Proceedings of the International Symposium on Engineering Lessons Learned fromthe 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, March 1-4, 2012, Tokyo, Japan

FACT-FINDING ABOUT EVACUATION FROM THE
UNEXPECTEDLY LARGE TSUNAMI
Task team on Yamada-machi and Ishinomaki-shi, Tsunami Evacuation Survey Group of theGreat East Japan Earthquake DisasterYozo GOTO1
1

Sub-leader of the task team, Project researcher, Earthquake Research Institute, the University ofTokyo, Japan, gotoyozo@mti.biglobe.ne.jp

ABSTRACT: Almost twenty thousand people died in a region where the disaster
preparedness level was thought to be relatively high. The truth about why so many
people had to die was surveyed by a group of researchers and engineers to extract lessons
for the community, municipalities and the next generation. About 1,300 evacuees in two
typical areas were interviewed or subjected to a questionnaire. One of the areas was
Yamada-machi, Iwate prefecture, which had a sawtooth coastline. The other was thecoastal area of west of Ishinomaki-shi, Miyagi prefecture, which comprised flat landalong Sendai bay.
Key Words: Great East Japan Earthquake, tsunami, evacuation, interview, questionnaire

INTRODUCTION
Almost twenty thousand people died due to the giant tsunami caused by the Great East Japan
Earthquake, even though the earthquake occurred in daytime, the tsunami took at least half an hour toarrive at coast line and people in the region should have been at a relatively high disaster preparedness
level. The purposes of this survey were to find the truth about why so many people had to die and to
extract lessons for the community, municipalities and the next generation.
At the beginning of the survey, a group was established consisting of researchers and engineers
who were interested in determining the facts about the people's evacuation from the giant tsunami. The
group was chaired by Professor Imamura of Tohoku University. It was separated into several task
teams, which were assigned to different areas to avoid further traumaizing evacuees by overlap of thesurvey. Our task team was assigned to the following two areas:
Yamada-machi of Iwate prefecture (hereafter Yamada)
Yamada has a sawtooth coastline, and had a population of 19,270 and 7,182 households as of March,2011 (statistic data of Yamada town office). The main business was culture fishery. Yamada had
suffered destructive tsunami three times in the past 115 years. They were the Meiji Sanriku Tsunami(1896), the Showa Sanriku Tsunami (1933) and the Chile Earthquake Tsunami (1960). The main area1617

of the town was protected by sea walls 5-8 meters high.
The JMA Intensity of the shaking of the Great East Japan Earthquake was 5-lower (MMI 7-8).
The maximum tsunami height was estimated to be 11-12 meters and it arrived about 35 minutes after
the earthquake. The dead and the missing due to the giant tsunami numbered 743 (web page of
Yamada of January 26, 2012), which was 3.9% of the population, and 10.5% of the people where theland was inundated (Miyazawa 2011). 2,762 houses collapsed or were washed away (web page of
Yamada), which was about 38% of the houses in Yamada.

Iwate pref.
YamadaWash out area
Burned area
courtesy of Yamada-machi town office

Fig. 1 Location of Yamada

Photo 1 Air photo of main part of Yamada

Ishinomaki-shi of Miyagi prefecture (hereafter Ishinomaki)
Ishinomaki has flat land in its southeast part along Sendai Bay. The population was 160,826 and there
were 57,871 households as of 2010, October (census data). The main industries were fishery, fishprocessing, commerce, and paper manufacture.
The JMA Intensity of the shaking was 6-lower (MMI 9-10). The giant tsunami arrived about 40
minutes after the earthquake, and its maximum height was 4-5 meters along the coast of Sendai Bay.
The tsunami inundated the flat and low area of the city, where the major population and industries had
been concentrated. The dead and the missing due to the giant tsunami numbered 3,859 (Web page ofIshinomaki, January 30, 2012), which was 2.6% of the population, and 4.2% of the people where theland was inundated (Miyazawa 2011). 22,419 houses collapsed or were washed away (web page ofIshinomaki), which was 38.6% of the houses in Ishinomaki.

