The Japanese Society for Aesthetics

Aesthetics No.25 (2021): 62-75

Recognition of Human Freedom in Schelling’s
Interpretation of Oedipus as Tragedy:
from Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism toPhilosophy of Art *YAHATA Sakura
Toyo University, Tokyo / University of Cambridge, Cambridge

Introduction
F. W. J. Schelling presents his position on the philosophy of art in his lectures on the
Philosophy of Art (delivered 1802–03 in Jena and 1804–05 in Würzburg), in which he discusses
the absolute in the form of art based on his philosophy of identity. In the same context, hedevelops a theory of genre that places drama as the highest form among the literary arts, and hecalls tragedy in particular the highest representation of the essence of art. He reflects on thecompleteness of his tragedy theory and its place in the theory of genre and asserts that this is achapter “worthy of publication” (druckwürdig).1 Thus, an approach to Schelling’s philosophy ofart requires an exploration of his theory of tragedy.
This paper focuses on Schelling’s account of Greek tragedy. He regards Prometheus as “thetrue archetype of tragedy” (AAII, 6, 1, 383/SWV 709) and gives equal praise to Sophocles’s
Oedipus Tyrannus. He finds that Greek tragedy expresses an absolute indifference to questionsof freedom and destiny through the hero’s resistance to fate and his own destruction. Tragedy,
which expresses the simultaneous conflict between and indifference of freedom and destiny ornecessity, is the highest presentation aimed at by the philosophy of art. At the same time, however,Schelling finds the expression of freedom in the man who challenges fate and falls, andcharacterizes Greek tragedy as the expression of “the greatest idea and the highest victory of
freedom” (der größte Gedanke und der höchste Sieg der Freiheit) (AAII, 6, 1, 373/SWV 697).
How can freedom be recognized in an indifference between freedom and necessity? This paper
attends to Oedipus Tyrannus and interprets Schelling’s investigation of human freedom as rooted
in his theory of tragedy.
The sources for this paper are Schelling’s Philosophy of Art and his early work Philosophical
Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism (1795) (Philosophical Letters), which articulates Schelling’s
basic concept of tragedy. First, this paper elucidates the discussion of Greek tragedy in* This paper is based on the Japanese version printed in Bigaku 67, No. 1 (2016): 25–36, published by theJapanese Society for Aesthetics.
1
From Schelling’s Overview of my future handwritten Manuscripts (Übersicht meines künftigen
handschriftlichen Nachlasses) in: Fuhrmans 1960, 14. Peter Szondi describes Schelling’s theory of tragedy: “since
Aristotle there has been a poetics of tragedy. Only since Schelling there has been a philosophy of tragedy” (Szondi
1961, 151), and “with this interpretation of Oedipus Tyrannus and of Greek tragedy in general, the history of thetheory of tragedy begins” (Szondi 1961, 157f.).

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Philosophical Letters, where Greek tragedy is considered as the art form that can realize human
freedom. Second, this paper summarizes the essence and form of tragedy as given in the
Philosophy of Art and analyzes Schelling’s interpretation of Oedipus Tyrannus and its symbol of
the hero. In this way, this paper concludes that the theory of freedom shown in the voluntary
acceptance of punishment in Philosophical Letters becomes the basis of the theory of tragedy in
the Philosophy of Art and, its developed form, leads to the expression and symbol of the tragic
sublime. This paper reads Schelling’s theory of tragedy as a theory of human freedom.

1. Possibility of Human Freedom in Greek Tragedy in Philosophical Letters on
Dogmatism and Criticism
The Philosophical Letters,2 published anonymously in 1795, is work in the form of letters,
which Schelling wrote as a theology student in Tübingen. It is in part a criticism of the orthodox
theological thinking he encountered at Tübingen, where the existence of God was regarded as a“supernatural fact” and happiness was “a reward for virtue.” 3 Schelling examines two
philosophical systems that differ from this orthodox theology, dogmatism (Dogmatismus), bywhich he refers to Spinoza’s philosophy, and criticism (Kriticismus), by which he refers to Kant
and Fichte’s philosophy. 4 Schelling enthusiastically accepts Kant’s philosophy, whichinvestigates the conditions of possibility of human cognition, but he is dissatisfied with it on thefollowing points: Kant’s critical philosophy is not a complete philosophical system based on asingle fundamental principle that unifies the theoretical and practical reason, that is, nature andfreedom, while maintaining their separation. In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, the ideas of theunconditioned (God, freedom, and immortality) are unrecognizable and are postulated only tomake room for faith in God. Under the influence of Fichte, Schelling considers the unconditioned
as the absolute I, the unifying principle of subject and object, while, at the same time, he presents
Spinoza’s philosophy as an alternative to Kant’s.
Spinozism, first expressed in Jacobi’s Spinoza Letters (1785), had a great influence on young
Schelling. In his letter to Hegel of February 4, 1795, Schelling calls himself a Spinozist and writes
that “for Spinoza, the world (the absolute object opposed to the subject) was everything, for me
it is the I [Ich]” (AAIII, 1, 22). The difference between dogmatism and criticism lies in thequestion whether one departs from “the absolute object or not-I [Nicht-Ich]” and “the absolute I”(Ibid.). Schelling integrates Fichte’s idea of the absolute I and Spinoza’s idea of God as presented
in Ethics into the concept of the absolute. Spinoza’s philosophy, which presents God as the only
substance, has potential to transcend the limitations of Kant’s epistemology, which is restricted

