1Nyåyasiddhåñjana
of Vedånta Deßika

An Annotated Translation

Toshihiro MIKAMI

2Nyåyasiddhåñjana
of Vedånta Deßika
An Annotated Translation
by Toshihiro MIKAMI

0. Introduction
0.0.

(1,1–40,1)

Maµgala(2,1–3,2)

I, [named] ‘a lord of [Mount] Veµkatha,’ being abundant in prosperity (ßr¥mat),whose knowledge attains the purport of the top of ßrutis, [namely, Upanishads], andwhose purpose is acquired through [Ótraya-]Råmånuja-åcårya,1 who was devoted to thevenerable Varadårya,2 will write [a book] (or prescribe [medicine]) [named] “The MagicalOintment (siddhåñjana) of Valid Logic” so as to decide the true reality (tattva) for
beginners whose knowledge (or sight) (d®ß) is sunk because of the connection with themultitude (pa†ala) of endless delusions (or with [eye disease named] pa†ala causing
endless delusions). // 1 //This [book] begins in order to purify the reality hidden by dancers of various
opinions who are different in the subject: [what is] real and [what is] unreal. // 2 // [3]I have already shown ‘prameya’ briefly at the end of my Nyåyaparißuddhi3; here
it will be explained again in detail. // 3 //0.1.

What is prameya?

(3,3–5,1)

1(Ótreya) Råmånuja (1220–1310), alias Vådihaµsåmbuda, is the maternal uncle
and the guru of Vedånta Deßika. [Raghavan 19; Singh 130f.; Dasgupta 118f.].
2

Varadåcårya (1165–1275) [Singh 127f.]. Dasgupta 119, esp. fn.

3

Chap.5 [ed. Viraraghavachari, pp.305ff.].

3

Brahman, which has all spiritual and non-spiritual beings as Its mode (prakåra)[or body], is the sole reality.
Though there is complete difference between the modes and One which hasmode or between the modes mutually, [4] [scriptures] speak of the identity and denywhat is other than it with the intention of speaking that [Brahman] qualified [by various
modes] is one etc.4 Because, otherwise, all means of valid knowledge [which clearlyshow the difference] would be violated. [5]And this very [Brahman, which is qualified by various modes] in this way, iscalled ‘prameya’ because, in general, it is the object of valid knowledge (pramåvishaya)and, in particular, it is the prominent object of knowledge (prakarsheˆa meyam).5 [7]Division between dravya and adravya

0.2.

Definition of dravya and adravya

0.2.1.

(7,1–16,1)(7,1–2)

Everything included in It is classified into substance (dravya) and non-substance(adravya). Substance is material (upådåna); material is that which is the substratum ofsome conditions (avasthå).6 Non-substance is what is not so.7
0.2.2.

The distinction between dharma and dharmin

0.2.2.1.

Proof based on pratyaksha(7,2–16,1)(7,2–11,2)

This distinction between substance [or dharmin, i.e. the substratum of conditions]and non-substance [or dharma] is proved by force of the perception [in the form “a pot
4“Etc.” means, according to R(anµgaråmånuja's commentary), its importanceetc.; accoding to K(®shˆatåtårya's commentary), it means the non-absence of anotherreality which is devoid of being qualifier (vißeshaˆatå) not established separately(ap®thaksiddha) from Brahman.
5Here prameya is derived in two different ways: (1) (pra+√må)+yaT;(2) pra+(√må+yaT); cf. “pËravaµ dhåtur upasargeˆa yujyate paßcåt pratyayena. .... pËrvam
dhåtu pratyayena yujyate paßcåd upasargeˆa” quoted in R (the same passage is found inNågeßabha††a's Paribhåshendußekhara). In this regard, the commentators quote the passageof the Nyåyaparißudhi (=NyP), chap. on prameya, the second day lesson: “Here according
to the derivation that prameya is the object of valid knowledge, all that is not superimposedis called ‘prameya’ because it is of non-superimposed form; still, what is [really] intended
here is that prameya is the excellent object of knowledge as being inherent subsidiary ofsuperior happiness for one who desirous of it” (atra yady api pramåvishaya˙ prameyam
iti vyupattyå ''ropitåkåravyavacchedårthatayå 'nåropitarËpaµ sarvaµ prameyaµ tathåpi
ni˙ßreyasåntaraµgatayå tadarthibhi˙ prakarsheˆa meyaµ prameyam iha vivakshitam)[318,2–4, ed. Viraraghavachari]. According to this, the second intepretation is his favorite
one. The Yat¥ndramatad¥pikå (ed. Adidevananda: abbr. to YMD) adopts this interpretation[IV. 1].
6

See 357,5ff.

7

In the chapter on adravya, it is technaicaly defined as saµyogarahitam [443,1].

has color” and the like] [8].

4

It is impossible to deny either of the two by means of the logic of Buddhists etc.8
The reasons are—
There is the practical usage (vyavahåra) of the distinction between color (rËpa)and the colored (rËpin) etc., which is not sublated (abådhita) and cannot be explained inother way (anayathåsiddha); [accordingly, this distinction cannot be delusion].
Seeing and touching, whose faculties are restricted to color and touch respectively,
identify9 (pratisandhåna) one and the same thing as being the substratum of [the two in
the form “I am touching what I saw10”]; [this identification could not be explained
without the one entity which has both color and touch].11 Even if grasped [dharmas]
coexist, grasping [faculty] does not violate the restriction concerning its own object:[seeing perceives only color and touching perceives only touch]; [accordingly, thesubstratum of the dharmas, which is recognized by both seeing and touching, cannot bedenied].
Further, another [positive entity being] limiting adjunct12 (upådhi) [which brings
8

Buddhists deny substance (or dharmin) for the reason that there is no substratumof [dharmas] such as color (rËpåder åßrayåbhåvåt); The Advaitins deny non-substance(or dharma) for the reason that only one [dharma, namely Brahman], which is falsely
imagined as [dharmas] such as color, is really existence (rËpåditayå
vikalpyamånasyaikasyaiva vå sattvåt). See Sarvårthasiddhi (Mysore ed.: abbr. to SAS)
I. 8: 24,2f.
9

pratisandhånam apy åtmagocaraµ pratyabhijñåvißesha eva; “yo 'hamadråkshaµ sa eva sp®ßåmi” ityevamådirËpatvåt [NyP 296,11f.].
10

Cf. “Between the [two doctorine], firstly the [Buddhist doctoirne] that there isno substratum [of dharmas] is refuted by means of particular recognition. That is, thereis the knowledge concerning [one] object grasped by two [different] sense organs in theform: I am touching what I have seen” (tatra nirådhåratvaµ tåvat pratisandhånavißesheˆanirasyati / asti hi d®sh†am eva sp®ßåm¥ti dv¥ndriyagråhyavastuvishayå dh¥˙) [SAS I. 8:25,6f.]. Though pointing out the direct perception “I touch what I see” is enough toprove the distinctin between dharma and dharmin, the recognition is pointed out with
the intention refuting kshaˆabhaµga also [SAS I. 8: 26,4f.].
11“The object of such [recognition by both seeing and touching] is not merecolor. Because [color] cannot be the object of touching; otherwise, even a blind person
could grasp color by touching. Nor is [it] mere touch. Because [touch] also cannot be
the object of seeing; if it were so, we could grasp the touch of a thing, even if it is nottouched, through seeing. Nor is [it] both [color and touch]. Because the two are theobjects of seeing and touching separately. Therefore, this recognition proves the existent,[i.e. dharmin], which is other than [dharma] such as color and is the subsratum of them;it has color and touch” (seyaµ na rËpamåtragocarå; tasya sparßanavishayatvåbhåvåt,anyathåndhasyåpi sparßanena rËpopalambhaprasaµgåt / na ca sparßamåtragocarå; tasyåpi
d®gvishayatvåbhåvåt, tathåtve cåsp®ßato 'pi d®ßå sparßadh¥prasaµgåt / na cobhayavishayå;darßanasparßayo˙ pratyekavishayatvåd eva / ata˙ iyaµ pratyabhijñå rËpådyatiriktaµtadåßrayabhËtaµ vastu prakåßayati, idaµ rËpasparßavat) [SAS I. 8: 27,2–28,3].
12

Non-essential factor adjoind to the pure form of an entity which is thereby

5about] the coexistence is not established. [9] You cannot accept position or time as such[limiting adjunct].13 Even if you should accept the coexistence through the identity in[position or time], there would be over-application [to things which are in the same
position but are different in time, things which are in the same time but in different
positions, or things which happen to be in the same position and the same time]. Nor
having one and the same cause or effect can be established [to be the limiting adjunct;because color and touch have different cause and effect]. If it were established, you canhardly avoid over-application [to things which have the same cause and effect but indifferent positions etc.].14 [10]Regarding one and the same [dharmin], there are clear and obscure understandingin accordance with its proximity and remoteness15 etc.16 These two [understanding]would be impossible [to explain] without evidencing that the understood dharmas aredelimited and conditioned [van Buitenen: VAS, p.184 fn.10]; e.g. a pot to ether.
13

According to Buddhist, time is not an independent positive entity. As for
position, Buddhist regards ether as mere non-obstruction (åkåßam anåv®tti˙)[Abhidharmakoßa I. 5d; cf. Nakamura: Early Vedånta, pp.462f.]; accordingly, it cannot
be the upådhi. Even if positive entity such as the earth were the position where dharmas
coexist, there would be endless regression because the earth etc. are also brought about
through coexistence of dharmas.
14

Cf. “[The opinion] that the coexistence is nothing but the identity in position
is rejected by means of the above-mentioned logic: [if the position were same as combinedcolor and touch, color and touch would be perceived separately and the recognition
would be impossible; if it were different, you would practically accept dharmin]. Because
things in the same space, even if they are in past, present and future, would be combined
together. [Buddhists:] The position is also different from time to time [because of its
momentariness]. [Answer:] Not so, because the momentariness will be refuted (TMK I.
25ff.). And the position cannot be ether; because you hold that it is mere non-absence ofobstruction. Nor is it material cause, because it is accepted that touch, color etc. haverespectively different moment as material cause. If they have the same material cause,that is substance. If the coexistence were brought about through the identity in position
such as the earth, this coexistent would also need another coexistent and, consequently,
there would be endless regression; or, there would be mutual dependence” (etena
deßaikyam eva saµg˙åta ity apåstam; ekadeßånvayinåµ traikålikånåm ekasaµghåtaprasaµgåt / deßo 'pi tadåtadå bhinna eveiti cen na; kshaˆabhaµgasya nirasishyamåˆatvåt /na ca te deßa åkåßådirËpa˙; tasya yushmåbhir åvaraˆåbhåvamåtratvajñåpanåt / nacopådånarËpa˙; sparßarËpåd¥nåµ bhinnabhinnakshaˆopådånatvåbhyupagamåt /ekopådånatve tu tad eva dravyam / p®thivyådideßaikyåt saµghåtatve tu tatsaµghåtasyåpi
saµghåtåntaråpekshåyåm anavsthå, anyonyåßrayo vå) [SAS I. 8: 34,2–35,4].
15

TMK (I. 8c: ekasmin dËratåder avißadavißadapratyabhijñådi tadvat) refers to
the fact that a man who saw a thing closely recognizes the same thing obscurely when
he sees it remotely and that a man who saw a thing remotely recognizes the same thing
cleary when he sees it closely (SAS 43,6f.: åsannadeße d®sh†vå dËraµ gatasyåvißadå
pratyabhijñå, dËre d®sh†vå sam¥paµ gatasya tu vißadå).
16‘Etc.’ denotes the condition of lightening etc. Cf. evaµ kramåd
bahalaviralålokådivaßåd apy ubhayathå [= vishadam avishadaµ ca] gråhyå [SAS I. 8:43,8f.].

6

more or less17 [because the dharmin is one and same].

Concerning one and the same [continuous dharmin such as clay], appearing anddestroyed conditions [or dharmas such as being a lump, being a pot, being a broken
piece] are established [in order] by means of perception (adhyaksha).
Even in a moment, many dharmas such as being black and being young are seen
in one and the same [person].18
In delusion19 (bhrama) in the form that a white shell appears yellow and the like,[the dharmin] such as a shell is identified [with the apparent dharma such as yellowness],
even though [the existent dharma such as] whiteness is not perceived. [Buddhists may
say that a yellow shell arises anew at the moment of the perception because everythingis momentary; but it is untrue. Because] at the same time another [normal] persons
perceive the same thing as white, [and because] the momentary destruction(kshaˆabhaµga) will be rejected later.20 [11]In every delusion, it is inevitable that [some] peculiarities (vißesha) [or dharmas]
are not grasped even though the [dharmin], which is the substratum [of the qualifiers],
itself is grasped. And it is accepted that the delusion is rubbed off when these [peculiarities]
are grasped.21
For this reason, [Advaita] theory that Brahman, without any peculiarity, is thesubstratum of every delusion has no ground.22
Criticism on sahopalambhniyama

0.2.2.2.

(11,3–13,2)[Obj.] [Dharmas such as] ‘blue’ and their substratum [or dharmin] are not different
17

Cf.
alpadharmavißish†atayå
grahaˆambhËyodharmavißish†atayå tu vißadagrahaˆam [SAS I. 8: 43,9ff.]

avißadagrahaˆam,

18

If dharmin were same as dharma, there would be the undesirable conclusion:a person µ being black, a person µ being young, \ being black µ being young (K).
19

Delusion (bhrama or viparyaya [Nyåyabodhin¥ §64]) is defined as:anyasyånyathådhyavasåya˙ordharmisphuraˆesaty
apratipannatadvirodhaviruddhavißeshådhyavasåya˙. It is classified into many types andthe delusion ‘a shell is yellow’ is an example of ekavißeshasphuraˆa [NyP I. ii: 56,4ff.].
Cf. Vedavalli 1984: 22.
20

16,3ff.

21

Cf. SAS I. 8: saµßayaviparyayau adhish†hånagrahe vißeshågrahåt
samånadharmagrahåc ca bhavata˙ / tathåd®sh†iniyamaß ca nånyathyituµ ßakya˙ [45,5ff.].
22

Cf. SAS I. 8: [Were it not for dharma], there would be no delusion whether
the substratum is completely grasped or not. Why is it possible that there is the distinction
between understood form and non-understood form in [Brahman] which has no dharma?
(adhish†hånasya kårtsyena bhåna 'bhåne ca na bhrama˙ / bhåtåbhåtåk®tibhidå kathaµnirdharmake bhavet //) [46,2f.].

becauseoftheinvariable

rule

that

they

are

simultaneously

7

cognized(sahopalambhaniyama).23[Ans.] It is not true. Because this [simultaneousness] can be brought about due
to the fact that they are cognized under the same sufficient condition24 (såmagr¥) [i.e.,they are always cognized by the eyes].25 Again the simultaneousness and the invariable
rule on it establish the very difference,26 [because nobody describes the simultaneousness
regarding one and the same thing]; accordingly, [the reason you pose] is contradicted27(viruddha). Moreover, if the invariable rule that they are simultaneously cognized meansthat [the ranges of the two cognition] are same (sama),28 it is not established in the caseof a shell and [its] whiteness [when the former is cognized by a handicapped person as
yellow29] [12]. Even [if the rule means that the ranges of the two] are not same (asama),30[it is not established] in the case of [the earth and] smell [when smell blowing in thewind is cognized a person who do not see the earth]. And [the reason] is straying(anekånta) in view of shining color [of light] and non-shining color [of a pot and thelike], [which are simultaneously cognized but are different].31[Advaitin—] Due to the difference among grasping [sense-organs], grasped[object] appears to be different.32
23

Here Vaibhåshika Buddhist utilizes sahopalambhaniyama to reject the existanceof dharmin. Cf. “sahopalambhniyamåd abhedo n¥lataddhiyo˙,” which is quoted in many
works as the verse of the Pramåˆavinißcaya by Dharmak¥rti [See Mesquita, Erkentnis,
S.35 Anm.28; Saµvitsiddhi, S.162 Anm.281]. This theory of Yogåcåra Buddhist is
criticized in 410,1f. and TMK IV. 20 also.
24såmagr¥: full collection of causes except for what is related to the effect by nomeans (kåryåyogavyavacchinna˙ kåraˆasamudåya˙) [Nyåyakoßa].
25

Cf. sahopalambhaniyama˙ ekasåmagr¥vedyatvaprayukta˙ [Tåtparyad¥pikå on
VAS (Tirupati ed.) 150,9].
26

Cf. Ír¥Bh II. ii. 27: såhityasyårthabhedahetukatvåt [303,6f.].

27

sådhyåbhåvavyåpto hetur viruddha˙ [TarS §54; YMD II. 36].

28

I.e. A µ B.

29

Cf. SAS I. 8: na ca rËpåder dharmiˆaß ca sahopalambhaniyama˙,p¥taßaµkhådibhrame rËpam antareˆa rËpiˆa˙ tam antareˆa tasya copalabdhe˙ [38,4f.].
30

I.e. A … B or B … A.

31

See 322,1–2.

32

Cf. SAS I. 8d: Let it be that a certain entity grasped by two sense-organs
exists by force of the identification. But we agree neither that it is composed of [dharmas]
such as color and taste nor that it is their substratum, because these [dharmas] do notexist. [The fact is]: regarding one and the same entity, various dharmas are known inaccordance with the difference in grasping [organ]; for example, in accordance with the8[Ans.] Not so. Because there is mutual dependence: the difference among [graspingorgans] such as the eye and the ear has the difference among grasped objects such ascolor for its limiting adjunct33; [that is, the former difference could not be establishedwithout the latter34]. [13] And we have already shown the example of the cognition inwhich, though grasping [organs] are different, grasped object is one and same: [“I amtouching what I saw”]. [On the other hand], though grasping [organ such as eye] is one
and same, the difference is seen in grasped [color] such as blue and yellow. And such iscommon to the other [sense-organs].
For the same reason [that the difference between dharma and dharmin is actually
grasped], the opinion [of some Buddhists] that four atoms beginning with wind[respectively] have one, two, three and four [dharmas] beginning with touch as theiressential nature35 (svabhåva) is rejected.36 [14]Criticism of the opponent's tarka

0.2.2.3.

(14,1–16,1)

And in the same manner, it is proved that the relatedness (vaißish†ya) [between
dharma and dharmin] is really existent37 and that determinate [perception38] (vikalpa) isdifference in reflector such as a jewel, a sword and a mirror, [the same reflected object]such as face is known as small, big, dirty, clean etc., and the reverse of left and righthappens (nanv astu pratisandhånabalåd dv¥ndriyagråhyaµ kiµcit; tat turËparasådyåtmakam iti vå tadåsraya iti vå na m®shyåmahe; teshåm evåbhåvåt / ekasminn
eva gråhakabhedåt tattaddharmadh¥˙, yathå maˆik®påˆadarpaˆådivyañjakabhedån
mukhåder aˆutvap®thutvamalinatvavimalatvådidh¥˙ savyadakshiˆaviparyåsaß ceti)[50,4ff.].
33

Here upådhi means jñåpaka (K).

34

Cf. SAS I. 8: “The difference among [sense-organs] such as eye is assumed
through the difference among grasped forms. If [the latter] has not been established,
how is the difference among [sense-organs] grasping [the forms] assumed? If there has
not been this [assumption], how is the difference among the grasped forms from it
assumed?” (cakshurådivaijåtyaµ hi gråhyåkårabhedåt kalpyate; tadasiddhau kathaµtadgråhakabhedak¬pti˙? tadabhåve ca kathaµ tata eva gråhyåkårabhedak¬pti˙?) [50,11ff.].
35

That is, “Earthy atom has color, taste, touch and smell as its nature. Watery[atom] has color, taste and touch as its nature. Fiery [atom] has color and touch as its
nature. Windy [atom] has touch as its nature” [Ír¥Bh II. ii. 17: 296,1–3]. According to
Dr Shokei Matsumoto, this description reminds us the theory of Vaißeshika(VaißeshikasËtra II. i. 1–4) rather than that of Vaibhåshika (Abhidharmakoßa II. 22)[Råmånuja no KenkyË (in Japanese), p.235 n.1]. See also Vedåntaparibhåshå V. 22. The
same theory is mentioned in SAS I. 8 [36,6ff.] also and the Ónandadåyin¥ thereof quotes
the verse of the Tattvamåtrapañcikå [?]: våyvådivyavahåro bhavati sparßådilakshaˆair
eva / dvitrisvabhåvabhågbhi˙ ekasmådd hrasvatåd¥va [37,10f.].
36

Here it is suggested that one entity cannot have plural entities as its nature(R). Cf. SAS I. 8: ekasyånekasvabhåvatvåyogåt, tadabhyupagame jainamatåvatåråt [37,1].
37

This statement presupposes the following objection— “How is it possible that
this [dharma] exists in what is devoid of it? On the other hand, if this [dharma] exists in9

non-sublated means of valid knowledge. And the silly talk that the relation is untenable
and so on are rejected for the reason that any one of the five members of the reductio ad
absurdum39 (tarka) is cast away40 and the like. [15]what is qualified by it, there would be the undesirable conclusion that this [dharma]
abides in itself. Therefore, there is neither dharma nor dharmin. (tacchËnye tasya v®tti˙katham iva gha†ate, tadvißish†e tu v®ttau svådhåratvaprasaµgas tata iha na guˆau nåpidharm¥)” [TMK I. 10]; “Where does what is accepted as attribute, say, color, exist? In
what is devoid of itself? Or, in what is qualified by itself? Not the former because it iscontradicted. … Not the latter because it would bring about mutual dependence. What isqualified is nothing but the qualifier, the subtantive of the qualifier (vißeshya) and therelation between the [two]. Because there is no proof on such [a qualified thing as isother than these three]. And any one of the above-mentioned three cannot be [qualified
thing] because there is neither knowledge on a qualified thing nor usage [of ‘qualified’]
regarding it only, [that is, both are possible only when there is the unit of the three].
Therefore, the word ‘qualified’ can mean both of the related, [namely, the qualifier andthe qualified]. Thus, attribute existing in what is qualified by itself abides not only in thesubstantive of [the qualifier] but also in [the qualifier] itself. What is undesirable? [Thissuggests] A is different from A. (yo 'yaµ rËpådi˙ dravyasya guˆatayesh†a˙ sa kiµsvaßËnye vartate svavißish†e vå? nådya˙, vyåghåtåt / … na dvit¥ya˙ / åtmåßrayåpåtåt /vißish†aµ vißeshaˆa-vißeshya-tatsaµbandha-atiriktaµ na kiµcit / tasmin pramåˆåbhåvåt /na cokteshu trishv anyatamamåtram, tåvati vißish†adh¥vyavahårayor abhåvåt / ata˙sambandhyubhayaµ vißish†aßabdårtha iti syåt / tathå ca svavißish†e vartamåno guˆa˙svavißeshyam iva svåtmånam api svådhår¥kuryåt / kim atrånish†am? svasya svasmåd
anyatvam)” [SAS I. 10: 77,6–81,5]. This discussion is found in the Khaˆ∂ana and the
Saµkßepaßår¥raka; see Bhåvaprakåßikå.
38

For the Buddhist negation of savikalpaka pratyaksha, see Dr Yuichi Kajiyama's
English translation of the Tarkabhåshå of Mokshåkaragupta §5 (pp.40ff.) [reprinted in
his Studies in Buddhist Philosophy, Kyoto, 1989]. Deßika criticizes it in NyP 77ff.,
TMK IV. 32.
39

Tarka is defined as: “vyåpyåµg¥kåre 'nish†avyåpakaprasañjanam” [SAS IV.
60: 590,6; NyP 214,18; YMD II. 43], namely, leading to an undesirable pervader throughaccepting a pervaded hypothetically. Mostly it is used as counter-argument (pratikËlatarka)
to refute the opinion of an opponent through leading to an unacceptable conclusion; thatis why I translate the term with reductio ad absurdum. (Cf. Tarkabhåshå, ed. KSS, p.
242, where the term is defined as anish†aprasaµga˙).
Opposing to the Naiyåyika, who do not accept tarka as valid knowledge [seeNySË I. i. 40 and the commentaries thereof, TarS §64], Deßika accept it as included ininference [NyP 214ff.]; for the detail of his discussion, see VEDAVALLI 1984: 108-13,
SINGH 1958: 241–46.
It is composed of five members:(1) prasañjakasya prasañjan¥yena vyåpti˙,(2) pratitarkena 'pratighåta˙,(3) prasañjan¥yaviparyaye paryavasånam,(4) prasañjitasya 'nish†atvam,(5) parapakshasådhakatvam [NyP 222,2f.].
(Cf. Tårkikarakshå, v. 72: (1) vyåpti˙, (2) tarkåpratihati˙, (3) avasånaµ viparyaye / (4)anish†a- (5) ananukËlatvam iti tarkåµgapañcakam // [summarized by POTTER in EIPH II:
637], cited in MMU, anumåna, §15).
The following example makes the point clear. When someone (A) infers ‘The
mountain has fire because it has smoke,’ another (B) says ‘There might not be fire.’ The
statement of B is rejected by the following tarka which shows that the non-existence of10

Moreover,(4)

Even after hundreds of objection by disputants, we should depend upon the forceof perception. Why doesn't this [force] grasp the [relation between dharma and dharmin]?
(5)

If either of this-ness (or dharmin) and thus-ness (or dharma) were denied bymeans of a certain [reasoning], the statement ‘there is not this [relation between dharmaand dharmin] would be also denied because either of [‘this’ and ‘is not’] would bedenied.
(6)

In order to prove that [all determinate knowledge] is disagreeing (visaµvåda)[with experience], 41 [Buddhists pose] the reason that it is determinate. But such reason
to such probandum (sådhya) is spoiled in view of the alternative whether the subject(paksha), the reason etc. are sublated (bådha) or not.42 [16]Thus, this existent distinction between substance and non-substance is established.
0.3.

Substances are continuous— Criticism on kshaˆabhaµga –(16,3–37,3)
And such substances are continuous (sthira). For there is no proof (pramåˆa) on[Buddhis doctrine that] everything is momentary (kshaˆabhaµga).
fire brings about the non-existence of smoke. First, (1) the non-existence of fire (=prasañjaka) is pervaded by the non-existence of smoke (= prasañjan¥ya). And (2) assuming,on the other hand, the existence of fire does not bring about any undesirable conclusion,
with which this [pervasion] could be rejected by means of [the pratitarka] (na ca sågnitve'py atra kaßcid anish†aprasaµga˙, yena tata˙ pratihanyeta). Moreover, (3) the fact contrary
to the non-existence of smoke, [which is to be brought about through the pervasion] (=prasañjan¥yaviparyaya), that the mountain actually has smoke, is concluded by means ofperception. Accordingly (4) the non-existence of smoke, which is to be brought about
through the pervasion, is not acceptable. Thus (5) [the opinion of the other] that themountain has fire is established [NyP 222,2-8] (Cf. TMK VI. 60 and Srinivasa Chari
1987: 93).
40

The opponent's tarka is: if dharma exists in what is devoid of it, there would
be contradiction; if dharma exists in what is qualified by it, dharma would exist in itself.
But neither is true, because dharma exists in [dharmin] which is the substantive qualified
by it (tadv®ttir dharmimåtre [TMK I. 10]; vastuta˙ tadvißish†e vißeshye [SAS 82,8f.]).
Accordingly, tarka is: if dharma exists in the substantive qualified by it, it exists in
itself. In this tarka, its fourth member is estableshed because the conclusion is not
acceptable, but its first member is not established (K).
41

Cf. Pramåˆavårttika II. 1: pramåˆam avisaµvådi jñånam; Nyåyabindu III. 5:
avisaµvådakaµ jñånaµ samyagjñånam.
42

If the knowledge of the reason etc. were with reference to what is sublated,
there would be the defect that the sublation is not established and the like. If they werewith reference to what is not sublated, the reason would be straying (vyabhicåra),because the very subject, which is determinate in the form of the knowledge of thereason etc., does not have the probandum, being disagreeing (R). The same reason of
Buddhists is refuted in TMK IV. 33 also.

11

From which [can we understand] this [doctrine], perception (pratyaksha) or
inference (anumåna)?
Proof based on pratyabhijñå

0.3.1.

(16,4–27,1)

Not the former, because perception is of nature contradictory [to themomentariness] : that is, the perception in the form of recognition43 [or identification](pratyabhijñå) [such as ‘The present pot is the very pot which I saw in the past (so 'yaµgha†a˙)’] proves the very continuity [of the pot in the present and that in the past].
[Obj.] This [recognition] is delusion (bhrånti).
[Ans.] Not so; for that which has neither defects in its causes, [i.e. sense-organs],
nor the cognition sublating it (bådhakapratyaya), cannot be [delusion].
[Obj.] The defect, too, is inferred by the sublation based on reasoning44 (yukti).
[Ans.] What is your reasoning?
0.3.1.1 On contrary attributes(17,1–22,1)[Obj.] [17] [Our reasoning] is composed of the contingency (prasaµga) that twocontradictory (viruddha) attributes (dharma) — namely, the capability (såmårthya) [ofsprouting a bud] and the incapability (asåmårthya) [of sprouting a bud], which are basedon the fact that [a seed in a field] makes an effect [i.e. a bud]45 (karaˆa) and that [a seedin a granary] does not make the effect (akaraˆa) — might be superimposed46 (adhyåsa)[in one seed, if a seed in a field and a seed in a granary, as you hold, were one and thesame]. Or rather, [our reasoning ] is composed of the contingency that even what cannot
make [an effect], [i.e., a seed in a granary], might make the effect; because what has thecapability could make the effect [without fail].
[Ans.] It is incorrect. Because the word ‘capability’ means having the innate
nature (svabhåva) of being able to make [the effect] when the assistant causes (sahakårin),[e.g. water and the sunlight], are present. In other words, it means having the non-existenceof the effect resulting from the non-existence of the assistant causes [18]. Therefore, the43“pratyabhijñånaµ hi nåma at¥tavartamånakålavartyekavastuvishayam ekaµpratyakshajñånam / tasya kåladvayasambandhavißish†am eva vastu vishaya˙”[VD¥pa II. ii. 24: 61,10-11].
There were some different views as to whether it is included in pratyksha alone
or not [NyP 295,2–296,10; Vedavalli 1984: 181–83]. According to Råmånuja, Vishˆucitta
and YMD (I. 21), it is included in perception.
44

Here yukti means tarka.

45

K = phalopadhånam.

46adhyåsa. K = saµbandha. Because pratyabhijña is of bhrånti, Buddhists use
this word. Cf. the usage of adhyavasåya in Tattvasaµgraha vv.447 & 450.

12capability itself [can] enter one and the same [seed], because whether making the effector not results from whether the assistant causes are present or not.
[Obj.] It is hardly possible that one and the same entity has both [the presence of
the assistant causes and the non-presence of them].
[Ans.] Not so. It is possible because the time [of the presence and that of the
non-presence] are severally fixed by connection47 (santåna) with each sufficient condition(såmagr¥) of these [two] [19].
[Obj.] The problem [how one and the same entity has] both the relation withparticular sufficient condition of [the presence] and the non-relation with it, still remains.
[Ans.] Not so; [this problem] is avoided for the very reason that each particularsufficient condition belongs to different time. When a seed-moment48 (b¥jakshaˆa) of
the same kind as [a seed in a granary] becomes a seed capable [of sprouting a bud] [20],you also cannot avoid this [fact that the presence of the assistant causes causes to begin
the effect].
[Obj.] [Only] the innate nature (svabhåva) of the moment immediately before[the seed capable of sprouting a but] causes [to begin the effect].
[Ans.] Because of the very [fact that it can make the effect only in the presenceof the assistant causes], this question has been already answered. Otherwise, there
would be the contingency of the complication (gaurava) of assuming innumerable moments
and their innate natures, though not perceptible.
If the assistant causes, though based on the affirmative and negative consequence49(anvayavyatireka), were not the causes,50 [21] even the fact that the material (upådåna)47

The commentators shows three interpretations: paraµparå (R1, K1), sambandha(R3, K2), paushkalya (completeness) (R2).
48b¥jakshaˆa˙ = b¥jarËpa˙ kshaˆa˙ (R). According to Buddhists, time is not
positive reality. So it must be called by the name of some entities existing in it.
49

If there are the assistant causes, there is the cause; if not the assistant causes,
there is not the cause.
50

R: “Then, your statement ‘the dominant [or sense-organs such as the eye], theauxiliary [such as light], the dependent [or the object] and the immediate [or the moment
immediately before] are the fourfold causes of the birth of knowledge (adhipati-sahakåriålambana-samanantapratyayåß catvåro 'pi jñånotpattihetava˙ [= Ír¥Bh II. ii. 21: 298,13f.])’would be contradicted.”
While the orthodox texts of the Vaibhåshika, e.g. the Abhidharmakoßabhåshya
II. 61, mention to hetupratyaya for sahakåri°, the same list are also found in many texts;
e.g. Bhåmat¥ ad II. ii. 21 (n¥låbhåsasya hi cittasya n¥låd ålambanapratyayån n¥låkåratå,samanantapratyayåt pËrvavijñånåd bodharËpatå, cakshusho 'dhipatipratyayåd rËpagrahaˆapratiniyama˙, ålokåt sahakåripratyayåd heto˙ spash†årthatå), SDS II. 275ff. Cf.
Matsumoto 235, n.5.

13[such as a seed] is the cause could not be satisfactorily explained (durnirvaha).
And further, if those which are divided into two by the difference of time — thatis, making the effect (karaˆa) and not making the effect (akaraˆa), or the presence of theassistant causes and the non-presence of them — should divide the one entity (vastu)[into two moments], those which are divided by the difference in position [of a seed] —that is, making the effect and not making the effect, the capability and the incapability,or the presence of the assistant causes and the non-presence of them — could divide
these two [moments]. Thus, even one moment would be divided into many parts. Thenthe one [entity] could not be established anywhere because the differences [in time andposition] are countless. Consequently, [your standpoint] might be the theory of voidness(ßËnyavåda). [22][Obj.] As to the difference in position, the presence and the non-presence in this[position] make it possible that [a sprout is seen only in a particular position of a seed].
[Ans.] It is incorrect; because contradictory [attributes] such as [the presence]and [the non-presence] ought to make difference, as in that case [of the difference intime]. [23]0.3.1.2 One thing can be connected with another time

(23,1–26,2)[Obj.] It is hardly possible that one and the same [entity] is connected with theprior time and the posterior time, which are mutually contradictory.
[Ans.] Not so; because it is unattainable to be prior or posterior with reference toits own self. That is, we never assert that one entity is connected with the time delimited(avacchinna) by its own antecedent non-existence (prågabhåva) and the time delimited
by its own annihilative non-existence (pradhvaµsa). You have to admit that there is nocontradiction, even regarding one moment, if the time prior to A and posterior to C is its
own time for B. For example, the intermediate position which is prior to atom (pramåˆu)
Y and posterior to atom C is its own position for another atom B; accordingly, there isno contradiction in that [one entity] is connected with [this position]. Otherwise, evenone moment would be divided as in the previous case. [24][Obj.] Nevertheless, it is hardly possible that the prior time and the posterior
time or limiting adjuncts51 (upådhi) of these [two], which are contradictory each otherlike light and darkness, enter one [entity]. If they were not contradictory, [the two]would be simultaneous (yaugapadya) [or connected with the same moment].
[Ans.] Not so. It is true that they would be contradictory each other if they were51

This is a reply to those who do not admit the inherent distinction of time (R).

14

simultaneous, but they are no [contradictory] if they enter one and the same entity.
Otherwise, [two objects] would be contradictory each other only because they areconnected with one knowledge and, consequently, recognition (pratyabhijñå) [such as‘The present pot is the very pot which I saw (so 'yaµ gha†a˙)’] itself could not arise atall.
[Obj.] What we intend to say is that it would be contradictory if [the prior] timeand [the posterior] time are identified (tådåtmya) because [the two] are different innature.
[Ans.] Yet the connection with one entity will not be denied, as in the case ofcolor and taste, [which are not identified but can be connected with one entity]. [25][Obj.] One entity is not connected with many anywhere.
[Ans.] You cannot say so. For you admit that an atom, momentary and without
any attribute (nirdharmaka) [according to your opinion], also have many [attributes]
such as being-without-space52 (nairantarya) when they are combined together.
[Obj.] The momentary destruction is proved by the notion of presentness(vartmånatva).53[Ans.] This argument is rejected for the same reason [that one entity can beconnected with both the prior time and the posterior time]: this [notion] makes neither
grasp nor suggest (åkshipyate) the non-existence of the connection with both the priortime and the posterior time. For it denies the mere non-presentness contradictory to that[presentness].54 And this [notion of presentness], denying the antecedent non-existence(prågabhåva) and the annihilative non-existence (pradhvaµsåbhåva) [regarding only] atthat time, is not contradictory to the connection with both the prior time and the posterior
time. [26][Obj.] Perception grasps only one moment connected with the sense-organ. Then,
another moment regarding this [entity grasped by perception] is hardly established.
[Ans.] Not so; because we already explained recognition (pratyabhijñå) and that
it is not sublated.55

52

Buddhists do not accept saµyoga. Cf. 475,7ff.

53

The similar objection is found in the Kusumåñjali [Viraraghavachari's BhËmikå

25].
54

Cf. Ír¥Bh II. ii. 24: pratyakshagamyå vartamånasyåvartamånåd vyåv®ttir na
vartamånasya vastvantaratvam avagamayati, api tu vartamånakålayogitåmåtram / na catåvatå vastvantaratvaµ siddhyati, tasyaiva kålåntarayogisaµbhavåt [300,13ff.].
55“pratyabhijñåpratyaksheˆa sthiratvasyaiva siddhe˙” [16,4].

15

0.3.1.2 Recognition cannot be denied by inference(26,2–27,1)[Obj.] [We shall pose the following inference—] All recognitions are delusions;because of being recognition, [born from both reminiscent impressions (saµskåra) and acontact with a sense-organ]; like the recognition of flame56 [where a succession offlames uninterruptedly produced anew is mistaken for one continuous flame].
[Ans.] [This is not correct]; because in view of [the defect in its causes (i.e. thesense-organs) or the cognition sublating it], which has been mentioned before [as causing
to be delusion],57 [this inference] has an vicious condition 58 (upådhi). If [recognition]
were sublated merely by this inference, [you could infer] that all cognitions (pratyaya)
are delusions only because of being cognition. Thus, you cannot avoid the doctrine of
the Mådhyamika [27] rising.
0.3.2.

kshaˆabhaµga cannot be proved by inference

0.3.2.1.

Inference itself is impossible(27,2–34,1)(27,2–3)

According to those who admit the momentary destruction, not only recognition,
which is of the nature of delusion for them, but also remembrance (sm®ti) is not possible,
as we will consider in [the section of] the self.59 And for the reason [that remembrance
is not possible], the recollection (pratisaµdhåna) of invariable concomitance (vyåpti) is
not possible; accordingly inference itself proves to be baseless.60 Then in what manner
do you infer the momentary destruction?
0.3.2.2.

Criticism on the hetu “sat”(27,3–31,2)

0.3.2.2.1.

anvayavyåpti is impossible(27,3–29,2)[Obj.] [Our inference is:] Whatever is existent (sat) is momentary (kshaˆika),
56[300,4].
57

Cf. Ír¥Bh II. ii. 24: jvalådishv iva såd®ßyanibandhano ' yam ekatvavyåmoha˙“kåraˆadosha-bådhakapratyaya” [16,5].

58“sådhanåvyåpakatve sati sådhyasamavyåpta˙ sådhanadharmavyatirikto dharmaupådhi˙” [NyP 96,8–97,1]. Cf. ÓTV 863,13: sådhanåvyåpakatve sati sådhyavyåpakatvam;“sådhyavyåpakatve sati sådhanåvyåpaka upådhi˙” [TarS §56]. Due to the presence ofupådhi, the inference becomes vyåpyatvåsiddha [ibid., YMD II. 35]. Here kåraˆadoshaor bådhakapratyaya pervades the sådhya (: bhrånti), but does not pervades the hetu (:pratyabhijñå). For further details of upådhi in Vißish†ådvaita-Vedånta, see Vedavalli
86–88.
59

Chap.2, j¥va-pariccheda: “bhråntirËpaµ vå åtmapratisandhånam, vishayapratyabhijñånam, sm®timåtraµ ca saµskårådhåraµ sthiram åtmånam antareˆa kathaµcid api
na gha†ate” [187,2–188,2].
60

Cf. Ír¥Bh II. i. 24: pramåt®premeyayo˙ kshaˆikatvaµ vadadbhirvyåptyavadhåraˆatatsmaraˆapËrvakånumånåbhyupagame 'pi du˙ßaka˙ [301,3f.].

16

like a pot; and these entities61 (bhåva) are existent. 62[Ans.] Even [this inference] is not [logically correct].
If the word “entity (bhåva)” denoted everything (vißva) as the subject (paksha),the distinction between the subject (paksha), the reason (hetu), and the instance (d®sh†ånta)were not established63 [28].
Even if the subject meant things other than a pot, a pot cannot be the instancebecause a pot are not well-known to be momentary. And the superimposition ofcontradictory attributes [such as capability and incapability, through which you intend
to prove momentariness], has been already refused.64[Obj.] Flames of a lamp can be the instance.
[Ans.] This instance is also rejected by the above-mentioned reason [that there isno agreement about its momentariness], because even [flames] are accepted to becontinuous (sthira) for three or four moments.
[Obj.] Let the limiting adjunct of a moment65 (kshaˆa-upådhi) be the instance,
then. Indeed it is not continuous; if so, it could not delimit (avacchedaka) a moment.
[Ans.] Not so; because a thing A whose beginning is delimited by the end of athing B and B whose end is delimited by A's beginning, though both [A and B] arecontinuous, can delimit [a moment].66 And the mutual delimitation [between A and B] is61bhåva =vastu (R).

62[udåharaˆa]: yat sat tat kshaˆikam, yathå gha†a˙; [upanaya]: santaß câm¥ bhåvå˙.
Here the reason is sat and the probandum (sådhya) is kshaˆika. Cf. Ír¥Bh II. i. 24:
arthakriyåkåritvåt sattvåd vå gh†ådi˙ kshaˆika˙, yad akshaˆikaµ ßaßavishåˆådi tadanarthakriyåkåry asac ca [300,10–12]. (Note that according to Buddhist philosophers
after Dharmak¥rti, sattva is nothing but arthakriyåsåmarthyatva. See, for instance,Nyåyabindu I. 15: arthakriyåsåmarthyalakshaˆatvåd vastuna˙; Jñånaßr¥mitranibandhåval¥1,9: sattå ßaktir ihårthakarmaˆi [= SDS II. 118].)
This reason sattva to prove kshaˆabhaˆga is first introduced by Dharmak¥rti in
his Pramåˆavinißcaya [the second chapter (ed. E. Steinkellner) 28,24ff.]. See E.
Steinkellner: ‘Die Entwicklung des Kshaˆikatvånumåna bei Dharmak¥rti,’ WZKSO 12-13,
1968/69, 361–77; Katsumi Mimaki: ‘Setsunametsu-ronshô’ (in Japanese) in: A. Hirakawa,Y. Kajiyama and J. Takasaki (eds.), Kôza Daijô Bukkyô vol.9: Ninshiki-ron to Ronri-gaku,
Tokyo 1984, pp.217–54, esp.224f.
63“sandigdhasådhyasya pakshasya, nißcitasådhyasya sapakshasya
pakshanish†hasya ca hetor bhedåvaßyambhåvåt”(R). Cf. TarS §49, 50, 44.
64

ca,

NySi 17,2–25,5.

65“kshaˆapadavåcyatåvacchedaka”(K), that is, all reason that cause to use theword a moment.
66

For instance, in the case “I saw a snake and ran away,” the moment I stopped
to see it and begin to run is delimited by seeing whose end is delimited by the beginningof running and by running whose beginning is delimited by the end of seeing.

17

established by being the object of the qualified knowledge, “simultaneously.” [29] As
two extended measuring-rots whose directions are contradictory but which are conjoined
a little in the middle are, though they are long, capable of delimiting a minimum(alpatara) space by the part delimited by their mutual conjunction; so in time. Hence
there is no defect.
vyatirekavyåpti is impossible

0.3.2.2.1.

(29,3–31,2)[Obj.] Affirmative [concomitance] (anvaya) must not be [in the inference].
Negative [concomitance] (vyatireka) should be: whatever is non-momentary (akshaˆika)
is non-existent (asat), like a rabbit's horn.67[Ans.] Not so. Because it cannot be mentioned that non-momentariness [i.e.
non-existence of momentariness68] is the pervaded (vyåpya). For momentariness acceptedby you by you has not been established; accordingly, non-momentariness expressed(nirËpya) by it is not established.69[Obj.] [The word “akshaˆika”] means [not the non-existence of momentarinessbut] being continuous for long time (cirakålasthåyitva) [30].
[Ans.] Then, it cannot be applied to a rabbit's horn, which does not have its own
innate nature (ni˙svabhåva).
[Obj.] Let the non-existence of a rabbit's horn be the instance.
[Ans.] Then it is nothing but existent (sann eva)70; because it is [31] based on themeans of valid knowledge (pråmåˆika).
[Obj.] ‘Non-existent (asattva)’ is defined as “being different from entity(bhåvetratva).”[Ans.] [Still non-existence of a rabbit's horn] cannot be [the instance]. The reasonsare as follows. According to the opinion that non-existence is another kind of positive
existence (bhåvåntara) [opposite to its counter-correlative (pratiyogin)],71 even [‘nonexistent’] cannot be established [in the non-existence of a rabbit's horn]. Even if [non67

Cf. Ír¥Bh II. i. 24: 300,10–12, cited above. A rabit's horn is an example ofabsulute non-existent. Cf. Sureßvara's B®hUp-Bhåshyavårttika v. : esha vandhyåsuto
yåti ßaßaß®µgadhanur dhara˙ / m®gat®shˆåmbhasi snåta˙ khapushpak®taßekhara˙ // (citedin SAS IV. 18: 511,2f.).
68
69

In vyatireka, sådhyåbhåva is vyåpya.

“abhåvapratyaye'pekshitatvåt”(K).
70
71

pratiyogitåvacchedakavißish†apratiyogijñånasya“kålasambabdhitvasyaiva sattvarËpatvåt”(R).

K 31,17–19. This doctrine is accepted by the Vißish†ådvaitins: “abhåvas tv
asmanmate bhåvåntaråtmå” [NyP 300,12]; cf. YMD I. 21, IV. 4.

18existence were] not [another kind of existence but negative categary other than positive
categories (bhåvåtirikta)], it would be easy to say (suvaca) that an existent is also
[continuous] as a non-existent is, [in your opinion, continuous].72 And there is no difference[whether ‘non-existent’ is other than non-existence or is other than existence] regarding
reversed supposition (kus®†i 73) so as to avoid the obstructions to perceptibleness(pratyakshatva).74
On the other hand, some [Buddhists], thinking that the reason “existent (sat)” issublated by Scriptures because Buddha taught a certain eternal reality (tattva) [i.e.
voidness or ßËnya], [32] regard “take place inevitably (dhruvabhåvitva)” as the reason. 75
That is to say:
[Obj.] Whatever takes place inevitably needs no cause (hetu); otherwise taking
place inevitably would be contradicted, [because whatever has a cause could be nonexistent in view of the non-existence of the cause, consequently it could not inevitably
take place]. For this reason, it is proved that the annihilative non-existence (pradhvaµsa)
of effects, which take place inevitably, needs no cause (ahetuka); accordingly the delay(vilamba) [of the destruction] is not possible. Therefore entity rising up now will be
destroyed by it [without any delay].76[Ans.] Here which is meant by the word “take place inevitably”,
72

anyatråpy abhåvasyeva bhåvasyåpi suvacatvåt. This sentence is too simple todecide the meaning. Here I follow the interpretation of K: “bhåvetaratvam evâsattvam
ity aµg¥k®tya tadvata˙ sthiratvasv¥kåre, abhåvetaratvam eva sattvam ity aµg¥k®tya tadvatobhåvasyâpi sthiratvena vaktuµ ßakyatvåt” [31,21–22]. R interprets differently: “ as nonexistence has technical non-beingness defined by to be other than existence, non-existence
has technical non-beingness defined by to be other than non-existence (abhåve
bhåvabhinnatvalakshaˆapåribhåshikåsattvavatabhåvabhinnatvalakshaˆapåribhåshikåsattvasyâbhåve 'pi suvacatvåt)” [31,6–7].
73

vipar¥takalpanå (N).

74

When a pot does not exist, if non-being (asattva) were other than non-existence(abhåvabhinnatva), perceptibleness of the pot would be obstructed because it is non-being;on the other hand, if non-being (asattva) were other than existence (bhåvabhinnatva),
perceptibleness of the pot's non-existence would be obstructed. Therefore both of us
should accept that being means “to be connected with the time” [R 31,8–10; K 31,23–26].
75
76

E.g. Tattvasaµgraha v.353. see Mimaki 1984.

This inference can be written as follows:ud¥yamånasya vastuna˙ (or dhruvabhåvina˙ kåryåˆåm) pradhvaµso 'hetuka˙,dhruvabhåvitvåt,[anyåpohavat].
The sådhya is ahetukatva, the hetu is dhruvabhåvitva, and the paksha is pradhvaµsa(abhåva) whose pratiyogin is vastu (or kårya).

19(1) to exist as long as [its counter-correlative (pratiyogin)] (tatsamakålabhåvitva77),(2) to take place immediately before [its counter-correlative] without any exception(tadanantarabhåvitvaniyama78),(3) to be born from [its counter-correlative] alone (tanmåtrajanyatva),(4) to be born from the sufficient condition of [its counter-correlative] alone (tadekasåmagr¥janyatva79),(5) without any cause (ahetukatva80), or others81?
(1) would be unestablished (asiddhi82) [because non-existence and its countercorrelative cannot coexist83]. (2) would be unestablished84 too. (3) and (4) would becontradictory (vyåghåta85) [to not having any cause 86]. And (5) would be the same as theprobandum (sådhya).87 Because of these logical defects (dosha), [33] only “to take placein future without any exception (eshyattvaniyama88)” remains [as faultless]. Yet you
also admit this [reason] to be inconstant (anaikåntika89) in the case of [the first] potsherd77= tatkshaˆatva, the third alternative in TMK I. 28. SAS: sa eva kshaˆo yasya
sa tatkshaˆa˙ tasya bhåvas tatkshaˆatvaµ tadå dhruvabhåvi sahabhåv¥ty artha˙.
78= anukshaˆatva, the fourth alternative in TMK I. 28. SAS: anukshaˆaßabdopacåritas tu hetur anantarakshˆavartitvam.
79(3) and (4) = tajjanyatå, the sixth alternative in TMK I. 28.

80= jananavidhuratå, the second alternative in TMK I. 28.

81

K refers to the fifth alternative in TMK I. 28: tattva (=pratiyogirËpatva). The
answer to this in SAS: pañcame tv asiddhir vyåghåtaß ca.
82svarËpåsiddhi (K). NyBo §56: svarËpåsiddhir nåma pakshe hetvabhåva˙. Cf.
YMD II. 33.
83

SAS: ayam api hetur asiddha eva / na ca pradhvaµsapratiyoginor yaugapadyasaµbhava˙, saµbhave vå bhåva˙ paßcåd api kiµ na syåt [SASv 140,15–16].
84

K: sådhyåvißeshåparaparyåyå saµdigdhåsiddhi˙ / vastusthirapakshetat-[=niyama-(N)] sampratipattyabhåvåt. SAS: tatråpi bhåvotpattyapekshayå
''nantaryavivakshåyåm asiddhi˙ / bhåvasvarËpåpekshayå tv ånantaryaniyame bhåva eva
hetu˙ syåd iti kathaµ hetunairapekshyam / tadatiriktanairapekshyaµ vivakshitam iti cen
na, tadvad eva sahakåriˆåm apy avarjan¥yatvåd iti [SASv 140,17–19].
85= viruddha: sådhyåbhåvavyåpto hetu˙ [TarS §54, YMD II.36].

86

SAS: tajjanyatve hetau pratijñåvirodha˙ / tajjanyatvaµ hi taddhetukatvam, tenakathaµ hetunairapekshyasådhanam / hetvantaranairapekshyam api ca durvacam ity uktam[SASv 140, 27–28].
87

SAS has a long discussion on this alternative [SASv 139,33–140,13].

88

eshyattva is the the first alternative in TMK I. 28. It is intepreted as“avaßyambhåvitvamåtra” [Ónandadåyin¥v 141,8–9].
89= asådhåraˆa: sådhyåbhåvavadv®ttitvam [NyBo §53, YMD II.38].

20

moment (kapåla-kshaˆa) causing to begin dissimilar successions (visabhågasantåna90),
the artificial destruction (pratisaµkhyånirodha91) inseparable from it, and so forth; [because
they take place in future without any exception but has causes such as hitting by ahammer]. If [whatever takes place in future without any exception did] not [have any
cause], exactly at the first moment every moment would spring up and at the same time
everything would vanish, for there is no distinction among all future moments in taking
place in future. [34][Obj.] In order to remove an attachment (åsthå) the momentariness should betaught.
[Ans.] What a pity! This big injustice may cling to a very righteous man who
speaks no false. And [only] a man of minute knowledge could remove his attachment inthis [instruction]. And only if you teach the non-eternality, [an attachment] can be[removed]. Otherwise you could not help teaching the ßËnya.
And counter-inferences are as follow:(1)

Recognition, the subject of our discussion, is valid knowledge (pramå) in so far
as its own object;
Because it is non-sublated cognition (abådhitabuddhi);
Like knowledge of own specific characteristic (svalakshaˆa). [36]Not only for us but also for the Vaibhåshika, [knowledge of own specific characteristic]is valid knowledge in so far as its own object.
(2)

Whatever is being (sat) is not momentary, like [37] the eternal entity accepted[in Buddha's teachings];
And these existents (bhåva) are being.

(3)[Although we do not admit that a rabbit's horn is cognizable], it would beconcluded even by your practical usage (vyavahåra)92 that:
Whatever is cognized (yat prat¥yate) is non-momentary, like a rabbit's horn.

(4)

Destruction has the cause (sahetuka);90= visad®ßasantåna, whose antonym is sad®ßasantåna.

91

Its antonym is apratisaµkhyånirodha (natural destruction). The two terms are
explained
in
Ír¥Bh
II.
ii.
21:
kshaˆikavådibhir
mudgaråbhighåtådyanantarabhåvitayopalabdhiyogya˙ sad®ßasantånåvasånarËpa˙ sthËlo
ya˙, sad®ßasantåne pratikshaˆabhåv¥ copalabdhyanarha˙ sËkshmaß ca yo niranvayovinåßa˙
pratisaµkhyånirodha-apratisaµkhyånirodha-ßabdåbhyåm
abhidh¥yate[298,19–299,1]. This explanation is criticized by Dr. Nakamura because it is far fromthat of Abhidharma Buddhism [Nakamura 1983: 462f.]. According to the
Abhidharmakoßabhåshya, ….
92“tanmatasiddhåµd®sh†åntatvenopanyåsa˙” (K).

ßaßaß®µgaprat¥tim

abhyupagamya

tasya

21

Because it has the previous limit (pËrvåvadhi93);
Like a pot.
And the others are understood by themselves.
Thus the continuity of substance is proved.
0. 4. Classification of substances(37,3–40,1)

And these7)

substances are classified into two as material (ja∂a) and immaterial (aja∂a) or

inwards (pratyak) and the other [i.e. outwards (paråk)],Or into six as (1) that which have three components (triguˆa94), (2) time (anehas95),(3) individual soul (j¥va), (4) God (¥ßvara), (5) manifestation of enjoyment (bhogavibhËti96), and (6) [attributive] knowledge (mati97) // 7 // [38]8)

Not referring to knowledge (dh¥), time and the manifestation of enjoyment, forthe reason that they are attributes and so on,98
Some classify the reality (tattva) into three [as spiritual (cit), non-spiritual (acit) andGod (¥ßvara)] in order to distinguish between bodies, souls and God // 8 //“Material (ja∂a)” means manifesting only from others.99 “Immaterial (aja∂a)”means not so.100 “Inwards (pratyak)” is manifesting for oneself.101 And “outwards (paråk)”means manifesting for others102 [39]. Thus is our practical usage. Accordingly it isestablished that [attributive] knowledge is, though immaterial, outwards.
93pËrvådhimattva = prågabhåvapratiyogitva (K).

94

= prak®ti and its vikåras.

95= kåla.

96= nityavibhËti.

97= dharmabhËtajñåna.

98“DharmabhËtajñåna is clearly an attribute of knower. NityavibhËti is an attributeof God in the form of His body and so on. And time is an attribute of enjoyed prak®tibecause it is the cause of the enjoyed evolution beginning with mahat” [R 38,7–8].
99

parata eva bhåsamånam = svanirËpitavishayatåßËnyatve [= nirËpakatvaåßrayatva-ubhayasambandhena
vishayatåvißish†ånyatve]sati
svetaranirËpitavishayatåvattvam (K). In YMD ja∂a is defined as “amißrasattvarahitam”[IV. 6].
100

tadanyat = nirËpakatva-åßrayatva-ubhayasambandhena vishayatåvißish†am(K). In YMD aja∂a is defined as “svayamprakåßatvam” [VI. 1].

(K).

101

svasmai bhåsamånam = svakart®kavyavahåraprayojakavishayatåvat (K).

102

parasmai bhåsamånam = svabhinnakart®kavyavahåraprayojakavishayatåvat

22Nåråyaˆårya,103 however, said like this in the N¥timålå:104* Knowledge has just the non-existence of outwardness, but [it does] not [have]inwardness. [N¥timålå]Still we should think that it is because he accepted [knowledge has] non-existence ofthat-ness (idaµtva)105 established only for the reason that it is the object of [anotherknowledge such as] seeing, 106 as asserted by the prima facie view (pËrvapaksha).107 Thatis, the prima facie view to this passage is as follows:* And [knowledge] is inwards because of the non-existence of outwardness, forit does not manifest as “that” like “blue” and so on [40]. [N¥timålå]In [the above-mentioned classification], the definition of triguˆa is having anelement called rajas, or having an element called tamas, or being able to become
conditions (avasthå) such as the great (mahat) and so on.108 It is established in various
conditions respectively by perception and so on. And it is infinite in the lower and otherdirections but is limited by manifestation of enjoyment (bhogavibhËti) in the upperdirection; because Scriptures (ßruti) mention that eternal manifestation (nityavibhËti) is
beyond tamas109 and triguˆa is mentioned like this:* It is infinite and its extent cannot be enumerated. [ViP II. vii. 26] [41]And it is also called “måyå (mysterious power)” because it is the instrument of thewonderful (vicitra110) creation, “prak®ti” because it generates (prakaroti) modifications,and “avidyå (ignorance)” and so on for the reason that it is opposite to knowledge(vidyå) and others.
103

Fl. in the first half of thirteenth century [Raghavan 21; Singh 130].

104

Published as Annamalai Univ. Philosophy Ser. 2, 1940. This is his only workthat remains completely.
105

In short, idantva is the same as ja∂atva. See the definition of ja∂atva and thefootnote to it.
106d®gvishayatvamåtrådh¥nasiddhikatvarËpao = jñånåntarådh¥nasiddhikatvamåtra(R) or svabhinnajñånavishayatvamåtrådh¥nasaµßayavishayatvabhåvarËpa (K).
107

That is, here paråktva means ja∂atva called idaµtva (R); consequentlyNåråyaˆårya's view is not contradictory to Vedånta Deßika's.
108“sattvaguˆakatva” is not mentioned here for fear of ativyåpti to ßuddhasattva[i.e. nityavibhËti (see YMD VI. 1)].
109“ådityavarˆaµ tamasa˙ paraståt” [ÍveUp III. 8 (= BhG VIII. 9)]. Here tamasmeans “•§¶”[Ír¥Bh et passim].
110

The reason for using the word “måyå” is to denote the idea “vicitra” [R41,3–4 = K].

23

And [it] begins a series of modifications (vikåra) characterized by similarity or
dissimilarity in accordance with the difference in time and place (bhåga).111 [42]And it is without any separation even if it transforms itself into [four] grosselements (bhËta) [except ether (åkåßa)] or organs (indriya), which are able to move.
That is why it pervades all its effects. Or rather, there is no contradiction that the two
crush each other (pratighatva) because one of the two has no touch. For example, fourgross elements beginning with wind, which has touch, are pervaded by ether, which has
no touch. And the very triguˆa, according to the difference in its conditions (avasthå),which suppress (upamardaka) their each preceding condition, becomes twenty-four
principles (tattva), namely, the primordial cause (prak®ti), the great (mahat), the I-ness(ahaµkåra), eleven organs (indriya), five subtle elements (tanmåtra), and five grosselements (bhËta).
[Objection:] Why can the one entity transform itself (pariˆåma) into the all,which consists of plural conditions (anekadhåvasthita)?
You may answer that as one lump of clay transforms itself into a pot, a dish andso on. But it is not right; because such transformation is impossible in the case of athing which has no part (niravayava). Or, if it had parts (såvayava), you could not but
conclude that plural entities transform themselves into plural things; accordingly, thetheory of the one and only material cause (upadåna) would be given up.
You may say that the one and only existent (sat), composed of many parts andcalled avyakta (non-manifested), is the material cause. But it is not true; because it
cannot bear the following alternative question (vikalpa): that is, which do you want tosay,(1) that unity (ekatva) and plurality (anekatva) has one substratum (åßraya),(2) that there is unity in the whole (aµßin) and plurality in parts (aµßa), or(3) that like a council, a forest, or an army, plural existents has unity caused by theconnection with one limiting adjunct (upådhi)?
Not (1), because it is contradicted. Otherwise why can you get angry with the
111“The difference in time means the time of creation and the time of dissolution.
The difference in place means [the place] connected with unequalness of guˆa and one
not connected with it. The similarity of evolution means not to be able to denote thedistinction between names and forms. The dissimilarity means to be able to denote thedistinction between names and forms. Accordingly, it begins dissimilar evolution in aplace connected to unequalness of guˆa, but it begins similar evolution in another place;because prak®ti itself engages in eternal evolution. On the other hand, in the time ofdissolution, evolutions become equal everywhere” [R 41,12–16].

24

theory that the difference and the non-difference [exist in one and the same entity](bhedåbheda)? Neither (2); because in this case you should accept the whole (avayavin).
Even if you accepted it, the world never arise from the only one [whole], because not
the whole but its parts independently transform themselves in various ways. Comparedto this, it is better to accept [plural] atoms (paramåˆu), unrelated (anårË∂ha) to the one
meaningless substance [i.e. the whole], begin the world. For the same reason, (3) is nottrue; because it is meaningless to show a group if each one separately begins [theworld], and real unity is impossible even in the case of a forest and so on. And further,in teaching unity based on limiting adjunct, your opinion has no difference from thetheory admitted by the Vaißeshika-school and others that endless atoms are the materialcauses [of the world]. [43] Therefore the assumption (kalpanå) that the one entity
transforms itself into the plural things is only a previous stage of the theory of false
appearance (vivarta-våda).112
To this objection, we answer:
9) Like something atomic (aˆu) or something omnipresent (vibhu) can be the substratumof a partial conjunction (prådeßika-saµyoga),
It is possible even for that which has no part (niravayava) to evolve partially // 9 //At first, not every non-substance (adravya) pervades its own substratum; because some[qualities] such as conjunction (saµyoga) [or sound (ßabda) in omnipresent ether (åkåßa)]are not observed so. And not every [non-substance] exists only in one part of its own
substratum; because some attributes (dharma) deprived of the coexistence(såmånådhikaraˆya) with its non-existence113 are observed.
10) That is why partial qualities (guˆa) are grasped in something atomic and somethingomnipresent.
So do accept the Vaißeshika and other schools // 10 // [44][Obj.] As to this point, we114 accept that in the case of something omnipresent[e.g. ether], another quality [e.g. sound] arises in the part delimited (avacchinna) by the
conjunction with their efficient cause (nimitta), an embodied (mËrta) substances [e.g. air(våyu)].
[Ans.] Then, how do you prove that the conjunction with an embodied substance112

To solve these problems, either unity or plurality should be denied. And
because unity is supported by Scriptures teaching the creation [e.g. ChUp VI], plurality
is false notion. Therefore we reach the vivarta-våda [R, K].
113svåbhåvasåmånådhikaraˆyarahitadharma. Cf. pËrvapaksha-lakshaˆa of vyåpti:sådhyåbhåvavasav®ttitva [NyBo 44].
114

The Nyåya-school (K).

25

is partial? For you do not accept inherent (svåbhåvika) partial difference (bheda) insomething omnipresent. And a conjunction never arises in the part having a conjunction
as its limiting adjunct; for the two would be mutually dependent (parasparåßraya): it isby a certain conjunction that a partial difference is established and it is in the thusestablished [part] that a partial conjunction arises.
[Obj.] Something embodied such as a pot can partially delimitate somethingomnipresent in accordance with its size.
[Ans.] It is also rejected for the above-mentioned reason [that the two would bemutually dependent]. And [such delimitation] is impossible in a conjunction of two
atoms, [which have the same size and have no part; because their conjunction would beoverall].
Therefore a conjunction which arises from the particular sufficient condition(såmagr¥), [45] enjoys (anu√bhË) the coexistence (såmånådhikaraˆya) with its own
non-existence in an atomic or maximum entity, which has no part; and moreover, in thesame entity, it produces the notion of various parts, separately fixed according to thecomprehension by the connection with itself, namely, the non-existence of its own
non-existence. Thus should be admitted from valid knowledge.
Similarly, even in the case of triguˆa without any part, the differences intransformation (pariˆåma), whose substrata are divided and whose parts are separately
fixed, arise by the differences in sufficient condition (såmagr¥) determined by the particularwish of Supreme God [46]. Why is it impossible that [such triguˆa's] cutting, splitting,moving and so on are also established when it partially transforms itself into something
characterized by touch (sparßa) and so on? Even for the parts of the substrata which has
the differences (bheda) such as moving and touch, it is these specific attributes [such as
moving and touch] that differentiate them each other (bheda). As in the theory of ether
without splitting, for its parts, it is peculiar conjunctions [with a drum and so on] or
attributes such as very acute sound that differentiate them each other (bheda); so is in
this case.
[Obj.] Even if [the differences characterized by transformation of conditions
such as the great were admitted in triguˆa without any difference], you could not escapefrom the snare that the difference and the non-difference [exist in one and the same
entity] (bhedåbheda).
[Ans.] No, because this kind of [blame for] the contingency (prasaµga) of thedifference and the non-difference is common to the theory of [momentary] destructions(vainåßika), [which blamed us for the contingency of the capability (såmårthya) and the26incapability (asåmårthya)115]. And there is no contradiction [owing to the difference intime, as taught in the refutation of the theory of momentariness116]. Only in the theory
that one entity is another [at the same time without any delimitating factor (avacchedaka)
such as the difference in time] do we point out its contradiction; [47] not in thetransformation that what have one condition [i.e., one] comes to have another condition[i.e., many], because unity and plurality as conditions are avoided by the difference intime. And the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya supports this view:* In the same way as the condition of being a jar results from its abandoning thecondition of being a half-pot or a lump of clay, plurality results from abandoning thecondition of unity, and unity from abandoning the condition of plurality; accordingly
there is no contradiction. [Ír¥Bh II. i. 15; 253, 11–12][Obj.] Let unity as condition not be contradictory to plurality in past or future.
But there would be contradiction in case the substantial identity of these substances.
[Ans.] No. True, there would be contradiction if one substance in itself substantiallybecame another. But there is no [contradiction] in case the very existent (sat) [substance]
attains plurality by the limiting adjunct, namely, the connection with many attributes(dharma). And in a sm®ti, the Venerable Paråßara says:* Identity117 of [individual] self with Supreme Self is admitted as real existent(paramårtha), but it is false; for one substance cannot become another. [ViP II. xiv. 26][48]
Or rather118, let the unmanifested (avyakta) have parts in nature (svata˙ såµßatva).
Even then there is no contingency that [we admit] the difference and the non-differenceor the whole (avayavin).
[Obj.] If each part respectively produces its own effect in this way, we need notassume the condition being one.
[Ans.] Yes. If we assumed it as the followers of Kapila do, we should be blamedso. The condition of unity, however, understood by the Scriptures teaching the cause [ofthe world], cannot be the target of the question as to complication (gaurava) of assumption(kalpanå) [49]. And it is not meaningless; because in order to refuse those which sublate
115

17,1–2 et passim. And, as pointed out by commentators, the Buddhist also
should have admitted a partial conjunction named nairantarya [25,1–2].
116

18,1ff.

117

yoga. = tådåtmaya or aikya [Vißnucitt¥ya ad loc.], abheda [R, K].

118

For fear that vivarta-våda should be accepted, the author says so [R 48,4–5].
Cf. K 48,12–23.

27

the Scriptures we can assume its meaning.
[Obj.] Unity is not real existent (våstavika) because it is based on limiting adjunct(upådhi).
[Ans.] No; because [the assumption that] plural [parts] forming a mass produce
unity (ekatva), is simpler (laughava) than [the assumption that] they produce the one[entity] (eka).119 And we will establish it when we refuse the whole (avayava) [otherthan its parts].120[Obj.] Then, it is mere congregation of atoms admitted by others.
[Ans.] You cannot doubt so. For [triguˆa], which is established by the Scripturesand so on as deprived of smell and taste and touch and other [qualities], not crushingeach other, the substratum of three elements (guˆa) called sattva and rajas and tamas,
blended each other, and forming subtle substance like five gross elements, has only the
non-existence of any nature (svabhåva) of atoms admitted by others; therefore it proves
to be an entity completely different [from atoms].
[Obj.] Referring to those who hold the theory of the difference and the differenceby limiting adjunct (aupådhika-bhedåbhedavåda), the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya states that Brahman
cannot be cut and so on even though it is connected with limiting adjunct.121[Ans.] This statement depends upon the power of the description that Brahman
in itself has no part and cannot be cut and so on [50]. Otherwise Brahman in itself
would have modifications (vikåra); accordingly there would be no room for the Scriptures
which describe Brahman has no modification. Moreover in this case, the contingency
that Brahman recollects all happiness and misery belonging to His parts, could not be
avoided; because He is omniscient. In the case of [triguˆa], however, there is not
mixture of the natures in each modifications fixed according to the partial differences.
By the above-mentioned discussions, the theory that atoms (paramåˆu) are thecauses [of the world] is also rejected. For there is no proof of the assumption of animperceptible atom, other than a floating mote (trasareˆu) shone by a sunbeam throughthe window.122 [On the other hand,] the very [floating motes] are called, according to thedifference in size, an atom (paramåˆu), a dyad (dvyaˆuka) or a triad (tryaˆuka) and so119“dharmikalpanåto varaµ dharmakalpanå” [R 49,9].

120

150,7–158,4; esp. .

121

Ír¥Bh I. i. 4 ?.

122

It is the smallest perceptible thing or the smallest thing that has largeness(mahattva), and is also called tryaˆuka, an aggregate of three dyads (dvyˆuka) in theNyåya-Vaißeshikas.

28

on in the books which can be sources of valid knowledge (pramåˆa). True some regards
an atom as imperceptible, but it is not contradictory [to our opinion]; because [floating
motes] can be invisible and so on when their color and other [qualities] are not appeared(anudbhava), like subtle substance, that substratum of grasped smell which is led by [thewind] conveying the smell [51]. And subtle substance led by the wind is not accepted
even by you as an atom, because you do not admit that an atom can be the substratum ofperceptible qualities (guˆa). Therefore neither from perception nor from the Scriptures123
can an atom accepted by you be proved.
[Obj.] But we think the inference as follows: The degree of minute size [or theincrease of smallness] (aˆuparimåˆatåratamya124) culminates (vißrånti) somewhere [i.e.,
at an atom (paramåˆu)]; because it is of the degree of size; [52] like the degree of big
size [or the increase of bigness, which culminates at something omnipresent (vibhu)].
[Ans.] It is not correct. For only if you say “because it is of degree” [as thereason], this inference has no inconstancy125 (vyabhicåra 126); accordingly the qualifying
attribute (vißeshaˆa), “in size” has no meaning. [And what is meant by the subject of theinference (paksha)?] (1) If the word “minute (aˆu)” is used in the sense of “atomic size(pårimåˆ∂alya 127),” mutual dependence (anyonyåßraya) occurs [because the inferencefunctions only after the subject is established but the subject is established by the very
inference]. (2) [If the subject means] “the degree of decrease (apakarsha) of largeness(mahattva),” you admit that it culminates [not at an atom but] at a floating mote.
(3) Even if [the subject] is used in the sense of “the degree of decrease of size” ingeneral, its culmination is also possible only at a visible thing128 [i.e., a floating mote or
triad].
[You may pose another inference: the degree of decrease of (the number of)parts (avayavåpakarshatåratamya) culminates somewhere i.e., at an atom (paramåˆu);123

E.g. “nityaµ vibhuµ sarvagataµ susËkshmam” [Muˆ Up I. i. 6] (R).

124aˆuparimåˆapåramyaor'pakarshasamånådhikaraˆotkarsha (K).
125aˆutvotkarsha(R);aˆutvanish†ho

For example, jñånaßaktitåratamya terminates somewhere (K).

126

It is of two kinds according to the Vißish†ådvaita or of three kinds according
to the Nyåya-Vaißeßika. (1) sådhåraˆa: sådhyåbhåvavadv®tti˙ [TarS §53],
pakshasapakshavipakshav®tti˙ [YMD II. 38]; (2) asådhåraˆa: pakshamåtrav®tti˙ [TarS],
vipakshasapakshavyåv®tta˙ [YMD]; (3) anupasaµhår¥: anvayavyatirekad®sh†åntarahita˙[TarS].
See VaiSË [Potter 1977: 218 §66], 『十句義論』[Potter 1977: 276 §4], PDhS
[Potter 1977: 291 §86].“pårimåˆ∂alyam aˆuparimåˆam” [NySMuk ad v.15].
127

128

Here it is illegible.

29

because it is degree. But it is not true; because] the culmination of the degree of
decrease of parts is also [possible only at a visible thing]. Or rather, let it have noculmination [of the number of parts].
[Obj.] Then, the size of a mountain would be same as that of a mustard and soon, [because everything would be composed of (årabdha) infinite parts].129[Ans.] Such contingency is avoided by the superiority and the inferiority
established by means of valid knowledge [53]. And you also accept the superiority andthe inferiority between [the numbers of] that which has higher genus (jåti) and thatwhich has lower, or [the numbers of] a moment, a day, a half-month, a month, a year,
four yugas, kalpa and so on, which are not different as to [being composed of] infinite
parts.130[Obj.] [Another inference is possible:] for example, [a floating mote (trasareˆu)],which is under the discussion (vipratipanna), is a product of substances being effects[i.e., three dyads (dvyaˆuka), composed of two atoms (paramåˆu)] (kåryadravyårabdha131);
because it has bigness (mahattva) and visibility (cåkshushatva), or because it has visibility
and is substance (cåkshushadravyatva).
[Ans.] Such inferences cannot achieve their aim (aprayojaka) [i.e., proving anatom], because they have no sublating (bådhaka) in their counter-example (vipaksha)[i.e., what is not a product of substances being effects].
[Obj.] The superiority as to the visibility of substance132 is found in proportion to
the superiority as to its bigness133 or the number of its parts: the former superiority iscaused by one of the latter two superiority. Therefore without [the bigness or the parts],
the visibility cannot exist. [That means there is negative concomitance (vyatirekavyåpti)between the probandum (sådhya) “being composed of parts” or “being a product” andthe non-existence of the reason (hetu) “visibility”].
[Ans.] No; [54] because the possibility (yogyatå) [for visibility] is accepted [ascaused by only having a visible color (udbhËtarËpatvamåtra)] according to our ordinal
129

See Kiraˆåval¥ [Potter 1977: 592]

130

“parajåti means sattå, and aparajåti means dravyatva etc. [The number of]existents, substances, pots etc. are equally infinite; but infinity of substance is superior
to that of a pot, infinity of existent is superior to that of substance. In the same way, in a
moment and so on, infinity of each preceding one is superior to that of each followingone” (R).
131= kåryadravyajanya (K).

132

=

133

mahattva is only a d®sh†ånta (R, K).

dravyacåkshushatåprakarsha
vaißadyåtißaya (K).

dravyavißayakacåkshushajñånanish†ha-30

apprehension(upalambha).

If

not

so,

“beinga

product

of

big

parts

(mahåvayavårabdhatva)” also could enter your invariable concomitance (vyåpti); [then,even a dyad would have bigness]. And our opinion is simpler (laughava) [because we
accept only having a visible color as the cause of the possibility for visibility and do notassume an invisible dyad etc.].
And [your inference is] merely proving what has already proved (siddhasådhana)by our opinion, because we think even each floating mote and the like, aerial (våyav¥ya),fiery (taijasa), watery (åpya), and earthy (pårthiva), is “a product of substances being aneffect” in the form of each former element.134[Obj.] I want to prove “the whole (avayavin) [inherent (samaveta)] in effects.”[Ans.] Even then, you cannot avoid inconstancy (vyabhicåra) by time, which weregard as visible135 [but not as the whole]. And for those who accept [a floating mote(trasareˆu)], which is actually seen (parid®ßyamåna), as a minimum entity (paramåˆu),the qualifying attribute (vißeshaˆa) “being big (mahattva)” [in the reason (hetu)] is notestablished [in the subject (paksha) “a minimum floating mote”; accordingly, the inferenceis unestablished in respect of itself (svarËpåsiddhi)].
[Obj.] Mere “having visibility and being substance (cåkshushadravyatva)” canprove “being big.”[Ans.] This inference also should be denied in the previous way, [that is, having
a visible color (udbhËtarËpatvamåtra) alone is admitted as the cause of the possibility(yogyatå) for visibility].
[Obj.] [An atom can be proved as follows:] earthiness (p®thiv¥tva) exists insomething inherent in an eternal thing [i.e., an earthy atom] (nityasamavetav®tti); because
it is genus (jåti) of [both] a pot and a cloth; like existence (sattå). [55][Ans.] Wise scholars (nirËpaka) do not count this kind of winding inference
among valid inferences. The reasons are as follows:(1) like the previous one, it has no sublating (bådhaka) in its counter-example(vipaksha);(2) due to the lack of something restricting its scope, [the reason] can be excessively
applied (atiprasaµa) [to wrong inference such as:
Earthiness exists in water,
Because it is genus (jåti) of [both] a pot and a cloth,134

The order is: tåmasåhaµkåra Æ ßabda-tamåtra Æ åkåßa Æ sparßa-t° Æ våyuÆ rËpa-t° Æ tejas Æ rasa-t° Æ ap Æ gandha-t° Æ p®thiv¥ [YMD IV. 31–47].
135

YMD V. 9: sha∂indriyavedya˙ kåla ity åcåryå˙.

31

Like existence (sattå)];(3) it can be obstructed by the following counter-inference and the like:
Earthiness does not exist in an eternal thing,
Because it is genus (jåti) of earth alone,
Like pot-ness;(4) what brings to an end (paryavasåna) in the particular intended thing [i.e., an atom],is not established; [accordingly, it can prove anything eternal].
And this inference is merely proving what has already proved (siddhasådhana);
because [we] accept that all entities such as pot are resorting to (åßrita) God (¥ßvara),and [in this case, we] do no accept any other relation [such as] inherence (samavåya).136
Even if you want to prove [only] “to exist in eternal things (nityav®tti),” the same defect[i.e., proving what has already proved (siddhasådhana)] results; since [we] admit that
substance having three components (triguˆadravya) is eternal by nature, even if ittransforms itself into a pot and so on.
In the same way, whosoever blames the atomic theory makes the objection by
the alternative question whether the conjunction (saµyoga) between atoms producing(årambhaka) [gross things] is entire (k®tsna) or partial (pradeßa); [in the former case]they could not produce substance of the size superior to them, [in the latter] they would
have divisions (vibhåga) [56].137 And the author of the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya makes the same
objection in the section including the following sËtra:* And, in the same way as the big and long [triad] from the short [dyad] and theminimum [atom], [other doctrines of the Vaißeshika are unsound].138 [BrSË II. ii. 10]
It is possible only for the Mådhyåmika [to make this objection], but not [possible]
for the other [schools of Buddhism139]. That is, the Vaibhåshika and other [namely, the136

Strictly speaking, the second reason is not for siddhasådhana but forsådhyåprasiddha, as K asserts. Noticing this, R explains that samavetatva here means
nothing but åßritatva because samavåya is apramåˆika.
137

E.g. Potter p.541, summary of Åtmatattvaviveka (by V. Varadachari) §61.

138

mahadd¥rghavad vå hrasvaparimaˆ∂alåbhyåm. “asaµjasam (sËt.9) iti vartate /vå-ßabdaß
ca-arthe/hrasvaparimaˆ∂alåbhyåm
=dvyaˆuka-pramåˆubhy
mahadd¥rghavat = tryaˆukotpattivådavat, anyac ca tadabhimataµ sarvam asaµjasam”[Ír¥Bh II. ii. 10; 289,4–290,1].
139“te[saugtå˙]
caturvidhå˙—
kecit[=
Vaibhåshikå˙]pårthivåpyataijasavåyav¥yaparamåˆusaµghåtarËpån
bhËtabhautikån
båhyån,cittacaittarËpåµß cåbhyantarån arthån pratyakshånumånasiddhån abhyupayanti / anye[= Sautråntikå˙] tu båhyån arthån sarvån p®thivyåd¥n vijñånånumeyån vadanti / apare [=Yogåcårå˙] tu, arthaßËnyaµ vijñånam eva paramårthasat, båhyårthås tu svåpnårthakalpå˙
ity åhu˙ / trayo 'py ete svåbhyupagataµ vastu kshaˆikam åcakshate; uktabhËtabhautikacittacaittavyatiriktam åtmåkåßådikaµ svarËpeˆaiva nånumanvate / anye

32

Sautråntika], though not admitting the conjunction (saµyoga) [other than close proximity(nairantarya)] between atoms in gathering together (puñja), should accept whether one
atom is covered (åv®ta) by another or not (anåv®ta) depends upon the difference in thedelimitations of space (digavacchedabheda) [57].
For those who assert only knowledge [is real] (jñånamåtravådin) [i.e., theYogåcåra], the alternative question whether the connection (sambandha) between one
knowledge and the form known by it (jñeyåkåra) is entire or partial is of the same
condition (tadavastha): [that is, if knowledge connected with its object entirely, we
could not grasp another object; and if partially, knowledge would have divisions].140[Obj.] It is avoidable, because something known is unreal (mithyå).
[Ans.] No, because even as to unreal things an imaginative description (ullekha141)
is inevitable.
[Obj.] We accept subtle (sËkshma) perceptible substance [a floating mote(trasareˆu)] as lacking any division (nirvibhåga), [thereby the problem of conjunction iseligible].
[Ans.] Then, the same objection is established as to the conjunction between [afloating mote] and something omnipresent (vibhu) without any division.142[Obj.] But we do not accept omnipresent substance.
[Ans.] Then, [the same objection is established as to the connection] between[two individuals (vyakti)] and genus (såmånya). Even if you do not accept [genus], [thesame objection is established] when conjunction (saµyoga) or inherence (samavåya)exists in many entities. For there is no rule that this objection relates to substance alone.
[Obj.] Only substance has the fitness for having divisions.
[Ans.] If you admit so, you would rather say [only] substance except something
atomic or omnipresent does.
[Obj.] True. Then, how [do you interpret the passage of] the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya [58]?
[Ans.] It intends to deny the assumption of something other than things actually
seen. Whosoever assume [a floating mote (trasareˆu)], which is perceived lacking any
division (nirbhåga), has parts (såvayava), should accept the following invariable rule[=Mådhyåmikå˙] tu sarvaßËnyatvam eva saµgirante” [Ír¥Bh II. ii. 17; 295,4–9].
140

Cf. Potter p.542, summary of Åtmatattvaviveka (by V. Varadachari) §62.

141

= jñånasya tadvishayakatva (K).

142

“uktasËkshmadravyåˆåµvibhusaµyogånabhyupagame
sarvamËrtadravyasaµyogitvarËpavibhutvånupapattiprasaµgena
tatsaµyogasyå''vaßyakatayå” (K ≈ R).

33(vyåpti): every substance producing [another] substance143 [always] produces after making
a conjunction dependent on its part (avayavata˙),144 and the difference in the delimitationsof space (digavacchedabheda) is also [always] dependent on the parts.145 Consequently
the atom admitted and settled by other [schools] cannot be proved. This fact is approved
about something atomic, God and so on, which are established by perception and the
Scriptures, according to means of valid knowledge [59]. For the same reason, in order toreject the sËtra
*There would be the contingency that the entire [Brahman becomes all theeffects]; otherwise the ßruti teaching its being without any part, would be stultified,146[BrSË II. i. 26]
there is sËtras beginning with
*No, because ßrutis say so; for [Brahman] is founded upon the holy word [only].147[BrSË II. i. 27][Obj.] Then, let it be that only subtle substances as established by perception
produce the world.
[Ans.] Not so. For if you admit independent production, it is opposite to thesacred texts (ßåstra). If you admit production dependent upon [God], prak®ti is also
admitted according to the Scripture148 (ågama). And there is contradiction in your theory
that the phenomenal world [characterized by space (åkåßa)], which must exist earlier
143

sarvaµ dravyaµ dravyårambhakaµ… Viraraghavachari's ed. omitts dravyaµ,which remains in K.
144

dravyårambhakadravyatvaµyatra
yatra,tatra
tatrasvåßrayåvacchinnasaµyogavattvam iti vå; dravyårambhakasaµyogatvaµ yatra yatra, tatra
tatra svåßrayåvacchinnatvam iti vå vyåpti˙ (K).
145

(K).

yatra yatra vibhinnadiksambandhatvaµ tatra tatra såvayavatvam iti vyåpti˙146

k®tsnaprasaktir niravayavatvaßabdakopo vå. “paraµ brahma k®tsnaµ kåryatvenopayuktam ity abhyupagantavyam / atha cidaµßa˙ kßetrajñavibhågavibhakta˙,acidaµßaß cå ''kåßådivibhågavibhakta ity ucyate; tadå … kåraˆabhËtasya brahmaˆoniravayavatvavådina˙ ßabdå˙ kupyeyu˙ = bådhitå bhaveyu˙” [Ír¥Bh II. i. 26; (II)268,1–4].
147ßrutes tu ßabdamËlatvåt. “tu-ßabda uktadoshaµ vyåvartayati / naivam
asañjasam / kuta˙? ßrute˙ — ßrutis tåvan niravayavatvaµ brahmaˆas tato vicitrasargaµcå''ha / sraute 'rthe yathåßruti pratipattavyam ity artha˙ / … ßabdamËlatvåd iti /ßabdaikapramåˆakatvena sakaletaravastuvisajåt¥yatvåd asyå'rthasya vicitraßaktiyogo na
virudhyate” [Ír¥Bh II. i. 27; (II) 268,9–13].
148

E.g. “avyaktaµ kåraˆaµ yat tat pradhånam ®shisattamai˙ / procyate prak®ti˙sËkshmå nityaµ sadasadåtmakam” (VishPu I. ii. 19), “gaur anådy antavat¥ så janitr¥bhËtabhåvin¥” (CËlikåUp 5) [Jacob: gaur anådavat¥ så tu…], “avyaktaµ kåraˆaµ yat tan
nityaµ sadasadåtmakam” (?).

34

than four elements [other than space], is produced by them.
[Obj.] The part of four gross elements are called space or sound.
[Ans.] It is abandoned [because even a child can distinguish space from four
elements]. [60] And the way (prakriyå) of the process of creation that one element
becomes material (upådåna) or product (upådeya) mutually, is contradictory to [theScriptures149].
[Obj.] There is nothing but four elements.
[Ans.] No, because it is contradictory to the Scriptures.150[Obj.] Let it be that floating motes (trasareˆu) themselves have the condition(avasthå) devoid of smell and so on.
[Ans.] If you admit so, in the same way, their turning into [the condition] devoidof any division (avibhågåpatti151) is also admitted; this is proved to be mËlaprak®ti(primordial cause).
This mËlaprak®ti is that which has each three components equally (samatraiguˆya).
According to the slight difference (måtrayå bheda152), as [triguˆa is called in othernames153], four conditions of [mËlaprak®ti], namely, avyakta, akshara, vibhakta[tamas]
and avibhaktatamas, are mentioned in the holy texts (åmananti).154 [61] In this regard,
Varadanåråyaˆa-bha††åraka155 says in the Nyåyasudarßana 156:
*The authors of sm®tis are of two kinds: some assert avyakta is the cause [of theworld], others assert tamas is the cause. The opinion of those who decide on (pary-ava-√so)
avyakta, is that varieties of avyakta with a slight difference in their condition areakshara and tamas, and the difference is not noteworthy. [The opinion] of those who
149

E.g. “åkåßåd våyu˙, våyor agni˙” (TaittUp II. i. 1).

150

E.g. “khaµ våyur jyotir åpa˙ p®thiv¥ vißvasya dhåriˆ¥” (Muˆ∂Up II. i. 3).

151= ekatvåvasthåpatti (R).

152

= alpabheda (K).

153

See 41,1–2.

154

E.g. avyaktam akshare l¥yate, aksharaµ tamasi l¥yate, tama˙ pare deveek¥bhavati [SubålaUp 2]. SudarßanasËri's Subålopanishadvyåkhyåna (not available now
and this quotation is the only passage ever known [Singh 129]) illustrates the difference
as follows: “(1) avibhakta-tamas is like a seed hidden in a granary, (2) vibhakta-tamas is
like a seed sown in mud, (3) akshara is same as a seed which is partially wet and loose
connected with water and (4) avyakta is same as a swollen seed” [R 61, 11–13], which
is supported by Vyåsårya (?) [K 61, 18–20].
155

fl. in the last decade of the 12th century [Singh 127].

156

An exposition of Ír¥Bh, published up to the end of I. i. 3. [Biblio 298–301].

35

decide on tamas, is based on the fact that they think much (urar¥k®tya) of such [slight]
difference. Therefore there is no contradiction between them. [Nyåyasudarßana ][Obj.] But in the [Ír¥-]bhåshya and so on, it is illustrated as to many passages[such as ‘avyaktam akshare l¥yate’ (SubålaUp 2)] that the word “akshara” read alongwith “avyakta” denotes a spiritual being (cetana).157[Ans.] There is not any contradiction in view of the following grounds158: [62](1) The author follows the way of the interpretation of others.159(2) Even if it undergoes spiritual modifications, the individual self (j¥va), lackingof modifications by nature, can be denoted by the word “akshara (non-delaying)” because
it is said to be created; like this, we can assume the potentiality (ßakti) of the word“akshara” whose object is other than Brahman to denote the particular condition of
non-spiritual entity. In order to teach it, [Råmånuja says so].
(3) [He says so] with the intention that in this case only the implication that does
not abandon [its own meaning] (ajahallakshaˆå160) is proper. The reasons are: (a) Though
in some [passages] the word “akshara (non-decaying)” denotes a particular [conditionof] prak®ti, which is decaying (kshara), this usage cannot be primary (mukhya). (b) Thereis not the purpose in the implication (lakshaˆå) by the connection with the decaying(kshara) named Brahman. (c) It is proper to teach a particular absorption (laya) and soon by the connection with the individual soul, and the absorption of both is described in
the passage such as*These two are absorbed in the highest soul [ViP IV. iv. 39].
1. 3

mahat

(62,8–66,1)

The mahat (great) is the triguˆa qualified by the condition immediately after thecondition called avyakta and the condition immediately before the condition calledahaµkåra. [63] Or its definition is being denoted by the word [mahat]. [65] As to
ahaµkåra and other [evolutions], such [definition] is possible.
According to the Såµkhya school, mahat is the mental faculty (v®tti) of
157

The commentators quotes the passage of the Ír¥Bh: “‘avyaktam akshare l¥yate’(SubålaUp 2) ‘yasyåvyaktaµ ßar¥raµ … yasyåksharaµ ßar¥ram’ (ibid. 7) ‘kshara˙ sarvåˆibhËtåni kË†astho 'kshara˙’(BhG XV. 16) ityådishu pratyagåtmany apy
aksharaßabdaprayogadarßanåt” [Ír¥Bh I. iii. 10; (II) 23,2–4]. Cf. “aksharaßabdanirdish†akË†astho 'citsaµsargaviyukta˙ svaˆa rËpeˆåvasthito muktåtmå” [GBh XV. 16].
158

According to the commentator, the latter, the better.

159

The above-mentined passage of the Ír¥Bh is the opinion of the pËrvapakshin.

160

E.g. “chatriˆo yånti (Men with umbrellas and men without it go).” See TarD
§59, NySMuk ad 82ab.

36determination (adhyavasåya), that is to say:
*Buddhi [=mahat] is determination. [SK 23]
But it is not true, because determination is the attribute (dharma) of åtman (theself).
[Obj.] [The definition161] of mahat is being the efficient cause (nimitta) ofdetermination in general (°måtra); and only by this fact (tåvataiva) it can be the objectof the word “buddhi,” “adhyavasåya,” etc.
[Ans.] Even if you conclude so (yadi param162), being the efficient cause of[determination] in general can not be the definition; because [this definition] has so
wide that it is applicable (ativyåpti) [even to time or ad®sh†a], and because any secondary(avåntara) special character (vißesha163) [that can distinguish mahat from following
principles] is not ascertained. For those who ascertain them, however, it also could be
the definition.
For the same reason, the definitions “being the cause of the merit (dharma) andthe demerit (adharma)” and the like are refuted. [66][Mahat] is of three kinds: såttvika, råjasa and tåmasa. Here each designation isbased on the difference in part by the preponderance (unmesha) of each component(guˆa).
1.4

ahaµkåra

(65,3–68,2)

Ahaµkåra (I-ness) is the triguˆa qualified by the condition immediately before
indriyas. Here also the definition by the Såµkhya school, that is,*ahaµkåra is abhimåna (ego) [SK 24],can be denied as in the previous case [for the reason that it is the attribute of åtman].
Moreover, it is denoted by the word “ahaµkåra” only because it is the cause to make(karaˆa) the notion (bhåva164) that one's body, which is not åtman, is “I (aham),” but notbecause it is the principle called “I” (ahamartha165).166 For the inward (pratyac) self is161

According to K, some MSS add “lakshaˆam.”162“yadi param” is often used by Yåmuna (N) and means “yadi nirvahaˆ¥yam…,
tarhi…” (Viraraghavachari's footnote 2).
163

The reading of U “vishaya” is apparently misprint.

164

ahambhåva = ahambuddhi (R, K).

165“na jñaptimåtram åtmå, api tu jñåtaivå'hamartha˙” [Ír¥Bh I. i. 1; (1) 146],“aham ity eva pratyagåtmano svarËpam” [ib. (1) 172,8f.]. See also NySi 204. [VißKoßa
q.v.].
166

In this respect, the commentators quote the passage of the Ír¥Bh: “sa tv

37[the principle called “I”]. And it is not contradictory to the description that [ahaµkåra]is to be abandoned,167 because ahaµkåra in the sense of “abhimåna,” synonymous witharrogance (garva) which causes to slight superior persons, is described so 168 [67].
As in the previous case, [ahaµkåra] is also of three kinds: [såttvika, råjasa andtåmasa]. Among them, form såttvika-[ahaµkåra] indriyas are generated; formtåmasa-[ahaµkåra] subtle elements (tanmåtra) of sound (ßabda); råjasa-[ahaµkåra] assists
both [generation]. Even in the case of tåmasa-[ahaµkåra] and råjasa-[ahaµkåra], [theabove-mentioned definition] is not of too narrow application (avyåpti), because, [thougheither are not the cause of indriyas], to be immediately before indriyas in general(°måtra) is accepted in both. Each mode169 of the relationship of the cause and the effectin three [ahaµkåra]170 is also the definition of the three respectively.
The king Bhoja,171 however, says:*This ahaµkåra is of three kinds: living (j¥vana), activity (saµrambha) andarrogance (garva). Because of the mixture of this being [ahaµkåra], object gets to be
used practically (vyavahåratåm eti).
According to the difference among såttvika, råjasa and tåmasa, further three kinds areborn. And it breathes (sam-ud-√ßvas) by the name of taijasa, vaikårika and bhËtådi.172
Among them, from the taijasa manas is generated; from the vaikårika eyes are generated;from the bhËtådi subtle elements (tanmåtra) [are generated]. That is the creation of themfrom it. [Tattvaprakåßikå173 ][68] In this respect, the parts contradictory to [our opinion] 174 should not be respectedanåtmani dehe 'hambhåvakaraˆahetutvenå'haµkåra ity ucyate / asyåhaµkåraßabdasya,abhËtatadbhåve Cvi-pratyayam utpådya vyutpattir drash†avyå” [Ír¥Bh I. i. 1; (1) 173,1–2].
167

E.g. “ahaµkåraµ balaµ darpaµ kåmaµ krodhaµ parigraham / vimucya
nirmama˙ ßånto brahmabhËyåya kalpate” [BhG XVIII. 53].
168

Cf. “ayam eva tv ahaµkåra utk®sh†ajanåvamånahetur garvåparanåmå ßåstreshu
bahußa˙ heyatayå pratipådyate” [Ír¥Bh I. i. 1; (1) 173,3].
169

That is, såttvika-ahaµkåra = indriyakåraˆatva, tåmasa-a°= tanmåtrakåraˆatva,
råjasa-a°= ubhayånugrahakåraˆatva.
170…kåryakåraˆaprakåram (Bv.) would be the better reading, N said.

171

Probably the same person as the author of the Råjavårttika on the YogasËtra,fl. in the 11th century [Dasgupta HIPh V 159].
172

Cf. “vaikårikas taijaso bhËtådir iti trividho 'haµkåra˙ / sa ca kramåt såttvikoråjasas tåmasaß ca” [VAS §57; 104,14f.].
173

The work is referred to by Mådhava in his Sarvadarßanasaµgraha, chap. 7:
Íaiva-darßana. Dasgupta shows its contents in his HIPh V 159–72.
174

That is, (1) the classification based upon j¥vana etc., (2) that manas and otherindriyas have respectively each own cause, (3) that tanmåtra is the product of bhËtådi.

38

because it is based on the heterodox (båhya) scriptures of the Íaiva sect. In the sameway, depending upon the [Vishˆu-]Puråˆa and so on by the Venerable Paråßara andothers, which are the most authoritative175 (pramåˆatama), the descriptions of otherPuråˆas should be justified (nirvåhya). And the extreme contradictions should be ignored.
1.5

indriya (68,3–87,4)

1.5.1

The definition of indriya(68,4–69,2)

Indriya (faculty) is that which is other than pråˆa and other [vital air] and iscompetent for each particular effect as the operation (vyåpåra) delimited (avacchinna)by the particular part of a body such as a heart, ears and eyes.
*The substance which is not a body but held by the vital air and supports the self
(purusha), is indriya, [?]says Varadavishˆu-mißra. The definition of the Såµkhya and other schools that indriya
has såttvika-ahaµkåra as its material cause (upådåna)176 is not correct because it is too
narrow to be applicable (avyåpti) to indriya which is not derived from prak®ti (apråk®ta)[69]. And the [definitions] asserted by the Vaißeshika and other schools such as[Indriya] is that which is the means (sådhana) of direct knowledge (såkshåtpramiti)
only if it is united with a body but which is not perceptible, [or] that which the means of
direct experience (såkshåtkåra) [Tårkikarakshå v. 28177]
are untenable for the reason that it is too narrow to be applicable (avyåpti) to karma-indriyas(the faculties of actions) and so on. And it will be explained that speech (våc) and thelike are indriyas.
1.5.2

The divisions of indriyas(69,4–70,4)

Indriya is of two kinds: pråk®ta (derived from prak®ti or material) and apråk®ta(not derived from prak®ti or immaterial). This distinction depends on whether it has puresattva (ßuddhasattva) or not (ßuddhasattva). According to some teachers,178 there is thedistinction between pråk®ta and apråk®ta even in avyakta, mahat and ahaµkåra [70].
The definition of pråk®ta-indriya (indriya derived from prak®ti) is being produced
175

The commentators refer to the Írutaprakåßikå.

176

The translator has not traced the exact source. Cf. SK 25: såttvika ekådaßaka˙[indriyagaˆa˙] pravartate vaik®tåd ahaµkåråt [= såttvika-ahaµkåråt].
177

According to the quotation in Nyåyakoßa, q.v. [142,15]. The work is written
by Bharadaråja (12c), and summarized in Potter 629ff, esp. 636.
178

Some hold that there are the twenty-four principles including mahat and otherintemediate principles even in the nityavibhËti; see chap.4, 389,3.

39

along with subtle elements of sound (ßabda-tanmåtra), having såttvika-ahaµkåra as its
material cause (upådåna) and so on.
And further, indriya is of two kinds: the faculty of knowledge (jñånendriya) andthe faculty of action (karmendriya).
1.5.3jñåna-indriyas(70,5–81,1)

1.5.3.1 jñåna-indriyas are six including manas(70,5–71,1)

The faculty of knowledge (jñånendriya) is the indriya being capable of spreading(prasaraˆa) knowledge. It is of six kinds according to the difference among manas(mental faculty), the faculty of hearing (ßrotra) and the like. And such distinction has
explained by Bha††a-Paråßara-påda in his Tattvaratnåkara beginning with*And it is of six kinds,and ending with
*Manas is internal. [Tattvaratnåkara]
The Såµkhya and other schools assert that manas is included in the faculties ofaction because all activities presuppose the manas.179 That is to say:*The faculties of perception (buddh¥ndriya) are said to be sight (cakshus), hearing(ßrotra), smell (ghråˆa), taste (rasanå) and touch (tvac). They say the faculties of action
are speech (våc), prehension (påˆi), walking (påda), excretion (påyu) and generation(upastha).180
Manas belongs to both. [SK 26–27a]
It is not right, because only through knowledge [manas] can be the cause ofactivities. Moreover, if something were [the faculty of action] only because [activities
presuppose it], even eyes and the like would be so. True in some cases181 there ispractical usage that [manas is] the faculty of action, but it is only figurative (aupacårika).
Actions (karma) are classified into mental (månasa), lingual (våcika) and physical (kåyika);
but it is because the word is used for the knowledge in the form of pure and impure will.
Therefore the faculties of knowledge are but six.
Among them, the varieties of the pråk®ta are as follows.
1.5.3.2 manas(71,2–72,1)

179“cakshuråd¥nåµ vågåd¥nåµ ca monodhish†hånåm eva svasvavishayeshu
prav®tte˙” [Tattvakaumud¥ on SK 27].
180Våcaspati reads 26cd: våkpåˆipådapåyËpasthåni
(underlined reading = U's reading in parenthesis).
181

K quotes the passage of Yåjˆavalkyasm®ti.

karmendriyåˆy

åhu˙

40

The definition of pråk®ta-manas is, not being pure sattva, being indriya common
to five kinds of objects, being indriya which is the instrument (karaˆa) of memory(smaraˆa) and so on.
And it is located only in the part of a heart. Even for other indriyas, the place ofthe root (kanda) is the part of a heart, but they respectively exist even in other places.
Generally the [individual] self also exists in [the part of a heart], as is explained in the[Ír¥-]Bhåshya :*[The individual soul] exists in a particular place which is the root of all indriyas;
accordingly, it cannot settle (ava-√sthå) in the eye. [Ír¥Bh I. ii. 18; 314,4–5]
Manas is the one and only internal organ. Only through its operation (vyåpåra),will (saµkalpa), determination (adhyavasåya) and others are generated; hence they are
not other kinds of internal organ, as is explained in the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya :*Manas itself is designated by the words buddhi, ahaµkåra and citta according
to the difference in function, namely, adhyavasåya (determination), abhimåna (ego) andcintå (thinking). [Ír¥Bh II. iv. 5; 391,18–392,1]
And further, the author of the [Brahma-]sËtra has illustrated this point as the example
as to pråˆa:* [The pråˆa] is designated as having five-fold function like the manas. [BrSË II.
iv. 11]
Therefore, what is asserted by the Såµkhya and other schools182:*The internal organ is of three kinds: [buddhi, ahaµkåra and manas] [SK 33]
and the like are refuted [72].
1.5.3.3 ßrotra(72,2–74,3)

The pråk®ta-ßrotra (the faculty of hearing derive from prak®ti) is the indriyacapable of grasping only sound out of five [kinds of object] such as sound.
It exists, in the case of men and the like, in the [part] delimited by the orifice(ßashkul¥) of the ear. In the case of a snake (dvijihva), however, it exists in the eye, as[Nåthamuni] has explained in the eighth section (adhikaraˆa) of the chapter on organs(karaˆa-påda) in his Nyåyatattva :*There is the restricted that the eye of snakes is the faculty of hearing (ßravaˆa).
[Nyåyatattva]
and so on.
182

That is, the Advaita-Vedånta School, according to N. See, however,Vedåntaparibhåshå I. 58: “v®ttibhedena ekam api anta˙karaˆaµ mana iti buddhir iti
ahaµkåra iti cittam iti ca ''khyåyate.”41[Obj.] But [Paråßara-bha††a] has said in his Tattvaratnåkara:*The substratum of these [indriyas] are the orifice of the ear, the body, theeyeball (nayanagolaka), the tongue and the nose [respectively]. [Tattvaratnåkara].
[Ans.] It should be regard as mostly the case (pråyika).
[Obj.] [Some texts] assert that [the faculty of hearing] is born from ether (nåbhsa)183
or that its material is direction (dik).184[Ans.] It can be justified (nirvåhya) by [the fact] that [gross elements] nourish(åpyåyanatva185) [the indriyas], 186 because there is the statement which cannot be explained
otherwise (ananyathåsiddha) that [the faculty of hearing] is born from ahaµkåra187 [73].
[Obj.] In the fifth section (adhikaraˆa) of the chapter on organs (karaˆa-påda) [inthe Nyåyatattva], however, it is said that the faculty (ßakti) of sight (netra) and thefaculty of hearing (ßrotra) and so on are composed of [fire (tejas), whose attribute(dharma) is] light (åloka), and of [ether (åkåßa), whose attribute is] sound (ßabda). And
in the seventh section, the passage beginning with
*The indriya is the subtle evolution of the food (anna),188 [Tattvaratnåkara]
and the passage beginning with*because the faculties of action are the evolutions of the food [Tattvaratnåkara]
make us understand that the indriyas are made of gross elements (bhËta).
[Ans.] It also can be justified (nirvåhya) with the intention that [ these elements]
nourish (åpyåyana) [the indriyas]. For in the Vedårthasaµgraha the statement of the183

E.g. “ßabda˙ ßrotraµ tathå khådi trayam åkåßasambhavam…” (Mahåbhårata
[Mokshadharma] XII. ).
184

E.g. “…dißa˙ ßrotraµ bhËtvå karˆau pråvißan” (AitareyaUp I. ii. 4).

185

The reading is supported by R. Varanasi ed. and Madras (1934) ed. readåpyåyitatva, which is supported by K.
186

Cf. VAS §57 quoted afterwards.: “indriyåˆåm åhaµkårikåˆåµ bhËtaiß
cåpyåyanaµ Mahåbhårata ucyate” (105,3f.).
187

E.g. “taijasån¥ndriyåˆy åhur devå vaikårikå daßa / ekådaßaµ manaß cåtra devåvaikårikå˙ sm®tå˙” (VishP I. ii. 47). According to Råmånuja's commentary on thispassage in VAS §57 [104,14–105,3] and the Vishˆucitt¥ya [7a, 6ff.], the translation is asfollows: Some say that the indriyas are [born from] the råjasa-ahaµkåra (=taijasa);[others say that] the ten indriyas (=deva) and the eleventh manas are [born from] thesåttvika-ahaµkåra (=vaikårika). On this point [our opinion is that] the indriyas (=deva)
are said to be [born from] the såttvika-ahaµkåra (=vaikårika). The last portion (atradevå˙…) is the proof for the ananyathåsiddhatva according to R and K. However theinterpretation of this passage is not ananyathåsiddha at all; see van Buitenen's translation
of VAS p.224 n.248.
188

Here anna means bhËta. Cf. Ír¥Bh I. ii. 23 (comm. on Muˆ∂akaUp I. i. 8):
adyata ity annam; vißvasya bhokt®vargasya bhogyabhËtaµ bhËtasËkshmam avyåk®tam…
[329,7–8].

42sm®ti [i.e., ViP I. ii. 47] is also interpreted in the same way. That is, from:*Those who know the Veda says the eleven indriyas are from the såttvika(vaikårika°) ahaµkåra …[VAS §57; 104,10f.]
up to:The Mahåbhårata 189 says the indriyas, being from ahaµkåra,190 is nourished by
the elements (bhËta). [VAS §57; 105,3f.][Obj.] [The following inferences prove that the indriyas are made of the elements:](a) The faculty of hearing (ßrotra) is made of the elements (bhautika), because it is anexternal organ (båhyendriya), [like the faculty of sight (cakshus)];(b) Ether (åkåßa) produces the indriya [i.e., ßrotra], because it is an element, [like earth];(c) Sound is grasped by the indriya which has the same quality (guˆa) as it, because it is
the quality causing the regularity (vyavasthå) of external organs, [like color (rËpa)];(d) The faculty of hearing (ßrotra) has the same quality as the quality grasped by it,
because it is an external organ, [like the faculty of sight]; and the like [74].
[Ans.] To this objection, the following refutations can be said: [the instance(d®sh†ånta) in the inference (a)] is deprived of the probandum (sådhya) because thefaculty of sight will be explained as not to be made of the elements (abhautika),191 they
are sublated by the ßrutis, and so on.
(11)

Sound is the attribute (dharma) of the element [i.e., ether]; and [the faculty of]hearing (ßruti) is from the såttvika-ahaµkåra (vaikårika). Accordingly, the proper (yogya)[sound], whose substratum is [ether] conjunct with [the faculty of hearing](saµyuktanilaya), is apprehended by [the faculty of hearing]192 // 11 //We will put down (√ßam) some controversies (vivåda) concerning sound whether
it is dravya or adravya, whether the faculty of hearing goes or sound comes and the likein [the chapter on] adravya.
189

SudarßanasËri's Tåtparyad¥pikå [118,15ff.] has not mentioned which passageof the Mahåbhårata is indicated here; it is maybe the same one as quoted in R and K,
the dialogue between Bh®gu and Bharadvåja from the Mokshadharma [Cr. ed. XII.
176–80]: “åpyåyyante ca te nityaµ dhåtavas tais tu pañcabhi˙.” Van Buitenen refers to
XII. 194. 5ff. without mentioning the source [1956: 224 n.250].
190

åhaµkårikåˆåm indiriyåˆåµ. Van Buitenen's ed. of VAS reads indiriyåˆåmåhaµkårikåˆåµ.
191
192

76,10–80,1.

“åhåµkårikaßrotrasaµyuktåkåßådinish†hoyogya-ßabda˙(=sa˙)
saµyuktåßritatvarËpapratyåsattyå ßrotrendriyeˆa (=tena) g®hyata it¥ty artha˙” (R≈K).
Varanasi ed. reads yoga˙ for yogya˙ in a parenthesis. In this case, the translation ofpåda cd could be: the connection (yoga = saµbandha) is saµyuktåßraya (saµyuktanilaya);[sound] is apprehended by it.

43

1.5.3.4 tvac etc.

(74,4–76,9)

If you substitute the word (a) ‘only touch (sparßa)’ and so on, [i.e., (b) ‘only
color (rËpa),’ (c) ‘only taste (rasa)’ and (d) ‘only smell (gandha)’], respectively for theword ‘only sound’ in the above-mentioned definition of the faculty of hearing (ßrotra),[“the indriya capable of grasping only sound out of five kinds of object such as sound”],
you can get the definitions of (a) the faculty of touch (tvac) and the others, [i.e., (b) the
faculty of sight (cakshus), (c) the faculty of taste (rasana) and (d) the faculty of smell(ghråˆa)] [75].
Among them, the substratum of the faculty of touch is the whole body. It is saidin the eighth section (adhikaraˆa) of the chapter on organs (karaˆa-påda) [in theNyåyatattva]:*The degree of the grasping touch [varies] according to the difference in the part[of the body]; and in the part of nails, teeth, hair and so on, touch is not grasped becauseof the very low degree of the pråˆa.193 [Nyåyatattva][The faculty of touch] properly (yathåyogyam) grasp the four elements such as air(våyu) [other than ether] by the conjunction (saµyogena). [The adravyas] such as touch[are grasped] as existing in [the dravya] conjunct with [the faculty of touch](saµyuktanish†hatayå).
The substrata of the faculty of sight (cakshus) and other [faculties, i.e., thefaculty of taste (rasana) and the faculty of smell (ghråˆa)] are respectively the eyeball(nayanagolaka), the palate (tålu) and the nose (nåsa). In this respect, it is said that thenose of an elephant is [one of] its hands, accordingly the substratum of the faculty ofhearing is same as that of the faculty of prehension (påˆi). It is explained [in the chapter
on organs (karaˆa-påda) of the Nyåyatattva194]:*Only an elephant can grasp smell by the hand [Nyåyatattva]
and so on. The above-mentioned regulation as to the part of each indriya is mostly thecase (pråyaßa˙) only in moving animals.
The faculty of sight grasp the four elements other than air (våyu),195 as [in thecase of the faculty of touch, by the conjunction]. Color and so on also, as in the case of
touch, [are grasped as existing in the dravya conjunct with the faculty of sight]
193

Nevertheless the pråˆa exists in them. See “na ca keßanakhådishu pråˆavyåptir
nåst¥ti ßaµkhyam; Nyåyatattva-ßåstre pråˆavyåpte˙ pratipåditatvåt” [R 75,12f ≈ K].
194

According to the pramåˆa-akåra of U.

195

Even åkåßa can be grasped by the cakshus. See 94,6ff.

44(saµyuktanish†hatayå). In grasping something far away, the connection (sambandha)[between the faculty of sight and its object] is established in view of the travel (prasaraˆa)of the ocular beam (mahas); it is explained in detail (prapañcita) in the second section(adhikaraˆa) of the chapter on organs (karaˆa-påda) [in the Nyåyatattva]. And in graspinga reflected image (pratibimba), [the connection is] based on that the ocular beam reflectedby the bright (svaccha) substance travels in the contrary direction, as is said the prima
facie view in the section (adhikaraˆa) on delusion [in the chapter on organs (karaˆa-påda)(?) of the Nyåyatattva196] [76]. Our experience (darßana) prove that glass (spha†ika) andthe like have the structure (saµsthåna) fit for the penetration of light such as the ocularbeam; that is why everyone can grasp something screened off (vyavahita) by glass. The
faculty of sight anointed with a magic eyewash (añjana) can grasp a jewel and so on[concealed in the earth], because the ocular beam purified by it can penetrate the earthand so on.
Now the faculty of taste (rasana) and the faculty of smell (ghråˆa) grasp taste
and smell respectively as existing in [the dravya] conjunct with [it]. And it is said in the
Tattvaratnåkara [of Paråßara-bha††a] that the connection [between an indriya and its
object] is of two kinds:*In this respect, the elders had known that a contact [between an indriya and its
object] (sannikarshaˆa) is [of two kinds only, that is,] conjunction (saµyoga) and existingin something conjunct [with the indriya] (saµyuktåßrayaˆa). Let observe respectively inthis way.197 [Tattvaratnåkara]
In this way, the manas, the faculty of touch (sparßa) and the faculty of sight(ålaoka) can grasp both dravya and adravya; the faculty of hearing, the faculty of taste
and the faculty of smell can only adravya. Or rather, all indriyas can grasp both dravya
and adravya, because they grasp the entity (vastu) qualified by the present time, as issaid by Ír¥-Vishˆucitta-årya in his Prameyasaµgraha in refuting [the theory] that [only]
pure existence (sanmåtra) is perceptible:*Time is included in all the cognitions (prat¥ti) because it is the attribute of [all]entities; accordingly, it cannot have any independent form (p®thagrËpavat198).
[Prameyasaµgraha]
196

Mesquita points out the similarity of this content and the passage of Ír¥Bh I. i.
1: (2) 36,2f. See Erkenntnis, S.252.
197
198

Also cited in NyP 74,6. Cf. YMD I. 15.

When the same passage is cited again [96,1f.], the reading is: °rËpavattva.
The comments here are: svåtantryeˆa kålo na prat¥ta ity artha˙ (R),pratyakßanirËpitamukhyavißeshyatvaµ nety artha˙ (K). Cf. the comments there.

45

1.5.3.5 Composition of indriyas(76,10–80,1)

By the way, the Vaißeshika and other schools assert:
Indriyas such as (a) the faculty of touch, [(b) the faculty of sight, (c) the faculty of tasteand (d) the faculty of smell] are composed of elements such as (a) air, [(b) fire, (c) waterand (d) earth] respectively;
Because they respectively manifest (abhivyañjaka) only (a) touch, (b) color, (c) tasteand (d) smell out of [five kinds of object] such as sound;(a) Like the wind, which manifests the coolness of sweat, (b) Like the light of a lamp,(c) Like water in teeth, [which manifests the taste of something entering through theteeth], (d) ghee, which manifest the smell of saffron [77].
[Ans.] In these [inferences], which is meant by “manifest,” (1) to be the meanspar excellence (karaˆa199) for the manifestation, (2) to be the auxiliary (anugråhika) to[the means par excellence],200 (3) to be a cause in general or (4) to be the indriya for it?
(1) and (2) are incorrect. For, in the case of (1), if you intend [the probandum(sådhya)] whose counter-correlatives (pratiyogin) are all the causes other than itself isthe means par excellence, the instance would be deprived of the reason (sådhanavikara)[because it cannot be the means par excellence then]; or, if you intend [the instance(d®sh†ånta)] is the means par excellence, [the probandum] would be unestablished in
respect of itself (svarËpåsiddhi). [In the case of (2), if the probandum is the auxiliary to
the means par excellence, the instance is the means par excellence; accordingly the
instance would be deprived of the reason. And if the instance is the auxiliary to themeans par excellence, the probandum is the means par excellence; accordingly, theprobandum would be unestablished in respect of itself].
(3) is also incorrect, because [the inference] would be inconstancy (anaikåntika)
in view of the substratum of the indriya or something to purify it, [which is one of thecause of the sight but is not composed of fire].
(4) is incorrect too, because [the instance is] deprived of the reason.
And all alternatives are sublated by the Scriptures, [which teach indriyas arederived from ahaµkåra]. This sublation (bådha) is also sublation by what make itself
understood (dharmigråhaka). That is to say, without the Scriptures indriyas, which issomething different from the eyeball, could not be established. Even being dependent
199

karaˆam.
200= såkshåtkåranirËpitasådhakatamatvam (K). See Påˆini I. iv. 42: sådhakatamaµ= karaˆanish†hasåmarthyasaµpådakatvam (K).

46

on a certain instrumental cause (karaˆa) can prove only an instrumental cause in general,
but not [indriyas, which is something] different from [the eyeball] [78].
[Obj.] [A blind man], even though the eyeball etc. have no defect, is deprived ofthe effect [i.e., seeing]; thereby [indriyas, which is something] different from [the eyeball],is assumed.
[Ans.] No; because a very small defect [in the eyeball exists but] is hardly seen
as [the defect of] a seed smelt by a rabbit.201[Obj.: The eyeball is not what is effective only when reached (pråpyakåri), but
indriya is so; accordingly indriya named cakshus is assumed].
[Ans.] Particular parts of the earthy (pårthiva) eyeball could spread out andconnect with the object as in the case of spreading fragrance; therefore there is nocontradiction to its effectiveness only when reached.
Therefore when the subject of an inference is that which is proved by theaffirmation and negation (anvaya-vyatireka202) [i.e., the eyeball which is known as earthy]
or that which is proved by the Scriptures [i.e., indriya known as derived from ahaµkåra],it is inevitable that [the probandum, i.e., to be composed of fire,] sublated by the meansof valid knowledge which makes [indriya] itself understood (gråhaka-pramåˆa) .
[Obj.] [The indriya other than the earthy eyeball is proved by following inference:]
Perception (såkshåtkåra) of color which is born when light does not exist [i.e., perceptionof color in darkness], has the instrumental cause named fire;
Because it is perception of color;
Like perception of color born when light does exist.
[Ans.] This inference is also incorrect; because it proves what has been alreadyproved (siddhasådhana) in view of fire [in our opinion], which is [the cause of perception]
as what nourishes (åpyåyaka) [visual organ]. Even if fire were the cause [of the perception],
there would be no restriction that it is the faculty of sight (cakshus); because not only
indriya but also a certain external fire whose color and touch is not manifested (anudbhËta),for example, hotness in summer, is also possible.
[Obj.] Then what we want to prove is [fire] whose color is manifested.
[Ans.] In this case, indriya accepted by you also would have manifested color;
thereby, darkness itself could not exist. [79] And [the inference] is inconstancy (anaikåntya)in view of the knowledge of God, [which has the perception of color but which does nothave the cause because it is eternal].
201

A seed smelt by a rabbit cannot sprout anymore (K).

202

golakasattve cåkshushajñånam, tadabhåve cåkshushajñånåbhåva˙ (K).

47

[Obj.] Then we add a qualifying attribute (vißeshaˆa) “non-eternal” [to the reason].
[Ans.] It is still inconstancy in view of the perception in deep sleep or theperception of yogin.
[Obj.] Then we add “being other than all grounds for inconstancy.”[Ans.] How skilful in logic you are!
In the same way, defects in other inferences can be guessed respectively [80].
1.5.3.6 apråk®ta(80,1–81,1)

Regarding [apråk®ta-indriyas] such as apråk®ta-ßrotra, the restriction that one
organ assists only its own object is not persisting; because the liberated and God, though
they do not expand their knowledge through the instrumental causes, are embodied
according to their free will. Their definitions are [denoted] by a particular part which istheir own substratum.203
The Buddhists, however, assert that the Enlightened (buddha) knows everything
through his eyes. It is not true; because there is not any means of valid knowledge toshow such omniscience (sårvajñya) as accepted by you.
[Buddhist] [We have an inference as follows:]
The degree of the excellence (prakarßa) in eyes culminates ( vißrånti) somewhere [i.e., in
the eyes of the Buddha];
Because it is of the degree of excellence.
[Ans.] Such an inference is also [incorrect]. For all the excellence of eyes ispossible only in the range of the objects grasped by them; accordingly, eyes cannot havethe culmination as to taste, which violates the range [81].
1.5.4

karma-indriya(81,1–87,4)

Now the faculty of action (karmendriya) [are explained].
Its definition is being the cause of any one action (kriyå) out of pronunciationand so on. It is of five kinds: the faculty of speech and so on.
(1) The faculty of speech (våk) is the indriya being the means of pronouncing(uccåraˆa) syllables (varˆa). And it exists in eight parts of the body: the heart, thethroat, the root of the tongue, the palate, the lip, the nose and the head.204 Birds other203“karˆaßashkulyadhish†hånatvaµßrotrendriyasya
lakshaˆam
nayanagolakådhish†hånatvaµ cakshurindriyasya, ityådikaµ drash†avyam” (R≈K).
204/

Cf. “ash†au sthånåni varˆånåm ura˙ kaˆ†ha˙ ßiras tathå /jihvåmËlaµ ca dantåß ca nåsika-ush†hau ca tålu ca //” (Påˆini-ßikshå quoted
in R and K).

48

than a parrot have no ability of pronouncing syllables, because the configuration(saµsthåna) of their each unseen power (ad®sh†a) does not assist it. Even for parrots,
their pronunciations are various in view of the variety of their [unseen power].
(2) The faculty of prehension (påˆi) is the indriya being the means of manual
work (ßilpa). And it exists in the hands and so on in the case of human being and thelike. In the case of an elephant, it exists in the nose.
[Obj.] It should be admitted to exist in the palate or the foot, because it is seenthat even the palate or the foot can do a manual work such as tying a pearl or writing(lipikaraˆa) in view of the hard training (abhyåsapå†ava).
[Ans.] True, it exists a little in both of them; because there is no contradiction inview of the difference in part205 and because the faculty of sight or the faculty of touch isseen abiding the part pervaded by another indriya, [for example, the eyeball has not
only cakshus but also tvak].
(3) The faculty of movement (påda) is the indriya being the means of walking(saµcaraˆa). And it exists in the feet and so on in the case of human being and the like.
In the case of snakes and birds, however, it exists in the side of the chest and so on. It is
explained in the eighth section (adhikaraˆa) of the chapter on organs (karaˆa-påda) [inNåthamuni's Nyåyatattva]:*Snakes do not have the faculty of action (karmendriya) named påda and gowith the chest. Their ability to move is on the chest. That is why they are called “thatwhich goes with the chest (uraga206)” or “that which does not go with the feet (pannaga207).”[Nyåyatattva]
Here “the faculty of action named påda” a metaphor to denote a particular part, [i.e., thefeet] [82]. For the indriya itself cannot be negated because every living beings have
eleven indriyas. And the various configurations [i.e., limbs of the body] help the [facultyof movement] become the cause of moving in the earth, water, the sky and so on,
because the affirmation and negation (anvaya-vyatireka) is seen in the case of [a yogin's]
entrance into other's body such as birds', [that is, if he enters birds' body he can fly, but
if he does not he cannot].
(4) The faculty of excretion (påyu) is the indriya being the means of abandoning205

virodhåbhåbhåvåd deßabhedena. According to R, some MSS reads deßabhede,
which means pradeßavißesha. Anyway, the word is connected with the previous
virodhåbhåva.
206

uraså gacchant¥ti ura-gå˙.

207

padbhyåµ na gacchant¥ti pan-na-gå˙ (K).

49

dung and the like (malådityåga). And it exists in various parts of the body. In the case ofa particular bird, it exists in the mouth. It is also explained in the eighth section (adhikaraˆa)of the same [chapter on organs (karaˆa-påda) in the Nyåyatattva]:*For example, a bat excretes its ordure and urine through the mouth. [Nyåyatattva](5) The faculty of generation (upastha) is the indriya being the means of particular
enjoyment (ånandavißesha). And it exists in the penis and so on.
1.5.5

Some aspects of indriyas(82,6–86,11)

1.5.5.1 The number of indriyas(82,6–83,1)

By the way, those who do not accept the karmendriyas cannot accept thejñånendriyas, because the reason (tarka) and the Scriptures [to prove them] are same in
the both cases. That is, as in the case of the faculty of sight and the eyeball,208 even thedefects of the feet and so on, a certain particular subtle defect prevents from walking
and so on. In the conclusion of the section which determine the number of [indriyas],209
the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya says:*The number [eleven] proved by these ßrutis and sm®tis210 is confirmed. The
statements regarding more number are to denote the different functions (v®tti) of themanas [such as buddhi, ahaµkåra and citta].211 The references to less number are connectedwith special effects such as accompanying (gamana) [the self] and the like which areintended in several contexts. [83] [Ír¥Bh II. iv. 5; 392,3–5]
1.5.5.2 Their size

(83,1–6)

And that they are minute (aˆu) means only that they are not to be perceptible
and limited in size.212 It is said in the [Brahma-]sËtra:*And [they are] minute [BrSË II. iv. 6],
as is clearly explained in the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya.213 And the ßruti passage:
208

See 78,1–2.

209

I.e. saptagatyadhikaraˆa, BrSË II. iv. adhi°2, sË°4–5.

210E.g. “indriyåˆi daßaikaµ ca pañca cendriyagocarå˙” (BhG XIII. 5),“taijasån¥ndriyåˆy åhur devå vaikårikå daßa / ekådaßaµ manaß cåtra” (VishP I. ii. 47)[see note on 72,5ff.] and so on.
211

See Ír¥Bh II. iv. 5 (391,18–392,1) quoted in 71, 6f.

212

Cf. “aˆutvaµ nåma paricchinnatve saty upalabdhyarhasthËlatåråhityam…
aˆutvaµ paricchinatve sati atisvacchatvam [or sparßavattvam or asparßavattvam (vls. in
the Bhåvaprakåßikå)]” [Írutaprakåßikå ad Ír¥Bh II. iv. 6; 393,22–24].
213“utkråtyådißravaˆåt parimitatve siddhe sati pårßvasthair anupalabhyamånatvåd
aˆavaß ca pråˆå˙” [Ír¥Bh II. iv. 6; 393,4–5].

50*They are all equal (sama) and are infinite (ananta)214 [B®hUp I. v. 13]means [not that their sizes are equal but] that they equally assist [perception],215 andmeans the abundance (båhulya) of the effects which is an attribute of the pråˆa enjoined(vihita) to worship (upa-√ås) in the passage:*Those who worship them as infinite [B®hUp I. v. 13].216
For the same reason, it is established that their sizes are limited and various. And theirsize varies in the various bodies such as of a mosquito and an elephant, because they
can be modified. In [the section on] knowledge,217 we will justify that the size varies
depending on the difference in time.
1.5.5.3 The indriyas are lasting(83,6–87,4)

And for all these [indriyas], only the defect in their own substratum is the defect:[in fact, they do not have any defect in themselves].218 Even in the condition of an inert
matter (sthåvara), an unseen power (ad®sh†a) and the like causes the degree (tåratamya)of the obstruction of the function (v®tti219) of each [indriya] as in the condition of deep
sleep. With the cooperation (sahakåra) by their powerful unseen power, the indriyas ofGandharva, yogins and so on can perceive a microscopic (sËkshma) object or a concealedone (vyavahita).
App.I

Case of yogins(83,8–84,6)

When [a yogin] enters into somebody's living (j¥vavat) body,220 though [indriyas]
are specified (vyavahita) in each person by his own unseen power from the time of his
origination (utpatti), the indriyas [of the latter] assist the former (para) like [the latter's]
body due to another special unseen power [of the yogin, which make it possible to enter214

ete sarva eva samå˙ sarva evånantå˙ (In Up, the second eva is omitted).

215

The word “sama” is not commented in the Ír¥Bh II. iv. 6. SudarßanasËri says:
samaßruti˙ kåryakaratvavishayå [Írutaprakåßikå ad Ír¥Bh II. iv. 6; 393,27].
216

This explanation is equal to that of the Ír¥Bh II. iv. 6 (393,5f.): ånantyaßrutis
tu
‘atha
yo
haitånanantån
upåste’ityupåsanaßravaˆådupåsyapråˆavißeshaˆabhËtakåryabåhulyåbhipråyå. Raµgaråmånuja's commentary on
B®hUp, however, suggests another interpretation: ånantyaµ ca''kalpasthåyitvåt
manaådivyash†ibhedåc ca (ad I. v. 13).
217

See buddhi-pariccheda .

218

That is why a blind can see if he gets another body.

219=prav®tti (R).

220

U reads j¥vavat parakåyapraveße, but j¥vavatparakåya°, which is contrasivewith m®takåya, is correct.

51

other's body]. Or rather, [a yogin] enters into every [body] with his own indriyas;
therefore, it is [his own indriyas] that assist him everywhere. For when he enters into adead body, only his own indriyas can do so. The same answer (samådhi) is proper when[he] enters into a living body [84]. And sm®ti says:*Whatever body the ruler [of indriyas] attains and from whatever body he departs,
he goes on his way, grasping them, as the wind [carrying] perfumes from their palace.
[BhG XV. 8]
And the practical usage (vyavahåra) of “somebody's body” as to a dead body is basedon figurative expression.221 Of [a dead body] which is entered [by the self of the yogin]with some parts of the body creating anew (årambhaka) a “somebody's body” such as abone and so on, [that is, subtle elements led by him], a new combination (saµghåta)which meets the definition of “body” begins. And at that time, [the yogin's] own bodyare dead. [He] enters [into his own body] again [begin a new “body”] as he enters into
somebody's dead body. Those who can control many bodies [at once], however, can[control two bodies or abandon one of them] at will (yathesh†ham). And when a bodyvanishes, the indriyas slightly (måtrayå) lose [five elements] nourishing (åpyåyaka) it.
When another body [is gained], the [indriyas] are nourished [by five elements] again.
It should be understood that [indriyas] abandoned by released men, which are
hold by others or not, remain till the universal dissolution (pralaya), and so on.
App.II Criticism on the theory that karmendriyas are produced and destroyed
withthe body(84,8–86,11)[Obj.] Isn't it that the karmendriyas are produced and destroyed with each bodyand that they will not enter another body again? That is, the [Vedånta-]Såra says:*Hands and so on are also the indriyas, because there is no distinction as toassisting the self when the self abides (sthite) in the body222 [VSåra II. iv. 5; 226,2] [85].
And also the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya asserts:*The indriyas are not seven, but eleven; because hands so on are also, when thesoul abides in the body, assist his enjoyment; and because they have distinct effects.
That is, it is seen that not only [the jñånendriyas] such as the faculty of hearing but also[the karmendriyas] such as the hand have distinct effects, for example, grasping, etc.
221

For the definiton of ßar¥ra is not applicable to it. The definition of ßar¥ra is:yasya cetanasya yad drvyaµ sarvåtmanå niyantuµ dhårayituµ ca ßakyam
taccheßataikasvarËpaµ ca tat tasya ßar¥ram [Ír¥Bh II. ii. 9; 222,11–223,1]. For the futherdetail, see NySi 158ff.
222°antaravashita. Adyar ed. reads anta˙sthita.

