MEASURES AGAINST EMERGENCIES:
LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA REGARDING SEWAGE WORKS
James H. Clark1
Black & Veatch
1. Introduction
After Hurricane Katrina cut its destructive swath across Louisiana, Mississippi,and Alabama, the Water Environment Federation (WEF) assembled a response
team to conduct an official assessment of the wastewater system damage. WEF,
together with Black & Veatch and select utilities, provided the technical andfinancial basis for this assessment. The team worked with the US Environmental
Protection Agency, state regulatory agencies, and WEF member associations in
the three impacted states to facilitate planning and execution of the study.
Findings, conclusions, and recommendations from the assessment provide good
information on steps to take to lessen the impact of and expedite the mitigation
efforts for future disasters.
2. Overview
Hurricane Katrina brought a tidal surge of 15-to-25 feet, which inundated
the entire coastline of Mississippi, a large portion of Louisiana, and the western
coast line of Alabama. Homes and businesses were destroyed across hundreds ofsquare miles. The hurricane also devastated wastewater utilities, with sometreatment systems suffering catastrophic damage. Compounding the problem,affected utilities in the surge area lost 25 to 80 percent of their population ratebase, undermining their ability to generate sufficient revenue to meet operating
costs and bond payments.
The area assessed by the study team was defined as the regions inLouisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama that experienced any of the following types ofdamage from Katrina: (1) ocean surge, (2) flood, and (3) winds in excess of 100
miles per hour. Of the 896 wastewater facilities in the three states, 118 weredetermined to have been located in one of the three damage zones, as shown inTable 1.
SurgeFloodWindTotal

23887118

Table 1 Number of Affected Utilities by Damage Zone
1800 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 600, Los Angeles, CA 90017- 229 -e-mail:Clarkjh@bv.com

As shown in Table 2, total damages to wastewater utilities from theassessment were estimated to be close to $1.4 billion: $1.2 billion for infrastructuredamage and an addition $163 million in needed subsidies to maintain a minimallevel of financial solvency. A significant portion of the damage is not expected tobe covered under current Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
guidelines.
StateAlabamaLouisiana
Mississippi
Total

Infrastructure Financial
Total
50
151925
146
1,071
231
16247
1,206
163
1,369%
4%
78%
18%
100%

Table 2 – Wastewater Utility Damage Estimate from Hurricane Katrina (US$Millions)3. Findings
In general, lessons learned can be categorized as (1) logistical issues thatcan be anticipated when investigating future disasters and (2) findings related toKatrina’s impact on facilities and local resources.
Logistics
A number of issues arose during the planning and implementation of the
post-Katrina investigations that have implications for future study efforts. Theseinclude:•••••

Maps. Maps of damage zones were not publicly available even two months
after the disaster. Nine months after the disaster, there still were no known
publicly available maps that demonstrated the sheer magnitude of thedamage.
Travel. Eight weeks after the storm, hotel rooms, rental cars, and flights
were still scarce. The investigators tried to use recreational vehicles (RVs)
to access the area, but few were available, and state regulations required acommercial driver’s license for RV operators if the RV is to be used forcommercial purposes.
Tires. Rental cars sustained significant tire damage from debris and nails
covering the road, and new tires were in short supply.
Access. Hard hit areas were closed to the public, but investigators wereable to access these areas when accompanied by utility staff.
Information. Utility staff had to immediately begin searching for and fixing
leaks, as well as inventorying damages, so they were a wealth of
information on the impacts of the hurricane, particularly regarding
infrastructure damage and implications.

- 230 -•••Traffic. Two months after the storm, roads were clogged with construction
and relief workers. Traffic into the regions in the morning and leaving theregions in the afternoon was reported to be much higher than normal.
Telephones. Phone lines were disrupted and the “fast busy signal” wascommon. Eventually, it was usually possible to get through, though some
utilities lost all phone service and gave their staff new cell phones.
Local support. People from the region were essential in overcoming
obstacles. In particular, they were highly attuned to communications issues
and often provided multiple phone numbers for requested contacts.

