HIAS-E-125

Cambodian Refugees

Katsuo Kogure(a) , Masahiro Kubo (b)(a)(b)

University of Aizu
Brown University

November 2022

Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University
2-1, Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-8601, Japan
tel:+81 42 580 8668 http://hias.hit-u.ac.jp/
HIAS discussion papers can be downloaded without charge from:https://hdl.handle.net/10086/27202
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Cambodian Refugees ∗Katsuo Kogure†
University of Aizu

Masahiro Kubo‡
Brown University

November 11, 2022
Abstract
This paper examines the consequences of forced displacement for Cambodian refugees during the Cambodian conflict (1978–1991). Using complete
count 1998 Census microdata, we focus on the two major groups of returnees,
namely those from the neighboring countries of Thailand and Vietnam, whichwere under the control of different great powers, respectively Western and Eastern, during the Cold War. The former stayed in refugee camps with humanitarian assistance prior to repatriation and the latter did not. Consistent with theavailability of humanitarian assistance, our analyses reveal that the returnees
from Thailand attained higher levels of education—while those from Vietnam,
by contrast, attained lower levels of education—than stayers. On the other
hand, the two groups both experienced worse labor market outcomes, with
employment shifts from the primary sector to the immature tertiary sector.
Such adverse displacement impacts are relatively stronger for later returnees.
We provide suggestive evidence that adverse displacement impacts can be attributed to congested labor markets resulting from limited access to available
agricultural land, exacerbated by the high contamination of landmines and
UXOs during the conflict. Our results demonstrate that forced displacement
due to conflict in a developing country can be a potential source of future misallocation.
JEL Codes: O15, J24, D74, N35
Keywords: conflict, forced displacement, refugees, repatriation, Cambodia∗

We are grateful to Dany Bahar, Sascha O. Becker, Felipe Valencia Caicedo, Keisuke Hirano,
Yoko Kijima, Satoru Kobayashi, Yuya Kudo, Takashi Kurosaki, Hisaki Kono, Tomohiro Machikita,
Yasuyuki Sawada, Stelios Michalopoulos, Louis Putterman, Akira Shibanuma, Yoshito Takasaki,
Kiyoyasu Tanaka, and participants at various conferences/seminars, including the 2nd Hitotsubashi
Summer Institute 2016, PacDev 2019, the Japanese Economic Association Spring Meeting 2019,
and the North American/Australian/Asian Econometric Society Summer Meeting 2021, for helpfulcomments on earlier versions of this work. We also gratefully acknowledge H. E. San Sy Than, H.
E. Hang Lina, and Fumihiko Nishi for providing us with the 1998 Census microdata. We also thankthe Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) for sharing landmine andUXO contamination and clearance data. This research is supported by Grants-in-Aid for Scientific
Research No. 15K17044 and No. 20K01610, the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, andthe Refugee Studies Junior Scholar Awards, Shinnyo-en, Shinnyo Educational Trust.
†
School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Aizu, Tsuruga, Ikki-machi,
Aizuwakamatsu, Fukushima 965-8580, Japan. Tel: +81-242-37-2500. Email: katsukogure@ gmail.com.
‡
Department of Economics, Brown University, 64 Waterman Street, Providence, RI 02912. Email: masahiro kubo@brown.edu.

11Introduction

Recent years have seen growing interest in the consequences of forced displacement
due to wars, civil conflicts, or persecution (see Becker and Ferrara 2019, Becker 2022,
Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2013, Verme and Schuettler 2021 for reviews). One historical turning point for responses to forced displacement is the Cold War between theWest and the East (UNHCR 2000). While proxy wars caused massive movementsof refugees, particularly in Africa, Asia, and Central America, the era also saw the
expansion of humanitarian assistance in camps; moreover, the United Nations organized and implemented repatriation and peacebuilding operations around the end of
the war.1 Despite its significance for the history of forced displacement, due to a lackof large-scale empirical data, we know little about how forced displacement during
the Cold War affected refugees and how those refugees have been reintegrated since
their repatriation in the context of developing countries. In this paper, we employ thecomplete count Census microdata, which can explicitly identify returning refugees,
to help address these issues.
Our study considers the consequences for Cambodian refugees who departed aroundthe time of the collapse of the Pol Pot regime (1975–1979) during the Cambodian
conflict (1978–1991).2 This refugee crisis corresponds to the Indochina refugee crisis(1975–1995) (during the Vietnam War and the Cambodian conflict), one of the largest
population shifts in history (Robinson 1998): More than 3 million out of 56 million
people in the region became refugees due to the Cold War and the rise of communism
in the region (UNHCR 2000, p. 79). Our focus is the two major groups of Cambodian
returnees, from the neighboring countries of Thailand and Vietnam, who experienced
1
In 1975–1980, UNHCR’s budget increased from US$ 76 million to US$ 510 million (UNHCR
2000, p. 7). In 1988–1994, the UN conducted 21 repatriation and peacebuilding operations, despite
there having been only 13 such operations in the previous 40 years (UNHCR 2000, p.133).
2
The Khmer Rouge (officially the Communist Party of Kampuchea), led by Pol Pot, won anarmed conflict during the Vietnam War in April 1975 and established the state of Democratic
Kampuchea in 1976. This regime ruled the country until being overthrown by the Vietnamese army
in January 1979.

2

distinct repatriation processes in terms of timing and humanitarian assistance. The
former stayed in refugee camps with humanitarian assistance until early 1990s, while
the latter went without it until around early 1980s. The two groups were also under
the control of different great powers, the West and the East, respectively, during the
1980s, when the Cold War intensified.3 With political economy considerations, ourstudy provides unique comparative research, albeit focusing on a single country.
Our study has policy relevance for contemporary refugee assistance in developing
countries. Nowadays, more than 89 million people are forcibly displaced by wars,
civil conflicts, or persecution (UNHCR 2021). As with many other refugees, Cambodian refugees were protected and assisted by international organizations, including
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the world’s leading organization supporting refugees. Although it is now common to construct andmanage refugee camps with a wide range of services (e.g., vocational training programs, education programs), as well as to assist with repatriation and the rebuildingof refugees’ lives after their displacement, these activities were initiated during the Indochina refugee crisis: Historically, assistance to the Indochinese refugees, especially
Cambodian refugees, became a turning point for UNHCR (UNHCR 2000, pp. 7–8).4
Since Cambodian refugees in Thailand (West) received such assistance and those in
Vietnam (East) did not, our results offer implications for the effectiveness of refugee
assistance.
Our analysis employs the 100% count 1998 Cambodian Population Census microdata, which contain basic information regarding individual and household socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., age, education, occupation, home ownership, place of
3“[R]efugees were used as pawns in geopolitical games to destabilize regimes and to encourage
insurgency in their countries of origin” (UNHCR 2000, p. 7).
4
UNHCR was established in 1950, the onset of the Cold War. In its early days, UNHCR focusedon facilitating the resettlement of refugees fleeing communist regimes in Europe. In the 1960s andthe early 1970s, UNHCR became involved in facilitating repatriations in Africa and Bangladesh, but
its involvement ended soon afterward (UNHCR 2000, pp. 1–8). During the Indochina refugee crisisof 1975–1980, UNHCR expanded the scope of its activities thanks to a budget increase from US$ 76
million to US$ 510 million (UNHCR 2000, p. 7).

3

birth, migration). Combining migration information with historical facts, we identify
well-defined former refugees aged 20–60 who returned from Thailand and Vietnam
and then select other individuals, ones who have never migrated before (hereafter,“stayers”), for their comparison samples.5 For those aged 34–60, we also look at theirchildren aged 6–19 (born after the event), if any, to explore the intergenerational
impacts of forced displacement. Our evaluation thus covers the cohorts aged 34–60,
20–33, and 6–19, whose human capital accumulation was affected in different ways
by forced displacement: The first cohort had already finished compulsory education
prior to the refugee event; for returnees from Thailand, the second cohort received
it in the camps and the third received it in the camps and in Cambodia after repatriation; meanwhile, for returnees from Vietnam, the second and third cohorts both
received it in Cambodia after repatriation, due to earlier repatriation than those fromThailand. Our examination of such older and younger returnees from Thailand andVietnam, each with distinct experiences, enables us to grasp the whole picture of theconsequences of the Cambodian refugees themselves and to gain deeper insights into
the long-term impacts of forced displacement, humanitarian assistance in camps, andthe repatriation and reintegration process.
Our evaluation focuses mainly on educational and labor market outcomes. The
latter include outcomes for sector of employment and occupational status. We look atthese outcomes for two main reasons. First, almost everyone was forcibly engaged inagricultural work (i.e., the primary sector) under the Pol Pot regime (Kiernan 2008).
Understanding how the subsequent sectoral and occupational structure differs between returnees and stayers is crucial for post-conflict policies in Cambodia. Second,“solidarity groups” (krom samakki) consisting of 10–15 families who work cooperatively and share their production, which started in 1979 (right after the fall of the
Pol Pot regime), arguably determined subsequent farmland ownership in Cambodia
5

We look at those cohorts because they were born prior to the refugee crisis and their existence
has not been affected by it.

4

(Amakawa 2001), though de jure private property rights were established in 1989.6
While they also faced high contamination from landmines and UXOs during the conflict (Ministry of Planning 2003, p. 73), returnees, especially later ones, might havelacked access to available agricultural land and been pushed outside agricultural labormarkets. Similarly, we also look at the impact of displacement on home ownership;
returnees might be less likely to own their own home.
Our analysis, on one hand, reveals a sharp contrast between the returnees fromThailand, who received education in camps, and those from Vietnam, who did so in
Cambodia right after repatriation: The former attained higher levels of education—and the latter, by contrast, attained lower levels of education—than the stayers. For
instance, our estimates suggest that the displacement increased years of schooling by
1.060 years for male returnees aged 20–33 in the former category and decreased yearsof schooling by 0.848 years for male returnees of the same age in the latter category.
This sharp contrast is likely to be due to the educational environment being relatively
better in the refugee camps (West) than in Cambodia (East) (see, e.g., Rogge 1990, p.
47). The latter returnees’ human capital accumulation might have been disrupted due
to repatriation, because it generally takes a substantial amount of time to readjust
to a new environment.
Our analysis, on the other hand, also reveals that both groups experienced worse
labor market outcomes, with employment shifts from the primary sector to an immature tertiary sector. For instance, our estimates for the male returnees aged 20–33
from Thailand and Vietnam suggest that the displacement decreased the proportionof employment in the primary sector by 23.3 and 16.3 percentage points, respectively,
while increasing the proportion of employment in the tertiary sector by 19.4 and 12.8
percentage points, respectively. At the same time, the displacement increased the
proportion of engagement in low-skilled work by 7.4 and 3.1 percentage points, re6

People’s Republic of Kampuchea, Council of Ministers, Sub-Decree No.25 on Providing House
Ownership to the Cambodian Population, 22 April 1989; People’s Republic of Kampuchea, Council of
Ministers, Instruction No.03 on Implementation of Land use and Management Policy, 3 June 1989.

5

spectively, while decreasing the proportion of engagement in middle-skilled work by
14.7 and 1.5 percentage points, respectively.
Taken together, our findings imply that higher education levels do not necessarily
lead to better labor market outcomes after repatriation (i.e., resources can be misallocated). Because the primary sector was a major industry and other sectors were notdeveloped at the time in Cambodia (Vickery 1999), returnees were likely forced toengage in low-skilled work (simple and routine tasks) in other sectors (especially thetertiary, i.e., informal, sector), being pushed out of agricultural labor markets due tolimited access to agricultural land—something exacerbated by the high contamination of landmines and UXOs. In other words, other sectors might not have matured
enough to adequately absorb the available labor force of the returnees at the time.
Thus, the adverse displacement impacts can be attributed to congested labor markets
resulting from limited access to agricultural land. We provide suggestive evidence tosupport this mechanism.
Our analysis addresses the potential endogeneity concerns about the non-random
assignment of refugees and stayers in our observational data. We first carefully use
a selection-on-observables assumption to identify the impacts of forced displacement
on refugees: In addition to the commonly-used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with covariates using the full samples, we use the 100% count Census microdata
to construct matched samples of refugees and stayers based on the Imbens-Rubin
approach (Imbens and Rubin 2015), generally exactly balancing observed covariates,
and the bias-corrected version of the nearest-neighbor matching method developed
by Abadie and Imbens (2011) for the estimation. Such matched samples with “strong
common support” facilitate our heterogeneity analysis (see Lechner and Strittmatter 2019 for relevant discussion). To address potential concerns about selection-onunobservables, for the matched samples, we construct more balanced samples, furtherbalancing pre-treatment covariates (this is feasible for limited samples). To address
the remaining concerns, we also consider omitted variable bias due to unobserved6confounders through Rosenbaum’s sensitivity analysis (Rosenbaum 2002). For thefull samples, we employ the machine learning-based instrumental variables method,
following Windmeijer et al. (2019), and also conduct sensitivity analysis, following
Oster (2019). These extensive analyses confirm the robustness of our base results.
We then examine heterogeneity in the displacement impacts, mainly with respect
to the timing of repatriation. The analyses reveal two key findings. First, later
returnees experienced relatively worse labor market and home ownership outcomes.
Importantly, this finding is even true for the returnees from Thailand aged 20–33, who
attained higher levels of education through forced displacement. Second, in terms ofintergenerational impacts, children who had to receive an education around the timeof repatriation experienced worse educational outcomes. The results are consistent
with those for the returnees aged 20–33 from Vietnam, the majority of whom received education right after repatriation. These findings imply that we may needto pay special attention to school-aged children, so as not to disrupt their humancapital accumulation during repatriation and reintegration. We also provide suggestive evidence that social networks built or maintained in camps mitigate the adverse
displacement impacts.
Finally, we empirically explore the potential mechanisms underlying the findings,
with the additional use of the large-scale nationally representative 2004 Cambodia
Socio-Economic Survey (CSES) microdata, collected based on the 1998 Census frame.
These contain detailed information regarding individual and household socioeconomic
characteristics (e.g., land ownership, social capital, health, remittances). We first
confirm the consistency of the 1998 Census and the 2004 CSES data, showing thatthe adverse displacement impacts continue in 2004. We then consider whether these
impacts are driven by congested labor markets resulting from limited access to agricultural land. We also employ nationwide geospatial data about areas contaminatedwith landmines and UXOs to consider potentially available land. Adjusting for possible differences in local socioeconomic characteristics across regions, we find evidence

7strongly supporting the congestion channel: Returnees, especially those who returned
later and/or specifically returned from Thailand to congested areas, are less likely tohave access to agricultural land and experience worse labor market and home ownership outcomes.
Motivated by the relevant literature and social contexts, we also consider otherpotential channels, including discrimination, health, and remittance networks (see,e.g., Brell et al. 2020, Currie and Madrian 1999, Chami et al. 2005 for relevant
discussions). There is a possibility that the adverse displacement impacts might bedriven by potential discrimination against returnees, poor health for returnees, or
better/worse remittance networks for returnees (e.g., relatives or friends abroad). We
find no evidence that these potential channels are likely to drive our results.
To gain further insights into the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance, we also
directly compare returnees from Thailand with those from Vietnam. The results
show that the displacement impacts in the younger cohorts (age 15–19) are relatively
better for the returnees from Thailand than for those from Vietnam. Given thatthe returnees from Thailand (West) received more extensive support than those from
Vietnam (East), humanitarian assistance might be more effective for minimizing adverse displacement impacts for younger cohorts. The findings are consistent withthose in the recent literature that suggest better childhood environments can lead tobetter long-term outcomes for children (e.g., Chetty et al. 2016, Chetty and Hendren
2018a,b).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 clarifies our contributions.
Section 3 provides relevant historical background. Section 4 describes our research
design and methods. Section 5 reports the estimation results, including the main
results and the heterogeneity of the results. Section 6 explores the mechanisms underlying the results. Section 7 provides a discussion that relates our results to thoseof relevant existing works. Finally, Section 8 concludes.

8

2

Related Literature

Our study contributes to a recent growing literature on forced migration (see Becker
and Ferrara 2019, Becker 2022, Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2013, Verme and Schuettler
2021 for reviews).7 In particular, our study has four distinctive features as comparedto the existing literature. First, using the 100% count Census microdata, our study
extensively explores the heterogeneous impacts of forced displacement on returnees
from two different countries (Thailand and Vietnam), as well as among their various
subpopulations, taking into account political and social contexts. Becker and Ferrara(2019, p. 15) argue that “[m]any studies looking at mass expulsions just treat forced
migrants as coming from a macro region or country without regard for heterogeneitywith respect to urban or rural origin, or different geographic or political conditions
within region/country of origin that can yield additional insights into the difficulty orease of forced migrants to assimilate at their destination.” Our results highlight theimportance of considering potential heterogeneity in the impacts of forced displacement among migrants facing different political and social constraints, demonstratingthat forced displacement, or more generally civil conflict, can be a potential source of
future misallocation (Banerjee and Duflo 2005, Besley and Ghatak 2010, Restuccia
and Rogerson 2013, 2017).
Second, our study considers long-term displacement impacts in the context of developing countries.8 The relevant existing works study forced migration situations in
7

See also Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., eds (2014) for a comprehensive overview of the interdisciplinary field of refugee and forced migration studies. Although the field emerged in the 1980s, theaccumulation of related economics literature (i.e., empirical studies) started in the early 2000s.
8Extant works focusing on developing countries examine the short- or mid-term impacts of forced
displacement (see Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2013 for a review). The literature has considered internallydisplaced persons (IDPs) in Northern Uganda (e.g., Fiala 2015), IDPs in Colombia (e.g., Ibáñez andVélez 2008, Ibáñez and Moya 2010), Burundian refugees (e.g., Fransen et al. 2017, Fransen et al.
2018), Rwandan refugees (e.g., Kondylis 2008), Bosnian refugees and IDPs (Kondylis 2010), andMozambican refugees and IDPs (Chiovelli et al. 2021). Kondylis (2008) and Fransen et al. (2017)
look at returnees, but do not distinguish between those from different destination countries. Fransen
et al. (2018) study Burundian returnees from Tanzania who received education in camps and provide
suggestive evidence that the forced displacement led to improved educational outcomes. A recent
work, Chiovelli et al. (2021), examines the impacts of multiple forced displacement trajectories on

9Europe or the United States (i.e., developed countries) (e.g., Arellano-Bover 2022,
Bauer et al. 2013, Becker et al. 2020, Deryugina et al. 2018, Nakamura et al. 2022,
Sarvimäki et al. 2022), and generally find positive displacement impacts on labor market outcomes, mainly due to the re-optimization of job and location choices throughforced displacement (especially for those who are or may become engaged in the primary sector).9 In contrast, our study of Cambodia (i.e., a developing country) finds
negative displacement impacts, although forced migrants may be able to re-optimize
their job and location choices. The distinct results might partly be attributed tothe systematic differences that forced migrants face in labor market structure andconditions (the extent of labor market distortions/frictions) between developed anddeveloping countries: Job opportunities may be more limited in the latter than theformer when forced migrants leave the primary sector. Other sectors in the lattercountries may not always be mature enough to adequately absorb the available labor
force.
Third, our study documents the historical legacies of the Indochina refugee crisis
during the Cold War (West vs. East), which became a historical turning point in
the expansion of refugee protection.10 Blattman and Miguel (2010, p. 42) argue that“[t]he social and institutional legacies of conflict are arguably the most important but
least understood of all war impacts.” Our results provide three key lessons regarding
the effectiveness of and constraints on humanitarian assistance for refugees: Improved
education in camps does not necessarily lead to better labor market outcomes after
human capital investments and occupational choices, focusing mainly on different types of IDPs
in Mozambique, and find indications that conflict-driven human capital accumulation may spur
structural transformation. They also look at long-term displacement impacts, using additional
survey data collected in a major city that received a large number of IDPs.
9
A change in preferences for education also leads to better labor market outcomes (Becker et al.
2020).
10
There is a small but growing body of literature relevant to wars/conflicts/violence in Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos (e.g., Miguel and Roland 2011, Kocher et al. 2011, Dell and Querubin 2018,
Riaño and Valencia Caicedo 2020, de Walque 2006, Merrouche 2011, Islam et al. 2016, Lin 2022,
Iwanowsky and Madestam 2019, Kogure and Takasaki 2016, Takasaki 2020); the latter seven study
Cambodian contexts. Also, Cortes (2004) examines the difference in labor market outcomes between
refugee and economic immigrants in the United States, the former of whom include refugees from
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

10repatriation, securing access to agricultural land might be a key consideration inagrarian countries, and humanitarian assistance might be more effective for younger
cohorts.
Lastly, our study also relates to the recent literature on the importance of childhood environments for long-term economic outcomes (e.g., Chetty et al. 2016, Chetty
and Hendren 2018a,b). Our study looks at changes in childhood environments due
to war/violence-induced forced migration, the results of which may imply that better environments in camps can minimize adverse displacement impacts, especially foryounger cohorts. Given our findings that improved education through forced displacement might not necessarily predict future labor market success in fragile andpost-conflict situations (i.e., due to the potential existence of misallocation), looking
at both educational and labor market outcomes might be indispensable; however,some extant works in the literature of war/violence-induced forced migration only
evaluate educational outcomes.

3

Historical Background

This section describes relevant forced displacement situations in Cambodia during
the Indochina refugee crisis (1975–1995).
Forced Displacement. The rise of communism in Indochina during the Cold
War caused massive movements of refugees in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos (see, e.g.,
Robinson 1998). In Cambodia, three events caused large numbers of refugees. The
first was the rule of the Khmer Rouge (officially the Communist Party of Kampuchea),
led by Pol Pot, in 1975–1979.11 Under threat of death due to persecution, around
170,000 and 34,000 people fled to Vietnam and Thailand, respectively, in 1975–1978(UNHCR 2000, p. 92).
The second event was the collapse of the Pol Pot regime. Following the late
11

Approximately two million people died from execution, disease, starvation, or exhaustion under
the Pol Pot regime (Dy 2007, p. 69).

11

1978 Vietnamese invasion, around 138,000 people fled to Thailand before the endof 1979 (Rogge 1990, p. 31, Suenobu 1995, pp. 5–6). Late that year, in response
to international pressure, Thailand adopted an “open door” policy toward refugees.
With the large ensuing influx of refugees, however, the policy promptly changed toa “closed door” one in early 1980 (Rogge 1990, pp. 67–69, Suenobu 1995, pp. 9–10). Consequently, those who fled to the border regions after early 1980 could notcross into Thailand and instead had to stay in the border camps (Rogge 1990, p. 69,
Suenobu 1995, p. 10).
The third event was the 1984–1985 Vietnamese dry-season offensive, which caused
about 220,000 people in the border camps to finally cross the border (Rogge 1990, p.
49). We use the term “refugees” for forced migrants in the Thai/Cambodian border
camps throughout this paper (as with other documents/reports), even though Thailand did not accede to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and regarded all “refugees”
as “illegal immigrants” from a legal and political perspective (see, e.g., Robinson
1994, p. 69).12 Forced migrants in the UNHCR camps were granted de facto refugee
status and became eligible for third country resettlement.
Refugee Camps. There were two types of refugee camps in the Thai/Cambodian
border regions: UNHCR camps and border camps. The UNHCR camps were assisted
and administered by UNHCR, whereas the border camps were assisted by the United
Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO)13 and administered by Anti-Vietnam political factions, including the Khmer Rouge. Basically, those who fled to Thailand
before the end of 1979 stayed in the UNHCR camps, whereas those who fled after 1980
stayed in the border (UNBRO) camps (Suenobu 1995, p. 11). While both types ofcamps provided essential services, including food, water, shelter, health care, primary12

The 1951 UN Refugee Convention defines a refugee as “someone who is unable or unwilling toreturn to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”
13
The UNBRO was established in 1982; the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and theInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provided services in the border camps from 1979,
along with food supplies from the World Food Programme (WFP), until then.

12and secondary education, and vocational training, the UNHCR camps provided moreelaborate services (Rogge 1990, p. 38, UNHCR 2000, p. 93).14 This is partly because
the politically affiliated border (UNBRO) camps suffered frequent attacks from Vietnamese troops into the mid 1980s, and services were temporarily stopped (Suenobu
1995, p. 3). The refugees in the camps (“illegal immigrants”) were generally notallowed to leave.
Repatriation. Refugees in Vietnam after the first event mostly returned to
Cambodia in 1979–1980, right after the collapse of the Pol Pot regime (Rogge 1990,
pp. 92–93). The Kampuchean Red Cross was responsible for providing resettlement
kits, food assistance (50 kg per family) and monitoring services (Robinson 1994, p.
6). Refugees in Thailand, mainly due to the second and third events, mostly returned
to Cambodia in 1992–1993 through a large-scale repatriation program organized by
UNHCR following the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement; those living in Thailand due tothe first event mostly resettled to third countries (Rogge 1990, p. 33).
For refugee families in Thailand, UNHCR initially promised two hectares of farmland at the time of repatriation. However, UNHCR later found it impossible to fulfil
this promise due to the limited availability of arable land; about 12% of Cambodian
villages were highly contaminated by landmines and UXOs (Ministry of Planning
2003, p. 73). UNHCR then prepared several repatriation options, including agricultural land (but not necessarily in their area of choice) and cash ($50 per adult and$25 per child under age 12); both options also included a household/agricultural kit15
and World Food Programme (WFP) food assistance (400 days) (see Robinson 1994,
pp. 23–24 for details). Due to the uncertainty about the assignment of land areas,
about 85% of the returnees chose the cash option (UNHCR 2000, p. 147). After
repatriation, UNHCR also provided community development assistance and “quick
impact projects,” including the construction or rehabilitation of roads, schools, and14

Khao I Dang, the only UNHCR camp after mid-1982, has often been called the most elaborately
serviced refugee camp in the world during this period (e.g., Rogge 1990, p. 38).
15
The household/agricultural kit included water buckets, mosquito nets, various hand tools, anda blue plastic sheet (Robinson 1994, p. 23).

13

health facilities (UNHCR 2000, p. 146).
Political Context. After the collapse of the Pol Pot regime, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), backed by Vietnamese troops, was established in 1979;
Vietnam eventually withdrew its forces from Cambodia in 1989. The leaders wereformer Khmer Rouge cadres—including then-current prime minister Hun Sen, who
had defected to Vietnam in 1977–1978—and old revolutionaries who had been in
Vietnam during the Pol Pot era. The PRK adopted socialism and respected basic
human rights, which had been denied during the Pol Pot era (Vickery 1986); theyalso reintroduced markets, money currency, Buddhism culture, and formal school education. There was an emphasis on agriculture as the primary industry to rebuild
the economy and the introduction of “solidarity groups” (krom samakki) consistingof 10–15 families who would work cooperatively and share their production; all land
still belonged to the state in 1979–1989. The PRK was supported by Vietnam, theSoviet Union, and other Eastern Bloc countries.
The Khmer Rouge, on the other hand, fled to the Thai/Cambodian border regions
following the 1978–1979 Vietnamese invasion. Rebuilding the military, they continued
guerilla warfare against the new government (PRK) army until the 1990s. In opposition to the “Vietnamese-installed” PRK, two other political factions also arose:
the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and the National United
Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC).16 The three political factions formed an anti-Vietnamese coalition government,
the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), in 1982 and administered the border camps in the 1980s. The CGDK was supported by Thailand, China,
and the Western Bloc countries, including the United States, and held Cambodia’sseat at the United Nations until 1990.
Following the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement among the four political factions (PRK,
16

The KPNLF was led by Son Saan, formerly prime minister under Prince Sihanouk from 1967
to 1968, whereas FUNCINPEC was founded by Prince Sihanouk and subsequently led by his son,Prince Ranariddh.

14

KPNLF, FUNCINPEC, and the Khmer Rouge), UNHCR organized a repatriation
program between March 30, 1992 and April 30, 1993, and a national election took
place under the supervision of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in May 1993, though the Khmer Rouge in the end boycotted theelection and refused to demobilize their forces. FUNCINPEC, led by Prince Ranariddh, became the leading party, while the Cambodian People’s Party,17 led by
Hun Sen became the second party. Forming a new coalition government, Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen became Cambodia’s first and second prime ministers. Hun Sen
later overthrew Prince Ranariddh in a 1997 coup. The Khmer Rouge, meanwhile,
continued to fight against the newly elected government, though the leaders defected
or were arrested in the late 1990s.

4

Empirical Design

4.1

Data

Our analysis employs two main data sets: the 100% count of the 1998 Cambodian Population Census microdata and the 2004 Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey microdata.
Census 1998. The census data contain basic information regarding individual
and household socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., age, education, occupation, homeownership, place of birth, migration). The information is available for all individuals
and households, though omits three districts and one village for security reasons.18
Combining migration information about “previous residence” and “duration of stay”
at one’s current residence with historical facts, we construct base samples of returnees
from Thailand and Vietnam and of stayers in Section 4.2.
Socio-Economic Survey 2004. The 2004 Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey(CSES) data, the first large-scale, nationally representative survey data from the 1998
Census frame, contain more detailed information regarding individual and house17

The name of the party changed over time as follows: People’s Republic of Kampuchea (1979–1989), the State of Cambodia (1989–1991), and Cambodia People’s Party (1991–present).
18
The estimated population in these areas is about 45,000 (National Institute of Statistics 2002);
it may include returnees from Thailand.

15

hold socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., land ownership, social capital, health, remittances). We complementarily use the 2004 CSES data to explore the potential
mechanisms underlying our main results, as well as further examine the long-term
impacts of forced displacement on socioeconomic outcomes.
4.2

SamplesIn this subsection, we construct two analysis samples, Full Samples and Matched
Samples, from the complete count census data. To begin with, we define the Full
Samples and discuss the differences in characteristics between refugees and stayers
in the Full Samples. Then, we explain our procedure for constructing the Matched
Samples and show the improved covariate balance of the resulting matched samples
for our main analyses.
Full Samples. Using the 1998 Census data, Figure 1 provides the distributionof individuals aged 20–60 who previously resided in Thailand (panel A) and Vietnam (panel B) and migrated to their current residence in 1975–1998.19 The figure
clearly shows that migration from Thailand and Vietnam surges in 1992–1993 and
1979–1980, respectively, i.e., with exactly the same timing as their respective repatriations (mentioned above). We define the individuals aged 20–60 who migrated fromThailand and Vietnam in 1979–1998 as returning refugees from Thailand and Vietnam, respectively, and select those aged 20–60 who never migrated (stayers) to serveas comparison samples. In selecting these samples, we impose certain conditions to
reduce unobserved factors affecting outcomes (e.g., rural-born people, “Khmer” formother tongue, “Buddhism” for religion) and deal with potential concerns about theinfeasibility of finding appropriate control groups among stayers. Hence, the resulting samples consist of returnees and stayers with the same ethnicity, language, andreligion.20 In the end, this procedure gives us 36,760 returnees from Thailand, 15,548
19

We look at individuals aged 20–60 because they were born prior to the refugee crisis and theirbirth was not potentially affected by it (see Kogure 2022 for relevant discussion).
20
We detail the complete sampling procedure in Appendix Table A1.

16

returnees from Vietnam, and 1,968,687 stayers (Full Samples).21 One limitation of
our refugee samples from the 1998 Census is that they are limited to those who nevermigrated after repatriation. Our robustness check addresses this point and considers
those who experienced multiple migrations after repatriation.
Covariate Balance. Since our samples of refugees and stayers are not randomly
determined, we check the differences in observed characteristics between the two
samples. Figures 2, 3, and 4 consider the covariate balances for age, education,and district of birth, respectively. Figure 2 provides age distribution for both sexes.
Figure 3 plots the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the coefficients ofyears of schooling for cohorts aged 34–60 by age and sex, adjusting for district of birth
fixed effects using ordinary least squares (OLS); we presume years of schooling is avariable determined after the refugee crisis (i.e., post-treatment variable) for cohorts
aged 20–33. Figure 4 provides geographic distribution by district of birth for both
sexes.22
Findings. We note three distinctions. First, the returnees from Thailand andthe stayers have a distinct age distribution (panel A-1 of Figure 2), implying thatthose aged around 35–40 are most likely to have become refugees. Second, the malereturnees from Thailand are more educated than the male stayers (panel A-1 ofFigure 3). Third, those born in districts near Thailand and Vietnam are more likely tohave fled to Thailand and Vietnam (panels A-1 and B-1 of Figure 4), respectively. For
the latter two findings, similar patterns occur in other contexts; more able Bosnians
tended to leave the country (Kondylis 2010), while Burundians and Mozambicans
in border regions tend to have become refugees (Fransen et al. 2017, Chiovelli et al.
2021).
Discussion. The following interpretations of these three findings might be plausible. First, those aged around 35–40 might have found it relatively easy to migrate,
21

Appendix Tables A2 and A3 report the descriptive statistics.
Men and women display similar patterns for both age and geographic distribution by districtof birth; the results showing these are available from the authors upon request.
22

17

because many were still single around the collapse of the Pol Pot regime and might
have been able to make migration decisions based on their own preferences. Second, given that they were targeted by the Khmer Rouge, better educated people—
especially males, due to their relatively high levels of education—might tend to havefled to Thailand and its camps to flee persecution. Third, those who were near theborder regions might have found it easier to flee. A relatively large number of people
from the Southwest zone also fled to Thailand, because this zone was the heartlandof the Pol Pot regime (Vickery 1999, pp. 93–107) and many might have fled alongwith the Khmer Rouge as the latter were pushed out by Vietnamese troops. In four
districts along the border with Vietnam, a great majority of residents are returnees.
This is probably because there was a large-scale purge in the East zone in 1977–1978(Kiernan 2008), during which many might have fled to Vietnam.
Matched Samples. The covariate imbalances found above can lead to unrobust
estimates and/or imprecise inferences in evaluating the impacts of forced displacement; with no comparable units, estimates can rely heavily on extrapolation andmay not be credible (see, e.g., Imbens and Rubin 2015). This is of particular concern
when one extensively explores heterogeneous impacts among various subpopulations(see Lechner and Strittmatter 2019 for relevant discussion). To address this concern,
we construct matched samples of refugees and stayers with “strong common support”
using the Imbens-Rubin approach (Imbens and Rubin 2015). With a large numberof stayers from the complete count census data, we construct the matched samples
by age and sex (the two covariates are exactly matched, as are mother tongue andreligion); because some pairs are potentially mismatched for education (for age 34–60) and district of birth, we rely on propensity scores to balance these two covariates
and thus not to decrease the number of observations, although our resulting matchedsamples also nearly exactly match them.23 Prior to the work, we exclude the returnees
23

We confirm that our base results are similar to those derived using exactly balanced data forage, sex, education (for age 34–60), and district of birth; the latter results are available from theauthors upon request.

18

from Vietnam whose districts of birth correspond to the four districts bordering Vietnam, mentioned above, (red and white background in panels B-1 and B-2 of Figure 4,
respectively), because finding appropriate comparison samples (stayers) is not feasible due to the small number of observations. Their inclusion leads to imbalances in
the covariate distributions.
For each subsample by age and sex, we estimate the propensity score using a logistic regression model, with a specification that includes years of schooling, districtof birth dummy variables, and a subset of their second-order terms (quadratic andinteraction), selected based on the Imbens-Rubin algorithm (Imbens and Rubin 2015,
pp. 285–288). For each cohort aged 20–33, we use district of birth dummy variables
as a fixed set of covariates. We finally construct a matched sample by matching each
returnee unit to the stayer unit with the closest estimated propensity score without
replacement. If there are ties, we select a match (a stayer unit) randomly. The resulting matched samples consist of 36,012 returnees from Thailand, 5,145 returnees from
Vietnam, and a corresponding number of stayers (Matched Samples).2425 Figures 2,
3, and 4 confirm the greatly improved covariate balance in the matched samples.26
4.3

Outcomes

Age 20-60. Our analysis looks at educational and labor market outcomes and homeownership. We consider ten labor market outcome measures and one home ownership outcome measure: two indicator variables for participating in the labor market(Labor Force) and being employed (Employed), employment period (months) during
the past 12 months (Months Worked), three indicator variables for being employedin the primary sector (Primary Sector), secondary sector (Secondary Sector), or tertiary sector (Tertiary Sector), four indicator variables for engaging in high-skilled
24

See Appendix Tables A2 and A3 for the descriptive statistics.
Some returnees are also dropped systematically in each propensity score estimation due to thelack of covariate overlap making it impossible to calculate the propensity score.
26
The distribution of estimated propensity score generally exactly overlaps between returnees
and stayers in each sample matched by age and sex; the results showing this are available from theauthors upon request.
25

19

work (High-skilled Work), middle-skilled work (Middle-skilled Work), low-skilled work
(Low-skilled Work), or the armed forces (Armed Forces), and an indicator variable forowning the dwelling in which one lives (Home Ownership). For younger returnees aged
20–33, we also evaluate three educational outcome measures: two indicator variables
for having attended school (Some Education) and having completed primary school(Primary School), and years of schooling (Years of Schooling).
We base the four labor market outcome measures on occupational status on the latest International Standard Classification of Occupation 2008 (ISCO-08) (ILO 2012).27
Our choice to evaluate engagement in the armed forces is motivated by the fact thatthe three political factions that administered the border camps all ran isolated “hidden camps” with the full support of the Royal Thai Army. Civilian populations in theborder camps might have been recruited for the resistance army (Rogge 1990). This
military service might have adverse impacts on the human capital and labor market
outcomes of young people (Blattman and Annan 2010).
Age 6-19. For older returnees aged 34–60, we also evaluate the educational andlabor market outcomes of their children aged 15–19, 12–14, and 6–11, if any; eachanalysis is limited to those actually living with each cohort. We use household-level
outcome measures—the proportion or average among cohorts aged 15–19, 12–14, or
6–11 within households. For the first cohort, we focus on the same outcome measures described above, with an additional educational outcome measure, namely the
proportion attending school (School Participation). Although this cohort already finished their nine-year compulsory education in the 1998 Cambodian education system,some may still have been in school due to delayed entry, temporary dropout, or grade
retention.
27

Our criteria are as follows: high-skilled work – “managers,” “professionals,” and “technicians
and associate professionals” (skill levels 3 and 4), middle-skilled work – “clerical support workers,”“services and sales workers,” “skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers,” “craft and relatedtrades workers,” and “plant and machine operators, and assemblers” (skill level 2), low-skilled work
– “elementary occupations” (skill level 1), and armed forces – “armed forces occupations” (skill
levels 1, 2, and 4).

20

For the latter two cohorts, who were still receiving compulsory education (assuming they were receiving any education at all), we consider three educational outcome
measures and one labor market outcome measure at the time of the 1998 Census:
the proportion having attended school (Some Education), the proportion attending
school (School Participation), the average grade progression (Grade Progression), andthe proportion participating in the labor market (Child Labor). We measure the grade
progression of each member of these cohorts by Grade − (Age − 5), which takes 0
if he/she progresses from any grade to the next one and a negative value otherwise.
We look at the two cohorts separately because the time of having entered school corresponds to that of repatriation for many of the cohort aged 12–14 for the returnees
from Thailand, and their human capital accumulation might have been disrupted
heterogeneously.
4.4
4.4.1

Analysis
Full Samples

Our analysis based on the Full Samples by sex estimates the following equation using
OLS with robust standard errors:0

Yid = α + γRef ugeei + Xi δ + πd + id , (1)where Yid is the outcome of individual i born in district d, Ref ugeei is an indicatorvariable equal to 1 if individuals are returnees from Thailand or Vietnam and 0 otherwise, Xi is a vector of individual characteristics (age, age squared, years of schooling(only for age 34–60)) and πd denotes district of birth fixed effects. A parameter ofinterest is γ, which captures the effects of forced displacement on the outcome. To
save space, we report the results based on the Full Samples, along with those of robustness checks, in Section 5.2. They are consistent with the results based on the
Matched Samples, the details of which we present below.

21

4.4.2

Matched Samples

Our analysis based on the Matched Samples follows a potential outcomes framework(Neyman 1923, Rubin 1974). The parameter of interest is the average treatment
effect on the treated (ATT), which addresses the question of how returnees’ outcomes
would differ if they were stayers; the ATT captures the overall (total) impacts of forced
displacement for returning refugees relative to stayers. Policy makers are generallyinterested in the economic situations facing those who became refugees themselves.
To identify the ATT, we impose assumptions of conditional independence or unconfoundedness and common support/overlap, as commonly used in causal studies(see, e.g., Angrist and Pischke 2008, Imbens and Rubin 2015). The former asserts thatthe two potential outcomes of refugees and stayers are independent conditional on theobserved covariates. The latter ensures sufficient overlap in the covariate distributions of refugees and stayers. The analysis of the intergenerational impacts generally
estimates the “net treatment difference” (NTD), as defined by Rosenbaum (1984),
a parameter estimated conditionally on the observed values of the post-treatment
variable because the existence of individuals aged 6–19 born after the refugee crisis(i.e., household formation) may have been affected by the event (Appendix Table A4
examines the impacts of forced displacement on sociodemographic outcomes).28
To estimate the ATT, we mainly use the bias-corrected version of the nearestneighbor matching method (Abadie and Imbens 2011, Imbens 2015) (our robustness
checks consider alternative estimation methods). Although simple matching estimators can be biased when the matching is not exact, matching (we use one-to-one
covariate matching) with replacement, in combination with regression adjustments(“bias adjustments”) within the matched pairs, can produce estimators with little
remaining bias (Abadie and Imbens 2011). To grasp the overall patterns of the im28

We find evidence suggesting that male returnees from Thailand and Vietnam have fewer children
aged 15–19, 12–14, and 6–11 (only for those from Vietnam) than comparable stayers, whereas female
returnees from Thailand have fewer children aged 15–19 and more children aged 12–14 and 6–11
than comparable stayers; the results of the intergenerational impacts should be taken with somecaution.

22

pacts, we first estimate the ATT based on the aggregated samples of cohorts aged
34–60 and 20–33 by sex. We use the basic set of covariates (age, years of schooling(only for age 34–60), and district of birth fixed effects) in the bias adjustments.
Since we evaluate many outcome measures at the same time, we potentially face
the multiple hypothesis testing problem: The probability of at least one Type I error
increases with the number of tests, and significant impacts may emerge by chance,
despite a lack of displacement impact (Anderson 2008). To address this concern, we
use the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate (FDR) of afamily of all hypothesis tests (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995).29 With N hypothesis
tests, we first sort and rank the p-values, giving the smallest p-value rank 1, the next
smallest rank 2, and the largest rank N , then adjust each p-value by multiplying
N and dividing its assigned rank. We use this adjusted p-value to construct 95%
confidence intervals, as well as to conduct hypothesis tests.

5

Results

5.1

Main Results

Figure 5 plots the point estimates of the impacts of forced displacement on selected key
outcomes and their 95% confidence intervals (adjusted with the Benjamini-Hochberg
procedure), along with the mean for stayers, for male and female returnees aged 34–60
and 20–33 from Thailand and Vietnam and for the male and female children, aged
15–19, 12–14, and 6–11, of the male returnees and stayers aged 34–60. Appendix
Figures A1 and A2 respectively provide the complete results for all outcomes for
returnees aged 20–60 and for the children, aged 6–19, of the returnees aged 34–60.
Age 34-60. We find evidence that the displacement had adverse impacts onlabor market outcomes and home ownership for the returnees from both Thailand
and Vietnam (panel A of Figure 5 and Appendix Figure A1). For instance, the point
29

FDR is the expected proportion of incorrectly rejected null hypotheses among all rejected
null hypotheses. We also consider the classical Bonferroni and Holm multiple testing procedures(Bonferroni 1935, Holm 1979); these are overly conservative in our case, where many outcomes aremutually related. The results are available from the authors upon request.

