FIRST INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON THE DECOMMISSIONING OF THE
FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
April 2016, Fukushima JapanThe Regulation of Decommissioningand Associated Waste ManagementBy
M W Weightman C.B.

Contents• Reflections• Lessons, Castles, Leadership, Values Obligations, Earned Trust, Heads of Rice
• Harmony - around a Common Goal
• A Fundamental Way – Risk reduction• Examples From UK• The Sun is Rising – Transition

Reflections
Looking back from 5 yearson:• A Devastating Time• Resilience and Fortitude• Amazing Progress• Learning, Looking Around,Looking Forward• Crisis to Calm Determined
Progress in Harmony

Lessons, Castles and Values
Fundamental Lesson from TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi:
Need a robust strong institutional nuclear safety system toensure that national/international standards and bestpractices are fully and rigorously implemented.
Use Strength in Depth Principles:- Involve All
Strong Deep Foundations:- Values and a Vibrant Safety Culture
Strong Protecting Roof:- Humble Leadership

Castles – Built on Strength in DepthPrinciples:••

Independent strong layers
Within each several diverse weapons ofstrength Bow and arrows Spears Clubs
 Swords
 Stones
 Boiling oil•No single point/Common mode failure

But success depends on the people:•••

Their culture
Their organisation
Their leadership

Utsunomiya Castle

3 Main Independent Pillars
In A Robust Nuclear Safety System

Strong Humble Leadership
Layer 1

Layer 2

Layer 3

Industry

Regulators

Stakeholders

Strong internal
challenge andpeer reviews

Open involvement andinformation

Legal Oversight

Hold to accountStrong self
regulation andpeer reviews

Prime Responsibility

Strong Foundation Stone: Values and Safety CultureWhat do I mean by strong?
Inner strength not brute strength:• Strong enough to listen andabsorb others’ ideas• Strong enough to not be afraidof challenge• Strong enough to welcome newideas and learn from others• Strong enough to tell it as it is• Strong enough to recognise
when you got it wrong and showthat you are learning from it

David and Goliath
Skills, Strategy & Inner Strength forSuccess7

A Robust Nuclear Safety System– Importance of Values
OBLIGATIONSEARNED TRUST

Industry
Strong self
regulation andpeer reviews

Regulation

Regulators

Stakeholders

Strong internal
challenge andpeer reviews

Open involvement andinformation

EARNED TRUSTOBLIGATIONS
Vibrant safety cultures with continuous
improvement, openness and transparency,
obligations and trust as core values – HUMBLE
LEADERSHIP

Importance of Nuclear Leadership

Leading with humility- Setting the vision, nurturing the culture, and living the values“The heavier the stock of rice, the lower its head.”

9Harmony - A Common Goal for
Decommissioning• A common goal for the 3 pillars of a robust nuclear safetysystem:– Industry– Regulator– Stakeholders (public, government, etc.)• Risk Reduction
Decommissioning is Risk Driven and needs the 3 Pillars to workin Harmony to achieve a Common Goal of Risk Reduction- A Fundamental Way

What is Risk and Safety?

• Risk – chance of bad consequences, loss (= FxC)
• Safety – Freedom from Risks• No such thing as absolute safety• Living is risky• We tolerate risks to achieve benefits• Some examples …

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Examples of Risk
• My overall chance of dying
next year ≈ 1 in a 100• My chance of dying in a car
accident while driving on
holiday in Japan ≈ 1 in10,000• My chance of dying while
travelling by train in Japan ≈2 in 1000,000• My chance of dying
eventually from myradiation exposure atDaiichi in May 2011 ≈ 4 in1000,000

Regulation in Decommissioning• When hazardous radioactive material (spent fuel, damaged fuel,waste, etc) is held in old, deteriorating, or unstable conditions
priority is to recover it and store in facilities built to modern nuclear
safety standards• Regulators and others accept that during recovery:– Risk of an accident or unplanned release may increase to achieve longterm– Workers dose may increase above normal operating levels– Discharges to the environment may increase above normal levels– And, storage of the material may be in an interim state pending final
conditioning for disposal

Similarities & Differences when Regulating HighHazard Degraded Fuel Facilities
Similarities:••••

Licensee has prime responsibility for safety
Regulator to ensure safety
Regulator independent
Regulator not isolated

Differences:••••

Regulators cannot stop operations to reduce hazards
Regulators want decommissioning as soon as reasonably practicable
Regulators have to accept that risks may increase in the short term
Some safety principles may have to be balanced against progressSome Examples from the UK - Sellafield

