Proceedings of the International Symposium on Engineering Lessons Learned fromthe 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, March 1-4, 2012, Tokyo, JapanTOWARDS BETTER MITIGATION OF TSUNAMIDISASTER IN INDONESIA
Dinar C. ISTIYANTO1, Shigenobu TANAKA2, Toshio OKAZUMI3, SYAMSIDIK4
1

Specialist Researcher, International Centre for Water Hazard and Risk Management,
Public Works Research Institute, Tsukuba, Japan, dinar55@pwri.go.jp
2
Deputy Director, International Centre for Water Hazard and Risk Management,
Public Works Research Institute, Tsukuba, Japan, dinar55@pwri.go.jp
3
Chief Researcher, International Centre for Water Hazard and Risk Management,
Public Works Research Institute, Tsukuba, Japan, dinar55@pwri.go.jp
4Researcher, Tsunami and Disaster Mitigation Research Center,
Syiah Kuala University, Banda Aceh, Indonesia, syamsidik@tdmrc.org

ABSTRACT: This paper describes the tsunami disaster mitigation development inIndonesia, especially related to its basic framework, its implementation and response totsunami disaster happened after 2004. The potential of tsunami intensity as hazard
identifier is also discussed. Lesson learnt from the two recent tsunami events, i.e.
Southern-West Java tsunami 2006 and Mentawai tsunami 2010 will be used to discuss
about the significant role of land use management as well as education, training and drill
in the reduction of fatalities during tsunami disaster.
Key Words: Indonesia, tsunami disaster mitigation, emergency communication andtransportation, tsunami danger and precursor knowledge, maintenance oftsunami early warning system, preparedness

INTRODUCTION
Historical data on tsunami disaster indicate that Indonesia is the most tsunami vulnerable country
in the world. In total, 110 fatal tsunamis occurred in Indonesia during 1600-2011, which caused
casualties and have killed about 244,000 people in total. This total human toll is unfortunately so far
the highest in the world, which indicates the high level of vulnerability of Indonesia against tsunami.
Consequently, serious effort towards effective tsunami disaster mitigation in Indonesia is urgent.
Figure 1 shows the big-six countries or region with the highest total human casualties due to tsunami
disasters within the years of 1600-2011 (ITDB, 2006; Watanabe, 1985; NAO, 2004).
The huge disasters by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami (IOT) that threaten countries surrounding
Indian Ocean stimulated the world cooperation in the development of Indian Ocean Tsunami Early
Warning System (IOTEWS). At the same time countries around Indian Ocean, including Indonesia,
have been impelled to develop or enhance their disaster management system.
The fundamental revolution on disaster management paradigm in Indonesia was officially started
after the enactment of Disaster Management Law in 2007. This law clearly mentions that disaster556

1600-2011

Fig.1 The big-six countries or region with the highest total human casualties due to tsunami
disasters within the years of 1600-2011 (ITDB, 2006; Watanabe, 1985; NAO, 2004).
management includes all three phases of disaster, i.e. before disaster (preparedness),
immediate-response actions during and after disaster (emergency), and after disaster (recovery andreconstruction).
In the Indonesian Disaster Management Law 2007, disaster mitigation is classified to be themeasure before disaster and includes the activities of (a) land use management, (b) development
planning, infrastructure development, building code, and (c) education, training and drill.
Implementation of these activities required knowledge of risk including risk mapping. To provide
accurate information about the risk, understanding about hazard characteristics is the prime
requirement.
In the simplest approach, the tsunami hazard maps were drawn based on the historical data of
tsunami wave height available for each area, which is finally classified into high – medium – lowtsunami hazard area. However, such a hazard map may not fully provide the necessary information
because the actual disaster is not merely dependent on wave height but are also affected by local
topography, demography, landuse, etc. Disaster mitigation planning needs more specific information to
enable detail action. In this concern, this paper is trying to provide hazard identification by using
tsunami intensity, based on which disaster mitigation activities can be determined easier.
Lesson learnt from the two recent tsunami events, i.e. Southern-West Java tsunami 2006 andMentawai tsunami 2010 will be used to discuss about the significant role of land use management aswell as education, training and drill in the reduction of fatalities during tsunami disaster.

