Discussion Paper No.

487

ARE

AMERICANS

MORE

THAN

JAPANESE?

THE

A U.S. - JAPANOF

SAVINGAND

ALTRUISTICCOMPARISONBEQUEST

MOTIVESCharles Yuji Horioka
Hideki Fujisaki
Wako Watanabe
andTakatsugu Kouno

November 1999

The Institute of Social and Economic Research
Osaka University
6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan*

Forthcoming in the International Economic Journal, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 2000).

ARE AMERICANS MORE ALTRUISTIC THAN THE JAPANESE?
A U.S.-JAPAN COMPARISON OF SAVING AND BEQUEST MOTIVES*
by Charles Yuji Horioka
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University;
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.A.; andInstitute for Posts and Telecommunications Policy, Ministry of Posts andTelecommunications, Government of Japan
Hideki Fujisaki
Daiwa Securities SB Capital Markets Co. Ltd. (formerly Institute for Posts andTelecommunications Policy, Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications,
Government of Japan)
Wako Watanabe
Princeton University and Postal Life Insurance Bureau, Ministry of Posts andTelecommunications, Government of Japan
Takatsugu Kouno
Institute for Posts and Telecommunications Policy, Ministry of Posts andTelecommunications, Government of Japan
November 1999
Address for all communications:Charles Yuji Horioka, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka
University, 6-1, Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan.
Phone: 81-6-6879-8586, fax: 81-6-6878-2766, e-mail: horioka@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp*The authors are grateful to Robert Barsky, B. Douglas Bernheim, David
Campbell, Christopher D. Carroll, Jay Pil Choi, Thomas Dunn, Mitsuhiro Fukao,
Joon-Ho Hahm, Koji Hamada, Shigeyuki Hamori, Fumio Hayashi, Yoshio Higuchi,
Wontack Hong, Ken'ichi Kanie, Miles Kimball, Yukinobu Kitamura, Junko Koie,
Per Krusell, Masahiro Kuroda, Robert Lipsey, Atsushi Maki, Hirohisa Maki, Dick
Nanto, Kazuo Ogawa, Fumio Ohtake, Megumi Okui, Daekeun Park, Chang Yong Rhee,
Kazuo Sato, Gary Saxonhouse, Matthew Shapiro, Yukiko Shigeno, E. Young Song,
Linda Tesar, David Weinstein, participants of the National Bureau of Economic
Research Japan Project meetings held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on April 1819, 1997, and April 17-18, 1998, the Ninth and Tenth Conferences of theInstitute of Posts and Telecommunications Policy held in Tokyo, Japan, on May
21, 1997, and May 20, 1998, the Conference on Wealth, Inheritance, andIntergenerational Transfers held at the University of Essex on June 22-23,
1997, the Japan Economic Seminar held at George Washington University on April
25, 1998, the Aging Workshop of the NBER Summer Institute held in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, in July 27-31, 1998, the Japanese Economic Association meeting
held in Tokyo, Japan, on September 13-14, 1997, the Japan Society of Monetary
Economics meeting held in Osaka, Japan, on October 24-25, 1998, and theInternational Economic Journal Economics Annual held in Seoul, Korea, on
October 29, 1999, and seminar participants at the University of Hawaii, theUniversity of Michigan, Keio University, Osaka University, and Syracuse
University for their helpful comments. In addition, Horioka is grateful to
the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture of the Government ofJapan for a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (project number 09206209).
Forthcoming in International Economic Journal, vol. 14, no. 1 (Spring 2000).

ARE AMERICANS MORE ALTRUISTIC THAN THE JAPANESE?
A U.S.-JAPAN COMPARISON OF SAVING AND BEQUEST MOTIVESABSTRACTIn this paper, we analyze a variety of data on saving motives, bequest
motives, and bequest division from the “Comparative Survey of Savings in Japanand the United States,” a binational survey conducted in 1996 by the Institute
for

Posts

and

Telecommunications

PolicyoftheMinistry

of

Posts

and

Telecommunications of the Government of Japan, in order to shed light on whichmodel of household behavior applies in the two countries.

We find (1) thatthe selfish life cycle model is the dominant model of household behavior inboth countries but that it is far more applicable in Japan than it is in the
U.S., (2) that the altruism model is far more applicable in the U.S. than it
is in Japan but that it is not the dominant model of household behavior ineither country, and (3) that the dynasty model is more applicable in Japan
than it is in the U.S. but that it is of only limited applicability even in
Japan.

Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers
D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
D91 Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
E21 Consumption; Saving
Key words: Households, household saving, saving, dissaving, bequests,
inheritances, inter vivos transfers, intergenerational transfers, saving
motives,precautionarysaving,precautionary
motive,bequestmotives,
intergenerational altruism, strategic bequest motive, selfish bequest motive,
implicit intra-family annuity contract, life cycle model, altruism model,
dynasty model, coresidence, living arrangements, Japan, United States, U.S.Japan comparison.
Charles Yuji Horioka, Institute of Social and Economic
University, 6-1, Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, JAPANResearch,

Osaka

Hideki Fujisaki, 5-7-8-302, Seta, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo 158-0095, JAPANWako Watanabe, 1-1-26-121, Naka Meguro, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-0061, JAPANTakatsugu Kouno, Institute for Posts and Telecommunications Policy, Ministryof Posts and Telecommunications, 1-6-19, Azabudai, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106-0041,
JAPAN

I. Introduction
An issue of critical importance for economists and policymakers alike iswhich model of household behavior (the life cycle model of Modigliani and
Brumberg (1954), the altruism model of Barro (1974) and Becker (1974, 1981),
the dynasty model of Weil (1989), etc.) is more applicable in the real world,and data on the saving and bequest motives of households can shed considerable
light on this important issue because the various models have very different
implications for saving and bequest motives.

In this paper, we analyze avariety of data on saving and bequest motives in the United States and Japan
from

the

(Chochiku"Comparative

Surveyofni

Nichibei

Hikakukansuru

Savings

inJapan

Chousa)"andthe(hereafter

UnitedtheStates"U.S.-Japan

Survey"), conducted in 1996 by the Institute for Posts and Telecommunications
Policy(IPTP)

oftheMinistry

of

Posts

and

Telecommunications

of

the

Government of Japan, in order to shed light on which of the aforementioned
models of household behavior applies in the U.S. and Japan.
There have been a number of previous studies that test for the validityof the various models in individual countries (for example, Bernheim, Shleifer,
and Summers (1985), Cox (1987), Hurd (1987), Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff(1989) for the U.S. and Ohtake (1991), Ohtake and Horioka (1994), and Hayashi(1995) for Japan--see Horioka (1993) for a survey of the literature on Japan),but these studies are confined to individual countries and make inferences
based on the actual behavior of individuals or households.

To the best of ourknowledge, the present study is unique in at least two respects: first,
because it compares the extent to which the various models apply in the U.S.
and Japan, and second, because it makes inferences based on direct informationon the attitudes of respondents.
Conducting a U.S.-Japan comparison is a meaningful exercise for at least1three reasons--first, because it might shed light on why Japan’s saving rateis so much higher than that of the U.S.; second, because there are important
culturaldifferences

betweenculturaldifferences

are

the

two

important,countries,

we

would

and

expecttotheextentdifferentthatmodelsofhousehold behavior to apply in the two countries; and third, because the U.S.
and Japan are by far the two largest economies in the world.
Our paper is organized as follows: we discuss theoretical considerations
in section II, describe the data source in section III, and conduct a U.S.Japan comparison of saving motives in section IV and a U.S.-Japan comparisonof bequests, bequest motives, and attitudes toward bequest division in section
V.

Section VI is a brief concluding section.
To preview the main findings of our paper, our U.S.-Japan comparison ofsaving and bequest motives suggests (1) that the selfish life cycle model isthe dominant model of household behavior in both the U.S. and Japan but that
it is far more applicable in Japan than it is in the U.S., (2) that thealtruism model is far more applicable in the U.S. than it is in Japan but that
it is not the dominant model of household behavior in either country, and (3)that the dynasty model is more applicable in Japan than it is in the U.S. butthat it is of only limited applicability even in Japan.

II. Theoretical Considerations
In this section, we briefly describe the three models of householdbehavior we will be considering and discuss the implications of these threemodels for saving motives, bequest motives, and bequest division.

A. The Life Cycle Model
The purest form of the life cycle model of Modigliani and Brumberg

2

(1954) assumes that individuals are selfish and do not care about theirchildren or about anyone else.

Thus, if this model is valid, households

should be saving primarily for retirement and other life cycle motives (i.e.,
motives arising from differences in timing between income and expenditurestreams over the course of their own lifetimes) and/or for precautionary
motives (which are also consistent with the life cycle model), any bequests
they

leave

shouldbeunintended

bequestsarisingfromlongevity

risk

or

intended bequests motivated by selfish considerations such as a strategic
bequest motive à la Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) or an implicit
intra-family annuity contract à la Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), and bequests
should be left only to children who provide something in return such as careand/or financial assistance during old age.

B. The Altruism ModelThe

altruism

model

assumesthathouseholds

harborintergenerational

altruism (altruism toward their own children), and thus if this model is valid,households should be saving not only for life cycle motives but also in orderto leave a bequest, their bequests should be motivated by intergenerational
altruism, and their bequests should be compensatory in the sense that more isleft to children with less earning capacity and/or greater needs.

