The Military-Industrial-Think
Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New
American Security
By Brett Heinz and Erica Jung
February 2021

Revolving Door Project1611 Connecticut Ave. NW
Suite 400
Washington, DC 20009
https://therevolvingdoorproject.org

Brett Heinz is the International
Program Assistant at the Center for
Economic and Policy Research(CEPR). Erica Jung is a former
intern at CEPR’s Revolving Door
Project.

Contents
Introduction

3

History and Background4

Corporate and Government Money in CNAS’s Donor Portfolio

6

Donor Involvement in CNAS’s Board of Advisors

8

A Very Unclear Line: Case Studies of Conflicts of Interest at CNAS

11

Private Military Contractors on the Battlefield

11

Ties to the US Military in Afghanistan

12

Drone Exports to the United Arab Emirates

14

Air Force Purchases of the B-21 Raider

15

China and the Pacific16

CNAS Alumni and the Biden Administration

18

Kurt Campbell

20

Avril Haines

20

Victoria Nuland

21

Other Concerns

21

Conclusion and Recommendations

23

References

27
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Alex Main, Ben Freeman,
Dan Beeton, Dawn Niederhauser, Jake Johnston,
Jeff Hauser, Joe Sammut, Miranda Litwak, Robert
Naiman, and Sarah Rawlins.

2

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Introduction
Since its founding in 2007, the bipartisan think tank Center for a New American Security(CNAS) has functioned not only as a research institution, but also as an incubator from which
presidential administrations select foreign policy personnel. Under the new US presidential
administration, at least 16 CNAS alumni have been selected for foreign policy positions.1
It is concerning, then, that the Center has exhibited a pattern of behavior in which serious
conflicts of interest have gone unacknowledged and undisclosed. CNAS receives large
contributions directly from defense contractors, foreign governments, and the US government;
publishes research and press material that frequently supports the interests of its sponsors
without proper disclosure; and even gives its financial sponsors an official oversight role inhelping to shape the organization’s research.
This report first examines CNAS’s major corporate and government donors, along with several
mechanisms through which these donors likely exert influence on the think tank’s research
agenda. Next, five case studies are presented in which CNAS has promoted the interests of its
donors without proper disclosure: 1) supporting the US military’s use of private militarycontractors who donated to CNAS, 2) advocating for the preferred Afghanistan strategy ofactive-duty US military officials with close links to the Center, 3) making a deal with the UAE
embassy for research calling for looser military drone export rules to the country, 4)advocating for additional purchases of jets produced by one of CNAS’ largest contributors, and5) recommending policies on US-China relations which would benefit multiple CNAS donors.
Finally, this report reviews CNAS figures in the Biden administration.
Business leaders and policy experts both possess a demonstrably outsized influence on US
foreign policy-making,2 so financial relationships connecting these two parties are potentiallyquite problematic, especially when the policy experts later move on to public office through the“revolving door.” When the business community has such strong influence over a research
institution, and that research institution plays a powerful role in staffing the government, it
follows that the business community may have influence over government policymaking.

1 See Table 2.
2 Jacobs and Page (2005).

3

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

CNAS is far from alone among Washington think tanks engaging in questionable ethicalbehavior of the variety described in this report, and all such behavior merits greater scrutiny.3
But the scale and scope of conflicts of interest which appear in CNAS’s work further highlights
serious concerns about political corruption as the US completes a historically troubled
transition from an administration rife with conflicts of interest, and as President Biden bringsin new staff to run the foreign policy and national security agendas of the world’s mostpowerful country.

History and Background
The Center for a New American Security has had deep Washington ties from the beginning.
Both cofounders, Michèle Flournoy and Kurt Campbell, served in Bill Clinton’s Defense
Department, among other government roles. The organization’s official launch event in 2007
featured remarks by former secretary of state Madeline Albright and keynote speeches by
senators Hillary Clinton (D-NY) and Chuck Hagel (R-NE), president Obama’s future secretaries
of state and defense, respectively.4
CNAS portrayed itself as a prestigious new research institution that sought to turn away fromthe foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration while still supporting a “strong,
pragmatic, and principled” approach to foreign policy. In one of their first publications, released
the same day as the launch event, Flournoy and Campbell state:
The next president will have to convince the American people and their representatives
in Congress to reject the neo-isolationist impulses they may feel in the wake of Iraq inorder to embrace a smarter and more selective form of engagement. Our nation’s
history and power—economic, military, and cultural—give the United States a unique rolein the world. The United States has been and will continue to be the preeminent leader
in the international community, and we cannot protect or advance our interests in a
globalized world if we do not continue to serve in that role. But with this unique role
come great responsibilities.5

3 See, for example, Williams and Silverstein (2013); Beeton (2014); and Lipton and Williams (2016).
4 Center for a New American Security (2007).
5 Campbell and Flournoy (2007).

4

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

This and other early reports provide a useful window into the hawkish views that orient muchof CNAS’s research and analysis. The think tank’s first-ever report, also coauthored by
Flournoy, argued that “the U.S. has enduring interests” in Iraq and the Middle East, “and theseinterests will require a significant military presence there for the foreseeable future.”6
Journalist Nathan Hodge described the Center’s overall approach “as a way for centrist
Democrats to reclaim a place in the national security debate ahead of the 2008 presidential
race.”7 But rumor quickly spread that the organization had ulterior priorities as well. In late2008, the Wall Street Journal noted that the Center was “rapidly emerging as a top farm teamfor the incoming Obama administration.”8 By the spring of 2010, at least 14 CNAS staffers had
been selected for positions in the Obama Defense and State departments; more came later.9
CNAS itself acknowledged from its early days that it received funding directly from major
weapons contractors and defense companies. These concerns eventually reached Congress.
At the 2009 hearing for CNAS cofounder Kurt Campbell’s appointment to the State
Department, Senate Foreign Relations chairman Jim Webb (D-VA) asked a series of questions:
The question really revolves around the creation of the Center for a New American
Security in ‘07 being heavily funded by defense contractors in government contracts.
And … former CNAS employees then migrating into the president’s administration, andwhether there are appropriate firewalls between the formation of that…. The viewpoint
here is that it was created just before an election cycle, with these contracts moving
into it, and then so many of the principals or employees moving into the administration.
Would you care to comment on that?
Campbell’s response defended CNAS and downplayed the funding. Going further, he said: “Wenever talked about weapons systems. We do not talk about defense systems. We instead try toalways talk at a very high level, on policy issues associated with national security….” Regarding
the political consulting that he and other CNAS officials do on the side, including for CNAS
donors, he added: “We’ve kept a very clear line. Not one of our publications, not one of ourpublic advocacies ever touches on anything that these companies worked on.”10

6 Flournoy and Brimley (2007).
7 Hodge (2010a).
8 Dreazen (2008).
9 Hodge (2010a).
10 Vote Smart (2009).

5

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Campbell set a “very clear line” for when he believes behavior becomes problematic: taking
defense industry money while writing broadly about defense issues poses no issue, while
talking about specific products produced by donors does. CNAS has a similar policy on their“about” page, stating that they “will not engage in any representational activities or advocacy
on behalf of any entities or interests.”11
As we will see, what makes the ethical standard set both in Campbell’s testimony and on
CNAS’s website so notable is that the think tank would go on to violate it on multiple separate
occasions, often without any acknowledgement that they were doing so.

Corporate and Government Money in CNAS’s Donor
Portfolio
Though CNAS describes itself as an “independent, bipartisan, nonprofit organization” that is“committed to the highest standards of organizational, intellectual, and personal integrity,” thelist of donors they provide on their website gives much cause for preliminary concern.12 Thinktanks are generally funded through a diverse array of sources, including academia,
governments, individual donors, non-profit foundations, private companies, and projectspecific grants.13 However, when a think tank is funded primarily by for-profit and governmentorganizations with interests relevant to their research, concerns emerge about the potential for
conflicts of interest which can threaten the impartiality of the research.
Top contributors to the Center for a New American Security include General Atomics Chairman
and CEO Neal Blue, the US Department of State, and two seperate Pentagon offices.14 In thelast decade, CNAS has received funding from all of the “big five” defense contractors —Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon — along withat least 24 other defense companies. A recent Center for International Policy (CIP) review ofdefense industry and US government support for 50 major American think tanks found that,from 2014 to 2019, “CNAS ... received more funding from defense contractors than any otherthink tank analyzed here.”15
11 CNAS (2021a).
12 Op. Cit.
13 The Revolving Door Project and its fiscal sponsor, the Center for Economic and Policy Research, do not receive funding
from corporate or foreign government sources, and roughly 80% of funding is from foundation grants. For more, see
CEPR (2021).
14 CNAS (2021b).
15 Freeman (2020). CNAS’s past and present donors in the defense industry include Airbus, BAE Systems, Boeing, Booz
Allen Hamilton, CACI, Cubic, DynCorp, Elbit Systems, General Dynamics, GE, Hensoldt, Huntington Ingalls, Itochu,