2This is the text published in Bd. 2, Heft. 3 and in Bd. 3, Heft. 3 in the Philosophical Journal of a Society ofGerman Scholars (Philosophisches Journal einer Gesellschaft Teutscher Gelehrten) edited by Friedlich ImmanuelNiethammer (AAI, 3, 3).
3
Matsuyama 2014, 45–47. According to Matsuyama, orthodox theologians were interpreting Kant’s proof ofGod’s existence to their advantage and regarding God’s existence as a supernatural fact; by doing so, they underminedthe critical spirit of reason and took advantage of its weakness.
4
Schelling distinguishes between Dogmatismus and Dogmaticismus, and he calls Spinoza’s philosophy an
example of the former and Tübingen orthodox theology to the latter (AAI, 3, 7–9).

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YAHATA Sakura

to subjectivity, and unify theoretical and practical reason.
Schelling identifies problems with both Spinozan and Kantian or Fichtean philosophy andexplores a position for himself that is neither dogmatism nor criticism but that can resolve theconflict between freedom and necessity. In the eighth letter of the Philosophical Letters,
Schelling asserts that Spinoza “deceived himself” (AAI, 3, 88/SWI 319) about intellectual
intuition concerning the problems of the I and freedom. According to Schelling, Spinoza has
objectified the intuition of self, and he believes himself identical with the absolute and therefore“lost in its nonfiniteness” through intellectual intuition (Ibid.). Schelling calls intellectual
intuition the “intuition of self,” saying that “everything objective had vanished for him, in theintuition of himself” (Ibid.).
We can never get rid of our own selves. The ground for this lies in our absolute freedom,owing to which the ego [Ich] in us cannot be a thing [Ding], cannot be a matter [Sache]capable of objective determination. (AAI, 3, 89/SWI 320)
Intellectual intuition is the act of the self-intuition of the I. Absolute freedom as the essence ofhuman beings resides in the ego. If the I is abandoned, as occurs in Spinoza, the absolute freedom
present in the ego also disappears. Schelling regards “the acting ego” as “the determined and thedetermining” and acknowledges the self-determination of the I and intellectual intuition (Ibid.).
Spinoza, according to Schelling, presents the absolute state of beatitude in terms ofintellectual self-intuition (AAI, 3, 91/SWI 322). Schelling quotes Proposition 42 of Part V of
Spinoza’s Ethics: “Beatitude [Seeligkeit] is not the reward of virtue [Lohn der Tugend], it is virtue
itself,” and rephrases it to say that what is established in intellectual intuition with beatitude isvirtue itself (Ibid.). In the state of beatitude of intellectual intuition, all conflicts disappear, andall conflict between morality and happiness is resolved (Ibid.).
Morality itself cannot be the highest, it can be only an approximation of the absolute state,
only a striving for absolute freedom which no longer departs from any law, yet which also
does not know any law but the unalterable, eternal law of its own essence. If it is to bethought of as morally possible, happiness [Glückseeligkeit] can be thought of only as an
approximation [Annäherung] to a beatitude which no longer differs from morality andwhich therefore can no longer be a reward [Belohnung] of virtue. (AAI, 3, 91f./SWI 322)
Schelling criticizes orthodox theology through the above proposition. For Schelling, striving forthe absolute state of absolute freedom, the essence of human beings, is morality, and morality
and beatitude are identical. Therefore, “where there is absolute freedom, there is absolute
beatitude” (AAI, 3, 94/SWI 324).
According to the ninth letter, “all philosophy demands absolute thesis as the goal of allsynthesis,” but this thesis is thinkable only through “absolute identity,” hence both criticism anddogmatism “necessarily strive for absolute identity,” so both philosophies are combined (AAI, 3,
97f./SWI 327f.). The difference between the both philosophies is to be “intent immediately uponabsolute identity of the subject” or to be “immediately intent upon the identity of an absolute

