Encouraging knowledge and enhancing the study of Asia

iias.asia

80

The Newsletter

Tamil film
culture andpolitics

The Focus

Heritage expertise
across Asia
Preservation through specificand diverse interventions

Chinese tea
and Asiansocieties

2

Contents

		
From the Director
3

A benevolent crossroads

		 The Study
5 	Representations of the past in a precolonial Khmer monastery manuscript		
Theara Thun
6-7 	Empty Home. House ownershipin rapidly urbanising China
		 Willy Sier and Sanderien Verstappen
8-9 	Southeast Asia and Trump year one:a work in progress
		 Sally Tyler
10-11 	Rodrigo Duterte and the Philippine
presidency: Rupture or cyclicity?
		 Mesrob Vartavarian		 The Opinion
12 	Experiences with censorshipin research and publication on
Singapore’s multiculturalism		 Lai Ah Eng

In this editionof the Focus
29-40

Heritageexpertise
across Asia

		 The Region
13-15
16-18
19-21
22-25

China Connections
News from Southeast Asia
News from Australia and the PacificNews from Northeast Asia

Trinidad Rico

This Focus section proposes to examine and study
cultural heritage debates less on heritage objects
and practices and more on the human agentsthat create, promote, and study cultural heritageand its preservation through specific and diverse
interventions. These interventions do not occur
in a void: they are often attached to distinct
disciplinary approaches and informed by specificpolitical contexts and historical circumstances.
Therefore, the six contributors to this section,
addressing challenging case studies ofpreservation of tangible and intangible heritage
in six different regions of Asia, aim to highlight
how the involvement of heritage experts affects
the very nature of cultural heritage objects andpractices, including the choice of approaches
that are used for their study.

		 The Review
26-27
28

New reviews on newbooks.asia
New titles on newbooks.asia

		 The Focus
29-30 	Introduction:
Heritage expertise across Asia
		 Guest editor: Trinidad Rico
31 	Palmyra and expert failure
		 Salam Al Quntar
32-33	Bordering on the criminal: A clash
of expertise in Bamyan, Afghanistan
		 Constance Wyndham
34-35 	Reclaiming cultural heritage after
disasters in Indonesia
		 Cut Dewi
36-37 Heritage making after the earthquake:
		 Safeguarding the intangible heritage
		 of the Qiang people in China
		 Qiaoyun Zhang
38-39 A critical review of Catholic heritage
		 sites in Nagasaki, Japan
		 Tomoe Otsuki
40 Reinterpretations at Fort Nassau
		 in the Banda Islands, Indonesia
		 Joëlla van Donkersgoed

		 The Review
42-47

Selected reviews from newbooks.asia

		 The Network
48-49
50-51
52-53
54-55

Announcements
Reports
IIAS Research, Networks and Initiatives
IIAS Fellowship Programme		 The Portrait
56 A museum for the living history of Asia
		 Museu do Oriente, Lisbon, Portugal

The Newsletter is a free periodical
published by the International Institutefor Asian Studies (IIAS). As well as
serving as a forum for scholars to shareresearch, commentary and opinion withcolleagues in academia and beyond,
The Newsletter is also a window into
the Institute.

T

he International Institute for AsianStudies (IIAS) is a global Humanities
and Social Sciences institute and aknowledge exchange platform, based inLeiden, the Netherlands, with programmesthat engage Asian and other international
partners. IIAS takes a thematic and multisectoral approach to the study of Asiaand actively involves scholars and experts
from different disciplines and regions in its
activities. Our current thematic researchclusters are ‘Asian Heritages’, ‘Asian Cities’and ‘Global Asia’.
Information about the programmes andactivities of IIAS can be found in the Network
pages of each issue of The Newsletter.

In this issue
In this issue, we take the opportunity to
inform you about an exciting new chapter
in the cooperation between IIAS and theShanghai Academy of Social Sciences(page 48). On page 51 we present again
a report of an interesting activity within theframework of the Humanities across Borders
programme, this time about a workshop on‘Feminist Methodologies’ at Cotton University
in India. We are particularly pleased that theideas developed during the workshop for a realhumanities approach to knowledge production
and curricula development were received withmuch enthusiasm by Cotton University’s Vice
Chancellor and Registrar. On the preceding
page, two international students of the Double
Degree in Critical Heritage Studies talk vividly
about a working visit to Morocco, personallyexperiencing the importance of studying
cultural heritage issues ‘in situ’, outside thewalls of the academy and in conversation
with local knowledge.
IIAS research programmes, networks
and other initiatives are described in briefon pages 52-53. Information about the IIAS
Fellowship programme can be found on pages
54-55. On pages 48-49 you will find our latest
announcements, and on page 4 the Call for
Proposals for ICAS 11, which will take placein July 2019, in Leiden, the Netherlands.

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

From the Director

The Newsletter is a free

periodical published by IIAS.
As well as being a window into
the institute, The Newsletter
also links IIAS with thecommunity of Asia scholars
and the worldwide public
interested in Asia and Asianstudies. The Newsletter bridges
the gap between specialist
knowledge and public discourse,
and continues to serve asa forum for scholars to shareresearch, commentary andopinion with colleagues inacademia and beyond.
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PO Box 9500
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iias@iias.nl
Colophon
The Newsletter
No. 80 Summer 2018
Managing editor:
Sonja Zweegers
Guest editor for The Focus:
Trinidad RicoRegional editors:
Terence Chong (ISEAS),
Ilhong Ko (SNUAC),
Kunbing Xiao (NYU Shanghai),
Edwin Jurriëns, Ana Dragojlovic
and Andy Fuller (Asia Inst. of
The University of Melbourne).
The Review pages editor:
Wai Cheung
The Network pages editor:
Sandra Dehue
Digital issue editor:
Thomas Voorter
Graphic Design:
Paul Oram
Lava
Printing:
EPC, Belgium
Submissions
Issue #81: 15 July 2018
Issue #82: 15 November 2018
Issue #83: 15 March 2019
Submission enquiries
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editor iiasnews@iias.nl

iias.asia

3

A benevolent crossroads
Philippe PeycamW

e are currently entirely captivatedby the preparations of two major
events, both of which promise to
stand as important new steps in the pursuitof IIAS’s global engagement. The first is theupcoming Africa-Asia conference in Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania (20-22 September 2018).
It will be the second edition of the Africabased event after the success of Accra 2015,
in Ghana. Following that historical event,
IIAS, ICAS, the African Association for AsianStudies (A-ASIA) and their multiple partners
were encouraged to think about turning theevent into a regular one and with it, facilitating
the development of a vibrant pan-African
network of institutions and scholars wishing
to build their capacity to respond to theeveryday more conspicuous crossing of
influences between political and economic
actors of the two continents. Together with
A-ASIA, we contacted the University of Dar
es Salaam (UDSM); an obvious choice given
the central role the Tanzanian capital andits university once played in nurturing a spiritof African intellectual engagement in the
post-independence period, and becauseof its geographically close connection to
Asia through the Indian Ocean rim.
Already, the 2017 ICAS event in Chiang Mai
saw three roundtables openly discussing theposition of Asia and its interactions with otherregions of the world including Africa, the Indian
Ocean and Latin America. This interest in Asia’s
global connections is here to stay and to grow.
Take for instance the interest in Asia’s relations
with Africa. Its range has expanded to embracea multiplicity of spaces of inquiry as shown by
the number of topics to be covered at the Dar es
Salaam conference. An average of ten to twelve
panels or roundtables will be organized undereach of the following nine broad themes:-T ranscontinental Connections
and Interactions- Histories and Genealogies- The Indian Ocean World- Economy and Development- Intellectual and Educational Encounters- ( Im-)Migrations, Diasporas, Refugees,
and Identities- Knowledge Production and Exchanges- Cities, Urban Communities, Architectures- Arts, Crafts and Cultural Interventions

The material is still ‘raw’, but with at least
one hundred panels and roundtables expectedon subjects as varied as ‘Comparison of the
Policies of the Two Koreas and Africa’, ‘Cuisines,
Mobility and Criminality’, ‘African Communities
in Guangzhou’, ‘Siddis in Karnataka, Gujarat,
Hyderabad and Goa’, ‘Building a Francophone
Centre d’Études Afrique-Asie’, ‘Writing Modern
Architectural Histories of Africa, Asia and theIndian Ocean’, the Dar es Salaam conferenceis set to continue what was pioneered at Accra,
where aspects of connections and comparisons
go hand in hand to weave a new trans-regionalframework of intellectual inquiry.
For UDSM and IIAS, the principle organisers,
new encouraging developments have occurredwith a number of institutions willing to sponsor
the event, by supporting a substantial numberof participants or by contributing to a travel
support fund for participants in need. I take thisopportunity to thank our colleagues from Muziris
Institute for the Indian Ocean Studies, Universityof Calicut (Kerala, India), Leiden University(the Netherlands), University of Michigan(Ann Arbor, U.S.), Observatoire des Sociétés del’Océan Indien, Université de la Réunion (Réunion),
National University of Singapore (Singapore),
Social Sciences Research Council (New York, U.S.),
Centre for Asian Studies, University of Ghana(Accra, Ghana), Shanghai Academy of Social
Sciences (China), the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation(New York, U.S.), the Henry Luce Foundation(New York, U.S.), University Mohammed V (Rabat,
Morocco). Behind these institutions are passionate
people who believe in the importance of sharing
and collaborating in an inclusive fashion.
The Dar event will be preceded by a two-day
working meeting in Zanzibar, in collaboration
with UDSM and local partners, on the subject ofinclusive collaboration around the growing field of‘Indian Ocean Studies’. Here too, the institutions
involved see the importance of pooling resources inview of developing an open Indian Ocean-focusedconsortium with at its heart, universities andcommunities from this vast maritime region.
The second forthcoming event is of course
ICAS 11 in Leiden, in July 2019. With the generaltheme ‘Asia and Europe, Asia in Europe’, this ICAS
event will be exceptional. Not only because it willbe the first time in nearly two decades that such amega conference takes place in Europe –in the citywhere it was born –but also because the terms ofknowledge production and collaboration developedin, on and with Asia in Europe have dramatically

Africa-Asia, a New
Axis of Knowledge– Second Edition
20 –22 September 2018
Venue:
University of Dar Es Salaam,
Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania
Building on the multiple
encounters, interactions anddialogues initiated at the
1st Africa-Asia Conference(Accra, Ghana, 2015), thissecond conference seeks todeepen the explorations of
new realities, and long
histories connecting Africa
and Asia.
Information and registration:www.icas.asia/africas

changed. The event of Dar es Salaam is a reminderthat Asia in its definition or in its influence isincreasingly pervasive. Europe for its part, asa world region in all its diversity, continues to bea major scholarly concentration of expertise on
and with Asia. It also includes within its populations
important segments of people with an Asianbackground whose voices and experiences are
becoming more potent. Today, the mayor of oneof Europe’s most important cities, London, is of
Asian background; so is the prime minister of Ireland.
The modes of collaboration, even academic, areevolving, with more fluidity and balance in theexchanges, with more centres of excellence, and an
ever-diversified range of connections, experiences
and perspectives among scholars.
An illustration of this intensification anddiversification in collaborations is the revamped
European Alliance on Asian Studies. Originallya small ‘club’ of institutions, the Alliance has grown
to represent almost all the regions of Europe where
Asia is a focus of interest. This diversification is also
true for the increasingly differentiated collectionof institutions, from topically focused think tanks
to generalist language-training based universities.
The Alliance today represents 18 members or would-be
members. It was never meant to be exhaustive. It works
rather as a group of institutions who share a common
interest in collaborating (not just in competing),
in facilitating mobility across Europe and with Asia,and in working towards potentially meaningfulshared initiatives, free from bureaucratic entrapments.
On numerous occasions, the Alliance’s members
have expressed frustration over the lack of structural
EU or national funding mechanisms that truly
encourage collaboration and inter-European
exchanges.
This is an issue the partners hope to discuss
at ICAS 11. For the Alliance members as for manyother participating institutions, Asian, European,and others, ICAS 11 in Leiden will be an opportunity
to display their work and to contribute activities(‘events within the event’) in an open setting and adesire for cross-fertilization and a mutually beneficial
partnership. In so doing, ICAS 11 should help toposition Europe and European institutions in relation
to Asia and Asian partners as an open space or
meeting ground, less fixed in past certitudes, richin multiple intellectual traditions and possibilities;
a more benevolent crossroads between Asiaand other regions of the world.
Philippe Peycam
Director IIAS

International
Convention of Asia
Scholars (ICAS)
ICAS 11 –Call for Proposals
16 –19 July 2019
Leiden, the Netherlands
ICAS 11 will be organized by Leiden University, the International
Institute for Asian Studies and GIS Asie (French Academic
Network on Asian Studies). 1500 Asia specialists andrepresentatives of civil society are expected to attend.
The submission deadline for proposals of Individual Abstracts,
Panels, Roundtables, Book presentations and PhD Dissertation
presentations is 10 October 2018.
For all information regarding
submissions, grants, fees, etc.:
https://icas.asia/en/icas11-cfp
For the ICAS Book andDissertation Prize 2019:https://icas.asia/en/icas-book-prize

The International
Convention of Asia
Scholars

16-19 July 2019
Leidenthe Netherlands

The International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS) engages
participants from all continents in dialogues on Asia that transcendboundaries between academic disciplines and geographic regions.
ICAS is an active accelerator of research.
Since 1998, ICAS has brought more than 20,000 academics,
civil society representatives, administrators and artists together
at 10 conventions. Publishers, institutes and NGOs converge to display
their products, services and research outcomes in the ICAS exhibition
hall. The ICAS Book and Dissertations Carousel offers (future) authors
a platform to launch their publications. With all these activities
ICAS has contributed to the decentring of Asian studies by including
more ‘Asian voices’, while successfully convening a global spacein which Asia scholars from the whole world can directly interact.

ICAS 11
Leiden University will be the local host of the eleventh meetingof the International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS).
ICAS 11 will be held in Leiden, the Netherlands, from 16-19 July 2019.
The convention will draw on the historically rich Asian and global
connections of the city, along with its renowned research institutes
and museums.

Call for papers: deadline 10 October 2018
For further information visit: icas.asia

The ICAS Book Prize (IBP) 2019
The biennial ICAS Book Prize (IBP) is a global competition that provides
an international focus for publications on Asia in the Humanities andSocial Sciences. The IBP received in excess of 500 entries in 2017(300 books and 200 dissertations). In addition to the original Englishlanguage Prize, the IBP 2019 will include 5 other language editions:
French, German, Chinese, Korean, and Spanish/Portuguese. The IBP
awards will be presented during the ICAS 11 opening ceremony.
Eligible titles are Asia-related academic publications in the Humanities
and Social Sciences. Books must have first been published after August
2016, and not have been submitted to a previous IBP.

Submit your titles to the IBP 2019 on icas.asia
Deadline: 10 October 2018

Asian Studies Book Fair
Publishers and academic institutes are invited to exhibit at the
Asian Studies Book Fair at ICAS 11, to present their publications,projects and programmes to the large number of attendees.
The Book Fair will also host events such as manuscript pitches,
author meetings and book launches.

Exhibitors or advertisers email icas11.exhibition@iias.nl

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

Pre-colonial historiography

Representation of the past ina local text produced prior to thearrival of colonial history writing.

Representations of thepast in a pre-colonial Khmer
monastery manuscript
Theara Thun

Prior to the arrival of Western notions of history in Cambodia, bangsāvatārwriting was the most popular genre used to record events and stories about
the past.1 Literally meaning ‘annals of a family or kingdom’ and commonlytranslated as ‘chronicle’, the bangsāvatār was a type of writing thatbelonged to a small elite class and highly respected religious leaders.

Cover page of the Pich 1855 (Courtesy of Khin Sok)

T

hese texts were often associatedwith the royal palace and Buddhist
monasteries. Those produced by thepalace almost entirely focus on stories andevents surrounding royal family members,
especially the genealogy of rulers and theirconflicts either among themselves or with theneighboring royal courts of Siam and Vietnam.
Those produced by Buddhist monasteries,
besides covering some major events about
the royal court, mostly recount events at the
local/provincial level. Composed in a poetic
format, these particular texts were also known
as the rabā khsatr writings, with their namereferring to ‘line’ or ‘lineage’ of the kings.
There are two monastery texts that have beenpreserved until the present. They originatedfrom the writings of a highly respected memberof the sangha (the Buddhist monkhood) named
Pich, an abbot in the province of Bārāy. The
Venerable Pich’s earliest text dates back to theearly 1840s, and another text composed by him
is dated 1855. The two texts were later adaptedby another highly respected monk, Chan,
who composed a manuscript in 1876 by largely
copying the two writings of the Venerable Pich.
The manuscripts still in existence at present are
the Venerable Chan’s 1876 edition and Venerable
Pich’s work of 1855, which was preserved by the
Buddhist Institute in Phnom Penh, where it was
re-copied in 1951 and entitled it Sāstrā Lbaoek
Rabā Khsatr Pheanday Udai Rājā Eng Chant[Palm-leaf Manuscript of the Poems of the
Lineage of King Udai Rājā Eng Chant]. Khin Sok
collected the two texts and published them ina book.2 This paper discusses the contents andthe representations of the past in the Venerable
Pich’s text of 1855, referred to as Pich 1855.3

Benefitting from threekinds of goodness
The main focus of Pich 1855 is a noble
family associated with the sponsorship ofa religious building. The family is that of alady named Prāk, whose husband, Narentrā,was governor of the province of Kampong
Svāy. Narentrā was appointed as governor
by the court of King Ang Chant (r. 1806-1834).
After the king’s death and Siam’s withdrawal
in 1834, he mobilized the people in his provinceand nearby provinces, including those in
Bārāy, to rise up against Vietnamese rule.
The revolt was defeated and Narentrā,
together with his family, fled to Bangkok forsafety. He fell sick and passed away in Siamleaving behind his wife Prāk and a young
son named Moen Meas.
The text goes on to depict how, after theend of Vietnamese rule over Cambodia during
the early 1840s, Prāk and Moen Meas returnedto their country. Due to the works of his latefather, Ang Duong’s court (r. 1848-1860) in
Udong awarded Moen Meas an official title:
Amrek Moen Meas. He married the daughterof another noble family, who gave birth to ason. Moen Meas passed away soon after due
to sickness. Pich 1855 describes the grief of
his wife and of his mother Prāk. It also tellsof Prāk’s decision to donate a large portionof her family’s wealth to the constructionof a vihāra [Buddhist monastery building] inorder to dedicate the dāna [merit generated
by her donation] to her late husband andson. In the last few pages, the text elaborates
in great detail on the activities of building
the vihāra, including the amount of money

donated by Prāk. The text ends right in the
middle of the description of a huge religious
ceremony held for the new monasterybuilding in 1855.
As the text is written by a Buddhist
monk, Venerable Pich, it tends to givepriority to the account of religious activities.
More specifically, besides events related
to wars and politics, the text appears to
pay considerable attention to such events
as funerals and wedding ceremonies,
Ang Duong’s coronation ceremony and his
restoration of Buddhism after the Vietnamese
occupation, Prāk’s preparations for theAncestors’ Day (Pchum Ben) festival, andthe ceremony for the new vihāra. In addition,
many events incorporated into the text
are mentioned in an explicitly Buddhist
framework. One finds ideas and philosophies
of Buddhism inserted whenever significant
events in the views of individuals andfamilies are mentioned, most prominently
those in Prāk’s family including the joyful
moments, the marriage of Moen Meas,
Moen Meas’s passing, and the sponsorshipof the monastery building. These teachings
help elaborate those events from a religious
perspective. They are usually abstract
and rationalize the events or activities by
associating them with religious teachings.
For example, the writer explained that thesponsorship that Prāk undertook for the
new monastery building would allow her tobenefit from three kinds of goodness, namely
earthly goodness, celestial goodness, andnirvana, and thus to escape from all typesof suffering and poverty.4

Journeys, behavior
and heartbreak
A close reading of the text shows that in its
account of Prāk’s family, it also incorporates
a mixture of elements from several pre-colonial
literary genres such as the nirās and chbāp.
The nirās, known in Thai literature as nirat,5
which literally means memorable journey
or departure, is a literary genre narrating
someone’s journey to a particular place.
Conveyed in poetic form, the nirās usually
recount in detail each step of the journey frombeginning to end. In the text, for example,
a long nirās passage was inserted whendescribing the journey of Prāk’s family when
they escaped from Kampong Svāy province
to Bangkok. It describes different landmarks,
including the names of the forests, rivers
and localities through which they travelled,
their difficulties and happy moments, people
they met, and the natural beauty theyencountered.6 The chbāp,7 which literallymeans the code of conduct, is another literary
genre conveyed in poetic form that describes
and analyzes people’s behavior and, at thesame time, suggests norms and roles for people
to follow. A chbāp passage was incorporated,
for instance, when Moen Meas’s mother-in-law
gives instructions to her daughter (Moen Meas’swife) about how to serve and obey her husband
by following five principles including honesty,
patience, and politeness.8
Moreover, some events in the text areheavily romanticized. When the writer covers
dramatic moments, such as a death, he goes

The Study

5

into considerable detail so as to capture thegrief of the relatives of the deceased person.
The writer does so by highlighting how
one or two family members express theirsadness and mourning. Using the voicesof the deceased person’s relatives, thewriter poetically romanticizes the moment
by interspersing personal expressions of love,loss and heartbreak. For example, at thepassing of Prāk’s husband in Siam, the writerconveys Prāk’s feeling at that moment:
Remembering the sad moments weran through the forests facing great
difficulties and risking our lives. Thinkingof those moments, it hurts my [Prāk’s]
feeling very much. My darling, you haveforever gone and left me alone without
caring about me anymore. If it was mealone, it wouldn’t be a problem. But, wehave our baby son. Why did you suddenly
die and leave him behind without providing
food? I’m deeply distressed for our baby
who loses his father and lives with no one
to take care of him.9
Based on what has been examinedin the text so far, it is evident that, besides
keeping a record of events about the past,this monastery text combines several formsof knowledge and literary genres. First of all,apart from recounting past events concerning
wars and politics, it associates some of those
events with the ideas and philosophies of
Buddhism. This indicates that the teachingsof Buddhism were a vital element of theperceptions of the past in this text. Secondly,
the choice of several literary genres, including
the romanticization of certain events, indicatesthe importance of foregrounding people’s
feelings and behaviors. In this sense, therepresentations of the past in this pre-colonial
text can be partly understood as recalling
memorable moments and places, enforcing
rules and regulations of how to behave, andromanticizing tragic moments such as thepassing away of a loved one.
Theara Thun received his PhD in History
from the National University of Singapore
under a joint doctoral scholarshipprogram between Harvard-Yenching
Institute and National University ofSingapore. thearachula@gmail.com
Notes
1	For further discussions on Khmer
bangsāvatār texts, see Vickery, M. 1977.
‘Cambodia after Angkor: The Chronicular
Evidence for the Fourteenth to SixteenthCenturies’ (Vol. I and II) Doctoral
Dissertation, Yale University; Chandler,
D. 1973. ‘Cambodia before the French:
Politics in a Tributary Kingdom, 1794-1848.’
Doctoral Dissertation, University ofMichigan; Mak Phoeun. 1981. Chroniques
Royales du Cambodge (De 1594 A 1677).
Paris: École française d’Extrême-Orient;
Khin Sok. 1988. Chroniques Royales duCambodge: De Baña Yat à la prise deLanvaek, 1417-1595. Paris: École française
d’Extrême-Orient.
2	Khin Sok. 2002. L’Annexion du Cambodge
par les Vietnamiens au XIX siècle: D’Après
les Deux Poèmes du Vénérable Bâtum
Baramey Pich. Paris: You-Feng.
3	Even though the edition we have is not
the original one, the contents of the text
seem to be largely intact. This is mainly
because it was originally composed in a
poetic format that demanded that those
who copied it paid great attention to
the consistent lyrics, syntax, and rhyme
in each verse. This does not necessarilymean that there are no errors in thiscopied edition. Thanks to Khin Sok’s
intelligent and painstaking work, however,many errors could be identified, corrected,
and the meanings of many terms clarified.
4	ibid., Khin Sok 2002, pp.324-325.
5	For a good discussion on the nirat writingof the early Bangkok period (1767-1855),
see Nadhi Eosseewong. 2005. Pen & Sail:
Literature and History in Early Bangkok.
Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, pp.126-143.
6	ibid., Khin Sok 2002, pp.290-294.
7	For a good discussion on chbāp writing,see Chandler, D. 1984. ‘Normative Poems(Chbap) and Pre-colonial CambodianSociety’, Journal of Southeast AsianStudies 15(2):271-279.
8	ibid., Khin Sok 2002, p.310.
9	My own translation from the Khmer text
in Khin Sok 2002, p.295.

6

Urbanisation

The Study

Real estate, mobility, and family
in rapidly urbanising China.

Empty Home. House ownershipin rapidly urbanising China
Why do people buy houses in which they cannot live? How might
we understand the fast expansion of China’s urban peripheries,
full of newly constructed flats but devoid of people, shops, and labour
opportunities? In this article, we look through the windows of one suchapartment in the outskirts of Wuhan, the provincial capital of China’s
Hubei province, based on insights acquired during the making andscreening of our film Empty Home (2016).1

Willy Sier and Sanderien Verstappen

One of the bedrooms of Wendy’s apartment (filmstill Empty Home).

In contemporary China, cities are growing
fast and, as buying a house is becoming
an important symbol of success, the realestate industry is flourishing. For rural-urban
migrants, a group that contributes greatly tocities’ growing populations, buying an urbanhouse is seen as a great accomplishment thatmarks the completion of a transition from rural
pasts to urban futures. Yet, the houses thesemigrants are able to afford are often locatedin city outskirts with few labour opportunities.
Therefore, many are unable to stay long-termin their newly acquired houses, and instead
furnish and store them for the future.
When Willy Sier conducted fieldwork
in China’s Hubei
province (2015-2016)
for her dissertation
on rural-urban
disparities in China,
and the desires ofuniversity-educatedyouths from rural
regions to overcome therural-urban divide, she
noticed that the topicof ‘buying a house’
came up frequently in conversation withrural families. Everybody seemed to be
in dire need of a house, preferably a housein the city. It struck Willy that in many cases
houses were purchased to subsequently
remain uninhabited. These houses werelocated on the uttermost outskirts of the city,seemingly desolate places, with plentiful
newly constructed flats but devoid of people.
It is in these far-flung urban peripheries thathouse ownership is affordable. However,being so far removed from facilities, industry,and labour markets, owners are forced
to reside elsewhere to make a living.
These field observations were turned
into a short documentary film, Empty Home,in cooperation with visual anthropologist
Sanderien Verstappen. Empty Home engages
with the question of house ownership in China
from the perspective of Wendy, a young
rural-urban migrant in Wuhan. It is a film

about rapid urbanisation, the desire tobuy a house in the city, and the inability
to live there. The film has an open format
that invites the viewer to think about thedesire to purchase real estate in a context
of continuous migration and mobility.

Rural-urban migration andhouse ownership in China
The promotion of rural-urban migration
is an important goal for the Chinese state.
The ‘National New-Type Urbanisation
Plan (2014-2020)’, released by the central
committee of the
China Communist
Party (CCP) on 16
March 2014, stated thatthe percentage of theChinese population
living in cities shouldgrow from 53.7 percent
in 2014 to 60 percent
in 2020. Indeed,
many Chinese cities
are rapidly expanding.
In Wuhan, the number of the city’s inhabitants
increased from 2 million in 1970 to more than
10 million in 2018.
China’s hukou system is a family
registration system that connects families to
one certain location and assigns them either
rural or urban status, which subsequently
influences their access to social programs
and state benefits (such as access to
education and health care) in differential
ways. The number of rural hukou holders living
in Chinese cities is estimated at approximately
280 million. These citizens living outside theirarea of registration are often referred to as‘being afloat’, for their lack of a stable
home and local registration in the cities.
However, in an effort to put down newroots and affirm their urban identities, therural-urban migrants Willy met in the field
were often interested in investing in urban realestate. Their investments follow a national“There has clearly
been a shift in attitude
towards housing andprivate property since
the Mao-era.”

upward trend in private homeownership.
Since the beginning of the post-reform era,
China has changed from a predominantly
public housing regime to a country with oneof the highest rates of private home ownershipin the world. The number of square meterssold on the real estate market has increased
from 27 million in 1991 to 157 million in 2016.
Willy’s research suggests that it is not only
the wealthier urbanites who buy real estate,
but that rural buyers also have a sharein driving this real estate market.

Explorations ofan ‘empty home’
Making the film Empty Home generated
new insights into these issues of mobility andhouse ownership. Willy had conducted almost
one year of ethnographic fieldwork in Wuhan
before the film was made and had seen
several empty houses during this period. While
we therefore had initially not expected muchdifficulty in finding a house in which we could
film, this turned out differently when Willy
approached the owners of houses that she

View from the window (filmstill Empty Home).

had seen or heard about. The large distance
between house and house owner created aproblem: opening the house for the film crew
required huge time and capital investments
by the owner. Some owners offered to lend us
the keys to their house, so we could enter theirapartment by ourselves; however, to makethe film we needed not only the images of thehouse, but also the interpretations and stories
of its owners. This situation created a practicalproblem, yet it also highlighted the frequent
occurrence of absentee house owners.
Then, there was Wendy. Wendy’s parents
own an apartment on the outskirts of Hankou
district in Wuhan. The distance between
Wendy and this apartment is ‘only’ a few
hours by public transport, which enabled her
to come to the house and show us around.
Wendy is a recent graduate from a university
in Wuhan. After graduation, she continued
to live in the campus area near her college,
where she opened a small fashion store
together with her friend Lucky. When Wendy’s
parents decided to buy the apartment in 2012,
investing their savings from several decades offactory and restaurant work, they were away
in China’s Southern megacity Guangzhou,

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

and so they let their two daughters, Wendy
and her older sister, take care of most of thedecorating. The girls furnished the apartment
with love and attention for detail, putting
Wendy’s own drawings as well as a softcoloured ‘Love Home’ IKEA painting on thewall. They now consider this apartment as
their ‘family home’.
Wendy took the presence of a camera
as an opportunity to present herself and herfamily in ways that she herself chose. Her
self-presentation took the form of a tour
through the house, during which she opened
cupboards, pointed at objects, and explainedfor each object how it had been brought to thehouse “by our own hands”. Objects that stoodout as important were the house slippers
and blankets made from cotton producedin their village of origin.
Willy and Wendy discussed questionsof residence. Sitting on the couch of the‘empty’ apartment, Wendy explained how
she lives in her shop and visits the family
apartment only occasionally, whilst her sister
married and moved in with her husband, andher parents live on the factory grounds inGuangzhou. Wendy hopes that her parents
will live in the apartment in the future,maybe after retirement.
Wendy’s family lives dispersed throughout the country —her parents and sister in
Guangzhou, some family members in Wuhan,
and one uncle remains in the old family housein rural Hubei province. Only once did they all
gather in the new apartment for a New Year’scelebration. In recent years, the family choseto return to the home village for this week offestivities, to be surrounded by old neighbours,
friends and family members. Wendy herself
does not have a strong connection to thisvillage, having grown up mainly with her
grandparents in another village —when
her parents were away as labour migrants—and in the school system where she wasa boarding student from age 10.
In the film, Wendy shows her current
two ‘homes’, one being the new apartment,
where she shows us around the living roomand two bedrooms, the other her shop, where
she sleeps every night on a fold-out couch,together with her friend Lucky. Wendy likes

The Study

7

A video tour through the apartment (filmstills Empty Home).

to think that travel in between these twosites is easy, “very convenient”, optimisticallyestimating the travel time at approximately
1 hour in the film, whereas in reality the journeyrequires 4 hours of travel on several buses andmetro trains. In a city that now covers 8494
square kilometres —compared to, for example,
the 790 square kilometres of New York City —it is no surprise that a daily commute from theapartment to the shop is simply not an option.
With all other relatives residing even further
away, the apartment remains unoccupied
most of the year. Yet, Wendy tells us repeatedly
in the film, this apartment is her ‘home’.

Settling in the city
The story of Wendy’s family is the storyof many rural families in Hubei province, andother parts of China. There has clearly beena shift in attitude towards housing and private
property since the Mao-era, when most urban
citizens lived in apartments provided by theirwork units and rural citizens were organisedin collective farms. During that time, owning
private property put citizens in the dangerous
category of the landlord class, a classificationthat could lead to persecution under thepolitical campaigns that called for theeradication of property-based class divisions.
Nowadays, however, statistics show thathouse ownership is very popular in China.
The number of apartments bought has
become an important marker of a person’s

status; moreover, the purchase of real estate
has become inescapable for bachelors looking
to marry. It is true that with the country’s
history of patrilocal living, provision of a‘marriage house’ by the husbands’ family has
long been part of Chinese wedding traditions.
But, whereas previous generations could
suffice with redecorating a room or building
a structure on the family plot in the husband’svillage, rural families today are expected toprovide the couple with a costly privatelyowned apartment, preferably in an urban
environment. This provision of a new housefor the newlywed couple is partly driven bycompetition for a relatively small number ofbrides —due to China’s current imbalanced
gender ratio. The promotion of the city andurban living as the desired form of modernity
is also reflected by government campaigns
that call for speedy construction of the urban
environment (see, for example, the billboard
featured in the film that says “speed up theconstruction of our nation’s cities”).
How might we understand and further
interrogate these profound shifts in attitudes
towards house ownership in China, fromcollective to privately owned houses, andfrom rural to urban housing? From an
economic perspective, the price of Chinese
real estate has increased rapidly in past
decades. Wendy believes that the price ofhouses in China “can only go up”, and so,
the purchase might be a smart investment.
However, the way Wendy speaks about thehouse, and the effort that has been put
into its decoration, shows that its meaning
goes beyond economic strategy. The symbolic
value of purchasing a home in the city seems
to be its power to solidify rural migrants’ urban
status and sense of belonging to the urban
community, and its physical representationof the family unit.
For rural families with long and complex
histories of mobility, the purchase of an urban
apartment is often seen as the completionof a process of rural-urban transition. It seems
that many of those families have practiced
rural-urban migration since the 1980s, whenfast economic development in cities andcoastal areas created labour opportunities forrural workers and restrictions on mobility werelifted. They are now making their connection
to the city more permanent by buying urban
property, despite the continued restrictionsof the Chinese hukou system.
Ever since Wendy was born, she and herfamily members have been separated andon the move. For Wendy, the shoe cabinet
in the new apartment (made especiallyfor the storage of her sister’s shoes) and thepictures on the wall (put there by her father)make her feel at home in Wuhan and closer
to her absent family members. Within acontext of intense mobility and fast societal
transformation, might the meaning of thisempty apartment then lie in its ability toprovide physical evidence of the existenceof this family, and its connection to the city?
Willy Sier is a PhD student at the
Amsterdam Institute for Social Science
Research, University of Amsterdam.
Previously, she studied Chinese and lived
in China for 8 years. w.m.sier@uva.nl
Sanderien Verstappen is a postdoctoral
researcher in the Anthropology of Modern
South Asia at LIAS (Leiden University
Institute for Area Studies), and a fellow
at the International Institute for AsianStudies (IIAS). Previously, she was alecturer in visual anthropology at the
University of Amsterdam.
s.b.verstappen@hum.leidenuniv.nl
The film Empty Home had its premiereat the VU Ethnographic Film Festival in
Amsterdam and has been screened aspart of bachelor courses and events at
the University of Amsterdam, Leiden
University, and the International Institutefor Asian Studies. It was also published on
the Guardian website on 24 March 2017as part of their ‘The Other China’ series.

Notes
A billboard from a government campaign (filmstill Empty Home).

1	https://vimeo.com/209590747

8

U.S./Southeast Asia relations

The Study

Trump’s retreat from multi-lateralism should
encourage Southeast Asian nations toward
new areas of engagement.

Southeast Asia and Trump
year one: a work in progress
In November of 2016, I published an essay in New Mandala comparing
Donald Trump with former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra; drawing
parallels between their status as billionaires who have avoided financialtransparency, marketed false narratives of themselves as self-made men,and displayed formidable media savvy.1 Like most political handicappers,
I underestimated the Trump campaign’s appeal, and predicted his defeat.

Sally TylerA

few lines of that essay, however,stand in crystalline relief whentrying to decipher the rise ofoutlier candidates:

Above:
U.S. President Donald Trump
registers his surprise as he realises
other leaders, including Russia’s
Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev,
Vietnam’s Prime Minister Nguyen
Xuan Phuc, President of thePhilippines Rodrigo Duterte andAustralia’s Prime Minister Malcolm
Turnbull, are crossing their arms forthe traditional ‘ASEAN handshake’
as he participates in the opening
ceremony of the ASEAN Summit
in Manila, Philippines, November
13, 2017. Copyright: REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst.

“The U.S. and Thailand are separated
by thousands of miles, but base voters
for Thaksin and Trump share some notablecharacteristics. The Bangkok taxi drivertransplanted from Isaan might seem tohave little in common with the gun-toting,
Christian fundamentalist in Oklahoma.
Yet, both have felt overlooked by successive
administrations, and have not identified
with the campaign rhetoric spun bytraditional candidates. Both groups
have had their votes vilified as not merely
helping a disfavored candidate, but
as actually undermining democracy.
Pundits on either side of the Pacifichave wondered how anyone could
support a demagogue like Thaksinor Trump. “What is wrong with thosepeople?” has been a familiar, shockedrefrain. The more instructive question
from a political viewpoint is, “What iswrong with democratic institutions for
failing to craft policies and messages
more inclusive of society’s marginalizedfactions to prevent them from becoming
targets of megalomaniacal candidates?”
A democratic nation which ignores large
blocks of voters for long will be madeto pay in one way or another.”

Parallels in unexpected
placesLike many others in the U.S. who foundthemselves stunned by the outcome of the2016 presidential election, I experienced
the desire to be far away from my home
in Washington DC on the day of Donald
Trump’s inauguration in January of 2017.
For me, there was little question of where to
go: Southeast Asia. I first began traveling in
the region more than two decades ago, andhave developed enduring friendships there,
which have led me to become a studentof its culture and politics.
My work in the U.S. concerns both policy
and politics, and I hoped that post-election
travel in the region would bring me respitefrom it. It was impossible, however, tocompletely escape the political lens, andI saw parallels in unexpected places between
events unfolding in the U.S. and in Southeast
Asia. I explored these parallels in a series ofarticles published throughout 2017 in New
Mandala, ANU’s Policy Forum and the Mekong
Review. I intentionally avoided the topics oftrade and defense, because they are alreadyextensively covered in the media; and instead
focused on more subtle connections on
a wide range of issues.
A visit to a ‘prison without walls’ on
the Philippine island of Palawan allowedreflection on efforts to roll back Obama era
criminal justice reforms in the U.S., and mass

incarceration trends in both nations. Changes
to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) policy in the
U.S. encouraged me to examine tax collection
efforts in Cambodia, Indonesia, and elsewhere
in Southeast Asia; and the necessity of a strong
public sector workforce to create a value-based
system of tax participation. Going to the theatrein Washington DC to see a new production of
The King and I led to consideration of Thailand’slèse-majesté laws, and comparison with Trump’s
desire to tighten libel laws in the U.S., as wellas the value of artistic free expression withina society. Other topics included labor rights,
the environment, refugees, space exploration,
the fashion industry, and more. What began
as taking note of quirky associations while
traveling morphed into a chronicle of theindirect ways that policy developments in
the U.S. and Southeast Asia can affect eachother; below are a few excerpts.

On labor rights 2(Failed Secretary of Labor nominee)
Puzder’s c.v. is a familiar roadmap to
Trumpland—a white male CEO withno experience in governance. His Senate
confirmation hearing was delayed, at least inpart because he failed to submit the required
disclosure forms, apparently flummoxed by
the level of transparency regarding possible
conflicts of interest required of a Cabinet
member. Or perhaps, it was indecision on
how to spin his hiring of an undocumented

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

immigrant as a housekeeper, and the fact that
he paid legally-required federal employment
taxes for her only after he had been nominated.
The Secretary of Labor’s impact on
domestic policy is clear, but its linkage
to foreign policy has received less publicattention. From taking a stand on whether
worker standards are included in trade
agreements to weighing in on where nations
land on the State Department’s Trafficking in
Persons (TIP) report, the Department of Labor
contributes significantly to U.S. foreign policy,
and decisions made by a new secretary will
be felt by workers around the world.
Puzder’s track record as CEO offers adismal glimpse into his take on global
corporate responsibility. A key example is palmoil, demand for which by the U.S. fast foodindustry has helped drive tropical deforestationin Indonesia and Malaysia, contributing
to global warming and air pollution inSoutheast Asia. As part of efforts to promotesustainable palm oil practices, the Union ofConcerned Scientists released a score card
indicating corporations’ commitments to use
deforestation-free palm oil. Puzder’s Hardees
and Carl’s Jr. brands received a score of zero.
Because of such disregard for sustainable
food practices, as well as his company’s sordid
history of labor violations, the International
Labour Rights Forum (ILRF) recently joinedwith more than 100 organizations to oppose
Puzder’s nomination.
Globally-minded consumers need to knowthat the world’s largest economy is helping
ensure labor standards around the world.
Just as I want to be confident that a fashion
bargain in Bangkok did not originate in an
unregulated hellhole like Rana Plaza, other
Americans should be able to eat a burger
that does not contribute to the erosion of
habitat for diverse species in Southeast
Asia. But we can’t do this without a firmand vigilant Department of Labor.

On mass incarceration 3
A prisoner named Ver gave me a tour ofparts of the compound open to the public(the maximum security unit is off limits).
He told me that he received a life sentence,of which he must serve 40 years, for selling
marijuana at the age of 21. He has now
served 32 years. Ver hails from Banaue, 330
kilometres north of Manila. At the time of his
conviction, he had a wife and two babies,
whom he has not seen since his imprisonment.
He was imprisoned in Manila for a few years
before being transferred to Iwahig, and saysthat the cost of travelling made family visitsprohibitive. He says he does not think muchabout what he will do when he is released,
as that is still eight years away and he will
be an old man by then.
Historically, Iwahig has served as an
overflow for Manila’s notoriously overcrowded
prisons, and those ranks are expanding
precipitously. Though most international
scrutiny of Duterte’s so-called war on drugs
has centered on extrajudicial killings, lessemphasis has been given to the ever-widening
swath of humanity he has had thrown into
prison. Now, lawmakers happy to do his
bidding are pushing legislation to lower theage of criminal liability to nine years old,
where it had been until 2006, when the age
limit was raised to 15.
Through concerted approaches, including
new sentencing guidelines without mandatory
minimums and clemency toward individuals
sentenced under previous guidelines, theObama Administration had successfully
reduced the federal prison population from
220,000 inmates in 2013 to 195,000 inmatesin 2016. Only days into a new Department ofJustice, the dismantling of this progress began.
US Attorney General Sessions announced
the reversal of Obama’s 2016 executive order
aimed at reducing, and ultimately ending,federal use of private prisons.
And now, the Trump Administration
has thrown the nation once again into thevicious cycle of the prison industrial complex.
The cycle’s effect is long-term; characterized
by lack of economic and educational
opportunity coupled with discriminatory
sentencing guidelines, resulting in a veritableprison pipeline for many young people,
particularly African Americans, leaving
them just as hopeless as Ver in Iwahig.

The Study
On the fashion industry 4This week5 marks the launch of Asia Islamic
Fashion Week, a first of its kind trade show in
Kuala Lumpur to showcase fashion featuring“cutting-edge style that is in line with Islamicvalues”. The women who wear such clothing
have traditionally not identified it as ‘Islamic’,but simply as modest. The fact that theorganizers of the Malaysian exposition choseto brand it as an Islamic fashion event reflectsthat they are aware that such clothing, andthe women who wear it, has reached a newlevel of global visibility in non-Islamic eyes.
Though the wholesale and retail buyers
targeted by their trade show remain Muslim,
their work, and any messages they wish toconvey through it, now includes a potentiallybroader audience.
Asia Islamic Fashion Week comes on theheels of the spring shows in New York, whereIndonesian designer Anniesa Hasibuan, who
also made headlines by showcasing the first
all-hijab collection at Fall New York Fashion
Week, featured a cast of immigrant models,in response to the Trump Administration’s
highly-publicized travel ban targeting nine
primarily-Muslim nations.
But beyond campaigns to confront implicit
bias and incorporate inclusive messaging,can prominent Trump policies be challenged
through fashion industry engagement? Lest
the sartorially-dismissive scoff, consider thatfashion is a more than
$1.75 trillion global
industry, accounting forat least $370 billion of
spending in the U.S. The
fashion industry could
potentially provide
a valid test case forengagement on Trump
policies because it hits
on so many key issues.
The complex nature of the global supply chain
involved in fashion touches on trade, laborrights, gender equity and the environment,
among other issues.

to attack by the government, regardless ofthe transgressions of their leaders. Thailand’s
constitutional requirement that its monarch
be Buddhist has created a de facto state
religion. Despite its litany of legitimate or
manufactured charges against (former abbot)
Dhammachayo, the junta must tread
carefully in attacking any wat, even one
with deep connections to political forces
which threaten its existence.

On substance abuse 7
Methamphetamine, whether calledshabu in the Philippines or yaba in Thailand,
has long eclipsed heroin as the most abusedillicit drug in Southeast Asia, despite theregion’s proximity to the Golden Triangle.
Ironically, though the U.S. is half a world
away from opium’s fertile crescent, Americans
consume more drugs derived from opium thanany other nation. Opioid overdoses are now
the most common type of accidental death in
the U.S., accounting for more fatalities than
gun homicides and car crashes combined.
When the US launched its so-called war
on drugs in the 1980s in response to thescourge of crack cocaine, criminal justiceand sentencing policies were adjusted toincarcerate more people for longer times. Now,
16 per cent of all federal and state prisoners
are locked up for drug use, possession or sale,down from a high of
22 per cent in 2000.
More than half of all
prisoners in Indonesia,
Malaysia, Myanmar,
the Philippines andThailand are jailed for
drug related crimes,
and many nationsin the region requirecompulsory detention
for drug addicts. Such compulsory detention
centers have come under scrutiny for humanrights abuses, and for lacking scientificallybased rehabilitation therapies.
U.S. states have passed legislation
attempting to halt the rapid transformationfrom patient to addict by creating prescription
drug databases which can be monitored bylaw enforcement to scrutinise, and potentiallystop, over-prescribers of opioids. The efforts
are working, as prescriptions for Oxycontin(a brand name for oxycodone) have declined
by 40 per cent since 2010. But even as reforms
are taking hold in the U.S., Big Pharma is
strategising ways to keep global sales strong.
Following the ‘playbook of big tobacco’
manufacturers, the drug companies’ solution
to enhanced scrutiny back home involves
global expansion, particularly in Asia’s
developing nations.
Mundipharma, a subsidiary of Purdue
Pharmaceutical, the maker of Oxycontin,
first began operations in Asia in 2011, as U.S.
sales began to drop. With regional offices in
Singapore, the firm’s promotional materials
downplay the risk of opioid addiction. Instead,flashy marketing campaigns have featured
glamorous celebrities who tell viewers not
to resign themselves to chronic pain.

