A Report on the Local Integration of Indo-Chinese Refugees
and Displaced Persons in Japan

Ikuo Kawakami, Waseda University
Koichi Koizumi, Daito Bunka University
Courtland Robinson, Johns Hopkins University
Yasunobu Sato, The University of Tokyo
Saburo Takizawa, Toyo Eiwa University
Susumu Yamagami, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University
Satoshi Yamamoto, The University of Tokyo*This study was commissioned by UNHCR Representation in Japan1

Table of Contents
ABOUT THE AUTHORS............................................................................................................................ 3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................................................... 6
ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................................ 6
1.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 8

PART I: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC RESPONSES TO THE INDO-CHINESEREFUGEE CRISIS .................................................................................................................................... 10
2.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES..................................................................................................... 10
2.1 THE INDO-CHINESE EXODUS AND REGIONAL RESPONSE ................................................................ 10
2.2 THE 1979 MEETING ON THE SITUATION OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN SOUTHEASTASIA ......................................................................................................................................................... 10
2.3 THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INDOCHINESE REFUGEES (ICIR), GENEVA 1989............ 12
2.4 END OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME TO ADDRESS THE INDO-CHINESE REFUGEE CRISIS.......... 12

3.

JAPAN’S RESPONSE ........................................................................................................................ 13
3.1 THE INITIAL RESPONSE ..................................................................................................................... 13
3.2
JAPAN’S ACCESSION TO THE REFUGEE CONVENTION AND RELATED LEGAL ISSUES ............. 16
3.2.1 RESPONSIBILITY FOR REFUGEE STATUS DETERMINATION ...................................................... 17
3.2.2 IMPLICATIONS OF RECOGNIZING REFUGEES AND BECOMING PARTY TO THE REFUGEE
CONVENTION ........................................................................................................................................... 19
3.3
THE ROLE OF NGOS IN THE RESETTLEMENT OF INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES IN JAPAN ......... 20

PART II: THE INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES’ RESETTLEMENT EXPERIENCES ....................... 24
4.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY................................................................................................. 24
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6

5.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY ................................................................................................... 24
SURVEY DATA AND METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................... 24
IDENTIFYING INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS AND CONDUCTING INTERVIEWS ............................. 25
FIELDWORK DURATION ............................................................................................................. 26
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN ....................................................................................... 26
ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................... 28

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS ........................................................................................................... 28
5.1
5.2
5.2
5.3
5.4

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 28
REFUGEES FROM VIETNAM ....................................................................................................... 28
REFUGEES FROM LAOS .............................................................................................................. 35
REFUGEES FROM CAMBODIA ..................................................................................................... 40
OVERALL FINDINGS ................................................................................................................... 49

CONCLUSIONS......................................................................................................................................... 56
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS....................................................................................................... 61
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................................................ 62
ANNEX 1: DATA SETS FROM INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED BETWEEN JUNE AND
DECEMBER 2008 WITH INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES LIVING IN JAPAN.................................. 68
ANNEX II.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE............................ 73

2

About the Authors

Ikuo Kawakami, Waseda University

Ikuo Kawakami is a Professor at the Graduate School of Japanese Applied Linguistics,
Waseda University, in Tokyo, where he specializes in anthropology and Japanese
language education. He has been involved with field-based research of Vietnamese
refugee families in Japan since the mid-1980s. He has also worked for the Japanese
Ministry of Education’s committee for developing ‘Japanese as a Second Language (JSL)
curriculum’ for school students. He has published numerous books and articles, including
Ekkyo-suru Kazoku-zainichi Betonamu kei jyuumin no seikatsu sekai (Families Crossing
Borders: The Lives of Vietnamese living in Japan), Idou-suru kodomotachi to Nihongo
kyoiku: Nihongo wo bogo to shinai kodomo eno kotoba no kyoiku wo kangaeru (Children
Crossing Borders and Japanese Language Teaching: Language Education for Children
Whose First Language is Not Japanese), both published by Akashi Shoten, Tokyo.

Koichi Koizumi, Daito Bunka University

Koichi Koizumi is a Professor in the Faculty of International Relations at Daito Bunka
University, in Tokyo and specializes in Refugee and Forced Migration Studies. He
focuses on the international community's response to humanitarian crises, with anemphasis on the socio-political dimensions of forced migration, sociological theories
of forced migration, the evolution of the international refugee regime, and issues such as
international refugee policy, international migration and asylum, the causes of migratory
and refugee movements, refugee assistance and development process, post-conflictreintegration and reconstruction, refugee resettlement and livelihoods. He previously
worked with UNHCR in the field from 1979 to 1981, and is a former Visiting Research
Fellow to the Refugee Studies Programme at the University of Oxford from 1990 to
1991. He is the author of several books on refugees and forced migration, including Who
is a Refugee? (Sanichi Shobo, 1998), Political Sociology of Forced Migration (Keiso
Shobo, 2005) and Globalization and Forced Migration (Keiso Shobo, 2009).

Courtland Robinson, Johns Hopkins University

W. Courtland Robinson, Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor at the Center for Refugee andDisaster Response at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health inBaltimore, Maryland. He has been involved in refugee research and policy analysis since1979. The non-governmental organizations and academic institutions with whom Dr.
Robinson has worked include the Indochina Refugee Action Center, Save the Children,
World Education, the U.S. Committee for Refugees, the Asian Research Center for
Migration, and Mercy Corps. He is the author of numerous studies on refugee issues,particularly in Asia. His book, Terms of Refuge: The Indochinese Exodus and theInternational Response (1998, Zed Books), was selected by the Humanitarian Times as3

one of the ten best books for 1999. His current research activities include famine anddistress migration in North Korea, demographic assessment methods in complex
emergencies, and development-induced displacement.

Yasunobu Sato, the University of Tokyo

Yasunobu Sato is Professor at the University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Arts&
Science, Graduate Program on Human Security (HSP). He holds a PhD in law(University of London 2000), LLM (Harvard 1989), and BA in political science (Waseda
University 1982). As Attorney-at-Law (admitted in Tokyo in 1984 and in New York in1991), he practised law in Japan, the United States and Europe and is currently a parttime advisor to the law firm Nagashima, Ohno & Tsunematsu. After working on refugeeprotection, peace keeping/peacebuilding and law & judicial reform as a legal official withthe following international organizations: UNHCR as legal officer in Canberra, Australia
in 1991-92, UNTAC as Human Rights Officer in Cambodia in 1992-93 and EBRD as
Counsel in London in 1995-97, he joined the Graduate School of International
Development at Nagoya University in 1999 and then moved to the University of Tokyoin 2005. He has represented the Peace-building Study Group since 2002 and been a
Council member of the Centre of International Assistance for Judicial Reform, theCommittee of International Relations, Japan Federation of Bar Associations since 2006.
Since April 2009, he has been Director of Center of Documentation of Refugees andMigration Studies (CDR) attached to HSP.

Saburo Takizawa, Toyo Eiwa University

After obtaining an MA in international relations from Tokyo Metropolitan University,
Saburo Takizawa joined the Ministry of Justice in 1976 where he dealt with Indochinese
refugees issues within the Bureau of Immigration. After obtaining a MBA from the
University of California at Berkeley, he joined the United Nations Office in Geneva in
1982. He has also worked for the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East (UNRWA) in Vienna, Amman and Beirut and the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO) in Vienna. In 2002, he joined the Office of theUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) at its Headquarters in
Geneva as Controller and Director. In 2007 he was appointed the first Japanese UNHCR
Representative in Japan and worked with the government to improve Japanese refugee
policy. He retired from UNHCR in August 2008. He is currently a Professor at Toyo
Eiwa University where he teaches international relations and organizations, as well as
refugee and migration issues. He is also a visiting professor at the United Nations
University in Tokyo.

4

Susumu Yamagami, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University

Susumu Yamagami is a Professor at the College of Asia Pacific Studies and Graduate
School of Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. He entered the Ministry of Justice in1972 upon graduation from the University of Tokyo (LLB). He studied at the Graduate
School of the University of Washington in Seattle from 1974 to 1976 (MA in Political
Science). He assumed various posts in the Immigration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice
and was seconded to UNHCR (1981-1983) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Senior
Assistant for Asia Pacific Cooperation, 1990-1993). In the Ministry of Justice he wasinvolved in various legislative processes and duties including Japan’s accession to the
Refugee Convention, amendments to the Alien Registration Act and Immigration Control
Act, Indochinese refugee issues and migrant labor issues, among others. In the Ministryof Foreign Affairs he functioned as an inter-ministry coordinator in Japan and a contact
point with foreign counterparts concerning APEC. In 2002 joined Ritsumeikan Asia
Pacific University and has been teaching International Relations, Regionalism andRegional Systems in the Asia Pacific, among other subjects.

Satoshi Yamamoto, the University of Tokyo

Satoshi Yamamoto is Project Assistant Professor at the University of Tokyo’s Graduate
Program on Human Security since May 2009. He has received his doctoral training inInternational Law at Nagoya University (Ph.D, 2005). His research focuses on refugees
in International Law, especially changing protection trends and the activities of UNHCR.
His recent work includes The Provisional Rules of Procedure of the United Nations
Security Council and the Council’s Recent Practices (co-authored with Ikuyo Hasuo
et.al., Research Institute for Peace and Security, January 2009), ‘The Concept of a
Refugee in International Law Studies’ (Discussion Paper for Peacebuilding Studies
No.12, June 2008, in Japanese), and ‘Refugees, Peace-building and Human Security inAsia’ (co-authored with Yasunobu Sato, Working Paper of Asian Society of International
Law 2007/13, March 2007). He was awarded the Akino Yutaka Award 2008 for his
research on Border Closure by FYROM (Macedonia) against Albanian Refugees from
Kosovo in 1999 (by the Akino Yutaka Eurasia Fund, August 2008).

5

Acknowledgements
This report has been produced with the assistance and contributions of project coordinators Olivia
Minami, Mika Hasebe and Kaisa Heikkinen; Satoru Miyazawa; Daniel Alkhal (UNHCR);
Madoka Futamura (UNU), and Kazuhiko Okuda (Senshu University), and edited by Johanna
Stratton (UNU).

Acronyms
AAR
ASEAN
CPA
CPP
CSO
CSR
ICIR
IOM
ISSJ
NGO
ODP
RHQ
RSA Kanagawa
RSD
SVC
UNHCR
UNTAC
UNU

Association for Aid and Relief
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Comprehensive Plan of Action
Cambodian People’s Party
civil society organization
corporate social responsibility
International Conference on Indochinese Refugees
International Organization for Migration
International Social Services Japan
non-governmental organization
Orderly Departure Programme
Refugee Assistance Headquarters
Association for Supporting Refugees' Settlement in Kanagawa
refugee status determination
Shanti Volunteer Center
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
United Nations University

6Preface
The genesis of this study was a proposal by Mr Saburo Takizawa, the UNHCR Representative inJapan from 2007 – 2008, as a way to commemorate 30 years since the Japanese government’s
1978 decision to resettle Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons. By forming a team ofscholars to undertake research on the current status of those persons who resettled in Japan, it wasenvisaged that a useful and original contribution could be made that has policy significance for
the Japanese government, as it formulates plans for the resettlement of refugees. In this context,
an historical and critical review of the resettlement process of Indo-Chinese refugees in Japan,
including the ways in which government policy has shifted in relation to changing internationaland domestic forces and realities; and the legal, socio-economic and other problems those who
resettled in Japan had to face, were determined to be of key importance.
It is hoped that this report reflects the significant contributions that various people have made insupporting the resettlement of Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons in Japan, and thatsome of the report’s findings may be useful in the future with regards to the recognition andresettlement of refugees.
UNHCR and the authors express their gratitude to The Tokyo Club, Rissho Kosei-kai, Inamori
Foundation and the Mainichi Osaka Foundation whose significant funding made this research
project feasible. In addition, the efforts of Mr. Takizawa and staff members of the UNHCR
Representation in Japan as well as The University of Tokyo’s Human Security Program are
greatly appreciated, particularly for organizing successive meetings and workshops, andpublishing this report. Many thanks are also owed to the group of graduate students who
demonstrated their commitment and professionalism in conducting interviews with a number ofIndo-Chinese refugees and displaced persons. Finally, our sincere gratitude and thanks areextended to the 245 interview respondents who took the time and trouble to meet and share theirexperiences for the benefit of this study.

7

1.

Introduction

The primary objective of this study is to identify lessons learned based on Japan’s pastexperiences in recognizing and resettling refugees and displaced persons form Indo-China. Useful
insights and findings will serve to inform and shape Japan’s future refugee policy, which is taking
a new direction following the 2008 government announcement to resettle 90 refugees fromBurma/Myanmar starting from 2010. As this will be one of the rare occasions in Japan’s history
for it to open its doors for the resettlement of refugees, there is a keen interest and concern felt byboth the government and civil society organizations (CSOs) regarding the provision of adequate
assistance for future intakes of refugees, given the long interval since the resettlement of IndoChinese refugees and displaced persons.
The existing literature on this subject includes surveys conducted by the Japanese Ministry ofForeign Affairs and Ministry of Justice on the state of the Indo-Chinese population in Japan
during the 1980s. Additionally, the International Social Services Japan (ISSJ) and Refugee
Assistant Headquarters (RHQ) of the Foundation for the Welfare and Education of Asian People,
were deeply involved in addressing the needs of Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons,made reports in the early 1990s on the status of the Indo-Chinese who settled in Japan.
Furthermore, the authoritative report, “Settlement of Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced
Persons and its prospects: 20 years since the first settlement” was published in March 1996 by the
Cabinet Secretariat of Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons Liaison and Coordination
Committee, in collaboration with concerned government agencies. This same Secretariat
published two additional reports in March 1997 and March 1998 about the Indo-Chinese
Refugees and Displaced Persons in Japan. These reports, however, cover only the first 20 years ofexperience and no comprehensive research has been undertaken during the past decade until thecurrent study.
This new study on the resettlement of Indo-Chinese refugees in Japan presents a timely
opportunity to review the past 30 years of refugee policy and practice, particularly from theperspective of the refugees themselves. It examines the legal, social, economic and otherproblems that Indo-Chinese refugees have faced in their effort to integrate into Japanese society,as well as discusses ways in which Japanese refugee policy has been shaped by the Indo-Chinese
refugee resettlement experience. It is hoped that this study provides evidence-based reasoning to
the Japanese government and society as a whole for why it should continue to broaden its
perspectives still further on providing protection and security to vulnerable people on the move.
Recent statistics suggest that Japan’s refugee and humanitarian policy is gradually softening butthat there is still much potential for Japan to bear a larger responsibility in recognizing refugees
and humanitarian status holders. The number of asylum applications in Japan has increased
substantially in recent years – nearly doubling from 816 people in 2007 to 1599 people in 2008.
The number of people recognized as Convention Refugees1 grew from 41 in 2007 to 57 in 2008,
1

A Convention Refugee is someone who is outside his/her home country, or the country where s/henormally lives, and cannot return to that country because of a well-founded fear of persecution based on
race, religion, political opinion, nationality or membership in a particular social group.

8and those who received humanitarian status increased from 88 in 2007 to 360 in 2008. The
figures for 2007 – 2008 are the highest over the past 26 year period since Japan acceded to the
Refugee Convention2 in 1981.3 By contrast, during 1982 – 2004, only 330 from a total of 3544
asylum applications were recognized as refugees.4
As the twenty-first century progresses, what new roles and responsibilities does Japan face in the
Asia-Pacific region and the world, particularly in the fields of humanitarian relief and humansecurity? Can it continue to promote the protection of refugees, asylum-seekers and othervulnerable migrant populations through its generous donations to humanitarian relief anddevelopment programs around the world, while in addition, strengthening its commitment toprotect and provide for refugees, asylum seekers and migrants within its own borders?
The structure of the report is as follows. The first section provides the international context of the
Indo-Chinese refugee crisis, the solutions to which are marked primarily by two international
conferences held in Geneva: the Meeting on the Situation of Refugees and Displaced Persons inSoutheast Asia in 1979, and the International Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees andDisplaced Persons in 1989. This is followed by an examination of the declared ‘end’ to the crisis
in 1994. Next is an assessment of the Japanese government’s response to the refugee crisis prior
to and following entry into force of the Refugee Convention in 1982, as well as the responses ofJapanese civil society to the situation. Part II forms the body of the report and starts with an
explanation of the research objectives, available data and methodology used, followed by adescription and analysis of the personal and collective experiences as provided by refugees
through interviews. Both general and specific policy recommendations are made in the final
section in an effort to better facilitate the integration process of refugees in Japan.

2

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted on 28 July 1951 by the United Nations Conferenceof Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under General Assembly
resolution 429 (V) of 14 December 1950, (entered into force 22 April 1954),
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf (Accessed 25 September 2009)

3

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees http://www3.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdf/B-S57-0001_1.pdf (Accessed 25 September
2009)
4

Ministry of Justice Statistics, http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/090130-1.html (Accessed 25 September
2009)

9

Part I:
International and Domestic Responses to the Indo-Chinese Refugee Crisis
2.

International Responses

2.1 The Indo-Chinese Exodus and Regional Response
The capture of Saigon on April 30, 1975 by the North Vietnamese army, the establishment of theprovisional revolutionary government in South Vietnam, the unification of Vietnam, as well as
the regime changes that occurred in Laos and Cambodia, simultaneously ended – at least
temporarily – the long lasting major warfare on the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. During, and in theaftermath of the Indo-Chinese conflict, more than three million Cambodians, Laotians andVietnamese left their homes in search of temporary asylum or permanent resettlement. Those who
feared persecution under the newly established Socialist Republic of Vietnam due to theirpolitical or ideological opinions, and those who were unable to adjust to the new system, began amass exodus from Vietnam by boat via the South China Sea to seek refuge in neighboring
countries. They came to be known as Vietnamese ‘Boat People’: 250 000 arrived in Malaysia by
1995, 200 000 in Hong Kong, 120 000 in Indonesia, 120 000 in Thailand,5 as well as several
thousand arriving directly to Japan’s shores as well.
Almost simultaneously, there appeared another exodus of people fleeing from Laos andCambodia into Thailand by land after regime changes in those two countries. They were often
called ‘Land People’ in contrast to ‘Boat People’ because they used land routes for fleeing. The
number of these people fleeing overland amounted to 110,000 in 1975 – 76 and reached 190 000
in 1979.6 Most Indo-Chinese refugees were resettled in third countries outside of Southeast Asia,
including 1.4 million in the United States, 260 000 in China, 200 000 in Canada, 185 000 in
Australia, 130 000 in France, and 11 000 in Japan. Roughly half a million people returned to theirhome country, either voluntarily or after being screened-out as non-refugees. Not counted in thesefigures are all the clandestine movements back and forth across borders, nor the tens of thousands
who suffered and died along the way as a result of piracy, pushback, banditry and abuse. 7
2.2 The 1979 Meeting on the Situation of Refugees and Displaced Persons in Southeast Asia
The response to the Indo-Chinese exodus gave rise to a number of specific initiatives – including
anti-piracy and rescue-at-sea programs, the Orderly Departure Programme (ODP), and large-scale
repatriation efforts – however it is framed by two international conferences on Indo-Chinese
refugees. The first conference in 1979, dramatically increased international resettlement
commitments, and the second in 1989, sought to replace resettlement with alternative, regional
5

Cabinet Secretariat, Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons Liaison and Coordination Committee“Settlement of Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons and its Prospect: 20 years since the firstsettlement”, 1996, 10.
6
Ibid at 6.
7
Courtland Robinson, Terms of Refuge: The Indochinese Exodus and the International Response (London
and New York: Zed Books, 1998).

