Cipango - French Journal of JapaneseStudiesEnglish Selection
4 | 2015

Japan and Colonization

Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan
Critiquer le colonialisme dans le Japon d’avant 1945
Pierre‑François Souyri

Electronic version
URL: https://journals.openedition.org/cjs/1121
DOI: 10.4000/cjs.1121
ISSN: 2268-1744
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INALCOElectronic reference
Pierre‑François Souyri, “Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan ”, Cipango - French Journal ofJapanese Studies [Online], 4 | 2015, Online since 20 November 2017, connection on 08 July 2021. URL:
http://journals.openedition.org/cjs/1121 ; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/cjs.1121

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945
Japan
Critiquer le colonialisme dans le Japon d’avant 1945
Pierre‑François Souyri

EDITOR'S NOTE
Original release: Pierre‑François SOUYRI, « Critiquer le colonialisme dans le Japon
d’avant 1945 », Cipango 18, 2011, 189‑236, mis en ligne le 18 juin 2013. URL : http://
cipango.revues.org/1525 ; DOI : 10.4000/cipango.1525
On the map, I paint Korea with dark black ink
and listen to the autumn winds.
地図の上 朝鮮国にくろぐろと墨をぬりつつ 秋風をきく
Ishikawa Takuboku, 1910,
at the time of Korea’s annexation by Japan.
(Translation from IWAKI, Y., 1989. Takuboku and Korea, Comparative Literature Studies.
vol. 26, no. 3, East‑West Issue, p 242.
Available at <http://www.jstor.org/> [Accessed 09 July 2013])
1

From the moment Japan began to implement its colonial policies, critical voices
emerged within the country over this new means of dominating overseas populations.
This little‑known yet clearly expressed criticism of colonialism became increasingly
audible during the so‑called Taishō democracy (1912‑1926) before gradually being
stifled once more at the end of the 1930s. Unlike the views expressed in favour ofpolitical freedom, which were enthusiastically received by Japanese society, criticism ofimperialism and colonialism garnered little support. Following in the tradition of theFreedom and Popular Rights Movement of the 1880s, the middle classes identified withthe calls for greater freedom and democracy, and partly concurred with working‑classaspirations to better living conditions. However, the vast majority of the population

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

believed that there was something to be gained—in addition to national pride—fromthe country’s expansionist adventures that culminated in the creation of a colonial
empire.
2

The Korean independence movement, Chinese boycott of Japanese products or failureof Japan’s military campaign in Siberia might have encouraged Japan to take a morecautious approach to foreign policy and critically examine its own colonial practices.
Indeed, there was hesitation among Japan’s ruling circles as to how to govern thecolonies. In 1919, the debate that had lain dormant since Japan’s first experiments incolonisation, in Taiwan at the end of the nineteenth century, finally burst into the
public arena. Should colonial governments be left to the army or placed under civil
administration? Was the aim of colonisation strategic (keeping Westerners at a
distance), economic (increasing Japan’s wealth by exploiting the colonies) or rather
civilising, by expanding Japan’s borders and culturally assimilating the conquered
populations? And was it even possible for these populations to be assimilated, for thatmatter? Debate raged as to the how or even why to colonise but no one, at least notwithin the ruling circles, questioned colonisation itself.

3

In Taiwan, Japanese efforts to take control of the island as of 1895 had met with aresistance that it would take time to eradicate. The government of the new colony had
thus naturally been placed in the hands of the army, something which did not preventhigh ranking civil servants such as Gotō Shinpei 後藤新平 (1857‑1929) and Nitobe Inazō
新渡戸稲造 (1862‑1933) from enjoying a certain amount of leeway in subsequent years,
with Nitobe notably being tasked by Gotō with developing an agricultural policy for
subtropical regions. Similarly, the annexation of Korea came about in a context of
extreme tension following the assassination of the previous Japanese Resident‑Generalof Korea and guerrilla activities against Japan. The military therefore had control of thecolonial administrative system. Prime Minister Hara Takashi 原敬 (1918‑21), when
appointing his new cabinet, was for his part opposed to the army controlling thecolonies and in favour of snatching back power by imposing a civil administration.

4

In the aftermath of the anti‑Japanese protests that raged across Korea in the springof 1919, criticism of the army, which controlled the country and had chosen the path ofbrutal repression, even reached within government ranks in Tokyo. The Korean
reaction was interpreted as a show of discontent with the Japanese military
government in Korea rather than a genuine national demand for independence.
Following a period of violent repression, the colonial regime made concessions byabandoning militarism (budan shugi 武断主義) and henceforth advocating a moretolerant policy aimed at replacing army personnel with senior civil servants, who weretheoretically less violent and more conciliating (bunchi shugi 文治主義). Welcomed by
the Koreans with some relief, this new and less repressive colonial government showed
a willingness to allow a Korean cultural discourse (bunka seiji 文化政治) to develop.
While throughout Japan there was talk of Japan and Korea sharing the same political
destiny (nissen dōchi 日鮮同治), over on the peninsula this policy was quickly suspectedof being nothing more than an attempt to crush the fledgling Korean national identity.
It chiefly succeeded in dividing the Korean nationalist movement into moderate“cultural” nationalism on the one hand and pro‑independence radicalism on the other.
A “desperate instability” hailing from the inmost depths of Korean society was visible
in the face of Japan’s thirst for assimilation.1

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan5

Doubts quickly surfaced in Japan itself as to whether it was possible to assimilate
colonial populations. Remember that one of the characteristics of Japanese colonialism
is to have constantly wavered between a policy of assimilation, dōka seisaku 同化政策
(Taiwanese and Koreans would one day become fully‑fledged Japanese), and one ofnon‑assimilation, dōka seisaku hantai ron 同化政策反対論, based on the idea of an
immutable and uniquely Japanese character and thus the impossibility of turning
colonial peoples into Japanese subjects in their own right.

6

Advocates of assimilation were driven by a kind of ideal in which the Japanese nation
was assigned a civilising role. Colonial peoples were Japanese citizens who were simply
unaware of it. In fact, it was in their interest to become Japanese in order to enjoy thebenefits of modernisation as part of Greater Japan. Encouraged by this ideal, in thelate 1930s they began to accelerate the process of remoulding colonial peoples intosovereign subjects (kōminka 皇民化), a process otherwise known as “imperialisation”.
Pseudo‑scientific theories on the shared ancestry of the Japanese and Koreans were
often used to give weight to their aspirations.2 Some even went as far as suggesting, atthe end of the 1930s, that the two populations intermarry (Japanese men with Korean
women) in order to encourage the assimilation of the peninsula into Japan (naisen ittai
内鮮一体). The purported advantage of this policy was to guarantee a lasting peace
between Japan and Korea by creating a mixed nation (kongō minzoku ron 混合民族論).

7

Proponents of non‑assimilation, who were often close to the ruling circles of the army,
were colonialists for economic and strategic reasons and their national pride meantthat they were hardly likely to imagine that colonial populations could be assimilated,much less that they could intermarry with metropolitan Japanese. However, their fears
over the possibility of a colonial uprising that would weaken positions outside ofJapan’s zone of control made them inclined to advocate leaving the colonial
populations to determine their own affairs, a policy known as minzoku jiketsu seisaku 民
族自決政策. This explains why the assimilationists at times adopted harsher politicalstands with regards the colonial populations than those who believed in the uniquenessof the Japanese “race” and were quick to develop—as in the case of Tōgō Minoru 東郷実—a theorisation of “racial differentiation” akin to apartheid (bunka seisaku 分化政策). 3
Local elites within the colonies occasionally took advantage of this contradiction by
supporting alternately one camp or the other.

8

Furthermore, remember that from the mid‑1880s Japanese advocates of freedom andpopular rights nurtured the idea that because Japan was changing and looking ahead tothe future it had an obligation to help its neighbours, and in particular Korea, bring an
end to immobilism. In 1884, Liberal Party (Jiyūtō 自由党) leaders Gotō Shōjirō 後藤象二郎 (1838‑1897) and Itagaki Taisuke 板垣退助 (1837‑1919) made plans for a military coupin Korea designed to rid the peninsula of the traditionalism of the ruling monarchy
which was an impediment to civilisation.4 Gotō even entertained dreams of becoming
prime minister of a liberated Korea! The following year, Ōi Kentarō 大井憲太郎(1843‑1922), leader of the Liberal Party’s most radical wing, in turn considered using
armed force to prise Korea from the hands of conservatives and overthrow thegovernment via military means.5 The intellectual Tsurumi Shunsuke (1922‑2015) points
out that at the end of the nineteenth century political factions on both sides of thedivide agreed that civilisation must be imposed, if necessary by force. 6 In 1905, thejournalist and historian Takekoshi Yosaburō 竹越与三郎 (1865‑1950) wrote thefollowing in an essay on the colonial government in Taiwan ten years after annexation:

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

Western nations have long believed that on their shoulders alone rested the
responsibility of colonizing the yet‑unopened portions of the globe and extending
to the inhabitants the benefits of civilization; but now we Japanese, rising from theocean in the extreme Orient, wish as a nation to take part in this great and glorious
work. Could we also, unknowingly, carry on our shoulders the yellow man’sburden? The answer will depend on our success or failure in Taiwan. 7
9For his part, the socialist (and future anarchist) Kōtoku Shūsui 幸徳秋水 (1871‑1911)
began to voice criticism of imperialism in 1901, deeming it a warmongering activity
that encouraged militaristic and despotic tendencies. He paid little attention, however,to the subject of colonialism and drew no parallels between imperialism and colonial
exploitation as such.8 Consequently, it was only gradually, at the beginning of
the 1910s, that the first critics emerged. Later, the influence of the Russian Revolution,
the right to self‑determination, the social unrest that swept the country and the spreadof democratic ideals led some to launch a direct attack on imperialism and its
immediate and tangible consequence: colonialism. The socialists, communists andanarchists showed an unwavering and instinctive distrust of colonialism, considering it
to be linked to imperialism and warmongering just as Kōtoku had argued. Nevertheless,solidarity with colonial peoples appeared to be secondary in their struggle and rare
were those who made anti‑colonialism a priority. For their part, certain liberals drewon an economic analysis to show that the financial cost of running the colonies
exceeded any profits generated. Considered immoral, brutal and irresponsible by some,for others Japan’s colonial policies were above all costly and ineffective. Lying between
these two positions championed, as we shall see, by some eminent individuals, was awhole spectrum of intermediate positions in which indignation at times coloured theeconomic debate. Others took offense at the colonial governments’ ignorance of local
cultures and criticised their desire to deny or destroy these in the name of what waspresented as a modern and civilised colonial policy.

10

Anti‑colonial thought in Japan fell into three main categories.

11

Firstly, there was a “moral” criticism that emerged essentially as an indictment of therepressive methods employed by the police and military in the colonies, particularly inthe wake of the protest movements of 1919. The majority of critics in this camp took
issue with a policy they believed only made sense if it were to do “good”, whereas infact it was doing “harm”. They fought on behalf of “others”, “thought of the Korean
people”, but were not necessarily opposed to the colonial enterprise itself, which they
saw as inherently positive but in need of reform and improvement. Ultimately, the idea
as they saw it was to “civilise”, “modernise” and even “democratise” the colonialsocieties. Most of those in this camp were virulent critics of assimilation and grewincreasingly critical of the brutality inherent in the colonial system. They underlined
the originality and importance of colonial or semi‑colonial peoples’ cultures and were
overtly hostile to the steamroller approach adopted by colonial Japan in its “cultural
policy”. This moral criticism—which remained marginal prior to 1919—became
increasingly vocal in the 1920s and 30s.

12

In addition to this there was an “economic” criticism, a product of Western liberal
thought. This criticism—which was ultimately fairly radical in nature—was anything
but altruistic. It emerged at the beginning of the Taishō period to condemn Japan’scolonial, and more broadly imperialist, policies as unprofitable, pointless anddangerous because they ultimately led to war. These policies entailed an increase inwhat was seen as Japan’s uneconomical military budgets. Colonialism and imperialism

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

conflicted with the well‑known interests of the country, the state and the nation, as
well as being morally questionable. Critics in this camp were anti‑colonial on principle
but took little interest in the protest movements of colonial peoples, other than to
declare that they would inevitably lead to independence and thus to Japan’s predictable
failure.
13

Finally, criticism of the colonial system emerged within Japan’s academic community
itself, precisely from certain university professors responsible for teaching colonial
affairs. From this point of view, Yanaihara Tadao 矢内原忠雄 (1893‑1961), who beganteaching in 1923, was emblematic. In some ways he attempted to combine the twocurrents of thought described here, blending economic criticism, moral criticism and aconsideration for the aspirations of colonial peoples. In the 1930s he began to foresee
the independence of the colonies as the ultimate aim of the process underway.

14

Each of the three types of anti‑colonial thought briefly defined here was embodied at
one point or other by certain “figures” whose background and political ideas will be
described in this paper. Of course, these thinkers may have influenced one another, andsome critics of colonialism may, depending on the period or their own politicalbackground, have focused their criticism in turn on one or other of the following
aspects: colonialism is morally unacceptable because fundamentally brutal andoppressive; culturally stupid because destructive and ignorant of local realities; costly
in financial terms because not profitable for the nation.

Denouncing Repression and Promoting Indigenous
Cultures
15

The pro‑independence or nationalist movements that broke out in Korea and China inthe spring of 1919 were portrayed in Japan’s mainstream media as essentiallyanti‑Japanese in nature and consequently garnered little sympathy in the home islands.
Some Japanese newspapers even suggested that the Koreans had been manipulated byWestern Christian missionaries hostile to Japan’s presence on the peninsula.

