The Japanese Society for Aesthetics

Aesthetics No.23-24 (2021): 89-100

On Appreciating Artworks Involving Cultural Properties
Jean LIN
The University of Tokyo, Tokyo

Introduction
Cultural property—any property that appreciators would attribute to a certain culture—,
when presented in an artwork, could affect the overall evaluation of the artwork. It tends to yieldpositive value, especially when presented in an environment where the culture in question isconsidered a minority. The examples are abundant throughout the early to the late modern period
in the West, namely Orientalism, chinoiserie, Japonism, and primitivism, where the Western
appreciators valued the exoticism of the Others (e.g. Said 1978; Chu and Milam 2019; Inaga
1999; Mabuchi 1997; Torgovnick 1990). The cultural property also yielded the valueof novelty when employed by the Western artists, as it brought perspective and technique unseen
in the preexisting Western tradition.
The situation seems to have changed in the past few decades with the rise of debate on
cultural appropriation—the view that the cultural outsider who is a member of majority culture
handling the cultural property of minority culture is morally inappropriate (e.g. Baraka 1987;
Keeshig-Tobias 1997; Rudinow 1994). The discourse arose from the postcolonial perspectivethat criticizes any practice that would continue the legacy of colonialism. Given this view, now
the artists could be criticized for handling cultural property not coming from their own culture
and possibly yielding negative value to their artworks.
On the other hand, though the access is limited, the cultural property still seems to becapable of yielding a positive value in the contemporary context for several reasons. For one, ascultural diversity and minority rights have become a matter of significance, identity art, in which
the minority artists reflect their cultural background onto their artworks, has been flourishing in
the past few decades (Haq 2015). Another is that, as the homogenization of culture has beenpromoted by globalization, contemporary appreciators came to value authentic things that areconnected to traditional culture (Cobb 2014). Such a longing for authenticity allows the culturalproperty to yield positive value. However, it also forms stereotypes based on cultural identity,
casting disadvantages upon artists. The expectation that ‘things made by insiders ought to beauthentic’ causes works by minority artists to be attributed to their background culture regardlessof their intention (Wu 2007). The stereotype that ‘things made by outsiders ought to be
inauthentic’ causes the work by outsiders handling cultural property to be viewed as inferior due
to the lack the sensitivity and understanding of the culture in question (Young 2008).
As can be seen, the cultural property not only yields positive values such as exoticness,novelty, and authenticity, but also negative values such as immorality and inauthenticity. Whilethese values have been debated in aesthetics and anthropology, a significant problem has been

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left largely undiscussed; that is, when discussing these values, the debate is inevitably based on
cultural essentialism. Focusing on the fact that culture is fluid and relative, this paper asserts thatthe above values are: 1) significantly dependent on the cultural background of the artist andappreciator; 2) cognitive yet aesthetic; 3) problematic when presented to different cultural groups.
The discussion in this paper will involve pursuing the following questions. Is aesthetic property
objective or subjective? Are cognitive and moral values aesthetic? How do cultural problems playinto evaluating artworks? Investigating these questions will indicate not only the aestheticalissues but also the social and anthropological issues, namely the consumption of the Others in theimperial era, the problem of cultural appropriation, and authenticity in the contemporary context.

