Time Allocation to Housework and Childcare in Japan
Huihui LI
December, 2020
Discussion Paper No.2023

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
KOBE UNIVERSITYROKKO, KOBE, JAPANTime Allocation to Housework and Childcare in Japan

Huihui LI1
Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University，2-1, Rokkodai, Nada-ku, Kobe, 657-8501, Japan

Abstract
This study examines whether the bargaining power affects a couple’s time allocation tohousework and childcare by distribution factors in Japan, based on the “collective” model
which assumes that the final distribution within the households should be Pareto-efficient. We
estimate the function of household production time using micro-data from the Survey on TimeUse and Leisure Activities at two points in time (2011 and 2016), and examine the changes inand structure of the allocation of couples’ housework and childcare time. Four variables are
considered in distribution factors: wife’s relative wage, wife’s relative age, wife’s relativeeducation level, and male-to-female sex ratio in the region. Our results show that the collective
approach can explain the Japanese intra-family time allocation. Specifically, we find that highwife’s relative wage reduces her own housework time and increases her husband’s houseworktime and childcare time. The effect of wife’s relative wage gets stronger in 2016. This study
also shows that wife’s relative age is significant for explaining distribution factors. At the sametime, it is inappropriate to take relative education as a distribution factor.

Keywords: Collective model; Intra-family time allocation; Time use survey

JEL classification: D13; J22

1E-mail address: huihuili@people.kobe-u.ac.jp1

1

Introduction

Previous social norms advocated families had a homemaking mother and a breadwinning father
in the 1960s in Japan. Nowadays, such traditional social norms are rapidly changing, with thenumber of dual-income households having exceeded the number of households with a full-timehousewife2. With the employment rate of married women at large increased (Nagamachi &Yugami, 2015), married couples must often decide how much time to devote to housework,
childcare. Despite the persistent imbalance in time spent on housework and childcare between
employed fathers and employed mothers in Japan, the time gap between men and women
spending on housework and childcare activities is shrinking3.
Numerous empirical studies have provided evidence on intra-family time allocation
mechanism of housework and childcare in different countries. Ueda (2005) found that a spousewith higher wages can reduce her or his own housework time and increase the other spouse’shousework time by the same amount of time, and Yamamura and Tsutsui (2019) thought age
gaps between husbands and wives influence their allocation of housework in Japanesehousehold. ALvarez and Miles (2003) studied the reasons behind the asymmetric distributionof housework within Spanish two-earner couples, and argued that a higher fraction of women’s
income is associated with fewer hours spent on housework. Hersch and Stratton (1994) argued
that husbands do less housework than wives as husbands’ relative earnings increase in the US.
Kimmel and Connelly (2007) stated that women with higher wages spend more time onchildcare activities in the US, and emphasized that childcare time is not suitable to be classified
as housework time.
However, what are the theoretical approaches to support empirical work on this issue? The
early “unitary” household model reconciles the single household’s utility framework with thepresence of multiple individuals. Under budget and time constraints, household members
decide to allocate their time to produce goods and services to maximize the household’s utility,
which simultaneously determines the housework and leisure time, labor supply, andconsumption for market goods (Becker, 1965; McElroy, 1997). Then, the Nash bargaining
model was developed, which assumes that the maximum utility that a family member canachieve when remaining single determines one’s threat point (or fallback position). The threat
point serves as the reservation utility, changes in which can affect the internal resource
allocation (time allocation) within household (Manser & Brown, 1980; McElroy & Horney,2

According to the Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office, the number of dual-income families was roughly twice that of full-timehousewife families in 2017.
3
In Japan, the Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities show that (1) employed mothers did 47 times more housework in 1996, but did
13 times more housework in 2016 than employed fathers; (2) employed mothers did 6.3 times more childcare in 1996, but did 3.5 times
more childcare in 2016 than employed fathers.

21981). However, it has been argued that a weakness of the framework is that Nash bargaining
does not demonstrate Pareto efficiency (Pierre-Andre Chiappori, 1988; Pierre-André Chiappori,1991), and the collective model overcome this.
The collective model was initially developed by Chiappori (1992), Chiappori (1988) andApps and Rees (1988). Considering each individual in the household has a respective utility
function and heterogeneous preferences, the collective model is more suitable in which
increases the efficiency of resource allocation within households. In the collective approach,the individual decision process is determined by one’s bargaining power within the household
under the assumption that the final distribution within the household should be Pareto-efficient.
Empirical studies that analyze intra-household time allocation and household production or
expenditure based on the collective model have emerged (Aronsson, Daunfeldt, & Wikström,
2001; Browning & Gørtz, 2012; Cherchye, De Rock, & Vermeulen, 2012; Kalenkoski, Ribar,& Stratton, 2008). Blundell, Chiappori, and Meghir (2005) presented a collective labor supply
model, incorporating parental care of their children into the theoretical model. Blundell,Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2018) adopted a structural life cycle approach in which thecouple decides the time allocation to market-work activities, childcare activities, and leisure.
They found that the couple’s childcare times can substitutes for child services in the home
production function, and the wife’s reaction to childcare time is relatively stable. However,there is a minimal study that used the collective model, and empirically analyzed the time
allocation between housework and childcare in Japan. One such work is Yoshida (2009), who
examined the factors that affect the couple’s decision process concerning housework andchildcare. The results showed that both members of the couple’s wage rates have statisticallysignificant effects on the time allocated to housework and childcare.
This study primarily addresses issues such as the extent to which a collective approach
explains the intra-family time allocation in Japan. Increasing in a wife’s relative bargaining
power vis-à-vis her husband is a critical factor that determines the time spent by each husband
and wife in household production activities. Shifts in bargaining power are due to the wife’s
wages from the labor market catalyzing time allocation within household in favor of wives.
Once the wife engages in market labor and earns wages, the wife’s bargaining power inhousework and childcare will increase, and then husband has less bargaining power, suchchanges in bargaining power influence the degree of time allocation couples respectively devote
to housework and childcare.
This study also contributes to the literature as follows. First, it uses a collective model toempirically analyze the determinants of husband-wife time allocations for housework andchildcare in Japan. We focus on the “distribution factors” that affect an individual’s intrafamily
3

bargaining power, and use four proxy variables such as wife’s relative wage, wife’s relativeage, wife’s relative education level, and male-to-female sex ratio in the region. Second, we use
microdata from the Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities for 2011 and 2016. The survey
is the nationally representative time-use survey in Japan and it collects salary information forhousehold members since 2011. Thirdly, we divide time use in home-produced goods into
housework time and childcare time to examine if there is heterogeneity between two activities.
The main findings of this study as follows: First, we confirm that the collective approachcan explain the Japanese intra-family time allocation. Specifically, we find that high wife’s
relative wage reduces her own housework time and increases her husband’s housework timeand childcare time. The effect of wife’s relative wage gets stronger in 2016. This study also
shows that wife’s relative age is significant for explaining distribution factors. At the same time,
it is inappropriate to take relative education as a distribution factor. Finally, there isheterogeneity between housework time and childcare time.
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the theoretical
approach. The data and analytical framework are presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses
the empirical results. Lastly, Section 5 summarizes the findings and addresses future issues.

