Online Advertising
Programme Market Insights
Final Report
For the Department of Digital,
Culture, Media and Sport
11th July 2022

About Spark Ninety
Spark Ninety is a strategy consultancy focused on
the digital media and advertising sectors. It helps
clients to understand complex markets andemerging business models; to develop strategies
and plans; and to assess investments. Spark
Ninety’s team are trusted advisors to clients
including major technology, media and internetcompanies, start ups, investors, regulators andgovernments in the UK and internationally.

© 2022 Spark Ninety2

Contents
Executive Summary

5

Review of online advertising harms

6Market trends

9

Supply chains

9International policy developments

10

Introduction

12

Scope of work

13

Methodology

13

Notes about ASA data

14

Caveats

14

Disclaimer

14

Review of Online Advertising Harms

15

Taxonomy of harms

16

Incidence and severity of harms

17

Trends in harms

19

Causes of harms

21

Market Trends

24

Online advertising media and formats

25

Online advertising data and targeting32

Supply Chains

34

Open display market supply chain

35

Owned and operated platform supply chains

41

Ad safety procedures

42

Industry and self-regulatory initiatives

47

International Regulatory Developments

49

European Union

50

European country-level developments

55

United States

56

Annex 1: Review of Online Advertising Harms

57

Malicious advertising58

Fraudulent advertising, including scams

59© 2022 Spark Ninety3Counterfeiting

70

Illegal and restricted activities, products and services

72

Non-identified advertising74

Misleading advertising

76

Offensive advertising78

Legal but harmful advertising

80

Advertising contributing to body image concerns

82

Mistargeting

83

Targeting vulnerable people

85

Discriminatory advertising86

Ad fraud

86

Brand safety risk

88

Inaccurate audience measurement, attribution and reporting

89

Annex 2: ASA Complaint Case Data

© 2022 Spark Ninety

90

4Executive Summary

The Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS) commissioned Spark Ninety to conduct ananalysis of online advertising harms, the online advertising market and regulatory landscape. This analysis
feeds into the Online Advertising Programme undertaken by the DCMS. This project was a limited exercise,based on desk research and interviews with the regulator and selected industry experts. Spark Ninety
would like to thank these contributors, including the ASA, Confiant, White Bullet and Ebiquity. This project
was conducted from February to April 2022.

Review of online advertising harms
There is a very wide range of ways in which online advertising can harm consumers and industry. The
following taxonomy lists 15 categories of harmful advertising - and builds on the version presented in the
DCMS Online Advertising Programme consultation1. These categories are not mutually exclusive: instancesof harmful advertising may, for example, be both misleading and offensive; industry harms may also havean impact on consumers.
Table 1: Taxonomy of harms
Causesharm to:Involves harmful ad:Content is
Category of harm
legal/illegal:

Consumers Content

Illegal

Malicious advertising

Consumers

Ad content

IllegalFraudulent advertising, including scams - in many cases involving
unsanctioned use of celebrity images

Consumers

Ad content

IllegalAds for illegal activities, products or services

Consumers

Ad content

IllegalCounterfeiting

Consumers

Ad content

IllegalNon-identified ads

Consumers

Ad content

IllegalMisleading ads

Consumers

Ad content

Legal

Offensive ads

Consumers

Ad content

Legal

Ads for products or services deemed to be harmful, but not illegal

Consumers

Ad content

Legal

Ads that are seen to contribute to body image concerns

Consumers

Targeting/placement

N/A

Mistargeting

Consumers

Ad targeting/placement

N/A

Discriminatory targeting

Consumers

Ad targeting/placement

N/A

Targeting vulnerable people

Industry

Content

Illegal

Ad fraud

Industry

Placement

N/A

Brand safety (including mistargeting)Industry

Measurement

N/A

Inaccurate audience measurement

Malicious and fraudulent or scam advertising are the most serious threats at present, based on anassessment of the incidence of these categories of harms and the severity of the impact caused toindividuals or businesses affected. 35,115 Action Fraud reports in 2020/21 were identified as being related
to fraud enabled by online advertisements, based on keyword analysis2. The total estimated loss from

1

DCMS, Online Advertising Programme consultation, 9 March 2022. Changes to this version include the addition of ‘counterfeitin g’ asa separate category, and the incorporation of ‘fake celebrity endorsement’ within the category of fraudulent advertising.
2
This data includes fraud initiated by paid-for advertising and non-paid for advertising such as organic search results and social media
posts. Only fraud reports where victims self-reported relevant keywords (e.g. ads, pop up, banner) are counted, therefore this data islikely to underestimate the total number of reported frauds initiated by online advertising.
© 2022 Spark Ninety

6

these reports was about £400 million3. Other categories of harm cause severe impacts for smaller numbersof people (such as advertising for illegal products and services) or mild impacts for large numbers of people(such as non-identified or inadequately disclosed social media advertising). Importantly, this assessment isrelatively subjective: it is difficult to make like-for-like comparisons between different categories of harm
due to a lack of consistent and comparable data and differences in the type of impact caused by harm,
ranging from financial losses to exacerbation of mental health issues.
Table 2: Relative incidence and severity of consumer harms - indicative guide
Low incidence(1)Low severity(2)High incidence(1)● Illegal products/ services [C] ● Malicious [C]● Fraud/scams [C]High severity(2)Medium severity(2)Medium incidence(1)● Discriminatory targeting(3)[C]● Targeting vulnerable
people(3) [C]● Counterfeiting [C]● Harmful but legal [C]● Mistargeting [C]● Body image(3) [C]• Brand safety risk [I]● Misleading [C]• Ad fraud [I]● Offensive [C]● Non-identified [C]Key:[C] = Consumer harm [I] = Industry harm. High threat - Low threat.

Notes:(1) Indicative guide to the relative incidence of harmful advertising in terms of the number of advertising impressions serve dto people. In absolute terms, the proportion of harmful advertising is low. See introduction section, below.
(2) Level of harm to an individual consumer or business. Subjective assessment e.g. it is difficult to compare financial loss es
with harm to well-being. The severity of impact of some harms can vary (e.g. misleading advertising may have a very low orhigh impact depending on the nature of the product or service advertised). The scale of industry harms are considered in thecontext of industry revenues (e.g. harms may be high in absolute terms, but low relative to a company’s revenues).
(3) Highly uncertain due to very limited evidence about the incidence of harm.

These harms may occur on paid search, open display (publisher websites or apps), social media orclassifieds advertising, or on social media influencer marketing. Certain harms are focused on certain partsof the market: ad fraud occurs primarily in the open display market4, while non-identified advertising isfound mainly in influencer marketing. Other categories such as misleading advertising are present acrossthese forms of advertising.
Over the last two years, the landscape of harms has evolved. Complaints relating to social influencer
advertising have increased, driven by strong growth in the amount of influencer marketing (see ‘market
trends’ section, below): ASA complaint cases5 grew 92% in 2021 to reach 3,662, accounting for 47% of allcomplaint cases relating to paid-for online advertising. 494 of these complaint cases (23%) resulted in an
advice notice6 or informal/formal investigation, with the remainder (77%) being outside the remit of the
ASA or where the ASA determined that no breach of the advertising codes occurred and no further action
was required.

3

City of London Police / National Fraud Intelligence Bureau, Fraud Enabled by Online Adverts 2020/21 – Dip Sample report,
November 2021. Involved analysis of Action Fraud reports. Quoted in the DCMS consultation on reviewing the regulatory frameworkfor online advertising in the UK: The Online Advertising Programme - Impact Assessment.
4
Refers to sales of fraudulent advertising inventory, such as non-human traffic. Search and social display advertising are relatively
unaffected by this type of fraud because there are limited mechanisms for fraudsters to profit from non-human traffic.
5“Complaint cases” refers to specific adverts complained about to the ASA. Some adverts generate multiple complaints. Therefore thenumber of complaints received by the ASA exceeds the number of complaint cases.
6
If the ASA decides that a possible breach of the Code has occurred but, on assessment against its prioritisation principles i t isconsidered low priority, for example causing minor detriment, it will write to the advertiser explaining the issues and providing advice
and guidance on how to comply with the Codes. It will not seek an assurance of compliance or contact the advertiser again regarding
the matter.
© 2022 Spark Ninety7Complaints about potentially harmful social display advertising also grew, with ASA complaint cases
increasing 54% to 1,629, or 21% of all paid-for advertising cases. ASA complaint cases about open display
advertising decreased 31% in 2021. However, according to data from security vendors, the volume of
malicious and scam advertising (not generally counted in ASA case data) was up to 0.16% of UK
programmatic advertising impressions in Q4 20217, while advertising verification vendors measured adfraud (an industry issue outside the ASA’s remit) at between 0.2% (mobile web) and 0.9% (desktop
display) of UK impressions in H1 20218.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the incidence of harms has decreased in certain narrow areas where theindustry has strengthened consumer protection measures. Paid search advertising for investment scams
appears to have decreased following the introduction of financial services advertiser verification by major
platforms in August 20219. Which? conducted a Bing search for ‘compare best savings rates’ on 20th
September 2021, revealing adverts for 4 firms listed by the FCA as potentially harmful10. A Spark Ninety
repeat of this search on Google and Bing on 20th March 2022 yielded no adverts for companies on the
FCA’s warning list, indicating a potential improvement.
Multiple factors contribute to the problem of harms, and these factors differ between categories of harm,
supply chains (open display vs. owned and operated), and the organisations involved. Some factors
contribute to the ease of harm happening in the first place, others contribute to limited detection andmitigation of harm after it has begun, and some limit the deterrent effect.
Figure 1: Factors contributing to online advertising harms - simplified

7

Proportion of impressions that involve malicious clickbait, forced redirects, criminal scams and other dangerous activity. Sour ce:
Confiant, Malvertising and Ad Quality Index, Q4 2021.
8
Average optimised-against-ad fraud levels. Source: IAS, Media Quality Report, H1 2021.
9
https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/10770884?hl=en-GB10
https://www.which.co.uk/news/2021/10/fake-ads-rife-on-bing-as-investment-scams-jump-84/.
© 2022 Spark Ninety

8Market trends
The online advertising market is evolving at a fast pace. Online advertising expenditure is increasing, newadvertising formats are emerging, and advertising practices are changing, especially around the use of data
for targeting. Some of the main developments affecting online advertising harms include:●

Strong market growth, with pure play internet ad spend in the UK projected to reach £19.9bn by202411, accounting for 72% of total advertising expenditure. Google, Meta and Amazon account for a
growing market share, estimated at 80% to 90% of digital advertising globally outside of China12.

●

Outside of the major digital platforms, there is an increasing range of “publishers” with online
advertising to sell, including games developers, audio streaming platforms, podcasters, connected TV
platforms, online retailers, and social media “micro” and “nano” influencers.

●

Online advertising formats are emerging that seamlessly integrate advertising into content and may
present an elevated risk of inadequate identification of advertising. Examples include virtual billboards,
virtual product placement and avatar sponsorship within games (and the metaverse in the longerterm), and host-read advertising in podcasts.

●

The influencer marketing industry is growing and evolving. Global expenditure is forecast to grow
19% year-on-year, from $13.8 billion (£10.6 billion) in 2021 to $16.4 billion (£12.6 billion) in 202213.
This is equivalent to about 3% of total global digital advertising expenditure in 2021. Brands are
increasingly arranging paid promotions with micro- and nano-influencers (fewer than 40,000
followers) who may seem more authentic and credible and have stronger connections with theirfollowers than big name influencers. This increases the number of influencers making paid-for posts.
Influencer live streaming is also increasing and advertising in these streams is challenging to monitor
where not recorded.

The online advertising industry is also moving away from certain privacy-invasive practices such as using
third-party cookies to track users across websites and facilitate behavioural advertising. To a large extent,
this move has been stimulated by web browsers withdrawing support for third-party cookies, andequivalent moves by mobile operating systems to limit access to mobile ad identifiers (MAIDs). There is
growing use of alternative market practices, including contextual targeting, browser-based frameworks,
data clean rooms, blockchain solutions and token-based advertising systems.

Supply chains
The programmatic open display and owned and operated advertising platform supply chains were
described in the CMA online platforms and digital advertising report14 published in 2020, which is to alarge extent still valid as a generalised model. There are variations to this model, including the existence ofan “alternative” programmatic open display advertising supply chain involving specialist intermediaries thatserve adult content publishers and other restricted content publishers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
there is an elevated risk of harmful advertising in this supply chain. The ad tech intermediaries involved in
the “alternative” supply chain are generally based overseas and are potentially challenging to regulate.
Recent trends in the programmatic open display advertising supply chain include a degree of simplification
driven by limited market consolidation, growing vertical integration/alignment, supply path optimisation,and increased transparency (such as IAB standards sellers.json and SupplyChain Object 15 that allow buyers
to see the sellers that intermediaries represent, creating a barrier to ad fraud).

11GroupM, This Year Next Year, UK End of Year Forecast, December 2020.
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/uk-in-global-top-three-for-digital-advertising-t3f2kjtk6
13
Influencer Marketing Hub and Refersion, Influencer Marketing Benchmark Report 2022
14
CMA, Online platforms and digital advertising, Market study final report, 1 July 2020.
15
https://iabtechlab.com/sellers-json/
12© 2022 Spark Ninety9Owned and operated platforms (e.g. Meta, Google, TikTok, Snap, Twitter) sell search and/or social display
advertising on self-service interfaces, opening the market to large numbers of SME advertisers. Recently,
platforms have tightened their ad safety measures and policies in certain limited areas and increasedtransparency, with developments including:●Stronger advertiser on-boarding checks to prevent bad actors from advertising. Google recently
introduced identity verification for all advertisers16. In 2021, Google, Meta, Microsoft, Amazon Ads,
Twitter and Tiktok announced commitments to introduce requirements on financial services advertisers
to demonstrate that they are authorised by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)17. Their timelines for
implementing these requirements vary.

●

Ad libraries to provide transparency. Meta Ad Library18 now provides a public record of ads currently
running on Facebook, Instagram, Messenger and Facebook Audience Network, but this does notinclude information about ad targeting. Google’s new policies may enable it to introduce an ad libraryor similar transparency measures in the future19.

●

Ad targeting restrictions to prevent inappropriate targeting. In January 2022, Meta removed the ability
for advertisers to target people based on certain sensitive data, such as health, race, ethnicity andpolitical affiliation20. It also limits the targeting options available for people it knows to be under 18 toage, gender and location, with interest-based, lookalike and various other targeting disabled for thisaudience21.

