Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific
GENERAL CONFERENCE
Jakarta, December 7-9, 2003th

10 Anniversary

REPORT
Introduction

CSCAP General Conference was held at“Strategic Security
Outlook in the Asia
Pacific” was adopted
as the main theme of
the Conference

The objective of General
Conference is to put
forth CSCAP views to alarger audience as wellas integrate government
representatives,
academics, civil society
members, journalists,
and business
community with thework of CSCAP

Hotel Borobudur, Jakarta, from 7-9 December
2003.
CSCAP
Indonesia,
along
with
AUSCSCAP, CSCAP Canada, and CSCAP
Japan, co-organised and hosted the General
Conference. “Strategic Outlook in the Asia
Pacific” was adopted as the main theme of theConference.
The 2003 General Conference was the first in
the series. It was previously known as ‘CSCAP
General Meeting’. The decision to change theterm‘GeneralMeeting’
to‘General
Conference’ was agreed by all CSCAP Member
Committees at its 18th CSCAP Steering
Committee Meeting (Singapore, 9 December
2002). The main reason to replace the General
Meeting with a General Conference is to put
forth CSCAP views to a larger audience aswell as integrate the participation of senior
government representatives, academics, civilsociety members, journalists, and business
community with the work of CSCAP. It was
felt that the General Conference, which would
have no authority to make binding decisions
on CSCAP, would be a better way in achieving
the aforementioned objective. It is greatly
hoped that the General Conference would
raise the profile of CSCAP to a higher level inthe future.

The 2003 CSCAP General
Conference marks the 10th
Anniversary of CSCAPThe Co-organisers ofConference include CSCAP
Indonesia, AUSCSCAP,CSCAP Canada, and
CSCAP Japan. Allsymbolically represents
four different geographicalparts of CSCAPThe Conference wasconsidered as timely
since the region of Asia
Pacific, like the rest of
the World, is being
faced with a series ofcritical security
challenges, mostnotably terrorism andanti-terrorist campaigns

CSCAP Indonesia voluntarily proposed to hostthe first General Conference. Indonesia’s
proposal to host the General Conference waswelcomed and in fact supported by all CSCAP
Members. Symbolically, the timing of General
Conference itself coincided with the 10th
anniversary of CSCAP, since its first Steering
Committee was held in Lombok, Indonesia, in
December 1993. Subsequently, three other
CSCAP
MemberCommittees,
namelyAustralia CSCAP (AUSCSCAP), CSCAP
Canada, and CSCAP Japan, agreed to coorganise the Conference, most notably infinding and securing some funds for the
Conference, and also in inviting speakers anddignitaries from each respective member
country. The three also symbolically
represented three different geographical partsof CSCAP, namely North America, South
Pacific, and Northeast Asia.
The Conference itself was considered as timely
since the region is faced with a series of criticalsecurity challenges, most notably terrorism
and anti-terrorist campaign led by the US. At
the global level, the war in Iraq, problems in
Middle East, and global concerns overWeapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
continue to draw major attention. The
implications of these problems are very much
felt in the Asia Pacific region, and attracted
much of our attention.

2

Countries in the region are
also compelled to deal withvarious existing security
concerns, including the
Korean Peninsula andsecurity of Southeast Asia
Talks about the imperative
to establish a closer
security co-operation, andeven new security
architecture are now
emerging

As a second-track
forum, CSCAP strongly
felt it necessary to
openly discuss thosevarious security
challenges in the region

In total, there were 2 Keynote
Addresses, 3 speeches, 7sessions, 1 Special Session on
Timor Leste, and 1After-Dinner
Talk on Islam
120 foreign participants from18 countries attended theConference, and 100 moreparticipants from Indonesia
attended the half-day Publicforum

As new security issues and challenges emerge,
countries in the region are also compelled todeal with various existing security concerns,
including the Korean Peninsula and growing
threats of terrorism in Southeast Asia. There
are now talks about the imperative to establish
a closer security co-operation, and even new
security architecture in the region and various
sub-regions, as a better means to cope withthose challenges. ASEAN, for instance, has
adopted the ASEAN Security Community
proposal as its new security strategy tostrengthen its national and regional resilienceand therefore to be better prepared for the newchallenges in the next two decades or so.
Against the above background, as the secondtrack forum for security dialogue and cooperation in the region, CSCAP members
strongly felt it necessary to openly discuss
those various security challenges in the region.
In so doing, the co-organisers worked andconsulted closely to formulate a set of topics
and speakers as well as strategy to proceedwith the Conference.
In total, there were seven sessions and one
special session on Timor Leste, and three
special speeches or talks during theConference, attended by more than 120 foreign
participants from 18 countries, and about 100
Indonesian participants. Additional 100
participants from Indonesia (including foreign
diplomats and journalists) also attended theConference, which was also made open to
public for a half-day on Monday, December 8.