16

One of the first people to denounce this simplistic analysis of the movements sweeping
the continent was Yoshino Sakuzō 吉野作造 (1878‑1933), a professor of political scienceat Tokyo Imperial University. Beginning in 1905, Yoshino advocated the“constitutionalism at home, imperialism abroad” doctrine (uchi ni rikkenshugi, soto ni
teikokushugi 内に立憲 主義、外に帝国主義); however, his stays in China and Korea in
addition to his own political reflection gradually led him to distance himself from thepositions he had defended in his youth. This political U‑turn took place between 1916
and 1918 and was rooted in a certain confidence in the rise of democratic forces within
Japan, as well as in China and Korea. Yoshino argued for a democracy that would becompatible with the Constitution of 1889 and could be developed within the frameworkof the imperial system. He called it minpon shugi 民本主義, or imperial democracy. 9
Henceforth, his proclaimed ideal was to “achieve democracy at home and establish
racial equality abroad (uchi ni minpon shugi no tettei, soto ni kokusai byōdōshugi nokakuritsu 内に民本主義の徹底、外に国際平等主義の確立) and he argued in favour of
the right of colonial peoples to self‑determination (minzoku jiketsu 民族自決). 10

17

Like many Japanese political observers, Yoshino Sakuzō had been highly impressedwith the Chinese nationalist revolution of 1911 in which the country was proclaimed a

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japanrepublic. He felt a connection to the Chinese revolutionaries11 and even wrote a historyof the Chinese revolution which he published in 1917.12 In articles published oversubsequent years he began to criticise the Japanese government’s heavy‑handed
approach on the continent and advocated a rapprochement between Japan and the
young Chinese nationalists who “held the country’s future in their hands”. 13 Moreover,
he became increasingly critical of the methods used by the kenpeitai 憲兵隊, Japan’s
military police famous for its operations in overseas territories. 14 He regretfully
expressed serious doubts as to the ultimate possibility of assimilating the Korean
people into the Japanese nation, arguing that the Korean peninsula had long possessed
its own civilisation quite distinct from that of Japan.
18

Yoshino warmly welcomed Chinese and Korean students to his classes and seminars,
and invited them into his home for open discussion, something which in the context
was not always simple. He travelled to China and Korea once again in 1916 and it waswith this trip that the first doubts began to surface:
I have met many Koreans this year and listening to what they have to say, it is clear
that, contrary to expectation, many speak of the current injustice of the Japanesepolitical authorities in their country. Whether this injustice is real or not matterslittle, but we would be wrong to ignore what they say.15

19

The nationalist and social upsurge in China and Korea at the end of the First World War
led Yoshino to distance himself more clearly from Japan’s policy. In October 1918 hewrote a short article in which he quoted comments made by the professor of colonialstudies at Kyoto imperial University, Yamamoto Miono 山本美越乃 (1874‑1941), who inthe daily newspaper Osaka Mainichi Shinbun 大阪毎日新聞 explained that the Koreans“had always possessed their own culture” and that it was “futile to ignore theircustoms, institutions and mores when governing them”. Yoshino then took on aprophetic air, concluding that:
The Korean issue will shortly become Japan’s main political concern: we must
realise that thanks to the war, Korea’s nationalist factions have grown significantly.
16

20

Following the Korean nationalist movement of March 1919, which saw a rash ofanti‑Japanese protests,17 Yoshino Sakuzō decided to invite his Korean students toReimeikai18 meetings and gave them the opportunity to argue for the independence of
their country, to the applause of the listening audience. He explained that Japan mustalso learn to see things from a Korean perspective if it was to understand the events
taking place. He was backed by a small but significant section of public opinion. At oneof these meetings, university professor Fukuda Tokuzō 福田徳三 (1874‑1930) declared
outright that “Korea did not belong to the militarist cliques” and that it “was high time
constitutional law was applied there”.19 However, Yoshino’s writings also attracted a
growing hostility from nationalist quarters.

21

A few weeks later, during the Chinese May Fourth movement of 1919, Yoshino Sakuzō
was one of the rare intellectuals to speak out in the Japanese press in favour of theChinese nationalists boycotting Japanese products. He explained that these movements“that had made the Japanese somewhat nervous” targeted the Tokyo bureaucracy andthe military and financial cliques rather than the Japanese people itself:
For many years I have fought to free my beloved country from the hands of thebureaucratic and military cliques. I do not get the impression that the Peking
students are at this moment doing anything different. I can only wish such a
movement success.20

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

22

Following on from this, Yoshino succeeded in inviting a delegation of teachers andstudents from Beijing University to Tokyo “to help foster a better understanding
between the young of both countries”. It was also around this time that a large numberof pro‑democracy journalists and professors travelled to Manchuria, Beijing andShanghai in an attempt to understand the events taking place on the continent. In
May 1920 the Chinese visitors spoke in public to explain the substance of the
May Fourth movement to Reimeikai members and the Shinjinkai .21 The students
welcomed them with interest and questioned them at length. Much the same can besaid of the interest of these societies in reflecting on colonial problems, in particular
Korea. They pronounced themselves in favour of an “improvement” (kaizen 改善) inJapan’s policy on the peninsula.22 Note that any issues of the Shinjinkai’s journal that
dealt with Korea were censured and banned from publication. Yoshino condemned therepressive tactics used by the colonial government in Korea in 1919 (leading to
8,000 deaths and 45,000 arrests),23 describing them as “inadmissible” and “immoral”, 24
in particular the massacres committed by Japanese police at Suwŏn in 1919 and the
district of Jiandao 間島 (in an area of Manchuria heavily populated by Koreans) 25 in
October 1920. These incidents were passed over in silence by both the government andthe press.26 In articles supporting the demands of the Korean movement, Yoshinoargued for the protesters to receive in response the abolition of the colonial
government’s discrimination against Koreans, an end to military rule, freedom of
expression, and the abandonment of Japan’s assimilation policy.

23

Despite his bold stances and sympathy for the Chinese and Korean nationalist
movements, which he considered to be democratic in aspiration, Yoshino Sakuzō neverlapsed into anti‑colonialism. While he argued for a utopian liberal colonialism that did
not repress independence movements and granted the colonial populations greater
freedom and democracy, he never challenged the principle behind the colony:
No one doubts that from a legal standpoint Koreans are Japanese subjects. However,in reality Koreans are not of the Yamato race. In the Empire of Japan currently
being built by the Yamato people, Koreans are like a distant offspring and in truththat is difficult to hide. We would like to be able to hope enthusiastically that
Koreans might feel the same sense of loyalty to Japan as inhabitants of the homeislands, but it stands to reason that we cannot impose such a feeling by force, andthough it is difficult to admit, this is not currently the case. 27

24

In response to the Korean nationalist movement of March 1919 and its repression by
the Japanese colonial authorities, Yanagi Sōetsu (1889‑1961) joined others in objecting
strenuously to the government’s attitude and took up the Koreans’ defence. “Seeingthat no one was publicly defending the unfortunate Koreans, I wrote in haste,” 28 he saidon the subject of “Sympathy for the Koreans”, a hard‑hitting text he published in the
Yomiuri Shinbun (20‑22 May 1919). “Who really believes that people can be boundtogether by a military government and repression? […] Lovers of peace can but smile
bitterly at the thought,”29 he wrote, adding that:
If we seek eternal peace with our neighbours we must purify our hearts with love
and immerse ourselves in compassion. Unfortunately, Japan has instead brandishedthe sword and offered abuse. Is this the way to mutual understanding, cooperationand collaboration? It is not. What is felt by the Koreans is limitless animosity, adesire to resist, hatred and a longing for separation. Consequently, they have but
one ideal: independence. It is quite natural that they would feel no love for Japan,
and only a handful of people hold our country in esteem.30

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

25

Known today as the founding father of the Folk Art Movement, an art critic and aphilosopher of religion, Yanagi Sōetsu31 went against the dominant thinking of his time,
embodied in the 1880s by Fukuzawa Yukichi 福沢諭吉 (1835‑1901) in his essay “Leaving
Asia” (Datsu A ron 脱亜論), as well as the opinions articulated in the 1890s by advocatesof pro‑Japanese nationalism (kokusuishugi 国粋主義). Yanagi believed that this mannerof thinking led the Japanese to develop an inferiority complex towards Westerners anda feeling of superiority over other Asians. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Yanagi
did not believe that the Japanese were “superior” to Koreans, something that was quiterare at the time.32 In any case, Yanagi Sōetsu felt neither inferior to Westerners nor saw
their existence as a pressure. His thinking took shape during the Taishō democracy, inwhat can only be described as favourable conditions. Many people during this period
believed that with Japan having finally achieved equal status with the great powers it
would be treated as an equal by the West and thus rid itself of the unpleasantinferiority complex developed by certain Japanese towards “Whites”, a feeling known
as gaison naihi 外尊内卑 (idolising foreigners, disparaging oneself), described back inthe 1890s by the nationalist Miyake Setsurei 三宅雪嶺 (1860‑1945).

26

A graduate of Gakushūin 学習院—the school of Japan’s aristocracy—and one of themost influential members of the literary group Shirakaba 白樺, Yanagi Sōetsu early on
developed ties with Westerners living in Japan. He notably struck up a friendship with
Bernard Leach, the great connoisseur of Far Eastern artistic culture, future author of
A Potter’s Book and introducer of Japanese raku33 pottery to Europe. Yanagi travelled to
Korea with Leach on several occasions and it was Leach who introduced Yanagi to thebeauty of Korean pottery. Leach’s fascination with Far Eastern art was equal only tothat of Yanagi for Japanese, Korean and even Chinese folk art. Yanagi was particularly
struckin 1914bythebeautyofChosŏn white porcelain, which was generally considered “plain” and had previously
attracted little admiration. He was one of the first in Japan to take an unprejudiced lookat Korean culture and admire its aesthetic—which he described as “a bitter beauty”—, 34
paying tribute in the process to those who had created these works. He saw himself as akind of Lafcadio Hearn, who had done so much to increase understanding of Japaneseculture in the West.35 To the Japanese who had previously considered Korea to benothing but a wretched and impoverished country, Yanagi’s views were revolutionary.
He introduced those who listened to him to “a different Korea”. Beauty transcends
borders, explained Yanagi, who made numerous trips to Korea and began to establish acollection of local crafts.

27

However, Yanagi was not merely a political commentator and did not content himself
with adopting a purely aesthetical standpoint. His stance cannot merely be described as
an indictment of violent repression. It was also a plea for the protection of Korean
culture and a criticism of Japanese tactics and reasoning:
We employ methods designed to make it impossible for Koreans to achieve fullindependence. We also refuse to recognise that they might have their own ways ofthinking and offer them nothing but an education and morals geared towards
Japan. In short, whether in material or spiritual matters we have robbed them of
their freedom and independence. Some argue that we are sowing the seeds that will
enable them to think like the Japanese, but we make no attempt to reach theirhearts. When we approach them it is always with the sword, never the heart. 36

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan28

To this he added: “such a policy will never give rise to peace in the colonies”. 37 Afterdemonstrating all that Japan’s ancient art owed to Korean influences, Yanagi thenwrote:
Instead of Japan being grateful [to Korea for having passed down its art], it isdestroying this unique Korean art. Enthusiasts collect ancient artefacts but have nointention of reviving the very thing that enabled this art to exist. If this is what is
known as the way of “assimilation”, it is terrifying. I believe that Japan’s true
mission is to preserve for Korea its merit of occupying a prominent place ininternational art. Education should be designed to nurture this art, not destroy it. 38

29

The following year, in his “Letter to My Korean Friends” published in the journal Kaizōin June 1920, he criticised the colonial policies that had robbed Korea of its
independence and destroyed its unique culture:
The Koreans are full of sorrow and suffering. Their flag no longer flies high in thesky and despite it being spring, the sueka flowers seem to have closed their buds
forever. Their own culture grows more distant by the day and is disappearing fromtheir villages. The vestiges of their civilisation, so remarkable in many respects,
now belong as if to the pages of an old book. People come and go with heads bowed,
their shoulders hunched over in pain and resentment. Even when they speak it is inhushed tones. Common people turn their backs on the sun and gather only indarkness. What force drives you to hide yourselves so? I can well imagine how yourminds and bodies are gripped by a sombre mood. Are your tears really of blood?
Man can endure suffering with ease but cannot live where there is neither love nor
freedom.39

30

Yanagi repeatedly spoke of the closeness and affinity he felt towards Koreans and theircivilisation. “Korea and Japan are historically, geographically, ethnically andlinguistically as close as brothers. The current situation is absolutely wrong. Korea islike a brother to Japan and yet is treated as a slave”. 40 By addressing Koreans directly
and speaking of his many Korean friends, well‑known or otherwise, Yanagi employedan effective rhetorical device that enabled Japanese readers to put themselves incolonial peoples’ shoes. In a text from 1920 he wrote that to Koreans, Japan was
doubtless nothing but a violent and merciless country.41 He presented the unvarnishedviewpoint of the other, using empathy as a means of denouncing the system. At times
he asked Japanese readers to put themselves in the Koreans’ position: “Oh, if only theJapanese could put themselves in the Koreans’ shoes,” he wrote on several occasions. 42
He also criticised the stupidity of the education system developed in Korea by thecolonial authorities and which was designed to instil Japanese values while denying thehistory of Korean culture. Vehemently opposed to the Japanese policy of assimilation,
Yanagi questioned, in the voice of a Korean: “Japan is providing us with an education; isit for us or for them? Young Koreans are asked to idolise as heroes those who arenothing but thieves”.43

