CSCAP MEMORANDUM NO. 22

Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

A Memorandum from theCouncil for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)
September 2012

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)
Memorandum No. 22
Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
September 2012
Introduction
The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, their related
technologies, and their delivery systems is a threat to international peace andsecurity. Responding to the threat is a shared responsibility of all states that
requires a coordinated effort encompassing a wide range of actions andinitiatives. Nonproliferation generally refers to actions (e.g., diplomacy,multilateral agreements, arms control, threat reduction assistance, and exportcontrols) taken to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
by dissuading the pursuit of or impeding access to, or dissemination of, theweapons themselves as well as related technologies, material, and expertise.
The WMD nonproliferation regime is an integral part of the international security
order and is broadly defined in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), theBiological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC). They all codify norms focused on preventing WMDproliferation (Articles I and II of the NPT, Articles I, III, and IV of the BTWC, andArticle I of the CWC). All three treaties make the UN Security Council the final
arbiter of enforcement decisions in case of noncompliance.
In addition, there are multiple legally-binding and other informal mechanisms thatserve to further codify the norm of nonproliferation of WMD, its components, anddelivery vehicles, especially ballistic missiles. States parties to the NPT agree toaccept safeguards to verify that they are not diverting nuclear technology frompeaceful purposes to nuclear weapons (Article III). Verification is conducted by
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Similarly, states parties to theCWC agree to accept extensive verification on their activities to ensure there isno diversion toward a military program and to verify that existing chemicalweapon stockpiles are being dismantled. Verification is conducted by theOrganization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which wasestablished pursuant to Article VIII of the Convention. The BTWC does notinclude verification mechanisms, although an Implementation Support Unit (ISU)has been established, as well as a confidence-building measure process thatserves to discourage proliferation of sensitive materials and technology has
developed over the years. There is also widespread support from the States
Parties to negotiate a verification protocol.

1More generally, there has been an effort to establish more effective controls overthe trade of WMD-related goods and sensitive technology. (See CSCAPMemorandum #14 for guidelines for managing trade of strategic goods.) Otherefforts include the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuelcycle, with agreement reached in 2010 on the establishment of an IAEA lowenriched uranium fuel bank. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution
1540 has since 2004 created new nonproliferation obligations for all UN Member
States.
This Memorandum offers general principles to promote the norm ofnonproliferation and its objectives, and recommendations to discourage
proliferation in the Asia-Pacific region.
General Principles
Nonproliferation of WMD and progress toward disarmament are in the interest ofall states.
Success in preventing, detecting, and responding to proliferation is possible only
through international cooperation and effective national controls over relatedmaterials and technology.
The global WMD nonproliferation regime can and must be strengthened throughits treaties and other implementing instruments and by the negotiation of a nondiscriminatory nuclear weapons convention calling for the universal elimination ofthese weapons.
Education, increased public awareness, and research are crucial to help create
an environment conducive to nonproliferation and, eventually, to a world free ofWMD threats.
Recommendations
Building upon recommendations of the CSCAP Study Group on Countering theProliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific, thismemorandum recommends policy actions to sustain and strengthen thenonproliferation regime. These recommendations include promoting andsupporting an improved international normative/legal-enforcement framework,
advancing national-level initiatives, and developing a better understanding ofnonproliferation through education, public awareness, and research.

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International Legal Framework
All states should promote the development of an international normative andlegal framework to sustain and strengthen nonproliferation policy through specificactions to include: Promote adherence by States Parties to the NPT, BTWC, and CWC asmain nonproliferation and disarmament instruments.
 Strengthen the role of the IAEA in accordance with its Statute andrespective safeguards agreements as the competent authority responsible
for verifying compliance with nuclear safeguards agreements.
 Promote the requirement for states to adopt an Additional Protocol (AP) to
their IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), whereappropriate, as a condition of supply for nuclear materials for use in civilian
nuclear power facilities.
 Promote the full implementation of the IAEA safeguards system including
the AP.
 Work toward discouraging withdrawal from the NPT, in particularaddressing how to respond to withdrawal, for states that have been foundin noncompliance with the Treaty.
 Work toward entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
 Strengthen the role of the OPCW in accordance with the CWC anddecisions of the State Parties as the competent authority responsible forverifying compliance with chemical nonproliferation obligations.
 Work to sustain the verification process of destruction of existing chemicalweapon stockpiles so as to achieve the goal of complete elimination of all
chemical weapon stockpiles at the earliest possible date.
 Work toward thorough implementation of the BTWC, including
implementation of the inter-sessional work program, further submission ofannual confidence-building measures, and the universality of theConvention.
 Explore how to improve responses to proliferation crises.