C. The Dynasty ModelThedynastymodel

assumesthathouseholds

wish

to

perpetuate

theirfamily line (dynasty) or family business, and thus if this model is valid,households should be saving not only for life cycle motives but also in order
to

leave

a

bequest,considerations,

and

their

their

bequests

bequestsshouldshould3

bebemotivated

dividedbyunequally,dynastic
withtheentire bequest being left to the first-born child or to the child who carries
on the family line or the family business.1

Thus,

the

three

modelsofhouseholdbehavior

have

very

different

implications concerning saving motives, bequest motives, and bequest division,and data on saving motives, bequest motives, and bequest division should be
able to shed considerable light on which model of household behavior isapplicable in the real world.

III. The Data Source
In this section, we discuss the “Comparative Survey of Savings in Japanand the United States,” the data source used for this analysis, in greater
detail.

This survey was conducted roughly simultaneously in the U.S. andJapan using identical questionnaires.

The U.S. survey was conducted during

the February 9-March 6, 1996, period by National Family Opinion, a private
polling organization.

2,200 households were selected from among the 40,000

households already participating in this company's National Household Paneland asked to participate in this survey.

Care was taken to ensure that theresulting sample was representative of the total population.

These households

were

back;

mailedquestionnaires

and

were

asked

to

mail

returning their questionnaires were sent one reminder.
responses, a response rate of 68.5%.

them

those

not

This resulted in 1,508

The Japanese survey was conducted during

the January 31-February 16, 1996, period by Nippon Research Center, a private
polling organization.
sampling

procedure,

1,800 households were selected by a stratified random
andquestionnaires

werecollected in person from, these households.
a response rate of 69.1%.2

4deliveredinpersonto,andThis resulted in 1,243 responses,

The target population in both countries was all households (including
single-personhouseholds)

with

a

head

aged

20

or

older.

The

geographic

coverage was as follows: cities in the 48 contiguous states plus the Districtof Columbia in the case of the U.S. and three large cities (cities with apopulation of 1,000,000 or more), five medium-sized cities (cities with apopulation of 500,000 to 600,000), and four small cities (cities with apopulation of less than 200,000) in the case of Japan.
The

surveyincludesavarietyofquestions

not

only

about

the

respondents’ behavior but also about their attitudes toward saving, bequests,
etc., and to the best of our knowledge, it is the first such survey to be
conducted simultaneously in the U.S. and Japan and one of the first such
surveys to be conducted in the U.S.3

IV. A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Saving Motives
In this section, we present data from the U.S.-Japan Survey on saving
motives.

In particular, we estimate the amount of saving for each of thirteen

motives in order to determine how much saving for each motive contributes tooverall household saving in the U.S. and Japan (see Horioka, Yokota, Miyaji,
and Kasuga (1997) and Horioka and Watanabe (1997, 1998) for a similar analysis
using Japanese data only).

A. Theoretical Considerations
Beforepresenting

considerations.

ourresults,

we

wish

to

discusssometheoretical

It is important to bear in mind that, at any given point in

time, there are households saving for any given motive as well as households
dissaving for that motive. For example, at any given time, there are young(pre-retirement) households that are saving for retirement as well as aged5

(post-retirement)households

that

are

dissavingforretirement.

What

contributes to overall household saving is the amount by which the saving of
those saving for a given motive (hereafter called "gross saving") exceeds thedissaving of those dissaving for that motive.
difference as "net saving."

We will hereafter refer to thisThe amount of net saving for any given motive canbe either positive, zero, or negative depending on the relative magnitudes ofgross saving and dissaving for that motive, and it will not necessarily belarge or even positive no matter how large gross saving for that motive is.
Gross saving for a given motive consists of the saving in the form of
the accumulation of financial assets of those planning to realize that motivein the future and the saving in the form of loan repayments of those realizingthat motive in the past (the repayment of principal is a form of saving
because it increases the household's net worth).

Similarly, dissaving for agiven motive consists of the dissaving in the form of the decumulation offinancial assets and the dissaving in the form of newly incurred debt of thoserealizing that motive during the current period.

In the case of motives

involving investment in depreciable fixed assets such as housing, consumer
durables, and plant and equipment, dissaving in the form of the decumulationof financial assets and that in the form of newly incurred debt will be
precisely offset by saving in the form of investment in such assets, butdissaving will still occur in the form of the depreciation on such assets of
those realizing such motives in the past.4

B. The Calculation Method
Fortunately, the U.S.-Japan Survey collects the information needed to
calculate the various components of gross saving and dissaving for each ofthirteen motives:"in order to save up for life after retirement" (hereafter

6

the

"retirement

motive"),

"in

order

to

provideextra

livingexpenses"(hereafter the "living expenses motive"), "for unexpected expenses required byillness,

disaster,children's

etc."

education"(hereafter(hereafter

the

the

"illness

motive"),

"for

one's

"education

motive"),

"for

one's

children's marriage" (hereafter the "marriage motive"), "to purchase one's own
home (and land) (including rebuilding and upgrading)" (hereafter the "housing
motive"),

"for

the

purchaseofdurablegoods"(hereafterthe"consumer

durables motive"), "for leisure" (hereafter the "leisure motive"), "to pay
taxes"(hereafter

the

"tax

motive"),

"to

start

up

one's

own

business"(hereafter the "business motive"), "saving not for any specific purpose but
for the sake of peace of mind" (hereafter the "peace of mind motive"), "toleave as a bequest" (hereafter the "bequest motive"), and "other."Direct information is collected on the accumulation and decumulation offinancial assets and on newly incurred debt and loan repayments for eachmotive.

The only exceptions are that information is not collected on loan

repayments and newly incurred debt for the retirement, tax, business, peace ofmind, and bequest motives in both countries and that information is notcollected on the accumulation of financial assets for the living expenses
motive or on the decumulation of financial assets for the retirement and peaceof mind motives in the case of Japan only.

Dissaving for the living expenses

motive in the form of the decumulation of financial assets is regarded as
being for the peace of mind motive in the case of those aged 59 or younger andfor the retirement motive in the case of those aged 60 or older, while savingin the form of loan repayments and dissaving in the form of newly incurreddebt for the living expenses motive is regarded as being for the peace of mind
motive, regardless of the age of the respondent. 5 6
Turningtodissaving

in

the

form

7

of

depreciationonowner-occupiedhousing, direct information is not collected thereon, but it can be calculated
by multiplying the market value of owner-occupied housing (the structure only)
by an appropriate depreciation rate.

The most recent housing censuses in the

U.S. and Japan (the 1993 American Housing Survey in the U.S. and the 1993
Housing Survey in Japan) found that the median age of owner-occupied housing
in the two countries is 27 and 17 years, respectively, and we assumed that theuseful life of owner-occupied housing in the two countries is twice the medianage--54 and 34 years, respectively.

Assuming geometric depreciation, therates of depreciation corresponding to these useful lives are 4.1744% and6.5481%,

respectively.

Unfortunately,

the

data

neededtocalculatethedepreciation on consumer durables and on the plant and equipment of familybusinesses were not available.

Thus, we had no choice but to ignore the factthat there is saving in the form of investment in real assets in the case of
the consumer durables and business motives and to assume that dissaving forthese motives takes the form of the decumulation of financial assets and newly
incurred debt.

C. The Estimation Results
Our estimates of household saving by motive are shown in Tables 1-6 andFigure 1.

Table 1 shows data on gross saving in the form of the accumulationof financial assets by motive, Table 2 data on gross saving in the form ofloan repayments by motive, Table 3 data on dissaving in the form of thedecumulation of financial assets by motive, Table 4 data on dissaving in theform of newly incurred debt by motive, Table 5 data on dissaving in the formof depreciation on owner-occupied housing, and Table 6 and Figure 1 data on
the total amount of gross saving, dissaving, and net saving by motive.7
Let us look first at our estimates of the total amount of gross saving,8dissaving, and net saving for each motive (see Table 6 and Figure 1).

As canbe seen from Table 6, the composition of gross saving is remarkably similar in
the two countries: the housing motive ranks first in both countries with ashare of 25.21% in the U.S. and 28.95% in Japan, the retirement motive ranks aclose second in both countries with a share of 21.36% and 26.11%, respectively,
and the peace of mind motive ranks third in both countries with a share of
15.37% and 14.18%, respectively.

Turning to the composition of dissaving, thehousing motive ranks first by far in both countries with a share of 41.14% and56.58%, respectively, and the consumer durables and education motives in the
U.S. and the peace of mind motive and “other” in Japan are the only othermotives

with

a

share

exceedingtenpercent.

Turning

finallytothecomposition of net saving, which is what measures the contribution of saving
for each motive to overall household saving, it is by far the highest in thecase of the retirement motive in both countries, but the share of this motive
is more than twice as high in Japan as it is in the U.S. (62.23% vs. 30.84%).
The peace of mind and housing motives rank second and third in the U.S. withshares of 20.74% and 14.60%, respectively, while the illness and peace of mind
motives rank second and third in Japan with shares of 22.26% and 18.92%,
respectively.

Note, however, that the illness and peace of mind motives areboth precautionary motives and that if they are combined, their combined shareis 27.93% in the U.S. and 41.18% in Japan.

Thus, the precautionary motive

broadly defined is the second most important motive for saving (after theretirement motive) in both countries and is far more important in Japan than
it is in the U.S. (see Figure 1).

