The Japanese Society for Aesthetics

Aesthetics No.20 (2016): 89-102

Did You Really Get a Mushroom?
Players’ Fictional Actions in Videogame Playing
MATSUNAGA Shinji

Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto

1. The Puzzle of Fictional Action Sentences
Just as works of fiction such as novels and films, many videogames represent fictional
characters, places, and events: that is, a fictional world. In this sense many videogames are akind of fiction [1].
Nevertheless, videogames do have a feature that films and novels do not have. Whendescribing videogame playing, we often attribute actions that seem to be performed within afictional location to players who are at a real location. For a player S, for example, we can state“S got a mushroom,” “S rested at an inn,” “S built a power plant,” “S thieved a car,” and so on [2].
Such statements cannot, at least in standard cases, apply to the audience of novels or films. Callthis kind of sentence that attributes apparently fictional actions to the audience of fiction
fictional action sentences or, for short, FA sentences. FA sentences are ones by which weordinarily describe our videogame playing, and so are meaningful ones.
FA sentences raise an ontological puzzle, however. Taken literally, they seem to say that aplayer as an agent performs her actions within a fictional place although she is a real person andtherefore located in a real place. Certainly it is possible for one to stay in a certain place and cause
an event in another place, or to interact with other people who are far away. But the problem weface is not that some actions are beyond a distance. The problem is that there seems to be an
ontological gap between the space in which we locate performed actions as individual events [3]and the space in which we locate the agent who performs the actions [4]. The puzzle can beformulated into this:(1) An FA sentence “a player S performed an action A” can be true,(2) where “S” refers to an existent located in the real world,(3) and “A” refers to an action located in a fictional world;(4) therefore, it can be true that an existent located in the real world performs an action within afictional world.
(5) But in the ontology we are standardly committed to, it is impossible that an existent locatedin the real world performs an action within a fictional world [5].
The acceptance of all (1) to (3) necessarily leads to the consequence (4), which is contrary to ourcommon view (5). Thus, as long as we should defend the common intuition, we must deny atleast one of (1) to (3) that all seem plausible. This paper’s goal is to show how this puzzle will besolved.

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2. Approach and BackgroundI take an analytic approach: I try to clarify what situations FA sentences indicate.
Requirements for this approach are as follows: First, I have to interpret FA sentences as notcontrary to the above formula (5) as much as possible. Second, I have to interpret them asconsistent with their ordinary uses in the gaming community. Third, I have to make a rational
explanation of why we are disposed to use FA sentences in spite of their apparent ontologicalerror. To satisfy all of these requirements will be sufficient to solve the puzzle.
There may be other approaches to FA sentences. For example, one may take an approachthat focuses on players’ perceptions and experiences in the cases where FA sentences are used,
and ask how and why peculiar perceptions (if any) arise. The perceptual theorists may tend toroughly assume what situations FA sentences indicate, and argue about our experiences withinor in relation to those situations. But even where the focus is on players’ perception, it is theprimary task to accurately specify the situation in question. Without the specification, we will
have a risk of working with something that never exists.
My interest is not just purely metaphysical but also practical. There are a lot of ordinary
discourses that deal with the situations that FA sentences apply to without any specification of
the meaning of FA sentences. Among such discourses, the most problematic is the ethical one
that accuses videogames and players of, for example, having a preference for violent actions infictional, or “virtual” as is often said, worlds. However, we will not be justified in judging a given
playing action as guilty or not unless we clarify what the sentence that describes it actually stands
for. While this paper is not intended to present any moral claim or suggestion, it may provide aconceptual framework for more substantially dealing with such ethical issues.
In the following I will consider some candidates for the answer to the puzzle. Theories I willtreat are not always intended to be an analysis of FA sentences, but all of them focus on thepeculiar relationship between players and fictional worlds in videogame playing, and therefore
are worth considering.

3. Immersionism
A line of thought may come up easily: In a situation that an FA sentence applies to, a player
has an experience as if she immerses herself in a fictional world, or identifies herself with a player
character who acts in the fictional world, and the FA sentence is about her experience. Call thistheory immersionism. Immersionism seems to be a widespread thought from researchers todevelopers to people who do not play videogames (Salen & Zimmerman, 2004, pp. 450–451).
According to immersionists, the formula (1) ought to be modified as follows:(1i) “S experienced as if she performed A” can be true.
This modification resolves the inconsistency between (1)–(3) and (5) since, in general,experiences can be different from facts. In other words, immersionists interpret FA sentences as
subjective reports about kinds of “illusion” or “simulated experiences” (Matsumoto, 2013).