10solutions. The 1979 conference was a response to a surge in refugee outflows, by land and sea, inthe wake of Vietnam’s consolidation of internal control and its invasion of Cambodia. Motivatedby the urgent need to save the lives of those fleeing precarious situations, UNHCR organized an
International Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons in Southeast Asia. It was here that
Vietnam agreed to impose a moratorium on illegal departures, and that attending states affirmed
the principle of first asylum in the region, but coupled with an agreement that Boat People beresettled in third countries, or as the formula was called, “an open door for an open shore.”8
Temporary first-asylum in Southeast Asia, in other words, was secured on the basis that refugees
would subsequently be offered permanent, third-country resettlement, mostly in the West.
The inception of an ODP was agreed on by UNHCR and the Vietnamese government in May
1979, and allowed for family reunion and ‘other humanitarian cases’ to leave Vietnam directly
for third countries. One obvious humanitarian advantage of the ODP over other ways of leaving
Vietnam was, of course, that those who were able to qualify under the Programme avoided theperils of ship wreck, forcible return to sea and pirate attacks. It was stressed at the same time,
however, that the ODP should not detract from the priority of those remaining in the camps.9
When the first Indo-Chinese refugees began arriving on the shores and borderlines of Asian
countries in 1975, not one of those countries was a signatory to the Refugee Convention or the1967 Protocol. 10 It is arguable that they rejected these instruments as Euro-centric andinappropriate to the Asian refugee experience.11 Or perhaps the instruments conveyed unwanted
obligations to provide asylum to unwelcome foreign populations. Whatever the reasons, it was
not until July 1981 that the Philippines first acceded to the Convention, followed three months
later by Japan, then China in September 1982. Each country came to play a significant, but very
different, role in the regional and international response. China became permanent home to aquarter of a million Vietnamese, by far the largest resettlement of Indo-Chinese refugees in Asia.
The Philippines agreed to build a regional processing center for refugees bound for third-country
resettlement and also provided first-asylum to Vietnamese Boat People; in all, more than 50 000
refugees were offered temporary asylum in the Philippines while more than 280 000 transited theprocessing center. Following the 1979 international conference, Japan became one of the world’s
largest donors to UN relief programs for Indo-Chinese refugees.12 Between 1978 and 2006, Japan
also offered to resettle approximately 11 000 Indo-Chinese refugees and displaced persons.
Depending on the perspective one takes, this is by far the largest commitment Japan has made to

8

Ibid.
UNHCR, United Nations University (UNU), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Report on theInternational Seminar on the Indo-Chinese Exodus and the International Response, 1995, Tokyo.
9

10

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, entered into force 4 October 1967.

11

Sara E. Davies, "The Asian Rejection? International Refugee Law in Asia," Australian Journal of
Politics & History 52, no. 4 (2006).
12
Meryll Dean and Miki Nagashima, "Sharing the Burden: The Role of Government and NGOs in
Protecting and Providing for Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Japan," Journal of Refugee Studies 20, no. 3(2007).

11

accept refugees and asylum seekers within its borders; it also ranks 48 out of 50 industrializedcountries in relation to the number of refugees resettled per 1 000 inhabitants.13
2.3 The International Conference on Indochinese Refugees (ICIR), Geneva 1989
In the Southeast Asian region, the increased numbers of Vietnamese boat people since mid-1987
was observed with keen interest and grave concern. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) Ministerial Meeting of 1988 proposed to convene an international conference to search
for a final solution to the problems relating to Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons. As
background to the ASEAN proposal, more than ten years had passed since the political upheavalsin Indo-China in 1975 and more than 2 million (of which 1.6 million people were resettled inWestern countries, Japan and China) left from there; the exodus, however, was still continuing.
There was a growing perception in Southeast Asian countries that the basic motivation of more
recent departees might not be political but rather economic (seeking job opportunities and a better
life abroad) given the worsening economic situations in the three countries of origin. There wasalso an increasing concern among the international community that the generous guarantee ofresettlement to the West was functioning as a pull factor.
Endorsed by the 39th Executive Committee of UNHCR and the 43rd General Assembly of UN, anInternational Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons was convened in
Geneva in June 1989. A Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) was adopted by the 74 countries inattendance. It called for humane measures to counter clandestine departures, accelerated andexpanded use of regular departure procedures such as the ODP, temporary refuge for all new
arrivals and a consistent process for refugee status determination in the region undertaken bynational authorities with UNHCR participation and support. It also reaffirmed the importance ofthird country resettlement and appealed for wider participation in the resettlement of refugee
camp ‘long-stayers’, or those who had stayed for more than three years.14
The CPA sought to position refugees in the larger context of people on the move worldwide by
striking a balance between international refugee protection with solutions in their countries oforigin. Under the newly introduced screening process, only those who were ‘screened-in’ were
offered opportunities for resettlement, whereas those who did not fulfill the Refugee Convention
criteria were sent back to their country of origin. While involuntary repatriation of ‘screened-out’cases remains the most contentious element of the CPA, the plan did allow more than 73 000
people to be repatriated to Vietnam and 26 000 people, including ethnic minority groups to Laos,under conditions of safety and dignity, monitored by UNHCR.15
2.4 End of the International Regime to Address the Indo-Chinese Refugee Crisis
With drastic shifts in resettlement policy for Indo-Chinese refugees and displaced persons in theinternational context as outlined above, and domestic policy changes taking place in Indo-China –
13

Ibid.
UNHCR, United Nations University (UNU), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), note 9 above, at 9091.

14

15

Ibid. at 15.

12namely market liberalization reforms, political stabilization and an upturn in the economy, theoutflow of boat people began to decrease dramatically around 1991– 1992. The international
community gradually started to share the view that there would no longer be an imminent threatof persecution based on political opinions or other equivalent causes, and agreed to abolish thescreening system for Boat People as a whole in February 1994.

3.

Japan’s Response

3.1 The Initial Response
Governmental agencies and local communities in Japan were not prepared for the arrival of IndoChinese asylum-seekers, particularly in the early days of the mass exodus from Southeast Asia.
Rather than establish a government-only response, the Ministry of Justice, port authorities andlocal governments sought the cooperation of the Japanese Red Cross and various religiousorganizations that were able to offer free lodging or help find alternative accommodation.
Comprehensive solutions to address the problems of Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced
Persons in Japan were eventually reached some two decades on from the initial wave of arrivals
in 1975. By 1995, 13 768 Boat People had arrived in Japan and about 40 percent of them had
chosen to resettle there, in their country of first asylum.16 The majority of Boat People to Japan,
however, chose to resettle mainly in the United States, Canada, Norway and Australia. 17 In
addition to the reception of Boat People, Japan resettled some 4 300 Indo-Chinese from refugee
camps in Southeast Asia as well as approximately 2 600 Vietnamese who qualified under the
ODP to resettle in Japan (see Table 1).
The first arrival of Boat People to Japan were rescued by an American ship and arrived to the portof Chiba on May 12, 1975. During that year, there were nine ships that rescued a total of 126
Boat People and arrived in Japan, in 1976 there were 11 ships carrying 247 persons, and in 1977
there were 25 ships carrying a total of 833 persons.18 The arrivals of Boat People continued toincrease, and between 1979 and 1982 more than 1 000 Indo-Chinese arrived annually to various
ports in Japan, capturing the wide attention of various circles in the country. Since nogovernmental agencies or local communities in Japan were prepared for such an arrival, basic
logistical matters regarding accommodation, food and clothing had to be explored on an ad hoc
basis. Each time a report was conveyed to the Ministry of Justice that a ship having rescued Boat
People was arriving, port authorities and local/national government sought the cooperation of the
CSOs. Despite civil society assistance, the government could barely cope with the unexpectedarrivals of Boat People during the early years from 1975 – 1982.
16

Cabinet Secretariat, Liaison and Coordination Committee for Indochinese Refugees and Displaced
Persons, Refugee Assistance Headquarters, http://www.rhq.gr.jp/japanese/know/i-nanmin.htm (Accessed 8
Aug 2009)

17

UNHCR, United Nations University (UNU), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), note 9 above, at 101.

18

Cabinet Secretariat for Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons, Liaison and Coordination
Committee “Settlement of Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons and its Prospect; 20 years since
the first settlement” (1996) at 12.

13

In the first two years of arrivals by sea, the Japanese government issued Special Landing
Permissions for Boat People under the authority of the Minister of Justice. Article 12 of the
Immigration Control Order (1951) was the relevant legislative authority in the case they were
rescued by Japanese ships, while Landing Permission Due to Disaster at Sea under Article 18 of
the said Order was granted in case they were rescued by foreign ships. From November 1977
onwards, regardless of the country flag of the rescuing ship, the Ministry of Justice issued only
Special Landing Permissions, and after the Immigration Control Order (1951) was amended to
the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act in 1982 following Japan’s ratification of
the Refugee Convention, the newly established Landing Permission for Temporary Refuge wasconsequently issued.
The reason why a Landing Permission Due to Disaster at Sea was given to Boat People rescuedby foreign ships was because their status was thought to resemble those rescued by ships
following shipwreck or other disasters at sea. According to the international law of the sea, therepatriation of rescued persons becomes the responsibility of the ships concerned and the countryof its flag.19 In the case that the first port of call of a foreign ship was a Japanese port, it wasdeemed appropriate by the Japanese government for it to issue Landing Permission Due toDisaster at Sea. On the other hand, if the ship carried a Japanese flag, the Ministry of Justicedecided to issue Special Landing Permissions on the basis that most Boat People were notcarrying passports and that even if some did have travel documents, it would not be practicable torepatriate them to Vietnam in the near future. Based on this line of reasoning, the Japanese
government requested those governments under which flag ships were arriving in Japan provide aguarantee that they would take responsibility for the final destination of any of the rescued Boat
People.
While such a practice was in operation, however, in 1977 there were three unexpected cases inwhich foreign ships had to depart with Boat People onboard for another destination before therelevant government (that which the flag was registered under) was able to make a decision about
whether to take on responsibility. Despite the tenable legal logic behind the Japanese
government’s policy in this regard, it was criticized severely both inside and outside of Japan.
The Ministry of Justice consequently began to issue Special Landing Permissions regardless ofthe flag of the ship, and the practice of relying on foreign governments to take responsibility wasconsequently abandoned. Thus, in the early years of the refugee crisis, the Japanese government
held the view that Boat People were permitted to stay temporarily in Japan until they were able toresettle in the country of their choice, or in the country whose ships rescued them.
Since the number of Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons arriving in Southeast Asian
countries far outnumbered those arriving in Japan, the Japanese government found it
inappropriate to rely on other countries’ willingness to accept those who were rescued by
19

UN Convention relating to the Law of the Sea obligates the state party in Article 98, Paragraph 1 (a) totake necessary measures for the captain of a ship belonging to that state to rescue and assist a person
distressed at sea to the extent that the ship concerned is not in risk of its own safety. This convention was
adopted in 1982 and came into effect in 1994. However, such a practice was firmly established muchearlier.

14

Japanese ships, or where ships were virtually operated by Japanese owners and arrived in Japan.
In accordance with the Cabinet Resolution of April 28, 1978 it was agreed that Japan would allow
the settlement of Boat People arriving in Japan, and following the Cabinet Resolution of April 3,
1979 a maximum of 500 Indo-Chinese were accepted for permanent resettlement. However, thislimit of just 500 was harshly criticized as being too low in relation to Japan’s economic power at
the time. The Japanese government then reiterated that this figure was not a fixed ceiling but to beunderstood as a target and that once the target was met, the figures would be increased. 20
As Japan’s initial resettlement numbers were considered too small by the international
community that sought to find global solutions to the Indo-Chinese refugee crisis, the Japanese
government decided to resettle Indo-Chinese refugees from refugee camps in Southeast Asia
further to an agreement reached at the 1979 Geneva meeting. Pursuant to successive Cabinet
Resolutions, the resettlement quota was gradually raised to 10 000 people in 1985,21 and later
abolished while Japan’s resettlement criteria were lowered to virtually any person who would be
able to support his/her own life in Japan. 22 This is how more than 4 300 Indo-Chinese were
eventually resettled from refugee camps to Japan, thereby giving a total of some 11 000 people
who resettled in Japan over the longer term.
Table 1: The State of Indochinese Refugees’ Resettlement in Japan
Boat
PeopleResidents in Japanas Foreign Students

From refugee
camps abroad

ODP

Total

Vietnam

3536

625

1820

2606

8587

Laos

0

73

1233

0

1306

Cambodia

0

44

1294

0

1338

Total

3536

742

4347

2606

11231

Source: Cabinet Secretariat, Liaison and Coordination Committee for Indochinese Refugees and Displaced
Persons (Figures as of Dec. 2004)

In order to establish its own refugee status determination procedures, the government enacted the
Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (1982) into which the main provisions of the
Refugee Convention were incorporated. At that juncture, the Japanese government moved fromcomplete reliance on the good will of voluntary groups to resolve logistical matters such asaccommodation, to establishing government-supported facilities in order to provide immediate
shelter and medical treatment.

20

Yamagami, Susumu, “Japan and Refugee Issues: yesterday, today and tomorrow” Nihon Kanjo
Publishing, 2007, at 89.

21

Cabinet Resolution of 9 July 1985.

22

It should be noted that the requirement “ability to support his/her life in Japan” is a leitmotiv in Japanese
refugee policy.

15

Pursuant to the Cabinet Resolution of July 17, 1981, the Omura Refugee Reception Center was
set up, and began operation in February 1982. This reception center accommodated Boat People
arriving in Japan for some three months during which individual interviews were conducted inorder to confirm identity and future options, and provide medical check-ups and guidance on life
in Japan, as opposed to refugee status determination which was not conducted. Afterapproximately three months at the Reception Center, the Indo-Chinese Boat People weretransferred to various accommodation facilities operated by the private sector and voluntarygroups, which later developed into non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and CSOs.
As mentioned earlier, the Japanese government acted passively and reactively to the unfolding
situation rather than proactively in finding solutions to the problems, due in part to thegovernment’s lack of “know how” about providing assistance to refugees. Consequently, thegovernment, where possible, tried to accommodate various proposals and recommendations madeby CSOs and volunteers which were engaged in helping Indo-Chinese Boat People to resettle andintegrate in Japan. Although there was constant dissatisfaction on the part of CSOs regarding thelack of speed and magnitude of governmental involvement, a Settlement Promotion Center was
established in Himeiji in Kansai prefecture in December 1979. It was followed soon thereafter by
a second center in Yamato in Kanagawa prefecture in February 1980. The continuous influx andcontinued stay of Boat People further led to the establishment of the Shinagawa International
Relief Center in 1983 in Tokyo. The overall management, Japanese language education, cultural
adaptation and job training was entrusted to the Refugee Assistance Headquarters (RHQ), an
organization which was established within the Foundation for Welfare and Education of the
Asian People under the coordination and collaboration of UNHCR. In the meantime, from anearly stage, the relevant ministries and agencies tried to coordinate their policies and practices
under the framework of The Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons Liaison and
Coordination Conference within the Cabinet (and its Secretariat) and through successive Cabinet
resolutions.
It should be noted that the involvement of local governments in resettling Indo-Chinese refugees
was minimal, if any. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the number of foreign residents in Japanwas small (some 850 000, the majority being residents of Korean origin who had lived in Japanfor decades) and the local governments lacked experience and expertise in dealing with foreign
nationals who could not communicate in Japanese. Above all, the local governments consideredthat refugee issues were part of “higher politics” and should be handled by the central
government.
3.2

Japan’s Accession to the Refugee Convention and Related Legal Issues

When the Japanese government decided to promote the resettlement of Indo-Chinese Boat People,
only a small portion of them expressed their wish to resettle in Japan. The fact that nogovernment accommodation facility was arranged until 1982, as well as factors such as themeager resettlement quota of just 500 persons, nurtured the image both domestically andinternationally, that Japan was indifferent to refugees. One such symbolic example was Japan’s
non-accession to the Refugee Convention at a time when all Western industrialized countries
were contracting parties. When the Government eventually decided to become party to the16Refugee Convention in 1981, several domestic laws needed to be reformed as they contained anationality requirement, that is, they were applicable only to Japanese nationals.
Japan’s legal system has historically contained various laws and regulations that provide fordifferential treatment between Japanese nationals and non-Japanese. Such discriminatory laws
and regulations included restrictions on eligibility of applications, eligibility for social security
allowances, as well as eligibility for public funds and public office.
The Japanese government comprehensively reviewed and amended the so-called nationality
clause in its legal system when it acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights23 in 1979. As a result, only four laws remained from which the nationality clause needed tobe removed so as to comply with Article 24 of the Refugee Convention. These were the National
Pension Act (1959), Child Allowance Act (1971), Child Rearing Allowance Act (1961) and the
Act Related to the Provisions of Special Child Rearing Allowance (1964). From a law reformperspective, the government did not find it too high a hurdle to ratify the Refugee Convention,
which had already been signed by some 80 countries.
On the other hand, most corporations abolished the requirement for employees to be Japanese,following a Supreme Court ruling in 1974 which determined that it was illegal for a company tocancel an informal promise of employment based on the fact that an applicant turned out not to bea Japanese national. While this resulted in employment discrimination mostly disappearing fromthe in-house regulations of companies, there are still some reports of nationality-based
employment discrimination today in Japan.
3.2.1

Responsibility for Refugee Status Determination

During governmental consultations on acceding to and implementing the Refugee Convention,
the issue of which institution should determine who is a refugee and how such procedures shouldbe established were debated. One proposal was for each relevant ministry or agency to assess
whether an asylum seeker is eligible for the protection offered by the Refugee Convention, while
the alternate proposal was that one particular institution be solely responsible for undertaking
refugee status determination. Related to this, was the question of whether to establish a new andindependent institution. Each proposal posed respective challenges: involving multiple
institutions opened up the risk of conflicting outcomes for any one asylum application, while theidea of establishing a new institution under the prevailing budgetary constraints was considered adifficult one. Extensive research on the comparative practices of other countries revealed thatrefugee status determination procedures were greatly diversified and reflected the particular legal
system and administrative practices of each country. In other words, there was no uniform
standard practice at the international level.

23

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and opened for signature, ratification andaccession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, (entered into force 23
March 1976). http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm

17

A careful reading of the Refugee Convention, however, led to the realization that according to
Article 31, asylum seekers should not be penalized for their illegal entry or presence. Such a law
may potentially conflict with an administrative decision made by a Japanese authority, andtherefore be deemed inappropriate or irrelevant. This underlined the Japanese government’s
persistent security concern that acceding to the Refugee Convention might create an obstacle tothe maintenance of law and order in Japanese society. In determining whether to become party to
the Refugee Convention, humanitarian considerations about the plight of asylum seekers andrefugees were not the sole concern. In the end, it was agreed that refugee status determination
should be undertaken by a single, existing institution for administrative purposes, and that the
Immigration Bureau within the Ministry of Justice should handle this function.
The Cabinet Resolution of March 13, 1981 stated that the determination of refugee status for the
purpose of implementing the Refugee Convention is be undertaken by the Ministry of Justice, andother ministries and agencies shall take appropriate supporting measures so that this function
could be processed smoothly. Based on this understanding, the Ministry of Justice prepared thedetermination procedures and issuance of a refugee travel document, while the Ministry of
Welfare prepared to delete the nationality clause from the relevant laws. “The Draft Act toAmend the Immigration Control Order (1951) and other relevant laws relevant to Japan’s
Accession to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees” was submitted to the Diet in
April 1981, passed and enacted in June, and came into effect in 1982 when the Convention cameinto force in Japan. The Government believed that their accession to the Refugee Convention
would be seen as a strong demonstration of its posture to tackle refugee issues seriously andpositively.
The screening procedures for determining refugee status that were introduced as part of the CPA
following the 1989 international conference were to establish whether an asylum seeker fellwithin the definition of the Refugee Convention. It was widely acknowledged and accepted,
however, that the generically termed ‘Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons,’ who had
fled their homelands and arrived in Japan from 1975 onwards had not been required to undergosuch a screening procedure. Since UNHCR and the UN General Assembly supported andendorsed such an approach, it was thought inappropriate to review the status of those who werealready settled, or to differentiate future treatment depending on whether a person was a
Convention refugee or not.
The Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons Liaison and Coordination Conference of April
22, 1981 in the Cabinet made the following agreement:(1) The Government continues to promote resettlement for Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced
Persons who hope to resettle in Japan, in accordance with existing cabinet resolutions.
(2) The Government continues to admit Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons who seek
temporary refuge in Japan to stay, in accordance with existing cabinet resolutions, provided that
UNHCR maintains its current assistance regime.