6

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Their ties with Northrop Grumman are particularly close. According to CIP’s study, over half ofNorthrop’s total contributions in the sample “went to just one think tank: CNAS.” The defense
giant has been listed among CNAS’s top tier of donors for at least five consecutive years.16
Alongside contributions from the Departments of Defense and State, US government funding
has also come from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the National
Intelligence Council. Additionally, NATO and at least 11 foreign governments allied with the US
have made contributions since 2015: Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Norway, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Other
supporters of CNAS include fossil fuel companies like BP and Chevron, investment banks like
Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase, and technology firms like Facebook, Google, andMicrosoft. Overall, 18 of the 100 largest publicly traded corporations in the US eachcontributed to CNAS in the last fiscal year alone.17
Such a breadth of sponsors raises concerns about the feasibility of impartial analysis. Though
the mere existence of a conflict of interest does not prove corruption, it creates opportunities
for corruption that most organizations seek to minimize via internal accountability
mechanisms or the use of disclosures when relevant. CNAS goes further than many others inlisting its major donors online. But while stating in tax filings that they have a conflict ofinterest policy,18 the case studies reviewed in this report suggest that said policy fails torequire authors to disclose straightforward institutional conflicts of interests on publications
where such disclosures would be highly relevant.
Most CNAS reports appear with some variation of a statement from the organization’s “about”
page: “CNAS does not take institutional positions on policy issues and the content of CNAS
publications reflects the views of their authors alone.”19 Several reports also include somevariation of the disclaimer that “the authors are solely responsible for any errors in fact,
analysis, or omission.”20 These inclusions give the Center ways to redirect potential concerns
L3/Harris, Leidos, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon Technologies, Rheinmetall, Rolls-Royce,
Saab AB, Safran, SAIC, and Textron. Hodge (2010a) adds Aegis Defense Services and KBR to the list, while Shorrock(2016) adds Mission Essential Personnel and ManTech International, thus bringing the total to at least 29 companies.
16 CNAS (2021b). Annualized lists of CNAS donors going back to the 2015-16 fiscal year can be accessed via the Internet
Archive’s Wayback Machine: https://web.archive.org/web/2020*/https://www.cnas.org/support-cnas/cnas-supporters
17 Op. Cit. and Fortune (2020). The 18 are: Alphabet [Google], Amazon, Bank of America, Boeing, Chevron, Cisco, Citigroup,
Comcast, ExxonMobil, Facebook, IBM, JP Morgan Chase, Lockheed Martin, Microsoft, Northrop Grumman, Prudential
Financial, Raytheon Technologies, and UPS.
18 CNAS (2020a).
19 CNAS (2021a).
20 For a recent example, see page 6 of Cordell and Lee (2021).

7

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

about individual reports toward the authors, thus skirting questions of institutional
responsibility. Flournoy herself has acknowledged this when discussing practices for conflictof interest avoidance: “… at a place like CNAS, it’s a little easier, in that we don’t takeinstitutional positions: our scholars have their own views, and as you’ve seen, we often debate
each other.”21
Perhaps more disturbing still are the aspects of CNAS’s organizational structure that offer
donors what appears to be a direct role in shaping their research. The “CNAS Corporate
Partnership Program” provides tiers of benefits to corporate donors at different contribution
levels. Promotional materials tempt sponsors with the opportunity to “… shape strategic policy
conversations.” Benefits for contributors over $30,000 include access to embargoed CNAS
reports, the ability to recommend candidates for the Center’s Next Generation National
Security Fellowship, and a variety of private meetings, briefings, and events with think tankofficials. The top level, for those contributing at least $120,000, includes an “[i]nvitation toparticipate in exclusive activities for members of our Board of Advisors with national security
principals and CNAS experts.”22

21 The Fletcher School (2014). These remarks begin at 00:37:43. This transcription is lightly edited for clarity.
22 CNAS (2021c).

8

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Donor Involvement in CNAS’s Board of Advisors
While CNAS’s board of directors is in charge of the organization, there is also a board ofadvisors that “actively contributes to the development of the Center’s research and expands[their] community of interest,” with members who “engage regularly with the intellectual power
generated at CNAS, though they do not have official governance or fiduciary oversight
responsibilities.”23More than 70 percent of the seats on this board — at least 27 of the 38— belong to individuals
who work at one of CNAS’s major financial sponsors, represent multiple CNAS donors, and/or
are themselves large individual donors. Together, these board members and the organizations
they directly represent contributed between $1.6 million to $3.7 million to CNAS in the mostrecent fiscal year (between roughly 12 and 28 percent of their total revenue).24
Rather than serving as an impartial group of “prominent leaders,” their board of advisors gives
many of those financing the think tank a significant role within the organization itself. Table 1
lists these 27 advisory board members, their donations, and their current ties to relevant
industries; several board members contributing less than $5,000 were not included.
Neal Blue, the billionaire executive of General Atomics and top personal contributor to CNAS,
holds a position on the Center’s Board of Advisors. Other board members include three CEOsof defense companies who have contributed to CNAS: Huntington Ingalls,

Leidos, andLeonardo DRS. They join Arnold Punaro, chairman of the National Defense Industrial
Association, an industry trade group whose mission is to engage “… thoughtful and innovative
leaders to promote the best policies, practices, products, and technology for warfighters....”25
Other seats belong to executives from the Aerospace Industries Association, Bank of America,
McKinsey & Co., Microsoft, Raytheon, and more.

23 CNAS (2021d). For the list of CNAS’s Board of Advisors, see CNAS (2021e).
24 CNAS (2021e), CNAS (2020a), and authors’ calculations.
25 NDIA (2021a) and NDIA (2021b).

9

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Table 1
Members of the CNAS Board of Advisors and their Connections to CNAS’ Donor Portfolio
Board Member

Carol Deane

Donor Type
Individual &Indirect
Individual

Carol Eggert

Corporate

Christopher Heinz

Foundation

Dale L. Ponikvar

Individual

Eric Fanning

IndirectFrederick O. Terrell
Frederick S.
Humphries, Jr.
H. Perry Boyle
Heather Nauert
James M.
Beamesderfer

Individual

Arnold Punaro

Corporate

Overlap with Donor Organizations
Board Chairman, National Defense Industrial
Association (NDIA)*
Senior VP of Military and Veteran Affairs,
Comcast NBCUniversal
Director of Board of Advisors, Heinz
Endowment, Heinz Family Foundation

2019-20 Contribution Level$10,000 – 24,999 & NDIA
members are contributors$100,000 – 249,999$100,000 – 249,999$50,000 – 99,999$25,000 – 49,999

President and CEO, Aerospace Industries
Association (AIA)*AIA members are contributors$10,000 – 24,999

Corporate VP of U.S. Government Affairs,
Microsoft$100,000 – 249,999

Individual
Corporate

Advisory Board Member, BGR Group$25,000 – 49,999$25,000 – 49,999

Corporate

VP, Veterans Initiatives, Prudential Financial$100,000 – 249,999

Jeremy Achin

Corporate

CEO and Cofounder, DataRobot$100,000 – 249,999

Joe Reeder

Individual

Lawrence Di Rita

Corporate

Mark Chandler
Michael Beckley

Neal Blue
Raj ShahRebecca Liao
Roger Krone

Corporate
Individual
Individual &Corporate
Individual
Individual
Individual
Corporate

Timothy J. McBride

Corporate

Thomas Schick

Individual
Individual &Corporate
Individual &Corporate
Individual
Individual &Corporate

Mike Petters

Todd Zabelle
Varun Marya
Walter F. Parkes
William J. Lynn III$5,000 – 9,999
Market President for Greater Washington DC,
Bank of America
Executive VP, CLO, and CCO, Cisco Systems
President and CEO, Huntington Ingalls
Industries
Chairman and CEO, General Atomics

Chairman and CEO, Leidos
Head of Global Government Relations,
Raytheon Technologies
Founder and CEO, Strategic Project Solutions
Senior Partner, McKinsey & Company
CEO, Leonardo DRS and Leonardo North
America$100,000 – 249,999$100,000 – 249,999$25,000 – 49,999$10,000 – 24,999 ind. &$100,000 – 249,999 corp.
$250,000 – 499,999$10,000 – 24,999$10,000 – 24,999$100,000 – 249,999$50,000 – 99,999$5,000 – 9,999$25,000 – 49,999 ind. &$25,000 – 49,999 corp.
<$4,999 ind. &$25,000 – 49,999 corp.
$25,000 – 49,999<$4,999 ind. &$100,000 – 249,999 corp.

Sources and Notes: CNAS (2021b) and CNAS (2021e). Three more advisory board members had individual contributions <$4,999,
while a possible fourth, “Jim” Thomas, could not be verified as the donor “James” Thomas.
*: NDIA and AIA are both membership-based defense industry trade groups.

10

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

A Very Unclear Line: Case Studies of Conflicts ofInterest at CNAS
The Center’s unique funding portfolio and internal structure may help to provide some insight
into the various ethical concerns raised around its work since its early years. What follows are
five case studies where significant undisclosed conflicts of interest have arisen.

