Failure Knowledge Database / 100 Selected Cases

InterCity Express Accident
June 3, 1998 in Eschede, Niedersachsen, Germany
Masayuki Nakao (Institute of Engineering Innovation, School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo)
The Inter-City Express (ICE) high-speed train operated by DB Fernverkehr derailed, and so me of the railcars
were thrown into the bridge piers of a road way overpass. The accident killed 101 and injured 200 people. The
direct cause of th e accident was damage du e to metal fatigue i n a wheel r im of a two-par t wheel. (V isit
http://nedies.jrc.it/index.asp?ID=216 for the press photo.)

Figure 1.The InterCity Express Accident [4]1. EventThe I CE h igh-speed tr ain 884 w as on the r oute from Munich to H amburg, car rying 3 00 passengers. I t
derailed near Esched e in n orth-western Germany, and so me of the railcars wer e thrown i nto t he bridgepiers of a roadway overpass (Figure 2). The accident killed 101 and injured 200 people.

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Failure Knowledge Database / 100 Selected Cases

Figure 2. Accident Site [3]2. Course
9:00AM: The 14-car ICE train 884 was on the route from Munich to Hamburg, carrying 300 passengers.
After stopping in Han over, the train made an emergency stop near Eschede in north-western Germany ataround 9:00 am when the operator felt something was wrong with the train. After finding nothing particular,
the train continued its journey northwards.
10:58: When the train was traveling 6km before reaching the roadway overpass at the speed of 200km/h, awheel rim that was lining a wheel on an ax le of the first passenger car (second railcar including the headcar) broke, peeled away from the wheel, and punctured the floor of the car, where it remained embedded.
(The survived stated that they heard a rattling noise a few minutes after the wheel rim broke.)At 200m before the r oadway over pass as the train pa ssed o ver a tr ack swit ch, the embedded whe el r im2

Failure Knowledge Database / 100 Selected Cases
slammed against the guide rail of the switch, lifting the axle carriage off the rails.
As the train passed over another track switch 120m ahead of the previous one, one of th e derailed wheelsstruck the points lever, changing its setting. The rear axles of the car were switched onto parallel track, andthe entire car was thereby thrown into the bridge piers of roadway overpass, destroying them completely.
At 10:59, one of t he then derailed wheels struck the points lever of the second switch, changing its setting.
The first passenger car was switched onto parallel track, and it was disconnected from the head car.
The sec ond and the th ird p assenger cars derailed de viating t o th e right from t he track and continued
traveling.
The first an d th e second pa ssenger cars pass ed intact und er the br idge, but th e t hird pass enger car was
thrown into the br idge pi ers of a roadway over pass. The t earing of the wagon h itches ca used a utomatic
brakes to engage.
The engine (head car ) came to a halt at 2km down the tr ack without der ailing after the automatic br akes
were engaged. The operator realized that the passenger cars were disconnected from the engine.
The derailed first, the second and the third passenger cars came to a ha lt several hundred meters down thetrack from the roadway overpass. The fourth passenger car passed intact under the roadway overpass androlled onto the embankment immediately behind it. This impact caused the roadway overpass to collapse as
the second half of the fifth and the sixth passenger car were passing under the bridge.
The collapsed bridge flattened the rear part of car 5 and car 6 completely. The remaining cars all derailed
and slammed folded into the rubble in a zig-zag pattern, as the collapsed bridge had completely obstructed
the track. The vehicles parked on the collapsed bridge plunged into the pile.
3. Cause(1) A wheel rim that was lining a wheel on an axle of the first passenger car broke. (Direct cause)
In order to reduce costs and improve ride comfort, the ICE cars employed the wheel design that uses arubber damping ring between a metal wheel rim and the wheel body. The wheel rim failed due to metal
fatigue (Figure 1).
The ICE884 was o ne of the 60 firs t generation railcars of the older model, and it still had the wh eel
rims of the “wheel-tire” design at that time of the accident.