POTENTIAL OF TSUNAMI HAZARD IN INDONESIA
Hamzah et.al (2000) divided Indonesia into 6 zones (see Fig.2) by considering the composition of its
tectonic plate-convergence, the depth of seismicity variation, and the characteristics of tsunami
generation. It is described that in Zone-A most of tsunamis were generated by earthquakes as results of
the activities of two tectonic elements; (i) subduction of Indian Ocean Plate beneath the Eurasian Plateand (ii) the great Sumatera fault located in Sumatera from its southernmost part near the Sunda Strait
to its northernmost part near the Andaman Island. Two tsunamis were generated by volcanic eruptionof Krakatau in 1883 and 1928.
In Zone-B, tsunamis were generated by two types of earthquake, i.e. subduction of Indian Ocean
Plate beneath the Eurasian Plate and back-arc- thrusting lies east-west in the north of theBali-Lombok-Sumbawa Islands. One volcanic tsunami was caused by the eruption of Tambora in
1915.
In Zone-C, all tsunamis were caused by tectonic earthquake due subduction of the Australian Platebeneath the southeastern part of the Eurasian Plate except two by volcanic eruption of Rokatenda in1927 and 1928 and one tsunami by landslide at Lomblen.

557

In Zone-D all tsunamis were generated by earthquakes in the back-arc opening zone in the
Makassar Strait, in which earthquakes usually have normal fault mechanism.
In Zone-E, within all tsunamis, four tsunamis were generated by volcanic eruptions, i.e. Awu in
1856 and 1892, Ruang in 1889, and Gamalama in 1871. The remaining tsunamis were generated byearthquakes in the Molucca Sea collision zone.
In Zone-F, tsunamis were generated by shallow earthquakes associated with the activity of
Caroline subduction zone.
Based on the tsunami data provided by International Tsunami Data Base (WinITDB) developed by
Gusiakov et.al (2006), Hamzah et.al (2000), Widjo et.al (2006) and Hidayat et.al (2007) a decadal
tsunami events statistic in Indonesia was drawn. In Fig.3, these data are shown as bar graphs
corresponding to each zone (A, B, C, D, E, and F) marked in Fig.2.
Philippine Sea
Plate
Eurasian Plate

A

E

F

D

B

Caroline
Plate

C

Indo-Australian Plate

Australia

Fig.2 Seismotectonics zonation of Indonesia Region, which is divided into six
zones (Zone-A, B, C, D, E, and F). Yellow lines denote the boundaries
of each zone. (Source: Hamzah et al., 2000)
160 1-16 10
161 1-16 20
162 1-16 30
163 1-16 40
164 1-16 50
165 1-16 60
166 1-16 70
167 1-16 80
168 1-16 90
169 1-17 00
170 1-17 10
171 1-17 20
172 1-17 30
173 1-17 40
174 1-17 50
175 1-17 60
176 1-17 70
177 1-17 80
178 1-17 90
179 1-18 00
180 1-18 10
181 1-18 20
182 1-18 30
183 1-18 40
184 1-18 50
185 1-18 60
186 1-18 70
187 1-18 80
188 1-18 90
189 1-19 00
190 1-19 10
191 1-19 20
192 1-19 30
193 1-19 40
194 1-19 50
195 1-19 60
196 1-19 70
197 1-19 80
198 1-19 90
199 1-20 00
200 1-20 10

0

5

10 0

5

10 0

5

10 0

5

10 0

5

10 0

5

10

Fig.3 Decadal tsunami event statistics in Indonesia based on ITDB data (Gusiakov et.al. 2006) plus
the latest data. Red-stars mean tsunami with I > 2.5 or those caused significant fatalities,
whereas green-stars indicate tsunami with I < 2.5 but caused considerable fatalities in the area.