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The immersionist explanation obviously fails. First, players do not always have such
experiences as immersion and identification in all cases where FA sentences apply. For example,
in the case where the predicate “rest at an inn” is attributed to a player who plays a title from the
Final Fantasy series, she usually never experiences as if she were resting at an inn or as if shewere a fictional character resting at an inn. This is not a special case. The same may be true ofmany cases where FA sentences are used. Second, in general, a person who observes a player’s
playing is able to properly apply an FA sentence about the playing action without any
consideration for the player’s subjective experience or phenomenology. This means that FA
sentences are not about subjective experiences.
Thus, the immersionist theory is not the answer to the puzzle. Of course, this does not denythat a kind of experience of immersion or identification can occur in some cases. And if in fact
there are such cases, it will be important to investigate them. However, as stated above, even insuch cases, the primary task should be the examination of whether the case in question is reallyof immersion or identification, and whether the fact of immersion is not concluded only fromthe fact that an FA sentence applies [6].

4. Virtualism
Another assumable answer is that players’ actions in videogame playing are neither real nor
fictional, but virtual. This view, virtualism, may be as popular as immersionism. Take as an
exemplar Espen Aarseth’s theory (Aarseth, 2007) which explicitly defends virtualism.
A prominent case Aarseth refers to is doors in the classic first person shooter Return toCastle Wolfenstein, in which “most of the doors are merely textures on the walls that look likedoors, but whose function is purely decorative” while “other doors actually do behave in a doorlike manner; they can be opened, closed, seen through, walked through and fired through”(Aarseth, 2007, p. 41). According to Aarseth, the former “purely decorative” ones are “fictional
doors,” and the latter are “virtual doors.” Of course, virtual doors are not real ones. To be virtualis “a mode of existence that is neither fictional nor real” (Aarseth, 2007, p. 42).
Thus, Aarseth assumes the third ontological domain, “virtual worlds,” which isdistinguished from both the real and fictional worlds. According to his virtualist view, theformula (3) should be modified as follows:(3v) “A” refers to an action located in a virtual world.
Things in virtual worlds are supposed to “actually behave” and to be capable of interacting withplayers. Therefore, this modification leads to the revised consequence of (4) which has noinconsistency with (5).
Virtualism has a fault in that it itself explains nothing [7]. Aarseth seems to simply define“virtual” as not real but capable of interacting. This notion of “virtual” gives us no explanation
but only the circulation of the question: What is videogame interaction? Virtual one. Then what
is it to be virtual? To be capable of interaction! In order for virtualism to be explanatory, it isnecessary to propose some informative definition of “virtual.”

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One can define “virtual” as, in terms of its more original use, being functionally equivalent
to its target or counterpart (Tavinor, 2012, p. 195). Indeed, this definition is suitable for realthings functionally equivalent to any other real things, like virtual computers or virtual memories.
It might seem to match with Aarseth’s use given that he describes something “behaving in a doorlike manner” as a virtual door. However, in the context of videogame playing, contrary to the realcontext, what “being functionally equivalent” means is quite unclear. Do Aarseth’s “virtual doors”
really have functions that real doors have? They are not functionally equivalent to real ones atleast as to whether they can be opened and closed, for virtual doors can never be opened or closed
in the same sense as real doors are capable of being opened and closed. This is more obvious as
to the virtual things that do not have any real counterpart: for example, virtual goblins. How are
we supposed to identify an object as functionally equivalent to a goblin? [8]After all, to assume actions and their targets in videogaming as virtual is problematic in thefirst place. This brings us back to the initial question: What action is it to open a door invideogames? In short, the concept of “virtual,” unless more informative specification is given,
will not explain FA sentences but rather will be explained only through some other analysis ofthem. Thus, the virtualist theory is not the answer to the puzzle, either.

