Discussion Paper No.19

Emergence and Features of
the Constitutional Review Bodies in Asia:
A Comparative Analysis ofTransitional Countries’ Development
Edited by Aziz Ismatov and Emi Makino
August, 2020

Nagoya University
Center for Asian Legal ExchangeCenter for Asian Legal Exchange (CALE)

Nagoya University, Japan

Emergence and Features of the Constitutional Review Bodies in Asia:
A Comparative Analysis of Transitional Countries’ Development

Edited by Aziz Ismatov and Emi Makino

FOREWORD

This research discussion paper provides a study on theory and practices of constitutional review
developments in five selected Asian jurisdictions, Myanmar, Singapore, Korea, including Russia andUzbekistan, which in some scholarly works are also addressed as Eurasia. The objective is to create
systematic narratives to document theoretical grounds and practical aspects of constitutional review, collectand present to a broader audience comparative, historical, analytical, and critical perspectives covering
constitutional judiciary in Asia. We hope that this collection will be of high interest for scholars,
practitioners, and students of comparative constitutional law, human rights, democracy, the rule of law,
constitutional adjudication, and Asia’s legal systems.
The general philosophy of constitutional review presupposes that constitutional courts are establishedto limit or balance executive and legislative branches’ activities. In such circumstances, scholars andpractitioners expect that constitutional courts would work as neutral arbitrators among the two branches.
Simultaneously, the vital role of the constitutional court which is a protection of fundamental rights issometimes neglected within the broader context of political involvement.
Contributors to this discussion paper were all invited to attend the workshop on Emergence andFeatures of the Constitutional Review Bodies in Asia held at the Department of Law, University of Yangon,
on October 22, 2019, and present their draft papers for this workshop. This research project was madeunder the auspices of Core-to-Core Program: Asia-Africa Science Platforms ‘Advancing Research in Asian
Constitutionalism - Establishing a Transnational Research Network to Promote Human Rights and Legal
System’ and, Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research ‘Commencement of the ASEAN Community and theEmergence of Heterologous Constitutional Profiles in the Region.’ Both projects are funded by the Japan
Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS). The manuscripts submitted by the participants to theworkshop were later revised and prepared for this unique publication.
The primary aim of the present research series is to analyze the theoretical background and practicalexperience of the constitutional review bodies in the context of comparative aspects with foreign
constitutional review bodies. Also, it will seek to understand the concept and ideas on constitutionalism inAsia and constitutional review bodies’ place in it. This workshop involved researchers from Japan, Korea,
Singapore, Myanmar, and other jurisdictions. The participants had an opportunity to share their views withcolleagues and learn from each other in terms of historical features, duties and functions, and selected casesof constitutional review bodies in different countries. This workshop also strengthened the relations
between involved scholars and contributed to the creation of the international research network on
Constitutionalism in Asia.
Aziz Ismatov
Emi Makinoiii

CONTENTS
FOREWORD ꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏ i
CONTENTS ꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏ iii
List of Authors ꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏ v
1. Future Perspective of the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of the Union of
Myanmar ꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏ 1
Justice. Hla Myo Nwe
2. The Functions and Duties of the Constitutional Tribunal of Myanmar ꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏ 17
Khin Phone Myint Kyu
3. A Case Analysis of the Constitutional Tribunal of Myanmarꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏ 27
Khin Khin Oo
4. A Constitutional Review Model: The Case of Korea ꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏ 37
Hyowon Lee
5. Constitutional Review in a Strong State: The Case of Singapore ꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏ 51
Jaclyn L Neo and Marcus Teo
6. The Constitutional Review Models from Transitional Countries: A case of Russia ꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏ 65
Fumito Sato
7. Specifics of the Late Soviet Constitutional Supervision Debate: Lessons for Central Asian
Constitutional Review? ꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏ 77
Aziz Ismatov
Workshop Program ꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏꞏ 95

iii

iv

List of Authors
Justice. Hla Myo Nwe holds the position of Member of the Constitutional Tribunal of the
Republic of the Union of Myanmar since 2013. She completed LL.B and LL.M degrees from Art
and Science University, Yangon, Myanmar in 1976 and 1982 respectively. After graduating, shebecame a Tutor at her alma mater for two years and later joined the International Law and Treaties
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1980 to 2013, where she became Deputy Director
General. During her diplomatic career, she served at Myanmar Embassies in Malaysia, thePhilippines, Thailand, Singapore, Egypt and the United Kingdom. She was also assigned as the CoAgent of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar over the Maritime Boundary Delimitation Case with
Bangladesh at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).
She has given numerous presentations at both international and local conferences, meetings
and workshops relating to law. Her significant publication is the book, The First Case in the History
of Myanmar by Settling the Dispute on the Maritime Boundary Delimitation. She also wrote many
articles in local newspapers and law journals. Last year, she participated in the Second International
Symposium of the Asian Association of the Constitutional Court and Equivalent Institutions (AACC)
and she wrote the research paper on Constitutional Review in Myanmar.
She has also strongly advocated for the rights and protection of Myanmar nationals
working overseas. During a career, spanning 45 years, she has developed a reputation for a tirelesswork ethic, dedication and commitment.

Khin Phone Myint Kyu holds the position of Professor at the Department of Law, University of
Yangon. She has an LL. B. degree from the University of Yangon (Myanmar) in 1984. After that, shecompleted LL. M. and Ph. D. degree in Civil Law specialization from the same University.
In 2007-2008, she participated as a commissioner of the Drafting Commission of theConstitution of the Union of Myanmar. In this current position, Dr. Khin Phone Myint Kyu is
engaged as a member of the ASEAN Law Association (Myanmar) and Curriculum and Syllabus
Committee of Civic and Moral Subject for Basic Education. Her research interest is in the field of
Family Law, Civil Law, and Public Law. She has published her research papers in the field of Family
Law, Comparative Legal Education, Civil Law Legal Education, and Public Law.

Khin Khin Oo, Professor at the Department of Law, University of Yangon (Myanmar), received
her LLB (1993), LLM (1997), and PhD in Law (2005) degrees from University of Yangon. Herteaching career has begun as tutor at Law Department of Dagon University in 1995; and afterwards
she has been teaching and researching at a number of Myanmar universities’ law departments. Herarea of specialization is civil law – particularly criminal law, family law, constitutional law andadministrative law, corporate law and child rights. In 2004, she did part of her research for PhD
degree at International Institute for the Rights of the Child (IDE) in Sion, Switzerland. She was av

visiting research fellow at CALS, National University of Singapore (2014), at Seoul National
University (2014), at Central European University (2016), and at Max Planck Institute forComparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg, Germany (2017). Her current researchinterest is constitutional adjudication systems and judicial review of administrative acts of somedifferent countries and different legal systems. She has been involving as drafting member ofMyanmar Technical and Vocational Education and Training Law since 2016, and drafting memberof National Water Policy and National Water Resource Committee Law. She is one of the membersof Research Group on Constitutionalism in Asia since 2016. She has been acting as core member ofInternational Cooperation Office of University of Yangon since 2018 December. In 2019 June, she
was appointed as one of the members of Union Legal Aid Board of the Republic of the Union of
Myanmar.

Hyowon Lee is a Professor at the School of Law at Seoul National University. His research interests
cover constitutional law and Korean unification law. He holds LL. B., LL. M. and Ph.D. inconstitutional law from Seoul National University. He worked as a public prosecutor at Public
Prosecutor’s Offices and the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Korea for 13 years (1994-2007).
He has valuable experience in writing the inter-Korean agreements.
Professor Lee worked as Visiting Scholar at Freie Universitaet Berlin (1999) and theFederal Constitutional Court of Germany (2006). He moved to Seoul National University and worked
as an Associate Dean for Student Affairs, at School of Law between 2012-2014, as an Executive
Director, SNU Foundation between 2015-2019, and as a Dean of Planning and Coordination in 2018.
He also worked as a Counterterrorism Human Rights Protector at National Counterterrorism
Committee, Office of the Prime Minister (2016∼2018). He was a member of the Constitutional
Amendment Advisory Committee, National Assembly (2014), and a member of North-South
Relation’s Development Advisory Committee, National Assembly (2015). He recently worked as a
Visiting Research Fellow at the Center of Asia Legal Exchange (CALE), Nagoya University (2019).
He published many articles and books on Constitutional law and North Korean laws. His
recent publications include; Understanding on Korean Unification Law (2018), and Peace and law(2018), Understanding on Constitutional Law of Korean Unification (2016), 70 Years of Korean
Politics (co-author), Academy of Korean Studies Press (2015), Law and Policy on Korean
Unification: Analysis and Implications (co-author), Korea Institute for National Unification (2014).
Currently, he serves as Director at Center for Constitutional Law and Korean Unification Law, Seoul
National University.

Jaclyn L Neo is an Associate Professor of Law at the National University of Singapore (NUS). She
specializes in constitutional law, as well as law and migration, and has degrees from NUS Faculty of
Law and Yale Law School. Her work aims to forefront Asian jurisdictions and mainstream them incomparative constitutional law.
vi

Jaclyn has published in leading journals in her field, including the International Journal ofConstitutional Law (I-CON), Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, Human Rights Quarterly, and theSingapore Journal of Legal Studies. She is the sole editor of Constitutional Interpretation in
Singapore: Theory and Practice (Routledge, 2017) and co-editor of Pluralist Constitutions inSoutheast Asia (Hart, 2019), and Regulating Religion in Asia: Norms, Modes, and Challenges (CUP
2019). Her work has been cited by the courts in Singapore and by the Supreme Court of India.
Jaclyn is the Director of NUS’ Centre for Asian Legal Studies, and currently serves on the
Singapore Law Society’s Public and International Law Committee and the Singapore Academy ofLaw’s Law Reform Committee. She is an elected Council Member of International Society for Public
Law (ICON-S) and the co-founder of the Singapore Chapter of ICON-S. Jaclyn has held visiting
positions at Frankfurt University, University of Münster, University of Trento, Melbourne Law
School, the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University andthe Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity. She is also a consultant
with WongPartnership, a leading law firm in Singapore.

Marcus Teo is a Teaching Assistant at the National University of Singapore. He specialises inconstitutional law and private international law.
Marcus is a graduate of NUS, and was previously a researcher at NUS’ Centre forInternational Law. He has published in leading journals in his field, including Public Law, the Journalof Private International Law and the Singapore Journal of Legal Studies. He has also presented papers
at various academic conferences, including those organised by the Asian Society of International
Law and the Journal of Private International Law.
Marcus is also an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore, and continues
to be a consultant in the field of public law in Singapore.

Fumito Sato is a Professor of the Graduate School of Law at Nagoya University. He specializes in
Russian law, especially in the field of constitutional law. He completed LL.M and was previously alecturer of the School of Law at Waseda University. He also studied as Visiting Fellow at Moscow
State University.
Sato has published articles on such topics as the development of the representative systemin the System Transformation period, constitutional adjudication in Russia, and the impact ofEuropean human rights protection on the Russian legal order. His research also focuses on theconstitutional development in Central Europe, including the history of the constitutional court systemin the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.

Aziz Ismatov holds the position of Assistant Professor at the Center for Asian Legal Exchange(CALE) Nagoya University. He completed LL.M and LL.D in International Human Rights Law at
the Graduate School of Law at Nagoya University (Japan), and prior to that, he graduated with anvii

LL.B in International Law from the University of World Economy and Diplomacy (Uzbekistan). Dr.
Ismatov also worked as a visiting scholar at Melbourne Law School (Australia, 2019) and as avisiting intern at Institute for East European Law (Germany, 2013). He is a member of Australasian
Association for Communist and Post-Communist Studies (AACaPS), and Asian Law and Society
Association (ALSA). He is also the Editorial Board Member of the Asian Law Bulletin (ALB), andUzbek Journal of Legal Studies (UJOLS).
In his current position, Dr. Ismatov is engaged in legal cooperation, research and educationin Asia. Dr. Ismatov’s research centers specifically on countries in transition from socialism to amarket economy. In his publications (for ex.) “Equal Citizenship, Language, and Ethnicity Dilemmas
in the Context of the Post-socialist Legal Reforms in Central Asia.” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), he
focuses on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law dilemmas in the post-socialist command
type states. In another recent work, “Constitutional Judiciary’s Role in Democratization
Process in the Post-Soviet Central Asia. The Constitutional Court in Uzbekistan.” Asian

Law Bulletin, 2020, he ties the emergence of constitutional review institutions in ‘newdemocracies’ with a wider international political goals, and discusses how suchsituation eventually affects constitutionalism.

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1. Future Perspective of the Constitutional Tribunalof the Republic of the Union of Myanmar
Justice. Hla Myo Nwe*

Abstract
There are different models of constitutional review systems all over the world. Likewise, the scopeof jurisdiction of constitutional review bodies such as Constitutional Courts, Constitutional Tribunals,
Constitutional Council, or Constitutional Chamber may be drawn wider or narrower. Myanmar had
exercised decentralized constitutional review system under the 1947 Constitution. At present,
Myanmar exercises the centralized constitutional review under the 2008 Constitution by conferring
this power to the Constitutional Tribunal. The main objective of the Constitutional Tribunal is tointerpret the provisions of the Constitution, to scrutinize whether or not laws enacted by thelegislature and functions of executive authorities conform with the Constitution, to decide on
constitutional disputes according to section 46 of the 2008 Constitution. The purpose of this paper is
to analyze the structure and subjects of constitutional review exercised by the Tribunal, to express
the Tribunal’s standards of review when considering the constitutional matters, the policy of
Tribunal and the effect of review of the Tribunal. It also includes the future perspective of the
Tribunal concerning the Union Peace Accord of Myanmar and the role of Tribunal in the federal
system.

*Member of the Constitutional Tribunal, Republic of the Union of Myanmar.

1

I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
TRIBUNAL
The British Empire colonized Myanmar (by then Burma) between 1886 - 1947, and, therefore,

Myanmar’s legal system is rooted in the British common law tradition. On 4 January 1948, Burmaproclaimed the first 1947 Constitution of Union. Under this Constitution, Myanmar had been
exercising a decentralized constitutional review according to Sections 25, 151, and 153. Previously,
the power of constitutional review was vested in the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution, todecide the constitutional disputes, and to examine the constitutionality of laws.
On 3 January 1974, the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Myanmar(hereafter, the 1974 Constitution) was adopted. Under Articles 200 and 201 of the 1974 Constitution,
the Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives), which was a unicameral legislative body, exercised
constitutional review. Such a review represented a classic socialist notion that rejected the separationof powers and placed a legislature on the top of the state hierarchy. Therefore, similarly to manysocialist states, the legislature did not produce quality constitutional review decisions but merely
exercised a sporadic interpretation of statues.
The current Constitution (hereafter, the 2008 Constitution) was adopted on 29 May 2008. The
Union Constitutional Tribunal (hereafter, the Tribunal) was established on 30 March 2011 as aseparate and independent institution for the first time in the history of Myanmar. The Tribunal wasformed as a part of legal reforms in the transition from the military rule to the democratic system.
Thus, the operation of the Tribunal, the authority and organizational structure have been regulated by
the Constitution. The Law of the Constitutional Tribunal was enacted on 28 October 2010 during theera of the State Peace and Development Council. Several amendments were made on 21 January
2013 and 5 November 2014 by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw1 (Union Parliament) by Law No. 4/ 2013
and Law No.46/ 2014. Myanmar’s legal system is a common law system, but in some cases,
particularly the formation of the Tribunal, show that it is mixed with some concepts of civil law
system.
II. STRUCTURE OF REVIEWAt present, Myanmar has been exercising the centralized constitutional review model under
sections 46 of the 2008 Constitution since it was established in 2011. Section 46 of the 2008
Constitution provides;

1

The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Parliament) comprises two Hluttaws namely Pyithu Hluttaw ((House of Representatives) andAmyotha Hluttaw (House of Nationalities), see Section 74 of the 2008 Constitution.

2

A Constitutional Tribunal is authorized to interpret the Constitution, to scrutinize whether or not laws
enacted by the legislature, check the constitutionality of functions of executive authorities, to decide on
the Constitution disputes, and to perform other duties prescribed in the Constitution.

The Tribunal has the final decision in matters of constitutionality. It is stated in Section 324 of
the 2008 Constitution that “the resolution of the Constitutional Tribunal of the Union shall be final
and conclusive.”
In the case of The President of the Union Vs Dr. Aye Maung and 23 Representatives of the
Amyotha Hluttaw (House of Nationalities)2, the Tribunal held that the Attorney-General should not
submit the reference case for reviewing the previous judgment since the resolution of the Tribunal
is final and conclusive.
The Tribunal performs abstract review ex-post under Section 322 (b) of the 2008
Constitution by vetting the constitutionality of laws. A request for a concrete review can be made byan ordinary court dealing with the case at hand ex officio. Section 323 of the 2008 Constitution
describes as follows;
In hearing a case by a Court, if there arises a dispute whether the provisions contained in any law
contradict or conform to the Constitution, and if no resolution has been made by the Constitutional
Tribunal of the Union on the said dispute, the said Court shall stay the trial and submit its opinion to
the Constitutional Tribunal in accord with the prescribed procedures and shall obtain a resolution. In
respect of the said dispute, the resolution of the Constitutional Tribunal of the Union shall be applied to
all cases.

III. THE SUBJECTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEWDue to different legal cultures, political and historical circumstances, the constitutional review
may take various forms. A Constitution may permit the legal dispersal of legislative power in theform of constitutional review. Constitutional review is the guardian of the Constitution andsafeguards the fundamental rights of citizens.
Constitutional review is a necessary element or ingredient of the Constitution. It prohibits all
sectors and state institutions from restraint arbitrariness, oppressiveness, and abuse of power. It
keeps the democracy flourishing and democratic principles by reviewing all state organs and all
government officials to be conducted within limited power. The main objective is to maintain thesupremacy of the Constitution, to safeguard the fundamental rights of the citizens, and to strike
down any law inconsistent with the Constitution. It is crucial to assess whether the constitutional
review between three sectors (executive, legislative, and judicial) is acceptable and practicable.
The Constitutional Tribunal of the Union of Myanmar assesses inter alia the elements ofconstitutional review as:2

Submission No.2/2012, Decisions of the Tribunal, 2012.

3

(1) there must be an actual case or cause of action or controversy that requires the exerciseof judicial power;(2) the subject act or issue is questionable or has valid reasons.
There is no single proportionality test adhering to the Tribunal, and the application of this test
relies on a case by case basis. The policy of the Tribunal is to strictly adhere to the concept ofpeace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and fair decision.
1.

Parliamentary laws and Statutes
Parliamentary laws and statutes are usually subjects of constitutional review. Section 322 (b)of the 2008 Constitution granted the Tribunal the power to exercise ex-post review.
In the case of Dr. Aye Maung and 22 representatives vs. The Republic of the Union of
Myanmar3, the Tribunal delivered an unconstitutional ruling, striking down the provision of the
Law Relating to Emoluments, Allowances and Insignia of the Region or State Level Persons, as
the Tribunal stressed that Section 262(a) (iv) and 262 (e) of the 2008 Constitution defined theMinister of the National Races Affairs as the Minister of the Region or State concerned. The
Tribunal ruled that these provisions clearly provide the Minister of the National Races Affairs andthe other Ministers of the Region or State an equal in status without any discrimination. After thedecision, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Parliament) amended this law on 8 March 2013.
In the case of No.1/ 2015, Dr. Aye Maung and 23 Representatives from Amyotha Hluttaw, theTribunal also ruled that provision of Section 11 (a) of the Law on Referendum for the Approval of
the Bill Amending the 2008 Constitution which permits holders of the Temporary Identity Cards
the right to vote, is unconstitutional with the 2008 Constitution.
Many countries have designed and developed a constitutional review to their own needs anddomestic situation. The type and scope of review power may differ from one to another. Thispower ensures the rule of law and confirms whether the actions of the executive branch conform toconstitutional guarantees. Some Constitutions grant an extensive range of review power. However,
the Tribunal’s power of review is limited. It is provided in Section 11 of the 2008 Constitution thatthe three branches are separated, to the extent possible, and they maintain a reciprocal control andensure check and balance between each other.
2.

Constitutional Amendments
The amendment of the Constitution is an alteration of specific provisions of the Constitution.

Amendments are made to improve quality, add new provisions, or to invalidate existing.

3

Submission No.2/2011, Decisions of the Tribunal, 2011.

4

In Niger, Senegal, and South Africa, constitutional courts have the power to review theconstitutionality of constitutional amendments, but some constitutional courts do not have such
power. In some countries such as India and Bangladesh, courts exercise decentralized
constitutional review, whereas the supreme courts have the power to review the constitutionality
on constitutional amendments. In Kyrgyzstan, constitutional amendments are subject toconstitutional review.
In Myanmar’s practice, amendment of the Constitution shall be proposed, processed, anddecided by the Constituent Assemblies. The Tribunal has no implicit or explicit power to review
the constitutionality of constitutional amendments.
The Constitutional amendments discussion has been under the process in Myanmar since
February 2019.

One of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw members from the National League for

Democracy (NLD), the current ruling party, urgently proposed to form a Joint Committee foramending the 2008 Constitution. After intense debate in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the Joint
Committee on Amending the 2008 Constitution was established with 45 members to make adetailed analysis of the proposed amendments of the 2008 Constitution.
Daw Nan Ni Ni Aye, a representative of Amyotha Hluttaw and 24 other representatives,
submitted the case No. 1/2019 to the Tribunal. They requested to present a bill for the amendment
of one particular Section of the Constitution. They claimed that since the bill is submitted inaccordance with the Chapter 12 of the 2008 Constitution, it should be accepted and openly
discussed at the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw in alignment with the provision of Section 435 of the 2008
Constitution, which stipulates the process of submitting to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw the bill toamend the Constitution.
The Tribunal considered the following facts;(i) whether or not there is a sufficient legal ground to claim for an interpretation ofSection 435 of the 2008 Constitution;(ii) there must be an actual case or cause of action obtaining for the exercise of judicial
power;(iii) whether the subject act is questionable or whether it has the valid reason to submit
for constitutional interpretation;(iv) whether or not the facts argued in the case are subjects that fall within the jurisdictionof the Tribunal;(v) whether or not Section 435 of the 2008 Constitution requires interpretation;
The Tribunal found that Section 435 of the 2008 Constitution is a procedural provision, andthe wording of that section is clear and complete, requiring no interpretation. It does not include
any complicated and indecisive fact, either grammatically or in terms of terminology. After the
Tribunal’s review of legal issues and different methods relating to the interpretation, the Tribunal

5

decided that it had to give full effect to the plain language of this particular section, and the
Tribunal had no authority to look into the consequences of interpretation. The Tribunal held that itwas not permissible to interpret a specific provision that did not need an interpretation.
Submission No.2/2019 was initiated by Dr. Sai Sei Kyauk Sam, the representative of Amyotha
Hluttaw from Shan State constituency and 24 other representatives, in order to obtain an opinion
from the Tribunal concerning an urgent proposal to form a joint Committee on Amending
Constitution composed of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw members representing all political parties,
proposed by its representative U Aung Kyi Nyunt from Magway Region constituency. They
questioned the constitutionality of the formation of the Joint Committee under Chapter 12 of the2008 Constitution.
The NLD members claimed the preliminary objection to the Tribunal stating that thesubmission of Submission No.2/2019 does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal since theformation of the Committee is decided by the Parliament’s resolution. The Tribunal had to hearand determine the central legal issue whether the matter claimed in the submission fell within thejurisdiction of the Tribunal.
The applicants requested the Tribunal to decide whether or not the action of the legislative
authority was in conformity with the 2008 Constitution. Under the 2008 Constitution, the Tribunal
is authorized to check the constitutionality of the laws enacted by the legislature and the actions ormeasures of executive authorities. The power to conduct the constitutional review over the action
or measure of the legislature is not vested upon the Tribunal. Thus, the Tribunal decided that theactions and resolutions of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw are not within the competence of the Tribunal.
3.

Parliamentary Resolutions
Parliamentary resolutions are also not subject to constitutional review in Myanmar as it isassumed that the constitutional review is a form of normative control, and a wide range ofparliamentary resolutions are not to be covered within this framework.
A case named Submission No. 5/2014, submitted by U Aung Kyi Nyunt, and the other 26
representatives of Amyotha Hluttaw was cited here regarding the question of the constitutionalityof proportional representation system for the election of Amyotha Hluttaw. The Tribunal pointed
out that, firstly, the law proposed to adopt the proportional representation system in the Amyotha
Hluttaw has not yet been enacted. Secondly, the decision remains to be settled at the Pyithu
Hluttaw (House of Representatives) and Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. The parliamentary process has not
yet been completed, and it requires to be finalized by the majority votes of both houses. The
Tribunal has the power to review the constitutionality of enacted laws, but not bills, resolutions,and activities of the Parliament. For all these reasons, the Tribunal determined that the case had notcovered the scope needed for the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

6

In 2016, the Submission No.1/2016 presented by U Sai Than Naing, representative of the
Amyotha Hluttaw and 22 other representatives, questioned one of the qualification clauses ofmembers of the Tribunal, which make as eligible a person who is, in the opinion of the President,
an eminent jurist. They also requested to interpret whether this provision is applicable only to threemembers chosen by the President under Section 321 of the 2008 Constitution.
The main issues of the case were;(i) whether or not the involving the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw as a respondent in this case iscontrary to the law;(ii) whether or not the interpretation of the resolution which is decided and approved by
the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw is contrary to the law, and whether or not the Tribunal has thejurisdiction over parliamentary resolution;(iii) whether or not the new additional formation and expansion of the Tribunal’s Law
concerning Section 333(d) (4) of the 2008 Constitution is contrary to the 2008
Constitution.
The Tribunal decided that it had the power to check the constitutionality of the laws enacted
by the legislature and the actions or measures of executive authorities. The authority to conduct theconstitutional review over the actions or measures of the legislature is not vested to the Tribunal
indeed. The Tribunal further decided that the actions and decisions of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw arenot within the competence of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further ruled that Section 4 (b) of the Constitutional Tribunal Law, which only
allows the President to nominate ‘eminent jurist’ as members, is contrary to the 2008 Constitution,and the submission was dismissed.
4.

International Treaties and International Laws
As constitutions and laws are based on the history and culture of one country, each country

has its unique systems and standards. But it does not mean that drawing out a universal
constitutional value and principle is entirely impossible. One of the important duties of theconstitutional courts and equivalent institutions includes harmonizing between the universal
constitutional values and local values of one’s country, during the recourse of adjudication.
International treaties are subjects of constitutional review in most countries such as Korea,
Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. However, in
Myanmar, international treaties are not subjected to the constitutional review. To ratify
international treaties, firstly, the ministry concerned makes a complete assessment over the treaty,translates into Myanmar language, and submits it to the Union Attorney-General’s Office toacquire legal opinions. Secondly, it is submitted to the Cabinet for approval. Thirdly, the ministryconcerned seeks the final confirmation from the legislature.

7

Constitutions must adhere to the most fundamental norms of international law. Commonly,
the executive branch is often assumed as the primary authority to ratify or withdraw frominternational agreements. However, some constitutions require legislative approval of treaties oreven judicial involvement before the ratification of such treaties. Furthermore, some constitutions
set limitations that may include mandatory or optional referendums.
Certain constitutions stipulate a provision that international obligations and treaties become
part of the domestic law and that provisions of international treaties should be applied
appropriately. Upon ratification of most international or regional treaties, countries implement
explicitly-stated international or regional requirements through national mechanisms andinstitutions. In Myanmar, the recognition of the international treaty as part of the national legal
system is connected with the ratification procedure. External factors, such as the role ofinternational law and treaties, have a little influence or play a limited role in Myanmar.
In our view, international law is not the only determining factor (the factor to be consideredby the Tribunal when reviewing the constitutionality of law) in constitutional review; rather, likesome constitutional courts, it is referred to as a norm to be respected in the course of judgment if it
deems necessary. International law and norms are respected when the Tribunal exercises its powerof constitutional review. We believe that it is about a search for just and good principles or sharednorms.
When the Tribunal takes into account human rights values, own local values, internationaland foreign precedents have minimal effect in determining constitutional issues. Domestic lawsneed to harmonize with ratified international agreements, and the duties prescribed underinternational agreements are to be consistent with the one countries’ constitutions.
5.

