FOR PUBLIC

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
5th GENERAL CONFERENCE
Jakarta, 6-7 December 2005

“Addressing Emerging Security Challenges in the Asia Pacific Region”

REPORT
Introduction
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) 5th General
Conference was convened at Hotel Borobudur, Jakarta, Indonesia, from 6 to 7
December 2005. CSCAP Indonesia as the host committee, along with
AUSCSCAP, CSCAP Canada and CSCAP Japan, co-organised the General
Conference which adopted “Addressing Emerging Security Challenges in the
Asia Pacific Region” as the main theme.

The 2005 General Conference was actually the second of the series of CSCAP
General Conference. The first three meetings were known as the CSCAP
General Meeting. The decision to change the term ‘General Meeting’ to‘General Conference’ was agreed by all CSCAP Member Committees at the
CSCAP 18th Steering Committee Meeting in Singapore, 9 December 2005. The
main reason behind this change is to put forth CSCAP views to a larger
audience as all well as integrate the participation of senior government
representatives, academics, civil society members, journalists, and business
community with the work and activity of CSCAP. The General Conference is1considered to be a better way to achieve these objectives, and is hoped to raise
the profile of CSCAP to a higher level in the future.

With this decision, the 2003 CSCAP General Conference, which is referred toas the 4th General Conference as a subsequent to the previous three General
Meetings, was held also in Jakarta. CSCAP Indonesia voluntarily proposed tohost the 4th and 5th General Conferences, and its proposal was welcomed andsupported by all CSCAP Member Committees. Subsequently, three other
CSCAP Member Committees, namely CSCAP Australia (AUSCSCAP),
CSCAP Canada and CSCAP Japan, agreed to co-organising both conferences,most notably in finding and securing funds and inviting speakers anddignitaries from each respecting member country. The three co-organisers
also symbolically represent three different geographical parts of CSCAP,
namely North America, South Pacific, and Northeast Asia.

Commenced by a session on a new paradigm of security in Northeast Asia,
contemporary security challenges for the Asia Pacific region were the main
topic for discussion in the 5th General Conference. The region is faced with aseries of crucial security challenges, most notably terrorism, humantrafficking, the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
maritime security threat, natural disaster, and the recent threat of infectious
diseases in the region. The increase of non-traditional security threats in theregion has been greater than previously predicted, thus posing serious
challenges to regional stability and security. The impacts of these threats are
suffered by all states in the Asia Pacific region, and must be responded towith the region’s most serious efforts.

The conference also took into its main concern efforts of regional cooperation
to address these issues. It is widely acknowledged that regional cooperationon countering proliferation and addressing other contemporary security
threats would provide the best vehicle for the region in overcoming the2ongoing problems. Calls for the establishment of closer security cooperationand the formation of new regional security architecture are re-emphasised
during the conference.

With the objective to create a conducive forum for an open second-track
dialogue, the co-organisers worked and consulted closely to formulate a set of
topics and speakers. Despite its tight and lengthy schedule, all sessions
succeeded in creating lively, open and frank discussions and debates.

All presentations, keynote speeches and comments were delivered by
distinguished scholars and government officials from around the region.
Among the officials were H.E. Dr. Juwono Sudarsono (Minister for Defence,
Republic of Indonesia), The Hon. Alexander Downer, MP (Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Australia), H.E. Datuk Azalina Othman Said (Minister of Youth andSports, Malaysia), H.E. Zainul Abidin Rasheed (Minister of State, Singapore),
Mr. Stephen G. Rademaker (Assistant Secretary of State for International
Security and Non-Proliferation, the United States), Dr. Kiyohiko Toyama(Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Japan), and Mr. Dao Viet Trung(Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam). The conference also
benefitedgreatlyfromdistinguished

formerministers

andformergovernment officials.

All things considered, the CSCAP 5th General Conference was successful.
There is a common understanding and enthusiasm among all CSCAP
Member Committees that the event will be regularly held in order to put forth
CSCAP views to a larger audience, which in the longer run is hoped tocontribute greatly to the regional security.

3General Observation and Assessment
Participants and Role Players. Around 120 foreign participants from 18
countries in the region and over 180 Indonesian attended the conference. This
number exceeded the initial expectation as the co-organisers expected about
200 attendants – with preparation for 250 people at the most. Last minutearrangements were made in response to this. The co-organisers, whilst in away overwhelmed by such a big number of participants, were contented as
the condition proved the high level of attractiveness of the CSCAP General
Conference.

Aside from CSCAP members, the conference participants also include
activists, journalists, academics, and diplomats. All participants attended theconference in their private capacity.

After thorough consultation among co-organisers and with other CSCAP
members, 51 distinguished individuals were invited to participate and playvarious roles in the conference, namely as keynote speakers, panelists,commentators, and chairs. The presentations given by the keynote speakers
and panelists were sharp and candid. The way they shared their minds ontheir assigned topics showed the high quality of their presentations.

Each session commenced with a Keynote Speech, which gave an opening andintroduction to the audience about the topic of the session. The sessions werethen followed by presentations from the panelists, who were all experts in the
topic of discussion, to create comprehensive discussions. The role of the chairs
was pivotal in the success of each session, as they stimulated lively andscholarly debates and discussions.

Selection of Topics and Flow of Discussion. At the preparatory stage,
one of the big challenges - if not the biggest - for the co-organisers was to draft4the programme of the conference. This, of course, included formulating a setof topics that would not only attract the attention of the audience, but would
also cover all contemporary security challenges in the region. Although fullmandate and liberty has been given to the co-organisers to decide the topics,
wide consultation was made with as many members of CSCAP as possible. In
addition to this, experience from the previous CSCAP General Conference
also contributed to the consideration.

Primarily, CSCAP Indonesia closely consulted with AUSCSCAP and CSCAP
Secretariat to prepare the first set of proposals. It was then decided that thefocus of the conference should be on the contemporary security issues in the
Asia Pacific, particularly on WMD proliferation and regional cooperation. The
initial agenda was then further discussed at the next stage, in which there
were involvements of all CSCAP Member Committees. The draft agenda was
improved accordingly, and circulated to all CSCAP Member Committees foramendments or approval.

After going through such process, seven main topics were chosen, namely: (1)Northeast Asia: New Paradigm for Security; (2) Countering Terrorism; (3)Human Trafficking; (4) Current WMD Developments; (5) Countering
Proliferation: International Arms Control Activities; (6) Maritime Security; (7)Prospects for Regional Cooperation in East Asia. In addition to sessions onthese seven particular topics, there were two Keynote Speeches on the topic ofCountering

Proliferation,

namely:KeynoteSpeechonCountering

Proliferation; and Keynote Speech on Regional Cooperation on Countering
Proliferation. There were also special speeches during meals on: (1) A Grand
Strategy for East Asia; (2) Maritime Security: New Challenges for the Region;and (3) U.S. Policies on Countering Proliferation. Last but not least, the final
session of the conference portrayed specific cases in regional cooperation,
namely cases of disaster prevention, regional peace-keeping and peacebuilding, and infectious diseases.

5Such broad range of topic was considered comprehensive and stimulating,and succeeded in putting forth CSCAP views to the large audience – which,as mentioned earlier, is an objective of the general conference. The topics wereabsolutely constructive in bringing new understanding among participants,
who came from various backgrounds and countries from around the region,
about the real concern of the region during this particular time.