“A leadership void
has been created;but nature abhors
a vacuum.”

On church-state relations 6
The threat of taxation has been the
primary regulatory mechanism that the
U.S. has used to shore up what Thomas
Jefferson called “the wall of separation
between church and state”, as articulated
in the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The
primacy of this concept within American
society cannot be minimized. The country’s
founders, some who had fled religious
persecution, understood religious freedom
to incorporate both freedom to practice theirreligion of choice, as well as freedom fromreligion, a concept heartily articulated byAustralia’s most recent census.
But without the impending stick oftaxation, would churches use theirconsiderable resources to play politics?
Other nations seem to agree that theymight. In Singapore, churches are required
to register as charities to receive a taxexemption, with revenue from side businessor investment taxed at a regular rate,
tax-exempt income is required to be used
for charitable purposes or the routine
operation of their ministries, as in the U.S.
Not surprisingly, the Singapore governmentis efficient about policing revenue owed
to it, and leaders of the City Harvest Church(CHC) were criminally convicted in a highprofile case for misuse of SG$50 million of
donations meant for charity, funneling thefunds into the pastor’s wife’s pop singing
career, as well as an opulent penthousein Sentosa.
Christianity, however, does not havethe lock on prosperity theology. Thailand’s
Wat Dhammakaya urges adherents aroundthe world to give generous donations asa short-cut to merit making, and isconspicuous in its accumulation of wealth.
Some have argued that the junta has beentargeting the temple’s assets to line its own
coffers, summoning images of Henry VIII’s
dissolution of the monasteries to pay for his
military campaigns. The endless Ramayana
ballet of Thaksin and Prayuth aside, thefailed siege of Dhammakaya illustrates
one peril involved in establishing a state
religion: its institutions become impervious

9of Colorado. Their report, The burden of
disease from rising coal-fired plant emissions
in Southeast Asia, concludes that Vietnam is
the ASEAN country that will be most affectedby coal pollution in the near future. They
estimate that more than 188 excess deaths
per million people will result there due to theburning of coal.
With the Asia-Pacific region representing
four of the world’s top five coal producers(China, India, Australia, and Indonesia),
significant shifts toward coal could create
economic benefits in the area – but these will
be more than offset by the erosion of progress
toward the Paris accord goals. If investment inrenewable energy stalls, the global objectiveof decreasing greenhouse gas emissions
by 2030 may prove unreachable. Thus, the‘Bridge Scenario’ to increase Southeast Asia’s
reliance on renewable energy and decrease oiland coal consumption, envisioned by a 2015
report from the International Energy Agency,
would be largely obliterated.

The big picture
Obviously, the people of Southeast Asia
want to understand where their interests may
lie in the Trump Administration’s new order, as
do people around the globe. But connecting
the dots between the president’s words andactions to reveal what might be considereda consistent foreign policy is challenging, atbest. It may be more instructive to examine
understated themes to piece together the
big picture.
Themes which emerged include the
Trump Administration’s troubling retreat frommulti-lateralism, particularly on pressing
issues requiring global solutions; and sheer
inaction enabled by administrative chaos at
the highest levels. A leadership void has beencreated; but nature abhors a vacuum, and it
remains to be seen whether ASEAN nations willband together with more regional coherence
to address problems, whether they will takemore nuanced positions in bi-lateral dealings
with the U.S., or will develop stronger allianceswith nations ready to assume a greater
leadership position.
The articles excerpted here are aboutneither U.S. nor Southeast Asian policy
in isolation, but rather illustrate a juncture
which may afford a synthesized explorationof both. As such, they may be difficult
to characterize, particularly in a world
prone to neat labels. Taken together,
I hope they can help the reader recognize
a greater connectivity between our two
regions, in what has become an increasingly
fractured world.
Sally Tyler is an attorney and policy
analyst based in Washington DC andthe author of Of Temples and Territory:
The ICJ’s Preah Vihear Decision and Its
Impact on Regional Dispute Resolution.
She is currently working on gathering
the articles referenced above into acollection, linked by new, original content.
mestyler@gmail.com

On the environment 8
In late 2017, EPA director Scott Pruitt
announced that the “war on coal is over”,
and that the agency will rescind the Obama
Administration’s Clean Power Plan, which
required utilities to steeply reduce carbon
emissions as part of the administration’s
overall goals to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, central to its commitments within
the Paris accord on climate change, fromwhich Trump has already signaled his intent
to withdraw.
The Trump Administration’s renewed
endorsement of coal mirrors Vietnam’s recent
decision to mothball its long-standing plans
to become Southeast Asia’s first nuclearpowered nation, in favor of coal. Citing concern
over both the level of public debt needed tocomplete construction and ‘environmental
risks’ following the disastrous Formosa leak,the National Assembly announced a decisionat the end of 2016 to halt developmentof the Ninh Thuan plant.
This sharp increase in the use of coal
will carry dire health effects, according toresearchers at Harvard and the University

Notes1	Tyler, S. ‘Second Acts for Thaksin andTrump?’ New Mandala, 4 Nov. 20162	Tyler, S. ‘A Good Day’s Work’, New
Mandala, 16 Feb. 20173	Tyler, S. ‘Lock Them All Up’, New Mandala,
16 Mar. 20174	Tyler, S. ‘A Fashionable Entry to Policy’,
New Mandala, 30 Mar. 2017
5	This excerpt originates from an article
written on 30 March 2017.
6	Tyler, S. ‘Blurring the Lines Between
Church and State’, Policy Forum, 7 July
20177	Tyler, S. ‘Exporting Addiction’, Policy
Forum, 7 Sept. 20178	Tyler, S. ‘Where There’s Smoke, There’s
Coal’, Policy Forum, 13 Oct. 2017

10

Oligarchs

The Study

Rodrigo Duterte’s rise represents
a diversification of rather than a challenge
to the Philippine national elite.

Rodrigo Duterte
and the Philippine
presidency
Rupture or cyclicity?
Mesrob Vartavarian

Scholars have devoted much attention to the rise of Rodrigo
Duterte and the impact his brand of populism has had on
the quality of Philippine democracy. This piece focusesinstead on the evolving nature of the Philippine presidency
and gradual diversification of the national oligarchy.
Rather than viewing Duterte as a break from the Philippine
experiment with constitutional democracy or a reassertionof national boss rule, it would be more accurate to viewhis rise as a manifestation of oligarchic proliferation, in
which actors and power groups previously excluded fromthe presidency manage to break into the national elite via
political and electoral manipulation.

Rodrigo Duterte and children at inauguration ceremony. Presidential Communications Operation Office, Public Domain.

Rejecting oligarchs: Duterte
as demagogic populist
The most widely disseminated interpretationof the Duterte phenomenon contends that thislocal strongman from Davao City is a national
manifestation of a troubling international
phenomenon. Namely, the rise of right-wing
populist figures who have issued crude, but
at times unsettlingly effective challenges toliberal globalism. According to its detractors,
the humanist inclusivity of liberal rhetoric thatclaims to champion the rights of all races,
genders, and sexual orientations is but amild palliative in the face of turbocharged neoliberal economic policies that have left more
and more wealth in fewer and fewer hands.
Neoliberal globalization has been accused ofcreating deep fissures between classes andregions across what were once more cohesive
nation-states. Cosmopolitan upper and middle

classes based in globally connected cities
have neglected the socioeconomic concernsof peripheral regions left behind as a result of
rapidly evolving economic structures. These
globalist structures have placed more emphasison highly mobile forms of capital and service
sector jobs that require levels of educationand training inaccessible to poorer segmentsof the population.
According to proponents of oligarchic
rejection, the origins of this populist backlashin the Philippines can be dated to the People
Power Revolution of 1986.1 A combinationof virulent plunder politics and increasing
repression of traditional elites by theauthoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos led
to a groundswell of mass opposition, which thearmed forces refused to suppress. Abandonedby their military and police, the Marcos family
fled. The new democratic government ofCorazon Aquino gave the Philippines a new

constitution that strictly curtailed possibilities
for authoritarian backsliding and greatly
empowered the national legislature.
Almost immediately, however, it became
apparent that the Philippines had overthrowna national cacique only to see the returnof traditional political dynasties committed
to a severely truncated form of democracy.2
1986 was more of a restoration than arevolution. Proponents of major social reform
were either met with congressional obstruction
or military repression. No meaningful land
reform took place, particularly on thoseestates owned by well-connected oligarchs.
Counterinsurgency operations against
agrarian leftist organizations launched during
the Marcos years continued under the new
democratic dispensation. Beset by a widearray of economic woes and attempted coupsby disgruntled elements of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), President Aquino could

not afford to alienate a military that used
the protracted campaigns against communist
guerillas to justify its continued preeminence.3
Manifestations of the Philippines’ continuing
dependence on its former colonial master also
persisted in aggravating nationalist sentiments.
Eager to retain the favor of the United States,
Aquino allowed Washington to hold on to its
military bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay
until these agreements came up for formal
renewal. Disgusted by America’s support for
the Marcos regime, enough pressure wasmaintained inside and outside the politicalestablishment to close these bases downin 1992. Yet, this only occurred after the Cold
War had ended, thus creating the impressionthat the Americans had not been thrownout so much as abandoned an overt militarypresence in the Philippines once it was nolonger necessary.
National leadership left much to be desired.
Presidents, weak and strong, rewarded cronies
and kinsmen with lucrative contracts andsinecures while leaving pressing problems
unresolved. Politics seemed to be the exclusive
preserve of a charmed circle of elite families
who rotated high office amongst themselves.
The dynastic nature of the Philippine
presidency reached its apogee at the turnof the twenty-first century: two successive
presidents, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and
Benigno Aquino III, were the children of former
presidents. Impressive economic growth
has occurred since the early 2000s but littleof this wealth has trickled down and thePhilippines remains far behind most of its
neighbors in lowering the percentage of
people living in poverty.
Structures of illicit political bargaining thattypified the pre-Marcos era emerged seemingly
unscathed after 1986. National politiciansaligned with provincial warlords and local
strongmen who delivered guaranteed votebanks during election campaigns in exchange
for patronage and pork barrel projects. Most
resource disbursements from the center tothe periphery disappeared into the pockets oflocal political clans, empowering a few elitefamilies at the expense of an effective civil
infrastructure and the satisfactory deliveryof services.
All these sociopolitical ills are magnified
manifold on the island of Mindanao,
particularly in the autonomous Muslim areas.
Neglect, mismanagement, clan feuds, andcorruption have left large parts of the island
mired in poverty and disappointment. National
politics are remote and seemingly uninterested
in southern provincial problems. It was widely
felt that only a presidential candidate from
Mindanao could understand and resolve theisland’s inequities. Duterte presented himself
as a familiar strongman who could get thejob done. He gave frequent speeches andinterviews in Visayan, the lingua francaof the central Philippines as well as northernand eastern Mindanao. This was a welcome
relief from the Taglish-speaking elites ofimperial Manila. His profanity-laced tirades
and locker room banter made him come acrossas an avuncular figure not averse to using
physical violence to keep unruly behavior incheck. Mindanao’s electoral mobilization on
behalf of one of its own was a major factor
in Duterte’s victory, but it is unlikely he would
have won the election without a similar senseof disillusionment with elite politics throughout
the archipelago. In areas like Central Luzon
and the National Capital Region, voters turned
to Duterte because he was an outsider.
A new generation of young voters who had
no memory of Ferdinand Marcos, martial law
or the People Power Revolution backed an
unknown quantity for the sake of shaking up
a stagnant status quo.
Duterte’s ostensibly simple solutions tocomplex problems have brought disruption
rather than resolution. The scourge ofcriminality and illegal drugs, which Duterte
vowed to eradicate in a matter of months, hasresulted in an interminable war on the poor.
Drug users and small time pushers are targeted
for extrajudicial execution while major kingpins
have been largely unaffected. Duterte’s true
intentions appear to be a nationwide social
cleansing of indigents and undesirables.
The poor are a convenient scapegoat for thesocial ills that plague the body politic, but
killing them does not reform the structuralinequalities that produce those ills.

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

The near obsession with eradicatingillegal drugs in slum areas further delayed
the enactment of the Bangasamoro Basic
Law (BBL) of 2014, which would give territorialautonomy to the Muslim south. The Moro
Islamic Liberation Front’s inability to pass the
BBL in partnership with Duterte expeditiously
weakened the organization’s credibility
among its members and precipitated thebreakaway of disaffected family clans whojoined or founded more extremist Islamicgroups. The Maute group’s rise was a resultof these frustrations. Their seizure of Marawi
City in conjunction with other extremist gangs
blindsided Manila. The AFP missed numerous
self-declared deadlines for Marawi’s complete
liberation. More damaging has been Duterte’s
imposition of martial law on the entire island of
Mindanao. Although not as all-encompassinga political crackdown as the variant imposedby Marcos over forty years ago, it broughtback bitter memories of an era thought to belong gone. The fighting in Marawi also offset
Duterte’s attempted tilt away from the UnitedStates, with the military seeking the technicalassistance of American special operations
forces without initially informing Duterteof their intention to do so.
Oligarchic rejection thus led to a rash
decision on the part of voters to back a local
warlord for the nation’s highest office. Although
he ran Davao City relatively effectively, theuse of local methods to solve national problems
has had very mixed results. While Duterte has
thus far been able to reward his supporters andcoopt most of the national legislature throughthe disbursement of presidential patronage, he
has not dismantled vested interests committed
to the socioeconomic status quo. While Duterte’s
violence at home and grandstanding abroad
have been cathartic for many, the Philippines
remains as oligarchic a state as ever.

Philippine oligarchic
cycles: wild and reformist
fluctuations
Theories of oligarchic rotation have viewed
Philippine national politics as a cyclicalphenomenon that operates according to thedisposition of the national executive. Corazon
Aquino’s presidency from 1986 to 1992 saw
the reestablishment of elite families who weredenied the spoils of office under the Marcos
dictatorship. Although President Aquino herself
rarely engaged in pathological excesses, anumber of her close family and key associates
ruthlessly reasserted their dominance over
local bailiwicks and lucrative assets. Fierce
competition between provincial clans forlegislative seats and mayoralties resulted inextensive electoral violence. The AFP and police
remained on hand to suppress those voices
and non-governmental organizations callingfor genuine social reform. The administrationof Fidel Ramos, 1992-1998, significantly
tamped down on egregious political violence.
Although a former Marcos crony and kinsman,
Ramos went some way toward portraying
the Philippines as a business friendly country
eager for foreign investment. Attempted coups
became a thing of the past and economic
deregulation was the order of the day.
These reforms were far from complete by
the time Ramos left office. Partial stabilization
was followed by an extended period ofwild oligarchic accumulation during thepresidencies of Joseph Estrada, 1998-2001,
and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, 2001-2010.
The Arroyo years saw the very worst of what
presidential predation had to offer. Provincial
warlords such as ‘Chavit’ Singson in Ilocos Sur
and the Ampatuan clan in the autonomous
Muslim areas were given free reign so long as
they delivered the votes Arroyo’s clique needed
to prolong its rule and amass further plunder.
The damage inflicted under Arroyo was so
extensive that significant reforms were required
to salvage the Philippines’ international
image and economic prospects. Benigno
Aquino III’s presidential term from 2010 to2016 saw a sustained drive against corruption
and attempts to prosecute provincial clans
involved in politically motivated massacres.
While political killings as a whole were nevercompletely eliminated, they ceased to manifest
themselves in the brazen and bloody mannerthat typified the Arroyo era. However, Aquino
III’s administration did not last long enough

The Study

or try hard enough to lessen the staggering
disparities between rich and poor. Access tosocioeconomic resources were still heavily
dependent on the favor and patronage ofelite families. The Philippine presidency was
still exposed to capture by a wild oligarch.4
Oligarchic power was temporarily tamed
through a plethora of civic reform programs
and presidential initiatives, but its deep
structures endured, making it possible for
Duterte’s predatory populism to take hold.

Oligarchic proliferation:
an expanding national elite
The abovementioned theories focus moreon contemporary practices and beliefs thanon long-term historical trajectories. Onceestablished, the traditional families appear
unshakable and near hegemonic in theircontrol of national political office. Someoligarchs are more civil and reform-minded
than others, but they are basically cut fromthe same cloth and in being so their reformism
can only go so far. While it is true that national
elites have rarely been eliminated, they
have had to share the trough of state withan increasing variety of voracious mouths.
An examination of Philippine politicaldevelopment since the American colonial
advent demonstrates that Duterte is as mucha manifestation of oligarchic proliferation as arupture or cyclical phase. From the beginningof the twentieth century, the Philippine national
elite has become progressively diverse. Various
oligarchs of different origins have had to sharean increasingly crowded national politicalarena. The initial channeling of local andregional elites into Manila politics by Americancolonial officials led to a homogenization of thenational political class. This homogenization
began to break down during the Second World
War. Marginal and more militarized elementsof this elite began to penetrate national
office in ways previously thought impossible.
These aggressive up-and-comers assembled
client networks that allowed them to distancethemselves from established political families.
Marcos’s consolidation of power and declarationof martial law then saw the politicization ofa heretofore apolitical military. Finally, since
the year 2000, local warlords from fringe areas
have been gaining in power and influence,a trend which culminated in one local warlord
seizing control of the national state.
Political horizons began to expand forthe indigenous elite during the archipelago’stransition from Spanish to American rule.
Philippine elites were no strangers to fierce
electoral contests that determined the
distribution and denial of resources. However,under Spanish rule elections were limited to
the local level. As an increasingly valuable
possession of Spain’s
dwindling empire,provincial and capitaladministrative positions
were reserved for
Spaniards alone.
The lockout ofindigenous elites fromlucrative government
posts was a major
factor precipitating
the Philippine struggle
for independence.
Faced with a formidable insurrectionof their own, American policymakers cast
about for ways to dissipate mass resistance.
Initially, they opted to govern the archipelagothrough highly educated Manila-based elites.
Very soon, however, American administrators
found these capital-elites ill-suited to govern ahighly localized and deeply fragmented polity.
The colonial state thus began to cultivate
local and provincial elites who were then cast
upwards into national politics.5 Weaving local
indigenous elites into central administrative andpolitical networks substantially weakened theinsurgency. Popular and millenarian movements
would continue to erupt in rural and urban areas
but were not enough to halt the coalescence ofa self-replicating national oligarchy. This stageof Philippine political development reached ahigh point under the authoritarian presidencyof Manuel Quezon.6 He carefully cultivatedalliance networks stretching from rural
localities to Washington, DC. Soon, almost
all state patronage flowed from his hands.

This period of centralized executive power
was brought to an end by the Japaneseinvasion. The violence and dislocation thatcame with Japanese occupation createdspaces for new power networks. Followings
cohered around local strongmen who could
obtain weapons and plunder. Rivals were
eliminated under vague accusations of‘collaboration’ as armed bands competed for
smuggling routes and high-value contraband.
The political future belonged to these local
toughs. With independence in 1946, theyquickly entered the national legislature, using
their war records and armed followings to
obtain electoral support. Ferdinand Marcos
was only the most successful example ofguerilla commanders who had gone to
Manila. Once in the national political arena,
he furnished his kin, armed followers, andformer fraternity brothers with further rewards.
Marcos also made extensive use of the rapidly
modernizing news media to construct an imageof heroic military service that went well beyond
the factual record. In addition, he managed tomarket himself as a firm believer in top-down
technocratic modernity, which would catapult
the Philippines into the foremost ranks
of developing nations.
All this was enough to win him thepresidency in 1965, but if he wanted to holdonto it indefinitely he would need the military.
The politicization of a heretofore professional
officer corps began almost immediately.
Budget increases, infrastructure projects,
and slush funds gave military and police
commanders a taste for power. When Marcos
declared martial law in 1972 their status andopportunities for illicit enrichment increased
exponentially. Marcos continuously allowed
them to accrue wealth and in exchange
they continued to support his dictatorship.
Yet, the dictator had made a mistake. His
military and police cronies soon became
autonomous oligarchs in their own right. The
profits they accumulated from payoffs, black
market ventures, and smuggling routes wereplowed back into constructing client networksof their own. When the regime’s prospects
became untenable they readily turned against
it to preserve their privileges. Abandoned byhis security forces during the People Power
Revolution, Marcos had no option but topack up and fly away.
Having enabled the fall of Marcos, thesecurity forces felt entitled to a preeminent
political role in the new era. A series ofcoups were launched against a tottering
Aquino administration, several of whichcame dangerously close to succeeding.
Consequently, Aquino agreed to maintain
Marcos-era security structures and makeFidel Ramos her foremost advisor on military
matters. Coup threats were thus contained,
but at the price of sustaining institutions
and personnel froman authoritarian past.
The subsequent Ramospresidency saw former
military and police
commanders reachthe commandingheights of politicalpower. Ramos filled his
administration withover a hundred retired
officers.7 Although thearmed forces were retrenched and modernized
to a significant extent, Ramos maintained its
privileged position and rewarded his former
military associates with the plums of office.
The Estrada and Arroyo years witnessed
the elevation of local warlords to heretofore
unknown levels of prominence. Marcos had
used warlords to drum up support and marshal
votes in the past, but they were never a
major component of his inner circle. Arroyo’s
reliance on the vote-banks of the Ampatuanclan by contrast meant sustained levelsof presidential patronage and support forprovincial predation. Full presidential backing
created a sense of complete impunity thateventually went too far. Had the Ampatuans
not committed the Maguindanao massacrein 2009, they might have used their near total
control of the autonomous Muslim region to act
as kingmakers in future presidential elections.
Rodrigo Duterte’s urban warlordism proved
far more successful.8 He launched his careerfrom a narrower base, Davao City, where he
had to contend with fewer jostling interests.

“ … national elites [ … ]have had to share thetrough of state with anincreasing variety ofvoracious mouths.”

11

His law-and-order platform, undergirded
by a steady hum of extrajudicial executions,
made him popular with local business interests
and Chinese investors seeking to expand theirhorizons into the island of Mindanao. Duterte
allowed the business sector to accumulate
profits without being too avaricious or involvedin their activities. This set the precedent andtone for his economic policy at the national
level. Although his associations with the leftist
movement and hostility to the United States
make him something of an atypical president,
he is quite the typical warlord. Duterte built
alliances with and accepted resourcesfrom any quarter that would increase his
personal power.
Upon his election to the presidency, Dutertebrought a bevy of advisors and acolytes with
him to Manila. Team Duterte quickly replicatedlocal methods of social control on a national
scale, with the killings of social marginals
across the archipelago becoming a top priority.
The rhetorical flourish utilized by traditional
elites to mask the brutalities of a profoundly
unequal society was quickly dropped in favorof a far cruder demonization of the superfluous
poor. Oligarchs who had been under a cloud
during Aquino III’s administration were quickly
rehabilitated and Duterte was frequently seen
hobnobbing with the likes of Gloria Arroyo,
Estrada, and the Marcos family. The Marcosesdelivered him the votes of Ilocos Norte, theirprovincial bailiwick, in exchange for expediting
their political rehabilitation, symbolized by
Ferdinand’s reburial in Heroes’ Cemetery.
Duterte has also experienced substantial
pushback from other established oligarchic
interests. Fidel Ramos chided Duterte forhis tilt away from the United States and othersenior officers grumbled at his patronageof the police at the expense of the AFP.
Such opposition has compelled Duterte
to backtrack on his anti-American rhetoricand the protracted conflict in Marawi City
made for quite amicable exchanges between
Duterte, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson,
and President Trump during ASEAN’s 2017
summits. Certain senators have also expressed
growing unease at the negative international
imagery generated by the drug war, a downward slide that could result in divestment
and credit rating downgrades. Duterte has
responded to elite criticism with a combinationof threats and half-hearted investigationsof police excesses.
It remains to be seen if the various oligarchs
in Manila will fully accept Duterte as one of
their own. Established families and interests
can be cajoled and occasionally bullied, butnever fully eradicated. Most of them must
eventually be accommodated, or else a hostileoligarchic coalition might coalesce, as it did
in 1986, and place Duterte in an untenable
position. Populist pronouncements aside,
Duterte’s principle intention appears to be theconsolidation of his position as a new type ofnational oligarch; whether or not he succeeds,
other local warlords will invariably follow suit.
Duterte’s rise to power represents a further
widening of the Philippine oligarchic gyre.
Mesrob Vartavarian
Independent Scholar
mvartavarian@gmail.com

Notes
1	Teehankee, J.C. & M.R. Thompson.
2016. ‘Electing a Strongman’, Journalof Democracy 27(4):125-34.
2	Anderson, B. 1988. ‘Cacique Democracy
and the Philippines: Origins and Dreams’,
New Left Review 169:3-31.
3	McCoy, A.W. 1999. Closer than Brothers:
Manhood at the Philippine Military
Academy. New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, ch.7-8.
4	Quimpo, N.G. ‘Can the Philippines’
Wild Oligarchy be Tamed?’, in Case,W. (ed.) 2015. Routledge Handbookof Southeast Asian Democratization.
London: Routledge, p.347.
5	Cullinane, M. 2003. Ilustrado Politics:
Filipino Elite Responses to American
Rule, 1898-1908. Quezon City: Ateneode Manila University Press.
6	Abinales, P.N. & D.J. Amoroso. 2017.
State and Society in the Philippines.
Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield,
pp.153-157.
7	ibid., McCoy, pp.31-32.
8	ibid., Abinales & Amoroso, pp.337-342.

12

The Opinion

Academic censorship

Exploring censorship in the context
of research and publishing.

Experiences with censorshipin research and publication on
Singapore’s multiculturalism
Lai Ah Eng

This short essay is based on my own work experiences.
I write about censorship by the state, vested interest
groups or individuals, and even oneself, in the context
of research and publication of findings on the topic ofmulticulturalism in Singapore. By censorship, I mean
broadly the curtailment of freedom to research andpresent certain information and interpretations in publicthrough publication, either through formal means or
through practice and judgement in professional conduct.
Multiculturalismin Singapore
I have had a mixed career in social
research (1982 to date) in various government and academic and policy researchorganisations, working primarily on Singapore’s multiculturalism (with its overlapping
ethnic, cultural and religious dimensions).
Multiculturalism is highly complex and open
to uncertainty, contestation and tension,and thus research and publication on it isopen to critical and censoring comments andresponses, be this by the state, various vested
interest groups/individuals and/or myself.
The Singapore state has historically set
the institutional framework for social-cultural
policies. Multiculturalism is an explicitly
declared founding principle in its nationbuilding project, but ‘race’ and ‘religion’ aretreated as sensitive subjects requiring carefulmanagement through a plethora of legislative
measures and institutional arrangements.
State rhetoric on multiculturalism is focusedaround celebration of its diversity and fearof its conflict-proneness. Any direct state
censorship and legal action is justified on
grounds of the potential dangers of ethnic andreligious extremism to public order and social
stability. Although such action has been taken
mainly against those in mainstream media
and political and religious individuals and notagainst academics, the academic atmosphere
has been affected and discourse on race andreligion is generally one of extreme caution
and preferably evaded. Some of myexperiences point to caution and censorshipnot directly by the state, but by gatekeepers
in academic and research organisations.

Experiencing caution
and censorship
My attempt to publish my doctoral
thesis “Meanings of Multiethnicity” witha local publisher, with the aim to promotelocal publishing, was met with silence froma commercial house, and a verbal response
from a local research institute: “the director
said not ready to publish such a book”.
The final recourse was to publish it with
Oxford University Press (1995).
My application for a job in a policy
research institute, based on a research
proposal on multiracialism in Singapore,

was successful only in a subsequentassessment. Yet when the completed project,with the proposed title “Beyond Rituals andRiots” (2004), was ready for publication,
I was advised by my directors to replace‘Riots’ with ‘Rhetoric’. However, I insisted
that the most important word in the title was‘Beyond’, and that ‘Riot’ was both a statereferenced and academic/research concept.
The next publication “Facing Faiths,
Crossing Cultures” (2005) was a compilationof an intercultural and interfaith dialogue seriesof public lectures, seminars and discussions.
In order to facilitate open and frank exchange,some discussions were conducted as closeddoor sessions. Nothing happened censorshipwise in this unprecedented dialogue series,
although I was taken to task for inviting anoutspoken intellectual, who was critical of
American foreign policies, as a speaker. My
justification: he had credentials and expertisein interfaith issues, foreign policy views aside.
I approached a following research project,
on religious diversity, with the understandingthat there were huge gaps of knowledge
to be urgently filled and issues to be better
understood and managed for the larger
social good. I worried about finding enoughparticipants with sufficient local knowledge
and experience for the project, but the end
result was a bumper crop of 28 contributions.
In the context of rising religious disrespect,extremism, aggressive proselytisation,
provocative behaviour and other inter-religious
tensions in Singapore and elsewhere, each
invitation to contribute was undertaken withearnestness, concern and commitment to thelarger social good of interfaith understanding.
My editorial approach to the rare chance of
publishing the project’s “Religious Diversity
in Singapore” (2008) was one of including as
much as possible within the scope of religious
diversity, with the exception of one detailon religious proselytisation in one chapter:I removed, to the dismay of the author, an
example of overzealous religionists posing
as tourists visiting some named religious sites(in Singapore and Malaysia), but who wereactually engaging in spiritual warfare andpraying for their collapse. I feared that theexample might trigger more inter-religious
anxiety, mistrust and even provide fuel for fire.
My primer on “Religion in Singapore” (2017)
received two major reviewer’s commentsthat posed potential censoring edits: that I
misrepresented one of the religions discussed

issues, and to write and speak with a senseof concern and commitment –this not only withregard to professional scholarship per se, butequally to larger social ideals of intercultural
understanding and social cohesion. Thismaximised the desire for freedom to research,
write and publish –and minimised any
tendency to practise self-censorship. At thesame time, in the context of volatile religious
politics, the closed-door discussions whichwere part of our research methodologies
were not seen as reflecting or perpetuating
the lack of freedom to speak openly, but
as safe spaces where participants felt
free to speak frankly. Nor was censorshipby gatekeepers a rigid practice to beunquestioningly accepted, but to benegotiated based on facts and reasoning.
The books still got published. And as for
self-interests, I did not lose my job nor did
I switch to safer topics. Indeed, my idealistic
motivations, nerve and competency toresearch multiculturalism, with all its‘minefields’, were gradually recognised.

Academic responsibility
in the real world
Leaders of the main faiths in Singapore.
Photo © www.mfa.gov.sg.

as full of ‘superstition’ to account for massive
conversions out of it; and that I was giving
unwarranted attention to the secular state’s
management of multi-religious Singapore.
I responded that I was simply reporting
converts’ given reason for leaving the religion,and that not to discuss the dominant state’srole in the Singapore case would be negligent
and careless scholarship. Thus far, nothing has
happened censorship-wise since the book’s
publication, even though it covered several
highly contested issues such as religious
proselytisation, absolutism and extremismin some interpretations, gay rights and homosexuality and the secular-religious divide.

Self-censorship
There are at least two reasons behindpossible self-censorship. The first is the fearof authority, be this the state or powerfulgatekeepers such as work superiors or evenpublishers, and the consequences for selfinterests. The fear of state limits on academic
freedom in Singapore has its roots in earlypost-colonial nation-building history in which
there were varied views on the autonomousrole of universities. This was made worse by
the state’s authoritarian and interventionist
tendencies in political and social life,
particularly through punitive action against
mostly political individuals whose public
views and actions were seen as disruptive to
public order or threatening to social stability.
At the same time, its pragmatic priority
over economic survival and economic goals
rendered the social sciences and independent
critical thinking on social issues unappreciated,even sometimes distrusted. The culture ofcaution and fear of writing and speaking
on the ‘sensitive’ topics of race and religion
is also a consequence of the larger ethnic
politics of the 1960s and 1970s in Malaysia
and Singapore, and later of religious politics.
However, it would be mistaken to thinkthat this culture of caution and fear is rigid
and unchanging. Since the 1990s, there has
been a gradual opening up of research andscholarship to address pertinent and pressing
social issues, including race and religion,
as younger generations of both locally- andforeign-educated scholars and researchers
entered the field. There was a strongly felt
urgency to fill huge gaps in and catch up withinformation and higher level knowledge, anda hunger for discussion and varied views oncomplex and difficult topics, amidst rapidchanges and developments. The advent of theinternet and social media further drasticallychanged views and expectations aboutsocial research and its public implications.
Thus, even as I worried about finding enoughparticipants from the local pool for myresearch projects, those I found showedsincere interest and earnest desire to takeup the challenge of researching difficult

The second reason behind self-censorshipin publication is the fear of causing offence
to others and of the social consequences,
particularly contributing to intercultural
tensions. Whether to publish in the interestsof knowledge or to omit a piece of evidence,
fact or opinion to avert offence and its
consequences –requires discerning judgement
based on skills, experience and grounded
awareness. Having directly experienced
an ethnic riot (Kuala Lumpur, 13 May 1969),
and having witnessed or researched ethnic
tensions over the years, has shaped my views
towards a broader sense of responsibility inresearch and scholarship on multiculturalism.
Rigorous gathering, analysing and interpretingof evidence remain the main requirementsof responsible research. But responsibility
is also about consciously considering thesocial impact and consequences, whether
on policy and practice implications or the
behaviour of vested interest groups orindividuals. Responsibility’s underpinning idealof contributing towards better understanding
and management for the common good and acohesive multiculturalism is all the more central
in importance in our time. As such, rather
than focus on censorship versus freedom ina narrow sense, I consider social responsibility
in scholarship and publication to be a parallel
challenge. Working under the often complex,
uncertain and volatile conditions thatmulticulturalism presents, the responsibilityof taking extra care, caution and considerationof the consequences of publication is not
so much an act of self-censorship that goesagainst academic freedom, but an expressionof the responsibility that must accompany it.
This larger sense of responsibility also helps
us make clearer and better judgements in ourdecisions on what to publish for the real world.
Other issues, such as access to information held by the state and the cultureof civil debate, discussion and dialogue,
affect freedom and censorship. But there is
now definitely more freedom to research andpublish on issues of race and religion than
before, and one must continue to expand
this freedom. It also remains forever true towrite and publish honestly and responsibly,
without fear or favour.
Lai Ah Eng Adjunct Senior Fellow,
University Scholars Programme,
National University of Singapore.
laiaheng@nus.edu.sg
		Note		The ongoing incident (since March 2018),
in which the Law Minister intensively
questioned historian P.J. Thum on his ‘fakenews’ interpretation of the state’s rationale
for the arrest of political opponents(Operation Coldstore, 1963) on grounds ofpublic security, is a case of old versus newpolitical styles of managing information,
publication and interpretation. I view
the Minister’s style as akin to that ofsome old ruling party first-generation
political leaders’, and Thum’s as that of
an idealistic and young historian’s.

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

China Connections
Chinese tea and Asian societies

Regional Editor
Kunbing Xiao

Chinese tea andAsian societies
Kunbing Xiao

W

Following the ‘the flow of tea’, fivearticles outline the transmission of tea andthe interplay of tea-tasting arts in Asiansocieties, including China, British India
and Taiwan. Researchers working from thediverse backgrounds of history, art history,
anthropology and substance abuse, reveal
in their studies the hidden nature of tea’s

impact on economics, politics and people’s
daily lives throughout Asia. These fascinating
research findings also remind us of Okakura
Kakuzō’s claim made approximately 200
years ago, when he asserted that “Asia isone”, a possible contemplation on his lattereven more renowned work, ‘The Book of Tea’.
However, a discussion about tea in
Asian societies should never ignore western
influences. We cannot imagine thosetea plantations in Darjeeling and Assamwithout the enthusiastic British search forthe taste of tea. The circulation of Chinese
tea around the world occurred at the sametime as westerners invaded the old empire.
Thus, global capitalism has been a criticalfactor, infiltrating and becoming rooted
in Asian societies. In the modern era, tea’s
globalisation is significantly accelerating
and becoming more widely appreciatedthan ever before.

Tea and everyday life: observations
from Chaoshan, GuangdongPeter d’Abbs

W

hat place do the rich traditionsof Chinese tea culture hold in theeveryday lives of people in a fastchanging, increasingly consumerist society?
To explore this question, I travelled to a region
renowned for its traditional tea culture: theChaoshan (潮汕) region in eastern Guangdong
province, home of gongfu tea –one of themost elegant and refined of China’s diverse
tea-drinking traditions. Through in-depth,
informal interviews, and observations over
several trips to Chaozhou and other centres
in Chaoshan, I tried to understand what
gongfu tea meant for people in Chaoshan.1
The first finding that became apparent tome was how deeply gongfu tea was integrated
into the everyday lives of people of all kinds ofsocial background. As one of my interviewees
explained, it has ‘seeped into our bones’.
People who were born and raised in Chaoshan
did not consciously learn about gongfu tea,
they simply came to know about it as they
grew up. The integral place of gongfu tea had
three dimensions: spatial, temporal and social.
Spatially, gongfu tea was everywhere. In theworkplaces, shops or homes that I observed,a gongfu tea set was always found in regularuse. Temporally, gongfu tea is woven into
the rhythms of everyday life: at home, after
dinner; and in shops, whenever trading isslow, out comes the gongfu tea set. Above all,drinking gongfu tea can be considered to bea social activity, nurturing relationships withfamily, friends and associates, and in doing so,
affirming the drinkers’ identity in a network of

13

Center for Global Asia
at NYU ShanghaiTea originated in China and has spread worldwide over the past two
centuries. Tea plants are highly sensitive to their natural environment
and, even today, are mainly cultivated in subtropical Asian countries.
The cultivation, processing and consumption of tea has influenced Asiansocieties for centuries, in various ways. In this edition of ‘China Connections’,
inspired by Appadurai’s ‘Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural
economy’, we explore how tea, as a commodity critically involved in modern
world history, affected ancient China’s regional politics, and how it stillpermeates ordinary people’s lives in Asia.

e encourage our readers toconsider tea in both its macroscalarand microscalar contexts. On the one
hand, tea is associated with regime change,
long-distance transportation, the organization of production, and global capitalism,
and so has propelled the emergence of theworld trade system. On the other hand, tea
is closely related to our consumption habits,
our social organization and life-styles, andto some extent reflects our bodily perceptionof the environment.

The Region

The extensive influence of tea has
also challenged researchers’ assumptions
and knowledge, making an interdisciplinary
approach and methodology essential forthe study of tea. From China of the Tang
Dynasty to California in America, from
British Indian tea plantations to teahouses
in Chaozhou, tea has influenced oursocieties dynamically and is still shaping
our modern world. We hope that thefollowing articles will unveil some of tea’s
mysteries and enable you to enjoy morethan just a cup of the beverage.

The Center for Global Asia at NYU Shanghai
serves as the hub within the NYU Global
Network University system to promote thestudy of Asian interactions and comparisons,both historical and contemporary. The overall
objective of the Center is to provide global
societies with information on the contexts
for the reemerging connections between
the various parts of Asia through researchand teaching. Collaborating with institutions
across the world, the Center seeks to playa bridging role between existing Asianstudies knowledge silos. It will take the leadin drawing connections and comparisons
between the existing fields of Asian studies,and stimulating new ways of understanding
Asia in a globalized world.

Asia Research Centerat Fudan University
Founded in March 2002, the Asia ResearchCenter at Fudan University (ARC-FDU) is
one of the achievements of the cooperationof Fudan and the Korean Foundation for
Advanced Studies (KFAS). Through the years,
the center is making all the efforts to promote
Asian Studies, including hosting conferences
and supporting research projects. ARC-FDU
keeps close connections with the ARCs inmainland China and many institutes abroad.

Kunbing Xiao iis Associate Professorof Anthropology at Southwest Minzu
University; the CGA-ARC postdoctoral
fellow at the Center for Global Asia
(2017-2018) NYU Shanghai; and Regional
Editor of 'China Connections'.
xiaokunbing@gmail.com

Again, this was accomplished by cultivating
expertise and discernment in one or moreof several domains, for example, creating a
special space for drinking tea; seeking out highquality tea utensils; exploring philosophicaland spiritual aspects of tea-drinking;developing a capacity to understand andappreciate the qualities and properties of any
given tealeaves, and knowing where and how
to purchase teas of the finest quality.
Today’s globalised world is characterisedby what some sociologists have described
as transnational streams of ‘cultural capital’,in which cultural objects from one place areappropriated, redefined and repackaged
for deployment as commodities elsewhere.2
In the case of Chaoshan gongfu tea, it ispossible to detect at least three such ‘streams’.
Firstly, within China, gongfu tea modelledon Chaoshan practices has been taken up by
many non-Chaoshan people, particularly inbusiness settings, as a vehicle for interacting
and negotiating with associates. Secondly,in the emergence of contemporary tea
art in Taiwan that began in the 1970s,
a style of drinking adapted from Chaoshansocial relationships through which a distinctive
and valued regional culture is transmitted.
As literary descriptions tell us, gongfu tea isa highly refined way of preparing and drinking
tea, using small teapots, preferably of Yixing
or Chaozhou clay, or porcelain gaiwan, in
which to prepare a very strong brew, mostfrequently of the locally grown, semi-fermented
Fenghuang Dancong (鳳凰單叢) tea. Thisis poured into small cups of around 30 ml
capacity for drinking repeated infusions fromthe same tealeaves. From my observations,preparing and drinking gongfu tea requires
attentiveness to procedural details – to being
jiangjiu (講究) – but this was achieved, notby slavishly following a rigid sequence of steps
as some literary accounts
suggest, but by showing
skill and dexterity. A gongfu
tea-drinking occasion
creates its own tempo.
Regardless of whether theoccasion lasts ten minutes or
two hours, during this time
participants put aside theincessant demands for hastethat punctuate the world
around and appreciate thetea slowly.
For most of my research
participants, drinking
gongfu tea was seen as“part of our lives”. Someparticipants, however, hadchosen to elevate their teaGongfu tea. Creative Commons. Courtesy Cosmin Dordea on Flickr.
drinking to a kind of art.

gongfu tea came to be regarded not as one
among many regional styles in China, but
as Chinese tea art per se.3 Thirdly, outside
China gongfu tea is being promoted as anauthentic, national Chinese ‘tea ceremony’,by implication analogous to the well-known
Japanese tea ceremony, with cultural rootsthat go back to ancient times. This last claim
is bolstered by historically dubious suggestions
that Chaoshan gongfu tea is a modern
manifestation of Tang dynasty tea-drinking
practices as described by Lu Yu in the oldest
extant treatise on tea, the Cha Jing orClassic of Tea. (In fact, gongfu tea almost
certainly originated in the 18th century in
the Wuyi mountain area of Fujian province.)
Where these cultural streams will flow
in future is a question for another day. In themeantime, in at least one region of China,
traditional tea culture continues to enrich
the lives, not just of a privileged cultural elite,
but of people everywhere.
Peter d’Abbs is Professorial Research
Fellow, School of Public Health,
University of Queensland, Australia.
p.dabbs@uq.edu.au		Notes1	d'Abbs, P. 2017. Art as Everyday Practice:
A Study of Gongfu Tea in Chaoshan,
China. Master of Arts with Honours,
University of New England, Armidale, NSW.
2	Appadurai, A. (ed.) 1986. The Social
Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural
Perspective. Cambridge University
Press; Palumbo-Liu, D. & Gumbrecht, H.
(eds) 1997. Streams of Cultural Capital:
Transnational Cultural Studies. Stanford
University Press.
3	Shuenn-Der Yu. 2016. ‘Taiwan and the
Globalization of Puer Tea: The Role of the
Taste of Aging’, Cultural and Religious
Studies 4(5):310-320; doi:10.17265/23282177/2016.05.004

14

The Region

China Connections
Chinese tea and Asian societies

The Global Tea Initiative at UC Davis
Katharine P. Burnett

In 2015, the University of California, Davis
launched the Global Tea Initiative for the
Study of Tea Culture and Science (GTI).
GTI is now transitioning to become the Global
Tea Institute for the Study of Tea Culture
and Science. GTI is committed to producing
tea research with a global perspective andsupporting research on tea from anywherein the world, in any discipline, and with any
methodology.
GTI’s mission is to promote the understanding of Camelia sinensis throughevidence-based research. Its goals are many.
They include fostering knowledge about tea
through colloquia and symposia, lecture series
and workshops, and through the extended

Global Tea Initiative with photograph of Tea Garden
Village, Qinghai. Photograph courtesy of Zhong Zhao,
Green Camel Bell NGO, China.

