Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
6th General ConferenceGreat Power Relations andRegional Community Building in Pacific Asia
Jakarta, 7-8 December 2007

REPORTFor Public

CSCAP Indonesia

0Part IINTRODUCTION

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) 6th General Conference was
successfully convened in Jakarta, Indonesia, from 7 to 8 December 2008. CSCAP
Indonesia again served as the host committee. Four other member committees, namely
AusCSCAP, CSCAP Japan, CSCAP Singapore, and CSCAP China agreed to co-organizing
the conference, most notably in finding and securing funds and inviting speakers anddignitaries from their countries.
With the objective to create a forum for an open second track dialogue, the co-organizers
worked and consulted closely to formulate a set of topics and speakers. Despite its tightand lengthy schedule, all sessions succeeded in creating lively, open and frank
discussions and debates on the most significant contemporary security issues faced by theregion.
With “Great Power Relations and Regional Community Building in East Asia” as thetheme, the conference lasted two days, with the first day devoted to broadening
understanding of the strategic and macroeconomic relationship between China, Japan,
and the United States, gauging their respective views regarding of one another’s roles
and intentions in the region, and then exploring how to build a sustainable regional
order.
Against the backdrop of this broader power architecture, day two of the conference wasto address specific issues and threats regarding peace and security in the region,
including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, peacekeeping and peace-1building, maritime security in the Malacca Straits, terrorism, and the security
implications of climate change.
Distinguished scholars and government officials from around the region were present
and delivered their views. Among the officials were H.E. N. Hassan Wirajuda (Ministerfor Foreign Affairs, Indonesia), H.E. Juwono Sudarsono (Minister for Defense,
Indonesia), H.E. James Clad (Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Southeast Asia,
U.S. Department of Defense), H.E. Ong Keng Yong (Secretary General, Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations), H.E. Lee Su-hoon (Chairman, Presidential Committee on
Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, Republic of Korea), and Mr. Masatoshi Shimbo(Deputy Director General for Foreign Policy Bureau, and for Disarmament, NonProliferation and Science Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
Following the success of the previous two General Conferences, the 6th General
Conference promoted the enthusiasm among all CSCAP Member Committees tocontinue this great effort, which in the longer run is hoped to contribute greatly to theregional security in the Asia Pacific.

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Part II
GENERAL OBSERVATION AND ASSESSMENT

Participants and Role Players
Around 120 foreign participants from 18 countries in the region and over 180 Indonesianparticipants attended the conference. In addition to representatives from CSCAP
Member Committees, the conference participants also include scholars, journalists,
activists, and government officials. A large number of the participants were from theyounger generation, including university students and young scholars, and most notably
the participants of the Pacific Forum Young Leaders program. This is very encouraging,as the involvement of the younger generation in CSCAP is relevant to the extension of
the network. All participants attended the conference in their private capacity.
Distinguished individuals were invited to participate and play various roles in theconference, namely as keynote speakers, presenters, and chairs. The presentations given
by all speakers were sharp and candid. The way they shared their minds on theirassigned topics showed the high quality of their presentations.
Each session commenced with a Keynote Speech, which gave an overview to theaudience about the topic of the session. The sessions were then followed by several
issue-specific presentations, to create comprehensive discussions. The role of the chairs
was pivotal in the success of each session, as they stimulated lively and scholarly debatesand discussions, as well as making sure the sessions went as scheduled.

3Selection of Topics and Flow of Discussion
At the preparatory stage, drafting the program of the conference included formulating a
set of topics that would not only attract the attention of the audience, but would also
cover all contemporary security challenges in the region. Although full mandate andliberty has been given to the co-organizers to decide the topics, wide consultation wasmade with as many members of CSCAP as possible. In addition to this, experience fromthe previous CSCAP General Conference also contributed to the consideration.
In order to create effective presentation and encourage more discussion among
participants, each Keynote Speech was given 20 minutes, while presenters were given 10
minutes each to present their views on their respective topics. Chairs of each session
were given the liberty to remind the speakers about their time limits, and they were
giving the task to be interventionist – clarifying points, relating the views of one speakerto those of another, bringing the speakers into conversation with one another,
identifying other conference participants with expertise on the matters under discussion,
keeping the focus on key issues and if necessary asking questions to the panelists.
To ensure open, frank, and friendly atmosphere for discussion, the conference was held
under the Chatham House Rule. All participants were repeatedly reminded to observe tothis rule.
At the sidelines of the conference, CSCAP proudly launched the first annual CSCAP
Regional Security Outlook. A press conference was held in the event of the launch of thereport titled “Security Through Cooperation: Furthering Asia Pacific Multilateral
Engagement”.

4Part III
Highlights of the Debates

Keynote Address – H.E. N. Hassan Wirajuda, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic ofIndonesia
Minister Wirajuda highlighted the evolution of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) from its Cold War origins to its recent expansion to include all
Southeast Asian states, to its current status as a potential catalyst for political andeconomic integration in the broader Asia Pacific region. He noted that as the central
front of the Cold War, Europe had found it necessary to develop the Conference on
Security Cooperation in Europe, while East Asia, positioned on the periphery of the Cold
War, found no need to establish a similar institution. The onset of the Vietnam War inSoutheast Asia and the Cultural Revolution in China, however, thrust the region onto
the center stage of world affairs.
ASEAN’s formation in 1967 provided the basis for regional cooperation, though lack oftrust and ongoing conflict in the region, along with sensitivities regarding military
alliances, initially precluded cooperation on security matters. Despite this slow-going
beginning, habituating processes of cooperation and dialogue in the region paved theway for the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which lifted the taboo on
addressing security issues within ASEAN.
Minister Wirajuda emphasized that more recently, regional responses to intrastate
conflicts have continued to demonstrate what he termed the “ASEAN spirit,” and havegreatly enhanced ASEAN’s confidence in addressing security issues. In particular, he
noted the involvement of regional parties in providing for peaceful resolutions of5

conflicts in Indonesia and the Philippines. Moreover, the 1994 establishment of theASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has provided a means for foreign ministers to discuss
security issues and eventually establish a dispute settlement mechanism. Already, headded, inter-governmental cooperation on fighting non-traditional security threats has
proven productive, and confidence building and the establishment of norms have eased
tensions in the region.
In addition to addressing intra-ASEAN issues, Minister Wirajuda commented thatthrough the ASEAN Plus Three mechanism and the East Asia Summit, ASEAN is also
helping shape a new architecture in the broader Asia-Pacific region. Indonesia, he said,
advocates a broader notion of East Asia—one that includes New Zealand, India, andAustralia—based not on geography, race, or culture, but rather on commonality of
purpose and values. Such an organization should use economic integration as the basis
for future cooperation, and upon its establishment and consolidation, could include
major East Asian powers as observers.
Having already helped provide security and prosperity both within and outside its
geographical area, Minister Wirajuda argued that ASEAN must now complete its
transition to an “ASEAN Community” built upon security, economic, and socio-cultural
pillars. In concluding his remarks, Minister Wirajuda cited greater socio-cultural
cohesion within ASEAN as well as the newly signed ASEAN Charter as positive signals
of movement in this direction.
In the Q and A session, Minister Wirajuda responded to two questions on the issue ofAsia Pacific community building. As to whether such a community would be “panAsian” or “pan-Pacific”, he noted that East Asian community-building should be a“bottom-up” process, like ASEAN, rather than a “top-down” process, like the European
Union. As such, its ultimate composition cannot yet be known.

6Regarding the involvement of external powers in this process, Minister Wirajuda
pointed to Russia’s interest in joining the East Asia Summit, and U.S. intention to wait
until the process is further developed before joining. To admit one without the othermight disturb the organization’s external balance and mar the process. However,bringing Australia and New Zealand into the process would demonstrate a positivecommitment to inclusiveness, he said.

Special Address: Emerging Regional Order in PacificThis session was dedicated to as an overview of the theme of the conference, during
which the speaker identified the key nations, bilateral relations, multilateral institutions
and organizations, as well as social and political trends within nations shaping the East
Asian order. The speech began by a reminder that while ASEAN has been a central
forum for and catalyst of discussions about broader regional order, the organization has
serious shortcomings. Despite ASEAN and a multiplicity of international and regional
structures, bilateral relations remain very important in reducing tensions in the region
and building operations there.
Sino-Russian relations have improved significantly of late, with past tensions having
begun to recede. Sino-U.S. relations remain complex, as a massive trading partnership
underpins a relationship strained by disagreements over monetary policy, productsafety concerns, and a host of other issues of concern to both parties. India’s growth andits projection outward and increasing relevance to international affairs will, likewise,
impact the East Asian order as it seeks to accommodate a second major rising power.
Finally, Russia’s recent assertiveness under Vladimir Putin’s leadership has the potential
to trouble its relations with the U.S. for the foreseeable future.