Private Military Contractors on the Battlefield
No more than six months after Kurt Campbell’s defense of CNAS in which he drew a “very clearline” that “[n]ot one of our publications ... ever touches on anything that [our donors] worked
on,”26 the organization released a publication touching on something which some of theirdonors worked on. In December 2009, coauthors John A. Nagl and Richard Fontaine publisheda report on the controversial role of private military contractors operating on behalf of the US
in war zones, a role that had expanded dramatically during the War on Terror.
“Contractors have become an enduring feature of modern American conflicts, and the UnitedStates cannot now engage in hostilities or in reconstruction and stabilization operations
without them,” the report states. Though the contracting industry may be “plagued by its own
set of problems,” Nagl and Fontaine argue reforms can improve performance; regardless,“contractors in American conflicts are here to stay.” They add: “not a single mission in Iraq or
Afghanistan has failed because of contractor non-performance,” a claim which is correct only
in a purely technical sense.27
Several months later, it was reported that CNAS had received funding from Aegis Defence
Services, DynCorp, KBR, and other military contractors who provided the types of services
praised in CNAS’s paper.28 This funding is not disclosed anywhere in the full report. Later
reporting revealed that CNAS also accepted funding from additional private militarycontractors such as Mission Essential Personnel and SAIC, though these contributions may
have come after the paper’s publication.29 Many of these companies had a direct financial
26 Vote Smart (2009).
27 Nagl and Fontaine (2009). As they acknowledge, private military contractors have not been criticized primarily for acutefailures in specific operations, but for more systemic issues of accountability, political legitimacy, cost-efficiency, etc.
that contribute to a failure in achieving long-term strategic priorities. See Singer (2003).
28 Hodge (2010a).
29 Shorrock (2016).

11

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

stake in the subject of CNAS’s report. DynCorp, for example, ultimately received $2.8 billion inState Department funding for its Afghanistan operations from 2002 to 2013, or 69 percent of
the State Department’s total such funding over this period.30
John A. Nagl — coauthor of the report, former CNAS president, and current advisory board
member — commented: “The people we talk to, our corporate funders, are involved in thatbusiness.… We talk to them about the fact that we’re doing that project. We talk to them about
their perspectives on it — but they don’t directly fund that work.”31 This suggests that
contributions to the Center’s general fund are not considered sufficient grounds for a
disclosure, contradicting Flournoy’s later claim that CNAS’s tendency toward the “pooling offunding” is a force that actually “washes out” some concerns of “bias.”32 The report’s othercoauthor, Richard Fontaine, is currently CNAS’s CEO.33

Ties to the US Military in Afghanistan
The Center has close ties to current and former US military officials, even beyond their
Pentagon funding. When former Pentagon spokesperson David Romley was announced as
CNAS’s senior VP in 2015, he was praised by retired Gen. James Mattis, whom the think tankdescribed as “a member of [the] CNAS Board of Directors and Romley’s former Commanding
General.”34 In fact, Romley had been the “senior Marine spokesman” for Gen. Mattis himself.35
Mattis has since served as defense secretary under Trump, while Romley’s work elsewhere
has implicated him as a participant in a disinformation campaign commissioned by the former
de facto Bolivian government to support the 2019 coup which put them in power.36
CNAS’s work on the war in Afghanistan helped revealed how far the Center would go topromote the ideas shared by military officials whom they have close ties to. They served as anintellectual hub for “counterinsurgency” theory in the context of the US’ ongoing wars, and in2010 they effectively circumvented the military’s chain of command by publishing a public
critique of US strategy in Afghanistan by then-active duty Gen. Michael Flynn (Trump’s futurenational security advisor). Nagl defended the move at the time, but admitted: “Obviously, it was

30 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (2014).
31 Hodge (2010a).
32 The Fletcher School (2014). These remarks begin at 00:38:08. This transcription is lightly edited for clarity
33 CNAS (2021i).
34 CNAS (2015).
35 Romley (2021). Though absent from the press release, this may have featured on his now-deleted CNAS staff profile.
36 Heinz (2020).

12

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

an irregular way to disseminate an idea for a serving officer.”37 The report helped Flynn
advance his controversial career, an act which the Center’s Thomas E. Ricks has sinceapologized for, acknowledging the “new prominence in the world of intelligence” it gave him.38
While a CNAS fellow, former US Army officer Andrew Exum was invited by Gen. Stanley
McChrystal, formerly his immediate boss, to be one of several experts participating in a 2009
“strategic assessment” of US Afghanistan strategy.39 Gen. McChrystal wanted to revise themilitary’s approach, and knew that “upon returning from their Pentagon-organized visit to
Afghanistan, many of the participants in the strategic assessment would serve as an advanceguard for [his] upcoming request for a significant increase in troops and resources.”40
As documented by George Mason University’s Janine Wedel, Exum obliged.41 In an October
2009 PBS interview, Exum praised McChrystal as one of the US’s “best and brightest
commanders” without disclosing their personal relationship.42 The same month, he released a
CNAS policy brief describing the “best case scenario for Afghanistan” as one that “requires aconsiderable investment of resources, though perhaps fewer than imagined,” including
additional troop deployments.43 Exum mentions McChrystal’s strategic assessment, but
discloses neither his participation in it nor his time as a civilian advisor to McChrystal.
It was a September 2009 Washington Post book review that ultimately sparked controversy.
Exum wrote that a book by Jon Krakauer (Where Men Win Glory: The Odyssey of Pat Tillman,
which included serious criticism of McChrystal) “falls flat,” largely because Krakauer was too“eager to launch an inquisition into the crimes of the Bush administration….”44 In a CNAS blog
post, Exum doubled down: “Stan McChrystal is one of the finest men I have ever known, and I
hope I have sons who serve under men like him. Jon Krakauer is going after him now because
he has written a crappy book and now has to sell it.”45
In November, the Post’s ombudsman published an article announcing that their “contract withreviewers requires them to disclose even the ‘possibility’ of ‘an appearance of a conflict of
37 Hodge (2010b). For the report, see Pottinger, Flynn, and Batchelor (2010).
38 Hodge (2010a) and Ricks (2016).
39 Conan (2010) and Brand (2011).
40 Hodge (2010a).
41 Wedel (2016).
42 Exum (2009a).
43 Exum (2009b).
44 Exum (2009c).
45 Exum (2009d). Exum ran a blog on CNAS’s website under the pseudonym of “Abu Muqawama.” Exum (2013). Since then,
an update of the CNAS website has caused Exum’s posts to appear without an author line, though his authorship is
made clear by references to Exum’s work in the first person.

13

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

interest,’” and that this “no-conflict clause was violated” by Exum’s failure to disclose his
participation in Gen. McChrystal’s assessment.46 Unlike Exum’s CNAS paper, the book review
now appears with a correction disclosing the conflict of interest. Nonetheless, the larger media
campaign around McChrystal helped turn President Obama away from his initial skepticism
and to ultimately embrace McChrystal’s request for a “surge” in Afghanistan.47 Exum later
served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle Eastern policy from 2015 to 2016.48

Drone Exports to the United Arab Emirates
In June 2017, media outlets were sent leaked emails from an account belonging to Yousef alOtaiba, UAE ambassador to the US. Among the documents was an invoice from July 2016 inwhich CNAS billed the Emirati embassy $250,000 for a “UAE Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) Study.”49 The embassy of the Persian Gulf monarchy, which at that time wasinvolved in a brutal war and accompanying humanitarian disaster in Yemen,50 paid CNAS to
produce a private paper which Otaiba could use to advocate for looser rules surrounding theexport of US military-grade drones.
Otaiba received the report, circulated it among UAE military officials, and wrote back: “…thankyou for the report. I think it will help push the debate in the right direction. Some of the UAV[unmanned aerial vehicle] manufacturers are pushing for a similar conclusion, so this reportmight reaffirm their arguments.”51
A month after Otaiba’s email, CNAS published a paper on drone proliferation which argued that“[t]he Trump administration should loosen restrictions on drone exports,” and “consider
targeted exports of uninhabited aircraft, including armed uninhabited aircraft, to close partners
and allies provided that they agree to the principles for proper use.”52 The paper makes nomention of the Center’s deal with the UAE. A CNAS spokesperson admitted that the researchdone for Otaiba’s paper had “supported an already ongoing CNAS project on drone
profliferation policy,” but insisted that both papers adhered to their “intellectual independence”
policies.53
46 Alexander (2009).
47 Baker (2009).
48 US Department of Defense (2015).
49 Jilani and Emmons (2017).
50 Stewart (2016), Human Rights Watch (2018) and Lederer (2020).
51 Jilani and Emmons (2017).
52 Ewers, Fish, Horowitz, et. al. (2017).
53 Jilani and Emmons (2017).