18

(3) For the Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons who were authorized to resettle inJapan, even if they are not recognized as refugees under the Refugee Convention, they shall be
provided with the equivalent treatment that Convention refugees are accorded as far as possible.
By 2005, it was officially recorded that 198 Vietnamese, 96 Cambodians and 115 Laotians had
applied for refugee status, and that 59, 50 and 48 people were recognized as such respectively.
Only a small portion of the Indo-Chinese who resettled in Japan filed applications for refugee
status. This suggests that there were few incentives to attain refugee status, given the fact that
there was little difference between refugee status holders and non-holders with regard to dailyliving and social security entitlements. Refugee status may have a significant implication on
admission and residential permission, however, once resettlement was authorized (territorial
asylum was provided), the Indo-Chinese in Japan might not have found any need or merit tobeing labeled as Convention refugees. Notably, those people who were recognized as Convention
refugees were issued a Refugee Travel Document24 under Article 28 of the Convention, while
those who retained their ‘Indo-Chinese Refugee or Displaced Person’ status were issued re-entry
permits under the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (1982).
3.2.2
Implications of Recognizing Refugees and Becoming Party to the Refugee
Convention
In retrospect, the decision to accept Indo-Chinese refugees had a number of implications forJapan. Above all, it prompted Japan to join the international humanitarian regime for refugees byacceding to the Refugee Convention. International pressure is often cited as the primary reason
for Japan’s accession to the Refugee Convention however, there are additional explanations. First,
the decision was based on a strategic consideration to maintain international relations of criticalimportance – particularly the military alliance with the United States. Second, it was a tacticalconcession by Japan to ensure that in the face of strong international pressure to liberalize its
asylum policy, it could still retain its fundamental isolationism by maintaining sovereign control
over refugee status determination and its domestic refugee policy.25 In doing so, security concerns
rather than humanitarian concerns prevailed. The decision to assign the task of refugee statusdetermination to the Immigration Bureau within the Ministry of Justice was in line with suchthinking. Third, public opinion in Japan also shifted towards being in favour of recognizing morerefugees, which placed added pressure on the government to play a more active role in global
refugee issues by becoming party to the Refugee Convention. Several NGOs played an importantrole in shaping positive public opinion, as mentioned in Part 3.3 below.
Another important but not well known consequence of acceding to the Refugee Convention werethat positive legal reforms that took place. By removing the nationality requirements from social
security legislation, foreign nationals, mostly of Korean origin, were no longer excluded from the24

According to Hiroshi Karube of RHQ, those people recognized as Convention refugees can use theJapanese civil code and other domestic legislation as the legal basis for adulthood and marriage, while
those without Convention refugee status must rely on the laws and practices of their country of origin,which may involve considerable time and money.

25

Ryuuji Mukae, “To be of the World - Japan’s Refugee Policy” European Press Academic Publishing,
2001, 241-243.

19

national labor, pension, health-care and social welfare system. Japan’s accession to the Refugee
Convention had the effect of broadening the social security network for hundreds of thousand
foreign nationals in Japan, and this change continues to benefit the two million plus foreigners
who live in Japan today. This is a positive, albeit unintended, consequence of becoming party to
the Refugee Convention and of becoming a more open society for refugees.
3.3

The Role of NGOs in the Resettlement of Indo-Chinese Refugees in JapanAs the Japanese government was not ready to effectively assist Indo-Chinese refugees when they
started arriving in Japan, the role of NGOs in providing relief assistance was a most significant
one. In reality, Japan’s civil society was not particularly strong and there were only a few NGOs
operating 30 years ago. It is useful to understand the socio-political context in Japan during thelate 1970s and early 1980s in order to better grasp the role that civil society played at this time. In
essence, Japanese society in general was not well prepared to handle the resettlement of IndoChinese refugees. Japan had virtually no experience in handling asylum seekers and humanitariancases until the arrival of Indo-Chinese refugees, and neither was it a signatory to the Refugee
Convention in the early years.
The Japanese government supported the United States’ military presence in Indo-China and thissparked a strong anti-war movement in Japan throughout the war years. In the late 1970s,
memories of atrocities were still fresh and the anti-war sentiment mostly undiminished. There
was not much sympathy within Japanese public opinion for people fleeing former South Vietnam,
as the Japanese media had typically depicted it to be led by a corrupt, pro-United States
government, while the North Vietnam was portrayed as leading a heroic national liberation
movement against the almighty military power of the United States, and enduring severe
casualties and losses. The harsh treatment of the people from the south by the new Vietnamese
government was under-reported by the Japanese media. Similarly, there was little knowledge of
the “killing fields” and human rights atrocities caused by Pol Pot’s regime in Cambodia. Likewise,
the complex political and military situations and harsh realities under the communist regime in
Laos were not well known in Japan.
These factors made it difficult for ordinary Japanese citizens to understand why Indo-Chinese
people were fleeing their own countries, and led some to believe that the reason for leaving was
economically-driven. In combination, this resulted in Japanese society offering a less thanwelcoming attitude to Indo-Chinese refugees. Moreover, as Japan’s economy was flourishing thenation had been single-mindedly pursuing economic growth for a long period, almost oblivious toconflicts and humanitarian issues throughout the rest of the world.
The arrival of Indo-Chinese refugees not only took Japan by surprise but also put the government
under pressure, mainly by the United States, to accept larger numbers. The Japanese government
was reluctant to accept refugees, on the grounds that Japan is a geographically small country withlittle space, the difficulty of learning the Japanese language, and marked cultural differences.26
This naïve and untenable argument was strongly criticized by CSOs and the media, however it

26

Reply of the Minister of Justice to parliamentary questioning20

reflected the general level of understanding and sentiments within some parts of Japanese society
concerning refugee issues at the time.
In order to obtain first-hand insights into the role of Japanese NGOs during this period, interviews
were conducted with representatives from five of the organizations that were active in assisting
the Indo-Chinese community over the past three decades: Rissho Kosei-kai;27 Akatsuki no Mura;28
Japan Volunteer Center (JVC); 29 Association for Aid and Relief (AAR); 30 Association for
Supporting Refugees' Settlement in Kanagawa (RSA Kanagawa).31
The interviews focused on the early years of assistance from 1978‒ 1985, and the following threequestions were posed:
1. Why and how did your organization get involved in assistance activities?
Well-established religious organizations such as Rissho Kosei-kai and Akatsuki no Mura, got
involved in response to international appeals made by religious bodies such as the World
Conference of Religions for Peace. Humanitarian consideration and compassion were their key
motives, and they were acutely aware of and concerned about strong international criticism thatJapan was indifferent to the plight of refugees and was merely concerned with economic matters.
In its founding days, JVC was comprised of mainly students, young people and homemakers who
traveled to Thailand to volunteer in areas where Indo-Chinese refugees were clustered. Following
media reports in Japan on the massive exodus and desperate plight of the Indo-Chinese, Japaneseof various backgrounds arrived in Thailand out of curiosity and concern, and were able to get
involved through JVC, which was a Japanese NGO that also functioned as a kind of visitors’
center. While JVC originated as a group of volunteers gathered in Thailand, as the core members
gained experience, the organization evolved into the first field-oriented ‘operational’ NGO fromJapan.
AAR was formally established in 1982, but prior to that, its founder Ms. Yukika Souma, 32
established the Association to Help Indochinese Refugees and organized a series of fund raising
campaigns for Indo-Chinese refugees with considerable success.
RSA Kanagawa consisted of volunteer homemakers who taught the Japanese language to IndoChinese refugees from the government-sponsored Yamato Settlement Promotion Center in theearly 1980s. They believed that language is a key to successful resettlement.

27

A Buddhist organization headquartered in Tokyo http://www.rk-world.org

28

An organization affiliated with Caritas Japan http://www8.ocn.ne.jp/~ak-mura (Jpn only)29

http://www.ngo-jvc.net

30

http://www.aarjapan.gr.jp

31

http://www.enjokyokai.org

32

Ms Souma was the daughter of respected politician Yukio Ozaki and member of Moral Re-Armament
which was an international moral and spiritual movement established in 1938 in Oxford, England.

21

Notably, there was little in the way of refugee assistance activities from the ‘liberal’ and ‘leftist’groups, such as Peace for Vietnam! Association of Civil and Cultural Organizations (Beheiren),which arguably reflects their one-sided understanding of the nature of the Indo-Chinese war andits consequences. There was also little support for refugees from conservative and right-winggroups.
2. What were your organization’s main activities?
All the aforementioned NGOs focused on providing direct assistance to Indo-Chinese refugees in
the form of such things as food and accommodation provision, language education and job
training. Torture and trauma care was not offered, however it is notable that victimology andtrauma care is relatively new in Japan, with professional associations such as the JapaneseSociety of Victimology being established as recently as 1990. The notion of ‘protection’ waslargely absent until a later stage when issues concerning Convention refugees became more
widely understood.
Rissho Kosei-kai and Akatsuki no Mura provided refugees with accommodation in temples andchurches as there were initially no government-sponsored facilities. Rissho Kosei-kai also
provided funds to UN agencies and other NGOs that were directly involved with the IndoChinese refugee crisis. The Association to help Indochinese Refugees (from 1982 AAR), lobbied
government authorities to recognize and accept more Indo-Chinese refugees and engaged infundraising campaigns, whereby they were able to also fund other NGOs. It provided
scholarships to refugee children who excelled academically, with the intention of creating ‘star
refugees’ that could help to change the negative image of refugees as people simply to be pitied.
RSA Kanagawa focused on Japanese language training, and provided supplementary language
courses to some 400 Indo-Chinese refugees, some of whom enrolled in consecutive classes andmade use of the educational opportunity for many years. In RSA Kanagawa’s view, insufficientlanguage training was one of the major reasons for the difficulties Indo-Chinese refugees faced inJapan.
3. What has been the impact of assistance activities on you individually, yourorganization, and on Japanese society generally?
On an individual level, most of the young members of the NGOs were deeply impacted by theirinvolvement as it was the first time for them to come face to face with victims of war, politicaloppression and persecution. For some of the more senior members, it reminded them of thetragedies experienced during World War II, such as children who were left behind during therepatriation of Japanese from China. Individual NGO workers had a strong sense of compassion
and commitment, and many admitted that they learned a great deal from their involvement andthat “helping refugees is helping oneself.”
At the institutional level, the experience was a turning point in the history of Japanese civilsociety. Except for the humanitarian assistance extended to East Bengali refugees during the1970s by the Shanti Volunteer Center (SVC), there were no other Japanese NGOs that had
experience in international refugee assistance. The Indo-Chinese refugee crisis led to the creationof dozens of volunteer organizations and NGOs. Many of those that emerged from the Indo22

Chinese crisis era are still active today, however, many NGOs began to branch out and expand
their activities to address African famine victims in the mid-1980s, the Iraq and Balkan crises
during the 1990s, as well as development, environmental, human rights and peace-building
activities in more recent years.
At the national level, the arrival of Indo-Chinese refugees had a tsunami-like impact on Japan – inthe sense that it was sudden, dramatic and of great magnitude. Having enjoyed peace, stability
and economic growth in relative isolation from the international humanitarian scene, the arrival of
Indo-Chinese refugees was a wake-up call that Japan cannot be immune to international
problems. It was another kurofune33 or strong external pressure to open up Japan. Faced with such
unprecedented events, the government sought to cope on a trial and error basis, however, it was
the NGOs that filled the gaps until the government developed adequate policies, programs andfacilities.
NGOs further contributed to the mobilization of public opinion in favor of recognizing andaccepting refugees in Japan, as well as becoming party to the Refugee Convention. Since then,NGOs have contributed to developing the notions of international responsibility-sharing, and theacceptance of refugees for resettlement as a form of international solidarity. According to social
constructivist theory, Japanese NGOs served an important agency role by introducing andpromoting new norms and beliefs concerning refugees and what Japan’s role should be, thereby
contributing to the change of the ‘structure’ surrounding refugee discourse.
However, efforts by those NGOs have been hampered by limited financial resources. Some 15
years ago, MOFA started providing funds to Japanese NGOs that provide refugee assistanceoutside Japan, but yet no funding has been provided to NGOs assisting refugees and asylum
seekers in Japan. The Ministry of Justice does not partner or contract NGOs to assist refugees orasylum seekers, and neither formal or regular meetings between relevant government ministries
and NGOs regarding assistance to refugees and asylum seekers in Japan have ever taken place.
Recently, there are signs that the situation is evolving in a way that promotes regular contact
between NGOs and government ministries, however, such a trend needs further encouragement
and support.

33

Kurofune, refers to ‘The Black Ships’ or Western vessels which arrived in Japan between the 15th and19th centuries. They helped to trigger the Meiji Restoration or the modernization period in Japan from a
feudal society approximately 150 years ago.

23

Part II: The Indo-Chinese Refugees’ Resettlement Experiences
4.

Research Methodology

4.1

Significance of this Study

Since the first arrival of Indo-Chinese refugees in the 1970s, several attempts have been made byvarious actors to identify the facts and nature of refugee issues as they relate to Japan. Such
research has generally tended to be inadequate and sometimes confusing. For example, much of
the empirical research was carried out by interviewing a limited number of refugees or persons ofconcern by using a multiple-choice questionnaire. The findings of the existing research also tend
to be influenced by the perceptions of the researchers involved. A case in point is a research study
carried out by the Ministry of Justice,34 and labeled as "objective research" on the basis of having
surveyed the employers of Indo-Chinese refugee workers, but not the refugees themselves. The
findings were resultantly more subjective than objective in nature, as they described the views of
employers only, along with preconceived notions that were articulated in each of the questions
asked.
While it may be difficult to accurately and comprehensively assess and articulate the situation of
refugees, it is of great importance to try and understand the situation from the perspective of the
refugees themselves. In order to do so, semi-structured interviews and open-ended questions are
more suitable than structured interviews or multiple choice questionnaires. Based on this line ofreasoning, interviews for this study were carried out in such a manner and therefore set it apartfrom the existing literature.
4.2

Survey Data and Methodology

The number of Indo-Chinese refugees and displaced persons whom Japan accepted from 1978 to2006 is approximately 11 000. With more than 30 years having elapsed since the beginning of theofficial reception until the present day, it is estimated that this figure of 11 000 has undergone
substantial change due to changes of residency within the country, deaths, births, resettlement toother countries and voluntary repatriation. The absence of a centralized, reliable and updated
refugee database makes it difficult to assess the needs, whereabouts, and degree of integration of
the Indo-Chinese refugee community, and therefore was a serious constraint on the execution ofthis study. Such a database would also be useful for government as it seeks to formulate
appropriate integration support policies and measures. Amendments to the Immigration Control
and Refugee Recognition Act (1982) were approved by the Diet in July 2009, and a centralized
34

Immigration and Refugee Recognition Bureau of the Ministry of Justice, “Investigation of the Actual
Situation of Indo-Chinese Refugees in Japan”, 1987, p.4 “…this research was primarily conducted by
Immigration Bureau officials with employers, managers, and officials of public schools and so forth whoare in contact with refugees and their families. In that sense, this report is “objective” in its character anddiffers from the study commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to International Social Services
Japan (ISSI) in which interviews were conducted directly with the refugees themselves and was therefore a“subjective” study.

24database system, which records details about all foreign nationals in Japan including refugees, isscheduled to be established.35 While such a database is controversial in terms of arguably crossing
civil liberties boundaries such as privacy rights, it is anticipated that the database could be used to
trace refugee movements and locate them at the municipality level so that service providers (RHQ,
UNHCR, CSOs, municipalities and academia) may provide more effective and timely assistance.
From the 3 000 letters that were sent to Indo-Chinese refugees requesting interviews, as many as
1 500 of them were returned to sender, indicating that they no longer lived at the given address.
The RHQ database is the most authoritative database on Indo-Chinese refugees in Japan, but it is
updated only when a refugee contacts RHQ for information or guidance. It is therefore neither upto-date nor complete. The high proportion of returned letters suggests that Indo-Chinese refugees
move residence, and probably also change their place of employment, more than occasionally.
Other reasons for the change of address include emigration to other countries or repatriation to
the country of origin. The main motives behind the moves are changing jobs and wanting to live
closer together with people from the same community, language group and culture.
In order to understand as accurately as possible the resettlement experience of Indo-Chinese
refugees in Japan, it is necessary to know of the major changes and events that have taken placein their lives. By dividing this three decade long process into six chronological sections, some ofwhich are marked by important international and political events, the experiences of the IndoChinese refugees may be systematically and collectively analyzed. This section seeks to assess
the steps and processes by which the refugees adapted, or were unable to adapt to a newenvironment amid changes within and outside of Japanese society.
1. Pre-arrival to Japan
2. Early stages of resettlement in Japan (1975 – 1980)
3. Post-ratification of the Refugee Convention by Japan (1981- 1989)
4. Period of economic growth in Indo-Chinese countries (1990-1995)
5.

Closure of the Indo-Chinese Refugee Issue (after 1995)

6. Current situation
4.3

Identifying Interview Respondents and Conducting Interviews

The survey focused primarily on first-generation refugees who experienced conflict in theircountries of origin, and included those who arrived directly to Japan, as well as those who stayedin camps either inside or outside their homeland and subsequently resettled in Japan. This groupwas supplemented by the “1.5 generation” who were born during the post-conflict reconstruction
years in their countries of origin, and the second-generation of Indo-Chinese who were born inJapan. (Annex I: Generation)

35

Asylum seekers will not be registered in the database.

25

Letters of request to participate as interview subjects were sent to 3000 households in May 2008
under the letterhead of UNHCR Representation in Japan. These contact details were accessedfrom a list compiled by RHQ. Only 68 people replied positively to the letter of request and agreed
to give face-to-face interviews; these people were subsequently interviewed in their own homes.
The main reasons for the initial low response rate seem to be “survey fatigue” and uneasiness
about being contacted by researchers who were completely unknown by community. In order toincrease the number of interviewees, the research team decided to reach out to the community
itself by seeking ‘word of mouth’ recommendations and connections. For example, religious
leaders, interpreters and respondents proved to be very cooperative in arranging introductions andhelping the researchers to set up additional interviews with people whom they knew. As a result,the number of interviewees rose from 68 to 245 people. In the end, 217 of these interviews weredrawn on for analysis and reporting.36 (Annex I: First Contact with Interviewee)
A concerted effort was made to gather an unbiased sample that fairly represented the various
communities and dynamics within them. With 80 respondents from Vietnam, 87 from Laos, and
50 from Cambodia, the result was that the three country of origin groups were not proportionately
represented, however, particular characteristics and tendencies among the respective groups did
appear clearly when the data that was collected through this method was compared. (Annex I:Country of Origin)
The interviews were conducted by a team comprising two lead researchers and several research
assistants who were given interview technique training by UNHCR personnel. Together, usuallywith the assistance of an interpreter, they conducted in-depth interviews by following aninterview questionnaire (Annex II: English Translation of Interview Questionnaire). A
written record of the interview responses was made and subsequently transcribed in report form.
The interview language was either Japanese or the corresponding native language (Khmer,
Vietnamese or Lao), with interpreting services utilized when necessary.
4.4

Fieldwork Duration

Interviews were conducted between June and December 2008, and the survey analysis was
carried out between January and March 2009. The fieldwork period was prolonged due to theinitial low response rate and the need to continually identify more interview candidates.
4.5

Interview Questionnaire Design

The interview questionnaire was designed by Professor Ikuo Kawakami. When seeking tounderstand how well Indo-Chinese refugees have integrated into Japanese society, it is necessary
to consider the ways in which the refugees themselves assess their lives in Japan. According toProfessor Kawakami, who has considerable experience in conducting fieldwork that focuses on
Vietnamese refugees in Japan, it is apparent that the Indo-Chinese refugees’ way of life is defined36

The reason why the interview records of 28 individuals were not utilized was because they wereconducted as part of a pair or group interview and lacked the kind of response that could be attributed to
one independent-thinking person. In other words, a discrete, individual response could not be discerned.