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Turning to the role of institutions in structuring the regional order, it was discussed thatinter-governmental and other multilateral organizations are making progress at
promoting cooperation in many fields—particularly economic. Interestingly, these
multilateralism institutions have typically been instituted to address one discrete field.
In addition to the intergovernmental organizations, informal, non-governmental
networks such as CSCAP constitute another type of regional organization that cangenerate and propose new solutions and issues.
While relationships—bilateral or multilateral—among key countries in the region remaina key determinant in East Asia, forces within those countries will also help determine
whether the future of the region is one of peace and stability, or conflict andconfrontation. In particular, each country’s interactions with the outside world will be
informed by pressures for internationalism, nationalism, and communalism. The search
for a more meaningful identity—whether religious, ethnic, or local in character—canlead to separatism, adding that peace and stability in the region and the future of
regionalism will depend on how this issue is handled. Both types of multilateralism—
formal and informal—are essential to peace in the region for two reasons: (1) a variety offactors have made it clear that wars cannot be won today; (2) addressing the key internal
issues that states face requires a calm international scene.

Session One: Great Power Relations in the Pacific Asian Region
Presenters in the conference’s first panel session took on one of the most pressing
questions in international relations at the outset of the 21st Century: what is the future ofChinese-Japanese-American relations? Moreover, how will trends in the relations affectthe prospects for peace and stability in the region? A common subsequent question thenemerged: how well China can cope with the environmental and social consequences of
its rapid economic growth? Many people doubt China’s own under understanding of its

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role in the world, and whether it ultimately aims for regional hegemony. All panelists
pointed to the current dynamism of this relationship, and highlighted China’s continued
rise and growing role as a major player in the world economy as key variables inanswering this question.
It was discussed that although the U.S. is the world’s sole superpower, rising powers
and other developing nations are playing larger roles internationally, causing a shift inthe strategic weight of the world toward Asia. Second, the role of ideology ininternational relations has diminished in the world, as the international community hasrealized that there is no one universally accepted national system, and countries should
thus be permitted to pursue their own paths. Third, while traditional security issues
remain important, a host of new issues—including poverty reduction, climate change,and energy security—are changing the nature of international relations, because no one
nation can address these issues on its own.
With regards to China’s strategic interests into the broader context of Northeast Asian
relations, democratization, cooperation, and economic integration are the key forces
shaping the Asia Pacific region and framing Chinese-Japanese-U.S. relations. These
trends have the capacity to provide for “strong decade” in regional relations if domestic
political and nationalist pressure on key regional actors remains in check. In China, thefocus remains on generating and managing economic growth, while the goals andnature of its military modernization process are not clear. These two features suggestthat China is not yet in a position to assume an international leadership role. At the sametime, Japan’s uncertain political climate and fears about Chinese competition interjectsome uncertainty into relations between the two countries even as their economies
become more closely intertwined.
While regional players seek to accommodate changing regional dynamics, the U.S.
political elite remains focused on the issue of terrorism. It was predicted that as this9

focus fades, China would become the top priority for American strategists. Nevertheless,he added that renewed focus on the region would be based not primarily on ensuring
military balance, as it has in the past, but on accommodating the rise of regional
economies, an evolving “East Asian identity,” and increasing regional integration.
The efforts to resolve disputes over the hot-button issues of the Taiwan Straits and theNorth Korean nuclear weapons program were currently on positive trajectories, but thatthe long-term key to reducing regional tensions would be improving Sino-U.S. and SinoJapanese relations. Looking forward, he cited as the keys to ensuring regional peace andstability in the future: economic nationalism; resisting an “alliance of values” between
the U.S., India, and Australia; recognizing Japan’s global citizenship with a permanent
UN Security Council seat; and finding a workable modus operandi between China andJapan.
On Japan-China relations, it was noted in the session that the world has never before
seen both a strong Japan and a strong China at the same time, and that the modus
operandi Ambassador Abramowitz had cited as key to regional peace had not yet beenfound, despite relations that have been warming of late. As a result, the U.S. presence inthe region is still required to act as a buffer between the two nations. A panelist qualified
his optimism about Sino-Japanese relations by noting lingering uncertainties about
China’s future. Not least among them was whether China’s political system would
eventually become more open and transparent.
Another panelist, however, contended that relationship is in fact bilateral, with the U.S.Japan alliance, on one side, and China on the other. This dynamic has both positive andnegative effects, he said. The Japan-U.S. relationship has discouraged Japanesedevelopment of nuclear weapons; however, it also provides a necessarily divisive
regional framework that engenders suspicion and rivalry. A gradual transition—not a10

revolution—to multilateral security architecture would prove preferable to the series ofbilateral relationships that currently exists.
In the Q and A period, the panelists addressed issues ranging from the potential
consequences of a values-based alliance system, to the impact of India’s rise on East
Asian relations, to the possible effects of U.S. normalization of relations with North
Korea. The three presenters agreed that a values-based alliance would be unnecessarily
provocative towards China, but exhibited some differences in how they believe
democracy and human rights should factor into the regional security framework.
Moreover, it was explained that while a values-based alliance may not be a prudent
policy, democracy in China is important to fostering better relations between China andJapan.
There was also widespread agreement that the main impact of India’s rise on the region
would be economic rather than military in nature, but that increasing Indian influenceand the effects of its “look east” policy are already evident in closer involvement inSoutheast Asia.

Luncheon Speech
The main topic of the luncheon speech on the first day of the conference was Australia’s
abiding strategic interests: strong regional relations, engagement with the U.S. focusedon the Asia-Pacific region, and continued engagement with multilateral organizations.
Australia has made strong regional relations a pillar of its foreign policy. The Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), she said, has proven itself essential to the region
and to Australia, which sends half of its exports to five APEC markets. Likewise, theARF has established itself as the most important regional security mechanism, and is
now ready to increase the tempo of its operations. The Australia-Indonesia conference11also serves as a forum for developing practices for multinational responses to natural
disasters, and this cooperation my in turn lead to greater cooperation on othertransnational security issues such as terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. Finally, theEast Asia Summit may indeed make a valuable contribution to regional security as well.
It was further discussed that stability in the Asia Pacific region also requires a view
beyond the region. Ongoing U.S. engagement is essential to peace in the region, alongwith movement toward a rules-based regional order in Northeast Asia, and active
engagement at the UN are also essential aspects of ensuring this stability. Australia seeks
to take these relations to their logical next stage by expanding the ARF’s preventative
diplomacy mission, and by urging regional organizations to take a role in global issues—in particular, in addressing climate change.

Session Two: Regional Reaction to Pacific Asia Great power Relations
Picking up from the first session’s discussions regarding Japan, China and the U.S.’scontinued efforts to redefine their relationships for the 21st Century, the second session
addressed how these developments are being received elsewhere in the region. All of the
speakers underscored the importance for the region of China’s economic and militaryrise, Japan’s efforts to find an international role consummate with its economic power,
and the U.S.’s continued engagement in the region.
During the session, it was highlighted that Asia has indeed been shaped by great power
relations, and the 30-year period since U.S. President Richard Nixon’s visit to China has
been a period of extraordinary peace and security in the region. Currently, however,with the rise of China and India, we are witnessing the biggest power shift in the region
since the U.S.’s emergence as a world power.

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It was discussed that these changes take place against a broader backdrop of changes in
the region that include ASEAN’s recovery from the late 1990s financial crisis, Russia’srole as a principal energy supplier and its efforts to regain major power status, andIndia’s massive economic growth, which soon stands to reach nine percent. At the sametime, terrorism has become a key issue in the region, particularly for the U.S., which, he
added, though still the preeminent “hard and soft power” in the region, has lost
influence in the Asia Pacific region because of its current focus on its commitments
elsewhere in the world. Finally, Northeast and Southeast Asia are building social
linkages.
Accommodating and managing this change is the most pressing challenge for othercountries in the region, particularly for middle powers like Australia. China, the U.S.,
and Japan will each have to undertake changes to create a new regional regime reflecting
the new distribution of power in the region. This is a delicate process, warning thatmajor power countries do not willingly choose conflicts, but rather find themselves
unintentionally drawn into conflicts. One of CSCAP’s challenges will be to help spell out
just what kind of new regional order would most effectively militate against conflict.
The session discussed some practical steps that middle powers can take to facilitate thattransition. Regional actors should begin this process by encouraging the U.S. and China
to negotiate and collaborate with one another. This is an important step toward
maintaining transparency and balance at this volatile time. Japan’s candidacy to becomea permanent member of the UN Security Council also deserves support. Maintaining a
reliable balance of power in the region and containing competition in the future will
determine whether the next 30 years in the region can be as peaceful as the last 30.
Specifically for India, it believes the growing interdependence between China and Japan
to be extremely important. Closer regional cooperation can make this relationship more
durable, and can be facilitated by increasing economic cooperation. However, India’s

