The Washington Quarterly

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US-China Rivalry and Japan’s Strategic Role
Yukio Hatoyama
To cite this article: Yukio Hatoyama (2021) US-China Rivalry and Japan’s Strategic Role, The
Washington Quarterly, 44:2, 7-19, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1932093
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1932093© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
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Published online: 17 Jun 2021.

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Yukio Hatoyama

US-China Rivalry andJapan’s Strategic Role

Former President Donald Trump was the first US president to bringthe US-China conflict into the open. His successor, President Joe Biden, has consistently indicated that the rift between the two countries can no longer beclosed. The tone of the Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, released on March 3, 2021, suggests that, differences in rhetoric
aside, little distinguishes the new administration’s position on China from that of
the Trump administration.1 Meanwhile, there has been no change in behavior on
the part of China since the Biden administration took office. As the US-China
rift is essentially the result of a “Thucydides trap,” the lack of dramatic change in
US-China relations with the incoming administration comes as no surprise.
However, even if the conflict between the United States and China is inevitable,
we cannot sit back and watch as tensions escalate, for there is no doubt that any
zero-sum competition between the two global powers would undermine peace
and prosperity in East Asia and throughout the world.
On April 16, 2021, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga held meetings
with President Biden in Washington DC and issued the US-Japan Joint
Yukio Hatoyama served as the 93rd Prime Minister of Japan from 2009 to 2010. He received
the Order of Friendship of the Russian Federation in 2011 and the Vietnam Friendship Medalin 2013. Since leaving frontline politics, Yukio Hatoyama has remained active in the private
sector. He has held the position of President of the East Asian Community Institute (EACI)
since May 2013, and he serves as President of the Yuai Foundation. He was a member of theInternational Advisory Panel of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) from 2016
to 2019. He can be reached at sugawa@eaci.or.jp© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in
any way.
The Washington Quarterly • 44:2 pp. 7–19
https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1932093
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Yukio Hatoyama

Leaders’ Statement: “U.S.-Japan Global Partnership for a New Era.”2 I would liketo take this opportunity to suggest a series of proposals aimed at reining in tensions between the United States and China, along with my personal view on
the role that Japan should play.

Avoid the Democratic Values Trap in Foreign Affairs
I will begin this discussion with three requests to the Biden administration. First,
the Biden administration should not over-assert values, including democracy, inforeign affairs. To be sure, I am truly hopeful that President Biden can rebuild
American democracy, and I offer my support toward that. The Biden administration stated, “Free societies have been challenged from within by corruption,
inequality, polarization, populism, and illiberal threats to the rule of law.”3 To
some extent, this also applies to Japan. The situation in the United States is
not a problem that has nothing to do withus. Having said that, the Biden administration
he Biden adminought to proceed with great caution whenistration should notdeliberately connecting its effort to rebuild
democracy at home with the struggle
over-assert democbetween democracy and autocracy taking
racy in foreign
place on a global scale.
affairs
The greatest concern today, not only for theUnited States but for diplomats the world
over, is how to manage US-China relations.
Yet, by seeking to remain faithful to values
such as democracy and human rights, we run the risk of condemning and excluding those who do not share these values. The other side also responds in the sameway. Ultimately, the more the United States emphasizes value-oriented diplomacy, the more acute the US-China conflict becomes. For example, if theUnited States emphasizes only policies that seek to ostracize China on thebasis of values, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and theFree and Open Indo–Pacific (FOIP), China will view its actions as coercive.
Valuing face, the Chinese are more likely to dig in their heels than acquiesce
to such demands.
If the United States excessively emphasizes democracy and human rights, itruns the risk of alienating not just China and Russia but also other non-democratic countries. The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance appeared
to divide the world into two camps: “those who argue that, given all the challenges we face, autocracy is the best way forward” and “those who understandthat democracy is essential to meeting all the challenges of our changing

