
annually, if Africa is to take the low-carbon development route, and theincremental cost if appropriate measures are not taken now is estimatedto be around US$13–19 billion (AfDB 2011).
At COP16, the Cancun Agreement was established (UNFCCC 2010),
which clearly stated that in the three years between 2010 and 2012,
developed countries would provide funding aid of almost US$30 billion
to developing countries in the area of climate change (“fast-start”
finance). It also agreed to establish a Green Climate Fund that would
make US$100 billion in funds available annually by 2020 (long-term
funds).

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Figure 3. Flow of Funds to Africa

Source: UNCTAD, OECD/DAC, and World Bank. IMF’s GDP forecast for 2012.
Extracted from Africa Economic Outlook (2012)

As indicated in Figure 3, the flow of funds is on the increase. This fundflow includes not only ODA, but also contains a large amount of foreign
direct investment from the private sector. As private fund is also one ofmajor finance sources, government need to consider to mobilise private
funds, not just public funds, so as to finance in climate change measures.
For further mobilisation of funds for climate change measures, Africancountries need to strengthen the absorptive capacity for climate funding
and improve enabling environment for private sectors.
Particularly, the governments need to engage diverse actors
comprehensively in planning and establishing; climate change policies,
such as Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) andNational Adaptation Plans (NAPs), as part of their development
policies; information sharing and dissemination with related parties intransparent manner; and implementation of measures based on an
appropriate budget. The climate change program loans now being
implemented in Indonesia and Vietnam are donor support schemes forthese activities. In these schemes, the donor and the government of thedeveloping country engage in dialogues on the provision of financial
support, through which they monitor and evaluate the implementation
status of a climate change policy scheme matrix. These schemes provide
an efficient way for governments to implement climate change policies
such as NAMAs and NAPs as part of their development policies, work
toward transparently sharing and disseminating information with318

Countermeasures against Climate Change in Africa

related parties, and implement measures based on an appropriate
budget (Sudo et al. 2008, Katsurai and Murakami 2012). On the other
hand, Furukawa et al. (2013) have surveyed the effects of general budget
support in the health sector and concluded that although there havebeen certain improvements in budget allocations in this sector, thesehave had a limited effect on improving health indicators. They commentthat general funding support and the complementary effects of the
projects and programs require attention. The complementary effects
between policy, budget, and project, as pointed out before, should beconsidered carefully, when policy planner consider to introduce a
climate change program loan.
There is also a strong need in Africa for appropriate low-carbon
technologies for enhancing development that is resistant to the effects ofclimate change. The Cancun Agreements also included an agreement toestablish a Climate Technology Center and Networks, in order to expand
and promote the development and transfer of technology to assist in
mitigation and adaptation, and to understand and support technicalneeds in developing countries. To promote the use of appropriatetechnology, various activities, such as formulating systematic
capabilities and data-gathering capabilities, and establishing systems toshare knowledge, will be required in addition to training humanresources.
These technical and investment needs could also create an attractive
market for private companies. Establishing an attractive market
environment for private companies to introduce technology andinvestments could help promote climate change measures in the private
sector.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), one of the market
mechanisms introduced under the Kyoto Protocol, was expected topromote the active participation of the private sector in the mitigation
business, and over 5,500 projects have been registered to date. However,as of the end of December 2012, only 104 projects, a mere 1.9%, were in
Africa (UNFCCC 2012). It has been pointed out that the current CDMs
have not been able to fulfill the functions intended at the Kyoto Protocol
due to the complexity of the applications and fundraising for low-profit
projects (Yamada and Fujimori 2012). The use of market mechanisms,
such as a simplified CDM or a bilateral offset credit system mechanism,319

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could act as an incentive for private companies to provide investments
and technical transfers, and efforts to improve the system and develop
the ability to effectively utilize these mechanisms are important.

7. Toward the Effective Promotion of Climate Change Measuresin Africa
As mentioned above, climate change is a cross-cutting issue and aproblem that has possible global effects. This means that instead ofindividual actors such as countries, sectors, or communities respondingin an ad-hoc manner, it requires a comprehensive approach spanningvarious strata from the individual and community level to thegovernmental and regional level, and there is a need to resolve the“apparent disconnect” generated between a policy-based top-down
approach and a community-based bottom-up approach (Bharwani and
Taylor 2011). In addition, the activities of each actor must be consideredfrom the viewpoint of externalities that influences the actions of others.
For example, an adaptive policy taken by one community might trigger
a maladaptation that could exacerbate the disaster damage in anothercommunity. Therefore, to effectively implement climate change
measures, information sharing among a wide range of actors isimportant, from the international level down to the community level.
Although Africa has the world’s lowest amount of GHG emissions, it isaffected the most by climate change. For Africa to maximize its natural
resource potential in a sustainable, low-carbon way, and be resilient toexternal shocks such as the effects of climate change, it must engage insustainable development in which everyone can receive the benefits ofgrowth. In other words, Africa is in a position to target sustainable
development through inclusive and resilient green growth. Africa’s
climate change measures are themselves the start of a new development
process.
Regarding its support for climate change measures in developing
countries, the Japanese government announced the Kyoto Initiative in
1999, the Environmental Conservation Initiative for Sustainable
Development (EcoISD) in 2002, the Cool Earth Partnership in 2008, andthe Hatoyama Initiative in 2009. Climate change was incorporated into
the Yokohama action plan, at TICAD IV, and as part of the Cool Earth320

Countermeasures against Climate Change in Africa

Partnership, US$92.1 million in funding was declared in the action plan
to support climate change measures in African countries. In the three
years from 2010 through 2012, a total of approximately US$1.3 billion
was provided, as support for climate change measures in Africa,
covering both mitigation measures and adaptation measures. Japan and
JICA have more than fifteen years of experience in the area of climatechange measures, and as the largest donor in this field, JICA supports
many projects and programs. It has extensive knowledge on theestablishment and implementation of promotion methods and theplanning and implementation of specific policies related to climatechange measures (such as energy, traffic, and agricultural policies), as
well as in the measurement, reporting, and verification of GHG
reduction effects using Climate-FIT, in vulnerability assessments, and in
the methods used to assess project effects through post-project
evaluations. This knowledge should be used effectively to support
climate change measure policies in Africa. Based on the discussions
above, we offer the following recommendations for the effective
promotion of future climate change measures in Africa.

Recommendation 1:
It is necessary to establish climate change policies in accordancewith the conditions of each country as part of its development
policies, share and disseminate this information with stakeholders
in a transparent manner, and implement it with appropriate budget
allocation.
The climate change policies established by governments, such as
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) and National
Adaptation Plans (NAPs), are prepared as part of each country’s
development policy, and it is desirable for these climate change policies
to generate co-benefits that will contribute to sustainable development(Fujikura and Toyota 2012). Many countries in Africa have alreadycreated NAMAs. In addition, LDCs have already prepared National
Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs). These clear, foreseeable, andstable policies lend credibility to the activities of actors, including inprivate investment. In establishing these policies, the opinions of actors
in the private sector and civil society organisations (CSOs), as well as
those of women and the poor, should also be actively incorporated along321

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with those of the government. Furthermore, although the use of data
based on scientific analysis is recommended wherever possible, such as
the amount of GHG emissions and forecasts of the effects of climatechange (Fujikura and Kawanishi, 2010), it is also necessary for the policy
makers to respond to the needs of their respective countries based on
precautionary principles and the concept of a “no regrets” policy, taking
into consideration the capabilities of the subject sector, region,community, and others.
To support these activities, in addition to supporting projects orprogrammes, schemes such as climate change loans can be effective, but
great care should be taken with regard to the mutually complementary
nature of policy, budget, and project policy, as well as the leverage effects
of general funding support.
Recommendation 2:
For effective Green Growth in Africa, support for access to information
as well as innovation through R&D are important to identify
opportunities for low-carbon and climate resilient growth and promote
effective green growth.
Access to information is the most important factor in today’s society, notonly for disseminating climate change policies, but also for providing
disaster information or information concerning low-carbon technologies
and funding access. It is also important for a country in determining how
it can apply climate change measures implemented by other nations orcommunities, or what effect they could have. Making greater use of
information and communication technology (ICT) is one way to improveaccess to this information. Sharing information and knowledge throughpolicy dialogues is another effective method. In addition, the NAMAs
established by each country require monitoring, reporting, andverification (MRV), and securing the transparency and accountability of
information through MRV will enable the implementation of
appropriate climate change policies in a plan-do-check-act (PDCA)
cycle. Furthermore, access to technical information will promote a
country’s introduction of technology that is internationally available andit can utilize, and could lead to the development of technology enablingleap-frogging. We must not forget that appropriate technical information
includes not only cutting-edge technologies, but also information on
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Countermeasures against Climate Change in Africa

traditional technologies, which can be very useful at times. Technology
transfers are expected to include not only transfers from developed
countries, but also transfers between developing countries throughSouth-South cooperation and triangular cooperation (Hosono 2012).
From the viewpoint of inclusivity using environmental education toenhance people’s awareness of climate change is important, particular
for the poor, who are vulnerable to the effects of climate change, and also
for women, and future generations.
Recommendation 3:
It is necessary to establish an enabling environment where everyone,
including the private sector, will participate in various climate change
measures.
It is important for the public sector to establish a path toward thecreation of a low-carbon economic society resilient to climate change
through policies and system improvements. However, the public sector
itself neither manufactures nor conducts business transactions on its
own. Everyone, not just private companies and CSOs, but also poor andsocially vulnerable people, is involved in certain economic and social
activities. In view of the public and external nature of global-scale
climate change, the participation of all is required for a low-carbon,socio-economic model that is resilient to climate change.
In particular, high expectations are placed on the private sector’s
participation in climate change measures, in terms of its broad influence,
funds, technology, and ability to increase employment. As pointed out
by JICA-RI (2012), in addition to support from the policy side, in order topromote the participation of the private sector, actions will be required
including organizing an investment environment such as stable
macroeconomic operations, establishing fair and transparent legal
systems, promoting business models such as public-private partnerships(PPPs), and providing support and seed money for establishing projects.

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Recommendation 4:
To promote climate change actions, it is necessary for Africancountries to use market mechanisms effectively along with the effective
use of funds and promotion of capability development
The implementation of specific climate change measures requires funds
and implementation capabilities. The Cancun Adaptation Framework
requires annual funds of US$100 billion to be made available by 2020, as
well as the structuring of a system to enable effective technology
transfers; there is also a strong need for funds for climate change
measures and technology in African countries. The effective use of funds
is required, as well as the development of ways to maximize the effects
of development and climate change measures while minimizing
additional costs. Funding for climate change was discussed at the 2011
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, and the partnership document
it adopted calls for the promotion of consistency, transparency, andpredictability in effective climate change finance and a broad approach
toward development aid (OECD 2011).
In addition to their effective use for supporting climate change
measures, public funds are also expected to provide leverage in
obtaining private funds,. Establishing a structure and environment topromote private investment can also contribute to an overall increase in
private investment, beyond climate change measures. Moreover, bymonitoring and evaluating the efforts of the donors involved, even more
effective cooperation could be possible. Lamhauge et al. (2012) haveconducted studies on monitoring and evaluation methods with regard
to several donors’ support for adaptation measures. Such monitoringand evaluation methods focusing on the role of donors should be
examined in the future.
Market mechanisms like CDM and bilateral offset credit mechanisms, or
innovative mechanisms like PES, including REDD+, can be easy for
African countries to work with. As pointed out by JICA-RI (2012), in
order for these mechanisms to be used effectively to benefit Africancountries, it is necessary to develop the capabilities of the Africancountries themselves, and to introduce these mechanisms into
international society so they can become even easier to use.

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Countermeasures against Climate Change in Africa

Recommendation 5:
JICA needs to function as a Solution Provider by establishingpartnerships with various stakeholders..
From the viewpoint of the public and external nature of climate change
on a global scale, an approach to climate change must be taken with theparticipation of all people. Japan and JICA have more than fifteen yearsof cooperation experience in the field of climate change, and also
constitute the top donor in this field. Particularly, Japan and JICA havecomparative advantage in effective use of renewable resources,
improvement of efficiency and productivity with optimal management,
and so on. There is a need to proceed with cooperation to implement the
optimal climate change measures, with Japan and JICA providing all thecooperation knowledge they have amassed to date for everyone to use.
In recent years, other donors have also started to provide active support
for climate change measures. Further knowledge is also being amassedin the academic and private sectors. In order to establish a low-carbon
economic society with the ability to withstand climate change, all thisknowledge needs to be utilized in an intercomplementary manner sothat all people, including the poor, will be able to receive the benefits ofdevelopment. Providing an optimal solutions by establishing networks
with various actors while keeping in mind international negotiations,
technology, and funding trends in the climate change field will be
required. To do this, we recommend establishing a broad collaboration
among international organizations, other aid organizations, CSOs,
universities, autonomous bodies, private companies and others, as wellas providing bridges for exchanges among various actors, such as
mediating policy dialogues between communities and governments.

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Korea, November 29 to December 1.
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2009. Integrating climate change adaptation into development cooperation: Policy guidance. Paris: OECD.
Sudo, T., A. Sato, Y. Murakami, and M. Motohashi. 2009. Promotion ofdeveloping country’s climate policy implementation: Applying
development policy loan. Paper presented at the Asia-Pacific
Forum on Low Carbon Economy, Beijing, China, June.
Sudo, Tomonori. 2012. Climate change and development in Africa.
Presentation at the fourth Annual Meeting of Low Carbon Society
Research Network (LCS-RNet), Oxford, UK. http://lcs-rnet.org/
meetings/2012/pdf/P3_3_Sudo.pdf (accessed January 8, 2013).
Troell, J. J., and C. Odote Oloo. 2011. Climate change adaptation andwater in Kenya: Governing for resilience. In Fujikura and
Kawanishi 2011, 259–285.
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 2012. Africa humandevelopment 2012: Towards a food secure future. New York: UNDP,
Regional Bureau for Africa.
United Nations Economic Council for Africa (UNECA), African Union,
and African Development Bank (AfDB). 2011. The Africa water vision
for 2025: Equitable and sustainable use of water for socioeconomic
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2010. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held
in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010. FCCC/
CP/2010/7/Add.1.
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Geneva: World Economic Forum.
Yamada, Kazuhito, and Mariko Fujimori, 2012. “Current Status andCritical Issues of the CDM. In Fujikura and Toyota 2012, 37–48.

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Chapter 12:
State-building and Conflict Prevention in
AfricaRyutaro Murotani

1. Introduction
Violent conflicts have been one of the major obstacles to economic
growth and development in Africa.1 However, in the 2000s, according to
the UCDP/PRIO datasets, the African continent witnessed a decrease in
the number of armed conflicts and battle-related deaths compared to the1990s. After the end of the Cold War, the number of armed conflicts inthe world hit its peak in the early 1990s, but started to decline from 1993.
In Africa, the number continued to increase to 18 in 1998, but started todecrease in the early 2000s (refer to Figure 1). The battle-related deaths
per year in Africa, which used to be some 20,000 to 80,000 in the late
1990s, are some 3,000 to 10,000 in recent years. Today, Africa is no longer
a continent with many large-scale violent conflicts.
Although the negative impact of violence has declined, we need toremain attentive to potential risks and continue to work on peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Conflict risks are still major concerns
for foreign investors. According to a JETRO survey (2013), political andsocial instability is the largest concern for Japanese investors in Africa,
and more companies are worried about it in 2012 than in 2007.
In the past, some countries suddenly became unstable and fell into
violent conflict; there are only 15 countries in Africa that have gone
through the past three decades without any armed conflict (based on
UCDP/PRIO’s criteria). Besides, many countries experienced the
1. Although the statistics provided in the first section cover the entire African continent, themain focus of this chapter is countries in Sub-Sahara Africa. Having gone through the ArabSpring in 2011, many of the countries in North Africa are facing the challenge of a transition tomore stable democratic rule. Though there are some similarities and inter-connectedness inchallenges of state-building in North Africa and Sub-Sahara Africa, contexts andcharacteristics differ so widely that it would be difficult to address both regions in the limited
length of this chapter.

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Chapter 12recurrence of conflict in a transition period from conflict to sustainable
peace. As discussed in World Bank (2011), post-conflict peace-building isa long-term endeavor, which requires more than a decade of institutionbuilding efforts.
Alarmingly, a new type of conflict is on the rise in recent several years,
producing an upward trend in the number of armed conflicts. Today,
there are many conflicts in which trans-national non-state actors such as
Al-Shabaab, AQIM, FDLR, and LRA are involved. The recent tragic
incident in Algeria demonstrated the political and security risks posedby these non-state armed groups to foreign investors.
Figure 1. Number of armed conflicts in Africa (top) and in the rest of the world(bottom)

Source: Author’s calculation based on UCDP/PRIO datasets2

2. “Internationalized” conflicts are ones that occurred between the government of a state andone or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary
parties) on one or both sides. “Extrasystemic” armed conflict occurs between a state and anon-state group outside its own territory (mostly colonial or imperial wars).

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As the characteristics of violent conflicts have shifted from purelyinternal strife to violence and fragility caused by transnational non-state
actors, capable state institutions that provide basic public services,
including public safety in remote areas, are a significant element inpreventing these problems. The lack of such capable institutions is one of
the reasons that allow transnational non-state actors to be active in thesefragile areas. The building of an “effective, legitimate, and resilient state”(OECD 2008, 7) is definitely necessary to address such problems.
Coercive measures are frequently needed to counter terrorists, however,
it is also essential to look at structural problems that lead to these
phenomena. To prevent the spread of the general public’s support forthese non-state armed groups, poverty, inequality, and other social
problems need to be addressed. It also requires a political/social
mechanism that articulates citizens’ expectations and enables the state torespond to society’s demands. In this sense, state-building is a vital
endeavor for achieving a stable and peaceful Africa.
The chapter discusses the challenges of state-building in Africa,
particularly in relation to conflict prevention. It first highlights
important points, which have been raised by existing literature anddiscussions, concerning state-building (Section 2). It emphasizes theimportance of state legitimacy in the eyes of the people, livelihood
improvement in addition to public safety, and a long-term perspective
for state-building. Section 3 then introduces major research findings by
JICA-RI and a JICA survey of its operations. For donors to help improvestate legitimacy, the section calls attention to context-sensitivity,
horizontal inequalities (HIs), and people’s perceptions. In Section 4,
JICA’s current field experience related to state-building will be
discussed. On the basis of the analysis in Section 2 and Section 3 and thereview in Section 4, the final section will present policy implications forthe future.

2. State-building: Building of Capable and Legitimate Institutions
Through their experiences of post-conflict peace-building, theinternational community, acknowledging the high risk of the recurrenceof violent conflict, expanded its focus from short-term emergency
response to long-term institution building. Not only in post-conflict
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settings but in general, to prevent violent conflicts and establish public
safety, state institutions with sufficient capacity to maintain law andorder are indispensable. However, to effectively maintain public order,
the state needs to be recognized as legitimate by society. In short,effective state-building needs the consolidation of a capable as well as
legitimate authority.
Among various discussions on state-building, the importance of state
legitimacy, livelihood improvement, and a long-term perspective needs
to be underlined. Long-term institution building should not only focus
one-sidedly on public safety but also include the task of supporting
people’s livelihood. Livelihood improvement is necessary for people tounderstand the dividend of peace and to accept the state as legitimate.
These perspectives for long-term institution building have to be
introduced in the early stage of any emergency response tohumanitarian crises. Development agencies have endeavored to realize“seamless” transitions from short-term emergencies to long-term
development, and have implanted long-term visions into their
engagement in an early post-conflict period.
Table 1 below summarizes the shift from short-term focus to long-termorientation.
Table 1. Conceptual Framework for State-building

Public Safety(Law andOrder)
Livelihood
Objectives

Short-term(emergency response)

Long-term(state-building)Ceasefire monitoring
Peace by force

Security Sector Reform (SSR)
Rule of Law

Emergency aid

Strengthening of (both central
and local) public organizations
Human resource development
Building of a capable andlegitimate state

Avoidance of humanitariandisaster

2.1 Building of capable and legitimate state institutions
In the post-Cold War peace-keeping operations in the 1990s, theinternational community often failed to avoid the recurrence of conflicts
and recognized the lack of effective institutions as one of the reasons forsuch failures. Failures of international engagement in establishing332

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sustainable peace forced the international community to pay greaterattention to the building of public institutions that guarantee longlasting sound governance. As incidents such as 9/11 increased global
concerns about security vulnerability spilling over from weakly
governed countries, scholars, including Fukuyama (2005), Chesterman(2004), Fearon and Laitin (2004), Krasner (2005), Ghani and Lockhart(2008), and Paris and Sisk (2009), debated the importance of anddifficulties in state-building in recent years.
This argument also resonated with the international development
community that has recognized the importance of good governancesince the 1990s. The donor community started to discuss the need to
improve its development effectiveness in fragile states, and accepted theidea of state-building in that context. In the OECD/DAC, the INCAF(International Network on Conflict and Fragility) functioned as an active
forum to create policy guidance on state-building in fragile states (e.g.,
OECD 2011). Among the donors, state-building is understood as aneffort to strengthen the capacity and legitimacy of state institutions toconsolidate effective, legitimate, and resilient states (OECD 2008).3
The lack of capable and legitimate state institutions that protect people
from human security crises makes the state vulnerable to violence by
non-state actors. Public safety is one of the most fundamental public
goods that should be provided by the state. Although such public safety
may be temporarily and partially provided by international forces and/or civic groups, the state remains as the primary guarantor of public
safety. Therefore, the strengthening of the state security capacity isfundamentally important to protect human security.
However, the mere reliance on coercive forces does not guarantee longterm stability. The state will face new challengers to public safety unlessit has peaceful and stable relations with society. To be accepted by a wide
range of social forces as the legitimate authority, the state needs to beequipped with inclusive institutions. If the state excludes some parts of
its population from public services and the development process, itcannot be regarded as legitimate by the excluded groups. For instance, as
we discuss below, horizontal inequalities (HIs) and group-based
3. Leaders of the fragile states themselves formed a group named g7+ and actively participate
in the debates, contributing to the international dialogue between fragile states and donors
on designing better international engagement to support state-building in fragile states.