14

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

The UAE first purchased unarmed drones in 2013 in a nearly $200 million deal with General
Atomics — the company led by Neal Blue, a major CNAS donor and advisory board member.54
The drones were delivered in 2017, the same year as CNAS’s report urging the US government
to let the UAE import armed drones. In response to US export restrictions, the UAE(traditionally a US ally) also purchased armed drones from China. The Royal United Services
Institute, a British think tank, observed that “[a]t least part of the reasoning behind the UAE’s
recent purchases of armed UAVs from China appears, besides prestige, to be to convince the
US to sell armed versions of its iconic MQ-9 Reaper and MQ-1 Predator UAVs…”55 CNAS’s
report mentions the acquisitions of Chinese drones by the UAE and others four separate times.
Before withdrawing from the conflict in 2019, the UAE put its Chinese-made drones to use in
Yemen, including to assassinate a Houthi political leader involved in talks toward ending theconflict just days before he was set to meet with the UN special envoy to Yemen.56 Shortly
after Election Day last year, the Trump administration nonetheless announced it planned to go
forward with a $2.9 billion sale of military drones to the UAE.57 Attempts to stop the sale overhumanitarian and security concerns failed in a 46-50 Senate vote, though it may now be on
hold due to the Biden administration’s freeze on Saudi and Emirati weapons sales.58

Air Force Purchases of the B-21 Raider
In 2018, CNAS released a report by Jerry Hendrix, former senior fellow and director of theCenter’s Defense Strategies and Assessments Program, which called the B-21 Raider stealthbomber “the next evolution in penetrating strike aircraft…” While the US Air Force currently
plans to purchase 100 of these jets, Hendrix argued that “these investments do not go far
enough,” and suggested that the military could benefit from “adding another 50 to 75 aircraft
to the planned buy,” along with other new purchases of military weaponry.59
Nowhere in the report is it disclosed that the maker of the B-21 bomber, Northrop Grumman,
was one of CNAS’s top donors at the time the report was produced; in fact, the majority of thecompany’s think tank contributions in the late 2010’s went to CNAS.60 In the nearly fourmonths since this conflict of interest was first publicly identified, no disclosure has been
54 Reuters (2013).
55 Tabrizi and Bronk (2018).
56 Walsh and Kirkpatrick (2019) and Shaif (2018).
57 Stone and Zengerle (2020).
58 Edmondson (2020) and Strobel (2021).
59 Hendrix (2018).
60 CNAS (2019), Freeman (2020), and Northrop Grumman (2021).

15

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

added.61 This constitutes a transparent contradiction of Campbell’s earlier testimony that
CNAS researchers “do not talk about defense systems” made by donors. Nor is this a lone
instance: Hendrix published a nondisclosed article the year before stating that Northrop
Grumman’s withdrawal from the competition for a Navy contract “represent[s] fears that thesituation within U.S. Navy acquisitions is far from healthy.”62
In 2019, the Air Force projected that the per-unit cost of a B-21 will be about $656 million.63 If
the Air Force were to adopt CNAS’s recommendation to add another 50 to 75 jets to its
purchase, it would mean something in the range of an additional $32.8–$49.2 billion in sales
for one of their largest donors. While CNAS scholars are far from the only participants in thedebate over B-21 procurement, taking a simplified look at Northrop Grumman’s $2.36 million in
donations to CNAS (2014–2019)64 as an investment in 50 potential new B-21 sales would
suggest a return on investment of roughly 1,390,000 percent. If CNAS’s report plays even a
miniscule role in convincing the Air Force to slightly expand B-21 acquisitions, Northrop
Grumman will successfully profit from its recent contributions to the organization through thesales of a single plane.

China and the Pacific
CNAS dedicates significant attention toward highlighting the perceived threat that China poses
to the United States. One report published last year, “Rising to the China Challenge,” wascowritten by a large group of authors including Daleep Singh, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Ely Ratner,
Peter Harrell, and Susanna Blume, all of whom now serve in the Biden administration.65
The report puts forward a list of recommendations calling for the US to plan for “China
contingencies,” to “ensure the Department of Defense can develop, access, and leverage thelatest technologies,” and to “[s]ustain and enhance a traditional and nontraditional defense
industrial base that is robust, flexible, and resilient.”66 The nearly 30 defense contractors who
have contributed to CNAS in recent years would stand to profit heavily from these proposals.
This dilemma further underlines why CNAS’s funding structure calls its independence into
question: the corollary of any major realignment of US foreign policy in the direction of
61 Hendrix (2018) and Freeman (2020).
62 Hendrix (2017).
63 Gady (2019).
64 Freeman (2020).
65 Ratner, Kliman, Blume, et. al. (2020) and Korman (2021).
66 Ratner, Kliman, Blume, et. al. (2020).

16

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

militaristic confrontation is an expansion in demand for the services of the defense industry,
the think tank’s primary patrons.
More directly, the report urges the United States to “strengthen diplomatic and security ties
with Taiwan” while failing to disclose that the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative
Office (TECRO), effectively Taiwan’s embassy in the US, is a major donor to the think tank.
CNAS is not alone in this particular conflict of interest: TECRO’s funding of DC think tanks has
been described as “omnipresent and rarely disclosed” in discussions of US-Pacific relations.67
In this particular case, the authors argued that “the United States will need to find ways toeffectively defend Taiwan, the Philippines, and Japan from growing Chinese military power.”68
In the fiscal year that CNAS made this statement, TECRO and the Japanese Embassy eachcontributed between $100,000 and $249,999 to their budget.69
Report co-author Ely Ratner, now a special assistant to the secretary of defense, has recently
been

selected

to

lead

the

Pentagon’s“ChinaTask

Force,”

which

aims

to

“provide a baseline assessment of department policies, programs and processes in regard to
the challenge China poses.”70

67 Clifton (2020).
68 Ratner, Kliman, Blume, et. al. (2020).
69 CNAS (2021b).
70 Garamone (2021).

17

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

CNAS Alumni and the Biden Administration
Flournoy has remarked on one way in which CNAS stands out from other think tanks:
At CNAS, we actually made growing the next generation of national security leaders an
explicit part of our mission. And we take a somewhat different approach to staffing bydesign ... we want to be staffed primarily by ‘futures,’ 30- or 40-something experts whoare hungry, entrepreneurial, [and] making a name for themselves. And we put thatemphasis on launching them through professional development, mentoring, etc., into
careers in public service.71
Recognizing that “think tanks are a part of this revolving door phenomenon in Washington” forolder officials leaving government, she emphasized the importance of hiring younger experts
to enter government and influence future policy. The same year as Flournoy’s address, politicalscientist Donald E. Abelson referred to institutions in this vein as “holding tanks,” think tanks“where policy experts congregate in the hope of being recruited into senior government
positions.”72 This institutional priority has become apparent again as a growing number of
CNAS officials are now serving in the Biden administration.
Table 2 lists the at least 16 CNAS alumni who have been selected for foreign policy andnational security policy-making positions in the Biden administration so far. Flournoy herself
was widely expected to serve as Biden’s defense secretary,73 but was ultimately passed overlast December. A January 8, 2021 CNAS press release announced the selection of Andrea
Kendall-Taylor, senior fellow and director of the Center’s Transatlantic Security Program, for aposition on the National Security Council (NSC), but in a February 2 tweet she declared her
intention to stay at the think tank without further explanation.74
Many of these figures previously served as volunteers on Biden’s agency review teams, whichwere responsible for managing the transition at federal agencies (thus giving them power overthe selection of nominees).75 Several of the CNAS alumni who served on these teams have not
yet had a position in the Biden administration announced, such as Sharon Burke on the
defense department review team, Alexandra Kahan on the state department team, and Matt
71 The Fletcher School (2014). These remarks begin at 00:21:08. This transcription is lightly edited for clarity.
72 Abelson (2014).
73 See, for example, Kheel and Mitchell (2020).
74 Estep (2021a) and Kendall-Taylor (2021).
75 Buildbackbetter.gov (2021) and Thompson, Meyer, and Cassella (2020).

18

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Olsen on the intelligence community team. Several CNAS alumni joining the administration
have individual records of concerning ethical conduct.
Table 2
CNAS Alumni in the Biden Administration
Name

CNAS Role

Alice Friend

Former Adjunct Senior Fellow

Avril Haines

Former Board of Directors Member

Director of National Intelligence

Colin Kahl

Former Senior Fellow

Under Secretary for Defense

Daleep Singh

Former Adjunct Senior Fellow

Deputy National Security Advisor

David Cohen

Former Adjunct Senior Fellow

Deputy Director of the CIA

Derek Chollet

Former Senior Fellow

Counselor of the Department of State

Desirée Cormier Smith
Elizabeth Rosenberg
Ely Ratner
Hady Amr
Kayla Williams
Kurt Campbell

Biden Administration Role
Deputy Chief of Staff to the Deputy Secretary of
DefenseFormer Next Generation National
Security Fellow
Director of CNAS’s Energy,
Economics, and Security Program
Executive Vice President and Directorof Studies
Former Adjunct Senior Fellow
Director of CNAS’s Military, Veterans,
and Society Program
Cofounder and Board of Directors
Chairman

Senior Advisor at the State Department
Counselor to the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of State for
Israeli-Palestinian Affairs
Assistant Secretary of Veterans Affairs for Public
Intergovernmental Affairs
Deputy Assistant to the President; and Coordinatorfor Indo-Pacific Affairs, NSC
Senior Advisor on China at the State Department’s
Policy Planning Staff
Senior Director for International Economics andCompetitiveness, NSC

Mira Rapp-Hooper

Former Adjunct Senior Fellow

Peter Harrell

Former Adjunct Senior Fellow

Susanna Blume

Director of CNAS’s Defense Program

Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Defense

Victoria Nuland

Former CEO

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Sources and Notes: Bender and Meyer (2020), Cormier Smith (2021), CNAS (2021f), CNAS (2021g), CNAS (2021h), CNAS (2021j),
CNAS (2021k), CNAS (2021l), Eidelson (2021), Estep (2021a), Estep (2021b), Korman (2021), Ravid (2021), US Department of
Defense (2021), and Wertime (2021). This count does not include Susan Rice, a former member of CNAS’s Board of Advisors
who will be serving in a domestic policy-making position in the Biden White House. Dreazen (2008) and Pager (2020). This table
was updated on February 12, 2021, to include additional CNAS alumni.

