China Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI)
Investment Report 2023
Christoph Nedopil

February 2024

China Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI)
Investment Report 2023
Christoph Nedopil

About this Publication
This brief is produced by the Griffith Asia Institute (GAI) at Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia incollaboration with the Green Finance & Development Center (GFDC) of the Fanhai International School ofFinance at Fudan University, Shanghai, PR China.
The brief aims to provide a vehicle for publishing preliminary results on topics related to the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) to encourage discussion and debate. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed inthis paper are entirely those of the author(s) and should not be attributed in any manner to Griffith University,
FISF or Fudan University, to its affiliated organisations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors.
Citation and the use of material presented in this brief should take into account this provisional character.

Please cite as:
Nedopil, Christoph, 2024, China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2023, Griffith Asia Institute,
Griffith University (Brisbane) and Green Finance & Development Center, FISF Fudan University (Shanghai),
DOI: 10.25904/1912/5140.
© 2024 Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University and Green Finance & Development Center, FISF
Cover picture: Image by usertrmk on Freepik

Acronyms and abbreviations
AEI

American Enterprise Institute

AIIB

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

ASEAN

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

AVIC

Aviation Industry Corporation

BRI

Belt and Road Initiative

BRIGC

Belt and Road Initiative International Green Development Coalition

CATL

Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited

CGIT

China Global Investment Tracker

CNCEC

China National Chemical Engineering Corporation

CNCEC

China National Chemical Engineering Corporation

CNOOC

China National Offshore Oil Corporation

CNPC

China National Petroleum Corp

CPEC

China Pakistan Economic Corridor

CRRC

China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation

EBRD

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

EIA

Environmental Impact Assessments

ESMS

Environmental and social risk management

EU

European Union

EV

Electronic vehicles

FDI

Foreign direct investments

FISF

Fanhai International School of Finance

GAI

Griffith Asia Institute

GCF

Green Climate FundGFDCGreen Finance & Development Center

GIP

Green Investment Principles

GW

Gigawatt

ICBC

Industrial and Commercial Bank of China

ICT

Information Communication Technology

MEE

Ministry of Ecology and Environment

MOFCOM

Ministry of Commerce

MoU

Memorandum of UnderstandingMW

MegawattOBOR

One Belt One Road

PGI

Partnership for Global Infrastructure

SDG

Sustainable Development Goals

SINOPEC

China Petroleum and Chemical

SMU

Singapore Management University

SOE

State-owned enterprises

UAE

United Arab Emirates

UN

United Nations

UNCTAD

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

USD

United States Dollar

Contents
China’s finance and investments in the BRI

1

Share of investments in China’s BRI highest on record2

Deal sizes are getting bigger again, particularly for investments

3

Regional and country analysis of Chinese BRI engagement

3

Sector trends of BRI engagement

5

Energy-related engagement in the BRI at low levels but with green growth including transmission

7

Transport engagement in the BRI

10

Major players in BRI investments

11

China’s BRI investments in a global comparison

12

Outlook for BRI finance and investments

13

Recommendations

14

Appendix 1: About the BRI

16

Appendix 2: Countries of the BRI

17

About the author

18

About Griffith Asia Institute19

About the Green Finance & Development Center

19

Notes and references

20

List of ﬁgures
Figure 1:
Figure 2:

China's BRI construction engagement and investments 2013-2023
Share of construction and investment engagement in the BRI 2013-2023

2
2

Figure 3:

Deal size of Chinese engagement in the BRI 2013-2023

3

Figure 4:

Chinese engagement in different BRI regions since 2013

3

Figure 5:

Trends of Chinese BRI engagement across different countries 2023 and comparison of2022 and 2023 investments and construction engagement

4

Figure 6:

BRI investments in different sectors 2013-2023

5

Figure 7:

Chinese BRI engagement in different sectors through construction and investment since 2013

6

Figure 8:

Technology related BRI investment in 2023

6

Figure 9:

Chinese BRI engagement in metals and mining 2013 – 2023 H1

7

Figure 10:

Chinese total energy engagement in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 2013-2023

8

Figure 11:

Chinese energy engagement through investment and construction in the BRI 2013-2023 bysubsector

9

Figure 12:

Energy engagement across the supply chain

9

Figure 13:

Chinese energy engagement in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by country in 2023 H1

10

Figure 14:

Chinese engagement in BRI transport infrastructure 2013-2023

11

Figure 15:

FDI trends in 2023, global and by region (billion USD and percentage change compared to 2022) 12

Figure 16:

5-step framework for accelerating green BRI investments after COVID-19

13

Key ﬁndings•

10 years after the announcement of the BRI, cumulative BRI engagement breached the USD 1
trillion mark (USD 1.053 trillion), with about USD 634 in construction contracts, and USD 419 in
non-financial investments;•

China’s energy related engagement in 2023 were the greenest in absolute and relative terms inany period since the BRI’s inception reaching USD 7.9 billion;•

China is increasingly investing in electricity transmission (over USD 7 billion);•

BRI finance and investments has picked up in 2023 with about 212 deals worth USD 92.4 billion
compared to about USD 74.5 billion in 2022;•

Investments as a share of BRI engagement reached record levels at over 52 percent, indicating
higher ownership and risk taking of Chinese enterprises;•

In 2023, particularly the technology (+1046 percent) 1 and metals and mining (+158 percent) grew.

•

Chinese companies strongly invest in metals and mining, which are particularly relevant to thegreen transition (e.g., lithium) and batteries for electric vehicles.