Ishinomaki-shi

South coast

Coutesy of Ishinomaki city office

Fig. 2 Location of Ishinomaki
Photo 2 Air photo of south coast of Ishinomaki

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Methods of survey
1) We visited evacuees in evacuee camps and temporal houses which were selected with considerationof the locations of the disaster areas, and interviewed them concerning how they survived and why
their deceased neighbors could not escape from the giant tsunami. We also distributed questionnaires
to the evacuees in temporary houses of Ishinomaki. The period of survey for Yamada was May to
September, and that for Ishinomaki was October to December, 2011.
2) At the beginning of each interview, the interviewer handed a “sheet for trust” to the interviewee.
The sheet described the purpose of the survey and how the results would be utilized, named themembers of the task team, informed the interviewee of his free refusal right, and gave the interviewee
the phone number of the interviewer. After obtaining the interviewee’s consent, the interviewer started
conversation with the interviewee carefully and tried to elicit his or her answers to the questions
during natural flow of communication.
3) During the interview, the interviewer was required to be a listener, to keep his eye-line lower thanthat of interviewee and to not interrupt the interviewee when he or she wanted to talk about something
not directly concerned with the questions. As a result, the interview sometimes exceeded one hour.
4) On the “sheet for trust”, a contact phone number was written. Although about five hundred
evacuees were interviewed, there were no complaint calls.
5) For the questionnaire, almost the same “sheet for trust” was attached as well as a return-mailenvelope. Questionnaires were posted to 3,400 temporary houses and 797 were returned (collection
rate 23%), and there were two phone calls: one was to confirm the nature of the task team and theother was to complain that his case did not match with the question items.
6) We also interviewed Yamada town office and Ishinomaki city office staff, fire brigade fire fighters,
community fire fighters and police. We obtained many statistical data from these people.

RESULT OF SURVEY
Evacuation circumstances
The following Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 denote the sequence of the main shock and aftershocks and the alerts
issued by JMA up to the arrival of the giant tsunami. Before the arrival of the giant tsunami, there
were several aftershocks, which might have interfered with evacuation. JMA corrected the first alert
and raised the expected tsunami height to double height by its second alert, but this was only 7-12
minutes before the arrival of the giant tsunami.
JMA First
Alert
Height:6m

JMA Second
Alert
Height >10m

Tsunamiarrival

MMI:9-10
MMI:7-

Main
shock(minute)Elapsed time after the main shock

Fig. 3 Sequence of main shock, after
shock, tsunami and alert in Yamada

Fig. 4 Sequence of main shock, after
shock, tsunami and alert in Ishinomaki

Courtesy of Eight-Japan Engineering Consultants Inc.

Courtesy of Eight-Japan Engineering Consultants Inc.

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Table 1 and Table 2 list the alerts broadcast by outdoor loudspeakers of the emergency municipal radio
communication systems of Yamada and Ishinomaki. Tsunami alerts were announced several times. It
is supposed that most of the loudspeakers were undamaged by the shaking of the earthquake andfunctioned until their supporting posts were washed down by the giant tsunami. However, many of theevacuees complained that they could not hear the sound or could not distinguish the meaning.
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 compare the age distribution of the dead with the age distribution of the whole
population. The effect of age is clear. The age distribution of the dead was high, in the 60's-80's, andwas more pronounced in Yamada. Originally, Yamada was a more aged society than Ishinomaki,
which shows that an aging society is at more risk than a younger society. One of the tragedies in
Yamada was that a large-scale care house was washed away by the giant tsunami, and 74 old people(10% of the dead in Yamada) and 14 staff lost their lives (Iwate Nippou, 2011).
Table 1 Contents of Yamada broadcast