23

estimates suggest that the displacement decreased the proportion of employment
by 2.5 and 9.5 percentage points for the male and female returnees from Thailand,
respectively, and by 0.4 and 6.2 percentage points for the male and female returnees
from Vietnam, respectively; except in the case of the male returnees from Vietnam,
these impacts are statistically significant at conventional levels. For all four groups of
returnees, the displacement decreased the proportion of employment in the primarysector by more than 20 percentage points and increased the proportion of employment
in the tertiary sector by more than 10 percentage points. At the same time, thedisplacement increased the proportion of engagement in low-skilled work by morethan 5 percentage points and decreased the proportion of engagement in middleskilled work by more than 8 percentage points. In addition, the displacement also
decreased the proportion of home ownership for all four groups of returnees by 1.3–3.4
percentage points and increased the proportion of armed forces engagement for the
male returnees from Thailand by 6.3 percentage points.
Age 20-33. In the evaluation of educational outcomes, we find a sharp contrast
between the returnees from Thailand and those from Vietnam (panel B of Figure 5
and Appendix Figure A1). Recall that this cohort received education after the refugee
crisis, and that most returnees from Thailand received it in camps while those from
Vietnam received it in Cambodia after repatriation. The displacement had positive
impacts on the educational outcomes of the male returnees from Thailand and negative impacts on those of the male and female returnees from Vietnam. For instance,
the point estimates suggest that the displacement increased years of schooling by
1.060 years for the male returnees from Thailand and decreased years of schooling by
0.848 years for the male returnees from Vietnam.
In an evaluation of labor market and home ownership outcomes, however, there
are no such contrasting impacts. The displacement had adverse impacts on the labor market outcomes of the returnees from both Thailand and Vietnam, spurring24their employment shifts from the primary sector to the tertiary one.30 The estimatedadverse impacts are relatively more modest for the latter, who experienced worse
educational outcomes. For instance, the point estimates for the male returnees fromThailand and Vietnam suggest that the displacement decreased the proportion of
employment in the primary sector by 23.3 and 16.3 percentage points, respectively,
and increased the proportion of employment in the tertiary sector by 19.4 and 12.8
percentage points, respectively. At the same time, the displacement increased the
proportion of engagement in low-skilled work by 7.4 and 3.1 percentage points, respectively, and decreased the proportion of engagement in middle-skilled work by
14.7 and 1.5 percentage points, respectively. In addition, the displacement decreased
the proportion of home ownership by 4.5 and 2.3 percentage points, respectively, andincreased the proportion of engagement in the armed forces by 4.2 percentage points
for the male returnees from Thailand.
Age 6-19. For the cohort aged 15–19, the results are qualitatively similar to
those for the returnees aged 20–33 (panel C of Figure 5 and Appendix Figure A2).
For the cohorts aged 12–14 and 6–11, the displacement had some negative impacts
on the educational outcomes of the cohort aged 12–14 of returnees from Thailand
and Vietnam and on those of the cohort aged 6–11 of returnees from Vietnam (panels
D and E of Figure 5 and Appendix Figure A2). The point estimates show that theestimated adverse impacts are relatively strong for the children of returnees from
Vietnam.
5.2

Robustness Checks

This subsection checks the robustness of our main results. We report the complete
results in Appendix Section A.1, and only summarize the results here.
30

One exception is that the displacement significantly increased the proportion of engagement inhigh-skilled work for the male returnees from Thailand. We confirm that these results are mainly
driven by regional differences in 1998 (i.e., destination choices); relevant results are available fromthe authors upon request.

25

Alternative Estimation Methods. We first confirm the robustness of our baseresults based on the Matched Samples by comparing them to an alternative estimation
method, namely blocking on the estimated propensity score in combination withregression adjustments within the blocks, following Imbens and Rubin (2015). The
results from OLS regressions based on the Full Samples are also consistent with those
based on the Matched Samples.
Threats to Identification. We next address potential threats to identification.
Because the availability of covariates is limited in our census data, unobserved characteristics might not be balanced between refugees and stayers, and the resulting
estimates might be biased. In particular, we are concerned that since refugees andstayers were exposed to conflict and violence under the Pol Pot regime (Kiernan 2008),
the former, who experienced multiple migrations before the refugee event, might havebeen exposed to them differently (see Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2013, pp. 773–774 forrelevant discussion). We construct more balanced samples, further balancing the levelof conflict and/or violence to which individuals were exposed before the refugee event,and show the robustness of our base results. In addition, to address any potential
remaining concerns, for our matched samples, we consider omitted variable bias due
to unobserved confounders through sensitivity analysis, following Rosenbaum (2002);
for our full samples, meanwhile, we conduct sensitivity analysis by following Oster(2019). We confirm that both results are robust to omitted variable bias.
For the full samples, we also employ an instrumental variables strategy in conjunction with machine-learning techniques, following Windmeijer et al. (2019). We employ
the machine learning-based, rather than standard, instrumental variables approach,because finding valid instrumental variables in advance is not feasible in our context.31
We consider district of birth dummy variables (key determinants of refugees) as potential candidates for instruments, assuming that some instruments work and others
do not. Having no prior knowledge of which instruments are potentially valid, we
31

For example, distance to border regions can correlate with the level of regional development
and thus is not a valid instrument.

26

use the adaptive Lasso approach of Windmeijer et al. (2019), building on Kang et al.
(2016) to assess the validity of the potential instruments. We can identify the causal
effect of forced displacement on outcomes when the proportion of invalid instruments
is less than 50%. To avoid computational errors, we limit the potential instruments
to the dummy variables for districts where the proportion of the returnees is between
0.1 and 0.9. Due to the limited number of potential instruments for returnees from
Vietnam, this robustness check is feasible only for those from Thailand. Due to endogeneity concerns or conceptual issues, we do not consider intergenerational impacts.
We confirm that the results that satisfy the identification assumption are generally
consistent with the original results.
Lastly, we also address the potential concern about resettlement selection. Our
samples of former refugees are limited to those who returned to Cambodia, thus excluding those who resettled in third countries. If returning refugees tend to havelower abilities, then the differences in unobserved ability between returnees and stayers might not be adequately balanced and might partly drive our results. To address
this point, we separately consider the returnees from the UNHCR and UNBRO camps(see Appendix Section A.1.2 for the construction of the samples); since Cambodian
refugees in Thailand could be resettled to third countries, including the United States,
only via the UNHCR camps, the sample selection problem, if any, is limited in thelatter samples. We confirm that the results for the returnees from the UNBRO camps
are consistent with the original results.
External Validity. Our robustness checks also address the potential threats
to external validity in the Cambodian context. Because our samples of returning
refugees are limited to those who did not migrate after repatriation, the displacement
impacts might systematically differ for this group. We construct alternative samples based on an alternative definition of refugees, including those who experienced
multiple migrations after repatriation, and show that our base results serve as conservative estimates of the displacement impacts: Returnees with multiple migrations

27

experienced far worse educational, labor market, and home ownership outcomes.
5.3

Heterogeneity

Given the robustness of our base results, we next examine the heterogeneity in displacement impacts with respect to age, timing of repatriation, refugee camps, anddestinations. The first analysis is based on subsamples matched by age and sex, andthe latter three analyses are based on the aggregated samples.
Age. Appendix Figure A9 examines heterogeneity with respect to age. While theresults are broadly consistent with those based on the aggregated samples, we note thefollowing distinction. The estimated impacts on educational outcomes are positive forthe female returnees aged 20–26 from Thailand (the majority of whom had to start
primary school in camps), but negative for those aged 27–33 (panel A2) (the majorityof whom had to start primary school in Cambodia prior to forced displacement).
These results suggest that the positive and negative impacts offset each other in theaggregated sample (Figure 5). We may need to pay special attention to girls who
are not in school, because they might have less access to educational opportunities incamps.
Timing of Repatriation. Focusing on four key outcomes, Figures 6 and 7
consider the heterogeneity among the returnees aged 34–60 and 20–33 from Thailand
who returned in 1979–1987, 1988–1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994–1998 and among
those aged 34–60 and 20–33 from Vietnam who returned in 1979, 1980, and 1981–
1998, respectively (Appendix Figure A10). Although the timing of repatriation is not
random and some caution is hence needed,32 the analyses exhibit a sharp contrast:
32

Appendix Section A.2.1 examines individual and regional characteristics correlated with early
return (before 1992) migration decisions, only for the returnees aged 34–60 from Thailand; we focus
on this age cohort because they seem to have been old enough to make migration decisions bythemselves at the time. We find that younger, male, and less educated refugees, those from districts
away from border regions and from districts more contaminated with landmines and UXOs, andthose who stayed in the UNBRO camps tend to have become early returnees. In a different context,
Beaman et al. (2022) consider return migration decisions for Syrian refugees (stemming from the“Arab Spring”) in Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq from 2011 to 2018 and find that security and accessto utilities in Syria are key factors facilitating their return migration decisions.

28

The later a given refugee returned, the worse their labor market outcomes, with
employment shifts into the tertiary sector. In terms of employment shifts, we findsome gaps between the male returnees from Thailand who returned in 1991 andthose who returned in 1992. Given that the latter generally joined the repatriation
program, they might have been more likely to have received assistance for accessing
agricultural land. There are no such differences for the female returnees, because
women are generally less likely to engage in agricultural work. For the returnees
aged 20–33 from Thailand, late returnees experienced better educational outcomesbut worse labor market outcomes.
Figure 8 provides results for the children aged 15–19 of the male returnees andstayers aged 34–60 (Appendix Figure A11 shows the results for the children aged
6–19). We find the above pattern (i.e., late returnees experienced better educational
outcomes but worse labor market outcomes) is relatively weak for age 15–19. For age
12–14 and 6–11, we find evidence that the displacement had adverse impacts on the
educational outcomes of the cohorts who had to receive education around the timeof repatriation; these results suggest that the adverse displacement impacts in theaggregated samples (Figure 5) are largely driven by those cohorts. The results arealso consistent with those for the returnees aged 20–30 from Vietnam, the majorityof whom had to receive education right after repatriation.
Refugee Camps. Appendix Figures A5 and A6 examine the heterogeneity between the returnees from the UNHCR and UNBRO camps. Assuming no sample
selection problem for the returnees from the UNHCR camps, the following findings
might be worthy of note. First, the returnees aged 34–60 from the UNHCR camps
experienced relatively worse labor market outcomes. Given that the UNHCR camps
provided more elaborate services, this finding is surprising. Second, this pattern also
occurs for the cohort aged 15–19, although returnees of this age from the UNHCR
camps experienced relatively better educational outcomes. Third, the estimated impacts on engagement in the armed forces are relatively strong for the male returnees

29aged 34–60 from the UNBRO camps. Appendix Table A8 examines these findings
using OLS, finding many statistically significant differences.
We might interpret these findings as follows. Since the UNBRO camps were affiliated with political factions, those who stayed in them might have found it relatively
easy to secure jobs through the networks built in the camps or through the exchange
of information, though the men might have faced an increased risk of being recruitedfor the armed forces. In contrast, because most of those who stayed in the UNHCR(neutral) camps hoped for third country resettlement into the early 1990s (Suenobu
1995, p.3), they might have tended to not have much of a social network, thus finding it relatively difficult to secure jobs. Taking all this information into account,social networks built in camps might have significantly affected subsequent outcomes.
This interpretation is consistent with the case of Japanese American interment during
WWII (Arellano-Bover 2022): Those displaced to internment camps could re-optimize
their job and location choices after internment through the exchange of informationand skills in these camps.
Destinations. We have anecdotal evidence that social networks with relatives
and village leaders at the time of repatriation were indeed important for access toagricultural land and local knowledge (Black and Koser 1999). To gain further insights
into the role of social networks in the repatriation and reintegration process, Appendix
Figures A12 and A13 consider heterogeneity for returnees who came back to theirbirth village and district. We assume such returnees had relatively better access tosocial networks at the time of repatriation. Although returnees’ choice of destination
is not random and we should again be cautious,33 the estimated adverse impacts onlabor market outcomes are relatively modest for the returnees aged 34–60 and 20–33
from both Thailand and Vietnam. The repatriation and reintegration process mayneed to carefully consider the availability of social networks.
33

Appendix Section A.2.2 examines individual and regional characteristics correlated with return
migration decisions in favor of birth districts for the returnees aged 34–60 from Thailand and Vietnam. For both sets of returnees, we find that less educated refugees and those from districts nearborder regions tend to have returned to their birth districts.

30

6Mechanisms

In the previous sections, we confirmed that our estimation results for the displacement
impacts on education are consistent with the availability of humanitarian assistancein Thailand and Vietnam. This section empirically explores the potential mechanisms
underlying the adverse displacement impacts on labor market outcomes, additionallyusing the 2004 Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey (CSES) microdata for returning
refugees and stayers aged 26-66, which corresponds to age 20-60 at the time of the1998 Census. We first examine whether the adverse displacement impacts are driven
by congested labor markets resulting from limited access to agricultural land. Wethen consider other potential channels, including discrimination, health, and remittance networks. With the lack of specific information about previous residence (e.g.,
Thailand, Vietnam) in the 2004 CSES data, our analysis based on this data defines
returning refugees as those who have lived abroad before and migrated to their current
residence in 1979-1998.
Consistency. In terms of its consistency with the 1998 Census data, we have
two concerns about the 2004 CSES data. First, as noted, the refugee status might becontaminated, because these data can only identify those who have lived abroad. To
address this concern, we limit the samples to those who live in the former Northwest,
West, and North zones and in the Southwest and East zones. Since the great majorityof returnees from Thailand and Vietnam live in these regions (see Figure 4), such
limited samples should largely capture the returnees from Thailand and Vietnam.
Second, with no information about districts of birth, our regression analysis basedon the 2004 CSES data cannot adjust for district of birth fixed effects. To address
this point, using the Full Samples of the returnees from Thailand, returnees from
Vietnam, and stayers aged 20–60, Appendix Table A11 considers the displacement
impacts on nine outcomes (evaluated below) without controlling for district of birth
fixed effects via OLS, confirming that the results are generally consistent with thebase results.
31

Displacement Impacts in 2004. Using the 2004 CSES data, Appendix Table
A12 considers the further long-term displacement impacts on the nine educational,
labor market, and home ownership outcomes. While the magnitudes of some coefficients differ, the results are qualitatively similar to those in Appendix Table A11. Thissuggests that the adverse displacement impacts on labor market and home ownershipoutcomes lasted into 2004. Given the consistency between the 1998 Census data andthe 2004 CSES data, below, we examine the potential mechanisms underlying theseresults.
6.1

Congestion

As noted, “solidarity groups” (krom samakki) who work cooperatively and share theirproduction, which started in 1979 under the socialist regime during the Cold War,have arguably determined subsequent farmland ownership in Cambodia (Amakawa
2001), despite the establishment of de jure private property rights in 1989. Indeed, theretrospective 2004 CSES data show that a large number of Cambodian households
started using their current agricultural land in 1979 (see Figure 9).34 Given this,our empirical findings may imply that returning refugees, especially those who cameback later, tend to have lacked access to agricultural land, something exacerbatedby high levels of contamination by landmines and UXOs during the conflict, and tohave been pushed out of agricultural labor markets. As a result, they might tend
toward engagement in other sectors, especially the tertiary sector. At the same time,
because other sectors had not at this time been developed in Cambodia (Vickery1999), they might tend to have engaged in low-skilled work in the sectors (i.e., informal
sector), unlike in developed countries. In other words, these other sectors might not
yet have matured enough to absorb the available labor force. In sum, the adverse
34

Land ownership is less likely to have affected the migration decisions of refugees (i.e., reverse
causality is unlikely) in our context. This is because migration decisions from refugees generally
occurred under the Pol Pot regime or when Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia in 1978–1979,
before the establishment of krom samakki under the new socialist regime. In addition, during andafter the Pol Pot regime in 1975–1989, people were not allowed to own land.

32displacement impacts might be attributable mainly to the congested labor markets
in all sectors, resulting directly or indirectly from limited access to agricultural land.
This subsection provides further supporting evidence for the congestion mechanism.
Access to Agricultural Land. First, focusing on household heads aged 26–
66 from the 2004 CSES data, Table 1 directly tests whether returning refugees areindeed less likely to have access to agricultural land. The dependent variable is anindicator variable equal to 1 if households had access to agricultural land (“owned
it,” “rented it,” or “had access some other way”) by 1998 and 0 otherwise (Access toAgricultural Land). Adjusting for age, age squared, and a dummy variable for female,column 1 reveals that the returning refugees had access to agricultural land by 1998
45.8% less often than stayers (the mean is 74.7%). When we add a control for yearsof schooling in column 3, the coefficient of refugee status remains similar and highly
significant. When we additionally adjust for district fixed effects in column 5, themagnitude of the coefficient decreases to -27.7%, implying that access to agriculturalland is substantially affected by regional differences or geographic characteristics.
Nevertheless, the returning refugees still have far less access to agricultural land.
Lastly, when we limit the samples to those who live in the former Northwest, West,and North zones and in the Southwest and East zones in columns 7 and 9, respectively,
we see consistent results. This suggests returning refugees are indeed less likely tohave access to agricultural land.
Given that the availability of agricultural land potentially differs across regions due
to landmine and UXO contamination, in the even columns, we additionally employ
nationwide geospatial data about landmine and UXO contaminated areas in 1992
(before clearance started). Figure 10 shows the spatial distribution, which reveals that
the Northwest zone, with a large number of returnees from Thailand, is particularly
heavily contaminated. Using a Geographic Information System (GIS), we construct acongestion measure and estimate the following equation via OLS with robust standard
errors clustered by village:33

0

Yivd = α + γ1 Ref ugeei + γ2 Ref ugeei × Congestionv + Xiv β + µd + ivd , (2)where Congestionv is the village-level congestion measure, defined as stayer density
per non-contaminated area (km2 ) within a 3.0 km buffer zone around each village
point before clearance started (see Appendix Figure A14 for the distribution), Xiv isa vector of individual and village characteristics (age, age squared, a dummy variable
for female, years of schooling, Congestionv , and the logarithmic value of village population aged 20–60 in 1998), and µd denotes district fixed effects; the demographic
variable is based on the 1998 Census data.35 Note that the analysis samples are limited to household heads residing in villages with complete information about village
points (contamination) and demographics.
We also have the following key finding: Returning refugees, especially those wholive in more congested areas, are less likely to have access to agricultural land. Thisis true for the Northwest, West, and North zones, but not for the Southwest andEast zones. The probable reason this pattern does not apply in the latter zones isbecause many returnees in these zones are from Vietnam, and thus came back earlyand had access to agricultural land by joining krom samakki. Indeed, the 2004 CSES
data show that 35.6% of the plots of returnees in the Southwest and East zones and20.3% of the plots of returnees in the Northwest, West, and North zones were “givenby the state,” while the average year in which returnees started to use agriculturalland in the Southwest and East zones and in the Northwest, West, and North zones
is 1989 and 1992, respectively; this timing is consistent with the period that saw theestablishment of de jure private property rights in 1989 and the organization of therepatriation program in 1992–1993.
Labor Market and Home Ownership Outcomes. Second, using the aggregated Matched Samples of the returnees and stayers aged 20–60, columns 1–5 in
35

We confirm that the results are consistent with those for alternative buffer sizes (1.0 km and 2.0km) and alternative congestion measures, namely the logarithmic values of one plus Congestionv(i.e., ln(1 + Congestionv )) for the three buffer sizes; the results for these alternatives are available
from the authors upon request.

34

panel A of Table 2 estimate equation (2) for five key labor market and home ownership outcomes (employed, primary sector, tertiary sector, low-skilled work, and homeownership), additionally adjusting for district of birth fixed effects. To gain moreinsights, columns 6 and 7 restrict the samples to those engaged in the tertiary sector
and consider two additional outcomes (low-skilled work and paid employee). The
latter is an indicator variable for work as a wage and salary worker (Paid Employee)(i.e., in a better quality job). We find evidence that returning refugees, especiallythose who live in more congested areas, experience worse labor market and homeownership outcomes. Along with the findings in Table 1, these results imply that returnees lacking access to agricultural land due to congested agricultural land markets
experience relatively worse labor market and home ownership outcomes.
Lastly, panel B of Table 2 examines the heterogeneity in displacement impacts
among those who returned in 1979, 1980, 1981–1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994–1998,
adjusting for both district of birth fixed effects and district fixed effects (Appendix
Tables A13 and A14 consider the returnees and stayers aged 34–60 and 20–33 and thechildren aged 6–19, respectively). Given the above findings, we expect later returnees
to experience worse labor market outcomes, because they tend to lack access to agricultural land. And indeed, the results strongly support this hypothesis. Importantly,
since district fixed effects are conditioned on, the difference in destination choices isunlikely to drive our results. In sum, the results in Tables 1 and 2 strongly support
the congestion channel.
6.2

Other Potential Channels

Table 3 considers other potential channels, including discrimination, health, and remittance networks.
Discrimination. As in other forced migration situations, there is the possibility
that discrimination against returnees might drive the adverse displacement impacts(see, e.g., Brell et al. 2020 for relevant discussion). With no direct information about
discrimination, we consider this possibility by examining the relationship with neigh35

borhood trust; the variable for neighborhood trust is an indicator variable equal to 1
if household heads feel safe from crime and violence in their neighborhood (Neighborhood Trust). If the discrimination channel exists, then returnees might exhibit lower
levels of trust in neighbors; we can expect to find a negative relationship (see, e.g.,Smith 2010 between trust and neighborhood). Panel A of Table 3 looks at this relationship. The results show no statistically significant relationships among the threesamples.36 Thus, the discrimination channel is unlikely to drive our results.
Health. We next consider whether the adverse displacement impacts are driven
by poor health for returnees (see, e.g., Currie and Madrian 1999 for the relationshipbetween health and labor market outcomes). This mechanism could be likely in
our context because most survivors of the Pol Pot regime suffered from long-term
mental health disorders, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (e.g., Bethet al. 2011), and health conditions might have deteriorated in forced displacement
or camps. Returnees might also be more likely to have fallen victim to landmines.
Panel B of Table 3 examines the relationship with three health outcomes: an indicatorvariable equal to 1 if individuals report that their health is “very good” or “good”
and 0 otherwise (Health Status I), an indicator variable equal to 1 if individuals reportthat their health is “much better” or “somewhat better” than others of the same age
and 0 otherwise (Health Status II), and an indicator variable equal to 1 if individuals
have any disability and 0 otherwise (Disability). Again, none of these variables havestatistically significant relationships in the three samples. Thus, the health channel
is also unlikely to drive our results.
36

As an alternative robustness check, focusing on stayers, we also examine the relationship between the proportion of returning refugees in villages and neighborhood trust; the variable for the
proportion of returnees is a village-level measure constructed based on returnees from Thailand orVietnam and stayers aged 20–60 from the 1998 Census data. In the analyses, we also adjust for thevillage population aged 20–60. If the discrimination channel exists, then stayers living in villages
with a larger proportion of returnees might exhibit lower levels of trust in neighbors. Again, we canconfirm no statistically significant relationships among the three samples. These results are available
from the authors upon request.

36

Remittance Networks. Lastly, we consider whether the adverse displacement
impacts are driven by the difference in remittance networks between returnees andstayers. Due to forced displacement, returnees might have different social networks,
having built new social networks and/or disrupted existing ones (see Sarvimäki etal. 2022 for relevant discussions). In our context, in particular, since returnees fromThailand stayed in camps for a long time, they might tend toward better remittancenetworks (e.g., relatives or friends abroad; however, worse remittance networks could
also happen) and thus might tend to receive more remittances. In this case, theymight also lack motivation to work (Chami et al. 2005). To examine this possibility,
panel C of Table 3 looks at the relationship with four outcomes related to domestic
and international remittances: an indicator variable equal to 1 if households receive
remittances from relatives or others in Cambodia (or from abroad) (Receipt) and theremittance amount in dollars from relatives or others in Cambodia (or from abroad)(Amount (USD)). Again, we find no evidence that the difference in motivation towork drives our results.
6.3

Returnees from Thailand vs. Vietnam

To gain further insights into the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance, using the
Matched Samples, Appendix Section A.3 examines the differences in key outcomes
between the returnees from Thailand and Vietnam and their children; stayers andchildren of stayers are the base group in the analyses for age 20–60 and 6–19, respectively. For age 6–19, unlike in our main analysis, we use children as the unitof analysis conditional on their characteristics. Based on the Matched Samples, wenewly construct samples for the children of returnees and stayers aged 34–60. Refugee(TH)/Refugee (VN) in the regressions is an indicator variable equal to 1 if household
heads and/or spouses are returnees from Thailand/Vietnam and 0 otherwise. We
describe the details in Appendix Section A.3, and summarize the key findings here.
Our analyses reveal a contrast between older and younger cohorts (Appendix Table
A15). For age 34–60 and 20–33, refugee status is more strongly negatively correlated37with employment for returnees from Thailand (panels A and B). In contrast, we findthe opposite pattern for age 15–19 (panel C). In addition, for age 6–14, the negative
relationships between refugee status and educational outcomes are relatively strong
for the children of the returnees from Vietnam, though the significant differences arelimited (panels D and E). Equally importantly, these negative relationships become
relatively weak only for the children of returnees from Vietnam when we additionallyadjust for access to schools, implying that they are driven by worse access to schools
only for the children of returnees from Vietnam.
Relatedly, focusing on the returnees aged 15–60 from Thailand and Vietnam who
returned in 1992–1993 and 1979–1980, respectively, Figure 11 plots the OLS estimates
and their 95% confidence intervals for the coefficients of refugee status for employment from Appendix Tables A13 and A14 (age 20–60 and 15–19, respectively), which
examine the relationships between refugee status and key outcomes for those who
returned in different years, conditioning on years of schooling, school participation(age 15–19 only), and district fixed effects. The figure shows that the adverse displacement effects are relatively worse for the returnees from Thailand in the older
cohorts and for those from Vietnam in the younger cohorts. Taken together, andgiven that the returnees from Thailand received extensive humanitarian assistanceand those from Vietnam did not, our findings suggest that humanitarian assistancecan be more effective for younger cohorts. The findings are consistent with thosein the recent literature that suggest better childhood environments can lead to better long-term outcomes for children (e.g., Chetty et al. 2016, Chetty and Hendren
2018a,b).

7

Discussion

Relevant existing works often provide evidence that those who left the primary sector due to forced migration subsequently experienced better labor market outcomes(e.g., Arellano-Bover 2022, Bauer et al. 2013, Nakamura et al. 2022, Sarvimäki et38

al. 2022). In contrast, our study provides evidence that those who left the primarysector due to forced displacement experienced worse labor market outcomes. One
clear difference between the existing works and our study is that the former consider
the long-term impacts of forced displacement in the context of developed rather thandeveloping countries. The contrasting results might be partly due to systematic differences in the labor market structure and conditions (the extent of labor market
distortions/frictions) that forced migrants may face between developed and developing countries: Job opportunities may be more limited in the latter than in the former.
In our context, unlike in developed countries, because the secondary and tertiary sectors were not developed at the time, those who were pushed out of the primary sector
might have had limited job opportunities in other sectors.37 As such, the adverse
displacement impacts might be attributed mainly to the congested labor markets inall sectors, arising directly or indirectly from the limited access to agricultural landat the time of repatriation. In the repatriation and reintegration process, access toagricultural land might be a key consideration in agrarian countries; indeed, Kondylis(2008), who considers the case of agricultural land being distributed for returnees in
Rwanda, finds no such adverse impacts. The examination of the further long-term
impacts of displacement is left for future work.
Regardless of our results’ consistency with the availability of humanitarian assistance, displacement could cause a shift in preferences towards investments in humancapital (Becker et al. 2020, Chiovelli et al. 2021). In our context, we do not findclear evidence that forced migrants invested in human capital more than stayers due
to any change in preferences, even though returnees from Thailand who received ed37

For example, in post-war Finland (1950), the proportion of people (except for forced migrants)
engaged in “agriculture,” “manufacture etc.,” “construction,” and “service etc.” is respectively as
follows: 0.38, 0.26, 0.09, and 0.27 (Sarvimäki et al. 2009), while in post-war Germany (1971), theproportion of male (female) natives (controls for first generation of migrants) engaged in “agriculture,” “industry,” and “services” is respectively as follows: 0.094 (0.199), 0.506 (0.274), and 0.398(0.526) (Bauer et al. 2013). In contrast, in Cambodia (1998), the proportion of male (female) stayers
aged 20–60 engaged in the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors in the Full Samples is respectively
as follows: 0.839 (0.804), 0.013 (0.010), and 0.079 (0.041).

39

ucation in camps experienced improved human capital accumulation.38 One reason
for this might be that the returns to education were likely not high for returning
refugees at the time in Cambodia, or the labor market environment may not haveinduced returnees to invest in education. Indeed, we find strong evidence that improved education in camps did not necessarily lead to better labor market outcomes
after repatriation.

8

Conclusions

Using the complete count 1998 Census microdata, this paper examined the consequences of forced displacement for Cambodian refugees. Focusing on returnees fromThailand and Vietnam and on their children, whose human capital accumulation wasaffected in different ways by forced displacement, we mainly evaluated their educational and labor market outcomes. Our analyses revealed that the returnees fromThailand attained higher levels of education and that those from Vietnam, by contrast, attained lower levels of education through forced displacement, consistently
with the availability of humanitarian assistance in Thailand and Vietnam. On theother hand, the two groups both experienced worse labor market outcomes, with
employment shifts from the primary sector to the immature tertiary sector (informal
sector). The adverse displacement impacts were relatively stronger for later returnees.
We then empirically explored the potential mechanisms underlying the main results
and provided strong suggestive evidence that congested labor markets resulting from
38

There might be some difference in preferences for education between the returnees from UNHCR
camps and those from UNBRO camps. Appendix Table A8 provides evidence that the children of
the returnees from UNHCR camps experienced relatively better educational outcomes than thoseof the returnees from UNBRO camps. Yet, for the children aged 6–14, especially those aged 6–11,
who received education after repatriation, the statistically significant differences generally disappear
after conditioning on district fixed effects (and the variables for access to schools). Indeed, forchildren aged 6–11, the statistically significant differences disappear only after conditioning on thefour variables of access to schools, with no statistically significant difference in grade progression
between the two groups. These results (available from the authors upon request) might imply thatthe differences in educational outcomes are driven by the difference in destination choices (access toschools), which might partly be induced by the difference in preferences for education.

40

limited access to agricultural land, exacerbated by high contamination by landmines
and UXOs during the conflict, likely drive the results. Based on our empirical findings,
we also discussed policy implications during camps, repatriation, and reintegration.
Our results imply that humanitarian assistance for refugees can be more effective foryounger cohorts.
Focusing on the Cambodian refugee crisis and extensively exploring its heterogeneous impacts among various subpopulations of refugees, our study provides insights
into the complex relationships among political and social structures, social situations, and economic behavior. Our results highlight the importance of considering
potential heterogeneity in behavior among people facing different social and politicalconstraints, and they demonstrate that forced displacement, or more generally civil
conflict, can be a potential source of future misallocation. Such considerations canlead to effective policy design, as well as a better understanding of human behavior
and the detailed process of economic change in conflict-affected societies.

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Rosenbaum, Paul R., “The Consequences of Adjustment for a Concomitant Variable That Has Been Affected by the Treatment,” Journal of the Royal StatisticalSociety, Series A (General), 1984, 147 (5), 656–666.
, Observational Studies, 2nd ed., New York: Springer, 2002.
Rubin, Donald B., “Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized andNonrandomized Studies,” Journal of Educational Psychology, 1974, 66 (5), 688–701.
Ruiz, Isabel and Carlos Vargas-Silva, “The Economics of Forced Migration,”
Journal of Development Studies, 2013, 49 (6), 772–784.
Sarvimäki, Matti, Roope Uusitalo, and Markus Jäntti, “Long-Term Effectsof Forced Migration,” 2009. IZA DP No. 4003.
, , and , “Habit Formation and the Misallocation of Labor: Evidence from Forced
Migrations,” 2022. Journal of the European Economic Association (forthcoming).
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453–475.
Suenobu, Yumiko, “Management of Education Systems in Zones of Conflict-Relief
Operations: A Case-Study in Thailand,” 1995. UNESCO Principal Regional Officefor Asia and the Pacific.
Takasaki, Yoshito, “Impacts of Disability on Poverty: Quasi-experimental Evidence from Landmine Amputees in Cambodia,” Journal of Economic Behavior andOrganization, 2020, 180, 85–107.
UNHCR, The State of The World’s Refugees, Geneva: UNHCR, 2000.
, Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2021, Geneva: UNHCR, 2021.

46

Verme, Paolo and Kirsten Schuettler, “The Impact of Forced Displacement on
Host Communities: A Review of the Empirical Literature in Economics,” Journalof Development Economics, 2021, 150, 102606.
Vickery, Michael, Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society, 1st ed., London:
Rances Pinter, 1986.
, Cambodia 1975-1982, Boston: South End Press, 1999.
Windmeijer, Frank, Helmut Farbmacher, Neil Davies, and George Davey
Smith, “On the Use of the Lasso for Instrumental Variables Estimation with Some
Invalid Instruments,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 2019, 114(527), 1339–1350.

47

12500
10000
Number
5000
7500
2500
0
1975

1980

1985
Year

1990

1995

1990

1995

0

1500

Number
3000
4500

6000

7500

A. Thailand

1975

1980

1985
Year

B. Vietnam
Figure 1: Distribution of Migrants from Thailand and Vietnam in 1975-1998
Note: The figure shows the distribution of individuals aged 20-60 who previously residedin Thailand (panel A) and Vietnam (panel B) and migrated to their current residence in
1975-1998.

48

A−1. Full Samples
Number50000 75000 100000

Stayers

0

0

500

25000

Number
1000
1500

2000

Returnees

20

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

20

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

50

55

60

50

55

60

50

55

60

A−2. Matched Samples

500

Number
1000
1500

2000

Stayers00500

Number
1000
1500

2000

Returnees

20

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

20

25

30

35

40
Age

45

A. ThailandB−1. Full Samples
Stayers

0

0

25000

200

Number400

600

Number50000 75000 100000

Returnees

20

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

20

25

30

35

40
Age

45

B−2. Matched Samples

150
Number
100
50
0

0

50

Number
100

150

200

Stayers

200

Returnees

20

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

20

25

30

35

40
Age

45

B. Vietnam
Figure 2: Age Distribution of Returnees and Stayers
Note: The figure shows age distribution for returnees from Thailand (panel A) and Vietnam(panel B) and for stayers aged 20-60 in the Full Samples and Matched Samples.

49

A−1. Full Samples
Women

Age (Stayers Mean)

Age (Stayers Mean)

Men
34(3.5)35(3.3)36(3.1)37(3.0)38(3.2)39(3.4)40(3.7)41(4.0)42(4.3)43(4.4)44(4.5)45(4.5)46(4.5)47(4.5)48(4.5)49(4.4)50(4.4)51(4.5)52(4.3)53(4.3)54(4.4)55(4.0)56(4.0)57(3.9)58(3.8)59(3.5)60(3.4)−0.006−0.004−0.002

0

0.002

0.004

0.006

34(2.0)35(1.9)36(1.9)37(1.9)38(2.1)39(2.3)40(2.5)41(2.6)42(2.7)43(2.6)44(2.5)45(2.4)46(2.2)47(2.1)48(2.0)49(2.0)50(1.8)51(1.7)52(1.6)53(1.4)54(1.3)55(1.0)56(0.9)57(0.8)58(0.7)59(0.7)60(0.5)−0.006−0.004−0.002

0

0.002

0.004

0.006

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.002

0.004

0.006

A−2. Matched Samples
Women

Age (Stayers Mean)

Age (Stayers Mean)

Men
34(3.7)35(3.9)36(3.7)37(4.0)38(3.9)39(3.9)40(4.4)41(4.4)42(4.8)43(4.6)44(4.5)45(4.6)46(5.0)47(4.9)48(4.7)49(4.6)50(5.0)51(4.5)52(4.1)53(4.4)54(4.4)55(3.6)56(3.8)57(5.2)58(3.9)59(3.6)60(3.7)
−0.06

−0.04

−0.02

0

0.02

0.04

0.06

34(1.7)35(1.7)36(1.9)37(1.9)38(2.0)39(2.2)40(2.0)41(2.3)42(2.7)43(2.3)44(2.2)45(2.2)46(2.2)47(2.0)48(2.1)49(1.8)50(1.5)51(1.4)52(1.2)53(1.9)54(0.7)55(1.0)56(0.8)57(1.2)58(0.9)59(0.8)60(0.6)
−0.06

−0.04

−0.02

0

A. ThailandB−1. Full Samples
Women

Age (Stayers Mean)

Age (Stayers Mean)

Men
34(3.9)35(3.6)36(3.4)37(3.1)38(3.4)39(3.3)40(3.8)41(4.4)42(4.4)43(4.5)44(4.7)45(4.6)46(4.7)47(4.7)48(4.6)49(4.6)50(4.5)51(4.7)52(4.6)53(4.4)54(4.4)55(4.1)56(4.3)57(4.0)58(3.9)59(3.9)60(3.4)−0.006−0.004−0.002

0

0.002

0.004

0.006

34(2.1)35(2.0)36(2.0)37(2.1)38(2.1)39(2.2)40(2.5)41(2.6)42(2.6)43(2.6)44(2.4)45(2.4)46(2.3)47(2.2)48(2.2)49(2.0)50(1.8)51(1.8)52(1.6)53(1.4)54(1.3)55(1.0)56(0.8)57(0.8)58(0.8)59(0.7)60(0.6)−0.006−0.004−0.0020B−2. Matched Samples
Women

Age (Stayers Mean)

Age (Stayers Mean)

Men
34(2.7)35(3.1)36(2.2)37(3.0)38(2.8)39(2.9)40(3.3)41(4.3)42(3.4)43(3.8)44(4.5)45(3.9)46(4.0)47(4.1)48(4.8)49(4.0)50(3.7)51(3.3)52(5.0)53(3.7)54(3.9)55(3.1)56(3.8)57(3.8)58(3.9)59(2.9)60(4.0)
−0.15

−0.10

−0.05

0

0.05

0.10

0.15

34(1.0)35(1.1)36(1.1)37(1.6)38(1.3)39(1.2)40(1.5)41(2.2)42(1.8)43(2.1)44(2.2)45(2.3)46(2.4)47(1.8)48(2.1)49(0.8)50(1.7)51(1.0)52(1.4)53(0.8)54(1.3)55(1.0)56(1.5)57(0.7)58(0.9)59(0.7)60(0.2)−0.25 −0.20 −0.15 −0.10 −0.05

0

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

B. Vietnam
Figure 3: Difference in Education between Returnees and Stayers
Note: The figure plots the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the coefficients ofyears of schooling for cohorts (returnees from Thailand (panel A) and from Vietnam (panelB) and stayers) aged 34-60 by sex in the Full Samples and Matched Samples, adjusting for
district of birth fixed effects using ordinary least squares (OLS); the stayers means are also
shown.

50

51

䣘䣫䣧䣶䣰䣣䣯

䣏䣱䣰䣦䣷䣮䢢䣍䣫䣴䣫䣕䣶䣣䣻䣧䣴䣵

䣕䣱䣷䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶䣘䣫䣧䣶䣰䣣䣯

䣏䣱䣰䣦䣷䣮䢢䣍䣫䣴䣫䣕䣶䣣䣻䣧䣴䣵

䣗䣴䣤䣣䣰䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵䣅䣱䣰䣨䣮䣫䣥䣶䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵䣙䣧䣵䣶䣕䣱䣷䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶䣇䣣䣵䣶䣅䣧䣰䣶䣧䣴

䣍䣴䣣䣶䣫䣧

䣘䣫䣧䣶䣰䣣䣯

䣏䣱䣰䣦䣷䣮䢢䣍䣫䣴䣫䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣧䣣䣵䣶䣙䣧䣵䣶䣕䣱䣷䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶䣇䣣䣵䣶䣅䣧䣰䣶䣧䣴

䣍䣴䣣䣶䣫䣧

䣘䣫䣧䣶䣰䣣䣯

䣏䣱䣰䣦䣷䣮䢢䣍䣫䣴䣫䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣧䣣䣵䣶

A. Thailand

Birth Districts (Stayers)䣍䣣䣯䣲䣱䣰䣩䢢䣕䣱䣣䣯䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪

䣎䣣䣱䣵

A-2. Matched Samples

Birth Districts (Stayers)䣍䣣䣯䣲䣱䣰䣩䢢䣕䣱䣣䣯䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪

䣎䣣䣱䣵

䣖䣪䣣䣫䣮䣣䣰䣦

䣕䣱䣷䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶䣇䣣䣵䣶䣅䣧䣰䣶䣧䣴

䣍䣴䣣䣶䣫䣧

䣘䣫䣧䣶䣰䣣䣯

䣏䣱䣰䣦䣷䣮䢢䣍䣫䣴䣫䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣧䣣䣵䣶䣙䣧䣵䣶䣕䣱䣷䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶䣍䣣䣯䣲䣱䣰䣩䢢䣕䣱䣣䣯䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪

䣇䣣䣵䣶

䣅䣧䣰䣶䣧䣴

䣎䣣䣱䣵䣍䣴䣣䣶䣫䣧

䣘䣫䣧䣶䣰䣣䣯

䣏䣱䣰䣦䣷䣮䢢䣍䣫䣴䣫䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣧䣣䣵䣶Residence in 1998 (Returnees)䣅䣱䣰䣨䣮䣫䣥䣶䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵䢵䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢶䢷䢲䢺䢳䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢵䢲䢲䢷䢳䢢䢯䢢䢳䢲䢲

䢳䢢䢯䢢䢷䢲

䢲䣔䣧䣶䣷䣴䣰䣧䣧䣵䣙䣧䣵䣶䣍䣣䣯䣲䣱䣰䣩䢢䣕䣱䣣䣯䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪

䣎䣣䣱䣵

Residence in 1998 (Returnees)䣅䣱䣰䣨䣮䣫䣥䣶䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵䢵䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢶䢷䢴䢷䢳䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢵䢲䢲䢷䢳䢢䢯䢢䢳䢲䢲

䢳䢢䢯䢢䢷䢲

䢲䣔䣧䣶䣷䣴䣰䣧䣧䣵䣖䣪䣣䣫䣮䣣䣰䣦

Figure 4: Geographic Distribution of Returnees and Stayers

Birth Districts (Returnees)䢵䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢶䢶䢸䢵䣅䣱䣰䣨䣮䣫䣥䣶䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵䢳䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢵䢲䢲䢷䢳䢢䢯䢢䢳䢲䢲

䣗䣴䣤䣣䣰䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵䣍䣣䣯䣲䣱䣰䣩䢢䣕䣱䣣䣯䢵䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢷䢳䢻䢳䢳䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢵䢲䢲䢷䢳䢢䢯䢢䢳䢲䢲

䢳䢢䢯䢢䢷䢲

䣇䣣䣵䣶䣍䣴䣣䣶䣫䣧

䣖䣪䣣䣫䣮䣣䣰䣦

䢳䢢䢯䢢䢷䢲

䣙䣧䣵䣶䣅䣧䣰䣶䣧䣴

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣧䣣䣵䣶䢲䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪

䣎䣣䣱䣵

䢲

䣔䣧䣶䣷䣴䣰䣧䣧䣵䣖䣪䣣䣫䣮䣣䣰䣦

䣅䣱䣰䣨䣮䣫䣥䣶䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵䣅䣱䣰䣨䣮䣫䣥䣶䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵

Birth Districts (Returnees)䣗䣴䣤䣣䣰䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵䣗䣴䣤䣣䣰䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵䢳䢲䢲䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢴䢷䢲䢲䢲䢷䢲䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢳䢲䢲䢲䢲䢴䢷䢲䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢶䢺䢶䢵䢸䣍䣣䣯䣲䣱䣰䣩䢢䣕䣱䣣䣯䢵䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢷䢳䢻䢳䢳䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢵䢲䢲䢷䢳䢢䢯䢢䢳䢲䢲

䢳䢢䢯䢢䢷䢲䢲䢲

䣕䣱䣷䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶䣇䣣䣵䣶䣍䣴䣣䣶䣫䣧

䣖䣪䣣䣫䣮䣣䣰䣦

䢳䢢䢯䢢䢷䢲

䣙䣧䣵䣶䣅䣧䣰䣶䣧䣴

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣧䣣䣵䣶䢲䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪

䢲

䣔䣧䣶䣷䣴䣰䣧䣧䣵䣖䣪䣣䣫䣮䣣䣰䣦

䣎䣣䣱䣵

A-1. Full Samples

52䣘䣫䣧䣶䣰䣣䣯

䣏䣱䣰䣦䣷䣮䢢䣍䣫䣴䣫䣕䣶䣣䣻䣧䣴䣵

䣕䣱䣷䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶䣘䣫䣧䣶䣰䣣䣯

䣏䣱䣰䣦䣷䣮䢢䣍䣫䣴䣫䣕䣶䣣䣻䣧䣴䣵

䣘䣫䣧䣶䣰䣣䣯

䣏䣱䣰䣦䣷䣮䢢䣍䣫䣴䣫䣙䣧䣵䣶䣕䣱䣷䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶䣕䣱䣷䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶

䣙䣧䣵䣶

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪

䣕䣱䣷䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶䣇䣣䣵䣶䣅䣧䣰䣶䣧䣴

䣍䣴䣣䣶䣫䣧

䣘䣫䣧䣶䣰䣣䣯

䣏䣱䣰䣦䣷䣮䢢䣍䣫䣴䣫䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣧䣣䣵䣶䣇䣣䣵䣶䣅䣧䣰䣶䣧䣴

䣎䣣䣱䣵䣍䣴䣣䣶䣫䣧

䣘䣫䣧䣶䣰䣣䣯

䣏䣱䣰䣦䣷䣮䢢䣍䣫䣴䣫䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣧䣣䣵䣶Residence in 1998 (Returnees)䣍䣣䣯䣲䣱䣰䣩䢢䣕䣱䣣䣯䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶

Notes: The figure shows geographic distribution of returnees from Thailand (panel A) and from Vietnam (panel B) and stayers aged
20-60 by district of birth and residence in 1998 in the Full Samples and Matched Samples. It also shows the 1977 administrative
zones of the Pol Pot regime and the 1998 districts.