52[Ír¥Bh II. iv. 5; 391,11–12]
And further,*The references to less number are connected with special effects such as accompanying(gamana) [the self] and the like which are intended in several contexts. [Ír¥Bh II. iv. 5;
392,4–5]
And the [Vedånta-]d¥pa clearly states:*Among them, the faculty of hearing and the like follow the self when he enters anotherbody. However, the karmendriyas such as the faculty of speech and the faculty of
prehension (hasta), which are produced with the body and destroyed with the self, assist
the self in the living (sthite) body [VD¥pa II. iv. 5; 77,14–16],
and so on. Therefore the author of the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya, as Yådavaprakåßa, thinks that
karmendriyas are produced and destroyed in accordance with each body.
[Ans.] It is not so; because to the sËtra,*And because the pråˆas move [BrSË III. i. 3],[Råmånuja] quotes the ßruti passage:*Following the departing [self], the [chief] pråˆa departs [from the body]; andfollowing the departing [chief] pråˆa, all the pråˆas depart [from the body] [B®hUp IV.
iv. 2]and the like223 [in his all commentaries]; and because in the section 224 [beginning with]*[Indriyas are] seven, because of the movement [BrSË II. iv. 4],
he stands the prima facie view that
*But as to those which are other than [the above-mentioned seven pråˆas],[understood] as grasping [some objects], … their denotation as pråˆa is figurative [Ír¥Bh
II. iv. 4; 391,10–13],
and after that, he explains that they are also pråˆas in [the sËtra],*But the hand and others exists because of [their being the assistants] (ata˙) to[the self] abiding (sthite)225 [in the body]; therefore (ata˙), it is not so226 [BrSË II. iv. 5].
Immediately after the sËtra,*And because the pråˆas move [BrSË III. i. 3], [86]the sËtra,223

E.g. BhG XV. 7–8.

224

I.e. saptagatyadhikaraˆa, BrSË II. iv. adhi°2, sË°4–5.

225

The translation of ‘sthite’ is here besed on the intepretation of Ír¥Bh andVSåra.
226

Here “ata˙” is taken as used twice and first ‘ata˙’ means ‘bhogopakaraˆatvåt’;see Írutaprakåßikå.

53*If it be said [that it is not so] because of the Scriptures as to going to Agni etc.;
no, because of the figurative nature [BrSË III. i. 4],
is commented as follows:*[Obj.] By the Scriptures beginning with: “Where the dead man's speech (våk) enters
into fire (agni), [his chief] pråˆa into air, [his] eyes into the sun” [B®hUp III. ii. 13], it isheard that at the time of the death of the self, his pråˆas enter into fire and so on;
accordingly, they cannot move with the self. Hence the Scriptures as to their movement
has to be interpreted in another way. [Ans.] Not so; because the Scriptures teaching the
movement etc. is figurative [Ír¥Bh III. i. 4; 408,17–409,1]
and so on. Therefore, it is apprehended that he accepts here that the karmendriya, thefaculty of speech, also moves. And it is same in other [indriyas]. The [Vedånta-]Såra
states:*It is because the seven [pråˆas] are prominent that the scriptures state themovement of the seven and they are qualified [by the word ‘jñåna’227] [VSåra II. iv. 5;
226,5],and so on. The [Vedånta-]d¥pa also says:*It is because the jñånendriyas including manas and buddhi in the form of its
function are prominent that the Scriptures state only the seven go [with the soul] [at thetime of his death228] and they are qualified [by the word ‘jñåna’] at the time of his
meditation229 [VD¥pa II. iv. 4; 77,9–10]
and so on. And those who assert that the indriyas are from ahaµkåra cannot accept they
are produced and destroyed with each body.230 The substrata of these indriyas, however,are not indriyas; accordingly they can be produced and destroyed with the body.
[Obj.] Then, how is the passage beginning with
*The faculty of hearing and the like… [VD¥pa II. iv. 5; 77,14],interpreted?
[Ans.] The answer is as follows. [The author of the Vedåntad¥pa] thought thateven if we accept [the faculty of speech and the like] are produced and destroyed with227

See “yadå pañcåvatish†hante jñånåni manaså saha” (Ka†haUp II. iii. 10) quoted
in the commentaries on ‘vißeshitatvåt’ in BrSË II. iv. 4 (R, K).
228Vedånta Deßika omitts “pråyaˆakåle” before “gatißravaˆam.”

229

Here Vedånta Deßika regards “prådhånyåt” as the reason for both
“gatißravaˆam” and “vißeshaˆam,” following the description of the VSåra. As far as I
know, however, all the texts of the VD¥pa regards “vågåd¥nåµ j¥vena saha gamanåbhåvåt,”which is omitted by him on purpose, as the reason for “gatißravaˆam.”
230ßabdatanmåtrasamakålotpattilayakatvåd indriyåˆåm (R, K).

54each body as others, we can prove that they are indriyas; and to the sËtra
*But the hand and others exists because of [their being the assistants] (ata˙) [tothe self] in the living (sthite) [body]; 231 therefore (ata˙), it is not so [BrSË II. iv. 5],
he said so with the intention of another grammatical construction (yojanå).232 Therefore
we understand that the author of the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya thought all eleven indriyas continue.
1.5.5.4 Criticism on the opinion on indriya by other schools (86,12–87,4)
In this way, the Scriptures prove only these [indriyas, jñånendriyas andkarmendriyas,] (eshåm eva) as such, [not excluding karmendriyas] (etåvatåm eva), having
the above-mentioned nature. Buddhists, the Vaißeshikas, the Cårvåkas and so on, talkother [doctrines on indriyas]: (1) [Buddhist] assume female indriya, male indriya and soon; (2) [the Vaißeshikas] reject karmendriya; (3) [the Cårvåkas] assert indriyas is one
only [and the difference in its function based on that in the part of the body], among
them (a) some accept the skin is the indriya, (b) some [accept] the body itself is theindriya;233 (4) [Yådavaprakåßa holds] karmendriyas are produced and destroyed with thebody; (5) (a) [some234 holds] manas is omnipresent (vibhu), (b) [some holds thereby] it
is eternal, [some holds] it is from fire, [but some holds] it does not exist, and so on;235(6) [Bhojaråja236 states] indriyas are form råjasåhaµkåra; (7) [some assert] they are madeof elements. These [doctrines] and the like should be neglected because of the proof by
the Scriptures. And the sublation by logic can be led respectively.

1.6tanmåtra and bhËta

1.6.1

General Definition(87,5–126,3)(87,5–88,6)

Now the creations of tanmåtras and so on [are explained].
Tanmåtra (a subtle element) is the substance qualified by the subtle condition(avasthå) which immediately [precedes] gross elements (bhËta). As milk changing into
(pariˆåma) curd has a intermediate condition, a substance changing into a gross element
231

Here the translation is based on the interpretation of VD¥pa.

232“Bhåshya-Sårayo˙ ‘sthite’ ity etat j¥vavißeshaˆatayå vyåkhyåtam, D¥pe tußar¥ravißeshaˆatayå iti bhåva˙” (R).
233

Cf. TMK I. 38

234M¥måµsaka, see Månameyodaya, dravya §124ff.

235

Cf. TMK I. 39.

236

See Tattvaprakåßika quoted in 67,5ff.

55

has a certain condition preceding it; This condition is tanmåtra. A substance qualified
by this condition is also called tanmåtra. And the very [substance] is the cause of a grosselement; hence, not only from qualities (guˆa) such as sound are gross elements created.
A gross element (bhËta) is the substratum of the object such as sound which hassome specific characters (vißish†a237) and the like. It is classified into a material (pråk®ta)
and an immaterial (apråk®ta) like the previous one [i.e., indriya].
Tanmåtras and bhËtas are of five kinds according to the differences among a
subtle element of sound (ßabdatanmåtra) and others or the differences among ether(åkåßa) and others.
1.6.2ßabdatanmåtra

(88,4–92,3)

Among them, ßabda-tanmåtra is the substance qualified by the intermediate
condition between tåmasåhaµkåra and ether.
In the same way, the definition of each subsequent tanmåtra [e.g. sparßa-tanmåtra]can be understood as to be qualified by the intermediate condition between each twoelements [e.g. to be qualified by the intermediate condition between ether and air(våyu)], to be the substratum of each quality which has no specific character (avißish†a)[e.g. to be the substratum of touch (sparßa) which has no specific character], or to be thematerial of each element [e.g. to be the material of air]. [89]App.

Criticism on the order of evolution in the Såµkhya (89,1–92,1)
The Såµkhya school, however, asserts: Five tanmåtras are directly born fromthe tåmasa-ahaµkåra. Among them, from ßabdatanmåtra ether is born. And other tanmåtras
produce each subsequent element with the assistance of each previous tanmåtras, [thatis, sparßa-tanmåtra with ßabda-tanmåtra produces air, rËpa-tanmåtra with sparßa-tanmåtra
and ßabda-tanmåtra produces fire, and so on].238
It is not true. For [some ßruti passage], such as*From ether air [arose] [TaiUp II. i. 1],
describe a specific order of materials which does not allow any other interpretation
237

vißish†a means having some vißeshaˆa such as ßåntatva, ghoratva and mËrdhatva.
Cf. SK 38: tanmåtråˆy avißeshå˙ … bhËtåni … te sm®tå vißeshå˙ …; Tattvakaumud¥ ad
SK 38d: åkåßådishu sthËleshu sattvapradhånatayå kecit ßåntå˙ sukhå˙ prakåßå˙ labhava˙,kecid raja˙pradhånatayå ghorå˙ du˙khå˙ anavasthitå˙, kecit tama˙ pradhånatayå mË∂hå˙
vishaˆˆå˙ gurava˙ [229,1–3].
238

Cf. Tattvakaumud¥ ad SK 38b: tebhya˙ tanmåtrebhyo yathåsaµkhyam ekadvi-tri-catu˙-pañcabhyo bhËtåny åkåßa-anila˙ [=våyu] -anala [=tejas] -salila [=ap] -avani[=p®thiv¥] rËpåˆi paˆca paˆcabhya˙ tanmåtrebhya˙ [228,2–3].

56(anayathåsiddha); and [the same order] is explained by Paråßara239 and others240 [90].
And the ßruti passage,*Tanmåtras [merge into] bhËtådi [SubålaUp 2],
does not mean that [all tanmåtras] directly merge into [tåmasa-ahaµkåra] at the sametime; because it is contradictory to the previous passage beginning with*earth merges into water241 [SubålaUp 2],
and it is contradictory to the passage,*From ether air [arose] [TaiUp II. i. 1]. [91]For, if it were so, the ßruti should first describe the order that “earth merges into
gandha-tanmåtra, water merges into rasa-tanmåtra” etc., and subsequently say “Tanmåtras
[merge into] bhËtådi.” And this ßruti does not intend to fix the complete order; because
the special order that
*Ether [merges into] indryas. Indriyas [merge into] tanmåtras [SubålaUp 2],
which even you cannot admit, is understood at the first sight (åpåta). In the same way,the ßruti passage,*There are sixteen originating principles (prak®ti) and eight effected ones (vik®ti)242[GarbhaUp 3] [92],can be also somehow interpreted.243
Therefore, the above-mentioned definition of ßåbada-tanmåtra is not applicableeven to [other tanmåtras] (ativyåpti). If [we] should [admit your opinion that]] all[tanmåtras] are produced at once [from ahaµkåra], it means only simultaneousness, but
sparßatanmåtra and so on are not of the nature of the intermediate condition between
ether and ahaµkåra. Thereby [the definition] is not of too wide application.
1.6.3

åkåßa

(92,5–100,3)

239

VishP I. ii. 37, 38cd–39ab, 40ab quoted in R and K.

240

R and K quote Bhagavatßåstra (Påñcaråtrågama?).

241

The order of the mergence in SubålaUp 2 is: p®thiv¥ Æ ap Æ tejas Æ våyu Æåkåßa Æ indriya Æ tanmåtra Æ bhËtådi Æ mahat Æ avyakta Æ akshara Æ tamas Æparå˙ devå˙.
242This passage is quoted in Ír¥Bh I. iv. 8 [114,6]. Cf. SK 3: mËlaprak®tiravik®ti˙, mahadådayå˙ [= mahad, ahaµkåra, 5tanmåtras] prak®tivik®taya˙ sapta /sho∂haßakas [= 5bhËtas, 11indriyas] tu vikåra˙, na prak®tir na vik®ti˙ purusha˙.
243

According to K, the eight (avayakta, mahat, ahaµkåra and 5bhËtas) are prak®tibacause they produce a body, and the sixteen (5vishayas and 11indriyas) are vik®tibecause they abide in a body. Such classification is seen in the dialogue between Janaka
and Yåjñavalkya in the Mokshadharma (K) and the Yamasm®ti (R, K).

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1.6.3.1 Its definition(92,5–93,2)

The definition of ether (åkåßa) is to be the substratum of qualified sound without
possessing touch (asparßatve sati vißish†aßabdåßrayatvam), and to nourish the faculty ofhearing (ßrotråpyåyakatvam). And it is admitted that [ether] helps by providing space(avakåßa) because it is established in the Scriptures [93]. Even in the part of prak®tiwhich does not change into ether [e.g. Vaikuˆ†ha], space exists; because otherwise, themotion of those who has touch [e.g. liberated men with subtle elements (bhËtasËkshma)]would be obstructed.
1.6.3.2 It is not eternal(93,2–94,4)[The Vaißeshikas] prove that ether is eternal, because it is substance which does
not have any part, [like the self]; and others [i.e., the M¥måµsakas] prove [the manas isomnipresent, because it is substance which does not have touch, like ether244].
These [inferences], however, must be vitiated; because they are sublated by the
Scriptures, [which teach both are produced]; because [if the reason of the Vaißeshikasmeans ‘not to have any part with inherent relation (avayavåsamavetatva),’] it is inconstancy
from [our] viewpoint (anyatarånaikåntya) in view of mahat and so on, [which aresubstances having some parts but are not eternal, even though both of us do not accept
them245]; and because [if the reason of the Vaißeshikas means ‘deprived of material(upådånaråhitya),’ it is unestablished for us, who accept ether has material]. Moreover,which does the ‘eternal’ mean, ‘deprived of entering into any condition’ or ‘existence of
substance forever’? [94] Not the former, because it is inconstancy in view of earthy
atom and the like, [which are eternal according to your opinion but have conditions(avasthå) such as conjunction (saµyoga) producing a dyad (dvyaˆuka), color born frombaking (påkaja) and so on]. And you accept that the subject (paksha) [i.e., ether] has thedifference of conditions such as having sound or not; thereby, [the reason] would be
sublation (bådha246) and contradictory to your position (apasiddhånta). Nor the latter,because it proves what has been already proved (siddhasådhana) [in our opinion].
[Obj.] The destruction characterized by the separation of parts is denied here.
244

See K's commentary on three ådi: åkåßåder
niravayavadravyatvådi.

nityatvådisådhanåni

245“mahadåder ubhayasaµpratipannatvåbhåve 'pi siddhåntisaµpratipannatayå
tanmatar¥tyå tatrånaikåntikatvam asty evety abhipråyeˆa anyatarånaikåntika-tvety uktam”
(K).
246

The definition of bådhita in TarS §57 is: yasya sådhyåbhåva˙ pramåˆåntareˆenißcita˙ [≈ kålåtyayåpadish†a in YMD II. 40]. But in this case the better definition is:sådhyåbhåvavatpakshako hetu˙ [NyKoßa, (KA ) from the Tarkakamud¥ ].

58[Ans.] It is not true. [Which does it mean, (a) non-existence of the destruction
characterized by the separation in the previous condition, (b) in the sequent condition,or (c) in the present condition?] In view of (a) what attains the state of ahaµkåra and soon, it proves what has been already proved. Concerning (b) what attains the state of air(våyutva) or (c) what undergoes the quintuplication247 (pañc¥karaˆa) and so on, thedistinction of the conditions are wholly probable, as has already explained.248
1.6.3.3 It is perceptible(94,6–97,4)

And this ether is perceptible. For when you open the eyes, without any delay249(tadaiva) you cognize “This is ether.”[Obj.] Why can something without any color be perceptible?
[Ans.] You cannot say so [95], because you should be asked why somethingwith some color can be perceptible, then.
[Obj.] [Perceptibility] is based on the possibility (yogyatå) [for visibility]
established by our cognition.
[Ans.] [The perceptibility of ether] is also [based on it]. For otherwise, [i.e., if
you accepted only having manifested color (udbhËtarËpavattva) as the reason for theperceptibility of a pot, pot-ness and the like could not be perceptible, and] it would be
untenable to assume the secondary (avåntara) distinction [of the perceptible entities
such as] color, the colored [substance] (rËpin), and the [qualities such as number,
extension etc.] which inhere in the entity together with the color (rËpaikårthasamavåya).250[96]
Or rather, the color of a independent entity (vyash†i) [such as ether] is establishedby the quintuplication (pañc¥karaˆa), as is said in the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya.251 And it is explained
247“ekaikam eva bhËtaµ dvidhåk®tya dvayor bhågayo˙ svabhågam ekaµ nidhåya
bhågåntaraµ caturdhåk®tya tåµß caturbhågån bhËtåntareshu caturshu yojayati” [YMD
IV. 50]. For the details, see 149,4ff.
248“tatra sparßådilakshaˆaprådeßikapariˆåtidaßåyåµ chedanabhedanaparispandanåd¥nåm api siddhi˙” (46,1–2).
249

It means without any time for consideration of vyåpti etc.

250

See Ír¥Bh I. i. 1 quoted below and the ßloka in the Ógamapråmåˆya:rËparËpitadaikårthasamavåyishu cåkshusha˙, etc. [4,18]. Professor Narasimhachari's noteon this passage is: rËpe, tadvati gha†e, tathå rËpeˆa saha ekasminn arthe gha†esamavåyasambandhena vidyamåneshu saµkhyåparimåˆådishu….
251“aˆ∂åntarvarttinaß cåkåßasya triv®tkaraˆopadarßitapañc¥karaˆena rËpavatvåt
cåkshushatve 'py avirodha˙” [Ír¥Bh II. ii. 23; 299,25f.].

59

in the Prameyasaµgraha [of Vishˆucitta], for example252:*Time is included in all the cognitions (prat¥ti) because it is the attribute of [all]entities; accordingly, it cannot have any independent form (p®thagrËpavattva253). Etherand directions have color due to the tripartition (triv®tkaraˆa) [Prameyasaµgraha],and so on.
[Obj.] But the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya says:*And mere existence (sanmåtra) cannot be perceived by the eye, because it
grasps the entities (padårtha) such as color, the colored [substance] (rËpin), and the[qualities] which inhere in the substance together with the color (rËpaikårthasamaveta),[Ír¥Bh I. i. 1; (i) 125,6f.][and it does not mention the thing mingled with colored entity by the quintuplication].
[Ans.] It means that the object of perception is a qualified entity but not that therelation called being mingled with colored [entity] (rËpavanmißratva) is denied. That is
why the Prameyasaµgraha says:*It is established that only what is associated with color, the colored [substance](rËpin), the [qualities] which inhere in the substance together with the color(rËpaikårthasanniveßa) and so on, [i.e., entities mingled with colored entity], areperceptible. [Prameyasaµgraha]
Hence it is grasped due to our cognition that even color which inheres in a conjunctthing (saµyuktasamaveta) makes the effect [97].
[Obj.] Then even God and so on, [which are conjunct with all the colored things,
would be perceptible].
[Ans.] No, because [He cannot be perceptible] as in the case of weight (gurutva).
As to air (våyu), even though it has color due to the quintuplication (pañc¥karaˆa), it is
not perceptible because its color is not manifested. Although the Prameyasaµgrahasays:*Even [keen] eyes of a baby cannot grasp air, which has no color (arËpa)[Prameyasaµgraha],
It means the non-existence of manifested color.
Thus ether has color; accordingly, we cognize “Ether is blue (ßyåma).”252

Hindi ed. includes yathå in the quotation, but Viraraghvachari [fn.1] suggests
it may be excluded refering to the same passage quoted before [76,8f.].
253

When the same passage is cited before [76,8f.], the reading is: °rËpatva. The
comments here are: apakshitam iti ßesha˙ / rËpaikårthasamavåyitayå prat¥yamåne
saµkhyådipratyakshe p®thagrËpånapekshåvad iti bhåva˙ (R), åßrayatåsambandhenarËpavattvam ity artha˙ / apekshitam iti ßesha˙ (K). Cf. the comments there. The same
reading and interpretation are right, said Viraraghavachari [fn. 1].

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1.6.3.4 It is not the non-existence of delimitations(97,4–99,2)

And for this very reason, this cognition is not what is based on the non-existenceof a delimitation (åvaraˆåbhåva) [as Buddhists254 and the Cårvåkas assert255]. For [thiscognition] is a positive statement (vidhi). From the viewpoint of those who assert
non-existence is another kind of [positive] existence, there is nothing wrong [in that
positive ether is the non-existence of delimitation]. From the viewpoint of those who
maintain [non-existence] is [negative category] different from [other positive categories],
however, the question if [ether] is the prior non-existence (pråg-abhåva) [of a delimitation]and the like, [i.e., if it is the annihilative non-existence (pradhvaµsa-a°), or if it is theabsolute non-existence (atyanta-a°)], cannot stand256 [98]; because the negation whosecounter-correlate (pratiyogin) is everything cannot be established. Even if a delimitation[exists], the non-existence of identity (tådåtmya) is of the nature of the negation of
being in the same substratum (såmånådhikaraˆya), [that is to say, the mutual non-existence(anyonya-a°) of a delimitation is of the non-existence of delimitation-ness (åvaraˆatva);
then, you could not cognize that ether is on the ground, because the negation of delimitationness is not possible in the earth as a delimitation257] [99]. Moreover, relative non-existence(saµsarga-a°) would not be possible without the cognition of something related, [i.e., its
substratum]; and it is concluded that this very [substratum] is ether.
[Obj.] [The cognition that there is no delimitation] is the negation whose substratumis assumed.
[Ans.] Not so, because [an assumed thing] could not be unsublated.
1.6.3.5 It is not light and darkness(99,3–4)[Obj.] [Ether] is based on light and darkness.
[Ans.] It is also untrue; because in reference to them, cognition of ether andpractical usage as such are impossible.258 [You may say that in the expression that ether
254

Abhidharmakoßa I. 5d.

255“atra kecit cårvåkå˙ saugatåß ca…” [SAS I. 46; 169,1].

256

The same vikalpas are seen in Ír¥Bh II. ii. 23.

257

This is based on the first interpretation of R: åvaraˆatvanishedhasyåvaraˆabhËte
p®thivyådåv asambhavåd bhËtala åkåßa iti prat¥tir na syåt. His second interpretation is:anyonyåbhåvasyasåmånådhikaˆyanishedhatvenåvaraˆatvanishedhatvåbhåvåd
åvaraˆanirodhitvaµ na syåt. The interpretation of K is: åvaraˆavaty api pradeßaåvaraˆatvåbhåvasambhavåd åkåßaprat¥tiprasaµga˙.
258“åkåße åloka˙, åkåße tama˙ ity ålokådyadhikaraˆatayå prat¥yamånasya åkåßasya
ålokådiprat¥tivishayatvåyogåt” (R ≈ K).

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is blue ether is superimposed (åropita) like a silver on a shell; but it is not true], becauseeven superimposition (åropa) is preceded by the cognition.
1.6.3.6 It is not inferred(99,4–100,3)

Moreover, if [ether] were not perceptible, it would be baseless that [ether] iswithin the scope of ignorant man's practical usage preceded by pointing out with thefinger. For the inference based on the consideration what [element] remains (parißesha)
as the substratum of sound, [that is, sound has something as its substratum, because it isquality; and only ether can be its substratum], and the like are not for ignorant people.
And such inference is not possible: there is not any logical defect in case sound were theattribute of parts of a drum as smell [of a flower which is far away from here but
brought by wind] or sound were the attribute of air, which is accepted as causing(kåraka) sound or manifesting (vyañjaka) it259 [100]. And [if it were the attribute of air
or earth] it could not be grasped by touch or [vision], because we see that smell, taste,color or so which is the quality of one and only element, is grasped by each organ(aksha). In the same manner, other sublations are also rejected. And the complication(gaurava) [due to the assumption of something other than four perceptible elements]
would be subalation for you. Howerver we accept sound as being in ether because of the
Scriptures. [101]
1.6.4

våyu

(101,1–107,2)

1.6.4.1 Its definition(101,1–2)

From ether, a subtle element of touch (ßabdatanmåtra) [is produced].
From the latter, air (våyu) [is produced].
Its definition is: (1) having qualified touch and being devoid of color(vißish†asparßavatve sati rËpaßËnyatvam);260 (2) being the substance grasped only by thefaculty

of

touch

of

us

and

the

like

[who

are

not

liberated](asmadådisparßanaikendriyagrå˙yatvam);261 (3) being qualified by touch which is neither
cold nor hot and not having smell (anushˆåß¥tasparßavißish†atve sati gandhaßËnyatvam),262
and so on.
259“ßabdånityapakshe utpådakatayå tannityapakshe vyañjakatayå” (R, K).

260

vißish†a prevents ativyåpti to ßabdatanmåtra; …sati prevents ativyåpti to åkåßa;rËpaßËnya prevents ativyåpti to p®thiv¥ etc.
261

asmadådi excludes mukta-indriya; eka prevents ativyåpti to p®thiv¥ etc.; dravya
prevents ativyåpti to sparßa.
262…sati prevents ativyåpti to jala etc.; gandhaßËnya prevents ativyåpti to p®thiv¥.

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1.6.4.2 It is peceived by the facultiy of touch(101,2–102,5)[The Vaißeshikas] It is unfit for the faculty of touch, imperceptible etc.; because
it is uncolored substance etc.
[Ans.] These reasons are rejected for the reason that they are contradictory to
our experience (upalambha), and that they are inconstancy (anaikåntya) [in view of time
and the self263] and so on 264 [102]. For it is not having color but having touch that causes
being grasped by the faculty of touch. And the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya also265 supports it.266
Following it, the author of the Vivaraˆa267 says:*Even tactual sense (sparßana) does not have pure existence as the object; because
its objects are touch and an entity having touch. [Vivaraˆa on Ír¥Bh].
And the Prameyasaµgraha says:*Even the faculty of touch has the capacity to grasp an entity having touch[Prameyasaµgraha].
If air were [not perceived but] inferred through touch, even earth, water and fire would
not be perceived by touch; for even in these cases we could say they are inferredthrough it, because the experience [that we touch a pot and so on] is same.
1.6.4.3 Its character(its movement and touch)(102,6–104,1)

And this air has inherent horizontal (tiryak) movement due to its own nature or
God's will in the form of unseen power (ad®sh†a). Due to the obstruction by substancesuch as earthy one or other air, [it has] circular (bhramana) movement, vertical (Ërdhva)
one etc. And for one who stands far away these [movements of air] are inferred throughthe circular one, vertical movement or so of a grass, dusts and so on. For one who
stands there, however, they are grasped by his tactual sense. Thereupon the variety of
air is also proved. And it stops when it is obstructed in all sides by earthy or watery[substance].
When it is conjunct with water, heat, a flower and so on, coolness, hotness,
263

The latter is only for the imperceptibility.

264ådi = aprayojaka.

265

H ommits the second ca. According to Virararghavachari, it means that not
only the Nyåya's Bhåshya but ours supports it [102, fn. 1].
266
267“nåpi tvacå sparßavadvastuvishayatvåt” [Ír¥Bh I. i. 1; 125,7].

The Vivaraˆa on Ír¥Bh is not available now. The author is Ír¥-Råmamißra (II)or Somåßiyåˆ∂ån (Somayåji Óˆ∂an), b.1094, who was said to be the brother of Paråßarabha††a and the son of Ír¥ Våtsåµka-mißra [Singh 118; Raghavan 17].

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fragrance and so on are imposed [on it]; because268 there is such affirmative and negative
relation (anvayavyatireka).
For this reason, the thought of the followers of the Óyurveda, who assert that air
is cool because of the maxim that:*For everything, increase [is caused] by things of the same kind, and the contrary[is caused] by things of the contrary kind [Vaidikaßåstra?],are rejected [103]. True there is the general instruction that [air is] cool because it
increases a cool thing and decreases a cool thing, but there is no restriction that increaseis caused by a thing of the same kind and that decrease is caused by a thing of a contrary
kind For we observe that an earthy thing, [which is neither cool nor hot], and so on
irregularly increase or decrease diseases.
[Obj.] In the case [of earthy things], it is possible due to the power of a natural
watery part and so on in these various earthy things.
[Ans.] Then, what is the contradiction if [air] is so? For in their independentcondition, air and the causes of its increase or decrease are composed of five elements[by quintuplication (pañc¥karaˆa)]. And because the ßriti passage,*Vital air is composed of water [ChUp VI. v. 4, vi. 6, vii. 1, 2],proves that vital air is nourished by water, it is possible [for air] to increase a coolthings. In various contexts, [the followers of the Óyurveda] explain the nature and theeffect of an entity based on its unimaginable capacity as [big] sound [caused by] a[small] drum. This [capacity] can applied here also; accordingly there is not any difficulty.
[104]
And air assists through nourishing the faculty of touch and as vital air, a body oran object.
1.6.4.4 On the pråˆa(s)(104,1–107,1)

Among them, what is called vital air (pråˆa) is specific air causing the maintenanceof a body and so on. It is neither mere air nor an action of air. It is said in the[Brahma-]sËtra:*[Vital air] is neither mere air nor its action; because it is stated separately [BrSËII. iv. 8].
This vital air is said to be of five kinds or ten kinds according to the variety of its
functions. The [Brahma-]sËtra says:*[Vital air] is described as having five functions like the manas [BrSË II. iv. 11].
268

co hetau (K).

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[105]
It is of five kinds according to the difference between pråˆa, apåna, vyåna, udåna andsamåna. It is of ten kinds in view of the difference between någa, kËrma, k®kara,
devadatta and dhanañjana.269 The word ‘pråˆa’ is explained generally [as meaning every
kind of vital air] or specifically [as meaning pråˆa among the five kinds], as the word‘våda’ [generally means a talk and specifically means a dispute].
It supports the body and the indriyas, as is established in ßriti passages such as:*On whose departing, this body looks like worst… [ChUp V. i. 7];*All [other pråˆa] became the form, [i.e., those which controlled], of it [i.e., the chiefpråˆa]. [?] [106]And the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya says:*The pråˆa, however, supports the body and the indriyas [Ír¥Bh II. iv. 16;
399,12].
This meaning is explained in detail in the topic on the meditation of the pråˆa.270
In this manner, it exists not only in a body of movable animals but also in a bodyof unmovable plants, because we accept earthy particles (dhåtu) [of a tree] which have adesire at budding time (dohada) for water sprinkled on its root. In this respect also, the[Ír¥-]Bhåshya says:*For though pråˆa can exist in a unmovable plant, it does not exist in fivedifferent way to support its body [Ír¥Bh II. i. 9; 222,9].
And to the [Brahma-]sËtra,*For this reason, the pråˆa [is para brahman] [BrSË I. i. 24],the [Vedånta-]d¥pa says:*Regarding [non-sentient things] such as a stone, a wood, their existence is notbased on the pråˆa [VD¥pa I. i. 24; 13,12–13].
It is explained in the eighth section (adhikaraˆa) of the chapter on organs (karaˆa-påda)in the Nyåyatattva that even nails, teeth, hair, a scar and so on, are the substrate very
low the pråˆa.
To control it in the form of emitting (recaka), inhaling (pËraka) and suspending(kumbhaka) is the fourth division of the eightfold yoga, [namely, pråˆåyama271]. The
further explanation on it is seen in the Óyurveda and the insruction of yoga [107].
269

Their functions are explained in the Ónandadåyin¥ ad TMK I. 53 [105 fn.1]. I
cannot trace the source (Puråˆa?) quoted in R and K.
270

ChUp V. i.

271

See the YogasËtra II. 50, the Yogabhåshya and Tattvavaißårad¥ on it.

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1.6.4.5 Its variations(107,1–2)

The air which is the material of a body is utterly different from the air which iscalled the pråˆa. Having air as the material is clear in the bodies filled with air oftempest, etc.
[Air] is object in hot wind, wind of a fan etc.
1.6.5

tejas

(107,3–115,2)

1.6.5.1 Våyu is its material cause(107,3–109,6)

From air, a subtle element of color (rËpatanmåtra) [is produced].
From the latter, a fiery element (tejas) [is produced].
The word ‘agni’ in the passage,*From air, fire (agni) [is produced] [TaiUp II. i. 1],
denotes a fiery element in general. [108][Obj.] If the passage,*From air, fire (agni) [is produced] [TaiUp II. i. 1],means [air] is the material cause of [fire], it is contradictory to our perception. For only
a leaf, grass, wood and so on can change into ashes, smoke, fire (dhËmadhvaja), and aleaf and so on are earthy. You may suppose that even in these cases imperceptible fieryparticles [in a grass etc.] led by unseen power (ad®sh†a) produce flames (jvålå), but thisassumption is complicated (guru). And various product [different from an original] isactually seen in the case of ashes, smoke, charcoal and so on; accordingly, the fact is not
avoidable [and does not lead to complication]. The peculiar touch, [hotness], is possible[in a thing whose material is earth, neither hot nor cool], as the specific smell belonging
to smoke, [which does not exist in grass], [or] as the specific touch [causing itch]
belonging to Alhagi Maurorum (durålabhå). Thus, as water transforms itself into foam,wave, or bubble according to the difference in its assistants, it is proved that earth
partially transforms itself into fire (hutavaha). If so, [the passage] beginning with,*From air, fire (agni) [is produced] [TaiUp II. i. 1],
can be explained as meaning that [air] is the efficient cause (nimittakåraˆa) [of fire].
[Ans.] It is not true, because it is contradictory to the process (prakriyå) of theorders of the creation272 and the dissolution273 [of the universe] read in the context
regarding a material cause which cannot be explained in other ways (ananyathåsiddha).
272

See TaiUp II. i. 1: åtmana åkåßa˙ sambhËta˙, åkåßåd våyu˙, våyor agni˙…

273

See SubålaUp II: p®thivy apsu pral¥yate, åpas tejasi l¥yate, tejo våyau l¥yate…

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And we will explain that a leaf and so on are also of five elements [by the quintuplication(pañc¥karaˆa)]. For this reason, we accept the origination [of fire] from their [fiery] part[109]. It is proper that [the fiery part of a leaf etc. is not perceived] before the originationof [flames], as soon after putting off flames, the [fiery] part of them is, [though it
exists], not perceived; in this case, there is not the complication [in the assumption ofanother external fiery element led by unseen power]. And concerning submarine fire(abindhana), you cannot imagine that it is the transformation of earth; the assumption ofirregular material [in each case] is complicated. Thus we perceive that fire hidden invarious things appears by force of a specific assistant and the conjunction with homogenous
parts brought by unseen power. And the usages of great sages also support it:*As fire lies in wood [?],
*As fire resides in wood and oil in a sesame, so that purusha… [VishP II. vii. 28],and so on. Therefore, it is proper in the stage of aggregate creation (samash†is®sh†i) thatfire is produced from air as its material, but in the stage of individual creation (vyash†is®sh†i)a gross fiery element appears from a subtle fiery element.
1.6.5.2 Its definition etc.

(109,6–110,3)

The definitions of a fiery element are having hot touch, having brilliant color,and so on.
And it nourishes the faculty of speech (våc) and the faculty of sight (cakshus), as
is explained in the following ßrutis:*Speech is composed of fire [ChUp VI. v. 4, vi. 1, vii. 6],*The sun, becoming sight, entered the eyes [AitareyaUp I. ii. 4],*Through his rays, the [man in the sun] entered it [B®hUp V. v. 1],
and so on. For eyes without a specific ointment (añjana), except for the case of an owl(dinåbh¥ta), [a fiery element] whose color appears and which is other than what nourishes
them is unavoidable and necessary to produce the knowledge of objects other thandarkness (timira) and the like [110].
As the digestive fire (vaißvånara) [it] assists [the self]. The digestive fire is a
specific fire abiding in the body which becomes the cause of digestion of eaten or
drunken food through the conjunction with the pråˆa etc.274
That a fiery element is the body is clear in the case of the bodies filled with fireof fire god (dahana275), the sun (tapana) etc.
274

See BhG XV. 14.

275

dikpålågnidevatå (R, K).

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That [it is the object] is [clear] in the case of sunshine, lightning, ordinary fire(hutavaha) and so on.
1.6.5.3 Flames are momentary and have the cause for their desruction(110,3–112,1)
Among them, ordinary fire composed of flames is proved to be momentary(kshaˆika) in the sense that it destroys very quickly, because (a) it is seen to be extinct
when the burnt object is extinct; (b) [flames are successively produced] when complete
causes, [namely, the conjunctions of another parts containing oil], successively approach;(c) you cannot see many light at once [111]. And the recognition (pratyabhijñå) [ofmomentary flames in the form that this is the very fire which was seen before] can be
explained in other way, [namely, it can be explained as wrong notion based on theirsimilarity], as [a man wrongly recognizes] light which was once blown out and islightened (åropita) again [during his absence].276 The difference between flames isperceptible, as is explained in the Nyåyatattva:*By close observation, flicker of fire can be seen as stream of water. [Nyåyatattva]“The destruction of flames takes place without any cause,” say someone who are
influenced by Buddhism. But it is not true, because momentary destruction would be
resulted [due to the absence of the cause for its delay] and because unseen power(ad®sh†a), God etc. are inevitably the causes. And it is possible for speed (vega) and soon, which is inseparable [from flames], to make another condition, [i.e., non-existenceof flames277]. In the same way, those who assert that last sound, last impression (saµskåra)[immediately before liberation] and so on also destroy in themselves are rejected. Holding
276

pratyabhijñå tu nishkråntapravish†avadasambhavån nirvåpitåropitad¥pådishvivånyathåsiddhå. My translation follows the interpretation of K: nishkråntapravish†edevadattådåv iva yåthåthyåsambhavåt … nirvåpitåropitad¥pådishu nirvåpaˆåropaˆeajånato jåyamånå “so 'yaµ d¥pa˙” iti pratyabhijñå såd®ßyadoshamËlakatayå yathå
bhråtirËpå, tathå “sayaµ d¥pajvalå” iti pratyabhijñå'pi bhråntirËpå. According to K, theinterepretation of R is on the variant reading as follows: pratyabhijñå tu
nishkråntapravish†asya sambhavån nirvåpitåropitad¥pådishv ivånyathåsiddhå (therecognition [of momentary flames in the form that this is the very fire which was seen
before] can be explained in other way as in the case of [wrong recognition of] lamp
which was once blown out and is lightened again, which is possible for those who once
departed and enters again). The third reading in K is: pratyabhijñå tu nishkråntapravish†asya
nishkramaˆadaßånirvåpitåropitad¥pådishv ivånyathåsiddhå (the recognition [ofmomentary flames in the form that this is the very fire which was seen before] can be
explained in other way, as those who once departed and enters again [wrongly recognize]
lamp which was once blown out and is lightened during his absence).
277nåßasya abhåvarËpatve [=bhåvåtiriktatve] hy ahetukaßaµkå'pi; asmanmate[=bhåvåntaråbhåvapakshe] tu nåßo nåma bhåvarËpåvasthåntaram eva, na tasyåhetukatvam(R≈K).

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in mind all this, the Vedårthasaµgraha says [112]:*A forest fire etc. also inevitably have a series of modifications which arecontrary to their earlier condition. [VAS §47; 100,7]
Concerning it, the classification into terrestrial (bhauma) one, celestial (divya)
and so on,278 totality of causes and effects of each of them, whether it is momentary ornot, and so on are presumed according to the possibility (yathåyogyam).
1.6.5.4 prabhå and prabhåvat

(112,2–114,4)

Fire is generally of two kinds: effulgence (prabhå) and effulgent one (prabhåvat).
Effulgence is a kind of fire which expands or contracts depending upon theexistence or the non-existence of concealment, and stretches out beyond its locus according
to its speed and capacity. And it is produced with the effulgent one and vanishes with it.
And it is not a portion of light broken into pieces. For it is complicated toassume that [these portion], which naturally go upwards [like fire], simultaneously
spread out in every direction provided obstruction by wind etc. is not seen [113];
whereas effulgence is accepted so according to our experience. Moreover, if it were so,firmer things such as a jewel or the sun would be broken into pieces. If it should be
accepted, they would be destroyed like light and the like. And it is too complicated toassume even in this case that they are produced [again and again] in every moment [likeflames]. For particular totality of causes as is seen in the case of oil [poured one by one
into a lamp and causing each flame], is not seen [in this case]. And recognition(pratyabhijñå) of a jewel and the like is not erroneous knowledge (bhrånti) [like recognitionof flames] because of mutual dependence: it can be proved to be erroneous only if [ajewel etc.] are proved to be broken into pieces, and they can be proved to be so only if[the recognition] is proved to be wrong.
[Obj.] If they are partly broken into pieces, as in the case of a Campaka flower
which is the substratum of broken perfume, the [erroneous] recognition [is possible].
[Ans.] Not so; because concerning recognition, the answer is already given [bypointing out the mutual dependence]. And if you accept another substance based on our
experience, there is no room for the assumption that [the recognition] is erroneous. And
the similarity between effulgence [and the flowers] is cast off because the perception of
perfume inevitably follows a particular course of wind and because it is seen that even if
the substratum such as a Campaka disappears its perfume persists. In summer night and278

According to YMD IV. 39, tejas is classified into bhauma, divya, audarya(gastric) and åkaraja (mineral). The explanation on them is seen in YMD IV. 40.

69

the like, though hotness, [whose substratum is a broken part of fire (tejas)], is experienced,
effulgence (prabhå) itself does not exist; [accordingly, effulgence cannot be a part offire].279 [114] And the fact that [effulgence] is thick in its root and is thin in its end isgrasped depending on our experience; [hence, it has parts].
[Obj.] But Varadavishˆu-mißra gave effulgence as the instance of expansion andcontraction of the knowledge of the self, which does not have any part, and said:*Effulgence has no part, because its part is not cognized [?].
[Ans.] It must be understood as based on the intention that [effulgence] is deprivedof a part which is capable of being split (chedana) or cut (bhedana).
And [effulgence] is not independent, because it is cognized as not being establishedseparately from a lamp and the like.
Effulgent one (prabhåvat) is light which is qualified by effulgence. And it is ofmany forms such as a jewel and the sun.
1.6.5.5 Its characters(114,4–115,2)

Due to the difference of its own nature depending upon particular totality of
causes, fire has the distinction in causing removal of grief [in the case of the sun],removal of joy and high tide (v®ddhi) [in the case of the moon], cooking [in the case ofordinary fire], illuminating [in the case of a lamp] and so on. Flames burning up are also
due to [the difference of its nature] or unseen power.
Though it has red and brilliant color as its one and only nature, its variety ofcolor is perceived due to the difference in its conjunction with water and so on. It is
proved by the ßruti:*Whatever red color fire has, [it is the color of fire] [ChUp VI. iv. 1],
and so on.
[Obj.: (1) Fieriness exists in a white thing, because it is genus (jåti) directly
pervaded by the substance-ness which exists in a colored thing, like wateriness; (2) fire
is white, because it is different from earth though it has color, like water].
[Ans.] Such affirmative and negative relations (anvayavyatireka280) used by the279This is based on the second interpretation of R. The first one (≈K) is: nanu
prabhåßrayåvinåbhËtatvaµprabhåyå
nåsti,
astamite'pisËryeaushˆyådyanapagamadarßanena tadåßrayaprabhåyå apy avasthiter ity åßaµkhya,
upalabhyamånaushˆyåßrayasya prabhådravyåtiriktatvån na dosha ity åha.
280

The commentators interpreted it in three ways: (1) there are affirmative
syllogism [a] and negative one [b]; (2) if fire increases whiteness increase, and if firedecreases whiteness decrease; (3) syllogism [a] has anvyavyatirekavyåpti. The second
one is seen only in R.

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Vaißeshika and so on in order to prove [fire] is white are sublated by the [above-mentioned]ßruti and can be explained in another way281 [115]. Concerning cognition that a disc(maˆ∂ala) of the midday sun is white, it is also possible that it is based on a watery part
supporting the disc whose touch, [i.e. coolness], is not manifested but whose color, [i.e.,
white], is manifested. And whether qualities are manifested or not is not fixed as isadmitted in other cases.
1.6.6

ap

(115,3–7)

From fire, a subtle element of taste (rasatanmåtra) [is produced].
From the latter, water (ap) [is produced].
Its definition is: having cool touch, not having smell but having specific taste,
and so on. Though it has white [color], sweet [taste] and cool [touch] as its one and only
nature, the variety of color, taste and touch is superimposed due to the difference in the
conjunction with its substratum and so on. Distinction in qualities of fire, water andfood is discussed in detail when we explain non-substance.282 Inherently it has fluidity(dravatva). Hail and the like, though they are composed of water, have solidness due tocoagulation (upash†hambha).
[Water] assists through nourishing vital breath (rasana) and the taste. That it is abody is clear in bodies in the case of the world of Varuˆa filled with water. That [it is]an object [is clear] in river and ocean.
1.6.7

p®thiv¥(115,8–117,2)

From water, a subtle element of smell (gandhatanmåtra) [is produced].
From the latter, earth (p®thiv¥) [is produced].
Its definition is: having peculiar touch; having taste and having specific touch,and so on [116].
First it is born as having fragrant [smell], sweet [taste], black [color] and touchneither hot nor cold. Therefore being neither hot nor cool is always consistent. It is
conditioned on the copresence or the coabsence (anvayavyatireka) of the limiting adjunct(upådhi) by fire or water that [earth] is perceived as having hotness or coolness. Its
blackness is self-evident, as is proved by the ßruti.283 Due to the difference in baking, it
is born as having the variety of color. That it has fragrance as its own nature is also281

anyathåsiddha = aprayojaka, vipakshe bådhakåbhåvåt (K).

282

Chap. 5 adravya-sara: .

283

See ChUp VI. iv. 1: yat k®shˆaµ tad annasya.

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established by the maxim of general rule (autsargika). And continuity of sweetness inwater, which is its [material] cause, is grasped [also in earth] so long as there is no
sublation. Though it has solidity, in some cases its fluidity is perceived due to theassociation with water, heat and so on.
And its assistance is through nourishing the mind and the faculty of smell.
That it is a body is clear in human being, animals, plants (sthåvara) and the like.
That it is an object [is clear] in clay, stones, food, herbs (aushadhi), darkness andthe like.
It is true that all that are referred to as an object and so on will be said as a body
regarding God or regarding the soul qualified by each object, we classify [them into an
object and a body] from the viewpoint of the difference in degree of usefulness for theusage of ordinary people and practically use [these two words] [117]. The Vaißeshika
also referred to even what is accepted as a body as an object:*An object is characterized by clay, stones and plants.284 [Praßastapådabhåshya,on p®thiv¥]
For they explain for themselves that plants are bodies.
1.6.8

tamas

1.6.8.1 It is substance and included in earth(117,4–126,3)(117,4–123,1)

Darkness (tamas) is substance and is composed of earth; because it is object ofunsublated cognition that it is blue [like a blue pot285] and [moving].286[Obj.] Because of [the general rule that] there is not visibility if there is no light[and there is visibility if there is light], [the cognition of darkness, which is generated in
the absence of light], is sublated.
[Ans.] Not so, because there is inconstancy (vyabhicåra) in view of light, [which
is visible without another light].
[Obj.] Excepting [the knowledge of light], [the above-mentionend rule holdsgood].
[Ans.] Still it is not right; because even if there is not [light], darkness, acceptedby you [as the non-existence of light], is visible.
284

vishayas tu dvyaˆukådikrameˆårabdhas trividho m®tpåshåˆasthåvaralakshaˆa˙(GOS ed. [with Nyåyakandal¥], §52 p.106). The italic portion is omitted here.
285

Some MSS mentioned in K add gha†avat after °vishayatvåt. According to K,
it means ‘like a blue pot’; but U makes this reading (with a parenthesis) contain the next
sentence.
286

ådi refers to moving (K).

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[Obj.] In order to establish the [assistant] capability ([sahakåri-]yogyatå) [forvisibility of darkness], whose definition is totality of causes other than [the essential
capability (svarËpayogyatå) such as being other than heaviness (gurutva)], and in order
to avoid the contradiction [that darkness can be seen with light], we should approve that[light is not the cause for the visual knowledge of darkness]287 [119].
[Ans.] Even in this case, you must know [that darkness is positive entity] forfear that you deny its form perceived [as blue and moving]. For what needs the other insome cases does not always need it: touch needs wind to grasp coolness of sweat andthe like, but touch does not need wind to grasp hotness.
Some holds that [darkness is] non-existence of light,288 non-existence of particularcognition, [that is, absence of cognition of color],289 or pure notion of blueness. 290 These
opinions are, however, rejected [respectively291] for the reason that [darkness] is perceived
as [not negative but] positive [120], that [the opinion] would be contradictory to ourordinary experience [that darkness has blue color], and that [darkness] appears as thatwhich has qualities (dharmin), that is, it is something blue. It is true that [the words]
dissolution (pralaya), destruction (vinåßa), termination (avasåna) and the like are used inpositive sense, but they permit a room for the theory that [they are] non-existent;
because [in these cases] we do not perceive other entity clearly [while in the case of
darkness we clearly perceive other entity possessing dark color and motion], and because
all notion of them is established as “… of something” [121]. Critics says that touch [indarkness] is not perceived, [though all colored things have touch]; it can be explained asin the case of light of a blue diamond.
Scriptures support the fact that darkness is substance etc., because they describe
its creation as in the case of other entities:
287“If light were also included in causes for the perception of darkness, thecapability for its visibility would be lost because the absence of light [=darkness, according
to the opponent], cannot coexist with light. On the contrary, the object [=darkness] itself
would be non-existent due to this contradiction” (R). K, however, interprets as follows:
if darkness is substance, light would be included in causes for its visibility as in the caseof a pot; in order to avoid this contradictionon, if darkness is non-existence of light, we
can accept that darkness is visible without light.
288

This is the opinion of the major Vaißeshikas. See Vaißeshika SËtra V. ii. 21f.
(the number in the commentary of Candrånanda), Kiraˆåval¥ 83–112 (Bibliotheca Indicaed.), etc.
289

This is the opinion of Ír¥ Råmamißra. See R on the ›a∂arthasaµkshepa quoted
below: rËpaprat¥tyabhåva eva tama iti bhåva˙ [121,15].
290

This is the opinion of Ír¥dhara. See Nyåyakandal¥ §18 [on dravya in general,§4 in VizSS] pp.32–35 (GOS ed.).
291

pakshatrayam api krameˆa pratikshipati (R≈K).

73*Bhagavat created darkness [?],
and because they mention its dissolution with other effects and light:*There is not darkness, nor light, nor other [?].
If [darkness] were [mere] non-existence of light, it would be contradictory to the factthat they mention the dissolutions of both darkness and light [separately]. Moreover theBråhmaˆa of Inner Controller describes not only light but also darkness as [His] body:*Whose body is darkness [B®hUp III. vii. 13].
And the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya comments on it:*In the same way, concerning water, fire, sky, air, the sun, regions (dik), themoon, stars, ether, darkness and light [Ír¥Bh I. ii. 19; 316,7]
and so on.
[Obj.] But the ›a∂arthasaµkshepa292 says in refuting the inference of the nonknowledge (ajñåna) as positive entity:*Darkness is not substance, as it appears even if we close the eyes. A blind man,however, cannot grasp [darkness] in the eyes. And our practical usage supports it.
[›a∂arthasaµkshepa][Ans.] It is said [as prima facie view] by other schools or only by one sect [ofour school], because it is contradictory to ßrutis, sm®tis and the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya.293 Appearing
even when we close the eyes is also similar to the case that eyes injured by bile (pitta)
grasp some bile. [You may say a blind man could not use the word darkness because it
is impossible for him even to see something in the eyes], but a congenital blind man
does not practically use [the word darkness] as substance [122]; even an acquired blindman, though the substratum of his sense faculty has some problems, can grasp something
in the eyes without contradiction, because capacity of the faculty remains to someextent.
[Obj.] Darkness is not substance; because it is grasped when light is not existent;
like non-existence of light.
[Ans.] It is not valid [inference]. For the Prabhåkara school, [who denies nonexistence as separate category], there are neither the reason nor the instance. For thefollowers of Udayana, [who assert darkness is non-existence of light], there is no distinction292

It is written by Ír¥ Råmamißra (b. 1074), a pupil of Råmånuja [Raghavan
1979: 17; Singh 118].
293

Ír¥Bh, in the pËrvapaksha of the Advaita, deals with tamas in reference to an
inference to prove bhåvarËpa-avidyå, and concludes that tamas is substance [I. i. 1: (2)11,2–12,1]; this view is not denied afterwards (Cf. ÍP (2) 12,21: tamo dravyam ity evaBhåshyakåra-matam, siddhånte tasyådËshitatvåt).

74

between the subject and the instance. For those who assert darkness is mere [blue]
color, there is inconstancy (vyabhicåra) in view of something seen by an owl and thelike. Even if you add an attribute “by human eyes” [to the reason], [still there isinconstancy] in view of something seen by yogins. Even if you add an attribute “[byhuman eyes] excepting those of yogins,” [still there is inconstancy] in view of something
grasped by eyes anointed with magic ointment (añjana). Even if you add an attribute“[by human eyes] without excellent unseen power, magic ointment and the like,” you
can hardly avoid sublation or contradiction: for example, darkness is different from blue
color (n¥lima) because it is the object of unsublated cognition that it is the substratum of
blueness.
Varada-guru says in his Tattvasåra:*We know what is called darkness, which is thin and thick, blue and moving, as
substance. No sublation has not been seen by anybody anywhere [123]. Accordingly, [tothe objection that darkness is non-existence because it pervades the inside of big room
as soon as light is put out], we can assume the reason [that it is like light pervades theinside of big room soon after the ignition],294 and right knowledge based on Scripturesconquers [the objection]. Indeed our experience shows that eyes manifest it without
light. [Tattvasåra v. 28; on the antaryåmi-adhikaraˆa][Obj.] Thus let our established theory (siddhånta) be that darkness is substance.
But the statement of the author of the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya does prove that it is composed ofearth.295[Ans.] Not so, because it is concluded by the principle of remainder (parißesha)
due to the statement that [darkness] is made of prak®ti and that it is blue. That is,[entities] made of prak®ti up to air have no quality of color; water and light have no
black color, as is said by the ßriti:*Whatever red color fire has…, [ChUp VI. iv. 1]and so on.296

294

These objection and answer are based on R and K. The Ratnasåriˆ¥ [published
as MGOS vol. 74], a commentary on the Tattvasåra by V¥raråghava (fl. 18 c. [Raghavan64]), explains in another way. This verse is cited in ÍP (2) 12,19f. without specificexxplanation.
295

E.g. ÍP (2) 12,22f.: svacchadravyatvåd åkåßakåryaµ tama˙; rËpavatvaµpañc¥karaˆåd upapadyate/ yadvå, teja˙kåryaµ tma˙; rËpavatvåt; sparßånupalambha˙svacchadavyatvåt.
296

yad agne rohitaµ rËpaµ tejasas tad rËpam, yac chuklaµ tad apåm, yat k®shˆaµ
tad annasya.

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1.6.8.2 On the description of the Tattvaratnåkara

(123,2–126,3)[Obj.] It is said in the Tattvaratnåkara that darkness (tamas) is nothing butmËlaprak®ti (primordial cause):*Bowing to Hari, tamas is explained; it297 bounds people if they slight Him, andit set them free if they resort to Him.
Accordingly, the examination on it should not be neglected as that on teeth of a crow,because we try to remove it only after we understand it bounds us.
Wise men have different opinions about what makes us grasp its nature and origin andso on. That is why questions arise. Now we will explain [to remove them].
1) According to the Vaißeshika, tamas is non-existence of light. 2) According to thefollowers of Prabhåkara, tamas does not exist; the cause for the practical usage of tamas
is nothing but the absence of memory298 concerning blue color299 [124]. 3) According to
the followers of Kumårila, it is assumed as another substance. 4) According to those
who know the truth, tamas is entity called pradhåna. [Tattvaratnåkara]
And putting down the third opinion after the criticism of both the first and the second, it
says:*On this point, those who know the truth assert that divine måyå composed of
300

guˆas

is thought to be external or internal tamas being in gross or subtle condition.

[Tattvaratnåkara]
Therefore, the principle of remainder cannot prove it is of earth.
[Ans.] It is not correct. First, [darkness] cannot be mËlaprak®ti, because its creationand dissolution are described with that of [mËlaprak®ti's] modifications. And the Bråhmaˆaof Inner Controller mentions tamas as opposed to light and is other than the primordial
tamas separately as [His] body through [God's] entrance into a group of effects.301 And
tamas as the primordial cause cannot be grasped by perception. And there is the following
verse in sm®ti:*There was neither day nor night, nor sky nor earth, nor darkness (tamas) nor
297

According to K, the subject is tamas.

298

sm®tipramoßa means memory deprived of the substratum or the subtratum-ness299

n¥labhåvarËpa. R and K suggest a better reading omitting bhåva.

300

Cf. daiv¥ hy eshå guˆamay¥ mama måyå (BhG VII. 14).

(R, K).

301

R and K refer to the following passage: yasyåvyaktaµ ßår¥raµ… yasyåkshåraµßar¥raµ… yasya tama˙ ßar¥ram… But B®hUp III. vii does not mention avyakta andakshara, and SubålaUp 7 does not mention tamas.

76

light, nor any other. Only one primordial cause302 which is not grasped by sense organs
such as ears, Brahman and the self (puµs) ware there at that time. [ViP I. ii. 23][Obj.] All the [fact that tamas is perceptible or it is separately His body] ispossible if [tamas as the primordial cause] is the substratum of other condition.
[Ans.] True, that is what we would like to say.
[Obj.] But “other condition” is different from the condition of earth.
[Ans.] Not so, [it is nothing but the condition of earth] due to the above-mentioned
principle of remainder.
[Obj.] Then, why are its creation and so on described as different from those ofearth?
[Ans.] You should interpret as in the case of the heaven or the sky.303[Obj.] Why is the usage of the word “tamas” common [to the primordial cause
and darkness]? [125][Ans.] The common usage can be explained in another way because it has many
meanings; for example, the word “prakåßa” is common to knowledge and light. Or
rather, based on dominant tamas as guˆa, our practical usage [of the word “tamas”] toboth is possible.
[Obj.] How [do you explain] the passage of the Tattvaratnåkara, then?
[Ans.] As a matter of fact, we also have doubt. For this work had not been
written up to the conclusion of the opening declaration (pratijñå), by which we could
decide the meaning. That is, this book is interrupted till the end of the ßloka,*On this point, those who know the truth assert…
As far as the part written down, however, it is not contradictory to what we have said;
because something composed of earth is also included in the entity called primordial
cause, for we do not hold the theory that an effect is not existent in its cause (asatkåryavåda).
And if the author intended to start the examination on prak®ti and all its effects, thepassage beginning with
*It bounds people if they slight Him…
is justified. Concerning the ßloka,*On this point, those who know the truth assert… [126],
we find the same intention because it classifies [tamas] into
*being in gross or subtle condition.
302
303

prådhånya: svårthe †haK-pratyaya˙ [Vishˆucitt¥ya].

See Ùgveda X. 90. (purushasËkta) 14ab: n≤bhyå ås¥d antárikshaµ ß¥rshˆódyáu˙ sám avartata.

77

Or rather, there is a certain other condition of prak®ti called darkness which is like darkcolor of new and dense cloud and is devoid of smell, touch and taste. Even in this case,
it is not proved to be another substance.
1.7

The number of principles

1.7.1

The number of principles are twenty-four(126,4–6)

Thus twenty-four principles (tattva) was examined. The statement on creation ofless [principles] such as:*From åtman, ether was produced [TaiUp II. ii. 1],*It created light [ChUp VI. ii. 3],
are not to deny the creations of other principles; because, equally based on the authority,
they cannot be neglected. And people say:*[Those who describe fully] say that from milk this304 is produced, from this
that, and from that yoghurt; [those who describe briefly] say that from milk yoghurt is
produced: what is the deference between two? [?]1.7.2

On the categorization of the Íaiva

(126,7–130,9)

For this reason, those who assert thirty-six principles are also rejected. They
assert as follows. On summary of the principles:*In the scripture of the Íaiva, [what should be known] first is threefold: the lord(pati), cattle (paßu) and bandages (påßå) in order [127]. Among them, the lord issaid to be Íiva, cattle are the selves (aˆu305), and bandages are five entities[Tattvaprakåßa].
On classification of the bandages:*The five entities are impurity (mala), karma, måyå, all the world produced frommåyå, concealing capacity (tirodhånakår¥ ßakti˙) [Tattvaprakåßa].
On clarification of eternal principles being the abode of the creation and the dissolution:*At the big dissolution of things, måyå, the self and Íiva remain. At the creation,
it starts again in the previous way [Tattvaprakåßa].
On enumeration of the principles:*In the beginning and the end [of the world], five pure principles are reported:Íiva, [128] capacity (ßakti), the eternal Íiva (sadåßiva), God (¥ßvara) and knowledge(vidyå).
304

kalila etc. (R, K).

305

In the Íaiva, j¥va is called aˆu, but it is thought to be vibhu.

78

From måyå, in order to help the self to be knower and doer, five principles is
produced: time (kåla), controlling power (niyati), kalå, knowledge (vidyå) andpassion (råga).
From måyå, the principle endowed with [three] qualities, namely avyakta, isproduced. Following that, the principles, buddhi, ahaµkåra, manas (cetas),
faculties of knowledge and action and tanmåtras, are produced. [Tattvaprakåßa].
In this doctrine, we have no objection on the classification into spiritual, nonspiritual and God, their eternality and so on. [In our doctrine], however, God is different
from well-known Íiva, but is Nåråyaˆa described by the word “eternal auspicious(ßåßvataßiva).” And He is one who possesses the body (ßar¥rin) for spiritual and nonspiritual in all conditions. These difference between [the Íaiva and] those who hold
Upanishads and the like will be explained in [the chapter on] God.
As to their enumeration of the principles, we do not have objection too much on
the five pure principles; because, strictly speaking, they are included in one principle
and they are said only by them. That is, they say so by themselves:*Among these [pure] principles, there is not order, because they are devoid oftime, [which is produced later]. Depending upon the functions, assumption ofthem are fixed in our scriptures.
In fact, there is only one principle which is called Íiva and possesses various
capacities [129]. The variety of it is assumed depending upon the difference
among the capacities. [Tattvaprakåßa]Passion (råga) defined by them as*Passion is composed of attachment [Tattvaprakåßa],which is nothing but one of the qualities of the self, is not another product of prak®ti. In
so far as the contact with prak®ti produce passion of the self, we accept their opinion.
[Obj.] Through the effect called passion, we assume its cause as another principle.
[Ans.] No, because it can be produced only through the knowledge that it causes
happiness and the like. Otherwise, we should assume another principle concerning
effects such as hate.
Knowledge (vidyå) is also described as follows:*The principle knowledge in the form of light, which causes to present an object
for the self whose capacity of doer is manifested [by kalå] is produced due to its
peculiarity as an instrument [Tattvaprakåßa].
On this point, however, multitude of instruments for right knowledge such as mind
alone is enough to present an object; accordingly, we do not accept another instruments.

79

And kalå is described as follows:*From måyå, kalå [is produced] following [niyati]. It conceals impurity (mala)of the self on one side, and manifests his capacity of doer. That is why it iscalled kalå306 here.
With time and niyati, which always possess subordination (upasarjanatå), itbrings about its own function up to earth. [Tattvaprakåßa]. [130]On this point, however, we accept one condition of prak®ti which causes condition of
avyakta and is called by the word akshara. Let it be that you use the word kalå oranother word in this meaning. Still that it manifests capacity of doer is not accepted;
because only knowledge (jñåna), desire, good and bad act and the like manifest it, andknowledge and so on depend on the organs (indriya) and the like.
The technical interpretation [on the niyati] is as follows:*The niyati is in the form of control (niyamana). It also is produced from måyåafterwards. All is controlled by it; accordingly, it is called that which controls(niyati). [Tattvaprakåßa].
If the word “control” here means the capacity of a controller, the niyati is nothing but
the will of God and the like. If [the word] means that fixed fruits necessarily come out,
the niyati is in the form of virtue, sin and so on. If [the word] means producing various
effects, the niyati is fixed capacity of various entities. Thus it is not another material
principle. It is true that some [texts] of the Pañcaråtra and the like, which are authority[for us], describe the creation of niyati, but it should be thought, based on the import ofeach [text], as counting down of a specific accepted principle and its capacity separately.
[Your] logical argument is always rejected, but the scripture is not.
1.7.3

Especially on time

1.7.3.1 Time is eternal and all-pervasive(130,10–141,8)(130,10–132,1)

That time is produced from måyå is sublated by [scriptures] such as,*Time as God is without beginning and its end is not known, a man of twice-born.
[ViP I. ii. 26].
And the reductio ad absurdum (tarka) is as follows:(12)

If there were no time after one point of time or before it, before-ness or after-nessin your statement would not be established.
(13)[You may say that there is no time in the past spatial position or the future

spatial position, but it is not true]. As for another spatial position (deßa), practical usage306< kalA (X 64) kshepe.

80

that it is in present, it was in past, it will be in future and so on, is possible as far as it isbased on time. Therefore [another spatial position] would not be also established if there
were no [time].
Although time is not the cause [of modification] in the eternal manifestation(nityavibhËti), it is not non-existent due to the expressions such as,*He cooks time; no time is there [in His eternal manifestation], there is the Lordalone307 [MBh XII. 25. 9],*Of which manifestation, time, composed of kalå, muhËrta and so on,308 is not
the cause of modification (pariˆåma) [ViP IV. i. 84].
Otherwise, [131] it would be contradictory to the statement,*Sages always see… [N®siµhapËrvatåpin¥Up V. 10],and the like.
And it is proved to be the efficient cause of various effects properly by means of
the examination of coexistence and coabsence309 (anvayavyatireka) and the scripture[quoted above]. And that [it is the efficient cause] is due to some limiting adjuncts(upådhi) [such as movement of the sun].310 But according to the opinion that [time] hastransformation (savikåra), time is only the material cause concerning its modifications(vikåra) [such as kshaˆa, muhËrta etc.]; because there is not another form as the efficientcause. [132](14)

Because only by one moment (kshaˆa) it can be the attribute of all this [world],

not only time but also [every] moments of it are all-pervasive (vyåpin) // 14 //1.7.3.2 Time is changing(132,2–136,8)

And [time] has transformation, which is said in the ßrutis such as,
307

Cited in VAS §42 also.

308

According to ViP I. iii. 8–9, 15 nimeshas = 1 kåsh†hå (3.2 sec.); 30 kåsh†hås =1 kalå (1.6 min.); 30 kålås = 1 muhËrta (48 min.); 30 muhËrtas = a day. But different
computation is found in the Manusm®ti [I. 64] etc. See Wilson's translation of ViP adloc., fn.
309

When it is spring, there are a mango-fruit and a kusuma-flower; when it isnot, there are not (R, K).
310

Concerning partite (akhaˆ∂a) time, anvayavyatireka is impossible; concerning
impartite (khaˆ∂a) time, it is possible (R). The Vißish†ådvaitin holds that it does notmatter if time is khaˆ∂a or akhaˆ∂a. See Vucci's Vedåntakålikåvali, kålanirËpaˆa 1cd–4ab: akhaˆ∂akhaˆ∂abhedena sa kålo dvividho mata˙ //1// ådyo vibhurbhËtabhåvivatmånatvadh¥kara˙ / nimeshådiprabhedena bahubhedas tv asau mata˙ //2//akhaˆ∂akåla evåyaµ nitya ity avagamyate / kåla˙ svakåryaµ prati tu syåd upådånakåraˆam//3// kåryarËpas tato naiva nitya ity avadhåryatåm /; YMD V. 7. In this regard, see also
van Buitenen 1956: 213, n.188.

81*From the shining person, all nimeshas, kalås, muhËrtas, kåsh†hås, days, halfmonths, months and seasons were born [MahånåråyaˆaUp I. 8];
and sm®tis such as,*He [modifies] time [MBh XII ]*[Time], composed of (maya311) kalå, muhËrta and so on [ViP IV. i. 84].
[Obj.] This [ßruti] can be explained as the description of production of god orlimiting adjunct.
[Ans.] You should not suspect so, because there is no sublation on its natural
meaning.
App.

Causation in eternal and all-pervasive entities(132,4–136,4)[Obj.] The sublation is that an all-pervasive thing (vibhu) cannot be transformed.
[133][Ans.] Not so, because we do not accept the transformation characterized bydecrease and [increase] of parts, and [the transformation characterized by] mere becoming
another condition is not contradictory to [all-pervasiveness]. Otherwise, an all-pervasive
thing itself could not be established. For all-pervasiveness is [defined as] having
conjunctions with all limited things (mËrta)312; accordingly, you cannot help admitting[transformation] in the form of conjunction at last. You might think that no [substanceincluding God] is all-pervasive for the reason that [every substance is transformed
though] the transformation [of all-pervasive thing] is inappropriate; if it were so, theall-pervasiveness of time would be denied because it is transformed. Nevertheless, its
transformation would not [be denied] for the reason that it is all-pervasive [because its
transformation is proved by the above-mentioned scriptures].313
Moreover, why does being transformed sublate all-pervasiveness?
[Obj.] Because there is no proof on being the cause. [134][Ans.] First, it is not general statement. That is,(15)

Whether [the statement] that there is no relation between the cause and the effectis said with the intention of understanding or not, your statement is rejected: in the first
311

Here mayaÈ means vikåra (K). See Påˆini IV. iii. 134 & 143.

312

Cf. Tarkad¥pikå §14: sarvamËrtadravyasaµyogitvaµ vibhutvam, mËrtatvaµparicchinnaparimåˆavattvaµ kriyåvattvaµ vå.
313

According to R and the comment of K on it: Ír¥mad-Raµgaråmånujamunibhis
tu dravyeshu sarvatra vikåritvasya pramåˆasiddhatayå tadanupapattyå vibhudravyam
eva na sv¥kriyata iti mate 'pi, kålasya vibhutvåbhåve 'pi vikåritvaµ nishpratyËham ity
abhpråyakatayå vyåkhyåta˙. According to K's own interpretation, the translation would
be somehow different.

82case [you should accept the usage of words] makes an effect, [therefore, it is contradictory
to your statement]; in the second case [the usage of words] do not make any effect,[therefore, your statement is meaningless].
(16)

As for [an effect] which has a limit, the previous limit is its cause and the last

one is its end. Without any limit, an effect would be eternal or non-existent at all.
[Obj.] We hardly grasp that an eternal and all-pervasive thing is a cause, because
it has no negative relation (vyatireka) in time and space, though it has positive relation(anvaya).314[Ans.] Not so. [135] For, even if there are not both [relation], that [an eternal andall-pervasive thing such as ether is the cause of quality such as sound] is proved by[inferences315 or scriptures] which make grasp something qualified (dharmin). And ingeneral the positive relation and the negative relation [between quality and its cause or
substratum] can be shown. It is the principle of remainder (pårißeshya) and the like thatproves something proved in general [as the substratum of the quality] is all-pervasive
and [eternal].
[Obj.] There is the invariable concomitance that something transformed is not
all-pervasive.
[Ans.] Not so, because there is inconstancy in view of God and His knowledge[136]: if the two were also included in the subject, [the inference] would be sublated byßrutis.
[Obj.] There is no defect because God is not transformed.
[Ans.] No, because His transformation in the form of conjunction, desire of thecreation and so on should be inevitably accepted.
The impossibilities of alternative that the [transformation] is entire or partial andthe like, however, would bring the theory that [everything] is void, because they arevalid not only in the case of all-pervasive substance but also in the case of somethingother than all-pervasive substance [such as genus (jåti), conjunction, knowledge, sound,atom]. And applying God, they are refuted by the author of the [Brahma-]SËtra, as
follows:*[Obj.] Entire [Brahman] would enter [the effect], [or the sacred word on His
being devoid of parts would be contradicted] [BrSË II. i. 26].
*[Ans.] On account of scriptures, however, [it is not so]; because [His power] is314

The same objection and answer are seen in Udayana's Nyåyakusumåñjali I. 19(V¥raraghavachari's note).
315

For example: ßabdådi˙ kiµcidåßrito guˆatvåd rËpådivat (R).

83

founded [only] by the sacred word [BrSË II. i. 27].
And the Vedårthasaµgraha states that kalå and so on are things transformed:*His great appearance, which is infinite and not touched by the transformation
caused by time whose proper form has countless division beginning with nimesha,kåsh†hå, kalå, muhËrta316 and up to parårdha 317 and which is the efficient cause of
the all transformation such as origination, maintenance and resorption of theworld… [VAS §42; 95,6f.]
And in the N¥timålå Nåråyaˆa-årya says:*Time is without beginning and end; it has divisions such as muhËrta, day andnight being transformed in every moment; it the cause of the transformation andmovement. [N¥timålå ] [137]1.7.3.3 Time is perceptible and cannot be proved by mere inference(137,1–141,8)
And [time] is perceptible. That is to say,(17)

In perception every entity appears as being in present. This [presentness] is not[the entity] itself, because there is difference in the knowledge: [the former is perceived
as the qualifier; the latter as the qualified]. Nor is it [caused by] limiting adjunct(upådhi) [such as movement of the sun]; because [the movement needs another limiting
adjunct to bring about its presentness, thus] endless regression would be resulted.
(18)[Obj.] This [limiting adjunct] can bring about [presentness] not only of other[entities] but also of itself; [accordingly, another limiting adjunct is not necessary].
[Ans.] If it were so, why isn't it so in the previous one, [namely, the entity
itself]?
[Obj.] Let it be so: [the entity itself can bring about its presentness; we do nothave to assume time as another principle].
[Ans.] To those who say so, scriptures are powerful enough [to prove the existenceof time in the form of presentness]. [138](19)

It is proved by our experience that something proved by [the scriptures, time], isperceptible.
[Obj.: Our experience cannot deny the possibility that the object of present
knowledge is the previous non-existence (prågabhåva) of various entities].
316

See the note on ViP IV. i. 84 quoted in 130,16.

317

A half existence of Brahmå. Cf. ViP I. iii. 27.

84[Ans.] It is preferable that present knowledge has [time] as its object, because it
is simpler.
(20)

And this [present] knowledge is not based on some indicating marks (laiµgika),[i.e., it is not inference]; because there is not consideration (vimarßa) on indicating
marks and the like.318[You may assert that time con be inferred, because] there is consideration on
indicating marks, [namely, temporary remoteness (paratva) belonging to an older thing
and temporary nearness (aparatva) belonging to a younger thing. And the former isbased on the larger number of connections with movement of the sun; the latter is basedon the smaller number of them. Movement of the sun, however, cannot directly connect
with a thing. Therefore we should assume something bringing about the connection. It isonly time that can be the link].319
Nevertheless it can be explained in other ways and we do not grasp logicalargument [to reject the explanations]. [139](21)

For limited [entities] mutually connected [with movement of the sun and athing] or all-pervasive [entities] directly conjunct with the [two], e.g. ether, which areaccepted by both of us, [140](22)

causing the larger number of connections with movement of the sun and thesmaller number of them, establish temporary remoteness and temporary nearness andthe like; [therefore we do not have to assume the other principles, time]. Otherwise, itwould be complicated.
(23)

Even if an entity established [by both of us] is assumed as something causingthat much, the world is not mixed, as in the case of the other [entity, namely time,
assumed by you].
(24)

If you accept temporary remoteness and [temporary nearness] as the connection

with time, you have to approve that time is perceptible because the indicating mark isestablished. [141](25)

Therefore mere inference cannot prove the existence of the other [entity called]

time.
Moreover, if it were proved only by scriptures, ordinary people could not use theword.
Believing that it is hard to accomplish time by mere logical argument, the318
319

Here liµga means liµgatva or vyåpti, and ådi indicates pakshadhrmatå (K).

In this regards, R refers to the Nyåyal¥låvat¥ 290,3–292,1 (ChSS ed.). See also
Kiraˆåval¥ 348–58 (Bibliotheca Indica ed.). Nyåyakandal¥ is of other opinin [85Nyåyatattva says in the chapter (adhikaraˆa) on conjunction:*Time is the number belonging to [action such as twinkling characterized by]conjunction and disjunction [of an eyelash] [Nyåyatattva],
and so on. And in the section on knower (pramåt®-påda), occasionally referring to time,
what is properly said320 is concluded:*Therefore time is the number of action depending upon the same substratum,[namely the sun] [Nyåyatattva].
And in the same [section], it is explained that [time] is perceptible, as follows:*All knowledge is experienced as connected with time. And memory, born as
qualified by space and space in the form of ‘that…,’ also proves the experienceof the previous time [Nyåyatattva].
And the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya says in the criticism of the Jaina:*Because time is known as mere attribute of entities, its independent existenceor non-existence etc. cannot be said, nor can be rejected.321 The practical usage“time exists” or “time does not exist” is same as the practical usage “genus (jåti)exists” or “genus does not exist” for users of the words [Ír¥Bh II. ii. 31; 309,15–17].
And that is the reason why time is not separately counted down.
1.7.4

The number including God etc.

(141,9–142,8)
Thus in the context of the creation starting from avyakta, mahat, ahaµkåra,[eleven] indriyas, [five] subtle elements and [five] gross elements, the individual self
and the Supreme [self] are [respectively] the twenty-fifth and the twenty-sixth. Counting
akshara and tamas separately or starting from either of the two and counting time
separately, [the individual self and the Supreme self] are imagined respectively to be thetwenty-sixth, the twenty-seventh, the twenty-eighth and so on [142]. And scriptures say:*Some hold the [individual self] is twenty-sixth; some the twenty-seventh[MantrikåUp ].
Those who assert larger number by counting sattva, rajas and tamas are rejected because
we will criticize the opinion that they are substances. The explanation of those who
intend to deny the number lager than twenty-five is shown in the Mokshadharma by
Bhagavat Vyåsa:*Oh king, the one is the Supreme and the other is the twenty-fifth. Sages see that
320sËkta. svokta suggested in U seems better.

321

It is stated in order to reject the Jaina theory of saptabhaµg¥naya.

86

they are same because [He] abides in it [as the inner-controller]. [MBh XII. ]And the [Brahma-]SËtra says:*Because [Brahman] abides in [the individual self], says Kåßak®tsna322 [BrSË I.
iv. 22].
And the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya etc.323 explained this meaning in detail in the explanation of thegrammatical coordination (såmånådhikaraˆya).324[Obj.] Nevertheless, it is impossible to fix the number of principles, because
each gross element has following various conditions such as sunstone [of earth], snow
and hail [of water], lightening and digestive fire [of fire].
[Ans.] Not so, because the [number of principles] is fixed as far as aggregate(samash†i) condition is concerned. As for particular individual (vyash†i) conditions after
the quintuplication (pañc¥karaˆa), however, the number is not countable because they
are infinite.
1.8

The creation

1.8.1

Change is partial(142,8–158,4)(142,8–143,5)

And from the part of these principles, each following [principle] is produced.
For it is mentioned in ßrutis325 that each previous [principle] covers each following one
and remains in the effects in its own form. Otherwise, [that is, previous principle
completely changed into following principle], only earth would remain [143]; but previous
elements are established by our experience.
Concerning [five] subtle elements, some hold they are completely transformed
for the reason that their covering and the like are not admitted; others hold they are also
partially transformed for the reason that a body and so on are said to be composed oftwenty-four principles.326 According to the first opinion, a body and so on are said to becomposed of twenty-four principles including five qualities as the effects of [five]subtle elements or they are said so only to teach they are composed of all non-spiritual322

Fl. 350–250 B.C. [Nakamura 1983: 376].

323

See Ír¥Bh I. i. 1, esp. vol. I (2) pp.57–62; ibid. I. i. 13; VAS §§75–76.

324“bhinnaprav®ttinimitånåµßabdånåm
ekasminnarthev®tti˙såmånådhikaraˆyam” [VAS §26: 86,8–9; Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: (1) 191,7]. Cf. Kaiya†a's definition(comm. on Mahåbhåshya I. ii. 42) [Ír¥Bh (R-Ai) 85]. See Oxford etc....
325

See “pradhånatattvam udbhËtaµ mahåntaµ tat samåv®ˆot [34ab] / yathå
pradhånena mahån mahatå sa tathåv®ta˙ [36cd] / åkåshaµ ßabdamåtraµ tu sparßamåtraµsamåvißat [39ab]” [ViP I. ii] (R, K).
326

150,1ff.

Råmånuja seems to hold the second opinion; see GBh XIII. 5–6, quoted in

87principles. According to the second opinion, covering and the like [of subtle elements]
are not mentioned without any intention as in the case of some [Upanishads] not mentioning
the creation of some [principles].327
1.8.2

The order of the creation(143,6–146,2)

Each principle is first created at His will by God, who has the each previous
principle preceding it as His body.328 Then He wishes to manifest individual names andforms329; and because these separated principles are not capable of individual creation,330
He wishes to mix them mutually. Thus having made the quintuplication with [a half of]each element and one-eighth of other four elements in the order described in the texts
such as,*A half of ether is fourfold: wind, fire, water and earth331 [?] [144],
He makes a group of the individual self, entered by Himself, enter into them, and fromthese principles He produces the cosmic egg (brahmåˆ∂a) composed of elements attaining
to the change called gold, enclosed by the seven covers, [namely water, fire, air, ether,ahaµkåra, mahat and prak®ti], each following one of which is ten times thicker than theprevious.332 And after that, out of His grace (prasåda) He creates four-faced [Brahmå],whose form is filled with all spiritual entities dwelling inside of this egg,333 in any one of327

For example, the ChUp does not mention the creation of åkåßa, mahat etc.;
the TaiUp does not mention the creation of mahat etc. (R, K).
328

Cf. “tad aikshata bahu syåµ prajåyeyeti / tat tejo 's®jata / tat teja aikshata bahusyåµ prajåyeyeti / tad apo 's®jata /…// tå [så in U] åpa aikshanta bahvya˙ syåma
prajåyemah¥it / tå annam as®janta” [ChUp VI. ii. 3–4]; “tadabhidhyånåd eva tu talliµgåtsa˙ (But He is [the cause of the world] because of marks indicating Him, His will)”[BrSË II. iii. 14].
329

Cf. “hantåham imås tisro devatå anena j¥venånupravißya nåmarËpe vyåkaravåˆi”[ChUp VI. iii. 2]; “nåmarËpe vyåkaravåˆi devådivicitras®sh†iµ tannåmadheyåni cakaravåˆi” [Ír¥Bh II. iv. 17; 402,23].
330

Cf. “tåsåµ triv®taµ triv®tam ekaikåµ karavåˆi” [ChUp VI. iii. 3]; “nånåv¥ryå”
etc. [ViP I. ii. 52ff.], quoted in 149,7ff.
331

The previous verse is: “evaµ jåteshu bhËtåni pratyekaµ syur dvidhå tata˙ /caturdhå bhinnam ekaikam ardham arshaµ tathå sthitam” (R, K).
332

daßaguˆitottara. Cf. “(1) våli- (2) vahny- (3) anila- (4) åkåßais tato (5) bhËtådinå
bahi˙ / v®taµ daßaguˆair aˆ∂aµ bhËtådir (6) mahatå tathå // (7) avyaktenå"v®to brahmaµs
tai˙ sarva˙ sahito mahån / ebhir åvaraˆaia aˆ∂aµ saptabhi˙ pråk®tair v®tam //” [ViP I. ii.
59–60]; “daßaguˆai˙ daßaguˆottara˙” [Vishˆucitt¥ya], that is, gold, composed of earth,is covered by the ten times larger watery cover, and the fiery cover is ten times larger
than the watery cover, etc.
333

“cetanabharitavigraham iti / baddhåtmasamash†ibhËtam ity artha˙ /samash†itvaµ karmavaßyaj¥vånåµ tacchar¥rånupravish†atvam” (R ≈ K).

88seven places, [namely His mind, His eye, His mouth, His ear, His nose, His testis and] alotus in His navel334; out of His anger He creates Rudra, [Íiva]. In this regards, a ßruti
says [145]:*Nåråyaˆa alone was; neither Brahmå nor the controller, [Rudra]. [MahåUp 1]…
*There four-faced Brahmå was born; a person with three eyes, having a trident
in his hand, was born. [MahåUp 2],
and so on. And also another ßruti says:*From Nåråyaˆa, Brahmå was born; From Nåråyaˆa, Rudra was born [NåråyaˆaUp
1],
and so on. It is stated in the Mahåbhårata:*Brahmå, [Rudra], having the dark-throat, and other gods are mentioned.
Awakened do not serve them, because the fruit is limited.
These two, wise and best, are said to be born from [His] grace and anger andfollow the ways making the creation and the dissolution shown by Him [MBhXII. 350. 36f.?].
And immediately God, being the inner-controller of Brahmå created by Himself, causes
Brahmå, who is magnified by knowledge and power as to wonderful creation which He
offers through understanding initiated in Vedas composed by Himself,335 and the various
dangers to whom such as Madhu and Kai†abha are removed by Him,336 to form thefourteen worlds337 in the cosmic egg and to create individual names and forms abidingin these [worlds], wonderful and various, such as gods, animals, human beings, plants
and a particular direction (dik) [146]; and so does He for Himself, having [Brahmå] as
His body. And it is stated in the [Brahma-]SËtra:334

Cf. “ahaµ prasådajas tubhyaµ lokadhåmne svayambhuve / tvatto me månasaµjanma prathamaµ dvijapËjitam // cåkshushaµ vai dvit¥yaµ me ås¥j janma puråtanam /tvaprasådåc ca me janma t®t¥yaµ våcakaµ mahat // tvatto me ßråvaˆaµ cåpi caturthaµjanma me vibho / nåsikyaµ caiva me janma tvatta˙ pañcamam ucyate // aˆ∂ajaµ cåpime janma tvatta˙ shash†haµ vinirmitam / idaµ ca saptamaµ janma padmajaµ me'mitaprabha //” [Hayaßira˙' teaching in MBh ].
335

svaprahita. Cf. “yo vai vedåµß ca prahiˆoti tasmai” [ÍvetUp VI. 18]; “nåmarËpaµ ca bhËtånåµ k®tyånåµ ca prapañcanam / vedaßabdebhya evå'sau [ådau?] vedåd¥nåµcakåra sa˙ //” [ViP I. v. 63]; “ßabda iti cen nåta˙ prabhavåt pratyakshånumånåbhyåm”[BrSË I. iii. 27].
336

Both demons, born from Vishˆu, were killed by Vishˆu when they wereabout to kill Brahmå. See the authority quoted in R and K.
337

Upper worlds: bhËrloka, bhuvarloka, svarloka, maharloka, janaloka, tapoloka,
satyaloka; lower worlds: atala, vitala, sutala, rasåtala, talåtala, mahåtala, påtåla [YMD
IV. 69–70].

89*But the creation of names and forms belongs to [Him], who makes the triplication(triv®tkurvat), because of the teachings [BrSË II. iv. 17].
He causes [Hari] to take back [the worlds]; and so does He for Himself, having Hari as
His body.
App.

Direction(146,3–149,3)[Obj.] Why can direction, eternal and all-pervasive, be an effect338?
[Ans.] The question is not right, because direction is not proved as an eternal
and all-pervasive substance. For the statement referring to west, east, far, near and so on[147] can be explained according to the circumstances as based on various [all-pervasive]
substances accepted by both of us such as ether which bring about the connection(upahita339) with various limiting adjuncts, or based on particular limiting adjuncts which
are thought to explain the difference [in direction], east etc., and are connected indirectly
by conjunction with something conjunct with other limited entity. You may say that
direction should be assumed as another new [substance] by giving up well-known[all-pervasive substance] such as ether in order to avoid the excessive application(atiprasaµga) that everything is endowed with every quality, but it is same as avoiding
Gaµgå and run to mirage for fear that the former might perish not only sin but also
merit.
(26)

Comparing to the assumption of another new [substance] as something having

the nature to bring about that much, you had better assume it is a substance (dharmin)
already established that brings about that much. [148][Obj.] Let it be that direction is other than ether because the ßrutis mention its
separate creation and dissolution, for example:*From His two feet earth [was born]; form His ear direction [was born] [RgVeda
X. 90. 14],
*Directions [into] the ear [?].
[Ans.] No, because it can be explained as the creation of the presiding deity(abhimånidevatå340) or the limiting adjunct as in the case of the creation and [the dissolution]referring to inner-space, the heaven and so on in these same sections341; otherwise you
338

The Nyåya-Vaißeshikas hold that direction or space (dik) is another substanceand is proved in the same way as in the case of time.
339

upahita = upanåyaka = saµbandhasaµpådaka (K).

340

Cf. van Buitenen's note to his translation of VAS, p.194 fn.97.

341

See Ùgveda X. 90. 14: n≤bhyå ås¥d antárikshaµ ß¥rshˆó dyáu˙ sám avartata /padbhy≤µ bh≥mir díßa˙ ßrótråt táthå lok≤◊ akalpayan //90should accept they are also separate entities. And the author of the [Brahma-]SËtra saysin the section beginning with*[Vital air (pråˆa)] is neither mere air (våyu) nor its action; because it is statedseparately [BrSË II. iv. 8],that vital air, though its separate creation etc. are mentioned,342 is an aspect of air; in thesame way, [those] of direction etc. should be thought as only to show an example.
Moreover, if a certain principle named direction were an effect, before its creation
and after its dissolution there would be no regulation (vyavasthå) with regard to therelation of covering and being covered343 or being far and near between the principles
such as prak®ti and mahat; for according to the ßrutis, direction is created in the stage ofindividualization (vyash†i). Or, if [direction] were limited because of its being an effectof prak®ti, there would be no regulation with regard to being upwards or downwards etc.
between pure sattva, triguˆa and so on. If it were explained in these cases as based onparticular limiting adjuncts or based on various [entities] which bring about the connection
with [various limiting adjuncts], the situation is same even in [our ordinary experience].
Therefore, direction is not another new principle.
What the Prameyasaµgraha [of Vishˆucitta] says:*Ether and directions have color due to the triplication (triv®tkaraˆa)344; and forthis reason, everything visible is grasped as having some particularity (vißesha)[Prameyasaµgraha],also makes us understand that [direction] is produced from elements made by thequintuplication, but not that it is another principle other than twenty-four [principles]
fixed in number.
Varadavishˆu-mißra, however, counts down the substance named direction
separately in the passage beginning with,*And substance is of twenty-six kinds: … sattva, rajas, tamas… [?].345
And its visibility is shown:*Ether, time and direction are [perceived] by the faculty of sight [?]. [149]And it is proved:*[Their visibility] is understood by the inference: direction and time are visible,
342

See “etasmåj jåyate pråˆo mana˙ sarvedriyåˆi ca, khaµ våyu˙…” [MuUp II.

343

See 142,7ff.

i. 3].
344

Here the Advaitic view that perception grasps pure existence is refuted. The
same portion is quoted in 76,8f. & 96,2.
345

Quoted again in 446,6.

91

because they are the substratum of conjunction being the cause of perceptible
remoteness (paratva) and nearness (aparatva), like a pot, and so on [?].
Here its separateness should be thought as having another intention like the enumerationof sattva and so on as [separate] substance, which is contradictory to the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya.
1.8.3

Pañc¥karaˆa(149,4–150,7)

In this manner, the whole [universe] starting form the cosmic egg up to grass iscomposed of the five elements, because the quintuplication (pañc¥karaˆa) and the likeare stated. [The statement of the triplication (t®vitkaraˆa)],*Let me make each one of three threefold [ChUp IV. iii. 4],
is mere indication, as is concluded by the [other Upanishad's passages] in the samecontext346 and supporting statement. [You may say that if it were so, the practical usagethat this is earth, which is composed of all elements, would be impossible]; but thepractical usage of ordinary people, scholars, and scriptures is based on predominance[of each element]. It is mentioned in the [Brahma-]SËtra:*Because they are greater, however, there is this designation, this designation347[BrSË II. iv. 17];
*But on account of its consisting of the three elements, on account of predominance[BrSË III. i. 2].
In the same manner, the quintuplication is also nothing but indication [because of theoctuplication including mahat etc.], as the Venerable Paråßara says:*These [principles], possessing various powers and being separated, are without
mixture; accordingly they, not having combine together, could not create living
beings.
Having got mutual conjunction, they depend upon one another; and having
merged into complete oneness, they have one composite unit as their result.348[…] they, from mahat to a particular, create the cosmic egg [ViP I. ii. 52–53,
54cd]. [150]
It is stated in the Ír¥mat-G¥tåbhåshya:346

See TaiUp II. i. 1 etc., which mentions five elements such as ether.

347

The last word is repeated because this is the last sËtra of the adhyåya.

348

ekasaµghåtalakshå˙. ekasaµghåtå˙ aˆ∂aµ lakshaµ sådhyaµ yeshåµ te(R ≈ K). The Vishˆucitt¥ya reads ekasaµghåtav¥kshå˙ or °lakshyå˙ and comments asfollows:
ekasaµghåtav¥kshå˙
caturvidhånantaprajånirantaråˆ∂otpådanatatparå˙;på†håntare eka˙ saµghåta˙ aˆ∂aµ lakshyaµ sådhyaµ yeshåµ te ekasaµghåtalakshyå˙,yadvå ekasaµghåtalakshyå eka˙ saµghåta˙ iti d®shyå˙.

92*‘[Five] gross elements, ahaµkåra [or bhËtådi], buddhi [or mahat] and avyakta[or mËlaprak®ti]’ [BhG XIII. 5] are substances producing the body (kshetra)[GBh XIII. 5–6; 427,7].
…
It is produced by substances from prak®ti to earth; it is the substratum of theindriyas; it has the modifications of the nature of desire, hatred, pleasure andpain, and its form is combination of the elements; it serves as the basis of theexperience of pleasure and pain by spiritual beings: this is what is called the
body. [GBh XIII. 5–6; 430,1–3]
In this way, bodies have eight substances as their material cause. As for indriyas, they
are another substances abiding in the body; because they are distinguished [from thebody]:*‘Ten and one indriyas and the five object of indriyas’ [BhG XIII. 5] are principles
abiding the body [GBh XIII. 5–6; 425,9–426,1]
and because the conclusion is:*[The body] is the substratum of the indriyas [GBh XIII. 5–6; 430,2].
This seems to suggest that the above-mentioned view that tanmåtras are completelytransformed is accepted.
[Obj.] If one [substance] had many substances as its material causes, admixtureof [various] genera (jåtisaµkara) would happen [in the whole composed of many elements,
each of which has own genus].
[Ans.] It would not happen, because we do not accept the whole (avayavin) [asdistinguished from its components (avayava)]. [151] The difference [between the wholeand its components] in understanding, word, number, size, place, time, effect and so on,[through which you prove the whole],349 is explained only with the help of another349

In this regard, R quotes the pËrvapaksha by the Vaißeshika (kåˆådå˙) in theårambhaˆådhikaraˆa of the Ír¥bhåshya [II. i. 15; 234,1–8]: “It is not possible that theeffect is non-different from the cause, because [the two] are known by different
understandings. As you know, understanding of the cause such as a thread and a lumpof clay and that of the effect such as cloth and a pot are not same at all. And there isdifference in word: threads are not called cloth, or cloth [is not called] threads. And
there is difference in effect: water cannot be brought with a lump of clay, or a wallcannot be made from a pot. And there is difference in time: the cause is prior in time
and the effect is posterior in time. And there is difference in form: the cause has theform of a lump and the effect is the form of a belly with a broad base. Thus a pot is said
to be destroyed even though a lump of clay exists. And the difference in number is seen:
threads are many and cloth is one. (And the difference in size is seen [added in R; theexample in K: there are threads in cotton and cloth in threads]). Moreover, the activityof producing agent (kårakavyåpåra) would be useless: if the effect were nothing but the

93condition which you accept as producing the whole, [namely, a particular conjunction
which you accept as the non-inherent cause (asamavåyikåraˆa)350 of the whole; that is,
the assumption of the whole as distinct from the components is not necessary because,
for example, all the practical usage concerning cloth is possible so far as it is regarded
as threads qualified by a particular conjunction].351 [152] Otherwise, a heap [of grains,forest, an army] etc. also should be assumed as another substance. [153]Moreover, [if the effect were completely different from the cause], you would
take the trouble such as that of explaining the fact that the weight [of the cause] and soon are not seen in the effect, [which has its own weight].352 For the weight of thecomponents is not hindered, because we observe a separate edge [of cloth] (daßå)353[also] falls down.354 On the other hand, if the weight of the whole were hindered, every[composition] including a dyad (dvyaˆuka) would not fall down. Even if every fall werecaused by the weight of [composite] atoms (paramåˆu), their weight could not be thenon-inherent cause of the fall of a pot and so on,355 which are not directly produced fromatoms.356 [154]cause, what could be accomplished by the producing agent? If the activity of the producing
agent, even though the effect is [already] existent [in the cause], were necessary as theassistant for the effect, the activity of the producing agent could never stop [sarvadå
omitted in R].”
350kåryeˆa kåraˆena vå sahaikasminn arthe samavetaµ sat kåraˆamasamavåyikåraˆam; yathå tantusaµyoga˙ pa†asya, tanturËpaµ pa†arËpasya [TarS §40];kåraˆa here means samavåyikåraˆa [NBo §40].
351

Cf. TMK I. 21a: na ca na˙ kalpanågauravaµ syåt; SAS: atra hi parair apy
asamavåyikåraˆatayåbhimatå d®sh†å ca saµyuktåvasthå sv¥k®teti nåsmåkam iha kåcit
kalpanå; kutas tad gauravaµ saµbhavet [229,4–6].
352

See TMK I. 20a: kåryopådånabhede na katham adhikatå gauravåde˙. This
problem is already discussed in the Nyåyavårttika II. i. 34 [Potter 1977: 323]; see alsoBhåvaprakåßa on SAS, p.217.
353

According to R, daßå here means avayava.

354

See SAS I. 20; 218,4–219,2 (Mysore ed.): kim ayaµ pratibandho'vayavigurutvasya, utåvayavagurutvasya? … na dvit¥ya˙, kadåcin nishkampe 'vayavinißåkhåphalahastådilambhanåbhåvaprasaµgåt.
355

§30].
356

The Nyåya-Vaißeshika defines gurutvam as ådyapatanåsamavåyikåraˆam [TarS

For atoms are connected (pratyåsanna) with neither the samavåtikåraˆas of a
pot's fall, i.e. the pot, nor its components (R). Cf. yatsamavetaµ kåryam utpadyate tat
samavåyikåraˆam; yathå tantava˙ pa†asya, pa†aß ca svagatarËpåde˙ [TarS §40]. In SAS,
however, the problem here is that atoms have no weight: kim ayaµ pratibandho'vayavigurutvasya, utåvayavagurutvasya? nådya˙, paramåˆugurutvasyaiva patanahetutvaprasaµgåt / tathå sati gurutvåt patanaµ dravatvåt syandanam iti
tattatkriyåvannish†hagurutvådikalpanåbhaµgåpåtanåc ca / ato 'tra varam avayavini
gurutvånupapattikalpanam / tatra cokto dosha˙ [218,4–8]; na tåvad avayavini gurutvaµ94

Furthermore, as to those which are made by combination of one long thread, thepractical usage of a word other than a thread would be denied, because there is not [thenon-inherent cause of a cloth, namely] the conjunction [of two threads].357 And there isno distinction between the notion of a cloth [in the course of weaving] which is madeout of threads including the second one up to the last but one358 and the notion of a[torn] cloth of threads other than threads taken away.359 You may hold that [each added
thread] produces [new] product, [namely another new cloth]; if it were so, you could not
accept the condition of a substance having two threads and so on if the first and thesecond thread are removed.360 [155]na jåyate; paramåˆugurutvaparißeshaprasaµgåt, tathå ca tvayånabhyupagamåt / ayukteßca, kåryagurutvåd eva hy aˆugurutvaµ kalpayasi [217,3–218,3].
357

In SAS, the same rejection is seen as the view of the opponent and rejected.
TMK I. 21b: vastre d¥rghaikatantubhramaˆaviracite vastudh¥r nåpi bådhyå. SAS: nanu
tantava eva vyatishaµgavißeshavißish†å˙ pa†a iti bhavatåµ råddhånta˙ “pa†avac ca”[BrSË II. i. 19] iti sËtre darßita˙; tathå sati d¥rghaikatantuparivartanavißeshanishpaådite
'vayavini kathaµ pa†abiddhi˙ syåt? anekatantusaµghåtåsiddher ity atråha: vastre iti / na
hi vayaµ tantugatam ekatvaµ dvitvabahutvådikaµ vå pa†adh¥nibandhanaµ niyacchåma˙;yathåd®sh†i (sarva-) sambhavåt / tvaµ tu svapakshadosham asmatpakshasthaµ manyase[230,8–231,8].
358

The same objection is seen in the Kiraˆåval¥ [Bhåvaprakåßå p.228 n.1].

359“In the procedure of making a big cloth, are new clothes such as that having
two threads successively produced each time a new thread such as the second one is
added, or not? In the first alternative, thousands of clothes would be cognized [in the
one big cloth]. It can not be said that the cloth with two threads is destroyed when thecloth with three threads is produced, because there is not any destroyer and destruction
without any reason is not appropriate. Therefore a series of clothes would be seen. In
the second alternative, knowledge of clothes which are born before the conjunction of
the last thread would be false. And there would not be a resulting of what is desired(ish†åpatti): knowledge of a cloth born in removing one thread or two also would be
false. And then there would not be a resulting of what is desired: those who hold that awhole is produced would also accept knowledge of a torn cloth is true because they
accept it is newly born” (R ≈ K). Cf. SAS I. 21a: p®thutarapa†anirmåˆakrame
dvitantukådipa†apaµktir utpadyate, na vå? na cet, buddhißabdåntarådir avasthåbhedåd
eveti siddhaµ syåt / utpadyate cet; tritantukådyårambhadaßåyåµ pËrvapËrvaµ tish†hati,na vå? pËrvatra tadanårambha˙; årabdhakåryais tadån¥m avayavyantarånårambhåt / na
ca dvitantukådis tantvantarasahitas tritantukådyåmbhaka iti yuktam, iha tantushu pa†aityådisvåbhimatavyavahåravirodhåt
/pËrvasiddhapa†aissårdhaµtantubhi˙pa†asambhave / pa†apaµkti˙ sam¥kshyeta kramåd ådhikyaßålin¥ // pråksiddhånåµpa†åd¥nåm uttarottarajanmani / ahetuko vinåßaß ca sthirapakshe na yujyate // na cet;upalambhaviruddhanåßasantatikalpanåprasaµga˙/evam
ekadvitryåditantvapakarshaˆadaßåyåm api khaˆ∂aparamparotpattinåßaparamparåk®pti˙k¬sh†atarå [227,7–228,7].
360“[Obj.]: A product is produced in the manner that a cloth having two threads
with another [third] thread produces a cloth having three threads, and so on. In thistheory, when some threads are removed, though clothes produced from each of thethreads are destroyed, the existence of another cloth not produced from them is not
obstructed. Therefore, the knowledge of a cloth would not be false. … [Ans.]: If the first
and the second threads are removed, the cloth having two threads which was produced

95

Concerning a pot and the like, we do not perceive a producing division [in alump of clay like a threads in a cloth]; hence, a division that you want is impossible.
And it is sublated by our experience361 and the ßrutis362.
Thus the whole is not accepted; accordingly, there is not the admixture of [various]
genera.
Even though it should be accepted, it could be explained [without the admixture]
as an image composed of fixed parts such as gold and silver, Gaˆeßa, [whose head is ofhuman beings but whose body is of elephant], and so on. According to our theory,
however, each element is fixed [as the substratum of its own genus] in a kind of
multitude. Even for those who accept the whole, many elements inevitably enter into
one multitude as the material cause and the efficient cause respectively [156]; andmutual admixture of genera or identity is not born in this case. Then, there is nodifference between two of us.
Besides, admixture of genera is not a defect like admixture of limiting adjuncts.
There is no regulating rule, without your prejudice, that entrance into one entity of two
limiting adjuncts which are mutually excluded in some things qualified (dharmin),363
such as being made and being limited, does not bring about over-application364 but sodoes [that] of two genera.
[Obj.] We always observe that two genera, excepting those which are in therelation that the one is pervaded by the other (paråparabhåva),365 cannot coexist: this is
the regulating rule.
[Ans.] Not so; because it is also possible for two limiting adjuncts such as being
blue and being yellow. It is seen in some cases, so is it in some kinds of genus. For
example, we see that being golden and being an earring, existing separately in a golden
first should be destroyed; when it is destroyed, another cloth [having three threads,
which was] produced from it, should be also destroyed; when it is destroyed, [anothercloth having four threads, which was] produced from it, should be also destroyed. In
this manner, till the destruction of the clothes, the knowledge of a cloth would be false”(K). Cf. SAS I. 21a: na ca dvitantukådis tantvantarasahitas tritantukådyåmbhaka iti
yuktam, iha tantushu pa†a ityådisvåbhimatavyavahåravirodhåt [227,11f.].
361

K).

“That which was a lump of clay the other day becomes a pot and so on” (R ≈362“våcårambhaˆaµ vikåro nåmadheyaµ m®ttikety eva satyam” [ChUp VI. i. 4].
The meaning of this passage is explained in detail in ÍBh II. i. 15 [252,1–10].
363

other.
364

Literally, two limiting adjuncts which exist by giving up the dharmi each

For example, mËrtatva exists in manas by giving up kåryatva, kåryatva exists
in color and the like by giving up mËrtatva; but both coexist in a pot and the like (R ≈

96bracelet and a silver earring, coexist in a golden earring; [157] and that being ga-soundand being in high pitch, [existing separately in high kha-sound and low ga-sound],coexist in high ga-sound. Still they are accepted as genus.
[Obj.] Then, any one of the two is denied to be genus. Or, two [independent]
genera, [e.g. being a golden-earring and being a silver-earring], which are manifested bya similar shape, [e.g. that of a earring], are assumed.
[Ans.] Such opinion is nothing but an attachment to the baby named yourconclusion. And such an attachment wants to eat [your conclusion], as a [hungry] cateats own kitten. For, if identical things were also recognized without sublation as beingof one and the same kind [based on the similarity of their shapes], genus itself would bedenied.366
Thus, it is proved that all individuals starting from the cosmic egg are composedof many principles.
For the detail of innumerableness of such cosmic eggs, configuration of particularworlds in them, their size, the difference in habitation of the protectors of the worlds,
time of their duration and so on, see astronomical texts, Puråˆas and so on.
The uneven creation of low and high beings from Brahmå up to a grass inaccordance with the degree of their experience of the fruits in the form of fixed time andplace is based on the degree of karma, flowing without beginning, of the multitude of
the individual selves, who are beginningless by nature [158]; therefore, there would not
be acquisition of what has not been done, the loss of what has been done,367 His
unevenness and cruelty368 and so on. Such defects, however, burst in the theory that theindividual selves [are not eternal but] remain till the dissolution and so on. Thus,
according to the degree of their merit and sin, some have superior body, indriyas,
knowledge, power and so on in the heaven and the like; some have inferior body and soon in the hell and the like due to the cause of miserable pain; some with mixed karma
have mixed moderate happiness and so on in the earth and the like.
1.9

On the body

1.9.1
K).

Its definition(158,5–180,4)(158,5–174,5)365vyåpyavyåpakabhåva (R ≈ K), such as the relation of gha†atva and p®thiv¥tva.

366

evopapattyå

gha†ådåv apy anugatavyavahårasya saµsthånasåd®ßyådjåtyasiddhir eva syåd iti, v®ddhim icchato mËlahåni˙ syåt (R, K).
367

Cf. VAS §71 and the note on it by van Buitenen.

97

1.9.1.1 The definition in the Ír¥bhåshya

(158,5–159,4)

In this occasion, common definition of the body is shown. The [Ír¥-]Bhåshya
says:*For a spiritual being, that substance which is capable of being completely [1]controlled and [2] supported for its own purpose, and which is [3] subordinate to
it by nature, is the body of that spiritual being (yasya cetanasya yad dravyaµsarvåtmanå

svårthe[1]niyantuµ[2]dhårayituµcaßakyaµ[3]taccheshataikasvarËpaµ ca tat tasya ßar¥ram) [Ír¥Bh II. i. 9; 222.11–223,1].
The intention of the author of the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya is: The word ‘body,’ whose denoting
function (v®tti) is, as that of words such as ‘cow,’ ‘pot,’ not fixed by the configurationand so on, cannot be fixed to some particular things; therefore, this very definition inagreement of all the usages is what is established in the ßrutis369 and inclusive one.370
Some371 interpreted this definition as one single unit; others as three [independent]
definitions: [(1) being controlled, (2) being supported and (3) being subordinate]. In theopinion that it is one single unit, what is excluded (vyavacchedya) is not acquired,[because each definition based on any one of the three is of the same scope372]. Stillsome hold that what is excluded is not settled in this definition [of the body], if it is one
single unite, as well as in the definition of Brahman that it is the cause of three, namely
the birth, [the preservation and the dissolution of the world] [159]; but that, [if only oneof the three is shown as the definition], the same questions may arise [in both cases, thatis, “Are there any other things that bring about the rest two373?”]. Such explanation,
however, is unfit for a logical text; accordingly the opinion that it is three is primary(mukhya). The venerable Bha††a-Paråßara also indicates the same opinion in the368

See BrSË II. i. 34: vaishamyanairgh®ˆye na såpekshatvåt tathå hi darßayati.

369“ya˙ p®thivyåµ tish†han … yasya p®thiv¥ ßar¥ram …” [B®hUp III. vii. 3–23]

etc.
370

In this regard, R and K refer to the passage of the Ír¥bhåshya: “[Not only insacred texts but] also in ordinary world, the word ‘body’ has not obtained, like words
such as ‘pot’, the function to denote substance of the same form, but is seen used in
non-secondary meaning (mukhya) to denote substances of completely different forms,
such as worms, insects, moths, snakes, human beings and animals. Therefore, we should
fix the cause of usage (prav®ttinimitta) of the word in agreement with all usages” [II. i.
9; 222,1–3].
371

See the Nayadyumaˆi of MeghanådårisËri (12 cent.), (MGOS 141, 1956). See
Hindi commentary in Varanasi ed., pp.194ff. fn.54.; BhËmikå by Viraraghavachari
p.28.
372

According to the Hindi commentary, ????

373

See ¥ßvara: 273,1–2.

98commentary on the two section concerning the Highest Self374:*Spiritual beings and non-spiritual beings are equally His body, because there isno difference among them in being pervaded by God, who controls them at His
free will. This is why a physical body is a body [Adhyåtmakhaˆ∂advayavivaraˆa].
In this way, only one [constituent, namely being controlled], is shown as the definition.
1.9.1.2 The first definition(160,1–162,5)

Thus, the three definitions are clear now.
The first definition is: For a spiritual being, that substance found in a certain
condition which, so long as it exists, unable not to be associated with the spiritual being,
and which, within its capacity, is to be controlled by nature is, in this condition, thebody of the spiritual being (yasya cetanasya yadavasthaµ dravyaµ yåvatsattam
asambandhånarhaµ svaßakye niyantavyasvabhåvaµ tadavasthaµ tasya ßar¥ram).
Here ‘spiritual being (cetana)’ means that which is qualified by spirituality(caitanya). Thereby spirituality is excluded from the body of its substratum.375‘Found in a certain condition’ is for the purpose of avoiding the partial
inapplicability of the definition (avyåpti), because the same thing in another condition,[for example, the body in the condition of ashes], is separated from [the spiritual
being].376‘Substance’ excludes action and so on.377‘So long as it exists’ and so on excludes [what is associated with a individual
self for a time] such as bodies of the others, the vital air, the organs and an axe from thebody of the individual self [161]. For vital air and so on, which are created separately,
exist before the formation of the body and is continuous even after its liberation till the
dissolution.
374

The work is quoted again named Adhyåtmakhaˆ∂advayavyåkhyå [258,10f.].
Oberhammer [1979: 217ff.] guesses that it is the commentary on the Subåla Upanishad.
But his discussion is not strong enough.
375

Accordingly, the dharmabhËtajñåna cannot be the body of its substratum, thej¥va, but is the body of God; the knowledge of God is nobody's body (R). Cf. ÍP on
cetanasya.
376

Cf. Ír¥Bh II. i. 9: “The dead body, beginning to collapse at the moment of theseparation from the individual being, the next moment has collapsed. The reason why it
is called ‘body’ is that it is in the same position where once the configuration assumed
as [the body] exists (m®taßar¥raµ ca cetanaviyogasamaya eva vißirtum årabdhaµkshaˆåntare viß¥ryate / pËrvaµ ßar¥ratayå parik¬ptasaµghåtaikadeßatvena ca tatraßar¥ratvavyavahåra˙).” [223,3–4] (K).
377

ådi denotes saµyoga (K).

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‘Within its capacity’ is for the purpose of avoiding the total inapplicability of thedefinition (asaµbhava). That is to say, the body of a man, an animal, a snake and thelike is not capable of flying in the sky, which can be done by the body of birds, but wecannot say they do not have the body only for this reason. Each capacity of these[bodies] can be judged from the consideration of coexistence and coabsence(anvayavyatireka) respectively.
[Obj.] The definition is inapplicable to a stone, a wood, a pot and the like even if
they become the bodies of individual selves378 because these former is not dependent
upon these latter.
[Ans.] This objection is set aside for that reason. For we ordinary men cannot
grasp a kind of very subtle controlling power [of them] as that of plants. It is true that
opening and closing the eyes are observed in some plants, but it is not universal. And
the sm®ti mentions that there is a little spirituality even in a stone, a wood and the like:*There is very subtle [power called knowing the body (kshetrajñasaµjñitå ßakti˙)]in non-livings; there is more [power] in plants [ViP VI. vii. 64].
According to the fourth definition mentioned later, however, there is no room for suchobjection.
And it does not mean controlling all time what is ‘within its capacity,’ because
on occasion we cannot [control] even [what is within its capacity] if we do not want to,[162] and because the effect cannot happen only due to the assistant not coming. For
example, it cannot be said that a group of seeds which are destroyed before sprouting
has not the capacity for sprouting.
‘To be controlled’ etc. excludes sickness and the like, which cannot be controlled.
For sickness and the like belong to a substance because they are composed of it and are
active within its capacity; [accordingly, without the word the definition would be applicableto them]. So are a body of the son, [which, so long as it exists as a body of the son,cannot help but being associated with the father's soul, and is active within its capacity
but is not always controlled], and the like.
The word ‘by nature’ prevents the partial inapplicability of the definition. For ahuman body and the like, though they are not controlled during sickness and so on, arebodies; we should know that being incapable of controlling at that time is due to some
limiting adjuncts.

378

For example, Ahalyå, who had an affair with Indra, became a stone by thecurse of his husband, Gotama. (According to Råmåyana I. 48–49, she became invisible).
The problem of the body in such case is dicussed in Ír¥Bh II. i. 9 [222,10]

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1.9.1.3 The second definition(162,6–163,1)

The second definition is: For a spiritual being, that substance found in a certain
condition which, so long as it exists, is to be supported is, in this condition, the body ofthe spiritual being (yasya cetanasya yadavasthaµ dravyaµ yåvatsattaµ dhåryaµtadavasthaµ tasya ßar¥ram). [163]
Bodies of the son and the like are excluded because they are not supported [bythe father] so long as they exist. The rest [should be taken] as in the previous one.
1.9.1.4 The third definition(163,1–165,1)

The third definition is: To a spiritual being, that substance found in a certain
condition which, so long as it exists, cannot be non-subordinate is, in this condition, thebody of the spiritual being (yasya cetanasya yadavasthaµ dravyaµ yåvatsattam
aßeshatånarhaµ tadavasthaµ tasya ßar¥ram) [164].
As in the previous ones, ‘cannot be non-subordinate’ excludes the son and so on;
because they can stop being subordinate to [the father] by a donation and the like, but
his body, even when he falls into a slave [165] and is subordinate to another person,
being subordinate to himself by birth cannot be stopped.
1.9.1.5 The fourth definition(165,1–166,4)

Here the forth definition, which is resulted from these three definitions and isintended by the author of the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya, is also mentioned: Of a spiritual being, that
substance found in a certain condition which is an inseparable attribute is the body of it(yasya cetanasya yadavastham ap®thaksiddhavißeshaˆaµ dravyaµ tat tasya ßar¥ram).
‘Inseparable’ means to be unable not to be associated, so long as one exists, with[the spiritual being]. Being supported, being controlled and being subordinate are intended
here as secondary varieties of being inseparable. What is excluded is clear enough.
Thereby, the following [objection] is also rejected. [166][Obj.] Is the criterion of the word379 (prav®ttinimitta) ‘body’ one of the three, or
all the three respectively, or the composite of the three? It is not the first, because it iscontradicted to the passage of the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya:379

The cause of using the word. “tasya bhåvas tva-taLau / ßabdasyaprav®ttinimittaµ bhåvaßabdenocyate” [Kåßikå ad Påˆini V. i. 119].
“prav®ttinimittalakshaˆam iti / prav®ttinimittaµ samudåyaßaktinimittaµ våcyabhËtam /tac ca lakshaˆam / tena vyutpattinimittabhËtasyopalakshaˆabhËtasya lakshaˆasya cavyåv®tti˙ / goßabdasya gamI-dhåtvartho vyutpattinimittam / p®thiv¥ßabadavåcyasyap®thiv¥tvasyopalakshaˆabhËtaµ gandhavattvam / tadubhayam api na prav®ttinimittam”[Írutaprakåßikå ad Ír¥Bh I. ii. 9; 222,19–22].

101*Being supported, being controlled and being subordinate are the criterions of
the word ‘body’ [Ír¥Bh I. ii. 2; 292,5–6].
Nor the second; because it is complicated, and the word would be polysemic. Nor thethird, because it is complicated. And there is unnaturalness in the opinion that the [threeare] independent definitions, [because the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya does not use ‘or’].
[Ans.] There is no defect, because being inseparable from a spiritual being,
which is indicated by the three, is the criterion of the word.
1.9.1.6 The accidental definition(166,5–168,1)
380

Or the accidental definition(ta†asthalakshaˆa) is: A body is a substance otherthan God and His knowledge (¥ßvaratajjñånavyatiriktaµ dravyaµ ßar¥ram).
In order to indicate that being a body is accompanied with the counter-relative
like being a father [167], and in order to indicate that secondary varieties such as beinga god, being a human being and having two legs are useless, the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya shows“For a spiritual being, that substance which” etc. In definition without showing thecounter-relative, a particular counter-relative is fixed according to means of valid
knowledge; as, speaking of the definitions of the Vaißeshika school, in the definitions ofrelative [categories] such as quality, generality, particularity, inherence and non-existence
without showing the relative, for example:*Quality is, being other than action, what is the substratum of genus alone.381*Generality is what is one, eternal and inherent to many382 [168].
*Particularity is, not being genus, what exists in one.383*Inherence is what is related forever.384 [169]1.9.1.7 The definitions of the NyåyasËtra criticized(169,1–174,2)

380

Definition is classified into essential one (svarËpalakshaˆa) and accidental
one (ta†asthala°). For example, ‘satyaµ jñånam anantaµ brahma’ is the former definitionof braham; the latter is ‘yato vå imåni’ etc. [NKoßa q.v.]. “ta†asthalakshaˆam iti /ßar¥raßabdaprav®ttinimittatvaßËnya˙ßar¥ravyavahåravishayatåjñåpaka˙ßar¥råsådhåraˆadharma ity artha˙” (K).
381karmånyatve sati jåtimåtråßrayo
dravyakarmabhinnatve sati såmånyavån guˆa˙.

guˆa˙.

Cf.

Tarkad¥pikå

§4:

382

nityam ekam anekasamavåyi såmånyam. Cf. Tarkasaµgraha §77: nityam ekamanekånugataµ såmånyam (= Tarkabhåshå); Tårkikarakshå v. 53: såmånyaµ nityam
ekaµ syåd anekasamavåyi ca.
383ßishyate.
384ajåtir ekav®ttir vißesha˙. Cf. Tårkikarakshå v. 53: ajåtir ekav®ttiß ca vißesha iti
nityasambaddha˙ samavåya˙ = Tarkasaµgraha §79.

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Another school, however, says in their sËtra:*Body is the substratum of activity, sense organs, and enjoyment [NyåyasËtra I.
i. 10].
Here the first definition is: body is, [qualified by] being a final whole (antyåvayavain),385
the substratum of activity. The [rest] two are: body is, qualified by that, the substratumof sense organs and the locus of enjoyment [respectively].
Among them, if the word ‘activity (cesh†å)’ means movement (kriyå) in general,
the over-applicability [to a pot and so on] is apparent. If it means movement the noninherent cause of which is conjunction with the self possessing volition (prayatna), thedefinition is over-applicable to the earth, a mountain and so on, though you do not
accept them as His bodies, which are the substratum of movement [such as earthquake]the non-inherent cause of which is conjunction with God possessing volition. If theattribute “the individual self possessing volition” is added, still the definition is overapplicable to the vital air and the like. Even if the attribute “conscious (buddhipËrvaka)
volition” is added, the definition is still over-applicable to the same when one consciously
exhales or inhales.
[Obj.] Air and so on are not a final whole.
[Ans.] What is so then?
[Obj.] A pot and so on.
[Ans.] They cannot be so in making a wall out of many pots, a garment out ofmany clothes and so on.
[Obj.] In these cases, there is not production of them.
[Ans.] Even in other cases, there is not [170]. That is true.
[Obj.] Let it be that a pot and so on are a middle whole then.
[Ans.] It is not true. Because anything could be so, the concept of a final whole
becomes [unreal] like a bud in ether. Accordingly, the definition qualified by it is very
nice!
[Concerning the second definition], being the substratum of sense organs shouldmean being inherent to them or being conjunct with them. But it is not the former,
because it is not accepted and parts of sense organs, according to your theory, would bebodies. Nor the latter, because it is possible even in a pot and so on [when one seesthem].
[Obj.] Conjunction as long as it exists is meant.
[Ans.] It is also untrue. For there is over-application to a bubble and the like
385

dravyånårambhakatve sati kåryadravyatvam [Nyåyakoßa].

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being born and destroyed while a person observes them without winking; and, according
to the theory that the mind is eternal, there is over-application to the self; moreover,they accept a dead body as a body.
[Obj.] That all parts of which are conjunct with sense organs is a body.
[Ans.] It is not true, because you also should accept that there is no conjunction
in all parts between the two limited things, namely, a body and a sense organ due to thecontradiction by crashing each other [171], and because it is established by means ofvalid knowledge that there are particular parts without any sense organ inside a body.
[Obj.] A place where many sense organs exists simultaneously is a body.
[Ans.] Not so; because, if ‘exist’ means conjunction in general, [all-pervading
substances such as] ether and also God would be our body, and because, if it means
inseparable relation, God would be [our] body according to our theory. If it means‘enlarge their power (upash†ambhaka386)’, the definition would be over-applicable tovital air.
[Obj.] Body is that which cannot be non-conjunct with sense organs so far as itexists [172].
[Ans.] The answer to it also has already been given [that a dead body is not so].
And it is unavoidable that the definition would be over-applicable to God and [the mind
according to your theory].
[Obj.] Body is that which is other than a sense organ [and] has activity, cessation
etc. based on the function of vital air.
[Ans.] No, because the self and the impurity and the like would be so.
[Obj.] That means being dependent on [vital air] in all activities [173].
[Ans.] It is not right, because the definition would be totally inapplicable(asambhava). That is, activity of a body carried away by wind is not dependent on thevital air.
[As for the third definition] also, if ‘the locus of enjoyment’ means the place ofenjoyment in general, the definition would be over-applicable to a house and so on.
[Obj.] ‘The locus of enjoyment’ means that depending upon which the self
experiences enjoyment.
[Ans.] Not so, because the definition would be totally inapplicable according to
our theory. That is, it is accepted that a liberated person, though without the body, has
386

indriyåˆåµsvasvakåryajananasåmarthyåpådakatvam
indriyaupash†ambhkatvam (R). This is based on the passage of the Nyåyabhåshya I. i. 10:yasyånugraheˆånug®hitåny upaghåte copahatåni sådhvasådhushu pravartante, sa
indriyåßraya˙ (Viraraghavachari fn. 1).

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particular enjoyment.
[Obj.] Enjoyment composed of misery is intended here.
[Ans.] Still the definition would be over-applicable to the sense organs. And thedefinition would be partially inapplicable to a body gained by God or a liberated person
and the like at will.
[Obj.] [A body is] the substratum of enjoyment caused by the mistake, [namely,that which are misunderstood as the substratum of enjoyment].
[Ans.] It is not also true [174]; because the definition would be over-applicable
to sense organs, mind and vital air, which are thought [by mistake] as the self by various
schools, and because it would be partially inapplicable to a body of God or a liberated
person and the like.
1.9.1.8 The other definitions criticized(174,2–5)[Obj.] A body is that which is composed of the head, the hand, the leg and so on.
[Ans.] It is possible even in the case of a sculpture.
[Obj.] [Let us add] ‘having vital air and the like’ [to the definition].
[Ans.] Still it is not right, because the definition would be partially inapplicable
to a dead body and the like.
[Obj.] It means only being associated with vital air and the like at times.
[Ans.] Still the definition would be partially inapplicable to the body of a plant
and the like, because they, though having vital air and the like, do not have the configurationof the hands, the legs and so on.
In the same way, other definitions also can be rejected. Only what has been
mentioned in accordance with ßrutis and other [scriptures] is the definition of it.
1.9.2

Classification of the body(174,6–178,1)

That very body is of two kinds: eternal one and non-eternal one. Of these, theeternal is the body of God composed of substance made up of three guˆas, time, theindividual self, auspicious locus387 [or His figure as Våsudeva] and so on. And eternal[sages388] have the natural forms of Garu∂a, Íesha and so on. The non-eternal is of two
kinds: that which is not made by karma and that which is made by karma [175]. The
former is of God in the forms of mahat and so on. So are the forms of Ananta, Garu∂aetc. and those who are liberated, which are made at will. That which is made by karma
387ßubhåßraya. See ViP VI. vii. 70f. and 76, quoted in R and K.

388

nityasËriˆåm in YMD IV. 55.

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is also of two kinds: that which is made by karma with the help of one's own will andthat which is made purely by karma. The former is of great [sages] such as Saubhari,[who controlled many bodies at once]; the latter is of other insignificant beings.
Again, the body is of two kinds in general: movable one and immovable one.
A wood etc. and a stone etc. are immovable ones; for example, those of a tree, ashrub, a creeper (latå), a spreading creeper (v¥rudh) and a grass, which are called tamas,moha, mahåmoha, tåmisra, andhatåmisra [176] [respectively]. 389 It is established by theßrutis which refer to the case of Ahalyå that there are individual selves having evenstone and the like as the bodies. Furthermore, the Vedårthasaµgraha says:*Therefore, all words which are known as having denoting power due to theconnection of the stem and an affix , e.g. god, man, yaksha, råkshasa, …, bird,
tree, creeper, wood, stone, grass, pot, cloth etc., denote, through the entities
having their own configurations which are commonly known as denoted by thewords, the individual selves presiding them and the Supreme Self, who is theinner-controller of them, finally [VAS §17; 87,3–6].
And it is said based on the authority of the ßrutis mentioning that all names and forms
after the individualization are entered by the individual selves. Moreover, on [the verse]:*Those who are characterized by tamas, abiding in the activities of the worst
guˆa, go downwards [BhG XIV. 18],
the Ír¥mat-G¥tåbhåshya comments as follows:*Those who are characterized by tamas, however, abiding in the activities of theworst guˆa — abiding in the activities of the guˆa called tamas, which become
increasingly worse, go downwards — attain the lowest state [of human beings],
then the state of animals, then birth as worms, insects and the like, then the stateof plants (sthåvara), then the state of shrubs and creepers, and finally the state ofstones, wood, clod, grass390 etc. [GBh XIV. 18; 468,1–4]
It should be known that the word sthåvara here denotes [not plant in general including a
shrub etc. but], as in the case of go (cattle in general or cow) and val¥vardha (bull), a
particular [plant] called sthåvara such as a tree.
The movable one is of four kinds: god, human being, animal and hellish being(nårayika). Asuras, yakshas, råkshasas and the like are also sprung from gods. Bråhmaˆas,
Kshatriyas, Vaißyas, ÍËdras and so on living in the bhËloka are sprung from human389

See ViP I. v. 5–6. Tamas etc. are mentined in the Såµkhyakårikå 48 as thefive variations of vaiparyaya.
390t®ˆa is omitted in the Nyåyasiddhåñjana (U adds it in parenthesis).

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beings. By the way, they are subject to the injunctions and the prohibitions mentioned inthe ßrutis and the sm®tis; so are gods and the like, because their expiration, sacrifice,penance, observance, knowledge of Brahman and so on are stated in the ßrutis. Beasts,
birds, reptiles and so on are sprung from animals. Hellish beings have bodies in whichmisery alone exists and which are hard to abandon in Raurava391 and other [hells].
Again the movable one is of two kinds: viviparous (yonija) and non-viviparous.
This [classification] is possible in all the three [movable ones] beginning with gods. For
being born from sweat and so on are seen in Prajåpati, [born from the lotus of God's
navel], Madhu and Kaiya†a, [born at God's will only], Dh®sh†adyumna, [born from fire],Airåvata, [born from milky ocean]. In the two, only the viviparous one needs the fifth
offering, [namely, the sexual intercourse].392 Before reaching the womb, he is merely
conjunct with others' bodies, namely, ether, wind, smoke, mist, cloud, rain, rice and thatof one who discharges the semen.393 [177] Among them, before reaching rice and thelike, he can quickly exit them. After that, it takes long time to exit.394 Concerning one
who is offered to the fifth fire called woman, following the sky, rain, the earth andman,395 his particular changes fixed in each time and so on are clearly determined in the
texts of the Óyurveda or yoga.396 It is in them that the mode of the production of sevenconstituent elements (dhåtu) [of the body] from semen and [menstrual] blood,397 thedetail of windy humor, bile, phlegm and so on, which are fixed in accordance with thestate of the original and the variation, [178] particular tubes and other [organs] and theirchange etc. are determined.
Similarly the distinction between womb-born, egg-born, sprouting-born and sweatborn also can be understood.
391

One of the twenty-one hells. See YMD IV. 28.

392

See ChUp V. iii. 3, ix. 1 and BrSË III. i. 1.

393

See ChUp V. x. 5–6 and BrSË III. i. 22, 24, 26.

394

See ChUp V. x. 6 and BrSË III. i. 23. The word durnishprapatara used here isa vedic form: durnishprapataram iti chåndasa˙ taßabdalopa˙; durnishprapatataram,
du˙khanishkramaˆataram ity artha˙ [Ír¥Bh III. i. 23; 422,6–7].
395

According to the pañcågnividyå, the soul of a dead person first reaches loka
(dyu in NySi), then parjanya, then p®thiv¥, then purusha, then yoshå, and gets rebirth.
See ChUp V. iv–viii.
396
397

On this point, R and K quote GarbhaUp 2–3.

According to GarbhaUp 2, (quoted in R), the order is: from chyle (rasa) blood(ßoˆita) is produced, from blood flesh (måsa), from flesh fat (medas), from fat bones(asthi), from bones marrow (majjå), from marrow semen (ßukla), and from the combinationof the blood and the semen, an embryo.

