DISSECTING THE WASHINGTONDECLARATIONThe NAPSNet Policy Forum provides expert analysis of contemporary peace and security
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Recommended Citation
Peter Hayes, "DISSECTING THE WASHINGTON DECLARATION", NAPSNet Policy Forum, April 29,
2023, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/dissecting-the-washington-declaration/

APRIL 29, 2023
PETER HAYES
I. INTRODUCTION
In this essay, Peter Hayes analyzes the five key elements of the Biden-Yoon Washington Declaration;and concludes: “Yoon’s January 2023 nuclear proliferation demarche and the US response havemade the peninsula, the region, and the world more insecure whilst doing nothing to actually reduce
the risk of nuclear war posed by the DPRK’s accelerating nuclear weapons program. The UnitedStates and its allies remain in strategic drift in Northeast Asia, and the risk of nuclear war—and its
cataclysmic humanitarian consequences—are increasing with each day that passes without
1substantial nuclear arms control dialogues, preventive diplomacy and nuclear risk reduction
measures.”
It supplements the Global Asia special issue on the Yoon intervention on ROK nuclear weapons andUS deterrence found here.
Peter Hayes is Director of the Nautilus Institute and Honorary Professor at the Centre forInternational Security Studies at the University of Sydney, and Senior Research Advisor of the AsiaPacific Leadership Network.
The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on
significant topics in order to identify common ground.
This report is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which arefound here.
Banner image: Yoon-Biden state dinner, White House video, here

II. NAPSNET POLICY FORUM ESSAY BY PETER HAYESDISSECTING THE WASHINGTON DECLARATIONAPRIL 29, 2023
The Washington Declaration issued on April 26 2023 at the conclusion of the Biden-Yoon summit
contains five key elements.
1. Biden threatens to eliminate (nuclear annihilate?) the DPRK regime
Biden’s threat to end the DPRK regime in response to a DPRK nuclear attack on the ROK was in the
Declaration wherein he states “that any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the ROK will be met
with a swift, overwhelming and decisive response.”[1]In less scripted form, he repeated this threat in in response to a journalist’s question.
Look, a nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its allies or partisans — partners— is unacceptable and will result in the end of whatever regime, were it to take such an action.[2]Biden is ambiguous as to whether nuclear or conventional means would be used to “end…thewhatever [sic, DPRK] regime.”
Scripted or not, Biden’s threat recalls Trump’s August 8 2017 threat to employ “fire and fury like theworld has never seen” to counter the DPRK’s nuclear threat.[3]From DPRK perspective, Democrat, Republican, they both project a threat to annihilate the DPRK
leadership. In the DPRK’s corporatist system, the leader/regime is the same as the entire
population. Intended or not, the perceived threat by North Koreans will be societal annihilation, notthe “mere” elimination of the DPRK leadership.
2. End of nuclear and conflict resolution negotiations
The joint declaration states: “"In parallel, both Presidents remain steadfast in their pursuit of2dialogue and diplomacy with the DPRK, without preconditions, as a means to advance the sharedgoal of achieving the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
In practice, the United States and the ROK have pursued a crime and punishment approach tonegotiations with the DPRK aimed at isolating and sanctioning the regime into compliance with theirdemands while offering nothing in return. The predictable response is the DPRK’s fight and flightrefusal to resume dialogue with the United States and the ROK.
Sole reliance on nuclear threat and military containment unaccompanied by engagement andmeaningful diplomacy with adversaries is like trying to cut paper with a one-bladed scissors.
If Yoon had a strategic goal in declaring that nuclear weapons are a live policy option in January2023,[4] this is it—to ensure that the United States does not resume dialogue with the DPRK, and forthe moment, he has achieved it. There will be DPRK responses, at times with actions of their own
choosing, and these will likely be aimed primarily at the ROK, not the United States. A possible
early casualty will be military clashes that destroy the 2018 ROK-DPRK military agreement thatmaintained a relatively tranquil DMZ during the Moon Jae-In administration, what Yoon calls a “false
peace.”[5]3. US-ROK presidential hotline?