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US-China Rivalry and Japan’s Strategic Role

world.”4 According to the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, headquartered at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, as of 2019, there were a totalof 92 countries between “closed autocracies” and “electoral autocracies” in theworld.5 This amounts to 51 percent of the world’s countries and 54 percent of
the global population. If these countries were to strengthen their ties with
China and Russia, the Biden administration would find it difficult to achieve
the diplomatic goals it intends to pursue. The signs are already apparent. On
March 27, China and Iran concluded a 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement on economic and security cooperation. Chinese Foreign Minister
Wang Yi has also visited countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United
Arab Emirates.
The essence of diplomacy, I believe, is to explore how well countries withdifferent values can get along. If the Biden administration insists on competingwith China, it may do so. I am not saying that the Biden administration
should refrain from criticizing China regarding the various problems it faces.
However, before it does so, the US government ought to inform China thatpeaceful coexistence between the two countries is a basic premise on which competition operates and that the Chinese Communist Party is the US government’s
only equal counterpart in China. At the very least, the US government should
declare its acceptance of the “one-China” policy as traditionally defined, so as
to avoid any misunderstanding. The US-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement on
April 16, 2021 mentioned “Taiwan” for the first time since 1969.6 Despite its
mild reference, I am afraid the fact that the word “Taiwan” appeared in the document is sending a counterproductive message to Beijing.

Better Understand Dilemmas of Interdependence Faced by Allies
Second, the Biden administration should not impose its own agenda on US allies
and partners when pursuing its strategy on China. The Biden administration has
declared its intention to mobilize allies and partners to oppose authoritarian
countries such as China and Russia. In doing so, it appears to be seeking to differentiate itself from the Trump administration, which pursued an “America First”
approach (although it is my understanding that, by the latter years of the Trumpadministration, the US government had already begun lobbying Japan as well asother allies and partners to support the effort to oppose China). In any case, withthe return of a “familiar face” to the diplomatic stage, the US government underthe Biden administration will be even keener to form a united front against
China with its allies.
It may well be true that allies of the United States face considerable problems
in their relations with a newly ascendant China. In the basic sense, allies of the
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Yukio Hatoyama

United States have much to gain from strengthening their hand against China by
acting in concert with the United States. Yet at the same time, to ensure theirown existence, these allies and partners cannot simply choose between the
United States and China while abandoning
the other. The context is very different fromllies and partners
the Cold War.
cannot simply
Take the case of Japan, for example: in
1985, trade with the United States accounted
choose between
for 29.8 percent of total trade, while trade with
the United States
the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern
Europe accounted for only 1.6 percent. In
and China
2020, trade with the United States accounted
for 14.7 percent, while trade with China(including Hong Kong) reached 26.5 percent.7 In 2019, before the COVID-19
pandemic, just 1.72 million people from the United States visited Japan, compared to almost 11.89 million Chinese people (including Hongkongers).8
The situation is also far from simple in the security domain, where it is often
taken for granted that the interests of Japan and the United States coincide.
Many people in Japan believe that US military bases are stationed here to
defend our country, not least in the event of an emergency involving the
Senkaku Islands. In fact, however, the most probable scenario for a military
clash between the United States and China is in the event of an emergency
involving Taiwan. Almost all Japanese would not entertain the notion that
US bases in Japan might be used in the service of Taiwanese independenceor that Japan might fight for Taiwan in such a contingency. Quite the opposite
is true: in recent years, the US government appears to have implicitly encouraged Taiwan to take steps toward independence. Despite its democratic credentials, most in Japan would definitely be unwilling to lend its support to such amove.
On November 15, 2020, 15 countries in East Asia and the West Pacific signed
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and on December
30, the European Union and China agreed in principle to conclude a comprehensive agreement on investment (the CAI). It would be a fatal error for either theUnited States or China to interpret such developments as indications that thecountries involved have “chosen” China and “abandoned” the United States.
It is, however, a clear indication that these countries do intend to coexist with
China in mutual prosperity. If both the United States and China listened totheir allies and partners, many of whom are unsure of how to manage thecomplex array of interests that span the US-China rift, this would also play a positive role in reining in the conflict.