All presentations, comments, and talks weredelivered by distinguished scholars andgovernment officials from both Indonesia andaround the region. Among the Indonesian
officials were H.E. General (Ret) Susilo3

All presentations,comments, and talks
were delivered by
distinguished scholars
and government officials

Participants showed great
enthusiasm and actively
engaged in lively, open andfrank discussions
CSCAP General Conference
has scored a great success,and there was strong
demand to hold the event
regularly

Bambang Yudhoyono, Minister Co-ordinator
for Political and Security Affairs, and H.E. Dr.
N. Hasan Wirayuda, Minister of Foreign
Affairs. From Australia, the Hon. Alexander
Downer, MP, was also present and actively
involved in the talks and discussion. The
Conference was also benefited greatly from thepresence of and presentations made by thesefollowing distinguished officials or former
officials,
namely:Honourable
Dato’
Hishamuddin Tun Hussein, Malaysian
Minister of Youth and Sports; The Hon. CedricFoo, State Minister for Defence, Singapore, andlast but not least; H.E. Jose Ramos Horta,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Timor Leste.
Former ministers who participated in the
Conference were Mr. Ali Alatas, former
Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Dr.
Surin Pitsuwan, former Thai Minister of
Foreign Affairs.
Despite its tight and lengthy schedule, most of
the participants showed great enthusiasm to
the Conference, from the beginning until thevery end of it. They actively engaged in lively,
open and frank discussions and debates. All inall, it can be concluded that the 2003 CSCAP
General Conference was a successful one, andthere was a strong demand from participantsthat the event must be regularly held by
CSCAP as its regular event and activity.

General Observation and Assessment
Participants and Role Players. As stated previously, theConference was fully attended by well over 120 foreign participantsfrom 18 countries in the region, and about 100 Indonesians. The big
number of full participants to the Conference was beyond the initialexpectation, as the co-organisers expect about 150 people, both foreign
and local, to attend the event. However, this may well reflect the levelof attractiveness of CSCAP General Conference to the people in the4region. All foreign participants bear their own airfare andaccommodation, but CSCAP Indonesia facilitated their bookings andlocal transport arrangement with the hotel. Most of the participants
were academics and government officials, who attended the Conferencein their private capacity. There were also journalists and activists of civilsociety organisations among them.
Since CSCAP General Conference is primarily aimed at introducing andbringing CSCAP to a wider audience, CSCAP Indonesia proposed tohave a half-day conference open to public. This public session was heldon Monday, 8 December, and attended by additional 100 participants,
mostly foreign diplomats and journalists (especially from CSCAP
member country) from major international media stationed in Jakarta.
Some Indonesian diplomats, journalists, academics, politicians, andofficials, including officials from the Ministry of Defence were also
invited to attend this public conference. In sum, more than 300 people
attended the half-day Conference on 8 December.
The co-organisers specifically asked and invited 50 distinguishedindividuals—mostly members of CSCAP national committees, toparticipate and play various roles in the Conference, namely as chairs,
speakers, and commentators. All of them accepted the invitation andparticipated in the Conference, except one from the US, whose healthproblem had prevented him from attending. Initially, a number ofimportant figures such as Dr. Paul Wolfowitz of the US and Vice
Minister Wang Yi of China were also invited. However, their tightschedule and program had prevented them from attending theConference.
Furthermore, having consulted with other members of CSCAP, the coorganisers also invited some non-CSCAP members as speakers. The
selection was made primarily based on their known-track record andexpertise in certain topic e.g. Islam, China, or issue of terrorism.
The presentations made by these distinguished speakers were top-classin quality. They were sharp and candid in sharing their minds on
various topics assigned to them. Led by able chairs, it successfully
stimulated a lively and scholarly debate and discussions among theaudience. The credits should also go to the commentators, whose
comments were equally thought provoking and eventually elevate thequality of each session.

5

Selection of Topics and Flow of Discussion. One of the greatest
challenges for co-organisers at the preparatory stage of the Conference
was to formulate a set of topics that would not only attract the attentionof audiences, but would also cover most of the current security concerns
and issues of the region. Although a full mandate and liberty wasinvested upon the co-organisers to decide the topics, yet, decision on
and formulation of topics was primarily based upon a wide
consultation with as many members of CSCAP as possible. It was
believed that such a mechanism would help ensuring the involvementof other CSCAP members, and accommodate as many ideas as possible.
CSCAP Indonesia had gone through two stages of preparation indrafting an agenda for the General Conference. At the first stage,
CSCAP Indonesia closely consulted with AUSCSCAP, CSCAP
Secretariat and CSCAP Co-chairs in preparing the first set of proposals.
It was agreed that emphasis should be given on security in the Asia
Pacific, specifically terrorism and its related aspects as well as otherpertinent issues. The initial agenda was then further discussed at thesecond stage, in which more members of CSCAP were involved. The
draft agenda was improved upon and circulated to all Member
Committees for amendments or agreements.
In the end, seven main topics were agreed upon, namely: (1) The Rise of
China and Its Impact on the Asia Pacific; (2) Developments on the
Korean Peninsula; (3) The World After the Iraq War; (4) Comprehensive
Measures to Counter Terrorism; (5) Islam in the Region; (6) Security
Challenges in Southeast Asia and South Pacific, and (7) the Way
Forward: Practical Proposals on Terrorism and Non-Terrorism Issues.
In addition to these topics and sessions, there was also a Special Session
on Security Challenges for Timor Leste. An After Dinner Talk on Islamin Indonesia was also presented by Professor Syafii Ma’arif, a leading
Moslem scholar in Indonesia, where Minister Downer served ascommentator. There were also special speeches during meals on: (1) the
Indonesian Defence White Paper; (2) Japan and the Security of Asia
Pacific, and; (3) the campaign against terror.
Many participants found that the above broad range of topic andagenda was very comprehensive and stimulating, and satisfactorily
meet their curiosity and expectations about what has been going on in
the region today, especially on security issues e.g. terrorism. The
selection of topics, especially on Islam in Southeast Asia, andparticularly Indonesia, were clearly useful in bringing newunderstanding among participants from the other parts of the region
6about the nature of Islam in Southeast Asia, which were partially or
inaccurately understood so far.
In order to have an effective communication and encourage morediscussions among participants, each speaker and commentator was
allotted very limited time to present their views on each topic. Each
speaker was given 10 minutes, and 8 minutes for commentator. Chairsof each session were given the liberty to remind the speakers about
their time limits, and this mechanism was introduced to and agreed by
all speakers prior to official opening of General Conference. However,these speakers were not absolutely obliged to provide a written paper.
Moreover, to ensure the open, frank and friendly atmosphere fordiscussion, the Chatham House rules were strictly applied, and theparticipants, especially journalists, were frequently reminded to observe
this rule.
As expected, the discussions went on very well, despite the cancellationof two speakers and one commentator at the very last minutes. It wasobserved that the degree of participants’ enthusiasm was high, despite
the tight and hectic schedule. They all engaged in lively debates,
especially on some sessions such as North Korea, Terrorism, and Islam.
As noted by one of the participants, one of the strengths and successesof this particular Conference is its ability to bring together people whowell know their materials as shown in the case of North Korea. The
presence of both participants from North Korea and South Korea, had
helped the participants to understand better the situation in the
Peninsula. It also applies to other issues, especially on Islam inSoutheast Asia.