13engagement in the region is not limited to its increasingly comprehensive relationshipwith the U.S., or its relationships with China and other Northeast Asian states. India’s
embrace of a broader understanding of security issues, and its inclusive approach toregionalism have also led to a convergence of interests with Southeast nations. This has
led to maritime security cooperation and on progress toward an India-ASEAN free trade
agreement. India is committed to participation in regional summits and otherarrangements and to furthering regional integration, which has allowed India to become
increasingly engaged on both economic and security issues in the region.
India is expected to continue to engage regional actors in both bilateral and multilateralsettings. India’s bilateral relationship has been integral to its efforts to combat terrorism
among other issues. It was emphasized that India’s current focus is on consolidating thebenefits of its economic growth and political development, rather than taking the lead on
the international stage. Despite its inward focus, however, India has clearly become
important to the region. Its rapid growth has made it an important economic player. At
the same time, the dynamism of the East Asia region is creating new opportunities androles that India can fill. Finally, if East Asia is to be redefined with ASEAN at its center,
India must necessarily be included for the sake of equilibrium.
The proposed U.S.-India deal to cooperate on civilian nuclear technology also has
important implications for U.S.-China-Japan relations is seen as a reflection of the U.S.’schanged understanding of India’s role in the world. Japan and China’s current
opposition to the deal on the ground that it would undermine the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is unfounded and runs the risk of being understood as
opposition to India as such. In this regard, it was explained that for India, energy
security and democracy as two additional issues effecting regional great power relations.
Neither India nor China subscribes to the U.S. position that global energy resources
should be allocated through a market-based system, each opting instead for equity
investment in energy sources throughout the world. This could lead to competition and14

more troubled relations between the two nations in the future as they both seek to meetskyrocketing energy demand.
On the other hand, for South Korea, it is primarily concerned with achieving a peacefulresolution of the standoff over the DPRK’s nuclear program. Beyond this, South Korea istrying to translate the six-party talks into a framework for broader regional security
cooperation. The South Korean government believes that enhancing economic
cooperation with the DPRK will pave the way for broader East Asian security
cooperation. South Korea also aims to enhance the region’s security through its alliances
as well as through multilateral security cooperation, he said.
Another important middle power in the region is of course the Southeast Asian states.
The diversity and differences among Southeast Asian countries precludes the possibility
that there will be one regional reaction to great power relations. That qualification aside,
it was noted that in general Southeast Asian nations have friendly relations with all the
major regional players, and refrain from taking hostile stands positions against anyone.
Accordingly, Southeast Asian countries have sought peaceful and stable relationships
with both the U.S. and China. In addition, Southeast Asia recognizes Japan’s desire to bea “normal country” and to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
Southeast Asia also would also like to be engaged in the regional security building,though this general sentiment has yet to be developed into actual policies within
ASEAN.
Questions from the audience ranged from the regional reaction to the situation in
Myanmar, to opinions about the direction of Japan’s foreign policy, to understandings
about China’s relationship with the U.S., to the role of the Non-Aligned Movement incontemporary Indian foreign policy. It was discussed that since 2001 ASEAN has
forcefully called for reconciliation and an end to repression in Myanmar, but has nottaken additional actions beyond broad condemnations. Alluding to the complexity of the15

issue, he added that it is not clear that expelling or suspending Myanmar from ASEAN
would improve the situation there. Moreover, sanctions are problematic because India
and China’s interests in Myanmar are not merely economic, but rather strategic. It was
further pointed out that no country is currently willing to back up sanctions or toughdiplomacy with the threat of force. As a result, they are without effect. The real
challenge, he said, would be to find a way to make China and India see it as in theirinterests to see the regime in Myanmar evolve.
On the question of how middle powers can influence great powers, it was explainedome countries have a better track record on this issue. The key service the middle
powers can provide is to inform great powers of the consequences of what their actions
mean for the region.

Session Three: Regional Institution Building in Pacific Asia
This session is preoccupied with the issue of the regional institution building in PacificAsia. The panelists addressed the current state of regional institution building in PacificAsia, and offered ideas about what the prospects and shape of any future suchinstitutions might be.
Begun by an historical overview of U.S. approach to Asia Pacific matters as well as how
the U.S. plans to approach the region’s security situation in the future, some of the
discussions evolved around the idea that the U.S. has asserted itself in the Pacific since
its independence, not just since the second World War, adding that the predictability
that the alliance system provides the international system has been an essential pillar ofpeace in the world. Today, the U.S. conceives of itself as an Asia-Pacific power—not justa Pacific power. Nevertheless, the U.S. must choose which regional meetings and fora
matter, and which do not, as its multiple engagements elsewhere require the U.S. to have16

clear priorities. APEC and ARF as two such bodies that matter a great deal. APEC
provides real benefits in the form of lowered barriers to trade and investment in theregion. Likewise, ARF has a real and important mission, despite how slow and taxing its
deliberations can be. However, in addition to the regional institution building, the U.S.
also values its bilateral relationships in the region; partnerships with Japan, thePhilippines, Thailand, India, and Singapore provide key elements to the region’s
security.
It was noted that despite the proliferation of Free Trade Areas (FTAs) in the region,
Pacific Asia would not have an EU-style regional body anytime soon. While arguing forthe extension of the current patchwork of FTAs to include 16 key countries, he also
cautioned that planning for regional institutions requires sober analysis, and must take
into account the complex forces—separatist, nationalist, and economic—that are criticalto a realistic understanding of the prospects for regional institutions in Pacific Asia.
Identifying specific functions and processes—rather than specific groupings of nations—and building mechanisms to address them, should be the basic organizing principle ofregional institution building.
There are issues that pose challenges—and in some cases, also opportunities—for
institution building in the region, beginning with the DPRK nuclear issue. The six-party
talks had been a success, he said, because they reflected a comprehensive approach toregional security, taking into account the economic and political issues, rather thanseeking to address the basic security situation in isolation. The emphasis on dialogue,
negotiation, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the commitment to engagement thatemerged from the six-party talks may provide solid normative foundation for efforts toinstitutionalize regional relations. At the same time, ASEAN’s consolidation through its
Charter, and the ARF’s progress in economic integration and, increasingly, in addressing
security issues, also serve as an example of regional institution-building and a means ofsocializing norms of effective regional relations, respectively.

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By taking stock of the institutions—both formal and informal—that currently underpin
the region’s security, which include the Westphalian state system, the U.S.-centric
system of alliances, the international financial system, the development of ASEAN, andother less formal, but still important, relationships, it was argued in the session that thearchitecture has served the region relatively well, but is currently under stress, and its
past performance does not guarantee its future success. The rise of China and India
present potentially destabilizing structural changes to the region’s power dynamics. At
the same time, financial interdependence has exposed the risk of a regional crisis, andglobalization and the rise of new transnational threats and linkages have eroded
Westphalianism and created new fissures—often within states themselves. At thedomestic level, the trend toward democratization in the region and increasing
expectations of good governance have introduced a new, and in some instances lesspredictable, variable into foreign policy planning.
The rise of China and the possible ascent of Chinese nationalism are also major issues.
The region need not hedge against China per se, but rather that one-party rule has madeChina’s future plans and intentions unclear. As a result, the region needs a trilateralmechanism between the U.S., Japan, and China, to increase transparency in theirrelations and in their respective goals for the region. In addition, China’s rapid economic
growth, along with that of Southeast Asia, has brought with it new regional problems
such as widening income disparities and adverse environmental effects that any regionalframework would have to address.
Moreover, non-traditional security issues should be discussed separately fromtraditional security issues. Cooperation on counterterrorism and counter-proliferation isbased on clear, shared interests, and should not be inhibited by disputes over other more
contentious issues.

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At the same time, however, questions remain about ASEAN’s ability to live up to its
high goals, and failure to bring enhanced security cooperation would have a devastating
effect on efforts to expand institutionalize a broader regional security framework.
Moreover, despite recently warmed relations, failure to achieve broad-based
improvement in Sino-Japanese relations would doom efforts at regional integration. In
fact, a joint effort is necessary to mitigate China and Japan’s ongoing rivalry, and bothparties should elevate the six-party mechanism in order to take advantage of thecurrently positive environment in order to start the hard work of building a rule-based,
institutionalized system in East Asia.
It was also highlighted that the region needs a fundamental reconsideration of the
security doctrines in the region, along with the realization that security and prosperity is
not a “zero-sum game.” Peace requires shared security and common prosperity. The
unpredictability of developments in certain countries should not be used as excuses for“hedging” against them. Such a transformation in regional relations is possible, he said,
but requires significant political will.
In this regards, states in the region should build up existing institutions in order toprovide the normative basis for achieving these goals. No less important than enhancing
the capability of such institutions, however, would be shaping their values and norms.
Only inclusive, multilateral security processes that steer clear of being characterized as
being directed against anyone in particular can facilitate the cooperation necessary forpeace in the region. This in turn demands a departure from adversarial, militarized
foreign policies, as well as from policies that use ideological grounds to determine termsof engagement and cooperation. Only with the participation of all the relevant actors in
the region can security be achieved, with cooperation on non-security issues serving as
the basis for future cooperation in security matters.

