Copyright ⓒ 2004
By
Center for Asian Legal Exchange
Graduate School of Law
Nagoya University
All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or copiedin any form or by any means without written permission of the publisher.
Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku, Nagoya, 464-8601, JAPANTOWARD A WELL FUNCTIONING
SECURITIES MARKET IN VIETNAM

Nguyen Thi Anh Van

Nagoya University
CALE Books 1

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam

FOREWORD
This book is a rich product of sincere study executed by Ms. Nguyen Thi Anh Van as a
Ph.D. candidate at Nagoya University.
Vietnamese society is now moving fast toward a market-oriented economy. This
movement is based on a determined policy of Vietnamese people and government. In
order to accomplish that policy all the better, a fully-fledged securities market is needed
urgently. Vietnamese people learned quickly what to do for it, having equipped necessary
legal frame of securities regulation since 1998. But Ms. Van wants to learn much more
about experiences of securities regulations in foreign countries, such as the United States
or Japan. She calmly analyzes problems of Vietnamese securities regulations andsecurities market, having a passionate ideal in mind. Then, she arrives to abundant,
realistic law-reform proposals toward a well functioning securities market in Vietnam.
This book is the first comprehensive and systematic legal academic research about
Vietnamese securities regulation in the whole world. Ms. Van has had to face extremely
difficult tasks---- to digest huge volumes of technical, complex legal texts in the field both
inside and outside Vietnam, to draw out meaningful analysis from the standpoint of whatis needed in Vietnam, and to compose solid and useful proposals for future Vietnamese
law reform---- almost without any preceding academic research in this area. She achieved
this task and completed her dissertation because of her exceedingly clear head and her
devotion of heart and soul for three years from April, 2000 to March, 2003 at Nagoya
University. The faculty of the Graduate School of Law, Nagoya University was happy toconfer upon her the Ph.D. degree for this accomplishment in March, 2003.
Now, the Center for Asian Legal Exchange, Graduate School of Law, Nagoya
University has decided to publish this Ph.D. thesis written by Ms. Nguyen Thi Anh Van
as the first issue in the new CALE Books series.
I believe myself to be very fortunate to have been the academic advisor of such an
intelligent, diligent, and charming Vietnamese young researcher. It was an enjoyable
experience for me to learn through her study about vital changes in the Vietnamese legal
environment. I am very pleased by the Center's decision to publish this Ph.D. thesis as
the inaugural volume of CALE books.
I am sure readers of this book can get clear-cut understanding how Vietnamese people
are endeavoring to achieve a transparent, fair and efficient securities market.

May, 2004
Michiyo Hamada
Professor of Law,
Graduate School of Law, Nagoya UniversityiiToward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to express my deep gratitude to Professor Hamada Michyo for her
research guidance, which enables me to develop the theses of the dissertation, for her timereading its earlier versions, and for her discussions and comments. I am also indebted toProfessor Nakahigashi Masafumi for his comments on the earlier drafts of the paper, andhis classes on Corporate Law where I acquired knowledge of the Japanese and American
law of corporations, which was very much helpful for my research. I am grateful toProfessor Frank Bennett for his guidance, which enabled me to shape the thesis statement
and lay down its basic plan at the time I was attending his class on Law and Its Social
Context, and also for his comments on the earlier drafts of the dissertation. I am thankful
to Professor Morigiwa Yasutomo and Professor Mastuura Yoshiharu for their classes
from which my paper was benefited. I would also like to thank Mr. John Francis Drennan
for his assistance with the linguistic aspects of the paper. All errors and omissions, ofcourse, remain those of mine.
I would like to extend my gratitude to the Japanese Ministry of Education, Science,Sports, and Culture (Monbukagakusho) for their sponsorship of my research, and to Hanoi
Law University (HLU) for giving leave so that I could make a reasonably long stay at
Nagoya University and could entirely devote my time to complete the research. I am also
thankful to Professor Le Hong Hanh (from HLU), who channeled my research interest in
the area of securities regulation as early as the regulation was coming into existence inVietnam.
I am greatly indebted to the Foreign Student Adviser, Ms. Okuda Saori, for theadvice and help I received from her from time to time, so that I could overcome
difficulties during my stay in Japan. I am also grateful to the Law Library Staff for theirkindness and patience in guiding me as to how to make use of reference materials andother library facilities when I fist came to the Graduate School of Law. Above all, I would
like to thank my parents, my husband, daughter, and sisters, without whose continued
love and support this thesis would never have been written.

May, 2004
Nguyen Thi Anh Vaniii

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam

TABLE OF CONTENTSACKNOWLEDGEMENT ………………………………………………………
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS …………………………………………………..
INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………....
CHAPTER I:
THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND THE NEED FOR A SECURITIESMARKET IN VIETNAM ………………………………………………………..
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN VIETNAM……………………………………..
1. The Economic System before the Open Door Policy ………………...
2. The Economic System after the Open Door Policy …………………..
II. THE NEED FOR A SECURITIES MARKET IN VIETNAM….……..…
1. A Securities Market and Long Term Finance for Businesses ………...
2. A Securities Market and the Promotion of the Equitization Process …
3. A Securities Market and the Mobilization of Funds from Domestic
and Foreign Savings …………………………………………………….
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITIES REGULATION IN
VIETNAM……………………………………..…………………………….
1. The Introduction of Securities Regulation .…………………………...
2. An Overall Appraisal of the Corner Stone of the Securities Regulation:
Decree 48/1998 ………………………………………………………….
CHAPTER II:
WHETHER THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS PROMOTE GOOD
INFORMATION FLOW …..................................................................................
I. PUBLIC OFFERING AND LISTING PROCESS UNDER THE
CURRENT SECURITIES REGULATION …………… …………………..
1. Public Offering ……………………………………………………….
2. Listing Process ……………………………………………………….
II. WHETHER THE CURRENT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
ENSURE THE AVAILABILITY, TIMELINESS, AND ADEQUACY OF
INFORMATION …………………………………….………………………
1. Information Disclosure Requirements under the Existing Regulation ..
a. Disclosure by Issuing Companies ………………………………..
a.1. Public Offering Disclosure ………………………………
a.2. Periodic Disclosure ………………………………………
a.3. Timely Disclosure ……………………………………..….

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam

a.4. Disclosure at the Request of Either the SSC or a Securities
Trading Center ……………………………………………..…
b. Trading Information Disclosure Requirements with Respect toSecurities Trading Centers ……………………………………….…
c. Information Disclosure in Tender Offers ………………………....
2. Whether the Accounting and Auditing Regulation Well Supports theInformation Disclosure Regime ……………………………………..…..
3. How Has the Existing Disclosure Regulation Worked? ……….……..
a. Whether or not the Existing Information Disclosure Requirements
have been adequately enforced ………………………………...……
b. What are the Attitudes of the ‘Trading-Floor-Ready Companies’
Towards the Current Information Disclosure Regime? …….……….
4. How Does the SSC React? ……………………………………………
III. WHETHER THE SCOPE OF THE INFORMATION DISCLOSUREREGIME IS ADEQUATELY ADOPTED…………………………………..
1. The Narrow Scope of the Current Information Disclosure Regime ..…
2. What Might be the Consequences of the Narrow-Scope-Disclosure
Regime? ……………………………………………………………….…
IV. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO ACHIEVE BETTER OUTCOMESFROM THE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE REGULATION? …………..
1. A Call for Improvement of the Disclosure Requirements applying tothose Who Make a Public Offering and to Listed Companies ………..…
2. The Need for Disclosure Requirements Applying to Companies Whose
Securities Offerings do not Fall Into the Purview of the “Public
Offering”, and to Non-listed Companies …………………………….….
3. The Need to adopt Comparable Accounting Rules and Independent
Auditing ……………………………………………………………….…
4. Possible Answers to the Practical Problems ………………………….
CHAPTER III:
WHETHER THE ANTI-FRAUD REGULATION CAN FOSTER AHEALTHY MARKET ……..……………………………………………………
I. THE CURRENT ANTI-FRAUD REGULATION AND THE
PREVENTION OF MANIPULATIVE AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES…
1. Insider Trading Regulation and the Prevention of Short-swing
Trading ……………………………………………………………..……
2. Market Manipulation Regulation and Stabilization Transactions……..
3. Misinformation Regulation and the Prohibition of Omission ofInformation ………………………………………………………..…….
II. THE EXISTING ANTI-FRAUD REGULATION AND THE
PROMOTION OF A LIQUID AND HEALTHY MARKET ……….……...
1. Should Short Sales be Totally Prohibited? …………………….…......
2. Should Extension of Credit and Lending Securities (Margin Trading)v

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam

be Entirely Banned? …………………………………………….……….
III. THE LACK OF LEGAL BASES FOR INVESTORS’ RIGHTS OF
ACTION AND FOR MEANINGFULLY DETERRENT SANCTIONAGAINST VIOLATIONS ……………..……………………………..……..
1. No Concrete Legal Bases for Rights of Action against Wrongful
Conduct …..……………………………………………………...………
2. Only Administrative Sanctions against Violations ……………………
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE ANTI-FRAUD REGULATION …........……..
1. Strengthening the Antifraud Regulation and Enhancing the
Enforcement Mechanism ……………………………………….……….
a. Short-swing Trading should be Put under Control …….……….
b. Stabilizing Activities should be Legalized ………………………
c. Omissions of Material Information should be Prohibited ……...
d. Concrete Rights of Action and Meaningfully Deterrent Sanctions
for Violations should have Legal Bases in the Securities Regulation……………...……..
2. Providing the Market with more Supporting Instruments ……………
a. Short sale should not be totally prohibited ……………………
b. Margin Trading should be allowed within a certain threshold ...
3. Eliminating Technical Deficiencies ………………………………….
a. Creating Definitions on a Number of Significant Terms …….…
b. Eliminating Inconsistencies in Different Legal Texts …..………
CHAPTER IV:
WHETHER SECURITIES PROFESSIONALS ARE ADEQUATELYREGULATED ……………………………………………………………………
I. REGULATION OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE SAFETY
OF PUBIC INVESTORS ………………………...…………..………...……
1. Securities Firms in General ……………………………..………..…..
2. Brokerage and Dealing Activities can be combined into One Securities
Firm in the Absence of Necessary Regulation of Conflicts of Interest ....
II. REGULATION OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF BANKS IN THE
SECURITIES MARKET ………………………………………………..…..
1. The Involvement of Banks in Securities Markets: Overseas
Experience - Lessons for Vietnam …………………………………..…..
a. The US Experience ………………………………………..…….
b. The European Experience ………………………………….…...
c. The Japan Experience …………………………………….…….
2. Whether an Entire Prohibition of Direct Involvement of Banks into theVietnamese Securities Market will Result in Good Outcomes ……..…..
III. FUTURE REGULATION OF SECURITIES PROFESSIONALS ……..
1. The Need for Concrete Provisions Regulating Conflicts of Interestvi

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam

between Securities Firms and Their Customers ………………………....
2. No Need for Indirect Involvement of Banks in a Number of Securities
Business Activities ………………………………………….. ………….
3. The Need for More Concrete Provisions Regulating Banks andSecurities Subsidiaries …………………………………………………..
CHAPTER V:
WHETHER THE EXCHANGE MARKETS ARE WELL ORGANIZED ….
I. STOCK EXCHANGES AND THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY: PASTAND PRESENT …………..…………………………………………………
1. Mutual Form of Stock Exchange ……………………………………..
2. Corporate Form of Stock Exchange ………………………………….
3. Reasons for Demutualization …………………………………………
4. Matters of Concern about the Consequences of Demutualization ……
II. THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE VIETNAMESE EXCHANGE
MARKETS IN RELATION TO AN EFFECTIVE MARKET .….…………
1. Securities Trading Centers as Non-profit Organizations that Belong to
the SSC …………………………………………………………………..
2. The Uncertain Legal Structure of the Planned Stock Exchanges ……..
III. A DESIRABLE MODEL FOR FUTURE EXCHANGE
MARKETS……….…………………………………………………………..
CHAPTER VI:
WHETHER THE MARKET REGULATORY SYSTEM CAN ENSURE
THAT THE SECURITIES REGULATION WILL BE WELL ENFORCED...
I. SECURITIES REGULATORY SYSTEMS: A THEORETICALANALYSIS ………………………………………………………………….
1. Securities regulatory system in general ……………………………….
2. Public regulation ………………………………………………………
3. Self-regulatory system ………………………………………………..
II. EMPLOYING AN APPROPRIATE REGULATORY SYSTEM: THE
EXPERIENCE OF THE US AND JAPAN ………………..…………..……
1. The US Securities Regulatory System …………………………….….
2. The Japan’s Securities Regulatory System: Past and Present …………
III. THE CURRENT VIETNAMESE REGULATORY SYSTEM: A
DEPENDENT PUBLIC REGULATOR ACTING IN THE ABSENCE OF
AN IMPORTANT SELF-REGULATORY SYSTEM ……………….…….
1. The Absence of an Important Self-regulatory System ………..………
2. The SSC: Lack of Independence, and Being Inadequately empowereda. The SSC Structure and Personnel ………………………………..
b. The SSC Powers ………………………………………………….

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam

b.1. Rules-making Powers ……………………………………..
b.2. Administrative Powers …………………………………….
IV. THE FUTURE REGULATORY SYSTEM OVER THE VIETNAMESE
SECURITIES MARKET ………….…………………………………...…….
1. A Single Public Regulator or a Self-regulatory System or a
Combination of the Two: Which Model should be Chosen for the Future
Regulatory System? ……………………………………………………..
2. What Should Constitute a Self-Regulatory System over the Vietnam
Securities Market? ………………………………………………………
a. Stock Exchanges as Self-Regulatory Organizations …………...…
b. Other Self-Regulatory Organizations Necessary for a Healthy
Market ……………………………………………………….…….
3. An ideal SSC ………………………………………………………….
a. What Form of SSC is best for Vietnam? ………………………....
b. The SSC Roles in Enforcing Securities Law ……………………...
CHAPTER VII:SUGGESTIONS FOR A BETTER OPERATIONAL SECURITIESMARKET IN VIETNAM ……………………………………………………….
I. FEASIBLE SCHEDULE FOR LAW REFORM ..………..………………
II. ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A FUTURE
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE REGIME..................................................
1. Future Disclosure Requirements Applying to those Who Make a
Public Offering and to Listed Companies …………………………….…
2. New Information Disclosure Regime Governing Those Whose
Securities Offerings do not fall into the Purview of the “Public Offering”
and Non-listed Companies ………………………………………………
3. The Need for Comparable Accounting Standards and Adequate
Auditing Regulation ………………………………..…………………....
4. Answers to the Practical Problems of Non-Compliance with theCurrent Disclosure Regime ………………………..…………………….
III. STRENGTHENING THE ANTI-FRAUD REGULATION…....………
1. Future Antifraud Regulation and Enforcement Mechanism …………
a. New Regulation of Short-swing Trading …………………………
b. New Legal Basis for Stabilizing Activities ……………………….
c. Prohibition of Omissions of Material Information ………………
d. New Legal Bases for Rights of Action and for Sanctions against
Violations ……………………………………………………………
2. New Supporting Instruments for a Future Market ……………………
a. Margin Trading should be allowed within a Certain Threshold …
b. Short Sale should not be totally prohibited ……………………….
3. Eliminating Technical Deficiencies ………………..…………………

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam

IV. COMPLETING FUTURE REGULATION OF SECURITIESPROFESSIONALS ……………………………………………………….…
1. Conflicts of Interest Issues ……………………………………………
2. Banks and the Securities Market …………………………………….
3. Banks and their Securities Subsidiaries …………..…………………..
V. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM …………………………………..………..
1. A Desirable Model for Future Exchange Markets ……………………
2. An Ideal SSC ………………………………………………………...
a. The Form of a Future SSC …………………………………..……
b. The SSC’s Powers in the Future …………………………………
3. The Need for a Self-regulatory System ………………………………
APPENDIX:CREATING A FAVORABLE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT SURROUNDING
SECURITIES REGULATION FOR THE FUTURE SECURITIESMARKET …………………………………………………………………………
I. RELEVANT LAWS CONCERNING THE OPERATION OF THE
SECURITIES MARKET IN VIETNAM ……………………………………
1.
The Constitution ……………………………………………...……
2.
The Enterprise Law ……………………………………………….
3.
The State Enterprise Law ………………………………………….
4.
Banking Law ………………………………………………………
5.
Foreign Investment Law …………………………………………..
6.
Tax Law ……………………………………………………….….
7.
Civil Law ………………………………………………………….
8.
Criminal Law ………………………………………………………
II. THE NEED FOR A SYNCHRONOUS IMPROVEMENT OF THE
ABOVE-MENTIONED LAWS ……………..………………………………
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...………………………………………………………………

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS-

ATSs: Automated Trading Systems
CEO: Chief Executive Officer
CFO: Chief Financial Officer
CEPD: Council for Economic Planning and Development (Taiwan)
CSRC: China Securities Regulatory Commission
ECNs: Electronic Communication Networks
EU: European Union
HCMC: Ho Chi Minh City
IASC: International Accounting Standards Committee
IOSCO: International Organization of Securities Commissions
LSE: London Stock Exchange
NASD: National Association of Securities Dealers
NASDAQ: National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
NYSE: New York Stock Exchange
OTC: Over the Counter
PSE: Philippines Stock Exchange
SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission (United States)
SESC: Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (Japan)
SIB: Securities and Investment Board (United Kingdom)SOEs: State Owned Enterprises
SROs: Self-regulatory Organizations
SSC: State Securities Commission (Vietnam)x

T ow ard a We ll Func tioning Sec uri tie s Mar ket i n V ietnam: I ntr oduction

TOWARD A WELL FUNCTIONING
SECURITIES MARKET IN VIETNAM

INTRODUCTION
In the year 2000, Vietnam witnessed a remarkable event - the birth of the first
securities trading center in Ho Chi Minh City.
In fact, the very first legal basis for the issuance of securities was created as early as
1990 by the passage of two legal texts, namely the Company Act and the Ordinance on
Banks, Credit Cooperatives and Financial Companies. These laid the legal foundation for
the establishment of shareholding companies and shareholding banks. In the following
years, the government has continuously passed other legal rules, in the form of decisions
and decrees that permit the issuance of shares and bonds by various legal entities. The
texts implied an intention by the Vietnamese Government to erect a securities market forthe country in face of the absence of a minimum legal framework for the operation ofsuch a market at that time.
Such an intention was explicitly revealed in 1995 when the Preparatory Commission
for the Establishment of a Securities Market was formed.1 One year later, in 1996, thefirst market watchdog - the State Securities Commission (SSC) - was founded, with amandate to establish and foster a securities market in Vietnam.2 From the outset, the SSC
was active in creating a legal framework for the birth of the stock trading centers - aninitial step in promoting the formation of formal stock exchanges in the future.
Immediately after the government had passed its Decree 48/19983 - the core legal rules
for the operation of a securities market - the SSC issued Decision 127/19984 to enable theerection of securities trading centers and planned stock exchanges. Since the passage ofthese governmental level documents, various rules have been promulgated to give further
guidance in connection with them. All of these make up the current securities regulationof Vietnam.
Although during the 1990s, a minimum legal basis for the formation and operation of
the market had been available, a formal trading center could not be formed. The reasonsfor that lay in the shortage of commodities for the markets5 and in the Asian financial
crisis.6 Thus, until the date the first trading center saw the light of day in July 2000, it had

1

See Decree 361-TTg dated June 20, 1995.
See Decree 75-CP dated November 28, 1996.
3
The full name of this legal text is Decree 48-1998/ND-CP, issued on July 11, 1998.
4
The full name of this legal text is Decision 127-1998/QD-TT, passed on July 11, 1998.
5
See “Vietnam’s First Securities Centre Expected to Open in 1999” (Nov. 11, 1998) ASIA PULSE,<LexisNexis: Non-US News>; see also “Vietnam to Delay Opening Hanoi, HCM City Stock Exchanges” (Nov.
25, 1999). ASIA PULSE <LexisNexis: News Group File, All>.
6
See “Vietnam Stock Exchange Opening Delayed another Week”, (Jul. 3, 2000) Deutsche Presse-Agentur<LexisNexis: News Group File, All>; see also "Vietnam Legal Update", Part 4: Equitization Issues,
http://www.phillipsfox.co.nz/publications, visited Oct. 5, 2000.
2

1

T ow ard a We ll Func tioning Sec uri tie s Mar ket i n V ietnam: I ntr oduction

taken almost ten years since the adoption of the first legal bases for the issuance of sharesin Vietnam.
To date, although the first securities trading center has only been operating for ashort period, rules regulating various aspects of the markets have already been revised
several times. A number of issues that need to be taken into consideration can still befound in the current securities regulation. Such issues lie in the information disclosure
requirements, in the anti-fraud regulation, in the regulation of securities professionals andin the market structure, as well as in the management apparatus of the markets. Analyzingthese problems and proposing possible solutions are the goals of this paper. To achieve
such goals, the paper will be divided into seven chapters.
Chapter 1 includes an introductory discussion on the historical development of theeconomic system in Vietnam before and after the 1986 Open Door Policy in order toargue that a fully-fledged securities market is indispensable to economic development in
Vietnam. First, that is because the increasing number of newly established enterprises in
the last few years, and even the banking system, all demand a fully-fledged securities
market as a means to enable them to be well financed. Secondly, a formal securities
market is also required to provide market liquidity for shares, which in turn will speed up
the equitization process. Thirdly, such a market will allow Vietnam to mobilize funds
from both domestic and foreign savings.
Finally the chapter proceeds to an overall appraisal of the current securities
regulations and draws out major problems that need to be dealt with to achieve a welloperational market.
Chapter 2 to Chapter 6 have been designed to deal with a number of areas insecurities regulations, where both existing and potential problems can be found. Problems
that stem from the regulation, and also those that stem from the practical implementationof such regulation, will be carefully analyzed and evaluated in order to find out better
forms of regulation for the newly emerging securities market in Vietnam.
Since information disclosure requirements and anti-fraud provisions are the mostsignificant components of securities regulations, these will receive first and second
priority amongst the problems needing to be dealt with in detail. Thus Chapter 2 argues
that the current information disclosure regulation cannot guarantee that public investors
will be adequately informed. The reasons are twofold. One is that the disclosure regime
fails in ensuring the availability, timeliness, and adequacy of information. The other isthat the regulation leaves a huge number of companies unregulated: companies whose
securities offerings do not fall within the purview of the “public offering”, and non-listedcompanies. These shortcomings have led to the fact that a large pool of public investors
has faced the danger of being uninformed.
Chapter 3 argues that the existing anti-fraud regulation cannot foster a fair andhealthy market. That is because it cannot avert manipulative and deceptive practices while
it deprives the market of instruments that support it well. It also fails to lay down concrete
legal foundations for rights of action which would equip company shareholders withnecessary measures to protect their own interests and those of their companies.

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T ow ard a We ll Func tioning Sec uri tie s Mar ket i n V ietnam: I ntr oduction

Furthermore, the sanctions against violations adopted by the regulation are not drastic
enough to ensure that the regulation will be well enforced.
Regulation of securities professionals and the legal structure of the exchange market
can be seen as the third and fourth most important amongst the said issues and will be
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 studies the current regulation of securities
professionals. It argues that the deficiencies in the regulation of conflicts of interest
between securities firms and their customers will put public investors at risk, and that astrict segregation between banking and securities business is not always wise and right.
Chapter 5 examines the legal form of the Vietnamese exchange market in relation to
those in other countries and their recent movements. It points out that the ownership
structure of the current securities trading centers and the planned stock exchanges might
not be appropriate in ensuring an effective market.
The management apparatus over the securities market will be discussed in Chapter
6. This chapter argues that Vietnam lacks an adequate regulatory system to enforce
securities law; that in the absence of a self-regulatory system, a single and dependent
public regulator cannot ensure that securities regulations will be well enforced.
Finally, Chapter 7 will sum up all the suggestions proposed in earlier chapters for
improving the existing securities regulation.
While discussing these issues, a comparative approach will be employed from time
to time, in order to find out acceptable solutions for Vietnam. As such, the paper will bepresented as a comparative study between the above-mentioned legal issues in Vietnam
and those in other jurisdictions such as the United State (US) and Japan. The ways suchproblems have been dealt with in these countries will be discussed. A question whichmight arise is that both these countries are much more advanced compared with Vietnam
in terms of socio-economic circumstances, and possibly their legal cultures also differ
from that of Vietnam, so why should they be chosen for comparison? Justification of thischoice can be made, however, on at least the following two grounds.
First, it is well documented that today there has been a tendency towards aconvergence of securities laws in various countries.7 It seems hard for Vietnam to keep

7

See Mark Gillen and Pittman Potter, “The Convergence of Securities Laws and Implications for Developing
Securities Markets” (1998) 24 North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation 83, 95 –109.
In this Article, the authors collect documentary and evidence that there have been a number of similarities
between the securities laws of different countries; that a country's securities law often borrows statutory
provisions from securities laws of other countries; and that the sources for borrowing seem to be very limited.
In justifying such similarities and borrowings, the authors give a number of reasons: (1) the laws employ
similar solutions since there are no more practical solutions than these; (2) wherever securities markets operate,
similar interest groups that stem from the markets can result in political pressures that lead to similar laws; (3)competitive pressures to attract investment capital can also result in similarities in the laws; (4) pressures fromthe US regulators with respect to other countries where the US might seek to impose US style securities laws;(5) the geographical proximity of countries, the indifference in language, or close business or educational
contacts; (6) and simple coincidences. The authors also maintain that the convergence of securities laws fromdifferent jurisdictions is an inevitable tendency, especially in the increasingly globalizing trend of securities
markets around the world.

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T ow ard a We ll Func tioning Sec uri tie s Mar ket i n V ietnam: I ntr oduction

away from such a tendency. That is because the Vietnamese securities market will be
isolated from and incompatible with other markets that are ready or approaching readinessfor an increasingly globalizing trend if its law and regulation are not standardized andharmonized with the global tendency. This would also mean that the Vietnamese
securities market will not be able to compete with other foreign markets in attracting
financial resources for economic development in the country. Learning the way todevelop a tailored set of laws regulating the securities industry from other countries willthus save time and energy for Vietnam in its law-making process.
Secondly, the two countries, US and Japan, have the most vibrant securities
markets in the world.8 These markets should be models for other countries, especially for
those in the process of establishing and promoting a securities market. Here again anotherissue that might arise is that both the American and the Japanese stock markets are so big
compared with that of Vietnam that it might not be appropriate to import regulatory
experience from those two countries. However, one might also argue that securities
markets, regardless of their size and location, often trigger similar interest groups, whichmight result in similar problems that need to be dealt with by law and regulation. For
example, obviously investors in all big and small markets are all in desperate need ofstatutory protection from market abuses and fraud. That is because of the fact that, owing
to their own interests: (1) issuing companies and listed companies tend to conceal
material information that might be harmful to their reputation, which in turn might
adversely affect their securities’ prices; and (2) corporate insiders and securities firms
tend to use their position of advantage in accessing inside information and in having
better knowledge of the area, to enter securities transactions to the detriment of outsiders(in the case of insiders) and customers (in the case of securities firms). For these reasons,securities laws in most of countries often contain information disclosure requirements,
antifraud provisions, and provisions for regulating conflicts of interest between securities
firms and their customers.
Although the American and Japanese law reform experience will be frequently
invoked in this paper, that is not its only source. Where it appears relevant to securities
law reform in Vietnam, some other jurisdictions such as United Kingdom, Germany,
Sweden, and Australia will also be visited. The aim of the comparative study is tocontribute to the completion of the legal framework governing the securities market,
which in turn can foster a well operational market for Vietnam in the future. Given that
aim, more advanced jurisdictions seem to be a better choice for comparison than thosethat are at the same level as Vietnam. To speed up the improvement of the future market,

See also Marc I. Steinberg, International Securities Law: A Contemporary and Comparative Analysis, (1sted. 1999) 2-3. The author argues that in an expanding global marketplace, standardization of regulatory
requirements among countries would strengthen investors protection; that creating greater harmony in a truly
global marketplace is required.
8
See Michael J. Scown, “Asia's Emerging Equities Markets” (1990), East Asian Executive Report 8, 8. In thisarticle, it is reported that: “... before the 1990 market crash, the Japanese stock market was the largest in theworld, with 40 percent of world capitalization, compared with 32 percent for the United State.”4

T ow ard a We ll Func tioning Sec uri tie s Mar ket i n V ietnam: I ntr oduction

it may well be that nothing is more useful than learning from the experiences of those
who have already succeeded in this area.

5

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter I

CHAPTER I
THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND THE NEED FOR
A SECURITIES MARKET IN VIETNAM

I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN VIETNAM
1. The Economic System before the Open Door Policy
Prior to 1975, Vietnam had undergone different foreign occupations and wartime
destruction. Since 1955 the country had been separated into two parts:9 the North and theSouth ruled by two opposite governments (Communist Party Government and American
Colonial Rule, respectively). Since 1975, although the Country has been reunified, its
post-war legacy was little more than the condition of an underdeveloped economy, as
observed by economists:
For many years, our economy has landed in a serious crisis, a
rapidly increasing inflation, a weak infra-structure, a big imbalancein economic structure and various difficulties facing the populationin daily life.10
Until 1986 the Vietnam economic system was a centrally-planned one. Production
and consumption were subject to detailed plans approved by the government. They were
not responsive to market demand. Market participants in the economy included two main
components: cooperatives and state enterprises (doanh nghiep nha nuoc).
The former were the second most important component in the socialist economy
after the latter. They consisted of small-scale saving and credit cooperatives, supply andmarketing cooperatives, minor handicraft cooperatives and agricultural cooperatives.
The system of saving-and-credit cooperatives had been in operation since 1945 as avehicle for collecting savings to support agricultural production. They mainly involved
farmers, householders and small cooperatives, and were a means of supporting the
population during the revolution of the Vietnamese people.11 These cooperatives were9

See “Lich su Viet nam” [Vietnam History], http://www.nhandan.org.vn/vietnamese/lichsuvietnam, visitedMar. 21, 2001.
10
See Nguyen Van Luan, Tran Quoc Tuan and Ngo Minh Chau, Thi Truong Chung Khoan o Viet nam[Securities Market in Vietnam] (1995) 121. Hereinafter, Nguyen Van Luan (et al.). (All translations ofVietnamese texts quoted from books, articles, bulletin, and legal documents in this paper, unless otherwise
noted, are of the author).
11
Since 1951, when the National Bank of Vietnam (now the State Bank of Vietnam) was established, thesystem of saving and credit cooperatives has been put under its control. For further information, see Tran
Duong, Ba Muoi Nam: Tien te – Tin dung – Ngan hang 1951 – 1981 [30 Years-Money-Credit-Banking in
Vietnam 1951 – 1981] (1981).

6

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter I

said to be rather strong during the colonial period and their success continued until theearly eighties.12
The system of supply and marketing cooperatives was first set up in 1955 under theform of a collective trading enterprise in which farmers invested in shares involving theirproducts. By 1962, this form of cooperatives had become widespread throughout theNorth of Vietnam. They were used to buy and sell agricultural products from the farmers
and they also supplied farmers with products bought from state-trading organizations. At
the present time, the number of successful supply and marketing cooperatives is quite
small, since most of them have been liquidated or sold to private entrepreneurs.13
Minor handicraft cooperatives have been used as a component of government-guided
strategies for industrial development since the first five-year plan (1961 - 1965). This kindof cooperative has the same organizational structure as supply and marketing
cooperatives.14
By the time land reform was introduced, agricultural cooperatives had come into
existence with government support. In practice, these were producers' cooperatives
established in the place of individual farming.15
Later, some other types of cooperatives could be found, such as those engaged intransportation and construction work. It was reported that before the Open Door Policy
was initiated, Vietnam had more than 30,000 industrial and handicraft cooperatives,
10,000 trading, 200 transportation and 500 construction cooperatives.16
The most important market participant (state enterprises), consisted of enterprises
established by the government, and was expected to play a leading role in the economy.
Their capital was fully funded by the government from the state budget on a non-refundbasis. If any extra capital was needed during their lifetime, they could get loans fromstate-owned banks. Even with the loans from banks, the enterprises did not have todischarge their debts if they incurred a loss. In addition, they could enjoy many
preferential treatments in doing business: they enjoyed a more advantageous tax system17
12

For more information, see Kirsch, Ottfried C.: “Vietnam: Agricultural Cooperatives in Transitional
Economies”, Discussion Paper 59,
http://www.rzuser.uni-heidelberg.de/~t08/DISKUS59.html, visited Mar. 10, 2001.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
For more information, see “Unable to Make the Big Leap, Cooperatives Face Extinction”, Vietnam
Investment Review (Hanoi) (January 1, 1995),
http://www.hartford-jwp.com/archives/54/111.html, visited Mar. 10. 2001.
17
Prior to 1990, the state-owned sector and other economic sectors were subject to two different collection
regimes. First is a turnover and profit collection regime (the term “tax” was not used for the state-owned
sector), applied to state enterprises. For example, the “Profits Distribution and Funds Formation Regime
applying to State Industrial Enterprises” [Che Do Phan phoi Loi Nhuan trong Cac Xi nghiep Cong nghiep Quoc
doanh] promulgated under Circular 11.TC/CNA dated July 22, 1986; the “State Enterprises’ TurnoverCollection Regime” [Che Do Thu Quoc Doanh] promulgated under Decision 188/CT dated Jun. 21, 1988.
Second is a tax system that consisted of turnover tax, profit tax, agriculture tax, and commodities tax, imposedon non-state sectors. For example, the “Regulation of Industrial-Commercial Tax” was applied to cooperatives
and households that engage in commercial and industrial business activities” [Dieu Le Thue Cong Thuong
Nghiep] promulgated under Resolution No. 200.NQ/TVQH, dated Jan. 18, 1966. This Regulation was

7Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter I

compared to other business entities in other economic sectors; they had the right to accessscarce resources; to have a priority position in export and import activities; to havemonopoly power in a number of industries such as telecommunications, railways,
transportation, banking and insurance. Furthermore, production and consumption wereconducted according to plans designed by the government. The enterprises did not evenhave to think of the quality of goods they should produce in order to make their own
markets. The government gave them consumers' addresses and they simply sold theirproducts to those customers at a price already decided by the government.18 Even if theenterprises did not complete the above-mentioned plan, directors did not incur any
liability. In such circumstances, there were no incentives for state enterprises to conduct
their business effectively. Consequently, loss-making enterprises were inevitable. By
1997, there were 5,800 state enterprises; but only 37% of these were said to be profitable.
The unprofitable enterprises had debts about double their capital.19
Although state enterprises were expected to play a leading role in promoting
economic growth, the management mechanism in a centrally planned economy did not
generate expected outcomes.
The same can be said about financial markets, whose principal component was themonetary market. The other minor part of financial markets was the national construction
bonds market. The bonds market consisted of issuing markets, which operated only when
the government wished to raise more funds to meet budget deficits.
In monetary markets, market participants consisted of the National Bank of Vietnam(now the State Bank of Vietnam),20 state-owned banks, credit cooperatives and socialistsaving funds (Quy tiet kiem xa hoi chu nghia).21The state-owned banks were specializedbanks operating in different areas (indicated by bank's name). For example, at this stage,
there were two types of banks, namely the Construction Bank established in 195722 andthe Foreign Trade Bank set up in 1963.23
In the centrally planned economy, the role of the banking system was to fulfill thecapital allocation requirements of the economy. As such, there was no separation between
the state management functions of the State Bank (the Central Bank) and the trading

continuously revised throughout 1966-1989; and “Ordinance on Agricultural Tax of 1983” [Phap lenh thue
nong nghiep].
18
See: Nguyen Ngoc Vu, “Chinh sach tai tro doanh nghiep duoi tac dong cua thue va chi phi pha san” [Policy
on Enterprise Subsidy under the Impact of Taxes and Bankrupt Expenses] (2000) 8, Tap Chi Ngan Hang
[Banking Review] 52, 52. In this article, the author also mentions the production and consumption of the state
enterprises in the centrally planned economy.
19
See David O. Dapice (Harvard Institute for International Development), “Vietnam's Economy: Responses to
the Asian Crisis”, http://ase.tufts.edu/wts/writingfellows-econ, visited Dec. 24, 2000.
20
In 1951, the National Bank of Vietnam was established under Decree No. 15/SL (signed by President Ho Chi
Minh) dated May 6, 1951. In 1961 it was renamed the State Bank of Vietnam under Decree No. 171/CP dated
October 26, 1961.
21
The system of Socialist Saving Funds was set up as part of the State Bank of Vietnam to collect savings fromindividuals.
22
Bank for Construction was formed under Decree 177/TTg dated April 26, 1957.
23
Bank for Foreign Trade was set up under Decree 155/CP dated Dec. 30, 1962.

8

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter I

functions of the specialized banks.24 Because of this feature of the banking system, it has
been referred to as the one-tier banking system in Vietnam. In this system, the State Bank
worked as a commercial bank and a central bank at the same time. It had branches andsub-branches located throughout the country, from municipal and provincial to districtlevels. The main tasks of such branches and sub-branches were to prepare and implement
credit and cash plans at the direction of the government.25 The specialized banks wereactually mere branches of the State Bank and their operation was subject to direction fromthe latter. 26 Such direction designed detailed activities for the banks, including thespecification of banks’ borrowers and the determination of ceiling and floor interest rates.
Banks could only provide loans for customers appointed by the government at an interest
rate falling within limits also announced by the government. Financial transactions mainly
occurred between those banks and other entities, namely state enterprises andcooperatives. Individuals were not allowed to open business accounts at banks, although
they could borrow money from credit cooperatives to develop their household economy
with a limited amount depending on each individual purpose. Deposit and lending rates
varied depending on the purpose of borrowing or the legal form of the borrowers.27 The
lowest rates were often given to state enterprises. Banks' roles and functions, at this stage,
were clearly designed to implement the government's economic policies, neither for
making profits nor for actually enabling financial flow.
2. The Economic System after the Open Door Policy
In 1986, the Open Door Policy, or “Doi moi”,28 was introduced in Vietnam, after
the Sixth Communist Party Congress. The reform focused on a number of socio-economic
policies. The most notable ones were: (1) ownership should be diversified to encourage
non-state ownership and allow the non-state sector to establish businesses. Joint ventures
between the state, cooperative and private sectors should also be permitted; (2) state
24

See “Business Environment - Banking and Finance”
http://www.vnn.vn/investment/business/busi_envi/bank_fina.html, visited Dec. 25, 2000.
25
See Decree 94 /TTg dated May 27, 1951. This Decree was replaced by Decree 171/CP dated October 26,
1961 (hereinafter, Decree 171/CP). Under these two Decrees, the State Bank of Vietnam was responsible forthe issuance and management of money and capital mobilizing-lending business.
Decree 163/CP dated June 16, 1977 (hereinafter, Decree 163/CP) although deprived of the State Bank ofVietnam’s mobilizing-lending function, certified that the State Bank of Vietnam was a legal entity and an
economic organization.
26
See Decree 171/CP and Decree 163/CP.
After the passage of Decree 65/HDBT on May 28, 1986, legal personality of specialized banks wasrecognized for the first time; this Decree made a first step in separating the state administrative function of theState Bank and the trading function of specialized banks. This new direction was later again adopted in Decree
53/HDBT dated March 26, 1988, which gave the first legal foundation for the establishment of a two-tierbanking system (see below, Section I.2 of this chapter).
27
For example, to promote agricultural production, lower-interest-rate loans were often given to enterprises
operating in this area - lower compared with those given to enterprises working in other areas; state enterprises
could get loans with lower interest rates compared with those applied to cooperatives.
28
This term means “New Deal”.

9Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter I

enterprises should operate according to the so-called ‘socialist accounting principles’29;(3) foreign investments should be encouraged. Favorable policies and incentives should
be applied to Vietnamese living abroad and to foreigners, in order to attract theirinvestment and business cooperation into the country; (4) prices should be liberalized.
Under this new price policy, the economic system should be switched fromadministratively determined prices to market determined prices; (5) the financial systemshould be fundamentally reformed: central banking functions should be separated fromthose of the specialized banks; (6) official exchange rates should be adjusted from time totime so that they would closely reflect genuine rates.30
Such renovation aimed to switch the economy into a state-oriented market economy
in order to promote economic growth. So far, the Open Door Policy has generated
initially encouraging outcomes. It is reported that the Vietnamese social and politicalregime has been maintained whilst its economy has quickly been stabilized and restored.
During 1993, its macro-economic indicators were stable; inflation had been severe, thendropped as low as 8.4% and the budget deficit was reduced. More surprisingly, Vietnam’s
economy has even been able to recover from the slowdown that followed the outbreak of
the regional financial crisis. Statistics made within the first 6 months of 2000 show that
economic growth increased by 6.2%, the highest rate during the last 3 years, industrial
production grew up to 14.5%, and agricultural production reached a record of 16.7 million
tonnes.31
In the law reform area, the departure point was December 29, 1987, when the Act on
Foreign Investment in Vietnam (Luat dau tu nuoc ngoai tai Vietnam; hereinafter, Foreign
Investment Act) was passed.32 Under Article 4 of the current Act, foreign investors can dobusiness in Vietnam under three forms: wholly-foreign-owned enterprises, joint venturesand business cooperation contracts. Article 2 of the Act gives definitions of three othertypes of contract into which foreign investors may enter to do business in Vietnam. Suchcontracts include Build-Operate-Transfer contracts (BOT), Build-Transfer-Operatecontracts (BTO), and Build-Transfer contracts (BT). These contracts can be concluded
between an authoritative Vietnamese state organ and a foreign investor.
It was the first time another economic sector - Foreign owners, rather than State andCooperative ones - has been legally recognized in Vietnam. Shortly after that, the 1990
Company Act (Luat cong ty) and the 1990 Private Enterprise Act (Luat doanh nghiep tunhan) were passed. These legal documents provided the newly-formed market economy
29

The so-called socialist accounting principles require state enterprises to operate on an economically andfinancially independent basis. In other words, state enterprises have business and financial autonomy.
Previously, state enterprises that made a loss could get further financial support from the government. Under
the new socialist accounting principles, they can no longer depend on governmental financial support. Rather,
they should make profits and have to be responsible for their own debts.
30
See Van kien Dai hoi Dang toan Quoc lan thu VI [Documents of the Sixth National Congress of theCommunist Party], (1987) 42 – 56.
31
See “Vietnam's Economic Renovation and its Main Achievements”, Main Macro-economic Indicators,
http://www.mafa.gov.vn:8080/Web+server/Economy.nsf, visited Mar. 17, 2001.
32
This Act was revised twice, in 1990 and 1992, and then was replaced in 1996. The 1996 Foreign Investment
Act was also amended in 2000.

10

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter I

some more new types of enterprises, by permitting the private economic sector to set up
businesses under the form of shareholding companies, limited liability companies andprivate enterprises.33 The 1999 Enterprise Act (Luat Doanh Nghiep), which replaces theabove-mentioned two statutes, has broadened market participation even further by therecognition of partnerships and single member limited liability companies. It can be said
that since the Open Door Policy was initiated in Vietnam, market participants have beenenriched by the recognition of a multi-sectoral economy in which all economic sectors areequal before the law. All companies, including state enterprises, now have to competewith each other to make their own markets in order to avoid bankruptcy. Production has
been conducted subject to the market's demands, except for a number of state enterprises
operating in some vital industrial areas34 in which the government's control is needed fornational security and defense reasons.
In the taxation sphere, a turning point occurred in late 1990 when various tax laws
were enacted, such as the Turnover Tax Act (Luat thue doanh thu), Profit Tax Act (Luatthue loi tuc), Special Consumption Tax Act (Luat thue tieu thu dac biet), and the Importexport Duties Act (Luat thue xuat nhap khau). Since then, a single tax system has been
adopted and applied to all business entities coming from different economic sectors.35
This more or less created an equal business environment for business entities regardlessof their ownership. Throughout the 1990s, the tax system had been progressively
improved by the passage of a number of new tax laws and ordinances, and by the revisionand replacement of other tax laws. 36
Law reform concerning financial markets occurred in 1988 when Decree 53/HDBT
dated March 26, 1988 was issued by the Government with the introduction of a two-tierbanking system. In this system, the state administrative functions have been given to theState Bank of Vietnam, while the trading functions have been vested in specialized banks;
and the specialized banks are no longer components of the State Bank of Vietnam, rather
they have become independent legal entities.
33

It is necessary to emphasize that in Vietnam, the usage of the term indicating “business entities” has beenchanged from time to time in legal texts. Before 1990, the term “enterprise” was formally used in bothgovernmental and ministerial legal documents. When the Company Act was passed in 1990, the term“company” was first formally used for shareholding and limited liability companies. But recently the National
Assembly has gone back to the term “enterprise” when drafting and enacting the 1999 Enterprise Act. Thus, atpresent, all laws governing companies in Vietnam use this term. However, if one scrutinizes the Act, this term
is not always used in an individual article, when referring to all types of enterprise. For example, the 1999
Enterprise Act uses the terms “limited liability company”, “shareholding company” and “partnership company”
while it uses the term “private enterprise”.
34
See Appendix No. 1, Decree 50-CP dated August 28, 1996 on "The Establishment, Reorganization,
Dissolution and Bankruptcy of State Enterprises" for the List of Priority Areas where State Enterprises can beestablished.
35
See above n. 17 for the difference between the old tax system and the new one.
36
For example: the Ordinance on High Income Earners’ Tax [Phap lenh thue thu nhap doi voi nguoi co thu
nhap cao], and the Ordinance on House and Land Tax [Phap lenh thue nha dat] were passed in 1994 and 1991
respectively. The Turnover Tax Act [Luat thue doanh thu] and Profit Tax Act [Luat thue loi tuc] were replacedby the Value Added Tax Act [Thue gia tri gia tang] and Corporate Income Tax Act [Thue thu nhap doanhnghiep] respectively.

11

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter I

This Decree also created two other state-owned banks (apart from the Foreign
Trade Bank and the Construction Bank, which was later, in 1981, renamed as theInvestment and Construction Bank and then, in 1990, the Investment and Development
Bank) namely the Industrial and Commercial Bank and the Bank for Agricultural
Development (now Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development37). A few years later,
the Bank for the Poor38 and Bank for Housing Development in Cuu Long Delta39 werealso established, pushing the number of state-owned banks up to six.
In 1990, Decree 53/HDBT was replaced by the Ordinance on the State Bank ofVietnam (Phap lenh Ngan hang nha nuoc Viet nam) and the Ordinance on Banks, Credit
Cooperatives and Financial Companies (Phap lenh ngan hang, hop tac xa tin dung va
cong ty tai chinh). These Ordinances provided the market with more participants bypermitting private and foreign sectors, apart from the state and cooperative ones, to carryout banking business. In 1997, these two ordinances were replaced by the State Bank ofVietnam Act (Luat ngan hang Nha nuoc Viet nam) and the Credit Institutions Act (Luatcac to chuc tin dung) respectively.
The Credit Institutions Act even takes a further step compared with that taken by theOrdinance on Banks, Credit Cooperatives and Financial Companies in diversifying theforms of credit organization. Banking business can now be carried out by different
economic sectors: state-owned, cooperative-owned, foreign-owned sectors, and private
sector40 under the forms of banking and non-banking institutions.
The monetary market today is no longer confined within financial transactions that
occur between banks and entities that belong to state-owned or cooperative-owned
sectors. Rather it has been opened to all market participants from different economic
sectors. The differentiation in interest rates based on the legal form of the borrower has
also been abolished since 1989. 41 However, lending from state-owned banks to state
enterprises still accounts for around 80% of all lending in Vietnam.42 It is also noteworthy
that interest rates have continuously been controlled by the government. In other words,
credit organizations have to trade within the ceiling and floor interest rates announced
from time to time by the State Bank of Vietnam. It is worth quoting the World Bank’sobservation:
In general, Vietnam's credit market is highly distorted as a result ofsubsidized and directed credit programs, including the priority given
37

See Decision 280/QD-NH5 dated October 15, 1996.
This bank was formed under Decision 252/TTg dated August 31, 1995, as a non-profit bank. Its operational
purpose is to eliminate poverty.
39This bank was set up under Decision 769/TTg dated September 18, 1997.
40
Since private credit institutions are not recognized under the Credit Institution Act, the private sector can
only establish shareholding credit institutions. For further information, see Art. 12, Credit Institution Act.
41
See Article 1.b, Decision 39/HDBT dated April 10, 1989 (promulgating “Policy on Deposit and Lending
Interest Rates”).
42
See “Country Commercial Guides - FY 1999: Vietnam”, Chapter VII: Investment Climate.
http://www.state.gov/www.about_state/business/com_guides/1999/eastasia/viet99_07html,
visited Mar. 22, 2001.
38

12

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter I

to loans to SOEs (state-owned enterprises: author added) and tovarious commodity programs for the purchase of rice and othercrops for export.43
This fact, together with the collapse of the system of the People's Credit Funds in thelate 1980s and early 1990s, led to a lack of public confidence. It was reported that:[T]he public keeps an estimated 45% of broad money as cash andover 50% of local business transactions are conducted outside of thebanking system・・・ At present, there are only 10,000 individualbank accounts for a population of 77 million. Vietnam continues tooperate largely as a cash economy.44
In such a situation, public savings have not been able to be adequately mobilized.
The banking system has missed a great financial resource which it should use for
economic development. Capital needy businesses, in turn, have surely faced obstacles inlooking for banking loans.
The other components of the financial market are non-organized credit markets(which have spontaneously been developed in rural areas). These markets have been
operating outside the banking system, among individuals, and are often referred to as"underground credit markets".
Griffin and Keith's observation might be useful to sum up the situation of thefinancial market in Vietnam in the 1990s:
It is widely known that the banking system is inefficient and in needof reform ・ ・ ・ Most domestic investment is self-financed or
financed through informal credit arrangements; the capital market isunderdeveloped and the commercial banking system plays a minor
role in financial intermediation.45

43

See “Advancing Rural Development from Vision to Action”,
http://www.worldbank.org.vn/rep7/visf003.html, visited Mar. 10, 2001.
44
See “Vietnam Trade and Project Financing”,
http://www.tradeport.org/ts/countries/vietnam/financing.html, visited Dec. 25, 2000.
45
See Griffin Keith, “The Management of Structural Adjustment and Macroeconomic reform in Vietnam”,
Human System Management, (1998) (Vol. 17) (Iss. 1). <Database: Academic Search Elite>, visited Nov. 22,
2000.

13

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter I

II. THE NEED FOR A SECURITIES MARKET IN VIETNAM
1. A Securities Market and Long Term Finance for Businesses
From an economic viewpoint, Vietnam is one of the poorest countries in theworld.46 Vietnam has been attempting to move away from this position for more than adecade, since the Open Door Policy was first introduced. The economic reform which has
been carried out since then allows every economic sector to set up enterprises. As a result,the number of non-state enterprises has been rapidly increased.
It is estimated that within seven years from the passage of the 1990 Company Act,
there were more than 35,000 companies and private enterprises47 established in Vietnam.
On average, over 5,000 companies and private enterprises have registered every year.48
Especially since the day the Enterprise Act came into effect, the business climate has been
improved. The proof is that the number of newly registered enterprises in 2000 almost
equals the total number of enterprises established within the 9 years from 1991 to 1999.
Within the first three months of the year 2001, an increasing tendency in the number of
newly registered enterprises could still be seen. There were 4000 enterprises founded witha total registered capital of 4,400 billion Dongs. Such an amount of capital increase is 1.5
times the size of that recorded at the same time in 2000.49 Among enterprises establishedin 2000, the number of shareholding companies (excluding equitized state enterprises),although accounting for only around 4% (compared with 44% for private enterprises and
51% for limited liability companies), is still bigger than the number of shareholding
companies established in the previous 9 years (from 1991 to 1999).50
Those figures themselves show that the Vietnamese economy has been in need of acomplete capital market to fully meet the financial demands of the newly formed
enterprises. The increasing number of shareholding companies recently established once
again shows the need for a fully-fledged securities market to enable those companies toraise funds from the public and create liquidity for their shares. This is to ensure that46

See “1998 World Development Indicators CD-ROM”, World Bank,
http://web.acces.uiuc.edu/faq/faq.pdl, visited Mar. 16, 2001.
See also Norman Brown IV, “The Long Road to Reform: An Analysis of Foreign Investment Reform in
Vietnam”, (2002) 25 Boston College of International & Comparative Law Review 97, 99. In this article theauthor points out that Vietnam’s economic and financial framework remains weak and underdeveloped.
47
The term “companies” here refers to shareholding companies and limited liability companies which were
established and operating under the 1990 Company Act.
The term “private enterprises” here refers to one-man-owned enterprises, which were established andoperating under the Private Enterprise Act of 1990.
Both of the above-mentioned Acts were replaced by the 1999 Enterprise Act on January 1, 2000.
48
See “Developments in Corporate Laws in Vietnam: Overview of Legislative Reforms in Vietnam”, (Apr. 21,
2000) (Vision & Associates) Mondaq Business Briefing, <LexisNexis: Non-US News>.
49
See Ministry of Planning and Investment: “Bao cao tinh hinh mot nam thuc hien Luat doanh nghiep”[Report on One Year Implementation of the Enterprise Act] delivered at the Governmental Meeting (March 28 29, 2001), 5.
50
Ibid.

14

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter I

shares can be publicly issued, and that the repurchase and resale of such shares can beeasily effected.
It can, however, be said that prior to July 2000, Vietnam did not have a securities
market in a real sense. The principal way for business entities raising more funds was toborrow from banks. But even if the banking system had been very well functioning, its
capability in providing long term financing would have been limited. This is because
banks’ financial resources rely mainly on customers’ deposits which can change
considerably, depending on customers’ demands.
In practice, almost all shareholding banks in Vietnam have been facing financial
constraints. They need to increase their charter capital. Some of them have gone public tomeet their pecuniary needs.51 Clearly, not only enterprises but also banks themselves havebeen looking for a securities market where long term financing can be accessed. In otherwords, an organized securities market has come to be desired by almost every type ofbusiness entity in Vietnam. As stated by Tran Dac Sinh, Deputy Director of the Securities
Trading Center, “We needed to set up the stock exchange to mobilize capital”.52
2. A Securities Market and the Promotion of the Equitization Process
Apart from their role in providing long term financing for enterprises, a full-fledged
securities market was said to be necessary to speed up the equitization process since theyfacilitate the liquidity of shares issued by those equitized enterprises.53 Faced with the
problem of loss-making and ineffective state enterprises, since 1992 the Vietnam
government had been conducting an equitization program on an experimental basis by thepassage of the two legal texts, Decision 202/CT54 and Decision 203/CT.55 Then, four
years later, a large-scale equitization program was carried out under Decree 28/CP.56

51

See Nguyen Tran Que (ed.), Thi truong chung khoan: Phuong thuc hoat dong va kinh doanh [Securities
Markets - Operational and Trading Methods], (1996), 234. Hereinafter, Nguyen Tran Que.
52
See Paul Wiseman, “Vietnam stock market sees low start, steady growth”, (Nov. 17, 2000) USA TODAY.
<LexisNexis: US News, Combined>.
53
See “Vietnam's Finance Minister says SOE Equitizations Must Go Faster”, (Dec. 24, 1999) ASIA PULSE.
<LexisNexis: News Group File, All>. Hereinafter, “Vietnam's Finance Minister says SOE Equitizations Must
Go Faster”.
54
This Decision was signed on August 6, 1992, by the President of the Ministers’ Council. The Decision
promulgated “The Regulation of the Conversion of a Number of State Enterprises into Shareholding
Companies on an Experimental Basis”.
55
This Decision was signed on August 6, 1992, by the President of the Ministers’ Council. The Decision
promulgated “A List of State Enterprises that will be Equitized”. The Decision selected the first seven state
enterprises for equitization on an experimental basis.
56
This Decree was issued on May 7, 1996, promulgating “The Regulation of the Conversion of a Number ofState Enterprises into Shareholding Companies”.
Decree 28/CP was later revised by Decree 25/CP dated March, 26, 1997, and in 1998 both of these Decrees
were replaced by Decree 44-1998/ND-CP dated June 29, 1998 (promulgating “The Regulation on theConversion of State Enterprises into Shareholding Companies”), hereinafter, Decree 44/1998.
Article 2 Decree 44/1998 defined the goals of the equitization program: (1) to mobilize capital from thepublic, transfer technology, create jobs, develop enterprises, enhance competitive capability and reform15

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter I

The latest legal rules that govern the equitization of state enterprises has recently
been released under Decree 64/2002.57 The Decree states the goals of the equitization
program. First, the program aims to enhance the effectiveness of and competitivenessamongst enterprises; and to diversify enterprise ownership, and to improve enterprisegovernance so that enterprise assets and those of the state will both be used effectively.
Second, the program aims to mobilize both domestic and foreign savings in order tomodernize technology and promote enterprise development. Third, the program isdesigned to strengthen the oversight of investors over the enterprises and to harmonize theinterests of the state, enterprises, and investors.58
Decree 64/2002 does not explicitly classify state enterprises for the purposes of
equitization as its predecessor, Decree 44/1998, did. Rather it defines four ways forequitization, as follows. By the first way, the whole capital the state has invested inenterprises is to be maintained while new shares will be issued to raise more funds for the
future equitized enterprises. The second way allows the sale of part of the capital the state
has invested in enterprises. The third way permits the sale of the whole capital the state
has invested in enterprises. The fourth way combines the second or the third way ofequitization with the issue of new shares.
Vietnam has thus been in the process of the equitization of state enterprises for a
decade. The equitization might promote the development of the securities market byproviding them with more commodities. However, the equitization cannot go smoothly inthe absence of an organized market, since there will be no market place that enables theliquidity of such special commodities. The problem would be more serious when a large
number of state enterprises is equitized. Then, the absence of a formal securities market
will make it even more difficult for shares to continue to be purchased and sold. For thetime being, the problem has not yet arisen, because of the modest number of equitizedenterprises. It is estimated that by December 1999 the number of state enterprises
throughout Vietnam that had been equitized was 167. This figure accounts for only 40%of the 1999 target and shows the slow speed at which the equitization program has
progressed.59
Of course, a fully-fledged securities market is not the only factor that can promote
the equitization program. Some other factors include the government efforts in speeding
enterprises' structure; and (2) to create opportunities for employees to become the company owners, to reformcompany management mechanism, and so on.
State enterprises fell into three categories for the purpose of equitization. The first category consisted of
not-for-profit enterprises operating in some specified areas shall not be equitized. The second consisted ofenterprises to be equitized, but after being equitized, the State must be a controlling shareholder of eachenterprise. The third consisted of enterprises that need to be equitized or converted into other types ofownership. In this group, the government need not be a controlling shareholder. For further information, see
Appendix, Decree 44/1998.
57
This Decree was issued by the Government on June 29, 2002 and has come into force since the 15th day after
the issuing date.
58
See Art. 1.
59
For further information see “Vietnam's Finance Minister says SOE Equitizations Must Go Faster”, above n.
53.