5. Fictionalism
Another candidate may claim that FA sentences are not true but fictionally true [9]. Call thisview fictionalism. Fictionalists are sure to change the formula (1) as follows:(1F) “S performed A” can be fictionally true.
According to fictionalism, in a case where an FA sentence, for example “S got a mushroom,”
applies, there is a practice in which we are supposed to imagine (or, as many prefer, makebelieve) that “S got a mushroom” is true. More precisely, along major theories of fiction, toimagine that the sentence is true is prescribed in the situation (Walton, 1990), or the utterer
intends the hearer to deliberately imagine that the sentence is true (Currie, 1990). Fictionalist
theory can also avoid the inconsistency between (1)–(3) and (5) because, from this view, fictional
actions attributed to players are just imagined, and therefore never really take place.
Two difficulties can be pointed out about this simple fictionalism, each of which seems, if
not decisive, hard to dispel. First, even if in such cases we imagine or are prescribed to imagine
a certain action in a fictional location, is it exactly the real player that we imagine has performed
the action? When “S got a mushroom” or “S rested at an inn” properly applies, do we reallyimagine that not Mario but S got a mushroom or that not Cloud Strife but S stayed at an inn?
This is questionable even as to what the player herself imagines, and more unlikely as to what
onlookers will imagine.
Fictionalists might try to avoid this first problem by making some amendment to theformula (2): We imagine that not the real player but the player in the fictional world performs
such and such actions. The player in the fictional world may be called the player’s “fictional self”(Davies, 2009, p. 275) or “fictional proxy” (Tavinor, 2009, p. 70), and sometimes may be said toDid You Really Get a Mushroom?

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be identified with the so-called “player character” or “avatar” who is properly a character locatedin the fictional world. However, we again have to answer the question of what is “fictional self”
or “fictional proxy.” And, as stated above, appealing to equivocal concepts like “immersion,”“identification,” or “virtual” is pointless.
The second problem for simple fictionalism is that it seems to overlook the peculiarity ofvideogames. It is true not only of videogames but also of fiction in general, whether novel,
painting, or film, that an audience of a fiction imagines in appreciating it that she herself doessuch and such in a fictional location (Walton, 1990; see below). Therefore, simple fictionalism
seems to fail to explain features of FA sentences, which are supposed to be characteristic ofvideogames.
Unless it resolves these problems, fictionalist theory is quite insufficient as an answer to the
puzzle. But there is a more sophisticated version of fictionalism which could overcome thechallenges.

6. Interactive Fiction Theory
Grant Tavinor (2005) attempts to explain the FA sentence cases, invoking Kendall Walton’s
make-believe theory. Tavinor draws attention to the Waltonian distinction between “work world”
and “game world,” each of which, according to Walton, is a kind of “fictional world.”
Walton’s basic conception is as follows: In children’s playing games of make-believe it isexplicitly or implicitly prescribed by the game’s rules that, say, if there is a stump in the forest,
players should use it as a prop and imagine that there is a bear there. In the same way, in ourappreciating works of fiction, it is prescribed by the practice to appreciate the work, i.e. by thegame’s rules, that we should use it as a prop and imagine given contents (Walton, 1990, pp. 35–
43) [10]. For Walton, that a proposition is true of a fictional world is that the proposition isprescribed to be imagined in a game of make-believe. But Walton divides the “fictional world”
into two: “We must be careful . . . not to confuse the worlds of games that appreciators playwith representational works with the worlds of the works [italics added]” (Walton, 1990, p. 58).
He briefly calls the former “game worlds” and the latter “work worlds.” In short, the distinction
between a game world and a work world is one between what is prescribed to be imagined inparticular practices using a work of fiction as a prop and what is prescribed to be imagined in
all authorized practices. For example, when a viewer, Richard, appreciates Georges Seurat’s A
Sunday Afternoon on the Island of La Grande Jatte, the proposition that Richard sees a couple
strolling in a park may be true of the world of his game but should not be true of the worlds ofother appreciators’ games. In contrast, the proposition that a couple is strolling in a park is true
not only of Richard’s game but of all authorized games using the work as a prop. The former sortof propositions constitute individual game worlds and the latter the work world (Walton, 1990,
pp. 58–60).
Walton’s concept of “work worlds” is roughly coextensive with our “fictional worlds.”
Waltonian theory’s point is that it posits not only public fictional truths of work worlds but also
more private ones of individual game worlds that may vary according to the appreciators.
Now, Tavinor introduces the distinction into his interactive fiction theory of videogames. It

