CSCAP MEMORANDUM NO. 21

Implications of Naval Enhancement in the Asia Pacific

A Memorandum from theCouncil for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)
August 2012

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)
Memorandum No. 21
Implications of Naval Enhancement in the Asia PacificAugust 2012
Executive Summary
The capabilities of maritime security forces in the Asia Pacific region, (mainly
Navies and Coast Guards) have been improving—with a few exceptions. With
these enhanced capacities, the principal role of the navies continues to be that ofstrengthening national defence and enhancing deterrence. Meanwhile, thetraditional constabulary functions of maritime security forces have expanded
beyond the protection of resources within EEZs (Exclusive Economic Zones) toinclude law enforcement tasks against maritime terrorism, piracy and armed
robbery, etc. Diplomatic and benign roles for the “common good” have expanded
to include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations. Theseroles are now being given equal emphasis along with traditional war-fighting
roles.
Today there is a distinct change in the type and format of maritime challenges,
which demand greater operational flexibility of maritime forces in dealing with
them.
Interdiction of SLOCs and energy lifelines is a perceived threat with its roots inadversarial relations between States. The rise of the non-state actor and theamorphous nature of threats posed by them is the most serious peacetime threat.
Unfortunately, with the wider roles and increased capabilities of maritime security
forces, the risks of stand-offs arising from incidents at sea have increased. Even
minor incidents, could escalate into conflict due to the “trust deficit” between
States. The competition for resources especially in disputed areas, as well as thecomplications arising from forces operating in closer geographical proximity andconstrained sea spaces, aggravates the problem considerably.
This memorandum recommends measures for risk mitigation and enhancing thebenefits of improved naval capacities. It encourages a cooperative and coherent
approach for the “common good” to help overcome growing challenges at sea.

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Introduction
This memorandum seeks to address the implications of the enhancement ofcapabilities of maritime security forces in the Asia Pacific region, (mainly the
Navies and Coast Guards inclusive of forces that work primarily as Coast Guards
but are named differently, for instance the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement
Agency).
(Refer to Annex 1 for recent Naval Developments in Asia Pacific region)
It seeks to assess and review the rationale and implications of this growth while
encouraging a common and coherent approach for using these capacities for the“common good” in overcoming the growing challenges in the maritime domain. It
also proposes measures that might mitigate the possible risks arising fromenhanced capabilities and maritime security forces operating in closer proximity.
Role of the Maritime Forces The role of Maritime Security forces in the Asia-Pacific region has
undergone significant changes in recent years though their traditionalraison d’être remains unchanged. While the maritime forces are in theprocess of evolving with enhanced capacities, improved capabilities andinventorial assets, the principal role of the navies continues to be that ofstrengthening national defence and deterrence.
 The rise of non-military operations has come to the fore and activities suchas traditional constabulary and policing functions have expanded beyond
the mere protection of resources, particularly within the EEZs (Exclusive
Economic Zones) to include law enforcement tasks against maritime
terrorism, piracy and armed robbery etc.
 The established diplomatic and benign naval roles for the “common good”
have expanded to include various forms of HADR (Humanitarian
Assistance and Disaster Relief) operations (inclusive of nuclear power
plant accidents and natural calamities) that are important to many regionalcountries. Hence maritime security forces are being used prima facie more
often to support humanitarian relief missions beyond national waters,
leveraging confidence-building measures and for projecting maritime
influence.

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Enhancing capacities and the rationale for the growth
The growth of most regional economies during the last few years has led to asimultaneous rise in defence budgets (with some exceptions) particularly withrespect to budgetary allocations to maritime forces of littoral states. Countries
previously without agencies like the Coast Guard have established such anorganization or have sought to enhance their capability.
The following reasons are often cited as important drivers for the enhancing
forces: With the growing importance and dependence on maritime trade andenergy supplies, there is an increased need to secure sea lines ofcommunication (SLOCs) from rising asymmetric and symmetric threats.
 Enhanced constabulary and policing functions require greater capacity forsurveillance, search and patrol.
 The vulnerability of the region to natural disasters, nuclear mishaps andmanmade accident has ensured the demand for humanitarian assistanceand disaster relief by maritime forces.
 Rapid development of naval technologies and the desire to access themfor achieving national objectives.
Threat perceptions and risks
The changes in the type and format of maritime challenges demand a greater
operational flexibility and capability for maritime forces than was previously thecase.
The interdiction of SLOCs and energy lifelines is a perceived threat with its roots
in adversarial relations between States and the level of existing mistrust. The riseof non-state actors and the amorphous nature of threats posed by them is themost serious peacetime threat.
Similarly, maritime terrorism and its manifestation and the increase in piracy havecaused considerable concern. Apart from this, illegal transportation of drugs,
refugees, arms by sea and their subsequent linkage to terror organizations isanother area of security concern. Such challenges place greater demands on theoperational capability of maritime forces.