Katrina’s Impact
Study findings ranged from impact on specific facilities, financial implications, andexamples of what works and what doesn’t.
•••
•

•
•

Wastewater treatment plants. Most wastewater treatment plant damage
was from storm surge, not wind. Electrical circuitry and power generators
were destroyed, and pumps and motors were damaged. Basins filled withgrit, but reinforced concrete structures held.
Collection systems. Storm surge also affected collection systems. There
was a high level of service connection failures in surge areas, and clean up
further damaged service connections. Above-ground portions of lift stations
were heavily damaged, and below-ground portions were impacted by gritaccumulation. Point repairs were greater in flooded areas, but not as bad
as expected.
Human resources. It was discovered that many people won’t evacuate,
including utility employees.
Strong senior management is critical.
Wastewater employees made heroic efforts.
Institutional efforts. Emergency Management Assistance Compacts didn’t
work well for water/wastewater utilities, and FEMA subcontractors were
unfamiliar with assets, creating a greater burden on resource-constrained
utilities.
Solvency issues. “Events of default” will hurt communities more than bondholders. Reserve funds (12-month) will run out in 2007. Bonds are being
issued to cover operating expense.
Long-term financial impact. A significant percentage of the rate base waslost, with population loss in surge areas ranging from 25 to 80 percent.
There was a smaller reduction in expenses. Without intervention, somereduction in debt service reserves is expected in 2006 with an inability tofund debt service payments in 2007.

4. Recommendations
Several recommendations evolved from the study:- 231 -•••Federal government. The federal government should develop greater
flexibility in programs, including eligibility and replacement. The fiscal
health of utilities should be monitored and relief provided as necessary.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should be provided astronger role in disaster response related to water and wastewater agencies.
State agencies and utilities. These entities should invest wisely anddevelop state-to-state mutual aid compacts that focus on water andwastewater.
Wastewater industry. The industry should improve training and bestpractices on emergency preparedness. The industry should also educate
the public on the importance of wastewater in public health.

References
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Katrina Recovery Maps.
http://www.fema.gov/hazards/floods/recoverydata/
katrina_index.shtm (accessed Jan 2006).
Hunter, Michelle. (2006) Jeff Sheriff’s Office Plans for the Worst. Times-Picayune
8 June 2006, http://www.nola.com/search/index.ssf?/base/news2/1149753038307650.xml?nola(Accessed 8 June 2006).
Mississippi Automated Resource Information System, Hurricane
Katrina Shapefiles. http://www.maris.state.ms.us/HTM/
Miscellaneous/Hurricane_Katrina.htm (accessed Dec 2005).
Peacock, W. G.; Morrow, B. H.; Gladwin, H., Eds. (1997) Hurricane
Andrew: Ethnicity, Gender and the Sociology of Disasters;
Routledge, Chapman & Hall: New York.
Smith, S. K. (1995) Demography of Disaster: Population
Estimates after Hurricane Andrew; Bureau of Economic andBusiness Research, University of Florida at Gainesville.
Smith, S. K.; McCarty, C. (1996) Demographic Effects of NaturalDisasters: A Case Study of Hurricane Andrew. Demography, 33,265–275.
Southern Regional Climate Center. http://www.srcc.lsu.edu/(accessed Dec 2005).
Water Environment Federation, Assessment of Reconstruction Costs and Debt
Management for Wastewater Utilities Affected by Hurricane Katrina, (April 2006)
http://www.wef.org/NR/rdonlyres/DF8D6AED-D72E-49A3-9711E956D750E720/0/katrinafinal.pdf- 232 -Purpose of Gulf States Assessment
Gain better understanding of hurricane-impacted
wastewater utilities’ needs; communicate theseneeds to policy-makers and industry

Reconstruction Issues and Lessons
Learned by Wastewater Utilities
Affected by Hurricane Katrina

Develop high-level assessment of infrastructuredamage and cost to repair
Develop assessment of impact on financial stability
Complete as quickly as possible
Use knowledge to educate policy-makers
Communicate impacts and needs to industry leaders-2

Charitable Teaming Approach

Methodology
Map damage zones

Water Environment Federation (Report Publishing andLegislative Affairs)

Storm Surge
Flood: Seawater+FreshwaterBlack & Veatch (Project Management, Estimating, andReport Development)

Peak wind gusts >= 100 mph

Identify wastewater utilities in each damage zone

Utility, WEF, and Corporate Volunteers (Field andPhone Survey Support)

Site visits followed by phone surveys across differentzones.