Note, finally, that net saving for the

housing motive has a negative share in Japan because, even though there is a
substantial amount of gross saving for the housing motive in Japan, it is more
thanoffset

by

an

even

largeramount9ofhousing-related

dissaving(depreciation) and that the larger amount of depreciation on housing in Japanis due, in turn, to the shorter useful life (lower durability) of housing inJapan.
Next, we would like to look at data on the importance of the bequest
motive, which is primarily consistent with the altruism and dynasty models.
The bequest motive is of only negligible importance in both countries, withbequest-related saving amounting to only 3.03% and 0.72% of gross saving and
only

5.04%

and

1.50%

of

net

saving

and

with

only

10.77%

and

3.63%

of

households saving for the bequest motive in the form of the accumulation offinancial assets in the U.S. and Japan, respectively.

It should be noted,

however, that the bequest motive can be defined more broadly to include theeducation and marriage motives (because these motives entail intergenerationaltransfers to one’s children) as well as the housing and business motives(because housing and family businesses are often bequeathed to one’s children),but even if the bequest motive is defined broadly to include these motives,
its share of net saving is only 24.96% in the U.S. and 1.64% in Japan.8

Thus,

it appears that the bequest motive is stronger in the U.S. than in Japan butthat it is not very strong even in the U.S.
Looking more briefly at the composition of gross saving and dissaving,it can be seen from Tables 1 and 2 that gross saving consists primarily of theaccumulation of financial assets in the case of most motives, with loan
repayments exceeding the accumulation of financial assets only in the case of
the housing and consumer durables motives and “other” in both countries.
Similarly, as can be seen from Tables 3 and 4, dissaving consists primarily ofthe decumulation of financial assets, with newly incurred debt exceeding thedecumulation of financial assets only in the case of the housing motive and“other” (in both countries) and the consumer durables and education motives

10

(in the case of the U.S.).

These findings are not surprising because it isprimarily in the case of housing, consumer durables, and (in the case of theU.S.) education that credit markets are well-developed.

As noted earlier,

however, in the case of the housing motive, both dissaving in the form of thedecumulation of financial assets and dissaving in the form of newly incurreddebt are fully offset by saving in the form of housing investment, as a resultof which the only form of dissaving is depreciation on owner-occupied housing(see Table 5).

D. Summary
Our results suggest that the life cycle model is much more applicablethan the altruism and dynasty models in both the U.S. and Japan inasmuch as
life cycle motives such as the retirement motive and precautionary motives
such as the illness and peace of mind motives (which are also consistent withthe life cycle model) are of dominant importance and the bequest motive is ofnegligible importance in both countries.

Moreover, our results also suggestthat the life cycle model is of much greater applicability in Japan than it isin the U.S. and that the altruism and dynasty models are much more applicablein the U.S. than they are in Japan inasmuch as the share of the retirement
motive (the most important life cycle motive) in net saving is twice as large
in Japan as it is in the U.S., the share of the precautionary motive is alsomuch higher in Japan, and the share of the bequest motive in gross saving andnet saving as well as the proportion of households saving for the bequest
motive in the form of the accumulation of financial assets are much smaller inJapan than they are in the U.S. (regardless of whether bequests are definednarrowly or broadly).9Note, moreover, that the altruism and dynasty models

might be even less applicable in both countries than suggested by our findings11because,

as

noted

earlier,bequests

could

well

be

motivatedbyselfishconsiderations, which are consistent with the life cycle model rather thanwith the altruism and dynasty models.

(We present data on bequest motives in

section V.B.)
Note, however, that U.S.-Japan differences in the relative importance ofthe various saving motives may be due not to differences in which model(s) of
household behavior apply in the two countries but to differences in theeconomic

andinstitutional

environments

(the

size

and

sourceofexternal

shocks, the availability of a social safety net, the position of the economy
in the business cycle, etc.) faced by households in the two countries or todifferences in the age and/or income distribution of the population in the twocountries.

With respect to the former, it could be, for example, that saving

for the retirement motive is far more important in Japan than it is in the U.S.
not because the life cycle model is more applicable in Japan but because
public and private pensions are less available or because there is greater
uncertainty about future benefit levels in Japan.

With respect to the latter,saving motives differ greatly by age (see the breakdown by age in Horioka and
Watanabe(1997,

1998)),

andthus

U.S.-Japandifferences

in

the

relative

importance of the various saving motives could be due in part to differencesin the age distribution of the population in the two countries.

For example,

the importance of the retirement motive increases sharply with age in bothcountries, and thus the fact that Japan’s population is much older than thatof the U.S. can help explain why the retirement motive was found to be so much
more important in Japan than it is in the U.S.10
regarded as tentative.11

12

Thus, our conclusions must be

V. A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Bequests, Bequest Motives, and Bequest Division
In this section, we present data from the U.S.-Japan Survey on bequests,
bequest motives, and bequest division, where bequests are defined throughout
to include inter vivos transfers.

A. A U.S.-Japan Comparison of the Importance of Bequests
Table 7 shows data on the prevalence of bequests in the two countries,
and as can be seen from this table, the proportion of respondents who havereceived bequests in the past is 28.67% in the U.S. but only 22.35% in Japan,
the proportion of respondents who expect to receive bequests in the future is28.40% in the U.S. but only 22.10% in Japan, and the proportion of respondents
who have received bequests in the past and/or who expect to receive them inthe future is 48.88% in the U.S. but only 40.18% in Japan.

Moreover, as canbe seen from Table 8, 45.92% of U.S. respondents want to make efforts to leavebehind a bequest to their children, whereas this proportion is only 25.72% inJapan (these figures represent the proportion of respondents holding either
view

1

or

view

2).

Finally,

as

we

saw

in

sectionIV,

10.77%

ofU.S.

respondents are saving in the form of the accumulation of financial assets inorder to leave a bequest, whereas this proportion is only 3.63% in Japan.

Itthus appears that individuals who have received or expect to receive bequests
andindividuals

who

plan

to

leave

bequests

are

in

the

minorityinbothcountries but that bequests are considerably more prevalent in the U.S. than
they

are

in

Japan.

These

resultssuggestthatthebequestmotiveisrelatively weak in both countries but especially weak in Japan.
However, Table 7 also shows data on the amount of bequests, and as canbe seen from this table, the average bequest (at current market value) ofrespondents who have received bequests in the past is $74,756 (2.131 times

13average annual household disposable income) in the U.S. and 54,110,000 yen(9.630 times average annual household disposable income) in Japan.

Moreover,the average bequest of all respondents is $21,431 (0.611 times average annual
household disposable income) in the U.S. and 12,090,000 yen (2.152 times
average annual household disposable income) in Japan.

Thus, the averagebequest-income ratio is much higher in Japan than it is in the U.S.

The

proportion of respondents who have received bequests in the past is somewhat
higher in the U.S. and thus the U.S.-Japan gap in the bequest-income ratio issmaller in the case of all respondents than it is in the case of respondents
who have received bequests in the past, but it is still quite high (thebequest-income ratio in Japan is 4.520 times higher than the U.S. ratio in thecase of respondents who have received bequests in the past and 3.524 times
higher than the U.S. ratio in the case of all respondents).
Thus, whether bequests are more prevalent in the U.S. or in Japandependsonwhich

criterion

is

used,

but

all

measurespertaining

to

the

proportion of households receiving or leaving bequests suggest that bequests
are considerably more prevalent in the U.S.

It thus appears that a smaller

proportion of households receive or leave bequests in Japan but that those who
do receive or leave bequests receive or leave much larger bequests than in the
U.S.

B. A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Bequest Motives
Note, however, that whether the life cycle model, the altruism model, or
the dynasty model applies in the real world depends more on the motives forwhich people leave bequests than on the prevalence or amount of bequests.
Fortunately, the U.S.-Japan Survey also collects data on the bequest motivesof respondents, and it is to these data that we now turn.

14

In one question, respondents are asked which of four views they holdwith respect to leaving a bequest to their children.

View 1 ("I want to makeefforts to leave behind a bequest regardless of whether my child or children
look after me after I retire") is an altruistic or dynastic bequest motive,
view 2 ("I want to make efforts to leave behind a bequest as long as my childor children look after me after I retire") is a selfish bequest motive (either
a strategic bequest motive à la Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) or an
implicit intra-family annuity contract à la Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981)), view
3 ("I will not make any particular efforts to leave behind a bequest but will
leave

to

my

child

or

childrenwhateverassetshappen

to

be

left

over")

indicates that only unintended or accidental bequests will be left, and view 4("I will not leave any bequest at all to my child or children") indicates thetotal absence of a bequest motive.

View 1 is consistent with the altruism anddynasty models whereas views 2, 3 and 4 are consistent with the life cycle
model, and thus information on the relative prevalence of these views willshed light on whether the life cycle model, the altruism model, or the dynasty
model is applicable in the real world.
The results are shown in Table 8, and as this table shows, 42.60% of U.S.
respondents hold view 1, whereas this proportion is only 19.29% in Japan.
Since view 1 is consistent with the altruism and dynasty models, this result
suggests that the proportion of households whose behavior is consistent withthe altruism and dynasty models is more than twice as high in the U.S. as it
is in Japan.

By contrast, the proportion of respondents holding views 2, 3,

and 4 is much lower in the U.S. than in Japan (3.32% vs. 6.43% in the case ofview 2, 51.14% vs. 70.10% in the case of view 3, 2.94% vs. 4.18% in the caseof view 4, and 57.40% vs. 80.71% in the case of these three views combined).
Since views 2, 3, and 4 are all consistent with the life cycle model, the fact

15

that a majority of respondents in both countries adhere to views 2, 3, or 4
suggests that the life cycle model is the dominant model of household behavior
in both countries, and the fact that the proportion of respondents adhering toviews 2, 3, or 4 is much higher in Japan than it is in the U.S. suggests thatthe life cycle model is much more applicable in Japan than it is in the U.S.