16

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter I

up the program, the willingness of the incumbent managements of state enterprises in
implementing such a program, and so on. However, one cannot deny positive impacts
generated by the existence of a formal securities market on the success of the equitization
process.
3. A Securities Market and the Mobilization of Funds from Domestic and Foreign
Savings
A formal securities market is necessary for the development of a newly emerging
market economy. It gives more possibilities for investment projects to be funded, whichare, in turn, able to expand the industries. It broadens the chances for local companies toraise funds by having access even to household savings. As noted by economists:
As for an underdeveloped economy in Vietnam, economic growthand development mean industrialization and modernization for thecountry. Capital demand has thus been increasing day by day. This
demand calls for medium and long-term financing provided by
special institutions, one of which is a securities market. An organized
securities market will quickly promote capital mobilization, which inturn will promote the industrialization of the country.60
In addition, such a market can even play a significant role in creating opportunities
for the economy to mobilize capital from foreign savings. As early as just after the Open
Door Policy was initiated, the 1987 Foreign Investment Act was passed, with generous
incentives to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), an external financial resource, into
Vietnam. 61 However, the Act and even the current Foreign Investment Act can only
activate one of the channels through which foreign capital (FDI) can be invested into
Vietnam. Another potential channel, a formal securities market, for capital flow into the60

See Nguyen Van Luan (et al.), above n. 10, 124.
The Foreign Investment Act of 1987 gave generous tax incentives to foreign investors. Enterprises withforeign invested capital could enjoy lower tax rates compared with those applied to domestic enterprises. For
example, profit tax rates applying to foreign invested enterprises were 15% and 25% (see Art. 26) (thesefigures can be contrasted to 30%, 40% and 50% profit tax rates applying to domestic enterprises: see Art. 10,
the Profit Tax Act of 1990). Where foreign investors reinvested part of profits derived from their businessconducted in Vietnam, they were entitled to profit tax refund corresponding to the amount of tax which was
already paid for the profits reinvested (see Art. 32). Foreign invested enterprises were also able to enjoy othertax incentives such as tax holidays, tax reduction and so on (see Art. 27).
The current foreign investment law still offers favorable treatment to foreign invested enterprises. The
Foreign Investment Act of 1996 (as amended in 2000) gives tax exemption and reduction to foreign invested
enterprises (Art. 21a). Loss incurred by a foreign invested enterprise in the current financial year can be
deducted from the enterprise’s assessable income of the following fiscal year (Art. 40). Facilities and machinesthat are imported to constitute immovable assets of foreign invested enterprises are also exempted from importtax (Art. 47.2). See also Decree 24/2000-ND/CP dated Jul. 31, 2000 (guiding the implementation of theForeign Investment Act) Arts. 55, 57; and see Circular 13/2001/ TT.BTC dated Mar. 8, 2001 (guiding theimplementation of the regulation of taxes with respect to foreign invested enterprises), Section II.
61

17

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter I

country from foreign sources had been missing. Obviously, not all foreign investors seek
to invest their money by running a business themselves. Rather, many of them look for an
indirect way of investment through which their money can generate profits throughdividends or interest derived from corporate shares or bonds they own. In such a case, aformal securities market will be an ideal place for them to realize their investment desires,
since the purchase, sale, and repurchase and resale of shares and bonds can be effected. In
the absence of such a market, the country apparently misses a significant externalfinancial resource, which would otherwise be mobilized for economic development.

III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITIES REGULATION IN VIETNAM
1. The introduction of securities regulation
The starting point for the development of securities regulation, as mentioned earlier,can be traced back as early as 1990 when the first Company Act and the Ordinance on
Banks, Credit Cooperatives and Financial Companies were adopted, with the recognitionof shareholding companies and shareholding banks. Then in 1992, the government made afurther effort in issuing Decision 203/CT, pursuant to which the first group of seven state
enterprises was singled out for conversion into shareholding companies through the saleof equity.
In 1994, a considerable number of legal documents concerning the issuance of
securities were passed. Started in July 26 when the government passed Decree 72/CP,
according to which the issuance of three types of government bonds (treasury bills whoseterm is less than one year to maturity; treasury bonds which mature after one year; andproject-finance bonds whose term is more than 5 years) was initiated. Then in September
17, the government issued a second regulation (Decree 120/CP) under which state
enterprise bonds and shares could be publicly offered.
In the same year, the State Bank also passed some legal instruments to enable theissuance of State Bank Bills (Decision 211-QD/NH1 dated September 22, 1994) and theissuance of bonds and shares by commercial banks (Decision 212-QD/NH1 dated
September 22, 1994 and Decision 275-QD/NH5 dated November 7, 1994, respectively).
In 1995, markets for bidding and for repurchase and resale of Treasury Bills andbank bills were established under Decision 88-QD/NH9 dated March 28, 1995 andDecision 89-QD/NH9 (on the same date), issued by the State Bank.
Although, up to this stage, a formal securities market had continuously been absent
in Vietnam, nevertheless the primary securities market was broader than that which had
been operating before the introduction of the Open Door Policy. On such a securities
market, the issuance of government bonds, company shares and bonds and bank bonds as18

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter I

conducted.62 Although the primary market existed, a number of problems still remained.
The principal ones were:(1) There was a lack of an adequate information disclosure regime. Enterprises thatsought to issue shares and bonds had to apply for an issuing license from the Ministryof Finance (MOF). They had to file the following documents with the MOF: a letterof application; the enterprise charter; a proposed business plan; the financial
statements of the most recent three years; and the proposal of the issuance. After
getting the issuing license from the MOF, they merely had to announce on public
media some information concerning the future issuance, such as number of shares orbonds going to be issued, their nominal value, time, and venue for the issuance, andrights of the securities holders.63 There was no provision saying that either the issuersor the MOF would be responsible for disclosing further information that could affectthe securities’ price; nor was there any provision saying that continuous and timely
disclosure of information was required.
(2) There were neither anti-fraud provisions to prevent misconduct on the market, nor
any specific provision to handle violators of the regulation of such a primary market.
(3) There was a shortage of professional intermediaries such as brokers and dealers foroffering and distributing securities.64 Securities were often issued through the State
Treasury, commercial banks and financial companies, or were even issued by theissuing enterprises themselves.
(4) Although there were legal bases for the issuance of company shares and bonds andgovernment bonds, as earlier mentioned, it was reported that in practice most of the
securities issued were short-term bonds whose terms were less than one year.65
The intention of the Vietnamese government to set up fully-fledged securities
markets was expressly revealed in the middle of 1995, when the Prime Minister issued
Decision 361/TTg to form a Preparatory Commission for the Establishment of a Securities
Market. The Commission's task was to study and to draft proposals on the establishment
and development of a securities market in Vietnam. Then the year 1996 marked an
important event, the establishment of the State Securities Commission (the SSC - thepublic regulatory authority over securities markets) under Decree 75/CP.

62

Legal bases for this market, as earlier mentioned, had been continuously released since the early 1990s.
Recently some of these documents have been replaced. For example: the 1990 Company Act was replaced by
the 1999 Enterprise Act; Decree 72/CP was replaced by Decree 01/2000/ND-CP dated Jan. 13, 2000,
promulgating “The Issuance of Government Bonds”.
63
See Circular 91-TC/KBNN dated Nov. 11, 1994 (“Provisional Regulation of the Issuance of Shares andBonds of the State-owned Enterprises”), Parts I.12, II.12, & II.14. Hereinafter, Circular 91-TC/KBNN.
64
See for example: Art. 9, Decree 72/CP: this Article said that government bonds can be issued through theState Treasury and commercial banks, financial companies and insurance companies; Art. 30, Decree 120/CP:
this Article vested in the State Bank of Vietnam a right to guide commercial banks and financial companies in
acting as agencies for issuing company shares and bonds; Parts: I.15.1 and II. 15, Circular 91-TC/KBNN.
65
See Nguyen Tran Que, above n. 51, 232.

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter I

Two years later, in 1998, a basic legal framework for the operation of securities
markets, Decree 48/1998, and a legal foundation for the establishment of stock trading
centers and the planned stock exchanges, Decision 127/1998, were issued on July 11,
1998. These governmental legal instruments, together with various decisions and circulars
issued by the SSC since 1998 to date, have created the current securities regulations in
Vietnam.
Decree 48/1998 regulates public offerings and the trade of listed securities. Private
offerings and the trade of non-listed securities are not subject to this Decree.
It can be said that all lawmaking activities throughout the 1990s have showned thegovernment's efforts in preparing necessary conditions for the birth of a formal securities
market in Vietnam. Those efforts were finally realized on July 20, 2000, when the first
Securities Trading Center was put into operation in Ho Chi Minh City.
2. An Overall Appraisal of the Cornerstone of the Securities Regulation: Decree
48/1998
The cornerstone of the securities regulation, Decree 48/1998, was drafted based on
experience learnt from various jurisdictions such as US, Japan, Britain, Germany, France,
Hong Kong, Korea, and China.
Because of the complexity of activities conducted in securities markets, usually incountries that have seen a long historical development of such markets, each group ofactivities is often governed by a separate act. For example in the US, securities laws
consist of different acts cover different areas such as Securities Act of 1933, Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Investment Company Act of 1940, Investment Advisers Act of 1940and so on. In Japan, various laws compose securities laws: Securities and Exchange Lawof 1947, The Law on Foreign Securities Companies of 1971, The Law on Trading in
Financial Futures of 1987, and so on.
In Vietnam, the situation seems to be quite different. The highest body of law
setting out the general legal framework for the operation of securities markets is Decree
48/1998, a governmental legal rule. This Decree covers almost every aspect of securities
markets from the regulation of public offerings, of securities professionals and theparticipation of foreigners in securities markets, to the regulation of abusive market
practices and the state management of securities markets. It is necessary to reemphasizethat in some areas, the Decree merely gives general principles, and as such, more detailed
guidance will be found in subordinate legislation issued by the SSC.
The Decree was designed to embrace four main goals. First is to create a favorable
environment for the issue and trade of securities. Second is to promote the mobilization ofinternal and external long-term financial resources. Third is to ensure that the securities
market operates in an orderly way, safely, publicly, fairly and effectively. And the fourth
is to protect the lawful interests of investors. 66 With such objectives, the Decree wasdivided into 11 chapters, covering 83 articles.
66

See Decree 48/1998, second paragraph.

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter I

Chapter I, titled “General Provisions”, sets forth the scope of the regulation anddefines terms used in the following chapters. Although the chapter was designed to clarify
necessary key terms, definitions of a number of important terms are still missing.
Chapter II, titled “Public Offerings of Securities”, is expected above all to give aseries of requirements concerning information disclosure imposed on issuers before going
public for fund raising. However, the chapter has failed to tell issuers that information
disclosure is the most important thing to do before a public offering can be conducted.
Although information disclosure is mentioned several times in the chapter,67 the languageof such provisions cannot give the impression to the public that information disclosure issignificant and should be made before and even after the issue of securities - to disclose
information continuously during the time the securities are in circulation.
The chapter concentrates on certifying that all public offerings of securities to belisted on a formal trading center must get approval from the SSC68 after going through acertain procedure provided by the Decree;69 that those who seek to make a public offeringof securities must meet a number of threshold;70 and that securities distribution must be
done through specified methods in a specified term. The chapter also emphasizes someadministrative measures that can be employed during a public offering, such as topostpone a distribution and to withdraw an issuing license.71
Chapter III identifies the stock trading centers and the planned stock exchanges. The
government clearly reveals its intention first to set up trading centers, later to be replaced
by stock exchanges.72 Some remarkable points in this chapter include: the recognition of astate-owned form of stock trading centers73 which might exist until they are replaced by
the stock exchanges in the future; the uncertain legal structure of the planned stock
exchanges;74 the silence of the Decree on certifying whether or not both the stock trading
centers and the planned stock exchanges are self-regulatory organizations.
Chapter IV codifies securities firms. It spells out a number of conditions to be met75
and the procedure that needs to be followed76 in order to set up a securities firm. It alsolays down criteria imposed on77 and procedure followed by securities firms' affiliates78 to
obtain a practicing license. Rights and duties of securities firms79 and some administrative67

See Arts.: 12, 13, 18, 19.
See Art. 3.1. The ambiguity of this statutory provision will be discussed in Chapter II, Section III, Subsection 1 of this paper.
69
See Art. 11.
70
See Arts. 6, 8 & 7.
71
See Arts. 15 - 16.
72
See Art. 20.
73
See Art. 21.
74
Article 23 although provides for the stock exchanges, does not spell out their form of ownership. It is unclear
whether stock exchanges will be owned by the state or by public or by exchange members.
75
See Art. 30.
76
See Art. 32.
77
See Art. 40.
78
See Art. 41.
79
See Art. 38.
68

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter I

measures that might apply to such firms and their associates80 are also included in thischapter. Furthermore, the chapter clearly requires credit institutions, insurance companies,
and general corporations (tong cong ty) to set up their own subsidiaries in the form of
securities firms to trade in securities.81 Chapter IV, however, does not properly deal withconflicts of interest issues. This is of importance to ensure that public investors areadequately protected.
Chapter V designs a legal framework for the establishment and operation of
investment funds and fund management companies. It explicitly states the parties that arenecessary for setting up a securities investment fund (a fund management company, asupervisory bank and investors).82 It also provides for the conditions83 and procedures84
for establishing an investment fund, a fund management company and a supervisory bank.
Rights and duties of these entities, as well as right of investors, are also stipulated in thischapter.85
Chapter VI, titled “Registration, Clearing and Securities Custody Services”, merely
gives general principles for these services, such as the contents of such services;conditions being met by securities firms that provide the services; and the way in whichcustomers’ assets are to be managed by those firms.
Chapter VII lays down provisions concerning the participation of foreigners andforeign entities in the securities market. According to this chapter, foreign organizations
and individuals can take part in the Vietnam securities market by purchasing, selling, andtrading securities. Where they seek to engage in securities business, they will have toestablish a join-venture with a Vietnamese partner and obtain a business license from theSSC.86 Foreign investment funds that are seeking to invest into Vietnamese securities
markets can do so after getting an approval from the Prime Minister and then a licensefrom the SSC.87
Concerning the percentages of securities that can be held by foreign investors, there
are a number of conflicts. Such conflicts will be mentioned while discussing the state
enterprise law in relation to the operation of securities markets.88
Chapter VIII, titled “Prohibited and Restricted Activities”, establishes regulation ofabusive market practices, takeovers and mergers. Takeover and merger can be effected
provided that those who engage in such transactions are subject to some statutory
requirements such as reporting to the stock trading center and holding a public tenderingin accordance with the SSC rules.89

80

See Arts. 39 & 43.
See Art. 29.1.
82
See Art. 44.
83
See Arts. 45 & 55.
84
See Arts. 51, 46 & 55.2, respectively.
85
See Arts. 47, 56 & 57.
86
See Art. 67.1.
87
See Art. 67.3.
88
See Section I, sub-section 3 of the Appendix.
89
See Art. 74.
81

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter I

Abusive market practices are dealt with in a simple manner. The chapter merely lists
prohibited activities. It either does not properly deal with some activities or over-regulates
other activities. Short-swing trading, for example, remains unregulated while otheractivities like short selling and margin trading seem to be over-regulated.
Chapter IX is titled “The State Management of Securities and Securities Markets”.
According to this chapter, the right to manage securities markets is vested in thegovernment. The SSC is a state organ that plays the state management role on behalf ofthe government. Other ministries, governmental organs and the people's committees atprovincial and municipal levels are responsible for cooperating with the SSC in carryingout the state management functions in the field of securities markets and within their own
duties and rights.90
Although the SSC is authorized to oversee securities market in this chapter, its
structure, personnel, and concrete rights and duties are not specified. To have an entire
picture of the SSC, one will have to look at Decree 75-CP.
Chapter X gives a legal basis for “Inspection, Supervision and Sanctions for
Violations”. This chapter specifies those who are subject to the inspection and supervisionof the SSC. 91 It also specifies the state organs that are responsible for disputes
resolution.92 Concerning sanctions for violation, it merely lists different levels of sanction
and seems to leave such sanctions to be dealt with in detail by other governmental rules.93
Finally, like any legal document, the last chapter, Chapter XI, contains“Implementation Provisions”. Such provisions concern the date of effect of the Decree;
the responsibilities and obligations of the head of the SSC and those of other ministries in
guiding the implementation of the Decree.
More detailed guidance for most of the chapters of Decree 48/1998 is released in theform of circulars or decisions issued by the SSC. Nevertheless, this does not adequately
make up for the above-mentioned weaknesses in the Decree.

Synopsis
In summary, it can be said that the current securities regulations show a significant
and initial step in establishing and facilitating an organized stock market in Vietnam.
However, since this was the first time when such a regulation was created, deficiencies
have been inevitable. A number of issues that lie in both the current securities regulations
and relevant laws need to be reconsidered to ensure a transparent, fair, effective andreliable market.
This paper proposes to deal with major problems of the current securities
regulations. In the following chapters, the five main themes that will be discussed are:90

See Art. 75.
See Art. 78.
92
See Art. 79.
93
See Art. 80.
91

23

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter I（1） Information disclosure requirements in relation to a transparent market;（2） Anti-fraud provisions and a fair market;（3） Regulation of securities professionals in relation to a healthy market;（4） Legal structure of exchange market and a well organized market; and（5） Market regulatory apparatus in relation to enforcement issues.

24

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter II

CHAPTER II
WHETHER THE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTSPROMOTE GOOD INFORMATION FLOW

Information disclosure is one of the most significant components of the securities
regulations and one of the most critical statutory issues for the protection of investors. For
those reasons, this chapter will discuss the current information disclosure regime in order
to find out what should be done to ensure a transparent market, which, in turn, canstrengthen investor protection. It argues that the disclosure regime fails to ensure thatpublic investors are adequately informed.
Before discussing the information disclosure regime, it may be helpful to have aquick look at the public offering process in Vietnam, and also the way in which issuing
companies are listed in a trading center. The reasons are twofold. First, public offeringand listing procedures adopted in Vietnam are quite distinct. The former can only be done
if the issuers obtain an issuing license from the SSC - which sounds stricter than what is
adopted elsewhere. The latter seems to be accomplished either in a lenient or in a strict
manner depending on the filing date 94 of listing documents with a trading center. 95
Secondly, both public offering and listing trigger company duties in information
disclosures. To have a clear idea of what an issuer and a listed company are required to do
to discharge such duties, a pre-understanding of statutory public offering and listing isthus required.

94

The later filing date seems to be the more difficult procedure an issuing company has to face in order tobecome a listed company. For further information, see Section I, Sub-section 2 of this Chapter.
95
Usually in other countries the issuers merely file a registration statement to the state authority in order to
execute a public issuance (there is no need for a license) and to have their securities listed on an exchange, theissuers will have to apply at the exchange and must get approval from it. The US and Japan are examples
where the requirements are almost the opposite to those in Vietnam.
Pursuant to Securities Act of 1933 s 5, 15 USC s 77e (2002), no securities may be offered or sold to the
public unless registered with the SEC.
Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 (2001 Japan) Article 4 also says: “A public offering or public
selling of a security ( ・・・ ) shall not be made unless the issuer has made registration with the Prime
Minister for the public offering or public selling of a security・・・”
However, in order to be listed on an exchange, for example NASDAQ Japan Market, the issuer will haveto file a listing application which will go through a listing examination before getting approval. In such an
examination, the soundness of corporate management, the adequacy of disclosure of corporate information, andothers such as the status of the parent company, status of any business activities which are against public
interests, will be looked into. For further information, see Osaka Securities Exchange: Fact Book 1999, IV.

25

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter II

I. PUBLIC OFFERING AND LISTING PROCESS UNDER THE CURRENTSECURITIES REGULATION
1. Public Offering
Public offering of securities is the offer for sale of securities that meet somestatutory thresholds concerning (1) the amount of equity capital or debt capital of acompany held by the public; and (2) the number of outside investors that purchase suchamount. According to such thresholds, the issuer has to sell at least 20 percent of theequity capital/debt capital to more than 100 outsiders. Where the equity capital/debt
capital exceeds 100 billion Dong, then, at least 15 percent of the equity/debt capital has tobe sold to more than 100 outside investors.96
Under the current securities regulation, public offerings of securities has to belicensed by the SSC, except for the issuance of government bonds.97 However, not all of
the issuers can be licensed; only those who meet a number of specified criteria are eligible
to apply for such a license. These criteria include:(1) The issuer shall have at least 10 billion Vietnamese Dong
chartered capital;(2) The issuer has made profits in the last two consecutive years;(3) The Management Board's members and director of the issuer
must have experience in business management;(4) The issuer shall have a feasible proposal to use funds raised by
the stock issuance;(5) The issuer shall have at least 20% of equity capital held by morethan 100 outside investors;(6) Founding shareholders of the issuer shall hold at least 20% of
the equity capital of the issuer within three years from the dateof completion of the issuance;(7) The issuer shall have an underwriter for the issuance if the total
value of issuing shares exceeds 10 billion Vietnamese Dong.98
Issuers that meet the above-mentioned conditions are required to file anapplication dossier99 to the SSC for an issuing license. There are two different sets of96

Pursuant to Article 2.2, Decree 48/1998, “[p]ublic offerings are the offers for sales of transferable securities
that meet requirements prescribed in Articles 6.5 and 8.2 of this Decree”. Articles 6.5, and 8.2, Decree
48/1998 lay down requirements concerning the amount of equity capital or debt capital of a company held by
the public and the number of company outside investors.
97
Ibid, Art. 3.
98
Ibid, Article 6.
99
In Vietnam, the term “application dossier” instead of “registration statement” is employed. Probably this isbecause Vietnamese issuers cannot simply be registered but must get a license from the SSC in order to make apublic issue of securities.

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter II

dossier required for shares and bonds offerings. To get shares publicly issued, theapplication dossier must include:100
A letter of application;
A public-notarized copy of the establishment license/decision;101
A public-notarized copy of the business registration certificate;
The company charter;
A general shareholders meeting's resolution approving the stock
issuance;
The company-profile notice (ban cao bach);102
A list of the members of the management board and director (orgeneral director);
The audited financial statements of the last two consecutive years;
Minutes of the company's asset assessment done by a competent stateauthority (if the issuer is an equitized state enterprise);
An undertaking to underwrite the issuing shares (if available).

100

See Decree 48, Art. 9.1; see also Circular 02/2001/TT-UBCK dated September 28, 2001 (hereinafter,
Circular 02/2001), Section IV. 1.
101
This document is required by Circular 02/2001 but not by Decree 48/1998. Since the effective date of theEnterprise Act, enterprise incorporators have not been required to obtain an establishment license. Nowadays
they only need a registration certificate to commence their businesses. Perhaps Circular 02/2001 refers to
issuers that are state enterprises in equitizing process.
102
The original Vietnamese text uses the term “ban cao bach”, whose precise meaning is “prospectus”.
Because the term “prospectus” employed in the Vietnamese text denotes a component of the registration
dossier, filed with the SSC, this might confuse foreign readers. Therefore, in this paper, the term “ban caobach” will be translated as “company-profile notice”; only when “ban cao bach” is made available for public
reference, then the term “prospectus” will be used.
In the US, the term “prospectus” means a notice, circular, advertisement, letter of communication, which
offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security [see Securities Act of 1933 s 2 (a) (10), 15 USC
s 77b (2002)]. A prospectus must contain specified information (but not all the information) found in theregistration statement filed with the SEC [see Securities Act of 1933, s 10 (a) (1), 15 USC s 77j (2002)]. The
prospectus must be available for public investors’ reference as soon as the relevant securities are eligible to be
publicly offered for sale (or during post effective period) [see Securities Act of 1933 s 5, 15 USC 77e (2002)].
In the literature, the term “prospectus” is, however, sometimes referred to as a component of theregistration statement. Alan R. Palmiter writes: “The registration statement is typically prepared by company
counsel. Part I contains the prospectus; Part II contains supplemental information, signatures, and exhibits.”
For more information, see Alan R. Palmiter, Securities Regulation: Example and Explanation, (1998), 88 &87. Hereinafter, Alan Palmiter.
David L. Ratner also writes: ‘“The registration statement” consists of two parts: the “prospectus”, acopy of which must be furnished to every purchaser of the securities, and “Part II”, containing informationand exhibits which need not be furnished to purchasers but are available for public inspection in theCommission’s files’. For more information, see David L. Ratner, Securities Regulation, (1998) 34. Hereinafter,
David Ratner (1998).
In Japan, the term “prospectus” is also used to denote “a document containing explanatory statements onsuch matters as may be prescribed by an ordinance of the Cabinet Office including the business of the issuer ofa security and others for delivery to the other party of a public offering or public selling of asecurities・・・”: [see Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 (2001 Japan), Art. 2, Sub-art. 10].

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter II

If the issuer desires to have its bonds publicly issued, an even more comprehensive
set of documents must be prepared. Although a resolution of the general shareholders
meeting concerning the issuance of bonds is not required as it is in the issuance of shares,
the dossier must consist of all of the remaining above-mentioned documents, and someextra documents must be added, namely:103
A resolution of the management board concerning the application
for public issuance of bonds; where the issuer is a state enterprise,
an approval for the issuance from the state authority that granted theenterprise an establishment license is required;
A commitment of the issuer to carry out its responsibilities withrespect to the investors;104
A contract signed between the issuer and the bondholders’ trustee;
Minutes of the evaluation of the surety, or an agreement document of
the underwriter to underwrite the settlement.
Within 45 days from the date of receipt of the application dossier, the SSC is
required to grant or refuse to grant an issuing license. Where a refusal is made, the SSC
has to give its reasons in written form.105
When seeking to issue extra shares to the public (e.g. to make a public issue ofshares for the second time), issuing companies also have to apply for an issuing licensefrom the SSC, 106 providing that, they meet a number of statutory requirements. 107
Circular 02/2001 provides for the contents of the application dossier filed with the SSC
by the issuers. It seems that the application procedure remains the same as what the issuer
has to go through to get shares issued for the first time, except for a simpler application
dossier filed with the SSC. Some exhibits exempted from submission include thenotarized copy of the company establishment license/decision, the notarized copy of thecompany charter, and the decision on evaluation of the enterprise asset signed by a stateauthority (where the issuer used to be a state enterprise).108
103

See Decree 48/1998, Art. 9.2; see also Circular 02/2001, Section IV. 2.
This commitment seems unnecessary since the bond certificate itself is a contract (1) which contains the
responsibilities of the issuer and the rights of the bondholder; (2) under which the two parties have agreed to
implement their responsibilities and rights. As such, there is no need for a separate commitment as provided forin this provision.
105
See Decree 48/1998, Art. 11.
106
See Circular 02/2001, Section V.1.
107
See Decree 48/1998, Art. 7; see also Circular 02/2001, Sections: II.1 and II.2. According to theseprovisions: (1) issuers have to meet almost all of the conditions facing them in the first issuance except for therequirement that founding shareholders, by the time the issuance finished, are required to hold at least 20%
equity capital of the issuer within the first three years from the date of completion of the issuance; (2)furthermore, the other two new conditions facing issuers are: (a) the second issuance must be effected at least
one year after the first issuance from the date the issuer obtained the first issuing license, and (b) total value ofshares issued for the second time must not exceed total value of the outstanding shares.
108
See Section IV.3.
104

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter II

Under Decree 48/1998 and Circular 02/2001, an issuing license seems to be valid
for a limited term because the issuers or the distributors must issue securities within 90
days from the effective date of the issuing license.109 After the 90th day, the remaining
securities cannot continuously be distributed, pursuant to Decree 48/1998. Circular
02/2001, however, goes further in saying that after the expiration of the 90-day period, if
there are securities remaining, and if the issuers seek to continue the distribution, thenthey have to file a letter of application to the SSC. The letter must include reasons for anda proposal of the continuous distribution of the remaining securities.
2. Listing Process
Section V.6, Circular 02/2001 says that shares and bonds that are eligible for public
issuance can be registered and listed at a trading center or a stock exchange. Article 22,
Decision 79/2000110 stipulates a number of criteria that issuers have to meet in order to
get their securities listed:
1. Having a charter capital of at least 10 billion Vietnamese Dong;
2. Making profits in the last two consecutive years preceding thefiling date of the application for being listed or re-listed; having
healthy financial conditions and potential prospects;
3. Having at least 20% of equity capital owned by more than 100
outside investors; this figure shall be 15% if the equity capital of
the issuer reaches 100 billion Vietnamese Dong;
4. Having at least 20% of total value of issued bonds held by morethan 100 outside investors; this figure shall be 15% if the total
value of bonds to be issued reaches 100 billion VietnameseDong;
5. Having financial statements in the last two consecutive years
preceding the filing date of the application for being listed or relisted, wholly approved or approved with an exception by anauditor;6. Having eliminated the causes for being de-listed (if the issuer was
to be de-listed and now applies to be re-listed).
The first four criteria can actually be found in the conditions a company has to meetto make a public offering. Thus, those who are already eligible for a public issuance will
only face one condition, (5), if seeking to be listed for the first time; or will face two
conditions, (5) and (6), if seeking to be listed for the second time.

109

See Decree 48/1998, Art. 14; see also Circular 02/2001, Section VI.9.
The full name of this document is Decision 79/2000/QD/UBCK, dated 29 Dec. 2000. This Decision
promulgates the “Regulation of Members, Listing, Information Disclosure and Securities Transaction”.
11029

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter IIThose who already meet the above-mentioned criteria can become listed companies
after completing some administrative procedures at a trading center. It seems that in doing
so, the issuers (1) can simply get registered at a securities trading center to be listedcompanies, or (2) have to apply at a securities center for being listed, depending on thedate on which the issuer files the listing dossier with a trading center.
Those who seek to get their securities listed on a trading center for the first time,
and within one year after obtaining the issuing license from the SSC, will have to file alisting registration statement with the center. The statement must consist of a letter oflisting registration, a copy of the issuing license, a report on the result of public offering, ashareholder or bondholder list, a copy of the company-profile notice and a resume of that
notice which was approved by the SSC.111 After five working days from the date thetrading center receives the adequate registration statement, the issuer can get securities
listed on the center.112
It seems that those who seek to have their securities listed on a trading center for the
first time, but one year after obtaining the issuing license from the SSC, have to overcome
another application procedure to get their securities listed. Article 16.3, Decision 79/2000
reads:
Where a listing registration is filed with a trading center one year
after the date of obtaining the issuing license from the SSC, apartfrom the documents provided for in sub-article 1 of this Article, theissuer has to file with the securities trading center the financial
statements of the last two consecutive years. Such statements must
include: the balance sheets, business performance reports,
commentary on the financial statements (attached with the commentsof an independent auditing company). The securities trading center
shall consider and settle within 45 days from the date of receipt of
the complete listing application dossier.
It is clear that where the issuer seeks to have their securities listed for the first time
and within one year from the date of receipt of the issuing license, its securities will belisted after five working days. Where an issuer seeks to have securities listed for the firsttime, but after one year from the date of receipt of the issuing license, it seems to be
subject to some discretionary powers of a trading center. In other words, in the latter caseit seems harder for the issuer to become a listed company than in the former case. This is,perhaps, because in the later case a longer time has passed since the issuer obtaining theissuing license from the SSC. During that time, the business situation of the issuer might
be changed and therefore the relevant trading center needs to investigate more about theissuer to ensure that its current business situation is satisfactory for being listed.

111
112

See Decision 79/2000, Art. 16.1.
Ibid., Art. 16.2.

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter II

II. WHETHER THE CURRENT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS ENSURE THE
AVAILABILITY, TIMELINESS, AND ADEQUACY OF INFORMATION
1. Information Disclosure Requirements under the Existing Regulation
A full information disclosure regime has widely been recognized as a cornerstone of
securities law to assure a continuous flow of information, which in turn ensures thatinvestors are protected. This position has become embedded, for example, in the IOSCO(International Organization of Securities Commissions) document,113 and in the US114 andJapan115 securities regulation. Having been aware of that fact, the lawmakers in Vietnam
created relatively comprehensive disclosure requirements, which seem impressive to
foreigners.116
The information disclosure regime is quite distinct compared with other componentsof the current securities regulations because of the fact that it lies in various legal texts
regulating both the securities industry and enterprises; and because it has undergone
consecutive changes within a short time. The core legal rule of the securities regulations,
Decree 48/1998, merely gives general principles concerning information disclosure.
Principles that are more detailed were created later by the SSC. Three months after theissuance of Decree 48/1998, the “Regulation of Public Issuance of Shares and Bonds”
promulgated under Circular 01/1998 117 was passed. In September 28, 2001, Circular
01/1998 was replaced by Circular 02/2001. This circular, similar to its predecessor,
provides a legal basis for public offering disclosures. Continuous disclosures are mainly
subject to the “Regulation of Members, Listing, Information Disclosure, and Securities
Transactions”, which was only released in 1999 by Decision 04/1999. 118 In June 12,2000, Decision 04/1999 was revised by Decision 42/2000,119 which, in turn, was shortly
repealed by Decision 79/2000 in December 29, 2000. Thus, information disclosure
113

See IOSCO, “Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation - A Report of the International
Organization of Securities Commissions: September 1998”, Part I.4.2.1: at
IOSCO Document Library, http://www.IOSCO.org/docs-public/1998-objectives.html,
visited Nov. 6, 2001.
114
See Securities Act of 1933 ss 5, 6, 7, 8, & 10, 15 USC ss 77e, 77f, 77g, 77h, & 77j (2002): the principal aimof the US Securities Act is to facilitate the availability of reliable information concerning securities that aregoing to be offered to the public; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ss 12, 13, & 14, 15 USC ss 78l,
78m, & 78n (2002).
115
See Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 (2001 Japan), Arts 5 & 24: the fundamental objective of the
securities regulation of Japan is timely disclosure of information.
116
See Indira A. R. Lakshmaman, Globe Staff, “Vietnam Takes Slow Road Toward Capitalism Stock
Exchange Opens to Trade only 4 Stocks”, (Nov. 27, 2000) The Boston Globe, <LexisNexis: Top News: Most
Recent Two Weeks of News Stories>.
117
The full name of this document is Circular 01/1998/TT-UBCK dated October 13, 1998 (hereinafter,
Circular 01/1998).
118
The full name of this document is Decision 04/1999/QD-UBCK1 dated March 27, 1999 (hereinafter,
Decision 04/1999).
119
The full name of this document is Decision 42/2000/QD-UBCK3 dated June 12, 2000. Hereinafter,
Decision 42/2000.

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter II

requirements can now be found in Decree 48/1998, Circular 02/2001, Decision 79/2000,
the Enterprise Act and other legal texts guiding the implementation of the Act.
The disclosure regime applying to issuing companies requires four types of
disclosure:(a.1.) Disclosure at the time an issuer is seeking to make a public offering (hereinafter,
public offering disclosure);(a.2.) Periodic disclosure (a disclosure made on a quarterly, half-yearly or annual basis);(a.3.) Timely disclosure (disclosure of newly emerged material facts that might affect theshare prices);(a.4.) Disclosure at the request of either the SSC or a securities trading center.
Securities trading centers are also subject to information disclosure regulation but
their duties are confined within the disclosure of market activities.
Apart from these requirements, information disclosure is also required when atender offer takes place.
a. Disclosures by Issuing Companies
a.1. Public Offering Disclosure
Public offering disclosure is of importance since it provides the public, for the firsttime, with relevant information about the issuers as soon as they publicly offer securities.
Such disclosures enable investors to make wise and right investment decisions in the
primary markets. Possibly for this reason, regulations of public offering in mostdeveloped countries' securities laws require information to be widely published anddistributed by issuers.120
In Vietnam, the whole set of statutory provisions that govern public offering
disclosures can be found in the regulation of public offering promulgated under Chapter
II Decree 48/1998 and Section IV Circular 02/2001.
Under the regulation on public offering, before securities can be sold to the public,
the issuer must file an application dossier containing specified information with the SSC
to obtain an issuing license, and must provide public investors with specified information.
The public offering disclosure an issuer has to make is thus done through this application
process. Documents found in the dossier 121 are expected to contain adequate andnecessary information concerning the issuer. Among these documents, perhaps the mostimportant ones that provide the public with essential information about the issuer are thecompany-profile notice and the financial statement.

120

See James D. Cox, “The Future Content of the US Securities Law: Premises for Reforming the Regulationof Securities Offering: An Essay” (2000) 63 Law and Contemporary Problems 11, 14.
121
The list of these documents is mentioned in Section I, Sub-section 1 (“Public Offering”) of this Chapter.

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter II

The company-profile notice must contain necessary, faithful, and transparent
information that will be helpful in enabling public investors and securities firms toappraise precisely the financial situation, business performance and prospects of theissuer. 122 The company-profile notice must provide the public with the following
information: 123
1. Name, domicile, telephone and fax numbers;
2. Summary of the company’s charter and history;
3. Structure of the organization or business group (conglomerate) the issuer belongsto;
4. Company management apparatus;
5. Financial performance analysis;
6. Shareholdings held by the current shareholders; names and addresses of large
shareholders (holding more than 5% of equity capital of the issuer), of
management board members and of the director, and the chief accountant, andtheir corresponding equity and debt ownership;
7. Tax liabilities and the way it is intended to discharge such liabilities of thecompany; pending debts; issuing plans and proposals for the use of the proceeds(capital raised from the public);
8. Outcomes of business performance and of marketing; and principal
products/services produced/provided in the last two consecutive years, and so on.
Where the issuer intends to issue shares that give shareholders the right to purchaseother shares of stock (call option), or intends to issue preferred shares having call option,or intends to issue convertible bonds or bonds having call option, or secured bonds, thecompany-profile notice must prescribe the rights and other conditions that relate to suchsecurities.124
The financial statement must be presented in conformity with the current accounting
regulation.125 The annual balance sheet and annual business performance report must be
audited by an approved auditing firm.126 Where the issuer holds more than 50% of the122

See Circular 02/2001, Section IV. 4. a.
Ibid, Section IV. 4.b.
124
Ibid, Section IV. 4.c. Possibly it is too early to introduce this provision when the Vietnamese securities
market is merely in its infancy.
125
The following Sub-section of this Section will discuss the current accounting regulation.
126
The “Regulation of Independent Auditing Firms Selected for Auditing Issuers and Securities Firms” waspromulgated under Decision 26/2000/QD-UBCK2 dated Apr. 5, 2000 (hereinafter, Decision 26/2000).
Pursuant to Article 2, Decision 26/2000, an approved auditing firm is an independent auditing firm that gets
approval from the SSC to audit issuing companies and securities firms. Article 5.1, Decision 26/2000, provides
for criteria to be met by independent auditing firms that seek to be approved auditing firms.
For more information concerning independent auditing firms, see Decree 07/CP dated Jan. 29, 1994, Art. 4(which defines independent auditing firms); Circular 22/TC/CDKT dated Mar. 19, 1994, Section III. 16 (which
specifies criteria to be met by those who seek to establish an independent auditing firm).
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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter II

equity capital of another company, the financial statement of this company must be
included in the application dossier filed by the issuer.127
After obtaining an issuing license from the SSC, the issuer must get its issuingannouncement published in one central and one local128 newspaper on five consecutive
days and in a formal bulletin of a trading center.129 The announcement must include: thename of the issuer, domicile of the head office, telephone and fax numbers; charter
capital; business purpose; public issuing price; types of shares or bonds; total number ofshares or bonds permitted to be issued to the public; date and term (thoi han) of theissuance; place where shares or bonds will be distributed; place where the prospectus will
be available for public access.130
The last item in the announcement that concerns the place where the public canobtain the prospectus of the issuer is a new rule introduced by Circular 02/2001,
compared with Circular 01/1998.
After obtaining an issuing license from the SSC, and before distributing securities tothe public, issuers have to file with the SSC specified documents such as a resume of theprospectus, an issuance notifying document, and other documents (if any are available),that are to be used for the distribution of securities. After five working days from the dateof receipt of the said documents, if the SSC has no refusal, the issuer can use these
documents in offering securities for sale to the public.131 The issuer is responsible forproviding a formal prospectus or its resume (if any is available) at the request of investors
or securities firms, and in the places specified in the Issuing Announcement.132 Someother possible ways by which the issuers, underwriters or distributors can directly furnish
the prospectus to individual investors such as mailing and facsimile transmission,
however, do not seem to be legally required.
a.2. Periodic Disclosure
Issuers are required to disclose information concerning their financial situations andbusiness performance on a periodic basis.133
On the whole, Decree 48/1998 and the Enterprise Act merely give generalprinciples concerning continuous disclosures imposed on issuers. More detailed
provisions can be found in Decision 79/2000.134

127

See Circular 0 2/2001, Section IV.5.
A local newspaper issued in the place where the head office of the issuer is located.
129
See Decree 48/1998, Art. 13.
130
See Circular 02/2001, Section VI. 2
131
Ibid, Section VI.3.
132
See Section VI.4.
133
See Decree 48/1998, Art. 18.2; see also the Enterprise Act, Art. 93.
134
This Decision reserves one chapter, Chapter IV titled “Information Disclosure”, which applies to listedcompanies, to fund management companies and to securities trading centers.
128

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter II

Listed companies have to report to the securities trading center and the SSC about
their business performance, capital, assets, turnover, profits and taxes on a quarterly basis,
and also on half-yearly basis, within the first 15 days of the following month.135
They also have to disclose the annual report within 90 days from the date ofcompletion of a fiscal year. Such a report includes a balance sheet, a businessperformance report, a cash flow report, a commentary on the financial statement (withattached certification by an approved auditing firm) and a general report.136 The first four
items of the annual report are actually components of a financial statement under thecurrent accounting regulation.137 Thus, the annual report consists of a financial statement
and a general report.138
Decision 79/2000 also requires listed companies that own more than 50% of theequity of another company, or those having 50% or more equity capital owned by anothercompany, to disclose the financial statement of their subsidiaries or holding companies,
respectively.139
The annual report must be filed with the securities trading center and the SSC; its
contents must be published in the annual releases of the listed companies, and be briefly
published in the two consecutive issues of a central newspaper.140
Furthermore, such annual reports must be preserved at the Information Disclosure
Section of the Securities Trading Center within two years, for investors' reference.141
a.3. Timely Disclosure
Timely disclosures are required in a number of specified circumstances. Decree
48/1998 briefly says that issuers have to report, in a timely way, to the SSC on their own
initiative where important information that can affect the prices of their securities isavailable.142
The timely disclosure regime is, moreover, provided for in some detail underDecision 79/2000. Listed companies must, on their own initiative, make timely disclosurein a number of circumstances, which can be grouped as follows:135

See Decision 79/2000, Art. 32.1.
Ibid., Art. 32.2.
137
See Decision 167/2000-QD/BTC (hereinafter, Decision 167/2000) dated Oct. 25, 2000, promulgating the“Enterprise Financial Statement Regime”, Part I, Section II.
138
Although Decision 79/2000 imposes a duty to disclose financial statements on listed companies, the core of
the accounting regulations, Ordinance on Accounting and Statistic, does not have any concrete provisionlaying down such a duty. Thus, public access to enterprise financial information does not seem legally
recognized under the current accounting regulation. This fact makes the Ordinance disagree with theEnterprise Act and the securities regulations and causes difficulties in implementing the accounting regulation.
139
See Decision 79/2000, Art. 32.3.
140
Ibid., Art. 32.4.
141
See Art. 32.5.
142
See Decree 48/1998, Art. 18.3.
136

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter II(a) Their financial situation has changed, e.g. their bank accounts are to be suspended or
blocked; or when such situations have been reversed; their assets have been damaged
up to 10% or more; or they go bankrupt;(b) Their legal structures might be changed: going into consolidation, merger, division or
separation; business registration certificate or business operation permission being
revoked; facing a dissolution decision;(c) Their performance does not go smoothly, for example: their business operation has
ceased for more than three months, or has been suspended or restarted; or the
consumption of their main products has been suspended;(d) They are threatened by some legal actions such as being prosecuted for violating thelisting regulation; being investigated by a tax authority; or receiving a court decision
concerning company business performance;(e) When they make a decision concerning a number of issues such as paying dividends,
splitting or adding up outstanding shares or issuing new shares, changing businesspurpose, expanding business scale up to 10% or more of the equity capital, de-listingand other decisions that might affect stock price or investors’ benefit.143
A listed company is required to report such information to the trading center inwritten form, within 24 hours from the time the event occurs. The listed company also has
to announce such an event within three days from the date it occurs, in a central
newspaper and a newspaper of the locality where its head office is located.144
The securities trading center is required to release the above-mentioned information
on its own information disclosure facilities. However, when the relevant companies arebeing investigated by a tax authority, receiving a court decision, or being de-listed, andwhen companies face events that might affect their securities prices, then the trading
center will have to disclose such information in the public media.145
Apart from these requirements, under the Enterprise Act, shareholders must be
informed about the company decision to acquire its own shares within 30 days from thedate of approval of that decision.146 The Act, however, does not specify the way in whichsuch information is to be furnished to shareholders.
a.4. Disclosures at the Request of either the SSC or a Securities Trading Center(hereinafter, disclosures at a request)
Decree 48/1998 merely says that where it is deemed necessary to protect public
investors, the SSC can request a relevant issuer to file with it a report on the issuer’s
business situation.147
143

See Decision 79/2000, Art. 33.1.
Ibid, Art. 33.2.
145
Ibid, Art. 33.3.
146
Ibid, Art. 65.
147
See Decree 48/1998, Art. 18.4.
144

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter II

Decision 79/2000 further develops the above-mentioned provision. Accordingly,
listed companies have to disclose relevant information at the request of either the SSC ora securities trading center if: (a) there is rumor, concerning a listed company, thatthreatens the price of its security, and it is deemed necessary to clarify such rumor; (b)when the price of a listed security and volume of transactions on such a security havesuddenly been changed.148
Where such circumstances have occurred, within 24 hours from the time thesecurities trading center or the SSC makes the request, a listed company has to disclose
the relevant information in a central newspaper and a newspaper of the locality where its
head office is situated. The listed company has to report to the SSC and the trading centerin written form.149 The concrete contents of the report made by the listed company will be
subject to the rules of the trading center where it has its securities listed.150
b. Trading Information Disclosure Requirements With Respect to Securities Trading
Centers
Securities trading centers have to disclose information concerning: market
transactions (securities’ prices, volume and value of securities transacted and so on);purchasing and selling orders (the best offering/purchasing prices, number of buying andselling orders); indexes of listed securities; market management and market situation;
listed companies and fund management companies, members of the trading center andinvestors.151
The manner in which securities trading centers disclose information includes
electronic boards, computer system on the trading floors; printed releases by the centers;
and public media. 152 Among these facilities, perhaps, the electronic boards can only
provide the public with information such as securities’ prices, volume, and value of
securities transacted, and indexes of listed securities. Material information that is helpful
for appraising the situation of listed companies will thus be disclosed by the remaining
facilities.
Securities trading centers are also responsible for furnishing information concerning
listed companies to securities firms. Those securities firms will then be in charge ofmaking such information available to public investors.153 Since the number of securities
firms remain poor, it seems hard for public investors to get information directly from therelevant firm.
Furthermore, the computer network among the Securities Trading Center, listedcompanies and securities firms has not been connected, and so information has been148

See Decision 79/2000, Arts. 34.1.
Ibid, Art. 34.2.
150
Ibid, Art. 34.3.
151
Ibid, Art. 40.
152
Ibid, Art. 41.
153
Ibid, Art. 42.1.
149

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter IItransferred mainly by mail, which is often delayed and dependent on the efforts of therelevant parties.154
The way in which information reaches the public investors can best be illustrated by
the following chart:

SSC
Information Disclosure Section of the STC
Computer System on Trading Floor
STC

STC’s Bulletins

Public Media

PublicInvestors
Securities Firms

Newspapers
Annual Printed Releases
Issuers

Prospectus at Places specified in Issuing
Announcement

Chart No. 1: Information Flowc. Information Disclosure in Tender Offers
It is noteworthy that “Corporate Tender Offers and Mergers” are inserted in
Chapter VIII, Decree 48/1998, under the title “Prohibited and Restricted Activities”.155

154

See Kim Chi, “Hoat dong cong bo thong tin tren thi truong chung khoan” [Information Disclosure on
Securities Trading Centre], (2001) 2, Tin Thi Truong Chung Khoan [Securities Markets Bulletin] (Jan. 6,
2001) 1, 1. Facsimile transmission is not mentioned here; it is unclear whether this facility has been employedin transferring information, hereinafter, Kim Chi.
155
Although having been titled “Corporate Tender Offers and Mergers”, Article 74 gives more weight toregulation of tender offers. Its contents do not embrace what is implied in the title. In other words, the Article
does not seem to deal directly with mergers.
The question of information disclosure in mergers will not be discussed here since such disclosure ismainly required and made among the shareholders of the parties in a merger, not among public investors.

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Article 74, titled “Corporate Tender Offers and Mergers” comprises two sub-articles.
Sub-article one reads:
Organization(s) and individual(s) which engage in any transactionthat affects the holding or the transferring of 5% or more of voting
shares of one issuing company, shall be subject to reporting to the
Securities Trading Center or Stock Exchange.
The language of this provision sounds ambiguous and does not seem to cover theactivities that might be expected. First, if the terms “organization” and “individual”,
employed in the provision, are read in singular form, the scope of this provision does notseem to cover an event that very likely occurs in practice, viz. the purchase in collusion of
more than 5% of voting shares from one issuer by two or more persons where each ofthem merely buys, for instance, 4.9% of the shares. If these terms are read in plural form(“organizations” and “individuals”), then it seems that any group of persons whosepurchases exceed 5% of the said shares will be subject to reporting requirements
regardless of whether or not they have purchased in collusion.
Secondly, the provision merely imposes reporting responsibilities on purchasers of
5% or more of voting shares of an issuer. It does not spell out which kinds of information
are to be reported. Decision 79/2000, while providing for the types of information that
securities trading centers have to disclose, says that the relevant securities trading center
shall disclose information concerning the investors that fall within the scope of Article 74
Decree 48/1998. 156 It appears that the only information required to be disclosed here
concerns the investors making tender offers.
Furthermore, the securities trading center seems to be the only entity that should bereported to, since the provision does not require the purchaser to report either to the issuer
or to the SSC. Experience from abroad shows that the issuer and the governmental
regulatory agency should also get a report from the acquirer where such transactions
occur.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 of the US also regulates this matter but in amore comprehensive manner. Pursuant to Section 13(d), the acquirers of more than 5% of
any equity securities of class/classes registered under Section 12 of the act will be subject
to reporting requirements, viz. to notify the issuer of such securities; to send to and to filewith the stock exchange and the SEC, respectively, statements containing specified
information. Section 13(d) even stipulates, in detail, the information that must be includedin the statement, e.g. information concerning the purchaser, the fund used to acquire such
equity securities, the purpose of the purchase, the amount of acquired shares, and otherinformation relating to any contract, agreement or understanding.157
The matter is dealt with in a similar manner in Japan, where a holder of more than
5% of share certificates (large shareholder) has to provide a “large holding report” to the156
157

See Article 40.8.
See items (A) - (E) of this Section.

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter II

Prime Minister within five days from the date that the person becomes a large
shareholder. The report must contain information such as:
matters relating to the holding ratio of share certificates, etc.,
matters relating to the funds used to acquire the share certificates,
etc., the purpose of holding the share certificates, etc. andothers・・・158
Sub-article two, Article 74, Decree 48/1998 allows the acquisition of more than
25% of the voting shares of one issuing company, provided that the acquirer makes apublic offer. It reads:
Organizations, individuals, and relating parties, which intend toacquire more than 25% of voting shares of an issuing company, shallhave to hold a public bidding in conformity with rules andregulations of the SSC.
Since the passage of this provision in 1998, the SSC has not created such rules andregulations. For this reason, to date, uncertainties remain and perhaps public biddings, if
available, have been held according to the discretion of the acquirers, which might goagainst the aim of this provision.

Some Remarks
Looking at the information disclosure regulation, one is impressed by its relative
comprehensiveness with various categories of information disclosure: (a) disclosures by
issuers/listed companies such as public offering disclosure, periodic disclosure, timely
disclosure, disclosure at a request, (b) disclosures by securities trading centers and (c)disclosures in tender offers. In addition, auditing work, which is required with respect tothe financial statements of listed companies, ensures that information released by thesecompanies is reliable. This is of importance since it can build up public confidence in thecompanies’ released information, and in securities markets also. Such a good system of
information disclosure, if accompanied by sound accounting rules and adequate auditing
regulation will, in principle, generate good information flow in the securities market, andthe market will gain public confidence. That is because accounting rules are seen as acentral part of information disclosure.159 The quality of disclosed information is greatly
dependent on accounting and auditing practices. Only when good systems of accounting
and auditing are achieved, can information disclosed by listed companies be reliable and158

See Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 (2001 Japan), Art. 27-23.
See Bernard S. Black, “The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets”, (2001)48
UCLA Law Review 781, 849.
159

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter II

useful to the public, and securities markets really attract public investors. A thoroughexamination of the current accounting and auditing regulation of Vietnam is thus needed
to clarify whether the current accounting and auditing rules are a support or a hurdle in
implementing the existing information disclosure regulation.
2. Whether the Accounting and Auditing Regulations Support Well the Information
Disclosure Regime
The core legal instrument regulating the accounting work of enterprises in Vietnam
is the Ordinance on Accounting and Statistics, which was passed on May 20, 1988. This
Ordinance and other subordinate legislation together compose the current accounting
regulation. Being issued more than a decade ago and covering the two different areas,accounting and statistics, the Ordinance can no longer meet the newly emerging
requirements of the young market economy; its provisions are not in conformity withother law regulating enterprises and are not comparable with international accounting
standards.
The Ordinance has been supplemented by a number of other legal documents
issued by the Finance Ministry. In 1995, Decision 1141160 was issued to promulgate the"Enterprises Accounting Regime". This Regime consists of the regulations of (1) the
accounts system, (2) the financial statement system, (3) accounting books, and (4)accounting exhibits. The regulation of the financial statement system (item No. 2) was
repealed by the new "Enterprise Financial Statement Regime" promulgated underDecision 167/2000. These two Decisions apply to large enterprises. Medium and small
enterprises are subject to the regulation of accounting and financial statement
promulgated under Decision 1177/TC/QD/CDKT dated Dec. 23, 1996. Since listedcompanies are large enterprises, the following discussion will focus on the statutory
provisions promulgated under the Ordinance, Decision 1141 and Decision 167/2000.
Although the new regulation of financial statements has been introduced by thesetwo decisions, there are several issues that still need to be taken into consideration. First,
the statutory provisions concerning the contents of a financial statement seem to be notentirely consistent. Pursuant to the Enterprise Act, a balance sheet and a settlement ofaccount report are components of a financial statement. 161 Meanwhile, a financial
statement is composed of (1) a balance sheet, (2) a business performance report, (3) acash flow report; and (4) a commentary of the financial statement, according to Decision
167/2000.162

160

The full name of this decision is Decision 1141-TC/QD/CDKT dated November 01, 1995 (promulgating the'Enterprises Accounting Regime').
161
See Art. 118.2.
162
See Part I, Section II (Contents of the Financial Report System). The cash flow report is although includedin the list, is not a mandatory item (see Part I, Section III, First paragraph). However, according to Article 32.2,
Decision 79, the cash flow report is a mandatory item in the financial statement released by listed companies.

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter II

Secondly, the form of financial statement that is modeled after the form applied tostate enterprises is very different from the international accounting standards. 163 The
requirements with respect to financial statements appear to be too complicated, with evenexcessive and unnecessary items.164 This observation is borne out by the fact that 90, 60,
and 40 different items are required to be included in the balance sheet, the businessperformance report, and the cash flow report, respectively. 165 Moreover, much of therequired information appears not to be necessary to be inserted in the statement e.g. thevalue-added tax, income, and salary of company employees.166 It is expensive and time
consuming to meet these requirements, especially in the current socio-economic
circumstance of Vietnam where human resources in the accounting and auditing fields
remain poor. As for the cash flow report, even though it is available for investors’
inspection, it does not always seem to be helpful. That is because of the adoption of thetwo statutory methods of reporting, direct and indirect, which causes difficulties toinvestors when they refer to such reports. Under the direct method, the report reflects
amounts collected from, and amounts paid for, various business activities, whileaccording to the indirect method, the report indicates various purposes to which the pretax-profits will be distributed to.
SACOM (a cable and communication materials shareholding company) has
encountered a problem after its information was released to the public, simply because it
followed the direct method to make the cash flow report. One of the items of information
disclosed by SACOM, when it announced a proposal on the issue of bonus shares in order
to increase its charter capital, was a 50 billion Vietnamese Dong depreciation fund. Afterthe information had been released, investors tried hard to study the cash flow report tofind out the concrete depreciation amount, but they failed. This is because the cash flow
report was made in accordance with the direct method based on the difference between
the total collected and the total paid amounts, which makes it difficult for investors todefine the depreciation fund.167
Looking at the accounting regulations of Vietnam, one finds that the regulations
are far different from those in other countries. A report on the changes in reserved profit
is important, as it helps investors to evaluate a company’s potential financial resources,
but it is not required to be included in the financial statement under the current regulation.
Thus, the statement, while in other respects containing too much information, cannot
provide public investors with useful information that would enable them to make prudent
investment decisions. In practice, investors find it difficult to compare financial
163

See “Seeing a Compromise”, SGT Weekly Dec. 08, 2001,
http://www.vneconomy.com.vn/en/finance/finance_taxation/01-0038.htm, visited Apr. 08, 2002.
Hereinafter, “Seeing a Compromise”.
164
Ibid.
165
See Decision 167/2000, Form No. B01-DN; Form No. B02-DN; and Form No. B03-DN, respectively.
166
See “Seeing a Compromise” above n. 163.
167
See “Nha dau tu mat niem tin vi doanh nghiep khong trung thuc” [Investors Lost Confidence Due toEnterprises’ Dishonesty], Dau tu chung khoan [Securities Investment], (Sep. 5, 2002),
http://vnexpress.net/Vietnam/Kinh-doanh/chungkhoan, visited Sep. 7, 2002.