●

Policies prohibiting certain forms of harmful advertising. Platforms have gone further than therequirements of the law and the CAP Code in banning some categories or types of advertising. For
example, in August 2021 Twitter prohibited misleading ‘before and after’ photos, content that body
shames a customer, and promotion of unhealthy or unsafe eating behaviours or eating disorders22.

International policy developments
The regulatory framework for online advertising differs by country and is highly complex. In most cases,
these frameworks involve consumer protection, data protection, media, communications, and verticalmarket laws as well as self-regulatory codes, and are enforced by government agencies and selfregulatory bodies. The main recent development among UK trading partners is the introduction of theEuropean Union Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA). In April 2022, the time ofwriting, the text of these laws had been approved by the European Parliament, though there is thepotential for changes during trilogue negotiations.
The DSA regulates intermediaries which they define as services that connect consumers with goods,
services and content (e.g. internet service providers, cloud services, messaging, marketplaces and social
networks). Specific obligations apply to online platforms (e.g. social networks, content-sharing platforms,
app stores, online marketplaces, online travel and accommodation platforms) and a subset of rules apply tovery large platforms (45 million or more users in the EU). Penalties will be set out in national laws, though
the European Commission will have the power to impose fines on very large platforms of up to 6% of
global turnover23. The main provisions of the DSA24 for advertising include:16

https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/9720978?hl=en-GB&ref_topic=9646742
https://www.techuk.org/resource/major-technology-companies-step-up-efforts-to-tackle-financial-fraud-and-scam-adverts.html
18
https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active_status=all&ad_type=political_and_issue_ads&country=GB&media_type=all19
https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/9720978?hl=en-GB&ref_topic=9646742 Accessed 12 March 2022.
20
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/09/technology/meta-facebook-ad-targeting.html
21https://www.facebook.com/business/help/229435355723442
22https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/ads-policy-update-log.html
23https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_20_2348
24
https://www.theregister.com/2022/01/22/eu_dsa_draft_meps/
17© 2022 Spark Ninety

10●Transparency requirements. Online platforms must provide users with information about when and on
whose behalf an advert is displayed, including who finances the advert, and how it is targeted to them.
Voluntary codes of conduct will be developed for other market participants (e.g. open display
intermediaries). Very large platforms will need to provide searchable ad libraries including content,
advertiser and targeting details.

●

Targeting prohibitions. Targeting of vulnerable groups based on special category data is prohibited asis the use of personal data for the targeting of minors.

●

Targeting consent withdrawal requirements. Online platforms must ensure that users can easily refuse
or withdraw consent for targeting advertising. The use of “dark patterns” (exploiting cognitive biases
to prompt users to reveal information they do not want to) is prohibited.

●

Access to data and algorithms. Very large platforms must provide the regulator and the European
Commission with access to data and algorithms to enable an assessment of their advertising systems’risks and harms.

The DMA introduces rules for platforms that act as gatekeepers (e.g. search, social networking, messaging,
operating systems, online intermediation) with an annual turnover in the European Economic Area of €6.5
billion or more25 and with more than 45 million monthly active end users26 in the EU. Penalties for noncompliance with the DMA include fines of up to 10% of the company's total worldwide annual turnover. Its
main provisions27 for advertising include:●

Requiring provision of pricing transparency information relating to the programmatic supply chain.
Gatekeepers must provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply services with free
information about the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided.

●

Banning intermediary gatekeepers from using business users’ advertising data to then compete with
them.

●

Requiring access to performance measurement tools and information to allow independent
verification. Gatekeepers must provide advertisers with performance measuring tools and data toallow them to carry out their own independent verification of their advertising.

●Banning personalised targeting without clear, informed consent. Clear, explicit, renewed, informed
consent needs to have been given to the gatekeeper in line with the GDPR.

These laws primarily affect search and social media platforms, not advertisers and publishers. Open display
advertising intermediaries are covered by a voluntary transparency code, and other measures apply only
where these intermediaries qualify as platforms or gatekeepers (e.g. Google, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft).
The self-regulatory system for advertising will co-exist with these new laws in EU Member States. There
have been separate regulatory developments in certain countries to address specific online advertisingharms, such as a law in Norway to make it illegal for influencers to share retouched photos of their body inpromotional posts28, and the introduction of the Responsible Influencer Certificate29 by the ARPP, the selfregulatory body for advertising in France.

25

Or a market capitalisation of at least €65 billion.
And/or more than 10,000 yearly active business users established in the EU.
27
Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 15 December 2021 on the proposal for a regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act) (COM(2020)0842 – C90419/2020 – 2020/0374(COD))
28
https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Vedtak/Beslutninger/Lovvedtak/2020-2021/vedtak-202021-146/29
https://www.arpp.org/certificat-influence-responsable-inscriptions/26© 2022 Spark Ninety11Introduction

The Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS) commissioned Spark Ninety to conduct ananalysis of online advertising harms, the online advertising market and regulatory landscape. This analysis
feeds into the Online Advertising Programme undertaken by the DCMS.

Scope of work
This project explores harms relating to paid-for online advertising in the UK, in line with the scope of theOnline Advertising Programme. The objectives of this study are to provide:●

An updated assessment of the nature and scale of online advertising harms.

●

An analysis of the online advertising market, including trends, supply chains (open display and owned
and operated) and industry initiatives.

●

A description of emerging international online advertising regulatory developments, focusing on theEuropean Union and the United States.

This project was a limited exercise, comprising 6 weeks of work, therefore these areas have been exploredat a relatively high level. The focus has been on describing recent developments, building on other work inthis area including a Plum Consulting report commissioned by the DCMS in 202030 and the DCMS Online
Advertising Programme consultation31 published in March 2022.

Methodology
The findings in this document are based on limited desk-based research and analysis including:●

Review of news media, company websites and reports, and data and reports from government andregulatory agencies, companies, charities and other civil society organisations.

●

Review of data from the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) about complaints, cases, monitoringstudies and the Scam Ads Alert System.

●

Analysis of certain information provided to the DCMS as part of its engagement with government andindustry stakeholders.

●

Searches on Google and Bing to identify examples of harmful paid search advertising in certain
relevant categories such as fraudulent advertising, counterfeiting and illegal products and services.
These searches were done on a small scale using selected search terms, and do not represent acomprehensive review.

●

Searches of Meta Ad Library32 to identify examples of harmful social media advertising in certain
relevant categories such as body image, counterfeiting and illegal products and services. These
searches were done on a small scale using selected search terms, and do not represent acomprehensive review.

In addition, the study team conducted a small number of targeted interviews with government agencies
and industry stakeholders, including the ASA, White Bullet, Confiant, Ebiquity and the Home Office. These
interviews focused on exploring issues that are not well documented in the public domain, such as cybercrime and online advertising relating to people trafficking. The project was conducted from February to
April 2022.

30

Plum Consulting, Mapping online advertising issues, and the industry and regulatory initiatives aimed at addressing them, May
2020.
31
DCMS, Online Advertising Programme consultation, 9 March 2022.
32
https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active_status=all&ad_type=political_and_issue_ads&country=GB&media_type=all© 2022 Spark Ninety13Notes about ASA data
Multiple sections of this report include ASA data about complaint cases. Each complaint case represents an
instance of an advert that the ASA receives a complaint (or complaints) about. Importantly:●

Not all complaint cases involve harm. In 2021, only 16% of complaint cases relating to paid-for online
advertising resulted in an advice notice or formal/informal investigation, with 84% being outside the
ASA’s remit or where the ASA determined that no breach of the advertising codes occurred and nofurther action was required. (See Annex 2 for details of a breakdown of action taken).

●Consumers may be more likely to complain about some forms of potential harms than others,
distorting the relative number of complaint cases by category.

●

The ASA categorises complaint cases as misleading, harm/irresponsibility, offensive or
miscellaneous/other. Certain categories of harm are not included in this data (e.g. industry harms suchas ad fraud and brand safety risk) or are not counted separately (e.g. advertising contributing to body
image concerns).

Caveats
There is very limited consistent and comparable data about the incidence of harms related to online
advertising in the UK, or the growth of these harms. As a consequence, the analysis presented in this reportpulls together various sources to provide a composite analysis of harms, but there is substantial uncertainty
in some of the results.
This project covered a very broad scope: 15 different categories of online advertising harm across 4
different market segments (search, social display, open display, classifieds); and 27 measures proposed in
the government’s consultation. Therefore, the analysis of these harms and interventions is necessarily highlevel and focuses on certain known issues.
This project was conducted prior to and during the government’s Online Advertising Programme
consultation, which was open from 17th March 2022 to 1st June 2022. Therefore, the project team did nothave access to responses to this consultation. New information is likely to have come to light since thecompletion of this report.

Disclaimer
This report has been produced by Spark Ninety Limited, a limited company registered in England andWales with registered number 11248585, in accordance with an engagement agreement for professional
services with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport. This report contains information about theonline advertising market based on sources believed to be reliable. The information is not advice andshould not be treated as such. To the fullest extent permitted by law, Spark Ninety Limited and its
employees do not accept or assume any responsibility or liability in respect of this report, or decisions
based on it, to any reader of the report. Should such readers choose to rely on this report, then they do so attheir own risk. Any views or opinions expressed in this report are those of Spark Ninety.

© 2022 Spark Ninety

14

Review of Online AdvertisingHarms

Taxonomy of harms
There is a very wide range of ways in which online advertising can harm consumers and industry. The
following taxonomy describes 15 categories of harmful advertising. These categories are not mutually
exclusive: instances of harmful advertising may, for example, be both misleading and offensive; industry
harms may also have an impact on consumers.
Table 3: Taxonomy of harms
Consumer/Content/
targeting

Legal / illegal

Category of harm

Consumer harms Harmful ad content

Illegal harms

Malicious advertising

Consumers

Ad content

IllegalFraudulent advertising, including scams - in many cases involving
unsanctioned use of celebrity images

Consumers

Ad content

IllegalAds for illegal activities, products or services

Consumers

Ad content

IllegalCounterfeiting

Consumers

Ad content

IllegalNon-identified ads

Consumers

Ad content

IllegalMisleading ads

Consumers

Ad content

Illegal harms

Offensive ads

Consumers

Ad content

Legal

Ads for products or services deemed to be harmful, but not illegal

Consumers

Ad content

Legal

Ads that are seen to contribute to body image concerns

Consumers

Harmful ad targeting andplacement

Consumers

Ad targeting/ placement

N/A

Discriminatory targeting

Consumers

Ad targeting/ placement

N/A

Targeting vulnerable people

industry

Mistargeting

Ad fraud
Industry harms

Brand safety (including mistargeting)Inaccurate audience measurement

This taxonomy includes the following minor changes relative to the version published in the DCMS Online
Advertising Programme consultation33:●

Counterfeiting is added as a separate category due to the specific characteristics of this IP crimecompared to advertising of other illegal products, services and activities.

●‘Fake celebrity endorsement’ is now included within ‘Fraudulent advertising’ because this harm isgenerally associated with scam advertising. It now refers to ‘unsanctioned use of celebrity images’
because some use of images is as sensational clickbait not endorsement.

Annex 1 provides a detailed description of each of these categories of harm, including examples, and anassessment of the nature, scale and severity of the harm.

33

DCMS, Online Advertising Programme consultation, 9 March 2022.

© 2022 Spark Ninety

16

Incidence and severity of harms
Malicious and fraudulent or scam advertising are likely to be the most significant harms in terms offrequency and severity of impact on people. Misleading advertising, counterfeiting, mistargeting, illegal
products and services, and harmful but legal advertising follow in terms of overall impact. This assessment
is relatively subjective due to the difficulty of making like-for-like comparisons between different categoriesof harm. This is a consequence of:●Different measures of the incidence of harm being available for different categories of harm.

●

Differences in the type of impact on individuals, ranging from financial losses to exacerbation ofmental health issues, and limited data about these impacts.

Table 4: Relative incidence and severity of consumer harms - indicative guide
Low incidence(1)Low severity(2)High incidence(1)● Illegal products/ services [C] ● Malicious [C]● Fraud/scams [C]High severity(2)Medium severity(2)Medium incidence(1)● Discriminatory targeting(3)[C]● Targeting vulnerable
people(3) [C]● Counterfeiting [C]● Harmful but legal [C]● Mistargeting [C]● Body image(3) [C]• Brand safety risk [I]● Misleading [C]• Ad fraud [I]● Offensive [C]● Non-identified [C]Key:[C] = Consumer harm [I] = Industry harm. High threat - Low threat.

Notes:(1) Indicative guide to the relative incidence of harmful advertising in terms of the number of advertising impressions serve dto people. In absolute terms, the proportion of harmful advertising is low. See below.
(2) Level of harm to an individual consumer or business. Subjective assessment e.g. it is difficult to compare financial loss es
with harm to well-being. The severity of impact of some harms can vary (e.g. misleading advertising may have a very low orhigh impact depending on the nature of the product or service advertised). The scale of industry harms are considered in thecontext of industry revenues (e.g. harms may be high in absolute terms, but low relative to a company’s revenues).
(3) Highly uncertain due to very limited evidence about the incidence of harm.