In order to create effective presentation and encourage more discussion
among participants, each Keynote Speech was given 15 minutes, whilepanelists were given 10 minutes each to present their views on theirrespective topics. Chairs of each session were given the liberty to remind the
speakers about their time limits, and they were giving the task to beinterventionist – clarifying points, relating the views of one speaker to thoseof another, bringing panelists into conversation with one another, identifying
other conference participants with expertise on the matters under discussion,
keeping the focus on key issues and if necessary asking questions to thepanelists.

To ensure open, frank, and friendly atmosphere for discussion, the conference
was held under the Chatham House Rule. All participants were repeatedly
reminded to observe to this rule. However, the Opening Session – with H.E.
Dr. Juwono Sudarsono’s speech – and Session Four – with The Hon.
Alexander Downer, MP’s speech – were exceptions.

6Highlights of the Debates
Opening Speech. In his Keynote Address, the Minister of Defence of the
Republic of Indonesia, H.E. Dr. Juwono Sudarsono, presented an overview of
the Indonesian perspective of the current regional security and defence issues.
He emphasised that for the coming ten years, defence sector would be the key
factor for economic and political improvement in Indonesia.

Indonesia, although known as the largest economy in Southeast Asia, is still
weak in many aspects of economic growth. This, of course, undermines
Indonesia’s capacity to create political stability. There cannot be sustainable
political development without economic development. Thus, Indonesia must
work on effective reform in three sectors, namely economic, political, andsecurity.

The Minister pointed out that with the assistance of neighbouring states in theregion, Indonesia would be able to obtain economic development, which inturn would support its capacity to sustain political democracy. In this context,
it is imperative that security is provided in the broader sense: economic;
social; and political.

Minister Sudarsono expressed his gratefulness to all of the colleagues fromthe Asia Pacific region for providing the necessary help during the relief timeafter the tsunami disaster, which had shown the concern of the international
community. He vividly emphasised that such thing reflected the vital
importance for a broader meaning of ‘security’.

A number of issues were raised during the Q&A time, mostly aboutIndonesia’s defence/security policies. Speaking about the role of the military
in Indonesia after the reform era, Minister Sudarsono pointed out thatIndonesia had the worst bureaucracy in Southeast Asia despite being the7largest country in the region, and the military would still circle around thecentre of the political movements unless such bureaucratic issues were solved.
Moreover, he also pointed out that the most serious threat to Indonesia’security was actually poverty.

Answering a question on regional cooperation in defence and security,
Minister Sudarsono explained that three major working cooperation werebeing maintained with Singapore, the Philippines and Papua New Guineathat included border security cooperation and joint training. Indonesia has
also been receiving assistance from the United States, Australia, and East
Asian states in security.

Minister Sudarsono ended the opening session by re-emphasising Indonesia’scommitment for political and security reform.

Session One: Northeast Asia – New Paradigm for Security. In
general, all speakers of this session acknowledged that there were still many
dangerous security issues threatening Northeast Asia. Of all issues, theKorean Peninsula was considered the most critical. Other issues include
territorial disputes and bilateral tensions.

It was understood pointed out that there were new challenges and threatsfacing Northeast Asia. The rise of nationalism, intolerance among countries,
proliferation of WMD and missiles, and terrorism render major impacts on
the security of Northeast Asia. The region has one of the world’s mostprominent concentrations of military strength. Moreover, compared to otherregions, Northeast Asia is characterised by wide diversity among countries interms of their stages of development, political and economic systems, andviews of security. It was raised in the discussion that the relationships among
the three big states – Japan, China, and Korea – remain problematic.

8

Furthermore, the U.S. retains a fair level of military presence in Northeast
Asia based on its alliances. With regard to this, the U.S. has nothing to gainfrom the increasing tension among Japan, China, and Korea. Most speakers
emphasised on the importance of the U.S’ support to the development ofregional dialogues.

Specifically on de-nuclearisation programme in the Korean Peninsula, it was
acknowledged that it remained the most prominent problem. All states werethus encouraged to support the Six Party Talk and other multilevel dialogues
to help solve this problem.

A discussion also evolved around the issue or Russia’s role in Northeast Asia.
Although one speaker claimed that Russia played an active role in various
security-related cooperation aimed at developing regional stability andpromoting regional dialogue, Russia was criticised to be preoccupied solely
by its relations with the U.S. and Europe, thus not ready to be a major Pacificpower.

Focusing on the Japan-China relation, opinions that were raised were mostly
concerned about the Yakushuni shrine issue. In general, all panelists andparticipants agree that both Japan and China must work together to resolve
historical issues.

As the region grows closer, regional cooperation becomes more imperative
than ever. Strengthening efforts among Northeast Asian states, and also withother states in the wider Asia Pacific, is important to ensure peace andprosperity throughout the region through continuation of fair, open andcandid dialogues.

9All in all, the session managed to conclude that to establish a new paradigm
for security in Northeast Asia would require mutual understanding andconfidence among the states, making progress in functional areas of common
ground, transparency, the establishment of a permanent forum among
Northeast Asian economies, and the broadening of the concept of security.

Luncheon Speech: A Grand Strategy for East Asia. The speech thatwas delivered in this session sought to answer the question of (1) whether a
new security structure would be needed in this region; and (2) whether thiskind of security architecture would come about by design and planning or
emergence in a natural and historical way.

With regard to formulating a grand strategy for East Asia, five future security
scenarios or alternative architectures of security were suggested: (1) apossibility of continuation of a U.S.-dominated security arrangement; (2)replacement of this kind of structure by China framework; (3) the balance ofpower situation by two groups of alliances; (4) a concert of power; and (5) acondominium of China and the U.S. as the leaders.

The U.S. was criticised in an opinion to have actually misused and almost
squandered the opportunity to make good news of its post-Cold War
unipolarsuperpower

status.

The

U.S.

lacks

the

attentionforonmultilateralism and in fact diplomacy itself, thus leading to the situation
where the U.S. has lost the kind of credibility not only in the military but in
diplomatic area as well. In this regard, the U.S policy toward the world andparticularly to Asia has become basically reactive. Meanwhile, Japan was also
criticised to be impeding itself in dealing with the rest of East Asia, not only increating an East Asian corporation mechanism but also even in conducting
diplomacy with its neighbours.

10

On the other hand, China has voluntarily renounced, for the time being, totake the leadership with its so-called peaceful rise, reconciliation and goodneighbour policies.

Meanwhile, South Korea said to be caught between the aspiration of
becoming more autonomous and self-reliant in terms of security and the needto maintain strong alliance with the U.S. and Japan, as well as with China ineconomic terms. Lastly, ASEAN was said to follow a policy whose main
objective is to assert this provocative framework in regional affairs. At thesame time, the divergence of views within ASEAN itself and among theleaders tends to get in the way community to make it.

A suggestion was made, which emphasised on the need to complement thekind of recent security framework - that is to add the element of concept andcooperation among the major powers and the rest within the region.

Session Two: Countering Terrorism. This session focused on finding
measures to combat terrorism. An interesting presentation explored the link
between terrorism and youth and education. It was said that four factors werevital in this context, namely: (1) extremist religious teaching; (2) low selfesteem among young people; (3) limited opportunities for social andeconomic advancement; and (4) societies continuing to fail to recognize thevalue of acknowledging, appreciating and respecting idea of diversity.

An analysis of terrorism from the perspectives of security, ideology, andcommunity was also presented. From the security perspective, the war
against terror is a war of attrition. However, terrorist resources are notinfinite. To prevent future attacks, effective and responsible law enforcement
to coordinate security and intelligent mechanism at national and international
level remains the key. On ideology, terrorism cannot be defeated solely by

11special counter-terrorist squads or elite army units. The ideology that
underpins this group must be addressed. The key must then be to expose
such terrorist ideology for what it is: a corrupted understanding of Islam.
From the community perspective, while Muslims focus much on the security
ideology aspect, there has been relatively little discourse on the role ofcommunity. The local community is probably one the most effective but
under-utilised institutions in countering terrorism.