Highlights of Debates

In his Keynote Address, Indonesian Minister Co-ordinator for Politicaland Security Affairs acknowledged CSCAP as the important secondtrack forum by stating that ‘CSCAP has distinguished itself as a vibrantforum to dwell on important issues as it has established an excellent
reputation and its recommendations have always been valuable to thegovernments.’
However, he raises his concerns over current security uncertainty facing
the world and the region. He further poses five stimulating andstrategic questions. First, will Iraq stabilise or destabilise? Second, howwill the war on terror affect security relationships in our region? Third,
7

how do we deal with the growing restlessness in the Islamic world?
Fourth, how do we evolve mechanisms for peace, which caters to theunique conditions of the Asia Pacific region? Fifth, how do we containthe virus of extremism, ethnic conflict, and ethno-nationalism?

On the Rise of China, one speaker highlighted the new shift orchanging trend in China’s security and foreign policy, especially whenit comes to the
ASEAN-China
relations.
Unlike in the past,
On the Rise of China andChina is now
seen as being
Its
Impacts
on
the
Asia
more
cooperative, which
Pacific
was
manifested in thesigning of theBali’s Treaty ofAmity and Co-operation. It was also observed that China’s economic
growth would eventually improve the country’s welfare and ease
domestic political transition. However, the development of China’s
maritime power around the South China Sea remains the key security
issue in East Asia. Another concern was on China’s possible reaction to
the Taiwan’s intention to declare independence. In this regard, theregion would like to see China consolidating its gains by ensuring
stable conditions that would allow its rise as regional major power toremain undistorted.
On the international dimension of China’s rise to power, anotherspeaker argued that this is not China’s first rise as great power. Yet, it isconsiderably the most comprehensive rise ever, which include political,
economic, scientific, technological, intellectual and culturaldevelopment. The rise of China has certainly pose implications globally.
Yet, the question on how China integrates itself into the region remains
in place.
Discussions on China were filled with optimism as well as pessimism.
Attention was also given to the current domestic problems in China,
especially growing poverty and inequalities, which may halt and evenreverse the whole development in the country. There was also concern
over the conditions under which China can be accepted as the regional
leader.