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1.9.3

The body-relation as to the non-spritual and God(178,2–179,9)

According to one tradition, it is directly and indirectly that the bodies of theindividual selves after the individualization become the bodies of God. Only indirectly,
according to the other.
The first opinion has been suggested by the usages398 of the author of the[Ír¥-]Bhåshya repeatedly. And also in the Tattvaratnåkara, the same [opinion] is supported,because [the author] says as follows:*Spiritual beings and non-spiritual beings are equally His body [Tattvaratnåkara],and so on.399
The second opinion, however, are accepted by the author of the Vivaraˆa [ad theÍr¥bhåshya]. That is, in the ›a∂arthasaµkshepa [of the same author], he brings forth thefollowing question — Because non-spiritual being is the body of [both] the individual
self and God, the knowledge born from the word denoting it terminates in both; andbecause both are independently manifest, there would be double manifestation. And heanswers:*Not so, because non-spiritual being becomes the body of Brahman [only] throughthe individual self [›a∂arthasaµkshepa].
Also in the Vivaraˆa, the same import is detailed.
This controversy is relative to bodies after the individualization such as those ofgods or human beings, because for His divine and auspicious body and the like, thoughnon-spiritual, the indirectness is impossible. For even the Vivaraˆa states, in order toavoid the contradiction that tamas and so on are also said to be His body,400 that theentities in the general creation are directly bodies of the Supreme as follows:*In the primitive creation, however, [Vivaraˆa]and so on. It is only in the distinction of names and forms such as god and human being
immediately following the creation of fire, water and earth that there is the indirectness
based on the ßruti passage:*By means of this individual self [ChUp VI. iii. 2]
and so on [179].
398“j¥vadvårå paramåtmani paryavasyanti” and “cidacito˙ paramåtmaßar¥ratvåt”(R, K). Cf. Ír¥Bh I. i. 1, p. 235 [Melkote ed.].
399

The same passage
Adhyåtmakhaˆ∂advayavivaraˆa.
400

7].

was

quotedin

159,3f.

as

of

the

I.e. yasya tama˙ ßar¥ram [B®hUp III. vii. 13]; yasyåksharaµ ßar¥ram [SubålaUp

108

Even after that, being His body directly and being His body indirectly [at thesame time] are not contradictory at all. That [the knowledge born from the word denoting
a non-spiritual being] terminates in both is also avoided, because the distinction of theapplication is fixed based on the speciality [that the individual self is manifest not as anindependent entity but as an inseparable attribute of God]. For that reason, there is notdouble manifestation. Moreover, it is not improper that one is the body of many at thesame time; because it is proper in applying the definition [of body], like being subordinate
to many etc. And substance composed of the three guˆas, being [His] body by itself as
the individual self is, does not lose its being the body of God just because it is in thestate of a particular combination entered by the individual self. And it does not become
another substance; because substance is not different, and because God is the innercontroller for separated elements and [indriyas] such as touch.401 And for this reason,
they are mentioned as body of God [directly] in the ßrutis. And in the [unconscious]
condition such as deep sleep and a faint, it is observed that a body and one who
possesses the body are controlled by God only, which is inherent for them. Accordingly,
this direct control would not be possible according to the [second] opinion. And mere
existence of the individual self does not bring about the control of the body; because it,
devoid of knowledge and will at that condition, is same as ether. Therefore, all substancesin every condition are by themselves the bodies of God only; their being the bodies of
the individual selves is caused by their karma. Thus, this way, [namely, the first opinion],proves to be better. [180]1.10

Postccript(180,1–7)(17)

May I know the figure named non-knowledge, spotted with black, red andwhite,402 [namely, substance composed of sattva, rajas and tamas], belonging to Vishˆuaccompanied with Ír¥; which is a veil covering the self, the locus of His sports at will,
His companion at night without any activity, [i.e., the dissolution], sleep of the non-sleeping
Self, and His peacock weather in arranging the net of the great Indra, [i.e. His trick],from Brahmå up to plants.
Here ends the first section on substance in the Nyåyasiddhåñjana composed byÍr¥mat-Veµka†anåtha or Vedåntåcårya, who is the lion among poets and logicians401ya˙ sarveshu bhËteshu tish†han … [B®hUp III. vii. 15]; yas tvaci tish†han …

402

See ÍveUp IV. 5: ajåm ekåµ lohitaßuklak®shˆåµ …

[21].

109

and who masters all branches of arts.

110

The Chapter 2 The Self
2.1

Its definition (181,2)
Now the individual self [is explained].
The definition is: It is, while being of minute size, a knower (jñåt®); it is, while

being subordinate to [God], a knower, etc.

2.2

The self is different from the body etc.

2.2.1

The self is not the body(181,3–184,3)First,403 such [individual self as spiritual being] is not the body. For we canassume that the spirituality exists neither in each part [of the body], nor in their combination,nor [in the whole distinct from its components]. [The first alternative] would bringabout the undesirable conclusion that [different parts] have different intensions as in thecase of different bodies.404 [182] Moreover, we have the notion of the difference [between‘I’ and the body or each of its parts], i.e. “[this is not I but] mine”; [accordingly all thealternatives are rejected].405 [The second alternative would bring about the undesirable
conclusion that the individual self is non-spiritual like a pot] for the reason that it is acombination, [that it has color or that it is grasped by an external organ].406 [The third
alternative is also incorrect] because the whole has been already rejected.407 Even if itshould be established, its quality would be accordant with the quality of its causes408,[namely, its components; accordingly, the above-mentioned defects as to the first403

Deßika follows the order of Yåmunåcårya's Ótmasiddhi: dehendriyamana˙pråˆadh¥bhyo 'nya 'nanyasådhana˙ [v. 3; 10,4].
404

Cf. ÓS 11,8f.: pratyekaµ paramåˆushu caitanyånupalabdhe˙ tadabbhyupagame
caikaßar¥ra evånekasahasracetanåpåtåt.
405

Cf. ÓS 12,17–13,3.

406

Cf. ÓS 16,16.

407

See 150,7–155,2. According to K, “it is rejected even by you (the Cårvåka)”;see ÓS 11,13ff.
408

Cf.
ÓS
11,9:
vißeshaguˆasyåsambhavåt; 15,9f.

akåraˆaguˆapËrvakasyakåryadravyavartino

111

alternative could not be avoidable] [183]. Even if a special change, [namely, an accidental
quality of spirituality], like a baked-born (påkaja) attribute,409 should be admitted [in thewhole], it would be impossible to avoid the undesirable conclusion that each component
part has [its own] spirituality, [as a new color of a baked pot is seen in its parts]. For thesame reason, the incoherent speech [of the Cårvåka school],*From those [four elements combined together to form the body], the spirituality[is produced], as intoxicating power [is produced] from a Kiˆva seed 410 and soon [mixed together to make an alcoholic drink]411 [CårvåkasËtra ],is rejected, because in the combination each part [inevitably] has the intoxicating power
as well as a particular taste [of the drink].412[Obj.] Then, let it be that a particular part of elements, quickly moving [aroundwhole the body] or staying [in a certain place of the body], becomes the knower [184].
[Ans.] If you say so, our opinion based on the Vedic authority [that the self
exists and is different from the body] is admitted in a different way. For, once somethingother than a mass called body is admitted, it is effortless to avoid the theory that it isnon-eternal and so on.
Some hold that its difference from the body can be proved only through thescriptures, as is said in the Ótmasiddhi:*Those who follow the ßrutis do not have confidence even in inferential proof ofthe self but accept that based on the ßrutis413 only [ÓS 53,15]. [186]409This supposes the following objectin: according to the p¥lupåka-theory, thebaked-born quality of the whole is always follows the quality of its cause, an atom;
according to the pi†harapåka-theory, however, it is newly born without any relation to
its parts. See Tarkad¥pikå §23: paramåˆushv eva påka˙, na dvyaˆukådau;åmapåkanikshipte gha†e paramåˆushu rËpåntarotpattau ßyåmagha†anåße punar
dvyaˆukådikrameˆa raktagha†otpatti˙ … iti p¥lupåkavådino vaißeshikå˙ / pËrvagha†asyavinåßaµ vinâivå'vayaviny avayaveshu paramåˆuparyanteshu ca yugapad rËpåntarotpattir
iti pi†harapåkavådino naiyåyikå˙.
410

kiˆvam aµkura˙ suråb¥ja˙ [fn. 4 ad ÓS p.12].

411

See BårhaspatyasËtra quoted in Ótmasiddhi 12,14f. and 15,12f.: ‘p®thivy åpastejo våyur iti tattvåni, tebhyaß caitanyaµ kiˆvådibhyo madaßaktivat.’ Cf.
Sarvadarßanasaµgraha on the cårvåka : p®thivyåd¥ni bhËtåni catvåri tattvåni / tebhya
eva dehåkårapariˆatebhya˙ kiˆvådibhya˙ madaßaktivac caitanyam upajåyate [Cowell's
ed. p.3].
412

The translation follows the interpretation of K. ÓS 15,12ff. shows anotherreason to refute this opinion of the Cårvåka.
413

In this regard, Yåmunåcårya quotes B®hUp III. ix. 26 etc. (neti neti), ÁßaUp 8,

112

2.2.2

The self is not the external organs(186,1–6)

Nor is it the external organs; for their mutual agreement cannot be fixed because
they are many, and that recollection of the object mutually perceived, [e.g., “What I
touch now is what I saw the other day”], would be impossible because each scope ofthem is limited414 etc. Nor one of them, because nothing decides it. Nor the combinationof them, because there is not the notion “I am a combination,” and because finally weshould conclude that [each] combined [organ has spirituality]. And the fact that those
who sleep and whose external organs are ceased see themselves the form of a tiger etc.
[in their dream] also clearly shows that the self is different from the external organs andthe body. Accordingly, the knowledge, when the organs are perfect or imperfect, “I amperfect” or “I am imperfect” is caused by our delusion. Or this knowledge means being
qualified by [such organs].
2.2.3

The self is not the mind

(186,6–187,1)

Nor is it the mind. For it is established by the ßrutis415 and the inference416 as
merely an instrument of the self, which is doer. And it is said to be produced fromahaµkåra by the ßrutis417 [187].
2.2.4

The self is not the vital air(187,1)

Nor is it the vital airs, because the [above-mentioned] reductio ad absurdum(yukti) as to [the theory that] body [is the self] is equally applicable to them.
2.2.5

The self is not the pure knowledge(187,2–194,2)

2.2.5.1 The self is not the mere knowledge but the knower (187,2–188,2)
Nor is it the knowledge (dh¥). For, if it were so, the recollection “I, [enjoying
happiness now], am that [who was in pain the other day]” would be impossible becauseKa†haUp V. 7, BhG II. 20, ChUp VI. xi. 3, VIII. xii. 1 [54,2ff.].
414

Cf. ÓS 17,8–11: kiµ pratyekam indriyåˆi cetanåni, saµbhËya vå? yadi
pratyekam, indriyåntaras®sh†asyendriyåntareˆa pratisandhånaµ na syåt; asti ca tat: yamaham adråkshaµ tam ahaµ sp®ßåmîti / ata eva na sambhËyåpi cetanatvam; na hi pañcabhirindriyai˙ saµbhËyaikaµ vastv anubhËyate, anusandh¥yate vå.
415

E.g. manaså hy eva paßyati [MaitråyaˆiUp VI. 30].

416

sukhådiprat¥ti˙ sakaraˆikå kriyåtvåt (R).

417

E.g. ekådaßa manaß cåtra devå vaikårikå sm®tå˙ [ViP I. ii. 47cd].

113[the knowledge] appears to be the quality of the knower and perishable. And such
recollection is not delusion because nothing can sublate it. The reasons [maintained by
the Buddhists] in order to prove the momentary destruction (kshaˆabhaµga) has been
already rejected.418 Without the eternal self as the substratum of the latent impression(saµskåra), the recollection as to the self, even if it were delusion, [188] recognition of
one object and, moreover, mere memory would not be possible at all. For the same
reason, the means [for the liberation], the experience of its fruits and the like also would
be hardly brought about.
2.2.5.2 Yogåcåra theory criticized(188,3–190,3)

Some [Buddhists] assert:*In whatever series (santåna) the latent impression (våsanå) of one's karma isput, its fruit bears only in the same [series], as the redness in cotton [is caused bylatent impression in its seed]419 [189];
but this is also incorrect. For some imperishable parts which support the latent impression[in the seed] endure in this [cotton]. Concerning all momentary existents (kshaˆa)420 in
the world, which are destroyed absolutely421 [in every moment], it cannot be said thatthe series is same or different. For whatever momentary existent born [in a certain
series] is, without distinction, subsequent to all destroyed momentary existents [including
those which are thought as belonging to another series]. [You may say that a momentary
existent in a certain position can give its latent impression only to the next momentary
existent in the same position, but] the identity of the position cannot be establishedbecause a particular position is also momentary. For the same reason, the difference in aseries

of
418

the

mind-consciousness(cittavijñåna)

and

the

store-consciousness

16,3–37,3.

419

This verse is quoted in Prajñåkaramati's Pañjikå ad Íåntideva'sBodhicaryåvatåra IX. 73cd (Bauddha Bharati Ser. 21, Varanasi, 1988, p.340). In SDS
III, 18ff., it is followed by the verse that: kusume b¥japËråder yal låkshådy avasicyate /ßaktir ådh¥yate tatra kåcit tåµ kiµ na paßyasi //. See below 506,7f. See also ÍD XVII
(90,5), where this verse is criticized by the Advaitins who maintan that d®gd®ßyasambandha
is impossible.
420

bauddhamate
vastuta˙kålasyåbhåvåt,gha†åderevaudyata˙svarasabhaµguratayå kshaˆakalpanånimittatayå, kshaˆyate hiµsyate iti vyutapattyå cagha†åder eva tanmate kshaˆatvena vyapadeßa˙ (R ≈ K).
421

niranvayavinåßa: destruction of the dharmin itself as well as the dharmas.

114(ålayavijñåna)422 [190] is also rejected. Therefore, what they say:*Though the knowledge itself has no division, those who have inverted perception
observe as if it had the difference: the knowing subject, the known object andthe knowledge423 [Pramåˆavårttika III (pratyaksha). 354],
decides that they themselves have inverted perception.
2.2.5.3 Advaita theory criticized: The self is the knower(190,4–191,3)

In this way, the established opinion of the pseudo-Buddhist Vedånta school,[namely the Advaita school], is also overcome. For424 the mere consciousness (jñapti),[not the knower and not eternal], cannot be the object of the I-notion; even if it isadmitted to be permanent, the conscious agent (anubhavit®) is postulated for the recollection
and the like, if they were of delusion425; if being the knower were brought about byanother delusion, there would be infinite regress.
[Obj.] The infinite regress as to causes is not defect [like a seed and a sprout].
[Ans.] Not so. For, [if infinite regress were not defect at all], you should abandon
your theory that ignorance is beginnings and that its substratum is real, [which you
maintain in order to avoid the infinite regress in case the former had beginning and thelatter were unreal], because defect and its substratum as such would be possible in any
case.
422

The commentators quotes the following verse: tat syåd ålayavijñånaµ yad
bhaved ahamåspadam / tat syådd hi cittavijñånaµ yan n¥lådikam ullikhet // The sameverse is quoted in Sarvadarßanasaµgrha chap. 2 (on the Buddhism), Cowell's ed. 38(with some variants: prav®ttivijñåna for citta°).
423

avibhågo
'pibuddhyåtmå
viparyåsitadarßanai˙/gråhyagråhakasaµvittibhedavån iva lakshyate // [= Pramåˆavinißcaya I. 45; Miyasaka's
critical edition of the Pramåˆavårttika (Acta Indologica 2, 1971-72) reads:
buddhyåtmaviparyåsita°]. This verse is quoted in Ótmasiddhi 25,3f., and also in many
works; cf. Nakamura: WZKSO 12-13 (1968), 242.
424

The following translation is based on the second interpretation of R. According
to the first interpretation, the translation is: “the mere consciousness, even if it isadmitted to be permanent, cannot be the object of the I-notion [because it is not thesubstratum of an object]; the conscious agent (anubhavit®) [as the substratum] is postulated
for the recollection and the like, even if they were of delusin [and were not a real
object]” etc.
425

In this regard, R quotes the passage of ÍBh: “If the consciousness wereadmitted to be the self, though it is permanent, there would be the same impossibility ofrecollection; because recollection proves the conscious agent continuous from the earlier
time to the later time, but not mere consciousness (anibhËter åtmatvåbhyupagame tasyå
nityatve 'pi pratisaµdhånåsambhavas tadavastha˙; pratisaµdhånaµ hi pËrvåparakåla-115

2.2.5.4 The reflection-theory criticized(191,3–194,2)

Nevertheless the same [Advaita school] [192], joined with the Såµkhya school,states as follows426:
As (a) a mirror [reflecting] a face [appears to be the substratum of the face],(b) an iron ball [associated with fire appears to be the substratum of the] hotness or(c) the palm [manifesting the sunbeam through a small hole in a dark room appears tobe the substratum of] the solar ray, so (a) reflection of (or on) the consciousness(cicchåyåpatti), (b) association with it or (c) manifestation of it causes the delusion that[the internal organ is] the substratum of it; accordingly, the internal organ [appears to]be the knower.
[Ans.] [Concerning (a)], if the literal meaning is intended, how is the reflection
possible between the invisible reflected object, [the consciousness], and the invisible
substratum of it, [the internal organ]427?
[Obj.] This is secondary usage meaning mere superimposition.
[Ans.] Where and of what? [That is, which is meant by ‘cicchåyåpatti,’ thereflection of the consciousness or the reflection on it?][Obj.] The consciousness is [superimposed] on the internal organ.
[Ans.] If it were so, the consciousness itself would be unreal, because it issuperimposed; {even if non-superimposed consciousness itself existed], the consciousness
not resting on [the internal organ] would be like fragrance of a sky-flower [because allknowledge is based on the I-notion].
[Obj.] The internal organ [is superimposed] in the consciousness, then.
[Ans.] If it were the case, there would be the delusion that the knowledge is thesubstratum of the internal organ, [193] but not the delusion that the internal organ is theknower; such delusion can never be seen.
Moreover, [as to (b)], if there were the association [between the consciousnesssthåyinam anubhavitåram upasthåpayati, nånubhËtimåtram)” [I. i. 1; I (1) 146,2f.] (≈ ÓS
32,11f.).
426

Cf. ÓS 34f. and ÍBh I. i. 1, (1) 161f.

427

Cf. n¥rËpe binbitatvaµ kva nu bhavti kathaµ rËpaßËnyasya tat syåt [TMK II.

116

and the internal organ], how do you, who do not accept the knower-ness as reallyexisting in the two like the hotness [existing in both the iron and fire], explain the
superimposition of it?
[Obj.] As we see in ordinary life that being dharma and being dharmin [aresuperimposed in a pot and its color etc.], such superimposition in [the consciousness
and the internal organ] causes the delusion as to being knower.
[Ans.] Because there is no criterion to decide in which being dharma is imposed
and in which being dharmin is imposed, the situation would be reversible: [not only
apprehension “I know (or I am the substratum of the knowledge)” but also apprehension“The knowledge is the substratum of I-notion” would be possible].
[Obj.] In one [of the two, i.e. the internal organ], we cannot grasp the distinction
from the dharmin; in the other, [i.e. the consciousness], we cannot grasp the distinction
from the dharma. These facts are the criterions.
[Ans.] Not so. For you cannot accept that the knowledge (jñapti), which illuminates
itself, has ungrasped distinctions other than itself; or if you should accept the distinctions,
you could not avoid the undesirable conclusion that [the knowledge or the self, which
has no speciality according to you], has some dharmas.
The opinion that (c) [the consciousness] is manifested by the internal organ(ahaµkåra) is also rejected for the very reason that [the knowledge, illuminating itself],cannot grasp no distinction, as is said by the Venerable Yåmuna-muni:*That the internal organ (ahaµkåra), which is insentient in nature, manifests theself, which illuminates itself, is as illogical as that a spent coal [manifests] thesun.428 [ÓS 35,13–14] [194]*And mutual manifesting and being manifested [between the internal organ andthe self] is impossible because they are opposite in nature. If the self weremanifested, it would lose its consciousness like a pot [ÓS 36,1–2].429
Therefore it is proved that the self is the knower and is the object of the I-notion.

71a].
428

This is to reject the opinion of Sureßvara, the Naishkarmyasiddhi II. 32.

117

2.3

The self is the object of ‘I’

2.3.1

The proof by means of perception(194,2–197,3)(194,2–195,2)

Furthermore,(28)

The self is the object of ‘I’ and is permanent. For it is inward [or it illuminates

for itself430]; it is experienced [that “I am the knower”]; desire for the liberation is in theform “there will be my happiness”; passages of Vedas431 mentioning [‘I’] regarding
liberated one 432, Brahman433 and one who intends to be liberated434; [as to a deep sleep]
there is the usage “I slept,” [which would be impossible if the internal organ were theobject of ‘I’ because its function stops at that time]; [195] [the usage] “I did not knowme [during a deep sleep]” is also merely based on the fact that there is not the knowledge
regarding one's own body [at that time]; and one remembers what he did before thesleep.
2.3.2

Advaitin's counter-inferences criticized(195,2–196,3)[Obj.] The self is not within the scope of the I-notion; because it is the self,
because it is immaterial, because it has no change, etc.
[Ans.] These [reasons] are rejected by force of our perception and the scriptures[we have pointed out immediately before]. And they are uncommon straying reasons(asådhåraˆa-anaikåntika) [because they are present only in the subject but not in any
similar example such as a pot]. [The same reasons] used to deny that the self is theknower or that it is the doer can be dealt with in the same way.
429

These two verses are also quoted in ÍBh [I. i. 1; (1) 162,3 & 7f.].

430

See the definition of pratyak [38,3].

431

According to the first interpretation of R, this compound means “due to thepassages regarding liberated one, Brahaman, one who intends to be liberated and the
Veda.” In this case the passage regarding the Veda are: “aham evådhaståd … ahaµpuraståt” [ChUp VII. xxv. 1], “tad åtmånam evåhaµ veda” [?], “ahaµ brahmåsmi”[B®hUp I. iv. 10] etc.
432

E.g. “aham annam” [TaiUp III. x. 6]; “aham manu˙” [RV IV. xxvi. 1], quoted
in
B®hUp
I.
iv.
10
(cf.
ÍBh
I.
i.
1:
“brahmåtmabhåvåparokshyanirdhËtaniravaßeshåvidyånåm api våmadevåd¥nåm aham ityevåtmånubhavadarßanåc ca” [(1) 171,7]) etc.
433
434

E.g. “hantåham imås tisro devatå˙” [ChUp VI. iii. 2] etc.

E.g. “ahaµ vai tvam asi bhagavo devate” [VaråhaUp 2. 34], “aham eka˙prathamam åsam” [AtharvaßirasUp 1], “mumukshur vai ßaraˆam ahaµ prapadye” [ÍveUp

118[Obj.] [196] The knowership, the doership or [being within the scope of the
I-notion] is not the attribute of the self; because it is an attribute, because it can be seenor [because it is an accidental attribute].
[Ans.] These [inferences] are not established because it is sublated [by ourexperience] and because nothing sublates [these reasons] in counter-examples. That is,when the syllogism that [the knowership etc.] are not the attributes of the internal organ(ahaµkåra) [because they are attributes etc.] is asserted, what is the logic [to refute it] of[you] loved by gods?
[Obj.] [We do approve this syllogism too, because these attributes are merely
fancied]by ignorance.
[Ans.] True, [your answer proves] only [your] ignorance435. For, [according to
your opinion, real] doership not rooted in ignorance cannot be accepted in any case. If
you should deny even [doership] rooted in ignorance, it is contradictory to injunctions
concerning [doership such as “one who wants the heaven should sacrifice”]. [197]2.3.3

The proof by means of scriptures(197,1–3)

And that the knowership is the inherent nature of [the self] is explained bymeans of ßrutis in the section [beginning with the BrahmasËtra]*For the same reason, [namely because of scriptures], [the self is not mere
knowledge but] the knower [BrSË II. iii. 19].
That the doership, which is the cause of being enjoyer, belongs to the self, the enjoyer,
and that it is generally caused by the Supreme Person are explained in detail in thesection [beginning with the sËtra]:*[The self, being the enjoyer, is] the doer because scriptures have a purport[only in that case] [BrSË II. iii. 33]
and that [beginning with the sËtra]:*But [the doership of the individual self] is from the Supreme [Brahman] becauseßrutis mention of it [BrSË II. iii. 40].

2.4
The self is self-luminous
VI. 8] etc.

(197,3–207,2)

119

It is proved by means of ßrutis and logical appropriateness that [the self] isself-luminous, eternal, various, minute and so on [198].
2.4.1

Its self-luminous aspect and illuminated aspect etc. (198,1–201,3)
And it is self-luminous [only] for itself; for others, however, it [is not self-luminousbut] known [indirectly] as the object of their knowledge. One's own [self] also can be
the object of his own knowledge in the form qualified by being minute, being subordinate,being controlled, being eternal and so on, which are determined [only] by other meansof knowledge, [namely inference and scriptures]. [199] But it is always self-luminous aswhat is qualified by being inward and being one in the form of ‘I’. During yogic
meditation, however, [it] is directly known by yogic perception as what is qualified by[all] true qualities which cannot [be directly perceived] before [the meditation].436 The
above-mentioned is stated in the Ótmasiddhi [201] :*So the self, being self-established, is known clearly by means of scriptures,
inference and perception resulting from yogic practice. [ÓS vs.43; 86,9–10]
Thus the self exists as the agent of knowledge (måt®), the object of knowledge(meya) and the knowledge (måna) accordant to the difference in being knower and soon. Varadanåråyaˆa-bha††åraka437 says in the Prajñåparitråˆa:*The self can be the agent of knowledge, the object of knowledge and theknowledge (pramåˆa). The [attributive] consciousness (dh¥) is the knowledge
and the object of knowledge. A pot and the like are merely the objects ofknowledge. [Prajñåparitråˆa] [202]2.4.2

The proof by means of scriptures(202,1–203,2)

The ßrutis regarding [its] self-luminousness are well-known. It is true that [theword ‘jñåna’] in*[Brahman is] truth, jñånam [TaiUp II. i. 1]
should be accepted as meaning [not knowledge but] knowing agent because there isudåtta accent in the last syllable438; that [the word]
435

Accordin to the first interpretation of K.

436yathåvasthitåpËrvåkåra°. K suggests thereading yathåvasthitasarvåkåra°.

437

Fl. in the last of the 12th century [Singh 127].

438

The text with accent marks reads jñånám. If a taddhita-affix aC [in P 5. 2.
127, meaning “belonging to this or existing in this (asyåsty asmin)”] is added to the

120*vijñånaghana˙ [B®hUp II. iv. 12]means ‘pervaded by knowledge’ because, judging from the [following] example‘rasaghana’ [II. v. 13], it is natural; and that in the passage*Knowledge (vijñånaµ) performs sacrifice [TaiUp II. v. 1],*[The self] is denoted by the [word ‘vijñåna’] because [the self] has that quality
as its essence, as the Intelligent (pråjña) [namely, Brahman], [is denoted by theword ‘bliss (ånanda)’] [BrSË II. iii. 29].
Nevertheless, in the passage*Indeed he is seer,439 hearer, smeller, taster, thinker (mant®), knower (boddh®),doer, vijñånåtman, and the [individual] self [PraßnaUp V. 9],
it is established that [the self is] ‘knowledge itself (jñånasvarËpa),’ because this meaning
is naturally understood from the word ‘vijñånåtman’, and because there is no use
mentioning again that he is knower, which is already explained particularly [by thewords ‘seer’ etc.] and generally [by the words ‘knower’] [203].
In the same way, the self-luminousness [of the self] should be admitted to benaturally established by means of the following passages:*Then the self becomes self-luminous (svayaµjyotis) [B®hUp IV. iii. 9],*Which is the self? The person who among vital air is composed of knowledge
and who is the illumination (jyotis) in the heart [B®hUp IV. iii. 7],
and so on.
2.4.3

The logical proof considered(203,3–207,2)—Attributive knowledge and substantive knowledgeÍr¥-Vishˆucitta says:*This is the inference: The self is self-luminous, because it is knowledge [ingeneral], like attributive knowledge (dharmabhËtajñåna).
Illuminating without being the object of other knowledge, being the relative ofword jñåna-, the udåtta-accent in the first syllable (6. 1. 193) is shifted to the last
syllable (6. 1. 163). In other cases, the last syllable of jñånam has svarita-accent (6. 1.
107 & 8. 4. 66). Accordingly, this jñånám, having udåtta-accent in the last syllable,means not ‘knowledge’ itself but ‘the substratum of knowledge.’ See ÓS 47,12ff.:‘satyaµ jñånám’ ity atråpi brahmalakshaˆanirdeße jñånaßabdo na jñånamåtravacana˙,
api tu tadvadvacana˙ / tadvacanatve ‘L-ITi’ [P 6. 1. 193] ity ådyudåttatvaprasakte˙ /antodåttaß cåyaµ jñånaßabda˙ / matvarth¥ya-aC-pratyayåntatve tathåtvaµ gha†ate,nånyathå. Cf. Narasimhachari 1971: 162f. and van Buitenen: Råmånuja's VAS, p.62,
n.173a.

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the relation between the knowledge and the self440 and so on,441 intended by Vishˆu-mißra[in this inference as common qualities of knowledge in general], are sublated by nomeans.
[If the self or substantive knowledge (dharmijñåna) were also knowledge, you
may claim, it would illuminate others as well as itself like attributive knowledge — Against
this objection, we reply:](29)

As a lump illuminates only itself but its light [illuminates] others as well as

itself, so is the difference between substantive knowledge and attributive knowledge,
though both are same [in being knowledge]. [204](30)

The [consideration 442] that ‘I slept happily’ and the like establish the inferential

knowledge as far as the [relation with the past] time and [the sleep] are concerned,
provided the self is always declared to be inward, self-luminous and happy.443(31)

Even in this case, the happiness appears as belonging to that time, like sweetness

and so on in the case ‘I sung sweetly’, ‘I walked slowly’ etc. [206][Obj.444] [The word] ‘knowledge,’ [presented as the reason (hetu) in yourinference], is a relative term (sambandhißabda) [and is always used in the form “A'sknowledge on B”; accordingly, mere ‘knowledge’ is just figurative].
[Ans.] Your view shows mere derivation of the word. The real criterion of theword (prav®ttinimitta), however, is being an independent cause to make something fit
for verbal reference (vyavahåra) [207]. And [an independent cause to make something
fit for verbal reference] described concerning one's own [verbal reference] is ‘selfluminous,’ [presented as the probandum (sådhya) in our inference]. Hence, [the reason]
is not same as the probandum. Being qualified by the substratum of the object is always
found in attributive knowledge, [but substantive knowledge is devoid of it]. Nevertheless,439

sprash†å after drash†å is omitted.

440jñånåtmasambandhapratisambandhitva. “being the describer of the relation
between the knowledge and the self (jñånåtamanor ya˙ sambandha˙ tannirËpakatvam)”(R), “having the relation existing in the self which has the knowledge as its adjunct(jñånapratiyogikåtmanish†hasambandhavattva)” (K); “it exists only in knowledge andthe self, accordingly [the reason] is not vyabhicåra at all” (R).
441jñånåtmånyataratva (R), jñånaßabdavåcyatva (K).

442paråmarßa. “vyåptivißish†apakshadharmatåjñånam” [TarS §44].

443

The commentators quote the passage of the Írutaprakåßikå 168,13–16.

122[according to our opinion], substantive knowledge is also qualified [by eternality etc.];
thus [our opinion] is not same as that of the other school, [namely, the Advaitin who
maintains pure knowledge without any quality]. [208]2.5

The self is eternal(208,1–2)

The reasons to prove that the self is imperishable are mentioned in the passages445
of the Bhagavadg¥tå beginning with
*Know, however, that to be imperishable by which all this is pervaded [BhG II.
17].
And they are explained in detail in [Råmånuja's] commentary on it. Moreover, if [theself] were non-eternal, it would bring about the undesirable conclusion that [the self]acquires [the result of] what he has not done and loses [that of] what he has done.

2.6

The self is atomic in size

2.6.1

The proof(208,3–213,17)(208,3)

And [the individual self] is atomic in size (aˆu). Because the ßrutis446 describeso, and because, [logically speaking], it is natural conclusion from the fact that we know
the self-luminous [self] to be limited in the [subtle] space inside the heart; [if it were
all-pervasive, it would be known everywhere]. [209]2.6.2

The Nyåya-Vaißeshika view criticized(209,1–4)[Obj.] [The self] must be all-pervasive so as to establish the fact that its effects
through the unseen force (ad®sh†a), [the substratum of which is the self], are seen at thesame time in all directions.447
444

The opinion of the Nyåya-Vaißeshika.

445

R quotes BhG II. 17–20.

446

E.g. “esho 'ˆur åtmå cetaså veditavya˙” [MuUp III. i. 9]; “årågramåtro hy
avaro 'pi d®sh†a˙” “vålågraßatabhågasya” [ÍveUp V. 8, 9].
447

According to the Nyåya-Vaißeshika, who regards the unseen force as thequality of the self, if the self were not all-pervasive, the effects of the unseen force
could not be established wherever the self does not exist. E.g. “dharmådharmayor

123[Ans.] This postulation is not proper. Nothing can deny that the individual self is
atomic; because, [in our view], the unseen force is nothing but the affection and angerof God448 and God, the substratum of the two, is all-pervasive.449 And if [the self] were
all-pervasive, our experience [such as ‘Knowing in a house, I am here’ etc.] would be
unnatural. The self, fixed within the body, moves like the organs [when the body goes
here and there]; this enables the knowledge and happiness here and there. [You may saythat to assume the movement of the self as well as the body is not simpler because theall-pervasive self, as you assume, would not need to move450]; but the movement of theself is supported by our experience and the ßrutis,451 while your assumption that [theself] is all-pervasive is not so. Thus for those who want logical simplicity (laughava),
the very [simplicity] results [if they accept our opinion].
2.6.3

The opinion of Yåmuna 452(209,4–210,2)

The Ótmasiddhi453 says in the portion refuting the view that the self is the vitalair:*Though they are devoid of touch, the selves, which are not all-pervasive, are fit
for departing, going and coming in accordance with the force of [their own]
volition, the unseen power, as the internal organ is454. [ÓS 22,6–7]
And in the same [work] in dealing with the question and the answer as to [how] theconsciousness spreads, the portion beginning with
*Having abandoned [its] substratum, [how can the consciousness, which is quality,åtmaguˆatvåt tadåßrayasyåvyåpakatve na syåd agner Ërdhvajvalanaµ våyos
tiryaµgamanam aˆumanasos tv ådyaµ karmeti, tayo˙ svåßrayasaµyogåpekshitvåt”[Vyomavat¥ 155,25–156,3]. See Umesha Mishra 1936: 376f. Cf. SAS ad TMK II. 19c:
dharmådharmau svåßrayasaµyukta evåßrayåntare kriyåµ janayata˙, kriyåhetuguˆatvåt,gurutvavat.
In this regard, see also the fragment of Paråßara Bha††a cited in 483,8f., which
seems to support the Nyåya-Vaißeshika proof.
448

See NySi , TMK V. 81.

449

Cf. SAS ad TMK II. 19d.

450

Cf. TMK II. 18b.

451

The commentators refer to “candramasam eva te sarve gacchanti”[Kaush¥takiUp I. 2]. TMK II. 18 refers to the pañcågnividyå.
Cf. NDy 247,12ff.

452

453
454

For the detail of Yåmuna's opinion on the size of the self, see Mesquita 1989.

avibhor åtmana˙ sparßavirahiˆo 'pi prayatnåd®sh†apreraˆånuguˆyena manasa
ivotkråtigatyågatayo yujyate. Viraraghavacharya's edition of the Siddhitraya reads avibhu-

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go to another place455?] [ÓS 64,1 = 79,5]
makes it clear that [the self] is atomic.
The references [to the self] in the ßrutis, the sm®tis etc. as ‘all-pervading’ and thelike456 can be justified, in accordance with the propriety in each case, from the fact thatan aggregate [of the selves exists everywhere] or that [the self] can penetrate into a
subtle thing through its attributive knowledge [210]. The word ‘all-pervasive’ in thepassage of the Ótmasiddhi,*[The self is] eternal, all-pervasive [ÓS 10,4],is also interpreted in the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya as follows:*It penetrates all non-spiritual things in nature because it is very subtle [Ír¥Bh I.
i. 1; (1) 174,1].
2.6.4

The view in the BrahmasËtra

(210,3–212,1)

And the author of the [Brahma-]sËtra himself explains that [the self] is atomic
by means of the sËtras,*[The self is atomic because the ßrutis mention its] departing [from the body],
going [out of it] and returning [to it] [BrSË II. iii. 20]
and so on.457 It is appropriate that the individual self, abiding in the part of the heart,
presides over various things through its attributive knowledge. In the same way yogins
and the like are able to preside over many bodies. It is not proper to assume [the self] tobe all-pervasive for this reason [211]. Keeping in mind all these, the [Brahma-]sËtra
says:*Through its quality [of knowledge], however (vå), [the self pervades the wholebody], as light [BrSË II. iii. 26].
And in the explanation of the liberated self, [the same work says]:*The pervasion [by the liberated self] is like that of a lump [212]; [the ßruti458]
shows so [BrSË VI. iv. 15].
tvenåsyåtmana˙ for avibhor åtmana˙ and °ådayo for °ågatayo (the reading of the Nyåyasiddhåñjana is parenthesized).
455Yåmuna's answer to this objection is: we do not accepted so etc., quoted in
NySi 419,7f.
456

E.g. “nitya˙ sarvagata˙ sthånu˙” [BhG II. 24], “tadvaj j¥vo nabho 'pi ca” [?],
“yathå lshetrajñaßakti˙ så vesh†itå n®pa sarvagå” [ViP VI. vii. 62].
457

Up to II. iii. 26, according to R.

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2.6.5

The Jaina view criticized(212,1–3)

Thus the assumption by the Jainas, who follow the misconception of the body as
the self, that [the self] has the same size as that of the body [for the time being] is also
disproved. And it is rejected by the following [Brahma-]sËtras:*And, [if you accepted] in this way [that the self has the size of the body], theself would be imperfect, [because, say, the self which once occupied the body ofan elephant cannot take the size of an ant].
*Nor also is there non-contradiction even if [the self] attains the different states(paryåya) [in accordance with the body]; since, [if it were so, the self] would be
subject to change and [consequently it would be non-eternal].
*Also because the final [size which the self has when it is liberated] is persistent,
both [the self and its size in that stage] are eternal; therefore [this inherent size ofthe self] is no different [from those in the previous stages] [BrSË II. ii. 32–34].
2.6.6

The statement of Varadavishˆu considered(212,3–213,6)
However, the statement of Varadavishˆu-mißra*In the stage of the transmigration [213], the self itself is atomic in size because[the self] itself and its [attributive] knowledge are contracted; but in the stage ofthe liberation, [the self itself], all-pervasive and omnipresent, and the [attributive]knowledge in the expanded form shine forth. This is understood by means of theßruti“This individual self is to be understood as a part of the hundredth part of thepoint of a hair divided a hundredfold; yet it is capable of infinity” [ÍveUp V. 9].
So is said by the venerable Paråßra:“The power of Vishˆu is said to be high, so high459 is what is called kshetrajña(individual self)” [ViP VI. vii. 61]

and so on asserts the individual self as well as [its attributive knowledge] has contractionand expansion. The same opinion is shown in his Månayåthåtmyanirˆaya in reference tothe phrase in the Ótmasiddhi:*eternal, all-pervasive [ÓS 10,4].
This is exaggerated statement because it is contradictory to the [Brahma-]sËtra and so
458ÍveUp V. 9.

459

Varadavishˆu reads tathå parå; but according to the siddhånta, tathå'parå is

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on.
2.6.7

The statements in the G¥tåbhåshya considered(213,7–17)

But the Ír¥mad-G¥tåbhåshya comments on “Beginningless brahman having Me
as the highest460” [BhG XIII. 12] as follows:*Brahman is what is endowed with the nature of greatness (b®hattva), namely,
the principle called kshetrajña (the individual self) which is the entity different
from the body etc. and is by itself devoid of the limitation by the body etc.
Indeed, the ßruti says:“Yet it is capable of infinity” [ÍveUp V. 9].
And its limitation by the body is caused by [its] karma; its infinity is when it isliberated from bandage of the karma [GBh XIII. 12; 434,9–12];
on “It exists covering all things in the world” [BhG XIII. 13]:*Whatever aggregate of things that exist in the world, covering— pervading
them, it exists.461 That is, it is all-pervasive in its pure state as it is devoid of thelimitation of space and the like [GBh XIII. 13; 436.9f.];
on “Unmoving and yet moving” [BhG XIII. 15]:
*unmoving by nature but moving when it has the body [GBh XIII. 15; 438,2];
and in other topics also it says:*Having unlimited knowledge as its sole form [GBh passim].
All these are to be regarded as merely referring to the pervasion of [attributive] knowledge
and the like. Because in the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya, the [Vedånta-]Såra and other works [ad IV.
iv. 15], [the same author] comments the passage*Yet it is capable of infinity [ÍveUp V. 9]in this way; especially in the [Vedånta-]D¥pa ad the sËtra
*The pervasion [by the liberated self] is like that of a lump ; [the ßruti] shows so[BrSË VI. iv. 15],
he intentionally takes up the ßruti of “the point of a hair” [ÍveUp V. 9] and says:*The author of the [Brahma-]sËtra think that the essential nature of the inner self
is being atomic only, because in the sËtra
proper reading.
460anådi matparaµ brahma. Íankara reads: anådimat paraµ brahma.

461

Here Vedånta Deßika changes the word-order of Råmånuja.

127“If [the opponent] hold that [the individual self] is not atomic because the ßruti462
states what is not so; [our answer is:] no, because the context relates to the other,[namely, Brahman]” [BrSË II. iii. 22],
he refers to only the Supreme as omnipresent463 [VD¥pa IV. iv. 15]
Therefore, it is the dogma of the author of the [Brahma-]sËtra and the author of the[Ír¥-]Bhåshya etc. that the individual self is always atomic.

2.7

The selves are plural

2.7.1

The proof(213,18–219,5)(213,18–214,1)

And the self in this nature is different from body to body, except a case of [apowerful yogin such as] Saubhari, [who could control fifty bodies at the same time464].
Because memory, experience, happiness, pain, volition of the organs and the like are
restricted [in each body]. Indeed, the NyåyasËtra465 says:*The selves are many because of the restriction466 [VaiSË III. ii. 16 (20)]The Såµkhyas also hold: [214]*The plurality of the selves (purusha) is proved; because birth, death and organs[of each person] are restricted, because there are not simultaneous activities, andbecause the proportion of three guˆas is different.467 [SåKå 18]
2.7.2

The import of the oneness taught in the scriptures(214,2–215,3)

The [scriptural] passages on the non-duality of the individual selves,468 however,462

I.e. “sa vå esha mahån aja åtmå” [B®hUp IV. iv. 22].

463

Following Viraraghavacharya's opinion [fn.1], “iti parsyaiva mahattvavacanåt”is added.
464

See van Buitenen's translation of VAS, fn.254.

465

Sic! Viraraghavachari adds (vaißeshika?).

466nånåtmåno vyavasthåta˙. This reading of the sËtra is found in the Kiraˆåval¥[p.99] and the Nyåyakaˆ∂al¥ [p.220]. Candrånanda' commentary reads: nånå vyavasthåta˙;
Upaskåra's commentary: vyavasthåto nånå.
467

The commenrarors quote the interpretation of the Såµkhyatattvakaumud¥ ofVåcaspatimißra.
468

E.g. “yady anyo 'sti para˙ ko 'pi” [ViP II. xiii. 90]; “tasyåtmaparadeheshu sato
'py ekam ayaµ hi yat” [ViP II. xiv. 32]. The import of these passage is examined in theÍr¥bhåshya I. i. 1 [(1) 240ff.].

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import oneness in mode [such as having knowledge as the sole form or being the bodyof God]. In fact, the word ‘one or same (eka)’ and the like are used to mean the onenessin mode also; for example, “This rice and that rice are the same,” and also,*The oneness of Råma and Sugr¥va [Råmåyaˆa, sundra-kå°]etc. are to be seen. That is summed up as follows:(32)

Statements of oneness are due to the non-contradiction, [say, between two kings],

the friendliness, [say, between Råma and Sugr¥va], the non-difference in genus, [say,between two grains], the non-difference in enjoyment, [say, between the liberated selves],
and incapability of separate existence so far as space, time, condition etc. are concerned.
[215]
And, though the similarity between the individual selves [in the transmigration]is [merely] as to their essential nature, [their similarity] in the liberation is as to their
attributive [knowledge] also, as is established by the Írutis and the sm®tis,469 and also byother [reasons]. Even these statements negating the difference between the individual
selves are for negating the difference in being a god etc., caused by the misconceptionthat the body is the self, but are not for negating the difference in their essential nature,
proved by means of right knowledge. So it is proper that these [passages] have the same
import that the clear expression of the negation of being a god etc.470 has.
2.7.3

Advaita view criticized(215,4–217,1)

Furthermore, for those who argue the oneness of the self without any specificcharacter, there would be the undesirable conclusion that the bandage and the liberation
are same; because from the viewpoint of the reality, ignorance is removed even in this[stage of bandage] [216], and from the viewpoint of unreality, the usage of [ignorance]
is possible even in that [stage of liberation]. As a matter of fact, [the word] transmigrationin the world is used even for liberated persons such as Íuka. Moreover,If annihilation of all the delusions were caused by delusion, there would be no
annihilation in reality. On the other hand, if [it were caused] by real knowledge, there
would arise deviation from your theory, abandonment of non-duality and so on; [because
469

E.g. “nirañjana˙ paramam aikyam upaiti” [Muˆ∂akaUp III. i. 3], “mamasådharmyam ågata˙” [BhG XIV. 2].
470

E.g. “caturvidho 'pi bhedo 'yaµ mithyåjñånanibandhana˙ / devådibhede'padahvaste nåsty evåvaraˆo hi sa˙” [Vishˆudharma]. quoted in ÍBh I. i. 1, Eng. tr. p.
117

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you should accept the knowledge as another real existent]. [217]We will reject the theory in detail afterwards.
2.7.4

Bhedåbheda view criticized(217,2–218,3)

As for Bhåskara's opinion, it is ridiculous that eternal and all-knowing [Brahman]is associated with limiting adjunct (upådhi). Since Brahman cannot be divided by limiting
adjunct, unavoidably Brahman Himself would be in the transmigration. If limiting adjunctmoved, there would be an undesirable conclusion that the bandage and the liberation
take place one after another at every moment.471 Even if limiting adjunct were divided
like [fifty bodies of] Saubhari, [Brahman] would inevitably recollect [all the experienceof the selves as Saubhari recollected all the experience of his bodies]. And if thedivision [of Brahman] were accepted, it would be contradictory to the opinion that He
cannot be cut.
Thus, [the opinion of Yådavaprakåßa] that Brahman, real existent and spiritual,is different and non-different from all the entities should be rejected. For he holds thatin the cosmic destruction even the bound [self] becomes real existence without any
difference to the liberated one; and, in the creation, even the liberated [self], all-knowing,
would be associated with endless transmigration due to his consideration, [caused by his
being all-knowing], on the identity with all the inferior beings [218]. Therefore, there
would be no distinction between the bandage and the liberation.
In our opinion, the cessation of ignorance must be another positive entity whichis in the form of expansion of special knowledge or is a kind of acceptance of loving
Highest Person and so on. All the other [opinions] are confused.
2.7.5

The meaning of the identity with Brahman(218,4–219,5)

In this way, [the condition mentioned in the passage]*One who knows Brahman becomes Brahman (brahmaiva bhavati) [MuUp III.
ii. 8]and so on is caused by the direct experience of the identity with Brahman. The identityof the liberated [self] and Brahman is based on the relation of the body and one who
possesses the body. And the direct experience of it is eternal, because the direct knowledge
471

Cf. VAS §55; 104,3f.

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of it is continuous as long as the self exists. According to the Nyåyasudarßana [ofNåråyaˆabha††åraka], however,*The word ‘eva’ [here] means [mere] similarity, as is stated in the Nighaˆ†u:“In some cases, eva means similarity.” [219]
And [the usage of eva] to mean similarity is seen in the following [injunction of]performance on the Írauta ritual:“One should kill a dwarf [animal] relating to Vishˆu. Having become Vishˆu(vishˆur eva bhËtvå), one who competes wins these worlds” [?].
‘Vishˆur eva’ means ‘like (iva) vishˆu.’ That is, becoming Vishˆu Himself is
not intended here, because it cannot be got for ‘one who competes’ by thesacrifice of cattle. Indeed, winning enemies etc. is nothing but worldly fruit,and so on. So the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya refers to only [the opinion that ‘eva’ is] figurative
usage:*And the practictical usage ‘This is [the same as] that’ in order to mean that thetwo have the same character is just primary (mukhya eva). For example, ‘This is[the same as] that cow,’ and so on [Ír¥Bh I. i. 1; (1) 153,1f.].
Here ‘just primary (mukhya eva)’ means ‘almost, [but not perfectly], primary.’ And‘This is [the same as] that cow’ dennotes that the two individuals have the same form.
Therefore, it is proved that the individual selves are different from God and they
are mutually different.

2.8

Classification of the self

(219,6–224,2)

And such self, though it has happiness by nature, is in the transmigration by
force of limiting adjunct. It is of two kinds: one who transmigrates (saµsårin) and one
who does not transmigrates (asaµsårain). The former is one who has the merit and the
demerit etc.; the latter is devoid of them.
2.8.1

Transmigrant (saµsårin)(219,7–222,2)

The former is also of two kinds: one who transmigrates forever (nityasaµsårin)and one who will be devoid of future transmigration.
2.8.1.1 Eternal transmigrant (nityasaµsårin)(219,8–220,4)

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The former of the two, [namely, nityasaµsårin], is [possible according to some
opinion472]; for it is possible for its transmigration not to stop because the cause [of his
liberation] will not come even afterwards as [they has not come] for beginningless pastkalpas. [220] The proof for it is the [scripural] statement that His glory as sport (l¥låvibhËti)is eternal. That is supported by the following passages*I throw continously [the worst of men] into [demoniacal wombs] [BhG XVI.
19],
*I can never endure [VaråhaP],and so on.
However, some473 explain as follows. These [passages] intend to mean theirexcessive delay [for the liberation], but nobody transmigrates foerever. Because [present]
non-relation between non-contradictory two things, [namely, the self and cause of theliberation], is pervaded by innevitablity of occuring in other time.474 Otherwise there
would be undesirable conclusion that people do not engage in the means of the liberation
for fear ‘May I be so?’
2.8.1.2 Non-eternal transmigrant(220,4–221,1)

Being devoid of future transmigration is possible due to approaching of its cause
like approaching of the present body which has not been acquired till now [221]. The
proof for it is the [scriptural] statement that one who knows Brahman is liberated.
2.8.1.2 The course of transmigration(221,1–222,2)

And such transmigrating beings are bound to a chain of their karma and go straywith wasting [karma] and being filled up with [karma] like a vessel of a machine forraising water from a well of time, which is revolving in the interior of the cosmic egg.
In this situation, one who does meritorious deed, following the order of night, later halfof the month, six months during which the sun moves southward, the world of thefathers, ether and the moon, ascends to the heaven.475 And he descends from the position
472

This is the opinion of the Mådhva school and Råmamißra, according to theÓnandadåyin¥ ad SAS II. 27.
473

Viraraghvacari points out that R's explanation follows the logic shown in theNyåyakusumåñjali (fn.1).
474

Both opinions are accepted by Deßika; see TMK II. 27d.

475

See ChUp V. x. 3.

132of the moon, following the order of ether, air, smoke, mist and cloud.476 There, offerings,[as the scripture figuratively describes], composed of faith [or subtle elements], soma
[or a divine body], rain, food and semen are [respectively] associated with positions of
the heavenly world, rainy cloud, the earth, a men and the womb.477 In this connection,
the need for the fifth offering [or conception] is mostly the case; because it is not seen in
the [births] of Draupadi, Dh®sh†adyumna and so on.478 So is [the births] of one who does
non-meritorious deed; because in the bodies of insects and the like [222], there is not
the fifth offering479 and they do not attain to the moon. 480 There is very terrible way tothe hell for them. And the experience of miseries in the hell, explained in Puråˆas481 andso on, makes a person's hair stand on end like a kadamba-fruit once he remembers thedescription.
2.8.2

Non-transmigrant

2.8.2.1 Classification(222,3–224,2)(222,3–4)

The second [i.e. one who does not transmigrate (asaµsårain)] is also of two
kinds: one who has absolute non-existence of the transmigration and one who has thetransmigration destroyed. Of the two, the former, an eternal seer (nityasËri), has, like
God, absolute non-existence of [the transmigration] because there is never the cause of
it. The latter, on the other hand, is the liberated beings (mukta) as mentioned before.482
2.8.2.2 Transmigrant beings are numberless; so are liberated(222,5–10)

Time is beginningless and thousand persons have been liberated everyday; stilltransmigration is not completely destroyed. Because this endless [transmigration] is ofsuch nature. And the Vedårthasaµgraha says:*This difference cum non-difference (bhedåbheda) doctrine [of Yådavaprakåßa]is worse even than the [Advaita] doctrine that Brahman is ignorant. For [according
476

See ChUp V. x. 5–6.

477

See Ír¥Bh III. i. 1–7, especially the exegesis of ChUp V. iv. 2 – ix. 1 [407,9–14].

478

See BrSË III. i. 19.

479

See BrSË III. i. 20.

480

See BrSË III. i. 17.

481

The descriotion in the Garu∂apuråˆa is popular.

482

220,4f.

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to the doctrine] immeasurable misery is real and, since those who transmigrate
are innumerable, it is hardly overcome [VAS §59; 106,5f.].
As a drop of water pours into ocean having endless water, among a group of one whotransmigrates, those who are liberated later enters into those who have been liberated
before. Though both one who transmigrates and one who are liberated are innumerable,
there is relative difference [between the numbers of the two] due to [the scripturalstatement483 that the former] is [His] one-fourth [and the latter] is [His] three-fourth.
And such [difference] is seen between [the number of] muhËrta (1/30 day), [that of]yåma (1/8 day), [that of] a day and night, [that of] kalpa and so on, or between [thenumber of] substance, [that of] earthy one, [that of] a pot and so on.484 Thus it isappropriate that the eternal [seers] are innumerable even in comparison with all thebound beings and the liberated beings.
2.8.2.3 Eternal seers really exist(222,10–223,5)

Some do no accept the category of eternal seer; [223] but it is not correct.
Because the passage*[Which] seers see forever [N®siµhapËrvatåpin¥Up V. 10, SubålaUp 6]
and so on describes the [highest] place485 qualified by plural seers who see forever. For
this very reason, it cannot be explained in other ways as referring to a series of theliberated beings, [who cannot see forever], or God, [who is single].486[Obj.] All the individual selves are excluded from absolute non-connection withtransmigration; because they are the individual selves etc. [Accordingly eternal seers
cannot exist].
[Ans.] Such inferential marks (liµga) can be rejected respectively since, [so far
as the ordinary individual selves are concerned], they merely proves what has been
already proved (siddhasådhana) and, [so far as the eternal seers are concerned], they arestultified [by the above-mentioned passage] etc.
As to the eternal seers, their innumerability, secondary classification and so on
483

ChUp III. xii. 6.

484

The similar instances are found in 518,1f.

485

The meaning of ‘vishˆor paraµ padam’ is explained in VAS §129.

486

See VAS §128.

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should be inquired in the Ír¥-Påñcaråtra-saµhitås.
(33)[The eternal seers] such as Ananta and Vishvaksena are brothers of joy withliberated beings, though the former have fixed service, from the viewpoint of theirknowledge, joy etc. [224]
Condition of God and eternal seers in pralaya

App.

(224,1–2)

In this way, those who hold that the condition of the eternal [seers] and God islike that of deep sleep in the universal destruction are threw away on account of [their]
eternal vision and so on. And because they do not have karma contractiong their knowledge,
such condition cacnnot be justified.

What is the cause of the liberation, then?
It is particular knowledge which is described by the words ‘upåsana’ ‘vedana’‘dhyåna’ and the like attaining to the form of bhakti, is repeated again and again, and iscontinued till death. So is said in the [Brahma-]sËtra:*Repetition again and again, on account of the teaching [BrSË IV. iv. 1];
furthermore,*[Meditation should be done] till death, because in this [scripture] also it isshown [BrSË IV. iv. 12].
But it is not mere knowledge of truth. Because it cannot be enjoined if it isaccomplished by mere hearing which is attained through liking for the ascertainment so
as to realize the excessive human purpose superficially understood by means of aparticular group of letters gained through studying main portions [i.e. Upanishads]
along with some subordinate branches, established by the injunction of study. And
because liberation is not seen even if mere [knowledge] is established. It is stated by thevenerable Ópastamba:*That there is attainment of pacification on knowledge arising is prohibited by
the scriptures. If there were attainment of pacification on knowledge arising,even here one should not experience misery487 [Ópastamba-DharmasËtra II. ix.
21. 14–16]
487

Quoted in Ír¥Bh I. i. 4 [146,11f.] as disproof of j¥vanmukti.

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Again it cannot be said that one who removes the mental impression (våsanå)concerning the distinction [between the self and Brahman] through hearing, thinking
and meditation attains the direct perception [of Brahman] born merely from the [scriptural]
passages. Because this opinion is spoiled for these reasons: [the removal of the mental
impression and the direct perception] are mutually dependent, it is contradictory [onaccount of the mutual dependence], etc.
Regarding [the Advaita concept of] avidyå, the argument cannot endure thealternatives, as is understood in the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya etc., concerning a) [avidyå] itself,b) the relation with it [or being its substratum], c) the knowledge which annihilates it,d) the knower of this knowledge, e) the instruction on its identity and so on488 [225].
And unreality can never bring about the knowledge of reality. That is to say, [226](34)

According to me, the knowledge of reality is brought about through reality;

according to you, however, the knowledge of unreality is brought about through unreality!
Sometimes the knowledge of unreality, [say, an image in a dirty mirror], is brought
about through reality But the knowledge of reality can never be brought about throughunreality.
Neither independent ritual action (karma) nor ritual action combined withknowledge can be the cause of the liberation, because [the scripture489] enjoins ‘toknow’ [as the cause] and prohibits other means. But to introduce ritual action as a
subsidiary (aµga) of [the cause] is not contradictory at all. For, in that case, [ritual
action] is not another [independent] means. Indeed, it is not until the mind is purified
through rubbing off the past karma, which prevents the direct experience of the Highest
Self and is in the form of merit and demerit in the transmigration based on rajas andtamas, that [the ritual action] becomes useful [for the liberation]. In the same way, it isalso established that living in special [sacred] places,490 a specific vow (vrata), seeking
refuge in Vishˆu etc. and also karmayoga and jñånayoga become the cause of theliberation indirectly [227]. For seeking refuge in Vishˆu and the like are adopted as
488

So-called saptavidhånupapatti in ÍBh I. i. 1 is composed of (1) åßraya-anupapatti[] (= b), (2) tirodhana-a° [], (3) svarËpa-a° [] (= a), (4) anirvacan¥ya-a°[], (5) pramåˆa-a°,(6) nivartaka-a° [] (= c) and (7) niv®tti-a°.
489

8].
490

I.e. tam eva viditvåti m®tyum eti nånya˙ panthå ayanåya vidyate [ÍveUp III.

There are 108 sacred spot, according to the Vaishˆava tradition, including
milky ocean and Vaikuˆ†ha.

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subsidiaries of the meditation. Or rather, the liberation is established as [sacrificed]
cattle and the like go to the heaven with the sacrificer (yajamåna). Indeed,*They go to the heaven with the sacrificer, lord of men! [MBh XII491] [228],
says the Mahåbhårata.
All that should be mentioned about karmayoga and jñånayoga is clearly stated inthe Ír¥mad-G¥tåbhåshya. It is said concerning karmayoga there:*Since karmayoga is easy to perform, free from careless mistake and independent
as it includes the knowledge [GBh III. 33; 130,8f.]
and so on; for these reasons it is explained that mere karmayoga can independently
establish the vision of the self (åtmåvalokana). Likewise, to the verse*Free from desire, with interest and mind controlled492 [BhG IV. 21],
it is said:*The meaning is: He sees the self in the above-mentioned form by mere karmayoga
without the intervention of jñånayoga. [GBh IV. 21; 165,3].
To the verse*Which has Brahman as its instrument to offer with493 [BhG IV. 24],
it is said:*The ritual action performed by those who want to be liberated is in the form ofknowledge because it is associated with the contemplation (anusandhåna) that
their self is the Supreme Brahman and it accomplishes the direct vision of theself without the intervention of jñånayoga.494 [GBh IV. 24; 167,6f.].
And in the fifth chapter, by the verses*Both the renunciation [or jñånayoga] and karmayoga lead to the highest
excellence. Of the two, however, karmayoga excels the renunciation of actions.
[BhG V. 2], [229]*One who resorts to even one [of the two] attains the fruit of both [BhG V. 4],*That state which is attained by those who resort in the såµkhya [or jñånayoga]
is reached by those who resort in the yoga [or karmayoga] [BhG V. 5],491

Found in the critical edition of Poona vol.18, p.440 (App.4, 2688).

492

yatacittåtmå. Here åtman denotes manas, according to the GBh; and citta
means ahaµkåra or buddhi, according to Deßika's Tåtparyacandrikå.
493
494

arpaˆa. arpyate anenety arpaˆaµ srugådi [GBh].

jñånanish†hå. In GBh, °nish†hå is used synonymously to °yoga [van Buitenen,Råmånuja on BhG, p.66 fn.116].

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its independence is clearly stated. In the verse*But renunciation [or jñånayoga], Oh mighty-armed [Arjuna], is hard to attainwithout [karma-]yoga. The meditating sage (muni) who follows [karma-]yoga
reaches the self495 in no long time. [BhG V. 6],
it is taught that karmayoga operates quickly even than jñånayoga and that it is hard toattain jñånayoga without karmayoga. And it is stated in many passages that both[karmayoga and jñånayoga] are subsidiary of bhaktiyoga. That is, in the commentary to
the verse*If you are unable to do even this [BhG XII. 11],
it is said:*Then, you should resort to aksharayoga described in the first six chapters(sha†aka) [of the Bhagavadg¥tå], which is in the form of the contemplation on
the essential nature of the self and generates the high devotion (parabhakti), andas its means, you should renounce the fruit of every action. [GBh XII. 11;
399,7–9].
And to the verse*The [direct] knowledge [of the self] is better than the repeated practice [ofremembrance of God, for one who cannot practice the latter] [BhG XII. 12],
it is said:*The meaning is as follows. When the mind is peaceful, the meditation on theself is accomplished; from the meditation on the self results the direct experienceof [the self]; form the direct experience of [the self] results the high devotion [toGod]. Thus, for one who cannot practice bhaktiyoga, the meditation on the self
is better. Than the meditation on the self, for one whose mind is not peaceful,
karmayoga which includes the knowledge of the self and is devoid of the intention
to the fruit, is better so as to accomplish the meditation.496 [GBh XII. 12; 401,7–9].
Likewise, it is said in the beginning of the last six chapters:*The direct knowledge of the inner self, one who attains, is subsidiary to themeditation on God, which is in the form of bhakti and is the means to attain thehighest goal, namely, God Våsudeva, the Highest Brahman. In the first six
495
496

Here brahman means åtman [GBh].

So the steps are: karmayoga fi manaßßånti fi åtmanish†hå fi åtmåparokshyafiparå bhakti˙. What is called aksharayoga in sËtra 11 may be the first four steps (oråtmanish†hå only?).

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chapters it is taught that the direct knowledge is [230] accomplished by the two
discipline: karmayoga and jñånayoga. [GBh XIII. 0; 408,3–5].
It is said [by Yåmuna-muni]:*For one who has purified the mind by means of both [karmayoga and jñånayoga],[the liberation] can be attained through the exclusive and excessive bhaktiyoga.497[ÓS 9,3].
In this regard, the central point is as follows.
Bhaktiyoga is the [chief] means for attainment of the Highest Self. For one who
cannot do it, the vision of the self is necessary to establish this bhaktiyoga. And bothkarmayoga and jñånayoga are the independent means for [the vision of the self]. Of thetwo, jñånayoga is the inherent subsidiary (antaraµga) of the vision of the self. Nevertheless
it is difficult to practice first. One who is not qualified for it should practice karmayoga,
the fruit of which is the same [as that of jñånayoga]. A renowned man, though he isqualified for [jñånayoga], should practice karmayoga so as to lead [ordinary] people.
For one who cannot practice [jñånayoga], it is karmayoga that brings about the capacity
for jñånayoga. Even if in course of time he abandons karmayoga and practices jñånayoga,that is not defect at all. And these two yogas, according to the motive [of one whopractice them], can bring about mere isolation (kaivalya) for someone [who wants it]; asthe very meditation of God can bring about [worldly merits] such as lordship (aißvarya)
for someone. That is no defect because it is through the difference in beginninglessstreaming karma in the form of merit and demerit that there is the difference in capacityand non-capacity [to practice a particular yoga], motive and so on [231].
Thus it is proved that only bhakti is the means for the liberation.
Bhakti (devotion) is love toward an admirable person. The very [bhakti] is
divided into parabhakti and so on498 according to difference in the condition. The word‘bhakti’ is used in secondary meaning for praise (stuti), salutation (namaskåra) and thelike because they are connected with it. And in the påda of summing up [various]
qualities, [i.e. the BrahmasËtra III. iii], this bhakti is investigated in different forms
according to the division [of vidyå] such as sad, madhu, dahara, bhËma, vaißvånara.
497
498

See the comment on this passage in the VAS [§91; 126,13f.].

parabhakti: jñånavißesha, parajñåna: såkshåtkåra, paramabhakti: bhagavatpråptitvaråhetubhËtapr¥tivißesha (R).

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Like this distinction such as sad, bhaktis in the form of meditations of the fourfold
Self499 also should be accepted [as is taught in the Påñcaråtrasaµhitås], because they are
not different in being established by the means of valid knowledge, being independent[means of the liberation] etc.
All these [bhaktis] are accomplished by a person who belongs to the upper threecaste500 and practices the duties in his caste (varˆa) and stage of life (åßrama)501 as thevarious scriptures teach, gods, asuras and the like.502 Women [such as Mairey¥] and one
who is devoid of any stage of life (vidhura) [such as Raikva], who are qualified for thesubsidiaries such as low-voiced prayer (japa) and fasting, can be qualified for the
meditation of Brahman. The [only] difference is that observing the stages of life isbetter than violating them.503 Those who violate vow of life-long abstinence (naish†hika)
and the like, however, [232] cannot be qualified, because the sm®ti504 says so and they
get expulsion from good people. Even if they perform expiatory ceremonies (pråyaßcitta),
they cannot be qualified for the meditation of Brahman, as is stated in the [Brahma-]sËtra:*But either case [such person] is expelled because of the sm®ti and custom [BrSËIII. iv. 43].
[Obj.] The ßruti speaks of the liberation of a cowherdess505 (gopikå) and the like.
Why do you limit it to the upper three caste, then?
[Ans.] The answer is below. Because they do not perform the means of theliberation in their present body, but they did it in their [past] bodies born as a bråhmaˆaetc. Though they have accomplished the means before, their specific karma which has
begun to operate (prårabdhakarma) made them enter into the low bodies. Whatever
body they have at last does not matter, because their bandage continues till their karma
499

Namely, Våsudeva, Saµkarshaˆa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. See Ír¥Bh II.

500

See BrSË I. iii. 33ff.:apaßËdrådhikaraˆa.

501

See BrSË III. iv. 33.

502

See BrSË I. iii. 25.

503

See BrSË III. iv. 19.

ii. 41.

504

I.e. Atrism®ti 8. 16 (Agnipuråˆa 165. 23) quoted in the commenataries adBrSË III. iv. 43.
505

For example, in the Vishˆupuråˆa.

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which has begun to operate ends. Thus Vidura506 and the like [were liberated] throughthe knowledge born from reminding the impression (saµskåra) in their past lives.
Accordingly, nothing is contradictory to the section of ‘except ßËdra.’507 And the sm®ti
says:*Even Dharmavyådha and others, though they are scorned and born in a low
caste, accomplished the perfection due to their discipline in the past lives like afemale ascetic. [VishˆudharmottaraP 10]
and so on. [233] Calling [King] Janaßruti, who want to hear, ‘ßËdra’ 508 is due to hissorrow (ßocana), as is clear in the [Brahma-]sËtra.509

Nyåsavidyå (or prapatti) is qualified by a specific conviction etc.510 It is notcontradictory to the passage:*There is no other way [to pass over death than knowing Him] [ÍveUp III. 8],
because [prapatti] is specific knowledge [234]. [Nor is it contradictory] to the passage:*But only through bhakti [BhG XI. 54]
etc., because [prapatti] is a kind of bhakti. For example, it is stated:*The firm conviction that the means to attain God is [God] Himself is calledsådhyabhakti or prapatti.
On the other hand, the conviction that the means to attain Him is bhakti is[called] upåyabhakti. The above-mentioned [sådhyabhakti] is better than it.
[235]Upåyabhakti destroys sin other than karma which has begun to operate(prårabdhakarma); but sådhyabhakti is better [because511] it destroys even [karma]
which has begun to operate. [?].
Like the divisions [of vidyå] such as sadvidyå, that [prapatti] is also different [from the
506

MBh

507

BrSË I. ii. 33ff.

508

See ChUp IV. ii.

509

See BrSË I. ii. 33.

510

Namely, ånukËlyasaµkshepa, pråtikËlyavarjana, mahåvißvåsa, kårpaˆya,
gopt®tvavaraˆa and åtmanikshepa listed in Ahirbudhnyasaµhitå XXXVII. ii. 28f. or
Lakshm¥tantra XVII. 60f. See also Bharatamini's verse quoted by Deßika's works [Singh
135].
511

According to Viraraghavachari's fn.1.

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other vidyås] is established owing to its being called by different names etc.512 and its
complete picture is established, according to the maxim of comprehension in all the
Upanishads (sarvavedåntapratyaya-nyåya),513 through summing up [various] qualities
taught in all the contexts concerning prapatti. Thus there is not the undesirable conclusionthat [prapatti] is combined with the other vidyås according to the maxim:*There is option because there is no different in fruits [BrSË III. iii. 57].
And because to combine [prapatti] with [the other vidyås, which] should be abandoned[in prapatti],514 is contradictory.
[Prapatti] as a subsidiary (aµga) to [sådhana-]bhakti and that as an independent
means (aµgin) are distinct, because there is difference in intention [236]. For example,
bhakti accomplishing lordship (aißvarya) is different from that accomplishing theliberation, or jyotish†oma performed as obligatory rite (nitya)515 is different from that
performed as optional rite (kåmya),516 though ritual action itself is the same.
[Obj.] Why is [prapatti], a kind of bhakti, taken as separate means?
[Ans.] You may think this to be based on the difference that [prapatti] is practiced
only once whereas [bhakti] repeatedly, that [the former] is independent whereas [thelatter] is dependent [on prapatti], etc.
[Obj.] It is needless to enjoin the difficult means [namely bhakti] while there is
the easy means [namely prapatti] accomplishing the same effect.
[Ans.] Not so. Such conviction and the like, [which are necessary for prapatti], is
not easy to get; accordingly both are difficult. So is said in the context concerning
prapatti:*My opinion is that [prapatti] is easy [apparently] but, [in fact], difficult to512

See BrSË III. iii. 56: nånå ßabdådibhedåt.

513

Cf. BrSË III. ii. 1: sarvavedåntapratyaya˙ codanådyavißeshåt. This is the Vedånta
version of sarvaßåkhåpratyaya-nyåya explained in the ßåkhåntarådhikaraˆa (M¥SË II. iv.
8ff.). That is, even if different qualities are ascribed to one vidyå in different Upanishads,
the vidyå is the same.
514

See BhG XVIII. 66: sarvadharmån parityajya.

515

The rite which should be done without fail. Non-performance of it brings
about defects (nitytve hy akaraˆe dosha˙ [SAS II. 38; 277,1]).
516

The rite performed to realize some desirable fruits such as svarga. Pråyaßcittta
etc. included in naimittika can be regarded as kåmya [TMK II. 40ab].

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perform [Lakshm¥tantra XVII. 105].
Furthermore the following example will make the point clear. Someone accomplishes a
king's buisiness with great effort and, when he mistakes, the king punishes him suitably.
Another person being contended with private service [for the king], however, accomlishes
the same effect or rather more effect with slight effort. The king tolerates his minor
mistake and, even if his mistake is great, the king punishes him a little.
[Obj.] Even in the latter, private service is difficult to get for an unfortunate
person.
[Ans.] So is in the former case. As in upåyabhakti (or bhakti), though ritual
actions are different in their easiness and difficulty according to the difference in Vedic
sect and in caste and stage of life [to which the performer belongs], so in [prapatti] also
[there is difference in difficulty from person to person].
[Obj.] If it be the case, to the [Brahma-]sËtra
*Indeed (tu) [belonging to a stage of life] is better than [not belonging to any
stage] because also of the sm®ti (liˆga)517 [BrSË III. iv. 39],
why is it commented as follows:*Because that which has much merit (dharma) and that which does not havemuch merit do not have the same effect [Ír¥Bh III. iv. 39; 557,17]? [237][Ans.] The answer is as follows. This concerns [the performance] of one and thesame qualified person in a principal sense and in a secondary sense. Otherwise, there
would be undesirable conclusion that the fruit is different even in the other stage of life,
the other [ritual] sËtra and so on having much merit; consequently, it would bring about
the undesirable conclusion that [having abandoned those of one's own and] entering theothers is better.
In upåyabhakti (or bhakti), rite absolutely obligatory (nitya), rite occasionallyobligatory (naimittika)518 and optional rite (kåmya) as is done without any intention to517Írutaprakåßikå: ßruter anumåpakatvåt sm®ter liµgaßabdenocyate. The sm®ti“anåßram¥ na tish†het tu dinam ekam api dvija” [Dakshasm®ti I. 10] is quoted here.
518

The rite done in the special occasions (kartavyaµ yan nimitte sati tat [TMKII. 40a]). It is of two kinds: the first is performed for expiation, such as pråyaßcitta,
which can be regarded as kåmya (påpaßåntyartham ekaµ tat syåt kåmyena tulyam[40ab]); the second is done in special time, such as ßraddhå, which can be regarded as
nitya because non-performance of it brings about defects (param akaraˆato doshak®n143

the fruits519 are performed as its subsidiaries, but not as independent means. Avoidanceof the prohibitions is equal to both the bhaktis. In sådhaybhakti (or prapatti), however,
optional rite is abandoned completely; but not rite absolutely obligatory.
[Obj.] The chief portion (aµgin) [namely upåyabhakti] is omitted [in prapatti];consequently, its subsidiary portions [namely ritual rite] also should be abandoned.
[Ans.] Not so, because we cannot neglect our own qualification [namely duties
in stage of life].520 All that should be understood in detail from the passages such as:*Abandoning the means [namely optional rite] and the prohibitions [238], hestands on521 the middle way [Lakshm¥tantra XVII. 58].
[Obj.] Some [sages] such as Saµvarta, Bharata522 and Vaidura abandon all dutiesof their own caste and stage of life and, knowing Brahman, walk around. That is talked
concerning those who act and desire at will.
[Ans.] It is not right. Because the idea in these contexts is concluded to be theinstruction about mere intension etc. [to establish] the knowledge that one should behave
like an idiot (ja∂a), as is understood in the following passages:*Let [a bråhmaˆa] desire to be childlike (bålya) [B®hUp III. v. 1],*Lead life as an idiot [Måˆ∂ËkyaKårikå II. 36; Manu II. 110],*Not spoiling the way of the natures523 [?],and so on. And ‘childlike’ means not showing one's own excellence in capacity, knowledge,
family and so on, though it exists; but not behaving, talking, enjoying and so on at will.
These points are shown in the following [Brahma-]sËtras:*[‘Childlike’ means] not manifesting [one's own mature], because of its fitness[to the context] [BrSË III. iv. 49],
nityatulyam [40b]). Cf. Srinivasachari: Fundamentals p.300f.
519

The commentators explain it is because the passage “yajñena dånena” etc.
[B®hUp IV. iv. 22] is applicable to kåmya. Or rather kåmya here may mean the firstkind of naimittika such as pråyaßcitta; because according to TMK, kåmya cannot be
subsidiary to brahmopåsana [Dasgupta HIPh III 293f.; Srinivasachari 300].
520

K quotes BrSË III. iv. 32: vihitatvåc cåßramakarmåpi.

521

åsthitå˙. V. Krishnamacharya ed. of the Lakshm¥tantra reads åßritå˙.

522

See ViP II. xiii–xvi; BhågavataP V. ix–x. [Winternitz, HIL I p.524f.].

523

satåµ mårgam adËshayan. R quotes the passage of ViP II. xiii. 42–44, but thereading is: satåµ vartmåny [dharmam in Vishˆucitt¥ya] adËshayan (43b).

144*Only (ca) in the case of danger of life, there is permission to take all kinds offood; because it is shown [in the scripture524]. [BrSË III. iv. 28],
*For the [above-mentioned] reason also the scripture is against doing at will[BrSË III. iv. 31],and so on.525 Otherwise, there would be the furry of hundreds of ßrutis and sm®tis suchas:*One who behaves in this way throughout his life reaches the Brahman-world[ChUp VIII. xv. 1],*One who has not ceased from evil conduct does not [reach it] [Ka†haUp I. ii.
24],*[Vishˆu is pleased] by one who acts according to his caste and stage of life
[ViP III. viii. 9]. [239][In the case of those who know Brahman commit sins] in this way, how can you
account for the non-clinging of his future sins and the destruction of his past sins526?
The answer is as follows.
For those who attain the knowledge, their past [sinful] karma other than that thefruit of which has been experienced, that which has been expiated and that which has
begun to operate are burned up by force of the means [of the liberation], as the fibres of
the ish¥ka-reed laid on fire.527 And their future [sinful karma] done unintentionally does
not cling to them as water [does not cling] to the lotus-leaf.528
As for their meritorious [karma] also, the part which is not fit for the knowledge,
though it causes happiness, is not different to [the sinful karma] in being opposite totheir liberation and resulting in undesirable fruits; thus it can be expressed by the word
‘sin.’ Accordingly, it does not cling to them or is destroyed.529 The passage524

ÍBh cites the episode of Ushasti in ChUp I. x.

525

ådi denotes III. iv. 29: abådhåc ca (R).

526

Cf. BrSË IV. i. 13: tadadhigame [= brahmavidyåpråptau] uttarapËrvåghayor
aßleshavinåßau, tadvyapadeßåt.
527

Cf. ChUp V. xxiv. 3: tad yathesh¥kåtulåm agnau protaµ pradËyeta, evaµhåsya sarve påpmåna˙ pradËyante.
528

Cf. ChUp IV. xiv. 3: yathå pushkarapalåßa åpo na ßlishyante, evam evaµvidi
påpaµ karma na ßlishyate.
529

Cf. BrSË IV. i. 14: itarasya [= puˆyasya] 'py evam aßlesha˙.

145*No karma which is not enjoyed perishes [even after hundreds of kalpas][BrahmavaivartaP I. xxvi. 70]
and so on relates to the fact that [karma cannot be destroyed by] the other [means] than
the knowledge.530
On the other hand, [karma] which has begun to operate cannot be destroyed until[its fruits are] enjoyed, as is said in the [Brahma-]sËtra:*But having destroyed the other two, [namely, meritorious and sinful karma
which has begun to operate], by enjoyment, he reaches Brahman [BrSË IV. i.
19].
And there is no rule that the karma which has begun to operate should end when
the present body [in which the knowledge is acquired] dies, because karma has wonderful
fruits. For one who abandons his load [to God] in the form ‘[I shall be released] when
the present body terminates,’ however, his [karma which has begun to operate] definitely
ends when the present body dies. Because even the passage that:*I shall remain so long as I shall not be released. Then I shall attain [Brahman][ChUp VI. xiv. 2]
relates to the termination of various karma which has begun to operate; and the passages
that:*Having risen up from this body [240] [ChUp VIII. iii. 4, xii. 3]
etc. also relate to the last body. For this very reason, there is the passage of the[Brahma-]sËtra:*Those who have office remains so long as the office lasts [BrSË III. iii. 31].
Thus, it is established that there is no restriction of time and place in which the last bodyceases, as is mentioned in these [Brahma-]sËtras:*If it is said that [one who dies] at night cannot [be liberated], no. Because[karma is] connected as long as the [last] body exits and the scripture shows thus[BrSË IV. ii. 18],
*And for the same reason, [one who dies] during the southern progress of thesun also [can be liberated] [BrSË IV. ii. 19],
etc.
530

vidyåbhinnavishaya. The translation follows the footnote of Viraraghavachari,
who suggests the reading vidyåvih¥navishaya found in Vådåvalikåra's Vidhisudhåkara
(?). This passage of the puråˆa is explained in ÍBh IV. i. 13 [583,16ff.]: this relates tothe confirmation that karma can produce fruits.

146

In the same way, [karma] intentionally done after [attaining the knowledge] isalso exhausted through enjoying it or performing expiatory ceremonies. And, as a rule,
he does not intentionally do meritorious or sinful [karma] which is unfavorable to theknowledge. For even meritorious [karma], if it is done with the aim of its fruits, is
opposed to the knowledge and he is indifferent to other fruits [than the knowledge];
moreover, as to sinful [karma], he fears violating the command of God. And if hesometimes does it intentionally, being afraid of that, he will spontaneously perform theexpiatory ceremony fit for it. If he should not perform it inadvertently, [the karma]
would be reduced to karma which has begun to operate; consequently, it respectively
fruits somehow or other before [his liberation] but it in itself does not bring about his[further re-]birth and so on. If there happened to be special karma or curse and the likewhich cause his [further re-]birth and so on, [such karma etc.] could bring about [hisfurther rebirth and so on]. Even in this case, however, his completed means [of theliberation] cannot be weakened. On the contrary, [his completed means] stops histransmigration when [such karma etc.] is concluded, as [it does when] his karma which
has begun to operate [is concluded].
[Obj.] Transmigration cannot stop because further karma operates successively.
[Ans.] You cannot say so. Because it is contradictory to the scriptures [teaching
the knowledge as the means of liberation] and it would bring about the undesirable
conclusion that completed meditation is fruitless [241]. That is explained in the[Brahma-]sËtras:*Likewise there is no restriction [in time] with regard to [the meditation] which
has the liberation for its result; because that condition is ascertained, becausethat condition is ascertained531 [BrSË III. iv. 51].
Though the [sËtra] speaks of ritual actions subsidiary to the knowledge, the same logic
can be applied to the knowledge.
[Obj.] If all the karma [of one who attains the knowledge] is destroyed in thisway, how is it justified that he gets rid of his meritorious and sinful deeds and that his
deer relatives and his enemies succeed to [his meritorious ones and sinful ones
respectively532]?
531

The repetition is because this is the last sËtra of the adhyåya.

532“tatsuk®tadushk®te dhËnute [dhunute in Up; vidhËnute in Karmarkar's ed. of

147

We shall explain this further— Firstly, [what are gotten rid of and succeeded]
are not [his deeds] done before [attaining the knowledge]. For some [deeds] havealready given fruits and some have been destroyed by means of expiatory ceremonies
and the knowledge, because both [expiatory ceremonies and the knowledge] as well as
fruiting cease karma (or action) itself. Some [rest deeds] having begun to operate can beremoved only through enjoying them. In the same way, concerning [his deeds] after[attaining the knowledge], [his deeds] which are done unintentionally do not cling [tohim]. Likewise, [his deeds] helpful to the knowledge are ceased through fruiting thevery knowledge and they do not have any aspect of the meritorious deed [as is gotten
rid of etc.]. [You may hold] that the karma (or action) done [not by himself but] by his
deer relative is gotten rid of by him etc., but it is not appropriate. Because these[karmas] are not his own and because it would be improper to show the succession [ofhis deer relatives and his enemies] simultaneous with the sharing [of his sons].533 You
may hold that the expression ‘succeed to’ is metaphorical because this is brought about
through their friendliness or enmity [242]. But it is not true; because it is contradictory
to the statement of the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya and the other [two commentaries of the sameauthor] on the passage of the [Brahma-]sËtra that:*Regarding [the statement of] ‘get rid of,’ however, as it is supplementary to[the statement of] ‘succeed to,’ [BrSË III. iii. 26],
and so on.534 And [such metaphorical succession] could not be the object of meditation.535
And it is contradictory to mention the attainment of what is done through his friendliness[by his deer relatives] etc. simultaneous with the sharing [by his sons].
To this [objection], our answer is as follows. Sinful [deed] done before [attaining
the knowledge] is of two sorts: that the fruits of which have been given and that thefruits of which have not been given. That the fruits of which have not been given is also[of two sorts]: that which has been destroyed by means of expiatory ceremonies and thatÍBh] tasya priyå jñåtaya˙ suk®tam upayanty apriyå dushk®tam” [Kaush¥takiUp I. 4];“tasya putrå dåyam upayanti suh®da˙ sådhuk®tyåµ dvishanta˙ påpak®tyåm” [quoted inÍBh III. iii. 26 as the text of the Så†yåyanin].
533

On account of the passage “tasya putrå dåyam upayanti suh®da˙ sådhuk®tyåµdvishanta˙ påpak®tyåm” quoted before.
534“upåyanaßabdasya hånivåkyaßeshatvåt / upåyavålyasya hi hånivåkyaßeshatvam
evocitam / vidushå tyaktayo˙ puˆyapåpayo˙ praveßasthånavåcitvåd upåyanaßabdasya”[ÍBh III. iii. 26; 488,7f.] etc.
535

Cf. tac[= håni etc.]-cinttanaµ ca vidh¥yamånaµ sarvavidyåµgaµ bhavitum
arhati [ÍBh III. iii. 26; 497,13].

148

which has not. That which has not [been destroyed] is also [of two sorts]: that which has
begun to operate and that which has not. Among them, what is to be destroyed by theknowledge is the last one. In the same way, [sinful deed] done after [attaining theknowledge] is also of two sorts: that which is helpful to the knowledge and that which is
not helpful. That which is not helpful is also [of two sorts]: that which is done intentionallyand that which is done unintentionally. Among them, what does not cling [to him] isthat which is done unintentionally. Thus these two collections of karma, the fruits ofwhich have not been given due to the obstruction by the other strong karma [i.e. the willof God], does not cling and is destroyed [respectively]; it is mentioned that [he] gets ridof the two and his deer relative etc. succeed to them. Likewise, on the [Brahma-]sËtra
that:*According to some, [there are many good deed] of the two other than [Agnihotra
and the like] [BrSË IV. i. 17],
which is to distinguish the purpose as to the passage that:*[His] deer relatives [succeed to his] good deed536 [?],
the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya comments:*And the non-clinging and destruction through the knowledge is concerned withthese [deeds]. [Ír¥Bh IV. i. 17; 589,7f.]
And the non-clinging and destruction mean the obstruction of the capacity of karma andthe destruction of it. And this capacity is composed of the particular love and anger ofGod [243]. And such love and anger reach [his] deer relatives and enemies. Only in thissense, the word ‘succeed to’ is used. On the portion of the [Brahma-]sËtra that:*But after death [BrSË IV. i. 14],the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya comments:*But subsequently to the death of the body, meritorious deeds which are helpful
to the knowledge and the fruits of which are perceived are destroyed: this is themeaning. [Ír¥Bh IV. i. 14; 587,6f.]
Subsequently to the death of the body, meritorious deeds which are helpful to theknowledge and the fruits of which are not perceived, are destroyed [or gotten rid of] and[his deer relatives] succeed to [them]. But other [deeds] do not cling to [him] and aredestroyed when he attains the knowledge; and when he departs [from the body], he gets
rid of them and [his deer relative etc.] succeed to them. That is the distinction. [244]536

The passage quoted in ÍBh III. iii. 26 as the text of the Så†yåyanin recension.

149Nyåsavidyå (or prapatti), however, can destroy even [karma] which has begun tooperate. Nevertheless, a part relating to his attachment and misery accompanied with it
still remain; when he is free of his attachment [even to the continuity of the body andhappiness accompanied with it], they cease completely. This condition, [namely, being
free from all the attachment], distinguishes an impatient aspirant (årta) from a patient
aspirant (d®pta). And a part relating to the attachment in the case of a patient aspirant
cannot be decided to be this much; because the way of intention is peculiar from person
to person. Furthermore, this vidyå (or prapatti) does not depend even upon what isthought of at the death.
(36)

This [prapatti], composed of the conviction that God accompanied with Lakshµ¥

is the sole means, prevents the idea that [prapatti] itself is the means; not to mention of[the idea that] its subsidiaries, [such as the thought at the death, are the means]. [245](37)

Of one who meditates like this, [i.e. bhaktiyogin], there is the liberation when

his karma which has begun to operate is concluded; of a patient aspirant, when the bodyis concluded; of an impatient aspirant, when his patience is concluded.

Of every person who intends to depart537 [from the body], first the faculty ofspeech and, following it, the rest nine become indivisible538 from the mind.539 And thismind combined with all the faculties [becomes indivisible from] the vital air.540 And this[vital air] combined with the eleven faculties [becomes indivisible from] the individual
self.541 And this [individual self] combined with the faculties and the vital air [becomes
indivisible from] five elements.542 And these [five elements] combined with the faculties,
the vital air and the individual self [becomes indivisible from] the Highest Self [in the537

mistake.

uccikramishata˙. R criticizes the variant reading ‘uccikramisata’ as gramattical

538

See the comment of ÍBh on ‘avibhåga’ [BrSË IV. ii. 15]: ap®thagbhåva˙p®thagvyavahårånarha˙ saµsarga˙.
539

See BrSË IV. ii. 1: våµ manasi; 2: sarvåˆy anu.

540

See BrSË IV. ii. 3: tanmana˙ pråˆe.

541

See BrSË IV. ii. 4: so 'dhyakshe.

542

See BrSË IV. ii. 5: bhËteshu.

150

heart].543 The above-mentioned is common to both one attains the knowledge and one
who does not attain the knowledge544 [246].
And the peculiarity of one who does not attain the knowledge has been explained
before.545 In the case of one who attain the knowledge, everyone easily departs from thebody through the pipe named Brahman in the crown of the head546; and conducted insuccession by the conducting (åtivåhika) persons called light, daytime, former half ofthe month, six months during which the sun moves northward, year, wind, the sun,lightning,547 Varuˆa, Indra and Prajåpati548 to their worlds respectively, he is led to thepresence of Varuˆa etc. by [the person] of lightning named ‘non-human (amånava) 549’ inthe above-mentioned order; again, he reach the presence of Brahman.
This way beginning with light and the transfer of his karmas to the others are
mentioned in the passage that:*He who knows both union (sambhËti) and destruction (vinåßa) crosses overdeath through the destruction and attains immortality through the union [ÁßåUp
14],by the words ‘union’ and ‘destruction.’550 The meaning is: he crosses over death throughthe destruction of his karmas and attains Brahman through the union with the way
beginning with light. In the expression that:*He meditates (upåsate) upon the union [?],
‘meditate’ means mere thinking (cintana). And the word ‘sambhËti’ is frequently usedin the sense of attainment: for example,*They attain (abhisambhavanti) light [ChUp IV. xv. 5, V. x. 1],*On departing hence, I shall attain (adhisambhavitåsmi) him [ChUp III. xiv. 4],*I attain (abhisambhavåmi) Brahma-world [ChUp VIII. xiii. 1],
543

See BrSË IV. ii. 14: tåˆi pare.

544

See BrSË IV. ii. 7: samånå cås®tyupakramåt.

545

221,1–222,2.

546

See BrSË IV. ii. 16.

547

See BrSË IV. iii. 1–2.

548

See BrSË IV. iii. 3.

549amånava. After that, he is a conductor and Varuˆa etc. merely assist him. SeeBrSË IV. iii. 5.
550This is to reject the interpretation of Yådavaprakåßa etc. that saµbhËti and151

and so on.
Nåråyaˆårya, however, holds that the words ‘union’ and ‘destruction’ indicate
knowledge (vidyå) and ignorance (avidyå) through implication (lakshaˆå) by way of
their fruits. That is,*Because for he who knows, liberation, accomplished through the knowledge(vidyå), is in the form of proper growth551 (samyak-abhiv®ddhi) [N¥timålå ?]and so on. In that case, this passage would have the same purport as the ßruti that:*He who knows both knowledge and ignorance552 [ÁßåUp 11]
and so on.
And for that who departs [from the gross body] and travels [the way beginningwith light], though all his karma terminates, what is mentioned by the word ‘subtle body(sËkshmaßar¥ra),’ a certain substance composed of three guˆas, still persists as supporter(upash†hambhaka) due to the power of the knowledge.553 So is said in the [Vedånta-]såra:*A subtle body persists even in the case of that who has departed from the body[VSåra IV. ii. 7: 381,5].
For this reason, his initial direct experience [immediately after travelling the way] is[still] like dawn, [i.e. not very clear]; therefore the way is effective [in accoplishingclearer direct experience].554 [247] And it is decided through the scriptures referring to
the way that the complete destruction of ignorance [or karma] needs travelling thespecific places [beginning with light]. Likewise, to the [Brahma-]sËtra that:*Jaimini thinks [that the way beginning with light carries those who meditate]
the Supreme [Brahman] because [the word ‘brahman’ is] used in the primarysense555 [BrSË IV. iii. 11],vinåßa indicate the phenomenal world and Brahman in the condition of its destruction
(R).
551

Here sambhËti means samyagabhiv®ddhi, which indicates moksha, which isthe fruit of vidyå. Thus sambhËti indirectly denotes vidyå.
552

Here avidyå means varˆåßramavihita karma [ÍBh I. i. 1: (1) 66,2; VAS §91:

553

See BrSË IV. ii. 9.

127,1].
554

My translation is in the line of the second interpretation of R. The firstinterpretation regards pratyËshakalpa as apekshita. K's interpretation takes pråthammika
as arcirådigate˙ pËrvabhåvin. See also fn. of Viraraghavachari.
555

This is the first pËrvapaksha in the kårya-adhikaraˆa [sË° 11–15]; the siddhåta
here is, according to Råmånuja, the opinion of Bådaråyaˆa: the way carries both those
who meditate the Supreme Brahman and those who meditate one's own self as distinct

152

the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya comments:*As the rise of the knowledge needs the duties of castes and stages of life,
purity, good conduct, [specific] place and time, which is understood through thescripture that: “[Bråhmaˆas desire to know] Him through reciting the Vedas”[B®hUp IV. iv. 22] etc.; so it is decided through the scriptures referring to theway that the completion of the knowledge, which in the form of the cessation of
all the ignorance [or karma], also needs travelling the specific places [Ír¥Bh IV.
iii. 11: 623,6–8].
And since the departure, [subtle bodies] endowed with more and more intensive
understanding and bliss are successively born. And halfway he can enjoy, roam, converseand so on because he [still] has vital air, sense-faculties and the like. And he becomes
liberated since he touches the ‘non-human’ being [on the shore of Vrajå].556 Till then,everything is [merely] the intermediate effect557 (vyåpåra) of the means [to the liberation][248]. Its [ultimate] fruit is ascending to the bed of the Supreme Abode etc.
At that time, he becomes qualified, like God, by [the eight qualities558] such as
being free from sin, realizing the desire etc. That is his inherent form manifested
through the complete destruction of all the preventions. [249] Since then, he never has
any repetition composed of transmigration.559 Firstly, in the place [where he reaches]
there is no dissolution on account of the descriptions that it is not subject to time,560 that
it is ageless, that it is imperishable etc. [Secondly], his enjoyment described in thepassage that:*If should desire the world of the fathers [ChUp VIII. ii. 1],
etc., is inmaterial enjoyment which is created without any effort only through his own
will [250] and fastened to the enjoyment of Supreme Person; accordingly, it is not of
from prak®ti whose self is Brahman (14).
556Some hold he must be different from the above-mentioned ‘non-human’ inlightening and that he is another ‘amånava’ based on the description: “gatvå'tho virajåµvimuñcati tanuµ sËkshmåµ, tato 'månavasparßåt kshålitavåsanå˙ suk®tino gacchanti
vishˆo˙ padam” [?]; some hold that there is no proof on the two amånava and thatregarding the above-mentioned amånava, våsanå is destroyed due to his touch to sacredpersons immediately after crossing vrajå (R).
557vyåpåra. tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanaka˙ [Tarkad¥pikå 47, Nyåyabodhin¥ 41].

558

See ChUp VIII. i. 5.

559

See BrSË IV. vi. 22.

560akålakålya. See “kålaµ sa pacate tatra na kålas tatra vai prabhu˙” [MBh?],“akshare parame vyoman” [ÍveUp IV. 8], “divyaµ sthånam ajaraµ cåprameyam” [?]153

transmigratin.561
By the way, såyujya (identification) means ultimate equality (såmya) [to Him] in
qualities such as understanding, bliss and realizing desire562 with the exception of theunique characters of God such as the activity concerning the world, namely, the creation
etc.,563 giving liberation, being meditated by those who want to be liberated and being
chief (ßeshitva); the other opinions on såyujya are comparable to the news about honeyof sky-flower. Firstly, såyujya is not mergence (laya) in Brahman; [if it were so], there
would be undesirable conclusion that the såyujya with Agni, Våyu etc. also means
mergence, [though one individual self cannot merge in the other individual self]. Nordoes it mean having the same body [that He has]. For regarding the body of theindividual self, even in transmigration [having the same body] is same [because every
body is His body]; regarding the body of God, even in liberation it is imposible [for theindividual self to have the body of God]. The other opinions564 are also [rejected] in thesame way.
What does this [såyujya] mean, then?
It means sharing the same qualities of the self. And only in this sense, it isprimary. For såyujya is the condition of sayuj and the word sayuj indicate [the condition]that two different [persons, namely, Brahman and the liberated self], are connected withthe same [enjoyment].565
And by force of the passages such as:*He attains supreme equality (såmya) [MuUp III. i. 3],*[Those who] attain similarity (sådharmya) with Me [BhG XIV. 2],
the passages such as
etc. (R).
561

Cf. BrSË IV. iv. 8.

562

Cf. BrSË IV. iv. 21.

563

Cf. BrSË IV. iv. 17.

564

Eg. svarËpaikya.

565

Cf. Rahasyatrayasåra XXII, p.614 (Viraraghavachari ed.): sayukkåvå˜ orubhogyattile bhoktåvåykkoˆ†u kË†a anvayakkumava˜; iµku saprakårabrahmamåkiÂa
bhogyattile brahmamum mukta˜um kË†a bhoktåkkalåy anvayikkaiyål„ mukta˜ai sayuka˜kiÂatu [= sayuk nåma sa ya ekasmin bhogye sahabhokt®tvenånveti / atra
saprakårakabrahmarËpe bhogye brhmaˆo muktasya ca saha bhokt®tvenånvayåt mukta
sayug ity ucyate].

154*[One who knows Brahman] becomes Brahman (brahmaiva bhavati) [MuUp III.
ii. 8]
also import the mere equlaity [in enjoyment], as is explained before.566
In attaining Agni and other [deities], there is difference in sålokya (sharing thesame world) etc. In attaining Brahman, which is in the form of sårËpya (sharing thesame form), the previous three, [namely, sålokya, sårËpya, såm¥pya], are also innevitably
implied.
Though [some passages seem not to accept sårËpya and såm¥pya as liberation,that is],*I never ask for sålokya and sårËpya as the liberation. I want, O long-armed one,såyujya with you, virtuous one [Jitaµte II. 36],
*Some live in the worlds of Vishˆu; some gain close contact; some attain suchform; some attain såyujyam, which is liberation [?];
still there is not any defect because they are in regard to attaining wonderful secondary
states such as the world of Ír¥vishˆu.

[Obj.] Servitude is a source of misery; Because it is servitude.
[Ans.] You should not say so. Because if the subject [of this syllogism] means‘servitude to those who are other than God,’ [the reason] merely proves what has been
already proved [251]; if the subject means ‘servitude to God,’ [the probandum] is
sublated [by the scriptures]. And [the reason] is straying (anaikåntya) in view of theservitude to a generous person, which [is servitude but] is of happiness.
[Obj.] [Then, we pose another syllogism:] The servitude distinct from that567 is asource of misery; Because it is servitude; Like that servitude.
[Ans.] The distinction suggests two individuals: [the servitude to a cruel person
566
567

218,4–219,5.

etadvyatireketi / atra sarvavyaktipaksh¥kåre d®sh†åntåsiddhiprasaµgåd
etadvytirikteti vißeshaˆenaikå vyaktir d®sh†åntårthaµ parißeshiteti drash†avyam / atra
etadvyatiriktasevåtvasya pakshatåvacchedak¥karaˆåt neßvarasevåtvam, an¥ßvarasevåtvaµvå pakshatåvacchedakam; yena pËrvoktadosha˙ syåt (R). According to the Hindi
commenatry, etad = vadånyasevå.

155

and the servitude to a generous person568]. [In the former case, the reason] merely
proves what has been already proved; [in the latter case, the probandum] is sublated [byour ordinary experience]. [Accordingly], even this [syllogism] cannot avoid one of thetwo partial [defects].
If [the subject means] servitude in general, there is an extra [defect that thesyllogism] has no example. If the pure negative concomitance (kevalavyatirekin) [thatthe non-existence of a source of misery is pervaded by the non-existence of servitude]
were intended, [the reason] ‘being servitude,’ which has a similar example569 because
there is a source of misery other than [servitude such as the death of a son], [but] which
does not exist in them, would be of uncommon strayer570 (asådhåraˆa). Moreover, purenegative concomitance [itself] will be rejected.571 Reductio ad absurdum (tarka) also
could prove nothing, unless it is supported [by another means of knowledge]. Mere[knowledge of] concomitance, [which does not have any means to exclude a counterexample], is meaningless. And to [the reason] ‘being servitude,’ there is adventitious
condition572 (upådhi), namely, ‘being concerned with sin.’
For those who relinquish their egoism that they are independent and become
servants [252], the servitude to God is in conformity with their own nature, accordingly
it can be of happiness.
Thus it is proved that liberation is established through specific knowledge whichis qualified by specific object,573 causes 574 and nature,575 and is composed of the direct
experience of God, which is in the form of unexcelled bliss free from any misery.

568

Hindi commentary: … and the servitude to God.

569

sisådhayishitasajåt¥yadharmavån sapaksha˙ (YMD II. 10).

570

asådhåraˆas tu vipakshasapakshavyåv®tta˙ (YMD II. 38).

571

NySi . Deßika has already rejected it in NyP 111ff.

572

sådhya[=du˙kahahetutva]-vyåpakatve sati sådhana[=sevåtva]-avyåpakatvamupådhi˙ (YMD II. 5).
573

I.e. Brahman.

574

I.e sådhakasaptakas shown in the fragment of Våkyakåra [Ír¥Bh (1) 63,4ff.].

575

I.e. darßanasamånåkåra [Ír¥Bh (1) 55,1f.].

156

The576 imaginary conception (vikalpa) of the supreme beatitude (ni˙ßreyasa) heldby the other [schools] such as:
1)mere destruction of the body or2)sexual intercourse with thousands of young women [held by Cårvåka],3)

destruction of knowledge on unreality577 [by Prajñåkara],

4)

total cessation of mental impression578 (våsanå) [by one sect of Buddhist],

5)

removal of eclipse through [external] objects579 [by one sect of Buddhist],

6)

eternal ascent,7)

Arhats' entering into the body,580 or

8)

non-enclosure qualified [by knowledge and bliss] [by Jaina],

9)

experience of [clear] predominance,

10)

independence,

11)

attaining the same form as Íiva [253], or

12)

remainder of the potentiality of knowledge [by Påßupata],

13)

cessation of ignorance [by Advaitin],

14)

cessation of limiting adjunct [by Bhedåbheda],

15)

removal of all the specific qualities [of the self] [by Vaißeshika581],

16)experience of the bliss the isolated self [by Såµkhya]

and so on582 should be rejected by the reason that:
there is the self other than the body [to Cårvåka],576≈ NyP 324,8ff. Cf. TMK II. 75.

577jñånål¥kalaya. samastål¥kavishayavijñånasantånoccheda [NyP 324,8].
Accoding to R, it is the opinion of Prajñåkara. Cf. SAS II. 75: dh¥santånapraˆåßaµ[75a] tu prajñåkaramatasthå˙ / tatråntimasyårthakriyåvirahåd asattve tatpËrveshåm api
tatheti ßËnya[tå]vådåvatåra˙ (Viraraghavachari ed. 330,5).
578våsanåtyantaviråma. Cf. våsanocchedamåtraµ tu bauddhaikadeßina˙ / tatra
sarvajñånasantånenaikatåpatti˙ syån na veti vibhåga˙ / [SAS II. 75: 330,4].
579

vishayoparågavaidhurya. R: vishayoparågalakshaˆopaplavaßËnyacitsantati.

580

Cf. Ërdhavaprayåˆaµ tu jainå˙ / tatra bhËmyå˙ nityapatanavan nityordhvagamanam eke / anye tu lokåkåßam atikramya sakalalokamastakasthåyiny alokåkåße dehamekam anekaµ vå parig®hya vasante iti [SAS II. 75: 330,8f.].
581

This is held by one sect of Nyåya (except the author of NyåyabhËshaˆa,Bhåsarvajña) and M¥måµså (Pråbhåkara) [SAS II. 75: 330,7].
582

TMK and SAS II. 75 refer to: nijamatisukhayor nityayo˙ sannikarsham [byBhËshaˆa; see SAS II. 69: 321,6–322,7]; cittena svåtmasaukhyånubhavam [by Bhå††a;see SAS II. 69: 330,8–12]; ßËnyådvaitam [by Mådhyåmika]; muktitåratamya [byÓnandat¥rtha, according to Ónandadåyin¥].

157

external objects are also real [to Buddhist],
their scriptures have no authority [to Cårvåka, Buddhist, Jaina and Påßupata],
Brahman is changeless [to Bhedåbheda],[Brahman] has no defect [to Advaitin],[the scriptures] teach the knowledge, the bliss and other [specific qualities of the self]
are eternaland so on.

Among them, those who argue that the supreme beatitude is like a stone, whoseknowledge is [also] like a stone, show the following inference:
The self is at times devoid of all the specific qualities,
Because it is the substratum of non-eternal specific qualities,583
Like a pot in the moment of its origination (utpaadyamåna),ether in the universal destruction (pralaya) and the like.
Concerning this [inference], firstly, it is obvious that there is the contradiction to
the scriptures.584
Moreover, in the view that [‘specific quality’] is the modification of knowledge,
the reason is recognized by only one of the two [debaters]585 (anyataråsiddhi). We do not
accept that knowledge etc. are qualities as you think [but we regard them as substance(namely dharmabhËtajñåna) and its modifications]; hence [the reason] proves what has
been already proved and does not exist in the subject (svarËpåsidddhi) [because the self
itself is not the substratum of them but attributive knowledge is the substratum of its
modifications such as icchå] [254].
The [two] examples are devoid of its ground and does not have the probandum,
because we do not accept ether and other [elements] in the universal destruction, [which583

Accoding to Nyåya-Vaißeshika, the guˆas of åtman are fourteen: saµkhyå,parimåˆa, p®thaktva, saµyoga, vibhåga, buddhi, sukha, du˙kha, icchå, dvesha, prayatna,
dharma, adharma, saµskåra (italicized ones are the vißeshaguˆas of åtman).
584
585

E.g. “na vijñåtur vijñåter viparilopo vidyate” [B®hUp IV. iii. 30].

anyataråsiddha˙ kåryatvåd anitya˙ ßabda˙ [PrPBh] iti / yady api ßabde vastuta˙kåryatvam asti, tathåpi vipratipannasya m¥måµsakasyåsiddham iti [Nyåyakandal¥ (GOS)
p.565].

158

merge into ahaµkåra at that time], and we accept that even a pot in the moment of its
origination has qualities. You cannot pose prak®ti in the universal destruction as theexample, because it also has guˆas (or qualities) such as sattva and because [prak®tiitself] is not accepted by the other [schools such as the Nyåya-Vaißeshika]. Likewise,
according to our opinion that [the specific qualities such as icchå etc. are] the modificationsof knowledge, whether the knowledge in the liberation is devoid of all the specificqualities or not, it cannot be the example because [the opinion] is not accepted by theother schools. For they do not accept knowledge as substance and its modifications.

[Obj.] The venerable Yåmuna-muni regards even what is called kaivalya (orisolation), which is in the form of the contemplation of bliss of one's own self, as
liberation:*In the eighth chapter, the varieties of the things which are to be understood andacquired586 by those who seek for aißvarya (supernatural lordship), the true natureof the imperishable (aksharayåthåtmya) [or one's own self in pure form, i.e.
kaivalya], and the feet of God are mentioned [G¥tårthasaµgraha 12];
likewise,*[Without the grace of Lakshm¥], it would [never] be possible for people to join
worldly enjoyment (saµs®ti) [or aißvarya], the imperishable and the abode ofVishˆu [Catu˙ßlok¥ 3].
And the author of the commentaries also follows these contents. That is, to theverse beginning with:*Four kinds of [men] are devoted to Me [255] [BhG VII. 16]
it is commented:*[The third devotee is] ‘jijñåsu,’ namely, one who want to attain the true natureof the [individual] self as is distinct from the prak®ti [GBh VII. 16: 248,6f.]
and so on. Also in the introduction of the eighth chapter it is said, in accordance withthe content of the seventh [chapter], that:*And [He has taught] the differences among those who meditate for the sake ofaißvarya, the true nature of the imperishable and the attainment of God in
586

What are to be understood are explained in BhG VIII. 3[–5], and what are to
be acquired are the meditation of God, final conviction (antimapratyaya) and the meditationof the way [after death] in accordance with each fruit [Deßika's Rakshå].

159

accordance with the degree of their good deeds and the distinction inunderstanding587 [BhG VIII. 0: 262,6]
and so on. Likewise, by saying that:*[Then He] speaks of the manner of meditation (smaraˆa) of he who seeks for
kaivalya588 (kaivalyårthin) [GBh VIII. 11: 271,1],
the verse beginning with:*That which [knowers of Vedas speak of] as imperishable [BhG VIII. 11],is introduced; and in the commentary on the verses beginning with:*All the doorways [BhG VIII. 12],
it is said that:*Uttering one syllable ‘om,’ which is Brahman, i.e. which denotes Me, [and]remembering Me, who am denoted [by it], fixing his own vital air in the head,
whoever abandons the body and departs reaches the supreme goal. The meaning
is: he attains the self as is distinct from prak®ti, which is of similar form to Me
and from which there is no return [to transmigration] [GBh VIII. 12–13: 272,2–4].
And immediately afterwards, having said that:*Thus the method of meditation on God by seekers of aißvarya and seekers ofkaivalya has been said in accordance with the goal they attain [GBh VIII. 14:
274,1–276,1],
the verse that:*[For that yogins] whose mind is not in anything else [BhG VIII. 14]
is commented. Having said that:*Hereafter in the remaining portion of [this] chapter [256], [He] explains that thejñånin589 and the seeker of kaivalya do not return and that the seeker of kaivalya
and that the seeker of aißvarya returns [GBh VIII. 15: 277,5],
the verses beginning with:*Having attained Me [BhG VIII. 15]
and ending with:*[It] rises up [again] at the coming of the day [of Brahmå] [BhG VIII. 19]
587

pratipatti. Ónadåßrama ed. of GBh reads: prapatti.

588jijñåsu = kaivalyårthin; see K .

589jñån¥ … bhagavaccheshataikarasåtmasvarËpavit prak®tiviyuktakevalåtmany
aparyavasyan bhagavantaµ prepsu˙ bhagavantam eva paramapråpyaµ manvåna˙ [GBhVII. 16: 249,1–3].

160

are commented; and further, having said that:*[Now He] explains that there is no return even for those who attain kaivalya[GBh VIII. 20–21: 281,1],
the verses beginning with:*Higher than this, however [BhG VIII. 20]
and ending with:*This is My highest abode [BhG VIII. 21]
are also commented. And immediately afterwards, having said that:*[Now He] explains that the object attained by the jñånin is, however, quite
different from this [GBh VIII. 22: 283,5],the verse that:*That Supreme person [BhG VIII. 22]
is commented. And immediately afterwards, it is said that:*[Now He] explains the way beginning with light, which is common to both one
who knows the true nature of the self (åtmayåthåtmyavid) [i.e. the seeker ofkaivalya] and one who are devoted to the Supreme Person [i.e. the jñånin] [GBh
VIII. 23: 284,2]
Now the commentary thereof is quoted here:*It is said in the ßrutis that the way beginning with light is common to boththese. And [the way] is characterized by non-return. For instance, [it is taught]
on the knowledge of the five fires (pañcågnividyå) that:“Those who know it in this way, [i.e. those who know the knowledge of the fivefires590], and those who in forest meditate tapas with faith, [i.e. those who meditate
on Brahman with faith591], go to light, and from the light to the sun” [ChUp V. x.
590

See “‘ya itthaµ vidu˙’ iti pañcågnividyånish†hån … uddißya …” [Ír¥Bh III.
iii. 32: 496,9f.].Cf. Raµgaråmånuja's comm. on ChUp.
591

See Ír¥Bh III. iii. 32: “‘… ye cåm¥ araˆye ßraddhåµ satyam upåsate …’[B®hUp VI. ii. 15] iti våjasaneyake, ‘… ye ceme 'raˆye ßraddhå tapa ity upåsate …’[ChUp V. x. 1] iti chåndogye / … ‘ye ceme’ ityådinå ßraddhåpËrvakaµ brahmopås¥nåµß
codißya … / … satyaßabdasya brahmaˆi prasiddhe tapa˙ßabdasyåpi tenaikårthyåt
satyatapa˙ßabdåbhyåµ brahmaivåbhidh¥yate” [496,7–497,3]; “atra våjasaneyake‘ßraddhåµ satyam’ iti ßraddhåßabdasya dvit¥yåntatvaßravaˆåd ihåpi ßraddhåßabdo dvit¥yånta˙ / chåndasatvåt ‘[chandasi] sUPåµ sU-luK-…’ [P 7. 1. 39] iti sUPo luK / tataß capurask®tye 'dhyåhåra˙ / (1) ßraddhå purask®tya brahmopåsate ity artha˙ / itis tv
avivakshita˙ / athavå evakåro 'trådhyåhartavya˙ / (2) brahmety eva ya upåsate ity artha˙ /tataß cåbrahmopåsanavyåv®ttiphalako 'yam itißabdo drash†avya˙ / yadvå
ßraddhåtapaßabdayo˙
prasiddhaevårtha˙/ßraddhåtapa˙paråyaˆånåccabrahmavidyånish†hatvam arthasiddham / tataß ca (3) brahmavidyånish†hå ity artha˙”[Raµgaråmånuja's comm. on ChUp: 628,8–15 (ed. Viraraghavachari)].

161

1].
And it is said in the scriptures that one who travels the way beginning lightattains Brahman and never returns:“The [non-human person] leads them to Brahman. … Those who proceed by this[way] do not return to this human condition” [ChUp IV. xv. 6].
Moreover, this ßruti regarding the goal described in the portion that:“Those who know it in this way” [ChUp V. x. 1]
is not with reference to the attainment of the self as is subsidiary to the knowledgeof the Supreme [Brahman], which is taught in the instruction of Prajåpati592 andthe like; for, [if it were so], the ßruti teaching the knowledge of the Supreme
separately that:“And those who in forest meditate on faith as tapas” [ChUp V. x. 1]
would be meaningless.
And in the knowledge of the five fires, the passages that:“Thus, indeed, in the fifth oblation [consisting of semen], [subtle elements
described as] ‘water’ become what are called ‘man’” [ChUp V. ix. 1][and that:]“Those whose deed has been good [will attain good birth] …; but those whose
deed has been evil [will attain evil birth] ” [ChUp V. x. 7]
teach that the state of human being etc. caused by good and evil deeds refers
only to waters mixed with other elements and that the self is merely united withthem; consequently, the distinction between spiritual beings and non-spiritual
things is declared there. After that, it is understood that the passages that:“Those who know it in this way … go to light” [ChUp V. x. 1][and that:]“[Those who proceed by this way] do not return to this human condition” [ChUp
IV. xv. 6],
declare that those who knows the distinct spiritual and non-spiritual entities as
what is to be rejected and what is to be attained in this way go to the way
beginning with light and never return.
Concerning one who knows the true nature of the self and one who are devoted
592

The content of Prajåpativåkya (ChUp VIII. vii–xii) is summarized in thepËrvapaksha of Ír¥Bh I. iii. 18 [42,8–46,8]. It teaches the true nature of the liberated self
as is merely helpful to the daharavidyå, one of the paravidyås (prajåpativåkye ca muktåtmasvarËpayåthåtmyavijñånaµ daharavidyopayogitayoktam) [Ír¥Bh I. iii. 19: 47,2f.].

162

to the Supreme Person, the passage that:“The [non-human person] leads them to Brahman” [ChUp IV. xv. 6] [257]teaches the attainment of Brahman; accordingly, the [individual] self distinct
from non-spiritual things is to be contemplated as having its sole delight in thesubordination to Brahman593 (brahmaßeshataikarasa) because of its having
Brahman for its [inner] Self. Another reason is the maxim “what you meditate iswhat you attain594” (tatkratunyåya).595 And its having its sole delight in thesubordination to the Supreme [Brahman] is proved in the ßrutis such as:“He who dwells in the self … whose body is the self” [B®hUp III. vii. 22(Mådhyandina rec.)][GBh VIII. 23: 284,3–285,2].
Thus it is established that there is the way beginning with light even for the seeker ofthe imperishable.
In commenting the verse regarding the purport of this ‘imperishable’ that:*Which is not destroyed when all the elements are destroyed [BhG VIII. 20],
it is said that:*[Which] is, when all the elements such as ether are destroyed with their causes
and effects, not destroyed, though it exists in each of them [GBh VIII. 20–21:
282,2–3].
[The statement seems to declare that the imperishable or kaivalya is still in the material
world, but] it is also with reference to [not kaivalya but] the condition mixed with
non-spiritual things. For, otherwise, it would be contradictory to the above-mentioned
way [beginning with light].
And in the twelfth chapter, on the verse that:*But those who [meditate on] the imperishable [BhG XII. 3],
it is said that:
593

Comparing with the phrases ‘ßeshataikasvarËpa’ and ‘ßeshataikarati’ in BhG,
van Buitenen translates it as ‘having as its sole joy and essence the being a ßesha of theSupreme Person’ [Råmånuja on the BhG, p.35 n.349].
594“tatkratu˙ tathopås¥nas tathaiva pråpnot¥ty artha˙ / ‘yathåkratur asmin loke
purusho bhavati tatheta˙ pretya bhavati’ [ChUp III. xiv. 1] ‘taµ yathå yathopåsate’[MudgalaUp 3] iti nyåyåt” [Ír¥Bh IV. iii. 14: 625,1f.].
595

Cf. “pañcågnivido 'py arcirådinå gatißravaˆåd arcirådinå gatasya brahmapråptyapunaråv®ttißravaˆåc ca, ata eva tatkratunyåyåt prak®tivinirmuktabrahmåtmakåtmånusandhånaµ siddham” [Ír¥Bh IV. iii. 14: 625,2–4].

163*Even they can (eva) attain Me. The meaning is: Even they can attain the self
whose form is smilar to Mine and which is free from transmigration [GBh XII.
3–5: 395,6].
Therefore, isn't it that this liberation called kaivalya is in confirmity with our
traditional doctorine?
So do hold some [scholars of our sect].

To this, our answer is as follows.
First, such liberation is not accepted by the author of the commentaries, as isclearly stated in the Íår¥rakabhåshya [or the Ír¥bhåshya]. That is, to begin with, in the
topic that:*Because of the connection of the sentences [BrSË I. iv. 19],
having said that:*Because the knowledge (vedana) of the Supreme Person is taught as the onlymeans for the immortality [Ír¥Bh I. iv. 19: II 144,11f.],
it is stated that:*The [knowledge] on the essential nature of the [individual] self, who is theglory (vibhËti) of the Supreme Person and the attainer (pråpt®), should beunderstood as being helpful to the knowledge of the Supreme Person, which
realizes the liberation, and not as being an independent means of itself [Ír¥Bh I.
iv. 19: II 144,12f.].
Likewise, in the explanation on the passage that:*There is the question regarding a man who has departed [Ka†haUp I. i. 20][258],
having shown the distinction in the concept of liberation among the various schools, thestatement beginning with:*But those who are well versed in the Vedånta [Sr¥Bh I. ii. 12: 305,18]
firstly points out the essential form (svarËpa) and attribute596 (svabhåva) of the individual596

On the distinction between the two terms, Deßika poses two interpretations in
his Tåtparyacanddrikå ad GBh XVIII. 55: 1) svarËpa is with reference to dharmin andsvabhåva to dharma; 2) svarËpaßabda˙ svarËpanirËpakadharmapara˙, svabhåvaßabdas
tu saulabhyapara˙ iti kecit [587,6ff.]. Cf. Carman, Theology, chap.6 (esp. p.91).

164

self and the Supreme, and says that:*… hold that liberation is the direct experience of the Highest Self in inherent
nature based on the removal of ignorance by the individual self, whose essential
form is concealed by the ignorance composed of the beginningless karma [Sr¥Bh
I. ii. 12: 306,2f.].
In the Vedårthasaµgraha, it is stated:*The attainment of the essential form of the [individual] self released from all
karma597 is implied in the attainment of God. Because the passage:“Those desires are real [but] concealed by the unreal (asatya)” [ChUp VIII. iii.
1],
teaches one's own karma as concealing the host of the qualities of God by theword ‘unreal’598 [VAS §129: 160,12–161,2].
Likewise, Varadavishˆu-mißra also raises the question that:*Isn't it that [the self] in attaining kaivalya has not be liberated yet? Because all
his karma has not been perished, as is explained [?],and states:*True, he has not be liberated. Because liberation is composed of the direct
experience of the bliss of the Supreme Self and because he does not have thedirect experience of the bliss of Brahman but has the mere direct experience of
his own self. And concerning the direct experience of one's own self says VenerableParåßara:“For the yogins who satisfy with their own self,599 there is the immortal state [i.e.
kaivalya]”600 [ViP I. vi. 38].
The non-transient (anapåyin) [state] different from liberation [i.e. kaivalya] is597

sarvakarmavinirmukta. Van Buitenen's text of VAS: °karmabandhavinirmukta.

598

The Tåtparyad¥pikå of SudarßanasËri comments: If all the karma that conceals
is destroyed, there is the attainment of the self; what conceals the host of the qualities of
God is also the karma. Thus in the attainment of the self caused by the cessation of [thekarma], the attaiment of God is also established because what conceals the host of thequalities of God also ceases at that time (tirodhåyakasarvakarmavinåße hy åtmapråpti˙bhagavadguˆånåm
api
tirodhåyakaµ
karmetitanniv®ttipËrvakåtmapråptau
bhagavadguˆatirodhåyakaniv®tter api bhåvåd bhagavatpråpti˙ siddhyati) [TD 315,16ff.].
599

svåtmasantoshiˆaß ca ye. U reads in parenthesis: svåtmasantoshakåriˆåm, whichis adopted in TC [VIII. 23: 286,15f.].
600

The next verse describes the liberation: ekåntina˙ sadå brahmadhyåyino yoginaßca ye / teshåµ tu paramaµ sthånaµ yat tat paßyanti sËraya˙.

165[nothing but] aißvarya attained by Yogic power [?].
Bha††a-Paråßara-påda shows in the Adhyåtmakhaˆ∂advayavyåkhyå601 that aißvarya
and the imperishable is same in being different from liberation:*It602 is based on the indifference [or rather] aversion to the enjoyment of aißvarya
and

the

imperishable,

which

are

different[fromliberation][Adhyåtmakhaˆ∂advayavyåkhyå].
Furthermore, if [kaivalya] were liberation, there is no termination without attaining
the inherent form; [hence] if there were the termination [in kaivalya], it should bethought as a kind of eternal transmigration (nityasaµsåra).
[Obj.] How can [the self] without body be in transmigration? [259][Ans.] I ask in reply: Why is [the self] fallen in the condition of the universal
destruction [in transmigration]?
[Obj.] Because even at that time he is connected with the subtle non-spiritual[entities] fit for the production of his future bodies and the like.
[Ans.] Then even in the case of [one who is in kaivalya], the connection with
non-spiritual [entities] is to be accepted.603 Thus, the only difference is whether the[future] bodies will be produced or not.
[Obj.] What is the proof on his connection with non-spiritual [entities]?
[Ans.] Because he has not experienced his own true nature and that of theSupreme. For it is the individual self existing in the curtain of måyå604 who cannot know
the true nature.
[Obj.] What is the cause of it?
601

Oberhammer guess that the work is the commentary on the SubålaUp [1979:
217ff.]; but his discussion is not persuasive enough.
602= brahmajñånam? [Oberhammer 1979: 83].

603

In this regard, TC quotes the description on prak®tilaya in theSåµkhyatattvakumud¥ 44 [286,18ff.]
604

Here måyå means prak®ti. Cf. Deßika's commentary on the Catu˙ßlok¥ v.1b
(yavanikå måyå): måyåßabdo 'yam “måyåµ tu prak®tiµ vidyåt” [ÍveUp IV. 10] iti
prak®tivishayatayå ßvetåßvatarair adh¥ta˙ [ed. V. Srivatasankacharyar 3,2f.].

166[Ans.] It is his specific karma. And in the Vedårthasaµgraha it is stated:*The attainment of the essential form of the [individual] self released from all
karma is implied in the attainment of God. Because the passage:“Those desires are real [but] concealed by the unreal (asatya)” [ChUp VIII. iii.
1],
teaches one's own karma as concealing the host of the qualities of God by theword ‘unreal’ [VAS §129: 160,12–161,2].
If he had not experience the true nature of the Highest Self, even though all his ignorance(or karma) has perished, so would be the other [meditators of Brahman]: [nobody could
not experience His true nature]. That much would be his own nature.
[Obj.] Why doesn't he return to transmigration, though he is still connected with
non-spiritual [entities]?
[Ans.] You may think that the will of God born from his karma being the causeof his kaivalya is of such a kind.
[Obj.] Isn't it that one who is afflicted with three kinds of misery [260] can attainpurity only through the knowledge on God? Then, why can he forget God when heclearly experiences his own self?
[Ans.] You say properly. Still if you persist in the existence of kaivalya, thereason has been said before. And Ír¥-Vishˆucitta say in the Saµgatimålå:*Why does the meditation performed by a person wishing to attain Brahman
make attain kaivalya? Our answer is: As a person who performs sacrifices toattain the heaven (svarga) may become a brahmaråkshasa and the like when hedoes not perform them properly [Saµgatimålå].
[Obj.] Who longs for his own self, which is like a burnt seed as it lacks even a
bit of capability for the direct experience of God in His inherent nature?
[Ans.] What a surprise! Those who long for the heaven, cattle, a son, food asalms etc., which are not of such a kind, are seen; to say nothing of [the self], which isendowed with excellent bliss and is of such a kind. And it is well-known that one's own
self is the object of affection. So say the scriptures such as:*A certain person sees this [self] as a wonder [BhG II. 29].

167

The recognition in departing from deep sleep is: ‘I slept happily,’ as is said before.605
And it is explained in the [Ír¥-]bhåshya 606 and so on. And it is said by Ír¥-Vishˆucitta:*[That the self is of bliss is proved] through the fact that happiness is recognizedconcerning deep sleep, that people anger when it is interrupted, and that people
abandon other things for it; and also through thousands of ßruti and sm®ti [?].
[Obj.] Why is it called ‘liberation’ [in some texts]?
[Ans.] [Merely] because the body and its faculties, being the cause of misery,
are destroyed [there].
[Obj.] Through which way does one who attains kaivalya go on and where does
he stay?
[Ans.] Somewhere.607 Firstly, the way beginning with light and staying in [theplace] beyond prak®ti are not possible for him. Because the two are mentioned in theßrutis only in the contexts regarding one who meditates the Highest Self. The distinction
mentioned in the passage:*Those who know it in this way and those who in forest meditate on faith astapas [ChUp V. x. 1],
is also based on the difference between the contemplation upon one's own self as has theHighest Self as its self and the contemplation upon the Highest Self as has one's own
self as His body [261]. And if he went on through the way beginning with light, hewould inevitably destroy all his karma and Brahman through the attainment of theparticular place. Because the ßruti says:*The [non-human person] leads them to Brahman [ChUp IV. xv. 6].
And the [Brahma-]sËtra says:*And because it is shown in the ßruti608 [that one who goes on through the way
beginning with light attains Brahman] [BrSË IV. iii. 12].
And if [one who attains kaivalya went through the way], it would be hard to avoid theundesirable conclusion that he becomes all-knowing because his ignorance (or karma),
605

205,1ff.

606

See Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: (1) 166,4–169,11.

607

U adds yena kenåpi in parenthesis before yatrakutråpi in order to makecorrespond to the questions.
608

I.e. ChUp VIII. iii. 4.

168which causes his knowledge contracted, would be completely destroyed. Also VenerableYåmuna-muni, stating that:*[Without the grace of Lakshm¥, it would never be possible for people to join]
worldly enjoyment [or aißvarya], the imperishable and the abode of Vishˆu[Catu˙ßlok¥ 3],shows ‘the abode of Vishˆu’ separately [from the imperishable or kaivalya]. And to the[Brahma-]sËtra that:*And because of the statement of the way for one who has heard of Upanishads[BrSË I. ii. 17],
which intends to decide that ‘the person within the eyes609’ is the Highest Self, the[Ír¥-]Bhåshya states:*The way beginning with light is taught in the other ßrutis as having to contemplated
by one who has understood the true nature of the Highest Person; that way,
which is characterized by non-return and brings about the attainment of theHighest Person, is [taught610] to Upakosala, who has learned [about ‘the person
within the eyes’] [Ír¥Bh I. ii. 17: 4–5],
and so on. For this reason also, there is not the way beginning with light for one who
contemplates the mere self. Otherwise, this [statement of the way] could not decide [that‘the person within the eyes’] is the Highest Self.
All that should be explained on this point is clearly stated in the [Ír¥-]bhåshya
on the [Brahma-]sËtra that:*[The group of conductors] leads those who are not dependent on the symbols(aprat¥kålambana), thinks Bådaråyaˆa [BrSË IV. iii. 14] [262].
There it is affirmed through the maxim ‘what you meditate is what you attain’ etc. thateven a person attached to the Pañcågnividyå contemplates his own self distinct fromprak®ti as having Brahman for his Self.611 And it is denied that one who meditates hismere self mentioned by the word ‘pråˆa’ in the BhËmavidyå612 goes on the way beginning609

See ChUp IV. xv. 1.

610

In ChUp IV. xv. 5–6.

611

Cf. pañcågnivido 'py arcirådinå gatißravaˆåd årcirådinå gatasya brahmapråptyapunaråv®ttißravaˆåc ca, ata eva tatlratunyåyåt prak®tivinirmuktabrahmåtmakåtmånusandhånaµ siddham [Ír¥Bh IV. iii. 14: 625,2–4].
612

ChUp VII, explained in BrSË I. iii. 7–8 (adhikaraˆa 2: bhËmådhikaraˆa). The‘pråˆa’ mentioned in ChUp VII. xv, which denotes the individual self, is different from169

with light through the unmistakable declaration (kaˆ†okti):*For those who are dependent on the symbols beginning with nåma and ending
with pråˆa,613 however, neither the way beginning with light nor the attainmentof Brahman exists, because there is neither meditation such as is established inthe ßrutis614 and because the maxim ‘what you meditate is what you attain’ [canbe applied to the meditation of that mixed with non-spiritual entities615] [Ír¥Bh
IV. iii. 14: 625,4–5]
and so on. And another fruit is shown for those meditate [the symbols] beginning withnåma and ending with pråˆa in the [Brahma-]sËtra that:*And [the ßruti] shows the distinction616 [BrSË IV. iii. 15].
Additionally in the conclusion of this topic,617 it is stated:*Therefore, the conclusion is: The group of conductors does not lead those who
meditate the spiritual entity [i.e., the self] as mixed with non-spiritual entities orby itself,618 regarding it as Brahman or as separated from Him; on the other hand,
they leads those who meditate the Supreme Brahman and those who meditate
the [individual] self distinct from prak®ti as having Brahman for its Self. [Ír¥Bh
IV. iii. 15: 626,1–3].
‘bhËman’ in VII. xxiii–xxiv, which denotes the Highest Self: pråˆaßabdanirdish†åt pratyagåtmano 'dhikatayå nirdish†a˙ satyaßabdåbhidheyas tasmåd arthåntarabhËta eva, satyaßabdanirdish†a eva bhËmeti satyåkhyaµ paraµ brahmaiva bhËmety upadißyate [Ír¥Bh I.
iii. 7: 13,2f.].
613

Namely, nåma [ChUp VII. i], våk [ii], manas [iii], saµkalpa [iv], citta [v],dhyåna [vi], vijñåna [vii], bala [viii], anna [ix], ap [x], tejas [xi], åkåßa [xii], smara[xiii], åßå [xiv], pråˆa [xv]. See also BrSË IV. i. 4–5: prat¥kådhikaraˆa.
614

I.e. the meditation of Brahman as having one's own self for His body and the
meditation of one's own self as having Brahman for its self.
615

acinmißropåsane before tatkratunyåyåt is omitted in NyS.

616

I.e. “yåvan nåmno gatam, tatråsya yathåkåcåro bhavati” [ChUp VII. i. 5]ityådikå
ßrutirnåmådipråˆaparyantaprat¥kamupås¥nåµgatyanapekshaµparimitaphalavißeshaµ ca darßayati [Ír¥Bh IV. iii. 15: 625,8–9].
617
618

I.e. kåryådhikaraˆa (IV. iii. 6–15).

acinmißraµ kevalaµ vå cidvastu brahmad®sh†yå tadviyogena ca ya upåsate.
Kumåradeßika's commentary on the Adhikaraˆasåråvali v.512 (IV. iii, v.13) suggests
the double readings: ‘… vå cidvastu …’ and ‘vå 'cidvastu’ (kevalaµ våcidvastv iti
sandhivißeshåd akåraßlesha-aßleshåbhyåµ cid-acitor dvayor api grahaˆam) [749,17f.;
ed. Viraraghavachari]. Cf. VSåra IV. iii. 14: prat¥kålambanås tv acinmißraµ kevalam
acidvastu ca ‘siµho devadatta˙’ (itivad) brahmad®sh†yå svarËpeˆa vå tadvastu ya upåsate
te [151,7f.]. But TC [285,22ff.] quotes the passage with reference to citvastu only. Cf.
RTS XXIX: prak®tisaµs®sh†amåyå tal prak®tiviyuktamåyå tal irukkum åtmavastuvaisvarËpeˆavå tal brahamd®sh†yåveyå tal paˆˆum anusandhånaµka¬ nålukkumnåmådyupåsanaµka¬ukkuppØl„ arcirådigatiyum brahmapråptiyumillai [1143,9–1144,2].

