CSCAP MEMORANDUM NO. 19

Reduction and Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

A Memorandum from theCouncil for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)
February 2012

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)
Memorandum No. 19
Reduction and Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
February 2012
Introduction
The reduction and elimination of all types of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons are an integral part of the global nonproliferation regime. The Biologicaland Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC), and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) all have provisions that
require or call for the elimination of weapon stockpiles. Based on total prohibition
provisions included in the two conventions, there are no acknowledged stockpilesof biological weapons and all states that acknowledge possession of chemical
weapons have established programs to eliminate them. The NPT is more
ambiguous regarding disarmament as Article VI commits all states “to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of thenuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty
on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control.”
The political commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons must be matched by awillingness by all states to develop the political and technical conditions thatmake the implementation of universal and verified nuclear disarmament possible.
States that possess nuclear weapons have the obligation under their treaty
commitments to reduce the size of their arsenals and ultimately eliminate themwhile those that do not possess nuclear weapons have the obligation to notundertake programs to acquire or develop them. Complete elimination of nuclear
weapons is contingent upon creating a sense of trust among all states andconfidence in the capacity of multilateral processes to address security concerns
through systematic steps to irreversibly reduce the size of existing arsenals while
simultaneously preventing the proliferation of the weapons, their components,and delivery systems. A nonproliferation regime that emphasizes the obligationsof all states to ensure the security of nuclear-related materials coupled withtransparent and enforceable verification is needed to give states the assurance
that violations will be detected and will be acted upon.

1Given the central importance accorded to nuclear weapons in the current
structure of the international security order, there is a need to ensure stability is
maintained as these weapons are being phased out. Moving to an order free of
nuclear weapons requires gradually phasing out the nuclear dimension ofdeterrence and eliminating nuclear weapons from security strategies andoperational doctrines. This will create a sense of confidence and, in turn,reinforce further movement toward universal nuclear disarmament. This
Memorandum offers a set of principles to guide policy recommendations toenable the process of moving toward a nuclear-weapon-free world.
Principles
The total elimination of nuclear weapons should be a priority for all states.
Disarmament and nonproliferation efforts are mutually reinforcing.
Multilateral cooperation
disarmament.

isessentialfor

achieving

nonproliferation

andWhile nuclear disarmament is a gradual process that requires participation by allstates, those possessing nuclear weapons have a special responsibility to takethe initiative to verifiably reduce and ultimately eliminate arsenals.
Disarmament measures that are transparent and irreversible contributesignificantly to the goal of building trust needed to achieve the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons.
All states bear responsibility for easing international tensions and strengthening
trust in order to facilitate the progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons
and to cooperate to avert the risk of proliferation of WMD, related materials, andtechnology to state and non-state actors.
Preventing the weaponization of outer space is in the interests of all states.
Strengthening existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and establishing new ones
through voluntary consensus of countries in a region are highly valued in thepursuit of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation objectives.
Education and increased public awareness can help create an environment
conducive to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.

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Recommendations
Building upon recommendations of the CSCAP Study Group on Countering theProliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific, thismemorandum recommends policy actions to promote improved verification andtransparency and increased political will to move toward the complete eliminationof nuclear weapons. These recommendations include promoting and supporting
an improved international normative-legal-enforcement framework, advancing
national-level initiatives, and developing a wider understanding of thedisarmament process through education and public awareness.
International Legal Framework
All states should promote the development of an international normative andlegal framework to facilitate the process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear
weapons as a part of the international order and prohibit the transfer of nuclear
weapon components and delivery systems. All states should support andpromote specific actions to include: Strengthen the role of IAEA as the competent authority responsible forverifying compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements.
 Strengthen the International Monitoring system (IMS) of the CTBT to help
maintain the continued moratorium on nuclear testing, prior to entry into
force of the treaty.
 Take measures to enable the CTBT’s entry into force.
 Participate in good faith in negotiations on completing a Fissile Material
Cut-off Treaty on the basis of the 1995 Shannon Mandate.
 Take steps to de-legitimize the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
 Make the proliferation of special nuclear materials (defined as plutonium,uranium-233, or uranium enriched in the isotopes uranium-233 or uranium235) an international crime and develop the means to prevent non-state
actors from acquiring nuclear weapons, pending their total elimination.
 Take steps toward the development of an international convention toprohibit the deployment and use of space-based weapons.

