Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific

MEMORANDUM

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ASIA PACIFIC CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY
BUILDING MEASURESIntroduction“CSCAP Memorandum No.1: The Security of the Asia Pacific Region”, issued in April 1994,
highlighted the importance of regional confidence building measures as an “effective mechanism”
to promote peace and security region wide. In an effort first to further define what type ofmeasures are appropriate of the Asia Pacific region in the post-Cold War era, and then topromote their application, a CSCAP Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs)
Working Group was established. What follows is a summation of many of the key points andinsights that emerged during the first two meetings of the CSCAP CSBMs Working Group, inOctober 1994 and May 1995.

Defining CSBMs
Definitions of CSBMs vary, ranging from the very narrow (looking almost exclusively at
military measures) to much broader interpretations encompassing almost anything that builds
confidence. This report defines CSBMs as including both formal and informal measures,
whether unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral, that address, prevent, or resolve uncertainties
among states, including both military and political elements,. Such measures contribute to a
reduction of uncertainty, misperception, and suspicion and thus help to reduce the possibilityof incidental or accidental war. Measures focused primarily on economics, such as the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) dialogue, are not included, despite the realization that
security broadly defined has an economic dimension and that economic mechanisms carrywith them some confidence building and security implications.
It is also recognized that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is, itself, a classic CSBM
in the wider sense of the term. It has made an extremely important and valuable contribution
to confidence building in the ASEAN sub-region and the lessons learned from the ASEAN
experience could also be very relevant for CSBMs in the Asia Pacific as a whole.

General observations
During the Cold War, a broad variety of CSBMs were tried in a number of places, manysuccessfully. The majority were aimed at managing the bi-polar contest between East andWest and, when not negotiated between the US and the USSR, normally focused on theEuropean region or, secondarily, on the Middle East. While such measures may notnecessarily apply to a post Cold War Asia, an analysis of common denominators that have
led to success or failure in the past may provide some lessons for the future.

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
Memorandum 2 – Asia Pacific confidence and security building measures1Some general observations regarding past efforts follow:- CSBMS cannot work in the absence of a desire on the part of participants to cooperate;they must be viewed in “win-win” not “win-lose” terms.
- CSBMs are most effective if they build upon or are guided by regional and global norms
and are in tune with a region’s underlying political, economic, and cultural dynamism.
- Foreign models do not necessarily apply, especially if an attempt is made to impose
them form outside the region.
- CSBMs are stepping stones or building blocks; they represent means toward an end.
- Military CSBMs, in particular, should have realistic, pragmatic, clearly-defined objectives
and there should be common agreement as to what constitutes compliance andprogress.
- Gradual, methodical, incremental approaches seem to work best.
- At least initially, the process may be as (or more) important than the product. However,
over time, substantive issues must appear on the agenda; dialogue without a focused,defined purpose can be difficult to sustain and a waste of precious resources and effort.

Asia Pacific CSBMs
Several additional observations are in order when specifically discussing this region. First is
the understanding that the Asia Pacific is not itself a homogeneous region, but rather consistsof several sub regions (and sub-sub regions) that are different in many aspects from one
another.
As a general rule, within the various Asian sub regions:- there is a preference for informal structures and a tendency to place greater emphasison personal relationships rather than on formal structures.
- consensus building is a key prerequisite.
- there is a general distrust of Western (especially European) “solutions”.
- there is a genuine commitment to the principle of non-interference in one another’sinternal affairs which cannot be dismissed as a mere excuse to avoid living up tointernational commitments … nor should it be used for this purpose.
It is also recognized that in a more interconnected world, a nation’s internal developments canhave broader regional, and even international ramifications. Differences in interpretation overthe external implications of internal events, and over approaches aimed at achieving,measuring, or guaranteeing universal basic rights persist, both between and within Asia
Pacific sub regions.

Recommendations
The prospective CSBMs that follow are offered for consideration by regional policy makers.
They are presented under four general headings – expand transparency measures, support
global treaty regimes, build on existing cooperation, and develop new multilateral approaches– for ease of discussion, with the recognition that overlap exists among the groupings.