31

Yanagi believed that the Japanese should take a critical look at themselves with regards
these questions. “I would like Koreans to know that amongst us other Japanese there
are those who believe that in this affair Japan is trampling morality underfoot”. 44 In the
text addressed to his Korean friends he criticised “the domineering Japan”, to which hewould prefer a more compassionate Japan, and wished for “humane Japanese”. He
deemed the situation in Korea at the time to be “abnormal” and “unnatural”. Part ofhis text was censored by the authorities and its translation in a Korean‑language
journal suspended.45

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

32

When the colonial government indicated its intention of destroying the Kwanghwa
Gate at Kyŏngbok Palace in Seoul in order to erect an enormous modern building
designed to house the new headquarters of the Government‑General, Yanagi wasscandalised. What the colonisers saw as the symbolic victory of Japanese modernity
over Korea’s past (the original gate had been built in 1395), Koreans saw as an attack on
a symbol of their national history. Yanagi felt that the Japanese authorities werecommitting yet another blunder, one caused by uneducated and blind bureaucrats who
knew nothing of Korea’s history and the peninsula’s nascent nationalism. In
September 1922 he published an article in Kaizō on the Korean architectural treasuresabout to be destroyed by the Japanese. It took the form of a letter to the Kwanghwa
Gate: “Kwanghwa Gate, Kwanghwa Gate, your days are now numbered. All memory of
your existence in this world is soon to disappear into cold oblivion”. 46 He extoled thebuilding’s virtues, writing: “Oh, Kwanghwa Gate, so magnificent in appearance” 47 andpossessing “tranquil beauty and dignity”. In this way, Yanagi expressed his sympathy
for the Korean people who were to be deprived of a part of themselves, defended art ingeneral and challenged the ridiculous idea of constructing a modern building “totallydevoid of creative beauty” on such a historic site. He deplored the fact that no one wasreally able to come to the monument’s defence, and even worse, that those who
opposed its destruction were accused of being conspirators.48 He did not hesitate totake his Japanese readership to task, writing “Readers, do not look down on this gate by
declaring it nothing but a piece from the late Chosŏn period”. 49 He also criticised a
policy that showed no restraint with regards art. “Oh, Kwanghwa Gate, what sorrow
you must feel!” His vehemence and irony tinged with despair touched a certain numberof Japanese decision‑makers, who decided to go ahead with their building but without
destroying the gate, which was dismantled and rebuilt on another location. 50 Yanagi
was subsequently listed by the Japanese authorities as a “dangerous person”. 51

33

His “discovery” of a “folk art” created by traditional craftsmen in Korea, at a time when
Japan was repressing the local population, led Yanagi Sōetsu to express views thatbordered on anti‑colonialism. As far as Yanagi was concerned, the fact thatindependence had become an ideal for Koreans was merely the inevitable consequenceof the resentment they felt towards their oppressors. However, he was demoralised byhis powerlessness to influence political decision‑making in Tokyo or Seoul. Along withsome of his Japanese friends in Seoul who supported the Korean cause (a few did exist,
such as the Asakawa brothers Noritaka and Takumi,52 who had decided to settle in
Korea at the beginning of the 1910s due to their love of Korean art and crafts and whohelped Yanagi to understand Korean art), he struck up friendships with Korean artists
and intellectuals such as Yom Sangso and Nam Kyŏngbok, reformist nationalists who
were instrumental in establishing a history of Korean literature and Korea’s popular
movements. In 1924 Yanagi founded a small Museum of Korean Folk Art in Seoul,stating his ambition as being to help Koreans better understand and appreciate theirown culture.

34

Yanagi is considered by some Korean nationalists today as having promoted a kind ofcolonial legitimacy. They accuse him of helping to strengthen the Japanese regime in
Korea by promoting Korean culture and becoming a kind of front for Japan’s “cultural
policy”. Appointed by Prime Minister Hara Takashi in 1919, the new Governor‑General
Saitō Makoto 斎藤実 (1858‑1936) was generally regarded as a liberal. In fact, Saitō had
previously worked under Yanagi’s father and assisted Yanagi in his projects. This might

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japango some way to explaining the assistance granted to Yanagi by certain representativesof the colonial authorities when he was attempting to set up his museum. 53 Yanagi’squestionable view of the “sorrowful” aesthetics of Korean art undoubtedly has a knackfor ruffling certain sensibilities in Korea today. However, his views must be considered
in context and while he had his faults, he nonetheless helped promote a widely
underestimated pottery. After all, where are the French aesthetes capable of founding a
museum of Algerian folk art in 1920s’ Algeria?
35

A spate of pogroms erupted in September 1923 following the Great Kantō Earthquake.
They mainly targeted Korean immigrants, who were killed in their thousands as thepolice stood by and did nothing. Yoshino Sakuzō immediately took up his pen to
denounce the massacres, even going as far as showing that the police often supplied
arms to the killers. His articles succeeded in touching a segment of public opinion andeven some cabinet members, who demanded an end to the massacres. 54 The Shinjinkai
published a special issue of their journal one month after the earthquake entitled“Tanemaku hito no tachiba” 種蒔く人の立場 (The Seed Sower’s Position). They spoke ofthe violence “with repugnance”, writing “Try as we may, we cannot erase what
happened”.55

36

Hysteria gripped the Japanese media the following year when the American House ofRepresentatives prepared to pass a new law on immigration (the Immigration Act
of 1924) that contained overtly racist and anti‑Japanese clauses. In May 1924,
Yamakawa Kikue 山川菊栄 (1890‑1980), a feminist with communist leanings,
denounced the anti‑Japanese movement in the United States and criticised in the nameof racial equality the egoism of the Americans; however, she continued:
During the great earthquake and fires of San Francisco [in 1907], did the American
police and army use the disaster as an excuse to openly display their anti‑Japanesesentiments and racial prejudices? Did they attempt to slaughter a large number ofJapanese? Did the Japanese in America meet the same fate as the Koreans and someworkers during the great earthquake last autumn [September 1923]? Do Koreans,
Taiwanese and other foreign peoples living in Japan really receive the same
treatment as metropolitan Japanese on a political, social and economic level? Andamong native Japanese, do women and workers really enjoy the same rights as
everyone else, despite having–and quite rightly–the same duties? And even for theJapanese, there are far too many areas given sacred status, in which according to
one’s gender, level of education or wealth, certain places are off‑limits, as if a signat the entrance read: “no entry to those belonging to inferior groups or peoples”. 56

37

This text, motivated by what was deemed the unacceptable attitude of the American
authorities, was one of the first not only to denounce the status and condition ofcolonial peoples within the home islands of Japan, but also to broach the need toeradicate the widespread discrimination suffered by certain social groups.
Yamakawa Kikue recognised the need to link the struggle of colonial peoples with thelabour and feminist movements.57

Great or Small Japan?
38

Among the democratic intellectuals, Ishibashi Tanzan 石橋湛山 (1884‑1973) was known
for his indictment of imperialism. An advocate of “Small Japanism” (shō nippon shugi 小日本主義), Ishibashi believed, based on what he presented as rational arguments, thatimperialism and colonialism cost more in the long run than they contributed to Japan,

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japanand that they encouraged the intrusive and inadvisable presence of military cliques in
the main organs of state. Ishibashi Tanzan was one of the first to hold the view that
expansionism was counter to democracy. In this sense, he stood in stark contrast to
someone like Yoshino Sakuzō, who for many years supported the “democracy at home,
imperialism abroad” doctrine. Given his post‑war career (he served as finance ministerfrom 1946 to 1947, then as prime minister for a few weeks in 1956‑1957),
Ishibashi Tanzan’s opinions clearly carried a certain weight. 58
39

Ishibashi Tanzan was a graduate of the Tokyo Vocational School (Tokyo Senmon Gakkō
東京専門学校, later renamed Waseda University). Having studied philosophy, he was
influenced by the pragmatism of John Dewey (and in fact invented a Japanesetranslation of the word pragmatism: sayōshugi 作用主義). He joined the agency Tōyō,
which published several newspapers, and began by writing in Tōyō Jiron 東洋時論, amagazine founded in 1910 which opposed the old moral code in the name ofindividualism, supported the recently formed feminist movement and criticised theimperial government’s repression of socialism. During the High Treason Incidentof 1911, Tōyō Jiron, which was incensed by the death sentences handed down to theanarchists, was banned by the censors on several occasions. Soon after, Ishibashi joined
the journal Tōyō Keizai Shinpō 東洋経済新報 (The Far Eastern Economic Review), despite
having no real training in economics. In addition to economic and financial news, thejournal also addressed political, diplomatic and social issues from a liberal standpoint.
It was particularly hostile to the constant inflation of Japan’s military budgets. The
preserve of Waseda graduates, Tōyō Keizai Shinpō was considered at the time to be one of
the bastions of radical liberalism (kyūshinteki jiyūshugi 急進的自由主義) and in
subsequent years quickly became a reference journal for its often clear‑sighted andnonconformist views. The group was headed by Miura Tetsutarō 三浦鉄太郎,
Ishibashi’s mentor. Ishibashi enjoyed a glittering career with the journal, becoming oneof its most outstanding journalists and finally its editor‑in‑chief. A self‑taught
economist, Ishibashi Tanzan went on to become a true liberal, a follower of thethinking of Adam Smith, and also argued in favour of establishing free‑trade
agreements between Japan and Korea.59 Despite being an unwavering liberal at a timeof rampant state interventionism, Ishibashi was often consulted by Japanese leaders in
the 1930s for his economic expertise.60

40

In the mid‑1910s, Ishibashi Tanzan focused his criticism on Tokyo’s foreign policy andthe doctrine known as “Great Japanism” (Dai Nipponshugi 大日本主義), which resulted
in a desire to produce ever more arms. He advocated a different approach, that of“Small Japanism”. The idea was given to him by Miura Tetsutarō, who in 1918 wrote anarticle entitled “Great Japanism or Small Japanism?” in which he showed that inGreat Britain, the imperial party, which championed the idea of a Greater Britain,
clashed with the liberals, who favoured non‑interventionism and free trade and were
opposed to colonial protectionism. Miura lamented that Japan had no political parties
advocating a “Small Japan”61 and only those in favour of a Great Japan. Proponents ofGreat Japanism suggested that it would be impossible to increase Japan’s wealth anddevelop the country without overseas expansion.62 However, pointed out Miura, if thiswas the case, why had Japan seen no improvement in its well‑being? Why on thecontrary was its standard of living falling? The truth was that expanding Japan’s
territories overseas required considerable sums of money to defend, manage anddevelop them; a “Small Japan”, on the other hand, would allow those in power toCipango - French Journal of Japanese Studies, 4 | 201512

Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

concentrate on improving living conditions and developing popular liberties. He
contrasted Great Japanism, which through overseas expansion promised increased
militarism and state despotism, with Small Japanism, which through expansion
conceived as a domestic phenomenon promised industrialisation, liberalism andindividualism.63 However, at no point did he mention the fate of the colonial
populations. Miura used statistical evidence to demonstrate the financial burden
inflicted on Japan by the colonies and ultimately denounced the illusion of Great
Japanism, an expression that Ishibashi would later adopt himself.
41

In 1914, Ishibashi was one of the rare individuals to clearly oppose Japan entering the
war alongside the Allies and state his hostility to using the war to obtain territorial
advantages or financial gain in China. Carving up China would only lead to increased
conflict between the great powers, he wrote.64 His predictions became a reality thefollowing year when Japan issued the Chinese government with its Twenty‑One
Demands. He condemned the aggressive tactics of the “military cliques”, explainingthat any economic and military advantages the Chinese government might be forced toconcede in the short term would be wiped out in the medium term by deteriorating
relations between the two countries and an inevitable increase in anti‑Japanesesentiment which, in the long run, would cost more to Japan than any advantages
obtained. Unlike Kōtoku Shūsui in the 1900s or Yoshino Sakuzō, his contemporary,
Ishibashi was not driven by questions of morality nor a desire to denounce theexcessive aspects of a policy. He based his analysis on a purely economic calculation
and an almost obsessively objective reasoning. He turned the prevailing logic at thattime on its head. His argument was not that Japan should relinquish Manchuria or
Qingdao in order to maintain good international relations or to please the Chinese
people, but rather for the good of the Japanese nation. Eschewing mystical, imperial
talk of the “national body”, or kokutai 国体, Ishibashi advocated running the state like abusiness, in other words, showing at least a modicum of rationality with regards
Japan’s interests and paying no heed to absurd ideology. For Ishibashi, imperialism
meant the easy way, mediocrity, short term and the absence of real ambition. Japan
lacked a true vision of the future.