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object” (AAI, 3, 98/SWI 328). Morality and happiness would be united in higher principle, thatis, “the principle either of absolute being or absolute beatitude” (AAI, 3, 98f./SWI 328).
Schelling proposes that freedom and necessity are not opposing principles, just as thedistinction between idealism and realism disappears when subject and object are identical.
He who has reflected upon freedom and necessity has found for himself that these two
principles must be united in the absolute: freedom, because the absolute acts byunconditional autonomy [Selbstmacht], and necessity, because it acts only according to
the laws of its own being, the inner necessity of its essence. In the absolute there is nolonger any will that could have reality independently of those acts. Absolute freedom andabsolute necessity are identical. (AAI, 3, 101/SWI 330f.)
Freedom and necessity are identical in the absolute, from the perspective of which, criticism anddogmatism are only distinguished in the way that they approach and realize the goal of theabsolute identity of subject and object (AAI, 3, 103/SWI 332). However, neither system makethe absolute “an object of knowledge,” so they aim “to make the absolute, an object of action, or,to demand the action by which the absolute is realized” (AAI, 3, 103/SWI 333). Thus, the twosystems are united in terms of how they realize the absolute, Schelling chooses a third way.
The realization of the absolute through action is shown in the unity of human freedom andthe necessity of the objective world represented by art, especially tragedy. According to the tenthletter, the possibility of confronting an objective power that threatens our freedom and failing is
no longer left to reason but is only found in tragedy, such as that of the Greeks (AAI, 3, 106/SWI
336). The contradiction between freedom of the subject and the objective power of fate can only
be borne by “a mortal” (ein Sterblicher).
A mortal, designed by fate to become a malefactor and himself fighting against this fate,is nevertheless appallingly punished for the crime, although it was the deed of destiny!
The ground of this contradiction, that which made the contradiction bearable, lay deeper
than one would seek it. It lay in the contest between human freedom and the power of theobjective world in which the mortal must succumb necessarily if that power is absolutely
superior, if it is fate. And yet he must be punished for succumbing because he did not
succumb without a struggle. That the malefactor who succumbed under the power of fate
was punished, this tragic fact was the recognition [Anerkennung] of human freedom; it
was the honor [Ehre] due to freedom. Greek tragedy honored human freedom, letting its
hero fight against superior power of fate. (AAI, 3, 106f./SWI 336)
Voluntary acceptance of punishment means defeat by fate but remains a choice made by a freehuman will. Failing through the expression of this free will is the only path left for human freedom.
Greek tragedy paradoxically proves the existence of human freedom through the hero’s tragic
fight against fate and his downfall, and it recognizes the existence of absolute freedom as theessence of the human, which is recognized by neither dogmatism nor criticism. It is the resolutionof conflict and the realization of human freedom by one person in the tragedy that is “theYAHATA Sakura

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recognition of human freedom” and “a great thought” about freedom (AAI, 3, 107/SWI 336f.).
Schelling leaves open the possibilities of human freedom by regarding Greek tragedy as arecognition of human freedom through the hero’s downfall before the objectivity of fate. This
perspective is precisely appropriate for the interpretation of Oedipus Tyrannus. Peter Szondi
assesses Schelling’s interpretation of Oedipus to find positive value in the protagonist’s attitude
toward undertaking punishment.5 Juichi Matsuyama characterizes the “realization of freedom”
in the fall of Oedipus as peripeteias a modern interpretation, understanding it as self-annihilation
carried out in opposition to Kant’s concept of freedom.6 As these scholars point out, for Schellinghuman freedom appears in the seemingly negative moment when the tragic hero voluntarily
accepts punishment and failure. This recognition of freedom is only shown by the ultimate choice
in Greek tragedy, which is not shown in question of the two choices of Spinoza’s objective world
and Kant’s freedom of the will. This recognition of freedom based on the idea of reversal is an
original feature in Schelling’s theory of tragedy.

2. Conflict and Indifference between Freedom and Necessity in Tragedy inPhilosophy of Art
In the Philosophy of Art, Schelling defines his approach to art in terms of the philosophy ofidentity, which develops both spirit and nature according to absolute reason. For Schelling, thephilosophy of art argues the absolute in the form of art, so he defines the philosophy of art asfollows: “the philosophy of art is the science of the All in the form or potency of art” (AAII, 6, 1,
114/SWV 368). Schelling holds that the absolute appears in the real or ideal world only when
posited in different determinations, and the ideal determinations are to be understood as potency(Potenz) (AAII, 6, 1, 112/SWV 365). Schelling integrates the idea of potency into themathematical meaning of exponentiation by repeating the same elements and constructions at
higher stages, which he calls Potenzierung. The absolute remains always in the identity of theparticular and the universal, but the work of art takes the form of an opposition of the particularand the universal (AAII, 6, 1, 116/SWV 370f.). Depending on whether they exist in the particular
or in the universal, genres of art are divided into real unity and ideal unity; the plastic arts, whichbring the infinite universal into finite things, fall into the former group, but the literary arts are in
the latter group, as they bring the particular into the infinite. Genres of art can be classified bypotency (Potenzierung) into those having real unity, ideal unity, and indifference of both:indicated by music, painting, and sculpture within the plastic arts, and lyrics, epic poetry, anddrama in literary arts.
The three stages of potency indicate “particularity or difference,” “identity,” and “theuniversal and the particular are one” (AAII, 6, 1, 328/SWV 639). The lyric poem, the real form,
is the “most subjective poetic genre,” and freedom is dominant in it, beginning with theparticularity of subjectivity and ending with an objective portrayal (AAII, 6, 1, 328/SWV 640).
By contrast, in the epic poem, the ideal form, the act as history is objectively described as within
5
6

Szondi 1961, 159.
Matsuyama 2014, 87–90.