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is important for Tavinor that, as seen in Richard’s case, propositions true of game worlds caninvolve reference to the appreciators themselves. Tavinor uses this fact to explain the peculiarityof videogames. According to Tavinor, the “distinction between work-worlds and game-worldsthat is so clear in traditional narrative fictions is beginning to smudge with the focus onvideogames” (Tavinor, 2005, p. 34). This derives from the feature of videogames as interactive
fiction that allows the players to “contribute to the truths of the work-world” (Tavinor, 2005, p.
33). In interactive fiction, “the distinction between work-worlds and game-worlds can become
somewhat fuzzed, as the game-world effectively projects into the work-world because of thefictional interaction” (Tavinor, 2005, p. 33). The point is, as far as I understand, that inappreciating a work of interactive fiction including videogames, appreciators themselves cancontribute to the instantiation of the work differently, and thereby influence its truths differently,
too; and therefore the boundary between the authorized work worlds and individual gameworlds is obscure.
From Tavinor’s view, FA sentences will be construed not as those fictionally true of rigid
work worlds but as those fictionally true of some blend of work worlds and game worlds. If thisis true, the two difficulties for simple fictionalist theory posed in the last section may be relieved,for, first, it may define a “fictional self” as an appreciator in such a blended situation, and second,it may explain FA sentences as peculiar to interactive fiction including videogames.
However, there is a problem with Tavinor’s account. As Aaron Meskin and Jon Robson(2012) show with a number of examples, even in videogames, game worlds are obviously
distinguished from work worlds. For example, when Richard plays Super Mario Brothers, theproposition that Richard saw Mario get a mushroom is fictionally true not of the work world but
only of the world of Richard’s own make-believe game. In the world of the work, the mushroom
world, there is no Richard, no character who has a large amount of the properties Richard has.
This fact is independent of whether Richard can contribute to the truths of the mushroom world
without being there. It is likely that while sitting in an armchair in his room he has someinfluence on its truths: for example, on whether Princess Toadstool shall be saved in a session.
The same will be true of almost all works of videogame fiction including narrative oriented ones
and sandbox genres, which Tavinor might keep in mind. The gap between game worlds and work
worlds may be more distinct in cases where the player character’s emotion as prescribed to be
imagined deviates from the player’s own emotion about the fictional situation (Meskin & Robson,
2012, pp. 212–213).
As Meskin and Robson accurately point out, Tavinor’s fault is clear in terms of the analogy
between videogames and performing arts such as theater (Meskin & Robson, 2012, pp. 214–
215). Tavinor seems to confuse the distinction between work worlds and game worlds with thedistinction between works themselves and their instances. If we think of performing arts ingeneral, it is obvious that these two distinctions are different. In theater, while there can be work
worlds of pieces of play as types, there can be work worlds of individual performances as tokens;and while there can be game worlds of individual audiences that use play works as props, there
can be game worlds that use individual performances as props. In the same way, works ofvideogames can have their own work worlds while each individual session can also have its own
work world; and in each session, the work world is still distinguished from the game world that

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each player personally or unauthorizedly prescribes herself to imagine.
Thus, Tavinor’s interactive fiction theory has difficult problems to resolve. As stated at the
beginning, it is certain that most videogames are fiction because they represent fictional worlds:
that is, they are props intended to be used to imagine that given propositions are true. It is also
true that our imaginative attitude plays a significant role in our appreciation of videogames.
However, it is hard to analyze FA sentences in terms of fiction, whether interactive or not.

7. Realism
The final candidate claims that the actions FA sentences refer to are neither virtual nor
fictional but real. Call this view realism. Realists will undoubtedly change the formula (3) as
follows:(3R) “A” refers to a real action.
Of course, according to the realist theory, there is no inconsistency between (1)–(3) and (5).
Some videogame theorists can be interpreted as realists. Jesper Juul (2005) characterizes
videogames as consisting of the two sides of “real rules” and “fictional worlds.” He says that “realrules” are real in the sense that “players actually [italics added] interact” with them (Juul, 2005,
p. 1). For example, a statement about the rules of Tetris, “when you have covered an entire row,
it disappears,” is “a statement about the real world” and can be “true in the normal sense” (Juul,
2005, p. 167). The rules of Tetris are just as real as the rules of tennis. “The rules of Tetris are
not physical but programmed; but this does not change the fact that it is a verifiable statement
about the real world” (Juul, 2005, p. 167). This is true not only of purely abstract videogames
such as Tetris, but also of videogames that are “not abstract” or “representational.” Juul argues
that “there is no real-world person called Eddy Gordo” and such a person exists only “in thefictional world of Tekken 3.” Nevertheless, “in the real world, it is factually true that you canchoose Eddy in Tekken 3, and that you can control the character of Eddy so that he attacks his
opponent using capoeira moves” (Juul, 2005, pp. 167–168).
James Newman’s account (Newman, 2002), which Rune Klevjer (2007, pp. 61–65)
summarizes under the name “the cursor theory,” can also be counted as a kind of realist theory.
Newman regards player characters or avatars as “vehicles” of players’ agency: that is, not as thecharacters who inhabit fictional worlds but as cursor-like instruments [11]. “Lara Croft isdefined less by appearance than by the fact that ‘she’ allows the player to jump distance x”(Newman, 2002, n.p.).
It is certain that actions which we perform in sports and those by which we operate cursors
are real ones. Therefore, if the actions that FA sentences refer to are just like such real actions,the puzzle of FA sentences will be resolved. However, these accounts are insufficient because
they give no answer to the important questions: What actions are actually described by such
expressions as “get a mushroom” and “attack the opponent using capoeira moves”? In what sense
are they the same as actions in sports or cursor-operating actions? Why do we naturally use FA
sentences to describe such real actions? Realist theories are not a satisfactory answer to our96

