Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (2): 238-267, 2008

Transformation of the Islamic Da‘wa Party in Iraq: From the Revolutionary
Period to the Diaspora Era
Yamao Dai*

Abstract
This paper aims to clarify how the Islamic Da‘wa Party came to embrace Iraqi nationalism that was compatible with Islamic doctrins by examining its struggle and accommodation to the political changes in domestic, regional, and international dimensions
from its establishment in 1957 to the mid-1990s.
Historical documents of the Da‘wa Party showed that it had three significant
turning points: firstly, it shifted from a reformist Islamic organization to a revolutionary
movement in the mid-1970s because of the complex influences of oppression, restriction
by regulation, and segmentation of the leadership; secondly, it had to evacuate from
Iraq to Iran after the Iranian revolution 1979 because of severe oppression by theBa‘thist regime; thirdly, it distanced itself from the Iranian authority in the late 1980s.
These historical contexts paved the way to its emphasis of Iraqi nationalism inconfronting international politics in the 1990s. In the diaspora leadership, the party
had few resources; hence it had to maneuver between other forces by persisting in
its independent stance. It was these complex factors that led the party to stress Iraqi
nationalism while maintaining Islamic doctrine.
The Da‘wa Party remained flexible enough to accommodate the multitude ofdimensions of political change. This reflects the compatibility of Islamism and Iraqi
nationalism within the party itself. Furthermore, it implies the inappropriateness of adichotomous understanding of Islamism and nationalism in analyzing the Da‘wa Party.

1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to clarify how the Islamic Da‘wa Party (Hizb al-Da‘wa al-Islamiya) came
to possess Islamic doctrines and Iraqi nationalism compatibly by examining its struggle andaccommodation to the political changes in domestic, regional, and international dimensions from its
establishment in 1957 to the mid-1990s.
Increasing attention has been paid to Islamic political parties in Iraq, with the Da‘wa Partyat the head of the list, especially after the U.S. invasion to Iraq in 2003. I could trace the roots of
most, if not all, modern Iraqi Islamic parties to the Da‘wa Party (see Figure 1), while the party has* 山尾 大, Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies, Kyoto University, Research Fellow of the Japan
Society for Promotion of Science (DC)
Accepted December 17, 2007238

YAMAO: Transformation of the Islamic Da‘wa Party in Iraq

Fig. 1. Islamic Movements in Iraq Overview
Notes: 1) This is a figure of Shi‘ite and Sunni Islamic political movements/organizations/parties.
2) Kurdish parties are not on the figure.
3)
indicates organizational transformations and influences,indicates partial
transformations of members.
4) ★ indicates Islamic political movements/organizations/parties in which majority of members are Sunni.
indicates that the Islamic parties or organizations5) The boxes of grayed upward diagonals
were established in Iran.
6) The boxes of grayed solid diamondindicates that the Islamic parties or organizations were
established outside Iraq, other than Iran.
Source: Made by author based on various information from media and academic researches quoted in
bibliography and others.
239

Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (2)remained in the mainstream through the turbulent 1980s to 1990s, and rose into power during thepost Iraq War period.1) Today it became one of the biggest ruling parties.
Researchers are, however, focusing attentions on various subjects other than the Islamic
political parties.2) A number of exceptional studies during the early days discussed socio-economic
backgrounds, and analyzed mobilizations of the Islamic movements in the slums such as Thawra
City without grasping the Islamic parties or organizations themselves [Batatu 1981, 1987]. Other
studies dealt with these institutions as “fundamentalist” or “radical” organizations, ignoring the
emergence and evolution of these parties [Baram 1990, 1994].3)
Among the first detailed works on Islamic movements is Joyce Wiley’s The Islamic Movementof Iraqi Shia [Wiley 1992].

Using primary sources, she argues that the Muslim Brotherhood(al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) and the Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami) have influencesin the creation of the Da‘wa Party [Wiley 1992: 31-32]. Following her research, Faleh A. Jabar
presented an overview of Shi‘ite Islamic movements emphasizing the roles of middle classes non‘ulama’ merchants in the shrine cities, especially the cities of al-Najaf and Karbala’ [Jabar 2003].
The contribution of his argument is that he brings western sociological-anthropological framework
into the analysis of Islamic movements. Criticizing dichotomy of the ruling Sunni elites and the oppressed Shi‘ite majority, he avoids monolithic understanding of Shi‘ite Islamic movements. Directing
his attention to three actors; the ‘ulama’, merchants in the shrine cities, and the intellectual middle

1) A rise of Shi‘ite Islamic parties or organizations, in particular, draws a lot of attention after the Iraqi War. Shi‘ite
issues have been examined quoting Iranian cases, as if the Shi‘a in Iran represents the Shi‘a in general. However,
it is clarified these days that Shi‘ite societies in Arab World have their own historical developments specific toeach country, especially the Shi‘ite societies of Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia [Nakash 1994; Shanahan 2005;
Ibrahim 2006].
2) Yitzhak Nakash deals with Iraqi Shi‘a in general, where he clarifies that Shi‘a has not been a majority group of
Iraq in its history in spite of the existence of the four Shi‘ite shrine cities [Nakash 1994]. Other important works
on modern Iraqi politics include; modern political history in general [Tripp 2000; Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett
2001; Marr 2004], transformation of Iraqi societies and Iraqi Communist Party [Batatu 1978], Iraqi Nationalism[Zubaida 2002; Sakai 2005], mechanisms of rule in authoritarian Ba‘thist regime from various perspectives
emphasizing Iraqi identities or historical symbols [Baram 1991; Makiya 1998; Sakai 2003; Davis 2005].
3) Iraqi scholar, ‘Adil Ra’uf, pointes out that there are almost no detailed studies on the Da‘wa Party, the SCIRI(Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, al-Majlis al-A‘la li-l-Thawra al-Islamiya fi al-‘Iraq), or Islamic
Task Organization (Munazzama al-‘Amal al-Islami; MAI) [Ra’uf 2000: 6]. Part of the reasons scholar have notpaid adequate attentions to this field is a lack of sources on Islamic movements due to various reasons. The Iraqi
Center for Strategic Studies in Damascus clearly mentions that the reason for the lack of researches in Arabic is thatscholars working on this topic, especially on the Da‘wa Party, were in danger for their lives and had no guaranteeof safety before the 1990s [MIID 1999: 7]. However, after the Gulf War in 1991, personal archives were opened
gradually to the public, and access to this information became more widely available. In these courses, detailed
researches in Arabic on the Da‘wa Party have been published, see [al-Mu’min 1993; al-Khursan 1999]. After the
Iraqi War in 2003, publications on the party started gradually, see [al-Shami 2006; Shubbar 2005, 2006].

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YAMAO: Transformation of the Islamic Da‘wa Party in Iraq

classes, he concludes that Islamic movements in Iraq, starting from social protest in communal bases,
has shifted to radical populist Islamism [Jabar 2003: 316].
Despite these contributions of recent works, international activities of the Da‘wa Party have notbeen dealt with. Moreover, preceding researches have not paid sufficient attention to transformationof the party within both international and regional dimensions. This paper, hence, attempts to place
an emphasis on shifts of policies and identities of the Da‘wa Party from longer period of its history
and wider perspectives, with special reference to domestic, regional, and international politics. The
reason for this may proceed from two factors: firstly, the party had to confront different puzzles ineach dimension; secondly, we will be able to acquire a comprehensive understanding of the party
from this perspective.
In a course of analysis, this paper will divide history of the Da‘wa Party into three periods: (1)from the formation of the party to 1980, the year its charismatic leader was executed. It was also
the years during which the party constructed its policies in the face of political changes inside Iraq,
and became a revolutionary party in the mid-1970s, (2) from 1980 to 1988, during which the party
had to face regional and international politics, especially of Iran after the Islamic revolution, (3) the
1990s in which the party was confronted severe struggle for survival after the drastic changes of international politics. It was in this diasporic period when the party inclined to have Iraqi nationalisticfeatures.4) A general view of Iraqi Islamic movements is exhibited in the Figure 1.
Hence, it should be inquired why the Da‘wa Party, although it once sought to Islamic revolution,
inclined toward Iraqi nationalism.
To answer this inquiry, this paper examines aforesaid three turning points of the party, namely
in the mid 1970s, 1980, and from 1988 to the beginning of 1990s, by describing historical changesof the party. It also tries to analyze causes and factors of these shifts. In the course of these analyses,
I will try to focus on three factors; (1) relations between the central government and the party until
1980 in particular, (2) interactions with regional countries in the 1980s, and (3) confrontation withother Iraqi oppositional organizations in international dimension in the 1990s.5)
Through these arguments, this paper intends to clarify (1) flexibilities of the Da‘wa Partyin accommodating the political circumstances around them, (2) compatibilities of Islamism andnationalism within the party. These arguments will give a better understanding of what was said4) This idea is based on Anderson’s concept “long-distance nationalism” [Anderson 1998].
5) I will mainly use the Da‘wa Party documents in general [HDI 1981-1989], the platforms and the official organs inanalyzing the party of the 1990s in particular [HDI 1992; SI 1993-1996]. As complementary documents, I will
use researches in Arabic on it.