C. A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Attitudes toward Bequest Division
The U.S.-Japan Survey also asks about the respondents' attitudes toward
bequest division, with respondents being asked to choose from among six views.
View 1 ("It will be divided equally among my children") is not, in general,consistent with any theoretical model but is consistent with the altruism
model if parents love their children equally and believe that their children’s
own resources and needs are roughly equal, and view 2 ("Most or all of it will
be willed to the child or children with the least income") is consistent withthe altruism model, whereas view 3 ("Most or all of it will be willed to thechild or children who look after me") is consistent with the life cycle model,
and view 4 ("Most or all of it will be willed to the child or children whocarry on my business") and view 5 ("Most or all of it will be willed to myoldestson/daughter

regardlessofwhetherhe/she

looks

after

me")

are

consistent with the dynasty model.12(It is not possible to say a priori withwhich

consistent.)

model

view

6

(“other”)

is

Thus,

information

on

the

relative prevalence of these views will shed further light on whether the life
cycle model, the altruism model, or the dynasty model is applicable in thereal world.
The results are shown in Table 9, and as this table shows, in the U.S.,
the proportion of respondents holding view 1 is 96.28% and the proportion
holding either view 1 or view 2 is 96.83%, whereas these proportions are only16

48.74% and 51.10%, respectively, in the case of Japan.13

Since views 1 and 2

are (or may be) consistent with the altruism model, these results suggest thatthe proportion of households whose behavior is consistent with the altruism
model is nearly twice as high in the U.S. as it is in Japan.

By contrast, theproportion of households holding views 3, 4, and 5 is much higher in Japan
than in the U.S. (32.38% vs. 2.48% in the case of view 3, 6.91% vs. 0.00% in
the case of view 4, and 7.59% vs. 0.41% in the case of view 5).

Since view 3

is consistent with the life cycle model, these results suggest that the
proportion of households whose behavior is consistent with the life cycle
model is far higher in Japan than it is in the U.S. (32.38% vs. 2.48%), andsince views 4 and 5 are consistent with the dynasty model, these results
suggest that the proportion of households whose behavior is consistent withthe dynasty model is far higher in Japan than it is in the U.S. (14.50% vs.
0.41%).

However,theproportionofrespondents

holding

a

view

that

is

consistent with the dynasty model is only 14.50% even in Japan, suggestingthat the dynasty model is not the dominant model of household behavior ineither country.

D. Further Evidence on the Applicability of the Dynasty Model
Additional evidence on the applicability of the dynasty model is given
in Tables 10 and 11.

First, Table 10 shows data on the types of assets

respondents plan to leave as a bequest, and as this table shows, 32.67% of
Americans planning to leave bequests plan to leave assets they inherited and96.60% plan to leave assets they acquired themselves, whereas in Japan thecorresponding proportions are 39.71% and 83.35%.

Thus, the tendency to leaveacquired assets is much stronger than the tendency to leave inherited assets
in both countries, and the tendency to leave acquired assets is considerably17

stronger in the U.S. than it is in Japan whereas the tendency to leave
inherited assets is considerably stronger in Japan than it is in the U.S.
Individuals regard inherited assets as belonging to their family (dynasty)
rather than to themselves personally, according to the dynasty model, and thus
these findings suggest that the dynasty model is more applicable in Japan than
it is in the U.S. but that it is of only limited applicability even in Japan.
Note that these conclusions are fully consistent with our conclusions based ondata on attitudes toward bequest division.
Turning to the second type of evidence, Table 11 shows the distributionof respondents by bequest motive, broken down by whether the respondent hasreceived bequests in the past and/or expects to receive them in the future.
As this table shows, in both countries, those who have received bequests inthe past and/or who expect to receive bequests in the future are considerably
more likely to have an altruistic or dynastic bequest motive (view 1) or aselfish bequest motive (view 2) and considerably less likely to plan to leave
only unintended bequests (view 3) or to plan to leave no bequest at all (view4).

This suggests that both Americans and Japanese are motivated to someextent by dynastic considerations (i.e., that they tend to feel obligated toleave a bequest to their children if they themselves received a bequest fromtheir parents).

However, this tendency is not necessarily any stronger in thecase of Japan, contrary to what the data in Table 10 suggest.

E. A U.S.-Japan Comparison of the Behavior of Bequest Recipients
Thus

far,

we

have

focusedalmostexclusively

on

the

attitudes

andbehavior of bequest givers (the parents), but in this section we focus on the
behavior of bequest recipients (the children).

If the children are altruistic,

we would expect them to look after their aged parents whether or not they18

expect to receive a bequest from them and whether or not the receipt of abequest is conditional on their looking after their parents.

By contrast, if

the children are selfish, we would expect them to look after their aged
parents only if they expect to receive a bequest from them or, more precisely,
only if the receipt of the bequest is conditional on their looking after theirparents.
selfishThus, we can shed light on whether the children are altruistic orbyseeingwhether

there

is

any

correlation

betweentheparent’sbequest intentions and the children’s behavior (in particular, whether or notthey look after their aged parents).

The U.S.-Japan Survey did not collectdirect information on how must care children provide to their aged parents so
we have used coresidence as a proxy therefor.

Since it is presumably easierfor children to care for their parents and to provide financial and in-kindassistance to their parents if they live together, we believe that coresidence
is likely to be a good proxy for care provided by children to their aged
parents.
First, Table 12 shows data on the coresidence rates of respondents

aged

49 years and younger and their parents, broken down by whether or not the
respondent expects to receive a bequest from their parents, and as this tableshows, in both countries, respondents who expect to receive a bequest fromtheir parents are more likely to live with them.

This suggests that children

are motivated by selfish considerations in both countries.

However, theimpact of bequest expectations on coresidence is much greater in Japan than it
is

in

the

U.S.:

the

coresidence

rate

of

those

with

(without)

bequestexpectations is 24.61% (18.79%) in Japan and 7.02 (6.75%) in the U.S.

This

suggests that children are much more selfish in Japan than they are in the
U.S.14
Next, Table 13 shows data on coresidence rates of aged respondents19(respondents aged 60 and older) and their children, broken down by bequest
motive, and as this table shows, the coresidence rate varies relatively littlebybequestmotive

in

the

U.S.

and

is,

in

fact,

lowest

in

the

case

of

respondents with a selfish bequest motive (6.67%) and second lowest in thecase of respondents with an altruistic bequest motive (7.53%) even though wewould expect it to the highest for these respondents if their children are
selfish (the coresidence rate is highest for respondents planning to leave
only unintended bequests (12.02%) and second highest for respondents planningto leave no bequest at all (7.69%)).

By contrast, the coresidence rate varies

substantially by bequest motive in Japan and the observed pattern is fully
consistent

with

the

hypothesisthatchildrenareselfishinJapan:

thecoresidence rates of respondents with selfish or altruistic bequest motives isby far the highest (63.89% and 63.46%, respectively) and is about 1.3 times as
high

as

that

of

respondents

planning

to

leave

only

unintended

bequests(49.45%) and more than two-and-a-half times as high as that of respondents
with no bequest motive (25.00%).

These results suggest that American children

are altruistic whereas Japanese children are selfish.15
We also did a probit analysis of coresidence between aged parents andtheir children including as explanatory variables income, the square of income,the age, marital status, sex, and health of the household head, housing tenure,city size, bequest motives, and (in the case of the U.S.) the race of thehousehold

head

and

found

that

the

bequestmotivedummiesaretotally

insignificant in the case of the U.S. but that the dummies for the altruistic
and selfish bequest motives are positive and marginally significant in thecase of Japan.

This demonstrates that the conclusion we drew from Table 13

does not change even when we control for other factors.

20

F. Summary
To

sum

up,

bequests

appeartobemotivatedprimarily

byselfishconsiderations in both countries, suggesting that the life cycle model is thedominant model of household behavior in both countries, but they appear to be
motivated to a far greater extent by intergenerational altruism in the U.S.
than

they

are

in

Japan,

suggesting

that

the

altruism

model

is

far

more

applicable in the U.S. than it is in Japan.

By contrast, bequests appear tobeselfishmotivated

to

a

far

greater

extentbyanddynastic

motives(especially the former) in Japan than they are in the U.S., suggesting that
the

life

cycle

and

dynastymodels(especiallytheformer)

are

far

more

applicable in Japan than they are in the U.S.

VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed a variety of data on saving and bequest
motives in the U.S. and Japan from the “Comparative Survey of Savings in Japan
and

the

U.S.,”

abinational

householdsurveyconducted

in

1996

by

the

Institute for Posts and Telecommunications Policy of the Ministry of Posts andTelecommunications of the Government of Japan, in order to shed light on whichmodel of household behavior applies in the two countries.