26

by both external factors (for example, trends in international society, social circumstances, legal
and educational system, policies regarding foreign nationals, media and so forth in the country ofresettlement) and internal factors (such as family in the country of resettlement, ethnic support
networks, access to information in their native language, ways of thinking and customs linked tothe country of origin). In other words, while the experiences and worldviews of Indo-Chinese
refugees who reside in Japan are grounded in a Japanese social context, they are at the same time
influenced by the circumstances of the international society and information in their first
language, which are accessed through ethnic networks inside and outside of Japan.
Time is also a decisive factor in shaping experience and outlook. Changes that occur over timesuch as social and economic circumstances, generational shifts, as well as family circumstancesand structure transform the lives of refugees and their way of thinking. It is therefore necessary
to take account of temporal considerations when collecting data from refugees regarding how
they perceive various aspects of their resettlement experience in Japan.
A total of 51 questions addressed the following issues:•

status of residence;•family situation;•

employment;•

housing;•

education;•

medical issues;•social security;•

assistance from the Japanese government, UNHCR, other organizations;•

ethnic community network in Japan;•

language (Japanese and native tongue);•return to country of origin;•contact with family/relatives in country of origin and abroad;•contribution to Japanese society and country of origin;•

communication between parents and children;•

livelihood (in)security;•

future vision.

27

4.6

Analytical methodology

The collected data from each interview was entered into a database and sorted into a variety of
categories, for example, year and mode of arrival. Data sorting was carried so as to discern someof the more intricate details of the resettlement experience for the three country groups.
Certain keywords were highlighted with the purpose of serving as a reference for laterinterpretation of the resettlement process. For example, the term “discrimination” was highlighted
across all 243 interview records in order to ascertain individual and collective experiences of
discrimination during their life in Japan. In order to increase the validity of the qualitative
analysis, important questionnaire items were cross-analyzed. (Annex I: Sections 1-10)

5.

Analysis and Findings

5.1

Introduction

Since 1978, the Japan has accepted approximately 11 000 Indo-Chinese refugees and displaced
persons, some of whom arrived directly to its borders as Boat People or continued their stay as
foreign students resident in Japan, and some of whom came via refugee camps or through the
ODP. This Indo-Chinese refugee crisis marked the first occasion for the Japanese government to
dispatch a delegation to refugee camps to select refugees for resettlement in Japan. And forJapanese society as a whole, the local integration of Indo-Chinese refugees and displaced persons
served as a test as to how it would respond and treat the group of newcomers, in a society that hashistorically been so closed to non-Japanese.
The aim of the field work was to ascertain facts about the Indo-Chinese refugees’ resettlement
experience in Japan based on empirical research. A lessons-learned approach was adopted thatplaced a particular focus on the difficulties they encountered in the process of their resettlement.
Their collective stories are compiled and summarized so as to illustrate their predicaments andown perceptions regarding their integration, as well as their perceived contributions to Japanesesociety.
In the following sections, the findings of the survey are presented according to respective countryof origin groups. Common issues that Indo-Chinese refugees have encountered in the process of
their resettlement are raised and discussed as to how and why they have, or have not, been able toeffectively integrate into Japanese society.

5.2

Refugees from Vietnam

Approximately 75 percent of all Indo-Chinese refugees who resettled in Japan came from
Vietnam. Their mode of arrival to Japan included all the variations: direct arrival by boat, arrival
following temporary stay in refugee camps in Southeast Asia, and arrival via the ODP and family
reunification arrangement. The first arrival of Vietnamese refugees in Japan dates back to May
1975, shortly after the fall of Saigon. However, since Japan at that time was not yet signatory to28the Refugee Convention, the Vietnamese refugees were only granted temporary protection
according to the Landing Permission due to Disaster at Sea. Therefore, Vietnamese refugees
during that time were readily resettled to the United States and other resettlement countries. As
the resettlement conditions in the United States and other western countries became increasingly
restrictive, the Boat People who had been rescued in the adjacent waters of Vietnam and brought
to Japan were no longer able to resettle in third countries. This situation, as well as international
public opinion, pushed the government of Japan in 1978 to allow these Vietnamese refugees toresettle permanently in Japan.

Section I: Before Arrival in Japan
After the fall of Saigon, former military officials of the South Vietnamese Army were sent to ‘reeducation camps’ from where some did not return alive. However, what awaited them after their‘re-education’ were difficult living conditions, discrimination, religious persecution, fear and alack of prospects for the future. This caused many to flee their homeland. In effect, many South
Vietnamese people were forced to flee due to fear of their lives, discriminatory treatment, mental
well-being, fear of persecution, and an overall loss of hope for the future.
Many who arrived in Japan had been rescued by tankers which were on their way to or passed by
Japan, after spending days floating in the open sea in small fishing boats with broken engines andwithout food and water. Vietnamese refugees who arrived in Japan were not able to resettle in the
country of their choice, and were left with no other option than to resettle in Japan. Many had left
their families behind when they fled; and male family members often escaped first and called thefamily over once they had reached safe land. Family separation caused additional and strong
stress and anxiety among refugees.
Besides direct arrival, there were Vietnamese refugees who fled Vietnam by boat or overland andarrived in refugee camps in other Southeast Asian countries. They escaped by boat in the 1970s
and 1980s and spent from several months to several years in camps in Singapore, Malaysia, Hong
Kong, the Philippines and Indonesia where they were interviewed by Japanese government
representatives and subsequently resettled in Japan. The refugee camps they stayed in depended
on the circumstances under which they had been rescued, for example, the ship’s destination port
or its navigation route. Their reasons for fleeing Vietnam were the same as those who arrived
directly to Japan: difficult living conditions, discrimination, religious persecution and so forth. It
was not uncommon to only stay a short time in a particular refugee camp before being transferred
to another camp, so there was continual readjustment before a durable solution could be found.
Camp life required one to make a temporary living. Conditions were harsh, food was scarce and it
was not possible to work. Prolonged stays in camps meant that some women were forced to givebirth there, often in poor hygienic conditions. Some thought about life after the camp and studied
English or Japanese when such means were available. Without the knowledge of which country
one would be able to resettle in, and when, forced most people to lead a life of instability and fearin the refugee camps, sometimes for a number of years.

29Many believed that they would not have a chance to be resettled in a particular country unlessthey had relatives who already lived there. For the refugees who lived in the camps, their time
was spent anxiously thinking about family members who were being scattered between Vietnam
and other countries, and whether they would ever be able to reunite. Many Vietnamese refugees
reported that both the Government of Japan and UNHCR failed to provide sufficient information
about the status and rights of refugees. It appears that those Vietnamese people who came to
Japan from the refugee camps, came for no other reason than the Japanese government had
offered to resettle them.
Another way of entering Japan was via the ODP. Some who came through this channel reported
that they were able to arrive in Japan due to the forces of international relations, namely, thatwhile the United States had stopped accepting Indo-Chinese refugees Japan was meanwhile
proactively making use of the ODP to reach its quota target. While some ODP Vietnamese do not
identify themselves as refugees, the Japanese government includes them under the broader
definition of Indo-Chinese refugees.

Section II: Early stages of resettlement in Japan (1975 – 1980)
Vietnamese refugees were permitted to resettle in Japan from the end of the 1970s, and were
temporarily housed in Settlement Promotion Centers where they received adjustment training, job
placement and housing assistance before they made their own way in Japanese society.37
Life for Vietnamese refugees at that time was reportedly difficult: many mentioned that learning
to communicate in Japanese, their housing situation, and human relations at their workplace weremost challenging of all. Securing employment, education, and housing were felt to be particularly
crucial in the early stages of resettlement. Ethnic community networks were not well establishedyet, and so assistance and information were not easily accessible. For example, sending
remittances back to one’s family in Vietnam could prove to be a problematic task. Being torn
apart from one’s own family added to the psychological stress of adjusting to Japan. Many
refugees responded that the first five years of their resettlement represented the greatest period ofchallenge and hardship.
Not surprisingly, among the most pressing issues was the Japanese language. It was very difficult
for Vietnamese refugees to adapt to life in Japan, as communication problems persisted,particularly at work, dealing with government services, or when seeking medical treatment.
Compared to Vietnam, the pace of life in Japan was faster and harder to keep up with. Also, bysimply saying that that they had come from Vietnam meant that people automatically labeled
them as ‘refugees’, which was cause for discriminatory treatment and narrow stereotyping. Not
being able to speak the language meant that their incomes were inferior to that of Japanese
workers, and not being able to speak up against wage discrimination only added to their37

The Japanese government determined that Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian refugees should beplaced in different Settlement Promotion Centers based on the historical background of the three IndoChinese countries.

30

frustration. In some cases, Vietnamese children were bullied at school, which is typicallyexplained by the fact that they were seen to be different.
Some Vietnamese refugees report that Japanese people looked down on Vietnam and Vietnamese
people. They feel that a racial hierarchy prevails in which Westerners are ranked high and Asians
low, with Japanese in the middle of the scale and Vietnamese below them. A portion ofVietnamese were consequently not able to adjust to Japanese society and migrated to othercountries.
Many Vietnamese affirm that NGOs offered assistance in diverse regions of Japan during thattime. Assistance from the Catholic Church (Caritas) and Buddhist organization (Rissho Kosei-kai)
was extremely valued. Also, the Japanese ‘bubble economy’ and the accompanying spirit oflimited state intervention in the 1980s fostered the attitude that governmental assistance should
not be expected, but rather, people should act independently and actively to help themselves, forinstance, by collecting information from relatives and friends or moving residence to find a newjob.
During that time, Vietnamese refugees living in Japan corresponded with their families backhome by mail, but it was widely suspected that the Vietnamese government was censoring their
letters. Some refugees suggest that this and other issues gave them the impression that theJapanese government was not very interested in refugee issues.

Section III: Post-Ratification of the Refugee Convention by Japan (1981-1989)
When asked about Japan’s ratification of the Refugee Convention, quite a number of Vietnamese
refugees answered, “We do not know about the Refugee Convention in detail. Nothing reallychanged [for us].” Some people claimed, “I was not able to go to the United States because Japansigned the Refugee Convention,” while others thought that the Japanese government adopted avery passive stance towards Indo-Chinese refugees. When reflecting on their lives in the 1980s,
some refugees responded that “Even when I wished to consult somebody, I couldn’t, because I
wasn’t able to speak Japanese. I was lonely. There was no assistance for Japanese-language
education, and it was difficult trying to make a living.”
Many felt that more than the ratification of the Refugee Convention itself, the favourable
economic conditions during the 1980s in Japan enabled them to find employment, which helped
them to cope with the initial hardships. Their homeland Vietnam on the other hand, in the 1980s,
faced a dire economic situation due to socialist-style governance. Some Vietnamese refugees
residing in Japan sent electronic appliances to Vietnam so that their relatives were able to make aliving by selling them. This suggests that some Vietnamese refugees in Japan maintained strong
ties with their relatives in Vietnam.
Vietnamese who arrived via the ODP during the 1980s and 1990s shared similar experiences tothose who settled earlier. Similarly, their most difficult problem was the Japanese language andthe consequent negative impact of not being able to communicate easily, such as bullying anddiscrimination, and the need to change jobs and residence for those reasons. However, not all
31

Japanese people treated them in the same way. Some responded that, “the Catholic community
was very friendly. Some Japanese would not know how to approach us, but once you broke theice and talked to them, they treated us in a friendly way.”Some respondents who came to Japan in the 1990s under the ODP did not receive any training or
assistance from the Settlement Promotion Center and had to start working right away in order toearn a living. In these cases, even basic Japanese language skills could not be easily acquired andinformation was therefore difficult for them to obtain. By contrast, a Vietnamese woman who
arrived in Japan via the ODP in 2000 experienced the beginning of her resettlement very
differently. Thanks to her Vietnamese husband’s understanding and the language training support
from teaching volunteers, her integration into Japanese society progressed fairly smoothly. She
says, however, that she felt discriminated against at work and attributes this to the prevailing antiforeigner attitude allegedly held by many Japanese. The only thing she could do was try to getalong and cope with the stress, she reports.
Sometimes, traditional family values would change during the course of life in Japan. In one case,parents tell how “in Vietnamese families, it is normal for children to support their ageing parents,
but my children do not support us. They left us behind and migrated to the United States.”
In the late 1980s, the issue of ‘bogus refugees’ from Vietnam was reported in the media. Whilesome Vietnamese refugees said that they were not knowledgeable about the controversy over‘bogus refugees’, one respondent commented, “Since I was working as an interpreter, I came toknow this issue very well. As there was a war between China and Vietnam, people of Chinese
descent were being persecuted in Vietnam. Moreover, due to the complex historical relations with
Cambodia and China, there were Chinese-Vietnamese and North Vietnamese fleeing to China.
From there, some Chinese pretended to be Vietnamese and tried to come to Japan by boat to seek
asylum.” The resemblances in physical appearance between Vietnamese and Chinese, the poor
living conditions in China, and the geographical proximity of China to Vietnam and Japan,
formed additional push/pull factors.
The reports about ‘bogus refugees’ impacted negatively on many Vietnamese refugees who had
worked hard and sought to integrate into Japanese society. Some Vietnamese refugees attributed
these reports to the circumstances in both Vietnam and Japan at that time. In other words, socalled ‘economic migrants’ fled North Vietnam and the alleged groups of ‘bogus refugees’
included North Vietnamese. According to one respondent, “As Japan planned to accept 10 000
refugees at that time, there was still room to receive more, which is why the Japanese government
recognized them.” One Vietnamese refugee admits that “because of the bogus refugees,
Vietnamese became distrustful of Chinese.” Moreover, these reports instilled anxiety in the
Vietnamese community about their eligibility as refugees in Japan. However, as one Vietnamesepointed out, “Bogus refugees are a difficult issue. It is hard to distinguish between ‘bogus’ and‘genuine’.” Also, some Vietnamese refugees noted changes in the wider society, pointing out that,“Japanese people became suspicious of foreign nationals, as reports on crimes committed by
Iranian refugees proliferated.”

32

Section IV: Economic Growth in Indo-Chinese countries (1990-1995)
From the outset of the 1990s, the Vietnamese economy finally began to recover. The
improvement of socio-economic circumstances in their country of origin had a marked influenceon the lives of Vietnamese refugees living in Japan. Upon learning that Vietnam was becoming
more affluent, the number of Vietnamese refugees who wished to return or temporarily visit theirhome country increased. Despite the recovery of the economy, their feelings toward their homecountry remained complex. Many interviewees said, “We could not trust Vietnam, even after the
economic reforms of Doi Moi”.38
With the dawn of the internet age from the 1990s and unprecedented access to various sources of
information, Vietnamese people living abroad constantly questioned whether the informationfrom Vietnam was trustworthy. For instance, “after Doi Moi, the government of Vietnam
welcomed the temporary return of Vietnamese refugees, but the underlying reason was because
we would return with money”. Many respondents remarked, “the urban areas in Vietnam havechanged but the rural areas are still very poor.”
Furthermore, one refugee reported, “once I returned to Vietnam to visit but I felt so insecure.
Every day, the police came and checked up on me. As a result, I decided to shorten my stay andreturned to Japan earlier than planned.” Consequently, he felt “insecure in both Vietnam and inJapan”, the latter due to social circumstances as previously described.
Future prospects for those contemplating a return to Vietnam were also uncertain during thisperiod. “Even if I see that Vietnam is improving and that life has become better there, mychildren grew up here and only know the Japanese language; they are not familiar with Vietnam”.
Accordingly, no interviewees responded that s/he would return to Vietnam with their children.
Even if they would like to return to Vietnam and think about leaving their children in Japan, some
reported having insecure feelings about their future, such as “I would like to return to Vietnam in
the future, however, I do not know whether I will receive my pension. I feel very insecure.” This
leads them to contemplate issues such as residential status in Japan and attaining Japanesecitizenship. One refugee said, “I naturalized in order to travel safely to Vietnam”.
With the 1990 amendment of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (1982),
many Vietnamese refugees were absorbed under the status of ‘long term resident’. Some
respondents commented, “it became easier to obtain ‘permanent resident status’ or to become aJapanese citizen after 1990. In fact, you need permanent resident visa status in order to borrowmoney from a Japanese bank.” Notwithstanding these views, there were many respondents who
did not know about the amendment of the aforementioned Act, which indicates that basic
information about relevant laws was not sufficiently disseminated among refugee communities.
Reports about the harsh realities of living in Japan as a non-Japanese came to light. According to
the real life experiences of their children in Japanese society, “it is practically impossible to get a
job without a Japanese name, even as a high school graduate,” and therefore believe that the38

Doi Moi or ‘renovation’ were the economic reforms initiated by the Communist government of Vietnam
in 1986, which gradually led to the Socialist-oriented market economy.

33

possession of Japanese nationality affects one’s chances of securing employment. Some
respondents noted a change in attitude within Japanese society towards Vietnamese and otherforeign residents according to the economic climate. They observed that “when the economy wasfine, Japanese people were friendly, but during the 1990s when the economic recession hit they
became unfriendly”.

Section V: Closure of the Indo-Chinese Refugee Issue (after 1995)
In response to the official closure of the Indo-Chinese refugee issue in 1995, one refugee stated,“the fact that the issue was considered closed was a good thing as Japanese people would
otherwise have lost interest in refugee issues”. Opinions regarding this declaration among theVietnamese community were, however, generally negative and their worries about the instabilityof daily life prevailed. Some reported hardships around this time, such as “after the bubble
economy burst, we lost our jobs and our quality of life deteriorated dramatically”, or “the fact thatthey declared the issue over made us change our status of residence to permanent resident status
so that we would not fear being forcefully repatriated”. Others were concerned that assistance andlegal protection would cease when the Settlement Promotion Centers closed, and therefore felt
insecure. Quite a few respondents felt that “it is difficult for us Vietnamese to gather and unite inJapan”.

Section VI: Current Situation
The most pressing issue for the majority of Vietnamese refugees is how to make a secure living.
Problems regarding work and income were most frequently cited. Life has become more difficultin the current economic downturn since diminished incomes make it harder for many to makeends meet.
Some respondents said that they wished to acquire Japanese nationality in order to escape thediscrimination that persists within Japanese society against Vietnamese and other foreign
nationals. Some, however, believe that naturalization requires a high level of Japanese language
ability and they are discouraged by their own low level of proficiency and ultimately haveabandoned any hopes they may have had to acquire citizenship.
Many first-generation refugees expressed concerned about their children’s education. As they
believe that education is the key to a stable life, the fact that their children only speak Japaneseand do not know their parents’ homeland worries the parents’ generation. Concerns about theirchildren’s identity were also raised. Therefore, many do not know how to handle the divisive
family issue of “I want to go back, but my children want to stay.”
Many Vietnamese parents think that their children are being bullied due to their foreign name.
They also claim that “compared to other countries, it is very difficult to acquire Japanesecitizenship”. As one Vietnamese ODP woman explained her beliefs, “The Government of Japan
does not accept applications for naturalization unless they can confirm that the Vietnamese34government has removed Vietnamese citizenship from that person. And yet, the Vietnamese
government does not permit us to renounce our Vietnamese citizenship. That is why
naturalization is difficult. In countries like Singapore, however, if you have evidence of yourapplication they will allow you to be naturalized after one year or so. It does not make sense tome that Japan insists on the ‘denationalization’ papers as we have to give up our nationality ofbirth when we acquire Japanese nationality in any case.”
Some people are determined that they “will not return no matter how much Vietnam develops”
and state that “I have decided to live permanently in Japan”, most expressed insecurity about their
future. It should also be noted that there are some who “even today, have nightmares about thewar”, but that there are also those who feel “supported by the Vietnamese Catholic Network”.
Some asserted that they contribute to Japanese society through their work, but many replied thatthey wish to contribute more in the future if they have the chance.