1. The Ontology of the Cultural Property and the Values It Yields
1.1 The Relativity in the Perception of Cultural Property
Among the values that cultural property brings to artwork, I will focus on exoticness, novelty,
morality, and authenticity. First, the meaning of each term must be clarified. Exoticness refers
to the quality of being foreign (or seemingly foreign) or being unusual, exciting, and mysterious
because of being foreign. Novelty is the quality of being new and innovative. Morality concerns
the distinction between right and wrong upon human conduct. Authenticity refers to the qualityof being genuine, having an origin of authorship supported by evidence, or replicating theessential features of the original form.
What is common in these values is that they are highly relative according to the perspectiveof appreciators. When one uses the term exotic, one is standing in the outsider’s perspective tothe culture that one perceives to be exotic. For example, while most Western appreciators arelikely to recognize the kimono motif as ‘exotic,’ someone who grew up in Japan would probably
take it as ordinary. While the Western appreciators might see ‘novelty’ in Japonism oil paintings
that adopted ukiyoe, the insider of Japanese culture might see it as ukiyoe executed wrong or
poorly. The debate of cultural appropriation almost always accompanies the disagreement on
what is ‘morally inappropriate’ and what is not. While sushi made by an Asian chef might feel
authentic to the American consumer, the insider who grew up eating sushi in Japan mightrecognize that the chef is Chinese and untrained, and thus think such sushi is inauthentic.
In other words, these values are dependent on the response of the appreciators, which varies
according to their cultural background. While it is the individual appreciator that judges thesevalues based on their subjective perspective, the judgment is not just a matter of personal
preference; it is conceivable that someone with similar cultural background would make a similar
judgment. As Pierre Bourdieu famously argued that one’s belonging to a social class determines
one’s taste (Bourdieu 1984), the same rationale could be applied here to cultural belonging. It is
not to say that the appreciators with the same cultural background would always have the same
preference or would make the same judgment on every aspect of the artwork. What I mean is thatthey are likely to make a similar judgment at least in terms of the values brought by culturalproperty. They can, in the end, disagree on whether they prefer the artwork or not. The point isthat they probably will agree upon whether the artwork is exotic or not.
If such culturally-relative values constitute artwork's value, one must have a particularOn Appreciating Artworks Involving Cultural Properties

91

cultural background to appreciate the work in full. Eddy M. Zemach (1991), the supporter ofobjectivism of aesthetic judgment and the realism of aesthetic property, presents the concept“standard observation condition (SOC)” (252). He asserts that to make an appropriate aesthetic
judgment, one must meet the certain condition necessary to perceive the aesthetic property. For
example, one must meet the condition such as having normal sight (not having sight defect),having an environment with enough lighting, and paying attention to the object in order toperceive the correct color property that an object has. Similarly, for the perception of the aesthetic
property, the observers must have the appropriate knowledge and skill to appreciate art in addition
to the normal human ability to perceive non-aesthetic property such as color or shape. The
aesthetic judgment often causes disagreement despite being objective, Zemach argues, due to thedifficulty of meeting the required condition. Consequently, Zemach asserts that aesthetic
judgment is objective, as long as one meets the conditions required.
The concept of SOC also applies to the perception of cultural property, but with different
limitations upon the scope of ‘appropriate’ or ideal appreciator. Just as how the scope for the ideal
appreciator of the aesthetic property is more selective than that of the color property, the ideal
appreciator of the cultural property has just another selective scope. If every property could havean ideal scope or group of appreciators, then perceiving any property in full is a matter relative
to the appreciator groups. That is to say, no property is judged objectively across all humankind,even color whose judgment seems to be so commonly agreed. How common the judgment isagreed, then, is just a matter of how selective the groups of appreciators are. This view maintains
objectivism to a certain extent, so long as the scope is limited to the group of ideal
appreciators. On the other hand, it abandons realism of property once admits the relativity ofperception among the different appreciator groups.
As demonstrated above, the concept of SOC reveals the relative objectivist nature of any
perceptible property, despite Zemach employed it to defend the objectivism of aesthetic
property. The supporter of relative objectivism is Alan H. Goldman (1993) who believes
that aesthetic property is a relational property that causes certain evaluation among theappreciator group in which the members share certain sensibility. Goldman points out the
problem with Zemach’s theory that disagreement in judgment could occur even among the ideal
appreciators. Since Zemach asserts that the disagreement in judgment should solve so long as one
meets the necessary condition, the disagreement among the ideal appreciators becomes
irresolvable. Goldman recognizes that there are multiple tastes other than the condition that
contribute to evaluating an artwork. For example, someone who is fully educated and trained toappreciate classical Western music and still not like Mahler, that is the matter of preference at theend. However, the appreciator might agree upon the judgment of the piece's excellence despite
not liking it. Here, the appreciator is reflecting upon the ideal judgment within the appreciatorgroup. In this way, Goldman explains the irresolvable disagreement while also allowing
objectivity across the group to some extent.
Consequently, cultural property yields different values among different appreciator groups.
The cultural property is more likely to bring positive values such as exoticness, novelty, andauthenticity when presented to a group of appreciators who perceives the culture in question as
foreign or minority. On the other hand, cultural property is more likely to produce negative values

