CSCAP MEMORANDUM No. 15

The Security Implicationsof Climate Change

A Memorandum from theCouncil for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)
June 2010

CSCAP Memorandum No. 15

The Security Implications of Climate Change

A Memorandum from theCouncil for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)
June 2010

CSCAP Memorandum No. 15
THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Executive Summary
Climate change poses significant security risks and grave challenges to the Asia-Pacificregion, including: decreasing energy access, decreasing access to food, increasedfrequency and intensity of hydro meteorological disasters, population displacement,
increased public health problems, and water stress. The kinds of responses that could help
manage these climate security risks include: policy and institutional strengthening;regional and international cooperation; monitoring, research and technology; publicawareness, education and training; and finance and resource mobilization. It would beprudent to begin implementing these responses in the near term, recognizing that there is
uncertainty about the timing of these security risks, some of which will emerge gradually,and some of which may be rapid onset and catastrophic in nature.
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Introduction
Assessment reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change show thatclimate change will have adverse effects on environmental and human systems in the AsiaPacific region. While there remains considerable uncertainty about the vulnerability ofenvironmental and human systems to climate change, some large-scale risks have beenidentified. These include: increases in the intensity of extreme heat events; increasingly
variable rainfall, leading to more frequent and extreme flooding and drought events;
decreasing winter rainfall across most of the region; an increase in the intensity of storms;
increasing sea-levels; increasing water pollution; increasingly variable and in the long term
declining runoff in river basins; decreasing crop productivity; and decreasing supplies ofprotein from coastal and pelagic fisheries. These changes will impact on sub-regions,countries, sectors, social groups and places in different ways, and at different times. Unlesswell managed, they may in turn increase security problems in the region.
Implications of Climate Change on Security in Asia Pacific
Based on a review of the available materials about climate change and security in theregion, consultations with climate change and security experts, and the views of CSCAPmembers, climate security risks for the region have been identified. The security issue ofconcern is an increased risk of significant social, economic or political instability in one ormore countries in the region. Achieving climate security is therefore consistent with theUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol’s
objective to avoid dangerous climate change.
The primary drivers of climate security risks in the region are changes in mean temperatureand precipitation, increasing climate variability, and sea-level rise and coastal change. Thefollowing climate security risks arise from these primary drivers:

