Proceedings of the International Symposium on Engineering Lessons Learned fromthe 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, March 1-4, 2012, Tokyo, JapanIMPLICATIONS OF THE GREAT EAST JAPAN
EARTHQUAKE FOR THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST
REGION OF THE UNITED STATESAndrew TAYLOR1, David SWANSON2, Mark PIEREPIEKARZ3, Yao CUI4, Paul
BRALLIER5, Tom XIA6, King CHIN7, Greg HESS8, Jonathan SIU9, Doug LINDQUIST10,
Erik BISHOP11
1

Associate, KPFF Consulting Engineers, Seattle, USA, andrew.taylor@kpff.com(SEAW Assistant Team Leader)2
Principal, Reid Middleton, Inc., Everett, USA, dswanson@reidmiddleton.com(SEAW Team Leader)
3
President, MRP Engineering, Inc., Seattle, USA, mrp@mrpengineering.com(SEAW Assistant Team Leader)
4
Post Doctoral Researcher, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Yokohama, Japan, somepig83@gmail.com
5
HNTB Corporation, Bellevue, USA, pbrallier@HNTB.com
6
Principal, DCI Engineers, Inc., Seattle, USA, txia@dci-engineers.com
7
Associate, GeoEngineers, Inc., Redmond, USA, kchin@geoengineers.com
8
Associate, KPFF Consulting Engineers, Seattle, USA, greg.hess@kpff.com
9
Principal Engineer/Building Official, City of Seattle Department of Planning and Development,
Seattle, USA, Jon.Siu@seattle.gov
10
Senior Associate, Hart Crowser, Inc., Seattle, USA, doug.lindquist@hartcrowser.com
11
Reid Middleton, Inc., Everett, USA, ebishop@reidmiddleton.com
ABSTRACT: Engineers from the Structural Engineers Association of Washington
studied the earthquake and tsunami damage caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake.
This team’s objective was to understand the effects of this event, because a similarearthquake and tsunami could occur along the Cascadia Subduction Zone, near the
Pacific Northwest Coast of the United States. This paper is a brief summary of the team’s
observations and the lessons learned that may be applied to earthquake engineering andemergency planning practices in the Pacific Northwest region.
Key Words: Great East Japan Earthquake, SEAW, reconnaissance, observation, lessons
learned, Pacific Northwest, Cascadia Subduction Zone, tsunami damage

INTRODUCTIONOn Friday, March 11, 2011 at 2:46 PM (local time), the Northeast coast of Japan was struck by amagnitude 9.0 (M 9.0) subduction zone earthquake as the boundary between the Pacific and the North
American plates ruptured along an offshore section. The rupture extended more than 300 km (200
miles) along the Japan coast, causing strong ground shaking that lasted for several minutes, and a

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devastating tsunami. A similar event along the Cascadia Subduction Zone, just off the PacificNorthwest Coast of the United States, would extend from Vancouver Island (Canada) to Northern
California.
Recognizing the impacts that an earthquake of similar magnitude would have on the PacificNorthwest region of the United States, the Structural Engineers Association of Washington (SEAW)
formed a reconnaissance team of engineers to observe and evaluate earthquake and tsunami damage in
the affected areas. The team traveled to the Tokyo and Sendai areas, and along the Tohoku coast to
observe the impacted areas. The team also met with Japanese earthquake research organizations,design and construction professionals, and public officials to learn more about the extent of thedamage and seismic design practices in Japan. Figure 1 shows the sites that the team visited in Miyagi
Prefecture.
This paper provides a brief summary of the team’s observations and the lessons learned that may
be applied to earthquake engineering and emergency planning practices in the Pacific Northwest
region of the United States. Observations and findings related to a number of topics are presented.
These include seismology, geotechnical effects, building performance, high-rise buildings, earthquake
protective systems, tsunami damage in coastal towns, roads and bridge performance, industrial
facilities and lifelines, and preparation, response, and recovery.