19

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Kurt Campbell
Kurt Campbell, CNAS cofounder and the most recent chair of its board of directors, has beenannounced as the Biden administration’s deputy assistant to the president and coordinator for
Indo-Pacific affairs on the NSC.76 Campbell’s response to congressional questioning during his
2009 appointment to the Obama administration, drawing “a very clear line,” has served as theprimary standard of concerning behavior for this report.
During his time in the Obama administration, Campbell helped implement the Obamaadministration’s reorientation of foreign policy toward the Pacific, often referred to as the“Pivot to Asia.” More recently, Campbell has been the chairman and CEO of The Asia Group,
LLC, a consulting firm which among other services “assists and facilitates Asian firms seeking
entry and introductions into the United States,” helping clients with “high level political andbusiness introductions in target markets…”77
Campbell served concurrently as the chairman for CNAS, which seeks to inform decisionmakers on US policy in Asia, and for The Asia Group, which seeks to persuade decision-makers
on US policy in Asia. This arrangement has led him to contradict his 2009 congressional
testimony. In 2017, Campbell personally attended an event which The Asia Group set up to
introduce Vietnam’s prime minister to “nearly 20 top American tycoons” the day before the PM
first met with President Trump; the two leaders discussed “trade and North Korea.”78 A monthearlier, a report from Campbell’s CNAS included recommendations to the Trumpadministration to pursue bilateral trade agreements and expand military support for a numberof Southeast Asian nations — including Vietnam.79

Avril Haines
Avril Haines, who was approved as the new director of national intelligence in an 84-10 Senate
vote, sat on the think tank’s board of directors and was a former principal at Flournoy’s
consulting firm WestExec, which has represented a number of major corporate clients who
donate to CNAS.80 Recent personal financial disclosures show that she reported $180,000 in

76 Estep (2021b).
77 CNAS (2020c). An archived copy of the webpage has been used, as most information on Campbell was recently deleted.
78 Tuan (2017) and Elliott (2018).
79 Cronin and Cho (2017).
80 CNAS (2021b), CNAS (2021f), Bender and Meyer (2020), Thompson and Meyer (2021), and US Senate (2021).

20

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

“consulting fees” from Palantir, which is also a CNAS donor.81 Founded by far-right billionairePeter Thiel, Palantir is a data-mining company and major contractor for Immigration andCustoms

Enforcement,

and

the

company’s

softwarehelpedfacilitate

the

Trump

administration’s mass deportations of immigrants.82
Haines previously served in the NSC and the CIA. During the latter period, she refused to
discipline CIA employees who spied on US Senate staffers’ emails while they were reviewing
the CIA’s torture program, and she reportedly resisted the declassification of the Senate
Intelligence Committee’s report on said program.83

Victoria Nuland
Victoria Nuland, former CEO of CNAS, is Biden’s selection for undersecretary of state forpolitical affairs, the department’s third-most powerful position.84 Nuland is somewhat
controversial among European diplomats for her hawkish approach toward US-Russian
relations, with one saying: “She doesn’t engage like most diplomats. She comes off as rather
ideological.”85 A leaked call in which Nuland expressed frustration with the European approach
towards the Ukraine crisis and commented “fuck the EU” circulated widely.86 In an article lastyear (after her depature from CNAS), she called for increased defense spending and weapons
development, as well as to “establish permanent bases along NATO’s eastern border.”87 The
governments of two nations on NATO’s eastern border, Latvia and Lithuania, are recent
contributors to CNAS.88

Other Concerns
While a comprehensive review of conflicts of interest in the individual careers of all 16 CNAS
alumni is outside the scope of this report, issues remain among the other CNAS alumni. As has
been noted, Blume, Harrell, Ratner, Rosenberg, and Singh were all among the co-authors of thereport “Rising to the China Challenge,” this report’s fifth case study. Furthermore, a brief
cursory review was all that was necessary to begin identifying other concerning behavior.
81 US Office of Government Ethics (2020) and CNAS (2021b).
82 Gray and Mac (2020) and Ongweso Jr. (2020).
83 Ackerman (2020).
84 Korman (2021).
85 Hudson (2015).
86 BBC (2014).
87 Nuland (2020).
88 CNAS (2021b).

21

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Derek Chollet, a former CNAS fellow and executive VP of the think tank The German MarshallFund, will serve as a counselor of the U.S. Department of State in the Biden administration. In
2019, Chollet held a series of press appearances to honor NATO’s 70th anniversary, including a
Washington Post opinion piece and congressional testimony in which he told Congress:“Continued support for funding of the U.S. military efforts in Europe will remain essential.”89 He
also teamed up with CNAS CEO Richard Fontaine for a public program at the Truman Library,
and the two coauthored a column in The Kansas City Star to promote the event the day
before.90
At no time in any of these appearances did either party openly disclose the fact that both oftheir organizations received funding from NATO. CNAS received somewhere between $25,000
and $50,000 from NATO’s Allied Command Transformation HQ in 2018, the year prior to theevent, while the German Marshall Fund received between $250,000 and $500,000 from NATOin both 2017 and 2018.91

89 Chollet (2019a) and Chollet (2019b).
90 Truman Library Institute (2019) and Chollet and Fontaine (2019).
91 Freeman (2020). Data confirmed via an email request to Ben Freeman, Director of CIP’s Foreign Influence Transparency
Initiative, 11 January 2021.

22

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Conclusion and Recommendations
In 2014, CNAS cofounder Michèle Flournoy spoke at a conference where she provided frankcommentary on the American think tank industry. “The funding climate has changed for thinktanks,” she notes. “Since the Great Recession of 2008, I think think tanks have been operating
in a much more financially austere environment … consequently, many, though not all, thinktanks have turned more and more to corporations and the business community for theirsupport, and also to foreign sources of funding.”92
Flournoy spent significant time discussing concerns by some about “whether there is inherent
bias in the sources of one’s funding … within the think tank community, and certainly within
CNAS, it’s raised this debate of ‘are we doing enough?’ to ensure that there isn’t undue bias
introduced by any source of funding, foreign or otherwise.”93 She continues:
Every funder has intent. They’re giving you money for a reason. And what you have toensure in running a think tank is that that bias does not creep into your analysis orconstrain your analysis … Even when best practices are followed, you have to ask at theend of the day, will the work be perceived as biased, or pulling punches, given the sourceof the funding? ... I think this is a very serious set of issues that think tanks have to think
through to maintain their independence and their integrity.
I think that the next chapter in this discussion is going to be about corporate donors …
There are some organizations that call themselves “think tanks” that actually accept
money from corporations to do very specific work that tends to advocate the programs
those companies produce, and I think that sort of … makes the waters more murky, andit also raises the bar for everybody else who’s serious about independence to ensurethat that’s not happening more broadly.94
The authors of this report are in full agreement with Michèle Flournoy’s expressed concerns
about the biases produced by corporate and government financing of think tanks, and it is forthis reason that we have highlighted her organization’s failure in “doing enough” to prevent“undue bias.”

92 The Fletcher School (2014). These remarks begin at 00:15:00. This transcription is lightly edited for clarity.
93 Op. Cit. These remarks begin at 00:35:15. This transcription is lightly edited for clarity.
94 Op. Cit. These remarks begin at 00:38:35. This transcription is lightly edited for clarity.