US EPA, DEQs, WEAs

Develop average infrastructure cost estimates for utilities
in each damage zone

25 Impacted Utilities from Louisiana, Mississippi, andAlabama

Apply costs across all affected utilities based on damage
zone location, utility size, treatment methods
Develop pro forma “Income Statement” for all wastewaterutilities in surge zone-3-4

Field Visits Posed Challenges

Project Schedule was Ambitious

Three field teams
Volunteers not covered under Emergency Management
Assistance Compacts (EMAC)

Hurricane Katrina

August 29

Proposal to WEF

October 5

WEF Acceptance

October 7

Site Visit Teams Mobilized

November 7

Limited hotel space

Phone Surveys Began

December 1

Rental cars scarce

New Orleans Site Visit

January 5-6

Vaccinations required

Draft Report for Peer Review

January 17

Report Published

April 25

Two months after Katrina:
Impacted utilities phone lines down

Rumors abound re conditions“Let’s take RVs!”
Development of appropriate survey forms-5-6

Initial Expectations

12 Utilities Visited (19 Facilities out of 118 Affected)
FAIRHOPE, AL
GULF SHORES, AL

Catastrophic damage to wastewater treatment
plants and collection systems in New Orleansarea and parts of Mississippi coast line

MOBILE, AL (2)BOGALUSA, LA
COVINGTON, LA

Reduced population in New Orleans, Slidell,perhaps elsewhere will affect utility revenues

PLAQUEMINES PARISH, LA (SEVERN TRENT) (5)SLIDELL, LA
WESTWEGO, LA

Assumed publicly available maps could be usedto plot damage areas

HARRISON COUNTY, MS (3)HATTIESBURG, MSMS GULF COAST REGIONAL WWA, MS
SEWERAGE & WATER BOARD OF NEW ORLEANS, LA-7-8- 233 -Initial Indications: Almost Half of Coastline ofMississippi Suffered Catastrophic Damage;
Surge Experienced 10 Miles Inland

Actual situation: Storm Surge of 15 to >25 feet
Hit Three States, Including Entire Mississippi
Gulf Coastline-9- 10Gulfport

Katrina: The Perfect Storm- 11- 12

Gulfport

New Orleans- 13- 14Video- 15- 16- 234 -Estimated 450,000 People’s Homes wereDestroyed

Impacted Population Served

25-80% loss of population rate base amongst
utilities in surge area

State- 17

Pop. Served inStudy Area
(Thousands)

Percentof
ImpactedSurgePop.

Alabama

242

14%

1%

Louisiana

1,157

64%

79%
20%

Mississippi

386

22%

Total

1,785

100%- 18

Most Wastewater Treatment Plant Damage wasfrom Storm Surge, not Wind

Collection Systems

Electrical circuitry
destroyedHigh level of service connection failures in surgearea

Pumps and motors
damaged

Clean up further damaging service connections
Above ground portion of lift stations heavily
damaged; below ground impacted by gritaccumulation

Power generators
destroyed

Point repairs greater in flooded areas, but not as
bad as expected

Basins filled with grit
Reinforced concrete
structures held- 19- 20

Additional Findings

Additional Findings

Many won’t evacuate…including utility employees. Plan forit.

Redundancy in supplies—diesel fuel, rolling stock,
records, telemetry

Strong senior
management is critical

FEMA sub-contractors unfamiliar with assets, createdgreater burden on resource-constrained utilities

Heroic efforts amongst
wastewater employees

Solvency issues“Events of default” will hurt communities more thanbond holders

Emergency
ManagementAssistance Compact(EMAC) didn’t work
well forwater/wastewater
utilities

12 month reserve funds will run out in 2007
Bonds being issued to cover operating expense“FEMA anticipation notes”

- 21

- 22

Assessment Findingsby State (US$ Millions)Long-Term Financial Impact

Significant percentage loss in rate baseState

25-80% population loss in surge areas

Smaller reduction in expenses- 24- 235 -Total

Percentage

501514%

Louisiana925

146

1,071

78%

Total

- 23Financial

Alabama

Mississippi

Without intervention, some likely to experience
reduction in debt service reserves in 2006,
inability to fund debt service payments in 2007

Infrastructure

231

16247

18%

1,206

163

1,369

100%

Recommendations

Surge Sources
Satellite images of damages from NOAA:
http://ngs.woc.noaa.gov/katrina/KATRINA0000.HTM

FederalDevelop greater flexibility in grant programs (eligibility andreplacement)
Monitor of utility fiscal health and provide relief as necessary
Provide stronger role for EPA in disaster response (wrtwater/wastewater)

Surge height maps from FEMA:
https://www.fema.gov/hazards/floods/recoverydata/katrina_index.shtm
WEF / B&V Report
http://www.wef.org/NewsCenter/katrinadamagereport.htm

States and Utilities
Invest wisely
Develop state-to-state mutual aid compacts that focus on water
and wastewater (Water/Wastewater Agency ResponseNetworks)

Wastewater Industry
Improve training, best practices on emergency preparedness
Educate the public on the importance of wastewater to publichealth- 25- 26- 236 -