The commitment to consult after DPRK uses nuclear weapons is new but not really. First, it assumes
the ROK president is still alive to consult after a DPRK nuclear attack on the ROK. Second, it applies
only to DPRK use against the ROK, not DPRK use against the United States itself (for example,
Guam), Japan, or someone else. The Declaration is explicit in this regard, stating that Biden says
“any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the ROK will be met with a swift, overwhelming anddecisive response.”
However, the commitment is only to make “every effort” which means the United States is free to do
whatever it wants with nuclear weapons, irrespective of this “commitment.” In other words, empty
words.
As a result of the declaration, there may be some upgrade in communications hardware between the
ROK presidential office and the White House to make such a communication possible after a nuclear
attack. Presumably this entails installing some form of secure and nuclear-hardened communication
system, likely hooked into US Forces Korea’s (USFK) own nuclear command control andcommunications systems. Whether the ROK president’s wartime bunker at Yongsan base ishardened against direct nuclear blast damage and/or electromagnetic pulse from nuclear
detonations is unknown. Possibly what’s envisioned is some form of ROK presidential mobile,
videoconference-bandwidth, satellite hotline to a dedicated line in the White House or connected toa local US nuclear-hardened military communication system that might still be operating even after
a nuclear attack, to connect back to US presidential command locations--or some otherarrangement.
4. NATO-Style “Strategic scenario planning”
According to the declaration, “the Alliance will work to enable joint execution and planning for ROK
conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations in a contingency and improve combined exercises
and training activities on the application of nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula." The twoallies will create a Nuclear Consultative Group to enhance ROK understanding of US nuclear war
planning.

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This is not at all the same as NATO style “nuclear sharing” as suggested by ROK Deputy National
Security Adviser, Kim Tae-hyo, who reportedly stated that the arrangement will make South Koreans"feel that they are sharing nuclear weapons with the United States."[6] In fact, US National Security
Council’s Ed Kagan stated: "So let me just be very direct. I don't think that we see this as a de facto
nuclear sharing.”[7]This joint commitment boils down to conducting a “high level” scenarios exercise in the form of atable top simulation run by STRATCOM, not specific targeting or operational matters. There arestrict limits on what nuclear-arms related information including knowledge as well as operational
details and hardware information can be shared with the ROK with a US-ROK program ofcooperation agreement. The information will therefore be generic and the simulation similarly nonspecific, broad-brush.
What may be new is increased attention to the role of ROK conventional military force supporting
US nuclear operations although it’s unclear what difference this will make at an operational level.
There is zero chance that ROK ASW would be involved in relation to supporting US SSBNs; andlikely no role for the ROK in the unlikely event that US ICBMs or missile defense systems are
involved in responding to a DPRK nuclear attack. If the DPRK used a submarine to launch thenuclear attack, ROK airborne and maritime ASW forces would be involved in finding and destroying
them, but US nuclear operations would not be aimed at those platforms unless they fired from a port
city in response to a nuclear attack by the DPRK on the ROK.
In reality, the only nuclear operations in which the ROK’s military might play a supporting role
relate to US nuclear bombers. ROK KC-330 aerial tankers might be used to refuel US bombers as
they approach the Korean peninsula, although this seems unlikely as very high degrees ofinteroperability are required in refueling operations. The other possible conventional aerial support
might come from ROK fighter aircraft.
US strategic bombers rely on stealth not accompanying fighter protection. Indeed, having ROK
fighter planes accompany US strategic bombers would tip off DPRK, Russian, and Chinese radars as
to the presence of an otherwise invisible stealth bomber. The idea that ROK fighters would fly
wingtip-guard each side of a US bomber is unrealistic. ROK planes and/or cruise missiles might betasked with destroying DPRK radar and SAM sites so that US strategic bombers can fly unimpeded
through entry corridors into the DPRK.
Such attacks might take place—assuming ROK airfields have not been destroyed in a DPRK nuclear
attack--sometime in the 3-4 hours it takes for US planes to fly from Guam to DPRK (if the US
bombers have been moved forward to Guam which is unlikely as they would be vulnerable on the
ground with nuclear weapons) or within 10-12 hours before US strategic bombers flying from
CONUS arrive in the vicinity of the DPRK.
However, this conventional role for ROK fighter and cruise missiles in attacking coastal radars andSAM sites assuredly is already a well-rehearsed role under the existing ROK “Kill Chain” posture aswell as in the US-ROK Combined forces Command joint war-plans with USFK and the ROK militaryand is not an innovation resulting from the Joint Declaration.