8

On the issue of Development on the Korean Peninsula, theConference
wasgreatly
benefited fromthe presence ofDevelopments on the speakers from thedistinguished
two
Koreas,anda
Korean Peninsulacommentatorfrom the US. The
issue of Korea
was considered asa perennial part of the security issue in the region. As reminded by
Chair of Session II, two main subjects need to be thoroughly discussed,
namely: (1) the prospect of the current six party talks and themultilateral process towards the resolution, and; (2) The relationship or
alliance arrangement between South Korea and the US.
One speaker acknowledged that situation in the Korean Peninsula isexperiencing changes, especially since 1998 when President Kim Dae
Jung promoted the “Peace and Prosperity” policy towards North Korea.
The dialogue process between the two had been more institutionalised
since the past few years, and had also been made more frequent. Yet,
the North Korean nuclear issue causes the military tension still to behigh. This is the main obstacle for the improvement of relations. It was
reckoned that the future of the talks remains unpredictable because
each side has its own version of how to solve the problem.
Nonetheless, as pointed out by speaker from North Korea, Pyongyang
would continue to regard the South Korea-US relation as an essential
issue that must be given proper understanding to reach a solution to theconflict. In the view of the North Korean leaderships, the resolution is
hard to achieve as long as the US still carries out a hostile policy
towards the North Korea. In the later developments, North Korea wasforced to take defence measures as a response to the US policies.
The debate continued to be focused on the US policy in Korea, and as
predicted, the nuclear issue. One suggestion made by the participant
was that noting the potential deadlock of the 2nd stage of six-party talks,
the discussion should then be aimed at making some productive
contributions to the official level. Participants should produce ideas ofwhat should be the principle for future settlement. A list of important
issues that needs to be discussed is as follow: (1) how to ensure a nonnuclear status; (2) how to meet legitimate security concerns of allparties; (3) how to ensure favourable external conditions for thesettlements. All participants were also reminded that peace could also
be possibly reached through negotiation and co-operation in otherfields such as economic and social.
9On the second day, which was open to public for half-a-day, criticalissue such as
the World after the
Iraq War washeatedly discussed.
All
speakers
andparticipants
The World after
concurred that
the Iraq War posed a
the Iraq War
tremendous
challenges to theglobal as well
as regional security.
As reckoned,
there were debates
whether or not the US and her allies should have taken anotherpeaceful option to settle the problem in Iraq. Yet, most of theparticipants expressed their greater concerns about the future scenario,
because as reckoned by many, the war in Iraq is not over as yet. Whatneed to be done by now is formulating a policy for reconstructing andre-building Iraq. This must include the transformation of Iraq into a
democratic country. As everybody well realised, this cannot be
undertaken overnight.
The Iraq War, as many concurred, has inevitably made the World andglobal politics more complex. We need to balance the various national
interests with changing environment, where religious community andethnicity were now parts of determining factors.
At this point, one speaker contended that linking terrorism with thereligion would be counterproductive. Instead, we must foster global
and regional co-operation to achieve peace and development. Anotherspeaker stressed the importance of UN as a genuine multilateral body,which seemed to be undermined by the current trends of unilateralism.
The major challenge ahead is then to formulate and adopt the best
strategy in revitalising the UN.
The impact of Iraq War on the regional security of Asia Pacific was also
thoroughly discussed. While everybody expressed their concerns overthe so-called dividing Trans-Atlantic alliance between the US andEurope, all participants concurred that countries in the Asia Pacificmust strengthen its way to build up a sense of regional community.

The next stimulating topic debated among participants was on
Comprehensive Measures to Counter-Terrorism. One solid agreement
among
the
participants wasComprehensive
Measures to Counter
Terrorism

10

that strategy to counter-terrorism must be comprehensive, which
include the measures to uproot its fundamental causes such as poverty
and injustice. The session on Terrorism was basically meant to draw amajor lesson from the experiences of three specific countries incountering terror, namely Malaysia (historical experience in countering
insurgency), India (on the sub-Continent), and Indonesia (with therecent case of Bali Bombings).
On the historical experiences, one major lesson that could be learned
was that the success of campaign against insurgency or terrorism islargely determined by the strategy of winning the heart and mind of thepeople. In the current context of war against terror, which was often
juxtaposed with radical Islamic groups, the idea of Islamic radicalism
must be discredited in order to win the war. We need to avoid theregeneration of the idea of radicalisms. It was suggested that in order todefeat the idea of religious radicalism, we must do the following: (1) be
propaganda-minded; (2) encourage the involvement of moderate
religious scholars to help subduing the ideas of radicalism, and; (3)exploit the political oxygen created by the radical groups e.g. moral
feeling of the foot soldiers against their radical clerics who live
luxuriously etc.
Another speaker categorised two groups of terrorism, namely domestic
and international terrorism. Insurgency in Kashmir for instance, wasregarded by New Delhi as domestic terrorism. The speaker agreed thatengaging radical groups would be useful through dialogue and proper
consultation to convince that those groups would not win their causes(e.g. separate from India). Yet, response from the audience on the needto distinguish the domestic from the international terrorism was rather
critical, as one participant raised question on the purpose of making
such a distinction.
Another highlight of this session was a discussion on the Investigationof the Bali Bombing. As clearly stated by the speaker, the bombing
incident that occurred on 12 October 2002 was a dreadful tragedy andhumanitarian disaster, which affected the Indonesian people and theinternational community. Hence, it was fully admitted that the successof the investigations was due to a totality of efforts and action byvarious parties, namely: the Indonesian Police and several other police
forces from friendly countries, most notably Australia and FBI;
government agencies; social institutions; and the general public.

11

On a practical side, the investigations were conducted through fourstages: (1) providing first-aid for the survivors, and identification of thedead right after the incident; (2) mobilising the police investigators andorganising those who involved into a joint investigation team; (3) searchand pursue the suspects, who were identified by a joint team; (4)strengthening the co-operation with international investigation team.
It was also noted that the war against terror is still far from end.
Realising that terror could be triggered by many factors and motives
including radicalism due to frustration, injustice mad cumulative
marginalisation, simply using the law enforcement measures is notenough. Any attempts must also include: (1) winning the hearts andsympathy of the religions community; (2) revitalisation of the role oftraditional, moderated and intellectual religious (Moslem) figures.
In all, it was widely reckoned that there is a need for a long-term
perspective on fighting terrorism, and a sole military approach could
not solve the problem. Another measures must also be implemented,
including the use of soft power in removing the root-causes ofterrorism. There was also a discussion on the relationship and linkage
between various terrorist groups and trans-national crimes
organisations, which must also be fought at the same time.

