Proceedings of the International Symposium on Engineering Lessons Learned fromthe 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, March 1-4, 2012, Tokyo, Japan

POLICY ANALYSIS ON BUILDINGREGULATIONS AND THE RECOVERY OF
EARTHQUAKE / TSUNAMI AFFECTED AREAS
Shoichi ANDO1
1

Director, International Institute of Seismology and Earthquake Engineering(IISEE), Building Research Institute (BRI) Japan, ando@kenken.go.jp , Prof., Dr.,
Graduate School of Engineering, the University of Tokyo, ando@mps.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp
ABSTRACT: The paper examines the situation and causes of recent big earthquake andtsunami disasters especially in the case of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, andanalyzes the damage to extract lessons on safety of buildings and recovery of cities fromthe view point of building regulations such as the Article 39 of the Building Standard
Law. In addition, the Article 8 of the Ordinance of City Planning Law resulted in not so
effective against tsunami in March 2011. Control mechanisms of building construction
should be integrated into socio-economic, institutional, technical and other policy tools.
Key Words: Great East Japan Earthquake, Building Standard Law, City Planning Law

INTRODUCTION
The impact of earthquake can be reduced by policy measures such as earthquake resistant building
design and construction standards, proper planning, education and trainings. The risk will increase asurbanization is adding extra pressures on building construction. In the case of “tsunami disaster”, theBuilding Standard Law (BSL) of Japan allows local governments to create their own regulation basedon its Article 39. However the regulation has not been utilized so often against tsunami. Moreover, theArticle 8 of Ordinance of the City Planning Law (CPL) resulted in not so effective in tsunami affectedareas of the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011 except some areas in Sendai Plain.
The paper examines the outline situation and causes of recent large scale earthquakes and tsunamis,
and analyzes the responses and reconstruction processes. Then, it shows how responded to the disaster,and how can people avoid the same disasters in the future based on the valuable lessons from the Great
Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) earthquake in 1995, Sumatra Tsunami in 2004, Pakistan earthquake in 2005,
Java earthquake in 2006, Peru earthquake in 2007, Sichuan earthquake in 2008, Haiti earthquake in2010 and the Great East Japan Earthquake. Since many large scale disasters have happened during
these ten years, this paper tries to comprehensively summarize the reasons of damages and what are
the lessons in terms of earthquake and tsunami safety of building and cities.
The demands ultimately help in creating conducive environment for policy intervention, in realizing
institutional mechanism to mitigate disasters for the municipal authorities and creating demand forcompetent professionals. In Japan, demands for seismic assessment and retrofit of houses that follow
old seismic codes before 1981, could be realized mainly by raising awareness.

1647

Table 1: Earthquake and Tsunami Disasters with over 15,000 casualties (1960-2011)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
ref.

Country: Earthquake
China: Hebei (Tangshan Earthquake)
Indian Ocean Tsunami
Haiti Earthquake
China: Sichuan (Wenchuan Earthquake)
Pakistan Kashmir Earthquake
Peru: Chimbote, Huaras
Iran: Manjil Earthquake, Rudbar
Iran: Kerman, Bam Earthquake
Armenia: Spitak Earthquake
Guatemala Earthquake
India: Bhuj Earthquake (Gujarat)
Japan: Great East Japan Earthquake
Iran: Tabas Earthquake
Turkey: Kocaeli Earthquake
China: Yunnan Earthquake
Japan: Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake

Year
1976
2004
2010
2008
2005
1970
1990
2003
1988
1976
2001
2011
1978
1999
1970
1995

Mg
7.8
9.0
7.0
8.1
7.6
7.8
7.7
6.7
6.8
7.5
8.0
9.0
7.4
7.8
7.8
7.3

Death (A) Collapse (B)242800226408470000222576(189273)87576
5461900
73328
27200066794(>15000)
35000
31830
55000
25000
22870
20023
(339000)
19295
12718518220
17118(60000)15621
6434
111123

Casualty ratio
A/B x 10048.1
(117.6)
1.6
26.9
57.8
(5.9)
15.2
(28.5)
5.7

Source: the BRI’s “World Seismic Disaster Catalog”, and United Nations. Events in gray box represent the earthquake disasters that occurredin 2001-2011. Part of collapse data, http://earthquake.usgs.gov/research/external/reports/08HQGR0102.pdf etc. ( ): not confirmed data

DAMAGE ANALYSIS OF THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EATHQUAKEFirstly, the damage of the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011 is analyzed in this section
to verify the current policy measures of building regulation against tsunami disasters. Fig 1 shows
ratio of casualties per population in the inundated area by affected municipality including dead andunknown persons as of 30 Dec., 2011 reported by the National Police Agency. Blue columns of in the
figure indicate Sanriku area where main geographical condition is “rias” coast that was suffered fromseverer damages, while green columns imply plain area in Sendai Plain and the southern regions.