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Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (2)about Islamism and nationalism.

2. Formation of New Islamic Political Party: Reformist Activities of the Da‘wa Party
First of all, I will provide a brief sketch of founding process of the Da‘wa Party, which was not definitely understood in previous researches, and then clarify its characteristics in its formative period
dealing with ideology, membership, organizations, and ‘ulama’ networks. This section intends tocomprehend basic features of the party.
2.1 Emergence of New Islamic Party: Socio-political Background and Founding Process
Iraq in the 1950s witnessed a rise of secularism such as an expansion of Iraqi Communist Party (ICP),
not only in slums in Baghdad but also in the Shi‘ite shrine cities, mainly al-Najaf. Hanna Batatu points
out that most of the members of ICP in al-Najaf were sons of relatives of Shi‘ite ‘ulama’, and a ratio of
Shi‘a in the Executive Command of ICP increased from 20.5% in 1941-48 periods to 46.9% in 1949-55
periods [Batatu 1978: 485-573, 700, 752]. Behind this rise of the ICP, I can observe a rapid modernization of Iraqi societies, which resulted in urbanization of societies that appeared in the late period of theHashimite monarchy.6) The immigrants made slums around big cities such as Baghdad, Basra, andMosul,7) where the ICP successfully mobilized these immigrants. The rise of secularism undoubtedly
produced a sense of impending crisis of those who related to the Shi‘ite religious establishment.
It is also worth mentioning to the fact that various political parties were acting in a comparatively democratic political arena in Iraq. As Shubbar aptly points out, multiple party systems partly
functioned in the election in 1954 [Shubbar 1989: 217-218]. This certainly provided possibility ofcreating a new Islamic party.
In these circumstances the Da‘wa Party was established by young ‘ulama’ and non-‘ulama’mainly merchants in the shrine cities. There are conflicting opinions concerning to the formationof the Da‘wa Party.8) After reviewing all these opinions against historical dates, I would sum up6) Population of Baghdad increased 53.9% from 1947 to 1957, and similar rise of population was seen in Basra(62.2%) and Mosul (33.4%) [Batatu 1978: 35].
7) Sakai analyzes clearly that it was not only “the gaps between the cities,” but also “the gaps within the cities” thatappeared in Iraqi societies as a result of this urbanization [Sakai 1991: 71-79].
8) These are divided into three opinions; all are dependent on views presented by members of the party in the formative period. Founding year; firstly, October 1957 presented by Salih al-Adib and Kazim al-Ha’iri [al-‘Abd Allah
1997: 17-18; al-Nu‘mani 1997: 154; ‘Allawi 1999: 37], secondly, late-summer of 1958 asserted by Muhammad
Baqir al-Hakim [Wiley 1992: 32; Ja‘far 1996: 511; al-Hakim 2000: 227], and thirdly, 1959 argued by Talib
al-Rifa‘i [al-Husayni 2005: 68-72]. These differences relate to how the foundation process was understood. The
first meeting to which founding members attended was held in al-Najaf in 1957, then they decided party apparatus
in Karbala’ meeting in 1958. And then detail discussions on party’s policies was determined in 1959 [al-Khursan
1999: 53-69]. See [Yamao 2006].

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YAMAO: Transformation of the Islamic Da‘wa Party in Iraq

the formative process in the following manner. Five reformists ‘ulama’ and non-‘ulama’ (Mahdi
al-Hakim, ‘Abd al-Sahib Dukhayyil, Sadiq al-Qamusi, Talib al-Rifa‘i, Salih al-Adib) had the plan toestablish a new Islamic political party form around 1956 [al-Nizari 1990: 38-41; al-Khursan 1999:
48-69; Yamao 2006]. They consulted about this plan to Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (1935-80), a
reformist ‘ulama’ and one of the most important figures of Islamic movements in Iraq. He later
became the charismatic leader of the Da‘wa Party. Then they brought this agreed-plan to the highranked mujtahid Murtada al-‘Askari to ask him join the creation of this party (see Table 1).
After legitimatizing of formation of a political party by naming it Islamic Da‘wa (call for Islam),al-Sadr emphasized the necessities of an Islamic political organization to join the political arena. He
stressed that, “it [establishing Islamic party] is not only permitted in our age, but is the duty for us togather efforts for Islam and distribute them according to wisdom… and to choose the most appropriate means to organize these efforts” [al-Sadr 2005b: 716]. In other words, he tried to clarify that it isnecessary to form political party organizations in order to play active roles efficiently in the modern
Iraq. Emphasizing the party’s role, al-Sadr maintains that the ideal ruling system should be basedon shura including ‘ulama’ in the shura council in order to guarantee Islamic law [al-Sadr 2005a:
704-706].
2.2 Characteristics and Identities of the Da‘wa Party in Its Formative Period
What, then, did the Da‘wa Party try to perform? It is pointed out that the ‘Arif regime from 1963 to1968 is a “golden age” for the Islamic movement in Iraq [Marr 2004: 128]. How did they increase
their influence?

I will examine characteristics of the party by analyzing membership and themethods it took to construct its representation.
Firstly, in the ideological level, the party followed al-Sadr’s thought. His thought is shown in
The Bases of Islam (al-Usus al-Islamiya), which was used as the textbook of the party’s education[al-Khursan 1999: 68, 94]. Al-Sadr emphasizes that the ultimate aim is the formation of the Islamicstate, but it is not allowed to step in a revolutionary action unless there are prospects for success of
the Islamic revolution [al-Sadr 2005a: 698-699]. The Party, therefore, did not intend to step in a
revolutionary movement but to enlarge the Islamic presence within the existing status quo. Al-Sadr
himself maintains, “Islam in its methodological perspective is not necessarily revolutionary as is thedomain of thought. On the other hand, Islam makes rooms for revolutionary change only in thelimited conditions” [al-Sadr 1982: 101-102].
Secondly, in the membership, I can point out two important features. Firstly, Table 1, a listof the leading members of the party in its formative period, shows that there is an alliance of non‘ulama’ intellectual lay members and ‘ulama’ in the religious establishment. Roger Shanahan points
243Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (2)Table 1. Leading Members of the Da‘wa Party in Its Formative Period
Leading Member

Occupation Muntada1) Founding 1st Period2) 2nd Period3)

Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr
Mahdi al-Hakim
Murtada al-‘Askari
Muhammad Baqiral-Hakim
Talib al-Rifa‘i‘Arif al-Basri‘ulama’‘ulama’‘ulama’Muhammad Bahr al-‘Ulum‘ulama’Fakhr al-Din al-‘Askari
Mahdi al-Samawi
Muhammad Husayn Fadl
Allah
Mahdi Shams al-Din
Kazim Yusf Tamimi
Sami al-Badri*
Salih al-Adib
Muhammad Hadi
al-Subayti‘ulama’‘ulama’Muhammad Husayn
al-Adib
Dawud al-‘Attar‘Abd al-Sahib Dukhayyil‘Abd al-Hadi al-Fadli‘Adnan al-Baka’
Hasan Shubbar
Sadiq al-Qamusi○○‘ulama’‘ulama’‘ulama’‘ulama’

○
○
○

○
○
○

○

○

○

○
△

○
○

○

○
○

○

○

○
left the party 1961
unknown 1st period
unknown 1st, 2nd
period○‘ulama’‘ulama’‘ulama’engineer○○engineersupervisorofeducation
professor
merchant
professor
professor of
Kulliyaal-Fiqh
lawyerprofessor of
MuntadaAnnotation
left the party 1961
left the party 1961

○

○
○
○

△

○

unknown 1st period
unknown 1st, 2nd
period

○

○

○

○
○
○
○

○
○

○

△

○

○

○

unknown 1st period

unknown 1st, 2nd
periodunknown 1st, 2nd
periodunknown 1st, 2nd
period‘Ali al-‘Allawi
al-Hajj Khadal
Ibrahim al-Marayati

Notes: 1) Muntada indicates the leading members who studied in Muntada al-Nashr.
2) 1st Period indicates the year from 1957 to 1961 in which the Da‘wa Party was directed by al-Sadr.
3) 2nd Period indicates the year from 1962 to 1972 in which the Da‘wa Party constructed party
apparatuses and institutions.
* Opposing to ‘Arif al-Basri in the mid 1960s, then founded Haraka Jund al-Imam in the late 1970s (seeFig. 1).
Source: Made by author based on [al-Mu’min 1993: 32-33; Ja‘far 1996: 511; Ra’uf 1999b: 9; al-Khursan
1999: 54-63, 67, 90-91, 121-122; Aziz 2002: 231-232; Jabar 2003: 97-98; al-Husayni 2005: 74-75,
86-87].