2

Theoretical ApproachThis study relies on the standard collective time-use theoretical approach introduces byBlundell et al. (2005), analyze individual time-use in a two-person group within a household.
In the collective framework, there are two individuals (decision-makers) in the household, towit, the husband and wife. Each individual has a utility function defined by observed leisuretime, individually produced public good in the household (shopping, and housework, among
others) and child welfare, which represents husband’s or wife’s rational preferences. We
assume the time-use decision-making always derives from Pareto-efficient outcomes of abargaining process (Browning, Chiappori, and Lechene, 2006), and the decision-making
process is also stable in the household (Browning, Chappori, and Weiss, 2014). The collectively
rational behavior in the collective time-use theoretical approaches is the result of the
maximization problem which difined by a weighted sum of the decision-maker utility functions,with the weights representing the bargaining power of the husband and the wife. The weightes
refers to the Pareto weights, which is considered as a function of the individual’s (the husband’s)
wage rates, income, and distribution factors, and also is continuous differentiability between
zero and unity. It represents the relative weight in the household, in the sense that it reflects therelative “bargaining power” of the husband and wife within the household. In the weights !,distribution factors is very different from the other variables which affect only the Pareto weight4(or says decision process), but do not influence the household budget constraint nor individual
preferences (Browning, Chappori, and Weiss, 2014).
There exists a two-step negotiation process by bargaining power in the collective approach(P. A. Chappori, 1992; Blundell, Chappori, and Meghir 2005). In the first step, the household
profits are maximized by the husband and the wife choosing their respective contributions topublic goods (household chore-production), and according to a given sharing rule, residual nonlabour income is allocated between the husband and the wife. In the second step, each individual
maximizes his or her utility to allocate private goods (time and commodity consumption),conditional on the sharing outcomes and budget constraint obtained in the first step. This study
focus on household bargaining takes place over the time allocation to public goods—housework
activities and childcare activities.
In general, the bargaining power within the household depends on distribution factors(Browning & Gørtz, 2012). As mentioned above, the variables are positively correlated withindividual "’s bargaining powers, in the sense that the higher the coefficient for distribution
factor, the stronger the individual’s intra-family bargaining power becomes, and the more
dominant the individual can be in intra-family time allocation of housework and childcare. Or,
to put it differently, distribution factors affect an individual’s intrafamily bargaining power,
they exert a salient influence on how husbands and wives split housework and childcare duties
between themselves. The distribution factor z has been considered as “the relative wage” (wifeto-husband wage ratio), “the relative age” (wife-to-husband age ratio), “the relative educationlevel4” (wife-to-husband years of schooling ratio), and so on (Browning, Chappori, and Weiss,2014). “Sex ratio” (Porter, 2016; Rapoport, Sofer, & Solaz, 2011) and “singles/non-singles ratio”(Van Klaveren & Ghysels, 2012) are also be used in the previous paper. In this study, we also
add “male-to-female sex ratio” as one of the distribution factors, for our database can accessthe information on the respondent’s living region. Theoretically, the relative wage (the relativeage, the relative education level, or sex ratio) represents one’s bargaining power within thehousehold. The higher one’s wage (the younger one’s age, the higher one’s education level, or
the fewer people of the same sex) vis-à-vis one’s spouse, the stronger one’s bargaining power
is in intra-family time allocation, resulting in a smaller share in housework and childcare. The
reverse is also true.

3

Empirical Framework

3.1 Empirical Model
4

Some previous study use “age difference” (the husband’s age minus the wife’s age) and “years of schooling” (thehusband’s years of schooling minus the wife’s years of schooling). We also estimated by control “age difference”
and “years of schooling”, the results are almost the same as in Table 1.
5Based on Eq. (5), we specify two empirical models, Eq. (6) and Eq. (7). We run Eq. 6 in an
empirical analysis of dual-income households because the data of the wife’s wage information
can be observed, and run Eq. (7) in the sample of the full-time housewife households.
#

#

&&
&&
*
*
#
ℎ!"
= #$ + #% % # ' + #( % # ' × )*+, ./00) + 1) 2 + 31) × 4567 89::4;<
&'
&'
*

#

*

+#+ =ℎ>?@A0*! + BCD) E + F5G) H + /

(6)
*,

*,

#,
ℎ!"
= I$ + I%' &'#, + I(' &'#, × )*+, ./00) + 1) 2 + 31) × 4567 89::4;<*,*,+I+ =ℎ>?@A0*!#, + BCD) E + F5G) H + J(7)"

where ℎ! is individual i’s housework time or childcare time in family “j” at day “t.” Appendix
1. shows the detailed contents of time spent on housework activities and childcare activities,
where the definition of housework time is the total amount of time spent on housework andshopping by minutes. Day “t” refers to weekday and weekend in our empirical analysis (Gracia& Ghysels, 2017; Kimmel & Connelly, 2007), because a large number of prior studies record""

the time use gap between weekday and weekend. $# and $$ are the hourly wage for the&"husband and wife5, respectively. K !" L denotes relative wage between the wife and the husband&#

as one of the distribution factors in dual-income households. The year dummy is one of the two&"time points of the micro-data, that is, 2016. K !" L × &'() +,--& is the interaction terms&#"

between relative wage and year dummy. The other distribution factors (.! ) include the relativeage (the wife’s age/the husband’s age), the relative education (the wife’s years of schooling/thehusband’s years of schooling), and the male-to-female sex ratio (the number of females aged
15–59 in Ken where the respondent lives / the number of males who 15–59 in the same area).
=ℎ>?@A0*!# refers to non-labor annual income of the household in family /, which does notinclude the wife’s and the husband’s wage. We control for the household nonlabor yearly
income, which implies the household with higher income may more willingly substitutemarket-purchased goods for home-produced commodities. We also control for household
characteristics, BCD*) . At a certain wage rate, changes in the number of children can lead tochanges in the couple’s housework time and childcare time (Blundell et al., 2005). We,
therefore, control the number of children in various age groups: the number of children aged 0
5
Wage refers to a respondent’s income over the last one year, if the respondent is a self-employment, operating
profit which is one’s annual sales minus expenses is the individual’s annual income information; if the respondent
has a side business, income from the side business should be contained in the annual income; if the respondent has
been engaged in current work for less than a year, the annual income is one’s estimated annual income.

6

to 2, the number of children aged 3 to 5, and the number of children aged 6 to 17 6 . The
theoretical model described above does not assume that other people (such as parents of thecouple) help with the housework or childcare, but we control for the dummy of the couple lives"

with their parent (or parent-in-law) (0)! ). Also, variables for “whether the couple lives in thethree major metropolitan areas” and Ken fixed effect are included. The definition of variables
is almost the same in housewife households with couple /′, but the controlled individual "’swage rates here do not represent distribution factors. It should be emphasized that, in many
empirical studies that discussed the time allocation for housework and childcare, market labortime is included as an essential explanatory variable. However, the collective model also shows
the first-order condition for market labor time, as well as the husband and the wife’s
consumption and household consumption on home production, by solving the household utility
maximization problem described by Eq. (3). Therefore, we cannot control market labor time inthe estimation.