5.2

Refugees from Laos

The political situation in the three Indo-Chinese countries underwent radical changes when in thesame year of 1975, the Khmer Republic collapsed on April 17, followed soon after by the fall of
Saigon on April 30, and a few months later in December, the monarchy in Laos was abolished.
Many Laotians, particularly the elites of the old regime, fled from their homeland under the selfproclaimed Socialist Lao People’s Democratic Republic.

Section I: Before Arrival in JapanThe Laotians who resettled in Japan did not experience the same appalling situations in theirhome country as did the Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees. Many escaped by crossing the
Mekong River by boat or by swimming, and sought refuge in neighboring Thailand where theyspent several years in refugee camps. There, they were given the possibility to nominate aresettlement country such as the United States, France and other mainly western countries. Under
these circumstances, it is interesting to learn about their expectations and reasons for selecting
Japan as their resettlement country.
Although in some cases Laotian refugees had relatives in France or the United States, some ofthem chose Japan for resettlement as they expected to return to their country of origin as soon as
possible, once the situation at home had improved. They anticipated that Japan would be the mostconvenient in this regard.
A then 16 year old boy who fled from Laos with a friend, and lived in a refugee camp for two
years, was interviewed by a Japanese government representative and subsequently arrived inJapan in 1980. He recalls, “I thought of settling down in Japan and not going to other countries. I
thought it would be the best place because of the abundant job opportunities here.” Anotherrefugee recollects that “people in Japan are also Asian people, so wherever I go I will see people
with black hair and I thought that would be good. Thoughts like that.” Whether such reasons can35be understood as having been made spontaneously is open for question, but at least it can be said
that they did not feel discomfort with regards to their perceptions of Japanese society.
A female refugee whose brother lives in the United States and cousins live in France said, “Icame to Japan because I liked Japan best. The people are Asian, the same as me. The customs in
America are very different from ours.” Interestingly, such decisions about resettlement
destination choices appear to be based on mere impressions. It may well be that it is impressions
that guide asylum seekers / refugees in important decision-making, even though they tend to lackobjectivity and insight. Lacking the means and opportunity to collect relevant information, it is
not surprising that the decision-making style is based on hearsay and impressions. Another factor
that appears to have informed their decision-making about resettlement options is time. One
refugee recalls, “it took me one year, but I think that for others it took from about three to five
years. Also, there was an order. My number was 9800, so I had to wait until that number wascalled up.” In other words, impatience caused by protracted stays in refugee camps was anotherfactor that influenced their decisions, along with the availability of resettlement options, namely,
the country which would allow them to resettle the fastest.
Alternatively, there were also respondents who based their decision around a hopeful return toLaos rather than on impressions of Japan: “I thought that since Japan is close to Laos, I may beable to go back if the situation gets better. I therefore started to study Japanese [in the camp].”Respondents with similar thoughts were either themselves well-educated or had friends who hadstudied abroad in Japan, thus indicating that they came from a rather wealthy background. In
other words, these refugees with a strong wish to return to their home country pro-actively
selected a country for resettlement that would facilitate their return. It was a very rational decisionin the sense that, as a means to an ends, they began by learning the Japanese language prior toleaving the refugee camp. Ironically, what triggered their ability to resettle effectively in Japan
was their intention to return to their homeland.

Section II: Early Stages of Resettlement (1975 – 1980)
Of the estimated 11 000 Indo-Chinese refugees and displaced persons in Japan, the number from
Cambodia and Laos are fairly low in comparison with those from Vietnam. Laotians, in contrast
to Cambodians, are spread all over the country. As one respondent pointed out, this has pushedthem in a mini-minority position within Japanese society and pressured them to assimilate. Theirexperiences of the Settlement Promotion Centers and their situations immediately following thisassistance were investigated. A male respondent who was 18 years old when he came to Japan,
reflects on the resettlement assistance he was given. “I felt that the assistance was sufficient. The
Center took good care of me.” Given that he was young at that time, it is likely that he absorbed
new things very easily.
When asked whether the three-month resettlement assistance she received from the Japanese
government was sufficient, a female refugee who switched jobs frequently and changed residence
within the Kanto (eastern) and Kansai (western) regions of Japan, answered very succinctly,“only some Japanese language [training was provided].” Even for someone like her who could
36not speak the Japanese language proficiently, jobs were available. She found a job right afterending the training period in the Settlement Promotion Center and subsequently made use of jobplacement offices to find employment. There appears, however, to be reasons other than personal
ones for her repeated change of jobs. It may be that without a reasonable knowledge of theJapanese language, she was left with no choice but to accept work where there was little
opportunity for growth and development. Alternately, it may also be observed that her experiencedemonstrates that Japanese society was tolerant and generous to support cases like hers.
Acknowledging that life was not easy, she is very grateful for the assistance provided to her, “I
worked really hard, and the Center and my company assisted me well.”
It is often mentioned that the direct cause of resettlement difficulties is the Japanese language.
The fundamental problem, however, lies in an assistance program where the language training
period is fixed without taking into consideration any individual differences among refugees. They
are practically bundled out into Japanese society without a social safety network after having
completed the minimum training. Despite having benefited from such “assistance”, respondents
reported that they were led to feel inferior and alienated from the host society, as well as made tosuffer from the stereotyped image of a “refugee” being a burden on society. This is an unexpected
but ironic result of how inadequate governmental “assistance” can construct, albeit
unintentionally, a negative image of “refugees” which compounds their suffering and hardship.
In some cases, Laotians reported that the governmental assistance set them on the right track tofinding gainful employment. “I stayed in the Yamato Settlement Promotion Center in Kanagawa
prefecture for three months and looked for a job opportunity for another three months.” This
respondent said he continued to work in the same job for 11 years, and then resigned due tohealth problems. He then resumed work and has been with his present company until this day.
With regard to job placement assistance, it was felt that such a service should not focus on salaryand working hours alone, but also to what extent the job criteria can be applied to the individual,
and vice-versa. Moreover, respondents suggested that any alternative positions that become
available should also be presented to the job-seeker.

Section III: Post-Ratification of Refugee Convention by Japan (1981 – 1989)
While it was anticipated that Japan’s ratification of the Refugee Convention would influence thelegal status of Indo-Chinese refugees, the reality was that their interests were confined to morepractical matters such as how to visit their family and relatives living abroad. Even though the
newly-created refugee protection system was of significance, what mattered more were the kindsof visible and concrete benefits that would be brought about.
When foreign nationals try to make a living in Japanese society, there are many who are troubled
by issues that originate from lifestyle differences. A female refugee, who explained that it was not
unusual in Laos if one slept until 9am, described Japan’s pace of life as always “speedy, speedy,
speedy”. Thinking back to the time when she was in the Settlement Promotion Center, she said,“everyone, at first, was still sleeping even though we were supposed to be studying Japanese from37

9am so our teachers had to come and say “Wake up, now! It is 9 o’clock!” Over time, shereported that they adjusted themselves to various lifestyle differences in Japan. “All the refugees
work hard now, same as the Japanese.” This account is not presented to imply in any way thatthese people were apathetic or slack, but rather that there were different attitudes to time anddaily rhythm.
On the issue of integrating into a society, questions of identity preservation and cultural
receptivity are raised. Faced with no other choice but to live in Japan, some respondents
commented that they sought to find their place in a society where the vast majority of people
share a common cultural knowledge and understanding, and think of each other as a homogenous
people. The standards by which foreign nationals are measured by are always according to a
Japanese benchmark. For example, while Laotian people are not innately lazy and Japanesepeople are not innately diligent, the standard of diligence that Laotian people were measured
against was always that which prevailed in Japan. In other words, some respondents suggested
that in considering integration and harmonization of foreign nationals into a society, it isimportant to compare the relative standards on both sides, rather than deeming that one is good
and the other bad, or one is right and the other wrong.
Notably, despair or a lack of well-being, do not characterize the responses given by the Laotian
refugees who were interviewed. Rather, their responses are suggestive of a willingness to accept
the various circumstances and challenges that they have been dealt. It is not possible, however, todefinitively attribute this perceived resilience to the fact they are Laotian, or the fact they are
refugees, or whether it is some other factor, such as being relatively well-educated and fromwealthy families.

Section IV: Economic Growth in Indo-Chinese Countries (1990-1995)
Most of the Laotian refugees who resettled in Japan arrived in the 1980s. Overwhelmed withwork and the need to make a living after completing their training at the Settlement Promotion
Centers, many reported that they lacked the time and wherewithal to observe current affairs andtheir surrounding circumstances during that period. “I had a very hard time for the first five years
after I left the Yamato Settlement Promotion Center. During those five years, I studied Japaneseon the weekends and learned Japanese from volunteer groups in Yokohama. It was a tough time.”
One refugee commented on the change of circumstances in his home country during this time:“when I went back to Laos in 1990, I noticed that the economy had started to stabilize because
there was no more conflict.” Another refugee recalls this period of change in Laos and theinfluence it had on his life in Japan: “Yes, things became more stable. With Laos’ economy
stabilizing, my relatives were able to find work and so we could stop sending them money.”
Another respondent said, “my mother, younger brother and sister still live in Laos today. If theyneed some money I help out, but not regularly.” Some people had different perceptions of thesituation back home: “Nothing had improved in Laos around 1995. But those who lived in Laos
received support and assistance from their families who lived abroad.”38

Among those who fled Laos for Japan, many maintained deep emotional ties with their family
and relatives who remained in their country of origin. In such cases, the remittances sent fromJapan helped to support their relatives’ livelihood and meant that the remitter carried an extra
burden or responsibility. Such injections of overseas’ money helped to improve the economic,
and arguably the political situation in Laos. It also influenced the disposable income, savings andstandard of living of the average Laotian refugee in Japan.

Section V: Closure of the Indo-Chinese Refugee Issue (after 1995)
Although the Indo-Chinese refugee issue was officially declared “closed” in 1994 in Geneva, forthe persons concerned, however, this development was generally of little concern. According tosome Laotian respondents, “no, it did not bring any change to my life in Japan,” and “[it did notchange anything for me] at that time, no, not really.” Meanwhile, others claim that they were notaware of such a declaration, “I have never heard about such a thing.” One may conclude that
Laotian refugees probably had little interest in this policy issue, and did not follow developments
at the international level, which helps to explain their lack of awareness.
One respondent reports that the difficulties she encountered while trying to change her residential
status from a temporary to a permanent visa led her to apply for Japanese citizenship. As she wasunable to receive the necessary assistance when applying for permanent residence, that is, secure
two letters of guarantee from referees to support her application, she decided to apply forJapanese citizenship instead, as that procedure did not require her to secure such a high level of
supporting documentation.39
The political situation at the state-level was not of great interest to many Laotians at this time as
there were other issues that preoccupied them in their daily life. For example, receiving thenecessary support to improve their Japanese language skills in order to meet the requirements for
citizenship was of great importance to them. “The Yamato Japanese Association taught meJapanese. This allowed me to prepare for the Japanese language exam which is part of theapplication process for acquiring Japanese nationality.” It was pointed out by the respondents that
there appear to be two sets of skills involved when learning the Japanese language: proficiency
for daily life and work which is more practical, and skills that prepare one for the Japanese
language proficiency test. Although these skills are not unrelated, it is useful to be conscious of
their difference when analyzing the challenges surrounding language for Indo-Chinese refugees,
and foreign nationals more broadly.
Based on data from this study, there appears to be a comparatively large proportion of Laotians
who have not acquired Japanese citizenship. While it is beyond the scope of this study, it would
be beneficial to examine the relationship between Japanese language proficiency and the decision
39

The Ministerial Regulation under Immigration Control and Refugee Determination Act requires only one
copy of letter of guarantee (Article 22, Paragraph 1). However, the current regulation was enforced in 1982,
and before 1982, the supporting documents to be submitted for the application of permanent residence was
decided by the operation manual within the Ministry of Justice. In those days two letters of guarantee might
have been required for permanent residence.

39

to acquire citizenship, particularly in terms of the challenges posed by the citizenship application
procedure.

Section VI: Current Situation
One elderly female Laotian refugee reports that although her current life in Japan is generally
going well, she and her husband are experiencing serious economic difficulties. She is theprimary-carer for her husband who is unable to work due to a workplace accident. She appealed
to the interviewer: “If only the United Nations could please help us…” For such people,
awareness of the issues that shape the policies and activities of the Japanese government or
UNHCR is not of great importance. What matters is to find assistance that can solve the pressing
issues they face on a day to day level. This is probably why aid that is not highly visible ispresumed not to exist. She commented: “There is no assistance from UNHCR.”
Some respondents complained that although they are trying to overcome extremely serious
difficulties, there are a number of more minor refugee-related issues that also trouble them. Some
respondents were not even aware of the existence of UNHCR. Others were conscious of people
whom they knew had problems: “I do not have any major problems right now, but I think otherrefugees might need assistance.” Even though they have chosen to live in Japan, the decision toremain in the country is in most cases neither a dream nor a wish. It is rather a decision formed
through a process of elimination when searching for a way to make a living. For a female refugee
who has never returned to her home country after coming to Japan, her impression of Laos is asfollows: “if peace returns to Laos, I will go and visit (my home country).” When asked about
returning to Laos now, she replied “If I return now…I will have nothing there.” Life in Japan iscertainly not easy, however, returning to Laos was not considered a viable option by nearly all
respondents.
Regarding the survey conducted for the purposes of this report, one male refugee stated, “why is
UNHCR conducting this kind of study at this point in time? They must have quite a lot of freetime to be doing this. Indo-Chinese refugees are fed up with studies that have led to no
improvement of their situation. We think it is meaningless.”

5.3

Refugees from Cambodia

In 1979, after having accepted the first group of Vietnamese refugees for resettlement, theJapanese government enlarged its resettlement quota to include refugees from Laos andCambodia. Following interview screenings and selection by Japanese government representatives
in Southeast Asian refugee camps, the Laotian and Cambodian refugees arrived in Japan by air.
The majority of Cambodian refugees were aged in their twenties to forties, the core group being
in their thirties. The male to female ratio was fairly evenly balanced, due to the selection criteria.

40Section I: Before Arrival in Japan
The primary reasons that Cambodian refugees fled their homeland were fear of war andinsecurity. Many respondents explained that they fled in order to escape the Pol Pot regime.
Another reason was to avoid conscription and the risk of having one’s sons sent as soldiers to theongoing war with Vietnam. In essence, they fled from the calamities of war in their home country
to seek a life of peace and security. Many fled overland to Thailand where they stayed in refugee
camps, such as the Kao I Dang Camp. Some, however, came to Japan after staying in Southeast
Asian refugee camps in countries such as Malaysia or Vietnam. Just like their Vietnamese andLaotian counterparts, Cambodians also spent from several months to several years in refugee
camps, and some people were moved between different camps.
When asked what their feelings were on being interviewed for resettlement selection by Japanese
government representatives, many respondents reported, “I applied for resettlement in the UnitedStates and Canada but failed, and Japan accepted me.” Others commented, “I heard a rumor that
the Japanese government accepts more refugees than any other country. The reason I decided to
go to Japan was that it is a free and peaceful country”; or “I wanted to go to France because I
have studied in a French school since I was a child”; or “I wanted to go to Canada because mysister went there”. One person stated, “Conditions in the refugee camp were terrible. I was happy
to go anywhere as long as I was able to get out of the camp,” while another said, “there were
thieves in the camp, so I was unable to sleep.”Furthermore, access to information about resettlement countries was limited inside the camp.
Many refugees learned about Japan once they landed. One refugee reports, “I did not know
anything about Japan, but seeing the Japanese NGO workers in the camp, I got the impressionthat it would be better than the United States.” Another respondent stated, “I decided to live inJapan because I was Asian and looked sort of similar to Japanese people. Therefore, I thought it
might be easier for me to adapt to Japanese society. Another reason is that I knew about Japanand liked it. I also knew that Japanese people were hard-working, so I wanted to resettle inJapan.” These responses demonstrate that some Cambodian refugees had a positive image ofJapan before their arrival, which many later found to not match the reality once they started livingin the country.

Section II: Early Stages of Resettlement in Japan (1975 – 1980)
Cambodian refugees were provided assistance by the Settlement Promotion Centers in Kanagawa
Prefecture (Greater Tokyo Area), and as a result, they established their communities mainly in the
Kanto region (eastern part of Japan) after the end of their training period.
As with their Vietnamese and Laotian counterparts, Cambodian refugees also echoed the viewthat achieving competency in the Japanese language proved to be the biggest challenge.
According to one respondent, “Everything was so tough for me. I am sure not only for me, but forother refugees too. In particular, I had problems with the language and Japanese customs.”
Despite receiving three (and in some cases four) months of language education and life41

adjustment training, some reflected, “Why is it that we only had three months of training? How
can I be expected to communicate with the person next to me at work? Being able tocommunicate is so important. Just three months and then going to work, that’s no good. Words
are so important.” Others said, “We were only given three months of language education. But it
was not enough at all”; and “The problem I felt was that I was sent off to work without receiving
enough language training. It was three months plus a couple more months while we searched fora job, but this was too short. When I left the Center, I could not understand Japanese at all. At theCenter, we studied Japanese with textbooks, but what I studied at the Center was very different
from the daily Japanese I needed to use in society. In other words, the Japanese language I
learned at the Center was completely different from the Japanese I heard at work. People wereable to understand me but I could not understand them.”
Many Cambodian refugees reported that they learned Japanese at work or at language classes thatwere offered by Japanese volunteers. One person stated that he acquired his Japanese language
skills when preparing for his driver’s license test. A large number of interviewees, however, feltthat communication in the workplace was very complicated. The following comment illustrates
this: “They told me to do this and that, but I didn’t understand. When I was asked to use thedangerous machines, I didn’t know how. I would try, but make mistakes, and they would get
angry. I had no idea why they were mad at me, but it was indeed me who made the mistake.”
The language barrier also reportedly influenced the working conditions and workplaceatmosphere for Cambodian refugees. They claimed, “Our income is lower than that of Japanese
co-workers” and “Japanese workers who entered the company after me got promoted faster.”Some expressed the opinion that Japanese people discriminate against Cambodian refugees.
There were occasions when they heard success stories from other Cambodian refugees who had
resettled in France, Australia or the United States, and inevitably made comparisons with theirown lives in Japan. “My classmates went to France, Australia or America. I only finished highschool, but other people got their PhD or at least graduated from university. When explaining tothem what I am doing, they laughed at me saying ‘if you had chosen to resettle in other countries,
you would not be doing such a job,’ which made me feel so embarrassed. If I had not chosen
Japan, I could have been like other people. That is my mistake”. Such statements suggest that thedegree of satisfaction that some refugees in Japan feel is influenced in part by the relative
comparisons they make with refugee counterparts in other countries, rather than solely withJapanese people.
A refugee who arrived in 1982 was asked the following question “Was the assistance from theGovernment of Japan sufficient when you started your resettlement?” He replied “If you say sucha thing, we refugees will get angry. There was none [assistance]. None. I’m still very angry about
that.” Another refugee who arrived in 1984 responded to the same question, “For three months
after our arrival, the Government of Japan took good care of us. I actually stayed at the Center for
four months – three months to study and another month while my husband was looking for a job.
However, there was no assistance after we left [the Center]. I heard that in America, for example,
assistance is provided for a few years. So I think Japan isn’t good compared to that. I haverelatives living in America, and when they wanted to study, the American government gave themassistance. But in Japan we are on our own.” Furthermore, a Cambodian refugee who arrived in42