Totally Collapsed Houses per
Inundated Area (unit/km2) more than 200
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0

Takahagi city

Tanohata village

Tagajo city

Rikuzen-Takata

Ishinomaki city

Miyako city

Ofunato city

Kamaishi city

Iwaki city

Kesennuma city

Sendai city

Otsuchi town

Sanriku area (Rias)
South of Sendai (Plain)

Yamada town

Ofunato city

Iwanuma city

Sendai city

Fig 1 Ratio of Casualties by Municipality

Shinchi town

Miyako city

Kesennuma city

Higashi-Matsushima

Soma city

Ishinomaki city

Namie town

Minami-Soma city

Yamada town

Minami-Sanriku

Natori city

Yamamoto town

Kamaishi city

Otsuchi town

Onagawa town

Rikuzen-Takata city

Sanriku area (Rias)
South of Sendai (Plain)

Onagawa town

14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Minami-Sanriku

Casualties per Population of inundated
area (municipalities more than 100 casualties, 2%)

Fig 2 Totally Collapsed Houses per Inundation Area

(1) The maximum ratio of human damage (casualties including death and unknown) per population of
the inundated areas in a municipality is recorded as 12 % in Onagawa town. Otsuchi town andRikuzen Tkata city claimed the following large ratio of human damage per population in the inundated
areas that were almost 11 %.
(2) Since no damage by tsunami can be observed outside of inundated areas, Fig 1 and Fig 2 represent

1648human damage and physical damage per inundated area respectively. The density of human andphysical damages in Otsuchi town and Onagawa town are the severest. The third concentrated damage
was seen in Yamada town. Kesennuma city and Kamaishi city follow them as the areas of collective
and massive damages both in human and physical aspects.
(3) The gravity of physical damage can be measured by the totally collapsed ratio. The density ofhouses and population in the inundation area of these cities was lower than in Onagawa and Otsuchi
town. If the ratio of unknown per human damage will represent severity of human damage, Onagawa
town reached 39 % as the highest ratio and Otsuchi town, Minami Sanriku town follow high ratio.
They are the municipalities that are ranked in Fig 2 as the heavily damaged areas.
(4) Fig 3 and Fig 4 shows the severity of damage by municipality, classifying the characteristics ofregions. The indicator of Fig 4 may represent characteristics of damage and will help to compare withother disasters. The proposed indicator is calculated as “number of human damage (as a sum of deathand unknown) per 100 totally collapsed houses” in each affected municipality. Coburn, Spence andPomonis defined similar ratio as “Lethality Ratio” in 1992. The following data is formed after
extracting municipalities that have larger fluctuation because of its smaller numbers.
(5) The ratio varies almost 100 times under this indicator. Rikuzen-Takata city recorded more than 50
persons’ human damage per 100 totally collapsed houses, while Sendai city’s indicator shows around 2
persons. Fig 4 tries to classify the damages however there was not so clear characteristics from above
mentioned data. Analysis on other big disasters in the world is conducted utilizing the same indicator(casualty ratio: number of casualties per 100 totally collapsed houses) in the latter section.
Characteristics of the Great East Japan Eq. (2)

600

2000

Tanohata

Sanriku

Fukushima
400

Onagawa

TOtsuchiIbarakiMinami-Sanriku

300

Kesennuma
Ofunato200
Ishinomaki

100

Rikuzen-Takata

1800

Sendai plain

500

Number of Casualties (person)

Unknown Ratio (Unknown per 1000 casualties)

Characteristics of the Great East Japan Eq. (1)KamaishiSendaiRikuzen-Takata
Namie

1600

1200

Kamaishi

1000

Natori

800

Higashi-Matsushima

Fukushima

Minami-Soma

IbarakiMiyakoSoma

400

OfunatoTagajoSanriku

Sendai plain

Onagawa
Minami-Sanriku

Yamamoto

600

200

0

Kesennuma

Otsuchi

1400

Iwaki

Watari

0
0

200

400

600

800

0

1000

Totally Collapsed Ratio (Totally collapsed per 1000 damaged units)