Regional Editor
Kunbing Xiao

efforts of research and teaching on campus
and through national and international
partnerships and exchange; developing
a curriculum for undergrads and grads,
as well as extramural courses for industry
specialists and the general public. When GTI
becomes an institute, we envision a dedicatedbuilding with tearooms and gardens, exhibition
space for narrating the stories of tea culture
and science around the world, meeting andteaching space, a sensory theater, and more.
Although Camelia sinensis is the primary focus,
GTI scholars acknowledge not only that manythings are consumed as tea, but also many
diverse tea cultures exist around the world.
All merit study.
Students are eager for formal classes
and research opportunities. Some of us are
already making this possible in our homedepartments. This year, seven GTI members
team-taught a trans-disciplinary First Year
Seminar on Global Tea Culture and Science,a course aimed at new students on campus.
This course is providing the basis from which
to build a permanent course on Global Tea

Culture and Science, and then the curricula
on Global Tea Culture and Science. GTI aims
to collaborate and partner with scholars,
research institutes, and the tea industry
nationally and internationally. With its broad
mandate for research and teaching acrossthe disciplines and from a global perspective,
GTI aims to work collegially and flexibly withothers, with an inclusionary attitude.
Katharine P. Burnett Associate Professorof Art History at UC Davis, is Founding
Director of UC Davis’s Global Tea Initiative
for the Study of Tea Culture and Scienceat the University of California, Davis. Her
interdisciplinary research explores how
cultural values are manifested in art, what
it means to collect art, and now also, what
we can learn about cultures and societies
through studying individual and diverse
tea cultures. For more information about
GTI, please contact Katharine Burnett,
kpburnett@ucdavis.edu. To inquire about
supporting the program, please contact
Assistant Dean Charlene A. Mattison,
cmattison@ucdavis.edu

The globalization of Chennian
and Qingxiang
Shuenn-Der Yu

Studying the globalization of ‘aging’(chennian 陳年) and ‘fresh fragrance’(qingxiang 清香) allows us to understandhow Taiwan has influenced the development
or resurgence of Chinese tea art and culture
in recent years. How the flavors known as
chennian and qingxiang were discovered or
created, recognized, and evaluated acrossAsian markets has been the focus of myresearch for the past fifteen years. Few
Taiwanese knew of Pu’er tea before the 1990s;
nonetheless, the fervor for Pu’er emerged in
Taiwan, rather than in Hong Kong where thisaged tea had been stockpiled for decades.
The craze then spread back to Hong Kong,and soon to Guangdong, Yunnan andNortheast Asia.
While Pu’er tea was gaining significancein trade, the high-mountain tea (gaoshancha高山茶) from the tea plantations in the highmountains of Taiwan (established in the late1970s), quickly became Taiwan’s most populartea. Remarkably, the flavor preference
and appreciation rituals in Taiwan had aprofound influence on other kinds of partiallyfermented teas. The popularity of Pu’er andhigh-mountain tea led to the emphasis of
two new flavor categories—chennian for theformer and qingxiang for the latter.
In fact, chennian was a newly defined
taste for Pu’er by Taiwanese tea merchantsand experts in the late 20th century.
The development of chennian revealed
the socio-cultural and historical processes
wherein value was allocated and meaning
was constructed by the tea merchants,
collectors, consumers and the government.
Pu’er tea from Yunnan was first introduced
to Taiwan in the 1970s through Hong Kong,
but this ‘stinky’ tea was not well acceptedby Taiwan’s popular tea culture that highly
appreciated fragrance. Nonetheless, thesophisticated tea art in contemporary Taiwan,
which was advanced by the government
to increase domestic tea consumption,
facilitated the invention of appreciation rituals
and evaluation standards for Pu’er tea. After
years of exploratory research in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, Taiwan tea merchants andexperts established an evaluation scale for
Pu’er tea according to the degree of aging;
the longer preserved Pu’er tea has better
taste and thus has higher value.
In the late 1980s, as the tension between
mainland China and Taiwan started to relax,
Pu’er tea became better recognized andaccepted by the Taiwanese under the ‘China
Fever’ (zhongguo re 中國热). The return ofHong Kong to China in 1997 also accelerated
the growth of the Pu’er tea market in Taiwan;

the Hong Kong tea traders sold off their aged
Pu’er tea to Taiwanese merchants because of
the uncertain future of Hong Kong’s economy.
The Pu’er tea fad was developed in the
mid-1990s in Taiwan, and soon spread to therest of Asia and the world. Today, one aged
tea cake can be sold for as high as 100,000
USD. Along the globalization of the Pu’er tea
products was the legitimization of chennianas the criterion to evaluate Pu’er and otheraged teas. This criterion also had an influenceon the fresh teas; for example, big-tree tea(dashu cha 大树茶) of better leaf quality forpotential aging is preferred in the market.
Qingxiang (fresh fragrance) has a different
story. It has been widely used to describe
the fresh aroma of tea in Taiwan both inhistory and in modern times. However, inthe mid-1990s, qingxiang was adopted todescribe the unique flavor of high-mountaintea to distinguish this newly invented tea from
Oolong tea. This qingxiang flavor partiallydepends on the special materiality of tea
leaves from high altitudes, but mainly is theresult of a deliberate manipulation of the
manufacture process to create a new tea.
Thus, the life history of qingxiang reveals
the co-evolvement of technology to ensure

Tea tasting with double cups (shuangbei pinming 雙杯品茗) were invented when high-mountain tea became
popular in 1980s. Photograph courtesy of Shuenn-Der Yu.

this flavor is consistently produced and wellappreciated. For example, a hot-air witheringmachine was used to counteract the fickle
weather in mountain areas and to stabilize
the chemical reactions; a new utensil (thesniffing cup) and a new style of tea tastingwith double cups (shuangbei pinming 雙杯品茗)were invented to promote this qingxiang
flavor. As qingxiang has become a preferred
taste in Taiwan, it gradually transformed
the flavor, aroma and values of other teas in
Taiwan, as well as in Fujian, Yunnan and North
Vietnam. Teas now tend to go through reduced
fermentation and baking to produce a similar
qingxiang flavor. For instance, Anxi County

in Fujian started to produce the qingxiangstyle variation of Tieguanyin (鐵觀音) called‘green Tieguanyin’. On the other hand, sincehigh-elevation cultivation is considered the
key to achieve the qingxiang flavor, a concept
called ‘mountain-top aroma’, similar to theidea of French terroir, which emphasizes the
micro-environmental ecology and local flavorof teas, has become the predominant factor
in determining the qualities and thus valuesof high-mountain tea.
Shuenn-Der Yu is Research Fellow at
Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica
yusd5644@gate.sinica.edu.tw

Puer tea cakes are being sun dried in Yiwu, the famous Puer tea production/distribution center since the Qing times. Photograph courtesy of Shuenn-Der Yu.

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

China Connections
Chinese tea and Asian societies

Regional Editor
Kunbing Xiao

Chinese and Indian teas andthe history of global capitalism
Andrew B. LiuTea, originating in China and later
widely cultivated in colonial India
and other Asian societies, was oneof the key factors in the creation of a global
market. Tea sales from China spiked after
the 1842 Nanjing Treaty and the attendantcreation of the treaty port system. At thesame time, British colonialists establishedtheir own tea industry in the northeast
Indian territory of Assam. Over the second
half of the century, the Chinese and Indianindustries engaged in a back-and-forthcompetition for consumers in Europe andthe U.S. In both regions, the first systematic
calculations of labor (conducted in thetwentieth century) revealed that eachof the tea industries employed moreworkers than any comparable urban sector
in each country. In short, tea was central
to the creation of modern capitalism
in both regional societies.
Past scholarship has acknowledged
the massive expansion of tea cultivationand production in Asia during this period,
but it has been skeptical whether market
competition actually transformed theeconomic conditions in those regions.

Tea cellar in Ruiquan (瑞泉) Wuyi Rock Tea Factory. This tea cellar was inspired by wine cellars
from western wine culture. Courtesy: Ruiquan Wuyi Rock Tea Museum.

For instance, the China trade relied
upon smallholder peasant households,
and the Indian industry was poweredby an indentured workforce. Historians
have labeled both types of productionas ‘precapitalist’ in nature.
In fact, tea production in Asia wasconstantly evolving and dynamic. Chinesemerchants and British planters introduced
techniques that were recognizably industrial
and modern. For instance, much like theclassic English factories of the industrial
revolution, they increased the scale ofoperations in response to greater demand,

Tea production in southern China
and its political implications during
the Tang and Song Dynasties
Yi ZouThroughout the Tang and Songdynasties (618-1279), the center ofChina’s economy gradually shifted
southwards into the valleys of the Yangtze
and Huai Rivers –a region that is now known
as ‘southern China’. Moreover, a significant
fiscal reform on taxation took place during
the mid-Tang era; the government started
to collect a tea tax, which graduallybecame an important source ofgovernment revenue. This practice
was legitimized in 793 AD througha law imposing a 10 percent tax ontea. Before that, the government only
collected land taxes and commodity
taxes on textiles. This tax reform wasclosely related to the expansion of tea
plantations, as well as changes in the
broader context of economy and politics
during the Tang and Song dynasties.

and relied upon a strategy of hiring primarily
low-wage workers –women and children –in an attempt to save expenses.
But perhaps the most notable instanceof the subtle ‘industrial’ character of ruraltea production in Asia was the way in which
tea plant managers developed systems forrationalizing production through the careful
calculation, measurement, and discipliningof their employees’ working time. This was true
for tea production in both China and India.
For instance, in the Chinese tea districts ofsouthern Anhui (Huizhou), we have manuals
written by merchant and workshop owners

Tea production in China was originallyconcentrated in Sichuan and Yunnan, andexpanded east- and southward to the Yangtze
River during the Northern and Southern
Dynasties. Up to the Tang, tea plantations
had prospered in southern China. Partsof southern China, like the hilly areas insouthern Anhui, had already been known
for tea production during the Tang dynasty.
Historical records show that around 862
AD, 70-80% of the residents in Qimen (祁門)County, Anhui depended on tea cultivation.
During the spring harvest season, merchants
would flock in to purchase tea with silver orsilks, and then sell the tea in other parts ofChina or abroad. During this time, the once
backward hilly areas developed into affluent
counties that contributed abundant taxes.
Local elites, such as the Zheng Chuan (鄭傳)
family, who accumulated enormous wealthfrom tea trading, founded a militia forself-defense during the turmoil in late Tang.

Tang Dynasty. Anonymous: A Palace Concert (Gongyuetu 宮樂圖) Ten court ladies in late Tang Dynasty were sitting around a table and drinking tea.
Courtesy: National Palace Museum (Taiwan).

The Region

15

that use precise calculations to designate
how quickly one should roll and roast tea.
Huizhou factory managers would monitor
working time by lighting incense sticks thatburned at a constant rate. With the sticks asa baseline, the managers rewarded workers
based upon how many pounds of tea they
could process in a given time. Similarly, inthe plantations of Assam, we have recorded
observations that the ‘tea gardens’ in the
remote valleys of the Brahmaputra River set
their clocks differently from the rest of thesurrounding Indian society, a system theycalled ‘Garden Time’. British planters sought
to maximize the amount of daytime spentworking, so they set their clocks backwards
an extra hour such that, in the words of one
account in Bengali: “when the gong strikes
six o’clock, it is not quite (thik na) six o’clock”.
Planters then divided up the day into twelve
equal units of sunlight, in which work was
carefully regulated by the ringing of gongs
and the constant weighing of leaves plucked.
Such examples suggest that instead ofthinking of Chinese and Indian tea as the apexof the traditional, pre-industrial economies
of Asia, we should view the history of tea asa pivotal moment in the history of capitalism,
both within China and India as well as intheir connection to the rest of the world.
Andrew B. Liu is Assistant Professorof History at Villanova University.
His current manuscript examines
the tea-growing districts of coastal
China and eastern India over thecourse of the past two centuries.
aliu01@villanova.edu

Later, the Northern Song dynasty re-unified
the Central Plains, but was confronted withchronic threats from nomadic regimes in thenorth. Tea, as a profitable business and means
to cover the military expenditure necessary
for protection from nomadic groups, became astrategic commodity for the Song government.
Thus, the government continued to adjust
the tea acts (chafa 茶法). It also promoted
a government monopoly on tea to maximize
fiscal revenue and to control the outbound flowof tea products. As a result, the merchants,
who paid a high price for their official tea
licenses (yin 引), armed their caravans toprotect their tea products. At the same time,
the highly lucrative tea business attracted
increasing numbers of armed smugglers
seeking to counter the government monopoly.
Consequently, local militias organized by
the tea giants appeared in provinces suchas Hubei, Jiangxi, and Anhui. Later, during
the north-and-south military confrontation
between the Great Jin and the Southern Songdynasty, these local militias played active roles
to guard their own properties. When the Yuan
dynasty replaced the Song, the government
appointed the surrendering militia leaders torule their own regions. For example, Wang
Yunlong (汪雲龍) from Wuyuan (婺源) County,
Anhui, was appointed as a local administrator,and his offspring inherited his authority to
manage tea taxes in Anhui and Jiangxi.
This historical vignette indicates thattea production and trade advanced thedevelopment of the hilly areas in southern
China during the Tang and Song dynasties,
turning infertile counties into prominent
tax contributors. The loose control of thegovernment over these originally barren
and backward areas facilitated the growthof local forces in the new prosperous era oftea. However, as the government quickly
became aware of the financial and strategic
significance of tea, it extended central
administration into these areas. Despite theinitial interdependence between the central
and the local forces, the government eventuallyabsorbed the local forces and gained control
over lucrative and strategic tea resources.
Yi Zou is associate professor of the Centerfor Historical Geographical Studies, Fudan
University, China. His research interests
are Chinese traditional rural society andmodern urban development. This research
was financially supported by Program of
the National Social Science Fund of China(No. 16BZS125). cnzouyi@126.com

16

The Region

News from Southeast Asia
Excavating Singapore

Regional Editor
Terence Chong

ISEAS@

Unity
Through
Understanding

2018 marks the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s
50th anniversary. Initiated in 1968 by thenDeputy Prime Minister Goh Keng Swee,
ISEAS has since been dedicated to researchand scholarship on Southeast Asia.

I

SEAS-Yusof Ishak’s Archaeology
Unit (AU) was formed in 2010. It is the
only dedicated archaeology centrein Singapore committed to the promotionof archaeology in the country andSoutheast Asia. AU not only conducts
annual archaeological Field Schools
in the Southeast Asian region for students
but also collaborates closely with local
agencies on excavations, archaeologicalsurveys and post-excavation work. Localarchaeologists have been excavatingin post-independent Singapore since1984. Approximately 30 sites havebeen examined since. Archaeology
in Singapore can be chronologicallyorganised into several periods.

Terence Chong

Singapore is a densely packed urban city not immediately associatedwith archaeology. However, there has been a surge in archaeologicalactivities on the island in recent years, especially around the historical
downtown Civic District. This flood of activities has been the resultof growing public interest in the country’s heritage and history.
Globalisation and immigration have raised public priority over local
and national identities, leading to greater attention to stories, artefacts
and research that help Singaporeans understand who they are andwhere they come from.

Firstly the Neolithic Period (New Stone Age)(from approx. 10,200BC). In the 1930s, British
archaeologists based at Singapore’s Raffles
Museum reported the existence of Neolithic
stone tools and implements at Tanjong
Karang (near Tuas) and on Pulau Ubin.
No excavations were conducted in Singapore,but a brief excavation at Tanjong Bungah on
the Johor side of the Tebrau Straits (known
as the Johor Straits from the 1890s) revealed
a well-preserved site with stone tools related
to those found in Sumatra, but different
from those found in the Malay Peninsula.
Secondly, the Temasek / Singapura Period(1300-1700 CE). Excavations since 1984 haverevealed large amounts of artefacts datingfrom the Temasek period. The archaeological

Archiving archaeological materials:
whose responsibility is it?
Lim Chen SianA

rchaeologists are portrayed in
popular imagination as individuals
with dirt-caked brows, hunched overin a trench, patiently digging away the
sediments, revealing marvels from thepast. While true to an extent, excavation
is nonetheless only one characteristicof the discipline. Beyond the excavation isa long-drawn sequence of processes thatarchaeologists grapple with behind-thescenes: cleaning, sorting, conserving,illustrating, photographing, cataloguingand studying the finds. As a custodian of
the past, the archaeologist bears a heavy
responsibility in caring for and maintainingarchaeological collections. However, thearchiving and curatorship of archaeologicalartefacts is a frequently overlooked aspectof the archaeological progress.
In the UK, archaeologists have theethical and professional duty to ensure thatthe archaeological collection is looked after
for posterity. In Singapore, the ownership ofarchaeological finds is unclear. There is nolaw addressing any antiquities recoveredfrom either archaeological excavations
or by chance. As such, there is no agency
or institution in Singapore that serves asa central depository for archaeologicalmaterials. While select museums under
the National Heritage Board (NHB) may
occasionally accept a few items for exhibition
purposes, these institutions hesitate overreceiving the complete archaeological

Excavating
Singaporeassemblage from an excavation project.
Understandably, these institutions also
do not have the necessary archaeologicalstaff to handle and curate the collection.
All this presents a conundrum for archaeologists in the country, as for the last three
decades archaeologists have taken it uponthemselves to look after the excavatedmaterials, and this archive has grownover the years. Presently, the ISEAS-Yusof
Ishak Institute (ISEAS) has in its custody
approximately 6 tons of artefacts fromexcavations dating back to 2004. Separately,
another principal collection is held at the
National University of Singapore.
In an attempt to answer the query of‘whose responsibility is it?’ a dialogue on
the future of the archaeological collectioncommenced with an ISEAS-NHB workshop
on Archiving Archaeological Materials
in late 2014, where heritage practitioners
and archaeology specialists from the UK
and Singapore debated and discussed theneed for an archaeological archive. The
workshop surmised that archaeologists andheritage institutions in Singapore all havea role to play in determining the fate of thearchaeological collection or archive. In theimmediate future, archaeologists as domain
specialists will need to lead the way todevelop the archiving protocols for Singapore.
In the longer term, legislation addressing theownership of antiquities, and the delegationof responsibility for their upkeep and care
will need to be determined.

evidence challenged past perceptions thatthe island’s historical narrative only began with
the British establishment of a trading stationin 1819, and pushed back the historical timeline
to approximately 1300CE.
Thirdly, the Colonial Period (1819 -1959).
Some 11 sites specific to the colonial period
have been excavated. The artefacts uncovered
have provided insights into hitherto unknown
social practices and cultural behaviour of
everyday people. These practices and behaviour
were simply not documented in official historical
records. We also know little about the lives ofthe local population during Singapore’s earlyyears as an East India Company settlement
or the daily routine of soldiers during theBattle for Singapore in 1942.

Meanwhile, at the NSC Archaeology Unit,
the future is in the making. Since 2014, there
have been post-excavation and collection
management initiatives to demonstratethat archaeological archives are vital forboth academic research and to safeguard
a national collection for future researchers.
With the provision of adequate resources
and funding, the Archaeology Unit has plans
to catalogue and care for the materials
from excavations at the National Gallery
Singapore, Victoria Concert Hall, Empress
Place and other sites by 2024. This ambition
is coupled with the production of useful
research from the collection, including
rolling out the publication of site reports
as part of the documentary archive.
All this is contingent on the availabilityof adequate resources and funding. ISEAS
looks forward to working closely withheritage agencies to collectively preserve
the country’s archaeological collection.

Finally, the Contemporary Period (1959present). Singapore’s frantic pace of industrialisation and urbanisation has resulted in only
a few pristine sites left for archaeological study.
These remaining sites feature the vestiges froma rural agricultural community. They also showcase the industrialisation period through brickworks and early post-war housing settlements.
All of these sites present potential for archaeological research into the lifeworlds of ourforbearers from the not too distant past.
The following articles are a sample of theresearch AU is conducting.
Terence Chong is Senior Fellow & Deputy
Director, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute;
Regional Editor of 'News from Southeast
Asia' terencechong@iseas.edu.sg

A version of this article was firstpublished in NSC Highlights Issue #7(Dec 2017 –Feb 2018).
Papers from the 2014 ISEAS-NHB workshop
Archiving Archaeological Materials are
now published and available for download
on https://tinyurl.com/auseries as NSC
Archaeology Unit ‘Archaeology Report
Series No. 7’.
Lim Chen Sian is an Associate Fellowof the Nalanda-Sriwijaya Centre(ISEAS –Yusof Ishak Institute).
His interests include the archaeology
of colonial period (post-European
contact) in Southeast Asia; material
culture trends over the past millennium;
settlement development; archaeologicallegislation; and public archaeology.
The archaeological investigations at the
National Art Gallery site (former Supreme
Court and City Hall) in Singapore isjust one of many projects he is working
on this year. chensian@iseas.edu.sg

Artefact storage at the NSC Archaeology Unit, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. (Credit: Aaron Kao)The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

News from Southeast Asia
Excavating Singapore

Regional Editor
Terence Chong

The Region

17

Pulau Ubin Anti-Motor
Torpedo Boat Battery:the gun that never was
Aaron Kao

Fig. 2: Gun floor consisting of overhead concrete canopy, gunner’s platform,and holdfast bolts for a twin 6-pounder gun. (Credit: Young Wei Ping)

Fig. 1: Pulau Ubin AMTB battery gun no. 1. Above: Plan view cross section.
Below: West elevation cross section. (Credit: Aaron Kao)The National Parks Board and the NSC
Archaeology Unit recently launcheda research collaboration to investigate
the archaeological significance of Pulau
Ubin island, located northeast of the main
Singapore island. The archaeology teamwould conduct surveys and excavations
on the island over a span of 18 months. In
December 2017, the team completed its first
field season by evaluating and recording
the remains of the Anti-Motor Torpedo
Boat (AMTB) military structures. While thedocumentation has been completed, archival
research and analysis are still ongoing tointerpret the past use of the site.
Kampong Bahru is a 21m knoll situated
immediately west of Sungei Mamam creek
along the central northern shoreline of Pulau
Ubin. During the Second World War, it was
the site of a coastal artillery emplacement
designed for two twin 6-pounder guns.
These guns were termed AMTB equipment,
and typically emplaced near the entranceof harbours in two or one gun configuration.
The Pulau Ubin AMTB battery formed partof the Changi Fire Command – a networkof coast artillery batteries placed to protect
the eastern part of Singapore; specifically,
the waterway leading into the Royal Navybase at Sembawang.
The first production batch of twin
6-pounders at the Woolwich OrdnanceFactory, UK, were sent to Singapore in 1937.
They armed several emplacements in Changi,
Pulau Tekong, and Keppel Harbour. However,
it is unclear whether the guns for Pulau Ubin
arrived in time to see any action. As a result,the emplacements remain in relatively goodcondition as it did not suffer from direct
enemy fire, and demolition by the retreating
British Army. Part of the research at the Ubin
AMTB was to examine whether any guns wereever emplaced at the battery.
The two gun emplacements of the AMTB
were similar in layout (see fig. 1 ). The central
gun floor area was flanked on the east side by
the magazine, and on the west side by a crew
shelter and artillery store. Both emplacements
were built eight meters apart in a staggered
formation on a terraced slope approximately
mid-way on the knoll, and facing northeast.
Gun no. 1 (see fig. 2) was the first emplacementfrom the east. Entry into the emplacement wason the west via a corridor situated between thecrew shelter and artillery store. Behind each
emplacement, stood a two storey (gun no.1)
and three storey (gun no.2) battery observation
post (BOP) tower. This structure housed
equipment and men to command the guns,
engines, and searchlights.
In addition to the gun emplacements, thebattery also consisted of ancillary buildingssuch as barracks, toilets, cookhouse, engine
room, oil store, storerooms, water pumping
station, and searchlight emplacements.
They were all built in a compact locationon the knoll. A jetty located west of the gun
emplacements also served the establishment.
The barracks, toilets, and cookhouse havesince been demolished. The engine roomand oil store were located together on thesouth-eastern foot of the knoll, out of view
from an attacking enemy ship. Both were
simple rectangle concrete structures withflat roofs. Approximately 300m downhill

Fig. 3: One of the DEL emplacements featuring steel reinforced shuttered concrete
construction to protect the searchlight equipment and crew. (Credit: Aaron Kao)

from the northeast corner of gun no.1, andat the water’s edge, were three DEL (defence
electric light) emplacements (see fig. 3).
These concrete structures house fixed beamelectric searchlights powerful enough to light
up a section of the waterway. These would
have allowed the guns to engage intruders
at night or in low light conditions.
Although it is unclear if the guns were
installed in time for the Japanese invasion,
it is evident that the battery was used tosome extent. Electrical fittings and otherdebris observed in one DEL emplacement
seem to suggest the occupation of equipment.
A telephone communication switchboard wasprobably installed in gun no.1’s BOP as marks
and fittings on the wall indicated so. An engine
was in use for a period of time as the ceilingsof the engine room were heavily covered
in soot. It may be possible that a temporary
arrangement was placed pending the arrivalof the guns. More research is now being
conducted to establish the activities of the site.
This AMTB battery was significant withinboth local and national context. It marked
the technological evolution of coastal artillery
in the British Army that started in the 16th
century in Britain, and early 19th century
in Singapore. If we were to discount British
association, the nearby 17th century Johor
Lama kingdom located along Sungei Johore
just across the straits had fought coastal
battles with the Portuguese and Acehneseby employing a wide array of coastal artillery
as a part of its defences. The Ubin battery
serves as an interesting evolutionary study
in this related field of warfare and coastal
defences in Southeast Asia.

The substantial remains of the Ubinbattery make the site rare as many othercoastal artillery gun batteries weredestroyed during the war or demolished tomake way for development. This surviving
specimen remains relatively intact andlegible. The battery also formed the larger
military landscape of fixed defences thatwas unique to Southeast Asia. Singapore
was after all the most heavily armed colony
within the British Empire in terms of coastal
artillery. At a local level, the Pulau Ubindocumentation project would complement
available information regarding thesubsistence and lifeways at Kampong
Bahru. It would help to answer questions
such as whether the militarisation of
Kampong Bahru affected or benefited the
local community. Despite the shortcomingsof the British Army in 1942, the coastal
batteries did deter a Japanese seaborne
assault, and fulfilled the role it was
designed to do.

This article can be found in NSC
Highlights Issue #8 (March–May 2018).
Aaron Kao is a Research Officer at
the Archaeology Unit, NSC, ISEAS –Yusof Ishak Institute, and a memberof the Pulau Ubin project. He received
his BA from the Royal Melbourne
Institute of Technology and has
a keen interest in pottery analysis
and military history. As a part of the
AU team he has excavated manysites in Singapore and Cambodia.
aaron_kao@iseas.edu.sg

18

The Region

News from Southeast Asia
Excavating Singapore

Regional Editor
Terence Chong

The decorated earthenware fromthe National Gallery Singapore site
Aaron KaoE

arthenware decorations areunderexplored in Southeast Asia.
This makes the earthenware discoveredat the site of the National Gallery Singapore(NGS) in 2009 all the more exciting. These
artefacts, weighing about 32 kilograms,
were one of the largest haul of ceramic fromthe site. By identifying the different typesof decoration, production techniques,
and socio-cultural representations, these
artefacts allow archaeologists to makeinferences into the lifeways of these
inhabitants of 14th century Singapore.

Most of the earthenware found in NGS
were low-fired (400 to 900 degrees Celsius)
clay vessels and likely served as utilitarian
receptacles for cooking and storage
purposes, and possibly as religious
paraphernalia. Found mainly in the 14th
century Temasek context, their widespread
distribution at nine other nearby sitesaround NGS in the downtown Civil Districtof Singapore suggests that they played
an important role in day-to-day activities.
One primary goal of my research is toform a classification typology. This is usefulas a data set for inter-site comparisons
which enable archaeologists to examine
the evolution of pottery making cultures,and how it relates to socio-culturalinteractions. Four attributes were used
to form this classification typology.
The first –‘Surface treatment’ –describes
the physical qualities of the ornamentationand the type of intervention carried out
by the potter on the surface of the clay.
Within the archaeological context,
decorations on earthenware are formsof ‘surface enhancements’ applied to thesurface of the pottery during various stagesof its production. This is done to amplify
the appearance or functionality of the pot.
To archaeologists, these can be important
indicators of individual or group behavioural
patterns such as artistic expression, cultural
identity and beliefs, or simply as a formof maker’s mark or ergonomic feature.
A sample set of 585 pieces weighing 2,564
grams was analysed. The sample size mass
is approximately 8% of the total earthenware
assemblage. At NGS, an overwhelming
88% of the earthenware decorations were
physically recessed. In other words, themajority of techniques used involved a degreeof penetration and displacement of the moist
clay (fig. 1). The remainder portion consistedof relief features created by adding (appliqué)and shaping the clay by hand. These areconsidered rare.
‘Operational action’, the second attribute,
investigates the random tool or finger
marks left behind by the potter(s). Thesephysical gestures indicate the type of motor
performance associated with production
techniques (fig. 2). At NGS, impressing andincising were the most common action at
52% and 38% respectively. They were also
responsible for all recessed decorations. The
third attribute, ‘decoration’, is a descriptionof the tool used and its related ‘operational
action’. For example, out of a total of 23 typesof decorations identified, carved-paddleimpressing (fig. 4) accounted for 46%. Thisparticular tool is a hand held wooden paddle
with a carved design on its working surface(s).
It is struck repetitively around the surfaceof the pot, in unison with a supporting anvil
held within the vessel. A textured imprint
is normally produced (fig. 1). The second
most numerous type of decoration is broadly
incised concentric grooves found on therims of the vessels. These range from one
to five groove configurations. The remaining
decorations are varied and uncommon.
These included different forms of impressing,such as paddles that were bound witha variety of textured organic materials,
stamping with an intricately carved tool
(fig. 3), and puncture marks created witha single-point or dentate-tipped implement.
These tools resembling a comb were also
used to incise parallel lines (fig. 2).
The fourth attribute, ‘motif’, describes
the primary visual elements of a decoration.
A diverse assemblage of 75 motifs was
identified at NGS, with most of theseoccurring as complex or simple geometric
designs within the carved-paddle-impressedcategory. Common visual elements usedconsist of triangles, squares, zigzag andcurvilinear lines, circles, and parallel dashes(fig. 4). Complex geometric designs arecomposed of hachured triangles laid inan alternating or linear configuration,
herringbone pattern, and repetitive rectilinear
spirals. Variations within these motifs areevident, which indicate that some potters
might have shared a non-rigid expressionof similar beliefs. Incised decorations areless elaborate, featuring borderlines, orunidentifiable curvilinear patterns. Appliquédesigns are mostly plain bands going aroundthe vessel but rare organic forms werealso encountered.
The distribution of archaeological materials
at NGS suggested that small households
probably occupied the site. This would
indicate the type of domestic environment
in which this heterogeneous assemblageof decorations would have high visibility.
The high frequency of geometric motifs
produced by carve-paddle-impressing
appears to place the pottery tradition foundat NGS in context with the Bau-Malay pottery
tradition hypothesised by Wilhelm G Solheim
II. Solheim believed that this tradition could
have formed as early as 1000 BCE, with strong
similarities with the geometric pottery foundin Southeastern China. It is believed that thisparticular pottery tradition occurred as early
as 3,000 to 2,500 BCE. Although it is not clear
if these decorations share the same meanings
as those found at NGS, the antiquity of thisform of aesthetic expression is apparent.

Fig. 1.
Impressed decoration
displaying signs ofclay penetration anddisplacement.

Fig. 2.
Dentate-tool incised
decoration. Different
types of rotary action
and accidental tool
marks can be seenon the surface of thispotsherd.

Fig. 3.
Intricately stamped
curvilinear scroll motif.

Fig. 4.
This complex carvedpaddle-impressed
decoration is composedof a variety of visualelements.

A version of this article was firstpublished in NSC Highlights Issue #7(Dec 2017 – Feb 2018)
Aaron Kao is a Research Officer at theArchaeology Unit, NSC, ISEAS –Yusof Ishak
Institute, and a member of the Pulau Ubin
project. He received his BA from the Royal
Melbourne Institute of Technology andhas a keen interest in pottery analysis andmilitary history. As a part of the AU teamhe has excavated many sites in Singapore
and Cambodia. aaron_kao@iseas.edu.sg

scale

0

1

2

3

cm

All images: Aaron Kao.

New titles from
ISEAS publishing
ISEAS Publishing is a dynamic presswith more than forty years’ experience.
It is the largest publisher of academic
books that focuses on Southeast Asianpolitics, economics, and social issues.
As a Unit of the ISEAS –Yusof Ishak
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worldwide.’
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Records, Recoveries,
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Vietnam’s Foreign
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The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

News from Australia and the Pacific
Human rights practices in Southeast Asia

Regional Editors
Ana Dragojlovic, Edwin Jurriëns
and Andy Fuller

Human rights practices
in Southeast Asia

The Region

19

The Asia Institute

For News from Australia and the Pacific, we ask contributors to reflect on their own
research interests and the broader academic field in Australia and the Pacific of which it
is a part. We focus on current, recent or upcoming projects, books, articles, conferences
and teaching, while identifying related interests and activities of fellow academics in thefield. Our contributions aim to give a broad overview of Asia-related studies in Australia
and beyond, and to highlight exciting intellectual debates on and with Asia in the region.
Our preferred style is subjective and conversational. Rather than offering fully-fledged
research reports, our contributions give insight into the motivations behind and directionsof various types of conversations between Asia and the region. In the current issue,
we highlight the topic of Human Rights Practices in Southeast Asia. We would like toacknowledge Ken Setiawan's invaluable support for this collection of essays.

The Asia Institute is The University of
Melbourne’s key centre for studies in
Asian languages, cultures and societies.
Asia Institute academic staff have an arrayof research interests and specialisations,and strive to provide leadership in the studyof the intellectual, legal, politico-economic,
cultural and religious traditions andtransformations of Asia and the Islamic
world. The Institute is committed tocommunity engagement and offers
a dynamic program of academic andcommunity-focused events and cultural
exchanges that aim to promotedialogue and debate.

Articles are edited by Ana Dragojlovic ana.dragojlovic@unimelb.edu.au and Edwin Jurriëns
edwin.jurriens@unimelb.edu.au, with assistance from Andy Fuller fuller.a@unimelb.edu.au,from the Asia Institute in Melbourne arts.unimelb.edu.au/asiainstituteWriting against impunity and state
violence in Thailand
Tyrell Haberkorn“What does it mean
to protest suffering,as distinct fromacknowledging it?”
Susan Sontag1

S

ince completing my PhD in 2007,
Sontag’s question has frequently
recurred as I have worked to becomea scholar-activist who divides her time
between the present and the recent past,
and among reading in archives and libraries,
observing human rights court cases, andtranslating accounts of state violence.
The inspiration for my work primarily comesfrom outside the academy: writers like Sontag
who make human rights violations accessible
to a broad public, human rights workers
creating knowledge that challenges thesilences and elisions present in dominant statenarratives, and survivors of rights violations
who dare to speak out despite the risks
they face. My work as a scholar grounds
my activism in rigour and activism in turnreminds me of the urgency of putting
knowledge to work in the service of justice.

Since 1997, my work has been basedin Thailand. Since the end of the absolutemonarchy in 1932, through twelve ‘successful’(meaning that power was seized) coups andseven failed coups, democracy and justice
have remained largely elusive. My latest
project, a book and a series of articles on
impunity in Thailand grew out of academicactivist crossings.2 In 2011, I observed an
Appeal Court ruling in Bangkok in which
Suderueman Maleh, who had submitted
a complaint of being tortured by a police
officer while in custody, was sentenced to two
years in prison for doing so.3 Suderueman’sconviction, for the alleged crime of providing
false testimony as a state official, laid barethe many layers of protection for perpetratorsof state violence. It was not enough that hewas tortured and his torturer was exonerated:
Suderueman was further persecuted for
daring to speak out. To understand how

and why, I decided to trace the historyof impunity in Thailand.
While doing so, I was based in the
Department of Political and Social Change(PSC) at the Australian National University(ANU), which I joined in 2009. PSC is acollection of political scientists, sociologists,
anthropologists, and historians working
on questions of political transformation
across East, South, and Southeast Asia. Theinterdisciplinary and comparative breadthpresent inspired me to approach impunityfrom the perspectives of law –namely how
law facilitates rather than prevents impunity–and politics, specifically how impunity
contributes to state-building, as wellas across time. My work greatly benefitted
from conversations with colleagues working
on the rule of law, and its opposites, andthe challenges of ending authoritarianism.4

Witnessing impunity
Beginning with the end of the absolutemonarchy on 24 June 1932 and ending
with the coup by the National Council for
Peace and Order (NCPO) on 22 May 2014,
I asked, what does the history of a nation
look like when told from the perspective of
citizens whose rights are violated, rather
than that of the victorious and powerfulleaders? My research found that Thai
citizens have experienced a range of formsof extrajudicial violence at the hands of state
officials, including torture, disappearance,
assassination, and massacre, across regimes
both dicta-torial and democratic. In nearly
all cases, state officials have escaped
sanction and accountability. This impunity
has been produced and sustained throughthe unwillingness of state officials to findtheir colleagues responsible, the intimidationof victims of violence and other citizens, andweak legal and other institutional structures.
Impunity takes place in public and ispedagogical and meant to be witnessed,from the instance of state violence to theevasion of accountability and finallyto the creation of evidence about it.
The most surprising lesson I learned
while researching impunity led to thetitle of my latest book: state violence
and impunity take place in full public
view. My expectation was that finding

Supreme court of Thailand, Bangkok. Photo Wikimedia.

evidence would be difficult. Instead,I mined archival and other publicly-available
state documents, newspaper articles,
memoirs of civil servants and victims of state
violence, and court observation to reveal
a history of impunity. Many of the violent
events I write about have been previously
unexamined or overlooked, but the primaryreason is not a sheer lack of information.
The events, as well as the evidence ofviolence, are in plain sight.
22 May 2018 marked the fourth anniversaryof the NCPO being in power. Like the previous
eleven ‘successful’ coups, the leaders of
the NCPO are bold in their violation of thepeoples’ rights because they do not fear
being held to account.

Fighting for justice
But the history of impunity in Thailand
also contains fragments of justice. In 2015,
the Supreme Court exonerated Suderueman
for exercising his right to call for accountability as a survivor of torture.5 Citizens
continue to protest the NCPO, even though
they risk prison terms for doing so as theregime has outlawed public assembly andcasts all criticism as sedition. After writing
about impunity for the last seven years,
I am now turning to what may be its opposite.
I ask how, why, and with what possible effectdoes opposition to dictatorship emerge?
To understand how to remake society anew
after dictatorship is an urgent corollary
to understanding how dictatorships cometo power again and again, for us ashumans as well as scholars.

Tyrell Haberkorn is an Associate
Professor of Asian Languages andCultures, University of Wisconsin-Madison(as of January 2018). She is the authorof Revolution Interrupted: Farmers,
Students, Law and Violence in Northern
Thailand (University of Wisconsin Press,2011), In Plain Sight: Human Impunityand Human Rights in Thailand (Universityof Wisconsin Press, 2018), and articles
and translations in Journal of AsianStudies, Critical Asian Studies, positions:asia critique, Dissent, Foreign Affairs,
and Prachatai. She can be reachedat tyrell.haberkorn@wisc.edu
		Notes
1	Sontag, S. 2003. Regarding the Painof Others. New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, p.40.
2	Haberkorn, T. 2018. In Plain Sight:
Impunity and Human Rights in Thailand.
University of Wisconsin Press.
3	Asian Human Rights Commission,
11 August 2011, ‘Thailand: Court
demonstrates contempt for humanrights by jailing torture victim on
say-so of alleged perpetrator’;https://tinyurl.com/ahrc100811
4	See, for example, Cheesman, N. 2015.
Opposing the Rule of Law: How
Myanmar’s courts make law and order.
Cambridge University Press; and Aspinall,
E. 2005. Opposing Suharto: Compromise,
Resistance, and Regime Change inIndonesia. Stanford University Press.
5	Prachatai, 13 October 2015,‘Supreme Court rejects charges related
to Deep South torture allegations’;
https://prachatai.com/english/node/5538

20

The Region

News from Australia and the Pacific
Human rights practices in Southeast Asia

Regional Editors
Ana Dragojlovic, Edwin Jurriëns
and Andy Fuller

Reparations of the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia:
a brief update
Rachel HughesS

ome refer to a ‘cultural renaissance’
as being underway in Cambodia,
even as recent events in the politicalsphere have troubled many. The arts —film,
dance, music, theatre, drawing, sculpture
and literature —are increasingly prominent
mediums for education and intergenerational
dialogue in the country, as well as, forfinding some satisfaction and peace forvictim-survivors.
The morning sky is clear and the pale
grey cattle pass by the classroom building.
Some eighty senior students of Kampong
Chhnang High School wait inside for a show
to begin. An actor suddenly appears at thedoor. She is dressed in a school uniform liketheirs but carries a drawing in one hand andwhat appears to be a turtle in another –itshead firmly tucked inside its shell. This isa performance of ‘Courageous Turtle’, a
two-actor play written by Sokyou Chea anddirected by Soung Sopheak that is currently
touring Cambodia. One of the suggestionsof the play is that we can learn from turtles:“only if you stick your neck out [do] you
make progress!”. It uses humour, pathos andaudience participation to play out situationsof control and resistance, and stories ofsuffering, care, worry, longing and loss.
Relationships from the past and present –between students, family members and cadre–provoke attention to the nature of action,
repercussion and courage. The official aimof the play is to promote historical awarenessand civil courage in Cambodia by reference
to the Khmer Rouge regime.1
After watching the play, students listen
to one or more victim-survivors from theirlocal area speak about living under Khmer
Rouge rule. In Kampong Chhnang, many
had questions for their elder after she spoke
about her experiences. It is estimated that,by the end of 2017, 150 civil parties andover 10,000 students had seen the playand engaged in intergenerational dialogue
following the performance.2

Reparation projects
The Courageous Turtle is one of nearly
thirty reparation projects either recognised
or currently awaiting recognition by
Cambodia’s internationalised Khmer Rougetribunal. The Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) is a hybridinternational criminal tribunal currently
underway in Cambodia. It aims to bringthose most responsible for crimes committed
in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979 tojustice. One important development of theCambodian tribunal is to allow some victimsurvivors to directly participate as parties in
the cases against former Khmer Rouge. These
participating victims are known as civil parties
and they assist the Prosecution and may
claim for reparations.

Photo: Rachel Hughes

Ven Keana (left) and Sum Monykeo (right) perform the play ‘The Courageous Turtle’. photo: Rachel Hughes

ECCC Case 002/01 was completed
in 2016, resulting in the conviction of twoformer senior Khmer Rouge, Khieu Samphan
and Noun Chea. As part of this case, someeleven reparations have been implemented,
including permanent and mobile exhibitions,the publication and distribution of the casejudgement, a memorial, published testimonies
and testimonial therapy and curriculum
resources.
For Case 002/02, whose closing
statements I observed in June 2017,
fourteen funded projects are currently being
considered by the three Cambodian and
two international Trial Chamber judges.
Recognition of these projects is expected(as part of the larger judgement) in the third
quarter of 2018. These additional fourteen
reparations include the play discussed above,
as well as a legal archive, dance performance,storybook, graphic novel, song-writing
competition, and an internet-enabled app
for learning Khmer Rouge history. Most of
the reparations are either already completed
or well underway; their recognition by thetribunal will be largely retrospective.
All these reparation projects – in theirdevelopment, resolution and implementation–have involved donors, partner organisationsand victims themselves. Many long-standing
Cambodian NGOs have helped to develop
and implement these projects as partnerorganisations. As well as involving civilsociety, two initiatives have been madepossible by the Cambodian government,
while other government Ministries –especially
the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport –have lent their support to the work of partnerorganisations on other reparations.

The politics of reparation
In my research, I am interested in how
these reparations have come about. Existing
relationships and complex negotiations meanthat these initiatives are all in some way
political. I am also asking: when, where andfor whom is this redress? What is the natureof these reparations, what is their spatial andtemporal extent? And what is the relationshipbetween these reparations and other pastand present-day memory work in Cambodia?
How do the current activities and events
arise out of, or directly contest, these otherways of working with the past?
Many of the ECCC reparations have been
funded by the German state, while threeprojects share a large pool of European Union
funding. This is not a politically neutral arena;rather, memory work is seen as a means toaccess a new funding stream by both existingand new organisations. As many of theseorganisations are headed by overseas-bornor educated Cambodians who have returned
home from the diaspora, the ‘geography ofjustice’ of the ECCC extends not only inside
but beyond Cambodia’s national borders.
Most of the reparations are creative artsbased projects, adding to an increased roleof art and art practice in public dialogue
about the past in Cambodia. One of the
expected effects of the ECCC reparations isgreater cross-cultural and intergenerational
dialogue at an interpersonal level. New formsof scholarly or larger-scale historical
dialogue, and renovation or contestationof prior political cultures of memory,is also observable.
Many reparations are based in, or travelling
into, provincial areas, to places otherwise
distanced by rural-urban inequality. In many
ways, and perhaps not surprisingly, these‘projects’ are a continuation of memory work,or historical dialogue, that has been ongoingfor decades. This memory work was central
to building political legitimacy throughout
the country in the post-Khmer Rouge period.

ChangeBetween my visits to Cambodia in
June 2017 for the final hearings of Case002/02 and January 2018, there werea few important changes. One change
was increased uncertainty and cynicism
amongst Cambodians and civil society
actors. Researchers and NGO staff were
worried about the viability of their ongoing
work, many quietly despairing of politicaldebate. With the arrest and detention of
the politician Kem Sohka, and the forced
closure of the well-known independent
newspaper The Cambodia Daily, manyin Cambodia are concerned about
the future.
Another change was the relative quiet
at the ECCC, with no more Trial Chamber
hearings for now. As the judges deliberate
Case 002/02, reparation activities continue
elsewhere. On tour with the Courageous
Turtle, at a new memorial installation site,
and in the rooms of the new Legal
Documentation Centre, the legacies of the
ECCC are only just emerging. In the wordsof Prim Phloeun, Executive Director of
Cambodia Living Arts:[the process of] finding justice has used
the arts [because] you have to recreate
and reimagine what was the past andhow can we also tell those stories, but ina way that […] is about creating dreams,
creating a future, creating somethingthat people can relate to.
Rachel Hughes is a Senior Research
Fellow in the School of Geography
at the University of Melbourne.
Her interests include the politics andgeopolitics of the memorialisationof the Khmer Rouge regime, andthe social and political legacies of
the current Khmer Rouge Tribunal(the Extraordinary Chambersin the Courts of Cambodia).
hughesr@unimelb.edu.au		Notes1	ECCC Civil Party Lead Co Lawyers’
final claim for reparation in Case002/02 (Doc. No. E457 6 2 1) p. 12.
2	Ibid.

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

News from Australia and the Pacific
Human rights practices in Southeast Asia

Fighting impunity through family
stories: photography and Indonesia’s1965 killings

Regional Editors
Ana Dragojlovic, Edwin Jurriëns
and Andy Fuller

The Region

21

Titik Awal (Starting Point) depicts Luweng Grubug, a vertical cavein Wonosari, central Java. Between November 1965 and January 1966,
1500 members of the Indonesian Communist Party and its affiliateorganisations were killed here. Image reproduced courtesy of the artist,
Rangga Purbaya.

Ken SetiawanTwenty years since the end of
authoritarianism in Indonesia, justicefor the crimes committed during theregime of President Suharto (1966-1998)
remains elusive. One example is thatof the 1965-1966 mass violence, during
which approximately 500,000 Indonesiancommunists and members of affiliatedorganisations were killed. Another million
were arrested and detained for lengthy
periods of time, mostly without trial. These
events were at the basis of the rise of theauthoritarian regime; as such addressing
this particular case is important to clearly
break with the past.
While in the early years of democratisation Indonesia embarked on a processof significant legal and political reforms,
including in the area of human rights andjustice for past crimes, those responsible forpast crimes have in general not been held toaccount. Therefore, the country has not beenable to break with the culture of impunity
instilled during the authoritarian regime.
My doctoral research on the Indonesian
Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM)
revealed a number of reasons that explain
the organisation’s limited effectiveness,
which are also relevant to the broader
challenges of human rights reform in the
country. These include shortcomings inlegal drafting, a lack of political will andthe ongoing influence of powerful elites
opposed to the pursuit of justice.1

The role of photography
As a postdoctoral fellow at The Universityof Melbourne, I have continued my researchon the dynamics of human rights incontemporary Indonesia. One of the mostworrying trends of recent years is therising intolerance against minority groups.
A particularly striking example of suchincreased pressures is that in September
2018, the police – giving into demands ofIslamist groups – broke up an event at oneof the country’s most renowned human rights
organisations, the Legal Aid Foundation(LBH) in Jakarta.
The attack on the LBH illustrates both theIndonesian government’s failure to resolve
past human rights abuses and the limitedsocial support for justice endeavours. In thespecific context of the 1965-1966 violence
this is, amongst others, caused by the fear ofcommunism that was instilled into Indonesiansociety by the Suharto regime. Twenty years
on, these “ghosts of 1965”2 remain a powerfultool to counter progressive groups. In thissituation of increased illiberalism, there is an
important role to play by civil society actors
in raising awareness on human rights issues.
At the same time, this task is also fraught withdifficulties, including how to prevent theirwork from being censored.3
A few years ago, I became acquainted
with Yogyakarta-based photographer Rangga
Purbaya (1976) whose work is focused on
opening a dialogue on the 1965-66 killings.
At first sight, there is little that refers to theviolence in his work: Rangga’s photographs
depict places, people and everyday objects
such as notebooks, razors and wooden boxes.
Upon closer investigation, however, the images
allude to a broader narrative. The objects are
old and worn, but because they have been
kept with great care, it is evident that they aretreasured. The places in the photographs arehaunting: an empty street and a vertical cavesurrounded by mist. The portraits, mainlyof young persons, suggest various messages:some look directly into the camera, others
avoid the lens. One young woman is pictured
looking at old photographs.
The viewer again has to move closer,
with titles and descriptions giving moreclues. The image of the vertical cave is titled‘Starting Point’ and adds that between
1965 and 1966 the place was a site of mass
killing of alleged communists. The photo of
the empty street is accompanied by a shortstory of a daughter looking for her father.
We discover that the notebooks and razor
belonged to someone called Boentardjo,
who –as one can gather from statements
accompanying the portraits –is a largely
unknown figure, but also a source of pride
and respected.