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Re-Engage China on Shared Challenges
Third, the United States ought to pursue cooperation with China across a wider
range of fields. In the recent US-China talks in Alaska, US Secretary of State
Antony Blinken stated, “The United States relationship with China will be competitive where it should be, collaborative where it can be, adversarial where it
must be.”9 The remark itself may seem to be stating the obvious. The problem
here is that the US government is now seeking to narrow down the range offields in which collaboration is possible while also further emphasizing competition with China. The areas where collaboration is possible are probably thosesuch as global warming and pandemic countermeasures. Yet, when one hears
many provocative comments by high-level US government officials, one
cannot help but feel that the administration is offering a handshake in one
hand while brandishing a stick in the other. When the overall atmosphere is
unpleasant, achieving cooperation in certain discrete fields is no easy task. If it
intends to appropriately control the conflict with China, the US government
should call on its counterpart to collaborate across a wider range of fields. It
should only declare a transition to the dimension of competition if China does
not respond. Such an approach would also make it easier for allies to act inunison with the United States.
The Trump administration was highly critical of the strategic engagement policies pursued by previous administrations vis-à-vis China. This helped spur a
global wave that equated engagement with being “weak-kneed” toward China.
Past engagement policies may not have resulted in the kind of changes, at thekind of pace, that were expected of Beijing. However, it would also be simplistic
and incorrect to argue that China has completely rejected the ways of international order. The most obvious proof of this is the change in China’s position
on climate change issues. The US government should not give up on its engagement strategy; it should focus its efforts on reforming it.
The Biden administration’s move to underplay “collaboration” and “engagement” and emphasize “competition” in its policy on China also seems to camouflage a sense of frustration with the perception that the United States may becaught and overtaken by China as a great power. The United States shouldcalm down. It is improbable that China’s national power will completely outstrip
the United States, allowing China to run away with the race. In 2019, the UnitedStates spent almost US$719 billion on its military, whereas China’s militaryspending stood at around US$266 billion.10 As of January 2020, the UnitedStates has 5,800 nuclear warheads compared to China’s 320.11 Moreover, theUnited States has a network of allies that stretches around the globe. In the
future, China’s population is set to age much faster than that of the UnitedStates, and the country will have to work on overcoming the so-called
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Yukio Hatoyama“middle-income trap.” The United States has considerable advantages over
China in the medium to long term with regard to population dynamics and economic growth potential. As long as China remains autocratic, the renminbi is unlikely to replace the US dollar as the dominant global currency.
My thesis is that the current state of China “catching-up” with the UnitedStates will continue in the long term, until the middle of this century. In otherwords, the United States has enough time and space to re-engage with China
and explore possibilities for collaboration under a reformed policy of engagement.
This discussion will return to two specific themes, apart from global warming andthe pandemic, around which the United States and China ought to collaborate.

China Must Exercise Responsibility as a Great PowerIn a telephone conversation on February 10, 2021, President Xi Jinping notedthat “confrontation between China and the U.S. would certainly be a disasterfor both countries,” offering cooperation to President Biden.12 What Xi Jinping
said is quite correct. Yet, few in America are willing to take Xi’s words at facevalue. At least half of the responsibility for this lies with China. An effective resolution to the US-China conflict would also require change on the part of China.
Over the past 30–40 years, China has achieved tremendous growth to becomea great power that now vies for the top spot globally. Yet, it may be China itself
that least understands how great its stature has become. China does not understand the anxieties and frustrations of the United States, nor does it attempt todo so. Its transformation into a major power has benefited greatly from theglobal system established by the United States since World War II. China hastaken this as a given and seemingly intends to continue to reap these benefits,
at no cost to itself, in the future. This does not bode well. China must accept,
in a more visible way, much greater responsibilities than it currently does. The
most effective way for China to promoteitself would be to voluntarily forgo thehina must accept
special and differential treatment (S&DT) dismuch greaterpensed by the World Trade Organization(WTO). China is the now the world’s
responsibilities thansecond-largest economy and has successfully
it currently does
invested effort in eradicating poverty under
the leadership of President Xi Jinping. Brazil,
whose Gross Domestic Product per capita is
lower than China’s, has already begun to forego S&DT at the WTO. If China
decides to do so, the international community will unquestionably see this as
China having finally expressed its commitment to becoming a responsible
great power.