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Unfortunately, the risk of stand-offs arising from incidents at sea has increased.
Such incidents, even minor ones, have the potential to escalate into conflict due
to the existing “trust deficit” between states and possible “offensive posturing”
among regional navies.
This problem is further aggravated by increasing competition for resource
exploitation especially in disputed areas, as well as the complications arisingfrom navies operating in closer geographical proximity and in constrained sea
space.
Recommendations
Risk Mitigation
The following actions would contribute to the reduction of the trust deficit andmitigate the risks of escalation:
 Maritime Security and Confidence Building Measures (MSCBMs): Theseshould be area specific and need to be conceptualized keeping in mind theparticipating littorals and the associated “politico- military will” to engage.
 Hotlines between the headquarters of regional maritime security forces.
 Wider acceptance of INCSEA type agreement or of the Code for UnAlerted Encounters between ships (CUES) developed by the Western
Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), including the members of the Indian
Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS).
 Strict application of the International Convention for Preventing Collisions
at Sea (COLREGS) in close quarters situations.
 Role of Preventive diplomacy: Preventive diplomacy in conflict escalation
is a tool that countries may consider using in preventing a conflict or its
escalation.
 Actions to develop a common understanding of law of the sea issues thatare currently the subject of differences of opinion between regionalcountries e.g. rights and duties in the EEZ.
 Prior notification of naval exercises and weapon firings, whenever possible.

4Benefit Enhancement and Capacity Building
One of the best ways to ensure the benefits of enhancing capacities of navies is
to “share” and encourage cooperative approaches which help maritime security
forces to overcome transnational characteristics of maritime threats andchallenges. The following initiatives are suggested: Encourage Joint/ coordinated anti piracy and SLOC patrols for ensuring
good order at sea—thus making sure that there emerges a greater degreeof inter-operability and information sharing between navies.
 Active participation in the various established institutional structures,
including but not exclusively limited to IONS, WPNS, ReCAAP, Meetingsof the Heads of Asian Coast Guards.
 Encouraging MOUs for cooperative or joint patrols between countries withunresolved maritime boundaries.
 Training of naval personnel in military / non-military issues.
 Dialogues between maritime security forces at both national and regional
level should be further enhanced, including the possible exchange ofliaison officers between national maritime headquarters and coordination
centres.
 Encourage regional exercises on non-military operations such as for
HADR, Search and Rescue (SAR) etc, to enhance interoperability in suchoperations as well as to improve the operational readiness of individual
militaries.
 Encouraging information sharing of “actionable intelligence” against
maritime threats by overcoming systemic and bureaucratic hurdles.

5Annex 1: Naval Development in the Asia Pacific (Selected Countries)
Countries

Recent Development, Primary Inventory Acquisitions and likely Projections for the next five to ten
years

Australia

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Indonesia

 Increase patrol and transport ships: replace ageing ships, safeguard borders, enhance logisticalcapabilities, and in support of HADR
 Standing request: 8 corvettes, 2 submarines, 3 LSTs, and 4 patrol craft By 2029, a 99-ship Striking Force, including 40 Guided Missile Escort, 26 Missile Fast Attack Craft, 16
Frigates, 10 Submarine Focus on defense industrial base and naval shipyard (increasing local content via joint venture) SIGMA (Ship Integrated Geometrical Modularity Approach) Technology: Possible “transformational
bridge” (standardization)