170

Moreover, it is stated in the [Vedånta-]Såra:*Those who follow the pañcågnividyå, however, meditate the [individual] self
distinct from prak®ti as having Brahman for its Self [as understood619] throughthe passage:“He, who dwell in the self” [B®hUp III. vii. 22 (Mådhyandina-rec.)].
Therefore, they are included in those who are not dependent on the symbols.
And there is no contradiction to the maxim ‘what you meditate is what you
attain.’ Both completely meditate Brahman in different ways: some meditate
Brahman whose body is the [individual] self; others meditate their own selves
whose Self is Brahman [VSåra IV. iii. 14: 398,5–8].
See also the explanation in the [Vedånta-]D¥pa [on this topic].
Now that the above-mentioned is established, the sentences in the Ír¥madg¥tåbhåshya are also to be interpreted in accordance with it. First , there is no dispute that
one who follows the pañcågnividyå go on the way beginning with light. And it has been
proved that he meditates his own [individual] self as having Brahman for its Self. It is
uncertain whether his end of life is kaivalya only or the experience of Brahman also: it
seems that according to the Íår¥rakabhåshya and other [commentaries by the sameauthor on the BrahmasËtras], he experiences Brahman [but] that according to the natural
meaning of the Ír¥madg¥tå-bhåshya, [he experiences] kaivalya [only]. But we havealready shown the interpretation of these works as is not contradictory each other in[my] commentary on the Ír¥madg¥tå-bhåshya named Tåtparyacandrikå.620 [268]In this regard, some points are mentioned here.
The portion beginning with:*[Now He] explains the way beginning with light, which is common to both one
who knows the true nature of the self (åtmayåthåtmyavid) [i.e. the seeker ofkaivalya] and one who are devoted to the Supreme Person [i.e. the jñånin] [GBh619620

NyS om. avagata°.

TC VIII. 23: 285,8–288,9; especially 285,10–12: “It is accepted that one who
follows the pañcågnividyå [or kaivalyårthin] also can attain the Highest Self. In attaining
Him, what is enjoyed by jñånins is the Highest Self qualified by their [individual]
selves. But those who seek for the true nature of the self [or kaivalyårthin] first enjoy
their own selves … and at last they attain Brahman” (pañcågnivido 'pi paramåtmapråptir
asty eveti sv¥kartavyam / tatra pråptau jñåninåµ paramåtmå svavißish†o bhogyam; aksharayåthåtmyanish†hånåµ tu svasvarËpam eva pËrvaµ bhogyam, … antato brahmapråpti˙).

171

VIII. 23: 284,2]
should be thought as not referring to those who seek [only] for kaivalya and those who
seek for the Supreme Person only because they are referred (prastuta). On the other
hand, this [portion] is with reference to the knower of Brahman divided into two: one
who contemplates his own self as having the Highest Self for its Self and one who
contemplates the Highest Self as having his own self for His body. [Only] in that case,the word ‘one who knows the true nature of the self’ is well suitable. The unnaturalcontent in the portion of one book [i.e., the Ír¥madg¥tå-bhåshya] should be grasped so as
to be fit for the natural content in many books [i.e., the commentaries by the sameauthor on the BrahmasËtras]. And it is not contradictory at all to the statement ofVenerable Yåmunamuni. In the Ír¥madg¥tå-bhåshya also, it was clearly taught that one
who follows the pañcågnividyå contemplates his own self as having Brahman for its
Self and he attains Brahman according to the maxim ‘what you meditate is what you
attain.’ [269]Some hold: What is enjoyed in kaivalya is one's own self being Brahman andthere Brahman is merely appeared as the qualifier of one's own self.
But in this case it could not be called kaivalya.
Those who know the true nature of the self621 hold: this [kaivalya] is difficult to
explain from the viewpoint of its means, its way, its proof and its mode.

(38)

This [individual self], [like an actor], having gradually attained beautiful roles[such as a god, a man, an animal and a bird] which are formed due to his various karma[270] and delighting a certain rich person (or God accompanied with Ír¥) by means of acertain wonderful drama [i.e., his life], directs his mind to the core of the scriptures after
considering [miseries such as entering] womb [again and again]622; and he, attaining
wealth due to his completion of the vidyå, shines in the heart.
621= Vådihaµsåbda (or Ótreya Råmånuja) etc. (K). The portion discussing kaivalya
of his Nyåyakulißa is not extant now, but his commentary on the Mumukshuppa†i
named Tåtparyad¥pikå [MGO No.] also discusses the problem; see Viraraghvachari fn.
622

Here Deßika uses technical terms of Indian dramaturgy: mukha, pratimukha,
garbha, avamarßa, and nirvahaˆa, which are known as five sandhis or dramatic divisions(See Såhityadarpaˆa 330–32).

172

Here ends the second section on the individual self in the Nyåyasiddhåñjana
composed by Ír¥mat-Veµka†anåtha or Vedåntåcårya, who is the lion among
poets and logicians and who masters all branches of arts.

Chapter 3 God

173

Now God (¥ßvara) is considered.
The definitions of God are: (1) being the lord (¥ßvara) of all; (2) while pervasive,623
being intelligent; (3) being the Principal to which all are subordinate624 (sarvaßeshitva);(4) being to be propitiated by all [ritual] actions; (5) being the bestower of all fruits; (6)being the substratum of all; (8) producing all the effects; (9) having, as the body, all thesubstances other than its own knowledge and Himself625 [272]; (10) having [auspicious
623

By this attribute, God is distinguished from the individual self (j¥va) (K).
Although our author holds that the individual self is regarded as atomic (aˆu) inthe Vißish†ådvaita siddhånta (see NySi 208,3–213,17; TMK II. 19–24), some åcåryas'
descriptions seem to suggest that the individual self becomes all-pervasive when liberated;
thus, Deßika tries to find their real imports (See NySi 209,4–210,2 for Yåmuna;212,3–213,6 for Varadavishˆu Mißra; 213,7–17 for Råmånuja).
Especially for the size of the individual self according to Yåmuna, whose opinion
may be misunderstood due to the lack of the extant text of ÓS, see Mesquita, Yåmunåcåryas
Lehre von der Größe des Ótman, WZKS 33 (1989): 129–50.
624

The meaning of ßeßin in Råmånuja is discussed in Carman 1974: 147–57(summarized in Carman-Narayanan 1989: 136–38).
625

This definition of God is based on an accidental definition (ta†asthalakshaˆa)of the body “A body is a substance other than God and His knowledge (¥ßvaratajjñånavyatiriktaµ dravyaµ ßar¥ram)” [NySi 166,5].
In the portion of NySi dealing with the definition of the body, Vedånta Deßika,following Råmånuja's definition (Ír¥Bh II. i. 9; 222.11–223,1: yasya cetanasya yad
dravyaµ sarvåtmanå svårthe niyantuµ dhårayituµ ca ßakyaµ taccheshataikasvarËpaµca tat tasya ßar¥ram) and SudarßanasËri's commentary thereon [ÍP 222,32–223,17],
gives following three definitions of the body, that is, (I) “If a substance found in acertain condition is, so long as it exists, unable not to be associated with an intelligent
being and, within its capacity, is to be controlled by nature— it is, in this condition, thebody of the intelligent being (yasya cetanasya yadavasthaµ dravyaµ yåvatsattam
asambandhånarhaµ svaßakye niyantavyasvabhåvaµ tadavasthaµ tasya ßar¥ram)” [NySi
160,1–2]; (II) “If for an intelligent being, a substance found in a certain condition is, solong as it exists, to be supported—it is, in this condition, the body of the intelligent
being (yasya cetanasya yadavasthaµ dravyaµ yåvatsattaµ dhåryaµ tadavasthaµ tasyaßar¥ram)” [ibid. 164,6]; (III) “If to an intelligent being, a substance found in a certain
condition cannot, so long as it exists, be non-subordinate—it is, in this condition, thebody of the intelligent being (yasya cetanasya yadavasthaµ dravyaµ yåvatsattam
aßeshatånarhaµ tadavasthaµ tasya ßar¥ram)” [ibid. 163,1–164,1]. Also Deßika shows
another definition as what is really intended by Råmånuja: (IV) “If of an intelligent

174

qualities] like ‘having will to be realized (satyasaµkalpa),626’ and so on. [273]
In the SËtra “[From which] the birth etc. [of this world],627” one unit of the originetc., [i.e. the creation, the sustenance and the absorption of the world], is said to be thedefinition, though any one of them alone could be the definition.628 That should be
regarded as for repelling the question of a fool that these three are [respectively] doneby three [different] doers, [i.e. Brahmå, Vishˆu and Íiva]. And also in the passage
beginning with “[Brahman is] true, [knowledge and infinite629],” while only the word
‘infinite’ could exclude all [other things from Him], there are the previous two qualifiers
being, a substance found in a certain condition is an inseparable qualifier—it is the bodyof the intelligent being (yasya cetanasya yadavastham ap®thaksiddhavißeshaˆaµ dravyaµ
tat tasya ßar¥ram)” [ibid. 165,2–3 ≈ TMK IV 83: dh¥tulyåßrayaµ yad vapur idam
ap®thaksiddhamad dravyam asya ]. Concerning these definitions, Deßika explains theword “an intelligent being” to point out that the intelligent-ness (caitanya) of an intelligent
being is excluded from the body of the intelligent being. In other words, the knowledge,
attributive-cum-substantive according to the Vißish†ådvaiata, is not the body of theintelligent being (cetanyasya caitanyavißish†asyety artha˙; tena caitanyasya tattadåßrayaµprati ßar¥ratvavyavaccheda˙ [ibid. 160,2–3]. Cf. SAS IV. 83: cetanasyeti caitanyavißish†atayå pratisambandhitayå nirdeßåd dharmabhËtajñånasya ßar¥ratvaµ nirasyate, na
hi jñånaµ jñånavißish†asyådheyavidheyaßeshabhËtam; ÍP 223,26f.: jñånavyåv®ttyarthaµcetanasyety uktam: na hi jñånaµ jñånavißish†ena niyåmyam, api tu svåßrayeˆa). This is
expounded by Raµgaråmånuja as follows: “If something were controlled by what isqualified by itself, it would be controlled by itself; for what is related to the qualified isinvariably related to the qualified. The attributive knowledge, therefore, is not the bodyof its substratum [or what is qualified by this knowledge]. Yet it can be the body ofGod. As to the knowledge of God, it is nobody's body (svasya svavißish†aniyåmyatve
vißish†ånvayino vißeshaˆånvayitvaniyamena svasya svaniyåmyatvaprasaµgåt svadharmabhËtajñånaµ svåßrayaµ prati na ßar¥ram; ¥ßvaraµ prati tu ßar¥raµ bhavaty eva, ¥ßvarajñånaµ tu na kasyåpi ßar¥ram)” [R 160,7–9]. Thus the above accidental definition isachieved.
For further discussion on the definition of the body, see the chapter of ßar¥ralakshaˆain the Nayadyumaˆi of Meghånanda and Viraraghavachari's Skt intro. thereon (ed. V.
Krishnamacharya and U. Viraraghavacarya, Madras Government Oriental Ser., 1956).
626

E.g. ChUp VIII. i. 5 etc.: esha åtmåpahatapåpmå vijaro vim®tyur vißoko
vijighatso 'pipåsa˙ satyakåma˙ satyasaµkalpa˙.
627BrSË I. i. 2: janmådy asya yata˙.

628

Cf. NySi 158,9f.: janmåditrayasya brahmalakshaˆatva iva tatråpi na vyavacchedyaµ siddham asti; ßaµkitaµ tu samam.
629

TaiUp II. i. 2: satyaµ jñånam anantaµ brahma.

175

because [these three qualifiers] exclude [non-Brahman] in order of those which might
be suspected [to be Brahman].630 The other [definitions of such kind 631] are to be interpreted
in this way. [274]He is one because the Írutis state that He is non-dual632 and that He is devoid of
the equal and the better.633
He alone is Brahman. Because only He, who is free from three kinds of limitation,634[275] is, as one who is made up of all, said in the Írutis to be ‘excessively great (b®hat)’or ‘making [others] great (b®µhaˆa)’635.
As respects passages [in which other deities are called the highest one] such as“All gods are Agni,636” “All this is Ap,637” “All gods are of Brahmå,638” and “Nonesurpasses you, Indra, 639” it is decided that they have another import [namely, praising aparticular ritual]. For they are mutually contradictory and are [but] subordinate to theinjunction of a ritual; thus, these [deities] cannot have ultimate Brahmanhood and other630

In this passage, ‘satya’ (or sharing being-ness without any limiting adjunct)excludes non-intelligent things and the non-liberated self (baddha), which may be calledby other names due to some limiting adjuncts; ‘jñåna’ (or constantly having non-contracted
knowledge) excludes the liberated self, whose knowledge is once contracted; and ‘ananta’(or having no limitation) excludes eternal seers (nitya). Thus, prak®ti, baddha, mukta
and nitya—which are in turn suspected to be God by a student—are excluded in thisorder. See Ír¥Bh I. i. 2: 113,2–116,1.
631

R refers to “nityaµ vijñånam ånandaµ brahman” [?], “avikåråya ßuddhåya
nityåya paramåtmane” [ViP I. ii. 1].
632

R refers to ChUp VI. ii. 1: ekam evådvit¥yam.

633

R refers to ÍveUp VI. 8: na tatsamaß cåbhyadhikaß d®ßyate.

634

God is devoid of limitation in space, time and entity (deßakålavastuparicchedarahita). See Ír¥Bh I. i. 2: 115,1f. For the further detail, see NySi 322,5ff.
635

Cf. Ír¥Bh I. i. 2: 110,5f.: upalakshyaµ hy anavadhikåtißayab®had b®µhaˆaµca, b®hater dhåtos tadarthatvåt..

III. 9.

636

agni˙ sarvå devatå˙. To be identified.

637Mahånåråyaˆa-Up XIV. 1 (= TaiÓr X. 22. 1).

638

bråhmaˆo vai sarvå devatå˙. To be identified.

639

Ùgveda IV. 30. 1. Other similar passages are cited and interpreted in TMK

176[qualities of God]. In the context regarding the cause [of the world], one and the same[God] is designated in specific term or general terms640 like sat, asat, avyåk®ta, brahman,åtman, åkåßa, pråˆa, ßiva, nåråyaˆa.641 [276][Objection:] Some scorpions are produced from cow-dung, some are from a[mother-]scorpion etc.: [the cause of a scorpion is not fixed]. In the same way, the causeof the creation of the world is not fixed owing to the difference in time and space; [inother words, the cause of the creation is different in each kalpa and cosmic-egg642].
[Replied:] It cannot be said so. Because the difference [in the case of the creation]
could not be proved by other means of knowledge [than the Scriptures]. Yet by meansof the Scriptures we identify [various descriptions of the creation] as belonging to one
and the same context and, accordingly, owing to the interpretational rule of apprehension
in all the recensions643 (sarvaßåkhåpratyayanyåya) [277] and the interpretational rule of640

SAS III. 5 lists sat, brahman, åtman, purusha, pråˆa and akshara as having aroom for the suspicion that it imports other entities (ßaµkitånyårtha).
641

R refers to “sad eva somyedam agra ås¥t” [ChUp VI. ii. 1], “asad vå idam agraås¥t” [ChUp III. xix. 1, VI. ii. 1], “tad dhedaµ tarhy avyåk®tam ås¥t” [B®hUp I. iv. 7],“brahma vå idam agra ås¥t” [B®hUp I. iv. 10, 11], “åtmå vå idam eka evågra ås¥t”[AitUp I. 1], “sarvåˆi ha vå imåni bhËtåny åkåßåd eva samutpadyante” [ChUp I. ix. 1](Cf. BrSË I. i. 23), “pråˆam evåbhisaµvißanti” [ChUp I. xi. 5] (Cf. BrSË I. i. 24), “nasan nåsac chiva eva kevala˙” [ÍveUp IV. 18], “eko ha vai nåråyaˆa ås¥t” [MahåUp 1].
642

Cf. SAS III. 14 [66,7f.]: “The [mere] assumption that ‘the three rulers [Vishˆu,Brahmå and Íiva] take turns at possessing strong ruling power and weak one, like a rimof a wheel, in accordance with the difference of kalpa divided by the dominance of oneof the [three] guˆas, namely, sattva, [rajas and tamas respectively]’ is thrown away.
(traya¥ßvarå˙
sattvådiguˆonmeshabhidurakalpabhedåc
cakranemin¥tyå
nimnonnataißvaryå iti kalpanåpi nirastå).” Ód ascribes this view to one sect of the Íaiva
(ßaivaikadeßin). According to the verses cited there (to be traced out), Vishˆu, Íiva andBrahmå correspond to såttvika, tåmasa and råjasa kalpa respectively.
643

The sarvaßåkhåpratyayanyåya is the principle explained in the ßåkhåntara-adhi°,M¥SË II. iv. 8–33. In this adhi°, against the pËrvapaksha that “When a ruitual is mentioned
in difference Vedic recensions, it is regarded as different because of difference in name”
etc. (sË° 8), the siddhåntin answers: “[It is], however, one; for there is no difference inconnection [with the result], in form, in injunction and in name” [sË° 9] (cited with
explanation in Ír¥Bh III. iii. 1: 461,2ff.) and so forth. That is, though different qualities
and so on are ascribed to one ritual in different Vedic recensions, the ritual is still one
and keeps all the qualties and so on together. (For the detail of this nyåya, see HDhÍ IV:
453–455. Cf. ÍP ad III. i. 1: 460,16ff. and Ír¥Bh (R-V) I: 30, fn.)

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common [rule] and specific [rule]644 (såmånyavißeshanyåya) [and] because of the directstatement that [the cause] is one645 and the like, we can [conclude that these passages
describe] the same content [in different ways]. Thus, we cannot assume the difference.
For the same reason, pradhåna and the like cannot be Brahman.
Neither Brahmå, nor Rudra (or Íiva). For they are proved to be the individual
selves because of the Írutis teaching that they are created, that they are dissolved [at theuniversal destruction], that they are subject to karma etc.646(39)

Those who are directly said to be an effect or to be subject to karma, [e.g.,
Rudra, Brahmå etc.], cannot be the cause [of the world]. [Although some
Scriptures mention of the creation of Vishˆu as well647], for the cause whose
sin is destroyed, [i.e., Vishˆu], it is appropriate to be an effect for sport (l¥lå)

Likewise the cause of the world, though different names and qualities are ascribedto it, is one and only. The sarvavedåntapratyayanyåya mentioned in BrSË III. iii. 1–5(adhi° 1) [cf. NySi 235,2] is the Vedånta version of this nyåya.
644

The interpretational rule that “A genaral rule, when not clear, shall be restrictedto specific one (såmånyavidhir aspash†a˙ saµhriyate vißeshata˙)” [TV ad III. iv. adhi°
14 (IV 425); quoted in MNP §112]. This rule is discussed in M¥SË VI. viii. 30–43(adhi° 10: paßu-adhi°). TD (ad VAS §96: 211) explains this interpretational rule asfollows: “For example, a general word paßu in the sentence ‘paßunå yajeta’ [not anexact quotation; see Edgerton's trans. of MNP, p.68, n.53], which means an animal ingeneral, finally imports a specific [animal, i.e. goat], denoted by the word chåga in the
mantra ‘chågasya vapåyå medasa˙ [anubrËhi]’ [?]”. Cf. Srinivasa Chari 1994: 53f.
For Deßika's application of these two rules, see SAS ad TMK III. 5.
645

R refers to “eka˙ ßåstå na dvit¥yo 'sti” [MBh II. 57. 8, XII. 219. 8, XIV. 26.
1], “dyåvåp®thiv¥ janayan deva eka˙” [?].
646

R refers to: “Vißvakarmå hy ajanish†a deva˙” [TaiS IV. vi. 2. 3], “sa Prajåpatireka˙ pushkaraparˆe samabhavat” [TaiÓr I. xxiii. 1. 1], “yo Brahmåˆaµ vidadhåti pËrvam”[ÍveUp VI. 18], “tryaksha˙ ßËlapåˆi˙ purusho [= Íiva˙] 'jåyata” [?], “so 'rod¥t // taµprajåpatir abrav¥t: kumåra, kiµ rodishi, yac chramåt tapaso 'dhi jåto 'sîti / so 'brav¥t:
anapahatapåpmå [vå]smy a(vi)hitanåmå / nåma me dhehi (in R the following passages
are summarized as påpmano 'pahatyai) iti // tam abrav¥t: Rudro 's¥ti” [ÍatBr VI. i. 3.
8–10], “eko ha vai nåråyaˆa ås¥n na Brahmå neßåna˙ [= Íiva˙]” [MahåUp 1],“åbhËtasamplave pråpte pral¥ne prak®tau mahån / ekas tish†hati vißvåtmå sa tu nåråyaˆa˙prabhu˙” [?] etc.
647

R refers to “brahma-vishˆu-rudra-indrås te sarve saµprasËyante” [AtharvaßikhåUp III (Adyar: III. 4; UVG: II. 15)].

178[or to incarnate].648 [278]And in the portion concerning the cause etc. [of the world], it is proved thatwords denoting various [entities] finally import the Supreme Self alone. Because their
final import is One who has these [entities] as the body. Or because, like the words‘åkåßa,’ ‘pråˆa etc., these [words can be interpreted as directly referring to the Supreme
Self] by means of secondary etymology.649
To summarize this—(40)

When [entities other than Him, e.g.], the individual selves, are mentioned inteachings of the Supreme (paravidyå), [we first should try to understand] bymeans of etymology and others that such a description directly refer to theSupreme. If some of their characteristics cannot be established otherwise,650
its object is [the Supreme] as qualified by these [characteristics].651 [279]
And [in some Scriptures, even other gods] teach to meditate themselves652 orshows themselves to be the lord of all653; such [a description] is based on contemplating648

R refers to “ajåyamåno bahudhå vijåyate” [TaiÓr III. xiii. 1. 1], “na mepårthåsti kartavyam” [BhG III. 22], “dharmasaµsthåpanårtham” [BhG IV. 8], “icchåg®h¥tåbhimatorudeha˙” [ViP VI. v. 84].
649

I.e., å samantåt kåßate kåßayati vå åkåßa˙; pråˆayati sarvåˆi bhËtåˆ¥ti pråˆa˙;hiraˆmayasya paramavyomno garbha˙ anta˙sthita iti hiraˆyagarbha˙; ßaµ bhavati
sukharËpo bhavat¥ti ßambhu˙ (R).
650

talliµgånayathåsiddhau. Cf. BrSË I. i. 32: j¥vamukhyapråˆaliµgån neti cenna, etc.
651

paravidyåsu j¥voktir niruktyåde˙ paråßraya˙. In a parallel verse in TÈ [p. 19,
v. 132], the first påda runs: anyokti˙ paravidyåsu, which V regards better (bhËmikå to
UVG ed. of NySi, p. 36). Also Kumåradeßika quotes a parallel verse in his
Adhikaraˆacintåmaˆi ad ASÓ v. 77 as the summary of the indrapråˆa-adhi° (BrSË I. i.
29–32), changing the first two pådas into: vyutpattyå paramåtmånaµ tattadukti˙ prakåßayet
[UVG ed., p. 149].
652

R refers to KauUp III. 2: pråˆo 'smi prajñåtmå taµ måm åyur am®tam ityupåsva.
653

R refers to AtharvaßirasUp 1 (opening): devå ha vai svargaµ lokam agaman 1 /te devå rudram ap®cchan: ‘ko bhavån’ iti / so 'brav¥t: ‘aham eka˙ prathamam åsaµvartåmi ca bhavishyåmi ca, nånya˙ kaßcin matto vyatirikta˙’ iti / ‘so 'ntaråd antaraµpråvißat / dißaß cåntaraµ sa pråvißat / so 'haµ nityånityo brahmåhaµ2 pråñco 'haµpratyañco 'ham,’ etc. [According to the quotation in VAS §108 and R. The reading of

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the Supreme Self whose body is their selves, which is understood in the Scriptures, [asis done by] Prahlåda, Våmadeva and other [saints]654 [280]. And for Him who has all as
the body, it is possible to be meditated, according to the injunction, even as one who isqualified by intelligent and non-intelligent beings.655 [281]
How to interpret the Athavaßiras, the Ívetåßvatara and other [Upannishads,656 inwhich Íiva is said to be the Supreme], is fully explained in the Purushanirˆaya.657 And
NSP ed. is: 1. åyan; 2. nityånityo 'haµ vyaktåvyakto brahmåbrahmåhaµ].
654

Cf. BrSË I. i. 31: ßåstrad®sh†yå tËpadeßo våmadevavat; Ír¥Bh I. i. 31: …
upadeßo 'yaµ na pramåˆåntarapråptasvåtmåvalokanak®ta˙, api tu ßåstreˆasvåtmad®sh†ik®ta˙ [278,4]. The illustrations of Prahlåda and Våmadeva are found in ViP
I. xix. 85 (intepreted in VAS §108) and B®hUp I. iv. 10 respecitively (both are quoted inÍr¥Bh I. i. 31).
655

Brahman can be meditated in three ways: [1] as itself, [2] as one who has an
enjoyer as the body and [3] as one who has the means of enjoyment as the body(nikhilakåraˆasya
brahmaˆa˙svarËpeˆånusandhånam,bhokt®vargaßar¥rakatvånusandhånam, bhogyabhogopakaraˆaßar¥rakatvånusandhånaµ ceti trividham
anusandhånam [Ír¥Bh I. i. 31: 279,19f.]; see also Ír¥Bh I. iii. 32).
656
657

R in particular takes up the description of the AtharvaßikhåUp.

This must be an extinct work of Yåmana, though a work of the same title isascribed to Nåthamuni [Dasgupta: HIPh III, 96; Narasimhachari 1971: 6], which isdenied by Mesquita [1973: n.49], and also to Varadaguru [Dasgupta: HIPh III, 352,
n.19]. Fragments of this work are collected by Narasimhachari [13–16]; see also Mesquita
1971: 187ff. and 1974: 189ff. For the content of the work, N®siµharåja (fl. in 16th cent.,acc. to Srinivasa Chari 1988: 11) refers to his Paratvad¥pikå (same as the Paratattvad¥pikå
mentioned in Dasgupta, HIPh III: 122?) (Ónandadåyin¥ ad SAS III. 5, Mysore ed.,p.34).
As is pointed out here by our author, how to interpret so-called Íaiva Upanißads
has been disucussed in many Ír¥-Vaishˆava åcåryas' works such as:Rånånuja: VAS§§95–108. Especially §102 on the word ßiva; §108 on AtharvaßirasUp; §100 on ßambhu.
—: Ír¥Bh
Esp. III. ii. 30–36 (adhi° 7) on ÍveUp.
Varadaguru: Tattvasåra vv. 71–92.
—: Tattvanirˆaya
Throughout [Especially for the interpretation of ÍveUp, see S.
Stark, WZKS 26 (1992)].
SudarßanasËri: ÍP
Esp. ad Ír¥Bh I. iv. 29 (pp. 183–201), where SudarßanasËri
closely examines ÍveUp, AthavaßikhåUp and AtharvaßirasUp.
—: TD
Esp. ad VAS §108 (pp. 241–43) on AtharvaßirasUp.
Vedånta Deßika: TMK III. 5–6 explains in detail why Vishˆu is called by well-known
names of Íiva; 7 on ÍveUp; 8 on the PurushasËkta; 9 on otherdeities; 10 on AtharvaßirasUp.

180

the author of the Commentary [Råmånuja] also [explains it] in his Vedårthasaµgraha,[Ír¥-]Bhåshya etc. [284] All these points are summarized in the book entitled Tattvanirˆaya
by Våtsya Varadaguru, who was perfectly contemplating Him. And in [his] Tattvasåra,the summary is shown by the following verse658:
Who are you?
—I am one who knows the truth.
Who is the supreme entity, then?
—[The supreme entity] is Vishˆu.
Why?
—Because such Upanishads as the Taittir¥yaka 659 (the aim of which is the[supreme] entity) refer to [the name ‘Nåråyaˆa’].
Why are other words [such as ßiva found in some other Upanishads]?
—Because [ßiva is] the attribute [of Vishˆu].
Why does Rudra speak [of himself] in this [connection with the supreme
entity]?
—Because [Rudra] regards [himself] as this [supreme entity, Vishˆu, who
is his own inner self].
Why is [Vishˆu also] born [according to some Scriptures]?
—[Because] He incarnates.
How [should we understand] another [disputable point]?
—Let it be interpreted [appropriately].660
Raµgarånånuja

R 280ff.; AthavaßikhåUp-Bh.

658

Tattvasåra, v. 71.

659

R refers to MahånåråyaˆaUp 11. 1 [= TaiÓr X. 11. 1]: sahasraß¥rshaµ devam
etc. Cf. TMK III. 8 (on which SAS refers to TaiÓr III. 13. 2, X. 11. 1; Våjasaneyisaµhitå
31. 22).
660

anyat kathaµ n¥yatåm. This is too simple to determine its purport. Translation
here is in the line of Viraraghavachari's comm. (UVG ed.).
If we follow the interpretation of the Ratnasåriˆ¥ ad the Tattvasåra (contained in
Madras ed.), translation may be: “How [should we interpret the passage mentioning] theother [higher ‘than Him (tata˙)’]? —Let it be interpreted [that tata˙ here means‘therefore’].” That is, the question is concerned with ‘tata˙’ in ÍveUp III. 10 “tato yaduttarataram idam” and the answer is: here ‘tata˙’ means not ‘than Him’ but ‘threfore.’181

Thus, it is established that Nåråyaˆa alone is the supreme cause, that He is to be
meditated by one who want to be liberated, that He is the inner Self for all beings etc.
Accordingly, it is to be understood that the following four views are also baseless661:
that is, (1) the Triad Forms (trimËrti) [or Vishˆu, Íiva and Brahmå] are equal,662 (2) they
are one and the same,663 (3) something beyond them [such as pure-Being is the supreme
entity], (4) another individual [is the Supreme Entity].664 [285]Indeed, this topic has been discussed in VAS §§101–102 and Ír¥Bh III. ii. 30–36 (adhi°
7) and by our author in TMK III. 7 and ASÓ ad the above adhi°. However this interpretation
is not satisfactory enough because Varadaguru deals with it in another verse in the
Tattvasåra (v. 76cd).
According to R, translation may be: “How is the other, [i.e. ßiva, mentioned inthe ÍveUp etc. as the Highest Brahman]? —[Because the same attributes that are foundin the passages praising Vishˆu are found even in the Up], let us interpret [in harmony
with these passages].” This seems to be mere repetiton.
661

nirmËlå˙. UVG ed. reads nirastå˙ and adds this reading in parenthesis.

662

Cf. SAS III. 14 [65,15f.]: “And the opinion that the three are ruler different
from each other is rejected because of the [description], say, that one presides over all
the beings (parasparaµ bhinnå ¥ßvarås traya iti pakshaß caikasya sarvapraßåsit®tvådibhir
nirasta˙).”
663

Cf. SAS III. 14 [65,6ff.]: “The opinion that the One directly has the threefold
division in incarnation, as in the case of Råma, K®shˆa and so forth, is intended in [theverses of Kålidåsa] like “That one form divides itself in three ways” [Kumårasaµbhava
VII. 44]. In this regard, commenting on its original sources like “Supreme Brahman,none but Vishˆu, is known as threefold here” [?] and “[The names of Brahmå, Vishˆuand Rudra] to create, to sustain and to destroy [the universe respectively]” [ViP I. ii.
66], [our teachers] has asserted that inasmuch as [these sources] are in accord with theother passages like “The inner Self for you as well as for me” [MBh XII. 339. 4],[Brahman] exists in the two [i.e., Brahmå and Íiva] intervened by [each] individual self
and in the one [i.e., Vishˆu] without intervention (ekasyaiva råmak®shˆådivatsåkshådavatåre tridhå vibhåga iti paksha˙ ‘ekaiva mËrtir bibhide tribhå 'sya [UVG: så]’ityådishu vivakshita˙ / tatra mËlabhËtånåm [read as UVG ed.] ‘vishˆur eva paraµ brahma
tribhedam iha pa†hyate’ ‘s®sh†isthityantakaraˆ¥m’ ityåd¥nåµ ‘tavåntaråtmå mama ca’ityådivåkyåntarånuvidhånåt kshetrajñavyavadhånena dvayor ekatråvyavadhånena caprat¥tiµ vyåcakhyu˙)”.
Cf. also VAS §108 [139,1–4]: Mahåbhårate ca Brahma-Rudra-saµvåde Brahmå
Rudram pratyåha: “tavåntaråtmå mama ca ye cånye dehisaµjñitå˙” [MBh XII. 339. 4;
Poona ed. deha°] iti | Rudrasya Brahmaˆaß cånyeshåµ ca dehinåµ parameßvaro Nåråyaˆo'ntaråtmatayå 'vasthita iti.
664

For (3) and (4), see SAS III. 14 [65,12ff.]: “As for the opinion that anotherpersonality or the pure existent and spiritual beyond the Trinity is the supreme principle,

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And God completely fills the Triad Forms. And [while the form of Vishˆu isdirectly filled by Him], the forms of Prajåpati [or Brahmå] and Paßupati [or Íiva] are[filled by God] with the intervention of [their own] individual selves665; this difference[is accepted] by force of the means of valid knowledge. That is the way [He] fills
everything.
[Objection:] That which exists in one place cannot fill the other place.
[Replied:] By saying ‘fill,’ which do you want to deny, (1) that [He] exists onlyin this place, (2) that [He] is the object of apprehension as filling there, (3) that [He] iscapable of producing effects filling there, or (4) that [He] is qualified by all the qualities?
(1) The first alternative does not hold good because we, [regarding Him as
omnipresent], do not accept that [He exists here only].
(2) Nor the second. Its denial is also [of four kinds]: (a) mere denial of theapprehension of [God] Himself, (b) denial of the apprehension of all the parts [of God][286] and (c) denial of the apprehension [of God] as having parts.
(a) The first alternative could not accomplish your purpose. Because the nonapprehension [of God] is due to the non-existence of sufficient condition (såmagr¥) [forthe apprehension]; and if this [condition] be here, He can be apprehended.
(b) The second one would lead to conclusions desirable [for us], no matter if it isproved that [He] has parts or not: [that is, if so, those parts existing in one place cannot
be apprehended in the other place; if not, no part can be apprehended].
(c) As for the third alternative, non-apprehension of having parts is quite natural
because [He] has no part; accordingly, such [non-apprehension] cannot be denied.
[Objection:] Since [He] is related to many [entities], [He] must have parts byforce of limitation by these various relations.
there is sublation even by the passage beginning with “One and only Janårdana assumes
the names [of Brahmå, Vishˆu and Rudra]” [ViP I. ii. 66] (trimËrtyutt¥rˆaµ purushåntaraµsac cinmåtraµ vå paratattvam iti pakshe ‘sa saµjñåµ yåti bhagavån eka eva janårdana˙’ityådibhir api bådha˙)”.
According to Viraraghavachari's comm. on SAS (UVG ed., p. 355), the former
is of Madhva (read vyåsat¥rtha for vyomåt¥ta) and the latter is of Yådavaprakåßa etc.
665

See SAS III. 14 [65,6ff.] cited above.

183[Replied:] Not so. Because substance, genus (jåti), denial and so on—qualified[respectively] by many attributes (guˆa), [many] individuals (vyakti), [many] countercorrelatives (pratiyogin) and so on—are not accepted so [as having parts] by force of
these [attributes etc.] [287]. Likewise, as is experienced, [that entity which is united
with many substances] (e.g., conjunction, [disjunction, two-ness]) is not [accepted ashaving parts]. And even in a thing having no part, existence and non-existence [ofsomething] manage to coexist at the same time.666 Otherwise, every kind of relationshipwould be lost and every kind of causality etc., which are based on it, would be lost;
consequently, only voidness (ßËnyatå) would remain.
(3) Nor the third. Because it is quite desirable that the production of everythingis denied in a limited place. And it is not contradictory if One who has potency (ßakti)
fit for [producing] everything exists there [in a limited place] also. This does not lead toan undesirable conclusion that everything is produced in a certain place667 inasmuch aswherever an effect is found, His potency is accepted668 as fit for this [effect] [288].
Otherwise, that which has potency would always produce its effect, though [our experience]is the contrary, and thereby the momentary destruction (kshaˆabhaµga) might beintroduced. If it were accepted, [production of effects] would be ordered669; but [suchjustification] is rejected because this [momentariness] has been already rejected [byus670]. You may assert that there would be desirable that everything is produced, incourse of time, in a certain place [289]. But this is contradictory if [‘everything’] means
666

E.g., ether is united partially with the existence of sound and partially with its
non-existence (R).
667This is the answer to the objection that if Brahman, which exists everywhere,
had potency fit for [producing] everything, that Brahman which exists in water could
burn (R).
668

K reads sv¥kåråt for sv¥kåre.

669

E.g., only a seed in the field can sprout but that in a granary cannot. Because aseed in a grain is different from that in the field since a seed is momentary, and only thelatter has potency for sprouting. See the discussion of Buddhists on the example of aseed and a sprout in NySi 17,1ff.
670

NySi 16,3–37,3. For Vißish†ådvaitins' refutation of kshaˆabhaµga, see alsoRåmånuja's commentaries ad BrSË II. ii. 24, TMK I. 25–31, ASÓ v. 194 (ad II. ii. adhi°
3).

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all the individuals (vyakti) that are to be produced (bhåvin) everywhere. Because thoseindividuals which have been produced [and] which are produced do not need production(bhavana) here.671 Because those [individuals] which have been destroyed can neither be
produced nor approach here at any time. [290] If [‘everything’] means merely [all theindividuals] homogeneous to Himself, this would lead to a desirable conclusion. Even672
between two kinds of [His] manifestation, there is partial mixture when [He] incarnates(avatåra).673(4) Nor the fourth. Because various [scholars674] accept that such [quality] ascolor, smell and taste pervades its own substratum and at the same time pervades all theparts in the case of the whole (avayavin), an atom and so on.
The above-mentioned has been fully demonstrated by the author of the SËtra.
That is, having raised the question “Whole [Brahman] would become [the world];
otherwise, there would be contradiction to Scriptural passages that [He] has no part,” he671

R: utpannasyotpadyamånasya cotpattyanapekshatvåd iti bhåva˙.

672This answers the following question: if it were the case, His manifestatiion asplay (l¥låvibhËti) (or the physical universe) would be homogeneous to His eternal
manifestation (nityavibhËti) (or thetranscendental realm) because Brahman exists inboth (R).
673

Cf. NySi, nityavibhËti-pariccheda, 395,4f.: pråk®tåpråk®tasaµsargo 'pi nånupapanna˙; anyathå pråk®talokeshu bhagavadavatårå˙, paramapade 'py arcirådimårgenˆasËkshmaßar¥rasya vaidikaputråder vå gamanaµ kathaµ gha†eta.
674

See NySi, adravya-pariccheda (on saµyoga), 478,2ff, where our author cites
VD¥pa II. i. 26, 29 and maintains that a part-less entity such as Brahman can, like genus(jåti) as assumed by the Naiyåyikas, exist entirely in a thing conjunct to it. Or this may
suggest the import of BrSË II. i. 29: “And because [those who assert that the modificationof Brahman is impossible since it has no part] have defects in their own doctrines(svapakshadoshåc ca).” The point of this sËtra is summarized by our author in ASÓ 171(ad II. i. 26–31, adhi° 9) as follows: “That is, [according to the Naiyåyika] an effectcalled conjunction does exist between an omnipresent entity [like Brahman] and thecontrary [like an atom] or between two atoms. If he asserts that it is not possible either
entirely or partially, he will fall into the doctrine of voidness. The Såµkhya also declaresthat the primordial matter is omnipresent. How can a product less than it be createdtherefrom? The same is to be observed even in the case of måyå and so on. Ourinterpretaion is, however, uninjured as it is uttered in the Scriptures (saµyogåkhyaµ hikåryaµ vibhutaditarayo˙ syåd aˆËnåµ mitho vå; kårtsyenåµßena vå tad vihatam iti
vadan ßËnyavåde nimañjet / såµkhyo 'pi pråha vibhv¥µ prak®tim iti kathaµ nyËnas®sh†istata˙ syåt; måyådishv evam Ëhyam; nigamanigaditå tv akshatå paddhatir na˙ //).”

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rejects it beginning with “However, because of the Írutis ….675” [292]Thus God, as is mentioned in the Scriptures, fills everything.

For the same reason, doctrine of [Brahman as] devoid of any characteristic(nirguˆa) is also rejected.
[Objection:] How [should we manage] affirmation and denial [in the Scriptures]
regarding [His] characteristics, which are mutually contradictory?
[Replied:] We examine this issue as follows.
First, it is not appropriate to adopt both [affirmation and denial] together, because[the two] are mutually contradictory. For the same reason,676 it is not [appropriate] toabandon both. Nor is it [appropriate] to adopt [either of the two] optionally (vikalpa),
because this [option] cannot be applied to an established [entity].677 Nor is it [appropriate]
to abandon either of the two, because there is no criterion as to which is to be abandoned.678[Objection:] According to the interpretational rule of disconnection679 (apaccheda675BrSË II. i. 26–27.

676

I.e., because nirguˆa-abhåva and saguˆa-abhåva are also mutually contradictory.
Cf.
SAS
III.
47
(206,7f.):
viruddhånyataravidhinishedhayor
itaranishedhavidhinåntar¥yakatvåt.;ÍD
LX(256,17–19):
parasparaviruddhobhyåµg¥kåravat tadubhayaprahåˆasyåpi virodhakukshinikshepam
evopalabhåmahe; na hi gha†tvågha†atvasamuccayacvad gha†ågha†avilakshaˆayor api
samuccaya˙ sambhavati, virodhåvißeshåt.
677

See BrSi 40,1–2: vastuni vikalpånupapatte˙; Íaµkara ad BrSË I. iv. 14: vastuni
ca vikalpasyånupapatte˙ [Ed. Paˆs¥kar, Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1938, p. 399].
Cf. NySi 456,1: siddhe ca vikalpåyogåt.
678

Cf. SAS III. 47 (206,2f.): na hi vastu vikalpyeta na viruddhasamuccaya˙ / na
cobhayaparityågo vihatiµ jahata˙ kvacit //.
679

The interpretational rule that the later is stronger than the former. See M¥SË
VI. v. 54 (adhi° 19): “When one[disconnection] occurs after the other, the former isweaker as in the case of the original [and the modification] (paurvåparye pËrvadaurbalyaµprak®tivat).”
The topic under discussion in this ahikaraˆa is expounded in Deßika's own
words as follows [TÈ 129,26–]:“As regards the performance that ‘The five priests creep forth touched frombehind by each other: the Prastot® touches the Adhvaryu from behind; the Pratihart®
[touches] the Prastot® [from behind]; the Udgåt® [touches] the Pratihart® [from behind];
the Brahman [touches] the Udgåt® [from behind]; the patron of the ritual [touches] the186

Brahman [from behind] (pañca rtvija˙ samanvårabdhå˙ sarpanti // adhvaryuµ
prastotånvårabhate prastotåraµ pratihartå pratihartåram udgåtodgåtåraµ brahmå
brahmåˆaµ yajamånam)’ [Ópastamba-ßrauta-SË XII. xvi. 17–xvii. 1 (< Pañcaviµßa-Br
VI. vii. 12); for prasarpaˆa, see Caland: L'Agnish†oma, p. 171f.], the pråyaßcittas in thecase of disconnection are enjoined in ‘Among [the priests] creeping towards the
Bahishpavamåna, if the Prastot® breaks the connection (yadi bahishpavamånam sarpatåµprastotåpacchidyeta)’ [Óp-.ß.-SË XIV. xxvi. 3] and so forth [< P.-Br VI. vii. 13–15]. It
is stated therein that ‘If the Pratihart® [breaks the connection], the patron will be deprivedof the cattle; he is to give all the property. If Udgåt®, the patron will be deprived of theritual; such ritual is to be finished without fee (yadi pratihartå paßubhir yajamåno
vy®ddhyeta / sarvavedasaµ dadyåt // yady udgåtå yajñena yajamåno vy®dhyeta /adakshiˆa˙ sa yajña˙ saµsthåpya˙)’ [Óp.-ß.-SË XIV. xxvi. 4–5]. These two occasional
rites (naimittika) [i.e., giving all the property and giving no fee] are, if in the same
performance, in conflict. If [the two priests] break the connection simultaneously in [thesame performance], the pråyaßcitta for the Udgåt® or that for the Pratihart® is to be done
optionally [cf. M¥SË VI. v. 51]. If [the two] break the connection one after the other, it
is fixed that the pråyaßcitta for one who breaks the connection later [is to be done]. Thatis declared: ‘paurvåparye pËrvadaubalyaµ prak®tivat’ [VI. v. 54].”[Cf. ÍP ad Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: (1) 86,13–20. Cf. also Srinivasa Chari 1988: 229f., n. 35
and notes of some modern translators on Ír¥Bh, e.g., Ír¥Bh (R-V): I, 27, fn. 2; Ír¥Bh(L): 180, n. 228; Ír¥Bh (K), Notes, pp. 6f.].
Based on this interpretational rule, the mahåpËrvapakshin in Ír¥Bh asserts thatthe nirguˆa-passages are stronger than the saguˆa-passages, since, considering nirguˆapresupposes guˆa, the nirguˆa-passages are later (nirguˆavåkyånåµ guˆåpekshatvena
paratvåd val¥yastvam) [(1) 87,5]. Cf. ÍD, våda 52 [230,9–10]: vidhir hy anyånapekshatayå
pËrvo bhavati, nishedhas tu nishedhyaprasaµgasåkåµkshatayå para˙.
Probably Råmånuja here refers to Sarvajñåtman's way of interpretation; cf.
Saµkshepaßår¥raka II. 114–118: “Or rather, suppose that all the means of knowledge
other [than the Scriptures] are valid respecting the Self. And we intentionally accept thatthey are clearly contradictory to the Upanishads. Notwithstanding, all other means ofknowledge that arose before are sublated by the understanding of Brahman that is born
later out of the Upanishads for someone (åtmany eva samastam astu yadi vå månåntaraµtena ca spash†aµ vedaßiroviruddham iti ca sv¥kurmahe kåmata˙ / evaµ saty api pËrvabhåvi
sakalaµ månåntaraµ bådhate paßcåt kasyacid eva vedaßiraso jåtå parabrahmadh¥˙ /114/).
Without sublating the erroneous understanding of water in a mirage that was produced
before, the following understanding that informs the true nature of a desert cannot arise.
Thus, as [this right understanding] originates when the understanding of water in amirage is rubbed off, the understanding of Brahman, which is born out of the Upannishads,[originates when] the error of difference [is rubbed off] (pËrvotpannam®gåmbuvibhramadhiyo bådhaµ vinå nottaraµ vijñånaµ samudetum Ësharabhuvo yåthåtmyam åvedayat /ßaknot¥ti yathå m®gåmbudhishaˆåm unm®dyad utpadyate tadvad vedaßirovacojanitadh¥rbhedabhramaµ brahmaˆi /115/). ‘When [disconnections] occur one after the other, theformer is weaker,’ says Jaimini in connection with the [M¥SË] VI. We shall show all
this and tell it to you. Fix your attention properly on it (paurvåparye pËrvadaubalyam

187naya), the former [i.e. the affirmation] is to be abandoned.
[Replied:] [293] This [rule is to] be applied to [two items that are] not always inconflict and are not always in the relation of prior and posterior. If [two items are]always [in conflict and in the relation of prior and posterior], it follows that the lattercannot be valid by force of the interpretational rule [mentioned in the adhikaraˆa of]contradiction (virodhanaya).680 And it is not appropriate to introduce the interpretationalåha shash†e 'dhyåye 'vasthito jaiminir yat / vakshyåmas tat sarvam ån¥ya tubhyaµ buddhiµsv¥yåµ samayag atråvadhatsva /116/). In respect to the case that two disconnections theagents of which are Udgåt® and Pratihart® occur one after the other when the injunctionof the ritual action is applied, it is doubtful for us whether all the property is to be lost or[the ritual] is to be finished without fee. To this replies the sage Jaimini: the later ispowerful (udgåt®pratihart®kart®katayå jåtau viyogau kramåd yasmin karmavidhiprayogasamaye tatraisha na˙ saµßaya˙ / kiµ sarvadraviˆavyayo bhavatu vå saµsthåpanaµdakshiˆåh¥nasyeti tadå paraµ balavad ity Ëce munir jaimini˙ /117/). For instance, thequality of the original form of a ritual and that of its modification—which are mutuallyconflicting too much—are regarded as sublated and negating [respectively], because[the original and the modification] are understood in this order. It is true that [the two]
may be conversely read [in some Scriptures], but the order of understandings still exists:
the understanding of the quality of the original is former, the other understanding islater; because [the two] occur only in such a way (yadvat pråk®tavaik®tåv atitaråm
anyonyasaµspardhinai dharmau bådhyanivartakåv abhimatau buddhau krameˆånvayåt /på†havyatyayasaµbhave 'pi ca tayor buddhikramo vidyate pËrvå pråk®tadharmadh¥ritaradh¥r antyå tathaivottithe˙ /118/).” Cf. BrSi 40,3ff., where Maˆ∂ana (this is siddhånta,acc. to Íaµkhapåni's comm.) cites M¥SË VI. v. 54 and ÍV, codanå, v. 57 in order toprove that the Scripture is stronger than perception. For applications of this interpretational
rule in the Bhåmat¥, the Nyåyåm®ta and the Siddhåntaleßasaµgraha, see N. S.
Råmånujatåtåcarya˙, apacchedanyåyasaµcåramårga˙, in: R. C. Dwivedi (ed.), Studies
in M¥måµså: Dr. Mandan Mishra Felicitation Volume, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1994, pp. 271–76.
680

Cf. ÍP (1) 196,1–11: virodhåbhyupagame 'py aniyatavirodhapaurvåparyavishayo 'pacchedanayo nåtra pravartate, api tu virodhådhikaraˆanyåya eva pravartate;tadvishaye hi paurvåparyaniyamo virodhaniyamaß ca vidyate. … yadvå må bhËdvirodhådhikaraˆanyåya˙,
atropakramådhikaraˆanyåya
eva
pravartate;
virodhapaurvåparyaniyamåt (ÍP (1) 196,1–12 = R 293,10–294,8).
Though here in NySi the author takes up the virodhådhikaraˆanyåya (like thefirst view of ÍP), he adopts the upakramådhikaraˆanyåya (like the second of ÍP) in hisother works. That is, ÍD, våda 52 [231,14–18] runs as follows: “That is, the interpretational
rule of disconnection can be applied [only] if [two items] are not always in conflict andare not always in the relation of prior and posterior. For if each of the two breaks theconnection, it is established that [the teaching of each pråyaßcitta] is valid inasmuch as
nothing sublates it; if [the two] break the connection simultaneously, [the teachings of]both [pråyaßcittas] can be valid because of option [cf. M¥SË VI. v. 51]. Only when [thetwo] break the connection one after the other, the former is sublated by force of the rule‘the later cannot arise if the former is not sublated.’ Yet the validity stands still if [thetwo break the connection] in different performances. If those which are always in188rule of disconnection, by which either of the two is completely sublated, in case thecontradiction [of the two] can be removed through distinguishing each aim. For thestatements negating [His] characteristic concern [only] those [characteristics] which areother than [His] auspicious characteristics enjoined [in the Scriptures] according to theinterpretational rule of a general rule and a specific rule681 (utsargåpavådanyåya) [294];
hence, they culminate in the negation of [His] bad characteristics, as is mentioned in theÍrutis.
conflict are in the relation of prior and posterior, however, it follows that the later is
impossible by force of the interpretational rule [mentioned] in the upakrama-adhikaraˆa(aniyatavirodhapaurvåparye hy apacchedanaya˙ / anyataråpacchede bådhakåbhåvena
pråmåˆyasiddhe˙, yugapadapacchede vikalpata ubhayo˙ pråmåˆyasambhavåt /krameˆåpaccheda eva kevalaµ ‘pËrvåbådhena notpattir uttarasya hi siddhyati’ iti nyåyena
pËrvabådha˙ / tathåpi prayogåntare pråmåˆyaµ siddhyaty eva / niyatavirodhapaurvåparyetËpakramådhikaraˆanyåyena parånutpattir eva).” Cf. Srinivasa Chari 1961: 79. See also
SAS III. 57 [260–61]: aniyatapauvåparye hy apacchedanaya˙, niyame tËpakramanayåt
parånutpattir eveti n¥tivida˙.
For virodhådhikaraˆanyåya, see M¥SË I. iii. 3 (adhi° 2): “Whenever there iscontradiction [between the Íruti and the Sm®ti], however, [the later] is to be disregarded.
Because [only] when there is no [contradiction], there is inference [that the Sm®tisupports the Íruti] (virodhe tv anapekshaµ syåd asati hy anumånam)” and “And because
the cause is found (hetudarßanåc ca).” In this case, the understanding of the Íruti comes
former and that of the Sm®ti later because though the Íruti is an independent means ofknowledge, the Sm®ti always needs the Íruti and inference on which its authority
depends (cf. ÍP 176,4–5: ßruti˙ prathamata eva pramitiµ janayati, nirapekshapramåˆatvåt;sm®tis tu svamËlabhËtaßrutyanumånåpekshatayå vilambitaprav®tti˙). Thus it follows thatthe principle “the former is stronger than the later” is declared in other words in thisadhi°.
For upakramådhikaraˆanyåya, see M¥SË III. iii. 1–8 (adhi° 1). This also declares
the same principle (See also van Buitenen 1956: 200, n. 134).
Altough I cannot find the direct statement of the Vißish†ådvaitins as to the
distinction between the two adhikaraˆas, the reason why Deßika prefers the upakramaadhi° is probably because Kumårila interprets the virodha-adhi° in such a way in which
the real conflict between the Íruti and the Sm®ti is not accepted. (Cf. G. Jha, PËrvam¥måµså
in its sources, Banaras, 21964, p. 196.)
Note that here the Advaitin fixes the order of the affirmative passages and thenegative ones and the Vißish†ådvaitin, admitting it for the time being, rejects the Advaita
interpretation. Cf. SAS III. 57 [261]: “And in this case, it is you who fix the order thatthe affirmation is prior and the negation is posterior. So you cannot avoid accepting thatthe later is less powerful (iha ca tvayaiva prasañjakapratishedhakayo˙ paurvåparyaniyama˙ sthåpita˙; ata˙ parasyaiva daurbalyaµ pratyetavyam).”[For Advaita refutation against using this principle to interpret nirguˆa- andsaguˆa-passages, see Advaitasiddhi II. iv, Nirnaya Sagara Press ed., p. 735 (cited in MK
1140).]
681

The rule that an exceptional rule is stronger than a general one. Same assåmånyavißeshanyåya. Cf. Ír¥Bh I. i. 1, (1) 195,1–3: nirguˆavåkyånåµ saguˆavåkyånåµca vishaya˙: “apahatapåpmå” ityådi “apipåsa˙” ityantena heyaguˆån pratishidhya“satyakåma˙ satyasaµkalpa˙” iti brahmaˆa˙ kalyåˆaguˆån vidadhat¥yaµ ßrutir eva
vivinakt¥ti saguˆanirguˆavåkyayor virodhåbhåvåd anyatarasya mithyåvishayatåßrayaˆam

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And it is stated in the Tattvasåra682:
There cannot be any contradiction between the affirmations and thenegations of characteristic, body, modification, birth,683 karma etc. withrespect to Brahman, because they have different purposes. Thus, theaffirmations cannot be sublated by the negations.
and so on. [295]Even though it has been established so, if the former [i.e. the statement that He
has characteristics] were sublated by the statement that [He] has no characteristic only
because of its being later (which is in nature endowed with the sense of negation684),
then even this [statement that He has no characteristic] would be sublated by the statementthat [everything] is void (ßËnya) and, consequently, it would be the thought of theMådhyamika [Buddhists] that wins at last. For neither statement is accepted as ofabsolutely real (påramårthika) authority [296] and both are not different in not being
absolutely real.685
Thus God has two identity marks686 (liµga): [having no defect and having
api nåßaµkan¥yam. Note the expression virodhåbhyupagame 'pi (ÍP 196,1) cited above.
682

Tattvasåra, v. 69.

683

MGOS ed. of the Tattvasåra reads bheda for janma; UVG ed. also janma- andadds the reading of NySi in parentheses.
684This is because abhåva always presupposes the knowledge of its pratiyogin.

685

This is the answer to the question that the nirvißesha-statements are based on
Vedic authority while the Buddhhist statements are heretical. In this regard, R quotes
the verse of an expert (abhiyukta): vedo 'n®to buddhak®tågamo 'n®ta˙ pråmåˆyam etasya
ca tasya cån®tam / buddho 'n®ta buddhibale tathån®to yËyaµ ca bauddhåß casamånasaµsada˙ //, which is quoted in SAS III. 59 as of “Yådavaprakåß¥ya˙ saµgraha˙”[268,12]. Cf. Ír¥Bh I. i. 1 [(1) 182,6–183,1]: “And [your assertion] that later sublation is
not found [in the case of nirguˆa-passage] is not certain, because we find its sublation in
the [Mådhyamika] statement that ‘the reality is void.’ You may protest that this [statement]
is from delusion, but only you hold that it is from delusion though no doubt we neverfind any sublation in this [Mådhyamika statement] (paßcåttanabådhådarßanaµ cåsiddham;ßËnyam eva tattvam iti våkye tasyåpi bådhadarßanåt / tat tu bhråntimËlam iti ced etad
api bhråntimËlam iti tvayaivoktam, paßcåtyabådhådarßanaµ tu tasyeva),” and II. i. 15[247,16–17]: sarvaßËnyatvåtirekinishedhåsambhavåt tasyaiva paßcåttanabådhådarßanam,doshamËlatvaµ tu pratyakshåd¥nåm vedåntajanmana˙ sarvaßËnyajñånasyåpy avißeshåt..
686

Cf. Ír¥Bh III. ii. 11: ubhayaliµgaµ sarvatra hi—yata˙ sarvatra ßrutism®tishu

190

auspicious qualities].

For the same reason the [Advaitic] view that “Brahman, though having no
characteristic (nirvißesha), concealed by that Ignorance (avidyå) which conceals [thereal nature of the Brahman] (åcchådikå) and falsely appears (adhyåsa) as the phenomenal
world (prapañca)—that is called creation—by force of that [Ignorance] which projects[the false nature of Brahman] (vikshepikå)687” is also rejected. For that [Brahman]cannot have any trace of a defect like Ignorance. It has been explained that [Brahman] is
qualified by numbers of [auspicious] quality such as omniscience 688 and that intelligent
beings are constantly many. Even the passage beginning with “Being only,689” [whichapparently seems to deny plurality in the beginning of the world], just intends to affirm
that [Brahman] is the material cause [of the world] and to negate other causes [thanBrahman] which are to be imagined in mind [297]. That is established by considering its
context.
Further,(41)

Whether the substratum [of delusion or Ignorance (i.e., Brahman)] is completely
manifested or unmanifested, the delusion will not take place. The distinction
between a manifested aspect (åk®ti) and an unmanifested one [in the substratum,i.e., Brahman] would prove that [Brahman] has a certain distinguishing char-acteristic.
paraµ brahmobhayaliµgam—ubhayalakshaˆam abhidh¥yate / nirastanikhiladoshatvakalyåˆaguˆåkåratva-lakshaˆopetam ity artha˙ [435,12ff.].
687

The concept of the two-fold ßakti of avidyå, åcchådikå and vikshepikå, isclearly shown in Sarvajñåtman's Saµkshepaßår¥raka I. 20: “Having covered the [true]
nature of the Self that shines clearly, Non-knowledge projects it illusorily in the form of
the individual selves, God and the world because [Non-knowledge] is endowed with thepotency of concealment and that of delusion owing to having the pure Self-ness as its
object and substratum (åcchådya vikshipati saµsphurad åtmarËpaµ j¥veßvaratvajagadåk®tibhir m®shaiva / ajñånam åvaraˆavibhramaßaktiyogåd åtmatvamåtravishayåßrayatåbalena)” [cf. Mayeda 1979: 83]. This classification, though not found in Íaµkara's
works, is present in Maˆ∂ana Mißra's Brahmasiddhi, which is, Thrasher [1993: 70–75]
asserts, under the influence of the usages of the Gau∂apådakårikå.
688

Cf. the definition of sarvajña in the Nyåyatattva: yo vetti yugapat sarvaµpratyaksheˆa sadå svata˙ (quoted in the ÍarGBh ad st. 5, p.145).

191

Thus [an entity] without any distinguishing characteristic cannot have such aparticular attribute to be concealed. Hence, if [Brahman] itself should be concealed,[Brahman] itself would be lost.690 And in that entity whose essential nature [i.e., thepure-Knowledge691] is quite clear because of its being self-luminous, there is not any
distinguishing characteristic to be determined by the mentality692 (pratyaya) to sublate[Ignorance].693 This leads to each of following two undesirable conclusions: none could
be liberated [if the Knowledge-as-Brahman cannot annihilate Ignorance] or [otherwise]none would be transmigrated694 [298].
689

ChUp VI. ii. 1.

690

Cf. Ír¥Bh I. i. 1 on the second anupapatti of avidyå (tirodhåna°) [(2) 3,10–12]:“Moreover, one who asserts that Brahman, whose essential nature is illumination only,is concealed by Ignorance would maintain the very destruction of [Brahman] itself.
What is called ‘the concealment of illumination’ is either the obstruction of the new
production of illumination or the destruction of present [illumination]. The concealmentof the illumination [of Brahman], [according to you], is nothing but the destruction of
the illumination since it is not accepted that the illumination is to be produced anew
(kiµcåvidyayå prakåßaikasvarËpaµ brahma tirohitam iti vadatå svarËpanåßa evokta˙syåt / prakåßatirodhånaµ nåma prakåßotpattipratibandho vidyamånasya vinåßo vå /prakåßasyånutpådyatvåbhyupagamena prakåßatirodhånaµ prakåßanåßa eva).” and also
VAS §40. TMK III. 34ab (channatve svaprakåßåd anadhikavapußo brahmaˆa˙ syådabhåva˙, bhåvånåµ chådaµ hi sphuraˆavilayanaµ tasya votpattirodha˙) is just a summaryof Råmånuja's discussion. For further discussion on tirodhåna-anupapatti by our author,see ÍD, våda 35 [Cf. Srinivasa Chari 1961: 142f.].
This is a rather typical criticism against avidyå, already found in ÍV, sambandhåkshepaparihåra, v. 85 “anyenopaplave 'bh¥sh†e dvaitavåda˙ prasajyate / svåbhåvik¥mavidyåµ tu nocchetuµ kaßcid arhati,” to which Maˆ∂aˆa replies in BrSi 12.
691

I.e., the Knowledge-as-Brahman/Ótman-itself or the Consciousness (caitanya).

692

I.e., the knowledge-as-means (pramåˆajñåna) or v®tti. Like the later Advaitins
Íaµkara uses the term v®tti in the sence of modification of the inner-organ (anta˙karaˆav®tti) and uses pratyaya in this sense [Mayeda 1968/69: 230f.]. Cf. VPari I. 4:
caitanyasyånåditve 'pi tadabhivyañjakånta˙karaˆav®ttir indriyasannikarshådinå jåyata itiv®ttivißish†acaitanyam ådimad ity ucyate; jñånåvacchedakatvåc ca v®ttau jñånatvopacåra˙:
tad uktaµ Vivaraˆe “anta˙karaˆav®ttau jñånatvopacåråt” (PPV 41,17). For the Advaita
opinion that Ignorance can be sublated not by svarËpajñåna but by pramåˆajñåna, see
Sundaram's trans. of Ish†asiddhi, intro., p. 69.
693

R: Does the sublating knowledge illuminate that characteristic [of Brahman]
which is not other than [Brahman] itself or that [characteristic which is] other [thanBrahman] itself? Not the former; because it is manifested in itself inasmuch as it isself-luminous. Nor the later; because those characteristics which is other than [Brahman
itself] are not accepted.
694

R: If the knowledge-as-means (pramåˆa), though its objects are not different

192

In fact, even between cognition (abhijñå) and re-cognition (pratyabhijñå), [bywhich you illustrate that the knowledge as Brahman itself and the notion to sublate
Ignorance, though having different effects, have the same content695], there is somedifference [in content] due to distinguishing characteristics in space, time and so on.696(42)[Only when] re-cognition has some extra contents in comparison to cognition,
the re-cognition is capable of sublating such [delusion of] difference as cannot
be sublated by this [cognition]—though you may not accept it.697

from that of Brahman-itself, annihilates [Ignorance], we would be constantly liberated
because [Brahman-] itself can unavoidably annihilate [Ignorance before the knowledgeas-pramåˆa does]. If [Brahman-] itself cannot annihilate [Ignorance], we are constantly
transmigrated because even the knowledge-as-pramåˆa, whose object does not excel
that [of the Knowledge-as-Brahman-itself], could not annihilate [Ignorance].
695

See ÍP (2) 2,16–19 [on Ír¥Bh I. i. 1; (2) 2,3: etad uktaµ bhavati, etc.]: “[TheAdvaitins argue:] In our experience there is no difference in content between cognition
and re-cognition but one type of knowledge is not contradictory to delusion while theother is contradictory to delusion. The cognition ‘This is one Devadatta’ has one [person]
as its content, still the delusion ‘There are two different persons’ (that is, ‘This one isdifferent from one who I saw before’) remains. Yet the re-cognition ‘This is that one
Devadatta’ is, though its content too is the oneness of Devadatta, contradictory to thedelusion ‘There are two.’ Thus it is proper that [only] the knowledge-as-means canannihilate the delusion [i.e., Ignorance], while its content is not different [from that ofKnowledge-as-Brahman] (nanu vishayavaishamyåbhåve 'pi kasyacid jñånasya bhramåvirodhitvaµ kasyacid bhramavirodhitvaµ ca d®sh†am abhijñåpratyabhijñayo˙ / ayam eko
devadatta ity abhijñåyå ekavishayatve 'pi pËrvad®sh†åd ayam anya iti
purushadvitvabhramao d®sh†a˙; pratyabhijñåyås tu so 'yam eko devadatta iti
devadattaikyavishayatve 'pi dvitvavirodhitvaµ d®sh†am iti vishayavaishamyåbhåve 'pipramåˆajñånasya bhramanivartakatvaµ yuktam).” The same discussion is found in ÍD,våda 43 [203,22ff.] as well.
R points out that here our author referred to the [Pañcapådikå]-Vivaraˆa. That is,
PPV ad PP cited below (Varaˆasi ed., p. 636) runs: devadattaikyasyåbhijñåyåm eva
siddhatvåt tadåkåreˆa pratyabhijñåvåkyåbhyåm upajanitena jñånenopådhiparikalpitabhedaniråsena pratyabhijñåvåkyayo˙ pråmåˆyam. The first Advaitin who applies “so'yam” (a well-known example of a lakshaˆå) to the knowledge from the Scriptures is
Padmapåda (PP 307: ßåstraµ hi so 'yam ityådilaukikavåkyavad brahmaˆi pråmåˆyam)and this is enlarged to interprete the passage ‘tat tvam asi’ by Sarvajñåtman [vanBuitenen 1956: 62–64; Mayeda 1979: 53–54].
696Råmånujaclearly negates a lakshaˆå (implication) in the sentence ‘so 'yaµ
devadatta˙’; that is, Ír¥Bh I. i. 1 [(2) 54,3f.] says: so 'yam devadatta ity atråpi na
lakshaˆå, bhËtavartamånakålasaµbandhitayaikyaprat¥tyavirodhåt (See also VAS §25).
697

Cf. ÍD, våda 43 [204,3–6]: Even in that case [of ‘This is Devadatta’ and ‘This

193

Thus, if [the Knowledge-as-Brahman] itself annihilates [Ignorance], there would
be eternal annihilation; if the knowledge-as-means (måna) which is other than [Brahman]itself [annihilates the ignorance], [Brahman] should be accepted as having somedistinguishing characteristics [299].
[Objection:] Since we do not find that what is not the knowledge-as-means(amåna) [such as a pot] sublates [delusion], being the knowledge-as-means is essential
for sublating. [That is why the Knowledge-as-Brahman cannot sublate Ignorance].
[Replied:] Why don't you accept, in the same way, that since we do not find thatwhat is not known (ameya) is the substratum [of delusion],698 being known is essential
for being [the substratum of delusion]? [But Brahman could not be the substratum ofdelusion according to you because It cannot be known699].
[Objection:] Because of the difference between a material entity (ja∂a) and nonmaterial one (aja∂a) [300] [or what is manifested by the other and what is manifested byitself,700 non-material or self-luminous Brahman do not have to be known so as to be thesubstratum of delusion, while a material thing like a pot must be known].
[Replied:] Nothing is different. For, [according to you], the knowledge-as-means(which is other than [Brahman] itself) [i.e., the internal organ] is also material [and] thepart of this [internal organ] which [Brahman] Itself enters [i.e., the Consciousness] does
exist even before [the sublation of Ignorance].
is that Devadatta’], there is difference in representation between the cognition and there-cognition; difference between cognition and re-cognition could not be establishedotherwise. None but you imagines that the re-cognition—which has an extra description
that—is of the completely same object as that of the cognition—which has a description
this only—like continuous streams [of knowledge] (tatråpy abhijñåpratyabhijñayo˙prakåßyåkårabhdo 'ati; anyathåbhijñåpratyabhijñayor bhedåsiddhiprasaµgåt / ko våbhavantam
antareˆasaityadhikollekhin¥µpratyabhijñåmasåvityetåvanmåtrollekhinyåbhijñayå
sahadhåravåhikavad
atyantasamånavishayåm
abhimanyate).
698

E.g., as far as a shell is not known, misconception of it as silver cannot takeplace.
699

Cf. ÍD, våda 19 [99,14–15]: brahmavishayaµ v®ttijñånaµ nivartakam iti cet‘anubhåvyatve gha†ådivad ananubhËtitvaprasaµga˙’ [< Ish†asiddhi 1,5–6: anubhËter anubhåvyatve ghatådivad ananubhËtitvaprasaµgåt (> ÓS 22,10; Ír¥Bh I. i. 1, (1) 100,3f.
and 134,4f. See Mesquita 1984: 189f.)] iti tvaduktaµ kiµ na smarasi.
For further discussion on the Advaita theory of unknowablity of Brahman, see
311,1ff. below.

194

Furthermore,(43)

Does Brahman have the quality called ‘being without any distinguishing
characteristic’ or not? In the former case, It has distinguishing characteristic
as It is endowed with this [quality]; even in the later case, It has distinguishing
characteristic as It is not endowed with [the quality ‘being without any
distinguishing characteristic’]. [301](44)[You may say that ‘without any distinguishing characteristic’ could not bedenied, according to the previous argument, if ‘without any distinguishing
characteristic’ were not existent; but] what we deny is that which is establishedthrough delusion by force of your statement [that Brahman is without
distinguishing characteristic] [or] that which is stated in supplementary reference(anËdita) through the implication (lakshaˆåv®tti) of this [statement]. That is, it
is denied for the reason that it has no denoting power. [302](45)

As the statement ‘The city has no speciality (nirvißesha)’ cannot be establishedin respect to one place [which has no distinguishing characteristic]; so allusages terminate in distinguishing characteristic.

(46)

You may say that [Brahman is without any distinguishing characteristic as]
distinguishing characteristic, [according to the Naiyåyikas], is without any
distinguishing characteristic; then, we reply: Is this [distinguishing
characteristic] also [related] to a certain [entity] or not? In the latter case, it
should have distinguishing characteristic, [namely, being related to something].
In the former case, it would lose the very nature of distinguishing characteristic[because nothing is distinguished by that which is not related to anything].
[Objection:] It is mere verbal expression (abhilåpa) that Brahman is without any

distinguishing characteristic; [so there is not the positive quality ‘without any
distinguishing characteristic’].
[Replied:] Were it the case, what we strive for would be proved. For [Its]distinguishing characteristic would not be denied in reality and [It] would be finallyaccepted to be in the scope of such expression.
[Objection:] Even [being in the scope] is impossible for a pure entity.

195[Replied:] Not so.
(47)

For whether an entity is taught as expressible (våcya) or inexpressible (avåcya),the entity is expressible in view of its being connected with the word ‘expressible’or ‘inexpressible.’
Moreover,(48)

It is decided by powerful means of knowledge such as perception that theworld is real. Then, the statement that [Brahman] is without any distinguishing
characteristic [should be regarded] as having another meaning701 as the sentence“The Scriptures post is the sun.”702[Objection:] Without the Scriptures, the world can be sublated by means ofinference such as:(A)

Cognition (pratyaya) of perception etc. is devoid of objective support(nirålambhana),
Because it is cognition,
Like cognition in sleep703;(B)

The phenomenal world is false (mithyå),Because it is seen (d®ßya),or Because it is excluded (vyåvartamåna),Like a shell [mistaken] as silver.
700

See the definition of ja∂a and aja∂a in 38,3: parata eva bhåsamånaµ ja∂am;tadanyad aja∂am.
701

That It has no inferior quality (R).

702

The sentence “ådityo yËpa˙” [TaiBr?] is quoted in Íåbarabhåshya I. iv. 23
and in the Arthasaµgraha (ed. and trans. G. Thibaut, Varanasi, 1882, p. 26) as an
example of the guˆavåda.Cf. YMD III. 5. For the detail of guˆavåda, see Kunio Harikai:
On the Three fold Classification of Arthavåda, in: R. C. Dwivedi (ed.), Studies inM¥måµså: Dr. Mandan Mishra Felicitation Volume, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994,
pp. 299–311 [Originally published in Japanese: Indogaku-Bukkyôgaku-Kenkyû 20-2
(1972)].
703

This syllogism is, as is pointed out by V, same as that of Buddhists; see SAS
IV. 24 (526,11f.): ya˙ pratyaya˙ sa nirålambana˙, yathå svapnådipratyaya˙; tathå ca
vimatam. Cf. Ír¥Bh II. ii. 28: yat parai˙ [= Yogåcårai˙] svapnavijñånad®sh†åntena

196[Replied:] Not so.
[Concerning the syllogism (A)], if apprehension without any object704(nirvishaya°), apprehension of non-existent705 (asat°), or apprehension otherwise 706(anyathå-khyåti) were to be proved, there would be defects such as contradiction,707
deviation from your own established theory (apasiddhånta) [of indefinable apprehension(anirvacan¥ya°)] etc.708[Concerning the syllogism (B)], if indefinability (anirvåcyatva) is to be proved,
there would be the defect that the attribute [of the probandum] is not well-known, thecontradiction to your own statement [which is definable with the very word ‘indefinable’]etc. [303] [You may say that ‘indefinability’ means not ‘the non-existence of definability’but ‘having the non-existence of reality (sattvåbhåva) as well as the non-existence of
unreality709 (asttvåbhåva)’; but the contradiction still remains]: as the coexistence of two
opposites, [e.g. reality and unreality], is contradiction; so the coexistence of such negationsjågaritajñånånåm api nirålambanatvam uktam [303,13]. So ålambana here means vishaya(See ÍP ad II. ii. 20).
704This is the theory of error by the followers Patañjali [Dasgupta III, 239] orsome Buddhists [Srinivasa Chari 175]. (= vishayåsadbhåvapaksha in Ír¥Bh (2) 27,5?).
Vedånta Deßika rejects it because it is cotradictory to our experience and, consequently,
it proves to be asatkhyåti, anirvacan¥yakhyåti or anyathåkhyåti [NyP 54f.; TMK IV. 30].
Cf. Vedavalli 65f.
705

This is the theory of error by the Mådhyamika Buddhist. Deßika's criticism of
this theory is seen in NyP 52f. and TMK IV. 18–19. See Singh 199f., Vedavalli 60,
Srinivasa Chari 173f.
706

This is the theory of error by the Naiyåyika. Deßika's criticism of this theory
is seen in NyP 44ff. and TMK IV. 12–14. See Singh 186ff., Vedavalli 55–58, Srinivasa
Chari 180ff.
707

R: [As to nirvishayakhyåti], it is contradictory to the essential nature of cognition
that it is dependent (sålambhana). (Cf. SAS IV. 30: bhråntir nirvishayety avagamåbhåvåt,pratyuta savishayatvam eva tasyå˙ sarveshu ßåstreshu suvyaktam uktam). [As toasatkhyåti], it is contradictory to being non-existent that non-existent also is the objectof knowledge. [As to anyathåkhyåti], it is contradictory to cognition that one thingappears the other. Moreover, it would be contradictory to your intention if the cognitionborn from the inference were also ‘nirårambhana’ because the reason ‘pratyayatva’exists even in this cognition.
708

There is vyabhicåra in view of the mahåvåkya: “tat tvam asi” (R).

709

E.g. gotva and aßvatva cannot coexist anywhere, yet the non-existence of197of these [two opposites] as are of the nature of the non-existence of each other, [e.g. thenon-existence of reality and the non-existence of unreality], is contradiction. Likewise,(49)

Because [some authorities] affirm that [the phenomenal world] is other thanboth real and unreal and because [some] negate it, [the phenomenal world,which you regard] as other than both real and unreal, is of reality [in the formof the affirmation] and is of unreality [in the form of the negation].

(50)

As well, [the proposition] “All are known by knowing one” would not beestablished for you. Because it is impossible to understand what is other thanboth real and unreal, [i.e. the phenomenal world], by understanding of theReal, [i.e. Brahman]. [304](51)

One can be understood from the other if the two are identified, similar or
dissimilar. In your opinion, however, [the proposition “All are known”] would
be sublated [because, according to you, the phenomenal world is negated byknowing Brahman] and [the identity, the similarity and the dissimilarity between
the phenomenal world and Brahman] would not be established. Or, you should
supplement (adhyåh®ti) [the proposition with the negative particle710] or [youshould regard it as] implication711 (lakshaˆå).
Moreover,(52)

While an entity has been defined [as existent] by refuting the second, the third
and the fourth alternatives712 respectively, shameless men assert theindefinability. [305]In addition, if the probandum means ‘being sublated (bådhatva),’ ‘being capablegotva and the non-existence of aßvatva can coexist in a pot and the like (R).
710

That is, “All are known” is interpreted as “All are negated” or “All are notknown.”
711
712

That is, “All are known” implicates “The substrata of all are known”

I.e., (1) existent (sat), (2) non-existent (asat), (3) both existent and non-existent(sadasat), (4) neither existent nor non-existent (na san nåsat). The Mådhyamika holdthat the ultimate reality is ßËnya beyond these four (see SDS II. 159: tattvaµ sat-asatubhaya-anubhaya-åtmaka-catushko†i-vinirmuktaµ ßËnyam eva). Cf. the verse cited in
Prajñåkaramati's Pañjikå ad Bodhicaryåvatåra IX. 2 (ed. P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit
Text Ser. 12, Darbhanga 1960: 274,12f.): na san nåsan na sadasan na cåpyanubhayåtmakam / catushko†ivinirmuktaµ tattvaµ mådhyamikå vidu˙ // (= SAS IV.

198of [being sublated] (tadyogyatva)’ etc., there would be defect that we never apprehendso,713 etc.714 If [mere] ‘being destructible’ is to be proved, we would have no objection.715
Furthermore, [306](53)

If the knowledge of the subject etc. [in your syllogism] is valid, there would
be sublation [of the probandum ‘being false’ since the subject etc. should bereal]; if not, there would be non-establishment [of substratum (åßrayåsiddhi)
because the subject should be unreal]. [307]If you should accept these [defects], the inference would be purposeless, self-

contradiction [since those who hold the subjects etc. to be unreal instruct them] andwould not stand.
Besides, [you may hold that there would not be sublation etc. because ourordinary perception etc. are not valid; but it is not true. For] there is mutual-dependence:
it is not until all perception etc. are proved to be of invalid knowledge that this inferencefunctions but this [invalidity of perception etc.] is established [only] from that [inference].
[Objection:] Because they are rooted in a defect, namely, latent impression (våsanå)of difference, perception etc. are not valid knowledge.
[Replied:] Not so. For there is mutual dependence between the defectiveness andthe invalidity. If either of the two were established from the Scriptures for the reason
that they are of high [authority], still there would be circulation: based on the high[authority] of the Scriptures, [either of] the invalidity and the defectiveness [of perceptionetc.] is decided; after this decision, [the above-mentioned] inference functions; [andbased on this inference, it is established that the Scriptures which accords with theinference are of high authority]. [308][Objection:] The essential nature of each entity (padårthasvarËpa) is the objectsof perception etc., whereas its quality named ‘being false’ etc. is the object of such
18: 508,4f.).
713

For instance, a pot is never apprehended as negated in its position (R).

714

Here ‘etc.’ means ‘being to be negated by knowledge (jñånanivartyatva)’ (K).
In that case, there would be the defect of siddhasådhana because that much lead to mere
‘being destructible’ and it cannot sublate the reality of the phenomenal world (R).
715

In SAS III. 51, vyåv®ttatva is interpreted as being different from something(kutaßcidbhinnatva), being to be sublated (bådhyatva) or being destroyed (naßvaratva)

199

inference as is not contradictory to this [perception]; accordingly, there is no contradiction.
[Replied:] This is not proper. Because the establishment of the essential nature
in itself is contradictory to ‘being false,’ [namely, ‘being of non-existence of the essential
nature’]. If the quality which is not contradictory to the essential nature and is technicallytermed (paribhåshita) the word ‘false’ were to be proved, there would be nothing
unacceptable for us.
Additionally, [309](54)

Does the idea of the thesis (pratijñå) asserting ‘false’ extend to your thesis ornot? [— in other words: Is ‘being false’ false or not?] In the former case,[your thesis] itself would be annihilated. In the latter, [the very thesis ofyours] would be of deviation (vyabhicåra).
If716 falsity is false, the falsity will be sublated; if reality is real, the reality will(55)

be established.717 [310]You may hold that ‘the falsity of the phenomenal world’ is real718 Brahman(56)

and, consequently, [the falsity] must be real; then, we reply: this [phenomenal
world] must be real because the phenomenal world is similarly [Brahman].
(57)

You may assert that this [phenomenal world] cannot be that [Brahman] becauseof its materiality (ja∂atva); then, its falsity cannot be that [Brahman]. This[falsity] could not be real according to you since it is different from that
[Brahman] because it is also [material].

(58)[Nor] can [the falsity] be different from real and unreal [according to you]because there is mutual contradiction like [that between] reality and unreality.
Consider that the notion of one substrates that of the other.
As well, [‘real’] Brahman is also [actually] ‘seen’ in the conditioned (upahita)[229].
716

The same verse is found in SAS III. 49 (218,6f.); SAS reads hi for tu.

717This is an answer to the quibble that as you deny falsity through the alternative
whether falsity is false or not, so we can deny reality through the alternative whether
reality is real or not.
718

K reports the variant tat for sat. If so, tat denotes mithyåtva, and the meaningof the verse does not change.

200

form and the like719 through the cognition of the phenomenal world or in the unconditioned
form and the like through the cognition sublating this [phenomenal world]. So [thereason ‘being seen’] deviates [from ‘being false’]. Otherwise, [even] Brahman would be‘false.’ [311][Objection:] [Brahman as] Consciousness720 (anubhËti) cannot be known721;
because it is consciousness.
[Replied:] Not so.
(59)

Does the statement that Consciousness cannot be known make any sense(bodhaka) or not? — In the former case, [Consciousness] is known throughthe very [statement]; if not, what is affirmed, and where?
In addition, if Brahman were totally unknown, it would be contradictory to thefollowing passages:
Now, after that, the inquiry (jijñåså) into Brahman [BrSË I. i. 1],
The knower of Brahman attains the Highest [TaiUp II. i. 1],
The Self, my dear, is to be known [B®hUp II. iv. 5],
etc. And teaching would be purposeless. If a teacher is convinced of the non-duality, towhom does he, [knowing the distinction between him and his student is unreal], give theinstruction? If, on the other hand, he is not convinced it, what does he teach? None otherthan a mad teaches those who are decided to be unreal such as [his] image.
[As to the second reason ‘being excluded’], mere exclusion (vyåv®tti) and constancy(anuv®tti) cannot be the criterion of falsity and [reality].722 Because,
719

According to K, ådi after upahita denotes upalakshita or vißish†a.

720

Or pure Knowledge itself beyond the distinction of the knower, the known
and the knowing.
721
722

Cf. Ish†asiddhi, maµgala: yånubhËti˙ … ameyå [quoted in ÓS 27,2].

Cf. Ír¥Bh I. i. 1, the first opinion in the mahåpËrvapaksha [that of the Vivaraˆa(Mesquita 1984: 185)]: mithyåtvaµ nåma prat¥yamånatvapËrvakayathåvasthitavastujñånanivartyatvam, yathå rajjvådyadhish†hånakasarpåde˙ [(1) 79,1f.]; and the second
opinion [that of Maˆ∂anamißra (Mesquita 1984: 185f.)]: gha†o 'sti pa†o 'sti gha†o 'nubhËyate
pa†o 'nubhËyata iti sarve padårthå˙ sattånubhËtigha†itå eva d®ßyante. atra sarvåsu
pratipattisu sanmåtram anuvartamånaµ d®ßyata iti tad eva paramårtha˙, vißeshas tuvyåvartamånatayåparamårthå˙; rajjusarpådivat: yathå rajjur adhish†hånatayå
'nuvartamånå paramårthasat¥, vyåvatamånå˙ sarpabhËdalanåmbudhårådayo 'paramårthå˙

201

(60)

[When various things, say, a rope, a bamboo and a stick, are mistaken as asnake], it is clear that there is reality in a rope, a bamboo etc., though mutually
exclusive, and that a snake, [though] constant [in these misconception], isfalse. [312](61)

If [a thing] were proved to be so [false] only because it is excluded, even thereal would be so; since we experience, for instance, that the reality of the pot[which exists elsewhere or in different time] is not here and now.723 [313](62)[Objection:] [The real] cannot be negated at that position and at that time
[where it exists].
[Replied:] So is a pot.
[Objection:] [Because the pot is negated in another position], it is the positionof the pot that is real.
[Replied:] This is not true. For we understand differently, [i.e. “a pot is in thisposition,” not “the position is”].

(63)[Objection:] Being (sat) is accepted to be real because of its constancy [in theideas, say], “[a pot] is,” and “[a cloth] is.”[Replied:] Were it the case, difference and non-being also would be real becauseof their constancy [in the ideas, say], “[a pot] is different” [and “a cloth isdifferent”] or “[a pot] is not” [and “a cloth is not”]. [314]Non-being due to difference in position and time is universal.724 So relative(64)

difference of one thing from the others is endless.
(65)[Objection:] This constancy [of difference] is mere verbal.
[Replied:] So is [the constancy of being]. Being-ness is nothing but knowablity
by various means of knowledge, we think. [315](66)

If it were accepted that being-ness is common to all existents because it isconstantly known, still this [being-ness] is established to be their quality, [notas themselves].

[(1) 99,1–4].
723
724

Cf. Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: (1) 129,3–132,6.

E.g. though knowablity (prameyatva) belongs to everything, in the relation of
conjunction (saµyoga) it is not anywhere; even Brahman is not material (R).

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Therefore, the truth: ‘false’ is that which is negated in a known position of space
and time and nothing beyond that and ‘real’ is not so.
And our counter-inferences are as follows:(67)

The subject under our dispute, [i.e. the phenomenal world], is real; Because it
is known, or because it is different from non-real etc.; Like the self.
Cognition, under our dispute, is based on the real (samyak); Because it is not
sublated by any knowledge; Like [the knowledge] accepted by [both of] us725[such as the knowledge of the self].
Here we show the secret of origin of the Vedåntins in the degenerate age(antimayuga)—(68)[The doctrine of] Íaµkara was born out of the mixture (saµkara) of theSåµkhya,726 Buddhism 727 and the Cårvåka.728 It has not only the defects ofthese [three schools] but its own extra ones. [316]Thus, it is established that Brahman never errs.

This [Brahman] is not in itself the material of the world.729 Because it iscontradictory to [the Scriptural passages] that it never undergoes any modification, that
It has no defect etc.
725

Literally, like [our] own doctrine (svatantravat). But if this doctrine were
accepted only by one side of the disputers, it could not be an example [see V's fn.2].
726

The Advaita and the Såµkhya are same so far as they regard the self (åtman
or purusha) as neither knower nor doer or experiencer in true sense (R).
727

For example, both the Advaitins and Buddhists use the same syllogism toprove that cognition is false, as pointed by R.
728

The Advaita and the Cårvåka are same so far as they accept the destruction of
I-notion (ahamartha) (R).
729

According to both the commentators, this is the criticism against Yådavaprakåßa.
Cf. VAS §9: brahmaiva … svabhåvata˙ … viyadådinånåvidhamalarËpapariˆåmåspadam[76,8f.]. Yet Viraraghavachari, based on a passage of the NyKus “brahmapariˆamater itibhåskaragotre yujyate [137,3],” approves that it cancerns Bhåskara’s doctrine also [fn.
2]. Actually in VAS §57 (105,7f.) and Ír¥Bh II. i. 15 (256,11) Råmånuja ascribesßaktipariˆåma-theory to Bhåskara. Concerning this, van Buitenen [1956: 225, n. 252a]
refers to Bhåskara's BrSË-bhåshya I. iv. 25 (cf. Srinivasachari 1934: 31).

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Nor does [Brahman become the material of the world] due to conditioning of[Its] potency (ßakti).730 For if the potency were non-different [from Brahman], the potency
would not be other than [Brahman] Itself [and the above-mentioned defects wereunavoidable]; if it were different [from Brahman], [your doctrine] would be same as ourdoctrine [that Brahman as conditioned by potency named prak®ti is the cause of theworld]; if it were different cum non-different (bhedåbheda) [from Brahman], in view of
the aspect of non-difference there would be the defects due to [Its] modification etc.
Again, it is declined by the above that everything is different cum non-different
by nature.
[Such concept of Brahman as is] excluded [from God, e.g. pure-existence], isrejected.731
Additionally, in the three doctrines, i.e., those of Íaµkara, [Bhåskara and Yådavaprakåßa],732 various kinds of grammatical coordination733 (såmånådhikaraˆya) [found in
the Scriptures] between the phenomenal world, which is composed of intelligent andnon-intelligent beings, and Brahman are discrepant and, [as a result, those who hold
730

This is the criticism against Bhåskara, who hold that not Brahman in itself but
Its potency undergoes modification. Cf. VAS §57: brahmaˆa˙ ßaktipariˆåma˙ [105,8];
van Buitenen points out that this doctrine is found in Bhåskara's BrSËBh I. iv. 25 [Eng.
trans., p.225, n.252a]. Note the differnce from the theory of Yådavaprakåßa that Brahman
as associated with ßaktis in intself is the material cause [Cf. SAS III. 27: 121,7ff.; Ír¥Bh
II. i. 15: 256,13ff.]
731

vyåv®ttam eva dËshitam. R seems to comment this reading (vyåv®ttam iti /¥ßvaråd vyåv®ttam ity artha˙ / sanmåtram eva brahma, ¥ßvaro na brahmety ayaµ paksha¥ßvarasya brahmatvasådhanåd dËshita evety artha˙).
V shows the variant reading in ‘4410 koßa’ [?]: sanmåtasyåµßino brahmatvaµca vyåv®ttam eva dËshitam (That pure existence in entire is Brahman [because It is]
excluded from [God] is rejected). Also V suggests the reading evam for eva.
The variant reading in NySi (M), NySi (Pan) and NySi (VDG) is: sanmåtasyåµßinobrahmatvam api nirvikåratvanirdoshatvådivirodhåt pËrvam eva dËshitam. This reading
is not supported by R and also ‘nirvikåratvanirdoshatvådivirodhåt’ is wrongly inserted
from the previous portion.
Anyway, because this portion is hardly fit for the context, there is some corruption
here.
732

ßaµkarådipakshatraye 'pi. V shows the variant ßåµkarabhåskarayådavapaksheshu in ‘tå° ko°’ [?].
733

For the definition of såmånådhikaraˆya, see my fn. on 142,5.

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these doctrines are to be interpreted them], with great effort, by means of implication(lakshaˆå) and so on. [317](69)

It is just a childish jargon that one and the same [Scripture] asserts that
[Brahman] is composed of the world and subsequently negates it,734 because
this would be [needless] trouble if, [in reality], there were no difference[between the world and Brahman]. [318](70)Indeed, there is not grammatical coordination between a shell and [that] silver[which is superimposed on the shell].735 Nor between two [reflections of] themoon.736 Nor between reflection (pratibimaba) and the original (bimaba).737
Nor between a pot and the space [in it].738 Nor between the space in one pot(71)

and that in another.739 Nor between the space in a pot and the total space etc.740
Nor between lump [of clay] and [its modifications such as] a pot.741 Nor

(72)
734

I.e. ChUp VI, having describing Brahman as being (ii. 1: sad eva somyedam
agra ås¥t), shows that It is the cause of the world (3: tad aikshata bahu syåµ prajåyeya).
If the Advaita or bhedåbheda theory were true, this scripture would negate the content
again.
735

So there would not be grammatical coordination between the phenomenal
world which is superimposed and that which is regarded as its substratum (R).
736

So in the Vivaraˆa school, which regards the self as the reflection of its
original or Lord, there would not be grammatical coordination between the individual
selves (R). Note that ¥ßvara in this school is Brahman or caitanya conditioned by avidyå.
737

So in the Vivaraˆa school there would not be grammatical coordination between
the individual self and Lord (R).
738

So in the Bhåmat¥ school, which regards the individual self as enclosed byignorance or the internal organ like the space enclosed in a pot, there would not begrammatical coordination between the internal organ and the individual self (R).
739

So for those who regard the individual self as a delimited Brahman, there
would not be grammatical coordination between the individual selves (R).
740

So for those who regard the individual self as a delimited Brahman, there
would not be grammatical coordination between the individual self and Brahman (R).
741

So in the bhedåbheda theory, there would not be grammatical coordination
between Brahman and intelligent beings, non-intelligent beings or Lord (R). This isespecially against Yådavaprakåßa according to K.

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between [its two different modifications such as] a pot and a dish.742 Nor
between lump [of clay] and [its conditioned] portion743. Nor between two
pots.744 [319](73)

It is true that there is an idea of grammatical coordination even between
different individuals, [say, a pot and a dish], due to [their common] aspectsuch as clay, but [such an idea] is caused by the identity concerning [their]
genera and the like.
Even though [these three] schools do not find any trouble [in explaining some

Scriptures passages], the Naiyåyika school and the like are better [because of its logicalconsistency]. For,(74)

It is better to postulate troublesome content because [some] statements [whose
authority is] accepted [by us] speak of contradictory content as the sentence“The Scriptures post is the sun.”
We are ashamed only to say that difference cum non-difference, which you hold,is contradictory. Nevertheless, we dare say — Non-difference is the non-existence ofdifference; why can we understand one thing and its non-existence in one and the sameplace simultaneously745? And non-difference is nothing but the non-existence of difference.
[Objection:] From the viewpoint of genus, there is non-difference; [from theviewpoint of individual, there is difference].746[Replied:] Then, non-difference belongs to genus etc. and difference belongs to742

So in Yådavaprakåßa's opinion (according to K), there would not be grammaticalcoordination between intelligent beings or non-intelligent beings and Lord (R).
743

So in Bhåskara's opinion, there would not be grammatical coordination between
Brahman and intelligent beings or non-intelligent (R). Cf. SAS III. 27: bhåskar¥yås tu
cidacidaµßavibhaktaµ brahmadravyam acidaµßena vikriyate, tadvikåropahitena
cidaµßena saµsarat¥ti [120].
744

So in Yådavaprakåßa's opinion (according to K), there would not be grammaticalcoordination between the modifications of Brhman (R); consequently, nor between theindividual selves (K).
745

Cf. Ír¥Bh I. i. 4: tayos tathåbhåvåtathåbhåvarËpayor ekatra saµbhavam
anunmatta˙ ko brav¥ti [159,5f.].
746

Cf. Ír¥Bh I. i. 4: kåraˆåtmanå jåtyåtmanå cåbheda˙, kåryåtmanå vyaktyåtmanå
ca bheda˙ [159,7].

206

individual etc.,747 so one and the same thing is not different cum non-different.748[Objection:] Genus and individual etc. are also mutually different cum nondifferent.
[Replied:] Is this [difference cum non-difference] brought about by itself or fromanother aspect? If the former, there would be contradiction749 [320]. If the latter, there
would be defects such as infinite regress.750
To those who are devoted to the [Jaina theory of] seven propositions(saptabhaµg¥),751 this is our refutation: [321]747

The two ‘etc.’'s denote kåraˆa and kårya respectively. See the above-citedÍr¥Bh I. i. 4 [159,7].
748

Cf. Ír¥Bh I. i. 4: vyaktigato bhedo jåtigataß cåbheda iti naikasya dvyåtmakatå

[159,9f.].
749

Cf. Ír¥Bh I. i. 4: “How can such two aspects [e.g. jåti and vyakti] as aredifferent from [their substratum] itself and abide in that [substratum] introduce
contradictory two qualities [i.e. difference and non-difference] into the very [substratum]?
[— If difference and non-difference had the same substratum, there would be contradiction.
Such two aspects as introduce non-contradiction could not be the substratum of difference
and non-difference; accordingly, these (two) do not introduce non-contradiction. For
instance, two aspects belonging to fire, brilliance and tawny-ness, cannot introduce intofire two contradictory qualities, hotness and coolness]” (svasmåd vilakshaˆaµ svåßrayamåkåradvayaµ svasmin viruddhadharmadvayasamåveßanirvåhakaµ kathaµ bhavet[159,14f.]; ÍP on it: sva-ßabdatrayam apy åßrayaparam / bhedåbhedayor ekåßrayatvena
hi virodha˙ / avirodhanirvåhakåkåradvayaµ hi na bhedåbhedayor åßrayabhËtam / ato na
tadavirodhanirvåhakam / agnigataµ paiµgalyam aujvalyaµ cåkåradvayam agnau
ß¥toshˆatvarËpaviruddhadharmadvayasamåveßanirvåhakaµ na bhavat¥ty artha˙) [citedin K].
750

Cf. Ír¥Bh I. i. 4: åkåradvayatadvatoß ca dvyåtmakatvåbhyupagame nirvåhakåntaråpekshayå 'navasthå syåt [160.1f.].
751

I.e. [1] syåd asti, [2] syån nåsti, [3] syåd asti ca nåsti ca, [4] syåd avaktavyam,[5] syåd asti cåvaktavyaµ ca, [6] syån nåsti cåvaktavyaµ ca, [7] syåd asti ca nåsti
cåvaktavyaµ ca [Ír¥Bh II. ii. 31: 309,3f.]. N.B. syåt-ßabda˙ khalv ayaµ nipåtas
tiµantapratirËpako 'nekåntadyotaka˙ [SDS III. 379]. According to the first interpretationof R, the saptabhaµg¥naya is refuted here for the reason that the bhedåbhedavådins etc.
also follow it. In fact, BrSË II. ii. 31, refuting the saptabhaµg¥naya, is cited in Ír¥Bh I. i.
1: (1) 123,1, where the Bhedåbhedavåda is rejected. In TMK also, saptabhaµg¥ isdiscussed after the bhedåbheda theory [V. 10] and in SAS III. 33, our author describes
the bhedåbheda view as jainagandhinåµ jalpitåni [138]. Cf. SDS XVI 774f.: bhåskareˆakshapaˆakacaraˆaµ pramåˆaßaraˆe bhedåbhedavådinåm.

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(75)

You hold that the subject under discussion is non-absolute (anekånta), because
it is existing, like another thing. But if this [‘non-absolute’ in this syllogism]
were not non-absolute, there would be deviation (anaikåntya) [because this‘non-absolute,’ though existing, is not non-absolute]. And if it were nonabsolute, [your syllogism could not stand and] there is no trouble for us.
[a] [Genus752 and individual are] never apprehended [as] same [even in the(76)

first indeterminate perception], because [they] are apprehended [even at thattime] as qualified and qualifier.753 [b] [The knowledge] “This one pot (eko'yaµ gha†a˙)” etc. is like knowledge “There is one person bearing a staff (ekodaˆ∂¥),” [where the word ‘one’ concerns the qualified (the person), and it
does not mean identity of the qualified and the qaulifier (a staff)]. 754 [322](77)[c] Grammatical coordination [between genus and individual] does not need apossessive suffix755 (matvarth¥ya) because [the two] are dependent by nature.756
752

Here begins the rufutation against the four reason to prove difference cum
non-difference: (a) in grasping an object for the first time, we do not see it as distinct(from its genus); (b) there is the apprehension associated with the word ‘one’; (c) there
is grammatical coordination without a possessive suffix; (d) the two are always
apprehended together. Cf. SAS V. 8: (a) prathamapiˆ∂agrahaˆeshu bhedenåpratyayåt,(c) matvarth¥yapratyayanirapekshasåmånådhikaraˆyåt, (d) sahopalambhaniyamåt,(b) ekaßabdånuvidhapratyayåc ca bhedåbhedaµ samarthayante [687,10ff.]. The four
reasons have been already shown and rejected by Sudaßana in ÍP ad Ír¥Bh I. i. 4[160,17ff.] and TD ad VAS §30 [65,4ff.].
753

Cf. Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: idam ittham iti hi sarvå prat¥tir upajåyate [(1) 118,4], whichis quoted in commenting TMK V. 8c: itthaµtvedaµtvaßËnyaµ na hi kim api kadåpy
arbhako 'pi prat¥yåt.
754

Cf. ÍP I. i. 4: eko daˆ∂¥tivad vißeshyaikyavishaya˙, na tu vißeshaˆavißeshyaikyavaishaya˙ [160,21f.]. Cf. also SAS V. 9: 688,17f.: eko daˆ∂¥tivad ekaßabdasya
vißish†avishayatvåt; and TMK V. 9c: dharmyaikyåd ekavåk syåt na tu bhavati tato
dharmadharmyaikyabiddhi˙, which is a reply to (c) as well as (b).
755

I.e. a suffix which has the meaning of matU(P), ‘belonging to this’ or ‘existingin this’. See P 5. 2. 94: tad asyåsty asminn iti matUP.
756

Cf. ÍP I. i. 4: ap®thaksiddhavißeshaˆatvaµ matvarth¥yapratyayanirapekshasåmånådhikaraˆyahetu˙ / ap®thaksiddhiß ca prakåraprakåriˆo˙ saµbandhaniyamåd
evopapannam / ata˙ prakåraprakåribhåvapratipannabhedaviruddhåbhedakalpanåyå
nåvakåßa˙ [160,19f.]. Cf. also VAS §§67f. and TMK V. 9c.

208[d] For 757 the same reason, they are always apprehended simultaneously. For
this [simultaneousness] is brought about only through distinction.758(78)

And this [simultaneous apprehension] is not established, because smell and soon are recognized without [recognizing] the substance [being their substratum].
Consider the deviation (anaikåntya) in color of light and that of a non-shining[object such as a pot].759
To summarize:(79)[a] There is not the apprehension of non-difference [between genus andindividual when an object is seen] for the first time, because there is therelation of the qualifier and the qualified (vaißish†ya) [even at that time]. [b]The apprehension [associated with the word] ‘one’ is because the dharmin isone. [c] A possessive suffix [is used in grammatical coordination between two
things] when [they] are separately established. [d] The simultaneousness [ofapprehension] is based on difference.760[Objection:] How is [Brahman] devoid of three kinds of limitation,761 though theworld and Brahman are completely different?
[Replied:] The answer is as follows.
Of these [limitations], being avoid of limitation in space and limitation in time isestablished as [It] is all-pervasive in all places and in all the time [323].
Now, being devoid of limitation in entity (vastupariccheda) does not mean being
identified with everything; nor does it mean being the substratum of all delusions; nordoes it mean that everything other than [Brahman] Itself is false and the like. Because[if so], the above-mentioned hundreds of objection [to the Advaitins or thebhedåbhedavådins] would rise. Hence we must interpret it otherwise.
757

For the detail of the refutation to sahopalambhaniyama, see 11,3–12,1.

758

Cf. sahatvatanniyamåbhyåµ bhedasyaiva sthir¥karaˆena vyåghåtåt [11,4].

759

Cf. bhåsvarådhvåntåbhåsvararËpåbhyåm anekåntatvåt [12,1].

760

bhedata˙. Or, ‘implies difference’ according to the variant reading bhdaka˙.

761

See 274,1f.

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In this regard, the author of the Vivaraˆa, [Ír¥-Råmamißra], says in commenting
the topic of ‘birth etc.762’ as follows:
Limitation in entity is quantity (pariˆåma) in entity. Limitation in space isbased on it763 [Vivaraˆa ad Ír¥Bh I. i. 2].
The same explanation is found in [his] Vedårthasaµgraha-vivaraˆa764 also.
Varadanåråyaˆa-bha††åraka, however, states in his Nyåyasudarßana:Limitation in entity means [1] having such and such (iyat) quality, havingsuch and such magnitude (vibhËti) and the like. Brahman is devoid of it.
Or Limitation in entity means [2] existence of another entity. Brahman isdevoid of it. Since everything other than Brahman is the body of Brahman,
there is no other [entity] than It. [Nyåyasudarßana ad Ír¥Bh I. i. 2: ]The [second interpretation] means that the expression ‘A is not B’ is not used concerningthat condition.765 So is said by the author of the Commentary:
Because there is no other entity than Brahman [Ír¥Bh I. iv. 23: 163,2].
The same content is mentioned by Nåråyaˆårya also:
Because [Brahman] is devoid of being such and such in quality, [Brahman]is understood to be unlimited [N¥timålå 37,13f.].
Among [these interpretations], the interpretation that [limitation in entity means]‘having such and such quality’ etc. is almost acceptable [324]. To explain — Limitationin entity means inferiority compared to something in some aspects concerning essential
nature, quality and magnitude. The interpretation that [the limitation means] quantity inentity is also a variety of this [interpretation]. So is the interpretation that [the limitationmeans] ‘existence of another entity.’ This [absence of such limitation] is the culminateof auspicious qualities like controlling etc., since it means being composed of everything,which is based on the grammatical coordination with all entities, as the body of everything.
762

Ír¥Bh I. i. 2: ananta-padaµ deßakålavastuparicchedarahitaµ svarËpam åha[115,1f.].

(R).

763

This passage is quoted again in 520,11.

764

Not extant. This portion is cited in 520,4f.

765

I.e. in the condition “yatra tv asya sarvam åtmaivåbhËt” [B®hUp II. iv. 14]

210

Thus, though perfectly different and innumerable entities are existent, it isappropriate that Brahman is devoid of three kinds of limitation.

By the [argument] above, the theory of the Yoga (påtañjala), the Íaiva, theVaißeshika (kåˆåda) etc. that [God] is merely the efficient cause (nimitta) [of the world]is also rejected. For the Írutis mention that the very [God] that is qualified by subtle
intelligent and non-intelligent beings in the condition of cause is the material cause(upådåna) [of the world].766 And that much is not contradictory to the Íruti mentioningthat [He] is not modified. Because such [Íruti] concerns only [His] aspect as the controllerof all or as one who has [all] for the body (ßar¥rin). On the contrary, it is acceptable that
[He] becomes the substratum of modification in qualified form, as a man qualified by
the body of human being and so on, though without any modification by nature, becomeschildish, young, old, fat and so on [325].
[Objection:] God is not the material cause of the world; Because He is theefficient cause of the world; Whatever is the efficient cause of a thing is not the materialcause of it, as in a pot and a potter.
[Replied:] This is not correct. Because it is contradictory to that which makes us
grasp the subject, [i.e. the Scriptures].
[Objection:] The subject here is but such [God] as is inferred as the efficientcause.
[Replied:] Not so, because He cannot be inferred.

[Objection:] The earth and the like have an agent (kart®); because of being aneffect (kårya); like a pot.767
766

E.g. TaiUp II. vi. 1, TaiBr II. viii. 9. 6 (brahma vanaµ brahma sa v®ksha ås¥t),
TaiUp II. vii. 1, MuUp III. i. 3 (R).
767

kshityådikaµ sakart®kam, kåryatvåt, gha†avat. This is the first proof of theexistence of God asserted in Udayana's Nyåyakusumåñjali, the fifth stavaka, i.e. NyKu
(Tirupati ed.) 279,9: kshityådikaµ kart®pËrvakaµ kårytvåt. The reason kåryatva first
appeared in Uddyotakara's Nyåyavårttika (Calcutta ed.) p.957 (according to Vattanky
1984: 23).
For the further discussion on the subject of the syllogism, see below 351,3ff.

211[Replied:] This [syllogism] is not valid. For there is sublation (bådha) if [abodied agent] as found [in the case of similar examples like a pot] is applied [to thepresent subject, since the earth and the like cannot have a bodied agent]. Otherwise, [notonly a body of the agent of the earth etc. but] also [his] knowledge and desire would beabandoned [326]. Since as eternal knowledge, [according to you, does not need] a bodyand the like, so it is tenable that eternal volition768 (prayatna) does not need knowledge
and so on.769[Objection:] If [volition] by itself got an object, [it] would be [same as]knowledge.770[Replied:] Not so, because it is appropriate [that volition, even without knowledge,
got an object] like volition proceeding from [mere] living771 (j¥vanapËrvaka) [in deep
sleep].772 [327][Objection:] In that case [of volition proceeding from living], [its object] islimited due to the unseen power (ad®sh†a).
[Replied:] Suppose that it is proper even in this case [of the volition of God]. It
should be admitted by you also. Otherwise, every effect would be produced at once if[His] object were not limited, because [His] eternal knowledge, desire of making andvolition relate to everything at any time; then, it comes about that everyone would be
simultaneously liberated without any effort, that [every effect] would be momentarily
768

Though the Vißish†ådvaitin regards prayatna as an aspect of dharmabhËtajñåna
(cf. NySi 426,5ff.; TMK V.68), Deßika here follows the Naiyåyika opinion that buddhi
and prayatna are different guˆas. See 329,1.
769

Cf. ATV 836,13–15: ßar¥raniv®ttau buddhiniv®tte˙, buddhinityatve ßar¥rånupayogavat prayatnanityatåyåµ jñånecchånupayogåt. Accoding to Íaµkaramißra'scommentary on ATV (BI ed., p.837), this is the opinion of Kaˆikåkåra (or Kåßikå° inv.l.). Cf. NyKus 286,6–8 (≈ Kir 68,9–11) and V. v.3..
770

Cf. ATV 836,19–21: na cåsya [= prayatnasya] svarËpeˆaiva vishayapravaˆatvam, jñånatvaprasaµgåt; ayam eva hi jñånåt prayatnasya bheda˙ yad ayamarthåpravaˆa iti.
771
772

Cf. PrPBh §295: j¥vanapËrvaka˙ suptasya pråˆåpånasantånapreraka˙.

Cf. ATV 837,5f.: j¥vanayoniprayatnavad vishayavyavasthå bhavishyati. To
this objection, Udayana answers that it is of the other kind (jåtyantaratvåt), which isignored by Deßika.

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destroyed and that no effect remains at the next moment.
[Objection:] The order of effects [is fixed] in accordance with the order of theiroperate factors (sahakårin).
[Replied:] This is shameless opinion. [328] For, because the operate factors arealso included in [His] effect, they [also] would cease at once.
If [His] volition has the same object as [His] knowledge, which relates to every
entity, eternal entities773 also would be the objects of such volition and consequently,
they also would be subject to the creation and the dissolution. If not, there would besome objects beyond His volition: God would lose Godhood.
[Objection:] Then, suppose God has such mere volition as is limited due to theunseen power only.
[Replied:] This kind of limitation is possible only for the non-eternal volition of
the individual self.
[Objection:] Nobody understands the volition [of individual self] as related to a
sprout and the like.
[Replied:] This is untrue. For the situation is same regarding volition proceedingfrom [mere] living. That is, [the existence of] this [volition proceeding from mere
living] is postulated only through its effect; so is [the existence] of that [volition related
to a sprout etc.].
Moreover, if the unseen power as the efficient cause of everything brings aboutsuch limitation, what is the use of your effort (prayatna) at postulating the unseen
volition [of God]?
The above is summed in the following [two verses]:(80)[His knowledge and so on] are all-pervading, by which it comes about that
there is no restriction [in time regarding the production of everything]. They
pervade [even] eternal [entities], which leads to the trouble [that eternal entities
are also subject to creation and dissolution]. If the restriction were brought
about by the unseen power, [His] eternal volition would be [useless like]nipples on the neck of a female goat.
773

so.

E.g. ether, according to the Naiyåyika; though the Vedåntin does not admits

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(81)

[Although even] the lower [individual] self can be dependent upon [only] his
own unseen power, the Supreme [Self] would be always dependent upon theunseen power of others. [329]We would like you to think the above discussion is done following the opinionof other [schools] that volition is other than knowledge.
Furthermore,(82)

For you, who prates:“There is no contradiction whether [His not having a body] is establishedor not774” and so on,[in the same manner], whether contradiction is established or not, thenegation of it would be negated: [that is, in the former case what has been
774

NyKu V. v.2: na bådhao 'syopaj¥vyatvåt, pratibandho na durbalai˙ / siddhyasiddhyo˙ virodho no, nåsiddhir anibandhanå.
In Udayana's own commentary, the c-påda is commented as follows: “Thecontradiction in peculiarity [i.e. that between a non-bodied agent and a bodied one],however, is avoided since both would be simultaneously apprehended if the peculiarities
were established and because they could not be understood as expelling the substratumof each other if they were not established; so it cannot be question.” (vißeshaˆa-virodhas
tu vißesha-siddhau sahopalambhena tad-asiddhau mithodharmiparihårånupalambhena
nirasto nåßaµkåm apy adhirohat¥ti) [NyKu 282,3f.]. Cf. ATV 831; Kir 66,4ff.
The Nyåyakusumåñjal¥-bodhan¥ [ed. in NyKu-M] of Varadaråja (ca. 1100–50,
according to EIPh II, 629) comments this portion as follows: vißeshavirodha iti / etatsaµgrahavyåkhyånena gatam* / athavå yady ayaµ kåryatvahetu˙ gha†ådau ßar¥rådimatkart®vyåpto d®sh†a iti pakshe 'py Ërv¥dËrvådau ßar¥rådivißish†am eva kartåraµ sådhayet;
tato nåsmåkaµ kvacid virodha˙; ko 'bhipramåˆasiddhaµ nåµg¥kuryåt? athadËrvåµkurådau yogyånupalambhaniråk®tatvena ßar¥rådikaµ na sådhayet, na hy
aßar¥ratvåd¥ni nirundhyåt / teshåµ kåryatvahetoß ca mitho gotvåßvatvavad dharmiparihåreˆaivåvasthånasyåsiddher iti [NyKu-M 564,6–11]. (*saµgrahavyåkhyåna = na tåvad
¥svaråsiddhau tasya nåstitvam akart®tvaµ ßar¥ritvam vå 'vadhårayituµ ßakyam / åßrayåsiddhiprasaµgåt [reduplicated in this edition] / tatsiddhiß cånena kåryatvånumåne[na ?]kårya ity asya bådhopaj¥vyatvån na bådha˙; pratyuta teshåm eva dharmigråhakapramåˆabådha iti bhåva˙ [NyKu-M 562,16–19])
R's comment on this verse is almost same as that of Varadaråja. It should be
noted, especially, that R shows the optional interpretation of the c-påda which, though
not seen in Udayana's own commentary (See V 330, fn.), follows the saµgrahavyåkhyåna
of Varadaråja: yadvå, ¥ßvare siddhe månåntaravirodho na pravartate; asiddhaucåßrayåsiddhyå månåntasyåprasarån na tadvirodha iti [R 329,12f.]. Cf. also SAS V. 16c:
75,7ff.

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established cannot be denied; in the latter what does not exist cannot bedenied]. [330](83)

Again, the attribute [‘not having a body’] which is understood through theaccepted opinion of your school, your own statement or [your] fallacious
reasons (hetvåbhåsa), is rejected because of the contradiction to theinvariable concomitance (vyåpti) [between ‘being an agent’ and ‘having abody’]. [331](84)[If in the inference, say, “A sprout has an agent because it is an effect,” a
non-bodied agent were postulated by force of the subject], having thought“Snow has fire because it causes grass fade775” we could postulate cold
fire by force of the subject— it is not the case. [332](85)When such feature as exceeds the relation to the subject [e.g. hotness,
which cannot belong to snow], is known regarding what is regarded as thepervader (vyåpaka) [e.g. fire], the reason cannot be proper even if it isquality of the subject. [333](86)

Again you may assert that once the relation [of ‘having an agent’] to thesubject [e.g. a sprout] is established [through the reason ‘being an effect’],
the extra feature [of the agent, e.g. not having a body etc.], is inferredthrough the remainder (pårißeshya) [i.e. that the body of the agent is notfound] and so on [i.e. that his knowledge and so on are eternal].776 But it is
not true, because the remainder is not ascertained [because we cannot
deny the possibility that the body of such an agent is beyond our
775

Cf. Kir 67,10ff., where an opponent to the Vaißeshika illustrates the vyåpakånupalabdhibådha of the reason kåryatva by the inference that himam vahnimatt®ˆådivikårakåritvåt. ÍV, anumåna 71f.
776

Cf. Ratnak¥rtinibandhåvali (ed. A. Thakur, Patna, 19752 ) 33,32f.: såmånyamåtravyåptåv apy antarbhåvitavißeshasya såmånyasya pakshadharmatåvaßena sådhyadharmiˆy anumånåd vißeshavishayam anumånaµ bhavaty eva. This is the view ofVåcaspatimißra in the Nyåyakaˆikå (ed. in the Pandit, p.211) according to the footnoteof Thakur. Cf. Kir 69,12f.: sådhanasåmånyasambandhabalena sådhyasåmånyavidhåv
upakrånte tatsahakåripakshadharmatåbalenåprat¥te ca vißeshe paryavasånåt.
(The Buddhist refutation against this view is summarized in M-TBh 45,5ff;
Kajiyama's Eng. trans., p.109.)

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perception].777
If778 such [feature] as is found [in similar instances like a pot, i.e. having a(87)body], is completely negated [in the subject], the probandum [i.e. having
an agent] cannot be established [since nobody knows an agent without abody779]; if not, the extra feature [i.e. not having a body] cannot be grasped.
Nor can we prove [a maker] in general, [neither bodied nor non-bodied;since there is invariable concomitance between ‘being an agent’ and ‘having
a body’].780(88)

As to the inference through the remainder, outcome is same in so far as
the affirmative [concomitance] is concerned [since in affirmative
concomitance, we never infer what is not found in similar examples]. And
the pure negative [concomitance] will be refuted later.781 [334]Further we ask: What is meant by ‘agent’ in [your probandum] ‘having anagent,’ (1) one who has the knowledge about all the causes such as material cause, (2)one who has the knowledge about some [causes such as material cause], or (3) [one who
has knowledge] in general? In the first [alternative], invariable concomitance would not
be established; for a potter and the like do not know [all the causes of a pot and the like,777

The translation is in the line of the interpretation of K.

R: Once, says the opponent, God is proved as one who possesses knowledge as
to the material causes of the earth etc., it is proved that His knowledge, which is eternalbecause of its not being produced from the sense-organs, the subtle-body etc., is notdependent upon a body. Not so, we reply, because neither ‘not being produced from thesense-organs etc.’ nor ‘being eternal’ is not established even now.
778

As is pointed out by V (fn.1), K and R respectively interpret this verse as
refuting each one of the two doctrines of the Naiyåyika: that the agent is without a bodyand that his knowledge is eternal. My translation of the verse is basically in the line of
K's interpretation (which seems to be natural to the context) and R's interpretation isshown in footnotes.
779

R: If non-eternal knowledge and so on, which are actually found in the caseof a pot and the like, were negated, even having knowledge etc. could not be established.
780

R: Pure knowledge, neither eternal nor non-eternal, cannot be established.

781

See below 349,4–351,2.

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say, the unseen power, God etc.782 In the second and the third alternatives, God would
not be established; for it would prove what has been already proved in view of theindividual selves who know instruments like Scriptures and materials like clay.783 In thismanner, it is established that the individual self could be an agent of dyad (dvyaˆuka)
etc. due to the unseen power. [335]
And it is unavoidable that [your] reason ‘being an effect’ is sublated in view of‘not being produced from a body’ or it has the adventitious condition (upådhi) [‘being
produced from a body784’].
[Objection:] [In the invariable concomitance between ‘not being produced froma body’ and ‘not having an agent,’ ‘from a body’ is] meaningless attribute785(vyarthavißeshaˆa) [because mere ‘not being produced’ pervades ‘not having an agent’]. 786[Replied:] Not so, because it has meaning so as to avoid non-establishment [inthe subject (svarËpåsiddhi)]. And a mantra, [the authority of which is beyond logic],
782

Cf. Ír¥Bh I. i. 3: upakaraˆabhËtayågådißaktirËpåpËrvådißabdavåcyåd®sh†asåkshåtkåråbhåve 'pi cetanånåµ na kart®tvånupapatti˙; tatsåkshåtkårånapekshaˆåtkåryårambhasya [122,6–8].
783

Cf. Ír¥Bh I. i. 3: ubhayavådisiddhånåµ j¥vånåm eva låghavena kart®tvåbhyupagamo yukta˙ / na ca j¥vånåm upådånådyanabhijñatayå kart®tvåsambhava˙, sarveshåm
eva cetanånåµ p®thivyådyupådånayågådyupakaraˆasåkshåtkårasåmarthyåt [122,4–6]. K
refers to the ASÓ v. 41 (ad BrSË I. i. adni° 3): … laghutvåd anumitivaßata˙
karmajaißvaryayukta˙ vißvåmitrådin¥tyå sphurati ….
784

That is, ßar¥rajanyatva pervades the probandum sakart®katva but does notpervades the reason kåryatva. R here asserts that the vyåpti between akart®tva andßar¥råjanyatva is stronger than that between kart®tva and kåryatva because the former
does not have upådhi and cosequently, it is of satpratipaksha [i.e. kshityådikam akart®kam,ßar¥råjanyatvåt].
785

An example of vyarthavißeshaˆa is ‘blue’ in the inference “The mountain has
fire, because it has blue smoke.” It brings about vyåpyatvåsiddhi. See Bhåshåpariccheda
v.77: vyåpyatvåsiddhir aparå n¥ladhËmådike bhavet.
786

Cf. ATV 834,19f.: asamarthavißeshaˆatvenåsiddhabhedasyåtulyabalatvåt;NyKu V. v.2: pratibandho na durbalai˙ and ibid. 281,4–6: anvaye tu vißeshaˆåsåmarthyåt /hetuvyåv®ttimåtram eva hi tatra kart®vyåv®ttivyåptam, na tu ßar¥rarËpahetuvyåv®ttir ity
uktam; Kir 68,6f.: ßar¥råd anutpatteß cåsamarthavißeshaˆatvåt, sapakshe gaganådåv
anutpattimåtrasyaiva vyåpyatvanißcayåt.

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does not read “Attribute in reason must be always for the purpose of avoiding deviation787(anaikåntya).”[Objection:] Were it the case, meaningless attribute could be faultless in any
case.
[Replied:] Not so. Because the criterion of ‘meaningless’ is that [an attribute] is
not used for the purpose of avoiding any defect. Or rather, suppose, then, that such[meaningless attribute], which is not useful for the topic under discussion, commits oneof the occasions for rebuke (nigrahsthåna) called ‘shifting the topic788 (arthåntara).’[Objection:] Because there is not invariable concomitance concerning the qualified[reason, i.e. ‘not being produced from a body’], one who avoids one non-establishment,[i.e. that in the subject], would fall into another [non-establishment, i.e. that inconcomitance (vyåpyatvåsiddhi)].789[Replied:] You cannot say so [336]. Because that [qualifier] does not establish
the non-existence of this [concomitance]. [337] [That is], wherever ‘not being produced
from a body’ is, mere ‘not being produced’ also exists; accordingly, wherever theconcomitance concerning this [‘not being produced’] is, the concomitance concerningthat [‘being produced from a body’] inevitably exists.790 [338]787

Cf. NyKu V. 2: vyåptaß ca pakshadharma upayujyate, nånyo 'tiprasaµgåt[281,6].
788

NyP 149,6: prak®tånupayuktavacanam arthåntaram. Cf. NySË V. ii. 7: prak®tådarthåd apratisambaddhårtham arthåntaram;
789ekåm asiddhiµ parihårato dvit¥yåpatti˙. Cf. ATV 834,21: … °åpatte˙ (= SAS

103,3f).
790

On this point R remarks: It is true that ßar¥rajanyatva-abhåva and janyatvaabhåva — which are distinct due to the difference between the qualified pratiyogin [i.e.
ßar¥ra-janyatva] and the non-qualified pratiyogin [i.e. janyatva] — cooxist in one andthe same substratum. But ßar¥rajanyatvåbhåva-tva and pure janyatvåbhåva-tva, which
are vyåpyatvåvacchedakas as having heavy dharma and light dharma, do not enter into
one place. Accordingly, there is not vyåpyatvåsiddhi as in the case of ‘blue smoke.’ For
in the latter case, n¥ladhËma-tva and dhËma-tva enters [into one place]; not so in theformer.
This is based on the principle that svasamånådhikaraˆavyåpyatåvacchedakadharmåntarågha†itadharmasyaiva vyåpyatåvacchedakatvam [NyKo 843f.]. Cf. Råmånujasiddhåntasaµgraha (Srirangam, 1994), pp.87f.

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Otherwise, the inference ‘There is a seed of kalama-rice because there is asprout of kalama-rice’ would result in failure. For in the negative concomitance [i.e.
wherever the non-existence of a seed of kalama-rice is, there is the non-existence of a
sprout of kalama-rice], [‘of kalama-rice’ in ‘the non-existence of a seed of kalama-rice’]would be meaningless attribute; because ‘the non-existence of a seed in general’ canestablish ‘the non-existence of a sprout of kalama-rice.’[Objection:] Some sprouts are born without a seed.
[Replied:] Then, even a sprout of kalama-rice could not be inferred, because [asprout] could be born without [a seed].
Likewise in [the inference ‘this embryo] is black, because [he is] a son ofMaitr¥,’ ‘the modification of food like a vegetable’ would not be adventitious condition791[339]. For [in the negative concomitance as to the probandum, i.e. whatever is not ‘themodification of food like a vegetable’ is not ‘being black’], ‘like a vegetable’ would bemeaningless attribute; because ‘the non-existence of the modification of food’ alone
could bring about the non-existence of blackness.
[Objection:] The blackness of a tamåla-tree and sapphire is found even if this[modification of food] is not existent; [thus, there is deviation in your negative
concomitance, i.e. wherever the non-existence of the modification of food is, there is the
non-existence of blackness].
[Replied:] Not so. For in these instances [of a tamåla-tree and sapphire], [notonly the qualifier ‘like a vegetable’ but] also that which is qualified [i.e. food] is
In negative concomitance, the reason is not invalidated by force ofvyarthavißeshaˆa (G. Bhattacharya: Studies in Nyåya-Vaißeshika Theism, Calcutta 1961,
p.105).
791

In the inference ‘Maitr¥'s embryo in her womb is black, because he is a son ofMaitr¥,’ ‘the modification of food like a vegetable’ is a doubtful upådhi. For, though it
does pervade the sådhya ‘being black’ (i.e. whosoever is black is the modification offood like a vegetable), its non-pervasion of the sådhana ‘being a son of Maitr¥’ (i.e.
every son of Maitr¥ is not the modification of food like a vegetable) is doubtful; because
the present embryo also may be ‘the modification of food like a vegetable.’ See SAS
IV. 43: upådhi˙ khalu ßaµgito nißcitaß ca / ßåkådyåhårapariˆatyådi˙ ßaµkita˙ … / yatra
khalu sådhanåvyåpakatva-sådhyasamavyåptyor anyatararËpasyåßaµkhå, sa ßaµkitopådhi˙; antimagarbhe 'pi ßåkådyåhårapariˆatisambhavena sådhanåvyåpter åßaµkitatvåt
[564,3–6].

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non-existent. Besides, this [modification of food like a vegetable] is not the criterion forthe blackness of a body. For there is not the modification of food like a vegetable in thebodies of plants or non-womb-born beings [340].
[Objection:] The blackness of a body caused by the modification of food isbased on the modification of food like a vegetable.
[Replied:] Not so. For [‘of a body caused by the modification of food’] would beswallowed up by meaninglessness; because in this case, there is the equal concomitance(samavyåpti) even through the [simple] probandum [i.e. blackness]. That is, this [equalconcomitance] is established insofar as whatever is not black is not based on themodification of food such as a vegetable [341].
[Objection:] Supposing that the probandum is that particular genus called blackness
which is not conditioned by any qualifier, there is not meaninglessness.
[Replied:] Not so, because this [particularity] would be hardly claimed without
any qualifier. For even if the word ‘particular’ alone is mentioned, it is the [very word]that is meaningless.
Furthermore, we could easily point out that there is a meaningless attribute in
the [syllogism] “[The earth etc.] has an agent because they are effects” also. That is,there is the absence of ‘being an effect’ whenever there is the absence of mere ‘having a
cause.’[Objection:] [The word] ‘cause’ is not used in this [syllogism].
[Replied:] Not so; because that [‘having a cause’] results [from ‘having an agent’].
Otherwise, [342] there would be no room even for you to criticize [that ‘from a body’ in‘not being produced from a body (ßar¥råjanyatva)’ is of a meaningless attribute] when
we use the words ‘being non-bodied (aßar¥ratva)’.792[Objection:] From the analyses of the compound (vigraha), ‘not being produced
from a body’ results.793[Replied:] Then, here also from the analysis of the word ‘agent (kart®)’, a particular792

See above 335,1.

793

aßar¥ratvam = na ßar¥raµ janakatvena yasya = ßar¥råjanyatvam.

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cause results.794 The relation as cause is expressed in ‘having an agent.’ [343]
Likewise from ‘being composed of parts (såvayavatva)’ in proving ‘being noneternal,’ ‘being produced from parts (avayavajanyatva)’ results. Here also would bemeaninglessness [in view of ‘from parts’]. [344] For the reason [‘being composed ofparts’] means neither mere relation to parts nor mere inherence to them, because such ispossible even for eternal entities like genus and quality. [345]In order to show the sublation [of the reason ‘being an effect’] in a counter-instance(vipakshe bådhakam), you point out the undesirable contingency that an effect would be
produced without any cause [if even a counter-instance, i.e. that which has no agent likeether, were an effect]— this is also rejected. For an agent is concluded to be [but] aparticular cause795 [among the causes including non-intelligent entities like time, theunseen power and so on].796[Objection:] [A intelligent agent] is proved to be general cause owing to the rulethat a non-intelligent being begins to act only when controlled by an intelligent being.797[Replied:] Not so. Because there is not such rule; [346] for example, we find thatan iron is moved by a magnet.
[Objection:] What we wish to establish [using the word ‘only’] is not thedelimitation of the relation to something other [than an intelligent being] but thedelimitation of the lack of the relation [to an intelligent being].
[Replied:] Not so. Judging from the co-presence and co-absence, it is possible
for the very [entity like a magnet] that is other [than an intelligent being] to be the794

An agent or nominative (kart®) is a particular kåraka (cf. Påˆini 1. 4. 54:
svatantra˙ [kåraka˙ from 23] kartå) and kåraka is defined as the cause of an action (seeKåßikå ad 1. 4. 23: kårakaµ hetur ity anarthåntaram / kasya hetu˙? kriyåyå˙).
795

Cf. 350,3–351,2 below.

796

Cf. the Buddhist refutation in ATV 840,7ff.: vipakshe bådhakåbhåvåt / deßakålaniyamåd¥nåµ svakåraˆåyattasannidhinå kådåcitkena pratiniyataßaktinå kåraˆenåcetanenåpy upapatte˙ (Cf. NKaˆikå 711, cited in JNA 139 and RNA 40f.)
797

To the above Buddhist refutation, the Naiyåyika answers that every kårya
must be conditioned by kårakas and that among them kart® is essential. See ATV
854,1ff.

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special cause [of the action]; nevertheless, why can you postulate an invisible [intelligent
cause] other than that? And we have explained that there is no sublation in a counterinstance.798

Again, of what nature is this ‘control’?
[Objection:] [To control something means] to drive (preraˆa) it.
[Replied:] Not so; because such [control] over shapeless entities (amËrta) is
impossible.
[Objection:] [To control something means] to know it as a cause in general.
[Replied:] Not so; because it would lead to the undesirable conclusion that volition
is futile.
[Objection:] [It means] mere proximity of one who has the three [factors of
production], namely, knowledge, [desire of making and volition].
[Replied:] Not so; for even an effect would be eternal as this [proximity] always
exists [347]. If there is restriction due to particular unseen power, it comes about thatthe unseen power acts not depending upon Him because the very [unseen power] restrains
Him. If [the unseen power does] not [restrain Him], it comes about that He also acts aslong as [He] exists [and the above-mentioned defect is inevitable].
Additionally, by no means [can] an intelligent being control God's knowledge,
which in nature is non-intelligent; because another knowledge is not found.799[Objection:] God himself, who is actually (vastuta˙) intelligent, is established as
the substratum of that [knowledge].800
798

Cf. Jñånaßr¥mitranibandhåval¥ (ed. A. Thakur, Patna, 1959), 285,7f.: kåryatvasya vipakshav®ttihataye sambhåvayte 't¥ndriya˙ / kartå ced vyatirekasiddhividhurå
vyåpti˙ kathaµ sidhyate //, cited in M-TBh 41,2f. and the commentary on ATV byÍaµkaramißra (BI ed.) 841,9f. (reading setsyati for sidhyate).
799

The control as ‘driving’ over His knowledge is not possible since it is shapeless.
Neither the control as ‘knowing as a cause’ nor that as ‘the proximity of one who has
knowledge and so on’ is possible without another knowledge (K).
800

Not to have knowledge etc. about something but mere proximity of one who
has the knowledge etc. is required so as to control it (R).
To control something is not the relation to one who has knowledge etc. about it
but mere relation to an entity implied (upalakshita) by the knowledge etc. (K).