Other Acts of Executive Authorities
The constitutional adjudication system is generally expected to guarantee the citizens’

fundamental rights from the abuse of power, violation of due process, and delay in action. The
constitution should prevent any action, inaction, or misuse of power by executive authorities, whichharms individual rights. Under Section 322 (c) of the 2008 Constitution, the Tribunal has the power
to veto the actions of executive authorities of the Union, Regions, States, and Self-Administered
Areas.4
In the case of Chief Justice of the Union vs. Ministry of Home Affairs5, the Tribunal ruled thatthe 2008 Constitution stipulated a separate and independent existence between the legislative,

4
The Union is constituted by seven Regions, seven States and the Union territories. The capital of the Union, Nay Pyi Taw is theUnion territory under the direct administration of the President. The Self-Administered Divisions and Zones are delineated in
respective Regions and States. See Sections 49 to 56 of the 2008 Constitution.
5

Submission No.1/2011, Decisions of the Tribunal, 2011.

8executive, and judicial powers. The judicial power empowered to the courts and judges is clearlystated in the 2008 Constitution. Therefore, the exercise of judicial power is permitted only to thejudges who are entrusted by the 2008 Constitution. The Tribunal delivered that the conferring
judicial power to administrative officers of the General Administration Department of the Ministryof Home Affairs is incompatible with the 2008 Constitution.
The constitutional courts and equivalent bodies also have jurisdiction over the competence
disputes among state agencies, between state and local governments, and among local governments.
In Submission No.3/2012, The Speaker of the Mon State Hluttaw vs. The Republic of the Union of
Myanmar, the Tribunal ruled that the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw has the right to enact laws related to thematters prescribed in Schedule One (Union Legislative List) referring to Section 96 of the 2008
Constitution. Similarly, the Region or State Legislature has the right to enact laws related to thematters provided in Schedule Two (Region or State Legislative List) referring to Section 188 of the2008 Constitution. Accordingly, the Tribunal decided that the exercise of legislative power to enact
the Development Committees Law by the Mon State Legislature as a whole or any part of the Mon
State is permitted by the 2008 Constitution.
6.

Emergency Decree
Emergency decrees are not subject to constitutional review in Myanmar. In emergencies, thePresident may exercise the executive power of a Region, State or Self-Administered Area
concerned, and entrust the executive power to an appropriate body or a suitable person. Although
the President has the right to exercise the legislative power exclusively for executive matters, hemay not entrust the legislative power to the above-stated body or person.
7.

Impeachment Proceeding
The authority to hear impeachment proceeding of the Head of State or Head of Government is

the typical function of the constitutional review and is found in many constitutional courts of theworld. In some countries, the power of impeachment is vested to the constitutional courts orequivalent bodies. The Tribunal of Myanmar has no jurisdiction power on any kind of impeachment
process. The impeachment process can be initiated only by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union
Parliament) in Myanmar.
8.

Electoral Process and Dissolution of Political Parties
Individual constitutions allow the power of review over the results of general elections and thedissolution of political parties. Some constitutions enable the electorate to recall its representatives in
the legislative sector before the end of their term. Some also confer the power to decide on election

9disputes to constitutional review bodies. Constitutions of Indonesia, Mongolia, Turkey, andKazakhstan offer examples of such category of constitutional review.
In Myanmar, the Tribunal is not involved in the electoral cases and dissolution of politicalparties. The Tribunal exercises the power of constitutional review according to Section 322 of the2008 Constitution because the Union Election Commission has such power.
In Submission No.1/2014, the Tribunal decided that the submission fell outside the scope of
its competence, and agreed that the Tribunal was not in the position to intervene into questioning
the constitutionality of the appointment of Lisu and Rawan National Races Minister in Kachin
State, and the appointment of Lisu National Races Minister in Shan state.
The Tribunal’s judgment is mainly based on the following points;(i) The process of the election is reviewed as (a) the respected State or Division as awhole is fixed as a single constituency for the national races who are entitled to elect theirrepresentative ministers to Region or State Parliament. (b)national races candidates whowant to contest in the election are required to present their names to Region/ StateElection Sub-Commission. (c)the objection to the candidate is permitted to be lodged.
(ii) Due to this electoral procedures, the applicants in the present case shall have taken
up their objection to Election Sub-commission during the process of election. The two
options are offered to the applicant; first, to settle this matter with Election Commission
when the constituencies for Lisu and Rawan races are fixed; second, to do the same when
the list of the candidate is presented.
(iii) Instead of resolving this matter in question with the then authorities concerned, thepresent case is only put up to the Tribunal over two years, after changing the previous
Election Commission.
(iv) The Tribunal observes that Union Election Commission Law, adopted in 2010,provides that the decisions and activities of the Commission are final and conclusive inthe matters such as (a) electoral functions (b) the appeal and revision against decisions of
the respective of Election Tribunal (c) activities in accordance with the Political Parties
Registration Law.
(v) It is evident that the arrangement of constituencies, acceptance of candidates, aconvening of the election, recognition of members of the various Hluttaw are to be
conducted by multiple levels of Election Commission. Those who are not satisfied withthe activities of the Commission are allowed to lodge objections within the limited time.
(vi) The Commission, on its own volition, has the right to request the relevant
documents or case file relating activities of the various Election Sub-commission andrender a decision that shall be final and conclusive.

10

(vii) With respect to the current submission, it seems that the Tribunal is requested tocheck the activities of the previous Election Commission. It is also found that the matterpresented to the Tribunal occurred before the enforcement of the Constitution and theenforcement of the Tribunal Law.
(viii) As the decision of the Union Election Commission is final and conclusive,provided under the Constitution, the Tribunal is not in the position to intervene.
9.

Constitutional Complaint
The judicial remedy of a constitutional complaint is a highly effective means of protection of

fundamental rights and freedoms. Some aim to safeguard the constitutional rights by a single court
empowered to restore the individual rights affected by an act of executive authority.
There may be individual complaints against laws, regulations, international treaties,
administrative acts as well as complaints against judicial decisions which harm fundamental rights
provided by their constitution. Omissions of administrative bodies and their acts also lead to theindividual complaint. Individual complaint is an effective remedy to protect individual rights. If theconstitutional complaint cannot be submitted to the court, the effective protection mechanism ofindividual rights cannot be established. Any individual rights shall be well protected from possible
infringement by executive authorities.
The individual’s right to complain about the alleged infringement of rights serves to prevent not
only the unconstitutional action of the executive sector but to maintain one’s domestic values andfreedoms guaranteed by the constitution. In Myanmar, according to Section 377 of the Constitution,
every citizen of Myanmar shall have the right to apply writs for the protection of their fundamental
rights to the Union Supreme Court and the Tribunal.
IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEWThe Tribunal’s statutory foundations include the 2008 Constitution. While considering a case,
the Constitutional Tribunal considers legal and factual grounds of each case. In doing so, theTribunal assesses the conformity of law amid facts to the fundamental constitutional values such as(a) whether or not the law or act are in conformity with basic norms and domestic constitutional
values; (b) whether or not the law or act has consequences or negative impact; (c) whether or not thelaw or act requires.

11

V.

EFFECT OF REVIEW

1.

Delivering the Decision
The Tribunal carries out speedy disposal after hearing for the interpretation, opinion, ordecision so far as possible and expected to announce the day of the hearing. The Tribunal rendersinterpretation and opinion with the consent of more than half of the members and passes decisions
with the permission of more than half of the members, including the Chairperson.6
The Tribunal may apply the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Code of
Criminal Procedure and the Evidence Act whenever it is deemed to be relevant and appropriate
with an aim to settle disputes under the Section 37 (a) of the Constitutional Tribunal Law. It also
points out that the Tribunal applies the principle of mutatis mutandis.
According to Section 34 of the Constitutional Tribunal Law, the Tribunal may invite theAttorney-General of the Union as the amicus curiae if it deems necessary. The Tribunal may
summon any person or organization concerned to testify and secure an opinion. All judgments areto be published except for the judicial deliberations of Tribunal’s judges carried out within the
Tribunal. The members have the right to give their dissented opinion, and it shall be recorded andkept confidential. Majority decisions or judgments shall be adopted by the Tribunal.
Concurring and dissenting opinions are the expression of plural methods and the reasons on
which concurrence or dissents are assessed by logical, critical analysis by all judges. It means all
judges of the Tribunal can give their own opinions freely without any interference from otherauthorities.
2.

Legal Effect and Enforcement
Section 324 of the 2008 Constitution and Section 24 of the Constitutional Tribunal Law providethat the decision of the Tribunal shall be final and conclusive. The judgment upon the submission
transferred from an ordinary court under Section 12 (g) of the Law on Constitutional Tribunal shallbe effective in all similar cases. It signifies that the right to appeal or the right to revision by theparties is not allowed.
Section 35 of the Constitutional Tribunal Law provides that all the judgment passed by the
Tribunal shall be declared in State Gazette. Decisions shall be bound and published for reference andkept as precedent cases.
All types of unconstitutional decisions have erga omnes effect. Section 198(a) of the 2008
Constitution states that if any provision of the law enacted by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union
Parliament), the Region Hluttaw, the State Hluttaw, the Leading Bodies of the Self-Administered
6

Section 22 of the Constitutional Tribunal Law.

12

Division or the Self-Administered Zone or any existing law is inconsistent with any provision of
the Constitution, the Constitution shall prevail. Moreover, according to section 446 of the 2008
Constitution, existing law shall remain in operation in so far as they are not contrary to theConstitution until and unless they are repealed or amended by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. Generally,
the decisions of unconstitutionality have prospective effect, and unconstitutional statute orprovisions shall lose its effect, but further legislative action is required in practical aspects to be
conducted by concerned executive authorities. The decisions of the Tribunal shall have a legal
impact since its adoption and published in the official gazette.
VI. SPECIFIC LEGAL REMEDIES
Any extraordinary remedies, which are provided in the constitution, in addition to thedecisions of the constitutional court, may include, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo
warranto, habeas corpus, and others. The legal remedies are discretionary and not compulsory. In
most constitutional courts, the remedies are available within the jurisdiction of an individual
application, but it is not under the subject of constitutional review.
Myanmar’s Constitution does not mention what kinds of remedies can be invoked by theindividuals applying writs to the Tribunal. The legislature could decide the remedies in the form oflaws, or sometimes remedies could be specified in the regulation of the Tribunal, but up to now,
such action has not taken place. The Tribunal, when decides cases, may take the opportunity to
declare and determine what remedies are permitted, but we do not have such a case.
VII. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE UNION PEACE AGREEMENT AND THE ROLE
OF THE TRIBUNAL IN THE FUTURE
The constitutional review is a cornerstone of judicial power. It plays an essential role inmediating the political process, a high-profile function of reviewing legislation for constitutionality,
the essence of the Constitutional Court for encouraging peaceful resolution of political disputes andfacilitating consolidation in democratic countries. It can be seen in the democratic transitional
experience of some countries as in the South Africa case and South Korea case.
It can be seen that in most of the countries, constitutional courts are created during theirdemocratic transition. The significant experience of South Korea, Thailand, Mongolia, and South
Africa proves the role of the constitutional court to maintain the political stability in democratization.
Myanmar is undergoing a process of democratization, and it had convened three sessions of
the Union Peace Conference, known as 21st Century Panglong Conference, and adopted a total of
51 basic principles to be included in the Union Peace Accord.

13

The second session was held on 29 May 2017, and 37 agreements were signed as a part of theUnion Peace Accord. It affirmed the mandatory establishment of a separate and independent
Tribunal. Currently, there are different views with respect to the establishment of theConstitutional Tribunal. Therefore, the 21st Panglong Conference affirms inter alia theestablishment of a separate and independent Tribunal aimed to strengthen a federal democracysystem. The Tribunal would become the judicial body to guard the implementation, compliance,and effective application of the terms and conditions of the Union Peace Accord.
The 21st Panglong Conference agreed inter alia that the Union must be based on democracy
and federalism. Myanmar makes a lot of effort to expeditiously implement the steps towards
amending the 2008 Constitution under the auspices of the 21st Century Panglong Conference7. It isalso aimed to establish perpetual peace and national reconciliation.
The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw has taken the initiative towards the amendment of several provisions
in the 2008 Constitution. The Joint Committee on Amending the 2008 Constitution is trying todraft amendments to the 2008 Constitution step by step and moving towards the Union based on
democracy and federalism. The Committee received more than 3700 recommendations foramendments from various political parties and intended to draft an amendment bill based on its
findings. In this regard, it can be found that seven political parties positively proposed 63
amendment recommendations concerning the Tribunal.
VIII.

THE ROLE OF THE TRIBUNAL WITHIN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

A greater depth of understanding of constitutional review in the federal system is crucial. The
involvement of the type of constitutional review and the principles of interpretation that have been
applied in other federations to resolve federal constitutional questions are also to be brought before
the Tribunal. Potential issues for constitutional review will be escalated, and more strengths,
weaknesses, and challenges should be assessed by the constitutional court in a federal system.
If we look at the federal features of the Constitution, especially in terms of legislative power,
we will see that it recognizes two levels of government, each of which has constitutional authority
in its own right and also divides legislative power between levels of government. The Federal
Constitution provides rulings for resolving any conflict when each level of government exercises
power. Under these circumstances, the role of the Tribunal becomes more vital. The allocation of
exclusive or concurrent power may lead to more controversial issues.

7
This conference is the Peace Conference of the Union held in 21st century and which is hostorically based on the Panglong
Conference held in 1947. The historical Panglong Conference, 1947, that conducted series of negotiations between General Aung
San and other ethnic leaders in 1947. All these leaders unanimously agreed and decided to unitedly struggle for independence
from British colony in order to establish the Union of Burma as a whole.. In order to reflect this very important historicalevent,the 21st Century Panglong Conference is held to negotiate between the ethnic leaders and all stakeholders enabling toestablish the peace in the entire Union of Myanmar and reform the democracy federal state.

14

The federal system may prescribe the three-fold distribution of power by recognizing theconstitutional powers of local government as the components of a federal system includes
legislative, executive, and sometimes judicial institutions at each level of government, and thepower is distributed among them. In this case, the Tribunal may take more responsibility, and thescope of the constitutional review system shall be enlarged. The Tribunal shall encounter morechallenges as the potential advantages and disadvantages of federalism take place.
IX. DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
A list of legislative competences and concurrent powers are distributed to the provinces andthe Federation. As the concurrent powers represent a more integral and flexible model offederalism, the challenge will become more complex.
The scope and functions of the Tribunal becomes broader especially in order to;(a)specify which level of government has supremacy in the case of any

incompatible or conflict arises or the question of supremacy rests with the national orfederal level. Sometimes the Tribunal has to play a more active role over concurrent
matters of the national government and federal government.
(b)Sometimes, the constitutional court has to be involved in the conflict toidentify and resolve whether it falls within residual or concurrent powers.
The federal system places a special responsibility on the constitutional review at the apex of
the judicial system, which must have an irrefutable reputation for independence, neutrality, andcompetence. If the guarantees to the sub-national units are breached, they have to recourse toconstitutional review. It will, therefore, become an essential role for the Tribunal to give sufficient
safeguards to protect the development of power.
Therefore, the scope and functions of the Tribunal will be more expansive (a) to oversee thepossible abuse of power by State Institutions (b) to control the mechanism for strict scrutinization
which is implemented to prevent the attenuate of federal power (c) to check any arbitrary acts
conducted by the federal government (d) to grant more constitutional review power and to avoid
unnecessary federal intervention and suspension (e) to play an advisory role on federal intervention
or any other misappropriation (f) to check and balance the deterrence of constitutional amendments.

15

BIBLIOGRAPHY
I.

Legal references
Constitution of the Union of Burma, 1947
Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, 1974
Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008
Constitutional Tribunal Law

II. Case study law
1. The Chief Justice of the Union Vs. Ministry of Home Affairs (Submission No.1/2011, 14 July2011)
2. Dr. Aye Maung and 22 representatives Vs. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar(Submission No.2/2011, 14 December 2011)
3. The President of the Union Vs. Dr. Aye Maung and 23 representatives of the Amyotha Hluttaw(Submission No.2/2012, 28 March 2012)
4. The Speaker of the Mon State Hluttaw Vs. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Submission
No.3/2012, 27 July 2012)
5. Daw Dwe Bu and 49 representatives of the Pyithu Hluttaw Vs. The Republic of the Union of
Myanmar (Submission No.1/2014, 18 September 2014)
6. U Aung Kyi Nyunt and 26 representatives of the Amyotha Hluttaw (Submission No.5/2014, 27
February 2015)
7. Dr. Aye Maung and 23 representatives of the Amyotha Hluttaw Vs. the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw(Submission No.1/2015, 11 May 2015)
8. U Sai Than Naing and 23 representatives of the Amyotha Hluttaw (Submission No.1/ 2016, 19
January 2017)
9. Daw Nan Ni Ni Aye and 24 representatives of the Amyotha Hluttaw Vs. the Pyidaungsu
Hluttaw (Submission No. 1/2019, 25 July2019)10. Dr. Sai Sei Kyauk Sam and 24 representatives of the Amyotha Hluttaw Vs. the Pyidaungsu
Hluttaw (Submission No.2/2019, 25 July 2019)16

2. The Functions and Duties of the Constitutional Tribunal of
MyanmarKhin Phone Myint Kyu*

Abstract
This paper first provides an overview of how Myanmar institutionalized constitutional review in the
post-colonial, socialist, and post-socialist eras. As a core focus, it investigates the functions andduties of the Constitutional Tribunal in the context of specific references to the case study law. It
demonstrates structural dilemmas existing in the domain of constitutional review in contemporary
Myanmar. This paper intends to shed light on how the Tribunal performs the functions and duties injudicial practice. This paper also concludes with the author’s solutions and recommendations aimed
at the enhancement of Tribunal’s capacity and effectiveness.

*

Professor, Dr., Department of Law, University of Yangon.

17

INTRODUCTION
Myanmar promulgated three constitutions since independence. First was the post-colonial 1947
Constitution of the Union of Burma. The 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of
Burma was adopted during the socialist era. The present 2008 Constitution of the Republic of theUnion of Myanmar (hereinafter, the 2008 Constitution) was adopted under the military government.
This Constitution is the basic law of the country and guarantees the fundamental rights of the citizens.
Moreover, it establishes the state structure.
Two former constitutions did not stipulate a separate and independent court to settle constitutional
disputes. According to section 151 of the 1947 Constitution, it was the Supreme Court to exercise theconstitutional review. In particular, it decided upon constitutional disputes and interpretation.
Moreover, the Parliament could grant the Supreme Court the additional power to exercise the judiciaryeffectively.1 Furthermore, section 4 of the 1948 Union Judiciary Act provided extensive powers to theSupreme Court to supervise all courts in the Union, and settle civil and criminal cases.
However, after the adoption of the 1974 Constitution, the Pyithu Hluttaw (People’s Parliament)
became an official organ to review and decide constitutional issues under Article 200 and Article 201of the 1974 Socialist Constitution. Indeed, the nature of Parliament usually exercises the power ofpassing laws; however, the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma practiced theconstitutional review. Therefore, this 1974 Constitution is a typical characteristic of Socialist
Myanmar. It demonstrates the ‘socialist legality’ and the reason for taking the power of constitutional
review (judicial review) by the Pyithu Hluttaw was that the representative of classes of people (e.g.,
representatives of peasant and workers) presided as the judges in legal proceedings. Legal scholars
could not preside as a judge but could offer only legal suggestions to the judges.
In 1988, the general discontent among the people had risen due to economic decline, leading toa countrywide civil disturbance. Administrative machinery broke down and, on 18th September 1988,
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) took over the power of the State. It suspended
the 1974 Constitution and abolished the Pyithu Hluttaw as well as various responsible councils, alongwith the Council of People’s Justice and the Central Court.
The SLORC, in order to adopt a new constitution, mobilized the National Convention in 1993;
however, three years later, it was suspended when the National League for Democracy (NLD)
boycotted it. A National Convention was again called in 2004 to adopt the Constitution. Four years
later, in 2008, they adopted the Constitution. Hence, Myanmar had remained without an effective
constitution from 1988 to 2008. Three years later, in 2011, the Constitutional Tribunal was set up
under Section 46 of the 2008 Constitution.

1

Section 153 of the 1947 Constitution of the Union of Burma.

18

I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL of THE UNIONThe Constitutional Tribunal of the Union Law (hereinafter, the Tribunal Law) was enacted in

2010, whereas it started performing its functions in 2011.2 This body stands as a separate judicial
institution to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional disputes.3 The Tribunal bears authority
to make decisions in disputes relating to the Constitution between Pyidaungsu (Union) and Regions,
between Pyidaungsu and States, among Regions, among States, and between Regions or States andSelf-Administered Areas and among Self-Administered Areas themselves. 4 The Constitution
establishes separation of powers among three branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. If the
disputes concerning these three branches’ functions and duties which are conferred by the Constitution
arise among them, the Constitutional Tribunal settles such kinds of disputes.
II. FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL OF THE UNIONIn Myanmar, apart from the Tribunal, there is a Supreme Court, courts of the lower level, courts
established by law5, and Courts-martial.6 The Tribunal is exclusively competent over constitutional
disputes and does not preside over civil or criminal cases.
Under the section 322 of the 2008 Constitution and section 12 of the Tribunal Law, the Tribunal
has the authority to interpret the provisions of the Constitution, review the constitutional disputes
arising out of the activities of executive organs, and vet the law passed by the legislature. Moreover,
the Tribunal has the authority to review the pending cases in ordinary courts. In 2013, the Law
amending Tribunal Law added several novelties, reporting back to the President, the Pyithu Hluttaw
speaker, and Amyotha Hluttaw speaker, who chose the members of the Tribunal.
Before this amendment was enacted, the President had argued that such a reporting requirement
would infringe upon the ability of the Tribunal to adjudicate constitutional issues independently andthat the bill was contrary to the principle of independent administering of justice. 7 However, thePresident’s argument was rejected by members of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. As a result of conflict, thisamendment passed without the President’s signature. In particular, the Constitution provides that “ifthe president does not send the Bill back to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw together with his signature and2State Peace and Development Council Law No. 21 under Section 443 of the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar,
2008.

3

Section 293(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008.

4

Section 46, ibid.

5

Juvenile Court, Municipal Court, Traffic Court and so on.

6Section 293. of the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008.

7

Section 19 (a), Ibid.

19

comments within the prescribed period, or if the President does not sign to promulgate, on the day
after the completion of that period, the Bill shall become a law as if he had signed it.”8
1.

Interpreting the Provisions of the Constitution
Constitutional interpretation is one of the core functions in the domains of constitutional andjudicial review. In Myanmar, the Constitution designates such authority with the Tribunal. To discuss
more about the interpretation function, this section will refer to the Attorney-General of the Union (onbehalf of the President of the Union) v 1.the Speaker, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, 2. The Speaker, thePyithu Hluttaw, 3. The Speaker, the Amyotha Hluttaw.9
Despite provisions for the formation of organizations and appointment of their members at theUnion, Region or State levels, and Self-Administered Division or Zone level, there is no specificdefinition of the term ‘Union Level Organization’ in the 2008 Constitution. The Attorney-Generalsubmitted on behalf of the President to the Tribunal with a request to interpret the ‘Union Level
Organization.’ The definition of the term ‘Union Level Organization’ is prescribed in section 2(1) of
the Law Relating to Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, section 2(h) of the Law Relating to Pyithu Hluttaw, andSection 2(h) of the Law Relating to Amyotha Hluttaw respectively as follows:
Union Level Organization means the Union Government, the National Defense and Security Council, theFinancial Commission, the Supreme Court of the Union, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Union, theUnion Election Commission, the Office of the Auditor General of the Union and the Union Civil Services
Board formed under the Constitution and as well as the Committees, the Commissions and the bodies
formed by Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Pyithu Hluttaw and Amyotha Hluttaw.10

Although the term ‘Union Level Organization’ is defined by the Laws Relating to Hluttaws, there
is no interpretation of the term ‘Union Level Organization’ in the provisions of the Constitution.
Therefore, in order to analyze the issues stated in the submission, the Tribunal needed to scrutinize theprovisions of the Constitution.
According to the provisions of Chapter IV of the 2008 Constitution, the term ‘Union Level
Organization’ means the organizations directly formed under the provisions of Constitution. The term‘organization’ mentioned in the submission is different from the Committees, Commissions, andBodies, which was merely formed by each Hluttaw. Hence, the term ‘Union Level Organization’ must
be interpreted as the Organization derived directly from the Constitution.
After discussing the above matters, it is also necessary to consider the interpretation of Chapter
IV of the Constitution titled Legislature. This chapter contains the following notions, “any of the Union

8

Section 105 (c), ibid.

9

Submission No.1/2012.

10

Section 2(1) of the Law Relating to Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, section 2(h) of the Law Relating to Pyithu Hluttaw, and Section 2(h) of
the Law Relating to Amyotha Hluttaw.

20

Level Organizations formed under the Constitution” and “Organizations or Persons representing anyof the Union Level Organization formed under the Constitution” as equal to “the Union Level
Organizations or persons appointed by the President with the approval of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.
However, Committees, Commissions and Bodies formed by each Hluttaw are regarded only asorganizations of Hluttaw.
Therefore, the Tribunal had to interpret that “any of the Union Level Organizations formed under
the Constitution” and “Organizations or persons representing any of the Union Level Organization
formed under the Constitution” are the Union Level Organizations or Persons appointed by the
President with the approval of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. 11 For all these reasons, the Tribunal granted
the submission of the President and “the status granted to Committees, Commissions, and Bodies
formed by each Hluttaw as Union Level Organizations is unconstitutional.”
Another case was submitted in 2016. It is the Submission No. 1/2016 presented by U Sai Naing,a member of Amyotha Hluttaw. In this case, the applicants brought the submission to the Tribunal torequest an interpretation of Section 333(d) (4) of the 2008 Constitution. This section states one of thequalifications of the members of the Tribunal as a “person who is, in the opinion of the President, aneminent jurist.” The applicants also requested the Tribunal to interpret ‘an eminent jurist’ is whether
or not applicable only to three members chosen by the President under Section 321 of the Constitution.
The Constitutional Tribunal Law limits the application of ‘an eminent jurist’ only to three persons who
were nominated by the President, not those by the speakers of Pyithu Hluttaw and Amyotha Hluttaw.
However, this provision is not consistent with the Constitution. The Constitution allows the applicationof ‘an eminent jurist’ to all nine members. Therefore, the submission was dismissed by the Tribunal.
There is another case relating to the interpretation of the Constitution - Daw Nan Ni Ni Aye(Amyothar Hluttaw’s Representative) and 24 others12 . The applicant said that the Court needs toreview the case in accordance with the special provisions if there is a special provision to review somecases in the 2008 Constitution or any other laws. As section 435 of the 2008 Constitution is a special
provision for the amendment of the Constitution, the applicants submitted the application to beinterpreted as this application is necessary to be received and discussed under section 435 of the 2008
Constitution. Therefore, the applicant submitted a suit for interpretation of the provision of section
435 of the 2008 Constitution.
The Tribunal referred to the statement of the legal scholars, N.S. Bindra and Maxwell13. They
described that if the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, no more can benecessary to interpret those words in their natural and ordinary sense.

11

Section 91 and 92(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008.

12

Submission No 1/2019.

13

N.S. Bindra, the Interpretation of Statutes, 5th Edition, Law Book Co, Allahabad, 1970, p-718.

21

Therefore, as the provision of Section 435 is already clear and unambiguous, one can read andunderstand in accordance with the original meaning of that section. Therefore, such kind of provision
is not necessary to be interpreted again. The Tribunal dismissed this submission.
2.