Furthermore, one speaker suggested that improving fragile democratic
institutions could be the best measure against the growth and spread ofterrorism, as there was a fragile balance of democratic institutions against
tendencies of authoritarianism in light of the war on terror and challenges tothe will to order, as well as a fragile balance of emerging democratic
institutions against tendencies towards the misuse of government office.

It was also found during this session that there were various understandings(and misunderstandings) of the concept of Jihad, which contributed a great
deal to acts of suicide bombs and terrorism. It was also found that there is
terrorism rationale for some Muslim communities. These communities orindividuals claim that the enemies of Islam, i.e. the U.S. and its allies, will notunderstand spoken and written language, but only the language of force.
Thus, this gives the rationale for them to “communicate” through bomb
explosions so that the enemy would hear and care.

This session was also enriched by a presentation on the work of the CSCAP
Study Group on Countering Terrorism, which had produced a Memorandum
on Enhancing Efforts to Address the Factors Driving International Terrorism.
The memorandum presented a working definition of terrorism as “organised
violence employed against civilians for a political purpose”. International
terrorism is terrorism mounted by an entity with a capacity to undertake12

attacks in more than one country, and with transnational elements in terms ofgoals, membership or support.

The memorandum explains that there are dominant factors driving
international terrorism. There is general agreement that terrorism feeds upon
a complex mix of factors that can vary in different environments depending
upon the peculiar historical, political, economic, social and security
conditions. International terrorism also has a degree of domestic moorings
where local terrorist groups link themselves to the al-Qaeda. The al-Qaeda
has also demonstrated a tendency to exploit any emerging issue in order toserve its cause.

It was generally agreed that the region had to broaden perspectives towards
formulating solutions to the common adversary in line with continuing trust
to improve the regional response. The discussion was indeed very lively due
to the high interest of the participants in the topic of the session. The mostpart of the discussion evolved around the on-going regional efforts incountering terrorism, and what more could be done to address the issue.
Several framework of regional cooperation were suggested.

Session Three: Human Trafficking. It was explained that the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that human trafficking
involves 4 million people per year - valued at USD 7 billion. In this regard,
human trafficking is the third largest business worldwide. It involves issuesof transnational crimes, violation of labour standards, and also migration
problems. Most recently, the issue has expanded to involving discriminationand gender-biased violation.

Human trafficking is now facing a new level of scrutiny. More than 50 years
after the UN 1949 convention, the dynamics now include various human13rights abuses, including exploitation, prostitution, forced labour, slavery,
even removal of organs.

One speaker explained that the problem was that the law enforcement
instrument was lacking definition. Moreover, the era of globalization, andcurrent political and social change of the world exacerbate the issue. The darkside of globalization, which impacts on the exploitation of resources at thecost of the poorer countries, has also triggered the blossoming of humantrafficking cases. In this regard, human trafficking presents a life of slavery
and involuntary servitude.

Thus, an emphasis was put on the call to adopt treaties, guidelines and newprinciples – particularly for countries with gross cases of human trafficking.
The UNHCR Report of 1998 called for the focus to be on careful antitrafficking strategies and the need for proper protection. Domestic
improvements have to be made as well, particularly in dealing with cases ofcorruption, the use of people as merchandise, the patronising of humantrafficking victims, problems of education, and last but not least legal reform.

Another speaker put forth several issues to deal with when responding tohuman trafficking. First, there is a need to understand ‘the nature of the beast’to fight this problem permanently - it must be acknowledged that thenecessity of labour due to globalisation is a factor to human trafficking.
Secondly, there should be an exclusive focus of human trafficking on the sex
industry. Thirdly, there is low governmental commitment to end trafficking.
Although there have been talks and dialogues, there has only been few
dedicated prosecutorial processes. Thus, it seems that combating trafficking is
not a priority for most states. Fourthly, states and other actors should push
for better prosecutions, rather than just more numbers of prosecutions. Thereis a need for better advocacy, and there is also an obligation for states andother actors to support criminal judiciary system. Lastly, there is the need for14

cooperation across national borders. In this regard, it was also stressed that
ending human trafficking is a global responsibility.
The work of the Bali Ministerial Conference of People Smuggling, Trafficking
in Persons, and Related Transnational Crimes was also explained during thissession. It was explained that the Bali Process is one of 13 regional processes
in the world dealing with migrant use. However, there are three areas which
distinguish the Bali Process from the others, namely: its focus on criminalising
the activities of human smuggling and trafficking as well as theaccompanying transnational crimes; its nature of action-oriented forum rather
than a consultative forum; and its intention to collaborate with broader
relevant established regional and multilateral institutions such as ASEAN,
APEC, and the UN. So far, it has successfully brought together thirty-eightsource, transit and destination countries from throughout the region, eighteen
observer countries, and fourteen relevant international organisations to workon raising awareness and coordination, as well as building practicalmeasures.

The discussion during this session focused on the applicability of regional
cooperation to combat human trafficking. It was conceded that there had beenvery little cooperation among agencies and states in the region on this issue. It
was suggested that it might be the time to make the measures more binding.

It was also admitted that human trafficking is indeed a consequence ofeconomic conditions and that some states may have other priorities such as
fighting terrorism. Thus, there is a need to develop the awareness of thestates, and also to create some sort of formal identification of the elements on
how to response to the problem.

15

Dinner Speech: Maritime Security – New Challenges for the
Region. The focus of the speech was on the Indonesian perspective of the
security in the Strait of Malacca. Indonesia’s concerns regarding the Malacca
Straits include the status of the strait, the safety of navigation, concerns
regarding fisheries, environmental concerns, and security concerns.

While Indonesia has its concerns, there are also concerns of the non-coastal
states, which regard the strait as important to their trade, economic, strategic
and security interests. Their main concern is of course safe navigation.

Seeing all these interests, there are actually common concerns among
Indonesia and other states which are also stakeholders in the security of the
Malacca Straits. These include the safety of navigation, the protection of themarine environment, the need to cooperate on search and rescue, contingency
plans against pollution, elimination of piracy and armed robberies, andpreventing maritime terrorism.

Recently, there has been increasing attention to this issue. The fourth
Tripartite Ministerial meeting of the littoral states was held in Batam on 1-2
August 2005. A month later, an international meeting was held in Jakarta,
organised by IMO in cooperation with three littoral states to discuss theenhancement of safety, security, and environmental protection in the strait.
There has also been cooperation between the three coastal states and Japan.

Aside from these efforts, it was said that a lot more were still needed to bedone, particularly in the area of the protection of the marine environment andthe promotion of safety and security of navigation. Many issues remain,
including: there is now an extensive industrialisation along the coast of thestraits of Malacca and Singapore; there is an extensive sand-mining for land
reclamation along the coastal areas, particularly in the Singapore Straits; and16the density of traffic is increasing and larger ships are carrying more cargoes
and some might be dangerous to the marine environment.