3.2 Data7
The empirical analysis is based on anonymized micro-data from the Survey on Time Use andLeisure Activities (the STULA) by the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs andCommunications in this study.8 To capture the changes in the time allocation of houseworkand childcare, we use the two-point time data, the 2011 STULA and the 2016 STULA. In theempirical analysis, the result of 2011 is the baseline results.
The STULA is one of the Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities questionnaire forms,
which is the representative national time use data. The STULA is conducted every five years
by the Statistics Bureau of Japan since 1976 for collecting data on daily patterns of time
allocation and leisure activities. The STULA requires each of the household members who aged
ten and older report on his/her daily activities during the designated two days in 15-minuteintervals (from 4:00 a.m. until 4:00 a.m. the following day). The STULA records respondents’
daily diary during any two different days of the surveyed period (24 h/day), distinguishing
between holidays, weekend days, and weekday. The STULA classifies time use activities suchas housework time, shopping, childcare time, and market time into separate categories based
6

We only control for “the number of children aged 6 to 17” in the estimation on housework time.
It should be pointed out that the results of this study are the original analysis conducted by the author based on thedata–the Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities, and are different from the statistical data information created
and released by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
8
The STULA has been conducted every five years in designated areas by the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications since 1976. It mainly surveys citizens’ allocation of time over a single day and what they had
chiefly done in daily life during any two days of the surveyed period. The questionnaire includes twenty question
items about personal life activities, 15 minutes being a category for each one, and some other items about the
respondents’ age, education, and employment status. The total sample comprises approximately 190,000 people
from approximately 77,000 families in 2001 and 190,000 people from approximately 80,000 families in 2006.
7

7

on a time unit of 15 minutes. The 2011 and 2016 STULA provided the data on respondents’annual income or profit (including tax)9. Household’s characteristics are also recorded by thehousehold head in the STULA.
We selected the sample for estimations based on the following principles. First, to focus
on the housework time of the husband and wife, we restricted the sample to thosecorrespondents who are from married households with an employed husband aged 18 to 59
years. Second, in the analysis of time allocation concerning childcare, we further restricted oursample to couples with at least one child aged six or younger. With these restrictions placed on
the sample, we found that the minimum of the wife’s housework and childcare time included 0
in some of the households with a full-time housewife. However, the zeros might be due totransitory effects, that is, the wife does housework and childcare, but she was ill on the day ofthe survey and did not perform these activities. To improve the validity of the empiricalestimates, we excluded data where the wife’s housework and childcare time did not exceed 15
minutes.10

3.3 Descriptive statistics of variables
According to the individual’s employment status, we further split the full sample into
households with regularly employed couples and households with regularly employed husband
and irregularly employed wife in the estimation of time allocation in dual-income households,
and into households with regularly employed husband in the estimation of time allocation in
full-time housewife households. Appendices 2-3 present the descriptive statistics of the sample
on housework time and childcare time allocation in dual-income households. Appendices 4-5
offer the descriptive statistics of the sample on housework time and childcare time allocationin full-time wife households. Figures 1-4 are histograms describing the average of the couple’shousework time and childcare time in each household type，that are drawn based on the meanof the descriptive statistics in Appendices 2-5.
Figure 1 shows that employed wives spend about 13 times more (200 minutes per day)time on housework activities than employed husbands (16 minutes per day) on weekday.
Although the gap in housework time between employed husband and employed wife has
narrowed during weekend, the employed wife still undertakes the main housework activities.

9

Annual income or profit (including tax) refers to a respondent’s income over the last one year, if the respondentis a self-employment, operating profit which is one’s annual sales minus expenses is the individual’s annual
income information; if the respondent has a side business, income from the side business should be contained in
the annual income; if the respondent has been engaged in current work for less than a year, the annual income is
one’s estimated annual income.
10
In the empirical analysis, we estimated the data without this sample restriction, and the results are almost identicalto Table 1, with only minor differences in values.
8In the subsample (2) of households with regularly employed couples, regularly employed wives
do more housework than regularly employed husbands, 6.8 times more on weekday, and about
three times more on weekend. Subsample (3) in Figure 1 shows irregularly employed wives
spend more time on housework activities than both their husbands and regularly employed
wives in the subsample (2).
[Figure 1]
Figure 2 demonstrates that employed wives do more childcare than employed husbands,
4.8 times more on weekday, and two times more on weekend. Households in which bothhusband and wife in subsample (2) are regular employers show a similar trend. However, insubsample (3), the differences in childcare time increase between regularly employed husbands
and irregularly employed wives. Figures 1 and 2 imply that employed husbands in any
employment status still spend more time on childcare than on housework, and that employed
wives undertake most of the unpaid domestic work, especially housework activities.
[Figure 2]
Figures 3 and 4 present the average housework time and the average childcare time of
couples in full-time wife households. In all the samples, full-time wives spend 30 times as muchtime as their husbands on housework on weekday, and they also spend 11 times as much time
as husbands on childcare on weekday. The difference in housework time and childcare time
between couples in full-time wife households on weekend is almost the same as that in dualincome households. Also, the data in the subsample (2) is nearly the same as the full sample (1)because most of the husbands are regular employees in full-time wife households in Japan.
[Figure 3][Figure 4]
For the relative hourly wage in Appendices 2-5, the employed wives’ hourly wage is lower
than their employed husbands in dual-income households, especially in subsample (3), which
includes households with regularly employed husband and irregularly employed wife. In
contrast, the difference in hourly wages between regularly employed husband and regularly
employed wife is not very large (subsample (2)). The average hourly wage of regularly
employed husbands in full-time housewife households is between 22,00 yen and 27,00 yen.
The wife-to-husband age ratio is about 0.96 in all samples. Husbands and wives have almost
the same number of years of education. Indeed, the 14th Basic Survey of Birth Trends showsthat most people tend to marry someone with the same educational experiences (educational
assortative marriage). There is little difference in the gender ratio between men and women
aged 18 to 59 in the county where the individual lives. In the housework time sample, mostfamilies have children aged 6-18. In the childcare time sample, most dual-income households
9have children aged 3-5, while most full-time housewife households have children aged 0-2.
Couples are more inclined to cohabit with their mothers (or mothers-in-law) than with fathers(or fathers-in-law) The household nonlabor annual income of dual-income households is higher
than that of full-time housewife households.

4

Estimation Results

For our multivariate analyses of spouses’ time spent on housework and childcare, we faced astatistical challenge: specifically, the reported amounts of time devoted to each activity arenonnegative, with substantial numbers of observations massed massing? at zero, especially forhusbands’ time. If the ordinary least square estimation is used, this will lead to biases andinconsistent estimates. Thus, we needed multivariate models that are appropriate for censoreddependent variables. Therefore, this study uses Tobit models as an econometric model. In
section 4，we estimated selected coefficients and marginal effects on the expected value of thecensored outcome, conditional on housework or childcare time being above zero.