558

In Zone-A, very few records are available on tsunami wave height or fatalities except after the
2004. However, it could be noticed that the recurrence of tsunami with intensity of 2.5 or higher islearned to be happened about every 100 to 150 years. The following events were reported to cause
high Tsunami Intensity (I) or cause big fatalities (F) or damage, i.e. in 1797 (I=3), 1833 (I=2.5), 1861
(I=3, F=725), and 2004 (I=4, F=165,000).
In Zone-B, the recurrence of tsunami with intensity of 2.5 or higher is about every 30 to 50 years.
The following events are considered to have significant level of hazard or disaster, i.e. 1818 (I=3.5,
F=400), 1851 (Hmax=14.5), 1883 (Hmax=36, I=4.5, F=36,417), 1917 (F=15,000), 1977 (I=3.5,
F=189), 1994 (I=2.5, F=250), and 2006 (I=2, F=390).
Zona-C is the most active tsunami zone with the long record since 1629. It is seen that tsunamis
with intensity of 2.5 or higher have happened about every 50 to 80 years. They were including theevents of 1629 (I=3), 1674 (I=4, F=2,970), 1763 (I=2.5), 1852 (I=2.5), 1899 (I=3), 1928 (I=3), 1979
(I=3, F=539), and 1992 (I=2.7, F=2,200).
Zone-D is the most less tsunami hazard area in Indonesia. Only five tsunami events were reported
since 1917 and the tsunami intensities I are less than 1.5. However, fatalities of 13 people werereported in the event of 1967.
In Zone-E, the recurrence of tsunami with intensity of 2.5 or higher is about every 40 to 50 years.
Although the fatalities were not as huge as those in Zone-A, B, or C, there were four records oftsunami events with tsunami intensity equal or greater than I=2.5, i.e. 1889 (I=2.5), 1927 (I=3, F=50),
1968 (I=3, F=392). In addition, in 1856, smaller tsunami with I=2 caused fatalities of F=100.
Zone-F booked more tsunami event comparing to Zone-D but the recorded maximum tsunami
intensity are only between 1.5 and 2. The most fatal tsunami disasters in this area happened in 1864
(I=1.5, F=250) and 1996 (I=1.8, F=108).
Tsunami Intensity Variation in Indonesia
From the same source of data (Gusiakov, 2006), correlation of tsunami intensity with its incident
number for each area was drawn as in Fig.4. The tsunami intensity scale is of Soloviev-Imamura(1972). It is shown that, except Zone-D and F, most of Indonesian region experienced tsunami hazards
with high intensities of greater than I=4. In Zone-D and F the maximum tsunami intensity is only I=2.
It can also be seen that in all area, the most frequent events are those with tsunami intensity between
I=1 and 1.5.

Fig.4 Correlation of tsunami intensity with its incident number for each area.
A rough approximation of the exceedence probability graphics of tsunami intensity were generated
from the available data. Since the data in Zone-A, B and E show a similar tendency, the data of thesezones are combined to get the graphic for the related zones and is provided in Fig.5(left). The similar559

graphic for the combined Zone-C and F is shown separately in Fig.5(right). No graphic is provided forZone-D as the data for this zone is too few. From Fig.5 we learned that the median tsunami intensity inall zones are about I=1.5.

Fig.5 Graphics of probability of exceedence of tsunami intensity for: (left) zones of A+B+E; and(right) zones of C+F