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YAMAO: Transformation of the Islamic Da‘wa Party in Iraq

out that one of the characteristics of the Da‘wa Party is cooperation between clerics and technocrats[Shanahan 2004: 943-944]. Secondly, there were some significant Sunni leading figures in theDa‘wa Party at least in the formative period. As Figure 1 suggests, Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan
al-Muslimun) and Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami), mainly Sunni organizationinfluenced the formation of the Da‘wa Party.9) Shubbar points out clearly that the party did not havesectarian inclination, but had pan-Islamic feature [Shubbar 2005: 209-211]. It is by now clear thatthe Da‘wa Party did not have only Shi‘ite disposition, at least in the beginning.10)
Thirdly, the Da‘wa Party tried to cooperate with the Shi‘ite religious establishment. This
argument can be justified by cooperative activities between party members and the al-Najaf ‘Ulama’
Association (Jama‘a al-‘Ulama’ fi al-Najaf al-Ashraf), which was founded by reformist ‘ulama’ in thereligious establishment. Collaborating with another ‘ulama’ association, the Baghdad and Kazimiya‘Ulama’ Association (Jama‘a al-‘Ulama’ fi Baghdad wa al-Kazimiya), the Da‘wa Party actively
opposed the nationalization of banks and large-scale factories in 1964 [al-Khursan 1999: 146;
al-Hakim 2000: 243-244]. Al-Sadr wanted to cooperate with the Shi‘ite religious establishment.
Consenting to this direction, the party acted within the framework of the ‘ulama’ associations[al-Mu’min 1993: 50, 96]. Moreover, paying attention to the organizational level of the party, it had
the Committee of Public Relations for Contacting Religious Authorities (Lajna al-‘Alaqat al-‘Amma
li-l-Ittisal bi-l-Marja‘iya wa ‘Ulama’ wa al-Shakhsiyat al-Muhimma)11) in order to create and maintain solid links with the Shi‘ite religious establishment [al-Khursan 1999: 89-93; al-Husayni 2005:
85-86], which shows that the party considered this kind of solidarity as important for expanding
party influence.
In addition, the Da‘wa Party expanded its influences as it utilized Shi‘ite ‘ulama’ networks ingeneral and that of al-Sadr’s in particular (see Figure 2). The party spread from Iran to Lebanon
dependent on Shi‘ite ‘ulama’ networks. For example, al-Sadr went to Lebanon and discussed
Islamic movements in Iraq with his own cousin Musa al-Sadr, founder of the Amal Movements in
Lebanon [al-Mu’min 1993: 100; Ja‘far 1996: 479]. Many of Lebanese who were studying in Iraq
9) The leading figures of the Da‘wa Party such as ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Badri, ‘Arif al-Basri, Hadi al-Subayti, and Mahdi
al-Hakim were former members of leading command of Islamic Liberation Party, and Murtada al-‘Askari wasmember of Muslim Brotherhood [al-Khursan 1999: 39-41; Sankari 2005: 85]. In addition to this sequence of themembership, al-Khursan points out influences of Islamic thoughts of Sayyid Qutb and Abu al-A‘la al-Maududi,
and Jabar argues that there can be confirmed similarities between political programs of the Da‘wa party, Muslim
Brotherhood, and Islamic Liberation Party [Jabar 2003: 81-82].
10) Sunni members in the leadership of the party played important roles in terms of introducing political programs in
the formative period. It became, however, laborious to sight Sunni membership after the mid 1970s.
11) The core members of this Committee are Murtada al-‘Askari, Mahdi al-Hakim, and al-Dukhayyil; all of them hadstrong relationships to the Shi‘ite religious establishment [al-Husayni 2005: 86-87].

245

Fig. 2. Network of Shi’ite ‘Ulama’: al-Sadr Family
Notes: 1) □ indicates male, ○ indicates female2) ＿ indicates parents and children relationship, ∥ indicates matrimonial relationship
Source: Made by author based on [al-Ha’iri 1986: 15-42; Norton 1987: 39-40; Ra’uf 1999a: 73-74; ‘Abd al-Hamid 2002: 14-21; al-Nu‘mani
2003: vol. 1, 26-44; al-Haydari 2005: 33-38; al-Husayni 2005: 33-46; Chehabi and Tafreshi 2006: 137-141; al-‘Amili 2007: vol. 1,
5-6].

Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (2)246

YAMAO: Transformation of the Islamic Da‘wa Party in Iraq

became members of the Da‘wa Party, and there are direct organizational and ideological connections
between Iraqi and Lebanese Islamic movements [Shanahan 2005: 142-147, 167].
Fourthly, using all these networks, the Da‘wa Party made an effort to participate in politics.
The party’s document stresses the necessity of participation in Iraqi politics through election if
possible. It also presents some ideas concerning the creation of political programs in terms of callingfor Islam (Da‘wa), making political organizations for elections, and establishing labor unions (suchas al-niqabat, al-ittihadat, al-jam‘iyat) in order to support the party in elections. It is effective for theDa‘wa Party, it maintains, to promote sympathizers of the party to participate in the elections, andto increase the influential voices [HDI n.d.a: vol. 2, 134-139, 1981: vol. 1, 85-88].
In short, the formation of an organization in this context means promotion of participationin the political field in a democratic manner. The party tried to enlarge Islamic role in a panIslamism point of view, but at the same time, it sought to participate in the political arena within theframework of Iraqi state making the solid linkage with the Shi‘ite religious establishment, although it
comprise not only Shi‘a members. This is the basic stance of the party in the formative period.

3. Doctrinal Shift of the Da‘wa Party toward Islamic Revolution
This section firstly examines causes and consequences of change in the Da‘wa Party’s policy orientation toward the revolutionary movement in the mid 1970s. Secondly, it outlines the second shift ofthe party in the face of regional politics in the 1980s. Through these analyses, I will clarify historicalcontexts that motivated the party’s inclination to Iraqi nationalism.
3.1 Toward Revolutionary Movement: After the Mid-1970s
These policies of the Da‘wa Party, however, changed gradually toward revolutionary movement aspolitical and economical situations shifted after the formation of the Ba‘thist regime in Iraq in 1968.
An overview of the party documents gives us a justification to argue that the Iraqi Islamic movements
had their first turning point in the mid-1970s [MIID 1999: 26-27].12) Why did this change occur?
I can point out three causes of this shift: firstly oppressions from the Ba‘thist regime; secondly
regulations of outlawry; and thirdly segmentations of the party’s leadership.
Firstly, the Ba‘thist regime started to suppress the Da‘wa Party from the beginning of the
1970s. As we have seen above, the Da‘wa Party increased its influence by cooperating with thereligious establishment. The Ba‘thist regime had to stand against it with increasing inclination forauthoritarianism. Behind this enforcement of oppression, I can notice fairly excellent economic
12) The party document also pointes out that the mid-1970s was one of the important turning points of the party,
especially 1974’s execution of the party’s leading members [HDI 1989: vol. 4, 198-199].