1990 responded as follows, “When I left the Center, I told a staff member there: ‘I was working
as a teacher in Cambodia so I would like to study even though I cannot speak Japanese well at the
moment.” But the staff member gave me a cold reply and said, ‘The Japanese government did notallow you to come to Japan to study, but to work.’ I know that in Europe and America, there is asystem to support those who wish to study. Maybe that staff member did not think I knew aboutsuch a support system for refugees... But the Japanese government sees refugees only as part ofthe labor force.”
Language problems hamper effective communication and can create misunderstandings. One
Cambodian refugee said, “I could not express myself well enough to convey my feelings andwhat I wanted to do. Also, the Japanese classes at the Center taught everything in honorificlanguage, but once I left the Center, people spoke in a colloquial form which I could notunderstand. For example, there are many ways to address “you” in Japanese, but I was using theuncomplimentary form of “omae” without knowing that it was rude. This eventually became anissue. There were times when I wondered whether I was being discriminated against because I
could not understand what people were talking.”
Some respondents felt that this kind of discrimination does not only stem from misunderstandings
due to language, but also originates from a particular kind of Japanese disposition against
foreigners and Asian residents in Japan. For instance, many respondents said, “I wish Japanesepeople and society stopped discriminating against other Asian people. They admire Westerners
but look down on other Asians.” Another added, “Most Americans and Europeans come to Japanto work. These people might not face any difficulties here but Indo-Chinese people who live here
permanently …we do face discrimination.”
Language difficulties together with a perception of racism / discrimination against Indo-Chinese,were also reported to have a negative impact on some people’s experiences at work and in thecommunity. For instance, “Other problems that I encountered were generally to do with humanrelations in the company. No matter how hard I tried, it was not easy to get along well. The sameis true regarding the relationships with my neighbors. My Japanese neighbors didn’t like
Cambodian food and thought our food smelled too strong. Even though they complained aboutit, I thought I could not do anything to resolve the issue because this is our custom.”Cambodian respondents reported that finding employment was not an easy task. Some mentioned
the problem of job-hunting as one of the central challenges in daily living. One respondent stated,“Finding a job? We didn’t have any choice except to do the “3D (dangerous, dirty,
difficult/demeaning) jobs. The job market was not open to foreign nationals. But I found that
there were a lot of other foreigners like Koreans and Chinese. They were also forced to work in
difficult jobs and were similarly in a tough situation. Such news encouraged me because I
realized that it was not only me who was in a tough situation.” The same refugee also explained,“Those who left the Center were in principle given the chance to study more with the help of
volunteer Japanese language classes. But this system was not effective. The reason why is that westudied Japanese only once or twice per week and most of us worked in physically demanding
jobs. We were very tired after work and not able to study and remember much of what we learnt,
so it was not effective.”43

Numerous refugees cited difficulties with Japanese customs. A female refugee explained, “I
couldn’t get used to bowing. I could not understand why Japanese people always do that. No one
taught me the meaning of bowing, and how and why one should bow. I wanted to go to school.
But I couldn’t, so I was very frustrated about that. In any case, I studied very hard. Many people
misunderstood my words and my attitude. I was very sensitive. After many years, I finally got
used to the different customs in Japan, and since then, I feel that I have integrated in Japan tosome extent and it is so now much easier to live here.”
When asked about their perception of assistance form UNHCR, regardless of the refugee’s yearof arrival, the following answer was very common: “UNHCR helped us while we stayed in the
refugee camps but there was no assistance from them after coming to Japan”. Also, “No, I did not
realize that there was any assistance from UNHCR, only from RHQ.”
Other difficulties during the early stages of their resettlement included issues concerning housing,daily life and Japanese customs, the cold climate, lack of an ethnic community network, andworries about family members who remained in Cambodia. While the following case issomewhat exceptional, there were refugees who suffered extreme mental health issues relating to
the challenges of resettling in Japan that led them to commit out of character acts. For example,
due in part to the various stresses and pressures of adjusting to life in Japan, Mr. Bouy Moeun
killed his own wife and three children (aged eight, six and four years old) in Yamato City,
Kanagawa Prefecture on February 8, 1987. He was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment by the
Yokohama District Court on January 31, 1992. This sentence was reduced on the basis that his
criminal conduct was affected by a mental disorder caused by stress and pressure following his
arrival in Japan.40

Section III: Post-Ratification of the Refugee Convention by Japan (1981-1989)
As most Cambodian refugees worked long hours in manual labour jobs, they had little time oropportunity to access information. Japan’s accession to the Refugee Convention and broadersocial and political issues went by largely unnoticed. One Cambodian refugee reflects on thattime: “I worked and did a lot of overtime hours. Basically all I did was work. I came homearound 10 or 11pm and then slept. I didn’t even have the time or energy to watch television.” Asa consequence, many Cambodian refugees reported that Japan’s accession to the Refugee
Convention had no influence on their lives. The same applies to the scandal surrounding ‘bogus
refugees’ in the 1980s. Due to a general lack of information, and low levels of Japanese literacy,
many seem not to have been aware, or concerned with such issues.
Moreover, most of the Cambodian refugees reported difficulties in obtaining information fromtheir homeland about the prevailing circumstances under the Socialist regime, which made manyof them worry about their relatives and family who remained there. The following statement
reflects this: “I contacted my two brothers and one sister who lived in France by postal mail. I had
40

Yokohama District Court, Judgment 31 January 1992 ( Judgment for Case No. 81 Wa 1987)44

another brother in Cambodia but at that time the infrastructure was not well developed socommunication, including sending and receiving postal mail, was quite difficult. I was rarely able
to contact him.”
In response to the question, “Did information from abroad or from your family in other countries
affect your life in Japan?” the same respondent replied, “Yes, it influenced my life. I have arelative in Canada. When I first came to Japan, I faced lots of problems. I heard from people who
lived in other countries…and even though they had problems, when compared to what I was
facing in Japan, their problems didn’t seem that huge. This influenced me in that I realized that inorder to change the situation I was facing, I had to help myself. I had to work harder and study
more Japanese. I don’t like to lose.”

Section IV: Economic growth of Indo-Chinese countries (1990-1995)
While the primary concern for Cambodian refugees in the 1980s was to secure a job and maintaina decent standard of living, by the 1990s, many refugees gradually became used to the Japanese
language and their lives in Japan. Having said this, however, mastering the language and finding
and maintaining gainful employment remained major challenges throughout this 1990s.
Moreover, the ongoing civil war in Cambodia41 made those in Japan feel isolated and distanced
from their families.
In 1993, when democratic elections were carried out and peace was restored, Cambodian refugees
in Japan began to consider returning to their homeland. Some remained skeptical about therestoration of peace in Cambodia. “I went back to Cambodia in November or December 1993 fora short trip. My father and brothers had already returned in January or February, 1993. I got
married in May 1993. The national election overseen by the United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) also took place that same month. I was very afraid that theelection would cause panic and that the situation would become dangerous so I returned to Japan
with my wife as soon as the wedding ceremony was over.” Another refugee said, “I have returned
to Cambodia three times so far. The last time I visited was six years ago. The first time I returned
was with my family in 1993, after peace was declared in Cambodia. The second time, I went
alone to visit my dying grandmother. The third time was when my grandfather died. Out of thethree visits, two of them were to attend funerals.”
Cambodian refugees who arrived in Japan during the 1980s tended to return temporarily to their
homeland, rather than repatriating for good. The main reason cited for deciding to continue living
in Japan was that their lives were already well-established, together with their children, families
and supporting ethnic community. By the time the economic bubble of the Japanese economy had
burst in the 1990s, however, living conditions grew even more difficult for refugees.
41

A comprehensive peace settlement was made in 1991 when the Paris Peace Agreement was signed, and a
UN peacekeeping mission helped maintain a cease-fire. The UN-sponsored general election in 1993 helped
to restore stability however the coalition government formed in 1998 following the general election won by
the Hun Sen-led Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) provided renewed political stability and peace.

45During the period of recession in Japan, respondents were asked whether the Japanese
government or UNHCR reached out to them with assistance and support. Most Cambodian
refugees responded negatively to this question. “It would have been good if UNHCR had given us
assistance. Refugees who have encountered trouble in Japan could not directly contact UNHCR.
If only UNHCR paid better attention to us, we could have accessed more information. I think
UNHCR’s assistance has not been enough. For example, typically refugees do not have a solid
understanding of the Japanese language, especially kanji, the written Chinese characters. And
refugee-related information was always written in Japanese, right? So if refugees don’t
understand written Japanese, how could we possibly comprehend the information?” explained
one respondent. As a consequence, it is evident that refugees have relied on their own respective
ethnic networks to access useful information. One refugee explains, “When refugees encounter
problems in their companies, friends exchange information on workplace related issues andsolutions. Through our network among Cambodian people, we are able to get better jobs. The
Cambodian refugee community in Japan comprises around 1,300 members, organizes a lot of
activities, and fulfils a vital function.”
Not only did Indo-Chinese refugees report that they do not receive much information or
assistance from UNHCR, but many Cambodian refugees expressed dissatisfaction with the levelof support that was provided by the Japanese government.
Attaining Japanese citizenship was also reported not to be an easy process either. One Cambodian
refugee recounted his experience, “When I applied for Japanese citizenship in 1992, The Bureauof Immigration requested that I submit original documents from Cambodia, but since I came to
Japan as a refugee and have lived here for around 20 years it is not possible. My name is not evenregistered in Cambodia so how could I get those kinds of documents? I could have obtained fakedocuments by bribing a corrupt Cambodian official, but I didn’t want to do that. In the early
1990s, the system of government in Cambodia was very different from the way it is now. I
therefore had difficulty trying to prepare the required documents for my citizenshipapplication. In order to apply for Japanese nationality, the Immigration Bureau requires too many
documents.”
As time passed, the children of first-generation refugees learnt to adapt to Japanese society andspeak Japanese fluently, while on the other hand, they were are not able to speak Khmer, theirparents’ native language. Representing a typical case, the following comment was made by arefugee who came to Japan as a child: “We (parents and children) have difficulties
communicating. We all struggle with the language. I can understand Khmer, but only speak
Japanese. Since I have been living in Japan for such a long time, I started feeling ashamed of
speaking Khmer…when my parents talk in Khmer in public I would sometimes criticize them bysaying, ‘Don’t speak Khmer!’ I think we cannot communicate well enough in our family.”46Section V: Closure of the Indo-Chinese Refugee Issue (after 1995)
A number of Cambodian respondents expressed worry about their future. Even though they havesettled down in Japan, they do not know what their life will be like in their senior years. Pension
benefits from the Japanese government may be received from age 65 onwards, but some worry
about how they will cope until then, and whether they really will receive a government pension.
Due to an inability to either access or fully comprehend relevant information, their feelings ofinsecurity are heightened. Furthermore, many feel that their employment, which represents thebasis for their livelihood, is unstable. “It was difficult to find a job because I am a foreigner.
Many companies said they were not looking for foreigners,” reported one respondent whose
experience emphasizes that finding stable work is more difficult for non-Japanese people.
While such scenarios could already be observed in the 1980s, the years following 1995 – when
economic conditions in Japan had deteriorated – forced issues such as employment and instability
to surface. The official declaration of the closure of the Indo-Chinese refugee issue also spelled
the closure of the Settlement Promotion Centers. The fact that many Cambodian refugees who
encountered hardships did not know where else to turn for assistance once the Centers had closed
down, increased their feelings of insecurity.

Section VI: Current Situation
There are three major areas of concern for Cambodian refugees who have lived in Japan for over
20 years. First, the ageing first-generation of refugees is concerned about economic security intheir twilight years. Among them are those who would like to return to Cambodia and live their
final years in their homeland, however, as their children are well settled in Japan they find it
difficult to reach a decision about whether to go or to stay.
Second, many of them think that the Japanese government and UNHCR have not done anything
to assist them. They remain troubled by their low standard of living, demanding working life andinsufficient vocational training, and sense a lack of options in terms of improving their situationin Japan. On being asked, “In your opinion, do you currently contribute to the development ofJapanese society?” one refugee replied, “I don’t think so. It’s not just me, but most of us, because
we need to work hard to make a living, and never have enough time to focus on studies. And
because of that we cannot contribute much to society. In the United States, since there is moreassistance for education, refugees can contribute to society a lot more. They can become civil
servants or teachers if they want to. But in Japan, we hardly have any options except for working
in restaurants that are visited more by Cambodians than by Japanese people. It is also difficult toobtain Japanese citizenship. America is a country of refugees and immigrants and is a friendly
place for them. But Japan is not. Japan has helped us [to some degree] but we need to make ourliving by ourselves. We face discrimination here and it is hard for us to fit completely into
Japanese society.”
The third issue relates to all Indo-Chinese refugee groups. The issue of residential status is of
considerable importance when examining what it is like to integrate into Japanese society. And
47

residential status for the first-generation’s children is of particular interest. One refugee said, “Forthe second-generation of refugees, there should be more flexibility and the process to acquire
Japanese citizenship should be easier. This should also include those second-generation refugees
who were born in other countries. My son, for instance, was one year old when we reached therefugee camp in Thailand. My daughter was born in that camp. When we came to Japan, my son
was three years old and my daughter was only three months. These kids were basically raised inJapan; they don’t know anything about the past. They have heard so little about Cambodia andcan only speak a little Khmer. They are basically like Japanese. The only difference is Japanesenationality, which is difficult to acquire. Therefore, the second-generation should have an easiertime applying for and attaining Japanese citizenship. This is my wish.” Another refugee reported,“When our children are grown up, I want them to have Japanese nationality. I want to change myson’s name…but the procedure is so complicated. In order to change it, I have to go to court but I
do not have the time or money.”
A Cambodian refugee who came to Japan as a child is currently applying for Japanese citizenshipand explains, “We are permanent residents and I am at present applying for Japanese nationality.
However, because I was a refugee, the Embassy of Cambodia will not do anything to assist me,
such as issuing the necessary certificates. Japan, on the other hand, does not do anything either.
That means that I have to go to Cambodia in order to get all the documents to complete theapplication procedure. But that is too expensive!” When asked why she is applying for Japanesenationality, she replied, “I want to live in Japan. I cannot go abroad. I have been here since I wasborn, and I need a Japanese name when I search for a job.” Many interviewees who came to
Japan as infants or were born in Japan see themselves with certainty as part of Japanese society.
The second-generation is more fluent in Japanese than in Khmer, while their parents are not as
proficient in Japanese as they are. For this reason, the relationship between parents and childrenof first and second generation refugees is complicated and undergoing various changes. As one
refugee puts it, “There is distance between children and parents. When there is a community
meeting, adults usually speak Khmer and their children speak Japanese.”
The fact that younger Cambodians may speak limited or no Khmer is apparent within thecommunity, however it does not mean that they are indifferent to Khmer culture. On the contrary,
there are some who are actively engaged and want to take advantage of their cultural heritage. As
one young Cambodian said, “I’d like to continue my career in Khmer dance. And in the future,
I’d like to make Khmer dance known in Japanese society. And I also want us to have our own
Khmer temple. Vietnamese and Laotian people in Japan have their own temples, but it is only
Cambodians who do not.” Some respondents expressed their enthusiasm about engaging in
activities between Japan and Cambodia in the future, “I have thought about that before. I’ve been
visiting Cambodia every year since 2003. When the Cambodian economy improves I would liketo try starting some business activities. It’s not that I want to return to Cambodia for good, but I
would like to be successful in a business between the two countries.”

48

5.4

Overall Findings

Below is a preliminary summary about the degree of integration and resettlement experiences of
Indo-Chinese refugees in Japan based on the interviews conducted with respondents from thethree country groups.

Before Arrival in Japan
In most cases, Japan was not the preferred destination country for resettlement or for seeking
asylum, according to the majority of respondents across the three country groups. This is perhaps
the most pronounced characteristic among Indo-Chinese refugees who resettled in Japan at thattime. Often, refugees’ hopes to be reunified with family members who had already resettled incountries like the United States, Canada, and France informed their destination preferences. It
was against a backdrop of increasingly restrictive resettlement policies in Western countries likethe United States, and strong international pressure on Japan to accept Indo-Chinese refugees forresettlement, that an estimated 11 000 refugees and displaced persons made their home in Japan.
While not necessarily wishing to resettle in Japan, most Indo-Chinese refugees were left with noother option as the possibility for them to resettle in other countries diminished. For those who
spent prolonged periods in refugee camps in Southeast Asia, it is noteworthy that many Laotians,in particular, did want to resettle in Japan and held positive images of the country. For many, theirrationale was that settling in Japan – a country that was a part of Asia – may be easier thansettling in a Western country. Some of them aspired to go to Europe or the United States after
initially settling in Japan.

Early stages of resettlement in Japan (1975 – 1980)
The Resettlement Promotion Centers established by the Japanese government at the end of the
1970s were designed to provide Indo-Chinese refugees with temporary accommodation, language
and cultural training, followed by job placement assistance and housing advice, before they weresent out into Japanese society. The training was initially for just three months, and was later
extended to four months. As a result, many respondents said that due to the insufficient language,
cultural and vocational training, and lack of governmental assistance after the initial period, theyencountered various difficulties particularly during their early stages of resettlement.
Among the various challenges, the greatest one was coping with the Japanese language. With
only three or four months of language training, many felt that they could not make use of what
they had learnt in their workplace. Without a solid understanding of the Japanese language, many
had painful experiences trying to adapt to daily life, and when navigating human relations at work
and in the local community. Language problems were cited as the single biggest challenge toadaptation and integration to Japanese society, according to all respondents regardless of theirdate of arrival to Japan, between the 1970s and 1990s.

49

Conversely, there were a minority of respondents who expressed their appreciation for the job
placement assistance provided by the Settlement Promotion Centers. Others were grateful for thehelpful assistance provided by NGOs and religious organizations, particularly during the initialstages of resettlement in Japan.
Japanese schools were required to accommodate Indo-Chinese refugees for the first time, and as aresult, failed to offer sufficient adaptation courses and Japanese language education to thechildren. The academic performances of most Indo-Chinese children were consequently below
average and led to very limited opportunities with regard to higher education and secure career
paths. In many cases, Indo-Chinese refugees accepted low-wage jobs doing the kind of unskilled
labour that Japanese workers preferred not to do. Their living arrangements tended to be in small,old public housing projects and wooden apartment buildings.
Due to a policy of dispersed settlement, some refugees led an isolated life after leaving the
Settlement Promotion Centers. Even at present, some refugees live far from their own ethnic
communities.

Post-Ratification of the Refugee Convention by Japan (1981-1989)
After Japan acceded to the Refugee Convention in 1981, the Japanese government gradually
increased its quota of Indo-Chinese refugees. Although the Indo-Chinese refugees in Japan faceddifficulties, particularly in the early stages of their resettlement, and lived hard lives, many wereable to find jobs during this decade as the Japanese economy was flourishing during the 1980s.
There is general agreement by the respondents, however, that upon leaving the Resettlement
Promotion Centers after three or four months, there was virtually no assistance from the Japanese
government. Many also responded that while UNHCR assisted refugees living in camps outsideof Japan, there was no support from UNHCR once arriving in Japan. Local governments also
made little effort to assist those refugees who became part of their constituency. Left on theirown, it was their ethnic community networks that supported them the most in the 1980s.
The Vietnamese refugees sought to form an ethnic community group by establishing countrywideorganizations. Among those, the Catholic Vietnamese network showed particularly strong
solidarity, and spread itself throughout Japan. Neither the Cambodians nor Laotians developed asimilarly expansive national network during this period, although their numbers wereconsiderably smaller than the Vietnamese community.
When asked about whether Japan’s accession to the Refugee Convention influenced their lives,
many respondents reported the following sentiment, “I do not know much in detail about theRefugee Convention. Nothing changed for us [after the accession].” As Indo-Chinese refugees
were not given sufficient language training opportunities, they relied solely on information thatwas gathered through their respective ethnic community network. Through such sources, theychanged jobs and residence within Japan, which eventually led to the formation of several ethnic
enclaves or neighborhoods. Vietnamese refugees, in particular, shaped their residential choicesaround information from their ethnic community networks. Cambodian and Laotian refugees on50

the other hand, often lived in small groups, but tended not to form concentrated ethnicneighborhoods.
The issue of ‘bogus refugees’ that was picked up by the Japanese media at the end of the 1980s
had a negative impact on Vietnamese refugees, who had until then worked very hard to make aliving and integrate into Japan. The public perception of the existence of ‘bogus refugees’ put
their credibility as ‘genuine refugees’ in danger, and caused them to worry about their status ofresidence, but also resulted in adverse feelings between South and North Vietnamese. In contrast,
information regarding this issue did not appear to reach nor impact on the Cambodian andLaotian refugees to the same extent. A core reason for this may be that the ‘bogus refugee’ issue
was of less concern as the allegations were not directly related to groups of refugees from
Cambodia and Laos.