42

Japan’s policy in China was based, he added, on an incredible superiority complex
displayed by the Japanese towards the Chinese:65
The vocabulary speaks only of Sino‑Japanese friendship, China and Japan form one
same people, their relationship is fraternal, like an elder brother with a younger
sibling […], but in reality the Japanese have only one thing in mind: engulfing
China. Friendly relations cannot be built on such a basis […]; if we truly want toestablish friendly Sino‑Japanese relations, the only solution is to abandon ourimperialist policy.66

43

In the aftermath of the anti‑Japanese protests that swept across Korea in 1919, and incomplete contradiction with public opinion as expressed in the mainstream media at
the time, Ishibashi explained why Korean independence was inevitable:
The Koreans are one people [ichi‑minzoku一民族]. They have their own language.
They have a long independent history. Some no doubt find it regrettable, but there
is not one single Korean who is glad that his country has been annexed by Japan.
Until they finally regain their independence, the Koreans will naturally andrepeatedly resist Japanese rule. What is more, as their knowledge and awarenessincreases, so their opposition to Japan will become increasingly radical. 67

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan44

At the beginning of the 1920s Ishibashi Tanzan once again condemned the Japanese
expansion on the Chinese continent which sought only economic advantages anddisplayed a predator‑like aggressiveness. He suggested abandoning a policy that merely
generated further tension with neighbouring countries and the great powers (inparticular the United States) and reiterated his support for “Small Japanism”. During
the Washington Naval Conference of July 1922, he published a slew of editorials in his
journal denouncing imperialism:
What if we were to relinquish Manchuria and Shandong, stop putting pressure on
China, and give Korea and Taiwan back their freedom, what then would be theconsequences? Britain and America would find themselves in an impossible
position, unable to maintain a moral stance in the world while allowing Japan toadopt such a liberal policy alone. China and the small countries of the world would
then turn to Japan and place their trust in it. India, Egypt, Persia, Haiti and theother countries dominated by the great powers would demand the same freedomthat Japan had granted to Korea and Taiwan. Our country would be exalted theworld over and neither Britain and America nor the other countries could doanything about it.68

45

A few days later, he wrote an article entitled Dai Nihonshugi no gensō 大日本主義の幻想(The Illusion of Great Japanism) in which he denounced the mediocrity of Japan’s
policies and criticised all the nebulous theories proclaiming the need to constantly
expand the country’s territories and permanently stoke the arms race. He ridiculed theidiotic craze for “Great Japanism” seen as a constantly expanding empire 69 and extolled
the economic and even political advantages of abandoning these costly dreams of
grandeur. “Let us resolve to release Korea, Taiwan and Sakhalin, and of course
relinquish China and Siberia,” he proclaimed in the introduction to this provocative
text in which he argued in favour of economic logic and the right to self‑determination.
70

46

After underlining the futility of the advantages implied in overseas expansionism,
Ishibashi argued that the determination of colonial or subjugated populations to resist
would eventually lead to the downfall of the colonial empire, just as Ireland had finally
freed itself from England after a bitter struggle. Ishibashi added that it was unlikelythat India would not go down this same route:
Why then should our country be alone in perpetually continuing its domination of
Korea and Taiwan and preventing the Chinese and Russians from exercising theirsovereignty? The Korean movement for independence, Taiwanese movement forthe creation of a parliament and anti‑Japanese movements in China and Siberia, arethey not already a sign of this process? I tell you that these movements will never
be contained simply through police repression or army intervention. It is likebelieving we could use the police and army to prevent the trade union movement ofworkers against capitalists.71

47

Ishibashi quickly realised that independence movements were inevitable and that
nothing could prevent them. “Even if Great Japanism were to provide us with someadvantages, it could not be maintained for very long,” he added. Moreover, it was noteven a source of revenue:
Instead of constructing barracks, let us build schools; instead of constructing
warships, let us build factories. The army and navy have a budget of 800 billion yen.
If we could invest just half of this amount each year in peaceful endeavours, in justa few years the face of Japan’s industry would be transformed completely. 72

48

He continued further on:

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 JapanFar from weakening us, abandoning Great Japanism would allow us to achieve
substantial gains. If we were to relinquish territories like Korea, Taiwan, Sakhalin
and Manchuria, and make vast China our friend, the entire Far East and all thesmall and weak countries of the world would voluntarily give us their moral
support. […] The essence of this strategy is harmony. Who cares what arms aredeveloped by one or two arrogant nations? Our country—leader of a free world andsupported by the hearts of Asians and the entire world— could never again bevanquished through war.73
49

Ishibashi urged Japan to strive “to morally support the small and weak countries of theworld”, by which he meant all those that were not “great powers”. One senses in
Ishibashi some Asianist and pacifistic impatience. An alliance between “peoples ofcolour”, based on real friendships and relationships of trust, was the only way to resist
growing pressure from Anglo‑Saxon countries following the Washington Naval Treatyof 1922. Achieving this meant breaking with traditional diplomacy.

50

In fact, in the 1920s Japan’s ruling circles felt unease at China’s growing nationalism
which aspired to unify a country divided since the establishment of a republic in 1912
and which had fallen partly into the hands of warlords. The victories of the nationalist
Kuomintang made them fear the emergence of a powerful state. For Japan’s imperialist
circles, China’s progress towards unification was a nightmare and Ishibashi Tanzan
condemned this attitude which sought to ignite a war in order to guarantee
north‑eastern China’s permanent separation from the rest of the country. Ishibashi
directly opposed the military operations that began in Manchuria in September 1931. A
few days after the “incident” of 18 September 1931, he published a vitriolic article:
There is endless talk of the “Manchurian issue”. There is indeed a way to settle thisfamous issue at once, and that is to restore normal friendly relations between China
and Japan. It would be an excellent idea both for the two countries and for world
peace.74

51

Instead of pacifying the Kuomintang leaders, Japan’s military operations would merely
stoke Chinese national pride and anti‑Japanese resentment, believed Ishibashi.
Whether Japan liked it or not, it would be drawn into a conflict of even graver
proportions.
Just as the Japanese nation could not accept being subjected to foreign rule, so theChinese nation cannot accept such a situation. Those in favour of Japan advancing
into Manchuria are refusing the Chinese the right to think as they do. Does this not
merit some self‑criticism? […] The first condition for our nation to settle theManchurian problem is for us to simply accept China’s demand for a unified state. 75

52

Recognising Chinese sovereignty would challenge the idea that only the pursuit ofJapan’s national interests was justified, an idea that underpinned nationalist discourse
in Japan. Ishibashi added that Japan risked finding itself seriously isolated in this affair,since offending Chinese nationalist sentiment would enable them to attract thesympathy of international opinion. And Ishibashi continued in May 1932 by denouncing“the misinformation and narrow‑minded myopia causing incalculable damage toJapanese society”, in a country where “it is no longer possible to speak freely about
foreign relations, the military, or anything of real importance”. 76

53

By taking into account the Chinese point of view in his approach to the Manchurian
issue, Ishibashi provided food for thought for many young intellectuals, in particular
the young sinologists of the time such as Takeuchi Yoshimi 竹内好, who spoke of their“Ishibashian discovery” upon reading the politician’s writings. In fact,

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

Takeuchi Yoshimi questioned whether any Japanese at that time was capable ofunderstanding Chinese nationalism.77
54

Faced with the acts of violence committed by the military during the 1930s, Japaneseparliamentarians adopted an attitude that was ambiguous to say the least, covering up
the “patriotic crimes” committed in Manchuria. Ishibashi wrote in no uncertain terms
that “they were making themselves complicit in murder” and that “it was as if thegovernment was run by gangsters (bōryokudan 暴力団)”.78 For Ishibashi, theManchurian affair was the work of ideologists driven by irrational motivations.

55

Ishibashi continually advocated the long term over short‑term thinking. The
difficulties he foresaw for Japan on the continent have since proven him right. Having
failed to correctly assess the scale of the Chinese nationalist reaction, Japan soon founditself bogged down in the country. Needless to say, the warnings issued by Ishibashi
from the mid‑1910s to the early 1930s were ignored by Japanese leaders, who even at
the height of the war, and despite his anti‑government leanings, consulted him
regularly. In 1937 he joined the Shōwa kenkyūkai 昭和研究会, a kind of think tank for
Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro 近衛文麿 (1891‑1945)79 where he met well‑known
individuals from the liberal opposition such as the philosopher Miki Kiyoshi 三木清(1897‑1945). However, it was clearly Ishibashi who was right about the fundamental
issue: “Great Japanism” had no historical future. He spoke out against military rule andin favour of a return to a parliamentary system. In the wake of Pearl Harbor he wrote,“I am a liberal but not a traitor to the state” and criticised the constantly expanding
theatre of Japan’s military operations.80 One senses his despair at seeing his country
embark on a course he predicted would end in failure.

56

Japan’s phenomenal growth in the 1950s and 1960s proved Ishibashi right in hindsightto advocate a “Small Japan” with its development refocused on domestic growth, a far
cry from the country’s imperialist dreams. The post‑war Prime Minister
Yoshida Shigeru 吉田茂 (1878‑1967) entrusted Ishibashi Tanzan with the task ofrebuilding the Japanese economy by appointing him finance minister (from May 1946
to May 1947). Opposed to the economic reform advocated by the occupation
authorities, in particular the dissolution of the zaibatsu, he clashed with the American
authorities over his desire to reduce the costs linked to the presence of the Allied
forces. Despite his muted opposition to the wartime militaristic regime, Ishibashi fell
victim to the purge imposed by the Americans, who had not forgiven him for having
defied them, and was forced to leave the political arena for a time. He nonetheless went
on to become one of the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party, served as minister forinternational trade and industry from 1954 to 1956, pushed for relations to be restoredwith the USSR and communist China,81 and was finally appointed prime minister (fromDecember 1956 to February 1957) despite staunch American opposition. 82 Ill healthforced him to abandon his position just two months after his nomination.

57

Ishibashi Tanzan was a pioneering and visionary spirit. In economic terms he was aliberal (but was also responsible for introducing Keynes in Japan), politically speaking
he was a rather moderate democrat opposed to communism (but resolutely against
military expansionism and fascism), while in the diplomatic arena he advocated “Small
Japanism” (but wavered between desiring isolationism for his country or a moral role
as a “global leader”). His brand of anti‑colonialism was not one of solidarity withcolonial populations but rather a principled stance. When reading him today one
cannot help but be struck by his invariably lucid reasoning. He never succumbed to the

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japandominant ideas of his time. His firm belief that warmongering was never profitable forlong caused him to clash with the imperialist and colonialist circles of the pre‑1945 era,
which he also saw as anti‑democratic elements. His views were so lucid that someessayists have had fun imagining what Ishibashi would say about Japan today and how
he would have criticised Japan’s leaders, a completely futile exercise, admittedly, but
one based on a great admiration for an atypical individual. 83 It is striking to note theextent to which his views in the 1920s and 1930s prefigured the Japan of the post‑war
economic miracle, “an economic giant but a political dwarf”, a peaceable country
whose standard of living increased steadily without intervening in the affairs of therest of Asia.

Academic Doubts as to the Validity of Colonialism
58

Ishibashi was not the only person to develop critical economic analyses of imperialism
and colonialism. In truth, the question of Japan’s colonial policy had become thesubject of a debate with scientific pretensions. Beginning in 1895, the issue came under
scrutiny as the first “enlightened” administrators of Taiwan believed that the solution
to their problems lay in a “scientific approach” and Gotō Shinpei was keen for the newcolony to serve as a “laboratory”.84 Japan’s 1905 victory over the Russians changed thecountry’s international status and saw it emerge as a new “great power”. Rememberthat this event led Japan to obtain the southern part of Sakhalin as well as leased
territories on the Liaodong peninsula, establish its protectorate in Korea and exert apowerful influence in Manchuria. Consequently, in the wake of the Russo‑Japanese War
the academic study of colonial policies emerged as a research topic at university and apractical and theoretical body of knowledge. As early as 1903, Nitobe Inazō, thewell‑known author of Bushido, Soul of Japan, had been appointed lecturer at Kyoto
Imperial University after gaining experience of colonial administration in Taiwan. 85 The
first university to create a chair in colonial studies was Tōhoku Imperial University in
Sendai in 1907.86 Then in 1909, Nitobe was given the newly created chair at Tokyo
Imperial University. Yanaihara Tadao took over the position in 1922. 87 He was not yet
thirty.

59

Yanaihara belonged to the Japanese Christian pacifist movement known as theNon‑Church Movement, which was closely linked to Uchimura Kanzō 内村鑑三
(1861‑1930), the great Christian intellectual of the late nineteenth and early twentiethcentury who in turn was influenced by the uncompromising pacifism of Leo Tolstoy.
Yanaihara Tadao professed himself impressed by Uchimura Kanzō’s uncompromisingand independent nature. He was also close to leading Christian figures who had joined
the moderate branch of the socialist movement, the most eminent representatives ofwhich were Kinoshita Naoe 木下尚江 (1869‑1937) and Abe Isoo. At university he was
fascinated by leading personalities Nitobe Inazō and Yoshino Sakuzō.