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the absolute identity, in which there is no struggle between human freedom and necessity ofdestiny, indicating pure necessity or pure identity (AAII, 6, 1, 369/SWV 691). Drama, at a thirdlevel of potency, expresses the unity of the particular and the universal. In the drama the action“is itself actually presented” (AAII, 6, 1, 369/SWV 692), that is, human actions are not portrayedin the narrative, but rather are presented in a performance. Drama is defined as the “final synthesisof all poesy” (Ibid.), being neither subjective nor objective, and tragedy is taken as the highest
appearance of art, representing a complete indifference between the ideal and the real.
Schelling acknowledges the struggle against freedom and fate in tragedy and calls for an art
form that is simultaneously subjective and objective. The essence of tragedy is defined in thechapter “On Tragedy” as follows.
The essence of tragedy is thus an actual and objective conflict between freedom in thesubject on the one hand, and necessity on the other, a conflict that does not end such that
one or the other succumbs, but rather such that both are manifested in perfect indifference
as simultaneously victorious and vanquished. (AAII, 6, 1, 371/SWV 693)
The conflict between and unification of subject and object and of freedom and necessity, is afundamental issue in the philosophy of identity and is a theme that is also common to thephilosophy of art. The tragic hero strives to act through his own will, but his actions are alreadydetermined by the mighty and objective power of fate. Schelling acknowledges the fact of aconflict between freedom and necessity in human beings’ attempt to realize their own freedom in
opposition to fate, which is decisive, and finds the essence of tragedy to be in the way that thisconflict ends in indifference.
For Schelling, the absolute indifference between freedom and necessity must “besymbolized” in and through human nature (AAII, 6, 1, 368/SWV 690). The human nature, inwhich freedom and necessity are bound up with one another, must be represented by individuals,
who are called “persons” (Personen) (Ibid.). The indifference between freedom and necessity
appears in the person, “who succumbs to necessity can elevate himself above it through thedisposition [Gesinnung]” (AAII, 6, 1, 368/SWV 691). The German word Gesinnung refers to theindividual’s consciousness or pattern of thinking, but Schelling uses this word to refer to the goodand courageous attitude of the protagonist’s moral person as expressed in a tragedy. If theprotagonist’s mental attitude is brave and great, he accepts the misfortunes that come his way as
fate and admits his guilt. Through the moral attitudes and actions of the protagonist, freedom
becomes elevated to a being that can overcome the mighty inevitability that continues to threaten
and dominate human beings. Thus, disposition is the principle that guides the moral actions of
the subject. Against this background, we observe the influence of Kant’s moral philosophy, which
understands disposition as the maxim of the will to fulfill obligations according to moral laws.
The relationship between freedom and necessity, brought about by moral action through the
hero’s disposition, is not resolved when one of the two overcomes the other but is a seemingly
contradictory state in which both overcome each other and are overcome at the same time. In
resisting necessity, freedom raises itself to a position equal to that necessity and comes to appear
as objective as the necessity. In this appearance, freedom and necessity, which had been separate

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and opposed, appear having “equality in being” (Gleichseyn) (AAII, 6, 1, 368/SWV 690), without
being equally distinct from each other. Schelling calls the state where freedom and necessity are
equal in power and being absolute indifference. At this stage, the resistance of freedom tonecessity no longer exists, and freedom appears as absolute freedom (AAII, 6, 1, 369/SWV 691).
For Schelling, art is the reintegration of the originally identical through the separation of freedom
and necessity and its presentation as indifference. Thus, art objectifies the absolute, the originalidentity, as true and absolute indifference, and tragedy is its highest expression (AAII, 6, 1,
368/SWV 690).
Schelling indicates that in what kind of tragedy, the struggle between freedom and necessity
appears by considering what type of person in tragedy falls into misfortune. First, as tragedy does
not occur if necessity determines the good, only “when necessity imposes evil [das Uebele]” does
necessity appear to be in conflict with freedom (AAII, 6, 1, 371/SWV 694). Referring toAristotle’s Poetics, Schelling defines the persons and misfortunes that tragedy should represent.
The tragic hero must be neither good, nor bad, nor very bad, but a person mediating between
these who falls from very happy and well-regarded state into misfortune. The subject of tragedy
is “a person who is exceptional as regards neither virtue nor justice [Gerechtigkeit], and who does
not fall into misfortune as a result of wickedness [Laster] or crime [Verbrechen], but rather as aresult of error [Irrthum]” (Ibid.). Only such a tragic subject can give rise to “sympathy” (Mitleid)or “fright” (Schrecken).7
This perspective, however, differs from Aristotle’s Poetics. Aristotle requires that tragedy
should show how the eminent men have passed into adversity through error (ἁμαρτία) andremoves the necessity of fate or God from the plots of tragedy insofar possible as he can. 8
Schelling, however, asserts that guilt does not come about through error, but “through the will ofdestiny and an unavoidable fate [Verhängniß]” or “by the vengeance [Rache] of the gods” (AAII,
6, 1, 372/SWV 695). To be touched by an unavoidable fate is “the highest possible misfortune[Unglück]” (Ibid.), and guilt comes from the beginning as inevitable.
In Schelling’s view of human beings, the actions of the hero are already determined by fate,even if they seem to be chosen by himself. No matter how a person tries to resist fate, freedom
appears to have no choice but to succumb to overwhelming necessity. However, as freedom rises
to parity with necessity, the struggle between freedom and necessity does not remain a conflictbut ends in a state where “both are manifested in perfect indifference as simultaneously victorious
and vanquished” (AAII, 6, 1, 371/SWV 693).
This is the greatest idea and the greatest victory of freedom: voluntarily to bear the7This characterization of the subject of tragedy is almost a word-for-word quotation from Chapter 13 ofAristotle’s Poetics. According to Aristotle, the best tragedies are complex, not simple, and represent fearful (φοβερóν)and pitiable (ἐλεεινóν) events. The plots of the finest tragedies do not show any of the following three cases: 1)changing from prosperity to adversity, 2) changing adversity to prosperity, and 3) the very wicked person’s fallingfrom prosperity to adversity. This leaves only case: 4) the person in between these cases, such a person is someone
not preeminent in virtue and justice, and one who falls into adversity not thorough evil and depravity, but throughsome kinds of error (1452b32–1453a12). For quotations from the Poetics, I quote from the OCT and give the pageand line numbers from Bekker edition.
8
Cf. The translator’s note Nr. 9 to the Chapter 13, Matsumoto, N. and Oka, M. 2008, 166.