Within the last three decades, experiences have proven that: (1) the problemsof the straits of Malacca and Singapore could be solved throughpractical/technical mechanism and cooperation; (2) cost and burden sharing
in promoting safety and security of navigation are possibly with thecooperation with Japan, and are increasingly necessary and essential; (3) userstates should voluntarily cooperate with the coastal countries to promote thesafety of navigation and to protect marine environment in the straits, as wellas in law enforcement activities; (4) what is needed now is a moreauthoritative and permanent institution to follow up on previous measures;(5) while cooperation and assistance from user states are needed and required
under UNCLOS 1982, there are certain situation in which Indonesia would
not be comfortable with, such as the stationing or hiring of foreign navies ormarines, arming commercial vessels with offensive weapons, and joint patrolsof foreign navies in the straits.

Some other issues emerged during the discussion. The debate about therelationship between piracy and terrorism was raised. It was acknowledgedthat the relation between the two has not been able to be determined. There
was also a discussion on sovereignty, particularly linking issues such as theresistance towards foreign navies, and also relations with user states.

Session Four: Countering Proliferation. This was a keynote session on
the topic of proliferation as one of major security issues, which was meant tobe an overview or introduction to the following sessions that would
comprehensively discuss several aspects on proliferation issue in the Asia
Pacific region. The Hon. Alexander Downer, MP, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Australia, shared his views on the topic by giving a Keynote
Speech.

17

Minister Downer addressed proliferation of weapon of mass destruction(WMD) as one of the greatest threats to international and regional security.
According to him, there is no country that can claim immunity from thismenace. He highlighted the threats from countries illicitly pursuing WMD
and missiles capable of delivering them were beyond their source, and theurgent need to make an urgent act and a practical commitment to prevent
WMD from falling into the wrong hands.

Minister Downer stated that a variety of dramatic changes in the global
security environment over the past two decades contributed to the spread of
WMD and the increased risk of their use. He outlined some key trends in thediversification of proliferation threats: (1) a small number of states continue toflaw international non-proliferation norms by secretly developing WMD, andtheir reason for doing so are based on the misguided belief that theseweapons would bring them the power and prestige to be a superpower; (2)the increase in economic development and free trade system have opened up
new opportunities for both proliferators and terrorists, as globalisation has
increased the availability of materials and technology required to makebiological, chemical, and even nuclear weapons, thus resulting in morecountries developing indigenous capability to produce WMD and missiles; (3)a few of these countries or individuals within them have exported theirexpertise - the nuclear procurement network operated by Abdul Qadir Khanis the most disturbing of the cases that is so far come to light; (4) the rise oftransnational terrorism has significantly increased the problem for states,
because terrorist groups cannot be constrained in their action by a threat ofretaliation.

To counter proliferation, Minister Downer emphasised that it demanded as
broader range of tools and measures as possible. It includes not only
continuous efforts to comply with multilateral non-proliferation treaties, but

18

also international cooperation to cut supply of weapons and missiles
programmes. Other measures are also needed to protect vulnerable sources of
WMD-related materials against terrorist procurement, such as improved
security for radioactive and other hazardous materials.

Minister Downer considered the Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI) as aleading example of the type of new thinking that facilitated immediate
practical actions against the acquisition of WMD and/or WMD materials by
proliferators and terrorists. The PSI aims at enhancing operational capacity
within and between participating countries to help them contribute toeffective and timely actions to stop illicit trafficking of such weapons.

He concluded and closed his address by making some points: (1) no one’s tool
or measure is adequate for arresting the proliferation of the most dangerousof all weapons; (2) the diversity of the threat requires comprehensive, flexible,
and innovative responses; (3) it is also clear that the global counterproliferation network can only be as effective as it is wide, and the fullcommitment of all countries is required to deny the proliferators opportunity
to exploit the weaknesses in existing collective defences; (3) all states should
be under no illusion to the difficulties of the challenges they face and of theurgent need for practical actions; (4) there are risks and costs to a programmeof actions, but they are far less than the long-ranged risk and cost of not doingso; (5) if all states in Asia Pacific work to integrate their economies moreclosely, they have a clear responsibility to the next generation to ensure that
their future prosperity and security is not held hostage by such threats.

Session Five: Current WMD Developments. The main topic of thissession was “Various Challenges of Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMD) as
Contemporary Challenges to the World Security”. The issues discussed
included the development of nuclear weapon, missiles, chemical, and19

microbiological weapons, with the objective to raise awareness that the
problem of proliferation and WMD were everyone’s problems and everyone
could contribute to deal with the problem. This session underscored how
serious the problem was, what the dimension of the problem was, and why it
was of crucial matter in East Asia and Asia Pacific.

First, on the topic of nuclear terrorism and proliferation, it was explained thatthe threat of nuclear attack had never been greater, as using a nuclear weapon
in a populated city could kill as many people as in the tsunami disaster lastyear (2004), but the consequences will be more horrific and would transformthe global security environment. Moreover, nowadays, terrorist groups are
more likely to use nuclear weapon in their actions, and no country is free fromthat threat. Therefore, there is a need for a shift in the paradigm of securing
nuclear weapon, by focusing on nuclear terrorism threats as there has notbeen enough effort to combat them.

Moreover, three areas of concern were listed. The first is Pakistan, as thenumber one nuclear terrorist concern in the world, especially in this region.
The second area of concern is Russia, as the richest country in uranium in theworld. Securing the materials is not enough as it is also important to reduce or
eliminate the material, or transforming the use of the material into nonweapon use, as what has been done by the U.S. The third is the concern about
civilian research reactors. One of the examples is Australian Nuclear Reactor.

Next, the discussion continued to the topic of missile development, including
ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. It was said that threat was a declarationof intent; in this context it means military capability plus political intent to use
the military capability. Missile proliferation and WMD is more political thanmilitary. To deal with the proliferation threat, a speaker suggested not relying
on threat forecasts. Proliferation is needed; the production of ballistic missile
is actually starting to level off. On the other hand, cruise missile is increasing

20

exponentially. Therefore, the best forecast is risk assessment not threat
assessment. However, the assessment has to consider all nation and terrorist
organisations.

On another dimension of WMD, which is biological weapon development, a
speaker expressed concern about the use of biological weapon by terroristgroups. The threat of biological weapon grows in line with at least fivereasons. Firstly, the rapid diffusion of biotechnology and the indiscriminate
use of antibiotic are increasing the resistance of people against these issues.
Besides, biological weapon manufacturer is conceivable in a legitimate
program. Secondly, it is easy to manufacture and conceal the production.
Thirdly, the production can be easily enhanced by genetic manipulation. For
example, the avian flu would be more dangerous if the virus of avian flue
mutated either naturally or manipulated. Fourthly, there are defence scientists
involved in bio-defence measures that could defect to assist terrorist groups.
Lastly, biological weapons threat is of low risk but with high consequences.
The psychological affect is also immense.

In this regard, a suggestion was put forward, which includes three strategies
to deal with the threat of biological weapon: firstly, by establishing norms;
secondly by detecting and preventing biological weapon proliferation; andlastly by responding to biological weapon attacks. In addition, several points
were emphasised: (1) Domestic legislation is imperative to ensure surveillance
within countries or detection and prevention of illicit activities; (2)International consensus on the establishment of verification norms isimperative; (3) Security Council Resolution 1540 undoubtedly provides a blue
print for addressing biological weapons proliferation.

Next, on the issue of biological weapon with the focus on the risks and ethics
of its counter-measures, it was explained that biological weapons issue was
not simply a mass destruction issue. Rather, it should be seen as microbial

21

threats to security which might be perceived in three overlapping dimensions:(1) deliberate disease; (2) fast moving natural outbreaks of familiar infectious
diseases; and (3) the risk associated with laboratory research on pathogenic
micro-organism, which is generally carried out for the benign purpose ofdevising pharmaceutical and other countermeasures against both deliberate
and natural disease threats. In this regard, biological weapon proliferation is
not like any other proliferation, as it would include proliferation ofknowledge and proliferation of technology.