3 Take steps toward the development of an international convention toprohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
 Take steps toward the development of an international convention thatprohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of nuclear weaponsand establishes a timeframe for eliminating all nuclear weapons.
National Initiatives
Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategies andoperational military doctrines is a key part of creating the trust needed to proceed
toward the complete elimination of these weapons. To promote multilateralconfidence and demonstrate the political will to fulfill disarmament commitments,
all states based on their treaty commitments should take action to: Fully implement the actions contained in the Final Document of the 2010
NPT Review Conference.
 Adopt national legislation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons
and related materials in accordance with the requirements of UN Security
Council Resolution 1540.
 Criminalize the proliferation of WMD-related materials.
 Conclude a country-specific Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement andAdditional Protocol with the IAEA to improve transparency of all nuclear
facilities. States that have a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) in force
should adopt the modified SQP version.
 Promote transparency and develop verification capabilities related tonuclear disarmament.
The states in possession of nuclear weapons have a special responsibility topromote disarmament. While most of this burden falls on the US and Russia dueto their large arsenals, all states possessing nuclear weapons must be engaged
in seeking ways to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the international
security order. To promote transparency and discourage other states fromdeveloping nuclear weapons programs, all states that possess nuclear weapons
should:4 Reaffirm negative security assurances stating that nuclear weapons will
never be used against countries that are in full compliance with theirnonproliferation obligations.
 Declare or take steps toward a “no first use” or “sole purpose” policy for
nuclear weapons.
 Accelerate the dismantlement and verified destruction of all nuclear forces
and fissile materials declared in excess of requirements by individualstates. Treaties should mandate the verifiable destruction of nuclear
warheads.
 Make an open and detailed declaration regarding the size and compositionof existing weapon arsenals and fissile material production facilities andstockpiles.
 Sign protocols for and adherence to all nuclear weapon-free zones.
 Develop a protocol for the safe and verified disablement and destruction of
any nuclear weapons captured on the territory of a non-nuclear weapon
state.
 Ensure that disarmed weapons are safely and securely destroyed, not justdisabled.
All states in possession of nuclear weapons should establish confidence-building
measures aimed at a systematic reduction of reliance on these weapons inmilitary doctrines. These include:Take all necessary measures to reduce the risk of accidental orunauthorized launch of nuclear weapons.

De-alert nuclear weapons from quick-reaction status.

Limit the missions assigned to nuclear weapons and mandating their use
only as a last resort and exclusively in response to the use of nuclear
weapons.

Avoid and prevent the policy of compensating for the reduction in nuclear
systems by increasing the number of strategic conventional systems ormodernizing nuclear weapons.

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Education and Public AwarenessAn important longer-term means of creating the political will to advance the goalof complete elimination of nuclear weapons is through disarmament and nonproliferation education. It is essential to raise public awareness that any
perceived security or political advantages of nuclear weapons are outweighed by
the grave threat they pose to humanity. To this end all states should promote anddedicate sufficient resources to: Increase awareness of the threats posed by nuclear, biological, andchemical proliferation and the value of nonproliferation and disarmament
efforts.
 Conduct research into disarmament verification and enforcementmechanisms for responding to noncompliance with nuclear disarmament.
 Examine the process leading to the prohibition of chemical and biologicalweapons as a basis for establishing a prohibition convention for nuclearweapons.
 Develop a roadmap for the elimination of nuclear weapons that can bereviewed and revised as circumstances change.
 Detail the conditions that must be established for all states in possessionof nuclear weapons to accept nuclear transparency and move in thedirection of complete nuclear disarmament.
 Conduct studies to better understand the relation between nonproliferationand disarmament.
 Conduct studies to describe the nature of an international security orderwithout nuclear weapons.
ASEAN Regional Forum member governments should promote awareness of thethreats posed by WMD proliferation and the value of nonproliferation anddisarmament efforts.

