CSCAP MEMORANDUM NO. 18

Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)

A Memorandum from theCouncil for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)
September 2011

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)
Memorandum No. 18
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)
September 2011
INTRODUCTION
Despite past promises, the international community has often failed to preventthe commission of crimes like this or take timely and decisive action to protect
the victims. Recognizing this legacy, the largest ever meeting of Heads of Stateand Government endorsed the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) concept in 2005.
The concept has been unanimously reaffirmed twice by the United Nations
Security Council (Resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009)) and in 2009 theGeneral Assembly agreed to continue its deliberation on implementing RtoP
(Resolution 63/308).
The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) is animated by a profound belief thathumanity can do a better job of living up to its most deeply held common moral
beliefs and aspirations and that it can do so whilst preserving and strengthening
core institutions such as state sovereignty. RtoP is borne out of a shared ethicalbelief that innocent civilians should be protected from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in a manner consistent with theprinciples and purposes of the UN Charter.
As agreed by UN Member States, RtoP rests on three equally importantand non-sequential pillars:i)

The responsibility of the state to protect its population from genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and fromtheir incitement.

ii)

The international community’s responsibility to assist the state to fulfill
its responsibility to protect.

iii)

In situations where a state has manifestly failed to protect its
population from the four crimes, the international community’s
responsibility to take timely and decisive action through peaceful
diplomatic and humanitarian means and, if that fails, other moreforceful means in a manner consistent with Chapters VI (pacificmeasures), VII (enforcement measures) and VIII (regionalarrangements) of the UN Charter.

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The present Memorandum examines the scope and meaning of RtoP,
presents, twelve recommendations for its implementation in the Asia Pacificregion, and identifies some of the next steps towards translating the concept fromwords to deeds.
The Memorandum concludes that regional arrangements in the Asia Pacificregion should play an important role in implementing RtoP. Regional activism in
implementing RtoP would enhance regional peace and security as well as
strengthening the protection of people. It would also foster regional ownershipand ensure that RtoP is implemented in a manner consistent with local norms
and interests, strengthen partnership between the region and global institutions,and enhance key national and regional capacities.

MEANING AND SCOPE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECTThe Memorandum concludes that RtoP is consistent with regional norms. In
particular, RtoP does not create new legal obligations, but is rooted in existing
international law. It represents a commitment to implement existing law in relation
to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, to assist
states to fulfil their commitments and to work together in a manner consistent
with existing law to respond in a timely and decisive manner when the four
enumerated crimes are committed. Further, the Memorandum finds that RtoP
applies only to the four specified crimes (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing
and crimes against humanity) and not to a wider range of human security issues
and that it is consistent with the principle of non-interference and the UN Charter.
It is important to distinguish what RtoP is and is not.
RtoP is:1.

… an internationally agreed concept aimed at protecting populations fromgenocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity andpreventing these crimes.

2.

… defined by paragraphs 138-140 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome
Document, unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly andreaffirmed by the UN Security Council in 2006 and 2009.

3.

… a concept that rests on three equally important and non-sequential
pillars.
i)

The primary responsibility of the state to protect its own population.
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4.

ii)

The international community’s responsibility to assist the state to fulfil
its responsibility to protect.

iii)

The international community’s responsibility to take timely anddecisive action, through peaceful diplomatic and humanitarian means
and, if that fails, other more forceful means in a manner consistent
with the UN Charter, should a state manifestly fail to protect its own
population.

… universal and enduring. The state’s primary responsibility to protect andthe international community’s responsibility to assist apply to all states, allof the time. They apply as much to the global North as the global South

RtoP does not…
1.

… apply to human security problems other than the four specified crimes(genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity) which
are enumerated by existing international law.

2.

… establish, or claim to establish, a new principle of international law. It isembedded in existing international law and demands only that states act inaccordance with existing law.

3.

… weaken state sovereignty. By affirming the primary responsibility of thestate to protect its own populations and promising to help strengthen thestate’s capacity to protect its population, RtoP contributes to thestrengthening of state sovereignty.

4.

… permit behaviour that is inconsistent with the UN Charter. Specifically,
enforcement measures must be expressly authorised by the UN Security
Council and all other measures must be consistent with the Charter.