247

Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (2)conditions in Iraq. Depending on the massive growth of oil incomes,13) the regime used these rents
for welfare on one hand, and intensified the suppression to the Islamic movements on the other.
The oppression concentrated on the supporters of al-Sadr and the Da‘wa Party, and many Iranian
students in al-hawza were expelled from Iraq labeling them as members of the Da‘wa Party [Ra’uf
2000: 118, 2001: 109].
Secondly, the regime enforced regulation which allowed them to execute a person solely because
they were a member of the Da‘wa Party (Regulation No. 461) [Ra’uf 2000: 121]. This was the peakof clampdown. In the course to reach this summit, it became more and more laborious for the party
to participate in political arena legally.
Thirdly, as a consequent of these political changes inside Iraq, we can notice serious segmentations of the Da‘wa Party’s leadership especially after 1974’s attack by the Ba‘thist regime.14) A split of
the party had already started in 1972 when the regime tried to destroy the party apparatuses.15) ‘Arif
al-Basri, a high-ranked mujtahid in the religious establishment, took over the party leadership after
1972 [al-Khursan 1999: 180]. He made considerable efforts to re-bridge the party and the religious
establishment. The year after his assumption of the leadership, however, the regime re-started an
oppressive attack to al-Basra branch and arrested a large number of the party’s leading members. At
the peak of this oppression, the regime executed five high-ranked mujtahids in the party leadershipin December 1974 [al-Mu’min 1993: 115-123]. This series of oppressions resulted in, as al-Khursan
mentions, the Da‘wa Party becoming like a body without head [al-Khursan 1999: 188].
As a result of this, the Da‘wa Party was divided into two parts: the Iraqi Committee (Lajna
al-‘Iraq) which played active roles inside Iraq, composed of comparatively new leaders, and theGeneral Leadership (al-Qiyada al-‘Amma) which was composed of senior leadership outside Iraq
[al-Khursan 1999: 212-217].16) In other words, dual leadership, the inside-Iraq leadership and theoutside-Iraq leadership started in this period (see Figure 1). In order to reunify the leadership, theparty would choose revolutionary movement against the Ba‘thist regime.
13) Oil income in 1971 is estimated 840 million U.S. dollars, 1,843 million dollars in 1973, and increased in 1979 to
21 billion dollars [Owen and Pamuk 1998: 162, 260]. Iraqi oil income increased nearly 30 times within only 8
years.
14) In 1974, the regime executed 5 high-ranked religious leaders in the party; namely ‘Arif al-Basri, ‘Imad al-Din
al-Tabataba’i, ‘Izz al-Din al-Qabanji, Nuri Muhammad Husayn Ti‘ma, and Husayn Kazim Jalukhan [al-Mu’min
1993: 115-123; al-Khursan 1999: 211; Shubbar 2006: 125-145].
15) I can confirm the main segmentations of the party’s leadership once in 1972, and more than twice in 1974. See[al-Khursan 1999].
16) Leading figures of the Iraqi Committee were Sabah ‘Abbas (leadership), Faysal Hilli, Fadil al-Zarkani, Mahdi ‘Abd
al-Mahdi. The General Leadership was divided into three factions; (1) al-Subayti faction, (2) al-Asifi faction, (3)al-Basri faction [al-Khursan 1999: 212-217].

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YAMAO: Transformation of the Islamic Da‘wa Party in Iraq

These are the reasons why the party changed their policy orientation. I will next examine
concretely how the party became revolutionary movement.
First of all, we should pay attention that the segmentation of the party’s leadership does notmean a decline of the party’s activities and its influences on the Iraqi society and politics. On
the contrary, because of the drought in the southern parts of Iraq in the late 1970s, political andeconomical frustrations have been increasing among the Iraqi people living in the south. In these circumstances, the Da‘wa Party successfully mobilized those frustrated masses and appealed to people
there [Batatu 1987: 211]. It was in this period that the Da‘wa Party started to mobilize the Iraqi
masses widely. It is worth mentioning that members of the Da‘wa Party shared the military base in
Biqa’ Valley with Lebanese militias and military organization of Fath in the mid-1970s [al-Khursan
1999: 361].
Al-Sadr maintains very clearly the importance of building strong cooperation between the party
and the religious establishment;“I am now convinced that Islamic movement17) cannot accomplish its own purpose without aids
from the religious establishment. At the same time…. It is crucially important for the religious
establishment to cooperate with Islamic movement in order to accomplish its missions…. The
relationship between the party and the religious establishment should be organized tightly in order
not to be destroyed by the regime.”18)

Sympathizing these ideologies of al-Sadr’s thought and political changes in Iraq, the party itself
was gradually changing direction towards revolutionary movement. The party held the conventionof Makka in 1977 in order to discuss party’s policies critically.19) This was turning point of the party
in terms of its relationship with the Shi‘ite religious establishment. For example, the Iraqi Committee
held meetings with al-Sadr during February and March of 1979 to discuss those who should takeresponsibility in the oppositional Islamic movements. They agreed that while religious authority
should lead the movements considering the party’s opinions, both should act as a unity. They also
agreed to cooperate, (1) in collecting and buying weapons, (2) in starting demonstrations, (3) in pub17) In this context, Islamic movement indicates the Da‘wa Party.
18) Al-Sadr’s words quoted in [al-Mu’min 1993: 125-126].
19) In this convention, following points were discussed; (1) enforcement of Islamic thoughts in the party andapplying them to the party activities, (2) urgent need in increasing of the party’s members and their influence, (3)enforcement of Islamic educations and that of calling (Da‘wa) in the party members, (4) needs of the party’s social
activities, (5) qualifying the party leadership, (6) estimations of the party’s activities [al-Khursan 1999: 231-248].

249

Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (2)lishing leaflets of the party, and (4) in holding meetings every week [al-Khursan 1999: 262-263, 269].
Moreover, it was decided in the meeting between al-Sadr and Hasan Shubbar, one of the importantleaders of the formative period (see Table 1), that the religious establishment acquire money and aid
to the Da‘wa Party in order to accomplish a revolution [al-Khursan 1999: 278]. The party official
document stressed in 1978 that it was crucially important to make a strong cooperative relationshipwith al-Sadr in order to fight together against the Ba‘thist regime and construct an Islamic state [HDI
1989: vol. 4, 171-172]. Following this policy, the Iraqi Committee of the party acted under al-Sadr’s
direct command [al-Husayni 2005: 143].
In these circumstances, neighboring Iran witnessed the Islamic Revolution in February 1979.
This significant event accelerated revolutionary tendency of the Da‘wa Party. Al-Sadr tried to widen
his influences by sending his own wakil (representative) to all Iraq [Ra’uf 2000: 137-138], and toconstruct wukala’s networks (representatives networks) [Jabar 2003: 231].20) More than 80% of
these representatives were members of the Da‘wa Party [al-Khursan 1999: 265].
The Da‘wa Party, on the other hand, widened its mobilization of the Iraqi masses in Intifada
Safar in 1977 and Intifada Rajab in 1979. The former occurred during the pilgrimage to Karbala’at the occasion of al-Arba‘in in that year. And the latter was the oppositional demonstration against
the third arrest of al-Sadr in Jun 1979, which was assumed to be a great opportunity for expanding
membership of the party.21) The Da‘wa Party tried to get sympathizers not only among masses, but
inside the Iraqi army. The party’s leadership approved of the shift to the “political stage” officially,in which political struggles including armed battles, violent demonstrations, and mass movements
against the government supposed to be operated [HDI 1989: vol. 4, 167; al-Khursan 1999: 293].22)
At the same time, by the grace of al-Sadr’s efforts, increasing number of supporters joined toal-Sadr’s activities and the Da‘wa Party’s struggle. The sympathizers organized delegations (wufud
al-bay‘a) and sent them to his house, where they often had an assembly for reinforcing Islamic
struggle [Ra’uf 2000: 137-138]. Using these opportunities, al-Sadr and the party organized the Iraqi
20) One of the remarkable example, al-Sadr dispatched one of the most brilliant his disciples Mahmud al-Hashimi to
Iran and Britain, where he founded Islamic Liberation Movement (Haraka al-Taharrur al-Islami). He played a important role in making the Political Committee (al-Lajna al-Siyasiya) composed of students of al-hawza following
the order from al-Sadr. Moreover, al-Hashimi played as middleman between the Shi‘ite religious establishment,
the Da‘wa Party, and Iranian government bringing correspondences among al-Khomeyni and al-Sadr [a-Khursan
1999: 265-267; Ra’uf 2001: 167].
21) It is said that there were around 1,000 core members and a few thousands sympathizers of the Da‘wa Party according to the report presented by the regime [al-Khursan 1999: 314-315].
22) The Da‘wa Party has four stages of development in its political program, namely (1) ideological stage, (2) politicalstage, (3) revolutionary stage, and (4) ruling of revolutionary government. See [HDI 1981: vol. 1, 219-234, 1984:
vol. 3, 259-263].