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grievances have been the major causes of violent conflicts in Africa(Stewart 2010). What inclusive institutions look like, however, differsfrom one country to another depending on a country-specific context(e.g., OECD 2010).
2.2 Peace-building “from below”: greater emphasis on livelihood
Among various aspects of institution building, the past decade has seen
an increasing focus on public-safety issues, as typified by security sector
reform (SSR). Critics, however, opposed the imposition of state
institutions “from above,” and called for promoting the voices “frombelow” (e.g., Hilhorst et al. 2010). The efforts for institution building
such as the formulation of a constitution, democratic elections, andjustice sector reform, may not be the primary concern of the local
populations. Advocates of peace-building “from below” emphasize theimportance of welfare, livelihoods, and perceptions of the local people
and communities (Richmond 2009, Shanmugaratnam 2008).
Improvement of welfare and public service delivery is the key for thepeople to understand the dividends of peace. Richmond (2011) insists on
the need to localize, contextualize, and hybridize international statebuilding policies to adapt to everyday human needs. Roberts (2011)
suggests the shift of emphasis from political institution-building toinstitutions that serve society. Responding to local human needs would
help improve the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of local people.
The state’s capacity to deliver services to the people largely depends on
effective administrative organizations as well as on the ability of public
officials who actually deliver the services to the people. Institutional
capacity and human resource development are indispensable toimprove the state capacity to support people’s livelihood.
2.3 Bridging the “gap” by institutional and individual capacity
development
In the late 1990s, it was pointed out that there is a “gap” between
humanitarian assistance and development assistance in a post-conflictsituation. Development assistance often came too late in the transition
from humanitarian crises to reconstruction phases. Although short-term
relief can be provided by external actors, service delivery by local publicorganizations is indispensable for longer-term livelihood improvement.
Besides, the two instruments have different modus operandi as
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development assistance aims to support long-term development in morestable environments (Crisp 2001, Ogata 2011).
As a consequence of the increasing awareness of the gap, humanitarianagencies became more concerned about their long-term sustainability,
while development agencies started to get involved in post-conflictsituations much earlier than before. By infusing a long-term perspective
into post-conflict assistance, the seamless supports aim at a smoothtransition from short-term emergency to long-term institution building
for improving the livelihoods of local people.

3. Research Findings from JICA-RI on State-building Efforts
With regard to state-building and conflict prevention, research projects
at JICA Research Institute (JICA-RI) are mainly concerned with state
legitimacy. Research findings by JICA-RI indicate that international
engagement can support state-building by helping improve state
legitimacy. Some of the findings are being reflected in JICA’s operational
approach, which will be discussed in Section 4.
3.1 Capacity traps and legitimacy traps
In the article “Capacity Traps and Legitimacy Traps: Development
Assistance and State Building in Fragile Situations”, Takeuchi, Murotani,
and Tsunekawa (2011) illustrate how the difference in politicalenvironment affects the impact of development assistance, and call forheightened awareness of the different types of fragility when donors
decide upon their policies. They categorize post-conflict situations into
two types: “capacity trap” and “legitimacy trap.” Capacity trap
countries are those that have failed to improve state capacity to provide
security and basic social services and consequently have failed toestablish state legitimacy. Legitimacy trap countries are those that havedemonstrated the capacity to provide security and services to the
population but suffer from shaky legitimacy due to expanding
inequalities and authoritarian management. In this environment,
improving state capacity may not necessarily improve state legitimacy.
On the contrary, it can further curtail state legitimacy. These two traps
create very different contexts in which donors are required to plan theirstrategies carefully.

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3.2 Horizontal Inequalities (HIs)
Inequality has always been an important factor that explains grievances
and instability. To address group-based grievances, the perspective ofhorizontal inequalities (HIs), that is, inequalities between identity
groups, has been developed.
Based on case studies and quantitative analysis in ten African countries,
Mine et al. (Preventing Violent Conflict in Africa: Inequalities, Perceptions
and Institutions, 2013) reconfirms the significance of HIs on instability
and violent conflict in Africa. Particularly when one group is
disadvantaged in multiple dimensions of inequalities (political, social,economic, and cultural), HIs are most likely to cause violent conflicts asdemonstrated by the histories of South Africa and Kenya.
In Ethnic Diversity and Economic Instability in Africa: Interdisciplinary
Perspectives, Hino et al. (2012) suggest that ethnic diversity, though notleading by itself to inter-group conflict, can be a potent force ofinstability when HIs are high, and particularly when high HIs coalescewith high vertical inequality within each ethnic community.
In short, the alleviation of inequalities is a necessary condition forenhancing state legitimacy, which is fundamental for long-term statebuilding.
3.3 People’s perceptions of inequalities
In assessing the legitimacy of states, people’s perceptions are sometimes
more important than objective HIs, as people take actions based on theirsubjective beliefs. As advocates for peace-building “from below” argue,
successful state-building efforts should be based on the understandingof the perceptions of local people. According to the analysis of Mine et al.
(2013), people’s perception of horizontal inequalities (HIs) is not equal tothe objective inequality that appears in statistical data. For instance, as
observed in Nigeria and Zimbabwe, a group perceiving itself as thepoorest is not necessarily the poorest according to social and economic
statistics. This implies that external actors should pay attention not only
to objective HIs but also to people’s perceptions.
Mine and his associates’ study demonstrates that this distortion ofperceptions is most probably associated with political HIs. The groups
that are politically marginalized tend to regard themselves as also being
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economically marginalized, even when this contradicts the objective
evidence. The Igbo in Nigeria clearly show such tendency. On the other
hand, their analysis also indicates that economically advantaged groups
tend to behave in a hostile manner through the fear of losing theiradvantaged positions, when political power relations shift rapidly totheir disadvantage. All this evidence points to the importance of politicalpower distribution in post-conflict societies.
Regarding the political HIs, Mine et al. (2013) point to the importance ofinclusive mechanisms, either formal or informal, that are open to various
identity groups. Their case studies demonstrate the relative politicalstability of the countries that have power-dispersing mechanisms
combining sustainable power-sharing based on informal practices andadvanced decentralization. In various Sub-Saharan African countries,
informal customs assure every major identity group is represented indecision-making. These power-dispersing mechanisms help fortify
legitimacy by means of the inclusive political participation of majorgroups. If such an arrangement is combined with efficient service
delivery and citizen safety (state capacity), the efforts for long-term
institution building are on the right track.
JICA’s survey report titled Livelihood and Employment Promotion in
Conflict Affected Countries4 (2012) also highlights the importance ofpeople’s perception as a lesson learned from its operational experiences.
This survey demonstrates that, although it is important to supportsocially vulnerable populations such as refugees and IDPs, widows,
orphans, traumatized people, and handicapped people, exceptionallygenerous treatment of these people created tensions within communities
in past JICA projects. Special consideration to ex-combatants can also
create animosity among other people in local communities. External
actors need to be careful of these sentiments and try to build confidence
between socially vulnerable people and others within local communities.

4. JICA’s Approach to Support State-building
JICA has already integrated into its field practice many of the insights
obtained from past research and discussion on state-building. JICA has
been especially eager to support long-term strengthening of institutional
4. Details of the report will be discussed in the Section 4.1.

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and individual capacity, especially for the purpose of improving
people’s everyday livelihood. Helping the recipient government toeffectively connect itself with local residents to strengthen its legitimacy
has also been the main goal of JICA activities.
JICA has also promoted “seamless” transition from early humanitarian
aid for protection to development assistance for empowerment. Thisfocus requires JICA to get engaged in institution building from the earlystages of reconstruction.
Finally, JICA has tried to be more attentive to political contexts in eachcountry, and mainstream conflict-sensitivity (“do no harm”) to ensure
the positive impact of its activities on state-building.
4.1 Enhancing state capacity and legitimacy
The Government of Japan and JICA have focused their attention more on
post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building since the mid-1990s. The
revised ODA Charter in 2003 recognizes “human security” as one of its
five basic policies, and peace-building as one of its four priority issues.
After Sadako Ogata became the President of JICA, JICA integrated the“human security” perspective, especially for conflict-torn countries, as
its operational philosophy. As a result, Japan’s ODA spending in 43
countries that the OECD categorized in 2010 as “fragile states”5increased its share in total ODA spending (net ODA total, excluding debt
relief) from 9.86% in 2000 to 24.24% in 2009 (refer to Figure 2).

5. For statistical purposes, OECD chose 43 countries and areas as “fragile states” in 2010 byusing CPIA of the World Bank, ISW (Index of State Weakness) of the Brookings Institution,
and CIFP (Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Fragility Index) of Carlton University as
their benchmarks.

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Figure 2. Share of Fragile States in Japanese ODA (Net ODA total, excluding debt
relief)Source: Author’s calculation based on OECD Stat.

In some of these countries (e.g., the Democratic Republic of Congo), JICA
engaged in the capacity building of security forces. However, JICA has
been more active in the area of livelihood improvement. JICA regarded
the capacity of public institutions and public officials directly involved
in livelihood improvement efforts as the core function, and provided
support to strengthen this function in post-conflict countries such as
Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, and Cote d’Ivoire. This core function
centers on health, education, vocational training, and local
administration.
JICA’s programs for community-based development and vocational
training intend to simultaneously strengthen the capacity for public
service delivery and improve people’s welfare. In doing so, it aims toenhance both state capacity and legitimacy, as improved service delivery
by the central or local government organizations would enhancepeople’s welfare and their trust in the state. Emphasis on enhancing
people’s trust is important particularly in fragile situations. Although
their direct impact is limited to project areas, JICA anticipates that these
local actions will eventually be scaled up to contribute to the broader
and longer-term endeavor of state-building.
JICA’s survey report (Livelihood and Employment Promotion in Conflict
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Affected Countries, 2012) contains evaluations of twelve such projects forcommunity development and vocational training in nine countries andareas, including seven projects in five Sub-Saharan African countries:
South Sudan, Rwanda, Uganda, Eritrea, and the Democratic Republic ofCongo (DRC). The following are some of the findings from JICA’s
activities aiming at enhancing the capacity and legitimacy of state
institutions, especially for livelihood improvement. Though the report isbased on simple evaluations not as rigorous as academic research, thelessons learned from the field are suggestive.
■ Capacity development of local public officials
In these projects, as the lack of individual and organizational capacity isacute in fragile situations, the process of implementation was designed
to encourage capacity development of local government organizations.
These entities were assigned the responsibility of jointly delivering
public services with JICA experts, so that they could learn how toeffectively provide services to the local population as on-the-job training.
The Project for Livelihood Improvement in and around Juba for
Sustainable Peace and Development (LIPS) in South Sudan and the
Study on Community Development in Cataracte District, Bas-Congo
Province in the DRC are representative of JICA’s approach to community
development, which primarily features the capacity development ofgovernment (both local and central) institutions, instead of the provisionof benefits to farmers directly or via NGOs. When the LIPS project
started in 2009, the government of the Southern Sudan had just four
years of experience. Basic policy guidelines and strategies had not been
well articulated, and local officers had little experience of working in thefield. In the project, the community development officers, after receiving
training, cultivated the land in cooperation with farmers, built schools,
and supported local farmers in starting businesses. This firsthandexperience enhanced the officials’ capacity and motivation. In the BasCongo Study, local government officials were directly engaged withlocal communities in conducting and monitoring pilot projects.
■ Feedback of data and knowledge into national policies
On several occasions, local governments’ experience of actual service
delivery had a feedback effect of updating and improving the policies athigher levels including national development strategies. As most of theconflict-affected countries do not have sufficient statistical data,
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firsthand information from the field can link the voices from below withnational policy planning.
One good example is the LIPS project mentioned above. South Sudan’s
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had had little information on
agricultural activities in rural villages until the LIPS project provided
them with community development manuals and agricultural
technology packages. These documents were prepared on the basis of
the field surveys, training, and sub-projects implemented in the LIPS
project. The documents and information provided are being utilized toformulate a national agricultural development policy.
In Rwanda, the Project for Strengthening the Capacity of Tumba College
of Technology (TCT) resulted in the TCT turning into a model for othervocational training centers. More specifically, the TCT conducted incompany training to strengthen the link between trainees and local
companies. The Workforce Development Agency (WDA) of the
Rwandan government subsequently adopted in-company training inother vocational training centers.
■ Building confidence in local government institutions
The nurturing of state legitimacy is important particularly in conflictaffected countries because public service delivery has been suspended
for a long period and people may look upon the government as apredatory body rather than a service delivery organization. Under suchcircumstances, service delivery improvement through participatory
planning and implementation can enhance communication between
local government officials and citizens and help the local governmentbuild confidence among people.
In South Sudan, where public service delivery had barely existed during
the war that lasted for more than 20 years, a LIPS sub-project –agricultural extension workers trying to help local farmers – contributed
to cultivating local people’s confidence in the new government. Local
communities established their own rural development committees anddirectly negotiated with local governments. Communication between
the two has been strengthened significantly in the process.
In the case of northern Uganda, local governments did not have evenbasic facilities such as city halls and offices; so the Project for341

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Community Development for Promoting Return and Resettlement of
IDPs in Northern Uganda provided offices and multi-purpose halls for avariety of public events such as public meetings, training courses, music
festivals, and cooking contests. Local governments intended to foster thesense of affinity among local residents, particularly women’s groups.
They also worked closely with returnees in designing sub-projects, sothat local people’s trust in government officials would be enhanced.
4.2 Seamless assistance
Under the leadership of President Sadako Ogata, JICA adopted thehuman security perspective as one of the key pillars for its operation.
The human security perspective emphasizes both protection throughemergency relief and empowerment for long-term development.
When Ogata became the president of JICA, she stressed the importanceof “seamless” support bridging the gap between humanitarian anddevelopment assistance. In its mission statement of 2008, JICA endorsed“seamless assistance that spans everything from prevention of armed
conflict and natural disasters to emergency aid following a conflict ordisaster, assistance for prompt recovery, and mid- to long-term
development assistance” as one of its four strategies.
In Sudan and South Sudan, for example, JICA joined the international
joint assessment mission while separately conducted its own survey
even before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in
2005. This rapid engagement resulted in quick impact projects in theearly recovery period in South Sudan, such as the Juba River port
reconstruction. These projects were soon followed by larger
development assistance including human resource development toserve long-term development.
4.3 Mainstreaming of conflict-sensitivity
JICA has also tried to become more sensitive to negative effects onconflicts and state legitimacy that may be inadvertently caused by thedonor’s activities. To avoid such pitfalls, JICA has introduced the PostConflict Needs Assessment (PNA) mechanism by which it analyzes
potential conflict risks in each context, and pays due consideration to theimpacts of such risks on state legitimacy. It stresses the importance oftaking into account the coexistence and reconciliation between different
social groups within local communities in designing community
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development projects. JICA also plans to introduce the evaluation
guideline that incorporate conflict-sensitivity for projects in conflictaffected areas.
One example of such consideration is JICA’s efforts in Sudan and South
Sudan that aim at mitigating grievances stemming from economic andsocial disparities among different regions. In South Sudan, in parallelwith the assistance to the Juba areas, JICA has intensified its support toless developed regions such as Malakal. In Sudan, JICA has extended its
support to less developed areas including Darfur, the eastern provinces,
and Three Protocol Areas.

5. Conclusion
State-building and conflict prevention remain as vital challenges inAfrica. Bearing in mind the changing nature of conflicts throughout thecontinent, the international community has increasingly focused onstate-building. To prevent violent conflicts and establish long-term
stability, building capable and legitimate state institutions, which lookafter both public safety and livelihood improvement, is essential.
JICA-RI’s research findings also demonstrate that successful statebuilding needs the strengthening of state capacity and legitimacy.
Legitimacy building is an especially difficult task because it is deeply
affected by changeable perceptions of the people. To nurture state
legitimacy, horizontal inequalities (HIs) and other inequalities must be
tackled. At the same time, inclusive institutions need to be constructed tofoster a sense of fairness among the population.
JICA, as well as other development partners, has already started tointegrate some of these insights into its planning and implementation.
Coordination and mutual learning between donors will also be essential.
However, in order to make their efforts to help state-building andconflict prevention more effective and efficient, greater and more
persistent attention should be directed to the following points:(1) Building of inclusive institutions
Inclusive institutions are key to consolidating state legitimacy based onstable state-society relations. Inclusive institutions can mitigate the343Chapter 12

adverse effects of HIs. This, however, does not mean that attending HIs
is not important. HIs need to be reduced since they are a root cause ofviolent conflicts. Meanwhile, inclusive institutions will help foster
consensus and compromise among contending forces. However,institutions should not be imposed upon people by external actors since
institutions can be securely established only when major stakeholders
accept them as legitimate. What donors can do is to provide the recipient
country with the opportunity to learn about current and historicalexperiences of other countries.
(2) Human security perspective: protection and empowerment
In tackling the challenges of state-building, the human security
perspective should always be remembered, as it can provide acomprehensive understanding on state-building (Newman 2011).
Human security integrates top-down measures to protect people andbottom-up measures to empower them. Capable institutions to protect
people and empowered communities to hold the state accountable andlegitimate are essential for bringing about a stable state that can maintainpublic safety and improve people’s livelihood. The human security
perspective supports the seamless transition from emergency relief tolong-term development. While top-down measures are necessary toprotect people in emergencies, the empowerment of people and local
communities are crucial for long-term development.
(3) Local context sensitivity
External actors need to be sensitive to local contexts so they can avoid
doing harm while maximizing the positive impact of their activities. In
such assessment of local context, they need to be aware that people’s
perceptions are not necessarily equal to statistical data. While HIs need
to be reduced, at the same time, donors need to pay attention to how
their efforts for HI reduction are perceived by various stakeholders andcarefully design their projects. This caution is valid not only at theplanning stage but also at the operation stage in which local people
directly observe donors’ behavior. Donor coordination and information
sharing must be crucial to avoid harming people’s perceptions.
Since the beginning of the millennium, Africa has started to witness a
declining number of armed conflicts and battle-related deaths. Thoughtrans-national non-state armed groups may impose new types ofchallenges on peace-building in Africa, structural problems such as344

State-building and Conflict Prevention in Africa

poverty, inequality, and other social issues remain crucial for peace andsecurity, and state-building remains imperative for a stable and peaceful
Africa. African leaders have strived to establish sustainable peace
throughout the continent. Donors can help their efforts by supporting
the building of capable and legitimate states if they are sensitive enoughto local contexts. TICAD will provide a forum for a wide range ofstakeholders to discuss how we all can collaborate to address this crucial
challenge.

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References
Chesterman, S. 2004. You, the people: The United Nations, transitional
administrations and state building. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crisp, J. 2001. Mind the gap! UNHCR, humanitarian assistance and thedevelopment process. International migration review 35 (1): 168–191.
Fearon, J. D., and D. D. Laitin. 2004. Neotrusteeship and the problem of
weak states. International Security 28 (4): 5–43.
Fukuyama, F. 2005. State building: Governance and world order in thetwenty-first century. London: Profile Books.
Ghani, A., and C. Lockhart. 2008. Fixing failed states: A framework forrebuilding a fractured world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Part Ⅳ:

South-South Cooperation for Knowledge
ExchangeChapter 13:
South-South and Triangular Cooperation for
Sub-Saharan Africa’s Development–With special emphasis on knowledge
exchange and co-creation
Shunichiro Honda, Hiroshi Kato and Yukimi Shimoda

1. Introduction
This chapter looks at South-South Cooperation (SSC) and Triangular
Cooperation (TrC) in the context of the development of Sub-SaharanAfrica (SSA). The reason for our focus on SSC and TrC1 is twofold. Firstand most importantly, SSC/TrC has been one of the central principles
underpinning and guiding the TICAD process since its beginning in
1993. And second, SSC/TrC has become the key theme both in the UN
fora (UN 2012a) and the global process on development effectivenessagenda especially since the 2011 Fourth High Level Forum on Aid
Effectiveness (HLF4) in Busan, which strongly highlighted SSC as wellas TrC (Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation2011).2
This paper has two specific objectives. One is to give a broad picture of
1. As to the definition of SSC and TrC, we rely on the definition of the UN, which reads asfollows:“South-South cooperation development is a process whereby two or more developing
countries pursue their individual and/or shared national capacity development objectives
through exchanges of knowledge, skills, resources and technical know-how, and throughregional and interregional collective actions, including partnerships involving
governments, regional organizations, civil society, academia and the private sector, for theirindividual and/or mutual benefit within and across regions. South-South cooperation is nota substitute for, but rather a complement to, North-South cooperation (UN 2012b, p.5).”“Triangular cooperation involves Southern-driven partnerships between two or moredeveloping countries supported by a developed country (ies)/or multilateral organization(s)to implement development cooperation programs and projects (UN 2012b, p.5).”
2. HLF4 emphasized that “South-South and triangular cooperation have the potential totransform developing countries’ policies and approaches to service delivery by bringing
effective, locally owned solutions that are appropriate to country contexts” (Global
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 2011: p.9).

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the current state of SSC vis-à-vis SSA, given the increasing interest andactual involvement in African development by the Southern partners.
And the other is to take a closer look at, among various forms of SSC/
TrC, how knowledge exchange and co-creation is happening, based on
JICA’s experiences in facilitating such processes by means of TrC.3
The body of the chapter consists of two parts. Section 2 is an overview of
SSC/TrC targeting SSA. Section 3 will try to share some of Japan’s
experience in supporting knowledge exchange and co-creation through
TrC.

2. SSC/TrC: Overview of Trends and Issues

2.1 Africa as the central actor in SSC
SSC itself is an age-old phenomenon, and Africa, together with Asia, has
always been at the center of the movement. Cooperation among theSouth, particularly on the aspect of economic cooperation, dates back to1955 when the Asia-Africa Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia,
to discuss Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation. In thesubsequent decades, developing countries pressed further ahead to forma group to push their economic interests (Cheru 2011).4 Such a
movement first culminated in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
involving more than 100 countries. Then in 1964, G 77, a forum fordeveloping countries to articulate and promote their collective interests
relating to the global economy was formed within the United Nations(UN). Throughout, Africa was at the center of the movements.
During the 1970s, several key resolutions and policy documents ontechnical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC) wereadopted, which then culminated in the adoption of “the Buenos Aires
Plan of Action (BAPA)” at the UN Conference on TCDC held in 1978.
The action plan laid out both the conceptual and operational framework
for TCDC promotion, which, to this day, remains as the main reference
document (UN 1995). Following the launch of BAPA, there were also
moves on the economic cooperation front, such as the Caracas
Programme of Action adopted by the High-level Conference on
3. The South-South knowledge exchange in the context of African development seems tohave been receiving inadequate attention compared to South-South trade and financing in
Africa (UNCTAD 2010; UN 2008; Kragelund 2012).
4. The South-South partnership in the field of economic cooperation has until recently beentermed as Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries (ECDC) in UN fora.