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performance even amongst a very small number of domestic listed companies. 168 Far
worse are the difficulties investors might encounter when they seek to compare such
performance between listed companies operating inside and outside Vietnam.
Usually, in other countries, a financial statement consists of (1) a balance sheet, (2)a business performance report, (3) a cash flow report, (4) a report on the changes inreserved profit, and (5) a commentary on the financial statement.169 In Japan, for example,
a financial statement (accounting documents) consists of the following items: (1) abalance sheet, (2) a profit and loss account, (3) a business report, (4) proposals relating to
the disposition of profits or the disposition of loss, and (5) the annexed specifications of
the above-mentioned documents.170
Regulation of financial statements in countries such as Britain, Singapore,
Australia and the US, as observed by one commentator, can be very strict or relatively
lenient, and can vary in such matters as submission deadlines, business sizes, and so on;
but they all have certain common features: (1) financial statements are mandatory for all
listed companies and large limited liability companies; (2) the required contents of thestatement vary from listed companies to small companies, and differentiate between thescope, size and legal structure of the companies; (3) the statements are to be audited sothat they gain public confidence; (4) information contained in the statement is classified
into public-disclosure and non-public-disclosure items. Thus the public cannot access allof the information in the statement; (5) there are enforcement mechanisms, including
sanctions and education measures. For example, a fine will be imposed for the latesubmission of financial statements; accounting and auditing staffs must be qualified, andfinancial disciplines are to be widely disseminated within the business community.171
In Vietnam, although the auditing work was not provided for under the Ordinanceon Accounting and Statistics, it has recently been required in the information disclosure
regime, as earlier mentioned, and in the Enterprise Act. Under the Act, shareholding
companies are to be inspected by an independent auditor. For the purpose of auditing,shareholding companies fall into two groups: those whose annual financial statements
need to be inspected by an independent auditing firm and others whose annual financial
statements need not.172 Though the Act does not expressly spell out which companies will
be audited by an auditing firm, the answer can be found in The Regulation of Independent
Auditing Firms Selected for Auditing Issuers and Securities Firms, promulgated under168

See Kim Chi, above n. 154.
See Anh Thi, “‘Tron’ bao cao tai chinh? Binh quan ca nuoc chi co 20% doanh nghiep thuc hien” [Financial
Statement Avoidance? On Average, only 20% of Enterprises Nationwide Have Financial Statements Filed].
Thoi bao kinh te Viet nam [Vietnam Economic Times] (Sep. 24, 2001),
http://www.vneconomy.com.vn/vn/doanh_nghiep/dir.cgi, visited Apr. 08, 2002. (Text is in Vietnamese).
Hereinafter, Anh Thi.
170
See Commercial Code (Japan), Art. 281.
171
See “Seeing a Compromise”, above n. 163.
172
See Art. 92.
169

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Decision 26/2000. The Decision includes an article specifying which companies are
required to be audited by an independent auditor:173(1) Shareholding companies and equitized enterprises that offer
securities to be listed for the first time, and those who seek tofurther issue securities to the public;(2) Shareholding companies that used to have securities issued
beyond the scope of Decree 48/1998, dated July 11, 1998, issued
by the Government (promulgating the regulation of securities
and securities market), and now seek to have their securities
listed;(3) State enterprises and limited liability companies that seek toissue bonds to the public;(4) Securities firms, fund management companies, and othersecurities investment funds which are established and operate in
Vietnam.
According to the language of the first three provisions, it is unclear whether the
relevant companies will be subject to continuous auditing, or merely face auditing
requirements when they seek to issue securities to the public or have their securities
listed. Although the last provision does not spell out such an issue, it seems to imply that(and its language only makes sense if) the entities mentioned in the provision will be
subject to auditing requirements and such requirements will apply to them in the course ofbusiness. Possibly the first three provisions also intend to require all those companies tobe subject to independent auditing, on a periodic basis, once they seek to make a public
offering or to have their securities listed.
In order to avoid conflicts of interest, Decree 26/2000 also contains some statutory
provisions under whereby independent auditing firms must not provide auditing services
to an issuing company or a securities firm if they fall into a number of specified positions.
For example, if an auditing firm and an issuing company/securities firm have a business
relationship (where they subscribe capital to run a business together: to set up a joint
venture, or a shareholding company); if an auditing firm and an issuing
company/securities firm have, in common, a five percent shareholder; or if the former andone of the latter are, at the same time, subsidiaries of another company, and so on.174
Auditors working in these independent auditing firms and the firms’ representatives
are also to be subject to a number of statutory requirements. For example, they must not
be a shareholder eligible to vote or a proxy of that shareholder of the audited issuing
company or audited securities firm; they must not be a member of the management boardof the audited issuer or audited securities firm, nor may they be a customer having
preferred treatment from the audited issuer or audited securities firm; they must not be in
173
174

Art. 2.
For more information, see Art. 5.2.

44

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter IIa close relationship (i.e. parents – children, spouse, siblings) with a person who is adirector, manager or an equivalent person of the audited issuer or audited securities firm;
they must not provide non-audit services such as bookkeeping and making financial
statement for the audited issuer or audited securities firm.175
To ensure that auditing firms maintain good quality services and to keep themworking within statutory disciplines, Decree 26/2000 also requires those firms to bereselected regularly by the stock market watchdog in order to act as an independent
auditing firm. Every two years, the SSC will announce a list of independent auditing
firms eligible to audit issuing companies and securities firms.176 Issuers and securities
firms can choose an auditing firm and auditors from the list to audit their accounting
books.177
In terms of auditing regulation over companies that make a public offering andlisted companies, and securities firms, the auditing regulation is rather complete with anumber of advanced principles. The auditing requirements do exist, but if they are notaccompanied by sound accounting regulation then there will still be a big obstacle in theway of foreign investors accessing Vietnam securities markets. That is because theycannot evaluate the financial performance of Vietnamese listed companies by comparing
their financial statements with those of their foreign counterparts. Of course, one mightargue that accounting rules vary from country to country and no one country's accounting
rules seem to deserve adoption by other countries. That is true and for decade, theharmonization of accounting standards has become one of the operational goals of the
IASC (International Accounting Standards Committee) and the IOSCO.178 For the time
being, what Vietnam needs are comparable accounting standards regardless of theabsence of international securities offerings, cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the
country. Furthermore, in the increasingly globalizing tendency of securities markets inrecent years, harmonization of accounting standards and practices is clearly needed.
Adopting a comparable accounting system with other countries around the world would
thus enable the Vietnam’s securities market to attract more foreign investors and also
permit such market to be compatible with their counterparts outside Vietnam.

175

For further information, see Art. 6.
See Art. 7.
177
See Art. 8.
178
For more information concerning the efforts of the IASC and the IOSCO in harmonizing countries'
accounting standards, see Marc I. Steinberg, above n.7, 149.
The IASC is an independent, private body that was established with a mandate to create a uniform set ofaccounting standards to be followed by companies that make cross-border securities offerings. The IASC is anadvisory authority, not an official regulator, so it does not have real enforcement authority. In December 1998,
a set of core accounting standards was completed by the IASC to be submitted to IOSCO for approval andadoption worldwide. For further information see Joseph J.M. Orabona, “There's A New Sheriff In Town - Will
the New SEC Chairman Allow Issuers of American Depository Receipts to Use International AccountingStandards To Satisfy Listing Requirements on U.S. Exchanges?”, (2002) 22 National Administrative Law
Judge Foundation Journal of The National Association of Administrative Law Judges 223, 243. Hereinafter,
Orabona.
176

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter IIThis is not to say that having internationally comparable accounting standards will
ensure the success of information disclosure regulation. 179 Rather, accounting andauditing practices play a significant role toward achieving such success. This has been
proven by the recent debacles of some economic giants, Enron and WoldCom, in the US.
The Enron breakdown resulted from conflicts of interest, accounting, poor
management, poor public disclosure practices, and auditing failure.180 The collapse of
Enron occurred at a time when the American stock market recoded unprecedented
success, but also a time when “sharp practitioners in business, investment banking,accounting or law appear to have challenged the fundamental tenets of ‘full disclosure ofmaterial information’ or ‘fair presentation of accounting results’”.181
However, according to the former SEC Chairman, David Ruder, the primary fault
in the Enron failure was poor management, which allowed Enron to engage in extremely
aggressive accounting, to overstate its earning, and not to disclose the true nature of its
corporate and financial structure and so on. He further stresses that・ ・ ・ the Enron problems represent a failure in corporate
governance. One striking aspect of this failure is Enron’s apparent
lack of respect for the accounting system that underlines financial
reporting. Enron seems to have purposely attempted to avoid
disclosure of its true finances. Instead it should have utilized theaccounting system as a means of assisting it to make soundmanagement decisions and as a source of information helping it toprovide the securities markets with a truthful statement of financial
condition.182
179

In the US, the SEC has been empowered to establish the accounting standards governing the production offinancial statements, a component of the registration statements and periodic reports filed with the SEC under
the securities laws [see Securities Act of 1933 ss 7 & 19(a), 15 USC ss 77g, 77s (a); see also Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ss 3(b), 12(b) & 13(b), 15 USC ss 78c(b), 78l(b) & 78m(b) (2002)].
However, in history, the SEC has delegated such a power to the private sector, the Committee on
Accounting Procedure, later, the Accounting Principles Board (APB). Since the APB did not perform its taskswell, the Financial Accounting Standards Board was set up in 1973 to accomplish the creation of accounting
standards, which have come to be known as Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (the term “Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles” is a technical accounting term that combines “conventions, rules, andprocedures necessary to define accepted accounting practice at a particular time.”) Since 1988 the SEC hastaken a mandate to establish high quality, comprehensive international accounting standards. [For further
information see Ibid Orabona, 239 & 242].
Regardless of those efforts of the SEC in developing accounting standards, recently a number of financial
scandals occurred in the US. For more information, see Faith Stevelman Kahn, “What are the Ways ofAchieving Corporate Social Responsibility?: Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron, Financial
Fraud, and September 11, 2001”, (2002) 76 Tulane University Tulane Law Review 1579, 1635.
180
See Joel Seligman, “What can We Learn from Enron”, (Paper delivered at a special lecture conducted byProfessor Joel Seligman on “Securities Regulation in the United States”, held by Nagoya University, Center
For Asian Legal Exchange (CALE), on May 23, 2002), 5 & 16.
181
Ibid, 3 – 4.
182
Ibid, 22.

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All these problems clearly have a connection to accounting practices rather thanto accounting standards.
The WorldCom meltdown, as reported, has its roots in accounting fraud.
Compared with the Enron scandal, the WorldCom case is not at all complex but quite
simple. 183 Within several years, WorldCom’s Chief Financial Officer, Scott Sullivan,
improperly capitalized several billion dollars worth of expenses in violation of generally
accepted accounting principles. The fraudulent activity aimed to reduce operating
expenses and artificially inflated profits, which allowed WorldCom to meet Wall Street
analysts’ profit expectations and the company’s profit margin goals during 2001 and thefirst quarter of 2002.184
Faced with these financial scandals, on July 30, 2002, President Bush signed into
law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The Act contains a number of statutory provisions
that have certain impacts on the accounting profession. The Act establishes the PublicCompany Accounting Oversight Board, which is in charge of overseeing andinvestigating the audits and auditors of public companies, of sanctioning both firms andindividuals for violations of laws, regulation, and rules. 185 To enhance the quality of
information disclosed by listed companies, the Act requires each of these companies to set
up an independent audit committee.186 In John Coffee’s view, this provision is the “mostimportant and sweeping revision” of the Act since, although the provision does notstrongly affect US corporations, it is a real threat to corporations incorporated outside theUS, especially those from European countries. The reason lies in the difference between
the corporate governance structure adopted in the US and those adopted in European
countries. The latter is characterized by a two tier-board whose managing board (lowerone) has no independent directors, and whose supervisory board (upper one) has half ofthe members being employees’ representatives. For this reason, Coffee predicts that thisstatutory reform might cause foreign issuers who are already listed to de-list, and those
who are going to list to decline to list on the US stock exchanges.187
To ensure that both public companies and auditors are responsible for all audited
reports, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires auditors to report to and to be overseen by acompany’s audit committee; and the committee has to approve all services provided by its
auditor.188 Public companies and their auditors are required to be subject to new rules andprocedures in connection with the financial reporting and auditing process such as:
second partner review and approval of audit reports, 189 management assessment of183

See Representative Max Sandlin, “Statement for Financial Services Committee Hearing, - Wrong Numbers:
the Accounting Problems at WorldCom” (Jul. 8, 2002),
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/070802sa.pdf, visited Dec. 12, 2002.
184
Ibid.
185
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 s 101, 15 USC s 7211 (2002).
186
Ibid, s 301, 15 USC s 78f(m) (2002).
187
See John C. Coffee, “Racing Towards the Top? The Impact of Cross-listings and Stock Market Competition
on International Corporate Governance” (2002) 102 Columbia Law Review 1757, 1824-1825. Hereinafter,
John Coffee (2002).
188
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, ss 204 & 302. 15 USC ss 78j-1(k) & 7241 (2002).
189
Ibid, s 103, 15 USC s 7213 (2002).

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter IIinternal controls, and audit reports having to contain a description of internal control
testing.190 In addition, auditors are forbidden from offering certain non-audit services toaudit clients, such as bookkeeping, information systems design and implementation,
appraisal or valuation services;191 auditors are also subject to the so-called “audit partner
rotation” which requires leading audit partners and audit review partners to be rotatedevery five years on public company engagements.192 To avoid conflicts of interest, theAct puts some limits on audit services providers. Accordingly, an accounting firm must
not provide audit services to a public company if the former employs one of the ex-topofficers (CEO, controller, CFO, chief accounting officer, or person in an equivalent
position) of the latter.193
It can be said that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is a quick response by the US
Congress to the scandals at Enron and WorldCom in order to restore public investor
confidence. The Act, however, has been criticized for its hard rules. According to the
Chairman of the London Stock Exchange, by its tough statutory provisions, the Act
would make the US stock market “far less attractive and welcoming to foreign issuers”.
In other words, it would cause a number of non-US firms to list their shares in other stock
markets outside the US.194
Probably, it is too early to judge the potential consequences of the Act to the US
economy and its impact on the corporate community. Whether success or failure that will
result from such a statutory reform remains to be seen. Valuable lessons that we can learn
from the recent American experience are: (1) attention should be paid not only to thecompletion of accounting standards, but also to accounting and auditing practices, inorder to avoid serious corporate financial scandals, which can devastate public confidence
in the stock market at an accelerating speed; and (2) the importance of establishing a
regulatory body to be in charge of overseeing accounting practices i.e. to inspectregistered accounting firms’ operations, to investigate potential violations of securities
laws, accounting standards, competency and conduct, and to impose sanctions for noncompliance or violations of the accounting and auditing regulations. Such a body would
play a significant role in supporting a good overseeing mechanism, which in turn would
ensure high quality accounting and auditing practices.

Some Observations
It can be said that the existing accounting rules do not well support the information
disclosure regulation. For this reason, although the information disclosure requirements
are comparable to those adopted in some developed economies such as the US and
190

Ibid, s 404, 15 USC s 7262 (2002).
Ibid, s 201, 15 USC s 78j-1(g) (2002).
192
Ibid, s 203, 15 USC s 78j-1(j) (2002).
193
Ibid, s 206, 15 USC s 78j-1(l) (2002).
194
See “UK’s LSE Chairman Blasts US Corp Reform Act”, (Dec. 9, 2002) Reuters,
http://www.forbes.com/markets/newswire, visited Dec. 10, 2002.
191

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Japan,195 they might not generate expected outcomes. Moreover, merely having complete
statutory disclosure requirements still sometimes cannot assure a healthy market. China
adopted its national Securities Law in 1998 with a rather comprehensive set of disclosure
requirements.196 Market manipulation and insider trading resulting from non-compliancewith the disclosure requirements do occur.197 Perhaps China is not unique in facing suchproblems, and it is very unlikely that Vietnam would be an exception. The experience,
therefore, should not be ignored in the context of Vietnam, where both the securities
industry and its supervision apparatus are merely in their infancy. The question of how to
enforce the information disclosure regulation is thus of importance. The following
discussion will deal with the practical implementation of the current disclosure regulation.
3. How Has the Existing Information Disclosure Regulation Worked?
So far, two types of practical problem concerning the information disclosure
regime can be seen. One consists of those problems relating to non-compliance with thecurrent information disclosures regime; and the other concerns the attitudes of "tradingfloor-ready companies" towards that regime.
a. Whether or not the current information disclosure requirements have beenadequately enforced?
A general criticism is that there has been a lack of information concerning listedcompanies; and that the disclosure regime has not properly been implemented, since listedcompanies often break the regulation on information disclosure.198 From public investors
to securities firms and listed company, all have their own varying observations
concerning the question of information disclosure.
Public investors complain about the quality and quantity of information provided by
the trading center. They get a bulletin on every trading session from the Securities
Trading Center, but the source of information is extremely poor. Market information
merely provides some figures concerning the highest or lowest prices, volume of matchedorders, totally trading volume of the preceding session, and so on. They further say that
all those source of information, they have already self-collected and self-maintained for195

See the Securities Act of 1933 ss 5, 6, 7, 8, & 10, 15 USC ss 77e, 77f, 77g, 77h, & 77j (2002), and Schedule
A; see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ss 12, 13 & 14, 15 USC ss 78l, 78m, & 78n (2002); see also Securities
and Exchange Law of 1948 (Japan), Arts. 5 & 24.
196
See Daniel M. Anderson, “Taking Stock in China: Company Disclosure and Information in China's Stock
Markets” (2000) 88 Georgetown Law Journal 1919, 1932.
197
Ibid.
198
See “Dirty Play Drives Market off Course” (Jul. 16, 2001) Emerging Markets Datafile, The Vietnam
Investment Review, <LexisNexis: Country & Region: Asia Pacific: World Sources Online, Emerging Markets
Datafile>. Hereinafter, “Dirty Play Drives Market off Course”.

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reference.199 In practice, investors have to self-collect information concerning the trading
situation of the center, and concerning interest, speed of economic growth of listedcompanies, and so on. They also have to self-assess the situation based on their own
subjective thoughts.200 Even at such a self-collecting level, it is clear that not all investors
are able do this.
Investors also complain about the lack of transparency and accuracy of both theprospectus and the financial statement made by listed companies.201 They further say that
listed companies do not periodically disclose information as provided by the law; listedcompanies do not make timely disclosure of information concerning share transactions ofcompany management board's members and of major shareholders; these companies do
not make timely announcement of information in the public media and in a number ofcases their released information is not accurate.202 In addition, the financial statements are
said to be sparsely prepared, and the commentaries on such statements lack concrete
explanations.203
Securities firms do not seem happy with what they get from the Stock Trading
Center either. Pham Uyen Nguyen, Vice Director of Bao Viet Securities Firm, says that
securities firms merely get "crude" information concerning market direction or listedcompanies from the Stock Trading Center; that the firms are hesitant in processing suchinformation for fear of being reproved for doing so. Thus, investors will have to selfanalyze the situation and decide their investment, and the consultative role of securities
firms is hardly ever activated.204
Listed companies themselves have their own concerns. For them, the shortage of
information on the stock trading center mainly stems from the lack of concrete andnecessary guidance from either the SSC or the Stock Trading Center. As stated by
Nguyen Thi Ngoc Phuong, Vice Director of Lafooco:
So far, we merely disclose information on our own initiative since wehave been thinking that investors need information. Nobody has told
us how to disclose information and to what extent information should
be disclosed.205
199

See “Thi truong chung khoan thieu thong tin” [Securities Markets Fall Short of Information] (Nov. 29,
2001), http://vnexpress.net/Vietnam/Kinh-doanh/Chung-khoan, visited Dec. 24, 2001. Hereinafter, “Securities
Markets Fall Short of Information”.
200
See “Nha dau tu van ‘doi’ thong tin” [Still Investors in ‘Hunger’ for Information] (Apr. 27, 2002),
http://vnexpress.net/Vietnam/Kinh-doanh/Chung-khoan, visited May 1, 2002. Hereinafter, “Still Investors in‘Hunger’ for Information”.
201
See “Securities Markets Fall Short of Information”, above n. 199.
202
See “Nhieu cong ty niem yet vi pham viec cong bo thong tin” [Many Listed Companies ViolatedInformation Disclosure Requirements] (Nov. 22, 2001), http://vnexpress.net/Vietnam/Kinh-doanh/Chungkhoan, visited Dec. 25, 2001. Hereinafter, “Many Listed Companies Violated Information Disclosure
Requirements”.
203
See “Still Investors in Hunger for Information”, above n. 200.
204
See “Securities Markets Fall Short of Information”, above n. 199.
205
Ibid.

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Even the monthly reports listed companies have to file with the SSC are said not to
be useful. According to Pham Thi Loi, the Financial Director of SACOM:[M]onthly reports filed with the SSC tell the public almost nothing,since in order to get accurate figures concerning the businessfinancial situation of companies, such reports must be made on aquarterly basis.206
Facing these problems, the SSC has its own observation. Bui Thanh Huong,Director of the Department for Securities Trading Management of the SSC, seems toattribute all failure of the implementation of information disclosure requirements tosecurities firms. She maintains that a number of directors of securities firms have been, atthe same time, carrying out too many functions so that they cannot pay enough attention
to information disclosure.207
Perhaps a report delivered at a symposium on “Improvement of Information
Disclosure Regime on Vietnam Securities Markets” held by the SSC in Ho Chi Minh Cityon November 20, 2001, gives the most objective comments on the implementation of theregime. According to this report, on the one hand, information disclosure is entirely new
to market participants, so that most of them often violate the disclosure requirements.208
They lack experience in dealing with this area. They do not perceive the importance of
information disclosure. On the other hand, there has not been a good coordination
between different channels of information; a unique form for information disclosure has
not been available; and there are many overlaps between statutory documents regulating
this area of the securities market.209

A Case Study:
In fact, a number of violations of information disclosure regime by securities firms
and by issuing companies have been reported.
Hoang Duc Long, chief inspector of the SSC, has admitted that some securities
firms have breached the disclosure regulation. These firms give priority to their large
customers, with the result that these customers could manipulate share prices. 210
However, it has not been reported which measures, if any, have been taken to deal withsuch violations.
206

Ibid.
Ibid.
208
The author seems to imply that most of the violators are not aware of the fact that they are violating the law.
209
See “Many Listed Companies Violated Information Disclosure Requirements”, above n. 202.
210
See “Dirty Play Drives Market Off Course” above n. 198.
207

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One violation by a listed company, HAPACO (Hai Phong Paper Shareholding
Company) was publicized on May 28, 2001.211 HAPACO was accused of breaching theinformation disclosure regime when it said that it would sell 30,000 shares to raise funds
for a project in which a Kraft paper plant was to be built. According to Tran Dac Sinh,
director of the Securities Trading Center, “[T]he information was released before theauthorities had approved the project. The move (putting share trading on the alert) is
aimed at protecting the interests of stock investors and balancing market stability.”
Although the volume of HAPACO shares traded after that was a little bit lower than inearlier sessions, nevertheless the price increased. It was predicted that the price would go
up to 150,000 VND (around 10.30 USD) from less than 100,000 VND before theinformation was released.
Being questioned by the Securities Trading Center’s officials, HAPACO’srepresentative maintained that the accusation for violation of the information disclosure
regulation was groundless and that they would appeal to the SSC. HAPACO disagreed
with the Securities Trading Center’s accusation and was concerned that the company
share price might be falling, and that the prestige of the company might be degraded.
The Securities Trading Center, however, merely warned HAPACO that if thesituation did not improve, they would use harsher measures such as revoking HAPACO’slisting rights.
Perhaps the mere administrative measures are not drastic enough to prevent
violation of information disclosure.
b. What are the attitudes of the ‘trading-floor-ready companies’ towards the current
information disclosure regime?
Although the current information disclosure requirements are rather comprehensive,
the Ho Chi Minh City Securities Trading Center, the first and the only trading floor todate, has experienced very quiet trading sessions, because of the small number of listedcompanies. It has recently been reported that equitized state enterprises account foraround 700, only a ‘handful’ of them being keen to list.212 By late December 2001, it wasreported that the number of listed companies on the Securities Trading Center was about
to touch eleven.213 This figure can be contrasted with four listed companies at the time theCenter commenced its operation in July 2000.214 Some complain that the listing standards
211

See Nguyen Hong, Xuan Son, “Hapaco Stock Up Despite STC Alert” (May 28, 2001) Emerging Markets
Datafile, The Vietnam Investment Review, <LexisNexis: Country & Region: Asia Pacific: World Sources
Online, Emerging Markets Datafile>.
212
See Nguyen Son, “Listing Sweetener Consider” (Oct. 8, 2001) The Vietnam Investment Review,<LexisNexis: Non-US News>. Hereinafter, Nguyen Son.
213
See “Them hai doanh nghiep nhan giay phep niem yet” [Two More Companies Obtaining Listing
Certificate] (Dec. 24, 2001) Dau tu chung khoan [Securities Investment],
http://vnexpress.net/Vietnam/Kinh-doanh, visited Dec. 25, 2001.
214
See “Profits Hard to Come by for Vietnam Stock Brokers” (Oct. 31, 2000) Deutsche Presse-Agentur,<LexisNexis: Non-US News>.

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are too strict215 to be met by many companies.216 However, statistics shows that among
660 shareholding companies established from the equitization of state enterprises, there
have been up to a hundred companies having a chartered capital of more than 10 billion
dong.217 A hundred companies meet the capital requirement while only about a tenth ofthem are listed on the trading center. Thus the quiet trading sessions in Ho Chi Minh City
Securities Trading Center cannot be attributed to high listing standards.
More frequently-mentioned reasons for the hesitancy of trading-floor-readycompanies to become listed companies include: (1) companies’ fear of facing information
disclosure duties, fear of being controlled and threatened by their competitors after being
listed; (2) companies’ concerns about the changes in the structure of shareholders and ofcompany governance if they are on the trading floor; (3) and companies’ poor knowledge
about the operation of trading centers.218
Among these, the fear of facing information disclosure requirements remains theprincipal obstacle.219 Companies are generally afraid of disclosing their financial situation
to the public, and of facing transparent reporting standards. As a result, they merely said
that they were going to list, but they did not do so.220
Equitized enterprises would be a potential source for listing on the trading center. It
is said however, that the incumbent management boards are very concerned about theirbenefits and responsibilities after being listed.
Many equitized enterprises remain hesitant towards [sic] joining theofficial Ho Chi Minh City-base bourse due to perceptions [sic] thatthe negative aspects of official listing of their stocks, such as forced
financial reporting requirements and increased pressure on
management, outweighed the limited benefits they would gain fromsuch a move.221
Equitized enterprises are not only in fear of disclosing their secret information, but
enterprise managers are also afraid of losing their positions and other privileges they have
215

These standards are already mentioned while discussing listing criteria facing issuers at the beginning of
this Chapter.
216
See “Vietnam Stock Exchange Set to Launch Trading”, (Jul. 25, 2000) Deutsche Presse-Agentur,<LexisNexis: Non-US News>. It is reported that amongst 500-odd state-owned enterprises that were alreadyequitized, fewer than 50 of them have met “Vietnam's relatively strict listing requirements”; see also Vu Long ,“Forty Firms Meet Listing Criteria, But All Remain Hesitant”, (Nov. 20, 2000) Emerging Market Datafiles,
The Vietnam Investment Review <LexisNexis: Non-US News>. Hereinafter, Vu Long (Nov). It is reported that
one of the main obstacles in the way of companies going to the trading floor is difficult financial situations.
217
See “Duoc nhieu hay mat nhieu?” [Gain and Loss, Which one Has More Weight?], (2001) 76 Dau tu chungkhoan [Securities Investment] 13, 13.
218
Ibid; see also Vu Long (Nov.), above n. 216; and see also Anh Thi, ‘“Ngai’ niem yet chung khoan? Xem xet
dieu kien thich hop cho cac doanh nghiep” [“Hesitancy” of Being Listed? Considering Appropriate
Requirements Imposed on Enterprises], (May 11, 2001) Thoi bao kinh te Vietnam [Vietnam Economic Times].
219
See Vu Long (Nov.), above n. 216.
220
See Nguyen Son, above n. 212.
221
See Vu long, “Enthusiasm Sinks for Forced Floats of Equitized Firms” (Aug. 13, 2001) Emerging Markets
Datafile, The Vietnam Investment Review,<LexisNexis: Non-US News>. Hereinafter, Vu Long (Aug.).

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enjoyed if their enterprises have more shareholders, especially large ones. It was also
complained that management board members - controlling shareholders - of ashareholding company often enjoy a number of privileges in the form of bonuses andother extra benefits. They also have powers to allocate profits in the company, and to
decide the ways in which dividends are distributed.222 This complaint does not seem to beconsistent with the Enterprise Act, which vests the rights in the general shareholders’meeting to decide the allocation of annual dividends for an individual type of share.223
However, it is very likely that in practice the actual decision maker concerning level ofdividend to be distributed is the management board rather than the general shareholders’meeting, since it is often the case that minority shareholders cannot attend theshareholders’ meeting and so cannot vote. The actual voters therefore are mainly large
shareholders. Consequently, the decisions of such a meeting reflect their will.
Another sector that would also be a potential source for listing on the trading floor
is the banking sector. However, there seem to be some obstacles as well on the ways
banks access the trading floor. It was claimed that the lack of a legal framework settingout clear administrative and capital requirements for commercial banks had prevented
banks from listing.224 In practice, however, although a statutory rule that supports theparticipation of domestic joint stock commercial banks in stock trading centers has beenpromulgated,225 the banks do not seem ready for listing. What has made banks hesitant tolist is “the effect that fluctuations on the fledging market would have on depositors’
confidence”.226 Of course, it is not absolutely right to say that no banks want to list. Someof them have considered listing. But the minimum capital requirement and other listing
criteria are the main obstacles to doing so.227
Perhaps most, or almost all, of the above-mentioned reasons result from the factthat trading-floor-ready companies have not been aware of the benefits a listed company
will have, or of the benefits that would accrue from diversifying capital sources throughsecurities markets. Such poor awareness of the advantages they would have after
becoming a public company seems to be the main reason for their hesitancy. To solve thisproblem, educational measures might be useful. If the problem truly exists, Vietnam is not
the only country experiencing such a problem. It is reported that other Southeast Asian
countries have the same experience; that companies in these countries “need a much222

See Hoang Quy Vuong, “Giao dich chung khoan trao tay tai Viet nam va nhung van de ton tai” [OTCTransactions in Vietnam Stock Market: Trouble Ahead!” (2000) 8 Tap chi Ngan hang [Banking Review] 49,
50, (text is in Vietnamese). Hereinafter, Hoang Quy Vuong.
223
See the Enterprise Act, Art. 70.2.a.
224
See Vu Long, “Exchange Sets Course for Bank Listings with Legal Framework”, (Jul. 9, 2001) Emerging
Markets Datafile, The Vietnam Investment Review, <LexisNexis: Non-US News>. Hereinafter, Vu Long (July).
225
See Art. 2, Decision 172/1999/ QD-TTg dated Aug. 19, 1999 (promulgating the regulation of “The Rights
of Credit Institutions in Establishing Securities Subsidiaries and Becoming Listed Companies”). Hereinafter,
Decision 172/1999.
226
Xuan Ha, “Joint Stock Banks Change Minds on Bourse Listing” (Sep. 10, 2001) Emerging Markets
Datafile, The Vietnam Investment Review, <LexisNexis: Non-US News>.
227
Ibid.

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greater length of time to find out step by step about the true and tangible benefits of going
public.”228
Of course, one might also argue that those trading-floor-ready companies inVietnam do not have big investment projects that require large finance, and therefore they
do not want to go to the trading floor. In other words, for the time being, the Vietnam
economy does not have large-scale projects and for this reason, it might not yet be theappropriate time for Vietnam to run a formal securities market. However, earlier in
Chapter One, it was well documented that a formal securities market is indispensable tothe economic development in Vietnam. The above-mentioned argument can thus be set
aside.
4. How Does the SSC React?
As the number of listed companies still remains very modest after more than a year
since the first trading center came into operation, a number of commentators think thatlisting requirements should be adjusted to enable more companies to be listed. However,the SSC has a strong position concerning this issue. The director of the Department for
Securities Issuance Management of the SSC, Vu Thi Kim Lien, said that Decree 48/1998,
especially listing requirements provided therein, would not be altered, at least over the
next few years.229 Pham Trong Binh, deputy director of the said Department, added: "[i]t
is up to the companies to meet the requirements, not for the government to eliminate thesepublic protections, and many companies are able to do so".230
To cope with the fact that only a few listed companies are listed on the trading floor,
the SSC recently revealed its new policy, viz., to appoint companies that meet listing
criteria to list. The SSC chairman, Nguyen Duc Quang, said “besides the voluntarycompanies which meet listing requirements, some others will be selected and appointed tolist”.231 According to a commentator, this is a way to force companies “being bourseready” to list.232 Perhaps, using a mandatory manner to get more companies onto the
trading floor would not generate positive results. In such a circumstance, an OTC (overthe-counter) market operating in its own legal framework would be a solution.
According to another source of information, for the time being the SSC has been
consulting different governmental authorities and agencies to reduce listing requirements
in order to augment the number of listed companies on the Ho Chi Minh Securities
Trading Center.233 The Commission's recent perception is that “the number of listed firms

228

See “Readying the Stock Market for Healthy Acceleration” (Feb. 11, 2001) Vietnam Economy
http://ww.vneconomy.com.vn/en/stock/dir.cgi, visited Dec 25, 2001.
229
Xuan Son, “Disclosure Rules Set for ‘Tightening’”, (Feb. 5, 2001) Emerging Markets Datafile, The
Vietnam Investment Review, <LexisNexis: Non-US News>.
230
Ibid.
231
See Vu Long, (Aug.), above n. 221.
232
Ibid.
233
See Nguyen Son, above n. 212.

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in the stock trading center is still very small, while existing requirements are keeping
potential listers away” - said by a vice chairman of the SSC, Tran Xuan Ha.234
A proposal for the birth of an OTC market has also been processed. The
Government Office has directed the SSC to finalize a legal framework for such a market
by the September 1, 2000.235 Recently, however Vu Bang, SSC vice chairperson, stated“[w]e find it necessary to set up such a market but a legal basis is not available”. He
further stressed that “[t]he requirements for monitoring this market are as strict as thosefor the official exchange, so we need to take careful consideration”; and that to run an
OTC market, a big investment in equipment to detect fake share certificates is required.236
These statements imply that the opening of the OTC market in Vietnam is a long term
project.
At present, the SSC has two schemes: (a) to create a second “board market”, and(b) to adopt an OTC market. The first scheme allows it to set up a second board market in
Hanoi, which will be similar to that in Ho Chi Minh City, but will only deal with small
and medium-sized businesses that meet lower listing requirements. The proposed
requirements include having a chartered capital of 5 billion VND, and having profitablebusiness performance for at least one year. The second scheme legalizes an OTC market,
which would be located in the same premises in Hanoi, in which the stock price would be
negotiated by sellers and buyers. The SSC hopes to set up a second board market first andto adopt an OTC market later.237
It would be quite interesting if the second scheme is implemented. Then perhaps
Vietnam would have a unique model of an OTC market compared with others all over theworld, distinguished by the fact that it would have a defined physical location with a
trading floor. However, all that the SSC has actually done so far in this regard has been to
improve, to some extent, the current arrangements for the young securities industry in
Vietnam.

III. WHETHER THE SCOPE OF THE INFORMATION DISCLOSUREREGULATION IS ADEQUATELY ADOPTED
1. The Narrow Scope of the Current Information Disclosure Regime
The current regulation of public offerings of securities only binds issuers that seek
to make a public offering of securities that will be listed on a trading center. Article 3.1,
Decree 48/1998 providing for “Public Offering”, reads:
234

Ibid.
See Nguyen Hong, “Equitized Firms Need ‘Notarized Trading Facility’”, (Sep. 4, 2000) Emerging Markets
Datafile, Vietnam Investment Review, <LexisNexis: Non-US News>.
236
See “Regulator to Pilot OTC Stock trade”, Vietnam Economy,
http://www.vneconomy.com.vn/en/stock/, visited Oct. 26, 2001.
237
See “Opinions Differ on Hanoi Bourse role” (Oct. 1, 2001) Emerging Markets Datafile, The Vietnam
Investment Review, <LexisNexis: Non-US News>.
235

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Public offering of securities to be listed on a centralized market,
except for the offering of government bonds, shall be licensed by theState Securities Commission.
The language of this article is ambiguous. It gives the impression that only thoseissuers that will have their securities listed on a trading center have to get an issuinglicense from the SSC for their public offerings. This leads to uncertainty about how anissuer knows that its securities will be listed on a trading center in the future so that it candefine, even before the public offering is initiated, whether it will be subject to licensing
requirement under Article 3.1.
The first paragraph of Circular 02/2001 defines the scope of the public offering
regulation. It does not, however, make the meaning of Article 3.1 any clearer. It even,once again, confirms that the regulation of public offering is merely applied to theissuance of securities mentioned in Article 3.1:
In order to implement Decree 48/1998/ND-CP, dated July 11, 1998,
issued by the Government, stipulating securities and the securities
market, the State Securities Commission hereby provides thefollowing guidelines on public offering of shares and bonds to belisted on a centralized market.
Perhaps in order to have an accurate idea of which companies will be subject to thelicensing requirements, and thus which companies will fall into the scope of theinformation disclosure regulation, one should look at the statutory concept of “public
offering”, which was mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter. Such a concept confines
public offerings to those made by issuers, at least 20 percent of whose equity/debt capitalis held by outside investors. This figure falls to 15 percent where the equity capital or the
total value of bonds to be issued by the issuer exceeds 100 billion Dongs.
Thus it is only those issuers who meet the above-mentioned criteria who will be
subject to the information disclosure regime. The remaining issuers, therefore, are not tobe bound by the current disclosure requirements.
Furthermore, continuous disclosure requirements, provided for in Decision
79/2000, apply only to listed companies. Non-listed companies, therefore, are almost
facing no information disclosure.238 Article 31.1 Decision 79/2000 reads:
Securities trading centers, listed companies and fund managementcompanies are subject to information disclosure requirements
provided for in this regulation.

238

Except for their duty to file the annual financial statement with a Tax Authority and a Business Registry
under Article 93 the Enterprise Act.

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These provisions might cause public concern since investors that hold securities
traded outside a formal trading center - unlisted securities - do not seem to be informed atall. This also means that they remain unprotected under the current regulation on
information disclosures.
2. What might be Consequences of the Narrow-Scope-Disclosure Regime?
In practice, regardless of the lack of a statutory regulation, informal stock markets
have been operated through a number of cafes and even through some websites.239 In theabsence of an organized market place, shares of equitized state enterprises have been
traded on unorganized stock markets since before the time the first trading center was
established. Even after the first securities trading center came into existence, such markets
remained the places for share transactions of unlisted equitized enterprises. The informal
market even seems more attractive to investors than the formal trading center. A recent
report reveals that while the stock prices on the trading center tend to decline, those on thefree market sharply increase (by the end of October 2002 the prices rose by 15-30%
compared with those in March 2002); and that the increasing number of shareholding
companies joining the informal stock market has made the market much busier.240
Small and medium investors in Vietnam are rather familiar with the Cafe Index X
House in Ho Chi Minh City where they can trade via an electronic board updated on a
weekly basis. Frequently quoted securities on such a board are confined within around 10
different types. A commentator satirically observes, “Vietnam seems to follow the waythat Britain experienced in the 17th century”. 241 In such a market place, information
concerning traded shares cannot be said to be sufficient, even if not actually poorly
provided. Consequently, investors are in danger of being exposed to risks, especiallywhen a minimum legal basis for the performance of the OTC market has not yet beenmade.
For the time being in Vietnam, the number of listed companies remains poor,
because a pool of equitized enterprises does not meet the statutory requirements to havetheir shares listed, whilst other pools, for some reasons, do not want to be listed on aformal trading floor (as earlier mentioned). Decree 48/1998 and other legal rules issued
by the SSC merely govern transactions over securities issued in public offerings or/and
listed securities. Obviously, there have been a huge number of transactions effectedbeyond the scope of the securities regulations, as well as the oversight of the SSC, andoutside the securities trading center. In practice, the unorganized market seems evenbusier than the organized one.242 In such a circumstance, an OTC market and a legal
239

See Thanh Ngoc, “Thi truong chung khoan co the anh huong toi nganh Ngan hang nhu the nao?” [How Can
a Securities Market Affect Banking Industry?] (2000) 12 Tap chi Ngan hang [Banking Review] 59, 59.
240“Gia co phieu tren thi truong tu do tang manh” [Stock Prices in Free Market Sharply Increase], (Oct. 23,
2002) http://www.vnexpress.net/vietnam/kinh-doanh/chung-khoan, visited Oct. 24, 2002. Hereinafter, “Stock
Prices on Free Market Sharply Increase”.
241
See Hoang Quy Vuong, above n. 222, 51.
242
See “Stock Prices in Free Market Sharply Increase”, above n. 240.

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framework for its operation has become increasingly demanding, or at least, a system of
information disclosure requirements with respect to non-listed companies should be taken
into consideration. Perhaps at present, the only statutory provision, concerning suchdisclosure, which can be revoked, is Article 93, the Enterprise Act. This Article requires
shareholding companies to file the annual financial statement with the state authorities(including the registry and the taxation authorities) after such a statement was approved ina general shareholder meeting. The Article has three Sub-articles. Sub-articles one andtwo read:
Within 90 days from the date of completion of the fiscal year,
shareholding companies have to file the annual financial statement
approved by the general shareholders’ meeting with a tax authority
and a registry.
A resume of the annual financial statement must be furnished to allcompany shareholders.
According to the language of this provision, it is not clear when the annual financial
statement is to be sent to shareholders, before or after the general shareholders’ meeting.
This is of importance since, if it reaches shareholders before the meeting, that would help
them to cast right and informed votes.
Sub-article three makes the company annual financial statement available to all
those who show interest in the relevant company information. In other words, it gives
public access to the company annual financial statement. It reads:
Every organization and individual can see or get a copy of such astatement in the registry office for a fee.243
Furthermore, organizations and individuals can request the registry to provide themwith information concerning company business registration244 and ordinary shareholders
can access the shareholders’ list.245
According to the language of Article 93, it is clear that all shareholding companies
face information disclosure duty, which is good. However, such a duty is merely required
to be discharged on an annual basis. Thus, the Article cannot ensure public investors oftimely access to material information of the relevant non-listed companies where suchcompanies issue their shares publicly and when their shares are traded outside anorganized trading center.

243

To date, the regulation of the fee has not been created. Accordingly, Article 93.3 the Enterprise Act has notbeen implemented in practice.
244
See Enterprise Act, Art. 20.2.
245
Ibid., Art. 53.2.c.

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IV. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO ACHIEVE BETTER OUTCOMES FROM
THE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE REGULATION?
The current information disclosure regulation only binds those companies whose
securities issuance falls within the purview of the “public offering”, and listed companies.
In that sense, the regulation is rather complete since it provides for various types of
disclosure. However, in practice the market still falls short of information. This shortageis attributed to the intention of listed companies in disclosing information, to the lack ofnecessary guidance from the SSC and the Securities Trading Center to help listedcompanies properly to discharge their duties, and to the components and contents of thefinancial statement. The previous discussion has also revealed that the enforcement of theregulation is not drastic enough to enhance discipline, to prevent violations, and to equipmarket participants with the availability and timeliness of information. In view of such
deficiencies, it is submitted that the following steps (arranged according to chronologicalpriority for law reform) should be taken to achieve better outcomes from the information
disclosure regulation.
1. A Call for Improvement of the Disclosure Requirements Applying to those Who
Make a Public Offering and to Listed Companies
a. Statutory Provisions laying down the Ways in Which Information is Made Available
to the Public should be Revised
a.1. The Need for Concrete Guidance and a Unique Form for Information Disclosure.
One of the problems that arise in the implementation of information disclosure
requirements is the lack of concrete guidelines for companies to follow. Companies often
disclose information on their own initiative and are not sure of how to do this for the best.
The SSC or the Stock Trading Center should therefore release concrete guidance to help
listed companies make necessary information available to the public.
The creation of a model form for company information disclosure applied
throughout the country is also required. This is of importance since it would give acommon standard for disclosing information and help securities firms as well as public
investors easily to appraise and compare financial situations and business performance
between different listed companies.
Apart from those, the training of corporate information disclosure staff is also
required, to ensure that they can follow all guidelines, either from the SSC or from thetrading center, without difficulty. This is to produce skillful staff capable of performing
their information disclosure duties. In the absence of such well-trained staff, even full sets
of guidelines and a unique form might not help to assure good information flow. At
present, the securities regulation merely says that information disclosure activities of60

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter II

listed companies is to be accomplished by the so-called information disclosure staffs. It
does not, however, spell out any criterion such staffs have to satisfy in order to do the job.
a.2. The Need for More Accessible Ways for Public Investors to Obtain Company
Information.
Meanwhile, according to Chart No. 1, 246 there are three information providers,
namely issuers, securities trading centers and securities firms. However, there is
uncertainty as to whether investors can directly get information from these providers. If
the answer is “yes”, a further question arises: if they are entitled to require a provider tofurnish information to them by mail or facsimile, then who will bear such mailing/faxing
costs? The current information disclosure regulation does not go into such a detail. For
public investors, low cost of obtaining information is of significance. For this reason, inmany countries, public investors do not have to pay any fee to obtain information.
Chart No. 1 also indicates various channels for information flow and through which
public investors can access information concerning listed companies. These channels
include: (1) obtaining annual printed releases of listed companies, (2) getting bulletins
issued by the trading center, (3) accessing a computer network on trading centers or (4)going to the disclosure section of the trading center, to securities firms, and to the places
specified in the issuing announcement, and (5) reading newspapers.
Obtaining printed releases of listed companies seems to be a good way in which
public investors can learn more about the companies. Nevertheless, under the current
regulation, such releases are only issued on an annual basis, which cannot guarantee thetimeliness of information. This cannot be a good choice for investors. Moreover, it isunclear where such releases are available under the current regulation: in the office of theissuers or at the trading center.
Accessing a computer network on a trading center seems to be a reliable way to get
information; getting information directly from securities firms or from securities
distributors at specified places is also a good way. However, it is not an easy task, since
there might be a long distance between the investors and the trading center, the specified
places, or the relevant securities firms, especially when the number of firms remains
limited.
Reading bulletins released by a trading center and newspapers seems to be an easy
way for public investors to obtain information concerning the listed companies they wish
to put money into. However, in remote areas, potential public investors might be available
but it is hard for bulletins and newspapers to arrive promptly. Furthermore, the potential
investors are not able to access the computer network on a trading center, nor can theyeasily obtain a printed release of the listed company. In this case, all available ways thatcan provide information to investors seem to be useless. Here one might argue that
farmers, even well off ones, rarely put money in the hands of others (in this case, issuingand listed companies) which they do not know about, or only know very little about; that246

See this chart in Section I, Sub-section 1, item b of this chapter.

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to build up farmers’ confidence with the market is even harder than to do so with otherinvestors. This is probably true in part. However, if and when farmers acquire a better
understanding of the securities market and the benefits generated by it, then they mightchange their minds and desire to invest money in this new area.
A question that arises is how to enrich the manner in which public investors canaccess information to ensure that they are able to make prudent investment decisions.
Even if a comprehensive set of disclosure requirements is available and all companies
well meet such requirements, but the ways in which public investors can accessinformation are not adequately provided for, then investors will remain inadequately
informed.
In Japan 247 and in the US, 248 the issuers, underwriters, or securities firms are
required to deliver to investors a copy of the prospectus that contains information
provided in the registration statement filed with the governmental agency in charge ofoverseeing the securities market. This way of releasing information does not seem to be
too complicated for use in transferring information in Vietnam.
Some possible ways to make information reach investors in the future in Vietnam
include:1. Furnishing information (by either mail or facsimile transmission) with an individual
investor who shows his/her interest in the relevant security. Securities firms, issuers,or their distributors could easily perform this task and charge investors a fee, whichmight cover both the costs of the disclosure documents and of delivery. However, thefee, if available, should not be too costly, so that it will not have a negative impact on
the investors’ desire to obtain information.
2. Making the information available at the office of the issuing companies for investors
who can easily access such an office. In both the US and Japan, public investors can
get information by themselves at the office of the issuers by seeing a prospectus thathas been examined by the stock market watchdog.
3. Making the information available in some other public media, other than newspapers,such as internet. The SSC or trading center should create different websites where thepublic can easily access information concerning public issuers and listed companies.
This would be a useful way for investors to obtain company information, especially inview of the fact that the number of internet subscribers has been increasing in
Vietnam.
4. Setting up a computer network among securities trading centers, listed companies, andsecurities firms, to speed up the transfer of information.
a.3. Company information should be furnished to shareholders before the generalshareholders’ meeting.

247
248

See Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 (2001 Japan), Art. 15.2.
See Regulation C, Rule 460 of the US.

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The Enterprise Act, Article 93.2 says that the resume of corporate annual financial
statements must be announced to all shareholders. It does not expressly say, however,whether such a resume must reach shareholders before or after the general shareholders’meeting. Article 74 of the Enterprise Act, providing for the way in which a generalshareholders’ meeting is convened, states:
1. The Person who convenes the General Shareholders’ Meetingmust send a letter of invitation to all shareholders at the latest
seven days before the meeting date.
2. The meeting agenda and other materials necessary for discussion
before decisions are approved must be attached with the letter ofinvitation.
It is unclear whether the term “decision” embraces the annual financial statement under
this Article. If one scrutinizes the Enterprise Act, one might become even more confused,since the answer could be both “no” and “yes”. “No” can be inferred from the language of
Article 80. One of the duties of the Management Board provided for in Article 80 is todeliver the “annual financial statement” at the General Shareholders’ Meeting. Article 80
does not use the term “decision” for such a document. “Yes” can be drawn from thelanguage of Article 77 (stipulating the way in which shareholders’ meeting's decisions areapproved). This Article uses the sole term “decision” to refer to all documents that needapproval at a shareholders’ meeting. Decree 03/2000 guiding the implementation of theEnterprise Act does not make such provisions any clearer, either.
These uncertainties should be eliminated and there should be a provision explicitly
saying that the resume of the annual financial statement must be filed with shareholders
before the general shareholders’ meeting. This would allow shareholders to study thestatement in advance and enable them to cast appropriate and prudent votes.
b. The Gaps in Statutory Provisions on Information Disclosures in Tender Offers
should be eliminatedInformation disclosures required in tender offers provided for in Decree 48/1998
are too general, as previously discussed. Meanwhile, the Decree fails: (1) to distinguishthe circumstances where a group of persons/organizations constitutes a statutory personthat buys more than 5% of the voting shares of an issuer, triggering an information
disclosure duty; and (2) to define which information must be disclosed. The revised
provisions should therefore: (1) specify the situation where two or more
persons/organizations purchase, in collusion, more than 5% of the voting shares of anissuer and impose an information disclosure responsibility on them; (2) define which
information is necessary to include in the report. In addition, the Decree merely requires
the acquirers to report to the stock trading center. It would be more appropriate if such areport were to be filed with the SSC as well as being furnished to the issuers.

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2. The Need for Disclosure Requirements applying to Companies Whose Securities
Offerings Do not Fall into the Purview of the “Public Offering”, and to Non-listed
Companies
The second biggest problem with the current information disclosure regime is,perhaps, the absence of information disclosure requirements applying to companies
whose securities issuance does not constitute a “public offering” within the purview of
Articles 2.2, 6.5 and 8.2, Decree 48/1998, and on non-listed companies.
In practice, the number of companies that meet listing standards is limited, andeven amongst companies that already meet listing requirements, not all are willing to list.
This leads to a pragmatic problem since non-listed companies seeking pecuniary recourse
from the public are numerous, but not subject to either offering disclosure or continuous
disclosure requirements prescribed in the current securities regulations.
Obviously, in such a circumstance, a legal framework for the operation of an OTC
market with a comprehensive information disclosure regulation is urgently required. Sucha regulation should embrace both offering disclosure and continuous disclosure
requirements, to ensure that public investors are well informed. It is important that
relevant shortcomings of the current disclosure regime applying to listed companies
should be examined so as to maximally avoid similar statutory deficiencies in its futurecounterpart regime applying to non-listed companies. In such a regime, possibly all typesof disclosure requirement should also be laid down as binding on non-listed companies.
In Japan, a company, whether listed or not, having more than 500 million Yen of
legal capital, and having 500 shareholders or more, is required to report to the Prime
Minister.249 Similar provisions have also been adopted in the US.250
3. The Need to Adopt Comparable Accounting Rules and Independent Auditinga. Accounting rules
As for financial statements, types of information included in the statement should
be simplified to enable companies cope well with reporting work, especially when humanresources in accounting and auditing in Vietnam remain constrained. The future contentsof the financial statement should be redefined to make it useful not only for taxation
purposes but also for investment purposes. Attention should also be paid to thecomponents of the financial statement. Possibly, the statement should reflect the changes
in reserved profit so that it would become more informative and useful for investors.
These improvements are of importance in bringing Vietnam accounting rules closer
to those adopted elsewhere. If internationally comparable accounting standards can be
249

See Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 (2001 Japan), Art. 24.1.4; see also Enforcement Regulation of
Cabinet, Art. 3-6.2.
250
See the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 12(a) & (g), 15 USC s 78l.

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achieved in Vietnam, the country’s securities market might become more attractive to
foreign investors. Foreign investors will refrain from investing in the securities market ofa country if they cannot compare the financial conditions of that country’s companies
with those in other countries because each country adopts a different accounting system.
No country should ignore the fact that an internationally comparable accounting law plays
a significant role in making up the attractiveness of a securities market.
b. Independent Auditing for All Shareholding Companies.
Under the Enterprise Act, independent auditing only applies to a number ofshareholding companies, as earlier mentioned.251 To single out a number of companies
whose financial statements need not be audited might give the opportunity for company’s
officers to commit fraud. A requirement that an independent auditor inspect a company’s
financial statements is thus a significant protective measure against fraud by thecompany's officers. 252 In future, discrepancies between different auditing requirements
adopted by the Enterprise Act, the securities regulations, and the accounting regulation
should be eliminated. It may be a good idea if auditing requirements apply to allshareholding companies. For big companies, an audit might be required on a short-termbasis while for small companies an audit might be required on a longer-term basis.
c. The Need for a Supervisory Body Overseeing Auditing Practices
Possibly, in order to ensure that the public good in independent auditing receive
appropriate consideration at all times, there is a need for a supervisory body overseeing
audit practices. That body should be charged with the responsibility of reviewing andevaluating how independent audits of the financial statements of public companies are
performed and to consider whether the recent trends in audit practices serve the public
good. This body should report to the SSC where it finds weaknesses in and failures of theaudit process so that the SSC can act in response to such problems in a timely manner toavoid serious consequences that might occur.
4. Possible Answers to Practical Problems
In Section I of this chapter, two main practical problems were mentioned, namely:
non-compliance with the current information disclosure regime; and the hesitance oftrading-floor-ready companies to become listed companies.
Non-compliance. On the whole, non-compliance with the law often derives fromtwo facts: a general lack of adequate statutory provisions to enforce the law, and theweakness of enforcement mechanisms. It can be said that both facts have been applicablein the context of Vietnam.
251

See Section II, Sub-section 2 of this Chapter.
See “General Principles of Company Law for Transition Economies”, (1999) 24 Iowa Journal of
Corporation Law 190, 287.
252

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So far, sanctions for violation of securities regulation have merely been adopted at
the administrative level. Although Decree 48/1998 provides for disciplinary,administrative, criminal, and civil sanctions, to date the government has only issued one
single rule governing administrative violations in the field of securities markets. Decree
22/2000253 provides for rather comprehensive treatment of administrative violations of
the regulation of public issuance of securities. Such treatment falls into four categories:
fines ranging from 5 million to 50 million Dong (around 300 to 3000 USD);
supplementary sanctions (suspending or withdrawing issuing license; confiscating theentire turnover from services provided by the violators); and other sanctions.254
Despite the existence of such administrative sanctions, in practice violation of theinformation disclosure regime do occur. This suggests that sanctions that are more severe
should not be ignored as a means of putting market participants under appropriate
discipline. Possibly, what public investors need is not many further laws and regulation toprotect them, but rather more drastic enforcement of existing laws by the SSC.
Companies’ Hesitancies. The problem of negative attitudes of bourse-readycompanies towards going public to raise funds can be solved in various ways.
The main reason that triggers companies’ hesitancy to become listed is the fear of
facing information disclosure duties after being listed. Perhaps a solution for theimmediate future would be for information disclosure duties to be imposed on very big
shareholding companies with a high number of shareholders and high equity capital,
regardless of whether they are listed or not. This could be done by revising the Enterprise
Act so as to legalize such duties. At present, the Enterprise Act merely requires all
shareholding companies to disclose information on an annual basis, as earlier discussed.
Such a requirement should be broadened by requiring these companies to disclose
information on a more timely and frequent basis.
Of course, such a statutory approach might have burdensome implications atgovernmental authority level, since it would not be an easy task, in terms of humanresources, to cope with the screening of information filed with the authority byshareholding companies. Nevertheless, this would be a good measure to eliminate
companies’ fear of facing information disclosure duties, which in turn can be a hurdle on
the way to listing on trading floor.
Another alternative is that the government could intervene with the status of theequitized-state-enterprises as a controlling shareholder. This option is feasible since, inmany equitized-state-enterprises, the state holds a block of shares that enables it to keep
control of the newly formed shareholding companies.255
253

This Decree, dated July 10, 2000, promulgates the “Regulation of the Treatment of Administrative
Violations in the Field of Securities and Securities Markets”.
254
See Art. 4.
255
Decree 44/1998 required the State to be a controlling shareholder in a number of shareholding companies
converted from state enterprises. Recently, Decree 64/2002, although it does not explicitly say so, provides forfour forms of equitization. In enterprises that are equitized under the first three forms, the state still remains ashareholder, even a large shareholder, with those transformed into shareholding companies under the first andsecond forms. For further information, see Section II, Sub-section 2, Chapter I of this paper.

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Apart from that, educational measures should also be employed to help the
corporate community to understand the benefits of becoming listed companies. Suchbenefits are no longer confined to listed companies but also extend to public investors.
That is because, first they can ensure that the capital demands of listed companies can bemet; and secondly, public investors can be maximally protected through transparent
disclosures made by those listed companies. To execute such measures, the SSC and thestock trading centers should have websites that can equip the general public withknowledge of securities markets in general and of the benefits of having a transparent
information disclosure system in particular.