5.

… violate the principle of non-interference. RtoP is consistent with Article2(7) of the UN Charter and the Treaty of Amity of Cooperation because it
does not call for unwanted interference in the domestic affairs of states,with the sole exception of measures adopted by the UN Security Council
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

6.

… constitute a new label for humanitarian intervention. It does not call forthe use of force in every situation where one or more of the four crimes arebeing committed. When timely and decisive action is required, force and3coercion are called for only when peaceful means have proven inadequate
and are authorised by the UN Security Council.

IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN THE ASIA
PACIFIC REGION
The Memorandum identifies twelve recommendations through which national
governments, regional arrangements and the region’s global partners might
begin to implement the RtoP and build a future free of genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
It is recommended that national governments:
1.

Consider appointing an official to serve as a focal point for RtoP.
Among other things, national RtoP focal points could provide their own
governments with early analysis of emerging situations involving the four
RtoP crimes, offer advice directly to the executive about matters relating to
the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity genocide and mass atrocities, coordinate national
responses to the four RtoP crimes, facilitate cooperation with regionalarrangements and the UN, and cooperate with other national focal points.
National focal points might also hold an annual informal dialogue with the
Joint Office of the United Nations Special Advisers for Genocide
Prevention and RtoP. Although a modest first step in itself, theappointment of national focal points would facilitate the implementation ofmany of the other recommendations proposed by the Study Group.

2.

Devote resources to raising awareness about RtoP. The first step in
implementing the RtoP in the Asia Pacific region is to build awareness ofthe concept through dialogue and training. This can be facilitated on a
Track One or Track Two basis and is likely to be most effective when
conducted on a national basis. National-based activities are necessary inorder to develop a shared understanding of RtoP among stakeholders, andincrease the level of awareness and knowledge about RtoP among
national elites, decision makers and civil society groups. They also begin
to lay the foundations for strengthening the state’s capacity to prevent
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

3.

Use education to inculcate the skills and values needed to resolve
disputes peacefully. In the long-term, the key to preventing violence in all
its manifestations lies in education. Violence is fundamentally grounded in
the inability of people to resolve and manage their differences peacefully.
The forging of values supporting diversity and interpersonal skills through4

inculcating tactics and strategies for the peaceful resolution andmanagement of differences is therefore a crucial component of violence –including mass violence – prevention. The most effective way to educate
people to resolve differences in a non-violent fashion is through theeducation of the young.
The Memorandum recommends that the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF):
4.

Consider establishing a Risk Reduction Centre to conduct early
warning and assessment of the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity and cooperate with the UN. A
Risk Reduction Centre could fulfil the following important functions andsignificantly improve the region’s capacity to prevent and respondeffectively to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity:(a) Establish a transparent and reliable method of early warning analysis
that includes safeguards against politicisation and utilises local
knowledge.
(b) Conduct risk analysis of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing andcrimes against humanity. Applying the agreed framework, the Centre
could conduct annual risk analysis. On request, it could provide timely
and accurate advice to the ARF Chair, ARF Ministerial Meetings andInter-sessional Meetings and provide research support to the Eminentand Expert Persons.
(c) Cooperate with the Joint Office of the Special Advisers to the UN
Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide and RtoP (hereafter‘Joint Office’).
(d) Share best practices and learn lessons with the UN and other regions.
(e) Establish small teams of experts on matters such as ceasefires,
power sharing arrangements, disarmament, election design andmonitoring, human rights protection and promotion and constitutional
reform. These teams could assist the ARF Chair and governments onrequest.
(f)

Facilitate desktop exercises to examine the connections between
early warning assessment and response. This might include
conducting scenario based games with defence officials to demystify
the process of early warning, assessment and response, forge
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anticipatory relationships and identify areas in need of further
development.
5.