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It also requires a way to “knit together” Northeast and Southeast Asia, greater nongovernmental and civil society cooperation, the promotion of the World Trade
Organization system to mediate financial disputes, and structures that reflect the
distribution of power in the international system, rather than ideological and historicalfactors. However, the key to a sustainable system would be fostering a constructive U.S.China relationship through greater military to military contact and cooperation. Finally,
he said that as the majority of violence in the region now occurs at the national level,
ensuring peace and stability in the region requires attending to governance and security
issues at the national level.
In the lively discussion that followed the panelists’ presentations, the speakers
elaborated their views on the six-party talks on the Korean peninsula. It was expressedthat the near future would be a difficult time in the talks as Japan, South Korea, and the
U.S. election seasons all make political compromise there difficult. Despite any shortterm setbacks, the talks are significant insofar as they show the capability of regional
players—and most importantly China and the U.S.—to discuss regional security in aconstructive manner.
Regarding the six-party talks’ potential as a mechanism for regional problem-solving, it
was noted that the existence of the ARF makes the establishment of a separate Northeast
Asian security forum a less pressing task. Some of the panelists voiced their criticism of
the notion of a values-based organization for addressing the region’s problems, addingthat such an alliance would be unnecessarily provocative and would not facilitate thecooperation needed to ensure peace and security in the region.
Panelists also addressed ASEAN’s contributions to regional peace and security. On thequestion on the U.S. opinion of aspirations for an ASEAN community, it was explainedthat the results of expanding ASEAN’s membership were mixed, as the difficulty ofaccomplishing its lofty goals with such a diverse membership had caused the20organization “to lose face a bit.” Regarding the situation in Myanmar, the “ASEAN way”
is meant to be effective, but the organization’s activity on the issue appears more as“hand-wringing” than quiet, effective diplomacy. However, it was agreed that a
growing sense of community in the region, even if that sentiment had not yet been
operationalized within ASEAN.

Dinner Speech
The central theme of the dinner speech was Japan’s approach to regional and global
security issues. Japan’s alliances and active engagement in the region was conducive tostrong and mutually beneficial relationships in the Asia Pacific region. A four-pronged
strategy to accomplish the political and economic stability that he said should be thecommon objectives for the region was proposed.
First, cooperative and active engagement should characterize regional relations. Second,
all countries should actively seek constructive roles for China to play. Third, regional
cooperation should be based on the rule of law, and should be conducted withtransparency, openness, and a view toward the shared interests of all the region’s actors.
Finally, the transparency of the East Asian Summit and ARF processes should be
increased.
With regard to how Japan, specifically, would fit into this framework, Japan’s alliancewith the U.S. remains important, and this relationship is only strengthened by working
with the U.S. to address major global challenges, including containing nuclear
developments in North Korea and Iran, and supporting the fight against terrorism, whileat the same time working to deepen its diplomatic relationships with neighboring
countries.

21

The complexity of Japan’s relationship with China was also discussed. China’s economic
development, has been a blessing for Japan, as has its efforts as chair of the six party
talks to create consensus among parties in order to maintain peace on the Korean
peninsula. Japan seeks to build this mutually beneficial role and to support China’s
constructive engagement in the region, he said, citing the example of cooperation among
the Chinese and Japanese leadership on economic cooperation and environmental
protection.
At the same time, Japan has paid close attention to China’s rapid modernization of its
military and believes that for China to be a constructive partner in the future, it must betransparent and responsible about its military capacity. Toward this end, the ASEAN
Plus Three mechanism can serve as a forum for confidence building measures andpreventative diplomacy. Because of the positive contribution ASEAN and the ARF canmake to advancing an East Asian community, Japan welcomes the ASEAN Charter andprovides strong support for ASEAN’s further integration and development.

Session Four: Combating Terrorism – Achievements and Obstacles
This session sought to discuss two main issues: a global overview of the successes andchallenges in combating terrorism; and the contextualization of the regional assessmentsof terrorism.
Successes in combating terrorism since 2001 was said to include: the toppling of the
Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq; the destruction of the al
Qaida safe-haven and leadership in Afghanistan; the allocation of funding worldwide tocombating and preventing terrorism, and the resulting hardening of criticalinfrastructure as well as border and aviation security; the disruption of terrorism
financing and support operations; the increase in public awareness and vigilance22concerning

terrorism;

theenhancementofintergovernmental

counterterrorism

cooperation and information sharing, as well as streamlined processes withingovernments for sharing and acting on intelligence information; and the reduction instate sponsorship of terrorist activity. Perhaps most importantly, there has been no
attack on the scale of the 2001 attacks in the U.S.
The different varieties of terrorism in various countries and contexts preclude thepossibility of a single “silver bullet” response to terrorism. The diversity of terrorist
movements, tactics, and strategies have likewise necessitated a multifaceted government
response. Various national governments’ counterterrorism policies have improved, andthe most successful responses have combined coercive measures to combat committed
terrorists with conciliatory measures to deter would-be terrorist recruits and supporters.
These successes, however, have come in spite of major failures and mistakes—
particularly on the part of the United States. The “Global War on Terror”, has beenpoorly conceived and poorly executed. In framing its response to the 9/11 attacks as awar, the U.S. succumbed to the emotional fervor of the time, in the process inadvertently
elevating its adversary and committing itself to a primarily military strategy to combat
terrorism. This lack of clarity and sobriety led to the wrong-headed conflation of thethreats posed by Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. It also led to two importantmissed opportunities: first, to mobilize the international community to cooperate incombating terrorism, and second, to educate the American public as to the risks andimplications of its status as the world’s sole superpower.
Such mistakes and missed opportunities have created a series of new obstacles, the war
in Iraq most notable among them. As long as the U.S. military remains on the ground in
the Middle East, it will be considered an imperial power and as a result have little
capability to be a moderating influence in the region. More broadly, the loss of American

23

standing in the world makes it difficult for other countries to support U.S.-led policies
and initiatives.
There are also other factors increasing the danger posed by terrorism. Smaller andsmaller groups are finding it easier to procure lethal weaponry to carry out their radical
agendas with violence. Migration from conflict zones in South Asia, North Africa, theMiddle East and elsewhere to Europe and other developed countries can provide
terrorist groups access to those countries, while also potentially causing a sense of
separation and alienation within migrant groups that can aid terrorist recruitment.
In the years since the 9/11 attacks and the world’s response, terrorists have also learned
and adjusted their tactics. Such developments have been aided by terrorists’ ability tocapitalize on the internet to facilitate their activity. Finally, a lack of knowledge on thepart of governments as to how the terrorist recruitment and radicalization processactually works also inhibits a comprehensive and effective government response.
Overcoming these obstacles will require recognition that a military response is not thesolution to the problem of terrorism. Instead, lessons from successful instances ofcombating terrorist movements should be tailored and employed to address the
dynamics of current terrorist movements. Combating terrorism successfully requires amultifaceted response that forgoes to the temptation for politically appealing but
ultimately ineffective short-term measures.
On the updates on regional counterterrorism developments, it was noted that there havebeen no major bombings in Indonesia since October 2005. A successful operation against
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has denied the terrorist group a key base in Poso, Central
Sulawesi, and extensive infiltration of jihadi networks have provided the government
with critical information about militant plans and operations.

24Moreover, recent times have seen major splits and fissures within the most feared jihadi
groups, and the successful denial of international funding to such groups have forced
them to generate their own sources of funding. Important arrests and the successfulprosecutions of terrorists in the Philippines also constitute a major victory. Better bordercontrols, more awareness about the problem of prisons as centers of radicalization andrecruitment as positive developments in regional efforts to combat terrorism.
Some potential sources of strength upon which terrorists might capitalize in the futurewere also presented during the session. Radical publishing houses continue to operate in
Solo, and recruitment and indoctrination continues, particularly among pre-teens andadolescents in radical schools. Likewise, the splintering and weakening of well-known
terrorist groups like JI has created space in which new radical groups can form andthrive.
In the context of these dynamics, increased focus on local operations should be expected.
Moreover, the issue of apostasy at home can generate far more fury among potential
terrorist recruits and sympathizers in the region than civilian deaths in Iraq and
Afghanistan can, she said, adding that local “jihads” in Ambon and Poso have beenhugely important for recruitment and combat training. Such local conflicts also provide
an ideological common ground for radical groups that may otherwise have many
disagreements.
The practical and political difficulties that arise from portraying the fight against
terrorism as an international effort were then highlighted. When it is carried out as anational agenda—rather than an international effort— it is easier for governments togarner the popular support they need for effective implementation of their plans. Doingso helps governments avoid adopting misleading concepts that undermine theircounterterrorist agendas, adding that counterterrorism correctly understood is primarily
concerned with law enforcement, rather than war. Finally, while noting that25