Singapore The last of six Formidable-class frigates was delivered in August 2008 (all the vessels werecommissioned in 2009)
 Two ex-Swedish Vastergotland-class (Archer-class) Submarines will supplement rather than replace theexisting four Challenger-class

Vietnam Plans to obtain six Kilo-class Project 636 submarines
 Two 2,000t Gepard 3.9-class frigates ordered in 2006 were launched in December 2009 and March 2010.
 May 2010 order for six Canadian-built DHC-6 Twin Otter amphibian aircraft, three of these being theGuardian 400 maritime-patrol variant

Doubling the navy’s submarines from the present six Collins-class vessels.
Land-attack cruise missiles to arm new submarines, surface vessels and combat aircraft.
Eight new frigates, larger and better equipped than the present Anzac class.
New class of around 20 offshore combatant vessels of up to 2000 tones
Large strategic sealift ship of 10-15,000 tonnes to enhance amphibious capability.
Australian Defence Vessel Ocean Shield , an amphibious ship joins RAN Jul 2012. To be used for HADR
and later transferred to Customs and Border Protection.
 Three new Air Warfare Destroyer (AWDs)

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China China’s naval forces: 75 principal combatants, more than 60 submarines, 55 medium and large
amphibious ships, and 85 missile-equipped patrol craft Construction of a new PLA Navy base on Hainan Island was essentially completed by 2010. The base islarge enough to accommodate a mix of attack and ballistic missile submarines and advanced surface
combatants
 Chinese aircraft carrier (refitted Varyag) undergoing extensive sea trials. Reportedly a training programfor some 50 pilots to operate fixed-wing aircraft from an aircraft carrier The PLA Navy is improving its over-the horizon (OTH) targeting capability with Sky Wave and Surface
Wave OTH radars
 China continues production of its newest JIN-class (Type 094) nuclear powered ballistic missile
submarine (SSBNs) and may field up to five new SSBNs. One JIN-class SSBN has entered service
alongside two new SHANG-class (Type 093) nuclear powered attack submarines (SSN), four older HANclass SSNs, and China’s single XIA-class SSBN.
 Further expansion of its current force of nuclear-powered attack submarines and may add up to fiveadvanced Type 095 SSNs
 China has 13 SONG-class (Type 039) diesel-electric attack submarines (SS) in its inventory. The followon to the SONG is the YUAN-class SS, as many as four of which are already in service. China may plan
to construct 15 additional hulls for this class.
 The PLA Navy continues to produce surface combatants. These include two LUYANG II-class (Type052C) Guided Missile Destroyers (DDGs); two LUZHOU-class (Type 051C) DDGs; and four (soon to besix) JIANGKAI II-class (Type 054A) guided missile frigates (FFG) to be fitted with the medium-range
HHQ-16 vertically launched naval SAM currently under development

Republicof Korea In its recent pursuit of a blue-water navy capable of operating on the high seas, the ROK has
concentrated on commissioning large, capital ships, including the Dokdo-class landing-platform dock in
2007, six KDX-II (Chungmugong Yi Sunshin) destroyers from 2003–08 and two KDX-III (Sejong theGreat) cruisers in 2007 and 2010 (three have been ordered in total). In the past decade, no new ASWfocused surface vessel, either corvette or frigate, has been commissioned.
 Three out of an eventual nine KSS-2 submarines (German Type 214s) have been commissioned in thepast decade, and a new frigate class will be commissioned from 2011.
 Following the Cheonan incident, the navy admitted that it had started mass production of the Hong
Sangeo ship-to-submarine missile/torpedo to be used on the KDX-II and KDX-III platforms; 70 of the twostage anti-submarine missiles had been ordered in 2009.
7 In general, for 2011, key investments are expected in ballistic-missile early warning radar, Aegis
destroyers, F-15K and SAM-X aircraft, new-generation multiple rocket launch systems (MLRS) and the K21 infantry fighting vehicle program.
Malaysia

 RMN has to overcome the 17 ships transferred to the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (200506)
 In 10th Malaysian Plan six ASW helicopters have been asked for.
 Two Scorpene submarines (newly acquired) more planned in forthcoming plans.
 Hopes to acquire a LPD (Landing Platform Dock), New Generation Patrol Vessel NGPV (Littoral Combat
ship Multi Purpose design) – (a squadron of it by 2020) Second class of Kedah class vessels, modernization of Kasturi class under SLEP (Service Life Extension
Programme)

Philippine

 Modernization under CUP(Capability Upgrade Programme) in line with Philippine Navy Strategic Sail Plan
2020
 Eight Hamilton class in pipeline (one joined in 13 May 2011)
 Purchase of submarines, 30 Patrol vessels and 2 LCUs envisaged.