Consider strengthening its capacity to employ diplomacy to mediate
and resolve crises before they escalate. Diplomacy is one of the best
preventive tools. When used effectively, preventive diplomacy can prevent
crises from escalating and forestall the need for other measures. Most
cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity have political roots and therefore require political solutions. Third
party mediation is often required to build trust between the parties. It has
been used to good effect by regional arrangements in Africa andelsewhere. The ARF could consider adopting a similar role by developing
capacities that could be used to mediate and resolve crises early, on aconsensual basis, preventing their escalation. In particular, it could
consider:(a) The appointment of envoys by the ARF Chair.
(b) The establishment and maintenance of a register of high-level andexperienced people who are able and willing to serve as envoys. ARF
participants might further assist by ensuring that they regularly update
their list of Eminent and Expert Persons and ensure that at least one
person on that list has experience with diplomacy or mediation. EEPs
might then be called upon to fulfil these duties.
(c) Utilisation of a ‘Friends of the Chair’ mechanism by the ARF Chair.
(d) Inviting the ARF Chair to cooperate with the Secretary-General of
ASEAN in responding to imminent emergencies or crises.

6.

Consider establishing a standing regional capacity to prevent
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity
and respond to them in a timely and decisive manner. Many countries
in the Asia Pacific are already major contributors of personnel, finances,and equipment to UN peacekeeping missions. Groups such as the ARF
could use this comparative advantage to augment the region’s contribution
to regional and global security by establishing a standing capacity that
could be available for deployment, at the request of the host state or theUN, in order to prevent the four RtoP crimes or respond to theircommission in a timely and decisive manner. The ability to rapidly fund,organise, deploy and coordinate operations to prevent or respond to thefour RtoP crimes strengthens stability, saves lives and increases the
chances of success. Yet rapid deployment is often difficult to achieve. The
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ARF could consider working towards the establishment of a regional
standing capacity to deploy soldiers, police forces and civilians to preventthe four RtoP crimes or respond to them in the event of either a requestfrom the host government or the authorisation of the UN Security Council.
The development of specific proposals in this area will need to be drawn
up with a careful eye for detail and should draw on the findings of the
CSCAP Study Group on Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding. More work isneeded to examine the modalities for working towards the development ofsuch a standing regional capacity but a key starting point is joint andmultinational training.
7.

ARF participants should consider providing voluntary backgroundbriefings. There is no single template that states can refer to when
implementing their primary responsibility to protect. Differences of history,geography, culture, ethnic composition and political disposition may meanthat practices and institutional configurations that might work in one
country are inappropriate when applied to another. Equally, though, ideas
developed in one place might help leaders in another to address their
particular issues. Therefore, it is important to recognise that valuablelessons can be learned from all states. The ARF already provides
opportunities for governments to provide background briefings. Thismechanism could be used to provide states with an opportunity to present
reports about their policies, experiences and plans for the implementationof their Pillar I responsibilities and to learn from the experience of others.
Background briefings to peers through the ARF could also extend toparticipating states providing voluntary briefings on their domestic situation,
identifying challenges and risk factors, explaining recent developments
where appropriate and identifying areas where assistance might beneeded. Over time, officials might be encouraged to include information
about domestic issues with regional implications in the ARF.s Annual
Security Outlook.

8.

Consider establishing an Inter-Sessional Meeting on Small Arms andLight Weapons. The management of small arms and light weapons(SALW) is particularly relevant to the capacity of a state to exercise its
primary responsibility to protect. The proliferation and trade in illicit SALW
is a key catalyst for political instability and for the commission of genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity by non-state
actors. The ARF has established an impressive track record of activism on
this issue, ably supported by CSCAP. Given the clear connection between
SALW, regional instability and the potential commission of genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity by non-state actors,
the work already undertaken by the ARF on this issue, the establishment
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of an ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on SALW would represent both anatural next step for the ARF and an important element of its contribution
to the implementation of RtoP.
9.

Establish a consultative mechanism to monitor and advise the UN
Peacebuilding Commission and support national capacity building toprevent the four RtoP crimes. Supporting states to build the capacity toprotect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing andcrimes against humanity is an absolutely critical component of the RtoP.
Capacity building in this context refers primarily to the building of effective
and legitimate state institutions but also to the achievement of sustainable
and equitable economic growth. The most obvious avenue is to augment
the peacebuilding activities undertaken by the UN in states under stress.
With that in mind, the CSCAP Study Group on RtoP supports the proposal
brought forward by the CSCAP Study Group on Peacekeeping andPeacebuilding, for the establishment of a consultative mechanism tomonitor and advise the UN Peacebuilding Commission, focusing especiallyon targeted economic assistance to tackle specific peacebuilding related
problems and support for rule of law capacity building. This could be
supported by a small Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program within
the ARF Unit.