Over the last two years, the landscape of harms has evolved. Complaints relating to social influencer
advertising have increased, driven by strong growth in the amount of influencer marketing (see ‘market
trends’ section, below): ASA complaint cases34 grew 92% in 2021 to reach 3,662, accounting for 47% of allcomplaint cases relating to paid-for online advertising. 494 of these complaint cases (23%) resulted in an
advice notice or informal/formal investigation, with the remainder (77%) being outside the remit of the ASA
or where the ASA determined that no breach of the advertising codes occurred and no further action was
required.
Complaints about potentially harmful social display advertising also grew, with ASA complaint cases
increasing 54% to 1,629, or 21% of all paid-for advertising cases. ASA complaint cases about open display
advertising decreased 31% in 2021. However, according to data from security vendors, the volume of
malicious and scam advertising (not generally counted in ASA case data) was up to 0.16% of UK
programmatic advertising impressions in Q4 202135, while advertising verification vendors measured ad

34“Complaint cases” refers to specific adverts complained about to the ASA. Some adverts generate multiple complaints. Therefore
the number of complaints received by the ASA exceeds the number of complaint cases.
35
Proportion of impressions that involve malicious clickbait, forced redirects, criminal scams and other dangerous activity. Source:
Confiant, Malvertising and Ad Quality Index, Q4 2021.
© 2022 Spark Ninety

17

fraud (an industry issue outside the ASA’s remit) at between 0.2% (mobile web) and 0.9% (desktop
display) of UK impressions in H1 202136.
The rating of the relative incidence of harms is based on the following assessment which takes into accountdifferent categories of available data to build a composite picture. Importantly, these categories show
different quantities which are not directly comparable: the number of examples gives a broad indicationof the number of publicly reported or findable instances of harmful advertising, while the percentage of ads
served shows the proportion of open display advertising (a subset of the online advertising market)
impressions or content that are harmful. The overall assessment based on these measures provides abroad guide to the relative incidence of harmful advertising in terms of the number of advertising
impressions served to people. The proportion of advertising impressions that is harmful appears to be
low in absolute terms (e.g. less than 1% in the case of ad fraud). It is not possible to provide a robust
assessment of relative or absolute levels of harm due to the lack of consistent and comparable data acrossthe different categories of harm.
Table 5: Relative incidence of harms - highly indicative guide

Category of harm

Number of% of ads served% of people

examples (1)(2)

exposed (3)Number of
ASA complaintcases (4)Overallassessmentof relative
incidence (5)Malicious advertising

Medium

0.16%[H]

n/a

n/a

High

Fraudulent advertising, including scams

High<0.16%(6)[H]<17%(7)[H]

n/a

High

Ads for illegal activities, products or services

Medium

n/a

n/a

n/a

MediumCounterfeiting ads

Mediumn/a9%-10%(8)[M]n/aMediumNon-identified ads

High

n/a

n/a

3,541(9)[H]High

Misleading ads

High

n/a

<27% (10)[H]

6,364[H]High

Offensive ads

Mediumn/an/a454 [M]

MediumHarmful, but not illegal ads

Mediumn/an/a956 [M]

MediumAds contributing to body image concerns

Medium

n/a

n/a

n/a

Medium *Mistargeting

Medium

n/a

n/a

n/a

MediumDiscriminatory targeting

Low

n/a

n/a

n/a

Low *

Targeting vulnerable people

Low

n/a

n/a

n/a

Low *

Ad fraud

High

0.2%-0.9%(11)[H]

n/a

n/a

High

Brand safety risk

Medium

0.1%(12) [M]

n/a

n/a

MediumKey:[L]/Low - [M]/Medium - [H]/High. * = High level of uncertainty due to very limited data.

Notes:(1) Number of examples = indicative measure based on the frequency of media reports and other public reports of harms,
and the number of examples found in a small number of selected searches on Google and Bing and on Meta Ad Library (seemethodology section, above).
(2) % of ads served = proportion of ads in the programmatic open display market that cyber security or verification providers
have measured. Excludes non-detected issues. Excludes social media, where relevant.
(3) % of people exposed = proportion of people who claim, in surveys, to have seen relevant categories of harmful
advertising. In some cases, consumers are responding to broadly phrased questions that capture organic, non-paid foradvertising as well as paid-for advertising.
(4) Number of ASA complaint cases in 2021. Importantly, the number of ASA complaint cases is not a direct measure of
the level of harm because (a) consumers might be more likely to complain about some forms of harm than others, and (b)not all ASA complaint cases involve harm: only 16% of complaint cases relating to paid-for online advertising resulted in

36

Average optimised-against-ad fraud levels. Source: IAS, Media Quality Report, H1 2021.

© 2022 Spark Ninety18

an advice notice or formal/informal investigation, with 84% being outside the ASA’s remit or where the ASA determinedthat no breach of the advertising codes occurred and no further action was required.
(5) The overall assessment refers to the relative incidence of harmful advertising i.e. the amount of harmful advertising
impressions served to people relative to other categories of harmful advertising. It is not a measure of the absolute
proportion of advertising impressions that are harmful, which in most cases appears to be low (e.g. less than 1% in the caseof ad fraud).
(6) Proportion of impressions that involve malicious clickbait, forced redirects, criminal scams and other dangerous activity.
Source: Confiant, Malvertising and Ad Quality Index, Q4 2021.
(7) 17% of people claimed to have been targeted by a scam on social media (Which, November 2021) - likely to include paid
and organic advertising. Excludes search, open display and classifieds.
(8) 9% of EU consumers have been duped into buying counterfeit goods by online advertising, and 10% of UK female
consumers were prompted by social media endorsements to buy counterfeits. Source: European Union Intellectual Property
Office, European Citizens and Intellectual Property report, 2020.
(9) Non-identified or inadequately disclosed adverts are a substantial subset of the 3,541 complaint cases of misleading
influencer marketing.
(10) 27% of UK consumers claim to have seen misleading or harmful advertising on video sharing platforms. Excludes othersocial media, open display, search and classifieds. Source: Ofcom Video-sharing platform usage & experience of harms
survey 2021.
(11) Proportion of UK programmatic advertising impressions that were fraudulent in H1 2021 ranged from 0. 2% (mobileweb) to 0.9% (desktop display) - after optimisation against ad fraud. Source: IAS, Media Quality Report, H1 2021.
(12) Proportion of UK open web content that was categorised as ‘high’ or ‘very high’ risk in H1 2021. Source: IAS, Media
Quality Report, H1 2021
(12) Inaccurate audience measurement is not included on the table because this harm is not measurable on comparable
metrics to other harms.

The rating of the severity of harms is based on a qualitative assessment of the impact of harms on people
and industry.
Table 6: Relative severity of harms
Low●●

Offensive advertising(offence to individuals) [C]
Non-identified advertising(misleading) [C]Medium
●
●
●
●
●
•
•

●
●

Counterfeiting (financial losses to businesses, ●individual harm from dangerous products) [C]Harmful but legal (wide range of different
harms e.g. exposure to legal drugs) [C]Mistargeting (harm to minors from ageinappropriate ads) [C]Body image (harm to mental health) [C]Misleading (harm from products / services
being other than described) [C]●
Ad fraud (financial losses to advertisers) [I]
Brand safety risk (damage to companies’
brand image, societal harm from funding
piracy or other harmful content) [I]
Discriminatory targeting (exclusion of certain ●groups from opportunities) [C]Targeting vulnerable people (exacerbation ofother harms e.g. mental health) [C]Key:[C] = Consumer harm [I] = Industry harm

Notes:(1) Level of harm to an individual consumer or business.

© 2022 Spark Ninety

High
Fraudulent advertising,including scams(substantial individual
financial losses; damage tocelebrity reputation inclickbait cases; damage tobrand reputation in cloning
cases) [C]
Malicious advertising(individual financial losses
from theft of data andmisappropriation ofcomputer resources) [C]Illegal products andservices (individual harmfrom the purchase of illegal
products or provision ofillegal services e.g. people
trafficking) [C]19

Trends in harms
There is very limited evidence about whether the scale of different harms has increased or decreased overthe past 1-2 years because many data sources provide snapshots, not a time series, and the types of data
available for each harm differ. The following table shows the trends in terms of anecdotal evidence (e.g.
industry commentary), measured incidence (e.g. monitoring of advertising), ASA complaint cases, andestimated costs (e.g. economic costs) where available, and an overall composite assessment. In manycases, the available data does not point to a clear trend or relates only to a subset of the category of harm.
Therefore, this assessment provides a top-level view: trends in some harms differ by category ofadvertising (e.g. search, social, open display) which is explored in the sections on each harm, below. Notethat the number of ASA complaint cases is not a direct measure of the level of harm because (a) consumers
might be more likely to complain about some forms of harm than others, and (b) not all adverts that they
complain about are harmful. Therefore, this metric provides only a rough indication of potential changes in
the level of harm.
Table 7: Trends in the scale of harms
Number ofCategory of harm

Anecdotal

Measured

ASA

Estimated

Overallreports

incidencecomplaint

cost

assessment

cases
Malicious advertising

⇨

⇧

n/a

n/a

⇨

Fraudulent advertising, including scams

⇨

⇧

n/a

⇧

⇧

Ads for illegal activities, products or services

⇨

n/a

n/a

n/a

⇨

Counterfeiting ads

⇨

n/a

n/a

n/a

⇨

Non-identified ads

⇧

n/a

⇧

n/a

⇧

Misleading ads

⇧

n/a

⇧

n/a

⇧

Offensive ads

⇧

n/a

⇧

n/a

⇧

Harmful, but not illegal ads

⇧

n/a

⇧

n/a

⇧

Ads contributing to body image concerns

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

Mistargeting

⇩

⇩

⇧

n/a

⇩

Discriminatory targeting

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

Targeting vulnerable people

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

Ad fraud

⇨

⇩

n/a

⇩

⇨

Brand safety risk

⇨

⇩

n/a

n/a

⇨

Key: ⇧ = Increase ⇩ = Decrease ⇨ = No change

At a more granular level, evidence is emerging that the incidence of harms has decreased in certain narrowsub-categories where the industry has strengthened consumer protection measures. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that the incidence of paid search advertising for investment scams has decreased following the
introduction of financial services advertiser verification by major platforms in 2021. Which? conducted aBing search for ‘compare best savings rates’ on 20th September 2021, revealing adverts for 4 firms listedby the FCA as potentially harmful37. A Spark Ninety repeat of this search on Google and Bing on 20th37

https://www.which.co.uk/news/2021/10/fake-ads-rife-on-bing-as-investment-scams-jump-84/.

© 2022 Spark Ninety20March 2022 yielded no adverts for companies on the FCA’s warning list, indicating a potential
improvement.

Causes of harms
Multiple factors contribute to the problem of harms, and these factors differ between categories of harm,
supply chains (open display vs. owned and operated), and the organisations involved. Some factors
contribute to the ease of harm happening in the first place, others contribute to limited detection andmitigation of harm after it has begun, and some limit the deterrent effect.
Factors contributing to the enablement of harms or the lack of prevention of harm taking place at source
include:●Bad actor access. Platform and intermediary customer due diligence procedures do not, in some cases,
prevent bad actors, such as organised crime groups, from setting up accounts to buy advertising (e.g.
scam advertising) or sell advertising (e.g. piracy services on which advertising may be misplaced).

●

Limited ad screening. Platform and intermediary checks on ad creative and landing pages, up front
and in flight (during a live campaign), do not detect all advertising that is in breach of their policies.
This is a problem where harms in the advertising should be identifiable, such as unsanctioned use ofcelebrity images or fake URLs in the case of clone fraud.

●

Solutions not used. In some cases, advertisers, intermediaries or platforms do not use available
technology, data and services to limit harms. This may include use of standards for transparency in the
open display supply chain (e.g. buyers.json) or use of data sources to identify harmful publisher
content and prevent ad placement there.

Factors contributing to a lack of detection of harm and a slow or limited response after detection, such as
takedowns, include:●

Few public ad records. At present, only Meta provides a comprehensive and publicly accessible
library of ads on its platforms, though this is limited to certain information about live ads. Therefore, it
is difficult for the public/stakeholders to know what ads are running and determine whether these areinappropriate.

●

Limited monitoring. There is limited independent regulatory or law enforcement monitoring to detectharmful advertising or harmful activity such as ad fraud. Monitoring high volumes of small-scale adcampaigns (e.g. the long tail of micro-influencers, SME advertisers) is especially challenging.

●

Reporting issues. The systems available for consumers to report inappropriate advertising are
relatively complex and fragmented and, in some cases, rely on consumers to capture information aboutads. Therefore, some harmful ads go unreported or reports are not investigated easily or swiftly.

●

Lack of ad IDs. There is no commonly agreed identifier of ads - a creative ID. Different market
participants identify creative copy in different ways. Therefore, when harmful advertising is identified
on one platform or intermediary, it may be difficult to find instances of the same ad on other platforms.

●

Slow responses. In some cases, intermediaries, platforms or publishers may be slow to respond to
public, regulator or peer reports of harmful advertising or activity, and/or take limited action. As aconsequence, harmful advertising or activity might continue after reports are received.

© 2022 Spark Ninety

21

Factors contributing to a lack of incentive to comply with laws and regulations:●

Limited penalties. The penalties for breaches of the CAP Code or for breaking the law may be limitedor, in the case of certain overseas advertisers or bad actors, unenforceable.

●

Limited enforcement. Law enforcement in areas of cyber crime such as malicious advertising and ad
fraud is relatively limited - in part due to the complexity of these offences. Therefore, bad actors might
not believe that there is a strong prospect of investigation and conviction.

●

Overseas jurisdiction. Some bad actors, such as cyber criminals responsible for malicious advertisingand ad fraud, are based overseas. In consequence, investigation and prosecution may requireinternational law enforcement cooperation which could be challenging to achieve in certain territories.

Figure 2: Factors contributing to online advertising harms - simplified© 2022 Spark Ninety

22

Table 8: Factors contributing to different categories of harm
Bad actor
access[F]

Limited adscreening[F]

Few public
ad records[D]

Limitedmonitoring[D]

Reportingissues[D]

Lack of ad
IDs
[D]

Slow
responses[D]

Malicious advertising

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

Fraudulent advertising, including scams

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

Ads for illegal activities, products or services

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

Counterfeiting ads

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

Category of harm

Solutions not
used
[F]

Non-identified ads

Limitedpenalties[I]

Limited enforcement[I]

Overseas
jurisdiction
[I]

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

Misleading ads

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

Offensive ads

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

Harmful, but not illegal ads

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

Ads contributing to body image concerns

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

⬤

Discriminatory targeting

⬤

⬤

⬤

Targeting vulnerable people

⬤

⬤

⬤

Mistargeting⬤

Ad fraud⬤

Brand safety⬤⬤

Inaccurate audience measurement
Key:[F] = Factors enabling harm to occur© 2022 Spark Ninety[D] = Factors limiting detection and mitigation[I] = Factors limiting incentives to comply

23Market Trends

The online advertising market is evolving at a fast pace. Online advertising expenditure is increasing, newadvertising formats are emerging, and advertising practices are changing, especially around the use of data
for targeting. The following section describes selected trends relevant to advertising harms. The scope of
this project did not include a comprehensive review of the very large wider range of trends affecting theonline advertising market.