international assistance in implementing counterterrorism policies is important, he said
that it is also necessary to ensure that such efforts do not compromise domestic support
for counterterrorism measures—particularly the essential support and cooperation
required from within the Muslim community.
Gaining that support and cooperation already poses a significant challenge regardless, of
any taint of external interference it might have. The perception that the efforts to combat
terrorism are actually broader sanctions against the Muslim world reinforces an alreadyexisting perception of bias against the Muslim world, and thus inhibits such cooperation.
At the same time, an ongoing sense of moral decadence and injustice in society—and theIslamic injunction to redress such injustice—feeds sympathy for terrorism.
In the question and answer session that followed, the panel addressed questions aboutIndonesia’s successes in dealing with terrorism, the ongoing insurgency in Southern
Thailand, the connection between Islam and terrorism, the role of good governance andpreventing terrorism, and links between terrorism in Southeast Asia and other parts of
the world.
As to what lessons might be drawn from Indonesia’s counterterrorism successes, it was
explained that the political factors since Indonesia’s transition to democracy in the late
1990s have helped the government gain legitimacy in combating terrorism. In addition,
the Indonesian police have proven as a competent and effective force in combating
terrorism. And finally, not all the members of radical organizations are ultimately
committed to using violence to achieve their aims after all.
The issue of Southeast Asians studying in Pakistan and the potential for this to be asource of militant recruiting and radicalization was also discussed, and it was explainedthat more important than education was the return of individuals who had received
terrorist training in Pakistan, and that this had largely taken place in the 1990s.

26

Indonesia has worked with moderate Islamic groups such as the Nahdatul Ulama andMuhammadiyah—groups that in the late 1990s rejected appeals to replace authoritarian
government in Indonesia with a theocratic state. They have worked to addresshumanitarian disaster, health, education, and other factors important to denying
potential grievances terrorists can use to garner support and legitimacy for theiractivities.
On the issue of the U.S. focus on terrorism, it was explained that it goes much deeper
than the current administration of George W. Bush, noting the shock that the 9/11 gaveto the U.S. polity, and that the best that can be hoped for from the U.S. in the yeas tocome would be a de-emphasis on terrorism in U.S. foreign policy and an effort to“normalize” its response to terrorism.
Turning to the question of the link between Islam and terrorism, it was discussed that
Muslim terrorists are actually quite few relative to the Muslim population in the world,
and added that terrorists have come in from a broad range of ideological and religious
backgrounds, including Christian, secular, atheist, and so forth. As for the situation inSouthern Thailand, it was assessed that the situation is worsening, and the number of“no-go zones” controlled by insurgents is actually increasing. Nevertheless, it is not clear
what the insurgents’ goals actually are. As it currently stands, the situation is not an“international problem,” and has not received attention from the international
community because no foreigners have been killed.

Special Address on ASEAN Security Community
The conference next received an address that provided an update on the status of
ASEAN member states’ efforts to tackle their most difficult challenge yet: the formation27

of an ASEAN security community. It was mainly discussed that the “nuts and bolts”
issues of ASEAN integration show there is a long way to go, and despite the fact that the
security community is one of the three pillars of the ASEAN community to beestablished by 2015, security cooperation will always pose a unique challenge.
An ASEAN charter has been signed that includes provisions for the establishment of ahuman rights body. Non-traditional security issues have provided a key area for security
cooperation in the region. ASEAN has made a mutual legal assistance agreement that
now needs to be turned into a treaty that can serve as the basis for an ASEAN legal
system, and they have successfully worked together to combat terrorism in the region. In
addition, the Philippines and Malaysia have held a defense ministers meeting this year—
something that would have been unthinkable even four years ago—that has adopted aplan of action and may promote mechanisms for addressing the critical issue of maritime
security. ASEAN states are also in the process of developing and operationalizing theASEAN Humanitarian Assistance center to respond to disasters in the region.
There are signs of progress in ASEAN’s efforts to address traditional security issues aswell. The recently-signed charter includes a dispute settlement mechanism as well as
provisions for the use of ASEAN’s good offices for reconciliation and mediation. At thesame time, the growth of the ARF and the commitment major regional powers—the U.S.
Russia, and China—have shown to its development show the relevance of ASEAN todeveloping a sustainable regional order. The ASEAN Secretariat is said to see thepotential to expand and heighten the profile of the ARF in the future.
These signs of progress have already formed the basis for a future ASEAN security
community, despite the myriad multilateral and bilateral issues that remain to beaddressed in the region. Moreover, the work that remains to be done in forming an
ASEAN security community should not be obscured by the fact that there is broad

28

agreement that multilateral cooperation is needed to address some of the most important
security-related issues in the region.
The question on ASEAN’s capability of dealing with the domestic governance issues ofmember states—particularly in Myanmar—and on ASEAN’s long-held principal of noninterference in one another’s domestic affairs was discussed, including a brief overview
of ASEAN’s efforts to facilitate an end to repression and hostility in Myanmar. ASEAN,
has been engaged on the issue since 2003 with the acceptance of the Myanmar ruling
junta’s “roadmap for democracy.” The roadmap was discussed the next year, but in
2005, the change of the Prime Ministers in Myanmar and the less cooperative stancetaken by the junta led to a deterioration in ASEAN-Myanmar relations. In 2007, ASEAN
decided the roadmap “can no longer be defended in public”. This confrontation reached
its apex with the September 2007 protests on the streets of Myanmar and theirsubsequent repression. ASEAN subsequently supported UN Envoy’s mission in
Myanmar, and resolved not to return to the quiet diplomacy of the past and instead tomove the process forward. This led to a common ASEAN position calling for progress
toward democracy.
It was explained that forcing the issue would cause the Myanmar delegation to leave,thus preventing the signing of the charter. The signing of the charter was given priority,and confrontation with Myanmar was shelved, despite a commitment to publicizing theissue of repression in Myanmar and demanding the release of Aung San Suu Kyi.
Although ASEAN would remain engaged on the issue in the future, this sequence of
events had reflected poorly upon the organization. Four major ASEAN dialogue
partners—the EU, Canada, the US, and New Zealand—all decided to curtail cooperation
with ASEAN because of Myanmar, delaying the adoption of a critical Free Trade Area
agreement.

29

Session Five: Addressing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in
the Asia Pacific – The Six-Party Talks
Both optimistic and pessimistic tones with regards to the ongoing six-party talks overthe DPRK’s nuclear program emerged in the session. The six-party talks is generally
regarded as part of a larger effort against proliferation in the region and the world. It
was generally agreed that the dispute fundamentally boils down to two issues:
disarming the DPRK; and preventing proliferation beyond the Korean Peninsula.
It was generally believed that the centrality of relations on the Korean Peninsula tostability in the greater Northeast Asian region. Security in the region requires greater
economic and social integration, he said, and the outcome of the Korean issue could
facilitate or inhibit broader efforts at regional integration. The DPRK’s decision towithdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and its decision to pursue
highly enriched uranium were said to be the main issues that originally gave birth to the
six-party talks. Early efforts at the talks faltered, however, as the DPRK and the U.S.’scommitments to the talks remained suspect. US suspicion of the DPRK’s commitment todisarmament, and the DPRK’s suspicion of the US’s faithfulness to abide by its security
guarantees, led to the collapse of the talks, however. Only after the subsequent DPRK
nuclear test and rounds of new sanctions did conditions change and the U.S. renew its
commitment to diplomacy on the issue.
The result of that renewed commitment manifest itself in a joint statement, and acommitment to pursue concrete measures to reinforce the agreement. These measures,along with resolute diplomacy from Washington and Seoul has in turn resulted ingreater confidence among regional actors and continuing progress toward resolving theissue. In the course of the subsequent discussions, the DPRK agreed to abide by past its
commitments. In addition, new, concrete proposals for future economic cooperation
have emerged. Whether these signs of progress reflect a strategic shift on the part of the30

DPRK, however, can only be verified once the DPRK makes a fundamental shift in its
economic model toward integration with the world economy.
The implications of the six-party talks for the broader region was indeed one of the
major issues discussed throughout the session. It was noted that political maneuveringin the region demonstrates that a “cold war” mentality continues to animate regional
relations. The climate of anxiety and mistrust this produces can obstruct improvement inregional relations and can arouse sensitivities about history and nationalism that inhibit
regional progress. To this mix, there is a concern that competition for global hegemony
has now been added, further exacerbating an already tense situation. In such a climate ofuncertainty, the DPRK’s desire for détente with the South could further regional
relations by serving as a bridge between China and Japan, thereby easing one
troublesome relationship integral to the region’s security.
It was also emphasized by the panelists that the DPRK-U.S. relation remains the key
ingredient for progress in the talks. The DPRK nuclear test, and the US sanctions that
followed, seriously imperiled the process. Nevertheless, US preoccupation with foreign
policy concerns elsewhere in the world, and the DPRK need for better relations with the
U.S., have created “diplomatic space” for progress on the issue. The new commitmentsthat have followed represent a faster track for the process.
On a more optimistic tone, elements of success are said to have existed in the course of
2007, even if disabling the Yongbyong nuclear facility is the only thing that isaccomplished. Such a step would represent that the situation is not getting worse, even if
it does not decisively prove that the situation is getting better.
Another interesting topic discussed was the letter US President George W. Bushreportedly sent to DPRK leader Kim Jung-Il. It was said that the letter does not in fact