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YAMAO: Transformation of the Islamic Da‘wa Party in Iraq

masses to their oppositional movements [Ra’uf 2001: 163].
In short, the ultimate goal of the Da‘wa Party shifted to Islamic revolution under the complex
influences of the oppressions, restrictions of the regulation, and segmentations of the leadership.
Iranian Islamic Revolution accelerated this tendency. Consequently, the party intensified revolutionary movement by mobilizing Iraqi masses.
3.2 The Da‘wa Party in Exile: Deteriorating Balance of Power
Al-Sadr and the Da‘wa Party openly expressed their sympathy for Islamic revolution in Iran calling
for the Iraqi people to support it [Ra’uf 2001: 33-34, 147]. The party declared that it was crucially
important to accomplish Islamic revolution in Iraq, which should be guided by the party itself [SI1980: Sep. 3]. A response which brought the Ba‘thist regime a growing sense of crisis, and led toal-Sadr’s subsequent secret execution in April 1980 were the fears that he and the party had a huge
potential to mobilize the Iraqi masses to the Islamic revolution.
These chain of events forced most of the leading members of the party and other Islamist
organizations to leave their own country.23) Many of them were heading to Iran. The Iran-Iraq War
broke out in September 1980. After the loss of the charismatic leader and separation from supportsof Iraqi masses, the Da‘wa Party and other Islamist organizations had to accommodate the regional
and international politics for their survival.
What was happened, then, to Iraqi Islamic movements in Iran? There were two steps; firstly,
unification of the dispersed Islamic organizations, secondly, distancing from the Iranian authority inthe end of the 1980s. The latter would be more important in analyzing consequent transformationof the Da‘wa Party.
The first effort of these Islamists was to make the formation of an alternative Islamic organization in order to integrate various Islamist factions.24) On the one hand, the Iraqi Islamic movements
tried to utilize the Iranian authorities for reconstructing their power and survival strategies, andthe Iranian government attempted to influence these movements for its own strategies on the other,
until 1988 when the Iran-Iraq War ended. The most important of them was the establishment of theUnion of Iraqi Fighters ‘Ulama’ (Jama‘a al-‘Ulama’ al-Mujahidin fi al-‘Iraq) consisting of around 80

23) There were a great number of students from Lebanon studying under al-Sadr and committing in activities of theDa‘wa Party. Many of them, after coming back to Lebanon, joined to the Islamic movements there and became
members of the Amal Movements and Hizb Allah afterword [Norton 2007: 30-32].
24) First of all, Murtada al-‘Askari tried to integrate the Da‘wa Party and the Iraqi Mujahidin Movement (Haraka
al-Mujahidin al-‘Iraqiyin), but failed because he was the senior leader of the Da‘wa Party [Jabar 2003: 236]. The
Iranian government also tried to integrate them in order to make use for what was called “export of the Islamic
revolution.”251

Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (2)‘ulama’ under command of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim and Mahmud al-Hashimi. The Iranian
government also made commitments to these attempts. All these process established the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (al-Majlis al-A‘la li-l-Thawra al-Islamiya fi al-‘Iraq;
SCIRI)25) in 17 November 1982 [SCIRI 1983: 4-5; Jabar 2003: 235] (see Figure 1).
It goes without saying that the Iranian government tried to influence the Islamic movements
including the Da‘wa Party itself. The Iranian government adopted “export of Islamic revolution”
policy, and tried to support Iraqi Islamic organizations. The SCIRI maintained close relationshipwith Iranian authority [SCIRI 1983: 35]. The Da‘wa Party also accommodated power struggle for
integration of Islamic organizations in which the Iranian authority tried to intervene.
The party, however, did not feel gratified at this intervention. On the contrary, it gradually
increased its tendency to distance from Iranian government especially after the mid-1980s. This is
the second step of the Da‘wa Party. Why then did it choose to distance from Iranian authority whileother organizations such as the SCIRI and the MAI maintained close relation?26)
To put it briefly, the Jurisprudence Council (al-Majlis al-Fiqhi), which was established in February 1984 and occupied by old ‘ulama’ leadership [al-Khursan 1999: 410-411], was decided to abolishin the Da‘wa Party’s assembly in January 1988. This is called “Conference of Hawa’ Zaynab” in theparty’s history. It means the old leadership which had strong connection to the Iranian authority
was expelled from the party. Hence, the party could adopt relatively independent policies from the
Iranian authority.
Then, it should be argued why the Da‘wa Party could decide to abolish the Jurisprudence
Council.
Firstly, there were important changes of the party in this period; it introduced election system
to select the party’s leading members from 1980 [HDI 1981-1989; al-Khursan 1999: 386, 390-397,
530]. This election system enabled the party to decide policies democratically.
Secondly, the party reinforced its organizational structure, and decided to impose strict regulations in selecting the leadership [HDI n.d.b]. Having hierarchical structures in the organization,
the party became more steadfast in organizational foundation, compared with other Islamist
organizations such as the SCIRI and the MAI (See Figure 3). It may safely be inferred that thisstrong structure enabled the party to conduct relatively independent activities.

25) The SCIRI has changed its own name to al-Majlis al-A‘la al-Islami al-‘Iraqi in 12 May 2007.
26) The SCIRI is estimated to be an umbrella organization which has strong influence of the Iranian government [Jabar
2003: 239]. Likewise, the MAI maintains its position as following; “The ideology in document [of Munazzama
al-‘Amal al-Islami] was constructed based on Wilaya al-Faqih proposed by al-Khomeyni” [MAI 1980: 3].

252

Fig. 3. Organizational Structure of the Da‘wa Party in 1980s
Source: Made by author based on [HDI n.d.a, vol. 2, n.d.b: 95-202; al-Khursan 1999: 367-368, 390-395, 521-537, 583-623].

YAMAO: Transformation of the Islamic Da‘wa Party in Iraq

253

Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (2)Thirdly, senior ‘ulama’ in the leadership struggled to strengthen their own power, which seemed
to inexpedient for the party. At the beginning of 1980s, senior ‘ulama’ had an increasingly powerful
voice. Temporary, they became quite strong in the party. The position of Jurist of the Party (Faqih
al-Da‘wa) was established in 1982, where Kazim al-Ha’iri was elected. The Jurisprudence Council
was formed based on this position. In these circumstances, al-Ha’iri attempted to strengthen his
position in the party by utilizing connections to Iranian ‘ulama’ [Jabar 2003: 258]. Similarly,
Muhammad Mahdi al-Asifi, party’s spokesman and one of the prominent pupils of al-Sadr, tried
to utilize his linkage with Ahmad al-Khomeyni, son and aide of the supreme leader of Iran. These
struggles for power were probably brought frustrations to non-‘ulama’ members in the party.
Consequently, the Da‘wa Party reached its turning point in 1988. The party already had theelection system and the solid organization. That is why the senior ‘ulama’ in the leadership were
expelled in the 1988’s conference. Moreover, Kazim al-Ha’iri was defeated in the election which was
carried out in order to choose new leadership in the party [al-Khursan 1999: 417].27) Further, thespokesman of the Da‘wa Party Muhammad Mahdi al-Asifi was reportedly isolated in the party assembly in 1989. After that, Kazim al-Ha’iri moved to Qom, where he becomes one of the prominent‘ulama’ and lives in a more academic life.28)
On the other hand, the mainstream of the party established the Political Bureau (al-Maktabal-Siyasi), which became the central apparatus of the party. The Political Bureau moved to Damascus and London, where they were publishing Sawt al-‘Iraq, the official organ of the party.29)
To summarize, balance of power between ‘ulama’ and non-‘ulama’ leading members in theDa‘wa Party was deteriorated in the struggle for survival in the 1980s. This reflects a distance from
Iran which the Da‘wa Party gradually created, which sharply contrasts with the SCIRI and the MAI.
This distancing tendency of the Da‘wa Party will ensure independent policy orientations
considering political situations inside Iraq, while it is confronting with multitude of problems in theinternational dimension. It will be also a key to argue reasons why the party inclines to acquire Iraqi
nationalism in 1990s.
27) It is said that after abolishing the Jurisprudence Council of the party, members started to follow to legal opinionsof Fadl Allah, the sworn friend of al-Sadr and once affiliated to the Da‘wa Party [al-Khursan 1999: 418, 420; Ra’uf
1999a: 287]. Therefore, plenty of feature articles and serial articles of Fadl Allah appeared in the party’s organ in
the 1990s.
28) Al-Ha’iri now stresses that he is one of the prominent students of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. Dr. MATUNAGA
Yasuyuki, “Mujtahids of al-Najaf School in Qom Today: with a Special Survey on Persian Literatures on
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr.” KIAS Research Meeting, Kyoto University, 21 May 2007.
29) The leading members of the Political Bureaus are; ‘Ali al-Adib (Iranian Branch), Ibrahim al-Ja‘fari (London
Branch), Jawad al-Maliki (Damascus Brunch) [al-Khursan 1999: 419-420].