Fig 3 Unknown Ratio and Totally Collapsed Ratio

2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
Number of Totally Collapsed Houses (unit) except Sendai, Ishinomaki

Fig 4 Totally collapsed houses and Casualties

Photo 1: Otsuchi town, Iwate prefecture, Photo 2: Onagawa town, Miyagi prefecture (both Apr. 2011)

1649

DAMAGES AND RECOVERY OF RECENT BIG EARTHQUAKE DISASTERS
Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004): Numerous people including tourists from Europe and North America
were drowned and died by Indian Ocean Tsunami. The tsunami caused by the Sumatra Earthquake on
26 December 2004, killed in total approx. 230,000 people in 12 countries. One of the reasons why thetsunami brought so many victims lies in the tourists from the Western countries at Christmas vacation
who did not notice the danger of tsunami. This Tsunami provided an opportunity for the Westerncountries to acknowledge natural disasters. The “World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR)”
that was held in Kobe in January of 2005, only less than a month after the Indian Ocean Tsunami,
proved such global awareness. In total 158 countries have participated in the WCDR, and the “Hyogo
Framework for Action (HFA) 2005- 2015” was adopted.
From experiences in Aceh after the 2004 tsunami, many lessons can be learned. There were remaining
ships in the residential area where is located a few kilometers from the coast line of Aceh as a memoryof disaster. There are huge amount of construction sites of new houses in the areas. However, becauseof so rapid reconstruction of public facilities and houses, some houses were constructed with lower
earthquake resistance and lower quality than before. Some completed recovery houses were stillvacant in some residential zones as no infrastructure was provided as of Dec. 2007.

Photo 3: Bam, Iran after 2003, reconstruction

Photo 4: Aceh, Indonesia in 2005 (by UNCRD)

Pakistan Earthquake (2005): Kashmir (Pakistan) earthquake occurred on October 8, 2005 at 9AM.
Most of victims were killed by collapse of houses, schools and other buildings.
Java Earthquake (2006): Java earthquake claimed more than 5,000 casualties on May 27, 2006 earlyin the morning. More than 200,000 houses were destroyed, and crushed the residents.

Photo 5: Barakot, Pakistan (Mar. 2006)

Photo 6: Java, Indonesia (Sept. 2006) reconstruction

1650

Wenchuan Earthquake (2008): Wenchuan Earthquake occurred on May 12, 2008 in the afternoon.
Around 90,000 people were killed mainly in Sichuan Province of China. Many of them claimed theirlives by being pressed with collapsed buildings particularly their own houses. The affected area
extended from cities that have hundreds of thousand populations to villages in the mountain regions
more than 500km long range of areas. It was just before the Beijing Olympic Game, the Chinese
government quickly responded, such as the rapid provision of temporary houses. It was ten times
larger in number of units within the same period compared with the case of the 1995 Great
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. The reconstruction of houses finished within 2 years although the original
recovery plan needed 3 years.
One of the factors why the recovery has been completed so fast is “Partner Assistance” system that hascontributed to recovery of a heavily affected city through the support by a designated province in
China. This system was applied from the initial stage to whole reconstruction and proved effective,
partly because of competitive atmosphere of the system. The traumatic care of victims and recovery ofcultural heritages are included. Retrofitting of vulnerable buildings remains a major issue as a lesson.

Photo 7: suburb of Pisco, Peru (Aug. 2007)

Photo 8: a village in Sichuan, China (June 2008)

DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF THE DAMAGESThe Fig 5 and Fig 6 show the comparison of disasters in different areas using a proposed indicator.
From the indicator that sets forth number of casualties per 100 totally collapsed houses, the range of
numbers varies from 60 to 2 or 1 in both figures that Fig 5 shows difference among municipalities in
the Great East Japan Earthquake affected areas and Fig 6 indicates difference of recent huge disasters.
Casualties per 100 Totally Collapsed Houses(All municipalities more than 100 casualties)
70

Sanriku area (Rias)

60

South of Sendai (Plain)

50
40
30
20
10

Iwaki city

Sendai city

Tagajo city

Watari town

Ofunato city

Miyako city

Minami-Soma city

Kesennuma city

Shinchi town

Ishinomaki city

Iwanuma city

Higashi-Matsushima

Minami-Sanriku town

Namie town

Yamada town

Yamamoto town

Natori city

Onagawa town

Soma city

Kamaishi city

Otsuchi town

Rikuzen-Takata city0

Fig 5 (2011 Japan) and Fig 6 (recent world) Number of casualties per 100 totally collapsed houses