Topic on Islam in the Region had definitely been very much attractive
to most—if not allof the participants.
Islam
in
the
RegionYet, as remindedby the Chair ofsession on Islam,thediscussion
pursued on this
topic must be on
Islam in a wider perspective, and not about terrorism.
One speaker highlighted two major points that need to be discussed
when talking about Islam in the region: (1) Islam in Southeast Asia isundergoing a period of resurgence, and such a resurgence should be thebeginning for analysis, not the end of analysis; (2) since we are in thefluid situation, we would need more time to understand the wider
context of Islam in the region.
One interesting point raised during the presentation, and subsequentdiscussion, was on the fact of widening gap of perception about Islamin the region. It was observed that since September 11, two groups haveprovided assessment of the Muslim world of Southeast Asia: (1)terrorist and security experts; and (2) Islamic scholars and social
scientists researching Muslim societies. Yet, despite all conferences and12seminars, and publications in the last three years, the knowledge gap
between them is widening, and this is having a negative impact on ourability to formulate proactive, broad-based, policies to combat terrorism
in the region. The reasons are: (1) the views of the first group—terrorist
experts—have been popularised in the press and have come todominate the public discourse on the global war on terrorism; (2) thetwo groups seldom attempt to engage in dialogue with each other. As aresult, after 911, Islam as a religion is being understood more frequently
through security studies lenses.
Therefore, the key to building the bridge between the two groups is tofocus on the policy arena, as there needs to be a review of the stock ofknowledge on Islam in Southeast Asia, and converging on the design ofpolicies to counter terrorism.
Like the discussion on terrorism, which was widely based on thespecific country experiences, the discussion on Islam also followed thesame pattern, which was drawing lessons from specific country
experiences of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, with a comment
made by a speaker from a non-Southeast Asian country (the UnitedStates).
Most speakers concurred with general observation as mentioned earlier.
Yet, in Malaysia, where the process of Islamisation and adjustment had
been taking place, the problem was not very much on the gap ofknowledge between terrorist experts and Islamic scholars. The problem
is not about Islam per se, but rather about politics. It is more about theability of the various forces of politics, Islamic and government alike, todeliver goods and prosperity for the people. Unlike in Indonesia, where
Islamic organisations have been playing a significant role as civil society
groups, local Islamic scholars in Malaysia have failed to address andacknowledge the role of civil society groups in democratisation andmodernisation of Malaysia.
It is important to note that political Islam, whose objective is modernity
itself, is seen as the main feature of modern Islam. Some groups, known
as part of religious movement, often adopt a very modern approach fortheir movement. Therefore, we need to share their perspective on
modernity although the language might be different. Unfortunately, thediscussion of political Islam has not been so advanced, as yet. One
speaker even suggested that the moderate groups of Islam must
understand that they needed to approach people at the grass root level.
So far, the moderate and/or the liberal groups only targeted people in13

big cities, which in the end made these groups detached from the large
number of people in the rural areas and unable to send the message ofmodernity to their own people.
Like Malaysia, it was also noted that Indonesia had gone both the
emergence of radical Islamic movement, and tension. The tension
particularly aroused from the fact that although Indonesia wasregarded as the largest Muslim nation in the world but it has neveracknowledged Islam as state religion. Despite the fact that Muslims
constitute the largest single majority of the Indonesian total population,
Indonesia is not an Islamic state, nor a secular one in a strict sense of theterm. Instead, Indonesia is a Pancasila state, which places religions—
including Islam—in an important position.
Furthermore, one common question frequently posed by Muslims inIndonesia was on the extent to which Islam or the Muslims becomes afactor in both domestic and foreign policies, and how Muslims could
influence Indonesia’s foreign policy in order to play a greater role in theIslamic world. Basically, it was noted that the government has
traditionally or conventionally disregarded Islam as a factor in theformulation of domestic and foreign policies. Despite the fact thatIndonesia generally remains on good terms with Muslim states in the
Middle East, Indonesia has tended not to associate itself with Islam.
Therefore, it is important to make it clear that if Indonesia extended its
supports to certain Middle East countries or groups of Muslim people
like Palestinians, the support is basically not on the ground of Islam, butrather as a sign of solidarity for those who struggle for independence
and justice.
The fact that Indonesia has no agenda to pursue a greater role in theIslamic world has a lot to do with the nature of Islam in Indonesia. The
Indonesian Islam has a number of distinctive characters vis-à-vis
Middle East Islam. The Indonesian Islam, by and large, is a moderate,accommodating kind of Islam, and the least Arabicised Islam.
Moreover, the existence of hardliner, militant, radical, or even“fundamentalist” Muslim within Indonesian Islam that are so obvious
recently and have been regarded to have taken the centre stage ofIndonesian Islam in the aftermath of 911 and Pentagon terrorist attacks,
is actually not new. Yet, It was argued that the increase of radicalism
recently was primarily caused by the government’s failure to enforce
law and order, and solve a number of acute social ills such as continued
ethno-religious conflicts, marked increase of crimes, rampant
14