Table 2 Contents of Ishinomaki broadcast

Time
14:47

Time
14:48

14:54

15:13
15:25

Contents
A large earthquake has occurred.
Close sea wall gates and leave thecoastLarge tsunami alert was issued.
Expecting height is more than 3
meter. Evacuate. Close sea wallgates
As above
Evacuation order issued

14:52

Contents
A large earthquake has occurred. Large
tsunami alert was issued. Leave the coastand river mouse. Avoid using cars
Repeated with some additional information

14:56
14:58

ditto
ditto

15:02
15:04
15:20
15:25
15:20
15:25

ditto
ditto
ditto
ditto
ditto
ditto

Age Distribution(noirmalized)

Populationin YamadaAge Distribution(noirmalized)

Population in
Ishinomaki

Casualty
in YamadaAgeCasualty in
Ishinomaki

Age

Fig.6 Age distribution of Population
and Casualties of Ishinomaki

Fig.5 Age distribution of Population
and Casualties of Yamada
Disaster awareness

Disaster awarenesses in the two areas were different. Table 3 and Fig. 7 show the perception of riskthat the evacuees in Yamada and Ishinomaki had during the strong and long-duration earthquake. The
seismic intensity meter of Yamada was located on rather solid ground and the recorded intensity was
assumed to be smaller than that of low ground near the sea. But still the average intensity in Yamada
must have been lower than that in Ishinomaki. The strong earthquake did not raise the threat of atsunami in the minds of many people in Ishinomaki.

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Table 3 Tsunami risk awareness associated with feeling of strong earthquake
Did you think that a tsunami would
come just after the earthquake?
Large tsunami must come
Tsunami will come but not so large
Tsunami will not comeNot think about tsunami
Number of sample

Not think abouttsunamiTsunami will
not come

YamadaIshinomaki

44%
36%
7%
12%

15%
31%
22%
32%

200

289

Large tsunami
will comeNot thinkabout tsunami
Large tsunami
will come

Tsunami willcome, but not
so large

Tsunami willcome, but not
so large

Tsunami will
not come

Ishinomaki

YamadaFig. 7 Did you think that a tsunami would come just after the earthquake?

Table 4 shows actual actions of evacuees in Yamada and in Ishinomaki. In both areas, about two
thirds of the people started to evacuate soon after the shaking went down. However, about one fourthof the people in Ishinomaki did not evacuate before the tsunami arrived. Table 4 also shows that 14%of evacuees in Yamada started evacuation during the shaking. This may also show high awareness ofthe people in Yamada. But, we should take the aftershocks' sequence into consideration whenanalyzing this data. People in Yamada might have been feeling continuous shaking for some period
after the end of the main shock, as shown in Fig. 3.
Table 4 Timing of beginning evacuation
When did you begin evacuation?
During shaking
Soon after earthquake stopped
Just before tsunami arrived
After tsunami arrived
Due to fire or others
Number of sample

YamadaIshinomaki

14%
53%
17%
9%
7%

1%
63%
9%
22%
5%

200

290

Fig. 8 shows other differences of tsunami awareness. About three fourths of the evacuees in
Ishinomaki had not thought specifically about tsunami risk and evacuation before the giant tsunami ofMarch 11, 2011. This low awareness of tsunami risk might have been because of the low estimation oftsunami run-up height denoted by the official hazard map.
Fig. 9 shows the tsunami hazard map in the south west area of Ishinomaki, and Fig. 10 shows theactually observed area inundated by the giant tsunami of March 11, 2011. Many of the evacuees in
Ishinomaki had not seen this hazard map, but the low estimation of tsunami risk might have been
passed on to them by word of mouth.

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<5min<5min
Others

5-10min10-20minNeverthought
beforeNeverthought
before20-40min5-10min10-20min
20-40min
40-60min>60min>60min 40-60min

Yamada (sample:199)

Ishinomaki (sample: 268)

Fig. 8 Before you experienced March 11, what had you thought thetime interval would be between earthquake and tsunami arrival?