1651

The following observation can be pointed out from above-mentioned figures and field visits:(1) Number of Fig 5 represents the “inclination” of Fig 4. Although there may exist slight difference of
judgment and definition of a “totally collapsed house” among municipalities, large difference of value
cannot be explained. From the data in Fig 7, it is not so clear the difference of each municipality. The
difference of prefectures may be analyzed (although the highest casualties in Iwate prefecture in theFig 6 cannot be explained from the Fig 7 that indicates the awareness of risk in Iwate was the highest).
(2) Fig 5 shows lower “casualty (mortality) ratio” in Ofunato city even though it is located in Sanriku.
The reasons why the ratio in Soma city, Natori city and some other plain areas resulted in higher ratio
compared with average of Iwate or Sanriku region may also provide social or historical reasons of thedamages. Since this paper focuses on institutional aspect, further research is executed.
(3) Fig 6 indicates also the wide range of difference of casualty ratio in the recent huge disasters. In
general, tsunami disasters claimed rather higher ratio than the other cases. One of the reasons may be
the frequency of a disaster (Huge tsunamis occur every thousand years while huge earthquakes can beexperienced once per several hundred years, as it is said “disaster comes when it is forgotten”).
(4) Fig 6 also suggests that the large difference of casualty ratio between the higher cases such as Iranand Pakistan (and in the case of Haiti, the casualty ratio became over 100 persons by official statistics)
and lower cases in China 2008, Peru 2007 and Java 2006. The case of Kobe in 1995 set forth the
middle level of casualty ratio. (5) and (6) are the tentative hypotheses based on the current data.
(5) Photos 6-8 that were taken one week or a few months after each disaster show the typical damageof houses. Photo 6 of Indonesian case shows a reconstructed house. The collapsed wall was seen at theback right side. That was the former house with very thin brick wall. Not only in Indonesia but also in
Peru (Photo 7), and China (Photo 8) people constructs one story house with light roof materials andthin wall, especially in rural regions. The local residents use traditional construction systems.
(6) Photo 3 in Iran and Photo 5 in Pakistan indicate modern construction methods. In case of Iranpeople uses steel frame brick infill structures. As the damage of pure (dried) brick houses was severer
than the steel frame type, many reconstructed buildings adopted the steel frame structure. In the caseof Pakistan in 2005, reinforced concrete buildings like schools, hospitals and apartment houses werecollapsed and caused many casualties. It means that even modern structure, it causes severe humandamage if the structure was not properly designed and constructed.

Fig 7 Reasons (chance) of Evacuation on March 11, 20111652

Based on the data on damages of the Great East Japan Earthquake from the view point of building
control and urban planning, i.e. Fig 8 to Fig 11, further observations can be pointed out as follows:(1) Fig 8 shows two exceptionally large damaged cities in terms of physical damage. Both Sendai cityand Ishinomaki city are classified as the area of “Urban Planning with Area Division”. That means thepressure of development and increase of population are expected in these cities. Therefore, in order toeffectively invest resources into designated Urbanization Promotion Area (UPA) without investing into
Urbanization Control Area (UCA) (almost ten times difference of casualty ratio between two cities).
(2) Fig 9 clearly indicates the characteristics of urban planning with Area Division (red columns).
Accumulated houses existed in the area and were damaged. The damaged houses include collapsed
houses, half collapsed houses and partially damaged houses. However, top six municipalities in the Fig
9 cannot be found in the Fig 10. That means in urbanization promotion areas especially in the Sendai
plain, housing damage in tsunami inundation areas turned out large number, while human damage was
not so severe if compared with Sanriku where there is no UPA except Onagawa town.
(3) Fig 10 shows the same data as Fig 6 with classification by urban planning type. As same as the Fig8, all municipalities in Fig 10 established urban planning. That means heavily damaged areas onhouses (Fig 8) and human (Fig 10) were basically controlled under urban planning system with rather
strict building control systems that are connected each urban planning.
(4) In the Fig 11, not so specific difference between urban planning with Area Division and without
Area Division can be observed.
Damaged Houses per Inundation Area (unit/km2)

Totally Collapsed Houses

6000(municipalities more than 1000 units)