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YAMAO: Transformation of the Islamic Da‘wa Party in Iraq

4. Iraqi Nationalism of the Da‘wa Party in Its Diaspora Leadership
The Da‘wa Party became diasporic after distancing from Iran. This section first demonstrates
attempts at integration of the Iraqi oppositional movements in the 1990s in order to reveal politicalchanges around the party. Then it shows drastic change of the Da‘wa Party’s policies adopting Iraqi
nationalism while maintaining its Islamic feature, and finally it will inquire processes and reasonsthat the party inclined to have Iraqi nationalistic feature.
4.1 Iraqi Oppositional Movements: An Overview
The 1990s witnessed turbulent changes in international politics around the Iraqi oppositional movements. The U.S. policy toward Iraq faced its turning point at the beginning of the second Gulf War.
The U.S. supported the Iraqi government in the face of the Iranian Islamic Revolution during the IranIraq War ignoring authoritarianism of the Iraq regime. After the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait, however,the U.S. policy turned completely, and became hostile to Iraq. I will sum up three important
political changes regarding to the oppositional movements in regional and international dimensions.
Firstly, the Iranian government was losing their incentives to support the Iraqi Islamic organizations because of the failure of their attempt to “export Islamic revolution” at the end of the Iran-Iraq
War in 1988. Iraqi Islamist, therefore, could not expect Iranian supports as they did in the 1980s.
Secondly, Sha‘ban Uprising (Intifada Sha‘ban), which occurred in March 1991, started by Iraqi
soldiers evacuated from Kuwait, failed. The Da‘wa Party tried to mobilize Iraqi masses utilizing
its members inside Iraq, and supporting this uprising especially in the marsh, southern part of Iraq
crossing Iranian border [al-Musawi 2000: 72]. This uprising and activities of the party were, however, thoroughly oppressed by the Ba‘thist regime. After this failure, the party had more difficulties
to practice its activities inside Iraq.
Thirdly, after the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait in 1990 and the second Gulf War in 1991, relationship between Iraqi government and western countries changed completely. The western countries
have been supporting the Iraqi government in order to build a breakwater against the Iranian Islamic
revolution. This allied relation, however, deteriorated because of the second Gulf War.
Focusing on the political situations inside Iraq, we can clearly observe an appearance of obvious
sectarianism for the first time of its modern history.30)30) Eric Davis points out that inside Iraq, “sectarian feelings expressed during the Intifada [Sha‘ban Uprising], manifest
in graffiti on Republic Guard tanks that declared ‘No more Shi‘a after today’ (La shi‘a ba‘d al-yawm)” [Davis 2005:228]. In this way, the word “shi‘a” which had been almost totally absent from political discourse, entered thevocabulary of Iraqi politics [Davis 2005: 228]. Moreover, the regime tried to divide the Shi‘a itself into respectablereligious Shi‘a, on one hand, and lower-class, even déclassé, elements, on the other, who do not conform to social
standards [Davis 2005: 243].

255

Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (2)Confronting with these international and domestic changes, how did Iraqi oppositionalorganizations deal with?
Iraqi oppositional organizations started to organize and integrate themselves with the supportsof the western countries. In these circumstances, what kind of policies has the Da‘wa Party been
constructing? In order to answer this question, I will first give a rough sketch of the attempts at
integration (see Table 2).31)
The first move toward this integration was the meeting of the Joint Action Committee (Lajna
al-‘Amal al-Mushtaraka; JAC)32) held in Beirut in December 1990. In the second conference of the
JAC in March 1991, which was considered epoch-making because various organizations such as
secularist, communist, and Islamist groups participated [Sakai 1999: 78], a 5-men steering committee
and a secretariat were established.33) This arena of integration, however, moved to Europe as thewestern countries such as Britain and the U.S. tried to intervene. Western-oriented secularist Ahmad
al-Chalabi created the Iraqi National Congress (al-Mu’tamar al-Watani al-Muwahhad; INC) basedon the JAC. The INC was the largest umbrella organization of Iraqi oppositional movements supported by the western world, mainly by the U.S. [Sakai 1999: 79]. The founding conference was heldin Vienna in June 1992, to which many of London-based independent Iraqis and the Kurdish parties
attended. This assembly was expanded to have more than 200 representatives of 19 Iraqi oppositionalorganizations in second conference of Salah al-Din, Kurdistan region in the northern part of Iraq
[INC 1993: 5].
What was important in this Salah al-Din conference is the fact that the three posts ofpresidential council were divided among three men according to ethnic and sectarian lines; Mas‘ud
al-Barzani, Kurdish representative of the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party), Muhammad Bahral-‘Ulum, Shi‘ite representative of Ahl al-Bayt, and Hasan Mustafa al-Naqib, independent Sunni
representative.34) There is an important difference between the INC’s way of dividing power and that31) The Iraqi oppositional movements can be divided generally into 3 groups; secularist groups (including nationalist,
communist, socialist, and democrats organizations), Kurdish groups, and Islamist groups.
32) The Joint Action Committee was Damascus-based coordinating forum incorporating the pro-Iranian groups.
33) This committee was composed of 2 Islamists, 1 Kurd, 1 from Iraqi Communist Party, and 1 from pro-Syrian Ba‘th
Party. The secretariat was composed of 17 members, and consultative assembly has 48 members. Jawad al-Maliki
was elected as president.
34) Many of the significant figures of the INC resigned for various reasons. For example, Bahar al-‘Ulum resigned
in May 1995, al-Naqib in August 1995. Bahar al-‘Ulum, who became Ministry of Oil from 2003 to May 2006,
mentioned in 1995 that tendency of individualism of al-Chalabi became increased, stressing this is not the reasonof his resignation [MI 1995a: 28-30; SI 1995: May. 168]. It is also reported that “the INC is turning in on itself infactional conflicts” [CN 1994-1995: 2]. At the same time, Bahar al-‘Ulum advocated for establishing an Islamic
Front (Jabha Islami) of the Iraqi oppositional movements [SI 1995: May. 168].

256

Other Islamic Parties

INC and Secularist Parties

Democrat Organizations

Political System ・democracy
・constitutional parliamentary
government
・division of the three powers
・only Iraqi people has the right toselect governmental types
・decentralization
・(strongly oppose to federal system)・democracy (IN/IC)・democracy (ID/T/B)
・democracy based on Islam (K)・constitutional parliamen- ・constitutional parliamentary
・constitutional parliamentary
tary government (IN)government (ID/T)
government (K/I)
・division of the three powers (K)・sovereignty of law (IN) ・sovereignty of law (B)・sovereignty of law (K)・federal system (KD/PU/ ・political pluralism (ID)IC)
・construction of state based on・denial of state which has any
strong religious, sectarian,
Islamic law (I)nationalism characteristics (ID)・sovereignty of Islamic law (I)・decentralization (I)・denial of federal system based on
sects, ethnicities (S)・denial of political system based on
sects, tribes (S)・denial of federal system (M)Ethnicities/Sects ・abolition of divide policy based on ・Islamic state comprehends all people ・(division of posts based ・abolition of divide policy based
ethnicities, religions sects
regardless of ethnicities and sects (I) on ethnicities, sects; INC) on ethnicities, religions, sects (B)・guarantee of the right to vote to all ・abolition of divide policy based on
ethnicities, sects
ethnicities, sects (I)・(denial of division of posts based on ・negative attitude to sectarianism
ethnicities, sects)(S/M)
・abolition of racism (I)・approval of racial, sectarian, andlinguistic diversity (K/I)
Minorities
ofrightstominorities
・guarantee
・protection of rights of ethnic,
・protection of rights of ethnic,
sectarian minorities and minorities
sectarian minorities (ID)・protection of minorities is theobligation of governmentof thought (K)Kurd
・support for return of the Kurdish
・cooperation with the KDP, the PUK ・protection of right of the
refugees(K)
Kurd (IC)・support for establishment of theautonomous government
・protection of the Kurdish culture
and language