corruption at all levels of society, and so forth. It was further
exacerbated by the demoralising of the military and police forces thatreally undermined their capacity to play their role properly inmaintaining security and order, and political fragmentation as
Indonesia enters a new era of political liberalisation. The keys toaddress the radical Islam are: (1) strengthening the state in a sense of astrong democratic state; (2) strengthening the law enforcement agencies;(3) empowering civil society groups including the group of Moslem
people, and Islamic boarding schools.
In Thailand, like everywhere, Islam was the driving factor behind
independence movement (e.g. in Southern Thailand), which could be
regarded as political resurgences of Islam as well. Yet, unlike in the pastwhen purification process of religious understanding came from thelocal interpretation, today’s purification process came from and was
being driven by the Middle East, along with the returns of Southeast
Asian students from that region. Having tipped a delicate balance
between the state and religion, these students felt that the politicalsystem does not belong to them and unmatched their religious
expectation, which might lead to tensions. Poverty, inequality andunemployment in certain areas of Thailand that have a significant
Moslem population exacerbated the problem. The two issues certainly
increased the feeling of alienation that was vulnerable for radicalisation.
In the end, the central of debate was very much on the possible
reconciliation between the process of Islamisation and secularisation,and how Muslim communities could help subduing the growing
uneasiness created by and aroused from this tension. There was alsoquestion on how to pursue the modernity among Muslim communities
in regard with current wave of globalisation. However, as one speaker
noted it, Islam also had its own perspective on modernity and we
needed to share the perspective although the language might bedifferent.

Discussion and talk on Islam continued in a special After-Dinner Talk
with the Chairman of Muhammadyah, one of the largest Moslem
organisations in Indonesia, and Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
The speaker presented his views on radicalism and the predicaments ofIndonesian Muslims. It was observed that since the September 11
incident in the US, Islam has been the centre of attention, in greater
focus than ever. Questions were then raised about Islam, especiallythose relating Islam to violence. Some people resort to simple answer:
Islam is the problem and therefore has become a suspect in this regard.
15

In Southeast Asia, Islam has also become a subject of suspicion,
especially with the rise of radicalism in several countries, includingIndonesia. It is argued that radicalism is the result of desperation, of
those unable to face modern life and its challenges. They are unable torespond to these challenges in a sophisticated way, and view that theworld has deviated too far. When the pressure grows stronger for thedeprived, they feel confused and alienated.
When the government does not come to their defence, they feelabandoned and become angry. This anger finds its expression in many
forms, some though violent means. If this happens on a collective basis,then you have a fertile ground for radicalism. Here, the state comes in
as catalyst for the deprived to resort to violence.
In Indonesia, millions of Muslims continued to live in extreme poverty,
and for them the reality was an unpleasant one. Corruption is no longer
an exception. Meanwhile, people are presented with new way of life on
the regular basis, and millions of Muslims in Indonesia cannot
understand why hedonism and consumerism, with all its consequences
for morality continue to flourish. Indeed, radicalism must be
understood as a response to these concerns.
Within the Muslim community in Indonesia, some believe there is a
global conspiracy of the West to undermine the Islam life and theMuslim community. Globalisation, the ongoing problem of thePalestinians, and the sad events in Iraq flourish this belief. There are
two factors why the Muslims in Indonesia and elsewhere havedifficulty in understanding the lack of progress in their society:
1. The pre-occupation to a historical exercise to reject modernity,
including democracy, human rights and nation-state. Argument:
Islam is not compatible with democracy.
2. The obsession with the glorious past of Islam. A sense of identity
crisis and helplessness ensue in the contemporary world.
It was also noted that the way we approach this problem would depend
on what the Muslims do within their own community, and how others
approach and interact with the Muslim community around the world:(1) the Muslims have to put their thinking straight and recognise own
weaknesses; (2) Islam cannot be understood in the context of terrorism,
as it will be easily misunderstood and distorted. Islam and the rest havebeen having difficulty in building understanding since the September
11 incident. A comprehensive understanding of Islam requires
16

constructive engagement with the Muslim communities themselves.
Suggestions proposed in this session are:
1. Working together to eliminate injustices, poverty, prejudices, andpractices of discrimination at national and global levels. It should
begin with awareness to emphasise similarity rather thandifferences.
2. Plurality and civil ways in managing differences would
demonstrate the true meaning of civilisation.
3. A better way towards the future lies in our willingness to movebeyond the current impasse in understanding each other.

On the topic of Security Challenges in Southeast Asia and South
Pacific,
which
also
includesSecurity Challenges inpresentationand discussionon
ASEAN
SecuritySoutheast Asia and South
Community(ASC) Proposal,
Pacificmuch of the
discussion werefocused on theassessmentofcurrent security and strategic outlook in both sub-regions.
It was noted that in Southeast Asia, the widely accepted knowledge isthat peace and security in the region depends on a wider global security
framework. It was also noted that in Southeast Asia, the discovery of
local terrorist groups linked to Al-Qaeda is a wake up call for theregion. The rise of radical Islam makes the situation more complex.
Given the complexity of the threat, there is a requirement forinternational community to respond to the threat together. Countries
must engage in close dialogues among each other. The fact that thethreat is so imminent and we cannot wait until the terrorist network
consolidates before actions are taken. Trans-national nature of the threatmeans that sustained and closed relationship is needed. In that regard,
it was acknowledged that forming a (new) regional security architecture
is felt imperative and necessary to ensure the security of Southeast Asia.
On the ASEAN Security Community, there are two reasons why
ASEAN needs to form ASC. Firstly, so far the relationships among
countries in ASEAN have been too much based on economic cooperation. This makes ASEAN like ‘walking with one leg’. The
establishment of ASC is expected to balance the economic nature of
relationship by providing another leg, which is security co-operation.
Secondly, the establishment of ASC provides ASEAN with a rareopportunity to renew its commitment. It will be like establishing a new17