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puzzle unless they explain these issues. In what follows, both Sageng’s theory and my own theory
take a realist position and try to fill the insufficiency.

8. Reference Shift Theory
With interest similar to mine, John Richard Sageng (2012) attempts to analyze what actions
FA sentences describe [12]. Sageng bases his argument on our intuition that we actually dosomething in videogame playing, and on our commitment to the causal relationship between
our behaviors and the events reported: that is, our “ownership” of the in-game actions (Sageng,2012, p. 225). We are usually committed to the view that the actions FA sentences describe are
the real actions performed by players themselves. For Sageng, this is also supported by the factthat “evaluations of in-game action that pertain to movement, such as ‘swift’ and ‘skillful’ or‘precise’ apply in full force to the players [sic] ability to execute his intentions about in-gameactions” (Sageng, 2012, p. 226).
Thus, Sageng defends the realist view by observing our practice in which FA sentences areused. As stated above, any plausible realist theory has to explain, if the actions FA sentences
describe are real, what kind of real actions they are, and why we are disposed to use special
expressions that are literally false in order to describe some real situations. Sageng does explain
both by the notion of “a reference shift for the terms describing the action from the represented
happenings to on-screen spatio-visual happenings” (Sageng, 2012, p. 219). The core idea is this:. . . the semantic consequence of introducing real action with pictorial representations is thatthe players’ intentional object will change from the fictional happenings originallycursivated to the things he now interacts with, which are simply the computer generated
spatio-visual graphical shapes that he sees before him on the screen. Thus, normally when
the player intends to perform a “shooting” or “walking” in the context of gameplay thecontents of his mental states have shifted reference to graphical happenings on the screen.
(Sageng, 2012, p. 228)
According to Sageng, this reference shift affects our language.
Prior to interaction, the term “running” in a description of depiction refers to an ordinary
running, but after interaction we have the option to regard the term as directly referring tocomputer generated shapes on the screen that have spatial similarities with runnings. . . .
The problem with these new actions [whose intentional objects are graphical shapes] is that
we for the most part only know their identification conditions from their historicalconnection with their representational role and for the most part we do not have special
words for them. (Sageng, 2012, pp. 228–229)
That is, for Sageng, when one intends to do something to a fictional object O depicted by apictorial representation R, her intentional object changes from O to the graphical shape in R that
depicts O. And since it is only through specifying the “history” of R’s representational function