92Jean LIN

such as inauthenticity and immorality when presented to a group of viewers familiar with theculture.
1.2 Cultural Property and Aesthetic ValueAs established above, the perception of cultural property and the value it yields are subject
to change relative to the appreciator group. The next question I want to pursue is whether thosevalues—exoticness, novelty, morality, and authenticity—are aesthetic or not. While artwork canhave various artistic values that contribute to the overall evaluation of artwork, aesthetic value isa particular one tied to the experience of appreciation1. From our observation so far, it would bereasonable to say that the values brought by cultural property can affect the evaluation of an
artwork. ‘Exotic’ and ‘novel’ are often used as a positive evaluative term. When perceived as‘morally inappropriate,’ artwork could be evaluated negatively. ‘Authentic’ is a positive
evaluative term, but ‘inauthentic’ is a negative evaluative term. Therefore, the values yielded bycultural property should at least qualify as artistic values.
In the recent discourse considering the scope of aesthetic value, there are divided views overthe inclusion of cognitive and moral values. In the traditional interpretation of aesthetic value,cognitive and moral values have been excluded, for aesthetic is associated with sensation andpleasure, and thus the realm devoid of those values. However, with the emergence of artworks
without aesthetic value in the traditional sense, philosophers were driven to revise the notion ofaesthetics to accompany the contemporary context of art. There are versions of views thatemphasize the significance of intellectual engagement in aesthetic judgment. For example,
Kendall Walton (1970, 337) points out that the “facts about the origins of works of art have an
essential role in criticism, that aesthetic judgments rest on them in an absolutely fundamental
way”. He also mentions that “what aesthetic properties that a thing seems to have may depend on
what categories it is perceived in” (354). According to Walton’s view, when one perceives a workof art in a category, one perceives the ‘gestalt’ of the category; that is, the single quality formedin combination of perceptual quality—how things look or sound—and intellectual realization ofa category.
Walton’s view on aesthetic property can be used to analyze the process in which culturalproperty and its values are perceived. First, cultural property could be classified into perceptual
property and intellectual property. Perceptual cultural property may include motif or style that is
attributed to a certain culture. For example, properties like the kimono motif, or the flat
perspective of ukiyoe employed by Western artists during Japonism, are this type of culturalproperty. Intellectual cultural property may include the artist’s cultural identity, personal history,
and the subject matter attributed to the culture. This kind of property is usually found in the artist
statement or the information about artwork provided by the exhibition site or catalog. In theprocess of appreciation, each type of cultural property functions differently. Assume that an

1
I will employ Robert Stecker’s take on aesthetic value that “the capacity to provide valuable experience tothose who understand a work”, and on artistic value that the “sort of valuable properties that is appropriate to bringforward for consideration when we are evaluating an item as an artwork” (Stecker 2010, 221-222).