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ABOUT CSCAP
CSCAP is a non-governmental (second track) process for dialogue on security
issues in the Asia Pacific. Membership in CSCAP is on an institutional basis andconsists of Member Committees. Current membership comprises Australia,
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, theDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia,Mongolia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
and the USA.
The functions of CSCAP are as follows:a. to provide an informal mechanism by which political and security issues
can be discussed by scholars, officials, and others in their private
capacities;
b. to encourage the participants of such individuals from countries andterritories in the Asia Pacific on the basis of the principle of inclusiveness;c. to organise various working groups to address security issues andchallenges facing the region;d. to provide policy recommendations to various intergovernmental bodies onpolitical-security issues;e. to convene regional and international meetings and other cooperative
activities for the purpose of discussing political-security issues;
f. to establish linkages with institutions and organisations in other parts of theworld to exchange information, insights and experiences in the area ofregional political-security cooperation; andg. to produce and disseminate publications relevant to the other purposes ofthe organisation.
Study groups are the primary mechanism for CSCAP activity. As of February
2012, there were six CSCAP Study Groups. These are concerned with: (i)Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific;(ii) Significance of the Existence of Regional Transnational Crime Hubs to theGovernments of the Asia Pacific Region; (iii) Multilateral Security Governance inNortheast Asia/North Pacific; (iv) Naval Enhancement in the Asia Pacific; (v)Water Resources Security; and (vi) Cyber Security.
This memorandum was produced by the CSCAP Study Group on Countering theProliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific and wasapproved by the 36th CSCAP Steering Committee Meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam, on
20 November 2011.

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Further information on CSCAP can be obtained from the CSCAP website atwww.cscap.org or by contacting the CSCAP Secretariat:
CSCAP Secretariat
c/o ISIS Malaysia
1 Persiaran Sultan Salahuddin
PO Box 12424
50778 Kuala Lumpur
Malaysia
T: +603-2693 9366 Ext 125
F: +603-2693 9375
E: cscap@isis.org.my8

CSCAP Memoranda
CSCAP Memoranda are the outcome of the work of Study Groups approved by theSteering Committee and submitted for consideration by the ASEAN Regional Forumand other bodies.
 Memorandum No.18 - Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)
Author: Study Group on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)
Date published: September 2011
 Memorandum No.17 - Promoting the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
Author: Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction in the Asia PacificDate published: June 2011
 Memorandum No.16 - Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations
Author: Study Group on Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations
Date published: January 2011
 Memorandum No.15 - The Security Implications of Climate Change
Author: Study Group on the Security Implications of Climate Change
Date published: July 2010
 Memorandum No.14 - Guidelines for Managing Trade of Strategic Goods
Author: Export Controls Experts Group (XCXG)
Date published: March 2009
 Memorandum No.13 - Guidelines for Maritime Cooperation in Enclosed and SemiEnclosed Seas and Similar Sea Areas of the Asia PacificAuthor: Study Group on Facilitating Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific
Date published: June 2008
 Memorandum No.12 - Maritime Knowledge and Awareness: Basic Foundations ofMaritime Security
Author: Study Group on Facilitating Maritime Security Cooperation in the AsiaPacificDate published: December 2007
 Memorandum No.11 - Human Trafficking
Author: Study Group on Human Trafficking
Date published: June 20079 Memorandum No.10 - Enhancing Efforts to Address the Factors Driving
International Terrorism
Author: Study Group on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Campaign Against
International Terrorism with Specific Reference to the Asia Pacific Region
Date published: December 2005
 Memorandum No.9 - Trafficking of Firearms in the Asia Pacific Region
Author: Working Group on Transnational Crime
Date published: May 2004
 Memorandum No.8 - The Weakest Link? Seaborne Trade and the Maritime
Regime in the Asia PacificAuthor: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: April 2004
 Memorandum No.7 - The Relationship Between Terrorism and Transnational
CrimeAuthor: Working Group on Transnational Crime
Date published: July 2003
 Memorandum No.6 - The Practice of the Law of the Sea in the Asia PacificAuthor: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: December 2002
 Memorandum No.5 - Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea
Author: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: February 2001
 Memorandum No.4 - Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation
Author: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: December 1997
 Memorandum No.3 - The Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Cooperative
Security
Author: Working Group on Comprehensive and Cooperative Security
Date published: December 1995
 Memorandum No.2 - Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures
Author: Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures
Date published: June 1995
 Memorandum No.1 - The Security of the Asia Pacific Region
Author: CSCAP
Date published: April 199410