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punishment for an unavoidable transgression in order to manifest his freedom precisely
in the loss of that very same freedom, and to perish amid a declaration of free will.
This, as presented here as well as in my own Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism andCriticism, is the innermost spirit of the Greek tragedy. This is the basis for thereconciliation and harmony residing in that tragedy, the reason it does not devastate us,
but rather leaves us feeling healed and, as Aristotle says, cleansed. (AAII, 6, 1, 373/SWV
697)
In addition to the paradoxical recognition of human freedom by its fall in the Philosophical
Letters, a state of harmonious indifference must appear in tragedy. Here, we can observe
Schelling’s intention to incorporate the recognition of freedom in Philosophical Letters into
tragedy found on the philosophy of identity in the Philosophy of Art. Juichi Matsuyama interprets
Schelling’s previously cited understanding of tragedy (AAII, 6, 1, 371/SWV 693) as containing
double meaning, synthesizing a conflict between freedom and necessity as well as theindifference between them. Further, Matsuyama notes the appropriateness of Eumenides andOedipus at Colonus for the philosophy of identity, which defines absolute identity as afundamental principle; as Prometheus Bound and Oedipus Tyrannus, which Schelling considers
to be archetypes of tragedy, do not fit the definition based on the reconciliation and harmony ofthe philosophy of identity, we seem to find a breakthrough in the thesis of the philosophy ofidentity in this thought of freedom.9 Certainly, the definition of tragedy in the Philosophy of Art
emphasizes human freedom through the abandonment of the subjective ego, which is in common
with the Philosophical Letters, and the harmonious and conciliatory character based on thephilosophy of identity. However, according to the definition of tragedy and the previous quotation(AAII, 6, 1, 373/SWV 697), the essential element to bring about reconciliation and harmony intragedy results from the recognition of freedom through struggle and downfall; the harmonious
state must be brought about through the proof of freedom. Therefore, both struggle andindifference are shown in a tragic work.

3. Analysis of Oedipus Tyrannus and the Tragic Sublime
Although Schelling deals with several tragic works in Philosophy of Art,10 he finds theexpression of freedom to be predominant in Sophocles’s Oedipus Tyrannus. That tragedy begins
with a scene in which Oedipus, King of Thebes, is given the message of an oracle telling how hecan save his kingdom from disaster: by finding the murderer of the previous king, Laius. Noneof the earlier story that occurred before this scene is given at the beginning of the play, andOedipus himself is completely unaware of the murder. The carefully calculated plot structure
moves from Oedipus’s search for the murderer to his discovery of the truth. In Oedipus’s past,
several characters worked to avoid the horrible prophecy that Oedipus would kill his father, marry9

Matsuyama 2014, 136–138.
Schelling lists the three major Greek tragic poets and their works, including Aeschylus’s Eumenides andPrometheus Bound, Sophocles’s Oedipus Tyrannus, Oedipus at Colonus, and Antigone.
10

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70with his own mother, and beget with her that unfortunate line of sons and daughters. Despite thiseffort, Oedipus is unable to resist the force of fate, and the prophecy is fulfilled. Oedipus finallyrealizes who he is, admits his guilt, and gouges out his eyes so he could not see the truth.11
Aristotle, in his Poetics, praised Oedipus Tyrannus for simultaneously expressing the twonecessary components of tragedy: 1) reversal (περιπέτεια), in which a well-intentioned action
leads to the opposite results, leading from good fortune to bad fortune, making a change to send
events in the opposite direction, and 2) recognition (ἀναγνώριϭις), is a change from ignorance toknowledge.12
Schelling understands Oedipus’s guilt not as a mistake but as harm inflicted on him byinevitable fate. It is only after all of the prophecies have been realized that Oedipus recognizes
the truth; therefore, “Oedipus’s fate thus fulfills itself unknown to him” (AAII, 6, 1, 372/SWV
696). According to Schelling, nothing occurs by chance in a tragedy, and everything is necessary.
For example, that Oedipus encounters Laius is also “necessary for the fulfillment of fate” (AAII,
6, 1, 375/SWV 699). Every action of Oedipus is an inevitable act that fulfills the oracle, which isdriven by a destiny beyond his will, although it is seemingly done consciously by free will.
For Schelling, the recognition of freedom clearly occurs in Oedipus Tyrannus where
Oedipus gouges out his eyes. 13 What is expressed there is no longer freedom “as mere
particularity” in opposition to necessity but freedom that “elevates itself to universality” to theequal of necessity (AAII, 6, 1, 373/SWV 697).14 At this level, “the only genuinely tragic elementin tragedy” appears (AAII, 6, 1, 374/SWV 697).
The recognition of freedom brings about the sublime, which frees and purifies the soul from
suffering. According to Schelling, when the tragic hero accepts his fate without doubt, that is, “atthe moment of highest suffering,” he simultaneously enters into “the highest liberation andgreatest dispassion [Leidenslosigkeit]” (AAII, 6, 1, 374/SWV 698). The power of fate, which is
absolute, is overcome by the will, becoming no longer absolutely great but only relatively great.
When fate and will are equally balanced, “the symbol of the absolutely great, namely, of thesublime disposition [die erhabene Gesinnung]” appears (Ibid.). Schelling considers the inevitableguilt of the originally “guiltless guilty person” as “the greatest conceivable misfortune” and thevoluntary punishment of this person by his own hand to be “the sublimity in the tragedy” (AAII,
6, 1, 375/SWV 699). It is only through the sublime act of voluntary acceptance of the punishment
for inevitable sin that freedom is elevated to reach necessity, with the highest identity or
indifference. The inner disposition of the hero is not subjective but becomes the principle thatunifies absolute greatness with the hero himself and makes him act. It is essential for therealization of freedom that the hero’s inner disposition be represented as a sublime action,
11