Fig. 1 Sites visited by the SEAW reconnaissance team in Miyagi Prefecture and dates visited
SEISMOLOGY
There are striking similarities between the geological setting of the Great East Japan Earthquake andthe geological setting along the Pacific Northwest Coast of the United States. Figure 2 shows theapproximate fault rupture area related to the M 9.0 main shock of March 11, 2011, and the estimatedfault rupture area that could be associated with a M 9.0 subduction zone event in the Cascadia
Subduction Zone off the coast of Washington, Oregon, and northern California in the United States(USGS 2011).
Geological studies have found that as many as seven subduction zone earthquakes have occurred
during the last 3,500 years along the Pacific Northwest coast. The most recent of these was 312 years ago,on January 26, 1700 (Atwater et al. 2005). The average return time for these events appears to be in therange of 300 to 600 years. Thus, because there is at present a very real possibility of a subduction zone
earthquake occurring in the Cascadia Subduction Zone, and because such an event would have1312

consequences similar to the Great East Japan Earthquake, the SEAW team felt it was imperative to visit
the Tohoku area and learn as much as possible about damage caused by the earthquake and tsunami.
Hundreds of accelerograms were recorded during the main shock and subsequent aftershocks of theGreat East Japan Earthquake, providing an unprecedented body of ground motion data from a subduction
zone earthquake. This data will be extremely useful in predicting the effects of future subduction zone
events, for the study of ground motion characteristics such as topographic effects, and for use in theanalysis of future building and bridge designs.

Fig. 2

Approximate fault rupture area of M 9.0 main shock of March 11, 2011 (left), andapproximate fault rupture area of hypothetical M 9.0 Cascadia Subduction Zone event (right).
(Graphics courtesy of United States Geological Survey)
GEOTECHNICAL EFFECTS

The team observed that earthquake damage related to geotechnical effects generally occurred in known
geologic hazard areas. For example, landslides and rockfalls generally occurred in areas of past
instability. Liquefaction occurred in areas with loose to medium-dense, saturated sand and silt,
especially in areas of reclaimed land (e.g. at Urayasu City in the metropolitan Tokyo area).
Liquefaction damage was extensive, even at sites over 150 km from the fault rupture. Examples ofobserved liquefaction damage include damage to structures caused by ground movement and lateral
spreading toward bodies of water. Liquefaction caused ground and utility line settlement that resulted
in breaks where utilities entered pile-supported structures. Some inadequately designed pilefoundations were damaged by liquefaction. Sand boils appeared at the ground surface in someliquefaction zones. These sand boils sometimes limited earthquake recovery. Several cases wereobserved where liquefaction caused pipelines, manholes, and vaults to float out of the ground.
The team observed that ground improvement measures are effective in mitigatingliquefaction-induced damage. Existing engineering methods appear to provide reasonable estimates of1313

the likelihood and effects of liquefaction. Newer structures that were designed for known geologic
hazards performed well under the long-duration ground shaking imposed by this earthquake.

Fig. 3

Performance differences between adjacent buildings supported on piles versus shallow
foundations in Urayasu City (Lindquist)
BUILDING PERFORMANCEJapan’s modern design codes consider seismic hazard levels that are similar to current U.S. codes. One
exception is that in some cases Japan’s codes require higher design forces for very flexible,
long-period structures (e.g., some high-rise buildings). In addition to life-safety seismic performance,
Japan’s codes require considerations of building functionality following a moderate earthquake.
Buildings designed under recent Japanese design codes (post-1980) performed well during thisearthquake, with limited structural damage. However, costly non-structural damage was common,largely due to situations where there was a lack of seismic restraints for building contents and building
systems. As a result, it is anticipated that the Japan national standard for non-structural elements will
be revised based on data obtained from this earthquake.
The team observed no structural failures of modern buildings (unless other factors were involved,
such as poor soil conditions), but older/non-ductile buildings experienced damage. In many cases,
structural configuration irregularities (mass eccentricity, stiffness discontinuity, strength discontinuity,etc.) in combination with soil or topographic conditions were major contributing factors to damage.
Seismically retrofitted buildings are common in Japan. Retrofitted buildings performed well,demonstrating that seismic retrofitting is a very effective way to preserve older buildings in a highseismic zone. Buildings in the Pacific Northwest are expected to perform similarly to buildings inJapan: newer buildings should do well but older buildings (without seismic retrofits) are likely to
be damaged. Contents and equipment (non-structural elements) are likely to be heavily damaged inmany buildings. Design beyond life safety (i.e., occupiable design) is needed for true seismic
resilience of communities in the Pacific Northwest.