Family stories
Boentardjo Amaroen was Rangga
Purbaya’s paternal grandfather. Boentardjo
was one of many who was disappeared in1965 and presumably killed in circumstancesthat have never been uncovered. As so many

Indonesians of his generation, Rangga grewup unaware of his family’s past.4 But in 1998,
a few months after the fall of the Suharto
regime, Rangga’s parents told him about his
grandfather. At the time, he was not sure what
to do with the information (“to me, it was justa fact”) and continued to focus on his studies
and work. While his parents became activein victims’ rights organisations, Rangga kept
his family history at a distance. Ten years
later, however, this changed when Rangga
had to pick up his mother when a meeting she
attended was threatened by a vigilante groupknown as the Indonesian Anti Communist
Front (FAKI), not dissimilar from the attack
on LBH Jakarta mentioned above.
Rangga explained his frustration: “I feltthat what they did wasn’t tactical, it wasn’t
strategic. Their events always had a high riskof intimidation. There was no back up plan
when things went wrong. My mother was
panicking, she was scared”. And so, Rangga
decided to make the story of his family – andthe bigger story of the 1965 killings – central
to his work for the first time. He researchedhis grandfather’s documents, which had
been kept by an aunt, and he spoke to family
members, but many were reluctant to open
old wounds. In general, Rangga found the
younger generation more receptive anddecided to tell the story of his grandfather
primarily through them.
There are two main distinguishing
characteristics of Rangga Purbaya’s work.
The first is that direct references to violence
are absent. As Rangga explained, this wasa deliberate choice he made as an artist,
wanting to present something new. This aspectdifferentiates his work from other visual
artists, who have portrayed the 1965 violence
explicitly. At the same time, I see the absenceof direct references to violence in his work
also as a reflection of his position as someoneborn long after the events took place.
The absence of violence almost automaticallytriggers a conversation between the viewer
and the artist about the places, objects andpeople portrayed, eventually bringing us
to Boentardjo and his fate, and the broader
context of the 1965 killings.
A second characteristic of Rangga’s workis the central place of the family. Family is,so he has found, a relatively easy way to talkabout the 1965 killings. “I’ve decided toaddress 1965 from a perspective that I know
best: my family. It’s easier than talking about
people you don’t know. Also, when I talk about
my personal history, that of my family, people
often become more open. Often, they starttalking about their families, too”.
Together, these two elements allow for a
dialogue on family, collective history and loss,
as well as hopes for the future. The creationof a conversation is one of Rangga’s main
objectives, who argues that interpersonaldialogue is crucial for reconciliation: “before
we can reconcile, people need to be awareof what has happened, so they can see
the event from various perspectives”. His
work also underlines that in a context ofrising illiberalism, personal stories are botha powerful and gentle tool to continue
discussions on past wrongs and directions
towards a more just future.
Ken Setiawan is a McKenzie
Postdoctoral Research Fellow at
the University of Melbourne’s Asia
Institute. She has a PhD in Law from
Leiden University, the Netherlands.
Her research interests include
globalisation and human rights,
the sociology of law, transitionaland historical justice, as well
as reconciliation and reparation.
She is the author of Promoting
Human Rights: National Human
Rights Commissions in Indonesia
and Malaysia (Leiden University Press,2013). setiawan.k@unimelb.edu.au		Notes1	See, for instance, Setiawan, K. 2016.
‘From Hope to Disillusion: the Paradoxof Komnas HAM, the Indonesian National
Commission on Human Rights’, Bijdragentot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 172(1):1-32.
2	Kuddus, R. 2017. ‘The Ghosts of 1965.
Politics and Memory in Indonesia’,
New Left Review 104:45-92.
3	Indonesia has a vocal human rights
movement. For a recent discussion ofIndonesian civil society and the 1965-1966
violence see Kuddus, 2017.
4	All quotes of Rangga Purbaya in thispiece are from my interview with him
on 10 January 2018.

22

The Region

News from Northeast Asia
Northeast Asia’s engagementswith the Middle East

Regional Editor
Ilhong Ko

The Seoul National University Asia Center(SNUAC) is a research and international
exchange institute based in Seoul,
South Korea. The SNUAC’s most distinctive
feature is its cooperative approach infostering research projects andinternational exchange program throughclose interactions between regional andthematic research programs about Asiaand the world. To pursue its mission
to become a hub of Asian Studies, SNUAC
research teams are divided by different
regions and themes. Research centers andprograms are closely integrated, providing
a solid foundation for deeper analysis
of Asian society.

Northeast Asia’s
engagements with
the Middle East
Ilhong Ko

Northeast Asia’s links with the Middle East
can be traced back to ancient times, when thetwo regions were connected via trade routes.
The material remains of these trade relations,housed in the museums of Japan, South Korea,
and China, are a vivid reminder of the active
movement of Arab merchants and goods. In themodern period, engagements between the tworegions have extended to the political, as wellas economic realms. In this issue of News from
Northeast Asia, we examine the reality of modern
interactions between the Middle Eastern region
and the countries of Northeast Asia, focusing on
issues such as energy, diplomacy, investment,
and military relations.

Relations between Japanand the Middle East
Akiko YoshiokaThe beginning of the 20th century saw
a rapid increase in Japan’s demandfor oil, along with the introduction of
motor vehicles and warfare, while domestic
oil production had already peaked at the time.
Safeguarding a stable supply of oil becamea keystone of Japan’s energy security, which
led Japan to the Middle East, as well as Asia
and Russia.
Japan's first import of Middle Eastern
oil took place in 1921 from Iran.1 After WorldWar II, Japanese demand for oil continued
to increase, for postwar reconstructionand economic growth. Despite failing in
Saudi Arabia and Iraq in the 1930s due toinsufficient development funds and technicalcapacities,2 Japan’s endeavor to secure
crude oil by developing oil wells eventually
succeeded in 1957, when the Arabian Oil
Company gained concession of the Khafji
field at the neutral zone between Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait. However, since most of Japan’s
oil was imported through major Western
oil companies that controlled vast resources

by concession agreements, Japan’s
relations with Middle Eastern countries,
albeit important, were not considered vital.
A paradigm shift occurred in 1973
when the Organization of Arab Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OAPEC) implemented
an oil embargo after the fourth Arab-Israeli
war. Japan had failed to be categorized
as an Arab-friendly nation and was informedof an export reduction. The news caused
a so-called ‘toilet-paper panic’ among
the Japanese who believed paper
production would soon stop, leading tomassive purchases. The oil crisis accelerated
inflation, which led the government tointroduce a legal framework to prevent thehoarding of goods and the arbitrary hikingof prices. This event inspired some serious
rethinking with regard to Japan’s energy
security and its relations with the Middle
East. As a new initiative to understandMiddle East geopolitics and to strengthenties, the Japanese Institute of Middle Eastern
Economies (JIME), the predecessor of
JIME Center-IEEJ, was established in 1974.

Above: Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Youji Muto, next to Dutch Foreign Minister Koenders, at the Pledging
Conference in Support of Iraq in July 2016. Image courtesy of United States Department of State.

Of the Northeast Asian countries,
Japan was the first to establish formal
economic relations with the Middle
East in the modern period. The way in whichthese economic, and later political, relations
developed throughout the 20th century to thepresent day is addressed by Akiko Yoshioka,
Senior Analyst at the JIME Center-IEEJ, in‘Relations between Japan and the Middle
East’. For South Korea, the Gulf region has
been a ‘land of opportunities’ since the 1970s.
In ‘Reinventing the Middle East? South Korea’s
Engagements with the Gulf amid Geopolitical
Conflicts’, June Park of Seoul National
University discusses the potentials and risksfacing South Korea’s maneuvers in the Middle
East. China’s presence in the Middle East is
considerable indeed, and its influence in theregion is expected to increase even further.
In an attempt to present a multi-facetedview of China-Middle East relations, two
perspectives are presented. The way in which
China envisages its role in, and relationshipwith, the region is first illustrated by Tsinghua
University’s Tingyi Wang in ‘China and the
Middle East: Old Friends in a New Era’. The
reality of China’s engagements in the Middle
East is then examined by Ceren Ergenç ofMiddle East Technical University in ‘China’s
Relations with the Middle East: A Perspectivefrom the Region’.

On the energy security front, the nationaloil stockpile, which did not exist in 1973, is now
secured for more than 100 days, and energysaving measures have become prevalent inJapanese society. The Japanese government
also increased the use of nuclear energy
and natural gas in an attempt to diversify its
primary energy supply. Therefore, the share ofoil among primary energy sources decreased
significantly from 75.5% in 1973 to 41.1% in2015.3 However, in terms of dependence on
Middle Eastern oil, not much has changed;
the current share of the oil supply coming from
the Middle East is more than 80%, higher than
the 77.5% in 1973 –although it did temporarily
decrease in 1987 to 69.7%. In 2015, four Middle
Eastern nations –Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
Kuwait, and Qatar –provided as much as
75.4% of Japan’s oil. Since 1975, either Saudi
Arabia or the UAE have been top oil exporters
to Japan; meanwhile, UAE, Qatar, and Oman
provide a quarter share of Japan’s natural gas
supply. In 2011 Qatar doubled its gas export
to Japan following the suspension of nuclear
power operations caused by the Great East
Japan Earthquake, and became Japan’s thirdgas provider besides Australia and Malaysia.4
Since the Ministry of Economy, Trade andIndustry (METI) has predicted that oil andnatural gas will continue to make up about halfof Japan’s primary energy in 2030, relations
with the Middle East shall remain the mostimportant for Japan’s energy security.
Relations between Japan and the Middle
East have grown outside the realm of energy
in past decades. The Middle East is an
important market for the automobiles andmachinery export, as well as for infrastructuredevelopment for Japanese companies, whohave also worked on enhancing humanresources and technical cooperation in various
fields through government support. Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
has been engaged in several reconstruction
projects after the Iraq War in 2003, suchas power plants, water-supply systems,
communication networks, oil refineries, andfertilizer factories. At the beginning of the
21st century, some gulf airlines introduced
direct flights to Japan and contributed toraising the profile of Arab Gulf countries
among the Japanese. Dubai has now becomea well-known tourist destination among theJapanese, in addition to the historic cities
of Istanbul and Cairo.
Beyond these economic aspects, the Middle
East has also been the center stage of national
security discussions, especially since the endof the Cold War. During the Gulf Crisis andthe Gulf War in 1990–1991, the Japanese
government maintained a rather tentative
approach to the hostage situation in Iraq,
where hundreds of Japanese were used as
human shields; at the same time they wereasked by the United States to contribute
militarily in the war as an ally. It was the firsttime post–World War II that Japan had to deal
with an international conflict. Even though
Japan ended up spending as much as $13
billion, the ad hoc policy was not appreciatedin the international community, and the
Gulf War is now remembered as a diplomatic
defeat. Since then, Japan has pursueda ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’ policy,
sending the Self-Defense Force (SDF) overseas
mainly through peace-keeping operations
with the UN. A new law in 2007 upgradedinternational operations as the primary
mission of the SDF. So far, the SDF has been
deployed to the Persian Gulf (1991), the Golan
Heights (1996–2013), Iraq (2004–2008), Sudan(2008–2011), and South Sudan (2011–2017),
as well as other Asian and African countries.
Japan’s active political and economic
engagement with the Middle East, at bothgovernment and private levels, aims to achieve
peace and stability in these countries. For thispurpose, Japan has been deeply involved in
the Middle East peace process since the 1990s.
However, Japan lacks the political leverage
to be an influential mediator between parties
in conflict because of stringent constitutional
limitations on the military sphere, despite
the historical advantage of neutrality it
has enjoyed in the Middle East comparedto European countries. Therefore, Japan’s
approach to energy security and strengthening
relations with the Middle East has been andwill be mainly to focus on the economic field,
including a steady and long-term commitment
to human and social development.

Dr Ilhong Ko Research Fellow at Seoul
National University Asia Center; Regional
Editor of ‘News from Northeast Asia’
mahari95@snu.ac.kr

Akiko Yoshioka Senior Analyst at JIME
Center-IEEJ (Institute of Energy Economics,
Japan) yoshioka@jime.ieej.or.jp
		Notes1	Hosaka, S. 2014 (June/July). ‘Nihon towangan no sekiyu: baren sekiyu yunyuu 80
shuunen’, Chuto Kyouryoku Senta Nyusu.
2	Nakajima, I. 2015. Sekiyu to nihon: kunan
to zasetsu no shigengaikoushi. Tokyo:
Shinchousha, p.55.
3	The Energy Data & Modelling Center (IEEJ).
2017. Enerugi keizai toukei youran, p.26.
4	Ibid., pp.192-193.

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

News from Northeast Asia
Northeast Asia’s engagementswith the Middle East

Regional Editor
Ilhong Ko

The Region

23

Reinventing the Middle East? South Korea’s engagementswith the Gulf amid geopolitical conflicts
June ParkS

outh Korean industries take great pridein having constructed some of the mostmonumental infrastructures in the Gulf
since the 1970s. The oil shock of 1973 prompteda spike in oil prices and allowed for petrostatesin the Gulf to initiate an economic development
agenda focusing on infrastructure, acrossSaudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Iraq.1 Following
the Asian Financial Crisis of the 1990s, South
Korean construction companies–notably
Samsung C&T, Hyundai Engineering &Construction, GS Engineering & Construction–have constantly looked into opportunities
in the region.2 The expansion of South Korea’s
economic engagements with Gulf States
is coupled with its cultural charm offensiveof the Korean Wave (hallyu), and exports of'Made in Korea' products ranging from halalcertified foods to electronics and autos.3
South Korea stands at a pivotal turning
point for diversification of trading partners,
as it continues to rely on an economic model
heavily dependent on exports –with a hugeconcentration on China and the United States
as export destinations. Along with Southeast
Asia, the Middle East region is all the more
important for the South Korean economy as
an alternative export destination. But as therelationships between South Korea and the Gulf
states deepen, despite the positive effects ofincreased level of engagements, South Korea’s
engagements in the region are not without
potential risks as the Middle East is by far one of
the world’s most geopolitically complex regions.
Energy is the most crucial component
in South Korea-Middle East transactions,and the main drive for South Korean outward
investments in the region. As Asian demandfor Middle Eastern energy continues to grow,South Korea is one of the biggest consumers
of Gulf oil and natural gas.4 South Korea’s firstoverseas nuclear power plant building projectin the UAE and installation of a nuclear reactor
for a joint research project in Jordan brought
about subsequent interests from Saudi Arabia.
As the Gulf states look toward diversifying theirenergy sources, they look to Northeast Asia –China, Japan, and South Korea –for provisionof nuclear and renewable energy sources.
Yet, South Korea manifested patternsof disorganization and corruption in its
investments for energy resources in Iraq during
the Lee Myung-bak presidency (2008 to 2013).
As one of the major buyers of Iraqi oil, South
Korea has made deliberate miscalculationsin its investments in oil drilling and liquefaction
projects in pre-ISIS Iraq. Its public investments
in Akkas, Mansuria, Badra and Zubayr
under the Lee Myung-bak presidency wereconsidered catastrophic failures, incurring
huge losses of the South Korean taxpayers’
money, and investigations into the investments under the Moon administration haveculminated in Lee’s arrest in March 2018.
In the pre-ISIS era, South Korea also sufferedfrom misreading local politics, as the Korea
National Oil Corporation and SK Energy were
excluded by the Iraqi Central Government
in Baghdad in the 2008 bidding process foroil fields development, due to their previous
involvement in oil liquefaction projects with the
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq.
When the Iraq War ended in 2011, South Korean
industries sought for a revival of economic
engagements with the region, but the interwar
period did not last long and investment projects
would soon be stalled due to the Syrian war
that broke out in 2011, and the subsequent
rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) in 2014.

President Moon Jae-in and Suhail bin Mohammed Faraj Faris Al Mazrouei, UAE Minister of Energy and Industry, during the South Korean president’s state visit
to the UAE in March 2018. Image courtesy of The Republic of Korea Cheong Wa Dae (Blue House).

With the effects of the KRG referendumof 2017 becoming obsolete, South Korean
firms are now vying for new opportunities in
Iraq, notably in infrastructure and technology
for democratic growth. South Korean
con-glomerate Hanhwa’s construction ofresidential apartments in Bismiyah New Cityof the Baghdad Governorate5 and South
Korean IT firm Miru Systems’ successful bid
for sale of electronic voting machines for
Iraqi local and parliamentary elections to theBaghdad Government signaled the beginningof South Korea-Iraq partnerships toward
reconstruction in post-ISIS Iraq.6
While South Korea could indeed play therole of a facilitator in Iraqi democracy andgovernance through such partnerships –resembling Iraq as a former war-stricken country
that went through democratic transitions andbreakthroughs in the 1980s –South Korea’s own
controversies in the 2012 presidential elections,entailing manipulation of vote count methods
via automated voting machines, let alone its
previous experiences of vote count controversies
in the presidential elections of Sungman Rhee,
the first Korean president, and authoritarianleaders Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-whan,
attest to certain limits of the South Korean modelof democracy and South Korean transfer of
democratic governance toolkit to post-ISIS Iraq.7
Whether South Korea as a US ally would be
able to proactively engage with Iraq on projects
other than oil, and whether its assistancecould help shape Iraq’s governance structure
towards democracy, remains to be seen.
While it is widely understood that South
Korea’s main security concern is North Korea,
South Korea has been involved in a seriesof broader security roles in the Middle East
from the 2000s. Into the new millennium,
South Korea’s pursuits in the Middle East were
centered around achieving economic interests,
but with combined military engagements.

Post-9/11, with the U.S. declaration of war
on Iraq in 2003, South Korea was obligatedas a U.S. ally to deploy troops to Erbil of theKurdistan autonomous region of Northern Iraq
(now Kurdistan Regional Government: KRG)
upon the U.S. request to send additional forceson 4 September 2003. The Zaitun Division,
composed of 600 military medics and engineers,
operated in Iraq as contingent of the Republicof Korea from 2004 to 2008. In 2018, nine years
after its signing, a secret military pact between
the Republic of Korea and the United ArabEmirates obligating South Korean deploymentof special forces to the UAE on a regular basis,
without South Korean national assembly
approval, came to light.8 The pact proved to
be instrumental in finalizing the South Korean
bid for the Barakah nuclear power plant in
the UAE under Lee Myungbak. Nonetheless,the Moon administration’s decision to embark
on a more strategic partnership with the UAE
reveals South Korea’s vested economic interests
on outward investments in the renewable andnuclear energy sectors in the coming years,
despite its internal reluctance to delve into
the region with military pursuits.9
The Middle East is a complicated region in
many aspects, and a power vacuum graduallydevelops in uncertainty. Russia under Putin
remains engaged in Syria, but the U.S. under
Trump sways between engagement andwithdrawal, while China seeks more active
involvement economically and politically inthe region. The Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry isintensifying via proxy wars in Yemen and Syria.
South Korea’s engagements could thus be adouble-edged sword due to the geopoliticalcomplexities in the region, particularly owing
to South Korea’s own military engagementswith the U.S. that have been deemed apriority for South Korea in the postwar period.
Participation of a middle power such as South
Korea in the management and reconstructionof a post-conflict state of Iraq and strategic
partnership with a Sunni state would entail
certain levels of risks for South Korea going
forward. Such risks may be compounded asdecision making processes are convened byomnipotent presidencies in the South Koreanpolitical system. South Korea’s maneuvers in
the Middle East will require careful treading,as North Korea’s ties with other Middle Easterncountries could also potentially jeopardize
South Korea’s position in the region.
Dr. June Park Research Fellow at theSeoul National University Asia Center,
S. Korea junepark@snu.ac.kr

		Notes1	Shim, U.S. 2015. ‘South Korean Workers
and the Middle East Construction Boomin the 1970s’, Journal of Contemporary
Korean Studies 2(1):37-56.
2	Maierbrugger, A. ‘South Korea is building
the Gulf’, Gulf News. 5 November 2015.
3	Saberi, D. ‘The Rise of South Korea’s SoftPower in the Middle East’, The Diplomat,
14 March 2018.
4	Tan, F. & R. El Gamal. ‘Iraq plans majorchange to oil pricing for Asia’, Reuters,
21 August 2017.
5	‘Construction in Iraq - Key Trends andOpportunities to 2020’, PR Newswire,
17 August 2016.
6	‘S. Korean firm bags deal to export votecounting machines to Iraq’, Yonhap News,
2 April 2017.
7	Choi, G. H. ‘Is it the plan or NO plan?
Dissecting the Vote-Count Controversy’,Newstapa, 7 July 2017.
8	Park, J. & A. Ahmad. ‘Risky Business:
South Korea’s Secret Military Deal with
UAE’, The Diplomat, 1 March 2018.
9	Gambrell, J. ‘South Korean president
visits UAE amid deepening ties’, AP,
25 March 2018.

24

The Region

News from Northeast Asia
Northeast Asia’s engagementswith the Middle East

Regional Editor
Ilhong Ko

China’s relations with the Middle East:a perspective from the region
Ceren Ergenç

President Xi Jinping. © Creative Commons. Courtesy UN on flickr.

After thirty years of domestic development and consolidation, China hasentered a new phase in which its international aspirations are clearly pronounced;
it is redefining its role in the international
system. The Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) in
particular signals a new type of regionalization in the making, with its bilateral projects
with countries and regions beyond China’s
immediate borders. One of these regions
is the Middle East, where this realignmentis intertwined with political and economic
concerns.
China’s relations with the Middle East
were initially shaped by Cold War dynamics.
While China did not intend to be actively
involved in the region’s affairs, it took a stancewithin the framework of the ‘Third Worldism’ ofthe Mao-era. China’s relations with the Middle
East were predominantly political during theCold War period. Given China’s pro-Palestinian
attitude, Egypt, a leading member of the
Arab (Socialist) League, became the first Arabcountry to recognize the People’s Republicof China in 1956, while the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries in the WestCamp refused to recognize it until Sino-US
normalization in 1972. In return, China did notestablish diplomatic relations with Israel until
1992. China recognized Palestine in 1988 withwhich it had maintained political, culturaland economic relations since the early 1960s.
Turkey also did not establish diplomatic
relations with China until 1971. Turkey
had received a high number of Uyghur
refugees throughout the 1950s, following
the consolidation of China’s borders.
Consequently, Turkey served as one of
the major hubs of the Uyghur diaspora in
the following decades. The activities of the
Uyghur diaspora leaders in Istanbul remained
a source of discordance between the Turkish
and Chinese governments even after theestablishment of diplomatic relations.1

In short, China’s relations with the Middle East
until the 1980s were shaped by two factors:
Cold War-era political rivalries and China’s
own domestic security concerns. The postMao years would witness the centrality of
economic motivations.
Currently, China’s relationship with the
Middle East has three dimensions: Economic,
international political, and domestic/regional
security concerns. In assessing each of these
dimensions, China’s uneasy relationship with
the Middle East due to clashes of economic,
diplomatic and security interests in theregion can be highlighted. Japan and South
Korea were the primary East Asian economic
partners of the Middle East during the 1970s
and 1980s. China slowly became an economic
partner as its dependency on the region’senergy resources grew from the 1980s. China’s
economic interests in the Middle East focus onfour aspects: energy, trade, service labor, andthe construction industry/investment. China
has become an energy importer following
the exponential growth of its industries.
The Middle East supplies more than half ofChina’s oil needs and in return, China is thelargest buyer of MENA oil.2 Additionally, theMiddle East is one of the central zones of theBelt & Road Initiative (BRI) of China launchedby President Xi Jinping in 2013. BRI is theproactive foreign policy of China that aims
at channeling out excessive domestic capital,creating employment for China’s skilled andunskilled workforce, and fostering bilateralinterdependencies in Asia, Europe and Africa.
The BRI includes the Middle East through major
infrastructure investment policies, such as theSuez Canal, which is central to the ‘maritime
Road’ part of the BRI. Israel and Iran are also
included in the BRI: Iran through the Tehran
railway that connects to the China-Pakistanroute, and Israel through the Red-Med projectthat aims at connecting the Red Sea to theMediterranean. Both railway projects arecentral to the ‘land-bound Belt’ part of the BRI.

The BRI is primarily based on the constructionindustry, as exemplified in Kuwait’s Silk City.3
China’s infrastructure investment in theconstruction industry is a welcomed
development against the economic slowdown
Arab countries have been facing following
the political instability in the aftermathof the Arab Spring or dropping oil prices.4
Besides these economic motivations,
China appears willing to be involved inregional political affairs as a tool to consolidate
its image as a responsible world power.
China’s traditional foreign policy doctrine,
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,
formulated in 1953, upholds non-intervention in
the domestic affairs of sovereign states. Suchan approach prevented China from getting
involved in regional conflicts as a moderator
or an external actor that could change thebalance of power. However, China has recently
made moves signaling a more proactive foreign
policy. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, China
maintains its position of advocating a twostate solution as manifested in the 2016 Arab
Policy paper.5 However, Chinese academic andcultural institutions also do not participate in
the boycott against Israel, which makes China
a welcome candidate for mediation between
the two parties.
As for the Syrian civil war, China has been
following international institutional channels
such as the United Nations Security Council(UNSC) and the International Syria Support
Group, and has acted as Special Envoy in
the Syrian Peace Talks following Russia’s
proposals. Therefore, China is perceived as apart of a coalition with Russia and partly with
Iran on the Syrian peace process.6 The reason
that China does not act more forthcoming
regarding the Syrian crisis is due to theoutcome of the Libyan civil war during theArab Spring period. China did not object tothe UNSC resolution to intervene in the Libyan
civil war but when the intervention caused
the overthrowing of the Qaddafi regime,

China felt its main foreign policy principle,
non-violation of state sovereignty, had been
compromised.7
Turkey is currently ambivalent about
China’s position in the Syrian crisis, although
it previously collaborated in a military drill
with China in 2010 on the condition that
Israel be excluded. The military drill was
followed by a missiles deal with China which
was abruptly and unilaterally canceled byTurkey in 2014 in response to NATO’s protests.8
Prospects for a closer alliance with China andmembership to the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization are often pronounced by thecurrent Turkish government as a sign of its
new multifaceted, less Western-oriented,
foreign policy orientation.9 In short, Chinais gradually emerging as a global power
involved in regional affairs.
While China appears willing to act asa responsible global power, its own domestic
security concerns prove its involvement in
the Middle East region to be less than smooth.
There are two main domestic concerns thatshape China’s involvement in the Middle
East: Middle Eastern relations with the
Uyghur minority in China, and the impactof the Arab Spring on China’s public opinion.
China’s relations with Turkey have followed
a tumultuous path given the former’s soft
attitude towards the Uyghur separatist
movement. While the movement’s headquarters
were removed from Istanbul following theTurkish government’s ‘China pivot’ in the early
2000s,10 China is concerned that there is anincreasing number of Chinese nationals of
Uyghur background joining ISIS in Syria with
the intention to go back to China via Turkey.11
Consequently, China imposes visa restrictions
on Turkish nationals even though China andTurkey enjoy warm relations at the presidential
level, as demonstrated in the 2014 G-20
Summit in Hangzhou where Turkish president
Erdogan was a keynote speaker along with
Russian president Putin.
China’s approach towards the popular
protests in Iran and the Arab Spring has been
cautious, as it perceives these popular protests
against governments to be detrimental towards
China’s domestic stability concerns. However,China’s reluctance to take a stance against
the Arab regimes during the Arab Springs led
to a loss of credibility for the country in Arabpublic opinion.12
To conclude, China has been heavily
involved in Middle Eastern affairs in recent
years. While its economic involvement iswelcomed by the regional actors, politicaland security concerns create obstacles for
China to be perceived as a global power
central to regional affairs in the Middle East.
Ceren Ergenç Assistant Professor,
Middle East Technical University,
Department of International Relations& Asian Studies Program, Turkey
cergenc@metu.edu.tr
		Notes1	Kuscu, I. 2013. ‘The Origins of Uyghur LongDistance Nationalism: The First Generation
Uyghur Diaspora in Turkey’, Journalof Central Asian & Caucasian Studies
8(16):73-94.
2	Hardy, L. 2017. ‘A Rising China Eyes theMiddle East’, The Century Foundation.
https://tinyurl.com/hardy2017 all websites
referenced here were accessed on 15 April
2018.
3	Idem4	Lehr, D. 2017. ‘The Middle East is the Hub
for China’s Modern Silk Road’, Middle East
Institute. https://tinyurl.com/lehr2017
5	Xinhua. 2016. ‘China’s Arab Policy Paper’.
https://tinyurl.com/xinhua2016capp
6	Ibid., Hardy 20177	Sun, Y. 2012. ‘Syria: What China Has
Learned From its Libya Experience’, Asia
Pacific Bulletin, East-West Center. https://tinyurl.com/sun2012apb
8	Ergenç, C. 2015. ‘Can Two Ends of Asia
Meet? An Overview of Contemporary
Turkey-China Relations’, East Asia 32:289–
308; DOI 10.1007/s12140-015-9242.
9	Idem10	Idem
11	Lin, C. 2017. ‘Chinese Uyghur colonies in
Syria a challenge for Beijing’, Asia Times.
https://tinyurl.com/lin2017atimes
12	Schichor, Y. 2013. ‘Middle Eastern
Perceptions of China’s Rise’, China Policy
Institute. https://tinyurl.com/Schichor2013

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

News from Northeast Asia
Northeast Asia’s engagementswith the Middle East

Regional Editor
Ilhong Ko

Tingyi Wang

I

China is a strategic partner of Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, Iran, and it also maintains
frequent high-level contacts with Israel, Turkey,
and other states. Very few state leaders could
pay state visits to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iranat the same time and receive warm welcomes,
as President Xi did in 2015. Just before Xi’s
departure, China issued its first ‘Arab Policy
Paper’ since 1949, which is a milestone of SinoArab relations. China was also determined toplay an active role in the Palestine-Israel Peace
Process, and held the Palestinian-Israeli Peace
Symposium in Beijing in 2017.
Besides warming up diplomatic andpolitical interactions, China has alreadybecome the largest trade partner of many
Middle East countries. ‘Make Trade, Not
War’ – trade and peace are China’s two
main objectives in this region. So far, around
300,000 Chinese nationals live and work in
the United Arab Emirates. They mainly stayat the ‘Dragon City’, a well-known bazaar city
crowded with Chinese businessmen, locatednext to Dubai. It is estimated that at least amillion Chinese now live in the Middle East.
One Belt One Road, or the so called ‘New
Silk Road’ is a worthy attempt, although some may argue that it will be too costly
and profits not as good as projected. Despite
these arguments, China’s trade with the

Middle East is maintained at high levels.
To take Sino-Arab trade as an example,
China’s trade with Arab countries hasgrown from 36.7 billion USD to 251.2 billion
USD between 2004 and 2014. In 2016 thebilateral trade volume reached 231.9 billion
USD, with more than half of China’s crude
oil coming from Arab countries (190.6
million tons, 50.15% of the total amountof 381 million tons).1 This figure does notinclude Iran, the fifth largest oil importer
to China. As Professor Tim Niblock
has noted on China’s relations with
GCC countries, “For the two centuries
preceding 2013, the bulk of Gulf trade
was with Western countries ... In 2013, forthe first time, China became the largest
partner of the Gulf region (taking alleight Gulf countries together).”2
Military cooperation between both sides
has steadily moved forward. Despite thefrequent high level visits and purchases ofequipment and weapons, China’s military
existence in the Middle East is generally‘soft’, taking the form of peacekeeping
missions in Sudan and Lebanon. China’s
naval escort fleet also made a numberof stops at the ports of Middle Easterncountries and played an important rolein evacuations in Yemen in 2015 whencivil war broke out. Compared to China’s
various commercial interests and presenceof more than a million Chinese nationals
in the Middle East, its military power isrelatively weak and so far it only has alimited existence in this region to protect
its people and commercial interests. But
China may have two ports surrounding
the Middle East in the near future: oneis Gwadar port in Pakistan and the otheris Djibouti port in East Africa.
As for how the Chinese view the
Middle East region, there are very
different opinions. Some believe that the
Middle East is a strategic area for China
and will be useful to China’s One Belt One
Road initiative; others think the area is

Participants of the ‘China-Arab Academic Dialogue’, which took place in Beijing in September 2014.

25

harmful to China’s development
and just to want keep away from this‘Graveyard of Empires’. But basically,
most Chinese people know very little
about the Middle East. As for the view
from the Middle East, some may
appreciate China’s non-involvement
attitude towards local issues and its
maintenance of long-term friendly
relations, whilst others may suspect
China’s intentions in the region and fearthat China may become another dominating power as its influence grows.
The challenges to Sino-Middle East
relations are obvious, and may causesome problems or even risks in the near
future. Firstly, each side has only a limited
knowledge or understanding of the other.
Although historical connections existed
in the past, China’s relationship with the
Middle East was halted for quite a longtime and even after World War II, theCold War and ideological divisions stillplayed a very negative role in bilateralrelations. Until 1992, Israel as the last
Middle Eastern country finally established
its diplomatic relations with China.
Secondly, the turbulence, conflicts, andcivil wars taking place in the Middle East
have already caused some worries within
Chinese society, following the kidnappingand murder of Chinese nationals inPakistan and Afghanistan in the past
few years. Thirdly, China is a newcomerwith growing interests in the region but
at the same time faces pressures in Eastand South Asia. Whether China hasenough resources and the determination
to continue developing its long-term
strategic relations with the Middle East
countries is still a question with noanswer in sight.

China and the Middle East:
old friends in a new era

t is quite unusual to see a state keeping
good relationships with all the Middle
East countries. In January 2016, Chinese
President Xi Jinping made his first state-visit
to the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, and Iran. This symbolic visit marked
the rapidly developing relationships between
China and the Middle East. The ambitious
initiatives of Xi’s presidency, such as‘One Belt One Road’, Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB), and the Silk Road
Fund, all have linkages with the Middle East.
Connections between China and the Middle
East date back to around 2000 years ago
to China’s Han dynasty. Now both sides
are entering a new era as old friends.

The Region

Tingyi Wang PhD candidate at
the Department of International
Relations, Tsinghua University, China
wangtingyi12@mailstsinghua.edu.cn
		Notes

Calligraphy combining the Arabic word ‘Salam’
and the Chinese character ‘宁’, which both mean‘peace’. Adapted from a photo taken in Riyadh.

1	Ministry of Commerce of thePeople's Republic of China, 2017;https://tinyurl.com/cafiec20171102
2	Niblock, T. 2016. Situating the GCC
in China's Transforming Roles in
Asia, Middle East Institute;
https://tinyurl.com/mei-niblock26

newbooks.asia

The Review

New reviews on
newbooks.asia
Now available to read online

Asian Studies. Newest Titles.
Latest Reviews.

newbooks.asia is the go-to Asian studies book review
website, administered by IIAS. The site lists the newest
titles in the field of Asian studies and makes them available
for review. Find a selection of new titles on page 28.
All reviews are posted online, whilst a lucky few also
make it into The Newsletter (see pp.42-47 of this issue).
Browse a selection of the latest reviews below.

‘One of the most reliablereferences’ – Meredian Alam
Anne Rademacher and K. Sivaramakrishnan (eds). 2017.
Places of Nature in Ecologies of Urbanism
Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press
ISBN 9789888390595
https://newbooks.asia/review/disengagement-nature-urban‘Superb balance of the theoreticaland empirical, with a mix of casestudy narratives and analysis. This
work should become the standard
for many years to come’ – Paul Doolan
Ana Dragojlovic. 2016.
Beyond Bali: Subaltern Citizens and Post-Colonial Intimacy
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press
ISBN 9789462980648
https://newbooks.asia/review/beyond-bali‘A masterful assessment of issues
surrounding the citizenship on South
Asians living in the French colony
of Indochine’ – William B. Noseworthy
Natasha Pairaudeau. 2016.
Mobile Citizens: French Indians in Indochina, 1858-1954
Copenhagen: NIAS Press
ISBN 9788776941581
https://newbooks.asia/review/mobile-citizens‘A delightful, often anecdotic
narrative of exemplary fieldwork
and in-depth interviewing’ – Niels Mulder
Sophorntavy Vorng. 2017.
A Meeting of Masks: Status, Power and Hierarchy in Bangkok
Copenhagen: NIAS Press
ISBN 9788776941970
https://newbooks.asia/review/life-show‘The method of zooming in on one
family will definitely be interesting
to historians of empire, for whom
the micro-historical approach is still
relatively uncommon’ – Kirsten Kamphuis‘A compelling perspective [to those]interested in understanding themultidimensional problems associatedwith eradicating open defecationin India and elsewhere’ – Linda Lane

Niranjan Casinader. 2017.
Transnationalism, Education and Empowerment:
The Latent Legacies of Empire

Diane Coffey and Dean Spears. 2017.
Where India Goes: Abandoned Toilets, Stunted Development
and the Costs of Caste

Abingdon and New York: Routledge
ISBN 9781138916012
https://newbooks.asia/review/colonial-education

Noida, Uttar Pradesh: HarperCollins India
ISBN: 9789352645657
https://newbooks.asia/review/where-india-goes‘A convincing book on the formation of
new urban zones in Ho Chi Minh City,
bringing together the voices of those whohave become victims of such zones andof those who exclusively profit from it’ –‘The most outstanding featureof this book is its illustrations
and audiovisual resources’

Hans Schenk
Erik Harms. 2016.
Luxury and Rubble, Civility and Dispossession in the New Saigon
Oakland: University of California Press
ISBN 9780520292512
https://newbooks.asia/review/rubbles-luxury– Lonán Ó Briain
Victoria Vorreiter. 2016.
Hmong Songs of Memory: Traditional Secularand Sacred Hmong Music
Thailand: Resonance Press
ISBN 9780998123905
https://newbooks.asia/review/hmong-songs

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

‘Erudite, entertaining, and accessible’– Sumana Paul
Gautam Kumar Bera. 2017.
A Cultural and Religious History of Tripura
Guwahati, India: Spectrum Publications
ISBN 9788184330854
https://newbooks.asia/review/tripura-tripuris

The Review

27‘Had the authors reproduced theinterviews in full, with an extensive
historical introduction, and detailed
explanatory notes, the results would
have been much better’ – Chandar S. Sundaram
Edgar A. Porter and Ran Ying Porter. 2018.
Japanese Reflections on World War II
and the American Occupation
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press
ISBN: 9789462982598
https://newbooks.asia/review/japanese-reflections‘An insightful read and, perhaps
more importantly, contributes toa discussion that will hopefully
grow and take root’ – Neil Webster‘This should be considered required
reading for any scholars interested
in the Indian state, postcoloniality,
and sexuality studies’ – Lars Aaberg

Olle Törnquist and John Harriss with Neere Chandhoke
and Frederik Engelstad (eds). 2016.
Reinventing Social Democratic Development: Insightsfrom Indian and Scandinavian Comparisons

Jyoti Puri. 2016.
Sexual States: Governance and the Struggle
over the Antisodomy Law in India

Copenhagen: NIAS Press
ISBN 9788776942007
https://newbooks.asia/review/reinventing-development

Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press
ISBN 9780822360438
https://newbooks.asia/review/sex-governance-law‘This book certainly deserves
praises for the contributors’ efforts
to introduce a rarely-discussed
concept through in-depth analysesof cases’ – Shangpo Hsieh‘Presenting factual information as wellas analyses of economic and politicalstrategies by governments and oilcompanies that encompass major
regions of strategic importance’ – Kurt Radtke

Paul J. Carnegie, Victor T. King, and Zawawi Ibrahim (eds). 2016.
Human Insecurities in Southeast Asia

Mehdi P. Amineh and Yang Guang (eds). 2017.
Geopolitical Economy of Energy and Environment:
China and the European Union

New York: Springer
ISBN 9789811022456
https://newbooks.asia/review/human-insecurity

Boston and Leiden: Brill
ISBN 9789004273108
https://newbooks.asia/review/geopolitical-economy‘A comprehensive, authoritative
account of the contemporary politicallandscape of the Middle Kingdom’‘It provides food for thought,
and a stimulus to undertake further,and more integrated, research’– Shane J. Barter and Jaroslav Zapletal– Patrick Vanden Berghe

Sebastian Heilmann (ed.) 2017.
China’s Political System

Andrea Acri, Roger Blench and Alexandra Landmann (eds). 2017.
Spirits and Ships: Cultural Transfers in Early Monsoon Asia

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN 9781442277359
https://newbooks.asia/review/china-political-system

Singapore: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak InstituteISBN 9789814762755
https://newbooks.asia/review/spirits-ships‘This book shines a useful light on therelationship between contemporary
China and Russia’ – Gregory Vincent RaymondMichal Lubina. 2017.
Russia and China: A Political Marriage of Convenience- Stable and Successful
Opladen, Germany: Barbara Budrich Publishers
ISBN 9783847420453
https://newbooks.asia/review/russia-china‘A treasure trove for anyone interested,
not only in the history of Kabul, butalso that of Afghanistan and beyondin general’ – Willem Vogelsang
May Schinasi. 2016
Kabul: A History 1773-1948
Translated by R. D. McChesney
Leiden and Boston: Brill
ISBN: 9789004323636
https://newbooks.asia/review/kabul-history

28

newbooks.asia

The Review

Asian Studies. Newest Titles.
Latest Reviews.

Visit newbooks.asia to browse the newest titles in
the field of Asian studies. If you would like to review
any of the available titles, of which you will finda selection below, please submit a review request
through the website or send an email to our editor
at newbooksasia@iias.nl

Asian Studies. Newest Titles. Latest Reviews.

newbooks.asia
Empire and Ecology in the
Bengal Delta: The Makingof Calcutta
Debjani Bhattacharyya. 2018.
Cambridge University Press
ISBN 9781108425742
newbooks.asia/publication/empire-and-ecology

Buddhism Illuminated:
Manuscript Art fromSouth-East Asia
San San May and Jana Igunma. 2018.
University of Washington Press
ISBN 9780295743783
newbooks.asia/publication/buddhism-illuminatedPhilippine Modernities:
Music, Performing Arts,and Language, 1880 to 1941

Experimental Beijing: Genderand Globalization in Chinese
Contemporary Art
Sasha Su-Ling Welland. 2018.

Jose S. Buenconsejo (ed.) 2018.

Duke University Press
ISBN 9780822369288
newbooks.asia/publication/experimental-beijing

University of the Philippines Press
ISBN 9789715428491
newbooks.asia/publication/philippine-modernities

Amanda Therese
Snellinger. 2018.
Making New Nepal:
From Student Activism
to Mainstream Politics
University ofWashington Press
ISBN 9780295743080
newbooks.asia/publication/
making-new-nepal

Jennifer Robertson.
2018.
Robo SapiensJapanicus: Robots,
Gender, Family, andthe Japanese Nation
University of California Press
ISBN 9780520283190
newbooks.asia/publication/
robo-sapiens

Judd C. Kinzley. 2018.
Natural Resources
and the New Frontier:Constructing Modern
China’s Borderlands
University of Chicago Press
ISBN 9780226492155
newbooks.asia/publication/
natural-resources

Leo F. Goodstadt. 2018.
A City Mismanaged:
Hong Kong’s Struggle
for Survival

J. Barton Scott. 2017.
Modern Hinduismand the Genealogies
of Self-RuleAna Paulina Lee.
2018.
Mandarin Brazil:
Race, Representation,and Memory

Hong Kong University Press
ISBN 9789888455980
newbooks.asia/publication/city-mismanaged

Primus Books
ISBN 9789386552693
newbooks.asia/publication/
modern-hinduism

Stanford University Press
ISBN 9781503606012
newbooks.asia/publication/
mandarin-brazil

Andrew I. Yeo andDanielle Chubb (eds).
2018.
North Korean Human
Rights: Activists andNetworks

Rosemarijn Hoefteand Peter Meel (eds).
2018.
Departing from Java:
Javanese Labour,
Migration and Diaspora

Don F. Selby. 2018.
Human Rights
in Thailand

Cambridge University Press
ISBN 9781108425490
newbooks.asia/publication/rights-activists

NIAS Press
ISBN 9788776942458
newbooks.asia/publication/
departing-java

Munira Cheema. 2018.
Women and TV Culture
in Pakistan: Gender, Islamand National Identity

Adil Johan. 2018.
Cosmopolitan Intimacies:
Malay Film Music of the
Independence Era

Sender Dovchin. 2018.
Language, Mediaand Globalization in
the Periphery: The
Linguascapes of PopularMusic in Mongolia

I.B. TaurisISBN 9781788311779
newbooks.asia/publication/
gender-islam

NUS Press
ISBN 9789814722636
newbooks.asia/publication/
malay-film-music

Routledge
ISBN 9781138051676
newbooks.asia/publication/
popular-mongolia

University ofPennsylvania Press
ISBN 9780812250220
newbooks.asia/publication/
human-rights-thailand

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

The Focus

29

Heritage expertise
across Asia
This Focus section proposes to examine and study cultural
heritage debates less on heritage objects and practices andmore on the human agents that create, promote, and study
cultural heritage and its preservation through specific anddiverse interventions. These interventions do not occur in a
void: they are often attached to distinct disciplinary approaches
and informed by specific political contexts and historicalcircumstances. Therefore, the six contributors to this section,
addressing challenging case studies of preservation of tangible
and intangible heritage in six different regions of Asia, aim tohighlight how the involvement of heritage experts affects thevery nature of cultural heritage objects and practices, including
the choice of approaches that are used for their study.