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US-China Rivalry and Japan’s Strategic RoleThe United States is right to assert that competition with China, now a major
power, should take place under equal conditions. While correctly evaluating thefact that the Chinese government has made steady efforts with regards to the protection of intellectual property and cracking down on cyberattacks, I wish it tofurther strengthen and accelerate measures in these domains. Moreover, infields where the United States wishes to collaborate with China, China should
dial back its political maneuvering and endeavor to prioritize deals with theUnited States. The only viable way to rebuild the lost trust between the twocountries and replace competition and conflict with cooperation as the cornerstone of bilateral relations is to move toward collaboration, one step at a time.
The “wolf warrior diplomacy” that drew attention in 2020 greatly undermined
China’s soft power in the international community. Whether China had a valid
point, the use of this rhetoric and posting of tweets that make one question thecharacter of its leaders is unpleasant to see. On balance, China lost far more bycreating additional enemies around the world than it gained from boosting
national prestige at home. If China continues to flaunt its newly acquired
power with further contemptuous public diplomacy, public opinion in the
United States and elsewhere could easily turn against it. This would draw
China into a succession of unnecessary confrontations with many countries,
including the United States, thereby damaging its own position.

Beyond Climate and Pandemics: Priorities for US-China Engagement
Beyond cooperation in commonly cited global issues such as climate change andpandemics, the United States and China should engage each other in two strategically critical areas: controlling decoupling in information and communications
technology and managing a new arms race in East Asia, including the deploymentof land-based intermediate-range missiles.
Create Global Standards for Information and Communications Technology
In today’s world, the idea that the fate of competition among countries hangs onadvanced technology is already common sense. In the field of information andcommunications technology (ICT), the Trump administration introduced the
new method of barring Chinese firms from the US market as a security
measure. However, this move may also have been motivated by critical concernsthat the United States had fallen behind in the field. Similarly, the Biden administration appears to be trying to collaborate with other like-minded democracies
to bar Chinese businesses from their markets. However, this is a risky path totread. In the ICT domain, the United States and China should aim forcoexistence.
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If the US government’s approach succeeds, China may find itself in trouble, inthe short term at least. However, just as the United States is unwilling to allow
China a technical edge in this field, China is also intent on refusing the UnitedStates a technology monopoly. In May 2020, Xi Jinping’s leadership announced
its new “dual circulation” economic strategy. The new model aims to internalize
production in high-tech industries to hedge against further decoupling from theUnited States. With a population of around 1.4 billion, the Chinese economy issufficiently large. China also controls large swaths of markets in parts of Africa,
Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. There is a distinct possibility
that in the future, separate Chinese and American technology standards will exist side byhere is a distinct
side in the ICT field, and Chinese businesses
will be able to procure parts through supply
possibility that sepchains within China or with pro-China
arate technology
countries. Needless to say, if such a bloc formation occurs, both consumers and businesses
standards will exist
will suffer economically. The formation ofin the ICT ﬁeld
blocs in the ICT field would also have repercussions for other fields, greatly destabilizing
the world in which we live. Even if China failed to establish its own technology
standards and supply chains in the digital domain, if it were to push back indomains of trade or investment other than the digital economy, the impact suffered by the United States and its allies, Japan included, would be severe. I, forone, would be unwilling to accept such risks and uncertainty.
It is an undeniable fact that Chinese firms have a competitive edge in bothprice and performance in the field of data economy. If the United States wishes
to exclude Chinese businesses and force its allies to toe the line, the US government would need to provide clear explanations, but in actual practice, its
reasons are ambiguous and inadequate. Problems that could potentially occur
in the realm of national security would not be limited in scope to one specificcountry. It would be fairer to create technology standards for high-tech communication equipment as well as unified global standards for cybersecurity,and to develop mechanisms that would not prevent the use of any country’s products and services, provided those standards were met. It is also essential todevelop a global system to monitor whether agreed-upon standards are being
complied with. If such mechanisms could be created, developing countries
that do not have the leeway or necessary technology to invest resources incybersecurity would also be able to reap the benefits of digitalization withpeace of mind.
On September 8, 2020, China launched a Global Initiative on Data Security,
calling on countries to coexist and co-prosper in the high-tech economy. China