•

Engagement related to batteries reached about USD 8 billion;•

Africa became the largest recipient of Chinese engagement, overtaking Middle Eastern countries;•

19 countries saw a 100 percent drop in BRI engagement, including Turkey, and Kenya; Russia
saw one deal in 2023, after no engagements in 2022;•

BRI investments in 2023 continue to be dominated by private sector enterprises, including
Huayao Cobalt and CATL, while construction contracts were dominated by state-owned
enterprises (SOEs);•

In global comparison, Chinese overseas engagement grew, while global FDI into emerging
economies in 2023 dropped significantly;•

For 2024, we see further growth of Chinese BRI engagement with a strong focus on BRI
country partnerships in renewable energy, mining and related technologies;•

Potential future engagements can be expected in six project types: manufacturing in newtechnologies (e.g., batteries), renewable energy, trade-enabling infrastructure (including pipelines,
roads), ICT (e.g., data centers), resource-backed deals (e.g., mining, oil, gas), high visibility or
strategic projects (e.g., railway).

China’s finance and investments in
the BRI
Cumulative BRI engagement in the full 10 years since theannouncement of the BRI in 2013 breached the USD 1
trillion mark to reach USD 1.053 trillion, about USD 634
in construction contracts, and USD 419 in non-financial
investments.

This compares to USD 74.5 billion BRI engagement inall of 2022—an increase of 18 percent).
Of the 2023 engagement, about USD 44.6 billion was
through investment and USD 43.7 billion throughconstruction contracts (partly financed by Chineseloans). China’s overall engagement shows a steadydevelopment since 2020 from the onset of COVID-19(see Figure 1).

Preliminary data on Chinese engagement throughfinancial investments and contractual cooperation for2023 in the 149 countries of the BRI 2 show about 212
deals worth USD 92.4 billion.

About the data:
In November 2023, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) released new BRI engagement statistics
covering the period of January to October 2023. 3
According to these data, Chinese enterprises invested about USD 25.85 billion in non-financial direct
investments in countries “along the Belt and Road” (a year-on-year increase of 20.1 percent). At thesame time, the value of newly-signed project contracts by Chinese enterprises in the "Belt and Road"
countries was USD 128.42 billion, a year-on-year decrease of 5 percent.
For this report, the definition of BRI countries includes 150 countries that had signed a cooperationagreement with China to work under the framework of the BRI by December 2023.
This analysis is derived from and presents numbers very similar to the China Global Investment Tracker(CGIT), published by the American Enterprise Institute 4. We expand those data with our own data
based on research at Griffith Asia Institute and at the Green Finance & Development Center affiliatedwith FISF Fudan University, Shanghai. Specifically, T=the CGIT includes deals with a size of over USD
100 million. We expand the data with more research and granularity for sub-sectors and sub-sectors
and adjust, include or exclude projects based on our own information.
We define BRI engagements as those Chinese construction and investment deals in countries that had
we identify as having an MoU with China to cooperate under the BRI at the time of the report (thus, if
the Syrian Republic signed a BRI MoU in 2022, we also count prior investments into Syria as BRI
investments).
As with most data, they tend to be imperfect and need regular updating.

1

Figure 1: China's BRI construction engagement and investments 2013-2023

Source: © 2023 GAI and GFDC (Data AEI and others).

Figure 2: Share of construction and investment
engagement in the BRI 2013-2023

Share of investments in China’s BRI
highest on record
The share of Chinese engagement in the BRI throughinvestments compared to construction has seen its
highest levels in 2023: investments reached about 52
percent of BRI engagement compared to 29 percent
in 2021.
2023 is the first time that more than 50 percent of the
BRI engagement is through investments where
Chinese investors take equity stakes with higher risks.
This compares to construction contracts that are
typically financed through loans provided by Chinese
financial institutions and/or contractors with the
project often receiving guarantees through the hostcountry’s government institutions (see Figure 2).

Source: © 2023 GAI and GFDC (Data AEI and others).

2

Deal sizes are getting bigger again,
particularly for investments

Regional and country analysis ofChinese BRI engagement

The average deal size for investments has more thandoubled from a low or USD 354 million in 2020 to
USD 772 million in 2023. This is the second highest
deal size since the BRI’s inception in 2013 (2018 had
investment deal sizes of USD 749 million).

Africa is the largest recipient of BRI engagement withstrong growth also in Central Asia. Chinese BRI
engagement was not evenly distributed among all
regions. BRI countries in Africa saw a 47 percent
increase in Chinese construction contracts and a 114
percent increase in investments. In consequence,
Africa as a continent became the largest recipient ofChinese engagement worth USD 21.7 billion,
overtaking Middle Eastern countries that saw USD
15.8 billion in engagement.

For construction projects, the deal size in 2023 was
the second lowest since the BRI was announced in2013, with about USD 394 (see Figure 3). Comparedto the peak in 2017, this is a 22 percent decrease.
Particularly for construction projects, this trend islikely in line with the ambition to have “small or
beautiful projects” in the BRI propagated throughofficial channels. Another reason is that China
adjusted its risk management strategies to adjust for
BRI country risks that are more pronounced, e.g., due
to sovereign debt issues.

Nevertheless, Middle Eastern countries continued tobe major recipients of Chinese construction
engagement, receiving 36.7 percent of total BRI
construction engagement in 2023, a growth of 31
percent from 2022.
East Asian BRI countries, meanwhile, expanded theirintake of Chinese investments by 94 percent to USD
6.8 billion in 2023 (see Figure 4).