Trinidad Rico

I
Restoration work at Taj Mahal, 2016.
Photo by author.

t is a very exciting time to be interrogating
the value and scope of different formsof cultural heritage expertise that are
deployed across Asia for two main reasons.
On the one hand, since the late 1980s, global
histories of the development of heritage
discourses and methods have predominantly
highlighted the significance of recognizing
a set of opposing territories, practices andexperiences, articulated as ‘Western’ and‘non-Western’ heritage approaches. Although
this distinction is problematic in itself, what
is significant about this turn for the purposesof the present collection of debates is thatthe idea that there may be a ‘non-Western’approach was built significantly on evidencecollected from different sites across Asia.
These studies suggested convincingly thata ‘Western’ model for heritage preservation
was incompatible with—often described as
destructive of—local material and immaterialvalues and practices surrounding a heritage,
and therefore contrary to the aims of cultural
heritage preservation. For example, in his
early work, Denis Byrne argued that the way
in which standards of authenticity

were applied in the restoration of Buddhist
Stupas irreversibly damaged the authentic
value of these objects across Thailand as
objects of living religious practice.1 This typeof argument propelled both a distinct
academic debate on ‘alternative’ modesof heritage preservation, and also anarticulation of a support for alternative
approaches to preservation through theformalization of suitable principles andstandards for ‘non-Western’ heritage inpolicy documents by international heritage
safeguarding organizations.
On the other hand, and intimately
connected to these developments, adisciplinary interest in ‘non-Western’ heritagedebates and practices called for a better
understanding of precisely what a ‘nonWestern’ approach should be, and equallyimportant, who should be authorized to
articulate it. The study of heritage in Asia
as a territory for heritage studies that has
been used to define ‘non-Western’ heritage
approaches has since grown in the directionof a heritage preservation field that frames
its study and management within suitablesocial, historical, political, and especiallyreligious contexts—an effort that aims tobring complexity to a homogeneous ideaof ‘non-Western’—or ‘Eastern’—heritage.
As researchers working on Asian cultural
heritage sites, the contributors to thissection align with this aim but are also
concerned with the way in which we are
deeply implicated in the expert roles andvoices that are part of the examination of‘Asian’ heritage preservation in various ways.
For example, we may manage and deploy
specific disciplinary forms of expertise in
our studies, which originate elsewhere andare brought in to become vernacularized inlocal contexts. We also examine and engage
critically with the work of other experts andtheir forms of knowledge from our particulardisciplinary vantage points, and finally, weconstruct and perform our own disciplinary
expertise through the production of academic
debates across different sites as well as
globally. Our work connects the specificityof heritage preservation practices in thecontext of Asia with broader debates inregional and international scales, examining
the channels of expertise, their points oforigin, destinations, as well as conversations
and their adaptations into local contexts
and needs. Because of this, a concern withexpertise, and the complicated dynamics
that are involved, has become germane toa critical heritage turn and the ethical studyof heritage preservation and management
in contemporary Asia.
Continued on next page >30

Heritage expertise across Asia

The Focus

level of Christian sites in Nagasaki, Japan,
as a process that has compromised theauthenticity of an important narrative thathas the opportunity to be revealed andcommunicated through heritage constructs.
Through a process that involved grassroots,
governmental, and international experts at
different stages, this piece brings forth thecomplicated relationship between foreign
experts and local forms of knowledge
production that are able to reveal unknown,concealed, and extremely sensitive ‘hidden’
historical and social facts in Japan. In addition,
Otsuki challenges the selective use of different
historical and ethnographic sources that areused by foreign experts to support the workof heritage preservation, suggesting insteada better incorporation of local archives ofknowledge in order to construct heritage
resources more ethically.

Charting expertise

Excavation and restoration work of a historic building in Doha, Qatar. Photo by author.

The contributors
The contributors to this Focus section
address the role of experts, expert
knowledge, and expert networks in the
mediation of cultural heritage value, its
management, and its dissemination acrossvarious professional and academic platforms.
In particular, contributors were asked toconsider the intimate relationship between
heritage value, its preservation, and thedisciplines that approach them, as well as
their own roles as disciplinary agents andknowledge-brokers in the transmission of
specific forms of expertise—carrying formsof knowledge and methodologies that
construct knowledge about, and together
with, the field and its interlocutors. This
ongoing debate unfolds through different
active or completed research projects acrossfield sites in various countries of Asia: Syria,
Afghanistan, (Western) Indonesia, (Eastern)
Indonesia, China, and Japan. While there aremany scholars involved in this type of work
across regions of Asia and the world, thissection curates a few archetypal voices fromdifferent disciplinary angles, including views
from Anthropology, Archaeology,
Art History, Heritage Studies and Sociology.
This overview, therefore, aims to give a senseof the mosaic of issues that are encounteredin the field when heritage preservation is put
to work by the hands of experts in different
contexts, while also hoping to draw out
common challenges and concerns that may
inspire us to think of new ways to support
and/or challenge different forms of expertisein accordance with concerns articulated
collectively as ‘heritage ethics’.
In the opening article in this section, Salam
Al Quntar offers a discussion on the way inwhich different forms of expertise address thechallenges of preserving heritage resourcesin war-torn Syria. Considering the immense
level of interest that the ongoing conflict hasbrought to the fate of heritage resources,
Al Quntar identifies an issue that underscoresdisciplinary and institutional approaches alike:the absence of Syrian-centered approaches
to the safeguarding of heritage value andheritage resources. Instead, she points out,
efforts have been often directed towards
hyper-visible initiatives for Western audiences
and the mobilization of heritage concerns
in diplomatic transactions—which Al Quntar
likens to the use of heritage for propaganda
by the perpetrators of destructive practices.
Constance Wyndham brings a second
challenging case study in the examination ofheritage expertise, focusing on her researchin Bamyan, Afghanistan. In this piece, shelays out a complicated landscape ofexperts and local stakeholders that unfolds
throughout the reconstruction efforts anddebates surrounding the destroyed Bamyan
Buddhas. Her work narrates the interplay

between different forms of disciplinary
expertise, that is, different conservationand heritage management agencies, which
territorialize through their work the ruins of
the famous Buddhas. This piece capturesin particular the way in which local groups
are not only excluded but also unable toperceive the differences between the various
international bodies of foreign experts working
on this heritage site. The outcome of thesenegotiations, which mobilize concepts ofauthenticity in accordance with different
regional and institutional interpretations,causes confusion among local stakeholders
and experts.
Cut Dewi follows this collection of
debates with a commentary from Western
Indonesia through her study of post-disaster
Banda Aceh, on the island of Sumatra. In thispiece, she highlights a dynamic that is often
observed in ‘non-Western’ heritage territories,
where heritage experts foreign and local
alike deploy standards of expertise that aredamaging to the preservation of local heritage
value. Considering expert assessments andprocesses of selection that actively exclude
the restoration of active ‘living’ mosques,
Dewi critiques a dominant heritage practicethat fails to acknowledge its Westerncolonial legacy, advocating instead for formsof expertise that devise ways to embrace
Indonesia as a stand-alone territory.
In contrast, Joella van Donkersgoed
observes a different embrace of colonial
legacies for the preservation of heritage
resources in Eastern Indonesia. In the Banda
Islands, she documents the development ofa heritage industry that openly welcomes
Western experts to highlight and protect Dutch
heritage resources on the island as part ofa broader legacy of economic wellbeing andresource exploitation that has characterized
the island through the Spice trade. This,
however, does not happen without conflict
between local and foreign ideas of restoration.
Aesthetically, she documents the restoration of
Nassau Fort as a process that causes tension
between disciplinary standards of restorationand local perceptions of authenticity thatgo against modern approaches to theconservation and management of heritage
resources. Logistically, local stakeholders
resent the type of workforce that is used tocarry out restoration work as something thatsomewhat affects the authenticity of therestoration work itself.
Moving eastward, to China, Qioayun
Zhang discusses heritage preservation
debates and policies that surround thepreservation of intangible cultural heritage
for the ethnic Qiang people in the aftermathof the Wenchuan earthquake of 2008.
Considering governmental efforts to preserve
this previously unsupported heritage resource,
she examines the way in which the local
Qiang have reacted to expert assessment
and subsequent monetization of their skills
as their newly-heritagized cultural resource
was drawn into the post-disaster limelight,
and the challenges involved in maintaining
authenticity in these practices. This case study
cautions against the use of intangible heritage
practices in nationalist agendas at the expenseof alienating practices from their rightfulpractitioners. Zhang also highlights the uneasy
relationship between heritage preservationand the religious practices that rely on entirely
different forms of authority and expertisein order to assess authenticity and value.
A final contribution from Tomoe Otsuki
describes a challenging expert involvement in
the identification and protection at a global

Although the six case studies featured
in this issue are diverse, they do problematize
coherently some of the key concerns forcritical heritage studies in this region. A theme
that weaves these case studies together isa concern with heritage ethics, that is, aconcern with not just the type of expertisethat is deployed to resolve specific heritage
preservation challenges, but also with theforms of self-assessment that may (or may not)be used alongside standards, methodologies,
and the authority of disciplinary archives
and knowledges. Experts, however criticallytrained, are not immune to perpetuating
dominant frameworks through the work ofheritage identification and management, andEurocentrism in cultural heritage preservation
approaches is not simply resolved throughinterventions applauded in critical heritage
studies. Despite a growing concern with
marginalized voices and agendas thathave propelled the critical heritage turn, an
under-development of new and alternative
methodological discussions that accompany
this turn in heritage studies means thatinterventions often normalize foreign
ontologies. The interplay of international,
regional, and local expertise today makes
the work of heritage preservation a truecosmopolitan venture. This is not simply due tothe networked nature of heritage preservation
organizations, but also the hybrid identity of
approaches that make the identification of‘the local’ increasingly challenging: local expert
authorities may partake in self-colonization
through the systematic use of foreign tools,
and local stakeholder groups may exercise
their agency through the willing assimilationof foreign principles in order to gain authentic
control of a heritage resource and its future.
In this sense, expert networks become
increasingly reticent to being identified as‘local’ or ‘foreign’.
Therefore, moving forward, a concern within
the growth of a critical heritage methodology
is not simply to challenge forms of expertise
but to confront the disciplinary baggageof Heritage Studies in order to challenge
categorical distinctions between different levelsof locality that are used to inform researchquestions and methodologies. Looking beyond
nationalities, languages, and institutionalarrangements, there is a construction ofknowledge that travels very effectively ‘under
the radar’ in the form of best practices,
standards, and disciplinary languages thatoriginate in the same colonial centers and are
deployed by ‘foreign’, ‘local’, and ‘hybrid’
experts alike. The challenge is, therefore, toassess how this hybridity affects the workof characterizing the relative value of highly
politicized types of expert knowledge, and to
examine the effects of how and when thesecategorical boundaries are erected or erased.
Trinidad Rico Assistant Professor
and Director of Cultural Heritage
and Preservation Studies, Departmentof Art History, Rutgers University.
trinidad.rico@rutgers.edu

Notes

Heritage construction at work in Banda Aceh, Indonesia. Photo by author.

1	Byrne, D. 1995. ‘Buddhist Stupa andThai Social Practice’, World Archaeology
27(2):266-281.

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

Heritage expertise across Asia

Palmyra and expert failure
Salam Al Quntar

Since the outbreak of Syria’s civil war in 2011, Syrian cultural
heritage has suffered extensive destruction resulting from collateralbombing damage, military use, intentional destruction, and looting.
As discussed in relation to the international failure to respond to the
tragic humanitarian crisis that ensued, the destruction of heritage hascreated great frustration for the international community of heritage
experts, who have focused primarily on obtaining and distributing
information about the extent of damage to cultural resources, rather
than on the conditions created by the crisis.1

In this sense, the Syrian heritage crisis
represents what Lynn Meskell has called
an “expert failure” to describe the ineffectiveness of professional archaeologists
and preservationists to save heritage in a timeof conflict.2 I would argue that traditional
expert responses to the crisis by internationalorganizations, spearheaded by the United
Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), have shown little
tangible benefit to Syrians, to Syrian heritage
professionals, and to Syrian cultural heritage.
The majority of appeals made in supportof the protection of Syrian heritage haveendorsed a notion of universality andneutrality to justify the need to protect thiscultural heritage. However, the emphasis by
UNESCO on coordinating its efforts throughgovernmental communication channels
has resulted in an inability to take effective
protective actions and puts to question
its commitment to neutrality. The ongoing
concerns with the fate of Palmyra, as
I discuss in this piece and through myresearch, demonstrates the failure of
UNESCO’s commitment to building peacein the minds of women and men. It also
attests to the failure of international experts
to preserve the heritage of Palmyra inany meaningful and sustainable way.
I argue that, in these failed attempts, little
consideration has been given to local
communities and to Syrian experts as mainstakeholders in the preservation of thiscultural heritage resource.

PalmyraBuilt around an oasis in the Syrian desert,
Tadmur—or Palmyra [city of palms]—was
one of the most important trade and cultural
centers of the ancient world, with a distinctive
local culture that was incorporated into the
Roman Empire in the first century CE. Morethan two centuries later, the city gained
independence from Rome, and under its
famous Queen Zenobia, established the

The Arch of Triumph, Palmyra, Syria. Photo by author.

Palmyrene empire which annexed much of
the Roman east. Palmyra’s architecture isnotorious for its grand colonnade, a 1100
meter-long Roman street that connects a
temple to the god Bel with the area known as
the Camp of Diocletian. Other archaeologicalremains in the ancient city of Palmyra today
include an agora, a theatre, urban quarters,
and other temples that comprise what is
generally considered by scholars to be thefinest example of surviving Roman architecturein the Eastern Mediterranean. Also, within thearchaeological zone of Palmyra stands the
Fakhr-al-Din al-Ma’ani Castle. This heavy
fortification dates to the 13th century andoffers a spectacular view of the site. The siteof Palmyra, inscribed as a UNESCO World
Heritage Site in 1980, has a defined place inSyrian historical consciousness. Syrians feel aparticular connection to the site and take muchpride of the once great merchant city that
influenced and ultimately defied the power ofRome. Palmyra stands at the literal crossroadsof civilizations as the art and architecture of
the city is also a perfect portrait of the Fertile
Crescent, which features an incredible blendof cultures and traditions: a dynamic culture
and a land of inherent pluralism and mélange
owing to its Mesopotamian, Levantine, Semitic,
Greco-Roman, Persian, and Islamic heritage.
Both the modern town and ancient cityof Palmyra were caught in the crossfire thatmarked the Syrian civil war, first starting
during early 2013. In 2014, military forcesfrom the Assad regime fortified themselves
within the site, further damaging the ruins.
In 2015, ISIS forces overran Palmyra, andcommitted barbaric and monstrous assaults
on the people and cultural monuments andartifacts of the city. Throughout these events,
the destruction of Palmyra’s magnificent
monuments provoked an international outcry
and prompted significant media attention.
At the center of these events, ISIS executed
Khaled Al-Ass’ad, the former directorof Antiquities at Palmyra and a devoted
outstanding archeologist whose work had

been dedicated to this site. Following thisshocking execution, ISIS proceeded to destroy
many of the most famous ruins in situ—the
Bel and Baalshamin temples, the tower tombs,
the monumental arch and standing columns—
in addition to plundering the Palmyra Museum
and destroying a large number of sculptures
and artifacts still inside. In March 2016, theAssad forces backed by Russian military
support, recaptured Palmyra and immediately
started building a Russian military base within
the site. Nine months later, in December
2016, ISIS recaptured Palmyra and this time
destroyed the tetrapylon and damaged thetheater. The Assad regime forces managed
to take it back in March 2017.
During this time, the ancient site also
witnessed extensive looting operations,which resulted in many Palmyrene artifacts
appearing on the antiquity market or being
captured by Lebanese and Turkish customs
officers. Looting started in the fall of 2011,closely following the uprising in Syria, andas ISIS took occupation of the site, they
established the so-called Diwan al Rikaz
office, giving digging permits in exchange fora tax, applied only for non-figurative objects.
However, it is believed that the looters werehanding over only unsellable figurative
objects to the Diwan al Rikaz (presumably to
be destroyed by ISIS fighters), while keepingfrom ISIS those artifacts in good condition
that are to be sold to dealers of antiquities
on the black market.

Heritage and preservation
as propaganda
Throughout the different shifts in thecontrol of Palmyra, its monuments andartefacts have been used in appalling politicalpropaganda.3 While ISIS used the ancienttheater to stage dramatic executions forcirculation on social media, Russian militaryforces later staged a music concert at thetheater to promote an image of a civilized
Russian savior before losing thesite to ISIS forces again. As ISIS was
driven out of Palmyra in
March 2016, and despite the fragile
security conditions, UNESCO
released a statement on its futureplans for Palmyra on 27 March2016. In this, the organization
announced a telephone conversation between the Director
General of UNESCO, Irina
Bokova, and President Vladimir
Putin of Russia during which
they discussed the protection
and preservation of the cultural
heritage of Palmyra. Offering“full support for the restoration of
Palmyra”, this diplomatic display
was underscored by the fact that
UNESCO openly collaborated
with a foreign actor in an issue
contextualized by an ongoing civil
war, making claims on behalf ofa devastated nation. UNESCO’s
statement came at a time whenmillions of Syrians were, and stillare, displaced as a consequence ofthe bloody conflict and the peopleof Palmyra continue to experience

The Focus

31

active risk to their lives, including possible
detention by the Assad government and thedestruction of their homes and heritage.
This tone-deaf engagement with heritage
preservation in the context of active conflictsuggests an absence of ethical concerns.
There are, in addition, equally problematic
claims surrounding the preservation of
Palmyra from other organizations. During
the destruction documented at the site, anumber of international research efforts werelaunched to record the extent of damage tocultural heritage resources in various ways.
While analysis of high-resolution satellite
imagery has typically been used to record
the destruction of monuments by the handsof ISIS,4 technological advancements in
3-dimensional documentation (3D) are used
popularly to produce archival informationand promote dissemination of information
about cultural heritage sites. For example,
the Institute for Digital Archaeology at the
University of Oxford has created a 3D modelof the destroyed Arch of Triumph in Palmyra
using structure-from-motion photogrammetrydata,5 which was then printed as a 3D archand put on display in London and New York.
This initiative prompted a heated debate
about the purpose of such an endeavor,
both its creation and display, especiallyconsidering that the reproduced model not
only failed to capture the authenticity ofthe original structure, but moreover showeda lack of relatedness between this initiativeand heritage stakeholders in Syria. In thissense, the display was a ‘technological hit’that claimed Western custodianship overan endangered heritage and not much else.

Reconstructionof Palmyra
Throughout my work as an archaeologist
concerned with the ongoing developments
in Syria I note that, at various levels of
authority, groups of international experts
engage with problematic uses of heritage
preservation claims without a clear concern
for the ethics associated with the work ofheritage preservation and management.
Instead of promoting a better understandingof the way in which Syrian cultural heritage
resources and their fate are mobilized
for political or sectarian gains, a concern
with an idealistic reconstruction of Palmyra
de-sensitizes audiences and other experts
alike to the context that gives Palmyra its
significance: heritage reconstruction as areconciling and unifying role in post-conflict
Syria, with the Syrian people (not monuments)
at the core of the reconstruction process. The
day for discussions about the reconstructionof Palmyra will come and it will require aperiod of reflection about what should be
rebuilt, how it should be done, and how
recent events of the war and occupation
by ISIS should be memorialized, if at all.
This is a discussion that will invite voicesfrom institutional and disciplinary heritage
expertise. I argue, therefore, that this
discussion must be undertaken by Syrians
on all sides of the conflict and not decided
for Syria by international experts anddiplomatic organizations.
Salam Al Quntar Lecturer AssistantProfessor - Classics, Rutgers University.
sa1370@rutgers.edu

Notes1	Al Quntar, S. & B.I. Daniels. 2016.
‘Responses to the Destruction of Syrian
Cultural Heritage: A Critical Review ofCurrent Efforts’, International Journalof Islamic Architecture 5(2):381-397.
2	Meskell, L. 2010. ‘Conflict Heritage andExpert Failure’, in Labadi, S. & C. Long(eds) 2010. Heritage and Globalisation.
London: Routledge, pp.192-201.
3	Eakin, H. ‘Ancient Syrian Sites: A Different
Story of Destruction’ (The New York
Review of Books, 29 September 2016);
tinyurl.com/syriansites (accessed
4 March 2018)
4	‘Special Report: The Recapture of Palmyra’;
www.asor-syrianheritage.org/4290-2(accessed 4 March 2018)5	
www.digitalarchaeology.org.uk/
building-the-arch32

Heritage expertise across Asia

The Focus

Bordering on
the criminal
A clash of expertise in Bamyan,
Afghanistan
Constance Wyndham

The idea that cultural heritage is increasingly under threat
has ushered in a new era for heritage expertise. One example
where various regimes of heritage expertise converge is at
the site of the destroyed Bamyan Buddhas in Afghanistan.
Clashes between these conflicting realms of expertise haveresulted in a ‘stalemate’ over the future of preservation
work at the eastern Buddha and affected how local groups
understand and relate to the site. As the preservation ofdamaged heritage is increasingly mobilised as a featureof international post conflict reconstruction programmes,
this scenario asks questions about the role of experts andexpert knowledge in such heritage interventions.

Heritage ‘at risk’and expertise
While the destruction of the Bamyan
Buddhas by the Taliban in 2001 was treatedas a new phenomenon, cultural property
has often been subject to intentional actsof destruction and iconoclasm. Indeed,‘heritage’ and destruction are deeplyintertwined because damage to the material
and immaterial past often inspires heritage
designation.1 A common response fromheritage agencies and professionals to thedestruction of the Buddhas was to organise
awareness raising initiatives and academic
conferences aimed at mitigating threat toheritage. However, asserting such conventions
and mechanisms for protecting heritage,
which are common in the aftermath of such
spectacular attacks, empower the idea thatheritage is increasingly endangered which, inturn, provides legitimacy to the constructionof specific forms of preservation knowledge,
agendas, and policies.2
The notion that heritage is under threat
gives power to a dominant global approachto heritage preservation that results froman ‘Authorised Heritage Discourse’ (AHD),3
a hegemonic discourse that promotes anidea of heritage as monumental, material andpermanent, and something to be cared for bytrained ‘experts’.4 Here, I will outline how thesignificant amount of international heritage
expertise attracted to the preservation
challenges of the Buddha niches – a highprofile site that is still perceived to be at risk
– affects how local groups understand andrelate to this heritage site.

The authority of experts
The Buddha niches are part of thedesignated ‘Cultural Landscape and Archaeological Remains of the Bamyan Valley’
inscribed on the United Nations Educational
Scientific and Cultural Organization(UNESCO) World Heritage List and World
Heritage in Danger List in 2003, two years
after their destruction by the Taliban. Due tothis designation, any conservation work on
the niches must comply with the Operational
Guidelines of the Convention Concerning
the Protection of the World Cultural andNatural Heritage of 1972 (also known as theWorld Heritage Convention) and preserve
the Outstanding Universal Value of the site.
From the beginning, the conservation efforts
at this site have been concerned with the
management of international expertise.
In Munich in November 2002 the ‘Bamiyan
Expert Work Group’ (BEWG) was formed
by UNESCO and the National Committeeof Germany of the International Council on
Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS Germany).
Since 2002, this group has met approximately
every 18 months in a different city aroundthe world (although only once in Afghanistan
in 2005), to debate and discuss plans forthe future of the Bamyan valleys’ heritage.
A small number of Afghans are included
at each meeting while the majority of thegroup consists of international experts from
UNESCO, the Japanese National ResearchInstitute for Cultural Properties, the ItalianInstitute for Protection and Environmental

The Bamyan Valley showing the two Buddha niches. Photo by Bert Praxenthaler.

Research, Italian firm RODIO, Aachen
University, Munich Technical University
and ICOMOS Germany.
Since 2002, under the umbrella of UNESCO,
experts from these heritage agencies andorganisations have implemented a highly
technical programme of conservation, largely
funded by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The focus has been on surveying,measuring and logging of data relating to
the niches and the surviving fragments fromthe blasts, and stabilising the niches of boththe eastern and western Buddha. Hundredsof fragments with a recognisable sculpted
surface have been recovered, numberedand documented, and are currently housedin temporary buildings constructed at thefoot of each niche. Japanese conservators
and archaeologists have undertaken an
adjunct programme of laser scanning theextensive network of caves and conservationof the remains of the mural paintings. The‘safeguarding’ project has so far received
US $6,345,807 of funding.5 To date, theseinterventions at the niches have beentechnical with an emphasis on the role ofthe international expert or consultant who
visits Bamyan for short periods, rather thanlonger-term investments focused on either
understanding local regimes of heritage
value, or on training for Afghan conservators
or engineers.

A conflict of expertise
In July 2002, upon the arrival of the first
ICOMOS Germany mission to the valley, thegovernor of Bamyan province expressed his
urgent wish to ‘reconstruct’ the Buddhas.6
While reconstruction, without the correct
documenting evidence, is not permissible
under paragraph 86 of the World Heritage
guidelines and its principle of authenticity,during my field research in the valley Afghans
continually expressed a desire to reconstruct
at least one of the Buddhas in some shape orform. However, the international ‘experts’ seem
split between two camps over the future of
the niches: the group of experts from ICOMOS
Germany based at the Munich Technical
University, led by ex ICOMOS President
Michael Petzet, recommend anastylosis,
a method of reconstruction that involves
reassembling and restoring the many boulders
and fragments to their original positions
on the monument, possibly with the use ofa foundational structure as support, while
Japanese donors
and consultantsand UNESCO
largely advocate
for the niches tobe stabilised but
remain empty.
One supporting
argument here isthat the niches were
inscribed on theWorld Heritage List
after the destructionof the Buddhas,
therefore any change to the integrity ofthe site as it has been inscribed would beconsidered to detract from its authenticity.
At the 10th BEWG meeting, which took
place in Tokyo in 2011, it was announced
that neither Buddha statue was to be totallyreconstructed. This determination was
followed by a recommendation from theExpert Working Group that the large western
niche be left empty “as a testimony to the
tragic act of destruction” while a study isundertaken to see if a “partial reassemblingof fragments of the eastern Buddha could be
an option”. Afghan local, national government
and Bamyan residents were disappointed.

What followed reveals a differencein agenda and a lack of communication
between the two giants of international
heritage policy and practice. In 2013, experts
from ICOMOS Germany were contracted by
UNESCO to build a platform to structurally
consolidate the rear face of the Eastern
Buddha and protect the public from falling
rocks. During their work at the site tobuild this platform, ICOMOS consultants
fashioned two structural supports to theeastern Buddha niche that were constructedwith iron rods, reinforced concrete and bricks.
As the work progressed, these half-built
pillars, which stuckout at the bottomof the niche began
to resemble theBuddhas destroyed
feet. ICOMOS
consultants maintainthey were merely
following UNESCO’s
instructions
and constructing
a protective platform
to improve accessto the site. However,
UNESCO understood the appendages as
an opportunistic attempt by ICOMOS
to reconstruct the eastern Buddha’s feetas a means of instigating its preferredconservation strategy of anastylosis,
and was outraged at this apparent deliberate
flouting of World Heritage conservation
doctrine. In an article by The Art Newspaper
from February 2014, a consultant architectfor UNESCO accused ICOMOS Germanyof carrying out work that was “borderingon the criminal”, “wrong on every level”
and taking place without their knowledge
or permission. As a response, in July 2014,
UNESCO terminated ICOMOS Germany’s“[...] carrying out workthat was “bordering on thecriminal”, “wrong on every
level” and taking place
without their knowledge
or permission.”

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

Heritage expertise across Asia

The Focus

33

Cooperation (SAARC), an initiative aimed
at promoting trade and regional economic
development. Visiting filmmakers from China
sponsored a 3D laser projection of imagesof a life sized Buddha into the niche of thewestern Buddha at night as part of thefestivities, using a huge projector transported
from Kabul. The principal Buddha hologram
projected into the niche was one of a totallydifferent Buddha, which has no direct
relationship to Bamyan but rather resembles
a statue of a generic Gandharan Buddha
from southern Afghanistan or Pakistan,enlarged to fill the niche. The niche of thewestern Buddha, which had been occupied
by a vast scaffolding and closed off to locals
throughout the long years of preservation
efforts, was suddenly activated by thisintervention. This popular event represents
another use of the site by ‘non experts’and is revealing as to the range of possible‘authentic’ Bamyan Buddhas.

Will ‘revitalisation’ happen?
Under pressure from an Afghan government keen to rebuild at the Buddhas, UNESCO
organised the 14th Expert Working Group
Meeting in Tokyo in September 2017 for which
proposals for the statues’ ‘revitalisation’ weresought. This call revealed the hierarchies ofknowledge inherent in such meetings: in an
accompanying document, Afghan participants
are referred to as ‘Afghan authorities’ andinternational consultants as ‘international
experts’. The partially rebuilt ‘feet’ havebeen a catalyst for several local movementsthat support reconstruction of the statues.
For example, Shukria Neda, an Afghan civilsociety activist that currently lives in Bamyan,launched a pioneering campaign to collect
two Afghanis from local residents (four US
cents), with the aim of collecting enoughto pay for the reconstruction work. However,at the meeting itself, some forms of authority
and expertise were deemed more acceptable
than others and Shukria Neda was excluded
from speaking in the main public symposium
where the international proposals fromJapan, Germany and Italy were discussed.
These international proposals included
a range of propositions for the future of
the valley: ongoing work on the remaining
fragments; a lapidarium of fragments; arammed earth Buddha; a marble Buddha;
and, a plastic Buddha situated on the cliff
opposite the niches.
The recommendations that followed
the Expert Working Group meeting in Tokyo
advocate for “the establishment of a working
committee for reviewing proposals for the
Bamyan Buddha statues”. As negotiations forthe future authenticity of the site continue,
it remains to be seen what role local expertiseand civil society will play in authenticatingreconstruction.
Constance Wyndham University College
London Institute of Archaeology
c.wyndham.11@ucl.ac.uk

The eastern Buddha with the ‘feet’ concealed behind plastic sheeting in 2015. Author’s photograph.

contract to work in Bamyan, accusing theorganisation of making new constructions
that threatened the Outstanding Universal
Value of the site.
Since the debacle, the Japanese government has withdrawn funding support and
two independent international heritage
consultants were sent to Bamyan to assess thesituation at the eastern Buddha. These experts
subsequently sent a report recommending thatthe ‘feet’ be carefully removed, a solution thatis not possible due to local sensitivities aroundany further destruction at the site. Currently,
the unfinished appendages stick out at thebottom of the Buddha, partially covered bya brown plastic sheet that flaps in the windaround the ungainly ankle-like structures.
This controversy, which was played out in theinternational media, in which photographs of the
supposed, and unfinished, ‘feet’ were included
for everyone to make their own judgment,
demonstrates the power of the monument forinternational heritage organisations such as
UNESCO and ICOMOS Germany to attract
publicity, leverage themselves and undermine
each other’s work. Since this wrangle in 2013
between the two international organisations
there has been no further conservation workat the eastern Buddha.

However, this deadlock had an interesting
effect locally. Interviews that I conducted
as part of my field research with membersof the local community in the valley during
2015 suggested that ICOMOS’s constructionof the ‘feet’ or structural platform wasexactly what the majority of local residents
expected, and that this incident was widelyinterpreted locally as the start of the muchanticipated rebuilding of the Buddhas.
Interestingly, local groups do not seem toperceive the differences between the various
international bodies who are seen instead
as interchangeable foreign experts. Several
residents expressed disappointment that the‘foreigners’ had started to rebuild the Buddhas
and then stopped without undertaking any
more activity at the site.
So far, the processes of preservationand clashes between conflicting realms ofinternational expertise at the Buddha niches
have worked to largely sideline local systemsof heritage value and ideas of ownership at
the site. This scenario illustrates the territorial
manner in which international bodies persist
in dealing with the Buddha niches while
paying lip service to Afghan ownership andparticipation. One result is that local groups
and individuals relinquish responsibilityof the valley’s heritage as they understandinternational agencies and experts as having
control: “it is a World Heritage site – we don’t
have a role” explained one informant.
However, several recent local initiatives
reveal interesting counterpoints to UNESCO’s
expert led interventions at the Buddha niches
and their attached notions of authenticity.
One such happening is ‘One Night with Buddha’,an annual event organised by The Bamyan
Tourism Association to commemorate thedestruction of the Buddhas. This ceremonytakes place on 2nd of March, the date of the
beginning of the statues’ destruction. Students
and younger residents of Bamyan attend
the event, during which participants walkwith candles around the site and read poetry.
While the Bamyan Expert Working Group
recommended that the niche of the western
Buddha remain empty in order to bear witness
to the Taliban’s act of destruction, ‘One Nightwith Buddha’ is a way for local groups tomomentarily reclaim the site from international
heritage agencies and undertake actsof memorialisation and commemorationof their own.
Another such event happened in 2015 when
Bamyan was declared the first cultural capitalof the South Asian Association for Regional

Notes
1	Holtorf, C. 2006. ‘Can less be more?
Heritage in the age of terrorism’,Public Archaeology 5:101-109.
2	Vidal, F. & Dias, N. (eds) 2016.
Endangerment, Biodiversity and Culture.
Routledge.
3	Smith. L-J. 2006. Uses of Heritage.
Routledge.
4	Rico, T. 2014. ‘The limits of a “heritageat risk” framework: The construction of
post-disaster cultural heritage in Banda
Aceh, Indonesia’, Journal of Social
Archaeology 14(2):157-176.
5	Manhart, C. et al. 2014. ‘UNESCO’s
activities for the Safeguarding of
Bamyan’, in C. Margottini (ed.) Afterthe Destruction of Giant Buddha Statues
in Bamiyan (Afghanistan) in 2001.
Springer, p.65.
6	In Michael Petzet’s account of ICOMOS
Germany’s activities in Bamiyan in July
2002 the governor of Bamyan informs
a team from ICOMOS on “the urgent
wish to reconstruct the Buddha”,
see: The Giant Buddhas of Bamiyan,
Safeguarding the Remains. Monuments
and Sites series, No. XIX. Berlin,
ICOMOS-Hendrik Bäßler, 2009, p.43.

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Heritage expertise across Asia

The Focus

Reclaiming cultural heritage
after disasters in Indonesia
While concerns in post-disaster heritage preservation are focused on the loss of known
heritage assets, the erasure of destroyed heritage and the exclusion of emerging heritageby the hands of careless expertise is the biggest challenge in preservation that follows
devastation caused by a natural disaster. Post-disaster reconstruction helps us understand
not only what heritage is, but also the place of heritage and preservation traditions in postdisaster contexts. In my field research in Banda Aceh, Indonesia, I have observed destruction
and loss of heritage value as a direct result of expert judgement, a process that suggests the
deployment of a very narrow understanding of cultural heritage that results in systematic
exclusions of local heritage forms.

Cut Dewi

The Baiturrahman Grand Mosque, Banda Aceh, Indonesia. Photo by author.

A“The heritage sites
affected by the tsunami[...] have become
places of remembering[and are] a reminder
to future generations
about the risks andlikelihoods of recurring
tsunami events”

s it has been argued by critical
heritage advocates, an Authorised
Heritage Discourse (AHD)1 has been in
operation since the European Enlightenment.
In particular, this discourse posits that cultural
heritage is an object primarily understood to
be at risk of destruction and loss. This AHD
discourse and definition for cultural heritageis, in turn, shaped by the forms of authority
and expertise that have been influential to theheritage industry—in particular, architects,
archaeologists, historians, and art historians.
These disciplinary experts have been powerfulactors who put forward through their work
an idea of what heritage is for ordinary
people and communities, and who have taken
a privileged position as stewards to look after
heritage and pass it on to future generations.
The dominance of these forms of disciplinary
expertise, however, has obscured the social,
cultural and political contexts and uses thatheritage may relate to.
For example, in Indonesia, the AHD view ofexpertise is reflected in the legacy of a Dutch
heritage policy, Monumenten Ordinantie(1931), introduced during the Dutch colonialera, from the late sixteenth century to1945. Despite the end of the colonial rule in1945, this policy was uncritically adopted
as heritage policy across an independent
Indonesia, with updates in 1995 and 2010,setting forth heritage principles that are stillin use today. This appropriation, and theassociated adoption and dissemination of auniversalizing and European discourse, havesince dictated standards for care of heritage
resources in this Southeast Asian nation.
As a result, it has reinforced a tendency tooverlook Indonesia’s heritage tradition in
the construction of its heritage policies.

Understanding value
The narrow definition of architectural
heritage as an object that is old, monumental,
and historical (as articulated in the AHD), hasinvariably excluded many places and objects
which have been preserved in such a way
to reflect a continuity of cultural activities
in the aftermath of a natural disaster. Thesebuildings and places play important roles
in supporting social reconstruction throughan articulation of traditions as part of continuous processes of identity formation.2

Some scholars have argued that thissocial reconstruction is needed alongside
the physical reconstruction that is the focus
of post-disaster work. For example, in Banda
Aceh, it has been argued that the social
reconstruction of society does not stop after
formal reconstruction projects come to anend (such as the five-year plan undertaken by
the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Board
for Aceh and Nias (BRR).3 Still today, thesurvivors reconstruct their social and cultural
life through various means, which includes
the construction of cultural heritage places.4
The main reason for the erasure of heritage
in this particular context is primarily theway that authenticity is understood by
heritage experts: the perceived and actual
age of a place or building is often mobilized
to exclude emergent forms of heritage after
the disaster. In Indonesia, the age-limits ofheritage value are determined to be up to
50 years old, posing a challenge to the waythat heritage debates and management
decisions are conducted in light of the tsunami
reconstruction. The aftermath of the tsunami
in Banda Aceh saw the reorganization ofheritage lists on account of different

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

understandings of value. On the one hand,debates emerged about the inclusion oftsunami sites as official forms of heritage.
On the other hand, heritage buildings
destroyed or affected by the tsunami were
removed from inventory lists that designate
heritage resources, resulting in the lossof government funding and support for
their maintenance.
For example, the Badan Pelestarian Cagar
Budaya (BPCB, the Conservation Board for
Tangible Heritage) withdrew support andfunding for the Teungku Dianjong Mosque
in Banda Aceh, on account of issues with its
authenticity. The mosque has been destroyed
and reconstructed several times in the samestyle featuring a three-tiered roof, but using
different materials—from a wooden structure to
bricks and concrete. This heritage organization
invoked Act #11 of 2010 regarding Cultural
Properties, which mandates a strict code ofauthenticity in relation to the preservationof original materials in heritage buildings.
What has been clear in post-tsunami heritagedebates amongst heritage organizationsin Indonesia is that the authenticity of thematerial and style of a heritage remains themain parameter for acknowledging heritage
value from the perspective of experts.
My PhD research from 2011 to 2015
revealed that, for the community, thisparticular mosque still holds the sameauthentic significance as a mosque eventhough the physical fabric has changed.5 Its
use-value is also intact, used spiritually for
prayers especially during the wet season,
and also socially as a place of remembering
the past, especially the past related toTeungku Dianjong (the figure who founded

Heritage expertise across Asia

the mosque), the 2004 tsunami and membersof the community who disappeared during
this catastrophe. The haul, the ceremony
remembering the death of Teungku
Dianjong, still takes place in this mosquein a collaboration between the communityand his family. Yet the ceremony had to behalted for several years until the mosque
was properly re-built in 2008. For the local
community, the tsunami sites have as much
heritage value as the mosque, and they
have therefore expressed a desire to reclaim
them and have them acknowledged as such.
The rebuilding of places, especially mosques,
serves an important role in Islamic society andis a process that, I would argue, is imperative
to the construction of survivor identity andcultural resilience. In the face of the disaster,
rebuilding a historical mosque is considered
heritage-making in its most authentic form.

Healing and social
reconstruction
The heritage sites affected by thetsunami, in this sense, have become placesof remembering and commemoration not only
in relation to the past tsunami disaster, butalso as a reminder to future generations about
the risks and likelihoods of recurring tsunami
events. In this way, heritage sites can become
not only a repository of community values
and collective memories, but also provide theopportunity to engage in processes of posttraumatic healing and social reconstruction;rather than the physical aspects which mightfade.6 In consideration of these processes,
the revocation of a heritage status for

Peulanggahan (Teungku Dianjong) Mosque, Banda Aceh, Indonesia. Photo by Author.

different types of sites, after destruction,
hurts in multiple ways. It is a process thatmakes us consider the effects of applying
dominant heritage definitions (such as AHD)
to a disaster-prone area like Banda Aceh,
which would effectively lose many of its
heritage icons on account of changes to theirauthenticity. While at the same time, newsites of potential heritage value constructed
after the disaster are a long way from being
recognized as having heritage value.
In my work, I suggest that a country likeIndonesia should advocate for alternative
ways of looking at heritage not just on
account of resisting AHD understandingsof heritage value as alien and foreign toIndonesian heritage traditions, but also
in consideration of societies that may be
more prone to rapid change—as is the caseof communities across Indonesia that arevulnerable to natural disasters. It has beenargued that Indonesian heritage traditions
pay more attention to non-material aspectsof sites and buildings, promoting instead
authenticity of meaning, ritual, and spiritual
activities. In this sense, the acknowledgementthat there is a non-Western movement of
heritage management now needs recognition
from different experts involved in heritage
management in Indonesia, especiallyarchitectural conservationists, who havethe ability to be involved and advocate foralternative ways of looking at heritage.
Cut Dewi Lecturer at the Departmentof Architecture, Syiah Kuala University;and researcher at PPISB (Centre forCultural and Social Studies), Banda Aceh,
Indonesia cutdewi@unsyiah.ac.id

The Focus

35

Notes
1	Smith, L. 2006. Uses of Heritage.
Routledge.
2	Daly, P. & Rahmayati, Y. 2012. ‘Cultural
Heritage and Community Recovery
in Post-Tsunami Aceh’, in P. Daly,
R.M. Feener & A. Reid (eds) From the
Ground Up: Perspective on Post-Tsunami
and Post-Conflict Aceh. Singapore:
ISEAS Publishing.
3	Samuels, A. 2010. ‘Remaking
Neighbourhoods in Banda Aceh:
Post-tsunami Reconstruction of Everyday
Life’, in M. Clarke, I. Fanany & S. Kenny(eds) Post-Disaster Reconstruction:
Lessons Learn from Aceh. London:
Earthscan, Ltd.
4	Rico, T. 2016. Constructing Destruction:
Heritage narratives in the tsunami city.
Routledge.
5	Dewi, C. 2015. ‘Iconic Architectural
Heritage: Its Memory and Conservationin Post-Disaster Context’, unpublished
PhD Thesis at the Australian National
University.
6	Dewi, C. 2017. ‘Rethinking architectural
heritage conservation in post-disaster
context’, International Journal of Heritage
Studies 23(6):587-600.

36

Heritage expertise across Asia

The Focus

Heritage making
after the earthquake
Safeguarding the intangible heritage of the Qiang
people in China
After the 8.0-magnitude Wenchuan earthquake in 2008, the Chinese State set about tosafeguard the intangible cultural heritage (ICH) as a part of their efforts to support the ethnic
Qiang people and their cultural life.1 The Qiang were hit hard, with more than 80 percent of
their population living across severely affected areas. The Chinese government led swift andcomprehensive relief efforts, placing a particular emphasis on recovering the Qiang culture.
The inscription of selected Qiang cultural practices as national ICH, as well as the rescue
and promotion of the newly-nominated ICH, became a major part of the post-earthquake
heritage recovery plan.

Qiaoyun Zhang

S

A Qiang Shibi and A Qiang Sheepskin
Drum Dance Master performing at
a government-sponsored Qiang New Yearcelebration. Photo by author.

oon after the disaster, four Qiang cultural
practices (Qiang Sheepskin Drum Dance,
Qiang Embroidery Skills, Qiang New Year,
and Qiang Polyphonic Singing) were included
on the Representative List of Intangible Cultural
Heritage of China, becoming the first time thata large number of ICH of such a small ethnic
group were added to the national list at once.
In 2009, the Qiang New Year was inscribedon the List of Intangible Cultural Heritagein Need of Urgent Safeguarding sponsoredby the United Nations Educational Scientificand Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
With such an unusually fast inscription of
the Qiang ICH into the Chinese national and
UNESCO lists, there was considerable statefunding and governmental planning invested
in the rescue and promotion of Qiang ICH
and their stewards. For instance, annual
celebrations of the Qiang New Year have been
held in the Qiang concentrated counties by

the local governments since then. Thanks
to these initiatives, local industry has beenrebuilt and transformed mainly through anemerging heritage tourism. At the local level,
these newly-heritagized cultural practices
have thrived in many Qiang villages where
associated practices such as worship, healing,
exorcism, dance rituals, as well as embroidery
and watchtower construction skills, were
given space and resources to continue tobe practiced.
This heritagization—which emerged as amatter of urgent safeguarding needs—should
be seen as a State and scholarly-led process.
Selected Chinese scholars worked closely with
the PRC Ministry of Culture and local culture
and sports bureaus in order to interpret,
promote, and regulate the implementation of
ICH safeguarding measures. Such scholar andState collaborations have been establishedsince the beginning of the Chinese ICH

safeguarding campaign in the early 2000s.
The Chinese ICH safeguarding campaign
therefore transformed the status, significance,and even the practices of the heritagized
cultural traditions in Qiang. The campaign
also changed how the Chinese general public
perceive and interact with such items.

Challenges for
ICH safeguarding
What I refer to as the ICH knowledgemaking process in China includes thefollowing three aspects. First, sponsored by
the central government, the ICH safeguarding
campaign has grown to be a major means toprotect and celebrate traditional and ethnic
cultural practices as national treasures in
China. ICH is a nascent yet politically energizing concept in contemporary Chinese

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

campaigns for cultural heritage protection
and promotion. When introduced to theChinese public in the early 2000s, intangible
heritage was seen as a morphologically andculturally alien concept. Nevertheless, China
is now the country hosting the largest numberof elements on the UNESCO-recognized
Representative List of the Intangible
Cultural Heritage of Humanity. The Chinese
Representative List of Intangible Cultural
Heritage now includes almost 1300 elements.
Second, the heritagization of folk rituals
is a process of knowledge production andidentity transformation in which the folk
ritual is officially reinterpreted and upheld
as national heritage. Adopting and adapting
UNESCO’s discourse on ICH, the campaign
grants heritage status to what was previously
considered to be private, old, local, and once
denigrated cultural practices, allowing theseto enter the public and collective Chinese
cultural life. Described as ‘feudal superstition’and officially banned or condemned in
the past, some of the now-celebrated ICH
items were long despised for contributing
little importance to Chinese culture inaesthetic, intellectual, or social terms. In thiscontext, the heritagization that took place
is a culturalizing process that integrates‘backward’ and ‘superstitious’ practices into
new and promising “cultural categories”.2
The culturalizing process recognizes andrepresents the folk rituals’ political viability,
scientific validity, educational utility, andsocial positivity, essential for the nationalist
construction of a modernizing multi-ethnic
China. The making of the Qiang New Yearas national ICH is a case in point: this Qiang
worship ritual is reinterpreted as an occasion
for the Qiang to express “respect andadmiration to all spirits, the motherland, andthe ancestors”,3 to “promote ethnic unity andharmony”,4 to be educated about civilized
conducts, as well as to celebrate the ‘positiveenergy’ (zheng nengliang 正能量) embeddedin the officially-acclaimed ‘miraculous
reconstruction’ after the earthquake.
Last, but not least, along with the stateled ICH safeguarding campaign, the local
stakeholders’ perceptions and performancesof their own traditional cultural practices
have been transformed. In large part, thisis because heritagized practices are now
articulated within the terms of ‘multivocality’—that is, where a folk ritual is used to display
multiple diverse voices and meanings
when presented to different audiences
and performed by varied practitioners.5
The protection awarded by ICH designation
provided new resources and opportunities
for the folk rituals to survive. Admittedly,
the promotion of the Qiang ICH led to thedevelopment of both performative and sacredaspects of these rituals. Villagers safely andcreatively took advantage of the preeminenceof ritual practices, such as the continuationof the New Year celebration and shibi
rituals in funerals and house construction,
to fulfill their responsibilities and reinforce
social relations (Shibi
are the Qiang ritualspecialists who monitor
major Qiang rituals at
funerals, weddings,
and Qiang New Year).
Such responsibilities
and relations form the
backbone of everyday
community life, which inturn provides sociallyaccepted meanings and artifacts of the
manifestation of cultural heritage. At thesame time, the local Qiang added newmeaning and function to the heritage cultural
practices. For example, after the earthquakeshibi were frequently asked to perform the‘sending the red’ ritual to bless villagers’
new cars, in which specialists place a pieceof ‘blessed’ red cloth under the windshieldof the vehicle. In the past, shibi would only
perform such a ritual when worshiping
the spirits.