With regard to the issue of laboratory research, there are two concerns. The
first is the ethical concern of genetic engineering of pathogens andweaponisation of biological agent for biological weapon threat assessment
purposes. The second concern involves the risks. The challenge of biologicalresearch is to conduct it safely, securely, and in a manner sensitive tointernational security. Bio-safety concern is how to prevent the biologicalagent from escaping from the laboratory. Bio-security concern is related to theprevention of the misuse of the biological agents as weapons.

In this regard, it was pointed out that East Asia experienced a rapid
expansion of interest and investment in biotechnology, leading to an increasein the number of people and facilities engaged in research on pathogenic
micro organisms. The security challenge this poses is best addressed at the
global level by strengthening Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
compliance, although regional cooperative initiatives would support thatprocess. It is important to enhance information exchange and technicalassistance between developing countries and developed countries in theworld.

The Q&A part of this session centred upon the awareness of various
dimensions of WMD. The discussion assisted all participants to understand22the key points of how to best prevent all negative impacts of WMD. The issue
of prevention was then covered in the following session.

Session Six: Countering Proliferation – International Arms
Control Activities. This session commenced by an introduction of thecurrent international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons, which
are done in multilevel with different measures, tools and efforts, by the UN
and other multilateral institutions, groups of sovereign states and those taken
bilaterally or by limited numbers of countries. Particularly on WMD, several
measures had been taken by the IAEA, OPCW, the new UN SC Resolution
1540, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). On the other hand, there
are some efforts through the SALW proliferation and certain conventional
weapons.

Four implementations of the new Security Council Resolution 1540 will
greatly help close the existing gap among non-proliferation regimes, whichprimarily put more focus on state-to-state mechanism. This resolution covers
not only the WMD and their means of delivery, but also the proliferation anduse by terrorist groups and other non-state actors, hence strengthening theexport control and border control. The current non-proliferation regimes
oblige only those states who have joined or voluntarily participated in theregime, while the resolution comprehensively mandate the all nations
whether they are a member of the UN or not. This resolution has given
awareness to all members of states about their obligation under the resolution
to give clarification of what are lacking, what needs to be done and what kindof assistant is available to help the implementation.

The other progress on the WMD non-proliferation measures include theadoption of the convention about the nuclear and radioactive material by the
UN General Assembly and the IAEA convention which set binding obligation23

to protect nuclear facilities and materials. The nuclear terrorism convention issignificant in mandating the signatories to criminalise and extradite those
who involve in all activities relating to nuclear and radioactive materials.

IAEA is considered to be playing a vital and practical role for the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. In halting the state to state spread of nuclear
weapons, it has come to be trusted as a sound and independent point ofreference as well as a potential arbitrator with the necessary integrity. It has
the expertise, facilities and accumulation of knowledge in securing nuclear
material and preventing the proliferation. However, a speaker said that
although the IAEA might be competent and effective in verifying compliancewith the safe cost obligation, it was not the ultimate enforcement power.
Therefore there is a need to link the IAEA’s confidence to more political level
and to put it in a mechanism that guarantees full attention and involvement of
the Security Council in overseeing the IAEA’s roles. There was also an idea toestablish an international framework that could prevent the risk of nuclear
proliferation while preserving the rights of peaceful civilian use of nuclear
energy and technology.

The session also discussed the Korean perspective and explained how the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) served as a cornerstone in global nonproliferation and disarmament regime. It was explained that the North
Korean nuclear issue posed the threat for peace and security on the Korean
Peninsula, Northeast Asia and beyond. NPT has shown its inherent limitationin dealing with such issue. A speaker believed that the Six Party Talk was thebest means to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. The adoption of a Joint
Statement was enough to build the expectation that problem would be
resolved by rational dialogue and negotiation.

North Korea is now much more economically dependent, therefore more
vulnerable to the pressures from other countries. However, such pressure24could have impacts, such as it could bring much more lucrative deal whichmakes North Korea will be more reluctant to give up their nuclear program at
the early stages.

To this end, South Korea should be mindful of the following points. Firstly,
North Korea should build sufficient trust by returning to the NPT as soon as
possible and then discuss the issue of peaceful use of the nuclear energy.
Secondly, the issue of peace regime and the nuclear issue should not be mixed
up. Lastly, South Korea should design a region for South Korea-U.S. allianceunder the premise that North Korea nuclear problem has been resolved.

Another speaker explored that the international effort to prevent proliferation
has shown a significant progress as well as some problems and challenges.
Concerning the positive aspects, four points were mentioned: (1) theinternational consensus has been constant in the prevention of the WMD
proliferation; (2) the SC Resolution 1540 on non-proliferation has been
adopted and is under implementation; (3) some initiatives to strengthen nonproliferation regimes have been put forward; (4) political and diplomaticefforts have been continuously pursued to resolve proliferation issue by
weighing up dialogues and cooperation.

On the other hand, several difficulties and problems were also mentioned: (1)the review conference of non-proliferation treaty ended without substantial
results; (2) no powerful consensus on arms control or disarmaments; (3)nuclear issues are constantly growing all around the world; and (4) there is
growing risk of WMD acquisition by terrorist groups and other non-state
entities.

The Q&A part of this session was dominated by the issue of North Korea, as
scepticism about the Six Party Talk was raised. Questions were also raised
about the activities of the UN to reduce, if not prevent, proliferation.

25

An observation from CSCAP Study Group on WMD was also revealed during
the discussion time. The Study Group observes that there is a great deal of
support in theory for broader international non-proliferation regime andcertainly there has been great international support for the UN Security
Council as the ultimate arbitrator. In reality, however, the Study Group foundthat there has been several instances, such as in Iran and North Korea, where
attempts to bring the matter to the Security Council are resisted.

There was also a discussion on China’s nuclear weapons policy, particularly
the trends in Chinese nuclear deployment and how China reconciles its
policies with its legal obligation under the Article 6 of the NPT.

Session Seven: Regional Cooperation on Countering Proliferation.
It was explained in this session that three pillars of the global regime exist,
namelythe

1968

NuclearNon-Proliferation

Treaty(NPT),

Nuclear

Disarmament, and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (PUNE). The 9/11
terrorist attack has aggravated the threat of proliferation and the threat tointernational peace and security, thus requiring collective actions by theinternational community. Arrangements and cooperation in countering
proliferation in the Asia Pacific would include the Treaty on Southeast Asian
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ or the Bangkok Treaty), theRarotonga Treaty and the Declaration on the Korean Peninsula. These
regional arrangements give significant contribution, not only to the nonproliferation pillar of the NPT, but also to the promotion of peace and stability
in the region.

The establishment of regional cooperation on non-proliferation complements
the global regime of NPT, which would also provide the region with more
flexibility to adapt to the characteristics of the region, including the view on

26

the geo-strategic environment, perception of security threat to the region andto the individual states in the region.

With the nuclear issue in the Korean Peninsula still unresolved, the prospect
to establish a nuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia is very bleak at the moment.
Indeed, the issue is very complex and politically sensitive. Moreover, it wasemphasised that nuclear-free zones with effective safeguards under the IAEA
system would become the backbone of regional cooperation for countering
proliferation and at the same time serve as an important mechanism tomaintain regional peace and stability. For Asia Pacific, resolving the nuclear
issue in the Korean Peninsula would be of utmost importance.
During the Q&A, it was expressed in a comment that the increasing interest in
non-proliferation and nuclear energy in the region had raised additional
concern about just how effective a nuclear weapon free zone might be.
Moreover, it was raised that the safeguard system under the IAEA systemwere important in analysing the nuclear weapon free zone issue, especially inSouth East Asia, for it to work effectively. However, the mechanism ofconsultation would eventually reduce the interest of nuclear weapon
proliferation.