Orange colored line isestimated tsunami run-up line

Orange colored area was actually inundated

Attached to “Hazard Map of Ishinomaki”

Geospatial Information Authority of Japan

http:/www.city.ishinomaki.lg.jp/static/
guide_ishinomaki/tsunami//

http:/www.gsi.gojp/kikaku/kikaku60003.html

Fig 10 Tsunami inundated area by
March 11, 2011 great tsunami

Fig 9 Hazard Map for south
west area of Ishinomaki

The difference of disaster awareness also appeared in the rate of participation in disaster drills(Fig. 11). The ratio of people who had not participated in a disaster drill was one third in Yamada, but
two thirds in Ishinomaki. In Ishinomaki, disaster drills were conducted by communities supported by
the city office, but participation of people had been generally low. Moreover, almost all the drills had
focused to earthquake and fire. This low tsunami-awareness level in the south-west area of Ishinomaki
might have come from the disaster prevention plan of Ishinomaki, which had shown the expectedtsunami height to be of small damage level, as the result that the tsunami expected through authorizedprocedures was not large along Sendai bay.
Fig. 12 shows the relation between quick evacuation and ratio of participation in annual disaster
drills in Yamada. People who had participated in disaster drills every year evacuated quickly. In
Yamada, evacuation drills had been conducted every year by the town office, and were participated inby 10-15% of its population.

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Others

Every year
participate

Every year
participate
At times
participate

Neverparticipate

Recently notparticipate

Recently notparticipate

Neverparticipate

At times
participate

Yamada (sample:200)

Ishinomaki (sample:281)

Fig. 11 Did you participate in disaster drill?

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

lit
t le

no

t

Evacuate soon after earthquake (sample: 139)

Ve

ec
e
R

ry

nt
ly

tt
A

Ev

er
y

ye

im
es

ar

Evacuate after facing danger (sample: 52)

Rate of participation in annual disaster drill

Fig. 12 Quick evacuation vs. rate of participation in annual disaster drill“Tsunami Tendenko” and mutual cooperation
Fig.13 shows the answers to the question about with whom the evacuee evacuated. In Yamada,evacuation alone was about twice that of Ishinomaki. That is, “Tsunami Tendenko”, which is a
traditional tsunami disaster phrase meaning “evacuate by oneself and do not care about others”, wascarried out more honestly. In Ishinomki, however, it is also important to note that families, neighbors
and community leaders helped people to begin to evacuate (Table 5). Many people alerted theirneighbors who were lacking information. They also helped vulnerable neighbors to evacuate.
Withneighbor

Alone

With
coworkerWithneighbor

Alone

With
coworker
With familyWith family

Yamada (sample:207, multiple)

Ishinomaki (sample: 268, multiple)

Fig. 13 With whom did you evacuate?

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Table 5 Trigger to person evacuating
What was the trigger to you evacuating
Feeling large and very long shaking
Hearing alert of large tsunami
Guide of head of family
Following neighbor's evacuation
Community leader's guide
Seeing receding tide
Seeing tsunami coming
Seeing tsunami crashing over seawall
Fire, others
Number of sample

YamadaIshinomaki

54%
10%
6%
3%
6%
1%
11%
1%
8%

27%
19%
18%
6%
15%
0%
5%
1%
9%

179

215

Table 6 shows what the evacuees were doing until beginning evacuation or being caught in thetsunami. It should be mentioned that in Ishinomaki the ratio of evacuees who tried to pass alert of risk
to neighbors and helped others to evacuate was considerably larger than that of Yamada. However, it
might be oversimplifying to explain this discrepancy by the difference of humanity in these two areas.
Only 7% of Yamada evacuees tried to gather up mess caused by the earthquake, while 20% of
Ishinomaki evacuees did. People in Yamada might have had much more feeling of crisis and might nothave been able to afford to think of helping others.
Table 6 Behavior just after earthquake, up to evacuation or tsunami arrival
What were you doing until starting evacuation or
being caught by tsunami