Urban Planning with Area Division

30000

5000

Land Use Districts without Area Division

Urban Plan with Area Division

25000

UPA without Area Division

20000

Urban Planning without Land Use District

4000

15000

3000

10000

2000

Outside of Urban Planning Area

5000
1000

Soma city0

Iwaki city
Rifu town
Sendai city
Shiogama city
Tagajo city
Matsushima
Onagawa town
Ootsuchi town
Kesennuma city
Ishinomaki city
Yamada town
Kamaishi city
Natori city
Miyako city
Ofunato city
Minami-Sanriku
Shichigahama
Higashi-Matsushima
Tanohata village
Rikuzen-Takata
Noda village
Minami-Souma
Iwaizumi town
Yamamoto town
Iwanuma city
Watari town
Souma city
Shinchi town
Namie town
Kuji city
Futaba town
Ookuma town
Naraha town

Tagajo city

Watari town

Yamamoto town

Natori city

Yamada town

Kamaishi city

Onagawa town

Otsuchi town

Minami-Sanriku

Rikuzen-Takata city

Miyako city

Ofunato city

Minami-Soma

Iwaki city

Higashi-Matsushima

Kesennuma city

Sendai city

Ishinomaki city0

Fig 8 Totally collapsed houses by municipality

Fig 9 Damaged houses per Inundation area

Casualties per 100 Totally Collapsed Houses

Characteristics of the Great East Japan Eq. (2-2)(All municipalities more than 100 casualties)
Urban Plan (Area Division)

60

UPA without Area Division

50
40
30
20
10

Sendai city

Iwaki city

Tagajo city

Watari town

Ofunato city

Minami-Soma city

Miyako city

Kesennuma city

Ishinomaki city

Shinchi town

Iwanuma city

Higashi-Matsushima

Minami-Sanriku town

Namie town

Yamada town

Yamamoto town

Natori city

Onagawa town

Soma city

Kamaishi city

Otsuchi town

Rikuzen-Takata city0

Number of Casualties (person)

70

2000
Rikuzen-Takata

1800

UPA Division

1600
1400

no Division

Kesennuma

Otsuchino land use

1200

Kamaishi

1000

Natori

800

Higashi-Matsushima

Yamamoto

Minami-Soma

600

MiyakoSoma

400

Watari200

out of UPA

Onagawa
Minami-Sanriku

Ofunato

Iwaki

Tagajo

0
0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

Number of Totally Collapsed Houses (unit) except Sendai and Ishinomaki

Fig 10 Casualties per 100 totally collasepd houses
Fig 11 Totally collpased houses/casualties(Values of Fig 10 & Fig 11 are the same as Fig 6 & Fig 4 respectively. UPA: Urban Planning Area)

1653

JAPANESE BUILDING REGULATIONS AGAINST DISASTERS“Area Division” system and building control systems that are prescribed in the City Planning Law(CPL) and the Building Standard Law (BSL) are expected to play significant roles to prevent tsunami
and earthquake disasters. However, before the Great East Japan Earthquake, a few cases of “Disaster
Hazard Area (DHA)” under the Article 39 of BSL were applied to prevent tsunami disaster. The reason
why DHA has not been so popular in the case of tsunami can be explained as follows:(1) DHA aims to prevent disasters utilizing locally applicable control codes through designation of thearea. There exist approximately 17,800 DHA in Japan (2007 MLIT), however most of them were
designated against land slide to restrict housing construction in the steep slope areas. DHA against
tsunami risk was not established except a few cases as the frequency of occurrence is quite rare andresidents do not agree to prohibit from building their houses. There is no national financial support.
(2) As shown in the Table 2, DHA provides permanent restriction while other building control systemin the disaster affected area like the building control based on the Article 84 of BSL, sets normally twomonths’ limitation or in the case of the Great East Japan Earthquake maximum 8 months’ control.
DHA controls will not be necessary for the area without any development pressure.
(3) DHA was sometimes used in the recovery projects after damaged disasters. In the case of Aonae
area of Okushiri town after a big tsunami of the off coast of South-West of Hokkaido earthquake in
1993, DHA was introduced to the high risk area in the old residential zone after the new hilly safe area
was developed utilizing the “Collective Removal project against Disasters” with subsidies fromnational government (by MOC, current MLIT). This was the unique case after tsunami under DHA.
(4) As shown in the Table 4 in the Appendix, Iwate prefecture requested all affected municipalities to
set DHA to the heavily tsunami affected area in April 2011. However Kamaishi city decided not to use
DHA in July 2011 and other municipalities are also reluctant to apply DHA. On the contrary, Miyagi
prefecture set building control in large areas using the Article 84 of BSL. Sendai city and Yamamoto
town utilize DHA to control building construction in tsunami hazardous areas.
Table 2: Comparison of Building Control based on the BSL Article 39 and Article 84
Building Standard Law
Designation of area
Duration of control
Construction control
Application to Great
East Japan Earthquake
Response ofmunicipalities
Applied cases