The legend of Oedipus is narrated in Homer’s epic poem, but the scene where Oedipus gouges out his eyes
is Sophocles’s creation. Cf. the translator’s commentary of Oedipus Tyrannus, in: Fujisawa 2000, 142f.
12
Aristotle, Poetics, 1452a22–1452a33.
13“It was Apollo, Apollo, my friend, who accomplished there cruel, cruel sufferings of mine! And no other
hand stuck my eyes, but my own miserable hand!” (1329–1332). Citation from the OCT.
14
Matsuyama understands that the sorrow of Oedipus (1329–1335) represents the battle between human beingsand God, where human beings is elevated to the place where only God should be, and interprets this as the reflectionof the philosophy of tragedy in the philosophy of art to the understanding of human beings in Schelling’s Freedom
Essay. Matsuyama 2011, 233f.

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sublimity and freedom become inseparable.
Schelling presents the real and ideal sides of genius as follows: the former informs the flowof the infinite into the finite and the latter informs the finite into the infinite, calling each “poesy”(Poesie) and “art” (Kunst) (AAII, 6, 1, 190/SWV 461). Poesy and art, the two sides of genius, areexpressed in works of art as “sublimity” and “beauty” (Ibid.). In other words, sublimity and thebeauty each a unity with different directions. However, according to Schelling, there can beneither sublimity without beauty nor beauty without sublimity. The sublime, where it is not
beautiful but only horrible, is only “monstrous or adventurous,” so it cannot be called theerhabene and it requires “limitation” (Begrenzung) of beauty (AAII, 6, 1, 196/SWV 468f.).
Whether there is more of the unlimited or the limited determines whether the nature of sublimity
or beauty is stronger. Relative to the absolute, there is no qualitative opposition between sublimityand beauty, but rather “a quantitative opposition” (AAII, 6, 1, 196/SWV 469).15 Beauty and thesublime are determined on the basis of the philosophy of identity, which holds that differencesamong all things are grounded in quantitative difference.
Schelling finds the object of the sublime in both nature and disposition. The sublime ofnature is “a sensory object” but one that would cause our faculties to vanish into nothingness inrelation to its size or power (AAII, 6, 1, 190f./SWV 462).16 Like Schiller, Schelling describes anature that is inaccessible to our powers of comprehension, namely, “the sum of all the blind
forces too powerful,” and it is “chaos,”17 and he considers it to be “the fundamental intuition of
the sublime” (AAII, 6, 1, 193/SWV 465). The intuition of chaos itself lies within “the intuitionof the absolute,” and it becomes “symbol of the infinite” (Ibid.).
Referring to Friedrich Schiller’s essay On the Sublime (1801), Schelling connects the
sublime to the infinite.18 When man can sensitively intuit the immeasurable mass and power ofnature, they become only relative infinity, but when man can intuit the true “absolute grandeur[Große]” within the nature, “the infinity itself,” relative infinity becomes “the mirror” to intuit
the absolute infinity (AAII, 6, 1, 191/SWV 463). Thus, the “intuition of the truly infinite within
the infinite of nature” is the intuition of the sublime, and then the nature becomes the symbol of
the infinite itself (Ibid.). The infinite has no form, making it “formlessness” (Formlosigkeit)(AAII, 6, 1, 193/SWV 465), but the intuition of the infinite is aesthetically intuited in the externalthings of nature, and it is called “an aesthetic intuition” (eine ästhetische Anschauung) (AAII, 6,
1, 192/SWV 463).19 Because Schelling’s aesthetic intuition is a kind of intellectual intuition, theintuition of the sublime is also included in intellectual intuition. Here, we find a concept of the

15

A goddess in which beauty dominates is Juno as “sublime beauty,” while a goddess in which sublimity
dominates is Minerva as “beautiful sublimity” (AAII, 6, 1, 196/SWV 469).
16
Schelling quotes the two kinds of the notion of sublime from Schiller’s On the Sublime, but it is not exact
quotes, but rather modifications to his own theory. Cf. Schiller, Über das Erhabene, 42.
17
Cf. Ibid. 48.
18
Cf. Ibid. 46f.
19
According to Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), the aesthetic intuition is “the intellectual
intuition which has become objective” (die objektiv gewordene intellectuelle [Anschauung]) (AAI, 9, 1, 325 / SWIII,625).