3 Promote regional-level assistance capacity in implementing UNSCR 1540.
 Promote regional support for full and effective implementation of UNmandated sanctions resolutions.
 Promote and develop regional initiatives to reduce proliferation, be it tobetter prevent or counter it, or manage its effects.
 Support the UN disarmament machinery including the UNGA, UNDC, andthe Conference on Disarmament.
National Initiatives
Stopping the proliferation of WMD is a key part of making the world a safer place.
In order to promote multilateral confidence and demonstrate the political will tofulfill nonproliferation commitments, all states should take action to: Faithfully fulfill their obligations and commitments as states parties to thenonproliferation and disarmament treaties and conventions.
 Conclude a CSA and an AP with the IAEA, where appropriate, to improvetransparency of all nuclear facilities; states that have a Small Quantities
Protocol in force should adopt the modified SQP version.
 Adopt national legislation to prevent, detect, deter, and disrupt theproliferation of WMD and related materials in accordance with therequirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1540.
 Promote comprehensive support for the four main multilateral export
control regimes: the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Australia Group(AG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Wassenaar
Arrangement (WA); make use of the guidelines and understandings ofthese regimes in developing national export controls.
 Encourage broad support and follow the Hague Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC); expand its membership and takesteps toward enhancing the scope of restrictions of the agreement.
 Avoid exporting sensitive technologies to states that have not brought intoforce appropriate trade controls.

4 Criminalize the proliferation of WMD-related materials and activities that
directly or indirectly contribute to such proliferation.
 Maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protectionof sensitive materials and facilities.
 Act proactively to stop proliferation when it is occurring on their territories.
Address thoroughly all compliance issues with the major nonproliferation treaties,agreements, and arrangements, and help resolve all cases of noncompliance.
Education, Public Awareness, and Research
An important longer-term means of creating the political will to improvenonproliferation policy is through education, public awareness, and research. To
this end, all states should promote and dedicate sufficient resources to: Increase awareness of the threats posed by WMD proliferation and the useof WMD, as well as of the value of nonproliferation efforts anddisarmament.
 Promote cooperation with the UN and other stakeholders, includingindustries.
 Increase participation in the outreach activities organized by the four main
multilateral export control groups and its members.
 Develop a roadmap of actions to undertake in case of noncompliance withthe major nonproliferation treaties.
 Promote studies and research on verification aspects of nuclear
disarmament.
 Conduct studies to better appreciate the relationship between global
nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.
 Enhance support for programs and projects aimed at developing expertiseof WMD disarmament, nonproliferation, and arms control among the next
generation of foreign affairs specialists.
ASEAN Regional Forum member governments should promote awareness of thethreats posed by WMD proliferation and the value of nonproliferation effort.

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ABOUT CSCAP
CSCAP is a non-governmental (second track) process for dialogue on security
issues in the Asia Pacific. Membership in CSCAP is on an institutional basis andconsists of Member Committees. Current membership comprises Australia,
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, theDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia,Mongolia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
and the USA.
The functions of CSCAP are as follows:a. to provide an informal mechanism by which political and security issues
can be discussed by scholars, officials, and others in their private
capacities;
b. to encourage the participants of such individuals from countries andterritories in the Asia Pacific on the basis of the principle of inclusiveness;c. to organise various working groups to address security issues andchallenges facing the region;d. to provide policy recommendations to various intergovernmental bodies onpolitical-security issues;e. to convene regional and international meetings and other cooperative
activities for the purpose of discussing political-security issues;
f. to establish linkages with institutions and organisations in other parts of theworld to exchange information, insights and experiences in the area ofregional political-security cooperation; andg. to produce and disseminate publications relevant to the other purposes ofthe organisation.
Study Groups are the primary mechanism for CSCAP activity. As of September
2012, the sole CSCAP Study Group which is still active is concerned withCountering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific.
Previous Study Groups concluded recently in June 2012 include: (i) Significanceof the Existence of Regional Transnational Crime Hubs to the Governments ofthe Asia Pacific Region; (ii) Multilateral Security Governance in Northeast
Asia/North Pacific; (iii) Naval Enhancement in the Asia Pacific; (iv) Water
Resources Security; and (v) Cyber Security.
This memorandum was produced by the CSCAP Study Group on Countering theProliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific and wasapproved by the out of session CSCAP Steering Committee Meeting via
electronic consultation on 3 September 2012.