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CHAPTER III
WHETHER THE ANTI-FRAUD REGULATIONCAN FOSTER A HEALTHY MARKET

Together with the information disclosure regime, the anti-fraud regulation plays asignificant role in protecting public investors and in ensuring a healthy market. This
chapter will probe in depth the current anti-fraud provisions in order to draw out statutory
gaps that should be filled and regulatory weaknesses that should be eliminated so as toachieve better outcomes from the anti-fraud regulation. It argues that owing to the sparse
language of the regulation and the absence of a legal foundation for investors’ rights ofaction, the regulation will fail to prevent manipulative and deceptive practices. It further
maintains that the entire prohibition of short sale and margin trading will deprive theVietnamese securities market of strongly supporting instruments.
In explaining the need for anti-fraud provisions in securities laws, David L. Ratner
maintains:

・・・since the complexity of securities invites unscrupulous people
to attempt to cheat or mislead investors and traders, the securities
laws contain provisions prohibiting a variety of fraudulent,manipulative or deceptive practices. These provisions have been
applied to a wide range of activities, including trading on "inside
information," misleading corporate publicity, and improper dealings
by corporate management.256
This observation has been proven by securities regulations in countries all over theworld, although the extent to which fraudulent activities are prohibited varies fromcountry to country.
In Vietnam, the core legal rules governing securities and securities markets,
Decree 48/1998, includes an entire chapter, Chapter VIII specifying activities that market
participants are either prohibited or restricted from doing. The prohibited activities
include: insider trading, market manipulation, misinformation, short selling, and credit
transactions and lending securities.
In contrast to the regulation of abusive market practices and anti-fraud provisions
in the securities laws of the US and of Japan, Chapter VIII, Decree 48/1998 is far simpler.
In fact a general lack of definition concerning prohibited activities can be seen in it, and it
seems that the chapter merely gives a list of prohibited activities. It is the purpose of thefollowing sections, then, to discuss the most serious problems of the regulation.

256

See David L. Ratner, Securities Regulation: Materials for a Basic Course, (3rd ed, 1986), 2. Hereinafter,
David Ratner (3rd ed, 1986).

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I. THE CURRENT ANTI-FRAUD REGULATION AND THE PREVENTION OF
MANIPULATIVE AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
1. Insider Trading Regulation and the Prevention of Short-swing Trading
Article 70, entitled “Insider Trading”, prohibits specified persons from selling andpurchasing securities when the information that can affect the securities’ price has notbeen publicly disclosed by the issuing company. It does not, however, define precisely
what information can be deemed to have a material impact on securities’ price nor does it
give a definition of “insider”. It simply lists persons (including organizations) who must
not directly or indirectly engage in purchasing and selling securities if the relevant
information has not been made public by the issuer of such securities. Such persons
include:1. Issuing organizations and relevant person(s);2. Employees of issuing organizations and relevant person(s);3. Large shareholders of the issuing organizations and relevant
person(s);4. Auditors and relevant person(s) of the auditing company that wasappointed to audit the issuing organization;
5. Officials and employees of the SSC, of the Securities Trading
Centers, Stock Exchanges and relevant persons; officials andgovernment employees of other organs that have opportunities toapproach inside information.
Under Article 2.20, Decree 48/1998, the term "relevant persons" is construed aseither individuals or organizations having been in a relationship of:a. Parent and subsidiary companies (if available);b. Company and company managers;
c. A group of persons that entered into an agreement to takeover acompany or to take control of the decision making of thecompany;d. Parents, spouse, offspring and siblings.
From the public servant’s perspective, Article 70 seems rather broad since it
includes all governmental officers and employees who can access inside information as
persons that are not eligible for trade when such information has not been made public. A
similar provision can be found in Article 6 (3), the Provisional Measures on Prohibiting
Securities Fraud of China. Perhaps Vietnam has learnt from China’s experience in this69

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respect, since China is also a country where “administrative agencies are especiallypowerful and can directly affect a company's policy and activities”.257
From the shareholders’ perspective, it can be claimed that this provision is, to someextent, relatively narrow, since it merely prohibits large shareholders from trading on
inside information; other shareholders, by implication, do not seem to be prevented fromso doing. Large shareholders, pursuant to Article 2.26, Decree 48/1998, are those who
hold 5% or more of voting shares of an issuer.
Article 53, the Enterprise Act while providing for the rights of ordinary
shareholders in general, confers some important rights on shareholders or groups ofshareholders who have owned more than 10% (or a smaller amount as prescribed in thecompany charter) of the company’s common shares in the six consecutive months. Suchrights include: nominating candidates to the Management Board and Supervisory Board;convening a General Shareholders’ Meeting; seeing or getting a copy of the list ofshareholders that are entitled to attend the General Shareholders’ Meeting; and otherrights as provided for in the Act and the company charter.258 Although Article 53 does not
use the term "large shareholder" to refer to such persons, it makes a distinction between
10% shareholders and others. As such, only 10% shareholders have the privilege ofintervening in the company management apparatus and in the management of thecompany. Other shareholders, whether they hold 9.9% or less than 1% of voting shares,
accordingly – and equally – do not have such a privilege. Thus, there seems to be noreasonable ground to impose a restriction on 5% shareholders in dealing with company
shares while excluding the under-5% shareholders from subjection to that restriction.
So far, the regulation of insider trading, while at a first glance appearing expansive,
merely lists the persons who are forbidden to trade. A definition of insiders and of
information that can affect the securities price is still missing. For that reason, it cannot
distinguish between insiders and non-insiders, and therefore it is difficult to impose
liabilities on a non-insider who has obtained inside information by improper means, but
has not directly traded, and has merely recommended others to trade on that information.
Decree 48/1998 has also failed at defining prohibited activities done by insiders, such as
leaking inside information and making it possible for others to trade on inside
information, or tipping, or recommending others to trade on a basis of inside information.
Decree 22/2000 seems to go further compared with Decree 48/1998, although it merely
governs the administrative treatment of violators of the securities regulation. It imposes
sanctions on any person who either uses or discloses inside information to another person
so that either the former (insider) or the latter (tippee) can purchase or sell or make apurchase order or a sale order of such securities. Article 5.1.c. imposes administrative
sanctions on the following activities:

257

See Jay Zhe Zhang, ‘Securities Markets and Securities Regulation in China’, (1997) 11 North Carolina
Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation 557, 602.
258
See Sub-Art. 2.

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Using inside information to trade, or providing information to (ortipping) another person to make a purchase or to put a purchaseorder; or to make a sale or to put a sale order;
Regulation of insider trading is a complicated matter. More detailed provisions areneeded to ensure that the regulation at least covers those activities that need to be
regulated. The current provisions under Decree 48/1998 deal merely with part of insider
trading. In practice, insider trading can be executed in various and sophisticated ways.
With such simple language in Article 70, it is hard to impose sanctions on people
engaging in insider trading transactions.
The American and Japanese regulations on insider trading might be useful to
examine. In the US, both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of1934 do not explicitly mention insider trading. Two provisions, Sections 10(b) and 16,
were inserted in the 1934 Act to deter fraud in the sale of securities and to achieve fulland fair disclosure of the character of securities.
Section 10(b) proscribes the use of manipulative and deceptive devices to defraudin the purchase and sale of securities. The Section makes it criminal to trade “incontravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe”. The said
rules and regulations, which were created by the Commission, the SEC, have been known
as Rule 10b-5. This Rule generally lays down sanctions against purchases or sales by
persons who have accessed information that is not known by those with whom they deal
or by traders in general. Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for any person(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit tostate a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of circumstances under which they were made,not misleading, or(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
The US case law has also accepted a theory of insider trading which is composed of
two elements: “(i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing
a corporate insider to take advantage of that inside information by trading without
disclosure.”259 From the US Supreme Court’s position, any securities transaction bearing
these two elements will be deemed guilty under Rule 10b-5.
Section 16(a) requires 10% shareholders, officers and directors of listed companies
having shares registered under Section 12 of the 1934 Act to file a report with the SEC no259

See Chiarella v United States, 445 US 222, 227 (1980).

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later than ten days after the end of the month the acquisition or disposition of theircompany’s shares occurred. Recently, the time in which such filings must be made hassignificantly reduced under Section 403 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. Pursuant to
the new provision, Section 16 insiders must file reports within two business days
following the execution of a securities transaction.
Where the sale and purchase of securities by such persons were effected within aperiod of less than six months, their company is entitled to confiscate the profits (shortswing profit) derived from such sale-purchase transactions.260
In Japan, views on whether insider trading regulation has been adopted since thepassage of the Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 is not unanimous. A number ofcommentators think that insider trading provisions have been codified in the Securities
and Exchange Law almost as long as the United States, i.e. since 1948, when Japan firstenacted the Law. The evidence is that Article 58 of the Law is much like the US Rule10b-5. Most of commentators agree that the provision is best interpreted to cover insider
trading practices. 261 Another view, however, says that prior to 1988, a proper insider
trading regulation had not been available in Japan, and that only the 1988 amendment of
the Securities and Exchange Law has effected considerable changes in this area.262
The current Law, as amended in 2001, explicitly governs insider trading by the four
articles: 166 and 164 entitled “Prohibited Acts of Corporate Insider” and “Restitution ofUndue Profit Made by Officer or Major Shareholder”, respectively; Article 163 requires
the filing of a report on trade in specified securities; and Article 167 prohibits insider
trading in tender offers.
Article 166 while prohibiting insiders from sale, purchase, assignment andacquisition of specified securities of listed companies, explicitly defines insiders,263 andtippees,264 and also construes the meaning of the relevant terms used in the article, such as“material fact”, “made public”, “parent company”.265

260

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 16 (b), 15 USC s 78p (2002).
See Louis Loss, Makoto Yazawa and Barbara Ann Banoff (eds), Japanese Securities Regulation, (1983),
192. Hereinafter, Louis Loss et al (eds).
See also Ramzi Nasser, “The Morality of Insider Trading in the United States & Abroad” (1999) 52
Oklahoma Law Review 377, 382. Hereinafter, Ramzi Nasser.
Article 58 reads: “No person shall (1) employ any fraudulent scheme or artifice with respect to buying,selling or other transactions in securities; (2) obtain money or other property by using documents or any otherrepresentations which contain a false statement with respect to a material fact, or omit representation of amaterial fact which is necessary in order to make such statements made not misleading; (3) make use of any
false quotation for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale or other transactions in securities. ”
Lately, for the first time in history, in February 1999, the Japanese Supreme Court ruled on an insider
trading issue. For further information, see Masanori Hayashi, “Japanese Insider Trading Law at the Advent of
the Digital Age: new Challenges Raised by Internet and Communication Technology” (2000) 23 Hastings
Communication & Entertainment Law Journal 157, 159.
262
See Hiroshi Oda, Japanese Law, (1st ed, 1999), 288.
263
See items (1) - (5) of Sub-article 1.
264
See Sub-article 3 of this article.
265
See Sub-article 2, 4 and 5.
261

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Article 164, similar to Section 16 of the American Securities Exchange Act,
discourages officers and major shareholders of a listed company from taking advantagesof confidential information they obtained by their positions. If such circumstances do
occur, profit gained from the relevant transaction will be confiscated for the company.
Article 163 requires corporate officers and shareholders owning 10 percent or moreof shares to file with the Prime Minister a report on his/her purchase/sale of the said
shares. Filing must be made within the first 15 days of the month following the month ofpurchase/sale. This Article and Article 164 are made to prevent short-swing trading.
Article 167 was almost designed in the same pattern as that of Article 166, but its
scope is confined to the regulation of insider trading in tender offers.
2. Market Manipulation Regulation and Stabilization Transactions
Similar to other articles, Article 73 also fails to define the term “manipulation”,
even though it is used in the title of the Article: “Market Manipulation”. It specifies thatorganizations and individuals are prohibited from engaging either directly or indirectly ina number of activities. It reads:
Organizations and individuals must not directly or indirectly carryout the following activities:
1. Purchasing, selling a security in collusion with another person inorder to create an artificial supply, demand in such security;
2. Engaging in purchasing or selling transactions without
delivering title to the securities;
3. Continuously purchasing securities with high prices, or
continuously selling securities with low prices;
4. Re-purchasing or re-selling their own securities (in the case of
issuing companies) in the absence of SSC permission.
According to the language of the Article 73.1, the two transactions, purchasing andselling, do not seem necessarily to be simultaneously effected. Rather the fact that thetransaction is done “in collusion with another person in order to create an artificial
supply, demand” seems to decide the unlawfulness of the transaction.
Article 5 Decree 22/2000, while providing for sanctions to be imposed on persons
who violate securities regulation, lists a number of violation activities. Sub-article 1.a,although mentioning the same activities as those under Article 73.1 Decree 48/1998,
seems to give a different meaning. It reads:
Simultaneously purchasing or selling a security on one's own
initiative or in collusion with another person in order to create
artificial supply, demand or artificial prices.

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The term “simultaneously” does not agree with the word “or” in the language ofthe provision. Perhaps this provision should read: “Simultaneously purchasing andselling a security ・・・ ” Regardless of that, this provision clearly mentions “washtrading”, while Article 73.1 does not.
Anti-manipulation is a complicated task, and it demands a corresponding complex
regulation. Sometimes it is hard to draw the line between manipulative and legitimatetransactions, especially when such transactions are entered into by some specific groupsof people in stabilization transactions and in contested takeover bids. The US securities
regulation appears to have detailed rules dealing with these two areas.
Stabilizing activities are often performed by participants in a public offering if at
the same time they bid for or purchase the same securities. Stabilizing activities are also
employed by issuers in repurchasing their own securities on the market to influence theprice of such securities.
In the US, activities in the former case are deemed unlawful if they are conductedin contravention of rules and regulations prescribed by the SEC. 266 Such rules 267 areenshrined in Regulation M. The regulation focuses on the bidding and purchasing
activities of persons that have connection with a public distribution (the purchase of the
securities being distributed). Regulation M makes it unlawful for issuers, selling security
holders, underwriters and other distribution participants, directly or indirectly to bid for or
to purchase any unit of the distributing securities in an attempt to induce any person to bid
for or to purchase such securities during the applicable restricted period. 268 The
Regulation also forbids any person who purchases securities from any distribution
participant to cover a short sale occurring during a specified period of time.269
There are, however, some exceptions under which two types of conduct can bepermitted: (1) broker-dealers may engage in market making transactions in NASDAQ
securities without violating Rule 101;270 (2) syndicate members may conduct stabilizationtransactions to prevent or retard a falling market price of a security, provided that suchtransactions are effected in conformity with pricing requirements.271
Activities in the latter case (issuers repurchasing their own securities) are subject toRule 10b-18. Pursuant to this rule, an issuer and its affiliates are not prohibited fromrepurchasing during any trading day, provided that the purchase meets the four conditions
concerning the number of brokers or dealers that effect the purchase, time of the purchase,price of the purchase and volume of purchase. Such conditions include: the purchase ismade through only one broker or one dealer on one single day; the purchase is not the
opening transaction nor is it made during the last half hour of the trading day; thepurchase is not effected at a price exceeding the highest current independent sale price;266

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 9 (a) (6), 15 USC s 78i (2002).
There are six rules, numbered from 100 to 105.
268
See Regulation M, Rules 101 & 102.
269
Rule 105.
270
Rule 103.
271
Ibid, Rule 104.
267

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and the total of such purchases is equal to or less than 25% of the average daily trading
volume for the preceding four weeks.272
In contested takeover bids, manipulative activities are very likely to be conducted.
Dealing with this problem, the US law makes it unlawful for any person who
misrepresents or omits any material fact in connection with any tender offer.273 The two
criteria, namely misrepresentation and omission, are of importance in defining whether or
not a manipulative device was employed in a tender offer. In the absence of these twoelements, even if the offer occurs in a way that affects the price of the target shares to thedetriment of the target company shareholders, it will not be deemed a manipulativetransaction.274
Going back to the case of Vietnam, the current anti-manipulative provisions are far
simpler than those dealing with such complicated circumstances in the US legislation.
Stabilizing activities in a distribution of securities seem to have no room in the regulation
except for the vague language of Article 73.4, Decree 48/1998, pursuant to which issuing
companies are prohibited from repurchase or resale of their own securities in the absenceof SSC permission. It is unclear whether this provision refers to the purchase by issuers ina public distribution of securities or in a secondary market.
The latter case, repurchases in a secondary market, or share buybacks, is provided
for in the Enterprise Act, but in a sparse manner. Shareholding companies are eligible tobuy back maximally 30% of common shares, or maximally 100% of other kinds ofshares, provided that the purchase of more than 10% of the total number of theoutstanding shares of each kind is decided by the General Shareholders’ Meeting; thepurchase of a lower amount is to be decided by the Board of Management.275 In buying
back shares, the amount of shares companies purchase from individual shareholders mustcorrespond to the stock ratios the shareholders hold in the companies.276
The Enterprise Act does not say that such companies have to get permission fromeither the SSC or a Securities Trading Centre to buy back their outstanding shares.
However, pursuant to Decree 48/1998 and Decision 79/2000, it seems that the companies
in question will have to get an approval from the SSC or the Securities Trading Centre.
The Decree and the Decision do not seem to agree with each other in defining a uniqueauthority that is in charge for granting such permission.277 Thus, when a listed company
desires to buy back its shares, it will have to get the approval from (1) either the General

272

Rule 10b-18.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 14(e), 15 USC s 78n (2002).
274
Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 US 1, 7, (1985).
275
See the Enterprise Act, Art. 65.
276
Ibid, Art. 65.3. It can be said that company shareholders are equally treated in share buyback. This principle
is also adopted in Japan.
277
Article 73.4, Decree 48/1998 merely implies that companies have to get permission from the SSC in such acase. Article 54, sub-articles 1, 2 & 3, Decision 79/2000 states that the authority responsible for approving
buyback of shares is the Securities Trading Center. It is unclear whether buyback of shares needs approval
from both the SSC and the Securities Trading Center or from only one of the two organs.
273

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Shareholders’ Meeting or the Board of Management, depending on the repurchasedamount; and (2) the SSC or/and the Securities Trading Centre.
Decision 79/2000 goes further than the Enterprise Act in that it lays down some
limits on company repurchase. That is, listed companies can only put one order topurchase at least 3% and at most 5% of the total approved amount. In special
circumstances, they can put an order to buy back more than 5%, provided that they get
permission from the relevant securities trading centre.278 Where a listed company buys
back more than 25% of its voting shares, it has to do so by making a bid.279
Decision 79/2000, however, does not set out any limit on the repurchase price, nordoes it lay down any requirement on the time the repurchase order can be made. These
criteria are vital to the prevention of manipulation by listed companies in share buybacktransactions. In the absence of such criteria, listed companies might have potential
opportunities to manipulate shares prices under the form of share buyback.
The current laws seem merely to deal with share buybacks. As such, participants ina public distribution cannot bid for or purchase the offering securities in order to stabilize
the securities’ price. In practice, stabilization transactions in a distribution are importantto underwriting companies, since such transactions are sometimes required to support thepurchases of securities to mitigate risk that might be incurred by the underwriter of such
issue. When revising the antifraud provisions, the law makers might have to think ofmaking a more detailed regulation to cope with new and even conventional manipulative
activities that have been found in other securities markets outside Vietnam.
3. Misinformation Regulation and the Prohibition of Omission of Information
Article 71, entitled “Misinformation”, proscribes the improper dissemination of
information. Under Sub-article 1, “[o]rganizations and individuals must not announce or
circulate untrue information”. This provision, however, is too simple to make it clear
whether it refers only to a false statement included in an application dossier filed with the
SSC, or whether any false statement made in any form (either oral or written) will fall
into the scope of the provision.
Furthermore, Sub-Article 1, while prohibiting false statements, does not seem
explicitly to forbid the omissions of material facts in a statement concerning the issuanceor trade of securities that would affect the investment decisions of public investors. Sincea true statement does not necessarily mean a full statement, it is very likely that the person
in question can make a true statement and yet omit a number of items of material
information. As such, the statement could lead other persons to purchase or sell a security
at a price misleadingly affected by such a statement. Clearly the provision inadvertently
leaves room for such statements to be made.

278
279

Ibid, sub-article 2.
Ibid, sub-article 3.

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It might be useful to look at the way the Americans deal with this issue. Section
18(a) entitled “Liability for Misleading Statements”, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934of the US, reads:(a) Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement inany application, report, or document filed pursuant to this title or
any rule or regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in aregistration statement as provided in subsection (d) of section 15 ofthis title.... shall be liable to any person (not knowing that suchstatement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon suchstatement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which
was affected by such statement, for damages caused by suchreliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in goodfaith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or
misleading.
This section explicitly prescribes: (1) liability imposed on any person that makes
statement on which another person buys or sells a security at a price affected by thestatement; (2) a statement must be inserted in documents filed with the SEC under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. It does not use the term “false or untrue statement” inthe first place. Rather the term “any statement” is employed, provided that it hasconnection with the purchase or sale of a security at a price affected by such a statement.
In that way the term “any statements” can cover both material misstatement and omissionof material facts.
Sub-article 2, Article 71, Decree 48/1998 refers to some organizations, namely theissuer, the underwriter and relevant persons, but it puts them in a narrower context
compared with those in Sub-article 1. These organizations are banned from doing things
that might mislead investors even before the issuer obtains an issuing license. It reads:
During the time the application dossier for securities issuance isbeing considered by the SSC, the issuer, the underwriter and relevant
persons must refrain from advertising, offering and having otheradvertising-characterized activities that might result in investors'
misunderstanding the securities to be issued.
So, in relation to the purpose of advertising, offering and other related activities
performed before the attainment of an issuing license from the SSC, the statutory
prohibition of misleading activities only applies to the issuers, underwriters and relevant
persons. Thus, the prohibition does not apply to a number of potential organizations thatare very likely to be able to make misleading statements concerning the issuing or tradingof securities, such as securities trading centers, appraisal agencies, law firms andaccounting firms. None of these organizations fall within the meaning of the term“relevant person”.
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II. THE EXISTING ANTIFRAUD REGULATION AND THE PROMOTION OF A
LIQUID AND HEALTHY MARKET
1. Should Short Sale be totally Prohibited?
The term “short sale” is not defined by Decree 48/1998 either. Article 69, entitled“Short Sale”, makes unlawful any sale of securities if the seller does not actually havetitle to the securities at the time of selling. It reads:
Organizations or individuals are prohibited from selling any security
in any form if the organizations or individuals do not own suchsecurity at the time the transaction is effected.
Owing to the failure in defining the term “short sale”, this provision cannot explain
in which situation the seller can be deemed to own securities.280 It simply prohibits all
persons, not only securities firms, from selling short in any circumstance. According to agovernment official, an entire prohibition of short sale is an innovative creation ofVietnam in order to prevent speculative short sales, the sort of activity that resulted in the
East Asian financial crisis of 1997. 281 A question arising here, of course, is whether
speculative short sale was the only or even the main cause that led to that crisis.
Economists seem to attribute the financial crisis to two main factors: (1) domestic
policies and practices, and (2) the development of the global financial system, currency
speculation and the behavior of large institutional investors.282
The former derives from a number of issues such as: weaknesses of financial
institutions, and of regulatory or overseeing systems; a high number of risky investment
projects conducted in the field of real estate and in the stock market; ineffective corporate
governance and supervision; a credit boom by which corporations incurred high dollar280

See Rule 3b-3 issued by the US SEC, for example. This Rule gives a definition of “Short Sale”: “The term‘short sale’ means any sale of a security which the seller does not own or any sale which is consummated by
the delivery of a security borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller. A person shall be deemed to own asecurity if (1) he or his agent has title to it; or (2) he has purchased, or has entered into an unconditional
contract, binding on both parties thereto, to purchase it but has not yet received it; or (3) he owns a security
convertible into or exchangeable for it and has tendered such security for conversion or exchange; or (4) hehas an option to purchase or acquire it and has exercised such rights or warrants: Provided, however, that aperson shall be deemed to own securities only to the extent that he has a net long position in such securities.”
281
See Vu Ngoc Nhung, “Hoan thien thi truong chung khoan Viet nam nham thiet lap nen tai chinh vung manhva hieu qua” [Completion of Vietnam Securities Market in order to Establish a Strong and Effective Financial
Foundation], (Paper presented at the conference on “Finance and the Development of Vietnam Securities
Market”, held by the Financial Research Institute, Finance Ministry, in Ho Chi Minh City, on May 22, 2001),
3. See also the appendix of the above-mentioned paper “Thu gui ong Andy Gent, Tong giam doc Ngan hang
Hong Kong & Thuong Hai tai Vietnam” [Letter to Mr. Andy Gent, General Director of Hong Kong &Shanghai Bank in Vietnam], 9.
282
See Noeleen Hezer and Martin Khor, “The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Ways
Forward” http://www.worldbank.org/devforum/speaker_heyzer.html, visited Nov. 4, 2002.

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denominated short-term private debt, and weaknesses in legal structure as well as politicalaccountabilities.283
The latter factor is said to have its root in the combination of deregulation andliberalization of the financial sector in most of the countries that were worst affected by
the crisis; the increasing interconnection of the market and speed of transactions throughcomputer technology; the development of large institutional financial players; and thespeculation or short term investment that could move in and out very quickly acrossnational borders.284
Here, causes of the crisis are classified into domestic and international ones and assuch, problems with financial sector can be found in both areas, in parallel with othernon-financial problems, and under various forms. Although risky investment projects inthe stock market are mentioned, similar risky projects in real estate can also be seen.
Furthermore, risky investment projects in the stock market were not the single financial
problem. Others such as the credit boom, corporate high debts, and the combination of
deregulation and liberalization of the financial sector in relevant countries, can also befound. As such, it is unclear whether speculative short sale, which was only one of thefinancial problems, dominated.
For the purpose of our study here, perhaps the interim report of the Emerging
Markets Committee, IOSCO, gives a clearer picture of causes that led to the financial
crisis. The report observes such causes from a different approach, by which all problems
concerning financial market are grouped into one of the three main causes of the crisis.
These three main causes are: (1) macroeconomic issues, (2) structural issues, and (3)financial market issues.285
The first cause refers to (a) capital flow surges that could generate benefits todeveloping countries, but could also bring along with them significant risks, especially inthe absence of necessary pre-conditions to ensure the sound deployment of private capital
flow; (b) the fact that large capital inflows received by many emerging markets in theearly 1990s, along with the credit boom, enabled rapid and sustained economic
expansion, which, in turn, led many of these countries to run significant current accountdeficits; (c) the loss of competitiveness arising from exchange rate policies adopted bymost of the afflicted countries, which is also found to have been a crucial factor thatcaused the crisis; and (d) the confluence of all the above-mentioned factors.286
The second cause (structural issues) consists of (a) the deregulation andliberalization of the financial sector in the economies worst afflicted by the crisis; (b) theunderdeveloped debt markets that caused the worst-afflicted economies to over-rely onbanking finance; (c) the failure in regulating and supervising financial institutions; (d) the
inadequate disclosure and weak corporate governance that resulted in significant
283

Ibid.
Ibid.
285
See “The Causes of the Asian Financial and Economic Crisis”, extracted from an interim report “Causes,
Effects and Regulatory Implications of the Financial and Economic Turbulence in Emerging Markets” by the
Emerging Markets Committee, IOSCO. http://risk.ifci.ch, visited Nov. 4, 2002.
286
Ibid.
284

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problems in the financial and corporate sectors of the worst-afflicted countries; and (e)distorted lending decisions as a result of a confluence of the above-mentioned factors.287
The third cause (financial market issues), as pointed out in the report, is composedof the three following factors: (a) the currency market activity or the sharp currency
devaluation experienced by the South East Asian countries; (b) the use of OTC
instruments, especially derivatives and off-balance-sheet items, that very likely triggered
the crisis most severely; and (c) the financial contagion that resulted from an increasingly
global and integrated financial system.288
According to the report, the crisis was clearly a consequence of various factors. If
speculative short sales lay in the so-called “use of OTC instruments”, it was merely one of
the issues that occurred in the financial market, and the financial market issues were, inturn, merely one of the three principal causes that led to the Asian financial crisis.
Therefore, speculative short sales were obviously not the only cause – indeed not evenone of the principal causes – that triggered the financial crisis in Asia in the late 1990s.
Concerning the benefits generated by, and harms resulting from, short sales, there
have been contrary schools of thought. It might be useful to quote the Report of the US
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency:
The proponents of short selling contend that it is a necessary featureof an open market for securities; that in a crisis short sellers areuseful in maintaining an orderly market; and that their activities
serve as a cushion to break the force of a decline in the price ofstocks. Its opponents assert that short selling unsettles the market,
forces liquidation, depresses prices, accelerates declines, and has no
economic value or justification.289
The US SEC, while proposing rules and seeking public opinion on short saleregulation, points out two important benefits which short sales provide for the market,
namely market liquidity and pricing efficiency.290
Market liquidity: when market professionals effect short selling transactions, they
are offsetting temporary imbalances in the supply and demand for securities and thus are
creating substantial market liquidity. Through securities professionals, short selling
activities enrich the trading supply of stock, which in turn lessens the risk when investors
might have to pay an artificially high price owing to a temporary shortage in supply.291
287

Ibid.
Ibid.
289
See Stock Exchange Practices, Report of Senate Comm. On Banking & Currency, S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1934). Quoted in Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, (4th
Ed. 2001), 797. Hereinafter, Loss and Seligman.
290
See “Proposed Rules” (SEC), (Action: Concept Release; Request for Comments. Oct. 28, 1999), 17 CFRPart 240, [Release No. 34-42037; File No. S7-24-99] RIN 3235-AH84, Short Sales. 64FR 57996.
<LexisNexis>. Hereinafter, “Proposed Rules” (SEC).
291
Ibid.
288

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Pricing efficiency: in an efficient market, prices fully manifest all interests ofpurchasers and sellers. When entering into a securities transaction, both the purchaser andthe short seller expect to profit from the difference between the buying and the selling
price. Usually a short seller in a security trusts that the security is overvalued and so its
price will fall. By engaging in short sale transaction, that seller informs the market of
his/her evaluation of future securities price performance, which in turn, contributes tosecurities pricing efficiency. By employing short sales to gain profit from pricedivergence between a stock and a derivative security (e.g. a convertible security or an
option on that stock), arbitrageurs also add to pricing efficiency.292
The US SEC, although recognizing the above-mentioned benefits generated byshort sale, has stressed that short sale can also be utilized as a manipulative tool on
securities market.
Loss and Seligman, while considering opposite schools of thought over theadvantages and disadvantages of short sale, also conclude that it is impossible to find out
where the truth lay between these extreme views.293 Regardless of such a controversy
over short sale, in practice, the Dutch, French, Germans, British, and even the Americans,have all more or less eliminated the prohibition of short sales.294
Today short sales are often controlled rather than prohibited. Both the Japanese andthe Americans seem to follow this approach. The Securities and Exchange Law of Japanreads:
No person shall do the acts set forth below in violation of theprovisions of a Cabinet order.
(1) To make the sale of, or the placement or acceptance of an orderfor the sale of, a security without owning, or by borrowing, suchsecurity (including such case as may be prescribed by a Cabinet
order as one comparable thereto), or(2) To make the placement of an order to buy a security forthwith
when the price of such security has risen from that at the time ofthe placement of such order and is equal to or above the limit
price set by himself/herself, or to sell a security forthwith when
the price of such security has fallen from that at the time of theplacement of such order and is equal to or below the limit priceset by himself/herself.295
Pursuant to this provision, in Japan, short selling is only prohibited where the price of therelevant security drops (that is when the security can be sold at a price lower than theprevious preceding selling price).
292

Ibid.
See Loss and Seligman, above n. 289, 797.
294
Ibid, 795 – 796.
295
Art. 162: items (1) and (2).
293

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In the US, short sale regulation has been adopted since 1930s under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC's Rules. The short sale regulation is twofold:regulation of short selling by corporate insiders and that by others. Corporate insiders areprohibited from selling short their corporate security if the seller or his/her principal does
not own the sold security; or even if he/she does own the security but does not deliver it
within 20 days from the selling date, or does not deposit the security in any usual channelof transportation within 5 days after the sale is consummated.296
The second part of the short sale regulation even reaches every person who
engages in a short-selling transaction.297 However, such a transaction will only be deemedunlawful where the prices of the relevant securities are falling.298 In other words, shortsales only become illegal in a declining market; in an advancing market, they are
permissible. The purposes of short sale regulation in the US were mentioned in an SEC
report in 1963, including: (1) to permit short sale in an advancing market; (2) to eliminate
the use of short sale in driving the exchange markets down; (3) to avoid short selling inaccelerating a downward trend in stock price.299
The controversy over positive and negative aspects of short sale has continued.
Recently, in the US, the SEC has sought public comments on the necessity of short saleregulation and the extent to which short sale should be regulated. By this open request forcomment, the SEC aims to find out the most appropriate regulatory structure for shortselling. One of the eight proposed concepts related to the regulation of short sale ofsecurities is the elimination of Rule 10a-1.300

2. Should Extension of Credit and Lending Securities (Margin Trading) be Entirely
Banned?
Article 72 makes it unlawful if securities firms and their associates engage in credit
transactions and lending securities. This Article is too brief to give a clear meaning of“extension of credit” and “lending securities”. It reads:
Organizations that engage in securities business and persons whopractice in the area of securities trade must not extend credit andlending securities.
This might be an equivalent to the provision concerning “Purchasing Securities on
Margin” under the US Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. However, in the US, the296

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 16(c), 15 USC s 78p (2002); see also Rule 16(c).
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 10(a), 15 USC s 78j (2002).
298
See the US SEC rule: Rule 10a-1.
299
See “Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission”, H.R.
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), at Pt.2, 251.
300
See “Proposed Rules” (SEC), above n. 290.
297

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term “margin transactions” refers to securities purchased on credit. 301 In that sense,
Article 72 has failed to define the prohibited activities, since it cannot make any
connection between “extension of credit” and “lending securities”. It simply bans
specified persons from engaging in two such areas of business: (1) extending credit and(2) lending securities. As such, its meaning cannot be construed as the prohibition ofextending credit for the purchase of securities, although that might have been theintention of the lawmakers.
In practice, in other countries, the purchase of securities on credit is not usuallyprohibited but is put under control. That is because margin trading, to some extent, has agood impact on market liquidity and promotes a healthy market. As observed by some
economists:
margin trading must be defended not on the grounds that it
efficiently and ingeniously assists the speculator, but rather that it
encourages the extra trading which changes a thin and anemic
market into a thick and healthy one.302
However, there are a number of reasons why margin trading cannot be totally
deregulated. According to the US SEC report, an entire freedom in the extension of credit
for purchasing securities has been found detrimental to the exchange. 303 Loss andSeligman also give three reasons for control of margin trading under the American law.
The first is to prevent a situation where the nation’s credit resources, which would
otherwise have been available at normal interest rates for more desirable uses of local
commerce, industry, and agriculture, could be drained by much higher rates into loans forsecurities speculation in the stock market. The second is to protect the margin purchaserfrom a risk the purchaser might encounter by purchasing securities mainly on credit. And
the third is to achieve a stable economy and to avert over fluctuation in the market.304
The US securities regulation thus does not ban margin trading but allows such a
trading within certain thresholds.305 A margin requirement of 50% of the market value ofthe purchased securities has been maintained for years. A purchaser can thus enter amargin transaction by borrowing up to 50% of the market price of the securities he/she is301

See Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation, (1985), 285. Hereinafter, Thomas Lee Hazen.
See J. Patrick Raines and Charles G. Leathers, Economists and the Stock Market, (2000), 112.
303
See Dean Furbush, Annette Poulsen, “Symposium on the Regulation of Secondary Trading Markets:
Program Trading, Volatility, Portfolio Insurance, and the Role of Specialists and Market Makers: Harmonizing
Margins: the Regulation of Margin Levels in Stock Index Futures Markets”, (1989) 74, Cornell Law Review
873, 876.
304
See Loss and Seligman, above n. 289, 803.
305
Regulation T of the Federal Reserve Board governs the extension of credit by securities market
intermediaries like broker-dealers. Regulation U of the Federal Reserve Board governs the extension of credit
by banks.
302

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going to buy. In extending credit to a customer in a margin transaction, broker-dealers are
required to disclose initially and periodically the credit terms in margin transaction.306
A similar provision to that of the US is adopted in Japan, where margin trading canonly be effected by a securities company if its customer deposits a specified sum ofmoney. Article 161-2, Securities and Exchange Law reads:
A securities company shall, in connection with such transaction as
may be prescribed by an ordinance of the Cabinet Office including amargin transaction and others, receive from its customer inaccordance with the provisions of an ordinance of the Cabinet Office
the deposit of a sum of money no smaller than an amount arrived atby multiplying the market price of the security by such ratio as thePrime Minister may fix by taking into consideration the assurance offairness of the sale or purchase of , or any other form of transaction
in, a security.

III. THE LACK OF LEGAL BASES FOR INVESTORS’ RIGHTS OF ACTION
AND FOR MEANINGFULLY DETERRENT SANCTIONS AGAINSTVIOLATIONS
1. No Concrete Legal Bases for Rights of Action against Wrongful Conduct
To ensure that public investors are adequately protected, other jurisdictions often
adopt a legal basis for three kinds of action: private action, class action and derivative
action. Concrete provisions concerning these rights do not appear to be available in the
Vietnamese securities regulation and enterprise laws.
A legal action against market participants like Securities Trading Centers and theirstaff, securities firms and their employees, issuing companies and their officers, and otherpersons who violate the securities regulation are not mentioned in Decree 48/1998, nor
are they stipulated in the Enterprise Act. Article 79 Decree 48/1998 merely provides forthe settlement of disputes arising in the issuance and trading of securities and in othersecurities transactions. However, this provision is inserted in Chapter X, namely“Inspection, Supervision and Treatment of Violation”, following the two Articles, 77 and78, which provide for inspection and supervision by the SSC. This fact seems to imply
that disputes mentioned in Article 79 are only those found by such inspection andsupervision, and do not include disputes instituted by public investors. As such, it isunclear whether or not public investors have rights of action under the current securities
regulations.

306

See Rule 10b-16 of the SEC: under this Rule, both initial and periodic written disclosures of the credit termsof margin loans are required.

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Article 79.1 says that disputes over securities transactions are to be initially handled
by the relevant parties on a negotiation and mediation basis. Stock Trading Centers, Stock
Exchanges and the SSC can act as a third party in reconciliation of such disputes. Where
parties fail at self-handling the dispute, they can bring the case to an economic arbitrator
or a court of law for settlement or trial, respectively.
Sub-article 2 of Article 79 goes on to provide for the settlement of disputes
involving a foreign party. If these disputes cannot be handled by the relevant parties on anegotiation basis, and cannot be settled in conformity with an international treaty towhich Vietnam is party, then the disputes will be solved in conformity with the law ofVietnam.
Nowhere in the Article or in Chapter X are rights explicitly vested in investors tosue the securities law offenders on their own initiative, to protect themselves.
Decree 22/2000 merely provides for the rights of individuals to make accusation
regarding administrative violations to the state competent authorities. 307 Accusation
regarding other violations not of an administrative nature cannot be made by individuals
since there is no concrete legal basis for doing so. Possibly, in order to institute legal
action against a wrong doing where the violation is not of an administrative nature,investors have to rely on general statutory provisions found in the Ordinance on
Procedure for Settlement of Civil Disputes308 and the Criminal Procedure Code.309
Rights to take legal action are of importance. Such rights, if adequately adopted,
can usefully cooperate with the market watchdog in preventing insider trading and otherdeceptive practices. It might be helpful to learn from the Japanese experience. For a long
period of time, private rights of action were not legally recognized under the Securities
and Exchange Law in Japan. The old Article 58 of the Law does not give a direct legal
foundation for civil remedies. The remedies, however, can be found in Article 709, the307

See Art. 19. 2.
See Art. 1. This Article empowers citizens and legal entities with the rights to institute legal proceedings
against wrong doers to protect their lawful interests.
On August 2, 2002, for the first time, a company was sued by workers for depriving them of several
billions Vietnamese Dong by not paying social insurance fees and workers’ salary. This legal action was taken
by seven workers, on behalf of another 260, working at the First Branch, Thien Ho Production Ltd. Co. The
case was brought into Thu Duc District Court (located in Ho Chi Minh City). For more information, see “Cty
TNHH Thien Ho (TPHCM) chiem doat tien BHXH: Cong nhan khoi kien Cty ra toa!” [Thien Ho Ltd. Co.:
Usurping Social Insurance Fees – Workers Sue at a Court of Law!], Bao Lao dong [The Labour], Issue No.
205, Aug. 6, 2002.
http://www.laodong.com.vn/, visited Aug. 6, 2002.
This case although it has not yet been heard, shows that the language of Article 1, the Ordinance on
Procedure for Settlement of Civil Disputes, is very broad. Perhaps, shareholders can similarly take a classaction against the company where the class interests are injured. However, it is unclear whether a derivative
suit can be brought into court under this Article 1.
309
Article 84 of the Code vests in citizens the right to accuse a criminal offender. Article 87 imposes criminal
prosecution obligations on a number of state competent authorities such as investigation organs and thePeople’s Prosecutors’ Office. Where the crimes occur within their own jurisdiction, Border Defending Army,
Naval Force, and the Forestry Office can also institute prosecutions. Courts can also institute prosecution if
during a trial they find a new crime or a new criminal offender.
308

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Civil Code. 310 Unfortunately, the provision has never been used to prosecute insider
trading in Japan.311 More precisely, there was only one insider trading case, but it merely
appeared in the press, not being reported in any official case reports.312 A number ofreasons for that have been found: (1) most Japanese did not think insider trading to be
wrongful conduct,313 (2) Japan is an inherently non-litigious society;314 (3) Japan lacked
provisions for class actions and effective discovery procedures; (4) Japan has extremely
expensive litigation fees for taking a civil action.315 Although legal action can be initiatedunder Article 709, the Civil Code, it is maintained that “any tort action places the burdenof proof on the plaintiff, and Japan’s discovery procedures make proving a violation of
insider trading laws extremely difficult”.316
Possibly the absence of direct statutory provisions on private right of action andclass action in the Securities and Exchange Law, as well as other aspects of social andlegal culture, have resulted in the failure to detect insider trading in Japan. In theliterature, an often-seen observation is that Japan is a heaven of insider trading.317 Whilein the US, the number of actions against insider trading taken by the SEC alone amount to
300 per year, in Japan there have only been three cases brought to trial.318 This fact,
however, shows that the small number of cases brought to court in Japan cannot be
attributed only to the dearth of concrete legal bases for rights of action in the securities
regulations. It also indicates that the Japanese market watchdog does not seem to havemade a real effort in detecting insider trading. This is probably the case, since in a numberof circumstances, even when concrete legal bases for rights of action are available, there
might still be a dearth of litigation since investors themselves cannot detect or do notknow whether this or that transaction actually constitutes insider trading.
In the US, to answer the question whether Congress allows a private right of action
under Section 10(b), one will have to look at the language of that Section, which does notseem to explicitly specify such a right. However, aside from statutes enacted by thelegislature, the US case law is another important source under which a private right ofaction against violators of Section 10b can be found. In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
310

See Louis Loss et al (eds.), above n. 261, 192.
Ibid, 192 – 3; see also Ramzi Nasser above n. 261, 328; see also Curtis J. Milhaupt, “Managing the Market:
the Ministry of Finance and Securities Regulation in Japan”, (1994) 30 Stanford Journal of International Law
423, 454. Hereinafter, Curtis Milhaupt.
312
See Louis Loss et al (eds.), above n. 261, 192.
313
Ibid, 191- 192; see also Ramzi Nasser, above n. 261, 384.
314
Cutis J. Milhaupt, above n. 311, 455; see also George F. Parker, “The Regulation of Insider Trading inJapan: Introducing a Private Right of Action”, (1995) 73, Washington University Law Quarterly 1399, 1414.
Hereinafter, George Parker.
315
Ibid (George F. Parker), 1414 - 5; see also Larry Zoglin, “The Global Securities Market: Insider Trading inJapan: A Challenge to the Integration of the Japanese Equity Market into the Global Securities Market”, (1987)
Columbia Business Law Review 419, 422.
316
Ibid (George F. Parker), 1422.
317
See Ramzi Nasser, above n. 261, 382 - 383; see George F. Parker, above n. 314, 1403; and see also ShenShin Lu, “Are the 1988 Amendments to Japanese Securities Regulation Law Effective Deterrents to Insider
Trading?”, (1991) Columbia Business Law Review 179, 193.
318
See George Parker, above n. 314, 1403.
311

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the plaintiff shareholders sued the defendant shareholders for violating Section 10(b), theExchange Act when purchasing shares from the plaintiffs without disclosing material
information. The US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that thedefendant shareholders entered deceptive transaction and that the plaintiff shareholders
were entitled to a private remedy without proving whether or not the defendants profited
from the transaction.319
2. Only Administrative Sanctions against Violations
Article 80, Decree 48/1998 provides for the “Treatment of Violations”. It merely
gives the levels of sanction borne by violators. Depending on the nature of the violationand the extent to which the securities regulation is breached, disciplinary, administrative
or criminal sanctions can be imposed on the violator. Although civil sanctions are notmentioned here, Article 80 goes on to say that where the violation has caused damages toother parties, compensation for damages will be applied. So it can be said that civil
sanctions are also adopted in this Article.
For the time being, the statutory sources dealing with such violations are mainly
found in Article 80, Decree 48/1998. There are no further rules expanding the language of
Article 80 apart from Decree 22/2000. However Decree 22/2000 merely deals withadministrative violations. Other violations remain poorly regulated. Since securities law
offenders in general, and securities crimes in particular, are relatively new in Vietnam; thecurrent Criminal Code has no concrete article regulating these newly emerging crimes. In
the absence of such provisions in the Criminal Code, the simple language of Decree
48/1998 and the limited scope of Decree 22/2000 cause general concern as to whether
Vietnam has enough remedies to protect public investors. And that is not to mention
whether or not the available remedies are well enforced.
As long as public confidence in securities markets is maintained, the markets canattract customers. Failure in doing so will result in ineffective markets, which goesagainst the goal of Vietnam in creating a market place where capital demands can beincreasingly and widely met to support economic development in the country.

IV. THE FUTURE OF THE ANTI-FRAUD REGULATION
Looking at the anti-fraud regulation as a whole, one can easily recognize a numberof deficiencies that need to be eliminated. First are the statutory gaps in the regulation andin its enforcement mechanism. Second is the failure of the regulation to employ
supporting instruments to promote a thick and healthy market. Third are technicaldeficiencies in the regulation. To consolidate the regulation, enhance its validity, andpromote a healthy market, the following steps should be taken:
319

See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69F Supp. 512, 514 - 515 (E. D. Pa.) (1946).

87Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter III

1. Strengthening the Anti-fraud Regulation and Enhancing the Enforcement
Mechanisma. Short-swing Trading Should be put under Control
The regulation of insider trading has no provision requiring company officers andlarge shareholders to report their sales or purchases of securities to the state authority.
Such a provision is of significance in detecting short-swing trading and in confiscating
short-swing profit for the company. Decree 22/2000 does have a rather general provisionon which the whole amounts derived from law-breaking activities and the relevant
securities can be expropriated (sung cong quy).320 This provision gives the impression thateven if profits that have derived from insider trading transactions (for example, shortswing profits) were detected, the relevant company is not entitled to disgorge such profits.
Rather the profits will be transferred into the state budget.
The future regulation of insider trading therefore needs concrete provisions toimpose reporting duties on any person who, by the acquisition of shares, becomes a large
shareholder, and on company insiders who engage in transactions to purchase and to sellshares. Such duties should be discharged at the time the acquisition occurs and at the endof the month the purchasing or selling transactions are effected. A concrete period oftime, within which a purchase that can be matched against a sale at a higher price so thatthe transactions can be deemed as short-swing trading, also needs to be defined. In
addition, a legal basis, on which a company can recover short-swing profit derived fromthe purchase and sale of shares effected within a short period of time, as specified by thelaw, needs to be created.

b. Stabilizing Activities Should be Legalized
The language of the anti-manipulative provisions - Article 73, Decree 48/1998, israther general. As such, it seems to cover too broad an area, while lacking necessary
details to deal with a number of specific issues. For example: in a number ofcircumstances, where stabilization of market price of a security during the issuance isrequired, there is a need for purchase or bid for such security by an underwriter or issuer.
The current regulation gives no legal basis for such transactions to be effected.
There should be statutory provisions clearly distinguishing between bidding andpurchasing activities done by securities distributors to induce others to purchase the
distributing securities, on the one hand, and activities that are actually done to stabilize
the securities price in order to avoid risk that might be incurred by the underwriters, on
the other hand. Such provisions should explicitly require issuers to set out their proposal
on price-stabilizing activities, if they plan to do so, in the application filed with the SSC
320

Art. 15, sub-art. 2, paragraph d.

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before the commencement of a public offering. When stabilizing operations are actually
done during a distribution, underwriters should be subject to reporting requirements to the
SSC.
In the absence of such provisions, on the one hand, there will be no legal basis for
detecting manipulative transactions conducted under the form of stabilization. The
problem becomes more serious once legal action is taken since it will take time andenergy for courts to discern manipulative and stabilizing activities during the time ofhearing. On the other hand, where it is necessary, actually stabilizing activities could not
be performed. This obviously causes difficulties for securities distributors in preventing
and retarding the falling trend of securities prices during a public offering.
Concerning the repurchase of outstanding shares by listed companies, at present,
although there are up to three provisions - Article 65 of the Enterprise Act, Article 73.4 of
Decree 48/1998, and Article 54.2 of Decision 79/2000 mention the issue - uncertainties
still remain. All of the Articles say rather little about the conditions for share buyback
except for the requirements by which the buyback must be approved by the generalshareholders’ meeting and then by the Securities Trading Center, and the minimum, andmaximum amounts that can be repurchased on a once-a-day basis. Possibly, there should
be concrete provisions laying down more detailed limits companies have to meet in sharebuybacks. Such limits would include the maximum purchase price a listed company
might offer and the time such transactions could be effected. These would reduce thepossibilities for listed companies to manipulate their share prices.
c. Omissions of Material Information should be Prohibited
The mere prohibition of false statements under Article 71.1 is not enough to avoid
public investors being misled. It is therefore, necessary to insert a provision that makes
unlawful the omissions of material facts in a statement. In addition, the forms (oral or
written or both) in which statements are to be made within the scope of the provision alsoneed to be specified.
Another legal loophole also lies in the “misinformation provisions”. Article 71.2
merely proscribes issuers, underwriters and relevant persons from advertising, offeringand carrying out other activities having an advertising character before obtaining theissuing license from the SSC. As earlier discussed, the provision leaves room for so doing
to many other persons such as securities trading centers, appraisal agencies, law firms andaccounting firms. In practice, it is not beyond the abilities of such persons to accomplish
the prohibited activities under Article 71.2. So this gap should be eliminated.
d. Concrete Rights of Action and Meaningfully Deterrent Sanctions for Violations
should have Legal Bases in the Securities Regulation
Rights of action (including private right, class and derivative) and legal sanctions
are of importance in ensuring compliance with the law. Both these issues have not been

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properly dealt with by the current regulation, as earlier discussed. 321 More concrete
provisions embodied in securities regulations conferring private rights of action on
investors to institute proceedings against wrong-doing are thus necessary. Suchprovisions could be adopted in an individual article dealing with individual fraudulent
activities or could be combined in the form of articles specifically dealing with such rightsof action. Regardless of what forms they might take, such provisions should expressly set
out the private right of public investors against violators of any nature (civil, criminal or
so on) in a court of law. The Enterprise Act also needs concrete articles providing forclass and derivative actions to ensure that company shareholders have adequate legal
remedies to protect their own interests as well as those of the company.
These provisions will, in part, build up public confidence with the newly emerging
securities market, as investors would know that they could take legal action against thewrong-doer on their own initiative when necessary.
To enable such rights of action, especially derivative action, to be realized,
litigation fees in general, and court fee in particular, should also be reasonably provided
for, since high fees might minimize the number of suits brought to court. This is because
in contrast to a suit instituted by a private action or class action, in a derivative suit, theplaintiff will not receive any compensation, event if eventually successful.
Merely recognizing the rights of action for public investors is not enough to assurecompliance with the law, in the absence of an adequate and proper system of statutory
sanctions. As pointed out earlier in this Chapter, 322 at present, only administrative
sanctions have been adopted, and on a rather detailed basis. Sanctions for violations
having criminal and civil natures are still missing. Even with a full system of legal
sanctions, if adequate levels of penalty are not adopted, the success of law reform would
still be in doubt.
In the late 1980s, Japan had experienced a reform in securities law, by which the
Securities and Exchange Law was adopted with more detailed standards. But for various
reasons, concerns about the success of the Revised Law still remain. One such reason is“the relatively minor penalty threatened by the law”.323 It is said that both maximum fineand imprisonment sanctions applied to those “reaping enormous profits” (a maximum fineof 500,000 Yen and imprisonment of at most six months) provided in the revised Law atthat time are not sufficient.324
In Vietnam, the maximum fine level under Decree 22/2000 is merely 50 billion
VND (around 3000 USD), which is not drastic enough. There is thus an urgent need for
Vietnam to introduce adequate criminal sanctions, appropriate fines and propercompensations for damages caused by frauds in law and in practice.
321

See Section III of this chapter.
See Section III, Sub-section 2 of this chapter.
323
See Harald Baum, “Japanese Capital Markets: New Legislation”, (1989) 22 Law in Japan an Annual 1, 24.
324
Ibid. The author compares such levels of punishment in Japan with those adopted in the United State (a fineof 1 million USD and 10 year imprisonment) and in Switzerland (3 year imprisonment and up to 40,000 Swiss
Francs or in some specified cases, an unlimited fine).
322

90Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter III

2. Providing the Market with more Useful Instrumentsa. Short Sale should not be totally prohibited
The current securities regulation bans short sales entirely. As earlier discussed,
short sales, whilst they can be employed in manipulative transactions, can also benefit themarket by providing liquidity and pricing efficiency. A strict prohibition as has been
adopted in Vietnam will deprive the young securities market of a useful instrument.
The lawmakers should pay more attention to this problem and possibly create a new
short sale regulation under which: (1) only short sales effected by company insiders
should be strictly proscribed; (2) short sale transactions entered into by other public
investors should only be banned in a falling market to prevent free falls in stock prices.
b. Margin Trading should be allowed Within a Certain Threshold
The prohibition of purchasing securities on margin under Article 72, Decree
48/1998 should be discussed more thoroughly, since margin trading, as earlier discussed,
to some extent has a good impact on market liquidity and promotes a healthy market. For
these reasons, an approach in which margin trading is not totally prohibited, but can be
carried on within certain limits, has often been adopted elsewhere. Usually the law setssome thresholds on the amount of credit that can be obtained by investors who purchasesecurities using such loans, as earlier discussed.
In the history of the stock exchange in the US, margin requirements were first set
by the exchanges and individual brokers. In 1913, the NYSE adopted a rule based on atheory of “proper and adequate” margin requirements. The theory generally says that if
margins are not set properly and adequately, they might be harmful to the exchange. The
theory used to be followed by exchange members in setting their own margin
requirements.325
The stock market crash in 1929 pushed the US Congress to take a decisive step ingranting to the Federal Reserve Board the power of regulating initial and maintenancemargins.326
Perhaps this should be a lesson for Vietnam in revising the regulation of margin
trading. The problem is to find an appropriate credit limit within which investors could
purchase securities for speculation, rather than to ban margin trading entirely.
3. Eliminating Technical Deficiencies
a. Providing Definitions of a Number of Significant Terms
325

Ibid. 877.
Ibid. 877 - 878; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 7(a), 15 USC s 78g (2002). Pursuant to thisSection, the Federal Reserve Board has the right to “prescribe rules and regulations with respect to the amountof credit that may be initially extended and subsequently maintained on any security”.

326

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Precise definitions of the terms that refer to the prohibited activities such as“insider trading”, “market manipulation”, “misinformation”, “short sale”, and “credit
transaction, lending securities” should be provided. This is essentially important to ensure
the feasibility of the regulation. In the absence of such significant definitions, it is hard toknow in practice which activities fall into the scope of the relevant provision.
b. Eliminating Inconsistencies in Different Legal Texts
Decree 48/1998 has failed to define activities that are deemed as unlawful such as
tipping or recommending other persons to trade based on inside information. Whiletipping is not prohibited by Decree 48/1998, it is deemed illegal and subject toadministrative sanctions under Decree 22/2000. It seems that the two Decrees do notagree with each other about this issue, although that might not have been the intention of
the lawmakers. Of course the later rules often overrule the earlier rules, but this should betaken into account while revising Decree 48/1998 to maximally eliminate undesirable
discrepancies between these two documents.
Another discrepancy is found between Article 73.1, Decree 48/1998 and Article
5.1.a, Decree 22/2000. These two Articles refer to the same manipulative activity but donot seem to be successful in the way they are expressed. Both have failed to describe theprohibited activity – wash trading – adequately as earlier discussed. For these reasons,both Articles should be reworded to assure their transparency and to clarify their intention
as well as to eliminate the inconsistency between them.

92Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter IV

CHAPTER IV
WHETHER SECURITIES PROFESSIONALS
ARE ADEQUATELY REGULATED

In parallel with the information disclosure regime and anti-fraud provisions, theregulation of securities professionals is also critical to investor protection. That is because
in many cases conflicts of interest between customers and broker-dealers are inevitable.
In the absence of an adequate regulation of such conflicts, broker-dealers might takeadvantage of their superior knowledge in the area over their customers to make profits tothe detriment of these customers.
Furthermore, a suitable regulation of market professionals can even contribute tomarket development. In the case of Vietnam, defining the proper extent to which banks
can act as securities professionals or can enter securities business is of importance increating competitive force in the market, which, in turn, will foster market development.
This chapter studies the current regulation of securities professionals in Vietnam
and argues that the regulation is not adequate. It contains weaknesses which will threaten
investors’ protection and be hurdles on the way Vietnam promotes market development.

I. REGULATION OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE SAFETY OF
PUBLIC INVESTORS
1. Securities Firms in General
Decree 48/1998 refers to all securities professionals as securities firms. Securities
firms can engage in one or more of the following business activities: (1) brokerage; (2)dealing; (3) portfolio management; (4) underwriting; and (5) securities investment
advisory services.
Securities firms must be shareholding or limited liability companies having an
operating license granted by the SSC.327 This means that, like any company, securities
firms must be established under the Enterprises Act328 and doing business in conformity
with that Act. To trade in securities, they must obtain a license from the SSC.
In order to avoid risks incurred by future securities firms and by the public at large,
the lawmakers created various statutory conditions that firms have to meet before andafter obtaining a business license from the SSC. Such conditions relate to future business

327

See Decree 48/1998, Art. 29.
This Act was passed in 1999; under the Act four forms of enterprise are recognized, namely limited liability
company, shareholding company, partnership, and private enterprise.