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72

sublime that is not based on subjective feelings of pleasure and displeasure.20
The infinite appears in the sublime through the disposition. For Schelling, since “thedisposition or the principle by which the finite is reduced to a symbol of the infinite is actuallyfound in the subject,” nature is not sublime in itself, and only in art is the object itself sublime(AAII, 6, 1, 195/SWV 468). In particular, the sublime in tragedy is the sublime of the disposition,and it is called “the genuinely tragically sublime.”
The genuinely tragically sublime depends for just this reason on two conditions, namely,that the moral person capitulate to the forces of nature and simultaneously be victorious
through his inner disposition [Gesinnung]. (AAII, 6, 1, 195/SWV 467)
Nature is overlaid with destiny. The tragic hero is destroyed by misfortune, which is a necessary
element of “the ethically sublime” (das sittlich-Erhabene) (Ibid.). This is because, just as fateleads Oedipus to his downfall, the struggle against misfortune tests a person’s courage, and when
this struggle “neither wins a physical victory nor capitulates morally,” the protagonist emerges
as “the symbol of the infinite” that transcends all suffering (Ibid.). Schelling recognizes the truly
ideal sublime in the tragedy by Sophocles, seeing that the ethically sublime person who
overcomes fate can be embodied in himself only through the disposition of the hero (Ibid.). The
triumph of human free will over necessity through the disposition is expressed precisely as the
choice not to flee from a harsh fate but to courageously accept punishment like Oedipus.
The higher morality, as seen through the actions of freewill, which is infinite within humanbeings, is represented in the tragic persona in art. The disposition is not merely a subjective
movement of the mind but a morality permeated by infinity, embodied in the person of the tragic
hero. Schelling’s idea of high morality, realized through the sublime disposition, corresponds to
Schiller’s definition of dignity (Würde) as “the expression of a sublime disposition [erhabene
Gesinnung]” in On Grace and Dignity (1793).21 As infinite morality exists in integration withthe tragic hero, he becomes a symbol of the sublime disposition. Schelling defines the symbol asfollows: “Representation of the absolute with absolute indifference of the universal and theparticular within the particular is possible only symbolically”; the representation of the absolutein this way is accomplished in art, and its material is sought in mythology (AAII, 6, 1, 145/SWV
406). Universal freedom, namely morality, is united with the particular of Oedipus and presented
in the real thing of a tragic work.
The realization of the sublime in the hero is intuited by the spectator through the chorus.
Schelling emphasizes the role of the chorus at the end of his theory of tragedy as follows: “itelevates the spectator completely away from the common desire for deception directly into thehigher realm of true art and of symbolic portrayal” (AAII, 6, 1, 380/SWV 705). The chorus
represents “objectivized reflection accompanying the action,” and “a continuous means of
20

J. F. Courtine also indicates Schiller’s renovation of the notion of sublime; Schelling eliminates the relation
to the subject, which since Kant firmly belonged to the definition of the sublime, and thus “the infinite itself” appears
in the contemplation of the sublime which Schiller already discussed though without drawing all consequences fromit. Courtine 1998, 196f.
21
Schiller, Über Anmut und Würde, 289.

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73

comfort and reconciliation” (AAII, 6, 1, 380/SWV 706). The conflict between freedom anddestiny as played out on stage would be a horrible event, willed with fear, as it is. Tragedy as
performed is recaptured and reflected upon by the songs of the chorus, and here, the spectator is
not tormented by pain and horror but is guided toward a “more serene reflection” and relieved of“the feeling of pain” (Ibid.). The chorus allows the spectator to intuit the entire noble morality
not merely as something terrible but also as something beautiful. The chorus, which alleviates
suffering and moves the spectator to emotion, is a mediating device between the play and thespectator, an essential function of tragedy that fosters reconciliation. Schelling praises ancient
Greek tragedy as the best version of this form, as modern tragedy lacks chorus.22
Finally, this paper examines the ontological position of freedom realized in the tragic hero.
Katia Hay disagrees with Dieter Jähnig’s interpretation of the tragic hero as a “medium” (Mittel)
or “place” (Stätte) for the realization of the true purpose of tragedy; she asserts that “Oedipus
does not offer a sacrifice for the representation of an absolute superhuman [übermenschlich]
freedom, but symbolizes […] the highest realization of the freedom, and the realization of his
own freedom.”23 As Hay points out, the image of Oedipus that Schelling takes up in his theoryof tragedy is not the medium of freedom as something beyond human beings, as Jähnig interprets
it, but freedom realized through action by the hero’s moral mental, attitude or inner disposition.
In line with Schelling’s argument, the freedom presented as a symbol in the hero has infinity oruniversality, but it is not merely ideal: it is real in human beings. Schelling discovers thepossibility of realization of this human freedom in the actions of Oedipus. Oedipus fights again
and again to defy his fate and finally gains the true freedom through his own downfall. The heroof Greek tragedy possesses “an absoluteness of character” (AAII, 6, 1, 376/SWV 700), where
heroes are moral people who are able to perform actions through their own characters: and in thissense, Oedipus is a hero. Schelling finds the “noble, great morality” (edle und große Sitten) of
Greek tragedy in this image of hero (AAII, 6, 1, 377/SWV 701). In the heroic figure of Greek
tragedy, there is a freedom that can be won by humans through action rather than being
recognition by or in God.