Article 39 (Disaster Hazard Area: DHA)
Based on bylaw of local governments
Permanent measures
Prohibit housing, limit other building (nonational intervention)
Iwate: Urge municipality to set bylaw
Miyagi: Pref. started to plan to apply
Iwate: Mayors are prudent (negative)
Miyagi: Part of Minami-sanriku town
Hokkaido, Okushiri town, Aonae area

Article 84 (Control in Affected Area)
By Specialized Admin. Authority *1
Max. two months *2
Prohibit / limit building construction in
the project planned area
Iwate pref.: No application
Miyagi: Applied to 5 municipalities
Miyagi: Enterprises were embarrassed
then try to permit some construction
Great Hanshin-Awaji Eq. (Kobe etc.)*1 Specialized Administrative Authority: Mayors that put building officer, Governor of prefecture in other cases*2 Based on a special law, max. 6 months’ additional extension was possible this time, Miyagi extended till Nov. 11.

As shown in the Table 2 and Table 4, the basic direction toward reconstruction of Miyagi prefecture
and Iwate prefecture seems to select different way as the case of building restriction in early stage. It
seems that Miyagi prefecture aims to improve urban structure using this opportunity especially in the
coastal zones, while Iwate prefecture seems to be struggling to maintain population in the tsunami
affected areas and then restriction of building construction in Iwate prefecture is not so strict comparedto Miyagi prefecture because the population decrease trend is expected severer in the remote regions
from big cities. However, it may be caused simply because of the difference of urban planning settingsof both prefectures, i.e. Miyagi prefecture sets Area Division and most of coastal areas are prohibitedto construct buildings while there is no Area Division (UPA and UPC) and construction of buildings is
not so strictly controlled in the coastal cities and towns in Iwate prefecture.

1654

RECOVERY POLICY MEASURES FOR TSUNAMI AFFECTED AREAS IN JAPAN
Total 40 types of project systems are designated as the principal project in the Law on the Special Area for
Reconstruction of the Great East Japan Earthquake that was established in December 2011. Major projectsystems are “Collective Removal Project against Disasters”, “Recovery Base Project against Tsunami (anew system based on the new Law on Tsunami Disaster Management Regional Development)”, “LandReadjustment Project for Urban Renewal”, “Public Operated Housing for Disaster Victims” and“Improvement Project of Small-Scale Residential Area”. Characteristics are summarized in the Table 3.

Table 3: Characteristics of Major Basic Project Systems to be applied to Reconstruction (in 2011)
Basic
Projects
Subsidies
Area

Collective
Removal projectagainst Disasters
Cost for public
works incl. landdevelopment
except sell land
No relation to
Urban Planning

Recovery Base projectagainst Tsunami (new)Totalmounding
cost,
Development of evacuationbuilding and Public works
etc.
Principally within Urban
Planning Area (UPA)
Principally 2 projects perurban, and approx. 20 ha
per project

Scale

More than five(usual 10) houses

Condition

DesignationofDisaster Hazard
Area is requisite

Define area for landpurchase, Step by step
extension will be possible

Agreementof
MLIT minister on
removal plan

Planning decision as urban
facility, project approval ofprefecture (or MLIT)

Process
Aid ratio

Project on Land
Readjustment
for
Urban Recovery
Cost for public works
incl.
land, totally
mounding(40
persons/ha)WithinUrban
Planning Area (UPA)

Public Operated
Housing after
Disasters
Cost for public
houses for low
incomepeople,aid for the aged

No condition

No condition

More than 15 (5)units, with 50%
vulnerable units

No condition

Consolidated area ispreferable

Consolidated area todevelop road system.
Division of project
area
Urban
planning
procedures are needed(fromplanning
decision to liquidation)

All costs will be covered (special case by national grant + special tax).

Improvementofsmall-scale
residential area
Public works, clear
vulnerable
units,
community facilitiesetc.