4.1 Estimation results on time allocation in dual-income households
Tables 1-2 describe the estimation results of housework time and childcare time in dual-income
households, respectively.11 The average marginal effect of the Tobit models on time use isreported 12 . There are three panels in?

each table. Panel A in Tables 1 and 2 reports theestimated results of housework and childcare time allocation for the overall sample. Panel B
lists the results of housework and childcare time allocation for subsample of households withregularly employed couples. Panel C describes the results of housework and childcare time
allocation for the subsample of households with regularly employed husband and irregularly
employed wife.
[Table 1][Table 2]
4.1.1

Estimation results on housework time allocation in dual-income households

Our main parameter of interest is the coefficient of the relative hourly wage of wife-to-husband
in dual-income households, which says a higher relative wage implies more power andcorrespondingly less time devoted to housework and childcare in the household. As shown inPanel A of Table 1, the wife’s relative wage has a statistically significant effect on the couple’shousework time. As expected, the wife’s relative wage has a strongly negative impact on her
11

To check the robustness, we re-estimated this equation with a nuclear family. The results of all the dependent
variables are fully robust with respect to sign and significance. Although the marginal effect value has changedslightly, it does not affect our conclusion (the same as in Table 1). These results are available from the author.
12
The detailed coefficient estimates are available upon request.
10

housework time and a strong positive impact on her spouse’s housework time. The marginal
effect means that if dependent variables increase with the wife’s relative hourly wage at aconstant rate, doubling the wife’s relative wage/a twofold increase in the wife’s relative wage
leads to an increase of 1.99 minutes per day in the husband’s housework time and a decreaseof 14.12 minutes in the wife’s housework time on a weekday. The results of the time allocation
estimations on weekend show the same trend. In the results of the interaction terms between
the relative wage and year dummy, the estimated coefficients of the husband’s housework time
are almost non-significant. Still, the effect of the interaction terms on the wife’s houseworktime gets stronger in 2016. In Panel B of Table 1, the wife’s relative wage has a positive impact
on the regularly employed husband’s housework time and a negative effect on the regularly
employed wife’s housework time on weekday. However, the result on the effect of relative
wages in wife’s housework time on weekend has lost its significance. Turning to householdswith regularly employed husband and irregularly employed wife as shown in Panel C of Table
1, we find no statistically significant results in any column except for the effect on wife’shousework time on weekend. In general, the higher the wife’s relative wages, especially for the
regularly employed wives, the stronger her bargaining power, which leads to shorter houseworktime on the part of the wife and longer housework time on that of the husband. Although thecoefficient value of the marginal effect is small in each panel, there is still a gap in the impact
on the wife and husband. We argue that the difference between the husband’s and wife’shousework time may be partially due to the wife’s originally spending more time on housework
than her husband.
The other main parameter of interest is the coefficient of the relative age. The wife’s
relative age is negatively and significantly related to husbands’ housework time on the weekend.
The result shows that the relatively older wife has lower bargaining power compared to theirhusband, which leads to her husband doing less housework (Browning & Gørtz, 2012;
Kalenkoski et al., 2008). The marginal effect of relative age on husbands’ housework time is28.82 on the weekend in Panel A. However, and we cannot find a statistically significant impactof the relative age on weekday in all panels. In the hypothesis of the collective model, thebargaining power is remarkably higher if the wife’s years of schooling are higher than her
husband’s, which entails her performing relatively less housework. But, the effect of the wife’s
relative education on husband’s and wife’s housework time is mixed, as shown in Table 1. Weargue that the mixed result may be related to the educational assortative marriage phenomenon
in Japanese society, that is, many Japanese people tend to choose to marry a spouse who has asimilar education level (Schwartz & Mare, 2005). Browning and Gørtz (2012) also consideredthat the parameter estimates for the years of schooling variables (or their difference) could not
11

be treated as distribution factors. Hence, the results may also imply that it is inappropriate totake relative education as a distribution factor in this study. The effect of the sex ratio is almost
not significant. Marriage market matching is related to age and education level. However, as
the sex ratio data we use does not involve detailed information on individuals’ characteristics,
we may not be able to observe how the sex ratio influences an individual’s bargaining power.

4.1.2

Estimation results on childcare time allocation in dual-income households

Table 2 reports the estimation results on childcare time allocation in dual-income households.
The marginal effect of the relative hourly results on the weekday shows that a twofold increasein the wife’s relative wage only leads to an increase of 5.22 and 9.62 minutes per day in thehusband’s childcare time in Panels A and B, respectively. However, we find that the relative
wages in 2016 had a positive impact on couples’ childcare time across all the panels. We cannot
find a statistically significant effect of the relative age on couples’ childcare time. One possible
interpretation is that, Japan’s seniority-based wage system installs a positive correlation
between wage and age, especially in the case of regularly employed husbands. This means thatthe older one is, the higher one’s wage. Wives may, therefore, be mainly responsible forchildcare activities, although older wives have lower bargain power and their bargaining power
weakens with age. The higher the wife’s relative year of schooling, the less the time the husband
devotes to childcare activities. However, the wife’s relative year of schooling has almost no
statistically significant effect on childcare time allocation. Numerous previous researches
pointed out that not only is there a substitute relationship between employed husband andemployed wife for time spent on childcare activities, but also that highly educated mothers will
spend more time in childcare activities (Guryan, Hurst, & Kearney, 2008). Numerous
researches have demonstrated that there is substitution relationship between the respective
childcare time of employed husbands and employed wives, and that highly educated mothers
tend to spend more time on childcare activities. The effect of the sex ratio is almost notsignificant in Table 2.
Generally speaking, the impact of bargaining power on childcare time is different from its
effect on housework time. The results above indicate an interesting outcome: the distribution
factors affect the negotiation process and can explain time allocation to housework activities inhouseholds in Japan except for (wives’) childcare time. Hence, we can conclude that there isheterogeneity between childcare time and housework time, and the result implies the necessity
to distinguish childcare time from housework time (Kimmel and Connelly, 2007; Yoshida,2009).

12

4.2 Estimation results on housework time and childcare time in full-time housewife
households
Tables 3 and 4 respectively report the estimation results (the average marginal effect of the
Tobit models13) of housework time and childcare time in full-time housewife households. There
are two panels in each table. Panel A in Tables 3 and 4 describe the estimated results ofhousework and childcare time allocation for the overall sample. Panel B lists the results ofhousework and childcare time allocation for the subsample of households with regularly
employed husband.
[Table 3][Table 4]

4.2.1

Estimation results on housework time allocation in full-time housewife households

In respect of the husband’s hourly wage in Table 3, the increase in husband’s hourly wage
increases his wife’s housework time in full-time housewife households. The marginal effectsof the husband’s hourly wage vis-à-vis his spouse’s housework time are 31.56 on weekday and36.18 on weekend in Panel A. The results of the wife’s relative age show that senior wives
spend more time on housework activities. The wife’s relative year of schooling and the femaleto-male ratio have almost no statistically significant effect on housework time allocation. The
result of the main parameters in panel B is nearly the same as in Panel A.