31

suggest a new US approach to the issue. Rather, it is an extension of the process ofnegotiations and dialogue the U.S. embarked upon last year.
On the other hand, the DPRK continues to emphasize that the practical measures toward
denuclearization should be carried out in accordance with the principle of“simultaneous action.” In general, a view from the DPRK would claim that negotiations
have been able to move forward because of the DPRK’s refusal to bow to US pressure,
US acceptance of the DPRK’s fair demand for self-protection and recognition of its
sovereignty, and US willingness to engage in bilateral talks with the DPRK in the context
of the six-party negotiations. Moreover, the DPRK views that the US agreement to lift
financial sanctions further suggested greater will to reach a solution to the impasse, andnoted that if the U.S. now abandons its strategy of nuclear threats, further discussions
could be productive.
In exchange for DPRK disclosure and disablement, the DPRK demands that the U.S.
remove the DPRK’s label as a state sponsoring terrorism and other sanctions against the
DPRK pursuant to the US’s Trading With the Enemy Act, and start trade, or discussions
will stall again. Also, the DPRK demands the next phase of negotiations should include
the provision of a light-water reactor to the DPRK, and that the trust and confidence
built between the DPRK and the U.S. through the course of negotiations should
culminate in normalization of relations between the two countries.
Another important topic discussed was the abduction of Japanese citizens. On the one
hand, the DPRK views that. Japan’s insistence on raising within the six-party talks theissue of the abduction of Japanese citizens by the DPRK is an impediment to the process,as Japan’s actions will complicate the talks. On the other hand, the issue is extremely
significant for Japan—particularly in terms of popular sentiment. In order to achieve
peace, the DPRK must acknowledge the abduction and return the abductees. DPRK
leader Kim had said he acknowledged the issue and would return survivors and32

investigate the issue, but had yet to do so. It was further explained that the South Korea
understands Japan’s grievances, but believes the interposition of the issue into the sixparty talks is unhelpful. However, that pursuing the two issues simultaneously is apossibility. The U.S. must attend to its alliance with Japan, but added that Japan mustcome up with an acceptable idea of what constitutes progress on the abduction issue,
considering the potential difficulties involved in uncovering the actual events thattranspired.
More on Japan, it was voiced that Japan has been instrumental in persuading the U.S. toenter into negotiations with the DPRK. In responding to this question, it was discussed
that the recent meetings between the South Korea and the DPRK had included talks on
the nuclear issue, and DPRK leader Kim had signaled a willingness to cooperate in theprocess, and ultimately, to denuclearize. South Korea recognizes the importance of thenuclear issue and the US insistence that this be the primary issue on the Korean
Peninsula. However, that the nuclear issue is but one part of the broader inter-Korean
peace process.
Another question that came out was with regard to timing, particularly concerning the
U.S. election cycle would be crucial to making progress, as domestic political pressures
could compromise the U.S. leadership’s negotiating flexibility. In response to this, apanelist said that the ROK understood the importance of timing at this stage, but
cautioned that the current juncture would not be the last opportunity for progress on theissue. The current impasse over the which actions should come first—the DPRK’s
disclosure and disablement of nuclear sites and materials or the U.S.’s delisting of the
DPRK pursuant to the TWEA—should be resolved by performing the two actions inparallel. Another response was given by noting that while simultaneous progress on thedenuclearization issue and the intra-Korea process is possible, and would actually
reinforce both efforts, as the dominant impression in Washington is that the ROK is
more interested in good photo opportunities with the DPRK than it is in achieving

33progress on the nuclear issue. The U.S.’s position is likely that the two Koreas should
conclude a final agreement with the U.S. and China as observers, and that
denuclearization and then peaceful coexistence on the peninsula should pave the way
for some sort of confederation.
Another question asked was whether there was a possibility that the DPRK mightultimately be accepted as a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS), and cautioned that such adevelopment would cause Japan to revise its nuclear doctrine, though probably not todevelop nuclear weapons of its own. It was explained that while Japan and China are
now nervous about the possibility of the DPRK being accepted as a NWS—despite thefact that Japan and China had urged the U.S. to reengage diplomatically with the
DPRK—the U.S. would clearly oppose such a development, adding that it would bepolitically impossible for the U.S. to normalize relations with a nuclear-armed DPRK.
Moreover, the UN Security Council has demanded complete and irreversible DPRK
disarmament.
A note of optimism also came up about the six-party process, but cautioning that two
critical issues must be resolved for the process to go forward. First, the U.S. will demandverification that the DPRK’s accounting of nuclear-related facilities is full and complete.
Second, the U.S. is unlikely to improve trade relations with the DPRK or to lift trade
sanctions before the DPRK proves that it has taken concrete actions, potentially resulting
in disputes over what “simultaneous action” actually means. It was generally agreed
among the panelists that the common goal of denuclearization is now clear, but theframework for achieving that goal is indeed shaky. Consequently, the management of
the process must be very careful and labor intensive.
Despite the efforts of various parties, including CSCAP, which has a WMD working
group that has developed policy proposals on the issue, there has been no major
reductions in nuclear stockpiles by the major powers, and none is in sight. Against this34

backdrop, the six-party talks are one bright spot, though the verdict is far from decided
as to their ultimate success.

Luncheon Speech
Against the backdrop set by preceding discussions of pressing security issues in the
Asia-Pacific region, the main theme of the luncheon speech on the conference’s second
day was an overview of how one country—Indonesia—seeks to provide for its own
security. An analysis of Indonesia’s national defense should take into account five
distinct levels: global, regional, national, and no less important, provincial and local.
While analysis of these levels reveals competition and tension among them, adequate
national defense requires their synchronization.
Some of the constraints on Indonesian defense planning were addressed. Despite being
Southeast Asia’s biggest country, geographical and financial constraints make securing
Indonesia’s sovereign space a distinct challenge compared to other countries in theregion. For instance, Indonesia’s U.S. $3.3 billion defense budget is still outsized bySingapore’s defense budget of U.S. $4.4 billion. Bearing such constraints in mind, the key
elements of Indonesian defense strategy in the coming years are said to be as follows.
First, the financial burdens on the Indonesian military mean that it will have to combine
both hard and soft power to provide adequate security. Second, with regards to thechallenges of the securing the Malacca Straits, which serve as a link between Southeast
and Northeast Asia, Indonesia requires an integrated defense strategy that draws on all
types of national power and on the resources and capabilities of regional actors, not juston the military’s capabilities. Next, developing strategic partnerships with China, withIndonesia’s Southeast Asian neighbors, and with the U.S. is also important, he said.
Toward this end, he proposed strengthening the ASEAN regional defense community.
Finally, to help cover the gap between the resources available to the Ministry of Defense

35and the challenges it faces, sensitizing provincial and local leaders to the demands ofnational defense and their potential roles in providing for security is important.
A number of the other elaborations were made during the session, particularly on issues
dealing with the specifics of how local and provincial actor could appropriately be
included in national defense. In response to a question about the possibility that mightsuch participation exacerbate and facilitate separatist movements, it was explained
imperative of ensuring that the activities at each level are in line with the national
strategy, and that if this is assured, then sharing knowledge and defense burdens at thevarious levels should be supported. In successful instances, local and provincial leaders
have participated in courses on economic development and defense sponsored by thenational government.
On the issue of the territorial command structure of the Indonesian military, reforms
should be calibrated to what is politically possible. As a result, the current focus should
be on finding a way for local economic activities to contribute to non-military defense byconnecting outlying regions with the rest of the country, rather than radical reforms.
In a broader term, questions on Indonesia’s place in the regional order were also
discussed. Comprehensive security relationships with the U.S., India, Russia and others
are critical for familiarizing the regional powers with one another and for meeting thepolitical and economic demands in the region. In addition to strengthening these
relationships, reinforcing the ASEAN Regional Forum is also a key priority for
expanding Indonesia’s defense cooperation, adding that a broader vision about defensethat recognizes the need to move beyond concerns of national sovereignty and toward
inter-provincial security connections is needed.