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[Replied:] Not so. Because this proves merely what has been already proved inview of the individual self.801[Objection:] Even that knowledge [belonging to Him] is understood by itself [asa cause] in general [form] [348]. Only by means of [such knowledge in general form],[God] controls it.802[Replied:] Not so. Because this would lead to the undesirable conclusion that[the knowledge] in specific [form, e.g. ‘This is the material,’ ‘This is the assistant,’‘This is the donee’ etc.], would not be the cause. If [it were] not [the cause], every[individual self] could be the creator [of the world] when he gets in any way theknowledge [in general form] concerning everything.
[Objection:] [He] controls it by means of another knowledge.
[Replied:] Not so, because infinite regress (anavasthå) would be brought about.
[Objection:] [He] controls this [following knowledge] by means of that [precedingknowledge].
[Replied:] Not so, because mutual dependence would be brought about if they
controlled each other.
[Objection:] There is not mutual dependence because the following knowledge
is not the cause of the world [349].
[Replied:] Not so. For if [the following knowledge] were not the cause at all, it
would be non-existent.803 If this [following knowledge], which is capable of controlling801

Even if the production of a sprout and the like is proved to be dependent upon
the relation to a person who has knowledge and so on, nothing negates that the person
who has the knowledge and so on is the individual self. Thus, although it is impossible
for the individual selves to have the [specific] knowledge concerning the material andso on [of a sprout and the like], it is not [impossible to have] knowledge in general andso on (K).
802

To be controlled means to be the object of apprehension as a cause. And
God's knowledge can be apprehended by itself as a cause. And this does not lead to thecontradiction that the object is same as the subject (karmakart®bhåva). For there is thecontradiction that the object is same as the subject in describing the knowledge as its
own cause in specific form like ‘The knowledge of God is the cause’; but not in theapprehension of itself as the cause in general form (R).
803

While even sanmåtra can be the cause of something (R).

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the cause [of the world or the first knowledge], were not the cause, the first cause804 [orthe first knowledge] also would not be the cause [of the world]. Likewise, if neither[His] desire of making nor volition were the cause, God could be the agent no longer.

Besides, in the negative concomitance that whatever is not ‘having an agent’ isnot ‘being an effect,’ ‘having no cause’ is adventitious condition.
[Objection:] ‘Having no cause,’ [though it pervades the non-existence of thereason, i.e. ‘not being an effect’], [350] does pervade [the non-existence of the probandum,i.e.] ‘not having an agent’ [as well]; [accordingly, it cannot be adventitious condition].
[Replied:] That is not true. For it is doubtful whether the subject [such as theearth, which is ascertained not to be ‘having no cause,’ is ‘not having an agent’ or
not805]; therefore, [‘having no cause’] is inevitably adventitious condition. If [doubtful
adventitious condition were] not [defect], ‘the modification of food such as a vegetable’
would not be adventitious condition and consequently, we could infer that Maitr¥'s son[in her womb] is black [for the reason that he is a son of Maitr¥].806
Moreover, the non-existence of general thing does not pervade the non-existenceof a particular thing; [accordingly, the non-existence of a particular cause such as anagent does not lead to the non-existence of a cause in general]. If so, the non-existenceof earthiness would pervade the non-existence of pot-ness and consequently, a jug
would not be earthy.
[Objection:] While you have said that [the non-existence of a particular cause
does not lead to the non-existence of cause in general], what [kind of particularity] is
intended in the statement that ‘an agent is a particular cause’ [351]: that it is one ofmany causes or that it does not commonly exist in all effects? Of them, the former isdenied because such [particularity] could be applied to even the unseen power and soon, [the non-existence of which can lead to the non-existence of cause in general]. And
the latter alternative is not established.
804

V suggests the reading jñånasya for kåraˆasya.

805

According to R. Cf. the definition of paksha by the Old Naiyåyika, for instance,in TarS §49: sandigdhasådhyåbhåvavån paksha˙.
806

Cf. SAS IV. 43 cited above in the note on 338,3–339,2.

224[Replied:] You cannot say so; for we have already answered this objection in
refuting the rule that [a non-intelligent entity begins to act only when] controlled [by an
intelligent being].807

In addition, does the subject ‘the earth etc.’ include the conjunction between
God and a pot and the like or not? In the former case, there is partial non-establishment808(bhågåsiddhi) [regarding a part of the subject, i.e. God-pot-conjunction]; or, if such[conjunction] as is proved by this very inference forms the subject, there is mutual
dependence.

In

the

latter

case,

there

is

doubtful

non-absoluteness809(sandigdhånaikåntikatå).
[Objection:] Even if it is doubtful whether God-pot-conjunction has an agent or
not, [352] it is not contradictory to the proof of God.
[Replied:] It is not true. For we cannot avoid mere doubt that the others might be‘not having an agent’ like the conjunction between the two; that much is enough toreject that the earth etc. have an agent.
[Objection:] The subject is in the general form, as ‘An effect under dispute hasan agent’; then, there is no defect.810
807

See above 345,1ff.

808Vedånta Deßika mentions two kinds of bhågåsiddhi, namely (1) åßrayabhågåsiddhi (NyP 197,19–20: åßrayabhågåsiddho yathå “avayavåvayavinau nityau,
dravyatvåt” iti; na hy avayavasamudåyåtriktam avayavißabdårthaµ trayyantavida
icchanti) and (2) svarËpabhågåsiddhi (NyP 198,16f.: svarËpabhågåsiddho yathå
“gha†avyatiriktaµ nityam, kåryatvåt, gha†avat” iti; na hi paksh¥k®teshv ¥ßvarådishusvarËpata˙ kåryatvam). Just bhågåsiddhi ordinarily means the latter (see, e.g., Tarkabhåshå
of Keßavamißra [KSS ed.] 248,9f.) and so is the present case.
809

In NyKo, sandigdhånaikåntika is defeined as: (1) sådhyatadabhåvasaµßayakatvam; (2a) pakshåµße sådhyåbhåvasaµßayåtmakaµ pakshav®ttitvåvagåhi vyabhicårajñånam, (2b) atha vå hetau vyabhicårasaµßaya˙ [from Gadådhar¥]. R notes: Although
the substratum (i.e. God) itself has not been proved when the inference concerning Him
starts, there is, somehow, the (2a) type of sandigdhånaikåntika held by the Naiyåyika.
810

Cf. ATV 825,10: vivådådhyåsitakart®kaµ sakart®kaµ kåryatvåt.

According to Trirocana, the teacher of Våcaspatimißra, the existent in the worldis classified into three kinds: (1) that which is well-known as having an intelligent
agent, (2) that which is well-known as not having an intelligent agent and (3) that the225[Replied:] That is not true. For even syllogism regarding a general thing [353]should serve for strengthening all particulars; so all the particulars are expected to beestablished in general. If [God] is proved by means of the other [inference] or this very
[inference], it is unavoidable that this inference is meaningless or that there is mutual
dependence [respectively].

For what purpose, [asks a student], do we reject the proof of God? And wecannot get along without any purpose. The persons who understand God by means ofinference and is devoted to Him may well, hearing our discussion, have the suspicion
that [God] does not exist (nåstikya); in this sense, both we and those [who hear our
rejection] have great sin.
Oh, [we answer], how compassionate you are! Let's not teach it to such [dullpersons]. And hear [our] purpose — Firstly, [our purpose is] to make truth clear as it is,
as we reject [the misconception] that smell is grasped with the ear. And [the second
purpose is] to remove the disbelief in God from those who have skilful intellect andnotice that the inference [of God] is fallacious [354]. And that is why the thought of dull
persons is not agitated by a man of skillful intellect. Let us have compassion [to them]even in this way. And [thirdly], we can avoid the undesirable contingency that the
Scriptures, which make what has not been attained attain, would be mere repetition(anuvåda).
[Objection:] Even if [the Scriptures] be mere repetition, there is no defect. For
God is certainly proved [by the inference].
[Replied:] Not so. For God being the material cause as well as the efficient cause[of the world] is not proved.
[Objection:] [The Scriptures] first make supplementary reference to such God as
is proved by the inference as the efficient cause and next give the injunction that [He] isthe material cause; as [the Scriptures] firstly make supplementary reference to such
existence of an agent of which is doubtful; see Nyåyavårttikatåtpaya†¥kå ad IV. i. 21:
953,1ff. (Calcutta ed.): etåvad abhipretam åcåryasya— trayo hi khalu bhåvå jagati
bhavanti: [1] prasiddhacetanakart®kå˙, yathå pråsådå††ålagopuratoraˆådaya˙; [2] prasiddhatadvipayayå˙, yathå paramåˆvåkåßådaya˙; [3] sandigdhacetanakart®kå˙, yathå
tanutarumah¥dharådaya˙. (Cf. Kajiyama, Eng. trans. of M-TBh, p.96, n.257.)
Cf. also the syllogism in Kir 65,18f.: ßar¥rånapekshotpattikaµ buddhimat-

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earth and so on as are proved by perception and give the injunctions that they aresubordinate (ßesha) to God, that they are His bodies and so on.
[Replied:] If [the Scriptures] made supplementary reference [to Him] in thisway, we could not assert that the inference negating that [He] is the material cause issublated by force of [the Scriptures] which make us grasp the dharmin [or God], thoughif [He] is proved as qualified [by being both the material cause and the efficient cause],
we can easily affirm so.
[Objection:] Suppose this [sublation] is also accepted as in the case of the inferences
negating that earth and so on are subordinate to God and so on [355].
[Replied:] Not so. For as to this [inference negating that the earth and so on are
subordinate to God etc.], [mutual] contradiction is easily pointed out whether [theScriptures] which make us grasp that which are to be negated, [i.e. the subordination to
God etc.], are established or not: [that is, if established, the inference is contradictory tothem; if not, the inference cannot be established because what is to be negated has notbeen known]. Here [in the case of God as inferred to be the efficient cause], on thecontrary, as to the syllogism ‘God is not material cause, because He is intelligent or
because He is an agent, like a potter,’ such [contradiction] is hardly pointed out. Then,[we could infer] that God is not the material cause as long as it is possible to interpret
the Scriptures [asserting that He is the material cause] in the other way [like the passage‘A Scriptures pole is the sun’]; consequently, the knowledge that [He] is the sole causeof the whole world, as is mentioned [in the sËtra] that:
From whom the creation etc. of this [world] [BrSË I. i. 2],
would be eclipsed. Fearing this, the author of the [Brahma-]sËtra immediately mentions
that:
Because the Scriptures [alone] is the source [regarding Him] [BrSË I. i. 3],
by which he negates that [He] is within the scope of the other means of knowledge.
[Objection:] Were it the case, how can you explicate the sËtra that:[Not what is inferred], because of the impossibility of construction [BrSËII. ii. 1],
pËrvakam, kåraˆavattvåt, yat kåraˆavat tad buddhimatpËrvakaµ yathå ratha˙.

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and the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya and the other [commentaries by the same author] thereof811?
Furthermore, in the section on an agent (kart®-påda) of the Nyåyatattva where it teaches
that an intelligent being is an agent, [356] [Nåthamuni] raises the objection that:
Isn't it that wind [independently] makes the multitude of earthy dust? …
[Nyåyatattva],
and gives the answer as follows:
It is answered — A cause is [composed of] the three, namely, an agent(kart®), an instrumental (karaˆa) and an object (karman), and is qualified
by an action (kriyå). Without any one of these three, an action is impossible… [Nyåyatattva].
Here also the permission to infer God is found. This [sËtra] “Because the Scriptures is
the source” [BrSË I. i. 3], therefore, must be explained in the other way.
[Replied:] Not so. For “Because the impossibility of construction” [BrSË II. ii.
1] and [the commentaries thereof] are of the other meaning. In fact, the intention here isto show [the Såµkhya], who teaches that so-called prak®ti not controlled by an intelligent
being is the material cause, an example of contradiction and so on regarding [its]specific [aspect, i.e. its independency]. In our opinion, however, these [counter-inferences
against the Såµkhya] are but mere reductio ad absurdum812 (tarka) based on possibility;
811

I.e., “‘Inference (anumåna)’ means what is inferred, [i.e. the pradhåna as heldby the Såµkhya]. The pradhåna accepted by you is not capable of constructing thewonderful world. Because it is, though non-intelligent, not controlled by an intelligent
being understanding its nature. Whatever is thus is so, like mere wood and the like inthe construction of a palace, a chariot etc. That is, it is experienced that a non-intelligent
thing like wood is not capable of constructing an effect if not controlled by an intelligent
being and that it begins to construct an effect if controlled by one who understand it.
What we say is, therefore, that the pradhåna, not controlled by an intelligent being, is
not the cause” [Ír¥Bh II. ii. 1: 279,9–13].
812

Tarka is defined as: “vyåpyåµg¥kåre 'nish†avyåpakaprasañjanam” [SAS IV.
60: 590,6; NyP 214,18; YMD II. 43], namely, leading to an undesirable pervader throughaccepting a pervaded hypothetically. Mostly it is used as counter-argument (pratikËlatarka)
to refute the opinion of an opponent through leading to an unacceptable conclusion; thatis why I translate the term with reductio ad absurdum. (Cf. Tarkabhåshå, ed. KSS, p.
242, where the term is defined as anish†aprasaµga˙).
Opposing to the Naiyåyika, who do not accept tarka as valid knowledge [seeNySË I. i. 40 and the commentaries thereof, TarS §64], Deßika accept it as included ininference [NyP 214ff.]; for the detail of his discussion, see VEDAVALLI 1984: 108-13,
SINGH 1958: 241–46.

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only the Scriptures supported by them is the means of the valid knowledge.
For the same reason, the statement of the Nyåyatattva also should be interpreted[in this line].
It is to be thought that the inference that [God] is merely the material cause of
the world is refuted in order to point out the sublation by force of [the Scriptures],which makes us grasp the dharmin [or God], against those who, [as the Såµkhya], referto [such] material cause [as is proved by inference] and deny that it is the efficient cause
as well; and that the inference that [He] is merely the efficient cause is refuted in orderto point out the sublation by force of [the Scriptures] against those who, [as the Naiyåyika],refer to [such] efficient cause [as is proved by inference] and deny that it is the materialcause as well [357].
In addition, if the subject [of the inferences] were God [as proved to be theefficient cause] by the Scriptures [of the Yoga] or [the material cause as proved by thatof the Såµkhya], we precisely point out the non-establishment of substratum (åßrayåsiddhi)[because these Scriptures have no authority].813[Objection:] The passages mentioning the identity of the material cause and the
It is composed of five members:(1) prasañjakasya prasañjan¥yena vyåpti˙,(2) pratitarkena 'pratighåta˙,(3) prasañjan¥yaviparyaye paryavasånam,(4) prasañjitasya 'nish†atvam,(5) parapakshasådhakatvam [NyP 222,2f.].
(Cf. Tårkikarakshå, v. 72: (1) vyåpti˙, (2) tarkåpratihati˙, (3) avasånaµ viparyaye / (4)anish†a- (5) ananukËlatvam iti tarkåµgapañcakam // [summarized by POTTER in EIPH II:
637], cited in MMU, anumåna, §15).
The following example makes the point clear. When someone (A) infers ‘The
mountain has fire because it has smoke,’ another (B) says ‘There might not be fire.’ The
statement of B is rejected by the following tarka which shows that the non-existence offire brings about the non-existence of smoke. First, (1) the non-existence of fire (=prasañjaka) is pervaded by the non-existence of smoke (= prasañjan¥ya). And (2) assuming,on the other hand, the existence of fire does not bring about any undesirable conclusion,
with which this [pervasion] could be rejected by means of [the pratitarka] (na ca sågnitve'py atra kaßcid anish†aprasaµga˙, yena tata˙ pratihanyeta). Moreover, (3) the fact contrary
to the non-existence of smoke, [which is to be brought about through the pervasion] (=prasañjan¥yaviparyaya), that the mountain actually has smoke, is concluded by means ofperception. Accordingly (4) the non-existence of smoke, which is to be brought about
through the pervasion, is not acceptable. Thus (5) [the opinion of the other] that themountain has fire is established [NyP 222,2-8] (Cf. TMK VI. 60 and Srinivasa Chari
1987: 93).

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efficient cause [are metaphorical] like the passage “A Scriptures pole is the sun.”[Replied:] Why?
[Objection:] Because it is contradictory to the definitions [of the two].
[Replied:] Not so. For the definition of efficient cause is not ‘that [cause] which
is other than material and non-inherent cause (asamavåyi) is efficient cause 814’, nor thedefinition of material cause is ‘that [cause] which is other than efficient and non-inherent
cause is material cause’; it they were so, there would be the contradictions.
[Objection:] What is [the definition], then?
[Replied:] Following the passage of the Vedårthasaµgraha that:
Being material cause is being the locus of modification [VAS §70; 111,7],
we define material cause as the substratum of states (avasthå). State is adventitious(ågantuka) and inseparable (ap®thaksiddha) quality.
Specifically the material cause is, in reference to [an entity] itself (svarËpa)qualified by each succeeding state, the very entity qualified by the state which corresponds
to it (tadanugata) and is always anterior to it [358]. For example, in relation to that
substance clay which is qualified by the state of being a pot, the very substance [clay]that is qualified by the state of being a lump [is the material cause]. The word ‘corresponds
to’ excludes the state of the universal dissolution.815
Efficient cause816 is that which is required in such form as is other than expectancy
813

My translation of this passage follows the interpretation of K. For further
explanation on this point, the Ír¥Bh (according to K) or Deßika's other works such as
TMK and the ASÓ with the commentaries on them (according to V) should be referredto.
R, however, regards the passage as the resume of the above. The translation
following R is: “This is the resume — If the subject [of the inference negating that God
is the material cause] were God [as proved] by the Scriptures or [God as proved byinference], there would be non-establishment of substratum: [in the latter case, suchinference has been already rejected; in the former, the subject, i.e. God as proved to be
the material cause, is not open to doubt]”.
814

Cf. TarS §40: tadubhaya [= samavåyikåraˆa, asamavåyik°] -bhinnaµ nimitta-kåraˆam.
815

Here it is implied that the clay qualified by the state of being a dust (reˆu),which is anterior to the state of being a lump, is not the material cause of a pot (R).

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(aunmukhya) of modification 817 [359].
Never do we accept non-inherent cause as the sub-division [of cause], because it
is mere technically termed one (påribhåshika). Otherwise, we could term even anothersub-division like ‘the cause near to efficient cause is non-efficient cause.’ The conjunctionof threads, for instance, as the non-inherent cause of cloth818 is by no means established.
For we have already reject [the Vaißeshika concept of] whole [as different from its
component parts819] and only [threads qualified by a particular conjunction] become that[cloth: that is, there is no causality between the conjunction and the cloth]. It is true thaturging [the threads] and so on are established as the causes of the conjunction, but they
do not surpass the scope of efficient cause.
And, thus, both of the definitions are applicable to God. For it is established that
[God] who has as the body those intelligent and non-intelligent entities who havenon-divided name-and-forms is, in relation to [God Himself] who has as the body those
intelligent and non-intelligent entities who have divided name-and-forms, the materialcause820; and also it is established that [He] is the efficient cause in such form as is otherthan ‘having as the body non-divided intelligent and non-intelligent entities’ — for
instance, in the form of having particular will, which is common to a potter and the like.
Other [schools] also should accept that God is an agent-cum-material regardingsome objects. That is, there are the conjunction between God and a thing like a pot andso on, of which God is the material cum efficient cause according to [their definitions];
for [He] is inherent in [them] and [He] is an agent of all effects. If [He] were not816

According to YMD IX. 3, the nimitta as defined like this includes that nimitta
which is defined as kåraˆatayå pariˆåmayit® and the sahakåri defined as kåryotpattyupakaraˆaµ vastu.
817

K interprets it as upådånåvacchedakadharmabhinnadharmåvacchinnakåraˆa-tåvat.
818

According to the Nyåya-Vaißeshika, the conjunction of threads is the asamavåyikåraˆa of cloth as the former is inherent in the object (= the thread) in which the later isinherent (patåtmakakåryeˆa sahaikasminn arthe tantau samavetaµ sat samavåyisambandhena vartamånaµ sat pa†åtmakakåryaµ prati tantusaµyogåtmakaµ kåraˆam asamavåyikåraˆam [NyBo §40]).
819

See above 150,7–155,2.

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accepted as the agent, the inference “[The earth and the like] have an agent because ofbeing an effect” would fall into the end (daßamadaßåpanna).
Likewise, it is established that even [an intelligent being] other than God [360]is the material cause cum efficient cause in generating his own knowledge (jñåna),happiness and so on based on [his] will (buddhi).
Thus it is established that the Upanishads teach Brahman having as the bodysubtle intelligent and non-intelligent entities transforms Himself into One who has as
the body gross intelligent and non-intelligent entities.

Hence, it is admitted, in accordance with the means of valid knowledge, thateverything different from Him is in the relations [with Him] such as being a supporterand being supported, being a ruler (¥ßvara) and being ruled, being subordinate and being
the Principal (ßeshin), being cause and being effect.
(89)

And [these relations] are with Ír¥ or Lakshm¥ [ as well]. The partnership (dåmpatya)of the Two [i.e. Vishˆu and Ír¥] is permanent.821 [Scriptures passages] referring to [Her]equality822 [with Him], [Her] identity823 [with Him], [Her] being [His] potency824 (ßakti),
820

Cf. VAS §74: nåmarËpavibhågånarhasËkshmadaßåpannaprak®tipurushaßar¥raµbrahma kåraˆåvastham, … nåmarËpavibhågavibhaktasthËlacidacidvastußar¥raµ brahmakåryåvastham [113,7–9].
821

K warns that ßriyå saha cannot be connected with dåmpatyam.

822

E.g. ‘asyeßånå jagata˙’ [TaiS VI. iv. 12 (cited below)] and ‘¥ßåno bhËtabhavyasya’ [Ka†haUp IV. 12, 13], where both are called ‘Ruler’; ‘vishˆupatn¥’ [Yajur-Sam
4. 4. 12 (cited in ÍarGBh 127,23)] and ‘ßriya˙ pati˙’ [GBh intro.: 3,1], where both arecalled ‘Lord’ (R).
823

E.g. ‘naranår¥mayo hari˙’ [Brahma(-aˆ∂a)-P (cited in CßBh 5,1)], ‘nåråyaˆåtmikåµ daiv¥µ’ [Kåßyap¥yaP (cited in ÍarGBh 134,19f.)], ‘tvaµ yåd®ßo 'si kamalåµ apitåd®ß¥µ te dårån vadanti yuvayor na tu bhedagandha˙ / måyåvibhaktayavat¥tanum ekam
eva tvåµ måtaraµ ca pitaraµ ca yuvånam åhu˙ //’ [Ír¥vishˆuvaibhava(-adhikåra) (cited
in CßBh 5,23f.)], where it is said that Ír¥ is Bhagavat qualified by sattå etc., that She is
Bhagavat qualified by another eternal body as Ír¥, that He occasionally takes up theform of Ír¥ for enjoyment or that He partially becomes Ír¥ with a different ego forenjoyment (R) (= the pËrvapakshins in CßBh 4,12–14 & 18f. Cf. Narasimhachari 1971:31f.).
824

E.g. ‘jagadutpådikå ßaktis tava prak®tir ishyate / saiva nåmasahasreshu(°sahasrais tu in CßBh) lakshm¥ ßr¥r iti k¥ryate’ [? (cited in CßBh 4,6f.)] (R).

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[Her] similarity to Him825 and so826 on are justified from this fact. [361]
The references to [Her] equality [with Him] can be clearly justified from the factthat [their] knowledge, bliss and so on are completely equal and that [they] are equal increating the world,827 being the Principal (ßeshin), being able to be a resort (ßaraˆyatva),
being the goal to be attained (pråpyatva) and so on828 [362].
The references to [Her] identity [with Him] are also justified as follows. [She] is,in the above-mentioned manner, identified [with Him] from the view point of mode as
For the detail of the concept of Ír¥ as ßakti, see Narasimhachari 1971: 25–29.
825

E.g. ViP I. viii. 17cd cited below and ‘åkramya sarvåµ tu yathå trilok¥µtish†haty
ayaµ devavaro 'sitåkshi / tathå sthitå tvaµ varade tathåpi’ [Vishˆusm®ti 99. 6 (cited in
CßBh 6,1f.)] (R).
826

E.g. ‘vishˆo˙ ßr¥r anapåyin¥’ [ViP I. viii. 17b (cited in CßBh 5,13; SRBh ad.
v.38)] and ViP I. viii. 35 cited below (also in CßBh 6,2), where the difference and thetwo-ness are mentioned (R).
827

In this regard, R refers to Ùgveda X. 129. 2 (ån¥d avåtaµ svadhayå tad ekam)
and asserts that svadhå here denotes Lakshm¥ according to the usage of ViP I. ix. 119(svadhå tvaµ lokapåvan¥). This is the second interpretation of the passage in Deßika's
CßBh 10,16–11,5; esp. 10,24ff. (See also ÍP ad Ír¥Bh II. iv. 7: 394,19f.). Cf.
Narasimhachari 1971: 40 and Srinivasa Chari 1994: 179f, n.30.
828

R refers to ‘asyå mama ca ßeshaµ hi vibhËtir ubhayåtmikå’ [Vishvaksena-Sam(cited in ÍarGBh 129,21f.)], ‘lakshmyå saha h®sh¥keßo devyå kåruˆyarËpayå / rakshaka˙sarvasiddhånte vedånte 'pi ca g¥yate //’ [Lakshm¥tantra XXVIII. 14 (cited in full in RTS
959,2)], ‘saµsårårˆavatåriˆ¥m’ [Kåßyapasm®ti? (cited in RTS ?)], ‘våca˙ paraµ prårthayitå
prapadyen niyata˙ ßriyam’ [Íaunaka-Sam? (cited in ÍarGBh 127,12 as uktaµ bhagavatå
ßaunakena)], ‘åtmavidyå ca devi tvaµ vimuktiphaladåyin¥’ [ViP I. ix. 120 (cited in
CßBh 15,3f.)], ‘yåmålambya sukhenemaµ dustaraµ hi guˆodadhiµ / nistaranty acireˆaiva
vyaktadhyånaparåyaˆå˙’ [Såttvata-Sam 12. 84 (cited in CßBh 14,22f.; ÍarGBh 127,13f.)],‘ß®ˆåti nikhilån doshån (nikhilaµ dosham in CßBh) ßr¥ˆåti ca guˆair jagat // ßr¥yatecåkhilair nityaµ ßrayate ca paraµ padam’ [Ahirbudhnya-Sam 51. 61–62] and ‘ßrayanat¥µßr¥yamåˆaµ ca ß®ˆt¥µ ß®ˆvat¥m api’ [ibid. 21. 8(*)], ‘vaikuˆ†he tu pare loke ßriyå
sårdhaµ jagatpati˙ / åste vishˆur acintyåtmå bhaktair bhågavatai˙ saha //’ [Liµga-P(cited in SRBh ad v.39) and the second half of the Dvayamantra(†).
*These verses of the Ahirbudhnya-Sam are cited in CßBh 3,11f.; ÍarGBh 132,9ff.;
SRBh ad v.12: 44,7ff. For the word of ßr¥, RTS XXVIII [950,4ff.; Skt. p.323] gives thefollowing six etymological interpretations: ßr¥yate, ßrayate, ß®ˆoti, ßråvayati, ß®ˆåti andßr¥ˆåti. Cf. Srinivasa Chari 1994: 158.
†ßr¥mate nåråyaˆåya nama˙. For the meaning of the portion, see RTS 1009,9ff.:
Skt. p.342ff.

233[the Two] are completely equal in the form of a couple829 (dvandva) and [She] is [also]
the substratum of being the Principal (ßeshin) to whom the whole phenomenal world issubordinate. In addition, [She and He] appear to form the one deity (which is to bementioned in respect to all the oblations concerning [God] Himself) since Her Husband
has the relation to Ír¥ in a way that agrees with application (yathåviniyogam) as, forinstance, in [the Scriptures of] Mahendra and [that of] Agnishoma 830; for this reason orothers, [She is identified with Him] [363].
Now, the references [to Her] as [His] potency mean that [She] is [His] attributein the form of a wife and the like; or they mean that [She] is helpful in driving [His]operations like the creation as [She] has the same sport (l¥lå) [as He]. And the reference831
as ‘potency (ßakti)’ is always made to the part of a feminine even in another couple of amasculine and a feminine.832
The references [to Her], like [His] divine manifestations833 (vyËha), as a varietyof [His] state are concerned with [Her own] incarnations834 (avatåra) and so on. For that[incarnation of Ír¥] which becomes, at [Her] own will or at the will of the Supreme, thecondition of effect is also a variety of the state of God, since everything forms the829

R refers to ‘tulyaß¥lavayav®ttåµ tulyåbhijanalakshaˆåm’ [Råmåyaˆa V. 16.

5].
830

For example, in the sacrifice of Mahendra, the deity is not mere Indra but
Indra qualified by greatness; in the sacrifice of Agnishoma, the deity is neither mere
Agni nor mere Soma but the two associated each other. Likewise, when ‘asyå mama caßeshaµ hi vibhËtir ubhayåtmikå’ [Vishvaksena-Sam (cited in ÍarGBh 129,21f.)], ‘makåras
tu tayor dåsa˙’ (cited below 367,3) and the like are applied, Vishˆu and Ír¥ are worshiped
as in the Agnishoma; when the dvayamantra is applied, Vishˆu qualified by Ír¥ isworshiped as in the case of the Mahendra (R).
831

V suggests to read ßaktißabda˙ for ßaktitvavåda˙.

832

R refers to ‘ßiva˙ ßaktyå yukto yadi bhavati’ [?] (which is said on Pårvat¥) and‘ßakticakrasya nåyikå’ [Sanatkumåra-Sam ] (Cf. CßBh 12,1f.: ßaktißabdo 'pi hy atravihåråkhyakåryopayuktavißeshaˆatvåbhipråya˙ patn¥vishaya eva).

R).

833

For the outline of His vyËha, see below 394,5–395,2.

834

Cf. ViP I. ix. 144: Råghavatve 'bhavat S¥tå, Rakmiˆ¥ K®shˆajanmani (cited in234

nature of God.835
Likewise, [Her other] appellations, say, [1] ‘desire (icchå),’ [2] ‘consciousness(saµvit)’ and [3] ‘ego 836 (ahaµtå),’ are also to be regarded as intending, for instance, [1]that [She] is favorable to affection, [2] that [She] is self-luminous [364], [3] that [She]has such form as particularly explains [Her] essential nature [as distinct from the otherdeities].
All that is to be mentioned on this point has been said by Ír¥-Råmamißra in›a∂arthasaµkshepa immediately after the explanation of the divine abode837 (divyasthåna).
Now we shows this portion—
And from the same logic [as is mentioned in the explanation of divine
abode], [His] Consort and the like are also established.
[Objection:] Particularized838 injunction (vißishtavidhi) as to [Her] being
the Principal [to whom the phenomenal world is subordinate] (ßeshin) is
not possible. Because it is improper that what is subordinate to someone issubordinate to another [i.e. the phenomenal world that is subordinate to
God cannot be subordinate to Her]. For the same reason, nor is supplementaryreference (anuvåda) [possible]. Moreover, His Consort and the like [must]
form the body of the Supreme; otherwise, it would be contradictory to[the Scriptures passage ‘He was] alone [in the beginning]’ [ChUp VI. ii.
1]. For [She] is, unlike [His essential nature] such as bliss, not inseparable[to Him]. Thus [both] are equal [in forming His body or in being subordinate
835

My translation of this sentence follows R; while according to K, it means ‘For
since everything is the ap®thaksiddhavißeshaˆa of God, everything that becomes thecondition of effect at its own will or at the will of the others (i.e. His or Her will) is avariety of the state of God.’
836

E.g. Ahirbudhnya-Sam II. 43: sarvabhåvåtmikå lakshm¥r ahaµtå paramåtmana˙.
837
838

Namely, nityavibhËti.

Here the passage of Taittir¥ya-Sam IV. iv. 12 ‘asyeßånå jagato vishˆupatn¥’ isdealt with. According to the objector, the passage can neither gives the injunction as to
the Consort of Vishˆu as qualified by ßeshitva [¨ ¥ßånå] nor make a supplementaryreference to the Consort that has been laid down elsewhere, giving Her the attributeßeshitva.

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to Him]; accordingly, it is impossible that [the world and His Consort] arein the relation of being subordinate and the Principal respectively.839[Replied:] Not so. It is current in our daily life that [the property] of ahusband belongs to his wife also. [365] And control by both is single
Principal-ness,840 because the Sm®tis 841 mention the inseparableness [of acouple]. It is said by one who knows ethics (n¥ti):‘Charity (tyåga) cannot take place if not desired by one of a couple’[Íåbara-Bhåshya VI. i. 17].842
In fact, when [the property of a couple] is divided, [charity is] notcompleted.
And the passage, assisted by the above-mentioned principle, gives theinjunction as to the Wife qualified by being the Principal [366]. Or rather,having made a supplementary reference to [His Consort or being thePrincipal, the passage gives the injunction as to being the Principal or
being His Consort843].
Besides, though it is impossible that the body [of a husband] is [his] wife
in our daily life, it is not contradiction so far as what is not in the scope ofother means of knowledge [than the Scriptures] is concerned. And in our
839

samatvån na mitha˙ßeshaßeshitå. The expression presupposes the principle
mithosambandhanyåya mentioned in M¥SË III. i. 22 (adhi° 12): guˆånåµ ca parårthatvåd
asambandha˙ samatvåt syåt (R).
840

This sentence is cited in ÍarGBh 129,22f. as well.

841

R refers to ‘dharme cårthe ca nåticaritavyå’ [?] (cited in Íåbara-Bhåshya VI.
i. 17 as dharme cårthe ca kåme ca nåticaritavyå / sahadharmaß caritavya˙ / sahåpatyamutpådayitavyam) and ‘påˆigrahaˆåd dhi sahatvaµ karmasu tathå puˆyaphaleshu
dravyaparigrahe ca’ [?] as well as the Íruti-passage that ‘patn¥ hi pår¥ˆahyasyeße’[Taittir¥ya-Sam VI. ii. 1. 1] (cited in Íåbara-Bhåshya VI. i. 16).
842

M¥SË VI. i. 6–16 (adhi° 3) deals with the right of women to perform sacrifice
and ibid. 17–21 (adhi° 4) deals with the right of wives.
843

In the former case, the passage of Taittir¥ya-Sam VI. iv. 12 refers to His
Consort that has been establsihed in ‘hr¥ß ca te lakshm¥ß ca patnyau’ [Taittir¥ya-Óraˆyaka
III. xiii. 2] and gives the injunction as to ßeshitva. In the latter case, the passage refers tothe ßeshitva that has been establsihed in ‘¥ßånå dev¥’ [Taittir¥ya-Bråhmana III. xii. 3. 2]
and gives the injunction as to being His Consort (K).

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ordinary life, it is because [the body of a husband] is non-intelligent that[it] cannot be [his] wife. Furthermore, if that [injunction as to being his
wife were] concerned to himself, it would have the defect of self-dependence(åtmåßraya).844 Subordination [of this kind] is found even in the othercase845 since it is not contradictory [367]. [›a∂arthasaµkshepa]
By this portion, Ír¥-Råmamißra has justified that the world is in its proper
essence846 subordinate (ßeshataikarasa) to the Couple.
Furthermore, the following Íruti [supports this content]:
The syllable a stands for the Lord of all the world, Vishˆu or Hari; thesyllable u for Lakshm¥, drawn out by Vishˆu; the syllable m for a slave of
the Two — This is the definition of the sacred syllable om847 [Ka†haÍruti?].
In respect to om, like other mantras, various kinds of [other] interpretation can be given
in many places.848 However, there is not such contradiction in the content [of this Íruti]
as would force us into interpreting [this passage] in other way.
844

sa ca svasmin åtmåßrayadosha˙. Here the translation follows the second
interpretation of K: sa˙ = patn¥tvavidhi˙. K gives another interpretation: that he himself
is not his wife (apatn¥tvam = sa˙; note that vidheyaprådhånyåt puµstvam) is based on
the defect of åtmåßraya. Also he criticizes R's interpretation (sa˙ = patipatn¥bhåva˙) as
unfit for the context.
845

I.e. in our ordinary life, according to the second interpretation of K. R (= thefirst one of K) illustrates it with sprinkling water (prokshaˆa), which is subordinate to
the rite (kratu) and is that to which br¥hi-rice subordinate.
846This is a favorite expression of Råmånuja. Van Buitenen notes that °rasa
means not only °svarËpa or °svabhåva but also °rati (Råmånuja on the Bhagavadg¥tå,
rpt. Delhi etc., 1968, p.35, n.92; his Eng. trans. in VAS, p.238, n.349).
847

This verse is quoted in the Ír¥sËktabhåshya of Raµganåthamuni alias Nañj¥yar,
p.59 (ed. A. Srinivasa Raghavan, 1937) as ka†haßruti [the same word found in RTS
837,1 also denotes this verse according to the Såravistara of Viraraghavacharya]; while
it is not found in the extant Vedic texts. Its c-påda is cited in CßBh (8,2) as well (acc. toNarasimhachari 1971: 37, n.174).
848

R refers to another interpretation shown in Ash†aßlok¥ (by Paråßara-bha††a),v.1: akårårtho vishˆur jagadudayarakshåpralayak®t, makårårtho j¥vas tadupakaraˆaµvaishˆavam idam / ukåro 'nanyårhaµ niyamayati sambandham anayo˙, tray¥såra˙ tryåtmå
praˆava imam arthaµ samadißat //.
For the detail of the meaning of om, see RTS XXVII: 827,1–847,4 ( Skt. 270–78).

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And [it is verified] by the following [Scriptures passages]:
The Wife of Vishˆu, ruling (¥ßånå) this world [Taittir¥ya-Sam. IV. iv. 12],The Ruler (¥ßvar¥) of all beings [Ír¥sËkta 9],
and so on. Regarding the former Íruti, some regard it as concerned with BhË849 because[‘the wife’ here] has the same case-ending as the word aditi and so on. 850 Yet it is wrong
opinion that [this passage] is concerned with [mere] direction [for the reason that ‘thewife’ here has the same case-ending as the word dik 851]; for it is contradictory to themark [i.e. ‘the wife of vishˆu’ indicated] in the Írutis and other [Scriptures].
So does say the venerable Paråßara [368]:
Oh! Mother. This world, movable and immovable, is pervaded by You
and Vishˆu [ViP I. ix. 126],
As Vishˆu is all-pervading, oh the best twice-born, so is She [ViP I. viii.
17],
None is superior to the Two [ViP I. viii. 35],and so on.
Again, it is said in the teachings of Bhagavat that:[The two] are mentioned as if they form one entity852 [Ahirbudhnya-Sam
3. 26]
The whole phenomenal world, including intelligent and non-intelligent
entities, are pervaded by Lakshm¥. Her Lord, however, pervades Her aswell as everything. Still, the lordship of Ír¥ is equal to that of Ír¥'s Lord.
The Pair is the Principal [to whom the world is subordinate] (ßeshin)forever [?],
849BhËdev¥ is also called BhËmi or P®thiv¥.

850

TaiS IV. iv. 12 runs as follows: asyeßånå jagato vishˆupatn¥ / vißvasyavyacå
ishayat¥ subhËti˙ ßivå no astu aditir upasthe. And it is well-known that aditi denotesBhË (R); e.g. TaiS I. v. : bhËmir bhËmnå dyaur variˆåntarikshaµ mahitvå / upasthe tedevi adite 'gnim annådam annådyåyådadhe, cited in K. Here ‘and so on’ denotes ishayat¥(making send out), which is the cause of modification as food.
851
852

I.e. Ërdhvå dißåm [TaiSam IV. iv. ].

ekatattvam ivoditau. Deßika adopts this reading in CßBh 6,2 as well; theAdyar ed. of Ahirbudhnya-Sam reads: tattvam ekam ivoditau.

238

and so on.
In the Ahirbudhnyasaµhitå,853 the Lakshm¥tantra854 and so on, the above-mentioned
content is emphasized in detail. [382]
The above-mentioned content, [i.e. that She is also all-pervasive Principal asHe], can justify the description that [His other consorts] like BhËmi855 also form Her
parts.
In fact, [eternal seers like] Ananta, Vishvaksena are also said to be of the natureof [His divine manifestations] like Saµkarshaˆa simply because [these latter] enter into
[these former]. It is because there are sub-divisions of meditation (upåsana) in accordancewith application (viniyoga) that there is option (vikalpa) as to whether Brahman is
accompanied with [His] wife, followers and the like or devoid of them; but not because[the two kinds of description] are [respectively] concerned with, say, [His] being confusedand [His] being pure or [His] condition of cause and that of effect. For we have alreadyshown the refutation on this point.856 All the relations of cause and effect among [His]divine manifestations (vyËha), [His] incarnations (vibhava) and so on are, as we shall853

K refers to II. 62; III. 1, 4cd–5, 7–9 etc., 23–26, 41–42ab, 43–44ab etc.; VI.
2–4; VII. 65; XXI. 7cd, 9cd–10ab etc. (K reads some minor variants which are notfound in any manuscript used for the Adyar ed., but I cannot judge whether his reading
is based on the Ír¥vaishˆava tradition or not).
854

K refers to I. 39cd–40 etc.; II. 25cd–26ab, 28ab, 29–30ab, 31ab etc.; III. 1–2,
8cd–10ab, 14, 22cd–23ab, 25; IV. 48ab, 51ab etc.; V. 31cd, 35, from 37ab up to 81cd;
VIII. 11; XII. 12–14ab; XIII. 22; XVII. 30cd, 31a+31d, 32ab, 34cd–35, 36cd–37; XXVII.
41, XXVIII. 14 (Likewise K reads some minor variants which are not found in any
manuscript used for the Adyar ed.).
855

In the Ír¥vaishˆava theology, BhË (or BhËmi) and N¥lå are also accepted as
the consorts of Vishˆu, though their rank is lower than Ír¥/Lakshm¥. The degree of theimportance of the three consorts is, according to ÍarGBh (151,2f.; ad st. 5:evambhËtabhËmin¥lånåyaka), Ír¥ > BhËmi > N¥lå (nityaniyataprådhånyatåratamyakrameˆa ßriyå saha ekåsanasthau devyau tacchåyåsaµkåßatayå darßayati). See Srinivasa
Chari 1994: 176–78. In this regard, ÍarGBh (151,3f.) and R refer to the Ír¥guˆaratnakoßa
of Paråßarabha††a, v. 26: … devi tvåm anu n¥layå saha mah¥ devya˙ sahasraµ tathå
yåbhis tvaµ stanabåhud®sh†ibhir iva.
856

Because, says K, we have alredy reject the Advaita theory that there is ajñåna
in Brahman, the Yådava-theory that Brahman itself is modified, and the Bhåskara-theory
that Brahman has distinctions due to upådhi (K).

239

explain [in the next chapter857], concerned with [His] forms (vigraha).
And [Her] divine manifestations like Lakshm¥, which are correspondent to [His]various divine manifestations and so on, are established by the Scriptures.858
The positions of [His] divine manifestations and so on, say, mutually being
subsidiary and being the Principal (aµgåµgibhåva), are due to [His] own will; for God
exists everywhere being the single.
It is true that in particular amulets (yantra) and the like, Våsudeva and [His]other [manifestations] are sometimes regarded as subsidiary to Lakshm¥, Sudarßana andso on859 [383]. But there is not any contradiction if [Lakshm¥ etc.] are contemplated, as[they] really are, to have as the Self Brahman; for only to those who have as the Self
[Brahman] itself [e.g. Lakshm¥], [Brahman] itself [e.g. Våsudeva] voluntarily becomessubsidiary. If [Lakshm¥ etc.] are contemplated with the view that [they] are Brahman,on the other hand, [they] are regarded as the Principal to whom [Våsudeva etc.] aresubsidiary just for the purpose of attaining various particular fruits; accordingly, theorder of entities is not violated as in the case of the other injunctions taught in the
Upanishads as to [the meditation on such symbol as name] with the view [that it isBrahman860].
Yet the above-mentioned is not applicable to such entities [as Rudra] that are
taught [as the Principal] in the other Ógamas [like the Íaivågamas] as well, since we857

See 394,3: ¥ßvaraßar¥re ca sËkshmavyËhavibhavådibhedå˙ ….

858

R refers to ViP I. ix. 144 cited above.

859

E.g. in a yantra towards Lakshm¥, Våsudeva is regarded as subsidiary to Her;in that towards Sudarßana, N®siµha is regarded as subsidiary to him (K). R refers to a
mantra towards S° that: ‘sthåpayet sarvamadhye tu cakraråjaµ suvigraham / ash†adikshu
N®siµhaß ca sthåpayet susamåhita˙ //’ [?].
860d®sh†ividhi. See Ír¥Bh IV. i. 4–5 (adhi° 3: prat¥ka°), in which ChUp III. xi. 1:
mano brahmety upås¥ta, VII. i. 5: sa yo nåma brahmety upåste, etc. are cited. The
meditation of this kind, called prat¥kopåsana, is defined as: abrahmaˆibrahmad®sh†yånusandhånam [Ír¥Bh VI. i. 4: 576,7f.]. So R here remarks that it does notmatter as to d®sh†ividhi if the entity [being its object] is real or not.
Those who engage in it cannot be liberated. See Ír¥Bh IV. iii. 14: ye tu
brahmakåryåntarbhËtaµ nåmådikaµ vastu devattådishu siµhådid®sh†ivad brahmad®sh†yå… upåsate na tån [arcirådi˙] nayati [624,13f.].

240

will explain that these Ógamas have no authority.861
And the authority of the Påñcaråtra has been explained in the Ógamapråmåˆya862
and in the section of the Ír¥-Pañcaråtra of the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya863; we have also explained
it in the Nyåyaparißuddhi.864
It cannot be said that an amulet and so on are generally baseless; for they arefound in the [N®siµha-pËrva- and -uttara-]Tåpan¥ya-Upanishads and other [Scriptures]and their fruits are grasped by perception.
Therefore, you can suspect neither the conversion of the entities nor the nonauthority of the Scriptures on which these statements are based. [384]Thus it is established that Brahman, having all intelligent and non-intelligent
entities as Its mode, is one and only Nåråyaˆa accompanied with Ír¥.
(90)

Having attained to the best bed of the chief serpent [i.e., Ananta] expanded
and spreading, the Couple — the Two are our rulers — finds pleasure in thecreation, the maintenance and the dissolution [of the world], holding together
and laughing with such words pleasant to the ear as om, tat and sat of thelotus-born child [i.e. Brahmå] resting on the lotus of [His] navel.
Here ends the third section on God of the Nyåyasiddhåñjana composed byÍr¥mat Veµka†anåtha Vedåntåcårya, who is the lion among poets andlogicians and who masters all the branches of arts.

5. Eternal transcendental dominion
861

The part of NySi seems to be lost (or not written by the author?).

862

As is clear from the title, whole the work contributes to this subject. For thedetail of the work, see Narasimhachari 1971: 97ff. and his introduction to the criticaledition (GOS 160, Boroda, 1976). Especially for the part in which the pañcaråtraadhikaraˆa of the BrSË is discussed (ÓP 109,7–135,7), see Gerhard Oberhammer: Yåmunamunis Interpretation von BrahmasËtram 2, 2, 42–45, Wien, 1971.
863
864

I.e. BrSË II. ii. 39–42, adhikaraˆa 8: utpattyasambhava°.

See NyP 282,2–284,8: here our author quotes the last portion of ÓP 169,4–170,11(NyP 283,7ff.) and refers to his work Påñcaråtrarakshå, the first chapter named siddhåntavyavasthå, for the further exposition (NyP 284,7f.).

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Now [His] eternal transcendental dominion865 (nityavibhËti) is explained.
Its definition is: while being other than substances made up of three guˆas(triguˆa), having sattva866; while being self-luminous (svayaµprakåßa), having sattva;
while being free of tamas, having sattva; being other than what is dissimilar to the place
where the ignorance completely disappears,867 and so on. [385]
It is proved by means of the following passages:*[This person] of sun-color beyond the tamas [or the material universe 868] [ÍveUp
III. 8; BhG VIII. 9],*These [powers reached] the heaven869 (nåka) [TaiSam III. 5. 11. 5],*Abiding beyond this rajas [or the material world870] [Ùgveda VII. 100. 5; TaiSam
II. 2. 12. 5],*One who watches this [world] in the supreme heaven871 (vyoman) [Ùgveda X.
129. 7],*In that imperishable supreme heaven872 [MNårUp I. 2],*In a thousand pillars, immeasurable, strong and brilliant, [where the God of
865

Considering the double meaning of vibhËti, i.e. His divine ruling power (aißvarya[See also the Darßanodaya (Mysore 1933) by Lakshm¥puram Ír¥nivåsåcårya (ca. 19th–20thCent., according to Raghavan 1979: 80), p.208, cited in Srinivasa Chari 1994: 243, n.4])
and the territory under His rule (niyåmya), I translate it with the English word ‘dominion.’
For Råmånuja's usage of the term, see Carman 1974: 140–46.
866

In these definitions, ‘having sattva’ serves to exclude spiritual beings like theindividual self and God (R).
867This roundabout definition serves to include the bodies of eternal sages livingin the place (R).
868

See GBh VIII. 9: ådityavarˆaµ tamasa˙ paraståd— apråk®tasvåsådhåraˆadivyarËpam [270,1] and TC: tamasa iti sarvakåraˆabhËtatamodravyavivakshå; tamsa˙paraståd ity anena phalitam apråk®tatvam [270,11f.]; VAS §131: tama˙ßabdena saiva
prak®tir ucyate [161,13f.];
869

The verse runs: te ha nåkaµ mahimåna˙ sacante (Ùgveda X. 90. 16 reads
sacanta) yatra pËrve sådhyå˙ santi devå˙.
870

See VAS §131: raja˙ßabdena triguˆåtmikå prak®tir ucyate, kevalasya rajaso'navasthånåt. imåµ triguˆåtmikåµ prak®tim atikramya sthite sthåne kshayantaµ vasantam
ity artha˙. anena triguˆåtmikåt kshetrajñasya bhogyabhËtåd vastuna˙ paraståd vishˆorvåsasthånam iti gamyate [161,10–12].
871Såyaˆa's commentary runs: asya … jagato yo 'dhyaksha˙ ¥ßvara˙ parameutk®sh†e satyabhËte vyoman vyomani etc.
872

See VAS §131: tat sthånaµ avikårarËpaµ paramavyomaßabdåbhidheyam iti
ca gamyate [161,17].

242

gods stays873] [Jaimin¥yaBr IV. 384],
and so on874 [386].
Such875 being the case, in the passage that:*The sages always see this supreme abode of Vishˆu (tad vishˆo˙ paramaµ
padaµ sadå paßyanti sËraya˙) [Ùgveda I. 22. 20 etc.],[the pada is] established as different from [Vishˆu] Himself because the distinction isindicated [in the genitival ending ‘of Vishˆu (vishˆo˙)’]; 876 thus, this also establishes theparticular abode qualified by many seers who always see, because the meaning [‘abode’]is natural to the word pada877 and because [it is described as] being always seen. And
this is qualified injunction (vißish†avidhi), like the passage that:*For Agni the [cake] on eight potsherds [TaiSam II. 4. 3. 3];
since there is no other way [to interpret it].878
873

The passage runs: sahasrasthËˆe vimite d®∂ha ugre yatra devånåm adhideva
åste, which is introduced in SAS III. 61 as ßå†yåyaninaß caivam åmananti [273,11f.], in
SRBh 93,13 (ad v.39) as talavakåraßruti and in ÍarGBh 152,23 as talavakårå˙.
874

R refers to ‘hiraˆmaye pare loke (R in his comm. on MuUp adopts theordinary reading koße) virajaµ brahma nishkalam’ [MuUp II. 2. 10], ‘pådo 'sya vißvå
bhËtåni tripåd asyåm®taµ divi’ [Ùgveda X. 90. 3], TaiS III. 5. 11. 5 (cited above),‘yathå pådodaras tvacå vinirmucyata evaµ ha vai [SRBh reads evam ihaiva] sa påpmanå
vinirmukta˙ sa såmabhir unn¥yate brahmalokam’ [PraßnaUp V. 5], ‘vijñånasårathir yas
tu mana˙pragrahavån nara˙ / so 'dhvana˙ påram åpnoti tad vishˆo˙ paramaµ padam’[Ka†haUp III. 9], ‘sa khalv evaµ vartayan yåvadåyushaµ brahmalokam abhisampadyate
na ca punar åvartate na ca punar åvartate’ [ChUp VIII. 15. 1], ‘ramyåˆi kåmacåråˆivimånåni sabhås tathå / åkr¥∂å vividhå råjan padminyaß cåmalodakå˙ // ete vai nirayås
tåta sthånasya paramåtmana˙’ [MBh XII. 196. 6f.], ‘divyaµ sthånam ajaraµ cåprameyaµ
durvijñeyaµ cågamair gamyamånam (SRBh reads gamyam ådyam) / gaccha prabho
raksha cåsmin prapannån kalpe kalpe jåyamåna˙ svamËrtyå’ [MBh XVI. 5. 27], ‘devåß
ca (SRBh reads °å hi) yan na paßyanti divyaµ tejomayaµ padam / atyarkånalad¥ptaµ tatsthånaµ vishˆor mahåtmana˙ // svayaiva prabhayå råjan dushprekshaµ devadånavai˙’[MBh III. 136. 79f.]— these are cited in SRBh ad v.17 in explaining the phrase paraµpadam [64,27ff.]; R further quotes ‘tad ekam avyaktam anantarËpaµ vißvaµ puråˆaµtama˙ paraståt’ [MBh ?], ‘ß¥rshakapålaµ bhinatty aˆ∂aµ bhinatty aksharaµ bhinattitamo bhinatti’ [MBh ?].
875

The following presupposes the objection that paramapada or the nityavibhËti
is Vishˆu Himself. Cf. VAS §128: nanu cåtra ‘tad vishˆo˙ pramaµ padam’ itiparasvarËpam eva paramapadaßabdenåbhidh¥yate; ‘samstaheyarahitaµ vishˆvåkhyaµ
paramaµ padam’ [ViP I. 22. 53] ityådishv avyatirekadarßanåt [159,13f.].
876

Cf. VAS §128: tad vishˆo˙ padam iti vyatirekadarßanåt [159,16f.].

877

Cf. TD (ad §128): (parama-)padaßabdasya ca sthånavåcitvavyutpattisaµbhavåc
cedaµ sthånaparam [313,18f.].
878

How to interpret the passage is expounded in VAS. Here I will show thetranslation of this portion [§128: 158,16–159,5]—
From the statement that ‘tad vishˆo˙ paramaµ padam,’ i.e., the supreme abodeof Vishˆu, namely, the Supreme Brahman, is ‘always seen by the sages (sadå paßyantisËraya˙),’ we understand that there are some persons endowed with perfect knowledge
who have seen [it] at all times. The construction of the sentence is either that ‘ye243

And this particular abode is explained in the Mokshadharma:*Boy! These are, indeed, the hells of the abode of the Supreme Self [MBh XII.
196. 6]and so forth.
And this dominion is infinite in a certain direction [i.e. upwards] and is limited
in a certain [direction, i.e. downwards], because we can ignore neither those Scriptures
which describe [the dominion] as endless nor those which describe it as beyond tamas[or the material universe]. Although infinity itself is common [to both], this [transcendental
dominion] is greater even in comparison to the infinite [material universe] composed of
the three guˆas because of the [Scriptural] passage that [the former] is greater and [thelatter] is smaller.879 And because we have already proved the mutual difference [innumber] among infinite entities880 [387]. Even concerning area, we will show the following
examples: The area of ether upper than the sun is infinite, [that] upper than the Earth ismore infinite, and [that] upper than the Påtåla (or the lowest hell) is most infinite. And
the designation of one foot and three feet is, though it is said with the other intention,881
help us to understand the difference in area. And this distinction does not mean four
equal divisions. For it is said that:*[The reference to Its measure] is [only] for the purpose of meditation (buddhi),
as in the case of [the reference to Its] ‘feet’ [and other parts of the body] [BrSËIII. ii. 32].
And this [dominion] is non-spiritual, because it is different from both the categoryof the individual self and that of God. Still it is self-luminous (svayamprakåßa) by forceof the following passages:sËraya˙ te sadå paßyanti’ or that ‘ye sadå paßyanti te sËraya˙.’[Obj.] In either interpretation, more than one element cannot be enjoined, [since
it would bring about the defect of våkyabheda (TD 310,13; cf. MNP §33ff.)].
[Ans.] Not so. Since all [these elements] have not been established, here thesupreme abode qualified by all [these elements] is enjoined*; as is stated [in the sËtra
that] ‘However that [action] as well as its qualifying elements, if not taught by another,should be enjoined because [they] are inseparable for the purpose of the injunction(tadguˆås tu vidh¥yerann avibhågåd vidhånårthe na ced anyena ßish†å˙)’ [M¥SË I. 4. 9].
For example, the injunction of an action, say, that ‘yad ågneyo 'sh†åkapåla˙’ [TaiSam II.
4. 3. 3, also cited in the Íåbarabhåshya on this sËtra], the action that is qualified by all[qualifying elements] is enjoined because neither the action nor the qualifying elements
have been established. Likewise, the present passage teaches the supreme abode ofVishˆu, which has not been established, as being always seen by the sages. So there isno contradiction.
*See MNP §12: yatra tËbhayam [= karma tadguˆåß ca] apråptam, tatra vißish†aµvidhatte. tad uktam ‘na ced anyena ßish†å˙’ [M¥SË I. 4. 9] iti; ßish†å upadish†å ity artha˙.
yathå ‘somena yajeta’ [not found in the extant Vedic texts] ity atra soma-yågoyorapråptatvåt somavißish†a-yåga-vidhånam— somavatå yågenesh†aµ bhåvayed iti. na
cobhayavidhåne våkyabheda˙, vißish†asyaikatvåt.
879

I.e. Ùgveda X. 90. 3, ChUp III. 12. 6: pådo 'sya vißvå bhËtåni, tripåd asya'm®taµ divi.

244*There the world are composed of bliss and enjoyments are of the nature ofbliss882 [Ahirbudhnya-Sam VI. 23],
*The world named ånanda (bliss) and composed of the supreme bliss [?],*For both of us [the Lord and Me Lakshm¥], there is the supreme heaven, which
has no pair and is the supreme happiness. One who manifests (prasara) the six
good qualities, at [His] eternal will, has become the space883 [Lakshm¥tantra
XVII. 9],and so on. Likewise, to the question that:*Of what is this body (vyakti) of God composed? [?],
the general answer is:*That of which God composed [?];and to the further question that:*Of what is God composed? [?],
the final answer is:*He is composed of knowledge [?].
Thus [His] form in the divine world is composed of knowledge; so it is proper that thewhole eternal dominion, composed of this substance, is composed of knowledge. And
here ‘composed of knowledge’ means nothing but self-luminousness.
It is appropriate that this [eternal dominion], though being knowledge, does nothave the two properties found in the self, namely, having the object and being theagency. And it is reasonable that [this eternal dominion] is outwards (paråk) because it
manifests itself for the others as in the case of the attributive knowledge(dharmabhËtajñåna).884 As the attributive knowledge at the time of [unconscious
conditions] like deep sleep, it does not manifest itself at the time of bandage. [388] Stillas that [attributive knowledge] at such situations [becomes the known object of theknower himself at another situation or that of another person], this [eternal dominion] isestablished as an object of the knowledge. True the knowledge of those who are free of
bandage is all-pervasive, but this [eternal dominion] does not depend upon it [so as to880

Cf. 53,1f. (chap.1) and 222,8ff. (chap.2). For the detail of endless number, seechap.6: 517,3–518,2.
881

As has been explained in chap.2 [222,7f.], the purpose of the passage is toshow that though both those who transmigrate and those who are liberated are innumerable,
there is relative difference in number between the two.
882tatrånandomayå lokå bhogåß cånandalakshaˆå˙. The Adyar ed. reads bhogå˙for lokå˙ and vice versa.
883

tayor nau paramavyamo nirdvandvaµ sukham uttamam / shå∂guˆyaprasaro
nityasvåcchandyåd deßatåµ gata˙. The Adyar ed. reads nirdukham for nirdvandvam,
padam for sukham (shown as v.l.), divya˙ for nitya°.
884

See below the definition of paråk: parasmai bhåsamånaµ paråg iti
vyavahriyante; tenåja∂åyå api mate˙ paråktvaµ siddham [38,3f.].

245

be manifest] as in the case of the peculiar nature (svarËpa) of the self [or what makes
the self as such, i.e., the substantial knowledge]. Even if [an entity] is an object of theknowledge, [its] self-luminousness is also accepted in the other case [i.e. that of thepeculiar nature of the self] as well.
Some hold, however, that [the eternal dominion] is called self-luminous, knowledge
and the like simply because it is endowed with unexcelled light and because it does notconceal knowledge and that it is called bliss, happiness and the like because it possesses
absolutely favorable [qualities] like color, taste and smell [389].
And this [transcendental dominion] is, as is taught in the Pañcopanishad,885
composed of the five gross elements and the [eleven] corporal faculties (indriya); it
forms the bodies, the corporal faculties, the vital breathes886 and the objects of theeternal (nitya), the liberated and God in accordance with their own will.
According to some, it is also composed of the twenty-four principles (tattva) as
in the case of [the material universe] made up of the three guˆas.887 Yet, these principles
are not in the relation of source and modification, because the Írutis describe the bodies
and so forth in the divine universe as constant. As well as [the gross elements] like ether[and the corporal faculties], there exist [the intermediate principles], namely, mahat,[ahaµkåra and the five tanmåtras], though they are not derived from prak®ti (apråk®ta).
In fact, there [in the divine universe], [each preceding principle], say, ether, is not thematerial cause of [each following principle], say, air.
And the configuration and so on of the body and the rest in this [eternal dominion]885

V remarks: Pañcopanishad denotes a particular pañcamantra, which is wellknown in the daily routine etc. of the sect. In SRBh ad v.15 [59,2], Deßika cites a phrasefromtheRahsyåmnåyabråhmaˆa(according
totheeditor)that:
pañcopanishanmantravigraham.
Cf. YMD VI. 2: pañcopanishanmantrapratipådyatayå pañcopanishadåtmakå;apråk®tapañcaßaktimattayå pañcaßaktimay¥ti nigadyate. On this portion, the Hindi
commentary by Shiv Prasad Dwivedi says: ‘There are mantras of an Upanishad whosename is secret. They teach the divine form composed of the five divine elements as tothis vibhËti. Therefore, the nityavibhËti is said to be composed of pañcopanishad (rahasyanåmaka jo upanishadoµ ke mantra haiµ, ve us vibhËti kå divya pañcabhËtåtmaka rËpame pratipådana karate haiµ, ataeva nityavibhËti ko pañcopanishanmay¥ kahå jåtå hai)’(Chaukhamba Surbharati Granthamala 160, Varanasi, 1989, p.106). As to the pañcaßakti,
A. Govindacarya svamin refers to the Pådmatantra (jñåna-kanda?) XII. 36ff., according
to which the five are sarva, niv®tti, vißva, purusha and paramesh†hi (Yat¥ndramatad¥pikåor The Light of the School of Ír¥ Råmånuja, Madras, 1912, p.91, n.198); SwamiÓdidevånanda follows it (trans. in YMD, p.188, n.4).
Cf. also Vedåntakårikåvli VI. 4: svayaµ prakåßarËpeyaµ pañcopanishadåtmikå.
886

As is pointed out by V (fn. 2), the author does not give any explanation as tothe vital breathes.
887[69,4f.].

Cf. avyaktamahadahaµkåreshv api pråk®tåpråk®tavibhågo 'st¥ti kecid åcåryå˙

246

are almost same as material ones.
It is established that there are the corporal faculties because the Scriptures describe
the bodies including the pure object888 (ßubhåßraya) [or the form of God] as having thefeet and other [organs]. For the word ‘eye’ and the like primarily mean [its faculties] but
not [the parts of the body] such as the eye-ball.889 The statement that:*[The liberated] are devoid of the faults of corporal faculties and shine forth
everywhere890 [Lakshm¥tantra XVII. 16]
and the like, according to the principal of general rule and exceptional rule(utsargåpavådanaya), intend to deny the corporal faculties caused by their karma; assuch a passage as:*Indeed, [pleasure and pain do not touch] one who has no body [ChUp VIII. 12.
1],
negates the body caused by one's karma. The author of the Commentary clearly mentions
that there are the sixteen (i.e. the [five] gross elements and the [eleven] corporal faculties)
and their fruits891; for in the topic [beginning with the sËtra] that:*There are not, says Bådari [BrSË IV. iv. 10],he examines whether the liberated have the body and the corporal faculties or not. 892
Again, Bha††a-Påråßara-påda shows that God and other [inhabitants in thisdominion] have the mind (manas). For he himself states, for example,893 as follows:*Although, as you assert, reasoning (tarka) is incapable of proving the mind
independently, it will be still powerful if supported by the Ógama. And theÓgamas read:888

In Ír¥Bh I. i. 1, ViP VI. 7 (called ßubhåßrayaprakaraˆa) is expounded asfollows: dhåraˆåsiddhyarthaµ ßubhåßrayaµ vaktum … (1) paraßaktirËpam idam amËrtam
[= acidviyuka-j¥va˙] (2) aparaßaktirËpaµ kshetrajñåkhyamËrtam [= cidvißish†a-j¥va˙] ca(3) paraßaktirËpasyåtmana˙ kshetrajñatåpattihetubhËtat®t¥yaßaktyåkhyakarmarËpaavidyå cety etacchaktitrayåßrayo bhagavadasådhåraˆam ‘ådityavarˆam’ [ÍveUp III. 8]ityådivedåntasiddhaµ mËrtasvarËpaµ ßubhåßraya ity uktam [(1) 222,2 … 223,1–3]. For
the interpretation of the portion of ViP, see van Buitenen: ‘The Íubhåßraya Prakaraˆa(Vishˆu Puråˆa 6, 7) and the meaning of bhåvanå,’ in Studies in Indian Literature andPhilosophy (Delhi etc., 1988), pp.13–24 (= Adyar Library Bulletin 19, 1955) and V.
Raghavan: ‘Vishˆupuråˆa and Advaita,’ ALB 39, 1975.
889

Yet the apråk®ta-indriyas cannot be difined without mentioning their substrata;
see NySi 80,2: tattadadhish†hånavißeshådibhi˙ tallakshaˆam.
890

The Adyar ed. reads sarvata˙ for sarvaßa˙.

891

As to their fruits, see the commentary ad BrSË IV. iv. 13 and 14 in the sameadhikaraˆa (R).
892

I.e. Råmånuja shows the problem of this adhikaraˆa as follows: kiµ muktasya
dehendriyåˆi na santi, uta santi [Ír¥Bh IV. iv. 10; 643,3].
893

It seems that V suggests to omit yathå here.

247“Seeing these objects of desire with the mind, he is pleased” [?],
“His mind is the divine eye” [?],“He meditates these other objects of desire with the mind” [?],
“The world was created with the mind [?],
“From Him the vital breath is born, so are the mind and the corporal faculties”[?],
and so on in the topics regarding [His] high [states in the Vaikuˆ†ha] as well as[His] low [states in the material worlds as incarnation]. [Tattvaratnåkara?]
The different opinion, [however], is [also] stated894:*Some of our teachers are of the opinion that here manas means the knowledge(buddhi). Because the usage of ‘having knowledge (buddhimat)’ and that of‘having mind (mansvin)’ are not different at all.895 And because in [the expressions]“My manas is agitated” and “My manas is calm,” the condition of this [manas]
is [described as] directly perceived896 [Tattvaratnåkara?].
Further, the objects are ornaments, arms, arrows, attendants, mansions, gardens,
wells, artificial mountains for playing and so forth — they are excessively wonderfuland eternal. Some [objects], however, are products and non-eternal. For even there [inthe eternal dominion], trees have modifications such as buds, flowers and fruits; rivers[have modifications] such as foam, wave and bubble; and [His] body has [modifications]such as [His] divine manifestations (vyËha) and [His] incarnations897 (vibhava). Only
those modifications which are caused by time and dependent upon karma are negatedthere, but not even those caused merely by the will of God. [390]
So are the bodies also: some bodies of the eternal seers and God are eternalbecause of being held with their eternal will; some are non-eternal because of being
held with their non-eternal will. [The bodies] of those who are liberated, however, areproducts and are non-eternal also. For it is taught in the {Ír¥-]Bhåshya and the other[commentaries898] that some of them have the bodies and some does not.
By the way, all the corporal faculties there are eternal. Because they are, as ether
therein, not dependent upon their material causes. Among them, some are eternally heldby the eternal seers and God; some are temporarily held. But those who are liberated
hold them only temporarily as in the case of the bodies.
894

By the same author?

895

Both are used to mean ‘wise.’896

If manas meant the mind only, it could not be directly perceived because themind is beyond the range of the indriyas (R).
897

His vyËha and vibhava will be explained later [394,4ff.].

898

On BrSË IV. iv. 12.

248

It is for the enjoyment in the form of service (kaiµkarya) of God, which isapproved of by Him, that the eternal seers hold the bodies and so on. So does God for
His own enjoyment, for pleasing the eternal seers, who are subordinate to Himself, andfor establishing [His] being meditated by one who desires to be liberated. And His[holding the body etc.] is merely due to His own will. Of the eternal seers, however, insome cases it is due to the will of the Supreme Person only; in some cases, it is due totheir own will which is in accordance with the will of the Supreme Person. So is statedin the [Brahma-]sËtra:*In the absence of the body, [one who is liberated enjoys] as in dream; because
it is possible [BrSË IV. iv. 13],
*When there is [the body], as a waking [person] [BrSË IV. iv. 14]. [391][Obj.] It is reasonable that the eternal and only one knowledge has a variety ofconditions such as happiness, misery, will (icchå), hate etc. in the transmigration because
it has a variety of contraction and expansion due to the karma. God might have [various
kinds of] volition899 (saµkalpa) causing the unequal modifications of material matter(triguˆa) in accordance with the difference of the operate factor (sahakårin), namely, thekarma of the individual self which attains to the condition of fruition. As to the non-material
modifications such as the wonderful body, however, why is it possible that the eternal
seers, those who are liberated and God — who are devoid of limiting adjuncts such as
karma and time, and whose knowledge is free of contraction and expansion [due tothese limiting adjuncts] and, [consequently], can grasp all entities — have particularconditions of knowledge such as the temporary will, the [temporary] volition and the[temporary] bliss caused by them?
Our answer is —(91) [Even] the knowledge of the Omniscient gradually has different contents (ullekha).
If not, [He] could, by no means, understand effects as being in past, in future and inpresent etc. [392](92) Those who are liberated and the like, though they are free of limiting adjuncts
such as the karma, have the will, the volition, the body etc. due to the particular will of
God.
(93)

And the will of God differs due to the particular karma in the individual creation900
899

According the commentators, saµkalpa is a special will in the form ‘Let me
accomplish it by performing,’ while icchå means will in general in the form ‘Let it be’[393].
900

The creation beginning with the cosmic egg (R) or that immediately after the
pañc¥karaˆa (K).

249

(vyash†i) and due to unevenness of the [three] guˆas in the aggregate creation901 (samash†i),or rather, due to time causing this [unevenness].
(94) Such condition of time [as causing His will to differ] is due to the stream of
moments. Again, this [stream] is due to the stream of limiting adjuncts [for the streamof moments, e.g. the movement of the sun], or [in the dissolution of the world] due tothe preceding [modification of time] such as moment.
(95) As it is conditioned by the limiting adjuncts or the preceding [modification oftime] such as moment, the stream of will of God can be the cause of each following one.
[393]
(96) And [His] will to create the non-material wonderful things does not need anyother limiting adjunct [such as the karma of the individual self]; because its stream isendless [as each preceding will is the cause of each following one].
(97) Or rather,902 [His] will, [His] volition and the creation revolve like a wheel. So
mental conditions of God should be in the manner of a seed and a sprout.
(98) Let it be accepted, by force of the Ógama, that the potency of God is beyond
reasoning: God does not need any other operate factor [even including time] in the
beginning of each creation.
(99) [While the above-mentioned answer is based on the opinion that His knowledge
is eternal but its condition has variety] and, if so, the non-material eyes and so on are[only] for beatifying Him; some has the opinion that the knowledge of God itself is
non-eternal. [394]For example, Varadavishˆumißra says:*Because the non-eternal knowledge of God grasps what would be grasped by
the eternal knowledge whose object is everything [?].
Thus it is established that God and the like have the eternal body etc. andnon-eternal ones in accordance with the difference between their eternal will and noneternal will.
Moreover, speaking of the body of God, we should know its varieties such as thesËkshma [or His transcendental form], the vyËha [or His incarnation in divine form] andthe vibhava [or His incarnation as human being and the like] etc., explained in detail by
901
902

The creation beginning with mahat (R) or that before the pañc¥karaˆa (K).

This alternative is to avoid the objection that even time cannot be the cause of
the modifications in the nityavibhËti according to the passage “kålaµ sa pacate tatra nakålas tatra vai prabhu˙” [MBh ] (K).

250

the Ír¥mat-Påñcaråtra-[Ógama]. Now we pose an outline—
The sËkshma is the Supreme (para) Brahman, as has been explained before, 903
called Våsudeva, whose body is purely of the six qualities.904 The classification intoßåntodita and nityodita also should be regarded as concerning the very Supreme.905
The vyËha is composed of Våsudeva, Saµkarshaˆa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha.
Each preceding one is the cause of each following one. Among them, in Våsudeva all
the six qualities such as knowledge are manifested. In [the remainder] beginning with
Saµkarashaˆa, four [out of the six] are not manifested; because a pair of qualities which
is fit for [their each moral function] such as spreading ßåstras and [their each creative
function] such as withdrawing the universe, is predominant906 [395]. [Nevertheless] allthese [six qualities] exist in every [vyËha]. Their each sub-incarnation is innumerable.907
Varieties of the vibhava are [about thirty-nine avatåras] beginning with
Padmanåbha908 and the ten avatåras beginning with Måtsya909 etc.
903

The commentaors refer to the passage of the JaiBr quoted in 385.

904

His six qualities are jñåna or knowledge, ßakti or potency, bala or strength,aißvarya or lordship, v¥rya or energy and tejas or splendor. For the detail, see S. M.
Srinivasa Chari 1994 (Vaishˆavism, Delhi): 187–91.
905

R asserts that the nityodita is para-Våsudeva and the ßåntodita is vyËhaVåsudeva as the cause of Saµkarshaˆa etc. This view, however, is refuted by V because
it is unfit for the Deßika's sentence. Also V quotes Deßika's Stotraratnabhåshya ad v.33
as the support of his opinion [fn.1]. See also V's bhËmikå 39–41. Note that RTS refers
to the opinion that the vyËha is composed of three because the vyËha-Våsudeva is sameas the para-Våsudeva [V: 194,4f.; Skt trans. 50,14f.].
906

That is,Saµkarshaˆa has
strengthforwithdrawing the universe
andknowledgeforspreading ßåstras;
Pradyumna haslordshipforcreating the universe
andenergy for
spreading dharma;
Aniruddhahaspotencyformaintaining the universe
andsplendorforspreading the truth.
See the Ógama text quoted by the commentators and the Ahirbudhnasaµhitå V. 17–18,
21–24.
907

Well-known twelve sub-vyËhas are:
Keßava, Nåråyaˆa, Mådhava
from Våsudeva;
Govinda, Vishˆu, MadhusËdana
from Saµkarshaˆa;Trivikrama, Våmana, Ír¥dhara
from Pradhyumna;
Hrish¥kesha, Padmanåbha, Dåmodara
from Aniruddha.
The twelve rule the twelve suns of each month. See YMD IX. 20f.
908

The thirty-nine avatåras listed in the Ahirbudhnyasaµhitå V. 50–56 are: (1)Padmanåbha, (2) Dhruva, (3) Ananta, (4) Íaktyåtman, (5) MadhusËdana, (6)Vidyådhideva, (7) Kapila, (8) VißvarËpa, (9) Vihaµgama, (10) Kro∂åtman, (11)Ba∂abåvaktra, (12) Dharma, (13) Våg¥ßvara, (14) Ekåmbhonidhißåyin, (15) Kama†eßvara,251

Varieties of the vibhava as an idol (arcå) are svayaµvyakta (self-manifest),
daiva (of gods), årsha (of sages) and so on.910 Note that an idol-incarnation at the requestof gods etc. becomes non-material immediately after their particular consecration(pratish†hå) owing to the will of God, who is disposed to be graceful (prasådonmukha).
It is not unreasonable even if material things and non-material things coexist. If it wereunreasonable, why could it be possible that God incarnates Himself in the material
world, that the subtle body goes even the Supreme Abode911 through the way beginningwith light [396] or [sages of extreme yogic power] such as Vaidikaputra912 go there?
For the Supreme dwelling within the central part of the heart as the inner-ruler[of the individual self], in particular, there is [another] incarnation as subtle inner-ruler(sËkshma-antaryåmi-avatåra).913
And not only God but also [His] body has wonderful potency such as pervasion.
Counter-arguments, [say, that whatever has the body cannot be all-pervasive etc.], arerejected because of this very [fact], which is proved by [the authority] making the
subject [i.e. His body] known (dharmigråhaka). Also concerning the eleventh chapter ofthe Ír¥mad-[Bhagavad-]g¥tå, [397] the author of the commentaries clearly teaches that[His] body is all-pervasive, the cause [of everything] etc. — To the verse:(16) Varåha, (17) Narasiµha, (18) P¥yËshaharaˆa, (19) Ír¥pati, (20) Kåntåtman, (21)Råhujit, (22) Kålanemmighna, (23) Pårijåtahara, (24) Lokanåtha, (25) Íåntåtman, (26)Dattåtreya, (27) Nyagrodhaßåyin, (28) Ekaß®ıgatanu, (29) Våmanadeha, (30) Trivikrama,(31) Nara, (32) Nåråyaˆa, (33) Hari, (34) K®shˆa, (35) Paraßudh®gråma, (36) Råma,(37) Vedavit, (38) Kalkin, (39) Påtålaßayana.
R lists the thirty-nine avatåras, referring to the Vaikhånasa-, theAhirbudhnyasaµhitå etc. (≈ V. 50–56 of the AhirS; vv. 52, 53 are considerably different
and list Ekårˆavaßaya, KËrma and Am®tåharaˆa in place of Ekåmbhonidhißåyin,Kama†eßvara and P¥yËshaharaˆa).
The Vishvaksenasaµhitå lists thirty-six avatåras and YMD [IX. 24] follows it.
Deßika does not fix the exact number of avatåras, only saying “thirty or so”[RTS V: 200,1; Skt. 51,7]. See Srinivasa Chari 1994: 218f.
909

I.e. (1) Måtsya (fish), (2) KËrma (tortoise), (3) Varåha (boar), (4) N®siµha(man-lion), (5) Våmana (dwarf), (6) Paraßu-Råma, (7) Ír¥-Råma, (8) Bala-Råma, (9)K®shˆa, (10) Kalki [YMD IX. 23]. Deßika's Daßåvatårastotra vv. 2–11 (= theSaµkalpasËryadaya VII, vv. ) explains each of these ten avatåras. Note that Buddha is
not included in the list. See Srinivasa Chari 1994: 230, n.48.
910

YMD IX. 28 classifies the arcåvatåra into (1) svayaµvyakta, (2) daiva, (3)saiddha and (4) månusha. In (1), God manifests Himself as an idol at His own will; e.g.
the idols in Ír¥raµgam, Tirupati, Badarikåßrama, Vånamåmalai and Melkote. In (2),God manifests Himself as an idol at gods' request; e.g. the idol in the Varadaråjasvåmi
temple in Kanchipuram. In (3), at sages' request. In (4), at human beings' request[Srinivasa Chari 1994: 225f.].
911

According to the commentators, paramapada here denotes the Vrajå river
only, because the subtle body disappears after crossing the river.
912

The Hindi commeatary refers to the Bhågavatapuråˆa.

252*See now, oh Gu∂åkeßa, the whole world with movable and immovable things
united here in My body and whatever else you wish to see [BhG XI. 7],
it is stated that:*See the whole world with movable and immovable things united — standing in
one spot — here in My one body and even there. And see also whatever else you
wish to see only in one spot of the one body [GBh XI. 7: 362,4f.].
Likewise, to the verse914:*Again, there in the body of God of gods, Påˆ∂ava saw the whole world, divided
many-fold, united. [BhG XI. 13],
it is stated that:*There in the divine body of God of gods […],915 the whole world composed ofthe material principle (prak®ti) and the individual selves (purusha), divided in
many-fold: differentiated in accordance with the difference among the group of
enjoyers — various and wonderful gods such as Brahmå, animals, human beings,
immovable beings etc.—, places of enjoyment — earth, mid-space, heaven,[hells such as] Påtåla, Atala, Vitala and Sutala etc. —, objects of enjoyment andmeans for enjoyment [GBh XI. 13: 364,6–365,1].
Again, to the verse:*This form of Mine, which you have seen, is very difficult to see. Even gods
ever long to see this form [BhG XI. 52],
it is stated that:*This form of Mine — engaging in controlling everything, the substratum of all
and being the cause of all —, which you have seen, is very difficult to see —cannot be seen by anyone [GBh XI. 52: 389,11f.],
and so on. Consider also [His] mode of being the substratum of everything, taught in thesection [of the Vishˆupuråˆa] concerning ornaments and weapon. 916 In another place,the Venerable Paråßara says:*That in which all the potencies reside, oh king, is the other great form [or body]of Hari different from all other [His] forms [mentioned before]. With His own
913

h®tpadmakarˆikåmadhyagatasyåntaryåmiˆa˙parasyavißeshata˙sËkshmåntaryåmyavatåra˙. Accoding to R and the first interpretation of K, the meaning
is: Though He is all-pervasive and, consequently, exists in every heart of the individual
self also, He takes another incarnation as the subtle inner-ruler within each heart especially(for easy meditation). V's teacher, [KËriråram svåmin], guesses the reading“h®tpadmakarˆikåmadhyagato'syåntaryåmiˆa˙parasyavißeshata˙sËkshmo'ntaryåmyavatåra˙” and asserts that it is fit for the description of RTS: [sarvaru†aiyavumh®dayaµkaÒile sËkshµamåyiruppatoru rËpavißeshattaik koˆ†u niÂkiÂa nilai
antaryåmyavatåram (203,1ff.; Skt. trans. 51,16f.)].
914

Unfortunately, the portion of TC XI beginning with the middle of 12 up to the
opening of 16 seems to be missing [Viraraghavachari's edition of GBh with TC, p.365,
fn.2].
915“which is infinite in length and breadth, which has innumerable hands, stomachs,

253

sport [God in] this [form] where all the potencies are,917 oh king of people,
makes forms movable, [i.e. His incarnations], called gods, animals and men[ViP VI. vii. 70–71],
and so on.
Among all these bodies of God, there is slight difference in giving worldly
fruits. But the final beatitude [i.e. the liberation] is easily accessible in all [His bodies]for those who meditate [Him] as all-pervasive.918 And [the description] “Having attained
to the vyËha after reaching the vibhava …” is to be regarded as concerned with aparticular qualified person who do not meditate [Him] as all-pervasive. [398](100) Knowledge full of spotless bliss and in the form of pure sattva voluntarily
becomes the world for the enjoyment of God, the lord of Kamålå [or Ír¥]. Let thatknowledge, which is beyond imagination, in which one can be liberated from the
beginningless darkness [or ignorance], and which is composed of manifestations of theLord, abide in my mind.

Here ends the fourth section on His eternal transcendental dominion in theNyåyasiddhåñjana composed by Ír¥mat-Veµka†anåtha or Vedåntåcårya, who is
the lion among poets and logicians and who masters all branches of arts.

Chapter 4 Knowledge
Now [attributive] knowledge919 (mati) is explained.
Its definitions are: while having an object, shining forth(sakarmakåvabhåsatva); while having a subject, shining forth920
faces and eyes, which has immeasurable splendor, which has immeasurable divine
weapons, which has immeasurable divine ornaments fit for itself, which has divine
garlands and apparel, which is anointed with divine perfume and which is full of infinite
wonders.”916

The commentators refer to ViP I. xxii. 65: “Vishˆu, the Lord composed ofperishable and imperishable [entities], bears all that composed of spritual beings and thenon-manifest like the essential nature of ornaments and weapon,” and so on.
917

samastaßaktîti padaccheda˙; samastå˙ ßaktya˙ yasmin tat tathoktam[Vishˆucitt¥ya].
918

Or those who recite the all-pervasive mantra (R, K).

254(sakart®kåvabhåsatva) etc. In the first chapter of the Nyåyatattva, however,[Nåthamuni] refutes the other definitions and concludes [its] definitions
mentioned by himself—*The four definitions of knowledge are: 1) being excessively fast,921
2) being extensively subtle,922 [400] 3) being without weight, and 4)
always illuminating923 as long as it exists [Nyåyatattva].
There we should guess attributes as are needed [to complete the definitions].
And this [attributive knowledge] is self-luminous only to the self
being its own substratum when it illuminates an object. But [knowledge]
belonging to the other time or the other [selves] is, for those who are in thetransmigration, the object of memory, inference etc. For the others [whoare not in the transmigration], however, even [knowledge] belonging to theother time or the others can be the object of their own perception because
they are omniscient. So is said in the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya:*It is stated that knowledge (anubhËti) is self-luminous(svayaµprakåßa). But this is true only for the self being the subjectof knowledge (jñåt®) when [the knowledge] illuminates an object;
there is no rule that this is proper for all [the selves] in every case[Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: (1) 134,2f.].
(101) Apprehension ‘I know’ and the like, refutation of [the opinion thatknowledge is the object of] mental perception (månasapratyaksha) etc.924
are the valid means to understand that knowledge (dh¥) is self-luminous —Let it be accepted. [401]919

In the Vißish†ådvaita, buddhi, mati, saµvit, anubhËti, dh¥ etc. aresynonymous and denote dharmabhËtajñåna. See Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: (1) 145,2;
YMD VII. 11.
920“While …” is to avoid the over-application to dharmijñåna or the
self.
921
Because it is conjunct with everything in the world at the time ofliberation (R) [the text of K is missing here].
922
Because it can enter even the body of an ant (R, K). As to 1) and2), see also 414,2f.

255

Moreover,(102) Can925 an omniscient [person] perceive even his own particularknowledge or not? In the former case, [its] self-manifestness is established.
In the latter, he would not be omniscient.
(103) Is knowledge that knowledge exists concerned with [the knowledge]
itself or not? In the former case, [knowledge] is self-luminous. In the latter,everything could not be established consequently.926 [402]
To [the Bhå††a M¥måµsakas927] who hold that [knowledge] is inferred
due to the manifestness928 (pråka†ya) [of its object], we reply—(104) If knowledge were merely assumed [to be the cause for the manifestnessof its object], it would be enough to assume only the sufficient condition(såmagr¥) [of the manifestness], because it is simpler [than assuming
knowledge also in the middle of the sufficient condition and the
manifestness].929 [But] if [knowledge], which is perceptible [in our opinion],is assumed to be different from that [sufficient condition], above-mentioned
923

bhåvyåpti = prakåßaniyama (K).
924
I.e. the refutation the opinion that knowledge is inferred throughjñåtatå or manifestation (K). R seems to interpret °ådi as °pËrvaka(månasapratyakshabhaµgasahitam ahaµ vevdm¥ityådyupalambhanam eva…).
925
V refers to SAS IV. 1: 472,4ff. (ed. Viraraghavachari, Madras
1973).
926
If the knowledge that knowledge exists were not concerned withitself, this knowledge, the existence of which would not be ascertained,
would be non-existent; if so, existent-ness of all knowledge, being an objectof this [knowledge], would be non-existent and, consequently, knowledge
would be non-existent; if so, [its] object would be non-existent; if so,everything would be non-established (R). K poses another interpretation
also.
927
See SAS IV. 3: kaumårilås tu kanthayanti— na svayaµprakåßa,nåpi månasapratyakshå buddhi˙, svaphalena tu vishayaprakåßenånum¥yata
iti … arthagata˙ prakåßo liµgam, purushagata˙ prakåßo 'numeya˙ [476,1–4].
928pråka†ya = jñåtatå = prakåßa.

256

undesirable conclusion [that knowledge is needless] would not be brought
about; [for perceptible entity cannot be omitted in view of simplicity].
(105) Manifestation (prakåßa) [or manifestness] here [in an object such as apot], which is nothing but [its] relation to knowledge, cannot be known if
this [knowledge] is not established. [Thus we cannot infer knowledge frommanifestation].930[The notion of] knowledge (jñåna) depends upon the verbal activityof [known] object [i.e. to be known] and that of [knowing] subject [i.e. toknow]; because there is difference in suffix [in the expression ‘I know a pot(gha†am ahaµ jånåmi)’ and so on]. [403](106) [Though ‘to know (√jñå) and ‘to shine forth (pra-√kåß)’ denote thesame notion], there is [difference in usage] between ‘[a pot] shines forth (oris manifest) (prakåßate)’ and ‘[a pot] is known (jñåyate).’ This [difference]is caused by difference in verbal root, as [the difference between] instrumental[suffix] and accusative [suffix] in [the usages of] ‘bhinatti’ and ‘på†ayati 931’
etc.932(107) Verbal expression, restriction of a [known] object and [its] being
manifested are caused by knowledge. [404] And such restriction of own
nature is not violated even in regard to manifestness (pråka†ya).
929

See TMK IV. 3: buddhir yata udayati te syåt tato 'rthaprakåßa˙,
madhye buddhi˙ kimarthå; SAS 476,5ff.: purushagataprakåßakalpane 'pi
yady arthagataprakåßam antareˆa vyavahåro na jåyate tadå buddhijanakatvena 'bhimataiva såmagr¥ låghavåd arthaprakåßasya 'vyavahitahetur
iti kalpyatåm.
930
Cf. Mesquita 1990: 87, Anm.187.
931
I.e. ‘paraßunå v®kshaµ bhinatti’ and ‘paraßuµ v®kshe påtayati’denote the same meaning (He cuts a tree with his axe), but the case-endings
are reverse.
932
The translation here is based on V's fn. According to R, the translationof vv.105cd–106 is—“jñåna is dependent upon the action of known object and that ofknowing subject [and has the meaning of prakåßa]. Expression thereof (that‘prakåßate’ and ‘jñåyate’), based on the difference in suffix [between

257(108) [That is], as this [manifestness] operates on [its object] only, so[knowledge] manifests only [its object]. [Thus, manifestness of the object
has no raison d'être].
[Also], why can manifestness be generated even in a past [object],future one,933 non-existence [of an object] and also known-ness934 (jñåtatå)?
In [the portion of] the Ótmasiddhi for ascertaining the meaning of
the word ‘prakåßa (illumination or manifestation),935 to the question that:*What is the meaning of the word prakåßa, then? [ÓS 81,8],
the author first quotes the passage of the Nyåyatattva that:*[The meaning is] not being remote from direct experience(anubhavådËra), or the cause of memory [ÓS 81,10: from Nyåyatattva
I].
Then, having stated that:*Prakåßa means not being remote from attributive knowledge (saµvit)[ÓS 81,11],
he states concerning alternatives936 of [the meaning of] ‘not being remote(adËra):*Let anubhavådËra mean either being different from what is remote[from direct experience] or being opposed to what is remote. And
this condition is being prakåßa.937 Why should we be indulged insuch useless discussion on this point? [405] [ÓS 82,1f.].
Likewise, the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya says:
accusative-ending and nominative-ending] (as [that] between instrumental[suffix] and accusative [suffix] in [using] ‘bhinatti’ and ‘på†ayati’ etc.), iscaused by the difference in verbal root.”
Though K interprets in the same manner, he does not mention of the underlined
portion, as is pointed out by V.
933
Cf. at¥te 'någate cårthe kathaµ pråka†yasambhava˙ [fragment of
the Saµvitsiddi quoted in ÍP I. i. 1: (1) 102,26]. Also ÓS 23,7ff. (Thisargument is omitted in Ír¥Bh (1) 102,2ff. [Mesquita 1984: 193]).
934
If pråkå†ya (= jñåtatå) were generated concerning jñåtatå, there
would be infinite regression (R, K).
935
It is examanined in Narasimhachari 1971: 209f.

258*And prakåßa is that which is common to all spiritual and non-spiritualentities (padårtha) and makes [them] fit for practical usage [Ír¥Bh I .
i. 1: (1) 143,1].
Thus, knowledge is not inferred from illumination [or manifestation](prakåßa) but is self-established.
All this is explained in detail by Bha††a-Paråßara-påda in his
Tattvaratnåkara. For example,*Knowledge is self-luminous. Because it is perceptible entity; because
this [perception] is impossible for the other [i.e. the mind]; becauseof the process of elimination938 (pårißeshya); because of the means ofvalid knowledge939 and so on.
Because there is verbal expression, [say, ‘I know a pot,’ soon] after[its] apprehension [without any interruption by other knowledge],
because there is no doubt [whether I know or not at that time] [406]and because [each of continuous knowledge] is regarded as establishedso long as it exists,940 it is certain that knowledge shines forth [byitself]. [Tattvaratnåkara]
This is a summary—*[Knowledge is] self-established. (1) Because something else
[apprehending each of continuous knowledge, i.e. reflective mental
perception], is not seen941; because942 of (2) affirmative concomitance936

I.e. kim idam adËra iti? [1] dËråd anya˙, [2] tadviruddha˙, [3]tadabhåvo vå? [ÓS 81,12].
937
According to R, prakåßatva here means prakåßamånatva. He also
points out that the reading prakåßo 'tra for prakåßatvam is better.
938
E.g. the object-ness exisiting in knowledge correlated (nirËpita) toperception ‘I know a pot,’ is correlated to itself; because it is related tosomething, while not related to the others; like the object-ness of a pot
existing in itself (K).
939
E.g. the inference that: knowledge is self-luminous, because it isknowledge, like knowldge of God (R).
940
Soon after continuous knowledge, there is recollection ‘I have259

and (3) negative concomitance (vyåptåd anvayavyairekita˙); becauseof (4) postulation (arthåpatti); because of (5) reduction ad absurdum(yukti); and because of (6) the Scriptural passages. [Tattvaratnåkara]
In commenting on the [above-mentioned] phrase that:*Because of (2) affirmative concomitance and (3) negative
concomitance [Tattvaratnåkara],[(2) the affirmative one] is shown [first]:*Knowledge, under discussion, does not require the relation to [other]homogenous [things] in assistants (kiµcitkåra) dependent upon itself943
so far as the verbal expression caused by944 itself concerned. 945 Because
it is a cause of verbal expression. Like an object, sense-organs, light
etc.946 [407]seen it for this period’; if knowledge were not self-luminous, such recollection
would be impossible because each of continuous knowledge would perish
without being experienced (R, K).
941
If there were reflective perception (anuvyavasåya) of each ofcontinuous knowledge in the middle, its continuity would be interrupted
and, consequently, the recollection would be impossible (R, K).
942
The following reasons are explained in the words of Paråßara
himself.
943svådh¥nakiñcitkåre. K: intermaditate cause (vyåpåra) born
immeditately after itself; e.g. vishayendriyasannikarsha (R). Though,according R, this is to avoid the objection that the reason is vyabhicåra
because the eye needs homogenous light in its verbal expression, this objection
is refuted by Paråßara. Then, this adjective is not neccesary. If so, thissyllogism would be completely same as that of Yåmuna [ÓS 62,8–16]
interpreted by Deßika in his Tattva†¥kå [UVG ed., p.147,15ff.].
944°gata = utpådya (R) or prayojya (K).
945
The sådhya is, in short: being the cause of vyåpåra bringing aboutvyavahåra not dependent upon the relation to itself (K).
946
Concerning the proof that the self is self-luminous, the similarargument is seen in ÓS 62,8–16: “All entities need, for their manifestations[siddhi˙ = vyavahårayogyatårËpa˙ prakåßa˙ (Tattva†¥kå 147,16)], neither
an entity which is homogenous to themselves nor that which is manifested(sådhya) by themselves. Accordingly, the self does not need [anything] for
its own manifestation [this verse is quoted in Tattva†¥kå (147,15f.) withreference to the proof that knowledge is self-luminous (Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: (1)260[Obj.] There is deviation (anaikåntya); because the eye, [which theNaiyåyikas regard as fiery], requires light, homogenous to it,[concerning its verbal expression].
[Ans.] Not so. Because this [eye], which is a sense-organ or is derived
from ahaµkåra, is heterogeneous to light, [which is made up of grosselements].
Also, other [inferences] are —The latent impression (saµskåra) on knowledge947 does not require
the direct experience (anubhava) of knowledge inherent to the same
object as that of itself.948 Because it is latent impression. Like thelatent impression on another [object949].
The latent impression on an object is generated along with the latent
104,2); also in Nyåyakulißa 75].— No entity is found, for its own illumination(or manifestation), to be dependent upon another object unique andhomogeneous [to themselves]. [For example], a pot, as you know, is notdependent upon another pot for its manifestation (siddhi) but is dependent
upon light etc., which is heterogeneous [to it]. Likewise, light illuminating[a pot etc.] is dependent upon neither another light nor a pot etc., themanifestation of which is dependent upon it; but it is dependent uponsense-organ, which is heterogeneous [to it]. So sense-organ is dependent
upon neither another sense-organ nor light and a pot etc., the manifestationof which is dependent upon it; but it is dependent upon knowledge, which
is heterogeneous [to it]. Similarly, knowledge is dependent upon neither
another knowledge nor sense-organ etc., the manifestation of which isdependent upon it, for its manifestation; but it is dependent upon the self,
being independent and its substratum, which is heterogeneous [to it]. In thesame manner, the self is dependent upon neither another self nor knowledge
and sense-organ etc., the manifestation of which is dependent upon it, for
its experience. Thus, the manifestation of the self in itself is not dependent
upon anything.” See Narasimhachari 1971: 179 and Mesquita 1990: 69f.
947
jñånasaµskåra
=jñånasm®tijanakasaµskåra
(R)orjñånavishayakasaµskåra (K).
948
If this sådhya is established in [the paksha] ‘jñånasaµskåra,’ it isestablished that knowledge is self-luminous or having itself as its object.
For it is inevitable that this saµskåra is generated from knowledge as an
object and there is a rule that saµskåra on something is generated fromdirect experience of the same thing; accordingly, saµskåra on knowledge
could not be generated from the same [knowledge] if knowledge had itself
for its object. (K)261

impression on [its] knowledge.950 Because it is the latent impression
on an object. Like the latent impression [on the object] born out ofknowledge ‘I know this [object]’ [408].
[Obj.] ‘Based on knowledge concerning both [an object and its
knowledge]’ is effective [as adventitious condition (upådhi) in thelatter inference].951[Ans.] Not so. For [‘concerning both’] is meaningless attribute(vyarthavißeshaˆa) because mere ‘based on knowledge’ could establish
the concomitance [in this inference].952 [Tattvaratnåkara]
Immediately after that, having said:*Moreover [Tattvaratnåkara],
the author shows the inference affected by the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya953 as follows:*Knowledge (saµvit) has its own attribute [and] verbal usage which949

For example, saµskåra on a pot, which bring about memory of apot, requires direct experience of a pot in the same substratum [i.e. theself], but it does not require direct experience of knowledge (R).
950
Consequently, vishayånubhva is equal to jñånånubhava (R, K).
951
Because ‘based on knowledge concerning both an object and its
knowledge’ pervades the sådhya ‘being generated along with the latentimpression on knowledge’ in the d®sh†ånta ‘the latent impression on theobject born out of knowledge “I know this object”’; but it does not pervades
the sådhana ‘being the latent impression on an object’ in the paksha ‘thelatent impression on an object’ (K).
952
The attribute ‘concerning both’ in knowledge merely makes thepaksha excluded. If such attribute were meaningful in the upådhi, all that isother than paksha could be upådhi and inference itself would be impossible(K).
953
I.e. Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: (1) 104,2–106,3, (where Råmånuja enlarges theargument of Yåmuna [ÓS 23,13–24,4] based on the description of
Vimuktåtman [Mesquita 1984: 193f.]) — “Knowledge (anubhËti) has its
own attribute [and] verbal usage which are independent of anything else.
Because it brings about this attribute and verbal usage in another thing
through its own relation [to it]. Whatever brings about a certain attributeand a certain verbal usage in another thing through [its] own relation [to it],is found to be independent of anything concerning that [attribute] and that[verbal expression] in reference to itself; like color to visibility. That is, forexample, color brings about visibility etc. in earth and the like through its

262

are independent of anything else,954 [Tattvaratnåkara]and so on. As to this [inference], you can extract [two] inferences by
yourself.955
Having said:*Furthermore, there is (3) a negative inferential mark (liµga) also
[Tattvaratnåkara],
the author uses [negative inferential marks] such as being non-material(ja∂atva) and being knowledge (jñånatva) in syllogisms 956 and explains them.
Two (4) postulations are explained: that is, [knowledge is self-luminous
because, otherwise], its perceptibility would be impossible957 and its bringing
about particular verbal usage [‘it is manifest’ in another object through its
own relation to it] would be impossible.
The author teaches (5) reduction ad absurdum, say, that knowledge is
own relation [to them], but it is independent of the relation to color for its
own visibility. Therefore knowledge itself is the cause of its own being
illuminated as well as of verbal expression ‘It illuminates.’”954≈ Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: anubhËtir anayådh¥nasvadharmavyavhårå [(1) 104,2].
Needless to say, Mesquita's German translation “den Denk- undSprachgebrauch in bezeug auf seine Eigenschaften” [1984: 193, Anm.53] is
not correct.
955
The
syllogism
posedbyRåmånuja‘anubhËtir
anayådh¥nasvadharmavyavhårå,svasaµbandhåd
arthåntare
taddharmavyavahårahetutvåt’ [(1) 104,2] shows two different syllogisms
inseparately, for fear that the work should be too voluminous [ÍP 104,24 ≈TÈ 146,13]. SudarßanasËri divides it into ‘anubhËtir anayådh¥nasvadharmå,svasaµbandhåd arthåntare taddharmahetutvåt’ and ‘anubhËtir anayådh¥nasvavyavhårå, svasaµbandhåd arthåntare tadvyavahårahetutvåt’, andcomments them in detail [ÍP 104,25ff.; also Írutaprad¥pikå 62–64]. Also
Deßika himself shows them in more elaborate form: anubhËti˙ paragatasvajanyadharmåtyntasajat¥yåvaßyambhåvidharmayogesvåtyantasajåt¥yåpekshåniyamarahitå, svavijåt¥ye svånantarakålottarakålånuv®ttirahitadharmahetutvåt;anubhËti˙svåtyantasajåt¥yåpekshåniyamarahitasvavyavahårå, hetutvåt [TÈ 146,18f.; 147,12f.].
956
E.g. knowledge is self-luminous; because it is non-material;
whatever is not self-luminous is not non-material, like a pot; knowledge is
not so, therefore it is not so.

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not illuminated (or manifest) by others because, [if it were illuminated byothers], [knowledge] could not illuminate [other] entities such as a pot.
*And (6) the Scriptural passages [Tattvaratnåkara],
says the author,*such as:“Here this person becomes self-luminous (svayaµjyotis)” [B®hUp
IV. iii. 14],
“The self is, indeed, his light” [B®hUp IV. iii. 6],“He rests by his own light958” [≈ B®hUp IV. iii. 9],“His knowledge, known by itself, is named Brahman” [ViP ],which intend to show that the individual self, called by the word
‘knowledge (jñåna)’, is self-luminous, make it possible that
consciousness (saµvit), which is [also] expressed by the word
‘knowledge (jñåna)’, has self-luminousness in view of possibility
and simplicity.959 Accordingly, [409] the passage that:“As one sun illuminates all the world, oh Bhårata, so the individual
self (kshetrin) illuminates all the body (kshetra)” [BhG XIII. 33],
and the like, which explain the individual self and its knowledge
through their similarity to a jewel, the sun and a lump and their light,
make us understand that knowledge and the self are similar in being
self-luminous. And no undesirable conclusion is not brought about.
[Tattvaratnåkara]
The inferences to prove [knowledge] to be cognized (vedya) etc.
because of its being expressed (vyvahåryatva), its being an entity (vastutva),
its being an object of valid knowledge (prameyatva), its being action (kriyåtva)etc. are rejected. The reasons are: [if ‘to be cognized’ means ‘to be cognizedby another knowledge’], there is competent non-apprehension960(yogyånupalambha) [as to such knowledge]; [if it means ‘to be cognized in
957

Because its månasapratyaksha has been already refuted, says R. If
so, the refutation of månasapratyaksha in the Tattvaratnåkara (quoted in
410,3ff.) is preceding to this portion.

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general’], [these inference would] prove what has been already proved [inview of knowledge of God]; [‘to be action’] is not established [in thesubject, which we regard as not action but quality of the self] etc.
[Nevertheless], the establishment of [knowledge] not being an object ofknowledge is justified. Because being temporarily an object of knowledge961
exists even in knowledge as an unknown pot and the like are existent. And
because the objection that [knowledge cannot grasp itself as] a tip of afinger [cannot touch itself 962] is rejected [410] since we do not accept being
an object etc.963
The fear964 that if [knowledge] were self-luminous, [knowledge andits known object] have no distinction because [the two] are always
apprehended simultaneously (sahopalambhaniyama), is also completely
destroyed. For the inference is defective; because the probandum (sådhya)[‘having no distinction’] is sublated (avaruddha) by contradictory perception,[which distinguishes knowledge from its object, in the form ‘I know it’];[the reason] is contradicted [as simultaneousness presupposes distinction];
because [the inference] is purposeless, etc.965
Furthermore, it is stated in the summary of refuting mental perception(månasapratyaksha) as follows:958

svena jyotishå ''ste [for pravapiti in B®hUp].
959
Because another knowledge is not necessary (R).
960
See Vedåntaparibhåshå VI. 4–8 (Adyar ed.).
961
kadåciddh¥karmatvam. Though R comments the reading°adh¥karma-, he regards °dh¥karma- as better.
962
Cf. aµgulyagraµ yathåtmånaµ nåtmanå sprash†um arhati /svåµßena jñånam apy evaµ nåtmanå jñåtum arhati // [Prakaraˆapañcikå
(Benares ed.): 187,4f. etc.], which is a fragment of Kumårila's B®hat†¥kå.
See Mesquita 1990: 66, Anm.118.
963
Because we do accept in itself neither svakarmatva in the sense ofbeing its own object, though different from itself, nor svakart®tva in thesense of being its own substratum, though different from itself (K). According
to V, ‘different form itself,’ which is not mentioned in the text, is automaticallyattained because it is accepted that one thing become its own object [i.e. we265*Because there is competent non-apprehension [of mental perception],
because [knowledge] can [be manifest] be itself, because there would
be infinite regress [if another knowledge were accepted] — aresublating reasons. And because the [above-mentioned] two reasonscannot prove the probandum due to its non-establishment (asiddhi)
and deviation (vyabhicåra).966 Because of these non-proof andsublation, knowledge cannot be within the scope of mental[perception]. Thus, [knowledge] is self-manifest and this is the way
to establish knowledge.967 [Tattvaratnåkara]
Immediately after refuting [the Advaita opinion that] the [scriptural]
passages have an undifferentiated sense (akhaˆ∂årthavåkya), the author,
based on the refutation of manifestness (pråka†ya) and mental perception,teaches the reasons again [411]. There the two reasons are being momentary
specific quality (vißeshaguˆa) of the self etc. [i.e. being specific quality ofthe self compatible (yogyåtmavißeshaguˆa) to the mind]. On this point it isstated that momentariness etc. [i.e. compatibility to the mind968] are nonestablished, [according to us, in knowledge] and also that [the first reason]
is of deviation (anaikåntika) in view of merits born out of expiatory rites(pråyaßcitta), [which are momentarily destroyed after destroying sin but are
not apprehended with the mind]. Consider, in the way, also [deviation of
the two reasons] in view of volition proceeding from [mere] living(j¥vanapËrvaka) as is assumed in the other schools.
By the way, Varadavishˆumißra says:*Happiness and pain are aspects of knowledge [?],and immediately after this, he says that:*Desire, dislike and volition are perceived with the mind [?].
can accept the two if same as itself] (fn.1).
964This is an objection of the Yogacåra Buddhist. Cf. ÓS 43ff.
965
Cf. 11,3ff, where the Vaibhåshika Buddhist theory that there is nodharmin is refuted.
966Paråßara's discussion on this point will be explained immediately
after that.

266This is, no doubt, based on the assumption that qualities different [fromhappiness and pain] such as desire exist [in knowledge]; or rather, it isbased on the opinion of the other [schools].969 And there is no difference
between happiness and pain and desire etc. in being an aspect of knowledge.
(109) Happiness or pain must not be the mutual non-existence of the other.
For [if they were so], [apprehension of happiness and that of pain] are inmutual-dependence [because apprehension of non-existence needs that ofits correlative]; it is sublated by knowledge [which grasps the two as positive];and neutral condition is apprehended.970 [412]And this [knowledge], which differs from person to person, can grasp
everything by nature. Nevertheless, it is contracted due to karma at thecondition of transmigration and, in degree971 (tåratamya) in accordance with
their each karma, expands depending upon sense-organs. For this very
reason, their each object is regulated and it is spoken of differently, owing
to difference in its expansion, as rising and setting. So is stated in the[Ír¥-]Bhåshya:*Depending upon the above-mentioned expansion of knowledge
through sense-organs, [knowledge] is referred to as rising and setting[Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: (1) 160,5].
For this [teaching], to the objection that [knowledge] never depends onsense-organs because it is eternal, our answer has been already given.
Now
weconsiderwhether
continuous
understanding(dhåravåhikavijñåna) is of one single form (ekarËpa) like the sunbeam
coming up without any gap, or of the form of series (santatirËpa) like[flame of] a lamp, [each one of which is momentary972 but] is made continuous
owing to [successive] combination of oil and a wick.
967

Here the word saµvitsiddhi does not denotes the work of Yåmuna.
If it did so, missing portion of the work [e.g. its fragments collected in
Mesquita 1988: 195] might be referred to here.
968
Accordning to R. According to K, ådi denotes guˆatva.
969
This suggests that Deßika himself did not know the whole context

267

On this point, Varada-Nåråyaˆa bha††åraka supports the first view.
That is to say, it is stated in his Prajñåparitråˆa, in connection with [thediscussion that] memory is not valid means of knowledge,973 that:*Continuous understanding is a series of successive knowledge, [where
each momentary knowledge severally] manifests an object as being
in its own time, in the form, [say], ‘a pillar is [now]’ [and at the next
moment] ‘a pillar is [now]’ [and] ‘a pillar is [now]’ [at the next]; andit is valid apprehension (pramå) because there is something different
from cloud [or something revealing unknown things] and it isindependent974 — this is the opinion [of the others].
In our opinion, [however], continuous understanding is but one
knowledge.
Indeed, eternal knowledge is produced due to the destruction etc. ofa part obstructing [the expansion of knowledge; accordingly, senseorgans etc. are helpful only when the obstruction is destroyed but notwhen eternal knowledge is produced975]. [413] If there is no obstruction
for a long time, [the knowledge] manifests [an object] for a longtime. But the knowledge lasting for a long time as to an object is not
the above-mentioned continuous [series of knowledge]. Because
knowledge of God as is based on the Scripture976 would not be accepted.
It is eternal; therefore, knowledge of everyone is also eternal becauseof the text.
970
Cf. TMK V. 74.
971
Cf. ViP VI. vii. 63.
972
See 110,3–112,1.
973
This view is quoted and refuted in NyP 290,15ff. Deßika is of
opinion that sm®ti is included in pramåˆa. See Singh 1958: 274f. and Vedavalli
1984: 172–75.
974
It can grasp something unknown and is not dependent upon original
knowledge as in the cacse of memory (R, K). Cf. the fragment of the
Prajñåpritråˆa[NyP
290,16]:
jñåtåtmajñånasvarËpatvåt
svaprameyaprahåˆata˙ / vishayåvyabhicåratve 'py apråmåˆyaµ sm®ter
matam //.
975
According to R and K.

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of the Scripture977 [Prajñåparitråˆa],and so forth.
Bha††a-Paråßara-påda says in refuting [the Advaita view that]perception grasps pure-existence (sanmåtra):*Because it is accepted that [knowledge] continues so long as its
connection to the organs (karaˆa) even if it is contracted[Tattvaratnåkara].
Even in this view, it should be accepted that when the conjunction
with sense-organs are momentary, knowledge is also momentary.
But some [is of] the second opinion, because the sm®ti,978 the[Ír¥-]Bhåshya979 etc. show that knowledge is momentary and that meditation
is in the form of a series. [414]Classification of this [knowledge], which is by nature directly
experienced by itself (svata˙pratyakshasvabhåva), into perceptional one(pratyaksha), inferential one (anumiti) etc. or seeing, hearing, thinking etc.
is also conditioned by varieties of its instrument (karaˆa). Even when it
expands towards all directions, [knowledge keeps] its nature of manifesting
itself directly.
Because [knowledge] is excessively fast and excessively subtle,980 [itcan be] all at once related to things far off and nothing prevents it. And thisrelation is characterized as conjunction (saµyoga). So is said in the[Ír¥-]Bhåshya etc. Because it clearly states:*The relation is characterized as conjunction; and knowledge is nothing
but substance [Ír¥Bh II. ii. 27: 303,11],and so on.
976ågamådikam. Here other pramåˆas are also indicated, according
toR. R reports the reading ågmåtigam also. In this case, the translation is:“For non-eternal knowlege of God, which is contradictory to the Scriptures,is not acepted.”
977
I.e. B®hUp IV. iii. 23.

269

There may be following objections—[1]

What proves the eternality of knowledge?

[2] If [it] were so [eternal], how are its varieties such as waking state andsleeping state established?
[3]

What proves its expansion?

[4]

Why can knowledge, quality (guˆa) of the self, be substance?

[5]

What proves that it is substance?

[6] How can this [knowledge], being dharma of the self, go out from its
substratum?
[7] How can [knowledge], not having any increase and decrease, be
associated with another size?
[8]

How is [its] conjunction to past or future things possible?

[9]

How [is its conjunction] to quality etc. [possible]?

[10] Why doesn't [knowledge] manifest intermediate things to which it
relates?
[11] Why can knowledge of the liberated self have conjunction tonumberless spots at once or gradually?
[12] Why does [the liberated self] floating in the moonlight of his own
pervasive knowledge — whose conjunction to various parts of knowledge
is, like a spider clinging to a net of threads of its own saliva, dependent
upon [its own] moving — [415] have innate relation to its own knowledge
excluding another knowledge981?
978I.e. ViP VI. vii. 97.
979
I.e. Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: kshaˆabhaµginyå˙ saµvida˙ … [(1) 145,8].
980
Cf. the fragment of the Nyåyatattva quoted in 399.

270

[1] Among them, to the first [question], our answer is: it is the Scriptures.
For example,*There is no cessation of the knowledge of a knower. There is no
cessation of the seeing of a seer. Because [both are] imperishable[B®hUp IV. iii. 23],
etc. And this is commented in the Ótmasiddhi:*Teaching that because a knower is imperishable [his] knowledge isalso imperishable, this ßruti shows that knowledge is caused by the
essential nature of a knower. [ÓS 84,12f.]
In this regard, it is stated also in sm®tis:*As by washing the dirt of a jewel, no brilliance [of it] is produced[anew]; so by the cessation of the ignorance, no knowledge is produced[anew] for the self.
As by digging a well, neither space nor water is produced [anew]; soonly an existent is made to become manifest — how can a non-existent
be produced?
Similarly, by the destruction of evil qualities [auspicious] qualities
such as intelligence are manifest, but not produced [anew]; because
those of the self are eternal982 [Vishˆudharma 104. 55–57],
etc. Moreover, the [Brahma-]sËtra says:*For the same reason, [the self] is but the knower (jña) [BrSË II. iii.
19];
again,*There is no defect [in that knowledge denotes the self], also983 because[knowledge] lasts as long as the self exists; for such [usage] is seen[in our daily life] [BrSË II. iii. 30].
981

When knowledge A moves or not is in accordance with whether
the individual self B moves or not, A belongs to B. But, in fact, even if theself moves, it is united with another part of its own pervasive knowledge; itcannot make its own knowledge move. Therefore, particular relation
excluding others is hardly attained (R).

271

[2] To the second [question, our answer is]: it is an obstructing tamas.
As fire, which can burn [something], cannot burn [anything] in the presenceof [a particular kind of] jewel and the like984 but it burns independent of any
other causes985; so [various conditions of knowledge] such as waking state
are established owing to the presence or absence of a particular tamas. So is
said [in the BrahmasËtra]:*Because, however, [knowledge, which is] existent [even in sleeping
state], can become manifest [in waking state], as in the case ofmasculinity (puµstva) etc., [which are existent but not manifest inchildren]. [BrSË II. iii. 31].
Hence, it is easily understood that knowledge, the expansion of which
is limited to waking state and the like, is manifest only when it manifests
an object, but not at other occasions.
However, Ír¥råmamißra says in his ›adårthasaµkshepa as follows:*Of course, [knowledge] is self-established. It is not non-manifest
even in deep sleep. For [at that time] it illuminates itself only for its
substratum [i.e. the self] — This is peculiarity [for the knowledge],986
as we will explain in proper occasion. [416] And it is because [its]instruments always rest that there is no verbal expression [at thattime]. [›adårthasaµkshepa]
The same content is stated also in [his] Vivaraˆa. — This should be regarded
as an arrogant speech987 (vaibhava). For otherwise it would be contradictory
to the [Brahma-]sËtra that:*Because, however, [knowledge, which is] existent [even in sleeping
982

Also quted in Ír¥Bh IV. iv. 3 and ÓS 85.
According to Råmånuja, ‘also (ca)’ indicates the other reason thatboth knowledge and the self are self-luminous.
984
E.g. a particular mantra. Cf. Månameyodaya II. (4) 45.
985
This is a well-known example to teach potency (ßakti). E.g., see
NyBo §2.
986
This answers to the objection that knowledge would be nirvißesha
at that time. R refers to the passage of ÍP: dharmeˆa dharm¥ savißesha˙,
983

272

state], can become manifest [in waking state], as in the case ofmasculinity (puµstva) etc., [which are existent but not manifest inchildren] [BrSË II. iii. 31],
and the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya thereon. It is no wonder even if knowledge, which
can manifest all objects, is devoid of an inner object as it is devoid of all
external objects.
And there is not any contradiction in the statement of the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya
that:*Likewise, as you know,988 the reflection of a person risen up fromdeep sleep is: ‘I slept well.’ This very reflection makes us understandthat even at that time989 [of deep sleep] the self, which is the ‘I’(ahamartha), has happiness and knower-ness [Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: (1) 167,2f.].
Because such [description as ‘having happiness’ and ‘having knower-ness’is done] with the intention of showing that the essential nature [of the self]
is favorable and that [it] is inwards990 (pratyak) [respectively].991[3] To the third [question], Bhagavat-Yåmuna-muni answers.992 For
example, he says:*Accordingly,993 consciousness (caitanya) also goes out with the senseorgans and comes in contact with each object; as the faculty of touch[comes in contact with its object] with the hands etc. [ÓS 76,6f.],
dharmiˆå ca dharma˙ savißesha˙ [114,14].
987
To show the greatness of a disputer who is capable of arguingeven in the standpoint of opponents.
988
hi˙ prasiddhaµ parair apy udåh®tatvaµ ca dyotayati [TÈ 215,15f.].
989
tadån¥m eva. The original text of Ír¥Bh reads: tadån¥m api.
990
Cf. svasmai bhåsamånaµ pratyak [NySi 38,3].
991
Cf.
TÈ
215,17–20:
nåtra
vishayånubhavasukhaµdharmabhËtadh¥prasaratvaµcavivakshitam;sushuptivyåghåtåt,“puµstvådivat” [BrSË II. iii. 31] iti sËtravirodhåt, pËrvåparabhåshyai˙pratikshptatvåc ca / ata˙ svasyaivånukËlatayå svenaiva prakåßamånatvetåtparyam / yad dhi yasyånukËlatayå bhåti, sa tena sukh¥ti vyavahriyate;yasya yena yad bhåti sa tena tasya jñåteti ca.
992This portion of ÓS is closely examined in Narasimhachari 199–204.

273

and so on. After that, having raised the question that:*If you argue that [the knowledge], being formless (amËrta), cannot
have any activity like ether [ÓS 77,18f.],
he rejects it in the portion beginning with:*What is ‘form (mËrta),’ by which activity would be incapable, then?
[ÓS 77,18],994
and, as well, explains the way of [its] relation to things not immediately
connected995 or remote things.996 Then, he says:*As is stated by Bhagavat:“This [mind] carries away his intelligence (prajñå), as wind [carriesaway] a ship on water” [BhG II. 67].
And Manu says:“Among operating sense-organs, if one sense-organ goes astray, his
intelligence goes astray through it; as water from a leather” [Manusm®ti
II. 99][ÓS 78,21–79,3].
And in this regard, there is the ßruti also:*And the ancient intelligence went out through it [ÍveUp IV. 18].
[Obj.] The import of the ßruti is different from that of the sm®tis.997[Ans.] [We cite it] because the content naturally understood [fromthem, i.e. that knowledge goes out], is not sublated. This [difference] belongs
only to the portion sublated.

993

ata˙. The reading in the UVG edition of the Siddhitraya, i.e. atha,must be a misprint.
994
Up to 78,6.
995
Judging from the content of ÓS, vyavahita here is concerned withat¥ta-anågata and asat.
996
See ÓS 78,8–14 (examined in NySi 420,8–421,5: the answer tothe eighth question).
997
I.e., ÍveUp VI. 18 teaches the Highest Self is the cause of awaking

274[4] To the fourth [question], we illustrate it with light (prabhå) and [itssubstrata such as a lamp]. For instance, it is stated in the {Ír¥-]Bhåshya:*It is not contradictory that knowledge, being quality of the self, issubstance; as the substance called light, being quality of a lamp.
[Ír¥Bh II. ii. 27: 303,11f.]
And what should be explained as to light has been already stated [by us998]
and it had been examined in the {Ír¥-]Bhåshya.999
By the way, it is unavoidable for those who assert a whole [as different
from its constituents] (avayavin) to accept that substance resorting to some[substance] is, at the same time, resorted to by other [substance], [e.g. a pot
resorting to the earth is the substratum of a half-pot (kapåla)].
Moreover, to begin with, we do not accept the restriction, held by the
Vaißeshika school and others, that quality is non-substance1000 as [we do not
accept the restriction that] a qualifier (vißeshaˆa) [is non-substance]. [417]For the definition of quality is: that which is resorted to some [entity]
in nature is quality of the latter.
And [the word ‘quality’] is never technical one (påribhåshika) [as isheld by the Nyåya-Vaißeshika school], because it would be contradictory to
our ordinary usage.1001
Thus, there is some divisions among qualities, namely, substantive
qualities (dravyåtmakaguˆa) and pure qualities (kevalaguˆa). These former
are knowledge etc.; these latter are sattva, rajas, tamas and so forth. We
will explain them later.
for the individual selves, whereas the quoted passages of BhG and theManusm®ti teach that uncontrolled sense-organs destroy knowledge (R).
998
See NySi 112,2ff.
999
I. i. 1: (1) 150–53.
1000
Cf. the defnition of guˆa in the Tarkad¥pikå: dravyakarmabhinnatve
sati såmånyavån guˆa˙ [§4].
1001
Because even dåt®tva and the like are called guˆa (R, K).

275

In this regard, [some hold1002 that] the word ‘quality’ used for sattva
and the like is of primary meaning (mukhya) but [the same word] used forknowledge and the like is of figurative meaning1003 (gauˆa). To the passageof the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya that:*But1004 [the practical usage of ‘quality’] for this [light is because this(fire) is always its substratum and light is (always) subsidiary to that(fire)1005] [Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: (1) 150,6],
this opinion is stated in the Vivaraˆa also, that is,*[Light] is metaphorically called ‘quality’ by force of [the fact that]
it is always dependent [upon fire] [Vivaraˆa].
In this opinion, there is no room for [the fourth] question because[knowledge] is not accepted to be quality [in primary sense].
Others, however, do not accept the assumption that [the word ‘quality’used for knowledge] is figurative for the reason that it can be primary
because the criterion (prav®ttinimitta) [of this word] is but the abovementioned [definition]. Now, the passage of the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya [quoted above]
that:*But … for this [Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: (1) 150,6],
etc. is commonly [natural] (sådhåraˆa) [for both opinion, namely, the opinion
that the ‘quality’ for knowledge is primary and the opinion that it is figurative].
The passage of the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya [quoted above] that:*… the substance called light [Ír¥Bh II. ii. 27: 303,11f.],
etc. and the passage of the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya] that:1002

R suggests to supplement kecit after tatra and iti vadanti after thequotation of the Vivaraˆa.
1003
Judging from his way to comment (sattvådishu
guˆaßabdasyetyasyånantaraµ vyapadeßa iti ßesha˙), the text used by R may
read mukhya˙ for mukhyatvam and gauˆa˙ for gauˆatvam.
1004
NySi reads ca for tu; but the latter reading is supported by ÍP aswell as TÈ.
1005
asyås
tu
guˆatvavyavahåro
nityatadåßrayatvataccheshatvanibandhana˙.

276*True light is quality of substance possessing the light, but [it is] …
not quality like whiteness and the like1006 [Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: (1) 150,4],
etc. [418] are natural for the opinion that [the ‘quality’] is primary. It is
stated in the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya by denying that sattva etc. are substances that:*And sattva etc. are well-known to be but qualities [Ír¥Bh II. ii. 1:
280,1].
This passage is also [natural for the same opinion]. For [the import here isthat] nobody accepts [them] to be substances because it is natural for thedetermination [by the word ‘but (eva)’].1007
As [in the opinion that knowledge is but substance and the usage of‘quality’ for it is figurative], there is no room for the [fourth] question also
in the opinion of Varadanåråyaˆa-bha††åraka.1008 Because, [according to his
opinion, knowledge is but quality and] the word ‘substance’ for knowledge
is figurative.
This quality (guˆa) [defined as “that which is resorted to some entity
in nature”] is optionally regarded as even genus (jåti), quality (guˆa), action(kriyå) and substance due to another intention of someone.
For instance,1009 that specific dharma which is essential (antaraµga)
to many dharmins is genus — when in an entity expressed (nirËpita) by acertain [dharma] the expectation of particularity (vißeshåkaµkshå) is mostly
satisfied, this [dharma] is called ‘essential’; [that specific dharma which is]1006

Cf. ßauklyådivad iti / adravyatvalakshaˆaµ guˆatvaµ må bhËt,åßritasvabhåvatvaµ tad ast¥ti bhåva˙ [TÈ 199].
1007
Here ends the opinion that knowledge is both substance and quality
and that the usage of ‘quality’ for knowledge is primary (R).
1008
See the fragment of the Prajñåparitråˆa quoted in 431,10ff. Such
opinion is not seen in his Nyåyasudarßana as far as its published portion isconcerned.
1009
Here our author paraphrases ‘the most subtle (sthavish†a) — which,according to R, implies that they are not acceptable — definition’ of the
Tattvaratnåkara cited below in 541,8–10.

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established [as] particularizing the [entity] animated1010 (anupråˆita) by this[genus] is quality (guˆa); [that specific dharma which is] to be establishedof this kind is action; that which is qualified by these [three] is substance.
In this way, words express genus, quality, action and substance.
The word guˆa [used] for this [‘quality’ defined as “dharma establishedas particularizing an entity animated by the genus” is based on its being] a
sub-division [of quality in general defined as “that which is resorted tosome entity in nature”]1011; as the word våda is used for [talk] in general aswell as specific [discussion1012].
And one entity can be optionally regarded [not only as one but also]
as two, three or four of these [genus etc. which are defined in this way][419]. For example, knowledge (jñåna) is substance as it is the substratumof conjunction etc.; the same is quality as it particularizes the essential
nature of the self which is expressed as inwards; [and it is] action in thedescription ‘He knows’ etc. Other cases also should be examined in thisway.
By the way, [grammarians] assert that substance is existence andnon-substance is non-existence.1013 Their intention is that all qualities areincluded in [the term] substance. So there is no use of [discussing] suchtrivial matter.
1010

Here ‘animated (anupråˆita) by this’ means ‘the particularizing
expectancy (vißeshåkaµkshå) is satisfied by this genus (R).
1011
According to the paraphrase of R.
1012
Cf. så [=kathå] dvividhå v¥tarågakathå vigig¥shukathå ceti / pËrvo
våda iti såmånyaßabdenaiva vißeshato 'pi nirdißyate [NyP 131,7–9]; nanuvådaßabdasya kathåsåmånyavåcitvåt tena kathaµ vißeshåbhidhånam ity ata
åha — såmånyaßabdenaiveti / tathå ca vådaßabdo 'yam anekårtha itinånupapattir iti bhåva˙ [Ír¥nivåsa's commentary ad loc., ed. ChSS, p.135].
The definition of våda in the Nyåyatattva is: parasya svopadeßanyåyena
nißcitårtho vyavahåro våda˙ [NyP 131,10]. Cf. NyåyasËtra II. i. 1.
1013
sattvaµ dravyam asattvam adravyam. Also quoted in SAS V. 5.
Cf. Kåßikå ad Påˆini I. 4. 57: sattvam iti dravyam.

278[5] To the fifth [question], we answer — Knowledge is substance, because
it has expansion and other [conditions], like a thing which everyone accepts
so; to the same probandum, because it is knowledge, like the self, and soon. Varadavishˆu-mißra states as follows:*Knowledge is substance; because it is the cause of latent impression(bhåvanå), while different from the unseen power; like the self [?].

[6] To the sixth [question], our answer has been already given in the
fourth [if it means that knowledge cannot exist out of its substratum]. If itmeans that [knowledge would] leave aside its own substratum, [our answer
is]: we never accept so. For the Venerable sage Yåmuna [rejects] the same
objection:*[Not so] because we do not accept that [knowledge] leave aside theself. Not leaving aside the self, consciousness goes out1014 throughsense-organs etc. And it is stated in [our] ßåstra1015 that this[consciousness, if it were once] separated [from the self], could notjoin again. [ÓS 79,5–7][7] The seventh [question] is set aside by the illustration of the coil of asnake.1016 And mere [being associated with another size] would not bringabout increase and decrease. Because it is unavoidable only in the case ofthings having separable parts [420].
Or rather, let [knowledge] have increase etc. Even in this case, itcannot be seen so nor touched; because it is beyond sense-organs and1014

ni˙sarati. The texts of ÓS read nißcalati.
1015
I.e. the Nyåyatattva (R). Yåmuna often refers to the work as ßåstra[Narasimhachari 1971: 7].
1016
Cf. BrSË III. ii. 26: ahikuˆ∂alavat.

279

because it is devoid of touch etc. And there is not the restriction, [as in thecase of cotton], that something increasing always comes to have some
gaps; because it is in nature capable of having conjunction with all directions
without any gap.
[Obj.] Why can this [knowledge] be filled in a small space?
[Ans.] Because it is not obstructed due to its being devoid of touch.
And that it is said in the Nyåyatattva to be excessively subtle.1017
Some [i.e. the Naiyåyikas etc.] hold that one substance cannot havevarious size even if there is difference in time [because, according to them,when size changes another whole (avayavin) is produced anew]. But this isrejected by the above-mentioned [discussion]. Because it is difference intime that removes the contradiction [in size] and because a whole [as different
from its constituents] (avayavin) does not exist.
[Obj.] If it were the case, the objection in the [Brahma-]sËtra that:*And because the final [size of the liberated self] endures [and]because both [the self and its size at that stage] are eternal; hence,[the size is innate for the self and, consequently], [the previous size]
cannot be different [from this size1018] [BrSË II. ii. 34],
which is to refute the Jainists (digambara) who hold that the self takes
various sizes in accordance with the body, could be applied to [your opinion]
also.
[Ans.] Not so. Because the intention in this [sËtra] is rejecting thecontent which is merely based on reasoning etc.