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that we can identify the action and its object, and we have no special word for the action, we
cannot help using the term that originally described O in order to describe the new action
towards the shape on the screen. In the context where FA sentences are used, “to get a mushroom”
means to do something to the graphical shape that depicted a fictional mushroom (or a fictional
action of getting a mushroom). Of course, Sageng continues, most videogames involve fictional
events and settings as essential, and players’ desires for in-game actions are often to pretend to
do such and such. Nevertheless, even in such a case, the player’s intention is still towards thegraphical environment (Sageng, 2012, p. 230).
Sageng’s reference shift account seems plausible in some important respects. First, heclearly shows the theoretical motivation for the realist position in terms of the observation of ourpractice. Second, he reasonably explains why FA sentences are used in order to describe realactions. In particular, it is a convincing claim that the terms originally standing for represented
contents are used for the individualization and description of graphical elements that represent
the contents. Finally, he points out that even when players perform with pretenseful orimaginative motivations, it is not fictional but real actions that they actually intend and perform.
Sageng’s theory has a crucial difficulty with regard to what real actions FA sentences apply
to, however. According to Sageng, FA sentences describe players’ “graphical actions,” that is, theinteractions between players and the on-screen spatio-visual graphical shapes. But, in standard
cases where FA sentences apply, it is obvious that the actions players intend and perform cannot
be reduced to graphical ones. For example, where “S rested at an inn” or “S got a mushroom”
applies, S did not intend to do something to a certain graphical shape on the screen itself that
had originally represented the fictional action of Cloud and his party’s resting at an inn or of
Mario’s getting a mushroom.
This is evident from two facts. First, it is the case that even though in a player’s action theintention for the screen, the physical input, and therefore the output, all are just the same, what
FA sentence applies to the action can still be variable. For instance, when a player who does notunderstand the rules of Super Mario Brothers at all deliberately handles the gamepad with theintention for a certain graphical shape, and successfully brings about the graphical output that
represents Mario’s getting a mushroom as intended, she cannot be described as having got themushroom since she does not understand the significance of getting a mushroom in the game.
Second, it can be the case that two actions that are about different on-screen graphical states arestill described by one and the same FA sentence. For example, you can do and be described
equally in both cases where the monitor is normally on and where it is off or flickering badly.
This suggests that the actions FA sentences describe are not about the on-screen graphicalshapes, but rather another thing that may be usually comprehended through the graphics. Of
course, from the realist view, it is not any fictional thing represented by the screen. The lastchallenge the realist theory faces is to elucidate what this real situation is.

9. Institutionalism
My own view is that if we pay attention to what the actions in traditional games are and how
they are described, then our problem concerning videogames will be resolved without any

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MATSUNAGA Shinjidifficulty. My argument is this: (i) In traditional or non-electronic games, such as card games,board games, sports, and so on, the rules of a game constitute the real actions that are possible
only within the context of playing the game, which I call gameplay actions. (ii) It is very common
that gameplay actions are specified by the symbols introduced only for such a purpose, andconsequently are described by using the expressions containing the names of such symbols. (iii)
In this respect, non-representational videogames have the same feature except that theirsymbols all are graphical. (iv) What is peculiar to representational (i.e. fictive) videogames is thatthey have the symbols for gameplay actions that are individuated in accordance with theirfictional contents. (v) Because of this, the gameplay actions in videogame fictions are describedby using fictive vocabularies: that is, the expressions originally for describing fictional contents.
This explains what actions FA sentences describe and why FA sentences are naturally used todescribe such actions. Each claim needs to be more detailed.
(i) Such actions as checking and taking a knight in chess, and hitting a home run andstriking out in baseball, would all never exist if there were not the rules of chess and baseball. Of
course, without any rule, you can perform the action of moving a horsehead-shaped black piece
into a certain place on a white and black checkered board, or that of clouting a ball far away witha wooden club; but some rule is required for those behaviors to be counted as a move or a homerun: that is, a gameplay action. In characterizing speech acts, John Searle takes up this featurethat rules of games in general have (Searle, 1969, pp. 33–42). Rules that “create or define newform of behavior” typically seen in games, Searle calls constitutive rules, whose form is usually“X counts as Y in context C” (Searle, 1969, pp. 33–35). According to Searle, the facts and actions
that in a given context constitutive rules make possible are institutional (Searle, 1969, pp. 50–
53) [13]. It is true that institutional facts are not “brute” ones, but they are still a kind of fact.
Thus, facts and actions in traditional games are no less real than those in any institutionalsituation like marriage or court, at least in the ontological sense [14].
(ii) In most traditional games, special symbols are introduced in order to specify what thepresent state is and what event or action takes place: for example, chess pieces, the grid of achessboard, bases and lines in baseball, and so on [15]. Because of this, in order to describe agame situation, whether a state, an event, or an action, one usually uses the name of the symbolthat specifies the situation. For example, we usually use a name like “knight” or “second base” todescribe a game situation such as “taking a knight” or “stealing second base” [16].
(iii) The same applies to abstract or non-representational videogames like Tetris. Gameplay
actions in videogames also require constitutive rules as long as they are a kind of institutional
action. It is constitutive rules that enable us to count a certain state of computer hardware as acertain game situation such as beating the game, losing, getting an extra life, performing
combos, and so on. In a sense, they give gameplay actions a kind of significance, which
encourages us to perform or not perform the actions. What is peculiar to videogames in thisrespect is that the game situations (objects, states, events, actions, etc.) are represented
exclusively by graphical symbols on the screen [17]. And consequently, we need to use the namesof graphical symbols to describe the game situations. In Tetris, for example, we may usually say“the I-tetrominoes can clear four lines” or “I misplaced the square,” where “I,” “four lines,” and“square” all are obviously the names of certain on-screen graphical shapes that specify certain