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appreciator begins to experience a visual artwork without intellectual properties. In that case, theperceptual properties (not necessarily cultural) themselves could yield some aesthetic response
from the appreciator, such as the pleasurable use of color or form. The perceptual properties turncultural when the appreciator recognizes any motif or style attributable to a particular culture.
When this happens, the cultural property can function as the symbol that denotes a culture,potentially suggesting the artwork's cultural category. It works only when the appreciator
recognizes the motif or style in attribution to a particular culture. If the appreciator does not
associate with a culture, the motif or style will remain as ordinary perceptual property.
At some point during the appreciation, the appreciator may attain the intellectual property.
From there, the cultural property—the cultural identity of the artist or the culture-specific subject
matter of the artwork—will build certain expectations in the appreciator’s mind. When theappreciator goes back to experience the perceptual aspect of artwork again, the perceptual culturalproperties that were invisible before might begin to appear. For example, the motif or symbol thatthe appreciator did not recognize as something cultural before attaining intellectual culturalproperty will now turn into perceptual cultural property. Also, other perceptual properties that are
not necessarily cultural might begin to seem cultural as well. If the appreciator accesses theintellectual property before the perceptual property, the expectation will affect the appreciative
process from the very beginning.
At any point in the appreciative process, the appreciator might perceive the gestalt of culture.
It could be when the motif or style was first recognized in attribution to a culture, or when theartist’s personal history was learned, or when the motif or style was recognized in attribution toa culture with the help of intellectual cultural property. All types of cultural property could
contribute to forming the gestalt of culture to be perceived by the appreciator. When the gestaltof culture is perceived, the appreciator might simultaneously attain the values such as exoticness,novelty, morality, and authenticity.
The question here is that, are these values aesthetic? The above appreciative experience
shows that the perception of cultural property at any level involves cognitive recognition of theculture; after all, ‘culture’ is a concept, not a sensation. If the appreciator has no conception ofculture, the perception of any cultural property will be impossible. Only after the concept ofculture arises in mind can the appreciator interpret the work in connection to the values associatedwith the culture, such as exoticness, novelty, morality, and authenticity. The mode of perception
required here is dependent on cognitive recognition based on the individual appreciator’s cultural
background; it is much more complex than ‘beautiful’ or ‘graceful.’
Based on the above analysis, the values such as exoticness, novelty, morality, and authentic
can be considered the cognitive value included in artistic value. The next question is that, cancognitive value considered as aesthetic value? According to Stecker’s view, aesthetic value is“the capacity to provide valuable experience to those who understand a work” (Stecker 2010,221). In other words, for some values to be aesthetic, they must be involved in providing the‘valuable experience.’ As a result of expanding the scope to accompany conceptual art, what’s
left with ‘aesthetic’ now seems to be its connection to the experience provided by artworks. Peter
Lamarque (2007) asserts that the difference between conceptual art and literary work lies in theformer’s ability to provide an experience that cannot be reduced to a mere statement. Furthermore,94

Jean LINhe suggests that conceptual art can have aesthetic value. While the significance of conceptual art
lies in its concept, its perceptual aspect or ‘vehicular medium’ still got its role. That is, to bringthe concept into existence and provide the experiential aspect of the artwork. According toLamarque, the aesthetic value lies in the consonance of means (vehicular medium) to end(concept). In other words, if the medium chosen by the artist successfully realizes the intended
purpose—be it a political message or be it a philosophical statement—then that can be an
aesthetic value. On a similar line, Elizabeth Shellekens (2007, 84-85) states that “if the idea iswell represented through its vehicular medium, it is the artwork conceived as idea—not themedium—that can be said to have certain aesthetic qualities,” and calls it the “virtue of ‘fitting.’”
This view of ‘means to end consonance’ or ‘virtue of fitting’ can support the argument that
cultural property can yield aesthetic value. Cultural property can yield aesthetic value,
particularly when the artist intends to elicit values such as exoticness, novelty, morality, andauthenticity. For example, say an artist intends to convey political critique made from theminority’s perspective. In that case, having the insider identity of the culture would give
authenticity without being morally inappropriate. Moreover, the artist may choose painting as themedium and employ a cultural motif that can easily prompt the concept of the culture in theappreciator’s mind. This would promote the appreciators to smoothly connect the perceptual
experience with the subject matter. As these would all contribute to hitting the means to end
consonance, it can be said that the artwork has an aesthetic value.