4.2.2

Estimation results on childcare time allocation in full-time housewife households

Table 4 reports the estimation results on childcare time allocation in full-time housewife
households on the weekend. The increase in the husband’s hourly wage only increases his
weekend childcare time in full-time housewife households. An increase in the husband’s hourly
wage leads to an increase of 37.88 minutes per day in his childcare time in Panel A, and to anincrease of 44 minutes per day in Panel B. The relative age relates to an increase in husband’schildcare time of 75 minutes per day, and an increase in wife’s childcare time of 73 minutes
per day on the weekend in Panel A. The effect of the relative age in Panel B shows results
similar to those in Panel A. The marginal effect of the wife’s relative years of schooling is thatit increases her childcare time by about 50 minutes per day on the weekend the female-to-maleratio has no statistically significant effect on the couple’s housework time allocation.

5

Conclusion

In this study, we used the 2011 and 2016 Surveys on Time Use and Leisure Activities to analyze
13

The detailed coefficient estimates are available upon request.
13

the time allocation to housework and childcare. We refocused the attention on (1) to what extent
a collective approach, which assumes intra-family bargaining power, explains the intra-family
time allocation in Japan, (2) if there is heterogeneity between housework time and childcare
time.
To investigate these two points, we presented a collective model with essential elementsof distribution factors used for analyzing intra-family time allocation. According to amethodology proposed by Blundell, Chappori, and Meghir (2005), distribution factors can beused to account for the way husbands and wives divide housework and childcare duties between
themselves, for they affect an individual’s intra-household bargaining power. Our estimationof the distribution factors indicates that as far as the female spouse is concerned, a larger valueof relative wage implies higher bargaining power, which brings about a decrease in herhousework time and an increase in her husband’s housework and childcare time. The effect of
the relative hourly wage on the wife’s bargaining power in terms of housework gets stronger in
2016, but its impact on the couple’s childcare time is positive. In this way, we confirm that thecollective approach can explain the intra-family time allocation, and the positive influence thatthe wife’s higher wage compared to the husband has on her power in the family bargaining
process.
Additionally, this study also shows that the relative age is significant in explaining
distribution factors. At the same time, it is inappropriate to take the relative education and sex
ratio as a distribution factor. Finally, it is meaningful to distinguish childcare time fromhousework time for empirical analyses.
However, we noticed that there are still problems to be resolved. Whether in the collectivemodel theory or in the empirical analysis, we have not discussed the time allocation to leisure,so the topic should be examined in the future.

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16

FiguresFig. 1 The average housework time in dual-income
households
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%

200.02

246.59223.56143.49262.61235.90

40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

15.53
Weekday

59.59
Weekend(1) All Sample

68.01

21.05
Weekday

Weekend

55.20
11.35
Weekday

Weekend(2) Households with regularly(3) Households with regularly
employed couples
employed husband and irregularly
employed wife

Husband's Housework Time

Wife's Housework Time

Fig. 2 The average childcare time in dual-income
households
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%

154.93138.28181.26156.13131.13123.73

50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

75.46
28.73
Weekday

Weekend(1) All Sample

96.64
38.70

57.36
19.25

Weekday

Weekend

Weekday

Weekend(2) Households with regularly(3) Households with regularly
employed couples
employed husband and irregularly
employed wife

Husband's Childcare Time17

Wife's Childcare TimeFig. 3 The average housework time in full-timehousewife households
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%

291.20291.64343.13344.62

40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

62.80
11.36
Weekday

63.10
11.21
Weekday

Weekend(1) All Sample

Weekend(2) Households with regularly employed husband

Husband's Housework Time

Wife's Housework Time

Fig. 4 The average childcare time in full-timehousewife households
100%
90%
80%
70%

50%

208.54210.7660%
278.02277.96

40%
30%
20%

0%

77.93

77.68

10%
25.02

24.56

Weekday

Weekend

Weekday(1) All Sample

Weekend(2) Households with regularly employed husband

Husband's Childcare Time18

Wife's Childcare Time

Tables
Table 1 Estimation results of housework time in dual-income households
Panel A. All Sample
Weekday
HusbandRelative Hourly Wage

1.99
0.56

-12.74(0.99)-6.43***-11.15(7.21)(1.46)(3.30)

1.92

8.80-28.82(5.45)(16.85)(9.37)

-0.41

3.98

31.46

(7.53)(24.51)(13.31)

2.46-21.49(2.69)(9.32)(5.04)(8.37)

1.91

-0.59

-3.62

-11.62(3.64)(12.99)(6.84)(11.63)-67.06303.9720.78-553.34(70.59)(242.25)(129.35)(226.25)

0.96

9.60

33.82

83.65

(14.43)(47.97)(26.09)(45.46)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

15,465

15,465

26036

26036

Hh Char and Region
controls
Number of Obs

2.06
-1.85

Female-Male
Ratio*year2016

Wife(1.92)

Relative Years of
Female-Male Ratio***

Husband(0.73)

Relative Years of Schooling

Schooling*year2016-14.12(5.49)

Relative Age
Relative Age*year2016

Wife(0.76)
Relative Hourly
Wage*year2016***

Weekend

F

3.34

***

13.99

NOTE:
* Significant at the 1% level** Significant at the 5% level*** Significant at the 10% level

19

*

**

***

-16.29

4.19

***

***
***

19.59
(15.44)**28.08(22.75)

***

***

-1.96

12.63

**
*

***

Table 1 Estimation results of housework time in dual-income households (Continued)
Panel C. Households with regularly employed husband andPanel B. Households with regularly employed couples
Weekday
Relative Hourly Wage

Wife

2.82

-4.22

(1.00)
Relative Hourly
Wage*year2016
Relative Age
Relative Age*year2016

Weekend

Husband****

Weekday
Wife

Husband

Wife

Husband

Wife

2.65

-0.43

-0.64

-3.76

-1.55

-7.39

(2.64)(0.90)(4.51)(1.59)(3.48)

-4.75

1.59

-22.54

-3.88

-7.48

(1.67)(7.64)(2.85)(5.98)

6.81

9.73-30.45(6.64)(22.79)(11.36)**(1.27)

0.73

-5.77

(1.31)(3.72)(2.40)(4.24)

1.89

29.53

-27.97

58.91(10.77)(24.50)(18.89)(29.08)*

Weekend

Husband(2.32)-2.27

irregularly employed wife

**

**

***

-2.29

-34.08

-1.93

-2.04

-5.72

42.95

49.03

(14.34)(34.85)(24.53)(39.20)(9.03)(33.85)(16.93)

6.91-18.74

11.45

-3.37

-26.7348.79(29.94)(4.88)(12.51)(9.59)(14.30)(3.20)(12.47)(6.23)(10.95)