Based on the above discussion, tsunami intensity I=1.5 (Soloviev-Imamura scale) shall be set-up as a
threshold for minimum design criteria of any mitigation measure in all area of Indonesia, whereas the
maximum design criteria is adjusted to the relevant area.
Typical Exposure and Vulnerability against Tsunami Disaster in Indonesia
The exposure of coastal area against tsunami shall be assessed by considering the distance of vital
assets (residential area, factory, city infrastructures, etc.) to coastline, the altitude of the area above
mean sea level, and availability of protective measure (Post, 2007). Whereas, population density,
building structures, and building density have been considered as several important factors related tovulnerability.
Most of coastal cities or village in Indonesia traditionally lay very close to coastline without any
protective structure against high wave. Many of them are also located along the river bank from theriver mouth into inland direction. At several parts of coastal areas, seawall or revetment had been
constructed but for the purpose of coastal erosion countermeasure only.
Further, referring to the description by McGranahan et al. (2006), 20% of Indonesian populations(about 40 millions) are living along coastal areas that fall under the criterion of Low Elevation Coastal
Zone (LECZ). McGranahan et al. define the LECZ as contiguous land area up to 100 kilometers fromthe coast that is ten meters or below in elevation. This situation increases the exposure grade ofIndonesian coastal areas against tsunami hazard.
Referring to Tsunami Hazard Map of Indonesia (Paris, 2007), the following areas are classified
into very high and high tsunami hazard area: western-coast of Sumatera, from Banda Aceh toLampung; west and southern coast of West-Java; southern-east coast of East-Java; northern coast ofBali, north-eastern coast of Flores and islands north to Timor Island; northern coast of Papua Island;
western coast of Central Sulawesi; and coastal areas surrounding Halmahera Sea, Sulawesi Strait, andSeram Sea.
Figure-8(a) and -8(b) respectively show the Google’s bird view of Padang City and Bengkulu City,
the two most populated coastal cities along western-coast of Sumatera Island. These figures show highlevel exposure of those two cities against tsunami disaster by fact that these cities are linked to the sea
without any protection at all. Refer to the map of population density within the LECZ provided by
CIESIN (2007), Padang as well as Bengkulu cities are occupied by 500 to 1,000 residents within akilometer square of its LECZ. According to Borerro’s worst scenario simulation (2006), the future
giant tsunami will inundate about 8 km coastline of Padang City up to 1.5 km inland, whereas about
11 km of Bengkulu City’s coastline will be inundated between 400m to 1.5 km inland.

560

(a)

(b)

Fig.8 Google’s bird view of (a) Padang City and (b) Bengkulu City, the two most populated coastal
cities along western-coast of Sumatera Island.

TSUNAMI EVENTS IN INDONESIA AND IMMEDIATE EVACUATION RESPONSE
Systematic investigations on tsunami disasters in Indonesia were started just after the Flores Tsunami
in 1992. This is the first devastating tsunami in the modern age of Indonesia with fatalities toll of
about 2,200. Twenty-five tsunami events were reported happened in Indonesia since then, however,
not all events caused casualties or fatalities, and some others were not recorded in detail. Table 2
shows tsunami events in Indonesia since the Flores Tsunami in 1992.
Table 2. Tsunami events in Indonesia 1992-2011
Year
1992
1994
1994
1994
1994
1995
1995
1996
1996
1998
2000
2000
2000
2002
2002
2004
2004
2005
2005
2005
2006
2006
2007
2009
2010

Month Date
12
12
1
21
2
15
6
2
10
8
2
13
5
14
1
1
2
17
11
29
5
4
6
4
6
18
9
13
10
10
11
11
12
26
3
28
4
10
7
24
3
14
7
17
9
12
1
3
10
25

Time
13:29
11:24
17:07
01:17
06:44
15:42
11:33
16:05
14:59
14:10
12:21
16:28
14:44
22:28
19:50
21:26
7:58
23:09
11:14
15:59
15:57
15:19
13:10
19:43
14:42

Lat
-8.48
1.01
-4.97
-10.48
-1.26
-1.32
-8.38
0.73
-0.89
-2.07
-1.11
-4.72
13.8
13.04
-1.76
-8.17
3.32
2.06
-1.71
7.9
-3.6
-9.33
-4.52
-0.408-3.484Long
121.9
127.73104.3
112.83127.98127.44125.13119.93136.95124.89123.57102.09
97.45
93.07
134.3
124.91
95.85
97.01
99.78
92.1
127.21
107.27101.37132.89100.114