2. Cultural Relationship of Artist and Appreciator
2.1 Cultural Identity of Artist and Appreciator
The previous section indicated how relative objectivism applies to the judgment of values
that cultural property yields. This section applies relative objectivism to analyze how the insider
and outsider status of an artist is determined.
The concept of cultural appropriation signifies that a cultural outsider ought not to accessthe cultural property, or else one could be criticized for being morally inappropriate. While there
are some laws that limit access to cultural properties, many cases of cultural appropriation do not
involve any legal violation. Thus, in most cases it is the appreciators’ judgment, not the law,which restricts access to cultural properties. What is being judged here is the cultural identity of
the artist. In other words, whether the artist is the outsider or insider of the culture in question.
But how is this judgment made? This question is often unclear in the discourse of cultural
appropriation; nevertheless, the distinction of insider and outsider is the very premise of thedebate itself. Erich Hatala Matthes (2016) argues that the concept of outsider and insider
conforms to the view of cultural essentialism, which perceives culture to have a set of essential
qualities. Through categorizing individuals based on cultural stereotypes, cultural essentialism
could contribute to the colonialist practice of marginalizing the minority. Cultural appropriation
conforming to cultural essentialism poses a paradox, for that it criticizes and follows thecolonialist view simultaneously.
By applying relative objectivism, one can distinguish insiders and outsiders without falling
into cultural essentialism. In most cases, the personal history of the artist is a powerful andOn Appreciating Artworks Involving Cultural Properties

95

accessible source of reference. There might be some obvious cases where the artist was born,raised, and has ethnic roots in a culture in question, which will convince most appreciators thatthe artist is undeniably an insider of the culture. However, many individuals have a much more
complex personal history containing multiple cultural components, making it harder to make acrisp decision of insider or outsider. In that case, what becomes crucial is the cultural identity of
the artist relative to that of the appreciator. That is to say, the artist is an insider when theappreciator thinks that the artist has equivalent or higher insiderness compared to the appreciator,
and the artist is an outsider when the appreciator thinks that the artist has equivalent or higher
outsiderness compared to the appreciator2. This theory signifies that the artist’s cultural status isnever absolute but is always subject to change relative to the appreciator’s cultural background.
According to this theory, an artist’s 'qualification' to access cultural property is determinedin relation to the cultural status of the appreciators. At this point, the above theory might seem
subjectivist. I will now combine it with the relative objectivist view. The individuals can be sorted
into groups according to the judgment on the artist's cultural identity. Then it would be plausible
to assume that within such appreciator groups, the judgment of whether the artist is an insider oroutsider of culture will concur. Therefore, objectivity occurs in the group as that judgment
becomes the norm shared within the group. Moreover, if the group forms the majority of thecommunity where the artwork is being presented, then it will be the consensus that the artist is or
is not an insider or an outsider of the culture in question. Thus, if the community judges the artist
to be the outsider of the culture in question, the artist is at risk of being accused of cultural
appropriation. On the other hand, if the community judges the artist to be the insider of the culture
in question, the artist may yield positive value through the cultural property.
2.2 Appreciator’s Expectation and Artist’s Intention
If the appreciators approve the insider status, the artist attains the ‘qualification’ to accessthe cultural property. This qualification allows the artist not only to employ cultural property
without being criticized but also to achieve the aesthetic value through means to end consonancewhen intending to convey a cultural subject matter. Thus, it is advantageous for the artist willing
to be evaluated in attribution to the culture.
As asserted earlier, the cultural property must be present in the community of appreciators
who view the culture in question as foreign or minority to yield the values such as exoticness,novelty, morality, and authenticity. If the artist wishes to present such values without beingcondemned of cultural appropriation, the insider status upon the community is crucial. In otherwords, as long as the artist ‘seems’ insider to the majority of the appreciator, the cultural property
is effective in bringing positive value to the artwork. For example, consider how often the sushi
restaurants in the West are run by Chinese or Korean owners and employees and still succeed ingiving the impression of being authentic. It is plausible to think that this is because the East
Asian appearances allow their seemingly insider status upon the Western consumers. Therefore,
if the artist intends to yield positive value to the artwork through presenting the cultural property,
then the artist must select the context of the exhibition where: 1) the culture in question is foreign
2

I have presented the early version of this theory in my previous article (Lin 2019).