Online advertising media and formats
The UK online advertising market is forecast to grow strongly over the next 3 years, with pure play internet
ad spend projected to reach £19.9bn by 202438, accounting for 72% of total advertising expenditure.
Search is forecast to continue to be the largest category, accounting for expenditure of £10.5bn by 2024,
followed by display (£7.0bn, excluding news and magazine publishers and broadcasters), and e-commerce(£2.4bn). Google, Meta and Amazon account for a large market share, forecast to be 74% of digitaladvertising globally in 202239.
Figure 3: UK advertising revenues, 2012 to 2024

Source:GroupM, This Year Next Year, UK End of Year Forecast, December 2020.

Notes:(1) Data for TV, radio, newsbrands and magazines includes “digital extensions”.
(2) Internet e-commerce advertising revenue relates to advertising placed on e-commerce services.
(3) Influencer marketing expenditure is not included.

There is an increasing diversity of advertising media and formats, with growth across in-game, digital audio
and connected TV advertising, retail media and influencer marketing. These developments have three main
implications for online advertising harms:
●

38
39

There is an increasing range of “publishers” with online advertising to sell, including games
developers, audio streaming platforms, podcasters, connected TV platforms, online retailers, andsocial media “micro” and “nano” influencers.

GroupM, This Year Next Year, UK End of Year Forecast, December 2020.
Ebiquity, Google, Meta and Amazon are on track to absorb more than 50% of all ad money in 2022, February 2022.

© 2022 Spark Ninety25●Intermediaries are emerging that specialise in trading advertising inventory in some of these areas,such as podcast advertising networks and influencer marketing platforms.

●

Some emerging advertising formats carry an elevated risk of harm, such as non-identified advertisingin the case of in-game product placement, influencer marketing and host-read podcast advertising,where the advertising is relatively seamlessly integrated with the content.

Table 9: Online advertising market segmentation and selected trends
Market segment and subsegment

Selected trends

SearchEmergence of voice search, visual search, augmented reality search,such as Google Lens and Live View in Google Maps40.

Social display① Growth of major platforms and a fast pace of change in the social
media market, with innovation in social media advertising formats.

Open display: Standard and native display

More engaging and interactive ad formats, such as “playable ads” thatenable mobile users to preview or try out an app within the ad 41, andnative video ads that live stream brand video (e.g. Teads InRead
Live42).

Open display: Video and connected TV② Growth in connected TV advertising expenditure, the emergenceof display advertising on device interfaces and increasing role forgateway platforms.

Open display: Audio③ Growth in podcast advertising and the emergence of actionableaudio ads enabled by voice devices.

Open display: In-game advertising④ Growing range of ad formats integrated into gameplay, in somecases ad served, such as virtual billboards, virtual product placement
and avatar sponsorship.

Open display: Retail media⑤ Retailers selling advertising on their websites and apps and, insome cases, using first-party data to buy advertising on third-party
services.

Classifieds

Increasing use of transactional business models with platforms taking
a share of revenue as an alternative or complement to charging foradvertising.

Influencer marketing⑥ Growth in influencer live streaming, and micro and nanoinfluencers. Growth of influencer intermediaries.

Numbered trends above are elaborated on in the following sections.

40

https://arvr.google.com/ar/https://vungle.com/resources/playable-ads/
42
https://www.teads.com/viewable-outstream-teads-formats/41© 2022 Spark Ninety26

1 Social media advertising
There is a very wide range of trends and developments affecting the social media advertising market - it isbeyond the scope of this report to detail these in full. Overall, the major owned and operated platforms
account for an increasing share of the market. Ebiquity estimates that Google, Meta and Amazon grew theirshare of the global digital advertising market from 67% in 2020 to 74% in 202243 (note that these figures
include search and open display advertising revenues as well as social).
There is a fast pace of change in the social media market in terms of advertising expenditure, formats andpractices. For example, it is expected that TikTok will reach 1.5 billion monthly active users globally in
2022, with advertising revenues forecast to grow from $4 billion in 2021 to $12 billion in 2022 44. This issmall relative to Meta’s $115 billion global revenues in 202145.
TikTik also illustrates the development of new advertising formats, with offers for both brand and response
advertisers. For example, advertisers that have set up TikTok shops can create video shopping ads 46
showing products that people can buy by tapping on a product card in the ad to take them through to a
shop. TikTok is also testing live shopping ads where people can purchase products from a live streamed
ad47. These ad formats are examples of the “shoppable advertising” trend, where social platforms provide
brands with advertising as well as ecommerce capabilities.
2 Connected TV advertising
The majority of UK households are equipped with connected TV (CTV) devices, such as smart TV sets,
streaming devices (e.g. Amazon Fire TV, Roku), games consoles and operator set-top boxes (e.g. Freeview
Play). In Q1 2021, 79% of households used their TV set to watch online or on-demand content, with 44%
using apps on a smart TV set and 29% a streaming box or stick48.
These devices provide internet connectivity enabling people to view video on demand (VOD) and video
sharing platform (VSP) services on their TV sets, and supporting the following range of CTV advertisingformats49:●

CTV advertising - advertising served in an internet-delivered video service viewed on a TV set (e.g.
video ads on ITV Hub, All4 or YouTube viewed on a TV set)●

Addressable advertising on broadcast TV - addressable ads that replace broadcast ads, with ad
insertion enabled by a CTV device (e.g. Sky AdSmart)●

Advertising in CTV device user interfaces - display, video or paid search advertising placed in thedevice user interfaces, such as its home screen, electronic-programme guide, or search results (e.g.
Samsung First Screen Ads)

Globally, the CTV advertising revenue is forecast to grow from $16.6 billion (£12.7 billion) in 2021 to$32.6 billion (£25.1 billion) in 2026, a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 14%50.
The CTV advertising supply chain is comparable to the display advertising supply chain, with the exceptionthat operators of operating systems, devices and app stores play a role. Known as ‘gateway platforms’,
these companies include Google, Roku, Amazon, Samsung and other device manufacturers. Gateway
43

Ebiquity, Google, Meta and Amazon are on track to absorb more than 50% of all ad money in 2022, February 2022.
https://www.emarketer.com/content/tiktok-triple-its-ad-revenue-this-year45
https://digiday.com/marketing/the-rundown-google-meta-and-amazon-are-on-track-to-absorb-more-than-50-of-all-ad-money-in2022/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=digidaydis&utm_source=daily&utm_content=220204
46
https://ads.tiktok.com/help/article?aid=10007856
47
https://ads.tiktok.com/help/article?aid=10009169
48
Ofcom Technology Tracker 2021.
49
Spark Ninety, Connected TV advertising market dynamics, November 2020.
50
GroupM, This Year Next Year: Global 2021 End-Of-Year Forecast44© 2022 Spark Ninety27

platforms are involved in the provision of data for targeting (e.g. viewing data) and the sale of advertisingon user interfaces and some third-party video services.
Broadcasters pre-clear advertising on their VOD services, limiting the risk of harmful advertising. However,other market participants do not generally pre-clear ads, and in some cases sell advertisingprogrammatically, creating a risk that inappropriate advertising will be placed on TV screens.
3 Digital audio advertising
Digital audio advertising expenditure in the UK increased 17% to reach £127 million in 2020 51. It includes
advertising in streamed audio services (e.g. radio, Spotify) and podcasts. Podcast advertising is an area ofespecially high growth, with US podcast ad spending forecast to increase 31% in 2022.
Digital audio advertising formats include spots, sponsorships and host-read advertising. Digital audio
advertising is becoming more interactive, with startups such as AdTonos and Say It Now enabling people toaction ads via smart speakers. For instance, listeners were able to book a test drive after hearing a car ad 52.
There is potential for brand safety harm in the case of sensitive topic podcasts, and non-identified
advertising in the case of host-read advertising.
The digital audio supply chain is comparable to other display media, with sales channels including direct,
owned and operated platforms (e.g. Spotify Ads) and programmatic.
4 In-game advertising
In 2020, 62% of UK adults were playing games on any device, with 92% of 16-24s playing games.
Mobiles, consoles and computers were the devices used to play games by the largest proportions ofpeople53, with games played ranging from action, sports and role-playing, to puzzles and casinos. Somegames carry advertising, with UK games advertising revenues estimated to have grown from £190m in2015 to £286m in 201954. Globally, the in-game advertising market is forecast to grow at a CAGR of 16%
over the period 2021 to 202555.
In-game advertising involves an increasing range of formats and practices. The main potential issues within-game advertising include:●

Non-identification of advertising where ads are seamlessly integrated into gameplay (e.g. virtual
billboards, virtual product placement, virtual character sponsorship). Deals between brands andgames publishers might not be transparent to players.

●

Inappropriate advertising where advertising is traded programmatically. With the exception ofstandard display formats, in-game advertising has generally been placed via direct deals between
brands and games publishers, ensuring publisher control over ad content. Future growth inprogrammatic trading of games advertising (e.g. programmatic sales of virtual billboards) might
increase the risk that inappropriate advertising is placed within games. Exposure of child audiences toadvertising in age-restricted categories is a particular risk due to the young audiences for games.

51

IAB Europe, Adex benchmark 2020 study. Converted from Euros to GBP at rate of £1 = €1.12.
https://voicebot.ai/2020/12/03/first-interactive-commercial-radio-ad-campaign-debuts-on-london-smart-speakers/
53
Ofcom, Adults’ Media Use and Attitudes report, 2020/21.
54
Ofcom, Online Nation, 2020 Report, 24 June 2020.
55
Technavio, In-Game Advertising Market by Platform and Geography - Forecast and Analysis 2021-2025, May 2021.
52© 2022 Spark Ninety28

Table 10: Overview of in-game advertising formats and potential issues
Advertising format

Description

In-game display advertising

Banners, badges, video, interstitials and rewarded video formats that appear in
app and web games.

Virtual billboards

Digital form of out-of-home advertising (billboards). Ad placement may be static(pre-agreed between games publishers and brands) or dynamic (inserted live byintermediaries such as Bidstack, Anzu and Admix). In some cases, brand logos
are seamlessly integrated into gameplay (e.g. the Volkswagen logo appears on
the floor of the fighting ring in the UFC 3 game56).

Virtual product placement

Virtual versions of branded products are placed within games for players tointeract with. Products may be incorporated into games during development ormade available through downloadable content packages in the case ofwearable/usable in-game items (e.g. sponsored unlocks of customisable clothing,vehicles or themed maps). The Mario Kart 8 game included a free-to-download
Mercedes content pack57, while Louis Vuitton-designed custom ‘skins’ that could
be worn by characters in League of Legends58.

Virtual character/avatar
sponsorship/ promotions

Virtual characters or avatars in games may be sponsored and/or promote
products. For example, Alex Hunter, a character in the FIFA 18 console game forPlaystation 4, signs a deal with Coca-Cola and shoots a commercial for them aspart of the game59.

Figure 4: Example: NHS COVID virtual billboard advertising in the Dirt Rally 2.0 game, facilitated by
Bidstack60

56

World Today News, Why in-game advertising (especially now) has so much potential, 15th August 2020.
Business Insider, Nintendo Mercedes Benz DLC for Mario Kart 8 is Actually Kind of Depressing, August 2014.
58
Washington Post, This is what Louis Vuitton looks like in League of Legends, 29th October 2019.
59
Digiday, ‘A whole new world’: Coke has a sponsorship deal with a virtual soccer star in ‘FIFA 18’, September 2017.
60
Source: https://www.bidstack.com/news/press/motorsport-com-codemasters-adds-coronavirus-message-into-dirt-rally-2-0/
57© 2022 Spark Ninety29Figure 5: Example: Subway virtual product placement in the Uncharted 3 game61

Figure 6: Example: Mercedes content pack in Mario Kart 862

5 Retail media
A diverse array of retailers, from Amazon, Walmart and Tesco, to Uber Eats and Skyscanner, are selling
advertising on their websites and apps and, in some cases, using first-party data to buy advertising onthird-party services. Amazon generated advertising revenues of $31.2 billion (£24.0 billion) in 2021, withgrowth of 32% in Q4 202163. Major US retailer Walmart reported advertising revenues of $2.1 billion in
202164. US retail media ad spending is forecast to increase by 31.4% in 2022 and 26.2% in 2023,
accounting for 19.3% of digital ad spending in 202365.
In the UK, Tesco has developed the Tesco Media & Insight Platform in partnership with dunnhumby 66. This
platform is powered by Tesco Clubcard data and offers a range of advertising formats on Tesco’s digitalproperties, including banner ads, sponsored search results and creative solutions, such as competitions. It
also enables advertisers to target their customers on third-party digital publisher sites, throughprogrammatic advertising, as well as on Facebook. Tesco also provides a range of in-store advertisingformats, such as digital signage and in-store radio, as well as direct mail and coupons. Other UK retailers,
61

Source: https://whatculture.com/gaming/10-weirdest-product-placements-in-videogames?page=2#:~:text=Subway%20customers%20who%20bought%20specific,performing%20some%20death%2Ddefying%20esc
ape.
62
Source: http://e-aagh.net/2014/08/mario-mercedes-leads-new-mario-kart-8-dlc/
63
https://www.emarketer.com/content/amazon-has-larger-advertising-business-than-youtube
64
AdExchanger, Walmart Breaks Out Ad Business Revenue At $2.1 Billion And Details How Ads Power Its Retail Evolution, 18
February 2022.
65
eMarketer, Why 2022 will be the year of retail media networks, 14 January 2022.
66
https://www.dunnhumby.com/tesco-media-insight-platform/© 2022 Spark Ninety30

such as Sainsbury’s67 and Boots68, also offer advertising on their digital services. It is reported that ASOS
plans to launch a programmatic advertising business69.
The risk of inappropriate advertising on most retail media platforms is likely to be relatively low because
retailers generally sell advertising to supplier brands (reputable companies) through direct relationships, insome cases over self-service platforms. An exception is platforms that sell to the long tail of smaller
brands (e.g. Amazon), where a small minority of these brands might be less reputable companies that seek
to place misleading advertising, for example.

6 Influencer marketing
The influencer marketing industry continues to grow strongly, with the global market forecast to increase
from $13.8 billion (£10.6 billion) in 2021 to $16.4 billion (£12.6 billion) in 202270. This is equivalent toabout 3% of total global digital advertising expenditure in 202171. Some of the main trends relevant toharms and regulation include:●

Live streaming. Influencers are increasingly live streaming content on platforms such as Twitch, Mixer
and DLive, as well as Facebook Live, YouTube Live and IGTV (Instagram). Growth has been
particularly explosive on Twitch, with an 83% year-on-year increase in viewership during the
pandemic72. They may promote products and services directly and/or place advertising in graphics ortext in a video feed. On some platforms, including Twitch, IGTV (Instagram) and Mixer, streams are notautomatically recorded for later viewing, creating a challenge for regulators to investigate reports ofbreaches, although creators/influencers can manually configure the settings to record their live
streams for later viewing if they choose to do so. The ASA offers specific advice on advertising in live
streaming73.