Figure 4 (Continued): Geographic Distribution of Returnees and Stayers

B. Vietnam

Birth Districts (Stayers)䣅䣱䣰䣨䣮䣫䣥䣶䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵

Birth Districts (Returnees)䢳䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢺䢲䢶䢳䢳䢢䢯䢢䢵䢲

䢳䢢䢯䢢䢳䢲

䢲䣔䣧䣶䣷䣴䣰䣧䣧䣵䢵䢳䢢䢯䢢䢳䢲䢲

䣘䣫䣧䣶䣰䣣䣯

䣏䣱䣰䣦䣷䣮䢢䣍䣫䣴䣫䣅䣱䣰䣨䣮䣫䣥䣶䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵䣍䣴䣣䣶䣫䣧

䣖䣪䣣䣫䣮䣣䣰䣦

䣗䣴䣤䣣䣰䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵䣇䣣䣵䣶䣅䣧䣰䣶䣧䣴

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣧䣣䣵䣶䣙䣧䣵䣶䣍䣣䣯䣲䣱䣰䣩䢢䣕䣱䣣䣯䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪

䣎䣣䣱䣵

Residence in 1998 (Returnees)䣅䣱䣰䣨䣮䣫䣥䣶䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵䢳䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢵䢹䢵䢻䢵䢳䢢䢯䢢䢳䢲䢲

䢳䢳䢢䢯䢢䢵䢲

䢳䢢䢯䢢䢳䢲

䢲䣔䣧䣶䣷䣴䣰䣧䣧䣵䢳䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢺䢳䢵䣍䣣䣯䣲䣱䣰䣩䢢䣕䣱䣣䣯䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪

䣎䣣䣱䣵

B-2. Matched Samples

Birth Districts (Stayers)䣍䣴䣣䣶䣫䣧

䣖䣪䣣䣫䣮䣣䣰䣦

䣅䣱䣰䣨䣮䣫䣥䣶䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵䢵䢳䢢䢯䢢䢳䢲䢲

䢳䢳䢢䢯䢢䢵䢲

䣕䣱䣷䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶䣇䣣䣵䣶䣅䣧䣰䣶䣧䣴

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣧䣣䣵䣶䣗䣴䣤䣣䣰䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵䣍䣣䣯䣲䣱䣰䣩䢢䣕䣱䣣䣯䣙䣧䣵䣶䣍䣣䣯䣲䣱䣰䣩䢢䣕䣱䣣䣯䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪

䣎䣣䣱䣵

䢳䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢹䢻䢶䢵䢳䢢䢯䢢䢳䢲䢲

䢳䢳䢢䢯䢢䢵䢲

䢳䢢䢯䢢䢳䢲

䣇䣣䣵䣶䣍䣴䣣䣶䣫䣧

䣖䣪䣣䣫䣮䣣䣰䣦

䢳䢢䢯䢢䢳䢲

䣙䣧䣵䣶䣅䣧䣰䣶䣧䣴

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣧䣣䣵䣶䢲䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪

䣎䣣䣱䣵

䢲

䣔䣧䣶䣷䣴䣰䣧䣧䣵䣖䣪䣣䣫䣮䣣䣰䣦

䣅䣱䣰䣨䣮䣫䣥䣶䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵䣅䣱䣰䣨䣮䣫䣥䣶䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵

Birth Districts (Returnees)䣗䣴䣤䣣䣰䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵䣗䣴䣤䣣䣰䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵䢳䢲䢲䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢴䢷䢲䢲䢲䢷䢲䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢳䢲䢲䢲䢲䢴䢷䢲䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢶䢺䢶䢵䢸䣍䣣䣯䣲䣱䣰䣩䢢䣕䣱䣣䣯䢳䢲䢳䢢䢯䢢䢶䢲䢵䢷䢵䢳䢢䢯䢢䢳䢲䢲

䢳䢳䢢䢯䢢䢵䢲

䢳䢢䢯䢢䢷䢲䢲䢲

䣕䣱䣷䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶䣇䣣䣵䣶䣍䣴䣣䣶䣫䣧

䣖䣪䣣䣫䣮䣣䣰䣦

䢳䢢䢯䢢䢳䢲

䣙䣧䣵䣶䣅䣧䣰䣶䣧䣴

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣧䣣䣵䣶䢲䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪

䢲

䣔䣧䣶䣷䣴䣰䣧䣧䣵䣖䣪䣣䣫䣮䣣䣰䣦

䣎䣣䣱䣵

B-1. Full Samples

A. Age 34−60
Employed

Primary Sector−0.025

Tertiary Sector−0.263−0.095−0.219−0.004−0.10 −0.05

0

0.078

0.120

−0.256
Stayers Mean:
0.97 (TH,M)
0.84 (TH,W)
0.97 (VN,M)
0.86 (VN,F)−0.062

Low−skilled Work

0.218

0.078

0.195
Stayers Mean:
0.83 (TH,M)
0.79 (TH,W)
0.87 (VN,M)
0.82 (VN,F)−0.2160.05 0.10 −0.30 −0.15

0

0.15

Stayers Mean:
0.13 (TH,M)
0.05 (TH,W)
0.09 (VN,M)
0.03 (VN,F)

Stayers Mean:
0.02 (TH,M)
0.03 (TH,W)
0.02 (VN,M)
0.02 (VN,F)

0.144

0.30−0.24 −0.12

0

0.12

0.071

0.24−0.10 −0.05

0.061
0

0.05

0.10

B. Age 20−33
Years of Schooling

Employed

1.060−0.005

Tertiary Sector−0.014−0.0970.009

Stayers Mean:
4.37 (TH,M)
3.07 (TH,W)
4.22 (VN,M)
2.48 (VN,F)−1.2 −0.6

0

0.6

1.2

0.074

0.101

−0.848−0.308Low−skilled Work

0.194

0.128

Stayers Mean:
0.89 (TH,M)
0.80 (TH,W)
0.88 (VN,M)
0.82 (VN,F)−0.040−0.10 −0.05

0

0.067

Stayers Mean:
0.09 (TH,M)
0.05 (TH,W)
0.06 (VN,M)
0.03 (VN,F)

0.031
Stayers Mean:
0.02 (TH,M)
0.02 (TH,W)
0.03 (VN,M)
0.01 (VN,F)

0.133

0.05 0.10−0.20 −0.10

00.10 0.20 −0.08 −0.04

0.050
0

0.04 0.08

C. Age 15−19
Years of Schooling

Employed

0.317−0.0280.169

0Stayers Mean:
4.63(TH,M)
3.79(TH,F)
4.44(VN,M)
3.43(VN,F)

0.5

1.0 −0.22 −0.11

0

0.036

0.040
Stayers Mean:
0.31(TH,M)
0.44(TH,F)
0.32(VN,M)
0.48(VN,F)−0.152

0.034

0.044

−0.025−0.054Low−skilled Work

0.037

−0.062−0.530−1.0 −0.5

Tertiary Sector

Stayers Mean:
0.01(TH,M)
0.01(TH,F)
0.00(VN,M)
0.01(VN,F)

0.008

0.075

0.11 0.22−0.10 −0.05

0

0.05

Stayers Mean:
0.01(TH,M)
0.01(TH,F)
0.01(VN,M)
0.01(VN,F)

0.10−0.06 −0.03

0.023
0

0.03

0.06

D. Age 12−14
Some Education

School Participation−0.016−0.047−0.057−0.20 −0.100Child Labor−0.0120.008−0.056−0.0750.000−0.082
Stayers Mean:
0.84(TH,M)
0.81(TH,F)
0.82(VN,M)
0.75(VN,F)−0.110

Grade Progression−0.0450.029
Stayers Mean:
0.81(TH,M)
0.74(TH,F)
0.79(VN,M)
0.69(VN,F)−0.1070.10 0.20−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

0.026

0.20 −1.0

−0.5

0

0.020
Stayers Mean:−5.00(TH,M)−5.10(TH,F)−5.19(VN,M)−5.47(VN,F)

0.5−0.0201.0 −0.10 −0.05

0Stayers Mean:
0.03(TH,M)
0.06(TH,F)
0.03(VN,M)
0.10(VN,F)

0.05

0.10

F. Age 6−11
Some Education

School Participation

Grade Progression−0.007−0.009

0.009

0.001

−0.001−0.005

0.019

0.001

−0.049−0.20 −0.10−0.052
Stayers Mean:
0.54(TH,M)
0.53(TH,F)
0.51(VN,M)
0.51(VN,F)−0.0680

0.10

Male (TH)0.20−0.20 −0.10−0.044
Stayers Mean:
0.54(TH,M)
0.52(TH,F)
0.50(VN,M)
0.50(VN,F)−0.0790Child Labor

0.10

0.20 −1.0

Female (TH)

0.070
−0.5

0

−0.001
Stayers Mean:−2.71(TH,M)−2.70(TH,F)−2.80(VN,M)−2.81(VN,F)

0.5

Male (VN)−0.003

1.0 −0.10 −0.05

0Stayers Mean:
0.00(TH,M)
0.00(TH,F)
0.01(VN,M)
0.01(VN,F)

0.05

0.10

Female (VN)

Figure 5: Impacts of Displacement on Educational and Labor Market Outcomes
Notes: The figure plots the point estimates of the impacts of forced displacement on educational
and labor market outcomes (selected) and their 95% confidence intervals along with the stayers
means for male and female returnees aged 20-60 from Thailand (TH) and Vietnam (VN) and forthe male and female children aged 6-19 of the male returnees and stayers aged 34-60. The estimatesare based on the Matched Samples and are from the bias-corrected version of the nearest-neighbormatching method (Abadie and Imbens 2011). We adjust the 95% confidence intervals using theBenjamini-Hochberg procedure (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995).

53

Men Aged 34−60 (TH)Employed

Primary Sector−0.025−0.263−0.026

Tertiary Sector−0.186−0.018

0.266

0.073

0.204

−0.316

0

0.051

0.149

−0.253−0.040

0.035

0.356
−0.196−0.036−0.06−0.03

0.019−0.379−0.022

0.078

0.151

−0.302−0.005Low−skilled Work

0.218

0.089

0.248

0.03 0.06 −0.40−0.20 00.20 0.40 −0.40−0.20

0

0.124

0.20 0.40 −0.16−0.08

00.08 0.16

Women Aged 34−60 (TH)Employed

Primary Sector−0.095−0.2190.006

Tertiary Sector−0.103−0.030−0.104

0.046

0.115

−0.085−0.2060.114−0.246−0.295−0.20−0.10

00.10 0.20 −0.36−0.18

1979−98 (All)

0.039

0.061

−0.191−0.150

0.078

0.093

−0.073−0.116

Low−skilled Work

0.120

0

1979−87

0.18 0.36 −0.18−0.09

1988−90

0

0.060
0.078

0.134

0.088

0.130

0.094

0.09 0.18 −0.12−0.06

1991

1992

0

1993

0.06 0.12

1994−98

Men Aged 34−60 (VN)
Employed−0.004

Primary Sector−0.2560.024−0.045

0.071

0.094

−0.169

0.007

0.145

−0.4660

Low−skilled Work

0.195

−0.0620.013−0.08−0.04

Tertiary Sector

0.040
0.311

0.04 0.08 −0.50−0.25 00.25 0.50 −0.40−0.20

0

0.146

0.20 0.40 −0.20−0.10

00.10 0.20

Women Aged 34−60 (VN)
Employed

Primary Sector−0.062

Tertiary Sector−0.2160.053−0.1790.144−0.030−0.0590.079−0.16400.12 0.24 −0.50−0.25

0.061
0.016

0.105

−0.440−0.24−0.12

Low−skilled Work

0.041
0.240

0

1979−98 (All)0.25 0.50 −0.30−0.15

1979

1980

0

0.15 0.30 −0.16−0.08

0.125

0

0.08 0.16

1981−98

Figure 6: Heterogeneity – Timing of Repatriation (Age 34-60)
Notes: The figure plots the point estimates of the impacts of forced displacement on labor market
outcomes (selected) and their 95% confidence intervals for the male and female returnees aged 34-60
from Thailand (TH) and Vietnam (VN) who returned in different years. For the estimation method,
see the notes to Figure 5 and the main text.

54

Men Aged 20−33 (TH)Years of Schooling

Employed

1.060
0.584

−0.000

0.243

0.9

0.040

0.130

−0.024

1.066

0.043

0.288

−0.011

1.491

0

0.044

0.012
1.102

0.074

0.138
0.042

0.216

Low−skilled Work

0.194

0.086

−1.8 −0.9

Tertiary Sector−0.014

0.071

0.182

−0.049

0.084

0.244

1.8 −0.10−0.05

00.05 0.10 −0.36−0.18

0

0.101

0.18 0.36 −0.12−0.06 0

0.06 0.12

Women Aged 20−33 (TH)Years of Schooling−0.005

Employed

Tertiary Sector−0.0970.098−0.048−0.729

0.230
0.003

−1.4 −0.70

1979−98 (All)

0.005

0.074

0.042

−0.080

0.099

0.068

−0.098

0.103

0.078

−0.150

0.7

0.028

0.035

−0.097
0.079

0.067

0.081

−0.049−0.516

Low−skilled Work

0.101

0.147

1.4 −0.20−0.100

1979−87

0.10 0.20 −0.20−0.10

1988−9000.088

0.10 0.20 −0.10−0.05 0

0.05 0.10

1992

1994−98

1991

1993

Men Aged 20−33 (VN)
Years of Schooling

Employed−0.848Tertiary Sector

0.009−0.482

0.128
0.086

−1.496−2.0 −1.0

1.0

2.0 −0.14−0.07

0.003

0.017

−0.010−0.078

0

0.031

0.066

0.041

−0.659Low−skilled Work

0.266

0

0.07 0.14 −0.30−0.15 0

0.086

0.15 0.30 −0.12−0.06

00.06 0.12

Women Aged 20−33 (VN)
Years of Schooling

Employed−0.308−0.040−0.0240.5

1.0 −0.20−0.10 0

1979−98 (All)−0.0030.080−0.142

0

0.050

0.043

−0.052−0.497

Low−skilled Work

0.133
0.073

−0.446−1.0 −0.5

Tertiary Sector

0.012
0.262

0.10 0.20 −0.30−0.15 0

1979

1980

0.15 0.30 −0.16−0.08 0

0.132

0.08 0.16

1981−98

Figure 7: Heterogeneity – Timing of Repatriation (Age 20-33)
Notes: The figure plots the point estimates of the impacts of forced displacement on educational
and labor market outcomes (selected) and their 95% confidence intervals for the male and female
returnees aged 20-33 from Thailand (TH) and Vietnam (VN) who returned in different years. For
the estimation method, see the notes to Figure 5 and the main text.

55

Men Aged 15−19 (TH)Years of Schooling

Employed

0.317

Tertiary Sector−0.028−0.128−0.072−0.6190.632−2.0 −1.0−0.004−0.067

0

1.0

0.026

0.034

−0.054−0.306−0.021

0.039−0.122

0.652

0.034

0.005

−0.014−0.088Low−skilled Work

0.037

2.0 −0.40−0.20

0.040

0.035

0.029

0.038

0.032

0.049

0

0.20 0.40 −0.14−0.07

0

0.042

0.07 0.14 −0.10−0.05

00.05 0.10

Women Aged 15−19 (TH)Years of Schooling

Employed

0.169

Tertiary Sector−0.062−0.388−0.159
0.046

0.566

−0.025−2.0 −1.0

0

0.026

0.028

0.026

0.043

−0.1481.0

1979−98 (All)

0.046

0.020

−0.047−0.099−0.0050.043−0.110

0.069

0.036

0.028

−0.943−0.175Low−skilled Work

0.044

0.036

0.081

2.0 −0.40−0.20

0

1979−87

0.20 0.40 −0.14−0.07

1988−9000.065

0.07 0.14 −0.10−0.05 0

0.05 0.10

1992

1994−98

1991

1993

Men Aged 15−19 (VN)
Years of Schooling−0.530

Employed−0.025−0.440−0.086−0.556

0.008

0.027

0.003

0.021

0.003

0.019

0

0.8

1.6 −0.30−0.150

Low−skilled Work

0.040

0.025

−0.501−1.6 −0.8

Tertiary Sector

0.080

0.15 0.30 −0.24−0.12

0

0.028

0.12 0.24 −0.10−0.05

00.05 0.10

Women Aged 15−19 (VN)
Years of Schooling

Tertiary Sector

Low−skilled Work−0.054−0.152−0.041−0.148

0.045

0.011

−0.161

0.035

0.010

0.299
−0.338−1.6 −0.8

Employed

00.075−0.1260.8

1.6 −0.30−0.15 0

1979−98 (All)

0.023

0.153

0.15 0.30 −0.24−0.12

1979

1980

0

0.12 0.24 −0.10−0.05 0

0.060

0.05 0.10

1981−98

Figure 8: Heterogeneity – Timing of Repatriation (Age 15-19)
Notes: The figure plots the point estimates of the impacts of forced displacement on educational
and labor market outcomes (selected) and their 95% confidence intervals for the male and female
children aged 15-19 of the male returnees aged 34-60 from Thailand (TH) and Vietnam (VN) who
returned in different years. For the estimation method, see the notes to Figure 5 and the main text.

56

.3
.2
Density
.1
0
1960

1965

1970

1975

1980 1985
Year

1990

1995

2000

2005

Figure 9: Timing of Access to Agricultural Land
Note: The figure shows the timing of access to agricultural land for Cambodian households in the2004 Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey data.
䣎䣣䣱䣵䣖䣪䣣䣫䣮䣣䣰䣦

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣧䣣䣵䣶䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣍䣴䣣䣶䣫䣧

䣐䣱䣴䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶䣅䣧䣰䣶䣧䣴

䣇䣣䣵䣶

䣙䣧䣵䣶

(
!

䣘䣫䣮䣮䣣䣩䣧䣵䢢䢪䢵䢰䢲䢢䣭䣯䢢䣤䣷䣨䣨䣧䣴䣵䢫䣅䣱䣰䣶䣣䣯䣫䣰䣣䣶䣧䣦䢢䣣䣴䣧䣣䣵䣏䣱䣰䣦䣷䣮䢢䣍䣫䣴䣫䣘䣫䣧䣶䣰䣣䣯

䣕䣱䣷䣶䣪䣹䣧䣵䣶䣍䣣䣯䣲䣱䣰䣩䢢䣕䣱䣣䣯䣆䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵䣆䣍䢢䣼䣱䣰䣧䣵䢢䢪䢳䢻䢹䢹䢫䣅䣱䣰䣨䣮䣫䣥䣶䢢䣦䣫䣵䣶䣴䣫䣥䣶䣵

Figure 10: Areas Contaminated with Landmines and UXOs in 1992
Notes: The figure shows the landmine and UXO contaminated areas in 1992 (before clearance
started), which are depicted based on the results of baseline survey (BLS) and clearance by the
Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA). The 1977 administrative zonesof the Pol Pot regime (DK zones (1977)), the 1998 districts, conflict districts (not covered by the1998 Census), and 3.0 km village buffers are also depicted.

57Age 34−60 (TH)Age 34−60 (VN)

−0.031

1992−0.044

1993

−.18

−.12

−.06

0.052

1979

0.004

1980

0

.06

.12

.18

−.18

Age 20−33 (TH)

−.18

−.12

−.06

0

.06

.12

.18

−.12

−.06

0

.06

−.18

−.12

−.06

0

.06

.12

.18

−0.0501979−0.092

1980

.12

.18

Age 15−19 (VN)

0.032

−.18

.12

0.025

1980

0.005

1993

.06

0.091

Age 15−19 (TH)
1992

0

1979

−0.0281993−.06

Age 20−33 (VN)

−0.010

1992

−.12

.18

−.18

−.12

−.06

0

.06

.12

.18

Figure 11: Displacement Effects on Employment for Different Cohorts
Notes: The figure plots the OLS estimates and their 95% confidence interval for the coefficientsof refugee status on employment for the returnees and their children aged 15-19 from Thailand(Vietnam) who returned in 1992-1993 (1979-1980). The results are from Appendix Tables A13(age 20-60) and A14 (age 15-19), which examine the relationships between refugee status and key
outcomes for those who returned in different years, adjusting for age, age squared, a dummy variable
for female, years of schooling, a dummy variable for attending school (only for age 15-19), districtof birth fixed effects, and district fixed effects. For details, see the notes to Appendix Tables A13
and A14.

58

59

(2)
-0.2857(0.0498)-0.0038(0.0051)
0.0071(0.0014)
Yes
No
No
0.745
9.838
8.759
5,364
0.139

(1)
-0.4581(0.0434)

6,087
0.070

Yes
No
No
0.747

All

All

6,087
0.073

Yes
Yes
No
0.747

(3)
-0.4457(0.0431)

All

Access to Agricultural Land
All
All
NW
West
North
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
-0.2857-0.2769-0.2334-0.3290(0.0498) (0.0445) (0.0601) (0.0640)-0.0038-0.0035(0.0051)(0.0058)
0.00710.0092(0.0014)(0.0019)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.745
0.747
0.745
0.730
9.838
9.838
8.759
8.759
5,364
6,087
5,364
2,245
0.139
0.231
0.229
0.270
All

NW
West
North
(8)
-0.1561(0.0739)-0.0186(0.0051)0.0142(0.0031)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.727
7.075
7.455
1,938
0.288
2,752
0.228

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.773

(9)
-0.1769(0.0572)

SW
East

(10)
-0.2173(0.1031)0.0097(0.0063)
0.0073(0.0024)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.769
11.781
9.174
2,394
0.209

SW
East

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates where the unit of observation is the household head. It reports robust standard errors, adjusted forclustering by village, in parentheses. Regressions use data about household heads aged 26–66 from the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey
2004; age 26–66 corresponds to age 20–60 at the time of the 1998 Census. Columns 7-8 (columns 9-10) limit the analysis samples to thehousehold heads residing in the former Northwest (NW), West, and North zones (Southwest (SW) and East zones) (see Figure 4). “Accessto Agricultural Land” is an indicator variable equal to 1 if households had access to agricultural land (owned it, rented it, or had access insome other way) by 1998 and 0 otherwise. “Refugee” is an indicator variable equal to 1 if household heads lived abroad before and migrated
to their current residence in 1979–1998 and 0 otherwise. “Congestion” is the village-level congestion measure, defined as stayer density per
non-contaminated area (km2 ) within a 3.0 km buffer zone around each village point before clearance started. Base controls include age,
age squared, a dummy variable for female, and the logarithmic value of village population aged 20–60 in 1998. The analysis samples in theeven columns are limited to the household heads residing in villages with complete information about village points (contamination) anddemographics.

Base controls
Years of schoolingDistrict FE
Mean (Dep. Var.)
Mean (Congestion)
SD (Congestion)
Observations
R-squared

Congestion

Refugee×Congestion

Refugee

Dependent Variable:
Sample:Table 1: Access to Agricultural Land in 1998

Table 2: Congestion Channel
Sample:Dependent Variable:

RefugeeRefugee×Congestion
Congestion
Base controls
District of birth FE
Years of schoolingDistrict FE
Mean (Dep. Var.)
Mean (Congestion)
SD (Congestion)
Observations
R-squared
1979
1980
1981-1991
1992
1993
1994-1998
Base controls
District of birth FE
Years of schoolingDistrict FE
Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

Employed(1)

Primary
Sector(2)

0.0055(0.0086)-0.0025(0.0007)0.0018(0.0007)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.856
8.903
9.592
77,5760.128-0.0519(0.0123)-0.0050(0.0009)0.0049(0.0009)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.703
8.903
9.592
77,5760.236

0.053(0.012)0.016(0.022)-0.015(0.008)-0.023(0.010)-0.038(0.009)-0.050(0.010)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.850
82,3140.136-0.005(0.018)-0.034(0.026)-0.126(0.013)-0.111(0.013)-0.127(0.012)-0.141(0.018)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.687
82,3140.257

All
Tertiary
Sector(3)

Low-skill.
Home
Work
Own.
(4)
(5)
A. Congestion
0.05190.0387-0.0094(0.0067)(0.0050)(0.0025)
0.00220.0018-0.0007(0.0006)(0.0004)(0.0002)-0.0029-0.00150.0008(0.0005)(0.0004)(0.0002)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.145
0.058
0.973
8.903
8.903
8.903
9.592
9.592
9.592
77,576
77,576
77,576
0.190
0.084
0.040
B. Timing of Repatriation
0.053
0.018
0.013
(0.011)(0.007)(0.005)
0.046
0.016
0.018
(0.011)(0.009)(0.007)0.096
0.069-0.016(0.008)(0.007)(0.004)0.077
0.058-0.014(0.008)(0.006)(0.003)0.085
0.062-0.022(0.007)(0.005)(0.004)0.088
0.066-0.055(0.013)(0.010)(0.006)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.154
0.058
0.969
82,31482,31482,314
0.198
0.078
0.057

Tertiary Sector
Low-skill.
Paid
Work
Empl.
(6)
(7)
0.0905(0.0218)0.0004(0.0013)-0.0001(0.0012)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.317
7.394
10.047
11,2320.261-0.1480(0.0220)0.0016(0.0013)-0.0019(0.0013)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.440
7.394
10.047
11,2320.338

0.028(0.033)0.050(0.034)0.100(0.020)0.096(0.019)0.089(0.017)0.104(0.022)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.303
12,6370.253-0.064(0.036)-0.114(0.032)-0.156(0.021)-0.118(0.018)-0.109(0.017)-0.086(0.024)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.447
12,637
0.328

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates where the unit of observation is the individual. It reports
robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by village, in parentheses. Regressions use data about
returnees from Thailand and from Vietnam and stayers aged 20–60 from the Matched Samples. In
columns 6 and 7, the analysis samples are limited to those engaged in the tertiary sector. For
definitions of the dependent variables, see the main text. For variable definitions for panel A, see
the note to Table 1. In panel B, “19XX(–19XX)” is an indicator variable equal to 1 if individuals
returned from Thailand or Vietnam in 19XX(–19XX) and 0 otherwise; stayers are the base group.
Base controls include age, age squared, a dummy variable for female, and the logarithmic value ofvillage population aged 20–60 in 1998 (panel A only).

60

Table 3: Other Potential Channels
Sample:Channel:Dependent Variable:
RefugeeMean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Channel:Dependent Variable:
RefugeeMean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Channel:Dependent Variable:
RefugeeMean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Dependent Variable:
RefugeeMean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Base controls
Years of schoolingDistrict FE

All

NW
SW
All
NW
SW
West
East
West
East
North
North
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
A. Discrimination
B. Health
Neighborhood Trust
Health Status I
0.024
0.024
0.016
-0.0200.039-0.074(0.048) (0.053) (0.095)(0.035) (0.049) (0.050)
0.499
0.530
0.473
0.129
0.092
0.150
6,086
2,245
2,752
13,378
4,718
6,203
0.206
0.272
0.187
0.093
0.092
0.087
B. Health
Health Status II
Disability-0.0200.022-0.0620.008
0.037-0.024(0.029) (0.033) (0.053)(0.022) (0.029) (0.036)
0.132
0.098
0.153
0.073
0.072
0.074
13,378
4,718
6,203
13,378
4,718
6,203
0.077
0.090
0.070
0.077
0.097
0.069
C. Motivation
Domestic Remittances
Receipt
Amount (USD)
0.019
0.024
0.014
1.432
1.731
3.285
(0.028) (0.038) (0.039)(4.205) (6.034) (5.381)
0.110
0.089
0.126
10.28
6.57
11.71
6,087
2,245
2,752
6,087
2,245
2,752
0.123
0.124
0.112
0.045
0.069
0.038
International Remittances
Receipt
Amount (USD)
0.027
0.044
0.005
40.63
89.81
-28.41(0.027) (0.035) (0.046)(35.34) (56.85) (25.06)
0.041
0.062
0.030
15.42
22.16
11.29
6,087
2,245
2,752
6,087
2,245
2,752
0.087
0.085
0.082
0.042
0.056
0.042
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates where the unit of observation is the household head (panels
A and C) and the individual (panel B). It reports robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering byvillage, in parentheses. Regressions use data about household heads/individuals aged 26–66 from theCambodia Socio-Economic Survey 2004; age 26–66 corresponds to age 20–60 at the time of the 1998
Census. In columns 2 and 5 (columns 3 and 6), the analysis samples are limited to the household
heads/individuals residing in the former Northwest (NW), West, and North zones (Southwest (SW)and East zones). “Neighborhood Trust” is an indicator variable equal to 1 if household heads feelsafe from crime and violence in their neighborhood and 0 otherwise; one observation is missing incolumn 1 of panel A. “Health Status I” is an indicator variable equal to 1 if individuals report that
their health is “very good” or “good” and 0 otherwise. “Health Status II” is an indicator variableequal to 1 if individuals report that their health is “much better” or “somewhat better” than othersof the same age. “Disability” is an indicator variable equal to 1 if individuals have any disability
and 0 otherwise. “Receipt” of domestic (international) remittances is an indicator variable equal to
1 if households receive remittances from relatives or others in Cambodia (from abroad). “Amount(USD)” of domestic (international) remittances is the remittance amount in dollars from relatives
or others in Cambodia (from abroad). “Refugee” is an indicator variable equal to 1 if household
heads/individuals have lived abroad before and migrated to their current residence in 1979–1998
and 0 otherwise. Base controls include age, age squared, and a dummy variable for female.

61

For Online Publication
Contents
A.1 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A–3
A.1.1 Alternative Estimation Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A–3
A.1.2 Threats to Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A–3
A.1.3 Threats to External Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A–5
A.1.4 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A–6
A.2 Auxiliary Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A–7
A.2.1 Early Return Migration Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A–8
A.2.2 Return Migration Decisions to Birth Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A–8
A.3 Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A–9
A.3.1 Returnees from Thailand vs. Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A–9

List of Tables
A1 Construction of Full Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. –12
A2 Descriptive Statistics (Mean) – Age 20-60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. –13
A3 Descriptive Statistics (Mean) – Age 6-19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. –14
A4 Additional Results – Sociodemographic Outcomes (Age 20-60) . . . . . . . . . . . A. –16
A5 Robustness Check – Alternative Estimation Methods (Age 20-60, TH) . . . . . . . A. –19
A6 Robustness Check – Alternative Estimation Methods (Age 20-60, VN) . . . . . . . A. –21
A7 Sensitivity Analysis – (Age 20-60) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. –23
A8 Auxiliary Analysis – Early Return Migration Decisions (Age 34-60, TH) . . . . . . A. –27
A9 Mechanism – Returnees from UNHCR vs. UNBRO Camps (Age 34-60, 6-19) . . . A. –28
A10 Auxiliary Analysis – Return Migration Decisions to Birth Regions (Age 34-60) . . A. –30
A11 Consistency Check – Census 1998 (Age 20-60) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. –31
A12 Consistency Check – CSES 2004 (Age 26-66) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. –32
A13 Mechanism – Adjustment for Residence in 1998 (Age 20-60) . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. –33
A14 Mechanism – Adjustment for Residence in 1998 (Age 6-19) . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. –35
A15 Mechanism – Returnees from Thailand vs. Vietnam (Age 6-60) . . . . . . . . . . . A. –41

List of Figures
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
A7
A8
A9

Main Results – Age 20-60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. –43
Main Results – Age 6-19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. –44
Robustness Check – Alternative Specifications (Age 34-60, TH) . . . . . . . . . . . A. –47
Robustness Check – Alternative Specifications (Age 6-19, TH) . . . . . . . . . . . A. –48
Robustness Check and Heterogeneity – Refugee Camps (Age 34-60, TH) . . . . . . A. –50
Robustness Check and Heterogeneity – Refugee Camps (Age 6-19, TH) . . . . . . A. –51
Robustness Check – Alternative Samples (Age 20-60, TH) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. –53
Robustness Check – Alternative Samples (Age 6-19, TH) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. –55
Heterogeneity – Age (Age 20-60) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A
. –57

A–1

A10 Heterogeneity – Timing of Repatriation (Age 20-60) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. –60
A11 Heterogeneity – Timing of Repatriation (Age 6-19) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. –64
A12 Heterogeneity – Place of Birth (Age 20-60) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. –68
A13 Heterogeneity – Place of Birth (Age 6-19) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. –72
A14 Distribution of Congestion Measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A
. –76

A–2

A.1

Robustness Checks

This section checks the robustness of our main results to alternative estimation methods and threats
to identification, as well as external validity.
A.1.1

Alternative Estimation Methods

Tables A5 and A6 consider the robustness of the results to alternative estimation methods for the
returnees aged 20–60 (born prior to the refugee crisis). For comparison purposes, we also report theoriginal results and those from OLS based on the Full Samples. The alternative estimation methods
include blocking on the estimated propensity score in combination with regression adjustments
within the blocks and an instrumental variables strategy in conjunction with machine-learningtechniques (only for the returnees from Thailand). The former uses the Matched Samples andfollows the approach proposed by Imbens and Rubin (2015); we construct the blocks based on theImbens and Rubin algorithm, which gives the optimal number of blocks (Imbens and Rubin 2015,
pp. 290-294), and the regressions adjust for the basic set of covariates (age, years of schooling (only
for the cohorts aged 34–60), and district of birth fixed effects). The latter uses the Full Samples andfollows the approach proposed by Windmeijer et al. (2019) (detailed in the main text). We confirm
that the results from the alternative estimation methods, as well as OLS are generally consistent
with the original results.
A.1.2

Threats to Identification

We next consider the robustness of the results to potential threats to identification (we present
sensitivity analysis separately below). Since our census data offers limited covariates, unobserved
characteristics might not be balanced between returnees and stayers and the resulting estimatesmight be biased. In particular, since refugees and stayers were exposed to conflict and violence under
the Pol Pot regime (Kiernan 2008), the former, who experienced multiple migrations before therefugee event, might have been exposed to them differently; conditioning on district of birth fixed
effects might not adequately balance the level of conflict and/or violence to which such individuals
were exposed before the refugee event, though refugee status is largely determined by birth place(Figure 4). In this case, the estimated impacts of forced displacement might be contaminated by
the impacts of conflict and/or violence under the Pol Pot regime (see Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2013,
pp. 773-774 for relevant discussions).
To mitigate this potential concern, we consider two alternative matched samples, constructed
as follows. First, using the samples of returnees and all stayers who had their children in 1975-1983
A–3

in Cambodia, we reestimate the propensity score, additionally controlling for different patternsof having children in 1975–1983 and for their district of birth;1 we can further balance local andfamily-related characteristics and exposure to conflict and/or violence before the refugee event.
Second, limiting the above samples to married couples, we reestimate propensity score, further
additionally controlling for the characteristics of both husbands and wives (age, education, anddistrict of birth). Although the sample size decreases due to limited overlap, these two alternative
matched samples are better balanced between returnees and stayers. Unfortunately, this approachis feasible only for returnees aged 34–60 from Thailand.
Figures A3 and A4 present the results for returnees aged 34-60 from Thailand and for theirchildren aged 6–19, respectively. To compare the results with the original ones, we sequentiallyreport them based on five samples: Matched Samples (MS), Limited Matched Samples I (LMS-I)(constructed based on the treated units included in both MS and AMS-I (defined next)), Alternative
Matched Samples I (AMS-I) (constructed based on the first alternative specifications for propensity
score), Limited Matched Samples II (LMS-II) (constructed based on the treated units included inboth MS and AMS-II (defined next)), Alternative Matched Samples II (AMS-II) (constructed basedon the second alternative specifications for propensity score). For the limited samples, we confirm
that the results based on the alternative matched samples are consistent with the original results,
based on the baseline specifications of the propensity score.
For the returnees from Thailand, we further check the robustness of the results to anotherpotential threat to identification. As noted, the returnee samples are limited to those who returned
to Cambodia, excluding those who resettled in third countries. Indeed, a substantial number ofrefugees in Thailand eventually moved to third countries, including the United States, throughthe UNHCR camps; such decisions were made nonrandomly. We have some anecdotal evidence
that refugees with families or close relatives in third countries were likely to have been selected
for resettlement to facilitate the reunification of refugee families (e.g., Rogge 1990). If returning
refugees tend to have lower ability, then the differences in unobserved ability between returnees
and stayers might not be adequately balanced and may partly drive our results.
To address this potential concern, we separately consider the returnees from the UNHCR and
UNBRO camps. The sample selection problem, if any, will be limited in the latter samples. With no1

Due to the limited overlap (the impossibility of calculating the propensity score), we can only construct thealternative matched samples for the returnees who had one or two children during this period. For the two groups,
we first limit the samples to those who had their child or children born in the same district (58.1% of the returnee
samples) and then estimate the propensity score, additionally adjusting when they had children.

A–4

direct information to identify those returnees, we assume that returnees aged 34–60 from Thailand,
whose children were born in Thailand in 1975–1983 and in Cambodia in 1980-1983, to be from the
UNHCR and UNBRO camps, respectively. This exploits the fact that those who fled before early
1980 basically stayed in the UNHCR camps, located in Thailand, while those who fled afterward
stayed in the UNBRO camps, located in Cambodia, until 1983, due to the Thai government’s
change in refugee policy in early 1980. The number of returnees from the UNHCR and UNBRO
camps is 5,522 and 3,932, respectively; analysis is not feasible for the returnees aged 20–33 because
they were generally single in 1975–1983. Figures A5 and A6 present the results for the returnees
from each camp and those who returned from each camp in 1992–1993. We confirm that the results
for returnees from the UNBRO camps are consistent with the original results.
A.1.3

Threats to External Validity

We next consider the robustness of the results to potential threats to external validity in thecontext of Cambodia. As noted above, one limitation of our samples is that returning refugees arelimited to those who did not migrate again after repatriation. Some returnees might have migrated
after repatriation to find better jobs or to join family members or relatives (Robinson 1994), anddisplacement impacts might systematically differ for this group. To address this potential concern,
we consider alternative samples based on a different definition of refugees, though this is feasible
only for returnees aged 34–60 from Thailand. We define returning refugees from Thailand as
those whose household members were born in Thailand after 1975.2 We construct the alternative
matched samples following the same procedures. Importantly, these samples include returnees who
experienced multiple migrations after repatriation.
Figures A7 and A8 report the results for the returnees aged 34–60 from Thailand and fortheir children aged 6–19, respectively. To compare these results with the originals, we sequentiallyreport them based on four samples: Matched Samples (MS), Alternative Matched Samples III(AMS-III) (constructed based on the alternative definition of refugee), Limited Alternative Matched
Samples III-A (LAMS-III-A) (constructed based on the treated units included in both MS and
AMS-III), and Limited Alternative Matched Samples III-B (LAMS-III-B) (constructed based on
the treated units included in AMS-III, but not in MS). The returnees in LAMS-III-B are those
who experienced multiple migrations after repatriation. We confirm that the estimated adverse
2

This sample construction is consistent with our base samples for age 34–60 and can provide us with more
observations. We also confirm similar results when limiting the samples to those who had children (conditioning onparent-child relationships); the results are available from the authors upon request.

A–5

impacts are generally relatively strong for these returnees, implying that our original results serve asconservative estimates of the displacement impacts: Returnees with multiple migrations experienced
far worse educational, labor market, and home ownership outcomes.
A.1.4

Sensitivity Analysis

Matched Samples. Following Rosenbaum’s approach for matched pairs (Rosenbaum 2002), Tables A5 and A6 assess the robustness of our main estimates to hidden bias to address concerns
about remaining omitted variable bias. Assuming an unobserved binary confounder, we rely on thesensitivity parameter, Γ, or the ratio of the respective odds of being a refugee for two matched units.
This parameter also determines an lower and upper bound on inference quantities, p-values, for thenull hypothesis of no displacement impact to reflect uncertainty due to hidden bias, manipulatinga range of probabilities of “success,” or the occurrence of the event that an outcome value differs
between two matched units.
For example, if Γ = 1, then the two matched units have the same chance of being refugees, as
in a randomized experiment (a study free from hidden bias); the lower and upper bounds of theprobabilities of success, defined by 1/(1 + Γ) and Γ/(1 + Γ), respectively, for the case where an
outcome value differs between them, are both an equal 1/2, which leads to the usual significancelevel (i.e., no range of significance level due to no hidden bias). If Γ = 2, then one may be twice as
likely as another to have been a refugee due to an unobserved confounder (although the two units
appear similar in terms of the observed covariates); the lower and upper bounds of the probabilities
of success then become 1/3 and 2/3, respectively, thereby leading to a range of significance levels
that reflect uncertainty due to the hidden bias resulting from the unobserved confounder. As Γ
increases, the interval becomes wider and eventually uninformative, with large p-values; the null
hypothesis is less likely to be rejected. As such, our estimates are sensitive if the original conclusionschange for a Γ just barely larger than 1. We can report a Γ corresponding to maximum multiplicityadjusted p-values less than 0.05, and can thus confirm that our key findings are generally robust
to hidden bias.
Full Samples. To assess the sensitivity of the results based on the Full Samples, we conduct
a sensitivity analysis, following the approach proposed by Oster (2019). This approach considers
both coefficient movements and R-squared movements when covariates are included, assuming thatboth observed and unobserved covariates explain the same amount of variability (variance) in theoutcome variable in a regression model. Based on Oster’s results, we consider the following bias-

A–6

adjusted impacts of forced displacement:γ ∗ ≈ γ̂BS − δ(γ̂RS − γ̂BS )

2
2
Rmax
− RBS
2 − R2 ,RBS
RS

where γ̂BS and γ̂RS are the estimates based on the Baseline specification (age, age squared, yearsof schooling (only for age 34-60), district of birth fixed effects) and Restricted specification (nocovariates), respectively.
Our interest is in how coefficient estimates change due to unobserved confounders when we
adjust the covariates. δ is the proportional degree of selection. Following Oster’s suggestion,
we assume equal selection: The ratio of the coefficient movement is the same as that of the Rsquared movement. To allow for the over- or underestimation of the true displacement impacts,
we consider two cases, δ = 1 and δ = −1: The former assumes the same amount of selection
going in the same direction, whereas the latter assumes the same amount of selection going in the2
2 , respectively, are the R-squared from the baseline regression
opposite direction. RBS
and RRSmodel (Baseline specification) and restricted regression model (Restricted specification) defined2is the R-squared from a regression that controls for all observed and unobserved
above. Rmax
22
covariates. Although Rmax
is unobserved, we know that Rmax
is bounded by the upper bound 1
2
2
(Rmax
= 1), which gives the most conservative estimate of the displacement impacts, γ ∗ . An Rmax

below 1 should be considered in empirical works, based on Oster’s recommendation (she derives acutoff value of 1.3 as a multiplier for the R-squared from restricted regression models).
222= 1 (see Table A7). In the firstand (2) Rmax
= 1.3 × RBS
We consider two cases: (1) Rmax
22 ), regardless of the direction of the unobserved selection, the displacementcase, (Rmax= 1.3 × RBS

impacts are consistent with those in Tables A5 and A6. For some outcomes, this holds true even for2
the most conservative case (Rmax= 1). These results suggest that omitted variable bias is unlikely

to be significant enough to alter our conclusions.