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South-South and Triangular Cooperation for Sub-Saharan Africa’s
Development–With special emphasis on knowledge exchange and co-creation

Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries (ECDC) in May
1981.
Such high levels of interest in SSC (including ECDC), however, waned in
the following decades.5 Nonetheless, several notable actions on SSC/TrC
started in the 1990s. In 1993, the UN General Assembly endorsed thestrategy and framework for the promotion and application of TCDC
(UN Resolution 48/172).6 And it was around this time that the first
TICAD was co-organized in Tokyo by the Government of Japan, theGlobal Coalition for Africa (GCA)7 and the UN. In spite of the rather
somber situation surrounding SSC at the time, the Tokyo Declaration for
African Development adopted at the 1993 TICAD underscored theimportance of SSC, especially the exchange of development knowledge
and experience between Asia and Africa. The conference declaration
read as follows:
We, the participants of TICAD, recognize that development
achievement in East and South-East Asia have[sic] enhanced
opportunities for South-South cooperation with Africa. We
welcome the interest shown by some Asian and African countries
in promoting this cooperation.8
The strong focus on SSC by the first TICAD then led to the holding of the
Asia-Africa Forum in Bandung in the following year. The subsequentTokyo Agenda of Action adopted during the second TICAD in 1998
further went on to highlight intra-African cooperation (TICAD 1998). At
TICAD III in 2003, after the launch of the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) in 2001 and African Union (AU) in 2002, theparticipants reviewed the achievements and challenges of the precedingten years and acknowledged the tangible contributions of the TICAD
process in continuously upholding and supporting SSC/TrC practices,
especially Asia and Africa cooperation. Building on the review results,
its tenth anniversary declaration urged African countries and partners to
5. Manning pointed out that such decline of development cooperation from non-DAC states
resulted in the dominance of aid from DAC countries and multi-lateral organizations up until
the mid-2000s(Manning 2006).
6. DAC also endorsed the importance of SSC in its document of Principles on the New
Orientations in Technical Cooperation (OECD/DAC 1991).
7. GCA was later replaced by the Africa Union (AU) following its establishment in 2002. The
World Bank joined the TICAD process as co-organizers from the second TICAD.
8. Tokyo Declaration for African Development 1993 (TICAD 1993 Paragraph 26)

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further strengthen their partnership in the spirit of solidarity (TICAD
2003). In furthering the achievement of the past TICAD process, the“Yokohama Declaration towards a vibrant Africa”, the outcome
document of the fourth TICAD was presented in 2008 (TICAD2008).
The centrality of SSC/TrC came to be reaffirmed in December 2009 with
the Nairobi Outcome Document being adopted at the United Nations
High-Level Conference on South-South Cooperation in Nairobi (UN2010). Organized as the 30th anniversary of the 1978 Conference on
TCDC in Buenos Aires, the conference set out the overall UN SSC/TrC
framework.9 Such heightened energy surrounding this theme has also
started to be felt in other global fora, such as the global monitoringprocess of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. SSC/TrC wasregistered as one of the major agenda items at the HLF4. The outcome
document of the Busan Forum, namely the Global Partnership for
Effective Development Cooperation, strongly featured the theme as ahighly promising approach for effective development cooperation in
coming years.
Thus, in the history of the development of SSC/TrC as an effectivemeans for development cooperation, Africa has been playing a dual role
– both the central promoter and beneficiary. We also note that the TICAD
process has been instrumental in supporting African countries’ efforts in
SSC.
10

2.2 The current state of SSC for Sub-Saharan Africa
The limited availability of data makes it nearly impossible to capture
exactly the magnitude and breadth of SSC and TrC for SSA including
technical cooperation (TC), which is the main aid instruments forknowledge exchange and co-creation. Currently accessible data is fromthe OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which incorporates datafrom the limited numbers of non-DAC donors, including non-DAC
9. The document was formally endorsed at the 66th General Assembly in February 2010.
After the conference actions to translate the Nairobi outcome document into practice got intofull swing. A prime example is the annual Global South-South Development Expo (GSSD
Expo) with the UN office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) as its main secretariat.
10. The Republic of Korea, which has often been included among the emerging donors, is not
fully covered in this paper as it has been a DAC member only since 2009. Nevertheless, as arelatively new donor country, it is worth noting that Korea is among the active donors inknowledge promotion such as through its Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) implemented
by the Korea Development Institute (KDI).

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South-South and Triangular Cooperation for Sub-Saharan Africa’s
Development–With special emphasis on knowledge exchange and co-creation

OECD members.11 Other than CRS, the global AidDATA initiative,
working closely with the International Aid Transparency Initiative(IATI), has made an effort to develop an aid database using a variety ofsources including CRS, and donor reports. However, the data from mostnon-DAC donors, including those major actors such as China, India andBrazil, are mostly on a project basis, which made the analysis difficult.
(1) SSC for SSA from partners outside Africa
Non-DAC partners in the CRS data12This paper first looks at the trend of Non-DAC partners reported to DAC
CRS, which include several major Non-DAC partners such as Saudi
Arabia, Thailand and Russia. We will then turn to China, India, Brazil
and South Africa, on which an increasing number of articles and reports
are now available, as well as to other non-DAC partners such as North
African partners, in later sections.
Figure 1 indicates the gross total ODA disbursements by non-DAC
partners on CRS data at both levels of global and SSA countries covering
the period between 2004 and 2011.
Figure 1. Gross total ODA disbursements by non-DAC partners reported toOECD (in millions of US dollars)

Source: Author based on OECD CRS data (OECD Various Years)

11. Non-DAC donors in the CRS data include the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland,Israel, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, Chinese Taipei, Cyprus, Kuwait,
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and theUnited Arab Emirates.
12. According to the rough definition provided by OECD on the data, ODA denotes the“concessional financing for development (“ODA-like” flows)”(OECD Various Years).

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Figure 2 provides a closer look at the disbursement trend regarding SSA
from 2004 onwards (indicated by the red columns in Figure 1 above).
After the sudden decline in 2009, which may be largely explained by the
global financial crisis in late 2008, it returned to an appreciation trend
and surpassed the level of 2008 in 2011. The rapid expansion in 2008 andthe sudden decline in the following year largely reflect the disbursement
trend by oil-producing Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, which
accounts for over 60% of CRS non-DAC donor data. Overall, the ODA
trend toward SSA countries seems to be following the same general
growth trend of the total ODA by non-DAC partners, at least for the first
decade in the 2000s.
Figure 2. Gross total ODA disbursements to SSA countries by non-DAC partners(in millions of US dollars)

Source: By authors, based on OECD CRS data (OECD Various Years)

In addition to the total volume of ODA disbursement, CRS also collects
and publishes data specifically on TC. Figure 3 depicts the non-DAC
members’ ODA disbursement trend for TC to SSA countries. It displays
an upward trend similar to that of the total ODA. It should be noted
here, however, that the volume of TC is by far a smaller fraction of thetotal ODA.13 Among the non-DAC partners reported to the CRS data,
several donors are increasingly active in knowledge exchange throughTC in support for the development of SSA countries. One example is
13. The very small volume of TC may also be explained by the composition of CRS data inwhich oil producing non-DAC donors occupy the large proportion of the total non-DAC
donor ODA reported to DAC. The main aid activities of these countries are the financing of
infrastructure projects through concessional loan windows such as those of the Saudi Fundfor International Development. Also, the fact that other non-DAC donors have not provided
disaggregated figures for technical cooperation may also explain the small volume.

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South-South and Triangular Cooperation for Sub-Saharan Africa’s
Development–With special emphasis on knowledge exchange and co-creation

Turkey. In addition to its neighboring countries such as those in West
Asia, Turkey has been rapidly expanding its assistance to Africa
including capacity building assistance through TC in various fields suchas agriculture, health and vocational training.14
Figure 3. ODA disbursements (Technical Cooperation) to SSA countries by
non-DAC partners (in millions of US dollars)

Source: By authors, based on OECD CRS data (OECD Various Years)

Looking at the beneficiaries’ side, we can see that a limited number of
SSA countries tend to have received a large portion of total non-DAC aid
disbursements including TC, as shown in Figure 4, which shows thatconflict-affected countries tend to receive handsome portions of aid from
non-DAC member countries.

14. It is noteworthy that Turkey has been making efforts in systematizing its cooperation by
undertaking various actions including the introduction of joint country strategy paper andtalent bank mechanism, which pools Turkish technical experts for South-South knowledge
sharing (Gülseven 2012).

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Figure 4. Share of beneficiaries in reported non-DAC aid to Sub-Sahara Africa,
2011

Source: By authors, based OECD CRS data (OECD Various Years)

Though most individual non-DAC partners in the CRS data do notprovide their regional distributions, the most likely major active
partners for SSA are oil-producing Arab countries, which mainly
provide assistance to Islamic countries in SSA. Other than that, Turkey isan increasingly active donor; it has pledged to provide more aid to least
developed countries (LDCs) including SSA countries.15
China, India and Brazil
As stated above, our analysis so far has not included the very important
non-DAC partners of China, India and Brazil, and South Africa due tothe unavailability of data. Given this shortcoming, we now turn to theestimated figures of gross global ODA disbursements of the three
abovementioned countries between 2005 and 2010, using informationfrom the OECD Development Cooperation Report 2012.16 South Africa
will be dealt with later.

15. According to the briefing note of Turkey’s development cooperation on the webpage of
the Turkish government, aid delivered to Africa increased by 67% from 30.9 million US
dollars to 71 million US dollars in 2010.
16. There is also a large discrepancy between the DAC estimation and other estimated figuresin several other papers such as by Kragelund 2012, potentially due to definitional issues, thedifferent source of information and other reasons.

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South-South and Triangular Cooperation for Sub-Saharan Africa’s
Development–With special emphasis on knowledge exchange and co-creation

Table 1. Trend of Gross Global ODA Disbursements by Brazil, China and India(in millions of US dollars)
Brazil
China

India
Total
Estimate

2005
158.07911.902006
277.21
1,033.27

2007
291.901,466.86

2008
336.83
1,807.57

2009
362.21
1,947.65

2010
N/A
2,010.61

1,487.47

1,691.88

2,151.36

2.753.90

2,797.90

2.649.68

414.50381.40392.60609.50488.04639.07

Source: By the authors, based on OECD (2012) 17

Table 1 above gives a rough picture of the general trend of thesecountries in expanding their global ODA. In comparison to the ODA by
non-DAC partners (shown in Figure 1), the figures, likely to besignificantly underestimated, indicate that considerably larger volumesof ODA are being provided by these three countries, especially by China.
Their specific contribution to SSA is hard to discern, since regionallydisaggregated data is unavailable. The following is a glimpse of theirprofiles by referring to several existing documents.
China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid in 201118 states that 45.7% of China’s
foreign aid in 2009 was allocated to Africa including North Africa. It also
reports on China’s foreign aid distribution by income levels for recipient
countries, namely that 39.7% of the total aid is provided to LDCs, a goodpart of which could be SSA countries. Combining all these, Chinese’s
sizable foreign aid is likely to be flowing to SSA countries.
Component-wise, the country has also been continuing and expanding
TC and knowledge exchanges. The review of the achievements on the
Sharm el Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012) indicated that the country has
accepted around 24,000 professionals to the training programs offeredby the Chinese Government during the three year period in various
fields like agricultural, education and health (The People’s Republic ofChina 2012).
As regards India’s aid to Africa, major beneficiaries of her concessional
17. The table is based on the STATLINK data for Figure V33 of the OECD Development
Cooperation Report (DCR) 2012.
18. This white paper on China’s foreign aid is the first of its kind published by the Chinese
Government.

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loan aid through the EXIM Bank from 2003 to 2007 (Indian financial
years) include Sudan (21%), Ethiopia (7%) and Mali (5%) (Kondoh et al.
2010, pp.33-34). Under the Africa-India Partnership for Enhanced
Cooperation adopted in 2011, training opportunities for over 1,200
professionals for Africa have been provided between 2011-12 (AIFS
2011).
Brazil’s SSC, according to the 2009 figure, amounted to over 362 million
US dollars,19 out of which 14% is delivered through TC. In spite of the
traditional focus on its support to neighboring countries in Latin
American, Brazil is expanding its support to SSA. Moreover, it has also
started to extend its assistance to non-Lusophone African countries like
Ghana and Burkina Faso.20(2) SSC partners in the African continent
Having looked at the partners outside the continent, we now turn to SSC
partnerships on the African continent.
Regional mechanisms for intra-Africa collaboration
First and foremost, the regional organs such as the African Union
Commission (AUC), with its development arm of NEPAD and subregional organs like SADC and EAC, have played and are increasingly
playing larger roles in intra-Africa development cooperation andknowledge facilitation. As part of their mandate, these regional and subregional organs have organized various programs and initiatives, which
aim to promote the coordinated actions of development cooperation andsharing of knowledge and experience among African countries.
Specifically regarding SSC, the AU and NEPAD formulated the African
Platform for Development Effectiveness (APDev) in July 2010, with SSC
as one of the three thematic thrusts (NEPAD n.d.). In more specific fields,
the AUC and NEPAD Agency and the African Development Bank (ADB)
have formed an initiative, namely the Programme for Infrastructure
Development in Africa (PIDA), for the purpose of coordinated regionwide actions on infrastructure development (e.g., energy, transport,
water, and ICT) in Africa (PIDA n.d.). In other areas such as agriculture,
19. This figure only covers the grant portion of aid provided by the Federal Government andexcludes concessional loans, debt relief and cooperation by state and local governments(OECD 2012 p.260).
20. However, according to the report by the Brazilian Government, African Portuguesespeaking countries still account for 55% of Brazil’s resources for TC in Africa (Brazilian
International Cooperation Agency 2010).

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South-South and Triangular Cooperation for Sub-Saharan Africa’s
Development–With special emphasis on knowledge exchange and co-creation

the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme(CAADP) coordinated by NEPAD has been formulated to create amultilateral framework for agricultural development (CAADP n.d.)
involving a broad range of stakeholders including state institutions,NGOs, the private sector and research organs in and outside Africa.21
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is an innovative NEPAD
initiative worth mentioning. APRM is an African-led self-monitoringmechanism for political, economic and corporate governance among
African countries that voluntarily acceded to it.22 The APRM process ofreview and the follow-up actions involve not only the government but
also other actors such as civil societies and the private sector. As of theend of 2011, 14 countries had been peer-reviewed (APR Secretariat 2012).
Though criticisms remain on its limited abilities to hold African leaders
accountable, it has certainly offered rare opportunities for mutual
learning among African countries on their governance challenges (Grutz2010). We now turn to look at individual, prominent SSC partnercountries in the African continent: South Africa, and North Africancountries, notably Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco.
South Africa23
Being a BRICS country, South Africa is by far the major actor in SSC in
Sub-Saharan Africa with its GDP roughly 40 times larger than average
SSA economies. South Africa’s cooperation toward African peer
countries covers a wide range of activities like aid, trade, security, andpolitics, which goes beyond the OECD-DAC’s categories.24
Since 2009 when President Zuma took office, the process of institutional
development for SSC has been rapidly progressing, including theestablishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency(SADPA), envisaged to be a unified agency for international cooperation,and of the Partnership Fund for Development, which will replace theAfrican Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF). The
21. NEPAD has also opened a virtual space for the community of practice involving various
themes including infrastructure and agriculture. The access to the community of practice forfood security is http://www.nepad.org/foodsecurity/group.
22.Thirty three member countries were in APRM as at January 2013 (APR Secretariat 2013).
23. This section draws heavily on Vickers (2012).
24. In 2010, South Africa received about US$1,000 in net ODA. According to Vickers (2012,
footnote 1 in p. 536), about 2.2 % of South Africa’s ODA was to Africa over the period 20002010.

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Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO),
renamed from the Department of Foreign Affairs, was also established in2010 for the purpose of “promoting South Africa’s national interests andvalues” and “the African Renaissance” (DIRCO 2010, p. 6). In April 2012,
the concept of SADPA was formally approved by the government. The
establishment of SADPA will bring a wide range of changes, including
stricter project assessment, mobilization of multiple funding sources,
and using various modes of cooperation with emphasis placed on grants
and TC.
The notable characteristic of South African cooperation is the country’s
active support in the areas of peace building, democratic governanceand public sector capacity development including public financial
management. This largely reflects the historical pathways along which
the country has traveled in the post-Apartheid era.
South Africa has been contributing to sub-regional integration by
participating in political and economic regional frameworks, such as theSouthern African Customs Union (SACU), the Southern African
Development Community (SADC), the SADC free trade area, and theSpatial Development Initiative (SDI).
Egypt25
Egypt has been an age-old actor of SSC since the 1970s, particularly in
Africa and the Middle East, while learning from development
experience gained from other regions including Asia. Egypt prioritizes
SSC in its foreign policy, with four principle regions: “free trade areas;
foreign direct investment; TC; and exerting efforts for the region’s
positive integration into the global economy” (PEMA 2008, p. 8).
There are two funds for Egyptian SSC: one is the Egyptian Fund forTechnical Co-operation with Africa (EFTCA) and the other is the
Egyptian Fund for Technical Co-operation with the Commonwealth(EFTCC). The EFTCA started its activities in 1991 in order to consolidate
and support cooperation between Egypt and other African countries. Its
main activities have been organizing training courses, dispatchingexperts, and offering emergency humanitarian assistance to countries
affected by natural disasters. Under the framework of the EFTCA, Egypt
has helped more than 30 African countries, managed at least 45 projects,
25. This section chiefly draws on PEMA 2008 and JICA 2007.

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South-South and Triangular Cooperation for Sub-Saharan Africa’s
Development–With special emphasis on knowledge exchange and co-creation

dispatched at least 90 short-term and 140 long-term experts in the areasof health, agriculture, water resources, and education, and provided
food, medicine, and logistics assistance to many African countries(INSouth n.d.). The other fund, EFTCC, has organized various training
courses in the areas of tourism, culture, crime and investigation, theArabic language, migration, and medical industries for many CIS
countries such as Uzbekistan, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Albania,
Armenia, Tajikistan, Russia, and Mongolia. Egypt also conducts SSC
with other partners such as the EU, USAID, Norway, China and Korea,
as well as Japan.
Tunisia26
Under the supervision of the Ministry of Planning and International
Cooperation, Tunisia has been actively promoting and implementing
SSC through the Tunisian Agency of Technical Cooperation (ATCT)
established in 1972. The ATCT is obliged to implement the national
policy of TC. It has regional offices in Kuwait, Oman, Mauritania, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Its missions include
mobilizing appropriate Tunisian human resources to work abroad
through TC, providing training for foreign professionals, carrying out
technical assistance projects, and promoting SSC/TrC. Tunisia’s SSC for
Africa covers various areas: poverty reduction, health, vocational
training, banking, agriculture, water and the environment,
telecommunications, and women’s empowerment. The ATCT has
dispatched more than 30,000 Tunisian professionals and experts abroad
for foreign employers, public and private institutions, and regional andinternational organizations. It also has provided tailor-made training
and standard training programs for 3,000 foreign professionals from
more than 39 countries, mainly African countries. These training
programs are organized in specialized institutions within the country or
by dispatching experts to participants’ countries, in cooperation with
WB, UNDP, USAID, IDB, GTZ, and JICA.
Morocco27
Morocco is a member of the League of Arab States and the Arab Maghreb
Union, and maintains friendly ties with the West. Morocco withdrew
from the Organization of African Unity (AOU) in 1984 due to its
territorial dispute over the Western Sahara. It is currently the only
26. This section draws chiefly on ATCT n.d.
27. This section mainly draws on AMCI n.d. and JICA 2012d.

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African country which is not a member of the AU. However, Morocco
also places emphasis on measures for Africa. As a foreign policy,
Morocco has been promoting cooperation with African and Arabpartners.
The Moroccan Agency for International Cooperation (AMCI) establishedin 1986 has been playing an active role in implementing SSC activities.
The AMCI provides 1) training, particularly for foreign students andexecutives, 2) technical cooperation, and 3) economic and financial
cooperation. Morocco receives about 8,000 students (including 6,500
scholarship recipients) from 42 countries, the majority of whom are fromAfrican countries. Following South Africa, which is the top investor in
Africa, Morocco occupies second place.
The TC provided by the AMCI is to strengthen SSC in various areas
through long-, medium-, and short-term training, study visits,
dispatching experts, and implementation of joint programs. Partners ofMorocco’s SSC activities vary: countries of the South for bilateral
cooperation, traditional donor countries for triangular cooperation, andinternational organizations and agencies for multilateral cooperation.
The number of beneficiary countries increased from 6 in 2000 to 22 in2006.
Morocco has also provided economic and financial cooperation since themid-1990s to support micro-projects in education, health, and smallhydro.
2.3 TrC and Sub-Saharan Africa
TrC has been increasingly recognized as a vital modality in support of
SSC. Most TrC is delivered through technical cooperation (TCs)including training and dispatch of experts. Its main advantage derives
from the opportunities it provides for combining the expertise of diverse
development actors28 – expertise likely to fit the needs of partnercountries having similar development challenges. Traditional donors
including DAC bilateral donors as well as multilateral development
institutions can complement such endeavors through the provision of
additional financing and knowledge. Hosono argues that “South andNorth can collaborate on knowledge creation, knowledge exchange,
28. More rigorous analysis regarding the effectiveness of TrC is a remaining challenge(McEwan 2012).