●

Micro and nano influencers. Brands are increasingly using influencers with small followings who may
seem more authentic and credible and have stronger connections with their followers than big nameinfluencers74. Micro influencers have approximately 1,000 to 40,000 followers, while nano influencers
have fewer than 1,000 followers, though definitions are not widely agreed on. The emergence of alarge volume of small-scale influencers could present a challenge for regulators in terms ofcompliance monitoring.

●

Influencer intermediaries. Globally, the number of influencer-related service offerings, such as
platforms and agencies, increased 26% to 18,900 in 2021. Influencer marketing platforms raised over$800 million (£615 million) in funding in 202175 with notable raises including LTK, Grin, Mavrck,
CreatorIQ and Tagger. In some cases companies are aggregating micro and nano influencers:
Heartbeat76 specialises in bringing promotional opportunities to Instagram and TikTok accounts withfollowers from as few as 500. The involvement of these agencies and platforms in the placement ofinfluencer advertising could help to improve regulatory compliance by making advertisers andinfluencers more aware of the rules.

67

https://www.research-live.com/article/news/sainsburys-launches-retail-media-platform/id/5077102
https://www.boots-uk.com/about-boots-uk/company-information/boots-media-group/69
https://digiday.com/marketing/asos-programmatic-ads-business/
70
Influencer Marketing Hub and Refersion, Influencer Marketing Benchmark Report 2022
71
Calculated using GroupM data for total global digital advertising expenditure.
72
Insider Intelligence, Livestream surges in popularity after pandemic, 1st January 2022.
73
https://www.asa.org.uk/news/go-live-advertising-in-live-streaming.html
74
Forbes, Influencer Marketing’s Surprising Rise Of The ‘Everyperson’, 4 February 2021.
75
Influencer Marketing Hub and Refersion, Influencer Marketing Benchmark Report 202276
https://heartbeat.com
68© 2022 Spark Ninety31

Online advertising data and targeting
Online advertising market practices are evolving as a consequence of increasing restrictions on user
tracking and behavioural targeting. There is a move towards alternative targeting mechanisms, such as
contextual advertising, which can be facilitated without structural change to the supply chain.

Limits on user tracking across websites and apps
The online advertising industry is beginning to transition away from certain privacy-invasive practices suchas using third-party cookies to track users across websites and facilitate behavioural advertising. To a large
extent, this move has been stimulated by certain web browsers withdrawing support for third-party
cookies, and equivalent moves by mobile operating systems to limit access to mobile ad identifiers (MAIDs).
Table 11: Status of use tracking on the main web browsers and mobile platforms
Environment

Competitor

Status of third-party cookies and mobile identifiers

Web browsers

ChromeThird-party cookies will be phased out from late 202377 - postponed
from an original target date of January 2022 due to industry andregulatory concerns around the impact of this move on competition.

Web browsers

SafariThird-party cookies have been blocked as default since the release of
Safari 13.1 in 2020. This is part of Apple’s Intelligent Tracking
Prevention (ITP) privacy feature78.

Web browsers

FirefoxThird-party cookies have been blocked as default since the introductionof Firefox’s Enhanced Tracking Protection in 201979.

iOS (Apple)

Apple launched App Tracking Transparency (ATT) in an update to theiOS14 operating system released in April 202180. ATT requires apps toseek user opt-in for use of IDFA (Apple’s mobile identifier), in effectlimiting cross-app tracking on iPhones, given that a large proportion ofusers are unlikely to opt in.

Mobile platforms

Mobile platforms

Android (Google)

Google will support Android AdID for at least two years. However, inFebruary 2022 Google announced the Privacy Sandbox on Android81 - a
multi-year initiative to limit sharing of user data with third parties andintroduce more private advertising solutions that operate without crossapp identifiers, including Android AdID.

The deprecation of third-party cookies has affected competitors differently. Websites with logged in users,
such as social media services and some news websites, are still able to use first-party cookies to trackpeople within their properties and serve targeted advertising. However, these same services are no longer
able to behaviourally target many users on their iOS apps. In consequence, it is estimated that Snap,
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube lost revenue of $9.85bn in Q3 and Q4 202182.

77

https://digiday.com/marketing/cheat-sheet-google-extends-cookie-execution-deadline-until-late-2023-will-pause-floc-testing-injuly/
78
https://www.zdnet.com/article/apple-blocks-third-party-cookies-in-safari/79
https://blog.mozilla.org/en/products/firefox/firefox-now-available-with-enhanced-tracking-protection-by-default/
80
https://techcrunch.com/2021/04/26/apples-app-tracking-transparency-feature-has-arrived-heres-what-you-need-to-know/
81
https://blog.google/products/android/introducing-privacy-sandbox-android/82
https://www.ft.com/content/4c19e387-ee1a-41d8-8dd2-bc6c302ee58e© 2022 Spark Ninety32

Development of alternative business models
Third-party cookies and mobile identifiers, where in use, play a wide role - enabling behavioural targeting
across websites as well as supporting other key elements of the online display advertising ecosystem,
including audience measurement, attribution, and reach and frequency management. The online advertisingindustry is developing new practices and business models to replace this range of functionality - it is not
focused solely on new methods of targeting. It is also exploring solutions to long-running problems withthe open display advertising ecosystem, such as a lack of transparency and accountability and asusceptibility to fraud, viewability and brand safety/suitability issues. Some of the main areas ofdevelopment include:●

Contextual targeting - online content and environments are categorised according to theme,
keywords, sentiment, emotion or other characteristics, creating data and taxonomies that advertisers
can target. For example, an airline might target web pages relating to travel, foreign languages,
international sports, weather, or other indicators that might suggest an interest in booking flights.
Contextual advertising practices are evolving, with ad tech providers experimenting with artificial
intelligence (AI) to understand the context of web pages or apps83.

●

Browser based frameworks - Chromium Privacy Sandbox84 is developing a range of solutions toreplace functionality currently enabled by cross-site tracking using third-party cookies. These solutions
generally involve consumer browsers processing personal data to allocate users into broad, nonindividually identifiable cohorts (e.g. interest groups) that the online advertising ecosystem can interact
with via browser API calls. In January 2022, Google proposed an API named Topics that categorises
users into a small number of broad interest groups such as fitness or travel85.

●

Data clean rooms - ad tech providers such as InfoSum have developed means of matching data fromdifferent industry participants while maintaining the anonymity and privacy of end users. Applications
for these clean rooms include matching advertiser and publisher first-party data, enabling advertisers
to target potential customers who are on their databases on publisher websites and apps. Thisapproach allows advertisers to activate their first-party data, instead of targeting based on segments
provided by ad tech intermediaries, which are in some cases derived from third-party data originatingfrom user “surveillance”.

●

Blockchain - distributed ledger technology (DLT) can be used to generate a single record of online
advertising transactions, limiting the possibility for intermediaries to take excess margins throughhidden fees or for nefarious actors to pass off fake advertising impressions as premium publisher
inventory. There is a proliferation of blockchain advertising startups, such as Finestra, Alkimi
Exchange86 and Constellation Hypergraph. Alkimi is developing a blockchain advertising exchangethat applies decentralised finance (DeFi) solutions to online advertising auctions87.

●

Token-based advertising systems - privacy-first web browser Brave has developed its own system of
online advertising. The browser blocks advertising served by websites, such as banner ads andoutstream video. Instead, Brave sells its own advertising which it serves into browsers in the format oftab sponsored images or browser notifications88. The Brave rewards scheme89 gives users Basic
Attention Tokens (BAT)90 in return for viewing ads, tracks which websites users devote their attention
to, then distributes users’ BAT to these websites in proportion to this attention, with 70% of Brave adrevenues distributed in this way.

83

https://www.exchangewire.com/deep-dive/contextual-advertising-ais-answer-to-a-cookieless-world/
https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-privacy/privacy-sandbox
85
https://blog.google/products/chrome/get-know-new-topics-api-privacy-sandbox/
86
https://alkimiexchange.com/
87
https://www.exchangewire.com/blog/2021/08/12/untangling-the-web-qa-with-alkimi-exchange/
88
https://brave.com/brave-ads/
89
https://brave.com/brave-rewards/
90
https://basicattentiontoken.org/
84© 2022 Spark Ninety33

Supply Chains© 2022 Spark Ninety

34

The programmatic open display and owned and operated advertising platform supply chains were
described in the CMA online platforms and digital advertising report91 published in 2020. To a large extent,
the findings of this report relating to supply chains are still valid. This section builds on this work by
describing:●

Recent trends and developments, especially changes to the supply chain structure and market
practices.

●

Variations on the simplified and generalised model (e.g. in specific market segments) to illustrate therange of participants and roles involved in online advertising.

●An “alternative” programmatic open display market ecosystem which carries an elevated risk ofharmful advertising.

●Role of market participants with respect to ad safety, including advertiser on-boarding, ad clearance
and monitoring, and response to reports of harmful advertising.

The Google (Google Ads and search), Meta, Snap and TikTok supply chains were selected by DCMS as asample to illustrate the approaches of owned and operated platforms.

Open display market supply chain
Generalised supply chain
The following supply chain shows the ad tech participants generally involved in the trading and placementof online advertising sold programmatically by major publishers to major brands. This supply chain was
described in the CMA Online platforms and digital advertising market study92.
Figure 7: Programmatic open display advertising supply chain - simplified

91
92

CMA, Online platforms and digital advertising, Market study final report, 1 July 2020.
CMA, Online platforms and digital advertising market study - Appendix M: intermediation in open display advertising, 2020.

© 2022 Spark Ninety

35

Participants in this supply chain include:●

Advertisers: Businesses and other organisations which direct the content of a message within an
online advertisement, directly or indirectly, in order to influence choice, opinion, or behaviour.

●Media agencies: Typically major advertisers engage media agencies to provide strategic advice andplan and buy advertising on their behalf, though some advertisers have in-housed certain online media
buying activities. Media agencies are generally part of holding companies that also include creative
agencies and, increasingly, data propositions.

●

Advertiser ad servers: Advertiser ad servers are used by advertisers and media agencies to store theads, deliver them to publishers, keep track of this activity and assess the impact of their campaigns bytracking conversions.

●

Demand-side platforms (DSP): Provide a platform that allows advertisers and media agencies to buy
advertising inventory from many sources. DSPs bid on impressions based on the buyer’s objectives
and on data about the final user.

●

Supply-side platforms (SSP): Provide the technology to automate the sale of digital inventory. They
allow real-time auctions by connecting to multiple DSPs, collecting bids from them and performing thefunction of exchanges. They can also facilitate more direct deals between publishers and advertisers.

●

Advertiser ad servers: Publisher ad servers manage the publisher’s inventory and provide the decision
logic underlying the final choice of which ad to serve.

●

Publishers: Online publishers operate websites, apps or other online services and monetise theirservices by selling digital advertising. There is an increasing range of organisations in this category,including:○News publishers (e.g. The Guardian, The Telegraph, Reach)○

Digital content publishers (e.g. Buzzfeed, Future)○

Internet served Video-on-Demand (VOD) services (e.g. ITV, Channel 4, Pluto TV)○

Audio publishers (e.g. Spotify, Global)○

App developers (e.g. Tinder)○

Games publishers (e.g. Activision, Epic)○

Connected TV platforms (e.g. Roku, Samsung TV, Amazon Fire TV)○

Retailers (e.g. Amazon, Tesco)○

Other non-traditional publishers (e.g. Skyscanner, Uber Eats)

Variations on the generalised supply chain
In certain situations, the supply chain differs from the generalised programmatic model. Participants in thead tech stack may be disintermediated or substituted by alternative categories of participant performing asimilar role. The main variations include:●

Direct sales. Publishers may sell some online advertising direct to agencies or advertisers through:○Manual orders. Especially in the case of tenancies (where the advertiser pays a flat fee for acertain period of ad placement), custom solutions (e.g. non-standard advertising formats) andadvertising sold as part of cross-platform packages (e.g. bundles of online and print advertising).

○

Owned and operated platforms. In certain cases, publishers have developed owned and operated
self-service buying platforms that integrate the ad tech stack and avoid disintermediation by© 2022 Spark Ninety

36third-party ad tech vendors. For example, ITV sells online video inventory through Planet V93, aself service buying platform.
●

Ad networks. The CMA defines ad networks as ‘intermediaries that aggregate inventory supply frompublishers and match it with demand from their own demand sources, therefore connecting
advertisers and publishers and integrating in a single service most intermediation functions’94. The
functions provided by ad networks are comparable to a combination of an ad server and an integrated
SSP (e.g. Google AdSense, Google AdMob). In some cases, networks also integrate a DSP/self-service
buying platform and/or conduct direct sales (e.g. Acast). Generally, ad networks serve small publishers
or specific advertising formats, such as mobile, in-game and audio. Examples of ad networks include:○

Google AdSense - used by small publishers to sell advertising through Google’s own demand
platform Google Ads as well as third-party DSPs.

○

Google AdMob - used by publishers to sell mobile app advertising inventory.

○

Acast - used by podcast creators to sell advertising in podcasts.

●

Self-service buying platforms. Google Ads provides a buying platform for search and display
advertising, including Google’s display supply as well as third-party SSP supply. It integrates thefunctions of the advertiser ad server and DSP. Similarly, Facebook Ads Manager allows advertisers to
buy advertising on Facebook Audience Network (publisher app inventory) as well as Facebook,
Instagram and Messenger.

●

Agency disintermediation. Some major advertisers have in-housed certain digital media buying
activities, instead of agencies conducting these activities, or adopted hybrid models where advertisers
and agency teams work together95. In many cases, SME advertisers buy online display advertising
directly from self-service platforms such as Google Ads or Facebook Ads Manager without using anagency. The CMA estimated that around a quarter of all digital advertising expenditure in the UK ischannelled through media agencies96. (The proportion of open display advertising expenditurechannelled through media agencies is likely to be much higher than one quarter because this market
segment has a lower weight of SME buyers than search or classifieds).