A.2

Auxiliary Analyses

This section considers individual and regional characteristics correlated with returnees’ early return
migration decisions (only for returnees from Thailand) and their return migration decisions to go
back to birth regions.

A–7

A.2.1

Early Return Migration Decisions

Focusing on returnees aged 34–60 from Thailand among the Matched Samples, we examine individual and regional characteristics correlated with their early return migration decisions; we focus
on this age cohort because they seem to have been old enough to make migration decisions bythemselves at this time. We estimate the following equation using OLS with robust standard errors
clustered by district of birth:0

Yidp = α + Xi δ + β1 ln(Distance to T hai border)d + β2 P rop of contaminationd+ β3 ln(Areas)d + λp + idp ,where Yidp is an indicator variable equal to 1 if returnee i born in district d, province p, returned to
Cambodia before 1992 and 0 otherwise, Xi is a vector of individual characteristics (age, a female
dummy, years of schooling), ln(Distance to T hai border)d is the logarithmic value of the shortest
distance (km) from the centroid of district d to the Thai border, P rop of contaminationd is the
proportion of contaminated areas in the total village buffer zone areas (3.0 km radius) in district d,ln(Areas)d is the logarithmic value of the total village buffer zone areas (3.0 km radius) in districtd, and λp is province of birth fixed effects. We create ln(Distance to T hai border)d and ln(Areas)dusing a GIS.
Table A8 reports the results. Column 1 reports results without adjusting for province of birth
fixed effects. We find that younger, male, and worse educated refugees, and those from districts
away from border regions or those more contaminated with UXOs and landmines, tend to be early
returnees. When we additionally adjust for province of birth fixed effects in column 2, the results
are similar to those in column 1, though the significant difference for ln(Distance to T hai border)dbecomes weak, as we expected. Columns 3 and 4 limit the sample to the returnees from the UNHCR
and UNBRO camps whom we can identify (see Section A.1.2). After adding an indicator variable
for those from the UNHCR camps (UNHCR), we do the same exercises as in columns 1 and 2 andadditionally find that refugees in the UNHCR camps are more likely to be late returnees.
A.2.2

Return Migration Decisions to Birth Regions

We next examine individual and regional characteristics correlated with return migration decisions
to birth districts for returnees aged 34–60 from Thailand and Vietnam from the Matched Samples.
Columns 1 and 2 and columns 5 and 6 of Table A10 estimate the above equation after replacing
the dependent variable with an indicator variable for the returnees from Thailand and Vietnam,
A–8respectively, who came back to their birth districts. Columns 3 and 4 and columns 7 and 8
focus on the returnees from Thailand and Vietnam who returned in 1992–1993 and 1979–1980,
respectively. For the returnees from Vietnam, given that the majority returned in 1979–1980,
we do not consider P rop of contaminationd and ln(Areas)d . Also, in columns 5–9, we considerln(Distance to V ietnam border)d , the logarithmic value of the shortest distance (km) from thecentroid of district d to the Vietnamese border, instead of ln(Distance to T hai border)d . For bothsets of returnees, we find that less educated refugees and those from districts near border regions
tend to go back to their birth districts.

A.3

Mechanisms

A.3.1

Returnees from Thailand vs. Vietnam

Using the Matched Samples, Table A13 examines the differences in key outcomes between the
returnees from Thailand and Vietnam for age 34–60 (panel A) and 20-33 (panel B) and for children
aged 15–19 (panel C), 12–14 (panel D), and 6–11 (panel E); stayers (panels A–B) and children of
stayers (panels C–E) are the base group. For age 6–19, unlike in our main analysis, we use children
as the unit of analysis conditional on their characteristics. Based on the Matched Samples, we newly
construct samples of the children of the returnees and stayers aged 34–60. Refugee (TH)/Refugee(VN) in the regressions is an indicator variable equal to 1 if household heads and/or spouses are
returnees from Thailand/Vietnam and 0 otherwise.
For age 15–60 and 6–14, the OLS regressions consider two and three different specifications,
respectively. For age 20–60, columns 1 and 3 adjust for age, age squared, a dummy variable forfemale, years of schooling (panel A only), and district of birth fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4
additionally adjust for years of schooling (panel B only) and district fixed effects. Columns 1 and
3 for age 6–19 and columns 5 and 8 for age 6–14 adjust for the characteristics of children (age,a dummy variable for female, years of schooling (panel C only), a dummy variable for attending
school (panel C only)) and those of household heads (age, years of schooling, a dummy variable
for female head, district of birth fixed effects). Columns 7 and 10 for age 6–14 additionally adjust
for access to schools (continuous variables of the distance (km) to the nearest primary schools
and secondary schools (panel D only)); the analysis samples are limited to individuals residing invillages for which there is information about village points.3 For age 6–19, we also consider the
specifications while adjusting for the characteristics of parents, with consistent results.
3

Using these limited samples, we can also confirm consistency with the results in columns 5–6 and 8–9.

A–9

The key findings are as follows. For the cohorts aged 15–60, who already finished their compulsory education in the 1998 Cambodian education system, panels A and B (age 34–60 and 20–33)
show that refugee status is more strongly negatively correlated with employment for the returnees
from Thailand. However, panel C (age 15–19) shows the opposite pattern. For the cohorts aged
6–14, who had to receive compulsory education, the point estimates in panels D and E (age 12–14
and 6–11) show that the negative relationships between refugee status and educational outcomesare relatively strong for the children of the returnees from Vietnam, though the significant differences are limited. Panels D and E also show that when we additionally adjust for access to schools,
the negative relationships become relatively weak only for the children of returnees from Vietnam,
implying that they are driven by worse access to schools only for this age group of children. In
sum, given that the returnees from Thailand (West) received more extensive support than thosefrom Vietnam (East), these results may imply that humanitarian assistance can be more effective
for minimizing adverse displacement impacts for younger cohorts.

References
Abadie, Alberto and Guido W. Imbens, “Bias-Corrected Matching Estimators for Average
Treatment Effects,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 2011, 29 (1), 1–11.
Benjamini, Yoav and Yosef Hochberg, “Controlling the False Discovery Rate: A Practicaland Powerful Approach to Multiple Testing,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B(Methodological), 1995, 57 (1), 289–300.
Imbens, Guido W. and Donald B. Rubin, Causal Inference for Statistics, Social, and Biomedical Sciences: An Introduction, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Kiernan, Ben, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer
Rouge, 1975-79, 3rd ed., London: Yale University Press, 2008.
Oster, Emily, “Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evidence,” Journalof Business & Economic Statistics, 2019, 37 (2), 187–204.
Robinson, W. Courtland, ““Something Like Home Again” the Repatriation of Cambodian
Refugee,” 1994. The U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington D.C.
Rogge, John R., “Return to Cambodia: The Significance and Implications of Past, Present andFuture Spontaneous Repatriations,” 1990. The Intertect Institute.
A–10

Rosenbaum, Paul R., Observational Studies, 2nd ed., New York: Springer, 2002.
Ruiz, Isabel and Carlos Vargas-Silva, “The Economics of Forced Migration,” Journal of Development Studies, 2013, 49 (6), 772–784.
Windmeijer, Frank, Helmut Farbmacher, Neil Davies, and George Davey Smith, “On
the Use of the Lasso for Instrumental Variables Estimation with Some Invalid Instruments,”
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 2019, 114 (527), 1339–1350.

A–11

A–12

Description of Conditions
Observations
Total number of individuals in the complete set of 1998 Census microdata
11,435,097
They are 20–60 years old.
4,650,448
They speak Khmer (Cambodian) as their mother tongue.
4,432,053
They are Buddhists.
4,396,895
They were born in rural areas in Cambodia.
4,000,123“Employment period” is not missing, whether they are employed or unemployed.
3,991,582
The highest grade of school that they completed is not missing or other.
3,986,991
The information on housing (light, fuel, water, and toilet) conditions is not missing.
3,878,455
Returnees from Thailand(8) They were born in Cambodia and previously resided in Thailand.
37,023(9) The information about their “duration of stay” in their current residence is not missing.
36,853(10) Duration of stay in their current residence is less than 20 years.
36,760Returnees from Vietnam(8) They were born in Cambodia and previously resided in Vietnam.
15,669(9) The information about their “duration of stay” in their current residence is not missing.
15,619(10) Duration of stay in their current residence is less than 20 years.
15,548(11) They were born in districts other than Chantrea, Kampong Rou, Rumduol, and Svay Teab in Svay Rieng.
5,219
Stayers(8) They have never migrated before.
1,968,687
Notes: The table reports the detailed procedures for developing the base sample used for our analysis. The sample is constructed fromthe complete set of the 1998 Census microdata, with 11,435,097 individuals. Columns 2 and 3 describe the conditions and the numberof individuals that satisfy these conditions, respectively.

No.
(0)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Table A1: Construction of Full Samples

Table A2: Descriptive Statistics (Mean) – Age 20-60
Men
Variable

Full Sample
Refugee
Stayer(1)(2)

AgeYears of schooling
Labor force
EmployedMonths worked
Primary sector
Secondary sector
Tertiary sector
High-skilled work
Middle-skilled work
Low-skilled work
Armed forces
Home ownership
Observations

42.678
4.217
0.973
0.943
10.409
0.572
0.044
0.341
0.058
0.724
0.099
0.075
0.959
11,32444.467
3.788
0.982
0.974
10.741
0.875
0.013
0.090
0.041
0.914
0.016
0.006
0.991
362,881AgeYears of schooling
Labor force
EmployedMonths worked
Primary sector
Secondary sector
Tertiary sector
High-skilled work
Middle-skilled work
Low-skilled work
Armed forces
Home ownership
Observations

45.360
4.159
0.983
0.976
10.893
0.752
0.032
0.195
0.040
0.877
0.041
0.020
0.981
4,226

44.467
3.788
0.982
0.974
10.741
0.875
0.013
0.090
0.041
0.914
0.016
0.006
0.991
362,881

Age
Some education
Primary school
Years of schooling
Labor force
EmployedMonths worked
Primary sector
Secondary sector
Tertiary sector
High-skilled work
Middle-skilled work
Low-skilled work
Armed forces
Home ownership
Observations

27.557
0.823
0.472
5.421
0.931
0.875
9.422
0.562
0.047
0.280
0.052
0.689
0.096
0.052
0.936
5,318

26.122
0.783
0.383
4.518
0.928
0.886
9.651
0.807
0.014
0.069
0.024
0.842
0.018
0.006
0.979
423,886

Age
Some education
Primary school
Years of schooling
Labor force
EmployedMonths worked
Primary sector
Secondary sector
Tertiary sector
High-skilled work
Middle-skilled work
Low-skilled work
Armed forces
Home ownership
Observations

26.771
0.794
0.499
5.286
0.959
0.931
10.309
0.777
0.027
0.132
0.025
0.872
0.026
0.013
0.974
2,888

26.122
0.783
0.383
4.518
0.928
0.886
9.651
0.807
0.014
0.069
0.024
0.842
0.018
0.006
0.979
423,886

Group:

Women
Matched Sample
Full Sample
Matched Sample
Refugee Stayer
Refugee
StayerRefugee Stayer
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
A-1. Age 34-60 (TH)42.55542.55542.67544.53242.62542.625
4.197
4.242
1.892
1.888
1.884
1.908
0.973
0.979
0.788
0.880
0.789
0.865
0.942
0.966
0.745
0.865
0.746
0.843
10.402
10.630
7.847
9.217
7.865
9.037
0.570
0.831
0.574
0.822
0.575
0.795
0.044
0.015
0.016
0.009
0.016
0.007
0.342
0.126
0.171
0.040
0.171
0.052
0.057
0.062
0.014
0.007
0.013
0.009
0.723
0.879
0.642
0.845
0.643
0.820
0.100
0.020
0.103
0.018
0.103
0.025
0.075
0.011
0.002
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.960
0.990
0.956
0.990
0.956
0.990
10,954
10,954
13,057
598,647
12,81912,819B-1. Age 34-60 (VN)
44.78844.78845.11544.53244.65444.654
3.565
3.562
1.629
1.888
1.498
1.491
0.971
0.975
0.898
0.880
0.814
0.875
0.958
0.969
0.890
0.865
0.798
0.858
11.148
11.102
9.562
9.217
9.095
9.639
0.614
0.868
0.785
0.822
0.608
0.824
0.069
0.009
0.007
0.009
0.014
0.006
0.279
0.093
0.100
0.040
0.180
0.034
0.036
0.046
0.004
0.007
0.006
0.004
0.822
0.902
0.850
0.845
0.715
0.842
0.087
0.017
0.037
0.018
0.080
0.018
0.018
0.006
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.960
0.987
0.986
0.990
0.976
0.989
1,526
1,526
4,850
598,647
1,630
1,630
A-2. Age 20-33 (TH)27.55527.55527.70826.38527.70327.703
0.823
0.774
0.635
0.657
0.635
0.646
0.472
0.363
0.201
0.207
0.202
0.201
5.417
4.373
3.048
3.140
3.059
3.067
0.931
0.932
0.754
0.872
0.755
0.840
0.875
0.893
0.694
0.834
0.695
0.796
9.428
9.543
7.214
8.818
7.233
8.417
0.562
0.798
0.545
0.786
0.544
0.753
0.048
0.015
0.020
0.012
0.020
0.007
0.281
0.087
0.146
0.042
0.147
0.047
0.052
0.029
0.017
0.012
0.017
0.012
0.689
0.838
0.606
0.812
0.606
0.776
0.097
0.022
0.084
0.016
0.085
0.018
0.052
0.010
0.003
0.000
0.003
0.000
0.936
0.981
0.939
0.977
0.938
0.980
5,260
5,260
7,061
583,273
6,979
6,979
B-2. Age 20-33 (VN)
26.62526.62526.81926.38526.92826.928
0.570
0.733
0.636
0.657
0.450
0.545
0.278
0.365
0.230
0.207
0.140
0.144
3.371
4.220
3.213
3.140
2.174
2.483
0.944
0.920
0.912
0.872
0.830
0.848
0.888
0.878
0.888
0.834
0.781
0.822
10.31810.097
9.496
8.818
8.907
9.251
0.648
0.811
0.797
0.786
0.602
0.786
0.064
0.014
0.008
0.012
0.019
0.008
0.188
0.061
0.086
0.042
0.164
0.031
0.015
0.024
0.008
0.012
0.012
0.009
0.817
0.832
0.856
0.812
0.709
0.803
0.057
0.026
0.026
0.016
0.064
0.014
0.011
0.004
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.956
0.979
0.976
0.977
0.959
0.973
971
971
3,584
583,273
1,018
1,018

Notes: The table shows the means of variables for returnees from Thailand (TH) and Vietnam (VN) and for stayers
aged 20-60 in the Full Samples and Matched Samples. For the variable definitions, see the main text.

A–13

A–14

0.826
0.436
0.351
4.415
0.435
0.338
3.457
0.279
0.022
0.049
0.004
0.305
0.039
0.003
4,585
0.673
0.431
0.270
3.467
0.397
0.317
3.583
0.246
0.014
0.059
0.002
0.294
0.023
0.000
811

Some education
School participation
Primary school
Years of schooling
Labor force
EmployedMonths worked
Primary sector
Secondary sector
Tertiary sector
High-skilled work
Middle-skilled work
Low-skilled work
Armed forces
Observations

Some education
School participation
Primary school
Years of schooling
Labor force
EmployedMonths worked
Primary sector
Secondary sector
Tertiary sector
High-skilled work
Middle-skilled work
Low-skilled work
Armed forces
Observations

VariableGroup:

0.774
0.441
0.307
3.925
0.480
0.400
4.457
0.389
0.008
0.005
0.001
0.394
0.007
0.000
943

0.807
0.439
0.319
4.197
0.460
0.373
3.890
0.361
0.009
0.011
0.001
0.373
0.008
0.000
5,980

Both Sexes
Refugee Stayer
(1)
(2)

0.721
0.511
0.318
3.801
0.361
0.287
3.271
0.232
0.018
0.041
0.004
0.273
0.014
0.000
479

0.865
0.517
0.423
4.911
0.388
0.302
3.096
0.254
0.017
0.043
0.003
0.269
0.038
0.005
2,630
0.832
0.548
0.375
4.443
0.387
0.321
3.587
0.314
0.004
0.004
0.001
0.317
0.005
0.000
580

0.849
0.532
0.380
4.625
0.388
0.313
3.235
0.304
0.005
0.008
0.001
0.311
0.006
0.000
3,617

Men
Boys
Refugee Stayer
(3)
(4)
Girls
Both Sexes
Refugee Stayer
Refugee Stayer
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
A-1. Age 15-19 (TH)
0.788
0.770
0.813
0.789
0.353
0.340
0.406
0.407
0.284
0.259
0.340
0.301
3.964
3.792
4.313
4.036
0.486
0.537
0.463
0.481
0.378
0.436
0.365
0.396
3.861
4.584
3.793
4.158
0.304
0.420
0.299
0.384
0.029
0.014
0.022
0.007
0.058
0.014
0.057
0.015
0.004
0.001
0.004
0.001
0.343
0.437
0.322
0.395
0.044
0.009
0.050
0.010
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.000
2,686
3,695
6,116
6,507
B-1. Age 15-19 (VN)
0.628
0.717
0.657
0.730
0.351
0.329
0.400
0.385
0.235
0.242
0.265
0.294
3.178
3.429
3.462
3.779
0.447
0.571
0.432
0.534
0.358
0.481
0.349
0.449
4.036
5.331
3.942
5.019
0.277
0.465
0.268
0.446
0.009
0.014
0.016
0.002
0.077
0.007
0.070
0.007
0.002
0.002
0.004
0.001
0.330
0.475
0.321
0.446
0.030
0.009
0.029
0.010
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
496
600
826
789

Age 34-60

Table A3: Descriptive Statistics (Mean) – Age 6-19

0.710
0.489
0.313
3.920
0.388
0.303
3.464
0.237
0.017
0.052
0.004
0.280
0.022
0.000
463

0.854
0.482
0.410
4.808
0.412
0.324
3.376
0.273
0.018
0.047
0.003
0.285
0.045
0.004
3,418

0.794
0.493
0.377
4.437
0.445
0.367
4.059
0.360
0.000
0.009
0.002
0.357
0.011
0.000
474

0.836
0.502
0.362
4.490
0.408
0.334
3.479
0.326
0.004
0.011
0.000
0.331
0.008
0.000
3,943

Women
Boys
Refugee Stayer
(9)
(10)

0.609
0.322
0.224
3.048
0.480
0.397
4.451
0.298
0.015
0.092
0.006
0.360
0.038
0.000
522

0.776
0.332
0.276
3.879
0.509
0.403
4.185
0.319
0.027
0.070
0.005
0.354
0.056
0.001
3,646

0.686
0.297
0.226
3.287
0.606
0.524
5.857
0.523
0.003
0.007
0.000
0.523
0.010
0.000
480
Continue

0.744
0.317
0.241
3.588
0.550
0.453
4.771
0.437
0.011
0.020
0.001
0.453
0.013
0.000
3,954

Girls
Refugee Stayer
(11)
(12)

A–15

0.802
0.736
-5.066
0.053
6,017
0.695
0.648
-5.402
0.066
822
0.530
0.524
-2.687
0.004
8,534
0.461
0.451
-2.8270.009
1,001

Some education
School participation
Grade progression
Child labor
Observations

Some education
School participation
Grade progression
Child labor
Observations

Some education
School participation
Grade progression
Child labor
Observations

Some education
School participation
Grade progression
Child labor
Observations

VariableGroup:

0.510
0.508-2.817
0.006
1,116

0.538
0.534
-2.707
0.003
8,356

0.785
0.744
-5.324
0.066
880

0.827
0.777
-5.0430.045
6,556

Both Sexes
Refugee Stayer
(1)
(2)

0.436
0.431
-2.830
0.007
682

0.529
0.523
-2.699
0.004
5,809

0.729
0.688
-5.291
0.046
428

0.835
0.779
-4.967
0.043
3,290

0.505
0.503
-2.799
0.006
766

0.541
0.537
-2.711
0.002
5,779

0.816
0.793
-5.188
0.034
477

0.840
0.811
-4.999
0.032
3,614

Men
Boys
Refugee Stayer
(3)
(4)
Girls
Both Sexes
Refugee Stayer
Refugee Stayer
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
A-2. Age 12-14 (TH)
0.770
0.810
0.791
0.803
0.694
0.741
0.716
0.744
-5.170-5.103-5.154-5.179
0.062
0.058
0.062
0.058
3,379
3,632
7,078
6,471
B-2. Age 12-14 (VN)
0.660
0.748
0.687
0.753
0.610
0.688
0.646
0.695
-5.526-5.467-5.445-5.340
0.084
0.097
0.074
0.072
477
490
766
766
A-3. Age 6-11 (TH)
0.520
0.528
0.526
0.532
0.513
0.524
0.519
0.528
-2.687-2.697-2.810-2.783
0.004
0.003
0.005
0.005
5,702
5,564
8,849
7,979
B-3. Age 6-11 (VN)
0.445
0.506
0.453
0.478
0.432
0.504
0.448
0.475
-2.833-2.813-2.952-2.875
0.013
0.008
0.015
0.006
638
722
862
850

Age 34-60

Table A3: Descriptive Statistics (Mean) – Age 6-19

0.457
0.455
-2.927
0.016
579

0.523
0.517
-2.804
0.006
5,926

0.744
0.709
-5.306
0.058
404

0.820
0.766
-5.064
0.046
3,872

0.508
0.506
-2.778
0.004
586

0.534
0.530
-2.809
0.004
5,412

0.773
0.732
-5.330
0.056
429

0.831
0.789
-5.098
0.040
3,599

Women
Boys
Refugee Stayer
(9)
(10)

0.436
0.428
-2.916
0.017
536

0.511
0.504
-2.803
0.004
5,822

0.627
0.574
-5.622
0.094
433

0.763
0.668
-5.249
0.080
3,940

0.438
0.435
-2.975
0.008
527

0.510
0.505
-2.725
0.006
5,211

0.738
0.661
-5.341
0.089
411

0.773
0.694
-5.287
0.077
3,519

Girls
Refugee Stayer
(11)
(12)

A–16

No. of female children aged 15-19

No. of male children aged 15-19

No. of children aged 15-19

Female children aged 15-19

Male children aged 15-19

Children aged 15-19

GrandmotherGrandfather

Demographics
Household size

WidowedDivorced

Marital status
MarriedDependent Variable
Household head

-0.331(0.033)-0.007(0.002)-0.011(0.003)-0.137(0.007)-0.097(0.006)-0.093(0.006)-0.244(0.011)-0.121(0.008)-0.123(0.008)0.018(0.003)-0.001(0.001)-0.004(0.002)

0.418

0.407

0.825

0.346

0.339

0.561

0.043

0.018

6.577

0.014

0.009

0.956

1.8

1.9

1.9

1.4

1.5

1.6

1.2

1.2

1.4

1.1

1.5

-0.237(0.029)-0.005(0.001)-0.017(0.003)-0.040(0.006)-0.045(0.006)-0.030(0.006)-0.105(0.010)-0.059(0.007)-0.046(0.007)0.027(0.005)0.008(0.003)0.009(0.004)

0.386

0.383

0.769

0.325

0.320

0.533

0.060

0.014

6.038

0.126

0.048

0.758

1.4

1.5

1.3

1.1

1.2

1.1

1.3

1.2

1.2

1.0

1.1

1.1

A-1. Returnees Aged 34-60 from Thailand
Men
Women
Stayers
Stayers
ATT
Mean
Γ
ATT
Mean
Γ
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
-0.006
0.899
0.087
0.225
1.5
(0.005)(0.006)-0.162(0.087)-0.005(0.007)0.006(0.008)-0.070(0.017)-0.047(0.018)-0.062(0.017)-0.160(0.031)-0.071(0.024)-0.089(0.023)0.013(0.009)0.001(0.003)0.002(0.004)

0.485

0.480

0.965

0.402

0.390

0.634

0.033

0.018

6.624

0.012

0.009

0.951

1.3

1.2

1.3

1.1

1.1

1.2

0.153
(0.086)0.002(0.005)-0.006(0.009)0.015(0.017)-0.010(0.016)0.021(0.016)0.028(0.029)0.003(0.021)
0.025(0.022)0.036(0.015)0.001(0.008)-0.011(0.012)

1.0

Continue

0.385

0.362

0.747

0.313

0.307

0.515

0.067

0.016

5.871

0.148

0.052

0.721

B-1. Returnees Aged 34-60 from Vietnam
Men
Women
Stayers
Stayers
ATT
Mean
Γ
ATT
Mean
Γ
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
-0.004
0.907
0.038
0.215
1.0
(0.013)(0.015)

Table A4: Additional Results – Sociodemographic Outcomes (Age 20-60)

A–17

Observations (Returnees)
Observations (Stayers)

No. of female children aged 6-11

No. of male children aged 6-11

No. of children aged 6-11

Female children aged 6-11

Male children aged 6-11

Children aged 6-11

No. of female children aged 12-14

No. of male children aged 12-14

No. of children aged 12-14

Female children aged 12-14

Male children aged 12-14

Dependent Variable
Demographics
Children aged 12-14

0.697

0.737

1.433

0.520

0.540

0.782

0.374

0.372

0.745

0.339

0.337

1.2

1.3

1.2

1.1

1.1

0.041
(0.006)0.018(0.006)0.030(0.006)0.051(0.009)0.017(0.007)0.034(0.007)0.054(0.006)0.033(0.006)0.039(0.006)0.086(0.013)0.042(0.010)0.044(0.010)12,81912,819
0.578

0.606

1.184

0.432

0.448

0.663

0.314

0.326

0.640

0.286

0.293

0.526

1.0

1.0

1.1

1.1

1.1

1.2

1.0

1.0

1.1

1.1

1.0

1.1

0.644

0.700

1.343

0.487

0.515

0.754

0.371

0.358

0.729

0.329

0.323

0.591

1.1

1.1

1.2

1.1

1.1

1.2

1.2

1.1

1.0

0.001
(0.017)-0.018(0.016)0.019(0.016)-0.001(0.023)-0.018(0.018)0.017(0.018)-0.009(0.016)-0.010(0.017)0.000(0.016)-0.029(0.034)-0.022(0.026)-0.007(0.023)
1,630
1,630

Continue

0.455

0.526

0.980

0.351

0.394

0.577

0.287

0.301

0.587

0.264

0.277

0.494

-0.039(0.019)-0.045(0.018)0.001(0.018)-0.065(0.026)-0.049(0.021)-0.015(0.021)-0.080(0.017)-0.059(0.019)-0.056(0.019)-0.164(0.037)-0.091(0.030)-0.073(0.028)
1,526
1,526

1.2

-0.053(0.007)-0.034(0.007)-0.024(0.007)-0.064(0.010)-0.037(0.008)-0.028(0.008)0.009(0.006)0.000(0.007)0.007(0.007)0.013(0.014)0.001(0.012)0.012(0.012)
10,954
10,9540.612

B-1. Returnees Aged 34-60 from Vietnam
Men
Women
Stayers
Stayers
ATT
Mean
Γ
ATT
Mean
Γ
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)

A-1. Returnees Aged 34-60 from Thailand
Men
Women
Stayers
Stayers
ATT
Mean
Γ
ATT
Mean
Γ
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Table A4: Additional Results – Sociodemographic Outcomes (Age 20-60)

A–18

0.032
(0.048)-0.001(0.002)-0.008(0.004)
5,260
5,260

-0.004(0.007)0.000(0.002)-0.001(0.001)

0.048

0.014

5.361

0.005

0.009

0.734

0.159
(0.035)0.000(0.002)0.006(0.003)
6,979
6,979

0.053
(0.007)0.011(0.003)0.009(0.003)

0.040

0.014

5.302

0.022

0.029

0.748

1.0

1.2

1.2

1.3

0.291
(0.113)-0.009(0.006)-0.011(0.010)971
971-0.054(0.019)-0.003(0.003)0.004(0.003)

0.057

0.024

5.478

0.003

0.007

0.713

1.0

1.0

0.345
(0.107)0.005(0.005)-0.008(0.009)
1,018
1,018

0.010
(0.019)-0.010(0.008)-0.015(0.006)

0.045

0.010

5.252

0.028

0.039

0.713

1.0

B-2. Returnees Aged 20-33 from Vietnam
Men
Women
Stayers
Stayers
ATT
Mean
Γ
ATT
Mean
Γ
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
-0.021
0.540
0.016
0.081
(0.020)(0.012)

Notes: Columns 1 and 4 (Columns 7 and 10) report the estimates of the impacts of forced displacement on the sociodemographic outcomes for maleand female returnees aged 20–60 from Thailand (Vietnam). The estimates are based on the Matched Samples and are from the bias-corrected versionof the nearest-neighbor matching method (Abadie and Imbens 2011). Robust Abadie-Imbens standard errors are reported in parentheses. Columns
2 and 5 (Columns 8 and 11) report the means of the corresponding male and female stayers aged 20–60, respectively, for male and female returnees
aged 20–60 from Thailand (Vietnam). Columns 3 and 6 (Columns 9 and 12) report the results of Rosenbaum’s sensitivity analysis (Rosenbaum2002); the values of Γ are sensitivity parameters, which correspond to maximum multiplicity-adjusted p-values less than 5%. “Household head” is anindicator variable equal to 1 if individuals are household heads and 0 otherwise. “Married”/“Divorced”/“Widowed” is an indicator variable equal to 1
if individuals are married/divorced/widowed and 0 otherwise. “Household size” is the number of household members. “Grandfather”/“Grandmother”
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if individuals live together with their grandfather/grandmother and 0 otherwise. “Children aged 15–19/12–14/6–11”
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if individuals live together with children aged 15–19/12–14/6–11. “No. of children aged 15–19/12–14/6–11” is thenumber of children aged 15–19/12–14/6–11 living together.

Observations (Returnees)
Observations (Stayers)

GrandmotherGrandfather

Demographics
Household size

WidowedDivorced

Marital status
MarriedDependent Variable
Household headA-2. Returnees Aged 20-33 from Thailand
Men
Women
Stayers
Stayers
ATT
Mean
Γ
ATT
Mean
Γ
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
0.018
0.601
1.0
0.063
0.108
1.5
(0.008)(0.006)

Table A4: Additional Results – Sociodemographic Outcomes (Age 20-60)

A–19

Number of instruments
Obs. (Returnees)
Obs. (Stayers)

Home ownership

Armed forces

Low-skilled work

Middle-skilled work

High-skilled work

Tertiary sector

Secondary sector

Primary sector

Months worked

Employed

Dependent Variable
Labor force

10,954
10,954Match(1)-0.006(0.002)-0.025(0.003)-0.260(0.041)-0.263(0.006)0.029(0.002)0.218(0.006)0.000(0.003)-0.156(0.006)0.078(0.003)0.063(0.003)-0.031(0.002)
10,954
10,954Blocking(2)-0.005(0.003)-0.025(0.004)-0.263(0.055)-0.266(0.008)0.029(0.003)0.220(0.007)-0.002(0.004)-0.159(0.007)0.080(0.004)0.065(0.004)-0.030(0.003)
4.4

2.7

3.5

2.5

3.7

1.0

1.6

Γ
(3)
1.1

3.1

> 5.0

Matched Sample

Men

11,324362,881

11,324362,881

Full Sample
PostOLSALASSO(4)(5)-0.008-0.051(0.002)(0.014)-0.028-0.136(0.002)(0.031)-0.284-1.120(0.033)(0.248)-0.289-0.446(0.005)(0.039)0.030-0.031(0.002)(0.007)0.239
0.403(0.005)(0.030)0.008
0.003(0.002)(0.005)-0.178-0.314(0.004)(0.040)0.081
0.052(0.003)(0.014)0.070
0.080(0.003)(0.011)-0.031-0.053(0.002)(0.016)
32

24

16

24

18

9

20

28

21

17

27

Inv.
IVs
(6)
19

12,81912,819Match(7)-0.074(0.005)-0.095(0.005)-1.170(0.058)-0.219(0.006)0.009(0.001)0.120(0.004)0.005(0.001)-0.175(0.005)0.078(0.003)0.002(0.000)-0.034(0.002)
12,81912,819Blocking(8)-0.077(0.007)-0.098(0.007)-1.193(0.080)-0.222(0.008)0.009(0.002)0.119(0.005)0.004(0.002)-0.177(0.007)0.078(0.004)0.002(0.001)-0.035(0.003)

Matched Sample

A. Returnees from Thailand Aged 34-60

3.6

3.7

3.9

2.3

1.5

3.4

1.8

2.7

1.3

1.7

Γ
(9)
1.6

13,057
598,647

12

0

16

9

5

5

15

10

12

12

Inv.
IVs
(12)
7

24
13,057
598,647
Continue

Full Sample
PostOLSALASSO(10)(11)-0.081-0.043(0.004)(0.010)-0.104-0.333(0.004)(0.058)-1.254-3.325(0.047)(0.356)-0.235-0.185(0.005)(0.014)0.008-0.021(0.001)(0.007)0.130
0.045(0.003)(0.014)0.007
0.004(0.001)(0.002)-0.188-0.162(0.004)(0.013)0.081-0.001(0.003)(0.010)0.002
0.002(0.000)(0.000)-0.035-0.004(0.002)(0.008)

Women

Table A5: Robustness Check – Alternative Estimation Methods (Age 20-60, TH)

A–20
5,260
5,260

5,260
5,260

Blocking(2)
0.049(0.011)0.110(0.013)1.045(0.094)0.001(0.007)-0.015(0.008)-0.100(0.104)-0.234(0.012)0.032(0.005)0.194(0.010)0.024(0.005)-0.147(0.011)
0.074(0.006)0.042(0.005)-0.045(0.005)
2.8

3.7

3.6

2.1

1.5

3.6

2.5

2.8

1.1

1.6

1.4

Γ
(3)
1.2

5,318
423,886

5,318
423,886

Full Sample
PostOLSALASSO
(4)
(5)
0.046
0.031
(0.006)(0.021)
0.107
0.021(0.007)(0.026)0.992
0.584(0.053)(0.178)-0.002-0.010(0.004)(0.013)-0.019-0.061(0.005)(0.039)-0.170-7.814(0.058)(1.327)-0.245-0.449(0.007)(0.132)0.034-0.037(0.003)(0.006)0.201
0.097(0.006)(0.015)0.023
0.018(0.003)(0.009)-0.153-0.099(0.007)(0.022)0.076-0.032(0.004)(0.010)0.045
0.024(0.003)(0.004)-0.0460.033(0.004)(0.011)
12

7

0

7

6

1

2

3

9

7

5

3

4

5

Inv.
IVs
(6)
4

6,979
6,979

Match
(7)
-0.010(0.008)0.001(0.007)-0.005(0.049)-0.082(0.007)-0.097(0.007)-1.139(0.082)-0.204(0.008)0.013(0.002)0.101(0.005)0.006(0.002)-0.166(0.007)0.067(0.004)0.002(0.001)-0.039(0.004)
6,979
6,979

Blocking(8)-0.010(0.011)0.000(0.009)-0.014(0.068)-0.084(0.009)-0.099(0.010)-1.165(0.114)-0.206(0.011)
0.013(0.003)0.100(0.007)0.005(0.003)-0.168(0.010)0.067(0.005)0.002(0.001)-0.040(0.005)

Matched Sample

B. Returnees from Thailand Aged 20-33

2.6

1.8

4.0

2.0

1.1

3.0

2.0

2.3

1.3

1.6

1.6

Γ
(9)

7,061
583,273

7,061
583,273

Full Sample
PostOLSALASSO(10)(11)-0.0040.072(0.006)(0.020)-0.001-0.236(0.005)(0.051)0.004-2.972(0.038)(0.432)-0.090-0.041(0.005)(0.016)-0.107-0.563(0.006)(0.075)-1.212-4.907(0.065)(0.562)-0.212-0.122(0.006)(0.020)0.012-0.014(0.002)(0.004)0.100-0.012(0.004)(0.028)0.005-0.010(0.002)(0.004)-0.173-0.685(0.006)(0.062)0.065-0.047(0.003)(0.006)0.002
0.001(0.001)(0.002)-0.0400.056(0.003)(0.010)

Women

13

4

10

7

6

7

10

7

5

7

8

4

10

9

Inv.
IVs
(12)
5

Notes: The table considers the robustness of the results to alternative estimation methods for the male and female returnees aged 34-60 (panel A) and 20-33(panel B) from Thailand. For comparison purposes, columns 1 and 7 report the estimates based on the Matched Samples from the bias-corrected version of thenearest-neighbor matching method (Abadie and Imbens 2011). Columns 3 and 9 report the corresponding results of Rosenbaum’s sensitivity analysis (Rosenbaum2002); the values of Γ are sensitivity parameters, which correspond to maximum multiplicity-adjusted p-values less than 5%. Columns 2 and 8 report the estimates
based on the Matched Samples from blocking on the estimated propensity score, in combination with regression adjustment within the blocks for the optimal
number of blocks, selected based on the algorithm proposed by Imbens and Rubin (2015). Columns 4 and 10 report the OLS estimates based on the Full Samples.
Columns 5 and 11 report the estimates based on the Full Samples from the machine learning-based instrumental variables (adaptive Lasso) approach, following
Windmeijer et al. (2019), assessing instrumental validity in columns 6 and 12. Robust (Abadie-Imbens) standard errors are reported in parentheses (in columns
1 and 7). For the definitions of the dependent variables, see the main text.

Number of instruments
Obs. (Returnees)
Obs. (Stayers)

Home ownership

Armed forces

Low-skilled work

Middle-skilled work

High-skilled work

Tertiary sector

Secondary sector

Primary sector

Months worked

Employed

Labor force

Years of schoolingPrimary school

Dependent Variable
Some education

Match
(1)
0.051
(0.008)0.111(0.009)1.060(0.067)0.002(0.005)-0.014(0.006)-0.084(0.075)-0.233(0.009)0.032(0.003)0.194(0.007)0.024(0.004)-0.147(0.008)0.074(0.005)0.042(0.003)-0.045(0.004)

Matched Sample

Men

Table A5: Robustness Check – Alternative Estimation Methods (Age 20-60, TH)A–21

Obs. (Returnees)
Obs. (Stayers)

Home ownership

Armed forces

Low-skilled work

Middle-skilled work

High-skilled work

Tertiary sector

Secondary sector

Primary sector

Months worked

Employed

Dependent Variable
Labor force

Matched Sample
Match Blocking
Γ
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.003
-0.003(0.008)(0.009)-0.004-0.011(0.008)(0.010)0.118
0.040(0.108)(0.132)-0.256-0.2623.4(0.015)(0.020)
0.060
0.062
3.9
(0.007)(0.010)
0.195
0.193
2.9
(0.013)(0.018)-0.006-0.009(0.007)(0.009)-0.081-0.0831.6(0.013)(0.017)
0.071
0.073
3.0
(0.008)(0.011)
0.014
0.012
1.6
(0.004)(0.005)-0.027-0.0281.6(0.006)(0.008)
1,526
1,526
1,526
1,526

Men
Full Sample (OLS)
LimitedAll(4)(5)-0.0050.001(0.005)(0.005)-0.010-0.001(0.006)(0.006)0.041
0.110(0.071)(0.073)-0.273-0.256(0.012)(0.012)0.062
0.060(0.007)(0.007)0.203
0.195(0.011)(0.011)0.001
0.000(0.005)(0.005)-0.092-0.082(0.010)(0.010)0.070
0.068(0.008)(0.007)0.012
0.013(0.003)(0.003)-0.030-0.027(0.005)(0.005)
1,574
4,226
362,821 362,881

Women
Matched Sample
Full Sample (OLS)
Match Blocking
ΓLimited
All
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
-0.064-0.061
1.3-0.065-0.038(0.013)(0.012)(0.010)(0.009)-0.062-0.0601.2-0.067-0.037(0.013)(0.013)(0.010)(0.010)-0.565-0.5441.0-0.633-0.357(0.157)(0.153)(0.122)(0.115)-0.216-0.2152.4-0.226-0.182(0.015)(0.014)(0.012)(0.011)
0.008
0.008
0.009
0.008
(0.004)(0.003)(0.003)(0.003)
0.144
0.146
4.1
0.149
0.136
(0.010)(0.010)(0.010)(0.009)
0.003
0.002
0.003
0.003
(0.002)(0.002)(0.002)(0.002)-0.129-0.1271.7-0.133-0.098(0.014)(0.014)(0.011)(0.011)
0.061
0.062
2.8
0.062
0.056
(0.007)(0.007)(0.007)(0.006)
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
(0.001)(0.001)(0.001)(0.001)-0.013-0.0131.1-0.012-0.012(0.005)(0.005)(0.004)(0.004)
1,630
1,630
1,650
4,850
1,630
1,630
598,411 598,647
Continue

A. Returnees from Vietnam Aged 34-60

Table A6: Robustness Check – Alternative Estimation Methods (Age 20-60, VN)

A–22

Full Sample (OLS)
LimitedAll(4)(5)-0.161-0.121(0.015)(0.011)-0.074-0.056(0.014)(0.012)-0.792-0.592(0.113)(0.091)
0.015
0.052(0.008)(0.008)0.000
0.045(0.010)(0.010)0.135
0.557(0.124)(0.113)-0.170-0.080(0.015)(0.013)0.054
0.040(0.008)(0.006)0.124
0.090(0.013)(0.010)-0.008-0.009(0.004)(0.004)-0.0190.030(0.013)(0.011)
0.029
0.021(0.008)(0.006)0.006
0.007(0.003)(0.003)-0.020-0.014(0.007)(0.005)
974
2,888
423,383 423,886

Women
Matched Sample
Full Sample (OLS)
Match Blocking
ΓLimited
All
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
-0.095-0.0961.2-0.106-0.078(0.020)(0.020)(0.015)(0.012)-0.004-0.004-0.021-0.008(0.015)(0.015)(0.011)(0.010)-0.308-0.3121.4-0.384-0.254(0.120)(0.119)(0.092)(0.075)-0.016-0.018-0.042-0.008(0.016)(0.016)(0.012)(0.009)-0.040-0.041-0.057-0.012(0.018)(0.017)(0.013)(0.010)-0.330-0.342-0.543-0.120(0.210)(0.205)(0.155)(0.120)-0.182-0.1831.9-0.197-0.112(0.020)(0.019)(0.015)(0.012)
0.011
0.011
0.012
0.009
(0.005)(0.005)(0.004)(0.003)
0.133
0.132
3.4
0.127
0.091
(0.013)(0.012)(0.012)(0.008)
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003
(0.005)(0.004)(0.003)(0.002)-0.092-0.093
1.3-0.104-0.044(0.019)(0.018)(0.014)(0.011)
0.050
0.050
2.3
0.043
0.030
(0.009)(0.008)(0.008)(0.005)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)-0.015-0.0151.0-0.016-0.015(0.008)(0.008)(0.006)(0.004)
1,018
1,018
1,021
3,584
1,018
1,018
582,622 583,273

B. Returnees from Vietnam Aged 20-33

Notes: The table considers the robustness of the results to alternative estimation methods for the male and female returnees aged 34-60 (panel A) and 20-33(panel B) from Vietnam. For comparison purposes, columns 1 and 6 report the estimates based on Matched Samples from the bias-corrected version of thenearest-neighbor matching method (Abadie and Imbens 2011). Columns 3 and 8 report the corresponding results of Rosenbaum’s sensitivity analysis (Rosenbaum2002); the values of Γ are sensitivity parameters, which correspond to maximum multiplicity-adjusted p-values less than 5%. Columns 2 and 7 report the estimates
based on the Matched Samples from blocking on the estimated propensity score, in combination with regression adjustment within the blocks for the optimal
number of blocks, selected based on the algorithm proposed by Imbens and Rubin (2015). Columns 4 and 9 (Columns 5 and 9) report the OLS estimates basedon the Full Samples, without (with) those who live in the four districts along the border with Vietnam, the great majority of whom are returnees. Robust(Abadie-Imbens) standard errors are reported in parentheses (in columns 1 and 6). For the definitions of the dependent variables, see the main text.