23

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Over the last 14 years, CNAS has produced a large body of research and establishedconnections with a wide variety of scholars and DC power players. Despite theseaccomplishments, a straightforward pattern of nondisclosed conflicts of interest has emerged,
stemming in large part from the influences of the Center’s corporate, military, and foreign
government donors. A donor portfolio composed of powerful parties with their own policy
interests, a “Corporate Partnership Program” with member benefits, and a donor-stacked
board of advisors compound one another to create serious ethical questions. Taken together
with their tendency to serve as a recruitment center for presidential administrations, theCenter’s issues are difficult to avoid.
Several years after his failure-to-disclose incident, former CNAS fellow Andrew Exum indirectly
addressed the situation by acknowledging that scholars “have an obligation to announce ourconflicts of interest and to let the public make an informed decision about the substance ofour research,” pointing to a blog post where he had provided proper disclosure before. He
added, though: “It is not enough to establish correlation.... One must also establish causation
as well.... You better have hard evidence to support the latter.”95 Wedel notes that this is an
odd standard for an impartial researcher: “unless you have the goods to back up a conflict-ofinterest question, you shouldn’t even float it.… good intentions, as perceived by the players
themselves, trump everything and should inoculate them from inquiry.”96
Furthermore, Exum’s response avoids an important debate going beyond corruption. It isn’t
necessary for there to be a quid pro quo between sponsors and researchers in order tosuccessfully distort the public’s worldview in favor of said sponsors. Powerful sponsors canensure that people already inclined to agree with them are given the largest public platforms,
thus ensuring large audiences for those whose sincerely held beliefs align with their interests.
Lee Drutman of the think tank New America has estimated that business interests spend 34
times as much on lobbying as unions and public interest groups do, and added:
Large companies also spend considerable resources shaping the intellectual
environment through funding think tanks and academic research and symposia—that is,by shaping elite consensus. Spreading ideas is by no means quid pro quo corruption.
But in a world where resources to spread ideas are highly unequal, the outcomes ofsuch distortions can feel a bit like corruption.97

95 Exum (2012).
96 Wedel (2016).
97 Drutman (2015).

24

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

The Center’s hawkish ideological leanings, which prioritize “Extending American Power,”98 arenaturally favorable to influential sponsors who see opportunities for profit or gain in such an
extension. If CNAS is successful in influencing policy makers, they effectively generate new
demand for the defense industry and related parties. This, in turn, enriches these sponsors andprovides them with additional financial resources with which to fund outlets like CNAS, thus
spawning a positive feedback loop of militarism.
Many examples of conflict of interest in this report can be explained as simple lapses inoversight. By way of illustration, some figures associated with CNAS have been publicly
supportive of the US government investing in semiconductor technologies, and while it may betrue that the Semiconductor Industry Association gave them a five-digit contribution last year,
it is also true that there’s reason to view this as a smart recommendation which many
objective researchers would make.99
But when a pattern emerges, it suggests that the ambiguity is intentional. Wedel argues that“[s]uch impenetrable organization means that it’s almost impossible to put your finger on,
ultimately, who is responsible or accountable for what — if anyone is,” thus creating “theperfect environment” for betrayals of the public trust.100 Campbell, Flournoy, Fontaine, andother senior CNAS officials have called to “significantly increase U.S. national security anddefense spending.”101 While it is unlikely that they made this argument solely because they
were paid to do so by defense contractors, it is difficult to distinguish between this possibility
and the also-troubling alternative that defense contractors paid them because they made it.
This report contains criticism of the activity of more than a dozen current and former CNAS
officials. Rather than a collection of individual missteps, the Center’s behavior over more thana decade suggests, at best, a serious deficiency of accountability. At worst, it suggests a
systemically corrupt arrangement in which CNAS promotes the interests of its sponsors inwork claiming to be purely in the public interest.
Several policy options exist to prevent think tanks from hiding conflicts of interest while
presenting themselves as impartial researchers. Congressional “Truth-in-Testimony” rules
created by Rep. Jackie Speier (D-CA) in 2014 now require think tank experts who testify on
98 Campbell, Edelman, Flournoy, et. al. (2016).
99 See, for example, the comments of former CNAS adjunct fellow Eric Sayers to the Washington Post in a June 2020 article
which was featured on CNAS’s website. CNAS (2020c) and CNAS (2021b).
100 Wedel (2016).
101 Campbell, Edelman, Flournoy, et. al. (2016).

25

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Capitol Hill to disclosure any foreign government funding their think tanks recieve.102 A recent
2021 update by Reps. Katie Porter (D-CA) and James McGovern (D-MA) strengthened theserules and expanded them to include all financing that poses any conflict of interest. However,loopholes still exist which allow the majority of think tank experts whose employers areopaque about their funding sources to dodge these disclosures, and even experts at theminority of relatively transparent think tanks still possess the means to skirt the rules.103 These
rules should be further strengthened to eliminate the ability of congressional witnesses tododge them.
There are likely many think tanks who are hiding their own conflicts of interest by being lesstransparent than CNAS in listing their donors. Last October, then-secretary of state Mike
Pompeo called on “think tanks and other foreign policy organizations that wish to engage with
the Department [to] disclose prominently on their websites funding they receive from foreign
governments, including state-owned or state-operated subsidiary entities.”104 While this is a
step in the right direction, a voluntary request for disclosures is an inadequate solution to the
problem, and the range of concerning donors requiring disclosures extends beyond foreign
governments.
The IRS could mandate financial transparency by requiring that all think tanks make their fulllist of donors contributing at least $5,000 (a list each organization already files in its taxes)
public.105 Additionally, the Biden administration can explore executive or legislative actions tocondition future US government funding of think tanks on adherence to a set of minimumtransparency and accountability requirements, including proper conflict of interest disclosures.
In any case, President Biden should turn against the immense corruption emblematic of the
Trump administration and set high standards for the selection of personnel, including detailed
disclosures of past work by all major appointees and nominees. As Biden continues to choose
staffers to fill out his administration, there are clear choices he can make to create a morepeaceful and more secure world without damaging the moral integrity of his nascentadministration.

102 Dennett (2018).
103 Clifton (2021).
104 Pompeo (2020).
105 Freeman (2020).

26

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

References
Abelson, Donald E. 2014. “Old World, New World: The Evolution and Influence of Foreign
Affairs Think-Tanks.” International Affairs 90:1.
https://is.cuni.cz/studium/predmety/index.php?do=download&did=77730&kod=JMM704
Ackerman, Spencer. 2020. “The Proxy War Over a Top Biden Adviser.” The Daily Beast, July 7.
https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-proxy-war-over-joe-biden-adviser-avril-haines
Alexander, Andrew. 2009. “Undisclosed Conflict in a Review of Jon Krakauer’s Book on Pat
Tillman.” Washington Post, November 15. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/11/13/AR2009111303346.html
Baker, Peter. 2009. “How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan.” New York Times,
December 5. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/06/world/asia/06reconstruct.html
BBC. 2014. “Ukraine Crisis: Transcript of Leaked Nuland-Pyatt Call.” BBC, February 7.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957
Beeton, Dan. 2014. “On Government Funding of Think Tanks.” Washington, DC: Center for
Economic and Policy Research, September 10. https://cepr.net/on-government-fundingof-think-tanks/
Bender, Bryan, and Theodoric Meyer. 2020. “The Secretive Consulting Firm That’s Become
Biden’s Cabinet in Waiting.” Politico, November 23.
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/23/westexec-advisors-biden-cabinet-440072
Brand, Matthew C. 2011. “General McChrystal’s Strategic Assessment: Evaluating the
Operating Environment in Afghanistan in the Summer of 2009.” Montgomery, AL: Air
Force Research Institute, July. https://media.defense.gov/2017/Jun/19/2001765050/1/-1/0/AP_BRAND_MCCHRYSTALS_ASSESSMENT.PDF
Buildbackbetter.gov. 2021. “Agency Review Teams.” Accessed January 19.
https://web.archive.org/web/20210119193832/https://buildbackbetter.gov/thetransition/agency-review-teams/

27

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Campbell, Kurt, Eric Edelman, Michèle Flournoy, et. al. 2016. “Extending American Power:
Strategies to Expand U.S. Engagement in a Competitive World Order.” Washington, DC:
Center for a New American Security, May 16.
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/extending-american-power-strategies-toexpand-u-s-engagement-in-a-competitive-world-order
Campbell, Kurt, and Michèle Flournoy. 2007. “The Inheritance and the Way Forward.”
Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 27.
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/the-inheritance-and-the-way-forward
Center for a New American Security (CNAS). 2007. “CNAS Official Launch: Hillary Clinton
Keynote Address.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 27.
https://www.cnas.org/publications/video/cnas-official-launch-hillary-clinton-keynoteaddress______. 2015. “Center for a New American Security Names David Romley Senior Vice President
for Development.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 29.
https://www.cnas.org/press/press-release/center-for-a-new-american-security-namesdavid-romley-senior-vice-president-for-development______. 2019. “CNAS Supporters.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security,
archived on July 11.
https://web.archive.org/web/20190711161035/https://www.cnas.org/supportcnas/cnas-supporters______. 2020a. “Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax.” Washington, DC: Center for a
New American Security. https://s3.us-east1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/CNAS_Form990_FY2019_Signed.pdf______. 2020b. “Kurt M. Campbell.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security,
archived on December 10.
https://web.archive.org/web/20201210190228/https://www.cnas.org/people/kurt-mcampbell