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Fig. 4 Retrofitted buildings in central Sendai (left) and Tohoku University (right) (Siu)HIGH-RISE BUILDINGSNo reports of structural damage to high-rise buildings in Miyagi Prefecture (Sendai) and Tokyo were
made, but there were many reports of non-structural damage (building contents, interior finishes,equipment) and loss of building systems, including water, sewer, gas and electricity.
The loss of building mechanical and electrical systems in residential structures over eight stories
high led to “high-rise refugees”. Without power for elevators, residents could not reach their apartments
and condominiums. Pumps providing water to upper stories were not operational, and without gas,
residents could not heat their units or cook. The displaced population from high-rise buildings had notbeen anticipated in some earthquake planning scenarios, illustrating that life-safety seismic
performance is not enough. High-rise buildings, in particular, must be habitable after a major
earthquake.
Buildings in Japan are commonly outfitted with seismic sensors and shutoffs on gas and water
systems. Backup generators provided emergency power to high-rise buildings immediately after theearthquake, but after the first 24 hours, additional fuel supplies were difficult or impossible to obtain.

BUILDING PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS
Since the 1990s, Japan has enthusiastically embraced special seismic protection systems for buildings.
These include base isolation systems, where a building is placed on flexible or sliding supports, anddamping systems, where damping devices are installed within the structural frame to absorb earthquake
energy and reduce earthquake damage.
According to statistics published by the Japan Society of Seismic Isolation (JSSI 2012), as of 2009
Japan had over 2,600 commercial and multi-family residential buildings with seismic isolation systems,
whereas Washington State has only eight such buildings. Japan has over 3,800 single-family homes withseismic isolation systems. In Washington State there is only one base-isolated single family home,which is currently under construction. Japan has over 1,000 buildings with earthquake damping systems.
Washington State has only ten buildings with damping systems.
The Tohoku earthquake was a “living laboratory” for studying the performance of buildings withbase isolation systems and damping systems. These systems performed as expected: in all cases studied
by the team, the base isolation and damping systems provided effective control of damage to both1315

structural systems and non-structural elements. The Great East Japan Earthquake demonstrated thatthese systems worked well, and they should be considered more often for important structures andfacilities in the Pacific Northwest.

TSUNAMI DAMAGE IN COASTAL TOWNSThe team visited several coastal towns along the Miyagi coast that experienced strong ground shaking
followed by several tsunami inundation events (Figure 1). The region includes relatively flat coastline
as well as hilly areas (north of Sendai). Table 1 summarizes tsunami impacts on the towns of
Ishinomaki and Minamisanriku.
Table 1 Statistics for two coastal towns inundated by tsunamis (as of May 14, 2011, Japan Times)
Town
Population
Perished
Missing
Evacuees

Ishinomaki (50% of town flooded)
Approx. 160,000
2,964 (2%)
2,770 (2%)
8,780 (5%)

Minamisanriku Town
Approx. 17,500
514 (3%)664(4%)
4,870 (28%)

The team met with local officials to discuss the tsunami damage and disaster response measurers.
In many coastal towns the tsunami wave heights far exceeded the maximum planning scenario.
Nonetheless, state-of-the-art early warning systems and aggressive mitigation actions prevented aneven larger catastrophe.
The region experienced more than two minutes of strong ground shaking followed by multiple
aftershocks and tsunami inundations along the coast. Depending on the location, maximum wave
heights ranged from 4.5 to 15 meters (15 to 50 feet) and overtopped coastal seawalls, as well as somemulti-story structures that had been designated as vertical evacuation shelters. A seismic retrofit
program instituted after the 1978 Miyagi-ken Oki earthquake proved effective. Retrofitted structures
such as schools and hospitals survived the ground shaking and, in areas also inundated by tsunamis,
provided reliable vertical evacuation shelters.