Heritage expertise across Asia

My long-term field research for this casestudy, since 2012, cautions against ignoring
the politics of interpretation and safeguardingthat may alienate local practices from local
communities, turning the ICH inscribed37

A bird's-eye view of the reconstructed Qiang village. Photo by author.

practices into showcases for state power
and nationalist agendas. In the events
that unfolded as part of urgent heritagesafeguarding planning, the viewpoints andexpectations of the Qiang ICH stakeholders
and ordinary villagers were marginalized.
I argue that their right to define their own
cultural practices in their own terms as wellas employ agency in the way that they would
have preferred toprotect such practices
were disregarded.
Local community
members and scholars
alike have also been
concerned with the
influence of tourism
and a market economy
on the transmissionof these ICH practices.
For example, the celebration of the Qiang
New Year, or the practices and skills involvedin traditional embroidery, were mobilized
as commodities for tourism consumption.6
Many stewards of the Qiang New Year,
Qiang Sheepskin Drum Dance, and Qiang
Embroidery Skills became representatives
not only for the noted cultural practices, butalso for Qiang earthquake victims. They were
popularly invited to perform their skills andtechniques at various events to demonstrate
the survival of endangered practices as wellas the resilience of the Qiang population as awhole. However, increasingly the Qiang shibi
were accused by villagers of performing ‘fake’and out-of-context rituals for the sole purposeof entertaining tourists at the expense ofengaging in blasphemy of spirits or ancestors.
Shibi and their apprentices expressed similar
concerns with offending the spirits in such

“Heritagized practices
are now articulated
within the terms of‘multivocality’.”

Discussion

The Focus

performances, preferring to create special
rituals just for tourism events, while retaining
the authentic practice for its sacred purposes.
In addition, there was a lack of sustainable
planning or funding strategies involved. The
emergent Qiang ICH preservation campaign
seemed to come to an end along with thecompletion of the State-led reconstruction
projects in 2011. My research in the affected
Qiang communities shows that very little longterm effort was devoted to the transmission ofthese ICH within local communities when the
media and scholarly attention on the Qiang
faded away. This contrast leads to two main
issues surrounding the newly-heritagized
cultural practices. On the one hand, the lackof funding or cultural preservation planningmay prompt villagers to participate more in
for-profit performance of their traditions,misrepresenting the social and cultural
meanings of these practices and essentializing
and further marginalizing rituals and the
Qiang. On the other hand, the short-lived
preservation campaign failed to preserve,and sometimes even destroyed, the socioecological context surrounding the tradition— especially the human-environmental andinter-personal relations involved — in whichsuch practices originate and develop.7
Although there were cases in which individual
villagers re-discovered values through thesepractices, culturally insensitive safeguarding
programs may cause ICH items to lose their
attachment to community values, reducing
their liveliness and relevance.
Qiaoyun Zhang Affiliated Fellow
at International Institute for AsianStudies, Leiden, the Netherlands(see p.55 of this issue) q.zhang@iias.nl

Notes
1	The Qiang people are one of the 55
officially recognized ethnic minorities
in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
They have a comparatively small
population of 300,000 and have long
been economically, politically, andculturally marginalized.
2	Gao, B. 2014. ‘How Does Superstition
Become Intangible Cultural Heritage
in Postsocialist China?’ Positions 22(3):551-72.
3	ICH China. 2013. ‘Qiang Nian 羌年’[Qiang New Year Festival].
http://www.ihchina.cn/4/10460.html(accessed 7 Feb 2018).
4	ICH China. 2013. ‘Daizu Poshuijie
傣族泼水节’ [Dai Water-splashing Festival].
http://www.ihchina.cn/5/11073.html(accessed 7 Feb 2018).
5	McDowell, J.H. 2010. ‘Rethinking
Folklorization in Ecuador: Multivocality
in the Expressive Contact Zone’,Western Folklore 69:181-209.
6	Le Mentec, K. & Zhang, Q. 2017.
‘Heritagization of disaster ruins andethnic culture in China: Recovery plans
after the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake’,
China Information 31(3):349-370.
7	Zhang, Q. & Barrios, R.E. 2017. ‘Imagining
Culture: The Politics of Culturally Sensitive
Reconstruction and Resilience-buildingin Post-Wenchuan Earthquake China’,in Companion, M. & Chaiken, M. (eds)
Responses to Disasters and Climate
Change: Understanding Vulnerability
and Fostering Resilience. CRC Press,
pp.93-102.

38

Heritage expertise across Asia

The Focus

The relief of the 1865 discovery of hidden Christians in the Ōura Cathedral, Nagasaki. Courtesy of Minimi-shimabara City, Nagasaki.

A critical review of Catholic heritage
sites in Nagasaki, Japan
Tomoe Otsuki

In July 2016, the Japanese government nominated a group of Catholic heritage sites in the Nagasaki
region to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) World Heritage
Committee for inclusion in the World Heritage List. This nomination comprises a collection of 12 sites that tell
the story of the 250-year prohibition of the practice of Christian faith between the 17th and 19th centuries
in Japan. The process of shaping what constitutes Catholic heritage in Nagasaki calls for an examinationof the history, legacy and local knowledge that have been excluded from the official discourse thathas accompanied this heritage.

T

his essay explores how the discourseof Outstanding Universal Value (OUV)
that has been used to support thisnomination has shifted as different actors
have become involved in the process of World
Heritage-making. In particular, I examine
the role of the advisory body to UNESCO,
the International Council on Monuments andSites (ICOMOS), in defining the significanceof history of Japanese Catholicism used
to justify the status of the proposed sites as
World Heritage in light of the introductionof the history of ‘hidden Christians’ to aninternational audience.

‘Underground Catholics’in Nagasaki and the World
Heritage Campaign
The Nagasaki region of Japan used to be
the religious centre for Japanese Catholics
and European missionaries during the
16th century, as the region served as Japan’s
gateway for the exchange of knowledge,
technology and culture with foreign countries.
However, as the number of Japanese
subjects and lords converting to Catholicism
increased, feudal authorities perceived
Christianity to be a threat to their ruling powerand banned Christianity in the year 1612.
During the period of Christian prohibition,
all European missionaries were expelled fromthe country, while many Japanese Catholics
went underground to escape persecution,
hiding in remote areas in the Nagasaki region.
These Catholics, who disguised themselves
by publicly practicing Shinto/Buddhism while
secretly maintaining their faith, are referred
to as ‘underground Christians’ or ‘hidden

Christians’. In this essay, I refer to them as‘underground Catholics’ to be consistent withthe historical background of this period, inwhich no missionaries from the other branchesof Christianity, such as Protestantism, entered
Japan.1 Many of the underground Catholics
were accused of heresy, while others refused
to renounce their faith even in the face of
exile, torture and death.2
In the mid-19th century, Japan finallylifted its 250-year policy of closure to foreigncountries and opened a few ports to theoutside world, one of which was in Nagasaki.
The first Catholic church was erected in
Nagasaki after the ban on Christianity waslifted, but it was opened solely for foreigners
residing within Nagasaki. In March 1865,
however, a small group of underground
Catholics secretly entered the church andasked a French priest, “Where is the statueof Santa Maria?” They then whispered:“All of us have the same heart as you.” Thisencounter led to the discovery of roughly
15,000 underground Catholics across the
Nagasaki region.
Advocates for the preservation of Catholic
heritage sites believe that a collection of
Catholic historical sites can tell this rich andunique history of Japanese Catholicism inNagasaki spanning a period of four centuries.
The campaign for designating Nagasaki’s
Catholic churches and heritage sites as
World Heritage was initially launched bya citizen group called ‘To Declare a New
World Heritage: The Nagasaki Church
Group’ (hereafter ‘the Church Group’) in
2001. The group was composed of local
Catholics, scholars and non-Christiancitizens. This citizen group identified
49 Catholic churches throughout theNagasaki Prefecture as potential candidates
for World Heritage nomination. The membersof the Church Group believed that thesechurches illustrated the “livingness” of theregion’s Catholic heritage, being sites where
local Catholic communities have maintained
their religious values and ensured thecontinuity of their cultural tradition developed
over a period of 450 years. They claimed
that this living aspect of these churches
constituted OUV.3
Their campaign was successful. In January
2007, Nagasaki’s Catholic churches wereregistered in the UNESCO Tentative List forJapan, marking the intention to pursue aWorld Heritage List nomination; the sites were
described as “testimonies of the suppressed
adherents’ re-acquisition of religious freedom
and its long process”.4 In November 2007,
the Prefectural Government of Nagasaki
created a working group called the ‘Nagasaki
World Heritage Scholarly Conference’(NWHSC) as an official body to discuss thepreservation campaign strategies for Catholic
heritage sites and to write an application for
nomination to the UNESCO World Heritage
List. The NWHSC comprises members fromboth the public and private sectors, suchas Nagasaki Catholic leaders, scholars,
business leaders and civil servants. Gradually,
the role of primary agent and stakeholder
in the heritage campaign for these sites
was shifted from the Church Group to the
NWHSC. Between 2007 and 2012, the NWHSC
repeatedly reviewed the components of thesites. Eventually, it listed 14 Catholic heritage
sites and named the multi-site assemblage
the ‘Christian Churches and Heritage Sites in
Nagasaki’.5 The proposed heritage complex
consisted of the remains of two castles whose

The Tabira Cathedral, one of the sites excluded fromthe final application to the World Heritage Committee.
© Creative Commons on Wikipedia.

rulers converted to Catholicism during the
16th century; four villages where underground
Catholics concealed themselves during theperiod of Christian prohibition; and eight
Catholic churches that were built after theend of Christian prohibition. The NWHSC
presented this heritage collection as sitesof exchange and communication of traditional
cultures between Japan and the West.

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

ICOMOS intervention
in Nagasaki
In January 2015, Japan recommended
the inscription of Catholic heritage sites to the
UNESCO World Heritage List. In Septemberof that year, a group of experts from ICOMOS
came to Nagasaki to assess the applicationand the heritage property. In February 2016,
ICOMOS recommended that the Japanese
government dramatically review its application,
asking that the application focus on the periodof the ban on Christianity in Japan, which
experts considered a period of exceptionalsignificance in Nagasaki, rather than on the
period that followed after the ban was lifted.
In April 2016, the NWHSC invited ICOMOS
to Nagasaki in order to refine its application.
ICOMOS maintained its previous advice, telling
the NWHSC to exclude sites that were not
relevant to the Christian ban. ICOMOS also
advised the NWHSC to include the term ‘hidden
Christians’ in the title of the heritage property.
In the new version of the application to
the World Heritage List, the property consistsof 12 sites, 10 of which are villages where
underground Catholics used to live, including
one of the villages located in the Amakusa
region in Kumamoto Prefecture. Nearly all
the churches selected by the Church Groupand the NWHSC—except the Ōura Cathedral,
where underground Catholics revealed
themselves to the French
priest in 1865—were
eliminated from the final
application. Instead, 7
Catholic churches wereadded to the list as they
are located in these 10
villages that housed
underground Catholics
during the period of
Christian prohibition.
The Tabira Cathedral
is one of the churches that were excluded fromthe final list in the very last selection processfrom 2016 to 2017. After the end of banning
Christianity, 8 families of former underground
Catholics moved to a small village called‘Tabira’ from different underground Catholics’
villages and built a humble temporary
church. Tabira continued to receive former
underground Catholics from other villages
in Nagasaki. They reclaimed wasteland andfinally built the Tabira Cathedral in 1918. The
cathedral was dedicated to the 26 martyrs
who were executed by crucifixion in Nagasakiin 1597. ICOMOS, however, claimed that the
Tabira Cathedral is irrelevant to the period of
Christian banning as Tabira became a Catholicvillage after the end of the ban, ignoring
tremendous efforts and sacrifices the former
underground Catholics made in order to transform the wasteland into the land of God.
The final application to the World Heritage
List is titled the ‘Hidden Christian Heritage
Sites in Nagasaki Prefecture and the
Amakusa Region’. The application describes
how underground Catholics “gave rise toa distinctive religious tradition that was
seemingly vernacular yet maintained the

Heritage expertise across Asia

essence of Christianity”,6 adding thatthe property shows “the distinctive way inwhich the hidden Christians continued theirfaith during the ban on Christianity” andtherefore has OUV. In July 2016, the Japanese
government nominated the Catholic heritage
sites to UNESCO’s World Heritage List. The
final decision for a permanent registration
is to be made in July 2018.
The intervention by ICOMOS experts
played an important role in efforts to shedlight on the history of underground Catholics.
The period of Catholic persecution has neverbeen a part of Japanese national history
and very few people in Japan know thatapproximately 4,000 underground Catholics
became martyrs, while thousands of other
Catholics were sent into exile. After theofficial nomination to UNESCO, it became
clear that no Japanese heritage stakeholders,
including the local and national media, hadever considered the question of how people
in Japan might come to terms with thisforgotten or marginalized history. ICOMOS
also contributed to honouring underground
Catholics by representing this population
to an international audience as courageous,
faithful Japanese Catholics who developed
a distinctive religious tradition.
However, some local scholars havealso argued that ICOMOS experts, as wellas members from the NWHSC, ignored
certain aspects oflocal knowledge
regarding theunderground Catholics
in the designation ofboundaries for thisnomination. First andforemost, the final
application obscures theprominent differences
between ‘underground
Christians’ (Senpuku
Kirishitan) and ‘hidden Christians’ (Kakure
Kirishitan). ‘Hidden Christians’ is a morecommon and popular term both in Japan andabroad to describe Japanese Catholics during
the period of Christian prohibition; however,‘underground Christians’ refers to those
who secretly maintained their faith during
the period of Christian persecution. Hence,
all Japanese Catholics during the period of
Christian prohibition should be referred to as‘underground Christians’. The term ‘hidden
Christians’ refers specifically to those who
decided not to belong to the Roman Catholic
Church, but rather continued to maintaintheir own religious values and traditions
developed over 250 years of persecution
even after the Japanese government lifted theban on Christianity. Notably, the Japanese
title of the heritage property employs theterm ‘underground Christians’, whereas
the term ‘hidden Christians’ remains in the
English title of the property.
When Catholicism was reintroduced inJapan after the end of Christian prohibition,
many of the underground Catholics werestunned by the significant differences
between official Catholic teachings and“[...] they witnessed
how ignorance andrejection of others’
faiths and values
caused brutal violence.”

what they themselves had practiced for 250
years. Following the Roman Catholic Church
also meant that they had to dismiss all the
traditions that their ancestors had developed
and handed down through generations.
As a result, many of the former underground
Catholics decided to live as ‘hidden
Christians’ and continued to keep themselves
isolated from mainstream society and the
Catholic Church in Nagasaki in order toensure the continuation of their own religious
values and traditions.7 They did not identify
themselves as Catholics anymore and did
not build a Catholic church. Equally importantis the fact that hidden Christian communities
still exist in the contemporary period.
However, they are virtually disappearing
as their communities are aging anddepopulating, and no official conservation
measures have been provided by the central
government to preserve their traditions.8

Disrupting continuity
In my research, I am concernedwith revealing knowledge gaps between
ICOMOS experts’ understanding of hidden
Christians and local knowledge. There are
two museums devoted to underground andhidden Christians in Hirado city,9 Nagasaki,
which used to be the land of underground
Catholics and continues to house hidden
Christian communities. The archival andmaterial collections in these museums as wellas the curators’ historical and ethnographic
knowledge are essential to understanding
the history of Japanese Catholicism in theregion. However, none of the ICOMOS experts
visited these museums during their stay in
Hirado city or tried to learn the history of
hidden Christians from the local curatorsin these museums. Likewise, the NWHSC
did not include any of these curators or
ethnographers on their selection committee.
As a result, the NWHSC was incapable ofcommunicating to the foreign experts fromICOMOS that ‘hidden Christians’ are living
communities in the present, and that isolating
the history of underground Catholics from theperiod after Christian prohibition would not
only contribute to the further marginalizationof hidden Christians and the erasure of theirrich history and particular cultural traditions,but also disrupt the continuity between
the period of Christian persecution andthe present time.
Shigeo Nakazono, an ethnographer anda curator of the hidden Christian museumin Hirado, claims that, as time passed,
underground Catholics genuinely soughtways of co-existing with Buddhism/Shintoism
in order to keep their faith; not all theunderground Catholics ‘disguised’ themselves
as Shinto/Buddhists.10 Nakazono argues thatthe significance of the underground/hidden
Christians in Japanese society is their practiceof embracing others’ religions in order tomaintain their own—precisely because they
witnessed how ignorance and rejectionof others’ faiths and values caused brutal
violence. Prior to the period of Christian

The Hara Castle Ruins, one of the sites included in the final application to the World Heritage Committee. Courtesy of Minami-shimabara City, Nagasaki.

The Focus

39

persecution, European missionaries hadordered Japanese Catholics to persecute
non-Catholics, including Buddhist monks andShinto priests, and to burn down temples andshrines in order to propagate Catholicism
during the 16th century.11 Yet this significant
part of history is now completely excluded
from the official discourse of Catholic
heritage in Nagasaki on account of the typeof sites and narratives that were selected
to represent and justify this nomination.
The official representation of underground
Catholics as it stands authenticates their
history and practices for an international
audience; however, a romanticized imageof underground Catholics that excludes theperiods before and after their persecution
can undermine the truly significant elementsof their history, which invokes tremendous
sacrifice and tolerance.

Conclusion
This case study raises the issue of how
local voices and ethnographic knowledgeof Japanese Catholicism Christianity areused—or in this case, excluded—from theprocess of defining the Outstanding Universal
Value of a property. The final application has
betrayed the wishes of local Catholics forthe conservation of their churches as living
heritage as the role of primary agent in theheritage campaign shifted from the Church
Group to the NWHSC and ICOMOS. The
nomination process of Nagasaki’s Catholic
heritage sites has raised some crucial
questions: How should heritage experts,
including ICOMOS, deal with religious
heritage that implicates extremely delicate
narratives and histories? How can local
heritage-makers effectively communicate
with ICOMOS experts? How can critical
heritage scholars advocate for the importanceof including local ethnographers and curatorsin the process of heritage-making? Japan’s
nomination of Catholic heritage sites tothe UNESCO World Heritage List is only the
beginning of the exploration of the legacy ofJapanese underground Catholics and what
their sacrifice can signify to humanity.
Tomoe Otsuki Research Associateof the York Centre for Asian Research,
York University, Toronto, Canada
tomoe.otsuki1219@gmail.com

Notes
1	Protestantism was introduced toJapan in the early 1860s after the banon Christianity had been lifted.
2	See Martin Scorsese’s 2016 film Silence,
based on the 1966 novel Silence(Chinmoku) written by Japanese
Catholic author Shūsaku Endō. Silence
effectively depicts the history of Christianpersecution and the tremendous sufferingof underground Catholics and captured
European missionaries in the Nagasaki
region.
3	Matsui K. 2013. Sacred Sites for Tourism
Strategies: Nagasaki Churches andthe Commodification of Place. Tokyo:
Tsukuba-Daigaku Press.
4	
http://whc.unesco.org/en/
tentativelists/5096
5	All the heritage properties were Catholic
related sites. However, they were officiallynamed ‘Christian Churches and Heritage
Sites in Nagasaki’.
6	
http://kirishitan.jp/values/val004
7	Nakazono S. 2015. What is ‘Hidden
Christians’? [Kakure Kirishitan to wa
Nanika] Genshobo: Fukuoka.
8	The local government of Hirado city,
Nagasaki, has recently launched anoral history and documentary project torecord the tradition of hidden Christiansin the city.
9	One is Hirado Kirishitan Museum(https://tinyurl.com/hirashin) andthe other is Hirado Ikitsuki HistoricalMuseum Shima no Yakata(https://tinyurl.com/hirashin2).
10	‘My Perspectives—Lack of Experts on
Heritage in Nagasaki’, Nagasaki Press,
21 June 2016.
11	Anan, S. 2009. Study of Subjects
of Discrimination in Nagasaki:
Trade, Christianity and Buraku[Hisabetsuburakuno Nagasaki gaku:
Boueki to kirishitan to hisabetsu-buraku].
Nagasaki: Centre for Nagasaki Human
Rights Studies.

40

Heritage expertise across Asia

The Focus

Reinterpretations at Fort Nassauin the Banda Islands, IndonesiaJoëlla van Donkersgoed

Heritage sites are in a constant process of re-interpretation by a wide
variety of actors and stakeholders. The act of attaching meaning to a sitedoes not occur in a vacuum but is influenced by power dynamics within its
broader social context. For example, emphasis on certain features of a site,at the expense of other features, can vary with each interpretation and eachinterpreter. Moreover, the meaning ascribed to a site by contemporarycommunities may be widely different from the intended meaning givenby the society that constructed it. Because of this, heritage sites should
be studied from a variety of angles that together shape the interpretationof the landscape in which the site exists.

View from the reconstructed bastion of Fort Nassau on Banda Neira. In this image the material used for thereconstruction of the bastion is clearly visible, as well as the fact that the residence is located in the trajectoryof the next phase of reconstruction. Photo by Joëlla van Donkersgoed.

In my research on the current interpretationsof the cultural landscape of the Banda Islands
in Indonesia, I explore the interpretations of
the historic site of Fort Nassau on the islandof Banda Neira by diverse interest groups,
including local, national and international
agents. Through my work, I examine thechallenge of gathering insights into thedifferent influences that define this particularsite as a heritage site. Considering various
heritage interpretations, which include bothcolonial narratives as well as the oral history of
the Bandanese people, I suggest that fixating
on a specific historical heritage deters theongoing (re)interpretation of sites to suit theneeds of contemporary society.

Banda Islands and Fort
Nassau: nutmeg and mace
Until the mid-1800’s, the Banda Islands
in Indonesia were the primary source location
for the sought-after spices nutmeg and mace.
As these goods were popular around the world,
traders from Asia and the Arabian Peninsula
travelled great distances to the region in orderto obtain them. The first European tradersthat engaged with people on the Banda
Islands were the Portuguese in 1512, followedby the Dutch in 1599, and the English in 1601.
The Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde
Oostindische Compagnie or VOC) wasestablished in 1602 with the prime objective of
maximizing profits by establishing monopolies
on certain trade goods—the remoteness of the
Banda Islands and their profitable resources
made this location an obvious target for theestablishment of a monopoly on nutmeg
and mace. However, the Bandanese were
not receptive to trading exclusively with theDutch, which would mean breaking otherlong-established trade relations. The VOC sent
Jan Pieterszoon Coen to seize control of theisland, which he did through violent measures.
In particular, in 1621, a bloody confrontation
known as the ‘Bandanese Massacre’ involved
not only the execution of 44 Bandanese
noblemen but also the persecution, deportationand starvation of an estimated 90% of thelocal population. After this violent conquest,
Jan Pieterszoon Coen divided the islands into

perken, plots of land that were to be governedby ex-VOC employees, called perkeniers,
and labored by slaves.
Fort Nassau in Banda Neira is the firstpermanent construction the Dutch built on thearchipelago, leading to fierce resistance fromthe Bandanese noblemen. It is the location
where 44 noblemen, orang kaya, were publicly
quartered and decapitated during the Dutch
conquest. The fort itself has since known
several uses, including its function as a prison
and a storage facility. However, it lost its
military defensive function after it was severely
damaged by bombing during its capture by
the English in 1810. The inner court was thenturned into a tennis court for the enjoymentof the perkeniers families. In the 20th century,
this open area was re-used as the location fora radio station and antenna. These, in turn,became a target for Japanese bombs during
the attacks on the Banda Islands in WorldWar II, which damaged the fort further.
In ruins, the fort failed to regain a new function
and vegetation took over the site. Bandanese
who live near and at the site reported thatthe structure became haunted, with soundsof the massacred men and the rattling of
their chains heard at night.

From site of tragedy
to site of tourism
Fort Nassau had seen multiple phasesof destruction and reinterpretation prior to
the start of my research. When I first visited
the site, the Banda Islands at large had been
attracting interest from within and outside
Indonesia by organizations and individuals
interested in the development of heritage
industries, due to its multi-cultural history andunique natural marine environment. Notably,
through the patronage of a prominent local
family Des Alwi, foreign experts have been
involved in the preparatory work for thenomination of the Banda Islands on the
Tentative List for the World Heritage List of
the United Nations Educational Scientific andCultural Organization (UNESCO).1 As a result of
this general interest, the regional conservation
office in Ternate, Balai Pelestarian Cagar
Budaya (BPCB), initiated a reconstruction

project for Fort Nassau in 2014, which included
the removal of vegetation and the rebuildingof the collapsed and absent bastion walls. This
government initiative can be seen as shapedby a specific vision of tourism consumption:
a completed fort that aligns with the aestheticof the VOC. In order to accomplish this, thedifferent life-phases of the fort, including
its partial destruction and other historicallysignificant events, were disregarded.
Although there is an overall consensus
among the Bandanese that the restoration is apositive action for the fort, the project has notbeen received with merely positive responses.
Firstly, plans to reconstruct the moat aroundthe fort were encountered with resistanceby the local population who have inhabitedthat land for several decades and used thearea of the moat for the cultivation of crops.
Proposed preservation and rehabilitationplans to reconstruct the entire structure would
therefore involve the displacement of several
families. Secondly, there have been conflicting
reactions to the reconstruction of the walls of
the fort on two separate counts. On the one
hand, the materials used in the reconstructedbastions differ from the material in the originalstonework. Discontentment was voiced byseveral Bandanese in relation to this distinction,
who argued that the reconstructed parts ofthe fort did not seem ‘original’ or as it is more
frequently described in the field of heritage
studies, that it is inauthentic. On the other
hand, the Bandanese have also voiced regrets
that the construction work is conducted by
non-local workers, fueling the perceptionthat the regional office does not trust thecraftsmanship of Bandanese construction
workers. Overall, the Bandanese feel thatthrough this process of outsourcing the work,
they have lost their ability to determine how thereconstruction of their site is being conducted.
Interestingly, while many post-colonial
heritage debates question the contemporary
validity of preserving colonial structuresin territories that were once occupied, thedevelopment of a heritage industry in the
Banda Islands suggests that heritage resourcesfrom the Dutch colonial era are not regarded
negatively by the Bandanese nor the otherIndonesian stakeholders involved in theseinterpretations. Instead, these resources
are valued as an opportunity to monetize
a heritage through tourism and foster a senseof pride in buildings that reflect the financial
successes made through the trade ofnutmeg historically.

Processes of reinterpretation
Fort Nassau on Banda Neira is an
example of a Dutch colonial site that is being
reinterpreted for contemporary uses. These
efforts are propelled by Indonesian president
Jokowi’s wish to stimulate tourism as an
avenue to increase the GDP of Indonesia.2
Efforts and resources towards the reconstruction of this fort fit within this goal inorder to attract more tourists to the Moluccan
province. The Bandanese seem to welcome
an increase in the number of tourists that visit

their islands, and the reconstruction of Fort
Nassau is regarded as a positive investment
towards this goal. The concern of the local
population, however, is the way in which
this is conducted. There is an overall senseof exclusion amongst the local communities
during the process of reconstruction and there
is a fear that the reconstructed site will be
an inauthentic replica. The fear is based on
previous reconstructions that did not meet the
expectations of the Bandanese; for example, arecent renovation of a colonial building by nonlocal investors opted for a new roof made ofblue durable material rather than a traditionalroof. Some Bandanese described the modern
appearance of this material as degrading thehistorical feeling of the building and the area.
The use of material that differentiates visuallyfrom the historical fabric is in this case a factor
that decreases the heritage value in the eyesof the Bandanese.
The ongoing efforts in heritage management, including the addition of this site asa cultural landscape to the Tentative List of
UNESCO, as well as the restoration initiatives
at Fort Nassau, suggest that there is increasing
interest in the heritage resources of the Banda
Islands at multiple local and international
levels. This has attracted outside experts,
who are invited to ‘do something’ with theheritage for the promotion and benefit of the
Bandanese people. These efforts are welcomedby the local community as they recognize that
tourism is a profitable source for seasonal
work, and they are also proud to share thehistory and resources of the islands withvisitors. However, developments surrounding
the restoration efforts at Fort Nassau revealed
that the local community does not feel directly
empowered through the current style ofheritage management. There are various ways
in which their involvement could be formalized
in these initiatives; for example, Bandaneseconstruction workers could be employed rather
than outsourcing the work to a company fromAmbon; and the process of consulting thecommunity could include devising a plan toincorporate the reconstructed site into their
daily social lives, giving the fort a function
beyond tourism as a stage to hold cultural
performances, a marketplace, an area fordrying nutmeg, etc. This would stimulate thesite to accrue new social value and contributeto the larger cultural landscape that defines
the Banda Islands as a potential World
Heritage List property.
Joëlla van Donkersgoed
PhD Candidate, Rutgers University
j.van.donkersgoed@rutgers.edu

Notes1	‘The Historic and Marine Landscapeof the Banda Islands’, UNESCO World
Heritage Centre, 9 Feb 2017,https://tinyurl.com/bandaislands
2	‘Tourism Ministry Aims to Woo
13.5 Million Foreign Visitors next Year’,
The Jakarta Post, 14 June 2016,
https://tinyurl.com/woovisitors

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

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newbooks.asia

The Review

Asian Studies. Newest Titles.
Latest Reviews.

Transoceanic Africa-Asiaconnections
The Indian Ocean was not always the ‘Indian’ Ocean. It has also been an African Ocean
known as the Zanj Ocean, Abyssinian Ocean, and Ethiopian Ocean. These names forgotten
in popular imaginations as well as in academic scholarship represent a larger problem
surrounding the maritime littoral: the neglected historical and contemporary role of Africans
in this seascape and on its shores. Yet, in the last decade new studies have been appearing
in the field, and the three books under present review represent this new trend.

Mahmood Kooria​Reviewed titles

Malik Ambar:
Power and Slavery
Across the Indian
Ocean

Africa in the Indian
Imagination: Raceand the Politics ofPostcolonial Citation

Africa in the Indian
Ocean: Islands
in Ebb and Flow

Ali, O.H. 2016

Burton, A. 2016

Leiden and Boston: Brill

Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press

Durham and London:
Duke University PressT

he ocean has historically been ahighway for large scale and long term
flows of communities, commodities, andideas, in which millions of people willingly
or unwillingly travelled, traded, coerced, andcommodified. Africa’s major collaborators
have been the Asian communities before andafter the European and American colonial/
imperial endeavours. Both Asia and Africa,
the two major continents sharing the ocean’sshores, have historically plotted their sociopolitical, economic, and religious trajectories
under the direct influence of the ocean.
This review essay is mainly concerned withthis aspect: how did the Indian Ocean play,and how does it continue to play, a crucialrole in the memories of and studies on the
Afro-Asian interactions in the past andthe present.

The oceanic scapein Africa-Asia Studies
In the past decade, there have been
increasing attempts to identify theseinteractions between Asia and Africa, insideand outside the region. The major conferences
organised by the University of Goethe in
Kuala Lumpur (2014), Cape Town (2015) andFrankfurt (2016) and by the International
Institute for Asian Studies in Accra (2015)
and Dar es Salam (2018) are worth noting inthis regard. The latter’s first conference withparticipants from 40 countries in 55 panels
resulted in the formation of a consortium
called the Association for Asian Studies inAfrica, headquartered in Accra, and has
identified and energised ‘Africa-Asia’ as a
new field of study. Relatedly, there have beenremarkable academic initiatives by Chinese,
American, Indian, South African, Malaysian,Singaporean, and European institutions,
not to mention the international diplomaticconventions for South–South collaborations
between postcolonial Asian and Africancountries, starting with the Asia-Africa
Conference in Bandung in 1955 and stretching
to its 60th anniversary conference re-hosted
by Indonesia in 2015. All these efforts haveproduced a significant amount of academic
projects to record, analyse, and advancethe nuances of these linkages, yet the lion’sshare is focused on the interests of China
in Africa, mainly emphasising political andeconomic negotiations and investments,
but also social, cultural and demographic
implications. Given the recent ‘reappearance’of China after almost 600 years, this suddenboom in literature and discourse has createdan imbalanced academic orientation towards
the deep genealogies of transcontinental
exchanges and encounters between the tworegions. The Indian Ocean often appears
only marginally as a memory scape ofthe historical past to be invoked when thesituation demands it.
Notwithstanding, the wider Asia-Africa
discourse, several edited volumes, andconference proceedings, have recognised
the role of the ocean in the transcontinental
interactions. Two book series, for example,(published by Ohio University Press, editedby Richard B. Allen; by Palgrave MacMillan,edited by Gwyn Campbell) have publishedvolumes with an emphasis on Africaninteractions with Asia through this littoral.
Within this field, one booming zone ofstudy is slavery in the Indian Ocean.
The subfield explores nuances of otherwise unrecognised forced relocations ofAfricans and Asians, from within different
Asian-African regions to such faraway
places as Australia.1 Some other common
themes, such as piracy, have also foundsignificant scholarly attention, particularly
after the increase of Somali piracy in andaround the 2010s. Several other individual
researches have explored the African
involvement in the oceanic mobilities
through intellectual, religious, and legal
networks. The works on Islamic legal andpolitical encounters in the eighteenth tothe twentieth centuries have presented
fascinating African cases in the wake ofEuropean colonial expansions. And, ofcourse, the histories of European andArab colonialisms in East and South
African terrains through enslavements,
forced migrations, genocides, armaments,organised plunders, along with negligible
tints of infrastructural developments, havebeen subjects of serious studies throughthe frameworks of the oceanic scape.

The three books under review slightly
move away from these trends in present
historiography, yet they are informed byand have emerged from the wider currents
in the African and Asian connections andconflicts because and despite of the European
colonial expansions. Omar H. Ali follows
the life of Malik Ambar, an iconic figurein the transoceanic and transcontinental
mobility of the 16th and 17th centuries, who
dramatically went from being a teenage slave
to a statesman and kingmaker; Antoinette
Burton focuses on gradations of race, genderand politics in the literature produced on
the Africa–India entanglements in the 20th
century; and Tor Sellström foregrounds theAfrican islands in the littoral as products
and producers of the maritime socioculturalgeography. These works together represent
three major aspects of East and South Africa’s
predicaments with the maritime world: that ofslavery and forced migrations, the depictionsof Africans as an inferior racial category
within the Indian (Ocean) literary contexts,
and the islands as marginalised terrains ingeopolitical concerns of mainland countries,
be they in Africa or elsewhere.

Phenomenal lifeof an African slave
Omar Ali’s study tells of the ways inwhich Africans were forced to leave their
homelands as slaves and travel thousandsof miles.2 Malik Ambar was such a slave, yet
a figure who resisted the Mughal expansion
into the Deccan through his diplomatic skills
and military tactics (bargi-giri). For several
decades in the late 16th and early 17th century
Ambar was the sole barrier for the Mughals to
the Deccan. Born into and raised by an Oromo
tribe in the Ethiopian highlands, enslaved andexchanged in the slave markets of Africa andthe Middle East before ending up in SouthAsia, Ambar travelled a long way in his life,
similar to many other thousands of Africans
before and after him. In India, Malik Ambar
was first sold in the Sultanate of Ahmednagar
to the chief minister Mirak Dabir aka Chengiz
Khan, who himself was once a Habshi
slave and had risen to his position in the

Sellström, T. 2015

royal court. Under his tutelage, he learnt“the ways of the court and state operations”(p.42). Following the assassination of his
master in a royal plot, Ambar travelled
between different kingdoms in the Deccan
region working for several commanders andrulers. Over the course of time, he “increased
his following across the western Deccan”
by inheriting the army of his former
commanders and harassing Mughal forces
and capturing their supply convoys. Utilising
this manpower, military and diplomatic
skills, and marriage alliances, he rose toprime minister of the Ahmednagar Sultanate
where he controlled the enthronement anddethronement of sultans, built up marvellous
cities and forts, and excelled in administrationof law and order.
In between all the ups and downs of
his life, Ali argues that Ambar depended on
the life principle of namak halal or ‘true tothe salt’ —a concept and tradition of being
loyal to the master —in his services to the
Nizam Shah rulers, no matter who sat on
the throne. However, although true that he
was loyal to the sultanate during several
hardships, he also poisoned a ruler to deathwhen things did not go as he had planned;
or more precisely, when the then Persian
queen called his daughter “a mere slave girl”,“concubine” and a “kaffir” (p.65). Ambar
poisoned both the queen and the king andreplaced him with a five-year-old boy as the
new sultan. Ambar served his interests morethan that of the master(s) and the throne.
Ambar’s story has attracted theattention of several scholars in the lastcentury, but Ali ‘oceanises’ the story throughcomparative and connected histories.
He provides a vivid comparative descriptionof Ethiopia, Iraq and India as backdrops for
Ambar’s trails. Ambar’s later life has been
well recorded, but the author accommodatesa ‘discursive strategy’ of contextualisationand imagination to fill the gaps in his earlylife for which “documentary evidence issparse” (p.135). Through this mechanism ofinterpretative connected historical reading,we get a detailed image of the lives andoceanic journeys of not just Ambar, butof also several other African slaves from
East and Central African regions.3

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

Asia sites/cites Africa
By the mid-nineteenth century, the flowof slaves between the continents was reversed;
now instead of slaves from African lands,
the bounded and free labourers fromSouth Asia and beyond filled the ships as apivotal workforce for European plantations,colonial bureaucracies, and infrastructuredevelopments in Africa. In the colonial period
up until the late 20th century, this processcreated a layered racial hierarchy in Africa asmuch as in the Indian soils and minds. Despite
claims for Afro-Asian solidarities or becauseof the Afro-Asian (unequal) collaborations
post-Bandung Conference (1955), the ‘brown’often asserted itself as an in-between or better
racial category vis-à-vis the ‘black’. Those ofIndian origin distanced themselves from black
identities in their social, political and cultural
struggles and sought allegiance with theprivileges of the white. The (re)presentationof these racial regimes in the postcolonial
writings of Indian/African authors form thecentral emphasis of Antoinette Burton’s book,
Africa in the Indian Imagination.
Burton takes the literature as emblematicof the Africa-Asia interactions and the ways
in which those are narrated, negotiated,cited and sited. With a focus on writers withan Indian background and their citationary
practices, Burton elaborates on the politics(and biases) of the connections and theirtellings, in which Africa, Africans, and‘blackness’ are circulated as a recurrent tropein the Indian imaginations. These postcolonial
racialised image-nations emerge from thehierarchised privileges that the Indians in
Africa enjoyed or strived for during the colonial
and apartheid regimes.4 Before he would
become ‘Mahatma’, Gandhi’s political, social,and communalist predispositions against
Africans in early 20th century (explicatedthrough his pejorative uses of such terms
as ‘kaffir’), thereby distancing himself fromblack people, was part of a larger Indian
aspiration of placing themselves above theAfricans, according to which they would in
1919 request the League of Nations “to reserve
Tanganyika an ‘Indian’ territory for the purposeof Indian colonisation” and which led Sarojini
Naidoo to support this Indian colonial ambition
by saying that “East Africa … is the legitimate
Colony of the surplus of the great Indian
nation”(p.10). Burton analyses the nuancesof such south-south racial and sexual politics
by historicising “the role of Africa and of
blackness in the emergence of a postcolonial
Indian identity that was both transnationaland diasporic, but no less conscious of orinvested in racial and sexual difference forbeing both” (p.14).
The multi-sited and many-cited realor fictional journeys of protagonists between
India and Africa as well as within Africa
deepen our understanding of the modes
through which racialised citationary practices
plugged into the postcolonial narratives.
Burton takes two novels, one travel account,and (auto-) biographical writings to caricature
how often those writers walked the thin lineof racism and crossed over to the racialist,
if not racist, terrains in their writings.
This literary corpus stands as a rich archival
repository for historical enquiries into the
racial and sexual sentimentalities of theauthors and their wider contexts. In thisarchive of mind-sets, we not only see howoften skin colour and race conflicted withand compromised each other, but also wewitness testimonials of gender collaborations
that form interracial solidarities, whether
in a patriarchal misogynist setting amongbrown and black men, or feminist/female
understandings of motherhood orsisterhood between and among blackand brown women.
Looking through the works of four authorsof South Asian descent (Anasuya R. Singh,
Frank Moraes, Chanakya Sen, and Phyllis
Naidoo), Burton investigates how Africa
and Africans have been cited and sited as
secondary and tertiary categories in whichrace, class, sexuality, legality, technology,
and politics deepened boundaries and frictionsin the envisioned Afro-Asian solidarities ofthe postcolonial world. Out of the four, only
Phyllis Naidoo asserts a non-racial historyof Africans and Indians in the anti-apartheid
struggles, while the remaining authors follow
a racialist citationary apparatus to describe

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and enliven African protagonists, plots
and places. Beyond these convolutions,gendered and sexualised solidarities emerge
across the racial boundaries. While the politicalmentoring by an African companion (Serete)
for Indian brothers (Srenika and Krishandutt)in Singh’s novel “confirms the possibility ofcross-racial brotherhood”(p.45), Srenika’s
wife Yagesvari and the family maidservant(Anna) are unable to converse with eachother (and thus stands as a critique of
universal sisterhood), the same way Indian
women would be scapegoated for failedAfro-Asian collaborations in Sen’s novel,in which the cross-racial “collaborative
patriarchy” is in the driving seat and“Afro-Asian solidarity is a homosocial
experience at the expense of a brown
woman”(p.105). These lowered and stooged
profiles of women in the transcontinental
exchanges are reversed once we come to
Naidoo’s (auto-)biographical writings in which,at least in one instance of the activist Cynthia
Phakathi, gender solidarity “interrupt[s]cross-racial alliances and empower[s] an
African woman not just to prove her worth or
get her job back but to tell her African male
employer” the status of her work (p.141).
These writers represented the larger
Indian and African connections of theirtimes and they fed into the existing politicaland diplomatic agendas, whether it was
Cold War or Africanisation. Such issues
are reflected in the citational practices ofrespective authors. Burton convincingly tells
us how the authors in the twentieth-century
postcolonial Indian and African
intellectual realms imagined
themselves as harbingers of newforms of change and createdan assertion of racial bias
through more advanced forms oftechnological, educational, andcultural exchanges.

(if not in the South African context of Naidoo),
the islands in the ocean do live with theremnant bulks of Afro-Asian intermixtureswith deep histories across centuries. Those
aspects define present socio-economic,
religious and political realms of the island
nations in different ways, be it in Madagascar,
Comoros or any other islands in the area.
Sellström presents a quick trip through allthese aspects in his book.
Apart from bringing these islands tothe forefront of discussions by locating themin the land-based African and sea-based
international maritime geopolitics anddescribing their predicaments in social,economic, political, and environmental(trans-)formations, Sellström’s book as such
does not have an overall argument or narrative.
He himself admits this: “The book is not theoutcome of original research, nor does it
claim to break new theoretical ground” (p.xii).
This lack of any persuasive arguments in thehistorical or contemporary situations mightmake the book less attractive a read, andmight appear like a long Wikipedia entry,
but it should be useful for general readers
to get an overall idea of these islands.
The islands under discussion are
Madagascar, Comoros, Reunion, Mauritius,
Seychelles, Mayotte, and Chagos. In thelong Introduction (‘From Zanj to Maersk’)Sellström describes their common features,histories, politics, and problems. In thefollowing chapters, he enquires similar
themes with regard to each island country,
such as the geographical and demographic

African islandsof the ocean
The same predicaments ofmemory on the oceanic melangesof the past is very much partand parcel of the present on
the African islands in which
the intermixed communities
of Asian, African, and European
origins create a maritime
demography with increasing
concerns over their coexistencesin the contemporary island
nations. These islands are thefocus of Tor Sellström’s Africa
in the Indian Ocean. If the AfroAsian interactions in Ali’s andBurton’s works had spatial andtemporal segregations throughinconsequential/discontinued
contacts of a dislocated Ethiopianslave or a Goan traveller, or asa writer who fictionalises
the events and moments of
temporary contacts

43

specificities, colonial and postcolonial
economic and political transitions, diplomaticand international engagements. For the
purpose of this essay’s focus, what becomes
clear in his description of these islands isthe ways in which the oceanic mobilities inprecolonial and colonial periods dramatically
influenced the demographics, cultures andpolitics of these islands. Just like the movementof slaves, labourers, pirates, and tradersshaped their recent past, the large scalemigrations in the premodern periods, such asthat of the Austronesian, Bantu, Arab, Swahili,
and other communities, have also defined
the very nature of each island’s historical andcontemporary situations. The interactions
between these Asian and African communities
along with the European colonialism provide
irrefutable spectacles of transoceanicinteractions which produced creole/hybrid,
multi-racial/ethnic communities. Some of theislands had also been drastically transformed
through Western colonialism, be it the ancientisland countries such as the Comoros or otherlater-populated islands such as Reunion and
Mauritius, and the same colonialism continues
to shape the fate of some islands like Chagos
and Mayotte where the UK, USA, and France
continue to breach international laws andtransform these places into “the scenesof human tragedies” (p.306).

Concluding remarks
Taken together, the works of Ali, Burton
and Sellström present a conglomerate ofhistorical and contemporary interactionsof Africa with the oceanic littoral. Whilethe narratives on slave mobilities and therepresentations of Africans in postcolonial
Indian writings demonstrate a transoceanic
entanglement with Asia at large, or India inparticular, the socio-political and economic(trans-)formations of African islands in theocean illuminate the prosperous past of
Africa-Asia exchanges along with theircontentious present in nationalistic andmajoritarian political rhetoric. The oceanic
world and its impacts on the lives of African
individuals, nations and institutions are
irrefutable both in the past and in thepresent despite the politicised, insensitiveand ignorant attempts to erase or ignore
the vivid trajectories. Future research andinitiatives will enlighten us more on thevarious faces and phases of Africa’s role in
the littoral and of Africa–Asian connections
across the ocean.
Mahmood Kooria Leiden University
m.kooriadathodi@hum.leidenuniv.nl

Notes

Malik Ambar. Courtesy Wikipedia.

East Africa and the Indian Ocean 1596, Arnold Florent van Langren. Courtesy Wikimedia Commons.