1017

See the fragment quoted in NySi 399f.
This translation follows the paraphrase of Ír¥Bh, but that of VD¥paor VSåra seems to be easier to understand. According to it, the translation
is: “And the final [size of the liberated self] endures, [accordingly, the size
is innate for the self]. Therefore, both [the self and its size at that stage] areeternal. Hence [the previous size] cannot be different [from this size]”.
1018

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[8] To the eighth [question], our answer has been already given in theÓtmasiddhi. That is, having raised the objection that:*How can consciousness have conjunction with things in the pastand future which are not existent [now]? [ÓS 78,8], [421]
the author rejects it with the following counter-replies — [according to theNaiyåyikas], there is subject-object relation (vishayavishayibhåva) [evenconcerning things in the past and future]; [according to the Bhå††as], there
is manifestness (pråka†ya) [even in things in the past and future]; [eventhings in the past and future] are associated with [the notion of] number
etc.1019; [according to our established theory], the knowledge [of a person inthis cosmic-egg] has quickly conjunction with [things] existing in vastly
remote regions [such as another cosmic-egg].1020 Furthermore, saying that:*Both [things in the past and those in future] exist even now as ofpast and future. So nothing is untenable1021 if they come to contact
with knowledge in these modes [ÓS 78,9f.],
he justifies the probability of the conjunction because this substance isexistent. The meaning is as follows. Some [i.e. the Bhå††as1022] explain that
because [a thing] in past and future, which is not existent now [as anindividual (vyakti)], is present even now as genus, it can be the substratumof manifestness. Likewise because [it] is present also as that substance[which is the substratum of past condition (avasthå) etc.],1023 conjunction is
also possible.
[Obj.] There is not conjunction with [things] qualified [by these1019

See ÓS 78,8f.: kathaµ vå vishayabhåva˙, prakåßamånatvam,
saµkhyådiyogo vå? tayor yas tatra nirvåha˙ sa evåtråstu.
1020
See ÓS 78,11f: yathå dav¥yasi deße satå dhruva-ßißumårådinå d®ktu sannik®shyate, tathå dav¥yasi kåle satå kalpådyantavartinå
svayaµbhuvådinå.
1021
nånupapatti˙. ÓS reads kå for na.
1022
According to Mesquita, it is the opinion of Sucaritamißra [1990:
90].
1023
According to the Vißish†ådvaita, dravya as the substratum of various
avasthås is eternal and only avasthås on it are chaging (R).

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conditions].
[Ans.] The situation is same [for the Bhå††as] because these [objects]
are not manifested in particular mode.

[9] To the ninth [question], we answer, we do not accept so. That is, therelation [of knowledge] with quality and the like is not conjunction but‘being in that which is in conjunction1024’ (saµyoginish†hatå). It is like, say,inherence in that which is in conjunction (samyuktasamavåya) in [the theoryof] other [schools]. The statement that:*The relation is characterized as conjunction [Ír¥Bh II. ii. 27: 303,11],and the like import that conjunction is prerequisite [for knowledge]. And it
is stated by Ír¥råmamißra in his ›a∂arthasaµkshepa:*As to those which are fit for this [conjunction], conjunction brings
about [their] object-ness (vishayatå) [422]. As to those which are notfit [for conjunction], [conjunction] with those which are related tothem [brings about their object-ness] [›a∂arthasaµkshepa].
This means — As to entities which are fit for conjunction, conjunction
manifests [these] substances qualified with presentness and the like. As to[entities] which are not fit for conjunction, e.g. [qualities] such as color,
however, it is each probable conjunction with substrata, causes or effects
which are related to them that manifests them.
By the way, it is stated in the Ótmasiddhi that:*Conjunction (saµyoga) is synonymous with nairantarya (being
without any gap) and is but excessive proximity. This very
[conjunction] is, in the Vaißeshikas, categorized as inherence(samavåya) when it resorts in an dependent [entity].1025 Accordingly,
1024

Cf. vishyendriyasambandhaß ca — dravyeshu saµyoga˙,dravyåßriteshu rËpådishu tu saµyuktåßrayaˆam [NyP 74,4f.]. See also theverse of the Tattvaratnåkara cited in NyP 74,6 and NySi 76,5.
1025
I.e. samavåya is but saµyoga between two inseparable (ayutasiddha)
entities, an independent one and a dependent one (R).

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an alternative based on the assumption1026 that [inherence] is different[from conjunction]1027 is impossible [ÓS 82,9f.].
This also imports that there is not another relation than [conjunction] because,in our opinion, inherence accepted by other [schools] are not accepted and[inherence is] nothing but a variety of [conjunction] itself; but not that therelation between quality and what has quality (guˆin) is [also] characterizedwith conjunction. Should one say ‘quality and what has quality are in
conjunction,’ this usage should be metaphorical — In order to teach this,the author says “synonymous with nairantarya.” The usage ‘in conjunction’is merely based on the fact that there is no gap [between the two]. It is
stated that this much is categorized by the Vaißeshikas as another entity[i.e. inherence] by means of fallacious reasoning. Otherwise, [that is], if
quality had conjunction, it also would be substance because [having
conjunction] is the definition of substance. Even if we propose that thedefinition of substance should be being associated with conditions (avasthå),it is unavoidable that qualities would be substances because they are associatedwith the condition, namely, the conjunction with knowledge. And it cannot
be said that there must not be the classification into substance and nonsubstance. Because the author of the commentaries himself justifies thatsattva, rajas and tamas are non-substances.1028 Thus, this should be interpreted
in the way we have explained. Or rather, this is to be regarded as inaccordance with the opinion of those who accept nairantarya only and do
not accept even conjunction1029 [423]. 1030
1026

urar¥k®tya. Viraraghavachari's ed. of ÓS reads Ër¥k®tya and adds
the reading of NySi in parenthesis.
1027
I.e. Which is the relation between knowledge and an object,
conjunction or inherence? If the former, knowledge could not be related toqualities. If the latter, it could not be related to substances (R).
1028
See Ír¥Bh II. ii. 1: sattvådayo dravyadharmå˙, na tu dravyasvarËpam
[279,16]. Cf. the passage of Ír¥Bh II. ii. 1 quoted in NySi 418,2.
1029
Cf. NySi 25,1–2.
1030
In other words, this is not the opinion of Yåmuna himself (R).

283

[10] The tenth [question] is illustrated with ocular beam, [which spreads
all over the world but cannot grasp intermediate space, an atom, ether etc.
though it has conjunction with them].
[Obj.] In this case [of ocular beam], capability [of an object for sight]
decides [whether it can be grasped or not; accordingly, ocular beam cannot
be the illustration].
[Ans.] Not so. Because so [capability of an object for knowledge
decides whether it can be grasped or not] in the case [of knowledge].
[Obj.] If conjunction with knowledge exists, the capability other [thanthe conjunction] is purposeless.
[Ans.] We can even say — if conjunction with sense-organs exists[in the case of ocular beam], [the capability] other [than the conjunction]
would be purposeless.
[Obj.] If a certain entity is incapable for [one] knowledge, it would
never be manifested by any [other] knowledge.
[Ans.] Not so. Because the same situation would be brought about
when [an entity] is incapable for [one of] the agents for knowledge(jñåpaka).1031[Obj.] One agent for knowledge can [grasp] only some [entities fit
for it] due to [its] own nature.
[Ans.] Then, so knowledge [can grasp] only some [entities fit for it].
[424]
[Obj.] It is the nature of sufficient condition (såmagr¥) [of knowledge],
we suppose, that restricts objects of each knowledge. Then, an extra relation
1031

E.g. if an object is incapable for a jñåpaka, say, a sense-organ, it
would be incapable for all jñåpakas (R).

284

[i.e. conjunction of knowledge] is needless.1032[Ans.] Not so. For this [sufficient condition] does not exist in thecase of the eternal knowledge of God. Accordingly, [if it were the case],
His knowledge would have no object; thereby, He would have no knowledge.
This would lead the undesirable conclusion that God does not exist.1033[Obj.] Such restriction exists so far as non-eternal knowledge isconcerned.
[Ans.] True. Nevertheless, [the conjunction] is allowable [by force of
the Scriptures]; as [the Vaißeshikas etc.] adopt [particular relations] such as
inherence in that which is in conjunction (saµyuktasamavåya) [merely byforce of the confidence on their system], though there is restriction in thenature of [sense-organs], [due to which] the eyes, for example, operate[only] in color by excluding taste etc. while they are not different [fromcolor] in being inherent in that which is in conjunction.1034 And it is statedin the Nyåyakulißa:*And conjunction [of knowledge with an object] is accepted by forceof the Scriptures teaching that [knowledge] spreads and [it] is pervasive[Nyåyakulißa IV: 74,21].
[Obj.] Mere [acceptance of] the capability would lead the undesirable
conclusion, say, that [the eyes] grasp even other [concealed] color. To
avoid it, we accept the particular relations [as well].
[Ans.] Then, we also adopt the relation [i.e. conjunction of knowledge]in order to avoid [the undesirable conclusion] that [knowledge] would always
manifest [things fit for it] if [their] capability alone [were accepted].
1032

I.e. when knowledge is produced with a sense-organ contactedwith an object, the knowledge has the object. So there is no use postulating
conjunction of knowledge (R).
1033
Because God must be omniscient (R).
1034
In other words, though the restriction in the nature of the eyes isenough to avoid the over-application that the eyes grasp even taste etc. (R).

285

[Obj.] The sufficient condition [for knowledge] alone [425] could
prevent [such] over-application in this case [of knowledge: that is, knowledge
manifests things fit for it only when its sufficient condition exists].
[Ans.] Not so. For even in that case [of concealed color etc.], similarly[the sufficient condition for grasping them could prevent such overapplication; accordingly, inherence in that which is in conjunction etc. areneedless].
[Obj.] The relation [i.e. inherence in that which is in conjunction] isalso included in the sufficient condition in this case [of the perception ofcolor].
[Ans.] Why cannot this [conjunction of knowledge] also be includedin that1035 [sufficient condition for the manifestation]? For the very sufficientcondition for this relation [i.e. inherence in that which is in conjunction]
can enable the restriction [which you assumed to be caused by] this [relation].
That is, [the restriction] that there is the relation only in that [object] is also
caused by the nature of the sufficient condition; [therefore, it is unnecessary
to postulate the relation in the middle].

[11] To the eleventh [question], our answer is: [due to its] excessive
speed, special potency or the will of God. And wonderful speed is acceptedin the light of the eyes, the sun etc. So believe that one which reaches theutmost [speed] covers everything immediately or in two or three moments.

[12] As to the twelfth [question], there is not any defect in that [knowledge]
belongs to [particular self] and is dependent upon [the self] in nature though[the self] moves [while the knowledge stands still]. For example, for one
who asserts that the [individual] self is all-pervasive [426], [though] the1035

UVG ed. reads tasyåpi tatra following R. The other editions readtatråpi tasya.

286

body, the sense-organ etc. [moves while their self does not, there is not any
defect in that they belong to the self]; for one who accept God, [though]those which are ruled by Him [moves while He does not, there is not any
defect]; [though] couples of a slave, a servant and the like [moves while
their master does not, there is not any defect in that they belong to themaster]; according to [those who assert a whole (avayavin) as different
from its constituents] such as the Vaißeshikas, [there is not any defectthough] between a whole [e.g. a tree] and its constituents [e.g. branches],
which cannot exist separately, [these latter] move and [the former] does notmoves1036; and in our opinion, [there is not any defect] though [the individualself] possessing the body moves in the pericardium1037 (pur¥tat) and other[places of the body1038] while the body [does not move].
Thus, for those who follow Upanishads, there is light (or wisdom)
against rainy cloud (or the collection of [such] defective [objections]).

Knowledge in itself forms happiness, pain, wish and volition inaccordance with the difference of adventitious condition. Because there isno valid means to understand something other than knowledge that [theVaißeshikas1039] regard as causing happiness and so on.
It is dependent upon its object that knowledge forms empirical1040
1036

You cannot say that a tree also moves with the limitation of its
branches, because its root does not move at all (R).
1037
Cf. B®hUp II. i. 19.
1038
See BrSË III. ii. 7.
1039
The Vaißeshikas has been regarded sukha, du˙kha, icchå, dvesha,
prayatna as different from buddhi since the sËtra [I. i. 5 (Candrånanda)]. As
far as present consciousness concerned, the first two are produced from theconjunction, conditioned by the contact of sense-organs with favarable orunfavarable things, between the self and the mind along with dharma or
adharma. The next two are produced from the conjunction between the self
and the mind along with sukha or du˙kha. [PDhS §§290ff.].
1040
The word is necessary since the innate happiness of dharmibhËtjñåna

287(vaishayika) happiness and pain; accordingly, the object can be also denotedby the word happiness or pain because there is no difference in being
favorable or unfavorable [427]. And it is explained in the topic on bhËma. 1041
So is stated in the Vedårthasaµgraha:*Knowledge is dependent upon its object; therefore, Brahman itself
is happiness as [the knowledge on it] is of happiness1042 [VAS §142:
171,2].
Volition does not exist in the condition of deep sleep because such is
not perceived. And [breathing] such as out-breath (apåna) is brought about
due to unseen power and so on. The other school [i.e. the Vaißeshikas] also
accept unseen power and so on as the cause of volition [proceeding frommere living (j¥vanapËrvaka)] in the case [of deep sleep]. Suppose it is[directly] for out-breath etc. So the reason ‘being motion’ etc. [which the
Vaißeshikas regard as] the valid means to postulate volition1043 in the middle[of the unseen power and breathing] can be established in other way. And
because in the topic beginning with [the BrahmasËtra that]:*[Obj.] ‘The inner [self]’ is concerned with that which has the aggregate
of material elements … [BrSË III. iii. 35],
it is stated in the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya that:*Because the inner self is not the agent of breathing in deep sleep[Ír¥Bh III. iii. 35: 503,16],and that:*Because it is not the agent of breathing etc. in deep sleep, faint andthe like [Ír¥Bh III. iii. 35: 503,20].
is not dependent upon its object (K).
1041BrSË I. iii. 7–8. E.g. “Because all that is experienced is of happiness,no misery is not seen” [Ír¥Bh I. iii. 7: 18,2] (R).
1042
Following the reading of VAS, read sukharËpatayå (adopted in
VDG ed., Pandit ed., Varanasi 1966 ed.) for sukharËpatåyå[˙] (adopted in
UVG ed., Madras 1934 ed.; based on the reading of R).
1043
E.g. suptasya pråˆåpånakriyå prayatnakåryå, pråˆåpånakriyåtvåt,jågrata˙ pråˆåpånakriyåvat [NyKan §224]; sushuptasya pråˆådikriyå
prayatnapËrvikå, tatkriyåtvåt, jågratas tatkriyåvat [Kir §175a].

288

Though [the self] is not an agent at [these occasions], some postulate [volition(prayatna)] as something other than agency (k®ti). But this is rejected because
prayatna and k®ti are well-known to be synonymous and because this iscomplicated.

[Obj.] Happiness and so on cannot be the qualities of the self. On thecontrary, they should be varieties of mental function (manov®tti). And theÓtmasiddhi supports it. That is, having begun with:*By the way, it has been explained that consciousness (citi) is accidental
quality for the reason that it is special quality of the self with theillustration of happiness and so on.1044 This is also done by one whodoes not understand what quality is. [ÓS 83,8f.],
the author states:*And happiness and pain are not qualities of the self. Because these
conditions are explained as the increase and decrease of the sense-organ[i.e. the mind].1045 And it will be propounded in the section explaining
what the last word1046 [of my introductory verse1047] means. Thus, theillustration is devoid of the reason. Also passion, dislike etc. arevarieties of mental function [428], but not direct qualities of the self.
For it is understood [in the following ßruti]:“Desire, determination,1048 doubt, faith, lack of faith, steadfastness,lack of steadfastness, shame, dh¥ and fear — all this is just mind”
1044

66,14].
1045

I.e. ågantukaµ jñånam, åtmavißeshaguˆatvåt, sukhådivat [ÓSCf. ÓS 56,2: indriyapaushkalyanåßayor eva sukhadu˙khatvåt.
1046
Following ÓS, read pada for påda.
1047
I.e.
svata˙sukh¥
in
v.
3
of
ÓS
[10,4f]:dehendriyamana˙pråˆadh¥bhyo 'nyao 'nanyasådhana˙ / nityo vyåp¥pratikshetram åtmå bhinna˙ svata˙sukh¥ //. The portion of ÓS dealing withthe word is not extant.
1048
According to the Raµgaråmånuja's commentary on B®hUp,
saµkalpa here means adhyavasåya.

289[B®hUp I. v. 3].
And says the [Bhagavad-]g¥tå… [ÓS 83,12–84,3].
Thus quoting the [Bhagavad-]g¥tå that:*[…], wish, dislike, happiness,1049 pain and a combination supporting
spirituality1050 — thus kshetra [has been] briefly [illustrated alongwith its modifications] [BhG XIII. 6], 1051
he explains the definition of body for it.1052 Again, having raised the question
why the word dh¥ is read along with [the words desire etc. in the ßruti]:*What is dh¥ here? [ÓS 84,10],
he says:*It means conjecture (utpreksha), not imports consciousness (jñapti).
Because this [consciousness] is taught in the same ßruti to be innate.
That is, it is taught that:“There is no cessation of the knowledge of a knower.” [B®hUp IV.
iii. 23][ÓS 84,10–12],
and so on. Likewise, on the [Brahma-]sËtra that:1049

UVG ed. omits sukham (!).
1050
While Íaµkara reads cetanå and dh®ti˙, Råmånuja reads cetanaådh®ti˙ in a compound form and interprets it as cetanasyâdh®ty ådhåra˙.
But ÓS reads cetanå-dh®ti˙: cetanayå dhriyamåˆa˙ saµghåto hi deha˙ [84,5].
In this regard, see V's fn.2 and also Viraraghavacharya's note in his editionof GBh with TC [p.429, fn.1].
1051
UVG ed. and Madras (1934) ed. read: g¥yate ca “icchå dvesha˙sukhaµ [om. in UVG ed.] du˙khaµ saµghåtaß cetanådh®ti˙ / etat kshetraµsamåsena” iti g¥tåµ codåh®tya. As is pointed out by V [fn.1], this may becorrupted because here ÓS runs: g¥yate ca “icchå dvesha˙ sukhaµ du˙kham”
iti / “cetanådh®ti˙” iti kshetralakshaˆam… etc. Also the reading of VDG
ed., Pandit ed. and Varanasi (1966) ed: g¥yate ca “icchå dvesha˙ sukhaµ
du˙khaµ saµghåtaß cetanådh®ti˙” iti kshetralakshaˆam [in brackets (VDG);
Pandit ed. adds iti after that] / “etat kshetraµ samåsena” iti g¥tåµ codåh®tya,makes no sense. In order to make coincide with ÓS, V proposes the reading:‘…“icchå dvesha˙ sukhaµ du˙khaµ” iti’ iti kshetradharmatvam uktvå
‘“cetanådh®ti˙”’ iti g¥tåµ codåh®tya. Here I translate this phrase adding iti
after g¥yate ca.
1052
ÓS 84,5–8.

290*[Vital air] is described as having five functions like the mind [BrSËII. iv. 11],
it is stated in the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya that:*As desire and so on are not entities different from mind according
to the statement that:“Desire, [429] determination, doubt, faith, lack of faith, steadfastness,lack of steadfastness, shame, conjecture and fear — all this is justmind” [B®hUp I. v. 3];
so according to the statement that:“In-breath, out-breath, diffused breath, up-breath and middle-breath— all this [breathing1053] is just breath” [B®hUp I. v. 3],
out-breath and so on are also understood as a variety of the functionof breath, not as another entity [Ír¥Bh II. iv. 11: 396,7–10].
Why can happiness etc. be qualities of the self, then?
To this, we answer — one who does not study our established opinion
falls into such mistake through investigating [only] books. That is, first in
the Ótmasiddhi, immediately after:*By the way, … with the illustration of happiness and so on [ÓS83,8],
stating that:*Dharma conditioning1054 the essential nature [of an entity] lasts aslong as its substratum lasts. Happiness and the like are not so, while
consciousness (bodha) conditions the essential nature of the self.
And it has been explained how being the self is conditioned on
consciousness1055 [ÓS 83,10–12],
the author mentions the difference between pure consciousness and happinessand the like in view of being innate and not being innate; [accordingly], the1053

NySi omits ana˙ between samåna˙ and ity etat.
1054upådhi = prayojaka (R).
1055
See ÓS 66,17f.: tatråhur åtmatattvajñå˙ svataß caitanyam åtmana˙ /svarËpopådhidharmatvåt prakåßa iva tejasa˙.

291

following statement that:*And happiness and pain are not qualities of the self. [ÓS 83,12]
etc. is said as an arrogant speech (vaibhavavåda) or as an opinion of otherschools. Otherwise, why does he state:*Thus,1056 various verbal expressions as to consciousness, which isthe essential nature of the self, such as ascertainment, doubt etc.1057
are concerned with particular contacts to objects.1058 Or rather, 1059
[they are] concerned with consciousness [itself] associated with theseparticular [contacts]. [ÓS 85,17f.],in the beginning of conclusion? For if [ascertainment etc.] were accidental
qualities [of the mind], there would be no difference in having sense-organs
as adventitious condition etc. But so is not stated; in fact, it is stateddifferently [that ‘which is the essential nature of the self’]. [430][Obj.] It is you who falls into mistake of one who does not study of
our established opinion [because the Ótmasiddhi clearly states “happinessand pain are not qualities of the self”].
[Ans.] It cannot be true. In fact, the Ótmasiddhi is an introduction(prakaraˆa) of the ‘scripture’ (ßåstra) named Nyåyatattva. And all is clear
in the eighth section (adhikaraˆa) of the first part (påda) of this ‘scripture,’
which is composed of the exposition of knowledge.
So the [Brahma-]sËtra and the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya [quoted above] mean:
the mind, which is classified into different conditions causing knowledgeof various conditions [such as desire, determination etc.], is called by these
1056

aßnute //.
1057

Cf. ÓS 62,18f.: … citi˙ / nånåpadårthasaµsargåt tattadvititvam

Here ‘etc.’ includes happiness and pain also (R).
1058
vishayasaµßleshavißeshagocaraeva.
ÓS
reads:
vishayasaµßleshavißesheshu.
1059
The second alternative is shown because it is knoweldge that forms
ascertaiment etc. (R). This is siddhånta according to Viraraghavacharya's
note on ÓS [p.85, fn.2].

292

various designations. 1060 And similar reasoning is justified in another place— in the topic that:*[Obj.] [Corporal faculties are] seven, because of movement [BrSËII. iv. 4],
it is stated that:*The mind itself is designated by the words buddhi, ahaµkåra andcitta according to the difference in function, namely, adhyavasåya
(determination), abhimåna (ego) and cintå (thinking). [Ír¥Bh II. iv. 5;
391,18–392,1]
In addition, it is stated in the Vedårthasaµgraha:*“The dharmas of pain, ignorance and impurity are of prak®ti, not of
the self” [ViP VI. vii. 22]— that is, these dharmas do not belong to the essential nature of theself because of being based on karma caused by the association withprak®ti. By discrimination between what is gotten and not,1061 they
are said to be dharmas of prak®ti. [VAS §79: 116,16–18]
Also in the same [work], having said that:*And the word bhakti means a special kind of love (pr¥ti). Love isbut a special kind of knowledge. [VAS §141: 170,11f.],
the author shows the objection1062 that:*But love and happiness (sukha) are not different things. And ordinary
people understand that happiness is accomplished by means ofknowledge and is different from [knowledge] [VAS §141: 170,12f.];
he answers as follows:*Not so. Particular knowledge with which that [happiness] isaccomplished is in itself happiness.
To explain — Knowledge of an object is common to happiness, pain
and neutral emotion. And this [knowledge], the particularity of which
is dependent upon an object, becomes so [happiness, pain and neutral
1060

Cf. TC 428,27f.
1061pråptåpråptavivekena = anvayavyatirekåbhyåm [TD 164,11].
1062
Of the Vaißeshikas [TD 344,14].

293

emotion]. Accordingly, when knowledge particularized by a particular
object is thought to produce happiness, the knowledge concerning
this object is in itself happiness. And nothing other than this[knowledge] is not apprehended. And because only by this[particularized knowledge] the expression ‘happy’ can be accountedfor. [VAS §§141–42: 170,13–18],
and so on. Moreover, the description of the Bhagavadg¥tå that:*Wish, dislike [BhG XIII. 6],
etc. is justified by the author of the commentaries in [his commentary]
thereon as follows:*Wish, dislike, happiness, pain — these effects of the body are said
to be the modifications of the body. Though wish, dislike, happinessand pain are qualities of the self, they are said to be the modificationof the body as the effects of the body since they are originated fromthe association of the self with the body. Concerning their being thedharmas of the self, [He] will state that:“As to being one who experiences happiness and pain, the self is said
to be the cause” [BhG XIII. 20][GBh XIII. 6: 428,3–429,2].
Again, Ír¥-Råmåmißra says in the ›a∂arthasaµkshepa:*Happiness is a variety of knowledge dependent upon a variety of aknown object, because nothing beyond this is not seen[›a∂arthasaµkshepa],
and so on. Also Varadavishˆumißra says:*First, happiness and pain are but knowledge concerning favorable
and unfavorable things. So the two are not included in qualities [asindependent items] [?],and so on. And it is stated by Ír¥-Vishˆucitta in the Saµgatimålå:*Thus, the essential nature of the individual self, which is comparedto light or heat of fire for the Supreme Self, is, in deep sleep and thedissolution, devoid of difference of modification — which
distinguishes [the individual self] from the Supreme Self — composed

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of endless [varieties of] the expansion of knowledge such as [431]doubt, ascertainment, misunderstanding, untrue knowledge,
perception, inference, verbal teaching, passion, dislike, greed, delusion,
insanity, envy, steadfastness, uncertainty, faith, shame, fear etc.
[Saµgatimålå],and so on.
Therefore, it is proved that happiness and so on are varieties ofknowledge.
[Obj.] How can the knowledge of God, which is eternal and grasps
everything, form desire and so on, then?
[Ans.] Suppose it is possible due to particular limiting adjunct, because[He] has another non-eternal knowledge, or in any way. In fact, it is acceptedthat God has non-eternal knowledge born from sense-organs as well; i.e.
Varadavishˆu-mißra says that:*Because the non-eternal knowledge of God grasps what would begrasped by [His] eternal knowledge whose object is everything1063[?],
and that:*Because this [non-eternal knowledge] is also born from sense-organs[?].

In the topic on the self-establishment [of knowledge] of the
Prajñåparitråˆa, [Varada-Nåråyaˆa bha††åraka] states that:*And some hold that happiness and pain are varieties of knowledge.
But it is not proper. Because these two are found in [parts] of the
body such as legs.
And the self is not present in these [parts] because it is minute. Nor
its attributive knowledge is present there. [Prajñåparitråˆa]1063= 394,1.

295

Immediately after declaring like this, he justifies that the individual self,
either in the state of bandage or of liberation, is minute. And he continues:*Knowledge under discussion is said to exist only in [the place]where its substratum [i.e. the self] exists;
Because it is consciousness while being attribute; like the knowledgeof Brahman.1064 Accordingly, [432] knowledge is quality; it cannot
be substance.
And even objects of past and future is manifested by force ofknowledge. Without depending upon conjunction, [knowledge] brings
about the effect [i.e. manifestation] in every kind of object.
Hence, the relation between knowledge and an object is [notconjunction] but subject-object-relationship (vishayavishayibhåva),with which knowledge can be related to everything [including thingsin past or future and also non-substance].
Such knowledge is [sometimes] called ‘all-pervasive1065 (sarvaga)’ as
it is spontaneously related to everything. [That is], it is said to berelated to everything and grasp everything without leaving [itssubstratum].
Because this [knowledge] brings about the effect even in that which
is not associated with its substratum, it is different in character from
quality (guˆa). That is why it is called substance in the[Ír¥-]Bhåshya. 1066
To explain — qualities such as touch make effects such as burningand burst only in things to which their substrata are associated;knowledge is not so.
That character of this [knowledge] which is different from quality is
1064

Therefore, according to this syllogism, the knowledge of theindividual self is always minute because its substratum, i.e. the individual
self, is always minute even in the state of liberation. That is why theknowledge of the embodied self cannot exit in the parts where pain etc. areexperienced.
1065
E.g. vesh†itå n®pa sarvagå [ViP ].
1066
E.g the passage of Ír¥Bh quoted in 416,15.

296

mentioned [in the Ír¥bhåshya] by the word ‘substance.’ Then, it isproper that knowledge also belongs to another positive [category]like potency (ßakti).
[Anyway], knowledge is included in quality or belongs to another[category other than both substance and quality]. For, if the opinion
that knowledge is substance is adopted, none could explain what is
modified [into knowledge]. And it is needless [to assume knowledge
as substance in order to make its conjunction with an object possible;
because, as is mentioned above, conjunction is not necessary forknowledge]. [433]Now, happiness and pain, though they are produced in parts of thebody, appear so and so for the embodied self by force of knowledge.
If it be argued that [the two] are the qualities of the self because they
are not experienced in the body without the self, not so. For [the two]cannot be the qualities of the self because they are not experienced in[the self] without body.
The two [i.e. happiness and pain], which are the qualities of thebody, is manifest through knowledge having an object,1067 which is
the quality of the self — this is established to be accepted by wise
persons.
The two appear just as experienced by spiritual being with karma;thus, there is no deviation from manifestation [—in other words, they
are always manifest when they exist]. Otherwise, [they would appear]
to no purpose.
Desire and the like, [however], do not exist in a part of the body;therefore, they should be the qualities of the self and called varietiesof knowledge.
Suppose, [in the case of a yogin and the liberated self], that the self,
though minute, is apprehended in many bodies, as [reflected image
1067‘having an object (sakarmaka)’ is hetugarbhavißeshaˆa;accordingly, happiness and pain, which are without an object, cannot bekinds of knowledge having an object (R).

297of] the sun is apprehended in many ponds. [434]In the case of yogins, many bodies act instantly like one body due to[their] wonderful power or the grace of God.
Since no gap is grasped between these [bodies] and the will of theself, the presence [of the self] in the form ‘I …’ is also apprehended
in each [body].
In the case of yogins, their corporal faculties including the mind are
divided in each body and act at the will of God etc.
The liberated self, however, takes many bodies at his own will. He is
all-knowing and wonders, eating what he wants and assuming theform he wants.1068
And the expression, say, that the [liberated] self enters all [bodies]with [his] knowledge as a lamp with [its] light1069 is [simply] basedon [the similarity in] being manifested.
Though things in past and future are never manifested by light, they
are manifested by knowledge. Therefore, do not think [a lamp andknowledge] are thoroughly similar. [435]This [liberated] self, minute in itself, becomes all-pervasive throughits quality, [namely, knowledge]. [Thus], both expression, [i.e. minuteand all-pervasive], is proper as to the individual self.
The supreme Self, however, in itself pervades everything according
to the ßrutis. He is thought to be the inner-controller for all, limitless1070
and, consequently, all-pervasive.
It is because sense-organs do not function that knowledge does not
manifest an object in deep sleep. [Still] knowledge in itself and theself is independently manifest [even] at that time.
For a person waking up reflects ‘I slept well during this period,’which clearly shows that the self is manifested even at that time.
1068

Cf. imån lokån kåmånn¥ kåmarËpy apy anusañcaran [TaiUp III. x.

1069

Cf. BrSË IV. iv. 15: prabhåvadåveshas tathå hi darßayati.
Brahman is devoid of three kinds of limitation. See 322,5–324,4.

5].
1070

298

And the negative consciousness ‘I do not know me as well as otherthings’ is but concerned with the self qualified by humanity and soon, [which is called me] and outward objects, [which are called otherthings].1071 [436]But the consciousness accompanied with the word ‘I’ does not exist
in deep sleep. Still the inward object itself is manifested as qualified
by knowledge not grasping an [outward] object. [Prajñåparitråˆa]
Immediately after that, the author justifies that the self is the I-notion(ahamartha) and rejects the opinion that knowledge can be inferred. Then
taking up happiness and pain again—*Pain and the other [i.e. happiness] are [always] manifested as favorable
and unfavorable for the enjoyer who has karma. Accordingly, there
is no deviation from manifestation concerning the two.
If there were the deviation from manifestation, the existence of these[two] itself would be purposeless. [In other words], if [the two] were
not manifested, their appearance for enjoyment would not beenjoyed.
Knowledge is designated by the words desire, dislike, volition etc.
These varieties of knowledge are regarded as in accordance with thedifference of its objects.
They are manifested not existing in a part of the body like happinessand the like, but as existing the self; [because] no person has theconsciousness, say, ‘I have desire in my feet.’[On the contrary], there is consciousness, say, ‘[I have] pain in myfeet,’ ‘[I have] pleasure in my arms.’ [Prajñåparitråˆa],he concludes,*Therefore, desire and so on are the varieties of knowledge whereas
happiness and pain are the qualities of the mind [Prajñåparitråˆa].
Some contents are contradictory to the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya and so on, i.e.,that happiness and pain are the qualities of the body only because they are1071

Cf. Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: (1) 168,4ff.

299

apprehended only in a part of the body such as an arm and a feet; that it isappropriate that desire and so on are varieties of knowledge because they
are no apprehended so; that knowledge does not exist beyond its substratum;that [knowledge] manifests [an object] by means of subject-objectrelationship without depending upon conjunction; that [knowledge] is nonsubstance. They are adopted1072 because [the author] is too lazy to do teethto-teeth battle against the elephant of the other school.
In the Nyåyasudarßana, the same author states that happiness andpain are the qualities of the self. That is,*The meaning is: what is stated as ‘having happiness’ in the[Ír¥-]Bhåshya is the self qualified by the body such as that of humanbeing, but not also the body which qualifies the self. Because the self
in general is the substratum of happiness. Because the self existing in
the body has empirical happiness and so on, it is understood that they
belong to the self qualified by this [body] due to [the experience] that
this self is happy [Nyåyasudarßana]. [437]In the same way, the unseen power (ad®sh†a) is also nothing but [akind of knowledge] composed of love and anger of God. And the fact thatthe fruit of karma is restricted for each of the individual selves can bejustified simply because1073 they are severally determined to be subject tothese [love and anger of Him]. And this [unseen power] is decided to be ofsuch nature because it is understood from the scriptures. So is stated in theBhåshya of Drami∂åcårya 1074:
1072

self.

parig®h¥ta. K reports the variant parih®ta.
1073
I.e. without ad®sh†a or dharma and adharma of each individual
1074

Also known as Dravi∂a° in the Advaita tradition. His fragments
are collected in: H. Nakamura, Vedånta-tetsugaku no Hatten, Tokyo 1955
(the original Japanese edition of his History of Early Vedånta Philosophy
vol.3, not yet translated into English), pp.119–36; van Buitenen, Råmånuja's
VAS, Pune 1956, pp.302–11.

300*With the desire of attaining fruits,1075 indeed, they seek to please the[Highest] Self by means of action [such as sacrifice and charity][Drami∂a-bhåshya],1076
and so on. Also in the [Ír¥-]Bhåshya:*[Merit and demerit] are understood only from the Scriptures [Ír¥Bh
II. ii. 3: 282,13],and so on. The author of the [Brahma-]sËtra himself expounds it clearly in:*Fruits are from Him, because of aptness [BrSË III. ii. 37],
and the following sËtras.
It is accepted by The Vaißeshika and others1077 that: a body etc. aremade up of the gross elements induced by special qualities of the enjoyer[i.e. the self],1078 because they are the means of his enjoyment, like a garland[composed by him]; if [this syllogism] is established, [the special quality]
is proved to be unseen power inherent in the individual self through theprocess of elimination (parißesha) because [it] cannot be [such special
qualities of the self which do not exist before the formation of the body]such as knowledge1079 [438] — This is not true. Because the restriction[concerning the body] can be justified only due to the unseen power as wehave defined and, accordingly, there is no sublation in a counter-example.
And this would not lead the undesirable conclusion that [the fruits of someone]
are enjoyed by the other. Because what restricts [the enjoyment, namely,
1075

karmaphalasaµbibhantsayå. Van Buitenen's ed. of VAS reads°saµbibhatsayå.
1076= Fg. 5 [Nakamura 1955: 121f.]; Fg. 1 of the B®hUp-bhåshya [vanBuitenen 1956: 302]. Quoted in VAS §124 [152,11] and Ír¥Bh II. ii. 3[282,6]. Råmånuja expounds the fragment in VAS §124 [152,12–14].
1077
The similar argument is, as is pointed out by V, shown in NyKu,
the first stabaka. The completely same inference is found in the Nyåyal¥låvat¥659ff. The prototype of this inference are found in Vyomavat¥ (2) 229.
1078
The vißeshaguˆas of the self are buddhi, sukha, du˙kha, icchå,dvesha, prayatna, dharma, adharma [TarS §73].
1079
Cf. NyKu I §53: ßar¥råde˙ pråk teshåm [=buddhyåd¥nåm] asattvåt
[48,4].

301

His] will etc., supervise (adhyaksha) [it].1080
If it be so, it is not any defect to accept even love and [anger] of gods
like Agni and Indra as the unseen power by force of the ßrutis.1081 It isbased on God that they also become donors of fruits.1082 In any case, theunseen power is composed of [only] love of God without any exception.
[439] So is stated by [God] Himself:*Truly I am the enjoyer and the lord (prabhu) [or the donor of fruits1083]
of all sacrifices [BhG IX. 24].
Conditioned with various karma [of the individual selves], the knowledge
of God forms anger etc. But it is not his defect. Because [His anger etc.] are[but] good qualities (guˆa) consistent with keeping His own command.
Likewise, gracious condescension (sauß¥lya),1084 forgiving love (våtsalya),1085
friendship1086 (sauhårda) and so on are varieties of [His] knowledge.
1080

This follows R. According to K: will, [volition and karma of theindividual self], which restrict [the enjoyment], are perceived.
1081
R and K refer to “t®pta evainam indra˙ prajayå paßubhis tarpayati”
[?].
1082
Cf. BrSË II. iii. 40.
1083
phalapradåt®. See GBh IX. 24, VAS §124 [153,14]; Ír¥Bh III. ii.
40 [458,17].
1084
The English equivalent is of Carman. Deßika's definition is:sauß¥lyaµ ßobhanaß¥latvam, tac cåtråtimah¥yaso 'py atih¥neshu
guhagopålådishv
apisådhvasapraßamanånanyaprayojanan¥randhrasaµßleshasvabhåvatvam [Íaraˆågatigadyabhåshya 146,10f.]. Råmånuja
himself has not defined the term; the definition of the term in SudarßanasËri'sÍaraˆågatigadyabhåshya
and
that
in
Paråßarabha††a's
Vishˆusahasranåmabhåshya are shown in Carman 1974: 194f.
1085
The English equivalent is of Carman. Deßika's definition of theterm is: våtsalyam ‘ßaraˆågatavatsala˙’ [Råmåyaˆa V. 21. 20] ityådybhipretå
svalakshaˆ¥yatayåbhimateshu doshataraskåraˆ¥ pr¥ti˙ [Íaraˆågatigadyabhåshya 146,14f.]. For the definition of the term in Paråßarabha††a's
Vishˆusahasranåmabhåshya and Periya Óccan Pi¬¬ai's Íaraˆågatigadyavyåkhånam, and also its significance in the post-Råmånuja period, see Carman
1974: 196f. and 223–30.
1086
Deßika's definition of the term is: sauhårdam ‘suh®daµsarvabhËtånåm’ [BhG V. 29] ‘uraså pratijñagråha pårthaµ saµchådya

302

As to [the emotions] referred to by [theorists of dramaturgy] beginningwith Bharata, the lasting emotions1087 (sthåyibhåva) such as affection1088(rati) are [440] the modifications of this [knowledge]. Among transitory
emotions1089 (saµcåribhåva), nirveda or self-disparagement etc. are thevarieties of knowledge; fatigue (glåni) etc. are the varieties of the conditionof the body and the like. The word svapna also clearly denotes a variety ofknowledge when it means dreaming; when it means deep sleep, it denotes
the condition devoid of all the expansion of knowledge in one who does
not faint and lives. Consider dulness (jå∂ya) etc. in the same manner [441].
[Obj.] Whose condition is nidrå (or sleepiness), then?
[Ans.] Of the mind or knowledge oppressed by worry, laziness,
tiredness and the like. And it causes deep sleep etc.
[Obj.] How [do you explain] the sËtra of the great sage [Patañjali]that:*Nidrå is the mental-function (v®tti) concerned with [tamas], whichis the cause of the non-existence [of the other mental-functions in
waking or dreaming]1090 [YogaasËtra I. 10],then?
mådhava˙’ [MBh VII. 28. 17] ityådiprasiddhaµ såmånyato vißeshataß cahitaishitvam [Íaraˆågatigadyabhåshya 146,24f.].
1087
For its definition, see Bhåvaprakåßa of Íåradåtanaya [fl. the 12 th
century], quoted in R. The sthåyibhåvas are eight or nine (including ßånti)in numeber; see V. Raghavan: The Number of Rasa-s, Madras 31975, pp.69ff.
Cf. ratir håsaß ca ßokaß ca krodha-utsåhau bhayaµ tathå / jugupså vismayaß
ceti sthåyibhåvå˙ prak¥rtitå˙ [Nå†yaßastra VI. 17].
1088
Cf. Såhityadarpaˆa 207: ratir manonukËle 'rthe manasa˙pravaˆåyitam.
1089
Also called vyabhicåribhåva. They are said to be thirty-three in
number. See ? quoted in R.
1090abhåvapratyayålambanå v®ttir nidrå. Våcaspati interprets:jågrasvapnav®tt¥nåmabhåva˙
tasya
pratyaya˙kåraˆaµbuddhisattvåcchådakaµ tamas tad evålambanam vishayo yasyå˙ så tathoktå
v®ttir nidrå [ÓnSS No.47; 15,13ff.].

303[Ans.] [It is called v®tti with] the intention that it is to be suppressed
like another mental-function1091 for one who master meditation, because
this section [of the YogasËtra] deals with suppressing.1092 It has been explainedin the Ótmasiddhi.1093
Moreover, wrong observations concerning knowledge, say, that it isobjectless, that it has no substratum, that it has no dharma are to be rejectedby force of [our ordinary] apprehension [‘I know it’] and so on.1094 [Thewrong theories of error] such as that an object of error is non-existent1095(asatkhyåti), that it is but idea1096 (åtmakhyåti), that it is inexplicable1097(anirvacan¥yakhyåti) have been rejected by us in the Nyåyaparißuddhi.1098
Additionally, all that is necessary for ordinary usage (vyavahåra)such as the means of knowledge and the known entities has been expounded
there [in the Nyåyaparißuddhi]; accordingly, all is not illustrated here. There
the real nature of the categories are made clear in accordance with the orderof the Vaißeshikas. [442]1091Like viparyaya, which is not v®tti at all.
1092
Cf. YogasËtra I. 2: yogaß cittav®ttinirodha˙.
1093
ÓS 72,14f.: nirodhaparatvåt prakaraˆasya na v®ttisvarËpe tåtparyaµ
viparyayavat.
1094
Concerning this ådi, R quoted the verse: jñåt®jñeyavih¥naµ tebrahma jñånåtmakaµ yadi / bhojyabhokt®vih¥nå 'pi bhavet tarhi bhjikriyå //
[?].
1095
This is the opinion of the Mådhyamika Buddhist. Deßika's criticism
of this theory is seen in NyP 52f. as well as TMK IV. 18–19. See Singh
199f., Vedavalli 60, Srinivasa Chari 173f.
1096
Of the Yogåcåra Buddhist. Deßika's criticism is found in NyP
48–51 as well as TMK IV. 20ff. See Singh 192ff., Vedavalli 58ff., Srinivasa
Chari 173f.
1097
Of the Advaita Vedåntin. Deßika's criticism is found in NyP 53ff.
as well as TMK IV. 16f. See Singh 195ff., Vedavalli 61ff., Srinivasa Chari
175f.
1098
The vißish†ådvaita view on khyåtivåda is closely examined in V'sbhËmikå, pp.42f.

304(110) May my knowledge be very fortunately influenced by hundreds ofwords of the king of ascetics [or Råmånuja] and, having reached the mansion,
namely, the top of the ßrutis increasing enjoyment, have fresh idea which isalways happy (sadåsåmoda) in proximity with [His] eternal realm of bliss[and] is eager for the voluntary embrace of Dåmodara [or K®shˆa].

Here ends the fifth section on knowledge in the Nyåyasiddhåñjana
composed by Ír¥mad Veµka†anåtha or Vedåntåcårya, who is the lion
among poets and logicians and who masters all branches of arts.

Chapter 6 Non-substance305

Now non-substance [is explained]. Non-substance is that which isdevoid of conjunction.
In1099 this regard, the triguˆa (or material substance which has all
three guˆas) has a series of conditions [i.e. continuous modifications]characterized by similarity and dissimilarity1100; time also [has a series ofconditions] from [being] kshaˆa, [being] lava, being nimesha up to [being]parårdha; and knowledge [has a series of conditions] such as being perception,
being inference and being verbal knowledge (ßrauta); even pure sattva has acertain1101 [series of conditions] similar to that of the triguˆa — thus,
innumerable modes [of non-substance] are to be considered according to
the means of valid knowledge. Keeping this in mind, Varadavishˆu-mißra
states:*And quality (guˆa) is innumerable [?].
Thus, it is impossible to enumerate such innumerable difference among
these [conditions] one by one. Additionally some [of them] which can be[enumerated] have been almost explained in the section on substance [ofthe present work] and more explanation would not be useful for people,
empirical usage (vyavahåra), unseen power etc. This is why [we will not
explain all these conditions and only] explain the other non-substances
which can be clearly counted.
They are only ten: sattva, rajas, tamas, five [qualities] beginning withsound (ßabda), conjunction (saµyoga) and potency (ßakti). These [ten] nonsubstances do, as case be, cover [all other categories which are accepted as
non-substance by the other schools], say, weight (gurutva), fluidity (dravatva),
viscidity (snehatva), latent impression (saµskåra), number (saµkhyå), size
(parimåˆa), separateness (p®thaktva), disjunction (vibhåga), remoteness(paratva), nearness (aparatva), action (karma), generality (såmånya), 1102
similarity (såd®ßya), particularity (vißesha), inherence (samavåya), nonexistence (abhåva), qualified-ness1103 (vaißish†ya) etc. Even among them,
1099

This is an answer to the question why all the avasthå, which issame as adravya [see the definition in 7,2], is not dealt with in this section.
1100
R refers to his own comment on the passage “And [it] begins asimilar or dissimilar series of modifications (vikåra) in accordance with thedifference in time and place” [NySi 41,2].
1101
I.e. excluding the body of God etc. (R, K).
1102
NySi in the present form explains up to this and stops.
1103
This is postulated by the M¥måµsakas as the relation between
existence and non-existence because neither conjunction nor inherence is306

some [categories] that are not accepted by our fellows as included [in theten non-substance] will be explained in suitable places. In the
Tattvamuktålåpa,1104 we have mentioned to varieties of non-substanceincluding oneness (ekatva) along with some [categories] accepted by our
fellows [444].
Among them, sattva is that non-substance beyond sense-organs anddifferent from potency which causes illumination, happiness, lightness etc.
It is of two sorts: pure one and impure one. Pure sattva is that sattva which
exists in substance devoid of rajas and tamas. It belongs to [His] eternal[transcendental] manifestation (nityavibhËti). Impure sattva is that sattva
which coexists with rajas and tamas. It belongs to the triguˆa.
The definition of rajas and that of tamas are attained by exchanging
the attribute of the definition of sattva [that ‘which causes illumination,
happiness, lightness etc.’] for ‘which causes greed, activity etc.’ and ‘whichcauses carelessness, confusion etc.’ [respectively].
All these three pervades the entire prak®ti and, [though] non-eternal,
has a eternally continuing series. They are well-balanced at the time of the
dissolution and become uneven at the beginning of the creation; [thus],
they serves for the creation, the maintenance and the dissolution in dueorder.1105 Due to the difference among cooperative causes (sahakårin) such
as God's will, they do cooperation etc. one another [in the form that the one] is dominant and [the other two] is subdued. Because due to the difference
among persons associated with their each unseen power [or love and anger
of His], [the three] become dominant, equal and [subdued].1106 For instance,
the Venerable Paråßara says that:*One and the same entity [445] … [ViP II. vi. 47],1107
possible (R). Cf. the Nyåyal¥låvat¥ criticizing the view that it is anotherpadårtha [ChSS ed. 68,1–75,1].
1104
TMK V. 41.
1105
R remarks: “the meaning is that ‘they serve for the creation, themaintenance and the dissolution, which take place in due order’; do notthink ‘sattva, rajas and tamas cause the creation, the maintenance and thedissolution respectively,’ because there is not such order.” — It should be
regard as ‘they cannot be independent causes,’ because Deßika says:
sattvarajastamsåµ sthityutpattilayeshu vißesheˆa bhagavatådhish†hitatvaµteshuteshu ßåstreshËcyate [SAS V. 16].
1106
As one and the same female body is the cause of pleasure for her
husband, of pain for a man having his own wife, of confusion for another
woman (R).
1107
“One and the same entity serves, [due to the difference of persons],

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and that:*The same, having served for affection, … [ViP II. vi. 48]. 1108
The detail is to considered in the Bhagavadg¥tå and its commentary.1109
Also for the classification into of sattva, of rajas and of tamas concerning
effect,1110 course,1111 ritual act,1112 food,1113 charity1114 etc., see the explanationin these [two].
And these [three] are unambiguously said to be non-substance in theÍår¥rakabhåshya. [That is], to the sËtra that:*Also because of the impossibility of construction [BrSË II. i. 1],
it is stated that:*By force of the letter ‘also (ca),’ it is added that the continuity(anvaya), [with which the Såµkhyas prove the prak®ti to be theprimordial cause],1115 is not absolute [446]…
Because sattva etc. are qualities of substances, but not substances
for happiness, the production of jealousy and anger — how, then, is it
possible that one entity is the same in nature?”
1108“[Even concerning one person], the same, once having served for
affection, comes to serve for pain and, again, comes to serve for anger and,again, comes to serve for favor”; “Hence, nothing is happy or miserable innature” [49ab] etc.
1109
R refers to BhG XIV. 9–10 and the passage of GBh XIV. 10 that:
Owing to the past karma and because of the differences in the food nourishing
the body, sattva etc. come to be dominant and subdued. Sometimes sattva
is preponderate dominating rajas and tamas; sometimes rajas [is preponderate]
dominating sattva and tamas; sometimes tamas [is preponderate] dominatingrajas and sattva [464,13–465,3].
1110
See BhG XIV. 11–13.
1111
See BhG XIV. 18.
1112
See BhG XVII. 4.
1113
See BhG XVII. 8–10.
1114
See BhG XVII. 20–22.
1115This anvaya corresponds to samanvaya in the Såµkhyakårikå 15.
See Tattvakaumud¥: bhinnånåµ samånarËpatå samanvaya˙ /sukhadu˙khmohasamanvitå hi buddhyådayo 'dhyavasåyådilakshaˆå˙ prat¥yante / yåni ca yadrËpasamanugatåni tåni tatsvabhåvåvyaktakåraˆåni, yathå
m®ddhemapiˆ∂asamanugatå gha†amuku†ådayo m®ddhemåvyaktakåraˆakå.
Cf. ÍP 279,29–31: kårye 'nvitasya m®dåde˙ kåraˆatvaµ d®ßyate, tathå
sattvådimayasukhadu˙khåde˙ kårye 'nvayåt kårye sattvådyanvaya˙ siddha
iti sattvåd¥nåµ kåraˆatvam iti hy uktam.

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themselves. In fact, sattva etc. are, being the causes of levity,
illumination etc. existing in [substances] such as earth, special naturesof these [substances]. But they are never apprehended to be continuousin effects as substances like a lump of clay, gold etc. And sattva etc.
are well-known to be but qualities [Ír¥Bh II. ii. 1: 279,13;
279,16–280,1].
So is stated in the [Vedånta-]d¥pa:*By force of the letter ‘also,’ it is added that sattva etc. cannot bematerial causes because they are qualities of substances like whitenessand the like. In fact, sattva etc. are, being the causes of levity,
illumination etc. existing in effects, are special natures which belong
to its causes such as earth [VD¥pa II. ii. 1: 56,7–8].
Varadavishˆumißra, however, hods that sattva, rajas and tamas aresubstances, for instance:*And substance is of twenty-six kinds: … sattva, rajas, tamas…
[?].1116
This is untenable since it is contradictory to the [Brahma-]sËtras in the
topic on the Såµkhyas 1117 and the commentaries thereon.
Sound is that which is grasped with the faculty of hearing like ours
and exists in the five gross-elements.1118
It is of two sorts: [1] that which is composed of letters (varˆa) and[2] that which is not composed of letters.
[1] That which is composed of letters is that [sound] which is devoidof an aggregation of the non-existence of the modes such as a, ka, ca, †a, ta,
pa and ya. This [kind of sound] is manifested by [the parts of a vocal
organ] such as a palate of gods, men etc. It is concerning this [kind ofsound] that expressiveness (våcakatva) etc. have been considered [in many
works of various schools].1119
It comprises fifty-one modes including ksha. 1120 In some cases, it is
1116

§33.

Already quoted in 148,11.
1117
I.e. racanånupapattiyadhikaraˆa, II. ii. 1–9.
1118
I.e. not in ether only as is held by the Vaißeshikas etc. Cf. TarS
1119

According to the first interpretation of R. According to the secondand K, “Concerning this [kind of sound], it is considered that [a word
denoting the body] expresses [that which has the body in the end] etc.,[which] has been mentioned [in the first section on triguˆa].”
1120
=.

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said to comprise only fifty modes because there is no distinction between laand Òa1121 in the primary list of characters (måt®kåpå†a). Some [letters], say,ya, ra and la, have different forms [due to conjunction]: kya, kra1122 etc.
Shorts of diphthongs or the vowels resulting from a vowel-combination[i.e. e, o, ai and au] are possible in the practical usages of spoken languages
such as Pråk®t and they are taught in the primary list of characters in
Dravidian languages etc. In Sanskrit, however, [447] they are excluded
from the primary list of characters because they do not have expressiveness.
In this manner, these [letters] are said to be sixty-three in the Mokshadharma
anyway. Also the scriptural passage that ‘There are a thousand letters in theSupreme Heaven’ is justified for the reason that there are the other syllablesor that the very syllables [in this world] can be distinguished into a thousand
letters, ten thousand letters or so owing to the attribution due to situation,
combination etc.
[2] That which is not composed of letters is that [sound] which has
an aggregation of the non-existence of all the modes such as a, ka, ca, †a, ta,
pa and ya. It is manifested with a music instrument, cloud, wind, disjunction
etc. [448]As to the both [kinds of sound], according to the theory that only [thesound] closing to the portion of the ear is manifested by air [and is grasped
there by the ear], it is only the [sound] existing in ether that can be grasped.
According to the theory that [even the sound] that exists in a musicalinstrument etc. is grasped, it is justified that [the sound] existing in the fivegross elements also can be grasped. In this regard, Varadanåråyaˆabha††åraka, [clearly supporting the latter theory], mentions of the operation[or going out] of the faculty of hearing when it grasps the sound existing
far away:*Owing to our experience that sound is [apprehended as] far, near, inthe west etc., the faculty of hearing is capable of going out andgrasping sound here and there.
[For] if a series of the sound coming from a far place were grasped
due to [its] inherence [to ether], then [only the sound that is near to
the ear could be grasped and, consequently, the sound] produced far
away would not be grasped so [as the sound far away].
Because of the dulness of sound etc. we can grasp [the sound] as
produced far away etc., still we could not grasp [the sound] as in theeast, in the west etc. [?]This sound is produced along with ether and is dissolved along withthe dissolution of that [ether]. It is neither produced nor dissolved alongwith the production or dissolution of the other gross elements because air
1121

I.e. l and ¬.
1122
E.g. k+y = Ky; k+r = [k.

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etc. are also the portions [or products] of ether. Or rather, that [sound]which exists in ether is produced or dissolved along with ether [449] andthat [sound] which exists in air etc. is also [produced or dissolved] alongwith each gross element.
Sound is constant (sthira). Because, for instance, we identify sounduttered in excessively high tone with those uttered in the other tones, which
is opposed to [the cognition that they have] different qualities.1123 For it isheard that varieties of high pitch etc., e.g. the sixth note and others, are thequalities of air, by which [sound] is manifested, in the following passage:*As air, which is pervasive without any difference, has varieties suchas that called the sixth note owing to the difference of holes in aflute, so [all] the [individual] self1124 [is, though individual selves aredifferent due to their own karma, uniform] [ViP II. xiv. 32].
For this very reason, all the syllables ga existing till the end of kalpa aresame, so are the other syllables.
By the way, the statement of Ír¥-Vishˆucitta that:*The ear, like the other sense-organs,1125 also grasps the entities
composed of innumerable particularities such as being sound, beingga, being soft, being hard, being low, being medium etc. [?],
[where these particularities are said to be the qualities of sound], also
intends to deny the apprehension of an entity without any particularity.
Because in [his1126] commentary on the [Taittir¥ya-]Upanishad ad the passage
that:*[Oh, air!] You, indeed, are the perceptible Brahman [450] [TaiUp I.
i. 1, xii. 1],
it is stated that air is but that which manifests [sound].1127[Some] imagine as follows — Owing to the ßruti-passage that:*Salutation to thee, oh air! You, indeed, are the perceptible (pratyaksha)
Brahman. I will speak of you, indeed, the perceptible Brahman. [TaiUp
1123

The same illustration is found in TMK V. 24a, which mentions of
the Bhå††a view that sound is eternal.
1124
Here paramåtman denotes åtman or the individual self; cf. MBh?
(≈ BhG XIII. 22) [Vishˆucitt¥ya].
1125
For itarendriyavishayavat (as in the case of the objects of the othersense-organs), read itarendriyavat which R regards as easier to understand.
1126
This description clearly shows that Vishˆucitta wrote a commentaryon the Upanishad† also (V), though it is not mentioned by Raghavan [1979:
18f.].
1127
Here ‘but (eva)’ is for denying air's being ‘that which producessuch sound.’ If the author intended to mean that hardness etc. are thequalities of sound, he should state that air produces anew such sound (K).

311

I. i. 1, xii. 1]
and the [above-quoted] supplementary passage that:*Holes in a flute [ViP II. xiv. 32],
and also in view of the simplicity of assumption,1128 it is particular air,which is regarded as that which manifests [sound] by others, that isapprehended as qualified by various qualities of sound1129 which are produced
due to the various vibration (gha††aˆa) of particular substance [for articulationsuch as a palate] and the [various] latent impression (saµskåra) [of previous
pronunciation]. [451]
The summary [of the above-mentioned various opinions regarding
sound ] is: all sound has the Supreme Self, who has [any of] particularmodification1131 of the non-manifest (avyakta) as the body, as the materialcause. Again, it is neither eternal nor without material cause as independent
substance assumed by the Bhå††as1132 or as the quality [of ether] assumed by
the Pråbhåkaras.
1130[The theory of the Grammarians1133] that syllables have spho†a1134
etc.1135 as the material cause is contradictory to the Scriptures and1128

Because it is complicated (gaurava) to assume that which produces(utpådaka) other than that which manifests (vyañjaka) (R).
1129ßabdaguˆavißish†a. R poses some interpretations: “This means (1a)‘qualified by the modification in the form of sound-ness’ or (1b) ‘qualified
by the qualities of sound such as being high; after all, it means ‘modified
into sound.’ According to some, however, (2) this is the opinion that thequality called sound is produced in air due to the function of a palate etc.:[the substratum of sound is only air, neither ether nor the other grosselements (K)].”1130(a) the substratum of sound is only ether; (b) it exists in all the
five elements; (c) it is substance being the modification of air; (d) air ingeneral is its substraatum (K).
1131
It does not matter whether the modification is ether or air (R).
1132
See the verse quoted in SAS V. 22: 702,1f.
1133
Here R quotes Våkyapad¥ya I. 1.
1134
For the definition of the term, see SDS XIII. 137f.: (1) sphu†yate
vyajyate varˆair iti spho†o varˆåbhivyaµgya˙ (2) sphu†ati spha†¥bhavatyasmåd artha iti spo†o 'rthapratyåyaka˙. Cf. ÍP I (1) 180,20f.: nådai˙ spho†yate
iti vyutpattyå spho†a˙.
1135
ådi-padårtho vim®ßya˙ (V).

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perception.1136 And concerning spho†a, our perception1137 cannot be validmeans of knowledge; [452] yogic perception is doubtful. Nor the
Scriptures.1138
Besides, what makes assume [spho†a according to you theGrammarians] can be interpreted in the other way.1139 [You try to provespho†a by means of] the alternative question, say, which denotes the meaning[of a word], each of [constituent syllables] or the combination [of thesyllables1140]. Yet the same alternative holds good concerning that which ismanifested by spho†a1141; [accordingly, you cannot blame us because bothof us have the same defect1142]. But in your case, there is further [defect] ofassuming [spho†a in addition to well-established syllables].
In the same way, the spho†a of a sentence is also broken (sphu†ita).
Also the singular form in the expression ‘I understand the meaning fromsound’ is not concerned with the oneness of that which is devoid of part1136

Or, ‘contradictory to the Scripture that ‘[våyo tvam eva]
pratyaksham [brahmåsi]” [TaiUp I. i. 1], [which teaches that air manifests
sound].’
1137
See SDS XIII. 127ff.: pratyaksham evåtra pramåˆam / gaur ity
ekaµ padam iti nånåvarˆåtiriktaikapadåvagate˙ sarvajan¥natvåt. R rejects it
for the reason that: ekopådhyavacchinnavarˆasamudåyavishayatayå 'py
upapatte˙. Cf. TMK IV. 87.
1138
R refers to the usage of spho†a in MBh III. 11. 58 (?) and interprets
it etymologically. Cf. TMK IV. 89; SeM¥ 91,13ff.
1139
Cf. TMK IV. 88.
1140—Not the former because the other syllables would be meaningless;nor the latter because momentary syllables can not form a combination (R).
Cf. SDS XIII, 132–135: kiµ varˆå˙ samastå vyastå vårthapratyayaµ
janayanti? nådya˙, varˆånåµ kshaˆikånåµ samËhåsaµbhavåt / nåtyanta˙,… [the reason here is different from that posed in R] … tasmåd varˆånåµvåcakatvånupapatau yadbalåd arthapratipatti˙ sa spho†a˙; ibid. 143f.:varˆånåµ våcakatve dvit¥yådivarˆoccåraˆårthakyaprasaµgåt (from Kaiya†aad Mahåbhåshya p.12).
1141
The same refutation is found in SDS XIII. 182f. also. Like SDS, R
further examines Bhart®hari's answer to this refutation in Våkyapad¥ya I.
85.
1142
In this regard, R quotes the Ílokavårttika, ßËnyavåda v. 252ab:
yaß cobhyo˙ samo dosha˙ parihåro 'pi vå sama˙ (the original reading of thea-påda is: tasmåd yatrobhayor dosha˙). Moreover, R takes up the objection
to this argument in Våkyapad¥ya I. 85 and refutes it.

313[i.e. spho†a], because we apprehend oppositely [that parts are many].1143
Against [your opinion] that Brahman is expressed by the word spho†a[453], we have no objection. Nevertheless the superimposition (adhyåsa)etc. [on spho†a] are to be rejected like the Advaita opinion.1144
The grammatical sm®tis [beginning with the PåˆinisËtra1145] areestablished even without [accepting] spho†a. And you cannot say all isproper that is said by them. Moreover, Påˆini and so on have not assert so[on spho†a]; the others [like Bhart®hari] who make an effort incessantly1146
should not be respected. And it is stated by Bha††a-Paråßara-påda:*[All that] grammarians [should do is to] arrange a stem, an affix
and an accent according to old usages and etymologically explain theformation of a word.1147 [?]And for the same reason that is mentioned concerning the guˆasbeginning with sattva, sound is proved to be non-substance.
[Obj.] That sound is non-substance and that it is [not produced anewbut] manifested cannot be our finally accepted view (siddhånta). Because itis proved to be substance and an effect (or that which is produced anew)
according to the ßrutis and so on. That is, in the passage that:*That syllable declared in the beginning of the Vedas1148[MahåNåråyaˆaUp X. 8],
and so on, it is stated that syllables are the material causes of the othersyllables. And non-substance could not be a material cause. If [the passage]1143

Cf. SeM¥ 90,15ff.: ‘ßabdåd arthaµ prat¥ma˙’ ity ekavacananirdeßåt
‘ekaµ padam’ iti kaˆ†hokter anekebhyo gakårådibhyo 'dhikaµ ßabdam
upalabdhavanto vyavahåra iti cet; tan na, etc.
1144
Because spho†a is, like Brahman, nirvißesha and niraµßa and, hence,
it does not have a part known and a part unknown, it cannnot be thesubstratum of adhyåsa.
1145
According to K.
1146
n¥radhra. K shows the variant nirarthaka (in vain).
1147
Cf. Våkyapad¥ya I. 16.
1148
The full passage is: “What is meant (para) by that syllable declaredin the beginning of the Vedas and established in the end of Vedas [=om-kåra] which is dissolved (l¥na) in its source (prak®ti) [= a-kåra], is theHighest Lord” (yo vedådau prokto vedånte ca pratitish†hita˙, tasyaprak®til¥nasya ya˙ para˙ sa maheßvara˙). The meaning is explained in VAS§103 quoted below.

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simply meant that [syllables] are the instrumental causes [of the others], thenatural meanings of [the words used here] ‘source (prak®ti),’ [which denotes]
a material cause, and ‘dissolved (l¥na)’1149 etc. 1150 would be spoiled. Because
an instrumental cause could be neither the source nor the place ofdissolution.1151 And this [passage should] not be [interpreted as] metaphorical,
because nothing sublates [its natural meaning] and because [suchinterpretation] is contradictory to the statements of the author of thecommentaries. So in [his] Vedårthasaµgraha, starting with the phrase that:*The syllable om, which is the seed of the Vedas as it is in the
beginning and the end of the Vedas1152 [VAS §103: 135,7],
he continues:*The syllable om is the source of all the Veda [454]. And the sourceof om [or a-u-m] is the syllable a. The Veda, which is the modificationof the syllable om, is dissolved in the syllable om, which is its own
source. Also the syllable om, which is the modification of the syllable
a, is dissolved in the syllable a, which is its own source.1153 The
para1154, i.e. the import, of this syllable a, which is the source of thesyllable om, is the Highest Lord. The meaning is: Nåråyaˆa — whois denoted by the syllable a, which is the source of all denotative[words], and who is the source of all denoted [objects] — is theHighest Lord [VAS §103: 135,9–12].
Further, quoting the passage that:*The letter a, indeed, is the whole language (våc) [AitareyaÓraˆyaka
II. iii. 6],
he states:*It is quite clear that all denotative [words] have the syllable a as thesource and that all denoted [objects] have Brahman as the source[VAS §103: 136,1–2].
Also in the Ír¥mad-G¥tåbhåshya [ad the verse that]:*Of letters, I am the syllable a [BhG X. 33],
1149

See MahånåråyaˆaUp X. 8 quoted above: … tasya prak®til¥nasyaya˙ para˙ sa maheßvara˙.
1150upådånaprak®til¥nådisvårasyabhaµga. Here the translation follows
R. V interprets: the natural meaning of the word prak®til¥na etc., which isconcerned with upådåna, would be spoiled.
1151
According to K.
1152
See MahånåråyaˆaUp X. 8 quoted above: yo vedådau prokto vedånte
ca pratitish†hita˙, tasya …
1153
See MahånåråyaˆaUp X. 8 quoted above: … tasya prak®til¥nasyaya˙ para˙ sa˙ …
1154
See MahånåråyaˆaUp X. 8 quoted above: … tasya prak®til¥nasyaya˙ para˙ sa˙ …

315[the same author states:]*Among letters, I am the syllable a, which is well-known in the ßruti
passage:“The letter a, indeed, is the whole language” [AitareyaÓraˆyaka II.
iii. 6],as the source of all syllables [GBh X. 33: 351,6–7].
And it is stated that sound is modification in the {Ír¥-]Bhåshya that:*Since Prajåpati, the creator, and sound, which is the modification of
the ahaµkåra named bhËtådi,1155 are destroyed in the material (pråk®ta)
dissolution. [Ír¥Bh I. iii. 29: 66,2–3]
So also in the [Vedånta-]d¥pa:*In the Vedas composed of sound which is the modification of theunmanifested (avyåk®ta) [VD¥pa I. iii. 29: 32,4],
etc. Moreover, the passage beginning with:*One who has the Vedas as the body1156 [?],
also proves [sound] to be substance. Because only substance can be thebody, as is established in the definition of the body.1157 Also in the Ótmasiddhi
it is stated that:*We experience that even quality such as sound, smell, effulgence ofthe sun and brilliance of a jewel has movement and goes beyond thesubstratum. Indeed, sound is very subtle, is of the nature of going far
off and is elemental [ÓS 79,7–8];*This [sound], you know, travels by its special force as long as thevelocity (vega) lasts, like a [thrown] stone, even from things, e.g. theconch and the mouth, far away from the range of sight,1158 [455]though it is devoid of touch. [ÓS 78,4–5],
etc., which clearly justify the denial of sound being the quality of ether,1159
that it is aerial,1160 that it takes place immediately after pronunciation,1161
and the refutations of the opinion that sound is manifested.1162
1155

I.e. the tåmasåhaµkåra.
1156
yasya vedå˙ ßar¥ram. Such phrase is not found in B®hUp(Mådhyandina-rec. also) and the SubålaUp.
1157
158,5ff.: yasya cetanasya yad dravyaµ sarvåtmanå etc.
1158d®ßåm, genitive. If the v.l. dißåm, is adopted, it should be taken as
accusative and is combined with abhipratitish†hati (to travel) (R).
1159
I.e. ÓS 79,12: atad- [=åkåßa-] guˆatvåt.
1160
I.e. ÓS 79,12: våyav¥ya˙ ßabda˙, etc.
1161
I.e. ÓS 79,14f.: utpadyate ßabda˙, k®takaß ca; kriyottaram
evolabhyatvåt.
1162
I.e. ÓS 79,16: na cåbhivyañjakatvam, etc.

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[Ans.] If it be decided in this way [that sound being non-substanceand manifested cannot be our finally accepted view], [the Vedic passages]that syllables are the material causes [of the others] should be interpreted as[1] just literal (yathårtha), [2] imaginary (kålpanika), 1163 [3] the injunction
concerning meditation1164 (d®sh†ividhi) or [4] figurative (aupacårika).
[1] We cannot adopt the first alternative. Because according to theopinion that syllables are eternal, [syllables] can be neither a material cause
nor a material effect (upådeya). According to the Naiyåyika opinion,[syllables] are accepted to be [not material causes but] non-inherent causes
etc. and they, [being qualities], never produce anything existent anew. Evenin the opinion of the Venerable sage Yåmuna, it is air that is the materialcause of syllables. The author of the commentaries also mentions of [sound]being the modification of the ahaµkåra [and] nothing suggests to accept[such] order 1165 of production [that enables the indirect relation concerningsound] as in the case of the statements [that the world] is the modificationof the non-manifest.1166 [You may hold that such relation is taught in the
Vedic passages, but] the [Vedic] statements show inconstant relation of amaterial and an effect concerning syllables1167 [and] they show contradictory
relation of a material and an effect1168 [456]. Again [you may regard such
1163

Non-literal like the talk of an old bull (R). ‘The talk of an old bull’is shown as an example of nonsensical statement in Såyana's introductorycommentary on the Ùgveda.
1164
Like “mano brahmety upås¥ta” [ChUp III. xviii. 1] (R). This is theso-called prat¥kålambhana type of meditation; see BrSË IV. i. 4.
1165paryåya˙ = paramparå (K).
1166This is against the following objection: as the world can be said tobe the modification of the non-manifest because the two are indirectly
related by means [of the order of the modifications beginning with theahaµkåra], so syllables can be said to be the modifications of the ahaµkåra
because sound, which has syllables as the material causes, is [described inthe Ír¥Bh as] the modification of the ahaµkåra (R); or since [the statementof the ÍBh] intends to mean indirect modification as in the statement thatthe world is the modification of the non-manifest, the statement that [sound]is the modification of the ahaµkåra is possible because sound is accepted
to be the modification of the syllable a, which is the modification of theahaµkåra (K).
1167
I.e. “In some texts, syllables are said to be the modifications of thea-letter, the u-letter etc., which form the portion of om; in some, [they aresaid to be] the modifications of the h-letter etc., which form the portion ofh®llekha” [457,5f.].
1168
For instance, compare AitÓr II. iii. 6 cited above with AitBr XXV.

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descriptions as optional, but] option is impossible as to an establishedentity.1169 Further, if [it be explained that there is not any fixed rule concerning
the material cause with] the illustration that [some] scorpions [are producedfrom] cow-dung and [some are from a mother-scorpion],1170 this would
bring about complication. And [there is some difference between a scorpion
from cow-dung and that from a mother-scorpion, yet] no difference is seen
[in the case of sound].
[Obj.] [Though the non-manifest is the material cause, syllables canbe] the material causes as those which delimitate (avacchedaka) [the nonmanifest being] the material cause.
[Ans.] Not so. If it should be the case, [syllables] could not be thematerial causes as lump-ness, which belongs to the lump of clay, [cannot
be the material cause of a pot]. For even when that which is qualified is amaterial cause, the qualifiers cannot be so because they are devoid ofqualified-ness.1171
Moreover, the description that [sound] has color etc.1172 can beestablished by no means. Because color is produced only in [entities]
following fire. And because this would bring about the undesirable conclusionthat [sound] is visible and, consequently, it has touch etc. like a pot. Further,that which is apprehended everywhere cannot have a particular position.1173[457][2] Nor the second. Is this [being ‘imaginary’ concerned] witheverything, with the phenomenal world or syllables only? Not the former
two. Because the voidness, [which would be brought about if everything
were imaginary], the non-duality [of Brahman, which would be brought
about if the phenomenal world were so], and the like are rejected becauseof the contradiction to the very teaching1174 and so on. Nor the rest. For
vii. 2 cited below.
1169
Cf. 292,3: na ca vikalpa˙ siddhe tadayogåt.
1170
Cf. 276,1.
1171
Otherwise, when One which is qualified by spiritual and nonspiritual beings is the cause [of the world], these qualifiers [also] would be
the causes (R).
1172
E.g. “ßvetaµ ßyåmaµ ca p¥taµ ca piµgalaµ n¥lalohitam / n¥laµkanakavarˆaµ ca varˆåny etåny anukramåt //” [?] (R).
1173
See the verses from Måtrikådhyayanaßloka (?) quoted in R
(447,10ff.) and in K (456,-1ff.).
1174
In either case, the very teaching that everthing or the phenomenal
world is imaginary would be false because it is included in either of thetwo. Cf. v.54 in 309,1.

318[being imaginary] could be applied to [the teaching that] prak®ti etc. [arethe material cause of the world] because [it] is not different [from theteaching that syllables are the material causes] in being based on the Scriptures.
[You may assert that the latter teaching is refuted because it is not appropriate
for syllables, devoid of color, touch etc., to be the material causes, but] theinappropriateness can be doubted in every case [including prak®ti etc.]. For
that which is based on the Scriptures cannot be sublated in view ofappropriateness and their authority is well-established. Further, nonapprehension cannot sublate [the existence of a thing] if it be incompetent1175;
otherwise, there would be the over-application [that all is non-existent thatis not apprehended].
[3] [Obj.] Then, let us accept the third view. To explain — In some
texts, syllables are said to be the modifications of the a-letter, the u-letter
etc., which form a portion of om [458]; in some, [they are said to be] themodifications of the h-letter etc., which form a portion of h®llekhå. Moreover,a Íruti [teaches] in the other order:*From the Ùgveda, bhËr was born. From the Yajurveda, bhuva˙.
From the Såmaveda, suva˙.
These [three vyåh®tis] having the shining One [as god1176] heated up.
From these heating ones, the three syllables were born: the a-letter,the u-letter and the m-letter. These are combined together. That isom [AitareyaBråhmaˆa XXV. vii. 1–2].
But a sm®ti states:*Prajåpati squeezed the a-letter, the u-letter and the m-letter, bhËr,bhuva˙ and suva˙ as well from the three Vedas [Manusm®ti II. 76].
Also, having stated generally that all the mantras have om as the source, theritual texts (kalpa) mention of the source-letter of each mantra. Moreover, it
is explained that the Vedic verses (chandas) keep1177 a mantra at the
dissolution.1178 Additionally, particular colors like white, red and yellow are
mentioned regarding various letters; one and the same letter is described ashaving different colors in accordance with the difference in the applicationand that in mantra. Likewise, particular positions etc., which are fixed ornot, are [mentioned regarding various letters]. Truly, however, syllables do
not have any variety of color, position etc.; the only intention [of thesedescriptions] is that contemplating [syllables] as of such character makes
special unseen power as in the case of a story associated with an amulet
1175

Cf. Vedåntaparibhåshå VI. 3 (Adyar ed.).
1176
ßukriya: ßukla˙ tejish†ha˙ paramåtmå, sa eshåµ devateti tånißukriyåˆi (R). But the text of the Bråhmaˆa (ÓnSS ed.) reads ßukråˆi.
1177
saµchådya. Cf. ChUp I. iv. 2: chandobhir acchådayan etc.
1178
Therefore mantras are eternal, which is contradictory to the passages
mentioning of their sources (R).

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(yantra). Otherwise, these [descriptions] would lose their authenticity because
they teach mutually contradictory contents as to the relation of a material
and the effect, color, position etc. Therefore, only the injunction concerning
meditation is proper in this case.
[Ans.] Such view is also blamed. To explain — Like [the injunction],say, that:*One should meditate this syllable om as the udg¥tha [ChUp I. iv. 1],
the injunction “One should meditate om as the material of all the syllables”
is not found; on the other hand, the [above-cited] statements [as to syllables]
are, no doubt, teachings regarding the truth. If they were still the injunctions
concerning meditation, so could be even [the statement] that Brahman isthe cause of the world and the like. And [the view] that [the statements asto syllables] are the injunctions concerning meditation is quite out of questionin the statements of the author of the Commentary,1179 which makes us
understand the reason [to ascertain] truth.
[Obj.] Depending upon [the maxim that] kåßa-grass is used [as asubstitute for] kußa-grass,1180 the relation of original and modification [isestablished] in the way, say, how syllables are produced in the part of ether
delimited by a-letter.
[Ans.] Then, what is qualified by this [a-letter] being original would
be figurative so far as this [letter] is concerned. Consequently, the injunction
concerning meditation is abandoned.
[4] [Obj.] Let it be in this case.
[Ans.] If it were the case, the statement [of the author of theCommentary1181] that the syllable a, which is [actually] the source of all
denotative [words] denotes the Supreme Self, who is the source of all
denoted [objects], would be improper [459]. Hence, the indication of theparticularity in the form of the relation of original and the modification[would be] figurative as having the intention of praise or as connected withthe potency etc. of various effects, as in the case of the indication of[colors] like red, white and black regarding the three guˆas.1182
1179

See the passage of VAS cited above.
1180
Cf. Ír¥Bh II. i. 15: kåßakußåvalambenåpi [258,4]; and ÍP thereon:kåßasya kußatvena kußasthåne 'valambanaµ kåßakußåvalambhanam;
amukhyam ity artha˙. Although the maxim is sometimes used to mean
being driven from one untenable argument to another almost equallyuntenable [Ranghacharya & Varadaraja Aiyangar, Eng. trans. II, pp.314f.,
fn.2], here it means only amukhyatva as in the Ír¥Bh.
1181
Cf. the passage of VAS cited above.
1182
Cf. ÍveUp IV. 5.

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Thus it were established [that the above four views are not acceptable];then, the fifth view is advocated: [a Vedic passage that syllables are thematerial causes] is sometimes [1] just literal, sometimes [2] imaginary,
sometimes [3] the injunction concerning meditation (d®sh†ividhi) andsometimes [4] figurative (aupacårika). That is, if [its meaning] is not sublated,[it is interpreted as] the first; if sublated and baseless, the second; if there is
the injunction of meditation, almost [the passage is interpreted as] the third;
if [its meaning is] sublated but has some base, [it is interpreted as] thefourth.
[Obj.] Even if it were the case, there would be no finally acceptedview for us. That is, is sound substance or non-substance? If substance,
what is the material cause of what? How is [its] relation with color etc.? If
non-substance, how [is its] relation with being material cause, color etc.
[interpreted]?
[Ans.] Our answer is as follows. Some of our sect assert (I) sound issubstance; some assert (II) it is non-substance.
Even in the view that it is substance, some hold (I-a) it is made up of
air and some hold (I-b) it is not made up of air.
Even in [the view] that [it] is made up of air, according to one
opinion, (I-a-1) [sound], being the dharma of a drum etc., is manifested bybeating as light, being the dharma of a lump etc.; according to the other,(I-a-2) it is produced anew by beating as wind by a fan.
that:

In either view, it is devoid of touch [460] because of the statement*Though it is devoid of touch. [ÓS 78,5].
Even if [it] is made up of air, it has no touch because of the non-apprehension.
(I-a-1) The ground of the first opinion is that it is natural to ourverbal expression, say, ‘drum-sound (bher¥ßabda) [or sound of a drum].’(I-a-2) In the other, this [sound] is produced anew only at that time[of beating] according to the copresence and coabsence because we can[interpret] such expression like ‘wind by waving,’ [i.e. we can interpret itas ‘sound by a drum’].
(I-a) The intent of those who accept [sound] as made up of air is:
suppose air [itself] has sound-ness, which is based upon audibility, as we
assume the potency of manifesting or [producing], which is not found in
the air other [than that which is connected with the drum etc.]; since air,whether manifester or producer, must be present and it is complicated if we
assume the sound other [than air], whether manifested or produced by it.
And in this [view], the teaching that [a syllable] is the material cause [ofthe other] etc. are just [3] the injunctions of meditation or [[4] figurative].

321(I-b) If [sound] is not made of air, however, [its] material cause is, as
is taught [in various passages], not fixed in accordance with the differenceof kalpa or the cosmic egg. For the same reason, nor [its] position etc. are
fixed. But [its position etc.] are not apprehended because it is not compatible
with color and so on. Or rather, the injunction of meditation etc. are accepted
regarding the aspect sublated by the non-apprehension.
(II) Now, the view that [sound] is non-substance is explained.
According to this [view], firstly, the reasons which are stated by the authorof the Commentary in order to [prove] that sattva, rajas and tamas are
non-substances1183 hold good in respect to sound also. Also the designation[of sound] as the modification of the non-manifested or ahaµkåra1184 isjustified since it means that [sound] is adventitious quality.1185 [461] And
the statement of the Ótmasiddhi1186 is justified as it is mentioned as theopinion of the others or that of one sect [of our school]. Bha††a-Paråßara-påda
mentions of only [the view] that sound is quality of ether when he expounds‘sentence’:*For a series of sentence was previously composed by God — whostarts the specific natures and the conditions of [everything] including
sound, which is attribute of ether — as purporting contents compatible[with perception]1187 [Tattvaratnåkara?].
Besides, [the passage] beginning with:*One who has the Vedas as the body1188 [?],
is validated as being concerned with a particular god [presiding the Vedas].
Likewise, verbal expression as to the material cause, color, position etc. [ofsyllables is validated as it is concerned with a presiding god of each syllable].
In the same way, [the passage] beginning with:*That which is dissolved into its source1189 [MahåNåråyaˆaUp X. 8],[is also validated]. The verbal expression that a [seed] letter of each god is
the material cause etc. of each [god] is to be interpreted as figurative or as
the injunction of meditation in accordance with its context. That the material
1183

See Ír¥Bh & VD¥pa II. ii. 1 etc. cited in 445,3ff.
1184
See Ír¥Bh & VD¥pa I. iii. 29 cited in 454,7ff.
1185
I.e. being ‘modification’ here means adventitiousness, not theassociation of one and the same substance with another condition, by which
it should be accepted that [sound] is substance (R).
1186
I.e. the passages cited in 454,10ff.
1187
Sentence is wished by God, who starts everything, to have, innature, contents not sublated by perception; accordingly, sound is of suchnature. It cannot pass such nature (R).
1188
Cf. 454,9f.
1189
Cf. 453,7ff.

322

cause is not fixed [in various texts] and the like should be judged from [thediscrimination of] the authenticity and the non-authenticity of the [genuine]
Scriptures and the pseudo-Scriptures as in the case of the material cause
regarding entities which is not fixed [in various text]. Concerning the[genuine] Scriptures, you should interpret from the view point of reason.1190
In this manner, the different opinion [as to whether the materialcause of everything is] the a-syllable or the h-syllable is rejected.
In this regard, some hold there is not any contradiction. That is, herethe ‘a’ suggests the sixteenth letter [i.e. visarga (˙)] accompanied with that[a] in front or from behind [462]. It is this [a-˙ or ˙-a] that is [said to be]
the material cause [of everything]. And that is why this [sixteenth letter],which is of nature of both [vowel and consonant], is read [in the alphabetlist] in-between vowels and consonants. It is well-established through ourexperience that the first syllable and the sixteenth combined reversely, [i.e.
˙-a], become ha, as, for instance, the syllable i becomes the syllable y[when it is combined with a vowel].1191 And that is stated in the
Lakshm¥tantra. 1192 Therefore, what is read in the scriptural passage that:*a iti brahma [AitÓr II. iii. 8],
is the a-syllable followed by the sixteenth syllable.1193
But the others think as follows — First, this [˙ syllable] is not listenedat all in the om syllable. And it is not read in the Scripture that ‘The lettera˙, indeed, is the whole language.1194’ Besides, the substitute of the o [forthe a˙] is not justified [in the case of the om] because [the a˙] contains thecase-ending.1195 It is affirmed by the means of knowledge that Vishˆu alone
is the cause of everything. He is well-known to be denoted by the first[syllable a]. True some authoritative mantras mention of the syllable h [asthe cause of everything] [463], but it is to be regarded as stated after
accepting this [syllable h] is the [initial] letter for the Supreme Self [named
Hari]. Depending upon the Írutis and so on, you can consider how everythingarises from the syllable om through its part,1196 [namely, the syllable a].
1190

(R).

If both are authentic, the one compatible with reasoning is acceptable

1191

Cf. Påˆini 6. 1. 77: iKo yaÔ aCi.
1192
調べなくちゃね。
1193

If mere a is intended, the passage would be ‘eti brahma’ (R).
Cf. AitÓr II. iii. 6: a-kåro vai sarvå våk, cited above.
1195
If the sixteenth syllable at the end of the nominative singular forma˙ containing the case-ending were included in the om, the form om could
not be established (R).
1196
K reads deßa for aµßa.
1194

323

When this [syllable om] is [said to be] connected with the three Vedas, it isregarded [as] ending with the syllable m; when [the four Vedas] including
the Atharva are intended, [the syllable om is regarded as] followed by acertain voice1197 (nåda). In the same way, consider the minor difference as
to the source[-letter] in the form of the syllable a, gårhapatya, gåyatr¥, thefirst feet, ®gveda, svarloka etc.1198[Obj.] Why is the syllable om produced from the syllable a?
[Ans.] It is easy to understand the reason that from the Supreme Self,
which is denoted by the syllable a, the deity presiding over the syllable om
or deities and the like [presiding over] the parts of this [syllable om1199] areproduced.
Accordingly, the opinion that sound is non-substance is creditable.
And so be the case, you can imagine, as you understand, that the ears
functions [after reaching the source of sound, as the eyes]; that air, which
manifests sound, reaches [the ears]; that the [subtle] parts of [the source]
like a drum, which has sound, reaches [the ears] [464]; or that air, which
has the sound [as the quality], reaches [the ears].1200
Thus sound is explained.
Touch is that non-substance which is other than what is dissimilar
1197

It is of a half mora and exists after the syllable m of om, as is
well-known in the mantraßåstra (R). So a, u, m and this nåda correspond to
the four Vedas respectively.
1198
R quotes the following passage: tasya ha vai praˆavasya yå pËrvå
måtrå p®thivy a-kåra˙ sa ®gbhir ®gvedo brahma [°må in UVG] vasavo gåyatr¥gårhapatya˙ så såmna˙ prathama˙ pådo bhavati / yå [in parenthesis in UVG]
dvit¥yå [added in UVG] 'ntarikshaµ sa u-kåra˙ sa yajurbhir yajurvedo
vishˆu-rudrås [vishˆË r° in UVG] trish†ub dakshiˆågnis så såmno dvit¥ya˙pådo bhavati / [yå(added in UVG)] t®t¥yå dyau˙ sa ma-kåra˙ sa såmabhi˙såmavedo rudrådityå jagaty åhavan¥ya˙ så såmnas t®t¥ya˙ pådo bhavati / yå'vasåne 'sya caturth¥ ardhamåtrå så somaloka om-kåra˙ såtharvaˆair mantrair
atharvaveda˙ saµvartako 'gnir maruto vårå∂ekarshir bhåsvati så såmnaß
caturtha˙ pådo bhavati [?].
1199
According to the second interpretation of R. According to thefirst: deities [such as Saµkarshaˆa], who are the parts of this [deity presiding
over the syllable om].
1200
That means: even if sound is non-substance, neither the maxim ofv¥c¥taraµga nor that of kadambhagolaka is acceptable (R). For these two
analogies, see Bhåshåpariccheda v.166.

324

from that which is grasped with the tactual organs like ours.1201
It is classified into three: cool, hot and neither-cool-nor-hot. Water
has cool [touch]; fire has hot [touch]; earth and air have neither-cool-nor-hot
touch.
Due to the mixture with another element, [various] touches appear to
be confused here and there; [they does] not be really [confused], as isunderstood by means of copresence and coabsence.1202 Likewise, in somecases, [an element] appears not to have [its own] touch. That is why thelight etc. of a jewel is not grasped with the tactual organ. It is stated in the
topic on the connection1203 (anvayådhikaraˆa) by the author of the Vivaraˆa[i.e. Ír¥-Råmamißra], in illustrating the contradiction in the difference cum
non-difference theory, as follows:*For instance, whatever is cool is never hot. And the hotness of air iscaused by fire inside of it, not by its real nature. For, according tothose who know truth, [if the hotness in air were] an attribute produced
through baking (påkaja) [like those of earth, it] could be removed bybaking. [Still] the color of fire [in ‘hot air’] is not apprehended
because it is overpowered by the equal colors [of earth or water
inside of air]. The touch of this [fire], however, is apprehended [in‘hot air’] because it is not overpowered by the other touches1204 [465].
All these [facts] are fixed according to our experience. [Vivaraˆa]‘Neither-cool-nor-hot’ is [an independent variety of] touch, but notmere absence of both cool and hot. [Should it be the case], ether etc. would1201

On this roundabout definition, R refers to the definition of thenityavibhËti (384,12: ni˙ßeshåvidyåniv®ttideßavijåt¥yånyatvam).
1202
I.e. only when there is the connection with fire or sunshine, there
is verbal expression ‘hot’ (R).
1203
As the Hindi commentary supposes, it may be His Vivaraˆa adÍr¥Bh I. i. 4, samanvayådhikaraˆa (probably 155,9f.: na hiß¥toshˆatama˙prakåßådivad bhedåbhedau ekasmin vastuni saµgacchete). Or,
it may mentions of one chapter of his ›a∂årthasaµkshepa; for the names of
the chapters of the work, see the verse in the Nayaprakåßikå [ed. Ír¥Bh with
ten Comms., vol.1, p.25]: j¥va-brahma-anvaya-avidyå-taddhvaµsopåyamocanam (Cf. Raghavan, History, p.17; though he understands the compoundin different way: ‘His ›a∂årthasaµkshepa is said to contain the main doctrinesof Vißish†ådvaita on the following six heads: soul, God, nescience, removalof nescience, means to get moksha and the nature of moksha’).
1204
tatsparßopalambhas tv anyasparßånabhibhavåt. R reports the variant
reading that: tatsparßånupalambho 'nyasparßåbhibhavåt. In this case, needlessto say, tat denotes våyu.

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be apprehended so [like air]. And it is established by the Íruti1205 that air
and earth have touch.
[Obj.] It is touch in general.
[Ans.] You cannot say so. Because there is no general [thing] without
any speciality.
[Obj.] It is [touch in general] in which neither speciality as ‘cool’ northat as ‘hot’ is apprehended.
[Ans.] You cannot say so. Because nothing makes us postulate thatspeciality which is never apprehended and because there is no support fromthe Scriptures.
Now, some expound as follows depending upon the general observationthat increase is cause by things of the same kind,1206 that air or wind (våta)is hot since hot [things] cause the increasing of wind.
But it is not true. For as [some fruits, say, a date-fruit and a jack-fruit]
have the same taste but their influence [on the body] differs each other,even in this case varieties of innate nature are possible; accordingly, there
is no sublation as to the opposite position (vipaksha) [that air is not accepted
as hot].
[Obj.] Coolness would never apprehended in air [if it were not accepted
as hot] — this consequence is sublation.
[Ans.] Not so [466]; because such consequence is quite acceptable
when [air] is not associated with snow or when associated with sunshine.
And the apprehension of [air] as cool when associated with snow can be
explained in the other way as caused by limiting adjunct. Otherwise, [i.e.
the above-mentioned reduction ad absurdum of yours were satisfactory],
we could also assume [air] as hot for fear of the consequence that air,[otherwise], could not be apprehended as hot.1207[Obj.] What is favored for this [reductio ad absurdum of yours1208]?
1205

R refers to: ßabdaikaguˆa åkåßa˙ ßabdasparßaguˆo 'nila˙ [?].
1206
Cf. the Óyurvedic passage cited above in 102.
1207
anyathoshˆånupalambhaprasaµgåd ushˆasya kalpyatvåt. The
variant reported in R that ushˆasyåkalpyatvåt is, as is asseted by V, to be
regarded as additional or in place of the whole passage, i.e., not only inplace of ushˆasya kalpyatvåt.
1208
kiµ tatrånugråhyam. R poses two interpretations: kim
ushˆatvasådhakam anugråhyam, uta ß¥tatvasådhakam. K clears the meaningof the former — “What is favored for the tarka in the form that hotness
would never be apprehended in air if hot touch were not accepted, i.e., the326[Ans.] Producing hot things is [favored]. In fact, no non-hot thingcan be the material of hot substance. And it is air that is [said to be] thecause of hot fire [in the Scriptures].
Thus air is neither-cool-nor-hot. So is earth.
Again, touch is of two sorts: produced through baking (påkaja) andnot produced through baking. The former [kind of touch] belongs to earth;
the latter to the other three. Between these [two], varieties of [touch] produced
through baking are particular touches of nectar, poison, ‘monkey-itch,1209’
cotton, a stone, a cow, a Brahmin, an outcaste (caˆ∂åla) etc. First, earth
arises from water as having mere neither-cool-nor-hot touch [467].
Afterwards, difference in baking causes difference [in touch], as is affirmed
according to copresence and coabsence.
‘Soft,’ ‘hard’ etc., [which are gained through baking], are also varietiesof touch; because they are apprehended with the tactual organ alone. Theeyes, however, merely make us infer, through grasping such color etc.
which are inseparable to these [touches], not only touch in general but also
these [soft touch etc.] properly. The hardness in hail-stone and the like iscaused by the mixture with earth. The expression ‘soft wind’ is based on
the fact, say, that its speed is slow. Notwithstanding, some hold these[softness etc.] are special kinds of conjunction.
[Obj.] Why do a cow, a Brahmin and an outcaste have [468] different
touches?
[Ans.] Because of the difference of purity, impurity and so on, which
are based on them.
[Obj.] It is caused by the difference of birth (jåti), isn't it?
[Ans.] How [do we know] the difference of birth?
[Obj.] From the difference in the mode of mixture of a mother and afather.
[Ans.] Not so. Since such [mixture] is not found in the case of a[primeval] Brahmin born [from Brahmå] through the mind1210 etc. Or rather,
the purity etc. are established due to the rate of sattva, rajas and tamas,
which is based on the graduation of merit and demerit, or due to the graduationof potency; accordingly, [469] there is not such difference of touch.
With respect to touches not produced through baking, however, themeans of knowledge proving hotness? For instance, what is favored for thetarka in the form that coolness would never be apprehended in air if cool
touch were not accepted, is the inference that: wind has cool touch, because
it is increased by cool thing, like phlegm. But such means of knowledge
proving that hot touch is never found. Hence, there is no room for theabove-mentioned objection since nothing is established only through tarka.”

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difference among them is caused by the difference of mixture etc.
[Obj.] Why don't even water and air have touches produced throughbaking?
[Ans.] Because new touch [which is regarded as] produced throughbaking does not continue [in water and air] after hotness is apart, while[soft touch etc. produced through baking] in earth [continue even after
hotness is apart].
[Obj.] Then, it should be the hotness that is produced through baking
in such cases.
[Ans.] Not so, because [the hotness] can be interpreted as figurative
like coolness of air. Likewise, the apprehension of earth as cool or hot isalso due to limiting adjuncts [such as snow or fire], because it is neverapprehended so without the presence of limiting adjuncts. If [the hot touchetc.] were produced through baking, [they] would be continuous afterward
like color [of a baked pot].
[Obj.] That which is made up of earth is apprehended as cool or hot
even if water is taken away or even if fire is put out.
[Ans.] It is because subtle [water or fire] still remain. Because in a
moment, even this much goes away.
Color is that non-substance which is other than what is dissimilarfrom that which is grasped with the visual organs like ours. It is classified
into [1] white, [2] red, [3] black and [4] yellow. Their definitions are [being
the object of] the notion or the usage of ‘white’ etc. Among them, [1]varieties of white [color] are particular colors of water, silver, conch, motherof-pearl, moon etc. [2] Varieties of red [color] are particular colors of fire,a china-rose, a pomegranate, a bandhuj¥va-tree, coral, ruby etc. [4] Varietiesof yellow [color] are particular colors of gold, a kåñcanåra-flower, yelloworpiment, turmeric etc. [3] Varieties of black [color] are particular colors ofan emerald, a bee, rain-cloud, darkness, a tamåla-tree, a dËrvå-grass etc.
Some are of the opinion that yellow color is also a variety of red[color] [470], because only red, white and black are mentioned in the
Scriptures regarding fire, water and food [or earth].1211
From another view-point, color is of two sorts: [a] brilliant and [b]non-brilliant. Brilliant [color] belongs to fire; non-brilliant to earth andwater. Color in fire is brilliant red, whereas [that] in water is non-brilliant
white and [that] in earth is various kinds of non-brilliant [color]. Even this[earth], its appearance etc. are not fixed due to the mixture [with the other1209

kapikacchË is a kind of medicine, also known as marka†¥.
1210
R cites “sa månasån saptaputrån as®jata” [?].

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elements].
The Vaißeshika and other [schools] hold that variegated (citra) [color]is the fifth [category of] color,1212 but it is not true. The reasons are as
follows— Such apprehension [as ‘variegated’] and the usage [of ‘variegated’]can be justified only because the very [various colors, e.g. those of different
threads], existing united together form one particular unit, [e.g. the color ofa many-colored cloth]. [As for a colorful picture], we cannot perceive such[variegated color] as is different from the ground etc. decorated with a heapof various kinds of colored powder. You [also] accept these [various colors]
as producing the color of the whole. Even if the whole [as different from its
components] were acceptable [471], [the whole] should be differentiated,according to our experience, into the [various] substrata of the various
colors [which are not pervasive in the whole]. As, for instance, [when there
is a monkey in the top of a tree, one and the same tree] has the conjunction[with the monkey in its top] as well as the non-existence of it [in its root];so such partial distinction as is apprehended restricts [the color of eachpart]. If, [as you hold], [this apprehension] were sublated for the reason that[the colors of each part] produce that color which is homogeneous to another[new] color pervasive [in the whole], even the conjunction etc. [in theabove-mentioned example] would be [pervasive in the whole tree] merely
for the reason, say, that [they] are attributes.
Likewise, variegated taste and smell1213 are also explained.
Taste is that non-substance which is other than what is dissimilarfrom that which is grasped with the organ of taste like ours. It is classified
into six sorts: [1] sweet, [2] sour, [3] salt, [4] bitter, [5] hot1214 and [6]astringent. Their definitions are like [those] of the above-mentioned [‘red’
and other colors1215]. Among them, [1] varieties of sweet [taste] are tastes
of sugar-cane, milk, molasses etc. [2] Varieties of sour [taste] are tastes ofmango, tamarind, åmalaka-fruits etc. [3] Varieties of salt [taste] are tastesof rock-salt, sea-salt etc. [4] Varieties of bitter [taste] are tastes of a kimpåkatree, a nimba-tree etc. [5] Varieties of hot [taste] are tastes of ginger,
pepper, mustard etc. [6] Varieties of astringent [taste] are tastes of har¥tak¥1211

Cf. ChUp VI. iv. 1.
1212
The opinion is, as far as I know, first appeared in the Nyåyavårttika
IV. ii. 12.
1213
citrarasagandhånåm.
V
guessesthereading
citrasparßarasagandhånåm because it is plural. Cf. YMD X. 10:
citragandhasparßarasånåm api niråsa˙.
1214
NySi mentions of ushˆa in place of ka†u in YMD X. 11.

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fruits, vibh¥taka-fruits, a mango-sprout etc. Some has the misconceptionthat hot and [astringent tastes] are included in a variety of bitter [taste]. For
the detail of them, see medical scriptures (Óyurveda). [472]
Smell is that non-substance which is other than what is dissimilarfrom that which is grasped with the organ of smell like ours. It is classified
into [1] fragrant and [2] non-fragrant. The definitions etc. of the two arelike the previous ones. [1] Varieties of fragrance are smells of sandal,
musk, saffron, a campaka-tree etc. [2] Varieties of non-fragrance are smellsof a stink, raw meat etc.
This smell belongs to earth only. As in the case of ‘a [hot-]ironburns,’ [in which what really buns is fire associated with the iron], this[smell] is apprehended [even] in water, air etc. because of the mixture withcampaka, på†ala-flower etc. Because it is established through theconsideration of copresence and coabsence that [such apprehension] is basedon the mixture with them.
Some may say: It has been established before that touch and other[attributes] are admixed in [all] the five elements due to the quintuplication(pañc¥karaˆa); therefore, suppose in this case that an attribute [admixed] invarious [elements] is apprehended in manifested mode due to special
manifesting power as water in mirage.
Let it be so, we answer. It should be examined whether attributes can
exist in the other elements without mixture with their innate substratum;
the mixture [should] be done previously or at present. Both are [acceptable]
as the case may be. Because the previous [mixture due to the quintuplication]is established by force of the Scriptures and the mixture with på†ala-flower
etc. is established at present by perception.
Now, [we shall show] the explanation of an attribute produced throughbaking (påkaja) for those who follow Upanishads.
At the time of origination, earth has black color. Because it is naturalfor the ßruti passage that:*Whatever black is [the color] of food [or earth] [ChUp VI. iv. 1],
because the author of the Commentaries states that the darkness of ether isdue to a part of earth which is got [in ether] through the quintuplication1216(pañc¥karaˆa) and because [its color] prior to the quintuplication cannot be
produced through baking.
[Obj.] Why does this [earth] come into existence as originallyassociated with specialities?
1215

E.g. the definition of ‘sweet’ is [being the object of] the notion or
the usage of ‘sweet.’330[Ans.] You must be satisfied looking at the special colors and touches
in water and fire.
Thus,1217 let earth be originally black. Of what nature are its touch,taste and smell at that time? — We reply. To begin with, its touch isneither-cool-nor-hot like air and is not produced through baking like [thetouch of] this [air]. The particular touches of poison, nectar, itch-herb1218
etc. are produced through baking. In fact, mere neither-cool-nor-hot [touch]is apprehended in all the earthy [products]. Therefore, it is appropriate that
this much is innate. Concerning [its] taste, sweetness is original. Because it
is appropriate that the sweetness belonging to water, the cause [of earth], is
continuous so far as no speciality is not found [473]. For this [taste] is also
apprehended abundantly like [neither-cool-nor-hot] touch. In fact, almost
all the Earth (mahåp®thiv¥) is apprehended as sweet. It is due to baking that[the Earth is] sometimes apprehended as having particular tastes such as
sourness and saltiness. So [its] particular [kinds of] sweetness [such as‘very sweet’ and ‘sweetest’] are also [due to baking], because it is based on
copresence and coabsence as [in the case of other tastes]. As to [its] smell,fragrance is original. Because it is abundant in the Earth as in the previous
case [of its taste]. And [its] non-fragrant smells such as smells of a stink,raw meat etc. are also due to baking as in the previous case.
So earth is originally produced as having neither-cool-nor-hot [touch],
sweet [taste] and fragrant [smell] in nature. After that, due to the difference
in baking [earth] is combined with varieties of neither-cool-nor-hot touch
such as that of itch-herb; varieties of black color such as those of an
emerald, a green tamåla-tree and a lotus; non-black [colors] such as whiteand red; varieties of sweet taste such as those of sugar-cane, milk andmolasse; non-sweet [tastes] such sourness and saltiness; varieties of fragrantsmells such as those of a campaka-tree and musk; and non-fragrant [smells]such as those of a stink and raw meat. And sometimes its smell, taste,color, touch and sound are produced together and vanish together; sometimes
one of them remains and one of them vanishes. For we must accept thedifference in baking in accordance with our experience.
In this regard, some hold that the previous set [of smell etc.] isdestroyed by one conjunction of fire and the following [new] set is produced
by another [conjunction]. We maintain, however, that one and the same
[conjunction] destroys the previous [set] and produces the following one.
For instance, production of many effects [through baking, e.g. new color,taste and smell], can be interpreted as caused by single sufficient condition
divided into varieties of mere prior non-existence of that [quality] which is1216

For the color of ether, see 96,1–97,4.
UVG ed. reads astveyam…
1218
K reports the reading dushparimarßa for dussparßa, which
1217

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to be produced, [e.g. the prior non-existence of the new color and so on];likewise,1219 numbers of annihilative non-existence, [e.g. that of the previous
color etc.], can be caused by [single sufficient condition] divided into varietiesof operate factor in the form of each specific nature of that [quality] which
is annihilated. In the same way,1220 annihilation of the previous set andproduction of the following set can be caused by [single sufficient condition]
divided into, say, both kinds of prior non-existence, [i.e. the prior nonexistence of the annihilative non-existence of the previous qualities and theprior non-existence of the following ones] [474]. But, in fact, an effect is
not of two kinds since we, [regarding non-existence as just another existence],
admit the annihilation [of the previous color] to be the following color.
Designation changes due to the difference of varieties of correlative. Thatis all.
However, in connection with the refutation of manifested-ness [asthought in the Bhå††a M¥måµsakas], Bha††a-Paråßara-påda says:*As is known, that which destroys the previous color does not produce
the following individual, since conjunctions in the form of baking
are different. [Tattvaratnåkara?].
We regard it as [stated] following the opinion of others. For [the author]
explains that one and the same [thing can] bring about many effects.
And due to the subordinate difference in baking, the subordinate
difference in smell etc. is established.
Moreover, there is difference in opinion regarding baking: [theVaißeshikas assert] heating of [individual] atoms (p¥lupåka) [while theNaiyåyikas assert] heating of [the whole composite such as] a jar(pi†harapåka). 1221 Neither is accepted by us because, [according to us], thereis neither an atom nor the whole [as different from its components]. [475]Therefore, what is left to consider is [only] whether heating is done inassemble form or in separated form. In this regard, [we accept] both as thecase may be. First, the former, [i.e. baking in assemble form, is acceptable]
because that which has no gap, e.g. a pot, is apprehended as having different
color in accordance with the difference in baking. Insofar as the apprehension,even the Vaißeshikas would have no objection. Nonetheless, they assume
that the previous composite is broken into atoms and another new whole isproduced again in the order beginning with a dyad since they accept theconrresponds to the reading dushparimarßådisparßai˙ etc. in 473,6.
1219
tadvat. R doubts corruption in this sentence and suggests the readingyathå vå for tadvat here and shifting the latter to the end of the sentence. K
reads tadvat but interprets it as mere evam not corresponding to the previoustathå.
1220
tathaiva. K reports the variant tayaiva denoting såmagryå and V
regards it better (fn.1); still K admitts tathå to be necessary here.

332

rule that the [qualities] like color of the whole exist so long as their substratum
exists and that particular qualities of the whole is produced by those of its
part. The latter, [i.e. baking in separated form, is] also [acceptable] because
melting, contraction and the like are apprehended in baking bees' wax. Thisimplies that partial baking is also possible.
Conjunction is that [non-substance] which is the efficient cause thenotion that [something] is conjunct [with another].1222
Some are of the opinion that it is in the nature of but [two conjunct]things themselves1223; [some] that it is in the nature of but being-without-space(nairantarya).1224 [476]Of the [two opinion], [conjunction is] not [in the nature of] mere
[conjunct] things themselves. Because even though two [conjunct] things
themselves are existent, there is not the notion that [the one] is conjunctwith [the other] before or after the conjunction.
Nor the latter. Because there is no objection for those who, [like us],regard non-existence as another form of existence. That is to say, in our
opinion even such [being-without-space, or the non-existence of space,between two things] can be [regarded as the existence of] conjunction in apart [of one thing] proximate to [a part of the other].
[Obj.] Even though partial, there should be being-without-space[between the two] alone.
[Ans.] Not so, because even in this case you cannot pass over theabove-mentioned alternative [whether it is the conjunct things themselves
or something different]. That is, even if [being-without-space be of nonexistence], conjunction has been already established [as the countercorrelative of being-without-space] since such being-without-space as isdifferent from [conjunct] things themselves is in the nature of the nonexistence of conjunction in a particular remote part.
And the fact that [conjunction] is apprehended as sharing the same
substratum with the non-existence of it does not lead to contradiction because
1221

Cf. TarD §23.
1222
The definition saµyuktapratyaya of Deßika is same as Praßastapåda's[PDhS §165]. Udayana comments on it: yadvißish†e dravye ‘saµyuktam
idaµ anena’ iti matir sa saµyoga˙ [Kir 143,19f.].
1223
The same objection is found in Vyomavat¥ [ad PDhS §165] 64,12ff.
1224
The latter is of Buddhist. See SAS V. 52:
saµyogasyåntarålåbhåvatvavådinaµ bauddham, etc. (cf. NyKan [ad PDhS§165] 346f.). The Buddhist concept of saµyoga is rejected otherwise in333such is based on difference in portion.1225
As regards1226 part-less (niravayava) [entities], a portion (aµßa) as
caused by a limiting adjunct1227 (aupådhika) becomes the cause of conjunction[477]. And there is not infinite regress as the limiting adjunct also needs
another [for its conjunction]; for nothing other than contact (saµßlesha)with a limiting adjunct is necessary so far as imagination (jñapti) is concerned.
Because even if limitation by another [limiting adjunct] is [necessary] when[the contact] is produced, there is no defect like infinite regress in a seed
and a sprout.
Or rather, suppose that the difference in portion regarding part-less[entities] is [not due to a limiting adjunct but] innate considering theycannot be indicated in separated form as they cannot be divided.
[Obj.] Were it the case, it would bring about the following undesirable
conclusions: [you should accept a part-less entity as] one-cum-many, [inother words, you should accept the difference cum non-difference theory];[otherwise, you should accept a part-less entity as] the whole [as different
from its many components]; or, [you should accept a part-less entity as] but
a collection [composed of the many portions like forest composed of trees].
[Ans.] You cannot say so. Because such portion [as belongs to an
undivided entity] does not cause the designation by name of difference. Or
rather, let being one-cum-many as such be accepted [478] [since] it ishardly denied by force of valid knowledge.
Or rather, suppose whatever part-less exists entirely in all things
conjunct [to it] as genus, as is assumed by the Naiyåyika and others, does.
Having doubt the above, the author of the [Brahma-]sËtra reject it [in the
topic] beginning with [the sËtra]:*Whole [Brahman] would become [the world]; otherwise, there would
be the contradiction to the scriptural passage that [He] has no part[BrSË II. i. 26].
TMK V. 52a–c & SAS, as is expounded in Srinivasa Chari 1988: 351f.
1225
E.g. When a monkey hangs on a branch of a tree, one and thesame tree has the conjunction with the monkey regarding the branch aswell as the non-existence regarding its root and so on. It would be contradiction
if conjunction and the non-existence of it coexist in the same part.
1226
This is to refute the Jaina opinion that a nirvayavavastu cannot
have conjunction. Cf. TMK V. 53.
1227
I.e. a portion delimited by an upådhi in the form of another entity.
As sound is produced in ether, which is regarded as portionless by some,delimited by a drum, conjunction with a pot and the like is produced in [apart-less entity] like God and time delimited by another entity (K).

334

And to this [topic], it is stated in the [Vedånta-]d¥pa1228 that:*Brahman — which is different from all the other things, is understoodonly by means of the Írutis and is endowed with all potency1229 —becomes an effect and becomes infinite,1230 though It has no part.
Therefore, [such] doubt [as can be raised] regarding an entity whose
potency is limited, is not applied to It. As, according to those who
accept genus, genus [such as cow-ness], [though] shapeless [orunlimited] (amËrta), is wholly pervading even endless thingscompletely different each other such as a broken-horned [cow], a
innate-hornless [cow] and so on, [still such] doubt [as can be raised]
regarding the other entity [is not applied to it]; so it is possible [forpart-less Brahman] to be the cause of the world. [VD¥pa II. i. 26:
53,4–6]To the sËtra in the same topic that:*And because of the defects in [your] own position [BrSË II. i. 29],
it is stated that:*Moreover because of the defects in [your] own position that theprimordial matter (pradhåna) and so on form the cause [of the world],
Brahman is the cause of the world. Those defects which have been
pointed out regarding the primordial matter and so on would never
be attached to this [Brahman] since [It] is different from worldly
entities.1231 [VD¥pa II. i. 29: 53,18f.]
It is concluded, therefore, that as portion-less [entities] such as [a] theprimordial matter, [b] an atom, [c] latent impression (våsanå) andconsciousness (saµvit), Brahman and so on are capable of [a] partial
modification, [b] being [partially] covered and not covered [by anotheratom] and [c] having many objects and so on; so it is not inappropriate that
conjunction or a conjunct thing in full is connected to many things.
Even [the Vaibhåshika Buddhists], who assert momentary atoms,
accept that in the condition of multitude, one atom, without difference in1228Ír¥Bh etc. do not show the example of jåti.
1229
Cf. BrSË II. i. 27: ßabdamËlatvåt; 30: sarvopetå.
1230
NySi reads anantam instead of the reading in VD¥pa anyat, which,according to K. Bhashyam (English Translation by Sri K. Bhaashyam of
Sri Bhagavad Ramanuja's Vedanta Deepa, Madras, rpt. 1990, p.82), means
the cause.
1231
NySi reads: tatraiva laukikavastuvisajåt¥yatvena pradhånåder
ukatadoshå naiva prasajyeran; while VD¥pa reads: tatra hi
laukikavastusajåt¥yatvena pradhånåder ukatadosho 'nye ca prasajyeran. R
seems to read as VD¥pa, judging from his comment that tatreti
pradhånakåraˆatvavåda ity artha˙, which cannot be applied to tatra in thereading of NySi.

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portion, has [so-called] being-without-space to many [other atoms]. [Even]for the Vijñånavådins [or the Yogåcåra Buddhists], one [knowledge] has
images (åkåra) of many [objects]. Now, why does the Mådhyamika [Buddhist]dislike conjunction in particular1232?
[Obj.] This [dislike] is the entity1233 being the gateway to thevoidness1234 (ßËnyatva) [480].
[Ans.] Not so. Because there is contradiction in [your] statement[that everything is void] whether the voidness is existent or non-existent.1235[Obj.] Nothing that is actually seen would be disliked.
[Ans.] Not so. Because this [conjunction] is actually seen.
[Obj.] Since it is not experienced that some [conjunction] are so[actually seen], others also are not so.
[Ans.] This is incorrect, since it would lead to the undesirable
conclusion that unique characters fixed in every one are denied.
And such conjunction is of two kinds: effected (kårya) one and noneffected [or eternal] one (akårya).
The former is between limited [entities] or between a limited [entity]
and an all-pervasive [entity]. [And it is] caused by action of both [conjunctentities] or action of either: for instance, [conjunction] between two lambsor [that] between a pillar and a hawk.
Conjunction [of a whole] produced from conjunction [of its component](saµyogaja) is also expounded by the Vaißeshikas.1236 This is not the case.
Because, [as a matter of fact], there is not a whole [as different from its
components]. That is, the conjunction of components is nothing but the
conjunction of a multitude [of the components]. Our apprehension is also in
the form that ‘Now it is conjunct with a part’ alone.
1232

In other words, you should dislike it equally as everything isßËnya for you (R).
1233
V suggests the reading astu for vastu.
1234
I.e. if saµyoga is negated, the relation between an entity as cause
and an entity as effect is also negated; therefrom, the ßËnyatva is established
(R).
1235
If the ßËnyatva is accepted as existent, everything is not established
to be ßËnya; if [the ßËnyatva is accepted as] non-existent, the ßËnyatva itself
is set aside (R).
1236
See PDhS §§171–74. TarD [§29] gives an example of the
conjunction between a book and a body which is produced from theconjunction between the hand and the book.

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Even supposing a whole is existent [as different from its components],
let the whole be conjunct by force of the same cause that makes its component
be conjunct at the very moment in which the component is conjunct. For
we never perceive that Devadatta is conjunct with a book soon after hishand is conjunct with the book; [on the contrary, we perceive the two
conjunction coincidentally]. The motion of his hand is the non-inherent
cause [of not only the conjunction of his hand with the book but also that ofDevadatta], since it exists [or inherent] in the [inherent] cause, [i.e. his
hand], of the [inherent] cause [of the conjunction of Devadatta, i.e.
Devadatta1237]; [accordingly], it is appropriate that the conjunction of1237kåraˆakåraˆavartitvåd asamavåyitåm åpannena.
According to the Nyåya-Vaißeshika, asamavåyikåraˆatå is of two
kinds: (1: laghv¥) kåryeˆa saha-ekasminn arthe samavetatve sati yat kåraˆaµtattå; (2: mahat¥) svakåryasamavåyikåraˆena sahaikasminn arthe samavetatve
sati yat kåraˆaµ tattå [see TarS §40 and NyBo; the classification is firstfound in Vyomavat¥ (ad PDhS §108) II. 11,15ff.]. The following is wellknown as an example— When cloth is made from threads, (1) the threadconjunction is the asamavåyikåraˆa of the cloth, as it is inherent [inguˆaguˆibhåva] in that object (= the thread) in which the effect (= thecloth) is inherent [in avayavåvayavibhåva]. (2) The thread-color is theasamavåyikåraˆa of the cloth-color, as the thread-color is inherent [inguˆaguˆibhåva] in that object (= the thread) in which the samavåyikåraˆaof the cloth-color (= the cloth) is inherent [in avayavåvayavibhåva]; thecloth is the samavåyikåraˆa of its color, as it is produced inherent [inguˆaguˆibhåva] in the color of the cloth (See TarS §40: yatsamavetaµkåryam utpadyate tat samavåyikåraˆam).
Thread-Color
guˆa
guˆin
Threadavayava

Cloth-Colorguˆaavayavin

guˆin
Cloth

Let us now return to the present portion.
The opponent asserts that the hand alone can have that conjunction
whose asamavåyikåraˆa is the hand-motion (R). That is, the hand-motion is(1) the laghv¥-type of asamavåyikåraˆa of the hand-book-conjunction, as it337

Devadatta with the book is also produced by force of the very motion[481]. And whenever there is the motion of his hand, the motion of thatbody which is delimited by this [hand] too is established; then, the conjunctionof [Devadatta], or rather, is caused by such [motion of his body itself]. Weshould accept, according to our experience, that action (karman) also shares
the same substratum with its non-existence as, for instance, conjunction.1238
Besides, when Devadatta's hand is conjunct with a book brought by anotherperson, for what reason is it unacceptable [that the book is conjunct] with
Devadatta as well as [his hand]? For [in that case] the hand is not different
is inherent [in kriyåkriyåvadbhåva] in that object (= the hand) in which theeffect (= the hand-book-conjunction) is inherent [in guˆaguˆibhåva].
To this, our author replies: the hand-motion can be (2) the mahat¥-typeof asamavåyikåraˆa of the Devadatta-book-conjunction because of its
kåraˆakåraˆavartitva (The similar expression regarding the mahat¥-type isfound in Tarkabhåshå 38,4f.: samavåyikåraˆasamavåyikåraˆapratyåsannasyåpi paramparayå samavåyikåraˆapratyåsannatvåt). To explain, thehand-motion is the asamavåyikåraˆa of the Devadatta-book-conjunction, as
the hand-motion is inherent [in kriyåkriyåvadbhåva] in that object (= hishand) in which the samavåyikåraˆa of the Devadatta-book-conjunction (=Devadatta) is inherent [in avayavåvayavibhåva]; Devadatta is the samavåyikåraˆa of the Devadatta-book-conjunction, as it is produced inherent [inguˆaguˆibhåva] in the conjunction.
Hand-MotionkriyåHand-Book-Conjunctionguˆakriyåvat

guˆin

Hand
avayava
Devadatta-Book-ConjunctionguˆaavayavinguˆinDevadatta
1238
It is claerly stated in the *Daßapadårthaßåstra (勝宗十句義論) by*Candramati (慧月) that karman is vyåpyav®tti [Chinese trans. in Taisho
vol.54, 1265b.26ff.; Eng. trans. by Hakuju UI [who was the first professorof Indology of Tôhoku Univ., my alma mater!] (rpt. Varanasi, 1962), p.114].

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from him in being devoid of the motion, [in which you may find thereason]. Because the direction of the one towards [the book] is not different
from that of the other.
The above [discussion] serves to reject disjunction (vibhåga) produced
from [another] disjunction too. And we shall make disjunction included [inthe annihilative non-existence of conjunction].1239
Now, non-effected conjunction is between two substances which haveno gap and are motionless. It is denied by the Vaißeshika1240 and other[schools]. [To this, we show the following syllogism]: Two all-pervasive[substances] are conjunct each other, because they have no gap, like thatwhich everyone accepts so. If there were not conjunction [between thetwo], it would lead to the undesirable conclusion that they have gap. Andeven for those who approve only being-without-space, it is avoidable [toaccept the conjunction] in this case. For, in our opinion, being-without-space
is nothing but conjunction in a proximate part [482].1241 We, 1242 however,
never get the notion of being-without-space regarding [substance and thatwhich is inherent to it] like quality.
[Obj.] Conjunction does not exist [between two all-pervasive
substances] because nothing causes it.1243[Ans.] You cannot say so. Because we have mentioned the cause orreason to know it (jñåpaka). And it is you who have applied [the principle]
that whenever a cause is absent, an effect in general is absent to [not only
the relation between non-eternal things but also that between] God's [eternal]
knowledge, [His eternal] desire and [His eternal] volition.1244 Moreover,even regarding all-pervasive [entities], their production of effects and so on
are dependent upon God's entrance [or conjunction].
1239

See 530,1ff.
See PDhS §§178–180, esp. §179 where aja˙ saµyoga˙ between
two all-pervasive things is negated1241
See 476,1ff.
1242
This is to reply to the objection that if nairantya were nothing butåsannadeßasaµyoga, guˆa and guˆin, [not being in the relation of saµyoga],
could not have nairantya (R).
1243
In PDhS §180, ajasaµyoga between two all-pervasive objects isnegated since there is no yutasiddhi between the two, namely, dvayor
anyatarasya p®thaggatimattvam.
1244
Cf. 325,4–326,2. Accordingly, the Nyåya-Vaißeshikas cannot assertthat non-effected or eternal conjunction is not possible since there is nocause (R).
1240

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The above is taught in Upanishads. That is, there are Íruti-passages
such as:*And Bhagavat is all-pervading1245 [ÍveUp III. 11],*Nåråyaˆa is pervading this everything inside and outside [MahåNårUp
XI. 6].
[Obj.] Due to the expression ‘and outside,’ nothing is all-pervasive
than God and [His] knowledge.
[Ans.] You cannot say so. Since it is naturally fit even if ‘outside’
denotes only something having outside parts. If not, even His attributive
knowledge would not be all-pervasive.
And other syllogisms are as follows. ‘All-pervasive substance, underdiscussion, is conjunct with all-pervasive substance1246; because it issubstance; like a pot.’ The invariable concomitance would not lead to theundesirable conclusion that it is conjunct with itself, because the probandum
can be established by means of the conjunction with another all-pervasive
substance as there are many all-pervasive substances. Likewise, ‘that whichis under discussion is conjunct with God, because it is substance, like apot,’ or ‘God is [483] conjunct with time and other [all-pervasive substances],because it is substance, like a pot.’ And [His] conjunction with time would
not lead to the undesirable conclusion that [He] is modified due to time.
Because the modification [of time] is dependent upon Him and specialreferences are found such as:*And He cooks time; no time is there [in His eternal manifestation],
there is the Lord alone [MBh XII. 25. 9].
By the way, Bha††a Paråßara-påda denies non-effected conjunction in
explaining that the mind is atomic. We guess that the latent impression of
the finally accepted view of these [two schools, namely, the Vaißeshika andthe Naiyåyika] is gloomed there as a consequence of citing the sËtra of
Akshapåda that:*The indicating mark (liµga) of the mind is that there is no simultaneous
production of knowledge [NySË I. i. 16],
and the sËtra of Kaˆabhaksha that:*The indicating marks of the mind is that knowledge exists or not[even] if there is the connection between the self, sense-organs andthe object1247 [VaiSË III. ii. 1].
1245

sarvavyåp¥ ca bhagavån. Radhakrishnan's Principal Upanishads etc.
read sa˙ for ca.
1246
Cf. Kir §179: åkåßaµ kålådinå saµyujyate mËrtasaµyogitvåd
dravyatvåd vå ßar¥ravat [149,12f.] (NyKan shows the first reason alone[367,5f.]).
1247
åtmendriyårthasannikarshe jñånasya bhåvo 'bhåvaß ca manaso

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For the same reason, it is also stated in the same [work] that time itself is
not perceptible.1248 Likewise, there is statement that:*And nothing is inappropriate if there is not non-effected conjunction[Tattvaratnåkara?];and [the objection] that:*What is the valid means to know the conjunction between an allpervasive [entity] and [a non-pervasive entity] like a tree? Not
perception, since it is the conjunction between a perceptible andnon-perceptible. Nor inference since there is a rule that it has two
shaped or limited things as basis [Tattvaratnåkara?],is replied as follows:*[Not so]; because the conjunction of an all-pervasive [entity] isinevitable so as to enable remoteness and proximity,1249 the movementof a body and its modifications,1250 burning up of fire and so on.1251[Tattvaratnåkara?].
Our response thereon has been already given: [these descriptions are under
the influence of the other schools]. Besides, as the conjunction of an allpervasive [entity] is said [to be inevitable] so as to enable a particularmodification of a shaped [entity] [484], so the conjunction [of an all-pervasive
entity like time] with God must be inevitably accepted so as to enablemodifications of time and other [all-pervasive entities]. Otherwise, it would
be impossible for [an all-pervasive entity] like time even to be the body ofGod.
Now, potency [is explained].
Potency is that particular non-substance which accounts for the causal
character of all causes.
liµgam. Candrånanda's commentary on VaiSË reads jñånasyåbhåvo bhåvaß
ca. Cf. PDhS §81.
1248
See above 137,1–141,8.
1249
In the Nyåya-Vaißeshika, temporal paratvåparatva are proved bymeans of the conjunction with all-pervasive time and spatial paratvåparatva
are proved by means of the conjunction with all-pervasive direction (dik);while both discussions are denied by Deßika (see above 138,2ff. and 146,3ff.).
1250
They have the self with prayatna as asamavåyikåraˆa (R). Thisshows that here Paråßara accepts the individual self as all-pervasive, while
it is atomic in the Vißish†ådvaita siddhånta [see above 208,3–213,17].
1251
Cf. VaiSË V. ii. 14: agner Ërdhvajvalanaµ våyoß ca tiryakpavanamaˆumanasor cådyaµ karmety ad®sh†akåritåni. The Vaißeshika regards themas a result of the conjunction of the ad®sh†a belonging to an all-pervasiveåtman. See above 209,1–4.

341

It is proved by means of both reductio ad absurdum and the scriptures.
[The former is illustrated]: that due to the obstacle to which in the presenceof preventing [factor] such as gem and mantra, fire does not burn, though
there is not non-existence of the absence of [fire] itself and cooperating
factors [like fuel], is potency— it is beyond the range of sense-organs. It
exists in magnet, the sound of the dandubhi-drum and so on. And it isclearly understood in each case [485].
Such contingencies as make [us] conclude [that potency is but] thenon-existence of prevention [would take place, according to the Naiyåyikas,
if we accept] the following [assumptions] and others: that the potency [ofburning] is destroyed [by the preventing factor]; that [such] attribute of that[potency as is fit for burning] is destroyed; that [another attribute which is
opposed to the potency for burning] is produced anew; and that nothing is
produced.1252 These are, however, finally removed by the Scriptures [cited
below].
[Obj.] Even supposing that [potency] is established, we friendly ask
you which of the following five opinions you accept: [1] that [potency forburning] itself is destroyed by the preventing [factor]; [2] that [such] attributeof this [potency as is fit for burning] is destroyed [486]; [3a] that [another]potency opposed to this [original potency] or [3b] its attribute is produced
anew; [4] nothing is effected though [the original potency] is in the same
[condition].1253[Ans.] Let us accept any one of them.
[Obj.] Such being the case, the cause which produces the potency
again [when it is upheld] could not be constant.1254 How do you avoid this1252

pratibandhakåbhåvaparyavasåyinåµ ßaktitaddharmanåßatadutpattyanutpattyådiprasaµgånåm.
This passage is based on the discussion in the NyKu I. 10:
pratibandhakena [1] ßaktir vå vinåßyate, [2] taddharmo vå, [3] dharmåntaraµvå janyate, [4] na janyate vå kim ap¥ti pakshå˙ [32,8f.].
R shows dåhaviruddhå kåcana ßaktir utpadyate and pråg eva siddhåyå
dåhaviruddhåyå˙ ßakter dåhapratibandhånukËla˙ kaßcid dharma utpadyate
as the third and the fourth assumption, which seems unfit for the expression
utpattyanutpatti. V regards nåßa, utpatti and anutpatti as the content ofprasaµga.
1253
Here the author adds [3a] to the four alternatives of theNyåyakusumåñjali cited above.
1254
Cf. NyKu I. 10: [4] akiµcitkarasya pratibandhakatvånupapatte˙,[3] vipar¥tadharamåntarajanane tadabhåve saty eva kåryam ity abhåvasyakåraˆatvasv¥kåra˙ / … [1] tadvinåße [2] taddharmavinåße vå punaruttambakena tajjanane 'niyatahetukatvam; pËrvaµ svarËpotpådakåd idån¥m

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undesirable contingency?
[Ans.] [We can avoid it] as follows. [According to the opinion thatthe original is destroyed], that [new potency] is produced from the very firethat is associated with the non-existence of the prevention; or [according tothe opinion that the original one lasts], the [very original] potency that is
not prevented produces the effect. Such explanation as is asserted by you[regarding burning1255] can be applied to potency as well.
[Obj.] Why is it postulated, then?
[Ans.] You cannot say so since our answer has been already given.1256[Obj.] Does1257 potency have potency (ßakta) or not? [487] If it has
potency, there would be infinite regress as potency needs another potency
so as to have potency and the latter also needs another. If it does not havepotency, the potency could not be a cause since it does not have any
potency. If [even such potency] were [a cause], it comes about that oil
could be produced from sands, that sprout from stone etc.
[Ans.] Not so. Because that [potency] is, though it does not haveuttambhakåd utpatte˙ / … na ca pratibandhakaßaktim evottambhako
viruˆaddhi na tu bhåvaßaktim utpådayat¥ti såmpratam; tadanutpattiprasaµgåt[32,9–33,6].
The above discussion is modified in SAS V. 99 as follows: “Moreover,
it is to be asked regarding the postulation of potency as different [frompratibandhåbhåva]: if [the original] one is destroyed by the preventing factor,
what produces [new] potency [of burning] when it is upheld again? If you
answers the upholding factor (uttambhaka) does, it leads to the undesirable
conclusion that the cause is not constant. If you assert that [new] potency isnever produced anew even if it is upheld, burning would not be effected. …
If you hold that [the original] potency is not destroyed by the preventing
factor but is hindered, let the fire itself be hindered. It is no use postulating
potency as it is complicated” [768,14–769,3].
1255
According to the Nyåya-Vaißeshika, so-called ßakti is but
pratibandhakåbhåva and that which causes to burn is fire qualified bypratibandhakåbhåva. E.g. SAS V. 99: “This is, you know, the way to refuteßakti — if fire does not burn due to losing the non-existence of prevention,
let the very non-existence of prevention be ßakti. And the non-existence ofprevention alone is the cause since the fire qualified by the non-existenceof prevention causes to burn. So it is not because of the obstruction of suchßakti as is other [than the non-existence of prevention] but because of thelack of sufficient condition (såmagr¥) that there is no effect in the presenceof preventing factors such as gem and mantra. For the postulation of it
would be complicated” [768,10–14]. For the detail of the refutation of ßakti
in the Nyåya-Vaißeshika, see NyKan 354–56, NyKus I. 10.