36Session Six: Security in the Malacca Straits
Continuing with the second day’s theme of addressing specific, key security issues in theregion, the complex security issues the Malacca Straits present were indeed significant tobe discussed. An overview of the key issues opened one’s eyes on how complex thesituation is. While everyone agrees that “safe passage” should be the primary goal forthe straits, transit states understand this to mean safety from piracy, terrorism, and otherthreats. At the same time, the littoral states believe their interests should not be
adversely affected by others’ use of the Straits. These states are particularly concernedwith pollution and environmental problems and their affects on fisheries in and aroundthe Straits, stemming from the increasing number of vessels transiting the area and fromshipwrecks in the Straits.
In order to improve the safety and security in the Straits, a series of practical measures
were proposed. For example, wrecked ships are a hazard in the area and should be
removed, along with the need to increase the ability of actors in the Straits to handle
hazardous material often brought through the straits. In addition, plans to deploy an
Automatic Identification System in the straits should go forward. In addition toaddressing these safety and environmental issues, user and littoral states must deal withsecurity.
A discussion on the topic of course requires a legal perspective. It was discussed thatrather than a wholesale reappraisal of the security regime governing the straits, allparties involved should pay more heed already established international law. The Straits
should not become a battleground for balance of power issues, because such issues werealready fought out in the drafting of the Law of the Sea Convention. Moreover, as half of
the Straits is within territorial waters, local laws apply, and no county can create policies
governing the whole area of the Straits without the consent of the coastal states.

37

Any agreements and cooperation with regard to the straits should respect thesovereignty of these states and be consistent with international law, and security
concerns should be worked out at the operational level. Toward this goal, defense forces
have already cooperated to an unprecedented degree, and a number of bilateralagreements regarding security in the straits are forthcoming as well. As a sign of these
positive developments, there have been no recent attacks on ships moving through themain straits channel.
Some optimistic tones with regards to the current situation were also found. Despiteongoing legal, safety, and security concerns in the Straits, there is actually reason to bepositive about progress already made toward addressing the issues. It was voiced that
security in the Straits has in fact been well served by ongoing initiatives from both user
countries and the littoral states. “Eyes in the sky” surveillance, coordination among thelittoral states, the efforts of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, and bilateral
initiatives for joint patrols are said to have contributed to enhanced security in the area.
In the subsequent discussions, it was generally agreed that continued efforts to help
Indonesia secure its waters, to share intelligence and information and to continue andenhance cooperation on patrolling the states were all sound ideas. As to why Indonesia
has been reluctant to join the Container Security Initiative, it was discussed that there
was no good reason Indonesia had not originally taken part in the program, but now theinitiative has appeared to have lost some steam.
The panelists also addressed in more detail the issue of piracy and terrorism in theregion. All agreed that the possibility of maritime terrorism is real, and that some futurecollaboration between organized crime groups and terrorist groups was also possible.
However, it has not been proven that such a link has been established. In fact, goals ofpiracy and those of terrorist groups are actually quite different, making the possibility of
future collaboration a serious, but unlikely proposition.

38

Session Seven: Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in the Asia Pacific
Peacekeeping and peacebuilding have become key issues both for managing andresolving conflicts within the region, and for Asian countries that have committed
resources to and personnel to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations elsewhere in
the world. Given the high costs of violence, so little is invested in preventative
diplomacy.
The international community’s enthusiasm for the issue has waned, and it was generally
agreed that there is a glaring absence of UN leadership on this issue. The UN has notmade it clear what it expects from any new norms yet to be developed, and the principleof “responsibility to protect” has yet to be operationalized. An example is the relatively
feeble support the UN panel to reform peacekeeping operations received from theinternational community. Serious asymmetries continue to plague efforts to raise funds
and personnel for peacekeeping operations, and UN member states often use
peacekeeping operations as opportunities to raise their own profiles, rather than create
lasting peace in conflict zones. Failure to remedy these problems will cause the UN itself
to lose relevance.
Despite the lack of such reform and of dwindling resources and planning, UN
peacekeeping forces are being asked to take on more and more operations and activities.
A panelist explained that the expansion of the peacekeeping section of the UN has been
done without planning describing some of the reforms as “superficial.”
In the face of these challenges, a series of measures that the UN and other bodies—including CSCAP—could take to aid the reform process was outlined. First, the UN
should only go where it is welcomed and can make a difference, and must be able to do
so in a timely manner. Second, the UN should share the peacekeeping burden with
regional organizations, which should take on peacekeeping duties both within and39

outside their own regions, and should begin preparing for a wider scope of operations
by adopting oversight mechanisms.
The session also included a discussion of the lessons learned from peacekeeping
operations within the Asia-Pacific region. It was said that the lessons of peace operationsin the Pacific island countries could be instructive for peace operations elsewhere in theworld. In broad terms, the causes of conflict in the region have been essentially politicalin nature, and thus require primarily political—rather than primarily military—solutions
that draw on the entire range of agencies and resources of the governments involved.
For example, in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea (PNG), the government raised a force
to oppose separatists laying claim to a mine from which PNG derives significant wealth.
There, a peacekeeping force, though unarmed, was nonetheless able to have an impact inreducing tensions in the conflict because it correctly recognized and worked to overcome
the political obstacles to peace.
It is also important to develop a sound exit strategy before operations begin, and in
preparing for future political developments that may imperil peace agreements. The
current political instability in the Solomon Islands shows that peacekeeping forces musthave a long time horizon if they are to succeed. The case of the Solomon Islands also
demonstrates how outside forces can play a destabilizing role, as Taiwan has done byinjecting financial support into an already fragile political situation in order to advanceits own international agenda.
CSCAP has indeed included peacekeeping and peacebuilding as one of its main issues ofconcern, as peacekeeping has become an important part of the region’s broader
discussions about security. China and Japan have become increasingly involved ininternational peacekeeping, he explained, with both countries using the issue to help
redefine their roles in the current international system. In addition, ASEAN and the ARF
have made peacekeeping central parts of their frameworks, acknowledging the ongoing40

humanitarian concerns in the region. Peacekeeping will thus be a key test of how thoseorganizations can cooperate on their broader security agendas. The challenge was thatpeacekeeping practices are changing, and are based on UN norms that are themselveschanging. Given the relevance of the issue for the Asia Pacific region, regional
governments must be involved in the debates over just how these practices and norms
change.
Turning from general studies on peace operations to a specific example, the session
proceeded to discussing what the lessons to have come out of the peacekeeping
operation in the Indonesian province of Aceh. The operation in Aceh was less about“peacekeeping” per se, than it was about implementing a memorandum of
understanding between the Indonesian government and the GAM (Free Aceh
Movement), the separatist rebel movement in the region. Integral to the operation’s
success was the commitment to the peace process from both sides of the dispute. This
commitment made it easier to approve and operate a peacekeeping force that was
unarmed.
In addition to the commitment of both parties to peace, there were other factors thatpaved the way for the Aceh operations’ success. From the beginning of the operation, theforce had a clear mandate that included a set timeframe. No less important, the force
came to Aceh not just with the assent of the Indonesian military, but indeed at its
request. It was explained that the Indonesian military deserves praise for its support forthe peace agreement and the force to help facilitate its implementation.
In short, there are key lessons from the Aceh experience for future peace operations.
First, it provides a great example of how in lieu of he UN, regional organizations—in
this case ASEAN and the EU—can play a key role in peace operations. Second, planningand coordination of a peacekeeping mission should commence as soon as a peace accord
is designed. Finally, there is the central importance of reintegration as part of ongoing41

efforts to keep peace. Reducing unemployment and providing for economic
development are integral to making sustaining peace and to facilitating a broader
reconciliation process.
Responding to a question from the audience, the panelists underscored the central
importance of preventative diplomacy in managing conflict and keeping peace. It wasnoted that preventative diplomacy framed the peace strategies in the pacific islands, andthat preventative diplomacy should be the focus and first line of action, adding that
regional organizations would be wise to establish mechanisms for anticipating andengaging in preventative diplomacy.
The panelists also received a question on how the region might engage on deciding themeaning of the “responsibility to protect” affirmed by the UN Security Council. It waspointed out that the recommendation to develop new norms for peace operations
included in the report on the responsibility to protect had been controversial as it wasunderstood to be an attack on the principle of sovereignty, though it should beunderstood to be quite the contrary, he said. The other problem, he added was that there
is a general lack of belief that peacebuilding works. It is criticized from some corners as
being too costly, time-consuming, and politically and strategically unviable. Critics point
to Iraq and Afghanistan as examples of such failures, but the regional debate should takeup how exactly these experiences might inform future peacebuilding efforts in thisregion.
Still on the same issue, it was discussed that the tragedies in Srebernica and Rwanda
birthed the responsibility to protect, and that though it was accepted by the UN General
Assembly, it was generally viewed as a mechanism conceived in the developed world
and to be imposed on the developing world. The current impasse in the crisis in Darfur,
he said, in which the Sudanese government has refused to welcome a UN force,
demonstrate the gap between rhetoric and action regarding the responsibility to protect.