On the issue of nuclear weapon trade protocol, there have been efforts where
Chinese would like to be the first one to accede to this treaty. In this regard, it
was discussed whether there was any further action to follow this politicaldeclaration. It was understood that there were internal problems whichhamper the participation in nuclear weapons free zone.

After discussion, a review and summary of the previous sequential sessions
on WMD proliferation was given. It was considered a correct decision to put
the WMD proliferation and its possible countering measures as the central
theme in the first half of the second day of the conference. WMD issues

27comprise the single most important set of security issues in the international
agenda. Hence, WMD proliferation remains as a strategic issue in the future,compared to the war on terror.

Referring to the previous sessions on countering proliferation, it was
explained that a number of different practical efforts to address WMD
proliferation problems had been raised. Moreover, the CSCAP Study Groupon Countering the Proliferation of WMD has also been working on theidentification and refinement of a broad range of practical proposals on
countering WMD proliferation.

The review concluded that it was necessary to explore an ambitious andimaginative thinking of these efforts to successfully address the most strategic
issue.

Luncheon Speech: U.S. Policies on Countering Proliferation.
Following the sequential sessions on countering proliferation, there was acomprehensive speech during lunch about the U.S. efforts to prevent WMD
proliferation. Firstly, the growing international consensus over the need tocombat WMD proliferation as well as missiles capable of delivering such
weapons was mentioned. To combat this threat, all countries should work in
all levels: national; bilateral; and multilateral.

Action at the national level is a binding legal obligation under the UN
Security Council Resolution 1540. This resolution requires all UN member
states to criminalise WMD proliferation, adopt and enforce effective export
controls, and secure nuclear materials. It also mandates that states adopt laws
designed to prevent the financing of proliferation. The speaker cited theexport control policy of the U.S. as one of concrete actions to combat
proliferation of WMD at the national level.

28

At the bilateral level, the U.S. has been working for years with othergovernments to improve their ability to implement the types of controls now
required by Security Council Resolution 1540, including to stop shipments
and to secure dangerous materials.
At the multilateral level, multilateral cooperation against proliferation is morethan just good citizenship. It was said that Proliferation Security Initiative(PSI) was one of the examples of multilateral efforts to combat WMD
proliferation. However, PSI is not a treaty-based approach. As a result, it
imposes no legal obligations on the participating governments. There is noformal organisation with a budget or headquarter. Instead, it is a partnershipdesigned to act proactively in enforcing national and international legal
authorities to deter, disrupt, and prevent WMD and missile proliferation.
Organisations like the United Nations, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and
APEC can make valuable contributions to multilateral efforts to combat WMD
proliferation. It is important to recall that WMD non-proliferation obligations
are not an imposition by any one state or group of states. Rather, theseobligations are established under international legal instruments to which thevast majority of the world’s governments are party. The Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological
Weapons Convention define the non-proliferation obligations of the parties tothese treaties.
Most of the questions following the speech addressed the issue of PSI and its
consistency with international law. Some concerns were raised, which centred
upon the opinion that the membership of PSI was limited only to certain
countries, thus making PSI suitable only for the U.S. interests.
Some critiques were also raised about the U.S. policies on the issues. Cynicism
about U.S. double standard was voiced, particularly in assessing the U.S.’

29

policies on Israel. A question was also raised regarding the U.S.’ aggressive
policies against terrorism and how that related to non-proliferation efforts.

Session Eight: Maritime Security. A discussion on maritime security in
the Asia Pacific region would of course require an observation of the Chineseperspective. It was explained that the current situation of maritime security in
Asia Pacific reflects that the old mechanism of maritime security has passed,
while the new mechanism has not been established yet. The new approach ofmaritime security in this region was still led by the U.S., although the region
had developed to be multi-polar. Therefore, it is important for countries in theregion to seek for a common understanding of maritime security in theregional context.
It was also explained that China practiced a new maritime security concept,
which emphasised more on interregional cooperative security, especially inthe sharing of some common concerns. The measure is to use non-militarymeans such as political dialogues in resolving disputes and conflict byeliminating misunderstanding between states.

Another speaker presented a different perspective on the issue of interstate
conflicts within the seas of the Asia Pacific region, especially the East andSouth China Seas and the Strait of Malacca, and also the sea areas around theIndonesian archipelagic waters. The conflicts include issues of territorial
rights over small islands or over the demarcation of the exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) or over dangers such as piracy, maritime terrorism, illegal
fisheries, illegal immigration, illegal trade, the proliferation of WMD andforeign military activities.

Regarding the conflict between China and Japan on the development ofseabed resources in the East China Sea, the probability of military incident is30

feared. In the 21st century, the demand of maritime resource is increase, and anumber of countries are not hesitance in expanding their claims to seabedresources.

At the same time, marine environment protection and conservation in the
Asia Pacific region is an urgent issue. The problem of global warming is
deeply linked with the oceans, and marine environment issues are connected
to both resource development and security. The approach to ocean-related
issues must be comprehensive and integrated.

Next, an explanation about two categories of contemporary issues regarding
maritime security was given. The first set of issues includes disputed
maritime areas which concerns sovereignty of offshore island, overlapping
claim of economic zone, sovereignty over geographic feature, etc. The second
category includes issues of shipping activities, safety of the passenger of theship, armed robbery and piracy.

International cooperation is important to cope with the problem, however one
must note the premise that difficulty arises because the ship are passing
through territorial water or archipelagic water under the sovereignty of thecoastal state and under the international law. The only state that can exercise
this power or patrol with the state under sovereignty is the coastal state. The
Strait of Malacca is an example.

Since the 11 September 2001 incident, the priority of all maritime
organisations has been maritime security. A new protocol was recently
adopted, which was intended to update the convention. It includes new
offences, such as the use of ship to transport WMD and provision to board
ships that are suspected in illegal activities. In this context, legal framework is
mandatory in resolving maritime security issues.

31

A discussion evolved regarding the Law of the Sea Convention. Article 43
regulates that coastal countries will allow free transit, as safe and soon as
possible, for tankers. On the other hand, user states have to cooperate withcoastal countries to safeguard the environment. Similar regimes are applied
for archipelagic sea lanes. In this regard, it must be understood that coastal
countries are not interested in making it difficult for passing vessels. What ismore important is to see the common concern, where both littoral states anduser states could cooperate and offer assistance to assure safe navigation.

In addition to that, issues of jurisdiction of coastal states and cooperation tosolve the problems of oil and gas exploitation in the South China Sea werealso discussed. Particularly concerning disputed areas along the coast of East
Asia, it was acknowledged that the problems included resource management
and arrangement of law and order at the sea area. It was suggested that
Northeast Asia should learn from the good progress of cooperation inSoutheast Asia.

Session Nine: Prospects for Regional Cooperation in East Asia.
This session focused on the prospects of cooperation within the East Asian
Summit (EAS) framework. It was said that the success in the earlier stages of
the EAS will depend on a number of factors. The first is the global
environment. In this regard, the U.S.’ war on terror and intervention in Iraq
and steady expansion of global economy are some key issues. The second
factor is the EAS’ relationship with other frameworks of cooperation. It is
important that the EAS both preaches and practices open regionalism. The
third factor is ASEAN. ASEAN must acknowledge its own limitations, thus
the EAS must also look elsewhere for inspiration.