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another potency, established for causes as fit for [their own] effects.1258
Otherwise, you cannot avoid even the following contingency and the like:Is hotness hot or not? — If the former, there would be infinite regress; if
the latter, it could not produce any effect [of heat] like a cool thing [488].
And the above is stated by the Venerable Paråßara:*All entities has potencies beyond the scope of explicable knowledge
as fire has hotness of fire. That is why Brahman has such inherent
potencies as that of the creation, the best of ascetics! [ViP I. iii. 2],
and so on. It means that the inherent natures as proved by means of valid
knowledge can be abandoned by no means. Likewise, it is stated in the
Ahirbudhnyasaµhitå:*Potencies of all beings are inexplicable and inseparable [Ahirbudhnya
Saµhitå III. 2],
and so on. The same are to be referred to regarding all [potencies]. [489]Some [i.e. the Íaivas] asserts as follows— Potency is that which is
helpful to mere presence of all causes. Without it nothing is useful1259
because it has no potency and because there is copresence and coabsence.
For this very reason, [potency is] actually the most important, though it
appears to be an attribute. [It is thought to be] only one everywhere due tothe simplicity of postulation. It is stated that:*The supreme potency is only one and is composed of knowledge,
bliss and action [Íaivågama?].
[It is] devoid of modification since modification belongs to that which hasthat [potency]. [It] does not need any other potency because it has potency
and because there would be infinite regress. And it is of unquestionable
greatness since it is established according to [the authority] by which we
grasp the subject that it makes what is improbable probable. For the reason
that it is only one, it has no limitation in time and space. It is stated that:*The supreme potency is all-pervasive and all this world is pervaded[Íaivågama?].
[It] is devoid of limitation in entity since it manifests itself in all forms. As
non-spiritual potency, [it] has parts (kalå); as independent spiritual potency,
Note, as is said by R, that the expression ‘asserted by you’ is only
based on the similarity in using pratibandhakåbhåva.
1256
I.e. the Vißish†ådvaitins accept ßakti by force of the Scriptures.
1257
Cf. Nyåyal¥låvat¥ (Kashi Skt. Ser. 64), p.61: sakter apißaktyantaråpekshåyåm anavasthite˙, anapekshatve tathaiva vyabhicåråt.
1258
V refers to the Nyåyakulißa chap.10 for the further refutation against
Udayana.
1259
In this reagrd, R quotes the verse: ßiva˙ ßaktyå yukto yadi bhavatißakta˙ prabhavituµ na ced evaµ devo na khalu kußala˙ spanditum api.

344[it] has no part. One should meditate with devotion1260 that [potency] whichis covered with the phenomenal world in the form of causes and effects [atthe time of transmigration] and is endowed with the dissolution of thephenomenal world [at the time of liberation].
The others [i.e. the Vißish†ådvaitins] do not think so. To explain—First, [potency] is not the most important since so is that which is qualified
by it. For the same reason, it cannot be the material cause [of the world].
Moreover, it is accepted that modification is nothing but the limit of preceding[condition] and that of following [condition]. Nor is [potency] only one
everywhere since it is proved to be distinct from entity to entity. Nor is [it]eternal in every [entity] since we have no means to know non-eternal as
eternal. Nor is [it] beginningless [490] because [potency] itself is attained
along with the cause [being its substratum]. Nor is [it] of unquestionable
greatness since it has its own limited object. If [potency has beginning andits object is limited], it is also established that [potency] has limitation inentity.
[Obj.] Isn't it that the potency of Brahman forms the potency of
everything? Suppose that the others have the potency since they are theobjects of that [potency of Brahman] and that they have limited objects, itis needless to accept different potencies in everything.
[Ans.] Not so. Because it is irrefutably natural that each entity is said
to be the substratum of potency. It is true that the potency of Brahman isbeyond any other potency, still the potency is established as belonging toHim. The passages declaring that this [potency] is important or that [it] isequal [to Him] are also possible considering their intention [of praising His
power]. Further, no passage is found that declares [His potency] is superiorto [Him]. And [the authority of] the Yåmala and other [Íaiva Tantras, 1261 inwhich His potency is described so], is negated by means of the topic on thePåßupata.1262 And the refutations regarding the non-duality ofConsciousness1263 are to be considered here [regarding the non-duality ofpotency] again.
Now there is dispute in our sect as to whether this [potency] exists
1260

According to the first interpretation of R (tatparto bhåvayed iti /tåtparyeˆa, bhaktyety artha˙). According to the second, ‘meditate it as higher
than the phenomenal world.’
1261
Cf. Kåraˆatantra I. 122: yåmale måt®tantre ca kåpåle pañcaråtrke
(quoted in Pañcaråtrarakshå, p.26).
1262
BrSË II. ii. 35–38. Deßika's criticism of the Íaiva Ógamas is foundin the Påñcaråtrarakshå (ed. M. Duraiswami Aiyangar and T.
Venugopalacharya, Adyar Library Ser. 36, Madras, 1942), pp.26–28.
1263
See above 292,2–315,5.

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only in substance or in non-substance as well. Bhagavat Yåmuna-muni saysin the Ótmasiddhi that:*In all substances there is that common attribute (guˆa) called potency
having [its effect] as the object which is understood from its effect[ÓS ].
On this passage, some accept ‘in all substances alone,’ adding the emphasizing
particle to the portion ‘in all substances.’ Others [accept] ‘in all substances
there can be (asty eva),’ [as] is stated by Varada Vishˆumißra:*Though potency is an attribute, it can exist in quality (guˆa) andaction [as well] [?].
In the previous opinion, [non-substance] such as color [is said to] havepotency owing to its having the same substratum as the potency, which
belongs to substance; in the latter opinion, there is potency even in colorand so on. Thus, in any way, let it exist only in substance or in [non-substance]
like color as well. Still, potency itself has been proved to be based on our
tradition. The author of the Commentary also mentions potency in explaining
a body:*For instance, fire does not produce hotness due to the prevention of[its] potency [Ír¥Bh II. i. 9: 223,2]. [491][Obj.] The word ßakti in the passage that:*Entity forms entity due to its own ßakti [ViP I. iv. 52],
is interpreted as ‘assistance’ by the author of the Commentary. For instance,*‘Due to its ßakti,’ namely, due to its own karma, the entity (or theform) such as a god is attained [Ír¥Bh II. i. 34: 293,2];
likewise,*To cause destruction of sins means to cause destruction of its ßakti
which has been produced. The ßakti is also nothing but the unhappiness(apr¥ti) of God [Ír¥Bh IV. i. 13: 584,3].
So the Venerable Paråßara says:*The1264 ßakti of Vishˆu (or the liberated self) is called the higher;that known as kshetrajña (or the transmigrating self) [is called] thelower. Another named ignorance or karma is accepted as the thirdßakti, by which the all-pervasive ßakti [known as] kshetrajña iscompletely enclosed, King! [ViP VI. vii. 61–62],
1264

Cf. Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: “The twofold form of Supreme Brahman, i.e.
Vishˆu, which is denoted by the word ßakti, is taught as divided into
embodied and non-embodied. Again, it is said that the division named‘embodied,’ namely kshetrajña which is enclosed by the ignorance known
as karma and is qualified by non-spiritual matters, is impure because of its
being connected with the three misconception. Again it is negated that thesecond division named ‘non-embodied,’ which is devoid of the ignorance
known as karma, is free of non-spiritual matter and is of the form ofknowledge alone, is the ßubhåßraya because …” [(1) 222,2–223,1].

346*King! Wherever all these ßaktis are established, there is anothergreat form of Hari, which is other than His [phenomenal] cosmic
form [ViP VI. vii. 70],
*So the ßakti of Supreme Brahman is the whole world [ViP I. xxii.
56],
and so on, where the word ßakti is used to denote inseparable attribute ingeneral. Furthermore, in the Vedårthasaµgraha where the author comments
the passage that:*All entities has potencies beyond the scope of explicable knowledge[ViP I. iii. 2],
having stated that:*It is meant, therefore, that Brahman is endowed with various andinfinite ßaktis [VAS §82: 120,2],
the author quotes the following passage:*So it says:“With you, eminent one, whose form is this miraculous world, withyou, K®shˆa, who is the greatest of miracles,1265 I am united” [ViP V.
xix. 7][VAS §82: 120,2–5].
It is understood hereby that the author does not accept the other ßakti since
he refers to the passage “… whose form is this miracle world…” as themeaning of the word ßakti.
[Ans.] You may be right. [Still] that much cannot prove that [theauthor] does not accept the special quality defined as ßakti or potency
because he directly mentions ßakti as the cause of effects like burning,which can be prevented by [preventing factor] such as gem and mantra.1266
The usages of the word ßakti regarding these various [entities] in figurative
meaning or in secondary meaning do not intend to teach that these entities[themselves] are potencies. The statement that karma is the ßakti of theindividual self and the statement that the happiness and unhappiness ofSupreme Person is the ßakti of karma mean only that [these former] aredependent upon these [latter] since these [latter] cause to produce [theseformer]. Because of the very [dependence], kshetrajña, ignorance etc. andthe world are also said to be the ßakti of Supreme Brahman. Or it is because[they] are based on [His] unexcelled potency. Here1267 [492] Vishˆu is said
to be ßakti due to the metaphor that potency and that which has it are
1265

Some read °pareˆa, some °vareˆa.
1266
See Ír¥Bh II. i. 9 cited above.
1267
In fact the above-quoted Vishˆupuråˆa passages do not refer toVishˆu as ßakti (note that vishˆußakti [VI. vii. 61] denotes muktåtman
according to the interpretation of Råmånuja). So R mentions the passage‘brahmavishˆußivå brahman pradhånå brahmaßaktaya˙’ [?].

347

non-different. The quotation of the passage “… whose form is this miracle
world…” regarding that:*… is endowed with various and infinite ßaktis [VAS §82: 120,2],1268
is to explain that [He] is endowed with wonderful potencies as one who
creates the wonderful world. Hereby there is not any mistake.
Thus the special quality named ßakti is established.
Weight is the nature which causes to fall. It belongs to water andearth. [It] is postulated through fall.1269
Some1270 hold that one perceives it with the touch when, say, one
weighs something. This [weight] is not known when one touches its side
portions or upper portions, which is not any defect1271 because weighing
and the like are [but] the assistant causes [of perceiving weight]. If not,[that is, if the perceptibility of something were negated only because of its
dependence upon an assistance], we could not perceive, say, that someone
is a Brahmin as it is necessary to grasp the relation of his mother andfarther.1272
On the contrary, the others assert1273 as follows: There is not suchweight as is other than the very nature of earth or water. It is establishedthat both [earth and water] fall by nature if there is no prevention. Even theweight [which you regard as] distinct from [the very nature of the two]
becomes the cause of fall owing to its own nature; then, let this nature[directly] belong to the very nature [of the two], because that is simpler[than postulating such weight in-between]. The fixed rule as to [the weight
1268

V.
1269

yat tu … tatra … should be yat tu … tac ca, as is pointed out by

Cf. PDhS §297: … patanakarmånumeyam….
1270
Vallabha holds that weight is perceptible (Nyåyal¥låvat¥, ChSS
ed., pp.631ff.), while Deßika (cf. TMK V. 37) as well as most of the
Vaißeshikas (cf. PDhS §297: apratyaksham) does not accept the perceptibilityof weight; .
1271
Explaining that weight is not perceptible, Ír¥dhara says: ye tutvagindriyagråhyaµ gurutvam åhu˙ teshåm adha˙sthitasya dravyasya
sparßopalambhavad gurutvopalambhaprasaµga˙ [NyKan 608,10f.].
1272
K asserts that this description is based on others' opinion because
our author actually denies the perceptibility of Brahmin-hood. See my noteon 559,5ff.
1273
åhu˙ is reduplicated in UVG ed.

348

of each thing] such as pala1274 and so on, [which is known through] thedifference [in speed] of falling,1275 is also based on the fact that component
parts [of each thing] are more or less. Indeed, the authors of sm®tis1276 alsoteach the fixed rule regarding [weight] like pala as accordant to it [492].
And it is stated in the seventh section of the prameya chapter in theNyåyatattva:*Weight consists of the nature of something falling down.1277 Levity
is the non-existence of it [Nyåyatattva].
Further, if fall made us postulate the [quality] which is different from [thevery nature of a falling thing], even the flaming up [of fire] and the horizontal
blow [of air] would [make us postulate] such two [qualities] of fire and air
as well.1278[Obj.] Such [movements of fire and air] are established through theirown nature, their unseen power, the will of God or their particular potency.
[Ans.] The same can be applied even in the case [of fall]; sincenothing is different. Keeping this in mind, says the same work:*Weight is classified into three: downward, horizontal and upward.
Air, fire and water have [respectively] horizontal weight, upward
weight and downward weight [Nyåyatattva].
[Obj.] These [nature and so on, which must be unique to each thing],
cannot exist in the two elements [i.e. water and earth].
[Ans.] We ask in return: How can [the ‘weight’] assumed by you[exist in the two]?
[Obj.] Because of [their] own nature.
1274

1 pala = 93.312 gr. (L. Renou et al., L'Inde Classique II, Paris,
1953, App.13).
1275
patanatåratamyapalådiniyama˙. Cf. TMK V. 36: påte bhedåt
palådipratiniyati˙ and SAS ad loc.: påtabhedåt parikalpyeta tad api, etc.
1276
R
and
K
cite
the
followingSm®ti:
gavåkshagatamårtaˆ∂araßmimadhye prad®ßyate / trasareˆupramåˆaµ tu raja
ity ucyate buddhai˙ // trasareˆvash†akaµ reˆu˙; tattrayaµ råjasarshapa˙ /te 'sh†au yava˙; sho∂asha tu yavå måsha˙, athavå tribhi˙ // rËpyaµ måsho
dvi-guñjo vå; dharaˆaµ sho∂ashaiva te / ßatamånaµ tu daßabhir dharaˆai˙palam eva ca // [?].
1277
adha˙patanasvabhåvåtma gurutvam. V reads °svabhåvåt sa
gurutvam and comments that because such nature exists in something heavy,
the very nature is gurutva (fn.1).
1278
The problem on the movements of fire and air in connection to
gurutva has been treated in Kir 253,25ff.

349[Ans.] The same answer holds good [in this case also]. And it is to beconsidered that as flaming up exists in secondary varieties of fire belonging
to one element, so in this case also [such nature and so on exist in many
elements]. [494] Also for the reason that water is but earth in anothercondition according to our opinion [on modification], nothing is wrong [ifone and the same nature and so on exist in the two].
Even when we weigh something, we know [its] pressure fromperception; as, for instance, [we perceive] air resistance. Only due to thisfact, we practically use the expression ‘weight’ even in the case [of air,which is in fact devoid of weight]. And this [pressure] is known [as weight]
because we feel great heaviness when a strong person presses us and wepractically use the expression ‘light’ when the same person presses us
gently.
Thus, such weight as you assume can be proved neither from inference
nor perception.
[Obj.] Then, suppose that [qualities] perceived in both water andearth like taste are the causes of fall.
[Ans.] Not so. Because the difference [in speed of falling] is not in
proportion to them and we perceive otherwise, [e.g. all is not heavier thathas stronger taste].1279[Obj.] What is true weight [for you], then?
[Ans.] Listen. In the opinion that potency is not acceptable, [weight]
is the distinctive nature [of a thing]. In the opinion that it is acceptable,[weight] is particular [potency], because it is appropriate to conceive this[potency], which is accepted as causal function for everything, in this caseas well.
By the way, the Såµkhyas accept the particular quality of earth andwater named ‘weight’ being the cause of fall as the result of tamas.1280
They1281 should accept the particular quality named ‘levity’ being the resultof sattva1282 as the cause of the flaming up of fire and the horizontal blow of
air. Rather, suppose that an effect such as fall is fixed due to the very cause
due to which, you think, weight and levity are fixed in earth and so on. It iscomplicated to postulate another quality in-between.
1279

Cf. Kir 253,23f.: rasåc ca patane påshåˆåt ßarkaråyå˙ påtavißesho
rasådhikyåt [syåt].
1280
Cf. SK 13: guru varaˆakam eva tama˙.
1281
yat tu … tai˙ …. As is asserted by V, yat tu should be yais tu oromitted.
1282
Cf. SK 13: sattvaµ laghu prakåßakam.

350

The postulation of the quality ‘weight (gurutva)’ is hereby negatedbecause of the complication (gurutva). [495]
Fluidity is the object of the notion of fluidity. And it is the primarycause of flowing.
Not only in water does [it] exist, because it is apprehended even insuch earthy and fiery products as milk and gold. And it is of two sorts:
inherent one and that which is produced through baking. Water has inherent
one; earth and fire have baking-produced one. Or rather, fluidity exists only
in water. In such substances as gold,1283 that [fluidity] which exists in water
is apprehended. For it is established, as everything is composed of fiveelements [due to quintuplication], that the part of that [water] sometimes
emerges [in everything]. That is illustrated by the venerable author of theCommentary with the example of the appearance of water in mirage.1284
Notwithstanding, this [fluidity] is not mere wateriness. Because when that[water] becomes hail, we apprehend solidity.
The others, however, assert as follows. Your statement that fluidity
exists in water is correct. But how is it established as other than merewateriness?
[Obj.] It is postulated as the cause of flowing.
[Ans.] Why isn't this [flowing] also caused by that [wateriness]?
[Obj.] [Fluidity] is other [than wateriness] since in the expression‘water is fluid’ it is known as an attribute [of water] as in the expression‘fire is hot’ and the like1285 [496].
[Ans.] In spite of that, let us accept this [fluidity] as that particularconfiguration which is ultimately same as wateriness, as we experience, as
in the case of solidity.
[Obj.] Solidity is a particular conjunction.
[Ans.] So is this [fluidity] since there is no distinction. In addition,solidity is not mere a particular conjunction but is that particular touch
inherent only in earthiness which depends upon the particular conjunction.
And fluidity is that particular conjunction which is devoid of even slight
unevenness. And it is stated in the seventh section of the prameya chapter
1283

V adds ksh¥ra- in parentheses with a question mark.
1284
See Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: mar¥cikåjalajñåne 'pi teja˙p®thivyor apy ambuno
vidyamånatvåd indriyadosheˆa teja˙p®thivyor agrahaˆåd ad®sh†avaßåc
cåmbuno grahaˆåd yathårthatvam [(2) 35,11–13].
1285
V sugests the reading agner aushˆyådivat for agnir ushˆa ityådivat.

351

in the Nyåyatattva:*That which has the touch endowed with loose conjunction is soft(m®du); that which has the touch endowed with unloose conjunction
is solid [Nyåyatattva].
[Obj.] What causes this conjunction devoid of even slight unevenness?
[Ans.] You should believe that wateriness does.
[Obj.] What ever is wateriness?
[Ans.] Alas! Do you want to deny wateriness, adhering to fluidity?
Or, do you think that fluidity is established as wateriness? —Both1286 cannot
be correct.1287 [497][Obj.] I dare ask you: What is wateriness?
[Ans.] It is a kind of genus.
[Obj.] What manifests it?
1288

do.

[Ans.] Particularity and so on in the form of such particular conjunction[Obj.] Then, let us abandon wateriness as well, accepting them only.

[Ans.] I do not mind. Still that much cannot establish fluidity as
independent [quality].
[Obj.] If it had no fluidity, water could hardly be entered like thesurface of the earth.
[Ans.] Not so. Because there is inconstancy in view of [that which,though devoid of fluidity or liquidness, can be easily entered] like ether.
[Obj.] [Something cannot be entered, because it is devoid of fluidity]
while it has touch.
[Ans.] Not so. Because there is inconstancy in view of wind, sun-heatand so on.
[Obj.] It is because they are of the nature of looseness.
[Ans.] Why?
[Obj.] Because they have some gaps.
[Ans.] Not so because they are not apprehended so. For instance, we
1286

R reads na cobhayaµ yujyate for na cobhayam api yujyate.
1287
Because wateriness is perceptible while fluidity as different quality
is not so (K).
1288
tåd®ßasaµyogavißesharËpavißeshådi. V suggests to omit
vißesharËpa.

352

never apprehend any gap in the midday sun. If you still admit it, you should
accept it even in the case [of water] because there is no distinction.
[Obj.] What causes such particular well-conjunction1289 as is fit for
entrance and the like? [— It must be nothing but fluidity].
[Ans.] Not so. [Because1290] we can reply by the illustration of wind,sun-heat and so on.
Now, you said that fluidity is other than wateriness because weapprehend solidity when [water] becomes hail [498]. Nor is it true. Since itis due to some particular strengthening factors that we apprehend its solidity
as [that] of fiery elements like gold. For fire has neither instinctive solidity
nor extrinsic one. Moreover, we never apprehend water when water changes
into hail and the like; when it melts, however, we never fail to apprehendboth wateriness and fluidity— if any one of the two were not apprehended
at that time, the difference [between the two] would be understood.
[Obj.] Why isn't [fluidity] synonymous [with wateriness]?
[Ans.] Due to the difference of the limiting adjuncts such as particular
conjunction, as we have said.
That is the fluidity assumed by the Vaißeshika and other schools [tobe independent quality].
Now, viscidity (sneha) is explained. Viscidity is the object of thenotion of viscidity. It exists in water only. [It] is found through union withghee and the like. It is not mere fluidity because fluid things like gold
cannot gather dust.1291 Nor is it wateriness because we express separatelythat ‘water is viscid’ and because we apprehend ‘it is viscid’ in bees' wax
and so on without apprehending water [499]. Thus some of our sect following
the Vaißeshika hold that there is that quality named viscidity which isestablished by means of perception, exists in water only and is the cause ofgathering dust.
The others, however, assert as follows. No doubt there is theapprehension that ‘something is viscid.’ But this [apprehension] is concernedwith merely particular color, touch and so on. For we never apprehend
another quality distinctly. There is the apprehension that ‘it is viscid’ evenin the case of water due to its being shiny. So is it in the case of substances
1289

(K).
1290

I.e. the particular conjunction devoid of even slight unevenness

V suggests to read samådhånåt for samådhånam.
1291
PDhS §301: saµgraha° = parasparam asaµyuktånåµsaktyådåd¥nåµ piˆ∂¥bhåvapråptihetu˙ saµyogavißesha˙ [NyKan 611].

353

like gold.
Or rather, nobody understands that water is viscid. For it is clay andthe like that are understood so. Gathering dust is also caused by waterinessor particular potency inherent in the same object as wateriness. It is, therefore,
appropriate that fluid things like gold do not gather it. Moreover, though
you accept the quality called viscidity because of gathering dust, why don't
you postulate another quality called ‘hardness (raukshya)’ also in fire forthe reason that it cracks something? If you admit that cracking and the likein that case [of fire] were caused by [its] hotness and so on, why don't you
accept that gathering in this case [of water] is caused by [its] coolness andso on? And it is stated in the seventh section of the prameya chapter in theNyåyatattva:*Stickiness (picchilatva) is the touch of such conjunction as is difficult
to disjoint; separability (vißlish†atva) is the touch of such conjunction
as is easy to disjoint [Nyåyatattva].
Further, if viscidity were established because of gathering, it should be
postulated even in gum of a jack-tree and the like. Or rather, it is better topostulate it only in them because [they] gather more.
Alternatively, suppose that gathering is caused by particular potency
as in the case of magnet. And we never understand that water always
gathers something, because we find out even the fact that dry clay splits up
when it is dipped with water. So it is to be admitted that, as is experienced,
water in itself gathers or splits something, assisted by cooperative causes.
By the way, for spiritual beings sneha means affection or desire toacquire; raukshya means misery, desire to give up or anger. The otherquality, hereby, is not established.
Latent impression (våsanå) is that which is produced from direct
experience (anubhava) and is the cause of recollection1292 (sm®ti). It is
postulated through [its] effect. First, recollection is not caused by [previous]
direct experience1293 [500] because [the direct experience of an object] hasbeen destroyed for long [when the recollection of it takes place]. Nor [is it
caused by] the self and so on indicated (upalakshita) by that [direct
experience]; because even something destroyed, [which could be the cause
1292

TMK V. 101 shows more elaborate difinition: båhyåkshåder av®ttau
ciraviditam api samaryate yena so 'yaµ saµskåra˙.
1293
na tåvad anubhavahetu˙ sm®ti˙; v.l. in R: na tåvad anubhava˙sm®tihetu˙. Though the content is same (the compound in the former should
be understood as bahuvr¥hi), the latter seems to be better because onlysm®tihetu (= bhåvanå or saµskåra) can be the subject of the following
sentences.

354

as indicator if it were cognized at that time], cannot be the cause as indicator
if it is not cognized.1294 Nor [is it caused by] the annihilative destruction ofthat [direct experience]; since it would lead to the undesirable conclusionthat the latent impression (saµskåra) does not cease [forever1295]. Nor [is it
caused by] the apprehension of a similar object and the like, because it
would lead to the over application1296 that mere [apprehension of a similar
object not experienced before] also [causes recollection1297] and becausethat [apprehension of a similar object] which is qualified [by direct experience]is not established [since the direct experience has been destroyed]. If you
argue that [recollection is caused by] the particular unseen power produced
from direct experience, this means that latent impression is established.
There is different opinions1298 as to whether this [latent impression] isin the form of merit and demerit or other than these [two]. Of them, theformer is not acceptable [501] since these [merit and demerit] are notapplicable to a thing beyond the range of injunction and prohibition. Thus
the latter remains. [There is] also [different opinions as to whether] such[latent impression] is imposed (ådheya) potency or other than that. Anyway
the process of causality1299 and so on is not different.
And there is different opinions in our sect as to whether it belongs to
the self or the knowledge-as-substance. Of them, it is proper that [latentimpression] belongs to the knowledge-as-substance because [it] is proximate
to direct experience and recollection.1300 Notwithstanding, Varadavishˆu1294

dhvastasyåpy
ajñåyamånasyopalakshaˆatayåpi
kåraˆatvåsambhavåt.
R
reports
v.l.
dhvastasyajñåyamånasyopalakshaˆatåyåm pi hetutvåsambhavåt, which means: Thoughsomething destroyed can be indicator if it is cognized, [direct experience,
which is not cognized], cannot be the cause.
1295
According to the opinion that abhåva is an independent category.
Cf. SAS V. 102: na ca pËrvånubhavapradhvaµsamåtram eva saµskåra itivåcyam; tasya parapakshe nityatvena saµskårapramoshåbhåvaprasaµgåt,
asmatpakshedhavaµsasyabhåvarËpatvenaparyåyeˆabhåvasyaivåbhidhånåc ca [771,11–13].
1296
atiprasaµgåt. R reads prasaµgåt and shows this reading as v.l.
1297
Cf. SAS V. 101: tulyadarßanådikam evådhunikasaµskåro 'stv iti
ca vaktuµ na ßakyate, anavagate 'py arthe sm®tiprasaµgåt [770,14].
1298
vißesha. V reads vißaya and adds vißesha in parenthesis.
1299
I.e. anubhava Æ våsanå or saµskåra Æ sm®ti.
1300
Since direct experience and recollection belong to the knowledgeas-substance as its particular condition, it is proper that mental impression,
which is caused by direct experience and produces memory, is in the same

355

mißra states as follows:*Since the very means of knowledge that makes us postulate mental
impression (bhåvanå) makes us postulate that it has as substratum theself, which is continuous,1301 and because there is no means to teachthat it has as substratum the knowledge, which is not continuous [?].
This is no doubt stated with the intention of the opinion of others since hehimself explains that knowledge is substance1302 and is eternal. Again, theauthor of the Vivaraˆa [i.e. Ír¥-Råmamißra] comments on the topic of
purport (samanvayådhikaraˆa) in connection to the refutation of the difference
cum non-difference view1303:*The [non-spiritual] limiting adjunct (upådhi) [e.g. the internal organ],indeed, cannot be the recollector [of previous experience]. Nor theparticular part [of the spiritual being, i.e. Brahman, delimitated by
the limiting adjunct] because [when the limiting adjunct moves around]the mental impression in one position could not be the cause ofrecollection in the other position.1304 Were it possible, there would be
no rule [that the mental impression of one person causes the recollectionof the person only]. And mental impression has the same substratum
as direct experience [Vivaraˆa ad Ír¥Bh I. i. 4].
This is, no doubt, stated from the viewpoint of those who do not accept thatthe knowledge-as-attribute is substance [as well]. In our opinion, however,there is no defect since direct experience, mental impression and memory
are particular aspects of knowledge. Accordingly, the meaning of the passage
that:*[The individual self] covered with the dust [called] våsanå [ViP VI.
vii. 19]and so on1305 is understood [as ‘covered with våsanå through the knowledge’]substratum as the two (R). In TMK V. 103 cd, our author positively criticizes
the opinion that saµskåra directly belongs to the åtman for the reason that
it is nirvikåra.
1301
Since (bhåvanå or) saµskåra is postulated as the intermediate cause
so as to make it possible for previous direct experience, which is temporary,
to be the cause of sm®ti, it also would be temporary and could not make thedirect experience be the cause if it had as substratum a temporary entity[like knowledge] (R).
1302
See the fragment of Varadavishˆu in 419,5f.
1303
Ír¥Bh I. i. 4: 159,1–161,17. The passage is probably the commentaryad 161,4ff.
1304
Herefrom it is evident that the author regards saµskåra as directly
belonging to the individual self (R).
1305
anekajanmasåhasr¥µ saµsårapadav¥µ vrajan / mohaßramaµprayåto 'sau våsanåreˆukuˆ†hita˙: “Travelling the path of transmigration

356[502].
The Vaißeshikas hold that tendency (saµskåra) is of three sorts, namely,
speed (vega), mental impression (bhåvanå) and elasticity (sthitasthåpaka). 1306
It is inappropriate.
As for speed, there is no means to make us understand that it isdifferent from a particular kind of action (karma). For the notion, say, that‘it moves quickly’ is also understood as merely based on a special feature(atißaya) of the action. And the special feature of action is accepted by both[of us].1307 It is stated in the prameya chapter in the Nyåyatattva in connection
with the explanation of time:*For speed is the proximity in time [taken for] conjunction[Nyåyatattva].
Additionally, the word ‘speed’ is used even concerning action caused byvolition in the expression ‘He goes speedily (vegena)’ and the like. That
speed appears to be an attribute of [moving things] like an arrow is rejected
through the notion of slowness; [that is, you should admit speed as well as
slowness to be particularity of motion].
[Obj.] Tendency-ness belongs to a thing producing motion, because
it is the genus [which belongs to] tendency1308 [503].
[Ans.] Such1309 inference is defective because of the overapplication,1310 the non-establishment1311 and so on.
for many thousands of birth, that [individual self] attains misery of ignorance
and is covered with the dust called våsanå”. There the self is taught to be
the direct substratum of våsanå but the fact is that it is covered with våsanå
through the knowledge (R).
1306
See PDhS §302. The Naiyåyika view on vega is a little different
from the Vaißeshika one in that it is momentary or not (See EIPh II 129;
Umesha Mishra 1936: 43). It is to be noted that Bhåsarvajña does not
accept vega as a quality and holds that it is included in action (SeeNyåyabhËshaˆa, pp.162f).
1307
Cf. SAS V. 104: bhavån api karmabhedair vegabhedaµ kathayati;tathå ca yåd®ßakarmabhedåd vegabheda˙ parikalpyate sa eva karmabhedo
vega ity ucyatåm [773,4f.].
1308
The d®sh†ånta is sattå (R) or guˆatva (K).
1309
TMK V. 104 poses another inference of the Naiyåyika to provevega: ßarådigataµ dvit¥yådikarma ßaraguˆotpannam, tatkåryatvåt,tannish†aprathamakarmavat [SAS 773,8f.].
1310
I.e. Tendency-ness belongs to a thing producing color, because itis the genus [which belongs to] tendency (R).
1311
I.e. jåtitva is not establsihed in our opinion (R).

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Ír¥ Vishˆucitta-årya reads kriyå as the meaning [of the word] vega 1312:
that is, in refuting the inference of God—
*If [the Naiyåyika] argues that every kind of motion [including
earthquake] presupposes volition because it is motion, not so; because
there is deviation in view of the vega of an arrow and flowing ofwater and because it is contradictory to the postulation of ‘having
cause’ if [the vega and the flowing] are assumed to be of [their] own
nature [?].
Again, elasticity (sthitasthåpaka) is but special configuration(saµsthånavißesha). For we find that the difference in coming back is inaccordance with that in special configuration [504]. [You may say that] itcomes about that the action takes place at any time [if special configuration
is its cause], but [the doubt] is [applicable to your opinion] as well; [if you
reply that] it is avoidable because [the action] is accompanied with assistantcauses like expansion and release, [the answer] is [applicable to our opinion]
as well. You should admit that even such difference in elasticity as adifferent [quality] is based on the difference in special configuration. Then,
it is better to accept the very special configuration establishes the comingback to former position than to postulate the unseen new quality. [Its] loss
(parißuddhi) [i.e. not coming back] is to be considered in this opinion as
well as [in the opinion that elasticity is] a different [quality].
Although some hold that [saµskåra] is of two sorts, that is, tendency
of knowledge and tendency of action (karmasaµskåra), what kind of thetendency of action is accepted by them? First, it cannot be of the nature of
speed or elasticity because such has been negated. Nor is it the cause of theactivity of right action and sinful one. For that [activity] is also explained
from each preceding unseen power, own independence [or free will] and soon. Nor is it true that, for instance, when [a drummer] plays the m®dangam,
that [tendency of action] which is conditioned by [his] each preceding playis the cause of the manual readiness and so on in [his] each succeeding
action [505]. Because the manual readiness and so on in that [action] arebased on the fact, say, that the particular hardness [of the drum] is loosened
due to [his] each preceding play and because the quickness in [his] driving[his] hands is based on the quickness of that memory [of him fit for]driving which is produced from [his] mental impression (saµskåra) formed
after [his experience of] each preceding play.
Still the author of the Commentary states that:*To cause non-attachment of sin1313 means to cause to obstruct theorigination of that potency which is the cause of the unfitness for1312

pa†hitau.
1313kriyå vegårthatvena pa†hitå. K reports v.l. kriyåvegåv ekårthatvena
Cf. BrSË VI. i. 13: tadadhigama uttarapËrvåghayor aßleshavinåßau.

358

Vedic ritual, the våsanå and the sinful course (pratyavåya) [Ír¥Bh IV.
i. 13: 584,1],*Though [you are] bound to that beginningless and perverted våsanå
which is the cause and is the effect of these two [i.e. sin and theego1314] [Íaraˆågatigadya 17],and so on; even such passages do not persist upon the postulation of suchsaµskåra as is different from the mental impression (våsanå) of direct
experience. And immediately after the passage that ‘… of sin’ and so forth,
it is stated that:*Indeed the sin which are done bring about to a person the unfitness
for Vedic ritual, the taste for undertaking further [sinful] action of
the same kind and the sinful course. To cause to destroy sin is tocause to destroy that potency of this [sin] which has been produced.
The potency also is but the displeasure (apr¥ti) of the Supreme Person[Ír¥Bh IV. i. 13: 584,2–3].
Thus it is established that sinful action produces the taste for undertaking
further action of the same kind through the displeasure of the Supreme
Person; accordingly, it is implied here that there is not the different kind ofsaµskåra. And, for instance, in the topic that:*But it is the two [earlier actions, i.e. sin and demerit], the fruits ofwhich have not yet begun [that can be destroyed] [BrSË IV. i. 15],
it has been clearly commented as follows:*Moreover, apart from the pleasure and the displeasure of God which
are produced from meritorious action and non-meritorious action,
there is no means to know the existence of that saµskåra which isthe cause of the continuity of the body [Ír¥Bh IV. i. 15: 588,1–2].
It is to be understood that the same principle [that there is no means toknow its existence] is applicable to the other [kind of våsanå] as well. So isstated in the Ír¥madg¥tå-bhåshya. [That is], in commenting the verse that:*The faith (ßraddhå) of [all] embodied beings, which is produced
from [their] own nature (svabhåva), is of three sorts: of sattva, of
rajas and of tamas. Listen about it [BhG XVII. 2],
it is stated1315 that:1314

See Deßika's commentary: påpasyåhaµkårasya ca, etc. [ed. V.
Srivatsankacharyar, Madras, Sri Vedanta Desika Seventh Centenary Trust,n.d.: 170,7]; while R, following the previous two phrases (i.e.
anantåsahyåpacårayukto'py
etatkåryakåraˆabhËtånådivipar¥tåhaµkåravumË∂håtmasvabhåvo 'pi), comments: etadubhayety anenåhaµkåra-asahyåpacårau g®hyete.
1315

Though my translation follows R (evam iti / atiriktasaµskåråbhåva
ukta ity artha˙ / kutroktam ity atråha trividheti / ity asya vyåkhyåne iti /asya vakshyamåˆena ity uktam ity anenånvaya˙), it seems to be better, as issuggested by V, to omit uktam in ßr¥madg¥tåbhåshye 'py uktam (or uktam

359*Svabhåva means their own unique nature (bhåva) [506], namely,
each peculiar taste of them caused by the previous våsanå. For whatever[a person has] taste, he comes to have faith on it. Faith is the zeal
(tvarå) in the means with the conviction that it brings about one's
desired object. Våsanå and taste and faith are those qualities of theself which are produced from [its] association with the guˆas. Sattva
and other guˆas, which produce these qualities of the self such asvåsanå, are qualities of the particular body, the [particular] senseorgans, the [particular] internal organ1316 and are known only through[their] effects. The meaning is that [våsanå and so on1317] are produced
from the direct experience with such body and so on as are associatedwith sattva and other guˆas [GBh XVII. 2: 516,10–517,4].
Though the passage of the Ótmasiddhi that
*It is impossible, you know, for liberated one — whose association
with the organs, the body, [the tendency] of knowledge and the tendencyof action is completely removed — to have the motivation to rise up
the consciousness concerning himself and the other1318 [ÓS ]where the Venerable Yåmuna-muni [seems to] put the tendency of knowledge
and that of action distinctively, is also to be interpreted in the line of theauthor of the Commentary.
According to some,1319 the continuity of våsanå is to be acceptedfrom the fact that when a seed of cotton was soaked in the red color of lac,
we find the redness of its flower, fruit and so on even if the redness of this[seed] has gone. In this regard, however, it is to be examined whether thevåsanå arises in its effects like the flower or in parts of the seed transforming
itself into the flower and so on. Not the former; for the våsanå cannot arise[in its effects] because the substratum [of the våsanå] is different [from thatof the color of the lac] and the substratum is not existent [when the laccolors the seed in red]; otherwise [i.e. if the color of the cotton in one thingat the end of the quotation).
1316
dehendriyåta˙karaˆavißeshagatå. Most of the editions of the GBhread vishaya for vißesha; V adopts the reading, adding vißesha in parentheses.
1317
Cf. TC 517,21f.: at¥ndriyåˆåm ananubhËtånåµ kathaµvåsanåhetutvam ity atråha sattvådiguˆayukteti. The Eng. trans. of the GBhby M. R. Sampatkumaran (rpt. Bombay, 1985, p.412) and that by Swåm¥Ódidevånanda (Madras, 1991, p.525) interpret like this.
1318
Cf. B®hUp II. iv. 14, IV. v. 15: yatra tv asya sarvam åtmaivåbhËt.
R reports the variant reading anirdhËta° for nirdhËta° andanapav®ktasya for apav®ktasya. In that case, svaparasaµvedana should beinterpreted as ‘the direct experience of his own self as well as that of theHighest Self.’1319
V refers to the verse of Buddhist cited in 188,3–189,2.

360

produced the våsanå in the other], there would be the over-application [thatanything can produce the våsanå in a thing]. If the redness is caused by thecontinuous succession of a part of the cotton in the parts of the seed, on theother hand, the våsanå is purposeless.
[Obj.] A certain saµskåra should be admitted from the fact, forinstance, that we find the removal of poison in water when the Gåru∂amantra
is recited.
[Ans.] It is inappropriate because these various effects are brought
about only through the particular potency conditioned by the power of themantra [507]. In fact, saµskåra — which is restricted to producing aneffect of the same kind — cannot be the cause of such effect.
The M¥måµsakas accepts that saµskåra or purification belongs tosuch ritual materials as the br¥hi-rice in the ritual action enjoined in the[Scriptural passage] that:*He sprinkles water over the br¥hi-rice1320 [≈ Taittir¥ya-Bråhmaˆa III.
2. 5. 4],and so on.
The Naiyåyikas, however, assert that it is [but] the saµskåra of theaction, saying that:*It is admitted that saµskåra or purification by sprinkling (prokshaˆa),pouring (abhyukshaˆa) and so on1321 belongs to the agent of theaction alone1322 [NyKus I. 11].
Against this, [the M¥måµsakas argue as follows]. It is to be examined:
Of what nature is such saµskåra [as is accepted by you], that which iscalled våsanå (or mental impression) or that which is of the nature of
unseen power? Not the former; for this [kind of saµskåra] cannot produced
from action as it is produced from direct experience. Nor the latter. For if[the sprinkling etc.] should produce the unseen power inherent in the self[of the agent] alone without giving anything to the materials, it comes
about that [such subsidiary actions like the sprinkling also] directly contribute[to the main action1323] (årådupakåraka) like fore-sacrifices (prayåja). [508]1320vr¥h¥n prokshati; TaiBr reads enån…. (See MNP §71:.207, fn.58).
1321
According to R, abhyukshaˆa is sprinking to oneself (svaprokshaˆa)and ‘and so on’ denotes avokshaˆa or sprinking to the ground.
1322
saµskåra˙
kartur
(NyKu:
puµsa)
evesh†a˙
prokshaˆåbhyukshaˆådishu (NyKu: °ådibhi˙).
1323
The årådupakåraka means a subsidiary action (aµga) directly (åråt= såkshåt) related to the main rite (pradhåna), while sannipatyokåraka or
indirectly-contributing one is related directly to a material or an accesary(aµga) and only indirectly to the main rite by producing utpattyapËrva (Cf.

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Furthermore, as a result, [even] in its modified form (vik®ti) where theoblation of n¥våra-rice and so on is employed [in place of vr¥hi-rice], it
would be [necessary] to sprinkle over vr¥hi-rice, not over n¥våra-rice; forthe [latter] cannot establish the unseen power inherent in the self as it is notenjoined in its primary form1324 (prak®ti). So the saµskåra is to be admitted
only in the vr¥hi-rice and so on. [509]
To this, we reply: Were it the case, this saµskåra is becoming theobject of the will (abhimati) of each deity or becoming fit for sacrifice byincreasing the guˆas like sattva. Accordingly, this cannot establish [thesaµskåra as] independent particular quality.
Now, number (saµkhyå) [is explained]. Number is the object of thenotion and the usage of ‘one’ ‘two’ ‘three’ and so on.
Some hold that it belongs to substance alone; while some hold that[it] belongs to all the categories (padårtha) like substance, quality and soon.
Edgerton's index to MNP, s.v.).
1324
R: If the sprinkling brings about the speciality (atißaya) that belongs
to a thing over which [water] is sprinkled, even in the case of the oblationof n¥våra-rice, the sprinkling over the n¥våra-rice instead of the vr¥hi-rice isestablished for the purpose of establishing the speciality of the n¥våra-rice.
On the other hand, if the sprinkling in the primary form should not purify
the oblation-material but directly contribute [to the main action] like foresacrifices, the sprinkling that has as the means vr¥hi-rice would be attained[even in that case], as is enjoined regarding the primary form, like thefore-sacrifice which has as the means ghee. Since the sprinkling that has as
the means vr¥hi-rice alone is enjoined in the primary form and the sprinklingthat has as the means n¥våra-rice is not enjoined [there], that [sprinkling]which is not enjoined cannot accomplish the unseen power inherent in theself. And it is implied that if the sprinkling of each entity should directly
contribute [to the main action], the ßeshi-hood of the vr¥hi [to the sprinkling],
which is taught by its accusative ending [cf. MNP §71], would be spoiled.
K: If the sprinkling should produce the unseen power belonging to
the self but not that [purification] which is belongs to the vr¥hi-rice etc.,
then the vr¥hi-rice etc. would be the aµga of the sprinkling but the latter
would not be the aµga of these former. Then, when the sprinkling is,according to the principle ‘The enjoined pradhåna prevents the aµgas’ [?;cf. M¥SË XII. ii. 27: aµgaguˆavirodhe ca tådarthyåt], transferred from theprimary form to the modified form where the oblation of n¥våra-rice and soon is employed, vr¥hi-rice, which is its aµga, would be also unavoidably
attained; accordingly, it comes about that one should sprinkle over vr¥hi-rice
only.

362

And [the Vaißeshikas], who hold that [it] belongs to substance alone,assert as follows1325: The oneness in eternal substances [e.g. an atom] iseternal (or non-produced); [the oneness] in non-eternal substances [e.g. a
dyad and so on] is produced by lots of oneness belonging to [their] component
parts. Two-ness, three-ness and so forth are produced by lots of onenessbelonging to each thing which are assisted by enumerative cognition1326
1325

The following seems to be not quotation from the Vaißeshika
works but the summary of their theory by the author. Cf. TarS §24: ekatvaµnityam anityaµ ca / nityagataµ nityam anityagatam anityam / dvitvådikaµtu sarvatrånityam eva. See also the summary of the Vaißeshika view in
TMK V. 39.
1326
The process of the notion ‘two’ is expounded in PDhS as follows—“(I) The eye of a knower is related to two substances, homogeneous [e.g.
two pots] or heterogeneous [e.g. a pot and cloth].
(II) The knowledge regarding the generality of one-quality (ekatva) [i.e.
ekatvatva], which is inherent in [the one-quality] inherent in [the substances]with which the [eye] is conjunct, arises.
(III) That single cognition having many objects which is on the two onequalities [i.e. apekshåbuddhi] arises from the generality of one-quality, its
relation [to the two one-qualities (i.e. inherence)] and the [preceding]knowledge [regarding the two one-qualities]. (b) The knowledge regarding
the generality of one-quality is to be destroyed [*This is clearly shown in
the text read by the Vyomavat¥].
(IV) In dependence on this [(enumerative) cognition], two-quality (dvitva)
is produced anew by means of the two one-qualities in their own two
substrata.
(V) There arises the knowledge regarding the generality of two-quality [i.e.
dvitvatva]. (c) The enumerative cognition is to be destroyed by force of thisknowledge regarding the generality of two-quality. (vi) The knowledge
regarding the two-quality is to arise due to the generality of two-quality, its
relation [to the two-quality] and the [preceding] knowledge [regarding thegenerality of two-quality].— All these occur at one moment.
(VI) Then, (C) by force of the destruction of the enumerative cognition, (d)the two-quality is to be destroyed. (e) The knowledge regarding the generality
is to be destroyed by force of the knowledge regarding the two-quality. By
force of the two-quality, the knowledge regarding it and its relation, (vii)the knowledge regarding the substances that ‘these are two substances’ is toarise. — All these occur at one moment.
(VII) Soon, the knowledge regarding the substances that ‘these are two
substances’ arises. (D) The two-quality is destroyed. (f) The knowledge
regarding the two-quality is to be destroyed. (viii) The saµskåra is to arise
due to the knowledge regarding the substances. — All these occur at one
moment.

363(VIII) Soon, (F) the knowledge regarding the two-quality is destroyed.
[IX] (G) The knowledge regarding the substances is also [destroyed] by thesaµskåra.”(§131: yadå(I)
boddhuß cakshushå samånåsamånajåt¥yayor dravyayo˙ sannikarshesati,(II) tatsaµyuktasamavetasamaveta-ekatvasåmånyajñåna-utpattau,(III) ekatvasåmånya-tatsambandha-jñånebhya ekaguˆayor anekavishayiˆyekå buddhi˙ [= apekshåbuddhi˙] utpadyate,(b) ekatvasåmånyabuddheß ca vinaßyattå [read in Vyomavat¥];tadå(IV) tåm apekshyaikatvåbhyåµ svåßrayayor dvitvam årabhyate.
tata˙ puna˙,(V) tasmin dvitvasåmånyajñånam utpadyate;(c) tasmåd dvitvasåmånyajñånåd apekshåbuddher vinaßyattå,(vi) dvitvasåmånya-tatsambandha-tajjñånebhyo dvitvaguˆabuddher utpadyamånatå,— iti eka˙ kåla˙.
§132: tata idån¥m,(VI) (C) apekshåbuddhi-vinåßåd
(d) dvitvaguˆasya vinaßyattå,(e) dvitvaguˆabuddhita˙ såmånyabuddher api vinaßyattå,[read as Kir](vii) dvitvaguˆa-tajjñåna-sambandhebhyo dve dravye iti dravyabuddher
utapadyamånatå,— iti eka˙ kåla˙.
§133: tadanantaram,(VII) dve dravye iti dravyajñåsyotpåda˙,(D) dvitvasya vinåßa˙,(f) dvitvaguˆabuddher vinaßyattå,(viii) dravyajñånåt saµskårasyotpadyamånatå,— iti eka˙ kåla˙.
§134: tadanantaram,(VIII) (F) dravyajñånåd dvitvaguˆabuddher vinåßa˙,[IX] (G) dravyabuddher api saµskåråt.)Udayana summarizes the process as follows [Kir 128,24–129,7 (≈SDS X. 83–87, 97–100)]—
tad ayaµ prakriyåsaµkshepa˙:(I) indriyårthasannikarsha˙, tasmåt (II) ekatvasåmånyabuddhi˙, tata˙ (III)apekshåbuddhi˙, tata˙ (IV) dvitvam, tasmåt (V) dvitvasåmånyajñånam,tasmåc ca (VI) dvitvaguˆajñånam, tata˙ (VII) dravyajñånam, tata˙ (VIII)
saµskåra˙— ity utpådakrama˙ / vinåßakramas tu— (B) apekshabuddhita˙
ekatvasåmånyajñånasya dvitvotpattisamakålam [= IV] vinåßa˙, (C)apekshabuddher dvitvasåmånyajñånåd dvitvaguˆabuddhisamakålam [= VI],364

(apekshåbuddhi). [510]
To this [we object]: Firstly, the usages of ‘two’ and so forth areaccomplished by the very sufficient condition that [brings about] two-nessand so forth, since they appear to be the object of the enumerative cognitionof each [person].1327 Even if two-ness and so forth belong to external objects,
it should be admitted that they are restrict to one who uses the words(vyavahart®) by force of the very [enumerative cognition1328]; for, otherwise,
it comes about that [number] is generally known like color and so on.
Therefore, it is more reasonable to accept the opinion that the usages andtheir restriction are caused by the very [enumerative cognition].
And [you] admit that when the cognition of this kind ceases, thetwo-ness and so on [also] cease. So it is more troublesome to postulate thecessation of the effect [i.e. the two-ness etc.] from mere cessation of thecause [i.e. enumerative cognition, which you regard as mere assistant causeof the two-ness etc.1329] [511]. Yet it is more reasonable to [accept, like us],(E) dvitvasåmånyajñånasya dvitvaguˆajñånåt [= VI], (D) dvitvasyåpekshåbuddhivinåßåd dravyabuddhisamakålam [= VII], (F) guˆabuddher
dravyabuddhita˙ saµskårotpattisamakålam [= VIII], (G) dravyabuddhes
tadanantaraµ saµskåråt.
For the reason why apekshåbuddhi is assumed to continue for threemoments, see S. Kuppuswami Sastri, A Primer of Indian Logic (Madras,
19613), pp.91f.
1327
dvitvådivyavahåråˆåµdvitvådisåmagryaiva
nishpatti˙tattadapekshåbuddhivishayatayaiva teshåµ sphuraˆåt (Judging from hiscomment that apekshåbuddhivishayatårËpayå dvitvasåmagryaiva dvitvådivyavahåråˆåµ nishpattir iti yojanå, the text on which R comments seems toomit teshåµ sphuraˆåt or, as is suggested by V, omit sphuraˆåt and readteshåm connected with dvitvåd¥nåm in the next sentence).
In other words, ‘If you accept that two-ness and so forth are produced
from the object of enumerative cognition, let the usage of ‘two’ and soforth be brought about by the apprehension of those particular entities
which are but the objects of the enumerative cognition. It is needless topostulate two-ness and so forth (yåd®ßåd apekshåbuddhivishayåd
dvitvådyutpattiµ vadasi tåd®ßåpekshåbuddhivishayavastuvißeshopalambha
eva dvitvådivyavahåram åtanotu, kim anena dvitvådikalapanena)’ [SAS V.
40: 716,5f.].
1328
Cf. SAS V. 39: apekshåbuddhi˙ tattatpurushamåtranish†heti
tajjanyaµ dvitvatritvådikaµ tattatpurushair eva d®shyate.
1329
According to the Vaißeshika, two ekatvas are the asamavåyikåraˆasof dvitva and apekshåbuddhi is its nimittakåraˆa (R). Cf. NyKan 282,8 [adPDhS §131, (IV) cited above]: ekaguˆayor [= ekatvåbhyåm]asamavåyikåraˆatvam anekavishayåyå buddhe˙ [= apekshåbuddhe˙] nimitta-

365

that the cessation of the usages is caused by mere cessation of the cognitionof this kind.
[Obj.] The peculiar cognition is by no means possible without
depending upon the two-ness and so on, whether they are real or superimposed.
[Ans.] How is it possible in your position, then [512] ?
[Obj.] Due to special potency.
[Ans.] Not so because, [were it the case], you would be forced todeny [the necessity of] the two-ness.
on.

[Obj.] The potency is the prior non-existence of the two-ness and so[Ans.] Not so; for in the presence of all prior non-existences like thatof two-ness and that of three-ness, the fixed rule as to which becomes thepotency is not established.
[Obj.] The rule is [established] due to being within the range (parigraha)of the particular will of God or the unseen power.
[Ans.] Then, nothing is different [between our opinions].
[Obj.] There is difference: it comes about that the usage [of ‘two’
etc.] has no object [in your position].
[Ans.] Not so since we have already explain [its] object [i.e.
enumerative cognition]. [513] Moreover, your answer is unsatisfactory [dueto the mutual-dependence]: it is not until two-ness and so on are understoodby the valid means of knowledge that the prior non-existences of them areassumed to be the assistant causes of them; it is not until these [priornon-existences of two-ness etc.] are understood by the valid means ofknowledge that the two-ness and so on are produced respectively inaccordance with the fixed order of them.
Thus it is established that number like two-ness is [but] becoming
the object of particular cognition.
Now one-ness is examined.1330 First, the effected one-ness [which is,kåraˆatvam; also Vyomavat¥ (2) 33,23f. And it is stated in PDhS §132 [(C)and (d)] that the destruction of apekshåbuddhi causes the destruction of
dvitva; in this regard, NyKan says: d®sh†o guˆånåµ nimittakåraˆavinåßåd
api vinåßo yathå mokshapråptyavasthåyåm atyantatattvajñånasyaßar¥ravinåßåt [288,8f.].
1330
V asserts that ekatva is examined here because there is different
views in the Vißish†ådvaita: that is, some hold that it is another non-substance(Cf. NySi 444,1) and the other hold that it is also mere specific knowledge.
Cf. TMK V. 42: aikyaµ svåbhedam åhu˙ katicana, … anye tv etat svasattvam

366

according to the Vaißeshikas, produced anew by lots of one-ness belonging
to component parts and belongs to the composite whole] cannot be accepted
at all. Since we do not accept the whole [as different from its components],
its one-ness is by no means possible. The one-ness of a multitude is [figurative]
like the one-ness of a heap [of grains].1331 In fact, even as to the former case[e.g. cloth] people use the word ‘many’ focusing on the parts [e.g. ‘many
threads’].
[Obj.] The condition of ‘one’ is produced at the time of gatheringand the condition of ‘many’ is [produced] at the time of separation.
[Ans.] Not so since it would lead to the contradiction of difference
cum non-difference. As to [‘one’ or ‘many’ as mere] notion, it is justifiable
otherwise just from the viewpoint of multitude or division. As for [‘one’and ‘many’ as] specific nature [of a thing] [514], on the other hand, thecontradiction of difference cum non-difference in reality would follow.
And we would cognize one thread in the condition of cloth [if the condition‘one’ were produced anew when threads gather together].
[Obj.] How about the one-ness of the phenomenal world at the timeof the dissolution?
[Ans.] Such cannot happen in any way.
[Obj.] Then, it is contradictory to the Írutis.
[Ans.] No, because [their] intention is on the abandonment ofdifference.
[Obj.] The very [abandonment] is the one-ness.
[Ans.] Not so, because this [abandonment of difference] is in nature
the condition of becoming the primordial matter (prak®titvåvasthå). For
instance, when1332 [earth] is transformed into such modifications as grassand stone, people begin to use the expression that ‘[they are] different fromearth’; when the same are transformed into another modification, people
again begin to use the expression that ‘[it is] earth’ [is produced]. But thismuch means [515] neither the mutual one-ness of each part like grass andstone nor [their one-ness] with the earth. What, then? [It means] mere
attaining the homogenous condition through abandoning the heterogeneousconditions. That1333 can be said regarding the primordial matter and so on as…. The different character of ekatva has been already noticed by Kaˆåda[EIPh III: 119]. Cf. VaiSË VII. ii. 1–2.
1331
Cf. SAS V. 41: saµghåtaikyaµ tu råßivad aupacårikam eva [717,13].
1332°kalåyåm, which means °daßåyåm according to R. K reports thatthe reading °daßåyåm is found in most MSS.
1333
Hereafter the text runs: evaµ prak®tyådåv ap¥ti / cintyaµ

367

well.
The one-ness that belongs portionless entities [like atoms] is also to
be examined in the same way. Nevertheless, [we define] one-ness as becoming
the object of that cognition of a mere entity which is devoid of the cognitionof another entity brought together as of equal importance in relation to one
and the same verb.1334 [516] This [definition] can justify even the practicalusage that ‘this [is] one, this [is] also one’; for though [the two] are brought
together [in this case], [they] are devoid of being in relation with one andthe same verb and having the equal importance1335 [517]. And there is notcontradiction to our cognition and so on [which have been pointed by us inproving the difference between dharma and dharmin1336], by which we areforced to bear the complication [in postulating one-ness as different fromthe specific nature of a thing].
Likewise, in the same manner we can account for the number cognized
as to [non-substances] like qualities as well even without [postulating
niravayavagatam aikyam apy evam / tathåpy ekakriyånvayena, etc.
V entertains doubts about this punctuation: iti should be connectedwith cintyam etc. and denotes the reason of the next portion because thediscussion on ekatva (beginning with 513,3: ekatvaµ cintyate…) does notend here; the second evam is unnatural because according to TMK V. 41c:
asaµghåtarËpe kvacana nirupadhi˙ syåd asåv ekasaµkhyå (Cf. SAS 717,14f.:
asaµghåtarËpe paramåˆvådau niupådhir asåv ekatvasaµkhyå sv¥kriyate),the ekatva beloging to a niravayavavastu is to be regarded as different fromthat belonging to multitude. Thus, respecting the original reading, V suggests
to read: … ap¥ti cintyaµ niravayavagatam aikyam apy evaµ tathåpi /ekakriyånvayena, etc., which means: … accordingly, that one-ness belonging
to portionless entities which is [still] to be examined is also [regarded as
the buddhivißeshavishayatva] in the following manner (evam) [i.e.
ekakriyånvayena etc.], even though (tathåpi) [it is not figurative like thatbelonging to multitude]. Or rather, V suggests to read: … ap¥ti cintyaµ
niravayavagatam aikyam / yady apy evam tathåpy ekakriyånvayena, etc.
As to the reading indicated in R: evaµ cintyam, V guesses thattathåpi is omitted in this case.
1334
By ‘equal importace,’ the cognition of color in a pot is excluded;by ‘one and the same verb,’ the cognition ‘this is one, this is one’ isexcluded (R).
1335
In view of the cognition of the dharma and the dharmin [i.e. one
and this], the two are devoid of samaprådhånya; in view of the cognition of
the two dharmins [i.e. this1 and this 2], the two are devoid of ekakriyånvayitva(V). R's comment is of the same content.
1336
See chap.1: 7,2–16,1.

368‘number’ as] another category.1337 It is extra for you, though the cognitionis same [even] in this case, to postulate difference [between number insubstances and that in non-substances].
The1338 practical usage in respect to innumerable [entities] also denies
number of this kind [i.e. particular numbers from two to maximum(parårdha)]; [never does it denies the number as defined by us, i.e. becoming
the object of particular cognition]. Otherwise, it is contradictory even foryou [since you admit that enumerative cognition is indispensable for theorigination of number]. Although everything is brought together [as theobject] for the [enumerative] cognition of [omniscient ones] like God [i.e.
all the entities are countable for them], innumerableness is in nature infinite1339
because there is not any limit like hundred, thousand, ten thousand and soon [518]. Difference in number does exist even between innumerable things:
for instance, [that] between past kalpas and the multitude and so on of stars
and the like; [that] between individuals having substance-ness, those having
earthiness, those having pot-ness and so on.1340
By the way, it is stated in the Commentary that:*One-ness is the limitation by number ‘one’ [Ír¥Bh I. i. 1: (1) 143,2].
This also does not presuppose the opinion that number is another category.
Because [it] intends to show mere undesirable contingency of particularity
against those who maintain an entity without any particularity. Even such
number as is assumed by us is not different in being particularity.
It is stated in the Ótmasiddhi by Bhagavat Yåmunå-muni that [number]
like two-ness is also continuous as long as [its] substratum exists.1341 This isalso stated, we think, merely with the intention of frightening the Vaißeshika
doctrine [that two-ness and so on are destroyed when enumerative cognition
1337

The Pråbhåkaras regard saµkhyå as a different category so that it
can belong to guˆa and so on as well. Cf. TMK V. 44: adravye 'py asti
saµkhyå vyavah®tibalata˙ så tato 'nyå guˆåde˙.
The number of guˆas has not been satisfactorily explained in thePråc¥na-naiyåyika theory and the problem is first resolved by the Navyanaiyåyika theory of paryåpti [EIPh III: 119]. Later, Raghunåtha-ßiromaˆialso accepts saµkhyå as another padårtha (Daniel H. H. Ingalls: Materials
for the Study of Navya-Nyåya Logic, HOS 40, p.39, n.38).
1338
This is the answer to the objection that: If number is but becoming
the object of particular cognition, nothing would be innumerable since
everything is within the scope of God's knowledge (R).
1339
V suggests to read ånantyarËpam for ånantyam.
1340
The similar expression is found in 53,1f.and 222,8f. and is referred
to in 386.
1341
ÓS 77,9ff.

369

is destroyed] [519].
In fact, Bhagavat Nåthamuni remarks in the seventh section of theprameya-påda in his Nyåyatattva that:*Number is that in which conjunction is included [Nyåyatattva],
and that:*Number is of the peculiar nature (tadåtmå) of all [entities][Nyåyatattva].
The meaning of that [previous passage] is said to be that: The relation toparticular cognition is practically called ‘number’; and it is but conjunction.1342
Or rather, we may think, this [passage] is concerned with the one-ness of amultitude.
Varadavishˆu-mißra and others, following the [above-mentioned]
description of the Ótmasiddhi, have admitted the number as different[category]. For instance, it is stated that:*Those [qualities] which exist in perceptible entities, namely, number,size, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness,
fluidity and similarity, are perceptible [].
Further, the existence of number in qualities is mentioned as follows:*The number existing in qualities are grasped as existing in an entity
existing in a thing conjunct1343 [to the sense-organ] [].
It is to be thought that such is also said as the opinion of others.
Bha††a Paråßara-påda states in connection with the refutation and soon as to manifested-ness (pråka†ya) that:*Number is first cognized at the second moment1344 [Tattvaratnåkara];[and that1345]:*And there is no contradiction because this number belongs to an
inherent thing [Tattvaratnåkara],and so on, where he practically accepts number [as assumed by the
Vaißeshika]. But we cannot judge whether [the author said so] as acceptedby himself or accepted by others since [the portion of the work] in which1342

V suggests to add iti after the sentence.
1343
Read saµyuktåßritåßritatvena (which is mentioned in R as a better
reading and is, according to K, found in most MSS.) for saµyuktåßritatvena.
If the latter is adopted, it means ‘as indirectly existing in a thing conjunct’(K) or ‘since quality, which is the substratum of the number, exists in athing conjunct’ (V).
1344
That is, the pråka†ya [of dvitva] must be produced at the third
moment by the cognition regarding the dvitva, which is produced at thesecond moment. But, while the dvitva has been destroyed at that time [i.e.
the third moment], on what is the pråka†ya produced? (R).
1345
According to R, the next passage is cited from the other portion.

370

prameya is discussed has been lost. [520]Size (parimåˆa) is the object of the notion of size. It is of four sorts:
minute (aˆu), big, long and short. All these four kinds of size forms thatwhich is described (nirËpita) by the correlative (pratiyogin); since weunderstand ‘This is [more] big than that,’ ‘This is [more] minute than that,’‘This is [more] long than that,’ ‘[This is more] short [than that]’ and thelike.
As to such [size], some hold that there is not size in all-pervasive
substances because [they] are understood as immeasurable (aparimita). In
fact, Ír¥råma-mißra states in his Vyåkhyå ad the Ír¥-Vedårthasaµgraha,
when the word ‘infinite1346 (ananta)’ is commented, as follows— having
said that:*Limitation (pariccheda) in entity is size in entity; limitation in spaceis its product [VAS-vyåkhyå];and further:*Non-limitation is not quality [VAS-vyåkhyå],and so forth. And Bhagavat Yåmuna-muni says in the prima facie view ofthe Ógamapråmåˆya that:*It is illustrated here with the example of the size of ether, but it isalso but1347 what is to be examined. Size means delimitation (avaccheda)of space: ‘this much,’ that is to say, being surrounded by [another]
entity all around (parita˙).1348 And it cannot exist in ether. If so, why
can this [ether] be shown as an example here? [ÓP 6,5–8].
But the others hold that: Because such size as is in the form that ‘thisis bigger’ and the like is possible even in this case, size does exist even in
those [all-pervasive substances]; the verbal expression ‘immeasurable’ is toreject contracted size.
And such another quality named ‘size’ is accepted by the author of
the Vivaraˆa [i.e. Ír¥råma-mißra]. That is, he states in the Vivaraˆa on thesection on ‘origination’ as follows:*Limitation in entity is size of entity; limitation in space is based on
it [Vivaraˆa ad Ír¥Bh I. i. 2],
and so on.
1346

The word in VAS §1 (the maµgala v.1): …
nirmalånantakalyåˆanidhaye …; or that in §136: ‘satyaµ jñånam anantaµbrahma’ [TaiUp II. i. 1] iti nirdeßåt … aparicchedyatayå casakaletaravilakshaˆam [166,14f.]
1347
While NySi reads iva, the critical edition of ÓP reads eva without
v.l.
1348
I.e. parito månaµ parimåˆam (R).

371

Now, the other view1349 is as follows. Size is not another category. To
explain — nothing but particular pervasion of an area in the form describedby the correlative of each [entity] is the size of each [entity]. And such
[pervasion] is admitted even by those who accept [size] as another category.
Then, it would be complicated to postulate something other than that. [521][Obj.] Firstly, mere conjunction with an area cannot be size since it
is over-applicable [to any kind of size]; accordingly, you should admit that[size is] a particular delimited area. And you should admit the delimitation
is made not by everything but by that which is qualified by particularsize.1350 So it is inappropriate to deny that [size] by means of the delimitationof an area, for which that [size] is indispensable. Moreover, there would be
infinite regress that the size of an area is dependent upon another area.1351
Thus, it is proved that size is another category.
[Ans.] It is not true; for we explain the delimitation as follows. WhenA can cover a certain area conjunct with B as well as another area at thesame time, A has larger size than B; when A cannot cover the whole area
conjunct with B at once, A has smaller size than B [522]. Likewise, being
larger from the viewpoint of the straightforwardness in one direction islong-ness; being small from the same viewpoint is short-ness.
By the way, [the Vaißeshika conception of] minimum-ness (aˆutva)
as different from those1352 cannot be established since [we have already]denied atoms (aˆu).1353 All these four kinds [of size] can exist even in one
entity. For instance, as to a particular plant, the practical usages of ‘big,’‘small,’ ‘long’ or ‘short’ are found in comparison to another plant.
Such being the case, the size of the delimitating factor, by which
there would be defects such as the contradiction to indispensable factor andthe infinite regress, is never shown here [in our definition of size].
By the above argument it is explained that there is small-ness and
1349

This is the author's own opinion (R). In TMK. 45, however, thesimilar view (deßådhikyådisiddhåv upadhibhir iha tadyuktasaµyogåd
deßavyåptibheda˙ parimiti˙) is refuted.
1350
parimåˆavißeshavißish†ena. R, though he shows only up to °vißesha,
comments this reading: mahattvaparimåˆavißish†åvacchinnadeßasaµyogo
mahatparimåˆam etc. ; K holds that °vißesheˆa is better.
1351
Cf. SAS V. 45: nanu deßair evopådh¥nåµ parimåˆam astv iti yadi
vadasi, tarhi parasparåßraya˙: åkåßådideßair upådhidravyaparimåˆamupådhibhiß cåkåßådideßaparimåˆam iti [721,2f.].
1352
Cf. PPBh §151: tathå cåˆv api dvividham: nityam anityaµ ca /nityaµ paramåˆumana˙su, tat pårimåˆ∂alyam; anityaµ dvyaˆuka eva.
1353
See chap.1: 50,3–60,3. For aˆutva, see also TMK V. 50.

372

large-ness even in an area. [523][Obj.] Without the particular size as different from the specific natureof a thing, there would be no difference between the conjunction withsomething large and that with small.
[Ans.] Not so, since [such difference] is found even in [aggregate
objects] like a heap [of grains, which is not accepted as the whole and,
therefore, cannot be the substratum of the quality size].1354[Obj.] In this case, this [difference] is based on a large number of[its] component parts.
[Ans.] Not so. 1355 Suppose, then, [the difference] is caused by it onlyin everything.
[Obj.] We find that the size becomes different, though the number ofthe component parts does not change, when they are loosely conjunct.
[Ans.] True. Still let only the pervasion of this much area be, for [it]is accepted as producing the particular size only through the loose conjunction.
In fact, such is found even in powder when it is gathered and spread.
Like [aggregation], large-ness and many-ness1356 also produce only
particular pervasion of an area; since another intermediate other than that is
not known.
And it is stated by Bhagavat Yåmuna-muni that:*Size means delimitation (avaccheda) of space. [ÓP 6,6].
Bhagavat Nåthamuni also says in the seventh section of the prameyapåda [of his Nyåyatattva] as follows:*Size is that in which number is included [Nyåyatattva];
and further,*The long-ness [of something] is [its end] being far [from its startpoint].
The short-ness is being near.
The wide-ness is being far obliquely.
1354

Cf. SAS V. 45: saµghåtarËpeshuråßiprabh®tishu
deßasambandhavißeshamåtram eva parimåˆavyavahårakåraˆam [721,4f.].
1355
As is pointe out by V, it is better to omit na.
1356
The Vaißeshikas hold that all the four kinds of non-eterenal sizeare caused by any one of (1) number (e.g. the number of paramåˆus anddvyaˆukas produce the size and the length of a traˆuka and so forth), (2)size (e.g. the large-ness of components produces the size of the composite)and (3) aggregation (pracaya).
The logic explained so far regarding (3) can be applied to (2) and (1)as well (R).

373

The narrow-ness is being near obliquely.
The straightforward-ness is its part existing on the end of its own[another] part [524].
The curved-ness is its part existing [in any way1357] on its own [another]part.
The circle-ness is that the far-ness and near-ness of the final part inone direction from the final part in the opposite direction [i.e. thelength of the diameter] is uniform.
The square-ness is that the far-ness and near-ness [of the last part inone direction of the cardinal points1358] from the last part in the
opposite direction of the cardinal points (kevala) [i.e. the length ofeach side] and that of the last part in one direction of the intermediate
points from the last part in the opposite [i.e. the length of eachdiagonal] are [respectively] uniform [Nyåyatattva].
We may omit the following some items; then, it is stated that:*The large-ness is the pervasion of many [areas].
The small-ness (mandatva) is its non-existence [Nyåyatattva].
Further, he mentions the specific nature of size in general (or quantity)common to everything, say, space, time, number, height and so on, that:*Size is of the peculiar nature (tadåtmå) of all [entities1359][Nyåyatattva].
The point thereof is as follows. Size is of three kinds: length (åyåma),breadth (viståra) and thickness (ghana). And it culminates in the east andthe west, the north and the south, or upwards and downwards accordant
with possibility. Among all these three pairs of direction, that in which
there is excess is length; that in which there is moderateness is breadth; thatin which there is shortage is thickness. As to these three [kinds of size],
there are various kinds of practical usage due to the difference in the degreeof [their] mixture. In all-pervasive substances there is no size if its fullness
is taken into consideration; if its various delimitating factors are taken into
consideration, there is the [metaphorical] usage [of the word size], as thecase may be. [525]Separateness (p®thaktva) is, according to the Vaißeshika1360 and other1357

svåµßasya svåµßasthiti˙. V suggests to read pårßve after svåµßasya.
K comments: yathåkathaµcid iti ßesha˙.
1358
Following R, supply kevalaviruddhadigantåµßånåm.
1359
Cf. the definition of number cited in above 519,2.
1360
See PDhS §161: p®thaktvam apoddhåravyavahårakåraˆam. But theNavya regards it as anyonyåbhåva; see NyK 508: atra navyå˙ (= D¥didhikårå˙)M¥måµsakå˙ [Cf. MMU II, guˆa, 8] cåhu˙— p®thaktvam anyonyåbhåva

374

schools, another quality that is the cause of the usage ‘separate.’ But it
cannot be distinguished from difference (bheda) in general, since the notion[of ‘separate’] culminates in that much. And what [they assume as] making
us postulate it is, [as we shall show later], interpreted otherwise. Moreover,
we never find that [the word ‘separate’] is used along with the word ‘different(bhinna).1361’ And it is experienced that the notion and the usage of‘separateness,’ having the same limit as that of ‘difference,1362’ are concernedwith not only substances but also non-substances.1363[Obj.] This [notion as to non-substances] is misconception.
[Ans.] Not so, since nothing sublates it.
[Obj.] Suppose the quality that [we] call separateness is the content
of the word ‘difference.’[Ans.] It is not acceptable, since this [content] can be accounted for
as a result of such [character of a thing] as the specific nature, theconfiguration, blue, yellow and other [colors].1364 For the word ‘difference’as to all these [mutually different items] is etymologically derived becauseof the limiting adjunct of the notion ‘not synonymous’ as, for example, theword ‘specific nature’ [as to different items is etymologically derived becauseof the limiting adjunct of the notion ‘the unique character’]. And the very
[difference as to the specific nature etc.] is mutual non-existence [526].
[Obj.] In the [negative expression] that ‘A is not B (idam idaµ nåsti),’mutual non-existence is known, [unlike separateness], as not described by
the limit.1365
eva, na tu guˆåntaram iti (Gadådhari, vyutpattivåda) (Dinakar¥, guˆa).
1361
Cf. SAS V. 51: yadi p®thaktvam asådhåraˆadharmarËpatvåd bhedåd
anyat, tarhi tadvåcakaßabdasya bhedavåcakaßabdena såmånådhikaraˆyaµprasajyate; na ca tathopalambhyate: na hi p®thag ity uktvå bhinnam iti
vadanti, bhinnam iti coktvå p®thag iti vå [725,14–16].
1362
bhedåvadhyavadhikatayå. Cf. SAS V. 51: yad bhinnam iti
vyavahriyate, tad eva p®thag iti; yat p®thag iti, tad evetarad iti ca vyavahriyate[725,10]. According to the second interpretation of R (= K), here avadhi
means pratiyogin. The similar usage of the word avadhi is found in TMK
V. 51c: nåpy ajñåtåvadh¥nåµ p®thag idam iti dh¥˙. Cf. Kåßikå ad P 1. 4. 24(dhruvam apåye 'pådånam): dhruvaµ yad apåyayuktam apåye sådhye yad
avadhibhËtaµ tat kårakam apådånasañjñaµ bhavati.
1363
Cf. SAS V. 51: na ca p®thag iti dh¥r dravya eva niyatå, guˆåd¥nåm
api p®thaktvenopalambhåt [725,1].
1364
Cf. SAS V. 51: kiµca bhedaß ca n¥lap¥tådir asådhåraˆo dharmaevåbhimata˙ [725,11f.].
1365
The similar discussion to prove that p®thaktva is another guˆa is375[Ans.] This cannot [negate our position], since such happens due tothe particular word [i.e. p®thak].1366[Obj.] Påˆini means that the fifth case [is introduced] when synonyms
for the word anya (other than), which denotes the quality called separateness,are related.1367[Ans.] Why [doesn't the word anya denote mutual non-existence]?
[Obj.] If [he] intended synonyms for mutual non-existence, even theusage that ‘gha†åt pa†o na bhavati’ would result. [527][Ans.] Not so, because there is the particularity that [the fifth case isintroduced] when [synonyms of anya] culminate in that which has thequality (dharmin).1368[Obj.] How [do you justify] if separate-ness is indicated [e.g. gha†åtpa†asya p®thaktvam]?
[Ans.] It does not matter, since [the quality separate-ness] firstdescribes that which has the quality and, then, informs us the quality. On
the other hand, [negative particles] like a, må, no and na, having the senseof non-existence (asattva),1369 do not require the limit (or the countercorrelative).
Or rather, the limit in the case of these [negative particles] is shownin the same case ending [528].
Thus, it is established that separateness is but difference in general.
Again, it is stated by Bha††a Paråßara-påda, immediately after
explaining difference, that:*Likewise those dharmas which have been already postulated, namely,
substance, quality and action, could completely explain distinct1370
notions, verbal usages (vyavahåra) and conducts (vyavahåra);accordingly, we do not need postulate another quality named difference
found in Kir §161, Nyåyal¥låvat¥, ChSS, pp.368–72, Tårkikarakshå v.45.
1366
See P 2. 3. 32: p®thak-vinå-nånåbhis t®t¥yå 'nyatarasyåm [+ pañcam¥(28)].
1367
See P 2. 3. 29: anya-årat-itara-®te-dikßabda-añcU-uttarapada-åCåhi-yukte, and the Kåßikå on it (cited by R): anya ity arthagrahaˆam,anyårthayoge pañcam¥ty artha˙.
1368
According to R: anyårthayoga eva pañcamyå vidhånåd
anyaßabdasya ca dharmiparyantatvåt, idam idaµ nåst¥ty atra naÑaß
cånyonyåbhåvamåtravißrantatvena dharmiparyantatvåbhåvån na pañcam¥.
1369
Cf. P 1. 4. 57: cådaya˙ [nipåtå˙ (56)] asattve.
1370
apunarukta, literally, ‘non-repeated.’

376that has not [been postulated] previously. For the same reason,
particular separateness1371 and the like, which are postulated by the
Vaißeshikas, are also cast away [529] [Tattvaratnåkara?],and so on. Further, in refuting the dilemma as to whether difference belongs
to one thing or many [or different] things,1372 he says:*For we clearly perceive the very two different things that haveblueness and whiteness [e.g. a blue pot and a white pot] asdifferentiating between the thing that has the quality blue and thething that has the quality white.1373
Those who postulate [the difference between the two] depending
upon particular separateness and the like must be afraid of such[defect that has been pointed out by you] as self-dependence [and themutual-dependence, since the particular separateness etc. aredependent upon difference1374]; we, who accept what is seen(d®sh†avådin), are not [afraid of such defect] [Tattvaratnåkara?].
Thus, the peculiar nature and the qualifying attribute [of differentiated things]
are denoted, as the case may be, by the word ‘separate (p®thak)’ or theword ‘different (bhinna)’. 1375
1371

E.g. dvi-p®thaktva (the p®thaktva that, as dvitva, belong to two
different entities, say, ‘dve p®thak’), tri-p®thaktva etc. (R). Cf. Tarkakaumud¥(cited in NyK 508): dvip®thaktvådi ca nånaikap®thaktvavishayakåpekshåbuddhijanyaµ tannåßanåßyaµ ceti sarvam anityam eva. For further discussion
on dvip®thaktva etc., see Kir §162, NyL 372,4–374,2.
1372
I.e. Does difference belong to one thing or different things? Not
the former, since it would contradictory [to the concept of difference]; nor
the latter, because the defect of åtmåßraya would result if this [difference]is dependent upon itself and because a single entity could not belong to twothings without partial difference [i.e. difference could not be in two things
without other difference] (R).
1373
There is the doubt that if the difference between a blue pot and awhite pot were the two peculiar colors of each [pot], it would violate ourknowledge that single difference is described by the two entities, i.e., ‘there
is difference between the two’; the doubt is removed by force of the knowledge
in the form of the perception which grasps the very peculiar qualities ofeach [pot] form differences. Our knowledge as to the oneness, i.e., ‘there isdifference between a pot and a cloth,’ is like [that of] the peculiar nature(svarËpa) of a pot and a cloth (R).
1374
I follow the interpretation of R (= K); while V divides the compond
vißeshap®thaktvådisåpeksham into vißeshap®thaktvådi såpeksham and holds
that the vißesha is not the adjective of the p®thaktva but means the fifth
category because Paråßara does not say p®thaktvavißeshådi (fn.1).
1375
Cf. TMK V. 13: dharma˙ kvåpi svarËpaµ kvacid iti ca yathåd®sh†i.

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In addition, it is also stated in the seventh section of the prameya-påda
of the Nyåyatattva as follows:*Difference is of two sorts: atireka and vyatireka [Nyåyatattva].
Here atireka means such quality as does not exist in another dharmin;
vyatireka means the peculiar nature of a dharma, a dharmin and so on.
As to the passage in the same section that:*Oneness is perfect conjunction; difference is its non-existence[Nyåyatattva],
this [‘difference’] means disjunction. [530]
The other schools [like the Vaißeshika] hold that disjunction (vibhåga)is [another] quality opposite to conjunction.1376 But it is not true, because
the destruction of conjunction is brought about only by such [actions] aspushing and splitting. It is possible for those [actions] which are accepted
as producing disjunction to destroy that [conjunction].1377[Obj.] It is impossible for such actions and [the unseen power] as arefavorable for being similar to those [actions and the rest] which produce
The alternative of svarËpa and dharma is used in the mahåpËrvapaksha ofÍr¥Bh in order to deny bheda: bhedas tåvan na vastusvarËpam… nåpidharma˙… [I. i. 1: (1) 97,5–98,5]. This is based on the assertion in
Brahmasiddhi, chap.2, esp. pp.47ff. (also Sambandhavårttika, vv.917–86,
Ish†asiddhi, GOS ed., pp.2–24); judging from Deßika's interpretation of theNyåyatattva cited below, Nåthamuni also knows this alternative. Deßika
refutes this alternative in ÍDË, våda 13 also. See Srinivasa Chari 1988:
32–35; Mesquita, Erkentniss, S.119–28.
1376
saµyogavirodh¥ guˆo vibhåga˙. Cf. Kir 152,20: saµyogavighåtako
guˆo vibhåga˙ (≈ TarS §28: saµyoganåßako guˆo vibhåga˙). For the reason
why TarS does not accept such definition as is found in PDhS (vibhågo
vibhaktapratyayanimittam [§182]), see Athalye's Notes to TarS, p.166.
It is to be noted here that some logicians denied vibhåga as anotherguˆa even at the time of Våcaspati Mißra and that Bhåsarvajña clearly
denied it (NyåyabhËshaˆa, pp.161f.), which was criticized by Udayana (Kir
151,10–152,2) and by Vallabha in detail (Nyåyal¥låvat¥, ChSS, pp.849–58);
cf. EIPh II: 122–23.
1377
Cf. SAS V. 56: saµyogavinåßakatvena vibhågaµ sv¥kurma iti cet
tan na, saµyogavinåßasya vibhågakåraˆatvena kalpitåt karmaˆa eva siddhi˙syåt [730,2–4]. The same discussion is found in the NyåyabhËshaˆa: karmaˆaeva saµyoganivartakatvåt [161,5] etc., which is paraphrased by Udayana asfollows: karmaiva saµyogavinåßakam astu; tasmin sati tanniv®ttidarßanåt,anvayavvyatirekagamyatvåc ca vastusåmarthyasya. na hi guˆåntarasyåpi
guˆavinåßakatve 'nyat pramåˆam asti [Kir 151,10f.].

378

conjunction1378 to destroy it [as well].
[Ans.] You cannot say so; since [conjunctions with fire] are admitted
to destroy color and other [qualities] even if they are similar to such
conjunction with fire as is accepted as producing [these] color and others.
Nothing is wrong if an individual that is produced by A is destroyed by A,
not to mention another [individual that is not produced by A].
[Obj.] A certain quality is postulated as producing the sound of split
things like a pot.1379[Ans.] Not so. For even in this case it is possible for those [actions]like splitting which produce the disjunction to produce that [sound]; and [inopinion] such [an action] is in the nature of a kind of conjunction.1380
In addition, the notion ‘[two things are] disjunct’ can be understoodas having the non-existence of the conjunction [between the two] as theobject [531].
[Obj.] If [disjunction were mere non-existence of conjunction], there
should be the notion ‘disjunct’ even between Mt. Meru and the Vindhya
Range.
[Ans.] Not so, because that [which forms the object of the notion‘disjunct’] is in the nature of annihilative non-existence (pradhvaµsa) [ofconjunction].1381 And even in this case, some may entertain the notion‘disjunct’ based on mere non-existence of the conjunction; you also interpret
this [notion] as metaphorical. That notion ‘disjunct’ in some cases [e.g.
between a pot and cloth even when they are conjunct, between color andtaste etc.] which is based on difference in specific nature is to be justified in1378

saµyogajanakajåt¥yatvådinånukËlasya karmåde˙. I follow theinterpretation of R that here ådi denotes the same function of the ad®sh†a;while, according to K, it denotes ‘destroying the conjunction with [each]preceding part which is opposite to the conjunction with [each] succeeding
part’.
1379
Cf. PDhS §182: ßabdavibhågahetuß ca.
1380
Although Deßika admits two different views as to karman, namely,that it is a kind of saµyoga and that it is another category (see below
543,1), the present passage seems to indicate that the former is his favorite.
In this connection, V shows another interpretation presupposing the latter
opinion (fn.1).
1381
tasya vidhvaµsåtmakatvåt. This reading is adopted by VDG, M,
V in parenthesis and H, while R reads tasya vidhvaµsåtmakatvåbhåvåt andV adopts it (the printed reading °tvabhåvåt must be a simple misprint). K
comments both the readings. In the latter reading, tasya denotes the nonexistence of conjunction between Meru and Vindhya.

379

the same manner.
[Obj.] Disjunction, which is momentary,1382 cannot possibly be in thenature of annihilative non-existence, which is continuous.
[Ans.] Your discussion is not proper. For there is no valid means toknow its momentariness apart from [your] technical concept [i.e. disjunction],
because the notion ‘A is disjunct from B’ can [remain] till the next conjunction[of the two] so long as, say, we remember the counter-relative [B].
[Obj.] If [disjunction] were in the nature of annihilative non-existence,
the knowledge ‘[A is] disjunct [from B]’ would [still] exist even when [thetwo] are conjunct again [because the annihilative non-existence of theprevious conjunction between the two is present even at that time].
[Ans.] Not so; since even in your position it comes about that thenotion ‘non-conjunct’ [still] exist [at that time], because the non-existenceof the previous conjunction is present.1383[Obj.] Every time conjunction that has been produced is destroyed,
we entertain the notion of that [‘non-disjunct’] whose counter-correlative iseach [conjunction] alone [532].
[Ans.] [We also reject your objection] in the same way.1384[Obj.] It is appropriate that disjunction is a quality [since] it is, likeconjunction, understood as existing in two substances.
[Ans.] Oh, what a great Vaißeshika you are! For you insist so though[the Vaißeshikas also] admit that such [antecedent or annihilative] nonexistence as is present in the substratum where the counter-correlative [willexist or existed] is, by nature, combined [with the other substrata of thecounter-correlative] as well1385 [533]. In fact, you must accept the notion
1382

Cf. PDhS §193: vinåßas tu sarvasya vibhågasya kshaˆikatvåd
uttarasaµyogåvadhisadbhåvåt kshaˆika iti etc.
1383
Cf. TMK V. 56: tvannirdish†e vibhåge gatavati ca sato˙ syåtvibhaktaprat¥tir bhËya˙saµyogasiddhau.
1384
Cf. SAS V. 56: bhËya˙saµyogapradhvaµsakåle tasyaiva
saµyogasya pradhvaµsena tasminn eva kåle vibhaktaprat¥tir ast¥ti mamåpi
samånam [730,11f.].
1385
yad abhåvasya pratiyogyådhåriˆa˙ svato militatvam abhyupagachatåm evam abhimanyase. I adopt the reading commented by K andtranslate it almost in the line of K (for abhyupagachatåm, I follow thesecond interpretation of V: anådare vå shash†h¥, tadanådaraˆån mahåvaißeshikatvam). Though VDG, Pan, M and H add avagraha before milita°
and it is supported by R, I cannot adopt the reading because it would makethe interpretation more roundabout and, moreover, R seems to read this380

that the annihilative non-existence of conjunction is present in the twothings [which were conjunct] because it has the counter-correlative [i.e. theconjunction] that [was] present in both. [And in some cases, the notion]‘non-conjunct’ is caused by the anterior non-existence of conjunction.
[Obj.] In your opinion, the annihilative non-existence of somethingis but the existence of another; that is, you accept disjunction in anotherterm.
[Ans.] Not so, because [the non-existence of one conjunction] is merelyin the nature of another conjunction and the like.
[Obj.] How do you explain that an entity is contradictory to anotherentity of the same kind, [in other words, why is the preceding conjunction
oppose to the succeeding one]?
[Ans.] Don't forget this question till non-existence is explained.1386
As to the notion [of disjunction], the same content is produced in[various words like] ‘disconnected (viyukta),’ ‘disunited (vigha†ita),’‘separated (vißlish†a),’ ‘having destructed conjunction (vinash†asaµyoga),‘disjunct (vibhakta),’ ‘removed (viprak®sh†a),’ and ‘belonging to anotherpart (deßåntaragata)’ [534].
Keeping all these in mind, [Nåthamuni] says in the seventh sectionof the prameya-påda of the Nyåyatattva that:*Disjunction (viyoga) cannot be said [as another quality][Nyåyatattva].
He says even in the following portion of the same [work] that:*Conjunction is complete proximity; disjunction is farness[Nyåyatattva].
[Obj.] It would follow that conjunction is also negated by this [word‘proximity’ as disjunction is negated by the word ‘farness’].
[Ans.] Proximity can be explained only as ‘being in the nature of the
conjunction with a proximate place’; such being the case, there is no difference
between that which [is assumed by you to be] a substitute [for conjunction,i.e. proximity] and the substituent [i.e. conjunction] in proving conjunction.
Farness is also but conjunction with a particular place. Thus there is no
disjunction as another [quality].
Other [schools] hold that remoteness (paratva) and nearness (aparatva)
is qualities causing the notion of ‘remote’ and [that of] ‘near’ [respectively]
portion differently. That is, R's comment runs: ‘svato 'militatåm iti. amilitatvam anubhayav®ttitvam. vastuto 'nubhayav®ttitvam abhimanyase kim ityartha˙,’ from which V guesses the reading: … svato 'militatåµ kim
abhimanyase. Anyway, the text seems to be a little confused syntactically;381

in relation to space and time. [But we hold that] both are not different froma particular spatial or temporal relation [535] because it is simpler.1387[Obj.] How can we perceive the conjunction with imperceptible [entity
like space and time]?
[Ans.] You are not right since we have already explained that bothtime and space are perceptible.1388 You assume that spatial or temporal
relation delimited by a certain condition (upådhi) produces remoteness andnearness; such [relation] of this kind [directly] forms, in our opinion, theobject of our verbal usages [‘remote’ and ‘near’].1389 Hence, there is noroom for the over-application.1390 Moreover, if you postulate the other qualities
simply because of the notion of ‘remote’ and that of ‘near’ though theverbal usages can be justified [without them], it comes about that you
should postulate similar qualities even in respect to such [verbal usages] as(1) higher and lower genus (paråparajåti), (2) higher and lower size (paråparaparimåˆa), (3) higher and lower knowledge (paråparajñåna) and (4) [higher
K still finds some difficulty in interpreting the passage and suggests to readsvato militatvam abhyupagataµ nåbhimanyase or … abhyupagacchann evam
abhimanyase.
1386
Unfortunately the portion discussing abhåva in NySi has been
lost.
1387
According to the Vaißeshikas, paratva and aparatva are produced
depending upon the apekshåbuddhi whose object is sannik®sh†atva (=saµyukatasaµyogålpatva or ådityaparivartanålpatva) or viprak®sh†atva (=saµyuktasaµyogabhËyastva or ådityaparivartanabhËyastva) [See PDhS§§202f. and NyK or Kir thereon]. Such being the case, it is simpler toregard paratva and aparava as being the object of the apekshåbuddhi because
we never find paratva and aparatva over and above this relation and because
it is complicated if we postulate that which is not required (apekshåbuddhivishayarËpatvam
antareˆådhikaparatvåparatvayor
adarßanåd
anapekshitakalpane gauravåc ca apekshåbuddhivishayabhåva eva
paratvåparatve sta˙) [SAS V. 58: 732,10f.].
It is to be noted here that Bhåsarvajña does not accept paratva-aparatva
for the same reason (NyåyabhËshaˆa, p.162). Udayana rejects his view in
Kir 164,1ff.
1388
For time, see 137,1–141,8; for space, see the fragment of
Varadavishˆu in 148,12–149,2.
1389
Cf. SAS V. 58: kålak®taparatvåpatve sËryapariv®ttyådibhedenakålådhikyådimåtråt param aparam iti pratyayau sta˙. dikk®taparatvåparatve
saµyuktasaµyogålp¥yastvabhËyastvamåtråt
paratvåparatvabuddh¥bhavata˙.
ithamanyathåsiddhau
buddhivyavahårau
samadhikaparatvåparatve vidhåtuµ na ßaknuyåtåm [732,11–14].

382

and lower] potency, since there is no difference.
[Obj.] In those cases, we can explain them through (1) existing in
more [entities] and existing less [entities], (2) delimitating wider space anddelimitating smaller space and [(3) having more objects and having lessobjects].
[Ans.] We have said that even in these cases [i.e. remoteness andnearness] we can justify those [verbal usages] through relation to muchspace and that to little space, that to much time and little time. You also
explain that [directions] like east-ness and west-ness or [temporal distinctions]like past-ness and future-ness are in the form of mere conjunction withspace and time1391 [536]. Then, what kind of difference do you find in these[remoteness and nearness], due to which you are eager to postulate theother quality1392?
[Obj.] Without remoteness and nearness, we could hardly explain theabundance and the scantiness of the conjunction of something conjunct[with our sense-organs].
[Ans.] Were it the case, there would be mutual-dependence. That is
to say, those two [i.e. the abundance and the scantiness] which are described[or understood] distinctively are the efficient causes of the remoteness andthe nearness; the remoteness and the nearness which are produced fromthese [abundance and scantiness] describe them.
[Obj.] Those [abundance and scantiness] which are not described [orwhich are not understood distinctively] produce [the remoteness and thenearness] [537]. 1393
[Ans.] It comes about that, for instance, stars and the moon are also
apprehended so [i.e. as remote and near respectively].1394
1390

That paratva and aparatva are confused (K). Cf. Kir 165,4f.: yadi
hi dikpiˆ∂asaµyogåt paratvam aparatvaµ cotpadyate, sarvatra sarvatdå
sarvathotpadyeta, avißeshåt.
1391
The apekshåbuddhi which is assumed by the Vaißeshika as thecause of paratva and aparatva occurs only between two things exisiting in
one direction (ekasyåµ dißy avasthitayo˙ piˆ∂ayo˙) or in the present(vartamånakålayo˙) [PDhS §§202f.].
1392
Cf. SAS V. 58: kiµca kålena pËrva˙ paßcådbhåv¥ vartata iti deßenåpi
prågbhåv¥ paßcådbhåv¥tyådivyavahårå˙ sahasraßo 'pi d®ßyante. na ca tatraguˆabhedå bhavadbhir api kalpyante. kevalaµ deßakålasambandhamåtreˆavyavahåravißeshå˙ prat¥yanta iti hi bhavanto 'pi vadanti. tad anyatråpi nadaˆ∂avåritam [732,17–733,1].
1393
Cf. Kir 165,8–10: saµyuktasaµyogålpatvabahutvalakshaˆayo˙sannik®sh†atva-viprak®sh†atvayor apekshåbuddhivißeshayoß ca svakåraˆåd383[Obj.] Not so because we never [actually] grasp the gap [between
stars and the moon] as they are [too] far.
[Ans.] Then, give up [the idea that the abundance and the scantiness]in reality (sattayå) cause [remoteness and nearness]. That means what we
desire is established.
As to the statement of Ír¥ Vishˆucitta in his Prameyasaµgraha that:*You may argue ‘How about a distant [object]?,’ but [the abovementioned1395] is quite all right [even] in this case. In fact, we perceive
all that are fit for sense-organs including such [qualities] as size,
separateness, spatial and temporal remoteness and nearness as wellas the form (rËpa) distinct from other [entities], say, the sun andether [Prameyasaµgraha],nor does it intend [remoteness and nearness as] independent principles; it
only intends that [perception] is related to qualified [entities]. And that [anentity] is qualified [by remoteness or nearness] is satisfactorily justified
even in the way we have explained. Therefore, you cannot say that itteaches independent principles simply because they are referred to[individually]. For it is stated in the same work as follows:*[Even] doubts in darkness as to, for instance, whether [a present tallobject] is a pillar, a demon, a man or a woman are of this kind [i.e.
doubts as to the distinction from some specific entities]. In fact, itcannot be said that at night we do not know even the distinction fromsuch [evident entities] as the sun, a light, the earth, ether and ourselves[538]. For we never confuse one who see with that which is seen
except for the misconception regarding the self as the body
[Prameyasaµgraha].
Why can a pillar, a demon etc. form independent categories owing to their
being referred to individually here? Or rather, [the above] expression isbased on the opinion of other schools or a sect of ours; still there is nodefect, since it intends to teach the apprehension of a qualified [entity].
Now action (karma) [is explained]. Action is the object of the notionof movement (calana).
It is perceptible since we apprehend so regarding [the parts of ourbody] like palm.
Still it is not inferable because it would not be established [if it wereinferable]. That is, [such] product [of action as conjunction and disjunction,
which you regard as the inferential mark of action], can be explained merely
utpatte˙ svapramåˆåt prat¥teß ca parasparånapekshatvån na parasparåßrayadosha˙.
1394
The star-orbit (maˆ∂ala) is further than the moon as is known
from ViP II. 7. 6 (R).

384

through the sufficient condition of action that is accepted by both [of us].
Further, [such inference] would lead to over-application. That is, from theconjunction between a mountain and a cloud, which is product [of action],
we could infer action even on the part of the mountain.
[Obj.] This conjunction is produced from one of the two.
[Ans.] What proves it? What establishes the rule that this [conjunction]is produced from the action of the cloud even in this case?
[Obj.] Our [direct] apprehension regarding the cloud and the mountain
as moving and not moving [respectively] does.
[Ans.] It follows that what we desire, [i.e. the perceptibility of action],is admitted.
[Obj.] Action is inferred from conjunction [with one place] precededby disjunction [with another].
[Ans.] Were it the case, we could infer action on the part of themountain which is conjunct with one cloud having been disjunct with anothercloud [539]. Moreover, if action were inferred after the product takes placeand is known to us and concluded to be pervaded [by action], we could nothave present understanding like ‘it is moving’; because [the inferential
knowledge] would be accomplished after delay. In our opinion, however,[action] is related to our sense-organs the moment [it] enters into existence
and apprehension is possible just for this reason even in this case as in thecase of other categories.
Thus, [action] is mostly perceptible if [it] is fit for perception and it
forms the object of the notion of moving.
There is different opinions in our sect: some hold that it is in thenature of conjunction preceded by disjunction, which is acceptable foreveryone; others hold that [action] is something else being the cause of this[conjunction preceded by disjunction].
Of them, the former view is as follows.
Suppose that what is regarded [by the Naiyåyikas] as the cause ofaction (for instance, volition and the unseen power) produces only conjunction
preceded by disjunction, which is regarded [by them] as the product of that
[action]. We never distinctly apprehend anything in-between, by which[our reproach as to] complication [in postulating action] could be refuted.1396
Although there is conjunction preceded by disjunction between the moon
and a star, we do not entertain a notion that they move since we do not
1395

Here the author tries to prove that perception in general has an
object which is qualified by distinction from others (R).
1396
Cf. SAS 775,6f.: yå khalu deßåntarapråpti˙ karmajanyeti pareshåm

385

apprehend immediate succession of a series of the conjunction. For instance,
you also admit that even if something is wandering, you never entertain anotion that it wanders in each moment but you [entertain the notion] when
you consider [each action] as successive. Likewise you should be satisfied
even in this case [of the moon and a star].
[Obj.] The difference [between conjunction and action] is establishedbecause of the distinct designation that ‘It is conjunct by action.’[Ans.] Not so. Because what is denoted by the word ‘action,’ which
is nothing but separation from a preceding conjunction, produces a following
conjunction and, hence, the difference [between the action and the following
conjunction] is possible [540].
[Obj.] It comes about that if the following conjunction is continuous,
the notion ‘it moves’ persists until this [conjunction] is destroyed.1397[Ans.] Not so, because [the notion of] action is [concerned with]either the very moment when conjunction preceded by disjunction is produced
or a successive series of that [conjunction] which is momentary. [541]
And it is stated in the first chapter of the Nyåyatattva that:*If [you assert] that such [actions] as going and cooking are known
as momentary, It is not true. In fact they are not momentary because
they are particular conjunction [preceded by] disjunction[Nyåyatattva],
and so on. And it is stated in the second chapter that:*‘Going’ means attainment from one place to another [Nyåyatattva].
It is stated incidentally in the pramåt®-påda that:*We hold that action is perceptible [Nyåyatattva],
and says the author:*Therefore, we do not regard attainment from one place to another as
the inferential mark [of action]; on the contrary, we hold that this
[attainment] itself is that [action] because postulation is simpler[Nyåyatattva],
and so on.
However, Bha††a Paråßara påda says that:*That which is known is called an object (artha) because it is attained(aryamåˆa) by sense-organs. 1398 Object is of four kinds: substance,
genus, quality and action [Tattvaratnåkara];
and that:*As to genus, quality and action, [the sense-relation called] ‘inherenceish†å, na punas tadatiriktaµ karmopalabhyata iti bhåva˙; låghavaµ cåtra
kåraˆam.
1397
yåvat tadvinåßakålam. For the usage of yåvat and the accusative
form, see P 2. 1. 8 and 2. 3. 8. R reports the v.l. tadvinåßakålaµ yåvat.

386

in what is inherent in a thing which is conjunct’ is possible when if
we accept generality [e.g. going-ness in a moving cows conjunctwith eyes] [Tattvaratnåkara],and so on. But [it should be regarded as intending the opinion of otherschools] as the statement of the same author in which generality, which isincluded [in a particular configuration], is listed separately. In fact, that is
why the very author says as follows:*That1399 particular dharmas which is essential to the dharmin, i.e.
substance, is genus; [that specific dharma which is] established [as]particularizing the [entity] animated by this [genus] is quality (guˆa);[that specific dharma which is] to be established of this kind is action;that which is qualified by these [three] is substance. These are mostrough definitions; we will explain them in detail in [the portion] on
prameyas1400 [Tattvaratnåkara]. [542]The other view is as follows.
Action is not mere conjunction preceded by disjunction; because itcomes about that we entertain the notion of moving as to a mountain which
was disjunct with one cloud and is conjunct with another or with the samecloud again.
[Obj.] Conjunction and disjunction [of something] with a certain
position [i.e. its substratum] are called action.
[Ans.] Not so, since it comes about that we entertain the notion ofmoving as to a fish which is fallen into a powerful stream but keeps
unshaken.1401[Obj.] The stream cannot be a position; ether, the earth and the like[can be so].
[Ans.] [Not so 1402] because attainment to a position and verbal usage[regarding it] are not different even in these cases.
1398

thaN.

I.e. artha = √® + thaN. See UˆådisËtra II. 4: ushI-kushI-gå-®tibhyas

For the detail of the meaning of this passage, see NySi 418,4–7,
where this description has been given by our author as an example of thedefinitions of jåti etc. with some comments. The similar description isfound also in SAS V. 112.
1400
Which had been lost; see above 519,10.
1401
In this case, the substratum of the fish, namely, the flowing waterof the river, is not constant; accordingly, the fish is always disjunct with
one water and is conjunct with another. See SAS V. 107: na hi jalapravåhasthiravapushi matsye santataµsamågacchatpravåhasambabdhe 'pi karmaprat¥ti˙ [775,7f.].
1399

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[Obj.] Conjunction and disjunction with a steady position are called
action.
[Ans.] It follows that action is established as different [fromconjunction and disjunction] because the distinction between a steady thing
and an unsteady one can be explained [only] through something different
from conjunction and [disjunction].
And it is stated by Varadavishˆu Mißra in the Månayåthåtmyanirˆaya
immediately after defining perception that:*And this [perception] is concerned with substance, quality and action;
because all the entities (padårtha) are included in these three. Of
them, substance is defined as ‘that which has conjunction’; quality isdefined as ‘that which has no conjunction while it is different fromaction’ [Månayåthåtmyanirˆaya],and so on. The same author states that action is perceptible in the otherportion that:*But action which exists in visible substance is visible[Månayåthåtmyanirˆaya],and so on. [543]
According to us, it does not matter whether that [action] is different
from conjunction and [disjunction] or not.1403 Yet we assert that it is notproper to introduce the third category (ko†i) [as different from either substanceor quality]. For anything can be defined [as an independent item] by meansof the negation of that which is accepted [as not included1404].
[Obj.] That which has neither an effect in the form of conjunction
nor that in the form of disjunction, while having generality, is quality1405[— which does define quality as different from action].
[Ans.] You are not right. For if we give the definition ‘that in which
both of these [effects] are non-existent and both “producing something
V adds na in parenthesis with ?.
1403
TMK V. 107 also shows the two opinions without jundging whichis correct. But such description is, according to R, not the real intention of
the author and he supports the opinion that karma is included in saµyoga.
In this regard, V points out the fact that the author has listed the ten
adravyas only [fn.1]. In fact, he has clearly stated that tasya [= karmaˆa˙]
ca saµyogavißeshatvåt [NySi 530,6].
1404
According to the comment of R revised by V: yeshåµyatrånantarbhåva˙ (the original: antarbhåva˙) ish†as tån p®thakk®tyalakshaˆasya sarvatra kartuµ ßakyatvåt.
1405
The definition is derived from the definition of karman in VaiSË I.
1. 15 (dravyåßray¥ aguˆavån saµyogavibhågeshv akåraˆam anapeksha iti
1402

388

similar to its own producer” and “being dissimilar to that [producer]” areno-existent is quality,’ it comes about that even latent impression (saµskåra)is regarded as different [from quality; that is, latent impression produces
memory, which is similar to its producer, i.e. direct experience, but isdissimilar to direct experience]. [544] Another definition [of quality thathas such an attribute as excludes action] is also to be examined in this way.
only.

Thus, [every entity] is classified into substance and non-substance

Now, generality1406 (såmånya) is explained.
The Vaißeshika and other [schools] assert that generality is one andeternal and is inherent in many.1407 Their discussion is as follows.
We1408 could not satisfactorily explain our verbal usage [associatedwith] our notion of single [idea (åkåra)] as to many things without any
specific cause [i.e. generality].
And1409 it cannot be true that [generality] is, [as is held by theYogåcåras], [mere] idea in our knowledge (jñånåkåra). Because [the theoryof] cognition of self (åtmakhyåti) has been rejected [in the BrahmasËtra 1410].
[545] And [if it were the case], our activity towards [such] an [external]
object [as is different from our knowledge, say, silver] could not be explained.
Moreover, non-apprehension of the difference [of the ‘silver’ (which isassumed as the substratum of silver-ness) from the knowledge (which is thereal substratum of silver-ness), through which the Yogåcåras may explain
this activity], would be impossible.1411
Nor can it be true that [generality] is, [as is held by the Mådhyåmikas],
non-real (al¥ka). Because cognition of non-real (asatkhyåti) is sublated [byguˆalakshaˆam) and I. 1. 16: (ekadravyam aguˆaµ saµyogavibhågeshv
anapekshaµ kåraˆam iti karmalakshaˆam). Cf. V, fn.2.
1406
As to Deßika's discussion of jåti, see also TMK V. 111–122,
Tattva†¥kå 170–72 and NyP 308–10.
1407
nityam ekam anekasamavåyi såmånyam. ≈ TarS §77: nityam ekamanekånugataµ såmånyam (= Tarkabhåshå, KSS ed., p.213). Cf.
Tårkikarakshå, v.53: såmånyaµ nityam ekaµ syåd anekasamavåy¥.
1408
For the Vaißeshika proof of jåti, see also TMK V. 113.
1409
Buddhist refutation against jåti is also summarized and rejected in
TMK V. 114. Cf. also Kajiyama's Eng. trans. of TBh, pp.126–30.
1410
I.e. II. ii. 27–29 (adhi° 4).
1411
Cf. TMK V. 113: na cåsiddham åropaˆ¥yam. For the proof of the389

our ordinal perception]. And our activity [towards an object] could not be
explained if we understand [it] so [i.e. if we understand it as unreal]; if we
do not understand so, it comes about that cognition otherwise (anyathåkhyåti)is admitted. [Moreover] non-apprehension of the difference [of what is
unreal from what is real, through which the Mådhyåmikas may explain thisactivity], would be impossible in this [opinion]; since such [difference] isproved to be unreasonable in examining the alternative whether it is real or
unreal [— the difference cannot be real because it belongs to an unreal
thing; if it were unreal, there would not be the difference and even what isreal would be real] [546].
Nor is [generality] in the nature of discrimination1412 (apoha). Since
we always understand a thing in positive form. And our activity could not
be possible as in the former cases. If you explain A as different from non-A
and the latter as different from the former, it is mutual-dependence. And[the mutual-dependence is inevitable inasmuch as] no discrimination ispossible without counter-positive. When you say discrimination from non-A,
if the word A denotes an individual, it comes about that [the discrimination]is continuous it comes about that another individual is heterogeneous; if[the word A] denotes that which is homogenous to this [A], it comes aboutthat you admit genus (jåti).
Nor is [generality] in the nature of similarity (såd®ßya) of configuration(saµsthåna) [547]. Because it cannot stand for the alternative whether it iscontinuous or discriminative: [if the former, it is nothing but genus; if thelatter, it cannot bring about continuous knowledge1413].
Therefore, let generality be one and continuous.
To the above-mentioned, we answer as follows.
Which is ‘notion of single [idea]’ said by you, [1] notion of singleindividual-ness, [2] notion of single-genus-ness (ekajåtitva), [3] notion ofhomogenous-ness (ekajåt¥yatva), [4] notion of having quality of a single
form (ekåkåradharmavattva), or [5] notion that is always associated with
one-word (ekaßabdånuviddha)?
[1][2] Neither the first nor the second. Since there are undesirable contingency
that only one of the two remains, [i.e. individual and genus cannot coexist],and other [defects; e.g. that notion of a single individual never proves
genus, that notion of a single genus does not take place in a present object].
[3] Nor the third, since it is not established. Because determinative[perception] never takes place in the form that ‘this is continuous in them.’
diffrence between gråhaka and gråhya against the Yogåcåra, see TMK IV.
20 and NyP 50ff.
1412
Cf. TMK V. 115. For the Buddhist concept of apoha, see Kajiyama's

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The verbal usage of pot-ness that belongs to a pot [does not force us toaccept genus; because it] is possible like [the verbal usage of what is not
accepted as genus by you1414], say, time-ness belongs to time.
[4] Nor the fourth, since it comes about that such [genus] as cow-ness isrooted out [548]. Because only configuration, which is accepted by us, doesso [bring about this notion]. For you also explain [the notion of a singleform] in an earthen pot, a golden pot and so on in this way [by means of
their common configuration]. In fact, you cannot accept pot-ness continuous
in them for fear of1415 the mixture of genera. 1416 If you accept exclusive
genera [i.e. earthen-pot-ness and golden-pot-ness] or even if you do not
accept [pot-ness in a golden pot1417], the continuous notion and the[continuous] verbal usage [concerning them] are based on the similarity of[their] configurations. If you accept such [explanation in this case], let it beaccepted in every case.
[Obj.] Continuous notion and [continuous] verbal usage as to thewholes [e.g. pots] is explained through the continuity of the generality of
its component [e.g. half-pot-ness of half-pots].
[Ans.] Not so. Since the above-mentioned defects like the mixture[of genera] are common to a half-pot and so on.
[Obj.] Suppose, then, that there is continuous generality by accepting
the mixture.
[Ans.] This is [still] incorrect since it is not proper to postulate [anotherentity ‘generality’] though the notion can be explained otherwise.
[Obj.] [We should postulate generality] because if exclusive
configurations and the like [of various cows] caused continuous notion [ofa cow], there would be over-application [549].
[Ans.] How [do you explain] that there is not over-application when
Eng. trans. of TBh, pp.122–26, esp. fn.333.
1413
See the pËrvapaksha in TMK and SAS V. 118.
1414
Those which cannot be jåti according to the Vaißeshika aresummarized in the following verse of Udayana: [1] vyakter abheda˙ [2]tulyatvaµ [3] saµkaro 'tha [4] anavasthiti˙ / [5] rËpahåni˙ [6] asambandhojåtibådhakasaµgraha˙ // [Kir 23,3f.]. Time-ness is an example of [1]. See
Kuppuswami Sastri, A Primer of Indian Logic, pp.33–36.
1415jåtisaµkara-bhayåt; K reports the reading °prasaµgåt.
1416
E.g. that of pot-ness and gold-ness in a golden pot. Such mixture is
not acepted by the Vaißeshika [See the third item in the Udayana's versecited above]; Deßika, however, accepts it [TMK V. 111].
1417
Cf. SAS V. 111: suvarˆådighatådau gha†atvam eva nåst¥ti teshåm

391

exclusive configuration manifest continuous1418 [generality]?
[Obj.] It is because that much [of configuration] has such specificnature [as manifests the continuous generality].
[Ans.] Our answer is same. For it can be said that very much [ofconfiguration] causes the continuous notion. In your opinion, there are
mere violation of perception and complication [in postulating the generality
between the configurations and the notion].
[5] The fifth (pañcama˙) has been also explained (pañcatåµ gata˙)likewise. That is, which is intended there, [a] notion that is always associatedwith the word ‘one’ or [b] notion that is always associated with a single
word like ‘cow’?
The former is not selected. Because if this intends ‘one individual,’ it
is non-established1419 [in many]; and because the verbal usage of ‘being of
one genus (ekajåt¥ya)’ is possible [even] based on various specific adjunct,like the verbal usage of oneness as to [mere collection of many things] likea heap, an army, an assemble and a forest. And the adjunct here means
superimposition of many things on one concept.
Nor is the second, because such is common even to words having
many meanings.1420[Obj.] There is something special [in a word go (cow)] excluded
from [words having] many meanings.
[Ans.] It does not [prove genus] because such [speciality] is also
possible [without genus] as in the case of words like ‘specific nature (svarËpa)’and ‘object (vishaya).’ In fact, we find that the words like ‘specific nature’and ‘object’, signifying various items, are common in some forms and are
peculiar in some forms [550]. Likewise the word go are also common towater, speech, lays, the sun etc. and attains to speciality owing to thecontext. So there is no room to postulate the distinctive cause [i.e. genus].
[Obj.] If generality were but configuration, you could not possibly
explain [generality like color-ness and taste-ness] in those which are devoidof that [configuration1421] like color and taste.
[= keshåµcit nyåyavådinåm] åßaya˙ [779,1f.].
1418
For jåtivyañjaka, see TMK V. 117.
1419
ekavyaktir iti vivakshåyåm asiddhe˙; K reports the reading
vivakshåyåm api siddhe˙.
1420
R illustrates it by an example of aksha; e.g. videvanåksha meaninga spot of a dice, vidh¥takåksha meaning a myrobalan, ßaka†åksha meaning
an axle.
1421
In SAS V. 121, saµsthåna is defined as avayavaracanåvißesha

392[Ans.] Then, how do you explain [genera] in those which are devoidof the [configuration] indicative (upalakshaˆa) [of genus].
[Obj.] Indication [of the genera] in them is [their] characteristic(lakshaˆa).
[Ans.] What is this?
[Obj.] This is apprehension; [that is, being-an-object of theapprehension of color etc. is indicative of color-ness etc.].
[Ans.] Not so, because self-dependence would follow; [for theapprehension of color etc. is dependent upon the indicative knowledge inthe form of being-an-object of the apprehension of color etc.]. [551] In our
opinion, however, the very [being-an-object of the apprehension of coloretc.] itself is what brings about the identity [of various kinds of color etc.,
i.e. color-ness]; accordingly, there is no defect.
[552][Obj.] [Such color-ness etc.] are not dependent upon the indication.

[Ans.] Even in our opinion, [they] are not at all dependent upon theconfiguration.
That is, similarity is of two kinds: similarity in property (dharma)and similarity in specific nature (svarËpa).
Mostly in the case of substance, the notion and verbal usage in single
form is caused by the similarity in property. And keeping that much inmind, Ír¥ Vishˆucitta says that [554]:*Sameness of majority of components is to be denoted by the word‘similarity’ in reference to counter-correlatives [?].
As to those which are devoid of another property, [the notion andverbal usage in single form] is caused by the similarity in specific nature.
Intending this much, the Venerable author of the Commentary says that:*Configuration means nature peculiar to [an entity].1422 So1423
configuration is to be considered in accordance with the entity [Ír¥Bh
I. i. 1: (1) 126,3–127,1].
It is commented in the Vivaraˆa as follows:*For those who observe various entities appears the configuration
defined as particular composition (vinyåsa) of their components.
[Obj.] How is [the word saµsthåna (configuration)] cannot be possibly
derived [etymologically 1424], since the configuration of each entity is[788,5].
1422
svåsådhåraˆaµ rËpam. SP: rËpam ap®thakvißeshaˆam; T†¥kå:nirËpakam ity artha˙ [171].
1423
itir hetau (R).

393

different from that of every other entity. If [it] were common, [it]would lose peculiarity.
[Ans.] This is not right. Because it can be derived from an adjunct aswell, as the word ‘animal’ [is derived] from [the adjunct ‘having] atail’. And the adjunct [in the present case] is similarity [Vivaraˆa adÍr¥Bh].
Here the phrase ‘composition of [their] components’ intends to give an
example; otherwise, it comes about that verbal usages as to color and thelike, say, that ‘color-ness is genus,’ is negated. Although the description‘and the adjunct is similarity’ etc. is natural for the opinion that [similarity]
is a different [entity], [this ‘similarity’ must] denote only specific nature
because this opinion is inappropriate [555].
[Obj.] If similarity were but specific nature (svarËpa), everything
would be similar to everything because there is no difference in being mere
specific nature.1425 And [‘nature (rËpa)’ and ‘similar’] would never usedsimultaneously like ‘this nature is similar to other nature.’[Ans.] Such would be common even if [similarity] were accepted asa different [entity]. [556] That is, if this [thing] have similarity, it would be
similar to everything because there is no difference [in having similarity1426].
[For fear of this], you may assert that this is to be individually established,owing to our perception, as having the similarity whose correlative is thatmuch. Then, let it be admitted that the very specific nature is to be individually
established, owing to the same [perception], as having that much as its
correlative; for there is no difference. And the simultaneous usage is not
impossible, because [nature] becomes the object of the word ‘similar’ inthe form that is described by its correlative. Otherwise, it could no be usedalong with [such] a word [denoting specific nature of a thing] as ‘object(vishaya).’[Obj.] If generality were mere similarity, it would follow that not
only a cow (go) but also a gayal (gavaya) is denoted by the word go.
[Ans.] It cannot be so, because extreme-similarity1427 (sausåd®ßya) is
generality. For the fixed rule is established that when certain extremesimilarity is indicative of generality, this [extreme-similarity] itself is that
I.e. sam-sthånam = samena sthånam.
1425
E.g. a gha†a would be similar to a pa†a since there is no difference
between gha†asvarËpa and pa†asvarËpa in being svarËpa.
1426
If a gavaya is the substratum of the similarity to a go, it would be
the substratum of the similarity to a mahisha (buffalo) as well because there
is no difference in being the substratum of similarity. If the similarity in agavaya has a go as its correlative, it would have a mahisha also as its
correlative because there is no difference in being similarity (R).
1424

394

[generality] [557].
[Obj.] What is extreme-similarity as different from [mere] similarity?
[Ans.] It is, at the first sight, the excess of same properties; ultimately,
it is a kind of specific nature.
However, it is stated by Nåråyaˆårya that:*Genus is but configuration. Though each [configuration of anindividual] is different from that of every other [individual], it isrecollected in the second individual and so on by force of extremesimilarity, and brings about a single notion and word regarding theentities that is its own substrata. The very recollected (configuration,
namely) extreme-similarity,1428 is also called continuity (anuv®tti)[N¥timålå ].
And it is stated by Varadavishˆu Mißra that:*Those which exist in perceptible substratum, namely, number, size,
separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness and nearness,
fluidity and similarity are perceptible. We have already explainedthat comparison (upamåˆa) is an independent means of knowledge.
And this similarity is a quality, because it is proved by the following
inference: effected number, potency and similarity are qualities;
because they are effects related [to a thing], while different fromsubstance and action; like whiteness in a pot [?]Such statements are to be regarded as the opinions of one sect, since they
do admit so.1429 [558] As to the verse of Bha††a Paråßara påda that:*Many persons understand similarity to be sameness of the majority
of components. We will show that it is an independent prameya in[the section on] prameya [Tattvaratnåkara],
we do not understand what is his [real] intention because the following part
discussing prameya had been lost. Or rather, let us admit that similarity is adifferent [entity] even in his opinion. Still the above is favorite for us.1430
Therefore, saµsthåna here [in our opinion] is a synonymous of åk®ti(configuration). The very [åk®ti] is called sausåd®ßya (extreme-similarity),jåti (genus) and såmånya (generality) in the form of [being] described byeach other; nothing beyond this is apprehended.
sansåd®ßyam atyantasåd®ßyam [SAS V. 116: 784,7].
1428
V, following the reading of the text of the N¥timålå, adds saµsthånam
in parenthesis before sausåd®ßyam.
1429
teshåµ tathåbhimatam ity ekadeßimataµ mantavyam. R interprets
the sentence as: ‘it is to be thought that such is the opinion of one sect andtherefore they admit so’ and shows the reading teshåµ na tathåbhimataµmantavyam as better.
1430
In this regard, R cites the verse that: yultiyuktaµ vaco gråhyaµ na
1427

395

But it is stated by Bha††a Paråßara påda that:*[Obj.] If [you] do not accept such generality as substance-ness andearth-ness [belonging to substance], whiteness [belonging to quality]and baking-ness [belonging to action], how [do you explain] thatthose which are [directly] expressed [by a word] (våcya) and causesof the application [of a word] (prav®ttinimitta) — for instance, lineage[in a word like Brahmin-hood] and condition [in a word like pot-ness]— are designated by a single word, while they are many and have nosingle causal factor (prayojaka)?
[Ans.] How do you [explain] it? For this is not a burden only to us.
In fact, everyone (sarva˙ loka˙) admits that a single word is usedeven regarding many things in such an expression as ‘all (sarvam)’.
[Tattvaratnåkara];
and further,*People regard those which are expressed as one owing to the onenessof their specific nature, that of their forms (tad¥yarËpa) and, finally,that of their adjuncts, or because of their similarity and the nonapprehension of their difference1431 [559].
[It is] due to the oneness of their specific nature in the case of thesun, the moon and the like; due to the oneness of their forms (åkåra)in the case of a pot, cloth and the like [Tattvaratnåkara],and so forth. First it is not intended here that ‘the oneness of forms’ isnon-figurative, because genus [as an independent category] is negated. We
think hereby that what is meant here is ‘having such particular configuration
as is fit for the determinate [perception] in single form.’
And such generality is directly perceived1432 in some cases — forexample, pot-ness; in some cases [it is perceived] with the help of particular
cooperative factors — for example, ghee-ness in melted ghee, [which isapprehended] with the help of grasping [its] smell; Brahmin-hood, [which
is apprehended] with the help of remembering the relation of the fathers
and the mothers.1433 It is stated by Venerable Yåmuna muni in theÓgamapråmåˆya that:*Hence Brahmin-hood does not escape perceptibility as it is understoodby means of vision assisted with the memory of the lineage. [560] Sotu purushagauravam [MBh?].
1431
V asserts that iti after this verse is to be omitted (fn.1).
1432
Cf. the verse of the Prakaraˆapañcikå III, p.17: jåtir åsrayato bhinnå
pratyakshagocarå / pËrvåkåråvamarßena Prabhåkaraguror matå (cited in thefootnote * in Dr. Narasimhachari's ed. of ÓgP, p.145).
1433
The similar description is found in 492,6 as well. According to K,
however, it is not the siddhånta of Deßika. As to the nature of Brahmin-hood,
K refers to SeM¥ ad I. ii. 1 [pp.145ff.], T†¥kå [], ÍP ad I. iii. adhi° 7

396

it is experienced, as is mentioned [in the verse cited above1434], thatvision1435 produces the knowledge of genus with the help of various
cooperatives [ÓgP 145,3–6],
and so on. …1436
Here stops the work Nyåyasiddhåñjana composed by Ír¥mad
Veµka†anåtha or Vedåntåcårya, who is the lion among poets andlogicians and who masters all branches of arts.

(devatå°, sË° 23–29) [].
1434
I.e. Ílokavårtika, sambandhåkshepavåda, v.37, cited in ÓgP 145,1f.
1435
Read cakshusha˙ (adopted in Dr. Narasimhachari's ed. of ÓgP),not cakshushå (supported by R but not found in any MS. of ÓgP).
1436
Even Raµgaråmånuja did not know the continuation of the work:
he said at last that: ‘The remainder of the work after this was not foundanywhere. To supplement it would cause derision. Other items to be known
had been settled properly by the same [author] in his other works. Accordingly,
nothing is to be considered now.’References and Abbreviations

397

ABORI
Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Institute.
AhirS
Ahirbudhnyasaµhitå.
AK(Bh)
ÓnSS
ÓP
AR
ASÓ
ARR
ÓS
ÓTV
BÓUp-BhV
Bh-BSËBh
BhG
BI
BrSi
BSË
ChSS
CßBh
EIPh
GAS
GBh
GOS
HDhÍ
HIPh
IPh
IS
ÁS
IBK
IIJ
ITB
JA

Abhidharmakoßa(bhåshya) of Vasubandhu.
Ónandåßrama Sanskrit Ser. (-saµsk®tagranthåvali), ed. by
Pandits of the Ónandåsrama (if not specified), Poona (Pune).
Ógamapråmåˆya of Yåmuna.
Am®tåsvådin¥ Rahasya-s of Vedåntadeßika.
Adhikaraˆasåråvali (or °åval¥) of Vedåntadeßika.
Am®tarañjani Rahasya-s of Vedåntadeßika.
Ótmasiddhi of Yåmuna. See Siddhitraya.
Ótmatattvaviveka.
B®hadåråˆyakopanishadbhåshyavårttika.
Bhåskara’s Commentary on the BrahamsËtra.
Bhagavadg¥tå.
Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta: Asiatic Society.
Brahmasiddhi of Maˆ∂ana Mißra.
BrahmasËtra [References are to the numbers of sËtra andadhikaraˆa (shown under §) in Ír¥Bh, not those in Íaµkara’scommentary etc.].
Chaukhamba [Choukhamba] Sanskrit Ser., Varanasi(Benares).
Catu˙ßlok¥bhåshya.
Karl H. Potter, General ed. Encyclopedia of Indian
Philosophies.
Yåmuna’s G¥tårthasaµgraha.
Råmånuja’s G¥tåbhåshya.
Gaekwad’s Oriental Ser., Baroda (Vadodara): Oriental
Institute.
Pandurang Varman Kane, Histroy of Dharmaßåstra.
Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, 5
vols.
S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, 2 vols.
Ish†asiddhi.
Áßvarasiddhi. See Siddhitraya.
印度學佛教學研究 (Indogaku Bukkyôgaku Kenkyû or Journalof Indian and Buddhist Studies).
Indo-Iranian Journal.
印度哲学仏教学 (Indo-tetsugaku Bukkyôgaku or Hokkaido
Jouranal of Indian Philosophy and Buddhist Studies).
Journal Asiatique.

398

JAOS
JBBRAS
JNA
JORM
JRAS
Kir
KSS
LT
MGOS
MLBD
MMU
MNP
MSË
NaiS
NBh
NBhË
NDy
N¥M
NKandal¥NKaˆikå
NKul
NKus
NM
NP
NSP
NSË
NV
NVTT
NVTP
NySi
PAIOC
Pd
PR
PañcP
PDhS
PMBh
PPV
PrakP
R- —°Up
RG

Journal of the American Oriental Society.
Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
Jñånaßr¥mitranibandhåvali.
Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
Kiraˆåval¥ of Udayana.
Kashi Sanskrit Ser., Varanasi: ChSS Office.
Lakshm¥tantra.
Madras Government Oriental Ser., Madras: Government
Oriental MSS Library.
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi etc.
Månameyodaya of Nåråyaˆa.
M¥måµsånyåyaprakåßa.
M¥måµså- or Jaimini-sËtra.
Naishkarmyasiddhi.
Nyåyabhåshya.
NyåyabhËshaˆa.
Nayadyumaˆi.
N¥timålå.
Nyåyakandal¥.
Nyåyakaˆikå.
Nyåyakulißa.
Nyåyakusumåñjali.
Nyåyamañjar¥.
Nyåyaparißuddhi of Vedånta Deßika.
Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay.
NyåyasËtra. References are to the sËtra number(s) of Calcutta
ed. (see NV).
Nyåyavårttika.
Nyåyavårttikatåtparya†¥kå.
Nyåyavårttikatåtparyaparißuddhi.
Nyåyasiddhåñjana.
Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference.
Pañcadaß¥.
Påñcaråtrarakshå.
Pañcapådikå.
Padårthadharmasaµgraha or Praßastapådabhåshya.
Paramatabhaµga.
Pañcapådikåvivaraˆa.
Prakaraˆapañcikå.
Raµgaråmånuja’s commentaries on Upanishads.
Ír¥ Bhagavad Råmånuja Granthamålå: Ír¥ BhagavadRåmånuja’s Nine Valuable Works, ed. P. B. Kåñc¥ Aˆˆangarå-

399

RNA
RTS
ÍåBh
SamV
Í-BSËBhÍ- —°Up
SAS
SbÖAW
ÍDË
ÍD¥
SDS
SeM¥
ÍGBh
SK
ÍP
SRBh
Ír¥Bh
SÍ
ST
ÍV
SVOS
TaiUpBhV
TarS
TBh (M)
TC
TD
TMK
TNir
TS(P)
TSåra
T†¥kå
TV
°Up
UVG
VaiSË
VAS
VDG

cårya, Kåñc¥: Granthamålå Office, 1956.
Ratnak¥rti-Nibandhåvali.
Rahasyatrayasåra.
Íåbarabhåshya.
Sambandhavårttika.
BrahmasËtra-Íåµkarabhåshya.
Íaµkara’s commentaries on Upanishads.
Sarvårthasiddhi.
Sitzungberichte der Philosophisch-Historische Klasse derÖsterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.
ÍatadËshaˆ¥ [The number of våda is shown in Roman].
Íåstrad¥pikå.
Sarvadarßanasaµgraha.
Seßvaram¥måµså.
Íaraˆågatigadyabhåshya.
Såµkhyakårikå.
Írutaprakåßikå of SudarßanasËri.
Stotraratnabhåshya.
Ír¥bhåshya.
Saµkshepaßår¥raka of Sarvajñåtman.
Siddhitraya.
Ílokavårttika.
Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Ser., Tirupati: Tirumalai Tirupati
Devasthanams Press.
Taittir¥yopanishadbhåshyavårttika of Sureßvara
Tarkasaµgraha of Annaµbha††a.
Tarkabhåshå of Mokshåkaragupta.
Tåtparyacandrikå. See GBh.
Tåtparyad¥pikå.
Tattvamuktåkalåpa.
Tattvanirˆaya.
Tattvasaµgraha(-pañjikå).
Tattvavsåra.
Tattva†¥kå of Vedånta Deßika.
Tantravårttika of Kumårila Bha††a.
Upanishad.
Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå, pub. and ed. with comm. by
Abhinava Desika Uttamur T. Viraraghavacharya, Madras.
VaißeshikasËtra. [Referencea are the sËtra number in
Candrånanda’s comm. and that in Íaµkaramißra’s is addedin parenthesis].
Vedårthasaµgraha.
Ír¥mad-Vedåntadeßika-granthamålå.

400

VD¥pa
ViP
VizSS
VPari
VPP
VSåra
WZKM
WZKS(O)YMD
ZDMGVedåntad¥pa.
Vishˆupuråˆa.
Vizianagram Sanskrit Sries, Benares.
Vedåntaparibhåshå of Dharmaråja.
Swami Satchidanandendrasaraswati 1964.
Vedåntasåra of Råmånuja.
Wiener Zeitschrift fËr des Kundes Morgenlandes.
Wiener Zeitschrift fËr die Kunde Südasiens (Süd- undOstasiens).
Yat¥ndramatad¥pikå.
Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Geselschaft..