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US-China Rivalry and Japan’s Strategic Roleconsiders the ideas proposed in the initiative as only abstract principles, leaving
sufficient room for China’s arbitrary interpretation. It would be difficult to adopt
these as international norms without considerable amendments. It is worth
noting, however, that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called on countries
to “develop a set of international rules on data security that reflect the will
and respect the interests of all countries through broad-based participation.”13
It would be unwise to ignore this bid.
Rather than prioritizing joint rulemaking among democratic countries, theBiden administration should call upon China to participate, from an earlystage, in the task of developing shared norms and standards for cutting-edge technology. Needless to say, China must demonstrate the highest possible degree of
flexibility. Otherwise, its participation in negotiations might be seen as a delaying
tactic, potentially moving the world toward the worst-case scenario of an
excluded China. In any case, the negotiations will not be easy. Middle powers
such as Japan, South Korea, and Europe, which have significant technologicaland production capabilities in the ICT domain, will be required to usher boththe United States and China in the direction of an international agreement.

Pursue Missile Disarmament in East Asia
The United States and China carry the greatest share of responsibility for the
future of security in East Asia. They, together with Japan, must make concerted
efforts to develop a missile disarmament or arms control system in the region.
In East Asia and the West Pacific, China has outstripped the United States in
its deployment of ground-launched missiles in the 500–5,500 km range.14
Because the United States was party to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces(INF) Treaty that prohibited ground-launched missiles with a range of 500 to
5,500 km, it could not deploy missiles of that range in the region. Since withdrawing from the INF Treaty in August 2019, the United States seeks to
deploy ground-launched missiles that had been banned under the INF Treaty
in East Asia beginning in the mid-2020s in a bid to close the regional missile
gap with China.15 There is no justification for the fact that China (and North
Korea) already has an overwhelming number of missiles with a range thatcovers neighboring countries such as Japan. However, if the United States
were to deploy multiple ground-based, intermediate-range (500–5,500 km) missiles in the East Asia and West Pacific regions, China could be expected to
deploy additional missiles to match or exceed those of the United States, inorder to maintain its advantage. Russia is also preparing to respond to a deployment of missiles in the region by the United States.
A chain reaction of security dilemmas would drive not only North Korea, which
is developing missiles for its own reasons, but the entire East Asian region,
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including Japan and South Korea, in the direction of missile expansion. As theevents of World War I demonstrate, where weapons are concerned, equilibriumof quantity does not always lead to strategic stability. I am deeply afraid of a nightmare in which East Asia, in the future, becomes the powder keg of the world.
There is a most pressing need, at least for the United States, China, andRussia, to conclude an anti-missile treaty akin to the INF Treaty in the East
Asia and Western Pacific regions. However, frankly speaking, even if theUnited States today adopted a similar policy to the “Double-Track Decision”
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in December 1979—in
which NATO both threatened to deploy and offered negotiations to eliminate
intermediate-range missiles—the possibility of concluding an INF-style treaty
in Asia is extremely unlikely. Today’s China is not the exhausted Soviet
Union we saw toward the end of the Cold War. Although the Cold War saw
parity achieved between the United States and Soviet Union on the military
front, the United States is far ahead of China, at least with regard to strategic
nuclear weapons. Although the hurdles preventing the use of nuclear weapons
are significantly higher today than in the past, reducing China’s arsenal of intermediate-range missiles amid growing tensions over Taiwan would pose an existential problem for the Communist Party leadership.
The only way to make inroads is for Japan toplay
the role of a mediator between the United
he only way toStates and China. Though the United States
make inroads is forcan develop intermediate-range, groundlaunched missiles, it would need to deploy
Japan to play thethese missiles along the first island chain torole of mediator
use them effectively against the Chinese
between the US
Navy or inland missile squadrons. As theUnited States does not possess territory inand Chinathat area, the only option is to deploy missiles
in the territories of its allies and partners. Yet,the countries of East Asia are generally unwilling to accept US missiles for fear ofharming their relations with China. The US government seems to have placed its
hopes for deployment on Japan, which is well-positioned geographically andwhose government is vocal about its intention to strengthen the alliance.
The reality, however, is that Tokyo is less than enthusiastic about accepting
US missiles. The Japan-US Security Treaty permits the stationing of US forces
in Japan, but if the Japanese government expressed clear opposition to thedeployment of US missiles and requested talks on the matter, the UnitedStates would be unable to ignore its wishes. Japan can leverage this position topressure the United States and China to conclude an Asian INF treaty. The Japanese government can suspend its decision about the deployment of intermediate-T