YamadaIshinomaki

Going back to home
Going back to home to help family to evacuate
Going to collect family in school or somewhere
Going to sea side to look at sea
Collecting important goods
Locking my house
Picking up items scattered by the earthquake
Making phone calls or sending e-mail to relatives
Remember nothing
Doing nothing, evacuated immediately
Passing alert of risk to neighbors
Helping handicapped people to evacuate

15%
8%
6%
7%
38%
14%
7%
3%
2%
20%
2%
3%

12%
7%
6%
1%
28%
8%
20%
4%
3%
23%
9%
5%

Number of sample (multiple answer)

200

280

Information triggering evacuation
Fig. 14 shows the evacuees' information sources of tsunami alert. TV was generally no use
because electric power went down during the earthquake in both Yamada and Ishinomaki. Therefore,
outdoor loudspeaker of the emergency-municipal-radio-communication-system (hereafter EMRCS)
was the most important tool for transmitting disaster alerts to people. The contents of announcements
after the earthquake until the tsunami’s arrival are shown in Table 1. The second most important
information source in Yamada was portable radios or car radios, but in Ishinomaki it was word of
mouth from neighbors.

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Others
EMRCS indoor
TV, One Seg
receiverInternet, etc.
Family, neighbor,community leader

OthersEMRCS indoor
TV, One Seg
receiverInternet, etc.
Family, neighbor,community leader

Loudspeaker on
emergency vehicle

EMRCS outdoor
loudspeaker

EMRCS outdoor
loudspeaker

Loudspeaker on
emergency vehicle

Radio

Radio

Yamada (sample:114)

Ishinomaki (sample: 172)

Fig. 14 Information source of large tsunami alert
Whether or not the announcements reached people is shown in Table 7. The alert did not reach 36% of
people in Yamada and 49% in Ishinomaki, including those who “Do not remember”. Many evacuees,
especially in Ishinomaki, complained that they could not hear the sound or could not understandannouncements from outdoor loudspeakers. Although most of the speakers were functioning before
the tsunami arrived, the volume might have been too low for people indoors or might have had too
much echo for people outdoors. Many evacuees stated that the speech tone lacked a sense of crisis fora person who was in a hurry to evacuate.
Table 7 Informativity of loudspeaker for tsunami alert
Did you hear the tsunami alert by EMRCS

YamadaIshinomaki

46%
10%
36%
9%

43%
7%
10%
39%
-

200

281

Heard before or during evacuation
Heard after evacuation
Do not remember
Could not hear or could not understand
OthersNumber of sample

Did the large tsunami alert enable people to evacuate or not?
We asked evacuees which was the key factor that decided them to begin evacuation. The result isshown in Table 5 above.
In Yamada, more than half the evacuees answered "very long strong earthquake", and a few ofthem answered "large-tsunami alert ". In Ishinomaki, these two factors came closer to the same level,but more evacuees answered that "information from people such as family, neighbor and community
leader" was the key factor.
In conclusion, "large-tsunami alert" was not the key factor in both areas. JMA issues tsunami alerts
as a task and there have been many discussions on ways of making announcements in the early stage
after a M9.0 huge earthquake. But, the alert was not the key factor in people’s decision to begin toevacuate. If the electric power had not been cut and most people could have obtained information fromTV, some information from JMA, such as the expected time of the tsunami’s arrival and the observed
tsunami height in the early stage, might have confused people in the area.
Evacuation method
Fig. 15 and Table 8 denote evacuation methods and their efficiencies. One third of the evacuees in
Yamada and 56% of those in Ishinomaki did use cars to evacuate. In Ishinomaki, many encountered1625

traffic jams. 11% of car evacuees were forced to leave their cars to escape, or stay in their cars and becaught by the tsunami. We must note that these data came from survivors. If data from the dead were
included, the ratio of those caught in their cars would somewhat increase.
There have been many discussions about the demerits of evacuation by car. However, during ourinterview survey and questionnaire survey, we received many opinions which stressed the need forevacuation by car of old persons and/or disabled persons.
OthersOthersCar(passenger)

Car(passenger)

Walking

WalkingCar(driving)

Car (driving)

BicycleBicycleYamada (sample:197)

Ishinomaki (sample:232)

Fig. 15 Evacuation methods

Table 8 Traffic jam during evacuation
Was your car been trapped by traffic jam?