60

In addition to the moral pacifism from which he took inspiration, Yanaihara Tadao
added a brand of anti‑colonialism that was fairly radical for his time and was based on awell‑researched economic and political analysis which, as in the case of
Ishibashi Tanzan, professed to be rational. He wrote for the journal Chūō Kōron andpublished critical writings on Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria. In 1935 he produced astudy on the southern islands under Japanese rule and in 1937 a work on India under
British rule. As early as 1937 his radical opposition to the new war against China earned

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

Yanaihara a professional ban that saw him dismissed from Tokyo Imperial University.
He was reinstated as professor at Tokyo University after the war, in November 1945,and subsequently served as its president from 1951 to 1957. The historian of Western
economics Ōtsuka Hisao 大塚久男 (1907‑1996), the post‑war leader—along with
Maruyama Masao 丸山眞男 (1914‑1996)—of the “modernist” school of thought,
declared himself a disciple of Yanaihara, who emerged as a kind of intellectual andmoral figure.88
61

In around 1920, Yanaihara adopted stances that were overtly hostile to the repression
carried out by the government and army in Korea. A humanist and democrat, hecondemned Japan’s colonial policy which impoverished Korean farmers and left them
destitute, advocating instead autonomy for the colonies within the framework of theempire. In 1926, in a text published in Chūō Kōron, he demonstrated that while
repression had certainly crushed the protesters of 1919, they—in other words the
Korean people as a whole—had been victorious.89 Despite a desire for change, he added,
the Korean people were the victims of a crippling tax policy while their lands were
gradually being confiscated by Japanese settlers. This process robbed producers of theirmeans of production and proletarianised the country, leaving the Koreans with barely
enough to survive and forcing many to emigrate to Siberia, Manchuria or even, more
recently, Japan itself.90 The Japanese policy of exporting rice from the peninsula to
Japan forced Korean farmers to work themselves into the ground producing for themetropole while contenting themselves with meagre meals.91 A “desperate instability”
was visible deep within Korean society, he wrote on several occasions. 92 At this stage
Yanaihara considered it natural for Koreans to be given the right to participate in theadministrative and political life of their country. Specifically, this meant giving them
the right to vote (the Japanese themselves had only achieved universal suffrage—for
men—the previous year) by allowing them to participate in the political life of themetropole, but above all by creating a parliament in Seoul. 93 “Just as the working classis able to defend its own interests sufficiently by sending its representatives toparliament, so the colonial peoples will be able to defend their interests byparticipating in political decision‑making”.94

62

Yanaihara described Japan’s colonial policy as a “despotic” regime (sensei seiji 専制政治) that did not recognise the rights of the colonised, who were treated like
“uncivilised black people” (mikai kokujin 未開黒人),95 and which practised a policy ofassimilation through an autonomous colonial government. And yet, he said, this regime
was the product of an era: the imperialist violence and democratic demands pervading
Japanese and Korean society were reflected in colonial policy orientations. He urged
the Japanese parliament to exempt the colonial populations from paying further taxes
and advocated liberating “those being tortured and stifled”. Japan must have thecourage to face facts, he wrote.96 As for assimilation—if such a thing were even possible—, it was impracticable if it were to be carried out by a colonial administration, whichin itself was an obstacle to assimilation. If Japan were to reply on such anadministration, collaboration with the Koreans would quickly become impossible since
their social practices resulted from a different history to that of Japan. 97

63

At this stage Korean independence was not yet one of the options envisaged by
Yanaihara. He advocated political autonomy for the inhabitants of the peninsula anddemocratic guarantees for Koreans, but little else. In this sense, his position remained
similar to that of his Kyoto colleague Yamamoto Miono, who during World War I had

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

actively supported the transformation of German possessions in the Pacific into
Japanese colonies but who was opposed to assimilation and advocated self‑governancefor the colonised (jichi shugi 自治主義).98 Yanaihara believed that Japan must surmount
Korean resistance without alienating its population but rather by convincing them of
the need for an alliance between the two peoples within the framework of the empire.
Indeed, he believed that home rule was the best defence mechanism for avoiding
Korean emancipation and its complete separation from Japan. 99 He went even further
by explaining that if as part of such a policy the Koreans were to break free and become
independent, it would be a great success for Japan’s colonial policy and “the honour ofthe empire”.100
64

In a critique of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan entitled Taiwan under Imperialism, firstpublished in 1929 and then in paperback form in 1937, Yanaihara produced what was
no doubt the first serious Japanese‑language study of Taiwan written from a criticalperspective.101 The fact that the author was a professor in colonial studies at Tokyo
Imperial University only heightened its impact. In fact, this study of Taiwan was often
seen post‑1945 as representing the starting point of Japanese area studies (chiiki kenkyu
地域研究). Kuwabara Takeo considered it a classic in Japanese social sciences anddescribed it as “a book with great scientific rigour of which we Japanese can beproud”102. The book was banned from exportation to Taiwan upon its publication but
became a bible for Taiwanese students studying in Japan, where it continued to beavailable in libraries and was first translated into Chinese on the continent in 1930. 103
Yanaihara explained that large Japanese capitalist companies like Mitsui and
Mitsubishi had monopolised the island’s industries (in particular the food‑processing
and sugar‑producing industries) and that Taiwanese farmers and workers were thevictims of oppression and fierce social and economic exploitation. His arguments drew
on a kind of economism (similar to Marxism to be specific). Above all, and this isperhaps the main point, Yanaihara clearly specified the need to take into account thedemands of the Taiwanese nationalist movement.

65

Yanaihara began by recounting the history of Formosa—the Beautiful Island—which
was fought over by the Portuguese, Dutch and Chinese during the seventeenth century.
The Chinese were victorious but in the nineteenth century the island once again
became an object of desire for the Prussians, Americans and French before the Japanese
finally seized Taiwan after it was ceded to Tokyo by Beijing at the end of theSino‑Japanese War.104 Yanaihara took the opportunity to re‑examine the Sino‑Japanese
War of 1894‑1895, which he presented not as “a national war”, as official propaganda
would have it, but as “an imperialist war”.105

66

In Japan circa 1895, where industrial capitalism was still in its infancy, imperialism as
an ideology had already firmly taken root.106 In fact, the occupation of Taiwan had costmore to Japan than any profits generated, and Yanaihara deemed this a “luxury
expenditure” that the Japanese state had permitted itself in pursuit of a questionablestrategic vision.107 By seizing Taiwan in order to avoid it falling into the hands of theother great powers, Japan had for the first time adopted a clearly imperialist attitude.
Yet this outcome had been in no way unavoidable. Yanaihara’s criticism, however, justlike that of Ishibashi, focused on the consequences: namely (public) expenditure higher
than (private) profits, and a deterioration in Japan’s symbolic image in the region.
Ultimately, Yanaihara questioned what price Japan would have obtained for Taiwan
had it sold the island off and invested the money into the national economy. 108 Though

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japanhe did not employ the expression “Small Japan”, Yanaihara’s stance here resembled theviews put forward by Ishibashi Tanzan.
67

Yanaihara also criticised “the exacerbated level of colonial despotism that has rarely
been equalled in other colonial experiments around the world,” 109 he wrote, notwithout exaggeration but no doubt a little too quickly.110 However, the brutality of thecolonial endeavour, combined incidentally with significant public investments, did
eventually produce undeniable results, particularly in the field of sanitation,
infrastructure and transport. Moreover, these successes made political reforms
unavoidable, since without these opposition to the island’s Japanisation would continue
to grow. He concluded that the development of colonial imperialism was contradictory,
that it was racing towards its own downfall as it were. 111

68

Yanaihara was generally opposed to assimilationist policies, believing that with the
weak democracy and authoritarian practices of the metropole, the Japanese lot was not
so enviable. However, beyond the two colonies’ historical differences, the problems of
Taiwan and Korea were identical. Political rights enabling self‑governance should be
extended to the colonial populations. And if they were to demand their independence,
it should be granted, thought Yanaihara, for they would then necessarily maintainfriendly, peaceful relations with the former metropole. Thus, there was ultimately
nothing to be lost in the colonies achieving independence, as long as the process took
place peacefully. Yanaihara’s views on traditional Japanese policies were thus
extremely critical. He displayed a fairly radical reformism but never went as far as
suggesting the severing of relations between metropole and colonies.

69

Incidentally, these views earned him criticism from followers of Marxism. In
Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1921), Lenin was one of the first to explicitly
establish a link between imperialism and colonialism, but his analysis was little known
in Japan prior to the early 1920s. Yanaihara is known to have discussed Lenin’s work in
his lectures.112 One of his former colleagues at the Faculty of Economics,
Hosokawa Karoku 細川嘉六 (1888‑1962), who worked at the Ōhara Institute for Social
Research (Ōhara Shakai Mondai Kenkyūjo 大原社会問題研究所), openly questioned
the contradiction inherent in Yanaihara’s position, in which “one could not help but
defend the interests of the capitalist class” and be the spokesperson for a system, andhe voiced doubts as to the scientific nature of such teachings. 113 Later, in 1932‑1933,
followers of the Kōza school of Marxism developed a radical criticism of colonialism,
seen as inextricably linked to capitalism and imperialism, in their “Lectures on theDevelopment of Japanese Capitalism” (Nihon shihonshugi hattatsushi kōza 日本資本主義発達史講座). However, their view of colonialism as being an epiphenomenon ofimperialism meant that they failed to propose a specific critical analysis of a systemthey believed would collapse by itself with Japan’s revolution to come. 114 The only
person to have attempted a Marxist analysis of the situation in Taiwan, including aradical criticism of colonialism, is Yamakawa Hitoshi山川均 (1880‑1958), one of thefounding members of the Japanese Communist Party.115 According to him, the colony
became profitable in 1908 following a difficult start. It was thus a success, but for
whom? Not for the colonial populations subjected to economic exploitation coupledwith harsh political rule. He pointed to the confiscation of land by the sugar and paperindustries, which were controlled entirely by mainland capital and benefitted from thepolitical support of the colonial administration, as well as pay discrimination between
colonists and colonised. He also explained how the issuing of a special law, known as

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Title 63, allowed the governor‑general to behave like a “despotic sovereign” and how
the transition to a civil administration as of 1920 had not really changed anything since
the repressive public order laws remained in force. He came down in favour of a
growing democratic movement in Taiwan and called for equal rights between colonial
peoples and metropolitan Japanese, but ultimately voiced concerns about thefundamental indifference of working‑class Japanese vis‑à‑vis the situation in thecolonies.116
70

Though Yanaihara adopted several aspects of Yamakawa Hitoshi’s Marxist economic
analysis in his study, he never adhered to communist values. Rather than simply
providing a critical review of colonial policies, Yanaihara proposed undertaking
research in the form of concrete fieldwork on colonial societies. In fact, with its
combination of history, politics, sociology, education and economic analysis, there wasan undeniably multidisciplinary dimension to his work. Indeed, it is in this sense that
he may be considered a pioneer in the study of culture areas.

71

A few months after the military intervention in Manchuria in September 1931,
Yanaihara wrote an article which he later reprised in The Manchurian Problem. 117 In aneffort to understand the situation in Manchuria, Yanaihara traced the imperialist
rivalries that had existed in the region since the early twentieth century and described
the causes of the anti‑Japanese protests in China, which he presented on the one handas “a historical necessity”, given the economic and political development of China andManchuria, and on the other hand as a “nationalist movement”. In his eyes, thisanti‑Japanese nationalist movement was deeply rooted and probably impossible tocontain. The idea of protecting Japan’s special interests and privileges in China would
only lead to a clash with Chinese nationalism, a movement he considered to be in theascendant. Given these circumstances, Japan’s policy in Manchuria could only lead to aworsening of the situation. This conviction led him to refute the colonialist discourses
justifying Japan’s presence in the region which drew on three economic arguments:
emigration, profits from trade and the idea of a Japanese‑Manchurian trade bloc.

72

Japanese farmers emigrating to Manchuria would not solve the problem of
overpopulation in the metropole, explained Yanaihara. Driven out by the poverty inJapan, the colonists he likened to emigrants found themselves in a difficult situation
with significant set‑up costs and, for the government, running costs to maintain publicorder and supply a market that cost more than it made. The Japanese invasion severed
traditional trade links between China and Manchuria and disrupted economic channels.
These channels were rebuilt with Japan, but the structural weakness of Manchuria’s
domestic market carried very little weight in Japan’s foreign trade, barely more than 5
to 10%, which was nothing compared to the costs incurred in controlling the area andmaintaining order. Added to this was the rapid deterioration in relations with China
due to Japan having taken control of Manchuria. As early as 1932, Yanaihara forecast asecond Sino‑Japanese War, which indeed broke out in 1937. Lastly, was it feasible tocreate a self‑sufficient Japan‑Manchuria economic bloc, as advocated in certain circles,
and would it really be effective? The idea was to tap into Manchuria’s vast reserves ofraw materials, but as Yanaihara explained, despite their abundance these resourceswere insufficient for an economy like that of Japan. Furthermore, they were often of
inferior quality or unprofitable to extract. Yanaihara concluded that when consideredsolely from the perspective of its overall profitability, Japan’s occupation of Manchuria
was a grave and costly economic error. It would provide only short term gains, heCipango - French Journal of Japanese Studies, 4 | 201521

Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

explained, and only to the capitalists who had invested in the region. Graver yet, it
implied a difficult war with China that would cost Japan much more than theoccupation of Manchuria would ever yield and whose outcome was uncertain.
73

Under the guise of a political analysis, Yanaihara proceeded to criticise the imperialist
arguments that abounded in the press at that time. Economically speaking, colonisation
was futile. Worse still, wanting to politically engineer the prosperity of the Japanesenation through the oppression of the Chinese nation, itself under construction,
indicated a complete lack of understanding of the political and social movements
sweeping Asia since the beginning of the century. Japan’s designs were virtually
guaranteed to fail, he wrote. “Conversely, if Japan were to acknowledge China’s desire
to create a unified state and help it achieve this goal, it would be helping itself as wellas contributing to peace in Asia”.118

74

Linking on from this, the question of morality was also raised. Was the invasion right?
The answer was no, and this for reasons of principle:
It is right to oppose the invasion [of Manchuria by Japan]. It is right to not provoke
a war for that. Justice demands, by means other than war, that the invasion be
stopped. The aim of justice is to prevent war and punish those who began theinvasion. And the path taken by justice can only lead towards peace. 119