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US-China Rivalry and Japan’s Strategic Role

range ground-launched missiles at US military facilities in Japan for a certain
period in the hope that negotiations between the United States and China
will take place. If China continues to reject the offer of negotiations, the probability of missiles being deployed under its nose will increase.
Still, if negotiations are left entirely in the hands of the United States andChina, they are likely to accomplish nothing. The Japanese government should
adopt the style of diplomacy employed by former Chancellor of West Germany
Helmut Schmidt to apply pressure to the United States and China—and, where
necessary, to Russia—and clear away obstacles to achieving disarmament or anarms control system.16 If Japan took the lead in cooperation with South Korea
and the countries of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), leverageon the United States and China would be significantly increased. To this end,
Japan must maintain a humble stance with regard to its history of invasions andcolonial rule.17 Missile expansion in East Asia is also likely to have adverse
effects in Europe, through developments in Russia. Therefore, collaboration
between Japan and European middle powers is also extremely significant.

Place the Senkaku Islands Off-Limits to Both Japan and China
Finally, I propose that the Japanese and Chinese governments conclude a new
agreement to manage the territorial dispute. This is not a request to theUnited States. However, I will introduce it here as it may also help nip in thebud potential military conflict between the United States and China.
In response to requests by the Japanese government, the US government hasrepeatedly expressed the view that Article 5 of the Japan-US Security Treaty
applies to the Senkaku Islands. Yet, this does not mean that the US militarywould fight against the Chinese army in the event of a struggle in the Senkakus
under any circumstances. Moreover, despite the declarations of President Obama
and Trump that the treaty “applies to the Senkaku Islands,” there has been no
obvious sign of decrease in the number of intrusions by the China Coast Guard
into territorial waters around the Senkaku islands.18 Although Japan’s andChina’s coast guards are, at this moment, taking a judicious approach to the situation
at sea, the threat of a clash if some accidents were to occur is constant and immediate.
Meanwhile, there are growing calls within Japan to build structures on the Senkaku
Islands, emboldened by the Biden administration’s move to clarify its adversarial
stance against China. If Japan did try to build structures on the islands, the prospectof a physical clash would be highly likely. Such a foolish outcome would also be an
unwelcome development for the United States. To prevent an emergency in the
Senkaku Islands and eliminate the possibility of conflict between the UnitedStates and China as a result, we must find a fundamental solution that removes
the possible causes of conflict between Japan and China.
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My proposal is that the Japanese government officially recognize the existenceof a territorial dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands and both countries
shelve the territorial dispute and agree not to enter the territorial seas and contiguous zones around the Senkakus. To date, the Japanese government has maintained its position that there has never been a territorial dispute in the Senkakusthat needs to be resolved. Yet globally, the Japanese government is alone in thisopinion. Despite claiming that Japan has de facto control over the islands, theJapanese government has refrained from evenlanding on the islands for many years. Japanokyo should ofﬁhas nothing substantial to lose from acknowledging the territorial dispute. If it recognizedcially recognize a
the Senkakus as a contentious zone, there
territorial dispute
would be sufficient reason for both Japan andwith China over the
China to declare the area off limits. The Japanese government currently allows Japanese
Senkaku Islands
fishing boats into the waters on a limited
basis, but this too would be deauthorized
without exception. Meanwhile, the China Coast Guard often enters the waters
around the Senkakus, citing incursions by Japanese fishing boats. If Japan did
not enter the area, China would also be unable to do so. A deal that prevents
both Japan and China from entering the waters around the islands would also
be beneficial to the United States.
Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, an advocate for Pan-Europeanism andpioneer of European integration, stated, “Every great historical happening
began as a utopia and ended as a reality.”19 To all observers, the intensifying
rift between the United States and China has the air of a great, unstoppablecurrent. Yet, if someone somewhere speaks of an ideal and translates it into
action, without giving up, it is not impossible to change the course of history.