Relative Years of-11.45

6.92

5.59

-2.72

6.57

15.29

-4.90

-8.23

(7.05)(17.84)(12.78)(19.60)(4.19)(17.65)(8.51)(15.33)-139.05-511.03-305.90-787.011.35

519.77158.98-455.37(133.53)(334.03)(227.20)(374.87)(77.72)(330.81)(165.00)(294.58)

3.25

67.37

156.35-24.55

19.65

22.42

23.90

(29.22)(68.76)(49.30)(78.38)(15.61)(62.83)(31.71)(58.12)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of Obs

5,515

5,515

9,246

9,246

9,108

9,108

15,377

15,377F

2.07

Female-Male
Ratio*year2016
Hh Char and Region
controls

50.99

*

***

3.94

***

2.6

***

4.59

20

**

***

1.74

***

9.02

***

-20.48***Schooling****(19.18)

8.97

Female-Male Ratio*-11.28Relative Years of

Schooling*year2016

*

***

2.93

**

***

***

-10.15

7.14***

Table 2 Estimation results of childcare time in dual-income households (Continued)
Panel C. Households with regularly employed husband and irregularly

Panel B. Households with regularly employed couples
Weekday
Relative Hourly Wage

Weekend

Weekday

Husband

Wife

Husband

Wife

Husband

9.62

1.26

-2.10

-2.20

-8.10

(6.04)(2.37)(5.57)(4.49)***(3.11)
Relative Hourly

employed wife**

(8.22)

-5.93

-1.34

(4.56)(5.77)

9.32

13.43

4.44

40.61

4.64

2.84

(5.95)(6.85)(5.76)(14.62)(7.90)(12.10)-10.01

26.85-48.37

-9.24

8.11

-57.18-34.9135.17(30.80)(68.98)(42.08)(51.37)(17.64)(44.03)(29.66)(39.92)-0.41-19.5967.82-77.53-24.85

127.61

65.69-87.26

Age*year2016(38.39)(83.19)(57.20)(75.13)(24.11)(59.99)(41.01)(57.33)

Relative Years of-48.88-22.15-22.022.75

9.81-56.86

Schooling(15.94)(32.84)(26.96)(31.15)(9.16)(24.53)(18.73)

Relative Years of

15.16

94.54

-1.78

34.94

-8.64

-13.3546.09(21.66)(45.07)(34.57)(42.70)(12.04)(32.44)(24.63)(33.59)Schooling*year2016
Female-Male Ratio

**
**

***

10.90
(25.09)*-14.32233.25-317.481285.71-476.66-601.14241.31(470.44)(906.49)(710.49)(862.37)(307.72)(725.70)(531.52)(709.60)55.47-212.91248.21

78.09

31.71

219.09-160.91-2.28(86.55)(185.59)(135.87)(162.49)(57.53)(137.01)(99.45)(133.08)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of Obs

1,384

1,384

2,443

2,443

1,636

1,636

2,646

2,646

F

5.35

*year2016
Hh Char and Region
controls*-80.46**-1228.30

Female-Male Ratio-848.77

***

***

Wife

1.63

Relative**-19.27

Husband(7.35)

Relative Age

**

Wife

(3.48)

Wage*year2016

-7.16

*

Weekend

***

11.57

***

2.48

*

***

7.66

21

***

5.7

***

4.18

***

12.3

***

4.8

*

***

Table 2 Estimation results of childcare time in dual-income households
Panel A. All Sample
Weekday

Weekend

Husband

Husband

Wife

-5.55

-0.81

0.60

(2.29)(5.36)(1.79)(3.57)

-1.99

6.19

10.10

(2.47)(6.27)(4.03)(4.96)-4.00-13.15-32.3312.73(16.26)(36.48)(24.69)(31.57)

-0.86

26.98

70.57

(21.34)(48.00)(33.56)-31.62-41.74(8.83)(20.05)(15.53)(18.84)

4.66

42.50

24.05

8.72

(11.62)(26.21)(20.16)(25.63)-190.00-42.83-41.14(263.85)(560.90)(429.17)(536.91)

78.23

39.10

22.42

10.17

(49.23)(108.68)(80.03)(101.80)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of Obs

3,186

3,186

5,309

5,309

F

6.22

Relative Hourly Wage

Relative Hourly
Wage*year2016
Relative Age

Relative Age*year2016

Relative Years of Schooling

5.22-15.10Relative Years of
Schooling*year2016
Female-Male Ratio

Female-Male Ratio*year2016-824.85

Hh Char and Region
controls

Wife
**

*

***

***

10.39

NOTE:
*

Significant at the 1% level** Significant at the 5% level*** Significant at the 10% level

22

***

4.55

**

**

9.21

*

-73.05(45.19)

***

***

2.28

11.21

***

Table 3 Estimation results of housework time in full-time housewife households(Panel A) All Sample
Weekday
Husband
Husband’s Hourly Wage

Weekend
Wife

Wife

5.51

36.18

31.56

(2.57)(10.95)(4.54)

Husband’s Hourly

-2.32

18.40

Wage*year2016(3.90)(18.81)

-5.09

75.49

(5.98)
Relative Age*year2016***

Weekday

Husband-3.79

Relative Age(Panel B) Households with regularly employed husband
Husband

Wife

Wife

4.98

33.57

28.46

(8.59)(2.44)(11.18)(4.65)(8.71)

3.91

-7.92

-2.34

20.08

5.08

-3.97

(6.77)(12.95)(3.70)(19.09)(6.87)(13.03)

-4.83

69.66

-0.78

65.69

-0.64

62.18

(26.60)(11.47)(20.65)(6.21)(27.24)(12.07)(21.27)

-7.03

-1.38

9.48

-12.58-10.34

-2.59

8.17

15.06

(8.57)(41.77)(17.61)(33.79)(8.83)(42.53)(18.56)(33.70)

6.90-12.15(14.41)(7.18)(11.84)-12.4814.10(18.56)*****

Relative Years of

4.62

5.16

-10.01-15.33

5.40

Schooling(3.03)(14.10)(6.80)(11.37)(3.13)

Relative Years of-8.90-35.78-13.82

7.97-10.31(4.87)(22.67)(10.25)(17.79)(4.97)(23.28)(10.68)93.20

662.42421.61-442.1642.72

703.36345.87(93.97)(428.24)(188.31)(329.57)(96.81)(444.40)(195.52)

2.89-80.3525.35-28.29-20.77-76.31(17.40)(80.87)(36.39)(64.02)(17.62)(82.08)(37.13)(65.35)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Schooling*year2016
Female-Male Ratio
Female-Male
Ratio*year2016
Hh Char and Region
controls-32.04