ASEAN. Hence, it could remove the gap between the new and older
members.
Moreover, as countries in Southeast Asia were also faced with agrowing threat of transnational crimes in all its aspects, closer cooperation was therefore critically needed. Yet, efforts to having a closer
co-operation in security were often hampered by the issues ofsovereignty and non-interference principle, which clearly reflect thedegree of sensitivity among countries in the region It was strongly
expected that a renewed commitment and a higher degree of confidence
as proposed and reflected in the ASC proposal could help overcoming
those barriers to closer security co-operation.
On the issue of South Pacific, it was noted the security nature in thissub-region was probably different from that of the Southeast Asia,
especially when it comes to the issue of terrorism and radical Islam. Yet,
like many other regions, problems and challenges faced by South
Pacific remained the same, including: 1) historical dispute among
countries and nations, 2) poverty, 3) pollution and environmental
degradation, 4) transnational crimes, 5) rising prices and cost of living,
and 6) aid dependency, especially to the Australian and New Zealandaid.
Yet, it was felt that discussion on the security outlook in South Pacific
was rather left behind compared to other regions. It was then urgedthat CSCAP should promote more discusion on the security of South
Pacific, especially through the South Pacific Dialogue Forum that had
been established within CSCAP framework.

On the Way Forward, the chair stressed that the goal of thisparticularsession
and
topic
is
to
concentrate
The Way Forward
only on some ofthe points fromtheprevioussessions,forexample, some practical ideas proposed which were to be taken up by
CSCAP into its program.
One important point and suggestion made in that particular session is
the region must find a delicate balance between the governments ofAsia Pacific countries and their people. In that regard, it was strongly
believed that the Asia Pacific population, including civil society must be
engaged in order to combat the issue of terrorism. In this regard, the18role of track-two institution is of crucial importance as it can sustain asecurity dialogue, which must be inclusive for the whole region.
Yet, it was reminded that the track-two institution must avoid being
captured by the track-one or governments. The balance between track
one and two, and also with track one-and-a-half, is critically important.
Nonetheless, it was critically felt that CSCAP should contribute to theprocess of security dialogue in the region, for instance, by providing
initiatives and proposals to the officials.
With regards to the issue of terrorism, it was firmly believed that
CSCAP must help dealing with the issue. As a non-governmental body,
CSCAP could approach the issue from the root causes perspectives thatin many times had been neglected by the state approach. It was
reckoned that the policies and measures taken sometimes even become
the source for aggravating the problem of terrorism.
Other speaker argued that the discussion during the Conference hadsuggested us not to approach the issue of terrorism from the narrowmilitary measures or perspectives. Instead, we needed to find a deeper
understanding about the region, such as more understanding anddevoting more time to study about Islam in the region. In the view ofmany, Islam in the region had so far been understood from the lens ofterrorism experts, and not from the lens of social scientist or nonsecurity perspectives. Therefore, it was recommended that we needed
to understand Islam from social science approach, since Islam is socomplex and Moslem communities are not monolithic in nature.
In the future, as one speaker envisioned, CSCAP must focus its energy
on three efforts: (1) CSCAP ought to open up a dialogue with track-one(through ARF) by holding regular meetings in between ARF SOM; (2)
CSCAP should be engaging track-three, meaning involving the NGOs
and civil society; (3) CSCAP should work on the area of security cooperation and security (confidence) building measures.
On the General Conference itself, one speaker maintained that an evenlike CSCAP General Conference could provide contributions for the
ARF and even APEC, which had also discussed security implications
besides economic issues. The Conference series should be able tocomplement other forums such as the Asia Pacific Roundtable and theShangri-La Dialogue.

19Participants supported most of the ideas presented during the lastsession. In the end, it was felt and concluded that CSCAP must package
the projects in a way to be accepted by the policy makers, and CSCAP
normal agenda must always reflect the new issues talked about in theforum, in order to maintain its relevance. Yet, there were also debatesover the institutional reform within CSCAP and possible that could be
adopted in order to have a closer dialogue between CSCAP and thevarious governments. One of the most important issues discussed wason attracting more young scholars to get involved in the CSCAP processsince it would determine the institutional sustainability of CSCAP in the
future.
In addition to those topics above, the Conference was also greatly
benefited from presentations and speeches made by official andministers from Australia, Indonesia, Japan, and Timor Leste. They
covered various issues, most notably the Indonesian Defence White
Paper, security challenges facing Timor Leste, the role of Japan, and thecampaign against terrorism.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Timor Leste, for instance, shared his
views on the critical security challenges facing the country. There arenine inter-related factors that critically affect the security of Timor
Leste: (1) the lack of economic development; (2) interdependence andglobalisation; (3) environmental changes; (4) transportation andcommunication links; (5) ensuring balanced demands for justice andpeaceful reconciliation; (6) ability to promote the rule of law andinternal law and order enforcement; (7) land and maritime borderagreement with the neighbouring countries; (8) threats of terrorism andtransnational organized crime, and; (9) the traditional or militaristic
challenge.
The next boiling question was what sort of policy Timor Leste should pursue
to meet these challenges. As clearly pointed out, Timor Leste needs tomake creative use of multilateral diplomacy to complement traditional
bilateral relationships, such by becoming an active member of theUnited Nation, the CPLP, the Non- Aligned Movement, etc, to securely
anchor its security concerns within the international order. There was ahope that Timor Leste could be admitted as a full member of ARF.