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Notes
1. Joseph R. Biden, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (Washington, DC: The
White House, March 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/
NSC-1v2.pdf.
2. “US-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement: ‘U.S.-Japan Global Partnership for a New Era,’”April 16, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100177718.pdf.
3. Biden, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, 7.
4. Biden, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, 3.
5. Autocratization Surges—Resistance Grows: Democracy Report 2020 (Gothenburg, Sweden:
Varieties of Democracies (V-Dem) Institute, March 2020), https://www.v-dem.net/
media/filer_public/de/39/de39af54-0bc5-4421-89ae-fb20dcc53dba/democracy_report.
pdf.

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US-China Rivalry and Japan’s Strategic Role
6. “US-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement: ‘U.S.-Japan Global Partnership for a New Era.’”7. Figures are calculated using Time Series Data - Trade Statistics of Japan, Japanese Ministryof Finance, https://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/suii/html/time_e.htm.
8. Japan National Tourism Organization, “Number of Foreign Visitors to Japan by Nationality and Purpose as of 2019,” accessed May 2021, https://www.jnto.go.jp/jpn/statistics/
tourists_2019df.pdf. (Data in English is available at https://www.tourism.jp/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2021/04/JTM_inbound20210406eng.xlsx).
9. Dan De Luce and Abigail Williams, “China Poses ’Biggest Geopolitical Test’ for the U.S.,
Secretary of State Blinken Says,” NBC News, March 3, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/world/china-poses-biggest-geopolitical-test-u-s-says-secretary-state-n1259489.
10. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Data for All Countries from 1988–
2019 in Constant (2018) USD,” accessed April 2021, https://www.sipri.org/sites/
default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932019%
20in%20constant%20%282018%29%20USD.pdf.
11. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Nuclear Weapon Modernization
Continues but the Outlook For Arms Control Is Bleak: New SIPRI Yearbook Out
Now,” June 15, 2020, https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/nuclear-weaponmodernization-continues-outlook-arms-control-bleak-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now.
12. Michael Crowley, “Biden Raises Concerns with China’s Xi in First Call Since Election,”
New York Times, February 10, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/10/us/politics/
biden-xi-jinping-call.html.
13. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “The Chinese Side Proposes a Global Initiative on Data Security,” September 8, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.
cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1813730.shtml.
14. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republicof China (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020) 55–60, https://
media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARYPOWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF.
15. In today’s military terms, they are classified into short-range (300–1,000 km), mediumrange (1,000–3,000 km), and intermediate-range (3,000–5,500 km).
16. For more details about Japan’s initiative to pursue a missile arms control regime in East
Asia, refer to Kiyoshi Sugawa, “Play the Big Game for US-China Missile Arms
Control Treaty,” East Asian Community Institute, April 15, 2021, https://www.eaci.or.
jp/archives/avp/331.
17. Japan’s relationship with South Korea is also an extremely fraught affair, due not only to
our historical issues but also to the fact that a situation resembling a “Thucydides Trap” isin play as our powers converge. My proposal for reconciliation with South Korea is in
Yukio Hatoyama, “Japan and South Korea Should Look at the Big Picture to Overcome
the Historical Problems,” East Asian Community Institute, August 12, 2020, https://www.eaci.or.jp/wp-content/themes/EACI/resources/files/20200812en.pdf.
18. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels
in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan’s Response,” last updated June11, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html.
19. Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe (Vienna: Alfred A. Knopf, 1923), xv,
https://dspace.gipe.ac.in/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10973/18298/GIPE-008187-Contents.
pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y.

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2021

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