It is unlikely that such entry corridor clearance missions would take place on the northern parts of
the DPRK east and west coasts because such an angle of approach comes perilously close to Chineseand Russian borders and also entails additional flight time for the bombers to get to targets. Almost
certainly US strategic bombers would cross the coast somewhere well north of the DMZ and more orless opposite Pyongyang and Hamhung in the central coastal areas of the DPRK--well within range of
ROK fighter-bombers and their standoff missiles—assuming the ROK planes still exist after a DPRK
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nuclear attack.
The DPRK knows this, so these coastlines are heavily fortified with radar and surface-air missiles,
which is precisely what past US-ROK exercises flying offshore are intended to “light up” so that US
signals intelligence can locate them ahead of time for targeting purposes.
In sum, the declaration’s “deeper, cooperative decision-making” boils down to slightly enhanced
symbolic participation in nuclear “planning”—similar to NATO’s nuclear planning for the 31 nonnuclear NATO members that don’t have nuclear weapons and don’t have the nuclear-delivery role ofthe 5 NATO non-nuclear delivery states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey) that
constitutes the core of “nuclear sharing.” The declaration made no change in how the United States
shares nuclear weapons and operations with the ROK.
In sum, for all the verbiage and new entity, nothing substantively new to see here.
5. Nuclear Signaling[8]In addition to the threat rhetoric from Biden and Yoon, reinforced symbolically with the “planning,”
table top simulation, and more explicit formulation of a possible ROK air force role in US nuclear
bomber operations in the DPRK, the only other “new” item is resumption of ballistic missile firing
submarines (SSBN) visits. The last SSBN visits to the ROK were to Chinhae in 1981, see Table 1.
Many US nuclear-capable aircraft have flown to and around Korea in the last few years, so that
tempo is already high; US nuclear attack submarines have also made port visits, although not often.
US ICBM tests have been calibrated briefly by postponement due to tension in Korea, but there are
only two such tests each year, so using missile tests is difficult signal threat in a crisis is difficult in atimely manner. Redeployment of US nuclear weapons to Korea was explicitly ruled out by Biden.
Due to operational constraints and the vulnerability of US SSBNs in ROK port visits to Russian,Chinese, or DPRK attack, my best guess is that the United States will make one or two SSBN visits
and then will return to its habitual mid-Pacific deployment to ensure that the SSBN retaliatory force
is invulnerable. The timing would depend on having at least two such SSBNs deployed in the Pacificat the time of the visit, to ensure that no matter what happens to the ship visiting the ROK, theUnited States maintains its retaliatory capability in the Pacific at all times.
Table 1: 1981 US warship visits to the ROK

Source: US Navy, US nuclear warship visits 1981, computer printout, US FOIA release to
Nautilus Institute.[9]5Note: The two SSBN visits on January 12-16 and March 8-11 may have been related to theTeam Spirit exercise, and the sub-Team Spirit naval exercise Valiant Flex that year. At thetime, the US had five Polaris missile SSBNs operating in the Pacific.
6. Conclusion
The ROK tail (Yoon’s talk of nuclear proliferation) has wagged the American nuclear dog. His verbal
antics in January 2023 about nuclear proliferation elicited enhanced “reassurance” in the form ofrestated generic nuclear commitment and an explicit US presidential threat to eliminate the DPRK,
enhanced by a small, symbolic increase in access to nuclear war planning, buttressed by iconic
signaling in the form of US SSBN visits (minor in the world of nuclear war), matched by a ROK
recommittal to its NPT non-nuclear weapon state status.
In short, reversion to the status quo ante—a fact noted by South Korean conservatives calling for the
ROK’s independent nuclear armament after the declaration was issued.[10]However, in inter-Korean relations, Yoon has unleashed the dogs of nuclear war on Kim Jong Un.
Not only will nuclear diplomacy not occur during his tenure in the Blue House; but the stage is now
set for increased DPRK nuclear threat and signaling aimed at the United States as well as fury
focused on Yoon himself. For all the pomp, red carpet treatment and karaoke in Washington, Yoon
was unable to change US nuclear policy in any substantive manner. In effect, the Washington
Declaration is the reimposition of US nuclear policy whereby Washington pulled the ROK back intoline and rebuked Yoon for his clownlike behavior in January.[11] Having proven that he has no real
influence over American policy, the DPRK now has no reason to talk with him.