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
Memorandum 2 – Asia Pacific confidence and security building measures2

Expand transparency measures
Transparency measures represent convenient, low-risk methods for promoting confidence ain
the near term while laying the foundation for more ambitious programs to follow. Althoughtransparency could in some circumstances contribute to instability, in general, greatertransparency about military doctrine, capabilities, and intentions can provide reassurance andhelp build trust and confidence.
A wide variety of military transparency measures exist. These include direct military to militarycontacts, visits by military delegations, military personnel exchange programs, intelligenceexchange, prior notification of military exercises, the opening of military exercises to international
observers, greater openness regarding military budgets and defence planning and procurement,
and the preparation of defence white papers or policy papers. Many have been, or could easily
be initiated unilaterally or pursued on a bilateral or broader basis.
The development both of minimum standards o openness and of common definitions or uniform
outlines for defence policy white papers, arms registries, statements or defence expenditures,and other transparency measures would enhance military transparency efforts. Bothgovernmental and non-governmental organisations should also encourage and facilitate
informed public debate on security issues.
In the interest of creating greater trust and understanding, there is also a need for greater
dialogue on security issues both among the region’s uniformed militaries and between themilitary and civilian communities. Greater uniformed military participation in security oriented
dialogue would facilitate more informed debate and enhance the relevancy of end products, while
also increasing the level of understanding between military officers and their civilian counterparts.
Once the regional utility of the UN Arms Register is examined and verified, the creation of aregion-wide arms registry merits serious consideration, given the increased military expenditures
among most of the region’s nations and lingering suspicions about military capabilities andintentions. An Asian (or more inclusive Asia Pacific) Arms Registry could provide more detailed
information and entail stricter reporting requirements than the current UN Register.

Support global treaty regimes
Endorsement by regional states of global arms control treaty regimes that limit or ban
unconventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction could provide a measure ofassurance that neighbouring states are not embarking on new programmes of strategic
significance. Conversely, a failure to endorse or honour global mechanisms could
demonstrate a lack of confidence in CSBMs in general and raise questions about regional
willingness to embrace other such measures. As a result, Asia Pacific states should attachhigh priority to the support and implementation of global treaty regimes.
Broad-based Asia Pacific support for the recent indefinite extension of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) is a positive step in this regard. All non-member states areencouraged to join and all nations, to include the nuclear weapons states, are urged to abide
fully by the spirit and intent of the NPT. Other global activities or initiatives worth pursuing
include measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, the need to implement
and enforce the Chemical Weapons Convention, the possible expansion of the Missile andTechnology Control Regime into a global treaty, support for a Comprehensive Test BanTreaty, universal endorsement of a nuclear “no first use” policies, and the enhancement ofIAEA safeguard mechanisms.

Build on existing cooperation
Patterns and habits of practical cooperation already exist on a diverse set of security-related
issues within the Asia Pacific. The possibility of building upon or expanding existingmechanisms should be vigorously explores.

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
Memorandum 2 – Asia Pacific confidence and security building measures

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The expansion of existing maritime cooperation efforts into a broad-based maritime safety
and security regime show particular promise. One possible approach would be themultilateralisation of the old US-Soviet or recent Russian-Japanese Incidents at Seaagreements, perhaps broadened to include safety-at-sea measures as well. Measure tocombat smuggling or piracy, to monitor pollution, or to provide common search and rescue orhumanitarian relief capabilities should also be explores. (A separate CSCAP Working Grouphas been formed to examine the topic of maritime cooperation).
Support for nuclear weapons free zones should be seriously considered. The South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) proposal, as outlined in the Treaty of Rarotonga, is particularly
noteworthy since the treaty accommodates the “right of transit” and “neither confirm nor deny”
principles. The advantages of a nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula seem self-evident;
other Asia Pacific sub-regions may lend themselves to such zones as well, e.g. the Southeast
Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEA-NWFZ).
Mutual interests in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy also provide opportunities for
multilateral cooperation, with early emphasis perhaps focuses on nuclear safety andregulatory issues. The 1994 Japan-ROK-Russia joint study on radioactive contamination in
the North Pacific provides one working example of multilateral cooperation on nuclear safetyrelated issues.