Scrutinizing the Laws Enacted by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and Institutions with the Right
to Make Laws at Various Levels and Functions of Executive Authorities at Various Levels
Including the Union Level
According to section 322(b) of the 2008 Constitution and section 12(b) of the Tribunal Law, theTribunal can scrutinize the laws enacted by the legislature for examining whether they conform with
the Constitution or not.
The related case decided by the Tribunal on 14th December 2011 was Dr. Aye Maung and 22
Representatives v. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar14. In this case, the applicants presented a
submission on the question of whether the term ‘Minister of the National Races Affairs’ used in section
5 of the Law of Emoluments, Allowances, and Insignia for Representatives of the Region or State isincluded in the term ‘Ministers of the Region or State or not’. The main issues of that case werewhether or not the status of Ministers of the National Races Affairs was equal to other Ministers of
the Region or State and entitled to receive the same treatments.
Under section 262(a) (iv) of the Constitution, the Chief Minister of the Region or State shallobtain the list of Hluttaw representatives to carry out the affairs of each National Race in the Region
or State as the Ministers of National Races Affairs from the relevant Election Commission.
Under section 262(e) of the Constitution, the Chief Minister of the Region or State submits thelist of candidates to appoint the Ministers of the National Races Affairs together with the other
Ministers candidate list, which is approved by the Region or State Hluttaw.15
The Tribunal held that section 262(a) (iv) and 262(e) of the Constitution defines the Minister of
the National Races Affairs as the Minister of the Region or State concerned. Consequently, Section
262(g) (ii) of the Constitution allows the President to assign duties to the Hluttaw representatives who
are the Ministers of the Region or State, to do the affairs of National races concerned. These provisions
give the Minister of the National Races Affairs and the other Ministers of the Region or State an equal
status without any discrimination.
According to section 12(b) of the Tribunal Law and by analyzing the submission mentioned
above - No. 2/2012, the Tribunal can scrutinize the constitutionality of laws after legislation (ex post
facto). In Myanmar, before promulgating a law, a bill is usually announced in the newspapers in order
to ask for suggestions from citizens. If the Tribunal can scrutinize the constitutionality of those bills

14

Submission No. 2/2011.

15

Section 262(e) of the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008.

22

at the time of the announcement in the newspapers, disputes related to the legislation will be reduced,
and the enacted laws will become more convenient in practice.
Another power of the Tribunal is scrutinizing the constitutionality of the acts of central and local
executive authorities. Such authority is prevalent in constitutional review. The Chief Justice of theUnion v. Ministry of Home Affairs16 case was decided on 14th July 2011. In the instant case, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, as an applicant, submitted the case to the Tribunal questioning thelegality of conferring first class judicial power to the sub-township administrative officers as requestedby the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Before the independence, the administrative officers jointly carried out the judicial functions with
their original administrative functions. After independence, the High Court and the Supreme Court
were established under Section 3 of the Union Judiciary Act 1948, respectively in accordance with
Section 134 and 136 of the 1947 Constitution of the Union of Burma.
When the Revolutionary Council took power in 1962, the People’s Judiciary system was adopted
on 7th August 1972, and the Chief Court was established while other existing courts remained
unchanged. During the period of the Revolutionary Council and the period of the Socialist Republic,
executive and judicial power was separately and independently exercised. When the State Law andOrder Restoration Council (SLORC) came into power in 1988, the existing State organs wereabolished by Notification No. 2/1988, and the new Judiciary Law was promulgated. The Supreme
Court, the State or Divisional Court, and the Township Court were formed.
The power of criminal jurisdiction was conferred on Sub-township administrative officers inareas that were needed. Similarly, during the period of State Peace and Development Council (SPDC),
which was reconstituted by the SLORC in 1997, the Supreme Court conferred sub-townshipadministrative officers the power of the Additional Magistrate. As the sub-township administrative
officers exercised the First Class Magistrate power in the previous government, the Ministry of Home
Affairs submitted the Supreme Court to empower the First Class Magistrate power to 27 sub-townshipadministrative officers as judicial officers.
Upon the applicant’s request, the court took into consideration whether the appointment of the
sub-township administrative officers as judicial officers, conferring the first-class power of Magistrate
and appointing sub-township administrative officers as juvenile judges are constitutional or not.
The Tribunal held that provisions of the 2008 Constitution stipulated that the legislative,
executive and judicial power of the Union should be separate. The judicial power of the courts andjudges is prescribed in the Constitution. Therefore, the exercise of judicial power is permitted only tothose judges who are empowered by the Constitution. The conferring of judicial power toadministrative officers of the General Administration Department of the Ministry of Home Affairs is
not in conformity with the Constitution.
16

Submission No. 1/2011.

23

3.

Deciding upon Constitutional Disputes among Territories in the Country Including theUnion Territories
The Tribunal has reviewed the disputes between the Union and different levels of local

governments, and among local governments. The Tribunal examined the case of Speaker of the Mon
State Hluttaw v. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar17.
The petition submitted by the Speaker of the Mon State Hluttaw to the Tribunal included the issueof whether or not the Region or State Hluttaw should continue to exercise its legislative power
empowered by the Schedule Two unless the repeal or amendment of the laws which were inconsistent
with the Constitution.
When governments of the Regions or States perform their development activities or enact the law
for respective Region or State, they should follow the guidance of the President18. The Development
Committee Law (the SLORC Law No. 5/1993) - the union level law was required to be repealed
urgently to allocate the legislative power to the Region and State. The laws passed by the Regions orStates or Self-Administered Zone should also be consistent with the Constitution. (Schedule Two is
the lists of laws which can be passed by States or Regions or Self-Administered Zone.)
Therefore, the Tribunal advised the applicants to exercise the enactment of laws andimplementation of legislative powers permitted in Schedule Two only after the repealing or amending
the provisions of existing laws.
4.

Reporting Respectively with Regard to the Tribunal Members’ Performance Relating to
the Functions
Section 19(a) clearly states that the courts are to administer justice independently, according to

the law, and adhering to judicial principles. The Tribunal is also a branch of the Judiciary. Therefore,
it should administer justice independently and exist separately from the other two branches. Since subsection (i) of section 12 requires that the Tribunal members are required to report back to the President,
Speaker of Pyithu Hluttaw, and Speaker of Amyotha Hluttaw with regard to their performance of theirfunctions, it seems that the other two branches interfere the Judiciary. Consequently, Section 12 subsection (i) of the Tribunal Law affects the existence and jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Therefore, thissub-section (i) should not be added as the Tribunal’s duty.
5.

The Matters not decided by the Tribunal
The power to impeach the President and Vice-President of the State is the peculiar power of theconstitutional review. But in Myanmar, the Tribunal does not exercise this power of impeachment.
17

Submission No. 3/2012.

18

Guidance issued by the President of the Union on 8-6-2012 and 29-6-2012.

24

According to the section 71 of the 2008 Constitution, if it is required to impeach the President or any
Vice-President, not less than one-fourth of the total numbers of representatives of respective either
Hluttaw shall submit a charge to the Head of the Hluttaw concerned. Action should proceed when thischarge is supported by not less than two-thirds of the total number of the representatives of the Hluttaw
concerned. If one Hluttaw endorses the taking of the action, the other Hluttaw should form a body toinvestigate the charge. After investigation, if not less than two-thirds of the total number ofrepresentatives of the Hluttaw passed the resolution that the President or Vice-President unfit tocontinue in office, the Hluttaw will submit this resolution to the Head of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. And
finally, the Head of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw will declare the removal of the President or the VicePresident.
Some countries, for example, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, America, France, Albania, Korea, Croatia,
Poland Slovenia, and Taiwan, exercise constitutional review to confer the power to decide the resultsof general elections or election disputes. But in Myanmar, the Tribunal does not interfere in theelection cases and dissolution of political parties.
In the case of Daw Dwe Bu, a member of the Pyithu Hluttaw, Angyinyan Constituency, Kachin
and 49 members of the Pyithu Hluttaw19, that it has no jurisdiction over election matters. The Tribunal
does not have the authority to deal with the election matters on the ground that these disputes areconcerned with the previous Election Commission. The disputes arise before the enforcement of the2008 Constitution and the establishment of the Tribunal. Furthermore, Section 9 of the Union Election
Commission Law provides that the decision of the Union Election Commission is final and conclusivewith regard to election matters. This lack of jurisdiction reduces the power of the Tribunal. Therefore,
the power to decide the election matters should be added as one of the functions of Tribunal. Moreover,
the Tribunal cannot decide on the activities of the legislature.20
CONCLUSIONThe Tribunal can deliver decisions on the constitutionality of laws and administrative measures.
The Tribunal’s functions and duties are the interpretation, vetting, and scrutinizing the provisions of
the Constitution and actions of executive authorities.
The Tribunal can interpret the provisions prescribed in the Constitution only when cases forinterpretation are submitted. In my view, deciding the submitted cases causes that the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction becomes restricted and cannot expand its authority in performing its functions. Therefore,
the Tribunal itself should have its own motion to try the constitutional matters as one of its functions.

19

Submission No.1/2014.

20

Submission No. 1/2019.

25

The Tribunal is an organ passing decisions on constitutional disputes. According to the provisionof the functions and duties of the Tribunal, its members have to submit their reports on the duties andfunctions to those who nominated them. That provision could lead to constant political influence byeither the President or the Speakers of Pyithu Hluttaw and Amyotha Hluttaw over each Tribunal
member. Through submission of reports to the persons concerned, the President, Speaker of Pyithu
Hluttaw, and Speaker of Amyotha Hluttaw may exert influence over the Tribunal members. Therefore,
this kind of function should not be recognized because it causes interference over the Tribunal.

26

3. A Case Analysis of the Constitutional Tribunal of Myanmar
Khin Khin Oo*

Abstract
The Constitutional Tribunal of the Union of Myanmar was established under the auspices of 2008
Constitution together with the new democratic government. Constitutional review system under
separate constitutional courts is new experience for Myanmar as Myanmar is the second common
law country having such court. The present work carefully studied one famous case decided by
the Tribunal in 2017. This case well demonstrated certain issues in formation of the Tribunal forhearing and deciding the cases.

*

Prof., Dr., Department of Law, University of Yangon.

27

INTRODUCTION
The current 2008 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar came into force
when the new civilian government took over state power on January 31, 2011. The threebranches of sovereign power, namely the legislative, executive, and judicial power, “areseparated to the extent possible, and exert reciprocal checks and balances among
themselves.”1 Under the Constitution, there is a separate chapter for the judiciary that establishes
the Supreme Court, Court Martial, and Constitutional Tribunal. There are some relatively
important provisions for these courts under the Constitution. The details of the organization andformation of the Supreme Court and its subordinate courts for the ordinary judiciary and thedetails of the organization and construction of the Constitutional Tribunal for constitutional
adjudication are prescribed by the Union Judiciary Law and the Constitutional Tribunal of theUnion Law respectively. The 2008 Constitution and Defense Services Act of 1959 provides theformation of Court-martial and military adjudication separately.2 The purpose of this work is to
study the case decided by the Constitutional Tribunal of the Union of Myanmar in 2016 andto analyze its jurisprudence in deliberation and adjudication in such cases.
I.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL OF THE UNION
OF MYANMAR
The Constitutional Tribunal of the Union (CTU) is a judicial organ with a particularjurisdiction which is established by the Constitution for constitutional review. 3 Notably,
Myanmar is one of the two common law countries to have a constitutional court separate
from its supreme court, after South Africa. One of the basic principles of the Union under
the Constitution is to establish the CTU.
A Constitutional Tribunal shall be set up to interpret the provisions of the Constitution, toscrutinize whether or not laws enacted by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Parliament), theRegion Hluttaws and the State Hluttaws (States Parliaments) and functions of executive
authorities of Pyidaungsu, Regions, States and Self-Administered Areas are in conformity with
the Constitution, to decide on disputes relating to the Constitution between Pyidaungsu andRegions, between Pyidaungsu and States, among Regions, among States, and between Regions
or States and Self-Administered Areas and among Self-Administered Areas themselves, and to
perform other duties prescribed in this Constitution.4
1
Section 11 (a) of the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008. The Constitution will be hereinafter referred
to as the Constitution.
2
The Defense Services Act of 1959 was lastly amended by the SPDC Law 25/2010, Law Amending the Defense Services Act,
1959.
3

Section 293 of the Constitution.

4

Section 46 of the Constitution.

28

Under Section 320 of the Constitution, the CTU is composed of nine members, including the
Chairperson. In this regard, the President, the Speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw (House ofRepresentatives), and the Speaker of the Amyotha Hluttaw (House of Nationalities) submit thecandidates’ lists, each consisting of three members to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Parliament)
for its approval. Out of nine, the President appoints one member as the Chairperson of the CTU.5
Again, Section 322 of the Constitution, stating the functions and duties of the CTU, provides
more details than the Chapter I of the Constitution. The CTU interprets the provisions under theConstitution, reviews the constitutionality of laws enacted by different Hluttaws, andconstitutionality of functions of executive authorities at different administrative levels. The CTU
also decides constitutional disputes and fulfills other functions and duties assigned by the Union
Parliament.
By using the power under Sections 336 and 443 of the Constitution, the State Peace andDevelopment Council enacted the Constitutional Tribunal Law on October 28, 2010, to form the
CTU and prescribe its duties and functions.6 Section 38 of the CTU Law entrusts the Tribunal
extraordinary power to issue necessary rules, declarations, orders, directives, and procedures toimplement the statutory provisions. The CTU had later issued the Constitutional Tribunal of theUnion Rules by Notification No 30/2011on June 28, 2011.7
II. MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNALThe CTU of the first Pyidaungsu Hluttaw consisted of nine members and started to operatefrom March 30, 2011. Until December 31, 2015, the CTU had admitted 12 submissions andout of which it decided eight and dismissed one.8 One submission (Submission No. 1/2013)
was closed, and the applicants withdrew two submissions (Submission No. 2/2014 and 3/2014).
At one point, the legislature was not satisfied with the CTU’s decision of The President of theUnion v. The Speakers of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Pyithu Hluttaw and the Amyotha Hluttaw(Submission No 1/2012). The question was whether the status of the Committees, Commissions,and Bodies formed by each Hluttaw was Union-level organization (federal organizations) or not.
The CTU answered the question negatively, thus, supporting the President’s opinion. The
5

Section 321 of the Constitution.

6

This law came into force in January 31, 2011. The Law has 38 Sections of 14 Chapters. Some relevant provisions under the
Law will only be discussed for the present purpose. The Law has been amended two times so far: the first amendment was madein January 21, 2013, and the second amendment in November 5, 2014. Hereinafter referred to as CTU Law.
7
The Constitutional Tribunal Rules consisted of 21 Rules which correspond to the CTU Law and 8 forms which are to be usedin the deliberation and adjudication process of Tribunal. Hereinafter referred to as CTU Rules.
8

The term of a Hluttaw is five years. The period of the First Pyidaungsu Hluttaw started in March 30, 2010 and was completed
in March 31, 2015.

29

members of Parliament refused to accept such a decision. They demanded the resignation of
CTU’s members, arguing the inefficient discharging of CTU’s duties according to Section 334(a) (v) of the Constitution.
In September 2012, after failed attempts to resolve the crisis based on the wording of theConstitution, the members of the CTU, who were appointed in 2011, collectively resigned andleft the CTU dysfunctional until the reappointment of its new members in February 2013.
When the National League for Democracy government led by Daw Aung Sann Su Kyi won
the General Election and took State power in 2016, under the provisions stated in Section 320 of
the Constitution, Section 9 (d) of the Union Government Law, and Section 3 of the CTU Law, anentirely new bench of CTU members was appointed in March 2016. 9
III. SUBMISSION 1/2016
There were four submissions decided by the CTU between 2016 and 2019; one
submission each in 2016 and 2017, two submissions in 2019, and none in 2018. Particularemphasis will be given on the decision rendered on submission No. 1/2016. 10 The 23
representatives of the House of Nationalities brought the eminent person case before the CTU tointerpret Section 333 (d) (iv) of the Constitution. The applicants asked the CTU whether the
President has the right to use his discretion given by Section 333 (d) (iv) of the Constitution for
only three CTU members nominated by himself or for all nine members, including six othermembers nominated by Speakers of Amyotha Hluttaw and Pyithu Hluttaw. This was the firstsubmission before the new CTU under the National League for Democracy government during
Second Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.
IV. RATIONALE BEHIND THE SUBMISSIONOn March 31, 2016, the new CTU was filled up by nine new members under the Section 335
of the Constitution. The President, the Speaker of the Amyotha Hluttaw and the Speaker of thePyithu Hluttaw put forward three candidates each to be the CTU members. Daw Khin Htay Kywe
and U Twarl Kyin Paung were nominated by each Hluttaw to be CTU’s members based on being
eminent jurists under Section 333 (d) (iv) of the Constitution. During the selection process of thecandidates at Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the applicants of this submission challenged both candidates
for incompatibility with the qualifications prescribed for CTU members. Despite the challenge,

9

Notification 3/2016 was issued by President’s Office of Republic of the Union of Myanmar on 30 March, 2016.

10

This 1/2016 case will be hereinafter referred to as the eminent person case.

30

the Parliament approved all nine nominations under the Section 328 of the Constitution. 11
V.

CAUSE SHOWN IN THE EMINENT PERSON CASE
Section 333 of the Constitution provides the required qualifications for membership of the

Tribunal. The President, the Speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw, and the Speaker of Amyotha Hluttaw
can select three nominees each, who have political, administrative, economic, and security
outlook; and are being loyal to the Union and its citizens. Neither of them should be members of
Parliament nor members of a political party. All nominees should meet the standard personalqualifications set for the members of the House of Representatives except age limitation. In
connection with professional qualifications, he or she has served as Judge of the Region or State
Court for at least five years; or has served as either Judicial Officer or Law Officer for ten years
at Region or State level; or had practiced as an advocate for 20 years; or is, in the opinion of the
President, is an eminent jurist.
The applicants of this submission raised the question whether the qualification of being“person who is, in the opinion of the President, an eminent jurist” mentioned in Section 333(d)(iv) of the Constitution was relevant to the three candidates selected by the President, or all ninecandidates. The applicants made their allegation based on Section 4 (b) of the CTU Law as there
were differences between Section 333 (d) (iv) of the Constitution and Section 4 (b) of CTU Law.
According to Section 4 (b) of CTU Law, the President can select a member among three Tribunal
candidates on the criterion of ‘eminent jurist,’ despite lacking other professional qualifications
required by CTU Law. For all these reasons, the applicants alleged that appointment of mentioned
two members being eminent jurists was unconstitutional.
VI. REASONS AND JUDGEMENT GIVEN BY THE CTU
The CTU awarded its decision with its reason on January 19, 2019. The Tribunal approached
the issue intertextually, and also looked into the whole context of the Constitution.
The CTU reasoned that;
Since the President is the Head of the Union and Executive under Sections 16 and 58 of theConstitution, he is entrusted with such special privilege. If such privilege was limited for those threecandidates only who were selected by the President himself, this limitation would not be consistent
with the intent of the Constitution.

11

The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw shall have no right to refuse the persons nominated for the members of the Constitutional Tribunalof the Union by the President unless it can clearly be approved that they are disqualified. Section 328 of 2008 Constitution.

31

Moreover, the Director General from the Union who acted as amicus curiae pleaded that;
There is neither confusion nor ambiguity in Section 333 (d) (iv) of the Constitution, and theprofessional qualification of “being an eminent jurist in the opinion of the President” equally applies
not only to those three candidates selected by the President, but also to those other six candidates
selected by both Houses.

The Tribunal ruled on the submission as follows:
One of the functions of the Tribunal is to interpret the Constitution under Section 322 (a) of theConstitution. The question raised in the submission, however, did not fall within the scope of Section
322 (a) of the Constitution. According to the paragraphs 8, 9, and 12 of the submission, the applicants
asked the CTU not to interpret Section 333 (d) (iv) of the Constitution. Rather, the applicants sought
the Tribunal’s interpretation of the Section 333 (d) (iv) of Constitution with reference to Section 4(b) of CTU Law for an inconsistency clause between the Constitution and the CTU Law. If there
were a contradiction between the Constitution and any other legislation, the Constitution must
prevail that ordinary law. The effects of law is clearly provided by Section 198 (a) of theConstitution. 12

The CTU dismissed the submission.
VII. DISCUSSIONS
Individual constitutional sections prescribe the required qualifications for members of unionlevel organizations. Although age limitation and professional expertise vary from one position toanother, most of the required qualifications are common and similar to those for Parliamentarians
under the Section 120 of the Constitution. Moreover, the Constitution allows the President toappoint or nominate persons of whom he thinks ‘eminent’ in their professional capacity as heads
or deputies in some specific union-level organizations. These union level positions are Chief
Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, the Attorney General and AuditorGeneral, and their Deputies. Under respective sections, 13 the President is the sole authority either
to appoint or to nominate the above-mentioned posts with the approval of the Union Parliament.
Under Section 333(d) (iv) of the Constitution, however, there are three nominating authorities,i.e., the President, the Speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw and the Speaker of the Amyotha Hluttaw for
three CTU members each.
The Tribunal, however, stated in its judgment as follows;12

Decision on the Eminent Person case delivered on January 19, 2017, p 13.

13

Sections 237(a) (iv) (dd), 239 (a) (iv) (dd), 242 (a) (iv) (cc), 244 (a) (iv) (cc), 301 (d) (iv) (cc) and 310 (d) (iii) of theConstitution.

32

Being an eminent jurist in the opinion of President is one of the required professional qualifications
for certain constitutional positions such as members of CTU, including the Chairperson, Chief
Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, Union Attorney General, Union Auditor
General, and their respective deputies.
In other words, the Constitution empowers the President to use his discretion in selecting andnominating the candidates of whom he thinks eminent persons for those constitutional positions.

It is argued that in the instant case, the CTU decided without considering any other two
nominating authorities of Speakers from both Houses, rather than the power of the President
appeared under section 333(d) (iv). The reasons for the decision should be more concrete andprecise.
The second discussion point is Myanmar’s acceptance of the doctrine of natural justice.
Myanmar has been a common law country with a tradition of applying the principles of natural
justice for a long time.14 The principles of natural justice consist of two rules: the right to a fairhearing (audi alteram partem - listen to the other side) and the rule against bias (nemo judex incausa sua - no man is a judge in his own cause). The rule against bias is strictly applied to any
appearance of a possible bias, even if none exists. “Justice should not only be done but should
manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.”15 Therefore, a judge may not be a relative, friend,or business associate of a party, or he may not be personally hostile as a result of happening either
before or during a trial. The requirements of bias rule are embodied to the statutes in somejurisdiction as well.16
Under Section 320 of the 2008 Constitution, the CTU is formed with nine members,
including the Chairperson.17 This formation method is elaborated and supplemented by the CTU
Law. Section 20 of the CTU Law says that “All the members [nine members] including the
Chairperson, shall hear and decide in relation to the submission…” It, however, continues toprovide for conditional situations, such as “… In doing so, if all the members cannot attend due
to any duty or any other cause, the submission shall be heard by at least six members, including

14

It is essential that everything which might engender suspicion and distrust of a Tribunal should be cleared and there must bea feeling of confidence in the administration of justice. Please see Daw Lay and three others vs. U Maung Gyi, 1951 BLR (HC)34; Union of Myanmar vs. Maungn Shwe@ Maung Shae and one other, 1966 BLR (CC) 616.
15
R vs. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, [1924] 1 KB 256, [1923] All ER 233; Union of Myanmar vs. Maung Shwe @ Maung
Shae and one other, 1966 BLR (CC) 616.
16

For instance, the Section 18 of Act on the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany provides that

Justices are barred from exercising their judicial duties if they are a party to the case, or are or were married to a party, or are orwere in a civil partnership with a party or have already been involved in the same case due to their office or profession.
Another good example of Myanmar legislation is Anti-Corruption Law Section 24. The person who concerned with thecomplaint matter or has hatred of the complainant or the accused or related to the complainant or the accused shall not be themembers of the Investigation Board formed by the Anti-Corruption Commission.
17

Section 320 of the Constitution.

33

the Chairperson.” 18 Under Section 22 (c) of the CTU Law, the CTU passes its final decision by
the consent of more than half of the members, including the Chairperson.
There is an ambiguity whether all nine members of CTU including Chairperson must attend
at the Tribunal in hearing and deciding the submission or at least six members including
Chairperson could hear and decide the submission due to certain important circumstances which
may affect its decision. For an instance, one of the members of the Tribunal were vacant from theoffice or any Tribunal member were the party to the submission directly or indirectly, etc.
Hereinbefore discussed ‘eminent person’ case was substantially connected with H.E. Daw
Khin Htay Kywe and H.E. U Twarl Kyin Paung, who are two existing members of CTU. During
the hearing process, however, all nine members of the Tribunal body, including the mentioned
two members, heard the submission and dismissed the case.19 The reason given by the CTU isthat the Constitution and CTU law require all tribunal members to attend in formation of the
Tribunal and also in hearing and deciding the submission.
The statement provided by the U Htwe @ A. E. Madari vs. U Tun Ohn & One case would
be recited here as follows
Sections of the Constitution should not be interpreted in a narrow and technical manner but shouldon all occasions be interpreted in a large, liberal, and comprehensive spirit. Construction mostbeneficial in the widest possible amplitude of its powers should be adopted. The Constitution, thoughwritten, should be interpreted in such a way as will be subject to development through usage andconvention.20

There are different definitions between Tribunal and Court under Section 2 (c) and (f) of
CTU Law.21 However, the Section 293 of the Constitution under the Judiciary Chapter provides
that courts of the Union are formed as the Supreme Court of the Union and its subordinate courts,
the Courts-Martial and the Constitutional Tribunal of the Union. Therefore, one may suggest that
the CTU is the judicial body having particular jurisdiction of constitutional interpretation andadjudication. Since the principle of natural justice pertains equally to decisions decided by the
judicial body and quasi-judicial judgments decided by the administration, Tribunal might consider
adopting the natural justice principles for those submissions brought before it, when and where
necessary.
18

Most of the legislations indicate the formation of the Court or Tribunal or Council with an odd number of its members. It is
more likely to cast their vote based on organizational performance considerations. It may have some unknown reason behindthe fixing of this even number of Tribunal members.
19

https://www.constitutionaltribunal.gov.mm/my/judgment/765

20

U Htwe @ A. E. Madari vs. U Tun Ohn & One, 1948 BLR (SC) 541.

21
Tribunal means the Constitutional Tribunal of the Union formed under the Constitution. Court means the Supreme Court of
the Union, High Courts of the Region or State, Self-Administered Division Courts, Self-Administered Zone Courts, District
Courts, Township Courts and other Courts established by law.

34

CONCLUSIONThe Constitution of Myanmar came into force when a new semi-civilian government headedby President U Thein Sein took over state power in 2011. The Constitutional Tribunal of theUnion was established under the Constitution together with the new democratic government.
Enacting constitutional amendments has been one of the election pledges made by the National
League for Democracy since 2015, along with establishing the rule of law, and initiating a peace
process. However, only in February 2019 did the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw form a Joint Committee
comprising of 45 representatives to amend the Constitution. Some Hluttaw representatives, who
are the Defense Services personnel and members of the Union Solidarity and Development Party,
mainly claimed that this move for a constitutional amendment was procedurally unconstitutional.
The 25 Amyotha Hluttaw representatives, including Sai Hseng Kyauk Sam, sent the submission
2/2019 to the Tribunal for its decision. The CTU rejected the submission on the ground of lacking
the jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the peace process is being implemented based on a Nationwide Ceasefire
Agreement (NCA). The legality and constitutionality of the NCA and several related agreements
may be an essential legal issue in the near future. In this sense, the CTU must improve someconstitutional provisions on its capacity and independence, and to develop the legislation and its
jurisprudence.

REFERENCES
I.

Laws

Act on the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany.
Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008.
Constitutional Tribunal of the Union of Myanmar Law and the Rules.
Defense Services Act of 1959.
II. Books
Daw Hla Myo New, “Myanmar: Developments in Myanmar Constitutional Law” in 2016 Global
Review of Constitutional Law. Ed by Albert, David Landau et. al., (ICONnect-Clough Center, 2012) 135- 139.
Khin Khin Oo, “Judicial Power and the Constitutional Tribunal: Some Suggestions for Better
Legislation Relating to the Tribunal and its Role.” In Constitutionalism and35

Legal Change in Myanmar. Ed. by Andre Harding, 193 – 213. Hart
Publishing, 2017, at 210.
Research group, Burma Law Reports on Constitutional Law Cases (Between 1948 and 1964),
2018, September.
Research group, Facts about Constitutional Tribunal: Constitutional Law Journal (printed in
Myanmar Language), 2014, March.
Rulings

decidedbytheConstitutional

Tribunal

of

the

Union

of

Myanmar,https://www.constitutionaltribunal.gov.mm/my .
III. Cases
Daw Lay and three others vs. U Maung Gyi, 1951 BLR (HC) 34.
Decision on the Eminent Person, 1/2016
R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, [1924] 1 KB 256, [1923] All ER 233.
U Htwe @ A. E. Madari vs. U Tun Ohn & One, 1948 BLR (SC) 541.
Union of Myanmar vs. Maung Shwe @ Maung Shae and one other, 1966 BLR (CC) 616.