As has been the case for the last 3 decades, the United States and the DPRK will continue to use
nuclear threat against each other for compellence (not deterrence purposes); and for reassurance by
the United States of the ROK, not deterrence purposes. Nuclear extortion designed to force theother side to stop what they are already doing [that is, compellence] almost always has a bad
outcome and undermines deterrence which remains based on each side’s conventional
sledgehammer. This is the cost of the reassurance provided to the ROK by the United States, suchas it is.
Yoon’s January 2023 nuclear proliferation demarche and the US response have made the peninsula,
the region, and the world more insecure whilst doing nothing to actually reduce the risk of nuclear
war posed by the DPRK’s accelerating nuclear weapons program. The United States and its allies
remain in strategic drift in Northeast Asia, and the risk of nuclear war—and its cataclysmic
humanitarian consequences—are increasing with each day that passes without substantial nuclear
arms control dialogues, preventive diplomacy and nuclear risk reduction measures.[12]In this inter-Korean game of countervailing threat and escalation, Yoon has no cards left to play
except making risky moves involving conventional forces on the western sea, overflights, or along
the DMZ.
ATTACHMENT
Washington Declaration, April 26 2023[13]President Joseph R. Biden of the United States of America and President Yoon Suk Yeol of the
Republic of Korea (ROK) met on this 26th day of April, 2023 to mark the 70th anniversary of the U.S.ROK Alliance. The Alliance between our two nations has been forged in shared sacrifice, fortified byenduring security cooperation, and nourished by our close kinship that has enabled both countries to6leverage their diplomatic resources to peaceably achieve crucial, strategic outcomes. What began asa security partnership has grown and expanded into a truly global Alliance that champions
democratic principles, enriches economic cooperation, and drives technological advancements. Our
Alliance has been tested many times, and in every instance we have risen to the occasion andresponded to the changing threats on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific.
To commemorate this historic year for our Alliance, President Biden and President Yoon havecommitted to develop an ever-stronger mutual defense relationship and affirm in the strongest
words possible their commitment to the combined defense posture under the U.S.-ROK Mutual
Defense Treaty. The United States and the ROK are committed to peace and stability in the IndoPacific, and the measures we take together are in furtherance of that fundamental goal.
The ROK has full confidence in U.S. extended deterrence commitments and recognizes theimportance, necessity, and benefit of its enduring reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The UnitedStates commits to make every effort to consult with the ROK on any possible nuclear weapons
employment on the Korean Peninsula, consistent with the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review’s declaratory
policy, and the Alliance will maintain robust communication infrastructure to facilitate these
consultations. President Yoon reaffirmed the ROK’s longstanding commitment to its obligations
under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime
as well as to the U.S.-ROK Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.
The Alliance commits to engage in deeper, cooperative decision-making on nuclear deterrence,
including through enhanced dialogue and information sharing regarding growing nuclear threats to
the ROK and the region. The two Presidents announced the establishment of a new Nuclear
Consultative Group (NCG) to strengthen extended deterrence, discuss nuclear and strategicplanning, and manage the threat to the nonproliferation regime posed by the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK). In addition, the Alliance will work to enable joint execution and planningfor ROK conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations in a contingency and improve combined
exercises and training activities on the application of nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. In
keeping with the Presidents’ commitments, the Alliance has established a new bilateral, interagency
table-top simulation to strengthen our joint approach to planning for nuclear contingencies.
President Biden reaffirmed that the United States’ commitment to the ROK and the Korean people isenduring and ironclad, and that any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the ROK will be met with aswift, overwhelming and decisive response. President Biden highlighted the U.S. commitment toextend deterrence to the ROK is backed by the full range of U.S. capabilities, including nuclear.
Going forward, the United States will further enhance the regular visibility of strategic assets to the
Korean Peninsula, as evidenced by the upcoming visit of a U.S. nuclear ballistic missile submarine to
the ROK, and will expand and deepen coordination between our militaries. Furthermore, the UnitedStates and ROK will strengthen standing bodies for consultations on extended deterrence, including
the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group, to better prepare the Alliance to defend
against potential attacks and nuclear use and conduct simulations to inform joint planning efforts.