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capacity development, and institution
development solutions at scale.”building

toimplement

Below we will have a brief look at TrC’s development trends and current
status. In fact, a significant part of SSC reviewed above has been
conducted as part of the broader triangular partnership.
(1) The trend of TrC by major multilaterals and DAC donors
Globally, the most active bilateral donors in TrC are Japan, Germany andSpain, among which Japan has been widely recognized as the longstanding major actor for years (UN 2008; TT-SSC 2010). Regarding themultilateral institutions, UN specialized agencies including the UN
Office of South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC), former Special Unit forSouth-South Cooperation, UNDP and World Bank are counted as thenotable promoters of and contributors to TrC.
Aside from Japan, the details of whose TrC practices for SSA will betouched on in the next section, Germany has been the major TrC
contributor mainly through GIZ. Though Latin America has been themain region for German TrC, it has also applied TrC to other regions
including SSA (TT-SSC 2010). One example was the collaboration
between Germany and Brazil to help strengthen the National Institute ofStandardization and Quality (INNOQ) in Mozambique to improve thequality standards of products in Mozambique building on the capacity
developed in the National Institute of Metrology, Standardization andIndustrial Quality (INMETRO) in Brazil with past GIZ assistance (TTSSC n.d.a).
As exemplified by the various declarations and guidelines illustrated in
the preceding sections, the UN system has been a key promoter andactor in TrC for many years with UNOSSC as the focal point of the entire
system. UNOSSC offers diverse modalities for the promotion andsupport of SSC/TrC to its partners. It manages the UN’s major trust fundfor SSC/TrC, namely the United Nations Fund for South-South
Cooperation. Through a cost-sharing arrangement, it also cooperates
with donor governments, including Japan, to support SSC/TrC
initiatives. Some major events organized by UNOSSC are supported bythis cost-sharing modality, one of which is the annual Global SouthSouth Development EXPO to showcase successful Southern
development solutions to the complex challenges facing the South.
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UNOSSC also provides management services to various funds including
the G-77’s Perez-Gurrero Trust Fund for South-South Cooperation andthe India, Brazil and South Africa Facility for Poverty and Hunger
Alleviation. It has recently established other new mechanisms such as
the South-South Global Assets and Technological Exchange (SS-GATE),
which supports the South-South public-private partnership through theprovision of financial and other knowledge facilitation support.
Other UN specialized agencies such as UNEP, UNIDO and ILO havelong engaged in TrC. For instance, in the furtherance of its TrC, UNEP
has recently launched the South-South Cooperation Exchange
Mechanism for capacity development and technology transfer in theenvironmental and sustainable development field, which is the online
platform to exchange cases of innovative field practices in addition to its
more traditional support to SSC through training, workshops andforums (UNEP n.d.).
The World Bank Institute (WBI), the training and knowledge exchange
arm of the Bank, is also in the process of further strengthening its
function as the support organ for south-south knowledge exchange andcapacity development. WBI is using a broad range of SS exchange
instruments including the South-South Experience Exchange Trust Fund
(SSEETF), a catalytic funding mechanism launched in 2008 for demanddriven SSC initiatives, the Global Development Learning Network(GDLN), a mechanism to promote learning by linking affiliatedinstitutions with ICT such as video-conferencing systems, and also
support to regional centers of excellence such as the Zimbabwe-based
African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), a multi-lateralfoundation to support capacity development in policy formulation andpublic management.
(2) JICA’s triangular practice for SSA29
Japan has been widely recognized as the long-standing major bilateral
actor in triangular cooperation (UN 2008, Fordelone 2009, TT-SSC 2010).
The advent of JICA’s TrC dates back to 1975, the early days of SSC. Japan
has been noted for the advancement of institutionalization regarding its
engagement in SSC/TrC, which is still rare among DAC bilateral donors.
The SSC/TrC has been clearly stated as one of the central approaches ofJapan’s ODA in its ODA charter (Government of Japan 2003), mid-term
29. This section draws on JICA’s internal documents.

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policy (Government of Japan 2005) and JICA’s thematic guideline of SSC(JICA 2005).
Over the years, the volume and regional coverage of Japan’s TrC has
been expanded and diversified for greater impact. The major form ofJapan’s TrC has been what is called third-country training, or triangulartraining programs (JICA 2011). Many of these training programs invarious fields are offered by the organizations in developing countries,
which have built up their expertise and capacity in their respective areas
through prior bilateral technical cooperation with JICA and otherbilateral and multilateral aid agencies.
Among the regions, participants from SSA have steadily increased,
especially since the second half of the 1990s following the launch of thefirst TICAD in 1993. In 1993, the number of participants from SSA was
below 200, which is around 11% of the total beneficiaries in the year. By
2011, the number increased to 1,228 participants; the equivalent of 34%
of the total participants (3,780). Also, it is noteworthy that several SSA
countries like Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and Tanzania have become active
in providing training for other SSA countries, the beneficiaries of whichamounted to 381 participants in 2011. This implies that regional centersof excellence, which have knowledge and experiences to share withfellow countries, can be nurtured whatever the level of national income.
Other than triangular training programs, JICA also helped dispatch
experts from pivotal countries, though its size remains modest, with 23
experts in 2011.
To improve the impact, many of these training and expert dispatch
programs have been combined with other aid instruments such as
financial assistance within the broader program and project packages
including the case of the African Institute of Capacity Development(AICAD), which we will look at shortly. New types of TrC approaches
such as the establishment of a regional network as the community ofpractice, the increased use of ICT including videoconferencing andInternet-based information sharing have also been increasingly adopted,
which will also be illustrated later.
To institutionalize TrC, Japan has adopted a system called partnershipprograms. Over the years, Japan has built up a framework to support
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willingness to promote SSC (JICA 2009). On the African continent, Japanhas partnership programs with three countries: Egypt, Tunisia andMorocco.
In cooperation with the EFTCA in Egypt, JICA started implementing
triangular training programs in 1985. In 1998, as an output of TICAD II,
Egypt and Japan signed a partnership program, namely the Japan-Egypt
Triangular Technical Cooperation Programme for the Promotion ofSouth-South Cooperation in Africa. By 2012, Japan and Egypt
cooperated in organizing more than 20 training programs on various
themes such as rice cultivation and infectious disease prevention, andaccepted about 2,200 participants from 49 SSA countries. The idea of
cost-sharing was also introduced. Under the Programme, the twocountries have been jointly implementing TC activities to support thesocio-economic development of African countries by organizing
international training and dispatching experts.
Tunisia entered into partnership with Japan in 1999, when the two
governments signed the Japan-Tunisia Triangular Technical Cooperation
Programme for the Promotion of South-South Cooperation in Africa.
Many activities under the framework focus on areas that contribute to
the achievement of the MDGs, such as agriculture, water, and health/
medical. By 2012, Japan and Tunisia had cooperated in organizing 17
training programs for about 900 participants and dispatching 20
Tunisian experts.
Morocco and Japan signed the Japan-Morocco Triangular TechnicalCooperation Programme for the Promotion of South-South Cooperationin Africa in 2003. Under the program, Morocco has been conducting
international training related to such fields as road maintenance,
fisheries, and maternal and child health. By 2012, Morocco had
implemented nine international training courses for 1,009 participantsfrom 26 SSA countries. One example is a training program for roadmaintenance engineers of Francophone SSA countries offered by theInstitute of Training on Road Maintenance and Construction Machines(IFEER).30 Using inputs from Japan as appropriate, including Japanese
30. IFEER was established in 1993 with the support of the Japanese government including thecapital grant aid for its facility construction as well as technical cooperation for capacity
development. The institute has become a sub-regional training center for road maintenanceengineers of Francophone SSA countries.

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road maintenance equipment widely in use in Francophone SSA
countries, the course has been providing training fitted to the local
needs.
Though not having signed a partnership program, South Africa is amajor partner for Japan in supporting SSC for SSA. One of the notable
triangular cooperation activities between Japan and South Africa is the
support for the NEPAD initiative, in which South Africa has been one of
the major players, hosting its secretariat. As an integral part of NEPAD
support activities, South Africa’s Public Administration Leadership andManagement Academy (PALMS) and JICA have been collaborating toorganize triangular programs for the training of trainers for public sector
development. Since its start, the program has accepted the trainers ofmanagement development institutes (MDI) all over SSA countries.
As illustrated by the examples above, Japan’s strength in TrC may lie in
its accumulated experiences and the wealth of relationships of mutual
trust it has developed with a number of Southern partners through its
long commitment in TrC. In recent years, it has been trying to diversify
its modes of delivery. The remaining task for Japan may be to take stocks
of its vast past achievements, review them, and come up with innovativemodels fitted to the needs of the 21st century.
Though sketchy, our overview presented above of SSC and TrC for SSA
shows that over a long period, starting from the 1950s, there has beensteady progress in the promotion of SSC and TrC, involving more actors
and increasing amounts of resources, accompanied by various
institutional developments.

3. Case Studies of Triangular Cooperation for Knowledge
Exchanges in SSA
So far, we have looked at the history, current state, and major actors andmagnitude of SSC/TrC for SSA. We will now look at specific cases,
focusing particularly on knowledge sharing and co-creation. The
following five cases have been chosen to illustrate the wide variety offorms and contents of TrC.

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3.1 Cases(1) Transferring localized knowledge to neighboring countries:
Vocational and technical Training31
Senegal’s Vocational Training Center (CFPT) has been playing the role ofa center of excellence among French-speaking African countries toincrease human resources for industrial development.
The CFPT was established in 1984 with the support of Japan to meet the
shortage of entry- and middle-level technical workers, which was animportant target in the country’s 6th four-year economic development
plan (81/82-84/85). The center was designed from the outset with theidea that Senegalese human resources would be nurtured by Senegalese
instructors. Since its establishment, the institute has trained about 2,300
technicians and engineers who completed its two- or three-year
programs (JICA n.d.).32 These courses have come to be recognized as thecountry’s top level programs, with their completion being treated as acertified qualification for studies in France and Canada. In addition,
CFPT has been providing training and retraining to workers in bothformal and informal sectors as an implementing organization of the
Office National de Formation Professonnelle (ONFP)33 since the ONFP’s
establishment in 1984.
Over the years, the CFPT gradually developed its own knowledge andskills best suited to the country’s needs. At first, the training content was
heavily influenced by what was brought by Japanese experts. With time,
however, various innovations were made to produce locally adjusted
technical training systems. One small example of such adaptation is thatat the CFPT, the students—future leaders in the workplace—are
expected to maintain the workshop (work place) in an orderly, safe andclean fashion, according to the key lessons of the 5S doctrines—Sorting,Set in order, Systematic cleaning, Standardizing, and Sustaining. Whilemaintaining its original message, this principle was localized andintroduced into the Senegalese context with due modifications to make itsuit local labor customs.

31. This section draws on JICA 2012a.
32. Various qualifications obtained through Senegal’s education system are valid not only inneighboring countries, but also in France (JICA 2000, p. 324).
33. ONFP is funded by corporate employment insurance, donors, and internationalorganizations that provide financial support for vocational training.

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While building up its own capacity, the CFPT started supporting a large
number of countries—more than 20 of them—in their human resource
development; in 1999, in cooperation with JICA, it started providing 16
French-speaking countries with international training programs (JICA
2012b). Eventually, the Institute came to have about 15% of their BTI andBTS trainees coming from other countries.34 Cultural and socio-economic
similarities with the neighboring French-speaking countries certainly
facilitated the transfer and sharing of technologies and knowledge. This
has resulted in making CFPT one of the core institutions for thedevelopment of human resources in West Africa.
One major beneficiary of such cooperation is the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC). Concurrently with the CFPT project, preparations fora JICA-supported project in DRC were under way. The project aimed todevelop the capacity of the DRC’s National Institute of Professional
Preparation (INPP),35 in which a group of core instructors had to be
trained. Since CFPT seemed an ideal resource to support INPP, in 2010,
discussions between INPP and CFPT began, facilitated by JICA; the two
institutions worked out cooperation plans to meet the needs of the PP
with the available resources at CFPT, and cooperation between the twostarted.
(2) Seeking relevant knowledge from around the world: Civil Service
Training Centre in Ghana
The Ghanaian case presented below illustrates an interesting case wherea wide range of knowledge was sought and accumulated from a variety
of sources, and once internalized, such knowledge was shared more
widely with others. Such knowledge exchange happened in a TC project
assisted by JICA titled “Capacity Development of Public
Administration,” launched in 2007. Its aim was to improve the capacityof the Ghanaian Civil Service Training Center (CSTC). The projectfocused on two key cross-cutting themes: Ethical Leadership (EL) andQuality and Productivity Improvement (QPI).
From the onset, the project tried to seek knowledge and experience not
34. The number of overseas trainees is limited to 15% of the total due to prioritizing
Senegalese citizens (JICA 2000, p. 326).
35. The INPP was awarded the International Star Award for Quality (ISAQ) in the Gold
Category at the 2012 International Quality Awards in Geneva, Switzerland. The ISAQ is anaward for those who are recognized for investing in the improvement of their products andservices (ISAQ 2010).

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only from Japan but also from other Asian and Sub-Sahara Africancountries including Singapore, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Tanzania andSouth Africa, which are the members of the Commonwealth and sharemany common features in their civil service. In particular, the Civil
Service College (CSC) in Singapore played a central role. JICA, with its
close ties with these partners,36 played the dual role of catalyst andknowledge actor.
During the project, the Ghanaian CSTC acquired relevant knowledge
resources from partner countries through diverse modes of triangularcooperation, including face-to-face training sessions as well as videoconferencing. Extensive and intensive exchanges were promoted
between Ghanaian officials and their Southern counterparts.
All through these programs, CSTC applied a systematic approach toplanning, execution and evaluation of training. Complemented by the
improvement of training facilities, the annual number of training
programs offered at CSTC has increased from 15 courses to 54 a year,
which reflects the improved capacity of CSTC in organizing training
provisions.37
With these achievements, CSTC is now moving toward becoming a
regional center of excellence in civil service training. Assisted by JICA,
the center has started offering training opportunities to Liberia andSierra Leone. CSTC undertook training needs assessments in the twocountries to adjust the training content to suit the needs. The firsttraining was successfully launched in September 2011 and will provide
training opportunities to civil servants from the neighboring two
countries, with the aim of making them facilitators for future training
programs in their respective countries.
(3) Establishing a regional knowledge platform for poverty reduction:
AICAD38
The Project of the African Institute for Capacity Development (AICAD)
is a cooperation project focusing on regional cooperation in human
36. Japan and Singapore had established close ties, and to facilitate collaboration for TrC, they
introduced the Japan-Singapore Partnership Programme for the 21st Century (JSPP21) in1994.
37. This number includes training programs undertaken outside the project.
38. This section draws on JICA 2012c.

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resource development at the higher education level in East Africa. The
project is the brainchild of TICAD II, where the idea of establishing ahuman capacity development base for poverty reduction was discussed.
Later, in 2000, in collaboration with Japan, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda
reached an agreement to establish AICAD. AICAD was expected towork toward poverty reduction in East Africa through cooperation of
the three countries; it highlighted three functions for community-level
development activities: 1) research and development, 2) training andextension, and 3) information network and documentation.
Since its establishment, AICAD’s functions and organizational structure
have been steadily developed. Headquartered at the Jomo Kenyatta
University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT) in Kenya,39 it had
three country offices: at the Egerton University in Kenya, the Makerere
University in Uganda, and the Sokoine University of Agriculture in
Tanzania. Biannually, Governing Board meetings are held to discuss
important issues of AICAD’s management among the three countries’
ministries related to finance and education, science and technology, andrepresentatives of the member universities.40
With poverty reduction as its ultimate goal, AICAD and its members
have been promoting a wide variety of activities. They include, forexample, in-country training programs and comprehensive multiplelevel “Community Empowerment Programmes” for communities, a“Knowledge and Technology Dissemination Programme” for livelihood
improvement, East African region-wide training,41 and the New Rice for
Africa (NERICA) dissemination project. These activities resulted inenhancing social cohesion of target communities and women’s
empowerment. Skills and knowledge obtained through these activities
have also been being disseminated by the participants to communities,
supporting poverty reduction in member countries.
AICAD’s function of networking with other organizations has also beendeveloping. Since 2010, AICAD has been expanding its activities in thearea of university outreach activities. It has conducted four regional
training sessions in collaboration with the World Bank Institute (WBI)
39. JICA had supported the establishment and development of JKUAT since 1980.
40. As of 2012, the participating universities from the three countries amount to 19 (sevenfrom Kenya, seven from Tanzania, and five from Uganda).
41. Some of the regional training was organized in collaboration with WBI and WIA.

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and the Wetlands International Africa (WIA). Also, AICAD’s three
country offices have been constructing good partnerships with variousorganizations from national/local governments to NGOs.
Cooperating with Asia played an important role in AICAD’s
development. Starting in 2002, various professional knowledge
exchanges were conducted between educators of the three East Africancountries and those of Asia, namely Indonesia, Thailand and Japan.
The project had a system of sharing and spreading knowledge and skills.
For instance, in 2007, a regional training program for export promotion
was held in collaboration with Indonesia’s Export Trade Center.
Subsequently, in Tanzania, the knowledge and skills shared fromIndonesia at the training program spread into society through a cascadesystem of training: to community leaders and then from them to local
community members.
(4) Networking for knowledge exchange: Coalition for African Rice
Development (CARD)
The “Coalition for African Rice Development”, or CARD,42 is an example
of a network-based initiative for knowledge exchange and co-creation.
Launched on the occasion of the 2008 TICAD IV, it is a multi-stakeholder
platform with a well-established management structure “to support theefforts of African countries to increase rice production (CARD 2011).”
Providing complementary support for capacity development of SSA
governments in effectively managing rice sector development, it hashelped interested SSA governments in developing National Rice
Development Strategies (NRDS) within the framework of Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), agricultural development strategies
as well as the country framework for the Comprehensive Africa
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). So far, 21 out of 23
African member countries have successfully formulated NRDS throughbroad multi-stakeholders consultation process (CARD 2013). It has also
provided other kinds of support for creating an environment for ricerelated investment.
One of the hallmarks of CARD is its engagement of diverse actors. The
steering committee is represented by a broad range of stakeholders
42. For a general description of CARD and a discussion from an agricultural technology’s
point of view, see, respectively, Chapters 2 and 3 of this volume.

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including multi- and bilateral-organs, rice producing partner countries
in SSA as well as Africa-based regional organs and initiatives. They
include NEPAD, AGRA, FARA, WB, CGIAR, FAO, IRRI and JICA otherthan for SSA countries (JICA/AGRA 2008; CARD 2011).
With such broad engagement, CARD has tried to act as the forum amonginternational and local knowledge organs like research institutions anddonors. In other words, the CARD network is in itself an initiative andmechanism for multi-stakeholder knowledge exchange.
Another notable feature is its demand-driven approach. As the needs
and priorities for rice production promotion widely differ from country
to country, CARD specialists assist partner countries to identify thebottlenecks in rice production development and then extend thenecessary support to address the bottlenecks by inviting specialists fromknowledge partners in the CARD network.
CARD has also started to consciously promote intra-regional as well asinter-regional South-South and Triangular learning.43 SSC/TrC has been
set as one of four pillars of the CARD programs. Lately, CARD has
embarked on a sub-program of linking Asian partners with SSA
counterparts. In late 2012, it organized three video conferences for thepromotion of the South-South learning process with ASEAN partners
including the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Japan (CARD 2011,2012). Also included were government officials and private companies
like seed sellers and rice millers, as well as farmers’ groups. The
participants are now in the process of feeding back what they havelearned from the conference into the implementation process of their
NRDSs.
As seen from the above, CARD is a dynamic and broad network andplatform for promoting intra- and inter-regional knowledge exchange
aiming at higher productivity and more profitable rice production.
(5) Creating solutions to shared challenges: cross-border roadtransport
Triangular cooperation (TrC) can be an effective way of addressing
43. As part of the action for promoting information sharing on rice development, CARD is
now developing a dedicated webpage with ample space for storing relevant information
with links to all the key African initiatives in rice development (CARD 2011).

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regionally-shared issues among countries. One such example is theinitiative of promoting One Stop Border Post (OSBP).44
OSBP is a trade facilitation approach through the promotion ofharmonization and alignment of legal, institutional and procedural
aspects of trade at borders with concomitant infrastructuredevelopment. With complementary financial and technical support frominternational donors including JICA, an OSBP for road transport was
first introduced at the Chirundu border between Zimbabwe and Zambia
in December 2009 with tangible impacts on smoother and more efficientborder management. Even though the OSBP’s inauguration has been
relatively recent, it has already produced significant improvements
including the reduction of waiting times for border formalities.45 The
successful launch of Africa’s first OSBP at Chirundu was a case where
the concept of integrated border management was put into practice. TheOSBP at Chirundu itself was the South-South partnership between
Zimbabwe and Zambia assisted by both multilateral and bilateral
donors including the World Bank, UK DFID and JICA. Right after thelaunch, a workshop on the OSBP for road transport was organized withinvitees from RECs and representatives of five East African countries,
which had planned to introduce OSBPs under the coordination of theEast African Community (EAC).
Following the success at Chirundu, the OSBP practice is now being
replicated on other borders such as Maraba between Kenya and Uganda
and Namanga between Kenya and Tanzania as an integral part of theregional infrastructure initiative. Recognizing an increasing role ofregional organizations such as the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) and the East Africa Community (EAC) incatalyzing exchanges of knowledge and experience of development
practices as well as for the harmonization of cross-border activities,
JICA, with other development partners, has helped these regionalorgans in support of their stronger coordination and regulatory capacity
in scaling-up the OSBP approach.

44. For more details, see Chapter 8 of this volume.
45. It is reported that the required time for completing the border control has been reduced
from 1–2 hours to 20 minutes for passenger cars, from 2 hours to 1 hour for buses, and from
1–2 days to less than one day for trucks, respectively (See Chapter 8 of this volume).