Obs. (Returnees)
Obs. (Stayers)

Home ownership

Armed forces

Low-skilled work

Middle-skilled work

High-skilled work

Tertiary sector

Secondary sector

Primary sector

Months worked

Employed

Labor force

Years of schoolingPrimary school

Dependent Variable
Some education

Matched Sample
Match Blocking
Γ
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.163-0.164
1.6(0.020)(0.019)-0.087-0.0871.2(0.020)(0.020)-0.848-0.8521.5(0.151)(0.146)0.025
0.025(0.012)(0.011)0.009
0.009(0.014)(0.014)0.222
0.224(0.173)(0.172)-0.163-0.1631.8(0.020)(0.019)
0.049
0.049
2.3
(0.009)(0.008)
0.128
0.128
2.3
(0.015)(0.014)-0.008-0.008(0.006)(0.006)-0.015-0.015(0.017)(0.017)
0.031
0.031
1.3
(0.009)(0.009)0.007
0.007(0.004)(0.004)-0.023-0.0241.2(0.008)(0.008)
971
971
971
971

Men

Table A6: Robustness Check – Alternative Estimation Methods (Age 20-60, VN)

A–23

Obs. (Returnees)
Obs. (Stayers)

Home ownership

Armed forces

Low-skilled work

Middle-skilled work

High-skilled work

Tertiary sector

Secondary sector

Primary sector

Months worked

Employed

Dependent Variable
Labor force

OLS
(BS)
(1)
-0.008(0.002)-0.028(0.002)-0.284(0.033)-0.289(0.005)0.030(0.002)0.239(0.005)0.008(0.002)-0.178(0.004)0.081(0.003)0.070(0.003)-0.031(0.002)
11,324362,881-0.031

0.070

0.080

-0.173

0.005

0.235

0.030

-0.283-0.269-0.027-0.031

0.069

0.082

-0.182

0.011

0.244

0.031

-0.294-0.299-0.029Men
2
2= 1.3 × RBS
Rmax
δ=1δ = −1(2)(3)-0.007-0.008-0.0070.114-0.0070.020-0.061

0.144

0.004

-0.149-0.0540.163-0.055

0.025

0.168

-0.375

0.077

0.334

0.057

-0.428-0.514-0.2192=1Rmax
δ = 1 δ = −1
(4)
(5)
0.060
-0.076

OLS
(BS)
(6)
-0.081(0.004)-0.104(0.004)-1.254(0.047)-0.235(0.005)0.008(0.001)0.130(0.003)0.007(0.001)-0.188(0.004)0.081(0.003)0.002(0.000)-0.035(0.002)
13,057
598,647-0.036

0.002

0.080

-0.183

0.007

0.129

0.008

-0.231-1.218-0.099-0.035

0.002

0.083

-0.193

0.007

0.130

0.008

-0.239-1.289-0.109Women
2
2= 1.3 × RBS
Rmax
δ=1δ = −1(7)(8)-0.078-0.085A-1. Returnees Aged 34-60 from Thailand

Table A7: Sensitivity Analysis – (Age 20-60)-0.1790.021-0.064-0.048

0.014

0.106

0.022

-0.125-0.4980.058

Continue

0.109-0.0170.227-0.328

0.001

0.154

-0.006-0.345-2.009-0.2652=1
Rmax
δ = 1 δ = −1
(9)
(10)
0.034
-0.197

A–24

Obs. (Returnees)
Obs. (Stayers)

Home ownership

Armed forces

Low-skilled work

Middle-skilled work

High-skilled work

Tertiary sector

Secondary sector

Primary sector

Months worked

Employed

Dependent Variable
Labor force

OLS
(BS)
(1)
-0.005(0.005)-0.010(0.006)0.041(0.071)-0.273(0.012)0.062(0.007)0.203(0.011)0.001(0.005)-0.092(0.010)0.070(0.008)0.012(0.003)-0.030(0.005)
1,574
362,821-0.029

0.012

0.070

-0.090

0.002

0.204

0.064

-0.275-0.070-0.008-0.031

0.013

0.071

-0.094

0.001

0.201

0.061

-0.2720.152-0.011Men
2
2= 1.3 × RBS
Rmax
δ=1δ = −1(2)(3)-0.003-0.0060.159-0.018-0.030

0.011

0.014

0.247

0.362

-0.322-1.6320.365-0.220

0.043

0.171

-0.196-0.011

0.159-0.238-0.2251.714-0.3842=1
Rmax
δ = 1 δ = −1
(4)
(5)
0.319
-0.328

OLS
(BS)
(6)
-0.065(0.010)-0.067(0.010)-0.633(0.122)-0.226(0.012)0.009(0.003)0.149(0.010)0.003(0.002)-0.133(0.011)
0.062(0.007)0.001(0.001)-0.012(0.004)
1,650
598,411-0.011

0.001

0.062

-0.133

0.004

0.152

0.011

-0.229-0.784-0.067-0.013

0.001

0.062

-0.133

0.002

0.147

0.008

-0.223-0.483-0.067Women
2
2= 1.3 × RBS
Rmax
δ=1δ = −1(7)(8)-0.064-0.065B-1. Returnees Aged 34-60 from Vietnam

Table A7: Sensitivity Analysis – (Age 20-60)

0.283

0.010

0.021

-0.132

0.038

0.270

0.109

-0.304-3.800-0.058Continue-0.308-0.0080.103-0.134-0.0320.029-0.090-0.1492.533-0.0752=1
Rmax
δ = 1 δ = −1(9)(10)-0.047 -0.082

A–25

Obs. (Returnees)
Obs. (Stayers)

Home ownership

Armed forces

Low-skilled work

Middle-skilled work

High-skilled work

Tertiary sector

Secondary sector

Primary sector

Months worked

Employed

Labor force

Years of schoolingPrimary school

Dependent Variable
Some education

OLS
(BS)
(1)
0.046
(0.006)0.107(0.007)0.992(0.053)-0.002(0.004)-0.019(0.005)-0.170(0.058)-0.245(0.007)0.034(0.003)0.201(0.006)0.023(0.003)-0.153(0.007)0.076(0.004)0.045(0.003)-0.046(0.004)
5,318
423,886-0.047

0.044

0.076

-0.154

0.021

0.197

0.034

-0.244-0.153-0.021-0.004

1.018

0.112

-0.045

0.045

0.077

-0.153

0.024

0.205

0.034

-0.245-0.188-0.016-0.001

0.965

0.102

Men
2
2
Rmax
= 1.3 × RBS
δ=1
δ = −1
(2)
(3)
0.048
0.044

-0.277-0.0050.011-0.168-0.700-0.1700.046-0.2370.181-0.091-0.067

1.612

0.274

0.185

0.095

0.141

-0.139

0.745

0.572

0.021

-0.252-0.522

0.053

0.062

0.371

-0.061

2
Rmax=1
δ = 1 δ = −1
(4)
(5)
0.114
-0.022

OLS
(BS)
(6)
-0.004(0.006)-0.001(0.005)0.004(0.038)-0.090(0.005)-0.107(0.006)-1.212(0.065)-0.212(0.006)0.012(0.002)0.100(0.004)0.005(0.002)-0.173(0.006)0.065(0.003)0.002(0.001)-0.040(0.003)
7,061
583,273-0.040

0.002

0.064

-0.163

0.005

0.098

0.013

-0.203-1.093-0.097-0.081

0.033

0.001

-0.040

0.002

0.066

-0.183

0.005

0.101

0.010

-0.221-1.331-0.117-0.098-0.025-0.002

Women
2
2
Rmax
= 1.3 × RBS
δ=1
δ = −1
(7)
(8)
0.001
-0.010A-2. Returnees Aged 20-33 from Thailand

Table A7: Sensitivity Analysis – (Age 20-60)-0.1340.000-0.1020.087-0.044-0.094

0.113

0.004

1.399

0.172

0.226

0.700

0.057

Continue

0.054

0.005

0.232

-0.433

0.054

0.294

-0.090-0.428-3.822-0.387-0.406-0.692-0.0592
Rmax=1
δ = 1 δ = −1
(9)
(10)
0.167
-0.176

A–26-0.018

0.006

0.026

-0.017-0.007

0.125

0.055

-0.173-0.024

0.000

0.015

-0.686-0.065-0.021

0.006

0.032

-0.021-0.008

0.123

0.054

-0.168

0.293

0.001

0.016

-0.898-0.083

0.329

0.097

-0.349

0.063

0.113

0.280

0.167

-0.275-2.989-0.016

0.005

1.660

0.212

-0.368-0.0850.407-0.101-0.128-0.032-0.058-0.065

3.258

0.017

0.025

-3.245-0.3602=1
Rmax
δ = 1 δ = −1
(4)
(5)
0.470
-0.793

OLS
(BS)
(6)
-0.106(0.015)-0.021(0.011)-0.384(0.092)-0.042(0.012)-0.057(0.013)-0.543(0.155)-0.197(0.015)0.012(0.004)0.127(0.012)0.003(0.003)-0.104(0.014)0.043(0.008)0.000(0.000)-0.016(0.006)
1,021
582,622-0.016

0.000

0.041

-0.104

0.004

0.128

0.013

-0.200-0.728-0.058-0.042-0.209-0.008-0.017

0.000

0.045

-0.104

0.002

0.126

0.010

-0.194-0.358-0.056-0.042-0.558-0.034Women
2
2= 1.3 × RBS
Rmax
δ=1δ = −1(7)(8)-0.076-0.136B-2. Returnees Aged 20-33 from Vietnam

Notes: The table considers the coefficient bounds based on Oster’s approach. See Section A.1 for a detailed explanation.

Obs. (Returnees)
Obs. (Stayers)

Home ownership

Armed forces

Low-skilled work

Middle-skilled work

High-skilled work

Tertiary sector

Secondary sector

Primary sector

Months worked

Employed

Labor force

Years of schoolingPrimary school

Dependent Variable
Some education

OLS
(BS)
(1)
-0.161(0.015)-0.074(0.014)-0.792(0.113)0.015(0.008)0.000(0.010)0.135(0.124)-0.170(0.015)0.054(0.008)0.124(0.013)-0.008(0.004)-0.019(0.013)0.029(0.008)0.006(0.003)-0.020(0.007)974
423,383

Men
2
2= 1.3 × RBS
Rmax
δ=1δ = −1(2)(3)-0.146-0.177

Table A7: Sensitivity Analysis – (Age 20-60)

0.120

0.023

-0.220-0.102

0.478

0.318

0.129

-0.280-4.569-0.081-0.041

3.793

0.515

-0.152-0.0240.306-0.106-0.472-0.064-0.106-0.1143.484-0.034-0.043-4.561-0.5572=1
Rmax
δ = 1 δ = −1
(9)
(10)
0.869
-1.080Table A8: Auxiliary Analysis – Early Return Migration Decisions (Age 34-60, TH)
Sample:Age
FemaleYears of schooling

All
(1)
(2)
-0.005-0.004(0.001) (0.001)-0.018-0.017(0.007) (0.007)-0.004-0.004(0.002) (0.002)

UNHCR
ln (Distance to Thai border)
Prop. of contaminationln (Areas)
Province of birth FE
Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

0.077(0.019)1.493(0.653)0.022(0.022)
No
0.247
23,7730.023

0.066(0.040)1.313(0.564)0.026(0.017)Yes
0.247
23,7730.041

Limited Sample(3)(4)-0.005-0.005(0.001) (0.001)-0.024-0.024(0.008) (0.008)-0.004-0.004(0.002) (0.002)-0.164-0.163(0.021) (0.023)
0.084
0.058
(0.015) (0.035)
1.433
1.495
(0.538) (0.548)
0.027
0.040
(0.021) (0.017)
No
Yes
0.224
0.224
10,407 10,407
0.059
0.077

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates where the unit of observation is the individual. Robust standard
errors, adjusted for clustering by district of birth, are reported in parentheses. Regressions use data about
returnees aged 34-60 from Thailand from the Matched Samples. In columns 3 and 4, the analysis samples arelimited to those who returned from the UNHCR and UNBRO camps whom we can identify. The dependent
variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 if returnees returned to Cambodia before 1992 and 0 otherwise.
“UNHCR” is an indicator variable for returnees from the UNHCR camp. “ln(Distance to Thai border)” is
the logarithmic value of the shortest distance (km) from the centroid of each district to the Thai border.
“Prop of Contamination” is the proportion of contaminated areas among the total village buffer zone areas(3.0 km radius) in each district. “ln (Areas)” is the logarithmic value of the total village buffer zone areas(3.0 km radius) in each district.

A–27

A–28

p-value (H0 : γHC = γBR )Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Base controls
District of birth FE
Education controls (panel B)
District FE

UNBRO

UNHCR

p-value (H0 : γHC = γBR )Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

UNBRO

UNHCR

p-value (H0 : γHC = γBR )Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

UNBRO

UNHCR

p-value (H0 : γHC = γBR )Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

UNBRO

UNHCR

Dependent Variable:

0.532(0.073)0.073(0.090)0.000
4.330
12,801
0.271
Yes
Yes
No
No

0.524
(0.075)0.090(0.085)0.000
4.269
15,5460.211
0.458(0.083)0.206(0.098)0.008
4.330
12,801
0.299
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.422
(0.079)0.214(0.088)0.012
4.269
15,546
0.253

Years of Schooling(1)(2)-0.018(0.015)-0.011(0.018)0.703
0.365
12,801
0.146
Yes
Yes
No
No

-0.024(0.014)-0.003(0.016)0.175
0.376
15,5460.124-0.133(0.013)-0.094(0.013)0.004
0.811
10,4220.079-0.038(0.006)-0.023(0.006)
0.028
0.965
8,486
0.038

0.010
(0.014)0.002(0.017)0.572
0.365
12,801
0.383
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.004
(0.013)0.003(0.015)0.928
0.376
15,5460.369-0.062(0.014)-0.050(0.014)0.368
0.811
10,4220.151-0.030(0.007)-0.023(0.007)
0.339
0.965
8,486
0.069

Employed(3)(4)

Primary Sector
Tertiary Sector
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
A. Age 34-60
Men-0.263-0.1300.205
0.087(0.016) (0.014)(0.014) (0.013)-0.268-0.1190.217
0.073(0.018) (0.015)(0.018) (0.014)
0.781
0.478
0.502
0.337
0.714
0.714
0.235
0.235
8,486
8,486
8,486
8,486
0.222
0.340
0.203
0.311
Women
-0.282-0.1480.138
0.081(0.017) (0.016)(0.011) (0.010)-0.209-0.1260.117
0.080(0.018) (0.016)(0.011) (0.010)
0.000
0.120
0.097
0.941
0.694
0.694
0.118
0.118
10,422
10,422
10,422
10,422
0.174
0.303
0.103
0.163
B. Age 15-19
Household Heads-0.083-0.031
0.049
0.037(0.014) (0.012)(0.005) (0.006)-0.056-0.0280.040
0.030(0.016) (0.015)(0.006) (0.006)
0.064
0.844
0.190
0.320
0.336
0.336
0.035
0.035
15,546
15,546
15,546
15,546
0.131
0.348
0.043
0.085
Parents-0.070-0.0170.043
0.031(0.015) (0.013)(0.006) (0.006)-0.058-0.0250.035
0.027(0.017) (0.017)(0.006) (0.007)
0.487
0.586
0.306
0.509
0.333
0.333
0.029
0.029
12,801
12,801
12,801
12,801
0.159
0.367
0.065
0.112
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
0.042
(0.005)0.027(0.005)0.025
0.022
12,801
0.058
Yes
Yes
No
No

0.047
(0.005)0.028(0.005)0.002
0.027
15,5460.041

0.095(0.008)0.059(0.008)0.000
0.068
10,4220.055

0.098(0.009)0.065(0.009)
0.001
0.058
8,486
0.062

0.040
(0.006)0.028(0.007)0.091
0.022
12,801
0.101
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.045
(0.006)0.028(0.006)0.008
0.027
15,5460.078

0.072(0.008)0.048(0.009)0.013
0.068
10,4220.094

0.065(0.008)0.050(0.009)
0.201
0.058
8,486
0.123

Low-skilled Work
(9)
(10)

Table A9: Mechanism – Returnees from UNHCR vs. UNBRO Camps (Age 34-60, 6-19)

0.001(0.001)
0.005(0.002)0.031
0.001
12,801
0.018
Yes
Yes
No
No

0.002
(0.001)
0.004(0.001)
0.069
0.001
15,5460.008

0.000(0.001)
0.003(0.002)0.115
0.001
10,4220.009

0.047(0.006)0.078(0.012)
0.013
0.039
8,486
0.058

0.000
(0.001)
0.003(0.001)0.037
0.001
12,801
0.040
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Continue

0.001(0.001)
0.002(0.001)0.160
0.001
15,5460.021-0.001(0.001)
0.002(0.001)0.093
0.001
10,4220.152

0.017(0.006)0.014(0.007)
0.735
0.039
8,486
0.196

Armed Forces
(11)
(12)

A–29
-0.006(0.013)-0.035(0.016)0.084
0.531
15,782
0.261
Yes
Yes
No
No

-0.002(0.012)-0.039(0.015)0.016
0.528
18,2120.228

0.000(0.012)-0.030(0.016)
0.068
0.817
9,344
0.142

-0.031(0.014)-0.038(0.018)0.710
0.531
15,782
0.280
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

-0.026(0.013)-0.041(0.017)0.338
0.528
18,2120.253-0.009(0.014)-0.039(0.018)
0.075
0.817
9,344
0.165

-0.004(0.013)-0.035(0.016)0.028
0.808
10,9420.138-0.030(0.014)-0.028(0.017)0.940
0.528
15,117
0.284
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.025(0.013)-0.034(0.016)0.556
0.525
17,4150.257-0.013(0.014)-0.029(0.017)
0.340
0.816
8,940
0.187

-0.008(0.013)-0.024(0.015)0.274
0.807
10,4530.162

Some Education
(2)
(3)

0.006
(0.012)-0.032(0.015)0.011
0.808
10,9420.108(1)School Participation
Grade progression
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
C. Age 12-14
Household Heads-0.013-0.034-0.0400.074-0.026-0.069(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)(0.060) (0.063) (0.062)-0.034-0.050-0.039-0.091-0.045-0.027(0.016) (0.017) (0.016)(0.068) (0.071) (0.070)
0.185
0.278
0.972
0.017
0.782
0.543
0.746
0.746
0.745
-5.135-5.135-5.144
10,942
10,942
10,453
10,942
10,942
10,453
0.105
0.134
0.156
0.186
0.229
0.247
Parents-0.025-0.044-0.0480.080-0.025-0.072(0.013) (0.015) (0.015)(0.061) (0.066) (0.066)-0.035-0.057-0.047-0.092-0.060-0.050(0.017) (0.020) (0.019)(0.072) (0.080) (0.077)
0.568
0.466
0.935
0.022
0.647
0.781
0.758
0.758
0.757
-5.090-5.090-5.098
9,344
9,344
8,940
9,344
9,344
8,940
0.137
0.161
0.181
0.235
0.270
0.286
D. Age 6-11
Household Heads-0.005-0.029-0.028-0.001-0.077-0.071(0.012) (0.013) (0.013)(0.025) (0.027) (0.027)-0.043-0.043-0.037-0.081-0.109-0.097(0.015) (0.017) (0.016)(0.030) (0.032) (0.032)
0.015
0.336
0.519
0.010
0.299
0.410
0.524
0.524
0.521
-2.779-2.779-2.786
18,212
18,212
17,415
18,212
18,212
17,415
0.223
0.249
0.252
0.572
0.588
0.590
Parents-0.010-0.035-0.033-0.009-0.082-0.075(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)(0.026) (0.029) (0.029)-0.039-0.041-0.032-0.088-0.117-0.098(0.016) (0.018) (0.018)(0.031) (0.035) (0.035)
0.079
0.705
0.956
0.016
0.301
0.509
0.527
0.527
0.524
-2.749-2.749-2.754
15,782
15,782
15,117
15,782
15,782
15,117
0.256
0.275
0.279
0.583
0.596
0.598
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
0.001
(0.001)0.001(0.002)0.872
0.003
15,782
0.026
Yes
Yes
No
No

0.000
(0.001)
0.003(0.002)0.094
0.003
18,2120.014

0.001(0.007)-0.002(0.007)
0.718
0.050
9,344
0.074

-0.002(0.006)-0.003(0.007)0.895
0.053
10,942
0.056

(10)

0.001
(0.001)
0.002(0.002)0.669
0.003
15,782
0.037
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

0.000
(0.001)
0.003(0.002)0.079
0.003
18,2120.024

0.013(0.008)0.010(0.009)
0.798
0.050
9,344
0.089

0.009
(0.007)0.008(0.008)0.935
0.053
10,9420.070

Child labor
(11)

0.001
(0.001)
0.002(0.002)0.772
0.003
15,117
0.040
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.000
(0.001)
0.003(0.002)0.085
0.003
17,4150.025

0.013(0.008)0.011(0.009)
0.756
0.049
8,940
0.089

0.011
(0.007)0.009(0.008)0.807
0.053
10,4530.070(12)Notes: The table reports OLS estimates where the unit of observation is the individual. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by village, are reported in parentheses.
Regressions in panel A use data about the returnees from the UNHCR and UNBRO camps and about stayers aged 34–60 from the Matched Samples. Regressions in panels
B, C, and D use data about the children aged 15–19, 12–14, and 6–11, respectively, of returnees from UNHCR and UNBRO camps and of stayers, all aged 34–60; the samples
are constructed based on the Matched Samples. The samples in panels B, C, and D for “Parents” are limited to the children of married couples. “UNHCR” (“UNBRO”) in
panel A is an indicator variable equal to 1 if individuals are returnees from UNHCR (UNBRO) camps and 0 otherwise; stayers are the base group. “UNHCR” (“UNBRO”)
in panels B, C, and D is an indicator variable equal to 1 if household heads and/or spouses are returnees from UNHCR (UNBRO) camps and 0 otherwise; children of stayers
are the base group. Base controls in panel A include age, age squared, and years of schooling. Base controls in panels B, C, and D for “Household Heads” (“Parents”) include
age, a dummy variable for female, age of household head (father’s age, mother’s age), years of schooling for household head (years of schooling for father and mother), and an
indicator variable for female household head. District of birth FE for “Household Heads” (“Parents”) include district of birth fixed effects for household head (district of birth
fixed effects for father and mother). Education controls (panel B only) include years of schooling and an indicator variable for attending school. Access to schools (panels C
and D only) includes two continuous variables for the distance (km) to the nearest primary (panels C and D) and secondary (panel C) schools; the analysis samples are limited
to individuals residing in villages with information about village points.

p-value (H0 : γHC = γBR )Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Base controls
District of birth FE
Access to schools
District FE

UNBRO

UNHCR

p-value (H0 : γHC = γBR )Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

UNBRO

UNHCR

p-value (H0 : γHC = γBR )Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

UNBRO

UNHCR

p-value (H0 : γHC = γBR )Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

UNBRO

UNHCR

Dependent Variable:

Table A9: Mechanism – Returnees from UNHCR vs. UNBRO Camps (Age 34-60, 6-19)

A–30

Returnees from ThailandAll
1992-1993
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.003
0.002
0.001
0.000
(0.001) (0.001)(0.001) (0.001)
0.018
0.015
0.014
0.012
(0.011) (0.011)(0.016) (0.016)-0.014-0.013-0.018-0.017(0.004) (0.003)(0.004) (0.004)-0.179-0.136-0.194-0.168(0.039) (0.078)(0.044) (0.093)-1.175-0.908-2.082-1.741(1.615) (1.658)(1.782) (1.897)-0.041
0.008-0.0290.041(0.040) (0.043)(0.046) (0.049)
No
Yes
No
Yes
0.392
0.392
0.470
0.470
23,773 23,773
14,766 14,766
0.104
0.153
0.113
0.168
No
0.593
3,156
0.191

Yes
0.593
3,156
0.322

No
0.733
1,994
0.191

Yes
0.733
1,994
0.321

Returnees from Vietnam
All1979-1980
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
-0.005-0.003-0.004-0.002(0.001) (0.001)(0.002) (0.002)-0.022-0.005-0.044-0.032(0.022) (0.019)(0.028) (0.026)-0.027-0.015-0.025-0.016(0.006) (0.005)(0.009) (0.006)-0.178-0.245-0.197-0.199(0.040) (0.067)(0.056) (0.084)

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates where the unit of observation is the individual. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by districtof birth, are reported in parentheses. Regressions use data about returnees aged 34-60 from Thailand/Vietnam from the Matched Samples. In
columns 3 and 4 (columns 7 and 8), the analysis samples are limited to the returnees from Thailand (Vietnam) who returned in 1992-1993 (19791980). The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 if returnees returned to their birth districts and 0 otherwise. “ln(Distance toThai/Vietnam border)” is the logarithmic value of the shortest distance (km) from the centroid of each district to the Thai/Vietnamese border.
“Prop of Contamination” is the proportion of contaminated areas among the total village buffer zone areas (3.0 km radius) in each district. “ln(Areas)” is the logarithmic value of the total village buffer zone areas (3.0 km radius) in each district.

Province of birth FE
Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squaredln (Areas)

Prop. of contaminationln (Distance to Thai/Vietnam border)

Years of schooling

FemaleAge

Sample:Table A10: Auxiliary Analysis – Return Migration Decisions to Birth Regions (Age 34-60)

Table A11: Consistency Check – Census 1998 (Age 20-60)
Sample:Dependent Variable:
RefugeeMean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Dependent Variable:
RefugeeMean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Dependent Variable:
RefugeeMean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Dependent Variable:
RefugeeMean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Dependent Variable:
RefugeeMean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Base controls
District of birth FE
Years of schoolingDistrict FE

All

NW
SW
West
East
North
(1)
(2)
(3)
Years of Schooling
0.204
0.722
-0.620(0.083)(0.088)(0.259)
3.721
3.333
4.087
1,020,278 296,645
529,622
0.056
0.053
0.073
Primary Sector-0.264-0.252-0.249(0.014)(0.016)(0.026)
0.813
0.789
0.836
2,008,857 581,828 1,052,767
0.021
0.030
0.014
Tertiary Sector
0.168
0.163
0.165
(0.008)(0.010)(0.016)
0.060
0.071
0.054
2,008,857 581,828 1,052,767
0.020
0.033
0.015
Middle-skilled Work
-0.189-0.187-0.139(0.010)(0.012)(0.017)
0.844
0.825
0.867
2,008,857 581,828 1,052,767
0.024
0.030
0.018
Armed Forces
0.025
0.027
0.013
(0.003)(0.003)(0.002)
0.003
0.006
0.002
2,008,857 581,828 1,052,767
0.009
0.015
0.004
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

All

NW
SW
West
East
North
(4)
(5)
(6)
Employed-0.085-0.081-0.057(0.007)(0.008)(0.010)
0.879
0.866
0.900
2,008,857 581,828 1,052,767
0.040
0.044
0.035
Secondary Sector
0.020
0.017
0.027
(0.002)(0.002)(0.004)
0.012
0.013
0.013
2,008,857 581,828 1,052,767
0.001
0.002
0.001
High-skilled Work
0.010
0.011
0.011
(0.002)(0.002)(0.003)
0.018
0.019
0.019
2,008,857 581,828 1,052,767
0.008
0.008
0.010
Low-skilled Work
0.077
0.078
0.059
(0.005)(0.006)(0.008)
0.019
0.024
0.016
2,008,857 581,828 1,052,767
0.007
0.015
0.002
Home Ownership-0.033-0.033-0.032(0.003)(0.003)(0.004)
0.983
0.983
0.985
2,008,857 581,828 1,052,767
0.004
0.005
0.003
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates where the unit of observation is the individual. Robust standard
errors, adjusted for clustering by village, are reported in parentheses. Regressions use data about individuals(returnees from Thailand and Vietnam and stayers) aged 20–60 from the Full Samples. In columns 2 and5 (columns 3 and 6), the analysis samples are limited to the individuals residing in the former Northwest(NW), West, and North zones (Southwest (SW) and East zones), and the data used in the regressions for“Years of Schooling” are limited to the individuals aged 20–33. For the definitions of the dependent variables,
see the main text. “Refugee” is an indicator variable equal to 1 if individuals are returnees from Thailand
or Vietnam and 0 otherwise; stayers are the base group. Base controls include age, age squared, and adummy variable for female. Years of schooling and district FE (district fixed effects) are not controlled in
all regressions.

A–31

Table A12: Consistency Check – CSES 2004 (Age 26-66)
Sample:Dependent Variable:
RefugeeMean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Dependent Variable:
RefugeeMean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Dependent Variable:
RefugeeMean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Dependent Variable:
RefugeeMean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Dependent Variable:
RefugeeMean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Base controls
District of birth FE
Years of schoolingDistrict FE

All

NW
SW
West
East
North
(1)
(2)
(3)
Years of Schooling
1.204
1.695
0.490
(0.509) (0.757) (0.664)
4.069
3.967
4.347
6,386
2,208
2,943
0.065
0.071
0.084
Primary Sector-0.373-0.482-0.218(0.044) (0.049) (0.069)
0.716
0.717
0.723
13,378
4,718
6,203
0.022
0.057
0.006
Tertiary Sector
0.276
0.326
0.188
(0.037) (0.044) (0.063)
0.160
0.161
0.153
13,378
4,718
6,203
0.025
0.043
0.019
Middle-skilled Work
-0.235-0.305-0.138(0.035) (0.039) (0.056)
0.835
0.830
0.841
13,378
4,718
6,203
0.021
0.041
0.015
Armed Forces
0.012
0.003
0.025
(0.007) (0.008) (0.014)
0.006
0.008
0.006
13,378
4,718
6,203
0.008
0.01
0.011
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

All

NW
SW
West
East
North
(4)
(5)
(6)
Employed-0.064-0.105-0.017(0.021) (0.029) (0.024)
0.923
0.921
0.928
13,378
4,718
6,203
0.053
0.059
0.053
Secondary Sector
0.029
0.043
0.013
(0.016) (0.023) (0.025)
0.046
0.042
0.051
13,378
4,718
6,203
0.01
0.011
0.013
High-skilled Work
0.101
0.125
0.068
(0.024) (0.031) (0.038)
0.037
0.038
0.036
13,378
4,718
6,203
0.023
0.031
0.023
Low-skilled Work
0.053
0.065
0.030
(0.019) (0.024) (0.034)
0.043
0.045
0.044
13,378
4,718
6,203
0.006
0.009
0.005
Home Ownership-0.077-0.048-0.110(0.021) (0.019) (0.042)
0.976
0.976
0.976
13,378
4,718
6,203
0.011
0.008
0.017
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates where the unit of observation is the individual. Robust standard
errors, adjusted for clustering by village, are reported in parentheses. Regressions use data about individuals(returnees from abroad and stayers) aged 26–66 from the Cambodia Socio-economic Survey (CSES) 2004;
age 26–66 corresponds to age 20-60 at the time of the 1998 Census. In columns 2 and 5 (columns 3 and6), the analysis samples are limited to the individuals residing in the former Northwest (NW), West, andNorth zones (Southwest (SW) and East zones), and the analysis samples for “Years of Schooling” are limited
to the individuals aged 26–39; age 26–39 corresponds to age 20–33 at the time of the 1998 Census. For
the definitions of dependent variables, see the main text. “Refugee” is an indicator variable equal to 1 if
individuals have lived abroad before and migrated to their current residence in 1979–1998 and 0 otherwise;
stayers are the base group. Base controls include age, age squared, and a dummy variable for female. Yearsof schooling and district FE (district fixed effects) are not controlled in all regressions.

A–32

A–33

Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Base controls
District of birth FE
District FE

1981-1998

1980

1979

Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

1994-1998

1993

1992

1991

1988-1990

Timing of Repat.
1979-1987

Dep. Var.:

0.023(0.013)-0.034(0.020)-0.099(0.013)0.899
30,085
0.096
Yes
Yes
No

-0.015(0.014)-0.020(0.015)-0.040(0.012)-0.062(0.010)-0.081(0.009)-0.099(0.011)0.871
50,7020.099
0.052(0.013)0.004(0.020)-0.017(0.016)0.899
30,085
0.109
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.010
(0.014)-0.018(0.015)-0.033(0.011)-0.031(0.010)-0.044(0.009)-0.057(0.011)0.871
50,7020.130

Employed(1)(2)-0.103(0.027)-0.191(0.035)-0.444(0.029)0.794
30,085
0.142
Yes
Yes
No

-0.140(0.021)-0.184(0.020)-0.268(0.017)-0.217(0.018)-0.258(0.016)-0.301(0.023)0.702
50,7020.157
0.003(0.021)-0.042(0.026)-0.167(0.029)0.794
30,085
0.184
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.046(0.019)-0.111(0.021)-0.157(0.017)-0.121(0.013)-0.139(0.012)-0.151(0.020)0.702
50,7020.240

Primary Sector(3)(4)

Tertiary Sector(5)(6)
A-1. Age 34-60 (TH)
0.113
0.047
(0.018) (0.016)
0.158
0.082
(0.017) (0.017)
0.220
0.107
(0.015) (0.012)
0.138
0.079
(0.011) (0.008)
0.167
0.092
(0.010) (0.007)
0.185
0.084
(0.016) (0.013)
0.162
0.162
50,702 50,702
0.162
0.210
B-1. Age 34-60 (VN)
0.113
0.047
(0.018) (0.015)
0.132
0.039
(0.022) (0.013)
0.276
0.121
(0.021) (0.021)
0.099
0.099
30,085 30,085
0.152
0.184
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
0.028
(0.009)0.044(0.011)0.130(0.018)0.029
30,085
0.046
Yes
Yes
No

0.027
(0.010)0.042(0.013)0.058(0.011)
0.079(0.007)0.089(0.007)0.109(0.013)0.059
50,7020.050
0.007(0.009)0.013(0.011)0.077(0.015)0.029
30,085
0.082
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.030
(0.010)0.073(0.012)0.079(0.010)0.061(0.006)0.066(0.006)0.076(0.010)0.059
50,7020.081

Low-skilled Work
(7)
(8)

Table A13: Mechanism – Adjustment for Residence in 1998 (Age 20-60)-0.001(0.005)-0.003(0.006)-0.056(0.009)0.988
30,085
0.021
Yes
Yes
No

-0.031(0.009)-0.022(0.007)-0.014(0.004)-0.026(0.003)-0.035(0.004)-0.074(0.008)0.975
50,7020.025

0.004(0.006)0.008(0.007)-0.036(0.009)0.988
30,085
0.046
Yes
Yes
Yes
Continue-0.015(0.009)-0.023(0.008)-0.015(0.005)-0.011(0.003)-0.017(0.003)-0.048(0.006)0.975
50,702
0.064

Home Ownership
(9)
(10)

A–34

-0.283(0.204)-0.947(0.266)-0.511(0.201)
3.485
16,217
0.177
Yes
Yes
No
No

0.069
(0.283)-0.424(0.213)-0.112(0.146)0.523(0.103)0.734(0.112)0.558(0.119)3.812
26,4670.172-0.477(0.206)-1.170(0.246)-1.143(0.226)
3.485
16,217
0.201
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.147
(0.203)0.424(0.165)0.350(0.156)0.317(0.106)0.470(0.105)0.254(0.111)
3.812
26,467
0.211

Years of Schooling
(1)
(2)

0.067
(0.019)-0.010(0.041)-0.114(0.022)
0.838
16,217
0.109
Yes
Yes
No
No

-0.015(0.025)0.001(0.021)-0.044(0.022)-0.055(0.013)-0.081(0.014)-0.096(0.013)0.808
26,4670.102
0.091(0.020)0.025(0.044)0.005(0.026)0.838
16,217
0.127
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.018
(0.021)0.026(0.019)-0.002(0.017)-0.010(0.012)-0.028(0.013)-0.039(0.014)0.808
26,4670.146

Employed(3)(4)

Primary Sector
Tertiary Sector
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
A-2. Age 20-33 (TH)-0.120-0.0290.098
0.047(0.031) (0.026)(0.020) (0.019)-0.127-0.0490.123
0.067(0.028) (0.027)(0.021) (0.018)-0.208-0.0940.161
0.089(0.026) (0.024)(0.016) (0.015)-0.200-0.0960.123
0.075(0.022) (0.017)(0.012) (0.010)-0.236-0.1100.139
0.078(0.023) (0.018)(0.012) (0.010)-0.294-0.1390.187
0.105(0.028) (0.023)(0.021) (0.017)
0.672
0.672
0.128
0.128
26,467 26,467
26,467 26,467
0.148
0.251
0.095
0.169
B-2. Age 20-33 (VN)
-0.025
0.043
0.075
0.044
(0.031) (0.026)(0.020) (0.015)-0.095
0.009
0.072
0.022
(0.055) (0.049)(0.023) (0.015)-0.415-0.1260.245
0.106(0.032) (0.035)(0.024) (0.021)
0.757
0.757
0.075
0.075
16,217 16,217
16,217 16,217
0.142
0.204
0.082
0.182
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
0.012
(0.011)0.014(0.015)0.093(0.017)0.025
16,217
0.046
Yes
Yes
No
No

0.036
(0.015)0.031(0.014)0.043(0.010)0.072(0.009)0.080(0.008)0.090(0.014)0.052
26,4670.051
0.000(0.010)-0.016(0.013)0.029(0.015)0.025
16,217
0.095
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.037
(0.014)0.044(0.014)0.061(0.011)
0.060(0.008)0.064(0.008)0.057(0.013)0.052
26,4670.086

Low-skilled Work
(9)
(10)

0.008
(0.007)0.004(0.011)-0.066(0.012)0.977
16,217
0.029
Yes
Yes
No
No

-0.029(0.014)-0.016(0.008)-0.023(0.008)-0.031(0.005)-0.048(0.007)-0.084(0.009)0.960
26,4670.032

0.016(0.008)0.010(0.012)-0.031(0.013)0.977
16,217
0.068
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.018(0.014)-0.013(0.010)-0.024(0.009)-0.014(0.005)-0.027(0.007)-0.053(0.008)0.960
26,4670.072

Home Ownership
(11)
(12)

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates where the unit of observation is the individual. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by village,
are reported in parentheses. Regressions in panel A (panel B) use data about the returnees from Thailand (Vietnam) and stayers, all aged 20–33
from the Matched Samples. For the definitions of the dependent variables, see the main text. “19XX(-19XX)” in panel A (panel B) is an indicatorvariable equal to 1 if individuals are returnees from Thailand (Vietnam) who returned in 19XX(-19XX); stayers are the base group. Base controls
include age, age squared, a dummy variable for female, and district of birth fixed effects.

Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Base controls
District of birth FE
Years of schoolingDistrict FE

1981-1998

1980

1979

Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

1994-1998

1993

1992

1991

1988-1990

Timing of Repat.
1979-1987

Dep. Var.:

Table A13: Mechanism – Adjustment for Residence in 1998 (Age 20-60)

A–35

Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Base controls
District of birth FE
Education controls
District FE

1981-1998

1980

1979

Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

1994-1998

1993

1992

1991

1988-1990

Timing of Repatriation
1979-1987

Controls:
Dependent Variable:

0.063(0.194)-0.145(0.216)-0.509(0.195)4.075
19,644
0.227
Yes
Yes
No

0.149
(0.232)-0.623(0.179)0.101(0.120)0.492(0.093)0.523(0.089)0.026(0.161)
4.183
26,0860.210-0.017(0.192)-0.396(0.213)-0.847(0.223)4.075
19,644
0.241
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.250
(0.207)-0.029(0.194)0.222(0.138)0.375(0.094)0.361(0.091)-0.069(0.136)
4.183
26,086
0.236

Years of Schooling(1)(2)-0.078(0.047)-0.105(0.038)-0.052(0.033)0.385
19,644
0.147
Yes
Yes
No
No

-0.038(0.032)0.040(0.037)-0.024(0.023)-0.009(0.018)0.013(0.018)-0.094(0.021)0.383
26,0860.131-0.050(0.045)-0.092(0.042)-0.020(0.038)0.385
19,644
0.381
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.024(0.026)0.033(0.033)0.009(0.022)0.005(0.015)0.032(0.016)-0.060(0.021)0.383
26,086
0.372

Employed(3)(4)

Household Heads
Primary Sector(5)(6)
A-1-1. Age 15-19 (TH)-0.064-0.039(0.032) (0.026)-0.006-0.008(0.039) (0.032)-0.067-0.014(0.022) (0.021)-0.067-0.034(0.018) (0.015)-0.050-0.006(0.019) (0.017)-0.174-0.099(0.019) (0.020)
0.353
0.353
26,086 26,086
0.135
0.351
A-1-2. Age 15-19 (VN)
-0.119-0.079(0.045) (0.045)-0.134-0.101(0.036) (0.039)-0.194-0.115(0.037) (0.043)
0.369
0.369
19,644 19,644
0.148
0.364
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
0.040
(0.014)0.039(0.015)0.121(0.025)0.016
19,644
0.038
Yes
Yes
No
No

0.029
(0.011)0.039(0.015)0.039(0.008)0.043(0.006)0.050(0.007)0.052(0.011)0.026
26,0860.037
0.027(0.012)0.023(0.012)0.081(0.021)0.016
19,644
0.085
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.024
(0.011)
0.037(0.017)0.028(0.009)0.033(0.007)0.038(0.006)0.031(0.011)0.026
26,086
0.069

Tertiary Sector(7)(8)

Table A14: Mechanism – Adjustment for Residence in 1998 (Age 6-19)

0.005(0.009)0.011(0.010)0.049(0.013)0.010
19,644
0.021
Yes
Yes
No
No

0.005
(0.007)0.036(0.015)0.032(0.010)0.039(0.006)0.043(0.006)0.042(0.011)0.021
26,0860.034-0.002(0.007)0.000(0.010)0.039(0.014)0.010
19,644
0.043
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Continue

0.013(0.008)0.050(0.016)0.038(0.012)0.037(0.007)0.041(0.007)0.035(0.010)0.021
26,086
0.062

Low-skilled Work
(9)
(10)

A–36

Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Base controls
District of birth FE
Education controls
District FE

1981-1998

1980

1979

Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

1994-1998

1993

1992

1991

1988-1990

Timing of Repatriation
1979-1987

Controls:
Dependent Variable:-0.007(0.188)-0.065(0.229)-0.432(0.204)
4.139
17,373
0.263
Yes
Yes
No

0.088
(0.255)-0.662(0.204)0.166(0.131)0.496(0.100)0.431(0.090)-0.044(0.164)4.240
21,9460.258-0.113(0.190)-0.316(0.230)-0.606(0.235)
4.139
17,373
0.273
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.237
(0.225)-0.072(0.244)0.416(0.142)0.384(0.105)0.284(0.095)-0.174(0.151)
4.240
21,946
0.276

Years of Schooling(1)(2)-0.089(0.052)-0.109(0.041)-0.049(0.036)0.372
17,373
0.154
Yes
Yes
No
No

-0.064(0.034)0.034(0.041)-0.034(0.025)-0.008(0.019)0.030(0.020)-0.079(0.024)0.370
21,9460.144-0.059(0.050)-0.101(0.043)0.001(0.042)0.372
17,373
0.382
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.040(0.029)0.050(0.038)0.008(0.024)0.008(0.016)0.041(0.018)-0.054(0.023)0.370
21,946
0.378

Employed(3)(4)

Parents
Primary Sector(5)(6)
B-1-1. Age 15-19 (TH)-0.084-0.048(0.033) (0.028)-0.030-0.017(0.042) (0.037)-0.0660.005(0.024) (0.024)-0.061-0.025(0.019) (0.016)-0.0260.012(0.020) (0.018)-0.149-0.082(0.022) (0.023)
0.347
0.347
21,946 21,946
0.151
0.361
B-1-2. Age 15-19 (VN)
-0.117-0.081(0.051) (0.049)-0.126-0.098(0.036) (0.038)-0.189-0.087(0.039) (0.049)
0.358
0.358
17,373 17,373
0.158
0.368
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
0.026
(0.012)0.031(0.017)0.114(0.026)0.014
17,373
0.062
Yes
Yes
No
No

0.021
(0.010)0.043(0.018)0.030(0.009)0.036(0.006)0.045(0.008)0.050(0.012)0.021
21,9460.051
0.021(0.011)0.019(0.011)
0.067(0.018)0.014
17,373
0.108
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.016
(0.011)0.050(0.023)0.018(0.010)0.027(0.007)0.034(0.008)0.030(0.012)0.021
21,9460.085

Tertiary Sector(7)(8)

Table A14: Mechanism – Adjustment for Residence in 1998 (Age 6-19)-0.004(0.005)0.007(0.012)0.031(0.012)0.009
17,373
0.043
Yes
Yes
No
No

0.002
(0.007)0.045(0.017)0.025(0.010)0.034(0.006)0.035(0.007)0.044(0.011)
0.016
21,9460.043-0.003(0.006)0.003(0.010)0.025(0.013)0.009
17,373
0.070
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Continue

0.008(0.009)0.064(0.021)0.027(0.011)
0.033(0.007)0.034(0.008)0.039(0.012)
0.016
21,946
0.076

Low-skilled Work
(9)
(10)

A–37

Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Base controls
District of birth FE
Access to schools
District FE

1981-1998

1980

1979

Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

1994-1998

1993

1992

1991

1988-1990

Timing of repatriation
1979-1987

Controls:-0.014(0.037)-0.062(0.040)-0.083(0.033)0.805
16,145
0.119
Yes
Yes
No
No

-0.036(0.026)-0.012(0.028)0.026(0.017)-0.002(0.015)-0.017(0.014)-0.070(0.028)0.806
23,1160.101-0.019(0.038)-0.087(0.044)-0.109(0.037)0.805
16,145
0.131
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

-0.036(0.026)0.020(0.028)0.003(0.017)-0.011(0.015)-0.025(0.015)-0.057(0.024)0.806
23,1160.123
0.001(0.041)-0.027(0.039)-0.063(0.041)0.805
15,467
0.159
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.028(0.026)0.033(0.029)0.004(0.018)-0.015(0.013)-0.014(0.013)-0.047(0.025)0.805
22,1370.148

Some Education
(1)
(2)
(3)

Household Heads
School Participation
Grade Progression
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
A-2-1. Age 12-14 (TH)-0.028-0.042-0.034-0.127-0.123-0.151(0.027) (0.027) (0.028)(0.128) (0.125) (0.130)-0.053-0.044-0.033-0.2830.101
0.151(0.029) (0.030) (0.032)(0.129) (0.135) (0.144)
0.027-0.031-0.030-0.0910.014-0.003(0.018) (0.020) (0.020)(0.081) (0.085) (0.088)-0.019-0.038-0.042
0.122
0.030
0.010
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)(0.070) (0.069) (0.064)-0.045-0.064-0.055
0.112
0.005
0.024
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)(0.066) (0.065) (0.061)-0.086-0.084-0.069-0.241-0.288-0.249(0.026) (0.024) (0.024)(0.119) (0.112) (0.115)
0.743
0.743
0.743
-5.145-5.145-5.152
23,116 23,116 22,137
23,116 23,116 22,137
0.103
0.125
0.147
0.178
0.207
0.225
A-2-2. Age 12-14 (VN)
0.000
-0.003
0.017
0.269
0.174
0.303
(0.037) (0.039) (0.042)(0.176) (0.180) (0.191)-0.066-0.087-0.022-0.115-0.2550.066(0.040) (0.045) (0.040)(0.181) (0.189) (0.199)-0.095-0.120-0.078-0.245-0.366-0.166(0.033) (0.037) (0.041)(0.157) (0.154) (0.173)
0.751
0.751
0.752
-5.155-5.155-5.152
16,145 16,145 15,467
16,145 16,145 15,467
0.112
0.124
0.148
0.194
0.209
0.232
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Table A14: Mechanism – Adjustment for Residence in 1998 (Age 6-19)-0.024(0.023)-0.001(0.022)-0.016(0.017)0.055
16,145
0.051
Yes
Yes
No
No

-0.001(0.015)0.019(0.015)-0.011(0.007)0.009(0.007)0.018(0.008)-0.004(0.008)0.058
23,1160.049(10)-0.017(0.025)0.010(0.024)-0.001(0.021)
0.055
16,145
0.057
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

0.004
(0.015)0.025(0.018)0.013(0.010)0.017(0.008)0.027(0.009)0.004(0.008)0.058
23,1160.058-0.021(0.025)-0.003(0.026)-0.003(0.022)0.055
15,467
0.060
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Continue-0.001(0.016)0.017(0.018)0.009(0.010)0.018(0.008)0.028(0.009)0.001(0.009)0.057
22,1370.060

Child Labor
(11)
(12)

A–38

Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Base controls
District of birth FE
Access to schools
District FE

1981-1998

1980

1979

Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

1994-1998

1993

1992

1991

1988-1990

Timing of repatriation
1979-1987

Controls:-0.022(0.039)-0.059(0.042)-0.088(0.039)0.813
14,530
0.137
Yes
Yes
No
No

-0.029(0.029)-0.007(0.029)0.033(0.016)-0.005(0.015)-0.024(0.015)-0.071(0.029)0.816
19,7280.124-0.024(0.042)-0.086(0.047)-0.100(0.041)0.813
14,530
0.148
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

-0.034(0.029)0.026(0.031)0.007(0.018)-0.016(0.016)-0.036(0.016)-0.069(0.025)0.816
19,7280.141-0.003(0.045)-0.031(0.042)-0.051(0.046)0.813
13,952
0.173
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.030(0.030)0.041(0.032)0.005(0.018)-0.021(0.014)-0.026(0.015)-0.065(0.025)0.815
18,9220.164

Some Education
(1)
(2)
(3)

Parents
School Participation
Grade Progression
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
B-2-1. Age 12-14 (TH)-0.025-0.041-0.037-0.134-0.126-0.207(0.031) (0.031) (0.032)(0.138) (0.134) (0.140)-0.025-0.0030.012-0.2770.174
0.206(0.032) (0.034) (0.036)(0.133) (0.154) (0.161)
0.028-0.034-0.034-0.0260.117
0.085(0.017) (0.021) (0.020)(0.084) (0.097) (0.102)-0.022-0.042-0.046
0.141
0.034
0.009
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015)(0.073) (0.074) (0.069)-0.058-0.080-0.0730.099-0.028-0.021(0.016) (0.017) (0.016)(0.070) (0.070) (0.067)-0.088-0.094-0.083-0.276-0.343-0.310(0.027) (0.025) (0.025)(0.123) (0.114) (0.115)
0.759
0.759
0.758
-5.093-5.093-5.09919,728 19,728 18,922
19,728 19,728 18,922
0.122
0.138
0.158
0.214
0.236
0.252
B-2-2. Age 12-14 (VN)
-0.002-0.006
0.017
0.351
0.258
0.370
(0.040) (0.042) (0.045)(0.194) (0.196) (0.208)-0.063-0.098-0.041-0.094-0.2240.076(0.043) (0.049) (0.045)(0.181) (0.194) (0.197)-0.100-0.111-0.074-0.283-0.364-0.121(0.039) (0.043) (0.047)(0.185) (0.174) (0.195)
0.763
0.763
0.763
-5.112-5.112-5.107
14,530 14,530 13,952
14,530 14,530 13,952
0.127
0.138
0.160
0.226
0.238
0.258
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Table A14: Mechanism – Adjustment for Residence in 1998 (Age 6-19)-0.022(0.024)-0.001(0.022)-0.012(0.018)0.051
14,530
0.057
Yes
Yes
No
No

0.004
(0.016)0.016(0.017)-0.006(0.008)0.007(0.008)0.018(0.008)-0.006(0.008)0.052
19,7280.055(10)-0.019(0.026)0.010(0.024)-0.008(0.022)0.051
14,530
0.065
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

0.006
(0.015)0.018(0.020)0.014(0.011)
0.015(0.008)0.027(0.009)0.006(0.009)0.052
19,7280.064-0.025(0.027)-0.001(0.026)-0.006(0.023)0.051
13,952
0.069
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Continue

0.000(0.016)0.005(0.020)0.010(0.011)
0.015(0.008)0.028(0.009)0.004(0.010)0.052
18,922
0.066

Child Labor
(11)
(12)

A–39

Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Base controls
District of birth FE
Access to schools
District FE

1981-1998

1980

1979

Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

1994-1998

1993

1992

1991

1988-1990

Timing of repatriation
1979-1987

Controls:-0.024(0.038)-0.023(0.035)-0.005(0.031)
0.519
28,209
0.234
Yes
Yes
No
No

-0.031(0.026)-0.072(0.028)-0.015(0.020)-0.001(0.015)0.004(0.014)-0.041(0.022)0.519
41,1030.222-0.038(0.040)-0.030(0.037)-0.026(0.031)
0.519
28,209
0.244
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

-0.028(0.025)-0.026(0.023)-0.019(0.019)-0.011(0.014)-0.014(0.014)-0.054(0.019)0.519
41,1030.241-0.043(0.041)-0.029(0.038)-0.011(0.032)0.519
27,055
0.246
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.027(0.025)-0.028(0.023)-0.017(0.020)-0.015(0.013)-0.005(0.013)-0.052(0.020)0.517
39,4030.244

Some Education
(1)
(2)
(3)

Household Heads
School Participation
Grade Progression
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
A-3-1. Age 6-11 (TH)-0.030-0.025-0.024-0.078-0.082-0.087(0.027) (0.025) (0.025)(0.047) (0.045) (0.046)-0.074-0.024-0.026-0.111-0.011-0.030(0.028) (0.024) (0.024)(0.052) (0.053) (0.054)-0.017-0.020-0.017-0.066-0.084-0.074(0.020) (0.018) (0.019)(0.034) (0.037) (0.038)-0.005-0.015-0.0190.002-0.036-0.039(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)(0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
0.000-0.018-0.0090.009-0.062-0.054(0.014) (0.014) (0.013)(0.027) (0.026) (0.026)-0.045-0.058-0.058-0.083-0.157-0.161(0.022) (0.019) (0.019)(0.043) (0.039) (0.039)
0.515
0.515
0.512
-2.770-2.770-2.775
41,103 41,103 39,403
41,103 41,103 39,403
0.216
0.236
0.239
0.573
0.585
0.585
A-3-2. Age 6-11 (VN)
-0.027-0.041-0.047
0.083
0.023
0.016
(0.038) (0.039) (0.040)(0.092) (0.091) (0.094)-0.021-0.029-0.0280.000-0.049-0.044(0.035) (0.037) (0.038)(0.078) (0.081) (0.086)-0.017-0.035-0.0200.043-0.092-0.080(0.030) (0.030) (0.031)(0.060) (0.062) (0.066)
0.516
0.516
0.516
-2.756-2.756-2.75528,209 28,209 27,055
28,209 28,209 27,055
0.230
0.240
0.242
0.574
0.579
0.578
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Table A14: Mechanism – Adjustment for Residence in 1998 (Age 6-19)

0.007(0.009)-0.002(0.005)-0.002(0.003)0.004
28,209
0.012
Yes
Yes
No
No

0.006
(0.005)0.008(0.004)0.001(0.001)0.000(0.002)0.000(0.001)0.000(0.002)0.004
41,103
0.009

(10)

0.009
(0.010)-0.001(0.006)0.001(0.004)0.004
28,209
0.013
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

0.006
(0.005)0.009(0.005)0.003(0.003)0.001(0.002)0.000(0.001)0.001(0.002)0.004
41,1030.013

0.009(0.010)-0.002(0.006)0.001(0.005)0.004
27,055
0.014
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Continue

0.004(0.005)0.007(0.005)0.003(0.003)0.001(0.002)0.000(0.001)0.001(0.002)0.004
39,403
0.017

Child Labor
(11)
(12)

A–40
-0.029(0.041)-0.035(0.035)0.007(0.033)0.520
25,688
0.253
Yes
Yes
No
No

-0.039(0.028)-0.041(0.029)-0.007(0.019)0.000(0.015)0.010(0.014)-0.043(0.021)
0.523
35,5280.243-0.040(0.042)-0.045(0.037)0.007(0.034)0.520
25,688
0.259
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

-0.032(0.027)-0.002(0.027)-0.011(0.020)-0.011(0.015)-0.012(0.015)-0.056(0.021)
0.523
35,5280.257-0.048(0.044)-0.046(0.038)0.028(0.036)0.520
24,659
0.261
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.031(0.027)0.002(0.027)-0.007(0.021)-0.015(0.014)-0.001(0.014)-0.055(0.021)
0.521
34,0880.259

Some Education
(1)
(2)
(3)

Parents
School Participation
Grade Progression
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
B-3-1. Age 6-11 (TH)-0.038-0.030-0.029-0.088-0.093-0.102(0.029) (0.027) (0.028)(0.049) (0.051) (0.052)-0.0420.001
0.005-0.0690.024
0.018(0.030) (0.027) (0.027)(0.055) (0.060) (0.061)-0.009-0.012-0.006-0.062-0.082-0.073(0.019) (0.020) (0.021)(0.035) (0.039) (0.040)-0.004-0.015-0.0180.010-0.032-0.032(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
0.006-0.016-0.0050.012-0.066-0.059(0.014) (0.015) (0.014)(0.028) (0.027) (0.027)-0.049-0.062-0.060-0.095-0.180-0.179(0.022) (0.021) (0.022)(0.042) (0.042) (0.043)
0.519
0.519
0.517
-2.743-2.743-2.74635,528 35,528 34,088
35,528 35,528 34,088
0.237
0.252
0.254
0.582
0.590
0.590
B-3-2. Age 6-11 (VN)
-0.030-0.042-0.050
0.067
0.020
0.012
(0.041) (0.042) (0.044)(0.096) (0.093) (0.097)-0.035-0.045-0.047-0.026-0.059-0.070(0.035) (0.037) (0.038)(0.074) (0.074) (0.077)-0.006-0.0030.018
0.061-0.0030.031(0.031) (0.032) (0.034)(0.062) (0.065) (0.070)
0.517
0.517
0.517
-2.739-2.739-2.73825,688 25,688 24,659
25,688 25,688 24,659
0.248
0.254
0.256
0.582
0.586
0.585
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
0.004
(0.005)-0.002(0.005)-0.003(0.003)0.004
25,688
0.018
Yes
Yes
No
No

0.008
(0.006)0.000(0.002)0.001(0.002)0.002(0.002)0.000(0.001)0.000(0.001)
0.004
35,528
0.016

(10)

0.004
(0.006)-0.002(0.005)-0.002(0.004)0.004
25,688
0.021
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

0.007
(0.005)0.000(0.003)0.004(0.003)0.002(0.002)0.001(0.001)0.000(0.002)0.004
35,5280.024

0.004(0.006)-0.003(0.006)-0.002(0.005)0.003
24,659
0.023
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.005
(0.005)-0.002(0.003)0.003(0.003)0.002(0.002)0.000(0.001)0.001(0.002)0.003
34,0880.028

Child Labor
(11)
(12)

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates where the unit of observation is the individual. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by village, are reported
in parentheses. Regressions use data about the children aged 15–19, 12–14, and 6–11 of the returnees from Thailand (Vietnam) and of stayers, all aged 34–60, in
panels A/B-1/2/3-1 (A/B-1/2/3-2), respectively; the samples are constructed based on the Matched Samples. The samples in panels A/B-1/2/3-2 are limited tothe children of married couples. For the definitions of the dependent variables, see the main text. “19XX(-19XX)” is an indicator variable equal to 1 if household
heads and/or spouses are returnees from Thailand (panels A/B-1/2/3-1)/ Vietnam (panels A/B-1/2/3-2) who returned in 19XX(-19XX); children of stayers are
the base group. Base controls in A/B-1/2/3-1 (panels A/B-1/2/3-2) include age, a dummy variable for female, age of household head (father’s age, mother’s age),years of schooling for household head (years of schooling for father and mother), and an indicator variable for female head. District of birth FE in A/B-1/2/3-1(panels A/B-1/2/3-2) include district of birth fixed effects for household head (district of birth fixed effects for father and mother). Access to schools (panels
A/B-2/3-1/2 only) includes two continuous variables of the distance (km) to the nearest primary (panels A/B-2/3-1/2) and secondary (panels A/B-2-1/2) schools;
the analysis samples are limited to the individuals residing in villages with information about village points.

Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Base controls
District of birth FE
Access to schools
District FE

1981-1998

1980

1979

Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

1994-1998

1993

1992

1991

1988-1990

Timing of repatriation
1979-1987

Controls:

Table A14: Mechanism – Adjustment for Residence in 1998 (Age 6-19)

A–41

p-value (H0 : γT H = γV N )Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Base controls
District of birth FE
Education controls (B and C)
District FE

Refugee (VN)

Refugee (TH)p-value (H0 : γT H = γV N )Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

Refugee (VN)

Refugee (TH)p-value (H0 : γT H = γV N )Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

Refugee (VN)

Refugee (TH)p-value (H0 : γT H = γV N )Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

Refugee (VN)

Refugee (TH)Dependent Variable:

0.290(0.063)-0.165(0.136)
0.002
4.206
22,911
0.259
Yes
Yes
No
No

0.323
(0.063)-0.211(0.133)0.000
4.146
27,3070.212

0.449(0.079)-0.621(0.155)0.000
3.738
28,4560.174

0.275(0.072)-0.308(0.138)0.000
4.206
22,911
0.278
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.296
(0.066)-0.409(0.131)0.000
4.146
27,3070.241

0.402(0.081)-1.148(0.147)0.000
3.738
28,456
0.216

Years of Schooling(1)(2)-0.008(0.013)-0.079(0.027)0.014
0.368
22,911
0.140
Yes
Yes
No
No

-0.013(0.012)-0.074(0.025)0.023
0.381
27,3070.128-0.062(0.009)-0.026(0.019)0.075
0.810
28,4560.098-0.064(0.006)-0.042(0.011)0.068
0.871
53,8580.097

0.012(0.013)-0.058(0.028)0.016
0.368
22,911
0.373
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.006
(0.012)-0.054(0.026)0.023
0.381
27,3070.367-0.017(0.009)0.034(0.019)0.010
0.810
28,4560.145-0.035(0.007)0.004(0.011)0.000
0.871
53,8580.131

Employed(3)(4)

Primary Sector
Tertiary Sector
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
A. Age 34-60-0.240-0.1270.164
0.085(0.012) (0.009)(0.008) (0.006)-0.256-0.0970.175
0.081(0.026) (0.019)(0.017) (0.012)
0.564
0.125
0.565
0.776
0.696
0.696
0.165
0.165
53,85853,85853,85853,858
0.158
0.256
0.158
0.214
B. Age 20-33-0.215-0.0970.139
0.075(0.015) (0.012)(0.009) (0.007)-0.193-0.0570.135
0.081(0.031) (0.024)(0.018) (0.013)
0.515
0.107
0.809
0.713
0.669
0.669
0.131
0.131
28,45628,45628,45628,456
0.146
0.268
0.094
0.177
C. Age 15-19
Household Head
-0.071-0.0290.044
0.031(0.013) (0.012)(0.004) (0.004)-0.140-0.0930.064
0.050(0.025) (0.026)(0.012) (0.010)
0.011
0.018
0.123
0.084
0.350
0.350
0.028
0.028
27,30727,30727,30727,307
0.131
0.346
0.039
0.075
Parents-0.059-0.0170.039
0.027(0.013) (0.013)(0.004) (0.005)-0.137-0.0900.054
0.041(0.027) (0.028)(0.012) (0.009)
0.007
0.011
0.234
0.170
0.343
0.343
0.023
0.023
22,911
22,911
22,911
22,911
0.147
0.356
0.052
0.093
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

Table A15: Mechanism – Returnees from Thailand vs. Vietnam (Age 6-60)

0.033(0.004)0.011(0.006)0.002
0.016
22,911
0.042
Yes
Yes
No
No

0.038
(0.004)0.019(0.007)0.020
0.021
27,3070.033

0.069(0.006)0.046(0.012)0.083
0.053
28,4560.046

0.078(0.005)0.074(0.012)0.751
0.061
53,8580.046

0.032(0.005)0.008(0.006)0.001
0.016
22,911
0.075
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.036
(0.005)0.015(0.006)0.004
0.021
27,3070.061

0.056(0.006)0.024(0.010)0.004
0.053
28,4560.087

0.061(0.004)0.056(0.009)0.631
0.061
53,8580.081

Low-skilled Work
(9)
(10)

Yes
Yes
No
No

-0.042(0.004)-0.020(0.008)0.011
0.960
28,4560.026-0.033(0.003)-0.022(0.005)0.051
0.974
53,858
0.018

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Continue-0.027(0.004)0.013(0.008)0.000
0.960
28,4560.065-0.020(0.002)0.006(0.006)0.000
0.974
53,8580.056

Home Ownership
(11)
(12)

A–42
-0.007(0.009)-0.022(0.022)0.520
0.520
36,874
0.244
Yes
Yes
No
No

-0.012(0.009)-0.026(0.022)0.563
0.516
42,6850.222-0.013(0.009)-0.061(0.025)0.070
0.811
20,5210.128-0.016(0.011)-0.040(0.023)0.330
0.520
36,874
0.258
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

-0.018(0.010)-0.044(0.022)0.260
0.516
42,6850.242-0.025(0.011)-0.064(0.026)0.158
0.811
20,521
0.146-0.020(0.010)-0.069(0.024)0.046
0.801
24,0960.127-0.014(0.010)-0.037(0.025)0.377
0.518
35,303
0.260
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.017(0.010)-0.039(0.024)0.385
0.514
40,8240.244-0.024(0.010)-0.027(0.028)0.916
0.811
19,6250.169-0.016(0.009)-0.032(0.026)0.534
0.800
23,0050.153

Some Education(2)(3)-0.012(0.009)-0.063(0.023)0.034
0.801
24,0960.104(1)School Participation
Grade Progression
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
D. Age 12-14
Household Head
-0.030-0.050-0.0470.013-0.007-0.012(0.010) (0.011) (0.010)(0.045) (0.047) (0.044)-0.064-0.078-0.037-0.084-0.1990.052(0.023) (0.025) (0.026)(0.109) (0.113) (0.122)
0.168
0.285
0.700
0.404
0.105
0.617
0.739
0.739
0.738
-5.158-5.158-5.16824,09624,09623,00524,09624,09623,005
0.104
0.126
0.149
0.178
0.208
0.225
Parents-0.033-0.057-0.0550.021-0.011-0.026(0.010) (0.011) (0.011)(0.045) (0.050) (0.048)-0.057-0.071-0.031-0.007-0.1140.117(0.025) (0.027) (0.029)(0.118) (0.123) (0.132)
0.361
0.619
0.427
0.821
0.423
0.305
0.755
0.755
0.754
-5.105-5.105-5.113
20,521
20,521
19,625
20,521
20,521
19,625
0.123
0.140
0.161
0.214
0.237
0.253
E. Age 6-11
Household Head
-0.015-0.021-0.020-0.029-0.063-0.065(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)(0.018) (0.019) (0.019)-0.030-0.049-0.0430.029-0.064-0.048(0.021) (0.022) (0.023)(0.049) (0.050) (0.054)
0.531
0.221
0.356
0.256
0.981
0.763
0.512
0.512
0.509
-2.774-2.774-2.78042,68542,68540,824
42,68542,68540,824
0.216
0.236
0.239
0.573
0.584
0.586
Parents-0.011-0.019-0.017-0.025-0.064-0.063(0.009) (0.011) (0.010)(0.019) (0.021) (0.021)-0.026-0.045-0.0410.034-0.051-0.041(0.022) (0.023) (0.025)(0.049) (0.051) (0.055)
0.500
0.287
0.352
0.255
0.812
0.704
0.516
0.516
0.513
-2.747-2.747-2.75136,87436,87435,30336,87436,87435,303
0.238
0.253
0.255
0.581
0.590
0.591
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
0.001
(0.001)0.000(0.003)0.743
0.004
36,874
0.016
Yes
Yes
No
No

0.001
(0.001)
0.002(0.004)0.781
0.004
42,6850.009

0.007(0.005)-0.012(0.013)0.165
0.052
20,521
0.053

0.007(0.004)-0.009(0.013)0.238
0.058
24,096
0.047

(10)

0.002
(0.001)0.000(0.003)0.624
0.004
36,874
0.024
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

0.001
(0.001)
0.003(0.004)0.729
0.004
42,6850.013

0.018(0.006)-0.009(0.015)0.090
0.052
20,521
0.062

0.019(0.006)-0.002(0.015)0.164
0.058
24,0960.057

0.002(0.001)0.000(0.004)0.653
0.004
35,303
0.027
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.001
(0.001)
0.003(0.005)0.676
0.004
40,8240.016

0.017(0.006)-0.013(0.017)0.081
0.052
19,6250.063

0.018(0.006)-0.008(0.016)0.123
0.058
23,005
0.058

Child Labor
(11)
(12)

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates where the unit of observation is the individual. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by village, are reported in parentheses.
Regressions in panels A and B use data about the returnees from Thailand and from Vietnam and stayers, all aged 34–60 and 20–33, from the Matched Samples, respectively.
Regressions in panels C, D, and E use data about the children aged 15–19, 12–14, and 6–11 of the returnees from Thailand and from Vietnam and stayers, all aged 34-60; thesamples are constructed based on the Matched Samples. The samples in panels C, D, and E for “Parents” are limited to the children for married couples. “Refugee (TH)”(“Refugee (VN)”) in panels A and B is an indicator variable equal to 1 if individuals are returnees from Thailand (Vietnam) and 0 otherwise; stayers are the base group.
“Refugee (TH)” (“Refugee (VN)”) in panels C, D, and E is an indicator variable equal to 1 if household heads and/or spouses are returnees from Thailand (Vietnam) and 0
otherwise; children of stayers are the base group. Base controls in panels A and B include age, age squared, a dummy variable for female, and years of schooling (panel A only).
Base controls in panels C, D, and E for “Household Heads” (“Parents”) include age, a dummy variable for female, age of household head (father’s age, mother’s age), years ofschooling for household head (years of schooling for father and mother), an indicator variable for female head, and district of birth fixed effects for household head (district ofbirth fixed effects for father and mother). Education controls (panels B and C only) include “Years of Schooling” and “School Participation” (panel C only); see the variable
definitions in the main text. District of birth FE in panels C, D, and E include for “Household Heads” (“Parents”) district of birth fixed effects for household head (district ofbirth fixed effects for father and mother). Access to schools (panels D and E only) includes two continuous variables of the distance (km) to the nearest primary (panels D andE) and secondary (panel D) schools; the analysis samples are limited to the individuals residing in villages with information about village points.

p-value (H0 : γT H = γV N )Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared
Base controls
District of birth FE
Access to schools
District FE

Refugee (VN)

Refugee (TH)p-value (H0 : γT H = γV N )Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

Refugee (VN)

Refugee (TH)p-value (H0 : γT H = γV N )Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

Refugee (VN)

Refugee (TH)p-value (H0 : γT H = γV N )Mean (Dep. Var.)
Observations
R-squared

Refugee (VN)

Refugee (TH)Dependent Variable:

Table A15: Mechanism – Returnees from Thailand vs. Vietnam (Age 6-60)

Men and Women Aged 34−60
Labor Force

Employed−0.006−0.074−0.260−0.095
Stayers Mean:
0.979 (TH,M)
0.865 (TH,W)
0.975 (VN,M)
0.875 (VN,W)

0.003−0.064−0.10

Months Worked−0.025

−0.05

0

0.05

−1.170
Stayers Mean:
0.966 (TH,M)
0.843 (TH,W)
0.969 (VN,M)
0.858 (VN,W)−0.004−0.0620.10 −0.10−0.05

Primary Sector

0

0.05

0.10 −1.4−0.7

Secondary Sector−0.263

Stayers Mean:
10.630 (TH,M)
9.037 (TH,W)
11.102 (VN,M)
9.639 (VN,W)

0.118−0.565

0

0.7

1.4

Tertiary Sector

0.029−0.219−0.256−0.216

−0.30

−0.15

0

0.15

Stayers Mean:
0.015 (TH,M)
0.007 (TH,W)
0.009 (VN,M)
0.006 (VN,W)

0.30 −0.08

0.003

0

0.08 −0.24

−0.12

0

0.12

0.24

Low−skilled Work
0.078

0.02

0.078
Stayers Mean:
0.879 (TH,M)
0.820 (TH,W)
0.902 (VN,M)
0.842 (VN,W)−0.081−0.1290.04 −0.20−0.10

Armed Forces

0

0.10

Stayers Mean:
0.020 (TH,M)
0.025 (TH,W)
0.017 (VN,M)
0.018 (VN,W)

0.20 −0.10

0.071
0.061

−0.05

0

0.05

0.10

Home Ownership
0.063−0.031

0.002−0.0340.014

Stayers Mean:
0.990 (TH,M)
0.990 (TH,W)
0.987 (VN,M)
0.989 (VN,W)−0.027

0.001

−0.04

0.04

−0.175
Stayers Mean:
0.062 (TH,M)
0.009 (TH,W)
0.046 (VN,M)
0.004 (VN,W)−0.006

−0.08

0

0.195
0.144

−0.1560.005

Stayers Mean:
0.011 (TH,M)
0.000 (TH,W)
0.006 (VN,M)
0.001 (VN,W)

0.060

Middle−skilled Work−0.000

−0.02

0.120
Stayers Mean:
0.126 (TH,M)
0.052 (TH,W)
0.093 (VN,M)
0.034 (VN,W)

0.008

−0.04

High−skilled Work

−0.04

0.218

0.009
Stayers Mean:
0.831 (TH,M)
0.795 (TH,W)
0.868 (VN,M)
0.824 (VN,W)−0.01300.04

0.08 −0.06

Men (TH)

−0.03

0

0.03

Women (TH)0.06

Men (VN)

Women (VN)

Men and Women Aged 20−33
Some Education

Primary School

0.051−0.010−0.095

−0.10

0

0.10

−0.0040.20 −0.14

−0.07

0

Months Worked−0.084

−0.05

0

0.222
−0.3300.10 −1.4

Tertiary Sector

−0.7

0

0.20 −0.04

Armed Forces−0.03

Secondary Sector

−0.02

0.013
Stayers Mean:
0.798 (TH,M)
0.753 (TH,W)
0.811 (VN,M)
0.786 (VN,W)−0.163−0.182

1.4 −0.26

0.10

−0.13

0

0.13

Stayers Mean:
0.015 (TH,M)
0.007 (TH,W)
0.014 (VN,M)
0.008 (VN,W)

0.26 −0.08

Middle−skilled Work

−0.04

0.049
0.011

0

0.04

0.08

Low−skilled Work

−0.1470.074−0.166

0.067

Stayers Mean:
0.029 (TH,M)
0.012 (TH,W)
0.024 (VN,M)
0.009 (VN,W)−0.092

0

0.02

−0.10

0.04 −0.20−0.0150

Stayers Mean:
0.838 (TH,M)
0.776 (TH,W)
0.832 (VN,M)
0.803 (VN,W)

0.10

Stayers Mean:
0.022 (TH,M)
0.018 (TH,W)
0.026 (VN,M)
0.014 (VN,W)

0.20 −0.08

−0.04

0.031
0.050

0

0.04

0.08

−0.0390.007

Stayers Mean:
0.981 (TH,M)
0.980 (TH,W)
0.979 (VN,M)
0.973 (VN,W)−0.023

0.000

0

0.7

0.05

−0.045

0.002

−0.06

0

Home Ownership

0.042
Stayers Mean:
0.010 (TH,M)
0.000 (TH,W)
0.004 (VN,M)
0.000 (VN,W)

−0.05

0.032

0.003

−0.008

0.133

0.10

Stayers Mean:
9.543 (TH,M)
8.417 (TH,W)
10.097 (VN,M)
9.251 (VN,W)

0.006

0.128

0

1.2 −0.10

Primary Sector

0.024

0.101

−0.10

0.6

0.932 (TH,M)
0.840 (TH,W)
0.920 (VN,M)
0.848 (VN,W)−0.233High−skilled Work
0.194

Stayers Mean:
0.087 (TH,M)
0.047 (TH,W)
0.061 (VN,M)
0.031 (VN,W)

00.025 Stayers Mean:−0.016−0.204

Stayers Mean:
0.893 (TH,M)
0.796 (TH,W)
0.878 (VN,M)
0.822 (VN,W)

0.05−0.308−0.6−0.082
Stayers Mean:
4.373 (TH,M)
3.067 (TH,W)
4.220 (VN,M)
2.483 (VN,W)−0.8480.14 −1.2−1.139
0.009

−0.20

0.07

−0.014−0.0400.002−0.005
Stayers Mean:
0.363 (TH,M)
0.201 (TH,W)
0.365 (VN,M)
0.144 (VN,W)

Employed−0.097−0.10−0.087

Labor Force

1.060

0.001
Stayers Mean:
0.774 (TH,M)
0.646 (TH,W)
0.733 (VN,M)
0.545 (VN,W)−0.163−0.20

Years of Schooling
0.111−0.0150.03

0.06 −0.06

Men (TH)

−0.03

0

0.03

0.06

Women (TH)Men (VN)

Women (VN)

Figure A1: Main Results – Age 20-60
Notes: The figure plots the point estimates of the impacts of forced displacement on educational and labormarket outcomes and home ownership and their 95% confidence intervals, along with the stayers mean, formale and female returnees aged 20–60 from Thailand (TH) and Vietnam (VN). The estimates are based on the
Matched Samples and are from the bias-corrected version of the nearest-neighbor matching method (Abadie
and Imbens 2011). The 95% confidence intervals are adjusted with the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure(Benjamini and Hochberg 1995).

A–43

Men and Women Aged 34−60
Age 15−19 (Both Sexes)
Some Education

School Participation

0.021
0.025
−0.061

−0.14

−0.07

−0.004

0.036

0

0.07

Stayers Mean:−0.0010.439 (TH,M)
0.022 0.407 (TH,W)
0.441 (VN,M)
0.384 (VN,W)

0.14 −0.10−0.05

Labor Force−0.088−0.09700.07−0.0850.14 −0.14

−0.07

0

0.016

0.02

Low−skilled Work

0

0.03

1.0

−0.1652.0 −0.24

−0.01

0

0.12

−0.077−0.0680.002

Stayers Mean:
0.373 (TH,M)
0.395 (TH,W)
0.394 (VN,M)
0.445 (VN,W)−0.111

0.004

0

0.24

Middle−skilled Work

0.003

0.08 −0.02−0.12−0.1120.01

0.02 −0.18

−0.09

0

0.09

0.18

0.002

0.022

0

0

Stayers Mean:
0.361 (TH,M)
0.384 (TH,W)
0.389 (VN,M)
0.445 (VN,W)−0.158

0.003

0.04

0.6

Primary Sector

High−skilled Work
Stayers Mean:
0.001 (TH,M)
0.001 (TH,W)
0.001 (VN,M)
0.001 (VN,W)

0.3

0.002
Stayers Mean:
0.000 (TH,M)
0.000 (TH,W)
0.000 (VN,M)
0.000 (VN,W)

0.013

−0.03

−0.985−1.0

0

Armed Forces

0.039

−0.06

0.08 −0.6−0.081−1.0590.14 −2.0

0.064

0.032
Stayers Mean:
0.008 (TH,M)
0.010 (TH,W)
0.007 (VN,M)
0.009 (VN,W)

0.07

0.055

−0.04

−0.3

Stayers Mean:
4.197 (TH,M)
4.036 (TH,W)
3.925 (VN,M)
3.777 (VN,W)−0.235−0.0900.041
Stayers Mean:
0.011 (TH,M)
0.015 (TH,W)
0.005 (VN,M)
0.007 (VN,W)

0.04 −0.08

0.04

Stayers Mean:
3.890 (TH,M)
4.158 (TH,W)
4.457 (VN,M)
5.006 (VN,W)

0.038

0.015

0.268
−0.236−0.323

Tertiary Sector

0.006

0

0

0.239

Stayers Mean:
0.319 (TH,M)
0.301 (TH,W)
0.307 (VN,M)
0.295 (VN,W)

Months Worked
Stayers Mean:
0.373 (TH,M)
0.396 (TH,W)
0.400 (VN,M)
0.448 (VN,W)

0.013

−0.02

−0.04

Years of Schooling−0.503−0.097

Secondary Sector−0.04

0.10 −0.08−0.026
Stayers Mean:
0.460 (TH,M)
0.481 (TH,W)
0.480 (VN,M)
0.532 (VN,W)

Stayers Mean:
0.009 (TH,M)
0.007 (TH,W)
0.008 (VN,M)
0.002 (VN,W)

0.05−0.022−0.043−0.015−0.07

0−0.002

Employed−0.030

−0.14

0.032

Stayers Mean:
0.807 (TH,M)
0.789 (TH,W)
0.774 (VN,M)
0.729 (VN,W)−0.074

Primary School

0.004

0.06 −0.02

Men (TH)

0.000
0.000

−0.01

0

0.01

0.02

Women (TH)Men (VN)

Women (VN)

Men and Women Aged 34−60
Age 12−14 (Both Sexes)
Some Education

School Participation−0.028Grade Progression−0.045−0.011−0.025−0.027−0.086
Stayers Mean:
0.827 (TH,M)
0.803 (TH,W)
0.785 (VN,M)
0.752 (VN,W)−0.14 −0.07

0

0.007

0.038

−0.081−0.062Child Labor

0.007

0.013
Stayers Mean:
0.777 (TH,M)
0.744 (TH,W)
0.744 (VN,M)
0.693 (VN,W)−0.0470.07 0.14 −0.16 −0.08

0

0.08

0.16 −0.4−0.099−0.2−0.010
Stayers Mean:−5.043 (TH,M)−5.179 (TH,W)−5.324 (VN,M)−5.349 (VN,W)

0

0.2−0.0090.4 −0.06 −0.03

0Stayers Mean:
0.045 (TH,M)
0.058 (TH,W)
0.066 (VN,M)
0.072 (VN,W)

0.03

0.06

Age 6−11 (Both Sexes)
Some Education

School Participation−0.003−0.005−0.009−0.012−0.0350

Stayers Mean:
0.538 (TH,M)
0.532 (TH,W)
0.510 (VN,M)
0.478 (VN,W)

0.05

Men (TH)

0.001−0.020

0.000

0.015

−0.0170.10 −0.10 −0.05

Child Labor

0.025−0.043−0.016−0.10 −0.05

Grade Progression

0

Stayers Mean:
0.534 (TH,M)
0.528 (TH,W)
0.507 (VN,M)
0.475 (VN,W)

0.05

0.10 −0.2

Women (TH)−0.047−0.1

0.001
Stayers Mean:−2.707 (TH,M)−2.783 (TH,W)−2.818 (VN,M)−2.876 (VN,W)

00.1

Men (VN)

Figure A2: Main Results – Age 6-19
A–44

Stayers Mean:
0.003 (TH,M)
0.005 (TH,W)
0.006 (VN,M)
0.006 (VN,W)

0.2 −0.02 −0.01

0.010

0

Women (VN)

0.01

0.02

Men Aged 34−60
Age 15−19
Some Education

School Participation

0.019
0.014
−0.039

−0.10

0

0.10

0.20 −0.20−0.10

Labor Force0−0.030

−0.10

0

0.10

−0.11

0

0.016

−0.10

Stayers Mean:
0.008(TH,B)
0.014(TH,G)
0.004(VN,B)
0.007(VN,G)−0.001

−0.05

0

0.05

0.10 −0.20

Low−skilled Work

−0.10

0.03

−1.2

0

1.2

0.044

0.003

0.040

0.003

−0.02

Stayers Mean:
0.304(TH,B)
0.420(TH,G)
0.314(VN,B)
0.465(VN,G)−0.080−0.226

2.4 −0.30

−0.15

0

0.15

0.30

Middle−skilled Work−0.060−0.101

0.002

Stayers Mean:
0.001(TH,B)
0.001(TH,G)
0.001(VN,B)
0.002(VN,G)

0

0.02

Stayers Mean:
0.311(TH,B)
0.437(TH,G)
0.317(VN,B)
0.475(VN,G)−0.034−0.1770.04 −0.24

−0.12

0

0.12

0.24

0.004
−0.0000.023

0−0.320High−skilled Work0.20 −0.04

1.0−0.067

0.003

0.10

0.5

−0.1230.037

0Stayers Mean:
0.000(TH,B)
0.000(TH,G)
0.000(VN,B)
0.000(VN,G)

0.008

−0.03

0.22 −2.40

Armed Forces

0.036

−0.06

−0.5

Primary Sector

Stayers Mean:
3.235(TH,B)
4.584(TH,G)
3.587(VN,B)
5.331(VN,G)−1.557

0.075

0.034
Stayers Mean:
0.006(TH,B)
0.009(TH,G)
0.005(VN,B)
0.009(VN,G)

0.11

Tertiary Sector

0.011
0.016

0.05 0.10 0.15 −1.0−0.742
Stayers Mean:
0.313(TH,B)
0.436(TH,G)
0.321(VN,B)
0.481(VN,G)−0.025

Secondary Sector−0.054−0.302−0.1520.20 −0.22

0Stayers Mean:
4.625(TH,B)
3.792(TH,G)
4.443(VN,B)
3.429(VN,G)−0.530Months Worked−0.062
Stayers Mean:
0.388(TH,B)
0.537(TH,G)
0.387(VN,B)
0.571(VN,G)−0.137

Stayers Mean:
0.005(TH,B)
0.014(TH,G)
0.004(VN,B)
0.014(VN,G)−0.0080.20 −0.15 −0.10 −0.05

0.169
Stayers Mean:
0.380(TH,B)
0.259(TH,G)
0.375(VN,B)
0.242(VN,G)−0.035−0.028−0.064

−0.20

0.10

Employed−0.011

0.317

0.029

Stayers Mean:
0.532(TH,B)
0.340(TH,G)
0.038
0.548(VN,B)
0.329(VN,G)−0.052Years of Schooling

0.045

0.033
Stayers Mean:
0.849(TH,B)
0.770(TH,G)
0.832(VN,B)
0.717(VN,G)−0.109−0.20

Primary School−0.0060.06 −0.08

0.000
0.000

−0.04

Boys (TH)

0

0.04

0.08

Girls (TH)Boys (VN)

Girls (VN)

Women Aged 34−60
Age 15−19
Some Education

School Participation

0.016
0.030
Stayers Mean:
0.836(TH,B)
0.744(TH,G)
0.794(VN,B)
0.686(VN,G)−0.075

−0.10

0

0.10

0.20 −0.15 −0.10 −0.05

0Stayers Mean:
0.362(TH,B)
0.241(TH,G)
0.377(VN,B)
0.226(VN,G)Months Worked−0.014−0.175−0.038
Stayers Mean:
0.408(TH,B)
0.550(TH,G)
0.445(VN,B)
0.606(VN,G)

−0.10

0

0.10

−0.069Secondary Sector
Stayers Mean:
0.004(TH,B)
0.011(TH,G)
0.000(VN,B)
0.003(VN,G)

−0.05

−0.11

0.11

0.22 −2.4

Tertiary Sector−0.766−1.466

−1.2

0.045

0.004

0.036

0.004

0

0.05

0.10 −0.20

−0.10

0.033

0

0.03

0.10

2.4 −0.30

0.20 −0.04

−0.02

−0.15

0.06 −0.08

Boys (TH)

−0.04

0.006

Stayers Mean:
0.000(TH,B)
0.001(TH,G)
0.002(VN,B)
0.000(VN,G)

0

0.02

0.04 −0.24

−0.12

0.08

Girls (TH)Boys (VN)

Figure A2: Main Results – Age 6-19
A–45

Stayers Mean:
0.331(TH,B)
0.453(TH,G)
0.357(VN,B)
0.523(VN,G)−0.085−0.166

0.000

0.04

0.30

−0.050

0.000

0

0.15

−0.0890.001
Stayers Mean:
0.000(TH,B)
0.000(TH,G)
0.000(VN,B)
0.000(VN,G)

0

Middle−skilled Work

0.004

0.043
0.013

0

1.2

Armed Forces

0.036
Stayers Mean:
0.008(TH,B)
0.013(TH,G)
0.011(VN,B)
0.010(VN,G)

0.090

1.0

Stayers Mean:
0.326(TH,B)
0.437(TH,G)
0.360(VN,B)
0.523(VN,G)−0.121−0.231High−skilled Work

0.016
Stayers Mean:
0.011(TH,B)
0.020(TH,G)
0.009(VN,B)
0.007(VN,G)

0.5−0.0530

0.003

Low−skilled Work

−0.03

0

0

−0.102

0.035

0.017

−0.5

Stayers Mean:
4.490(TH,B)
3.588(TH,G)
4.437(VN,B)
3.287(VN,G)

Primary Sector

Stayers Mean:
3.479(TH,B)
4.771(TH,G)
4.059(VN,B)
5.857(VN,G)

0.012

0.014

−0.155−0.520
Stayers Mean:
0.334(TH,B)
0.453(TH,G)
0.367(VN,B)
0.524(VN,G)−0.1280.20 −0.22−0.4070.05 0.10 0.15 −1.0

Employed−0.051

−0.06

0.10

0.014

−0.007−0.138−0.10

0−0.0500.220

Labor Force−0.030−0.20

Stayers Mean:
0.502(TH,B)
0.317(TH,G)
0.493(VN,B)
0.297(VN,G)

0.042

−0.10

0.330

0.020

0.005

0.20 −0.20

Years of Schooling

0.056

0.010

−0.093−0.20

Primary School−0.012Girls (VN)

0

0.12

0.24

Men Aged 34−60
Age 12−14Some Education

School Participation−0.016−0.047−0.057

Child Labor−0.045−0.0120.008−0.056−0.0750.000−0.082
Stayers Mean:
0.840(TH,B)
0.810(TH,G)
0.816(VN,B)
0.748(VN,G)−0.110−0.20 −0.10

Grade Progression

0

0.029
Stayers Mean:
0.811(TH,B)
0.741(TH,G)
0.793(VN,B)
0.688(VN,G)−0.1070.10 0.20 −0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

0.20 −1.0

0.020

Stayers Mean:
0.026 −4.999(TH,B)−5.103(TH,G)−5.188(VN,B)−5.467(VN,G)

−0.5

0

0.5

−0.0201.0 −0.10 −0.05

Stayers Mean:
0.032(TH,B)
0.058(TH,G)
0.034(VN,B)
0.097(VN,G)

0

0.05

0.10

Age 6−11
Some Education

School Participation

Grade Progression

Child Labor−0.007−0.009

0.009

0.001

−0.001−0.005

0.019

0.001

−0.044−0.001−0.049−0.068−0.20 −0.10−0.052
Stayers Mean:
0.541(TH,B)
0.528(TH,G)
0.505(VN,B)
0.506(VN,G)

0

0.10

Stayers Mean:
0.537(TH,B)
0.524(TH,G)
0.503(VN,B)
0.504(VN,G)−0.0790.20 −0.20 −0.10

Boys (TH)00.10

0.20 −1.0

Girls (TH)Stayers Mean:
0.070 −2.711(TH,B)−2.697(TH,G)−2.799(VN,B)−2.813(VN,G)

−0.5

0

0.5

Stayers Mean:−0.003 0.002(TH,B)
0.003(TH,G)
0.006(VN,B)
0.008(VN,G)

1.0 −0.10 −0.05

Boys (VN)

0

0.05

0.10

Girls (VN)

Women Aged 34−60
Age 12−14Some Education

School Participation

Grade Progression

Child Labor−0.012−0.018

0.051

0.006

−0.006−0.0210.106−0.0000.044−0.006−0.026−0.089−0.20 −0.10−0.020
Stayers Mean:
0.831(TH,B)
0.773(TH,G)
0.773(VN,B)
0.738(VN,G)

0

0.10

Stayers Mean:
0.789(TH,B)
0.694(TH,G)
0.732(VN,B)
0.661(VN,G)−0.0690.20 −0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

0.20 −1.0−0.228−0.5

0Stayers Mean:−5.098(TH,B)−5.287(TH,G)−5.330(VN,B)−5.341(VN,G)

0.5

Stayers Mean:
0.040(TH,B)
0.077(TH,G)
0.056(VN,B)
0.089(VN,G)−0.048

1.0 −0.10 −0.05

00.05 0.10

Age 6−11
Some Education

School Participation

Grade Progression

Child Labor−0.016−0.018

0.008

0.002

0.004

0.001

−0.081−0.001−0.019−0.019−0.0590.013

Stayers Mean:−0.001 0.534(TH,B)
0.510(TH,G)
0.508(VN,B)
0.438(VN,G)

Stayers Mean:−0.006 0.530(TH,B)
0.505(TH,G)
0.506(VN,B)
0.435(VN,G)−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

0.20 −0.20 −0.10

Boys (TH)00.10

0.20 −1.0

Girls (TH)Stayers Mean:
0.155−2.809(TH,B)−2.725(TH,G)−2.778(VN,B)−2.975(VN,G)

−0.5

0

0.5

Stayers Mean:

0.010 0.004(TH,B)
0.006(TH,G)
0.004(VN,B)
0.008(VN,G)

1.0 −0.10 −0.05

Boys (VN)

0

0.05

0.10

Girls (VN)

Figure A2: Main Results – Age 6-19
Note: The figure plots the point estimates of the impacts of forced displacement on educational and labormarket outcomes and their 95% confidence intervals, along with stayers mean, for the children aged 6-19
(for both sexes, for boys, and for girls) of the male and female returnees aged 34–60 from Thailand (TH)and Vietnam (VN). For the estimation method, see the notes to Figure A1 and the main text.