Figure 3: Deal size of Chinese engagement in the BRI
2013-2023

Interestingly, Latin American BRI countries saw very
little construction engagement in 2023, just USD
180 million (just ahead of Pacific BRI countries
receiving USD 170 construction engagement). Yet,
Latin American BRI countries saw an increase of 92
percent for their investments to receive about 5.5billion in investments, taking 20.5 percent of all
Chinese BRI overseas investments.

Source: © 2023 GAI and GFDC (Data AEI and others).

3

Figure 4: Chinese engagement in different BRI regions since 2013

Source: © 2023 GAI and GFDC (Data AEI and others).

Figure 5: Trends of Chinese BRI engagement
across different countries 2023 and comparison of2022 and 2023 investments and construction
engagement

China’s financing and investment spread across 61
BRI countries in 2023 (up from 60 in 2022), with 37
countries receiving investments and 45 withconstruction engagement.
The country with the highest construction volume in2023 was Saudi Arabia, with about USD 5.6 billion (upfrom 2.6 billion in 2022), followed by Sri Lanka (USD
4.5 billion), Tanzania (about USD 3.1 billion) and UAE(USD 2 billion).
Regarding BRI investments, Indonesia was the single
largest recipient with about USD 7.3 billion in
investments, followed by Hungary (USD 4.5 billion)
and Peru (USD 2.9 billion).
19 countries saw a 100 percent drop in BRI
engagement compared to 2022, including Kenya,
Myanmar, Turkey. China’s engagement in Pakistan
for the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
dropped by about 74 percent (see Figure 5).
The countries with the largest growth of BRI
engagement were South Korea (+577 percent),
Bolivia (+493 percent), Namibia (+457 percent),
Tanzania (+415 percent), and Uzbekistan (+375
percent).
After Russia did not receive any Chinese engagementin 2022, China National Chemical Engineering
Corporation (CNCEC) joined AEON Corporation tobuild a methanol plant in Volgograd. 5

Source: © 2023 GAI and GFDC (Data AEI and others).

4Sector trends of BRI engagement
In 2023, particularly the technology (+1046 percent)and metals and mining (+158 percent) grewcompared to 2022.

About technology:
in 2023, we summarised all electric vehicle
and car-related investments into
technology, which were previously partly
located in the transport sector.

The focus of China’s overseas BRI engagement
continued to be on infrastructure, particularly inenergy (31 percent) and transport (16 percent),
which is a significant reduction, particularly in theenergy sector (down from 45 percent in 2022). The
mining sector overtook the transport sector,
constituting 21 percent of Chinese overseas
engagement (see Figure 6).

The finance, utilities and health sectors saw
significant drops.

Figure 6: BRI investments in different sectors 2013-2023

Source: © 2023 GAI and GFDC (Data AEI and others).

When looking at China’s engagement strategy inthese sectors distinguished by construction andinvestment, it becomes clear that investment withequity shares and thus higher risk within the Chineseorganisations becomes an increasingly important
strategy particularly in mining, technology, andtransport (see Figure 7).

5

Figure 7: Chinese BRI engagement in different sectors through construction and investment since 2013

Source: © 2023 GAI and GFDC (Data AEI and others).

One important growth sector is technology whichreached over USD 14.3 billion in engagement in BRI
countries with a focus on battery, car parts, EV
manufacturing, as well as telecoms (see Figure 8).
Some noteworthy engagements include investments
into electric vehicles, such as battery production withZhejiang Huayou Cobalt in collaboration with LG in
South Korea, or Zhejiang Hezhong’s EV car
manufacturing in Thailand. Outside of the BRI, BYD
established a car manufacturing in Brazil.

A manufacturing plant related to renewable energy
technology was the Goldwind agreement for the
implementation of a wind turbine industrial unit worth
around USD 36 million, which will generate about
1,100 direct and indirect jobs. 6
In Indonesia, Tria Solar, Sinar Mas, Agra Surya Energi
and Indonesia’s government-owned power company
PLN agreed to construct Indonesia’s largest solar celland solar panel factory in Central Java. 7
Another important growth area of strategic
importance is China’s engagement in metals andmining reaching USD 19.4 billion. Engagement in the
sector has grown by 158 percent compared to 2022
and reached the highest level since 2013. The
minerals and metals are particularly relevant to thegreen transition (e.g., lithium) and batteries forelectric vehicles. Engagement has been strong invarious African countries, Bolivia and Chile in Latin
America, and Indonesia. China already holds
significant shares of global mining sources (e.g., over
80 percent of global graphite resources), and evenmore control in material processing (where acrosslithium, nickel, cobalt and graphite, China owns morethan 50 percent of global capacity). 8

Figure 8: Technology-related BRI investment in
2023

Examples include vertical integration investments by
the world’s largest battery manufacturer CATL, whichbought the share’s for a nickel mining concession inIndonesia from PT Aneka Tambang Tbk (Antam). 9
Others are a lithium mining operation in Mali by
Jiangxi Ganfeng or through Hainan Mining’s
acquisition of Kodal Minerals part of a lithium mine in
Mali 10, a copper processing plant agreement in Saudi
Arabia 11, and a commissioning of a lithium processing
plant in Zimbabwe 12 (see Figure 9).

Source: © 2023 GAI and GFDC (Data AEI and others).