75

Ishibashi Tanzan and Yanaihara Tadao were both respected personalities and opinion
leaders in their time. But they were not alone. In fact, incidentally, it is interesting tonote that the majority of teachers at the imperial universities in charge of analysingcolonial societies were opposed to the brutal colonialist policies developed by thevarious Japanese governments. In an article published in Taiyō in May 1920, Yamamoto
Miono, who taught colonial policy at Kyoto University, argued for a local
administration run by the Koreans themselves and for deputies representing thecolonial minorities in the Japanese Diet. Others, on the contrary, supported anassimilationist policy in the name of democracy. This was notably the case of
Uehara Etsujirō 上原悦二郎 (1877‑1962), who dreamed of a Japan in which the
democratic revolution had been achieved and which would be capable of assimilating a
democratised Korea in order to build a common nation free of discrimination. 120

76

The anti‑repressive and reformist colonialism of Japanese democrats from the 1920s
and 1930s may seem outdated today. But make no mistake about it: rare were those at
the time in Great Britain and France, for example, who expressed such clear
condemnation of colonial injustice. From this point of view, the Japanese critics ofJapanese colonialism were quite remarkable. Moreover, radical advocates of
independence were a minority in the Japanese colonies at that time. Indeed, a certain
section of Korean and Taiwanese nationalists sincerely believed—just like the Japanese
democrats—that the colonial system could be reformed. So it was that
Tagawa Daikichirō, a deputy and advocate of “imperial democracy” as conceived by
Yoshino Sakuzō, came to present to the Japanese Diet a Taiwanese petition for thecreation of a parliament in Taipei. It was signed by Taiwanese who presented
themselves as “Japanese nationals who also aspire to democracy”. Similar petitions
were presented in Tokyo on numerous occasions. Similarly, as early as 1920, petitionsof this type calling for a law to make Koreans eligible for election circulated in Korea.
The right to participate in public life was a fundamental aspiration for local Taiwaneseand Korean elites. Taking Japanese assimilationists literally, they declared themselves

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

to be “Japanese” or “nationals” and as such called on the Japanese authorities in thecolonies or the home islands to grant them representation in the capital. 121
77

In some ways it could be said that Taiwanese and Korean nationalists were themselvescaught up in the wave of democracy that swept through Japan as of 1918, that they
played an active role in it and that they demanded greater democracy and autonomy intheir own countries as well as in the metropole. A convergence began to emerge
between Japanese liberals and democrats and local elites in the colonial societies inorder to fight the brutal and repressive systems established by the colonial
government.

78

In a Japan where expansionists were in the majority, those voicing criticism ofcolonialism ultimately remained limited in number. Despite hailing from theintellectual elite, these voices received little attention from the upper echelons of thegovernment where militarist and imperialist influences were too strong. The more
influential these factions were, the more difficult or even impossible it became to voice
criticism. But let us not imagine that anti‑colonial movements wielded much influencein Western colonial metropoles before the Second World War either. More often thannot, it was the proportions anti‑colonial movements took on in the colonies themselves
after the war that in turn brought home the reality of colonialism to metropolitan
populations. Japan’s anti‑colonial movements were never able to gain momentum
because decolonisation came about suddenly, as it were, with Japan’s military defeat inAugust‑September 1945. After all, France did not lose its colonial empire upon its defeat
in 1940. Yet after 1945, Japan found itself if not colonised, at the very least defeated andsubjected to the presence of the United States Army on its own soil. This is the paradoxof a country forced to deprive anti‑colonial discourse of all pertinence after 1945. As
pointed out by Nishikawa Nagao, the post‑war Japanese saw themselves both as former
colonisers with regards their former territories and as a colonised or semi‑colonised
people by the United States. He describes the mind‑sets that emerged at the time,
turning the Japanese into a people “colonised from the inside”. 122

79

Incisive criticism of the colonial regime was voiced prior to decolonisation, albeit by aminority. From this point of view, the movement within Japanese society was not out ofstep with Western countries. Indeed, those clearly expressing anti‑colonialist views inWestern colonial metropoles prior to the 1930s were few in number. Claude Liauzu
speaks of the “marginality of anti‑colonialism” in pre‑war France. 123 This ability ofcertain Japanese critics to rise above the fray and warn of the looming disaster shows, if
it needed repeating, the discernment and lucidity of one section of “civil society” inJapan. It also suggests certain continuities—beyond the period of militarism and war—
between liberal and democratic policies before and after the war.

NOTES
1. To borrow the expression used by the economist and specialist in colonial policies Yanaihara
Tadao 矢内原忠雄 (1893‑1961). For an outline of Japan’s colonial policy see Alain DELISSEN, “LaCipango - French Journal of Japanese Studies, 4 | 201523

Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

Corée” (Korea), in Hartmut O. ROTERMUND et al., L’Asie Orientale et Méridionale aux XIXe et XXe siècles
(South and East Asia in the 19th and 20th Centuries), Paris, PUF, Nouvelle Clio, 1999, pp. 135‑232, inparticular chapter 3, “Le premier XXe siècle : les ambivalences de la colonisation japonaise” (TheFirst 20thCentury: The Ambivalences of Japanese Colonisation), pp. 177‑195; see also
Pierre‑François SOUYRI, “La Colonisation japonaise : un colonialisme moderne mais non
occidental” (Japanese Colonisation: A Modern but not Western Colonialism), in Marc FERRO (ed.),Le Livre noir du colonialisme, XVIIe‑XXIe siècle : de l’extermination à la repentance (The Black Book ofColonialism, 17th‑21st Century: From Extermination to Repentance), Robert Laffont, Paris, 2003,
pp. 407‑430. For English works, see in particular Ramon H .MYERS and Mark R. PEATTIE, The JapaneseColonial Empire, 1895‑1945, Princeton University Press, 1984, which remains an authority.
2. “Theory on Japanese‑Korean Common Ancestry” (Nissen dōsoron 日鮮同祖論). These issues
are elaborated upon in Oguma Eiji 小熊英二, Tan’itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen 単一民族神話の起源 (Origins of the Myth of Ethnic Homogeneity) Shin’yōsha 新曜社, 1995, in particular chapters 5
and 13. See also Arnaud NANTA, Débats sur les origines du peuplement de l’archipel japonais dansl’anthropologie et l’archéologie (décennie 1870 – décennie 1990) (Anthropological and Archaeological
Debates on the Origins of the Settlement of Japan [1870s‑1990s]), université Paris 7 (unpublisheddoctoral thesis), 2004.
3. OGUMA Eiji, op. cit., p. 239.
4. In 1914, ITAGAKI Taisuke, a believer in “racial harmony”, instigated an abortive movement toextend equal rights with the Japanese to the inhabitants of Taiwan. Cf. Mark R. PEATTIE, “JapaneseAttitudes Toward Colonialism”, in MYERS and PEATTIE (ed.), The Japanese Colonial Empire, op. cit.,p. 103.
5. On this affair, known as the “Ōsaka Incident”, see Lionel BABICZ, Le Japon face à la Corée àl’époque Meiji (Attitudes to Korea in Meiji‑Era Japan), Maisonneuve & Larose, 2002, pp. 148‑154.
6. TSURUMI Shunsuke 鶴見俊輔, Senjiki Nihon no seishinshi 1931‑1945 戦時期日本の精神史, Iwanami
Shoten 岩波書店, 1982, revised edition, 2001, p. 121 (English title: The Intellectual History of
Wartime Japan: 1931‑1945, Routledge, 1986). Note, however, that shortly after the Ryūkyū Islands
were annexed, Ueki Emori 植木枝盛 (1857‑1892), future leader of the Freedom and Popular
Rights Movement, published an article entitled: “Why the Ryūkyū Islands Should be Given their
Independence” (Ryūkyū no dokuritsu seshimubeki ronzu 琉球の独立せしむべき論ず), in
Aikokushirin 愛国志林, Osaka, March 1880, text published in ITŌ Teruo 伊東昭雄, Ajia to Kindai
Nihon, Hanshinryaku no shisō to undō アジアと近代日本—反侵略の思想と運動 (Asia and Modern
Japan. Anti‑invasion Thought and Movements), SHAKAI Hyōronsha 社会評論社, 1990, pp. 16‑19.
7. Quoted by YANAIHARA Tadao, Teikokushugi ka no Taiwan, seidoku 帝国主義下の台湾精読 (Taiwan
under Imperialism: Exegesis), edition put together by

WAKABAYASHI Masahiro

若林正丈,

IWANAMI Bunko 岩波文庫, 2001, p. 35. English translation from Mark R. PEATTIE, op. cit. p. 83. Inaround 1890, Takekoshi Yosaburō was one of the most active members of Minyūsha 民友社, thePeople’s Friend Society, a new movement that was both nationalist and democratic. In 1905 heserved as a deputy in the political party Seiyūkai 政友会 and was close to future prime minister
Saionji Kinmochi 西園寺公望 (1849‑1940).
8. KŌTOKU Shūsui, L’Impérialisme, le spectre du XXe siècle (Imperialism, the Ghost of the 20th
century), translated, presented and annotated by Christine Lévy, CNRS, 2008. The vulgate ofresearch on Kōtoku Shūsui has clearly shown his fascination for European and American socialist
and anarchist movements. This point of view was partly challenged by the historian Ishimoda
Shō 石母田正 (1912‑1986), Kōtoku Shūsui to Chūgoku, minzoku to aikokushin no mondai ni tsuite 幸徳
秋水と中国—民族と愛国心の問題について (Kōtoku Shūsui and China: The Issue of Ethnicity
and Patriotism), 1952 text, reproduced in TAKEUCHI Yoshimi (ed.), Ajia shugi アジア主義(Asianism), volume 9 from Gendai Nihon shisō taikei 現代日本思想体系 (Anthology ofContemporary Japanese Thought), Chikuma Shobō 筑摩書房, 1963, pp. 384‑410. Ishimoda

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

attempted to demonstrate in this text the solidarity he claimed Kōtoku felt with the colonial
populations’ struggle for independence.
9. To use the term employed by Andrew GORDON in his book Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar
Japan, University of California Press, 1991.
10. MATSUO Takayoshi 松尾尊 (texts established and annotated by), Yoshino Sakuzō shū 吉野作造
集 (The Collected Writings of Yoshino Sakuzō), volume 17 of Kindai Nihon shisō taikei 近代日本思想体系 (Anthology of Modern Japanese Thought), Chikuma Shobō, 1976, postscript by
MATSUO Takayoshi, p. 474. Self‑determination should be understood here as a certain freedom

given to colonial populations to manage their own affairs according to their own customs.
11. And this despite the fact that between 1904 and 1906 he had been the private tutor of the sonof Yuan Shikai 袁世凱, the future conservative rival of Sun Yat Sen (Sun Zhongshan 孫中山) at
the head of the newly republican China.
12. Published in Yoshino Sakuzō senshū 吉野作造選集 (The Selected Writings of Yoshino Sakuzō),volume 7, Iwanami Shoten, 1995.
13. “Taishigaikō konponsaku no kettei ni kansuru Nihon seiryaku no konmei” 対支外交根本策の決定に関する日本政略の混迷 (Japan’s Strategic Disarray in the Decision‑making over its
Fundamental Policy Orientations for China), published in 1916 in the journal Chūō Kōron 中央公論. See the revised edition in Yoshino Sakuzō shū, op. cit. pp. 134‑135.
14. Japan’s kenpeitai has often been compared to the German Gestapo during theSecond World War.
15. YOSHINO Sakuzō, “Mankan o shisatsu shite” 満韓を視察して (Observations from Manchuria
and Korea), Chūō Kōron, June 1916, in Yoshino Sakuzō shū, op. cit., p. 145, quoted by NARITA Ryūichi
成田龍一, Taishō demokurashii 大正デモクラシー (The Taishō Democracy), Iwanami Shinsho,
2007, introduction, p. iv.
16. “Chōsen tōchisaku” 朝鮮統治策 (The Domination of Korea), October 1918, published in Chūō
Kōron, reproduced in Yoshino Sakuzō senshū, op. cit., volume 9, pp. 50‑51. For further information
on YAMAMOTO Miono see infra.
17. Known as the March 1st Movement of 1919. Following the death of the Korean Emperor who
had been deposed by the Japanese, the Koreans protested in masse shouting “Long live Korean
independence!” (Tongnip manse 獨立萬歲).
18. The Reimeikai 黎明会 (Dawn Society) was run between 1918 and 1920 by a group of academics,
liberals and moderate socialists. It aimed to fight the intransigence and intolerance ofgovernment circles. Using pamphlets and public lectures, Reimeikai fought for universal suffrageand opposed Japan’s repressive laws and brutal colonial policy.
19. Taishō shisō shū 大正思想集 (Taishō Period Thought: Collected Writings), Book II, edition put
together by KANO Masanao 鹿野政直, volume 34 of the Kindai Nihon shisō taikei series, op. cit., 1978,
postscript by KANO Masanao, p. 444. Fukuda Tokuzō was a professor of economic history. His
firmly liberal stances resembled those of moderate socialists.
20. YOSHINO Sakuzō, “Pekin gakuseidan no kōdō o manba suru nakare” 北京学生団の行動を漫罵する勿れ (Do Not Disparage the Peking Student Movement), June 1919, in Yoshino Sakuzō shū,op. cit., p. 322.
21. In 1918, a group of students and disciples of Yoshino founded an association called the
Shinjinkai 新人会 (New Man Society), which over the next ten years played an instrumental rolein the student democratic movement at Tokyo University. A similar association was created at
Waseda University, while another was already in place at Kyoto University, where students met
for discussions on labour issues to which workers were invited. The statutes of the Shinjinkai
speak of “liberating humanity” and “reforming Japan”. These associations were forerunners to
the “student movements” that were influential from this period through to the mid‑1970s (withthe exception of the wartime period).