28

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

______. 2020c. “Lawmakers Propose Billions to Boost U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturing andResearch.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 10.
https://www.cnas.org/press/in-the-news/lawmakers-propose-billions-to-boost-u-ssemiconductor-manufacturing-and-research. Originally published as Whalen, Jeanne.
2020. “Lawmakers Propose Billions to Boost U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturing andResearch.” Washington Post, June 10.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/10/semiconductor-manufacturinggets-boost-senate-bill/______. 2021a. “About CNAS.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security.
https://www.cnas.org/mission______. 2021b. “CNAS Supporters.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security.
https://www.cnas.org/support-cnas/cnas-supporters______. 2021c. “CNAS Corporate Partnership Program.” Washington, DC: Center for a New
American Security. https://www.cnas.org/support-cnas/cnas-corporate-partnershipprogram______. 2021d. “Frequently Asked Questions.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American
Security. https://www.cnas.org/support-cnas/frequently-asked-questions______. 2021e. “People: Board of Advisors.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American
Security. https://www.cnas.org/people?group=board-of-advisors______. 2021f. “Avril Haines.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security.
https://www.cnas.org/people/avril-haines______. 2021g. “Hady Amr.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security.
https://www.cnas.org/people/hady-amr-1______. 2021h. “Daleep Singh.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security.
https://www.cnas.org/people/daleep-singh______. 2021i. “Richard Fontaine.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security.
https://www.cnas.org/people/richard-fontaine______. 2021j. “Alice Hunt Friend.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security.
https://www.cnas.org/people/alice-hunt-friend______. 2021k. “Desirée M. Cormier.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security.
https://www.cnas.org/people/desirée-m-cormier

29

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

______. 2021l. “Mira Rapp-Hooper.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security.
https://www.cnas.org/people/dr-mira-rapp-hooper
Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). 2021. “Our Funders.” https://cepr.net/ourfunders/
Chollet, Derek. 2019a. “Republicans Threatened NATO Once Before. Dwight Eisenhower
Stopped Them.” Washington Post, February 4.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/02/04/republicans-threatened-natoonce-before-dwight-eisenhower-stopped-them/______. 2019b. “NATO at 70: An Indispensable Alliance.” US House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 13.
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20190313/109112/HHRG-116-FA00-WstateCholletD-20190313.pdf
Chollet, Derek and Richard Fontaine. 2019. “From Truman to Trump, Why Kansas City Matters
to NATO.” Kansas City Star, April 7. https://www.kansascity.com/opinion/readersopinion/guest-commentary/article228912219.html
Clifton, Eli. 2020. “Taiwan Funding of Think Tanks: Omnipresent and Rarely Disclosed.” The
American Prospect, July 17. https://prospect.org/world/taiwan-funding-think-tanksomnipresent-rarely-disclosed/
Clifton, Eli. 2021. “Dark-money Think Tanks Dominate House Foreign Affairs Witness List.”
Washington, DC: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, January 26.
https://quincyinst.org/2021/01/26/dark-money-think-tanks-dominate-house-foreignaffairs-witness-list/
Conan, Neal. 2010. “McChrystal Calls Out White House ‘Wimps,’ Gets Summons.” NPR, June
22. https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128010104
Cordell, Kristen A. and Kristine Lee. 2021. “Harnessing Multilateralism for Digital
Development.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 12.
https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/harnessing-multilateralism-for-digitaldevelopment
Cormier Smith, Desirée. 2021. “Desiree C.” LinkedIn, accessed February 12.
https://www.linkedin.com/in/desireecormiersmith/

Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
30 TheConflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Cronin, Patrick M. and Cho, Anthony. 2017. “Averting Disengagement: A Geoeconomic Strategy
for the Trump Administration in Southeast Asia.” Washington, DC: Center for a New
American Security, April 20. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/avertingdisengagement
Dennett, Lydia. 2018. “Foreign Influence at the Witness Table?” Project on Government
Oversight, September 12. https://www.pogo.org/investigation/2018/09/foreigninfluence-at-the-witness-table/
Dreazen, Yochi J. 2008. “Obama Dips into Think Tank for Talent.” Wall Street Journal,
November 17. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122688537606232319
Drutman, Lee. 2015. “Bring Back Corruption!” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Winter.
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/35/bring-back-corruption/
Edmondson, Catie. 2020. “Senate Rejects Attempted Blockade of Weapons Sales to U.A.E.”
New York Times, December 9.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/us/politics/senate-weapons-sale-uae.html
Eidelson, Josh. 2021. “Biden Taps New York Fed Market Chief as National Security Deputy.”
Bloomberg, February 5. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-05/bidentaps-new-york-fed-market-chief-as-national-security-deputy
Elliott, Justin. 2018. “The Hidden Hand of a Casino Company in Trump’s Contact with Vietnam— ‘Trump, Inc.’ Podcast.” ProPublica, April 25. https://www.propublica.org/article/trumpinc-podcast-vietnam-casino
Estep, Chris. 2021a. “CNAS Experts Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Peter Harrell Selected for
National Security Council Staff.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security,
January 8. https://www.cnas.org/press/press-release/cnas-experts-andrea-kendalltaylor-and-peter-harrell-selected-for-national-security-council-staff
Estep, Chris. 2021b. “CNAS Co-Founder and Board Chairman Kurt Campbell Selected as
Deputy Assistant to the President and Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs on the
National Security Council.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security,
January 15. https://www.cnas.org/press/press-release/cnas-co-founder-and-boardchairman-kurt-campbell-selected-as-deputy-assistant-to-the-president-and-coordinatorfor-indo-pacific-affairs-on-the-national-security-council

31

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Ewers, Elisa Catalano, Lauren Fish, Michael C. Horowitz, et. al. 2017. “Drone Proliferation:
Policy Choices for the Trump Administration.” Washington, DC: Center for a New
American Security, June. http://drones.cnas.org/reports/drone-proliferation/
Exum, Andrew. 2009a. “Interview: Andrew Exum.” PBS, October 13.
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/obamaswar/interviews/exum.html______. 2009b. “CNAS Policy Brief – Afghanistan 2011: Three Scenarios.” Washington, DC:
Center for a New American Security, October 20.
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/cnas-policy-brief-afghanistan-2011-threescenarios______. 2009c. “Andrew Exum Reviews Jon Krakauer’s Book on Pat Tillman, ‘Where Men Win
Glory’.” Washington Post, September 13. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/09/11/AR2009091102614.html______. 2009d. “On Martial Virtue… and Selling Jon Krakauer’s Crappy New Book.” Washington,
DC: Center for a New American Security, Novemeber 2.
https://www.cnas.org/publications/blog/on-martial-virtue-and-selling-jon-krakauerscrappy-new-book______. 2012. “On Defense Policy Analysts and Conflicts of Interest.” Washington, DC: Center
for a New American Security, January 12. https://www.cnas.org/publications/blog/ondefense-policy-analysts-and-conflicts-of-interest______. 2013. “The Last Post.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, October
26.
https://web.archive.org/web/20131102000753/https://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqaw
ama/2013/10/last-post.html
The Fletcher School. 2014. “The Ideas Industry 2014: Thinking About Think Tanks – Keynote
and Welcome.” Youtube, October 20. https://youtu.be/Q0pJvGfvR3o
Flournoy, Michèle and Shawn Brimley. 2007. “Enduring U.S. Interests in Iraq: The Three No’s.”
Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, March 20.
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/enduring-u-s-interests-in-iraq-the-three-nos
Fortune. 2020. “Fortune 500.” https://fortune.com/fortune500/2020/

32

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Freeman, Ben. 2020. “U.S. Government and Defense Contractor Funding of America’s Top 50
Think Tanks.” Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, October.
https://3ba8a190-62da-4c98-86d2893079d87083.usrfiles.com/ugd/3ba8a1_c7e3bfc7723d4021b54cbc145ae3f5eb.pdf
Gady, Franz-Stefan. 2019. “US Air Force is Building First B-21 Stealth Bomber.” The Diplomat,
July 17. https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/us-air-force-is-building-first-b-21-stealthbomber/
Garamone, Jim. 2021. “Biden Announces DOD China Task Force.” US Department of Defense,
February 10. https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2500271/bidenannounces-dod-china-task-force/
Gray, Rosie, and Ryan Mac. 2020. “Peter Thiel Met with The Racist Fringe as He Went All in On
Trump.” Buzzfeed, September 11.
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/rosiegray/peter-thiel-donald-trump-whitenationalist-support
Hendrix, Jerry. 2017. “The Sum of Their Fears: The MQ-25 Stingray.” National Interest,
November 6. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-sum-their-fears-the-mq-25-stingray23062______. 2018. “Filling the Seams in U.S. Long-Range Penetrating Strike.” Washington, DC:
Center for a New American Security, September 10.
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/filling-the-seams-in-u-s-long-rangepenetrating-strike
Heinz, Brett. 2020. “Why A DC Public Relations Firm Pretended to Be Bolivian on Facebook.”
Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research, October 5.
https://cepr.net/why-a-dc-public-relations-firm-pretended-to-be-bolivian-on-facebook/
Hodge, Nathan. 2010a. “Coalition of the Shilling.” The Nation, March 11.
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/coalition-shilling/______. 2010b. “How a Plugged-In DC Think Tank Published a General’s Brutal Intel Critique.”
Wired, January 8. https://www.wired.com/2010/01/how-a-plugged-in-dc-think-tankpublished-a-generals-brutal-intel-critique/
Hudson, John. 2015. “The Undiplomatic Diplomat.” Foreign Policy, June 18.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/18/the-undiplomatic-diplomat/