As a consequence of these variations, an advertiser’s point of entry into the open display advertising
ecosystem could be a DSP, an ad network or a publisher - in some cases via a self-service platform. A
media agency may or may not be involved in this process.

Trends and developments
Although the open display advertising supply chain remains highly complex, it is becoming more simplified
due to market consolidation, vertical integration/alignment, supply path optimisation, and increasedtransparency. Some of the main trends and developments since 2020 include:●

Market consolidation. The CMA estimated that in 2019 Google accounted for 50-60% of the value ofads sold across all of the SSPs and ad networks, with the remainder accounted for by Xandr, Teads,
Taboola, Rubicon Project, Index Exchange and various others. Similarly, Google controlled 50-60% of
the DSP market, with the remainder shared amongst The Trade Desk, Xandr, Criteo, Amazon andvarious others97. Recently, the long tail of competitors to Google has consolidated to a limited extent
due to mergers and acquisitions. Major deals include:○In December 2021, Microsoft announced its acquisition of Xandr98.

93

https://www.planet-v.co.uk/
CMA, Online platforms and digital advertising market study - Appendix M: intermediation in open display advertising, 2020.
95
Digiday, Brands rethink their in-housing plans after tactic was ‘put on ice’ amid pandemic, April 2021 (behind paywall).
96
CMA, Online platforms and digital advertising, Market study final report, 1 July 2020.
97
CMA, Online platforms and digital advertising, Market study appendix C: Market outcomes, 1 July 2020.
98
Microsoft Advertising Blog, Microsoft to acquire Xandr to accelerate delivery of digital advertising and retail media solutions.
94© 2022 Spark Ninety37

○

In December 2019, Rubicon Project and Telaria merged to form Magnite99. In April 2021, Magnite
acquired Spotx100.

○

In September 2021, private equity firm Apollo Global Management acquired Verizon Media andrenamed it Yahoo101.

●

Vertical integration/alignment. Programmatic open display advertising expenditure is increasingly
following “closed” paths across supply and demand side intermediaries owned by the same
companies. In many cases, major ad tech companies operate intermediaries at different levels of the
supply chain (e.g. Google DV360/Google Ads - Google AdSense/Google Ad Manager/Google AdMob;
Yahoo! DSP - Yahoo! SSP). IAB Europe analysed 5 companies and found that a high share of spend on
their SSPs comes from their own demand (e.g. DSPs), with rates ranging from 35.3% to 94.1%102. It
forecasts that the share of programmatic expenditure via the open ecosystem will decrease from
40.2% in 2021 to 25.3% in 2025.

●

Supply path optimisation (SPO). Programmatic trading often involves multiple SSPs conducting
parallel auctions for each ad impression, which creates duplication and inefficiencies. There is a
growing trend towards finding the path from buyer to seller that is optimal in terms of fees and otherfactors - SPO. This trend is closely related to supply chain transparency, below. In some cases, SPO
involves cutting out intermediaries: DSP The Trade Desk introduced OpenPath, a service that enables
advertisers to access publisher ad inventory directly, bypassing SSPs (in cases where the publisher
users Prebid, a header bidding solution)103.

●

Supply chain transparency. The IAB has introduced transparency standards. On the demand side,buyers.json and DemandChain Object104 allow sellers to see the buyers that intermediaries represent.
Conversely, on the sell side, sellers.json and SupplyChain Object105 allow buyers to see the sellers
that intermediaries represent. The online advertising industry is also making steps towards
standardising supply chain audit procedures. A cross-industry task force involving ISBA, the IPA, IAB
UK and the AOP have developed a strategy for achieving financial audit transparency for
programmatic advertising106. This involves principles, an agreed data fields list, and a standard audit
permission letter.

These trends are mainly relevant to programmatic trading of standard display advertising formats, such as
banners, billboards and site skins. There is an increasing diversity of other online advertising formats,including video, audio, in-game and connected TV home screen advertising. In general, the supply chainsfor these market segments are comparable to the generalised display market supply chain. The maindifferences are the presence of specialist players (e.g. in-game advertising networks), category-specific adtech (e.g. server-side ad insertion in video streaming), and a bias towards direct sales due to less developed
programmatic trading.

99

https://investor.rubiconproject.com/news-releases/news-release-details/rubicon-project-and-telaria-agree-combine-form-largest
https://www.magnite.com/press/magnite-closes-spotx-acquisition/
101
https://techcrunch.com/2021/09/01/apollo-completes-its-5b-acquisition-of-verizon-media-now-known-as-yahoo/
102
IAB Europe, Economic Trends Forum Part 2, February 2022. Based on a review of SSP data from 12 publishers. This data is biase dtowards premium publishers.
103
https://www.adexchanger.com/publishers/is-the-trade-desk-encroaching-on-ssp-turf-with-openpath/104
https://iabtechlab.com/buyers-json-demand-chain/105
https://iabtechlab.com/sellers-json/
106
Videoweek, Industry Trade Groups Release New Tools to Crack Down on the Unknown Delta, 23 February 2022.
100© 2022 Spark Ninety

38

“Alternative” programmatic online advertising supply chain
Major online advertising intermediaries operate restrictions and prohibitions on content and advertising incertain categories. On the supply side, they generally apply advertising restrictions to content in sensitive
categories, such as adult, recreational drugs and gambling. For example:●

Google Publisher Restrictions (across the Ad Manager, AdMob and AdSense SSP/networks) apply tosexual content, shocking content, and content relating to explosives, weapons, tobacco, recreational
drugs, alcohol sale or misuse, online gambling, among other areas. Google Ads will not serve ads on
this restricted content. Other demand sources (e.g. DSPs) could serve advertising on content labelled
as restricted, but are likely to avoid it. Google states that publishers can choose to monetise content
covered by these restrictions, but are likely to receive less advertising than other, non-restricted
content107.

●

Major SSP Magnite applies “baseline content standards” that prohibit extreme content, including
hateful supremacist speech, direct calls for violence or harassment, gratuitous depictions of violence,
pornography, or materials that advocate illegal activities such as sexual abuse, fraud and piracy. It also
prohibits harmful disinformation. It performs checks during publisher onboarding and monitors
publisher content using third-party monitoring and classification services108. Therefore, it would bechallenging for adult or piracy sites to monetise their services via Magnite.

On the demand side, they generally prohibit advertising for illegal content and services, such as copyright
infringement, drugs and counterfeit goods and restrict advertising in areas such as alcohol and gambling.
For example:●

Adform, a DSP and SSP, prohibits advertising that includes content across a range of categories
including, but not limited to, hate speech, religion, pornography, weapons, copyright infringement,
counerfeit goods and malware. Advertisers require Adform’s written content to place ads in restrictedcategories, such as alcohol, gambling, financial services and politics. It requires advertisers to confirm
that they comply with applicable laws and regulation in the country of the audience targeted 109.

●

Google Ads and Google DV360 prohibit advertising of counterfeit goods and dangerous products, ads
that enable dishonest behaviour or involve misrepresentation, inappropriate content such as accident
images, and a wide range of other forms of content and product. It restricts ads that include sexual
content, alcohol, gambling, politics, financial services, among other areas110.

As a consequence of these restrictions publishers and advertisers operating in legal but restricted areas,
especially adult entertainment, are to a large extent exiled from the mainstream display advertising
ecosystem. Alternative ad tech vendors have emerged to service these exiles, leading to the creation of an“alternative” ecosystem. This ecosystem, illustrated above, is characterised by:●

Relatively large scale. The alternative ecosystem is likely to account for high volumes of online
advertising inventory. Intermediary TrafficJunky specialises in dating, cannabis, adult entertainment,
gambling, health & wellness and games publishers. It claims to process 218 million daily ad
impressions in the UK111.

●

Fragmented market. There are multiple ad tech intermediaries that specialise in selling advertising for
publishers in restricted content categories, especially adult entertainment.

107

https://support.google.com/publisherpolicies/answer/10437795?visit_id=637824427002597315-4120494383&rd=1
https://www.magnite.com/blog/on-content-standards/
109
https://site.adform.com/policies/policies-and-guidelines/ad-quality-policies/
110
https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/6008942
111
https://www.trafficjunky.com/online-advertising/traffic-statistics Accessed 10 March 2022.
108© 2022 Spark Ninety

39

●

Variety of business models. Intermediary business models include SSPs, DSPs and networks, including
affiliate networks. Some intermediaries integrate the full ad tech stack, providing advertisers with aself-service buying platform.

●

Intermediaries based overseas. Major ad tech intermediaries operating in the alternative ecosystem arebased overseas, such as Cyprus (TrafficJunky, Traffic Stars, Adsterra), Spain (ExoClick) and Canada(Juicy Ads).

The figure below illustrates this ecosystem. There is a degree of crossover between these ecosystems: forexample, in some circumstances SSPs in the alternative ecosystem may sell some advertising to DSPs in
the mainstream ecosystem.
Figure 8: Mainstream and “alternative” open display ecosystems - with examples of participants

The major intermediaries have policies prohibiting illegal advertising or content, such as Traffic Stars
advertiser guidelines112 and ExoClick compliance information113. However, anecdotal evidence suggeststhat the alternative ecosystem carries a relatively high level of harmful advertising.
●

White Bullet research found that 16% of UK ad impressions on piracy websites were malware, fraud,or adult ads in Q1 2022, compared to 19% in 2021114.

●

In 2020 and 2021, adult entertainment websites were targeted by a malvertising campaign where theads initiated redirects to fake Microsoft Windows system security alerts that were used to downloadmalware115.

112

https://trafficstars.com/guidelines
https://www.exoclick.com/compliance/
114
White Bullet, How regulation and outreach reduce ad placement on piracy websites, 2022.
115
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2021/02/malvertising-campaign-on-top-adult-brands-exposes-users-to-tech-supportscams/
113© 2022 Spark Ninety40

Owned and operated platform supply chains
Supply chain and the role of self-service platforms
The main social display and search platforms -Meta (Facebook, Instagram), Google (Google Ads, YouTube)
TikTok, Snap and Twitter - have owned and operated supply chains. Their advertising businesses are built
on scale and data, with each service reaching millions or tens of millions of logged-in users and gathering
extensive first-party data. This enables them to offer advertisers a range of targeting strategies from laser
pinpointing to mass market coverage, and options in between.
Search and social display platforms sell advertising on self-service interfaces, enabling a wide range ofadvertisers to buy advertising, including almost anyone with a registered business or other organisation,and in some cases individuals. This contrasts with some other media such as broadcast TV that haverelatively high barriers to entry. TV advertising requires a budget of at least a few thousand pounds, adegree of advertising creative and production expertise, and compliance with a centralised advertising copy
pre-clearance process (Clearcast).
These self-service buying platforms are part of a vertically integrated supply chain. Platforms also provide
advertising inventory management and allocation, and tools and services such as dynamic content
optimisation, data management, attribution and reporting, though offerings vary between providers. They
also provide their consumer-facing services.
Figure 9: Owned and operated platform supply chain - simplified

Notes:(1) DCO = dynamic content optimisation.
(2) This diagram simplifies the supply chain. In some cases, advertisers interface directly with platforms, without using a media
agency. In some cases, advertisers or media agencies use tools such as Smartly.io to manage campaigns on platforms. In some c ases,
publishers distribute content on platforms in return for a share of advertising revenue and/or the right to sell advertising on theircontent.
(3) Buying channels and platforms, and tools and services differ between platforms.

While this supply chain provides relatively unconstrained access to advertising, enabling small businesses
to promote themselves and grow, it also puts creative and media buying decisions into the hands ofthousands of individuals and small businesses, some of whom will be inexperienced, disinterested,
uninformed and potentially lack diligence. To some extent, they require 'hand-holding' through theonboarding and advertising processes by providing clear language, navigation and guidance. Inevitably the
low barriers to entry can, in some circumstances, also give those with malign intentions the opportunity toadvertise too.

© 2022 Spark Ninety41

Ad safety procedures
Search and display advertising platforms and open display intermediaries have a range of policies andmeasures in place intended to protect consumers from harmful advertising. These measures follow theadvertiser user journey from signing up with a platform (on-boarding) through to running advertising
campaigns. These policies and procedures are constantly evolving - the following sections highlight recent
developments.

Advertiser on-boarding checks
During customer on-boarding or thereafter, advertisers may be asked to verify their identity and/or thatthey are registered with relevant authorities. In most cases, vendors do not publish information about these‘know your customer’ procedures and it is unclear whether and how any checks are performed. Some of themain developments since 2020 include:●

Specific vertical market requirements. Certain players have introduced financial services advertiser
verification: advertisers must demonstrate that they are authorised by the Financial Conduct Authority(FCA). Google introduced this measure in August 2021, with Meta, Microsoft, Amazon Ads, Twitter
and Tiktok also having committed to introducing comparable requirements116. (see next section).

●

Advertiser identity verification. Google recently introduced identity verification and will make available‘ad disclosures’ showing the advertiser name and location117.

Generally, platforms require that advertisers set up business accounts and accept their general terms ofservice, community guidelines and privacy policies as a condition for access and use, providing grounds for
suspension or removal of any advertising deemed to be in breach of their policies.