Fig. 5Retrofitted school building (left) in Arahama Ward (Sendai) provided vertical shelter to thedevastated community, where virtually no wooden structures remained (right) (Pierepiekarz)

Inundated wood-framed structures were mostly destroyed. Extensive debris impact damage tosurviving wood-framed structures was evident. In inundation areas, erosion of building foundations
and in-ground utilities was also very evident. Fire events followed tsunami inundation at a number oflocations. Some inundated hybrid automobiles were reported to have shorted-circuited battery systems

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which were reported to have started fires.
The coastlines of the Pacific Northwest (United States) and British Columbia (Canada) exhibitfeatures that are similar to the east coast of Japan. A Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake could
generate strong ground shaking, tsunamis, and coastal elevation changes like those experienced in the
Great East Japan Earthquake. The team made the following observations regarding preparation for a
subduction zone event on the Pacific Northwest coast.
Extensive planning and mitigation activities are required in anticipation of a large-magnitude
subduction zone event. Some planning has been accomplished for the Washington State coast, but
progress on implementation of these plans is needed (http://www.facebook.com/ProjectSafeHaven).
Early warning systems (tsunami and ground shaking) save lives and are needed along the PacificNorthwest coastline. Reliable vertical evacuation shelters are required in potential tsunami inundation
zones. These structures must be sufficiently tall, allow access for the elderly and disabled population,
be capable of surviving long-duration strong ground shaking, and resistant to multiple debris impacts.
Coastal subsidence will affect local utilities and drainage patterns. A major earthquake and tsunami
will require an extensive, multi-year cleanup and debris removal program. Continued study andapplication of best practices from Japan will improve the resilience of the Pacific Northwest coast in
the event of a major Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake.
ROAD AND BRIDGE PERFORMANCE
The following observations were made related to road and bridge performance. Ground-shaking
damage to bridges was limited, due to adoption of modern seismic design codes and an aggressive
seismic retrofit program implemented after the 1995 Kobe earthquake. Tsunami damage to bridges wasprimarily due to crossings with deep-profile girders, spans lacking vertical hold-down anchorage at
supports, and scour at approaches. Many shallow-depth, short-span bridges survived many meters oftsunami inundation with repairable damage to their railings.

Fig. 6Functional low-profile vehicle bridge in Ishinomaki City. Note damage from tsunami toleading edge of bridge walkway and guardrail on the left side of the photo (Swanson)

Roadways were damaged by the earthquake in thousands of locations due to embankment
settlement or failure, bridge approach settlements, and lateral spreading. The extent of roadway
damage impeded the disaster response and evacuations. After three months, most repairs were madewith reduced speed limits necessary at many locations. The tsunami debris blocked most roadways in
the inundation zones. This further impeded the disaster response. Roadway embankments overtopped