6

Figure 9: Chinese BRI engagement in metals and mining 2013 – 2023 H1

Source: © 2023 GAI and GFDC (Data AEI and others).

Energy-related engagement in the BRI at low levels but with green growth
including transmission
China’s energy-related engagement in 2023 was
the greenest since the BRI’s inception in 2013: in
2023, China’s green (solar, wind) energy engagement
was about USD 7.9 billion, about 28 percent ofenergy engagement, plus an additional 6 percent(USD 1.6 billion) into hydropower.

Chinese engagement related to the energy sector
constitutes the largest share of China’s BRI
engagement. In 2023, total engagement in the energy
sector reached short of USD 30 billion—which is thelowest BRI energy engagement except for 2020.
A particular development is increased green energy(solar, wind and biomass) engagement, whichreached records of USD 7.9 billion (this number does
not include Chinese export of solar equipment).

About energy-related transmission:

Also, engagement in distribution systems (e.g.,
substations, power lines) constituted more than 11
percent of Chinese BRI energy engagement (seeFigure 10).

Starting with this report, we include energyrelated transmission engagement.

7

Figure 10: Chinese total energy engagement in the BRI 2013-2023

Source: © 2023 GAI and GFDC (Data AEI and others).

A major deal was the USD 4.5 billion engagement
by Sinopec in Sri Lanka to build an oil refinery,
which was approved in November 2023. 17

Coal
Following China’s announcement in September
2021 to not to build new coal fired power plants,
select new coal-fired power projects seem toprogress.

Rumors of an 8 GW gas power plant in Yakutia,
Russian Far East, with China’s Power China from
June 2023 have not yet been confirmed.
Oil-related investments dropped to zero in 2023
after years with several higher profile projects
inside and outside the BRI (e.g., China’s CNOOC
engaged in a USD 1.9 billion production sharing
deal with Petrobras to explore Brazil’s Buzlos
field). 18

In January 2024, a new 380 MW coal-fired power
plant unit, Labota No. 7 built by Chinesecompanies, started operation 13, the Pakistan
government approved a 300 MW of coal fired
power in Gwadar, Pakistan in January 2023 14 tobe constructed by China. While Pakistan had
announced in December 2020 to not build newcoal-fired power plants, various sources report that
China was interested in providing financial andtechnical support for the project 15—including thedesign that requires import of coal (rather thanusing possibly more affordable domestic coal in
Pakistan). 16 However, no financial closing has beenannounced, which is why this project is notincluded in the 2023 H1 dataset.

At the same time, BRI partners invested in China tosupport oil development, such as Aramco’s
investment in a petrochemical complex in Panjin
City, Liaoling Province.

Green energy/hydropower
China’s total engagement in green energy (solar
and wind) and hydropower amounted to about USD
9.5 billion in 2023. This compares to USD 8.1 billion
in 2022 (see Figure 10).

Oil and gas

Looking at investment only, Chinese green energy
and hydropower investment decreased to USD 1.5
billion in 2023 from USD 2.1 billion in 2022.

Oil and gas engagement fell slightly to USD 15.7
billion (52 percent of Chinese overseas energy
engagement), USD 6.4 billion in gas and 9.3 USD
billion in oil.

Meanwhile, construction projects related to green
energy (including hydropower) increased from USD
5.6 billion in 2022 to USD 8.1 billion in 2023.

8

Figure 11: Chinese energy engagement through investment and construction in the BRI 2013-2023 bysubsector

Source: © 2022 GFDC (Data AEI, GDFC, MOFCOM and others).

of which in hydropower and coal). Pakistan is followedby Russia and Saudi Arabia. An interesting case for
China’s energy investment is Zimbabwe: after acancelled coal-fired power plant in 2021, Zimbabwe
saw strong engagement in green energy through anagreement on a 1GW floating solar station 20 in 2023.

Energy engagement across the supply
chain
China’s engagement across the energy supply chain
has evolved in the data frame from 2022 to 2023.
While in both years, energy generation was mostimportant for China’s BRI engagement, exploitation(particularly in oil and gas) has decreased significantly
from USD 12.7 billion to USD 6.1 billion. Meanwhile,transmission engagement, crucial for the green
transition, has increased from USD 4.5 billion to over
USD 7 billion (see Figure 12).

Figure 12: Energy engagement across the supply
chain

Energy engagement in different countries
Analyzing Chinese energy engagement in different
BRI countries, we find that, Sri Lanka took the top
spot due to Sinopec’s engagement in building an oil
refinery. Similar to 2022, also Saudi Arabia held a top
spot as the country that received the most energy
engagement in 2023 (USD 3.7 billion), followed by
Peru (USD 2.9 billion). Contrary to the previous year,
Saudi Arabia also received a significant share (19percent) of green energy engagement. Peru,
meanwhile, received all of its engagement intransmission projects, where China Southern Power
Grid International bought the distribution, supply, andenergy services assets from Italian energy company
Enel 19. (see Figure 12).
Overall, the most important partner for China’s BRI
energy engagement since the BRI’s initiation in 2013
remains Pakistan, which has received USD 28 billion
through investment and construction contracts (mostSource: © 2023 GAI and GFDC (Data AEI and others).

9

Figure 13: Chinese energy engagement in the BRI by country in 2023

Source: © 2023 GAI and GFDC (Data AEI and others).