328

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proposals, the material and technical conditions of the future firm, minimum capitalrequirements,329 and qualification of the staff.330
Depending on the kinds of business activities carried out, securities firms have tomeet different levels of minimum capital requirement. Firms that provide brokerage,
portfolio management and investment advisory services must meet a minimum capital of
3 billion Dong. Such a figure applied to dealers is 12 billion Dong, and to underwriters 22
billion Dong. Where a firm carries out more than one business activity, it has to meet the
total minimum capital requirements for each such activity, 331 for example, 37 million
Dong if each of the above activities are carried out.
Since securities firms operate in a very special field, where specialty is highly
required and where fraud and risk are very likely to occur, they have to meet a number ofstatutory requirements that are not necessary to be met by other companies. This fact thus
makes securities firms differ from most other business entities. The fundamental
differences between securities firms and other companies are: (1) the staff in a securities
firm consists of securities trading staff. Apart form the clerks, accountants and cashiers,
other staff working in securities firms, including directors, must have a practicing licensefrom the SSC;332 (2) the statutory representative of a securities firm must be the firm's
General Director (or Director), who is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the firmin the stock trading centers.333 The firm representative must have a bachelor’s degree inlaw or economics, and a practicing license granted by the SSC as for other staff of thefirm; he/she must not be a member of the management board or a general director (ordirector) of a previously bankrupt company, nor can he/she be a securities trading staff
member whose practicing license was previously revoked by the SSC; and he/she musthave at least three year experience in financial, banking or insurance business.334 It is329

It should be noted that Decree 48/1998 uses the term “legal capital” (von phap dinh) instead of “minimum
capital requirement”. Although Decree 48/1998 does not construe this term, the meaning of “legal capital” canbe found under the Enterprise Act.
Article 3.7, the Enterprise Act defines: “Legal capital (von phap dinh) is the minimum capital enterprise
incorporators have to meet, pursuant to the law, in order to set up an enterprise.” Thus the concept of “legal
capital” in Vietnam denotes a minimum amount required by the law or a “minimum capital requirement”. It is
not similar to that in use elsewhere, where “legal capital” means “stated capital”: see Bayless Manning andJames J. Hanks, Jr. “Legal Capital”, (3rd ed 1990), 30 - 34.
330
See Decree 48/1998, Art. 30.
331
Ibid.
332
See Decision 04-1998/QD-UBCK3 dated 13 October 1998 (hereinafter, Decision 04/1998), issued by theState Securities Commission, promulgating the Organization and Operation of Securities Firms, Art. 12 as
amended under Decision 78/2000/QD-UBCK (hereinafter Decision 78/2000) dated December 29, 2000 by the
SSC, to amend and supplement the "Regulation of Organization and Operation of Securities Firms"
promulgated under Decision 04/1998.
333
See Decision 04/1998, Art. 18.
334
Ibid., Art. 19. The terms “finance”, “banking” and “insurance” in Vietnamese are “tai chinh”, “ngan hang”
and “bao hiem”.
Under the Enterprises Act, the statutory representatives of enterprises other than private enterprises caneither be the president of the management board (in shareholding companies), the president of the members’
assembly (in limited liability companies) or the general director of these companies. The Enterprises Act does94

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter IVinteresting that Article 19. 5, Decision 04/1998 does not include the term “securities”,
and as a result it inadvertently excludes from the post of a representative of a securities
firm, persons who have had three years, or even more, of experience in the securities
business. Of course, at the time this Decision was issued in 1998, there was no one who
had three-years experience in securities business since at that time no securities firms
existed in Vietnam. However, this provision will soon be outdated, especially since thefirst Stock Trading Center has already been operating since July 2000 with the first six
securities firms335 getting licenses to do securities business. Moreover, the term “finance”
itself covers all three areas “banking”, “insurance” and “securities”. Possibly the term
“finance” alone is enough to cover all the three areas in one of which a securities firm
representative is required to obtain experience.
Individuals holding a practicing license granted by the SSC are not permitted towork for or invest in two or more securities firms, or to occupy the position of director,
company manager, or shareholder owning more than 5% of voting shares of an issuer.336
By this provision, Vietnam has taken a relatively careful step in avoiding potential
conflicts of interest. That is necessary because both company law and securities law inVietnam are in their infancy.
The Enterprise Act, although it puts self-dealing under control, merely deals withtransactions between company board members and the company itself.337 In spelling out
the duties of company managers, the Act generally says that company management
boards, directors and other officers must not misuse their powers for their own interests or
those of other persons.338 Self-dealing, however, can basically be divided into four groupsof transactions: (1) those entered into by a company and its directors or officers; (2) thoseentered into by a company and a business entity in which the directors or officers have asignificant direct or indirect financial interest; (3) those entered into by a subsidiary and aparent company; and (4) those entered into by companies having common or interlocking
directors.339
The Enterprise Act has thus not yet covered all necessary areas requiring
regulation, nor can it provide adequate legal bases for governing transactions occurring
between companies with a common director/officer. The situation will become worse
when those companies have relationships involving a subsidiary securities company and aholding bank or the like. Such a relationship might well give rise to opportunities for bad
dealing to occur. In the absence of a comprehensive regulation of conflicts of interest, theprohibition of interlocking directorates can thus be deemed wise and right.

not specify any criteria to be met by the statutory representative of an enterprise as Decision No. 04/1998 doeswith respect to such a post in a securities firm.
335
See “Profits hard to come by for Vietnam Stock Brokers”, above n. 194.
336
See Decision 04/1998, Art. 17.1 & 17.2.
337
See Art. 87.
338
See Art. 86.2.
339
See Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law, (1986) 159.

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Such prohibition can be found in both Japanese and American laws. In Japan,
common directors and auditors between a securities firm and its parent bank or its
subsidiary bank are forbidden.340 Even a director who performs an executive duty in asecurities company must not perform the same duty in any bank, trust company or any
other financial institution. 341 The US had also prohibited interlocking directorates
between securities firms and banks.342 Recently, such prohibition was eliminated under
the Financial Services Modernization Act. 343 However, it can be argued that theelimination of interlocking directorates in the US is justifiable because of the extensive
US regulation of conflicts of interest. Most of the state corporation statutes in the US havespecial provisions regulating conflict of interest transactions. 344 Conflict of interest
provisions can also be found in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act.345 Or one
could even argue that whether or not such elimination is appropriate remains to be seen.
2. Brokerage and Dealing Activities can be combined in one Securities Firm in the
Absence of Necessary Regulation of Conflicts of Interest
The statutory permission under which one firm can act as both a broker and a dealer
is not something new. However, this combination of business activities often results inserious conflicts of interest between securities firms and their customers if there is no
statutory measure to avoid them. Decree 48/1998, Decision 04/1998 and even Decision
78/2000, all have no definition of either broker or dealer. Article 2, Decree 48/1998
merely defines brokerage and dealing. It reads:
Securities brokerage is an intermediary business of buying or sellingsecurities on behalf of customers for a commission.346
Dealing is activities of securities firm in buying and selling securities
for the firm itself.347

340

See Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 (2001 Japan), Arts. 32 & 32.2.
Ibid., Art. 32.3.
342
See Banking Act of 1933 s 32. (Richard W. Jennings, Federal Securities Laws: Selected Statutes, Rules andForms, 1999 ed).
343
Section 101 b.
344
See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Corporation Law, (2000) 324.
345
Since 1984, conflict of interest transactions have also been covered by Section 8.31, the 1984 Revised
Model Business Corporation Act. The 1988 revision creates four provisions: from Section 8.60 to Section 8.63.
Subchapter F, Section 8.60 (1) (ii), for example, says that a conflict of interest exists when a transaction isentered into by two corporations sharing a director and if “the transaction is brought (or is of such characterand significance to the corporation that it would in the normal course be brought) before the board of
directors of the corporation for action”.
346
See Article 2.6.
347
See Article 2.7.
341

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In practice, where a securities firm acts as a broker, it engages in the business ofeffecting transactions in securities for the account of others; where it acts as a dealer, it
engages in the business of buying or selling securities for its own account.
Jonathan R. Macey and Maureen O'Hara make a rather clear distinction between
brokers and dealers by defining the economic functions each of them performs. Dealers in
acting as market-makers provide a liquidity function; in purchasing and selling securities,
they carry out an arbitrage function. Brokers while acting as agents for customers or as
distributors of newly issued securities perform a distribution function, while simply
implementing the sale and purchase orders of customers is an executive function.348
When these functions are performed by one securities firm, conflicts of interest arevery likely to occur, since “what is the best for the broker-dealer is not always best forthe customer”.349 Cheryl Goss Weiss, while considering the liability of broker-dealers forbreach of fiduciary duty to their customers also maintains:
Broker-dealers face conflicts in many areas: between their own andtheir customers' interests; between the conflicting interests ofdifferent customers; and between their customers' interests and the
public interest... A conflict of interests exists when a fiduciary is
faced with a choice between his beneficiary's interests and any otherinterests.350
To prevent such conflicts, some measures which have often been employed include:
prohibition of broker-dealers from trading ahead of a customer's order, withholding andmaintaining accounts for employees of other broker-dealers without notifying suchbroker-dealers. Aside from those, disclosure requirements with respect to broker-dealers
can to some extent mitigate such conflicts. However, such requirements are usually very
constrained and even if all of these measures are in use, this cannot avoid the fact that
customers often refrain from dealing with firms that act as brokers and dealers at the sametime.351
The securities regulations of Vietnam while allowing one securities firm to carryout more than one securities business activity, also provides for a number of operational
principles securities firms have to follow, as well as statutory limitations imposed on
those firms.
Securities firms have to follow seven statutory principles while doing business.352
These principles are made up of ten sub-articles. The last three sub-articles were348

See Jonathan R. Macey and Maureen O'Hara, “Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A
Law and Economics Perspective”, (1999) 28 The Journal of Legal Studies 17, 44. Hereinafter, Macey and
O'Hara.
349
See David L Ratner (3rd Ed. 1986), above n. 256, 748.
350
See Cheryl Goss Weiss, “A Review of the Historic Foundations of Broker-dealer Liability for Breach of
Fiduciary Duty”, (1997) 23 The Journal of Corporation Law 65, 69 - 71.
351
See Macey and O'Hara, above n. 348, 45-46.
352
See Decision 04/1998, Art. 20: these principles were drawn from this article.

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introduced by Decision 78/2000. The ten sub-articles can be grouped into three
categories:
Principle of acting for customers' interests: this requires securities firms to act withfidelity and fairness and for the customers' interests.353 Firms have to trade skillfully andresponsibly and they must not trade ahead of customers' orders.354
Since the passage of Decision 78/2000, this principle has been widened by theinsertion of three other sub-articles: 8, 9, and 10 into Article 20, Decision 04/1998. Under
the amendments, (1) securities firms have to fully, timelily and honestly provide
information to customers; (2) business of a firm's owner and that of the firm itself must be
separated in order to avoid conflicts of interest between the firm, its staff and its relevantorganizations and its customers, and conflicts amongst its customers; (3) the threebusiness areas of brokerage, dealing and investment-portfolio-management must be
separated.
Principle of anti-manipulation: securities firms must not have any activity thatmisleads customers or the public on the securities' price, value and nature, nor can they
act to their customers' detriment.355
Principle of good financial, internal control and manning capacity: securities firms
have to ensure the adequacy of financial resources while trading with their customers;
must have good internal control to ensure that all activities conducted by them and theirstaff are in conformity with the law; must have enough qualified staff that have beenadequately trained and recruited.356
Apart from those principles, securities firms are subject to certain statutory
limitations. 357 For example, a securities firm must not own more than 20% or 15%
outstanding shares of a listed or a non-listed company, respectively; its capitalsubscription in a limited liability company must not exceed 15% subscribed capital of thatcompany. Some other limitations include a limit on the amount a firm can underwrite, alimit on the percentages of liquid asset a firm has to maintain, and a limit on the charter
capital a firm can use to purchase facilities and immovable assets. Apart from these, a
securities firm must not purchase shares issued by its parent company.358
353

Ibid., Art. 20.1.
Ibid., Art. 20.3.
355
Ibid., Art. 20.7.
356
Ibid, Art. 20.4 - 2-.6.
357
Ibid, Arts: 22, 23. Article 23 was revised under Decision 78/2000.
358
Articles 22 and 23 (as amended under Decision 78/2000) do not specify sanctions applied to securities firmsthat breach the above-mentioned limitations. Article 32, Decision 04/1998 generally says securities firms andtheir securities trading staffs that (1) violate provisions prescribed in the securities business license andpracticing license, respectively, or (2) breach statutory provisions provided in Decree 48/1998, shall havesanctions imposed on them in conformity with the current law.
Article 2, Decree 22/2000 provides for sanctions and other statutory measures applying to administrative
violations in the field of securities and securities market. The Article lay down two principal sanctions, namely
warning and monetary sanction. Other supplementary sanctions are also provided for, such as: revoking
business license or practicing license; confiscating the amounts derived from unlawful activities; andcompensation for damages.
354

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Firm - customer relationships are also subject to statutory regulation under the
language of Article 21, Decision 04/1998, which was replaced by a new Article 21 underDecision 78/2000. The new article has eight sub-articles compared with four sub-articles
under the old one. Under the new article, a firm and its customer must enter into a written
contract when the firm, with the agreement of the customer, is about to open and manage
a customer's account, or to provide investment-portfolio-management service to thecustomer; a firm's security assets and those of its customer must be separately managed;
firms must choose a bank for settlement and transfer all customers' fund into a bankaccount and must use customers' funds according to the agreement or direction ofcustomers; firms must not disclose information concerning a customer's account without
customer's consents; firms must immediately inform customers where there is any
unusual change in the price of securities in their investment portfolios.359
While providing statutory principles that securities firms have to follow and puttingsome restrictions on the activities conducted by these firms, neither Decree 48/1998 nor
Decision 04/1998 has a concrete article regulating the conflicts of interest between
securities firms and their customers. This deficiency has been partly eliminated by thepassage of Decision 78/2000, which creates the three new sub-articles earlier mentioned,
especially Sub-article 8 of Article 20, stipulating information disclosure duties by firms totheir customers. However, this Decision does not concretely specify what kinds ofinformation securities firms must provide to their customers. In addition, the new Article
21, although it has been broadened compared with the old one, merely requires of
securities firms timely notification of customers about changes in their investment
portfolios. Such provisions cannot ensure that conflicts of interest between the firms andtheir customers will be avoided.
Article 27, Decision 04/1998 provides for information disclosure requirements that
securities firms have to follow. It reads:
Securities firms are responsible for reporting honestly, precisely andfully to the State Securities Commission all information concerning
their trading activities.
Public information disclosure by securities firms must be done inconformity with the regulation of public information disclosure
issued by the State Securities Commission.
Aside from reporting to the State Securities Commission, securities
firms that are members of a stock trading center or a stock exchangemust report to the center or the exchange as provided for in Articles
28 and 29 of this Regulation.
Article 38, Decree 48/1998 provides for duties and rights of securities firms. Subarticle 2, although it requires securities firms to collect full information about financial
situations and investment goals of customers, does not explicitly say that firms have to359

The same can be said about sanctions applying to violators of these statutory provisions. See Ibid.

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter IVgive investment advice based on such findings. Decision 79/2000, while preserving one
article - Article 5 - stipulating concrete duties of member firms of a securities trading
center, also does not mention duties of securities firms to their customers. It has norequirements for securities firms concerning their responsibilities in ascertaining theircustomers' financial situation and ability to assume risk before determining which
securities should be recommended to them. Securities firms are not required to investigate
the nature and risks of securities that will be recommended to customers, nor are theyrequired to have an adequate basis for trusting that the securities they recommend aresuited to the customer’s needs.
Article 5 mainly concentrates on duties of securities firms in relation to stock
trading centers. Pursuant to such provision, firms have to be subject to the center's rules,
control, and supervision; they have to pay a membership fee and other subscription toform the so-called "settlement support fund"; they have to periodically and timelily reportto the trading center the following issues:a. Operating and financial situations in conformity with theRegulation of the Organization and Operation of Securities
Firms;
b. Monthly securities transactions in accordance with Form 02-TV
attached to the said Regulation within the first five days of thefollowing month;c. The merger, consolidation, division, separation andestablishment of branches; member firms wholly or partly
stopping operation; restructuring of the firms (where any of theseoccur);
d. Other information concerning the operation of member firms asrequested by the securities trading center;e. When activities that have violated securities law are detected.360
Apart from these, member firms have to report to the securities trading center within 24
hours from the time the following events occur:a. Increasing or decreasing registered capital;b. Going into bankruptcy or dissolution;c. Applying for bankruptcy announcement;
d. Being a plaintiff or defendant in a court case;e. Member's bank account being suspended or blockaded, or when
decisions to suspend or blockade its bank account are lifted.
f. Moving the head office, opening, closing or moving the mainbranch office;360

See Sub-article 5.

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g. Director or other trading staff of the member firm being under
the investigation of a governmental authority or having been on
trial by a court.361
Although these Articles impose rather detailed disclosure requirements on securities
firms, there is still be something missing here. Securities firms are not explicitly required
to disclose their conflicts of interest to customers when they recommend securities of
their own, or if they have some interest in recommended securities. This might give an
impression that, to some extent, they do not differ from coffee house stock exchanges
very much, which in turn might trigger fears among the public about investment safety.
Furthermore, if a securities firm can act both as a dealer and a broker, it might put its own
interests over the customers' interests. Even though a new regulation on conflicts ofinterest between customers and securities firms has been introduced, as previously
discussed, nevertheless it does not seem strong enough to eliminate conflicts.
Moreover, as securities professionals, securities firms obviously have superior
knowledge concerning securities transactions compared with that of their customers. It is
not beyond their ability to take unfair advantage of this superior knowledge in dealing
with their customers. Thus, it is necessary to set forth some statutory standards of conduct
for their business activities.
It might be useful to examine the ways in which conflicts of interest have been
dealt with in some other countries. In the US, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
while providing for the registration and supervision of broker-dealers, keeps silent on the
duty of broker-dealers to their customers. However, regulation of conflicts of interest canbe found in case law362 and in the rules of conduct issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the SEC), 363 the National Securities Dealers Association and the stock
exchanges themselves.364 Together, these set out a series of duties to be carried out bybroker-dealers: (1) broker-dealers must have a good understanding of their customers'
financial situation, ability to assume risk and investment holdings; must well understandthe securities they recommend to their customers; (2) they must assure that theirrecommendations are suitable for their customers' financial situation and needs; (3) theyshould fulfill their customers' investment objectives, and customers' orders must be
executed correctly and promptly; (4) they may not engage in excessive trading of
securities in the account in order to generate commissions; (5) they must not overcharge
customers in providing service nor may they effect securities transactions at an
unreasonable price.

361

See Sub-article 6.
See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F2d 434 (2nd Cir. 1943); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F2d 589 (2nd Cir. 1969);
SEC v. Capital Gains, 375 US 180 (1963); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F2d 1167 (2nd Cir. 1970), forexample.
363
See the Disclosure Order Execution and Routing Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 43,590 (Nov. 13,
2000).
364
See NASD Manual 2152; NASD Rules of Fair Practice; NYSE Rule 405, for example.
362

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In Japan, the Securities and Exchange Law, Article 38 imposes on brokers a duty to
specify the form of trading in advance. It reads:
A securities company shall, in case where it has accepted from acustomer an order for the sale or purchase of a security or for tradein over-the-counter derivatives contract on a security, give an
explicit indication to the customer in advance whether it willconsummate such sale or purchase or such trade by acting as aprincipal, or as a finder, broker, or agent.
Article 42 even further prevents securities companies from making a decisive
judgment and from soliciting customers to trade in over-the-counter derivatives contracts.
The Article details the prohibited activities in nine sub-articles and clearly distinguishesthem.
In addition, Article 43 proscribes securities companies from doing business in a
way that would make the companies adopt a condition that could undermine theprotection of investors. Relevant statements include:(1) The state which undermines or is liable to undermine theprotection of investors by making solicitation of customers
deemed inappropriate in the light of their knowledge, experienceor assets, for the purchase or the sale of a security or placement,
ect. of an order therefore, placement of an order for trade in
futures contract on a securities index, etc., trade in options
contract on a security, or trade in foreign market futurescontract on a security, or for trade in over-the-counter
derivatives contract on a security, or placement, etc. of an ordertherefore, or(2) Such state as may be prescribed by an ordinance of the Cabinet
Office as that which is liable to impair the public interest or
undermine the protection of investors, otherwise than the state
set forth in the preceding item.
These should be a good lesson for Vietnam in revising the current regulation of
securities firms business.

II. REGULATION OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF BANKS IN THE SECURITIESMARKET
Before judging the Vietnamese regulation of banks’ involvement in securities
markets, it might be useful to examine how the issue has been dealt with elsewhere.
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1. The Involvement of Banks in Securities Markets: Overseas Experience – Lessons
for Vietnam
a. The US Experience
Prior to 1900, although in the US there had been no statutory provisions prohibiting
commercial banks from carrying out securities business, such a prohibition was made bycase law. 365 With the adoption of the McFadden Act in 1927, the US has adopted auniversal banking system in which commercial banks can carry out securities activities.366
Owing to the stock market crash in 1929, a large-scale reform of the financial
system was initiated. Causes of the market crash of 1929 were attributed to the
speculative abuses in securities that infected commercial banking; unsound loans given bybanks to their affiliates; and the combination of investment and commercial banking.367
As a result, commercial and investment banking has been separated. A strict segregation
between banking and securities business has been entrenched in the Banking Act of 1933
(the Glass-Steagall Act).
Such a segregation includes: (1) the proscription of banks from acting as
underwriters of any issue of securities or stock, from dealing in securities or stock;368 (2)prohibition of a member bank from being affiliated with an organization that isprincipally engaged in underwriting securities and in certain other securities activities;369
prohibition of securities firms from doing banking business such as receiving demand
deposits; 370 prohibition interlocking officers, director or employee between securities
firms and member banks.371
In practice, before the market crash, banks could carry out various businessactivities. Many banks, especially national banks, invested heavily in speculative
securities; they entered the business of investment banking by buying original issues for
public resale. Banks lent their affiliates money to shore up securities’ prices or to secure
the financial position of the affiliates. Banks even advised their customers to purchasesecurities which the bank needed to sell for the pecuniary sake of the bank itself.372 These
facts gave rise to potential risk of loss to depositors and were subject to failures that inturn took away public confidence in the banking system. Furthermore, when banks
365

See Jennifer Manvell Jeannot, “An International Perspective on Domestic Banking Reform: Could theEuropean Union's Second Banking Directive Revolutionize the Way the United States Regulates its Own
Financial Services Industry?”, (1999) 14 American University International Law Review 1715, 1723.
366
Ibid, 1724.
367
See George J. Benston, “The Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking”, (1990), 11 - 14.
Hereinafter, George J. Benston.
368
See Banking Act of 1933 s 16, (Richard W. Jennings et al, Federal Securities Law: Selected Rules andForms, 1999 ed).
369
See Ibid, s 20.
370
See Ibid, s 21.
371
See Ibid, s 32.
372
See George J Benston, above, n. 367, 11.

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provide investment banking services and mutual funds, they face conflicts of interest
between themselves and their customers, as well as other abuses.373
In addition, the 1933 Act has taken account of the fact that commercial banks could
enter the business of investment banking was deemed as a cause of unfair competition.
Commercial banks have market power since they can access cheap deposit funds. Thus
they have an unfair competitive advantage over non-bank competitors; if they werepermitted to provide investment banking services, or own corporate stock, they would bedominant and could take over securities brokers and underwriters.374
However, a number of studies conducted before and after the enactment of the
Glass-Steagall Act375 have shown that the above-mentioned problems were not the causeof the financial crisis in 1929. The failure of the Bank of United States 376 has been
examined thoroughly and no evidence shows that failure of the bank or its use of affiliates
had any connection to securities operations. Rather it was due to the bank’s heavily
lending money to affiliates; because it used acquisitions as a measure for rapid expansion,
which was money-consuming and beyond its ability; and to avoid criticism by bankexaminers and depositors, it removed bad loans from the bank's books to affiliates.377
Also, among more than 200 banks engaged in securities operations, only 15 banks failed.
Their securities trading amounts, however, accounted for a very small percentage of their
total assets. The actual cause for the failure was found to be the bad banking situation.378
Neither securities activities nor securities investment (regardless of whether or notpurchased from bank securities affiliates) was a cause of bank failure. Rather, thecausative factors include: demographic changes, over-banking, fraud andmismanagement, and poor farming conditions.379
Jordi Cannals seems to have a clear observation concerning the cause of the market
crash of 1929:
It cannot be concluded from the results we have just presented thatthe cause of the 1930s banking crisis in the United States was thestock market activities carried out by some banks. Some results evenseem to indicate that the losses could have been higher if the banks
had not been able to count on the gains from the operations infinancial assets.380
All the findings thus tend to argue against the belief that banks' securities activities
or investment caused the collapse of the financial system. In practice, the firewall
373

Ibid, 13.
Ibid, 13 - 14.
375
Ibid, 16 - 19.
376
This bank is a commercial bank. In the US, the Federal Reserve System plays the role of a central bank.
377
See George J Benston, above, n. 367, 30 - 31.
378
Ibid, 32.
379
Ibid, 38.
380
Jordi Canals, “Universal Banking - International Comparisons and Theoretical Perspectives”, (1997), 77.
374

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separating commercial and investment banking in the US has been eroded. The
involvement of banks in securities markets has been broadened over the time. 381 The
separation between banking and securities businesses has been of little practicalsignificance. As pointed out by Poser:
Today, American commercial banks, like those of the United
Kingdom and other countries, conduct a wide variety of securities
activities, while investment banks and securities companies aremajor providers of banking services.382
The Banking Act of 1933 had thus been a major target of banking reform since its
enactment, but it remained unchanged for a long time. Recently, the adoption of the
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (the Gramm-Leach-Billey Act) has madeconsiderable alterations to the Banking Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
the Investment Adviser Act, and Investment Companies Act.
The 1999 Act makes significant alterations to the Banking Act of 1933. 383 It
eliminates the prohibition of a member bank from being affiliated with an organizationthat is "principally engaged" in underwriting services, under Section 20. Accordingly, (1)Bank Holding Companies can now acquire or set up subsidiary securities firms that canengage in the flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution of securities; (2)securities firms can acquire banks or do banking business through a Financial Holding
Company. It repeals the prohibition of interlocking directorates between securities firms
and banks under Section 32.
However, the Act does not alter sections 16 and 21 of the Banking Act providing theframework for permissible securities underwriting activities. Consequently, Banks arestill proscribed from engaging in most securities underwriting activities, and from acting
as an agent or dealing in certain government securities; and banks may not purchasesecurities for their own account. Securities firms are still forbidden from banking businesssuch as taking deposits and providing loans.
Securities firms and banks can carry out such activities through the holding
company arrangements envisioned by the Act or through a securities subsidiary of anational bank.384

381 See “United States: A Special Report Prepared by Warren F Cooke and Lynn Stofan Kaplan of Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, Ney Work”, International Financial Law Review Special Supplement 207, (Sep.
1991), 211 – 212; see also Jolina C. Cuaresma, “Business Law: The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act” (2002) 17,
Berkeley Technology Law Journal 497, 499.
382
See N. S. Poser, International Securities Regulation: London's “Big Bang” and the European Securities
Markets, (1991), 185. Hereinafter, N. S. Poser.
383
The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, section 101 (a), (b) repealed respectively sections 20
and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933. The Financial services Modernization Act of 1999: available at
http://www.senate.gov/~banking/conf/confrpt.htm, latest visit: Dec. 18, 2002.
384
Ibid, s 121.

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The Act also alters the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by which banks would not
be deemed as brokers or dealers for some specified “bank activities”. Banks are now
permitted to conduct certain limited brokerage and dealer activities without registration asa broker-dealer under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.385
The Act makes some revisions to the Investment Advisers and Investment Company
386
Act. Previously, banks were excluded from the “investment adviser” definition. The
new “investment adviser” definition now includes any bank or bank holding company
that provides investment advice or serves as an investment adviser.
To date, the legal environment in the US allows commercial banks to enter into thebusiness of securities companies through their subsidiaries. However, in so doing, certain
conditions must be met by both the banks and their subsidiaries, as stipulated in Section
121, the Financial Services Modernization Act. As for banks, only national banks that are
not affiliated with bank holding companies and have total consolidated assets of 1 billion
USD or less, are eligible for conducting financial activities as principal through operating
subsidiaries. Apart from being well capitalized, such banks must be well managed.387 If
satisfying these criteria, the national bank must then go through another step. It has to get
the approval of the Office of the Comptroller of Currency before it can actually conduct
financial activities through its subsidiary. The firewalls to maintain safety and soundness
will be put between a national bank and its financial subsidiary only when the latterengages, as a principal, in activities, which the former can only conduct through afinancial subsidiary. In such a case, the subsidiary can engage in financial activities
subject to restrictions imposed on affiliate transactions. When acting as an agent, thesubsidiary will not be subject to such restrictions.388 In addition, if the activity is one in
385

Ibid, ss: 201 - 202.
Ibid, ss: 211 - 220.
387
The term “well managed” is construed in Section 121(a)(2). It reads:“(6) Well managed. --The term ‘well managed’ means—“(A) in the case of a depository institution that has been examined, unless otherwise determined in writing by
the appropriate Federal banking agency—(i)the achievement of a composite rating of 1 or 2 under the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating
System (or an equivalent rating under an equivalent rating system) in connection with the most recent
examination or subsequent review of the depository institution; and(ii)
at least a rating of 2 for management, if such rating is given; or“(B) in the case of any depository institution that has not been examined, the existence and use of managerial
resources that the appropriate Federal banking agency determines are satisfactory.”
388
Section 121(a)(2)(B) explicitly prohibits banks from engaging in four types of financial activities throughbank subsidiaries: insurance or annuity underwriting, insurance company portfolio investments, real estate
investment and development, and merchant banking. (Merchant banking activities are subject to section 122.)
These types of financial activities may only be undertaken by subsidiaries of financial holding companies [s103(a)].
A national bank’s financial subsidiary therefore may engage in a wide range of activities previously barred
to a national bank or its operating subsidiaries, such as underwriting, or dealing in securities (including marketmaking); selling insurance [ss 121, 151 & 302].
However, in order to protect the deposit insurance system from the increased risk it might incur by the
expanded activities permitted to financial subsidiaries, a financial subsidiary and its parent national bank aresubject to certain requirements. Those requirements include: the amount the bank has invested in its subsidiary
386

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter IVwhich the national bank could not engage directly, the subsidiary is only allowed toengage in the activity as an agent, and not as a principal.389
b. The European Experience
The European countries do not seem to have such a strict segregation between
banking and securities businesses, compared with that in the US, even before the issuanceof the Second Banking Directive.390 Except for Belgium, where banks are strictly limitedin engaging in securities activities, and the UK, France and Greece, where commercial
banking and securities activities are separated by Chinese walls, other countries such as
Germany, Italy, Switzerland and the Netherlands employ a universal banking system.391
In the universal banking system, there is no firewall between banking and securities
businesses or commercial and investment banking services. As such, commercial banks
are eligible to engage in both kinds of business.
Since the Second Banking Directive came into force in 1989, a universal banking
model has been widely adopted throughout European countries. Pursuant to thisDirective, commercial and investment banking functions can be carried out by the same
corporate entity, and the involvement of commercial banks in securities business ispermitted.392 The Second Banking Directive reflects the EU position in promoting thebanking sector as well as in fostering EU financial markets. Under this position, it isintended that the participation of banks in the securities industry will diversify market
participants, will provide liquidity to commercial banks, and will help banks to maintainoverall earnings where profits from conventional banking business fall. And the EU sees
a flexible universal banking system as powerful means that enable EU financial markets
to compete with other markets around the world.393
Perhaps it is necessary now to see how such a system works in practice. The case ofGermany might be useful to examine since it is a country that is going ahead in
is to be deducted from its capital [s121(c)(1)(A)]; the financial subsidiary's assets and liabilities may not be
consolidated with the national bank's assets and liabilities [s121(c)(1)(B)]; the assets of all of the bank's
financial subsidiaries, on a combined basis, may not exceed $ 50 billion or 45% of the bank's total assets,
whichever is less [s121(a)(2)(D)]; and a financial subsidiary is treated as a holding company affiliate rather
than a bank subsidiary for purposes of the anti-tying provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act. [s 121(c)].
389
See Section 122.
390
See Gustavo Visentini, “Compatibility and Competition between European and American Corporate
Governance: Which Model of Capitalism?” (1998) 23 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 833, 839.
Hereinafter, Gustavo Visentini.
391
See Guo Li, “The Collapse of the Glass-Steagall Wall and Its Potential Impacts on China’s Banking Law”,
Legal Forum Featured Article.
http://www.lawinfochina.com/legalForm/FeaturedAtrticle/displayContent.asp?ID=28, visited May 5, 2002.
Hereinafter, Guo Li.
392
See the Annex List of Activities subject to Mutual Recognition (this identifies the securities activities that acredit institution may carry out. Such activities include: trading for its own account or for the account ofcustomers in long and short term securities; issuing of shares and related activities; managing of a portfolio andsome investment banking activities, including those concerning mergers and acquisitions).
393
See Guo Li, above n. 391.

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employing a universal banking system in Europe and also in the world. Although
Germany has permitted banks and securities companies to enter into the business of eachother, it seems that both the German banking system and the German securities markets
have functioned well. It is reported that the German financial market has been one ofmajor markets in Europe for years; that the German banking system is very extensive andeffective; that in terms of the size, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange ranks fourth in theworld, after New York, Tokyo and London; and that the German financial center is one of
the most intensely competitive European centers.394
c. The Japan Experience
A similar tendency to that of the US can be seen in Japan. Prior to the Second
World War, Japan adopted a universal banking system in which banks could engage inany kind of business, including securities underwriting services. 395 After the Second
World War, following the US model, a strict segregation between banking and securities
business was introduced in Japan, i.e., a strict prohibition against securities firms
engaging in banking business and banks engaging in securities business.396
Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law gives a legal basis for suchsegregation. This Article prohibits banks, trust companies or other such financial
institutions from engaging in any securities business except for the purchase and sale ofsecurities on a written order from a customer and for the account of the customer. The
prohibitions are not applied to certain specified transactions in which the tradedcommodities are, for example, governmental, municipal, corporate and other bonds.
There have been opposite viewpoints concerning the need to eliminate suchsegregation.397 However, the firewall between banking and securities business has been
lifted during the 1980s and 1990s.398 A reform of financial law initiated in 1993 hascreated a significant legal basis on which banks and securities firms can enter the businessof each other through their subsidiaries. Securities firms could establish banking and trustbank subsidiaries while banks could set up securities subsidiaries, although the scope andsize of such business was limited. Finally, the limitation on the scope and size of suchbusiness has been eliminated since the second half of 1999.399

394

See “Germany: A Special Report Prepared by Ulrich Koch of Single Loose Schmidt-Diemitz & Partners,
Stuttgart and Frankfurt Am Main” (Sep. 1991) International Financial Law Review Special Supplement 87, 87.
395
See Hiroshi Oda, above n. 262, 268.
396
Ibid., 271; see also George J. Benston, above n. 367, 2.
397
See Yusuke Kawamura, “The Present Attitude toward the System for Separating Banks and Securities
Companies”, Japan's Financial Markets, 1 -8.
398
See Hiroshi Oda, above n. 262, 272 - 273; see also Securities Market in Japan, (1998), (released by Japan
Securities Research Institute), 195 – 7 (hereinafter, Japan Securities Research Institute).
399
Ibid (Hiroshi Oda).

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Some Remarks
Although the debate concerning the segregation of banking and securities businesses
has been continuing in the US and Japan, both countries have experienced a general
statutory tendency toward lifting the fire-wall between these two businesses. This fact,
together with comprehensive data found in a number of studies conducted in the US
before and after the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, 400 has proved that the past
restriction was more or less a result of an over-reaction of the lawmakers to the market
crash in 1929. In the US, the SEC has recently been aware of the negative aspect of sucha separation. The SEC views the segregation of functions as undesirable since it would
deprive the securities industry of an ability to raise capital.401
Furthermore, the European experience seems to support well the elimination of thefirewall between the two industries. Lowering the barrier between banking and securities
businesses thus appears desirable. However, in the transformation period, totally lifting
the firewall might be a careless decision because of the distinguishing nature of thebanking business. The failure of a bank can be very contagious, to the point that it cancause huge damage to public depositors. Defining the extent to which the firewall should
be lowered is therefore of significance. Both the US and Japan seem to have a good
approach in reforming the regulation of the financial sector. The statutory permission onwhich banks can directly carry out some specified securities activities and indirectly
engage in others through their subsidiaries, can be deemed as one of their reasonableapproaches. It allows banks to enter securities business through their securities
subsidiaries while it keeps them away from risk. Of course where such an approach is
employed, it should be accompanied by necessary precautions, to avoid risks that might
be incurred by both banks and their subsidiaries.
2. Whether an Entire Prohibition of Direct Involvement of Banks into theVietnamese Securities Market Will Result in Good Outcomes
One of advantages Vietnam inherits from other countries in creating a securities
regulation regime is the regulation of banks' involvement in securities markets. Having
learnt from the US and Japan, Vietnam generally does not adopt an absolute segregation
between banking and securities businesses. Rather, a similar approach to that of both the
US and Japan in dealing with banks in this area has been employed by lawmakers. Decree
48/1998 prohibits credit institutions, insurance companies, and holding companies fromdirectly engaging in securities business. Those who desire to carry out securities businessmust establish separate securities subsidiaries.402
The term “credit institutions” is broadly defined under Article 20.1 of the Credit
Institution Act. The Act classifies credit institutions in terms of ownership, under which400

See George J. Benston, above n. 367, Chapters II, III, and IV.
See N. S. Poser, above n. 382, 244.
402
See Art. 29.1.
401

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credit institutions fall into four categories: state-owned, shareholder-owned, cooperatively
owned and foreign-owned. The last-named can be further divided into three groups: jointventure credit institutions, non-banking institutions and foreign banks' branches.403 The
term “credit institutions” thus denotes both banks and non-banking institutions owned bydifferent economic sectors.
Banks are those institutions which can engage in all kinds of banking activities(including taking deposits, giving loans and providing settlement services) and otherrelated activities. They include commercial banks, development banks, investment banks,
policy banks, cooperative banks, and others.404
Non-banking institutions are those which can engage in a number of banking
activities except for taking deposits and providing settlement service. They include
financial companies, financial leasing companies, and others.405 Aside from those, credit
institutions also include people credit funds and credit cooperatives.406
The Credit Institution Act does not have any article saying that banks can or cannot
engage in securities business, but since 1998, by the introduction of Decree 48/1998, thequestion has been clarified. The approach adopted here is to permit banks to carry out
securities business through their securities subsidiaries. In 1999, the Prime Minister madea further effort in issuing Decision 172/1999 to lay down a legal basis for banks to set up
their own securities subsidiaries. Since all credit institutions are forbidden from having
direct involvement in securities business, it can be said that Vietnam, to some extent, hasa stricter segregation between banking and securities businesses compared with that in the
US. Previously, in the US, only commercial banks were restricted from entering securities
business, and nowadays restrictions imposed on commercial banks merely confine themwithin certain activities such as underwriting, dealing in securities, and purchasing
securities for their own account. Other securities activities such as brokerage, dealing incertain securities and investment advisory service, can now be carried out by commercial
banks. In Vietnam, all kinds of securities activities are not permitted to be directly
conducted by credit institutions (including banks407 and non-banking institutions).
A question arising is whether or not it is necessary to proscribe the direct
involvement of banks in all kinds of securities activities. Today, even the restriction ofaccess to underwriting and dealing securities to commercial banks alone has been403

See Art. 12.
See Art. 20.2.
405
See Art. 20.3.
406
See Art. 20.5.
407
The term banks here denotes both commercial and investment banks. It should be noted that in Vietnam, theterm “investment bank” differs from its use elsewhere. For example, in the US, investment banks are those
whose primary purpose is to acquire finance for businesses, especially through the distribution of securities.
Investment banks do not take deposits and do not deal with the public at large.407 The Credit Institution Act ofVietnam, as earlier discussed, treats all types of banks as depository institutions. Decree No. 48/1998 simply
proscribes all types of banks and even other non-banking credit institutions from engaging directly in securities
business. Non-banking institutions, as previously mentioned, are not permitted to carry out every kind ofbanking business, especially acquiring deposits from the public. It seems that there is no reasonable ground totreat them in the same manner as banks.
404

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter IVquestioned, Vietnam seems to employ a rather special measure in regulating the scope of
securities business activities carried out by banks. In today’s increasingly competitive
business environment, banks have been struggling to expand their markets in order tosurvive. Whether this provision is realistic remains to be seen.
The main justification for such a provision is to avoid risks for the securities market
and for the benefit of banks themselves.408 However, the question whether or not the entry
even of commercial banks into securities business is a potential source of risk has been
well documented in the US, as earlier discussed. Thus, it is possibly that the prohibitionof all kinds of banks from carrying out securities activities of all kinds would merely
prevent unrealistic risks, while reducing market participation, which might also lessen
market competition. It seems hard to justify the denial of access by banks to some lessrisky business activities such as investment advising, securities portfolio management andbrokerage.
As earlier discussed, nowadays in Europe, a universal banking model has widely
been adopted, and so far no serious problems stemming from that system have beenreported. In the US and Japan, the barriers separating traditional banking activities of abank from its securities operations has been blurred. Perhaps, Vietnam should not ignore
such statutory development in countries around the world, on the way to improving its
regulation of the involvement of banks in securities markets.
Furthermore, although the Vietnamese current securities regulation adopts theindirect involvement of credit institutions in the securities market (e.g., the permission onwhich those institutions can do securities business through their subsidiaries), it does nothave any further provision regulating such parent-subsidiary relationship. Nothing in
Decree 48/1998, Decision 172/1999, Decision 04/1998, or Decision 78/2000 lays downnecessary conditions banks and their securities subsidiaries have to be subject to in orderto ensure safety for both banks and their subsidiaries.

III. FUTURE REGULATION OF SECURITIES PROFESSIONALS
1. The Need for Concrete Provisions Regulating Conflicts of Interest between
Securities Firms and their Customers
Regulation of conflicts of interest between securities firms and their customers is ofimportance in creating public confidence in securities markets. The current regulation of
securities firms adopts a rather complete system of disclosure requirements with respect
408

See Ho Cong Huong, “Quan he giua cong nghiep ngan hang va cong nghiep chung khoan” [TheRelationship between Banking and Securities Industry], (2000) 6 Tap Chi Ngan hang [Banking Review] 54, 55.

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to those firms, making them responsible for reporting to the SSC and the Trading
Center. 409 It also lays down general rules of conduct for securities firms. 410 Some
provisions covering the relationships between securities firms and their customers can befound, but they merely deal with procedures the two parties have to follow in executing
customers' orders.411 What appears to be missing here is the provision of specific duties of
securities firms in relation to their customers to avoid conflicts of interest between them.
Merely imposing on securities firms duties in finding out the financial situation andinvestment purposes of customers is not enough. More precisely, the revised provision
should require securities firms to obtain such information before recommending a type of
security so that they can ensure that the recommended security is suitable to a customer's
need and financial conditions.
There should also be a provision imposing duties on securities firms to investigate
the nature and risk of the securities they are going to recommend to their customers.
Another provision needed is the one pursuant to which securities firms must
disclose their conflicts of interest to their customers: whether they have an interest in the
security they have recommended them to purchase; and whether they act as a broker or adealer in the relevant transaction.
Finally, the regulation should expressly prohibit securities firms from engaging inexcessive trading of securities in the account of customers for the purpose of getting morecommissions, and also from overcharging customers when providing services.
2. No Need for Indirect Involvement of Banks in a Number of Securities Business
Activities
The fact that Vietnam has adopted a relatively strict segregation between banking
and securities businesses possibly results in part from the US experience of the market
crash in 1929, and in part from the situation of Vietnam. With a new securities market justopened, it is logical to be more careful in regulating that market. However, it has been
well documented that banks' participation in stock markets in the US prior to the market
crash of 1929 had not been the cause of the market crash; and that the previous separationof banking and securities business in the US is, more or less, out of context. A question
arising is why Vietnam should follow such an old trend that has been dropped over time
almost everywhere in the world: firewalls have been, little by little, lifted in the US andJapan and have been totally eliminated in Europe.
Securities markets in Vietnam therefore, should be more open to banks. Less risky
securities services such as brokerage, investment advice and securities portfolio
management could quite well be carried out directly by banks. The presence of banks inthe securities market, even merely within these business areas, would diversify market
participation and also strengthen the competitive forces in the market, which in turn409

See Decision 79/2000, Art. 5.
See Decision 04/1998, Art. 20.
411
See Decision 79/2000, Arts: 10 - 14.
410

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would promote market development. On the other hand, this would also expand thebusiness environment of banks and enable them to increase their chances to earn profits.
Other highly risky business activities such as underwriting and dealing in securities
should probably be left for banks' securities subsidiaries, to assure the soundness of thebanking system.
3. The Need for More Concrete Provisions Regulating Banks and Securities
Subsidiaries
Where banks are permitted to set up their own securities subsidiaries, somenecessary requirements should be imposed both on banks and on their subsidiaries, so as
to avoid risks.
There should be requirements concerning capital, assets and the state ofmanagement that banks have to meet in order to set up subsidiaries. After being
established, banks should be required to deduct the amount invested in the subsidiaries
from their capital for purposes of minimum capital requirements provided in the banking
law.
Some restrictions are also required on transactions conducted by subsidiaries ofbanks to ensure that the securities business they conduct will not affect their parent banks'
soundness.

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CHAPTER V
WHETHER THE EXCHANGE MARKETSARE WELL ORGANIZEDOne of the factors that have a crucial impact on market development is the structureof the exchange market. Whether the impacts are positive or negative depends on whether
an adequate legal form for the exchange market has been adopted. What is required, then,is to work out which legal structure for the exchange market can assure the attainment ofa well functioning securities market.
This chapter examines the current legal form of the exchange market adopted in
Vietnam in relation to those adopted in other jurisdictions and their recent movements. It
maintains that such a legal structure cannot foster good outcomes for Vietnam.

I. STOCK EXCHANGES AND THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY: PAST AND
PRESENT
1. Mutual Form of Stock Exchange
Since their inception under coffee shop meetings of stockbrokers in London and
Amsterdam, public stock exchanges in many jurisdictions have developed as cooperatives
or mutual enterprises,412 which were spontaneously chosen by the exchange founders.413
In the US, the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, the futures
exchanges, and the regional stock exchanges are all structured as cooperatives.414 In theUK, such a structure was also employed by the London stock exchange, and by the four
futures exchanges in London. 415 In Australia, the Australian Stock Exchange and theSydney Future Exchange were developed as mutual enterprises.416
Under the cooperative or mutual form, a stock exchange operates on a not-for-profit
basis. Members of the exchange are those who own seats on the exchange and get benefits
from their membership such as lower trading costs or access fees. However, this does not
imply that all stock exchanges always operated in such a way. The London Stock
Exchange operated on a for-profit basis throughout the early 19th century and during the412

See Frank Donnan, “Self-regulation and the Demutualization of the Australian Stock Exchange” (1999) 10,
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 1, 4; see also John Coffee (2002), above n. 187, 1800.
413
See Caroline Bradley, “Demutualization of Financial Exchanges: Business as Usual?” (2001) 21 Journal ofInternational Law and Business 657, 660. Hereinafter, Caroline Bradley.
414
See Oliver Hart and John Moore, “The Governance of Exchange: Members’ Cooperative Versus Outside
Ownership”, (1996) (12) (4), Oxford Review of Economic Policy 53, 54. Hereinafter, O. Hart and J. Moore.
415
Ibid.
416
See Frank Donnan, above n. 412, 5 and 15. The Australian Stock Exchange was a company limited byguarantee, having neither share capital nor shareholders. It was owned collectively by its members, whose
liability was limited to the amount of the guarantee they had nominated. Members were also the users of its
facilities.

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first half of the 20th century, and distributed generous amounts of dividends to its
members.417 The amendment of the Exchange’s deed of settlement in 1948 stopped the
Exchange’s payment of dividends.418 In 1986, the London Stock Exchange converted intoa private limited company419 (non-profit making company) under the Company Act of1985.420
The not-for-profit structure of mutual stock exchanges around the world has been,
however, dominant until recently.421 A mutually owned stock exchange differs from anexternally owned one in its governance structure, and members’ financial rights.
Mutual structure of governance permits the exchange members at the same time toown, control, and govern the exchange. Members are also owners and managers of theexchange. They are all equal in decision-making and subject to the one-member, one-vote
rule.
Members’ financial rights or ownership rights do not allow the members to accessthe exchange’s surplus. Rather they give the members an entitlement to the direct use of
the exchange’s trading services at a lower cost. Ownership rights are thus also trading
rights and usually not easily transferable, while revenues from the business areaccumulated rather than distributed.
The mutual form was attractive not only within the securities industry but also inother areas such as banking and insurance. Such a tendency continued even after the
introduction of the joint stock company form.422 Recently, however, this tendency has
been reacted against and replaced by another movement. In the security industry, such a
movement brings a new legal form for stock exchanges.

417

Ibid (Frank Donnan), 13-14; see also Roberta S. Karmel, “Stock Exchange Demutualization in Sweden andAustralia”, (Thur. Aug. 19, 1999) New York Law Journal 3, para. 3. Hereinafter, Roberta Karmel (1999). (This
Article is published in New York Law Journal, in Securities Regulation Section, Page 3, as a column. Page
number for all the citations from the article thus cannot be indicated. The pinpoints indicating paragraphnumber, counted by the author of this paper, will be provided instead of page numbers. The same will beapplied with other Articles found in New York Law Journal.)
418
Ibid (Frank Donnan), 14.
419
Company Act 1985 (Eng) c 6, s 81 says:“(1) A private limited company (other than a company limited by guarantee and not having a share capital )commits an offence if it-(a) offers to the public (whether for cash or otherwise) any shares in or debentures of the company; or (b)allots or agrees to allot (whether for cash or otherwise) any shares in or debentures of the company with aview to all or any of those shares or debentures being offered for sale to the public (within the meaning given
to that expression by section 58 to 60).”
420
See “London Stock Exchange: History”,
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/about/about_05.asp, visited Aug. 8, 2002. Hereinafter, “London Stock
Exchange: History”.
421
See Craig Pirrong, “A Theory of Financial Exchange Organization”, (2000) 43 The Journal of Law &Economic 437, 442. Hereinafter, Craig Pirrong.
422
See Caroline Bradley, above n. 413, 662.

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2. Corporate Form of Stock Exchange
Today, the whole world is experiencing a new global movement, where stock
exchanges are converting themselves from mutual enterprises into shareholder-owned
companies.423 Such a movement was initiated by the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 1993,
and quickly followed by the Helsinki Stock Exchange in 1995, the Copenhagen Stock
Exchange in 1996, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in 1997, the Australian Stock
Exchange in 1998, 424 and then Toronto Stock Exchange, Frankfurt Stock Exchange,
Singapore Stock Exchange, Hong Kong Stock Exchange and so on.425 The most recently
demutualized ones include the London Stock Exchange,426 the Paris Bourse, the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange and the Deutsche Bourse.427 In Japan, the Tokyo Stock Exchange
was demutualized in November, 2001. 428 In the United States, the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) 429 and theAmerican Stock Exchange430 have been considering a privatization proposal since 1999.
In January, 2001, NASD completed a private placement while NYSE was in the processof disclosing its privatizing intention.431
After going through the privatization process, a stock exchange will turn into a “forprofit” entity from a “not-for-profit” entity, or a new corporation will be formed. The
exchange’s proprietors will be shareholders instead of members. Where the exchange
goes public, its shares will be listed and freely traded. In the literature, such a process hasoften been referred to as “demutualization”.
3. Reasons for Demutualization
Deficiencies of the mutual form of stock exchanges have recently been brought into
discussion. Generally, commentators contended that it is not as efficient as the corporate
form.432 The following discussion will examine whether deficiencies are the causes thatforce stock exchanges to demutualize.
423

John C. Coffee Jr., “Privatization and Self-Regulation of Stock Exchanges”, (May 20, 1999) New York Law
Journal 5, para. 2. Hereinafter, John Coffee.
424
See John Coffee (2002), above n. 187, 1800; see also Roberta Karmel (1999), above n. 417, para. 11 & 20.
425
See Laura Cha, (Deputy Chairman and Executive Director Securities & Future Commission, at theCommonwealth Club California, USA, Jun. 6, 2000), “Securities Market Reform: the Hong Kong Experience”,
http://www.hksfc.org.hk/chi/press_releases/html/sp.../lc000606.htm, visited May 26, 2001. Hereinafter, Laura
Cha.
426
The London Stock Exchange was privatized in 2000. Since July 2001, it has become a listed company. For
further information, see “London Stock Exchange: History”, above n. 420.
427
See Roberta S. Karmel, “Turning Seats Into Shares: Causes and Implications of Demutualization of Stockand Future Exchanges”, (2002) 53 Hastings Law Journal 367, 368 – 369. Hereinafter, Roberta Karmel (2002).
428
See Tokyo Stock Exchange: History, http://www.tse.or.jp/english/about/history.html, visited Aug. 9, 2002.
429
See Roberta Karmel (1999), above n. 417, para. 1.
430
See John C. Coffee Jr., above n. 423, para. 2.
431
See Caroline Bradley, above n. 413, 668.
432
See O. Hart & J. Moore, above n. 414, 56; Frank Donnan, above n. 412, 8-9; and Roberta Karmel (1999),
above n. 417, para. 5 & 19; Laura Cha, above n. 425.

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Critics of the mutual form attribute deficiencies of this form to the two following
elements: the variation in the exchange’s membership in terms of the size or nature of themembers' business, and the extent to which the exchange has to compete. They argue thatthese elements have direct impacts on the relative performance of different stock
exchanges. Mutual enterprises seem to face constraints in their membership and a lower
degree of competition by comparison with stock enterprises. As a result, the latter is seen
as more efficient than the former.433 Some other opponents of the mutual form of stock
exchange go further in contending that it is the voting tendency, the structure and thegovernance of mutual exchanges that make the exchanges hard to respond in a timely
manner to the challenges of new technology. It is very unlikely that members will vote forany change concerning the subscription of additional capital.434 The same can be said
about voting for changes relating to the customary way in which the stock exchange does
business and concerning the potential value of membership. 435 Making decisions oncontentious business seems much harder to do in a mutual than in a corporate structure.436
The structure and governance of a mutual exchange tend to favor members’ interest rather
than those of the market and the investors. In the absence of control by competition or
regulation over market power, mutual exchange members have the potential to influence
the price, quality and range of services offered by the exchange. 437 All reveal the
weaknesses of the mutual form of exchanges.
A proponent of the mutual form, however, has argued that the corporate form does
not affect efficient monitoring of management. Rather it is competition among firms that
promotes the efficiency of such a management; that the diversified ownership in stock
enterprises even weakens shareholders’ power to monitor management effectively; andthat the non-ownership structure of the mutual form does not necessarily cause inefficientmonitoring.438
Perhaps there are questions here arising that are more important than whether themutual form is actually less efficient than the corporate form. Such questions are: whymutual stock exchanges were in operation for centuries, yet their deficiencies were not acontroversial issue; why such deficiencies have become a matter of concern only recently;
and what newly emerging phenomena have made the mutual form of stock exchanges toreveal weaknesses which have made it no longer appropriate for today’s need. So, what
are those phenomena?
One can easily recognize that technological advance has brought new life for the
securities industry in the last decade: that is the change from floor trading to screen
trading. Perhaps this is one of the factors, if other factors actual exist, that make a
traditional exchange with a physical trading floor and membership cards to be outdated,
433

Ibid (O. Hart & J. Moore).
See Laura Cha, above n. 425; John Coffee, above n. 423, para. 5.
435
Ibid (Laura Cha).
436
See Roberta Karmel (1999), above n. 417, para. 19.
437
See Laura Cha, above n, 425; see also Roberta Karmel (1999), above n. 417, para. 19.
438
See Fama, “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm”, (1980) (88) (21) Journal of Political Economy
288, 289 - 295.
434

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter Vor no longer to have much value. This factor has thus put traditional exchanges into tensecompetition with other electronic communication networks (ECNs) or alternative trading
systems (ATSs). In this competition, mutual exchanges are in need of financial support
for computerizing their trading services. Clearly, in doing so, exchanges need first to raise
more funds, which seems hard to do with a mutual structure, as earlier mentioned.
Switching to another form that will enable them to adapt with new challenges oftechnological development has thus become urgent.
There has been evidence supporting the above-mentioned hypothesis. Chicago
Mercantile Exchange Inc. said that demutualization enables it to generate a new financial
decision-making mechanism in accordance with the value of equity held by each member;to facilitate the exchange in making use of new business strategies as well as to allow theexchange to cooperate with strategic partners; to permit its governance and managerial
structure to adapt quickly to a competitive environment; and to provide exchange
members with equity values. The Australian Stock Exchange found it hard, at the sametime, to represent interests of both groups, large and small brokers, and compete withother exchanges. Thus it sees demutualization as a solution to the problem. The Toronto
Stock Exchange deems demutualization as a factor that can foster the competitiveness andcommercialization of the exchange as well as channel the exchange into paying more
attention to customers.439
These items of evidence, once again, reveal actually existing weaknesses of themutual form of stock exchanges that arose when the securities industry entered a new eraof technological advance. And the move of a considerable number of mutual-form
exchanges toward for-profit corporations further tends to prove that all of thosedemutualized stock exchanges had encountered the same problems and tried to overcome
such situations by demutualizing. Demutualization seems to be the single means
employed by exchanges around the world to enable them to escape from constraints of themutual form and so to cope with new challenges of technological change. It is a matter ofadapting to a new environment. It can be said that technological development itself has
triggered competitive force exchanges have to face, and has pushed them in such a
demutualizing movement.
This view seems to be supported by Richard Grasso and Henry M. Paulson. They
also see competition as a consequence of technology in maintaining that technology has
given rise to the development of new forms of competition. One such form is ECNs thatmight adversely affect the efficiencies of stock exchanges.440Grasso believes that after
being demutualized, the owners of stock exchanges will be diversified; competitive
challenges will be faster responded to in a more innovative way; and all of the financial

439

See Caroline Bradley, above n. 413, 668– 670.
See Richard A. Grasso (Chairman and CEO of NYSE), “Investor Ownership of Stock Exchanges”, (Sep. 28,
1999) FDCH Congressional Testimony, <Academic Search Elite>. Hereinafter, Richard Grasso; see also Henry
M. Paulson (Chairman and CEO of Goldman Sachs and Co.), “Hearing on the ‘Financial Marketplace of the
Future’”, (Feb. 29, 2000) Senate Banking Committee,
http://www.senate.gov/~banking/00_02hrg/022900/paulson.htm, visited May 26, 2001.
440

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requirements for competing with private trading systems will be more easily met. In otherwords, demutualized stock exchanges can cope with competitive challenges.441
John Coffee looks at the factor that resulted in the need for demutualization byclosely focusing on the case of NASDAQ. In working out why NASDAQ should
privatize, he thinks that the intense competition from ECNs which NASDAQ has been
facing is the reason; and that as a not-for-profit organization, NASDAQ runs into
financial difficulties with such competition with ECNs. He further maintains that, byprivatization, NASDAQ will be able to raise funds directly from capital markets so that it
can improve technology based on such mobilized funds.442 Here, although he does notdirectly say that technology leads to competition, Coffee points out clearly that it was thecompetition in modernizing technology with ECNs that triggered NASDAQ’s intention to
demutualize.
In the literature, commentators, however, do not seem to have a unanimous viewconcerning the reasons for the demutualization of stock exchanges. They do not seem toagree that technological development is the single reason that leads to demutulization.
Apart from rapid changes in technology, some other factors pointed out include:competition facing mutual stock exchanges and the globalization of securities markets.
Roberta Karmel agrees that technology is one of the factors that lead to
demutualization, but she does not see competition as a consequence of technology. She
clearly distinguishes the two factors, technology and competition, that lead to
demutualization. 443 She points out that screen trading which has replaced trading on
exchange floors on most exchanges is one of the rationales leading to stock exchange
demutualization.444 But she also maintains that competition, regardless of whether it isamong exchanges themselves or between exchanges and ATSs or between domestic andforeign exchanges, is another cause that has pushed exchanges into demutualization.445
However, one can argue that, whether it is competition between exchanges or between
exchanges and ATSs, or between domestic and international exchanges, all wereoriginated or triggered by technological development. It is technology that introduces
electronic trading system so that for-profit business entities having strong financial
resources can computerize their trading services, which in turn, causes transactions on
traditional trading floors to become costly; it is also technology that has turned the role oftraditional brokers down by providing investors with complicated market analysis at aclick on their own personal computers. Thus it seems that the original cause of
demutualization remains technological advances.