1	For a recent study in the field, see forexample, Hopper, M. 2015. Slaves of
One Master: Globalization and Slavery inArabia in the Age of Empire; Lovejoy, P.E.
2011. Transformations in Slavery: A History
of Slavery in Africa; Pybus, C. 2006.
Black Founders: The Unknown Story ofAustralia's First Black Settlers.
2	See for example, de Silva Jayasuriya, S.
2011. ‘South Asia’s Africans: A forgotten
people’, http://www.historyworkshop.
org.uk/south-asias-africans; de Silva
Jayasuriya, S. & J.P. Angenot (eds) 2008.
Uncovering the History of Africans in Asia;
Robbins, K. & J. McLeod. 2006. African
Elites in India: Habshi Amarat; Minda, A.
2004. An African Indian Community inHyderabad: Siddi Identity, Its Maintenanceand Change.
3	The book is prepared as a textbook
for students, with questions and answers,
excerpts from primary sources, anda timeline at the end of the book.
The narrative style of the book affirms
its usability as a textbook. It also gives
some portraits and paintings of Ambar
and a few other Africans in India, a luxuryof elite life that is generally rare forhis contemporaries.
4	For recent critical readings of Gandhi
in South Africa along with the wider Indiansociopolitical sentiments in the larger
colonial Africa, see Desai, A. & G. Vahed.
2015. The South African Gandhi: StretcherBearer of Empire; Greenwood, A. & H.
Topiwala. 2015. Indian Doctors in Kenya,
1895-1940: The Forgotten History.

44

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the hero and/or heroine take center stage,
they are more generally set ‘out in the open’,in real life, and are as such less divorced
from daily reality than the ones central to
Bollywood movies.
Pongiyannan argues that “the relationshipbetween Tamil cinema and politics … mainly
revolves around the actors’ potential toproject their superhuman qualities and fans’
faithfulness to the charisma of their favourite
actors” (p.29). Two factors are crucial here.
While actors set themselves apart fromordinary men by projecting themselves as
exceptional and ordinary on-screen, theaudience is ‘encouraged’ to perceive theirstars as superhuman with divine powers (ibid.).
In relation to this, fans have even been known
to display their devotion to their particular
film hero through religious practices and open
worshipping. The author furthermore argues
that it appears that a “fan’s allegiance tocinematic stars grows stronger as the popular
democratic institutions remain corrupt andcontinue to fail the masses” (p.33).

MGR –Nadodi Mannan (1958)

Tamil film culture andpolitics. Superstar
actors as charismatic
politiciansMichiel Baas

Compared to Bollywood, the Tamil movie industry(Kollywood) has received much less international andscholarly attention. With its detailed analysis of five movies
and their respective stars, Pongiyannan’s study Film andPolitics in India (2015) provides beautiful insights into theentanglement of movies and politics in Tamil Nadu, India.

​Reviewed title

Film and Politics in India:
Cinematic Charisma as a
Gateway to Political Power
Pongiyannan, Dhamu. 2015.
Bern: Peter Lang
ISBN: 978-3-0343-1551-7

In 2012, the Tamil film song ‘Why This
Kolaveri Di’ became a worldwide successand has been viewed over a 130 million times
on YouTube since. The song was written bylead actor Dhanush, star of the psychologicalthriller simply titled ‘3’, to which the song was
integral. Literally translating as ‘Why thiskilling rage, girl?’, its meaning or relevanceto the film was not much of a factor in its
international popularity. Instead, it was thesong’s ‘Tanglish’ (portmanteau of Tamil andEnglish, not unlike Hinglish which combines
Hindi and English) that seemed to trigger aparticular fascination abroad. It was probably
the first time a Tamil song made such an
impression overseas. Other than Bollywood,
Tamil Nadu’s movie industry Kollywood(named after Kodambakkam, a neighborhood

Top: Jayalalitha receiving Prime Minister
Modi at Chennai airport. Courtesy Wikipedia.
Below: Sarathkumar with Raadhika at
62nd Britannia Filmfare South Awards 2014.
Courtesy Wikimedia Commons.

in Chennai that is the center of the productionof its movies) enjoys much less internationalfamiliarity. Even if Dhanush, a well-known
actor who has performed in over 25 movies
so far, was central to a hit of epic proportions,his name is unlikely to elicit much of an ‘aha!’across India’s borders. The fact that he is theson-in-law of Rajinikanth, one of India’s mostrevered stars, is probably even less known.
Rajinikanth (often shorted as ‘Rajini’) is
one of the five ‘Tamil’ actors that Dhamu
Pongiyannan discusses in relation to theirpolitical aspirations in his informative andilluminating account of Tamil film and its
associated politics, Film and Politics in India(2015). Pongiyannan’s main argument is thata clear link can be drawn between the way
Tamil actors star on-screen, the role depicted,
the social issues touched upon, and his or her
political ambitions. For this the book builds on
Sara Dickey’s seminal work (1993) in showing
how these actors are not merely entertainers
but in their portrayal also “saviours of the
oppressed, protectors of the poor, messiahsof the malnourished, and deities of thedowntrodden”. As such they “inform theaudience, educate the spectator, address
various social problems, provide them with
solace, and secure them with hopes throughwarrior heroes” (p.12).

Bollywood vs. Kollywood
Any person who has ever seen a Tamilmovie will immediately recognize the relevanceof the argument made above. It is also whatsets apart Tamil movies, and in broader
terms ‘South Indian’ cinema (including the
Kannadiga, Malayalam and Telugu movie
industries), from Bollywood. While the latter
generally revolves around story-lines high on
glamour, with meticulously choreographedstudio-filmed dance routines and a focus on
the upper middle class and elites, the former
puts ‘ordinary’ Indians much more central,with scenes set in market places, people’s
homes, and simply on the street. While Tamilmovies also abound in musical scenes in which

For his analysis Pongiyannan focuses onfive iconic movies, each one clearly connectingwith the lead actor’s political ambitionsand views. The author kicks off the analysis
with perhaps one of Tamil cinema’s most
iconic movie stars, Marudur Gopalamenon
Ramachandran, generally referred to as MGR.
The founder of the All India Anna Dravida
Progressive Federation party or Anaithu Indhia
Anna Dravida Munnetra Kalagam (AIAMDK),
he was the chief minister of Tamil Nadu forten years, from 1977 till his death in 1987. MGR
continues to be worshipped as a god by thestate’s poor, and temples have been built in his
veneration. The movie that Pongiyannan pays
special attention to here is Nadodi Mannan(1958), which was not only MGR’s 100th
movie (he would make roughly 150 during his
lifetime), but also the one that propelled him
into politics and secured his political superstar
status. While it does not lie in the scope of
this article to provide a proper synopsis of themovie, nor of any of the other discussed in thisbook, what stands out in this movie –which
was also written, directed and produced by
MGR –is the way in which corruption, nepotism
and injustice are exposed by the two main
characters (a double role played by MGR).
Besides being the first color movie in Tamil
Nadu, the film is a clear example of one thatputs ‘Tamil-ness’ central through its layeringof cultural values and moral lessons.
As in the book’s subsequent chapter, which
focuses on actress Jayalalitha, Pongiyannan
notes the importance of MGR’s fair skin aspart of his appeal to fans. Yet while this may
have made him stand-out as a person hailingfrom a well-off and upper-caste (Brahmin)background, the actor never failed to pointout his humble upbringings and his early daysof poverty, in order for the masses to be able
to identify with him (p.46). Unlike Rajinikanth,arguably Tamil cinema’s ‘biggest’ star ‘ever’
and a Marathi speaker by birth, MGR was
not a native Tamil speaker, something which
at some point also became a political issue(p.46). But MGR simply argued that any
person who spoke Tamil was a Tamil, thoughhimself of Malayali ancestry. He promoted
himself as a pan-Tamil leader, and due to his
association with the anti-Hindu Dravidian
Movement also made a determined effort not
to be seen as religious, thus refusing to playreligious film roles (p.47).

Jayalalitha –Adimaip Penn
(1969)
Pongiyannan continues his analysis byzooming in on MGR’s heir-apparent andpartner Jayalalitha whose ‘whiteness’ or‘fairness’ added considerable charisma to her
popular appeal. Also hailing from an upper
caste (Ayyangar/Brahmin) background, like
MGR Jayalalitha’s popularity also crossed
caste lines and had a clear unifying effect on
the masses. Born in 1948, she passed away
recently in 2016 and was at the time still Chief
Minister (CM) of Tamil Nadu. In total she would
serve six terms as CM for a total of fourteen
years. According to Pongiyannan, her career
can be divided into three phases, the first

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018of which (1965-1973) is the time she madeher debut and entered into a relationshipwith MGR; the second (1973-1991), saw her
emerge as a star while her relationship with
MGR caused considerable commotion; andthe third, post-1991 phase, saw her come into
her own, develop her own (political) charismaand eventually become one of the state’s
most powerful political leaders.
Like MGR in the movie discussed earlier,
Jayalalitha plays a double role in one ofher most iconic movies, Adimaip Penn (1969).
It was a notoriously provocative film, in which
she was the first actress to expose her belly,
uncommon in Tamil movies till then, and as
a result she “became the forerunner of thecinematic sexuality of female actors in Tamil
Nadu” (p.77). Yet this sexuality would continue
to be coupled with notions of innocence,
augmenting her appeal to the masses. Actuallysinging one of the main songs in the movie,
rather uncommon in Indian movies since actors
and actresses generally lip-sync, the movie will
always be remembered for the way it endowed
Jayalalitha with a particular charisma that
she would expand on and make use of for
decades to come. While it cannot be denied
that her popularity was partly determined byher controversial relationship with MGR, andaugmented by her fair complexion –which theauthor refers to as “charisma of complexion”(p.99) –as well as upper caste background,the movie discussed here as well as those that
followed added powerful layers to what would
become one of Tamil Nadu’s most powerfuland charismatic political leaders.

Rajinikanth –Padayappa(1999)
More than any other Tamil actor,
Rajinikanth has left a mark across the state’sborders and even abroad. Legendary forhis completely over-the-top action scenes,
cigar flipping trickery as well as for that one
time when he actually had a one-on-one
conversation with a Malaria mosquito in themovie Endhiran (or Robot, 2010), Rajinikanth’s
fan base is notorious for their adulationand idolization, which generally reaches
feverish conditions around the time of a new
movie release. With fan clubs in countries
such as Japan, the actor is also far more
popular abroad than any other Tamil actor.
Compared to the previous actors discussed,
however, his political alliances have always

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remained somewhat of an enigma. Born in
an impoverished Marathi family in the city of
Bangalore (capital of the state of Karnataka),
he is in many ways the opposite of MGR:
unkempt hair, dark skin, and not particularly
muscular or even handsome by conventional
standards. His choice of roles is interestingin this light as well; he has never shied awayfrom playing characters displaying ‘bad
behavior’ such as drinking and smoking.
While his ordinary looks may makehim much more a common man than otheractors –arguably in itself an attempt tomake Tamil Nadu cinema more representativeand realistic (p.104) –his movies tend to be
characterized by a particular outlandishness
that has become his signature style. Yet
analyzing the various characters he has
portrayed over time, what stands out is that
he is much more religiously inclined than theactors mentioned above. Padayappa (1999),
one of his most iconic movies, for instance,is also one of the names of the popular Tamil
Hindu deity Lord Murugan. Rajini’s religious
avowals associate him “with right-wing
nationalist parties, such as the Bharathiya
Janata Party” (p.116), currently in power inIndia. Furthermore, as the author argues,“The way in which Padayappa’s successis built on the feudal social structure,
caste hierarchy, and the inferior status of
women sends a strong message to the Tamilaudience” (p.131). Rajini’s dark complexion
and characterization as a smoker and drinker,
though a morally upright man, may convince
the audience that he is one of them, but
his films at the same time suggest that his
audience “leave everything in the handsof god, embrace superstition, and accept
the feudal social structure.” (ibid.)

Newcomers Vijayakanth& Sarathkumar
In the final two chapters Pongiyannan
moves on to relative newcomers Vijayakanth
and Sarathkumar. Again the focus is on thepolitical views of both. Vijayakanth’s CaptainPrabhakaran (1991) and Sarathkumar’s
Naatamai (translated as The Village Headman,1994) are explored in greater detail. Like
Rajinikanth, Vijayakanth is a dark-skinned
action hero who is also somewhat perceived
as an alternative to the former (p.134).
At the same time the actor styles himself
as a black MGR, imbuing his movies withstrong political messages
and skillfully and cunningly
portraying himself as acharismatic leader. Perhaps
more so than in MGR’s case,he is particular known for
countering lawlessness andtaking up arms against
notorious criminals. CaptainPrabhakaran in that sense,
justifies violence, something
the actor does so with thefollowing words: “I need to
become a beast to destroy
the beast,” (p.138) the latter
referring to corrupt politicians
and bureaucrats.

Screenshot of Anirudh Dhanush singing ‘Why This Kolaveri Di’.

Screenshot of Rajinikanth in the movie Padayappa.

Interestingly, many of Vijayakanth’s
movie titles are different references to MGR’s
nicknames and song titles. Vijayakanth also
makes a deliberate effort to communicate to
MGR fans while at the same time positioning
himself as an unyielding action hero who
seems to channel Rajinikanth’s angry young
man’s image (p.140). Here the author argues
that: “The narrative structure of Vijayakanth’s
films revolves around this tension between theanti-heroic or antagonistic violent act, andthe heroic violent act, violence, and rescue.”(ibid.) What makes Vijayakanth particularly
unique is his lengthy discourses that heinserts in movies, highlighting “the deplorable
plight of the ordinary people when dealing
with bureaucratic red tape, corruption andviolence against women.” (p.155)
Like Vijayakanth, Sarathkumar is an action
hero who does not shy away from violence,but much more so than with the other actors
discussed, the persona he depicts on screen
can be directly linked to his own (Nadar) caste
background. Born into a low-caste position, his
caste has witnessed upward mobility throughits iconic leader K. Kamaraj, who as the author
also points out, was a contemporary of Gandhi(p.159-160). Like actors such as Stallone and
Schwarzenegger, Sarathkumar is a bodybuilder
and of the actors discussed in this book he isperhaps the most known for displaying andconflating a particular muscularity with strong
notions of hegemonic and ‘rural’ masculinity.
Through Naatamai (1994) he established his
charisma “by projecting himself as a man of
extraordinary integrity and revolutionary visionin terms of ideals such as, egalitarian justice …”(p.161) He continues to do so by representing
himself as a Rural Rambo, both conforming
to the feudal system and confronting theelements that threaten to disrupt the caste
hierarchy. Again the poor are a crucial focus
in his movies, particularly informed by growing
disenchantment over the divide between richand poor, while also challenging new formsof consumerism and materiality. In particular
the actor’s charisma builds on his “cinematiccharacterization as superhuman withextraordinary qualities that can redeem
people from their daily problems.” (p.167)

Tamil films in perspective

Movie poster for Endhiran.

45

Pongiyannan’s analysis is revealing forthe political undertones of many Tamil films
and the way Tamil actors make use of their
movies to propel their own political careers.
In MGR and Jayalalitha’s case this led to along-lasting and determining presence on thepolitical stage, while in the case of the otheractors discussed their political influence andambitions are less easy to pinpoint. A notableomission in Pongiyannan’s study is one of Tamil
Nadu’s most well-known actor, Kamal Haasan(1954), an avowed atheist who has always
remained rather aloof about his politicalambitions, but has more recently hinted atentering Tamil Nadu’s political arena himself.

With its sequential focus, moving from MGR,
Jayalalitha and Rajinikanth to more recent
actors, the author could have also paid moresignificant attention to the preferred shift
from fair to darker skin tones, the changing
role caste plays in the identity formation of its
actors and depictions in movies, as well as themore prominent role of violence.
Differing from Bollywood, it is clear that
Kollywood movies are much more politicallylayered, and function as political vehicles fortheir actors. In its keenness to contrast Tamilmovies with North Indian ones, Pongiyannan
has little to say about other South Indianmovie industries that also have strong politicalconnections, most notably the Telugu one.
Besides that, the book makes some claims
that lack a sound basis or reference, such as
the one where the author argues that Tamil
Nadu is the second wealthiest state in India(p.5), or where he mentions that the South
Indian languages Kannada, Malayalam andTelugu all have their roots in Tamil (p.8). Both
Tamil and Telugu did originate from the same
proto language, but Tamil developed fromProto-South Dravidian while Telugu emerged
separately from Proto-Central Dravidian.
As such it has never quite been conclusive
which of the two languages is older. Yet whatmakes Pongiyannan’s study a stand-out one
is the fact that it is one of the few that directly
focuses on Tamil cinema and while doing
so skillfully provides a comprehensive overview
of the way Tamil movies relate to various
issues and developments in the state.
Although Tamil as a culture and language
ranks among the oldest in the world, whenit comes to ‘Indian culture’ the focus remains
rather hegemonically on North India, somethingwhich sees itself represented in the significantly
higher number of publications about Bollywood
each year, contrasting markedly with themuch smaller number of ones on South Indiancinema. This also sees itself reflected in theinternational perception of Bollywood as evenmore prolific than Hollywood in the numberof movies that hit the theatres every year,
while a comparable number of movies originate
from the Tamil and Telugu movie industries.
The hit song ‘Why This Kolaveri, Di?’ did little
to change the perception of Tamil movies asa niche industry while Bollywood continues
to stand in the limelight and is perceived
as India’s premier and even ‘national’ movie
industry. Pongiyannan’s study is an important
reminder that there is more to Indian cinema
than Bollywood glamour and that its regional
movie industries are superbly revealing for theplight of the country’s underclasses, politicalconundrums, as well as hopes and aspirationsof the ‘common man’. Here’s for hoping moreauthors will follow suit and investigate thecomplex and variegated Indian cinematic
landscape.
Michiel Baas Asia Research Institute,
National University of Singapore.
arimba@nus.edu.sg

46

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The Faces of the Unknown:
A Frenchman’s Adventuresin Late Imperial China
Aliz Horvath

In the Land of Pagodas: A Classic
Account of Travel in Hong Kong, Macao,
Shanghai, Hubei, Hunan and Guizhou
Alfred Raquez. 2017. Edited and translatedby William L. Gibson and Paul Bruthiaux
Copenhagen: NIAS Press
ISBN 9788776942014
Image © Creative Commons. Courtesy
Luigi Andreola on Flickr.

M

ultifaceted – this is perhaps the firstword that may come to mind upon
reading through Alfred Raquez’s (or,using his real name, Joseph Gervais) accounton his travels around China during the lastyears of the 19th century. The book, translated
and edited exquisitely by William Gibson andPaul Bruthiaux, provides a curious mixtureof genres, impressions, and experiences that
may be of interest to a broad audience. The
term ‘complexity’, however, does not only
characterize the text, but can be used todescribe the author as well who, according
to the translators’ introduction, possessed anequally complicated background.
The material can be situated in theabundant range of personal accounts createdby previous foreign travelers, such as those
produced by Marco Polo in the medieval
period or Ennin who had penned a multi-year
diary in as early as the 9th century. These
works all provide interesting insights into thecurrent state of China, but unlike most cases,
where the authors’ personal circumstances
are fairly clear (Ennin, for example, wasinitially part of a diplomatic envoy andintended to gain more in-depth knowledge on
Buddhism), Raquez seems more of a mystery,
due to the lack of information regarding his
status and the purpose of his travel to Asia.
Despite the fog around the author’s
persona, the tone of his book consistently

represents a French perspective, which itself
is relatively rare in relevant source materials.
This approach, accompanied by his numerous
references to certain foreigners who servedin China in various capacities and his often
vivid criticism of other nations, fits organicallyinto the existing scholarship in multiple ways.
More specifically, it can enrich the field of
microhistorical research produced by, forexample, Jonathan Spence, whose work, To
Change China: Western Advisers in China(London: Penguin Books, 1980), covers theoperations of influential figures (such as
Inspector General Sir Robert Hart) who arealso mentioned by Raquez, demonstrating
his privileged status as an individual withspecial connections. His distinctly French
voice, on the other hand, can be juxtaposedwith the available studies on the operationsof ‘Westerners’ in late-imperial China,
represented by scholars, such as James Hevia,
whose major contribution, English Lessons:
The Pedagogy of Imperialism in 19th Century
China (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
2003), explores Western colonial endeavors
in Asia through specifically British lens, thus
shedding light on the distinction between theintentions and practices of different countries.
Raquez’s account reinforces the idea ofheterogeneity, while also showing examples
of unexpected collaborations between certain
Chinese (or ‘Celestial’, as he calls them) andforeign groups, whose mutual interests pushedthem on the same ‘side’. In this sense, Raquez’s
In the Land of Pagodas unequivocally adds
to our understanding of the complexities andthe chaotic nature of China’s late 19th century
history that cannot be characterized simply
through the ‘China vs the West’ binary.
This peculiar point of view is accompanied
by an interesting intertwinement of various
styles which may perhaps bring us closer
to the author’s persona. As I mentioned
earlier, the book does not include precise
information on Raquez’s identity, but the
rapid shifts between genres, occasionallyeven within a single paragraph, demonstrates
the different ‘masks’ that he takes on
throughout the story. Within the frameworkof a diary-type structure, Raquez appears in
at least three distinct roles which, I believe,
are directly related to the stylistic varietyof his work: as a tourist, he lists a variety
of practical information for future travelers
while attracting the reader’s attention to
the wonders he experiences by providing
vivid and almost literary-style descriptions
about his urban impressions, the sequenceof banquets he attends, and the changing
scenery around him. In the course of his
kaleidoscopic adventures, the only constantelement is the sight of pagodas that he neverneglects to mention. In Raquez’s mind, thesebuildings seem to be the symbols of China’s

The
The Social
SocialLife of Inkstones
Life of Inkstones
Simon Wickhamsmith

The Social Life of Inkstones:
Artisans and Scholars
in Early Qing China
Dorothy Ko. 2017
Seattle: University of Washington Press
ISBN 9780295999180

W

hen Manchu forces from thenortheast conquered the Ming
Empire in 1644, they, having had
a script for writing their own language for lessthan 50 years, suddenly became the rulers ofa culture whose written legacy stretched backmore than 2000 years. The practical concernsof government, as the Empire developed andits need for administrative efficiency andcultural power grew, meant that the rulers
felt the need to have access to, and a benign
control over, the material and intellectual
expression of their people.

old, traditional, or even authentic side amidst
all the novelties and drastic changes that theirencounters with foreigners entailed – thisrecurring motif may be the underlying reason
behind the author’s choice regarding thebook’s title.
Furthermore, it is also of importance topoint out that Raquez makes great efforts
to delineate the nature of French presencein China through the examples of mining,education, politics, etc., which clearlyexceed the boundaries of a simple travel
guide and make him also a sort of reporter
or even ‘intelligence agent’ who informs his
compatriots about future possibilities forFrance to strengthen its position in the region.
Finally, his references to other primarymaterials and his critical attitude towards
their merit (or the lack of it), the abundance of
excerpts from journals and legal documents,
numerous photographs, and his precise
observations on local customs seem to testify
his desire to consider his experience throughscholarly lens as well, thus adding anotherlayer to his account.
In scholarly works, there is a tendency
to have a relatively ambiguous attitude
towards diary-type materials due to theirhighly subjective nature that may cast doubt
on their reliability as primary sources. In thepresent case, however, the large numberof supplementary details, quotes, andtranslations provided by Raquez, as well as
the foreword, written by a Chinese individual,
appear to serve as means to enhance thecredibility of the material. With all this inmind, we might consider this book a hybrid,‘in-between’ work that tells us ‘Raquez’s truth’
through the intertwinement of original texts
and the author’s personal experience.
In terms of significance, the text can beinteresting not only to China scholars but also
to those focusing on European (especially
French) history and international relations,since the book provides insights into both the
French perception of China and the Chinese
view of Westerners, thus serving as a mirror
for all parties to face their own realities.
Ultimately, as I mentioned earlier, thequality of the translation is excellent andincludes an abundance of well-researchedfootnotes as well, which certainly facilitate theunderstanding of Raquez’s French references,making it easier for the reader to follow therich, but at times confusing, narration withoutmajor difficulties. The text mentions thatthe original edition contained an addenda
section, but the current version uses footnotes
instead both in the case of Raquez’s remarks
and the additions provided by the translators.
Although Raquez’s name is included in therelevant notes in square brackets, perhaps
a clearer distinction between the original
and the later contributions or a note in the
introduction about the reasons behind theeditors’ typographical choices would be
helpful. Otherwise, the book can serve not
only as a novel and useful material for a broad
audience, but also as a highly entertaining
read for anyone interested in foreign
encounters in the late 19th century.
Aliz Horvath University of Chicago

Dorothy Ko's engrossing new book,while clearly showing how ‘the Qing leaders
expressed their interests in artistry andtechnology by being attentive to the makingof each individual product’ (p. 11; italics in theoriginal), reveals more importantly the social
import of creating, receiving and appreciating
the inkstone, in which rested, ready for use,the vital fluid of administration and literaryculture. The ‘social life’ of the inkstone indeed,is its cultural capital: it is noticeable howlittle of Ko's book is actually devoted to its
use in the actual process of writing, and how
central are its aesthetic and tactile qualities.
During the first 150 years, during thereigns of the Kangxi, Yongzheng, andQianlong Emperors, the Palace workshops
were the tastemakers and focal points ofinkstone appreciation, and it was against
the subtle artistry and technical design of
the workshops' products that the carvingof inkstones was judged, and collections
assembled. Ko begins her book withan extensive and intricate tour of theThe Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

The Review

Courtly
Encounters
Caleb Simmons

C
Culture of Encounters:
Sanskrit at the Mughal Court
Audrey Truschke. 2016.
New York: Columbia University Press
ISBN 9780231540971

workshops through the first three imperial
reigns, including an account of the mastercraftsman and designer Liu Yuan. This
material on how the Empire contributed to theaestheticization of the inkstone, its reframing
as an objet d'art, elegantly contextualizes
the remainder of the book. Ko's analysis of
Liu's contribution to what she suggests as
being a secondary reframing, of the dragon
as a traditional symbol of imperial power asa standard indicator of the power of the Qing,
is one of the book's art historical highlights.
From the Imperial Palace, the book moves
first to the Yellow Hill villages in Zhaoqing,
Guangdong province, where the precious
Duan stone were mined and carved. Perhaps
this book is actually more about the Duanstone than about any product made fromit, for it is the color and the weight and theluster of the stone which gives it the quality
which rendered the inkstones so desirable
to collectors. As with a sculptor of marble orwood, the importance to a carver of inkstonesof sourcing just the right stone, of creatively

religious studies scholars working on earlymodern, modern, and contemporary India.
This book is extremely rich and is importanton many levels, but for the purposes of thisreview I will limit my discussion of Cultureof Encounters to sovereignty, a thread thatruns through the entire book.

Legitimation theory
and sovereignty
Truschke’s discussion of sovereignty
begins from a critique of legitimation theory
in her introduction. Following Sheldon Pollock(Language of the Gods in the World of Men,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006)
and Daud Ali (Courtly Culture and Political
Life in Early Medieval India, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), the author
highlights the simplistic perspective of oldmodels of legitimation theory and argues for amore nuanced understanding of the function
and role of courtly aesthetic culture in theimperial project. She pushes this forward byadopting Rodney Baker’s work and arguingfor a form of ‘inward-turning’ legitimation thatsought to define the Mughal ‘unique political
self’ (p. 19). Interestingly, she argues thatin this unique political self ‘the Mughals also
wished to see themselves as Indian kings andpursued this desire by appropriating a culture
deeply grounded in South Asia’s pre-Islamic
past’ (p. 19).
While this is certainly undeniable andrichly demonstrated throughout the volume,
my interest in political theology in earlymodern India led me to wonder how thisrelates to broader issues of sovereignty inpremodern India. I kept thinking that insteadof once again highlighting the perils of theoft-critiqued legitimation theory, it could
have been productive and interesting toconnect this material with work on the natureof sovereignty, e.g. Giorgio Agamben’s Stateof Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2005) or Carl Schmitt’s Political
Theology (ed. and trans. George Schwab,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005)
and The Concept of the Political (ed. andtrans. George Schwab, Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 2007).

ulture of Encounters is a groundbreaking study of Sanskrit in the
Mughal Court from 1560-1660 CE.
In this book, Audrey Truschke argues that ‘theMughal imperium … was defined largely by
repeated engagements with Sanskrit thinkers,
texts, and ideas’ (p. 2) that embedded thecourt in the ‘intellectual landscape of South
Asia’ (p. 4). The author uses the information to
problematize our received narrative of Indian
history, particularly related to the Mughals,
and its implication on contemporary politics
in the subcontinent. One of the things thatsets this book apart is the author’s commandover both Persian and Sanskrit, a rare andenviable quality, that allows her to expertly
examine literature across Islamic, Jain, andBrahmin traditions. The work is truly novel,
impeccably researched, and very well written.
It will inevitably have great influence in thefield and is a ‘must-read’ for historians andA specific example of where this could
have been helpful is in the third chapter
when Truschke turns her attention to theconstruction of sovereignty in Persian
renderings of the Sanskrit Mahābhārata.
This chapter is perhaps the most intriguingof the entire work as the author explores
the multiple valences between Islamicate
and Sanskrit traditions in the texts andthe processes of translation. Particularlyinteresting is the way the author expertly
navigates between politics and aesthetics
in order to show how the divide is arbitrary
and meaningless in this case. She argues
instead that the Persian Mahābhārata
tradition sought to redefine sovereignty

envisioning its application, is vital to therefinement of the finished work, and Ko's
treatment of the mines around Yellow Hill is
exemplary in showing both how the physicallandscape produced stones, and also how thestonecarvers themselves developed precision
tools with which to extract and subsequently
carve the stones.
The two chapters which concentrateon the carvers of inkstones emphasize
the importance of skill even over gender.
Gu Erniang, who functions as the central
character of this story, was the leading
carver of inkstones in her time, but also anentrepreneur and designer who, to use Ko's
words, expertly promoted her own brand.
Yet, while Gu's artistry and her brand becamefamous, the details of her life remain hidden.
Ko clearly wants to explore the artisan as abiographical subject, as well as a cipher for
his or her art, and yet like the subtle elements
concealed (or restrained) within the carved
inkstone often the individual is expressed
through the voices of second-hand accounts,

or art historical research. The characterand historical development of Gu's brand,
then, is an indication of how connoisseurshipand cultural power worked in the Qing Empire
during the 18th century, the subject of Ko's
concluding chapter about the collectorsof inkstones and their collections.
As a woman, Gu's gender seems to havebeen (or to have become) of little import in
the light of her art. However, inkstone
carving and inkstone appreciation remained
masculine preserves, and while women
could use inkstones to write, and to write
poetry of great beauty, circles of collectors
were limited to men. But, as the evidenceof Ko's painstaking research shows, there
were women who collected and appreciatedinkstones for just the same reasons, andin just the same ways, as did the menwith whom they lived. One of the principal
qualities of Ko's work is in revealing theinfluence which women exercised from their‘occluded’ position, and I feel that there isa sense in which their marginality, as with

Sovereignty in the
Mughal court47

by articulating a history of kingship andby forming a new Indo-Persianate aesthetic.
The chapter is thoroughly convincing in its
argumentation against legitimation theory
and its call to consider the role of knowledge
systems and aesthetics in the construction ofimperial power; however, in this discussion theimplications of these translations on Indianpolitical theology was perhaps downplayed
a little too much in order to emphasize theaesthetic literary interactions. Specifically,
I am thinking about the discussion of
Abū al-Fazl’s preface to the Razmnāmah(though to be fair the author returns to thissubject in brief repeatedly, including a great
discussion in Chapter 6, p. 218). Akbar’s
struggles to seize authority from the ulama
and the declaration of the king’s authority
in al-Fazl’s preface would have been aninteresting place to discuss sovereignty andthe role of aesthetics in the state of exception.
This could have also set the stage for the
fourth chapter in which Akbar’s ‘universal
kingship’ and ‘comprehensive sovereignty’
were discussed (p. 143).
While the book was overwhelmingly
convincing in its overall goals, this reviewer
was left with many questions regarding
sovereignty in the Mughal court: What are
we to make of sovereignty and the Mughal
unique political self as ‘Indian kings … deeply
grounded in South Asia’s pre-Islamic past’in the interaction of Persian and Sanskrit
courtly cultures? What implications does thishave for our understanding of sovereignty
in Indian kingship more broadly?
The author deftly shows that theinteractions between the Sanskrit andPersian literary traditions was dynamic,
but it was clearly also a generative one
beyond its aesthetic innovations, and limiting
the discussion of sovereignty to legitimation
theory brings up larger questions related
to political theology and sovereignty within
India that are left unaddressed. One canhardly fault the author for not treading into
these discussions further given the robust
manner with which she navigates so manydifficult academic terrains within the book.
Perhaps it will even encourage those of
us interested in sovereignty and politicaltheology to look more closely at the
Mughals in the future.

Conclusion
In that regard, I highly recommend Cultureof Encounters as not only an innovative studyof Mughal courtly aesthetic culture but also
for its ability to foster a greater interest inquestions of the construction of sovereignty
and political theology in early modern India.
Libraries at any institution of higher educationneed to have this book on its shelves. It would
be ideal reading for a graduate course on
modern Indian history, religion in SouthAsia, Islamic history, and/or Indian Islam(and surely many others). It is probably too
advanced for most undergraduate students;
though it is well-written enough for bright,
engaged students in upper division seminars.
Caleb Simmons University of Arizonaso much in the way in which Chinese
aesthetics is studied and framed andrepackaged, makes their influence – yetnot, of course, the recognition accorded
them in life – all the greater.
This is in almost every sense an excellent
book. It is full of information and of historicaland art historical analysis, and its illustrations– notwithstanding that the subject mattermight not always be easy to photographsuccessfully – are frequent and clear.
Physically weak readers should note however,that it is a very heavy book, due to the quality
and weight of its paper and binding. Thatsaid, the University of Washington Press
has produced a fascinating contribution to
the study of the art and aesthetics of writingin China, and to the cultural history of the
Qing. Dorothy Ko is a talented scholar, but
she is also a most alluring writer, and I lookforward to reading her other books.
Simon Wickhamsmith Rutgers,
The State University of New Jersey

48

The Network

Announcements

IIAS signs cooperation agreement with the
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS)
Leiden-SASS workshop

On 24 April 2018, in Leiden, theNetherlands, the International
Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) andthe Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences(SASS) signed an agreement to establish a
SASS-IIAS Centre for China Studies in Leiden,
and an IIAS-SASS Centre for China Studies
in Shanghai. The cooperation will relate not
only to developments within China, but also
to relevant topics in other parts of Asia andbeyond. The agreement was co-signed by
Leiden University.
The agreement provides for the exchangeof researchers between IIAS and SASS andtheir partners, and cooperation in projects.
Moreover, SASS and IIAS agree that the two
representative centres should be made fully
available to the researchers and membersof Leiden University, IIAS’s umbrella structure.
Philippe Peycam: “This ceremony is not justcelebrating the long-standing SASS-IIAS
partnership, but also one that includes Leiden
University”. The agreement was signed during
a festive ceremony at Leiden University’s
Faculty Club, in the presence of a broadgroup of interested parties from, among
others, Leiden University, NWO (Netherlands
Organisation for Scientific Research) and theChinese Embassy. The signatories were
Prof. Wang Zhen (王振), Vice-President of
SASS, Dr Philippe Peycam, Director of IIAS,
and Prof. Carel Stolker, Rector Magnificus
of Leiden University.

Left to right: SASS Vice-President Prof. Wang Zhen (王振), Rector Magnificus of Leiden University
Prof. Carel Stolker and IIAS Director Dr Philippe Peycam.

IIAS-SASS partnership
The present agreement constitutes
a new chapter in an already long-standing
and active partnership between IIAS
and SASS. In 2005, in Shanghai, the two
institutes jointly organised the fourth editionof the International Convention of Asia
Scholars (ICAS 4). This was the first evermajor international event of this kind in the
People’s Republic of China, attended by
1,400 participants from all over the world.
From that time on, IIAS forged collaborations
with many PRC institutions, including ofcourse, SASS. Another important step in thecollaboration between SASS and IIAS wasin 2011, when the two organisations joined
thirteen other institutes from Asia, Europe andthe USA to operate in the IIAS-coordinatedinterdisciplinary and trans-sectorial
research platform, the ‘Urban Knowledge
Network Asia’ (UKNA), under the theme of‘Human Flourishing in Asian Cities’. Amongthe over 120 researchers that were exchanged
between all the UKNA partners, several
researchers from the two institutes spenttime in both Shanghai and Leiden. This
year, also under UKNA, SASS and IIAS areorganising, in collaboration with Fudan
University and New York University Shanghai,a major conference on port cities, taking placein Shanghai in November 2018. In addition,
also this year, SASS will be participating, andpartnering with IIAS, to support the second
edition of the international conference‘Asia-Africa: a New Axis of Knowledge’,
which will take place in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania, on 20-22 September 2018.

IIAS National
Master’s
Thesis Prize
2018

The signing ceremony was precededby an afternoon workshop, during which
representatives of SASS and scholars from
Leiden University gave presentations about
on-going research on both sides. Following
introductions by Prof. Wang Zhen and
Dr Philippe Peycam, the Director of the
SASS Institute of Sociology and Institute ofYouth and Juvenile Studies, Dr Yang Xiong(杨雄) spoke on the subject of ‘Chinese
Social Development, Challenges and Policy
Thinking’. The next speaker was Dr Shi Nan,
researcher at SASS, who gave a lecture ‘On
the Flexibility of the Renminbi Exchange
Rate’. The last two lectures were deliveredby researchers from Leiden University.
Focusing on ‘China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor’, Dr Wang Jue (王珏) of the Leiden
Institute for Area Studies (LIAS) spoke aboutthe ‘Opportunities and Challenges on the‘Belt and Road’, after which Dr Rogier
Creemer, researcher at the Van Vollenhoven
Institute for Law, Governance and Society of
the Leiden Law School, addressed the‘Role of Technology in Governing China’.
The delegation furthermore included
Dr Chen Qingan (陳慶安; SASS Instituteof Law), and Dr Liu Ahming (刘阿明; SASS
Institute of International Relations), who had
arrived two weeks earlier to help prepare theday in close collaboration with IIAS staff
member Lin Xiaolan (林晓兰), as well as todiscuss a business plan for the cooperation
between SASS and IIAS for the coming years.
The discussion was continued immediately
upon the signing ceremony, together withthe full SASS delegation.
SASS website:www.sass.org.cn

IIAS offers an annual award
for the best national master’s
thesis in the broad field of AsianStudies, in the Netherlands

The Award•T he honorary title of ‘Best Master’s
Thesis’ in Asian studies• A maximum three month stipend to workat IIAS, in order to write a PhD project
proposal or a research article

Criteria

Photography © Ania Blazejewska•T he master’s thesis should be in
the broad field of Asian Studies,in the humanities or social sciences• The thesis must have been written
at a Dutch university• Only master’s theses which have been
graded with an 8 or higher are eligible• The thesis must have been evaluatedin the period 1 Oct 2017 –31 October 2018
• Both students and their supervisors
can apply

Submission
Please submit four hard copies of themaster’s thesis and a cover letter including
the grade awarded and your contact details.

Application deadline: 1 November 2018, 9:00 am
For further information email: iias@iias.nl

Submissions should be sent to:
Secretariat
International Institutefor Asian Studies (IIAS)
P.O. Box 9500
2300 RA Leiden
The Netherlands

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

Announcements

Upcoming
conferencesT

he Chinese state uses
cultural heritage as a sourceof power by linking it topolitical and economic goals, but
heritage discourse has at the sametime encouraged new actors toappropriate the discourse to protect
their own traditions. This bookfocuses on that contested nature ofheritage, especially through the lensof individuals, local communities,
religious groups, and heritage
experts. It examines the effect of theinternet on heritagisation, as well as
how that process affects different
groups of people.

Borderland Spaces: Ruins,
Revival(s) and Resources

Christina Maags is a lecturer
in Chinese Politics at the Schoolof Oriental and Asian Studies(SOAS), University of London.
Marina Svensson is Professorof Modern China Studies at
Lund University and does
research related to humanrights, cultural heritage,journalism, digital society
and the Internet in China.

T
Venue:
American Universityof Central Asia,
Bishkek,
Kyrgyzstan

he 6th conference of the Asian
Borderlands Research Network will
focus on the generative and productive
capacity of border spaces, which is urgently
in need of being addressed. It will address
the following questions: How are borderlands in Asia creating alternative spaces forheritages, self-definition and the extractionof resources? How can these cases serve
to rethink social theories of various kind?
Organised by the American Universityof Central Asia, the International Institutefor Asian Studies (IIAS) and the Asian
Borderlands Research Network (ABRN).
Information and registration:www.asianborderlands.net

20–22 September 2018

Africa-Asia, a New Axis of
Knowledge – Second EditionBuilding on the multiple encounters,interactions and dialogues initiated at
the 1st Africa-Asia Conference (Accra,
Ghana, 2015), this second conference seeks
to deepen the explorations of new realities,
and long histories connecting Africa and Asia.
Organised by the University of Dar es
Salaam (UDSM, Tanzania), Association for
Asian Studies in Africa (A-ASIA, Accra, Ghana)and the International Convention of Asia
Scholars (ICAS, Leiden, the Netherlands).
In partnership with: Muziris Institute for the
Indian Ocean Studies, University of Calicut(Calicut, Kerala, India); International Institutefor Asian Studies (Leiden, the Netherlands);

49

New book in the IIAS/AUPAsian Heritages Series

Still to come in 2018: two major international conferences co-organisedby the International Institute for AsianStudies. The events are open to anyone
with an interest in the themes addressed,
yet it is unfortunately no longer possible
to submit proposals.

13-15 August 2018

The Network

Venue:
University of Dar Es Salaam,
Dar Es Salaam,
Tanzania

Leiden University (Leiden, the Netherlands);
University of Michigan (UM, Ann Arbor, U.S.);
L'Observatoire des sociétés de l'océan Indien-OSOI, Université de La Réunion (La Réunion,Fr.); National University of Singapore (NUS,
Singapore); Social Science Research Council(SSRC, New York, USA); Center for AsianStudies, University of Ghana (Accra, Ghana);
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS,
Shanghai, China); Henry Luce Foundation(U.S.); and the Tokyo University of Foreign
Studies (TUFS, Japan).
Information and registration:www.icas.asia/africas

Chinese Heritage
in the Making:Experiences, Negotiations
and Contestations
Christina Maags& Marina Svensson (eds) 2018.
Amsterdam University Press
ISBN: 978-94-6298-369-4
288 pages, 19 b/w illustrations; Hardback€95.00 / £85.00 / $115.00

http://en.aup.nl/
books/9789462983694-chineseheritage-in-the-making.html

Asian Borderlands:
workshop and book launchO

n 2-3 May 2018, to mark the
publishing of the Routledge
Handbook of Asian Borderlands(eds Alexander Horstmann, Martin Saxer
and Alessandro Rippa), Tallin University andthe Forum for Asian Studies at Stockholm
University jointly hosted a book launchin conjunction with a workshop, titled‘Innovative Approaches to Border Studies’.
The Handbook is yet another milestone
in the studies of borderlands generally
and in the growing field of Asian borderstudies specifically; it is intended for a wide
audience —political or social stakeholders
in borders, students and people thinking
about borders within the wider society —because we strongly hold that the insights
gleaned from borders and ‘bordering’can enhance the explanatory power
in understanding the converging socialworlds across the globe.
The two-day workshop critically evaluatedthe current state of interdisciplinary
research on borders, explored future trends
and new methods, while also establishingconnections between ‘the mainstream’
and Asian border scholars. It explored
where Asian border studies as an interdisciplinary field is heading and teased

2-3 May 2018
Alexander Horstmann& Karin Dean,
Tallinn University,
Estoniaout complementary theoretical insights from
Asian border research to contribute to wider
scholarship on the one hand, and identified
new innovative methods for studying any
border, on the other.
Alexander Horstmann (Tallinn University)
argued that there is a dearth of theory
building in borderland studies, but that there
are new avenues, not least those developedin the context of the Asian Borderlands
Research Network (asianborderlands.net).
Beppe Karlsson (Stockholm University)presented his work on migration strategies
of indigenous minorities in Northeast
India. Tomas Cole (Stockholm University)presented his case-study on conflict,conservation and alternative regimes ofsovereignty in the highlands of Myanmar.
Other new avenues and innovative
concepts on Asian borderland studies werealso presented: Nick Megoran (Newcastle
University) on the biography of borders,focussing on the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan
border; Karin Dean (Tallinn University) on
assemblage and the Sino-Myanmar border;
Jussi Laine (University of Eastern Finland)on border making and -scaping; Martin
Saxer (LMU Munich) on pathways, placeknots and curation, terms that he developedin the context of his ongoing ERC projecton ‘Remoteness and Connectivity: Highland
Asian in the World’. Finally, Agniesza JoniakLüthi (University of Bern and Université deFribourg) presented her new project with
the Swiss National Foundation, ‘Road
construction maintenance in Sino-Inner
Asia border regions’. All in all, the workshop
collected very promising new avenues
in border research.
The Routledge Handbook of Asian
Borderlands is available from:https://tinyurl.com/routledgeAB2018

50

The Network

Critical Heritage Studies

Report‘In-situ’ discussions on
cultural heritage

Left: The tanneries, Fez.
Below: Médersa mérinide, SaléA sense of heritage

Fieldtrip,
Critical Heritage Studies,
Morocco,4-8 April 2018

Student discussion in Morocco
Heidi Jie and Eun Chae ParkE

leven students from the IIAS-coordinatedCritical Heritage Studies programme atLeiden University and twelve Museology
students from Mohammed V University shareda learning experience about the complexitiesof heritage in Morocco. The study trip was led
by an entourage of five academic experts withdifferent disciplinary backgrounds, including
Philippe Peycam (Director of IIAS), Léon
Buskens (NIMAR), Willem Vogelsang (Deputy
Director of IIAS), Elena Paskaleva (lecturer andcoordinator of the Critical Heritage Studies
programme at Leiden University) and Paul van
der Velde (ICAS Secretary), who all actively
participated in the academically stimulating
and culturally enriching exchange. It was a
five-day immersion in Moroccan architecture,museums, and, most importantly, food thatbrought us in touch with the multi-faceted
aspects of the cultural heritage of a country
that is trying to find its own voice.

Day 1: Tardy trepidation
Schiphol Airport, eight o’clock in the morning.
What began as an uneventful trip turned
into momentary worries upon touchdown
in Casablanca where two of the membersof our party were held in limbo by customs,
pending approval of their visas for entry into
the country. The rest searched frantically for
Wi-Fi and dirhams, some with more successthan others. After customs released therequired visas, we were off to Rabat where
we, running late, finally met with the students
from Mohammed V University and theirprofessor Mohammed Saïd El Mortaji.
The two groups introduced themselves overa cup of mint tea and Moroccan sweets.
After tea, the Leiden group was steered
to stunning panoramic riverside views set
against the late evening sun. What followed
was a tour through Rabat’s historically andculturally significant sites, guided by professor
Mohammed. By the time dusk had fallen,
Oumaima Oualid, a PhD candidate in Critical
Heritage at Mohammed V University, led
us through the bustling streets and plazasof Rabat. We took time to admire the tiled
fountains of the souk [market place]. Originallyserving as gathering places for the locals andtheir animals to water themselves as well as tocatch up on the latest gossip, these fountains
are now being renovated with the added
purpose of heritage-making and attracting
tourists. The group then dined in an Italianrestaurant where we had the chance to learn
about, discuss and exchange views on topics

In April 2018, students and academics from Leiden University
in the Netherlands and Mohammed V University in Morocco
embarked on a five-day journey to be immersed in thecomplexities and history of the expression of cultural heritage
in Morocco. The trip was organised by the International
Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) and the Netherlands Instituteof Morocco (NIMAR) in Rabat, Morocco.
ranging from Muslim prayer beads to political
divides in Morocco. After dinner, althoughvery enthused, most of us were longing tofind our beds.