Transport engagement in the BRI
Transport-related engagement is key to providing themeans to trade between China and the BRI
countries—where trade is a core component of the
BRI. Accordingly, China has invested in andconstructed projects in road, rail, aviation, shipping,and logistics across the world (see Figure 13).

Also, China engaged through its CRRC to
manufacture rail wagons and wheels in Saudi Arabia. 21
Other noteworthy projects include an agreement on
the tram project in Colombia 22.
Road transport: China continues to engage in road
construction projects across many countries worth
USD 7.5 billion. Examples include a toll road in
Cambodia worth about USD 1.6 23 billion.

Aviation: Two projects were announced, including the
upgrade of the runway of Honiara Airport in Solomon
Island by China Railway Construction.

Ports: Some shipping and port-related project
investments were announced in 2023, such as anagreement with Saudi Arabia to support Aramco’s
corporation shipping projects.

Rail: Total rail engagement was worth USD 4.2 billion(all but one through construction contracts) withengagements in Africa, Latin America and East Asia,
such as the Kinshasa urban railway in the Democratic
Republic of Congo.

10Figure 14: Chinese engagement in BRI transport infrastructure 2013-2023

Source: © 2023 GAI and GFDC (Data AEI and others).

Major players in BRI investments

led ahead of Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (both privatecompanies).

Among the major players for BRI investments in
2023 were—contrary to most years before—notexclusively Chinese SOEs, but private enterprises(see Table 1).

The Chinese companies most prominently featured
in construction projects in the BRI in 2022 wasPower China, followed by China Petroleum andChemical (Sinpoec) and China National Petroleum
Corp (CNPC). This development for construction
projects is in line with last years’ trends.

For investment projects, Contemporary Amperex
Tech (CATL), the world’s largest battery producer,

Table 1: Major Players in BRI investments in 2023 (parent companies)

Source: © 2023 GAI and GFDC (Data AEI and others).

11

China’s BRI investments in a global
comparison
Foreign direct investments (FDI) to developing
countries fell to USD 841 billion in 2023, a drop of 9
percent, according to UNCTAD’s Global Investment
Trends Monitor, published in January 2024. 24

African FDI flows, meanwhile stayed stable at an
estimated USD 48 billion with strong engagement in
Morocco, Kenya, and Nigeria. An issue seemed tohave been infrastructure engagements, which
dropped by more than 30 percent in Africa.

Particularly developing countries in Asia saw a steep
decline of FDI, registering a 12 percent drop. FDI into
Africa and Latin America, meanwhile, remained morestable.

Also, Latin American economies saw a decrease in
FDI, such as a drop of FDI by 22 percent in Brazil(particularly project finance).

In Asia, developing economies remained neverthelessattractive destinations for greenfield projects, despite
drops of FDI of 6 percent in China and 47 percent inIndia. Similarly, ASEAN economies saw a decline of 16
percent—despite a 37 percent increase in greenfield
investments.

Worrisome is the first decline (17 percent) ininternational project finance deals for renewableenergy since the Paris Agreement.
Looking ahead, UNCTAD expects a modest increasein FDI flows in 2024 with moderate inflation andtempered borrowing costs. However, geopoliticalrisks and high debt levels remain a concern for global
FDI flows.

Middle Eastern countries saw a rise in greenfieldannouncements, led by a 28 percent increase of FDI
in the UAE.

Figure 15: FDI trends in 2023, global and by region (billion USD and percentage change compared to
2022)

12

Outlook for BRI finance andinvestments
Chinese finance and investments into the BRI
countries in 2023 have accelerated.

expectation is driven by challenges in China’s
domestic economic development, where Chinesecompanies seek opportunities in other countries.

For 2024, a further recovery of BRI investments andconstruction contracts seems possible. On the one
hand, there is clear need for investments to green
boost growth to support the green transition both inChina and in BRI countries. This provides great
opportunities for mining and minerals processing
deals, technology deals (e.g., EV manufacturing,battery manufacturing) and green energy (e.g.,energy production and transmission). China refers tothese industries (electric vehicles, batteries andrenewable energy) as the “New Three“.

In line with our previous predictions, we continue to
see deal numbers increasing. With strong
engagement in sectors requiring significant
investment (e.g., mining, manufacturing), compared
to sectors with variable engagement (e.g., renewableenergy), we can expect deal size to also remain larger
than in 2021 and 2022.
At the same time, we see two types of large strategic
project types to continue that might not have direct
financial benefits: transport infrastructure
engagements (such as in strategic rail and road toconnect mines), and resource-backed deals (such as
in oil, gas pipelines).

Furthermore, continuing post-COVID-19 investments
by global financial institutions, including developing
finance institutions (such as the World Bank, AsianDevelopment Bank, AIIB) provide infrastructuredevelopment opportunities for Chinese contractors.

To move the BRI investments forward, we expand ourrecommendations from the previous reports:

We do expect Chinese BRI engagement to reachlevels at least as high in 2024 as in 2023. Part of thisFigure 16: 5-step framework for accelerating green BRI investments after COVID-19

13

Recommendations
Focus on projects that are financiallysustainable and cut losses in nonprofitable projects

Increase international cooperation for BRI
projects to allow existing and usefulprojects to go ahead also in difficult
times.