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

22. Taishō shisō shū II, ibid., p. 444.
23. As Michel Vié points out, this is less than the repression carried out by the French in Sétif andGuelma in 1945 (between 8,000 and 45,000 people massacred). The repression of the Malagasy
Uprising by French troops in March 1947 is said to have caused 80,000 deaths, a figure we canonly hope has been exaggerated. Others put the figure at between five and ten thousand deaths.
Contrary to common belief, Japanese colonialism was no more brutal than any other. See inparticular Michel VIÉ, Le Japon et le monde au XXe siècle (Japan and the World during theTwentieth Century), Masson, 1995.
24. “Suigen gyakusatsu jiken” 水原虐殺事件 (The Suwŏn Massacre), Chūō Kōron, July 1919, in
Yoshino Sakuzō senshū, volume 9, op. cit. , p. 67. The Japanese military police are accused ofmassacring over thirty villagers at Chemuri in the district of Suwŏn.
25. Paull Hobom SHIN, The Korean Colony in Chientao, A Study of Japanese Imperialism and Militant
Korean Nationalism, 1905‑1932, PhD thesis, University of Washington, 1980.
26. See in particular Yoshino’s article published in the February 1921 issue of Chūō Kōron, in
Yoshino Sakuzōsenshū, volume 9, op. cit., p. 171.
27. “Chōsen seinenkai mondai–Chōsen tōjisaku no kakusei o unagasu” 朝鮮青年会問題—朝鮮統治策の覚醒を促す (The Korean Youth Association Problem–Opening Our Eyes to the Policy
Implemented in Korea), Shinjin, 1920, 2‑3, in Yoshino Sakuzō shū, op. cit., p. 298.
28. “Chōsenjin ni omou”, Yanagi Sōetsu shū 柳宗悦集 (The Selected Writings of Yanagi Sōetsu),
TSURUMI Shunsuke (ed.), Kindai Nihon shisō taikei, op. cit., vol. 24, 1975, p. 183.

29. Ibid., p. 178.
30. Ibid., pp. 182‑183.
31. For more information on YANAGI Muneyoshi, alias Sōetsu, see the special feature in issue 16 of
Cipango – Cahiers d’études japonaises, 2009 (English version, 2012, available at http://cjs.revues.org/
75). See also Sōetsu YANAGI, The Unknown Craftsman: A Japanese Insight into Beauty, adapted by
Bernard Leach, Kodansha USA, 1990.
32. On the Japanese superiority complex towards Koreans, see Lionel BABICZ, Le Japon face à laCorée à l’époque Meiji. op. cit.
33. Bernard LEACH, A Potter’s Book, Faber and Faber, 3rd edition, 1988.
34. In “Chōsen no bijutsu” (Korean Art), YANAGI wrote of a “bitter beauty” (hishū no bi 悲愁の美).
See Yanagi Sōetsu shū, op. cit., p. 223. Then on page 226 he describes a “beauty of sorrow” (hiai nobi 悲哀の美).
35. “Chōsenjin ni omou”, op. cit., p. 177.
36. Ibid., pp. 180‑181.
37. Ibid., p. 183.
38. Ibid., pp. 181‑182.
39. “Chōsen no tomo ni okuru sho” 朝鮮の友に贈る書 (Letter to My Korean Friends), publishedin Kaizō 改造 in June 1920, reproduced in Yanagi Sōetsu shū, op. cit., p. 185.
40. Ibid., p. 188.
41. “Kare no chōsenyuki” 彼の朝鮮行 (He Who Travels to Korea), in Yanagi Sōetsu shū, op. cit.,
p. 198.
42. “Chōsenjin ni omou”, Yanagi Sōetsu shū, op. cit., p. 179 and p. 186.
43. Ibid., p. 181.
44. Ibid., p. 183.
45. TSURUMI Shunsuke, postscript, in Yanagi Sōetsu shū, op. cit., p. 434.
46. “Ushinaharentosuru Chōsen kenchiku no tame ni” 失はれんとする朝鮮建築のために (For a
Korean Architecture About to be Lost), in Yanagi Sōetsu shū , op. cit., p. 234.
47. Ibid., p. 236.
48. Ibid., p. 235.

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

49. Ibid., p. 236. The gate was destroyed during the Japanese invasions of the late 16 th century andsubsequently rebuilt in the 1860s.
50. The gate was restored to its original location in 1968, while the modern‑style Japanesebuilding was destroyed in 1995 as part of commemorations for the 50 th anniversary of Korean
independence.
51. TSURUMI Shunsuke, postscript, in Yanagi Sōetsu shū, op. cit., p. 434.
52. Asakawa Noritaka 浅川伯教 (1884‑1964) was a primary school teacher in Seoul while his
younger brother Takumi 浅川巧 (1891‑1931), who had followed him to Korea, worked as a local
government officer in the colonial forestry service. Takumi had studied Korean and spoke thelanguage fluently. Yanagi Sōetsu made ten trips to Korea between 1914 and 1924. See Asahi
hyakka Nihon no rekishi 朝日百科日本の歴史 (Asahi Encyclopaedia–The History of Japan), 1987,
fascicule no. 115, p. 147.
53. Kim BRANDT, “Objects of Desire: Japanese Collectors and Colonial Korea”, Positions, 8‑3,Winter 2000, Duke University Press, pp. 711‑746, p. 730.
54. See YOSHINO Sakuzō, “L’affaire du massacre des Coréens” (The Korean Massacre), Ebisu, special
issue, Le Japon des séismes (Japan and its Earthquakes), no. 21, 1999. Text from Chūō Kōron,Nov. 1923, published in Yoshino Sakuzō senshū, op. cit., volume 9, pp. 199‑204. Tome 2,613 Koreans
are said to have been murdered (231 according to the police) in addition to approximately
170 Chinese (3 according to the police). According to the historian Imai Seiichi (1924‑), the truth
no doubt exceeds even these considerable figures. See IMAI Seiichi 今井清一, Taishō demokurashii
大正デモクラシー (The Taishō Democracy), volume 23 of Nihon no rekishi 日本の歴史 (Japanese
History), Chūkō Bunko 中公文庫, 1966, 1971, p. 218.
55. Taishō shisō shū, book II, op. cit., p. 290.
56. YAMAKAWA Kikue 山川菊栄, Jinshu teki henken, seiteki henken, kaikyū teki henken 人種的偏見、性的偏見、階級的偏見 (Racial Prejudice, Sexual Prejudice, Class Prejudice), June 1924, reproducedin Yamakawa Kikue josei kaihō ronshū 山川菊栄女性解放論集 (Collected Essays on Women’s
Liberation by Yamakawa Kikue) Iwanami Shoten, 1994, pp. 74‑75. Remember that in
September 1923, in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the anarchist Itō Noe 伊藤野枝,
who co‑founded the Sekirankai 赤欄会 (The Red Wave Society, 1921‑1923) with Yamakawa Kikue,
was strangled at a Tokyo police station along with her partner, the famous anarchist Ōsugi Sakae
大杉栄 (1885‑1923), and his young nephew.
57. Vera MACKIE, Feminism in Modern Japan, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003, points
out on page 88 that Yamakawa Kikue made a distinction between Japanese society, which was
portrayed in her writings as a “gendered” society”, and colonial societies, which she saw as asingle, featureless block without class or gender. A slip of the pen by an activist born into acolonial power?
58.

ISHIBASHI Tanzan

is the only Japanese prime minister whose complete works span

fifteen volumes! (published between 1970 and 1972 by Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha 東洋経済新報社).
59. As pointed out by KARATANI Kōjin 柄谷行人 in Richard F. CALICHMAN (ed.), Overcoming Modernity,
Columbia University Press, New York, 2008, p. 108.
60. See the postscript by MATSUO Takayoshi 松尾尊兌 (ed.), Ishibashi Tanzan hyōronshū 石橋湛山評
論集 (The Critical Works of Ishibashi Tanzan), Iwanami Bunko, 1984, 2008, pp. 293‑295.
61. Beginning in the late 19th and early 20th century, individuals such as Nakae Chōmin 中江兆民 (1847‑1901), Ueki Emori, Abe Isoo 安部磯雄 (1865‑1949) or the Japanist nationalist
Miyake Setsurei each in their own way advocated a Small Japan but were not able to create very
structured political networks.
62. MIURA Tetsutarō, “Dai Nipponshugi ka Shō Nipponshugi ka” 大日本主義乎小日本主義乎 (BigJapanism or Small Japanism?), 15 April 1913, reproduced in Taishō shisōshū, volume I, edition
overseen by Imai Seiichi, volume 33 in the Kindai Nihon shisō taikei series, 1978, p. 66.

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

63. Ibid., p. 67.
64. “Shintō wa danjite ryōyū su bekarazu” 青島は断じて領有すべからず (Qingdao Must Not Be
Seized), editorial from 15 November 1914, in Ishibashi Tanzan hyōronshū, op. cit., p. 52.
65. “Kakon o nokosu gaikō seisaku” 禍根を残す外交政策 (A Foreign Policy that the Misses the
Root of the Problem), editorial from 5 May 1915, in Ishibashi Tanzan hyōronshū, op. cit., pp. 56‑57.
66. Quoted by KANO Masanao, Kindai kokka o kōsōshita shisōkatachi 近代国家を構想した思想家たち (The Thinkers Who Devised the Modern State), Iwanami Junia Shinsho 岩波ジュニア新書,
p. 133.
67. “Senjin bōdō ni taisuru rikai” 鮮人暴動に対する理解 (Understanding the Korean Uprising),
editorial from 15 May 1919, in Ishibashi Tanzan hyōronshū, op. cit., pp. 87‑88.
68. “Issai o sutsuruno kakugo. Taiheiyōkaigi ni taisuru waga taido”一切を棄つるの覚悟太平洋会議に対する我が態度 (Prepare to Abandon Everything. Our Position on the PacificConference), editorial from 22 July 1922, reproduced in Ishibashi Tanzan hyōronshū, op. cit.,
pp. 98‑99.
69. Since 1889 the official name of Japan had been the “Empire of Great Japan” (Dai Nippon
Teikoku). The Korean kingdom, which had become an “empire” in 1897, followed suit by callingitself the “Greater Korean Empire” (Tae Han Cheguk). At around the same time, some were using
the term “Greater France”.
70. “Dai Nihonshugi no gensō” 大日本主義の幻想 (The Illusion of Great Japanism), editorialfrom 30 July 1922, reproduced in Ishibashi Tanzan hyōronshū, op. cit., p. 101.
71. Ibid., p. 113.
72. Ibid., p. 120.
73. Ibid., p. 121.
74. “Manmō mondai kaiketsu no konpon hōshin ikan” 満蒙問題解決の根本方針如何 (WhatFundamental Policies would Resolve the Manchurian
26 September 1931, Ishibashi Tanzan hyōronshū, op. cit., p. 178.

and

Mongolian

Problem?

75. Ibid., p. 180.
76. See SABURŌ Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931‑1945, Pantheon Books, New York, 1978, p. 120.
77. KANO Masanao, Kindai Nihon shisō annai 近代日本思想案内 (Guide to Modern JapaneseThought), Iwanami Bunko, 1999, pp. 290‑291. On Takeuchi Yoshimi and his ambiguous role in
China during the war, see Samuel GUEX, Entre nonchalance et désespoir, les Intellectuels japonais
sinologues face à la guerre (1930‑1950) (Between Nonchalance and Despair: The Response of JapaneseIntellectuals and Sinologists to the War), Berne, Peter Lang, 2006.
78. ISHIBASHI Tanzan, “Kinrai no sesō tada kotonarazu” 近来の世相ただことならず (The Political
Practices of Recent Times will not be without Repercussions), editorial from 18 April 1931,
Ishibashi Tanzan hyōronshū, op. cit., pp. 173‑174.
79. See Kurt W. RADTKE, “Nationalism and Internationalism in Japan’s Economic Liberalism, The
Case of Ishibashi Tanzan”, in Dick STEGEWERNS (ed.), Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial
Japan, Routledge, London, 2003, p. 177.
80. Quoted by MATSUO Takayoshi in Ishibashi Tanzan hyōronshū, op. cit., p. 308.
81. This was logical for him because he had been one of the first to demand that Tokyo recognise
the “extremist” (Bolshevik) regime in 1918. “Kagekiha seifu o shōnin seyo” 過激派政府を承認せよ (Let us Recognise the Extremist Government), 25 July 1918, in Taishō shisōshū, volume I, op. cit.,
p. 386.
82. In 1957, a minority faction within the Liberal Democratic Party, led by Ishibashi Tanzan,
opposed the planned security treaty between Japan and the United States. Ishibashi believed thatJapan should adopt a strictly neutral stance in the clash between blocs. He feared that Japan’s
alliance with the United States would once again lead Japan into a military venture.