Ms
7.5
7.3
7
7.2
6.8
6.8
6.9
7.7
8.1
7.6
7.5
8
7.8
6.7
7.7
7.5
9
8.7
6.5
7.2
6.6
7.7

561

7.7
7.7

I
Hmax
2.7
26.18
1.5
2

D
L
L

Fatal
2200

2.5
1.5

13.9
3

L
M

1.5
1.8
1.8
1.5
1

4
3.43
7.68
2.7
5

0
1
1
4
1.5
-2.5

3
2
15
4
0.4

M
M
M
N
S
N
N
N
N
N
L
L
N

2
2
3

5
2
3.9

L

3.3

9

L

250
1
0
11
24
108
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
165,000 NOW
TIB
0
TIB
3 TIB
390 LTW0 LTW
0530 PTW

S

WS
TIB
N/A
TIB
TIB
TIB
TIB
TIB
TIB
RTW
RTW
TIB
TIB
NOW
TIB
TIB

Zone
C
F
B
F
C
E
F
E
E

F
C
A
A
A
C
B
A
A

In Table 2, Ms is surface magnitude of the earthquake, I is tsunami intensity scale ofSoloviev-Imamura, Hmax is the maximum observed run-up value, D is damage classification in
general, Fatal is number of killed people, WS means whether a warning message was released or not.
In the WS column, NOW - no warning was issued, PTW - Tsunami Warning issued by PacificTsunami Warning Center, RTW - Regional Tsunami Warning issued by PTWC for areas having no
TWS, LTW - Local Tsunami Warning issued by regional or national TWC, TIB – Tsunami
Information or Attention Bulletin issued by any agency, N/A - status unknown).
Among those events, 15 events (shaded line in Table 1) were selected and used to draw diagram asshown in Figure-6. It shows number of killed people, tsunami intensity, effective local warning status,
status of immediate evacuation action, initial tsunami arrival time and its lead time after earthquake ineach tsunami events.

Fig.6 Number of killed people, tsunami intensity, effective local warning status, status of immediateevacuation, initial tsunami arrival time and its lead time after earthquake in 14 tsunami event inIndonesia within 1992-2011.
“Killed people” means number of people directly killled by the disaster. “Effective warning” means
whether a local warning disseminated and reach to the residents effectively just before the disasters. If
local warning was disseminated, then it is given the value of 1, whereas value of zero is given in caseof no local warning at all. Meanwhile, “immediate evacuation” means whether the residents evacuated
immediately after sensed the earthquake shaking. Value of zero means no evacuation, value of 0.5
means very few people were evacuated, and value of 1 is given to the events where many people
immediately evacuated just after the earthquake or local warning.
Based on Figure-6, it is learnt that since 1992 only one local warning was effectively worked
before tsunami disaster events (i.e. Bengkulu Tsunami, 2007).
Figure 6 also shows that immediate evacuations by most of the residents were conducting only infour events (with or without local warning, i.e. 1998, 2005, 2006, 2007), very few evacuation were inthree events (without local warning, i.e. 1996, 2004, 2010) and the remaining events performed no
immediate evacuation responses. This distribution is summarized in Figure-7.
It can also be seen in Fig.6 that immediate evacuation related to few or no fatalities due to tsunami.
On the opposite, several to huge number of fatalities were recorded related to “no” or “very few”
immediate evacuations. Although many other factors, such as coastal morphology, tsunami intensity,562

distance of residential area from the coastline, availability of coastal protection, etc. also have theirroles however, these facts have given indication on the significance of immediate evacuation in
reducing the fatalities due to tsunami disaster.
“many” immediateevacuation
4 (27 %)

effective warning
1 (7 %)
no immediateevacuation
8 (53 %)

no effective warning
14 (93 %)“few” immediateevacuation
3 (20 %)

Fig.7 Distribution graphs of number of tsunami disaster events with or without local effective
warning (left) and number of tsunami events with or without immediate evacuation response(right). Case of Indonesia (selected) 1992-2011.
At the top part of Fig.6, the dark circles sign for tsunami event between 21:00 to 07:00, empty
circles sign for tsunami event between 07:00 to 18:00, and half-dark circles sign for the event between
18:00 to 21:00. The cases of Taliabu (1998) and Nias (2005) shows that people did immediateevacuation even if the hazard is generated in the midnight. It seems that their correct understanding on
the danger of tsunami and high awareness have led them to perform effective response.