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3.2. Modes of SSC/TrC for knowledge exchange and co-creation(1) Modes of knowledge exchange
Knowledge sharing and co-creation through SSC/TrC can take a wide
variety of forms, depending on the kind of knowledge being dealt with,and the environment in which the exchange takes place. Below is a
simple typology of the forms. It should be noted here, however, that thetypes below are not mutually exclusive and an initiative could evolvefrom one type to the other with time.
Hub-and-spokes with centers of excellence
In recent years, knowledge exchange through networks has come todraw increasing attention as promising architecture. Among the varied
forms of networks, the first is what can be described as the hub-andspokes-type knowledge exchange. This is a simple form of network
relying, at least initially, on an established central institution as a hub of
the knowledge sharing activities. And as the network develops,
spontaneous exchanges and interactions among the network members
often occur, with which the process of a virtuous cycle could kick in.
Among the cases presented above, the Senegalese and the Ghanaian
ones represent this model, where the CFPT in Senegal and the CSTC in
Ghana played central roles. The effectiveness of having these kinds of“centers of excellence” has been proven through a number of cases(Hosono 2013). Examples abound worldwide; to cite a few from Africa:
Tanzania as a hub of quality control in hospital management (Honda
2012), Kenya as a hub of strengthening science and mathematics
education (Ishihara 2012), and Egypt as a hub of infectious disease
prevention and surveillance (TT-SSC n.d.b).
Complex form of network/platform for knowledge exchange and sharing
Increasingly, more complex network forms of knowledge exchange andsharing are being applied in recent initiatives. For this, unlike the case of
the above hub-and-spokes, no single institution is assumed to be acentral knowledge organ; rather, the alliance comprised a number ofinterested parties interacting among themselves.
AICAD links up multiple regional research and training organs such as
the universities and NGOs. The AICAD headquarters in Kenya plays afacilitating role for knowledge exchanges among the members. CARD,
as its name (the “Coalition”) indicates, is essentially “a consultative
group of donors, research institutions and other relevant organizations
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Chapter 13that aims to promote rice cultivation in Africa via information sharing,harmonization of existing initiatives and projects and advocacy forfurther investment” (JICA/AGRA 2008; CARD 2011). Within the
network, these diverse actors, each having specific expertise, share andlearn a broad range of knowledge, including the formulation of national
rice development strategies, agricultural extension methods and theknowledge on new high-yielding rice varieties. The CARD secretariat
then plays the role of catalyzing and helps promote such multi-actor
exchanges. With its expanding stakeholders and increasingly active
knowledge exchanges, AICAD and CARD now evolve into more like a“platform” for knowledge sharing and exchange.
Partnership for knowledge sharing and joint problem solving
In contrast to the above two types of knowledge exchange based on
networks, the OSBP cases exemplify a tighter partnership among themembers seeking solutions to their shared or similar development
challenges. This process can, however, develop further, once theknowledge created proves useful. As illustrated in the OSBP’s case, theknowledge and experience created through the tight-knit collaboration
between Zimbabwe and Zambia are being shared with countries ineastern and southern Africa. The case of Ghana in civil service training
also illustrates the process of a problem-driven partnership forknowledge exchange: starting from the core partnership with a few
commonwealth countries including Singapore, Ghana now further
disseminates a locally adapted approach for civil service training to
Sierra Leone.
(2) Institutional arrangement
Different knowledge exchange requires different institutions. In somecases, as in CARD and AICAD, strong institutional arrangements wereintroduced from the very beginning; being large-scale projects involving
multiple layers of actors, obviously these two projects needed to have asolid institutional base, such as organizational structures and governing
bodies; in the case of CARD, the Steering Committee and otherstructures were put in place, and, for AICAD, networking systems
connecting the three countries under the Governing Board as the highest
decision making body were set up.
In contrast, the institutional building process took a quite different pathin the case of the Senegalese and Ghanaian projects; it was a process of378

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Development–With special emphasis on knowledge exchange and co-creation

spontaneous and gradual development: the linkages between the coreorganizations (i.e., CFPT in Senegal and CSTC in Ghana) and theirpartner organizations were developed gradually as the knowledge
sharing expanded by means of workshops and training courses.
These spontaneously developed institutions, however, can sometimes
grow into more formalized organizations. For example, in a project
concerning science and mathematics education, a knowledge sharing
movement started with an initiative by Kenya, and over the years it
gradually developed into a more formalized organization, comprising
27 African countries and regions, with well-articulated mechanisms forthe network’s governance (Ishihara 2012). A similar experience can befound in a case of hospital management where, with Tanzania as apivotal country, gradual networking progressed, which eventually grew
into an organization of mutual learning involving 15 countries (Honda
2012).
The OSBP’s case illustrates another promising pattern. It is a case where
the function of regional knowledge sharing on OSBP was strategicallyincorporated into well-established regional economic organizations
such as SADC and EAC. Such approach of using regional organs inknowledge sharing would lead to more harmonized and lessfragmented SSC/TrC in the region.
(3) The medium of exchange
As preceding sections have demonstrated, effective knowledge sharing
requires the strategic and timely applications of diverse instruments;
they could include face-to-face training sessions, dispatch of technicalexperts, workshops and seminars, and the use of ICT-based information
platforms. Especially, more and more opportunities have become
available, taking advantage of ICT for knowledge exchange, as
exemplified by the WBI’s GDLN, APDev’s Internet-based communities
of practice, as well as the use of video-conferencing in the case of
Ghana’s Civil Service Training.
On the other hand, it has also been widely recognized that face-to-facelearning opportunities continue to be critical in knowledge sharing,particularly with regard to the sharing of tacit knowledge (World Bankand Korea Development Institute 2012; Nonaka 2008). To further
improve the impact of SSC/TrC in coming years, strategic and creative379

Chapter 13

use of these multiple instruments should be explored through thesharing of good practices among stakeholders of SSC/TrC.
(4) Capacity development for more effective SSC/TrC
As an increasing number of countries expand their development
cooperation activities, they are also strengthening their capacity aseffective SSC performers. As shown above, the ongoing preparation
towards the establishment of SADPA in South Africa is an example ofsuch endeavor. Capacity development is also critical on the other side of
SSC/TrC, the beneficiaries.
An example of systematic joint efforts for the development of thecapacity as SSC partners is the one by the Brazilian Cooperation Agencyof the Ministry of External Relations (ABC), UNOSSC and JICA. They
have recently embarked on an innovative joint capacity development
program in the management aspect of SSC/TrC planning andoperations. It is an initiative to provide opportunities for knowledge andexperience sharing among the government staff in charge of SSC/TrC
technical cooperation. The target countries include both middle-income
countries including Brazil mainly as SSC/TrC providers as well as lowincome countries, which are mainly beneficiaries. In March 2013, its
inaugural “international training course on management of South-Southand Triangular Technical Cooperation” was organized in Brasília as partof the program; the program will span the next three years.46 The
participants of the first training comprised 39 practitioners from 36
countries, including 17 African countries.
Lastly, we maintain that the opportunity for being an SSC cooperation
provider is open to any country or organization beyond prominent
emerging economies. As illustrated in the Senegalese and Ghanaian
cases above, with capacity development, organizations can grow into
regional centers of excellence for knowledge sharing, as long as thecountries and/or organizations have strong ownership and a persistent
will to develop such capacity. Perhaps traditional North-South
cooperation by means of TrC can have a role to play in facilitating suchcapacity development processes, as exemplified in the above cases. In
fact, there are countless cases of such capacity development of
46. In addition to the training opportunities, the program also includes other complementary
support for SSC/TrC management including online consultation services and advisory
missions especially for selected focus countries.

380

South-South and Triangular Cooperation for Sub-Saharan Africa’s
Development–With special emphasis on knowledge exchange and co-creation

institutions supported by traditional partners. The international
community should continue to offer support, by means of appropriate
TrC and others, as such countries and organizations that wish to develop
their capacities to grow into cooperation providers.

4. Summary and Some Concluding Remarks and Implications
The discussion in Section 2.1 showed that Africa has been a central actor
as the promoter and beneficiary of SSC. We also noted that the TICAD
process has been playing an important role in promoting the momentum
toward more and better SSC for African development. Though sketchy,
our discussion in sections 2.2 and 2.3 has revealed that a wide variety ofactors have long been and are acting as SSC partners for thedevelopment of SSA including regional organs and North Africancountries, in addition to the oft-cited emerging economies. The lack ofdata on the activities of emerging and other actors is a serious obstacle inunderstanding the whole picture, and more effort is called for in datacollection and information sharing.
And in Section 3, we argued, based on the experiences we at JICA haveaccumulated, that knowledge sharing and co-creation through SSC and
TrC can take a variety of forms with diverse instruments, depending on
the types of knowledge creation and solutions needed. We also argued
that knowledge sharing and co-creation should not be monopolized by asmall number of actors but is a possibility for all aspiring countries andorganizations. In that regards, the North donors with their extensive
field office network and long history of close collaboration withcounterpart organs in SSA countries are well-positioned to provide
support. It is thus expected that the TICAD process will continue toprovide space and opportunities for experience sharing and open
dialogue among broad stakeholders on the furtherance of SSC/TrC
towards inclusive and dynamic development in Africa.
Finally, having attempted to provide an overview of SSC/TrC for SubSaharan Africa’s development, the authors renewed their recognition of
the multi-faceted and complex nature of SSC/TrC; a plethora of issues
surrounding SSC/TrC remain uninvestigated, such as their geopoliticalnature and the measurement and evaluation of their impact in the381

Chapter 13

beneficiary countries.47 These remaining but critical questions require
further research.

47. McEwan and Mawdsley 2012 argues for the need of more critical analysis of triangular or trilateral
cooperation beyond the managerial/technical discussions, which most currently available papers
including this one are limited to.

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Development–With special emphasis on knowledge exchange and co-creation

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387

AppendicesAppendix 1:
The TICAD Process and JapanKei Yoshizawa

This essay attempts to give a quick review of the history of the TICAD
process. Looking back at the different policies and priorities agreed on at
TICAD I through IV, and paying particular attention to the roles playedby the Japanese government, the essay will try to shed light on thecontributions that the TICAD process has had on African development.
It will start with a chronological revisit to the process and, toward theend, offer some of the author’s views on its 20-year-long evolution.

TICAD I (October 1993, Tokyo)
TICAD I was held in 1993 in the midst of the drastically changing
international environment in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War.
On the African continent, many countries were struggling toward
democracy, while at the same time many were experiencing politicalturmoil and some, civil wars. Western donors, on their part, weregenerally experiencing waning interest in supporting Africa after the fallof the Berlin Wall, and policy-wise, they were rather frustrated to see
many African countries remaining stuck with slow improvement ofmacro-economic performance and poor governance. In the meantime,
Japan, in 1989, had become the world’s top donor in regard todevelopment assistance, overtaking the US, and its bilateral aid to Africa
had been increasing rapidly since the late 1980s, including co-financing
with the World Bank and IMF through Structural Adjustment Lending
and Non-Project Grants supporting balance of payments aligning withstructure adjustments.
Thus, TICAD I was held in an international environment where, on the
one hand, there was a mounting sense, among African leaders, of the“Marginalization” of Africa in international politics, as well as that of
discontentment vis-à-vis the Breton-Woods institutions and the Western
donors; on the other hand, there was a mounting expectation toward391

Appendix 1

Japan as an emerging, though a little unfamiliar, development partner. In
1993, as a multilateral forum, the conference was organized jointly by
Japan, the UN, the UNDP and the GCA,1 and was participated in by 48
African countries (5 of which were represented by their heads of state), 8
international organizations, 12 bilateral donor countries and the EC.
The first TICAD conference came up with a message that, as I see it,
mixed the dominant policy orientation in the international aid
community at the time and Japan’s aid philosophy. The primaryinterests of the international community in the early 1990s were, on theeconomic front, economic reform toward a market economy and dealing
with the debt crisis still lingering from the 1980s; and on the political/
administrative front, the priority was democratization andadministrative and financial reforms that the Good Governanceprinciple demanded. These agendas inevitably echoed strongly in theTokyo Declaration of TICAD I, but the document also incorporated
policies and philosophies upheld by the Japanese Government, such as
self-help efforts, south-south cooperation and sharing Asian experiences
for African development (Horiuchi 2006:28).
In retrospect, it seems that the Japanese aid policy for Africa at the timeof TICAD I was rather broad and not as clear as those that would be
expressed later at TICAD IV. The commitment of the Japanese
Government was also rather limited at TICAD I. It was later in TICAD II
and thereafter that Japanese policy orientation took concrete forms andwere translated into action programs. Despite these limitations, TICAD
I, and Japan’s determination for African development that it
represented, enhanced the expectations of African leaders for Japan; it
was against this backdrop that the holding of TICAD II was announcedin April 1996 (Horiuchi 2004: 24).

TICAD II (October 1998, Tokyo)
Following the success of TICAD I, the Japanese government embarked
on efforts toward taking the lead in agenda setting in African
development and, more generally, in international development. The
most notable result was the adoption of the Shaping the 21st Century, The
1. Global Coalition for Africa, a group of experts and intellectuals on political and economic
issues regarding Africa

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The TICAD Process and Japan

Contribution of Development Cooperation, adopted at the DAC HighLevel Meeting held in May 1996 (Horiuchi 2004: 25), which was more
broadly known as “DAC New Development Strategy”.
The DAC New Development Strategy was different from the thendominant development paradigms that called primarily for Structural
Adjustment and Good Governance. While these policies largely aimed at
institutional and regulatory reforms, the DAC New Development
Strategy urged that governments and partners focus on the results to beachieved through development, highlighting the importance of self-help
efforts and clarifying the complementary role of development aid. It also
introduced numerical targets – an expression of the results-focusedorientation – on such domains as poverty reduction, social development(education, health), and environmental conservation and sustainable
development.
These principles upheld in the DAC New Development Strategy wereincorporated in the Tokyo Agenda for Action of TICAD II (Horiuchi
2004: 25); education, health and poverty reduction were identified as the
key challenges.2
In addition, eight numerical targets and 370
development projects, mostly reflecting the targets, were presented.3
Also, it was at TICAD II that the TICAD framework as we know it today
started to be shaped and formalized; the principle of “support for selfhelp efforts” was adopted as the basic principle of TICAD to be called“Ownership and Partnership” (Horiuchi 2006: 30); and othercharacteristics of TICAD emerged, such as the emphasis on poverty
reduction and social development, a results-oriented approachaccompanying numerical targets, and support for South-South
Cooperation.
This TICAD framework constituted a pioneering initiative ininternational efforts toward the adoption of the Poverty Reduction
Strategy by the IMF and the World Bank (1999), MDGs by the United
Nations (2000) and NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development,
2. The Japanese government announced the provision of grant aid of about 90 billion yen overthe subsequent five years in the fields of education, health and water supply.
3. UNDP reviewed the progress of the implementation of Tokyo Agenda for Action (UNDP
2003).

393

Appendix 1

2001).4
TICAD II also served as a platform to strengthen various then-existing
international development-related initiatives. For example, the Tokyo
Declaration and Tokyo Agenda for Action of TICAD II incorporated theHIPC Initiative (Lyon Summit in 1996) and other decisions made before
TICAD II about external debt issues. Subsequently, the expanded HIPC
Initiative (Cologne Summit in 1999) was agreed on based on ownershipand partnership principles and emphasis on poverty reduction andsocial development. The World Bank became a co-organizer of TICAD
in 2001.

TICAD III (September 2003, Tokyo)
The most important topic of TICAD III was to support NEPAD (NewPartnership for Africa’s Development), which was presented to theinternational community at the TICAD ministerial-level meeting(December 2001, Tokyo). NEPAD was consistent with the basic
principles of TICAD in that it emphasized ownership by Africancountries of their development process (Horiuchi 2006: 34). TICAD III
agreed to mobilize the support of the international community andexpand the partnership in its support. Concrete actions for supporting
NEPAD were subsequently developed reflecting TICAD III outcomes;
including Cross-Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI) and One Stop
Border Post (OSBP) initiatives highlighted in the TICAD IV Action Plan,5and the African Infrastructure Development Program (PIDA)
formulated jointly by the African Development Bank, African Union
Commission and the NEPAD Agency, adopted at the African Union
Summit in 2012.
The Summary by the Chair of TICAD III confirmed the three pillars ofAfrican development, consisting of (1) people-centered development, (2)poverty reduction through economic growth, and (3) consolidation ofpeace. Highlighting “poverty reduction through economic growth” asthe second pillar, this summary could arguably be understood asreflecting the position of the Japanese Government: in order to reducepoverty, economic growth must first of all be promoted – a position not
4. For details, see, for example, the Institute of International Affairs (2003)
5. Please see Chapter 8 of this volume.

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The TICAD Process and Japan

necessarily identical with either the market-oriented approachpromoted by the IMF and World Bank through structural adjustments,
or with the position of the United Nations that was calling for amobilization of a massive amount of development assistance funds toachieve MDGs by 2015.
Following this, this economic growth agenda became the central issue inthe subsequent TICAD process, coinciding with the economic growth ofAfrica that had started in the early 2000s led by exports of energy andmineral resources. In TICAD IV, “Boosting economic growth” was madethe first priority. And toward TICAD V, discussions are underway tomove the agenda more in the direction of further acceleration of growth,
as summarized by Japanese Foreign Minister Mr. Kishida in the TICAD
V Ministerial Preparatory Meeting in March 2013.

TICAD Ⅳ (May 2008, Yokohama)
TICAD IV was held in 2008. A total of 51 (out of 53) African countries
participated in the conference, with 41 of them represented by heads ofstate or government. The conference positioned the issue of boosting
economic growth as the first pillar, and came up with the outcome
documents titled the Yokohama Declaration and Yokohama Action Plan,
which clearly stated the commitments of the participants. Japan, for its
part, announced that it would double its ODA to Africa and provide up
to $4 billion of new ODA loans over the following five years to support
the continent’s economic growth, despite its difficult fiscal position.
Another noteworthy development was the introduction of the follow-up
mechanism for monitoring TICAD IV commitments and the Yokohama
Action Plan; since 2009, follow-up ministerial meetings have been held
every year to monitor the progress of these commitments. TICAD
Progress Reports are compiled and reported to the ministerial meetings.
The TICAD IV Yokohama Declaration emphasized the importance ofeconomic growth even more strongly than ever, putting it before otherpillars, i.e., those related to MDGs, environmental issues and climatechange, and consolidation of peace and good governance. The
prioritization of economic growth in TICAD IV represented aremarkable shift from the traditional emphasis on social and human395Appendix 1

development since TICAD I and toward the development of
infrastructure, trade and investment, and partnership with the private
sector.
However, prior to TICAD IV, Japan was constrained in mobilizing its
financial resources for supporting economic growth in Africa, due
primarily to the debt accumulation problem in Africa. This constraint
was relieved by the final settlement of long-standing debt problems
agreed on at the Gleneagles G8 Summit in 2005, prompting the Japanese
government to announce its ODA Loan support package for Africa
through co-financing with the African Development Bank (EPSA).6 In
TICAD IV, Japan pledged new ODA loans of up to $4 billion over five
years focused on cross-border infrastructure projects in transportationand the power sector to promote regional integration in Africa. This
pledge of “Doubling ODA to Africa” under the difficult fiscal situation in
Japan was initiated by the strong political leadership of the Fukuda
administration at the time, by switching the main destination of the
ODA budget, which had been largely directed to other regions.
This also marked a major turning point in Japanese assistance to Africa,
which had been virtually limited to assistance in social and humandevelopment mainly through grant aid and Technical Cooperation.7 The
size of the pledged ODA loans ($4 billion over five years) may not looksignificant enough when compared with the vast financing gap in
infrastructure investment reported to amount to $48 billion a year
(World Bank 2008), but it could play an important role in complementing
other financial resources, for example, through co-financing operations
with the African Development Bank and the World Bank.

6. EPSA stands for Expanded Private Sector Assistance for Africa. It aims at the provision of
ODA loans of $1 billion over 5 years from 2005 through co-financing with the African
Development Bank.
7. This does not mean that social and human development is no longer emphasized in the
TICAD IV commitments of Japan; in parallel to infrastructure development, the Japanesecontribution to the achievement of MDGs has also been strengthened through grant aid andTechnical Cooperation as part of the commitment.

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The TICAD Process and Japan

Contributions of TICAD to African Development
So far, we have looked at the development of directions and priorities atrespective TICAD meetings, summarized in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Priorities in the outcome documents in TICAD I to IV
TICAD I (1993)

Tokyo
Outcome Declaration on
document African
Development
Priorities

TICAD II (1998) TICAD III (2003) TICAD IV (2008)
Tokyo Agenda
for Action(1) Political and (1) Social
development
economic
and poverty
reforms
reduction:(2) Economic
Promotingdevelopment
humanthrough
activities of the development
private sector (2) Economic
development:(3) Regional
Promoting thecooperation
private sector
and regional(3) Basic
integration
foundations(4) Emergency
for development
relief anddevelopment(5) Asianexperience andAfricandevelopment

Yokohama
Summary by the Declaration ,Yokohama
Chair
Action Plan
(1) Boosting(1) Peopleeconomic
centered
growthdevelopment(2) Achieving(2) Poverty
MDGs
reduction(3) Consolidation
throughof peace andeconomic
good
growth(3) Consolidation governance(4) Addressingof peace
environmental
issues andclimate change(Prepared by the author based on information of JICA et al. (2007 and 2013) and the website of the Ministryof Foreign Affairs)

We now have a look to see what contributions the whole process has
made to African development.
To recapitulate, the following are some of the past major achievements of
the TICAD process:➢➢ Respect of the ownership of development through theformulation of the “ownership and partnership” principle at
TICAD II.
➢➢ Facilitation of development initiatives through African ownership
exemplified in such initiatives as NEPAD, agreed on at TICAD III.
➢➢ Emphasis on poverty reduction through economic growth as apillar of the African development agenda at TICAD III, and the397Appendix 1

introduction of a growth-oriented development strategy at
TICAD IV.
➢➢ Development of action plans based on numerical targets andoutcome goals as well as the establishment of a follow-up
mechanism in TICAD IV.
➢➢ Promotion of south-south and especially Asia-Africa cooperation8
since TICAD I.
The TICAD process also provided opportunities for the sharing of thedevelopment and growth experience between Asia and Africa, an
agenda highlighted from TICAD I. The ideas drawn from Asiandevelopment experiences, like the role of the governments, growthoriented development strategies, emphasizing the importance ofinfrastructure, and strengthening of ownership, added some values tothe development strategies in Africa, which had traditionally been led
by Washington Consensus-based thinking since the 1990s (Horiuchi
2006: 30, and JICA et al. 2013).
TICAD is different from other fora on African development in its
character as a global, open, and multilateral forum. While the EU, China,
Korea, India and Turkey, and others have held similar-looking summits
or ministerial-level meetings with AU and African governments, thesemeetings are held with the aim of strengthening bilateral partnerships
between the host government or institution and Africa. Unlike these,
TICAD is a summit-level meeting on African Development between
African governments and TICAD co-organizers, i.e., the Government ofJapan, the UN, the UNDP, the World Bank and the African Union
Commission. TICAD has a unique character as a forum open tointernational institutions, civil societies, the private sector, andacademics to discuss and reach consensus on the African development
agenda and action plan for the next 5 years, not limited to a bilateral
partnership and commitment between Japan and Africa.
As an open forum, the TICAD process has attracted the attention andparticipation of NGOs and the private sector. For example, the Japanese
civil society, with the establishment of the Africa Japan Forum (AJF) in
1994, has been playing an important role in the TICAD process; theircontributions included participating in the TICAD meetings, organizingside events and consultative meetings with the Ministry of Foreign
8. For more detailed discussion on south-south cooperation, see Chapter 13 of this volume.