Da‘wa Party

Table 2. Platforms of Main Iraqi Oppositional Organizations in 1990s

YAMAO: Transformation of the Islamic Da‘wa Party in Iraq

257

258

Relationsto Other
Oppositional
Organizations

Nationality

Democracy/
Election

RightsFreedom

Other Islamic Parties

INC and Secularist Parties

Democrat Organizations

・freedom of thought, belief (ID)・freedom of thought, association,・freedom of association, political
media (K)party
・importance of freedom anddignity (B)・freedom of rising religious slogan, ・freedom of expression, transportation, job, political and economic
demonstration, thought, assembly,
activity (I)transportation, media
・Iraqi people are equal regardless of ・anyone who believe the God has
・protection of human rights (B)ethnicities, sects, and ideologies they right to participate shura council
have(parliament) (I)・guarantee of right to vote,・prohibition of possession of resource
participate to election, have(I)
education, work, possession, social
services・a government elected legally by・guarantee of transformation of・guarantee of・guarantee of transformation of
Iraqi people should represents wills
power by election (K)transformation of power power by election (ID)of Iraq
by election (IN)・given anyone who was born in Iraq
regardless of ethnicities, sects
・(critical to the INC, resigned in ・participate in activities of the INC, ・accept to any・(participate in the INC, propose
1994; opposed to ①federalism, ② support it (K)organizations which
various policies to the INC; ID)
sectarianism, ③stance following to ・(limited activities in the INC from share the aim ofU.S.)
1994, froze them in 1999; S)
overthrowing the・critical to the INC’s stance following Saddam Husayn regime
to U.S.; propose to reconsider its (IN)policies (S)Da‘wa Party

Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (2)Other Islamic Parties

INC and Secularist Parties

Democrat Organizations

259

Notes: Particulars in the parenthesis ( ) were not quoted by the platforms, but by official organs or activities themselves as complementary explanations.
( K ) indicates Haraka al-Kawadir al-Islamiya (opposing to Wilaya al-Faqih theory influenced by Iran, seceded from the Da‘wa Party as Kawadir Hizb
al-Da‘wa al-Islamiya in June 1991, then changed it name to Haraka al-Kawadir al-Islamiya [HKI 1996; 1997].
( I ) indicates al-Kutla al-Islamiya fi al-‘Iraq (Sunni organization based on Saudi Arabia).
( S ) indicates the SCIRI (al-Majlis al-A‘la li-l-Thawra al-Islamiya fi al-‘Iraq; Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq); the SCIRI changed to
al-Majlis al-A‘la al-Islami al-‘Iraqi in 12 May 2007.
(M) indicates Munazzama al-‘Amal al-Islami.
(KD) indicates the KDP (Part-î Dêmukratî-y Kurdistan-î ‘Îraq; Kurdistan Democratic Party).
(PU) indicates the PUK (Yekêtî-y Nîştimanperwer-î Kurdistan; Patriotic Union of Kurdistan).
(IN) indicates the INC (al-Mu’tamar al-Watani al-Muwahhad; Iraqi National Congress).
(ID) indicates the AID (Ittihad al-Dimuqratiyin al-‘Iraqiyin; The Association of Iraqi Democrats).
( T ) indicates al-Tajammu‘ al-Dimuqrati al-‘Iraqi.
( B ) indicates the IDMB (Haraka Tansiq Quwa al-Tayyar al-Dimuqrati al-‘Iraqi fi Biritaniya; Iraqi Democratic Movement in Britain).
( I C ) indicates the ICP (al-Hizb al-Shuyu‘i al-‘Iraqi; Iraqi Communist Party).
( A ) indicates the INA (al-Wifaq al-Watani al-‘Iraqi; Iraqi National Accord).
Source: Made by author based on [KII n.d., 1991; HDI 1992; INC 1993; IDI 1993; SCIRI 1994; CN 1994-1995; SI 1994-1996: 145-190; MI 1995a, 1995b,
1995c; ICP 1996; HKI 1996, 1997; TDI 1997; IDMB 1998; al-Musawi 2000; Jabar 2003].

Other・demand for supports to ・opposition to both the・reconstruction of identities of・only Iraqi people has the right toIraqi societies and its cultures, andinternational societies,
dictatorship of the regime, andConsiderations
construct an interim government,
reinforcement of them (K)the UN Security Council
hegemony of the western world
which should be later ruled by onlyin particular (IN)(ID)
Iraqi people
・it should be decided in election
whether Iraq takes Islamic・preservation of independence of・the primary aim is・recognition of variety of Iraqi
government or not (K)overthrowing thenationalisms (ID)Iraq, sovereignty of Iraqi people,
and the land of Iraq
Saddam regime (IN)・unity of homeland Iraq (K)・protection of the unity of Iraq (ID)・reinforcement of cooperation and ・calling for supports of oppositional ・demand for the・construction of civil society in
Iraq (B)movements to international societies international court forsolidarity with Arab and Islamic
judging crimes against(K)
countries
・harmonization between identities of ・calling for supports of Iraqi refugees humanity of the regime(IN)(K)
Iraqi societies and Islamic values
・guarantee of women’s right to vote ・interim government should be・(cooperation with theconstituted by all the oppositional
Pentagon, CIA; IN/A)
organizations (K)・army, political parties,
・guarantee of women’s right to vote (I) and tribes should play
important roles in the・comprehensive reforms forbenefits of Iraqi people, not only
civilian control system
overthrowing the Ba‘thist regime (S) (A)Da‘wa Party

YAMAO: Transformation of the Islamic Da‘wa Party in Iraq

Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (2)of the JAC. The INC put the positions according to the ethnic and sectarian lines, whereas the JAC
made them according to the ideologies and existing political parties or organizations. This is the key
factor in considering relationship with other oppositional movements afterward.
In attempt of integration, what did the INC and other organizations express? The INC stressed
the urgent needs for establishing “constitutional, parliamentary, democratic order based upon politicalpluralism and the peaceful transfer of power through elections based upon the sovereignty of law” inIraq [INC 1993: 5]. Other significant organizations are, what I call democrat organizations mainly
based in Britain.35) They similarly maintained their platforms that the Iraqi political system should be“democratic parliamentary and constitutional government which guarantees political pluralism, andthe peaceful transfer of power by election” [AID 1993: 2]. These democrat organizations created theCharter of Democratic Agreement (Mithaq al-‘Ahd al-Dimuqrati) in October 1998 [IDMB 1998].
It is by now clear that the increasing numbers of oppositional organizations started to stressconstitutional, parliamentary, democratic political system, freedom, human rights, and protection ofminorities etc. A comparison of the platforms of main oppositional organizations is shown in Table
2. They had to represent themselves to the western world and request for supports for their oppositional movements, which result in increasing tendency of these democratic western-like platforms.36)
In short, it is clear that the oppositional movements had two characteristics in this period; (1)emphasis on the necessity of democratic, constitutional parliamentary political systems, and (2)distribution of the positions for fair presentation according to the ethic and sectarian lines as the INC
did.
4.2 Correspondence and Discorrespondence of the Da‘wa Party with the Integration Process
What kind of position, then, did the Da‘wa Party take? At the organizational level, the party segmented into many branches of the Kurdistan region, marshes in the southern Iraq, Iran, Damascus,and London. These branches acted rather separately after the Sha‘ban Uprising [al-Khursan 1999:
418-419]. The party literally became diasporic.
At the policy orientation level, the Political Bureau of the party in London published its
political platform in March 1992. Its main political assertion is listed in Table 2, which stresses theimportance of establishing a democratic parliamentary government in Iraq based on constitution,and protect the rights of the minorities and freedom of all the people [HDI 1992: 48-50, 59].
35) In these democrat organizations, for example, there are the Association of Iraqi Democrats (Ittihad al-Dimuqratiyinal-‘Iraqiyin; AID), the Iraqi Democratic Union (al-Tajammu‘ al-Dimuqrati al-‘Iraqi), the Iraqi Democratic Movement in Britain (Haraka Tansiq Quwa al-Tayyar al-Dimuqrati al-‘Iraqi fi Biritaniya; IDMB).
36) The Executive Council of the INC clearly maintains that they have the aim to appeal to the international community, and the United Nations Security Council in particular for supports [INC 1993: 6].