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by the tsunami were typically severely damaged. Many roadway embankments that were notovertopped acted as barriers to the tsunami.
INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES AND LIFELINES
Industrial Facilities
The team observed earthquake impacts on several industrial facilities as well as critical utilities andlifelines. The observations included here are examples, rather than a comprehensive assessment ofindustry and utility damage. Significant regional industries in the affected Miyagi-ken area include
agriculture, beverage and food processing, forest products, high-technology, petrochemical, ports,
fishing, manufacturing, assembly, and steel mills. Earthquake impacts on these industries included
ground shaking damage to structures and equipment (facility contents), as well as tsunami inundation(flooding), sometimes followed by fires.
Many industrial facility structures provided life-safety earthquake performance as intended bybuilding codes for new construction. The extensive impacts and losses to the region and nation,
however, indicate that performance beyond life-safety, such as “operational” or “functional”, may berequired to achieve a resilient (i.e., quickly recoverable) status following a major event.
As shown by this event, in subduction-type earthquakes, facilities and lifelines located over 400
km from the epicenter (e.g. in the Tokyo metropolitan area) can be impacted. For industrial facilities,
achieving acceptable seismic performance depends on the following factors: the facility location(elevation, soil conditions); critical services (bracing of services, impact of loss of services); tanks andpiping (anchorage, debris impact); power supply (backup generators, long-term fuel supply); electricalequipment (equipment elevation, redundancy); fire-following-earthquake hazards (on- and off-site
ignition sources); damage to suppliers (supply-chain dependency); customer impacts (effects on
post-event sales); extent of debris (debris impact, and debris cleanup); available post-event resources(pre-arranged); and redundancy of operations.

Fig. 7 Underground utility impacts due to soil liquefaction in Chiba (Tokyo metropolitan area) (left),and fire-following earthquake impacts at Sendai Airport cargo area (right) (Pierepiekarz)
Lifelines
Lifelines include the external critical utilities and systems that a facility needs in order to remainfunctional. Examples of critical lifelines include water supply, sewer and wastewater treatment, power
supply and distribution, communications, and transportation (highway, rail, airport, natural gas &fuel).
Although the team’s mission did not include a comprehensive treatment of lifeline systems, the1318

following observations and lessons can be applied to other regions prone to similar events, such as the
Pacific Northwest.
Regarding water and sewer systems, it was observed that these systems were often disrupted byliquefaction damage to underground pipelines. In addition, coastal ground subsidence sometimes
altered drainage patterns. Coastal water and sewer treatment facilities sometimes required extensive
debris cleanup and repair of debris impact damage.
Some electrical supply systems at low elevations or in the lowest floors of buildings weredamaged by tsunami inundation. Therefore, substations and electrical equipment should be located at
the highest possible elevations. Some power poles in tsunami inundation areas were destroyed byscour and debris impact. Prolonged power shortages impeded repair and recovery efforts for industrial
facilities.
With respect to communications systems, it was observed that some mobile telephone networks
may not be reliable for up to a week after the event, due to network congestion, short-term availabilityof back-up power, and the long-term supplies of fuel for backup generators. Voice Over Internet
Protocol (VOIP) and satellite systems were viable alternatives when mobile telephone network
facilities were overloaded or not operational.
PREPARATION, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY
These observations are based on discussions with officials from particular jurisdictions (prefectures,
towns, or cities) in Japan and may not reflect issues in the entire affected area.
Preparation
Japan invested in physical barriers to protect coastal communities from tsunamis. Many of these barriers(e.g., seawalls, levees, and “tsunami forests”) proved to be ineffective because of the extreme heights ofthe tsunami waves generated by this earthquake.
Japan employs early-warning systems for ground shaking and tsunamis. These systems work toprevent injuries and save lives. The ground shaking warning system is readily available to everyone via
mobile phones.
Japan regularly conducts drills for earthquakes and tsunamis. A town official in Minamisanriku
Town reported a high degree of participation in their annual tsunami drills. These drills saved lives in thisevent, since “everyone in Japan knows where to go” in the event of a tsunami.
Schools and hospitals are used for vertical evacuation and shelter, and their location and height must
be carefully considered. Minamisanriku Town relocated their schools to higher ground after a 1960
tsunami, and those schools were safe in the Great East Japan Earthquake. However, many patients in the
town hospital were not evacuated to a high enough floor to be safe, because the hospital’s plan did not
anticipate such large waves.
The Pacific Northwest has a number of coastal communities without accessible vertical evacuation
facilities. These communities are vulnerable to widespread casualties from a Cascadia Subduction
Zone earthquake and tsunami. Although some planning has been done in the Pacific Northwest fortsunami preparation and a few communities have begun implementation of those plans, much workneeds to be done.
Response
Self-evacuations and rescue evacuations made it difficult for local authorities to get accurate counts ofdead and missing people.
Earthquake-damaged roads and tsunami inundation slowed response. One group in Ishinomaki City,
stranded on the upper floors and roof of their evacuation center, waited two to three days for food,medical supplies, and rescue evacuation. With the loss of their hospital, Minamisanriku Town had to wait
over two weeks for a temporary field hospital to be set up. In the meantime, people needing medical care1319