SOUTH-WEST JAVA TSUNAMI 2006, EFFECTIVE WARNING AND AWARENESS
A tsunami disaster was generated along the west and central southern coast of Java Island on 17 July
2006 due to a tsunami earthquake (Mw = 7.7) that occured offshore near the trench of the Sunda
subduction zone south of Java at about 3:19 p.m. local time. The local felt reports indicated only weak
shaking in Java. There was no ground motion damage from the earthquake, but there was extensive
damage and loss of life from the tsunami (Mori et al., 2007). Figure 9 shows the map of the earthquake
epicenter location (USGS, 2006).

JakartaJAVA
INDIAN
OCEAN

Christmas Is.

BALI

EQ Epicenter(USGS, 2006)
100 kmLegend:the most affected coatalline (Widjo et al.,2006)

Fig.9 Map of the earthquake epicenter location
Despite having had learnt the great lesson from the IOT 2004, this disaster, however, still recorded
464 human tolls. The less awareness as well as less understanding of local community on the various
types of tsunami precursor has caused this unexpected number of human toll.
There was no effective local tsunami warning system in place, whereas the national warning
dissemination system had not ready yet. This caused the warning messages did not reach the target
residents. This claim was supported by a questionaire based survey result reported by Muhari et al.
(2007), which concluded that more than 70% of the residents in four locations among the five563

surveyed locations heard no evacuation warning related to this tsunami.Such a situation can beunderstood by refering to Table 2, which shows part of the warning time-line of South-West Java
Tsunami of 2006 compiled by IOC-ITIC (2006). It is known from this record that initial detection ofpotential tsunami and warning initiatives were well performed by the Indonesian national authority.
However, a failure to contact local government official by telephone due to unavailability ofcommunication contact points at the respected coastal area is considered to have fluffed the effective
early warning (see line no.6 in Table 1). This has taught the importance of ensuring warning
dissemination link until the end node of disaster target. Regular updating of contact point data iscomparably important measure to facilitate smooth warning dissemination.
Furthermore, the residents’ knowledge on various types of earthquake characteristics and their
possibility in generating tsunamis, such as this tsunami earthquake, which produced relatively weakground motion shaking but generating tsunami, is indispensable. Otherwise, they may perform false
response and causes high fatalities.
Table 1 Part of Timeline: July 17, 2006 Java, Indonesia Earthquake and Tsunami
Compiled by IOC ITIC (Local time set was added by the author)
No. UTC