YamadaIshinomaki

Trapped in a traffic jam
Saw traffic jam but not trapped in it
Saw some rubbles tying up traffic
Did not see traffic jam
My car and I were caught in the tsunami
Trapped in traffic jam, escaped from car and ran

10%
13%
4%
67%
4%
3%

36%
27%
3%
23%
5%
6%

Number of sample

79

171

Effect of past tsunami experience
Some people did not evacuate but stayed on the second floor or roof of their house. They described
why they did not evacuate. The results are shown in Table 9.
In both areas, about half the evacuees who did not evacuate thought the tsunami would not reach
their houses. Many of the old people in these areas had suffered damage in the 1960 Chile Earthquake
Tsunami and they thought that the tsunami height on that occasion was something like a standard.
However, the height of the March 11, 2011 giant tsunami was three to five times larger than thatstandardized height. There had not been any destructive tsunami for 50 years, and, to make thesituation worse, JMA had issued large tsunami alerts into this area several times in recent years, butpeople had not experienced a destructive tsunami.
Fig. 16 clearly shows the situation. The houses of persons who were washed out and died are shownby a blue dot on the figure. People living near the sea or river mouth did evacuate soon after theearthquake because they well knew the tsunami risk. As a result, there were few of casualties in theseareas. However, along the foot of the hills, i.e. slightly higher land, there were many casualties.
Apparently, people in these areas thought that as past tsunami run-ups did not reach the heights of theirhouses they did not need to evacuate. However, the run-up of the March 11 giant tsunami was muchhigher than previous ones.

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Table 9 Reasons for not evacuating immediately
I did not evacuate because;

YamadaIshinomaki

I thought tsunami would not reach my home.
I thought sea wall would protect us.
I was waiting and seeing
I was taking much time to prepare evacuation
I was looking for or waiting for my family
I didn’t know how to do
If tsunami came, I thought I could go up second floor
I would not have time to reach a safe place before
tsunami arrived
I could not leave my work place
I evacuated due to fire, not by tsunami
Others

42%
3%
10%
6%
7%
0%
3%
3%

42%
3%
10%
6%
7%
4%
1%
7%

4%
11%
16%

4%
16%

Number of sample

28

73

Yamada Bay

Public refuge
places on hillside

Houses wherecasualties were
livingRun-up line of2011 tsunami

TsunamiRun-up line of1933 tsunami

River
織笠

Run-up line of1960 tsunami

These people evacuatedbut stayed at foot of hill

100m

Origasa village, Yamada

Fig. 16 People living at foot of hills believed their houses would be safe, but --.

CONCLUSIONS
1) The age distribution of the dead was concentrated in the 60's-80's. Many of these old persons could
not move well. Even if they could walk, they tended to avoid it and preferred to go up to the second
floors of their houses. However, the giant tsunami easily washed away their wooden houses.
2) Young families, sons and daughters or grandchildren of these old persons, went back home fromdowntown in order to rescue them. Some of them succeeded and some of them were washed awaywith their old relatives. We should discuss “Tsunami Tendenko” after learning this fact, and must
deepen our thinking concerning reduction of car evacuation after learning that cars were indispensable
to save these families.
3) Experience of past tsunami disaster was not always helpful. People living in high risk regions suchas coastal areas and river mouths generally had enough awareness of tsunami risk from theirexperience or from the word of mouth of their parents. They quickly evacuated after the earthquake.
However, people living on slightly higher land where the tsunami run-up of the 1960 Chile
Earthquake Tsunami did not reach over-estimated the safety of their houses.