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

83. TANAKA Shūsei 田中秀征, Nihon Riberaru to Ishibashi Tanzan, ima seiji ga hitsuyō toshite iru koto 日本リベラルと石橋湛山 いま政治が必要としていること (Liberal Japan and Ishibashi Tanzan:
What is Needed in Politics Today), Kōdansha 講談社, 2004.
84. Mark R. PEATTIE, “Japanese Attitudes Toward Colonialism”, in MYERS and PEATTIE (eds.), The
Japanese Colonial Empire, op. cit., p. 84.
85. These were doubtless the first lectures given in Japan on “colonial policy” but no chair had as
yet been created. Yamamoto Miono taught colonial policy at the Faculty of Law in 1912 before aprofessorial chair was officially established with the creation of the Faculty of Economics in 1919,
a chair that he was given.
86. Chair in “colonial studies” (shokumingaku kōza 植民学講座) created at the Faculty ofAgronomy. In 1910, Nagai Ryūtarō 永井柳太郎 (1881‑1944) was appointed to a similar position at
Waseda.
87. Chair in “colonial policy” (shokumin seisaku kōza 植民政策講座) established within the Facultyof Law then transferred, in 1919, to the Faculty of Economics.
88. Andrew E. BARSHAY, “Postwar Social and Political Thought, 1945‑90”, in Bob Tadashi
WAKABAYASHI (ed.), Modern Japanese Thought, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 298.

89. “Chōsen tōchi no hōshin” 朝鮮統治の方針 (Policy Orientations on Korea), Chūō Kōron,June 1926, reproduced in Taishō shisō shū, vol II, op. cit., p. 383.
90. Ibid., p. 384.
91. Ibid., p. 390.
92. Ibid., p. 385.
93. Ibid., p. 392. The right to vote during this period followed a territorial rather than ethnic
discrimination. Remember that Japanese living in Korea did not vote but that Koreans in Japan
did. A Korean deputy was elected to the imperial parliament twice during the 1930s. Be that as it
may, no colonial empire has ever granted indigenous peoples the right to vote.
94. Ibid., p. 391.
95. Ibid., p. 392.
96. “Chōsen tōchi no hōshin” in Taishō shisō shū, vol. II, op. cit., p. 394.
97. Quoted by MYERS and PEATTIE, The Japanese Colonial Empire, op. cit., p. 117.
98.

ASADA Kyōji

浅田橋二, “Yamamoto

Miono

no

shokuminron”

山本美越乃の植民論 (Yamamoto Miono’s Theory of Colonisation), in Keizaigaku ronshū 経済学論集, Komazawa
daigaku 駒沢大学, vol. 18, parts 1 and 2, November‑December 1986, p. 18 et seqq. of part 1.
99. “Chōsen tōchi no hōshin”, in Taishō shisō shū II, op. cit., p. 393.
100. Ibid. p. 394.
101. YANAIHARA Tadao, Teikokushugi ka no Taiwan, op. cit. In addition to the usual simplification ofChinese characters, WAKABAYASHI Masahiro added some extremely useful explanatory notes to his
edition. This study of Taiwan was not the first of its kind, as YAMAMOTO Miono had alreadypublished a lengthy study: “Taiwan gikai setchi seigan undō to kako no sōtokuseiji” 台湾議会設置請願運動と過去の総督政治 (The Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliamentand Former Government‑General System) in Gaikō jihō 外交時報 (The Diplomatic Review),
no. 488, April 1925, quoted by ASADA Kyōji, op. cit . YAMAKAWA Hitoshi also produced a study of
Taiwan in 1925. YAMAKAWA Hitoshi, Shokumin seisakuka no Taiwan 植民政策下の台湾 (Taiwan
under Colonial Policy), 1925, reproduced in Yamakawa Hitoshi zenshū 山川均全集 (Complete
Works of YAMAKAWA Hitoshi), volume 7, Keisō Shobō 勁草書房, 1966.
102. KUWABARA Takeo 桑原武夫, Nihon no meicho, Kindai no shisō 日本の名著・近代の思想(Japanese Masterpieces: Modern Thought) Chūkō Shinsho 中公新書, 1962, p. 250.
103. YANAIHARA Tadao, Teikokushugi ka no Taiwan, op. cit., postscript by WAKABASHI Masahiro, p. 339.
This book is now regularly republished in Taiwan.

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

104. Prior to the arrival of the Japanese, the population of Taiwan had consisted partly of local
populations ethnically related to the ancient peoples of Malaysia and speaking Austronesianlanguages, and partly of Chinese settlers who had arrived since the seventeenth century, mostly
from the neighbouring continental province of Fujian. In fact, during the Qing Dynasty these
populations were known as Fan 番 (Ban in Japanese) and were themselves divided into the“civilised” Fan (shufan/jukuban 熟番) of the plains and the “wild” Fan (shengfan/seiban 生番) of
the mountains. The “civilised” Fan were in fact often of mixed race since immigration from
Fujian essentially involved men. The Japanese maintained the term Fan/Ban while transforming
the Chinese character into蕃 (used in Chinese to refer to barbarians) and adopted the habit ofreferring to the island’s most ancient populations using expressions with pejorative
connotations: doban (tufan) 土蕃, doi (tuyi) 土夷 or dohi (tufei) 土匪 (wild natives). In 1935, on theoccasion of the Taiwan Expo, they exchanged these terms for Heiho‑zoku (pingbu‑zu) 平埔族
(ancient pacified populations of mixed race) and Takasago‑zoku (Gaosha‑zu) 高砂族 (peoples
who had been pacified with great difficulty but were used as volunteers in the Japanese Armyafter 1942). The latter, which today make up about 2% of the island’s population, are usuallyknown these days as the Gaoshan‑zu 高山族minority. See the note by WAKABAYASHI Masahiro in
YANAIHARA Tadao, Teikokushugi ka no Taiwan, op. cit., p. 28. Yanaihara demonstrated how beginningin the Qing Dynasty, the Fan (Ban), who had been transformed into a minority, were despoiled of
their land by Chinese immigrants. In other words, he demonstrated that Taiwan had been undercolonial rule since the seventeenth system (ibid., pp. 37‑40).
105. YANAIHARA Tadao, ibid., p. 26.
106. Ibid., p. 25.
107. Ibid., p. 23.
108. Ibid., p. 245.
109. Ibid., p. 316.
110. KUWABARA Takeo, Nihon no meicho, Kindai no shisō, op. cit., writes on p. 246 that in around 1929,
while he was a schoolboy in the provinces, a Taiwanese “native” visited his school. Colourfully
dressed and dark skinned, he gave some kind of artistic performance to the students. The young
Kuwabara was struck at the time, he said, by the visit’s resemblance to a “fairground show”—or“human zoo” as we might say today —, by the disenchanted and weary air of the native inquestion and what he ultimately saw as the cruel performance demanded of this mantransformed into a “billboard” for Japan’s colonial policy in Taiwan. On a related note, it is worth
pointing out that the recent criticisms of colonial exhibitions are apparently long‑standing in thecase of Japan. See Nicolas BANCEL, Pascal BLANCHARD, Gilles BOËTSCH, Eric DEROO, Sandrine LEMAIRE,
Zoos humains, Au temps des exhibitions humaines, Paris, La Découverte, 2004 (published in English as
Human Zoos: Science and Spectacle in the Age of Colonial Empires, Liverpool University Press, 2008).
111. Ibid., p. 304, and p. 317 in particular.
112. YANAIHARA Tadao, Teikokushugi ka no Taiwan, op. cit., postscript by WAKABASHI Masahiro, p. 347.
113. YANAIHARA Tadao, Teikokushugi ka no Taiwan, op. cit., postscript by WAKABASHI Masahiro, p. 351.
Despite the outrageousness of his comments, Hosokawa was not entirely wrong if we consider
that the chair in colonial policy was abolished in 1945 with the fall of the empire. It was renamed
after the war and became the chair in “international economics” (kokusai keizai ron kōza 国際経済論講座). Regardless of this, Yanaihara and Hosokawa were both imprisoned during the war.
HOSOKAWA wrote a history of colonisation, Shokumin shi 植民史, reproduced in Hosokawa Karoku

chosaku shū 細川嘉六著作集 (The Selected Writings of HOSOKAWA Karoku), book II, Rironsha 理論社, 1972.
114. The first issue of Akahata 赤旗 (Red Flag), the underground newspaper of the JapaneseCommunist Party, in April 1923, carries a short article entitled “Chōsen kaihō mondai to musan

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japan

kaikyū 朝鮮解放問題と無産階級 (Korean Liberation and the Proletariat), Cf. Taishō shisō shū,book II, op. cit., p. 444.
115. YAMAKAWA Hitoshi, Shokumin seisakuka no Taiwan, op. cit.
116. ITŌ Teruo, Ajia to Kindai Nihon, Hanshinryaku no shisō to undō, op. cit., p. 142‑148.
117. “Manshū mondai” 満州問題 (The Manchurian Problem), in Yanaihara Tadao zenshū 矢内原忠
雄全集 (The Complete Works of YANAIHARA Tadao), volume 2, Iwanami Shoten, 1965.
118. “Teikoku shugi kenkyū” 帝国主義研究 (A Study of Imperialism), in Yanaihara Tadao zenshū,
op. cit., volume 4, Iwanami Shoten, 1965, p. 340.
119. YANAIHARA Tadao, “Kirisuto kyō ni okeru heiwa no risō” (The Peace Ideal in Christianity), in
Kirisutosha no shinkō 5 Minzoku to heiwa キリスト者の信仰〈5〉民族と平和 (Christian Faith –vol. 5 – Peoples and Peace), Iwanami Shoten, 1982, p. 117.
120. NARITA Ryūichi, Taishō demokurashii, op. cit., p. 151.
121. Ibid., p. 152.
122. NISHIKAWA Nagao 西川長夫, Shin Shokuminchishugiron Gurobaruka jidai no shokuminchishugi o
tou 〈新〉植民地主義論 グローバル化時代の植民地主義を問う (Essay on Neo‑colonialism.
Questioning Colonialism in the Age of Globalisation), Heibonsha 平凡社, 2006. Nishikawa
describes an internalised colonialism (naimenka sareta shokuminchishugi 内面化された植民地主義), p. 25 et seqq.
123. Claude LIAUZU, Histoire de l’anticolonialisme en France (The History of Anti‑colonialism inFrance), Paris, Armand Colin, 2007.

ABSTRACTS
From the beginning of Japanese colonial rule, some people began to raise their voices to criticize
this new domination on overseas people. During the Taishō democracy period, these voices
began to be heard, prior to be smothered during the 1930’s. There were many people who
doubted the capacity of the Japanese State to assimilate colonialized populations. We canseparate these contestators of the colonial system in three major trends of ideas.
1) A moral movement, which emerges basically as a fierce criticism of repressive police andarmy’s methods against colonial populations (especially after the 1919 independence movements
in Korea).
2) An economical criticism, inherited from the western liberal philosophy, stating thatcolonization cost more than it can bring in profits. This trend does not really care about thecolonial situation in itself, but consider that the colonial programme is short-termed enterpriseas colonial people will obviously struggle against the colonial ruler and defeat it sooner or later.
3) Criticisms of the colonial system appearing inside the Japanese academic world itself, amongprofessors in charge of studying and teaching colonial policies: their analysis of the colonial
domination leads them to admit the ineluctability of the “home rule” in colonial countries, oreven their independence.
Dès les débuts de la mise en place de politiques coloniales, certaines voix se sont élevées au Japon
pour critiquer cette nouvelle forme de domination sur des populations d’outre-mer, puis avec lesannées dites de la démocratie Taishō (1912-1926), cette critique peu connue mais pourtant
explicite du colonialisme est devenue plus audible, avant d’être de nouveau progressivement

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Criticising Colonialism in pre‑1945 Japanétouffée à la fin des années 1930. Très vite, des doutes naissent, au Japon même, sur la possibilitéd’assimiler les peuples coloniaux. On peut distinguer trois courants principaux qui s’en prennent
aux politiques coloniales du Japon. D’abord un courant « moral » qui émerge essentiellement
comme critique des méthodes répressives policières et militaires dans les colonies, surtout au
lendemain des mouvements de 1919 en Corée. Il existe par ailleurs un courant « économiste »produit de la pensée libérale occidentale. Ce courant est anticolonial par principe parce qu’il
pense que les colonies coûtent plus chères qu’elles ne rapportent et se préoccupe peu de lasituation des peuples colonisés, sinon pour proclamer que les mouvements politiques qui ynaissent conduisent inéluctablement à l’indépendance et donc à la défaite programmée du Japon.
Enfin, il apparaît une critique plus originale du système au sein même de l’université japonaise
parmi certains professeurs chargés d’enseigner précisément les politiques coloniales, qui
aboutissent à l’idée que le home rule ou l’indépendance des colonies est inéluctable.

INDEX
Keywords: Korea, Ishibashi Tanzan (1884-1973), Colonial Policy, Preservation of Local Cultures,
Colonial Knowledge, Yamakawa Kikue (1890-1980), Yanaihara Tadao (1893-1961), Yanagi Sōetsu
(1889-1961), Yoshino Sakuzō (1878-1933), Colonialism
Mots-clés: Corée, Ishibashi Tanzan (1884-1973), politique coloniale, préservation des cultures
locales, savoir colonial, Yamakawa Kikue (1890-1980), Yanaihara Tadao (1893-1961), Yanagi
Sōetsu (1889-1961), Yoshino Sakuzō (1878-1933), colonialisme
Chronological index: Taishō Period (1912-1926)
Subjects: History, Economy

AUTHOR
PIERRE‑FRANÇOIS SOUYRIUniversity of Geneva

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