had to be taken to a distant town.
Japan evaluates and posts building conditions using a red/yellow/green placard system very similar
to the ATC-20 system used in the United States. The City of Sendai had completed safety evaluations ofover 85% of their 8,900 buildings within three-and-a-half weeks after the earthquake. On April 7, a large
aftershock (M7.2) required the evaluations to be started over. Building evaluations were completed twomonths after the March 11 main shock. 17% of the buildings were red-tagged (unsafe to enter).
Debris management was the highest priority at the time of the team visit. Vast quantities of building
materials (mostly wood from residences), personal belongings, cars, and mud/sand had to be removed
from sites and piled up so that reconstruction and other aspects of recovery could begin. Government
officials had not yet decided on the final disposition of the debris at the time of the team’s visit.
Recovery
The Sendai Airport was initially closed after the earthquake due to tsunami damage to the main terminal
and airport infrastructure. At the time of the team’s visit, the airport was operating at 20% capacity, andan aggressive reconstruction plan was under way. Full service was restored on July 25, 2011, four months
after the earthquake and tsunami.
Restoration of utilities to coastal areas was a high priority but as late as three months after the event,electricity had not been restored in some areas.
Urayasu City (Tokyo metropolitan area) was built on fill and suffered extensive damage to utilities
from liquefaction and subsidence. Temporary systems were in place at the time of the team visit, but city
officials estimated it would take five to six years for complete restoration of utilities.
At the time of the team’s visit, Japan was adjusting to a national reduction in electrical generating
capacity, due to failure of the Fukushima nuclear power plant. The Tokyo Electrical Power Company
produced graphs showing power consumption versus available capacity, which were displayed andupdated in near-real time in public messaging outlets such as screens on trains.
Although some people who lost their homes moved in with relatives or friends in other parts of thecountry, Japan is faced with the need to provide temporary housing to replace many of the 100,000
homes destroyed by the tsunamis. In Miyagi Prefecture alone, 23,000 housing units were needed. At thetime of the team reconnaissance (ten weeks after the event) 15,000 units had been constructed, but only
half had been turned over to occupants.
Communities were making plans for rebuilding, but decisions on what and where to rebuild werestill being made at the time of the team reconnaissance. Cash-strapped local governments needed help
from an equally cash-strapped national government to implement any rebuilding plans. As expected, theplanning process is taking time. In Miyagi Prefecture, draft rebuilding plans were expected to besubmitted to the Prefecture Assembly for review and approval by late summer 2011.
General Observations
As Pacific Northwest officials and government agencies make plans for disaster response and recovery,
they should focus on several lessons the Great East Japan earthquake has demonstrated. First, recovery
efforts will need to focus on debris management and restoration of utilities. Second, in the aftermath of amajor earthquake, communities can only achieve rapid recovery if the both commercial and residential
recovery needs are carefully balanced. Finally, making temporary housing quickly available will reducethe burden on social services and decrease the stress on victims who are initially housed in emergency
shelters.