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YAMAO: Transformation of the Islamic Da‘wa Party in Iraq

The Da‘wa Party participated it the JAC conference in Beirut but refused to do so in the
Vienna conference of the INC. The party then took part in the Salah al-Din conference of the INC.
However, it did not contribute actively to its activities. On the contrary, it withdrew from the INC
in around February 1994 [SI 1994: Feb. 148].37) Why did the party take a critical stance against the
INC? I can point out three possible reasons.
Firstly, the Da‘wa Party was suspicious of western aids, particularly of the U.S. The party document maintains that the Gulf War became an opportunity for establishing U.S. hegemony in thisregion, and it did not consider Iraqi oppositional movements seriously, since it was merely looking on
without doing anything at the Sha‘ban Uprising after the Gulf War [HDI 1992: 29, 32]. Moreover,the party declared that the aims of the U.S. were, firstly destruction of Iraq, secondly preservationof the Ba‘thist regime, and thirdly weakening of the oppositional movements through economic
sanction [SI 1993: Jan. 122, 1994: Jul. 155]. These documents show the strong suspicious of the
U.S. The party, therefore, hesitated to enter into and strengthen its alliance with the INC, which hasstrong links with the U.S. [MI 1995b: 30].38)
Secondly, the Da‘wa Party strongly opposed to the federal system which was advocated by the INC.
Expressing federalism as segmentation of the homeland, the party stressed the necessities of preserving
Iraqi unity, resisting any occupations, and conserving sovereignty of Iraqi peoples [SI 1994: Feb. 148,
1996: Feb. 181]. Raising the banner of Iraqi nationalism or Iraqi patriotism which does not contradict
Islamic doctrines, the party maintained that it would struggle for the unity of Iraqis [SI 1995: Oct. 173].
Thirdly, the Da‘wa Party did not agree with the distribution of positions or power along the
ethic and sectarian lines, which the INC used in order to achieve a fair presentation [SI 1994: Feb.
148]. In other words, the party refused the inclination of sectarianism inside the INC. Moreover,the party maintained that the Ba‘thist regime reinforced sectarianism inside Iraq [SI 1994: Nov.
162]. Party document of the 1980s also admonished a sectarian inclination inside Iraq, and stressed
urgent necessities to unify the opposition movements regardless to the sects [HDI n.d.c: 6, 27, 38]. It
is natural that this awareness of risk of sectarianism may take the party to adopt a negative stance37) Islamic Block (al-Kutla al-Islamiya) also resigned the INC in January 1994 [SI 1994: Jan. 145], and the SCIRI froze
it activities of the INC. It is worth mentioning that this resignation does not mean that the Da‘wa Party recognized
the integration of the oppositional movements as unimportant. On the contrary, the party repeatedly stressed thenecessity of this integration, but in different ways [SI 1996: Jul. 190].
38) The Da‘wa Party maintained that the Vienna conference of the INC was not opportunity to cooperate between the
Iraqi oppositional organizations, but became a tool of the western world in general, and the U.S. in particular [SI1994: Aug. 157].

261

Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (2)against the INC’s way of power distribution.39)
In short, the Da‘wa Party accommodated other oppositional organizations with the INC at
the top of the list by; (1) corresponding with other organizations by stressing the importance of
democracy, (2) being against INC’s policy of distributing positions or power along the ethnic andsectarian lines.
4.3 Iraqi Nationalism of the Islamic Da‘wa Party in Its Diaspora Era
Another important feature of the party’s platform in 1992 is the emphasis on Iraqi nationalism. It
stressed nationalism in the face of international society by maintaining the necessities of creating
a government of the Iraqi people, by the Iraqi people, and for the Iraqi people as following; “it is
only Iraqi people’s right to select political systems in Iraqi government” [HDI 1992: 44], while it
maintained its Islamic feature by stressing that it is crucially important to harmonize Iraqi identitywith Islamic values [HDI 1992: 76]. Moreover, it is necessary for Iraqi government, which is electedby Iraqi people, to represent wills of all Iraqi people [HDI 1992: 49-52].40)
Why did the Da‘wa Party inclined to Iraqi nationalism? This was the inquiry from the beginning.
Firstly, the party kept distance from the Iranian authority. This enabled the party to have
independent policy both from Iranian and western interest. The party, hence, concentrated to its
own problems and issues inside Iraq.
Secondly, the party became diasporic as it distanced themselves from Iran. What was more, failureof the Sha‘ban Uprising made enormous difficulties in practicing its activities inside Iraq. The more one
has distance from his own country, the more passionate nationalism he becomes to have. Anderson’s
concept of “long-distance nationalism” can be applied to even strict Islamic revolutionary party.
Thirdly, the party was separated from supporters inside Iraq. It may be justified to speculatethat the party was facing to necessities to calling for support by insisting Iraqi nationalism.
In spite of this separation, to be precise, because of the separation from Iraqi masses, the party
paid sensitive attention to sectarianism inside Iraq which appeared in the 1990s. Moreover, theparty strongly opposed a paradox of the oppositional movements in the 1990s outside Iraq. The

39) As I have mentioned above, increasing inclination of the sectarianism appeared after the Sha‘ban Uprising. In
these circumstances, the Da‘wa Party highly estimated the conference of dialogue between Shi‘a and Sunni in
October 1994 in London [SI 1994: Nov. 162], and tried to cooperate with the Islamic Block, Sunni organization by
discussing with its leader Muhamad al-Alusi [SI 1996: May. 186].
40) Precisely peaking, I can notice a germ of nationalism in the Da‘wa Party. It already stressed the importance ofintegrating the oppositional movements within framework of unified Iraqi nation in the 1980s [HDI n.d.a, vol. 1:
253].

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YAMAO: Transformation of the Islamic Da‘wa Party in Iraq

attempt for integration of the Iraqi oppositional movements was carried mainly by the secularists
groups such as the INC, which were supported by the western world. What was worse, their comprehension of the division of power for integration was affected by the western way of understanding
Iraqi society. Hence, they divided positions and power along ethnic and sectarian lines, both fromsecularist and western perspectives. Ironically enough, this division of power resulted in fixing of
ethnic and sectarian segmentations. The more they tried to divide posts and power fairly, the moresegmented the ethnic and sectarian lines became.41) This was the structure of the paradox.
The party did not have a sectarian inclination from its formative period. It continued criticizing
sectarian tendency of the Ba‘thist regime in the 1980s. Again, the party denied this sectarianism ofboth inside and outside of Iraq in the 1990s by emphasizing its Iraqiness.
To recapitulate, in the diasporas leadership, in which the Da‘wa Party did not have muchresource and supporters to mobilize to engage with international politics such as accommodatingother oppositional organizations and interpreting itself to western world, it made the most of fairly
independent stance both from Iran and the western world. These complex elements would make theparty to emphasize Iraqi nationalism, while maintaining its Islamism features.

5. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to clarify how the Da‘wa Party inclined to Iraqi nationalism by analyzing
three important turning points of the party.
The Da‘wa Party started its activities as a reformist Islamic organization. It sought to participate in the political arena in a democratic manner making the solid linkage with the Shi‘ite religious
establishment.
The fi rst turning point arrived under the complex influences of the oppressions, restrictionsof the regulation, and segmentations of the leadership. Because of these, the ultimate goal of
the Da‘wa Party shifted to Islamic revolution in the mid-1970s. The Iranian Islamic Revolution
accelerated this tendency.
As a result, the party had to evacuate from their own country to revolutionary Iran in 1980.

41) The Da‘wa Party tried to produce any alternative ways of integrating the oppositional movements. Startingfrom the conference of Damascus in December 1995, in which many big names of oppositional movements suchas Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim (the SCIRI), Muhammad Mahdi al-Asifi (the Da‘wa Party), Taqi al-Mudarrisi(Munazzama), Mas‘ud al-Barzani (the KDP) and so on, gathered to adjust the movements in April 1996 [SI 1996:
Jan. 179, Apr. 184]. Moreover, Jawad al-Maliki had some meetings with members of the SCIRI in Damascus todiscuss how to integrate oppositional organizations including Islamist, nationalists, and the ICP [SI 1996: Apr.
185].

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Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (2)This was the second turning point.
The third wave of shift struck the party as a balance of power between ‘ulama’ and non-‘ulama’leading members in the party was deteriorated in the struggle for survival in the late 1980s. Hence,the party gradually created a distance from the Iranian authority which supported a number of ‘ulama’in the party. This paved the way to its Iraqi nationalism in confronting with international politics.
In addition to these historical contexts, there were three important factors which led the party
to emphasize Iraqi nationalism, namely: first the independent policy; second the diasporic situation;and third the separation from supporters within Iraq. In the diaspora leadership, the party had few
resource, hence it had to maneuver between other forces by persisting in its independent stance. It
was these complex factors that led the party to emphasize Iraqi nationalism while maintaining theIslamic doctrine.
It is apparent from the arguments above that the Da‘wa Party had been accommodating
the multitude dimensions of political changes with its flexibility. This reflects a compatibility ofIslamism and nationalism within the party itself. In other words, this implies an inappropriatenessof dichotomous understanding of Islamism and nationalism, at least within the Da‘wa Party.
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