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game situations.
(iv) Videogames that represent fictional worlds differ slightly: Graphical symbols thatspecify game situations and gameplay actions are usually individuated by their own fictional
contents. For example, on-screen symbols standing for game events like getting an extra life orrecovering hit points can be individuated only through their own fictional contents like Mario
getting a green mushroom or Cloud resting at an inn. That is, in fictive videogames, we often
need to understand what fictional content a part of the screen has in order to understand whatgame situation the graphical part specifies. This is true whether the fictive representations are
pictorial or linguistic.
(v) Thus, players’ actions in fictive videogames can be correctly described like this: A player
S intends and performs a gameplay action, say, getting an extra life, where she (and perhaps
onlookers too, if any) understands that the on-screen symbols representing the fictional content
of Mario getting a green mushroom simultaneously stand for her getting an extra life. In ourordinary terminology, this action is described by using expressions containing the names of thesymbols like “getting a green mushroom.” As a result, the description attributing the action to S
takes the form of “S gets a green mushroom,” the very form of FA sentences.
There might be some objections against this argument. First, some might say that my
account gives no explanation about players’ motivations and experiences of the gameplay
actions; if we pay attention to such aspects, we will need to take up as significant some fictive (ormake-believe) motivations or some special experiences like immersion or player-character
identification. This claim is quite plausible as such, but irrelevant to our present discussion.
Motivations or experiences of gameplay matter, but they are not the matter of its ontologicalstatus.
Second, some might think that I should explain further why it must be the very fictional
content rather than others that is represented by the symbol for a certain game situation. In otherwords, I have to explain what pairs of game situations and fictional contents are natural and notarbitrary. This is also right. In this paper, I certainly give no explanation about the relation
between gameplay actions and fictional contents, and it may be true that the relation is essential
for the analysis of cases where FA sentences are used. However, again, even if the investigationof the relation is crucial for understanding the nature of gameplay actions, it is not the ontologicalmatter on which we have concentrated in this paper [18].
Third, some might suspect that my argument is true not only of videogame fictions but alsoof a number of non-electronic fictive games like pen and paper role-playing games or mostmodern German-style board games. I fully agree with this opinion. What I said is just thatgameplay actions in videogames and those in non-electronic games are not different in regard totheir ontological status. And I have never said that both are not different in some other respects.
In fact, actions in videogames and those in traditional or non-electronic games differ in so many
respects such as their temporal density (i.e. how temporally detailed individual actions are). But
the differences between them in any respect that is not ontological are also irrelevant to what wehave focused on.

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10. Conclusion: The Answer to the Puzzle
Here is my conclusion. The actions FA sentences describe are real ones that are constituted
institutionally. That is, they are ontologically the same as institutional facts. The reason why FA
sentences are naturally used in order to describe such real actions in videogame fictions is thatthe individualization of the actions is dependent on the fictional contents which are represented
by the symbols that stand for the actions; thereby we naturally use the names of the symbols inorder to describe them; and the names are fictive vocabularies that originally referred to fictionalsituations.

Notes
[1]

[2]
[3]
[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]
[8]