36

4. A Constitutional Review Model: The Case of Korea*
Hyowon Lee**

Abstract
Since the establishment of the Constitution in 1948, the Republic of Korea had gone through various
constitutional adjudication systems. However, Korea had failed to run these systems efficiently andnormatively as the right means of protecting the Constitutional order.
Then the current Constitution, revised in 1987, introduced the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional
Court is currently recognized as an indispensable component to protect people’s basic rights and torealize ‘rule of law’ and constitutionalism. The Constitutional Court has jurisdictions regarding
constitutional review such as the adjudication on constitutionality of statutes, on impeachment, on
dissolution of a political party, on competence dispute between government institutions or local andfederal organs, and on constitutional complaint.
This constitutional adjudication system has developed its own distinct characteristics which differ
from that of Germany and the United States, namely the two prominent models of constitutional
adjudication. From its birth until now, the Constitutional Court has judged around 37,080 cases and1,709 cases (4.6%) among these were decided to be unconstitutional. Most of the cases are either on
the constitutionality of statutes or on the constitutional complaints. Meanwhile, the two most importantand unprecedented cases of the Constitutional Court would be the dissolution of the Unified
Progressive Party in 2014 and the impeachment of the incumbent President in 2017.
Despite aforementioned attainments, the Constitutional Court of Korea has further tasks to fulfill. The
Constitutional Court needs to practice its authorities within the limits of the Constitution, respect
diversity, strengthen its independence, protect democratic legitimacy and harmonize its decisions with
the Supreme Court.

* This article was funded by the 2020 Research Fund of the Seoul National University Asia-Pacific Law Institute,
donated by the Seoul National University Law Foundation.
**Professor, School of Law, Seoul National University.

37

INTRODUCTION
The Korean Constitution sets forth the basic values and order of the state nation. To be specific,
it defines the governing organization in one part and guarantees the basic rights in the other. Since theConstitution is the supreme legal norm of the society, no governmental authority shall violate theConstitution. The phrase ‘governmental authority’ or ‘governmental power’ in this context includes
the three of the legislative power, the administrative power and the judicial power.
By protecting the basic rights from the abuse of governmental power, mandating the government
to practice its power within the limit of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court protects theconstitutional order. Especially, by subjecting governmental power to the basic rights and securing
procedural legitimacy in practice of governmental power, the Constitutional Court also realizes thesubstantial principle of ‘rule of law’. This function of the Constitutional Court is realized through theconstitutional adjudication system, in which the Court makes a final and ultimate decision on various
constitutional matters based on the constitutional principles.
This is the reason why the Constitutional Court is recognized as an indispensable component of
national governance in Korea, along with the representative system, the separation of powers, theelection system and the local-governing system. The important role the Korean Constitutional Court
and its constitutional adjudication system share in Korean society is also an interesting example forscholars and lawyers of international society.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION: ITS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE
CURRENT SYSTEMThe Constitutional Court of Korea has developed a distinctive constitutional adjudication system

which clearly differs from both the German system and the U.S. system. Examining its historicaldevelopment and reviewing the current system would be necessary to understand Korean
constitutional adjudication thoroughly.
1.

Historical Development
The first Constitution which was enacted in 1948 established two different organs to deal withconstitutional matters: the Constitutional Committee to decide on the constitutionality of statutes andthe Court of Impeachment to decide on the impeachment cases. Ten Justices composed theConstitutional Committee – five of the Justices were Supreme Court Justices and the other five weremembers of the National Assembly – and the Vice President was the Chairman of the Committee. The
Committee existed for 10 years but dealt with only six cases during the period. Two cases of statutes
were decided to be unconstitutional – Article 18(1) and 24(1) of the Agricultural Land Reform Act
and Article 9(1) of the Special Measure Decree on Punishment of Crimes Under National Emergency.

38

In this case, above three provisions were decided to be unconstitutional because they infringed theright to trial to the Supreme Court.
In 1960, the fourth Constitution stated that the Constitutional Court shall be established.
However, the May 16 Military Coup D’etat took place only one month after the enactment of theConstitutional Court Act and the Constitutional Court was never built in reality.
The Constitution of 1962 abolished the Constitutional Court and mandated constitutional
adjudication to the Supreme Court. Within 10 years thereafter, only two cases of statutes were decided
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. In the first case, Article 2(1) of the National Compensation
Act was decided unconstitutional since it infringed the right to claim for damages and the right toequality. In the second case, Article 59(1) of the Court Organization Act was decided unconstitutional
as it violated the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over adjudication on constitutionality of statutes.
Another important decision in this period would be the case on the criminal law clause on rape. The
clause which limited the object of ‘rape’ to ‘women’ and thus concluded that not any male person
could become a victim of the rape crime was decided to be constitutional. Also, according to thedecision of the Supreme Court, the capital punishment in criminal law shall be constitutional.
Finally in 1972, the Supreme Court lost its authority for constitutional adjudication and the eighth
Constitution reintroduced the Constitutional Committee. This constitutional adjudication system gave
the Constitutional Court the authority to decide on the three sorts – the constitutionality of statutes(atthe request of the Supreme Court), the impeachments and the dissolution of political parties. Thissystem existed without any change under the ninth Constitution, but not any decisions were made in
the period of the eighth and ninth Constitution. Namely, the Constitutional Court had its power only
in name.
2.

Current System
The current Constitutional Court was introduced in 1987 by the tenth Constitution. The tenthConstitution which is the current Constitution bestowed upon the Constitutional Court five sorts ofconstitutional review – the adjudication on constitutionality of statutes, the impeachment, thedissolution of political parties, the competence dispute between government institutions or local andfederal organs, and the constitutional complaint.
The Constitutional Court decided on a total of around 37,080 cases from its establishment in 1988
until July 2019. Among them, 1,709 cases were decided to be unconstitutional, which is around 4.6%of the whole decisions. In detail, there were 929 cases on constitutionality of statutes of which 388
cases were decided to be unconstitutional, 2 cases on impeachment of which 1 case was upholding, 2cases on dissolution of a political party of which 1 case was upholding,1 107 cases on competence

1

The second one was a retrial in which the subject matter was the very same with the first trial.

39

dispute of which 19 cases were decided unconstitutional, and 28,765 cases on constitutional complaintof which 1,300 cases were decided to be unconstitutional.2
The Constitutional Court is recognized as an indispensable component to protect the people’s
basic rights from abusive practice of public power and to realize constitutionalism and rule of law
substantially. In particular, the introduction of the constitutional complaint is assumed to be an
important event in the history of Korean constitutionalism. Through this system, individuals can filea case by him or herself directly without prior procedure going through other governmental organs.
II. ORGANIZATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Korean constitutional adjudication system is based on the German model and has adapted somefactors from the system of the United States. This results a distinct system of Korean Constitutional
Court and one of the most characteristic point is that constitutional review is assigned to a separate
court of the Constitutional Court. The function of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court may
collide with each other in some case.
1.

Justices and the Chief Justice
The Constitutional Court is composed of nine Justices who shall be qualified to be court judges

are appointed by the President. Among the nine, three are selected by the National Assembly and theother three are selected by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. As a result, though the President
appoints the nine Justices, only three of them are selected by the President him/herself. The term ofJustices in offices is six years and can be renewed, though there has not been any Justice in the history
to be re-appointed. The retirement age of a Justice is 70.
The Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court is appointed by the President among the Justices,
but with the consent of the National Assembly. The Chief Justice represents the Constitutional Court
and takes charge of the affairs of the court. Being the chairman of the Council of Justices, the Chief
Justice directs the Full Bench of the Court. The term of the Chief Justice in office is six years and theretirement age is 70. Other treatments and remuneration would be the same as the Chief Justice of theSupreme Court.
The status of the Justice is strictly protected and guaranteed for the independence of theConstitutional Court. Justices rule independently following their conscience and in conformity with
the Constitution and relevant Acts. ‘Conscience’ in this context shall not be understood as a personalor subjective one, but rather a professional and objective one. Additionally, Justices are not removed
from office except when in case of impeachment against him/herself or a being sentenced of2

http://www.ccourt.go.kr/cckhome/kor/info/selectEventGeneralStats.do

40

imprisonment without prison labor or heavier. Not any Justice would be suspended from office or havehis/her salary reduced or suffer any other unfavorable treatment except by disciplinary action. Thereinstitutions are all to protect the Justices from external power that force them to decide against theirprofessional conscience.
2.

Procedure of Judgement
The process of a constitutional adjudication begins when a petition is filed to the Constitutional

Court by submitting a written request, either in person, by post or via online and mobile phone. In the
Full Bench consisting of all nine Justices, the presence of seven or more Justices is required to hear acase, and it takes a majority vote for a decision. However, six or more Justices’ agreeing votes are
required in cases falling under any of the followings: deciding a statute unconstitutional, impeaching
the impeached, dissolving a political party, upholding a constitutional complaint and overruling theprecedent of the Constitutional Court on interpretation and application of the Constitution or laws.
There are both oral and written arguments. In the adjudication of impeachment, dissolution of apolitical party and competence dispute, arguments are conducted orally.

On the other hand, in the

adjudication on the constitutionality of statutes and constitutional complaint, arguments are conducted
through papers. Additionally, the Constitutional Court can examine evidence or demand forsubmission of relevant materials if necessary.
When the Full Bench concludes a hearing, the Justices involved prepare and sign a written
decision. In this process, all Justices shall express their opinions on the written decision. The
Constitutional Court shall pronounce the final decision within 180 days after receiving the case for
adjudication. However, the time limit is non-compulsory and exceeding the period does not infringe
the right to trial in conformity with the Constitutional Court Act. The expenses for adjudication by theConstitutional Court shall be borne by the state.
The Constitutional Court adopts the principle of compulsory attorney representation. Thus
claimants or respondents must have an attorney as his or her counsel and have the attorney to pursue
the proceeding. In case an individual has no financial ability to retain an attorney, he or she can beprovided assistance from a court-appointed counsel.
III. ADJUDICATION ON CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTESThe adjudication on constitutionality of statutes is frequently filed and discussed. The diverse
ways of a case of the constitutionality of a certain statute being raised toward the Constitutional Courtand diverse sorts of decisions made by the Court are very important in understating Korean
constitutional adjudication system.

41

1.

Jurisdiction
The Constitutional Court can nullify a statute by deciding it unconstitutional. Through thissystem, the work of legislative branch is examined and the checks-and-balances mechanism isrealized.
The Constitutional Court has its authority on concrete normative control, rather than an abstract
normative control. This means that the Constitutional Court can decide on the constitutionality of astatute only when the constitutionality of the statute is relevant to the judgement of a judicial casewhich is ongoing in ordinary courts such as the Supreme Court3. Additionally, only a statute that isalready enacted and has gone into effect can be an object of the adjudication. Thus an adjudication on
constitutionality of statutes is not an ex ante constitutional review, but an ex post one.
There are three ways a case of the constitutionality of statutes could be filed to the Constitutional
Court. Firstly, an ordinary court can request the Constitutional Court directly and by its own decision
for adjudication in case the ordinary court regards a statue or any provision of the statuteunconstitutional.
Next, the ordinary court can answer the call of the party when it decides the call is persuasive. In
this case, the party cannot request for constitutional adjudication by himself or herself and the request
should be done only through the ordinary court.
Finally, when the ordinary court does not find the call of the party persuasive and reject the call,the individual party may file a constitutional complaint directly. The filing is available only when theordinary court has already rejected the call and this complaint is filed not against the court’s judgement
but only against the statute itself.
2.

Characteristics
In terms of the adjudication on constitutionality of statutes, the jurisdiction differs in accordancewith the legal status of the statute to be examined. When the statute is an Act or laws enacted by the
National Assembly, the jurisdiction belongs to the Constitutional Court. When administrative decrees
or regulations or actions created by the administrative branch are to be examined, the jurisdiction
belongs to the Supreme Court. However in both cases, the statutes can be on adjudication only when
the constitutionality of statutes is at issue in a trial.4
Additionally, any statute of provision thereof decided as unconstitutional shall be ineffective fromthe day in which the decision is made. Only when the statute or provision is related to criminal
punishment, the statute or provision shall be ineffective retroactively. The statute or provision decided

3
In this paper, civil, criminal, administrative, family courts, namely all the courts other than the Constitutional Court would becalled ‘ordinary’ in comparison with the Constitutional Court,
4

Article 107 (2) of the Constitution; Article 41 (1) of the Constitutional Court Act.

42

as unconstitutional cannot be applied to a trial it is concerned. 5 The Court’s decision of
unconstitutionality shall bind the ordinary courts, other state agencies and local governments.6
Lastly, the Constitutional Court does not decide its judgement in only two sorts of ‘constitutional’or ‘unconstitutional’. Instead, the Court can conclude that the statute is ‘partially constitutional andpartially unconstitutional’, or ‘not conforming to the Constitution’. The specific type of a decision
depends on the purpose and necessity to transform the decision upon consideration of the contents ofthe statutes. To prevent confusion caused by the absence of law caused due to the unconstitutionality
decision and to maintain legal stability, the Constitutional Court may refrain itself from deciding astatute unconstitutional and instead decide that the statute does not conform to the Constitution.
IV. ADJUDICATION ON IMPEACHMENT
The impeachment has reinforced the function of Constitutional Court in Korean society in recent
years. Not many Constitutional Courts around the world are assigned of the authority to impeach highranking governmental officials and this system along with the dissolution of a political party enhances
the influence of the Constitutional Court in Korea.
1.

Jurisdiction
If the high-ranking public officials including the President of Korea violate the Constitution orother laws in the performance of their official duties, the National Assembly may pass a motion for
their impeachment. The Constitutional Court has exclusive jurisdiction over impeachment
proceedings brought against certain high-ranking public officials. The subjects of impeachment are as
the followings: the President of Korea, the Prime Minister, members of the State Council, Executive
Ministers, Justices of the Constitutional Courts, judges, members of the National Election
Commission, the Chairman and members of the Board of Audit and Inspection, and other public
officials designated by Act.7
Any person whom a motion for impeachment has been passed shall be suspended from exercising
his or her power until the Constitutional Court makes a final decision on the impeachment case. Whena request for impeachment has reasons for upholding, the Constitutional Court shall pronounce a
decision that the accused person be removed from public office and the impeached person cannot
become a public official for five years.8 Additionally, the decision of impeachment does not exempt
the person from civil or criminal responsibility.

5

Article 47 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act.

6

Article 47 (1) of the Constitutional Court Act.

7

Article 65 (1) of the Constitution.

8

Article 54 (1), (2) of the Constitutional Court Act.

43

2.

Major Cases
There were two cases of adjudication on impeachment in Korean history. Both of them wereagainst the incumbent Presidents and in one of the two cases the President was impeached.
In the first case which was filed in 2004, the Constitutional Court decided to reject the
impeachment of President Noh Moo-hyon from office. The Court reviewed that he had violated theobligation of political neutrality of public officials which was written in the Act on the Election of
Public Officials the Prevention of Election Malpractices and some other constitutional obligations.
However, the Court decided that “the act of violation of law by the President cannot be deemed
to be an evidence of the betrayal of public trust in the President to the extent that the public trust vested
in the President should be deprived of prior to the completion of the remaining presidential term, there
is no valid ground justifying the removal of the President from office”, 9 which means that such
violations were not sufficient enough to justify the removal of the President from office.
In 2017, the Constitutional Court decided to uphold the impeachment of President Park Geunhye from office. She had violated the Constitution and law in the performance of duties, and the subject
matter in this case was whether to concede ‘the existence of a valid ground’ or not. The Constitutional
Court regarded that ‘the existence of a valid ground’ meant that the violation of the Constitution andlaw was grave enough to justify the removal of the President from office.
The Constitutional Court stated “the President’s acts of violating the Constitution and the law area betrayal of the people’s confidence, and should be deemed to be grave violations of the law
unpardonable from the perspective of protecting the Constitution. Since the negative impact andinfluence on the constitutional order brought about by the President’s violations of the law are serious,
we believe that the benefits of protecting the Constitution by removing the respondent from officeoverwhelmingly outweigh the national loss that would be incurred by the removal of the President”10
which means that the violation were grave.
V.

ADJUDICATION ON DISSOLUTION OF A POLITICAL PARTY
The Dissolution of a Political Party which was long considered to be a dead or nullified system

had its first case in 2013. Through this one case, complicated legal principles and precedent logics
were introduced, such as the meaning of freedom of political party, the protection of the basic
democratic order, and the status of the members of the dissolved party.

9

2004. 5. 14. 2004 Hun-Na 1. In this case, 9 Justices, all of the registered members rejected the petition for the impeachment.

10

2017. 3. 10. 2016 Hun-Na 1. In this case, 8 Justices, all of the registered members upheld the petition for impeachment adjudication.
At that time, 1 Justice was on the occurrence of a vacancy.

44

1.

Jurisdiction
If the objectives or activities of a political party do not accord with the basic democratic order,

the Government may request adjudication of dissolution of the political party to the Constitutional
Court. This jurisdiction is assigned to the Constitutional Court to protect the Constitution from thedestruction of.
In one side, the Constitutional Court protects democracy from abusive freedom of political party.
The Constitution guarantees the existence and activities of all political parties, and protects their rights
to the utmost extent. However, at the same time, the Constitution has established a constitutional
limitation on the freedom of activities of political parties so that they do not jeopardize the basic
democratic order.
On the other hand, through this system of Constitutional Court deciding the dissolution, politicalparties might be protected from arbitrary decisions of the Government. That is, a political party canbe dissolved only in certain situations as mentioned above and through this system the Constitutional
Court can double-checking the governmental request whether the government has decided reasonably
or not.
The Ministry of Justice, on behalf of the Executive, files for dissolution of a political party. The
Constitutional Court goes through oral proceedings on adjudication of dissolution of a political party.
It is required that six or more Justices agree for the dissolution in order for the Court to make adecision.11
Regarding two effects of judgements – the confirming effect and the formative effect - thedecision of dissolution of a political party has formative force. When the decision of dissolution of apolitical party is pronounced, the party loses its status as a political party and its privileges. The assetsof the dissolved political party are reverted to the National Treasury.12 Meanwhile, it is prohibited toform a new party that has similar principles to the dissolved party or a substitute party and not anyother party is permitted to use the name of the dissolved party.13
2.

Major Case
In 2013, after deliberation by the State Council, the Government filed a petition to request

dissolution of the Unified Progressive Party to the Constitutional Court. Related to this part, theConstitution provided “if the objectives or activities of a political party are against the basic democraticorder, the government may bring an action against it in the Constitutional Court”.14

11

Article 113 (1) of the Constitution ; Article 30 (1) of the Constitutional Court Act.

12

Article 59 of the Constitutional Court Act ; 48 (2) of Political Party Act.

13

Article 41 (2) of Political Party Act.

14

Article 8 (4) of the Constitution.

45

The subject matters of review in this case were firstly, whether the party’s objectives and activities
violated the basic democratic order, secondly, whether the party should be dissolved, and finally,
whether the lawmakers affiliated with the party should be stripped of their seats when dissolution of
the party. Deciding that the Party's objectives and activities violated the basic democratic order, theConstitutional Court decided to dissolve the Unified Progressive Party in 2014.15
The Constitutional Court affirmed that the objectives or activities of the party had generated aconcrete risk of causing substantial harm to the basic democratic order of our society, and thus werein violation of the basic democratic order. Also the Court added that the decision to dissolve the party
was an inevitable solution to effectively remove the risk posed to the basic democratic order, andtherefore was not in violation of the principle of proportionality. 16 About the third point, theConstitutional Court stated that the members of the National Assembly belonging to the party areforfeited of their seats in the National Assembly regardless of how they were elected, which means it
did not matter whether they were elected as majority representation or as proportional representation.
VI. ADJUDICATION ON COMPETENCE DISPUTE
The Constitution announces the separation of powers. In order to distribute public powers to theright organ and to have different branches to watch over each other, the resolution of conflicts between
state agencies and local governments about authorities and duties is an important constitutional matter.
Additionally, this principle of checks and balances between public powers is also a coordinating
mechanism to protect the basic rights.
1.

Jurisdiction
There are three kinds of adjudications in competence disputes. Firstly, there would be thecompetence dispute between state agencies such as the National Assembly, the Executive, andordinary courts. The second would be the competence dispute between a state agency and a local
government. Finally solving the conflict between local governments such as Metropolitan City,
Province, City, Self-governing District is also a competence dispute.17
The claimant may request adjudication on competence dispute if the respondent’s action andinaction infringes or is clearly in danger of infringing the competence conferred to the claimant by theConstitution or Acts. The Constitution has endowed the Constitutional Court with the jurisdiction on
the adjudication on competence disputes to realize the separation of powers and local self-governing
system.

15

2014. 12. 19. 2013 Hun-Da 1. In this case, 8 Justices upheld the petition and 1 Justice expressed a dissenting opinion.

16

The Unified Party applied for a retrial, but the Constitutional Court rejected in 2016(2016. 5. 26. 2015 Hun-A 20).

17

Article 62 (1) of the Constitutional Court Act.

46

2.

Characteristics
Adjudication on competence dispute resolves disputes regarding existence or scope of thecompetence of state agencies or local governments. The Constitutional Court proceeds an adjudication
in a neutral status according to the Constitution and related laws. Adjudication system on competence
dispute has the following characteristics.
Firstly, the decision on competence dispute shall be made in accordance with majority of nine
Justices. This means with only five Justices agreeing on one conclusion is enough to write a judgement,
unlike in other constitutional reviews. As mentioned above, at least six Justices need to agree on theunconstitutionality of statutes or impeachment or dissolving or accept constitutional complaints.18
Then, when the respondent’s action violates the claimant’s competence seriously and clearly, theConstitution Court may confirm the invalidity of the action which caused the competence dispute.
However, if the action has defects that are not serious and clear, the Constitutional Court may annul
the action. Thus, although the respondent’s action is not just, it may still be in effect.
Finally, the decision on competence dispute by the Constitutional Court shall bind all stateagencies and local governments. However, the decision to nullify an action shall not alter the effect of
already made actions, 19 since legal stability should be protected and legal confusion should be
prevented.
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINT
Any individual whose basic rights are guaranteed by the Constitution can file a constitutional
complaint to the Constitutional Court when his or her right has been infringed by public powers. In
constitutional complaint case, an individual becomes the claimant which is different from otherconstitutional reviews. The introduction of constitutional complaint system has contributed to therevitalization of constitutional adjudication system in Korea.
1.

Jurisdiction
The subject of constitutional complaint is very broad and comprehensive. It is defined that‘exercises or non-exercises of all kind of public powers’ can be the subject of constitutional complaint
and this also includes the legislation of the National Assembly. Here, even the neglects of legislation
are included. That is, in case the National Assembly is mandated to legislate an Act about certain
matter but do not legislate any legal statute, the basic rights are infringed and an individual can file a

18

Article 113 (1) of the Constitution.

19

Article 67 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act.

47

constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Court.
2.

Characteristics
In principle, a decision of an ordinary court is excluded from constitutional complaint by theConstitutional Court Act.20 That is, judicial decision is not included in ‘exercises or non-exercises ofall kind of public powers’. One exemption would be when the ordinary court applies statutes that are
already nullified by the Constitutional Court. In this case, the Constitutional Court can adjudicate a
judgment of the ordinary court. This allegedly aims to guarantee the independence of the judiciary andresolve legal disputes quickly, but many scholars insist that the judgment of ordinary court be includedin adjudication of constitutional complaint to protect basic right being infringed by ordinary courts.
If any other law offers any other means of relief, not any individual may file a constitutional
complaint without having exhausted all such processes.21 This is called the principle of subsidiarity.
This is important because most of actions made by administrative agencies are subjects ofadministrative litigation in ordinary court. Since the claimant has to file an administrative litigation inadvance and the decisions of ordinary courts are excluded from adjudication on constitutional
complaint, many actions of administrative agencies are in fact excluded from constitutional review.
When a constitutional complaint is filed a panel which consists of three Justices conducts a priorreview. The panel screens legal requirements for constitutional complaint. When the panel does notreach an unanimous decision of dismissal, it decides to refer the motion to the Full Bench. When adismissal is not decided within 30 days after request of adjudication on constitutional complaint, it
shall be deemed that a decision to transfer it to the Full Bench is made.22
CONCLUSIONThe Constitutional Court in Korea has allegedly functioned as an organ protecting basic rights
and safeguarding justice since its establishment in 1988. The Constitutional Court has following tasks
to solve to accomplish its role in a stable and complete way.
The qualification for Justices of the Constitutional Court should be broaden to non-legal scholars
and professionals who have insight into humanities, social community and state. The Constitutional
Court Act stipulates that only those who are qualified as judges are eligible for Justices. The
Constitutional Court plays a key role to embody the constitutional value and to realize justice andnational integration. Thus the Constitutional Court Act should be revised to open the door to non-legal
professionals.

20

Article 68 (1) of the Constitutional Court Act.

21

Article 68 (1), (2) of the Constitutional Court Act.

22

Article 72 (4) of the Constitutional Court Act.

48

It is desirable that all Justices are selected by the National Assembly in order to strengthen
democratic legitimacy of the Constitutional Court. The current system gives the President of Korea
excessive authority in appointing the Justices. Considering the fact that the President appoints theChief Justice of the Supreme Court, six Justices and the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court are
selected under the influence of the President.
The Constitutional Court shall exercise its authorities in harmony with the Supreme Court. In theConstitution, the status and power of the Constitutional Court is defined in Chapter 6 of theConstitution and the status and power of the Judiciary is defined in Chapter 5 of the Constitution. Thismeans that the Constitutional Court is a separate and independent branch from the judiciary. The
Constitutional Court shares the authority to interpret the Constitution and laws with the Supreme Court
in equal status or level. Both constitutional institutions should cooperate and collaborate in exercising
their authorities respectively for coherency.
The Constitutional Court shall make greater efforts to sustain its judicial independence, especiallyfrom political influences and populism. Even if the Constitutional Court functions as political-judicial
authority, it shall exercise jurisdiction according to ‘rule of law’ and constitutionalism and not merely
confirm political majority opinions.
Above four tasks are to be improved for the Constitutional Court to carry out its role of protecting
constitutionalism stably and actively. With strong effort of related social sectors and positive interestsof all the members of our society, constitutional adjudication system of Korea would develop further
to protect basic rights and realize social justice.

49

50

5. Constitutional Review in a Strong State: The Case of Singapore
Jaclyn L Neo* and Marcus Teo**

Abstract
This paper examines how Singapore’s courts have navigated their role in constitutional adjudication
within the context of a strong state. Singapore’s courts have generally adopted an attitude tending
toward deference to the political branches in constitutional adjudication, which stems from thecommon law conception of judicial power and their position as actors within a dominant party
democracy. Courts, however, have nevertheless consistently sought to uphold and entrench their
judicial independence. Moreover, they have developed and applied doctrines of public law for at least
three purposes: to ensure that representative democracy remains the basis of legitimate power in
Singapore; to maintain the principle of legality alongside due deference as a limit on all exercises ofpower; and to structure harmonious and deliberative political discourse in society. In doing so,
Singapore’s courts have defended and defined a clear role for themselves as constitutional adjudicators,
suited to Singapore’s legal and political context.

*

Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore.

**

Teaching Assistant, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore.

51

I.

INTRODUCTION
The exercise of the judicial power in public law adjudication – namely, adjudication on disputes

involving constitutional or administrative law issues – is perhaps the most important, yet mostcontentious, aspect of every legal system. To find that ideal conception of the judicial role and power,
courts engaging in public law adjudication must balance between different ideals – between formalism
and substantivism, universalism and contextualism, judicial courage and deference – to find a solutionthat works for their society. Further, since societies are ever-changing, and since public law must adapt
to such changes, the court’s quest in this regard is a never-ending one.
This paper examines judicial review in Singapore, in particular how Singapore courts havenavigated their role in adjudicating the constitutionality of legislative and executive actions within thecontext of a strong state. Although Singapore was a British colony and inherited a Westminster formof parliamentary government upon independence, it did not adopt the United Kingdom’s doctrine ofparliamentary supremacy. Instead, the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore1 (the “Constitution”)
proclaims that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. It goes further to proclaim that any law
inconsistent with the Constitution shall be void to the extent of the inconsistency. This doctrine ofconstitutional supremacy hews closer to the American model of constitutional review asserted by theSupreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, 2 which in more recent times has been called a “judicial
supremacy” model.3 However, despite the possible textual support for such assertive judicial review
powers, the Singapore courts have tended to take a more cautious approach towards judicial review.
The Singapore courts have only struck down a law once for being unconstitutional, though this waslater overturned on appeal to the highest court of the land. 4 Cases involving judicial review of
executive and administrative action have had more success, with several applicants succeeding in
obtaining judicial review remedies. Nonetheless, as studies have shown, the rate of success in thesecases has not been particularly high.5 Notably, the judicial review of executive and administrative acts
is often carried out based on administrative law principles derived from the common law, though they
may at times be mixed with constitutional claims.