A–46

Men Aged 34−60 (TH)Labor Force

Employed−0.0060.010
Stayers Mean:
0.979 (MS)0.973 (LMS−I)
0.989 (AMS−I)
0.970 (LMS−II)
0.995 (AMS−II)−0.06

Stayers Mean:
0.966 (MS)0.959 (LMS−I)
0.978 (AMS−I)
0.957 (LMS−II)
0.981 (AMS−II)−0.0030.024−0.005

−0.03

0

0.03

0.06 −0.08−0.0110

0.04

Stayers Mean:
0.831 (MS)0.858 (LMS−I)
0.879 (AMS−I)
0.854 (LMS−II)
0.930 (AMS−II)−0.080−0.139

−0.28

−0.14

0

−0.06

0.14

0.28 −0.06−0.03−0.1190.03

0.06 −0.18

−0.09

0.141
0.136
0.095
0.106

0.06 −0.20

−0.10

0

0.10

0.09

0.20

Low−skilled Work
0.078
0.074
0.067
0.063
0.070

Stayers Mean:
0.020 (MS)0.013 (LMS−I)
0.023 (AMS−I)
0.016 (LMS−II)
0.019 (AMS−II)

0.18 −0.10

−0.05

0

0.05

0.10

Home Ownership
0.063−0.031−0.019−0.008−0.013−0.019

0.035
0.031
0.016
0.017

0

0

2.0

0.218

Stayers Mean:
0.879 (MS)0.890 (LMS−I)
0.914 (AMS−I)
0.875 (LMS−II)
0.941 (AMS−II)−0.049

0

−0.03

0.03

−0.110−0.111

Armed Forces

−0.06

1.0

−0.1560.019

Stayers Mean:
0.011 (MS)0.005 (LMS−I)
0.007 (AMS−I)
0.005 (LMS−II)
0.005 (AMS−II)00

Stayers Mean:
0.126 (MS)0.100 (LMS−I)
0.086 (AMS−I)
0.100 (LMS−II)
0.054 (AMS−II)

Middle−skilled Work−0.0000.003
0.001−0.005

−0.03

−1.0

Stayers Mean:
10.630 (MS)10.338 (LMS−I)
10.487 (AMS−I)
10.152 (LMS−II)
10.596 (AMS−II)

Tertiary Sector

0.029
0.031
0.018
0.011
0.019

Stayers Mean:
0.015 (MS)0.008 (LMS−I)
0.016 (AMS−I)
0.011 (LMS−II)
0.005 (AMS−II)

High−skilled Work
Stayers Mean:
0.062 (MS)0.059 (LMS−I)
0.037 (AMS−I)
0.068 (LMS−II)
0.024 (AMS−II)

0.08 −2.0

Secondary Sector−0.263−0.171−0.166−0.260−0.288−0.224−0.146−0.436

0.014

−0.04

Primary Sector

Months Worked−0.025−0.007−0.019

0.03

0.06

MS

−0.06

−0.03

LMS−I

Stayers Mean:
0.990 (MS)0.995 (LMS−I)
0.990 (AMS−I)
0.992 (LMS−II)
1.000 (AMS−II)

0

0.03

AMS−I

0.06

LMS−IIAMS−II

Women Aged 34−60 (TH)Labor Force

Employed−0.074

−0.08

0

0.08

0.16

−1.170−0.043−0.073−0.057−0.103

Stayers Mean:
0.865 (MS)0.851 (LMS−I)
0.867 (AMS−I)
0.864 (LMS−II)
0.903 (AMS−II)−0.095

−0.16

−0.16

−0.08

Primary Sector−0.140−0.178−0.102−0.144

−0.12

0

−0.02

0.12

0.24 −0.04

0

−0.02

−0.02

−0.01

0

1.2

0.01

0.02 −0.24

0.02

0.04 −0.14

0.120
0.094
0.103
0.041
0.024

−0.07

0

0.07

0

0.12

0.14

Low−skilled Work

Stayers Mean:
0.820 (MS)0.809 (LMS−I)
0.836 (AMS−I)
0.829 (LMS−II)
0.882 (AMS−II)

−0.12

2.4

Tertiary Sector
Stayers Mean:
0.052 (MS)0.048 (LMS−I)
0.034 (AMS−I)
0.024 (LMS−II)
0.027 (AMS−II)−0.113−0.148−0.094−0.156

0.078
0.067
0.070

Stayers Mean:
0.025 (MS)0.028 (LMS−I)
0.024 (AMS−I)
0.022 (LMS−II)
0.016 (AMS−II)0.24 −0.10

−0.05

0.038
0.047

0

0.05

0.10

Home Ownership

0.002
0.003
0.004
0.000
0.000

0

0

Stayers Mean:
9.037 (MS)8.701 (LMS−I)
8.934 (AMS−I)
8.762 (LMS−II)9.328 (AMS−II)−0.175

Armed Forces
Stayers Mean:
0.000 (MS)0.001 (LMS−I)
0.000 (AMS−I)
0.000 (LMS−II)
0.000 (AMS−II)−1.2

Middle−skilled Work

0.005
0.002
0.005
0.000
0.000

−0.01

0.16 −2.4

0.009
0.005
0.006
0.005
0.011

Stayers Mean:
0.007 (MS)0.007 (LMS−I)
0.007 (AMS−I)
0.005 (LMS−II)
0.000 (AMS−II)

High−skilled Work
Stayers Mean:
0.009 (MS)0.005 (LMS−I)
0.001 (AMS−I)
0.000 (LMS−II)
0.000 (AMS−II)

0.08

Secondary Sector
Stayers Mean:
0.795 (MS)0.788 (LMS−I)
0.821 (AMS−I)
0.821 (LMS−II)
0.871 (AMS−II)0−0.398−0.751−0.788−1.296

Stayers Mean:
0.843 (MS)0.831 (LMS−I)
0.852 (AMS−I)
0.835 (LMS−II)
0.890 (AMS−II)−0.219−0.24

Months Worked−0.095−0.028−0.054−0.051−0.034−0.028−0.0270.002−0.0190.01

MS0.02 −0.06

LMS−I

−0.03

0

AMS−I

Stayers Mean:
0.990 (MS)0.992 (LMS−I)
0.994 (AMS−I)
0.981 (LMS−II)
1.000 (AMS−II)

0.03

0.06

LMS−IIAMS−II

Figure A3: Robustness Check – Alternative Specifications (Age 34-60, TH)
Notes: MS – Matched Samples; LMS-I – Limited Matched Samples I (constructed based on the treatedunits included in both MS and AMS-I); AMS-I – Alternative Matched Samples I (constructed based on
the alternative specifications for propensity score, with district of birth fixed effects for children born in
1975–1983; LMS-II – Alternative Matched Samples II (constructed based on the treated units included inboth MS and AMS-II); and AMS-II – Alternative Matched Samples II (constructed based on the alternative
specifications for propensity score, with the characteristics of both husbands and wives and district of birth
fixed effects for children born in 1975–1983).

A–47

Men Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 15−19 (Both Sexes)
Some Education

School Participation

0.021
Stayers Mean:
0.807 (MS)0.745 (LMS−I)
0.733 (AMS−I)
0.715 (LMS−II)
0.729 (AMS−II)−0.20−0.0300.064−0.0300.005−0.0900

0.10

0.20 −0.20−0.10

Labor Force0

Stayers Mean:
0.460 (MS)0.519 (LMS−I)
0.553 (AMS−I)
0.553 (LMS−II)
0.543 (AMS−II)

Stayers Mean:
0.373 (MS)0.415 (LMS−I)
0.449 (AMS−I)
0.430 (LMS−II)
0.478 (AMS−II)

0.047
0.099

0

0.12

0.24 −0.24

Secondary Sector

0.091
0.058

0

−0.0010.02

0.04 −0.06

0.12

Low−skilled Work0

3.0 −0.26

0.03

0.094
0.066

−0.13

0

0.06 −0.02−0.0770.006−0.001−0.0010

0.26

Middle−skilled Work
Stayers Mean:
0.373 (MS)0.409 (LMS−I)
0.457 (AMS−I)
0.417 (LMS−II)
0.476 (AMS−II)

0.004

−0.01

0.13

0.01

0.02 −0.24−0.007
0.092
0.049

−0.12

0

0.12

0.24

0.002
0.004
Stayers Mean:
0.000 (MS)0.000 (LMS−I)
0.000 (AMS−I)
0.000 (LMS−II)
0.000 (AMS−II)

0.027
0.026

0

1.5

−0.0180.003
Stayers Mean:
0.001 (MS)0.002 (LMS−I)
0.000 (AMS−I)
0.006 (LMS−II)
0.003 (AMS−II)

0.8

Armed Forces

0.030

−0.03

0

Stayers Mean:
0.361 (MS)0.405 (LMS−I)
0.448 (AMS−I)
0.414 (LMS−II)
0.468 (AMS−II)

0.003

0.009

0.033

−0.06

0.981

−1.5

0.4

Primary Sector

High−skilled Work

0.029

0.032
Stayers Mean:
0.008 (MS)0.007 (LMS−I)
0.008 (AMS−I)
0.011 (LMS−II)
0.004 (AMS−II)0.24 −3.0

0.035

−0.03

0

−0.004

0.542

0.039
Stayers Mean:
0.011 (MS)0.005 (LMS−I)
0.011 (AMS−I)
0.010 (LMS−II)
0.010 (AMS−II)−0.4−0.090

0.202

0.038

−0.0050

Stayers Mean:
3.890 (MS)4.128 (LMS−I)
4.673 (AMS−I)
4.208 (LMS−II)
4.790 (AMS−II)

Tertiary Sector

0.014

0.16 −0.8

0.232

0.029

−0.12

0.08

−0.503

0.010

−0.02

0

Months Worked

0.013

−0.04

−0.08

0.032

0.038

Stayers Mean:
0.009 (MS)0.008 (LMS−I)
0.005 (AMS−I)
0.010 (LMS−II)
0.006 (AMS−II)

0.20 −0.16−0.043
0.048

−0.12

0.10

0.006
−0.001

0.239 Stayers Mean:
4.197 (MS)3.786 (LMS−I)
3.709 (AMS−I)−0.0083.424 (LMS−II)
0.195 3.438 (AMS−II)−0.076−0.070−0.021

Employed−0.030−0.24−0.030
Stayers Mean:
0.439 (MS)0.365 (LMS−I)
0.352 (AMS−I)
0.325 (LMS−II)
0.363 (AMS−II)

Years of Schooling

Stayers Mean:
0.319 (MS)0.286 (LMS−I)
0.253 (AMS−I)
0.223 (LMS−II)0.214 (AMS−II)

0.032−0.033−0.003−0.10

Primary School

0.004

0.007

0.03

0.06 −0.02

MS

0.004
0.000
0.000

−0.01

0

0.01

LMS−I

0.02

AMS−I

LMS−IIAMS−II

Women Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 15−19 (Both Sexes)
Some Education

School Participation

0.025
0.004
Stayers Mean:
0.789 (MS)0.759 (LMS−I)
0.695 (AMS−I)
0.710 (LMS−II)
0.729 (AMS−II)−0.20−0.042

0.022
0.026

−0.061−0.0900

0.10

0.20 −0.20−0.10

Labor Force

0

−0.12

0.099

0

0.12

0.24 −0.24−0.12

Stayers Mean: −0.708
4.158 (MS)4.390 (LMS−I)
4.994 (AMS−I)
4.511 (LMS−II)
4.790 (AMS−II)

0.074
0.058

0

0.12

0.001
−0.0010

0.02

0.04 −0.06

Low−skilled Work

−0.03

−0.06

0.039

0.03

−0.013

0.542

0

1.5

3.0 −0.24

−0.12

0.009

0.03

0.06 −0.02

−0.01

0

0.12

0.06 −0.02

MS

−0.01

−0.005−0.001−0.0010.01

0.02 −0.20

−0.10

0.077
0.049

0

0.001
0.000
0.000

0

LMS−I

0.01

0.02

AMS−I

LMS−IIAMS−II

Figure A4: Robustness Check – Alternative Specifications (Age 6-19, TH)
A–48

0.24

−0.068
Stayers−0.120
Mean:
0.395 (MS)0.421 (LMS−I)
0.496 (AMS−I)
0.430 (LMS−II)
0.476 (AMS−II)

0.001

0

0.086
0.066

Middle−skilled Work

0.000

−0.0010.8−0.081
Stayers −0.132
Mean:
0.384 (MS)0.408 (LMS−I)
0.488 (AMS−I)
0.423 (LMS−II)
0.468 (AMS−II)

0.003
Stayers Mean:
0.001 (MS)0.003 (LMS−I)
0.001 (AMS−I)
0.005 (LMS−II)
0.003 (AMS−II)

0.4

0.002

0.026

0

−1.5

0

Primary Sector

High−skilled Work

0.038

0

−0.4

0.001
Stayers Mean:
0.000 (MS)0.000 (LMS−I)
0.000 (AMS−I)
0.000 (LMS−II)
0.000 (AMS−II)

0.010

−0.03

0.16 −0.8

Armed Forces

0.039
0.030
Stayers Mean:
0.010 (MS)0.016 (LMS−I)
0.010 (AMS−I)
0.018 (LMS−II)
0.004 (AMS−II)0.24 −3.0

0.022
Stayers Mean:
0.015 (MS)0.025 (LMS−I)
0.012 (AMS−I)
0.025 (LMS−II)
0.010 (AMS−II)

0.08

0.443

0.041

0.018

−0.0780.235

Tertiary Sector

0.016

−0.02

0

Months Worked

0.016

−0.04

−0.08

0.268
0.089
0.056
−0.076−0.323

Stayers Mean:−0.086
0.396 (MS)0.426 (LMS−I)
0.495 (AMS−I)
0.441 (LMS−II)
0.478 (AMS−II)

Secondary Sector
Stayers Mean:
0.007 (MS)0.007 (LMS−I)
0.008 (AMS−I)
0.005 (LMS−II)
0.006 (AMS−II)

0.20 −0.16

0.029

0.059

Years of Schooling
Stayers Mean:
4.036 (MS)3.821 (LMS−I)
3.376 (AMS−I)
3.551 (LMS−II)3.438 (AMS−II)−0.021−0.026

0.032

−0.24

0.10

Stayers Mean:
0.036
0.301 (MS)0.000
0.284 (LMS−I)
0.244 (AMS−I)−0.0080.263 (LMS−II)0.214 (AMS−II)−0.046

Employed−0.015
Stayers Mean: −0.054
0.481 (MS)0.528 (LMS−I)
0.573 (AMS−I)
0.538 (LMS−II)
0.543 (AMS−II)

Stayers Mean:
0.407 (MS)0.358 (LMS−I)
0.317 (AMS−I)
0.342 (LMS−II)
0.363 (AMS−II)

0.034

0.005

−0.10

Primary School−0.0040.10

0.20

Men Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 12−14 (Both Sexes)
Some Education

School Participation−0.028Child Labor−0.0250.007−0.045−0.048−0.047−0.106−0.116−0.104−0.061

0

0.10

0.011

−0.265−0.053

Stayers Mean:
0.827 (MS)0.767 (LMS−I)
0.811 (AMS−I)
0.729 (LMS−II)
0.741 (AMS−II)−0.082−0.20 −0.10

Grade Progression

Stayers Mean:
0.827 (MS)0.767 (LMS−I)
0.811 (AMS−I)
0.729 (LMS−II)
0.741 (AMS−II)−0.0740.20 −0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

0.20 −0.8

0.029−0.144−0.275−0.4

0Stayers Mean:
0.827 (MS)0.767 (LMS−I)
0.811 (AMS−I)
0.729 (LMS−II)
0.741 (AMS−II)

0.4−0.021

Stayers Mean:
0.827 (MS)0.010 0.767 (LMS−I)
0.811 (AMS−I)
0.729 (LMS−II)
0.741 (AMS−II)

0.8 −0.10 −0.05

0

0.05

0.10

Age 6−11 (Both Sexes)
Some Education

School Participation

Grade Progression

Child Labor−0.003−0.005

0.025

0.001

0.011

0.013

−0.037−0.0380.038
Stayers Mean:
0.538 (MS)0.491 (LMS−I)
0.529 (AMS−I)
0.424 (LMS−II)
0.478 (AMS−II)−0.077−0.20 −0.10−0.10100.10

0.20 −0.20 −0.10

MS

0.004
0.032
Stayers Mean:
0.538 (MS)0.491 (LMS−I)
0.529 (AMS−I)
0.424 (LMS−II)
0.478 (AMS−II)−0.076

0.002

0

0.10

LMS−I

0.20 −0.6−0.162

Stayers Mean:
0.538 (MS)0.491 (LMS−I)
0.529 (AMS−I)
0.424 (LMS−II)
0.478 (AMS−II)−0.169

−0.3

AMS−I

0.002

0

0.001
−0.0120.3

0.6 −0.04 −0.02

LMS−IIAMS−II

Stayers Mean:
0.538 (MS)0.491 (LMS−I)
0.529 (AMS−I)
0.424 (LMS−II)
0.478 (AMS−II)

0

0.02

0.04

Women Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 12−14 (Both Sexes)
Some Education

School Participation−0.011Child Labor

0.038

0.007

−0.027−0.067−0.083−0.048−0.132−0.062−0.0650

0.10

Stayers Mean:
0.803 (MS)0.783 (LMS−I)
0.747 (AMS−I)
0.727 (LMS−II)
0.741 (AMS−II)−0.0740.20 −0.20 −0.10

0.013−0.093−0.086

Stayers Mean:
0.803 (MS)0.783 (LMS−I)
0.747 (AMS−I)
0.727 (LMS−II)
0.741 (AMS−II)−0.082−0.20 −0.10

Grade Progression

0

0.10

0.20 −0.8−0.254

Stayers Mean:
0.803 (MS)0.783 (LMS−I)
0.747 (AMS−I)
0.727 (LMS−II)
0.741 (AMS−II)−0.275−0.4−0.008

0

0.4

0.029

Stayers Mean:
0.803 (MS)0.783 (LMS−I)
0.747 (AMS−I)
0.727 (LMS−II)
0.741 (AMS−II)

0.010

0.8 −0.10 −0.05

0

0.05

0.10

Age 6−11 (Both Sexes)
Some Education

School Participation

Grade Progression

Child Labor−0.009−0.012−0.0200.000−0.018−0.019−0.037−0.001−0.077−0.20 −0.10

0−0.168−0.041

Stayers Mean:
0.532 (MS)0.503 (LMS−I)
0.500 (AMS−I)
0.457 (LMS−II)
0.478 (AMS−II)

0.10−0.002−0.0760.20 −0.20 −0.10

MS

0

LMS−I

−0.001−0.078

Stayers Mean:
0.532 (MS)0.503 (LMS−I)
0.500 (AMS−I)
0.457 (LMS−II)
0.478 (AMS−II)

0.10

0.20 −0.6

AMS−I−0.099−0.169

−0.3

0

0.003

Stayers Mean:
0.532 (MS)0.503 (LMS−I)
0.500 (AMS−I)
0.457 (LMS−II)
0.478 (AMS−II)−0.010

Stayers Mean:
0.532 (MS)0.503 (LMS−I)
0.500 (AMS−I)
0.457 (LMS−II)
0.478 (AMS−II)−0.0120.3

0.6 −0.04 −0.02

LMS−IIAMS−II

0

0.02

Figure A4: Robustness Check – Alternative Specifications (Age 6-19, TH)
Note: See the notes to Figure A3.

A–49

0.04

Men Aged 34−60 (TH)Labor Force

−0.04

−0.02

0

Employed

0.02

0.04 −0.06

Primary Sector

−0.30

−0.15

0

0.15

−0.02

0

0.02

0.30 −0.06

−0.03

−0.05

0

All

0.05

UNHCR

0.03

0.06 −0.8

00.03

0.04 −0.18

−0.09

0

0.09

−0.4

0

0.4

0.8

Tertiary Sector

0.06 −0.24

Middle−skilled Work

Armed Forces

−0.10

0

Secondary Sector

High−skilled Work

−0.04

−0.03

Months Worked

−0.12

0

0.12

0.24

Low−skilled Work

0.18 −0.12

−0.06

0

0.06

0.12

Home Ownership0.10 −0.04

−0.02

0

UNBRO

0.02

0.04

UNHCR (1992−93)

UNBRO (1992−93)

Women Aged 34−60 (TH)Labor Force

−0.14

−0.07

0

Employed

0.07

0.14 −0.16

Primary Sector

−0.30

−0.15

0

0.15

−0.01

0

0.01

0.30 −0.02

−0.01

−0.01

All

0

0.01

UNHCR

0.08

0.16 −1.6

0

0.01

0.02 −0.24

−0.12

0

0.12

−0.8

0

0.8

1.6

Tertiary Sector

0.02 −0.16

Middle−skilled Work

Armed Forces

−0.02

0

Secondary Sector

High−skilled Work

−0.02

−0.08

Months Worked

−0.08

0

0.08

0.16

Low−skilled Work0.24 −0.12

−0.06

0

0.06

0.12

Home Ownership

0.02 −0.04

UNBRO

−0.02

0

0.02

0.04

UNHCR (1992−93)

UNBRO (1992−93)

Figure A5: Robustness Check and Heterogeneity – Refugee Camps (Age 34-60, TH)
A–50

Men Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 15−19 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.08 −0.04

0

0.04

School Participation

0.08 −0.14 −0.07

Labor Force−0.10 −0.05

0

0

0.05

0.10 −0.10 −0.05

0All

0.14 −0.12 −0.06

0.02

0.04 −0.06 −0.03

0.03

0

0.05

0

0.03

0

0.06

Years of Schooling

0.12

−0.8

Months Worked

0.10 −1.2

Tertiary Sector

Low−skilled Work−0.06 −0.03

0.07

Employed

Secondary Sector−0.04 −0.02

0Primary School

−0.6

0

0.6

High−skilled Work0.06 −0.02 −0.01

0

0.01

−0.4

0

0.4

0.8

Primary Sector

1.2 −0.16 −0.08

0

0.08

0.16

Middle−skilled Work0.02 −0.14 −0.07

0

0.07

0.14

Armed forces

0.06 −0.02 −0.01

UNHCR

0

0.01

0.02

UNBRO

UNHCR (1992−93)

UNBRO (1992−93)

Women Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 15−19 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.08 −0.04

0School Participation

0.04

0.08 −0.14 −0.07

Labor Force−0.10 −0.05

0

0

0.05

0.10 −0.10 −0.05

0

0.02

All

0.03

0.14 −0.12 −0.06

0

0.05

0.04 −0.06 −0.03

0.03

0.06

0.10 −1.2

−0.6

0

0.6

High−skilled Work0.06 −0.02 −0.01

0

0.01

Years of Schooling

0.12 −0.8

−0.4

0

0.4

0

0.01

UNBRO

1.2 −0.16 −0.08

0

0.08

0.02 −0.14 −0.07

0

0.07

UNBRO (1992−93)

Figure A6: Robustness Check and Heterogeneity – Refugee Camps (Age 6-19, TH)
A–51

0.16

Middle−skilled Work

0.02

UNHCR (1992−93)

0.8

Primary Sector

Armed forces

0.06 −0.02 −0.01

UNHCR

0

0

Months Worked

Tertiary Sector

Low−skilled Work−0.06 −0.03

0.07

Employed

Secondary Sector−0.04 −0.02

0Primary School

0.14

Men Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 12−14 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.14 −0.07

0

0.07

School Participation

0.14 −0.10 −0.05

0

0.05

Grade Progression

0.10 −0.4

−0.2

0

0.2

Child Labor

0.4 −0.06 −0.03

0

0.03

0.06

Age 6−11 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.06 −0.03

0All

School Participation

0.03 0.06 −0.06 −0.03

UNHCR

0

0.03

UNBRO

Grade Progression

0.06 −0.4

−0.2

0

0.2

Child Labor

0.4 −0.02 −0.01

UNHCR (1992−93)

0

0.01

0.02

UNBRO (1992−93)

Women Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 12−14 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.14 −0.07

0School Participation

0.07 0.14−0.10 −0.05

0Grade Progression

0.05 0.10 −0.4 −0.2

00.2Child Labor

0.4 −0.06 −0.03

0

0.03

0.06

Age 6−11 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.06 −0.03

0All0.03 0.06

School Participation−0.06 −0.03

UNHCR

0

Grade Progression

0.03 0.06 −0.4

UNBRO

−0.2

0

0.2

UNHCR (1992−93)

Child Labor

0.4 −0.02 −0.01

0

0.01

0.02

UNBRO (1992−93)

Figure A6: Robustness Check and Heterogeneity – Refugee Camps (Age 6-19, TH)
A–52

Men Aged 34−60 (TH)Labor Force

Employed−0.006−0.006
Stayers Mean:
0.979 (MS)0.978 (AMS−III)
0.977 (LAMS−III−A)
0.980 (LAMS−III−B)−0.001−0.01−0.260−0.031−0.013−0.02

Months Worked−0.02500.01−0.373
Stayers Mean:
0.966 (MS)0.967 (AMS−III)
0.965 (LAMS−III−A)
0.970 (LAMS−III−B)−0.022−0.0480.02 −0.06−0.03

Primary Sector

0

0.03

0.06 −1.0−0.5

Secondary Sector−0.263

Stayers Mean:
10.630 (MS)10.691 (AMS−III)
10.634 (LAMS−III−A)
10.806 (LAMS−III−B)−0.175−0.725

0

0.5

1.0

Tertiary Sector
0.029−0.289

0.218

0.032
Stayers Mean:
0.831 (MS)0.828 (AMS−III)
0.828 (LAMS−III−A)
0.830 (LAMS−III−B)−0.274−0.316

−0.30

−0.15

0

0.15

Stayers Mean:
0.015 (MS)0.015 (AMS−III)
0.014 (LAMS−III−A)
0.017 (LAMS−III−B)

0.30 −0.04

−0.02

0

−0.26

−0.13

0

0.13

0.02

0.078
0.098

−0.168−0.2080.04 −0.24

−0.12

0

0.12

Stayers Mean:
0.020 (MS)0.018 (AMS−III)
0.017 (LAMS−III−A)
0.019 (LAMS−III−B)

0.24 −0.12

−0.06

0.092
0.111

0

0.06

0.12

Home Ownership−0.031

0.066
Stayers Mean:
0.011 (MS)0.011 (AMS−III)
0.011 (LAMS−III−A)
0.013 (LAMS−III−B)−0.044

0.060

0.05

MS

Stayers Mean:
0.990 (MS)0.989 (AMS−III)
0.988 (LAMS−III−A)
0.989 (LAMS−III−B)−0.025

0.079

0

0.26

Low−skilled Work

Stayers Mean:
0.879 (MS)0.881 (AMS−III)
0.880 (LAMS−III−A)
0.883 (LAMS−III−B)

0.063

−0.05

0.04

0.250

−0.181

Stayers Mean:
0.007
0.062 (MS)0.062 (AMS−III)
0.061 (LAMS−III−A)
0.062 (LAMS−III−B)

Armed Forces

−0.10

0.02

0.233

−0.156−0.000−0.04

0Middle−skilled Work−0.000−0.013

0.036

−0.02

High−skilled Work

0.240
Stayers Mean:
0.126 (MS)0.129 (AMS−III)
0.128 (LAMS−III−A)
0.130 (LAMS−III−B)

0.031−0.0840.10 −0.10

−0.05

0

AMS−III

0.05

0.10

LAMS−III−A

LAMS−III−B

Women Aged 34−60 (TH)Labor Force

Employed−0.074−0.097−1.170−0.123
Stayers Mean:
0.865 (MS)0.869 (AMS−III)
0.872 (LAMS−III−A)
0.865 (LAMS−III−B)−0.084−0.124

−0.14

−0.07

0

0.07

−1.460
Stayers Mean:
0.843 (MS)0.846 (AMS−III)
0.849 (LAMS−III−A)
0.840 (LAMS−III−B)−0.104−0.1610.14 −0.18−0.09

Primary Sector

0

−1.2

0

1.2

Stayers Mean:
0.795 (MS)0.797 (AMS−III)
0.799 (LAMS−III−A)
0.793 (LAMS−III−B)−0.326

−0.17

0

0.17

Stayers Mean:
0.007 (MS)0.009 (AMS−III)
0.010 (LAMS−III−A)
0.008 (LAMS−III−B)

0.34 −0.04

−0.02

0.120

High−skilled Work

0.003

0.01

0.02 −0.30

0.08

−0.15

0

0.15

0.30 −0.12

−0.06

0.085
0.108

0

−0.034−0.051

0.001

Stayers Mean:
0.990 (MS)0.990 (AMS−III)
0.990 (LAMS−III−A)
0.990 (LAMS−III−B)−0.0340.004−0.0860.01

MS0.02 −0.10−0.05

AMS−III

0.16

0.093
Stayers Mean:
0.025 (MS)0.024 (AMS−III)
0.024 (LAMS−III−A)
0.026 (LAMS−III−B)

Home Ownership

0.002

0

0

Low−skilled Work

Stayers Mean:
0.820 (MS)0.821 (AMS−III)
0.825 (LAMS−III−A)
0.812 (LAMS−III−B)−0.271

0.002

−0.01

−0.08

0.078

−0.189

Armed Forces
Stayers Mean:
0.000 (MS)0.000 (AMS−III)
0.000 (LAMS−III−A)
0.000 (LAMS−III−B)

0.04 −0.16

0.155−0.216

0.005

0

0.02

0.129

−0.175

0.004

−0.01

0.015

Middle−skilled Work

0.005
Stayers Mean:
0.009 (MS)0.010 (AMS−III)
0.008 (LAMS−III−A)
0.013 (LAMS−III−B)

0.137
Stayers Mean:
0.052 (MS)0.049 (AMS−III)
0.049 (LAMS−III−A)
0.050 (LAMS−III−B)

0.006

0

2.4

Tertiary Sector

0.010−0.233−0.02

0.18 −2.4

0.009−0.263

−0.02

0.09

Stayers Mean:
9.037 (MS)9.148 (AMS−III)
9.148 (LAMS−III−A)
9.151 (LAMS−III−B)−1.211−1.968

Secondary Sector−0.219−0.34

Months Worked−0.0950

0.05

LAMS−III−A

0.10

LAMS−III−B

Figure A7: Robustness Check – Alternative Samples (Age 20-60, TH)
A–53

0.06

0.12

Men Aged 20−33 (TH)Some Education
Stayers Mean:
0.774 (MS)0.775 (AMS−III)
0.761 (LAMS−III−A)
0.790 (LAMS−III−B)

−0.08

−0.04

Primary School

1.060

0.055

0.109

1.029

Stayers Mean:
0.363 (MS)0.379 (AMS−III)
0.358 (LAMS−III−A)
0.401 (LAMS−III−B)

0.058

0.04

0.08 −0.14−0.07

Employed

0.112

0

0.07

−0.05

0

0.05

−0.6

0

0.6

0.235
0.277

0

0.15

Stayers Mean:
0.029 (MS)0.030 (AMS−III)
0.031 (LAMS−III−A)
0.028 (LAMS−III−B)

Armed Forces

−0.02

−0.04

0.03

Secondary Sector

−0.20

0.02

0

0.20

0.40 −0.06

−0.03

0.033
0.047

0

0.03

0.074

−0.206

0.096
Stayers Mean:
0.838 (MS)0.826 (AMS−III)
0.834 (LAMS−III−A)
0.819 (LAMS−III−B)−0.167−0.2460.04 −0.30

0.06

Low−skilled Work

−0.147

0.025

0

0.039
Stayers Mean:
0.015 (MS)0.017 (AMS−III)
0.018 (LAMS−III−A)
0.015 (LAMS−III−B)

Middle−skilled Work

0.022

0.06

−0.15

0

0.15

Stayers Mean:
0.022 (MS)0.027 (AMS−III)
0.026 (LAMS−III−A)
0.029 (LAMS−III−B)

0.30 −0.12

−0.06

0.089
0.102

0

0.06

0.12

−0.055

0.032

Stayers Mean:
0.838 (MS)0.826 (AMS−III)
0.834 (LAMS−III−A)
0.819 (LAMS−III−B)−0.0350.068

00−0.045

0.049

−0.08

−0.03

Home Ownership

0.042
Stayers Mean:
0.010 (MS)0.008 (AMS−III)
0.007 (LAMS−III−A)
0.008 (LAMS−III−B)

1.2 −0.40

0.023

0.30 −0.04

1.4 −0.06

0.032−0.375

0.024

0.196

0.7

−0.032

Stayers Mean:
0.798 (MS)0.789 (AMS−III)
0.793 (LAMS−III−A)
0.784 (LAMS−III−B)−0.252High−skilled Work

0.194
Stayers Mean:
0.087 (MS)0.085 (AMS−III)
0.086 (LAMS−III−A)
0.084 (LAMS−III−B)

0

Stayers Mean:
0.932 (MS)0.926 (AMS−III)
0.932 (LAMS−III−A)
0.921 (LAMS−III−B)−0.0141.073−0.312−0.9410.10 −1.2

0.968

Primary Sector

Stayers Mean:
9.543 (MS)9.607 (AMS−III)
9.604 (LAMS−III−A)
9.610 (LAMS−III−B)−0.242

Tertiary Sector

−0.15

−0.7

0.002
−0.022−0.233−0.587
Stayers Mean:
0.893 (MS)0.886 (AMS−III)
0.892 (LAMS−III−A)
0.880 (LAMS−III−B)−0.081−0.30

0.14 −1.4−0.084−0.058−0.10

Stayers Mean:
4.373 (MS)4.497 (AMS−III)
4.349 (LAMS−III−A)
4.653 (LAMS−III−B)

0.102

Months Worked−0.014−0.036

Labor Force

0.111

0.051

0

Years of Schooling

0.051

0.04

−0.0750.08 −0.10

−0.05

MS

0

0.05

AMS−III

0.10

LAMS−III−A

LAMS−III−B

Women Aged 20−33 (TH)Some Education

Primary School

Stayers Mean:
0.646 (MS)0.652 (AMS−III)
0.639 (LAMS−III−A)
0.672 (LAMS−III−B)−0.010−0.010−0.011−0.007

−0.04

−0.02

0

0.02

0.04 −0.06−0.03

Employed

00.06 −0.4

Stayers Mean:
0.796 (MS)0.800 (AMS−III)
0.798 (LAMS−III−A)
0.802 (LAMS−III−B)−0.1990

0.12

Tertiary Sector

0

−0.07

0

0.07

0.003

0.112

Stayers Mean:
0.004
0.012 (MS)0.013 (AMS−III)
0.000
0.014 (LAMS−III−A)
0.013 (LAMS−III−B)

Armed Forces−0.01

2.6 −0.40

−0.20

0

0.10

Secondary Sector
0.022

0

0.20

Stayers Mean:
0.007 (MS)0.007 (AMS−III)
0.007 (LAMS−III−A)
0.008 (LAMS−III−B)

0.40 −0.06

Middle−skilled Work

−0.03

0.013
0.036

0

0.03

0.067
0.078
Stayers Mean:
0.776 (MS)0.774 (AMS−III)
0.774 (LAMS−III−A)
0.776 (LAMS−III−B)−0.189−0.2710.02 −0.30

−0.15

0.06

Low−skilled Work−0.166−0.221

0.01

0.20

0

0.15

Stayers Mean:
0.018 (MS)0.022 (AMS−III)
0.021 (LAMS−III−A)
0.022 (LAMS−III−B)

0.30 −0.10

−0.05

0.073
0.087

0

0.05

0.10

−0.0530.002

Stayers Mean:
0.776 (MS)0.774 (AMS−III)
0.774 (LAMS−III−A)
0.776 (LAMS−III−B)−0.038

0.003

0

0

−0.039

0.002

−0.01

−0.10

Home Ownership

0.002
Stayers Mean:
0.000 (MS)0.001 (AMS−III)
0.000 (LAMS−III−A)
0.001 (LAMS−III−B)

1.3

0.117

0.14 −0.02

0.4 −0.20

Stayers Mean:
0.753 (MS)0.751 (AMS−III)
0.751 (LAMS−III−A)
0.752 (LAMS−III−B)−0.342

0.006

0.125

0.2

0.013

−0.235High−skilled Work

0.101
Stayers Mean:
0.047 (MS)0.051 (AMS−III)
0.050 (LAMS−III−A)
0.052 (LAMS−III−B)−0.099−0.153

Primary Sector

Stayers Mean:
8.417 (MS)8.485 (AMS−III)
8.433 (LAMS−III−A)
8.568 (LAMS−III−B)−2.216−1.3−0.120−0.276−1.2180.24 −2.6

0

Stayers Mean:
0.840 (MS)0.844 (AMS−III)
0.840 (LAMS−III−A)
0.848 (LAMS−III−B)−0.082−0.204−1.594

−0.12

−0.2

−1.139−0.115

−0.02

0.136

Months Worked−0.146

−0.14

0.03

Labor Force

Stayers Mean:
3.067 (MS)3.124 (AMS−III)−0.0033.067 (LAMS−III−A)
3.214(LAMS−III−B)−0.086−0.0050.024−0.097−0.24

Years of Schooling

Stayers Mean:
0.201 (MS)0.210 (AMS−III)−0.0030.212 (LAMS−III−A)
0.208(LAMS−III−B)−0.0190.001−0.0810.01

0.02 −0.10

MS

−0.05

0

AMS−III

0.05

0.10

LAMS−III−A

LAMS−III−B

Figure A7: Robustness Check – Alternative Samples (Age 20-60, TH)
Notes: MS – Matched Samples; AMS-III – Alternative Matched Samples III (constructed based on an alternative definition of former refugees); LAMS-III-A – Limited Alternative Matched Samples III-A (constructedbased on the treated units included in both MS and AMS-III); and LAMS-III-B – Limited Alternative
Matched Samples III-B (constructed based on the treated units included in AMS-III, but not in MS).