398

The TICAD Process and Japan

Affairs, presenting policy recommendations to TICAD meetings,
communication with the public on Africa, networking with African civilsocieties (TCSF 2008). The private sector was also an important partner:
the Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) also holds consultative
meetings with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs9 and presents proposals to
the Government of Japan on the TICAD process and public-private
partnership in Africa (Keidanren 2013).
With the changing environment surrounding Africa and the wholeworld, the challenge for the future TICAD process could be how it cancontinue to further promote debates and garner resources for African
development, both in public and private sectors, while strengthening its
unique character as a global and open forum, and building on the richexperience and assets it has created over the last 20 years.

9. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds meetings with the civil society and the private sector
for TICAD V (http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/ticad/index.html)

399

Appendix 1

References<Japanese books and documents>
Horiuchi, S. 2004. Ten years of the footprint of the Tokyo International
Conference on African Development (TICAD). n.p.
Japan Institute of International Affairs. 2003. Review on the New
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). [In Japanese.]Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development,
Tokyo.
Japan International Cooperation Agency, and Mitsubishi UFJ Researchand Consulting. 2007. Project Study on the TICAD Process; Reviewof the past achievements and implications for future success: Finalreport.
Japan International Cooperation Agency, and Mitsubishi UFJ Researchand Consulting. 2013. TICAD 20th anniversary review
Keidanren. 2013. Contributing to sustainable growth in Sub-SaharanAfrica: The business community’s Africa strategy towards TICAD
V. http://www.keidanren.or.jp/policy/2013/ 007.html.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2009–2012. TICAD IV annual
progress report 2008–2011. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/
ticad/report/index.html.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2004. 2003 White paper on official
development assistance (ODA). Tokyo: National Printing Bureau ofJapan.
ODA Evaluation Committee. 2008. Evaluation report on assistance toAfrica through the TICAD process. http://www.mofa.go.jp/
mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/hyouka/kunibetu/
gai/ticad/pdfs/
jk07_01_0001.pdf.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 1996. Shaping the 21st
century: The contribution of development cooperation [summaryinJapanese].
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/
doukou/dac/ sei_1_10.html.
TICAD Civil Society Forum (TCSF) [Y. Ishida, and M. Obayashi, eds.].
2008. 2007 citizen’s white paper on policy for Africa. Kyoto: Koyo
Shobo.
<English books and documents>
Horiuchi, S. 2006. TICAD after 10 years: A preliminary assessment andproposals for the future. In Japan, a model and a partner: Views and400

The TICAD Process and Japanissues in African development, ed. S. Adem. Leiden and Boston:
Brill.
Japan International Cooperation Agency, and Mitsubishi UFJ Researchand Consulting. 2007. Project study on the TICAD Process: Reviewof the past achievements and implications for future success; Finalreport. Report prepared for JICA, March.
Japan International Cooperation Agency, and Mitsubishi UFJ Researchand Consulting. 2013. TICAD 20th Anniversary Review. Report
prepared for JICA.
Keidanren. 2013. Contributing to sustainable growth in Sub-SaharanAfrica: The business community’s Africa strategy towards TICAD
V (summary). http://www.keidanren.or.jp/ en/policy/2013/007.
html.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2009–2012. TICAD IV annual
progress reports 2008–2011. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/
africa/ticad/ticadfollow-up/report/index.html.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 1996. Shaping the 21st
century: The contribution of development cooperation.
Development Assistance Committee, OECD, May.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2003. Review of
implementation of Tokyo Agenda for Action (TAA): Achievementsof goals and objectives; Action by Africa and its partners. Review
document.
World Bank. 2008. Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostics. Program
description.

401

Appendix 2

Appendix 2:Japan’s Official Development Assistance toAfrica 2000-2011
COUNTRY SCHEME
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Algeria
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
AngolaTechnical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Benin
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Botswana
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Burkina
Faso
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
BurundiTechnical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
CameroonTechnical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Cape Verde
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
CentralGrant Aid
AfricanTechnical Cooperation
Republic
Total

402

Japan’s ODA (Net disbursements, $ million)
2000
2001
2002
2003
-5.82
-5.00
-2.88
-1.05
0.00
0.18
0.05
0.11
0.94
0.82
0.65
1.08
-4.88
-4.00
-2.18
0.14
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
17.88
18.20
26.09
32.66
3.59
2.51
1.13
0.44
21.47
20.71
27.21
33.10
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
3.26
6.86
3.55
4.02
2.91
1.40
0.98
2.25
6.16
8.26
4.53
6.27
-0.86
0.69
-4.30
-4.31
3.56
2.59
1.21
2.78
3.35
3.97
2.96
2.79
6.06
7.24
-0.13
1.27
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
16.75
16.56
4.71
3.90
4.50
3.89
5.31
6.69
21.25
20.44
10.02
10.58
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.16
0.16
0.00
0.00
0.08
0.14
0.09
0.09
0.24
0.29
0.09
0.09
4.49
36.18
0.00
0.00
9.43
2.65
6.11
9.75
1.89
2.49
1.40
1.03
15.81
41.32
7.51
10.79
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
9.86
2.63
5.18
10.81
0.89
0.80
1.13
0.96
10.74
3.43
6.31
11.77
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
20.94
13.11
12.28
1.40
1.81
1.94
0.57
0.32
22.75
15.05
12.86
1.73

2004
-2.70
0.01
1.71
-0.98
0.00
24.03
1.43
25.47
-34.80
45.21
0.74
11.15
-4.17
0.92
1.88
-1.38
0.00
3.32
5.17
8.49
0.00
0.27
0.14
0.40
0.00
13.93
2.92
16.86
0.00
3.65
0.29
3.94
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.10

Japan’s Official Development Assistance to Africa 2000-2011

2005
-2.04
0.22
3.68
1.86
0.00
23.40
2.89
26.30
0.00
16.01
1.85
17.86
-7.97
5.28
1.84
-0.86
0.00
12.85
6.03
18.88
-1.42
1.66
0.25
0.49
8.56
9.04
1.67
19.27
0.00
2.72
0.11
2.83
0.00
0.09
0.01
0.10

2006
-17.25
1.24
4.33-11.68
0.00
8.94
3.46
12.41
0.00
6.84
3.22
10.06
-6.04
4.54
1.75
0.25
0.00
11.62
6.85
18.47
3.10
11.71
0.62
15.42
-79.61
95.89
2.49
18.77
0.00
1.61
0.92
2.53
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.10

2007
1.43
2.71
3.12
7.26
0.00
20.17
2.94
23.10
0.00
1.67
5.13
6.81
-6.72
2.47
2.02
-2.22
0.00
14.70
5.73
20.43
-0.62
6.96
2.18
8.52
0.00
16.00
2.55
18.55
0.00
1.44
0.44
1.89
-0.99
3.15
0.39
2.55

2008
0.47
1.99
1.57
4.03
0.00
15.40
2.35
17.75
0.00
21.07
6.14
27.21
-24.60
20.52
1.95
-2.14
0.00
11.39
9.58
20.98
-0.77
20.83
3.28
23.34
0.00
12.50
3.08
15.58
0.00
3.66
1.64
5.29
-0.57
12.57
0.17
12.18

2009
0.47
0.00
1.39
1.86
0.00
3.37
3.39
6.76
0.00
19.34
6.51
25.84
-4.83
0.22
1.99
-2.61
0.00
37.84
11.93
49.77
-35.89
52.36
3.95
20.42
0.00
4.30
3.81
8.11
1.49
14.63
1.75
17.87
1.21
4.70
0.16
6.08

2010
13.68
0.02
1.77
15.48
0.00
34.30
3.32
37.62
0.00
22.43
6.70
29.13
-5.14
12.87
2.98
10.71
0.00
25.47
16.11
41.59
0.00
34.22
4.84
39.06
6.06
31.45
4.52
42.03
6.73
7.35
3.32
17.40
-6.12
14.15
0.06
8.09

2011
0.00
0.01
1.42
1.43
0.00
7.65
3.77
11.42
0.00
18.47
7.70
26.18
-5.66
0.27
5.29
-0.09
0.00
24.08
16.22
40.30
0.00
17.63
3.57
21.20
3.96
13.03
6.69
23.68
20.63
4.74
1.17
26.54
0.00
38.14
0.11
38.25

Total
-22.53
8.71
63.90
50.08
-0.32
282.8141.14
323.61-3.14
327.3958.28
382.50
15.99
70.72
51.72
138.410.00
308.30112.99421.99-11.22224.1224.23
237.106.58
299.4856.44
362.52
28.86
126.11
22.35
177.36-2.01
342.2624.24
364.52403

Appendix 2

COUNTRY SCHEME
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Chad
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Comoros
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Congo
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Coted'Ivoire
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Democratic Grant Aid
Republic of
Technical Cooperation
the Congo
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Djibouti
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Egypt
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Equatorial Grant Aid
GuineaTechnical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
EritreaTechnical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Ethiopia
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Gabon
Technical Cooperation
Total

404

Japan’s ODA (Net disbursements, $ million)
2000
2001
2002
2003
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.21
0.11
0.13
0.23
0.21
0.11
0.13
0.26
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.17
0.16
0.10
0.07
0.17
0.16
0.10
4.84
0.00
0.00
0.00
9.78
0.35
0.33
0.40
8.78
3.97
4.87
2.05
23.40
4.31
5.21
2.44
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.27
0.08
0.66
0.32
0.21
0.23
0.19
0.31
0.47
0.32
0.85
0.63
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
12.01
1.53
4.03
6.08
1.92
1.46
1.41
1.97
13.92
2.99
5.44
8.06
7.06
-11.92-15.56
-6.92
45.91
41.49
8.02
9.23
32.94
23.10
20.47
19.37
85.92
52.68
12.93
21.68
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.03
0.19
0.03
0.06
0.03
0.19
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.10
3.30
3.92
11.01
0.30
0.17
0.37
0.73
0.40
3.47
4.29
11.74
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
26.18
43.89
37.02
45.21
7.85
8.50
13.51
11.32
34.03
52.39
50.53
56.53
-2.49
-1.69
-0.18
-0.31
0.30
2.65
3.54
0.37
0.69
0.62
0.48
1.70
-1.50
1.58
3.84
1.77

2004
0.00
0.05
0.62
0.66
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.25
0.31
0.00
0.47
1.43
1.90
0.00
48.06
0.41
48.47
0.00
6.05
1.11
7.16
-17.84
69.07
13.63
64.85
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.32
1.30
1.61
0.00
22.28
11.05
33.33
-0.10
1.82
0.97
2.69

Japan’s Official Development Assistance to Africa 2000-2011

2005
0.00
0.00
2.05
2.05
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.17
0.17
0.00
0.10
1.27
1.37
353.892.72
19.65
376.26
0.00
5.48
0.90
6.38
-98.6951.55
11.05-36.10
0.00
0.00
0.09
0.09
0.00
5.48
1.76
7.24
0.00
20.79
13.38
34.17
-0.68
5.40
1.40
6.13

2006
0.00
5.97
2.77
8.74
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.40
0.40
11.71
0.00
1.24
12.95
-4.95
27.50
0.62
23.17
0.00
3.50
1.09
4.59
-40.23
22.69
12.37
-5.18
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
7.57
2.34
9.91
0.00
45.15
12.71
57.85
-2.20
0.12
1.81
-0.28

2007
0.00
9.65
0.25
9.90
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
4.97
0.01
4.99
0.00
5.48
1.06
6.54
0.00
20.25
2.68
22.93
0.00
2.58
1.09
3.67
-49.96
10.59
12.33-27.04
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
6.60
1.78
8.37
0.00
24.15
11.89
36.03
-2.10
0.04
2.31
0.26

2008
0.00
14.33
0.06
14.39
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.03
0.00
10.49
0.13
10.62
0.00
18.88
0.62
19.51
0.00
45.32
5.89
51.22
0.00
2.24
1.50
3.74
-38.32
33.22
16.73
11.64
0.00
0.00
0.09
0.09
0.00
17.24
0.47
17.71
0.00
32.88
14.24
47.12
-2.73
0.37
4.11
1.75

2009
0.00
13.85
0.13
13.98
0.00
5.11
0.20
5.30
0.00
0.00
0.38
0.38
0.00
9.38
1.01
10.39
0.00
52.62
13.08
65.70
0.00
26.52
2.30
28.82
-65.1123.55
22.75-18.81
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.10
0.00
7.22
1.56
8.78
0.00
80.79
16.98
97.76
-4.89
0.13
4.85
0.08

2010
0.00
13.54
0.22
13.76
0.00
0.41
0.29
0.70
0.00
5.46
0.52
5.98
45.79
33.94
1.54
81.26
-0.43
66.19
14.24
80.00
0.00
34.42
3.56
37.98
-73.0720.75
34.59-17.74
0.00
0.00
0.32
0.32
0.00
8.25
1.61
9.86
0.00
65.88
28.01
93.89
-1.95
21.92
4.80
24.77

2011
0.00
20.39
0.43
20.82
0.00
2.11
1.55
3.66
0.00
6.94
0.28
7.21
1.56
6.25
0.36
8.17
-1,029.04
1,206.16
9.62
186.74
0.00
11.95
4.62
16.57
-126.300.14
34.88-91.29
0.00
0.28
0.04
0.32
0.00
7.25
2.19
9.44
0.00
86.12
33.59
119.70
-2.36
8.76
4.55
10.96

Total
0.00
77.82
9.14
86.94
0.00
48.25
7.26
55.51
0.00
36.13
5.71
41.83
163.06404.21105.71
672.95-479.61
1,641.44
108.25
1,270.06
0.00
247.7433.47
281.22
1,496.14
1,365.22
613.203,474.55
0.00
8.25
3.32
11.57
0.00
104.0819.86
123.950.00
867.91
270.13
1,129.25-11.66
47.55
33.30
69.16

405

Appendix 2

COUNTRY SCHEME
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
GambiaTechnical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Ghana
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
GuineaTechnical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
GuineaBissau
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Kenya
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
LesothoTechnical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Liberia
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Libya
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Madagascar
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
MalawiTechnical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Mali
Technical Cooperation
Total

406

Japan’s ODA (Net disbursements, $ million)
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.67
2.04
6.05
5.68
0.32
0.61
1.07
2.15
3.18
2.34
3.28
3.10
8.20
8.86
2.66
53.67
3.98
-5.49
0.00
-888.18
27.18
10.81
12.21
15.54
989.27
22.05
19.84
16.83
14.22
14.32
102.90
34.63
23.55
29.75
115.42
-4.46
-3.96
-2.41
-2.81
-8.67
20.59
20.10
18.58
20.27
23.09
3.01
1.24
2.40
3.37
2.08
19.13
17.38
18.57
20.83
16.50
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.14
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.12
0.06
0.01
0.00
0.18
0.12
0.06
0.01
21.89
2.66
-38.86-49.92
29.90
13.11
14.98
28.52
17.19
14.36
31.85
29.07
27.69
26.14
26.63
66.86
46.71
17.36
-6.59
70.89
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.30
4.68
3.50
2.48
0.52
0.57
0.54
0.43
1.53
0.70
0.87
5.22
3.93
4.01
1.22
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.05
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.05
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.15
0.17
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.15
0.17
0.00
0.00
0.00
-1.32
-1.25
-1.21
-1.31
0.50
17.58
20.34
4.80
6.47
21.33
10.05
6.36
4.00
4.55
6.13
26.31
25.46
7.60
9.70
27.95
-9.93
-8.38
-8.55
-3.54
-19.53
33.02
14.26
16.01
20.94
27.92
15.44
12.42
11.35
14.01
10.58
38.53
18.29
18.81
31.41
18.96
-2.18
-1.93
-1.87
-0.84
-72.38
24.94
16.32
13.36
11.89
84.29
9.42
8.69
5.54
3.00
1.78
32.18
23.08
17.02
14.05
13.69

Japan’s Official Development Assistance to Africa 2000-2011

2005
0.00
2.61
1.77
4.38
0.00
28.03
16.19
44.22
-0.22
9.52
2.65
11.95
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.03
7.56
23.39
29.94
60.88
0.00
6.30
0.38
6.68
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.33
0.33
-147.51178.92
8.20
39.61-12.94
18.79
13.84
19.70
0.00
20.39
2.81
23.20

2006
0.00
8.26
2.73
10.99
0.00
24.66
19.00
43.66
-8.05
21.27
3.86
17.07
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.04
54.40
24.46
27.29
106.15
0.00
4.45
0.32
4.76
0.00
17.19
0.20
17.40
0.00
0.00
0.05
0.05
6.34
30.05
7.42
43.82
-4.78
18.00
10.16
23.38
0.00
23.51
3.22
26.74

2007
0.00
5.81
0.58
6.39
0.00
27.13
19.35
46.48
-4.08
14.54
1.56
12.02
0.00
0.99
0.09
1.08
2.03
28.65
26.42
57.11
0.00
4.41
0.46
4.88
0.00
12.21
0.25
12.46
0.00
0.00
0.43
0.43
-0.90
103.049.05
111.19-181.52
209.35
12.47
40.29
0.00
6.89
2.76
9.65

2008
0.00
0.61
0.47
1.08
0.00
33.86
20.18
54.03
-0.24
14.72
2.37
16.86
0.00
5.07
0.76
5.83
-53.06
41.59
20.25
8.79
0.00
12.37
0.80
13.16
0.00
12.54
1.43
13.98
0.00
0.00
0.19
0.19
-0.48
11.47
9.38
20.37
0.00
16.71
14.08
30.79
0.00
32.01
2.52
34.52

2009
0.00
10.48
0.91
11.39
0.00
44.93
19.87
64.80
0.00
16.35
1.85
18.20
0.00
8.69
0.74
9.43
-50.68
59.53
24.81
33.66
0.00
2.33
0.24
2.56
0.00
11.06
3.66
14.71
0.00
0.00
0.08
0.08
-0.26
7.39
11.90
19.03
0.00
18.98
16.82
35.80
0.00
32.80
2.71
35.51

2010
0.00
16.25
0.97
17.22
0.00
47.36
22.65
70.00
0.00
9.96
0.84
10.80
0.00
15.87
0.24
16.11
-68.29
68.85
36.16
36.72
0.00
8.14
0.70
8.84
119.0310.85
4.42
134.31
0.00
0.00
0.13
0.13
0.00
0.00
9.62
9.62
0.00
49.59
19.86
69.46
0.00
34.58
3.71
38.29

2011
0.00
11.17
0.18
11.45
0.00
22.04
23.90
45.94
0.00
1.00
0.98
1.98
0.00
8.71
1.07
9.78
-57.17100.53
36.39
79.74
0.00
19.48
0.75
20.23
-198.24240.64
2.14
44.55
0.00
8.13
0.05
8.18
0.00
0.00
10.70
10.70
0.00
11.37
17.27
28.64
0.00
36.70
7.36
44.06

Total
0.00
130.7624.81
155.56-103.16
1,684.79
413.65
1,995.29
38.58
430.9656.07
525.600.00
108.74
7.48
116.22637.91935.34833.84
2,407.15
0.00
98.82
10.53
109.37-55.17345.8036.74
327.37
0.00
8.13
3.59
11.72
-22.35779.22
162.48919.39-35.38721.98306.40992.94-4.82
551.1887.23
633.59407

Appendix 2

COUNTRY SCHEME
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Mauritania
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
MauritiusTechnical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
MoroccoTechnical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
MozambiqueTechnical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Namibia
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Niger
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Nigeria
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
RwandaTechnical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Sao Tome Grant AidandTechnical Cooperation
Principe
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
SenegalTechnical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Seychelles
Technical Cooperation
Total

408

Japan’s ODA (Net disbursements, $ million)
2000
2001
2002
2003
-2.04
-1.81
-1.75
-0.02
29.01
26.25
10.90
19.33
2.97
5.16
3.88
4.61
29.94
29.60
13.02
23.93
-0.64
-0.41
-1.04
-1.18
0.51
0.08
0.10
3.54
2.26
1.63
1.64
0.56
2.13
1.30
0.69
2.92
73.13
71.95
20.49
33.59
15.33
15.00
9.46
15.95
14.82
14.68
10.84
15.24
103.28101.62
40.79
64.78
-1.03
-0.75
21.73
-0.40
11.70
26.66
44.81
32.53
9.29
7.61
3.12
3.14
19.95
33.52
69.66
35.27
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.64
0.27
2.04
0.14
3.78
2.94
1.11
0.68
5.43
3.21
3.15
0.82
-6.68
-1.14
-1.10
-0.60
14.27
7.18
7.96
8.37
7.43
7.00
6.43
5.89
15.03
13.04
13.29
13.66
0.00
-5.03
0.00
-13.84
0.26
11.46
16.85
17.91
2.37
2.45
2.26
2.32
2.63
8.88
19.10
6.40
2.28
0.07
0.00
-0.04
0.75
0.59
0.16
0.45
0.33
0.37
0.24
0.24
3.35
1.04
0.40
0.66
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.11
0.99
1.20
1.34
0.12
0.07
0.10
0.02
1.23
1.05
1.29
1.37
-3.10
-3.90
-2.72
-6.52
38.14
12.17
25.41
19.59
13.45
14.15
15.14
15.61
48.49
22.41
37.82
28.68
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
4.44
0.29
0.00
0.64
0.63
0.23
0.68
0.64
5.07
0.51
0.68

2004
-73.58
80.20
4.48
11.10
-1.26
2.50
0.29
1.53
45.42
7.81
13.08
66.31
-0.43
16.57
3.27
19.41
0.00
0.41
0.80
1.20
-22.36
30.90
5.54
14.08
0.00
5.91
2.76
8.67
0.00
0.10
0.76
0.86
0.00
1.39
0.07
1.46
-91.14125.64
15.92
50.42
0.00
0.00
0.67
0.67

Japan’s Official Development Assistance to Africa 2000-2011

2005
0.00
11.62
3.10
14.72
15.55
0.85
0.15
16.55
-69.43
2.22
13.02-54.19
-0.43
9.91
5.29
14.77
0.00
0.00
0.39
0.39
0.00
17.20
6.47
23.68
63.29
1.78
4.09
69.16
-0.88
1.78
1.94
2.85
0.00
1.31
0.22
1.53
0.00
9.62
18.33
27.95
0.00
0.00
1.26
1.26