1(1999 Rev Ed).

2

Marbury v. Madison 5 US 137 (1803).

3

Stephen Gardbaum, ‘Reassessing the new Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism’ (2010) 8:2 International Journal ofConstitutional Law 167 at 171.

4
See Taw Cheng Kong v. Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 78 (HC), cf Public Prosecutor v. Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR(R)489 (CA).
5
See Lynette J Chua & Stacia L Haynie, “Judicial Review of Executive Power in the Singaporean Context, 1965–2012” (2016) 4:1
Journal of Law and Courts 43. In this article, the authors studied cases from 1965-2012 and concluded that “[o]ut of the 87 decisions
in the High Court, 33% succeeded against the government, meaning that the court ruled at least partially in favor of the applicant,whereas 12 out of the 31 decisions, 39% in the Court of Appeal succeeded.” The authors further observed that “These are substantial
figures in the Singaporean context given the dearth of successful constitutional challenges and the criticisms in law and courts
literature.”52

It is difficult to assess comprehensively why the rate of success for judicial review in Singapore
has been low. One cannot discount the possibility that some of these are unmeritorious cases. At thesame time, other factors such as a judicial philosophy that tends towards deference to the politicalbranches could be in play. Such deference to the political branches stems partly from a strong
adherence to the common law conception of judicial power vis-à-vis the other branches of government.
Strategic reasons may also come to play especially in the context of a dominant party state like in
Singapore where the policy space that judges have to manoeuvre is limited. This deference can befurther disaggregated: there is stronger deference to parliament and a slightly weaker deference to the
executive. This scheme of deference fits closely with the common law approach to judicial review.
While in Singapore judicial review is asserted as part of judicial power, a tradition that traces back to
the American tradition of judicial review, this remains constrained by the legal system’s English roots
where parliament and parliamentary intent tends to be given preeminent status.
Part I examines the different models of public law adjudication within common law jurisdictions.
Part II provides a brief overview of Singapore’s judicial system. It examines the underlying structureand features that ensures judicial power and judicial independence, within the context of a supreme
Constitution. Part III then explains how Singapore’s courts have asserted judicial power in public law
adjudication, to define and limit exercises of legislative and executive powers, and to structure political
discourse, in Singapore.
II. THREE MODELS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE COMMON LAW
The first model of constitutional review is one of a subordinate court exercising powers to ensure
legality of governmental action. This is the model traditionally associated with the courts in the United
Kingdom which work within a long history of parliamentary supremacy, which is “deeply rooted in
Britain’s cultural and legal tradition.”6 Under this model, judicial review is highly limited and there is
no review of legislative acts for legality. Traditionally, courts in the UK employ common law
principles to supervise the acts of inferior tribunals and the executive. This ultra vires doctrine hadlong been premised upon the narrative of the courts upholding parliamentary intent. As Ariel Bendor
and Zeev Segal observe, “[j]udicial activism at large arguably requires a condition-sine-qua-non, i.e.,
convincing judges of their authority and responsibility to rebut governmental decisions withoutharming their impartial status.”7 Until recently, UK courts have been reluctant “to intervene in mattersthat fall into the “no-man’s land” of law and politics, e.g., issues dealing with political questions,which might be due to their perception of their limited role in the legal system.”8 The courts could and6
Ariel L Bendor & Zeev Segal, “Constitutionalism and Trust in Britain: An Ancient Constitutional Culture, a New Judicial Review
Model” (2002) 17:4 American U. Int’l Law Review 683.
7

Ibid at 704.

8

Ibid.

53

have however sought to advance rights-protection through interpretation. In more recent times, theUK Supreme Court has been arguably even more assertive in supervising the legality of executive
action,9 but this still occurs within the context of upholding parliamentary supremacy. Furthermore,even those who have sought to argue for a stronger basis of judicial review have done so within theconfines of upholding parliamentary supremacy. For instance, Mark Elliott’s proposal for a modified
ultra vires principle still relies on parliamentary supremacy as the main conceptual device forgrounding judicial review. He posits that courts give effect to Parliament’s general intention that, whenit creates decision-making powers, it only intends to grant such powers as are consistent with the ruleof law.10 Such proposals and recent developments constitutionalize judicial review, such that the UK
model could be considered ‘constitutional’, albeit in a very limited sense.
A second model of judicial review is commonly associated with the United States’ Supreme
Court, which could be called the “judicial supremacy” model. While parliamentary supremacy“prioritizes the democratic decision-making claims of the political branches at the expense of at least
potentially inadequate protection of rights”, in contrast, “judicial supremacy prioritizes the protectionof rights ... in a way that grants too much power to the judiciary at the expense of democratic decision
making.”11 In this judicial supremacy model, there is a justiciable bill of rights upheld by the Supreme
Court as a fetter on legislative and executive power.
A third model is the Commonwealth model of constitutionalism, which could be positioned
between the model of judicial supremacy and judicial subordination. The Commonwealth model posits
the following features: a legalized bill or charter of rights; some form of enhanced judicial power toenforce those rights by assessing legislation for consistency; and a formal legislative power to havethe final word on what the law of the land is by ordinary majority vote.12 This is a model that better
describes the current position in the UK where after the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act cameinto force on 8 October 2000, courts were empowered to review legislative acts for compatibility withthe relevant human rights but did not have the power to strike them down. The thinking behind thismodel is that it draws an intermediate balance between two models: parliamentary supremacy, on the
one hand, and judicial supremacy, on the other. Stephen Gardbaum argues that the model provides abetter balance between two “foundational values”, namely “the recognition and effective protectionof certain fundamental or human rights and (b) a proper distribution of power between courts and theelected branches of government, including appropriate limits on both.”13

9

See e.g. R (on the application of Miller) (Appellant) v. The Prime Minister (Respondent) [2019] UKSC 41.

10

See Mark Elliott, The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (Hart Publishing, 2001).

11

Gardbaum, supra note 3 at 171.

12
Ibid at 171; see also Stephen Gardbaum, ‘The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism’, (2001) 49 American Journal ofComparative Law 707.
13

Gardbaum, supra note 3 at 171.

54

Notably, different models may apply to describe the institutional design of constitutional review
but not the actual practice of constitutional review in a particular country. Singapore arguably sits
uneasily between the commonwealth constitutional model and the parliamentary supremacy model,
even though its institutional structure could even be said to have been modelled after the Americanmodel of judicial supremacy.
Another important observation is that these models were derived from constitutional systems
with general courts having the power to review the constitutionality or legality of governmental actions.
None of the courts within these common law systems are specialist constitutional courts, which may
be staffed by non-legally trained officials, and which hear only constitutional matters.14 This has greatsignificance since judges in a generalist court, like the Supreme Court of Singapore, need to have more
expansive expertise and their case load involves a greater range of issues. Thus, while the legitimacyof generalist courts may be impacted by their constitutional review decisions, this is not necessarily
the case. In contrast, the legitimacy of constitutional courts squarely hinges upon their constitutional
review decisions.
In the next section, we will examine the constitutional structure of the courts before going on to
examine recent cases demonstrating the cautious and somewhat more deferential approach that theSingapore courts have taken in constitutional cases.
III. SINGAPORE’S COURTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEWAs mentioned, constitutional review in Singapore is exercised by generalist judges in a generalist
court, which is staffed by legally-trained Judges which adjudicate on all civil and criminal matters.
The Supreme Court is made up of the High Court, which hears all substantive public law disputes atfirst instance; and the Court of Appeal, which exercises appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of theHigh Court, and which is the highest court of Singapore. Only the Supreme Court can exercise thepower of judicial review – although there other courts in Singapore which are subordinate to theSupreme Court (such as the State Courts), Article 93 vests the judicial power only in the Supreme
Court, and only the Supreme Court has the power to grant orders sought by applicants in judicial
review proceedings.15 But within the Supreme Court, the power of judicial review is not “centralised”
within a specific tribunal or coram. Rather, it is “decentralised”,16 meaning that any Judge sitting on
the High Court can judicially review any law or executive act, and find it unconstitutional or illegal,
with all such decisions being finally appealable to the Court of Appeal.

14

Alec Stone Sweet, “Constitutions, rights, and judicial power” in Daniele Caramani ed, Comparative Politics (Oxford University
Press, 2017) at 159-160.

15
Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) s 18(2) and 29A, read with the First Schedule. By contrast, Singapore’sState Courts lack the power of judicial review (State Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed) s 19(3)(b)), and cannot hear substantive
constitutional challenges (Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209 (CA) at [11] and [32]).
16

For a discussion of “centralised” vs “decentralised review”, see Stone Sweet, supra note 14 at 159-160.

55

Article 4 of the Constitution states that all legislation inconsistent with the Constitution shall, tothe extent of that inconsistency, be void. The power of constitutional review is not explicitly provided
for in the Constitution, but has been asserted and affirmed by the courts.17 For instance, in Chan Hiang
Leng Colin v. Public Prosecutor, one of the earliest constitutional review cases, the then Chief Justice
Yong Pung How, sitting as the High Court, stated that:“The court has the power and duty to ensure that the provisions of the Constitution
are observed. The court also has a duty to declare invalid any exercise of power, legislativeand executive, which exceeds the limits of the power conferred by the Constitution, or
which contravenes any prohibition which the Constitution provides.”18
Furthermore, in Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v. Public Prosecutor, the Court of Appeal
stated:“In a constitutional system of governance such as Singapore’s, the courts are
ordinarily vested with the power to adjudicate upon all disputes. … [J]udicial review forms
a part of this power to adjudicate, and concerns that area of law where the courts review
the legality of government actions: … In the normal course of events, all controversies,
whether of fact or of law, are resolved by the courts. This work is done in accordance withthe applicable rules of adjectival and substantive law, and it is the function of the courts todetermine what the facts are and also to apply the relevant rules of substantive law to thosefacts. Judicial review concerns an area of law in which the courts review the lawfulness ofacts undertaken by other branches of the government.”19
The courts have also affirmed their co-equal status with the other branches of government,20 suchthat constitutional review is seen as a “core aspect” of their judicial power21 and part of their judicial
function under a scheme of separation of powers in Singapore.
Singapore’s Supreme Court generally only carries out “concrete”, a posteriori judicial review,
based on actual cases or controversies brought before it by individual applicants who have locus standi
to do so;22 it generally will not perform “abstract” review of hypothetical scenarios, and will not review

17

Law Society of Singapore v. Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [149] (HC); Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor [2011]
2 SLR 1189 at [84]-[85] (CA).
18

Chan Hiang Leng Colin, supra note 15 at [50] (HC).

19

Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v. Public Prosecutor [2019] 2 SLR 216 at [46] (CA).

20

Tan Seet Eng v. Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [90] (CA).

21

Nagaenthran, supra note 19 at [71].

22This generally requires the applicant to either have had his personal rights violated (Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney-General [2012] 4
SLR 476 at [115] (CA)); have suffered “special damage” by virtue of a public right being violated (Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v.
Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1 at [33] (CA)); or be able to show that a “very grave and serious breach…of legality” has occurred(Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v. Attorney-General [2014] 1 SLR 345 at [62] (CA)).

56

legislation or executive acts a priori.23 The only exception to this rule involves the President’s power
under Article 100 of the Constitution to seek an advisory opinion on “any question as to the effect ofany provision of [the] Constitution which has arisen or appears to him likely to arise”. If this Article
is invoked (though it rarely is),24 an ad hoc Constitutional Tribunal consisting of 3 Judges of theSupreme Court will be constituted to issue an advisory opinion on the hypothetical constitutionalquestion posed to it by the President.
Judicial independence is key to the proper assertion of the judicial power, because it helps ensurethat judges are not disincentivised from checking exercises of legislative and executive power, andadjudicating disputes between people and the State.25 The Constitution contains express safeguards
for judicial independence including setting out clear rules for judicial appointment, security of tenure
and remuneration.26 Supreme Court judges are appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime
Minister, who must consult with the Chief Justice on the issue. Judges have security of tenure andremuneration up until the age of 65 – they can only be removed by a counsel of their peers, and only
on grounds of misbehaviour or inability. However, such measures to ensure judicial independence are
not extended to all judges. Lower court judges, namely the District Judges of the State Courts, do not
enjoy such protection.27 Neither do Judicial Commissioners and Senior Judges – people qualified tobe Judges of the Supreme Court who are on de facto probation before being confirmed as Judges;28
and people who were once, but have since retired from being, Judges of the Supreme Court, 29
respectively – although they also sit on the Supreme Court.
The judicial power and function in Singapore rests upon a scheme of separation of powers, which
has been recognized by the courts as being part of the Constitution’s basic structure. In Mohammad
Faizal bin Sabtu v. Public Prosecutor, Chan Sek Keong CJ noted that under “[t]he Singapore
Constitution…the sovereign power of the State is distributed among three organs of state, viz, theLegislature, the Executive and the Judiciary”, and that “[t]he principle of separation of powers…istherefore part of the basic structure of the Singapore Constitution”.30 This idea that a Constitution has
a “basic structure” which stands above and beyond its text derives from the Indian Supreme Court
decision of Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala.31 In this case, the court held that amendments to
the Constitution which are procedurally-proper but which derogate from the Constitution’s essential

23

For a discussion of “concrete” vs “abstract, and a posteriori vs a priori review, see Stone Sweet, supra note 14 at 160.

24

Article 100 has only ever been invoked once, in Constitutional Reference No 1 of 1995 [1995] 1 SLR(R) 803.

25

Chan Sek Keong, “Securing and Maintaining Judicial Independence” [2010] 22 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 229 at [3].

26

See Constitution Art 95.

27

See Michael Hor, “The Independence of the Criminal Justice System in Singapore” [2002] SJLS 497 at 504.

28
Constitution Art 95(4)(a); Thio Li-ann, A Treatise on Singapore Constitutional Law (Singapore: Academy Publishing, 2012) [Thio,
Treatise] at 02.114.
29

Constitution Art 95(4)(b).

30

Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v. Public Prosecutor [2012] 4 SLR 947 at [11] (HC) (emphasis added)

31

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461 (Indian SC).

57

features (or the “identity” of the Constitution itself) would be unconstitutional and invalid. This basic
structure doctrine has been hugely influential in constitutional courts across the world,32 although theSingapore courts have yet to conclusively embrace the doctrine.33 As Jaclyn Neo points out, while
Singapore courts have agreed that it is a legal fact that Singapore’s Constitution has a basic structure,they have yet to determine what legal doctrine would follow from that legal fact.34
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A STRONG STATE IN SINGAPORE
Judicial review has to be contextualized. Courts do not operate in a vacuum but within specificpolitical conditions. Tom Ginsburg has argued that “political and institutional structure…are the keys
to understanding the development of judicial review…the extent of political diffusion determines how
successful courts can be in asserting the power [of judicial review]”.35 Accordingly, where there is aconcentration of political power like in Singapore, there will presumably be less space for courts as
there is generally less division in the policy space. Singapore’s ruling party, the People’s Action Party(the “PAP”), has won every general elections and formed the government since Singapore’s
independence in 1965. In other words, it has been in power for almost 60 years. During this time, it
has dominated politics in Singapore, without a strong opposition in place. The PAP has never had lessthan 90% of the seats in Parliament.36 This has critical constitutional implications. Under Article 5 of
the Constitution, Parliament need only achieve a two-thirds majority of votes to amend “the provisionsof [the] Constitution”.37 The Singapore Parliament can exercise (and has in practice exercised) the
power to amend the Constitution on a frequent basis. Thus, Singapore has been called “fundamentally
undemocratic”38 and “competitively authoritarian”,39 and served as Mark Tushnet’s primary example
for “authoritarian constitutionalism”, which he describes as a model where “liberal freedoms areprotected at an intermediate level, and elections are reasonable free and fair.”40

32

See Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments (Oxford University Press, 2017) at 39-70.

33

See Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor [2015] 2 SLR 1129 at [69] (CA); Ravi s/o Madasamy v. Attorney-General [2017] 5 SLR
489 at [65]-[66] (HC).
34

Jaclyn L Neo, “Towards a “Thin” Basic Structure Doctrine in Singapore”, I-CONnect Blog (17 Jan 2018), available at:
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2018/1/towards-a-thin-basic-structure-doctrine-in-singapore-i-connect-column/

35

Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (Cambridge University Press, 2003) at
19.
36

Although the PAP has garnered as little as 60% of the popular vote in some elections, Singapore’s electoral system operates on afirst-past-the-post system, which, together with the Group Representative Constituency system (see infra note 57 and accompanyingtext), creates a “winner takes all” situation whereunder a political party which garners more than 50% of votes in a constituency wins
all (3-6) of the seats therein (see Thio, Treatise, supra note 28 at 02.083 and 03.012).
37

The only express limits on Constitutional amendments are those found in Articles 6-8 of the Constitution, concerning control over
the Singapore Armed Forces and the Singapore Police Force.
38
Sebastian Reyes, “Singapore’s Stubborn Authoritarianism”, Harvard Political Review (29 Sep 2015), available at
http://harvardpolitics.com/world/singapores-stubborn-authoritarianism/
39

Steven Levitsky & Lucan A Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism” (2002) 13:2 Journal of Democracy 51 at 52.

40

Mark Tushnet, “Authoritarian Constitutionalism” (2015) 100 Cornell Law Review 391 at 396.

58

Thus, as Yap Po Jen observes, a system like Singapore, which has a dominant party within thelegislature and with such powers of the legislature in relation to constitutional and statutory
amendment, may stultify attempts by courts to play a more active constitutional role through judicial
review.41 This is compounded by a deferential philosophy that could at least be said to partially stemfrom the courts’ common law roots. This is reflected for instance in how the courts insist that theyshould not assess the merits of legislative or executive acts,42 that they lack institutional competence
to consider polycentric matters or evaluate socio-economic policy,43 and that they should encourage“good government through the political process and public avenues rather than redress bad
government through the [judicial process]”.44
Indeed, Jack Lee points out in a 2015 article that there really have been only three cases in which
the courts disagreed with the government’s interpretation of the Constitution.45 The first is Chng Suan
Tze v. Minister for Home Affairs, a 1988 judgment where the Court of Appeal decided that, contrary
to the government’s assertion, it had the power to objectively review the exercise of ministerial
discretion to detain persons without trial under the Internal Security Act. 46 The second case was
decided in 1998 where the High Court ruled in Taw Cheng Kong v. Public Prosecutor that theprovision in the Prevention of Corruption Act which extended extra-territorial reach to citizens ofSingapore taking bribes overseas violated the equal protection clause (Article 12(1)). 47 This was
however overturned by the Court of Appeal.48 The last occasion he mentions was in 2013, when the
Court of Appeal held in Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General that the government’s assertion
that the Prime Minister had absolute discretion whether and when to call for by-elections where acasual vacancy had arisen in a single-member constituency was incorrect. The Court interpreted
Article 49 of the Constitution, which states that where a seat “has become vacant for any reason otherthan a dissolution of Parliament, the vacancy shall be filled by election” to mean that the Prime
Minister must call for a by-election although he has a wide remit to determine the appropriate time forthe by-election to take place.49 Another important case where the court disagreed with the government,
which was decided after Lee’s article was published is the case of Tan Seet Eng v. Attorney-General.50

41

Po Jen Yap, Courts and Democracies in Asia (Cambridge University Press, 2017) at 19-20.

42

Tan Seet Eng, supra note 20 at [91]-[93].

43

Ibid.

44

Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew, supra note 22 at [48] and [50].

45Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, “Foreign Precedents in Constitutional Adjudication by the Supreme Court of Singapore, 1963–2013” (2015)24:2 Washington International Law Journal 253 at 261.
46

Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 (CA).

47

Taw Cheng Kong HC, supra note 4.

48

Taw Cheng Kong CA, ibid.

49

Vellama, supra note 22 at [54]-[82] (CA).

50

Tan Seet Eng, supra note 20 at [95] and [97].

59In this case, the Court of Appeal invalidated preventive detention orders issued by the government on
the basis that they did not fall within the scope of the empowering legislation.
These cases nevertheless demonstrate the potential for judicial review to place constitutional
limits on political power. The Singapore model appears to be grounded in a view that judicial review
should be exercised only in extreme cases. This may be reflected for instance in a 2016 speech where
Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon stated that “[j]udicial review is the sharp edge that keeps government
action within the form and substance of the law”.51 However, a significant activity that could be missed
if one only looks at outcomes is the continuing normativization of constitutional law in Singapore.
This refers to the phenomenon where beyond the specific findings in the case, there are many morecases where the courts have developed jurisprudential doctrines that would serve to imbue
constitutional review with more normative depth.52
In this regard, Singapore’s courts have provided a strong legal basis in the way they
conceptualized their role within the constitution. First, law defines the basis of all legislative andexecutive power in Singapore. Thereunder, courts maintain and affirm Singapore’s commitment to“representative democracy” as its fundamental governing principle. Second, law defines the limits ofpower in Singapore. Here, notwithstanding the due deference they accord to the elected branches ofgovernment, courts apply the principle of “legality” as a hard limit on all exercises of legislative andexecutive power in Singapore. Third, law can structure political discourse in society without defining
its content. Here, courts use “balancing” as a tool to ensure harmonious and deliberative political
discourse in society.
1.

Representative Democracy and the Basis of PowerThe first role of law in public law adjudication in Singapore is the protection of representative

democracy. At the heart of representative democracy is the citizen’s right to vote. Without such a right,
citizens simply cannot be sure that their government represents them in any meaningful sense. In thecase of Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General,53 the centrality of representative democracy
and the right to vote to Singapore’s system of government came to the fore. At issue there was whether,
upon the resignation of an MP from a Single-Member Constituency, the Prime Minister had an
obligation to call a by-election to fill that seat. Article 49 of the Constitution states that vacantparliamentary seats “shall be filled by election in the manner provided by...any law relating to
Parliamentary elections”. This provision was the outcome of a previous constitutional amendment in
1963, which removed express wording requiring such a by-election to be called within three months

51

Sundaresh Menon, “The Rule of Law: The Path to Exceptionalism” (2016) 28 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 413 at [30].

52

See Jaclyn Neo, “Unwritten Constitutional Norms: Finding the Singapore Constitution”, Singapore Law Gazette (May 2019),
available at: https://lawgazette.com.sg/feature/unwritten-constitutional-norms-finding-the-singapore-constitution/.
53

Vellama, supra note 22.

60

of the vacancy of that seat. During the 1963 debates leading up to that constitutional amendment, theGovernment had clearly contemplated that the removal of such express wording would free theGovernment of the day from any obligation to hold by-elections for such vacant seats.54 The Court ofAppeal in Vellama held that in a Westminster system, citizens had a right to be represented. This inturn meant that the Prime Minister had a duty to call for a by-election when seats in Single-Member
Constituencies fell vacant, within a “reasonable time” of such vacancy.55 Within this affirmation ofrepresentative democracy is an implied a right to vote. Indeed, in a later case of Yong Vui Kong v.
Public Prosecutor,56 the Court of Appeal recognized that if there was a basic structure to the Singapore
Constitution, the right to vote could possibly form part of that basic structure.
The impact of this reasoning in Vellama concerning the right to be represented, however, hasarguably been narrowed in Wong Souk Yee v. Attorney-General, which involved facts similar to
Vellama, save that the parliamentary seat vacated was one in a Group Representation Constituency(“GRC”). The GRC scheme was introduced in 1988, which requires certain (in, fact, the majority of)electoral constituencies to elect their MPs in groups of 3-6 rather than as individuals, and requires eachsuch group to contain an MP from a racial minority group.57 The case arose when a minority MP
resigned her seat to contest in the presidential elections. The Court of Appeal held that the Prime
Minister had no duty to call for a by-election when “one or more of [the members of a GRC] hasvacated his or her seat”58 because the statute only provided for a by-election when all members of the
GRC had vacated their seats. Yet, while this latter decision may be criticised on other grounds,59 it isimportant for our purposes that the Court there was prepared to decide on the basis that, in principle,“the right to representation forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution”.60
2.

Principle of Legality
The principle of legality has been developed as a basis of judicial review in Singapore, although

its content remains rather limited.61 The principle of legality as understood in Singapore stems from aparagraph in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Chng Suan Tze v. Minister of Home Affairs, that “allpower has legal limits”.62 This means first that all exercises of governmental power must be subject
to “limits”, which means that “subjective or unfettered discretion” cannot exist. Secondly, these limits

54

Ibid at [61]-[72].

55

Ibid at [80]-[85].

56

Yong Vui Kong, supra note 33 at [69]-[70].

57Constitution Art 39A.

58

Wong Souk Yee v. Attorney-General [2019] 1 SLR 1223 at [78] (CA).

59

Namely, that it neglects the Group Representation Constituency system’s purpose of maintain racial representation in Parliament.

60

Wong Souk Yee, supra note 58 at [78].

61

See Jaclyn L Neo, “All Power Has Legal Limits: The Principle of Legality as a Constitutional Principle of Judicial Review” (2017)29 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 667.

62

Chng Suan Tze, supra note 46 at [86].

61are “legal”, meaning that “the courts should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary power”.63
Today, in Singapore, the notion that there must be some legal limits on the legislative and executive
power, enforceable by courts, is well-established. In the context of the executive power, the principleof legality comports clear limits. For instance, in James Raj s/o Arokiasamy v. Public Prosecutor, theCourt of Appeal held that although an accused person’s right to counsel could be delayed for a“reasonable time” by the police for the sake of expeditious and efficient police investigations, such adelay would be unconstitutional if it unreasonably hindered the accused person’s “undoubted right tolegal representation”.64
In Singapore administrative law, the principle of legality also imposes the limits of illegality,
irrationality and procedural impropriety on executive powers. Those three grounds of administrative
law judicial review apply uniformly, regardless of the subject-matter expertise or institutional
competence of the executive decision-maker in question: in Chng Suan Tze, the Court of Appeal
affirmed that, while “[t]hose responsible for national security are the sole judges of what action isnecessary in the interests of national security”, “the normal judicial review principles of ‘illegality,
irrationality or procedural impropriety’” were always available;65 and subsequently, in Tan Seet Eng
v. Attorney-General, the Court of Appeal affirmed that those three grounds of judicial review werealways available to the court, “even for matters falling within the category of ‘high policy’”, and thatwhen enforcing those grounds of judicial review, “the question of deference to the Executive’s
discretion simply does not arise”.66 Likewise, those three grounds of judicial review will also apply to
all executive decision-makers regardless of their constitutional authority: in Nagaenthran a/l K
Dharmalingam v. Public Prosecutor, the Court of Appeal held that the “rule of law” entailed that any
executive decision-making power, constitutional or otherwise, should always be subject to review on
grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety – and further, that any legislation whichmight purport to exclude such grounds of judicial review would be unconstitutional and invalid.67
3.

“Balancing” and the Structure of Political Discourse
The third important development in public law adjudication in Singapore is the structuring ofpolitical discourse in society. Courts have on occasion invoked the idea of “balancing” when
determining whether legislative and executive power has been exercised constitutionally. In Review
Publishing v. Lee Hsien Loong, the Court of Appeal hypothesized obiter how it might address thequestion of whether the tort of defamation should recognise a defence of Reynolds privilege (i.e. a

63

Ibid (emphasis added).

64

James Raj s/o Arokiasamy v. Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 SLR 750 at [31] and [39] (CA).

65

Chng, supra note 46 at [89] and [119].

66

Tan Seet Eng, supra note 20 at [99] and [106].

67

Nagaenthran, supra note 21 at [51] and [69]-[74].