India Lease of Akula II SSN (Chakra) from Russia
 SSN Arihant being built indigenously Three aircraft carriers Navy envisaged with INS Vikramaditya scheduled to join in 2013. Kochi built
Vikrant class (IAC) to be commissioned by 2015-16
 Twelve P8Is Multi Mission Maritime Aircraft to commence joining by 2013
 Thirty submarines are likely to be added over next few years.
 Thirty nine ships are on order currently by IN

Japan

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Purchase of a Light Helo carrier DDH 22
Procurement of 2,900T submarine.
Indigenous production of P-1maritime patrol aircraft and UAVs.
Development of Kawasaki XC2 transport aircraft.
Development of stealth destroyer
BMD systems on Aegis class and additional deployment of Patriot (PAC-3) systems

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New
Zealand

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USA

 One Ford Class, aircraft carrier under construction, 2 more planned—to replace oldest of 11 existingolder CVNs on one-for-one basis at five-year intervals.
 Two America class Amphibious Assault Ships planned, to replace retiring LHA-1 and ensure total forceof 10 (8 LHDs in service, plus these two projected LHAs (USS America (LHA-6) under construction,planned (LHA-7) USS Tripoli (LHA-7).
 Final Arleigh Burke class destroyer (out of the initial purchase order of 62-ships bought over past 20
years) to be commissioned summer 2012, with three more planned subsequently, followed by ten
additional Flight III versions beginning in 2016. Three Zumwalt class Guided Missile Destroyers underconstruction, to deliver in 2016-2018— designed as multi-mission ships with a focus on land attack
 LCS Littoral Combat Ship—two in service, two under construction for 2012 delivery, 20 more authorized
for following five years, toward eventual total of 55, to replace 26 remaining FFG-7 Frigates, and MCM
ships.
 Ten LPD-17 San Antonio Class (amphibious transport dock) planned—six now in service, four more
under construction.
 EA-18 Growler Electronic Warfare Aircraft EA-18G, 56 now in service, of total 114 planned as
replacements for EA-6Bs
 As of October 2011, there were 195 F/A-18E models and 236 F/A-18F models in the U.S. Navy inventory.
The F/A-18E/F serves as a replacement for both older model F/A-18 A/C aircraft, as well as for the now
retired F-14 Tomcat. The Navy and Marine Corps still possess 96 F/A-18A, 22 F/A-18B, 375 F/A-18C
and 132 F/A-18D aircraft operating in service and test roles.
 252 MH-60R, Multi-Mission Helicopter planned. 275 planned MH-60S

HMNZS Canterbury class strategic sea lift vessel commissioned June 2007.
Four Inshore minesweeping vessels inducted in 2009.
Two offshore patrol vessels entered service in 2010.
Enhanced Maritime projection and sustainment capability is due between 2015-2020.
ANZAC frigate upgrade is due to be completed between 2015- 2020.

Note: The above information has been collated from numerous internet websites.