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CONCLUSIONSJapan is the most prepared country in the world for earthquakes and tsunamis. The Great East Japan
earthquake exemplifies how earthquake planning and preparedness can save lives and property,
preventing an even greater disaster.
Seismic retrofit and protection technologies are effective at preventing earthquake damage. Japan
has been quick to implement lessons learned from past earthquakes by updating building codes, andimplementing protection technologies. These technologies (e.g., seismic base isolation and structural
damping systems) are widely used in new construction and retrofits in Japan, not only in essential
facilities, but also in single and multi-family housing, commercial buildings, and industrial facilities.
Most retrofitted buildings performed well during this earthquake with respect to both life safety andoverall damage control.
The Japanese public and government officials expect enhanced seismic performance of buildings
and facilities, and they understand the value of protecting people, buildings, and infrastructure fromfrequent, strong earthquakes. This M9.0 earthquake serves as a reminder that the life-safety performanceof structures and infrastructure is not enough to create earthquake-resilient communities. Higher
earthquake performance levels are also required to permit continuously habitable communities andpromote rapid economic recovery.
Current U.S. building codes and standards for earthquake design of new structures are very good atproviding life safety performance, but can be improved with respect to preservation of building
functionality.
The Japanese government encourages private sector support of earthquake and tsunami research anddevelopment. This has resulted in widespread application of earthquake protection technologies inconstructed projects.
Earthquakes around the world provide a real-world laboratory that teaches engineers, architects, andpublic officials how infrastructure and communities will perform in earthquakes. We must heed thelessons learned from these disasters.
Geologic studies along the Pacific Northwest Coast indicate that multiple earthquakes have occurredin the last 3,500 years. The most recent of these events occurred in the year 1700. An earthquake similar
to the Great East Japan Earthquake will occur again along the Cascadia Subduction Zone. The impacts ofthis event on our communities and industry will depend on the actions we take now to prepare for it. The
lessons learned from the Great East Japan earthquake can and should be applied in our own communities.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The SEAW Team members greatly appreciate Miyagi Prefecture’s invitation to host the reconnaissanceteam, provide access to the earthquake- and tsunami-impacted areas, and arrange for discussions withJapanese engineers and researchers on the implications for practice and research. Our trip would not havebeen possible without assistance from the State of Washington Department of Commerce, especially Ms.
Noriko Ban (Tokyo office) in arranging various meetings, planning site visits, and making logisticalarrangements.
We are especially thankful for support from the following organizations and individuals: Washington
State Department of Commerce: Mr. Mark Calhoon, Ms. Noriko Ban. Port of Tacoma: Mr. Larry Kavita.
Port of Seattle: Mr. Toshio Go. Miyagi Prefecture Government: Mr. Tomio Takahashi, Ms. Takeno
Suzuki. Interpreters: Mr. Hiroto Miyake, Mr. Seiichi Yamada. Sendai City. Tohoku Institute ofTechnology. Tohoku University. Port of Sendai. Taisei Corporation. Ishinomaki City. Minamisanriko
Town. Tokyo Institute of Technology. Urayasu City. Fudo Tetra Corporation. Kajima Corporation.
This reconnaissance study was partially funded by contributions from the following organizations:
Structural Engineers Association of Washington (SEAW), American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)(Seattle Section Geotechnical Group/Geo-Institute Seattle Chapter, and the Seattle Section), Washington
Association of Building Officials (WABO), Society of American Military Engineers (SAME) (Seattle
Post, and Mt. Tacoma Post).

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REFERENCES
USGS (2011). United States Geological Survey, map dated September 7, 2011, accessed on January 23,
2012, http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/shakemap/global/shake/Casc9.0_se/
Atwater, B., Musumi-Rokkaku, S., Kenji, S., Yoshinobu, T., Kazue, U. and Yamaguchi, D. (2005). The
Orphan Tsunami of 1700 – Japanese Clues to a Parent Earthquake in North America, U.S.
Geological Survey Professional Paper 1707 ed., University of Washington Press, Seattle andLondon.
JSSI (2012). Japan Society of Seismic Isolation, summary of response-controlled buildings in Japan,
accessed January 22, 2012, http://www.jssi.or.jp/english/eng2.html#members

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