62defence in defamation suits for defendants who can show that their statements meet a standard of“responsible journalism”), which turned on the extent to which Article 14(2) preferred freedom ofspeech over the protection of reputation. The Court would have to “strik[e] [a] balance between
freedom of expression and protection of reputation” by making “a value judgment which depends
upon local political and social conditions”.68 Whether and how this balance should be struck would bea fact-specific inquiry, involving how Singapore’s “political, social and cultural values”, the public
policy on the “media’s role in society” and Singapore’s “political culture” stood at the given time.69
Thus, the court used “balancing” as a metaphor to suggest that law had to remain socially-legitimate
and contextual, and reactive to continued political discourse on the matter.70
The use of “balancing” tests in constitutional rights adjudication, however, is not without
controversy, because courts who use such tests are sometimes seen as deciding contentious politicaldebates and ruling on the merits of legislative or executive acts – as compared to simply upholding“representative democracy” or the “principle of legality”, which are now fairly uncontroversial normsof constitutionalism in Singapore. For this reason, the use of “balancing” tests has often been criticised
as undemocratic and invocative of the judiciary’s “counter-majoritarian difficulty”. These critics, inturn, argue that such political and policy-laden issues should be left firmly to the democratic process
for resolution. 71
However, such criticism may not hold much water against the balancing tests used by Singapore’s
courts, which have been used not determine political debates in the abstract and remove civil society’s
ability to resolve those debates itself, but rather to ensure that the law takes a calibrated approach tothe facts of each case before the court, and remains reactive in general to Singapore’s evolving sociopolitical culture. Through balancing, courts can confine clashes between rights and public policy tothe particular facts of individual cases and resolve them for the purposes of that case only: one value
outweighs the other, but plural value systems are still recognised, since on different facts the othervalue might triumph instead. Thusly, the court “demonstrates respect for the dignity of the disputing
parties”,72 and “keeps everyone in the game, thereby enhancing its legitimacy”.73 Moreover, courts
carrying out “balancing” help “identify and thoughtfully explicate the policy concerns implicated withclarity and purpose” through its reasoning process, and can identify issues which the government or

68

Review Publishing v. Lee Hsien Loong [2010] 1 SLR 52 at [270]-[271] (CA) (emphasis added).

69

Ibid at [272]-[285].

70

For a discussion of how it did this, see Thio Li-ann, “Between Apology and Apogee, Autochthony: the ‘Rule of Law’ Beyond theRules of Law in Singapore” (2012) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 269 at 290-294.
71
See Jaclyn L Neo, “Balancing act: The balancing metaphor as deference and dialogue in constitutional adjudication” in Jaclyn L
Neo ed., Constitutional Interpretation in Singapore: Theory and Practice (Singapore: Routledge, 2016) [Neo, “Balancing”] at 96 fora summary of these critiques.
72

Sundaresh Menon, “Taming The Unruly Horse: The Treatment Of Public Policy Arguments In The Courts” (Speech given at theHigh Court of Sabah and Sarawak, Kota Kinabalu, 19 Feb 2019) at [57].

73

Neo, “Balancing”, supra note 71 at 95.

63

civil society may want to deliberate further and determine more conclusively, thereby “enlarg[ing] thespace for democratic debate and civic participation, and enrich[ing] the public life of the country”.74
So understood, the use of balancing does not allow courts to decide on the merit of the content oflegislative or executive acts, but merely to resolve disputes in a way that structures harmonious anddeliberative political discourse on pertinent issues.
CONCLUSION
A society’s public law cannot be abstract and unchanging, but must accord with the fundamental
values and practices of that society as it evolves over time. The role of the court, therefore, is todevelop and apply public law in this manner.75 Singapore’s courts have done this by, first, upholding
and entrenching their independence; and second, by using their judicial power to ensure that
representative democracy remains the basis of all legitimate exercises of power in Singapore, tomaintain the principle of legality alongside due deference as a limit on all exercises of power, and to
structure harmonious and deliberative political discourse in society. As the Court of Appeal noted in
Tan Seet Eng v. Attorney-General, such “judicial modesty must go hand in hand with judicial courage”
to enforce the law, for “while it is one thing to say that the court must not substitute its view as to theway in which [legislative or executive power] should be exercised, it is quite another to say that
the…exercise of [such power] may not be scrutinised by the court at all.”76 Thus, the notion of judicial“deference” within Singapore public law adjudication must be understood with some nuance.
Singapore’s courts will always accord “weak” or “minimal” deference to legislative or executive
acts:77 they will not assess those acts based on their merits,78 and will place the burden of proving theunconstitutionality and legality of those acts on applicants raising such challenges. 79 However,Singapore’s courts are reluctant to accord “strong” or “substantial” deference – in the sense of
abstaining, in total or in significant part, from adjudicating upon legislative or executive acts at all80 –if doing so would go against the “principle of legality”, which has been called a “basic principle inconstitutional and administrative judicial review” in Singapore.81

74

Menon, supra note 72 at [57]-[59]; see also Neo, “Balancing”, ibid at 96-97.

75

See Thio Li-ann, “Principled pragmatism and the ‘third wave’ of communitarian judicial review in Singapore” in Jaclyn L Neo ed.,Constitutional Interpretation in Singapore: Theory and Practice (Singapore: Routledge, 2016) for an overview of how Singapore’s
courts have done this over time.
76

Tan Seet Eng, supra note 20 at [95] and [97].

77

See Alison L Young, “In Defence of Due Deference” (2009) 72:4 Modern Law Review 554 at 562-563; Aileen Kavanagh,“Defending deference in public law and constitutional theory” (2010) 126 Law Quarterly Review 222 at 228; Neo, “Balancing”, supranote 71 at 89-90.

78

Tan Seet Eng, supra note 20 at [91]-[93].

79

Lim Meng Suang v. Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 at [104] (CA).

80

Young, supra note 77 at 560-562; Kavanagh, note 77 at 228; Neo, “Balancing”, supra note 71 at 89-90.

81

Chan Sek Keong, “Judicial Review – From Angst to Empathy” [2010] 22 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 469 at [8].

64

6. The Constitutional Review Models from Transitional Countries:
A case of Russia
Fumito Sato*

Abstract
The Russian Constitutional Court was established in 1991 as the consequence of the profound politicaland social transformation of Soviet society. Since then, the Constitutional Court performed the role ofreformer of Russian constitutional order, generator of contemporary ‘living constitutionalism.’ This
paper briefly examines the history, composition, authorities, and the essential attributes of judicial
precedents of this unique institution, and evaluates its performance. One of the core distinctions of theRussian Constitutional Court, compared with its Asian counterparts, is that it cooperates with theinternational judicial organization in the field of human rights protection. This paper sheds light on
the relationship between the Russian Constitutional Court and the ECtHR and attempts to reveal thecontradictory position, which the Constitutional Court holds under today’s complicated politicalsituation in Russia.

*

Professor, Graduate School of Law, Nagoya University.

65

INTRODUCTION
In Russia, the Constitutional Court (hereinafter, the Court) is a relatively young institution. It wasestablished in 1991 at the last stage of Perestroika based on the Austro-German model1. During theSoviet era, the integral principles and concepts of constitutional adjudication like separation of powers,
independence of the judiciary, human rights, and constitutionalism were denied as products ofbourgeois ideology. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the state’s highest body, and its Presidium werevested with the power to ensure observance of the Soviet Constitution2. However, until the late 1980s,
this function had not been invoked3.
The establishment of this Court was one of the most prominent developments, which symbolized
the systemic transformation from the communist regime in the field of law. Since then, the Court, an
institution enshrined in the Constitution of 1993 as a keystone of the ‘rule of law state,’ contributed
tremendously to transform old socialist legal order into the new one. One of the Judges of the Court,
Nikolai Bondar’ explicated that the Court performed a role of “reformer of Russian constitutionalism,
generator of contemporary “living” constitutionalism,”4 and the Constitutional control changed theConstitution from a mere legal act into “living law.”5The main aim of this paper is to elaborate on the basic attributes of the Russian Constitutional
Court, its composition, and authority. Furthermore, this paper will shed light on the underlying featuresof the Court’s activity. Such a pre-context will enable the author to eventually assess the actual
condition of "judicial constitutionalism" in Russia.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT –ITS HISTORY,COMPOSITION, AND AUTHORITY
1.

Brief history prior to the establishment of the Constitutional Court of 1994
When the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR established the Court in 1991, it was expected that thisnew institution would oversee not only the legislative body but also the Presidency and the judiciary.
As an example, citizens could submit a constitutional complaint to this Court against alleged
encroachment of their constitutional rights, when a “law application practice” (pravoprimenitel'naja
praktika) infringed such rights6. The concept of a “law application practice” means a well-established1Ведомости Съезда народных депутатов РСФСР и Верховного Совета РСФСР. 1991. № 19. Ст. 621.

2

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was vested with the power to control the observance of the Constitution of the
USSR and guarantee the conformity of constitutions and laws of union republics to the Constitution and laws of the USSR (Article
121, section 4 of the Constitution of the USSR of 1977).
3
In 1988, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR invoked this authority against decisions of the Azerbaijan and Armenian SSRs regarding
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Declaration of the state independence of the Estonian SSR.
4Бондарь Н. С. Судебный конституционализм: доктрина и практика. 2-е изд. М., Норма. 2016. С. 95.

5

Там же, С. 118.

6

Article 66 of the Act on the Constitutional Court of the RSFSR of 1991. См. Коваленко К. А. Понятие «сложившаяся
правоприменительная практика» в федеральном конституционном судопроизводстве// Журнал конституционного

66

judicial practice. One of such examples included a “guiding explanation of the Plenum of the Supreme
Court” that interpreted legal norms in an abstract manner regardless of concrete cases7. The Court,
therefore, in this respect, played the role of the quasi-higher court over the ordinary courts.
Simultaneously, the Court was competent to examine the constitutionality of the individual acts anddecisions of the Russian President both on the request from select state authorities and the Court’s own
initiative8.
In the fall of 1993, President El'tsin suspended the operation of the Russian Parliament based on
the presidential decree, following a conflict between him and the legislature. The Constitutional Court,
on its initiative, held that decree unconstitutional. The President, in turn, suspended the activity of the
Court 9 . Soon after this coup d’état, in December 1993, the current Constitution of the RussianFederation was enacted through a national referendum. Even though the Court was not dissolved andformer judges still maintained their terms of office, the composition and authority of the Court went
through certain modifications10.
In 1994, the Court lost its authority to independently initiate the examination of the President’s
decisions. Within the procedure of a constitutional complaint, the Court could only examine theconstitutionality of laws that allegedly violated fundamental rights of citizens. The Court lost its
authority to review the “law application practice,” and hence cannot control the judicial practice ofordinal courts again. Simply speaking, the Court lost its status as the highest body of the judicial branch.
2.

Judges and the Chairman of the Russian Constitutional Court
The Court consists of 19 judges11. The Federal Council appoints judges upon the proposals fromthe President12. The judge’s term of office is not restricted, excluding the requirement to retire at theage of 7013. Initially, the Court’s judges voted and elected the Chairman of the Court in the plenary
session 14 . In 2009, after the Constitutional Court Act was amended on the proposal of President
Medvedev, the Federal Council obtained authority to appoint the Chairman of the Court upon the
Russian President’s proposal. The Chairman’s term of office is six years. In 2010, this position wasправосудия. 2012. № 1.
7
Article 56, section 1 of the Act on the Judiciary of the RSFSR of 1981. The guiding explanation was issued in the form of theDecision of the Plenum of the Supreme Court.
8

Article 74, section 2 of the Act on the Constitutional Court of the RSFSR of 1991.

9Подробнее см. Авакьян С. А. Конституция России: природа, эволюция, современность. 2-ое изд. М., РЮИД. 2000. С. 171184.
10

СЗ РФ. 1994. № 13. Ст. 1447.

11

Article 125, section 1 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993.

12

The Federal Council is the Upper House of the Federal Assembly (Parliament), composed of the representatives of legislative andexecutive bodies of each constituent entity of the Russian Federation.

13
Article 12 of the Act on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 1994 (revised by the Federal Constitutional Law on
5 April 2005 No.2-FCL).
14
Article 23, section 1 of the Act on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 1994 (before the amendment thereof by
the Federal Constitutional Law on 2 June 2009 No.2-FCL).

67

exempted from a retirement age restriction15.
3.

Structure and location of the Court
Previously, the Court’s structure included a plenary session and two chambers. As an example,

the Plenary Session had competence to examine the conformity of constitutions or charters of theconstituent entities of the Russian Federation to the Federal Constitution. Unlike the relationshipbetween sections and grand chambers of ECtHR, the plenary session of the Russian Court could not
quash the rulings of a chamber. In 2010, the two chambers were abolished. Now, it is only the sessionthat is eligible to examine every case that the Court recognizes as “permissible”16.
Initially, the Court was located in Moscow. Since 2008 the Court has been relocated to SaintPetersburg. It now operates in the building of the Governing Senate (Pravitel'stvujushchij Senat), theformer Supreme Court of the Russian Empire.
4.

Authority of the Court
The authority of the Russian Court is similar to the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany.

First, according to the Constitution and the Constitutional Court Act, the Court resolves cases
concerning the conformity to the Constitution of the Russian Federation of legal regulations (federallaws, legal acts of the President, constitutions of republics, charters, and laws of constituent entities of
the Russian Federation)17 and international agreements of the Russian Federation, which have notentered into force18, i.e. abstract norm control19. Second, the Court exercises a concrete norm control,
or in other words, performs a constitutional review of law arising in specific cases forwarded byordinary courts 20 . Third, the Court tests the constitutionality of law applied in a specific case in
response to complaints of citizens against the alleged violation of constitutional rights and freedoms,
i.e., constitutional complaint21. Forth, the Court resolves competence disputes between; federal bodies,federal bodies and bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, and state bodies of15СЗ РФ. 2009. № 23. Ст. 2754.

16

Article 21 of the Act on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 1994 (revised by the Federal Constitutional Law on
3 November 2010 No.7-FCL).
17

Article 125, section 2, item a) - c) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993; Chapter 9 of the Act on theConstitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 1994.

18
Article 125, section 2, item d) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993; Chapter 10 of the Act on the Constitutional
Court of the Russian Federation of 1994.
19

Petitions for abstract review can be lodged by the President of the Russian Federation, the Federal Council (the Upper Chamber),the State Duma (the Lower Chamber), more than one-fifth of MP of each Chamber, the Federal Government, the Supreme Court,
Legislative and executive bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation.

20

Article 125, section 4 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993; Chapter 13 of the Act on the Constitutional Court of
the Russian Federation of 1994.

21

Article 125, section 4 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993; Chapter 12 of the Act on the Constitutional Court of
the Russian Federation of 1994.

68

constituent entities of the Russian Federation 22 . Fifth, the Court gives interpretations of theConstitution23. The Court also gives conclusions on compliance with the procedure for accusing thePresident of the Russian Federation of treason or the commission of another grave offense, i.e., theexamination on impeachment procedure of the President24. Furthermore, it examines the treaties on
the admission of foreign countries or a part of them into the Russian Federation as its new constituent
entity25. In addition, the Court also reviews the constitutionality of the implementation of decisions ofinternational human rights protection organizations26.
Unlike the German Court, the Russian Court cannot handle issues related to a ban on politicalparties. As mentioned earlier, the scope of the constitutional complaint is also limited only to thereview of the constitutionality of laws, and the Court does not examine the application of laws by the
executive or judicial branches. A relatively weak authority of the Court is the outcome of the politicalconfrontation with the President in 1993.
5.

Legal force of a Judgement
The Court’s ruling is final and cannot be appealed. A ruling has a general binding force and, inprinciple, a prospective effect. That means legal regulations which had been declared unconstitutional
lose their force for the future. However, in case of a constitutional complaint, a judgment of the Court
has a retroactive effect on the case, in which the judgment was rendered. In such situations, a retrial
in the civil or criminal procedures follows whenever a retrial is necessary to give remedy for victims.
Accordingly, in order to implement rulings of the Court, cooperation from legislative and judicial
branches is essential. In this respect, however, the Chairman of the Court sometimes blames the nonimplementation of its rulings by them27.
II. THE PRACTICE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Now, the Russian Court annually renders about 30 to 40 judgments. Furthermore, it also renders

22

Article 125, section 3 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993; Chapter 11 of the Act on the Constitutional Court of
the Russian Federation of 1994.

23

Article 125, section 5 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993; Chapter 14 of the Act on the Constitutional Court of
the Russian Federation of 1994.

24

Article 125, section 7 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993; Chapter 15 of the Act on the Constitutional Court of
the Russian Federation of 1994.

25

This authority is vested to the Constitutional Court, not by the Constitution or the Act on the Constitutional Court but the Act on
the procedure for admitting to the Russian Federation and forming in its composition a new constituent entity of the RussianFederation, enacted in 2001. This procedure was for the first time applied in the case of the annexation of Crimea in March of 2014(Постановление Конституционного Суда РФ от 19 марта 2014 г. N 6-П). The proceeding of the case was criticized by theprofessor of the High School of Economics, Elena Luk'janova, and this issue became a popular topic among the general public. См.
Лукьянова Е. А. #КРЫМНАШ: Спор о праве и о скрепах двух юристов и их читателей. М., Кучково поле. 2015.

26

Chapter 131 of the Act on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 1994. This authority will be analyzed in section 4.

27Дмитрий Медведев провел судебные слушания// Коммерсантъ, 16 июля 2008; Валерий Зорькин стал думским
лоббистом// Коммерсантъ, 21 январь 2009.

69

‘decisions.’ According to the Constitutional Court Act, the merit of a case is resolved in the form of ajudgment, and a procedural issue is settled in the form of a decision28. During its activity, however,
the Court developed the practice of decisions29. Some decisions reveal the meaning of Constitutional
provisions, especially by demonstrating interpretations of legal norms which do not contradict theConstitution. Such interpretation is expected to be considered and respected in ordinary courts.
Therefore, one may assert that the Court of 1994 was set up as the legislature’s watchdog, while inpractice, it has also been trying to affect the judiciary’s practice.
In order to illustrate the basic features of practices of the Court, its activity of 2015 will be taken
as an example. During this year, a total of 14622 cases were lodged to the Court, and it rendered 34
judgments. Among them, only one judgment did not recognize any violation of the Constitution. In 19
cases, the provisions of legal norms were regarded as unconstitutional. In 17 cases, the Court revealed
interpretations of laws which conformed with the meaning of the Constitution. In 14 cases, the Court
explicitly demanded the legislature to amend legal regulations. Furthermore, the Court rendered 3111
decisions30.
1.

Basic trends of the rulings
The Court has played a crucial role in reforming Russian old socialist legal order. It is this Court

that had introduced in Russia the case law system. According to this system the specific cases reveal
the meaning of legal norms and make these norms obligatory in the form of precedents. The old
fashioned, inquisitorial, criminal proceeding was also reformed based on many judgments of the Court.
In general, the Court contributed to eliminating obstacles and enhancing the level of human rights
protection.
On the other hand, the 1993 political confrontation seriously affected the activity of theconstitutional adjudication in cases touching upon the separation of powers31. When the Court comes
across with issues on the Presidency or cases with political interest, it generally stands on the side of
the Presidency.
The most prominent example is the 1995 Chechen case32. In this case, the Court endorsed the28

Article 71 of the Act on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 1994.

29Витушкин В. А. Определения Конституционного Суда Российской Федерации: особенности юридической природы. М.,Норма. 2005; Петров А. А. Решения Конституционного Суда Российской Федерации: конституционно-правовое
исследование: монография. Иркутск, Фонд «Право и Демократия». 2012; Сивицкий В. А. О динамике типологии решений
конституционного суда Российской Федерации// Журнал Высшей школы экономики. Право. 2012. № 2; Смирнов А.В.
Взаимосвязь видов решений Конституционного суда Российской Федерации, их оснований, целей и способов правого
толкования// Журнал конституционного правосудия. 2012. № 3.

30Информационно-аналитический отчет об исполнении решений Конституционного Суда Российской Федерации,принятых в ходе осуществления конституционного судопроизводства в 2015 году (электронный ресурс). Available at:
http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/Info/Maintenance/Informationks/Pages/ReportKS2015.aspx (Accessed: 31 August 2019).

31

The conclusion of the Constitutional Court, which declared the El’tsin’s decree unconstitutional, only heightened the tension
between the President of the State and the Parliament, and, at the end, lives of hundreds of persons within the Parliamentarybuilding were lost by a bombardment of the President’s tanks.

32Постановление Конституционного Суда РФ от 31 июля 1995 г. N 10-П.

70theory of so-called presidential “implicit powers.” 33 According to this theory, the President has
authority (and in the instant case, president could order to the Ministry of Defense to send troops tothe domestic regions, i.e., to the Chechen Republic), which can be deduced from the abstract provisionof the Constitution. The President can invoke such authority without any statutory empowerment. In
the Chechen case, Article 80, section 2, which enables the President to “adopt measures to protect thesovereignty of the Russian Federation, its independence and state integrity,” justified the troops’
development into Chechnya in the ‘extraordinary situation’ without the permission from the upper
chamber of the Parliament.
The December 21, 2005 judgment is another bright example. In this case, the Court altered its
old precedent of 1996, which demanded the constituent entity of the Russian Federation (in this case,
Altai region) to select its governor through direct elections by the local population34. The judgment of2005 justified a new appointment procedure of governors, according to which the President of theRussian Federation nominated candidates, and a local parliament appointed a governor among them.
This new procedure was proposed by the President Putin in 2004 in the context of confronting theterrorism accident, known as the Beslan School Siege. The 2005 judgment replaced the old precedentof 1996, which protected the political interest of former President El’tsin by a new one, which
supported Putin’s federal reform 35 . The Court justified the precedent change by stating thatinterpretation of the Constitution would be changed according to the transformation of its surroundingsocial and historical contexts, including “concrete socio-legal conditions.”36 According to this logic,
the transformation of ordinary laws endorses the change of the interpretation of the Constitution, which
has higher authority than any other legal act. The 2005 judgment was, therefore, vehemently criticizedas distorting the idea of the supremacy of the Constitution by Judge Anatolij Kononov in his persuasive
dissenting opinion37.
2.

Method of judicial review
At this point, it would be beneficial to make a cursory glance at methods of judicial review of the

Court. As a consequence of the introduction of German-style constitutional review, the Russian Court
accepted the principle of proportionality in order to assess the conformity of law to the Constitution38.
Article 55, section 3 of the Constitution is the legal basis of this principle. It states that “the rights andfreedoms of human and citizen may be limited by the federal law only to such an extent to which it is33Комментарий Эбзеева Б. С., Комментарий к постановлениям конституционного суда Российской Федерации. т. 1. М.,Норма. 2001. С. 244-245.
34Постановление Конституционного суда РФ от 18 января 1996 г. N 2-П.

35

См. Авакьян С. А. Почему «наместники» лучше «баронов»// Российская Федерация Сегодня. № 24. 2004.

36Постановление Конституционного Суда РФ от 21 декабря 2005 г. N 13-П.

37Особое мнение судьи Конституционного Суда РФ А. Кононова в Постановлении КС РФ от 21 декабря 2005 г. N 13-П.

38

См. Толстых В.Л. Конституционное правосудие и принцип пропорциональности// Российское правосудие. № 12. 2009.

71

necessary for the protection of the fundamental principles of the constitutional system, morality, health,
the rights and lawful interests of other people, for ensuring the defense of the country and security of
the State.”
In Russia, like other countries, the proportionality test consists of four criteria. First, theobjectives of the legislation are examined as to whether it pursues a legitimate aim. In practice, thelegitimacy of objectives is, in most cases, positively recognized by the Court. Second, the test ofsuitableness or rational basis test is applied. In 2013, the Court held a provision of the Labor Codeunconstitutional because it barred the person from working as a teacher when he or she was convictedof a criminal offense, which did nothing to do with an educational profession39. The third test is about
necessity. If there are less restrictive alternatives, the legal restraints are regarded as unconstitutional.
For example, in 2002, a prohibition against attorney’s right to participate in the hearing of civil trial
when he or she does not have access to the state secret was regarded as unconstitutional because there
are other less restrictive options as in-camera hearings40. The last test relates to proportionality in anarrow sense.
There is some criticism among scholars about the actual practice of applying proportional test by
the Court41. The Court, for example, tends to acknowledge traditional and conservative values like“special role of women for child-raising” as constitutionally relevant. Such a social value is applied
as a rationale for the constitutional review in order to justify the constitutionality of the legislations
without any sufficient justification42. It is also criticized that the Court acknowledged the principle ofproportionality on the surface, but it actually often did not apply it and reviewed cases only by“measuring by eye.”43
III. FIREWALL FOR CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY？ RUSSIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT AND EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Lastly, a new function of the Courts, which was assigned in the middle of 2010s in connection
with Europe, must be mentioned here. One of the prominent distinctions of Russian legal order fromthose of Asian countries is that Russia ratified the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in
1998, and Russian state authorities are now under the jurisdiction of European Human Rights
protection44.
39

Постановление Конституционного Суда РФ от 18 июля 2013 г. N 19-П.

40Определение Конституционного Суда РФ от 10 ноября 2002 г. N 314-О.

41Троицкая А. Пределы прав и абсолютные права: за рамками принципа пропорциональности? Теоретические вопросы ипрактика Конституционного Суда РФ// Сравнительное конституционное обозрение. № 2. 2015. С. 57.
42

Белов С. Пределы универсальности конституционализма: влияние национальных ценностей на практику принятия
решений конституционными судами// Сравнительное конституционное обозрение. № 4.2014. С. 50.

43Белов С. А. Ценностное обоснование решений как появление судебного активизма Конституционного Суда Российской
Федерации// Сравнительное конституционное обозрение. № 2. 2012. С.147.
44

Nußberger A. The Reception Process in Russia and Ukraine in H. Keller and A. Stone Sweet (eds.) A Europe of Rights: The

72

The first judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) against Russia was rendered
in 2002. Since then, the number of cases submitted to and pending in the ECtHR kept increasing year
by year. In 2010, the number of pending cases reached more than 40000. Because of multiple problems
in the domestic court system, many Russian citizens regard the ECtHR as an effective remedy for theprotection of rights and legal interests.
In the first decade of this century, ordinary courts, headed by the Supreme Court of the RussianFederation, were reluctant to refer to the precedents of ECtHR45. It was not uncommon that judges
lacked basic knowledge of its application, though Article 15, section 4 of the Constitution makes
international treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation a component part of its legal system.
In this context, the Court acted as a mediator between Russia and Europe. The Court frequently quoted
provisions of the ECHR and judgments of ECtHR, considered itself as the translator of European
precedents into Russian law 46 . The general measures, which are introduced into Russia based on
judgments of ECtHR, are also supported by the assistance of rulings of the Court. For instance, theCourt introduced a permanent moratorium on death penalty sentences in 200947. We can also take acase of 2010, which recognized a judgment of ECtHR as a ground for opening a retrial in civil
litigation48.
In some cases, the Court refers to case-law of ECtHR while ignoring its original context in orderto justify a restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms49. The Court, however, earnestly invoked
the Convention, especially in cases when the right to a fair trial, provided in Article 6 of the European
Convention, was violated. Such activities of the Court contributed to decreasing cases, lodged from
Russia, and pending before the ECtHR. In other words, the Court, to some extent, succeeded in“bringing human rights into the home.”50
Since 2010, the friendly atmosphere between the two Courts disappeared, and dissonance hascome to the fore. This new situation was prompted by the judgment of ECtHR on the famous Markincase in 2010, in which discrimination against male military personnel was examined. The applicant,Konstantin Markin requested childcare leave for three years, which was guaranteed for female soldiers.
Russian Army, however, rejected his request, and Russian courts also did not recognize his action. He,
Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems, OUP, 2008.
45

About implementation of ECHR in Russia, see, Burkov A. The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on Russian
Law: Legislation and Application in 1996-2006, Ibidem-Verlag, 2007; Бурков А. Конвенция о защите прав человека в судах
России. М., 2010.
46
Коротеев К. Место Европейской Конвенции о защите прав человека и основных свобод в аргументации решений
Конституционного Суда РФ// Сравнительное конституционное обозрение. 2013. № 4. С. 69-70.
47Определение Конституционного Cуда Российской Федерации от 19 ноября 2009 г. N 1344-О-Р.

48Постановление КС РФ от 26 февраля 2010 г. N 4-П.

49Например, см. Постановление КС РФ от 7 июня 2012 г. N 14-П.

50

E. Pamfilova depicted the main task of Russia in the 2000s in terms of European human rights protection as “bringing humanrights into the home.” См. Памфилова Э.А. Главная цель международного права – «принести права человека домой». Под
ред. Буркова А. Л. Применение Европейской конвенции о защите прав человека в судах России. Екатеринбург, Изд-во Уралун-та. 2006.