Develop new multilateral approaches
The time does not appear opportune for the creation of new formalised governmental
mechanisms to deal specifically with potential hotspots. Nonetheless, Indonesia’s on-going
efforts to act as an “honest broker” in establishing an informal (track two) dialogue among all
the various Spratly claimants should be supported and encourages, and careful consideration
should be give to the ROK Foreign Minister’s proposal at the 1994 ARF meeting for aNortheast Asia security dialogue. (A separate CSCAP Working Group is investigating
possible security frameworks for this sub-region). Cautious, low-keyed approaches seem bestwhen dealing with potentially volatile issues.
Proposals dealing with the establishment of comprehensive or cooperative security
mechanisms for the Asia Pacific should also receive careful consideration, even if a NATOlike security arrangement is inappropriate for the region at the present time. (A separateCSCAP Working Group is investigating the concepts of cooperative security andcomprehensive security and their possible relevance to, or significance for, the Asia Pacificregion). The creation of a formal, comprehensive, region-wide transparency approachanalogous to the former Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe is considered neither
desirable nor feasible in the Asia Pacific.

How to proceed
Many confidence and security building measures, especially in the transparency area, can beinitiated unilaterally and Asia Pacific governments are encouraged to pursue those measuresconsistent with their own security needs. Bilateral approaches have also been provensuccessful in the past and should continue, since they provide a useful model and a solid
foundation upon which to build broader-based CSBMs. Improved military-to-military relations
seem best handled, at least initially, on a bilateral basis and many regional problems can best(perhaps only) be solved bilaterally.
In the multilateral area, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) seems particularly well-suited tobecoming the consolidating and validating instrument behind many security initiatives
proposed by governments and NGOs in recent years. The ARF is both a political confidencebuilding measure in its own right and a vehicle for examining and promoting Asia PacificCSBMs. Its support of such ideas as the UN arms register, military transparency, and otherconfidence and security building measures should generate greater support for, and provide
greater focus to, efforts at both the official and track two levels to develop innovative newmeasures for dealing with potentially sensitive regional security issues.

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Progress may also be facilitated if better account is taken of developments at the global level– for example, at the UN Disarmament Commission – which have effectively“internationalised” certain broad principles in relation to confidence building and openness inmilitary matters. In this regards, the UN-sponsored regional security dialogue activities(collectively referred to as the “Kathmandu process”) should be seen as a potentially
important complement to other track two efforts. Attempts should be made to promote amutually beneficial interaction between regional institutions and the UN in its “regional role”.
For its part, the CSCAP CSBM Working Group will continue its comprehensive analysis ofseveral of the measures highlighted above. The Group will further investigate militarytransparency measures to determine which are most suitable to the Asia pacific region, withparticular focus on such measures as the preparation of defence policy white papers. The
Group also urges fullest possible regional participation in the UN Arms Register.

Conclusions
CSBMs, if properly devised and executed, can promote peace and stability in the Asia Pacific.
Regional states are encouraged to pursue immediately unilateral and bilateral measures that
not only build trust and confidence in their own right but also help lay the foundation forbroader-based regional or sub-regional multilateral cooperation. It is critical to focus ourcombined efforts on what is realistically feasible in the region rather than placing too muchemphasis on the structural mechanisms of confidence and security building.
Multilateral organisations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum are encouraged to place
CSBMs high on their future agenda and to endorse and promote the study of strategic orsecurity issues on a multilateral basis. Both the ARF and its individual members, as well asother nations and territories throughout the Asia pacific, are encouraged to support, provide
input into, and otherwise participate in CSCAP Working Group activities and other NGO andofficial initiatives aimed at enhancing trust and confidence and promoting security-oriented
dialogue in the Asia Pacific.

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