Ad reviews and approvals
Generally, platforms and DSPs review ads prior to delivery and in-flight (during a campaign) using in-house
technology and teams or external vendors. Review typically involves an automated scan for malware (inthe case of open display advertising) and other policy violations, with escalation to human review.
In the case of platforms, advertisers provide creative copy, target audience and other details on a selfservice platform that are then checked and validated for publication. A mix of automated and humanprocesses are deployed, and typical review times are around 24 hours118. Checks cover such aspects as theeligibility of the product/service; creative content and quality; the targeted region and age group;
congruence between ad creative and landing page; and the functionality and eligibility of the landing page.
Re-editing of creative copy or a change of target audience can trigger the review process again. Ads may bereviewed again after they are live for any reason.
Intermediaries and platforms do not publish information about how their ad reviews work. However, it islikely that the focus is on more serious and readily identifiable issues, such as malware, scams and IP
infringement. It is unlikely that this process could detect more nuanced issues such as checking the veracityof advertiser claims in order to identify misleading advertising. In Meta's words, 'Reviewing ads frommillions of advertisers globally against our Advertising Policies is essential, but it is not without challenges.
Our enforcement isn't perfect, and both machines and people make mistakes.'119
116

https://www.techuk.org/resource/major-technology-companies-step-up-efforts-to-tackle-financial-fraud-and-scam-adverts.html
https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/9720978?hl=en-GB&ref_topic=9646742
118
Google Ads: Most ads are reviewed within a working day. Once deemed ‘Eligible’ an ad can run.
TikTok: Most ads are reviewed within 24 hours.
Meta: Ad reviews are typically completed within 24 hours, primarily via automated tools
Twitter states: “Twitter Ads can be reviewed prior to running in campaigns. They are submitted for approval on an automatic b asis,
based on an account’s advertising status, its historical use of Twitter, and other evolving factors. Review generally takes into
consideration how an account uses Twitter, its profile, its content, and targeting included in any active or draft advertisin g campaigns.”
Snap: “Most ads are reviewed within 24 hours, although depending on a variety of factors, it may take longer.”
119
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/204798856225114?id=649869995454285
117© 2022 Spark Ninety42

If the validation process rejects an ad, then the buyer is given the reason(s) why and guided towards
correcting the non-compliant content. Advertisers usually have the right of appeal if they regard a rejection
as mistaken. In the case of serious or repeat offenders, platform policies allow for the suspension ofadvertising accounts, or even their permanent exclusion.
Figure 10: Example review process: Meta120

Ad safety review algorithms can inadvertently catch legitimate businesses with the parameters they use.
The telehealth service Wisp, which connects clients with providers for care relating to sexual andreproductive health, has faced obstacles to advertising121.

Ad targeting restrictions
Platforms offer advertisers various targeting options, such as demographics (gender, age), location,
language, custom audiences, lookalike audiences, retargeted audiences, interests and behaviours, device
and operating system. The self-service buying interfaces ask what is being advertised and allow thecreation of a target audience based on the selection of such options, individually or in combination.
At the booking stage platforms impose exclusions or disable certain options to prevent some inappropriate
targeting, such as advertising age-restricted products to children. For example, Meta advises advertisers of
alcoholic drinks: To ensure proper targeting, if you target an age group outside the legal directives, we’ll
automatically set the minimum age to the legally approved limit for the specific country/state and thenapprove the ad. Similarly, for health and fitness advertisers: If you’re promoting health and fitness products
and/or services, including vitamins and supplements, you must target your ads to people ages 18 and older.
If you target your ad to people younger than 18, you’ll be notified in Ads Manager that we’ve automatically
set the minimum age to 18 so that it can be approved for delivery.122 These default settings and restrictions
on the selectable audiences minimise the risk of mis-targeting.

120

https://www.facebook.com/business/help/204798856225114?id=649869995454285
https://www.adexchanger.com/digital-marketing-2/why-womens-health-is-hit-hardest-by-facebooks-ad-approvalalgorithms/?oly_enc_id=6866E6018134F8Z
121

122

https://www.facebookblueprint.com/uploads/resource_courses/targets/393309/original/index.html?_courseId=187039#/page/5be385
3da2488a7e42159af0© 2022 Spark Ninety

43Figure 11: Meta audience selection interface123

Ad libraries
Meta Ad Library124 provides a public record of ads currently running on Facebook, Instagram, Messenger
and Facebook Audience Network (which operates in the open display advertising market). The transparency
provided by this library may help stakeholders to identify and notify Meta about harmful advertising.
Snap125 also has an ad library, but it is limited to political ads at present.
Open display advertising intermediaries do not currently operate comparable libraries, though Google’s
policies imply that it may introduce an ad library or similar transparency measures in the future: ‘As Google
expands its transparency efforts, we may make information about your Google Ads accounts and ad
campaigns publicly available including: Advertiser name change history, Ad creatives, Dates and locations
ads served…’126

123

Audience Insight section supporting the booking:https://business.facebook.com/latest/insights/people?asset_id=114384364580285&nav_ref=audience_insights
124
https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active_status=all&ad_type=political_and_issue_ads&country=GB&media_type=all125
https://www.snap.com/en-GB/political-ads
126
https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/9720978?hl=en-GB&ref_topic=9646742 Accessed 12 March 2022.
© 2022 Spark Ninety

44Advertising policies
The major search and social media platforms and open display intermediaries have comprehensive
advertising policies, which vary between companies, but they tend to cover the following areas:●

Ad creatives and landing pages●

Misleading claims, behaviours, and content●

Prohibited and restricted advertising categories●

Intellectual property protection●

Data collection

These policies generally incorporate the requirements of the CAP Code. Some go further on certain issues,
such as restricting or prohibiting the advertising of contentious products (e.g. alcohol) or services (e.g.
gambling); or restricting aspects of a category, or to whom it can be advertised. The following tables
provide an indicative and selective summary of prohibitions and restrictions. Each advertising policy has
specific details and different restrictions: for example, gambling ad restrictions may apply to online
gambling only, not betting shops. Restrictions generally apply to age targeting (e.g. energy drinks on
TikTok must be 18+ targeted; Google restricts the advertising of all food and drink to under-18s).
Table 12: Categories of product/service prohibited by platform policies, UK – selected examples
Category

TikTok127

Alcoholic drinks

X

Cigarettes / e-cigarettes, vaping

X

Crypto currencies/ exchanges

X

Debt consolidation

X

Payday loans

Snap128

Twitter129

Google130

Meta131

X

X

X

X

X
X

Get rich quick

X

Gambling

X

Invasive cosmetic surgery

X

Weight loss/management

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

127

https://ads.tiktok.com/help/article?aid=10005234 Accessed 23 April 2022
https://www.snap.com/en-GB/ad-policies#financial-products Accessed 23 April 2022
129
https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies.html#Ads Accessed 23 April 2022
130
https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/6008942?visit_id=637853749644855889-1889855132&rd=1 Accessed 23 April2022
131
https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads/ Accessed 23 April 2022
128

© 2022 Spark Ninety45

Table 13: Categories of product/service restricted by platform policies, UK – selected examples
Category

TikTok132

Alcoholic drinks

Snap133

Twitter134

Google135

Meta136

X

X

X

X

Crypto currencies/ exchanges

X

X

X

X

X

Financial services

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Gambling
Energy drinks

X

X

HFSS food/drink

X

X

OTC medicines

X

X

X

The smaller platforms (TikTok, Snap, Twitter) tend to apply more bans, whereas Google and Meta's policies
lean more towards management through restrictions rather than outright prohibition. TikTok has the mostrigorous stance towards prohibition of certain categories (e.g. alcohol and gambling).
The platforms' policies are regularly updated to keep pace with politics, laws and societal trends; forexample:●In 2022, platforms banned advertising by Russian state-owned entities137.

●

In July 2021, Meta introduced restrictions that prevent advertisers from targeting people under 18 on
its platforms based on their interests or their activity on other sites138.

●

In August 2021, Twitter prohibited misleading ‘before and after’ photos, content that could bereasonably considered to body shame a customer, and promotion of unhealthy or unsafe eating
behaviours or eating disorders. It also banned promoting dangerous supplements that look similar toprescription drugs or claim to increase the speed of weight loss and muscle growth139.

132

https://ads.tiktok.com/help/article?aid=10005234 Accessed 23 April 2022
https://www.snap.com/en-GB/ad-policies#financial-products Accessed 23 April 2022
134
https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies.html#Ads Accessed 23 April 2022
135
https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/6008942?visit_id=637853749644855889-1889855132&rd=1 Accessed 23 April2022
136
https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads/ Accessed 23 April 2022
137
Example - Snap Inc: https://www.snap.com/en-GB/ad-policies#prohibited-content
138
https://www.reuters.com/technology/facebook-will-restrict-ad-targeting-under-18s-2021-07-27/
139https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/ads-policy-update-log.html
133© 2022 Spark Ninety46

Industry and self-regulatory initiatives
In 2020, a Plum Consulting report commissioned by the DCMS140 identified a wide range of industry andself-regulatory initiatives that help to address the problems of harmful online advertising. Since then, there
have been various developments in this area. The following are selected highlights. The scope of thisproject did not include conducting a comprehensive review of these initiatives.
●

Stop Scams UK141. This organisation was formed in 2019, with members including Google, Microsoft,
BT, Barclays, Lloyds Banking Group and HSBC. Meta joined in March 2022142. It is working to “stopscams at source”, noting the prevalence of criminals posing as members of the banking, tech andtelecoms sectors in order to scam their victims. The group is centred around technical collaborationand initiatives.

●

Scam Ad Alert System. The ASA Scam Ad Alert System launched in 2020 in partnership with major
online and social media platforms, including Google and Facebook. It receives reports from consumers(via a quick reporting form143) and passes these on to relevant platforms. Over the period June 2020 to
September 2021 participating platforms and networks who responded to an ASA information request
removed or suspended 765 ads and/or accounts as a direct result of information provided by the Scam
Ad Alert System. 135 of these related to alerts for an ad seen on their platform and 630 to alerts foran ad seen on other platforms, highlighting the value of cross-platform intelligence sharing.

●

TAG TrustNet. Following a 12-month trial, in October 2021 TAG announced the launch of TAG
TrustNet in partnership with Fiducia144. This represents a Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT)
initiative for the open display advertising market with the aim of building trust and transparency acrossthe supply chain. In January 2022, Innovate UK, a UK government innovation agency, awarded a grant
to TAG TrustNet to support the development of the initiative145.

●

EDAA AdChoices. The mission of the European Interactive Digital Advertising Alliance (EDAA) is toprovide the AdChoices icon to companies active in digital advertising in Europe. This icon is displayedon digital ads and links through to its Consumer Choice Platform, usually via an interstitial page,enabling people to learn about data-driven advertising and exercise control over it. In some ad techintermediary implementations (the interstitials differ between vendors), there is the possibility for
consumers to report harmful advertising (e.g. Google). In Great Britain, awareness of the icon (with the‘Ad Choices’ ad marker text) increased from 34% in 2016 to 50% in 2020, and the proportion ofpeople who had clicked on the icon increased from 27% to 40%146.

Current regulation and industry initiatives relating to body image
At present, the ASA may categorise advertising that has the potential to contribute to body image concerns
as misleading, harmful or otherwise socially irresponsible, depending on the nature of the underlying
issue147. CAP and BCAP Code rules on social responsibility148 have been applied to uphold complaints
140

Plum Consulting, Mapping online advertising issues, and the industry and regulatory initiatives aimed at addressing them, May
2020.
141
https://stopscamsuk.org.uk
142
https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/meta-facebook-hsbc-instagram-google-b988333.html
143
https://www.asa.org.uk/make-a-complaint/report-an-online-scam-ad.html
144
https://www.fiducia.eco/post/tag-launches-tag-trustnet-in-partnership-with-fiducia
145
https://ipa.co.uk/news/tag-trustnet
146
EDAA, European Advertising Consumer Research Report 2021.
147
In such cases, the ASA’s role is to weigh up, on the one hand, the advertiser’s commercial freedom of expression and, on the other
hand, restrictions that are necessary to protect the audience from misleading, harmful or offensive expressions. Where the ASA
determines there is little likelihood of advertising causing harm, it cannot justifiably seek amendments to or withdrawal of such ads, nomatter the strength of opinion articulated by the complainant. This balancing test is set by law; as a body exercising public functions,
the ASA must observe this test.
148
CAP Code rule 1.3 and BCAP Code 1.2): Marketing communications must be prepared with a sense of responsibility to consumers
and to society.
© 2022 Spark Ninety47

against ads featuring models who appear overly thin (in an aspirational context, in some cases) and ads forcosmetic interventions which exploit individuals’ insecurities about their bodies. The ASA can also
investigate ads that use digital editing to alter body parts in images if it suspects the editing may result in a
potential breach of the Code. In addition, the advertising Codes prohibit the targeting of weight reduction
and cosmetic intervention ads at children through the selection of media or the context in which they
appear 149,150. Body image is an area of self-regulatory development, with the potential for changes in theCodes. In 2021, the ASA launched a call for evidence to assist in their regulation of advertising which gives
rise to potential harms relating to body image151.
The advertising industry is also addressing the issue of body image. The Be Real campaign, founded by
Dove and the YMCA, launched the Body Image Pledge152 calling for the responsible portrayal of body
image by the advertising, fashion, media and music industries. In April 2022, Ogilvy UK announced that it
will no longer work with influencers who distort or retouch their bodies or faces 153. Social media platforms
have policies that prohibit or restrict some advertising that may contribute to body image concerns - in theUK:●

Meta’s advertising policy on personal health154states: ad content must not imply or attempt togenerate negative self-perception in order to promote diet, weight loss or other health-related
products. Adverts for cosmetic procedures, weight loss products and services, and dietary, health or
herbal supplements must be targeted to users aged over 18155.

●

Snap prohibits adverts for health and dietary supplements that promote weight loss, containexaggerated or unrealistic claims, or include “before and after” pictures related to weight loss. The
latter two prohibitions also apply to diet and fitness adverts. Adverts for plastic surgery must be
targeted to people aged over 18156.

●

TikTok prohibits advertising of invasive cosmetic procedures and weight loss/management fastingproducts or services, including supplements157. It also prohibits ad content that depicts, promotes,
normalises, or glorifies any dangerous weight loss behaviours associated with disordered eating158. It
allows advertising of licensed cosmetic clinics provided that adverts target users aged over 18.

●

Twitter prohibits the promotion of unacceptable business practices, including misleading ‘before andafter’ text or images, use of content that could be reasonably considered to ‘body-shame’ thecustomer, and encouragement, glamorization, or promotion of unhealthy or unsafe eating behaviours
or eating disorders159. It also prohibits knowingly advertising certain categories of products andservices to minors, including weight loss, health and wellness supplements, ultraviolet tanning, andpermanent cosmetics160.