A–54

Men Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 15−19 (Both Sexes)
Some Education
Stayers Mean:
0.807 (MS)0.813 (AMS−III)
0.810 (LAMS−III−A)
0.824 (LAMS−III−B)

School Participation

0.021
0.008
0.031

−0.002−0.006−0.03

00.06 −0.06

−0.03

0

0.03

−0.04

Employed−0.503−0.030−0.053−0.549−0.05

0Stayers Mean:
0.460 (MS)0.450 (AMS−III)
0.452 (LAMS−III−A)
0.444 (LAMS−III−B)

0.05

0.10 −0.14

−0.07

0

0.07

0.015

−0.02

0

0.02

0.04 −0.08

Low−skilled Work

−0.04

0

0.7

1.4 −0.20

−0.10

−0.01

0.10

0.20

Middle−skilled Work−0.0770.003

0.08 −0.02

0−0.0960.004

Stayers Mean:
0.373 (MS)0.371 (AMS−III)
0.372 (LAMS−III−A)
0.371 (LAMS−III−B)−0.071

0.002−0.14500.01

0.02 −0.20

−0.10

0

0.10

0.20

0.002
0.004
Stayers Mean:
0.000 (MS)0.000 (AMS−III)
0.001 (LAMS−III−A)
0.001 (LAMS−III−B)

0.037
0.048

0

0.04

0.8

Stayers Mean:
0.361 (MS)0.359 (AMS−III)
0.358 (LAMS−III−A)
0.360 (LAMS−III−B)−0.0860.003
Stayers Mean:
0.001 (MS)0.001 (AMS−III)
0.001 (LAMS−III−A)
0.001 (LAMS−III−B)

0.4−0.161High−skilled Work

0.057

0.041

−0.04

−0.7

0

Armed Forces

0.032
Stayers Mean:
0.008 (MS)0.006 (AMS−III)
0.005 (LAMS−III−A)
0.007 (LAMS−III−B)−0.4

Primary Sector

Stayers Mean:
3.890 (MS)3.862 (AMS−III)
3.852 (LAMS−III−A)
3.911 (LAMS−III−B)−0.3050.14 −1.4

0.044

0

0.08 −0.8−0.0900.048
Stayers Mean:
0.011 (MS)0.009 (AMS−III)
0.009 (LAMS−III−A)
0.010 (LAMS−III−B)

0.04

0.383

−0.110

0.038

0.014

0.058

0

−1.000Tertiary Sector

0.014
Stayers Mean:
0.009 (MS)0.010 (AMS−III)
0.011 (LAMS−III−A)
0.009 (LAMS−III−B)

0.225
Stayers Mean:
4.197 (MS)4.227 (AMS−III)−0.195
4.160 (LAMS−III−A)
4.407 (LAMS−III−B)

Months Worked

Stayers Mean:
0.373 (MS)0.372 (AMS−III)
0.372 (LAMS−III−A)
0.374 (LAMS−III−B)−0.031−0.099

0.013

−0.08

0.06 −0.08−0.043

Secondary Sector−0.04

Stayers Mean:
0.319 (MS)0.314 (AMS−III)−0.0050.304 (LAMS−III−A)
0.342 (LAMS−III−B)−0.030−0.008

0.239

0.043
Stayers Mean:
0.439 (MS)0.439 (AMS−III)
0.435 (LAMS−III−A)
0.446 (LAMS−III−B)

Labor Force−0.066

−0.10

0.03

Years of Schooling

0.032

0.005

−0.035−0.06

Primary School

0.004

0.04

0.08 −0.02

MS

−0.01

0.002
0.005

0

0.01

0.02

AMS−IIILAMS−III−A

LAMS−III−B

Women Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 15−19 (Both Sexes)
Some Education
Stayers Mean:
0.789 (MS)0.796 (AMS−III)
0.789 (LAMS−III−A)
0.797 (LAMS−III−B)

School Participation−0.004

0.036

0.027

−0.004

0.037

0.042

0.005

−0.000

−0.06

−0.03

0

−0.0060.03

0.06 −0.06

Labor Force

−0.03

0

0.03

−0.0160

Stayers Mean:
0.481 (MS)0.479 (AMS−III)
0.474 (LAMS−III−A)
0.477 (LAMS−III−B)

0.05

−0.07

0

0.07

0.02

Stayers Mean:
0.015 (MS)0.014 (AMS−III)
0.013 (LAMS−III−A)
0.017 (LAMS−III−B)

0.04 −0.08

Low−skilled Work

−0.04

−0.7

Stayers Mean:
4.158 (MS)4.177 (AMS−III)
4.101 (LAMS−III−A)
4.165 (LAMS−III−B)

0

0.060

0.04

0

0.04

0.7

1.4 −0.20

0.08 −0.02

−0.01

0

Stayers Mean:
0.000 (MS)0.000 (AMS−III)
0.000 (LAMS−III−A)
0.000 (LAMS−III−B)

0.08 −0.02

MS

−0.01

0.004

Stayers Mean:
0.395 (MS)0.399 (AMS−III)
0.395 (LAMS−III−A)
0.390 (LAMS−III−B)−0.075−0.1340.01

0.02 −0.20

−0.10

0

0.005

AMS−III

0.01

0.02

LAMS−III−A

LAMS−III−B

Figure A8: Robustness Check – Alternative Samples (Age 6-19, TH)
A–55

0.20

−0.068

0.002

0

0.10

−0.100

0.003

0

−0.10

Middle−skilled Work

0.003
Stayers Mean:
0.001 (MS)0.000 (AMS−III)
0.000 (LAMS−III−A)
0.000 (LAMS−III−B)

Stayers Mean:
0.384 (MS)0.386 (AMS−III)
0.382 (LAMS−III−A)
0.377 (LAMS−III−B)−0.086−0.155

0.003

0.064

0.8

Primary Sector

High−skilled Work

0.045

0.4

−0.081−0.2990.14 −1.4

0

0.003

0.042

0

−0.4

0.002

0.049

−0.04

0.08 −0.8

Armed Forces

0.039

−0.08

0.04

0.345
0.080

−0.114

0.052

0.023

Stayers Mean:
0.010 (MS)0.009 (AMS−III)
0.009 (LAMS−III−A)
0.010 (LAMS−III−B)

0

0.041

0.018

0

0.015

−0.772

Tertiary Sector

0.015

0.273
Stayers Mean:
4.036 (MS)4.088 (AMS−III)
4.084 (LAMS−III−A)
4.066 (LAMS−III−B)

0.041

Months Worked

Stayers Mean:
0.396 (MS)0.401 (AMS−III)
0.397 (LAMS−III−A)
0.394 (LAMS−III−B)

0.016
Stayers Mean:
0.007 (MS)0.009 (AMS−III)
0.009 (LAMS−III−A)
0.007 (LAMS−III−B)

0.268−0.506−0.0310.10 −0.14−0.04

Years of Schooling−0.323−0.072

Secondary Sector−0.02

0.06 −0.08−0.050−0.058−0.04

Stayers Mean:
0.301 (MS)0.301 (AMS−III)
0.306 (LAMS−III−A)
0.291 (LAMS−III−B)−0.026−0.032−0.05

Stayers Mean:
0.407 (MS)0.414 (AMS−III)
0.417 (LAMS−III−A)
0.407 (LAMS−III−B)

Employed−0.015−0.10

Primary School

0.025

0.10

0.20

Men Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 12−14 (Both Sexes)
Some Education

School Participation

Grade Progression

Child Labor−0.028−0.045−0.0250.007−0.030−0.058−0.0830.009−0.016−0.037

Stayers Mean:
0.827 (MS)0.825 (AMS−III)
0.821 (LAMS−III−A)
0.832 (LAMS−III−B)−0.070−0.10 −0.05

0

0.05

0.035
Stayers Mean:
0.777 (MS)0.779 (AMS−III)
0.775 (LAMS−III−A)
0.786 (LAMS−III−B)−0.1020.10 −0.14 −0.07

0

0.07

0.14 −0.6

0.004

Stayers Mean:−5.043 (MS)−4.993 (AMS−III)−5.043 (LAMS−III−A)−4.879 (LAMS−III−B)−0.365

−0.3

0

0.3

Stayers Mean:
0.045 (MS)0.045 (AMS−III)
0.046 (LAMS−III−A)
0.044 (LAMS−III−B)

0.6 −0.04 −0.02

0.013

0

0.02

0.04

Age 6−11 (Both Sexes)
Some Education

School Participation

Grade Progression

Child Labor−0.003−0.005

0.025

0.001

−0.013−0.018

0.005

0.003

Stayers Mean:
0.538 (MS)0.547 (AMS−III)
0.538 (LAMS−III−A)
0.566 (LAMS−III−B)−0.071−0.10 −0.05

0−0.0380.05−0.0810.10 −0.10 −0.05

MS

Stayers Mean:
0.534 (MS)0.543 (AMS−III)
0.534 (LAMS−III−A)
0.563 (LAMS−III−B)−0.1780−0.2

0.05 0.10 −0.4

AMS−III

0.000

0.019

0.000

Stayers Mean:−2.707 (MS)−2.665 (AMS−III)−2.693 (LAMS−III−A)−2.608 (LAMS−III−B)

Mean:−0.000 Stayers
0.003 (MS)00.2

LAMS−III−A

0.002 (AMS−III)
0.003 (LAMS−III−A)
0.002 (LAMS−III−B)

0.4 −0.02 −0.01

0

0.01

0.02

LAMS−III−B

Women Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 12−14 (Both Sexes)
Some Education

School Participation−0.011−0.027−0.026−0.052−0.012−0.10 −0.05

0

0.05

−0.1030.10 −0.14 −0.07

Child Labor

0.038

0.007

−0.031

0.009

0.020

0.007

−0.036

Stayers Mean:
0.803 (MS)0.810 (AMS−III)
0.805 (LAMS−III−A)
0.820 (LAMS−III−B)−0.071

Grade Progression

Stayers Mean:
0.744 (MS)0.755 (AMS−III)
0.751 (LAMS−III−A)
0.762 (LAMS−III−B)−0.231

Stayers Mean:−5.179 (MS)−5.155 (AMS−III)−5.168 (LAMS−III−A)−5.112 (LAMS−III−B)

0

−0.3

0

0.07

0.14 −0.6

0.3

Stayers Mean:
0.011
0.058 (MS)0.057 (AMS−III)
0.057 (LAMS−III−A)
0.057 (LAMS−III−B)

0.6 −0.04 −0.02

0

0.02

0.04

Age 6−11 (Both Sexes)
Some Education

School Participation

Grade Progression

Child Labor−0.009−0.012−0.0200.000−0.015−0.019−0.0460.000−0.051

0.001

0.005
−0.062−0.10 −0.05

0.003

Stayers Mean:
0.532 (MS)0.536 (AMS−III)
0.529 (LAMS−III−A)
0.541 (LAMS−III−B)

0

0.05

−0.0710.10 −0.10 −0.05

MS

Stayers Mean:
0.528 (MS)0.531 (AMS−III)
0.524 (LAMS−III−A)
0.537 (LAMS−III−B)

0

0.05

AMS−III

0.10 −0.4−0.119−0.2

Stayers Mean:−2.783 (MS)−2.771 (AMS−III)−2.767 (LAMS−III−A)−2.738 (LAMS−III−B)

0

LAMS−III−A

0.2

Stayers Mean:
0.005 (MS)0.004 (AMS−III)
0.004 (LAMS−III−A)
0.007 (LAMS−III−B)−0.002

0.4 −0.02 −0.01

0LAMS−III−B

Figure A8: Robustness Check – Alternative Samples (Age 6-19, TH)
Note: See the notes to Figure A7.
A–56

0.01

0.02

Men Aged 20−60 (TH)

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

−2.0 −1.0−.14 −.07
20

ATT
0 1.0 2.0

Months Worked

ATT−.16 −.08 0 .08 .16

EmployedATT
0 .07 .14

Labor Force

20

25

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

20

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

20

40
Age

45

50

55

60

30

35

40
Age

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

20

25

30

35

40
Age

ATT
0 .06 .12
35

40
Age

45

50

45

50

55

60

45

50

55

60

ATT
95% CI−.12 −.06

ATT
0 .06 .1230

60

Home Ownership−.12 −.06

25

55

ATT
0 .10 .20
20

Armed Forces

20

50−.20 −.10−.30 −.15
35

45

Low−skilled Work

ATT
0 .15 .30

ATT
0 .10 .20

30

25

Middle−skilled Work−.20 −.10

25

40
Age

ATT
0 .20 .40
20

High−skilled Work20

35−.40 −.20

ATT
0 .05 .10
25

30

Tertiary Sector−.10 −.05−.50 −.25
20

25

Secondary Sector

ATT
0 .25 .50

Primary Sector

30

55

60

20

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

Women Aged 20−60 (TH)−.30 −.15−3.0 −1.5

ATT
0 1.5 3.0

Months Worked

ATT
0 .15 .30

Employed

ATT−.20 −.10 0 .10 .20

Labor Force

20

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

20

25

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

40
Age

45

50

55

60

20

25

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

20

25

ATT
0 .06 .12−.12 −.06

ATT
0 .01 .02

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

Home Ownership−.02 −.0125

50−.20 −.10
20

Armed Forces

20

45

ATT
0 .10 .20

ATT
0 .20 .40
35

40
Age

Low−skilled Work−.40 −.20

ATT
0 .02 .04

30

35

ATT
0 .13 .26
25

Middle−skilled Work−.04 −.0225

30−.26 −.13
20

High−skilled Work

20

25

Tertiary Sector

ATT−.06 −.03 0 .03 .06−.40 −.20
20

20Secondary Sector

ATT
0 .20 .40

Primary Sector

30

55

60

20

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

A-1. Thailand
Figure A9: Heterogeneity – Age (Age 20-60)
A–57

ATT
95% CI

Men Aged 20−60 (VN)
EmployedMonths Worked

20

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

−6.0 −3.0

ATT−.40 −.20 0 .20 .40

ATT−.40 −.20 0 .20 .40

ATT
0 3.0 6.0

Labor Force

20

25

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

20

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

25

30

35

40
Age

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

20

25

30

35

40
Age

ATT
0 .15 .30
35

40
Age

45

50

60

45

50

55

60

55

60

ATT
0 .15 .30
25

45

50

ATT
95% CI−.30 −.15

ATT
0 .07 .14

30

55

Home Ownership−.14 −.0725

50−.30 −.15
20

Armed Forces

20

45

Low−skilled Work

ATT−.40 −.20 0 .20 .40
30

20Middle−skilled Work

ATT−.16 −.08 0 .08 .16

25

40
Age

−.50 −.25
20

High−skilled Work

20

35

ATT
0 .25 .50

ATT
0 .20 .40
25

30

Tertiary Sector−.40 −.20−.70 −.35
20

25

Secondary Sector

ATT
0 .34 .70

Primary Sector

30

55

60

20

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

Women Aged 20−60 (VN)
Months Worked

20

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

−6.0 −3.0−.40 −.20

ATT−.40 −.20 0 .20 .40

ATT
0 3.0 6.0

EmployedATT
0 .20 .40

Labor Force

20

25

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

40
Age

45

50

55

60

25

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

20

25

ATT
0 .10 .20−.20 −.10
30

35

40
Age

45

50

50

55

60

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

Home Ownership

ATT−.04 −.02 0 .02 .04

25

45

ATT
0 .15 .30
20

Armed Forces

20

40
Age

−.30 −.15

ATT
0 .25 .50
35

35

Low−skilled Work−.50 −.25

ATT
0 .05 .1030

20Middle−skilled Work−.10 −.05

25

30

ATT
−.40 −.20 0 .20 .40
20High−skilled Work

20

25

Tertiary Sector

ATT−.12 −.06 0 .06 .12−.60 −.30
20

20Secondary Sector

ATT
0 .30 .60

Primary Sector

30

55

60

20

25

30

35

40
Age

45

50

55

60

B-1. Vietnam
Figure A9: Heterogeneity – Age (Age 20-60)
A–58

ATT
95% CI

Men Aged 20−33 (TH)20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
Age

1.5
−3.0

−1.5

ATT
0

.20
ATT
0
−.20
−.40

−.20

−.10

ATT
0

.10

3.0

Years of Schooling.40

Primary School.20

Some Education

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
Age

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
Age

Women Aged 20−33 (TH)Years of Schooling
0.9
ATT
0
−0.9

ATT
0
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
Age

−1.8

−.24

−.20

−.12

−.10

ATT
0

.12

.10

.24

1.8

Primary School.20

Some Education

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
Age

ATT

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
Age

95% CI

A-2. Thailand

Men Aged 20−33 (VN)

1.5
ATT
0
−1.5

ATT
0

−3.0

−.40

−.50

−.20

−.25

ATT
0

.20

.25

3.0

Years of Schooling.40

Primary School.50

Some Education

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
Age

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
Age

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
Age

Women Aged 20−33 (VN)
Years of Schooling
1.0

2.0

.30

Primary School

ATT
0
−1.0

ATT
0

−2.0

−.30

−.40

−.15

−.20

ATT
0

.15

.20

.40

Some Education

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
Age

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
Age

ATT

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
Age

95% CI

B-2. Vietnam
Figure A9: Heterogeneity – Age (Age 20-60)
A–59

Men Aged 34−60 (TH)Labor Force

−0.04

−0.02

0

Employed

0.02

0.04 −0.06

Primary Sector

−0.40

−0.20

0

−0.03

0

0.20

0.40 −0.06

−0.10

0

0.03

0.06 −1.2

−0.03

0

0.03

0.06

−0.30

−0.15

0

0.15

−0.6

0

0.6

1.2

Tertiary Sector

0.06 −0.40

−0.20

0

0.20

0.40

Low−skilled Work0.30 −0.16

−0.08

0

0.08

0.16

Home Ownership

0.10

1979−98 (All)0.03

Middle−skilled Work

Armed Forces

−0.20

0

Secondary Sector

High−skilled Work

−0.06

−0.03

Months Worked

0.20 −0.10

1979−87−0.05

01988−90

0.05

1991

0.10

1992

1993

1994−98

Women Aged 34−60 (TH)Labor Force

−0.16

−0.08

0

Employed

0.08

0.16 −0.20

Primary Sector

−0.36

−0.18

0

−0.02

0

0.18

0.36 −0.04

−0.01

0

1979−98 (All)

0.10

0.20

−2.0

0.02

−0.02

0

0.02

0.04 −0.30

−0.15

0

0.15

−1.0

0

1.0

2.0

Tertiary Sector

0.04 −0.18

Middle−skilled Work

Armed Forces

−0.02

0

Secondary Sector

High−skilled Work

−0.04

−0.10

Months Worked

−0.09

0

0.09

0.18

Low−skilled Work0.30 −0.12

−0.06

0

0.06

0.12

Home Ownership

0.01

0.02 −0.10

1979−87−0.05

01988−90

0.05

1991

0.10

1992

1993

A-1. Thailand
Figure A10: Heterogeneity – Timing of Repatriation (Age 20-60)
A–60

1994−98

Men Aged 34−60 (VN)
Labor Force

−0.08

−0.04

0

Employed

0.04

0.08 −0.08

Primary Sector

−0.50

−0.25

0

−0.03

0

0.25

0.50 −0.16

−0.02

0

0.04

0.08 −1.0

0.03

−0.08

0

0.08

0.06 −0.24

−0.12

0

0.12

−0.5

0

0.5

1.0

Tertiary Sector

0.16 −0.40

Middle−skilled Work

Armed Forces

−0.04

0

Secondary Sector

High−skilled Work

−0.06

−0.04

Months Worked

−0.20

0

0.20

0.40

Low−skilled Work0.24 −0.20

−0.10

0

0.10

0.20

Home Ownership

0.02

0.04 −0.10−0.05

1979−98 (All)

0

1979

0.05

0.10

1980

1981−98

Women Aged 34−60 (VN)
Labor Force

−0.24

−0.12

0

Employed

0.12

0.24 −0.24

Primary Sector

−0.50

−0.25

0

−0.01

0

0.25

0.50 −0.04

−0.01

0

0.12

0.24

−2.0

0.01

−0.02

0

0.02

0.02 −0.40

−0.20

0

0.20

−1.0

0

0.04 −0.30

−0.15

0

0.02 −0.06

1979−98 (All)

−0.03

0

1979

0.03

1980

0.40 −0.16

−0.08

0

0.06

1981−98

B-1. Vietnam
Figure A10: Heterogeneity – Timing of Repatriation (Age 20-60)
A–61

2.0

0.15

0.30

Low−skilled Work

Home Ownership

0.01

1.0

Tertiary Sector

Middle−skilled Work

Armed Forces

−0.02

0

Secondary Sector

High−skilled Work

−0.02

−0.12

Months Worked

0.08

0.16

Men Aged 20−33 (TH)Some Education−0.12 −0.06

0

0.06

Primary School

0.12 −0.20 −0.10

Employed−0.10 −0.05

0

0.05

0

0.18

0.10 −1.4

0

0.09

1979−98 (All)0.20 −1.8

−0.7

0

0.7

0.36 −0.08 −0.04

0

0.04

−0.9

0

0.9

Labor Force

1.8 −0.08 −0.04

Primary Sector

1.4 −0.40 −0.20

High−skilled Work

Armed Forces−0.18 −0.09

0.10Months Worked

Tertiary Sector−0.36 −0.18

0Years of Schooling

0

0.20

0

0.15

0.04

0.08

Secondary Sector

0.40 −0.08 −0.04

Middle−skilled Work0.08 −0.30 −0.15

0

0

0.04

0.08

Low−skilled Work0.30 −0.12 −0.06

0

0.06

0.12

Home Ownership

0.18 −0.10 −0.05

0

1979−87

0.05

0.10

1988−90

1991

1992

1993

1994−98

Women Aged 20−33 (TH)Some Education−0.14 −0.07

0

0.07

Primary School

0.14 −0.20 −0.10

Employed−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

Tertiary Sector−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

Armed Forces−0.02 −0.01

0

0.01

1979−98 (All)

0

0.10

Years of Schooling

0.20 −1.4

Months Worked

0.20 −2.4

−1.2

0

1.2

0

0.02

0

0.7

1.4 −0.20 −0.10

Primary Sector

2.4 −0.40 −0.20

High−skilled Work0.20 −0.04 −0.02−0.7

Labor Force

0

0.20

0

0.15

0.10

0.20

Secondary Sector

0.40 −0.04 −0.02

Middle−skilled Work0.04 −0.30 −0.15

0

0

0.02

0.04

Low−skilled Work0.30 −0.10 −0.05

0

0.05

0.10

Home Ownership

0.02 −0.14 −0.07

1979−87

0

0.07

0.14

1988−90

1991

1992

1993

A-2. Thailand
Figure A10: Heterogeneity – Timing of Repatriation (Age 20-60)
A–62

1994−98

Men Aged 20−33 (VN)
Some Education−0.30 −0.15

0

0.15

Primary School

0.30−0.20 −0.10

Employed−0.14 −0.07

0

0

0.07

0.15

0.14 −2.0

0

0.20

−2.0

−1.0

0

1.0

0.30 −0.06 −0.03

0.02

0

−1.0

2.0 −0.50 −0.25

0.03

0

1.0

Labor Force

2.0 −0.14 −0.07

Primary Sector

High−skilled Work

Armed Forces−0.04 −0.02

0.10Months Worked

Tertiary Sector−0.30 −0.15

0Years of Schooling

0

0.25

0

0.10

0.07

0.14

Secondary Sector

0.50 −0.16 −0.08

Middle−skilled Work0.06 −0.20 −0.10

0

0

0.08

0.16

Low−skilled Work0.20 −0.12 −0.06

0

0.06

0.12

Home Ownership

0.04 −0.12 −0.06

0

0.06

1979−98 (All)

0.12

1979

1980

1981−98

Women Aged 20−33 (VN)
Some Education−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

Primary School

0.20 −0.08 −0.04

Employed−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

Tertiary Sector−0.30 −0.15

0

0.15

Armed Forces−0.02 −0.01

0

0.01

0

Years of Schooling

0.04

0.08 −1.0

Months Worked

0.20 −2.0

−1.0

0

1.0

0

2.0 −0.50 −0.25

0.02

0

0.5

1.0 −0.16 −0.08

Primary Sector

High−skilled Work0.30 −0.04 −0.02−0.5

Labor Force

0

0.25

−0.30 −0.15

0

0.15

0.50 −0.06 −0.03

00

1979−98 (All)0.05

0.30 −0.16 −0.08

0

0.10

1979

1980

1981−98

B-2. Vietnam
Figure A10: Heterogeneity – Timing of Repatriation (Age 20-60)
A–63

0.16

0.03

0.06

Low−skilled Work

Home Ownership

0.02 −0.10 −0.05

0.08

Secondary Sector

Middle−skilled Work

0.04

0

0.08

0.16

Men Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 15−19 (Both Sexes)
Some Education

−0.16

−0.08

0

0.08

School Participation

0.16 −0.18−0.09

Labor Force

−0.20

−0.10

0

0.10

−0.03

0

0.03

0.20 −0.20

−0.04

0

0.04

1979−98 (All)0.18 −0.30

−0.10

0

0.10

0.06 −0.10

−0.05

0

0.05

−0.15

0

0.15

Years of Schooling

0.30 −2.0Months Worked

0.20 −3.0

Tertiary Sector

Low−skilled Work

−0.08

0.09

Employed

Secondary Sector

−0.06

0

Primary School

−1.5

0

1.5

−0.02

0

0.02

0

1.0

2.0

Primary Sector

3.0 −0.28

High−skilled Work0.10 −0.04

−1.0

−0.14

0

0.14

0.28

Middle−skilled Work0.04 −0.24

−0.12

0

0.12

0.24

Armed forces

0.08 −0.04

−0.02

0

1979−87

0.02

0.04

1988−90

1991

1992

1993

1994−98

Women Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 15−19 (Both Sexes)
Some Education

−0.16

−0.08

0

0.08

School Participation

0.16 −0.18−0.09

Labor Force

−0.20

−0.10

0

0.10

−0.03

0

0.03

0.20 −0.20

−0.04

0

0.04

1979−98 (All)0.18 −0.30

−0.10

0

0.10

0.06 −0.10

−0.05

0

0.05

−0.15

0

0.15

Years of Schooling

0.30 −2.0Months Worked

0.20 −3.0

Tertiary Sector

Low−skilled Work

−0.08

0.09

Employed

Secondary Sector

−0.06

0

Primary School

−1.5

0

1.5

−0.02

0

0.02

0

1.0

2.0

Primary Sector

3.0 −0.28

High−skilled Work0.10 −0.04

−1.0

−0.14

0

0.14

0.28

Middle−skilled Work0.04 −0.24

−0.12

0

0.12

0.24

Armed forces

0.08 −0.04−0.02

1979−87

0

0.02

0.04

1988−90

1991

1992

1993

A-1. Thailand
Figure A11: Heterogeneity – Timing of Repatriation (Age 6-19)
A–64

1994−98

Men Aged 34−60 (VN)
Age 15−19 (Both Sexes)
Some Education

−0.24

−0.12

0

0.12

School Participation

0.24 −0.16

Labor Force

−0.30

−0.15

0

0.15

−0.04

0

0.04

0.30 −0.30

−0.05

0

0.05

0.08

0.16 −0.20

−0.15

0

0.08 −0.20

−0.10

0

−0.10

0

0.10

Years of Schooling

0.20 −1.6−0.8Months Worked

0.15

0.30 −3.6

Tertiary Sector

Low−skilled Work

−0.10

0

Employed

Secondary Sector

−0.08

−0.08

Primary School

−1.8

0

1.8

0.20 −0.04

−0.02

0

0.02

0.8

1.6

Primary Sector

3.6

−0.30

High−skilled Work

0.10

0

−0.15

0

0.15

0.30

Middle−skilled Work0.04 −0.30

−0.15

0

0.15

0.30

Armed forces

0.10 −0.02

−0.01

0

0.01

1979−98 (All)

0.02

1979

1980

1981−98

Women Aged 34−60 (VN)
Age 15−19 (Both Sexes)
Some Education

−0.24

−0.12

0

0.12

School Participation

0.24 −0.16

Labor Force

−0.30

−0.15

0

0.15

−0.04

0

0.04

0.30 −0.30

−0.05

0

0.05

0.08

0.16

−0.20

−0.15

0

0.15

0.08 −0.20

−0.10

0

0.10

−0.10

0

0.10

Years of Schooling

0.20

−1.6

Months Worked

0.30 −3.6

Tertiary Sector

Low−skilled Work

−0.10

0

Employed

Secondary Sector

−0.08

−0.08

Primary School

−1.8

0

1.8

−0.02

0

0.02

3.6

−0.30

−0.15

−0.01

0

1979−98 (All)0.01

0.04 −0.30

−0.15

0.02

1979

1980

1981−98

B-1. Vietnam
Figure A11: Heterogeneity – Timing of Repatriation (Age 6-19)
A–65

0.8

1.6

0

0.15

0.30

Middle−skilled Work

Armed forces

0.10 −0.02

0Primary Sector

High−skilled Work0.20 −0.04

−0.8

0

0.15

0.30

Men Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 12−14 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

School Participation

0.20 −0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

Grade Progression

0.20 −1.0

−0.5

0

0.5

Child Labor

1.0 −0.10 −0.05

0

0.05

0.10

Age 6−11 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

School Participation

0.20 −0.20 −0.10

1979−98 (All)01979−87

0.10

Grade Progression

0.20 −0.4

1988−90

−0.2

0

1991

0.2

Child Labor

0.4 −0.04 −0.02

1992

0

1993

0.02

0.04

1994−98

Women Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 12−14 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

School Participation

0.20 −0.20 −0.100Grade Progression

0.10 0.20 −1.0

−0.5

0

0.5

Child Labor

1.0 −0.10 −0.05

00.05 0.10

Age 6−11 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

1979−98 (All)

School Participation

0.20 −0.20 −0.10

1979−8700.10

Grade Progression

0.20 −0.4

1988−90

−0.2

1991

0

0.2

1992

Child Labor

0.4 −0.04 −0.02

1993

A-2. Thailand
Figure A11: Heterogeneity – Timing of Repatriation (Age 6-19)
A–66

0

0.02

0.04

1994−98

Men Aged 34−60 (VN)
Age 12−14 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.20 −0.10

0School Participation

0.10 0.20 −0.24 −0.120Grade Progression

0.12 0.24 −1.0

−0.5

0

0.5

Child Labor

1.0 −0.10 −0.05

0

0.05

0.10

Age 6−11 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.16 −0.08

0

0.08

School Participation

0.16 −0.18 −0.09

0

0.09

1979−98 (All)

Grade Progression

0.18 −0.4 −0.2

1979

0

0.2

1980

0.4

Child Labor−0.04 −0.02

0

0.02

0.04

1981−98

Women Aged 34−60 (VN)
Age 12−14 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

School Participation

0.20 −0.24 −0.12

0

0.12

Grade Progression

0.24 −1.0

−0.5

0

0.5

1.0

Child Labor−0.10 −0.05

00.05 0.10

Age 6−11 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.16 −0.08

0

0.08

School Participation

0.16 −0.18 −0.09

01979−98 (All)0.09

Grade Progression

0.18 −0.4 −0.2

1979

1980

0

0.2

Child Labor

0.4 −0.04 −0.020

1981−98

B-2. Vietnam
Figure A11: Heterogeneity – Timing of Repatriation (Age 6-19)
A–67

0.02 0.04

Men Aged 34−60 (TH)Labor Force

−0.02

−0.01

0

Employed

0.01

0.02 −0.04

Primary Sector

−0.28

−0.14

0

0.14

−0.02

0

0.02

0.28 −0.04

−0.04

All

0

0.04

Birth Village

0.02

0.04 −0.6

−0.02

0

0.02

0.04 −0.16

−0.08

0

0.08

−0.3

0

0.3

0.6

Tertiary Sector

0.04 −0.24

Middle−skilled Work

Armed Forces

−0.08

0

Secondary Sector

High−skilled Work

−0.04

−0.02

Months Worked

−0.12

0

0.12

0.24

Low−skilled Work0.16 −0.08

−0.04

0

0.04

0.08

Home Ownership0.08 −0.04

−0.02

0

Birth District

0.02

0.02

Birth Village (1992−93)

Birth District (1992−93)

Women Aged 34−60 (TH)Labor Force

−0.08

−0.04

0

Employed

0.04

0.08 −0.10

Primary Sector

−0.22

−0.11

0

0.11

−0.01

0

0.01

0.22 −0.02

−0.01

All

0

0.01

Birth Village

0.05

0.10 −1.4

−0.01

0

0.01

0.02 −0.18

−0.09

0

0.09

−0.7

0

0.7

1.4

Tertiary Sector

0.02 −0.12

Middle−skilled Work

Armed Forces

−0.02

0

Secondary Sector

High−skilled Work

−0.02

−0.05

Months Worked

−0.06

0

0.06

0.12

Low−skilled Work

0.18 −0.08

−0.04

0

0.04

0.08

Home Ownership

0.02 −0.04−0.02

Birth District

0

0.02

0.04

Birth Village (1992−93)

Birth District (1992−93)

A-1. Thailand
Figure A12: Heterogeneity – Place of Birth (Age 20-60)
A–68

Men Aged 34−60 (VN)
Labor Force

−0.08

−0.04

0

Employed

0.04

0.08 −0.08

Primary Sector

−0.30

−0.15

0

0.15

−0.02

0

0.02

0.30 −0.08

−0.01

0

All

0.01

Birth Village

0.04

0.08 −1.0

−0.04

0

0.04

0.04 −0.12

−0.06

0

0.06

−0.5

0

0.5

1.0

Tertiary Sector

0.08 −0.22

Middle−skilled Work

Armed Forces

−0.02

0

Secondary Sector

High−skilled Work

−0.04

−0.04

Months Worked

−0.11

0

0.11

0.22

Low−skilled Work0.12 −0.10

−0.05

0

0.05

0.10

Home Ownership

0.02

−0.04

−0.02

Birth District

0

0.02

0.04

Birth Village (1979−80)

Birth District (1979−80)

Women Aged 34−60 (VN)
Labor Force

−0.10

−0.05

0

Employed

0.05

0.10 −0.10

Primary Sector

−0.24

−0.12

0

0.12

−0.01

0

0.01

0.24 −0.02

−0.01

All

0

0.01

Birth Village

0.05

0.10

−1.0

−0.01

0

0.01

0.02 −0.16

−0.08

0

0.08

−0.5

0

0.5

1.0

Tertiary Sector

0.02 −0.16

Middle−skilled Work

Armed Forces

−0.02

0

Secondary Sector

High−skilled Work

−0.02

−0.05

Months Worked

−0.08

0

0.08

0.16

Low−skilled Work0.16 −0.08

−0.04

0

0.04

0.08

Home Ownership

0.02 −0.04−0.02

Birth District

0

0.02

0.04

Birth Village (1979−80)

Birth District (1979−80)

B-1. Vietnam
Figure A12: Heterogeneity – Place of Birth (Age 20-60)
A–69

Men Aged 20−33 (TH)Some Education−0.10 −0.05

0

0.05

Primary School

0.10 −0.14 −0.07

Employed−0.04 −0.02

0

0

0.02

0.04 −0.8

0

All

0.14

−1.4

−0.4

0

0.4

0.10

0.20 −0.04 −0.02

0

0.02

−0.7

0

0.7

Labor Force

1.4 −0.04 −0.02

Primary Sector

0.8 −0.24 −0.12

High−skilled Work

Armed Forces−0.06 −0.03

0.07

Months Worked

Tertiary Sector−0.20 −0.10

0Years of Schooling

0

0.12

0

0.08

0.02

0.04

Secondary Sector

0.24 −0.04 −0.02

Middle−skilled Work0.04 −0.16 −0.08

0

0

0.02

0.04

Low−skilled Work0.16 −0.08 −0.04

0

0.04

0.08

Home Ownership

0.03

0.06 −0.06 −0.03

Birth Village

0

0.03

Birth District

0.06

Birth Village (1992−93)

Birth District (1992−93)

Women Aged 20−33 (TH)Some Education−0.06 −0.03

0

0.03

Primary School

0.06 −0.06 −0.03

Employed−0.12 −0.06

0

0

0.06

0.12 −1.4All00.06 −0.4

0.05

0.01

−0.7

0

0.7

0.10

−0.02 −0.01

0

0.01

−0.2

0

0.2

Labor Force

0.4 −0.10 −0.05

Primary Sector

1.4High−skilled Work

Armed Forces−0.02 −0.01

0.03Months Worked

Tertiary Sector−0.10 −0.05

0Years of Schooling−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

0

0.09

0.05

0.10

Secondary Sector

0.20 −0.02 −0.01

Middle−skilled Work0.02 −0.18 −0.09

0

0

0.01

0.02

Low−skilled Work

0.18 −0.08 −0.04

0

0.04

0.08

Home Ownership

0.02 −0.06 −0.03

Birth Village

0

0.03

Birth District

0.06

Birth Village (1992−93)

Birth District (1992−93)

A-2. Thailand
Figure A12: Heterogeneity – Place of Birth (Age 20-60)
A–70

Men Aged 20−33 (VN)
Some Education−0.30 −0.15

0

0.15

Primary School

0.30 −0.18 −0.09

Employed−0.14 −0.07

0

0.07

0

0.14 −1.8

0.09

0

All

0.18 −1.6

−0.9

0

0.9

0.18 −0.04 −0.02

0

0.02

−0.8

0

0.8

Labor Force

1.6 −0.12 −0.06

Primary Sector

1.8High−skilled Work

Armed Forces−0.02 −0.01

0.09Months Worked

Tertiary Sector−0.18 −0.09

0Years of Schooling−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

0

0.10

0.06

0.12

Secondary Sector

0.20 −0.08 −0.04

Middle−skilled Work0.04 −0.20 −0.10

0

0

0.04

0.08

Low−skilled Work0.20 −0.06 −0.03

0

0.03

0.06

Home Ownership

0.01

0.02 −0.06 −0.03

Birth Village

0

0.03

Birth District

0.06

Birth Village (1979−80)

Birth District (1979−80)

Women Aged 20−33 (VN)
Some Education−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

Primary School

0.20 −0.08 −0.04

Employed−0.10 −0.05

0

0

0.05

0.10

All

0

0.08 −1.0

0.08

0.01

−1.0

−0.5

0

0.5

0.16 −0.04 −0.02

0

0.02

−0.5

0

0.5

Labor Force

1.0 −0.10 −0.05

Primary Sector

1.0

High−skilled Work

Armed Forces−0.02 −0.01

0.04Months Worked

Tertiary Sector−0.16 −0.08

0Years of Schooling−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

0

0.10

0.05

0.10

Secondary Sector

0.20 −0.02 −0.01

Middle−skilled Work0.04 −0.20 −0.10

0

0

0.01

0.02

Low−skilled Work0.20 −0.08 −0.04

0

0.04

0.08

Home Ownership

0.02 −0.04 −0.02

Birth Village

0

0.02

Birth District

0.04

Birth Village (1979−80)

Birth District (1979−80)

B-2. Vietnam
Figure A12: Heterogeneity – Place of Birth (Age 20-60)
A–71

Men Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 15−19 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.12 −0.06

0School Participation

0.06

0.12 −0.16 −0.08

Labor Force−0.14 −0.07

0

0

0.07

0.14 −0.14 −0.07

0All

0.16 −0.12 −0.06

0.01

0

0.07

0.02 −0.06 −0.03

0

0.03

0

0.06

Years of Schooling

0.12 −0.8

Months Worked

0.14 −1.4

Tertiary Sector

Low−skilled Work−0.06 −0.03

0.08

Employed

Secondary Sector−0.02 −0.010Primary School

−0.7

0

0.7

High−skilled Work0.06 −0.02 −0.01

0

0.01

−0.4

0

0.4

0.8

Primary Sector

1.4 −0.12 −0.06

0

0.06

0.12

Middle−skilled Work0.02 −0.12 −0.06

0

0.06

0.12

Armed forces

0.03

0.06 −0.02 −0.01

Birth Village

0

0.01

0.02

Birth District

Birth Village (1992−93)

Birth District (1992−93)

Women Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 15−19 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.12 −0.06

0School Participation

0.06

0.12 −0.16 −0.08

Labor Force−0.14 −0.07

0

0

0.07

0.14 −0.14 −0.07

All00.16 −0.12 −0.06

0.01

0.03

0

0.07

0.02 −0.06 −0.03

0

0.03

0

0.06

Months Worked

0.14 −1.4

Tertiary Sector

Low−skilled Work−0.06 −0.03

0.08

Employed

Secondary Sector−0.02 −0.010Primary School

−0.7

0

0.7

High−skilled Work0.06 −0.02 −0.01

0

0.01

Years of Schooling

0.12 −0.8

−0.4

0

0.4

0.8

Primary Sector

1.4 −0.12 −0.06

0

0.06

0.12

Middle−skilled Work0.02 −0.12 −0.06

0

0.06

0.12

Armed forces

0.06 −0.02 −0.01

Birth Village

0

0.01

Birth District

0.02

Birth Village (1992−93)

Birth District (1992−93)

A-1. Thailand
Figure A13: Heterogeneity – Place of Birth (Age 6-19)
A–72

Men Aged 34−60 (VN)
Age 15−19 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

School Participation

0.20

Labor Force−0.16 −0.08

0

0.08

0

0.16

0.02

0

All

0.06

0.12 −0.18 −0.09

0.02−0.16 −0.08

0

0.08

0.04 −0.08 −0.04

0

0.04

0

0.09

Years of Schooling

0.18 −1.4

Months Worked

0.16

−2.0

Tertiary Sector

Low−skilled Work−0.04 −0.02

0Employed

Secondary Sector−0.04 −0.02−0.12 −0.06

Primary School

−1.0

0

1.0

0

0.01

0

0.7

1.4

Primary Sector

2.0

High−skilled Work0.08 −0.02 −0.01−0.7−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

0.20

Middle−skilled Work0.02 −0.16 −0.08

0

0.08

0.16

Armed forces

0.04 −0.02 −0.01

Birth Village

0

0.01

0.02

Birth District

Birth Village (1979−80)

Birth District (1979−80)

Women Aged 34−60 (VN)
Age 15−19 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

School Participation

0.20 −0.12 −0.06

Labor Force−0.16 −0.08

0

0

0.08

0.16 −0.16 −0.08

All00.12 −0.18 −0.09

0.02

0.02

0

0.08

0.04 −0.08 −0.04

0

0.04

0

0.09

Years of Schooling

0.18 −1.4

Months Worked

0.16

−2.0

Tertiary Sector

Low−skilled Work−0.04 −0.02

0.06

Employed

Secondary Sector−0.04 −0.02

0Primary School

−1.0

0

1.0

High−skilled Work0.08 −0.02 −0.01

0

0.01

−0.7

0

0.7

1.4

Primary Sector

2.0−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

0.20

Middle−skilled Work0.02 −0.16 −0.08

0

0.08

0.16

Armed forces

0.04 −0.02 −0.01

Birth Village

0

0.01

Birth District

0.02

Birth Village (1979−80)

Birth District (1979−80)

B-1. Vietnam
Figure A13: Heterogeneity – Place of Birth (Age 6-19)
A–73

Men Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 12−14 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.12 −0.06

0

0.06

School Participation

0.12 −0.16 −0.08

0

0.08

Grade Progression

0.16 −0.4

−0.2

0

0.2

Child Labor

0.4 −0.06 −0.03

0

0.03

0.06

Age 6−11 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.08 −0.04

0

All

0.04

School Participation

0.08 −0.08 −0.04

Birth Village

0

0.04

Grade Progression

0.08 −0.4

Birth District

−0.2

0

0.2

Child Labor

0.4 −0.02 −0.01

Birth Village (1992−93)

0

0.01

0.02

Birth District (1992−93)

Women Aged 34−60 (TH)Age 12−14 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.12 −0.06

0

0.06

School Participation

0.12 −0.16 −0.08

0

0.08

Grade Progression

0.16 −0.4 −0.2

00.2Child Labor

0.4 −0.06 −0.03

0

0.03

0.06

Age 6−11 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.08 −0.04

All

0

0.04

School Participation

0.08 −0.08 −0.04

Birth Village

0

0.04

Birth District

Grade Progression

0.08 −0.4

−0.2

0

0.2

Birth Village (92−93)

Child Labor

0.4 −0.02 −0.01

0.01

0.02

Birth District (92−93)

A-2. Thailand
Figure A13: Heterogeneity – Place of Birth (Age 6-19)
A–74

0Men Aged 34−60 (VN)
Age 12−14 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

School Participation

0.20 −0.20 −0.100Grade Progression

0.10 0.20 −0.8

−0.4

0

0.4

Child Labor

0.8 −0.12 −0.06

0

0.06

0.12

Age 6−11 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.14 −0.07

0

All

0.07

School Participation

0.14 −0.14 −0.07

Birth Village

0

0.07

Grade Progression

0.14 −0.6

Birth District

−0.3

0

0.3

Child Labor

0.6 −0.04 −0.02

Birth Village (1979−80)

0

0.02

0.04

Birth District (1979−80)

Women Aged 34−60 (VN)
Age 12−14 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

School Participation

0.20 −0.20 −0.10

0

0.10

Grade Progression

0.20 −0.8 −0.4

00.4Child Labor

0.8 −0.12 −0.06

0

0.06

0.12

Age 6−11 (Both Sexes)
Some Education−0.14 −0.07

All

0

0.07

School Participation

0.14 −0.14 −0.07

Birth Village

0

0.07

Birth District

Grade Progression

0.14 −0.6

−0.3

0

0.3

Birth Village (1979−80)

Child Labor

0.6 −0.04 −0.02

0.02 0.04

Birth District (1979−80)

B-2. Vietnam
Figure A13: Heterogeneity – Place of Birth (Age 6-19)
A–75

0

200
Number of Villages
100
150
50
0
0

10

20
30
Congestion

40

50

Figure A14: Distribution of Congestion Measure
Note: The figure shows the distribution of the village-level congestion measure used in the analyses based on the2004 CSES data; the congestion measure is defined as stayer density per non-contaminated area (km2 ) within a 3.0
km buffer zone around each village point before clearance started.

A–76