Day 2: No sh*t talk about
my cityMorning breakfast at café Lina with
French pastries, coffee and a jus d’orange.
A visit to the heart of Casablanca, guided byshamelessly proud architect and Casablanca
native Labib El Moumni who would not accept,
in his words, “sh*t” talk about his city. He
guided us through the wide boulevards linedwith colonial-era Art Deco architecture,
remnants of the French protectorate. The
city design, culminating in the symbolic
clock tower, punctuated Casablanca’s firm
feet in the future. El Moumni highlighted thearchitectural details that showed the change inemphasis from French to a Moroccan identity.
Our tour ended with our first traditional
Moroccan lunch, during which Léon Buskens
proposed we consider assumptions aboutauthenticity by illustrating the fluidity ofchanges in cultural heritage with the historyof our drinking glasses on the table. They
were originally an exercise in frugality, madefrom recycled glass, and used primarily
in restaurants. The concept of bildy, or‘authentically made’, turned these previously
low-cost, mass-produced glasses sold for
1 dirham a piece, into twenty-five euro
glasses sold in Parisian shops!
From there, it was a dash to the train
back to Rabat for Leon’s lecture on ‘The Past
and Future of Morocco’, providing our groupwith the context from which to consider the
coming sites on our visit. Afterwards, thegroup split up, and a small satellite groupwent to have dinner in a local restaurant
to have a first taste of the local cuisine.

Day 3: 3D lectures
A morning trip to the city of Salé by tram,
where the main maritime gate of Salé andarchaeologist Dr Mohamed Krombi awaited us.
With infectious enthusiasm, Dr Krombi gave thegroup an extended tour during which he halted
at important archaeological sites. Animatedand with great passion, he captivated his
audience’s attention as he told the tale of thehistory of Salé, once the political and maritime
centre of Morocco. He led us to the top of themaritime gate, gifting us with a beautiful view.
Although Salé houses more citizens than Rabat,it has lagged behind in political and economic
resources. Rabat and Salé have a centuries-old
feud that still lives on today. The new tramsystem, even if it facilitates commuting, has so
far failed to foster any warm feelings between
the two cities. After admiring a renovatedcaravan sarai [roadside inn], we enjoyed a
cup of mint tea with a snack called msemmen–a pancake-like bread that is eaten throughout the day.
Back at the NIMAR institute, three Leiden
students presented their research; we thenvisited the Musée de l’Histoire et desCivilisation, an archaeological museum thataims to bring Moroccan heritage and history
to life, starting from prehistoric times to theIslamic era. After wrapping up our visit to themuseum, the group arrived at the buildingsof Mohammed V University where the Leiden
students continued their presentations forthe day. The Moroccan students were invitedand encouraged to consider how the topics
presented could be implemented in a Moroccan
context. The souk of Rabat was a welcome
respite at the conclusion of the tours andpresentations, where the students now hada chance to spend some time together. Our
gracious hosts were happy to show us the souk
and all its surprises. Students bought herbs andspices, sweets and boxes, all while experiencing
the smells and sounds of a vibrant, lively souk,a living entity, defined at its core by the people
and their relationship with it. The bargaining
and the stories told while being immersed in
the atmosphere brought home the idea that‘heritage’ is not at rest, but alive, and dynamic.

Day 4: Lost in the souk
The city of Fes. Guided by al-Mountasir
Loukili, we visited Dar Batha Médina, the
new museum of Islamic art, constructed by
the French using parts of houses of the
Moroccan nobility of Fes. Rooftop drinks at
a café near one of the old city gates revealed
how the city works to protect old buildings,
using removable architectural components

and allowing public use while protecting thebuilding at the same time. We resumed our tour
to visit the Al-Attarine Madrasa, built during
the height of decorative Islamic architecture.
Continuing to navigate to our next destination,
however, revealed the logistical challenges
of manoeuvring a group of thirty through thesouk, past carts, people and enticing shops,
inevitably resulting in the group splitting
up and some getting lost. The remainder ofthe group continued to enjoy the tanneries,
amongst other sites.
There was something about this souk thatleft a deep impression on most of us. Fromthe market stalls came a barrage of sounds
and sights; this place had its own pace andlife. Some students had the opportunity toshop and bargain at the local stores. From the
Moroccan students and the merchants of thesouk, the Leiden visitors learned about locally
produced goods, their uses, who uses themand why, which provided insight into Moroccan
daily life and culture. When the group was
reunited again, we shared our last traditional
Moroccan dinner with the other students andteachers, exchanging memories, impressions,and inshallah, aux revoirs and not-adieus.

Day 5: There and back again
We were sorry to have to leave Morocco,
a beautiful country we had just begun to
explore. Our bus was ready to take us back to
Casablanca Airport, but as trips go, things do
not always happen according to plan. It wasby coincidence, and our misfortune, that ourbus was held up for 45 minutes by a marathonin the city centre. Consequently, many of us
did not make the flight back to Amsterdam andhad to spend the night in Casablanca before
continuing the journey home on the following
day. One flight and a ride on the Thalys brought
everyone home safely, thus ending our journey.

Reflections
It is very well possible to learn about andengage with critical heritage studies in the
Netherlands, but the privilege of traveling toa country so vastly different from one’s own
afforded us the invaluable experience of‘understanding’ away from our textbooks andoutside the comfortable realm of the classroom.
It made us keenly aware of the importanceof context and the relevance of learning frompeople who are in close contact with the culture
under investigation. The senses also played an
important role in the experience. Sounds, smells,
tastes and textures add depth and colour likespices add flavour to food, something thata PowerPoint presentation in the classroom
cannot convey. Heritage, understood assomething fluid, evolves through exchanges,
continuously re-invented, and as societies
change, their heritages change with them.
Heidi Jie and Eun Chae Park students fromthe Double Degree in Critical Heritage
Studies of Asia and Europe programme
and participants of the Morocco fieldtrip.

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

Feminist methodologies

Embracing curricular reflectionand educational innovation

The Cotton Spring
Rakhee Kalita MoralThe two-and-a-half-day workshop
was “a liberating exercise”, as one
women’s studies scholar and teacher
remarked, filled with lively conversations withwomen’s collectives, sharing experiences
and perspectives from outside the formal
structure of the classroom and the curriculum.
Conducted by Professor Vergès (Advisor)and Dr Aarti Kawlra (Academic Director of
the HaB programme), the workshop brought
the everyday life of women seamlessly into
the feminist scholar’s world and provided
a shared space for reflection over common
concerns and issues stemming from theregion’s unique context.
Our discussions in preparation for theworkshop with women of different tribes
and communities in the Naga Hills and theAssam-Nagaland borderlands were initiallyto explore how traditional customs/practices
and formal legal injunctions trigger andinfluence collectivisation among womenin the region. My young and multi-tasking
research assistant Tiachenla was largely themover in Nagaland, without whom it would
have been impossible to organise the event.
Between Abantee Dutta, project associate andlaw researcher, and myself, some of the earlier
frameworks and rationale of understanding
women’s practices of resistance have since
been reshaped by the revelations that unfolded
through the workshop itself. However, thequestion that still remained pertinent anduppermost on the workshop’s agenda was:How do we do feminist methodologies in thespecific context of northeast India without
being limited by overarching theoreticalprescriptions that typically direct many of
our approaches to gender studies, and inparticular women’s studies?
The workshop was flagged off by a plenary
session at the Sudmerson Hall on 2 April 2018,
where the background and intent of the HaB
workshop –to revitalise and make relevant
the teaching and learning of women’s studies
courses for and by women in the Northeast–was officially recognised by university
officials, especially by the newly appointed
Vice-Chancellor and the Registrar of Cotton
University. It was followed by a lecture by
Francoise Vergès on Political Feminism in the
Era of Femonationalism and Populism to apacked room and eager audience that included
many students and scholars from other small
and big colleges and universities in Guwahati
and beyond. The public session sent out aclear message to all those present that Cotton
University was indeed ready to be the initiating
platform for curricular reflection and change
in gender studies in the cluster of institutionsof higher education in the northeast of India,
and for the implications for allied research.
Kheshili Chishi, a tireless peace worker
from Kohima in conflict-torn Nagaland, whose
drive and commitment was largely responsible
for mobilising two dozen women via overnighttrain journeys from the Naga Hills to Guwahati,
exemplified the urgency and spirit of sharedpurpose that brought the 70 participants
together in the workshop. Kheshili, oneof the front-runners in the Forum for Naga
Reconciliation (FNR), a civil society collectiveof the state rooting for peace with the Indian
government, remains a major resource for thecurrent project on women’s mobilisations, andhas brought the author in touch with several
grassroots people whose stories and struggles
give flesh to a proposed publication underpreparation as part of the HaB programme.
Entitled, The Little Book of Women’s Practices
from Assam and Nagaland, the volume isenvisaged as a handbook of women’s individualand collective practices in the everyday,
both in confrontation and collaboration
with state, society and family. One that

ReportWorkshop participants

Beyond home and family
The Cotton workshop was in recognitionof this ongoing work of women’s collectives in
the region. It was a coming together of womenfrom various orientations, both academics
and members of civil society groups. As theworkshop processes unfolded and participants
listened to the experience of –in the words ofrenowned feminists from across the world –“being (conscious) in the world”, their reactions
ranged from sheer wonder to euphoria andrealisation of a unity across geographies.
This knowledge provided participants withnovel ‘ways of seeing’ their own positionalities
and endorsed the local and contextual as
being uppermost for rethinking the discourseand practice of women’s studies in the region.
The participants comprised women fromacademia, including IIT Guwahati, Gauhati
University, North Eastern Hill University, TISS,Northeast Studies’ Regional Centre and othercolleges and collectives, as well as independent
researchers, unaffiliated but passionate
women, and a few activists that also included
some ardent MA students from the English
department of Cotton University, and happily
for me, my dynamic young colleagues Pallabi,
Raa and Risha. The workshop’s activities
enabled and echoed the participants’ own
lived situations, inspiring a sense of purpose
towards decision-making and change, together
with the recognition that gaining knowledge
about one’s own experience and positionality
in the present is empowering in itself.

51

Workshop,
Cotton University India,
2-4 April 2018

Early April 2018, and the corridors of Cotton University
in Guwahati, the capital city of Assam, were abuzz
with a burst of energy and gathering of women in thecentral conference hall of the 117-year old institution,
to participate in a workshop on ‘Feminist Methodologies’.
The event was occasioned by the northeast India projectof the IIAS-coordinated programme Humanities acrossBorders: Asia and Africa in the World (HaB), undertakenby the author to explore how the experience of women’s
mobilisations for peace via diverse civil society agentsin recent times, in Nagaland and Assam, could enter
the discourse and practice of women’s studies courses
in the region.

could feed into larger paradigms of women’sstudies programmes elsewhere. Articulating
the experience of being a woman in Assamand Nagaland, the handbook will document
women’s decisions, personal and public,in the specific cultural and political context
and history of the region.

The Network

A number of exercises were deployed
to enable sharing in an atmosphere ofconviviality and exchange. The workshop
began in the afternoon of April 2nd withthe ‘Who are we?’ exercise of mapping one’s
home and introducing oneself as though‘to a friend’, using small photos and index
cards on a wall map showing the northeast
region of India, followed by individual
accounts of ‘How we define ourselves socially’outside and beyond the home and family.
The next day, Francoise led the first session
on women’s work, titled, “Who is caring
and cleaning the world?”, during which theindividual and collective hours of work were
calculated to bring to the fore the mentalload carried by women in society today.
The afternoon session of day 2 reiterated
the need to interrogate crystallised constructsof ‘gender’, ‘custom’, ‘tribe’, ‘communal
identity’, ‘the Northeast’, and ‘nation’, thatdefine and intersect the experience of being‘woman in Assam and Nagaland’. Francoisehelped us inquire into the notion of ‘gender’in its Western definition, and to challenge
it for being too narrow and thus too poor to
truly account for the multiple ways in which
women experience their identities, roles andbelonging to a place. Aarti proposed the ideaof interrogating the discourse of place-based
identities and local pasts or lived histories,
and of becoming a researcher, activist
in defending one’s own sense of place.
She discussed the idea of expanding thenotion of value to resist the logic of monetary
value via price and a utility and introduced
the idea of custodianship and inalienablevalue to complement the rights-based
approach to natural resources, including floraand fauna, property, skills such as weaving,dyeing and bamboo construction, and othermaterial agents of sustenance and cultural
reproduction.

Dare to think, dare to imagine
The last day of the workshop featured
several break-away sessions to discuss‘Utopian thinking in a changing world’ in orderto realise a shared manifesto that stressed
the need to go beyond traditional patriarchal
norms to explain the violence of men against
women. What emerged was the need toinquire into the irreversible structural changes–political, military, ecological, economic –thatwere responsible for the emasculation of men
in the borderlands by the actions of the state.
This was followed by an individual story-board
exercise, titled, ‘I/We dare to think, dare to
imagine’, during which participants used dry
pastels on black chart paper to create visual
representations of womanhood from their own
vantage points. It resulted in a spectacularwall mural that further enlivened the workshop
space, already adorned with flowers andtextiles in bright colours.
The final session was a reflection and hightea with the Vice-Chancellor and Registrarof Cotton University, who were more than justenthusiastic about the curricular outcomes of
the workshop. It was exciting to see that the
Cotton University administration was alreadythinking of rolling out courses at three different
levels for the coming semester. It was proposedthat we create an inter-university group tobuild an add-on course for non-university
students as an introductory methodologies
course for all undergraduates acrossdisciplines, as well as a postgraduate course
at the master’s level in women’s studies.
The workshop was a reminder of therecurrent need to mobilise academia-society
linkages under one common platform. And
for women’s studies to celebrate womanhood(not simply the white feminist variety) whilereminding us that being woman awakens
the need to go past the discriminations
and totalisations that erase the sense ofimagining the self as being human in theworld. The convergence of ideas, ontologies
and epistemologies towards this end came alive
as a resurgence of women’s voices, scripting
a new narrative in the history of gender studies
and approaches in this region, home alreadyto several women’s peace movements andinterventions in what has long been regarded
as India’s troubled eastern frontier.
From some of my earliest imaginings
about documenting and archiving a women’s
movement in India’s northeastern peripheries(during the Chiang Mai kick-off of the
HaB programme in early 2017 steered by
Director Philippe Peycam’s indefatigable joie
de vivre), the April 2018 HaB workshop on
feminist methodologies at Cotton University
seems to have made a few seminal strides
in reconfiguring and repositioning learningand living with a real humanities approach
to knowledge production and curricula
development at the university. It is worth
reiterating that the encouragement andunstinted support to the workshop by both its
Vice-Chancellor, Professor Bhabesh Goswami,
and its Registrar, Professor Shikhar Sharma,
bring rich promise in formally forging theinstitution’s partnership with the International
Institute for Asian Studies in Leiden, theNetherlands, which has taken off both inspirit and action with this interesting eventat Cotton University. Dilip Gogoi from theFaculty of Political Science, my very competentco-convenor at Cotton University, silently
assured me, every time I felt anxious about
hosting a theory/praxis initiative of this kind,that we could certainly break out of the mould
and make this novel workshop a real success.
Spring is indeed here!
Rakhee Kalita Moral is Associate Professor
at Cotton University and Coordinator/
Primary Investigator of the Northeast
India project of the IIAS-coordinatedprogramme Humanities across Borders:Asia and Africa in the World

52

The Network

Research

IIAS Research,
Networks,
and Initiatives
IIAS research and other initiatives
are carried out within a numberof thematic, partially overlapping
research clusters in phase with
contemporary Asian currents andbuilt around the notion of social
agency. In addition, IIAS remains
open to other potentially significant
topics. More information:www.iias.asia

IIAS research clusters
Asian Cities
This cluster deals with cities and urban
cultures with their issues of flows and fluxes,
ideas and goods, and cosmopolitism andconnectivity at their core, framing the existenceof vibrant ‘civil societies’ and political microcultures. Through an international knowledge
network, IIAS aims to create a platform forscholars and urban practitioners focusing on
Asian cities ‘in context’ and beyond traditional
western norms of knowledge.

Urban Knowledge
Network Asia (UKNA)

www.ukna.asia
Coordinator: Paul Rabé p.e.rabe@iias.nl
Clusters: Asian Cities; Asian Heritages

S

EANNET is a four-year project(2017-2020), supported by a grantfrom the Henry Luce Foundation(New York, USA) that seeks to develop
a multi-disciplinary body of knowledge
on cities in Southeast Asia through theprism of the neighbourhood. Throughcase study sites in six cities (Mandalay,
Myanmar; Chiang Mai and Bangkok,
Thailand; Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam;
Manila, Philippines; Surabaya, Indonesia),
SEANNET seeks to engage the humanistic social
sciences in a dialogue with urban stakeholders
as co-contributors of an alternative knowledge
on cities. It seeks to achieve this through a
combination of participatory field-research,

Asian Heritages
This cluster focuses on the uses of culture andcultural heritage practices in Asia. In particular,
it addresses a variety of definitions associatedwith cultural heritage and their implications
for social agency. The cluster engages witha broad range of related concepts and issues,
including the contested assertions of ‘tangible’
and ‘intangible’, concepts such as ‘authenticity’,‘national heritage’ and ‘shared heritage’, and,in general, with issues pertaining to the political
economy of heritage.

Global Asia
Asia has a long history of transnational
linkages with other parts of the world, thereby
shaping the global order, as much as the world
at large continues to shape Asia. The Global
Asia Cluster addresses contemporary issues
related to Asia’s projection into the world as wellas trans-national interactions within the Asian
region itself. In addition IIAS aims to help develop
a more evenly balanced field of Asian Studies
by collaborating in trans-regional capacity
building initiatives and by working on new typesof methodological approaches that encouragesynergies and interactions between disciplines,
regions and practices.

T

he Urban Knowledge Network Asia
(UKNA) is an inclusive network that brings
together scholars and practitioners
engaged in collaborative research and eventson cities in Asia. It seeks to influence policy
by contributing insights that put people at thecentre of urban governance and development
strategies. The emphasis is on immediateproblem solving as well as on the identificationof long-term, transformative processes that
increase the scope for the active engagementof people in the creative production andshaping of the city in Asia. The UKNA
Secretariat is at IIAS, but the network comprises
universities and planning institutions across
China, India, Southeast Asia and Europe. Its
current flagship project is the Southeast Asia
Neighbourhoods Network (SEANNET), which
promotes research, teaching and disseminationof knowledge on Asia through the prism ofneighbourhoods and urban communities insix selected Southeast Asian cities.

Southeast Asia
Neighborhoods
Network (SEANNET)
in-situ roundtables and workshops, academic
conferences, publications, and new forms ofpedagogy developed in collaboration with local
institutions of learning. The second ambitionof SEANNET is to help shape and empowera community of early career scholars andpractitioners working on and from Southeast
Asia. To that effect, SEANNET research teams inthe six neighbourhoods comprise international
and local scholars, students from local
universities, and civil society representatives,
working together with neighbourhood
residents.
www.ukna.asia/seannet
Coordinators: Paul Rabé
p.e.rabe@iias.nl
and Rita Padawangi Singapore
University of Social Sciences
ritapadawangi@suss.edu.sg
Cluster: Asian CitiesI

IAS supports the work of the Indian
Medical Research Network, whichaims to stimulate social-cultural andsocial-historical research on Indian
medical traditions such as Ayurveda,
Unanitibb, Siddha, Yoga and Sowa Rigpa.
Of special interest is the integration ofIndian medicine in Indian public healthand its role as second resort for
middleclass Indians and Europeans.

Indian Medical
Research Network

www.iias.nl/indianmedicine
Coordinator: Maarten Bodem.bode@uva.nl
Cluster: Asian Heritages

Double Degree in
Critical Heritage Studies
of Asia and EuropeInitiated by IIAS, this programme involves
Leiden University in the Netherlands, two
Institutes at National Taiwan University
in Taiwan and one at Yonsei University inSouth Korea. Discussions with other possible
partners in Asia are ongoing. The programme
offers selected students the opportunity tofollow a full year study at one of the partner
institutes with full credits and a double
degree. The curriculum at Leiden University
benefits from the contributions of Prof Michael
Herzfeld (Harvard) as a guest teacher andthe Senior Advisor to the Critical Heritage
Studies Initiative of IIAS.
www.iias.nl/critical-heritage-studies
Coordinator: Elena Paskaleva
e.g.paskaleva@hum.leidenuniv.nl
Cluster: Asian Heritages

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

Research

The Network

53

Asian Borderlands
Research Network(ABRN)T
Humanities acrossBorders: Asia & Africa
in the Worldhis network focuses particularlyon the border regions between
South Asia, Central/East andSoutheast Asia. The concerns arevaried, ranging from migratory movements, transformations in cultural, linguistic andreligious practices, to ethnic mobilisation and conflict,marginalisation, and environmental concerns. ABRN
organises a conference in one of these border regions
every two years in co-operation with a local partner.
Next conference: Borderland Spaces: Ruins, Revival(s)and Resources, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 23-25 August 2018.
Also see p.48 in this issue.
www.asianborderlands.net
Coordinator: Erik de Maakermaaker@fsw.leidenuniv.nl
Cluster: Global AsiaCo-funded by The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation(New York, USA) this new IIAS programme (2017-2020)for global collaboration on humanistic education iscarried out by a consortium of twenty-three leading institutes
in Asia, West Africa, Europe and the United States, and theirlocal partners in Asia and Africa. Its goal is to mobilise thedevelopment of a global consortium of universities and theirlocal partners interested in fostering humanities-groundededucation. Its substantive vision is that of an inclusive andexpanded humanities. To this end, the program will initiate
methodological interventions in teaching and researchto surpass narrow disciplinary, institutional and ideologicalagendas. The programme facilitates border-crossing meetings,
workshops and other collaborative pedagogical formats in
its partner geographies. Jointly conducted, these events aim
to shape a curricular matrix and framework for humanistic
education across borders.
Follow the stories on the Humanities across Borders Blog
www.humanitiesacrossborders.blog
www.iias.asia/research/humanities-acrossborders-asia-africa-world
Clusters: Global Asia; Asian Heritages

Asian Studies
in AfricaS

ince 2010, IIAS and partners in Africa, Asia and the USA
have been working on an initiative to promote the studyof and teaching on Asia at African universities. The initiative
constitutes a first attempt to sustain a humanities-informed
South-South knowledge platform with connections between
other academic centres in Europe and North America, but also
Latin-America and Oceania. A roundtable in Chisamba, Zambia(2012) led to the establishment of the pan-African ‘Associationof Asian Studies in Africa’ (A-ASIA). A-ASIA held its three-day
inaugural conference in Accra, Ghana, in September 2015, entitled
Africa-Asia, a New Axis of Knowledge. Organised with the supportof the International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS) and
IIAS, it was the first conference held in Africa to bring together
a multidisciplinary ensemble of scholars and institutions fromthe continent and the rest of the world with a shared focus
on Asia and Asia-Africa intellectual interactions.
Next conference: Africa-Asia, a New Axis of Knowledge –Second Edition, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 20-22 September
2018. Also see p.49 in this issue.
http://www.icas.asia/africas
Cluster: Global Asia

Energy Programme
Asia (EPA)T

he latest and second joint
research programme of the
IIAS Energy Programme Asia
carried out with the Institute of West
Asia & African Studies of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences wasentitled The Transnationalizationof China’s Oil Industry (2013-2017).
It analysed China’s increasing
involvement with governments, local
institutions and local stakeholders
in the energy sectors of a numberof resource-rich countries in Africa,
Asia and Latin America.
Publication: Geopolitical Economy of Energy
and Environment China and the European Union(Medhi P. Amineh, Yang Guang, 2017).
www.iias.nl/research/energy-programmeasia-epa
Coordinator: M. Amineh
m.p.amineh@uva.nl; m.p.amineh@iias.nl
Cluster: Global Asia

Leiden Centre for
Indian Ocean StudiesT

he Leiden Centre for Indian Ocean
Studies brings together people andmethods to study the ‘Indian Ocean
World’, aiming to co-organize conferences,
workshops and academic exchanges withinstitutions from the region. Together with
IIAS, the Centre facilitates an inclusive andglobal platform bringing together scholars
and institutions working on connections
and comparisons across the axis of humaninteraction with an interest in scholarshipthat cuts across borders of places, periods
and disciplines.
The Centre will be participating in theinternational conference Africa-Asia,
A New Axis of Knowledge – Second Edition
in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania,
20-22 September 2018.
www.iias.asia/research/leidencentre-indian-ocean-studies
Cluster: Global Asia

Centre for Regulation& Governance (CRG)

The IIAS Centre for Regulation and
Governance in Asia is engaged ininnovative and comparative research on
theories and practices – focusing on emerging
markets of Asia. Its multi-disciplinary researchundertakings combine approaches frompolitical economy, law, public administration,
criminology, and sociology in the comparative
analysis of regulatory issues in Asia and indeveloping theories of governance pertinent
to Asian realities.
Cluster: Global Asia

International
Convention of Asia
Scholars (ICAS)W

ith its biennial conferences,
International Convention of Asia
Scholars (ICAS) is the largest
global forum for academics and civil society
exchange on Asia. Founded in 1997 at theinitiative of IIAS, ICAS serves as a platform
for scholars, social and cultural leaders, andinstitutions focusing on issues critical to Asia,
and, by implication, the rest of the world.
The ICAS biennial conferences are organisedin cooperation with local universities, cities
and institutions and attended by scholars
and other experts, institutions and publishers
from 60 countries. ICAS also organises
the biennial ‘ICAS Book Prize’ (IBP), which
awards the most prestigious prizes in thefield of Asian Studies for books and PhD
theses in English, Korean, Chinese, French
and German (more language editions areplanned for the future).

Ten conventions have been held since 1997
(Leiden, Berlin, Singapore, Shanghai, Kuala Lumpur,
Daejon, Honolulu, Macao, Adelaide, and Chiang Mai).
ICAS 11 will be held in Leiden, the Netherlands,
16-19 July 2019.
Deadline Call for Proposals: 10 October 2018.
Also see p.3 in this issue.
Website: www.icas.asia
IIAS/ICAS secretariat:
Paul van der Velde icas@iias.nl

54

The Network

IIAS Fellowship

IIAS Fellowship
Programme

Along with the research fellows who are attached to one of the IIAS
research programmes, the Institute yearly hosts a large number of visiting
researchers (affiliated fellows) who come to Leiden to work on their own
individual research project. In addition, IIAS also facilitates the teaching
and research by various professorial fellows as part of agreements with
Dutch universities, foreign ministries and funding organisations.

Current Fellows
Mehdi Amineh

Coordinator Energy Programme
Asia (EPA)
1 Sept 2007 – 31 March 2019

Kunthea Chhom

Sanskrit elements in Old Khmer
language: a case-study of boons
and curses in epigraphy fromancient Cambodia
1 March 2018 – 31 May 2018

Jatin Dua

A sea of protection: piracy, trade,and regulation in the Indian Ocean
1 Oct 2016 – 31 July 2018

Ana Dragojlovic

Politics of queer affect:
intentionality, mediation, intervention in Indisch memory work
1 June 2018 – 31 January 2019

Melinda Fodor

The Ānandasundarī by
Ghanaśyāma. A revised criticaledition with annotatedtranslation, introduction andglossary of selected words
1 March 2018 – 31 Aug 2018

Manpreet Kaur Janeja
The aesthetics of schools
meals: distrust, risk anduncertainty
1 Oct 2017 – 31 July 2018

Pralay Kanungo

Indian politics
Professor/ICCR Chair ofContemporary India Studies(until 30 June 2018)
1 Sep 2013 – 30 June 2019

Neena Talwar Kanungo
The arrival of digital
democracy in India: social
media and political parties
1 July 2016 – 30 June 2019

Carola Erika Lorea

Metaphor, meaning and oral
exegesis: the upside-down
language of the songs of Sādhanā
1 Jan 2018 – 30 June 2018Charlotte Marchina

Rethinking land use in the eraof the Anthropocene(Mongolia, Russia, China)
1 Feb 2018 – 31 Aug 2018

Katsunori Miyazaki

Research of the Siebold
Collection
1 April 2018 – 9 Sep 2019

William Peterson

Asian self-representation
at World’s Fairs
1 Jan 2018 – 30 June 2018

Saraju Rath

Inscriptional, literary andmercantile scripts of ancientand medieval India
1 Jan 2018 – 31 Dec 2018

Rituparna Roy

Kolkata Partition Museum
project
1 July 2017 – 30 June 2018

Bal Gopal Shrestha

Religiosity among the
Nepalese Diaspora
1 Jan 2015 – 31 Dec 2018

Xiaosen Song

Vietnamese women in theprocess of modern Vietnam’s
nation-building
1 Oct 2017 – 30 Sep 2018

Sanderien Verstappen

Rerouting relations:navigating emergent Muslim
and Hindu spaces in rural India
1 Sept 2017 – 30 April 2019

Tingfai Yu

Class as a method to localise
queer studies: towards
inter-Asian articulation
1 April 2018 – 31 Jan 2019

Qiaoyun Zhang

Cultural heritagization in timesof crisis: a Chinese experience
1 Sept 2017 – 30 June 2018

In the spotlight
political and social
demands, with relative
degrees of success.
Located against the
backdrop of such issues,
my current monograph,the focus of my IIAS
fellowship, is grounded
in long-term ethnographic
fieldwork on school meals in England.
The Aesthetics of School Meals: (Dis)trust,Risk, and Uncertainty (under contract) is anurban ethnography of the anxious everyday
engagements of Muslim/Hindu migrants ofSouth-Asian (Indian/Bangladeshi/Pakistani)
heritage in England with ‘healthy’ school
meals as entangled in wider historicaland variegated networks of perceived risks
and uncertainties. It unpacks the interactionsof health with the dynamics of (dis)trust
and mistrust integral to such networks,
thereby revealing implications forconfigurations of ‘public health’ and‘multiculturalism’, amidst calls to rethink‘cultural diversity’ and forms of ‘integration’in an increasingly volatile Europe.
I have conducted a pilot project (Waiting
for Food in India) on Mid-Day Meals in urban
schools which will form the basis of a future
research initiative. Future research plans
also include further developing interests
in gender, youth, and migration in cities
across Europe and Asia. After excitingly hectic
years of getting a new education programme
off the ground, in addition to teaching
and administration under the aegis of myacademic job, the IIAS fellowship has offered
me a tranquil and congenial space to explore
possibilities of harnessing some of these ideas,
and initiating conversations with scholars in
Leiden and Amsterdam across disciplines,
including anthropology, history, philosophy,
and area studies. The fellowship continues
to give me opportunities to interact withdiverse audiences through: researchseminars; a planned event at IIAS withMichael Herzfeld (Harvard University) on myjust-released co-edited book Ethnographiesof Waiting (Bloomsbury 02/2018); forthcoming presentations/discussions including
those in Brussels, Copenhagen, and Edinburgh(annual-workshop of the Bangladesh Studies
Network I initiated, now in its fourth year).
Engaging with the inviting range of lunch-time
lectures at IIAS and seminars across Leiden’s
Humanities and Social Sciences institutes/
networks, Leiden University’s fabulous library
resources, Amsterdam University’s stimulating
anthropology walking-seminars in the
Dutch dunes, and the immensely rewarding
intellectual and social interactions with fellow
fellows at IIAS are making this fellowship
an unforgettable experience. Adding to thisfurther, are the warm and welcoming IIAS
staff, and the Spring Outings to the marvellous
Dutch art museums, the lovely tulip-fields
in the ‘Keukenhof’ and the stately ‘Binnenhof’
Dutch government complex in The Hague.
And of course, for the foodie and foodanthropologist in me, the plethora of stalls
at the Leiden Saturday market along thecanal is an absolute delight!”

this imported model ofdealing with land andthe local perspectives
on their relationshipwith the environmentthat that exist among
the Mongolian herders
in Mongolia, Russia
and China.
According to Mongolian beliefs andpractices, the landscape is inhabitedby invisible entities, master spirits of theland (gazryn ezen). Traditionally, humans
should not disturb them, and must preserve
environmental resources. It is people
who belong to a place, and not the otherway round. Therefore, land privatisation
implemented by the Russian and Chinese
governments creates challenging meeting
points in terms of the existing relationships
with the land. I investigate how Mongol
herders, in the three countries where they
live, redefine, or not, the role they assign

themselves in the environment that theyshare with other (non-human) beings.
My seven-month stay in Leiden (FebruaryAugust 2018) is dedicated to data processing
and the writing. I am currently working on
my first monograph (to be published bothin French and English) that will address thespatial and political features of Mongolian
nomadic pastoralism. Although very few
researchers here in the social sciences areworking on Mongolia and Siberia, thanks
to IIAS’ extended network, I could quickly
connect with researchers from Dutch
universities (e.g., Amsterdam, Utrecht,
Nijmegen) working on related issues in othergeographical areas. Seldom have I had suchan opportunity to expand and strengthen
my own international network.
IIAS offers me a fantastic opportunity
to think and write in a stimulating environment that encompasses not only different
disciplines and areas, but also academic andnon-academic expertise. As a researcher

from a purely academic world who, due
to my work on sustainability-related issues
is increasingly receiving requests fromfield professionals (NGO, embassy staff),
I hugely benefit from the framework ofinterconnected academic and non-academic
fields of expertise.
I myself am committed to the transfer
of knowledge to wider audiences of nonspecialists, in particular by varying thetools and media, in past and future projects(photograph exhibitions, book of proverbs,
graphic novel...). In this respect, it was a hugeprivilege to meet, during my first weeks in the
Netherlands, Joost Grootens, a Dutch graphic
designer whose work I admire a lot. It isvery likely that he will design the numerous
maps included in the book I am working
on. Last but not least, coming back to theNetherlands, where, in a previous life I lived fornine years and which I still consider to be mysecond home, turns this already remarkable
opportunity into a unique experience.”

Manpreet K. Janeja
The aesthetics of school meals:(dis)trust, risk, and uncertainty“

Food insecurity and malnutrition
continue to be matters of concern
globally. They generate various
contested interventions such as the National
Healthy Schools Programme (UK) and the
Mid-Day Meal Scheme (India), underpinnedby visions of the ‘inclusive growth’ of ‘healthy
publics’ in ‘food-secure healthy futures’.
Such schemes have sought to manage issuesof hunger, inequality, taste, nutritionalguidelines, and socio-cultural norms andpractices amidst changing economic,

Charlotte Marchina
INALCO - Institut National desLangues et Civilisations Orientales
Rethinking land use in the Eraof the Anthropocene(Mongolia, Russia, China)“

My current research deals with land
use in Mongolian nomadic pastoralism.
Under the influence of the market
economy and western world views, landas private property has become widespread.
The aim of this project is an in-depth studyof the confrontations, assimilations andnegotiations that occur in the tension between

The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018

IIAS Fellowship

The Network

Qiaoyun Zhang
Cultural heritagization in times of crisis:a Chinese experience

Apply for an
IIAS fellowship“

As a fellow of the Asian Heritages cluster
at IIAS and a cultural anthropologist,
I have mainly been working on a project
titled ‘Cultural heritagization in times ofcrisis: a Chinese experience’, investigating
if, and how, heritagization is an effective
measure for the culturally-sensitive recoveryof the Qiang ethnic minority in South China,
following the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake.
Based on 15 months of dissertation fieldwork
and building on my dissertation analyses,
I explore three aspects of the Chinesestate-led nomination of Qiang culture for the
status of Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH),
and the resulting safeguarding practices
after it was awarded, as a means to rescue
and protect the Qiang culture. First, I examine
how the heritage regime and audit culture
influence the urgent heritagization planning
after the earthquake. Secondly, I look at
heritagization as a process of knowledge
production and identity formation for
the Qiang and the Chinese state. Finally,
I reflect on the radical transformationof the perceptions and practices of the
Qiang ICH, and the ICH-centered cultural
recovery planning in China.
The 10-month fellowship at IIAS has
greatly helped me accomplish this project.
Obtaining the fellowship soon after my
PhD helped me grow into a more maturescholar-teacher at one of the world’s
leading research institutions on Asian Studies.
I am first and foremost grateful for thecolleagues I have met at the institute.
Not only did we share and constructively
comment on each other’s work, we also
formed a scholarly community, throughworkshops and forging future collaborations.
Secondly, IIAS provides an extremely
comfortable and friendly working environment that allows me to concentrate on myresearch and writing, thereby assisted by
the always readily available support fromthe IIAS staff. Thirdly, the libraries and otherresearch resources made available to me
by the institute are invaluable. The newly
opened Leiden University Asian Libraryis undoubtedly one of the best of its
kind. Fourthly, working in Leiden andwithin close proximity to the University of
Amsterdam, Amsterdam Free University andother institutions, I am able to engage inconversations and lectures with experts in
China Studies, Anthropology, Emergency
Management Studies and Heritage Studies.
Finally, Leiden is absolutely a lovely place
to live and study. As a Chinese scholar
trained in the USA, the IIAS fellowship offers
me a precious cultural journey into theEuropean continent for the very first time.
I have spent a very productive andpleasant time At IIAS. In addition to theaforementioned project, I contributed anarticle to the Focus section of this issue(pp.36-37), and a review of a book about
the Wenchuan earthquake recovery to
newbooks.asia. I wrote a number of otherarticles on homeland reconstruction anddisaster tourism and revised my dissertation
for publication. Moreover, I gave five lecturesin and outside Leiden and developed inspiring
friendships with colleagues worldwide.
The valuable resources and sweet memories
gained through such intellectual exposure
and international experience are definitely
distinguishing assets for my future work asa university professor and cultural scholar.”Also read Qiaoyun Zhang’s article“Heritage making after the earthquake.
Safeguarding the intangible heritageof the Qiang people in China” in the
Focus section of this issue.

The International Institute for Asian Studies(IIAS) in Leiden, the Netherlands, invites
outstanding researchers to apply for an IIAS
fellowship to work on a relevant piece of
research in the social sciences and humanities.

Becomean IIAS
Fellow
IIAS Fellowship
possibilities andrequirements

We are particularly interested in researchers
focusing on one of the Institute’s three thematic
research clusters: ‘Asian Heritages’, ‘Global Asia’and ‘Asian Cities’. However, some positions
will be reserved for outstanding projects in any
area outside of those listed.
For more information about our researchclusters, see pp.52-53 of this issue of theNewsletter and www.iias.asia

Combine your
IIAS fellowship withtwo extra monthsof research in Paris
When applying for an IIAS Fellowship, you
may also choose to apply for an additional
two months of research at the Collège d’études
mondiales of the Fondation Maison des sciences
de l’homme (CEM-FMSH), in Paris, France.
Collaborating with IIAS, CEM-FMSH has
agreed to provide three two-month fellowships
each year for scholars who have been awarded
an IIAS fellowship. This grant from CEM-FMSH
will enable selected candidates to carry out
research in Paris for a further two months
immediately after their stay in Leiden.
If you are interested in this option, please
complete the relevant section of the IIAS
application form.

Application deadlines:
1 March and 1 October

Apply for an
IIAS-ASCL fellowship

Apply for a
Gonda fellowship

The IIAS-ASCL joint fellowship is intended
for researchers specialising in Asian-Africaninteractions. It aims to attract researchers
whose work is informed by current
theoretical debates, in the Social Sciencesand Humanities, on global connectivities
and who are able to critically engage withshifting paradigms in ‘area studies’ beyond
the ways in which these have traditionallybeen conceived in the West.

For promising young Indologists at the
post-doctorate level it is possible to apply
for funding with the J. Gonda Foundationof the Royal Netherlands Academy ofArts and Sciences (KNAW) to spend three
to six months doing research at IIAS.

Application deadlines:
1 April and 1 October

Application deadlines:
15 March and 15 September

Information and application forms:
www.iias.asia/fellowships

55

56

Asian art

The Portrait

Exploring exhibitions of Asian art
all over the world.

A museum for the living
history of Asia

Museu do Oriente. Lisbon, Portugal
www.museudooriente.pt

S

traddling past and present, art andanthropology, memory and actuality,
Museu do Oriente in Lisbon is dedicatedto the cultural dialogue between Portugal andAsia, presented through objects and narratives.
Opened to the public in 2008, the museum
is the flagship project of Fundação Oriente inPortugal, and is steered by the foundation’s
overall mission to foster mutual knowledge
between Portugal and the Asian territories it ishistorically linked to. In addition to exhibitions,
the Museum hosts a program of activities fromlive performances to workshops and lectures,
anchored around its two main collections –Portuguese Presence in Asia and Kwok On.
Inviting dialogue with contemporary artists,
researchers, institutions and communities,
these collections are as distinct as they arecomplementary.

Exchange of influences
Assembled through a policy of acquisitions
by Fundação Oriente since its inception in
1988, Portuguese Presence in Asia integrates
around 3000 works of decorative arts,
including furniture, lacquer work, silver andgold-smithery, ivory carvings, porcelain
and textiles, as well as paintings, sculptures,books and maps. It strives primarily to illustrate
Portugal’s pursuits in the East, driven by trade,evangelisation, and cultural exchange. As thecountry set out to become a seafaring tradeand military power, strongholds were
established in Goa, Malacca, Siam, Timorand Macao. People and goods travelled along
the new spice routes and a steady exchange
of aesthetic influences and knowhow ensued.
As local craftsmen received commissions

from European patrons, exotic materials
and traditional techniques were applied
to western typologies, resulting in culturally
layered, syncretic pieces.
Namban art is one such example. The term
refers to the Japanese artistic style bornof the contacts between the Japanese andthe Namban-jin or ‘Southern barbarians’
from Europe, more specifically Portugal
and Spain. Many of the pieces created bore
witness to their unique historical moment.
The folding ‘Namban screen’ shown in
Portuguese Presence in Asia is a veritablevisual account of the early encounters
between the Portuguese and the Japanese.
Dated to the Edo period (1615 -1868) in thestyle of the Kano school, it depicts the arrivalof the kurofone or black trade ship comingfrom Macao, with its procession of clergymen,
merchants, noblemen, slaves and interpreters,
whose unfamiliar facial features, attire andaccessories are minutely painted against
a typical one-dimensional gold background.
Even more impressive, the collection features
an extremely rare Namban helmet, a hybrid
piece replicating a Western design, madefrom traditional Japanese materials suchas washi paper and lacquer. This is the only
specimen of its kind on display in Europe.
As the political and geo-strategic world
map shifted, and borders were redrawn,
Europe-Asia relations changed, but the Far
East –perceived as exotic, opulent and foreign,oftentimes tinged with a hint of decadence anddanger –continued to enthral Westerners, fromacademics to artists, travellers, and writers.
Throughout the 1800s, this fascination would
spark a surge in systematic collecting, geared
towards a museum-like representation of old
civilizations and the diverse mosaic of Asian arts.
Thus, Portuguese Presence in Asia also
focuses on European collections of artworks
and archaeological pieces from the Far East,
assembled in the 1800s and early 20th century.
Chief among the exhibits is a series of Chinese
Neolithic ceramics dating back to 3000 BC,
funerary terracottas and a range of porcelain
pieces in varying designs and decorative styles
predating the ubiquitous blue-and-white. Hereare also shown remarkable pieces on extended
loan from other Portuguese national museums,
such as the Camilo Pessanha and the ManuelTeixeira Gomes bequests, from the Machado
de Castro National Museum.

Speaking to ancient beliefs
Museu do Oriente’s second leading collection,
Kwok On, is dedicated to Asian performing arts,
their founding narratives and popular religions.
This is an ethnographic collection that views
objects in relation to their respective context,
uses and symbolic power. Kwok On was donatedto Fundação Oriente in 1999 by French sinologist
Jacques Pimpaneau, who in turn had received
it from Chinese theatre enthusiast and collector
Kwok On, in 1971.
Initially composed of some 600 objects
pertaining exclusively to Chinese dramaticarts, under the guidance of Mr. Pimpaneau
and the stewardship of the foundation, thecollection has grown in size and diversity.
Every year, a mission is undertaken to procure
new pieces but also get in touch with local
artisans and communities. At present, it
exceeds 13.000 artefacts. Geographically,it spans the whole of Asia, including India,
Indonesia, Cambodia, and Thailand.
Kwok On documents puppet theatres fromTurkey to China. It represents Noh, Kabuki andBunraku theatre from Japan, Koothyattam
and Kathali theatre from India, Chinese opera,
Khon Thai from Thailand and Tazieh theatre
from Iran. Highly codified and stylised, Asian
performing arts represent the history andmythologies intrinsic to the daily life of thesecultures, thus playing a crucial role in identity
building. This means that Kwok On artefacts,though datable in terms of production, speak
to ancient practices and beliefs that haveremained relevant nowadays. This is one of
the collection’s most engaging aspects.
Currently, The Chinese Opera is on display,featuring lavishly ornamented costumes,
headdresses, make-up models, puppets,
prints and musical instruments. Traditional
Chinese opera is an elaborate form of dramaand musical theatre; an amalgamationof singing, pantomime, acrobatics, martial
arts and dance. Encompassing several
regional styles, the diversity of opera rivals
its longevity. Though the Cultural Revolution
tried to turn it into a political tool, the opera
experienced a revival from 1976 onwards
and has now regained its standing as oneof China’s foremost cultural treasures.
In presenting both Portuguese Presencein Asia and Kwok On, Museu do Oriente
offers a many-sided view of Asian arts andtraditions through time, as they resonate
across religion and society.
Rute Paredes
Communication Department

Top left:
Chinese opera: entranceof Characters sectionof the exhibition. Threeof the four tipologies ofChinese opera costumes(jing, dan and chou).
Photo: Nuno Vieira.
Top right:
Princess headdress. China,
Beijing, c.1980. Synthetic
materials, paper, metal,
textile. Headdress fora female character (dan),worn by a princess.
Museu do Oriente/Kwok
On collection/5.5.1C45.
©Fundação Oriente.
Photo: João Silveira Ramos.

Above:
Namban folding screen(detail). Six-panel folding
screen. Japan, Edo
period (1615-1868).
Wood (frame), paper,
pigment and gold leaf.
FO/06333. Photo:
Photography
Hugo Maertens-Bruges.
Bottom left:
Namban helmet(Namban Boshi). Japan,
Momoyana (1573/1615)/Edo (1615-1868) period,c. 1600. Washi paper
and lacquer. FO/0555.
Photo: Photography
Hugo Maertens-Bruges.