In his illuminating speech, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs
clearly stated that the multi-dimensional campaign against terrorism is
not at all a war against Islam. He then shared some of his country’s

20experienced in nurturing inter-religious tolerance and harmony,
especially with Muslim communities. The Minister then reiterated theimperative of defeating terrorist groups through the effective use of law
enforcement, intelligence, and security capabilities to track and arrest
terrorists, and to disrupt terrorist networks. In so doing, international
co-operation must be enhanced. It was further observed that Muslim
and non-Muslim countries had already shown they could be effective
allies in the fight against terror.
However, there was also a reminded that we need to keep our counterterrorism in perspective. There is a need to maintain some balance inthe bilateral relationships, and not view them exclusively through theprism of the campaign against terror. As every effort must be
undertaken in a multi-dimensional framework, common efforts to
defeat terrorism should not define bilateral relationships between
Australia and her neighbours. While expressing his slight disagreement
or scepticism over the effort to up-lift the root-causes of terrorism, theMinister proposed three suggestions: (1) there is a need to breakdown
mistrust and misunderstanding between Muslim and non-Muslim
societies; (2) working with the developing world to grasp the economic
opportunities afforded by globalisation is imperative and will help us
win the battle of ideas with the extremist, and; (3) the Muslim
mainstream must not cede the agenda to the terrorists.

Conclusion and Recommendation.

The 2003 CSCAP General Conference
The General Conference
has scored a major success
The General Conferencemarks the efforts and spiritof CSCAP to continuously
put forth its activities to awider public andgovernments in the region

The General Conference canbe used to create an open andco-operative atmosphere forcloser interaction between theofficials and people or public
The Conference has set a goodhas considerably scored a major success,not only in terms of attracting a large
number of audience and huge media
coverage, and or a lively and open debate,
but also in introducing and putting forth
the CSCAP and its activities to a wider
public and governments in the region.
After all, that was the primary objective of
having the General Conference in the firstplace, and it has been partially fulfilled
through the Conference.
As the first of the series, 2003 CSCAP
General Conference has successfully
created an open and co-operative
21

atmosphere for closer interaction between
the officials whom are responsible inmaking and executing security andforeign policy, and people or public who
concerns with the security environment
and issues, especially in the region. It has
set a new good precedent for exchanges ofideas among people and governments in
the region, which finally might contributesignificantly to the improvement of
security condition in the Asia Pacific.

The General Conference
should be held regularly as
one of the main activities of
CSCAP
The tradition of having two
or more CSCAP National
Committees serving as Coorganisers should bemaintained

As requested by many participants, andas also agreed by CSCAP, the General
Conference should be held regularly—
preferably on a bi-annual basis.
Furthermore, the tradition to having two
or more CSCAP National Committees as
co-organisers should be maintained inorder to improve and strengthen a senseof co-operation and solidarity among
CSCAP Member Committees, which in
the end will be benefit the improvementof CSCAP as regional second-track forum.
CSCAP Indonesia was proposed to hostanother General Conference in the next
two years to come.

Acknowledgement

As the host of the 2003 CSCAP General Conference, CSCAP
Indonesia wish to express its deepest gratitude and appreciation toother Co-organisers, namely AUSCSCAP, CSCAP Canada, CSCAP
Japan, and also to CSCAP Co-Chairs, and CSCAP Secretariat, for thequality of co-operation and support rendered in organising theConference, and for securing the funds for the Conference.

22

On behalf of other Co-organisers, CSCAP Indonesia wish also to thankthe Governments of Australia, Canada, and Japan for their financial
contributions and supports to the Conference.
Furthermore, the appreciation also goes to all other CSCAP Member
Committees for their commitments, continuous supports, andassistances extended to the Conference. Some of the Member
Committees were very much instrumental in promoting the Conference
so that it could attract a large number of participants. The presence ofsome of key and distinguished speakers were also made possible
because of the great efforts showed by numerous CSCAP Member
Committees.
The Co-organisers wish also to thank the speakers, commentators andchairs for their excellent quality of presentation and leadership, which
greatly benefited the participants. Their presentation and views
presented at the Conference had been stimulating, and successfully
encouraged a lively, open and frank discussion to take place.
Participants also deserve a credit for the success of the Conference. The
Co-organisers would like to thank them for their active involvement in
the discussion from the beginning until the very end of program.
Finally, the Co-organisers were appreciative of the invaluable
support and assistance given by and the commitment madewithout hesitation of the large number of individuals and parties
who involved in the organisation of the 2003 CSCAP General
Conference.

Jakarta, 30 January 2004

CSCAP Indonesia

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