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ABOUT CSCAP
CSCAP is a non-governmental (second track) process for dialogue on security
issues in the Asia Pacific. Membership in CSCAP is on an institutional basis andconsists of Member Committees. Current membership comprises Australia,
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, theDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia,
Mongolia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
and the USA.
The functions of CSCAP are as follows:a. to provide an informal mechanism by which political and security issues
can be discussed by scholars, officials, and others in their private
capacities;
b. to encourage the participants of such individuals from countries andterritories in the Asia Pacific on the basis of the principle of inclusiveness;c. to organise various working groups to address security issues andchallenges facing the region;d. to provide policy recommendations to various intergovernmental bodies onpolitical-security issues;e. to convene regional and international meetings and other cooperative
activities for the purpose of discussing political-security issues;
f. to establish linkages with institutions and organisations in other parts of theworld to exchange information, insights and experiences in the area ofregional political-security cooperation; andg. to produce and disseminate publications relevant to the other purposes ofthe organisation.
Study Groups are the primary mechanism for CSCAP activity. As of August 2012,
the sole CSCAP Study Group which is still active is concerned with Countering
the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific. Previous
Study Groups concluded recently in June 2012 include: (i) Significance of the
Existence of Regional Transnational Crime Hubs to the Governments of the Asia
Pacific Region; (ii) Multilateral Security Governance in Northeast Asia/North
Pacific; (iii) Naval Enhancement in the Asia Pacific; (iv) Water Resources
Security; and (v) Cyber Security.
This memorandum was produced by the CSCAP Study Group on Naval
Enhancement in the Asia Pacific and was approved by the out of session CSCAP
Steering Committee Meeting via electronic consultation on 9 August 2012.

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Further information on CSCAP can be obtained from the CSCAP website atwww.cscap.org or by contacting the CSCAP Secretariat:
CSCAP Secretariat
c/o ISIS Malaysia
1 Persiaran Sultan Salahuddin
PO Box 12424
50778 Kuala Lumpur
Malaysia
T: +603-2693 9366 Ext 125
F: +603-2693 9375
E: cscap@isis.org.my

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CSCAP Memoranda
CSCAP Memoranda are the outcome of the work of Study Groups approved by theSteering Committee and submitted for consideration by the ASEAN Regional Forumand other bodies.
 Memorandum No.20 – Ensuring A Safer Cyber Security Environment
Author: Study Group on Cyber Security
Date published: May 2012
 Memorandum No.19 – Reduction and Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
Author: Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction in the Asia PacificDate published: February 2012
 Memorandum No.18 – Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)
Author: Study Group on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)
Date published: September 2011
 Memorandum No.17 – Promoting the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
Author: Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction in the Asia PacificDate published: June 2011
 Memorandum No.16 – Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations
Author: Study Group on Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations
Date published: January 2011
 Memorandum No.15 – The Security Implications of Climate Change
Author: Study Group on the Security Implications of Climate Change
Date published: July 2010
 Memorandum No.14 – Guidelines for Managing Trade of Strategic Goods
Author: Export Controls Experts Group (XCXG)
Date published: March 2009
 Memorandum No.13 – Guidelines for Maritime Cooperation in Enclosed and SemiEnclosed Seas and Similar Sea Areas of the Asia PacificAuthor: Study Group on Facilitating Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific
Date published: June 200812 Memorandum No.12 – Maritime Knowledge and Awareness: Basic Foundations ofMaritime Security
Author: Study Group on Facilitating Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific
Date published: December 2007
 Memorandum No.11 – Human Trafficking
Author: Study Group on Human Trafficking
Date published: June 2007
 Memorandum No.10 – Enhancing Efforts to Address Factors Driving International
Terrorism
Author: Study Group on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Campaign Against
International Terrorism with Specific Reference to the Asia Pacific Region
Date published: December 2005
 Memorandum No.9 – Trafficking of Firearms in the Asia Pacific Region
Author: Working Group on Transnational Crime
Date published: May 2004
 Memorandum No.8 – The Weakest Link? Seaborne Trade and the Maritime
Regime in the Asia PacificAuthor: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: April 2004
 Memorandum No.7 – The Relationship Between Terrorism and Transnational
Crime
Author: Working Group on Transnational Crime
Date published: July 2003
 Memorandum No.6 – The Practice of the Law of the Sea in the Asia PacificAuthor: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: December 2002
 Memorandum No.5 – Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea
Author: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: February 2001
 Memorandum No.4 – Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation
Author: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: December 199713

 Memorandum No.3 – The Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Cooperative
Security
Author: Working Group on Comprehensive and Cooperative Security
Date published: December 1995
 Memorandum No.2 – Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures
Author: Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures
Date published: June 1995
 Memorandum No.1 – The Security of the Asia Pacific Region
Author: CSCAP
Date published: April 1994

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