Investors in BRI projects within China andoutside China should focus on smaller
projects that are easier to finance andfaster to implement. Particularly ininfrastructure and energy investments,
scalable solar

Tripartite cooperation with international
financial and implementation partners can
support BRI projects through better
access to financial resources, risk sharing
and knowledge sharing. Particularly nonSOEs that often have a higher burden ofaccessing investments from Chinese
large financial institutions could benefit
through broader access to finance, as
witnessed for example in the Zhanatas
wind farm in Kazakhstan, co-financed by
EBRD, AIIB, GCF and ICBC, while it wasbuild and is operated by China
International power Holding 25. Also,
Chinese financial institutions could
benefit to de-risk project finance by
broaden their international cooperation. A
report “China Third-Party Market
Cooperation for Infrastructure Finance
Financing Mechanism Handbook” hadbeen released in September 2021 toaccelerate tri-partite project finance. 26

and wind investments seem viable, as longas local conditions provide the relevant
grids to handle renewable energy supply.
With decreasing energy cost for renewableenergy, we also see an opportunity toinvest in early phase-out of existing older
coal projects, which would be both
economically and environmentally relevant.

Support partner-countries and partner
businesses in dealing with (sovereign)debt-repayment of already invested BRI
projects, e.g., through debt-for-natureswaps and nature performance bonds.

In addition, with European Union (EU)launching its “Global Gateway” and the
US pushing its “Partnership for Global
Infrastructure” (PGI), competition for the
BRI is increasing. However, if cooperation
for project finance and development inemerging markets is the goal, Chinese
investors and developers can accelerate
their cooperation with both public andprivate financial institutions from various
economies, particularly if they manage toshare standards.

Debt is a major concern for future growth inmany BRI countries. As we found in our indepth analysis of debt in BRI countries,
China has a unique opportunity to support
BRI countries in dealing with their debt
both bilaterally and multilaterally. Dealing
with the debt issue is crucial for providing
BRI countries with the necessary fiscal
space for future investments.
While debt-for-resource or debt-for-equity
swaps might seem beneficial for China in the
short-term to reduce the debt burden in the
BRI countries, these swaps tend toundermine future domestic growth
opportunities for BRI countries. Rather,
Chinese relevant stakeholders together withinternational partners through multilateralframeworks should support green recovery
by swapping part of the debt for nature andproviding necessary frameworks to increasetransparency and accountability of the use offunds.
Furthermore, sustainable debt instruments
could be applied to raise more funds, e.g.,through nature performance bonds.

14

Increase use of common environmental
and social standards in project evaluation(e.g., environmental impact assessment
EIA) and for environmental and social risk
management (ESMS)

Develop socially and environmentallyconscious phase-out strategies for
non-performing investments
Several investments in the BRI have had
to be stopped, mothballed or cancelled
due to financial (e.g., difficulties infinancing or servicing debt) andoperational reasons (e.g. due to travel
restrictions or problems in supply
chains). According to our study, over
50 percent of announced coal-fired
power plants have been mothballed.

In July 2021, the Ministry of Commerce,
together with the Ministry of Ecology andEnvironment, issued the Guidelines forGreening Overseas Investment andCooperation” 27 and in January 2022, theGuidelines for Ecological Environmental
Protection of Foreign Investment
Cooperation and Construction
Projects” 28. Within these Guideline,
Chinese developers are encouraged toadhere to international or Chinese
environmental standards, particularly incountries whose domestic environmental
standards and governance does not meetinternational standards.

To avoid reputational, social andenvironmental risks arising fromstopped, mothballed or cancelled
projects, plans should be developedand implemented by financial
institutions including insurancecompanies, developers, local
governments and relevant Chinese
authorities that compensate any losses
to workers and companies up to a
specific extent, and that ensure thatnature around mothballed andparticularly stopped projects can be
remediated. This also helps avoid
having skeleton constructions serve asa reminder of unfinished projects.

This is a formalisation of a number ofprevious Guidances, including the “Green
Development Guidance for BRI Projects
Baseline Study” and the “Application Guide
for Enterprises and Financial Institutions”
backed by various relevant Chinese
ministries published by the BRI Green
Development Coalition (BRIGC) in
December 2020 and October 2021
respectively. These guidance calls for
Chinese overseas investors to apply
independent environmental impact
assessments (EIA) and strict environmental
and social risk management (ESMS) toensure projects and investments areminimising environmental harm andmaximising environmental benefits. Also,
the Green Investment Principles (GIP)
integrate sustainability into corporate
governance, requiring boards tounderstand environmental, social andgovernance risks, as well as disclosing
environmental information.
By applying international standards,
Chinese financial institutions can moreeasily raise capital on the global capital
markets, accelerate co-financing withinternational partners and takeresponsibility to fulfill the goal of building
a “Green Belt and Road”.

15

Appendix 1: About the BRI
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) China’s main international cooperation and economic strategy. The BRI is also
known as the “One Belt One Road” (OBOR), the “Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk
Road” or just the “New Silk Road”. Its Chinese name is 一带一路 (yi dai yi lu). It was announced by Chinese
President Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan in October 2013.
The construction of the BRI is anchored in the Chinese constitution.

Goals of the BRI – and how to make it green
The BRI has officially “five goals”:
•
•
•
•
•

policy coordination,
facilities connectivity,
unimpeded trade,financial integration, andpeople-to-people bonds.