401*Ócårya CampË (or Vedåntåcåryavijaya) by Veµka†ådhvarin (fl. 1600)
ed. S. N. Raµganåthåcårya (in Telugu),
Adyar: Rare 1892 Ven AC ak(te) Ran.
? Sri Vedancharya Viijaya (Acharya Champu) by
Kousika Kavitarkikasimha, ed. with intro. and comm.
S. Ananthacharyi along with bhËmikå by Uttamur SriU. Ve. T. Viraraghvachari and forward by Sriman D.
Ramaswamy Ayyangar, New Delhi, Acharya
Vidyapeetham, 1964.
ÓgamapråmåˆyaÓgamapråmåˆya of Yåmunåcårya, ed.with notes by
M. Narasimhachary, Gaekwad's Oriental Ser. 160,
Baroda, 1976.

Aitareya-Upanaishad-Bhåshya of Raµgaråmånuja.
Ed. V¥raraghvachari. See Taitt¥riya-.

Ónandavall¥-Upanishad-Bhåshya of Raµgaråmånuja.
Ónandåßrama Sansk®ta Ser. 62. See PraßnaUp-Bhåshya
of Nåråyaˆa.
ÓS= Ótmasiddhi.
In: Sri Yamunacharya's Siddhi Traya with a Sanskrit
Commentary [GË∂haprakåßa] by Sri U. Ve. Abhinava
Desika Uttamur T. Viraraghvacharya with an
Introduction in English by R. Ramanujachari and an
English Translation by R. Ramanujachari & K.
Srinivasacharya,
ed.
T.
Viraraghvacharya,
Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå, Madras 1972.

Ash†ådaßabhedanirˆaya.
Ash†ådaßabhedanirˆaya: Explication des dix-huitdefferérences (entre les deux branches de l'École deRåmånuja) de Sr¥ Våtsya Raµganåtha, edition critique,traduction et notes par Suzanne Siauve, Publication del'Institute Français d'Indologie No. 58, Pondichéry,
1978.
Atharvaßikha-Upanaishad-Bhåshya of Raµgaråmånuja.
Ed. V¥raraghvachari, 1948. See Praßna-.
Bh®gu-Upanishad-Bhåshya of Raµgaråmånuja.
Ónandåßrama Sansk®ta Ser. 62. See PraßnaUp-Bhåshya
of Nåråyaˆa.

402

B®hadguruparamparåsåråsvådin¥ by Vedånta Råmånuja Mahådeßika [17c.]
See Ír¥tattvasiddhåñjana.
Carman 1974.

John Braisted Carman, The Theology of Råmånuja:
An Essay in Interreligious Understanding, New Havenand London: Yale UP.

Carman-Narayanan John Carman & Vasudha Narayanan, The Tamil Veda:
Pi¬¬å˜'s Interpretation of the TiruvåymoÒi, Chicaga:
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1989.
Chåndogya-Upanaishad-Bhåshya of Raµgaråmånuja.
See Taitt¥riya-.
Dasgupta 1975.

Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy
vol. III, Delhi etc.: Motilal Banarsidass [First Indian
Edition].

*Deßikamaµgalåßåsana by Kumåra Vedåntåcårya:Raghavan 1979: 68, n. 17 (in: Stotras of Vedånta Deßika,Bombay, 1973)
Adyar: P H 245-1 VD DM x.
GBh= Råmånuja's G¥tåbhåshya.
Sri Bhagavad Gita with Sri Ramanuja's Bhashya andVedanta Desika's Commentary named Tatparya
Chandrika, ed. Sri Abhinava Desika (Uttamur) T. Viraraghavacharya, Madras: Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå,1972.
[with TC up to ] Ónandåßrama Skt. Ser. 92, 1936.
[Text with Eng. trans.] Svåm¥ Ódidevånanda, Sr¥Råmånuja G¥tå Bhåshya, Madras: Sri Ramakrishna
Math, 1991.
In RG.
In Shastri Gajanana Shambhu Sadhale ed., The
Bhagavad-G¥tå with Eleven Commentaries [1)Íankaråcårya's Advaitabhåshya with 2) Ónandagiri'svyåkhyå, 3) Råmånuja's Vißish†ådvaitabhåshya with 4)
Vedåntadeßika's Tåtparyacandrikå, 5) Madhva's
Dvaitabhåshya with 6) Jayat¥rtha's Prameyad¥pikå, 7)
Hanuman's Paißåcabhåshya, 8) Veµka†anåtha's
Brahmånandagiri, 9) Vallabha's Tattvad¥pikå, 10)
Purushottama's Am®tataraµgiˆ¥ and 11) N¥lakaˆ†ha'sBhåratabhåvavad¥pa; to each chapter: 12) Yåmuna'sG¥tårthasaµgraha with 13) Vedåntadeßika's rakshå, 14)G¥tåmåhåtmya from the Padmapuråˆa (uttara-k°

403

171–188) and 15) Avig¥tå Notes by Dhupakara Shastri],
3vols., Parimal Sanskrit Ser. 17, Delhi, 1985 [Reprintof the second edition, Bombay, 1935ff.].
[Eng. trans.] M. R. Sampatkumaran, The G¥tåbhåshya
of Råmånuja, Ananthacharya Indological ResearchInstitute Ser. 14, Bombay, 1985 [first edition: Madras,
1969].
[Eng. trans.] Alkodavilli Govindacharya, [東大図書館蔵].
[Condensed Renadering] In van Buitenen 1968.
Govidacharya Svåmin 1912.
A. Govidacharya Svåmin, Tengalai and Vadagalai,
Journal of Royal Asiatic Society 1912, 714–18.
G¥tårthasaµgraha of Yåmuna.
[Ed. with G¥tårthasaµgraharakshå of Vedånta Deßika]In The BhG with Eleven Commentaries (See GBh).
[Ed. with Eng. trans.] In van Buitenen 1968.
[Ed. with Eng. trans.] In Govindacharya's trans. of GBh(See GBh).
[Ed. with Eng. trans.] In Sampatkumaran's trans. ofGBh (See GBh).
[Ed. with Eng. trans.] In Ódidevånanda's trans. of GBh(See GBh).
In ÓnSS 92 (See GBh).
Granoff, Phyllis E. 1978. Philosophy and Argument in late Vedånta: Ír¥Harsha’s Khaˆ∂anakhaˆ∂akhådya, Studies of ClassicalIndia 1, Dordrecht-Boston-London: D. Reidel Pub.
[Adyar H141-2 Sri KKy=z Gra PA]
Haµsasaµdeßa.

Hamsa Sandesa: One of Sri Vrdanta Desika's Kavyaswith the Commentary "Sanjeevana" in Sanskrit & Tamil,
ed. and commented by Sri Abhinava Desika Uttamur
T. Viraraghavacharya, Madras: Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå, 1973.
Sri Vedanta Desika's Hansasandesha, commented by
S. Narayana Sastri, English notes and trans. by S.
Narayana Iyengar, a critical study and appreciation by
K. Krishnamacharya, Madras: V. Ramaswamy Sastrulu& sons, 1955.

Áßa-Upanishad-bhåshya of Nåråyaˆa.
Áßa-Kena-Ka†a-Praßna-Muˆ∂a[ka]-Måˆ∂ËkyaÓnadavall¥-Bh®gu-Upanishada˙: Råmånuja-mata-anu-

404yåyi-Nåråyaˆa-k®ta-Prakåßikå-sameta-Áßopanishat,Raµgaråmånuja-varacita-Prakåßikå-sametå˙Kenaådi-Muˆ∂ka-antå˙,Råmånuja-mata-anuyåyiKËranåråyaˆa-racita-Prakåßikå-upetå
Måˆ∂Ëkyopanishat,Raµgaråmånuja-varacitaPrakåßikå-upeteÓnadavall¥-Bh®gu-Upanishadau,Ónandåßrama Sansk®t Ser. 62, Poona, 1910.
Áßa-Upanishad-Bhåshya of Vedånta Deßika.
Ásavasyopanishad Bhashya with Acharya Bhashya
Tatparya,
ed.
with
comm.
Uttamur
T.
Viraraghavacharya,
Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå,Madras, 1970.
K= K®shˆatåtårya's commentary on Nyåyasiddhåˆjana
named Ratnape†ikå.
See NySid.

Ka†a-Upanishad-Bhåshya of Raµgaråmånuja.
Ónandåßrama Sansk®ta Ser. 62. See PraßnaUp-Bhåshya
of Nåråyaˆa.
Kena-Upanishad-Bhåshya of Raµgaråmånuja.
Ónandåßrama Sansk®ta Ser. 62. See PraßnaUp-Bhåshya
of Nåråyaˆa.
Kiraˆåval¥Lipner 1986.

Månameyodaya.

Matsumoto 1991.

Jitendra S. Jetly ed.: Praßastapådabhåshyam with theCommentary Kiraˆåval¥ of Udayanåcårya, Gaekwad's
Oriental Ser. 154, Baroda, 1971.
Julius Lipner, The Face of Truth: A Study of Meaning
and Metaphysics in the Vedåntic Theology of Råmånuja,
Albany: State Univ. of New York Press.
Månameyodaya of Nåråyaˆa (An Elementary Treatiseon the M¥måµså), ed. and trans. C. Kunhan Raja and
S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Adyar Library Ser. 105,
Madras, 1975 (First edition 1933).
Shoukei Matsumoto, Råmånuja no KenkyË (A Studyof Råmånuja), Tokyo, ShunjËsha. [including Text &Japanese trans. of the Yatiråjavaibhva, theÍaraˆågatigadya, the Stotraratna and the Yatiråjasaptati;
annotated Japanese trans. of Ír¥Bh II. ii (complete), II.

405iii. 40–52 and the YMD; Word index of VAS and
Yatiråjavaibhva].
Måˆ∂Ëkya-Upanaishad-Bhåshya of Raµgaråmånuja.
Ed. V¥raraghvachari, 1948. See Praßna-.
Måˆ∂Ëkya-Upanishad-Bhåshya of KËranåråyaˆa.
Ónandåßrama Sansk®t Ser. 62. See PraßnaUp-Bhåshya
of Nåråyaˆa.
Mesquita 1973

Roque Mesquita, Yamunamuni: Leben, Datierung und
Werke, WZKS 17, 177–93.

Mesquita 1974—, Recent Research on Yåmuna, WZKS 18, 183–208.

Mesquita 1979—, Zur Vedånta- und Påñcaråtra-Tradition Nåthamunis,
WZKS 23, 163–93.

Mesquita 1980—, Yåmuna's Vedånta and Påñcaråtra: A Review,
WZKS 24, 199–224.

Mesquita 1984—, Råmånujas Quellen im MahåpËrvapaksha undMahåsiddhånta des Ír¥bhåshya, WZKS 28, 179–222.

Mesquita 1988—, Yåmunåcåryas Saµvitsiddhi: Kritische Edition,Übersetzunug und Anmerkungen mit einem
Rekonstruktionsversuch der verlorenen Abschnitte,Österreichische
AkademiederWissenschften
Philosophisch-Historische Klasse Sitzungberichte 504
Bd., Veröffentlichungen der Kommision für Sprachen
und Kulturen Südasiens Heft 21, Wien.

Mesquita 1989—, Yåmunåcåryas Lehre von der Größe des Ótman,
WZKS 33, 129–50.

Mesquita 1990—, Yåmunåcåryas Philosodhie der Erkenntniss: Eine
Studie zu seiner Saµvitsiddhi, Österreichische
AkademiederWissenschften
PhilosophischHistorische Klasse Sitzungberichte 563 Bd., Veröffentlichungen der Kommision für Sprachen und
Kulturen Südasiens Nr.24, Wien.

Mikami 1992

Toshihiro Mikami, Råmånuja niokeru Dokuzon nitsuite[On kaivalya in Råmånuja], Indogaku Bukkyôgaku
Kenkyû 40-2, 975–73 (in Japanese).

Mimaki 1984

KatsumiMimaki,
Setsunametsu-ronshô[Kshaˆabhaµgasiddhi], in A. Hirakawa, Y. Kajiyama

406

and J. Takasaki (eds.), Kôza Daijôbukkyô 9: Ninshikiron
to Ronrigaku [Seminar on Mahåyåna Buddhism vol.9:
Epistemology and Logic], Tokyo: Shunjûsha, pp.
217–254 (in Japanese).
Mumme 1988

Patricia Y. Mumme, The Ír¥vaishˆava Theological
Despute: Maˆavå¬amåmuni and Vedånta Deßika,Madras: New Era Pub.

MNP

= M¥måµsånyåyaprakåßa.
The M¥måµså Nyåya Prakåßa or [sic] Ópadev¥: A
Treatise on the M¥måµså System by Ópadeva, translated
into English with an Introduction, transliterated Skt.
Text and Glossarial Index by Franklin Edgerton, Delhi:
Sri Satguru Pub., 1986 [First ed.: New Haven, 1929].

Muˆ∂aka-Upanaishad-Bhåshya of Raµgaråmånuja.
Ed. V¥raraghvachari, 1948. See Praßna-.
Ónandåßrama Sansk®ta Ser. 62. See PraßnaUp-Bhåshya
of Nåråyaˆa.
Muˆ∂Up= Muˆ∂aka-Upanishad.

M¥På= M¥måµsåpådukå.
See SeM¥.

N= Prof. Dr. M. Narasimhacharya's opinion.

Nakamura 1951.

Nakamura 1983.

Hajime Nakamura, Brahma-SËtra no Tetsugaku[Phisosophy of the BrahmasËtra] (revised and enlarged
edition, 1981), Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten (in Japanese).
Hajime Nakamura, A History of Early Vedånta
Philosophy, part I, trans. T. Leggett, S. Mayeda, T.
Unno and others, Delhi etc., Motilal Banarsidass.

Narasimhachari 1971
M. Narasimhachari, Contribution of Yåmauna to
Vißish†ådvaita, Madras, Prof. M. Rangacharya
Memorial Trust.
Nikshepacintåmaˆi by Gopåladeßika [Vedånta Råmånuja's pupil].
See Ír¥tattvasiddhåññjana.
Nyåsavidyådarpaˆa by Vedånta Råmånuja Mahådeßika [17c.]

407

See Ír¥tattvasiddhåññjana.
Nyåsaviµßati.

Nyåyakaˆ∂al¥Nyåyakulißa:

Nyaasa Vimsati of Vedanta Desika, with meaning andcommentary in English by D. Ramaswamy Ayyangar,
Madras: Visishtadwaita Pracharini Sabha, 1979.
J. S. Jetly & Vasant G. Parikh eds.: Nyåyakaˆ∂al¥ beinga Commentary on Praßastapådabhåshya, with three subcommeantaries, Gaekwad's Oriental Ser. 174,
Vadodara, 1991.
Nyåyakulißa or The Lightnig-shaft of Reason by ÓtreyaRåmånuja, ed. with Introduction and Notes by R.
Ramanujachari and K. Srinivsacharya, Annamalai
University Philosophy Ser. 1, [Madras], 1938.

NyBoNyåyabodhin¥. See TarS.

NyKoßaNyåyakoßa.
Bh¥måcårya Jhalak¥kar, rev. Våsudeva Íåstr¥Abhyankar, Nyåyakoßa or Dictionary of TechnicalTerms of Indian Philosophy, Bombay Sanskrit andPrakrit Ser. XLIX, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental
Research Institute, 19784.

NyKus

Nyåyakusumåñjali.
Nyåya Kusumåˆjali of Udayanåcårya with the
Kusumaˆjalivistara, a lucid Commentary, andAnnotation on Particular Topics, ed. and commented
by Uttamur T. Viraraghavacharya, Tirupati: Kendriya
Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, 1980 [First edition 1941].
The Kusumanjali or Hindi Proof of the Existence of a
Supreme Being by Ud[a]yana Achárya with theCommentary of Hari Dása Bha††áchárya, ed. and trans.
E. B. Cowell assisted by Pandita Mahesa Chandra
Nyayaratna, Delhi, Caxston Pub., 1983 [first ed.:Calcutta, 1864].
The Nyåya Ksumåñjali of Udayanåchårya with fourcommentaries — the Bodhan¥ [up to the end of thethird stavaka], Prakåßa, Prakåßikå (Jalada) and
Makaranda by Varadaråja, Vardamånopådhyåya,Mecha Thakkura and Ruchido††opådhyåya and Notesby Ír¥ Dharmadatta (Bachchå Jhå), ed. Padmaprasåda
Upådhyåya & Dhuˆ∂iråja Íåstr¥, Kashi Skt. Ser. 30,

408

Varanasi, 1957.
Nyåyakusumañjali of Udayanåcårya with theCommentaries Ómoda of Íaµkara Mißra, Viveka ofGuˆånanda, Bodhan¥ of Varadaråja, Parimala of Mm.
Shri Harihara K®pålu Dvived¥, ed. with an introduction
and a resumé of the text [in Skt.] by Mahaprabhulal
GOSWAMI, Mithila Institute Ser. Ancient Texts No. 23,
Darbhanga, 1972.
NyP= Nyåyaparißuddhi.
Nyayaparisuddhi by Sri Vedanta Desika with New
Commentary [editor's Nyåyatattvaprakåßikå], [ed. Sri
Abhinava Desika (Uttamur) T. Viraraghavacharya],
Madras: Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå, 1978.

NyPAU

Ed. R. Ramanujachari and and K. Srinivasacharya. In:
Journal of the Annamalai University 10 (1940): 1–8;
12 (1946): 9–20; 14 (1949): 21–44; 15 (1950): 45–66;
16 (1951): 67–90; 18 (1953): 91–120; 19 (1954):
121–142; 20 (1955): 143–170;

NyPch

Nyâyaparishuddhi by Sri Venkanath Vedântâchâryawith a Commentary called Nyåyasåra by Sri
Niwâsâchârya, ed. Vidyabhushan Lakshmanacharya,
Chaukhamba Sanskrit Ser. 299, Benares, 1923.

NyPH

Íri-Veµka†anåtha-viracitå Nyåya-parißuddhi Hind¥Anuvåda tathå Prasåda Samalaµk®ta, ed. Ócåry
Íivaprasåd Dvived¥, Vidyåbhavan Pråcyavidyå
Granthmålå 54, Varanasi: Choukhamba Vidyabhawan,
1992.

NySi

= Nyåyasiddhâñjana.
Nyaya Siddanjana by Srimad Vedanta Desika with Two
Old Commentaries [Raµgaråmånuja's Vyåkhyå &K®shˆatåtårya's Ratnape†ikå ], [ed. Sri Abhinava Desika(Uttamur) T. Viraraghavacharya], [Madras]: Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå, 1976.

NySiHNyåya-Siddhåˆjana of Vedåntadeßika along with Hindi
Translation, ed. and trans. Svarg¥ya N¥lameghåcårya,Gaµganåtha-Jhå-Granthamålå vol. II, Varanasi, 1966.

M…Ír¥-Nyåyasiddhåˆjana … Ír¥-Raµgaråmånuja-muniviracita-vyåkhyå-sahitam,ed.
Kapisthalam
Deßikåcårya, Sri Vedantadesika's works Memorial

NySi

409

Edition vol. 1, Madras: Sri Vaishnava Siddhanta
Pracharya Sabha, 1934. [Kuppuswami Ins 778]
NySiP

Ed. Rama Misra Sastri, Pandit n.s.23 (1901).

NySMuk= Nyåyasiddhåntamuktåval¥.
Nyåyasiddhåntamuktåval¥ of Ír¥ Vißwanåtha Paˆcånan
with the commentary Kiraˆåwal¥ by Pt. Ír¥
Krißnavallabhåcårya, ed. Ír¥ Nåråyaˆacaraˆa Íåstr¥ andÍr¥ Swewtavaikuntha Íåstr¥, Kashi Skt Ser 212,
Varanasi, 19904.
[Eng. trans.] Swami Madhavananda, Bhåshåpariccheda
with Siddhånta-muktåval¥, Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama,
19773.

Pådukåsahasra.

… -Ír¥mad-Veµka†anåtha-Vedåntadeßika-viractaµÍr¥raµganåtha-PådukåsahasraµÍr¥bhåradvåjaÍr¥nivåsåcårya-k®ta-Par¥kshå-åkhya-vyåkhyå-sametam
Saµpådak¥ya-†ippaˆa-Drami∂a-padårtha-bhåvårthaparishk®tam, ed. Abhinava Desika Uttamur T. Viraraghavacharya, Madras: Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå,1970.

Påˆini= Påˆini's Ash†ådhyåy¥Sumitra M. Katre, Ash†ådhyåy¥ of Påˆini, Delhi etc.:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1989 [originally published by the
University of Texas Press, 1987].

PMBh= Paramatabhaµga.
Paramatabhaga with Anapåya prabhå, ed. Abhinava
Desika T. Viraraghavacharya, Madras: Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå, 1978.

Potter 1977

Karl H. Potter (ed.), Encyclopedia of Indian
Philosophies Vol. II: The Tradition of NyåyaVaißeshika up to Gaµgeßa, Delhi etc.: Motilal
Banarsidass.

Praßåstapådabhåshya:in Nyåyakandal¥ being a commentary on
Praßastapådabhåshya with three sub-commentaries[Èippaˆa of NaracandrasËri, Pañjijå of RåjaßelharasËri
& Kusumodgama of Íi∂ila], ed. J. S. Jetly & Vasant
G. Parikh, Gaekwad's Oriental Ser. 174, Baroda, 1991.

410

Praßna-Upanaishad-Bhåshya of Raµgaråmånuja.
Ubhayavedånthagranthamålå Saµsk®ta-dvit¥yasara˙: 4.
Praßna- 5. Muˆ∂aka- 6. Måˆ∂Ëkya- 7. AtharvaßikhaUpanaishada˙ … Ír¥-Raµgaråmånujamuni-viracitaBhåshya-bhËshitå˙ 8. Athrvaßirassåraß ca, publishedby UttamËr T. V¥raraghavåcårya, n. p., 1948.
Ónandåßrama Sanskrit Ser. 62. See PraßnaUp-Bhåshya
of Nåråyaˆa.
R
Raghavan 1979.

= Raµgaråmånuja's Vyåkhyå on Nyåyasiddhåñjana.
See NySid.
V. K. S. N. Raghavan, History of Vißish†ådvaita
Literature, Delhi: Ajanta Publications.

RGÍr¥ Bhagavad Råmånuja Granthamålå: Ír¥ BhagavadRåmånuja's Nine Valuable Works, ed. P. B. Kåñc¥Aˆˆangaråcårya, Kåñc¥: Granthamålå Office, 1956.

RTS= Rahasyatrayasåra.
Srimad Vedanta Desika's Srimad Rahasya Trayasara
with Sara Vistara (Commentary), 2vols., ed. Sri Uttamur
T.
Viraraghavacharya,
Madras:Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå, 1980.
[Eng. trans.] M. R. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Srimad
Rahasyatrayasara of Vedantadesika, Published by
Agnihotram Ramanuja Thathachariar, Kumbakonam,[1956?].
[Adyar H142-2 Ved RT=Raj]

RTS1Írimad-Rahasyatrayasåra˙,
2vols.,
ed.
Ír¥Råmadeßikåcåryar Svåmi, commented by V. R.
Råmasvåmi Aiyaµgår, …? , 1961.
[Kuppuswami Shastri Res. Ins. Lib., RHL49, 16576].

RTSSktÍr¥mad-Rahasyatrayasåra-Saµsk®tånuvåda˙, trans. Ír¥
KË. V. N¥lameghåcårya, ed. Aniruddhåcårya
Veµka†åcårya, Madras: Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå,
1968.

SAS

Sarvårthasiddhi.
See TMK.

SDS= Sarvadarßanasaµgraha of Mådhava.
Sarva-darßana-saµgraha of Såyaˆa-Mådhava, ed. withan original Skt. comm. by Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar,

411

Bhandarkar Research Institute, Poona 1978 (3rd ed.).
[Numbers are refered to that of chapters (in Roman)and lines in this edition]
SDS (C-G)

Sarva-darßana-saµgraha of Mådhavåcårya, ed. K. L.
Joshi, Eng. trans. E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough, Parimal
Skt. Ser. 2, Delhi. [The last chapter on theÍaµkaradarßana is omitted]

SDS (N)

Hajime Nakamura, Indo no Tetsugaku Taikei: Zentetsugaku-kØyØ YakutyË (Systems of Indian
Philosophy: Annotated Japanese translation of theSarvadarßanasaµgraha), 2vols., Tokyo 1995.

SeM¥= Seßvaram¥måµså.
Seswara Mimamsa and Mimamsa Paduka by Srimad
Vedanta Desika with Acharya Kumara Sri
Varadacharya's Mimamsa Paduka Paritrana and
Abhinava
DeiskaViraraghavacharya's
Sukshmarthateeka & Satpathasanchara, ed. Sri Uttamur
T. Viraraghavacharya, Madras: Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå, 1971.

Singh 1958

Satyavrata Singh, Vedånta Deßika: His Life, Worksand Philosophy (A Study), Chowkhamba Sanskrit
Studies vol. V, Varanasi.

Sinha, Jadunath. 1972. The Philosophy of Råmånuja, Calcutta: Sinha Pub.
[Adyar H142-3 Sin PR]
Sharma, Vemuri Anjaneya. 1974. Citsukha’s Contribution to Advaita (wothSpecial Reference to the Tattva-prad¥pikå), Mysore:
Kavyalaya Pub. [Skt College 19607]
Srinivasachari 1943 P. N. Srinivasachari, Philosophy of Vißish†ådvaita,
Adyar Library Ser. 39, Madras.
Srinivasa Chari 1988.
S. M. Srinivasa Chari, Fundamentals of Vißish†ådvata
Vedånta: A Study based on Vedånta Deßika's Tattvamuktå-kalåpa, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Srinivasa Chari 1994.
do., Vaishˆavism: Its Philosophy, Theology andReligious Discipline, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

412*Srinivasa Raghavan, A.: Nammå¬vår, Adyar: H080 SA Nam Sri.
*Srinivasa Raghavan, A.: Paråßara's comm. on 1000 names. H245-1 VS x=
Par Sri.
SS= Saµvitsiddhi.
Yåmunåcåryas Saµvitsiddhi: Kritische Edition,Übersetzunug und Anmerkungen mit einem Rekonstruktionsversuch der verlorenen Abschnitte, vonRoque Mesquita, Österreichische Akademie derWissenschften
Philosophisch-Historische
KlasseSitzungberichte 504 Bd., Veröffentlichungen derKommision für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens Heft
21, Wien 1988.

*Stories of Sri Desika in Pictures (in Tamil), Sri Vedanta Desika SeventhCentenary Trust.
Adyar: P H921-42 Ved VSSSubhåshitan¥v¥.

Sundaram 1968

Subhashita Nivi by Vedanta Desika with twocommentaries, Madras: Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå,1971.

P. K. Sndaram, Advaita Epistemology with Special
Refernce to Ish†asiddhi, Madras, Univ. of Madras[Second ed. 1984].

ÍDË= ÍatadËshaˆ¥ of Vedånta Deßika.
Tattwateeka (a Commentary on Ír¥bhåshya) andSatadooshani by Srimad Vedantadesika, ed. Sri Uttamur
Viraraghavacharya,
Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå,Madras 1974.

ÍDË (V)… Ír¥mad-Vedåntadeßika viracitå Ír¥man-Mahåcåryapraˆ¥tena Caˆ∂amårutena saµgatå ÍatadËshaˆ¥, ed. andHindi trans. Íivaprasåda Dvived¥, Vidyå BhavanPråcyavidyå Granthamålå 24, Varanasi: Chaukhamba
Vidyabhawan, 1991.

Ír¥Bh= Ír¥bhåshya.
[with SudarßanasËri's Írutaprakåßikå and the notes by
the editor] Brahmasutra-Sribhashya with Srutaprakasika, vols. I (in two parts) & II, ed. T.
Viraraghavacharya, Madras, 1988 [rep. (with some

413

corrections) of 1967 edition of Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå].
Ír¥Bh (Abh)[critical edition with editor's Notes in Sanskrit]
Vasudeva Shastiri Abhyankar (ed.), Ír¥-Bhâshya by
Râmânujâchâraya, pt.I: Text, pt.II: Notes, Bombay
Sanskrit and Prakrit Ser. No. LXVIII, Bomabay,
1914–16.

Ír¥Bh (BhD)[with the Bhåshyårthadarpaˆa by the editor] Sri Uttamur
T. Viraraghvachari (ed), Ír¥bhåshya and its
Commentary named Bhåshyårtha Darpaˆa, 2vols.,
Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå, Madras, 1963–64.

Ír¥Bh (CSË)[I. i. 1–4 with the Írutaprakåßikå] T. Ír¥nivåsa Íarmå
(ed.), Ír¥bhåshyam of Ír¥bhagavad-Råmånujamuni withthe commentary Írutaprakåßikå by Mahåmahopådhyåya
Sudarßanavyasabhatta, Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya
Prakashan, 1983 [first ed. 1916 Bombay].

Ír¥Bh (K)[Text with Eng. trans.] R. D. Karmarkar, Ír¥bhåshya
of Råmånuja, 3vols., University of Poona Sanskrit andPrakrit Ser. vol. I, Poona, 1959–64.

Ír¥Bh (L)[French trans. of I. i. 1] Olivier Lacombe, La doctrine
morale et métaphysique de Råmånuja, Paris: AdrianMaisanneuve, 1938.

Ír¥Bh (M)[Scholars of the Academy (eds.), Ír¥bhåshyam Íår¥rakam¥måµsåbhåshyam (Critical Edition) [with brief notes
based mainly on the Írutaprakåßikå, word-by-word
meaning
of
each
sËtra
with
the
BrahmasËtrapadyamålikå, and appendices# including

Appendices contain:
1. Summaries of each adhikaraˆa (with brief notes in Skt.):
1) (Íar¥raka) Nyåyakalåpasaµgraha of Seneßvara [Raghavan 21],2) Tattvasåra of Våtsya Varadåcårya [Raghavan 22],3) Adhikaraˆasåråvali of Vedånta Deßika,4) Adhikaraˆårthasaµgraha (or Ír¥bhåshyopanyåsa) of Do∂∂ayåcårya or Mahåcårya
[Raghavan 57],
5) Nayasaµgatimålikå of Ír¥nivåsåcårya;2. Index of quotations (with explanatory notes in Skt.) From:1) Írutis, 2) Sm®tis and 3) other works;
3.
1) Index of technical terms (with their definitions) found in the Ír¥Bh and in 2) thecommentary;3) Index of some notable words in the BrahmasËtras (with their meanings in the line ofRåmånuja);#

414

the Nyåyakalåpasaµgraha of Seneßvara, the Tattvasåra
of Våtsya Varadåcårya, the Adhikaraˆasåråvali ofVedånta Deßika, the Adhikaraˆårthasaµgraha (orÍr¥bhåshyopanyåsa) of Do∂∂ayåcårya or Mahåcårya,the Nayasaµgatimålikå of Ír¥nivåsåcårya, and theVedåntakårikåval¥ of Bucci Veµka†åcårya], 4vols, The
Academy of Sanskrit Research Ser. 4, Melkote:Academy of Sanskrit Research, 1985–91.
Ír¥Bh (O)[German trans. of I. i. 1, etc.] Rudolf Otto, Das Siddhånta
des Råmånuja, Tübingen, 1923 (2nd ed.).

Ír¥Bh (R-V)[Eng. trans.] M. Rangacharya & Varadaraja Aiyangar,
The VedåntasËtras with the Ír¥bhåshya ofRåmånujåcårya, 3vols., New Delhi: Munshiram
Manoharlal Pub., 1988–91 [first edition: 1898, 1965
Madras].

Ír¥Bh (RG)

Ed. P. B. Annangaracharya, in RG., 1956.

Ír¥Bh (Th)[Eng. trans.] George Thibaut, The Vedånta-sËtras withRåmånuja's Commentary, Sacred Books of the East
vol.48, Delhi etc.: Motilal Banarsidass, 1962 [first4) Index of sentences in the Ír¥Bh stated as the siddhånta, 5) the lokoktis and 6) the
prayogas;
7) Index of the names of the works quoted;
8) Index of the names of the authors quoted;
9) List of the abbreviations used in this edition;10) List of the quoted texts;
4. [In vol. I only]
1) Explanation of all sËtras,[verses in order to memorize (1) the number and the name of the adhyåyas, (2) the
number of the adhikaraˆas, (3) the number of the sËtras in each adhyåya, (4) the numberof the adhikaraˆas in each påda, and (5) the number of the sËtras in each påda];2) Summaries of the entire work, each adhikaraˆa and each påda;3) Import of each adhikaraˆa;4) The names of God as referred in each adhikaraˆa;5) Alphabetical index of the vidyås;6) List of the adhikaraˆas concerning the vidyås;7) Verses in order to memorize where each vidyå is found;8) Alphabetical index of the adhikaraˆas;9) The names of the saints referred to in the BrahmasËtras;
10) Alphabetical index of the sËtras.
5. [In vol. I only]
1) Important ßlokas of the Vishˆupuråˆa;2) Vedåntakårikåval¥ of Bucci Veµka†åcårya;3) Alphabetical indices of (1) the names of adhikaraˆas, (2) the Nyåyakalåpasaµgraha,(3) the Tattvasåra, (4) the Adhikaraˆasåråval¥, (5) the Naysaµgatimålikå, (6) the
BrahmasËtrapadyamålikå, (7) Råmånuja's own verses;
4) Variant readings (supplement);5) Errata.

415

edition 1904].
Ír¥guˆaratnakoßa.

Ír¥guˆaratnakoßa by Paråßarabha††a with Våtsya
V¥raraghavåcårya's Commentary Vasuråßi, ed. thescholars of the Academy, Melkote: The Academy of
Sanskrit Research, 1989.

Ír¥jayant¥nirˆaya by Gopåladeßika [Vedånta Råmånuja's pupil].
See Ír¥tattvasiddhåññjana.
Ír¥tattvasiddhåññjana by Vedånta Råmånuja Mahådeßika [17c.]
1. Sri Tattvasiddhanjana, 2. Nyasa Vidya Darpana,
3. Brhad Guruparamparasaraswadini, 4. Nikshepa
Chintamani, and 5. Sri Jayantee Nirnaya,
Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå, New Delhi: K. R. Padmanabhan, 1981.
Taitt¥riya-Upanaishad-Bhåshya of Raµgaråmånuja.
Taitt¥riya- Itareya- Chandogya Upanishad Bhashya by
Sri Ranga Ramanuja Muni with Uthamur Sri T.
Viraraghavacharya's Commentary named Parishakara
andUpanishadartha
Karikas,Madras:Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå, 1973.
TarD

Tarkad¥pikå.
See TarS.

TarS= Tarkasaµgraha.
Tarkasaµgraha of Annaµbha††a with the author'sD¥pikå and Govardhana's Nyåyabodhin¥, ed. Yashwant
Vasudev Athalye and trans. Mahadev Rajaram Bodas,
Second ed., Bombay Sanskrit Ser. 55, Poona:
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 19884.

*Tatacharya, M. K.: Life and teachings of Vedånta Deßika, Adyar: H282-092
Ved TA.
TattvanirˆayaVåtsya Varadagurus Tattvanirˆaya, Teil 1: Kritische
Textedition, Teil 2: Übersetzung und Anmerkungen,von Sylvia STARK, Österreichische Akademie derWissenschften
Philosophisch-Historische
KlasseSitzungberichte 570. Band, Beiträge zur Kultur- undGeistesgeschichte Asiens Nr. 4, Wien 1990.
[Adyar A080 BKG 4-1&2]

Tattvasåra by Våtsya Varadåcårya.

416

Tattvasåra with Ratnasåriˆ¥, ed. Kårappaµkå∂uVenkatachariyar svåmi, Madras Goverment Oriental
Ser. LXXVI, Madras, 1951.
TC= Tåtparyacandrikå.
See GBh.

TD= Tåtparyad¥pikå.
Vedarthasangraha of Sri Ramanujacharya with theCommentary Tatparyadipika of Sri Sudarsanabhtta, ed.
T. K. V. N. Sudarsanacharya, Vaishnava Sampradaya
Granthamala No. 5, Tirupati: Sri Venkatesvara Oriental
Institute, 1953.
Ed. with Vedarthasangraha by S. S. P. S. Rama Misra
Sastri, Pandit ns. 15–16 (1893–94) [2nd ed. 1924].

TÈ= Tattva†¥kå of Vedånta Deßika.
Tattwateeka (a Commentary on Ír¥bhåshya) by Srimad
Vedantadesika, ed. Sri Uttamur Viraraghavacharya,
Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå, Madras 1974.

TMK= Tattvamuktåkalåpa.
Srimad Vedanta Desika's Tattva mukta Kalapa andSarvartha Siddhi with Sanskrit Commentaries[VådhËla-ßr¥nivåsa's SarvårthasiddhigË∂hårthaviv®tti,
Saumyavaradaråmånuja'sSarvårthasiddhigË∂hårthaprakåßa
andV¥raraghavåcårya's
Alabhyalåbha], [Madras]: Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå,1973.

TMK(A)[III and IV only] Ír¥mad-Vedåntadeßika viracita˙
Tattvamuktåkalåpa˙, Sarvårthasiddhi-v®tti˙, Hind¥anuvåda tathå prasåda samalaµk®ta, 2 vols. (nåyakasara
and buddhisara), ed. and Hindi trans. Íivaprasåd
Dvived¥, Ayodhya: Tattvamuktåkalåpa Prakåßan,1983–84.

TMK(m)[I.
ja∂adravyasara]
Tattvamuktåkalåpa
andSarvårthasiddhi of Sri Vedåntåchårya with the Commentaries Ónandadåyin¥ and Bhåvaprakåßa, vol. I, ed.
D. Srinivasachar & S. Narasimhachar, University ofMysire Oriental Research Institute Publications SanskritSer. vol. 76, Mysore, 1933 .
[II. j¥va-sara 1–24] Ibid., vol. II, ed. S. Narasimhachar,
Univ. of Mysore … vol. 81, 1940.
[II. j¥va-sara 25–30] Ibid., vol. III, ed. T. T.

417

Srinivåsagopålåchårya, Univ. of Mysore … vol. 94,
1954.
[III. nåyaka-sara] Ibid. [Bhåvaprakåßa omitted], vol. IV,
ed. T. T. Srinivåsagopålåchårya, Univ. of Mysore … vol. 97, 1956.
TMK(p)

Tattvamuktákalápa
with
Sarvárthasiddhi
byVenka†anátha Deßika, ed. Ráma Mißra Sástrí, reprintof the Pandit, Kåß¥, 1900.

TMK(v)

Tattvamuktåkalåpa
ofÍr¥mad-Veµka†anåtha
Mahådeßika with three commentaries, Sarvårthasiddhi
byÍr¥mad-Veµka†anåtha,Ónandadåyan¥byN®siµhadeva and Aksharårtha by Devanåthatåtåcårya,2 vols., ed. N. R. Ír¥k®shˆatåtåcarya, Sarasvat¥bhavanaGranthamålå 128, Varanasi, 1990–96.

Tokunaga 1972.

T†¥kå

Muneo Tokunaga, Prapatti Shisô no Rekishiteki Tenkai[The Historical Development of the theory of prapatti],Shûkyô Kenkyû 45, 519–41 (in Japanese).
= Tattva†¥kå.
Tattwateeka (a Commentary on Sribhashya) by Srimad
Vedantadesika, ed. Sri Uttamur Viraraghavacharya,[Madras]: Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå, 1974.

Umesha Mishra 1936 Umesha Mishra, Conception of the Matter accoding toNyåya-Vaißeshika, Allahabad [rep. 1987, Delhi].

VaiSË

Van Buitenen 1968:

Varadachari 1983

Jambuvijayaji ed.: VaißeshikasËtra of Kaˆåda with theCommentary of Candrånanda, Gaekwad's Oriental Ser.
136, Baroda, 19822.
[The number in parenthesis is that of Upaskåra'scommentary].
J. A. B. van Buitenen, Råmånuja on the Bhagavadg¥tå:A Condensed Renadering of his G¥tåbhåshya with
Copious Notes and an Introduction, Delhi etc., Motilal
Banarsidass [First published in The Hague, 1953].
V. Varadachari, Two Great Acharyas: Vedanta Desika
and Manavala Mamuni, Madras, R. Ranghacharya
Memorial Trust.

Varadaråjapañcashat.

418

Varadaraja Panchasat of Vedanta Desika, with meaning
and commentary in English by D. Ramaswamy
Ayyangar, Madras: Visishtadwaita Pracharini Sabha,
1972.
VAS

= Vedårthasaµgraha.
Råmånuja's Vedårthasaµgraha, Introduction, Critical
Edition and Annotated Translation, by J. A. B. van
Buitenen, Deccan College Monograph Ser. 16, Poona,1956 [rep. 1992].
[Ed. with SudarßanasËri's comm.] see TD.
[English trans.] M. R. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Vedartha
Sangraha of Sri Ramanuja, Kumbakonam: pub. by thetransalator, 1956.
[Text with Eng. trans.] S. S. Raghavachar,Vedårthasaµgraha of Ír¥ Råmånujåcåraya, Mysore: Sri
Ramakrishna Math, 1956.

VDG= Ír¥mad-Vedåntadeßika-granthamålå.
Ed. Ír¥kåñc¥ Prativådibhayaµkara Aˆˆaµgaråcårya,Kåñc¥varam 1940–41.
1) Stotråval¥-vibhåga.
2) Vedånta-v° I: Adhikaraˆasåråvali, ÍatadËshaˆ¥.
3)II:M¥måµsåpådukå,Seßvaram¥måµså,Nyåyaparißuddhi, Nyåyasiddhåñjana.
4) III: Tattvamuktåkalåpa with Sarvårthasiddhi.
5) Kåvyanå†aka-v°: Haµsasandeßa, Subhåshitan¥v¥,Yådavåbhyuadaya, SaµkalpasËryodaya.
6) Vyåkhyåna-v° I: Áshåvåsyopanishadbhåshya,Catu˙ßlok¥bhåshya,Stotraratnabhåshya,Gadyabhåshya.
7)
II:G¥tårthasaµgraharakshå,G¥tåbhåshyaTåtparyacandrikå.
8) III: Tattva†¥kå, Niksheparakshå, Saccaritarakshå,Pañcaråtrarakshå etc.

VD¥pa

= Vedåntad¥pa.
Vedanta Deepa of Sri Bhagavad Ramanuja, [ed. Sri
Abhinava Desika Thirumalai Nallan Chakravarthy
Uttamur Vatsya Viraraghavacharya], Madras: Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå, rep. 1992.
Ed. Óchårya Bhattanathaswamy, Benares Sanskrit Ser.
69, 70 & 80, Benares, 1904.
In RG.
[English trans.] Sri K. Bhashyam, Sri Bhagavad

419

Ramanuja's Vedanta Deepa, Madras: Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå, rep. 1990.
[German trans.] A. Hohenberger, Råmånuja'sVedåntad¥pa: Seine Kurzauslegung der BrahmasËtren
des Bådaråyaˆa, Bonn, Univ. Bonn, 1964.
[Tamil commentary] Viraraghavacharya, D¥paprabhå,Madras: Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå, rep. 1989.
*Vedanta Desika in: Great Teachings of the World [Adyar: Min 291-6108
GTW LV].
Vedåntaprakriyåpratyabhijñå of Swami Satchidanandendrasaraswati.
Sri Swami Satchidanandendrasaraswati: VedåntaPrakriya Prattyabhijna, Holenarsipur (Mysore State),
1964.
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M. B. Narasimha Iyengar, Mumulshupadi of Lokacharya, Madras: Educational Pub.
House, 1962 [Eng. trans.].
Patricia Y. Mumme, trans. Mumukshuppa†i of Pi¬¬ai Lokåcårya withMaˆavå¬amåmuni’s Commentary, Bombay: Ananthacharya Indological ResearchInstitute, [1987].
MumukshËpåyasaµgraha of Meghanådåri SËri*Bangalore: Erish Mudråksharaßålåyåm, 1910.
M¥måµså- or Jaimini-sËtra.
[ÓnSS new (3rd) ed. with ÍåBh and Prabhå of Vaidyanåthaßåstr¥ (for I. i), TV (for I.
ii – III) and Èup†¥kå (for IV – XII) of Kumårila Bha††a, ÓnSS 97, 7 vols.: vol. 1 (I.
i), 1994 (rpt. of 4th ed. [1976]); vol. 2 (I. ii – II. i), 3 1981; vol. 3 (II. ii – iv), 31980;
vol. 4 (III), 1984 (new ed.); vol. 5 (IV – VII), 1984 (new ed.); vol. 6 (VIII – X),
1984 (new ed.); vol. 7 (XI – XII), 1985 (new ed.)]Ír¥-Jaimini-praˆ¥teM¥måµsådarßane
prathamådyåyasyatarkapådanåmå
parthamapåda˙…-Ír¥-Vaidyanåthaßåstri-praˆ¥ta-Prabhâkhya-vyåkhyå-sametaÍåbarabhåshyôpeta˙, ed. Subbåßåstri, ÓnSS 97/1, 1994 (rpr. of 4 1976 ed.).
… prathmådhyåyasya dvit¥yapådam årasya [sic] dvit¥yådhyåya-gata-prathamapådântovibhåga˙ M¥måsåkaˆ†h¥rava-Kumårilabha††a-praˆ¥ta-Tantravårttika-sahita-Íåbarabhåshyôpeta˙, ed. Gaˆeßa Íåstr¥ Joß¥, ÓnSS 97/2, 3 1981.

427… dvit¥yådhyåyasya dvit¥yapådam årabhya catuthapådânta˙ saµpËrˆodvit¥yådhyåya˙ …-Tantravårttika-sahita-Íåbarabhåshyôpeta˙, ed. Gaˆeßa Íåstr¥ Joß¥,ÓnSS 97/3, 31980.
… t®t¥yådhyåya˙ …-Tantravårttika-sahita-Íåbarabhåshyôpeta˙, ed. Pandits of theÓnandåßrama, ÓnSS 97/4, 1984 (nËtanaµ saµskaraˆam [3rd ed.]).
… caturthådhyåyam årabhya saptamådhyåyânto vibhåga˙ Bha††a-Kumårila-praˆ¥taÈup†¥kâkhya-vyåkhyå-sahita-Íåbarabhåshyôpeta˙, ÓnSS 97/5, 1984 (nËtanaµ saµskaraˆam [3rd ed.]).
… ash†amådhyåyam årabhya daßamådhyåyânto vibhåga˙ M¥måsåkaˆ†h¥rava-Bha††aKumårila-praˆ¥ta-Èup†¥kâkhya-vyåkhyå-sahita-Íåbarabhåshyôpeta˙, ÓnSS 97/6,
1984 (nËtanaµ saµskaraˆam [3rd ed.]).
… ekå∂aßa-dvådaßådhyåyau Bha††a-Kumårila-praˆ¥ta-Èup†¥kâkhya-vyåkhyå-sahitaÍåbarabhåshyôpeta˙, ÓnSS 97/7, 1984 (nËtanaµ saµskaraˆam [3rd ed.]).
BI
KSS
Ganganath Jha, The Pûrva-Mîmâmså-Sûtras of Jaimini, Chapters I–III with an Original
Commentary in English, 3 vols., rpt. of vol. 1 & vol. 3, Varanasi-Delhi: Bharatiya
Pub., 1979 (1st ed., Sacred Books of Hindus).
—, GOS
Mohan Lal Sandal, M¥måµså SËtras of Jaimini, 2 vols., Sacred Books of Hindus,
Allahabad, 1923–25 (rpr. Delhi: MLBD, 1980).
Naishkarmyasiddhi.
ed. G. A. Jacob, rev. M. Hiriyanna, Poona: Bhandarkar Research Institute.
The Naishkarmaysiddhi of Sureßvarâchârya with the Chandrikiâ of Jñåno†tama, ed.
G. A. Jacob, Varanasi: Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan, 1992 (rpt. of NSP ed.).
R. Balasubramanian, The Naishkarmyasiddhi of Sureßvara, Madras University
Philosophical Ser., Madras, 1988 [Text with Eng. trans.].
A. J. Alston, Realization of the Absolute: The “Naishkarmyasiddhi” of Ír¥
Sureßvaråcårya, London: Shanti Sadan, 2 1971 [Text with Eng. trans.].
Nåradapañcaratn*The Nårada Påñca Råtra in the Original Sanskrit, ed K. N. Banerjea, BI 38, 1865.
*Swami Vijnananda and H. P. Chatterji, trans. Ír¥ Nårada Pañcarååtram: TheJñånåm®tasårasaµhitå, Sacred Books of Hindus 23, Allahabad (rpt. ).
Nårad¥yasaµhitåNårad¥yasaµhitå. ed. Raghava Prasad Chaudhary, Tirupati: Kendriya Vidyapeetha,
1971.
*NayamayËkhåmålik of Appayad¥kshita.
Ed. V. N. Mrushnamacharya, Vißish†ådvaita Vaijayanti Ser. 1, Kumbhakonam: Gopala
Vilas Press, 1915–19.
Nayaviveka of Bhavanåth Mißra with Vivekatattva of Ravideva (tarkapåda), ed. S. K.
Ramanatha Sastri, Madras: Madras Univ., 1937 [Adyar H080 MUS sk12].
Nyåyabhåshya [NBh].
Nyaya-Darshana: The SËtra of Gautama and Bhåshya of Våtsyåyana with two
Commentaries the Khadyata by … Gangånåtha Jha … and the Bhåsyachandra byRaghËttama [up to III. ii. 17], ed. G. Jha and Dhundiråja Shastri, ChSS, 1924.
Ír¥-Gautamamahåmuni-praˆ¥taµ NyåyasËtram Våtsyåyan¥yaµ NyåyabhåshyamVåcaspatimißra-k®ta-NyåyasËc¥nibandha-sahitam, ed. with comm. G. Jha, Poona
Oriental Ser. 58, Poona, 1939.
Ír¥-Våtsyåyana-k®ta-Bhåshya-Ír¥-Vißvanåthabha††åcårya-k®ta-V®tti-sametåni
Ír¥Gautamamuni-pran¥ta-NyåyasËtråˆi, ÓnSS 91, 1922.
See also Calcutta ed. under NV and Mithila ed. under NVTP.
G. Jha, trans. The NyåyasËtras of Gautama with Våtsyåyana’s Bhåshya andUddyotakara’s Vårttika, 4 vols., Kyoto: Rinsen Book, 1983 (rpt. of Indian Thought

428

Ser. 13, Allahabad, 1915–19).
[The portion of NBh separately published as: NyåyasËtras with Våtsyåyana-Bhåshya,
Poona Oriental Ser. 59, 1939]
Debiprasad Chottopadhyaya and Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, Nyåya Philosophy:
Literal Translation of Gautama’s Nyåya-sËtra & Våtsyåyana’s Bhåshya along with aFree and Abridged Translation of the Elucidation by Mahåmahopådhyåya
PhaˆibhËshaˆa Tarkavåg¥ßa, 5 vols., Calcutta: Indian Studies, 1967–76.
[*Shorter version: Nyåya: Gautama’s Nyåya-SËtra with Våtsyåyana’s Commentary,
Calcutta, 1982].
Miyasaka Yûshô (宮坂宥勝), 『ニヤーヤ・バーシュヤの論理学』 (A JapaneseTranslation of the Nyåyabhåshya), Tokyo: Sankibo Press (山喜房仏書林), 1956.
Hattori Masaaki (服部正明), 論証学入門 (A Japanese Translation of Nyåyabhåshya I),
in: Gadjin M. Nagao (長尾雅人) ed., 『バラモン教典・原始仏典』 (Brahmanical and
Early Buddhist Scriptures), 世界の名著 (World Classics Ser.), vol. 1, Tokyo:Chûôkôron-sha (中央公論社), 1979 (Paperback ed.), pp. 331–397.
Nyåyabindu of Dharmak¥rti.
Nyåyabindu of Acharya Dharmakiritti with the Commentaries by Arya Vinitadeva& Dharmottara and Dharmottar-tika-tippani, ed. Dwarika Das Shastri, Bauddha
Bharati Ser., Varanasi, 1985.
Baudhå”cårya-Dharmak¥rti-praˆ¥ta˙ Nyåyabindu˙ Ír¥-Dharmottaråcårya-k®ta-†¥kåsameta˙, ed. Chandra Shekhar Shastri, LSS 22, 1924.
NyåyabhËshaˆa.
Ír¥madåcårya-Bhåsarvajña-praˆ¥tasya Nyåyasårasya svopajñaµ vyåkhyånaµNyåyabhËshaˆam,
ed.
Svåm¥
Yog¥ndrånanda,Våråˆas¥:›a∂darßanaprakåßanapratish†håna, 1968.
Nayadyumaˆi
Nayadyumaˆi˙ by MeghanådåsËri, ed. with intro. and notes by V. Krishnamacharya
and T. Viraraghavacharya, MGOS, 1956.
N¥timålå
N¥timålå by Nåråyaˆårya, ed. with intro. and notes by R. Ramanujachari and K.
Srinivasacharya, Annamalai Univ. Philosophy Ser., Annamalainagar, 1940.
Nyåyakandal¥.
Nyåyakandal¥ being a Commentary on Praßastapådabhåshya with three subcommentaries [Nyåyakandal¥†ippaˆa of NracandrasËri, Pañjikå of RåjaßekharasËri
and Kusumodgama of Íi∂ila], ed. J. S. Jetly and Vasant G. Parikh, GOS 174, 1991.
The Bhåshya of Praßastapåda together with the Nyåyakandal¥ of Ír¥dhara, ed.
Vindhyesvari Prasad Dvivedin, VizSS, 1895 (rpr. Delhi: Sri Satguru Pub., 1984).
Praßastapådabhåshya (Padårthadharmasaµgraha) with the Commentary Nyåyakandal¥by Ír¥dhara Bha††a, ed. with Hindi trans. Durgådhara Jhå, Varanasi: Sampurnananda
Skt. Univ., 1963 (rpr. 1977).
*Ganganath Jha, trans. The Padårthadharmasangraha with the Nyåyakandal¥ ofÍr¥dhara, Rpr. of the Pandit, Varanasi, 1916 (rpr. Varanasi: Chaukhambha Orientalia,
1982).
本多恵 (Honda Megumu), 『ヴァイシェーシカ哲学体系』 (A System of Vaißeßika: A
Japanese Translation of Nyåyakaˆ∂al¥), Tokyo: 国書刊行会 (Kokusho-Kankô-kai),
1990.
Nyåyakaˆikå.
Vidhiviveka˙ Ír¥mad-åcårya-Maˆ∂anamißra-k®ta˙ … -Ír¥mad-Våcaspatimißranirgitayå Nyåyakaˆikâkhyayå vyåkhyayå samalaµk®ta˙, ed. Råma Íåstrî, rpt. fromthe Pandit, Kåß¥, 1907.
Varanasi,
Eliot M. Stern, Vidhiviveka˙ of Maˆ∂anamißra˙, with Commentary Nyåyakaˆikå ofVåcaspatimißra˙, and Super-commentaries Jushadhvaµkaraˆ¥ and Svaditaµkaraˆ¥429

of Parameßvara˙, Critical and Annotated Edition: the pËrvapaksha˙, Diss. Univ. of
Pennsylvania, 1988 (UMI No. 8908395).
Nyåyakoßa
Bh¥måcårya Jhalak¥kar, rev. and enl. by Våsudeva Íåstr¥ Abhyankar, Nyåyakoßa or
Dictionary of Technical Terms of Indian Philosophy, Bombay Sanskrit and PrakritSer. XLIX, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 4 1978.
Nyåyakulißa or The Lightning-shaft of Reason by Ótreya Råmånuja, ed. R. Ramanujachariand K. Srinivsacharya, Annamalai Univ. Philosophy Ser., 1938.
Nyåyakusumåñjali.
Nyåya Kusumåˆjali of Udayanåcårya with the Kusumaˆjalivistara, a lucid
Commentary, and Annotation on Particular Topics, ed. and comm. by T.
Viraraghavacharya, Tirupati: Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, 1980 (First ed.: Tirupati,1941).
Nyåyakusumañjali of Udayanåcårya with the Commentaries Ómoda of Íaµkara
Mißra, Viveka of Guˆånanda, Bodhan¥ of Varadaråja, Parimala of Mm. Shri HariharaK®pålu Dvived¥, ed. with an introduction and a resumé of the text [in Skt.] by
Mahaprabhulal Goswami, Mithila Institute Ser. Ancient Texts No. 23, Darbhanga,
1972.
The Nyåya Ksumåñjali of Udayanåchårya with four commentaries: the Bodhan¥ [upto the end of the third stavaka], Prakåßa, Prakåßikå (Jalada) and Makaranda by
Varadaråja, Vardamånopådhyåya, Mecha Thakkura and Ruchido††opådhyåya andNotes by Ír¥ Dharmadatta (Bachchå Jhå), ed. Padmaprasåda Upådhyåya & Dhuˆ∂iråja
Íåstr¥, KSS 30, Varanasi, 1957.
N. S. Dravid, ed. and trans. Nyåyakusumåñjali of Udayanåcårya, pt. 1, New Delhi:
Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1996.
[Commentaries on the Kårikås]The Kusumanjal or Hindu Proof of the Existence of A Supreme Being by Ud[a]yana
Acharya with the Commentary of Hari Dasa Bhattacharya, ed. and trans. E. B.
Cowell assisted by Pt. Mahesa Chandra Nyayaratna, Delhi: Caxton Pub., rpt. 1983.
Ír¥mad-Udayanåcårya-praˆ¥ta˙Nyåyakusumåñlali˙
Tattvaprakåßikåsaµsk®tavyåkhyå-vibhËshita˙, comm. by Mahåkavi-Vasantatryambaka Íeva∂e, ed.
Brahmånanda Tripå†h¥, Varanasi: Chaukhambå Subharåt¥ Prakåsan, 1997.
Nyåya L¥låvat¥ by Vallabhåchårya with the Commentaries of Vardhamånopådhyåya,Íaµkara Mißra and Bhag¥ratha Èhakkura, ed. Harihara Íåstr¥, ChSS 64, 2 1991.
Nyåyamañjar¥.
Nyåyamañjar¥ of Jayantabha††a with †ippaˆ¥ Nyåyasaurabha by the Editor, 2 vols.,
ed. K. S. Varadachari, Mysore: Mysore Univ., 1969–83.
Nyåyamañjar¥ of Jayanta Bha††a with Commentary ‘Granthibhaµga’ by Cakradhara,
3 vols., ed. Gaurinath Sastri, Varanai: Sampurnananda Skt. Univ., 1982–84.
Nyåyamañjar¥ of Jayantabha††a, 2 parts, ed. Surya Nåråyana Íikla, KSS 106, 2 1971.
Janaki Vallabha Bhattacharyya, Jayanta Bha††a’s Nyåya-Mañjar¥: The Conpediumof Indian Speculative Logic [up to the sixth åhnika], Delhi: MLBD, 1978 (First
appeared in Calcutta Review 1953–57).
Nyåyaparißuddhi of Vedånta Deßika.
Nyâyaparishuddhi by Sri Venkatnath Sri Vedântâchârya with a Commentary called
Nyâyasar by Sri Niwâsâchaârya, ed. Vidyábhushan Lakhmânacharya, ChSS, 1918.
Nyayaparisudhi: A Treatise on Nyayasastra by Sree Nigamantha Maha Desika, ed.
Sree Visidhtadvaitha Pravachana Sabha, Madras, 1913.
Ed. VDG.
Nyayaparisuddhi by Sri Vedanta Desika with New Commentary [editor’s Nyåyatattvaprakåßikå], UVG, 1978.
Ed. R. Ramanujachari and and K. Srinivasacharya. In: Journal of the Annamalai

430

University 10 (1940): 1–8; 12 (1946): 9–20; 14 (1949): 21–44; 15 (1950): 45–66; 16(1951): 67–90; 18 (1953): 91–120; 19 (1954): 121–142; 20 (1955): 143–170;Nyåyaratna by Maˆikaˆ†ha Mißra with the Commentary Dyutimålikå by N®siµhayajvan,ed. V. Subramanya Sastri and V. Krishnamacharya, MGOS 104, 1953.
Nyåyasiddhåntamuktåval¥ on Kålikåval¥.
Nyåyaasiddhåntamuktåval¥ of Vißvanåtha Pañchånan Bha††åchårya with Dinakar¥(Prakåßa) Commentary by Mahådeva Bhå††a and Dinakara Bha††a & Råmarudr¥(Taraµgiˆ¥) Commentary by Ramarudra Bha††åchårya & Pt. Råjeßvara Íåstr¥, ed.
Hariråma Íukla Íåstr¥, KSS 6, 5 1997.
Nyåyasidhåntamuktåval¥ of Ír¥ Vißwanåtha Pañgånan with the Commentary
Kiraˆåval¥ by Pt. Ír¥ Krißnavallabhåcårya, ed. Nåråyaˆacaraˆa Íåstr¥ andSwetaavaikuntha Íåstr¥, KSS 212, 41990.
Swami Madhavananda, trans. Bhåshå-Pariccheda with Siddhåntamuktåval¥, Calcutta:
Advaita Ashrama, 31977.
NyåyasËtra. References are to the sËtra number(s) of Calcutta ed. (see NV).
Satißa Chandra Vidyâbhushaˆa, ed. and trans. The Nyâya Sûtra^s of Gautama, Sacred
Books of the Hindus, Allahabad: Panini Office, 1913 (rpt. Oriental Book Reprint
Corporation, 1975).
Walter Ruben, Die NyåyasËtra’s, Text, Übersetzung, Erläuterung und Glossar,
Leipzig, 1928 (rpt. Klaus Reprint, 1966)
中村元 (Nakamura Hajime), 『ニヤーヤ・スートラ』邦訳 (A Japaneese Translation of
the NyåyasËtra with Våtsyåyana’s Commentary) [NSË (complete) and NBh I], 三康
文化研究所年報 (Sankô Bunka Kekyûjo Nenpô) 14 (1982): 1–151; ibid. 15 (1983):
1–139 [rpt. in: 『ニヤーヤとヴァイシェーシカの思想』 (The Nyåya and Vaißeshika
Thought), 中村元選集［決定版］ [Selected Works of Hajime Nakamura (New ed.)],vol. 25, Tokyo: Shunjû-sha (春秋社), 1995].
Nyåyavårttika.
Nyåyadaßanam with Vatsyåyana’s Bhåshya and Uddyotakara’s Vårttika, Våcaspati
Mißra’s Tåtparya†¥kå & Vißvanåtha’s V®tti, ed. Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha (I. i)
and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha (from I. ii), Calcutta Skt. Ser. 18–19, 1936–1944(rpt. Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1982; Delhi: Munshram Manoharlal, 1985).
Nyåyavårttikam: A Gross on Våtsyåyana’s Commentary on the Nyåya-Aphorisms,
ed. Vindhyeßvar¥ Dvivedin, Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers, 1986 (rpt. of BI ed.,1887).
Trans. G. Jha. See NBh.
Nyåyavårttikatåtparya†¥kå.
Nyåyavårttikatåtparya†¥kå of Våcaspatimißra, ed. Anantalal Thakur, New Delhi: IndianCouncil of Philosophical Research, 1994.
Nyåyavårttika-Tåtparya È¥kå by Våcaspati Mißra, eed. Råjeßwara Íåstr¥ Dråvi∂,KSS 24, 1925–26 (rpt. 1989).
See also Calcutta ed. under NV.
Nyåyavårttikatåtparyaparißuddhi.
Nyåyavårttikatåtparyaparißuddhi of Udayanåcårya, ed. A. Thakur, New Delhi: IndianCouncil of Philosophical Research, 1996.
BINyåyadarßana of Gautama with the Bhåshya of Våtsyåyana, the Vårttikka of
Uddyotakara, the Tåtparya†¥kå of Våcaspati & the Parißuddhi of Udayana, vol. 1(Chapter I), ed. A. Thakur, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1967.
Nyåyabindu on MSË.
Nyaya Bindu by Vaidyanath Bhatta with a Commentary by Pandit Madan Mohan
Pathak: A Treatise on the Study of Purva Mimamsa, ed. Mahadeva Gangadhar
Bakre, Varanasi: Vyas Prakashan, 2 1993.

431Nyåyasudarßana
See Ír¥bhåshya with Ten Commentaries under Ír¥Bh.
Nyåsatilaka
Nyaasa Tilakam by Vedanta Desika, Eng. trans. D. Ramaswami Aiiyangar, Madras:
Visishtadvaitha Pracharini Sabha, 1980.
Nyåsaviµßati
Nyaasa Vimsati of Vedanta Desika, with meaning and commentary in English by D.
Ramaswamy Ayyangar, Madras: Visishtadwaita Pracharini Sabha, 1979.
Nyåyasiddhåñjana [NySi].
[U] Nyaya Siddanjana by Srimad Vedanta Desika with Two Old Commentaries [thevyakhyå of Raµgaråmånuja and the Ratnape†ikå of K®shˆatåtårya], UVG, 1976.
[VDG] Ed. VDG.
[V] Nyåya-Siddhåˆjana of Vedåntadeßika along with Hindi Translation, ed. andtrans. Svarg¥ya N¥lameghåcårya, Gaµganåtha-Jhå-Granthamålå vol. II, Varanasi,
1966.
[M] … Ír¥-Nyåyasiddhåˆjanam … Ír¥-Raµgaråmånuja-muni-viracita-vyåkhyåsahitam, ed. Kapisthalam Deßikåcårya, Sri Vedantadesika’s Works Memorial Edition
vol. 1, Madras: Sri Vaishnava Siddhanta Pracharya Sabha, 1934.
[P] Ed. Rama Misra Sastri, Pandit n.s. 23 (1901).
N. S. Ramanujatatachariar, Nyaya Siddhanjanam, T.T.D. Religious Pub. Ser.,
Tirupathi, 1985 [Tamil trans. of ja∂adravya-pariccheda].
Padårthadharmasaµgraha or Praßastapådabhåshya.
References are to the paragraph(s) in: Word Index to the Praßastapådabhåshya, ed.
Johannes Bronkhorst and Yves Ramseier, Delhi: MLBD, 1994.
Pådmasaµhitå
Padma Samhita, 2 vols., ed. Seetha Padmanabhan, R. N. Sampath and V. Varadachari,
Madras: Påñcaråtra Parißodhana Parishad, 1974, 1982.
*Påñcaråtraprasådaprasådhanam: A Påñcaråtra Text on Temple-Building (kriyåpåda
I–X), ed.H. Dabiel Smith, Madras: pub. by the editor, 1963.
PådukåsahasraÍr¥-Veµka†araµganåthadeßika-paraˆ¥taµ Pådukåsahasram Ír¥nivåsa-viracitayå
Par¥kshå-abhidhayå †¥kayå samu††aµgitam, ed. Pt. Kedåranåtha and Wåsudeva
Lakshmaˆa Íåstr¥ Paˆsh¥kar, NSP, 1911 (rpt. Varanasi, 1984).
…
PådukåsahasramÍr¥bhåradvåja
Ír¥nivåsåcårya
k®ta
Par¥kshåkhya
vyåkhyåsametam, UVG, 1970.
Pañcadaß¥The Pañcadaß¥ of Vidyåraˆya Muni with a Commentary by Råmak®shˆa, ed. Narayan
Ram Acharya, Delhi: Chaukhamba Skt. Pratishthan, 1987 (rpt. of NSP ed., 1912).
The Pañcadaß¥ of Ír¥ Vidyåraˆya Swåm¥, Eng. trans. Swami Swahananda, introd. T.
M. P. Mahadevan, Madras: Ramakrishna Math, 51995.
Shri Vidyaranyamuni’s Pañcadaß¥ with the Commentary of Rama K®shˆa, ed. with
Hindi commentary by Krishnanda Sagar, Varanasi: pub. by the translator, 1984.
Påñcaråtrarakshå
Ír¥ Påñcaråtrarakshå of Ír¥ Vedånta Deßika, ed. M. Duraiswami Aiyangar and T.
Venugopalacharya, Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1942 (rpt. 1967,
1996).
See also VDG and Rakshågrantha.
Pañcapådikå.
Ír¥ Padmapådåcårya’s Pañcapådikå with the Commentaries Vivaraˆa by Ír¥Prakåßåtmamuni, Tattvad¥pana by Ír¥ Akhaˆ∂ånanda Muni and Ùjuvivaraˆa by Ír¥
Vishˆubha††opådhyåya, ed. S. Subramanyaßåstri, Varanasi: Mahesh Research432

Institute, 1992.
Pañcapådikå of Ír¥ Padmapådåcårya with the Commentaries Prabodhaparißodhan¥of ÓtmasvarËpa and Tåtparyårthadyotin¥ of Vijñånåtman and Pañcapådikåvivaraˆaof Prakåßåtman with Tåtparyad¥pikå of Citsukhåcårya and Bhåvaprakåßikå ofN®siµhåßramin, MGOS, 1958 (Rpt. [I and II varˆakas only], Kendriya Skt. Vidyapeetha Tirupathi Ser., New Delhi: Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, 1985).
See also Calcutta ed. under Íaµkara ad BSË.
D. Venkataramiah, The Pañcapådikå of Padmapåda (Translated into English) [Ivarˆaka], GOS 107, 1948.
Pañcapådikåvivaraˆa. See Pañcapådikå.
Påˆini.
Sumitra M. Katre, Ash†ådhyåy¥ of Påˆini, Raman Transliteration and English
Translation [incl. Alphabetical index of the sËtras, Dhå†upå†ha, Alphabetical index
of verbal stems, Verbal stems acc. to meaning, Gaˆapå†ha], rpt [with some corrections]
Delhi etc.: MLBD, 1989 (first ed.: Univ. of Texas Press, 1987).
—, Påˆinian Studies II–IV: Dictionary of Påˆini, 3 vols., Poona: Deccan College,
1968–69.
—, Påˆinian Studies VI–VII: Dictionary of Påˆini Gaˆapå†ha, bound in one volume,
Poona: Deccan College, 1971.
—, A Glossary of Grammatical Elements and Operations in Ash†ådhyåy¥, Mysore:
Central Institute of Indian Languages, 1981.
Paramasaµhitå:Paramasaµhitå, ed. and trans. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, GOS 86, 1940.
Pårameßvarasaµhitå*Pårameßvarasaµhitå, ed. Ír¥ U. Ve. Govindacharya, Ír¥raµgam: pub. by the editor,
1953.
Paråßara ad Sahasranåma
Paråßara Bha††a’s Bhagavaguˆadarpaˆa ad Vishˆusahasranåma.
*Sri VIshnu Sahasranama with Bhashya of Sri Parasara Bhattar, ed. and trans. A.
Srinivasa Raghavan, Madras: Sri Visishtadvaita Pracharini Sabha, 1983.
*Sri Vishnusahasranama with Nirukti Slokas, ed. Uttamur Viraraghvacharya withEng. trans. of Introductory portion of Paråßarabha††ar’s Bhashya by K. Bhashya,
Madras: Visishtadvaita Pracharini Sabha, 1960.
Pariibhåshendußekhara.
Paribhåshendyßekhara˙ of Ír¥ Någeßa Bha††a with the Commentary SArvamaµgalåby Ír¥ Seshaßarma SËri, ed. Girijeßa Kumåra D¥xita, Varanasi: Sampurnananda
Sanskrit Univ., 1987.
Paushkarasaµhitå*Paushkarasaµhitå: One of the Three Gems in Pancharatra, ed. H. H. Ír¥ Yatiråja
Sampatkumåra Råmånujamuni of Melkote, Bangalore: A. Ír¥nivåsa and M. C.
Thirimalachariar, 1934.
Paramatabhµga.
*Sr¥ Nigamånta Mahådesika’s Paramata-Bhangam with Desikåsaya Prakåsa (commentary) [Skt.] by VedåntavåvadËka Villivalam Våtsya Nåråyanåchårya, 2 vols.,
ed. P. N. Krishnamacharya, Madras: pub. by the editor (5 Srinivasa Iyer Str. extension,West Mambalam, Ms–33) 1979–82 [Adyar H142-2 Ved PB xy Nar 1 & 2].
Paramatabhanga with Anapåya prabhå, UVG, 1978.
*Paramatabhaµga of Vedånta deßika, ed. S. S. Ayyangar, Madras, 1972.
*K. C. Varadachari, trans. “Sri Vedånta Deßika on the Lokåyata” [chap. 6], Journalof Ír¥ Veµkateßvara Rao Institute (Tirupati) 1.2 (1940): 137–60; “Sri Vedånta Deßika
on the Buddhistic school of thought” [chaps. 7–10], Ibid. 1.3 (1940): 17–58; [chap.
11], ASVOI (= ibid.?) 1 (1940).

433

Prameyakamala-måtaˆ∂a by Shri Prabha Chandra (A Commentary on Shri Manik Nandin’s
Pareeksha Mukh Sutra), ed. Mahendra Kumar Shastri, Bombay, 1912 (rpr. of thesecond ed. [1941] with a forward by V. N. Jha, Delhi: Sri Satguru Pub., 1990).
Prameyamålå
*of Våtsya Varadaguru. Ed. R. Ramanujachari and K. Srinivasacharya, Journal of
Annamalai University 10 (1940–41), Sup. 2, 3.
Prabhåkaravijaya
Prabhåkaravijaya of Nand¥ßvara, ed. Ananta K®shˆa Íåstr¥ and Råmanåtha Íåstr¥,
Calcutta, 1926.
Prapannapårijåta
Prapanna Parijata by Sri Nadoor Ammal, text with Eng. trans., Madras: Visishatadvaita
Pracharini Sabha, 1971.
Prakaraˆapañcikå.
Prakaraˆa Pañcikå with Nyåya Siddhi, ed. with notes by A. Subramanya Sastri,
Varanasi: BHU, 1961.
Prakaraˆapañcikå nåma Prabhåkramatånusåri-M¥måµsådarßanam, ed. MukundaÍåstr¥ A∂kar, ChSS 17, 1904.
Pramåˆavårttika.
Dharmak¥rti’s Pramåˆavårttika with Manorathanandin’s Commentary, ed. Råhula
Såµk®tyåyana, Patna, 1938–40 (App. to Journal of the Bihar and Orissa ResearchSociety 24–26).
Pramåˆavårttikabhåshya or Vårttikålaµkåra of Prajñåkaragupta, ed. R. Såµk®tyåyana,
Tibetan Skt. Work Ser., Patna, 1953.
The Pramåˆavårttikam of Dharmak¥rti: the First Chapter with the autocommentary,ed. Raniero Gnoli, Serie Orientale Roma, Rome, 1960.
Ócårya Dharmak¥rti k®ta Pramåˆavårttikåntargata Svårthånumåna-Pariccheda, ed.
Dalsukhbhai Malvania, Varanasi: Benares Hindu Univ., 1959.
Pramåˆavårttika of Ócårya Dharmak¥rtti with the Commentary ‘V®tti’ of Ócårya
Manorathanandin, ed. Dwarikadas Shastri, Bauddha Bharati Ser., Varanasi, 31994.
Prapañcamithyåtvånumånakhaˆ∂ana of Kumåra Vedåntåcårya.
Adyar X 352f. (P DN: 352E = TR 205); Melkote Biblio. 265b.; Potter2 310 [Raghvan
53].
PurushasËkta.
Sr¥mat-Såyaˆåcårya-praˆ¥ta-bhåshyôpetam Ír¥-PurushasËktam [ÙV X. 90], ÓnSS 3,
6
1979.
Raµgaråmånujabhåshya on Upanishads.
[Ed. with Viraraghavacharya’s sub-commentary]
Sri Rangaramanuja’s Brihadaranyakopanishadbhashya with Introduction, Translation
and Notes, pt. 1, Text with Skt. introd. and notes [Upanishadbhåshyaparishkåra] by
T. Viraraghavacharya, SVOS 43, Tirupati, 1954.
Kenadyupanishad -Prusha Sukta -Sri Sukta -Bhashya, UVG, 1972 (Incl.Raµgaråmånuja’s commentaries on Kena- Ka†ha-, Praßna-, Muˆ∂aka-, Måˆ∂Ëkya-, Ívetåßvatara-,
Atharvaßikhå-, Kaush¥taki- and Mantrikå-Up and the Agnirahasya [= ÍatapathaBråhmaˆa X. 5. 2–6]; SudarßanasËri’s commentaries on Subåla-Up, PurushasËkta,Ír¥sËkta; T. Viraraghvacharya’s sub-commentary Upanishadbhåshyaparishkåra on
the above commentaries, commentaries on Í°-Br° I. 10. 6, Mahå-Up, Nåråyaˆa-Up
and Dvaya-Up, Atharvaßirassåra [on Atharvaßiras-Up] and Upanishadarthasaµgrahakårikå on each Up).
Taitt¥riya- Itareya- Chandogya Upanishad Bhashya by Sri Ranga Ramanuja Muni
with Uthamur Sri T. Viraraghavacharya's Commentary named Parishakara andUpanishadartha Karikas, UVG, 1973.
[ÓnSS
ed.]
Áßa-Kena-Ka†a-Praßna-Muˆ∂a-Måˆ∂Ëkya-Ónadavall¥-Bh®gu-Upa-434

nishada˙Råmånujamatånuyåyi-Nåråyaˆa-k®ta-Prakåßikå-sameta-Áßopanishat,Raµgaråmånuja-viracita-Prakåßikå-sametå˙
Kenâdi-Muˆ∂akântå˙,Råmånujamatånuyåyi-KËranåråyaˆa-viracita-Prakåßikå-upetå Måˆ∂Ëkyopanishat,Raµgaråmånuja-viracita-Prakåßikå-upete Ónandavall¥-Bh®gu-Upanishadau, ÓnSS62, 1910. Chåndogyopanishad …, ed. G. S. Bakhale, ÓnSS 63, 1910. B®hadåråˆyakopanishad …, ed. S. S. Venegavakara, ÓnSS 64, 1911.
[SVOS ed.] *B®hadåraˆyakopanishad Bhåshya of Raµgaråmånuja, SVOS 43, pt. 2(trans. K. C. Varadachari and D. T. Tatacharya), Tirupati, 1954. *ChåndogyopanishadBhåshya of Raµgaråmånuja, pt. 1 (ed. with notes by T. Viraraghvacharya) and pt. 2(trans. K. C. Varadachari and D. T. Tatacharya), SVOS 36, 1952. *Ka†hapanishadBhåshya of Raµgaråmånuja, ed. and trans. K. C. Varadachari and D. T. Tatacharya,
SVOS 15, 1949. *Kenopanishad Bhåshya of Raµgaråmånuja, ed. and trans. K. C.
Varadachari and D. T. Tatacharya, SVOS 8, 1948. *Praßnopanishad Bhåshya ofRaµgaråmånuja, ed. and trans. K. C. Varadachari and D. T. Tatacharya, SVOS 25,
1951.
[Melkote ed.] *Áßåvåsyopanishad: A Critical Edition, ed. Academy of Sanskrit
Research Melkote, 1982 [incl. commentaries of Vedånta Deßika, Raµgaråmånuja
etc.]. *Kenopanishad, ed. M. B. Pårthasårathi Iyengar, Melkote: Academy of Sanskrit
Research, 1984. *B®hadåråˆyakopanishad, Melkote: Academy of Sanskrit Research.
[T. Viraraghavacharya’s old ed.] Ubhayavedånthagranthamålå Saµsk®taprathamasara˙: 1. Áßåvåsyopanishat Ír¥mad-Vedåntadeßika-anug®h¥ta-BhåshyeˆaÍr¥-KËranåråyaˆamun¥ndra-k®ta Prakåßikayå ca bhËshitå … 2. Kenopanishåt 3.
Ka†hopanishaccaÍr¥-Raµgaråmånujamuni-viracita-Bhåshya-bhËshitå
…
sampaådakena svak®ta-Upanishadbhåshyaparishkårâdyanekôpayuktåµßena saha …;…-dvit¥yasara˙: 4. Praßna- 5 Muˆ∂aka- 6. Måˆ∂Ëkya- 7. Atharvaßikha- Upanaishada˙… Ír¥-Raµgaråmånujamuni-viracita-Bhåshya-bhËshitå˙ 8. Athrvaßirassåraß ca …;…-t®t¥yasara˙: Taittir¥yopanishad Aitareyopanishac ca Ír¥-Raµgaråmånujamuniviracita-Bhåshya-bhËshite …, published by UttamËr T. V¥raraghavåcårya, Tirupati,
Madras, 1948–51. For Chåndoya- and B®hadåraˆyaka-Up, see SVOS ed.
*Taittir¥yopanishad-Mahånåråyaˆopanishad, 1951.
*Chådogyopanishad, SVOS, Tirupati, 1952.
Rakshågrantha
Srimad Vedanta Desika’s Rakshagranthas: Nikishepa Raksha, Saccaritra Raksha,
Sri Pancaratra Raksha (with Sri Bhagavad Ramanuja’s Nityagrantha) and
Gitarthasangraha Raksha, UVG, 1969.
Ratnak¥rti-Nibandhåvali˙, ed. Ananthalal Thakur, Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal ResearchInstitute, 1975 (Rev. ed.).[1st ed.: 1959].
Rahasyatrayasåra.
Srimad Vedanta Desika’s Srimad Rahasya Trayasara with Sara Vistara (Commentary),
2vols., UVG, 1980.
Ír¥mad-Rahasyatrayasåra˙, 2 vols., ed. Råmadeßikåcåryar Svåmi, commented by V.
R. Råmasvåmi Aiyaµgår, Kombakonam: Opilliyappa˜ Sanniti, 1961. [Skt College,
16576]
M. R. Rajagopala Ayyangar, trans. Srimad Rahasyatrayasara of Vedantadesika,
Published by Agnihotram Ramanuja Thathachariar, Kumbakonam, [1956]. [Adyar
H142-2 Ved RT=Raj]
KË. V. N¥lameghåcårya, Ír¥mad-Rahasyatrayasåra-Saµsk®tånuvåda˙, ed.
Aniruddhåcårya Veµka†åcårya, UVG, 1968.
Adhikårasaµgraha [the opening and ending verses in each chapter of RTS] withÍr¥bhåshyam Ír¥nivåsåcarya’s vyåkhyå, ed. R. N. Sampath and T. A. K.
Venkatachariar, Bulletin of Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras 21 (1976): 1–92.
Rahasyatrayasårårthasaµgraha. See Aravamudhan.
Råmåyaˆa.

435

The Råmåyaˆa of Vålm¥ki with the Commentary (Tilaka) of Råma, 2 vols., ed.
Wåsudev Laxman Íåstr¥ Paˆß¥kar, Delhi: Indologicak Book House (rpt. of NSP ed.).
Íåbarabhåshya. See MSË. See also Frauwallner 1968 for I. i. 1–5.
›a∂ Darßana Samuccaya (A Copendium of Six Philosophies) by Haribhadra, trans. K.
Satchidananda Murity, Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers, 2 1986.
Sambandhavårttika
The Sambandhavårttika of Sureßvaråchårya, ed. K. N. Chatterjee, trans. S.
Venkataramana Aiyar [originally published in the Pandit 23–26 (1901ff.)], Varanasi:
Chaukhamba Amarabharati Prakashan, 1981.
T. M. P. Mahadevan, Univ. of Madras.
Såµkhyakårikå.
服部正明 (Hattori Masaaki), 『古典サーンキヤ体系概説』 (A Japanese translatiion theSåµkhyakårikå), in: Gadjin M. Nagao (長尾雅人) ed., 『バラモン教典・原始仏典』(Brahmanical and Early Buddhist Scriptures), 世界の名著 (World Classics Ser.), vol.
1, Tokyo: Chûôkôron-sha (中央公論社), 1979 (Paperback ed.), pp. 189–208.
金倉圓照 (Kanakura Yenshô), 自在黒の思想−『数論偈』における人間の存在と運命(Thought of Áßvarak®shˆa [A Japanese trans. of SK with reference to all the extant
commentaries thereon]), in: 『インド哲学仏教学研究 III: インド哲学篇 2』 (Studies inIndian Philosophy and Buddhism, vol. 3 (Indian Philosophy, pt. 2), Tokyo: 春秋社(Shunjû-sha), pp. 103–82.
Saµvitsiddhi. See Mesquita 1988.
Saµkßepaßår¥raka.
The Saµkshepaßår¥raka of Sarvajñåtman, ed. with Eng. trans. by N. Veezhinathan,
Madras: Univ. of Madras, 1972 (21985).
ÓnSS
Tilmann Vetter, Sarvajñåtman’s Saµkshepaßår¥rakam. 1. Kapital: Einführung,Übersetzung, Anmerkungen, SbÖAW 282/3, Veröffentlichungen der Kommision
für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens Heft 11, Wien, 1972.
SåµkhyasËtra. In: Såµkhyapravacanabhåshya or Commentary on the Exposition of theSåµkhya Philosophy by Vijñånabhikshu, ed. Richard Garbe, Harvard Oriental Ser.
2, Cambridge (Mass.), 1943.
Sanatkumårasaµhitå
Sanatkumårasaµhitå of the Påñcaråtrågama, ed. V. Krishnamacharya, Madras: Adyar
Library and Research Centre, 1969.
SaµkalpasËryodaya
SaµkalpasËryodaya of Ír¥ Veµka†anåtha with Two Commentaries Prabhåvilåsa andPrabhåval¥, 2 vols., ed. V. Krishnamacharya, Madras: Adyar Library, 1948.
Sankalpa Suryodaya: Drama with Sanskrit Commentary and Tamil Translation, UVG,
1971.
*Nasimhacharya Swami of Cetloor, Eng. trans. Madras: Nigama Parimalam Office,
1924.
*M. R. Rajagopala Iyengar, trans. Saµkalpa Suryodaya, Madras: Vedanta Desika
Research Society, 1977 [Adyar H822 Ved SS=Raj].
Íaµkara ad BhGÍr¥madbhagavadg¥tå with the Commentaries Ír¥mat-Íåµkarabhåshya withÓnandagiri, N¥lakaˆ†h¥, Bhåshyotkarshad¥pikå of Dhanapati, Ír¥dhar¥,G¥tårthasaµgraha of Abhinavagupta and GË∂hårthad¥pikå of MadhusËdhanasarasvat¥
with GË∂hårthatattvåloka of Írydharmadattaßarmå, ed. Wåsudev Laxmaˆ Shåstr¥Paˆß¥kar, NSP, 1936 (rpt. ).
The Bhagavadg¥tå with the Commentary of Ír¥ Íaµkaråcårya, ed. Dinkar Vishnu
Gokhale, Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1931.

436

ÓnSS 34.
See also Bhagavadg¥tå with Eleven commentaries under GBh.
Sr¥mad Bhagavad G¥tå Bhåshya of Sri Saµkaråcårya, ed. with trans. A. G. Krishna
Warrier, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 3 1993.
Íaµkara ad BSË
Brahmasutra Íånkara Bhåshya with the Commentaries Bhåmat¥, Kalpataru andParimala, ed. Anantakrishna Íåstri and Vasudev Laxman Shåstri Paˆsikar, Varanasi:
ChSS Office, 1982 (Rpt. of NSP ed.).
Brahmasutra-Sankara-Bhasyam with Nine Commentaries (Pañcapådikå, Pañcapådikåvivaraˆa,Ùjuvivaraˆa,
Tattvad¥pana,Bhåmat¥,Ùjuprakåßikå,Bhåshyabhåvaprakåßikå, Vårttika and Prad¥pa), 3 vols., ed. Anantakrishna Sastri,Calcutta Skt. Ser., 1933–43.
2 vols., ÓnSS 21,
George Thibaut, trans. The Vedånta-sËtras with the Commentary of Íaµkaråkårya,Sacred Books of the East 34 & 38, Oxford, 1890–96 (rpt. Delhi: MLBD).
金倉圓照 (Kanakura Yenshô), 『シャンカラの哲学−ブラフマ・スートラ釈論の全訳』(Íaµkara’s Philosophy: A Complete Japanese Translation of theBrahmasËtrabhåshya), 2 vols., Tokyo: 春秋社 (Shunjû-sha), 1980–84.
服部正明 (Hattori Masaaki), 『不二一元論』 (A Japanese translation of Íaµkara’s
BrahmasËtrabhåshya II. i. 14, 18), in: Gadjin M. Nagao (長尾雅人) ed., 『バラモン教
典・原始仏典』 (Brahmanical and Early Buddhist Scriptures), 世界の名著 (WorldClassics Ser.), vol. 1, Tokyo: Chûôkôron-sha (中央公論社), 1979 (Paperback ed.), pp.
245–66.
*S. K. Belvalkar, The Brahma-SËtras of Bådaråyaˆa with the Comment ofÍaµkaråchårya, Chapter II, Quater 1–2, ed. in … Sanskrit with English Translation
and Notes, Poona: Bilvavkunja Publishing House, 1923–24 (1931).
Louis Renou, Íaµkara: Prolégomènes au Vedânta [French trans. of Adhyåsabhåshya],Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1951.
Íaµkara ad —°Up[ÓnSS ed. with Ónandagiri’s †¥kå]Ónandagiri-k®ta-†¥kå-saµvalita-Íåµkarabhåshya-yutå Áßåvåsyopanishat RahasyaD¥pikå-Viv®ttibhi˙ Sanåth¥k®tå Uva†a-Ónaµdabha††a-Anantåcårya-praˆ¥ta-bhåshyaiß
ca samalaµk†å, ÓnSS 5, 1980 (new ed.).
… Kenopanishåt …, ÓnSS 6.
… Ka†hopanishat …, ÓnSS 7.
… Praßnopanishat …, ÓnSS 8.
Ónandagiri-k®ta-†¥kå-saµbalita-Íåµkarabhåshya-sametå Muˆ∂akopanishat tathå
Nåråyaˆa-viracitå Muˆ∂akopanishadd¥pikå ca, ÓnSS 9, 71982.
… Måˆ∂Ëkyopanishat …, ÓnSS 10.
… Aitareyopanishat, ÓnSS 11.
… Taittir¥yopanishat …, ÓnSS 12.
B®hadåråˆyakopanishat Ónandagiri-k®ta-†¥kå-saµvalita-Íåµkarabhåshya-sametå, ed.
Kåß¥nåtha Íåstr¥ Ógaße, ÓnSS 15, 1982 (new ed.).
… Chåndogyopanishat…, ÓnSS 14.
K®shˆayajurved¥ya-Ívetåßvataropanishat
Íåµkarabhåshya-upetå
tathåÍaµkarånanda-k®tåÍvetåßvataropanishadd¥piikå
Nåråyaˆa-k®tåÍvetåßvataropanishadd¥piikå
Vijñånabhagavat-k®taµÍvetåßvataropanishadvivaraˆam, ÓnSS 17, 4 1982.
[Trans. Advaita Ashrama ed., Calcutta]Chådogya Upanishåd with the Commentary of Ír¥ Íaµkaråcårya, trans. Swåm¥Gambh¥rånanda, 1983.
The B®hadåråˆyaka Upanishads with the Commentary of Íaµkaråcårya, trans. Swami
Madhavananda, 71988.
Íaraˆågatid¥pikå

437*M. R. Rajagopala Uyengar, trans. Íaraˆågati Deepikå, Madras: pub. by the translator,
1974.
*Íår¥rakaßåstrad¥pikåof Raµgaråmånuja, ed. V. N. Krishnamacharya, Vißish†ådvaita Vaijayanti Ser. 2,
Kumbhakonam: Gopala Vilasa Press, 1915–19.
ÍålistambasËtra.
Órya Íålistamba SËtra, Prat¥tyasamutpådavibhaµganirdeßasËtra and Prat¥tyasamutpådagåthåsËtra, ed. with Tib. version and notes by N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Madras:
Adyar Library and Reseach Centre, 1950.
Sarvårthasiddhi. [SAS] See TMK.
Såttvatasaµhitå*ed. V. V. Dwivedi, Library Rare Texts Publication Ser. 6, Varanasi, 1982.
ÍDËÍatadËshaˆ¥ [The number of våda is shown in Roman].
Tattwateeka (a Commentary on Ír¥bhåshya) [with T. Viraraghavacharya’s comm.
Tattvårpaˆa] and Satadooshani [with V. Ír¥vatsåµkåcårya’s bhËmikå and T.
Viraraghavacharya’s comm. Kiµcitkåra] by Srimad Vedantadesika, UVG, 1974 [Theportion of T†¥kå published separately: UVG, 1974].
Sri Vedanta Desika’s Satadushani, ed. V. Srivatsakachar, Madras: V. D. Ramaswami,
1974 [same as the UVG ed., except Eng. introduction by R. Kesava Aiyangar].
Ed. VDG.
with Caˆ∂åmåruta of Mahåcarya, ed. P. B. Anantacharya Vidya Vinoda, BI 158,
1903–4.
… Ír¥mad-Vedåntadeßika viracitå Ír¥man-Mahåcårya-praˆ¥tena Caˆ∂amårutena
saµgatå ÍatadËshaˆ¥, ed. and Hindi trans. Íivaprasåd Dvived¥, Vidyå BhavanPråcyavidyå Granthamålå 24, Varanasi: Chaukhamba Vidyabhawan, 1991.
Íåstrad¥pikå.
Shåstrad¥pikå of Parthasarathi Mishra with the Commentary Mayukhamalika [II. iff.] of Samanåtha and the Commenatary Yuktisnehapraprani [I. i] by Råmakrishˆa,ed. Dharmadatta Jha, Varanasi: Krishnadas Academy, 1988 (rpt. of the NSP ed.).
ChSS
MGOS
GOS
SDS
Sarvadarßanasaµgraha.
Sarva-darßana-saµgraha of Såyaˆa-Mådhava, ed. with an original Skt. comm. by
Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar, Poona: Bhandarkar Research Institute, 31978 [References
are to the chapter and the lines].
Ír¥-Mådhavåcårya-praˆ¥ta˙ Sarvadarßanasaµgraha˙ MadhusËdanasarasvat¥-k®ta˙
Prasthånabhedaß ca, ÓnSS 51, 4 1977.
Sarvadarßanasaµgraha of Mådhavåcårya, ed. K. L. Joshi, trans. E. B. Cowell and A.
E. Gough, Delhi: Parimal Pub., 1986 [up to XV. The translation first published:
London, 1894].
Hajime Nakamura (中村元), 『インドの哲学体系』 [Sytems of Indian Philosophy: An
Annotated Japanese Translation of the Sarvadarßanasaµgraha], 2 vols., 中村元選集［決定版］ [Selected Works of Hajime Nakamura (New ed.)], vols. 28 and 29. Tokyo:
Shunjû-sha (春秋社), 1994/95.
Seßvaram¥måµså.
Seswara Mimamsa and Mimamsa Paduka by Srimad Vedanta Desika with Acharya

438

Kumara Sri Varadacharya’s Mimamsa Paduka Paritrana and Abhinava Deiska Viraraghavacharya’s Sukshmarthateeka & Satpathasanchara [with the editor’s M¥måµsåmeyasaµgraha], UVG, 1971.
Seßvara M¥måµså of Vedånta Deßika, ed. Vachaspati Upadhyaya, Delhi: S. N. Pub.,
1981.
Ed. VDG.
ÍeshasaµhitåÍesha-saµhitå, ed. L. Ír¥nivåsåcårya, Myosore: Myosore Dharmasaµhitå, 1935.
Íaraˆågatigadya.
Ed. RG.
*Gadyatrayam with the Commentaries of Sudarßana SËri, Periya Óccån Pi¬¬ai andVedånta Deßika [in Telugu], Kåñc¥puram: Ír¥vaishˆavagrantha Mudråpaka Sabhai,
1916.
*Gadya Vyåkhyåµga¬ [of SudarßanasËri and Peyiyavåccå˜ Pi¬¬ai], ed. K. Srinivasa
Iyengar Swami, Trichi: S. Krishnaswami Iyengar, 1976.
*M. R. Rajagopala Aiyangar, The Gadya-traya of Råmånuja, Madras: pub. by theauthor, n.d.
K. Bhasyam, Saranaagati Gadya with English Translation of the Text and its
Commentary by Srutaprakaasika Acharya, UVG, 1959 (rpt. Madras: Visishtadvaita
Pracharini Sabha, 1964).
*Trans. S. V. Srinivasan, in: Vißish†ådvaita Philosophy and Religion: A Symposiumby 24 Erudite Scholars, Madras, pp. 64–70.
V. V. Råmånujam, Gadyatrayam of Bhagavad Råmånuja, Text in Sanskrit with theCommentary of Periya Accån Pi¬¬ai, Bangalore: Ír¥ Parampara Sabha, [1994].
Íaraˆågatigadyabhåshya. See CßBh.
Siddhåntabindu
Siddhåntabindu of Madhusudana Sarasvati being a Commentary on the Daßaßlok¥ ofÍaµkaråchårya with two Commentaries Nyaya Ratnavali of Gaudabrahmånanda andLaghuvyåkhyå of Nåråyaˆa T¥rtha, ed. Tryambakram Íåstr¥ Vedåntåchårya, KSS 65,
2
1989.
Siddhåntakaumud¥.
Ír¥-Våsudevad¥kshita-k®ta‘Bålamanoramå’vyåkhyå-sahitå
Vaiyåkaraˆasiddhåntakaumud¥, 4 vols., KSS139, 111988 [= Bib. EIPh V, G1101].
Tattvabodhin¥-samåkhya-vyåkhyå-saµvalitå
Siddhåntantakaumud¥nåmaBha††ojid¥kshita-praˆ¥tå Påˆin¥yavyåkaraˆasËtrav®tti, ed. Vasudev Laksman Shastri
Pansikar, New Delhi: Maharchanda Lachhmandas Pub., 1985 (rpt. of NSP ed.) [=Bib. EIPh V, G1083?].
Vaiyåkaraˆasiddhåntakaumud¥ Bålamanoramå-Tatttvabodin¥-sahitå, 4 vols., ed.
Giridharaßarmå Catuveda and Parameßvarånandaßarmå Bhåskara, Varanasi (Delhietc.): Mot¥lål Banars¥dås, [1958]–1961 [= Bib. EIPh V, G1100].
James R. Ballantyne, The Laghukaumud¥: A Sanskrit Grammar by Varadaråja, rpt.
Delhi: MLBD, 1976 (1st ed., Varanasi, 1849).
Ír¥mad-Varadaråjåcårya-praˆ¥tå Sårasiddhåntakaumud¥ ‘Råkå’ -Saµsk®ta-Hind¥-vyåkhyôpetå, 4 parts (bound in one volume), ed. with comm. Ócåryalokamaˆidåhåla,Våråˆas¥: Caukhambhå Subhårat¥ Prakåßa, 1992
Siddhåntaratnåval¥Siddhånta Ratnåval¥ of Sri Venkatachårya, ed. Agnihotram Råmånuja Tåtåchårya,Tanjore: Saarasvati Maahal Library, 1982.
Siddhitraya.
Sri Yamunacharya’s Siddhitraya with a Sanskrit Commentary (Goodaprakasa) (by T.

439

Viraraghavacharya with. Eng. introd. by R. Ramanujachari and Eng. trans. by R.
Ramanujachari and K. Srinivasacharya), UVG, 1972.
[The comm. first published in: Siddhitrayam … UttamËr V¥raraghvåcåryeˆa svak®taGË∂haprakåßa-åkhya†ipaˆådinå …, ed. T. Viraraghvacharya, Tirupati, 1942; the Eng.
trans. originally appeared with the Skt. ed. by the same translators in Jouranal of theAnnamalai University (1935–43) and later published as: Siddhitraya by Yåmunåcårya,Annamalai Univ. Philosophy Ser. 4, 1943].
*Siddhitrayam, ed. Råma Mißra Íåstri, ChSS 10, 1900.
Ír¥mad-Bhagavad-Ymåmunamuni praˆ¥taµ Siddhitrayam Ír¥ Paˆ∂itapravaraRåmamißra Íåstri vyåkhyopetaµ … Råmadulåre Íåstribhi˙ prakåßitaµ saµßodhitaµca, Calcutta, vikrama 2000.
*Ed. Sampatkumåråcårya and Ír¥nivåsåcårya, Granthamalåµka˙ 12, Jagad¥ßapur¥,1942.
*Siddhitrayam Aˆˆaµgaråcåryaßiromaˆi-praˆ¥tayå Siddhåñjana-åkhyavyåkhyayå
samanvitam, ed. P. B. Aˆˆaµgaråcårya, NSP, 1954.
See Otto 1929a–c [partial German trans.].
Íivådvaitanirˆaya.
The Íivådvaita-Nirˆaya (An Inquiry into the System of Ír¥kan†ha) of Appaya D¥kshita,
ed. and trans. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Madras: Univ. of Madras, 1929 (rpt. 1974).
Ílokavårttika [ÍV].
[ed. with Nyåyaratnåkara] Ílokavårttika of Ír¥ Kumårila Bha††a with the CommentaryNyåyaratnåkara of Pårthasårathi Mißra, ed. Dvårikådåsa Íåstr¥, Varanasi: Tara Pub.,
1978.
The M¥måµså-Íloka-Vårttika of Kumårika Bha††a with the Commentary called Nyåyaratnåkara by Pårtha Sårathi Mißra, ed. ChSS 3, 1898–99.
[ed. with Uµveka’s comm.] Ílokavårttikavyåkhyå Tåtparya†¥kå of Uµbeka Bha††a[up to spho†avåda], ed. S. K. Ramanatha Sastri, rev. K. Kunjuni Raja and R.
Thangasway, Madras: Univ. of Madras, 1971 (1st ed.: 1940).
[ed. with Íarkarikå] Ílokavårttika†¥kå (Sarkarikå) of Bha††aputra Jayamißra [fromåk®tivåda to saµbandhåkshepaparihåravåda v. 39ab], ed. Kunhan Raja, Madras,
1946.
[ed. with Kåßikå] M¥måµså Slokavårttika with the Commentary Kasika of Sucaritamißra, pt. 1 (up to pratyakshasËtra) and pt. 2 (up to ßËnyavåda), ed. K. SåmbaßivaSåstr¥ [rpt. of pt. I and pt. II, Trivandrum: CBH Pub., 1990); pt. 3 (up tosambandhåkshepavåda), ed. A. Ramaswami Sastri, Trivandrum Skt. Ser. 90, 99 and150, Trivandrum, 1926–43.
Ms. Adyar Library[Trans.] Ganga Nath Jha, Slokavarttika translated from the original Sanskrit withextracts from the commentaries “Kasika” of Succarita Misra and “Nyayaratnakara”
of Partha Sarthi Misra, BI, 1900–1908 (rpt. Delhi: Sri Satguru Pub., 1983).
Spho†anirˆaya
The Spho†anirˆaya (Chapter XIV of the VaiyåkaraˆabhËshaˆasåra) of Kauˆ∂a Bha††a,ed. with intro. and notes by S. D. Joshi, Poona: Univ. of Poona, 1967.
Spho†asiddhi
Spho†asiddhi of Maˆ∂ana Mißra (English Translation), ed with trans. by K. A.
Subramania Iyer, Poona: Deccan College, 1966.
Spha†avåda of Någeßabha††a [Någiojibha††a], ed. with comm. Subioodhin¥ by V. Krishnamacharya, Madras: Adyar Library and Reseach Centre, 1946 (rpt. 1977).
Ír¥ Bhagavad Råmånuja Granthamålå: Ír¥ Bhagavad Råmånuja’s Nine Valuable Works[VAS, Íår¥rakam¥måµsåbhåshya (= Ír¥Bh), VD¥pa, VSåra, GBh, ÍG, Ír¥raµgagadya,Ír¥vaikuˆ†hagadya and Nityagrantha], ed. P. B. Kåñc¥ Aˆˆangaråcårya, Kåñc¥: Granthamålå Office, 1956.

440

Ír¥bhåshya [Ír¥Bh].
[UVG ed. with ÍP] Brahmasutra-Sribhashya with Srutaprakasika, 2 vols., Madras,
1988 (rpt. of the 1967 edition of UVG).
[Ed. with ÍP and GË∂hårthasaµgraha] Ír¥-Bhagavad-Råmånuja-muni-viracitam Ír¥bhåshyam Ír¥-SudarßanasËri-praˆ¥ta-Írutaprakåßikâkhya-†¥kayå … -Ír¥madAbhinavaraµganåtha-Brahmatantraparakåla-saµyami(33)-prarˆ¥ta-Ír¥bhåshyasËkti-GË∂hårthasaµgraheˆa ca sahitam, 2 vols. [up to I. iv. §2], Mysore, 1959–70.
[Adyar H142-1 Ram SB xy]Ír¥bhåshya with Ten Commentaries [= (1) ÍP by SudarßanasËri, (2) Bhåvaprakåßikå
(on ÍP) by Raµgaråmånuja, (3) Írutaprad¥pikå by SudarßanasËri, (4) Nayaprakåßikå
by Meghanådari, (5) T†¥kå by Vedånta Deßika, (6) MËlabhåvaprakåßikå (directly onÍr¥Bh) by Raµgaråmånuja, (7) Nyåyasudarßana by Varadanåråyaˆabha††åraka, (8)ASÓ by Vedånta Deßika, (9) Adhikaraˆacintåmaˆi (on ASÓ) by Kumåra Vedåntåcårya
and (10) Vishayavåkyad¥pikå by Raµgaråmånuja), 4 vols. only (up to I. i. 3), ed. V.
Anantåcårya and V. K®shˆamåcårya, Madras: Madras Sanskrit Book Depot, 1936–42[Adyar].
[NSP ed. with ÍP] Ír¥bhåshyam of Ír¥bhagavad-Råmånujamuni with the commentaryÍrutaprakåßikå by Mahåmahopådhyåya Sudarßanavyasabhatta [I. i. 1–4 only], ed. T.
Ír¥nivåsa ÍarmåDelhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1983 (first ed.: NSP, 1916).
[Melkote ed.] Ír¥bhåshyam Íår¥rakam¥måµsåbhåshyam (Critical Edition), 4 vols, ed.
Scholars of the Academy, Academy of Sanskrit Research Ser. 4, Melkote: Academyof Sanskrit Research, 1985–91 [with brief notes mainly based on ÍP, word-by-word
meaning of each sËtra and appendices incl. the Nyåyakalåpasaµgraha of Seneßvara,TSåra, ASÓ, the Adhikaraˆårthasaµgraha (or Ír¥bhåshyopanyåsa) of Do∂∂ayåcårya
or Mahåcårya, the Nayasaµgatimålikå of Ír¥nivåsåcårya, and the Vedåntakårikåval¥of Bucci Veµka†åcårya with Skt. notes].
[UVG ed. with Bhåshyårthadarpaˆa] Ír¥bhåshya and its Commentary namedBhåshyårtha Darpaˆa [by T. Viraraghavacharya], 2 vols., UVG, 1963–64 (rpt. 1997).
[Ed. with K. V. Abhyankar’s comm.] Ír¥-Bhâshya by Râmânujâchâraya, 2 vols. (pt.
I: Text; pt. II: Notes), ed. Vasudeva Shastiri Abhyankar, Bombay Sanskrit and PrakritSer. 68, 1914–16 [rpr. of I. i. 1–4: Pune: Saµsk®tavidyåparisaµsthå, 2 1965].
[Translations]M. Rangacharya and Varadaraja Aiyangar, The VedåntasËtras with the Ír¥bhåshya ofRåmånujåcårya, 3 vols., New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Pub., 1988–91 (firstpublished: Madras, 1898 [1st ed. of vol. 1] and 1961–65).
George Thibaut, The Vedånta-sËtras with Råmånuja’s Commentary, Sacred Booksof the East 48, Delhi etc.: MLBD, rpt. 1962 (first edition: Oxford, 1904).
Rudolf Otto, Das Siddhånta des Råmånuja: Ein Text zur indischen Gottesmystik
Texte zur indischen Gottes Mystic II, Tübingen, 1917 (21923) [I. i. 1].
*V. K. Ramanujachari, 2 vols., Kumbakonam: pub. by the translator, 1930.
Olivier Lacombe, La doctrine morale et métaphysique de Råmånuja, Paris: AdrianMaisanneuve, 1938 [I. i. 1 with Skt. text].
R. D. Karmarkar, Ír¥bhåshya of Råmånuja, 3vols., Poona: Univ. of Poona, 1959–64[with Skt. text and notes].
Jagadguru Ír¥ Råmånujåcårya k®t Ír¥bhåshya, 2 vols., ed. with Hindi trans.
Nimbårkåcårya Ír¥ Lalitak®shˆa Gosvåm¥, Prayåg, 1973.
Vireswarananda and Adidevananda, Brahma-sËtras with Text, English Rendering,
Comments according to Ír¥-Bhåshya of Råmånuja, Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 21986.
Ír¥bhåshyaparishkåra
Ír¥bhåshyaparishkåra˙ ofÍr¥sarasvat¥-vigrahaµ Deßikåcårya,Ír¥k®shˆatåtåcårya, Varanasi: Sampurnananda Skt. Univ., 1989.

ed.

N.

R.

Ír¥bhåshyaprakåßikå
Ír¥bhåshyaprakåßikå by Ír¥nivåsåcårya, ed. T. Chandrasekharan, Madras Government
Oriental Manuscripts Ser. 48, Madras: [Govt. Oriental Manuscripts Library], [1956].

441

Ír¥bhåshyavårttika
Ír¥-Bhåshya Vårttika … also Yat¥ndra Mat D¥pikå by Nivåså Chårya … andSakalåchåryamat Sangrah, ed. Ratna Gopål Bha††a, Benares Skt. Ser., 1907.
Ír¥bhåshyopanyåsa
*of Mahåcårya. Ed. T. Chandrasekharan, Bulletin of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library Madras 1-2 (1949): 9–22; 2-1 (1949): 1–20 [incomplete]*Eng. trans. V. K. Ramanujachariar, 2 vols., Kumbakonam: Pub. by the traslator,
1930 (439 + 929pp.) [Acc. to A Bibliography of Indian Philsophy, vol. 1, Madras:
Dr. C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar Research Endowment Committee, 1963, Vißish†ådvaita,p. 9]Ír¥guˆaratnakoßa
Ír¥guˆaratnakoßa by Paråßarabha††a with Våtsya V¥raraghavåcårya's Commentary
Vasuråßi, ed. the scholars of the Academy, Melkote: The Academy of Sanskrit
Research, 1989.
Ír¥mad-Vedåntadeßika-granthamålå [VDG] ed. Ír¥kåñc¥ Prativådibhayaµkara Aˆˆaµgaråcårya, Kåñc¥varam, 1940–41.
(1) Stotråval¥-vibhåga.
(2) Vedånta-v° I: ASÓ, ÍDË.
(3) Vedånta-v° II: M¥måµsåpådukå, SeM¥, NP, NySi.
(4) Vedånta-v° III: TMK with SAS.
(5) Kåvyanå†aka-v°: Haµsasandeßa, Subhåshitan¥v¥, Yådavåbhyudaya, SaµkalpasËryodaya.
(6) Vyåkhyåna-v° I: Áßåvåsyopanishadbhåshya, Catu˙ßlok¥bhåshya, Stotraratnabhåshya, Gadyabhåshya.
(7) Vyåkhyåna-v° II: GAS-rakshå, GBh-TC.
(8) Vyåkhyåna-v° III: T†¥kå, Niksheparakshå, Saccaritarakshå, Påñcaråtrarakshå etc.
Ír¥praßanasaµhitå*Ír¥praßna-saµhitå, ed. Seetha Padmanabhan, Tirupati: Kendriya Sanskrit
Vidyapeetha, 1969.
Ír¥stuti
Sristhuthi of Sri Vedanta Desika, trans. M. K. Srinivasan, Madras: Vedanta Desika
Research Centre, 1994.
Ír¥sËkta.
Ír¥sËktamÍr¥-Vidyåraˆya-P®thiv¥dhara-ady-åcårya-k®ta-bhåshyatrayeˆasamalaµk®tam, ed. fluˆ∂hiråjaßåsr¥, KSS 4, 3 1994.
Ír¥tattvasiddhåñjana
UttamËr T. V¥raråghavåcårya, ed. Ír¥ Såkshåtsvåmi-jñånavairågyånush†hånaßevadhiÍr¥mad-Vedåntaråmånuja-mahådeßikânug®h¥ta-granthå˙Ír¥tattvasiddhåñjanam,Nyåsavidyådarpaˆa˙, B®hadguruparamparåsåråsvådin¥ ca Ír¥munitrayåcårya Ír¥madGopåladeßika-anug®h¥tau Nikshepacintåmaˆi-Ír¥jayant¥nirˆayau cêti Pañcagranth¥,
ed. Ubhayavedåntagranthamålå, Delhi: Pub. by K. R. Padmanabhan, 1981.
Ír¥vacanabhËshaˆa*Ír¥vacana BhËshaˆa, ed. and trans. Robert C. Lester, Madras: Kuppuswami Researach
Institute, 1979.
Írutaprad¥pikåÍrutaprad¥pikå of Sudarßana SËri, ed. A. Srinivasa Raghavan, Tanjavur: Sarasvati
Mahal Library, 1972.
Írutaprakåßikå of SudarßanasËri. See Ír¥Bh.
Stotraratna.

442

Stotraratna or the Hymn-Jewel of Ír¥ Yåmunåcårya, ed. and trans. SwamiÓdidevånanda, Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1950 (31967).
See Otto 1917.
Stotraratnabhåshya. See CßBh.
Stotramålå
*Stotramålå, ed. P. B. Annangaracharya, Kanchi: Granthamala Office, 1969.
M. S. Lakhmi Kumari and M. Narasimhachary (S. S. Raghavan), Sri Vedanta Desika’s
Stotras (with English Translation), Madras: Sripad Trust, 1995.
*Stotras of Vedånta Deßika, Bombay: Sri Vedanta Desika Sampradaya Sabha, 3 1973
[Adyar H245 08 Ved St].
Sri Desika Stotramala, ed. with Tamil trans. Råmatecikåcåryar, Chennai-Tirucci: T.
Li††ir P¬avar Kampe˜¥, 1966 (rpt. 1993).
Ír¥deßikastotråˆi, ed. Ír¥råmadeßikåcårya Svåmi, Chennai, 1970.
Subhåshitan¥v¥
Subhashita Nivi by Vedanta Desika with two commentaries, UVG, 1971.
K. S. Nagarajan, ed. and trans. Vedånta Deßika’s Sbhashitanivi, Madras: Vedanta
Desika Research Institute, 1972 [Adyar H827-2 Ved SN x= Nag].
M. K. Srinivasan, Subhasita Nivi of Vedanta Desika: Treasure of Wise Saying,
Madras: Sri Vedanta Desika Research Centre, 1995.
Sudarßanåsh†aka
Sudarßanåsh†akam and Garu∂a Daˆ∂akam, Eng. trans. K. P. Rangaswamy, Madras:
Sri Vedanta Desika Research Centre, 1996.
SËtrårthåm®talahar¥, ed. R. Nagaraja Sarma, MGOS 77, 1951 [Dvaita].
Syådvådaratnåkara by VådidevasËri, 5 vols., ed. Mot¥lål Lådhåj¥, Pune, v¥rasaµvat
2453–57 (rpr. in 2 vols., Delhi: Bhårat¥ya Book Coop., 1UB Jawahar Nagar).
Taittir¥yåraˆyaka.
K®shˆayajurved¥yaµ Taittir¥yåråˆyakam Ír¥mat-Såyanåcårya-viracita-bhåshyasametam, ed. Ve. Íå. Rå. Rå. Båbåßåstr¥ Pha∂ake, ÓnSS 36, 2 vols., [rpt.] 1981
(with the Óndhrapå†ha of chap. X [= Mahånåråyaˆa-Up in eighty anuvåkas with acomm. by an anonymous] with an anonymous commentary).
Tha Taittir¥ya Óraˆyaka with the Commentary of Bha††a Bhåskara Mißra, ed. A.
Mahaddeva Sastri and K. Rangacarya, Delhi: MLBD, 1985 (rpt. of Government
Oriental Library Ser., 26, 27 & 29, Mysore, 1900–1902; Intro. by T. N. Dharmådhikåri
added).
Taittir¥yasaµhitå.
K®shˆayajurved¥ya Taittir¥yasaµhitå, ed. Ír¥påda Dåmodara Såtavalekar, Påra∂¥(Gujarat): Svådhyåya Maˆ∂ala, n.d. (4th ed.).
Taittir¥yopanishådbhåshyavårttika.
The Taittir¥yopanishad Bhåshya-Vårttika of Sureßvara, ed. and trans. R.
Balasubramanian, Madras: Univ. of Madras, 1974 (Rev. ed. 1984).
ÓnSS 13
Tarkasaµgraha of Annaµbha††a with the author’s D¥pikå and Govardhana’sNyåyabodhin¥, ed. Yashwant Vasudev Athalye and trans. Mahadev Rajaram Bodas,
Bombay Sanskrit Ser. 55, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 4 1988.
Ed. and trans. Kuppuswami Sastri 1931.
B. L. Atreya, Tha Elements of Indian Logic with the Text and Hindi & English
Translation of Tarkasangraha (Buddhikhaˆ∂a), Moradabad (U.P.): Darshana Printers,
4
1962.
Tattvabindu by Våcaspatimißra with Tattvavubhåvanå by Ùshiputra Parameßvara, ed.

443

and introd. V. A. Ramaswami Sastri, Annamalai Univ. Ser. 3, 1936 (rpt. New Delhi:
Navrang, 1991).
Biardeau
TattvårthådhigamasËtra
The Tattvårtha SËtra of Sri Umåswåmi with the Sukhbodha of Sri Bhåskaranandi,
ed. A. Shantiraja Sastri, Mysore: Univ. of Mysore, 1944.
Tattvatraya of Pi¬¬ai Lokåcårya.
Pillai Lokåcårya-svåmibhir Dravi∂yåm anug®h¥tam … Ír¥mad-Anantak®shˆåcåryasvåmibhir Saµsk®te ’nËditam Tattvatrayam, ed. with Hindi trans. Íivaprasåda Dvived¥,
Ayodhyå, n.d.
Tattavatraya with the Commentary of Varavara, ed. Bhågavatåcårrya, ChSS 4, 1889.
*M. B. Narasimha Iyengar, trans. Tattvatraya, Madras: M. C. Krishnan, 1974.
Anand Amaladass, S.J., Tattvatrayavyåkhyånam: Maˆavå¬amåmuni’s Commentaryon Pi¬¬ai Lokåyata’s Tattvatrayam, Madras: Satya Nilayam Pub., 1995 [Eng. trans.].
B. M. Awasthi and C. K. Datta, The Tattvatraya of Lokåcårya, New Delhi: Munshram
Manoharlal, 1973 [Eng. and Hindi trans.].
Tattvatrayaculaka
See ARR.
Tattvatrayaculakasaµgraha of Kumåradeßika and Tattvaßekhra of Pi¬¬ai Lokåcårya,ed. K. K. V. S. A. Ramanuja Das and Bhattanatha Svami, Benares Sanskrit Ser. 27,
1905.
Tarkabhåshå of Ír¥ Keßava Mißra with Tarkarahasyad¥pikå Hindi Commentary, ed.
Vißweßhwara Siddhåntaßiromaˆi, KSS 155, 8 1990.
Tarkabhåshå of Mokshåkaragupta.
Tarkabhåshå and Vådasthåna of Mokshåkaragupta and Jitåripåda, ed. H. R.
Rangaswami Iyengar, Myosore, 21952.
Eng. trans. with notes: Kajiyama 1966.
Japanese trans. by 梶山雄一 (Kajiyama Yuichi), 認識と論理（タルカバーシャー) in:
Gadjin M. Nagao (長尾雅人) ed., 『大乗仏典』 (Mahåyåna Buddhist Scriptures), 世界の名著 (World Classics Ser.), vol. 2, Tokyo: Chûôkôron-sha (中央公論社), 1967, pp.
447–543.
Tåtparyacandrikå. See GBh.
Tåtparyad¥pikå.
Vedarthasangraha of Sri Ramanujacharya with the Commentary Tatparyadipika of
Sri Sudarsanabhtta, ed. T. K. V. N. Sudarsanacharya, Vaishnava Sampradaya
Granthamala No. 5, Tirupati: Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Institute, 1953.
Ed. with VAS by S. S. P. S. Rama Misra Sastri, Pandit ns. 15–16 (1893–94) [2nded.: Reprint from the Pandit, Varanasi, 1924 (new pagenation)].
TiruvåymoÒi
Satyamurti Ayyangar, TiruvåymoÒi English Glossary, 2 vols., Bombay: Ananthacharya
Indological Research Institute, 1981.
Tattvakaumud¥
Våcaspatimißras Tattvakaumud¥: Ein Beitrage zur Textkritik bei kontaminierterÜberlieferung, ed. Srinivasa Ayya Arinivasan, Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 12,
Hamburg: Universität Hamburg, 1967.
Ganganath Jha, ed. and rans. The Tattvakaumud¥: Våcaspatimißra’s Commentary on
the Såµkhyakårikå, Poona Oriental Ser. 10, Poona, 3 1965.
Ír¥jvålåprasåda Gau∂a, Ír¥-Våcaspati-Mißra-k®tå Tattvakaumud¥ ‘K®shˆå’ -Saµsk®taHind¥-vyåkhyådvayopetå, Varanasi: Caukhambå Vidyåbhavan, 1992.
Richard Garbe, Der Mondschein der Sâµkhya-Wahrheit: Vâcaspatimiçra’s Sâµkhyatattva-kaumud¥ in deutscher Übersetzung, nebst einer Einleitung über das Alter und444

die Herkunft der Sâµkhya-Philosopie, Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie
der Wissenschaft 19/3 (1892): 517–628.
Yenshô Kanakura (金倉圓照), 『真理の月光』 (A Japaneese Translation of the
Tattvakaumud¥), Tokyo: Kôdan-sha (講談社), 1984.
Tattvamuktåkalåpa.
[U] Srimad Vedanta Desika’s Tattva Mukta Kalapa and Sarvartha Siddhi with Sanskrit
Commentaries, UVG, 1973.
[M] Tattvamuktåkalåpa and Sarvårthasiddhi of Sri Vedåntåchårya with the Commentaries Ónandadåyin¥ and Bhåvaprakåßa, vol. I [ja∂adravya-sara] , ed. D.
Srinivasachar & S. Narasimhachar, Univ. of Mysore Oriental Research InstitutePub. Skt. Ser. 76, Mysore, 1933; Ibid., vol. II (j¥va-sara 1–24), ed. S. Narasimhachar,do. 81, 1940; Ibid., vol. III (j¥va-sara 25–30), ed. T. T. Srinivåsagopålåchårya, do.
94, 1954; Ibid., vol. IV (nåyaka-sara) [Bhåvaprakåßa omitted], ed. T. T. Srinivåsagopålåchårya, do. 97, 1956.
[VDG] Ed. VDG.
[V] Tattvamuktåkalåpa of Ír¥mad-Veµka†anåtha Mahådeßika with three commentaries, Sarvårthasiddhi by Ír¥mad-Veµka†anåtha, Ónandadåyan¥ by N®siµhadeva and
Aksharårtha by Devanåthatåtåcårya, 2 vols., ed. N. R. Ír¥k®shˆatåtåcarya, Varanasi:
Skt. Univ., 1990–96.
[P] Tattvamuktákalápa with Sarvárthasiddhi by Venka†anátha Deßika, ed. Ráma
Mißra Sástrí, rpt. of the Pandit, Kåß¥, 1900.
[A] Ír¥mad-Vedåntadeßika viracita˙ Tattvamuktåkalåpa˙, Sarvårthasiddhi-v®tti˙,Hind¥ anuvåda tathå prasåda samalaµk®ta, 2 vols. (nåyakasara and buddhisara), ed.
and Hindi trans. Íivaprasåd Dvived¥, Ayodhya: Tattvamuktåkalåpa Prakåßan,1983–84.
Tattvanirˆaya. References are to the critical edition in Stark 1990, the paragraph number(s)by the editor added after §.
Tattvasaµgraha(-pañjikå).
Tattvasangraha of Ócårya Shåntarakshita with the Commentary ‘Pañjika’ of Shri
Kamalash¥la, 2vols., ed. Dwarikadas Shastri, Bauddha Bharati Ser., Varanasi, 1981–82(Second ed.).
Tattvasaµgraha of Íåntarakshita with the Commentary of Kamalaß¥la, 2 vols., ed.
with an introd. in Skt. by Embar Krishnamacharya, Foreward by B. Bhattacharya,
GOS, 1926 (rpt. 1984).
Ganganath Jha, Tattvasaµgraha of Íåntarakshita with the Commentary of Kamalaß¥la,
2 vols., GOS, 1937.
Tattvavsåra.
Tattvasåra with Ratnasåriˆ¥, ed. Kårappaµkå∂u Venkatachariyar svåmi, MGOS,
1951.
Tattvasara by Srivatsya Varada Guru with New Sanskrit Commentary Vatsya
Varivasya of Sri Abhnava Uttamur Viraraghavacharya, UVG, 1977.
*Ed. R. Ramanujacharya, Journal of the Annamalai University 8 (1939): 1–20.
[Text with Eng. trans.].
Tattva†¥kå of Vedånta Deßika.
Ed. UVG. See ÍD.
Ed. VDG.
ed. H.H. Srirangasathagopa Mahadesika, Vaishˆava Siddhånta Granthamålå 2,
Madras: Vaishnava Siddhanta Pracahara Sabha, 1938.
Tantravårttika of Kumårila Bha††a. See MSË.
Upanishad.
V. P. Limaye and R. D. Vadekar, ed. Eighteen Principal Upanishads, vol. 1, Poona:
Vaidika Saµßodhana Maˆ∂ala, 1958.

445

G. A. Jacob, A Concordance to the Principal Upanishads and Bhagavadg¥tå, rpt.
Delhi: MLBD, 1963 etc. (1st ed. Bombay, 1891).
For some minor Upanishads, reference are to the NSP ed. [abbr. N] (Ed. Vasudev
Lakshman Panshikar, Áßådyash†ottaraßatopanishada˙, Varanasi: Chowkhamba
Vidyabhawan, 1991, rpt of NSP ed.) and the Adyar editions [abbr. A] (Ed. A.
Mahadeva Shastri, Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre, The Vaishˆava
Upanishad-s with the Commentary of Ír¥ Upanishad Brahmayogin, 1923, rpt. 1979;
The Íaiva Upanishad-s with the Commentary of Ír¥ Upanishad-Brahma-yogin, 1925,
rpt. 1988) also.
Daßopanishad-s with the Commentary of Ír¥ Upanishadbrahmayogin, pt. 1 [Áßåvåsya,Kena, Ka†ha, Praßna, Muˆ∂aka, Måˆ∂Ëkya, Taittir¥ya and Aitareya], ed. Pandists of
the Adyar Library under the suprvision of C. Kubhn Raja, Madras: Adyar Library
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Robert Ernest Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, Second ed., 1931, rpt.
Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press, 1983.
S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanishads, ed. with introd., text, trans. and notes,
1953, rpt. Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989.
Swami Madhavananda, trans. Minor Upanishads, Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 6 1988.
Upadeßaratnamålå
*Upadeßaratnamålå or Necklace of Precepts of Sri Ramyajåmåt†imahåmuni with its
Sanskrit Version by Ír¥ Abhiråmavaraˆya, ed. and trans. M. T. Narasimhiengar,
Madras: Dravida Vedanta Ratnakara, 1910.
Upadeßasåhasr¥:Íaµkara’s Upadeßåsåhasr¥, ed. with intro. and indicis by Sengaku Mayeda, Tokyo:
Sankibo Press, 1973.
S. Mayeda, trans. A Thousand Teachings: The Upadeßasåhasr¥ of Íaµkara. Tokyo:
Univ. of Tokyo Press, 1979 (rpt. State Univ. of New York Press, 1992)
VaißeshikasËtra. [Referencea are the sËtra number in Candrånanda’s comm. and that inÍaµkaramißra’s is added in parenthesis]
VaißeshikasËtra of Kaˆåda with the Commentary of Candrånanda, ed. Jambuvijayaji,
GOS 136, Baroda, 2 1982.
Archibald Edward Gough, The Vaißisheka Aphorism of Kanâda with Commentsfrom the Upaskåra of Sankara Mißra and the Vivritti of Jaya-NârâyaˆaTarkapañchânana, Benares, 1873 (rpt. New Delhi: Oriental Book Reprint Corporation,1975).
中村元 (Nakamura Hajime), ヴァイシェーシカ学派の原典 (A Japaneese Translation of
the VaißeßikasËtra and the Padårthadharmasaµgraha), 三康文化研究所年報 (Sankô
Bunka Kekyûjo Nenpô) 10/11 (1979): 1–316 [The trans. of VaiSË reprinted in: 『ニヤーヤとヴァイシェーシカの思想』 (The Nyåya and Vaißeshika Thought), 中村元選集［決定版］ (Selected Works of Hajime Nakamura, New ed.), vol. 25, Tokyo: Shunjûsha (春秋社), 1996].
金倉圓照 (Kanakura Yenshô), 『インドの自然哲学』 (Naturalistic Philosophy of India),
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Våkyapad¥ya.
Ed. Wilhelm Rau: Bhart®haris Våkyapad¥ya, Abhandlungen für Kunde Morgenlandes
42/4, Wiesbaden, 1977.
Ed. K. A. Subramanya Iyer: Våkyapad¥ya of Bhart®hari with the Commentaries V®tti
and Paddhati of V®shadeva, Kåˆ∂a I, Deccan College Monograph Ser. 32, Poona,
1966 (rpt. 1995); The Våkyapad¥ya of Bhart®hari Kåˆ∂a II with the Commentary ofPuˆyaråja and the Ancient V®tti, Delhi: MLBD, 1983; Våkyapad¥ya of Bhart®hariwith the Commentary of Helåråja, Kåˆ∂a III, Part 1, Deccan College Monograph
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446

Ed. K. V. Abhyankar and V. P. Lamaye: Våkyapad¥ya of Bhart®hari, Poona: Univ.
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Trans. Madeleine Biardeau: Bhart®hari Våkyapad¥ya Brahmakåˆ∂a avec la V®tti deHariv®shabha (texte reproduit de l’édition de Lahore) traduction, introduction etnotes, Publication de l’Institut de Civilisation indienne, Paris, 1964.
Varadaråjapañcåßat
Vedåntadeßika’s Varadråjapañcåshat with Sanskrit Commentary by KarËr
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Varadaraja Panchasat of Vedanta Desika, with meaning and commentary in English
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VåyupuråˆaMahåmunißr¥vyåsapraˆ¥taµ Våyupuråˆam, ÓnSS 49, 1983 (new ed.).
Vedåntåcåryavijaya
Sri Vedancharya Vijaya (Acharya Champu) by Kousika Kavitarkikasimha, ed. withintrod. and comm. by S. Ananthachari, bhËmikå by T. Viraraghavacharya, Delhi:
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Vedåntad¥pa.
Vedanta Deepa of Sri Bhagavad Ramanuja, UVG, rpt. 1992.
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Vedåntasåra.
Vedåntasåra of Bhagavad Råmånuja, ed. V. Krishnamachari with trans. M. B.
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Ír¥-Bhagavad-Råmånuja-viiravita-Vedåntasåra˙
Pañcanad¥yaPt.
Ír¥Sudarßanåcårya-Íåstri-likhiita-Adhikaraˆasåråval¥-sahita˙,
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A.
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Råmadulåreßåstr¥, Haridåsa-Saµsk®ta-Granthamålå, Varanasi: ChSS Office, 1954.
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Vedântasâra˙ of Bhagavad Râmânuja, ed. Schalars of Academy, Melkote: Academyof Sanskrit Research, 1993.
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Vedåntasårasaµgraha.
T. M. P. Mahadevan, intro. and trans. Vedånta-såra-saµgraha (Quintessence ofvedånta) Ír¥ Anantendra-Yati, Madras: Ganesh & Company, 1973 [with selcet verses
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M. R. Rajagopala Ayyangar, trans. Vedartha Sangraha of Sri Ramanuja, Kumbakonam:
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S. S. Raghavachar, ed. and trans. Vedårthasaµgraha of Ír¥ Råmånujåcåraya, Mysore:
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Padmanabhan, [Text with trans. in Eng. and Tamil].
Hattori Masaaki (服部正明), 最高神とその様態 [A Japanese trans. of VAS §§65–93],
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Shokei Matsumoto (松本照敬), 『ヴェーダールタサングラハ』の研究 [Råmånuja’s Vedårthasaµgraha: Japanese translantion and notes] (1)–(6). (1) 東洋研究 (Studies ofAsia and Africa) 102 (1992): 1–16; (2) Ibid. 107 (1993): 95–118; (3) Ibid. 110(1994a): (4) 1–24; Ibid. 107 (1994b): 1–27; (5) Ibid. 116 (1995): 1–23; (6) Ibid. 120(1996): 27–51 [Up to VAS §126].
Vijñånabhikshu ad BSË.
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Vijñaptimåtratåsiddhi:
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The Vishˆumahåpuråˆa [with comms. Vishˆucitt¥ya and Ótmaprakåßå ], ed.
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Vißvåmitrasaµhitå*Vißvåmitrasaµhitå, ed. Undemane Shankara Bhatta, Tirupati: Kendriya Sanskrit
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Praßastapådabhåshyam of Praßasta Devåcårya with Commentaries (up to dravya)SËkti by Jagad¥ßa Tarkålaµkåra, Setu by Padmanåbha Mißra and Vyomavat¥ by
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