I roughly use the term “fiction” to refer to anything that represents a fictional world. This is far
from the definition of fiction, but it will be sufficient for my present purpose. My intention for thisterminology is (a) that I will pick up the feature of representing fictional worlds as shared by bothvideogames and other art forms like films, novels, comics, theaters, etc., and (b) that in order toavoid some confusion, I will exclude a common but problematic terminology that uses “fiction” torefer to separation from real or ordinary life, which is often thought to characterize play andgames in general.
The examples I suppose here are such well-known titles as the Super Mario Brothers series, theFinal Fantasy series, the SimCity series, and the Grand Theft Auto series.
I here adopt Donald Davidson’s ontology of actions that analyzes an action as an event (Davidson,2001).
It may be possible for one located in a real place to interact with a fictional character (supposed tobe) located in a real place such as Mickey Mouse, who is located in Tokyo Disneyland, Urayasu.
Therefore, the puzzle of FA sentences focuses not on our interacting with fictional characters but
on our acting and interacting within fictional locations. Rune Klevjer (2009) points out a similar
issue, where he explains the difference between a fictional object in “fictional space” and one in“real space” in terms of the Waltonian notion of reflexivity.
The proposition (5) might need explaining further. According to the Davidsonian line, “an agent
performs an action A” is analyzed into “ƎxƎe(A(x, e))” where x is the variable for the agent and e isthe variable for the event of which the properties of A are predicated. In order for this sentence tobe true, there must exist an individual that satisfies x and an individual that satisfies e. Both areconcrete individuals and so must be particularly located in time and space. Therefore, if weinterpret an FA sentence literally, in order for it to be true we must have an odd ontology thatcommits us to the possibility that both a real person and a fictional event are located in the sametime-space. (5) describes our (perhaps common) refusal of this consequence.
Moreover, another common difficulty seen in discourses on “immersion” or “identification” is thatsuch terms are unclear and/or equivocal. In fact, as Gordon Calleja (2011, pp. 25–34) surveys, theterm “immersion” used in game studies and game design is very ambiguous.
For a similar criticism, see Sageng (2012, pp. 226–227).
Grant Tavinor (2012, p. 196) attempts to defend the virtuality of fictional objects in the way “thedepictions of the game allow for an interaction that corresponds to an interaction that one might
have with an actual goblin [italics added].” This appeal to counterfactual assumptions about
fictional characters gives us no solution. If there were a real goblin, it could have a function of, say,hitting or being hit by someone. However, its virtual counterpart can neither hit nor be hit in any

Did You Really Get a Mushroom?

[9]

[10]

[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]

[15]
[16]

[17]
[18]

101

literal or real sense.
Theories of fiction, which attempt to analyze fictional sentences that can be formulated as “it is true
fictionally (or in fiction) that p,” are varied. Here I have in mind exclusively those who define fictionin terms of imaginative propositional attitude or make-believe, such as Kendall Walton (1990) and
Gregory Currie (1990). Although make-believe theories are also varied (see Friend, 2008), thedifferences among them hardly bring any crucial consequence here.
Note that Walton’s use of the term “game” is somewhat metaphorical, and his focus throughout is
on fiction and representational works in general, not on games in the literal sense. The terminology
is perhaps intended to highlight such aspects as rules prescribing imagination and appreciators’
imaginative participation in appreciating fiction.
Here Newman uses the term “vehicle” to refer not only to literal vehicles, such as cars in racing
games, but also to any medium for players’ in-game agency.
Sageng uses the term “in-game action reports.” Given his argument and examples, I take it as asynonym of “fictional action sentences” in my terminology.
Later, Searle uses the same conception to explain the ontological status of social facts andconstructs his philosophy of society (Searle, 1995; Searle, 2010).
Certainly, there may be a difference between facts in games and other kinds of institutional facts
in how strongly they are related to other real facts, for, as many have pointed out in the traditionof game studies, it may be true that games (or more generally play) tend to be relatively separate
from our ordinary or real interests and life (Juul, 2005, pp. 33–36). However, the difference is thematter of the relative amount of practical interests or that of the attitude players take when playing(Suits, 2014), and not that of the ontological gap between the real and the fictional (see note 5
above).
Such symbols are often called “game tokens.” I prefer not to use the term “token” here because it
often has some ontological implication as in the type/token dichotomy.
Besides those that contain the names of symbols, most games introduce their own vocabularies forgame situations. They may be quite new words for the games (e.g. “home run” or “checkmate”) or
somewhat metaphorical uses of existing words for real situations (e.g. “stealing a base” or “knights
can jump over others”). But what matters here is only the uses of the names of symbols.
To be precise, there can be not only on-screen visual symbols but also auditory and tactile ones.
I have discussed in my other paper why a certain relation between game situations and fictional
contents is natural and motivated in terms of the realism in simulation (Matsunaga, 2015; only inJapanese). Roughly speaking, if a game situation is (a) detailed enough, (b) structurally similar (i.e.
homomorphic) to a fictional situation, and (c) one whose relation to the fictional situation isconventionally familiar to us, then it is a realistic simulation and has a kind of motivatedness.

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* This paper is based on my earlier paper written in Japanese: Matsunaga S. (2013). Bideogeemu ni okeru
pureiyā no kyokōteki kōi [Players’ fictional actions in videogaming]. Bigaku, 243, 97–108.