96Jean LIN

or minority, and 2) the artist can attain the seemingly insider status upon the majority ofappreciators in the community.
There are also cases where the appreciators perceive cultural property from artwork without
the artist’s intention. It occurs when an artist has a seemingly insider status upon the community
so that the appreciators expect something cultural in the artwork. In such a case, the artist’s insider
status of the minority culture itself is a cultural property. The effect of this type of culturalproperty is powerful, as it could lead the viewers to see the cultural property within the artwork
even if the artist did not intend to. While this tendency is advantageous for the artists willing to
be valued in association with their cultural background, it could function as a hindrance for theartists who are not. This tendency can be problematic for it leaves the minority artist with limited
value to pursue in the contemporary artworld. The discourse of cultural appropriation may
suggest that the artworld has moved on from the colonialist practice of exploiting the exotic
Others. However, as pointed out by Nav Haq (2015, 15), the marginalization of the minority artist
seems to continue with the motivation replaced by the celebration of cultural diversity andminority rights, causing the “second tier of marginalisation.”
As illustrated, the cultural status of the artist is a cultural property that powerfully poses
expectations upon the appreciator. Once the expectation forms, it will affect all the other property
within the work since the appreciators will look for the cultural property regardless of the artist’s
intention.

3. Category and Evaluation of Artworks Involving Cultural Property
3.1 New Category Argument
The previous sections maintained that when an artist with outsider status employs culturalproperty, there is a risk of being accused of cultural appropriation, yielding negative value to theartwork. However, there are views that defend cultural appropriation to some extent and assertthat there are cases in which cultural appropriation could yield positive value. This section will
introduce such views and points out the problems associated with them.
James Young (2008, 36) introduces the concept of “innovative appropriation,” arguing that
cultural appropriation is not morally inappropriate when the artist has appropriated the property
in the ‘innovative’ way. According to this view, one should evaluate the innovative artwork in a
new category, not the original category from which the property originated. He also asserts thatas long as the outsider does not deceive people by presenting the outsider's creation as an insider's,cultural appropriation does not lead to inauthenticity. Furthermore, such work can possess“personal authenticity,” which emphasizes that any artwork can be authentic, for it is the creationof an artist’s genius (47).
Matthew Strohl (2019) argues on a similar line regarding the authenticity of culinary dishes.
When a culinary dish of culture is brought into a different region or country, the recipes may bealtered according to the new context. Some might call such dish inauthentic. However, Strohlargues that when the dish is brought into the new context, it becomes a different version of theoriginal, belonging to a new category and therefore not inauthentic.
In my previous article, I have called these the new category argument (Lin 2020). Both of

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these views are inadequate in defending against the authenticity problem of cultural
appropriation; they do not define what determines that the artist has appropriated the culturalproperty in the ‘innovative’ way, or who exactly would be the ‘appropriate’ judge of the newcategory’s authenticity. These ambiguities could potentially allow any morally inappropriate
cases to escape the accusation, as one can declare a new category, and everything is solved.
According to these arguments, whoever cannot perceive the work in a new category is making
the categorization error. Here, the problem of determining the correct category kicks in, which isanother inquiry to tackle.
While the theories proposed by Young and Strohl place importance on the freedom allowed
within the creative realm, such as art and cuisine, they tend to overlook the harm of cultural
appropriation. Young particularly, seem to perceive art as the privileged realm where moral
inappropriateness could be neglected to a certain extent. Such a view is apparent when he takes
the painting by Pablo Picasso and the play by William Shakespeare as examples of innovative
appropriation. By pointing out that these works are valued today despite their engagement incultural appropriation, he argues that when the artistic value achieved is so high, it evens thenegative value of moral inappropriateness. The problem of ambiguity is again present; how is it
determined whether the artistic value is high enough to even out the immorality?
As revealed, when the concept of cultural appropriation is brought into the creative realm,
one must confront the dilemma where creativity and morality coincide.
3.2 The Remaining Discomfort
Though I have criticized that Young and Strohl overlook the moral inappropriateness infavor of creativity, I agree that if someone can look at the work in the new category as they assert,
the cultural appropriation could yield positive value—such as novelty. However, the problem isthat not everyone is able to do that. If one cannot perceive the artwork in the new category, it
would just seem as the wrong or poor version of the original category. According to Young, thiskind of appreciator is committing a category error and that they cannot perceive the work’s value
in full. But is it just the problem on the appreciator’s side?
Young asserts that while it is inappropriate if one presents work by an outsider to be by aninsider, for it is considered a fraud, it would not be a problem if one presents honestly that thework is by an outsider. Indeed, the mismatch in labeling and content causes inauthenticity. For
example, I order a pizza at a restaurant, but when I bite into it, I realize that what looked likecheese was, in fact, coated sugar. In this case, I would probably feel disgusted for the unexpectedflavor, and of course, call it inauthentic as a pizza. It is because my expectation of pizza was
betrayed completely. I would probably even feel deceived because the labeling ‘pizza’mismatches the content. However, it could be that what is commonly recognized as ‘pizza’ inthat region is supposed to be coated with sugar instead of cheese. In other words, the judgmentin match or mismatch of labeling and content is also subject to relative objectivism, so that one
group might see it matching while the other might see it mismatching.
Consider how often the supposedly ‘new category’ is present under the name of the original
category. For example, while a cuisine’s ingredients and recipes are often somewhat modified
according to the environment, the name of cuisine stays the same. Assume a Japanese restaurant