2006
0.00
9.72
2.36
12.08
3.77
0.00
0.24
4.02
43.76
8.44
8.93
61.13
0.00
101.71
5.12
106.83
0.00
0.18
0.83
1.01
0.00
4.49
7.60
12.09
-488.99
2,116.31
4.30
1,631.61
0.00
8.93
3.81
12.74
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.03
0.00
20.08
14.42
34.50
0.00
0.00
1.91
1.91

2007
0.00
22.13
1.32
23.45
2.10
0.06
0.61
2.77
49.71
6.01
8.93
64.65
0.00
17.71
10.07
27.77
3.04
1.41
1.29
5.74
0.00
19.00
9.29
28.28
0.00
22.76
4.08
26.84
0.00
13.96
5.58
19.53
0.00
2.89
0.23
3.11
0.00
18.59
13.36
31.95
0.00
0.00
0.76
0.76

2008
0.00
10.75
3.73
14.49
0.11
0.08
0.17
0.36
82.83
16.85
6.16
105.84
0.00
17.58
6.15
23.72
7.15
0.61
1.90
9.66
0.00
5.56
11.38
16.93
0.00
25.21
3.75
28.96
0.00
10.26
7.49
17.75
0.00
7.15
0.07
7.22
3.19
7.89
14.05
25.13
0.00
0.36
1.26
1.62

2009
0.00
6.70
2.92
9.63
-3.34
0.21
1.06
-2.07
85.05
4.77
8.12
97.93
0.00
50.19
10.49
60.67
36.14
0.14
3.54
39.82
0.00
23.91
11.15
35.06
0.00
24.56
4.33
28.88
0.00
12.70
8.64
21.34
0.00
0.21
0.21
0.42
3.83
25.32
17.58
46.74
0.00
7.79
1.28
9.06

2010
0.00
12.53
2.03
14.56
-3.55
0.30
0.40
-2.85
102.788.23
10.15
121.16
0.38
48.95
13.52
62.85
36.39
0.17
4.03
40.59
0.00
15.73
9.43
25.16
0.00
16.94
6.93
23.87
0.00
11.01
11.81
22.82
0.00
2.85
0.75
3.54
2.80
30.82
21.58
55.21
0.00
8.94
0.63
9.57

2011
0.00
9.03
0.96
9.99
-3.85
0.27
1.15
-2.44
18.21
1.74
10.16
30.11
17.21
14.20
17.08
48.49
21.69
0.15
3.36
25.21
0.00
11.58
4.27
15.86
0.00
25.26
13.30
38.57
0.00
11.84
12.44
24.28
0.00
3.44
0.10
3.54
0.00
56.34
26.49
82.83
0.00
1.12
0.12
1.24

Total
-11.69484.1259.17
531.64
22.67
38.73
40.92
102.31898.93275.71
298.32
1,473.00
51.09
825.61124.271,000.98
104.4259.54
42.06
205.99-28.63440.12188.86600.39-182.342,430.38
131.562,379.58
5.53
227.4070.15
303.03
0.00
46.30
7.22
53.53
-16.29934.18328.15
1,246.02
0.00
41.25
18.43
59.67

409

Appendix 2

COUNTRY SCHEME
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
SierraLeone
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Somalia
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant AidSouth
AfricaTechnical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
South
Sudan
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Sudan
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
SwazilandTechnical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Tanzania
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Togo
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Tunisia
Technical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
UgandaTechnical Cooperation
Total

410

Japan’s ODA (Net disbursements, $ million)
2000
2001
2002
2003
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.06
3.69
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.09
3.73
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-20.05
-1.44
13.04
3.81
16.38
11.11
6.75
9.58
8.36
7.94
19.79
13.39
4.69
17.61

0.00
0.08
0.59
0.67
0.00
3.35
2.65
5.99
-12.68203.1626.65
217.14
0.00
8.26
0.24
8.50
52.97
3.30
15.85
72.12
0.00
16.00
6.37
22.37

0.00
0.22
0.46
0.69
0.00
3.16
3.38
6.54
-8.22
241.3227.35
260.44
0.00
2.61
0.26
2.87
70.68
4.04
13.74
88.45
0.00
8.93
5.64
14.57

0.00
0.42
0.75
1.17
1.52
0.47
2.53
4.52
-6.54
39.31
25.43
58.20
0.00
0.05
0.29
0.34
47.92
7.10
8.26
63.27
0.00
3.07
5.01
8.08

0.00
0.60
0.87
1.47
1.02
1.82
2.18
5.02
-1.76
53.90
22.32
74.47
0.00
0.03
0.30
0.34
74.08
1.09
10.35
85.52
0.00
3.14
6.39
9.54

2004
0.00
0.13
0.06
0.19
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.87
14.23
5.47
18.83

0.00
0.87
0.67
1.55
0.48
3.11
1.27
4.86
-105.36139.67
18.21
52.52
-1.69
2.13
0.33
0.77
50.84
0.31
8.59
59.73
-57.79
64.25
5.37
11.84

Japan’s Official Development Assistance to Africa 2000-2011

2005
-1.77
2.14
1.73
2.09
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.85
11.07
5.87
16.10

2006
50.47
9.01
3.21
62.69
0.00
0.24
0.00
0.24
-0.81
12.24
4.49
15.92

2007
-16.62
42.70
4.02
30.11
0.00
3.85
0.01
3.86
-0.80
0.81
4.65
4.67

2008
0.00
10.13
4.00
14.13
0.00
23.24
0.03
23.27
-0.91
0.66
3.92
3.67

2009
0.00
31.95
5.50
37.44
0.00
22.60
0.04
22.64
-1.01
0.43
5.24
4.67

2010
0.00
6.04
6.18
12.21
0.00
29.05
0.02
29.07
-1.07
2.05
6.13
7.11

0.00
0.48
1.64
2.11
21.54
3.51
0.86
25.91
0.00
14.44
21.67
36.11
-1.11
1.57
0.29
0.76
41.44
0.57
9.09
51.10
0.00
4.80
9.64
14.44

0.00
38.20
4.53
42.73
9.63
1.37
0.61
11.62
0.00
17.68
21.72
39.39
-1.05
1.34
0.14
0.44
9.96
0.19
8.41
18.56
0.00
13.56
8.22
21.78

0.00
44.61
6.97
51.58
4.75
2.01
0.51
7.26
33.96
667.6620.04
721.66
-1.04
1.16
0.33
0.46
12.28
0.18
8.10
20.56
0.00
17.83
9.68
27.51

0.00
100.519.14
109.64
0.00
2.31
0.87
3.18
5.40
43.36
22.23
70.99
-0.59
0.80
0.13
0.33
48.04
0.03
5.92
53.98
4.62
39.75
12.64
57.01

-27.63125.0913.57
111.03
0.00
0.19
0.99
1.19
48.56
48.68
23.22
120.46
12.89
20.96
0.24
34.09
8.26
0.19
5.97
14.41
6.64
23.16
24.24
54.05

0.00
92.92
26.16
119.08
0.00
2.81
1.55
4.36
10.50
65.87
28.23
104.60
-0.12
6.65
1.01
7.54
14.37
12.22
9.29
35.87
6.44
42.06
22.74
71.24

2011
0.00
18.42
8.11
26.53
0.00
51.96
0.01
51.97
-1.18
2.04
7.25
8.11
0.00
8.71
16.85
25.56
0.00
73.45
23.28
96.72
-2.53
14.43
0.66
12.55
37.91
43.73
37.80
119.44-120.44
126.61
3.10
9.26
17.13
0.16
7.68
24.97
1.15
28.19
27.79
57.12

Total
37.27
183.5638.85
259.6738.70
210.51
5.52
254.77
5.89
113.34107.79227.01
0.00
8.71
16.85
25.56
21.59
953.40125.72
1,100.72
36.41
83.93
30.92
151.29101.972,454.59
626.303,182.85-44.04257.0511.93
224.96618.1640.97
206.91866.0619.20
462.66
195.33677.21411

Appendix 2

COUNTRY SCHEME
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
ZambiaTechnical Cooperation
Total
Loan Aid
Grant Aid
Zimbabwe
Technical Cooperation
Total

Japan’s ODA (Net disbursements, $ million)
2000
2001
2002
2003
-6.18
-7.89
21.40
-7.68
23.75
41.65
32.34
19.55
14.36
13.27
14.64
16.45
31.93
47.04
68.38
28.32
21.78
16.34
14.81
0.00
30.08
4.65
3.52
0.08
10.51
8.01
5.31
4.93
62.37
29.01
23.64
5.01

2004
-7.54
7.51
14.28
14.25
0.00
0.09
3.47
3.56

Source: Japan’s ODA Data by Country, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of JapanNote:
1. Part of grants through international organizations are included in the category of bilateral Grant Aid
after 2006 when the grants are earmarked for specific recipients. A wider range of multilateral grants
has been categorized as bilateral ODA since 2011, in accordance with the direction of OECD/DAC.
2. The annual figures for Loan Aid and Grant Aid indicate the sums of funds actually disbursed within
the calendar year out of the amount committed with exchanged notes. The figures of Loan Aid show
the balances after subtracting repayments from recipients.
3. Accumulated totals of Loan Aid may be minus figures depending on fluctuations in exchange rates.
4. Technical Cooperation includes projects implemented by relevant ministries and local governments inaddition to those by JICA.
5. Totals may not always add up due to rounding.
6. The figures in Total show the sum of Japan’s ODA disbursements to the country.

412

Japan’s Official Development Assistance to Africa 2000-2011

2005-616.15732.9015.19
131.94
0.00
0.15
3.94
4.09

2006
0.00
16.79
14.75
31.54
0.00
2.64
3.90
6.54

2007
0.00
74.14
20.48
94.61
0.00
7.49
4.22
11.71

2008
0.00
18.57
18.57
37.14
0.00
7.69
2.27
9.97

2009
0.00
16.21
20.43
36.64
0.00
11.24
1.14
12.38

2010
1.44
20.90
23.80
46.14
0.00
17.13
1.79
18.92

2011
0.59
19.70
25.79
46.08
0.00
16.09
2.01
18.10

Total
-309.45
1,616.01
460.31
1,766.91
143.79446.44149.64739.86413

IndexA

Accelerated Industrial Developmentof Africa (AIDA), 178-79, 189
Action Plan on Food Price Volatility
and Agriculture, 73, 85-86
Africaagriculture, See African agriculture
challenges, in agricultural
production, 78-80
climate change and food insecurity,
risk of, 42-43
current status of development in, 21
debt management policies, 43-44
demographics, 33
developmental challenges, 59-60
development risks in, 41
disaster prevention and reduction,
315-16
economic development, 46-47
economic growth, rate of, 23-26, 45
economic reforms and progress,28-29
economic relationship, with foreigncountries, 26-28
economic transformation andsustained growth, strategies for,21-22
economy and society in 2040, 45-46
employment situation in, 33-34
foreign direct investment (FDI)
promotion, issues with, 176
GDP per capita (1970-1995), 36n27
global economic downturn, impactof, 41-42
good governance and anticorruption, 30-31
grain production in, 76

higher education and vocational
technical education in, 54-55
horticultural products, demand for,144
human capital development
measures, 55
IDA-eligible countries in, 44
informal sector, presence of, 36-37
intra-African market, 49
intra-regional trade, 40
investment in human capital, 54-56
manufacturing industry, 50-52
mitigation of climate change,
strategies for, 43
political instability, risk of, 41
poverty reduction in, 31-33
progress of MDGs in, 38-39
quality of education, 34-35
ratio of household enterprise
employment to total employment,
37
regional integration approach, 57-58
service sector in, 52-54
sustainability of African debt, 44
TICAD V Action Plan, 56-62
urbanization in, 35-36
water resource management, 316-17
Africa Japan Forum (AJF), 398
African agriculture, 47-50
Action Plan on Food Price Volatility
and Agriculture (2011), 85-86
challenges, 75-80
Coalition for African Rice
Development (CARD), 92-93
Comprehensive Africa Agricultural
Development Programme(CAADP), 87-88
415

general risks, 84
impacts of droughts, 83
international frameworks for, 85-88
investments, 80-82
JICA’s support for, 88-91
New Alliance for Food Security andNutrition (2012), 86-87
overview, 73-75
resilience of, 91, 94-95
Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPS),
88
Smallholder Horticulture
Empowerment Project (SHEP)
approach, 91
TICAD V plan, 88-92
African Continental Free Trade Area
(C-FTA), 233
African Development Bank (AfDB), 2,
4, 43, 45, 46, 57, 58, 205n18, 229,
231-32, 240, 360, 394, 396
African Green Fund, 43
African Institute for Capacity
Development (AICAD), 367,
372-74, 377-78
African Union (AU), 41, 56, 57, 87, 128,
178, 233, 353, 360, 398
Africa Rice Center (AfricaRice), 92
Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time forTransformation (2009), 195
Agricultural Development Led
Industrialization (ADLI), 182
Agricultural extension workers, 79,
108, 341
Agricultural innovations, 6Agricultural land, 42, 47-48
Agricultural Sector Development
Strategy (ASDS), 144
Agriculture, 39, 47
African, See African agriculture
climate change and, 90, 94
inclusive development, 124-26
investments in, 120-22
Japan’s Focus for, 91
416

in Kenya, 53
low productivity, reasons for, 119market oriented, 50, 143-45, 152-53
as a percentage of GDP, 313
post-harvest processing of, 119poverty reduction, 75, 89, 106, 120,125-26, 143, 180, 195, 307, 309, 311,
313
productivity of, 50n52
role of private sector, 119-20
small-scale farmers’ approach, 50
value chain systems, 119
Aid, 317, 360
in Africa, 27
agencies, 229
foreign aid, in Africa, 26, 27, 31
humanitarian, 338
Japanese aid
in Africa, 204-10
in Mozambique, 133-36
non-DAC donors, 354, 358“Aid for Trade (AfT)”, 231, 232
by region and category, 232
Al-Shabaab, 330
AQIM, 330
Arusha-Namanga-Athi River Road
Development Project, 240
ASEAN Plus Three Emergency RiceReserve (APTERR), 95
Asia, 21, 32, 47, 52, 76-77, 79, 119
agricultural investments in, 80
experience of, 52, 174, 179, 182, 189,392
food reserve systems, 91
Green Revolution in, 99, 102, 107,120
rain-fed areas in, 104
supply of vegetables in, 144vegetable supply trend in, 144
Asian rice technology, 101-6
Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), 95, 182, 375

IndexB

Bali Action Plan at COP13, 311
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
93, 255
Biofuels, 75, 81, 121
BOKASHI bags, 154
Bottom of Pyramid (BOP), 181
BRAC, 93
Brazil, 10, 29, 33, 40, 42, 93, 127, 131-33,
136, 138, 183, 237, 355, 358-60,
365-66, 380
Brazilian Agricultural Research
Corporation (EMBRAPA), 132
Breton-Woods institutions, 391
Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA),
352
Bunding, 11, 102-3, 105, 107, 109
Business environment, 29, 37, 51-52,
60, 188
Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system, 310

CCamp David Summit (2012), 42, 86
Cancun Agreement, 317, 319
Capacity development, 160, 210, 215,
259, 262, 289, 292, 366
community, 91
of customs on borders of Africancountries, 242
for health systems management,
262-63
importance of, 163, 165
institutional and individual, 334-35
institutional and management, 127
of local public officials, 340
for management of healthprograms, 263
market-oriented approach for,143-45for more effective SSC/TrC, 380-81
motivation theory for, 156
for poverty reduction, 373
of public sector, 362

South-South Cooperation (SSC),
380-81of SSA governments, 374-75
Capacity of Tumba College ofTechnology (TCT), 341
Caracas Programme of Action, 352
Caribbean, 43
annual cost of adaptation in, 42
rainfall and food security, 307
Centers of excellence (COEs), 293,366-67, 377, 380
Cereals
import of, 74, 78, 92
trade deficit in, 78
China, 33, 40, 42, 44, 45, 74, 138, 226,
301, 307, 355, 358-60, 398
White Paper on Foreign Aid (2011),
359
Chirundu Border Related Facility
Construction Project, 239
Chirundu Bridge Construction
Project, 239
Chokwe irrigation scheme, 102-3, 108
Civil society organisations (CSOs), 321
Civil wars, 26, 41, 391
Clean Development Mechanism(CDM), 319
Climate change, 323, 325
in Africa, See Climate change in
AfricaCancun Adaptation Framework for,324
developing countries and, 301-2
and food insecurity, 42
impacts of, 303
measures against, 81, 304
mitigation and adaptation, 43, 303-4
risk of maladaptation, 304
vulnerability to, 301, 304
Climate change in Africa
adaptation plans in, 311-13
agricultural sector, 313-14
carbon sequestration and storage,417

potential for, 308
effective measures, 320-25
funding, technology, and market
mechanisms associated with, 317-20
greenhouse gas emissions, 304-7
impacts, 306-7
JICA supported projects andprograms for, 321
mitigation measures, 307-8
renewable energy projects forenergy efficiency, 309
transportation infrastructure,
impact on, 310
urbanization and, 310
Climate Technology Center andNetworks, 319
Coalition for African Rice
Development (CARD), 48, 90,
92-93, 377-78
as a case of SSC, 374-75
Committee on World Food Security(CFS), 82, 122, 124
Common Market for Eastern andSouthern Africa (COMESA),
56n70, 232
Community, 36, 40-41, 57, 61, 73, 75,
85, 189, 196, 233, 273, 281, 291, 302,
316, 320, 333
capacity development, 91-92
ethnic, 336
JICA’s programs, 339
Community Empowerment
Programmes, 373
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture
Development Program (CAADP),
50, 58, 73, 87-88, 120, 361, 374
Comprehensive corridor
development, 243-44
Conference of the Parties (COP),
42-43, 311, 317
Conflict(s), 2, 9, 26, 41, 49, 59, 121, 204,
330, 332, 334, 336, 341-44
Cool Earth Partnership, 320
418

COP15, 43, 311
COP16, 317
Copenhagen Accord, 43, 311
Corridor development, 13, 48, 57, 133,
134, 136, 233, 236-37, 243-44, 310
Corridor Diagnostic Study of theNorthern and Central Corridorsof East Africa (CDS, 2011), 229-30
Corruption, in Africa, 30-31
prevention of, 60
CPIA scores, 28
Cross border, 15, 25, 40, 56-57, 225, 233,
238, 241, 244, 276, 376, 396
trade, 40transport system, 242-43
as a case of SSC, 225
water resource management, 316
Cross Border Transport Infrastructure(CBTI), 228-31, 394
current condition and issues in
trading and physical distribution,
225-28
definition, 225
Japan’s contribution, 233-43
need for, 228-31
solutions to shared challenges,
375-76DDAC Network on Gender Equality(2011), 94
Debt sustainability, 41, 43-44, 208
Department for International
Development (DFID), 230, 239,
280, 376
Development traps, 25, 31, 59
Differentiated approach, 10, 57, 61, 293
Direction of Low Carbon and Resilient
Development Cooperation by
JICA, 302
Disparity
among different income groups, 251
among low and middle incomeIndexcountries, 254
by economic status, 252
in education, 292
electricity, 197, 199
health services, 39, 249, 259
in health status and health service
utilization, 251-52
income, 61, 253safe drinking water, 39, 198
in terms of position toward UHC,
260
Doing Business environment, 188
Do-no bags, 154
Drought, 15, 42, 74, 83-84, 90, 94, 301,
307, 311, 313, 315

E

East Africa, 232-34
development of customs on bordersof, 242higher education, level of, 373
poverty reduction in, 373
railroads in, 239
supply of vegetables in, 144
East Africa Community (EAC), 376
East Africa Trade Transport
Facilitation Project (EATTFP), 232
East Asia, 4, 43, 51, 173
manufacturing industry in, 51
East Asian Miracle, 7
Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), 95
Economic Cooperation among
Developing Countries (ECDC),
353
Economic growth, 4, 10, 15, 21, 22-23,
26, 41, 45, 47, 49-50, 53, 56, 59, 77,
87, 138, 144, 174, 183, 189, 196, 199,
233, 234, 243, 274, 394-95
equity and sustainability of, 61
poverty reduction and, 31-33
of SSA, 3
Economic transformation, 21, 187, 213

Education
in Africa, See Educational
development in Africa
higher, 14, 34, 39, 54-55, 274-77, 279,
291, 293, 295, 373
primary, 268, 271-73, 277-80, 289,
291, 293, 295
quality of, 9, 14, 34-35, 39, 54, 61,
269, 270-71, 273, 275-76, 278, 281, 285
quantity of, 276
secondary, 35, 39, 54, 269, 275, 277,
279-80, 285, 291, 295
vocational, 291, 295
Educational development in Africa
basic education, quality of, 270
current status, 268-77
diverse stages of, 277-79“Education for All” concept, 280
enrolment rate in primary andsecondary education, 268-69
future global agenda for, 279-81
JICA’s approaches, linking policy
and practice, 289-90
JICA-supported projects, 281-90“Learning for All,” 280
post-basic education, quality of,274-77school-based management (SBM),
281
school facilities and teacher training
institutions, 292-93“School for All” project, 283-84, 292,
294
science and math education(SMASE), quality of, 287-88
teacher education, strategies toimprove, 285-89
TICAD, 291-95
Education For All (EFA), 268, 271-72
Education for sustainable
development (ESD), 302
Egypt-Japan University of Science andTechnology (E-JUST), 293
419

El Niño phenomena, 306
Employment, 4, 12, 22, 33-38, 47,
54-55, 119, 244, 258, 274, 280, 291,
295, 313, 323
youth, 34
Energy, demand for, 47
Energy sector, climate change and, 309
Enhanced Private Sector Assistancefor Africa (EPSA), 204
Environmental Conservation
Initiative for Sustainable
Development (EcoISD), 320
European Union (EU), 80n1
“Examination on the Basic SHEPApproach,” 149
Export(s)of agricultural products, 49of commodities, 21of energy, 21, 23, 45
of oil, 23, 196, 199

F“FABLIST Forum: Farm Business
Linkage Stakeholder Forum,” 146“Facilitators’ Training for Farmers’
Demand-Driven Extension,” 147
Family labor, 4, 107, 119
Fast Track Initiative (FTI), 268, 271-72
FDLR, 330
Fertilizer, 11, 74, 78-79, 84, 93, 102, 103,
105, 107-9, 119-20, 122, 126, 144,
147, 154, 213
Finance for health, 253, 258
Financial crisis, 4, 22, 27, 40, 42, 81, 356
Financial sector, 53
Fiscal policies, 44, 60
Floods, 15, 42, 83, 105, 301, 307, 313,
314-15
Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO), 74
Food insecurity, 83
climate change and, 42
Food Price Index, 74
420