The evidence isremarkably consistent, with the vast majority of it suggesting (1) that theselfish life cycle model is the dominant model of household behavior in bothcountries but that it is far more applicable in Japan than it is in the U.S.,(2) that the altruism model is far more applicable in the U.S. than it is inJapan but that it is not the dominant model of household behavior in either
country, and (3) that the dynasty model is more applicable in Japan than it isin the U.S. but that it is of only limited applicability even in Japan.
Looking first at the evidence in support of our conclusion that the life21

cycle model is the dominant model of household behavior in both countries, we
found

(1)

that

savingforlife-cycle

motives(especiallysavingfortheretirement and precautionary motives) comprises the bulk of household saving
in both countries, (2) that saving for the bequest motive is of negligible
importance in both countries, (3) that individuals who received or expect toreceive bequests, individuals who plan to make efforts to leave behind abequest, and individuals who are saving for the purpose of leaving behind abequest

are

in

the

minorityinbothcountries,

(4)

that

a

majorityofindividuals in both countries either do not plan to leave a bequest, plan toleave only unintended or accidental bequests, or plan to leave a bequest only
if their children look after them in their old age, and (5) that, in bothcountries, those who expect to receive a bequest are more likely to live with
their parents than those who do not expect to receive a bequest.
Turning to the evidence that the selfish life cycle model is more
applicable in Japan than it is in the U.S., we found (1) that the share ofsaving for motives that are consistent with the life cycle model (especiallythe retirement and precautionary motives) is much higher in Japan than it isin the U.S., (2) that the proportion of households saving in order to leavebehind a bequest as well as the share of bequest-related saving are muchhigher

in

the

U.S.

than

they

are

in

Japan,

(3)

that

the

proportionofhouseholds receiving or expecting to receive bequests is somewhat higher in
the U.S. than it is in Japan, (4) that the proportion of households planningto make efforts to leave behind a bequest is much higher in the U.S. than it
is in Japan, (5) that bequests are motivated to a far greater extent byselfish considerations in Japan than they are in the U.S. and that they are
motivated to a far greater extent by intergenerational altruism in the U.S.
than they are in Japan, judging not only from the data on bequest motives but

22also from the data on attitudes toward bequest division, and (6) that thecorrelation between whether or not one expects to receive a bequest from one’s
parents and whether or not one lives with one’s parents and that between
whether or not one has a bequest motive and whether or not one lives with
one’s children is much stronger in Japan than it is in the U.S.
Turning

finallytotheevidence

that

the

dynasty

model

is

more

applicable in Japan than it is in the U.S. but that it is of only limited
applicability even in Japan, we found (1) that the proportion of respondents
who plan to leave most or all of their bequest to the child who carries on thefamily business or to the eldest child (regardless of whether that child takes
care of them) is much higher in Japan than it is in the U.S. but not very higheven in Japan, (2) that the proportion of respondents who plan to leave behindassets that they themselves inherited is higher in Japan than it is in the U.S.
but not very high even in Japan, and (3) that the correlation between whether
or not a respondent received or expects to receive a bequest and whether or
not a respondent plans to make efforts to leave behind a bequest is positivein both countries but not overwhelming.
Reassuringly, our findings are broadly consistent with those of previous
studies for both countries.

With respect to Japan, our finding that the life

cycle model is the dominant model of household behavior is fully consistent
with the findings of Ohtake (1991), Ohtake and Horioka (1994), Hayashi (1995),
and other previous studies.

With respect to the U.S., our finding that thelife cycle model is the dominant model of household behavior is consistent
with the findings of Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985), Cox (1987), Hurd
(1987), Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1989), and other previous studies,but our finding that a substantial minority of Americans is altruistic issomewhat at variance with some previous studies.

23

Turning next to directions for further research, our finding that thevarious models of household behavior coexist in both countries suggests thattheoretical, empirical, and policy-oriented analyses must take account of thiscoexistence.

Second, our finding that the altruism and dynasty models are not

the dominant models of household behavior in either country suggests thatfurther theoretical work using these models is of limited value.
findingthat

precautionarysavingisofsignificant

Third, ourimportanceincountries suggests that further work in this area holds great promise.

both

Fourth,we found that the proportion of households whose behavior is consistent witheach model varies greatly depending on which criterion is used, and thus it
would be desirable to reconcile the various findings.

Fifth, our finding thatthe magnitude of bequests is much larger in Japan than it is in the U.S. issurprising because income growth has been much more rapid in Japan, meaningthat the gap between the lifetime incomes of younger generations and those ofolder generations is much greater in Japan than it is in the U.S., which in
turn

means

that

one

would

expectJapaneseparents

bequests to their children than American parents.

to

leave

far

smaller

A further investigation of

the reasons for our counterintuitive result is warranted.16

Sixth, it would beinteresting if similar data could be obtained for other countries as well.17
Turning finally to policy implications, as discussed by Barro (1974),
Becker (1974, 1981), and Weil (1989), the various models have very different
policyimplications.

For

example,competitive

equilibria

willalwaysbeefficient, the existence of asset bubbles is ruled out, and the Ricardian debt
neutrality proposition holds in the case of the altruism model, while theopposite holds in the case of the life cycle and dynasty models.

Thus, ourfindings should be of interest not only to economists but also to policymakers.

24

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Agents,"Footnotes
1

Note that the dynasty model is a special case of Weil's (1989) model, whichassumes that new and infinitely linked dynasties, which are not linked to preexisting families through operative intergenerational transfers, continuously
enter the economy over time, because children who are not first-born or who do
not carry on the family line or the family business represent the newdynasties that Weil's model requires.

2

A comparison of the samples for each country with those of similar household
surveys in the same country showed that the samples are more or lessrepresentative.

3

A copy of the fullcorresponding author.

questionnaireisavailable

upon

request

from

the

4

It could be argued that capital gains and losses on fixed assets such as land,
housing, etc., should be included in the saving for the purchase of such
assets, but I have chosen not to do so because I was interested in knowing how
much saving for each motive contributes to the national income accounts
concept of saving, which does not include capital gains or losses.

5

Unfortunately, it is not possible to calculate the proportion of respondents
saving for each motive in the form of the accumulation of financial assets,
the proportion of respondents saving for each motive in the form of loan
repayments, the proportion of respondents dissaving for each motive in theform of the decumulation of financial assets, or the proportion of respondents
dissaving for each motive in the form of newly incurred debt from the data in
the U.S.-Japan Survey because it is not possible to differentiate between
those who are not saving or dissaving for a given motive and those who did not
respond to the question. Thus, we estimated the proportion of respondents
saving for each motive in the form of the accumulation of financial assets on
the assumption that all respondents who hold financial assets for the motive
in question but did not indicate whether or not they accumulated further
financial assets for that motive during the past year did, in fact, do so.
Similarly, we estimated the proportion of respondents saving for each motivein the form of loan repayments on the assumption that all respondents who haveoutstanding loans for the motive in question but did not indicate whether or
not they made any payments on such loans during the past year did, in fact, doso.
We made the aforementioned assumptions because households holding
financial assets for a given motive are likely to be accumulating financial
assets for that motive on a regular basis, even if they did not indicate
whether or not they are doing so, and similarly, households with outstandingloans for a given motive are likely to be repaying those loans on a regularbasis, even if they did not indicate whether or not they are doing so. By
contrast, we estimated the proportion of respondents dissaving for each motivein the form of the decumulation of financial assets on the assumption that all
respondents who hold financial assets for a given motive but did not indicate
whether or not they decumulated any of these assets during the past year did

27not, in fact, do so. Similarly, we estimated the proportion of respondents
dissaving for each motive in the form of newly incurred debt on the assumptionthat all respondents who have outstanding loans for a given motive but did notindicate whether or not they incurred any new debts for the motive in question
during the past year did not, in fact, do so.
It appeared reasonable to makethese assumptions because decumulating financial assets and/or incurring new
debt in order to realize a given motive are likely to be one-time events
involving large sums of money, and thus we would expect non-response to beless of a problem than in the case of saving in the form of the accumulationof financial assets or in the form of loan repayments.
6

With respect to the treatment of outliers, it is customary to decumulate aconsiderable amount of financial assets or to incur a considerable amount of
new debt when realizing certain motives such as the housing motive; hence, alarge amount of dissaving in the form of the decumulation of financial assets
or in the form of newly incurred debt is not necessarily suspect. By contrast,
saving in the form of the accumulation of financial assets or in the form ofloan repayments is typically done gradually over a number of years out ofcurrent income. Thus, we excluded what appeared to be outliers only in thecase of saving in the form of the accumulation of financial assets or in theform of loan repayments.

7

As the results show, the net saving rate implied by our results is broadly
consistent with the National Accounts figure in the case of Japan but is muchhigher than the National Accounts figure in the case of the United States.
The reason for this is not clear and warrants further investigation, but inthis paper, we are interested in the composition of saving by motive rather
than in the level thereof. We are indebted to B. Douglas Bernheim and Daekeun
Park for this point.

8Note, however, that the share of the bequest motive broadly defined in grosssaving is 35.59% in the U.S. and 39.69% in Japan, meaning that it issubstantial in both countries and slightly higher in Japan than it is in the
U.S. We are indebted to Joon-Ho Hahm for this point.
9

Refer to Horioka and Okui (1999) for an analysis of the importance anddeterminants of retirement saving in the U.S. and Japan using the same data
source. They find that, in both countries, retirement saving is influenced bysome (though not all) of the factors identified by the extended life cycle
model, especially expected living expenses during retirement.

10

We are indebted to Joon-Ho Hahm and Daekeun Park for these points.