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Further information on CSCAP can be obtained from the CSCAP website atwww.cscap.org or by contacting the CSCAP Secretariat:
CSCAP Secretariat
c/o ISIS Malaysia
1 Persiaran Sultan Salahuddin
PO Box 12424
50778 Kuala Lumpur
Malaysia
T: +603-2693 9366 Ext 125
F: +603-2693 9375
E: cscap@isis.org.my7

CSCAP Memoranda
CSCAP Memoranda are the outcome of the work of Study Groups approved by theSteering Committee and submitted for consideration by the ASEAN Regional Forumand other bodies.
 Memorandum No.21 – Implications of Naval Enhancement in the Asia PacificAuthor: Study Group on Naval Enhancement in the Asia PacificDate published: August 2012
 Memorandum No.20 – Ensuring A Safer Cyber Security Environment
Author: Study Group on Cyber Security
Date published: May 2012
 Memorandum No.19 – Reduction and Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
Author: Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction in the Asia PacificDate published: February 2012
 Memorandum No.18 – Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)
Author: Study Group on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)
Date published: September 2011
 Memorandum No.17 – Promoting the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
Author: Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction in the Asia PacificDate published: June 2011
 Memorandum No.16 – Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations
Author: Study Group on Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations
Date published: January 2011
 Memorandum No.15 – The Security Implications of Climate Change
Author: Study Group on the Security Implications of Climate Change
Date published: July 2010
 Memorandum No.14 – Guidelines for Managing Trade of Strategic Goods
Author: Export Controls Experts Group (XCXG)
Date published: March 2009
 Memorandum No.13 – Guidelines for Maritime Cooperation in Enclosed and SemiEnclosed Seas and Similar Sea Areas of the Asia PacificAuthor: Study Group on Facilitating Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific
Date published: June 20088 Memorandum No.12 – Maritime Knowledge and Awareness: Basic Foundations ofMaritime SecurityAuthor: Study Group on Facilitating Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific
Date published: December 2007
 Memorandum No.11 – Human Trafficking
Author: Study Group on Human Trafficking
Date published: June 2007
 Memorandum No.10 – Enhancing Efforts to Address Factors Driving InternationalTerrorismAuthor: Study Group on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Campaign Against
International Terrorism with Specific Reference to the Asia Pacific Region
Date published: December 2005
 Memorandum No.9 – Trafficking of Firearms in the Asia Pacific Region
Author: Working Group on Transnational Crime
Date published: May 2004
 Memorandum No.8 – The Weakest Link? Seaborne Trade and the Maritime
Regime in the Asia PacificAuthor: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: April 2004
 Memorandum No.7 – The Relationship Between Terrorism and Transnational
CrimeAuthor: Working Group on Transnational Crime
Date published: July 2003
 Memorandum No.6 – The Practice of the Law of the Sea in the Asia PacificAuthor: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: December 2002
 Memorandum No.5 – Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea
Author: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: February 2001
 Memorandum No.4 – Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation
Author: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: December 19979 Memorandum No.3 – The Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Cooperative
SecurityAuthor: Working Group on Comprehensive and Cooperative Security
Date published: December 1995
 Memorandum No.2 – Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures
Author: Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures
Date published: June 1995
 Memorandum No.1 – The Security of the Asia Pacific Region
Author: CSCAP
Date published: April 1994

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