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The current disputes over where UN peacekeeping forces should be deployed, who pays
for them, and what their mandates should be, reflect larger issues about UN reform. Any
mission requires a UN Security Council mandate, and until the Security Council is itself
made

more

representative,

peacekeeping

missions

would

continuetobedisproportionately borne by some countries.
Subsequent questions to the panel touched on the role of economic development inpeacebuilding, the effect of peace operations on transforming civil-military relations, andabout the role of regional organizations in peace operations. A panelist offered thatsustaining peace often requires agricultural development not just for economic reasons,but also to facilitate the reintegration of combatants into society. With regard to civilmilitary relations and peacekeeping, participating in peacekeeping operations canchange both the way a military works, and attitudes among military personnel toprofessionalization and democratization. Peacekeeping can serve as a catalyst for
dialogue on broader issues of security sector reform.
The last question of the session dealt with ASEAN’s willingness to engage inpeacekeeping interventions, particularly in light of the vagaries of newly signed ASEAN
Charter with regard to the auspices under which such an intervention might beundertaken. It was expressed that ASEAN need not be the primary actor in all suchsituations, noting bilateral assistance, and the involvement of the UN and EU in
Southeast Asian peace operations as examples of how other actors might participate on
this issue.

Session Eight: Security Dimensions of Climate Change and Energy
Climate change and energy deserves to be understood in their own right, but it isincreasingly clear that the region’s efforts to meet its energy needs have a real impact on43

the climate. Both of these issues also have implications for human security, national
security, and indeed international security.
The session started with an overview of energy security in Asia, which portrays that
Asia has become too dependent on imported oil, much of which comes from politically
volatile areas. The natural gas situation in the region was less of a concern. Coal too
remains an option, but clearly poses environmental challenges as well. To meet theregion’s energy needs, states must cooperate to address their energy needs. The first ruleof achieving energy security should be to “do the right thing at home.” Also, the region
should expand its internal cooperation to include seek energy related investment ties
with other regions.
The discussion then took into account the impact of rising oil and gas prices on theregion’s energy security, highlighting in particular that for countries such as Indonesiathat have fuel subsidies, rising prices will increasingly stress state budgets. Higher fuelprices thus contribute to oil exporting countries security, but compromise consumer
countries. Issues of energy infrastructure in energy security were also discussed, as
natural disasters, terrorism and other forces can damage the infrastructure, and thus
prevent reliable delivery of energy resources. Nuclear energy has not yet become asource of energy for Southeast Asia, but many of the countries in the region are looking
at it as a future possibility. The prospects of a nuclear accident or sabotage, as well as thestorage of nuclear waste, raise additional questions about security in the region.
The future of the region depends to a great deal on the connections between climatechange, energy security, and economic growth. Considering this nexus, high oil prices
are not the main problem; rather, countries should focus on demand management andimproving energy efficiency. Countries in the region have had varying degrees ofsuccess at achieving efficiency, with Japan and Singapore leading the way, and otherlagging behind. With regards to China’s growing need of energy, despite the large

44amount of energy already consumed in China, in per capita terms China lags far behinddeveloped countries in energy consumption. As a result, as China continues to grow,energy demand in China only stands to grow as well, in the process increasing theoverall demand for energy in the region. In addition, China remains largely dependent
on coal. If environmental pressures and other concerns force China to rely increasingly
on other types of energy sources, demand pressures will further increase.
It was said that while much of the current discussions on energy security focus on theneed for regional cooperation, in actuality, we are witnessing a rise of resource
nationalism. This is a particularly dire development in light of the growing consensus
that climate change is already having an adverse effect on the public health andhumanitarian situation in the area. Climate change has caused tropical diseases to movenorthward, and the ability to deal with this demands improvements on governance inthe region. In this regard, a panelist cited the essential areas of concern for countries in
the region with regard to energy security. First among them was improving energy
efficiency across the region. Beyond that, managing energy resources and, no lessimportantly, water resources, is a primary area of concern. Finally, the region must work
to rid itself of domestic subsidies that decrease efficiency and increase consumption.
More specifically on climate change, a gloomy picture of the security implications ofclimate change dominated the discussion. Climate change will bring more of the natural
disasters that already plague the region. In addition, irreversible warming will increase
the risk of flooding, particularly seasonal flooding. At the same time, changes in the
distribution of rainfall mean that while there is more flooding, there will also be more
incidences of drought. These phenomena in turn can lead to a cascade of environmental
problems, including sequential natural disasters, increasing vulnerability of costal andtropical areas, deforestation, and a decrease in the productivity of fisheries.

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In addition to the environmental implications, it was well known that climate change
also raises myriad human security issues. Decreasing agricultural productivity would
have huge significant economic consequences. Moreover, intense warming could speed
the spread of disease and eclipse the ability of governments and health care systems tocope with these new challenges. To make matters worse, people who live in rural
areas—where government services of often weakest—and who thus rely more heavily
on agriculture than their urban compatriots, will be more sensitive to the effects ofclimate change. As a result, climate change could displace whole populations andunleash a spectrum of security concerns.
From another perspective, it was suggested that rather than thinking about theindividual effects of climate change, it is their sum effects that should be considered.
Food shortages, natural disasters, public health concerns just to name a few, may each be
challenges that can be met. Taken together, however, they have a compound effect that
could imperil the governments that must deal with their consequences..
“Three perspectives” of climate change and security were elaborated. First, the impact ofclimate change on food production, water resources, and weather events will bedifferentiated. This will lead not only to new power dynamics and imbalances in theinternational system, but also, where water resources are shared, it could begin to fuelcompetition and create new security issues. Second, because of rising sea levels,
migration patterns, and the myriad health and security issues associated with them, arechanging. Third, the poverty level could increase as people are displaced fromtraditional farmland. This will also lead to changes in food production patterns, andcould cause larger social and political disruptions. In all of these events, it is the poor
who are least able to adapt to new challenges and circumstances, and who thus stand tosuffer the most.

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The panelists also addressed the issue of oceanic acidification. It was explained that theissue is not currently a big part of the discussion right now, but it could impact fisheries
and reefs and could have a particularly acute effect in Asia, where many people are
dependent on fishing and coastal agriculture.
With regards to the future of the Kyoto Protocol and on international efforts to reduceenergy demand and increase energy efficiency, it was said that the U.S. believed thiswould put it at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis China. Moreover, a post-2012
climate change regime should bring the developing countries into the fold.
Turning to the issue of reducing energy demand, it was discussed that the key would be
attracting new investment—particularly in new energy sources—to meet increasing
demand. A panelist emphasized that there are no energy silver bullets, and that energy
production should be increased where it is already cheap, most notably in China.
Moreover, there are policies to create technology transfers to facilitate increasing use ofcleaner energy producing technologies, but that there are also “bottom-up” strategies in
China that could catalyze a transition to new sources of energy there.

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Part IV
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONThe 6th CSCAP General Conference has considerably scored a major success, not only interms of attracting a large number of audience and media coverage and stipulating open
and lively debate, but also in putting forth CSCAP’s views and activities to a wider
public.. A good composition of speakers and panelists determined the success of theconference. The conference was also highlighted by the involvement of both track one
and track two representatives, as the conference’s purpose is to link the two elements.
Following the previous conference, the 6th General Conference has successfully createdan open and cooperative atmosphere for closer interaction between the officials – whoare responsible in policy making and executing – and the public – who are concernedwith the regional security issues and environment. The conference has crated goodpractice of the exchange of ideas between the track one and track two, which at the end
might contribute to the improvement of the security of the Asia Pacific region.
As agreed at the previous conference, the General Conference would continue to be held
regularly on a bi-annual basis. A proposal to hold the next conference in anothercountry, as a change from Indonesia that has hosted the previous three conferences,came out during the informal talks at the side of the sessions. Having three or more
Member Committees as the co-organizers would be maintained to improve andstrengthen a sense of cooperation and solidarity among CSCAP Member Committees.

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Acknowledgement

As the host of the 5th CSCAP General Conference, CSCAP Indonesia wishes to express its
deepest gratitude and appreciation to the co-organizers, namely AUSCSCAP, CSCAP
Japan, CSCAP Singapore and CSCAP China and also to the CSCAP Secretariat and
CSCAP Co-Chairs for the quality of cooperation and support rendered in organizing theconference.
Furthermore, the appreciation also goes to all other CSCAP Member Committees for thecommitment, continuous support, and assistances extended to the conference. Some of
the Member Committees were very much instrumental in promoting the conference,thus attracting a large number of participants from their respective countries. The
presence of some key and distinguished speakers was also made possible because of
great efforts showed by some CSCAP Member Countries. The host is grateful for thisassistance.
The host and co-organizers would also like to thank the keynote speakers, panelists,commentators, and chairs for their excellent quality of presentation and role.
Presentations and views presented at the conference have been stimulating andsuccessfully encouraged lively and open discussion.
In the same manner, participants also deserve a credit for the success of the conference,for their active involvement on the discussion from the beginning until the very end of
the program.
Finally, the host and co-organizers appreciate the invaluable support and assistancegiven and the commitment made without hesitation by the large number of individuals
and parties involved in the organizing of the 5th CSCAP General Conference.

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