98Jean LIN

opens in France, serving Japanese dishes in a different style from how it is in Japan. The owner
would probably not present the restaurant as selling ‘Japanese dishes modified in the Frenchcontext,’ unless the restaurant's concept happens to be the fusion cuisine. Rather, the owner would
probably present the restaurant as serving the “authentic Japanese dishes.” In that case, is theowner scamming the French customers? Since most French customers would probably perceive
authenticity in the dish to the extent owner and chef being Asian, it can be said that the dish isauthentic enough to such particular appreciator group. While on the other hand, it might seem tothe insiders that the owner is deceiving the outsiders with inauthentic contents by using therelative insider status. Here, the problem of multiple versions of contents present under the samelabeling prevails.
The relative insiders who hold specific expectations toward culture are more likely to feel
discomfort from inauthenticity when the artwork involving cultural property does not fulfill their
expectations. Such a negative value yielded by cultural property might turn positive if theappreciator can perceive the artwork in a new category. However, as multiple contents are often
present under the single labeling, multiple authenticities relative to the appreciator group will
always occur.

Conclusions
This paper focused on the values such as exoticness, novelty, morality, and authenticity,which can be yielded by cultural property. Through the above discussion, this paper demonstrated
the following characteristics of these values.
Firstly, these values are significantly dependent on the cultural background of the artist andappreciator. By employing Goldman's view of relative objectivism, it was argued that culturalproperty yields value most effectively in the community where it is considered minority or foreign.
Relative objectivism also applies to the distinction of insider and outsider status of the artist upon
appreciation. It was demonstrated that the artist is an insider when the appreciator thinks the artist
has equivalent or higher insiderness compared to the appreciator, and the artist is an outsider
when the appreciator thinks the artist has equivalent or higher outsiderness compared to theappreciator. This way of distinction avoids cultural essentialism as it signifies that the cultural
status of an artist is subject to change according to the appreciator. It was also revealed that thecultural status of the artist is a cultural property that poses expectations of culture upon
appreciators.
Second, these values are cognitive yet aesthetic. By applying the view of Lamarque andShellekens that suggested the possibility for conceptual art to possess aesthetic value, it wasargued that values yielded by the cultural property, being a cognitive value, could be aesthetic in
virtue of ‘means to end consonance.’
Finally, these values can be problematic when presented to different culturalgroups. Through investigating the 'new category argument' made by Young and Strohl, thedilemma of creativity and morality was revealed. Although it is agreeable to say that the negativevalue such as inauthenticity can turn into positive value such as novelty, the problem of multiple
contents present under the same labeling would always cause the collision of authenticities.

On Appreciating Artworks Involving Cultural Properties

99*This research was conducted under the support of Suntory Foundation Torii Fellowship 2019.
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