Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific

MEMORANDUM

1THE SECURITY OF THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION
A. Major political and security issues
1. A new equilibrium among the great powers is yet to be established in the Asia pacific region.
The relationship between the United States, Japan, China, and Russia will be crucial forstability and peace.
2. Potential inter-state conflicts still exist. North-South relations in the Korean Peninsula and theNorth Korean efforts to enhance its nuclear capability have caused serious tension. Otherpotential conflicts include the overlapping claims in the South China Sea, the China-Taiwanproblem, and the Russia-Japan territorial dispute.
3. The military modernization programmes of some states have caused concern and anxiety
among others in the region. The various ground, air and naval arms procurements of several
states have led to perception that a major arms build up is underway in the region.
4. Domestic developments in some states could contribute to instability in the region. Issues
related to generational and leadership change, income and economic disparity, andexpectation for political reforms, are potential troublesome developments. Also, domestic
insurgencies and minority problems in some states remain sources of internal andinternational concern.
5. New assertions on human rights, environmental protection and democratization add to andcompound these uncertainties over domestic developments, as is the case with everexpanding inter-regional illegal immigration, drug-trafficking and fisheries problems.
6. Security cooperation on a multilateral basis is still problematic, whether it be on agovernmental or non-governmental basis. In the economic realm, the governmental APECand the non-governmental PEEC and PBEC have development into useful fora for regional
cooperation. In the security realm, the ASEAN Regional Forum and CSCAP are new, butthey should develop into effective fora for dialogue and cooperative effort within a shortperiod of time.

B. Confidence building measures (CBMs) – an effective mechanism
1. Despite several negative factors affecting the region’s political and security situation, theproblems that need to be addressed can be approached in a relatively benignenvironment. To take advantage of this reasonably favourable climate, it is timely for theCouncil for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
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ARF to begin to address key areas of concern and specifically, to consider various
confidence building measures (CBMs) which could promote peace and security in theregion.
2. CBMs provides both the process and procedure aimed at raising goodwill and trust
among governments through a variety of measures in the economic, political and military
fields. It is a distinctly psychological exercise aimed at reducing misperception andsuspicion. In the military field, it is basically aimed at enhancing transparency between
states. In its simplest form, the concepts of transparency posits that when a state knows
the level and types of arms and the doctrines and military planning that a neighbouring
state has, and the rate that its neighbour is arming or disarming, the changes fordangerous over-acquisition of arms or of potentially escalatory tension will be reduced.
3. CBMs consists of deliberate economic, political and military measures designed toalleviate tension and reduce the possibility of military conflicts. This implies that peacecan be attained on the basis of common security collaboration among states. CBMs also
is part of cooperative security, which facilitates preventive diplomacy and averts conflict.
CBMs also seeks to make military intentions clear in order to promote confidence byincreasing the flow of information.

C. Security CBMs activities
1. Promotion of activities in preventive diplomacy in the region including the following:(a) support for the Indonesian initiated ASEAN Workshop on the South China Sea;(b) promote dialogue and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula (at the bilateral and subregional levels);(c) promote dialogue on North Pacific cooperative security (both official and “secondtrack” efforts).
2. Expansion of existing bilateral agreements, for example, those covering incidents at sea
between Russia and the United States, and Russia and the United Kingdom, to include
some other countries: they could be developed into multilateral instruments.
3. Implementation of CBMs in the military field through information exchanges and otherprocedures, including:(a) intelligence exchange;(b) mutual invitation to observe force manoeuvres;(c) notification of forthcoming military exercises;(d) exchange of information and comparison of estimates of military strengths, military
budgets, doctrines and forward projections;(e) publication of a defence white paper or equivalent for each country; and(f) sharing of concepts and methodologies for defence planning and force structuredevelopments.
4. Cooperative efforts to ensure the security of sea-lanes and sea lines of communication,with the enhancement of capabilities and maritime surveillance, safety, and search andrescue operations, for example, the concept of a Regional Maritime Surveillance andSafety Regime (REMARSSAR), and the establishment of a Regional Maritime
Communications Network in the South West Pacific.

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
Memorandum 1 – The security of the Asia Pacific region

25. Other proposals in building regional security regimes including the following:(a) a South East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEA-NWFZ);(b) a Regional Airspace Surveillance and Control Regime;(c) a Regional Security Assessment Centre;(d) a Regional Technology Monitoring Centre;(e) a Resource and Information Centre on Arms Transfer and Production; and(f) A Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre.
6. Cooperative measures to control new technologies and weapons of mass destruction,
especially ballistic missiles, nuclear and chemical weapons.
7. The list above is not meant to be exhaustive, and the various CBM activities can bephased in over a number of years. Also, consideration should be given to other fields ofcooperation, which are related to security, such as:(a) economic security;(b) environmental security regime; and(c) Zone of Cooperation, e.g. for the Timor Sea or the South China Sea.

D. Relationship between ARF and CSCAP
1. In all the above activities, support from the non-governmental efforts or the “second track”
process might be crucial, especially in the earlier stages. CSCAP has considerable
intellectual strength and expertise, drawn from research institutes, universities andofficials acting in their private capacities.
2. CSCAP task force or study groups could deal with regional security issues in depth, inworkshops and seminars. Their findings would be made available to the ARF and otherofficial forums which promote regional security.
3. CSCAP has initiated four projects which may prove useful to ARF, viz.
Comprehensive/Cooperative Security, Maritime Cooperation, Enhancement of Security
Cooperation in the North Pacific, and CSBMs and Transparency. Also, CSCAP would
develop a database and information centre on security matters in the Asia Pacific region.
4. Finally, CSCAP can support the ARF by providing the necessary support activities for
ARF agenda, and making recommendations which are relevant for policy implementationby the ARF.

April 1994.

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
Memorandum 1 – The security of the Asia Pacific region

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