441

Ibid (Richard A. Grasso).
See John Coffee, above n. 423, para. 3.
443
See Roberta Karmel (1999), above n. 417, para. 2.
444
Ibid, para. 4.
445
Ibid, para. 5, 11, and 16. She points out that the Stockholm Stock Exchange and the Australian Stock
Exchange decided to demutualize to enable them to compete in the international environment.
442

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Lisa I. Fried446 and Doris Dumlao447posit another factor leading to demutualization,
namely the internationalization of stock exchanges or the globalizing challenges. The
demutualization of exchanges in New York, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, andAustralia is said to have been for the purpose of raising money for the exchanges toenable them to adapt to globalizing challenges.448 However, arguably, this actually resultsfrom the fact that, in the globalization process, exchanges around the world have tocompete with each other, both in terms of technology and finance (to afford them to beequipped with such technology), in order to survive. And here, once again, technologicalchallenges are clearly the cause of demutualization.
Demutualization, therefore, has a number of advantages. It eliminates constraints
resulting from the governance structure and voting tendency of traditional exchanges. It
diversifies ownership of the exchange and permits external owners. In that way it createsa new form of governance for exchanges and separates members' ownership rights fromtheir trading rights and generates value to these rights. It converts members' ownershiprights into shares, but still maintains the trading rights of the owners who are also
securities firms. In addition, demutualization transforms mutual exchanges into
commercial entities that tend to give more weight to the business aspects of operating amarketplace: they will operate on a more customer-oriented and profit-driven basis.
Demutualization will also enable the exchange to widely raise capital from the public,
which in turn will facilitate the exchange in coping with well-financed competitors.
4. Matters of Concern about the Consequences of Demutualization
Having such advantages, still demutualization is a matter of concern. That is,demutualization might render the stock exchange unable to carry out well its selfregulatory functions, because of the conflict of interests it has to face, and the threat of
takeovers and mergers over corporate stock exchanges.
Frank Donnan is suspicious of the Australian Stock Exchange’s ability in enforcing
its listing rules against itself.449 John Coffee finds almost unacceptable the existence of a
private body having regulatory authority over its competitors; he also wonders whether
NASD Regulation Inc. could enforce its own levies in the absence of significant revisionsof NASD and SEC rules.450 Roberta Karmel worries about “whether the profit motive will
undermine the fairness and effectiveness of self-regulation”.451 Aside from the concernsof problems arising when a demutualized exchange lists and trades its own shares452 and446

See Lisa I. Fried, “Plans Debated for Stock Markets’ For-Profit Conversion” (Sep, 30, 1999) New York Law
Journal 5, para. 3.
447
See Doris C. Dumlao, “State Funds’ Participation Key to PSE Demutualization”, Philippines Daily, (Nov.
6, 2000) http://www.inquirer.net/issues/nov2000/nov06/business/bus_5.html, visited May 26, 2001.
448
Ibid.
449
See Frank Donnan, above n. 412, 88.
450
See John Coffee, above n. 423, para. 8 – 9.
451
See Roberta Karmel (1999), above n. 417, para. 6.
452
See Caroline Bradley, above n. 413, 682– 686.

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter Vof problems occurring when a proprietary business acts as a regulator,453 Caroline Bradleyeven fears the risk that a proprietary exchange will become a takeover target or be merged
into another.454 However, Richard Grasso’s observation seems to address, in part, theseconcerns:
I believe these concerns are well-intentioned but ill-founded.
Because of the long-standing importance of market integrity to the
NYSE's competitive position, converting to for-profit status will, if
possible, strengthen our resolve to maintain the highest standards ofself-regulation.455
Richard Grasso even goes further in contending that “demutualization will
strengthen the NYSE's commitment to regulation”; that “the NYSE has successfully
regulated its competitors for over half a century” and that “spinning off regulation would
weaken investor protection”. 456 On balance, Grasso’s arguments are in favour of thedemutualization of the NYSE. In practice, there has come into existence a fear of conflictsof interest occurring when a private body is responsible for enforcing listing standards
against itself. However, there seem to be some good ways to cope with the problems.
After the demutualization of the Stockholm Stock Exchange and the Australian Stock
Exchange, both the Swedish and Australian government dealt with such problems, byvesting in their public securities watchdog a supervisory power over public disclosure andthe compliance with listing standards of the demutualized stock exchange.457 And, to date,such a measure seems to have worked well. The Corporation Law Amendment Act 1997
of Australia, however, does not narrow down the regulatory framework of the Australian
Stock Exchange. Justification of this is that the Exchange has been a for-profit entity
since its inception in 1987, and “its conversion to a public limited company simply
confirms the fact.”458
The concern that demutualized stock exchanges might be threatened by takeovers
and mergers, although stemming from practical experience of what happened with theStockholm Stock Exchange459 and the London Stock Exchange,460 does not seem to be a453

Ibid, 686 – 695.
Ibid, 696 – 701.
455
See Richard A. Grasso, above n. 440.
456
Ibid.
457
In Sweden, new legislation was passed to give the Financial Supervisory Authority a direct supervision of
public disclosure by OM (a clearing house and option exchange in Swedish stocks) and the Stockholm Stock
Exchange. Independent disciplinary committees having rights to initiate disciplinary proceedings with respect
to companies with a qualified holding in an exchange, were set up. For further information, see Roberta Karmel(1999), above n. 417, para. 12-13.
In Australia, the Corporation Law Amendment Act 1997 (Australian Stock Exchange Act) preserves theessential features of self-regulation and the autonomy of the Australian Stock Exchange while giving theAustralian Securities and Investment Commission powers to oversee the conduct of SROs. For further
information, see Frank Donnan, above n. 412, 68 - 69.
458
Ibid. (Frank Donnan), 68.
459
The merger of the Stockholm Stock Exchange by OM Gruppen will be mentioned later.
454

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real threat if necessary measures are employed. To cope with this potential problem, theAustralian Corporation Law Amendment Act imposes limits on the holding (no more than5%) of shares in the Australian Stock Exchange, so that no single person or entity cangain control of the exchange and the Exchange’s ownership will be diversified.461
Even in the absence of such statutory limitations, it can be argued that takeovers andmergers amongst stock exchanges are not always harmful to the public. Stock exchanges
have long been seen as market places for capital-laden investors to meet capital-needy
businesses, places where business entities can broadly raise funds from the public to meettheir financial demands to expand their businesses. In that sense, even takeovers andmergers do occur, but after the transformation of the relevant stock exchange, if theexchange remains a fair, transparent and efficient marketplace, then what harm would
actually result for the public? The Swedish experience seems to support this argument.
Since the Swedish government does not impose limits on the holding of shares as theAustralian government does, the Stockholm Stock Exchange, after being demutualized,
was controlled by OM, a 20% shareholder, and then in early 1998 was merged into OM.
However, the Swedish government thinks that even this would be beneficial to thecountry’s capital market. To strike a balance, on the one hand, the new law enhances theoverseeing power of the Financial Supervisory Authority over the Exchange; and on theother hand, the Swedish government has tended to become a 10% shareholder of the
combined entities.462
Regardless of what happened in Sweden and Australia, and of the on-going
controversy over demutualization in the literature, stock exchanges around the world haverecently witnessed rapid changes. This is because technology that has substantiallylowered transaction costs and allows investors direct access to on-line trading has put
much pressure on exchanges. As a result, traditional transactions on tangible trading
floors have become out-dated and costly. In addition, the globalization of securities
markets has blurred geographical borders of traditional exchanges. Exchanges mustreform themselves to attract cross-border customers or to compete with their counterparts.
The initial stage of such a reform effected by traditional exchanges is demutualization.
Perhaps the reform will not stop here but will need further innovation in terms of
exchange governance structure and changes in the extent to which the exchange can act asa self-regulator, to enable demutualized stock exchanges to overcome new challenges
introduced by the new corporate form of stock exchange, the stock corporation.

460

The London Stock Exchange (LSE) had also been threatened by a hostile tender offer by OM Gruppen in
August 2000. However, the LSE was ultimately successful in fending off the offer. For more information, see
Caroline Bradley, above n. 413, 657, 697-698.
461
See Australian Corporation Act 2001 (Cth) s 766E (Unacceptable Ownership Situation) under Division 2(Limitation on holding shares in the Exchange). This Section reads: “For the purposes of this Division, an
unacceptable ownership situation exists if any one person's voting power in the Exchange exceeds 5%.”
http://www.austlii.edu.au, visited Jul. 5, 2002.
This provision was first introduced in the 1997 Amendment of the Australian Corporation Act. For further
information, see Frank Donnan, above n. 412, 67.
462
See Roberta Karmel (1999), above n. 417, para. 12.

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II THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE VIETNAMESE EXCHANGE MARKETSIN RELATION TO AN EFFECTIVE MARKET
1. Securities Trading Centers as Non-profit Organizations that Belong to the SSC
The Vietnamese Government intends initially to set up securities trading centers in
Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) and to upgrade them into stock exchanges later.463
The grounds for such an intention was claimed to be: (1) lack of commodities forsecurities markets; (2) poor awareness of public investors about securities and securities
markets; (3) lack of expertise in securities firms; (4) lack of practical experience in the
management apparatus of securities markets; and (5) low level legal documents regulating
securities markets.464 It was further argued that as a stock trading center, the center will befully supported from the SSC in terms of granting licenses for public offering, andlicenses for running securities business. 465 A question that might arise here is what
obstacles the SSC would have to encounter in providing such supports for stock
exchanges if the exchanges were initially set up as such instead of securities trading
centers.
Because HCMC is the biggest industrial and commercial center in Vietnam, the first
securities trading center had been planned to be erected there in late 1998. While thisintention was being put into practice, a number of objective and subjective difficulties
arose, which delayed its birth until July, 2000. The reasons for the delay are numerous,
but some principal ones include: (1) the Asian Financial Crisis in late 1997;466 and (2) thelack of commodities for trading in stock trading centers.467
Although having learnt from the experience of countries around the world, neither
the mutual form nor the corporate form of stock exchanges has been brought into thecontext of Vietnam. Under Decree 48/1998, a securities trading center is a non-profitmaking legal person having its own seal and bank accounts. It belongs to the SSC and its
operational expenses are covered by the state budget. Its main functions include:
managing, conducting and supervising securities transactions occurring in the securities
trading center.468
Securities trading centers, thus, act as components of the SSC rather than as
independent organizations having the full functions of a securities trading center. An
arising question is whether or not a governmental administrative body should be put so
closely with securities trading entities.

463

See Decree No. 48/1998, Art. 20; See also Decision No. 127-1998, Art. 1.
See Tran Dac Sinh (et al), “Nhung van de co ban trong quan ly, to chuc, van hanh va phat trien Trung tam
giao dich chung khoan o Viet nam” [Fundamentals in Management, Organization, Operation and Developmentof Securities Trading Centers in Vietnam], (Working Paper, Ho Chi Minh City Securities Trading Center, State
Securities Commission, 2000), 77. Hereinafter, Tran Dac Sinh.
465
Ibid.
466
See above n. 6.
467
See above n. 5.
468
See Art. 21.
464

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The rationale for adopting a government-owned rather than a mutual or corporate
securities trading center, mainly involves the three following issues. First, the mutual
form of stock exchange is only suited to countries having a highly developed economy
and financial market, and a complete legal framework for the operation of securities
market.469 The argument might be further developed regarding the way that the corporate
form of exchange is only appropriate for the even more highly developed economies.
Secondly, for the time being, both of the mutual and corporate forms are not feasible
since the notion of securities markets is quite new in Vietnam. Securities firms are shortof the knowledge, experience, and necessary financial resources required to set up and to
run a stock exchange by themselves. Only the government can gather all necessary
resources for the erection and development of securities markets. For this reason,
Vietnamese securities trading centers should be set up by the Government as
governmental organizations. In other words, the government-owned form of securities
trading centers is the most suitable choice for Vietnam.470
Thirdly, in the early stage, governmental ownership and government management of
securities trading centers are required to ensure the fairness and discipline of the market.
Securities trading centers that are directly run by the state on a not-for-profit basis will
maximally assure the interests of public investors. This is of importance when Vietnam
does not yet have a complete and transparent legal framework governing securities
markets. 471
In response to the above-mentioned justifications, it can be argued, first, that as amatter of fact, in most countries around the world, it was the securities markets thattriggered the passage of securities laws, while in Vietnam it was the laws that triggered
the birth of the securities market. Accordingly, the Vietnamese securities market wasprobably born with a more complete legal framework than were many other securities
markets around the world. Furthermore, the answer to the question whether the economy
and financial market of Vietnam in this 21st century are less developed than those ofEngland and America in the 18th century472 remains unclear. Thus, it can hardly be said
that Vietnam could not adopt the mutual form of stock exchange for the reason that theVietnamese securities market does not have a complete legal framework for its operation,or because Vietnam does not have a highly developed economy and financial market asother countries have when their first stock exchange commenced business.
Practical evidence shows that even when economies in general and financial
markets in particular are highly developed, it is the time when the mutual structure ofstock exchanges can become outdated. The whole world has experienced a recent
469

Tran Dac Sinh, above n. 464, 76.
Ibid.
471
Ibid, 76-77.
472
In practice, some financial exchanges developed as mutual businesses before the introduction of generalincorporation statutes. For example, the London Stock Exchange commenced its business in coffee house inChange Alley, and then moved to a building marked as “The Stock Exchange” in 1773; the early stage in thedevelopment of the New York Stock Exchange was marked by the Buttonwood Agreement of 1792, enteredinto by brokers in New York. For further information, see Caroline Bradley, above n. 413, 662 – 664.
470

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movement in which stock exchanges in various jurisdictions have been converted frommutual into corporate form in response to technological advances achieved by highly
developed economies, as previously discussed. The corporate form of stock exchanges,
however, does not seem only appropriate with today’s highly developed economies andfinancial markets. Japan employed a corporate form for its stock exchanges even in thelate 1870s, when its stock exchanges first saw the light of day. Tokyo and Osaka Stock
Exchanges, the first two exchanges established in Japan, took the legal form of stock
corporations and worked quite well.473 This fact provides strong evidence that it would bequite feasible to adopt the stock corporation form for an exchange market at the time sucha market first commences business.
Secondly, most stock exchanges around the world had initially been set up under theform of mutual organizations by member firms of stock exchanges, or even under the
corporate form as occurred in Japan. However, they did not seem to encounter any
financial problem in raising funds for the establishment of the exchanges and for theiroperation. The early corporate-form stock exchanges in Japan even proved theiradvantageous position in raising funds from the public. It was reported that their shareswere listed and traded on the particular exchanges and were even the most popular sharesin trading volume.474 The corporate-form stock exchanges in Japan were finally dissolvedin 1947. The reason, however, was not because of their inappropriate legal structure, nor
was it their failure in mobilizing necessary funds to run the exchanges. Rather the reason
stemmed from the political situation of Japan at that time, which made it impossible forcorporate-form stock exchanges to get the authorization of the occupation authorities.475
On this point, it would seem to be undervaluing the financial potentiality of the
public if one were to say that the government is the only entity that can afford thepecuniary demands of establishing an exchange market. Even if the establishment of thefirst trading center actually required big financial resources to the point that theVietnamese securities firms could not afford it by themselves, another alternative is that
the Government could financially support them to promote the birth of the first securities
trading center. Since the mutual form is no longer appropriate for today’s securities
industry, as noted above, the government could promote the birth of the exchange market
by establishing a trading center under the form of a stock corporation, with thegovernment as a controlling shareholder. This approach is very likely to materialize,
since, three months before the date the trading center was to come into existence, it was

473

In Japan prior to 1878, there were no stock exchanges. The Stock Exchange Ordinance of 1878 adopted thestock corporation form for stock exchanges. Tokyo and Osaka stock exchanges were established under thatform.
The Exchange Law of 1893, which had been in force for 50 years, continued to recognize the stock
corporation form, in parallel with membership organization form for stock exchanges. And in fact every stock
exchange at that time was set up under the form of a stock corporation, not that of a membership organization.
For further information, see Louis Loss et al (eds.), above n. 261, 27.
474
Ibid.
475
Ibid, 28.

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reported that there had been four securities firms established476 to be ready to participate
in the center’s operation. Those firms together with the government would be quite able
to become the founding shareholders of the trading center.
Thirdly, the idea that state-ownership of non-profit securities trading centers will
maximally assure the interest of public investors sounds suspicious, since in mostcountries the stock exchanges have been owned either by members under a mutual form,or by shareholders under a corporate form; and such ownership forms have done no harm
to public interests. If government ownership and government management could reallyensure the fairness and discipline of the market, there would be no need for privatizing
state enterprises around the world.477 The arguments for privatizing state-owned stock
exchanges will be further discussed when considering the legal structure of the planned
stock exchange in Vietnam.
The organization of securities trading centers in Vietnam seems to be distinct but
not unique. At least in China, the current Securities Law of the People’s Republic ofChina, which was adopted in December 1998, still defines a stock exchange as a nonprofit making legal person,478 regardless of the fact that China is about a decade ahead inbuilding up stock markets compared with Vietnam.479 The legal form of Chinese stock
exchanges is however not clearly provided for in the Law. If one merely looks at theprovisions concerning members’ financial rights, one might think that stock exchanges
take the form of a mutual organization. That is because Article 98 of the Securities Law of
the People’s Republic of China says:
The income from various charges that is at the discretion of a stock
exchange shall first be used to ensure the normal operation andgradual gains improvement of the premises and facilities of the stock
exchange.
The gains accumulated by a stock exchange shall belong to its
members, and its rights and interests shall be shared by themembers. The accumulated gains may not be distributed to themembers while the stock exchange is in existence.

476

Those firms are Bao Viet Securities Company, Securities Investment Company, Ltd., De Nhat Securities
Joint Stock Company, and Sai Gon Securities Joint Stock Company. See “Vietnam is set to Launch Stock
Exchanges in July”, (Apr. 24, 2000) ASIA PULSE, <LexisNexis: All Sources: Country & Region: Vietnam:
Country Reports: Vietnam Country Files>.
477
It is reported that in contrast to decades ago when privatization of state-owned enterprises was only
discussed in a few industrial countries, today, privatization is moving forward very fast in many countries
throughout the world. For more information, see “Expediting the Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises in
Taiwan” (Feb.2001, Sectoral Planning Department, CEPD),
http://www.cepd.gov.tw/english/special/9002212.htm, visited May 4, 2002.
478
See Securities Law of the People's Republic of China 1998, Art. 95. The English version of this law was
found at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/CSRCsite/eng/elaws/elaw05.htm, visited Apr. 25, 2002.
479
The first stock exchange in China, the Shanghai Stock Exchange, was established in 1990. For further
information, see Roman Tomasic, “The Securities Law of the People's Republic of China: An Overview”,(1999) 10, Australian Journal of Corporate Law 1, 3.

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If one further looks at the governance structure of stock exchanges in China, one
might gain the impression that they are governmental organizations. Article 99 says: “Astock exchange shall have a board of governors.” And Article 100 states: “A stock
exchange shall have a general manager, who shall be appointed and removed by the
securities regulatory authority under the State Council.”Another example of a state-owned stock exchange is the case of the Cayman Islands
Stock Exchange established in 1997. Although it is state-owned entity, it takes the legal
form of a private limited company and operates as an independent entity.480
Vietnam is probably one of a very limited number of countries where securities
trading centers are owned by the state, as a component of the public securities regulator,
the SSC. Experience from other developed securities markets around the world shows that
securities trading activities should be separated from governmental management
activities, and stock trading centers should be independent legal entities. 481 Vietnam
should have a worldwide comparable model for its current securities trading centers aswell as for its planned stock exchanges.
2. The Uncertain Legal Structure of the Planned Stock Exchanges
The intention of the government to convert securities trading centers into stock
exchanges in the future is explicitly revealed in Decree 48/1998:
The Central Transaction Market will be organized step by step fromSecurities Trading Centers to Stock Exchanges.482
According to the language of this Article, it seems that the stock exchanges will be put
into use when the trading centers become mature, or the stock exchanges will be foundedon the maturity of the securities trading centers. Thus, by the time the stock exchanges
come into operation, all necessary conditions required for running formal stock exchanges
will presumably be available.
Although such an intention is clearly stated in Decree 48/1998, the legal structure of
the planned stock exchanges remains ambiguous. Article 23, Decree 48/1998 merely saysthat the planned stock exchanges are legal entities having financial autonomy, operating
under the supervision and administration of the SSC. The governance of the planned stock
exchanges is to be vested in a management board. The board is to be composed of nine
members: one president, two vice presidents (one being the general managing director),and six ordinary members (two members representing securities firms; two for the public,
and two for the government). The components of the management board represent
different interests, but they are all to be appointed and dismissed by the government. The
480

See “The Cayman Islands Stock Exchange”: http://www.cxs.com.ky, visited May 3, 2002.
In countries having long historical development of securities markets such as the UK, US, and Japan, stock
exchanges have never been operated as a dependent government organization. Rather they have been
established and operated as independent legal entities.
482
See Art. 20.
481

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president, vice presidents, and general managing director are to be appointed anddismissed by the prime minister based on recommendation from the SSC president. Other
members are to be selected by the president of the SSC for appointment and dismissed.
Though the capital raising mechanism of the planned stock exchanges is unclear,
their governance structure gives an impression that they are designed as governmentowned organizations.
That impression is perhaps true since policymakers still argue for a state-owned
form of stock exchanges. Their arguments are based on similar grounds to those used indefending the state-owned form of securities trading centers. 483 By adopting a stateowned structure for planned stock exchanges, Vietnam then will have stock exchanges
whose legal form is different from those of almost all other stock exchanges around theworld (which have been independent entities in the form of mutual enterprises). In
addition, there has been a global tendency towards demutualizing stock exchanges, thequestion whether the statutory structure of the planned stock exchanges in Vietnam isappropriate or not should be taken into account, in order to avoid failures in attaining awell operational securities market.
Furthermore, by the time the stock exchanges are established in place of the current
securities trading centers, the experimental period of running a securities market in
Vietnam will no longer exist. It seems hard to imagine that we will find any new
reasonable ground for state-owned stock exchanges at that stage. Even for the time being,
the state-owned form of the current securities trading center has been questioned. If suchform of ownership will continue to be taken by the planned stock exchanges, probably it
will further trigger greater controversy. Of course the principal question is not that of agreat or small controversy which might result from the state-owned stock exchanges.
Rather the question is whether such legal form will generate expected outcomes or will
promote an effective securities market. In defining an appropriate form for the exchange
market, experience from other countries around the world should not be ignored.
One might argue that it is too early to judge the efficiency of the state-owned stock
exchanges in Vietnam, especially when they have not yet come into existence; that eachcountry has different socio-economic circumstances, so that what is best for othercountries’ stock exchanges, especially those in developed countries, is very unlikely to be
best for those in Vietnam, a developing country; and that it is not always wise and right todirectly import successful experience from overseas into the country, and so on.
In response to these arguments, first, it can be said that state-owned entities,
regardless of where they may be, often reveal a number of weaknesses and deficiencies intheir operation. For this reason, state enterprises have been privatized everywhere around483

See Tran Cao Nguyen (et al), “So giao dich chung khoan Viet nam: Mo hinh to chuc, quan ly va giam sat”
[Vietnam Stock Exchanges: Organization, Management, and Supervision], (Working Paper No. CK-99.03,
SSC, 1999) 11, 48-49. Arguments for state-owned structure of future stock exchanges include: to maintainpublic investors’ confidence, to ensure that the future stock exchanges are well financed so that they can beequipped with modern facilities, to minimize errors when transactions are effected, and to assure that the stock
market is healthy and effective.
The preceding section provides arguments against these arguments.

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the world, as earlier mentioned. Vietnam has also experienced inefficient or loss-making
state enterprises for decades.484 This fact has prompted the Vietnamese Government toinitiate the state enterprises equitization process since the early 1990s.485 And why should
state-owned exchanges be an exception?
Secondly, to date, the world-wide demutualization or the global conversion ofmutual stock exchanges to private ones seems to be another factor that confirms therightness of such a new movement, which is, in a way, similar to what has happened withstate enterprises. In the words of Caroline Bradley ‘[t]he move to private ownership ofthese exchanges486 is comparable to the movement to privatize state owned enterprises
generally.’487
Thirdly, as pointed out in the first chapter of this work, one of the goals of theVietnamese government in establishing the securities market is to create a potential
channel for capital flow into the country from overseas. This goal can only bematerialized if the market is attractive to foreign investors in terms of its prestige.
Principal factors that contribute to good reputation or the attractiveness of a stock
exchange include fairness, transparency, market compatibility, and good capability inproviding services or financing technological advances (the latter is of importance inallowing an exchange to compete with others in terms of trading volume, liquidity, andselling services and data).
A fair and transparent market: to achieve such a market, the completion of theinformation disclosure regime, anti-fraud provisions, and the regulation of market
professionals is vital. These issues have been discussed earlier in this paper. The
following discussion will focus on the two factors: market compatibility and financing
technological advances.
Market compatibility: the previous discussion shows that nowadays the state-owned
form of stock markets is rarely employed by countries around the world. Obviously,
foreign investors, who have been used to dealing with non-government owned stock
exchanges for centuries, will not easily get familiar with a state-owned stock exchange.
Once they have to make a choice between a marketplace that is familiar to them (or ofwhich they at least have a relatively full image) and another which is not, then for thesake of their investments, they tend to choose the former, except for some moreventuresome investors.
484

It is reported that:“[U]p to 60% of SOEs constantly record losses and ask for subsidies from the State.
Vietnam now has 5,655 SOEs. Sixty percent have an average capital of VND5 billion ($333,333) or less, and
30% have an average capital of VND30 billion ($2 million) or more.
Forty three percent of machinery in SOEs has operated for ten years or more, and 44.7% has run for five
years or less. SOE debts in the 1991 - 2000 period amounted to VND277.8 trillion ($18.5 billion).”For more information, see “State Owned Enterprises: Govt Determined to Push up SOEs Reform”
http://www.vietnampanorama.com/business/soes.html, visited May 4, 2002.
485
For concrete legal bases of equitization program, see Section II, Sub-section 2, Chapter I of this paper.
486
Here, Caroline Bradley uses the term “these exchanges” to denote exchanges in different jurisdictions(author added).
487
See Caroline Bradley, above n. 413, 661.

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Technological advances employed by the market: to date many stock exchanges
around the world have privatized or reformed themselves into for-profit organizations
with diverse ownership. With such a global tendency, the coming years will witness acontinuously increasing number of demutualized stock exchanges from country tocountry. As earlier mentioned, technological development itself has driven thetransformation of stock exchanges into a shareholder-owned form to enable them tofinance technological advances so that they can computerize all trading services. It is evenpredicted that technology and telecommunication companies may own or be owned bysome stock exchanges in years to come; and that exchanges will compete not only in
trading volume and liquidity but also in selling services and data.488 Such developments inthe securities industry permits an investor in Japan, for example, to access all necessary
information on a company in the US, and vices versa, without difficulty and to route anorder to buy its shares, at a click on a computer key board. If Vietnam cannot offer crossborder transactions in such a simple and time-saving manner, then the country will lose agreat population of foreign investors. Even if the government can afford to computerize
the trading services offered by the future Vietnamese stock exchange, it will still be a real
burden for the state budget to cover such a financial demand, while instead it could relyon the public to provide such finance.
These analyses reveal that the state-owned form of stock exchanges would put
Vietnam in a disadvantageous position since it might cause foreign investors torefrain/abstain from investing in the market, while it would add to the state budget deficit,
or make the deficit more severe. Apparently, to avoid such disadvantages that might face
Vietnam, stock exchanges as departmental units of the SSC cannot accomplish the tasks.

III. A DESIRABLE MODEL FOR FUTURE EXCHANGE MARKETSThe previous discussion shows that the state-owned form of the current securities
trading centers and of the planned stock exchanges in Vietnam cannot promote theachievement of an effective market.
The discussion also reveals that the mutual form of exchange market has a long
history, but recently its weaknesses have been exposed. These deficiencies have become
increasingly obvious when the securities industry enters a new era of high technology andintense competition. This fact makes mutual stock exchanges no longer suitable fortoday’s securities industry. For that reason, the whole world has experienced anincreasing tendency in privatizing stock exchanges in the last decade. It is submitted that
Vietnam should learn from such experience so that it can save both time and money inachieving an ideal form for the current securities trading centers and the planned stock
exchanges: that is, to adopt a corporate structure of stock exchanges, or in other words, tolegalize a shareholding company form of stock exchanges. The current securities trading
center should now be privatized. As long as the government finds it necessary to interfere
488

See Laura Cha, above n. 425.

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in the governance of the trading center, the government should remain a controllingshareholder of the center after the privatization. In that way, the ownership of the center
will be diversified, which, in turn, will generate a new and more effective form ofgovernance for the center, while the state, when necessary, can still have influence on thecenter’s decisions as a large shareholder. The corporate form of exchange market should
continue to be taken by the planned stock exchanges when they come into existence.
Taking this approach does not imply that the privately owned structure of securities
trading center/stock exchange (hereinafter, stock exchange) is perfect. Because thebusiness carried out by stock exchanges differs from that carried out by other bodies
corporate, further steps following privatization should be taken to prevent potential
problems that might occur. The next and immediate step to be taken may be a statutory
reform in the division of regulatory functions between stock exchanges and the public
regulator, and in the exchange governance. The reform will avoid conflicts of interest
between stock exchanges and their competitors, and will avert potential hostile takeovers
and mergers amongst privatized exchanges.
Division of regulatory powers between stock exchanges and SSC: after being
privatized, stock exchanges would have a new legal structure: a shareholder-owned one;each stock exchange would be governed by a board of directors; the board's members
would be persons who have good reputation; the general shareholders’ meeting would be
the highest decision-making body of the exchange, and so on. It would be appropriate thatthe exchanges, after being formed by the SSC in conformity with the securities law,would also be subject to the Enterprise Act, as are other shareholding companies.
Furthermore, under the new legal form, stock exchanges would themselves beshareholding companies having their shares listed on their own trading floors and having
outstanding shares held by the public. To avoid conflicts of interest that might occur whenstock exchanges are in charge of enforcing listing standards and trading rules against
themselves, the SSC should probably retain supervising power over the compliance ofstock exchanges with such standards and rules.
Remedies to avoid takeover and merger: to avoid takeovers and mergers, there areat least two alternatives. The first is to adopt shareholding stock exchanges whose
controlling block of shares is held by the government. In this way, the government could
interfere in the governance of the exchanges as a major shareholder, when necessary.
Secondly, to recognize shareholding stock exchanges whose shares are not held by thegovernment at all. This approach can be dealt with in one of the two following directions:(1) to create some statutory limits on the holdings of a stock exchange’s shareholder. Thiscan avert the possibility of a person or a body corporate gaining control over the exchange
and influencing its decision-making processes; and (2) to adopt some statutory
requirements pursuant to which, if there would be any takeover or merger occurring
among exchanges, such a takeover or merger would not be effected without approval
from the government.

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CHAPTER VI
WHETHER THE MARKET REGULATORY SYSTEMCAN ENSURE THAT THE SECURITIES REGULATIONWILL BE WELL ENFORCED

The role of the management apparatus over the securities market cannot be denied,even when all other components of the securities regulation such as regulation of
information disclosure, of anti-fraud, of securities professionals, and exchange market
structure, are all completed. This is because, even when laws and regulation are perfect, inthe absence of an effective regulatory system, nothing can ensure that such laws andregulation will be actually implemented in practice.
This chapter scrutinizes the current market regulatory system of Vietnam in relation
to those in other jurisdictions. It argues that such a management apparatus has not been
appropriately adopted, so that the system will not be able to ensure that the securities
regulation will be well enforced.

I. SECURITIES REGULATORY SYSTEMS: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
1. Securities Regulatory Systems in General
Regulatory systems over securities markets are significant in enforcing securities
laws, to protect the investing public and to control market risks. Each securities market issubject to one kind of regulatory system or another. As M.I. Steinberg put it, regardless ofthe sophistication of any particular securities market, there must be some form of
regulation appropriate to the relevant market. The alternatives can range from (1) a central
government regulator having extensive authority, or (2) government regulation by meansof regional bodies, to (3) self-regulation conducted by stock exchanges or by otherorganizations, or (4) a combination of the above mentioned forms.489
The first and second form of regulation is actually governmental regulation or
public regulation, so that the options can now be seen as three: public regulation, selfregulation, and a combination of both. All these forms have been adopted somewhere orother around the world. In the past self-regulation was primarily employed in many
European countries490 and none of the member states of the EU had a securities regulatory
agency.491 The UK, the Netherlands, Ireland492 and Germany493 are examples of countries
489

See Marc I. Steinberg, above n. 7, 259.
See Maria A. Volarich, “Easing the Regulation of a Pan-European Securities Market: Applying the
Recommendations of the Rudman Report to EASDAQ”, (1996) 19, Fordham International Law Journal 2230,
2250. Hereinafter, Maria A. Volarich.
491
Ibid., at footnote n.160.
492
See Roberta S. Karmel, “The Case for a European Securities Commission”, (1999) 38 Columbia Journal ofTransnational Law 9, 31. Hereinafter, Roberta Karmel (1999) 38.
490

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that mainly employed self-regulation, and where government merely supported such
regulatory apparatus. For example, in the UK, apart from the London Stock Exchange
acting as a self-regulator, regulatory responsibilities were divided among some ministerial
agencies such as the Bank of England, the Treasury, and the Department of Trade andIndustry;494 in Germany, no federal securities agency existed, but stock exchanges acted
as self-regulators under the supervision of a state agency in their own jurisdiction.495 In
some other European countries such as France and Italy public regulation has been
adopted.496 A combination of public regulation and self-regulation has been in existence
in countries such as Japan,497 the US,498 Canada499 and Australia.500
Later, both the UK and Germany moved toward a regulatory system in which a
combination of public regulation and self-regulation is employed. In the UK, after thepassage of the Financial Services Act in 1986, a new regulatory structure has been
adopted. In such a structure, the Securities and Investment Board (the SIB), a quasigovernmental body, is the highest body sharing regulatory functions with self-regulatoryorganizations. The SIB Director-General is responsible for rule-making, and for awarding
and revoking licenses for securities firms, while SROs are entitled to draw up and oversee
rules concerning business practices in their respective fields.501
The regulatory system of Germany has changed since 1994 after the enactment of
the Financial Markets Promotion Act. The Act establishes the Federal Supervisory Officefor Securities Dealing, which is in charge of overseeing German securities markets. The
Office, the eight individual stock exchanges and the state governments compose theregulatory system of German securities market.502
493

See Maria A. Volarich, above n. 490, 2253.
See Henry Laurence, “The Rule of Law in the Era of Globalisation: Spawning the SEC”, (1999) 6 Indiana
Journal of Global Legal Studies 647, 661. Hereinafter, Henry Laurence.
495
See Maria A. Volarich, above n. 490, 2253.
496
See Roberta Karmel (1999) 38, above n. 492, 31.
497
See Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 (2001 Japan): The Law seems to vest in the Prime Minister the
power of a market watchdog (Arts. 4, 28, 68, 80, 186, and 194-6). But the Prime Minister can delegate such
power to the Director General of the Financial Services Agency, which in turn has to delegate part of his/her
power to the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission.
On the other hand, Article 87 treats securities exchanges as self-regulatory organizations. Under this
Article, members of a securities exchange must comply with laws, regulations and the rules of the exchange;
the exchange has the right to impose a fine on a member, to order a member to suspend or restrict the sale orpurchase of a security in the exchange, and to revoke the trade qualification of a member who has violatedlaws, regulations or the rules.
498
See Marianne K. Smythe, “Government Supervised Self-Regulation in The Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestion for an Accommodation”, (1984) 62, North Carolina Law Review 475, 483. Hereinafter
Marianne K. Smythe.
499
See Mark Gillen and Pittman Potter, “The Convergence of Securities Laws and Implications for Developing
Securities Markets”, (1998) 24 North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation 83, atfootnote 14. The Canadian securities industry used to rely on the self-regulation by the stock exchanges before
adopting public regulation.
500
See Frank Donnan, above n. 412, 68.
501
See Henry Laurence, above n. 494, 662 - 663.
502
Ibid, 681.
494

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2. Public regulation
The term “public regulation” can be construed as that regulation which is carried out
by government through either a single central governmental agency or a system of central
and local governmental authorities. In the latter case, coordination between central andlocal government in policing markets is adopted. Italy is an example, where public
regulation has been loaded on to both a central governmental commission and local
authorities.503
In countries where public regulation has been adopted in the form of a single public
regulator, either with or without parallel self-regulators, a governmental authority incharge of enforcing securities law is often set up. Such a body can either be a dependentor an independent governmental agency. In the literature, the US market watchdog isoften referred to as an independent agency, 504 while that of Japan is referred to as adependent one.505
A dependent regulatory agency can be either a component of the government or partof a governmental ministry. It often oversees securities markets within powers delegatedto it by the government or the ministry it belongs to.
An independent agency, in contrast, is a separate branch of government. According
to A. L. Peter, it is the fourth branch of government, which although it is subject to thesupervision or review of the other three branches, operates separately from them. Such agovernmental body is vested with executive, judicial and legislative power to oversee acertain area of government interest.506 The reasons why an independent agency is required
to oversee securities markets will be clarified while discussing the experience of the US
and Japan in running securities markets.

3. Self-regulatory system

503

See D. E. Ayling, The Internationalization of Stockmarkets (1986), 122. Hereinafter, D. E. Ayling.
See A. L. Peters, “The Independence of Independent Agencies: Independent Agencies: A Government's
Scourge or Salvation?”, (1998) Duke Law Journal 286, 287. Hereinafter A. L. Peters.
See also Nicole J. Ramsay, “Japanese Securities Regulation: Problems of Enforcement”, (1992) 60
Fordham Law Review 255, 281. Hereinafter, Nicole J. Ramsay.
See also Hal S. Scott, Philip A. Wellons, International Finance: Transaction, Policy and Regulation (6thEd. 1999), 251.
505
See Curtis J. Milhaupt, above n. 311, 472.
See also Nicole J. Ramsay, above n. 504, 269.
See also Gregory D. Ruback, “Master of Puppets: How Japan's Ministry of Finance Orchestrates its Own
Reformation”, (1998) 22, Fordham International Law Journal 185, 213 - 214. Hereinafter, Gregory D.
Ruback.
506
See A. L. Peters, above n. 504, 286.
504

134

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter VI“The term self-regulation”, As A. J. Campbell puts it, “means different things todifferent people”.507 In the literature, a range of definitions can be found. The term can beunderstood as the regulation carried out by industry or professional groups rather than by
the government. 508 It can mean regulation by a group of individuals or institutions
realizing that regulation of its activities is required for the common interest of the wholegroup.509 It can also refer to circumstances where the government has formally delegatedthe power to an industry to oversee the operation of the industry itself.510
To provide a closer image of self-regulation in relation to the securities industry,
David Ratner's observation might be useful. While discussing the “self-regulation” of the
US securities industry, David Ratner refers to the regulatory authority lodged in a numberof private associations of broker-dealers, known as “self-regulatory organizations”. Such
associations have been delegated both powers and responsibilities by Congress, (a) tocreate and enforce rules for the conduct of their members and (b) to assure compliancewith the federal securities laws by their members.511
In countries where a self-regulation system has been employed, whether in parallelwith governmental (public) regulation or as a single system, different organizations under
the form of stock exchanges or associations of securities dealers or of investmentcompanies or investment trusts, lay down their own rules binding their members. Thus theterm “self-regulatory organization” has been used.
a. Advantages of Self-regulation
In the history of the securities industry, the self-regulatory system is much older
than the governmental regulatory system.512 The former plays an important role in the
securities industry and is said to have a number of advantages over the latter.
Commentators generally agree on the following advantages: more efficiency, more
flexibility, a higher level of compliance, and lower cost.513

507

See Angela J. Campbell, “Self-Regulation and the Media”, (1999) 51 Federal Communications Law
Journal 711, 714. Hereinafter, Angela J. Campbell.
508
Ibid, 715.
509
See Betty M. Ho, “Rethinking the System of Sanctions in the Corporate and Securities Law of Hong Kong”,(1997) 42, McGill Law Journal 603, 627.
510
See Angela J. Campbell, above n. 507, 714.
511
See David Ratner (3rd Ed. 1986), above n. 256, 838.
512
As earlier mentioned, in European countries, securities industries were initially overseen by self-regulatory
systems. The same can be said about the regulatory system of the US securities markets. As David Ratnerpoints out, “[w]hen Congress created the SEC in 1934, stock exchanges as private associations, had been
regulating their members for up to 140 years.” See David Ratner (3rd Ed. 1986), above n. 256, 838.
513
See Angela J Campbell, above n. 507, 715 - 717; see also Margot Priest, “The Privatisation of Regulation:
Five Models of Self-Regulation”, (1997-98) 29, Ottawa Law Review 233, 269 – 270, hereinafter, Margot
Priest; see also Frank Donnan, above n. 412, 61 – 64.
Aside from those, some other advantages of self-regulation are also mentioned in the literature e.g.
political advantages and practical advantages. For more information, see Margot Priest, above n. 513, 268-269
and 271.

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More efficiency: it is argued that technical knowledge is an essential requirement indeveloping tailored rules to regulate an industry, and that industry members often havebetter technical knowledge of the relevant subject compared to a government agency.
Therefore directly using the industry's collective expertise to regulate the industry would
be more efficient than reproducing such expertise at the governmental agency level.
More flexible: self-regulation is more flexible than governmental regulation. SROs
can easily and quickly alter rules to adapt them to changing circumstances. Having
superior knowledge of its own area, the industry will know better than a governmental
agency when a rule should be changed to assure better compliance, and how the ruleshould be altered so that it will be more tailored to the particular industry. Of course agovernmental agency can also modify rules but can only do so after obtaining necessary
political support and consensus. Furthermore, the revision of rules by governmental
agencies often has to follow specified administrative procedures. All such things are oftenvery time consuming and can slow down the revision process.
Greater incentives for compliance: for psychological reasons, self-regulation
provides greater incentives for compliance. It is often easier for industry participants toperceive rules that are developed by the industry itself than those adopted by thegovernment. Furthermore, industry participants often better understand, and are more
conscious of, the rationale and goals of regulation as well as the rules themselves, wherethese are developed by the industry.
Lower cost borne by the government: in employing a self-regulatory system, thegovernment can reduce the cost of developing and enforcing rules since this burden willbe transferred to the industry. Even where the government retains oversight functions
over a self-regulatory system, such tasks still cost the government less than if it carriedout the whole task itself.
b. Disadvantages of Self-regulation
Self-regulation, although it has numerous advantages, also has a number ofdisadvantages. These are: self-interest, 514 lack of an adequate enforcement, potential
source of monopoly conduct,515 and favoritism.516
A disadvantage frequently referred to by commentators is self-interest. It issometimes doubted whether, with self-regulation, an industry can protect the public
interest and avoid public harm. Although it might have greater expertise than thegovernment, what assurance is there that this will be used for the public interest, that theindustry will not put its own interest over the public interest? Critics are even concerned
about the likelihood that the industry will turn regulatory goals into its own goals.

514

See Angela J. Campbell, above n. 507, 717; see also Margot Priest, above n. 513, 271 - 272; see also Frank
Donnan, above n. 412, 65.
515
See Angela J. Campbell, above n. 507, 718 - 719.
516
See Margot Priest, above n. 513, 272.

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The adequacy of enforcement in self-regulation is also questioned since it isclaimed, it is very unlikely that the industry has enough power to enforce adequate
sanctions. Even when it has enough power, its willingness to impose vigorous selfenforcement is questionable.
Self-regulation even causes a concern that it might provide favorable condition for
the existence of anti-competitive conduct. In self-regulatory industries, industry members
and members of each SRO in the industry will have to reach agreement on the way to
conduct their business. However, within the industry, members are also competitors.
Having to agree on the way to conduct their business, they would no longer becompetitors.
Another problem resulting from self-regulation is said to be favoritism. Selfregulation is carried out by SROs who are very likely to be dominated by larger or longestablished firms. The regulatory policy thus might reflect the interests of such firms
rather than those of either other industry members or of the public.
In the literature, a number of other disadvantages can be found.517 And this fact
seems to make it hard to decide whether self-regulation should be employed in regulating
securities markets. As noted by Margot Priest, while discussing advantages anddisadvantages of self-regulation, 'it is difficult to fully articulate the advantages anddisadvantages of a self-regulatory system in the abstract.'518
c. What Might Actually be the Strength and Weakness of Self-regulation?
One thing that can be seen from most of the above-mentioned criticisms of selfregulation, except for that on inadequate enforcement power, is that they actually stemfrom a common concern of whether the industry will act for its own benefit to thedetriment of the public. For example, one might well argue that, if the securities industry
cannot protect public investors, if it puts its own interests over public interests, then the
public will surely refrain from investing in securities markets. Rather they will channel
their investment into a safer sector, for example: banking. In such a circumstance, thesecurities industry itself cannot survive. The securities industry thus has to develop andwell implement its self-regulatory rules to protect the public, and of course, also to help it
survive; or at least to harmonize its own interests and those of the public. Even when suchdisadvantages do exist, there must be some appropriate statutory measures to nullify
them. It should be the task of the lawmakers and legal researchers to find out suchmeasures.
Perhaps the criticism that the self-regulatory system does not have adequate powerin enforcing rules and regulations has reasonable grounds. No private organization seems
517

Such disadvantages include under-regulation, over-regulation, narrow regulatory concerns, reduction of
accountability and higher cost to the public. For further information, see Margot Priest, above n. 513, 273 274.
518
Ibid, 275.

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to hold such power adequately, even when it is provided by legislation. It appears that
only the government is able to accomplish the enforcement task properly, since apart fromhaving various ministerial agencies administering different areas, it has in its hands
necessary forces such as courts, police and army. However, it is worth noting that whether
or not the enforcement can be done properly by the government also depends on certain
subjective and objective factors, such as the willingness and the independence of therelevant government agency. The questions whether a governmental agency wants toenforce, and whether it is able to enforce, thus arise. As long as these two questions havenot been properly solved, the reality of law enforcement, even at governmental level, isalso in doubt.

II. EMPLOYING AN ADEQUATEEXPERIENCE OF THE US AND JAPANREGULATORYSYSTEM:THE

1. The US Securities Regulatory System
Initially, the regulation of the US securities markets was self-regulatory. Stockexchanges had been regulating their members' activities for more than 140 years until the
passage of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.519 That Act, for the first time, has adopted aregulatory system where self-regulation by the securities industry and professional groups
plays an important role under the oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC).
The SEC, a body acting as a public regulator, is an independent agency520 formed by
Congress.521 It might be useful to examine the legal structure of the SEC to clarify thenotion of an independent regulatory agency.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 creates the SEC as a body composed of fivecommissioners appointed by the President, with a five-year term of service. Among thefive commissioners, not more than three are to be members of the same political party.
The commissioners cannot be dismissed by the Congress, they can only be fired by the
President for good cause.522 Such a structure, as A. L. Peters contends, creates a shieldthat can protect the commissioners from the vagaries of shifting political opinion.523
The Securities Act of 1933 empowers the SEC with all three powers: rule-making,executive and judicial, that are necessary for an agency to be independent. Rule-making
powers of the SEC are prescribed in Section 19(a), the Securities Act. It reads:
519

See David L. Ratner (3rd Ed 1986), above n. 256, 838.
In the literature, the US SEC is often referred to as an independent agency. For further information, see A.
L. Peters, above n. 504, 286, 287; see also Nicole J. Ramsay, above n. 504, 281; see also Hal S. Scott, Philip A.
Wellons, above n. 504, 251.
521
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 4, 15 USC 78d (2002).
522
Ibid.
523
See A. L. Peters, above n. 504, 287.
520

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The Commission shall have authority from time to time to make,amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the provisions of this title, including rules andregulations governing registration statements and prospectuses forvarious classes of securities and issuers, and defining accounting,technical and trade terms used in this title.
The SEC further can issue rules and regulations pursuant to which a class of
securities can be added to securities that are exempted from registration.524
Executive powers of the SEC can be found in Section 19 (b), the Securities Act of1933. It reads:
For the purpose of all investigations which, in the opinion of theCommission, are necessary and proper for the enforcement of thistitle, any member of the Commission or any officer or officers
designated by it are empowered to administer oaths and affirmation,
subpoena witnesses and the production of such documentary
evidence may be required from any place in the United States or any
Territory at any designated place of hearing.
The SEC can even institute disciplinary proceedings to censure, suspend or revoke
the registration of any broker or dealer where such measures are necessary in the public
interest.525 The SEC is also vested with hearing power where necessary:
All hearings shall be public and may be held before the Commission
or an officer or officers of the Commission designated by it, andappropriate records thereof shall be kept.526
Although the independence of the SEC is laid down in the Securities Act of 1933,such independence is not always absolute and can be affected by the administrative andlegislative branches of the government under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. That is
because both the Congress and the President might have significant influence on the SEC.
Congress, although it cannot remove the SEC’s commissioners in the ordinary course, theSenate or the House of Representatives can do so through a trial or through the drastic
method of impeachment, respectively. The influence of the President derives from his/her
power in appointing the SEC's chairman and other commissioners.527

524

See Securities Act of 1933 s 3 (b) & (c), 15 USC s 77c (2002).
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 15 (b) (4), 15 USC s 78o (2002).
526
Section 21, Securities Act of 1933 s 21, 15 USC s 77u (2002).
527
See A.L. Peters, above n. 504, 286 – 288.
525

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The independence of the SEC nevertheless, is said to be extremely important in
effectively implementing the statutory scheme.528 According to A.L. Peters, the necessityof such independence stems from the SEC's tasks to protect public investors and to ensurea fair and integrated market. A.L. Peters argues that statutes governing primary andsecondary securities markets as well as the business activities of financial intermediaries
are so complex that they require a regulator with special technical knowledge andexpertise to ensure the effectiveness of the market regulation. And only independentagencies can provide such a high degree of technical expertise that enables them toadminister those complex statutes. Therefore the SEC’s independence is of significance.
In addition, the need to segregate securities regulation from the vagaries of thepolitical process is stressed by Congress. As such, the regulation of the American
securities markets carried out by a system consisting of self-regulatory organizations andan independent SEC seems to be ideal. In such a system, self-regulatory organizations
operate under the oversight of the SEC, and cooperate with the SEC to accomplish the
SEC's tasks.
A.L. Peters goes on to say that another justification for the SEC's independence isthat such independence is required to enable it, as a law enforcement agency, toinvestigate and prosecute high-ranking persons that commit fraud in securities markets. In
so-doing, the Commission need not get permission from both the executive and legislative
branches of the government, nor is it governed by these two organs.529 One might argue
that as for a trial of powerful and high ranking persons, judicial independence is enough.
Perhaps this is true, but in some specific areas such as commerce and finance that are vitalto the strength of an economy, only the regulatory agencies have enough technicalexpertise to detect fraud. To save time and speed up enforcement proceedings, which inturn, can quickly prevent further damage to the public, the independence of these agencies
is required. Such independence should ensure that investigating and prosecuting
procedures are consummated in the shortest time without interference by othergovernmental branches. This is especially important where high ranking persons are
involved. Such independence should also enable the regulatory agencies to marshal
necessary evidence quickly so that legal action can promptly be taken in the courts.
Finally A.L. Peters contends that the best justification for the SEC's independence
from either political or economic interference stems from the nature of the securities
markets. In the US markets, the collective judgments of a vast number of investors frominstitutional to individual are reflected, and the use of regulatory means that rely on aparticular political ideology and aim at achieving certain economic effects cannot
succeed. A sound regulatory means must thus ensure that the markets are free and fair. To
achieve such means, the market regulator must strike a balance between employing
regulatory constraints needed to ensure the markets' fairness and integrity and assuring

528
529

Ibid, 291 - 293.
Ibid, 291.

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reasonable freedom in such markets. According to A.L. Peters, an independent SEC canmaximally attain such a balance.530
An independent regulatory agency, although it can benefit the regulated industry,might also be a source of potential problems, especially in connection with the resolutionof inter-agency disputes. According to A. L. Peters, that is because the government cannot
simply choose one course of action over another in mediating disagreements between
independent agencies. Sometimes legislation or judicial action may be required to effectthe compromise agreements between independent agencies even though such agreements
result from their own negotiations.531 Nevertheless, it can be said that benefits generated
by the independence of a regulatory agency are still overweight compared with the
problems that might result from such independence. That can be well proven by the longterm existence of an independent SEC in the US. The American SEC has now almost
reached its 70th year of age despite criticism of its governmental over-regulation532 andeven of its existence.533
2. Japan's Securities Regulatory System: Past and Present
Japan, in contrast to the US, is a country where the public regulator over securities
markets is not independent from the government. Japan has gone through consecutive
reforms of the public regulation system overseeing securities markets. Initially an
independent agency modeled after the SEC of the US, the Japan Securities and Exchange
Commission was established in May 1948. In 1952, the Commission was consolidated
into the Financial Management Bureau, which belonged to the Ministry of Finance. Since
the role of the securities market in Japan had been increasingly important in the national
economy, a separate bureau had become much in demand. As a result, in June 1964, theSecurities Bureau was set up.534
The Securities Bureau is one of the seven internal units of the Ministry of Finance the actual regulator of Japan’s securities markets. Since its birth, the Bureau assists the
Ministry of Finance by carrying out supervisory and administrative activities over the
securities industry. Its functions are similar to those of the US Securities and Exchange
Commission, although it is not an independent regulatory agency. Such functions include(1) licensing for stock exchanges, for securities firms and for securities investment trusts;(2) supervising these exchanges and entities, as well as their business associations; (3)530

Ibid, 292 - 293.
Ibid, 288 - 289.
532
See Thomas Lee Hazen, above n. 301, 10.
533
See Jonathan R. Macey, “Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case
Study of the SEC at Sixty”, (1994) 15 Cardozo Law Review 909, 921 - 925, 933 - 936. In this article, theauthor does not specifically criticize the independence of the SEC. Rather he criticizes the SEC's obsolescencewhen the US securities industry has undergone various changes. He maintains that the existence of the SEC is
no longer required in such circumstances.
534
See Japan Securities Research Institute, above n. 398, 278 - 279.
531

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examining the securities registration; (4) establishing corporate accounting standards; (5)supervising public accountants and auditing corporations.535
The Securities and Exchange Council is another important assistant of the Ministryof Finance. The Council, established in August 1952, acts as an advisory body. It studies
problems concerning the issuance, trading and other securities transactions that arise in
the securities markets and then recommends necessary measures to the Ministry of
Finance.536
Such a public regulatory system overseeing Japanese securities markets did not
generate expected outcomes. A number of problems concerning market manipulation,
fraud and unfair trading frequently occurred. It was claimed that most of the problems
stemmed from the failures of the Ministry of Finance in enforcing securities law.537 For
this reason, a number of proposals were made to reform the public regulatory system inJapan. 538 The reform, at last, resulted in the birth of the Securities and Exchange
Surveillance Commission (SESC) in July 20, 1992, a watchdog agency independent fromthe securities market regulators. 539 It is necessary to emphasize that the Ministry of
Finance is allowed to carry out the same tasks as those of the SESC. Consequently, the
SESC has to observe what the Ministry has done in order to avoid overlaps. 540 Becauseof this fact, it is hard to say that the SESC is entirely independent from the Ministry of
Finance.
The SESC is an external bureau of the Ministry of Finance, headed by a chairman
who is, in turn, assisted by two commissioners. All are appointed by the Finance Ministerwith the approval of both Houses of the Diet. 541 Their term of service is three years andthey can only be removed from office for extraordinary reasons. The operational goals of
the Commission are to ensure the fairness and integrity of the securities market and toprotect investors. With such aims, the SESC is delegated powers by the Ministry of
Finance such as (1) criminal investigations of irregularities; (2) inspection and monitoringof securities trading including securities transactions engaged in by Japanese banks.542
The SESC, however, does not have power to take enforcement action on its own
initiative. Where evidence of violation of either the securities law or regulations is found,the SESC cannot prosecute criminal offences, nor can it impose administrative sanctions.
The SESC, in such a case, will have to make a formal accusation to the Public
Prosecutors Office or recommend administrative sanctions to the Minister of Finance. The
535

See Nicole J. Ramsay, above n. 504, 268.
See Japan Securities Research Institute, above n. 398, 281 - 282.
537
See Nicole J. Ramsay, above n. 504, 271.
538
Ibid, 281.
539
See Japan Securities Research Institute, above n. 398, 284; see also Curtis J. Milhaupt, above n. 311, 468 471.
540
See Gregory D. Ruback, above n. 505, 212.
541
See Ministry of Finance Establishment Law (Japan) Art. 10.1 & 11.1.
542
See Japan Securities Research Institute, above n. 398, 285 - 287; see also Curtis Milhaupt, above n. 311,
470.
Japanese banks have increasingly been involved in securities business recently. For further information, see
Section II, Sub-section 2, Chapter IV of this paper.
536

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Minister of Finance, pursuant to the law, must respect the recommendations of the SESC,
although the Minister does not have to act on them.543
Curtis Milhaupt, in examining the roles of the SESC, points out some weaknessesof the SESC that result from its legal structure. First, the SESC does not only lackenforcement capability where violations are found, but also lacks administrative powers.
Secondly, the SESC does not have authority to act as a rule-maker and administrative
adjudicator. Milhaupt then concludes that the SESC does not have enough independencein acting as a market oversight agency. He further contends that the success of securities
regulatory reform in Japan greatly depends on whether or not the SESC's independence issufficient. Such independence is of importance since it can enable the agency toaccomplish its tasks as a watchdog over securities markets.544
The recently revised version of the Securities and Exchange Law of Japan seems tolay down an even more complex system of public regulators over securities markets.
Public issuing can only be made after the issuer has filed a registration with the Prime
Minister.545 Persons who seek to engage in securities business also file registration with
the Prime Minister. 546 The Prime Minister is also responsible for granting theauthorization on which a securities dealers association can be founded;547 and for granting
a license on which a securities exchange can be set up. 548 This provision gives theimpression that the Japanese Prime Minister is functioning as a single market watchdog
over Japanese securities markets. However, if one scrutinizes relevant articles embodied
in the Law, one will note that the Prime Minister is not acting on his/her own but in manycases can delegate powers to another person such as the Director General of the Financial
Services Agency who, in turn, can delegate the delegated powers to the SESC.549 The
SESC has become a component of the Financial Service Agency since June 1998.550 The
involvement of the Ministry of Finance beside the Prime Minister can also be seen in theinterrogation process conducted pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Law.551

III. THE CURRENT VIETNAMESE REGULATORY SYSTEM: A DEPENDENTPUBLIC REGULATOR ACTING IN THE ABSENCE OF AN IMPORTANT
SELF-REGULATORY SYSTEM

543

Ibid (Curtis Milhaupt), 471.
Ibid, 474 - 475.
545
See Art. 4.
546
See Arts. 28-2, 28-3 & 28-4.
547
See Arts. 68 & 70.
548
See Arts. 80, 82 & 83.
549
See Art. 194 - 6.
550
See “Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission: History and Functions”,
http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/english/aboutsesc/aboutsesc01.htm, visited Sep. 13, 2001.
551
See Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 (2001 Japan), Art. 186.
544

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1. The Absence of an Important Self-Regulatory System
For the time being, Vietnam has only one securities trading center. It is located in
Ho Chi Minh City. The duties and rights of the center (and eventually of the stock
exchanges) include:
1. Organizing, managing and handling the purchase and sale ofsecurities;
2. Managing and handing the system of securities transactions;
3. Providing services that support the purchase, sale and custody of
securities;
4. Registering securities;
5. Providing clearing settlement for securities transactions;
6. Disclosing information concerning securities transactions;
7. Inspecting and policing securities transactions;
8. Collecting listing fees, membership fees, transaction fees,
information disclosure fees and other service fees as provided bylaws;
9. Implementing the reporting, statistical, accounting and auditing
regimes in conformity with State regulations.552
Although having a number of rights and duties of a management nature, the center
can hardly be deemed a self-regulatory organization. This is due to its legal structure, as
discussed in Chapter IV of this work.
Other self-regulatory organizations such as a securities dealers association or asecurities investment funds association are not yet available. The former seems to be notfeasibly, since to date, a legal basis for the operation of an OTC market has not yet been
introduced in Vietnam. The latter perhaps shares the same fate with the former sincesecurities investment funds have not yet come into existence in Vietnam.
As a self-regulatory system has been absent in the Vietnam securities industry, all
securities regulatory powers are thus vested in the SSC.