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Energy availability. Climate change is likely to impact on the supply of climate sensitiveenergy sources, in particular biomass and hydroelectricity. It is also likely to impact on
infrastructure used to extract and distribute energy, for example oil and gas platforms andpipelines. The effects of these impacts on security include: disruption of supply of energy
needed for the health and wellbeing of the rural poor, and disruption of supply of energy
needed by industries, households, and critical public services.
Food access. Climate change is likely to undermine agro meteorological conditions in theregion, and coastal and marine fisheries, leading to declining yields and short term foodproduction failures. It may also damage food transport and storage systems, and lead torising food prices. These changes are likely to lead to widespread hunger and malnutrition,and social unrest.
Hydro meteorological disasters. Climate change is likely to increase the frequency andintensity of extreme events, which will have catastrophic outcomes on social systems thatare sensitive to and lack the capacity to plan for and respond to these hazards. Such events
may be immediate, and lead to widespread social disruption, including loss of life, injury
and illness, damage to critical infrastructure, disrupted agricultural and industrial
production, and livelihood shocks.
Population displacement. Climate change is likely to contribute to the movement ofpeople within and across borders, over short and long periods of time, through its effects
on livelihoods, health, and the sustainability of settlements. Large scale unplanned
migrations may lead to social disruption by increasing: pressure on public goods andservices, rivalry over resources, and problems of border control.
Public health. Climate change is likely to increase the number of people exposed to vector
borne diseases such as dengue fever and malaria, water borne diseases such as cholera andgastrointestinal disorders. It is likely to increase mortality due to heat stress, andcardiovascular illness due to smoke haze. These may lead to increasing mortality andmorbidity, epidemics that may cross borders, impacts on economic growth, and problemsof border control.
Water stress. Climate change is likely to reduce runoff in major catchments, increased
pollution of surface water, depleted and contaminated groundwater resources, and coastal
subsidence. These are likely to undermine livelihoods, industrial and agriculturalproduction, and lead to tensions over the management of transboundary water resources,
Other, lesser security risks arising from climate change include disputes over regional
fisheries, land and maritime boundaries, and increased human trafficking.
Suggested Responses
We recommend regional, sub-regional, national and local level responses to manage theseparticular climate security risks, in the following five areas:
Policy and institutional strengthening. This includes a review of existing national
policies to identify gaps, areas for improvement, and areas where better integration acrosssectors and scales are required. It also includes enhancing coordination among institutions
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working at regional, national and local levels, across policy domains, and between thepublic, private and community sectors. For example, improving food access may require
new national strategies, such as stockpiling in times of surplus production, and improved
coordination between trade, agricultural and rural development policies. Meeting thehumanitarian needs of people displaced by disasters requires planning to coordinate theefforts of local, national and regional agencies working to provide shelter, food and water,and to assist with resettlement.
Public awareness, education and training. A key element of capacity to adapt to climatechange is awareness among the general population of risks and an understanding ofresponses at all levels and across all sectors of society. National programmes to raiseawareness of the risks of dengue fever, for example, have proven to be effective in
reducing infection. This requires culturally appropriate materials to promote awareness ofclimate risks and responses across the region. It may also require the integration ofmaterials about climate change into primary, secondary and tertiary curriculum across theregion. For example, teaching about the risks climate change poses to population
movements can help break down the barriers to the integration of displaced people. Thereis a need for regional and national training schemes to improve the skills base required tomanage climate security risks at all levels and across sectors. This includes developing
skills in, for example: integrated water resource management, disaster risk management,
public health and primary health care, and renewable energy systems.
Monitoring, research and technology. There is a need to develop regional and national
research initiatives to identify places and groups most at risk from the impacts of climatechange, for example communities vulnerable to sea-level rise, water borne diseases, orfood access problems. There is a need to develop regional and national monitoring andearly warning systems to alert organizations to impending climate extremes such as
cyclones, and emerging crises such as dengue fever outbreaks, food access crises, andpopulation movements. There is also a need for the transfer of technologies to manage
climate security risks, such as the use of energy technologies, the use of new materials andsystems in agricultural production, climate and weather surveillance, and improved publichealth technologies and systems. Cooperation among countries within and beyond theregion to overcome the technical and financial barriers to the transfer of technologies isrequired. This may take the form of regional technical training programmes, andmechanisms to lower the cost of the transfer of technologies from the private to publicspheres.
Regional and international cooperation. This includes making use of existing regional
forums for dialogue among political leaders, officials, and private and community sector
actors from countries within and beyond the region on emerging climate security risks andways to manage them. It also includes enhancing regional cooperation and sustainable
development for developing countries and developing their capacities to cope with theclimate security issues. Regional contingency plans for food and health crises, and disaster
responses are necessary. Regional platforms for the exchange of information between
countries and communities about effective policies and programmes can be of assistance.
Regional programmes for the exchange of personnel between countries can help build
capacity and share experiences, for example with respect to groundwater management, or
the implementation of renewable energy systems in rural areas.
3Finance and resource mobilization. This includes global, regional and national
mechanisms to raise and effectively deliver the financial, human, and technical resources
to manage climate security risks in the region. This may include, for example: mechanisms
to extend insurance against losses caused by hydro meteorological disasters, schemes tohelp overcome the financial and technical barriers to implementing renewable energy
systems in rural areas; funding to establish stockpiles of food and medicine to respond tofood and health crises, contingency funds to enable rapid responses to the humanitarianneeds of people displaced by disasters, and technical assistance to improve climate andweather surveillance systems. These resources should be mobilized through multilateraland other bodies responsible for the implementation of programmes specifically related toclimate change, and to related climate security activities such as disaster risk management,health, water access, and food access.
Despite differences among regional countries in the basic national conditions, stage ofdevelopment, historical responsibilities, and respective capacities, there exist conditions,common will, the necessity and broad basis for coping with climate change. It would beprudent to begin implementing these responses in the near term, recognizing that there is
uncertainty about the timing of these security risks, some of which will emerge gradually,and some of which may be rapid onset and catastrophic in nature.

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ABOUT CSCAP
CSCAP is a non-governmental (second track) process for dialogue on security issues in the Asia
Pacific. Membership in CSCAP is on an institutional basis and consists of Member Committees.
Current membership comprises Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, theEuropean Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republicof Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Russia,Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and the USA.
The functions of CSCAP are as follows:a. to provide an informal mechanism by which political and security issues can be discussed
by scholars, officials, and others in their private capacities;
b. to encourage the participants of such individuals from countries and territories in the Asia
Pacific on the basis of the principle of inclusiveness;c. to organise various working groups to address security issues and challenges facing theregion;d. to provide policy recommendations to various intergovernmental bodies on politicalsecurity issues;e. to convene regional and international meetings and other cooperative activities for thepurpose of discussing political-security issues;
f. to establish linkages with institutions and organisations in other parts of the world toexchange information, insights and experiences in the area of regional political-securitycooperation; andg. to produce and disseminate publications relevant to the other purposes of the organisation.
Study Groups are the primary mechanism for CSCAP activity. As of June 2008, there were six
CSCAP Study Groups. These are concerned with: (i) Asia-Pacific Cooperation for EnergySecurity; (ii) Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific;(iii) Multilateral Security Governance in Northeast Asia/North Pacific; (iv) Safety and Security ofOffshore Oil and Gas installations; (v) Security Implications of Climate Change; and(vi) Transnational Organised Crime Hubs in the Asia Pacific.
This memorandum was produced by the CSCAP Study Group on Facilitating Maritime
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific and was approved by the 29th CSCAP Steering Committee
Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 2 June 2008.
Further information on CSCAP can be obtained from the CSCAP website at www.cscap.org or bycontacting the CSCAP Secretariat:
CSCAP Secretariat
ISIS Malaysia
1 Persiaran Sultan Salahuddin
PO Box 12424
50778 Kuala Lumpur
Malaysia
T: +603-2693 9366 Ext 129
F: +603-2693 9375
E: cscap@isis.org.my