No relation to Urban PlanningNo need for urban No need for urban
planning permit, planningpermit,needfinancial need financial MLIT
MLIT agreementagreement
Depend on the tax condition (local debt
will be reimbursed by rent).

The application of 40 project types will be selected by the local government within this fiscal year (byMarch 2012) and those reconstruction projects will be executed within 3-5 years utilizing mainly
national supplementary budget that will be provided to the local governments of affected areas soon.
Author tries to analyze execution process of reconstruction projects from urban planning view point.
As for December 30, 2011 national government has announced these systems and budgetary
framework to the local governments. Now local governments are discussing with community on theconcrete projects for reconstruction based on the basic plans and future prospect in each communitythat have been basically created in 2011.
The basic issue of these areas is the trend of decreasing population that will be heavily influenced todecide future urban plan of reconstruction areas. Table 4 shows estimated population based on a
research study by Hayashi and Saito in 2011. While population of Miyagi prefecture will decrease
less than 20%, total population of Iwate prefecture will decrease more than 30% by 2040 from 2005
within these 35 years. In addition, decrease of regional population is estimated almost 50% in thetsunami affected areas both in Miyagi prefecture and Iwate prefecture. The reconstruction plan will be
influenced by such regional population prospect as shown in the Table 4.
LIMITS OF JAPANESE BUILDING REGULATIONS AGAINST TSUNAMI
Both of the Building Standard Law (BSL) and the City Planning Law (CPL) in Japan lay down several
Articles related to recovery processes after disasters. However, the term of “tsunami” appears only
once in the BSL and in the case of CPL, it does not contain the term of “tsunami” in the law before
2011, because most of recovery processes were prepared against urban fire in these laws. The Japanese
history of urban disaster focuses on spread of fire in the city since Edo era and large-scale urban fire1655

also occurred recently in Kobe city in 1995 at the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. Therefore, current
urban planning system in Japan seems to deal with tsunami disaster management not so clearly. The
devastated tsunami that occurred on March 11, 2011 resulted in the first huge tsunami disaster during
almost one century of history of both legal systems.
There is no UPA in the 2011 tsunami affected areas in Iwate prefecture, while most of Sendai plain in
Miyagi prefecture is clearly divided into UPA and UCA. Most of Sanriku areas are not applied “AreaDivision (to classify into UPA and UCA)” even in Miyagi prefecture like Minami-sanriku Town and
Kesennuma City, because there was not so much pressure on increase of population. Area Divisionsystem should be applied to the area where urban settings are already formulated or where urban
development is expected within the next 10 years. Especially in the latter UPA case, the standard ofsetting area prescribes not to principally designate tsunami hazardous areas based on the Article 8 of
the Ordinance of CPL. However, in 1964 when the current CPL was established there existed few
scientific and engineering knowledge on tsunami to establish legal system, and with other reasons
such as indicated below, the regulations do not function well in reality.
The reasons why CPL did not function well against tsunami in spite of Article 8 of its Ordinance:(1) Social Reasons- When the UPA was firstly designated, the areas where consensus could be easily obtained wereselected. Already urbanized city areas had the first priority.
- UPA was basically set in the regions that rapid increase of population occurred.
- Many new public facilities and care houses for the elderly were constructed in the UPC areas withtsunami risks, because of consolidation of municipalities and progress of aged society.
(2) Physical Reasons- People thought that it will be easy to evacuate from tsunami, since the most advanced information
technology and early warning systems are established.
- People who lived in the coastal area thought that seawalls, river gates and tsunami evacuationbuildings would protect residents from tsunami disasters.
(3) Economic Reasons- UPA tends to be designated in and around already urbanized area, because of efficient use andmaintenance of infrastructure, such as roads, sewerage and water supply.
- To move to safer area, in particular change of urban setting is almost impossible in normal timeeven though all people recognized their high risk (partly because of financial reason of municipality).
- The movement to protect agricultural land becomes weaken as demand of agricultural land will notincrease and because of higher exchange ratio (strong yen) and excessive domestic rice production etc.
(4) Institutional Reasons- The Article 8 of the Ordinance of CPL does not include “tsunami hazard” application to alreadyurbanized areas. It regulates only newly urbanized (planned) areas.
- In the regulation of Article 8, the terms of “principally” and “hazardous area against tsunami” areused without clear definitions. There is no detail explanation in the MLIT guideline of urban planning.
CONCLUSIONS
Concentration of population into urbanization area and rapid improvement of social infrastructures dueto the economic growth mostly in emerging countries would be common now in the world economy.
As frequent earthquake and tsunami disasters during the 21st century (e.g. Sumatra Tsunami in 2004,
Kashmir Earthquake in 2005, Sichuan Earthquake in 2008, and the Great East Japan Earthquake andTsunami in 2011) proved such demands for disaster management. In each on-site observation, thecollapse of buildings caused major damages in the earthquake related disasters. Therefore, quality of
new houses and in the case of tsunami location of new urban area is the key to successful recovery.
Moreover seismic retrofitting became popular in Japan after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake,while there are few cases of retrofitting of existed buildings in many countries.
Further field investigation will be needed to follow the reconstruction processes in the affected areas1656