President Yoon affirmed that the ROK will apply the full range of its capabilities to the Alliance’s
combined defense posture. This includes working in lockstep with the United States to closely
connect the capabilities and planning activities of the new ROK Strategic Command and the U.S.ROK Combined Forces Command. Such activities will include a new table-top exercise conductedwith U.S. Strategic Command.
In view of these critical developments, President Biden and President Yoon send a firm message tothe international community that the United States and the ROK will stand together in the face of
any and all threats to their shared security, and continue their close consultations on further steps tostrengthen extended deterrence. In parallel, both Presidents remain steadfast in their pursuit of
dialogue and diplomacy with the DPRK, without preconditions, as a means to advance the sharedgoal of achieving the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

7III. ENDNOTES[1] “Washington Declaration,” White House, April 26, 2023, at:https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statement-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/[2] P. Baker, D. Sanger, “Deterrence, Biden Vows ‘End’ of North Korean Regime if It Attacks,” NewYork Times, April 26, 2023, at: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/26/us/politics/biden-south-kora-state-visit.html?utm_source=AM+Nukes+Roundup&utm_campaign=b2fe188e9EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_07_25_12_19_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_547ee518ec-b
2fe188ee9-391728633[3] P. Baker, S.H. Choe, “Trump Threatens ‘Fire and Fury’ Against North Korea if It Endangers U.S.,
New York Times, August 8, 2017, at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/world/asia/north-kore-un-sanctions-nuclear-missile-united-nations.html[4] S.H. Choe, “In a First, South Korea Declares Nuclear Weapons a Policy Option, New York Times,
January 12, 2023, at: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/12/world/asia/south-korea-nucler-weapons.html[5] M. Gordon, “U.S., South Korea Pledge Cooperation on Potential Use of Nuclear Arms; Seoul
agrees not to develop its own arsenal while gaining more of a say in planning response to North
Korea,” Wall Street Journal Online, April 27, 2023, at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-south-koea-pledge-cooperation-on-potential-use-of-nuclear-arms-ceeecec9[6] “Washington Declaration will help deter NK threat but not 'nuclear sharing' agreement: US
official,” Yonhap via The Korea Times, April 28, 2023, at:https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/04/120_349974.html[7] “Washington Declaration will help deter NK threat but not 'nuclear sharing' agreement: US
official,” Yonhap via The Korea Times, April 28, 2023, at:https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/04/120_349974.html[8] Nuclear threat refers herein to the use of any medium to convey a threat of nuclear attack
against an adversary. One such medium is variation of nuclear force deployments by alert levels,
force dispersion, or other displays of nuclear forces, referred to as “signaling” in contrast to
rhetorical threats (leadership rhetoric, declaratory or operational doctrines, etc.)[9] US Navy, US Warship visits, 1981, computer printout, US FOIA release to Nautilus Institute, at:https://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/1199-Port-Visits-in-PACOM.pdf[10] J. Smith, “Analysis: Calls for South Korean nuclear arsenal unlikely to fade despite US deal,
Reuters, April 27, 2023, at: https://www.reuters.com/world/calls-south-korean-nuclear-arsnal-unlikely-fade-despite-us-deal-analysts-say-2023-04-27/[11] Peter Hayes, “The Long Saga of Nuclear ‘Vortex Politics’ in Korea,” Global Asia, 18:1, March
31, 2023, at: https://www.globalasia.org/v18no1/cover/the-long-saga-of-nuclear-vortex-poliics-in-korea_peter-hayes[12] D. von Hippel, E. Lisowski, P. Hayes, S. Shetty, T. Suzuki, F. Yoshida, M. Nishida, S. Freedkin,"HUMANITARIAN IMPACTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE IN NORTHEAST ASIA: IMPLICATIONSFOR REDUCING NUCLEAR RISK", NAPSNet Special Reports, March 31,
82023, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/humanitarin-impacts-of-nuclear-weapons-use-in-northeast-asia-implications-for-reducing-nuclear-risk/[13] “Washington Declaration,” White House, April 26, 2023, at:https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statement-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/

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