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Failure Knowledge Database / 100 Selected Cases

Figure 1. Wheel Design and Failure (Translated) [2](2) Oversight of the maintenance crew: The maintenance crew did not follow the regulation.
According to Der Spiegel (news magazine), the derailed cars underwent a periodic maintenance by acomputer on the pr evious night. The Muni ch Maintenance Ce nter ex amined the external diameter of
each wheel and sleeve thickness using an acoustic sensor. While the permissible error was 0.6mm, oneof the wheels of th e derailed car had 1.1mm of error. The maintenance crew did not replace of repair
the wheels, assuming that the given value would only affect on the ride comfort.
(3) Insufficient failure detection system
The ICE tr ain did not ha ve a sy stem ins talled to detect wh eel f ailure and br ing t he tr ain to anemergency stop. Japanese bullet trains are equipped with a system for alerting the train operator aboutwheel de formation an d f ailure dur ing the oper ation so that the o perator may manua lly acti vate t heemergency brake. They also have a temperature sensor so that frictional heat in wheels exceeding 140
degrees C will cause automatic brakes to engage.
4. Immediate Action
Die Bahn (German Federal Railways) commissioned the Fraunhofer Institute to determine the cause of theaccident. All 59 railcars with the same “wheel-tire” design underwent complete overhaul after the accident.
5. Countermeasure
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Failure Knowledge Database / 100 Selected Cases
By the en d of J une 199 8, t he 59 r ailcars of the f irst gen eration ICE ha d t heir wheels r eplaced with t hesingle-cast wheels equipped in the second generation ICE.
6. Summary
The ICE once had the advertising statement “Travel twice as fast as vehicles and half as fast as aircrafts”. It
had carried more than 120 million passengers since 1991. Approximately 27 million people used the ICE in
1997, wh ich was 30% of all lo ng d istance tr avelers. Unti l this a ccident, it was bel ieved t hat Deu tsche
Reichsbahn ( Germany Natio nal Railways) had taken sufficient safet y measures o n its ser vices. Af ter thedevelopment of a new wheel design, two-part wheels were installed in the ICE trains that were previously
equipped with single-cast wheels. This change in wheel design led to an accident.
7. Knowledge(1) A change in a product entails risks in safety.
Product development always requires some changes in design, production and the inspection method.
The developers tend to pay attention to the improvement and forget about the tradeoffs.
It is important to assess the possible tradeoffs in the development and required efforts to minimize thedamage. The d evelopers m ust ab andon a new design, if an i mprovement cannot compensate th e
shortcomings th at come w ith it. In par ticular, a careful consideration and r eview are r equired b efore
making a change in a proven product. The product’s positive evaluation given over the years is a proofof its good quality.
(2) It is easy to ignore regulations and inspection standards.
(3) Sensors are effective in picking up things that are unable to be detected by humans.
8. Background
The ICE opened as a new land-bas ed h igh-speed p ublic transportatio n for Ger many i n 1991. The firstgeneration ICE trains were equipped with single-cast “monoblock” wh eels ideal for safe cruising at highspeed. Once brought into service, however, metal fatigue and non-circular deformations on the monoblock
wheel design could uncomfortable resonance and vibration at cruising speed.
In order to resolve the problem and im prove the r ide comfort, eng ineers de cided to employ a two- partwheels de sign (V SC Bochum84) i deal for s afe cruising up to 284km/h. T he w heel rim of the two -partwheels, 9 1cm i n diam eter a nd 1 3cm in thickness, consisted of a wheel body s urrounded b y a rub ber
damper and then a metal wear rim. This wheel design was also effective in reducing the maintenance costs
as replacement of the wheel rim fixes problems such as metal fatigue and cracks.
The DB started the production of new wheels in 1992 and replaced the wheels of the ICE trains to two-partwheels. The new w heel design brought into ser vice was proved successful at resolving the iss ue ofvibration at cruising speeds. The number of I CE passengers increased constantly and it tripled in 5 years
since 1992.
5Failure Knowledge Database / 100 Selected Cases
A n ew air shock absorber became a vailable in 1997. The D B found it effective i n r esolving t he issu e ofvibration at cr uising sp eeds in th e I CE trains equi pped wi th monoblock wheels, and deci ded to i nstallmonoblock wheels to the ICE trains. Replacement of wheels started from the second generation ICE trains
in production. In 1998, 44 trains had new monoblock wheels.
9. On the Side
The “wheel-tire” design was originally developed for str eetcars traveling at s ignificantly lower speeds. Its
relatively simple structure ha d be en e mployed successfully in s treetcars, el iminating resonance an dvibration at cruising s peed. The “wheel-tire” design had ne ither b een te sted no r b een in se rvice a t highspeed. The accident may have simply exposed the characteristics of rubber; its relatively inferior wear andabrasion resistant properties.
References[1] Nikkei Mechanical Online, http://nmc.nikkeibp.co.jp/kiji/t536.html[2] ICE Train Accident in Eschede, http://www.ndt.net/news/2000/eschedec.htm[3] Da nger Ahead! Feature, http://danger-ahead.railfan.net/features/eschede.htm#top[4] Mas ayuki Nakao (2005) 1000 Scenarios of Failure, Morikita Shuppan Co., Ltd.

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