Earlier Risk Reduction, Interim States andWorking in Harmony for a Common Goal

Examples – Sellafield Legacy ponds & silos
programme
1000bn ¥ clean-up programme
Most Hazardous Nuclear Site in UK- Constructed in 1940-60’s- Used to store, cool and prepare 1000’s of tonnes of fuel for reprocessing- Stored inventory; spent fuel, radioactive sludges, wastes, miscellaneous items- Facilities deteriorating, located in a very congested area of the site
- Very high levels of radiation and potential for contamination- Ponds and silos are in the process of being safely emptied- New plants required to process waste streams into a form for disposal
Image courtesy of Sellafield Ltd

Priority on major risk and hazard reduction

Sellafield – Legacy Ponds and Silos Risk
Framework Waste left in situ
 Waste recoveredearlier

Time Example 1: Magnox Swarf Storage SilosExample 1: Magnox Storage Silos• Used to tip swarf from the de-cladding of spent Magnox fuel intowater filled silos• One of the Highest Hazard Potential nuclear facilities• Up to 3% spent fuel carryover over decades of Magnox programme• Building built in 1950s• Major Issues with H2 generation, exothermic corrosion Mg + H2O • Stopped tipping swarf but encapsulate• Building strengthened, and active liquor removed & treated – about
3% of overall activity = 1/10 overall release form Chernobyl• But …
• Still massive hazard potential associated with rest of waste in silos• All agree need to reduce risk further

Magnox Swarf Storage Silos
Original Proposal• Recover Magnox swarf, etc whenplants available to condition waste
into form for deep geologicaldisposal store• Single process from retrieval toproduct compatible with disposal –22 step mechanical retrievals,
complex treatment andencapsulation and store• Initial contract placed for project(total cost around £2.5b) and notstart retrieving waste until later in2020s• Still time at risk challenge for all:earlier risk reduction neededMagnox Swarf Storage Silos
Risk Optimisation Strategy• Collaboration amongst independent regulators, licensees, NDA,Government, etc to develop a strategy based on earlier risk
reduction• Regulator accepts:– some increase in risk during retrieval– Some Decommissioning/Waste Management principles not met full
– Waste stored in raw form in multi-barrier containment for somedecades – INTERIM STATE before final disposal• Retrieval and store in raw interim state in modern facilities
significantly earlier and more reliably• 3 step process with some decades later simple waste finishing fordisposalExample 2: Decommissioning Facilities dealingwith fuel from the 1957 Windscale Fire

Pile 1 Decommissioning
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15 the fuel and isotopes – 8500 items
4000te graphite – 30000 items
8500 m3 ILW
Fuel in various states of damage anddeterioration in core
Fuel debris in channels
Safety related work on graphite,
Uranium hydride, etc
Lot of work on encapsulation matrix andmethodology
Development of fuel channel retrieval
toolWindscale Pile Storage Facility• Pile Fuel Storage Pond
decommissioning– Used to store, cool andprepare fuel fromWindscale piles– Built in late 1940s– Sat dormant for decades
after Windscale fire
– 650 tonne of waste
including spent anddamaged fuel– Similar issues to Fukushima
Daiichi?:First remove several 100 te of heavy contaminatedequipment after surveys using ROVs

Waste, and Spent fuel removal including damaged
fuel in various states of decay after over 50 years
storage• Have to process very carefully as
unsure of condition including insome cases criticality hazard• Started fuel retrieval in 2012
now completed having removed
more than 100 tonne• Stored in modern storage
awaiting further processing –Interim State• Drive was to reduce time at risk
• Collaborate working led tomassive reduction in planned
date for decommissioning –dewatering some 21 yrs ahead ofschedule

Use high active caveswith remote handlingcapability, used tohandling otherdegraded fuelThe Sun is Rising – A Transition for Daiichi?
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Crisis to calm determined progress
Built on Three pillars of a Robust Strong
Nuclear Safety System working inHarmony
Foundation Stone of Values – Humble,
Integrity, Openness and Transparency,
Obligations and Earning Trust
Driven and sheltered by HumbleLeadership
A Common Goal - Risk Driven
Decommissioning
A Fundamental Way Decommissioning isrisk driven and Needs the 3 Pillars toWork in Harmony to achieve a Common
Goal of Risk Reduction
Regulators and others accept change fromthe norm
Decommissioning in Harmony for thebenefit of the Japanese People - an
Example to the WorldA Time of Transition