Over the past years, the emphasis on developing a “green” and “high-quality” BRI has accelerated. The Ministryof Environmental Protection (now Ministry of Ecology and Environment) had published the Guidance on
Promoting Green Belt and Road already in 2017. The document stresses the relevance of the “ecologicalcivilisation”, “green development concepts”, “principles of resource efficiency and environmental friendliness”
within the five goals of the BRI.
During the 2019 Belt and Road Forum, green and sustainable development of the BRI took center stage,
together with debt sustainability. Accordingly, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment jointly initiated the BRIInternational Green Development Coalition (BRIGC) and international partners. With its 10 working groups, the
BRIGC aims to support green development, in e.g.,
•
•
•
•
•

green financegreen transport
green innovation
green urbanisation
green standards

In 2020, the MEE and several relevant ministries backed the Green Development Guidance for BRI Projects
Baseline Study published by BRIGC. The Guidance lays out 9 recommendations for greening the BRI and an
initial project taxonomy (“traffic light system” that distinguishes projects with high environmental risk (redprojects) and projects with environmental benefits (“green projects”). In 2021, an implementation Guide forfinancial institutions and project developers was published. Also, in 2021, the Green Development Guidelines forOverseas Investment and Cooperation were published by MOFCOM and MEE, while the same ministries
published the Guidelines for Ecological Environmental Protection of Foreign Investment Cooperation andConstruction Projects in January 2022 to stress relevant environmental risk management practices.
Find an overview of relevant policy documents for the BRI at the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Policies
Database–Green Finance & Development Center (greenfdc.org).

16

Appendix 2: Countries of the BRI
According to official information, in January 2023, 150 had signed cooperation agreements for the BRI. For
countries and organisations to “join” the BRI, China and the respective country or organisation sign a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).
For 5 countries listed in official Chinese media (yidaiyilu.gov.cn), we could not confirm a signature of an MoU forbilateral cooperation under the BRI framework.
The following BRI map shows the list of countries that have signed MoUs or are said to be members of the BRI.
You can find a more detailed list of countries of the BRI at Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – Green
Finance & Development Center (greenfdc.org).

17

About the author
Dr Christoph NEDOPIL is the Director of the Griffith Asia Institute and a
Professor at Griffith University in Brisbane, Australia. He is also a Visiting
Professor at FISF Fudan University, Shanghai, Acting Director of the Green
Finance & Development Center at FISF Fudan University, and a Visiting
Faculty at Singapore Management University (SMU).
Christoph regularly provides advisory to governments, financial institutions,enterprises, and civil society on sustainable development issues. He is the leadauthor of the UNDP SDG Finance Taxonomy, the Innovative Climate Finance
Solutions report for the G20 in Indonesia, and the Green Development
Guidance of the BRI Green Development Coalition under the Chinese Ministryof Ecology and Environment. He has authored four books and publishedarticles in Science and other leading journals. Christoph serves as board
director in scaling sustainability in businesses and finance.
Christoph is quoted regularly in Financial Times, The Economist, Reuters, Bloomberg, and other major outlets.
Before joining Griffith University, he served as Founding Director of the Green Finance & Development Centerand Associate Professor at the Fanhai International School of Finance (FISF), Fudan University and previously
as Founding Director for the Green BRI Center at the Central University of Economics in Beijing. He worked with
the World Bank in over 15 countries and was a Director in the German development agency GIZ. Christoph holds
a Master of Engineering and a PhD in Economics from the Technical University Berlin, as well as a Master of
Public Administration from Harvard Kennedy School.

18

About Griffith Asia Institute
Griffith Asia Institute (GAI) at Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia, is an internationally recognised instituteproviding knowledge, and solutions for sustainable development in Asia-Pacific. With a history of over 20
years, GAI has forged strong partnerships with key decision-makers in business, policy and with research
institutions across the region. With over 80 faculty members and 50 adjunct members, GAI works inmultidisciplinary teams and draws on a wide range of technical expertise in energy, finance, policy, andeconomics as well as in regional studies including a strong China component.
GAI is led by Professor Christoph Nedopil Wang and is organised through knowledge and regional hubs:
The Green Transition and Sustainable Development Hub addresses major challenges and opportunities for
Asian and Pacific economies in addressing SDGs related to climate, life on land, life in the sea, partnerships,
infrastructure and energy.
The Governance and Diplomacy Hub addresses major challenges and opportunities in the region for peacefulco-existence, diplomacy, inclusive governance, policymaking and institution building.
The Inclusive Growth and Rural Development Hub addresses major challenges and opportunities in the region
regarding currently underserved communities (e.g., women, indigenous, youth, rural, or people with disabilities).
The four regional hubs address major regional and country-specific challenges and opportunities in (1)Southeast Asia, (2) South Asia, (3) Pacific and (4) China and the Region, each with their own hub lead.
https://www.griffith.edu.au/asia-institute

About the Green Finance &Development Center
The Green Finance & Development Center (GFDC) is a leading research center that provides advisory, researchand capacity building for financial institutions and regulators for green and sustainable finance in China andinternationally.
The GFDC works at the intersection of finance, policy, and industry to accelerate the development and use ofgreen and sustainable finance instruments to address the climate and biodiversity crisis, as well as contribute tobetter social development opportunities.
The topics of our work at the Green Finance & Development Center respond to the needs and developments ofthe financial markets and related policies in China and internationally, while we also aim to provide evidencebased advisory and research for future policies and strategies to accelerate the greening of finance in policy
and practice.
The Green Finance & Development Center was founded in 2021 by Christoph Nedopil Wang. It is associatedwith the Fanhai International School of Finance (FISF) at Fudan University in Shanghai, PR China.