11
The shares of the population aged 0-19, 20-39, 40-59, and 60 and over were32.0% (22.4%), 31.9% (27.8%), 20.3% (28.9%), and 15.7% (21.0%), respectively,in the United States (Japan) as of July 1, 1996.
12

In Japan, it has traditionally been the eldest son who carries on the familyline or the family business, and in prewar Japan, the law stipulated that theentire bequest goes to the eldest son.
13

The U.S. results are broadly consistent with the findings of Dunn andPhillips (1997), who find that 90% of Americans bequeath at least some assets
to all of their children.
14Note, however, that the altruism model requires only that the parents be28

altruistic. Thus, the fact that the children are selfish does not necessarily
contradict the altruism model.
15

Horioka et al. (1996) also find that, in Japan, aged respondents with analtruistic or selfish bequest motive are roughly twice as likely to receive
financial assistance from their children as those with no bequest motive,
which again suggests that children are selfish in Japan.
16
We are indebted to Christopher D. Carroll and Daekeun Park for this point.
One possible explanation of our result is habit formation (see, for example,
Carroll (2000)).
17

The Urban Households Saving Market Study, conducted by the Bank of Korea in
1995, asked Korean households about their bequest motives and found that the
proportion of respondents with an altruistic bequest motive is somewhat higher
in Korea than it is in Japan but not nearly as high as it is in the U.S.
(25.7% in Korea vs. 42.6% in the U.S. and 19.3% in Japan), that the proportionof respondents with a selfish bequest motive is far, far higher in Korea than
it is in either the U.S. or Japan (22.8% in Korea vs. 3.3% in the U.S. and
6.4% in Japan), and that the proportion of respondents with no bequest motive(or planning to leave only unintended bequests) is lower in Korea than it isin either the U.S. or Japan (51.5% in Korea vs. 54.1% in the U.S. and 74.3% inJapan). Since the second and third responses are consistent with the life
cycle model, these findings imply that the proportion of respondents adheringto the life cycle model in Korea is much higher than it is in the U.S. but
somewhat lower than it is in Japan (74.3% in Korea vs. 57.4% in the U.S. and
80.6% in Japan). Thus, it appears that Korea is between the U.S. and Japanbut closer to Japan with respect to the degree of applicability of thealtruism and life cycle models. We are indebted to Joon-Ho Hahm for providing
us with the Korean data.

29

Table 1: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Gross Saving in the Form of the Accumulation of Financial Assets for Each Motive

Motive1 Retirement
2 Living expenses
3 Illness
4 Education
5 Marriage
6 Housing
7 Consumer durables
8 Leisure
9 Tax
10 Business
11 Peace of mind
12 Bequest
13 Other
Total

(3)
(5)
(6)
(1)
(2)
(4)
The average amount of grossTheaverageamount
of
gross
The
share
of (4) in
The proportion of
The ratio of (2)The ratio of (4)savingforeachmotiveinthegrosssavingin thehouseholds saving for saving for each motive in the form
to average
to averageof the accumulation of financial
form
of
the
accumulation
of
form
of
the
each motive in theannualannualassets of households saving for
financial assets of all
accumulation ofform of thehouseholdhouseholdeach motive in that form (in units
households
(in
units
of
financialassets foraccumulation of
disposabledisposableof dollars or 10,000 yen)dollarsor
10,000yen)allmotives(%)
financial assets (%)
income (%)
income (%)
48.57
33.58
42.57
21.10
6.78
19.08
24.60
34.81
30.87
3.95
37.70
10.77
1.54
315.92

(1)
(5)
(2)
(8)
(11)
(9)
(7)
(4)
(6)
(12)
(3)
(10)

5797
2411
1611
2137
3450
3289
1667
1703
2443
5220
2930
3708
2260

United States
(1)
(8)
(12)
(9)
(4)
(5)
(11)
(10)
(7)
(2)
(6)
(3)

16.52
6.87
4.59
6.09
9.83
9.37
4.75
4.85
6.96
14.88
8.35
10.57
6.44

2815
810
686
451
234
627
410
593
754
206
1105
399
35
9125

(1)
(3)
(5)
(8)
(11)
(6)
(9)
(7)
(4)
(12)
(2)
(10)

8.02
2.31
1.95
1.28
0.67
1.79
1.17
1.69
2.15
0.59
3.15
1.14
0.10
26.01

Japan
45.21
(1)
84.87
(1)
15.10
38.37
(1)
6.83
1 Retirement
2 Living expenses
37.21
(3)
41.19
(4)
7.33
15.33
(3)
2.73
3 Illness
23.95
(4)
35.74
(6)
6.36
8.56
(5)
1.52
4 Education
11.36
(5)
39.46
(5)
7.02
4.48
(6)
0.80
5 Marriage
10.76
(6)
80.26
(2)
14.28
8.63
(4)
1.54
6 Housing
6.14
(8)
28.76
(8)
5.12
1.77
(8)
0.31
7 Consumer durables
9.84
(7)
27.17
(9)
4.84
2.67
(7)
0.48
8 Leisure
5.69
(9)
23.67
(10)
4.21
1.35
(9)
0.24
9 Tax
0.96
(11)
12.00
(11)
2.14
0.12
(11)
0.02
10 Business
39.62
(2)
50.61
(3)
9.01
20.05
(2)
3.57
11 Peace of mind
3.63
(10)
29.38
(7)
5.23
1.07
(10)
0.19
12 Bequest
3.19
53.00
9.43
1.69
0.30
13 Other
197.56104.08
18.52
Total
Notes: Refer to the main text for an explanation of the calculation method. The figures in parentheses denote the rank of each motive (excluding "other").

30.85
8.87
7.52
4.94
2.56
6.88
4.49
6.50
8.27
2.26
12.10
4.38
0.38
100.00
36.86
14.73
8.22
4.31
8.30
1.70
2.57
1.29
0.11
19.26
1.02
1.62
100.00

Data source: The Institute for Posts and Telecommunications Policy, Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, Government of Japan, "A Comparative Survey of Savingsin Japan and the United States" (1996).

Table 2: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Gross Saving in the Form of Loan Repayments for Each Motive

Motive1 Living expenses
2 Illness
3 Education
4 Marriage
5 Housing
6 Consumer durables
7 Leisure
8 Other
Total

(3)
(5)
(6)
(4)
(1)
(2)
The proportion of The average amount of gross saving The ratio of (2) to The average amount of gross The ratio of (4) The share of (4) inhouseholds saving for each motive in the form of loan average annual saving for each motive in the to average annual gross saving in theform of loan repayments ofform of loan
for each motive in repayments of households saving forhouseholdhouseholdallhouseholds
(in
units
of
repayments
for allthe form of loan each motive in that form (in units ofdisposabledisposable
dollarsor
10,000yen)
dollars or 10,000 yen)motives(%)
repayments (%)
income (%)
income (%)
5.16
8.09
2.37
0.52
39.54
21.64
5.47
11.11
77.75

2181
1569
3128
800
6821
3044
1394
2786

United States
(4)
(5)
(2)
(7)
(1)
(3)
(6)

0.32
0.36
0.21
0.01
7.69
1.88
0.22
0.88
10.66

3.01
3.39
1.98
0.11
72.08
17.60
2.04
8.27
100.00Japan
1 Living expenses
2.12
(4)
37.33
(6)
6.64
0.79
(4)
0.14
2 Illness
0.30
(7)
50.00
(3)
8.90
0.15
(6)
0.03
3 Education
2.50
(3)
41.12
(4.5)
7.32
1.03
(3)
0.18
4 Marriage
0.81
(5)
67.00
(2)
11.92
0.54
(5)
0.10
5 Housing
24.08(1)
140.84
(1)
25.06
33.91
(1)
6.04
6 Consumer durables
6.90
(2)
41.12
(4.5)
7.32
2.84
(2)
0.51
7 Leisure
0.61
(6)
23.60
(7)
4.20
0.14
(7)
0.03
8 Other
5.17
67.29
11.98
3.48
0.62
Total
36.75
40.37
7.18
Notes: Refer to the main text for an explanation of the calculation method. The figures in parentheses denote the rank of each motive (excluding "other").

1.96
0.37
2.55
1.35
84.00
7.03
0.35
8.61
100.00

Data source: The same as Table 1.

(5)
(3)
(6)
(7)
(1)
(2)
(4)

6.22
4.47
8.92
2.28
19.44
8.67
3.97
7.94

113
127
74
4
2697
659
76
310
3741

(4)
(3)
(6)
(7)
(1)
(2)
(5)

Table 3: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Dissaving in the Form of the Decumulation of Financial Assets for Each Motive

Motive1 Retirement
2A Living expenses(age 59 or younger)
2B Living expenses(age 60 or older)
3 Illness
4 Education
5 Marriage
6 Housing
7 Consumer durables
8 Leisure
9 Tax
10 Business
11 Peace of mind
12 Bequest
13 Other
Total

(2)
(3)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(1)
(4)
The ratio of The average amount of The ratio of The share of (4) in
The proportion of
The average amount of
The share of (4) inhouseholds dissaving dissaving in the form of the (2) to average dissaving in the form of (4) to average dissaving in the dissaving in the form ofannualfor each motive inannualdecumulation of financial
form of thethe decumulation of
the decumulation ofhouseholdthe form of thehouseholdassets of households
decumulation offinancial assets of all
financial assets for all
decumulation of
disposable financial assets for motives (excluding thedissaving for each motive in disposable
households (in units offinancial assets (%) that form (in units of dollars income (%) dollars or 10,000 yen)income (%)
all motives (%)
housing motive) (%)
or 10,000 yen)
6.33

(4)

5368

(3)

4.24

(5)

2004

(9)

1.41
7.27
1.36
0.18
1.83
3.35
7.42
8.33
0.18
4.11
0.09
0.17
46.27

(9)
(3)
(10)
(11.5)
(8)
(7)
(2)
(1)
(11.5)
(6)
(13)

2565
1894
6734
6000
2236
3897
1717
2974
600
5136
1000
4200

(7)
(10)
(1)
(2)
(8)
(5)
(11)
(6)
(13)
(4)
(12)

United States
15.30

340

(1)

0.97

23.14

23.80

5.71

85

(8)