2. The SSC: Lack of Independence and being Inadequately Empowereda. The SSC Structure and Personnel

552

See Decree 48/1998, Art. 24.

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Decree 75/CP established the SSC in 1996,553 but the Commission formally cameinto existence on April 1, 1997.554 Decree 75/CP was rather simply designed, with only 6
articles, which lay down the whole legal structure as well as the functions, rights andduties of the SSC.
The SSC is a governmental agency whose functions include organizing andadministering securities and securities markets. 555 The SSC has legal personality. Its
operating expenses are funded by the state budget. Its functions include organizing andmanaging securities and securities markets.
In contrast to the US securities laws stating that the SEC is an independent agency,
not part of the president's cabinet and specifying the number of commissioners and theirterms,556 Decree 75/CP, while expressly saying that the SSC belongs to the government,does not specify a fixed number of SSC members nor does it have any article providing
the members' terms of service. It merely says that the SSC consists of a president, vicepresidents and other commissioners being deputy ministers of different ministries such as
the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Planning and Investment and theState Bank of Vietnam. The president and vice presidents are appointed and dismissed by
the Prime Minister. Other commissioners are recommended by the relevant ministries andthe State Bank of Vietnam, also to be decided by the Prime Minister.557
A notable point here is that all the commissioners of the SSC are working on a parttime basis since at the same time they hold other positions in the said ministries.
Regulating securities markets is complicated and burdensome work. With such a dualfunction, it is hard for them to accomplish their tasks adequately. In the US, thecommissioners of the SEC, under the law, cannot hold another position in any otheroffice. Pursuant to the Exchange Act:・ ・ ・ No commissioner shall engage in any other business,
vocation, or employment than that of serving as commissioner, norshall any commissioner participate, directly or indirectly, in any
stock-market operations or transactions of a character subject toregulation by the Commission pursuant to this title・・・558
This provision was clearly designed to ensure that the commissioners devote theirwhole time and expertise to their job.
553

On November 28, 1996, the Vietnamese Government signed Decree 75-CP to establish the State Securities
Commission.
554
See State Securities Commission, “Noi dung bai giang khoa dao tao ve Chung khoan va Thi truong chungkhoan” [The Contents of Lectures Delivered at a Training Session on Securities and Securities Markets]
conducted from July 27 to August 15, 1998 (This training course was held by the Chinese Hong Kong Instituteand the State Securities Commission), 196.
555
See Decree 75/CP, Art. 1.
556
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 4, 15 USC 78d.
557
See Decree 75/CP, Art. 1 and 3.
558
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 4 (a), 15 USC 78d (2002).

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b. The SSC Powers
Article 2, Decree 75/CP contains 12 sub-articles spelling out the powers and dutiesof the SSC. Such powers and duties can be classified into two groups: rule-making andadministrative powers.
b.1. Rule-making powers
Rule-making powers can be found in Sub-articles 1 and 7 of Article 2, under which
the SSC is in charge of:Drafting legal rules on securities and securities markets to submit to
the competent authority for consideration and approval; organizing
and guiding the implementation of such approved legal documents.
Issuing rules concerning listing, issuing announcements and otherinformation about securities transactions, purchase and sale;cooperating with the Ministry of Finance in establishing fees andcosts concerning the issuance and trading of securities.
To date the SSC has showed its effort in the rule-making area by issuingvoluminous documents within its powers, under the form of decisions and circulars.
These rules range from those governing securities trading centers and securities firms toothers regulating public issuance and securities transactions on secondary markets. A
number of such rules have been revised, even several times.
b.2. Administrative Powers
Administrative powers allow the SSC to act as a public regulatory agency oversecurities markets. The SSC is responsible for granting securities business licenses,
suspending and revoking such licenses where necessary, and granting securities issuinglicenses to those who desire to go public for fund raising. Such powers are laid down in
Sub-article 3, which reads:
Granting, suspending and revoking securities business licenses withrespect to securities firms, securities advising companies, securities
investment funds, fund management companies and otherorganizations that are eligible to issue securities on the securities
market.
b.2.1. Securities Business Licensing

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The SSC's power to confer a business license on those who seek to carry out
securities business seems unnecessary and goes against the freedom of doing businessentrenched in the 1992 Constitution.559 Usually, in other countries, those who seek to dosecurities business merely file registration documents with the relevant government
authority.
In Japan, a switch between registering and licensing systems has been made several
times. After the Second World War, Japan adopted a registration system for securities
companies.560 The 1965 Amendment of the Securities and Exchange Law replaced thatsystem with a licensing one. 561 At that time, the Ministry of Finance was in charge ofgranting business licenses for securities companies. 562 By this licensing system, thelawmakers hoped that unqualified broker-dealers would be excluded and the Finance
Ministry would be more powerful in administering securities firms.563
The revision of the Japan Securities and Exchange Law in 1998, however, went
back to a simple procedure of registration applied to those who desire to do securities
business.564 Under the recent revision of the Law (in 2001), this registering system has
remained intact.565 Corporations that desire to engage in securities business have to filewith the Prime Minister an application containing specified statements for registration.
Such an application must be accompanied by certain documents as provided for by thelaw.566 Where the application does not fall into the specified items that can be deemed as“Rejection of Registration”,567 the Prime Minister makes the securities company register
available for public inspection.568
A similar simple procedure to that of Japan can be seen in the US, where those whoare seeking to act as a broker or dealer are merely required to file with the SEC anapplication for registration. 569 This should be taken into account while revising thesecurities regulation of Vietnam.
559

Article 57 of the Constitution vests the freedom of doing business in Vietnamese citizens.
See Louis Loss et al (eds), above n. 261, 90.
561
Ibid, 91; see also Japan Securities Research Institute, above n. 398, 18.
562
See Louis Loss et al (eds), above n. 261, 91.
563
Ibid.
564
See Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 (1998 Japan), Art. 28. This article reads: “No person other than ajoint stock company registered with the Prime Minister shall engage in the securities business.”
565
See Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 (2001 Japan), Art. 28. The new Article 28, although it keeps theregistering system intact, is slightly altered in that it is no longer confined those who seek to do securities
business within join stock companies. This Article reads: “No person shall engage in securities businessexcept for a corporation that has registration therefore made by the Prime Minister.”
566
Ibid, Art. 28-2.
567
Ibid, Art. 28-4.
568
Ibid., Art. 28-3.
569
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 15 (b), 15 USC s 78o (2002). Section 15(b) (1) reads: “A broker ordealer may be registered by filing with the Commission an application for registration in such form andcontaining such information and documents concerning such broker or dealer and any persons associated withsuch broker or dealer as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors・・・”
560

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b.2.2. Public Offering Licensing
The Vietnam SSC even has a discretionary power in granting securities issuinglicenses under Decree 48/1998. Depending on which kind of securities will be issued, theissuer has to file different documentation with the SSC. Article 9, Decree 48/1998 gives
two separate lists of documents to be included in the application for the issuance of sharesand bonds.570 Within 45 days from the date of receipt of the application, the SSC must
grant or refuse to grant the issuing license to the applicant. When refusing to grant thelicense, the SSC has to issue a letter of explanation to the applicant.571
China used to adopt a similar approach to that of Vietnam before the passage of the
Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China. By such an approach, there wererequirements of issuing approval procedures and qualifications imposed on those whosought to make a public offering of either stocks or bonds. The future issuers had to go
through certain specified processes such as filing application documents, being examinedby the state authority, and obtaining an approval from such an authority. These provisions
were said to reflect one of the “aspects of excessive government control” under theInterim Regulations in China.572
The new Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China, passed in December
1998, however, has in part eliminated the above-mentioned difficulties. Nowadays, those
who seek to initiate public issuance of shares are no longer required to obtain the approvalof the market watchdog. Rather they are required to have their application verified by thestate authority overseeing the securities market. The current regulation reads:
Public offers of shares shall, in compliance with the conditions
provided for in the Company Law, be reported to the securities
regulatory authority under the State Council for verification. The
issuer shall submit to the said authority the application documents
prescribed in the Company Law and the relevant documents
specified by the authority.573
It is interesting that the public issuance of bonds still seems to overcome strict
control of the government. The Law further says:
The issuing of corporate bonds shall, in compliance with theconditions provided for in the Company Law, be reported to thedepartment authorized by the State Council for examination andapproval. The issuer shall submit to the department authorized by
the State Council the application documents prescribed in the
570

These lists were mentioned in Section I, Sub-section 1, Chapter II of this paper.
See Decree 48/1998, Art. 11.
572
See Jay Zhe Zhang, above n. 257, 625.
573
See Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China 1998, Art. 11, first paragraph.
571

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Company Law and the relevant document specified by the said
department.574
The new Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China more or less shows an
improvement, while Vietnam seems to have stepped in the same direction China did in
the past. The statutory discretionary power of the Vietnamese SSC might cause somefears to the public as to whether the SSC decision would be very likely to have been
affected by its own interests. This can be contrasted with the simple procedure of filing a
registration statement to the government authority adopted in many countries around theworld, including the US and Japan. The US is an example where the issuers do not haveto get an issuing license from the SEC. They merely file a registration statement with the
SEC575 and disclose specified information576 to the public in a detailed prospectus.577 The
registration statement will automatically become effective within 20 days after the filingdate.578
b.2.3. Powers over Securities Trading Centers/Stock Exchanges
Administrative powers also put the SSC in charge of establishing and dissolving
stock exchanges; and inspecting and supervising the operation of stock exchanges andother entities issuing securities or having engaged in securities business. Article 2 Subarticles 5 and 6, Decree 75/CP gives legal bases for such authority. It reads:
Reporting to the government for decision-making concerning theestablishment, suspension or dissolution of stock exchanges.
Inspecting and overseeing the activities of stock exchanges and otherrelevant organizations which engage in securities issuance andtrading and other securities services.
While expressly saying that the SSC can inspect activities engaged in by stock
exchanges and other organizations, Article 2 keeps silent on the SSC’s ability to impose
administrative disciplinary sanctions on those who are subject to the licensing authority. It
does not say whether or not the SSC has subpoena and enforcement power either, or
whether or not it can directly perform prosecutorial functions. Article 2.10 merely saysthat the Commission can:Act on its own initiative and cooperate with relevant governmental
branches in applying necessary measures to ensure that the574

Ibid, second paragraph.
See Securities Act of 1933 s 6, 15 USC s77f (2002).
576
Ibid, s 7, 15 USC s 77g.
577
Ibid, s 10, 15 USC s 77j.
578
Ibid, s 8 (a). 15 USC s 77h.
575

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operation of securities markets is effective and in accordance withthe laws.
Clearly, this provision does not tell which activities the SSC can do on its own
initiative and which should be done in coordination with other governmental agencies.
The term “necessary measures” should be explicitly explained here.
b.2.4. Sanctioning Powers
The SSC powers in imposing administrative sanctions, however, are provided for in
Article 15, Decree 22/2000. According to this article, there are two governmental
agencies in charge of imposing administrative sanctions: the Inspection Department of the
SSC and the Provincial People's Committees. The chief inspector and other inspectors of
the said Department can act on behalf of the SSC. Administrative sanctions include
warning sanctions; fines; and revocation of licenses (including issuing licenses held by
issuers, securities business licenses held by securities firms, and practicing licenses heldby securities trading staff working in securities firms). Administrative sanctions also
extend to some other measures such as confiscating all amounts earned by the violators;
and making the violators restore the safety ratio (to meet the initial stage or the statutory
requirement), revoking or correcting misinformation, and compensating damages.
Article 18, Decree 22/2000 further says that the violators must implement suchsanctions imposed by the persons in charge. Should the sanctions not be implemented,
enforcement will be carried out in conformity with Article 55, Ordinance on
Administrative Violations Settlement. Sub-article 2 of this Article say that persons who
have power to impose administrative sanctions also have power to enforce theimplementation of such sanctions. This means that the SSC does have enforcement
powers. Although the SSC powers are not as broad as those of the US SEC, they arebroader than those of the Japan SESC, since it can impose administrative sanctions and it
has enforcement capability where violations are detected and sanctions are defined.
b.2.5. Mediating Powers
An interesting provision, that cannot be found in either the US or Japan securities
laws, concerns the dispute reconciliation powers of the SSC. Decree 75/CP does not saythat the SSC has such powers but, they are provided for in Article 79, Decree 48/1998.
This article allows the SSC to act as a mediator to settle disputes concerning the issuanceand trade of securities and other securities transactions. This article reads:
Disputes arising in securities issuance and trading and securities
transactions must first be handled by negotiation and reconciliation.
Securities Trading Centers, Stock Exchanges, or the State Securities
Commission can act as a mediator in such disputes.

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However, in solving disputes, the SSC powers are merely confined to reconciling.
The SSC cannot hold an administrative hearing to determine the violation of the securities
regulations.579 Such a procedure can only be done at a court of law. Article 79 says:
If the reconciliation is not successful, parties to the dispute can bring
the dispute to an economic arbitration or to a court to be settled inaccordance with the laws.
b.2.6. Other Administrative Powers
The SSC administrative powers also allow the SSC to develop and promotesecurities markets as well as to ensure that the markets operate effectively and lawfully.
To achieve such goals, the SSC is empowered to act as follows:
Acting on its own initiative and cooperating with other relevant
ministries and governmental branches in establishing anddeveloping securities markets in Vietnam.580
Establishing and administering organizations which provide services
and assistance in securities markets.581
Training market managers, securities dealers and strengthening
their special expertise.582
Cooperating with international organizations and countries indeveloping securities markets.583
In addition, the SSC is responsible for managing its premises and personnel in
conformity with the government's provisions. It also carries out other tasks as assigned by
the government.584

579

In the US, the SEC has an entitlement to bring an action in a court of law to enjoin violation of securities
laws. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 says: “・・・it may in its discretion bring an action in the proper
district court of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, or the UnitedStates courts of any territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to enjoin such actsor practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be
granted without bond・・・”. [See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 21 (d) (1), 15 USC s 78u (2002)].
The SEC can also order an administrative hearing against persons and firms registered with it, to define
liabilities of the violator and to impose sanctions [see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ss 21B & 21C, 15 USC
ss 78u-2, 78u-3 (2002)].
580
See Decree 75-CP, Art. 2: Sub-Art. 2.
581
Ibid, Sub-Art. 4.
582
Ibid, Sub-Art. 8.
583
Ibid, Sub-Art: 9.
584
Ibid, Sub-Arts: 11 - 12.

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Some Remarks
By adopting these provisions, it is very likely that Vietnam will undergo the same
experience as Japan did before reforming its Ministry of Finance in response to thescandals. That is, having a governmental agency with a dual role: acting as a promoter
and regulator of the securities industry at the same time.585 This situation in Japan has
been criticized since it gives rise to potential conflict of interest where an agency acts asboth protector and overseer of securities regulation.586
Another similarity between the Vietnam SSC and the Japan SESC is that both lackauthority to prosecute criminal offenses. All these shortcomings might result in someconstraints to the effectiveness of the SSC work.
As earlier discussed, the effectiveness of the operation of a public regulator
depends greatly on the extent to which the regulator can act independently. This has been
proven by what happened in the US and Japan. Experience undergone by these twocountries seems to support the need for an independent public regulator. Although Japan
has not yet had a formal independent agency as the US does, the need for an independent
SESC has been discussed for years. 587 However, the situation has not been improved
much, since the Ministry of Finance does not support the Japanese-style SEC proposal.588
The Ministry does not want to narrow down its exclusive control over securities
industry.589 It desires to retain its authority over the SESC and argues that an independentagency is not necessary since the securities companies can be better monitored by alicensing system and an independent agency would be too isolated from the information
to work properly;590 that an independent agency modeled after the US SEC would notwork because of the distinguishing features of the securities industry in each country.591
It can be said that if Japan does not have an independent SESC, that is not because
an independent agency is not necessary in Japan. Of course Japanese people are also
aware of that need; however, as earlier-mentioned, the Ministry of Finance does not want
to lose its power over securities markets. The reason that led to the failure of Japan inachieving an independent regulator seems to be quite distinct. This should be aninvaluable lesson for Vietnam in seeking a suitable model for the future SSC.

IV. THE FUTURE REGULATORY SYSTEM OVER THE VIETNAMESE
SECURITIES MARKET585

See Curtis J. Milhaupt, above n. 311, 444.
Ibid.
587
Ibid, 474 - 475; see also Nicole J. Ramsay, above n. 504, 256, 268, 280.
588
Ibid, (Nicole J. Ramsay), 280.
589
Ibid.
590
See Gregory D. Ruback, above n. 505, 211 - 212.
591
See Nicole J. Ramsay, above n. 504, 280.
586

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1. A Single Public Regulator or a Self-regulatory System or a Combination of theTwo: Which Model should be chosen for the Future Regulatory System?
In the earlier discussion of advantages and disadvantages of self-regulation in the
securities industry, the literature seems to favor this form of regulation over thegovernmental one. It is generally recognized that self-regulation is a more effective way
to regulate, more flexible and adaptable to the changing demand of the market, and so on.
Yes, it seems hard to deny the advantageous aspects contributed by self-regulatoryorganizations to the regulation of securities markets. The presence of self-regulatoryorganizations in the regulatory system is thus necessary. Such a presence becomes
especially demanding where the government runs short of financial and human resources,
if the government embraces all regulatory tasks. The US had undergone such an
experience. That was during the New Deal, when the US government was unable toeffectively deal with abuse and fraud in the securities markets because of certain
constraints in financial resources and expertise. It had to rely on the strength of the
securities industry to deal with such problems.592
Many even think that government regulation gives rise to more problems than itsolves, and in many cases it did not succeed in alleviating market failure.593 Regardless ofthese criticisms, however, empirical evidence shows that securities markets do need ameasure of governmental surveillance. One might recall that the US securities markets
had been under the regulation of the private sector - the securities industry itself - formore than a hundred years before the SEC came into existence. The adoption of a public
regulator over securities business in the US is said to have stemmed from the stock
market crash of 1929 when the US government perceived the need of a market
watchdog.594
Furthermore, the whole world has observed a number of countries that have vibrantsecurities markets which used to employ a single self-regulatory system, but which havebeen moving toward adopting a similar system to that of the US, where a public regulator
is set up side-by-side with self-regulatory organizations. The UK, Germany and Canada
are examples of countries that have also adopted a public regulator after a relatively long
period of time almost employing a self-regulatory system to govern their securities
markets. The move toward a model similar to that adopted in the US can be seen in Japan,
as in Henry Laurence’s words, ‘the creation of the SESC is clear evidence that theJapanese have moved decisively, if incompletely, toward a more American style offinancial regulation.’595 This observation has recently been further confirmed by Japan.596
592

See Margot Priest, above n. 513, 268.
Judith O’Hare, “Regulation of the Securities Industry in Hong Kong: The Securities and Futures
Commission”, (1996) 6 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 1, 27.
594
See Henry Laurence, above n. 494, 658 - 659.
595
Ibid, 679.
596
The Chyunichi Shimbun released on September 20, 2000 reported that Japan is going to adopt an
independent market watchdog following the US SEC style.
593

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The choice of a regulatory system with the two components, a public regulator andself-regulatory organizations, has become dominant in vibrant securities markets in thelast few decades. All these facts have proven that when securities markets developed to acertain extent, governmental intervention is needed because the industry itself can nolonger manage the entire regulatory work. Although self-regulation has a number ofwidely perceived advantages, it sometimes cannot properly cope with frauds in markets
because of certain constraints in its enforcing capability.
On this point, one might find a contradiction since it seems that neither selfregulation nor public regulation can cope with market fraud. This is because dealing withmarket fraud is not a simple task. Mere self-regulatory organizations or public regulation
alone cannot accomplish the anti-fraud task, since the former does not properly haveenforcing capability while the latter might fall short of resources and expertise. All ofthese weaknesses of the two regulatory institutions are no longer mere assumptions, rather
they have actually been revealed in practice. However, when the two cooperate, they can
support each other, as the deficiencies of self-regulation seem to be able to be fulfilled bypublic regulation and vice versa. A combination of these two institutions into a regulatory
system can thus ensure better regulatory outcomes. Securities markets therefore require
both government oversight and that of the industry itself. The former is needed to enforce
law and regulations against and impose sanctions on market participants as well as tooversee the self-regulatory organizations. The latter is necessary to readily produce anddevelop tailored rules that are desperately required for regulating the industry whose
members often have better technical knowledge of and expertise in the regulated area than
the government agency.
From these arguments, it is advisable that Vietnam should adopt a regulatory
system with the two components: a self-regulatory system and a public regulator. In thatsystem, the public regulator would delegate a number of rule making and enforcing
activities to SROs. The public regulator could concentrate on rule-making activities at a
macro level, while SROs could focus on developing concrete rules regulating securities
industry members and listed companies, and supervising their compliance with such rules.
The public regulator would play a principal role in enforcing laws and regulations; but
SROs, while carrying out their supervising tasks, also need enforcing power to enhancemarket discipline. For example, they should have the rights to revoke membership of theirmembers and to de-list listed companies when the members or the listed companies haveviolated trading or listing rules. The public regulator should retain the power to oversee
SROs to ensure that their activities are taken in conformity with the public good.
By this way of power division, both law enforcement and the development ofregulatory rules could be strengthened. Clearly, too many tasks being accomplished by anorganization will lessen the organization’s possibility to discharge the tasks well.
However, when such assignments are reasonably divided and vested in appropriate
bodies, then the outcome should be better.

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2. What Should Constitute a Self-Regulatory System over the Vietnamese Securities
Market?
a. Stock Exchanges as Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs)
In Vietnam, when the stock exchanges are put in operation in place of the current
stock trading centers, they should also act as SROs. The law should have concrete
provisions regulating the operation of stock exchanges as SROs. Their legal structure
should resemble that of shareholder-owned corporations as discussed in Chapter V. The
SROs' rules of conduct for their members would be approved by the SSC after being open
to the public for comment. Securities firms should have their own right in deciding
whether to become members of an SRO. However, once a securities firm becomes a
member, the member would be bound by rules and regulation of the self-regulatoryexchange. Therefore memberships should be revoked by SROs where violations of suchrules and regulation are detected. This would more or less create enforcement power for
SROs, which in turn, would strengthen market discipline.
b. Other Self-Regulatory Organizations Necessary for a Healthy Market
Other SROs such as the securities dealers' association, the securities investment
fund's association, and the association of securities investment advisers are necessary
when the number of securities firms increases. The operational purposes of such
associations are to cooperate with and support each other in order to promote professional
special expertise, and to represent as well as to protect the lawful interests of theirmembers.
The legal structures of these associations should also be specified in the law. In
contrast to the stock exchanges, these associations would not take the legal form ofshareholding companies. As an association, their operating expenses would be covered bymembership fees subscribed by their own members.
Their proposed governance structure might include: (1) a members’ meeting to be
the highest decision-making body of the association; (2) an executive committee having a
specified term of service, and having duties of enforcing rules and regulations of theassociation; (3) other committees responsible for different tasks of the association such asfunctioning, advisory and so on.
The rules of these associations should also require the approval of the SSC before
taking effect. After that, they would bind the conduct of their members.
When such a system of SROs is put in operation, the SSC could delegate a numberof market oversight duties (rule-making and enforcing) to them. And in that way the SSC
workload could be reduced, which in turn would give more opportunities for the SSC toaccomplish its tasks well.
In the early days, after the national association of securities dealers comes into
existence, perhaps its legal form should resemble that of an association. In the later155

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stages, when the association has central facilities comparable to an exchange floor, andperforms broader functions which in combination are those of an exchange, then acorporate form might be a better choice.
3. An Ideal SSC
a. What Form of SSC is best for Vietnam?
In an earlier section of this chapter, the advantages of an independent agency acting
as a securities market watchdog have been analyzed in detail. It was well documented thata governmental agency, independent from political and economic ideology as in the caseof the US, is necessary to protect public investors and to ensure a free but fair andintegrated market. To achieve such goals, the regulatory agency should be able: (1) tosegregate securities regulation from the vagaries of the political process; (2) to strike abalance between employing regulatory constraints required to ensure that the market isfair and integrated, and to assure reasonable freedom in markets; (3) to acquire hightechnical knowledge and expertise necessary for administering complex statutes; and, last
but not least (4) to investigate and prosecute high ranking persons who commit fraud inmarkets. The agency would not accomplish such tasks in the absence of necessary
independence. Such an agency therefore seems to be ideal for the times since there has
been a tendency to move towards the American approach in choosing an appropriate
public regulator. Japan, the UK and Germany are countries involved in such a process.597
One commentator even recommends that the American SEC model should be adopted informing the watchdog for the EU securities markets.598
It seems hard to deny the necessity of a free, fair and integrated securities market,
and of adequate investor protection in Vietnam. It is even harder to say that such goals
could be achieved in Vietnam without an independent SSC. This is because most of thefactors that require an independent market watchdog in the US seem to exist in any
economy. The possibility of political or ideological interference, the likelihood of facing
violators who are high ranking persons, the complicated nature of statutes governing
securities markets, all are available everywhere including Vietnam. An independent
market watchdog is thus also required in Vietnam in achieving a healthy market.
Probably, the future SSC will be set up by the National Assembly acting
independently from the government. The composition of the SSC and the term of services
served by the commissioners should be clearly provided. The commissioners should notwork on a part-time basis as they are doing under the current law, since their posts are so
important and their jobs within the SSC office are so complicated. If at the same time they
are responsible for their jobs in their own ministries and for that in the SSC, there will be
no possibility for them to discharge their duties adequately.

597
598

Ibid, 656.
See Roberta S. Karmel (1999) 38, above n. 492, 34.

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b. The SSC Roles in Enforcing Securities Law
Meanwhile, the SSC has rather complete rule-making and administrative powers
but lacks a properly adjudicating power to enable it to act as an independent agency.
The SSC rule-making powers are comparable to those of the SEC in the US. The
SSC of Vietnam is even more powerful than the US SEC with its administering powers.
That is to say, the SSC has too much power in granting issuing licenses for issuers and inconferring business licenses on securities firms.
Power to grant an issuing license to issuers: this licensing power of the SSC
distinguishes Vietnam as the country where public issuance of securities is put under thestrictest control and where the regulatory body has the deepest power of interference as awatchdog. An arising question is whether with such a deep power of intervention, theSSC would be responsible to public investors if the approved issuing companies were togo bankrupt.
In practice, it is very likely that public investors find securities offering and tradingon organized trading centers very reliable, since all listed companies have gone through avery thorough screening process done and approved by the SSC. The SSC thus plays animportant role in creating public confidence in securities listed on the trading floor.
However, nowhere in the current securities regulation is it said that the SSC will be
responsible for losses incurred by public investors in the event of failure of listedcompanies. Rather, there is a provision saying that
The permission of the SSC on which an issuer can publicly issue its
securities merely means the issuance has already met statutory
requirements but does not imply that the SSC acts as a guarantor forthe security's value.599
All these things suggest that perhaps Vietnam should adopt a similar provision tothat in other countries in regulating public issuance of securities, which is to allow a
simple registration process effected by issuing companies in order to get their securities
publicly offered. By this approach, the question of the SSC responsibilities with respect topublic investors in the event of the issuing companies becoming insolvent or their security
values dropping, will be avoided. Also this can diminish the discretionary power of the
SSC in granting issuing licenses to companies that are seeking to go public.
Power to grant business license to securities firms: This power goes against the
freedom of doing business. Usually, in other countries, in order to carry out securities
business, a company that meets necessary conditions as provided for by the law will
merely have to file a registration statement with the agency in charge of overseeing
securities markets. This registration requirement should be adopted in Vietnam tosimplify the procedure companies have to go through before engaging in securities
business. Eliminating the procedure of getting permission from the SSC by securities
599

See Circular 02/2001, Part IV.4.f.

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firms is entirely constitutional, since freedom to do business has been enshrined in theConstitution since 1992.
While having ample power in administering the securities market, the SSC does nothave enough power in handling cases brought into its office except for the mediating
power. Neither does the SSC have power to prosecute criminal offenses. These shortages
in its powers will weaken the SSC’s capacity, and thus should be taken into account whenrevising the statutory provisions regulating the operation of the SSC.

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CHAPTER VII
SUGGESTIONS FOR A BETTER OPERATIONALSECURITIES MARKET IN VIETNAM

I. FEASIBLE SCHEDULE FOR LAW REFORM
Earlier discussions draw out a number of law reform tasks for lawmakers. Perhaps
it is too demanding to expect all those tasks to be consummated at one time. A feasible
schedule for accomplishing all the tasks, or how to make progress in law reform should
thus be deliberated.
Since, at the present time, both the Vietnamese people and the corporate
community are not very familiar with securities markets and their operation, the initialtask of the lawmakers is to make the market become really attractive to the public, whichis to build up public confidence over the securities market. To achieve that, strong
investor protection plays a significant role. Therefore, in the early stage of law reform, apressing issue, the assurance that public investors be well protected, should get firstpriority. An immediate task should thus be concerned with the information disclosure
regime, antifraud provisions, and then the regulation of securities professionals. Successin implementing the antifraud provisions greatly depends on the completion of theinformation disclosure regime, and on an adequate sanctioning system. That is because
typical fraudulent activities in the securities market, such as insider trading andmisinformation, can occur when the information disclosure requirements are weak, andany type of fraudulent activities can be conducted in the absence of adequate statutory
sanctions. Therefore, these areas of securities regulation should be improved in parallel.
The strengthening of the regulation of market participants and conflicts of interest
amongst them should be the following step.
At a later stage, when the number of listed companies and that of securities firms
are enriched, perhaps institutional reform is required. It might be the right time then to
redefine the legal structure for the current securities trading center and the planned stock
exchanges in order to foster an effective market. That is, to diversify the ownership ofstock exchanges, which, in turn, would give them a new form of governance and create
more opportunity for them to raise funds from the public. New decision making
mechanisms and potential financial capability generated by the new legal form of
exchange market, corporate form, would allow the exchange market to cope with anincreasingly competitive securities business environment.
Last but not least is to design an appropriate regulatory system to oversee market
operation, and to adequately enforce law and regulation. This final step is very important,since in the absence of a strong regulatory apparatus over the market, even if laws andregulations are complete, there seems to be no means to ensure that such laws andregulations are actually implemented.

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All these law reform activities would contribute to the attainment of a fair, effective
and disciplinary market. Following are concrete law reform activities that should be taken
to achieve a well operational securities market in Vietnam.

II. ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A FUTURE INFORMATIONDISCLOSURE REGIME
1. Future Disclosure Requirements applying to those who make a Public Offeringand to Listed Companies
Concerning the information disclosure regime applying to those who make a public
offering (public issuers), and to listed companies, the following issues need to be taken
into consideration.
First, concrete guidance and a unique form designed for information disclosure by
public issuers and listed companies should be created. It is the lack of such guidelines thathas partly led to failures in compliance with the current regulation. Furthermore,educational measures are also important to the success of the implementation of theinformation disclosure regulation. This is to ensure that information disclosure staff inindividual companies are well trained, so that they are able to discharge their disclosure
duties skillfully.
Secondly, there should be more helpful ways in which public investors can accesscompany information. Some possible ways include: (1) securities firms shall directly
furnish relevant information with an individual investor who shows interest in a relevant
security; (2) the issuers shall make information available at their offices for public access;(3) the SSC or securities trading centers shall create a web site (containing all required
information of listed companies and of those seeking to go public) providing free accessfor public; and (4) a computer network among securities trading center, listed companies
and securities firms shall be connected.
Thirdly, the Enterprise Act should explicitly require companies to furnish company
information including a resume of the financial statement, to shareholders before ageneral shareholders’ meeting. This will help shareholders of the companies makeinformed and prudent decisions at the meeting.
Finally, information disclosure requirements in tender offers should be
strengthened: (1) the revised version should clearly prescribe what information is required
to be reported, and to whom such information should be reported; and (2) it should also
impose disclosure duties on any group of people who purchase, in collusion, more than
5% of voting shares of an issuer.

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2. New Information Disclosure Regime governing those Whose Securities Offerings
Do not Fall into the Purview of the “Public Offering” and Non-listed Companies
Since the number of non-public-offering companies and that of companies whose
securities are traded outside a formal trading center are large, the absence of information
disclosure requirements imposed on these companies has become a real threat to theinvestment safety of the public.
A legal framework for the operation of the OTC market with a comprehensive
information disclosure regulation is thus urgently required. Such a regulation should
embrace a disclosure regime, which is composed of offering disclosure and continuous
disclosure requirements. Only when such a regime comes into existence can the abovementioned threat be eliminated in part and the market gain more investor confidence.
3. The Need for Comparable Accounting Standards and Adequate Auditing
Regulation
Accounting rules and accounting practice are decisive to the quality of information
disclosed by companies. Only when a good system of accounting rules are adopted andaccounting practice is performed in conformity with such rules, can information disclosed
by companies be said to be reliable and useful to the public. Then the securities market
can really attract public investors. A deliberate revision of the current accounting
regulation of Vietnam is thus required to ensure that accounting rules adequately support
the implementation of the future regulation of information disclosure.
The quality of disclosed information, however, is not only dependent on accounting
rules but also on accounting practice. Merely having good accounting rules does not
ensure that such rules will be followed by companies. It is hard for companies to follow
rules and regulations strictly in the absence of a review system. Auditing work is thus ofimportance in attaining such a goal. In other words, to ensure that disclosed information isof good quality, corporate accounting books should be audited by independent auditors,
and all accounting and auditing practices should be overseen by a supervisory body.
The Enterprise Act merely requires independent auditing with respect to a numberof shareholding companies.600 Such a provision might give opportunities for officers of
the remaining companies to commit fraud. Auditing by independent auditors should thus
be required of all shareholding companies. The frequency of such auditing can be defined
depending on the company size. Large companies should face auditing work more often
then small ones.
A body in charge of overseeing accounting and auditing practices should be set up
and work under the supervision of and report to the SSC.

600

For the discussion of auditing regulation and which companies have been required to submit to independent
auditing under the current law, see Chapter II, Section II, Sub-section 2 of this paper.

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4. Answers to the Practical Problems of Non-Compliance with the Current
Disclosure Regime
a. A Call for a New Enforcement Mechanism
An adequate legal basis for the enforcement of an information disclosure regime
should be created. The current securities regulation lacks adequate provisions to enforce
the regulation of information disclosure. With a low level of sanctions - merely
administrative sanctions- against violations, non-compliance with the current information
disclosure regime in particular, and the securities regulations in general, is obvious.
Criminal sanctions are thus urgently demanded to ensure that the disclosure regime will
be strictly followed.
b. Remedies for Hesitancy of Trading-Center-Ready Companies
To eliminate or at least to mitigate the negative attitude of bourse-ready companies
towards going public to raise funds:
First, the Revised Enterprise Act should impose information disclosure duties on all
the big shareholding companies (whose number of shareholders and amount of equity
capital are large) regardless of whether they are listed or not. Companies whose shares’
price quotations are frequently published should also be subject to disclosure duties.
Secondly, the government should use its voting rights as a controlling shareholder
to drive equitized enterprises on to the trading floor.
Finally, educational measures could be employed to equip the public, including thecorporate community and investors, with knowledge of (1) the benefits companies canattain by becoming listed companies; and (2) the benefits generated to the public investors
by transparent disclosure by listed companies.

III. STRENGTHENING THE ANTI-FRAUD REGULATION
1. Future Antifraud Regulation and Enforcement Mechanism
a. New Regulation of Short-swing Trading
The future regulation of insider trading needs concrete provisions to:(1) Impose reporting duties on any persons who, by the acquisition of shares, becomelarge shareholders, and on company insiders having purchases and sales of shares.
(2) Define the point of time such duties should be discharged: that is, at the time theacquisition occurs and at the end of the month the purchasing or selling transactions
are effected.

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter VII(3) Specify a concrete period of time within which a purchase and its matching sale,generating profits to the company insider, can be deemed as constituting short-swing
trading.
(4) Create a legal basis on which a company can confiscate short-swing profits when thepurchase and sale are made within a short period of time, as specified by the law.
(5) Last but not least, lay down a legal basis for derivative suits to enable shareholders to
institute proceedings against directors or large shareholders when wrong-doing is
detected.
b. New Legal Basis for Stabilizing Activities
A legal basis for stabilization of market price should be taken into consideration to
enable participants in a securities distribution to employ necessary measures to preventand to retard falling trend of securities’ prices during a public offering, or to avoid risk tothem (the underwriters). New statutory provisions are thus required to distinguish bidding
and purchasing activities done by securities distributors to induce others to purchase the
distributing securities with activities that are actually done to stabilize the securities priceto ensure safety to underwriters of the offering securities.
As for the repurchase of outstanding shares by companies, for the time being, thelaw merely requires share buyback to be approved by the general shareholders’ meetingand then by the SSC or the relevant securities trading center. No statutory provisions
prescribe the criteria a company has to meet to realize the proposal of share buyback.
There should be provisions laying down the limits concerning the time at which sharebuybacks can be effected, and the maximum price at which companies can repurchasetheir shares. This is of importance to avoid situations where a company can manipulate its
share price.
c. Prohibition of Omissions of Material Information
A mere prohibition of false statements is not enough to avoid public investors being
misled. The proscription of the omission of information is thus required since a true
statement does not always mean a full statement.
Furthermore, the forbiddance of misinformation that merely applies to limitedgroups of persons will not ensure good outcomes for the securities regulations. Such aprohibition should be applied to other potential persons (e.g. securities trading centers,
appraisal agencies, law firms and accounting firms) to eliminate possibilities where they
can commit fraud.

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d. New Legal Bases for Rights of Action and for Sanctions against Violations
d.1. Rights of action
At present, in order to seek legal action against wrongdoers that do not fall within
the purview of administrative violations, investors have to rely on the general provision of
the Ordinance on Procedure for Settlement of Civil Disputes. Nothing in the securities
regulation explicitly vests the right in investors to sue the securities law offenders toprotect themselves. Only the rights of individuals to make accusations regarding
administrative violations to the competent state authorities are stipulated. Accordingly,
other violations not of an administrative nature cannot be accused by individuals since thesecurities regulation does not give a legal basis for doing so. Concrete provisions
concerning private right of action should thus be created so as to build up the faith ofinvestors in that where necessary, they are entitled to sue in court to protect their lawfulinterests.
The Enterprise Act also needs concrete articles providing for class and derivative
actions to ensure that company shareholders have adequate legal remedies to protect theirown interests as well as those of the company.
In the absence of concrete provisions stipulating such rights of action, it will taketime and also energy for courts to define fairness while hearing a case.
In contrast to a suit instituted by a private action or class action, in a derivative suit,the plaintiff will not receive any compensation even if he/she eventually defeats thedefendant. High court fees will thus minimize the number of derivative suits brought tocourt. To cope with this problem, reasonable court fees should be adopted.
d.2. Statutory Sanctions for Violations
The securities regulation merely sets out the levels of sanction to be borne byviolators. Depending on the nature of the violation and the extent to which the securities
regulation are breached, then disciplinary, administrative, criminal, and civil sanctions
can be imposed on the violator. However, apart from administrative sanctions, theconcrete levels of disciplinary, civil, and criminal sanctions are not yet provided.
Provisions concerning adequate criminal sanctions, a fine system, as well as propercompensations for damages caused by fraud, should be created to enable the securities
regulation to be well enforced.
As long as public confidence in a securities market is maintained, the market can
attract customers. Failure in doing so will result in an ineffective market that go against
the goal of Vietnam in creating a market place where capital demands can be increasingly
and widely met to support the economic development of the country.

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2. New Supporting Instruments for a Future Market
a. Margin Trading should be allowed Within a Certain Threshold
It seems to be an over-regulated provision when totally prohibiting the purchase of
securities on margin instead of setting a margin on which investors can purchasesecurities for speculation. Possibly a certain percentage of credit extending for thepurchase of securities should be stipulated to enable margin transactions that have been
deemed helpful for the creation of healthy markets.
b. Short Sale should not be totally prohibited
This activity is also over-regulated since it is definitely prohibited under the current
regulation. The future regulation should make a distinction between short selling done bycompany insiders and that done by other persons. It should also embody a distinction
between a short sale consummated when the price is falling and that effected when theprice is increasing. And possibly short sales should only be prohibited (1) when suchtransactions are effected by company insiders, or (2) where there is a falling trend in theprice of the relevant securities.
3. Eliminating Technical Deficiencies
A general lack of definitions of a number of significant terms employed in the antifraud regulation will make it hard to avoid the committing of fraud. Thus, each prohibited
activity should be well defined when revising the regulation.
Inconsistencies in the use of legal terms in different legal texts that constitute theanti-fraud regulation are other obstacles to ensuring that the securities regulation will bewell enforced. This should also be avoided so as to enhance the effect of the regulation.

IV.
COMPLETINGPROFESSIONALS

FUTUREREGULATIONOF

SECURITIES

1. Conflicts of Interest Issues
Since the regulation of conflicts of interest between securities firms and theircustomers is of importance in creating public confidence in securities markets, concrete
provisions spelling out duties of securities firms in relation to their customers to avoid
conflicts of interest between them are thus required.
Merely defining the duty of securities firms to find out the financial situation andinvestment purposes of their customers is not enough. The provision should be moredetailed so as to require securities firms to obtain such information before recommending165

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Chapter VIIa type of security, so that they can ensure that the recommended security is suitable to acustomer's needs and financial conditions.
Other provisions essential to insert in the regulation include: a provision, which
imposes duties on securities firms to investigate the nature and risk of the securities they
are going to recommend to their customers; a provision on which securities firms must
disclose their conflicts of interest to their customers (that they have interests in the
security they recommend the customer to purchase; or whether they act as a broker or adealer in the relevant transaction); and a provision to prohibit securities firms fromengaging in excessive trading of securities for the sake of getting more commission from
customers; and from overcharging customers when providing services.
2. Banks and the Securities Market
As earlier discussed, regulation of the involvement of banks in the securities market
in Vietnam is rather strict. In the future, such a market should be more open to banks.
Less risky securities activities such as brokerage, investment consultancy and securities
portfolio management are quite suitable for banks to carry out directly. The presence ofbanks in the securities market, even within these business areas, would widen the market
participants and also strengthen competitive force in the market, which in turn would
promote the development of the market. And it also expands the business environment forbanks.
For the sake of the banking system, other highly risky business activities such as
underwriting and dealing in securities should probably be left for banks' securities
subsidiaries.
3. Banks and their Securities Subsidiaries.
Since banks should be permitted to set up their own securities subsidiaries to carryout underwriting and dealing activities. Both banks and their subsidiaries should be
subject to a number of criteria specified by the law to avoid risks in doing business. Suchcriteria should cover bank's capital, assets and state of management. After setting up a
subsidiary, a further requirement needed is that the capital of a bank and that of its
subsidiary should be clearly distinguished. In addition, permissible activities for banks’subsidiaries should be clearly specified in order to avoid risks for their parent banks.

V. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
1. A Desirable Model for Future Exchange Markets
State-owned entities in general, and state-owned stock exchanges in particular, haveshown to be inefficient in practice. The mutual form of stock exchanges has recently

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exposed weaknesses. Defining an accurate form for the current securities trading centers
and the planned stock exchanges is thus of importance. The shortest and most economic
way to achieve such a goal may be to learn from overseas experience. And that would
mean adopting a shareholders-ownership structure for stock exchanges.
In such a legal form, stock exchanges themselves are shareholding companies
having their shares listed on their own trading floors and having outstanding shares heldby the public. The exchange would be governed by a management board and a director.
The highest decision-making body of the exchange would be the general shareholders’meeting. The exchanges, after being formed by the SSC in conformity with the securities
law, should also be subject to the Enterprise Act as are other shareholding companies.
The SSC should retain supervising power over the compliance of stock exchanges, withlisting standards and trading rules, so that conflicts of interest that might occur whenstock exchanges are in charge of enforcing listing rules against themselves will no longer
be a matter of concern for the public.
To cope with the threat of mergers to stock exchanges, the following twoalternatives can be chosen: (1) the state should hold a controlling block of shares in suchexchanges and act as a shareholder having rights and duties corresponding to its equity
ownership; or (2) where the state is not a controlling shareholder of stock exchanges: (a)the law should put some limit on the maximum equity that can be held by eachshareholder of a stock exchange; or (b) all takeovers and mergers among stock exchanges
should be required to get approval from the government before they can actually beeffected.
2. An ideal SSC
a. The Form of a Future SSC
The future SSC should be set up by the National Assembly as an agency
independent from the government. The composition of the SSC and the term of services
served by the commissioners should be clearly prescribed in the law. Part-timecommissioners should be avoided since the tasks of the commissioners working in the
SSC office are very onerous and complicated. If at the same time they are responsible for
their tasks in their own ministries and for these in the SSC, there will be no possibility forthem adequately to discharge their duties.
b. The SSC's Powers in the Future
Meanwhile, the SSC as it now exists has rather complete rule-making powers,
which are comparable to those of the US SEC. Its administrative powers are even broader
than those possessed by that body. However, it lacks a properly adjudicating power toenable it to act as an independent agency.

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It can be said that the SSC has too many powers in granting an issuing license for
issuing companies and in conferring a business license on securities firms. Since Vietnam
adopts a licensing system rather than a registration system for public offerings of
securities, the SSC might be expected to be responsible for the securities being issued on
the approval of the SSC. That is because such an approval seems to give a guarantee forvalue of the approved securities. This could put the SSC in a deadlock situation as inpractice it cannot bear all such liabilities.
All these things suggest that Vietnam should adopt a similar provision with that inalmost all other countries in regulating public offering of securities. That is, to allow a
simple registration process by issuing companies in order to get their securities publicly
offered. This approach would eliminate the SSC responsibilities with respect to public
investors in the event of the issuing companies become insolvent or the values of theirsecurities dropping. It would also diminish public concern about the discretionary powerof the SSC in granting issuing license.
The elimination of the SSC's power to grant business licenses to securities firms is
also required since this power goes against the freedom of doing business entrenched in
the Constitution. A simple registration procedure for those who seek to carry out
securities business should thus be adopted in Vietnam.
In contrast to administrative power, dispute resolution power of the SSC is atpresent merely confined to reconciliation. The SSC is not able to adjudicate disputes
brought into its office, which is of importance in ensuring its independence, which is vitalin order to administer the market effectively.
The SSC does not have powers to prosecute criminal offenses. This shortcoming in
its powers will weaken the SSC’s capacity, and thus should be taken into account whenrevising the relevant statutory provisions.
3. The Need for a Self-Regulatory System
A self-regulatory system in Vietnam should consist of stock exchanges and someother associations of securities professionals. The latter might include a securities dealers
association, a fund management companies association, and an investment consultancy
companies association.
The law should thus include concrete provisions regulating the formation andoperation of these SROs. Their legal structures should resemble that of a stock
corporation in the case of stock exchanges, or of an association in the case of others. The
SROs’ rules should be approved by the SSC after being open to the public for comments.
The membership of these SROs should be subject to the initiative of securities firms.
However, after becoming a member, the member would be bound by rules and regulationof the relevant SRO. The SROs should be able to revoke membership once a member isfound breaching SRO rules. This is of importance in enhancing market discipline.
With such a regulatory system, the SROs can utilize their strength in developing
tailored rules governing industry members and listed companies, while the SSC's

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workload can be reduced by switching a number of rule making and enforcing duties to
the SROs. This would enable the SSC to concentrate rather on macro issues, and give
more opportunities for the SSC adequately to accomplish its tasks. The SSC, however,should retain powers to oversee these SROs, to ensure that they act in conformity withrules and regulations, especially when they themselves are also legal entities competingwith one another.

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APPENDIXCREATING A FAVORABLE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT SURROUNDING
SECURITIES REGULATIONSFOR THE FUTURE SECURITIES MARKET

Professor Louis Loss, in “Fundamentals of Securities Regulation”, points out:
securities regulation is like “an amalgam of everything from contracts and torts tocorporations and international law, it is difficult to draw precise boundary lines aroundthe subject matter.”601 Therefore, it seems proper and necessary for our present study toanalyze the operation of securities markets in a broad legal environment in which many
aspects - from the constitution, enterprise law, tax law and foreign investment law to civil
law and criminal law - will be discussed. The discussion will seek out statutory
deficiencies that need to be eliminated in order to create a really supportive legal
environment that will make possible a vibrant securities market in Vietnam.

I. RELEVANT LAWS CONCERNING THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIESMARKET IN VIETNAM
1. The Constitution
Although the economic reform was introduced in 1986, the supreme legal basis thatstrongly supports such a reform only came into existence in 1992, when the newConstitution was passed. Its passage by the National Assembly has given strongest legal
foundation for the long term existence of a multi-component commodity economy.
Article 15 reads:
The State promotes a multi-component commodity economy modeled
on a socialist-oriented market mechanism functioning under state
management. The multi-component economic structure withdiversified forms of production and trading organizations is basedon a regime recognizing the whole people ownership, collective
ownership, and private ownership. Among them, the whole people
ownership and collective ownership constitute the foundation.
Recently the Constitution was revised602 and this Article was altered. Recognition of themulti-sectoral economy has remained and has been strengthened. The Article has further
601

See Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, (1988), 72.
On December 25, 2001 the Vietnamese National Assembly passed “The Resolution on the Amendments ofand the Additions to a Number of Articles of the 1992 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”.

602

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been developed compared with its old version to ascertain a strong will of theGovernment in developing the economy as well as in industrializing and modernizing thecountry. The revised Article 15 reads:
The State shall build up an independent and autonomic economy,
based on the promotion of internal forces and of international
economic integration; the State shall accomplish theindustrialization and modernization of the country.
The State shall consistently implement a policy on the development ofa socialist-oriented market economy. That is a multi-sectoral
economy having diversified forms of production and trade. Suchforms should be based on whole people ownership, on collective andprivate ownerships. Among them, the whole people ownership andcollective ownership constitute the foundation.
The Constitution has also created fundamental principles for the operation of the
newly emerging market economy, such as freedom to do business,603 and equality before
the law of all business entities regardless of what economic sector they may belong to.604
The state also recognizes the diversification of economic sectors and protects lawful
ownership of individuals and entities doing business.605 The legalized economic sectors
are to include the state, cooperatives, private business and that of private capitalists (kinhte tu ban tu nhan). The recent revision of the Constitution further legalizes one more typeof economic sector, namely that of small shopkeepers (kinh te tieu chu).606
These supreme principles once again reflect the government policy of promoting a
multi-sectoral economy, an important criterion for the establishment of securities markets.
Such policy has also been embedded in various laws governing the Vietnam economic
system such as enterprise law, banking law, foreign investment law, and tax laws.

2. The Enterprise Law
Enterprise law is closely connected with securities regulation, for example: the way
in which a company can raise capital; duties of a company in raising funds from the603

See Art. 57. This Article reads: “Citizens have a freedom to do business”.
See Art. 22. This Article reads:“Production and trade entities that belong to any economic sector shall fully discharge their duties with
the State. They shall be equal before the law. Their capital and lawful properties will receive protection fromthe State.
Enterprises that belong to any economic sector are eligible to establish joint-ventures, and to associatewith other individuals, and domestic and foreign economic organizations in conformity with laws andregulations.”
605
See Arts. 19 - 23, 25 and 58.
606
See the Revised Article 21.
604

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public; rights of a company in reducing capital (share buyback), and so on. Enterprise law
thus has a crucial impact on the effectiveness of a securities market.
In practice, securities markets have a longer history than that of securities law. Thismeans that law was a consequential product following the securities markets, created bylawmakers where they found it necessary to put some statutory constraints over market
transactions. However, in Vietnam, one might say that the securities market is a “product”
of law. Is this true? If we look for a securities market by seeking an organized stock
exchange, then the answer will be “yes”. That is because we have witnessed thegovernment's efforts in preparing a legal framework for the birth of the first Stock
Trading Center in Ho Chi Minh City. However, if we take the view that the presence ofany securities transaction being conducted can be deemed as a proof of the existence of asecurities market, then the answer may be “no”.
As mentioned in Chapter I of this paper, the legal recognition of shareholding
companies has been in existence since 1990 when the Company Act607 was passed.
Consequently, securities markets, in theory, must also have existed since then to enable
the establishment of such a new form of company. From 1990 to 1997, however, aseparate securities regulation had not been available. In the absence of such a regulation,
the Company Act was clearly expected to more or less cover securities transactions.
However, the Company Act merely provided for some fundamental principles such as:company members' equity ownership;608 members' right in transferring subscribed capitalor shares;609 limited liability of company members;610 and a simple company management
structure.611 Many areas concerning securities regulation were left open, such as: anadequate information disclosure when a company goes public for capital raising;necessary limits on the right of members of management boards and directors in engaging
in securities transactions; disclosure of equity ownership of such members, directors andcontrolling shareholders; the minimum length of time for which company incorporators
are required to hold shares; the transfer of equity ownership where such equity was
subscribed in the form of immovable assets; the distinction between private and public
offerings, and so on.612
In addition, some prohibitions under the Act even caused difficulties to companies
in raising funds for business development. For example, limited liability companies wereforbidden from issuing any kind of securities.613
607

In Vietnam, each type of enterprise is regulated by a different law. In terms of their ownership, enterprises
fall into four categories: (1) state-owned enterprises, (2) foreign invested enterprises, (3) cooperative
enterprises, and (4) privately owned enterprises. They are subject to the State Enterprise Act, Foreign
Investment Act, Cooperative Act, and Enterprise Act, respectively.
608
See Arts. 5 & 8.
609
See Arts. 25.2 & 30.4.
610
See Art. 2.
611
See Arts. 27, 28, & 37 - 41.
612
For further information, see Section III, Sub-section 1, Chapter I of this paper.
613
See Art. 25.1.