73

therefore, applied to the ECtHR. This issue was also reviewed by the Court in 200951. The Court did
not recognize the violation of equal treatment between men and women. ECtHR, however, in its ruling,examined the reasoning of the Court thoroughly, rejected its reasoning in detail, and held that decisionof the Russian Army infringed applicant’s right protected by the Convention52.
The Chairman of the Court, Valerij Zor’kin, immediately responded to the ruling by publishing
his article in the state official newspaper, the Russian Gazette. He asserted that in Russian legal order,international treaties and agreements were subordinate to the Constitution, and the interpretation of
the Constitutional Court must not be overturned by the interpretation of the Convention by ECtHR.
He emphasized as a conclusion that Russia reserved a power to establish “a protective mechanism,”
which defended Russia form violation of its state sovereignty53.
Since this statement, discussion over “the protective mechanism” repeatedly emerged, especiallyamong the discourse of politicians54. Finally, in 2014 the first step towards its realization was taken.
The legislature introduced a new procedure. According to it, domestic courts were obliged to raisequestions to the Court on the constitutionality of legal norms, when its examination is required in orderto review the cases based on the decision of international human rights protection organizations55. In
this procedure, it is expected that if a legal norm, which was regarded as constitutional by the Court,
was, however, declared as encroaching on human rights by ECtHR, then domestic courts, in the retrialof that case, were to ask the Court for an opinion.
This new procedure attracted public attention and invited criticism as an attempt to overturn thejurisdiction of ECtHR. This new authority of the Court, however, leaves room for acceptance as a tool
to find out an acceptable way in terms of the domestic constitution to implement the individual andgeneral measures posed on Russia by rulings of the ECtHR56. This amendment of the Constitutional
Court Act still may be regarded as a way to seek a compromise and consensus with the European legal
order. In 2015, we witnessed the second attempt for establishing “the protective mechanism,” and its
core attributes, however, differ from its first step in 2014, as was mentioned above.
In July 2015, in response to the petition for abstract norm control, the Court held that a ruling of
ECtHR, which was based on the unconstitutional interpretation of the European Convention, was not
obligatory for Russia 57 . Subsequently to this judgment, the Constitutional Court Act was once

51Определение КС РФ от 15 января 2009 г. N 187-О-О.

52

Markin v. Russia, 7 October 2010.

53Зорькин В. Предел уступчивости// Российская газета. 29 октября 2010.

54Торшин А. Выбор России// Российская газета. 12 июля 2011; Исаева М. Сергеева И. Сучкова М., Россия и Европейский
Суд: реформы или конфронтация? // Арбитражный и гражданский процесс. № 10-11. 2011.

55

СЗ РФ. 2014. № 23. Ст. 2922. This amendment of the Act on the Constitutional Court is the direct outcome of the judgment of
the Constitutional Court on 6 December 2013, which handled the case raised from the Leningrad Regional Court based on the retrialof the Markin case. См. Постановление КС РФ от 6 декабря 2013 г. N 27-П.

56Вайпан Г. Трудно быть богом// Сравнительное конституционное обозрение. 2016. № 4.

57Постановление КС РФ от 14 июля 2015 г. N 21-П.

74

amended. The federal executive bodies, which are in charge of defending the interests of the RussianFederation in international human rights protection organizations, and in this context, the Ministry ofJustice, are vested with a new authority. The Ministry of Justice is, now, able to ask the Court about
the possibility to constitutionally implement a decision of international human rights protection
organizations, purporting to contradict the Russian Constitution58. Furthermore, the Constitutional
Court Act explicitly provides that the Court renders a judgment regarding “impossibility” toimplement an unconstitutional decision of international human rights protection organization59.
Though this new ‘protective mechanism’ is denounced as ignoring duty to recognize thecompulsory character of the jurisdiction of the European Court by Russian liberals and the Venice
Commission of COE60, the Court has already invoked this authority two times on the request of the
Ministry of Justice. In a case, when uniform disfranchisement of prisoners, based on Article 32, section
3 of the Constitution, was regarded as a violation of the ECHR61, the Court stated that it was impossible
to provide prisoners with the right to elect and be elected without a constitutional amendment. At thesame time, the Court, in its ruling, suggested the legislative way to evade from this impasse without
any constitutional reform 62 . In this case, the Constitutional Court demonstrated its readiness tocooperate with Europe63. In the second case, when the implementation of damages of the so-called
Jukos case was examined64, the Court simply rejected the possibility of its implementation65.
According to the 2015 judgment, the Court now undertakes the task of defending the‘constitutional identity’ of the Russian Federation. This function resembles to a firewall on thecomputer, which monitors and drives back the inventions from outside. The concept ‘constitutional
identity’ can contain variable meanings and nuances, starting from liberal up to conservative or
traditional ones, as was often seen in Western and Central Europe66. However, a closer look at thepractice of the Russian Court, especially in this decade, shows that the Court has assumed a role ofdefending values, which is something different from what the Court tried to pursue during the periodof systemic transformation.

58

Chapter XIII.1 of the Act on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 1994(revised by the Federal Constitutional
Law on 12 December 2015 No.7-FCL). СЗ РФ. 2015. № 51. Ст. 7229.
59

Article 104.4 of the Act on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 1994.

60

CDL-AD (2016)005.

61

Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia, 4 July 2003.

62Постановление КС РФ от 19 апреля 2016 г. N 12-П.

63Дедов Д.И. Решение системной проблемы социальной адаптации// Российский ежегодник ЕСПЧ. № 3. 2017. С. 14;
Морщакова Т. О некоторых актуальных проблем конституционного правосудия// Сравнительное конституционное
обозрение. 2017. № 3. С. 120. About criticism against this judgment, см. Пушкарская А. Конституционный суд впервые
разрешил не исполнять решение ЕСПЧ// Коммерсантъ. 19 апреля 2016.

64

OAO Neftyanaya kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 31 July 2014.

65Постановление КС РФ от 19 января 2017 г. N 1-П.

66

See Arnaiz A. S. and Llivina C. A. (eds.) National constitutional identity and European integration, Intersentia, 2013.

75

CONCLUSIONThe Russian Constitutional Court has been demonstrating judicial activism since its
establishment in 1991. It does not hesitate to render judgments, which hold legal regulations
unconstitutional. Russian citizens recognize the positive role of the Court in the field of human rights
protection. The fact of the trust of citizens is well supported by numerous complaints lodged with the
Court. This might be considered as good evidence of the notion that even in the states with a hybrid
regime, the constitutional judiciary can play a decisive role and be active in certain fields of law.
Nevertheless, one must not overlook the fact that activism of the Constitutional Court ceases toexist when cases interact with political interests67. For example, the Court did not pay attention to the“chilling effect” in its rulings when issues on freedom of expression were examined. Cases on theprinciple of horizontal and vertical separation of powers were also resolved in favor of the Presidency
and the central government.
In addition, the Court took a task to safeguard Russian ‘state sovereignty’ and ‘constitutional
identity’ against ‘inventions’ from outside. This task was assigned by legislative measures.
Nevertheless, one has to admit that its basic concept was already elaborated by the judgment of the
Court based on the enthusiastic contribution of the Chairman Zor’kin68. In this aspect, we are now
witnessing endeavors of the ‘guardian of the Constitution’ to seek its ‘raison d'etre’ seriously in orderto survive under the complicated political situation in Russia.

67Коротеев К. Указ. соч., С. 80.

68Например. см. Зорькин В.Д. Взаимодействие национального и наднационального правосудия: новые вызовы иперспективы// Журнал конституционного правосудия. № 5. 2012.

76

7. Specifics of the Late Soviet Constitutional Supervision Debate:
Lessons for Central Asian Constitutional Review?
Aziz Ismatov*

Abstract
This research will trace in detail the legislative process that paved the way for the establishment of theSoviet Committee of Constitutional Supervision (hereinafter, the CCS). This late Soviet practice ofconstitutional review offers some lessons for contemporary Uzbekistan, as despite a long list of rights in
its 1992 constitution and a separate constitutional court, a contemporary Uzbekistan’s constitutional
review has been largely non-existent. In fact, since the collapse of the Soviet Union almost 29 years ago,
the Uzbekistan’s Constitutional Court has issued fewer decisions than the Soviet CCS issued in 18 monthsof its short but fascinating life. This article will therefore shed light into the previous positive lessons from
Soviet constitutional supervision, and argue that contemporary constitutional review bodies in Central
Asia should now to make several steps back to make a reference to the previously omitted, but highly
valuable and helpful judicial experience. Such experience, including in the area of fundamental rights
protection, offers a positive feedback and distinct case-law that may stimulate a more vigorous approaches
towards constitutional judiciary.

Keywords; Constitutional review, constitutional supervision, socialist law, Soviet Union, Uzbekistan,Committee of Constitutional Supervision, constitutional court.

*

Designated Assistant Professor, Center for Asian Legal Exchange, Nagoya University.

77

I.

TRADITIONAL VARIATIONS BETWEEN THE SOCIALIST AND NON-SOCIALISTAPPROACHES TOWARDS JUDICIAL REVIEWThe classic socialist state doctrine in the former Soviet Union and Soviet bloc countries of Eastern

Europe had generally rejected the principles of judicial review over the constitutionality of legislation as
incompatible with the principles of democratic centralism which prioritized a supremacy of legislature.1
There are, broadly speaking, several substantive reasons given for the importance of the legislature in asocialist state. In the words of western professors of socialist law, the primary is that “the legislature isconceived to be the supreme expression of the will of the people and beyond the reach of judicial
restraint”.2 A leading Soviet commentator Chkhikvadze asserted that legislation, not judicial decisions,
was recognized as the sole source of law in the socialist system. 3
According to the Marxist-Leninist jurisprudence, the socialist state concept conflicts with a doctrineof separation of powers and, hence, opposes the rule of law concept.4 Historically, socialist states often
allocated public functions between the legislature, executive and judicial segments in such a way that thesethree authorities collaborated under the direct and strict supervision of the communist party.5 In the context
of democratic centralism as interpreted by quasi Marxist Soviet ideas, the party, while being represented
by the will of the people, morally obtained an unlimited power to rule for achieving good results.
Simultaneously, the socialist legal theory highlighted the supremacy and power of the party-led legislature
as a fundamental law-making body. Therefore, the named three segments of power in socialist states wereby no means separate or equal.
Hence, the socialist legal doctrine rejected any idea of the judicial review over the constitutionalityof legislation by any separate extra-legislative (extra-parliamentary) bodies which naturally did not havean authority to represent the party and, therefore a people (i.e. citizens). This is not, however, to assert thatsocialist system rejected any form of judicial review. Judicial review was usually vested with thelegislative bodies which, like the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, exercised many of the1

Similar approaches alongside with idea of necessity to introduce specific constitutional review mechanisms still exist in Vietnam, Laosand China. Refer further to Hand, Keith J., ‘An Assessment of Socialist Constitutional Supervision Models and Prospects for a
Constitutional Supervision Committee in China: The Constitution as Commander?’ in John Garrick and Yan Chang Bennett, China’s
Socialist Rule of Law Reforms Under Xi Jinping, (Routledge 2016); Hualing Fu et al., Socialist Law in Socialist East Asia (Cambridge
University Press, 2018).
2
John Newbold Hazard, William Elliott Butler, and Peter B. Maggs, The Soviet Legal System: The Law in the 1980’s (Published for theParker School of Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia University in the City of New York, by Oceana Publications, 1984), 320
3Victor Mikhailovich Chkhikvadze, The Soviet State and Law (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1969), 221; René David, Major Legal
Systems in the World Today : An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law /, 3rd ed. (London : Stevens & Sons, 1985), 240; Hazard,
Butler, and Maggs, 40.
4Mary Ann Glendon, Michael W. Gordon, and Christopher Osakwe, Comparative Legal Traditions: Text, Materials, and Cases on the
Civil Law, Common Law, and Socialist Law Traditions, with Special Reference to French, West German, English, and Soviet Law.,
American Casebook Series (St. Paul, Minn: West Pub. Co., 1985), 226–27.
5

Article 6 of the 1977 Constitution of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, (1977).

78

“powers of the parent body”.6 In practice, such bodies did not exercise a constitutional review in a form
that existed in the non-socialist jurisdictions. According to socialist legal doctrine, an individual who
believed that his constitutional rights had been violated could file a complaint in the executive branch
supervising the institution that had been responsible for the alleged violation or in the appropriate officeof the procurator.
From a non-socialist perspective, there are two principal moments highlighting the importance of
judicial review. As a primary reason, scholars and practitioners assert that judicial review is a fundamental
element of the rule of law state. Western legal literature mainly states that the rule of law state creates
borders between authoritarian and free states.7 Attanasio, while comparing socialist and non-socialist statemodels, asserts that in the rule of law state, individual conscience of free people cannot co-exist withcollective interests.8 Russian based scholars, for example, Shul’zhenko discusses the issue in a similar way
by addressing the need of separation of power for democratic rule of law state.9 Both scholars also point
to the unconditional necessity to have real and effective system of judicial review as essential element forexistence of such democratic rule of law state. In sum, the primary reason presupposes that an effective
system of judicial review in which judges are authorized to examine and, if necessary, declare the decisionsof the legislature and executive branches void, specifically when it comes to the question of fundamental
rights, is an absolute component of the rule of law.
A second reason, which is particular in newly emerging democracies, is the assertion that effective
judicial review is an instrument to ensure and give effect to the primacy of international law over domestic
law. As demonstrated by ongoing practice, true and effective constitutional review mechanisms adopted
aftermath of the collapse of socialism in select Eastern European jurisdictions, demonstrate positive
tendency of making domestic laws compatible with universally accepted standards, especially those
covering fundamental human rights.
Arguments presented above are hardly new or original except for demonstrating certain common
approaches among western and non-western (predominantly Russian-based) doctrines regarding socialist
and non-socialist judicial review principles. However, this research will also draw to the hypothesis that
centralist phenomenon continued affecting judicial review mechanisms, and eventually the rule of law
concept, even after the collapse of the socialism in the former socialist states, particularly ex-Soviet Central
Asia where democratic centralism has gradually transformed into presidential centralism.

6
Article 121, ibid; Refer also to Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World, Edition: First edition. (Bobbs-Merrill,1971), 7. Note; Supervision over the observance of laws was vested in the procurator-general who was often appointed by and responsible
and accountable to the supreme legislative body.
7
Jane Henderson, “The First Russian Constitutional Court: Hopes and Aspirations,” in Rein Müllerson, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, and Mads
Andenas, Constitutional Reforms and International Law in Central and Eastern Europe (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998), 382.
8

John Attanasio, B. “The Russian Constitutional Court and the State of Constitutionalism.” St. Louis Law Journal 38: (1994), 889.

9

Yu. Shul’zhenko, Konstitutsionniy Kontrol’ v Rossii [Constitutional Review in Russia], (Moskva, RAN, Institut Gosudarstva i Prava,
1995), 14.

79

II. PRE-HISTORY. A BRIEF BUT FASCINATING EXPERIMENT WITH SOVIETCONSTITUTIONAL SUPERVISIONAs a state based on a Leninist, quasi Marxist concept of democratic centralism, the USSR
implemented a socialist public legal doctrine in which supreme legislature enacted and amended theconstitution and gave concrete legal effect to its provisions.10 The Congress, led by the Communist Party,
was the highest organ of the state power and, as such, beyond any form of judicial review.11 In other words,
this organ had an uncontested authority and no agency could review its decisions. For most of the socialist
period, this constitutional arrangement therefore left no room for adequate constitutional review oflegislation or executive acts.
In the 1980s in socialist Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, a growing desire to build‘socialism with a human face’ gave rise to a wide-scale public debates that challenged these centralized
principles. In particular, these debates included a robust discussion of the possibility of inventing a socialist
version of rule of law and rights-based judicial review. A formalized decision to initiate in the former
Soviet Union a “socialist state under the rule of law” appeared first in July 1988 in the CPSU Resolution‘On Legal Reform’. 12 This document initiated a series of long-term political negotiations on the
introduction of a special mechanism, initially at the Union level and, subsequently, at the republican levels,that would have an authority to supervise the constitutionality and legality within the realities of the state
centrist system.
The Congress level deliberations regarding the future model of the proposed judicial review
institution in the USSR started at the second half of the 1980s. Notably by 1950, different constitutional
review bodies existed in most civilized states of the globe.13 Mixed types of judicial control institutions
also existed since the post-WWI period in socialist states of Eastern Europe such as Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary.14 Some of these states started a process of reconstruction of their
judicial review systems in the post-Stalin era. One example is Yugoslavia, which first launchedexperiments with the forms of judicial review and, later in 1963, established the Federal Constitutional
Court and the special constitutional courts.15

10

The Congress of People’s Deputies (S’yezd Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR) and the USSR Supreme Soviet (Verkhovniy Sovet SSSR)

11

See B. N. Topornin, Konstitutsiia v Sotsialisticheskom Pravovom Gosudavstve [The Constitution in the Socialist Rule by the Law State],in Sotsialisticheskoe Pravovoe Gosudarstvo 24, (1989), 35.
12

Izvestiya, July 5, 1988. Supplement No. 29.

13

Refer to Mauro Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (Clarendon Press, 1989); Edward McWhinney, Supreme
Courts and Judicial Law Making: Constitutional Tribunals and Constitutional Review (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1986)

14

Austrian centralized type of control, Political control (Constitutional Committees within the Parliament), Supreme Administrative
Tribunals. Refer further to Rett R. Ludwikowski, ‘Constitution Making in the Countries of Former Soviet Dominance: Current
Development’, 23 Journal of International and Comparative Law 155 (1993), 92-94.
15

Ludwikowski, 92-94.

80

By addressing the experience of different countries and their adopted models of judicial review, theSoviet socialist legal doctrine had to choose either between an existing concept or create one of their own.
For example, Savitsky suggested to sporadically follow American model and grant the Supreme Court of
the USSR the authority to practice both the concrete and abstract review features.16 Indeed, by the end of
1980s, a group of legal scholars and politicians were supporting the idea of dualist constitutional control,
namely by the Supreme Court and by the legislature. However, while considering the American model ofdiffused constitutional supervision, Topornin stressed that the composition and structure of the Supreme
Court of the USSR “seemed incapable of assuming new functions”.17 As a reasonable ground for rejecting
the American model, Hausmaninger mentioned also that the Soviet career judges who were trained mostly
in criminal and civil law were not prepared to produce quality constitutional judgements.18
Some Soviet jurists also proposed to follow the Austrian (Kelsenian) model of a separate
constitutional court elected by people and independent from public organs.19 Simultaneously, following
Kelsen’s logic, they suggested amending the constitution by enforcing the principle of separation of
powers and placing the constitutional court on the top.20 This idea clearly demonstrated a reflection ofradical moods among some jurists during the perestroika period. On the other hand, the majority of Soviet
bureaucrats and some prominent Soviet lawyers resisted against the creation of the constitutional court.
They stated that it would obviously conflict with the doctrine of democratic centralism and the supremacyof the legislation.
Shul’zhenko noted, “specialized constitutional controlling organs [if created] should be functioningin such a way so that the parliament [not constitutional court] pertains the main role in the area of[constitutional] control, and it should be a parliament to finally decide upon the constitutionality of acts.”21
Hence, out of intention to preserve the deeply rooted concept of supremacy of the legislation (legislative
power), the Soviet policymakers came up with the idea of creation of the Committee of Constitutional
Supervision of the USSR - CCS (Komitet Konstitutsionnogo Nadzora SSSR) which represented an original‘socialist’ model of a rights based judicial review.

16

V.M. Savitsky, ‘Pravosudie i Perestroika’, Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo, No. 9 (1987), 32-33.

17

Topornin, 35.

18

Herbert Hausmaninger, ‘The Committee of Constitutional Supervision of the USSR’ Cornell International Law Journal 23, No. 2 (1990),
288.
19
M. Mityukov, ‘Predtecha Konstitutsionnogo Pravosudiya. K Istorii Komiteta Konstitutsionnogo Nadzora SSSR’, Konstitutsionnoe
Pravosudie 4, No. 30 (2005), 35-36.
20

G. Shahnazarov, Tsena Svobody. Reformatsiya Gorbacheva Glazami Ego Pomoshnika. (Moskva: Rossika-Zevs, 1993), 93.

21

Yu. Shul'zhenko, ‘Avtoritet Osnovnogo Zakona’, Moskovskaya Pravda, June 14, 1988.

81

III. SELECTED MATTERS FROM THE PREPARATORY PROCESS
To negotiate the design, composition, jurisdiction and other organizational matters related to the legal
foundations of the proposed CCS, the Soviet authorities created a special commission of 23 prominent
lawyers. These lawyers mainly came from union-republics and worked for more than half a year on theconcept of the CCS law.22 Guided by Professor Kerimov, a scholar from Azerbaijan SSR, this special
commission eventually obtained his name – the Kerimov’s Commission. The activities of the Kerimov’s
Comission and subsequent travaux preparatoires on the CCS gave rise to a numerous controversies andclashes of interests between involved parties and demonstrated a complex political and legal nature of thematter. This section will refer only to the selected unique moments relevant to the present research.23
The preparatory work of the Kerimov’s Commission demonstrates that the most politically sensitive
issue touched upon the subordination of the union republics’ constitutions and laws to the CCS supervisionauthority. As the initial idea was to enable the CCS to monitor the constitutionality of both union andrepublican level legislation, it was largely opposed by the delegates from certain republics, mainly Baltic
States, Moldova, and Georgia. Notably, these republics most actively claimed sovereignty of republic levellaw from the union level law. Within the draft preparatory process and subsequent multiple negotiations
with the opposing deputies from Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldova, and Georgia, the Kerimov’sCommission could achieve a temporary political compromise in the form that the proposed CCS would
not be extending its supervisory authority to the republic-level legislation until a new Union Treaty was
passed, which, actually, never happened.24
The work of the Kerimov’s Commission also demonstrates peculiar to the perestroika period debatesaround the issue of nominating the CCS members. Notably, according to the recent constitutional
amendments, the USSR President enjoyed the right to nominate members of the CCS. This provision firstraised opposition by some delegates within the commission itself. In this regard, as a part of sovereignty
claims, delegates from the union republics repeatedly demanded the right to propose their own candidates.
Some proposed a contested election of members by the Congress. After some debates, the commission
decided to upheld the President’s Gorbachev’s constitutional prerogative to present his candidates forconfirmation (or rejection), emphasizing that he would naturally consult with the republics.25 However,
the Congress decided to support the claims of some delegates and ruled that CCS members should not be
the President’s political appointees as it would affect their ability to review President’s decrees. Therefore,

22
Kerimov’s Comission, or Commission to Prepare a Draft Law of the USSR on Constitutional Supervision in the USSR. Vedomosti S’ezda
Narodnykh Deputatov. Verkhovniy Sovet SSSR No. 1, item 24 (1989); Izvestiia No. 162, June 11, 1989, at 1, 7.
23

For detailed discussion on CCS in English refer to Hausmaninger 1990, 1992;

24

However, it should be noted here that out of 2250 deputies who voted to establish the Union CCS, 433 deputies voted against, 61 abstained,
and 50 Lithuanian deputies left the premises in open protest of the Union CCS issue.
Refer further to Hausmaninger 1990, 293

25

Kerimov’s second report, Izvestiia No. 358, Dec. 24, 1989, at 2, 8.

82

it was decided that it would be a prerogative of a Chairman of Supreme Soviet to appoint such high-classjudges.26
Another perestroika related feature is that the drafters decided to include the protection of humanrights into the catalog of the competency of the CCS. Indeed, the initiative with inclusion of human rights
attracts attention because of the following several issues. First, some commission members demanded thatthe clause on human rights would stipulate a free individual access (actio popularis) to the CCS. Thatwould mean that individuals who believed their fundamental rights were violated, could have a standing
to bring their claims to the CCS after exhausting all local remedies at the ordinary republic-level courts.
Second, some deputies demanded that if the CCS finds that a normative act or provision violates
fundamental human rights and freedoms secured by the Constitution of the USSR or by any international
treaty to which the USSR is a party, such act or provision is immediately deemed invalid. While in the
final reading the draft law on the constitutional supervision rejected the actio popularis, it confirmed theauthority of the CCS to invalidate any law which infringed human rights. The latter point was adopted
unanimously and did not face any resistance from union republics, whether Baltic or other states.
Eventually, at the end of 1988, upon increasingly heated political debates, the Congress passed the 1989
Law on the Constitutional Supervision of the USSR (the 1989 Law) which eventually paved the way forthe creation of the CCS.27
IV. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CCS AND SELECTED JURISDICTIONAL ISSUESThe CCS started its work on May 1990. The 1989 Law contained 31 articles grouped into five parts:
General Provisions, Membership and Process of Election of the CCS, Jurisdiction and Procedure of the
CCS, Status of Persons Elected to the CCS, and Other Questions of the Organization of the CCS. Thissection will not provide a detailed examination of the law but rather focus only on several critical moments
which laid the foundation of the Soviet and post-Soviet judicial review models.
Article 1 defined the objectives of the constitutional supervision in the USSR which aimed to promote“the conformity of acts of state organs and social organizations with the Constitution of the USSR and theconstitutions of union republics and autonomous republics” and to protect “constitutional human rights.”28
Article 3 laid down the fundamental principles guiding the activity of all organs of constitutional

26
Refer for a detailed discussion to Herbert Hausmaninger, “From the Soviet Committee of Constitutional Supervision to the Russian
Constitutional Court,” Cornell International Law Journal 25 (1992): 308
27

Zakon SSSR o Konstitutsionnom Nadore v SSSR [the 1989 Law of the USSR on Constitutional Supervision in the USSR, Izvestiya No.
360, Dec. 26, 1989, at 1, 7-8 and at 3, 1-6. (First session was held on May 16, 1990).
28

Art 1, Ibid.

83

supervision including, socialist legality, collegiality, and glasnost.29 Article 5 provided that members of
the CCS to be elected from among “specialists in the area of politics and law.”30
The 1977 Constitution and the 1989 law granted standing only to several public high organs to initiate
judicial examination of union level normative acts including the Presidential and Council of Ministers
decrees which represented the executive branch. The CCS members also had the authority to initiate areview on their own prerogative. Indeed, the biggest part of the total 29 cases produced by the CCS during
its short 19 months life, came as a direct initiative of the CCS judges. Such fact may raise justified doubts
regarding the impartiality of reviewing the cases initiated by judges themselves. Furthermore, in thosecases the CCS reviewed mainly acts violating fundamental right and freedoms.
As mentioned earlier, in light of some union republics’ sovereignty claims it was agreed that the CCS
would not extend its review to republics’ laws until adoption of the new Union Treaty. To note, thiscontradictive treaty was never signed. However, notwithstanding the issue of non-existent treaty, the CCS
obtained the authority to immediately invalidate any union or republic level law which violated humanrights stipulated by the Soviet constitution or any international treaty ratified by the USSR.31 As for theother types of the acts, the CCS had no authority to repeal.
The CCS, upon its examination of a certain normative act, issued a finding annexed by the analysis
and opinion on constitutionality or unconstitutionality of specific act. Such findings had mainly advisoryand suspending force. Human rights were the only exclusion. The content and style of the findings point
to several critical points. The findings from several cases show extremely brief text with almost no orvague references to the legal sources. The language abounds with sweeping generalities and often lacks
legal precision. The CCS’s opinions are devoid of the rigorous interpretation and analysis that marks their
Western counterparts. They also convey no sense of opposing viewpoints to a constitutional dispute or ofscholarly theory. To mention, all of the CCS’s decisions were unanimous. Dissents have been few andbrief whereas open sessions were held very restrictively.32
Main Findings
The mere fact of establishing a pioneer constitutional review system in the Soviet Union had resulted
in multiple opinions from legal theorist both within and outside the country. Some questioned theeffectiveness of the CCS in a country whose state doctrine had generally rejected the principles of judicial
review over the constitutionality of legislation as incompatible with the supremacy of parliament. Somescholars contested the role of the CCS in disputes between the union and republic level governments.

29

Article 3; [Rem] Glasnost’ means openness.

30

Article 5; The establishment of minimum and maximum age requirements, as suggested by Deputy Kryzhkov, was rejected by theCommission as arbitrary and without scientific foundation. Izvestiia No. 358, Dec. 24, 1989, at 2, 8.

31

Article 124 of the 1977 Constitution of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. Article 21 of the 1989 Law.

32

Article 17 of the 1989 law stipulated a provision on open meetings.