A pessimistic view of EAS was shown, as it was said that EAS had noestablished precedents to follow, and there were too many imponderables at32this juncture. However to have a good start, the EAS must at first develop its
own identity and intramural dynamics. Secondly, it must also reach out to theoutside world in the true spirit of open regionalism. Thirdly, there must be
substantive achievements, or strong indications thereof.

As for the U.S. perspective on East Asian regionalism, it was found that the
U.S. would like to see some simpler architecture for Asia Pacific, freer than
APEC process. It was explained the U.S.’ concerns over the architecture orlack of clarity over it, for example, are evident in various media. Various
forms of international cooperation are not an end in itself but a means toachieve the aims. Converging interests are particularly true in theinternational cooperation in this case. Geographical cooperation can beestablished around the core, but there is a tendency of widening. The
widening happens more rapidly than the deepening of the cooperation, thus
ending up with countries with different system, basic interests, economic
capacity, and less like-minded.

In the case of East Asia, there are several special problems. Firstly, there isincreasing number of big countries the region but there is no vision tocomplement that - vision with China as leadership or Japan is there, but notwith both countries as leaders. The second problem is the incredibly diverse
region. The third is the unclear geography and a blurring of line. In thisregard, politics is behind the decision to have 16 nations in the East Asia
Summit. All in all, geographically-determined regional frameworks do notnecessarily provide the best architecture to deal with any particular set ofissues.

Another speaker pinpointed functional integration as the focus rather thanpolitical integration (based on common value or on common destiny).
Because of the diversity, regionalism has to be functional. In terms ofleadership role and initiative taking, it has to be by merit. There is no denying

33

that there are potentials of competition between Japan and China. With thiscondition, functional cooperation provides opportunities. Japan can takeinitiative in financial cooperation and surveillance mechanism, while China
can take initiative for energy and other sectors.

Regarding the possible overlapping between EAS and ASEAN+3, it was said
that they can coexist for different purposes. East Asian states should be
responsible for the establishment of an East Asian Community given theirgeographical setting. ASEAN +3, in which ASEAN plays a key role, shouldtake the leading role in the process. ASEAN+3 should be institutionalisedwith an end to achieve commercial, financial, and social goals for the regional
cooperation.

While ASEAN +3 cannot enlarge its membership, EAS can. EAS is a newvenue for enhanced integration with ASEAN +3 countries. The more the EAS
members interact multilaterally and bilaterally, the better understanding will
be reached and higher level of cooperation will follow. Moreover, EAS can bea dialogue forum that is open, inclusive, and outward looking.

During this session, several comments showed pessimism regarding the EAS.
It was stated that regional configurations such as EAS should not give toomuch optimism, particularly seeing the differences among the states and thefact that there are still suspicion between these states. Doubts were also raised
regarding EAS in the future and also regarding the ASEAN+3.

Session Ten: Cases in Regional Cooperation. As suggested by the title,
this last session, as a subsequent of the previous sessions on regional
cooperation, presented three specific cases in regional cooperation in Asia
Pacific. The three cases were regional peace-keeping and peace-building,infectious diseases, and disaster prevention.

34

The first case was featured by an illustration of the CSCAP Study Group on
Regional Peace-keeping and Peace-building. One major recommendation
made by the study group is related to multinational coalition - in this case, forpeace keeping and peace building. It was explained that in some parts of theworld, regional organisations have tried to deal with this challenge, forexample in Africa and in the former states of the Soviet Union. EU and NATOhave also taken up this challenge to different degree.

In South Asia and Southeast Asia, even though regional organisations exist,
no significant efforts have really been taken - with the exception of someefforts in Solomon Island and Bougainville. This may well be a reflection of
the fact that such need in the region has been marginal.

As the region moves towards dealing with failing states scenario with theconcept of the Responsibility to Protect, it is vital that regional capabilities areharnessed and institutionalised to prevent external intervention. In terms ofpeace building, the establishment of a Peace Building Commission (PBC) was
recommended.

A discussion also evolved around the impediments in Southeast Asia andNortheast Asia to firmly establish such cooperation on peace-keeping andpeace-building. The capability of the region – including through the second
track frameworks – to coordinate emergency contingency force especially in apost conflict, peace-building and coping with situations after natural disastersituations was questioned.

Regarding coordination and contingency, it was suggested that developing
capacities and aspect of mobilization outside the UN mechanism wassignificant. Confidence-building measures and peace-building are the mostsignificant features in the region.

35

The second case which became a topic in this session was infectious diseases
in the region. It was explained that although ARF and other second track
dialogues in the region had discussed so much about comprehensive security
and covering in it conventional and unconventional threats, the idea of healthsecurity had not been in the region’s security lexicon.

Recent experiences of SARS have shown how it has become more than justhealth crisis. It affected the economy and has psychological impacts as well.
The poor handling of SARS has undermined the state’s credibility and led tocalls for transparency and accountability from different countries. The
intensity of the issue is also a major factor. The threat of infectious diseases isgreater than ever. SARS have made obvious the vulnerability of states.

In this regard, it was questioned how adding security label to infectious
diseases would help in addressing the consequent threats. For one, it could
increase awareness and readiness in addressing complex emergencies. It
could make state conscious of the presence of these diseases for the welfare of
the state as well as society. Securitising the threat of infectious diseases meanstranslating mere pronouncement of security threats to adopting an integrated
approach involving multi actors working together with medical community
to cope with the immense problems.

In pushing for such attitude, various issues and problems exist, including:most countries still see as unconventional threat in traditional perspective thatis as threat of offensive bio-terrorism; delayed impact of infectious diseases
has affected sense of urgency that drive decision making and resources
allocation amongst security planners and decision makers; attentions are
drawn to domestic conditions only - state capacity, crises management, andpublic concerns are not enough; epistemic communities that are placed tostimulate more innovative thinking about the destabilising potential

36infectious diseases (for example, public health officials, scientists) havegenerally not focused on security relevant aspects of infectious diseases.

It was emphasised that the gap needed to be filled. Many of existing
initiatives have not combined public health personnel with policy researchers
and none who has done that on policy and security framework. Thus, there isa need for catalysing actors with substantial influence over national
government that do recognize new and emerging infectious disease threats intheir own rights. Asia needs them to take the lead in encouraging
communication between international agencies, government and public in theissue. In this regard, CSCAP as premier epistemic community can lead theway in the setting the security issues relevant to this region.

An integrated approach to help human security, which involves different
actors would make the approach more coherent was suggested. Narrow statecentric approach has to be developed to face new challenges. The pinnacle ofthis is change of mindset that this is not a mere medical issue, rather, issues ofhuman security and national security. There is an urgent need to build a goodmechanism for global, regional and domestic disease surveillance and control
mechanism. A holistic and integrated approach is needed. Holistic means
being able to understand what it means for domestic regional and global
governance in addressing this issues. That means requiring number of actors
to work together (health workers and officials rarely coordinate with people
from the defence/security sector).

The last case discussed was disaster prevention, in particular learning fromthe tsunami experience in South and Southeast Asia. The presentation focusedon building better governance in disaster-stricken areas, in this case Aceh. In
the rebuilding phase after the tsunami, Aceh got 70% of the funding fromforeign aid, and roles of NGOs have been of great contribution. In this regard,
people-to-people connection is the core mandate.

37

The need to rely on local assets and community involvement are obvious. The
blueprint may come from the central and but the real building process mustcome from the community. Bottom up process must be ensured and theprocess must not fall into conflict and violence again. Village mapping
program is a successful example with great people’s participation.