Number of Obs

7,349

F

1.36

*

*

7,349
***

17.27

**
**

12,372***

2.48

12,372
***

9.8

**

7,041
***

NOTE: * Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 10% level

23

*

**

Husband

-2.51

***

***

Weekend1.24-40.18

*

7,041
***

16.88

*

*

2.43

-580.30*****(341.43)**

11,843***-22.11***

30.84

11,843
***

9.96

***

Table 4 Estimation results of housework time and childcare time in full-time housewife households(Panel A) All Sample
Weekday(Panel B) Households with regularly employed husband
Weekend

Husband

Wife

Husband

1.93

14.96

37.88

(7.57)(18.04)(13.43)

Husband's Hourly-7.31-66.69Wage*year2016(11.48)(33.56)(18.31)

4.64-41.6775.32(13.77)(44.69)(21.94)-12.18-0.70-84.92(20.27)(72.31)(35.31)

Husband's Hourly Wage

Relative Age
Relative Age*year2016**-33.60

Weekday
Wife

***
*
***

Husband

Wife

Husband-18.03

3.57

5.76

44.06

(20.30)(7.58)(18.22)(13.74)

3.66

-8.80

-50.03-39.68(28.11)(11.54)(34.05)(18.65)

4.12-69.4084.99(14.47)(45.69)(23.23)-19.4847.27-95.74(20.79)(74.42)(36.80)72.69**(32.27)**

Weekend-148.09***(53.03)-13.61(20.97)**-1.29(28.67)

***

60.52

***

-130.84

2.42

31.84

-7.51

52.41

5.62

22.84

1.58

50.75

(7.94)(23.64)(12.85)(20.45)(8.07)(24.16)(13.64)(21.10)Relative Years of

3.52-70.14-30.15

45.90

-1.25

-56.33-33.9649.51(11.24)(39.20)(20.62)(31.49)(11.40)(39.93)(21.56)(32.59)-48.04-1117.39-551.15-354.12-152.08-1132.81-522.41-193.38(257.84)(844.41)(408.95)(601.46)(261.59)(870.64)(426.38)(620.02)-11.69-42.94-59.88

-5.58

-7.71

-74.31-89.61-8.87(45.41)(146.13)(79.39)(117.62)(46.61)(148.70)(80.74)(119.96)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Female-Male Ratio
Female-Male Ratio*year2016
Hh Char and Region
controls
Number of Obs

2,949

F

10.28

2,949
***

11.25

4,905
***

3.35

4,905
***

13.56

2,831
***

NOTE: * Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 10% level

24

9.77

2,831
***

11.02

4,720
***

3.16

**

(54.06)

Schooling
Schooling*year2016*(33.45)

Relative Years of

*

***

***

Wife

**

4,720
***

13.09

***

Appendix 1 Definition of housework time and childcare time

Behavior typeContent sample

Housework

Cook, clean, take out the trash, do the laundry, iron theclothes, make the quilt, hang the quilt, sort and clean
the clothes, take care of the family, keep the books,
mow the garden, the bank and the town hall, repair thecars, repair the furniture

Shopping

Food, daily necessities, durable good, leisure supplies
and other shopping

Housework
Activities

Childcare
Activities

Changing diapers, taking care of infants and young
children, accompanying children, accompanying
children to learn, visiting classrooms, accompanying
children to play, and sports meeting support

25

Appendix 2 Descriptive Statistics of Housework Time in Dual-income Households
All sample
Weekday

Weekend

Households with regularly employed

Households with regularly employedcoupleshusband and irregularly employed wife

Weekday

WeekendStd.

Weekday
Std.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Husband's Housework Time

15.531(44.833)

59.589(97.305)

21.054(50.548)68.011(104.265)11.346(39.501)55.202(93.161)

Wife's Housework Time

200.020(134.370)

246.589(161.264)143.486(109.966)

223.559(159.272)

235.903(136.048)

262.611(160.848)

Relative Hourly Salary

0.679(0.801)

0.695(0.797)0.927(0.864)0.953(0.900)0.485(0.633)0.502(0.627)

Relative Hourly Salary*year2016

0.343(0.589)0.348(0.568)0.486(0.724)0.489(0.722)0.240(0.372)0.252(0.399)Relative Age

0.963(0.082)0.965(0.084)0.966(0.082)0.966(0.081)

0.962(0.080)0.965(0.084)

Relative Age*year2016

0.496(0.486)0.502(0.487)0.519(0.487)0.515(0.488)0.488(0.485)0.500(0.487)

Relative Years of Schooling

1.004(0.165)1.001(0.166)1.024(0.163)1.016(0.162)0.989(0.163)0.989(0.164)

Relative Years of Schooling*year2016

0.518(0.518)0.521(0.516)0.552(0.527)0.541(0.523)0.501(0.509)0.513(0.510)Male-Female Ratio

0.996(0.044)0.996(0.044)0.996(0.042)0.996(0.042)0.995(0.045)0.995(0.045)

Male-Female Ratio *year2016

0.510(0.497)0.514(0.497)0.533(0.496)0.526(0.496)0.501(0.497)0.513(0.497)

the Number of Children Aged 0 to 2

0.108

(0.335)0.111(0.334)0.163(0.405)0.173(0.409)0.074(0.276)0.076(0.279)the Number of Children Aged 3 to 5

0.159

(0.406)0.154(0.400)0.167(0.413)0.176(0.418)0.154(0.400)0.145(0.393)

the Number of Children Aged 6 to 18

0.828(0.953)0.804(0.946)0.702(0.926)0.699(0.917)0.924(0.964)0.889(0.960)

Cohabiting with House-head's Father

0.034(0.181)

0.027(0.163)0.042(0.200)0.035(0.183)0.030(0.171)

0.023(0.150)

Cohabiting with House-head's Mother

0.099(0.298)0.091(0.287)0.121(0.326)0.113(0.317)0.085(0.279)0.075(0.263)

Cohabiting with Non-House-head's Father

0.006(0.076)0.006(0.077)0.007(0.083)0.006(0.075)0.005(0.073)0.006(0.077)

Dev.

Mean

Std.

Variable

Dev.

Mean

WeekendDev.

Cohabiting with House-head's Mother

0.020(0.139)0.022(0.147)0.023(0.149)0.028(0.164)0.018(0.133)0.019(0.136)

Household Income

70.857(136.388)

69.868(134.800)

76.763(133.939)

73.854(132.175)

66.444(136.128)66.530(135.737)

Year2016

0.514(0.500)0.518(0.500)0.537(0.499)0.530(0.499)0.506(0.500)0.517(0.500)26

Appendix 3 Descriptive Statistics of Childcare Time in Dual-income Households
All sample
Weekday

Weekend

Households with regularly employed

Households with regularly employedcoupleshusband and irregularly employed wife

Weekday

Weekend

Weekday
Std.