33

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Human Rights Watch. 2018. “Yemen: Events of 2017.” https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2018/country-chapters/yemen
Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Benjamin I. Page. 2005. “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?”
American Political Science Review 99.1, February.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/LawrenceJacobs/publication/231788159_Who_Influences_Foreign_Policy/links/0deec52ced161ce
13b000000/Who-Influences-Foreign-Policy.pdf
Jilani, Zaid, and Alex Emmons. “Hacked Emails Show UAE Building Close Relationship with
D.C. Think Tanks That Push Its Agenda.” The Intercept, July 30.
https://theintercept.com/2017/07/30/uae-yousef-otaiba-cnas-american-progressmichele-flournoy-drone/
Kendall-Taylor, Andrea. 2021. “Excited to say that I will be continuing my work at the wonderful@CNASdc —much to do to support the Administration's efforts to manage US-Russia
relations and revitalize efforts to work w/ Europe on global challenges.” Twitter,February 2. https://twitter.com/AKendallTaylor/status/1356777058517549056
Kheel, Rebecca and Ellen Mitchell. 2020. “Top Contender for Biden Defense Chief Would Be a
Historic Pick.” The Hill, November 13. https://thehill.com/policy/defense/525765-topcontender-for-biden-defense-chief-would-be-historic-pick
Korman, Shai. 2021. “CNAS Experts and Alumni Selected for Senior Leadership Positions in the
Biden Administration.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January
21. https://www.cnas.org/press/press-release/cnas-experts-and-alumni-selected-forsenior-leadership-positions-in-the-biden-administration
Lederer, Edith M. 2020. “UN Warns of Yemen Famine, No Aid from Saudis, UAE, Kuwait.” AP,
September 15. https://apnews.com/article/yemen-saudi-arabia-united-arab-emirateshealth-kuwait-c70709124a313f15f46c954664a28309
Lipton, Eric and Brooke Williams. 2016. “How Think Tanks Amplify Corporate America’s
Influence.” New York Times, August 7.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/us/politics/think-tanks-research-and-corporatelobbying.html

34

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Nagl, John A. and Richard Fontaine. 2009. “Contractors in American Conflicts: Adapting to a
New Reality.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, December 16.
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/contractors-in-american-conflicts-adaptingto-a-new-reality
National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA). 2021a. “Board of Directors.”
https://www.ndia.org/about/leadership-and-governance/board-of-directors______. 2021b. “About.” https://www.ndia.org/about
Northrop Grumman. 2021. “B-21 Raider.” https://www.northropgrumman.com/what-wedo/air/b-21-raider/
Nuland, Victoria. 2020. “Pinning Down Putin: How a Confident America Should Deal with
Russia.” Foreign Affairs, June 9. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russianfederation/2020-06-09/pinning-down-putin
Ongweso Jr., Edward. 2020. “Palantir’s CEO Finally Admits to Helping ICE Deport
Undocumented Immigrants.” Vice, January 24.
https://www.vice.com/en/article/pkeg99/palantirs-ceo-finally-admits-to-helping-icedeport-undocumented-immigrants
Pager, Tyler. 2020. “Biden Taps Susan Rice for Top White House Domestic Policy Job.”
Politico, December 10. https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/10/biden-taps-susanrice-for-top-white-house-domestic-policy-job-444231
Pompeo, Michael R. 2020. “On Transparency and Foreign Funding of U.S. Think Tanks.” U.S.
Department of State, October 13. https://2017-2021.state.gov/on-transparency-andforeign-funding-of-u-s-think-tanks/index.html
Pottinger, Matt, Michael T. Flynn, and Paul D. Batchelor. 2010. “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for
Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan.” Washington, DC: Center for a New
American Security, January 4. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/fixing-intel-ablueprint-for-making-intelligence-relevant
Ratner, Ely, Daniel Kliman, Susanna V. Blume, et. al. 2020. “Rising to the China Challenge:
Renewing American Competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific.” Washington, DC: Center for a
New American Security, January 28. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/risingto-the-china-challenge

35

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Ravid, Barak. 2021. “Biden Turns the Page on Trump’s Israel-Palestine Policies.” Axios, January
28. https://www.axios.com/biden-administration-israel-palestine-hady-amr-c35064c3c9f7-4692-be37-af75cc25a1c2.html
Reuters. 2013. “UAE Signs $1.4 Billion Defense Contracts, Including Drones.” Reuters, February
18. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-drones/uae-signs-1-4-billion-defensecontracts-including-drones-idUSBRE91H0AY20130218
Ricks, Thomas E. 2016. “Did I Help Create a Monster? A Confession.” Foreign Policy, November
30. https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/30/did-i-help-create-a-monster-a-confession/
Romley, David. 2021. “David Romley.” LinkedIn, accessed January 15, 2021.
https://www.linkedin.com/in/david-romley-6392aa2b/
Shaif, Rawan, and Jack Watling. 2018. “How the UAE’s Chinese-Made Drone is Changing the
War in Yemen.” Foreign Policy, April 27. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/27/dronewars-how-the-uaes-chinese-made-drone-is-changing-the-war-in-yemen/
Shorrock, Tim. 2016. “Making COIN.” The Baffler, December.
https://thebaffler.com/salvos/making-coin-shorrock
Singer, P.W. 2003. “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry.” Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. 2014. “Department of State
Assistance to Afghanistan: $4 Billion Obligated Between 2002 and 2013.” April.
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/special%20projects/SIGAR-14-49-SP.pdf
Stewart, Phil. 2016. “Small U.S. Military Team in Yemen to Aid UAE Push on al Qaeda.” Reuters,
May 6. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-yemen-pentagon-idUSKCN0XX1ZJ
Stone, Mike and Patricia Zengerle. 2020. “Exclusive: Trump Administration Advances $2.9
Billion Drone Sale to UAE – Sources.” Reuters, November 5.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-emirates-drones-exclusive/exclusive-trumpadministration-advances-2-9-billion-drone-sale-to-uae-sources-idUSKBN27M06L
Strobel, Warren P. 2021. “Biden Re-Examining U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia, U.A.E.” WallStreet Journal, January 27. https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-freezes-u-s-arms-salesto-saudi-arabia-uae-11611773191

36

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Tabrizi, Aniseh Bassiri and Justin Bronk. 2018. “Armed Drones in the Middle East: Proliferation
and Norms in the Region.” London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, December.
https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20181207_armed_drones_middle_east_web.pdf
Tuan, Thanh. 2017. “Thủ tướng gặp gần 20 nhà tài phiệt hàng đầu nước Mỹ.” Zing News, May
30. https://zingnews.vn/thu-tuong-gap-gan-20-nha-tai-phiet-hang-dau-nuoc-mypost750794.html
Thompson, Alex, Theodoric Meyer, and Megan Cassella. 2020. “Biden Team Launches Agency
Review Teams Despite GSA Standoff.” Politico, November 10.
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/10/biden-transition-agency-review-gsastandoff-435779
Thompson, Alex, and Theodoric Meyer. 2021. “Janet Yellen Made Millions in Wall Street,
Corporate Speeches.” Politico, January 1.
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/01/yellen-made-millions-in-wall-streetspeeches-453223
Truman Library Institute. 2019. “NATO at 70.” Youtube, May 21. https://youtu.be/QtQJwP4OjZ0
US Department of Defense. 2015. “Andrew Exum.”
https://web.archive.org/web/20150905155638/http://www.defense.gov/AboutDoD/Biographies/Biography-View/Article/602700
US Department of Defense. 2021. “New Officials Sworn-In at the Department of Defense.”
February 9.
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2498946/new-officialssworn-in-at-the-department-of-defense/
US Office of Government Ethics. 2020. “Executive Branch Personnel Public Financial
Disclosure Report (OGE Form 278e): Haines, Avril.”https://extapps2.oge.gov/201/Presiden.nsf/PAS+Index/00CB412D4BCCFDF58525864F0
0810563/$FILE/Haines,%20Avril%20%20final%20278.pdf
US Senate. 2021. “Vote Summary: Question: On the Nomination (Confirmation: Avril Danica
Haines, of New York, to be Director of National Intelligence ).” January 20.
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=1
17&session=1&vote=00003

37

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security

Vote Smart. 2009. “Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee - The Nomination ofKurt Campbell to be Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.”
June 10. https://justfacts.votesmart.org/public-statement/430684/hearing-of-the-senateforeign-relations-committee-the-nomination-of-kurt-campbell-to-be-assistant-secretary-ofstate-for-east-asian-and-pacific-affairs
Walsh, Declan and David D. Kirkpatrick. 2019. “U.A.E. Pulls Most Forces from Yemen in Blow to
Saudi War Effort.” New York Times, July 11.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/world/middleeast/yemen-emirates-saudiwar.html
Wedel, Janine R. 2016. “Unaccountable: How Elite Power Brokers Corrupt our Finances,
Freedom, and Security.” New York, NY: Pegasus Books.
Wertime, David. 2021. “Exclusive: New Critique Calls for a China Without Xi.” Politico, January
28. https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-china-watcher/2021/01/28/exclusivenew-critique-calls-for-a-china-without-xi-491550
Williams, Brooke and Ken Silverstein. 2013. “Meet the Think Tank Scholars Who Are Also
Beltway Lobbyists.” New Republic, May 10.
https://newrepublic.com/article/113158/report-dozens-lobbyists-work-think-tankscholars

38

The Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex
Conflicts of Interest at the Center for a New American Security