10.

Consider strengthening the Eminent and Experts Persons Group sothat it may play a role in implementing RtoP. The ARF Eminent andExpert Persons Group (EEPs) represents an important source of expertisethat has a number of important roles to play in implementing RtoP.
Operating within their, the EEPs might contribute to implementing RtoP by,among other things:(a) Providing advice on a regional framework for early warning andassessment and assisting the Risk Reduction Centre.
(b) Supporting the ARF Chair’s efforts in the fields of diplomacy,
mediation, fact-finding and good-will missions.
(c) Compiling guidelines relating to best practice mediation and lessons
learned from past cases. These guidelines could be regularly updated,presented to mediators, and used as a training guide.
(d) Engaging in experts-level dialogue with the UN’s Joint Office on
Genocide Prevention and RtoP.

For global institutions and partnership with the Asia Pacific:
811.

Anticipatory relationships should be established between the region
and the UN to facilitate cooperation in the prevention of the four RtoP
crimes and effective responses. When genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity are incited or committed, delays
could cost thousands of lives. The utilisation of networks and relationships
in the face of a crisis is made much easier if they exist prior to the crisisand easier still if there are pre-established mechanisms for liaison. The
Asia Pacific region has already begun to develop national focal points andnetworks relating to peacekeeping, disaster response and humanitarian
operations. There are several possible ways of building these relationships,
so that they might be utilised for preventive purposes when the incitement
or commission of RtoP crimes is threatened. For instance:(a) Annual high-level dialogue between the UN and relevant regionalarrangements.
(b) Regular officials-level meetings on peace and security.
(c) The provision of training in early warning, assessment, conflict
analysis and other related areas by the UN’s Joint Office.
(d) Young leaders dialogue.

12.

Region-to-region and intra-regional dialogue should be strengthened
to facilitate the identification of best practices and lessons learned
relating to the implementation of RtoP. Each region has somethingunique to bring to the debate about how best to implement the RtoP.
Officials from ARF participating states could engage in annual region-toregion dialogue aimed at identifying best practices and lessons learned
relating to the implementation of RtoP. An alternative avenue is Track Two
dialogue. There exist a number of bilateral and multilateral Track Twochannels for region-to-region dialogue and CSCAP itself provides apotential vehicle for Track Two region-to-region dialogue.

NEXT STEPS FOR THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM
The implementation of RtoP within the ARF should proceed carefully and withdue consideration for the views of ARF participants. The process should also
provide ample opportunity for participants to examine, evaluate and debate therelevant issues. It should begin with modest and sustainable first steps.

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STEP 1> ARF Experts Meeting to consider the measures recommended
here. The Experts Meeting, which would ideally include representation from the
CSCAP Study Group on RtoP, could examine in detail the feasibility of thespecific measures identified in this Memorandum and Study Group’s Final Reportand consider and offer its own proposals on each of the twelve recommendations
contained in this report.
STEP 2 > Inter-sessional meeting on implementing RtoP. Having scrutinised
and modified the implementation agenda, the ARF experts meeting could
consider presenting a recommendation that the ARF establish an inter-sessional
meeting on implementing RtoP and a detailed assessment of the items forconsideration. The inter-sessional meeting may in turn consider bringing specificrecommendations to the ARF Ministerial Meeting in a timely fashion.
STEP 3 > Consideration of proposals by ARF Ministerial Meeting. The
Ministerial Meeting might be charged with debating the proposals brought tothem, agreeing on which to adopt, and taking the agenda forward from words todeeds by implementing agreed proposals
STEP 4 > Implementation