Economic Growth of the Indo-Chinese countries (1990-1995)
In the first half of the 1990s, the economies of the three Indo-Chinese countries finally began torecover and political stability returned. On the other hand, the Japanese economy started to enter
into an extended period of recession following the end of the “bubble economy” in early 1990s.
This triggered a desire for many Indo-Chinese refugees to return temporarily to their homeland,and consequently increased the number of refugees who visited their country of origin for a shortperiod. Yet, underlying the socialist governments of Laos and Vietnam’s official welcome ofrefugees to visit their homeland was the expectation that they would bring economic investment
and stimulus from abroad, which refugees who had resettled in Japan were not really able to offer.
Although UNTAC laid the foundations for democratic governance in Cambodia, from theperspective of Cambodian refugees, economic and political stability had not yet fully returned
during this period. Even if they returned temporarily, it was difficult for them to voluntarily
repatriate as a whole family to their home country.
Furthermore, the amendment of the Japanese Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act(1982) in 1990 brought together many Indo-Chinese refugees under the status of ‘long-term
resident’. While there are some who report that this step facilitated their acquisition of permanent
residence status or Japanese citizenship, there are others who were unaware about the amendmentof the aforementioned Act and its implications. This demonstrates that basic legal knowledge did
not trickle down adequately to affect the lives of Indo-Chinese refugees.

Closure of the Indo-Chinese Refugee Issue (after 1995)
With the Indo-Chinese refugee issue declared concluded in Geneva in 1994, the Resettlement
Promotion Centers in Japan were consequently closed, which signified a loss of counselingopportunities for refugees and bred feelings of insecurity. Some respondents reported that thisdevelopment prompted them to apply for permanent residence status at this time, in order to avoid
any fear of forced repatriation. Their feelings of insecurity remained, as they understood that theywould not be entitled to any support or legal protection thereafter. Having increasingly less51

expectations about receiving assistance from the Japanese government, they faced a dilemma as
many felt that repatriating permanently to their country of origin was also not a feasible orattractive option.

Current Situation
The current economic downturn in Japan has impacted many Indo-Chinese refugees and forced
them to lead an especially grueling life. First-generation refugees are ageing and find thatreasonably paid jobs are difficult to find and maintain. For them, the most pressing issues relate toemployment and salary, and whether their retirement years will be spent living insecurely due to asense of uncertainty about their pension entitlements and residential status. One reason for this isthat the Japanese language proficiency of first-generation refugees is low, which means they areless able to access information related to these issues. Some first-generation refugees abandon
their hopes of acquiring Japanese citizenship due to their insufficient language ability and theperception of cumbersome procedures and documentation requirements.
Language proficiency disparities within families of first and second generation Indo-Chinese is a
cause for communication difficulties. Typically, parents speak their country of origin language
and lack proficiency in Japanese, while their children speak Japanese fluently and have a difficult
time communicating in their parent’s native tongue. This has consequences for decisions about
the family’s future place of residence. Even if a refugee family wishes to return to their
homeland, the reality is that the Japanese-speaking children are invariably not keen to move awayfrom Japan, an environment that they are familiar with. Many first-generation refugees feeltrapped in this kind of situation whereby they want to return to their homeland, but their children
do not, and yet they want to keep the family together.
The health of a number of Indo-Chinese refugees has markedly declined since their arrival as adirect result of workplace-related accidents and injuries. It should be noted that many IndoChinese refugees found employment in sectors that are considered to be “dirty, difficult anddangerous”. While the national health insurance scheme provides them with coverage, sufficient
explanations and translation assistance is not provided for those who lack proficiency in Japanese.
Their access to such social security services should therefore be considered limited, in reality.
This is particularly true for mental health problems and trauma counseling that was not readily
managed, due to a lack of specialist services in Japan. The above-mentioned case of Bouy Moeun,
a Cambodian refugee who killed his wife and three children in Yamato City, Kanagawa
Prefecture in 1987, may be considered emblematic of the kinds of extreme acts that can betriggered when stress leads to psychological/psychiatric disorders. As recently as 2008, a
Vietnamese refugee, who suffered from serious mental health issues, committed suicide in thesame Kanagawa city of Yamato.

Nationality issues
Among the foreign nationals living in Japan and the volunteers helping them, there are persistentcomplaints regarding Japan’s citizenship policy and procedures. For example, it is asserted that52

the criteria for attaining citizenship are too rigid, and that the procedure takes too long. A waiting
period of over one year is to be expected, and this is due to the backlog of applications thatexist. 42 There does not seem to be any substantive difference in terms of the criteria for
citizenship when compared with other countries: for example, five years of actual residency, good
behavior/conduct, ability to support oneself with his/her livelihood or assets, and the loss of one’s
former nationality upon the granting of Japanese citizenship. In reality, over 10,000 citizenshipapplications are authorized annually. 43 Nonetheless, an impression remains among foreign
nationals that attaining Japanese citizenship is difficult. This may derive partly from pastpractices that have already been abandoned, which required applicants to provide a Japanesefamily name in order to be included in the official family registry. Moreover, the fact that one’s
current nationality is lost, as dual and multiple citizenship is not permitted, adds to the image thatcitizenship conferral in Japan is strict.
Since application procedures for acquiring Japanese nationality are complicated and eligibility
criteria is very high (including length of stay in Japan, strict documentation requirements such as
birth certificate and renunciation of previous nationality), not many first-generation refugeessought to acquire Japanese citizenship given their comparatively low levels of language
proficiency. Without the status of a full member of society that citizenship provides, many firstgeneration refugees feel insecure about their future. A comparative analysis of the ratio for those
who chose not to attain Japanese citizenship, it is noteworthy that Laotians are significantly
higher (65/87) than Vietnamese (43/80) and Cambodians (25/50). Such a comparison may point
to the insufficient dissemination of accurate information reaching the Laotian community, or may
be indicative of the fact that many Indo-Chinese refugees, and Laotians in particular, have notnaturalized because they hope to return to their homeland in their senior years, be it either
willingly, or reluctantly due to financial concerns that their pension in Japan is insufficient to liveon.
A shared experience among all three country groups is the ability to access information via theinternet or telephone from Indo-Chinese who have resettled in other countries. It is easier forthem to compare their living standards and experiences in Japan with those of their counterparts
living abroad. In this way, they learned that refugees in other resettlement countries appear tohave easier access to higher education, skill acquisition and citizenship, which prompted some
respondents to reconsider their lives in Japan and feel discontent towards the Japanese
government. Notably, this discontent has not meant that the government or wider society havereceived concrete demands and requests from the Indo-Chinese communities.

42

According to the Ministry of Justice website, there is no standard time frame for processing
naturalization applications (http://www.moj.go.jp/ONLINE/NATIONALITY/6-2.html). Observers andpractitioners suggest that approximately one year would be needed before naturalization is approved; For
instance, website of International Labor Law Firm mentions that the process may take between 6 months
and 18 months (http://krh-office.com/visa/naturalization.html)

43

According to Ministry of Justice statistics, between 1999-2008 14,000 – 18,000 naturalizations werereported each year. Home page on statistics relating to Family Registration related matters(http://www.moj.go.jp/TOUKEI/t_minj03.html)

53

The role of a supporting ethnic community is quite significant in facilitating integration and easeof living in Japan. It is noteworthy however that both Vietnamese and Laotian communities haveorganized religious groups and engage actively in community activities, however Cambodian
refugees do not have their own place of worship and lack a communal space to gather andorganize.
More than 30 years have elapsed since Japan accepted Indo-Chinese refugees. The degree of local
integration is largely influenced by individual differences and particularities. Some have adapted
well to Japanese society and stressed that Japan is a safe and stable place to live compared withother countries, which makes it attractive. There are some refugees who have become successful
and well-respected in Japanese society. In some instances, those who had no other option but toresettle in Japan came to realize the benefits on offer when comparing information with relatives
who remained in their homeland.
On the other hand, many respondents claimed that they have had difficulties in integrating into
Japanese society and expressed dissatisfaction with their lives in Japan. Some refugees who had apositive opinion about Japan in the early stages of resettlement adopted a more negative point ofview over time. These perspectives seem to be constantly reviewed and subject to change over theyears spent living in Japan.
The overall picture that emerges from this survey is not much different from the one presented in
the findings of the 1997 Cabinet Secretariat report, “Current Status of the Settlement of IndoChinese Refugees and Displaced Persons in Japan and Future Tasks”. The biggest problems that
Indo-Chinese refugees faced according to the 1997 were reported to be:•

Japanese language 43.6 percent•

housing (high price, too small) 36.1 percent•

job related issues (unfamiliarity with wage and promotion system, regarded as illegal
workers among others) 23.2 percent•

economic problems including wages 22.6 percent•

unfamiliarity with administrative procedures (difficulty to make themselves understood,
inability to understand documents and explanations, unavailability of guarantors, among
others) 19.1 percent•

children’s education (future career, expenses and native languages and cultures, among
others) 17.0 percent.44

As for their future plan, 34 percent responded that they intended to be naturalized and obtain
Japanese nationality, 32 percent preferred to stay in Japan with the status of permanent resident,
44

Secretariat for Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons Liaison and Coordination Committee in
The Cabinet, “Current Status of Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons and Future Tasks”, March
1997, 83-87.

54

and 13.5 percent hoped to return to their homeland if possible.45 In reality, 55.6 percent of the
respondents had “long term resident” status and 39.6 percent had “permanent resident” status,
which means that only 5 percent of the respondents had become Japanese citizenships at thatstage, 46 presumably due to the difficulty, perceived or otherwise, in obtaining Japanesenationality.
Another survey conducted in 2004 with regard to 163 Vietnamese refugees showed that 12 of the
respondents replied that they regret having come to Japan at all.47 In cautiously interpreting thisfigure, it must be noted that the sample size was small. Nonetheless it suggests that a minority of
refugees were unable to integrate at all into Japanese society.
It would be difficult to conclude that the current survey when read together with previous survey
data, supports a theory of widespread integration of Indo-Chinese refugees in Japan, whereby
they feel that they are valued members of society. Most refugees arrived in Japan having no otherchoice. Government support was limited, particularly language training. This limited their options
for employment and education, and most refugees were obliged to take up 3K (or 3D) jobs. Some
live in relative poverty. Many have struggled to survive, even with the support of their ethnic
community network. These factors help to explain why some refugees regret coming to Japan in
the first place. It is rather surprising that after 30 years of the first arrival of Indochinese refugees
in Japan, a minority of refugees still feel insecure and struggle to achieve a stable life in Japan.
One could argue that there is a small-scale ‘protracted refugee situation’ in Japan.48

45

Ibid 72.

46

Ibid 45-87.

47‘Japan’s Acceptance of Refugees: past, present, future’ Nihon no nanmin ukeire: kako, genzai, mirai,
Chuokouronjigyo Publishing, 2007 at 143.

48

Protracted refugee situations, EC/54/SC/CRP.14, June 2004. The paper defined a protracted refugee
situation as one in which a refugee population of 25,000 persons or more has been living in exile for five
years or longer in a developing country. 11,000 Indochinese refugees in Japan, an industrialized country,
thus does not meet this definition, however, the UNHCR definition is not universally accepted.

55

Conclusions
The Japanese government’s decision to accept and resettle Indo-Chinese refugees came about inlarge part due to strong international pressure. Having no experience in accepting a large numberof refugees previously, the Government relied on CSO assistance for a considerable time and wasslow to establish its own comprehensive support services. Nonetheless, the decision to accept
Indo-Chinese refugees prompted the Government to become party to the Refugee Convention in1981 and assume a new degree of international responsibility. In doing so, the Japanesenationality clause was removed from various pieces of legislation, which has since benefited
hundreds of thousands of foreign nationals living in Japan.
It is evident that the majority of Indo-Chinese refugees did not pro-actively choose Japan as theircountry of resettlement, but instead preferred the United States or other western countries due to a
mixture of historical, political, language and family reasons. Many resettled in Japan reluctantly
and held on to the hope that one day they might be able to resettle elsewhere. The lack of strong
motivation and willingness to resettle in Japan over the long term negatively affected theirintegration experience, such as their determination to learn the Japanese language. Combinedwith the inadequate governmental support to facilitate their integration in Japan, many IndoChinese refugees have struggled to achieve a stable and secure life in Japan. Given that theGovernment has formally ceased to assist Indo-Chinese refugees as of 2006, it is unlikely that
their situation will improve.
Japan’s Refugee Policy
Until recently, the Government did not seem to have had a clearly articulated ‘refugee policy’ tospeak of; what has been in place was a collection of ‘administrative procedures’ with a strong
immigration control orientation. In the absence of a government body that is centrally responsible
for refugee issues, it has fallen to 11 ministries, which have formed an inter-ministerial
coordination committee to jointly deal with refugee issues.
Over the last five years, there has been a positive change in Japan’s refugee policy, starting withthe 2004 revision of the Immigration Control and Recognition of Refugees Act (1982). The
number of asylum seekers in Japan increased from some 300 to 1600 in 2008, while the numberof persons recognized as refugees increased from one dozen a decade ago to 57 in 2008. The
number of humanitarian status holders grew sharply to 360 in 2008. The most remarkable policychange is the announcement of a third country resettlement program on a pilot basis from 2010
with respect to Myanmar refugees living in camps in Thailand. This decision signals that Japan is
becoming a more open country for refugees, and that it is making a new commitment to offering
durable solutions like resettlement.
Japan’s Assistance and Integration Policy
Assistance provided to refugees by the Japanese government until the establishment of RHQ in
1979 was largely ‘supply driven,’ that is, it relied on the existing and available services to assist
56them rather than catered to the actual needs of refugees. Assistance programs designed for IndoChinese refugees have reflected what assistance providers presumed were good for refugees,
thereby causing protection gaps.
The Government-sponsored Japanese language training program for Indo-Chinese refugees wascreated with the best of intentions, however, the outcome was that survey respondents on thewhole found them to be too short in duration and not necessarily reflective of their actual needs.
The assumption that four months of training in formal style language was sufficient proved to beinaccurate, and caused long lasting handicaps by forcing refugees to become self-reliant during aperiod when they clearly needed ongoing assistance. As a result, most refugees left the Settlement
Promotion Centers without enough language skills to cope with everyday life. After leaving theCenters, the only language training and assistance that was provided was that offered by NGOsand volunteer groups. One reason which explains why many Indo-Chinese refugees have largely
remained in the lower socio-economic bracket of Japanese society is the inadequate language
training they received in the early stages of resettlement.
For refugees to integrate effectively into Japanese society, dissemination of information in theirnative language regarding important issues such as refugee rights, administrative procedures,
employment, housing, school education, health care and social security is necessary. This is all
the more so given their weak Japanese language skills and the considerably complex
administrative procedures at the national and municipality levels in Japan. To date, such services
have been provided on a limited scale, which has made refugees feel confused and insecure, andobliged them to rely on piecemeal and sometimes inaccurate information from fellow refugees.
Similarly, it is very important that plain language legal advice is provided about various
civil/criminal affairs, including status of residence issues, as such legal assistance has been in
short supply to date.
Other forms of integration support that have not been provided sufficiently include job training
and re-skilling. Rather, efforts were made by RHQ and government agencies like Hello Work toarrange introductions and placements for Indo-Chinese job-seekers, however, these tended to belimited to unskilled labour opportunities. RHQ subsidized the salaries of Indo-Chinese
employees during their first six months of employment while they received on-the-job training.
This being said, there were few opportunities to find jobs other than in factories. Refugees arrived
in Japan from a range of professional backgrounds, however, that experience, knowledge andskill-set was not utilized effectively. University degree holders, for example, were obliged towork as manual laborers, and former farmers were sent to manufacturing factories. The ability to
be self-reliant and use one’s own skills and knowledge is important not only for economic
reasons but also for a sense of dignity and pride.
Communal recreation and cultural events provide refugees with an opportunity for fun andrelaxation, a sense of solidarity and mutual support, and a way of keeping cultural traditions alive.
It also provides opportunities to heal psychological trauma arising from experiences ofpersecution or family separation, and helps prevent social isolation. Indo-Chinese refugees were
obliged to find places such as churches and public facilities on their own for such purposes.
57

Incidentally, only a very limited degree of trauma care and mental health services were available
to refugees, and these were provided by NGOs with partial funding from RHQ and local
governments.
Many refugees who have spent years living in Japan wish to attain Japanese citizenship. Such a
decision can be an ultimate form of adaptation and integration, however, the requirements forJapanese citizenship are numerous (such as bank deposits and birth certificates) and standards are
so high that many applicants are forced to give up. This causes them to feel that they are forever a‘refugee’ or ‘gaijin’ (foreign national); a person who cannot put down roots and become a full
member of society.
Public information and awareness-raising
When Indo-Chinese refugees started arriving there were only approximately 750,000 foreign
residents living in Japan, most of whom were Koreans and Chinese who had lived in the country
since the end of World War II or before. These groups of foreign nationals were subject toconsiderable discrimination by Japanese. It is fair to say that Japanese society was not prepared –either socially or pragmatically – to receive Indo-Chinese refugees. For the majority of theJapanese public, the arrival of Indo-Chinese refugees was the first time for them to encounter
victims and survivors of war, political oppression and persecution. They had little idea of what a
refugee was, why they left their countries, and what their needs might be. Ignorance anddisrespect to other Asian people are arguably responsible for numerous incidents of
discrimination against Indo-Chinese, who tended to keep their refugee identity secret. While suchdiscriminatory attitudes are gradually disappearing among the younger generation, and althoughmany refugees appreciate the fact that Japan has provided them with protection and a level ofsafety and freedom that is unthinkable in their own countries, some felt they experienced a second
victimization by living in Japan.
The Japanese media has traditionally reported on refugee issues in a relatively favorable manner,particularly during the early days of the Indo-Chinese refugee crisis. Nonetheless, their portrayalof Indo-Chinese refugees has typically been about a group of people to be pitied and in need ofassistance, rather than survivors of human rights violation or people who can make positive
contributions to Japanese society.
More recently, the younger generation in particular has demonstrated interest in refugee issues, asseen by the numbers of university students who enroll in courses on refugees, or pursue refugeestudies at the graduate level. Seminars and symposia about refugees and migration are also wellattended. One refugee lawyer remarked that the situation ten years ago was very different to today– few students were interested in refugee affairs at that time. The annual Refugee Film Festival inTokyo, organized by UNHCR Representation in Japan and Japan for UNHCR and sponsored byvarious organizations and corporations attracts large audiences and public interest. NHK’s (Japan
Broadcasting Corporation) 2009 airing of a TV drama modeled on the Tokyo office of UNHCR
was a new development that helped to spotlight the issue of refugees for the Japanese mainstream
public.

58

Local Governments
This study found that local governments have played a relatively minor role in providing
integration assistance to Indo-Chinese refugees. Reasons for this may be that the majority of
Indo-Chinese refugees have typically resided near the Settlement Promotion Centers, and since
their numbers are few compared with migrant workers, they have not drawn the attention of local
governments. Moreover, since refugee issues are primarily the responsibility of the Ministry ofJustice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the inter-ministerial coordination committee, local
governments have considered the issue to be within the jurisdiction of the central government andnot theirs. The relatively minor role played by most local governments has meant that they have
not offered substantive support measures for Indo-Chinese refugees to integrate in their local
areas. Moreover, refugees chose to reside in a small number of cities close to the various
Settlement Promotion Centers where larger refugee populations are concentrated and mutual
support can be expected. As the number of refugees who are resettled and recognized in Japan
increases, the issue of integration in the communities where they live becomes more important, as
do the roles of local governments. Unless more local governments take a proactive role, thesuccessful integration of refugees into local communities will remain difficult. It is time, in
response to the central government’s initiative to start a resettlement pilot program, that local
governments make sincere and substantial effort to receive refugees in their constituencies andprovide proactive integration support measures.