Local

1. 08:19
2. 08:21
3. 08:24

15:19
15:21
15:24

Elapsed
Time
0:00
0:02
0:05

4. 08:25

15:25

0:06

5. 08:26

15:26

0:07

6. 08:27

15:27

0:08

7. 08:29

15:29

0:10

8. 08:31

15:31

0:12

9. 08:32

15:32

0:13

10. 08:33

15:33

0:14

11. 08:36

15:36

0:17

12. 08:38
13. 08:39
14. 08:40

15:38
15:39
15:40

0:19
0:20
0:21

ActionEarthquake occurs (USGS and Harvard CMT: 9.28S, 107.38E, 34 km, Mw7.7)
BMG calls start to be received
BMG SMS alert reporting automatic solution using 8 stations, ML6.8
BMG Mb5.5 => large difference in M implies non-typical earthquake.
PTWC Seismic Alarm triggers alerting PTWC duty staff.
BMG press inquiry on phone and issued to media - caution for tsunami.
JMA Operations Trigger for Distant Earthquake.
BMG unsuccessful to contact local government official in the coastal area by telephone due
to unavailability of communication contact points at the said areas. SMS message sent tolist of about 400 available addresses, though list did not contain many Java coastal
addresses
NEIC Short Period Alarm
PTWC Observatory Message with preliminary epicenter (9.3S, 107.3E), magnitude (Mwp
7.3) and P-wave arrival times disseminated to other observatories (e.g., JMA, WC/ATWC)
JMA receives PTWC Observatory Message
WC/ATWC calls to PTWC (determines that WC/ATWC does not need to issue a bulletinsince the earthquake is not in the Pacific Ocean)
PTWC Bulletin #1 - Indian Ocean Local Tsunami Watch Message disseminated via GTS,
email, fax, putting Indonesia and Australia in a Watch, M 7.2; providing estimated tsunami
arrival times for tsunami forecast points at Christmas Island, Australia (0836), Cilacap,
Indonesia (0900)
NEIC – initial automatic solution, Mwp 7.2
JMA receives PTWC Bulletin #1
PTWC confirms with Emergency Management Australia by Telephone
Tsunami arrival, Pangandaran, ………………………………………………………..

MENTAWAI TSUNAMI 2010 AND DISASTER PREPAREDNESS FOR SMALL ISLANDS
Mentawai tsunami 2010 was generated by a tectonic earthquake (Mw=7.8) occurred on 25 October2010 at 21:42 local time seaward of the Mentawai Islands, off-shore of Sumatra. Tsunami run-up of 3
to 9 m struck along southwestern coasts of the Pagai Islands and took 530 lives. Figure 10 shows
location map of Mentawai Islands and the epicenter of the 2010 tsunamigenic earthquake.
Tsunami Mentawai on October 25, 2010 gaves another prove of the urgency of an effective
telecommunication and transportation system during disaster, especially when dealing with remoteislands like Mentawai. Unavailability of this system was considered as one of the root of the lateemergency response in this disaster. The importance of integrated operation and maintenance oftsunami early warning system was also learnt from this disaster event.

564

o Padang

Malaysia

Siberut
IslandINDIANOCEAN

o Jakarta

Mentawai
Is lands

SiporaIslandPagai Utara
IslandPagai Selatan
Island30 km

EQ Epicenter(USGS, 2010)

Fig.10 Map of the earthquake epicenter location
Table 3 Initial response timeline to the Mentawai tsunami

22:43

23:20

23:42

00:20

03:10

04:30

1hr 38'2hr 00'2hr 38'5hr 28'6hr 48'10hr 18'

JMA - Padang; 0.3m

PTWC - tsunami watch
cancelled

JMA – Padang, etc.; 0.2m
– 0.4m

22:25
43'

52'

1hr 01'

22:23
41'

08:00

BMKG - Padang; 0.3m

22:01
19'

Actual initialtsunami arrived
in 5-10 minutes;
1 to 9m tsunami
depth

22:34

BMKG - Enggano; 0.27m

21:49
7'
PTWC - tsunami watch

PTWC - EQ message

NEIC - EQ recorded

5'

JMA - tsunami watch

21:48
6'

21:42

10/26

21:47

TIME
ELAPSED

LOCAL
TIME

10/25

BMKG Simulation:
Tsunami will attack
Pagai Selatan at
21:49:52

No feedback
confirmation from
Mentawai;telecomunication
system failed
BMKG: Tsunami Warning !!
- sent to media & local gov,
including Mentawai

Provincial Gov. got the disaster
report by a courier come from
Mentawai by motorboat:
Emergency response STARTED

10/27
20:00 morning

22hr

12 hrsbad weather hampered theemergency response; several
dispatched emergency ships
were returned back to Padang

BMKG: Warning CANCELLED!!
- no destructive tsunami

National coordination
meeting for emergency
Emergency response byusing six helicopters