Conclusion
Schelling took the idea of the recognition of human freedom in Philosophical Letters to thefundamental idea of tragedy in the Philosophy of Art, and provided a complete theory of tragedy
as a theory of an art genre. For Schelling, Oedipus Tyrannus is an ideal tragedy that expresses theabsolute indifference of freedom and necessity, and at the same time, it embodies the recognitionof human freedom. The downfall of the voluntary acceptance of punishment paradoxicallyrecognizes human freedom, and thus the tragic hero becomes a symbol of the sublime, that is, asymbol that presents infinite freedom and high morality as an united whole within itself. The
theory of tragedy in the Philosophy of Art is a development of the theory of human freedom

22

Schelling ctiticizes Schiller’s The Bride of Messina for reviving the chorus. This paper does not discuss thetheory of the chorus in detail but it does recognize its role in the amplification of fear. Cf. Matsuyama 2014, 165f.
23
Hay 2012, 96. Cf. Jähnig 1969, 247f.

74

YAHATA Sakurapresented in Philosophical Letters, and it can be understood as an idea that developed under thephilosophy of identity. The tragic theory in both works can be interpreted as Schelling’s attempt
to elucidate freedom as essential and real to human beings.
References
Schelling’s Writings in German
For the citations from Schelling’s works in this article, I translate original German texts into
English by reference to the English translations of Schelling’s Philosophical Letters by Marti and
the Philosophy of Art by Stott.
AA: Historisch-kritische Ausgabe. hrsg. im Auftrag der Schelling-Kommission der Bayerischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1976ff.
SW: Schelling’s Sämmtliche Werke. hrsg. von K. F. A. Schelling. Stuttgart/Augsburg 1856–1861.
Schelling’s Writings in English Translation
Schelling, F. W. J.: The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, D. W., University of Minnesota Press,
1989.
Schelling, F. W. J.: Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, in: The Unconditional in
Human Knowledge: Four Early Essays (1794–1796), trans. Marti, F., Lewisburg: Bucknell
University Press, 1980, 156–218.
Other Works
Aristotle: Poetics, in: Aristotelis de arte poetica liber (Oxford Classical Texts), Kassel, R. (ed.),Oxford University Press, 1965.
Courtine, J. F. (1998): Tragödie und Erhabenheit: Die spekulative Interpretation des „König
Ödipus“ an der Schwelle des deutschen Idealismus, in: Die Realität des Wissens und das
wirkliche Dasein: Erkenntnisbegründung und Philosophie des Tragischen beim frühen
Schelling, hrsg. von Jantzen, J., Schellingiana Bd. 10, Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog,
161–210.
Fuhrmans, H. (1960): Dokumente zur Schellingforschung IV, in: Kant-Studien, Bd. 51, Issue 14, 14–26.
Fujisawa, N. (2000): The translator’s commentary of Oedipus Tyrannus, in: Sophocles, Oedipus
Tyrannus [in Japanese], trans. Fujisawa, N., Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten.
Hay, K. (2012): Die Notwendigkeit des Scheiterns, Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber.
Jähnig, D. (1969): Die Wahrheitsfunktion der Kunst, Schelling: die Kunst in der Philosophie; Bd.
2, Pfullingen: Günther Neske.
Matsumoto, N. and Oka, M. (2008): The translator’s note of Poetics, in: Aristotle, Poetics [inJapanese], trans. Matsumoto, N. and Oka, M., Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten.
Matsuyama, J. (2011): Freiheit und Notwendigkeit: Zur Poetik und Philosophie des Tragischen
bei Aristoteles und Schelling, in: Die Philosophie des Tragischen: Schopenhauer,
Schelling, Nietzsche, hrsg. von Hühn, L., Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 223–246.
Matsuyama, J. (2014): Philosophy of Tragedy: A Ray of Light of Schelling’s Philosophy of Art[in Japanese], Nara: Kizasu-shobo.

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Schiller, F.: Über Anmut und Würde, in: Schillers Werke, Nationalausgabe, unter Mitwirkung vonKoopmann, H., hrsg. von Weise, B., Weimar. Bd. 20, 1962, 251–308.
Schiller, F.: Über das Erhabene, in: Schillers Werke, Nationalausgabe, unter Mitwirkung vonKoopmann, H., hrsg. von Weise, B., Weimar, Bd. 21, 1963, 38–54.
Sophocles : Oedipus Tyrannus, in: Lloyd-Jones, H. et Wilson. N. G. (ed.), Sophoclis Fabulae(Oxford Classical Texts), Oxford University Press, 1990.
Szondi, P. (1961): Versuch über das Tragische, in: Schriften, Bd.1, Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011, 149–
260.