In the discussion that followed the presentation, it was found thatreconciliation and peace-building in Aceh was an interesting situation. Issuesof military capability and lack of international regime in the area (most of the
responses were ad hoc) were acknowledged. It was stressed that the region
needed regimes for trade and protection of exotic species or humantrafficking - regimes that possessed both norms of protections and warning.
Indonesia needs international supports on that. This is a region peculiarly
vulnerable to disaster, thus would be more vulnerable in the future as
population grows, huge immigration, and no prevention mechanism
available.

Closing Remarks. In the concluding session of the General Conference,
Professor Brian Job of CSCAP Canada began by acknowledging CSCAP’s
efforts and record of achievement over the decade since its formation. In
assessing the 5th General Conference, Professor Job addressed three significant
factors: the theme of the conference; expectations of the conference; and therole of CSCAP as a track two organisation.

Regarding the themes of the general conference, three dynamics or levels of
consideration were apparent throughout the sessions:
1. Global context. Minister Sudarsono highlighted that the global centreof gravity has shifted towards Asia. Thus the General Conference must38

address how Asian problems fit within the overall global context.
Issues such as the Korean Peninsula, human trafficking, and terrorism,
while being seen as “Asian problems” within the Asian region, arebeing shaped and solved within the global context. On each of theseissues and others, the conference has presented remarkable views andexpertise.
2. Regional dynamics. The Conference keynote speakers and participants
were in accord that the three powers (China, India, and Japan) areredefining their economic and political roles, and at the same timequestioning the U.S. role in the region. As a result, the economic andsecurity architectures of the region are in flux. It was interesting tonote that Conference discussions focused substantial attention on the
EAS, but much less on APEC and even less on the ARF—perhaps
signalling shifts in the perceived importance and potential of these
institutions Also, of note, however, was the lack of discussion on therole of second track efforts and institutions. Professor Job pointed outthat this was somewhat surprising, given that this was a CSCAP
sponsored event.
3. Asian states and their people. Minister Sudarsono and many otherpresenters pointed out that each state in the region continues toexperience political transformations, dilemmas of economic growth,and issues of social and cultural reconciliation—albeit at differing
stages and differing degrees from one to the other. Attempting tomanage these factors has challenged states’ capacities for the provisionof the public goods of security, i.e., the provision of human security for
their populations.

Regarding the last point of Asian states and their people, three central issues
emerged during the conference. The first is the definition and redefinition
national identity - as well as the struggle - on one hand, and manipulation, on
the other hand, of forces of nationalism. The second is the role of the religion.

39

A great deal of time has been spent on this issue, but this time on thisconference it was less, although it remains a substantial issue. The third issues
is the necessity to think carefully of the fragile balance between democratic
institutions against the tendencies of authoritarianism and misuse ofgovernment office—tendencies that have increased in light of the war on
terrorism and challenges to order.

Thus, this comes to the second question of whether this CSCAP General
Conference can be said to have met expectations. Certainly in the sense ofpresenting a spectrum of views and spectrum of issues, it has. CSCAP has
showcased its capacity to bring expertise and different voices into the forum,and to extend the forum to others. This CSCAP General Conference has also
importantly, and to a greater extent than previous General Conferences,
showcased the substantive and technical expertise mobilised through CSCAP
Study Groups, particularly with regard to maritime cooperation, WMD
proliferation, human trafficking, and terrorism. The works of these Study
Groups were notable contributions and hopefully benefited other audiences
outside the forum as well.

Professor Job furthermore stated that the General Conference had alsopresented the views of important regional players. This is a critical role forthe conference. From the senior officials (particularly Indonesia, Australia andUnited States), participants had gained substantial and valuable knowledge of
their countries’ perspectives on Asia Pacific matters.

However, Professor Job regretted that the conference did not gain an
equivalent perspective from senior officials from China and India. Reflecting
on Sudarsono’s comment in the opening remarks that the critical challenge ofthe region was the peaceful resolution of the role of China, Japan, India andthe U.S., then it was imperative for CSCAP to mobilise its efforts in the40

subsequent general conference(s) to ensure that senior officials’ voices ofChina and India were heard in discussions.

Lastly, on the role of CSCAP as a regional track two organisation, Professor
Job looked to CSCAP’s role within the shifting regional architecture. CSCAP
regards itself as the track two vehicle for the ARF. Thus, it is necessary for
CSCAP to think about where and how it positions itself with regard to the
ARF and other regional institutions in the evolving context of new economic
and security architecture(s) of the region. It is also pivotal to think about how
CSCAP could articulate a voice as an epistemic community that looks toengage and exert a positive influence in regional agenda setting. In thisregard, CSCAP Study Groups have done extensive and impressive work, but
the question is how CSCAP can present this work in ways to official andunofficial audiences that provide impact.

To go forward with this goal, it is necessary to ensure continuity of CSCAP
Member Committees and the people engaged within them, while also paying
attention that Member Committees represent generational changes andchanges in national political perspectives on regional affairs. Unless we do so,
CSCAP will lose touch with changing social and economic forces, and its
deliberations at the General Conference and particularly in CSCAP’s Study
Groups will lose their relevance and impact.

41

Conclusion and Recommendation
The 5th CSCAP General Conference has considerably scored a major success,not only in terms of attracting a large number of audience and media
coverage and stipulating open and lively debate, but also in putting forth
CSCAP’s views and activities to a wider public. The 5th General Conference
was acknowledged to be enhanced than the previous one due to the more
substantial feedback and input from the CSCAP Study Groups. A goodcomposition of speakers and panelists should be obtained as well as involving
both track two and track one representatives as the conference’s purpose is tolink the two elements.

Following the previous conference, the 5th General Conference has
successfully created an open and cooperative atmosphere for closer
interaction between the officials – who are responsible in policy making andexecuting – and the public – who are concerned with the regional security
issues and environment. The conference has crated good practice of
exchanges of ideas among the track one and track two, which at the end
might contribute to the improvement of the security of the Asia Pacific region.

As agreed at the previous conference, the General Conference would continue
to be held regularly on a bi-annual basis. Having three or more Member
Committees as the co-organisers would be maintained to improve andstrengthen a sense of cooperation and solidarity among CSCAP Member
Committees.

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Acknowledgement

As the host of the 5th CSCAP General Conference, CSCAP Indonesia wishes toexpress its deepest gratitude and appreciation to the co-organisers, namely
AUSCSCAP, CSCAP Canada, and CSCAP Japan, and also to the CSCAP
Secretariat and CSCAP Co-Chairs for the quality of cooperation and support
rendered in organising the conference.

Furthermore, the appreciation also goes to all other CSCAP Member
Committees for the commitment, continuous support, and assistances
extended to the conference. Some of the Member Committees were very much
instrumental in promoting the conference, thus attracting a large number ofparticipants from their respective countries. The presence of some key anddistinguished speakers was also made possible because of great efforts
showed by some CSCAP Member Countries. The host is grateful for thisassistance.

The host and co-organisers would also like to thank the keynote speakers,
panelists, commentators, and chairs for their excellent quality of presentation
and role. Presentations and views presented at the conference have beenstimulating and successfully encouraged lively and open discussion.

In the same manner, participants also deserve a credit for the success of theconference, for their active involvement on the discussion from the beginning
until the very end of the programme.

Finally, the host and co-organisers appreciate the invaluable support andassistance given and the commitment made without hesitation by the large
number of individuals and parties involved in the organising of the 5th
CSCAP General Conference. *****

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