84

Deliberations in the preparatory process of the 1989 law evidence that initial constitutional review modelin the Soviet Union had indeed emerged in the context of sophisticated and unique environment.
While the negotiations on the top-level witness of multiple suggested scenarios on the futurecomposition and functions of the CCS, there was one critical aspect in the background which eventuallyaffected the effectiveness of the constitutional supervision in the late-period USSR. In particular, from thevery beginning, even before the adoption of the law on CCS, there appeared an unbalanced dualism as thesupreme legislation secured for itself an unlimited authority in constitutional supervision. This supervision
was subsequently named as parliamentary and co-existed with a specialized constitutional supervision
practiced by the CCS. Furthermore, such parliamentary supervision was theoretically under the auspicesof the Supreme Party Control. Separately, it is worth of mentioning of a procurator’s supervision system(Prokurorskiy nadzor), which in the former USSR pertained very wide authority and, thus, questioned thecompetence of the constitutional supervision. In other words, in the former Soviet Union, the competenceof the CCS was simultaneously duplicated by multiple actors, including, the President, legislation andprocuracy.33
These specific moments help to understand to what actual extent the CCS judges could embark on a
mission to initiate and review the constitutionality of normative legal acts. This also included several
unprecedented cases, when the CCS declared the decree of the President and the USSR security related
regulations as unconstitutional. In the first case, the CCS found that the President Gorbachev had violated
constitutional provisions on freedom of assembly of citizens when he signed a decree which attempted toregulate demonstrations in the capital city. In the second case, it has found that some security related acts
contained vague provisions which eventually violated fundamental freedoms.
CCS existed until December 23, 1991 and during a short span of its existence produced two dozen
findings mainly about human rights violations by Union law and executives including on the ground ofsuch international human rights treaties as the ICCPR and ICESCR. Most cases and subsequent findings
came as the CCS’s own initiative because of the judicial passivism from organizations which enjoyedstanding and multiplicity of actors who could perform a constitutional review in the former USSR. On theother hand, available case-law from CCS definitely present a positive development in the newly emerging
field of law in the USSR and, subsequently, the post-Soviet space. Furthermore, there are certain signs of
judicial activism performed mainly by the judges of the CCS, specifically in the field of protection ofhuman rights - the area which was left widely ignored by the pre-perestroika judiciary. Simultaneously,
Soviet legal scholars, somewhat to their discredit, failed to analyze every finding of the CCS critically andto enter into a public dialogue to develop constitutional doctrine and educate further politicians and the
population about the values of separation of powers and the rule of law.

33
Yu. Shul’zhenko, Konstitutsionniy Kontrol’ v Rossii [Constitutional Review in Russia], (Moskva, RAN, Institut Gosudarstva i Prava,
1995), 101.

85

V.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CCS IN THE UZBEK SSR
Article two of the 1989 law established several layers of constitutional supervision to correspondwith the federative organization of the Soviet Union. Thus, the article two introduced the CCS of the USSR
and provided for organs of constitutional supervision to be created in the union republics and autonomous
republics. The Kerimov’s Commission clarified that the republics may establish their own organs tosupervise the conformity of republic law with republic constitutions. It was considered that these organs
would act in complete independence from the CCS of the USSR. Hence, in theory, the Union level CCS
was not placed at the top of the hierarchy, except for the matters related to the protection of the fundamental
rights and freedoms. Practically, there are some doubts with regard to complete independence from theUnion level CCS.
In March 1990, the delegates of the Uzbekistan’s Supreme Council, during its first plenary session
raised the necessity of adopting a separate statute on constitutional supervision in the Uzbek SSR, Theirdeliberations soon resulted in regulation on establishing a special Commission on the Draft Law of the
Uzbek SSR on Constitutional Supervision.34 A prominent (however, non-legal) scientist Khabibullaev
chaired the Commission of 13 members that took a responsibility to prepare a draft law and forward it to
the Permanent Commission of the Supreme Council of the Uzbek SSR for further deliberations. In June
1990, the delegates of the Supreme Council in their plenary session, among 21 critical issues, had also
raised several aspects of the future Committee of the Uzbek SSR on Constitutional Supervision (Uzbek
SSR CCS) and its composition. Khabibullaev pointed that constitutional supervision had recommended
itself as a vital institution that demonstrated a positive practice for several decades in many democracies.35
He also pointed out that the commission elaborated a draft law in accordance with the CCS’ authority andthe main organizational principles as reflected in the article 116 of the 1978 Constitution of the Uzbek
SSR.36 The draft law was composed of five sections and 31 articles. The drafters also included a provisionthat the members of the CCS would be elected by the Supreme Council of the Uzbek SSR out of specialists
in the fields of law and politics for a term of ten years. When some delegates raised their concerns about
the ten-year term of the CCS judges, Khabibullaev said that “... as long as the CCS is [was] an institution

34
Prikaz ob Utverjdenii Komissii po Razrabotke Zakona o Konstitutsionnom Nadzore v Uzbekskoy SSR [Regulation on the Establishing a
Commission on the Draft Law of the Constitutional Supervision of the Uzbek SSR]. O’zbekiston Respublikasining Markaziy Davlat Arhivi[Central State Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan] XII Chaqiriq, O’zbekiston Respublikasining Oliy Kengashining 1990 Yil 18-20 Iyun
kunlari bo’lib o’tgan XI Sesssiya Materiallari [11th Plenary Session Materials], (Fond-2454, N 6,7091), 124-25.
35(Author remark) Obviously he mentioned ‘review’ rather than ‘supervision’, a nuance that also exists in the Russian language.

36

Ibid, 184. O’zbekiston Kengashining Majlislari. Ikkinchi Sessiya, 1990 yil 18-20 Iyun: Stenografik Hisobot. T., 1992, 103-104. Also
Article 116 of the “1978 Constitution of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic” (1978).

86

subjected directly to the Constitution, the term of its justices should not be tied to the term of the delegates[Peoples’ Deputies of the Supreme Council]”.37
After a group of delegates commented and supported the work of the Commission, the Supreme
Council adopted in June 20, 1990, the Law on the Constitutional Supervision of the Uzbek SSR. This law
was enforced in July 1, 1990.38 It mainly duplicated the 1989 law which laid the foundations of the unionlevel constitutional supervision and the Union level CCS.39
VI. COMPOSITION OF THE CCS OF THE UZBEK SSR
After the delegates adopted the law, they recommended multiple candidates for the position of CCS
judges mainly out of Supreme Council’s delegates. Archival documents say that, in between the sessions,
President Karimov suggested that composition of the CCS to be decided by a prominent Soviet legal
scholar, Academician Urazaev, who was simultaneously recommended to take the position of CCS’schairman. This moment raises specific concern and question with regard to the actual authority of the
President to make such proposal. Though similar initiative was rejected for President Gorbachev, one may
think that in Uzbekistan SSR such a sensitive moment regarding nominations was omitted, and could
potentially pave the way for the political appointments, notwithstanding the fact of Professor Urazaev’s
high prominence in Uzbekistan. Later, delegates approved the following Urazaev list of CCS judges.
(Refer to Table I)
Table I. The members of the CCS of the Uzbek SSR as approved in June 1990.40
Urazaev Shavkat (Chairman)
Academician, Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek
SSR, Juris Doctor, Professor
Kauymov
Rauf(Vice- Academy of Internal Affairs, Associate Professor
chairman)
Velikanov VladimirState and Law Dept of the Central Committee of theCommunist Party of Uzbekistan
Izambetov Tazhen
Nukus State University, PhD, Professor
Mirhamidov Mirshohid
Tashkent State University (V. I. Lenin) Juris Doctor
Nosirov Pulat
Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek SSR, Institute of
Economics, Doctor of Economics
Saidov Akmal
VLKSM (Youth committee of the Uzbek SSR) Juris
Doctor Candidate
Skripnikov Nikolai
Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek SSR, Institute ofPhilosophy and Law, Juris Doctor Candidate
37

O’zbekiston Respublikasining Markaziy Davlat Arhivi [Central State Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan] XII Chaqiriq, O’zbekiston
Respublikasining Oliy Kengashining 1990 Yil 18-20 Iyun kunlari bo’lib o’tgan XI Sesssiya Materiallari [11th Plenary Session Materials](Fond-2454, N 6,7091), 104-106.
38

Ibid, 51.

39

Zakon Respubliki Uzbekistan o Konstitutsionnom Nadzore v Respublike Uzbekistan N 93-XII (Outdated) (1990).

40

Akmal Saidov, O’zbekiston Konstitutsiyasi Tarihi [The History of Uzbekistan’s Constitution] (Tashkent: Tasvir, 2018), 146.

87

Teshaboev Mamatkhon
Tojiev Tursun
Khakimova Saiyora

Tashkent Supreme Party School, Juris Doctor
Candidate
Tashkent city, Legal consultant, Juris Doctor
Candidate
Procurator’s Office of the Uzbek SSR Juris Doctor
CandidateVII. STANDING AND JURISDICTION OF THE CCS OF THE UZBEK SSR
Article 12 of the 1990 law listed the organs competent to submit questions to the Uzbek CCS. Uponthe request by the Supreme Council of Uzbek SSR, the Uzbek CCS initiated procedures to revise the draft
laws and other acts which remained under the consideration of the Supreme Council of Uzbek SSR itself.41
With respect to existing laws of Uzbek SSR and other acts adopted by the Supreme Council of Uzbek SSR,
not less than one-fifth of the local people’s deputies, the President of Uzbekistan (this post was introducedin Uzbekistan first among Soviet Central Asian republics), the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Uzbek
SSR, the Supreme Council of the Karakalpak Autonomous SSR could raise an issue with the Uzbek CCS.
The Supreme Council of Uzbek SSR could contest the edicts (ukazy) of the President of Uzbekistan.
Upon the requests by the Supreme Council of Uzbek SSR or proposals from the President of Uzbekistan,
the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Uzbek SSR, and the Supreme Council of the Karakalpak ASSR,
the Uzbek CCS could initiate review of the Constitution and existing laws of the Karakalpak ASSR.
Mentioned public actors could also raise an issue with the Uzbek CCS regarding the decrees(postanovleniya) and regulations (rasporyazheniya) of the Council of Ministers of Uzbek SSR,
international treaties and other obligations of Uzbek SSR.
Finally, apart from the existing actors, the 1990 law also stipulated standing for the PermanentCommissions of the Chambers and Committees of the Supreme Council of the Uzbek SSR, Council of
Ministers of Uzbek SSR, Committee of People’s Control, the Supreme Court of the Uzbek SSR, theProcurator General, the Chief State Arbitrator, republic level social organizations, and the Academy of
Sciences of Uzbek SSR.42 Moreover, the CCS of Uzbek SSR was authorized to independently initiate
examination of conformity with the Constitution and laws of Uzbek SSR, all acts of the supreme organsof public power and administration of Uzbek SSR, and other organs that were formed or elected by theSupreme Council and the People’s Deputies Council.
A Chairman, a Deputy-Chairman, and other CCS members had the standing authority. The 1990 law
did not stipulate the exact number of the Uzbek CCS judges’ votes for the issue to be raised before, butrather required a simple majority of votes by the respective members. Hence, in general terms, the 1990
law stipulated a limited circle of public actors who pertained an exclusive authority to raise issue before
41

Article 12 of the 1990 law.

42

These bodies could raise issues pertaining to normative legal acts of other public organs and social organizations which did not fall within
the authority of procuracy supervision88the CCS, namely the Supreme Council, the President, one-fifth of parliamentarians, the Council of
Ministers and a limited number of public officials. The 1990 law provided no standing for individuals tobring their claims before the CCS. It only stated that citizens and other actors who had no standing toinitiate constitutional supervision could bring their concerns through the entitled organs discussed above.43
VIII.

PROCEEDINGS AND CASES

Upon analyzing the conformity or non-conformity of the examined act or draft (or its individual
provisions) with the Constitution, laws of the Uzbek SSR, and in cases where a matter of supervision
touched upon the international legal obligations, the Uzbek CCS issued a statement-finding (Zakluchenie)with a ‘well-reasoned’ written opinion with the elements of legal references, comparison and legal
argumentation. 44 However, even if such statement-findings contained opinion on constitutional nonconformity of examined items, they did not suspend the applicability of respective laws and other acts
adopted by the Supreme Council of the Uzbek SSR. Furthermore, the Supreme Council could reject any
finding of the CCS upon a two-third majority of vote at the following session.45 The only case in which
the conclusion of the CCS could immediately invalidate a normative act or any of its individual procedures
occurred in the case of infringements to human rights secured by the Constitution of the Uzbek SSR orinternational treaties to which Uzbekistan was a part.
In 1990, the Supreme Soviet of Uzbek SSR adopted the 1990 Resolution on Managing Public
Demonstrations, which restricted individuals from organizing meetings and demonstrations in the streets
and other public areas.46 This Resolution limited citizens’ right for public demonstrations and protests. In
particular, it allowed holding protests only inside the buildings (indoors), and after obtaining formal
permission from public authorities. The drafters of the Resolution stated that organizing massdemonstrations, meetings, and protests in public areas, including in the streets, parks, and squares, would
entail risks related to public security concerns. To ensure effective compliance, the drafters also stipulated
a provision that any failure to conform with the requirements of the Resolution would entail criminal
responsibility.
To implement this Resolution in practice, the Tashkent City Council (Gorsovet) had issued in thesame year the order on a temporary ban of mass protests and demonstrations in the Tashkent city.
Following this move from city authorities, citizens submitted a petition (obrashenie) to the CCS of Uzbek
SSR with a request to review the constitutionality of the Resolution and reaction of the Tashkent city
authorities.
43

Article 12 of the 1990 law.

44

Art 18, Ibid

45

Ibid

46
Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta Uzbekskoy SSR, Ob Uporyadochenii Organizatsiy i Provedeniya Sobraniy, Mitingov, Ulichnih
Shestviy i Demonstraciy v Uzbekskoy SSR (1990).

89

In its decision, the CCS stated that although there was a conflict between the requirements of the1990 Resolution and the constitutional provision on the freedom of expression as enshrined in article 48of the 1978 Constitution, the Committee nevertheless upheld the constitutionality of the Resolution. As ajustification, the CCS pointed to the art 37(2) of the Constitution, which permitted the restriction of certain
fundamental rights, which potentially could have damaged the state or social interests or interests ofcitizens.47
The CCS further interpreted the constitutional provision enshrined in article 37(2) in a way that theSupreme Soviet, while being the sole and supreme representative of people’s will, was eligible to posesuch restrictions. Hence, according to the CCS interpretation, “people [were] the sole source of power. Its
representative, the Supreme Soviet, acting in the name of people, could resolve the issue in a way thatwould conform with peoples’ interests.” 48 Hence, the CCS ruled that the 1990 Resolution did not violate
the constitutional provision on the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. By referring to theactual text of the case, one may notice that judges failed to provide enough and well-reasoned legal
argumentation and analysis in support of the constitutionality of the 1990 Resolution.
However, there was yet a positive aspect of CCS’s decision. Having examined the Tashkent City
Council’s order of temporary ban on mass protests and demonstrations in the city, the CCS found a grave
violation of article 48 of the Constitution. By pointing to the unconstitutional limitation of citizens’
fundamental rights, that CCS invalidated the executive order issued by the city council. 49 Althoughjustification of the Resolution’s constitutionality, on the one hand, and unconstitutionality of the city
council’s order on the other leaves many questions, this case at least shows the effectiveness of the CCS
to outlaw disproportional measures resulting in executive orders.
Another case touches upon the labor related issues in the late yeast of the soviet Union. In 1988,
following the perestroika in the state economic management sector, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
adopted the Resolution amending the Union-level Labor Law. 50 This Resolution legally enabled theemployer to terminate the labor contracts with those workers whose age permitted receiving a pension. In
other words, this Resolution granted the employer an authority to terminate a labor contract with a pensionage employee without a preliminary agreement from the labor union and regardless of such an employee’s
wish to continue the job.
After this Resolution was passed from the union to republic level, the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek
SSR had accordingly amended the article 41(1) of its Labor code. In 1992, CCS of Uzbekistan initiated a
47
Zakluchenie Komiteta Konstitutsionnogo Nadzora Uzbekskoy SSR (O konstitutsionnosti Ukaza Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta
Uzbekskoy SSR, Ob uporyadochenii organizatsiy i provedeniya sobraniy, mitingov, ulichnyh shestviy i demonstratsiy v Uzbekskoy SSR)
(1990). 1-3.
48

Ibid.,2.

49

3.

50
Article 95, Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Sovet SSSR o Vnesenii v Zakonodatel’stvo Soyuza SSR o Trude Izmeneniy i Dopolneniy
Svyazannykh s Perestroykoy Upravleniya Ekonomikoy,” Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta No. 6 (1988).

90review of article 41(1) of the Labor code after receiving several complaints about the discriminatory
character of the article. In the course of the judicial examination, the CCS concluded that article 41(1) of
the Labor code violated individual’s right for labor enshrined in the article 38(1) the 1978 Constitution,
which provided;
Citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan have the right to work - that is, to receive guaranteed work withremuneration in accordance with the quantity and quality and not lower than the minimum wage established by
the state, - including the right to choose a profession, occupation and work in accordance with vocation, abilities,
professional training, education and considering social needs.51

Apart from the constitutional provision, the CCS stated that age-based dismissal was inconsistent
with the Resident Employment Law and, thus, sharpened discrimination of retired persons in theemployment and labor area.52 Furthermore, the CCS found that the article of the Labor code conflictedwith the Pension Securities Law, which formalized a voluntary nature of the retirement in the USSR.53
Judges have noted that the named article of the labor code contained a provision that factuallylegalized compulsory terminating of a labor contract with individuals reaching retirement age. Judges also
noted that mandatory termination of a labor contract, apart from limiting certain guarantees andcompensation, also affected the right of a retired individual to seek reasonable justification of a dismissal
in the court. As a matter of fact, many judges, when dealing with similar cases, only upheld the decisionof the employer after establishing the fact of plaintiffs achieving full retirement age and right for a pension.
In the instant case, the CCS, by pointing to the discriminative character of the dismissal as provided inarticle 41(1) of Labor code, ruled on its unconstitutionality and invalidated it.54
Notably, earlies similar case was initiated in the union level CCS.55 Whereas the Union-level CCS
started the initial examination of this Resolution in the final days of the USSR in 1991, it was theConstitutional Court of Russia that issued a final decision on this case in 1993 and similarly found thedismissal provision as unconstitutional.56 Russian judgment even goes further in its logic and justificationof the case by citing international human rights instruments, particularly regulations of the International
Labor Organization, and even provides some dissents from individual judges.57

51

Article 38(1) of the 1978 Constitution of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (1978 Constitution), (1978).

52

Article 5, Zakon Respubliki Uzbekistan o Zanyatosti Naseleniya, Pub. L. No. 510– XII (1992).

53

Zakon o Pensionnom Obespechenii Grazhdan v SSSR, Pub. L. No. 1480–1 (1991).

54

Zakluchenie Komiteta Konstitutsionnogo Nadzora Respubliki Uzbekistan (O konstitutsionnosti normy, zakraplennoy v punkte 1 statyi 41
Kodeksa Zakonov o trude Respubliki Uzbekistan) (1992).
55

Zakluchenie Komiteta Konstitutsionnogo Nadzora SSSR No.20 (O polojeniyakh zakonodatel’stva, ogranichivauyshih ravenstvo
vozmojnostey grazhdan v oblasti truda i zanyatiy) (1991), 68-69.

56

Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF po delu o proverke konstitutsionnosti pravoprimenitel’noy praktiki rasstorjenie trudovogo
dogovora po osnovaniuy, predusmotrennomu punktu 1 statyi 33 KZot (1993), 29-37.
57

Ibid, Osoboe mnenie sudyi Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF G.A. Gadzhieva

91CONCLUSION: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF UZBEKISTAN AND
REVIEW WITHIN THE STRONG STATE CONTEXTThis late Soviet practice of constitutional review offers some lessons for contemporary Uzbekistan.
As mentioned, the story of Uzbek constitutional review began in the late Soviet period. Delegates fromthe then-Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan participated in the Soviet-level discussions of a socialist versionof constitutional law. Most notably, this included Urazaev, and another prominent Soviet legal scholar
Agzamkhodzhaev who also served as a judge on the Soviet Union level CCS. In 1990, the Uzbek SSR
also adopted a CCS with authority that was largely identical to that of the Soviet-level CCS. The Uzbek
CCS also issued very notable decisions that demonstrate a greater respect for fundamental rights. It is
however, also highly likely that the Uzbek CCS was simply a top-down imitation of the Soviet model.
In 1992, Uzbekistan achieved independence and became the first post-Soviet republic to adopt a
written constitution. This 1992 Constitution included a long list of fundamental rights and a Europeanstyle, stand-alone Constitutional Court. The 1993 law implementing this new Constitutional Court ofUzbekistan58 afforded it a significant power, including the power to strike down executive acts and formallaws based on the 1992 Constitution. This power notably included the authority to invalidate acts basedon constitutional invalidity. Formally, this appeared to be a step forward.
This newly empowered court however has not emerged as a powerful force for constitutional
implementation. One key problem was of personnel as the newly independent Uzbekistan had very few
constitutional law experts except for Urazaev, Khakimova, and Saidov. Moreover, another key problem
was the return of unbridled centralism to the post-Soviet space, particularly Russia and Central Asian
republics.59 In 1995, amidst large-scale economic depression and political instability, presidents across thepost-Soviet space argued that checks and balances on presidential power weakened their ability to respondto challenges. Uzbekistan’s then-president, Islam Karimov, was no exception. Although the Uzbekistan’s
Constitutional Court had not yet exercised its power to strike down laws or executive acts, Karimov pushed
through amendments to the 1993 law that removed the Court’s power to invalidate laws and presidential
acts within ‘certain span of time’. These amendments neutered Uzbek constitutional review before it evenhad a chance to begin. Despite a long list of rights in its post-Soviet 1992 Constitution and a separate
constitutional court, Uzbek constitutional review has been largely non-existent up to now. In fact, overalmost 27 years, the Court has issued barely about 20 cases.
Presently, the Soviet-level debate and practice of constitutional supervision offers a possible sourcefor beginning the largely unrealized project of Uzbek constitutional review. First, this debate is in Russianand is readily available to scholars and judges in the region. Second, this late Soviet-era debate and its
58

Zakon Respubliki Uzbekistan o Konstitutsionnom Sude Respubliki Uzbekistan N820-XII (Outdated since 1995) (1993).
William Partlett, Late Soviet Constitutional Supervision: A Model for Central Asian Constitutional Review? Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Oct.
2, 2019, at: http:/www.iconnectblog.com/2019/10/late-soviet-constitutional-supervision-a-model-for-central-asian-constitutional-review/
accessed on July 29, 2020.
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institutional practice at the Soviet level offer a way of viewing constitutional review not as a westerntransplant with no relevance to Uzbek practicalities but instead as a practice that is in line with its needs
and requirements. In particular, recovering this history can help reformers better understand how
constitutional review was justified in a highly centralized regime. For instance, a key theme in the Sovietlevel debates about the CCS was the importance of constitutional review in overcoming the vast numberof contradictory executive decrees and pronouncements. The problem of conflicting executive
pronouncements remains a significant issue in Uzbekistan today. This kind of justification can therefore
emerge as the foundation for a more focused and more persuasive discussion of the necessity of
constitutional review in the region.

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Workshop on the “Emergence and Features of the Constitutional Review Bodies in Asia:
A Comparative Analysis of Transitional Countries’ Development”(Pre - Centenary Celebration of University of Yangon)
Place:
Date:
Organized by:Funded by:

Myanmar- Japan Legal Research Center, University of Yangon, Myanmar.
October 22, 2019 (Tuesday)
Center for Asian Legal Exchange (CALE), Nagoya University
Department of Law, University of Yangon‐ JSPS Core-to-Core Program: Asia-Africa Science Platforms “Advancing
Research in Asian Constitutionalism – Establishing a Transnational
Research Network to Promote Human Rights and Legal System”‐ JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research –KAKENHI-(B)“Commencement of the ASEAN Community and the Emergence ofHeterologous Constitutional Profiles in the Region”

Myanmar established the Constitutional Tribunal (the Tribunal) in 2011 under the auspices of the2008 Constitution. Many intended to refer to this achievement as a product of peaceful transition frommilitary to civilian rule and a process of a state-controlled democracy launched in Myanmar aftermath
the 2011 ‘democratic’ parliamentary elections. Notably, up to this moment, the constitutional history
of Myanmar demonstrated not even a single precedent when policymakers would create an
independent agency and vest it with the authority of constitutional review.
Presently, the primary functions of the Tribunal include the constitutional interpretation andexamination of the constitutionality of statutes promulgated by the union and local level parliaments.
The Tribunal also has an authority to examine the actions of the union and local level executive
authorities. Whenever constitutional disputes occur, including those related to the rights between theunion and local authorities, the Tribunal is de jure competent to involve and issue a decision. In its
work, the Tribunal only deals with the enacted statutes and does not examine bills before enactment.
The Tribunal is authorized to conduct abstract and concrete review.
Between 2011-2019, the Tribunal has produced about 15 cases. A closer look at the legal analysis,argumentation and justification of reasons in these cases demonstrate certain structural issues in theconstitutional review system of Myanmar. Whereas a handful of cases had demonstrated that the
Tribunal could act as an independent adjudicator in the past, recent activities make it evident that the
Tribunal’s role in the political deliberations is unequivocal.
The general philosophy of constitutional review presupposes that constitutional courts are
established to limit or balance the activities of executive and legislative branches. In suchcircumstances, scholars and practitioners expect that constitutional courts would work as neutral
arbitrators among the two branches. Simultaneously, the vital role of the constitutional court is toprotect fundamental rights.
The primary aim of the present seminar is to analyze the theoretical background and practicalexperience of the Tribunal in comparative aspect with foreign constitutional review bodies. In addition,
it will seek to understand the concept and ideas on the constitutionalism in Myanmar and the tribunal’splace in it. This seminar will involve both; the domestic and researchers from, Japan, Korea, Singapore
and other jurisdictions. The participants will have an opportunity to share own views with fellow
colleagues and learn from each other in terms of historical features, duties and functions, and selected95

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cases of constitutional courts in different countries including; Korea, Singapore, Russia, andUzbekistan. This seminar aims to strengthen the relations between involved scholars and contribute to
the creation of the international research network on the Constitutionalism in Asia.
Program:
10:00-10:10 Opening
Opening Remarks: Kaoru Obata (Professor of Graduate School of Law, Nagoya University)
10:10-12:00
Session I. The Characteristics of the Constitutional Review in Myanmar.
Moderator: Khin Mar Yee (Part-time Professor of Department of Law, University of Yangon)
10:10-10:30
1) Keynote Speech “Future Perspective of the Constitutional Tribunal of Myanmar”
Justice. Hla Myo Nwe (Member of the Constitutional Tribunal of Myanmar)
10:30-10:50
2) “The Duties and Functions of the Constitutional Tribunal of Myanmar”
Khin Phone Myint Kyu (Professor of Department of Law, University of Yangon)
10:50-11:10
3) “Case Analysis of the Constitutional Tribunal of Myanmar”
Khin Khin Oo (Professor of Department of Law, University of Yangon)
11:10-12:00 Q&A/ Discussion
12:00-13:30 Lunch break
13:30-16:00
Session II. The Constitutional Review Models from other Asian Jurisdictions
Moderator: Kaoru Obata (Professor of Graduate School of Law, Nagoya University)
13:30-13:50
1) “A Case of Korea”
Hyowon Lee (Professor of School of Law, Seoul National University)
13:50-14:10
2) “A Case of Singapore”
Jaclyn Neo (Associate Professor of Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore)
Marcus Teo (Teaching Assistant of Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore)
14:10-14:30
3) “A Case of Russia”
Fumito Sato (Vice-Director/ Professor of CALE, Nagoya University)
14:30-14:50
4) “A Case of Uzbekistan”
Aziz Ismatov (Assistant Professor of CALE, Nagoya University)
14:50-15:05 Tea Break
15:05-16:00 Q&A/ Discussion

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CALE Discussion Paper No.19
EMERGENCE AND FEATURES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEWBODIES IN ASIA : A COMPARATOVE ANALYSIS OF TRANSITIONAL
COUNTRIES’ DEVELOPMENT
Editors

Aziz Ismatov and Emi Makino

Published byCenter for Asian Legal Exchange (CALE)
Nagoya University464-8601 Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku, Nagoya, JAPAN
Tel: +81 (0)52-789-2325
Fax: +81 (0)52-789-4902
http://cale.law.nagoya-u.ac.jp/

Issue dateAugust, 2020

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