Civil Society
The Indo-Chinese refugee crisis led to the creation and growth of dozens of Japanese volunteer
groups and NGOs, many of which later expanded their activities to address a range of global
issues. NGOs have contributed to promoting a deeper understanding of refugee issues in Japan
using advocacy techniques, and considerable dedication and personal effort. Lawyers’
associations have been instrumental in mobilizing public opinion in favor of both recognizing andaccepting refugees to Japan, and this included Japan’s accession to the Refugee Convention.
NGOs, particularly operational ones, have faced numerous challenges. These include raisingfunds, which may be attributed to Japanese society’s general lack of understanding about refugee
issues, as well as a taxation system that does not encourage or reward individual or corporate
donations for humanitarian causes. In addition, low remuneration levels and a lack of social
status/prestige accorded to NGO activities has made it difficult to attract qualified personnel andbring professional standards to NGOs. The refugee-oriented NGO community has suffered from alack of economies of scale, competition for limited funding, and a general lack of collaborationand partnership, which in turn has reduced its visibility, clout and ability to effect change.

UNHCR and international organizations
According to a number of respondents, UNHCR was not active in assisting Indo-Chinese
refugees following their arrival in Japan. Indeed, the fact that some respondents reported that they59

had not received any assistance from UNHCR, or otherwise had never heard of the UN refugee
agency since resettling in Japan was a surprising finding, given that UNHCR’s key mandate inJapan is to assist refugees who live in the country. In spite of these views, it is also a fact that
UNHCR established its initial presence in Japan as a result of the Indo-Chinese refugee crisis andthat UNHCR personnel were actively engaged in consultations during this period.
Academia
Studies on refugees in Japan have been few in number and limited in their analysis. Much of theacademic focus by Japanese scholars has been on refugee status determination (RSD) issues froman international law perspective; and only a few studies have been written from a political or
policy perspective. It is only recently that scholars have started to examine these issues from theperspectives of ‘people on the move’ or forced displacement. As recently as 2008, the JapaneseSociety on Immigration Policy Studies was established in response to the growing need to analyze
the phenomena of migration in and around Japan, and integration issues in Japan, including
refugees and humanitarian status holders.
This study on the integration of Indo-Chinese refugees in Japan should be a point of departure forfurther refugee studies and research. Future analysis could focus on adaptation by refugees andacceptance by Japanese society at the community level. A number of studies focusing on
adaptation by and acceptance of migrants, and the notion of multicultural co-existence have been
made, and would be complemented by new refugee-oriented studies. Collaboration between
refugee scholars and migration scholars is important to advance this common front. Further
research also needs to be made on the roles of NGOs, the media, local governments, andcorporations, which have played varying roles in terms of assisting Indo-Chinese refugees to date,
but whose future roles with regard to refugees will be of great importance.

60

The following policy recommendations are made based on the findings of this study, as well as
principles of best practice for third country refugee resettlement and integration. Generalrecommendations

General Recommendations
•

•

•

•

•

•

Reports such as this provide an opportunity for refugees’ opinions and experiences to bedisseminated and made known. It is therefore recommended that a range of platforms andforums, both official and informal, be put in place to enable refugees’ voices to be more
widely heard and understood.
Japan’s resettlement policy should serve three important functions: be an important tool
to provide international protection and meet the special needs of refugees whose life,
liberty, safety, health or other fundamental rights are at risk; provide a durable solution
for refugees; and be an expression of international solidarity and responsibility sharingthat helps States share each other’s burdens and reduce problems impacting the countryof first asylum.
The adoption of a comprehensive approach to resettlement is important. It shouldincorporate protection, socio-economic, cultural and language support that extends frompre-departure in the country of first asylum right through to the objective of successful
integration in Japan. It is important that the necessary budgetary provisions are made at
the national and local levels, and for civil society, and that an effective coordination
mechanism is developed.
Refugees – irrespective of their status as Convention refugees, resettled refugees, oranother category of protection visa should be:o Afforded the same residency status, and the rights and privileges that result fromthat status so as to ensure equal access to services and assistance;o Offered support for family reunification, as this is one of the building blocks ofintegration.
Japan’s resettlement program should be based on a comprehensive policy that views
refugees not simply as new members of the workforce but as members of a convivial
society who should be able to enjoy their full rights and human dignity, and contribute toJapan using their own valuable knowledge and experiences.
The coordination committee with representatives from 11 ministries concerned with theentry and residence of refugees should take a comprehensive and flexible approach thatclosely reflects principles of international refugee law and best practice in determining
the size and selection criteria of Japan’s new resettlement program. The Committee
should be complemented by several working groups that comprise representatives fromcivil society, local government, refugee communities and the concerned ministries. Suchworking groups would be accountable to the committee, but operate at a more functional,
accessible and dynamic level so as to feed useful information between high level policy
makers and those who are affected by refugee and resettlement policies

61

Specific Recommendations
Country of Asylumi) Selection Criteria•

Selection criteria for resettlement that are flexible should be introduced. The
individual’s reasons for fleeing his/her country of origin and degree of need for legal andphysical protection should be of utmost concern, however there are a set of otherimportant factors as which should also be taken into account.iii) Pre-Departure•••

A pre-selection briefing to inform refugees about Japan as it compares with otherresettlement countries is advisable, given that decisions to apply for resettlement incertain countries may be made based on hearsay and unsubstantiated information. This
could be communicated in the form of an information package that is made available bothelectronically and on public notice boards in the refugee camps;
Both the pre-selection briefing orientation and pre-departure orientation should be carriedout by an international organization or local NGO that is familiar with the Japanese
resettlement context as well as the local realities in the country of asylum;
In order to facilitate resettlement, pre-departure training, employment readiness and posttraumatic stress counseling should be offered in order to prepare refugees for integrationin Japan. These should also include language and cultural orientation courses, as well as
useful information about resettlement locations and support networks.

In Japaniii) Protection•

Convention status should be granted to refugees who resettle in Japan, as this would
entitle them to permanent residence status, and protection against refoulement. It would
also provide access to civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights similar to thoseenjoyed by nationals, and the opportunity to become a naturalized citizen of Japan.
Comprehensive legislation (for example, a proposed “Refugee Assistance Act”) should
be enacted in order to provide enhanced protection and integration support for resettled
refugees, and to clearly define ministerial responsibility for such protection andassistance in an integrated and coordinated manner. It is a welcome development that theGovernment is considering the enactment of a refugee protection and assistance law inthe near future.

62iv) Assistance
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

New legislation such as a proposed “Refugee Assistance Act” should comprehensively
address the assistance needs of all categories of refugees in Japan. This includes reception,
integration and financial assistance.
When designing assistance and integration programs, the Government should adopt a
community-oriented approach and consult refugees about their actual needs, taking into
account the fact that their needs vary with time and circumstance.
Language education should be more widely available and accessible to resettled refugees.
There should be greater flexibility as to the duration and method of instruction of
language training so as to reflect the day to day demands faced by refugees. Formal
language training should be complemented by informal opportunities that continue in theworkplace and local community, with the assistance of local governments, employers’
associations, NGOs and volunteer groups.
Useful information about life in Japan should be prepared and disseminated in the native
languages of resettled refugees. This should be managed by local governments in
consultation with NGOs and municipalities that have already prepared similar
information kits for migrant workers.
During the orientation period, newly resettled refugees should be provided with skills
training that reflects their backgrounds and interests. Such training should take into
account job availability in areas where they live.
In order to minimize the occurrence of economic, employment and housing problems, theGovernment should provide financial assistance to local governments or NGOs so thatthey are in a better position to offer substantive assistance to refugees in the early stagesof resettlement. Such assistance should include social security benefits if needed, accessto affordable housing, and employment guidance and re-skilling opportunities. Efforts
should be made to alleviate financial burdens on local governments as they will face
many challenges in assisting refugees to resettle and integration. The Government, in
consultation with UNHCR and Japan’s bar associations, should set up a system toprovide means-tested legal aid for refugees.
The Government, in consultation with UNHCR and NGOs should establish a program totrain ‘refugee advisors’ who can provide face to face assistance to all category of
refugees about integrating into Japanese society
The Government, namely the Ministry of Justice, should accord priority to all categories
of refugees in terms of acquiring Japanese citizenship. This could, for example, include
reducing the required length of stay prior to application.

v) Partnerships•

There should be more opportunities for meaningful dialogue between civil society andgovernment ministries, particularly the Ministry of Justice, concerning refugee issues. A
working group should be set up under the auspices of the inter-ministerial coordinationcommittee, and serve as a highly functional mechanism for interaction between local
government officials, refugee and community leaders, NGOs and concerned ministries so
as to adequately reflect refugees’ voices. The views of various members of the workshop
63

•
•

•

•

•

•
•

•

•

•

•

group should be represented during the Age Gender Diversity Mainstreaming (AGDM)
participatory assessments which are carried out jointly by UNHCR and NGOs.
The Government should consider introducing an Ombudsperson‘s system to serve as atrusted intermediary between various stakeholders concerned with refugee issues.
Briefings should be given to local communities in Japan that host refugees so as to create
greater awareness and understanding of refugee-related issues and their special needs, aswell as the positive aspects of living with refugees as neighbors.
New legislation, known as the “Refugee Assistance Act” should articulate a mechanism
for improved coordination between UNHCR, local government, and NGOs, based on theunderstanding that government alone cannot provide all services.
The central government should encourage local governments to support the integration of
refugees by providing useful services and resources to them, including those which havebeen provided to migrant workers.ii
Local governments in regional parts of Japan should be encouraged to host refugees asthat would provide refugees with more options and greater visibility so that they may
avoid becoming a ‘forgotten population’. Their presence would also help to usher ingreater cultural diversity within the regional host communities.
Relevant government ministries should provide funding to NGOs to carry out tasks
relating to the resettlement and integration of refugees.
UNHCR Representation in Japan should develop a more collaborative relationship withlocal government authorities, particularly those which are responsible for constituencies
where refugee communities live.
UNHCR Representation in Japan has played a significant role in improving relations with
NGOs and the Government, however, these favorable developments need to be sustained
and strengthened. Closer collaboration with the International Organization for Migration(IOM) in Japan, as well as with local governments which host refugees and/or migrants
would be beneficial to all parties concerned. Refugee communities themselves can play
an instrumental role in the successful integration of newly arriving refugees. They should
participate in the planning and implementing of community programs, as well as
orientation workshops and seminars. They should also be given the chance to provide
cohesive input into government consultations and contribute to the development of
improved policy and services across government.
For Japan to formulate sound migration and refugee policies, and equivalent systems, it isessential that Japanese academia takes a keener interest in migration and refugee studies.
It is encouraging that the United Nations University, the Human Security Program at the
University of Tokyo, among other academic institutions, have been active in this area of
research and training, in collaboration with UNHCR Representation in Japan and IOM.
Japanese universities and research institutes should be more active in promotinginternational academic cooperation that focuses on refugee protection and resettlement
issues by networking with refugee specialists, practitioners and refugees themselves.
Scholarships for refugees and the recruitment of scholarly refugees as researchers andacademic staff should be further promoted so that scholars and opinion-makers from both
Japan and from refugee communities may have increased opportunities to understand andlearn from each other.
64

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Martin, Philip, "Another Miracle? Managing Labor Migration in Asia." In United Nations Expert
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events in Japanese foreign diplomacy), (1991-93, 1995-2000, 2007-08)_______Wagakuni no Seifu Kaihatu Enjyo (Japanese official development assistance),
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_______ Seifu Kaihatu Enjyo Hakusyo (White Paper on Government/Official Development
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_______ Yamato Teijyu Sokusin Center 18 nen shi (Yamato Settlement Promotion Center - 18
years of history), (1998).
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Robinson, Courtland, Terms of Refuge: The Indo-Chinese Exodus and the International
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67

Annex 1: Data sets from interviews conducted between June andDecember 2008 with Indo-Chinese refugees living in Japan

1. Country of Origin
Vietnam

Cambodia

Laos

Total

80

50

87

217

2. Generation
Generation

Vietnam

Cambodia

Laos

Total

Others (family
13
reunification)

4

7

24

1st

55

44

76

175

1.5

8

1

4

13

2nd

4

1

0

5

Total

80

50

87

217

3. Nationality and Residential Status
Nationality

Vietnam

Cambodia

Laos

Total

N/A (Interviewer
did not ask)

1

0

0

1

Country of
Origin

63

31

74

168

Japanese

16

19

13

48

Total

80

50

87

217

68

4. Residential Area
Tokyo

9

2

6

17

Saitama

2

3

2

7

Kanagawa

44

45

77

166

Gunma

1

0

0

1

Aichi

4

0

0

4

Osaka

4

0

0

4

Hyogo

16

0

1

17

Shizuoka

0

0

1

1

Total

80

50

87

217

Age

Vietnam

Cambodia

Laos

Total

15-18

3

0

0

3

19-24

5

2

2

9

25-34

9

4

4

17

35-44

19

13

21

53

45-54

18

19

37

74

55-64

19

8

13

40

over 65

7

4

10

21

Total

80

50

87

217

5. Age69

6. Sex
Sex

Vietnam

Cambodia

Laos

Total

Male

47

27

55

129

Female

33

23

32

88

Total

80

50

87

217

Mode of Arrival

Vietnam

Cambodia

Laos

Total

N/A (Not askedorSecondgeneration)

8

1

2

11

ODP
(familyreunification for
Vietnamese
refugees)

22

0

0

22

Boat

50

1

0

51

Resettled
Refugeefrom
Oversee Camps

0

36

76

112

FamilyReunification
Program(for
Cambodian andLaotian refugees)

0

12

9

21

Total

80

50

87

217

7. Mode of Arrival708. First Contact with Interviewee
Mode of Contact

Vietnam

Cambodia

Laos

Total

Letter

36

16

19

71

Fieldwork
Coordinator

28

32

19

78

Family30

4

7

Friend02

13Interpreter

13

0

44

57

Total

80

50

87

217

Vietnam

Cambodia

Laos

Total

Others (Second
generation, bornin Japan)

4

1

0

5

More than 30(Arrived before
1979)

1

0

3

4

20-29
(Arrived 1980-89)

49

28

47

124

10-19
(Arrived 1990-99)

20

15

33

68

Under 9(Arrived after
2000)

6

6

4

16

Total

80

50

87

217

9. Number of years lived in Japan
Years

71

10. Voluntary Repatriation in the Future
Nationality

Vietnam

Cambodia

Laos

Total

Unsure or Not
25
asked

7

15

47

Certainly

8

8

14

30

Maybe

12

13

27

52

Never

35

22

31

88

Total

80

50

87

217

72

Annex II.

English Translation of Interview Questionnaire

Targeted interviewee:(A) Male refugee of first generation(B) Female refugee of first generation(C) Refugee who came to Japan as a child
The first phase of resettlement in Japan:□ When did you come to Japan?
□ When did you settle down in Japan?
□ What was your occupation in your home country?
□ Please explain how you arrived to Japan.
□ What was the reason for your resettlement in Japan?
□ What was your status of residence at that time?
□ What was the most difficult issue you encountered when you began to resettle in Japan? (Forinstance, employment, housing, education, language, healthcare, social security)□ Was the assistance from the Government of Japan (RHQ) sufficient when you started
resettlement?
□ Was the assistance from UNHCR sufficient when you started resettlement?
□ What other assistance was effective when you resettled in Japan?

Before arrival to Japan:□ The following questions were asked to those who departed their country via the Ordinary
Departure Programme.
□ Did you come to Japan to resettle for the long term, or with the expectation that you would
move on and resettle in another country?
□ Did you apply for resettlement in other countries besides Japan? If yes, what was the result? If
no, please let us know the reason why you did not apply to resettle in other countries?
□ Please explain the reason for leaving your country of origin.
□ Please explain your background while in your country of origin (place of birth, member of asocial group etc.)73

Japan’s ratification of the Refugee Convention in 1981
□ Did you experience any change to your life before and after the Japanese government accededto the Refugee Convention?
□ Reflecting on your life in Japan during the 1980s, what was the most difficult issue you
encountered? (for instance, employment, housing, education, language, healthcare, social
security)□ What do you think were the reasons for those hardships?
□ How did you gather information that was relevant to your life at that time?
□ Were you in contact with your family abroad at that time? How did you contact them?
□ Did the information from abroad, or from your family abroad, affect your life in Japan?
□ What was the most difficult issue you encountered when searching for a job, or on the job?
□ In the second half of the 1980s, the issue of ‘bogus refugees’ was taken up by the media. Did
you hear about such reports?
□ Did these media coverage about ‘bogus refugees’ affect your life?
□ At the time of this news issue, what was your opinion of Japanese society?

Economic growth in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos from the mid- 1980s to the 1990s:□ Have you ever visited your country of origin?
□ During this period of growth in Indo-Chinese countries, did the economic stabilization in yourhome country lead to any change in your life in Japan?
□ In 1990, the Immigration Control and Recognition of Refugees Act (1982) was amended. Did
this change affect your status of residence?
□ What were the most difficult issues you encountered at that time? (for instance, employment,
housing, education, language, healthcare, social security)□ What was the most difficult issue you encountered when searching for a job, or on the job?
□ At that time, was the assistance from the Japanese government sufficient?
□ At that time, was the assistance from UNHCR sufficient?
□ What was the most efficient support you received at that time?

74

The political situation in Indo-Chinese countries stabilized in the 1990s, and the ‘IndoChinese Refugee Issue’ was declared over in 1994.
□ Did the closure of the ‘Indo-Chinese Issue’ bring any change to your life in Japan?
□ Did this announcement affect your status of residence?
□ What were the most difficult issues you encountered following the end of the ‘Indo-Chinese
Refugee Issue’? (for instance, employment, housing, education, language, healthcare, social
security)□ After the closure of the issue, what was the greatest difficulty you encountered when searchingfor a job, or on the job?
□ After the closure of the issue, was the assistance from the Japanese government sufficient?
□ After the closure of the issue, was the assistance from UNHCR sufficient?
□ After the closure of the issue, what was the most efficient support you received?

Current living situation□ Please explain your current status of residence.
□ What were the reasons for acquiring, or not acquiring, Japanese citizenship?
□ What are the most difficult issues you face today? (for instance, employment, housing,education, language, healthcare, social security)□ Please explain if you are facing hardships with regard to your current employment or
education.
□ What are the reasons behind these hardships?
□ Is the assistance provided by the Japanese government sufficient?
□ Is the assistance provided by UNHCR sufficient?
□ In what language do you communicate in your family?
□ In your opinion, is there enough communication taking place?
□ Do you feel that you lack sufficient Japanese language proficiency for your work or daily life?
□ Would you like to learn the Japanese language? / Would you like to continue studying theJapanese language?

75

□ Do you feel content with your current life?
□ What is the main reason for that?
□ What are your plans for the future?
□ How would you like to spend your life after retirement and in your old age?
□ In the future, would you like to return to your home country?
□ In your opinion, do you currently contribute to the development of your home country?
□ In your opinion, do you currently contribute to the development of Japanese society?
Personal data requested from each interviewee:i•Gender: Male/Female•

Marital Status: Married/Unmarried/Divorced/Widowed•

Age: 15−18, 19−24, 25 ―34, 35 ―44, 45 ―54, 55 ―64, 65 and up•

Place of Birth:•

Period of resettlement in Japan:•

Language used at home:•

Education: primary school, junior high school, high school, vocational college, two-yearcollege/ four-year college•

Current employment: permanent employee, part-time worker, unemployed

These include, but are not limited to the following concerns:
o whether the person is a victim of torture or violenceo length of stay in country of asylum
o women-at-risk considerationso situation in country of asylum (including an assessment of security threats)o potential ability to integrate into Japanese societyo criminal recordo any relatives/acquaintances in the resettlement country
o known treatment requiring medical conditiono skills and educationo separation from nuclear family members (often left behind in country of origin)

ii One course of action would be to consult the Gaikokujin Sujuu Toshi Kaigi, an association established in2001 by 28 local governments to examine issues relating to migrant workers and foreign nationals, as it
could provide valuable knowhow on the integration of refugees in local communities.

76