2.42

5.78

5.95

7.31
5.40
19.19
17.10
6.37
11.11
4.89
8.48
1.71
14.64
2.85
11.97

36
138
91
11
41
131
127
248
1
211
1
7
1468

(10)
(4)
(7)
(11)
(9)
(5)
(6)
(2)
(12.5)(3)(12.5)

1.03
3.92
2.60
0.31
1.17
3.72
3.63
7.06
0.03
6.02
0.03
0.02
4.18

2.47
9.38
6.22
0.73
2.79
8.90
8.69
16.89
0.08
14.40
0.06
0.49
100.00

2.54
9.65
6.40
0.75

Japan
1 Retirement
2A Living expenses
10.02
(1)
96.86
(8)
17.24
9.71
(2)
1.73
18.60
(age 59 or younger)
2B Living expenses
3.13(4)
106.90
(7)
19.02
3.34
(4)
0.59
6.40
(age 60 or older)
3 Illness
2.73(5)
108.35
(6)
19.28
2.95
(5)
0.53
5.66
4 Education
3.47(3)116.73
(5)
20.77
4.05
(3)
0.72
7.76
5 Marriage
0.42
(10)
167.50
(3)
29.81
0.71
(9)
0.13
1.36
6 Housing
2.13(6)
1121.50(1)
199.58
23.89
(1)
4.25
45.78
7 Consumer durables
1.51(8)
134.29
(4)
23.90
2.03
(6)
0.36
3.88
8 Leisure
3.74
(2)
37.49
(11)
6.67
1.40
(7)
0.25
2.69
9 Tax
1.72
(7)
70.25
(9)
12.50
1.21
(8)
0.21
2.31
10 Business
0.11
(11)
300.00
(2)
53.39
0.32
(10)
0.06
0.62
11 Peace of mind
0.00
(12)
0.00
(12)
0.00
0.00
12 Bequest
0.55
(9)
40.40
(10)
7.19
0.22
(11)
0.04
0.43
13 Other
1.06
221.00
39.33
2.35
0.42
4.50
30.58
52.17
9.28
100.00Total
Notes: Refer to the main text for a description of the calculation method. The figures in parentheses denote the rank of each motive (excluding "other").
Data source: The same as Table 1.

9.15
8.93
17.37
0.08
14.81
0.06
0.50
100.00

34.32
11.81
10.44
14.30
2.51
7.16
4.96
4.27
1.14
0.00
0.78
8.31
100.00Table 4: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Dissaving in the Form of Newly Incurred Debt for Each Motive
(3)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(4)
(2)
(1)
The
share
of (4) in
The average amount of
The
share
of
(4)
in
The proportion of The average amount of dissaving The ratio of
The ratio offor each motive in the form of (2) to average dissaving for each motive (4) to average dissaving in the dissaving in the form ofhouseholds
in the form of newly
form of newly newly incurred debt for
newly incurred debt ofdissaving for eachannualannualincurred
debt
of
all
incurreddebt for all motives (excluding
motive in the form households dissaving for eachhouseholdhouseholdhouseholds
(in
units
of
all
motives(%) the housing motive) (%)
of newly incurred motive in that form (in units ofdisposabledisposable
dollarsor
10,000yen)
dollarsor
10,000
yen)
debt
(%)
income (%)
income (%)
MotiveUnited States
1 Living expenses
1.60
(5)
5631
(4)
16.05
90
(5)
0.26
2.58
5.38
2 Illness
2.67
(3)
3989
(5)
11.37
106
(4)
0.30
3.05
6.35
3 Education
0.59
(6)
75071
(1)
213.95
445
(3)
1.27
12.74
26.55
4 Marriage
0.00
(7)
0
(7)
0.00
0.00
0.00
5 Housing
3.60
(2)
50442
(2)
143.76
1816
(1)
5.18
52.00
6 Consumer durables
8.00
(1)
7575
(3)
21.59
606
(2)
1.73
17.35
36.14
7 Leisure
1.82
(4)
2167
(6)
6.17
40
(6)
0.11
1.13
2.36
8 Other
3.09
12601
35.91
390
1.11
11.15
23.23
Total
16.52
2851
8.13
81.63
88.28
Japan
1 Living expenses
1.01
(3)
48.00
(5)
8.54
0.48
(4)
0.09
0.49
0.48
2 Illness
0.00
(7)
0.00
(7)
0.00
0.00
0.00
3 Education
0.50(4)
120.40
(3)
21.43
0.60
(3)
0.11
0.61
0.60
4 Marriage
0.10(6)200.00
(2)
35.59
0.20
(5)
0.04
0.20
0.20
5 Housing
2.17(1)4117.50(1)732.74
89.46
(1)
15.92
90.13
6 Consumer durables
2.10
(2)
81.52
(4)
14.51
1.71
(2)
0.30
1.73
1.71
7 Leisure
0.20
(5)
20.00
(6)
3.56
0.04
(6)
0.01
0.04
0.04
8 Other
1.49
539.73
96.05
8.04
1.43
8.11
8.04
Total
5.97
99.25
17.66
100.009.79
Notes: Refer to the main text for a description of the calculation method. The figures in parentheses denote the rank of each motive (excluding "other").
Data source: The same as Table 1.

Table 5: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Dissaving in the Form of Depreciation on Owner-Occupied Housing(1)

MotiveHousing
Total
Housing
Total

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

The ratio of (4) to
The average amount of dissaving in the
The ratio of (2) to
The proportion of households The average amount of dissaving in the
average annual
form of depreciation on owner-occupied
average annual
form of depreciation on owner-occupied
dissaving in the form of
housing of households dissaving in that household disposable housing of all households (in units of household disposable
depreciation on ownerincome (%)
dollars or 10,000 yen)income (%)
form (in units of dollars or 10,000 yen)occupied housing (%)
United States
67.90
3195
9.11
2169
6.18
67.90
2169
6.18
Japan
62.74
81.78
14.55
51.31
9.13
62.74
51.31
9.13

Notes: Refer to the main text for a description of the calculation method.
Data source: The same as Table 1.

Table 6: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Gross Saving, Dissaving, and Net Saving for Each Motive(1)

Motive1 Retirement
2 Illness
3 Education
4 Marriage
5 Housing
6 Consumer durables
7 Leisure
8 Tax
9 Business
10 Peace of mind
11 Bequest
12 OtherTotal
1 Retirement
2 Illness
3 Education
4 Marriage
5 Housing
6 Consumer durables
7 Leisure
8 Tax
9 Business
10 Peace of mind
11 Bequest
12 Other
Total

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

The average amount The ratio of The share The average amount The ratio of The share The average amount The ratio of The shareof gross saving for (1) to average of (1) in of dissaving for each (4) to average of (4) in of net saving for each (7) to average of (7) ineach motive of all
motive of all
motive of all
net saving
annualdissavingannualgross
annualhouseholds (in units
households (in units
for allhouseholdfor allhouseholdsaving for households (in units
householdof dollars or 10,000
of dollars or 10,000
motives
disposable
motives
disposabledisposable all motives of dollars or 10,000
yen)
yen)
yen)
(%)
income (%)(%)
income (%)(%)
income (%)
United States
2815
(2)
8.02
21.36
376
(5)
1.07
7.13
2440
(1)
6.95
30.84
813
(5)
2.32
6.16
244
(7)
0.70
4.63
569
(4)
1.62
7.19
525
(8)
1.50
3.98
536
(3)
1.53
10.17
-11
(11)
-0.03
-0.14
238
(10)
0.68
1.81
11
(9)
0.03
0.20
227
(9)
0.65
2.87
3324
(1)
9.47
25.21
2169
(1)
6.18
41.14
1155
(3)
3.29
14.60
1069
(4)
3.05
8.11
737
(2)
2.10
13.97
332
(8)
0.95
4.20
669
(7)
1.91
5.07
167
(8)
0.48
3.17
502
(6)
1.43
6.35
754
(6)
2.15
5.72
248
(6)
0.71
4.70
506
(5)
1.44
6.40
206
(11)
0.59
1.56
1
(10.5)
0.00
0.02
205
(10)
0.58
2.59
2027
(3)
5.78
15.37
386
(4)
1.10
7.33
1640
(2)
4.68
20.74
399
(9)
1.14
3.03
1
(10.5)
0.00
0.02
398
(7)
1.14
5.04
344
0.98
2.61
397
1.13
7.52
-52
-0.15
-0.66
13184
37.57
100.005273
15.03
100.007911
22.55
100.00
Japan
38.37
(2)
6.83
26.11
3.34
(5)
0.59
3.68
35.03
(1)
6.23
62.23
15.48
(4)
2.75
10.53
2.95
(6)
0.53
3.26
12.53
(2)
2.23
22.26
9.59
(5)
1.71
6.52
4.65
(3)
0.83
5.13
4.94
(4)
0.88
8.77
5.03
(6)
0.89
3.42
0.91
(9)
0.16
1.01
4.11
(5)
0.73
7.31
42.55
(1)
7.57
28.95
51.31
(1)
9.13
56.58
-8.76
(11)
-1.56
-15.57
4.61
(7)
0.82
3.13
3.74
(4)
0.67
4.12
0.87
(7)
0.15
1.54
2.82
(8)
0.50
1.92
1.44
(7)
0.26
1.59
1.37
(6)
0.24
2.44
1.35
(9)
0.24
0.92
1.21
(8)
0.21
1.33
0.14
(9)
0.02
0.25
0.12
(11)
0.02
0.08
0.32
(10)
0.06
0.35
-0.21
(10)
-0.04
-0.37
20.84
(3)
3.71
14.18
10.19
(2)
1.81
11.24
10.65
(3)
1.90
18.92
1.07
(10)
0.19
0.72
0.22
(11)
0.04
0.24
0.84
(8)
0.15
1.50
5.17
0.92
3.52
10.39
1.85
11.46
-5.23
-0.93
-9.29
146.9726.15
100.0090.68
16.14
100.0056.28
10.02
100.00(continued)

Table 6 (continued)
Notes: Gross saving is the sum of gross saving in the form of the accumulation of financial assets and gross saving in the form of loan repayments, while dissaving is the sum of
dissaving in the form of the decumulation of financial assets, dissaving in the form of newly incurred debt, and dissaving in the form of depreciation on owner-occupied housing(but excluding dissaving in the form of the decumulation of financial assets and dissaving in the form of newly incurred debt for the housing motive). Net saving was calculated as
gross saving minus dissaving. The gross saving in the form of the accumulation of financial assets and that in the form of loan repayments for the living expenses motive of thoseof all ages, the dissaving in the form of the decumulation of financial assets for the living expenses motive of those aged 59 or younger, and the dissaving in the form of newly
incurred debt for the living expenses motive of those of all ages were regarded as being for the peace of mind motive, while the dissaving in the form of the decumulation offinancial assets for the living expenses motive of those aged 60 or older was regarded as being for the retirement motive. The figures in parentheses denote the rank of eachmotive (excluding "other").
Data source: Tables 1-5.