Weekend

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Husband's Childcare Time28.729(70.533)

75.458(139.528)

38.703(82.086)

96.637(157.160)

19.254(57.220)57.364(119.399)

Wife's Childcare Time138.282(164.943)

154.933(181.673)

156.134(187.625)

181.259(198.080)

123.732(140.675)

131.134(162.779)

Relative Hourly Salary

0.782(0.872)0.799(0.897)0.984(1.026)1.010(1.048)0.549(0.501)0.575(0.579)Relative Hourly Salary*year2016

0.428(0.730)0.411(0.629)0.557(0.917)0.547(0.791)0.303(0.427)0.287(0.391)

Relative Age

0.962(0.098)0.962(0.099)0.966(0.094)0.967(0.095)0.960(0.099)0.959(0.100)Relative Age*year2016

0.539(0.485)0.525(0.486)0.547(0.486)0.546(0.486)0.544(0.482)0.515(0.485)

Relative Years of Schooling

1.020(0.178)1.023(0.175)1.032(0.170)1.032(0.170)1.010(0.184)1.010(0.175)

Relative Years of Schooling*year2016

0.569(0.523)0.559(0.529)0.582(0.526)0.585(0.530)0.572(0.521)0.543(0.523)Male-Female Ratio

0.998(0.043)0.997(0.043)0.998(0.042)0.994(0.043)0.998(0.044)0.998(0.043)Male-Female Ratio *year2016

0.556(0.496)0.541(0.496)0.563(0.495)0.560(0.493)0.563(0.494)0.534(0.498)the Number of Children Aged 0 to 2

0.524

(0.572)0.542(0.561)0.649(0.583)0.654(0.564)0.414(0.533)0.440(0.540)

the Number of Children Aged 3 to 5

0.771

(0.572)0.757(0.574)0.666(0.589)0.665(0.579)0.858(0.536)0.842(0.556)

Cohabiting with House-head's Father

0.020(0.140)0.013(0.115)0.022(0.146)0.012(0.110)0.019(0.136)0.014(0.119)Cohabiting with House-head's Mother

0.046(0.209)0.047(0.211)

0.051(0.219)0.047(0.211)

0.038(0.191)0.044(0.206)

Cohabiting with Non-House-head's Father

0.005(0.068)0.002(0.049)0.003(0.054)0.002(0.040)0.007(0.082)0.003(0.058)

Cohabiting with House-head's Mother

0.011(0.106)0.015(0.123)0.009(0.096)0.016(0.127)0.014(0.118)0.013(0.114)

Household Income

32.211(79.729)29.733(67.458)

42.775(89.765)

39.153(78.093)21.684(59.162)

21.495(54.537)

Year2016

0.558(0.497)0.544(0.498)0.565(0.496)0.564(0.496)0.566(0.496)0.536(0.499)

27

Dev.

Mean

Std.

Variable

Dev.

Appendix 4 Descriptive Statistics of Housework Time in Households of full-time housewife
All sample
WeekdayHouseholds with regularly employed husband
Weekend

Weekday

Weekend

Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Husband's Housework Time11.365(39.517)62.802(96.366)

11.206(39.526)

63.104(96.487)

Wife's Housework Time

343.134(163.649)

291.204(161.202)

344.617(163.778)

291.636(160.978)

Husband's Hourly Salary

0.256(0.220)0.255(0.229)0.261(0.222)0.260(0.231)

Husband's Hourly Salary*year2016

0.111(0.194)0.110(0.201)

0.114(0.196)0.113(0.204)

Relative Age

0.965(0.090)0.963(0.093)0.965(0.089)0.963(0.091)

Relative Age*year2016

0.413(0.482)0.409(0.481)0.416(0.483)0.411(0.481)

Relative Years of Schooling

0.969(0.162)0.971(0.161)

0.967(0.161)

0.968(0.158)Relative Years of Schooling*year2016

0.415(0.494)0.412(0.492)0.418(0.493)0.413(0.491)

Male-Female Ratio

0.997(0.047)0.996(0.046)0.996(0.046)0.996(0.046)

Male-Female Ratio *year2016

0.423(0.492)0.420(0.491)0.427(0.492)0.423(0.492)the Number of Children Aged 0 to 2

0.286

(0.508)0.289(0.512)0.283(0.505)0.289(0.511)

the Number of Children Aged 3 to 5

0.262

(0.490)0.257(0.488)0.264(0.492)0.260(0.490)

the Number of Children Aged 6 to 18

0.656(0.873)0.639(0.855)0.667(0.878)0.647(0.856)

Cohabiting with House-head's Father

0.013(0.114)0.016(0.127)0.013(0.115)0.017(0.128)

Cohabiting with House-head's Mother

0.047(0.213)0.049(0.215)0.047(0.212)0.048(0.213)

Cohabiting with Non-House-head's Father

0.002(0.049)0.005(0.068)0.003(0.051)

0.005(0.068)

Cohabiting with House-head's Mother

0.014(0.118)0.015(0.123)0.015(0.121)

0.015(0.123)

Household Income

46.040(125.959)

50.362(130.118)44.702(126.120)49.092(129.646)

Year2016

0.426(0.495)0.423(0.494)0.430(0.495)0.426(0.495)28

Appendix 5 Descriptive Statistics of Childcare Time in Households of full-time housewife
Households with regularly employed

All sample
Weekdayhusband
Weekend

Weekday

Weekend

Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Husband's Childcare Time

25.020(61.526)

77.676(131.395)

24.564(61.639)77.930(131.425)

Wife's Childcare Time

278.021(197.659)

210.758(195.174)

277.964(197.626)

208.545(193.710)

Husband's Hourly Salary

0.224(0.196)0.220(0.190)0.228(0.195)0.223(0.190)Husband's Hourly Salary*year2016

0.098(0.171)

0.096(0.186)0.099(0.172)0.098(0.188)Relative Age

0.958(0.096)0.953(0.100)0.959(0.094)0.953(0.098)Relative Age*year2016

0.398(0.476)0.386(0.472)0.403(0.477)0.387(0.472)

Relative Years of Schooling

0.978(0.168)0.980(0.167)0.974(0.168)0.977(0.163)

Relative Years of Schooling*year2016

0.409(0.499)0.397(0.494)0.413(0.498)0.399(0.493)Male-Female Ratio

0.995(0.046)0.995(0.046)0.994(0.046)0.995(0.046)

Male-Female Ratio *year2016

0.411(0.489)0.402(0.488)0.416(0.490)0.403(0.488)the Number of Children Aged 0 to 2

0.713

(0.582)0.729(0.583)0.704(0.581)

0.725(0.583)

the Number of Children Aged 3 to 5

0.653

(0.586)0.649(0.590)0.658(0.586)0.653(0.589)Cohabiting with House-head's Father

0.005(0.073)0.007(0.085)0.006(0.075)0.008(0.087)

Cohabiting with House-head's Mother

0.019(0.138)0.022(0.148)0.019(0.138)0.022(0.147)

Cohabiting with Non-House-head's Father

0.001(0.026)0.001(0.035)0.001(0.027)0.001(0.036)

Cohabiting with House-head's Mother

0.006(0.078)0.008(0.087)0.006(0.079)0.008(0.088)Household Income

19.261(84.232)

19.144(72.861)

18.774(85.076)

18.882(73.056)

Year2016

0.415(0.493)0.405(0.491)0.420(0.494)0.407(0.491)29