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Only in 1998 was a separate securities regulation adopted - under the form of agovernmental legal document, Decree 48/1998. Two years later, in January 2000, the1990 Company Act was also replaced by the Enterprise Act.614
The Enterprise Act was said to represent a big step forward that Vietnam was
making toward general standards of corporate laws comparable to those in most of thedeveloped economies. 615 This Act introduced a number of new concepts, such as
corporate governance,616 company disclosure,617 and minority shareholder protection.618
Furthermore, by permitting companies to issue securities,619 by recognizing shareholders'
rights and obligations in offering, selling and purchasing shares620 and so on, the Act, tosome extent, shows its cooperation with Decree 48/1998 in regulating securities markets.
However, the Enterprise Act, once again, does not clarify private and public offerings,
while clearly saying that the offering and issuing of securities by shareholding companies
will be subject to securities regulation621 (the term "securities regulation" covers Decree
48/1998 and other relevant legal documents guiding the implementation of this Decree). It
should be emphasized that the current securities regulation only covers public offerings.
Private offerings, consequently, are not subject either to the Enterprise Act or to thecurrent securities regulation. This is surely a matter of great concern for investors inprivate offerings.
Furthermore, although the regulation of information disclosure was inserted in theEnterprise Act, such regulation is too rudimentary and merely gives some generalprinciples concerning shareholding companies' duties in disclosing information on anannual basis. This issue has already been discussed in depth in Chapter II of this paper.
3. State Enterprise Law
State enterprise law may appear to have no connection with the securities
regulation, since it regulates a kind of enterprises having capital subsidized from the statebudget. However, some issues concerning the rights of state enterprises in raising funds
and using their capital under the State Enterprise Act (Luat doanh nghiep Nha nuoc) areconsidered appropriate for discussion here.
Pursuant to the law, state enterprises can raise funds by issuing bonds and shares,
and by borrowing from banks and elsewhere, provided that the ownership of suchenterprises is not converted into another kind of ownership by way of capital614

As earlier mentioned, the Enterprise Act was passed in 1999. On January 1, 2000, it came into force andreplaced the 1990 Company Act and Private Enterprise Act.
615
See: “Vietnam”, APECA Press Release, http://apecsec.org.sg/whatsnew/press/rel52_99.html;
see also “Obstacles Ahead for Lauded Vietnam Business Law”,
http://vinsight.superb.net/1999news/1217.html, visited Dec. 23, 2001.
616
See Arts. 34, 49, 69, 97 & 101.
617
See Arts. 20, 21, 53 & 93.
618
See Arts. 31, 20, 21, 23 & 93.
619
See Art. 51.2.
620
See Arts. 53 & 64.
621
See Art. 61.4.

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mobilization.622 This provision is, by itself confusing, since once a state enterprise has
issued shares, part of its ownership would be transferred to shareholders under Article 2.1
Decree 48/1998.623 Consequently, the enterprise ownership would no longer be a purestate-ownership, but rather be converted into another form, private ownership, and theenterprise itself would become a shareholding company.
The State Enterprise Act does not have a single article saying that state enterprises
can transfer their capital. Article 7.h merely allows state enterprises to use capital “toinvest in, to join up or cooperate with, and to subscribe equity to other enterprises inconformity with the law.”
However, owing to socio-economic circumstances which have changed since thepassage of the State Enterprise Act, the Government's intention to equitize a number ofstate enterprises has been implemented on a large scale since May 1996 by the issuance ofDecree 28/CP.624 This Decree was replaced by Decree 44/1998, which in turn has
recently been again repealed by Decree 64/2002.
The legal recognition of the equitization of state enterprises means that the transfer
of capital in such enterprises is permitted. It has been roughly estimated that by 31
December 2000, the number of state enterprises throughout Vietnam that had been
equitized was 532. In the year 2000 alone, 188 out of 692 state enterprises were equitizedor had their ownership converted into other forms, which accounts for 27.2% of thetarget.625 Pursuant to Article 1.2, the Enterprise Act, the newly formed shareholding
companies after being equalized, are to be subject to the Enterprise Act. This Article wasinserted in the Act since the lawmakers hoped that it would promote the equitization
process of state enterprises, improving their management and facilitating the formation of
securities markets in Vietnam.626
Title to the shares can be sold to any economic organization or individual. Where
such transactions involve foreign investors (including individuals and entities) they mustbe subject to some statutory restrictions. Under Article 2, Decision 145/1999,627 foreign
investors can only purchase shares from state enterprises operating in 12 business areas as622

See The State Enterprise Act, Art. 8.1.b; see also Art. 1.3, Decree 27/1999/ND-CP dated 20 April 1999,
revising Decree 59/CP dated 3 October 1996 promulgating the “Regulation of Financial Management andBusiness Accounting in State-Owned Enterprises”.
623
This Article reads “Securities are certificates or book-entry records, certifying eligible ownership ofsecurity holders with respect to the asset or capital of the issuer・・・”
624
Art. 1, Decree 28/CP set out two goals of the equitization program. The first is to mobilize savings fromenterprises’ employees, from individuals and economic organizations inside and outside Vietnam to modernize
technology and promote enterprises’ development. The second is to create opportunities for enterprise
employees and others to become enterprise owners, which, in turn, is expected to foster more effective
business performance by the equitized enterprises.
625
See: Minh Huong, “Tinh hinh CPH DNNN nam 2000 & cac bien phap trong thoi gian toi” [TheEquitization of State-Owned Enterprises in the Year 2000 and Necessary Measures in the Coming Time],Thong tin Tai chinh [Financial Bulletin] 28, (1/2001) (Iss. 1+2), 28.
626
See “Enterprise Law Passed, May 1999”, Trade Information Center,
http://infoserv2.ita.doc.gov/apweb.n, visited March 20, 2001.
627
The full name of this legal document is Decision 145/1999/QD-TTg, issued on June 28, 1999 by the Prime
Minister, promulgating “The Regulation of the Sale of Shares to Foreign Investors”.

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provided in the Appendix of Decision 145/1999. Furthermore, according to Article 6,
Decision 145/1999, the total value of shares sold to foreign investors must not exceed
30% of charter capital of the issuing company.
However, according to Article 1, Decision 139/1999, 628 foreign entities andforeigners can maximally hold 20% of the total outstanding shares of one issuer. Any one
foreign entity and any one foreigner can own, at most, 7% and 3% of the said shares,
respectively.629 It is very likely that the total shares of a company held by foreign
investors could satisfy the requirement under Article 6 of Decision 145/1999 (not toexceed 30% of company charter capital) but not meet the requirement under Article 1,
Decision 139/1999 (not to exceed 20% of total outstanding shares of the company). In
such a case, if the company meets all statutory requirements for listing its shares on asecurities trading center, then it is unclear whether or not the company has to buy back theexcessive amount held by foreign investors. Article 6, Circular 01/1999630 says only that,in such a case, the foreign investors "are only allowed to sell shares". This might beconstrued as meaning that what the investors can do is to sell their securities, not to buy
more securities. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that they must sell theirshares to meet the ratio provided for in Article 1, Decision 139/1999.
The recently released Decree 64/2002 says that foreign investors can purchaseshares of an equitized enterprise, provided that the total value of the purchased shares
does not exceed 30% of the charter capital of the equitized enterprise operating inspecified areas as defined by the government.631 Thus Decree 64/2002 does not make anychange to the ceiling limit on the amount of shares purchased by foreign investors asprovided in Decision 145/1999. The above-mentioned problem therefore remains intact.
It can generally be said that the legal permission under which state enterprises canbe converted into other form of ownership, and can go public to raise capital, will actively
promote the development of the securities market, since it provides the market with morecommodities. However, whether such a permission results in positive impact on themarket depends on a number of factors. The above-mentioned statutory uncertainties, forexample, can be hurdles on the way to converting state enterprises into other ownershipforms.
4. Banking law
The Credit Institutions Act permits the establishment of shareholding credit
institutions including shareholding banks, shareholding financial companies andshareholding financial leasing companies.632 When such shareholding companies are628

The full name of this legal document is Decision 139/1999/QD-TTg, issued on June 10, 1999 by the Prime
Minister, promulgating “The Regulation of the Proportion of Foreign Ownership in Vietnamese Securities
Markets”.
629
Those figures apply to any circumstance regardless of which economic sector the issuer belongs to.
630
The full name of this document is Circular 01/1999/TT-UBCK1, dated December 30, 1999, guiding theimplementation of Decision 139/1999.
631
See Art. 5, paragraph 2.
632
See Art. 12.

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formed or raise more funds during their lifetime, then they actively participate insecurities markets as issuers.
The Act, while recognizing shareholding credit institutions, is silent on a number ofissues concerning the issuance and transfer of shares by credit institutions and concerning
the rights and duties of shareholders of credit institutions. It does not even say that theissuance of shares by credit institutions has to be subject to securities regulations. Only inthe year 2000, three years after the passage of the Credit Institutions Act, was agovernmental level legal document, Decree 49/2000,633 passed where by these legal
loopholes were eliminated. This Decree explicitly gives legal basis for the issuance ofshares by commercial banks. Sub-articles 2 and 3 of Article 43 read:
2. The issuance of shares shall be done in conformity with the State
Bank’s rules.
3. The issuance of shares to the public and through the securities
market shall be done in accordance with the regulations of
securities and the securities market.
Credit institutions can act as investors, since the Act allows them to use their charter
capital and/or reserved funds to subscribe capital into or to buy shares from othercompanies or other credit institutions.634
Since the Credit Institutions Act was passed in 1997, and before the issuance ofDecree 48/1998, there were some discrepancies between these documents.
First, the Act does not have any article specifying whether or not credit
organizations can directly participate in securities markets. In other words, it seems that
the Act does not prohibit direct participation of credit institutions in the securities market,
nor does it say that credit institutions are not to carry out securities business. Accordingly,
credit institutions can enter securities business. However, Decree 48/1998 explicitly
prohibits credit institutions from carrying out securities business directly.635 If they desire
to engage in this kind of business, they have to set up their own securities subsidiaries. In
1999, Decision 172/1999 issued by the Prime Minister once again confirms theprohibition entrenched in Decree 48/1998, by laying down legal foundation for banks toestablish their own securities subsidiaries.
The Credit Institution Act, although silent on the issue concerning the participationof banks in securities business, allows banks to provide a wide range of financial services:(1) Banks can manage assets for their customers.636 The term "asset" is construed in the
Civil Code as various things including securities.637 Thus, pursuant to the Civil Code and633

This Decree is dated September 12, 2000, promulgating “The Regulation of the Organizations andOperation of Commercial Banks”.
634
See Art. 69.
635
See Decree 48/1998, Art. 29.1.
636
Art. 72.
637
Art. 172.

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the Credit Institution Act, banks can manage securities without obtaining a license fromthe SSC.
However, according to Decree 48/1998, organizations that engage in securities
custody service must (a) meet a number of criteria concerning capital, material andtechnical bases and specialty in conformity with the SSC rules; and (b) must obtain alicense from the SSC to provide such a service.638(2) Banks can provide financial advisory services.639 Since the Credit Institution Act does
not define the term "financial advisory service", securities investment advisory services
might arguably be included in financial advisory services. Consequently, banks candirectly act as securities investment advisers without obtaining a license from the SSC as
required under Article 29, Decree 48/1998.640(3) Banks can serve as custodians of papers that can be valued in cash (negotiable
instruments).641 Once again, through the lack of definition of “papers that can be valued
in cash” in the Credit Institution Act, it can be argued that securities can also fall into themeaning of that term. As a result, banks would be entitled to the custody of securities
pursuant only to their banking business license issued by the State Bank, without needing
the SSC permission.
Secondly, while Decree 48/1998 expressly states that all public issuance must be
approved and licensed by the SSC,642 the Credit Institutions Act says that with anapproval from the Governor of the State Bank of Vietnam, credit institutions can issue
depository certificates, bonds and other certificates that can be valued in cash (negotiable
instruments) to raise funds.643 Accordingly, there seem to be two governmental authorities
from whom issuers can obtain permission to make a public issuance: the State Bank ofVietnam (giving permission to the issuers that are credit institutions) and the SSC (giving
permission to issuers other than banks). This might cause difficulties in managing andsupervising issuing activities on the market.

5. Foreign investment law
In 1987, immediately after the initiation of the economic reform in Vietnam, thefirst statute on foreign investment in Vietnam, the Foreign Investment Act, was passed.
The Act set out the basic structure for foreign investors' businesses conducted in the
country. The main purposes of the Act included: developing economic cooperation with
638

Art. 62.
Art. 75.
640This Article allows banks to enter securities markets by setting up their own subsidiaries under the form of
securities firms. Such firms must get a business license from the SSC to act as brokers, dealers, underwriters,
providers of portfolio management service, and securities investment advisers.
641
See Art. 76.
642
See Art. 3.1.
643
See Art. 46.
639

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foreign countries, achieving domestic economic development, and expanding export
based on effective exploitation of natural and human resources.644 This Act was revised
twice, in 1990645 and then in 1992,646 to adapt to changing circumstances previously
unknown to the lawmakers and to make the business environment in Vietnam more
attractive for foreign investors.
As the economic circumstances had further changed since the passage of the first
Foreign Investment Act (in 1987), this Act was replaced in 1996. The purposes of the1996 Act seems to have been broader than those in the 1987 Act. The 1996 Act aimed to
expand economic cooperation with foreign countries to foster industrialization,
modernization and national economic development on the basis of the efficient
exploitation and use of various resources of the country.647
However, after the Act had been in force for several years, a number of issues arosethat came under the scrutiny of the lawmakers. First, the 1996 Act did not allow foreign
invested enterprises to be converted into other business forms. Pursuant to the 1996 Act,
foreign investors, under provisions similar to those of the 1987 Act, could do business inthree forms: 100% foreign owned enterprises, joint venture enterprises and businesscooperation contracts. During their life time, they could not change their form when they
desired to do so. For example, a 100% foreign owned enterprise could not be converted
into a joint venture enterprise or vice versa even though such a conversion might benefit
the enterprise. Secondly, during the course of business, foreign invested enterprises mightneed to raise more funds but they could only do so through banking finance, not throughthe issuance of securities. This caused difficulties to such business entities in seeking to
expand their businesses. These are among a number of controversial issues that have been
discussed over several years.
The 1996 Act was again revised in June 9, 2000. The 2000 Revised Act tends togive more legal protection to foreign investors,648 and more tax incentives649 and toeliminate troubles for foreign investors in transferring legal capital.650 Under the 2000
644

See “The Foreign Investment Act”, first paragraph.
On June 30, 1990, the National Assembly promulgated the Act on Amendment of and Addition to a Numberof Articles of the Foreign Investment Act (hereinafter, the 1990 Revised Act).
646
On 23 December 1992, the National Assembly, once again, issued the Act on Amendment of and Addition toa number of Articles of the Foreign Investment Act (hereinafter, the 1992 Revised Act).
647
See the Act on Amendment of and Addition to a number of Articles of the Foreign Investment Act dated 9
June 2000 (hereinafter, the 2000 Revised Act), first paragraph.
648
See the 2000 Revised Act, Articles 1.4 and 1.5. For example, under Article 1.5, if a change in laws
adversely affects the interests of foreign invested enterprises and parties to business cooperation contracts, they
will be permitted to continue to apply the incentives or favorable conditions stipulated in their investment
license under the Foreign Investment Act or may be entitled to (1) change the objectives of the project; (2)exemption and reduction of taxes according to laws; (3) deduction of damages from taxable income; (4) propercompensation in cases of necessity.
649
Ibid, Arts. 1.11, 1.12, and 1.14, For example, Article 1.11 offers more favorable profit remittance tax rates(at 3%, 5%, and 7%) depending on the amount of contributed capital. In the old law those figures were 5%,7%, and 10% respectively.
650
Ibid., Art. 1.7. Under this Article, the transfer of capital no longer needs the approval for validity from thestate authority. It will only be subject to registration with the licensing authority. This will save much time and
645

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Revised Act, the transformation of forms of investment is permitted. Foreign invested
enterprises are now able to switch to another investment form by division, separation,
merger or consolidation.651
It can be said that a number of favorable conditions have been provided to promoteforeigners doing business in Vietnam. In fact, Vietnam has recorded importantachievements in the foreign direct investment area. It is estimated that by the 13th year
from the date the first Foreign Investment Act was promulgated (in 1987), more than
3,000 foreign direct investment projects have been licensed.652
However, the second controversial issue was not dealt with in the 2000 Revised
Act. That is the right of foreign invested enterprises to go public to further mobilize
capital. In other word, the equitization of foreign invested enterprises was not adopted in
the Revised Act. In practice, foreign investors in Vietnam view equitization as an efficient
way to mobilize capital and expand business. They have expected a firm legal basis toenable such a process. Nevertheless, the equitization has merely been conducted on an
experimental basis because of the lack of statutory provisions.653 It is reported that“previously, FIE equitization was included in the ministry's draft amendments to the Law
on Foreign Investment in Vietnam (the Act), but not in the final version.”654
It may be useful at this point to define the gains and losses that might result fromthe equitization of foreign invested enterprises. First, the equitization can benefit foreign
invested enterprises. It diversifies forms of capital mobilization, facilitates businessexpansion and thus makes the investment environment in Vietnam more attractive.
Secondly, the equitization can also be a good way to enrich commodities for the newly
established Securities Trading Center in Vietnam. However, the current Foreign
Investment Act only recognizes one corporate form of foreign invested enterprises,namely the limited liability company.655 If foreign invested enterprises are permitted to beequitized, then they will turn into shareholding companies, which do not fall within thescope of the Act. Another subsequent step that should be taken is to modify the Foreign
Investment Act once more to enable it to govern all the forms of foreign invested
enterprises. Even if the modification process at legislative level is not costly, anotherquestion concerning the current foreign investment policy adopted by the Vietnamese
effort for the relevant parties to the transaction. This Article no longer requires the transferor to give priority toVietnamese entities in the case of joint venture enterprises; no longer require the transferor to offer preemptive
rights to Vietnamese entities in the case of 100% foreign owned enterprises - in such transactions.
651
Ibid, Art. 1.3.
652
See “Foreign Invested Enterprises Eager to Fill out Ranks of VN's New Stock Market” Vietnam Economic
Times (Nov. 9, 2000) http://www.vneconomy.com.vn/en/ext_economic/fdi/e10057.htm,
visited Mar. 20, 2001.
653
Ibid.
654
See “11 FIEs Apply to Go Public”, Vietnam Economic Times (Nov. 1, 2000)
http://www.vneconomy.com.vn/en/ext_economic/fdi/e10050.htm, visited Mar. 20, 2001.
655
See Arts. 6 and 15. The former, inter alia, says: “A joint venture enterprise can be established under theform of a limited liability company having legal personality pursuant to the Vietnamese law”; the latter also
states, inter alia: “A 100% foreign owned enterprise can be set up under the form of a limited liability company
having legal personality pursuant to the Vietnamese law ”.

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government arises. That is, since 1987 the Vietnamese government has initiated a policy
with generous incentives to attract foreign capital directly invested in the country. If theequitization of foreign invested enterprises is legalized, whether or not this will go against
such a policy remains to be seen.
Because of these reasons, possibly an acceptable approach that would benefit bothforeign invested enterprises and the newly established securities trading center, while still
well supporting the above-mentioned policy, would be to permit foreign invested
enterprises to issue bonds. This would help the enterprises to raise more funds forbusiness expansion where necessary, would provide the trading center with morecommodities, and would not result in any new corporate form under which foreign
investors could do business in Vietnam. More importantly, raising capital through theissuance of debt instruments would not go against the government policy of attracting
more capital invested directly into the country from foreign investors.
6. Tax law
Tax policy has great impact in promoting the development of securities markets. In
many countries, in the early stage of development of securities markets, listed companies
can enjoy tax holidays and tax reductions.656
In Vietnam, to prepare for the birth of the securities market, a number of preferred
policies have been adopted, including tax policy. Even before the time the first securities
trading center was set up, various tax incentives had been offered to securities businesses
under Decision 39/2000.657 Pursuant to this Decision, securities firms have temporarily
been given maximally preferred tax treatments aside from tax incentives provided for inother tax laws and ordinances. This shows the government’s intention of promoting thedevelopment of securities business. Such favorable treatments include: (1) Value added
tax:658 this kind of tax is temporarily not being applied to legalized business activities659
of securities firms within the 3 year period: 2000 - 2002; (2) Corporate income tax:660
apart from enjoying tax incentives under the Corporate Income Tax Act, securities firms
and fund management companies are entitled to one year of tax exemption and 50% tax
reduction in the two following years.
Decision 39/2000 also offers favorable treatment to listed companies by giving
them corporate income tax reduction. If a company has securities listed on the trading

656

See Pham Quang Huyen, “Chinh sach thue doi voi su phat trien thi truong chung khoan” [Tax Policy andthe Development of Securities Markets], (Oct. 2000) 20, Thong tin tai chinh [Financial Bulletin] 10, 10.
657
The full name of this document is Decision 39/2000/QD-TTg dated 27 March 2000, issued by the Prime
Minister (promulgating “The Temporary Regulation of Tax Incentives Enjoyed by Securities Businesses”).
658
See Art. 2.
659
Pursuant to Decree 48/1998, Article 29.2, such activities are brokerage, dealings, management ofinvestment portfolios, underwriting, and advising services on securities investment.
660
See Art. 3.1.

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floor for the first time, it can enjoy up to 50% tax reduction in the two years following thelisted date.661
To channel investors into investment in the securities market, Decision 39/2000
even offers tax incentives to securities investors. Securities investors are exempted from“tax on high income earners”662 with respect to their dividends, and to interest derived
from their shares and bonds, and with respect to the difference between the selling prices
and purchase price of securities.663
It can be said that Vietnam has rather generous tax incentives applying to securities
businesses and securities investors compared with those in other countries where tax
exemption and reduction are merely offered in relation to direct tax. In Vietnam suchfavorable treatments can also be found in relation to indirect tax policy (i.e. the value
added tax policy).
7. Civil law
Civil law usually covers various areas of socio-economic life including a number of
aspects of securities and securities markets. It plays an important role in creating afavorable environment for the operation of securities markets in each country. In
Vietnam, the current Civil Code that was enacted in 1995 contains a number of concepts
that can be seen as a legal foundation for the securities regulation. However, at the time
the Civil Code was drafted, neither a formal securities market nor a separate securities
regulation had been available. Accordingly, discrepancies between the Code and Decree
48/1998 are inevitable. Such discrepancies concern the concepts of asset, ownership ofproperty, and contract for the custody of assets.
Article 172, the Civil Code says that: “Asset includes tangible assets, money,
papers that can be valued in cash and other rights over assets.” Apart from these,
others cannot be deemed as assets under the Civil Code. However, the first paragraph,
Article 2.1, Decree 48/1998 states:
Securities are certificates or book-entry records evidencing rights
and eligible interests of securities owners with respect to the assets
or capital of the issuers. Securities shall include:a. Shares;
b. Bonds;
c. Securities investment fund certificates;d. Other types of securities.

661

See Art. 3.2
This tax is similar to individual income tax in other countries but does not apply to every individual having
income. It applies only to individuals who have a high income.
663
See Art. 4.
662

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So, pursuant to Decree 48/1998, the concept of securities is not confined to papers thatcan be valued in cash but also covers book-entry records which might be stored either as
hard copies or in electronic databases. The concept of securities under Decree 48/1998,
therefore, does not fall within the connotation of the concept of asset under the Civil
Code.
Another problem occurs with the definition of contracts for the custody over assets.
Article 562, the Civil Code defines:
A contract for asset custody is an agreement between parties,
pursuant to which, the custodian receives property from thedepositor to look after the asset and will return the property itself tothe depositor at the completion of the contract. The property
depositor will have to make a payment to the custodian except fortransactions in which such a payment is not required.
In practice, when the property in question is securities, the above-mentioned
provision would appear to be difficult to implement, since securities are special
commodities which are often put in circulation. Usually on completion of a contract, thecustodian can only return securities that are in the same group and have the same value,
but not exactly the same securities certificates received from the owner at the time the twoparties entered the contract.
8. Criminal law
Criminal law also plays an important role in ensuring a transparent and healthy
securities market. This is because the market is so susceptible to manipulative anddeceptive practices, and in such a market, not only investors but also traders are quite
likely to be cheated and misled.
The Criminal Code was first enacted in 1985 and has been revised many times - in
1989, 1991, 1992, and 1997. It was drafted during the time of the old economic
management mechanism, the centrally planned economy, and although has been revised
from time to time, the Code still does not reflect the new tendency of the economic
renovation. In the year 2000, the new Criminal Code was passed; but no provisions on
securities crimes were made. The reasons for this omission has been ascribed to theprocess of researching, drafting, debating and enacting the Bill. This was done a long timeago, when an organized securities market had not yet been set up. It was hard for thelawmakers to foresee the complex transactions that might arise in this special market.664
Recently, the first Securities Trading Center of Vietnam was put into operation, andin the near future some others may be established. In the absence of statutory provisions
664

See Vu Nam, “Trach nhiem Hinh su trong linh vuc Chung khoan vat Thi truong chung khoan” [Criminal
Liabilities in Securities and Securities Markets], (2000) 7 Tin thi truong chung khoan [Securities Markets
Bulletin] 1, (Dec. 21, 2000), 1. Hereinafter, Vu Nam.

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concerning securities crimes (for example, insider trading, market manipulation,
misinformation) and corresponding sanctions in the Criminal Code; a too simple
provision concerning administrative, disciplinary, civil and criminal sanctions stipulated
in Decree 48/1998 665 might threaten the transparency and healthiness of the newly
emerging market. Thus, it is essential that provisions regarding securities crimes be
inserted in the current securities regulation so as to create a legal basis that might ensure
the transparency and safety of the markets. For the time being, there is merely agovernmental-level legal document, Decree 22/2000, that provides for 'Administrative
Sanctions in the Field of Securities and Securities Markets'. 666 Civil sanctions andcriminal sanctions could either be provided for in separate legal documents or be inserted
into Decree 48/1998 while revising this Decree.
Some commentators believe that provisions concerning crimes on securities
markets should be embodied in the Criminal Code.667 However, it often takes time to altera code, since, to do so, a formal law-making process by the legislature is required.
Experience from abroad shows that the securities crimes as well as criminal sanctions
need not be inserted in the criminal code. Rather they can be part of the securities
regulation. That is, such provisions should be inserted in a legal document governing
securities and securities markets such as the current Decree 48/1998. Both Japan and the
US are good examples in this area. The Japan Securities and Exchange Law, although it
was first passed in 1948, still now preserves an entire chapter, Chapter VIII, for “Penal
Provisions” spreading throughout 13 Articles from Article 197 to Article 209. Concerning
criminal prosecutions, the US has Section 24 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 32
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 dealing with penalties to be imposed on willful
violators of securities law. Violators can be punished either by fine or imprisonment
depending on the seriousness of the violations.

II. THE NEED FOR A SYNCHRONOUS IMPROVEMENT OF THE ABOVEMENTIONED LAWS
In the first section of this Appendix, positive and negative aspects of the current
laws concerning the operation of securities markets have been discussed. This discussion
has revealed that the Constitution has created a relatively good legal foundation for theestablishment of securities markets; and the current tax laws perform very well inpromoting such markets. The discussion however, has also shown the need for
665

This provision was discussed in depth in Chapter III of this paper while discussing “Statutory Sanctions for
Violations”.
666
See Decree 22/2000.
667
See Tao Huu Phung, “Mot so van de ve xay dung van ban phap ly cho TTCK” [A Number of Issues That
Need to Take Into Account in Making Legal Rules Governing Securities Markets] (2001) 1, Chung khoan Vietnam [Vietnam Securities] 28, 30; see also Vu Nam, above n. 664, 1.

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synchronous improvement of other laws, along with the revision of the securities
regulation, in order to make possible a transparent, fair and effective securities market.
Apart from the discrepancies that need to be eliminated, among those laws and the
securities regulation, each law has its own impact on the effectiveness of the securities
market along a different dimension, so to speak; and all should be improved accordingly,
as part of a comprehensive reform to achieve optimally operational securities markets in
Vietnam.
Enterprise law is very closely connected with securities regulation, and thus many
provisions of the enterprise law directly influence the market operation. A comprehensive
set of disclosure requirements entrenched in the enterprise law would be useful for, andwould beneficially support, public investors in making prudent investment decisions. An
improvement of the regulation of the equitization of state enterprises is also required to
speed up the equitization process, which in turn can enrich dealing commodities for thecurrently quiet securities trading center. Furthermore, to avoid difficulties in enforcing theregulation of equity ownership by foreigners in Vietnamese securities markets, theambiguous guidelines concerning the adjustment of the proportion of shares a foreign
investor can purchase from one issuer when such an issuer goes public should beclarified.
Banking law also has its impacts on the operation of securities markets.
Commodities for stock trading centers are more or less subject to the participation ofbanks as listed companies on trading floor. The question of the overlap between the
powers of the State Bank of Vietnam and the SSC in granting issuing licenses for issuers,
should also be dealt with, so as to avoid difficulties in supervising and managing markets.
Perhaps such a power should be vested in the SSC only, so that the SSC could administer
the whole regulation of public issuance as part of the securities regulations; and for its
part, the State Bank could well concentrate on administering banking law.
Foreign investment law is another legal source that needs to be taken into
consideration in this context. With a serious shortage of commodities for trade on the
trading floor at the present time, a legal basis on which foreign invested enterprises canissue bonds is required. In the long run, perhaps the privatization of foreign invested
enterprises is another issue that should also be deliberated.
The Civil Code, as earlier mentioned, conflicts with Decree 48/1998 in defining theconcepts of asset, of property ownership, and of contract for the custody of assets. Suchconflicts should be eliminated to ensure that these legal texts will be implemented without
difficulties.
The need to improve the Criminal Code mainly concerns the newly emerging
crimes on securities markets. The importance of criminal sanctions imposed on securities
crimes was well evidenced in the discussions on sanctions for violations in Chapter III ofthis work. Criminal sanctions should have a place in either the securities regulations or in
the Criminal Code. Wherever they be, attention should be made to the levels of sanctions.
That is adequate sanctions should be laid down for individual types of violation to ensurethat such sanctions are truly effected in regard to the behavior of market participants.

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185

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Bibliography

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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1. America- Banking Act of 1933
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- Revised Model Business Corporation Act- Sarbanes – Oxley Act of 2002
- Securities Act of 1933
- Securities Exchange Act of 1934
- Disclosure Order Execution & Routing Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 43,590(Nov. 13, 2000)- Regulation M (Sec. Ex. Act of 1934)- Regulation T of the Federal Reserve System- NASD Manual 2152
- NASD Rules of Fair Practice- NASD Rule 405
2. Australia- Australian Corporation Act (as amended in 2001)
3. China- Securities Law of the People's Republic of China of 1998
4. England- Company Act of 1985
5. Europe- Second Banking Directive
6. Japan- Securities and Exchange Law of 1946 (as amended in 2001)- Law on Foreign Securities Companies of 1971
- Law on Trading in Financial Futures of 1987
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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Bibliography

7. Vietnama. Accounting- Decision 167/2000-QD/BTC Oct. 25, 2000
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- Decree 94/TTg May 24, 1951
- Decree 163/CP Jun. 16, 1977
- Decree 65/HDBT May 28, 1986
- Decree 53/HDBT Mar. 26, 1988
- Decision 39/HDBT Apr. 10, 1989
- Decree 07/CP Jan. 29, 1994
- Decision 88-QD/NH9 Mar. 28, 1995
- Decision 89-QD/NH9 Mar. 28, 1995
- Decision 280/QD-NH5 Oct. 15, 1996
- Decision 252/TTg Aug. 3, 1995
- Decision 769/TTg Sep. 18, 1997
- Ordinance on Banks, Credit Cooperatives, and Financial Companies of 1997
- Credit Institution Act of 1997
- State Bank of Vietnam Act of 1997
- Decree 49/2000 Sep. 12, 2000
- Decision 172/1999/QD-TTg Aug. 19, 1999
d. Comapnies & Equitization- Foreign Investment Act (1987 Act, 1990 & 1992 Revised Acts, 1996 Act and 2000
Revised Act)- Company Act of 1990
- Private Enterprise Act of 1990
- Enterprise Act of 1999
- Decision 203/CT Aug. 6, 1992

187

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Bibliography- Decision 202/CT Aug. 6, 1992
- Decree 120/CP Sep. 17, 1994
- Decree 28/1996 May 7, 1996
- Decree 529-TC/QD-TCDN Jul 31, 1997
- Decree 44/1998/ND-CP Jun. 29, 1998
- Decree 64/2002/ND-CP Jun. 29, 2002
- Decree 59/CP Oct 3, 1996
- Decree 27/1999/ND-CP Apr. 20, 1999
- Decision 211-QD/NH1 Sep. 22, 1994
- Decision 212-QD/NH1 Sep. 22, 1994
- Circular 91-TC/KBNN Nov. 11, 1994
- Decree 24/2000/ND-CP Jul. 31, 2000
- Circular 13/2001/TT.TBC Mar. 8, 2001
e. Securities and Securities Markets- Decree 361-TTg Jun. 20, 1995
- Decree 75-CP Nov. 28, 1996
- Decree 48/1998/ND-CP Jul. 11, 1998
- Decision 127/1998/QD-TT Jul.11, 1998
- Decision 78/2000/QD-UBCK Dec. 29, 2000
- Decision 79/2000/QD/UBCK Dec. 29, 2000
- Decision 04/1998/QD-UBCK3 Oct. 13, 1998
- Decision 04/1999/QD-UBCK1 Mar. 27, 1999
- Decision 42/2000/QD-UBCK3 Jun. 12, 2000
- Decision 145/1999/QD-TTg Jun. 28, 1999
- Decision 139/1999/Qd-TTg Jun. 10, 1999
- Decree 72/CP Jul. 26, 1994
- Decree 01/2000/ND-CP Jan. 13, 2000
- Decree 22/2000 Jul. 10, 2000
- Circular 01/1998/TT-UBCK Oct. 13, 1998
- Circular 02/2001/TT-UBCK Sep. 28, 2001
- Circular 01/1999/TT-UBCK1 Dec. 30,1999
f. Taxes- Turnover Collection Regime Applying to State Enterprises (Decision 188/CT Jun. 21,
1988)- Regulation on Industrial-Commercial Tax (Resolution No. 200.NQ/TVQH)- Ordinance on Agriculture Tax of 1983
- Turnover Tax Act of 1990
- Profits Tax Act of 1990
- Special Consumption Tax Act of 1990
- Import-Export Duties Act of 1988

188

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Bibliography- Royalty Act of 1990
- House and Land Tax Act of 1991
- Value Added Tax Act of 1997
- Corporate Income Tax Act 1997
- Ordinance on High Income Earners Tax of 1994
g. Others- Constitution (1992)- Criminal Procedure Code
- Ordinance on Procedure for Settlement of Civil Disputes
II. CASES- Charles Hughes & Co. V. SEC (1943)- Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co. (1971)- Chiarella v. United States (1980)- Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. (1947)- Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc. (1985)- SEC v. Capital Gains (1963)- SEC v. Hanly (1969)
III. BOOKS
1. Foreign Books:
1.1. Alan R. Palmiter, “Securities Regulation: Example & Explanation” (1998)
1.2. Bayless Manning & James J. Hanks, Jr. “Legal Capital” (3rd Ed. 1990)
1.3. David L. Ratner, “Securities Regulation” (1998)
1.4. David L. Ratner, “Securities Regulation: Materials for a Basic Course” (3rd Ed.
1986)
1.5. D. E. Ayling, “The Internationalization of Stock Markets” (1986)
1.6. Franklin A. Gevurt, “Corporation Law” (2000)
1.7. George J. Benston, “The Separation of Commercial & Investment Banking” (1990)
1.8. Hal S. Scott, Philip A. Wellons, “International Finance: Transaction, Policy &Regulation” (6th Ed. 1999)
1.9. Hiroshi Oda, “Japanese Law” (2nd ed. 1999)
1.10. Japan Research Institute, “Securities Market in Japan” (1998)
1.11. Jennings, Marsh, Coffee, and Seligman, “Federal Securities Laws: Selected
Statutes, Rules and Forms” (1999)
1.12. Jordi Canals, “Universal Banking - International Comparisons & Theoritical
Perspectives” (1997)
1.1.3. Louis Loss, “Fundamentals of Securities Regulation” (1988)
1.14. Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, “Fundamentals of Securities Regulation” (2001)

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Bibliography

1.15. Louis Loss, Makoto Yazawa & Barbara Ann Banoff, “Japanese Securities
Regulation” (1983)
1.16. Marc I. Steinberge “International Securities Law: A Contemporary & Comperative
Analysis” (1st Ed. 1999)
1.17. N.S. Poser, “International Securities Regulation: London's ‘Big Bang’ & theEuropean Securities Markets” (1991)
1.18. “Osaka Securities Exchange: Fact Book 1999”
1.19. Patrick Raines & Charles G. Leathers “Economists & the Stock Market” (2000)
1.20. Robert Charles Clack, “Corporate Law” (1986, 12th printing)
1.21. Thomas Lee Hazen, "The Law of Securities Regulation" (1985)
2. Vietnamese Books
2.1. “Documents of the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam”(1987) (Van kien Dai hoi Dang toan Quoc lan thu VI)
2.2. Nguyen Tran Que, “Securities Market: Operational & Trading Methods” (1996)(Thi truong Chung khoan: Phuong thuc hoat dong va kinh doanh)
2.3. Nguyen Van Luan, Tran Quoc Tuan, & Ngo Minh Chau, “Vietnam Securities
Market” (1995) (Thi Truong Chung Khoan Vietnam)
2.4. Tran Duong, “Thirty Years: Money, Credit, Banking in Vietnam: 1951 – 1981”(1981) (Ba Muoi Nam: Tien te, Tin dung, Ngan Hang Vietnam: 1951 - 1981)
IV. PERIODICALS
1. Foreign Periodicals:
1.1. American University International Law Review (1999)14:- Jennifer Manvell Jeannot, “An International Perspective on Domestic Banking
Reform: Could the European Union’s Second Banking Directive Revolutionize the
Way the United States Regulates its own Financial Services Industry?” (1999) 14
AUILR.
1.2. Australian Journal of Corporate Law: (1999)10 & (1996)6:- Frank Donnan, “Self-regulation and the Demutualization of the Australian Stock
Exchange” (1999) 10 AJCL.
- Roman Tomasic, “The Securities Law of the People’s republic of China: An
Overview” (1999) 10 AJCL.
- Judith O’Hare, “Regulation of the Securities Industry in Hong Kong: The
Securities and Futures Commission” (1996) 6 AJCL.
1.3. Berkeley Technology Law Journal (2002) 17:

190

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Bibliography-

Jolina C. Cuaresma, “Business Law: The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act” (2002) 17
BTLJ.
1.4. Boston College of International & Comparative Law Review (2002) 25:- Norman Brown IV, “The Long Road to Reform: An Analysis of Foreign
Investment Reform in Vietnam” (2002) 25 BCICLR.
1.5. Brooklyn Journal of International Law (1998)23:- Gustavo Visentini, “Compatibility and Competition Between European andAmerican Corporate Governance: which Model of Capitalism?” (1998) 23 BJIL.
1.6. Carzodo Law Review (1994)15:- Jonathan R. Macey, “Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty” (1994) 15 CLR.
1.7. Columbia Business Law Review (1987), (1991):- Larry Zoglin, “The Global Securities Market: Insider Trading in Japan: A
Challenge to the Integration of the Japanese Equity Market into the Global
Securities Market” (1987) CBLR.
-

Shen-Shin Lu, “Are the 1988 Amendments to Japanese Securities Regulation
Law Effective Deterrents to Insider Trading?” (1991) CBLR.

1.8. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1999)38:- Roberta S. Karmel, “The Case for a European Securities Commission” (1999) 38
CJTL.
1.9. Columbia Law Review (2002) 102:
- John C. Coffee, “Racing Towards the Top? The Impact of Cross-listing and Stock
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance” (2002) 102 CLR.
1.10. Cornell Law Review (1984)74:- Dean Furbush, Annette Poulsen, “Symposium on the Regulation of Secondary
Trading Markets: Program Trading, Volatility, Porfolio Insurance, and the Roleof Specialists and Market Makers: Harmonizing Margins: the Regulation of
Margin Levels in Stock Index Futures Markets” (1989) 74 CLR.
1.11. Duke Law Journal (1998):- A. L. Peters, “The Independence of Independent Agencies: Independent
Agencies: A Government’s Scourge or Salvation?” (1998) DLJ.
1.12. East Asian Executive Report (1990):- Michael J. Scown, “Asia’s Emerging Equities Markets” (1990) EAER.

191

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Bibliography

1.13. Federal Communication Law Journal (1999)51:- Angela J. Campbell, “Sefl-Regulation and the Media” (1999) 51 FCLJ.
1.14. Fordham International Law Journal (1996)19; (1998)22:--

Maria A. Volarich, “Easing the Regulation of a Pan-European Securities Market:
Applying the Recommendations of the Rudman Report to EASDAQ” (1996) 19
FILJ.
Gregory D. Ruback, “Master of Puppets: How Japan’s Ministry of FinanceOrchestrates its Own Reformation” (1998) 22 FILJ.

1.15. Fordham Law Review (1992)60:- Nicole Ramsay, “Japanese Securities Regulation: Problems of Enforcement”(1992) 60 FLR.
1.16. Georgetown Law Journal (2000)88:- Daniel M. Anderson, “Taking Stock in China: Company Disclosure andInformation in China’s Stock Markets” (2002) 88 GLJ.
1.17. Hasting Law Journal (2002)53:- Roberta S. Karmel, “Turning Seats into Shares: Causes and Implications of
Demutualization of Stock and Future Exchanges” (2002) 53 HLJ.

1.18. Hastings Communication & Entertainment Law Journal (2000)23:- Masanori Hayashi, “Japanese Insider Trading Law at the Advent of the Digital
Age: New Challenges Raised by Internet and Communication Technology”(2000) 23 HCELJ.
1.19. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (1999)6:- Henry Laurence, “The Rule of Law in the Era of Globalization: Spawning theSEC” (1996) 6 IJGLS.
1.20 Iowa Journal of Corporation Law (1999)24:- “General Principles of Company Law for Transition Economies” (1999) 24 IJCL.
1.21. International Financial Law Review Special Supplement (Sep. 1991):- “Germany: A Special Report Prepared by Ulrich Koch of Single Loose SchmidtDiemitz & Partners, Stuttgart and Frankfurt Am Main” (Sep. 1991) IFLRSS.
-“United States: A Special Report Prepared by Warren F Cooke and Lynn Stofan
Kaplan of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, Ney Work” (Sep. 1991) IFLRSS.

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Bibliography

1.22. Japan’s Financial Markets:- Yusuke Kawamura, “The Present Attitude toward the System for Separating
Banks and Securities Companies” JFM.
1.23. Journal of International Law & Business (2001)21:- Caroline Bradley, “Demutualization of Financial Exchanges: Business as Usual?”(2001) 21 JILB.
1.24. Journal of Political Economy (1980)(88)(21):- Fama, “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm” (1980) (88) (21) JPE.
1.25. Law & Contemporary Problems (2000)63:- James D. Cox, “The Future and Content of the US Securities Law: Premises for
Reforming the Regulation of Securities Offering: An Essay” (2000) 63 LCP.
1.26. Law in Japan an Annual (1989)22:- Harald Baum, “Japanese Capital Markets: New Legislation” (1989) 22 LJA.
1.27. McGill Law Journal (1997)42:- Betty M. Ho, “Rethinking the System of Sanctions in the Corporate andSecurities Law of Hong Kong” (1997 42) MLJ.
1.28. National Administrative Law Judge Foundation Journal of The National
Association of Administrative Law Judges(2002) 22:- Joseph J.M. Orabona, “There’s a New Sheriff in Town – Will the New SEC
Chairman Allow Issuers of American Depository Receipts to Use International
Accounting Standards to Satisfy Listing Requirements on U.S. Exchanges?”(2002) 22 NALJFJNAALJ.
1.29. New York Law Journal (May 20, 1999; Aug. 19, 1999; Sep. 30, 1999):- John C. Coffee Jr., “Privatization and Self- Regulation of Stock Exchanges” (May20, 1999) NYLJ.
-

Roberta S. Karmel, “Stock Exchange Demutualization in Sweden and Australia”(Aug. 19, 1999) NYLJ.

-

Lisa I. Fried, “Plans Debated for Stock Markets’ For-Profit Conversion” (Sep. 30,
1999) NYLJ.

1.30. North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation (1997): 11& 22; (1998)24;

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Bibliography-

Jay Zhe Zhang, “Securities Markets and Securities Regulation in China” (1997)
11 NCJILCR.

1.31. North Carolina Law Review (1984)62:- Marianne K. Smythe, “Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities
Industry and the Anti-trust Laws: Suggestion for an Accommodation” (1984) 62
NCLR.
1.32. Oklahoma Law Review (1999)52:- Ramzi Nasser, “The Morality of Insider Trading in the United States & Abroad”(1999) 52 OLR.
1.33. Oxford Review of Economic Policy (1996)(12)(4):- Oliver Hart and John Moore, “The Governance of Exchange: Members’
Cooperative Versus Outside Ownership” (1996) (12) (4) OREP.
1.34. Ottawa Law Review (1997-98)29:- Margot Priest, “The Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-Regulation”(1997-98) 29 OLR.
1.35. Stanford Journal of International Law (1994) 30:- Curtis J. Milhaupt, “Managing the Market: the Ministry of Finance and Securities
Regulation in Japan” (1994) 30 SJIL.
1.36. The Journal of Law & Economics (2000) 43:- Craig Pirrong, “A theory of Financial Exchange Organization” (2000) 43 The
JLE.
1.37. The Journal of Legal Studies (1999) 28:- Jonathan R. Macey and Maureen O’hara, “Regulating Exchanges and Alternative
Trading Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective” (1999) 28 The JLS.
1.38. The Journal of Corporation Law (1997) 23:- Cheryl Goss Weiss, “A Review of the Historic Foundations of Broker-dealer
Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty” (1997) 23 The JCL.
1.39. Tulane University Tulane Law Review (2002) 76:- Faith Stevelman Kahn, “What are the Ways of Achieving Corporate Social
Responsibility?: Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron, Financial
Fraud, and September 11, 2001” (2002) 76 TUTLR.
1.40. UCLA Law Review (2001)48:

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Bibliography-

Bernard S. Black, “The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
Securities Markets” (2001) 48 UCLA LR.

1.41. Washington University Law Quarterly (1995)73:- George F. Parker, “The Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan: Introducing a
Private Right of Action” (1995) 73 WULQ.
2. Vietnamese Periodicals:
2.1. Banking Review (Tap Chi Ngan Hang) (2000) issues: 6, 8, 12- Thanh Ngoc, “Thi truong chung khoan co the anh huong toi nganh Ngan hangnhu the nao?” [How can a Securities Market Affect Banking Industry?] (2002) 12
Tap chi Ngan hang.
-Nguyen Ngoc Vu, “Chinh sach tai tro doanh nghiep duoi tac dong cua thue va chi
phi pha san”(2000) 8 Tap Chi Ngan Hang.

-

Hoang Qui Vuong, “Giao dich chung khoan trao tay tai Viet nam va nhung van
de ton tai” [OTC Transactions in Vietnam Stock Market: Troubles Ahead] (2000)
8 Tap chi Ngan hang.

-

Ho Cong Huong, “Quan he giua cong nghiep Ngan hang va cong nghiep chungkhoan” [The relationship between Banking and Securities Industries] (2000) 6
Tap Chi Ngan hang.

2.2. Securities Investment (Dau tu Chung khoan):- “Duoc nhieu hay mat nhieu?” [Gain and Loss: Which one has more Weight?]
Dau tu chung khoan (2001) 76.
-“Nha dau tu mat niem tin vi doanh nghiep khong trung thuc” [Investors Lost
Confidence Due to Enterprises’ Dishonesty], Dau tu chung khoan (Sep. 5, 2002).

-“Them hai doanh nghiep nhan giay phep niem yet” [Two more companies
Obtaining Listing Certificate] (Dec. 24, 2001).

2.3. Securities Market Bulletin (Tin Thi truong Chung khoan) (2000)7:- Kim Chi, “Hoat dong cong bo thong tin tren thi truong chung khoan” (2001) 2
Tin Thi Truong Chung Khoan.
2.4. Vietnam Economic Times (May & Sep. 2001):

195

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Bibliography-

Anh Thi, “Tron bao cao Tai chinh? Binh quan ca nuoc chi co 20% doanh nghiep
thuc hien” [Financial Statement Avoidance? On Average, only 20% ofEnterprises Nationawide have Financial Statements Filed] Thoi bao kinh te Vietnam (Sep. 24, 2001).

-

Anh Thi, “Ngai niem yet chung khoan? Xem xet dieu kien thich hop cho cac
doanh nghiep” [Hesitancy of Being Listed? Considering Appropriate
Requirements Imposed on Enterprises] Thoi bao kinh te Viet nam (May 11,2001).

2.5. Vietnam Investment Review (Jan. 1995):- “Unable to Make the Big Leap, Cooperatives Face Extinction”, Vietnam
Investment Review (Jan. 1, 1995).
V. REPORTS-“Report on Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange
Commission”, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.m 1st Sess. (1963)-“Concept Release; Request for Comments”, Proposed Rules (SEC) 17 CFR part
240 [Release No. 34-42037; File No. S7-24-99] RIN 3235-AH84, Short Sales-

Vietnam Ministry of Investment and Planning, “Report on One Year
Implementation of the Enterprise Act” (Mar. 28-29, 2001)

VI. UNPUBLISHED & WORKING PAPERS-

Joel Seligman, “What can We Learn from Enron”, (Paper delivered at a special
lecture conducted by Professor Joel Seligman on “Securities Regulation in the
United States”, held by Nagoya University, Center For Asian Legal Exchange(CALE), May 23, 2002).

-

Paper delivered at a conference held on “Financial and the Development ofVietnam Securities Market”, held by the Financial Research Institute, Finance
Ministry, Ho Chi Minh City, May 22, 2001-

Tran Cao Nguyen (et. al.), “Vietnam Stock Exchanges: Organization,
Management & Supervision”, SSC Working Paper (CK-99.03) (1999)-

Tran Dac Sinh (et. al.), “Fundamentals in Management, Organization,
Operation, and Development of Securities Trading Centers in Vietnam”, the Ho
Chi Minh City Securities Trading Center’s Working Paper) (2000)

196

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: BibliographyVII. WEBSITES
1. http://www.austlii.edu.au:- Australian Corporation Act 2001.
2. http://apecsec.org.sg:- “Vietnam”, APECA Press Release.
3. http://ase.tufts.edu- David O. Dapice, “Vietnam’s Economy: Responses to the Asian Crisis”.
4. http://www.cepd.gov.tw/english/special:- “Expediting the Privatization of State Owned Enterprises in Taiwan” (Feb. 2001).
5. http://www.csrs.gov.cn/CSRCsite:- Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China 1998.
6. http://www.cxs.com.ky- “The Cayman Island Stock Exchange”.
7. http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf- Representative Max Sandlin, “Statement for Financial Services Committee
Hearing, - Wrong Numbers: the Accounting Problems at WorldCom”. (Jul. 8,
2002).
8. http://www.forbes.com/markets/newswire- “UK’s LSE Chairman Blasts US Corp Reform Act” (Dec. 9, 2002) Reuters.
9. http://fsa.go.jp- “Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission: History and Functions”.
10. http://www.hartford-jwp.com- “Unable to Make Big Leap, Cooperatives Face Extinction”(Jan. 1, 1995) Vietnam
Investment Review.
11. http://www.hksfc.org.hk/chi/press_releases/html- Laura Cha, “Securities Market Reform: The Hong Kong Experience”.
12. http://www.inquirer.net/issues/nov2000- Doris C. Dumlao, “State Funds’ Participation Key to PSE Demutualization”
Philippines Daily (Nov. 6, 2000).

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Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Bibliography

13. http://www.IOSCO.org:- IOSCO, “Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation – A Report of theInternational Organization of Securities Commissions: September 1998”: IOSCODocument Library.
14. http://www.lawinfochina.com- Guo Li, “The Collapse of the Glass-Steagall Wall and its Potential Impacts on
China’s Banking law”, Legal Forum Featured Article.
15. http://www.laodong.com.vn:- “Cong ty TNHH Thien Ho (TPHCM) chiem doat tien BHXH: cong nhan khoi
kien cong ty ra toa!” [Thien Ho Ltd. Co.: Usurping Social Insurance Fees –Workers Sued at a Court of Law], Bao lao dong (Aug. 6, 2002).
16. http://www.lexis.com--“Vietnam’s First Securities Centre Expected to Open in 1999” (Nov. 11, 1998)
ASIA PULSE.
“Vietnam to Delay Opening Hanoi, HCM City Stock Exchanges” (Nov. 25,
1999) ASIA PULSE.
“Vietnam Stock Exchange Opening Delay another Week” (Jul.3, 2000) Deutsche
Presse-Agentur.
“Developments in Corporate Law in Vietnam: Overview of Legislative Reforms
in Vietnam” (Apr. 21, 2000) Mondaq Business Briefing.
Paul Wiseman, “Vietnam Stock Market sees law start, steady growth” (Nov. 17,
2000) USA TODAY.
“Vietnam’s Finance Minister says SOE Equitizations Must go Faster” (Dec. 24,
1999) ASIA PULSE.
Indira A. R. Lakshmaman, Globe Staff, “Veitnam Takes Slow Road Toward
Capitalism Stock Exchange Opens to Trade only 4 Stocks” (Nov. 27, 2000) The
Boston Globe.
“Dirty Play Drives Market off Course” (Jul. 16, 2001) The Vietnam Investment
Review, Emerging Markets Datafile.
Nguyen Hong, Xuan Son, “Hapaco Stock Up Despite STC Alert” (May 28, 2001)
The Vietnam Investment Review, Emerging Market Datafile.
Nguyen Son, “Listing Sweetener Consider” (Oct. 8, 2001) The Vietnam
Investment Review.
“Profit Hard to Come by for Vietnam Stock Brokers” (Oct. 31, 2000) Deutsche
Presse-Agentur.
“Vietnam is set to Launch Stock Exchanges in July” (Apr. 24, 2000) ASIA
PULSE.

198

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Bibliography-“Vietnam Stock Exchange Set to Launch Trading” (Jul. 25, 2000) Deutche
Presse-Argentur.
Vu Long, “Forty Firms Meet Listing Criteria, But all Remain Hesitant” (Nov. 20,
2000) The Vietnam Investment Review, Emerging Market Datafiles.
Vu Long, “Enthusiasm Sinks for Forced Floats of Equitized Firms” (Aug. 13,
2001) The Vietnam Investment Review, Emerging Markets Datafile.
Vu Long, “Exchange Sets Course for Bank Listings with Legal Framework” (Jul.
9, 2001) The Vietnam Investment Review, Emerging Market Datafile.
Xuan Ha “Joint Stock Banks Change Minds on Bourse Listing” (Sep. 10, 2001)
The Vietnam Investment Review, Emerging Market Datafile.
Xuan Son, “Disclosure Rules Set for ‘Tightening’” (Feb. 5, 2001) The Vietnam
Investment Review, Emerging Markets Datafile.
Nguyen Hong, “Equitized Firms Need ‘Notarized Trading Facility’” (Sep. 4,2000) The Vietnam Investment Review, Emerging Markets Datafile.
“Opinion Differ on Hanoi Bourse Role” (Oct. 1, 2001) The Vietnam Investment
Review, Emerging Markets Datafile.
“Vietnam is set to Launch Stock Exchanges in July” (Apr. 24, 2000) ASIA
PULSE.

17. http://www.londonstockexchange.com- “London Stock Exchange: History”.
18. http://www.mafa.gov.vn- “Vietnam’s Economic Renovation and its Main Achievements”, Main Macroeconomic Indicators.
19. http://www.nhandan.org.vn:- “Lich Su Viet nam”.
20. http://www.nul.nagoya-u.ac.jp/- Richard A. Grasso, “Investor Ownership of Stock Exchanges” (Sep. 28, 1999)
FDCH Congressional Testimony, <Academic Search Elite>.
-

Griffin Keith, “The Management of Structural Adjustment and Macroeconomic
Reform in Vietnam” (1998) (17) (1) Human System Management <database:
Academic Search Elite>.

21. http://www.phillipsfox.co.nz:- “Vietnam Legal Update” Part IV: Equitization Issues.
22. http://risk.ifci.ch

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Emerging Market Committee, IOSCO, “The Causes of the Asian Financial andEconomic Crisis” from the interim report “Causes, Effects and Regulatory
Implications of the Financial and Economic Turbulence in Emerging Markets”.

23. http://www.rzuser.uni.heidelberg.de- Kirsch, Ottfried C., “Vietnam: Agricultural Cooperatives in Transitional
Economies” Discussion Paper 59.
24. http://www.senate.gov/~banking:- Henry M. Paulson “Hearing on the ‘Financial Marketplace of the Future’” (Feb.
29, 2000) Senate Banking Committee.
- Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999.
25. http://www.state.gov:- “Country Commercial Guides – FY 1999: Vietnam”, Chapter VII: Investment
Climate.
26. http://www.tradeport.org/ts/countries/vietnam- “Vietnam Trade and Project Financing”.
27. http://www.tse.org.jp/english- “Tokyo Stock Exchange: History”.
28. http://www.vneconomy.com.vn- “Seeing a Compromise” SGT Weekly (Dec. 8, 2001).
-“Readying the Stock Market for Healthy Acceleration” (Feb. 11, 2001) Vietnam
Economy.

-“Regulator to Pilot OTC Stock Trade” Vietnam Economy.

-

Tron bao cao tai chinh? Binh quan ca nuoc chi co 20% Doanh nghiep thuc hien”[Financial Statement Avoidance? On Average, Only 20% of Enterprises
Nationwide Have Financial Statements Filed] (Sep. 24, 2001) Thoi bao kinh te
Viet nam [Vietnam Economic Times].

29. http://www.vnexpress.net/Vietnam/Kinh-doanh/Chung-khoan.
-“Thi truong chung khoan thieu thong tin” [Securities Markets Fall short ofInformation] (Nov. 29, 2001).

200

Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam: Bibliography-“Nha dau tu van doi thong tin” [Still Investors in ‘Hunger’ for Information] (Apr.
27, 2002).

-“Nhieu cong ty niem yet vi pham viec cong bo thong tin” [Many Listed
Companies Violated Information Disclosure Requirements] (Nov. 22. 2001).

-“Them hai doanh nghiep nhan giay phep niem yet” [Two more Companies
Obtaining Listing Certificate] (Dec. 24, 2001) Dau tu chung khoan [Securities
Investment].

-“Nha dau tu mat long tin vi doanh nghiep khong trung thuc” [Investors Lost
Confidence Due to Enterprises’ Dishonesty], Dau tu chung khoan [Securities
Investment] (Sep. 5, 2002).

-“Gia co phieu tren thi truong tu do tang manh” [Stock Prices in Free Market
Sharply Increase] (Oct. 23, 2002).

30. http://www.vietnampanorama.com:- “State Owned Enterprises: Govt Determined to Push up SOEs Reform”.
31. http://vinsight.superb.net:- “Obstacles Ahead for Lauded Vietnam Business Law”.
32. http://www.vnn.vn/investment/business- “Business Environment – Banking and Finance”.
33. http://www.web.acces.uiuc.edu/- “1998 World Development Indicators CD-ROM”, World Bank.
34. http://www.worldbank.org/- “Advancing Rural Development from Vision to Action”.
- Noeleen Heyzer and Martin Khor, “The Asisan Fiancial Crisis: Causes,
Consequences and Ways Forward”.

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