Table 7: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of the Importance of Bequests
United States
1. The proportion of respondents who have received
bequests in the past (%)
2. The average current market value of bequests received(the average for respondents who have received bequests
in the past) (in units of dollars or yen)
3. 2 as a multiple of average annual household disposable
income (times)
4. The average current market value of bequests received(the average for all respondents) (in units of dollars or
5. 4 as a multiple of average annual household disposable
income (times)
6. The average annual household disposable income of all
respondents (in units of dollars or yen)
7. The proportion of respondents who expect to receive
bequests in the future (%)
8. The proportion of respondents who have received
bequests in the past and/or who expect to receive
bequests in the future (%)
The number of respondents

Japan

28.67

22.35

$74,756¥54,114,240

2.131

9.630

$21,431¥12,094,555

0.611

2.152

$35,088¥5,619,294

28.40

22.10

48.88
1479

40.18
1217

Notes: Respondents not replying to the question about whether they have received bequests received in the past and/or to thequestion about whether they expect to receive bequests in the future were excluded from the sample when calculating the
proportions in lines 1, 7, and 8.
Data source: The same as Table 1.

Table 8: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Bequest Motives
Attitude toward bequests

The proportion of respondents holding each view (%)
United StatesJapan

1. I want to make efforts to leave behind a bequest regardless of
42.60
19.29
whether my child or children look after me after I retire
2. I want to make efforts to leave behind a bequest as long as
my child or children look after me after I retire
3.32
6.43
1+2. I want to make efforts to leave behind a bequest(regrouped)
45.92
25.72
3. I will not make any particular efforts to leave behind abequest but will leave to my child or children whatever assets
happen to be left over
51.14
70.10
4. I will not leave any bequest at all to my child or children
2.94
4.18
Total
100.00100.00
Number of respondents
1054
933
Notes: Respondents with no children, those not replying to the question about whether or not they have children, those replying "I
don't know, I have never thought about it" or not replying to the question about bequest motives were excluded from the sample
when computing these proportions.
Data source: The same as Table 1.

Table 9: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Attitudes toward Bequest Division
Attitude toward bequest division

The proportion of respondents holding each view (%)
United States
96.28

Japan
48.74

2. Most or all of it will be willed to the child or children withthe least income

0.55

2.36

3. Most or all of it will be willed to the child or children wholook after me

2.48

32.38

4. Most or all of it will be willed to the child or children whocarry on my business

0.00

6.91

0.41
0.28
100.007.59
2.02
100.001. It will be divided equally among my children

5. Most or all of it will be willed to my oldest son/daughter
regardless of whether he/she looks after me
6. Other
Total
Number of respondents

725
593
Notes: Respondents with one or no children, those not replying to the question about whether or not they have children and/or to thequestion about how many children they have, those replying "I don't know, I've never thought about it" or not replying to thequestion about bequest motives and/or to the question about the division of their bequest, and those replying "I will not leave any
bequest to my child or children" in response to the question about bequest motives were excluded from the sample when calculatingthese proportions.
Data source: The same as Table 1.

Table 10: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of the Composition of Bequests

Type of asset
Land/housing
Financial assets
Other
Total
Number of respondents
Land/housing
Financial assets
Other
Total
Number of respondents

The proportion of
respondents who plan to
The proportion of respondents The proportion of respondents whobequeath assets they inherited who plan to bequeath assets plan to bequeath assets they inherited(%)
they acquired on their own (%) and/or acquired on their own (%)
United States
17.28
78.12
83.82
21.58
80.52
84.42
15.68
54.65
57.84
32.67
96.60
100.00
1001
Japan
37.35
51.86
79.87
5.96
54.78
57.26
3.37
15.52
17.89
39.71
83.35
100.00889

Notes: Respondents who have no children, those not replying to the question about whether or not they have children, those
replying "I do not plan to leave a bequest to my child or children" or "I don't know, I've never thought about it" or not replying to thequestion about bequest motives, and those not replying to the question about the composition of their bequests were excluded fromthe sample when calculating these proportions.
Data source: The same as Table 1.

Table 11: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of the Distribution of Respondents by Bequest Motive, Broken
Down by Whether or Not They Have Received and/or Expect to Receive Bequests
Attitude toward bequests

The proportion of respondents holding each view (%)
United States
Japan
Respondents who
Respondents who
Respondents who
Respondents who
have received and/or have neither received have received and/or have neither received
expect to receive
nor expect to receive
expect to receive nor expect to receive
bequests
bequests
bequests
bequests

1. I want to make efforts to leave behind abequest regardless of whether my child orchildren look after me after I retire
49.43
35.18
25.72
14.14
2. I want to make efforts to leave behind abequest as long as my child or children lookafter me after I retire
3.60
3.16
6.73
6.37
3. I will not make any particular efforts toleave behind a bequest but will leave to mychild or children whatever assets happen to
45.45
57.11
66.35
72.71
be left over
4. I will not leave any bequest at all to mychild or children
1.52
4.55
1.20
6.77
Total
100.00100.00100.00100.00
Number of respondents
528
506
416
502
Notes: Respondents with no children, those not replying to the question about whether or not they have children, and those replying "I
don't know, I've never thought about it" or not replying to the question about bequest motives were excluded from the sample whencalculating these proportions. Moreover, the results are not shown for respondents not replying to the question about whether or notthey have received bequests in the past and/or to the question about whether or not they expect to receive bequests in the future.
Data source: The same as Table 1.

Table 12: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Parental Coresidence Rates by Bequest Expectations
Subsample

Parental coresidence rate (%)
United States

Japan

Respondents who expect to receive a bequest in
the future

7.02

(228)

24.61

(191)

Respondents who do not expect to receive any
bequests in the future

6.75

(326)

18.79

(346)

All respondents (excluding those who did not
reply to the question about whether or not they
expect to receive bequests in the future)

6.86
(554)
20.86
(537)
All respondents
6.80
(559)
20.82
(538)
Notes: These figures show the proportion of respondents aged 49 years or younger who live with one or more parents or parents-inlaw. Respondents not replying to the question about whether or not they live with their parents or parents-in-law were excluded
from the sample when calculating these proportions. Moreover, the results are not shown for respondents not replying to thequestion about whether or not they expect to receive bequests in the future. The figures in parentheses show the number of
respondents.
Data source: The same as Table 1.

Table 13: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Child Coresidence Rates by Bequest Motive
Attitude toward bequests

Child coresidence rate (%)
United StatesJapan
1. I want to make efforts to leave behind a bequest
regardless of whether my child or children look afterme after I retire
7.53
(146)
63.46
(52)
2. I want to make efforts to leave behind a bequest as
long as my child or children look after me after I
retire
6.67
(15)
63.89
(36)
3. I will not make any particular efforts to leavebehind a bequest but will leave to my child orchildren whatever assets happen to be left over
12.02
(208)
49.45
(182)
4. I will not leave any bequest to my child orchildren
7.69
(13)
25.00
(16)
All respondents (excluding those who replied "I don't
know, I've never thought about it" or who did not
reply to the question about bequest motives)
9.95
(382)
52.45
(286)
All respondents
10.05
(398)
49.70
(334)
Notes: These figures show the proportion of respondents aged 60 or older who live with one or more of their children. Respondents
with no children, respondents not replying to the question about whether or not they have children, and respondents not replying to thequestion about whether or not they live with their children were excluded from the sample when calculating these proportions.
Moreover, the results are not shown for respondents replying "I don't know, I've never thought about it" or not replying to the question
about bequest motives. The figures in parentheses show the number of respondents.
Data source: The same as Table 1.

Figure 1: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of the Composition of Net Saving

70

60

The share of net saving for each motive (%)

50

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20
Retirement

Precautionar
EducationyMarriage

Housing

ConsumerdurablesLeisureTax

Business

Bequest

Other

U.S.

30.84

27.93

-0.14

2.87

14.6

4.2

6.35

6.4

2.59

5.04

-0.66

Japan

62.23

41.18

8.77

7.31

-15.57

1.54

2.44

0.25

-0.37

1.5

-9.29

MotiveNote: The precautionary motive represents the sum of the illness and peace of mind motives.
Data source: Table 6.