16274) The large-tsunami alert broadcast by the emergency-municipal-radio-communication-system was
not effective. Many people decided to evacuate based on their feeling about the strong and abnormallylong earthquake. Many people also could not understand the echoing voice from the loud speakers.
Moreover, many evacuees said that they had thought the large tsunami alert issued by JMA might be"the boy who cried wolf" this time too.
5) There was a clear difference between the tsunami risk awarenesses of the people in the two regions,one of which has a sawtooth coastline facing the Pacific Ocean and another of which has a plain
coastline facing Sendai bay. In the latter case, not only individual citizens but also local communities
and sectors lacked tsunami risk awareness. Disaster drills were conducted every year but most of themfocused on earthquake and fire. Some public refuge places were located in low land near the sea.
This low awareness might have resulted from the hazard map compiled by the local government.
This map was of course based on advanced scientific knowledge and technology at that time andactually this area had not experienced a very large tsunami in recent years, but still the past inadequate
contribution of science and engineering on raising disaster awareness is regretted.
6) In the high-risk area, people's tsunami awareness was high but their spirit of mutual aid was
relatively low when compared to that of the people in what was thought to be the lower risk area. This
discrepancy must be surveyed more deeply.
7) This paper is based on a part of the data surveyed by the task team on Yamada-machi and
Ishinomaki-shi, Tsunami Evacuation Survey Group of the Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster.
Analyses on the whole data are still on-going.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Our task team visited many evacuees in their camps or temporary houses and we received positive
cooperation from most of them, who may have been bottling up their emotions when talking to us. We
also received much cooperation from Yamada town office and Ishinomaki city office. We will express
our thanks to them by carefully analyzing the data and distributing the results for use in tsunami risk
areas around the world.
This study has been supported by J-RAPID of JST and partially supported by JSCE.The author
also willingly lists the member of the Task team on Yamada-machi and Ishinomaki-shi below. They
are all co-authors of this paper.
Ikuo Abe
Junya Fukuoka
Yozo Goto
Shoji Hasegawa
Taro Ichiko
Hirotaka Ikeda
Chikako Isouti
Kazuyo Kamita
Masaru Kitaura
Taku Mikami
Hiroyuki Morita

Fuji-Tokoha Univ.
Eight-Japan Engineering Consultant
ERI, Univ. of Tokyo
JICA
Mikuniya Corporation
Fuji-Tokoha Univ.
Tokyo Metropolitan Univ.
Landbrains Corporation.
Kanazawa Univ.
Gunma National College of Tech.
Chiken Sogo Consultant

Tetsuo Morita
Hitomi Murakami
Itsuki Nakabayashi
Shigeki Nakamura
Yujiro Ogawa
Seiichi Sato
Hikari Suzuki
Tsutomu Tanaka
Madoka Ujita
Kazutosi Yamamoto
Sumio Yanagihara(Alphabetical order)
Gunma National College of Tech.
Yamaguchi Univ.
Meiji Univ.
Nihon Univ.
ITRI, Univ. of Tokyo
Nippon Koei Co., LTD.
IFDP
Eight-Japan Engineering Consultant
Landbrains Corporation
Pacific Consultants
Okumura Corporation

REFERENCES
Miyazaki H. (2011), “Population distribution along the area damaged by The 2011 East Japan
Earthquake”, Bulletin of the Tohoku Geographical Association,
wwwsoc.nii.ac.jp/tga/disaster/articles/j-contents5.pdf, 18 April (in Japanese)
Iwate Nippou (2011), “Disability of emergency evacuation of elder care facility” Special edition forreconstruction, http://www.iwate-np.co.jp/311shinsai/saiko/saiko110608.html, 8 June (In Japanese)

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