of the Great East Japan Earthquake. Comparison of prefectures and cities provide lessons on thereconstruction process under the different urban planning settings and conditions, and will be helpful
to improve urban planning systems. One sided control mechanism for implementation of building
cannot solve the problems. Building control has to be integrated with socio-economic, institutional,
technical and other tools to achieve safety of buildings and built-environment. In order to mitigate
earthquake risk, all stages of building construction, from location, planning, construction tomaintenance, are important. Awareness creation is instrumental for building culture of safety anddemands for intervention in disaster mitigation. The demands ultimately help in creating conducive
environment for policy intervention, in realizing institutional mechanism of code enforcement andland use control for the municipal authorities and in creating demand for competent professionals.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author acknowledge support from the Building Research Institute (BRI), the International Instituteof Seismology and Earthquake Engineering (IISEE) for providing opportunities to visit tsunami
affected areas in April (Iwaki, Miyako, Kamaishi, Sendai, Ishinomaki, Onagawa, Natori, Iwanuma)
and in September (Sendai, Ishinomaki, Onagawa, Minami-sanriku). The author also appreciates the
University of Tokyo for providing supports to visit Kessennuma, Rikuzentakata, Ofunato andKamaishi in November 2011 and January 2012. These supports make possible to summarize the paper.
APPENDIX DATA
Table 4: Comparison of Population and Urban Reconstruction of Miyagi and Iwate prefectures
Total population
Estimated pop.
Ratio(2040/2005)
Aged ratio(05-40)
Basic Concept for
Reconstruction (partof land use anddevelopment)
Current
situation(building control)

Miyagi Prefecture
2,360,218 persons (2005)
1,894,000 persons (2040)- 19.8% (affected area - 46.8%)
20.0% (2005) → 34.3% (2040)
Miyagi Pref. Recovery Plan:
Recovery focusing on tsunami disastermanagement of coastal areas applying removal
to high land, separation of work and home,multiple protection against tsunami from thelessons
Pref. set building control based on City
Planning Law etc. after BSL Article 84.

Iwate Prefecture
1,385,041 persons (2005)
962,000 persons (2040)- 30.5% (affected area - 48.8%)
24.6% (2005) → 38.0% (2040)
Iwate Pref. Recovery Basic Plan:
Based on agreements with residents,
improvement of residential area for safety anddevelopment connected with land use planconsidering tsunami disaster management
Pref. has recommended municipalities to use
BSL Article 39, but no execution.

Data: Miyagi Pref. Recovery Plan, http://www.pref.miyagi.jp/juutaku/saigaijouhou/20111221plan_honbun.pdf

Iwate Pref. Recovery Basic Plan, http://www.pref.iwate.jp/view.rbz?nd=2974&of=1&ik=1&pnp=2974&cd=35093

REFERENCES
Coburn A.W., Spence R.J.S. and Pomonis A. (1992). “Factors determining human casualty levels inearthquakes: Mortality prediction in building collapse”, 10th WCEE, University of Cambridge, UK
Cabinet Office (2011). “Reference Data”, Report of Special Investigation Committee on Earthquake
and Tsunami measures based on the lessons from the Tohoku Earthquake, Sept. 28, 2011, 35-43
MLIT (2011). “Guideline of Urban Planning”, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, transport and tourism.
Naoki Hayashi, S. Saito (2011). “Prospect of Population in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures”(in Japanese), SERC Discussion Paper, SERC11023
Tokuji Utsu (1990). “World Earthquake Catalogue”, The University of Tokyo, 243.
Utsu, T. (2002). “A list of deadly earthquakes in the World: 1500-2000”, International Handbook ofEarthquake and Engineering, Seismology Part A, 691-717, Academic Press, San Diego.

1657