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ABOUT CSCAP

CSCAP is a non-governmental (second track) process for dialogue on security
issues in the Asia Pacific. Membership in CSCAP is on an institutional basis andconsists of Member Committees. Current membership comprises Australia,
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, theDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia,
Mongolia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
and the USA.
The functions of CSCAP are as follows:a. to provide an informal mechanism by which political and security issues
can be discussed by scholars, officials, and others in their private
capacities;
b. to encourage the participants of such individuals from countries andterritories in the Asia Pacific on the basis of the principle of inclusiveness;c. to organise various working groups to address security issues andchallenges facing the region;d. to provide policy recommendations to various intergovernmental bodies onpolitical-security issues;e. to convene regional and international meetings and other cooperative
activities for the purpose of discussing political-security issues;
f. to establish linkages with institutions and organisations in other parts of theworld to exchange information, insights and experiences in the area ofregional political-security cooperation; andg. to produce and disseminate publications relevant to the other purposes ofthe organisation.
Study groups are the primary mechanism for CSCAP activity. As of June 2011,
there were eight CSCAP Study Groups. These are concerned with: (i) Countering
the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific; (ii) Export
Controls; (iii) Significance of the Existence of Regional Transnational Crime Hubs
to the Governments of the Asia Pacific Region; (iv) Multilateral Security
Governance in Northeast Asia/North Pacific; (v) Naval Enhancement in the Asia
Pacific; (vi) Responsibility to Protect; (vii) Water Resources Security; and (viii)
Cyber Security.
This memorandum was produced by the CSCAP Study Group on Responsibility
to Protect (RtoP) and was approved by the 35th CSCAP Steering Committee
Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 2 June 2011.

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Further information on CSCAP can be obtained from the CSCAP website atwww.cscap.org or by contacting the CSCAP Secretariat:
CSCAP Secretariat
c/o ISIS Malaysia
1 Persiaran Sultan Salahuddin
PO Box 12424
50778 Kuala Lumpur
Malaysia
T: +603-2693 9366 Ext 125
F: +603-2693 9375
E: cscap@isis.org.my

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CSCAP Memoranda
CSCAP Memoranda are the outcome of the work of Study Groups approved by
the Steering Committee and submitted for consideration by the ASEAN Regional
Forum and other bodies.
Memorandum No.17 - Promoting the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
Author: Study Group on the Security Implications of Climate Change in the Asia
Pacific
Date published: June 2011
Memorandum No.16 - Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations
Author: Study Group on Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations
Date published: January 2011
Memorandum No.15 - The Security Implications of Climate Change
Author: Study Group on the Security Implications of Climate Change
Date published: July 2010
Memorandum No.14 - Guidelines for Managing Trade of Strategic Goods
Author: Export Controls Experts Group (XCXG)
Date published: March 2009
Memorandum No.13 - Guidelines for Maritime Cooperation in Enclosed andSemi-Enclosed Seas and Similar Sea Areas of the Asia PacificAuthor: Study Group on Facilitating Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific
Date published: June 2008
Memorandum No.12 - Maritime Knowledge and Awareness: Basic Foundationsof Maritime Security
Author: Study Group on Facilitating Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific
Date published: December 2007
Memorandum No.11 - Human Trafficking
Author: Study Group on Human Trafficking
Date published: June 2007
Memorandum No.10 - Enhancing Efforts to Address the Factors Driving
International Terrorism
Author: Study Group on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Campaign Against
International Terrorism with Specific Reference to the Asia Pacific Region13Date published: December 2005
Memorandum No.9 - Trafficking of Firearms in the Asia Pacific Region
Author: Working Group on Transnational Crime
Date published: May 2004
Memorandum No.8 - The Weakest Link? Seaborne Trade and the Maritime
Regime in the Asia PacificAuthor: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: April 2004
Memorandum No.7 - The Relationship Between Terrorism and Transnational
Crime
Author: Working Group on Transnational Crime
Date published: July 2003
Memorandum No.6 - The Practice of the Law of the Sea in the Asia PacificAuthor: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: December 2002
Memorandum No.5 - Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea
Author: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: February 2001
Memorandum No.4 - Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation
Author: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: December 1997
Memorandum No.3 - The Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Cooperative
Security
Author: Working Group on Comprehensive and Cooperative Security
Date published: December 1995
Memorandum No.2 - Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures
Author: Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures
Date published: June 1995
Memorandum No.1 - The Security of the Asia Pacific Region
Author: CSCAP
Date published: April 1994

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