Foreign direct investment (FDI), 12,
26-28, 30, 176, 318, 362
Foreign aid, 26-27, 359
Fragile countries, 26, 28, 197, 199
Fragile situations, countries in, 59
Fragile states, 58-59, 208, 333, 338-39
Framework for the Improvement of
Rural Infrastructure, 58

G

G8 Summit (2012), 48
Gender, 38-39, 94, 127, 147, 153-54, 158,
163, 269, 291-92
Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV), 132
Ghana
Civil Service Training Center(CSTC), 371-72
Community-based Health Planningand Service program, 249
Green Revolution in, 105-6
Lowland Rice Development Project(LRDP), 118
paddy yields and production
practices in, 116, 118
yields and production practices inrain-fed areas, 105-6
GIZ, 365
Gleneagles summit, 195n2
Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), 353
Global Competitive Index (GCI), 196
Global food security, in Africa, 73-75
Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria (GFATM), 255, 257,
263-64Global Partnership for Effective
Development Cooperation, 351,
354
Governance, 13, 24, 30, 59, 61, 122-24,
215-16, 316, 333, 361-62, 379,
391-92, 395
Government, roles of, 48-49, 80
Graduate Research Institute for Policy
Studies (GRIPS), Japan, 11, 179,

Index181, 183-84
Green Climate Fund, 317
Greenhouse gases (GHGs), 301
emissions in Africa, 304-6
Green Revolution, 47, 99, 102, 107
in Africa, 92
in Asia, 102, 213
in SSA, 11, 99, 100-101, 108-10
Gross domestic product (GDP)growth rate for the agricultural
sector, Africa, 75-76
per capita, 37, 45-46, 197, 199, 271,
278
service sector’s contribution, 53
Growth and Transformation Plan
(GTP) 2010/11-2014/15, 182

H

Harmonization for Health in Africa(HHA), 262
Hatoyama Initiative, 320
Health services, in Africa
AIDS-related deaths, 247
average annual rate of reduction(AARR), 248
development assistance in, 255-61
financing for, 264
Health Extension Program,
Ethiopia, 249
Health Surveillance Assistant in
Malawi, 249
remaining and emerging challenges,
249-55
Herbicide, 102Higher education, 14, 34, 39, 54-55,
274-77, 279, 291, 293, 295, 373
High-Level Advisory Group on
Climate Change Financing (2010),
43High Level Forum on Aid
Effectiveness (2011), 324, 351
HIPC Initiative, 394
HIV-AIDS, 38-39, 248, 257, 264

Hokkaido Toyako Summit, 179
Horizontal inequalities (HIs), 331, 333,
336, 343
Horn of Africa, 27, 42, 83-85, 94, 311,
313
Horticulture, 94, 144-45, 147-48, 151,
154, 158, 162
Human security, 16, 94, 249, 314, 333,
338, 342, 344
Hygiene, 302

I

Importsof agricultural products, 4-5, 75, 92,
228, 314
of commodities, 24, 74
of energy, 23, 199, 309, 395
of oil, 23-24, 27, 44
Inclusive development, 93, 119, 12426, 133, 253, 312
Inclusive growth, 39, 41, 46-47, 133,
174
Incomedisparities, 61, 253, 292
distribution, 359
India, 29, 33, 40, 42, 45, 50, 74, 100, 189,
226, 301, 307, 355, 358-60
paddy yields and production
practices in, 117
Indonesia, 2, 45, 138, 318, 352, 374
Industrial development, in Africa
Accelerated Industrial
Development of Africa (AIDA),
178-79development strategies, 179-87
investment promotion anddiversification, 187-89
keys to sustainable economic
growth, 189-90
possibilities and challenges, 174-77
Infectious diseases, 39, 42, 130, 177,
247-48, 255-56, 263-64, 368, 377
Information and communication421

technologies (ICTs), 28, 53, 55, 195,
198-99, 203, 239, 241, 322, 360, 367,
379
information platforms, 379
Informal cross border trade (ICBT),
25n6, 40
Infrastructure
climate change and, 312
financial resources for, 9, 196, 20411, 214
for irrigation, 103
maintenance of, 203, 213, 216, 225
for transport, 8, 225, 228-33, 310
urban, 312
Infrastructure Consortium for Africa(ICA), 13, 195
Infrastructure development in Africa
by country groups, 199-201
country’s competitiveness and, 202
current status, 196-99
efficiency gaps, 203
financial weaknesses, in JICAassisted infrastructure projects, 214
financing source and gap, 204
governance reform of public
utilities, 215-16
importance of maintenance in,
213-14
information and communication
technology (ICT), 198-99
Japan’s infrastructure assistance, See
Japanese aid, in Africa
power, 197sectoral allocation of Japan’s ODA,
212-13
share of Japan’s financial
commitment on, 220
spending needs and funding, 203transport, 197-98
water supply and sanitation (WSS),
198
Instability
economic, 41-42, 336
422

political, 26, 41, 204
Institute of Technical Assistance andrural Extension of Brazil(EMATER), 132
Institution building, 15, 331, 332,
334-35, 337-38, 365
Integrated Water Resource
Management (IWRM), 316
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), 301, 303
International Aid Transparency
Initiative (IATI), 355
International Centre for Tropical
Agriculture (CIAT), 153
International Financial Cooperation(IFC), 176, 188
International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD), 92, 124International Monetary Fund (IMF),
24, 25, 32, 53, 59, 391, 393, 395
Investment
in agriculture, 11, 48, 83, 121, 124,
137-38environment for, 120
foreign direct, 12, 26-28, 30, 176, 318,
362
Irrigation, 6, 58, 79, 91, 94, 102-4, 107,
109, 114, 162, 198, 208, 210, 213,
312, 314

J

Japan Brazil Partnership Program(JBPP), 130
Japanese aid, in Africa, 204-10, 256
allocation of loan/grant assistance,
205-8, 210-11
Cross Border Transport
Infrastructure (CBTI), 233-43
to cross border transport
infrastructure development, 233-43
infrastructure assistance, 204-5
infrastructure financing, 204
policy challenges, 211-16

Indextechnical cooperation (TC), 208-10,
221
Japan International Research Center
for Agricultural Sciences(JIRCAS), 92, 132
Japan-Morocco Triangular TechnicalCooperation Programme, 368
Japan, ODA Charter of, 338, 366
Japan-Tunisia Triangular TechnicalCooperation Programme, 368
JICA’s triangular practice for SSA,
366-69Jobs, 4, 175
Jomo Kenyatta University ofAgriculture and Technology(JKUAT), 293, 373

K

Kaizen project, 9, 174, 181, 183-87, 259,
262
Kenya
GDP, 143-44
horticulture in, 145
Mwea irrigation scheme in, 109
services sector in, 53
SHEP and SHEP UP project, 145-63
supply of vegetables in, 144
Knowledge and Technology
Dissemination Programme, 373
Knowledge sharing and co-creation,
through SSC/TrC, 9, 369, 377-80
Korea, 93, 363, 379, 398
Kyoto Initiatives, 302, 319-20

LLand, 6, 42, 47, 49, 75, 77, 79, 81, 87, 89,
99, 121, 125, 131, 306
Land grabbing, 121
Landlocked countries, 25
La Niña phenomena, 306
L’Aquila Summit (2009), 85, 124, 314
Latin America, 43, 47, 80, 198, 228, 307,
360, 365

annual cost of adaptation in, 42World Bank projects in, 281
Learning, 9, 21, 56, 132, 138, 181, 183,
269, 270-72, 276, 285, 292, 343, 361,
379
Learning for all, 14, 279-80
Lehman shock, 74, 81, 127
Life expectancy, 249
Livelihood, 15-16, 49, 91, 93, 120, 122,
126, 138, 301, 311-12, 314, 331, 332,
334-35, 338-40, 343-44, 373
Local government, 15, 273, 339, 341-42,
374
Logistic Performance Index (LPI), 226
Low-carbon, 304, 309-10, 317, 319, 323,
325
Low-carbon growth, 320
Low income countries, 5, 7, 33, 55,
198-99, 203, 212, 255, 303
LRA, 330

M

Mckinsey Global Institute (MGI), 23
Malaria, 38, 42, 247, 248, 256, 264, 306
Malaysian Industrial Development
Agency (MIDA), 188
Management
reform of public utilities, 13, 195,
215-16school, 273, 281-85, 289-90, 292
Manufacturingin Africa, 50-52
sector, 53, 175, 177
share in GDP, 4, 51, 176
Maputo Declaration, 87, 90
Market Facilitator’s Guide toParticipatory Agro-enterprise
Development, 152Market information, 86, 126, 153
Market oriented agriculture, 50, 137,
143-45, 152-53
Micro and Small Enterprise (MSE)
Development Strategy, 182423

Middle East, 79, 228, 362
Middle income countries, 2, 34, 58,
198-99, 254, 380
Millenium Development Goals(MDGs), 46, 61-62, 249-51
progress of, 38-39
Mining sector, 23, 176, 188
Ministry of Agricultural Development(MDA), 132
Mombasa port, 233-36
Monetary policies, 27, 45
Mortality
maternal, 2, 39, 248, 251
under-five, 38, 248, 253
Motivation, 148, 156-57, 159-60, 259,
262, 272, 340
Mozambique
agricultural development program,
93
Chokwe irrigation scheme, 102-3,
108
Green Revolution in, 102-3
paddy yields and production
practices in, 113
regional development program in,48
yields and production practices inrain-fed areas, 102-3

Actions (NAMAs), 318, 321-22
National Rice Development Strategies(NRDS), 92-93, 374, 378
National Service of Rural Learning(SENAR), 132
Natural disasters, 15, 74, 85, 303, 307,
310, 312, 315, 342, 362
Natural resources, 2, 4-5, 8, 21, 25,
27-28, 59-60, 122, 134, 176-77, 189,
199, 236, 308, 312, 320
New Alliance for Food Security andNutrition, 42, 48, 86-87, 136
New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD), 56, 128,
230, 353, 393, 394
New Rice for Africa (NERICA), 93,
101-2, 108, 373
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 352
Non Governmental Organizations(NGOs), 125, 134, 147, 268, 340,
361, 374, 377, 398
Non-Project Grants, 239, 391
North Africa, 22, 26, 39, 41-42, 79, 174,
197, 199, 205, 225, 228, 249-50,
254-55, 260, 355, 359, 361, 381
North Corridor, 228, 233-36, 243
Nutrition, 38, 42, 56, 144

N

Office National de Formation
Professonnelle (ONFP), 370
Official development assistance(ODA), 60
by Japan, 138, 195, 402
by non-DAC members, 356-57
Oilexporting countries, 23, 27, 44, 197,
199, 202
importing countries, 23-24, 44
One stop border posts (OSBPs), 376,
394
capacity development, Namibia and
Botswana, 242

Nacala Corridor Development
Program, 12-13, 48, 128, 131-33,
134, 136, 236-37, 310
Nacala Economic Corridor,
Mozambique, 236-37, 243
Nacala project, 8National Adaptation Plans (NAPs),
304, 318, 321
National Adaptation Programs of
Action (NAPAs), 321
National Graduate Institute for Policy
Studies (GRIPS), 11, 179, 181, 184
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation
424

OIndex

Chirundu (Zambia/Zimbabwe),239
harmonizing regulations, 242-43
Malaba (Kenya/Uganda), 239-40
Namanga (Kenya/Tanzania),
240-41
reason for, 238-39“Organizers’ Training on the BasicSHEP Approach,” 149P

Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness, 354
Partnership programs, 130, 367-69
Payment for Ecosystem Services(PES), 308
Plan for Accelerated and Sustained
Development to End Poverty(PASDEP) (2005-2009), 182
Population, 99, 161-62, 175, 197-98,
244, 249, 261, 306-8, 333
working-age, 22, 33-34, 36, 45, 50, 52,
291
Ports, 7, 126, 133, 198, 213, 225, 228-29,
234
Post-2015 agenda, 62
Post-Conflict Needs Assessment(PNA) mechanism, 342-43
Post harvest processing, 119, 121, 137,
164
Post-MDGs, 260
Poverty, 4, 195, 243, 331, 363
Poverty reduction
agriculture, 75, 89, 106, 120, 125-26,
143, 180, 195, 307, 309, 311, 313
in East Africa, 373
economic growth and, 31-33
employment in low-income
countries and, 33
informal sector, role of, 37
regional knowledge platform for,363, 372-74
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers(PRSPs), 374
Power, 8, 43, 197, 199, 203, 205, 208,
212, 309, 396
Primary education, 268, 271-73, 27780, 289, 291, 293, 295
enrolment rate of, 35, 38, 54, 268-69,
275-77, 279, 282
Principles for Responsible
Agricultural Investment (PRAI),
49n48, 82-83, 93, 121, 124, 126, 135,
139, 314
Private sector
climate change and, 319
role ofin agriculture, 119-24
in health sector, 258
Productivity, 3-4, 7, 11, 24, 37, 314, 325
labor, 22, 37, 47, 52, 54-55
Programme for Infrastructure
Development in Africa (PIDA),
231, 360
Project for Community Development
for Promoting Return andResettlement of IDPs, 341-42
Project for Livelihood Improvement,
340
Project for Strengthening the Capacityof Tumba College of Technology(TCT), 341
Promotion of Responsible
Agricultural Investment, 314
Pro-poor growth, 259
Pro-poor policy, 258
ProSAVANA-JBM model aid,
Mozambique, 133-36
ProSAVANA project, 10, 12
Prospects, long-term, 45-46, 174, 182,
310, 331-32, 335
Public Administration Leadership andManagement Academy (PALMS),
369
Public-Private-Partnership (PPP), 182,
323
425

Public utilities, 13, 195
management reform of, 215-16

R

Railways, 7, 198, 213
Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest
Degradation (REDD), 311
Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest
Degradation plus (REDD+), 324
ecosystem services, payments for,311
for enhancement of forest carbon
stocks, 308
for forest conservation, 308
for sustainable management offorests, 308
Reformeconomic, 21, 28-29, 392
government regulatory, 79, 83, 121,
215-16, 393
institutional, 8, 124, 135-36, 211, 215,
393
policy, 6, 24, 60, 75
security sector reform (SSR), 334
Regional economic communities(RECs), 40, 56-57, 229, 232, 244
Regional integration, 22, 40, 53, 57-58,
232-33, 362, 396
Remittances, 26-27
Renewable energy, 43, 212, 303, 309
Resilience, 9, 11, 62, 73, 83-85, 90-91,
94-95, 310
Resource curse, 59-60, 177
Resources
energy, 5, 21, 23, 43, 45, 47, 395
financial, 9, 196, 204-11, 263-64, 396
forest, 81, 311
human, 37, 55, 127, 143, 244, 255-56,
267, 275, 277, 280, 291, 293, 295, 363,
371
land, 49, 75, 81, 121426

mineral, 5, 21, 23, 45, 47, 187, 226,
239, 395
natural, 2, 4-5, 15, 25, 60, 122, 134,
177, 199, 308, 312
reallocation of, 215
water, 49, 75, 81, 121, 236, 302, 307,
312, 315, 316-17
Rice, 6, 9, 11, 48, 78, 86, 90, 92-93,
99-109, 119, 368, 373-75
Risks
climate change, 42-43
political, 26
Roads, 7, 8, 13, 14, 58, 79-80, 126,133-34, 147, 154, 189, 197-98, 208,
213, 215, 225, 228-29, 233-36, 240,
310, 368-69, 376
Rural development, 39, 341

S

Sanitation, 39, 51, 198, 261
Scaling up, 8of education, 291-92
of funds, 135, 256
Seed-fertilizer revolution, 102
Seeds, 78-79, 84, 93, 102-3, 108-9,
119-20, 122, 154
Self-employment, 4Senegal’s Vocational Training Center(CFPT), 370
Sensitization Workshops, 146, 159
Service sector, 28, 47, 52-55, 175, 177
Sharm el Sheikh Action Plan, 359
Skilled birth attendants (SBAs), 251
Small farmers, See Small-scale farmers
Smallholder Horticulture
Empowerment and Promotion
Unit Project (SHEP UP), 145
activities of, 148-49
internal and behavioral changes
in, 159
philosophy behind, 156-58
Smallholder Horticulture
Empowerment Project (SHEP),

Index145
activities of, 146-47
enabling conditions of, 160-63
essence of success, 152-56“Facilitators’ Training for Farmers’
Demand-Driven Extension,” 147factors for success, 161-62
internal and behavioral changes in
activities of, 159, 167-69“Joint Extension Staff and Farmers
Dual (2) Gender Training” (JEF2G
Training), 147
motivation theory and, 156-57“Organizers’ Training on the BasicSHEP Approach,” 149
philosophy behind, 156-58
survey on income, 151-52
Small-scale farmers, 12, 50, 82, 83, 88,
89-91, 93-94, 99, 106-7, 121-22, 128,
138, 143, 145, 151, 156, 163-64, 237
South African Development
Partnership Agency (SADPA), 361
Southern African Development
Community (SADC), 40, 128, 232,
241, 360, 362, 376, 379
South-South Cooperation (SSC)
Africa, importance of, 352-54
capacity development, 380-81
centrality of, 354
partners in African continent, 360-64
for SSA from partners outside
Africa, 355-60
sub-Saharan Africa and, 354-64
TICAD and, 353-54
Spatial Development Initiative (SDI),
229, 230, 362
Special Economic Zones, 8, 189
SPRING-Singapore, 183
Statecapacity of, 261, 263-64
legitimacy of, 9, 333-34, 336, 340
State-building in Africa
capable and legitimate institutions,331-34
humanitarian and development
assistance, 334-35
JICA Research Institute (JICA-RI)
findings, 335-37
JICA’s approach to support, 337-43
Strengthening of Mathematics andScience Education (SMASE),
287-89, 293
Structural Adjustment Lending, 391
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 99
agricultural growth rate in, 76
annual cost of adaptation in, 42
Asian-type improved ricetechnology for, 101-6
average rainfall in, 307
cereal production in, 76, 77
debt management policies, 43-44
disease burden, 247
forest coverage in, 310
Green Revolution in, 99-101
need for, 99-100
MDGs 2012 Progress Chart, 39
private sector development and, 176
share of industrial products of, 51
trade deficit in cereals, 78
Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy
Program (1987), 229
Sustainable Peace and Development(LIPS), 340-41

T

Tanzania
Green Revolution in, 103
MV adoption in, 108
paddy yields and production
practices in, 114
yields and production practices inrain-fed areas, 103
Task Force on Innovative International
Financing for Health Systems, 253
Tax system, 30
Technical cooperation among427

developing countries (TCDC), 352
Technology transfer, 101-6, 178, 314,
323-24, 366
TICAD IV Action Plan, 3, 10, 12, 57, 92,
173-74, 179-80, 189, 196, 204, 225,
233, 255, 256, 262, 302, 320, 374,
392, 395-99
TICAD V Action Plan, 56-62, 88, 257
assistance to mobilize financial
resources for UHC, 263-64
capacity development for healthsystems management, 262-63
direction of cooperation in, 243-44
human development framework,
295
Japan’s role in promoting UHC
under, 261-64
Tokyo Declaration for African
Development, 353
Toyako summit (2008), 85, 179, 261
Tradepartners of, 41, 45, 47
terms of, 24-25, 40
Trade Mark East Africa (TMEA), 232
Trade Mark South Africa (TMSA), 232
Trade-Related Capacities for Market
Access (FIMA), 58
Trans-Africa Highway (TAH), 221, 229
Transformation, of African economies,
45-46
Transport, 52-54, 58, 119, 126, 197“Triangle of Hope (TOH)” approach,Zambia, 13, 174, 187-89
Triangular Cooperation (TrC)
Africa, importance of, 352-54
capacity development, 380-81
for knowledge exchanges in SSA,
369-80and sub-Saharan Africa, 364-69
Triangular Cooperation Program for
Tropical Savannah Agricultural
Development among Japan,
Brazil and Mozambique
428(ProSAVANA-JBM)
background, 128-30
description of projects, 133-36
objectives and characteristics,
132-33
partnership between Japan andBrazil, 130-32
points to consider, 136-37
Tropical forests, 308, 310
Turkey, 357-58, 398

U

UgandaGreen Revolution in, 103-4
paddy yields and production
practices in, 115
yields and production practices inrain-fed areas, 103-4
Unemployment
urban, 21
youth, 33-34, 38, 55, 174, 274
Union Economique et Monetaire
Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), 241
United Nations (UN), 39, 75, 124, 352,
354, 365
United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), 251
United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), 80, 120, 198,
307, 363, 365, 392, 398
United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC), 42, 302, 311, 317, 319
United States, 73-74, 86, 183
Universal health coverage (UHC), 14,255
Urbanization, 33, 35-36, 310, 312
Urban sector
climate change and, 310
transportation and, 310

V

Value chain(s), 6, 48, 78-79, 81, 89,Index92-93, 119-20, 125, 127, 130-34, 137,
164
Vietnam, 58, 92, 190, 318, 375
Vocational training, case of, 34, 55, 132,
293, 339, 340-41, 357, 363
Voluntary Guidelines on the
Responsible Governance ofTenure of Land, Fisheries andForests (VGGT), 82, 121-24, 138-39
Vulnerability, to climate change, 301,
304

Z

Zambia Development Agency (ZDA),
188

W

Water resources management, 15, 302,
315, 316-17
Water supply, 15, 312, 316-17
Wetlands International Africa (WIA),
374
Wheat, 78, 99-100, 119
Women, 81, 151, 153, 321, 323, 342, 373
empowerment, 363
participation infarming, 94, 147
political decision-making, 38
Workforce Development Agency(WDA), 341
World Bank (WB), 52, 55, 58-59, 79-80,
92, 120, 124, 137, 176, 188, 198,
231-32, 239, 264, 272, 280-81, 290,
302, 316, 330, 365-66, 373, 376, 379
World Development Report (2010), 143,
302
World food prices, causes of rise in,
74-75
World Food Programme (WFP), 75
World Health Organization (WHO),
248, 254, 260

Y

Yokohama Action Plan (2008), 57, 196,
291, 302, 320, 395
Yokohama Declaration, 354, 395

429