19

Notes and references1
2

Partly due to an updated methodology.
GFDC, 2023, Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-roadinitiative-bri/

3

MOFCOM, 2023, 2023 年 1-10 月我对“一带一路”共建国家投资合作情况 (China’s investment and cooperation withcountries co-constructing the “Belt and Road” from January to October 2023)
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tongjiziliao/dgzz/202311/20231103456787.shtml
AEI, 2023, China Global Investment Tracker, http://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/
Interfax, 2023, China’s CNCEC joins Aeon methanol project in Russia, https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/91513/
Evwind, 2023, Goldwind will install a factory of wind turbines for wind power in Brazil,
https://www.evwind.es/2023/03/24/goldwind-will-install-a-factory-of-wind-turbines-for-wind-power-in-brazil/90891
Indonesia Business Post, 2023, PLN partners with State Grid Corporation of China and Trina Solar to boost clean energy
and develop smart grid, https://indonesiabusinesspost.com/risks-opportunities/pln-partners-with-state-gridcorporation-of-china-and-trina-solar-to-boost-clean-energy-and-develop-smart-grid/
Financial Times, 2023, How China is winning the race for Africa’s lithium, https://www.ft.com/content/02d6f35d-e64640f7-894c-ffcc6acd9b25
Indonesia Business Post, 2023, Contemporary Amperex Technology (CATL) investment in Indonesian battery
megaproject to be completed in December, https://indonesiabusinesspost.com/risks-opportunities/contemporaryamperex-technology-catl-investment-in-indonesian-battery-megaproject-to-be-completed-in-december/

4
5
6
7
8
9

10 Beijing, 2023, 1.18 亿美元，中国海外寻锂添“新丁”！(With US$118 million, China Overseas is looking for “newcomers” inlithium!), https://tinyurl.com/4nd2rtxm
11 Zawya, 2023, Strengthening Saudi-China Ties: Major announcements from Arab-China Business Conference,https://www.zawya.com/en/projects/bri/strengthening-saudi-china-ties-major-announcements-from-arab-chinabusiness-conference-rtrw7np7
12 Africa News, 2023, Chinese mining company opens lithium processing plant in Zimbabwe,https://www.africanews.com/2023/07/06/chinese-mining-company-opens-lithium-processing-plant-in-zimbabwe//
13 Anhui, 2023, 热烈庆祝振兴公司印尼拉波塔电厂项目 7 号机组首次启动并网成功！(Warmly celebrate the successful startup and grid connection of Unit 7 of Zhenxing Company’s Laporta Power Plant Project in Indonesia for the first time!),https://shorturl.at/nyQZ814 International The News, 2023, 300MW coal power plant okayed for Gwadar,
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1027065-300mw-coal-power-plant-okayed-for-gwadar
15 Business Recorder, 2023, ‘Gwadar plants on Thar coal’: Two Chinese loans to be confirmed soon,
https://www.brecorder.com/news/40221115
16 Business Recorder, 2023, MoFA opposes ‘alteration’ in IPPs’ revised agreement,
https://www.brecorder.com/news/40216688
17 Reuters, 2023, Sri Lanka approves Sinopec's $4.5 billion refinery proposal,
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/sri-lanka-approves-sinopecs-45-billion-refinery-proposal-2023-11-27/
18 Reuters, 2023, China's CNOOC pays Petrobras $1.9 bln for production sharing deal at Brazil's Buzios field,
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-cnooc-pays-petrobras-19-bln-production-sharing-deal-brazilsbuzios-field-2022-11-24/
19 Power Technology, 2023, Enel reaches $2.9bn deal for Peruvian assets sale to China’s CSGI, https://www.powertechnology.com/news/enel-deal-peruvian-assets-salecsgi/
20 Beijing, 2023, 1GW! China Energy Construction to build floating photovoltaic power station in Zimbabwe,https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/Yo1GPvwqi3Ld3Hu-YXPk_g
21 Zawya, 2023, Strengthening Saudi-China Ties: Major announcements from Arab-China Business Conference
https://www.zawya.com/en/projects/bri/strengthening-saudi-china-ties-major-announcements-from-arab-chinabusiness-conference-rtrw7np7
22 https://www.seetao.com/details/205924.html
23 GCR, 2023, China Road and Bridge begins work on $1.6bn Cambodian link to Ho Chi Minh City,
https://www.globalconstructionreview.com/china-road-and-bridge-begins-work-on-1-6bn-cambodian-link-to-ho-chiminh-city/
24 https://unctad.org/news/foreign-direct-investment-developing-economies-fell-9-2024
25 https://www.ebrd.com/news/2020/ebrd-aiib-icbc-and-gcf-provide-us-953-million-for-wind-farm-in-kazakhstan.html
26 https://greenfdc.org/china-third-party-market-cooperation-for-infrastructure-projects-financing-mechanismhandbook/
27 http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/hzs/202107/20210716144040753.pdf
28 MEE, 2022, 关于印发《对外投资合作建设项目生态环境保护指南》的通知 (Notice on Issuing the "Guidelines for Ecological
Environmental Protection of Foreign Investment and Cooperation Construction Projects")
http://www.mee.gov.cn/xxgk2018/xxgk/xxgk05/202201/t20220110_966571.html

20Griffith Asia InstituteGreen Finance & Development Center

Griffith University Nathan campus
Nathan Queensland 4111, Australia

Fanhai International School of Finance (FISF)
Huangpu District, Shanghai, China 200001

Email: gai@griffith.edu.au

Email: info@greenfdc.org

griffith.edu.au/asia-institutegreenfdc.org