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34hr

Initial response timeline to Mentawai tsunami
In reference to the International Tsunami Alert Service Timeline released by UNESCO/IOC (2010),
Mentawai earthquake and tsunami timeline by BMKG Indonesia (2010) and compiled internet online
news, an initial response timeline to the Mentawai tsunami is summarized in Table 3.
Table 3 informs several facts related to the response situation at the initial state of Mentawai
tsunami as follows:
1. Based on numerical simulation result, the Meteorological, Climatological and Geophysical Agency
of Indonesia (BMKG) concluded that tsunami was generated and will attack Pagai Selatan Island at
about 21:49:52. Accordingly, BMKG released tsunami warning 5 minutes after the earthquake
through electronic media as well as direct message to the local governments including Mentawai.
This warning was cancelled 47 minutes later since no feedback confirmation from the Mentawai
local government about the actual field situation and tide-gage measurement network informed
small tsunami amplitude (0.2 – 0.4m).
It was known later that the telecommunication system failed to work since the electricity down due
to the lack of fuel to feed the electric generator in the central telecomunication station. In fact,
Mentawai Islands were regularly lack of fuel supply to support the daily activities.
2. The first courier from Mentawai Island arrived at Padang City in the next morning after 6 hours
tough motorboat journey under the bad sea climate and weather to report about the disastersituation.
3. Immediately after receiving the actual disaster information, emergency responses were started by
the Provincial Government of West Sumatera. However, severely bad sea climate and weather
hampered the emergency response; several dispatched emergency ships were returned back to
Padang;
4. A national level emergency coordination meeting was held in the evening of the same day to get
decission on the mobilization of helicopters for supporting the emergency measures, but the actual
actions were started only on the next day morning.
Risk Knowledge, Local Awareness and Fatalities Reduction
A field observation and questionaire survey were carried out in Mentawai Islands after the tsunami of
October 25th , 2010. Field observation was done to investigate if land use management intervention
regarding tsunami mitigation has been implemented, whereas questionaire survey was directed tocollect information related to the evacuation processes, by using key questions such as backgroundsituation of evacuation decission, knowledge on tsunami, tsunami inundation depth at the initialdecission of evacuation, ect. Survey locations include Surat Aban, Tapak, and Malakopa Villages inPagai Selatan District, and Sabeugungung, Montei Teikaku, Montei Baru-baru, and Betumonga in
Pagai Utara District.
Among the interesting result from the questionaire survey is that 40% of respondent have known
about tsunami and its characteristics before the latest event, whereas 32% have never known before
and 23% have heard about but not really understand. Regarding the timing of evacuation decission,
about 49% respondent did just after sensed the earthquake, 20% did after heard the shouting forevacuation, 15% after seeing that other people runaway, and each are 5% after observing the sea waterrise or recede respectively.
CONCLUSIONS
Tsunami intensity has a potential to be used as hazard identification based on which disastermitigation activities can be determined easier.
In the near future, while continuing the development of the whole tsunami disaster mitigation
system, the public education on the accurate knowledge of tsunami danger and various precursors
must be intensively and extensively carried out, by which individual awareness as well as community566

preparedness can be sustainably developed in the whole tsunami prone area to minimize the impact oftsunami disaster.

REFERENCES
Edward Bryant, Tsunami the Underrated Hazard, 2nd Edition, 2008, Springer, pp.132-133
Mori, J., Mooney, W. D., Afnimar, Kurniawan, S., Anaya, A.I., Widiyantoro, S. (2007). “The 17 July
2006 Tsunami Earthquake in West Java, Indonesia.” Seismological Research Letters, Vol. 78, No. 2,
201-207.
Muhari, A., Diposaptono, S., Imamura, F. (2007). “Toward an Integrated Tsunami Disaster Mitigation:
Lessons Learned from Previous Tsunami Events in Indonesia.” Journal of Natural Disaster Science,Vol. 29, No. 1, 13-19.
Lay, T., C. J. Ammon, H. Kanamori, Y. Yamazaki, K. F. Cheung, and A. R. Hutko (2011), The 25
October 2010 Mentawai tsunami earthquake (M w 7.8) and the tsunami hazard presented byshallow megathrust ruptures, Geophys. Res. Lett., 38, L06302, doi:10.1029/2010GL046552

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