149

CAP, Body Image in Advertising: Call for Evidence, 21 October 2021.
https://www.asa.org.uk/news/strict-new-rules-for-ads-for-cosmetic-interventions.html
151
https://www.asa.org.uk/resource/body-image-call-for-evidence.html
152
https://www.berealcampaign.co.uk/resources/body-image-pledge
153
https://www.thedrum.com/news/2022/04/07/ogilvy-will-no-longer-work-with-influencers-who-edit-their-bodies-or-faces-ads
154
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/2489235377779939
155
https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads
156
https://snap.com/en-GB/ad-policies#disclosures
157
https://ads.tiktok.com/help/article?aid=10005234
158
https://www.tiktok.com/community-guidelines?lang=en
159
https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/ads-content-policies/unacceptable-business-practices.html
160
https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/ads-content-policies/prohibited-content-for-minors.html
150© 2022 Spark Ninety48

International Regulatory
Developments© 2022 Spark Ninety

49

The regulatory framework for online advertising differs by country and is highly complex. In most cases,
these frameworks involve consumer protection, data protection, media, communications, and verticalmarket laws as well as self-regulatory codes, and are enforced by government agencies and selfregulatory bodies. This section does not describe these frameworks, but provides an overview of selected
recent developments that affect the way that online advertising is regulated, focusing on the areas coveredby the Online Advertising Programme in the UK, such as regulation of harms relating to online advertisingcontent and targeting.
New European Union laws introduce rules and obligations for major online advertising platforms in theareas of transparency, behavioural targeting and privacy. Developments within certain European countries
address specific issues such as responsible influencer marketing and use of retouched images inadvertising. In the US, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is addressing certain online advertising issues
and there are legislative proposals relating to privacy. These developments complement existing selfregulatory systems in these countries.

European Union
The main recent developments in advertising regulation at the European Union level are the proposed
Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act which will regulate major digital platforms and certain
other companies that intermediate between businesses and consumers. Rules and obligations around
online advertising form part of these Acts.

Digital Services Act
The proposed Digital Services Act (DSA) regulates the obligations of digital services that act asintermediaries in their role of connecting consumers with goods, services and content. It is intended toprotect consumers and fundamental rights online, create a transparency and accountability framework, andfairer and more open digital markets161. Rules will be harmonised across the EU and cover areas including
illegal content, traceability of business users in online marketplaces, safeguards for users, transparency,
obligations for very large platforms to prevent abuse of their systems, and researcher access to data.
Enforcement of the DSA will be through national and EU-level cooperation. Each Member State will
appoint a Digital Services Coordinator responsible for supervising intermediary services established in their
Member State. It will have the power to impose penalties specified in national law in line with theRegulation.
The DSA applies to online intermediaries, which includes services such as internet service providers, cloudservices, messaging, marketplaces and social networks. Specific obligations apply to online platforms, suchas social networks, content-sharing platforms, app stores, online marketplaces, online travel andaccommodation platforms. A subset of rules specified in the DSA apply to very large platforms, which havea significant societal and economic impact , reaching at least 45 million users in the EU, representing 10%of the population162.
On 20th January 2022, the European Parliament voted to approve the text of the DSA, including a range of
amendments163. Political agreement was then reached on 23 April 2022164, though the final text of thisagreement was not available at the time of writing. As of the January 2022 amendments, the DSA requires
online platforms to empower consumers around targeting practices, be more transparent, prohibit targetingof minors and vulnerable groups, and provide access to data and algorithms. Intermediaries in the open

161

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_20_2348
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_20_2348
163
https://www.theregister.com/2022/01/22/eu_dsa_draft_meps/
164
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_2545
162© 2022 Spark Ninety50

display ecosystem would be covered by voluntary codes of conduct around transparency. The main rules
around advertising include165:●

Prohibition of “dark patterns”. Users should be able to make free and informed choices about
advertising practices, and intermediary services shall not use practices (e.g. “dark patterns”) to exploit
cognitive biases to prompt users to reveal information they do not want to. (Amendment 40, Recital
39a).

●

Easy withdrawal of consent. Online platforms should ensure that users can refuse or withdraw
consent for targeting advertising, in accordance with the GDPR, in a way that is not more difficult nor
time-consuming than to give their consent. Refusing consent in processing personal data for the
purposes of advertising should not result in access to the functionalities of the platform being
disabled. Alternative access options should be fair and reasonable both for regular and for one-timeusers, such as options based on tracking-free advertising. (Recital 52, Amendments 57 and 498).

●

Online platforms transparency. Online platforms should provide users with information about whenand on whose behalf an advert is displayed, including who finances the advert. They should also
provide people with easy access to information about the main parameters used for determining thatspecific advertising is displayed to them, providing meaningful explanations of the logic, including
when this is based on profiling. (Recital 52, Amendments 57 and 498).

●

Codes of conduct for intermediary transparency. The Commission shall encourage and facilitate thedrawing up of voluntary codes of conduct at Union level between, online platforms and other relevant
service providers, such as providers of online advertising intermediary services or organisations
representing recipients of the service and civil society organisations or relevant authorities tocontribute to further transparency for all actors in the online advertising ecosystem. The effectivenessof the codes should be regularly assessed. In order to enhance accountability, participation andtransparency, procedural safeguards for drawing up codes of conduct are needed. (Article 36,
Amendment 372; Recital 70, Amendment 74).

●

Prohibition of targeting of minors. Online platforms should not use personal data for commercial
purposes related to direct marketing, profiling and behaviourally targeted advertising of minors. The
online platform should not be obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional information in order toassess the age of the recipient of the service. (Recital 52, Amendments 57 and 498).

●

Prohibition of targeting of vulnerable groups based on special category data. Targeting individuals
on the basis of special categories of data which allow for targeting vulnerable groups should not be
permitted. (Recital 52, Amendments 57 and 498).

●

Provision of ad libraries. Very large online platforms should ensure public access to repositories ofadverts displayed on their online interfaces to facilitate supervision and research into emerging risks.
Repositories should include the content of adverts, including the name of the product, service or brandand the object of the advert, and related data on the advertiser, and, if different, the natural or legal
person who paid for the advert, and the delivery of the advert, in particular where targeted advertising
is concerned (including the audiences the advertiser wishes to reach). In addition, very large online
platforms should label any known deep fake videos, audio or other files. The repository should holdadverts until one year after the last time the advert was displayed, and be searchable through easy toaccess, efficient and reliable tools. (Recital 63, Amendment 68; Article 30, Amendment 332).

165

Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 20 January 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliamentand of the Council on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (COM(2020 )0825– C9-0418/2020 – 2020/0361(COD))© 2022 Spark Ninety51

●Access to data and algorithms. The Digital Services Coordinator or the Commission may require
access to or report of data and algorithms to assess the risks and harms of a very large platform’s
advertising systems. The Regulation provides a framework for compelling access to data from verylarge online platforms to vetted researchers, not-for-profit bodies, organisations or associations. All
requirements for access to data under that framework should be proportionate and appropriately
protect the rights and legitimate interests, including personal data, trade secrets and other confidential
information, of the platform and any other parties concerned, including the recipients of the service.
Vetted researchers, not-for-profit bodies, organisations or associations should guarantee theconfidentiality, security and integrity of the information, such as trade secrets, that they obtain when
performing their tasks. (Recital 64, Amendment 69).

The DSA also introduces a notice and takedown regime for illegal content that includes a range ofobligations. Examples include measures for notice and action, an obligation to provide information to users,
and trusted flaggers. These measures may apply to illegal online advertising content.

Digital Markets Act
The proposed Digital Markets Act (DMA) introduces rules for platforms that act as gatekeepers in thedigital sector, with the aim of preventing these platforms from imposing unfair conditions on businesses
and consumers and ensuring openness of digital services. The DMA will apply to companies that provide acore platform service (search, social networking, messaging, operating systems, online intermediation) in atleast three Member States, have an annual turnover in the European Economic Area of €6.5 billion or more(or a market capitalization of at least €65 billion); control an important gateway for business users towards
final consumers (more than 45 million monthly active end users in the EU and more than 10,000 yearly
active business users established in the EU); and an (expected) entrenched and durable position 166.
Gatekeepers will be required to interoperate with third parties in specific situations, allow business users totrade outside gatekeeper’s platforms, and provide business users with access to the data generated bytheir activities on the gatekeeper’s platform. Gatekeepers will also be prevented from blocking users fromuninstalling pre-installed software or apps, using data obtained from their business users to compete withthese business users, and restricting users from accessing services acquired outside of the gatekeeper
platform. The DMA will be enforced by the European Commission. Penalties for non-compliance with the
DMA include fines of up to 10% of the company's total worldwide annual turnover and periodic penalty
payments of up to 5% of the company's total worldwide daily turnover.
The DMA includes specific transparency rules relating to online advertising. According to the amendments
adopted by the European Parliament on 15th December 2021167, gatekeepers must:●

Provide pricing transparency information relating to the programmatic supply chain. Gatekeepers
are required to ‘provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services,with free of charge, effective, high-quality, continuous and real-time when requested and to the extent
possible, with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different
advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain and the availability andvisibility of advertisement’. (Recital 42, Amendment 29) The Act specifies categories of information
including bids placed by advertisers and intermediaries, price-setting mechanisms and calculation offees, price and fees paid by the advertiser and publisher, and the amount and remuneration paid to the
publisher. (Article 5, Amendments 111 to 116) This measure is intended to tackle opacity in the
programmatic advertising value chain, but is likely to apply only to Google, Meta and Amazon, given
the definition of gatekeepers. Other intermediaries in the open display advertising supply chain would
not be covered.

166

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_20_2349
Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 15 December 2021 on the proposal for a regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act) (COM(2020)0842 – C90419/2020 – 2020/0374(COD))
167© 2022 Spark Ninety52

●

Use business users’ advertising data only for the provision of the advertising service. Gatekeepers
who play a dual role of intermediary (between businesses and end users) and as providers ofadvertising services (to allow businesses to advertise to end users), are prohibited from using
advertising data of business users to compete with them. They are also prohibited from ‘disclosing any
commercially sensitive information obtained in connection with one of its advertising services to any
third party belonging to the same undertaking and from using such commercially sensitive information
for any purposes other than the provision of the specific advertising service unless this is necessary forcarrying out a business transaction’. (Recital 44, Amendment 30).

●

Provide access to performance measurement tools and information to allow independent
verification. Gatekeepers need to provide the companies advertising on their platform with access tothe performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers andpublishers to carry out their own independent verification of their advertisements hosted by thegatekeeper. They should provide ‘advertisers and publishers for entire disclosure and transparency ofthe parameters and data used for decision making, execution and measurement of the intermediation
services. A gatekeeper should further provide when requested, with free of charge access to theperformance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers,
advertising agencies acting on behalf of a company placing advertising, as well as for publishers tocarry out their own independent verification of the provision of the relevant online advertising
services.’ (Recital 53, Amendment 36).

●

Refrain from personalised targeting without clear, informed consent. A gatekeeper shall ‘for its own
commercial purposes, and the placement of third-party advertising in its own services, refrain fromcombining personal data for the purpose of delivering targeted or micro-targeted advertising, except if
a clear, explicit, renewed, informed consent has been given to the gatekeeper in line with theprocedure laid down in the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 by an end-user that is not a minor.’ (Article 6,
Amendment 120).

The text of the DMA was provisionally agreed by European Parliament, European Council and European
Commission negotiators on 24th March 2022168. The final text was not available at the time of writing.

168

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220315IPR25504/deal-on-digital-markets-act-ensuring-fair-competitionand-more-choice-for-users© 2022 Spark Ninety

53

Other European regulation
Several other areas of European regulatory development are also relevant to online advertising:●

The ePrivacy Regulation is a proposed law to replace the existing ePrivacy Directive (Directive
2002/58/EC). The European Council approved a position on the Directive on 10 February 2021169,
since when the Directive has been in trilogue negotiations. Of relevance to advertising, the Directive
aims to streamline consent requests for cookies by enabling the use of browser settings to accept orrefuse tracking cookies and other identifiers170. However, text mandating browsers to provide theoption to prevent data collection and force users to select their privacy preferences during installation
has been removed171.

●

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) was facilitated by
the European Commission and the first version was signed in June 2018172. The signatories of thisMoU commit to minimise the placement of advertising on websites and mobile applications that
infringe copyright or disseminate counterfeit goods173.

●

The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive dates to 2005 and was intended to boost consumer
confidence and make it easier for businesses, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, to tradeacross borders. On 17 December 2021, the European Commission adopted a new Commission Noticeon the interpretation and application of the Directive, providing new guidance 174. With respect toonline advertising, this guidance clarifies that:○

Social media platforms can present an increased risk of “hidden advertising” (e.g. native
advertising that blends content and commercial communications) and that all forms of commercial
communications (advertising) should be disclosed, (Section 4.2.5).

○

Influencer marketing (including paid posts, affiliate content, retweets or tagging the trader/brand)
must make clear that a trader has paid for the promotion of the product and that this should beprominent. This also applies if the influencer is endorsing its own products or business. (Section
4.2.6).

○

Personalised persuasion practices based on linking data from different sources, continuous testing
to learn more about consumer behaviour (e.g. A/B testing), and without the full knowledge of theconsumer may be manipulative and unfair under consumer law. It adds that these practices may
have a more significant effect on vulnerable consumers, and that the concept of vulnerability is
dynamic and situational (someone can be vulnerable in one situation but not in others). The use of
information about the vulnerabilities of specific consumers or a group of consumers forcommercial purposes could amount to a form of manipulation in which the trader exercises undue
influence over the consumer and is prohibited. The guidance highlights that direct exhortations tochildren are prohibited. (Section 4.2.7).

169

https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/mixed-emotions-as-council-finally-adopts-position-on-eprivacy-text/
https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/eprivacy-regulation
171
https://iabeurope.eu/proposed-eprivacy-regulation/
172
https://iabeurope.eu/european-digital-policy/#pp-toc-6095231194fdc-anchor-2
173
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/strategy/intellectual-property/enforcement-intellectual-property-rights/memorandumunderstanding-online-advertising-and-ipr_en174
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021XC1229%2805%29
170© 2022 Spark Ninety

54

European country-level developments
Certain EU Member States and other European countries have introduced legislation or self-regulatory
initiatives that address online advertising harms. The following list provides selected examples. This project
did not involve conducting a thorough review of developments country-by-country.
●

In Norway, the 2009 Marketing Act has been amended175 to make it illegal for influencers to shareretouched photos of their body in promotional posts on social media, without acknowledging theimage has been edited176. The government will provide guidance on how retouched images should belabelled. This legislative change was made in response to concerns around body image in influencer
marketing.

●

In France, ARPP177, the self-regulatory body for advertising, set up a monitoring scheme that usedartificial intelligence and humans to review over 30,000 content items across over 7,000 influencers
for compliance with identification requirements178. It has also launched a Responsible Influencer
Certificate to encourage influencer awareness and compliance179.

●

In Germany, the Network Enforcement Law180 (Netzdurchsetzunggesetz or NetzDG) came into force
in 2017. It places obligations on social networks with more than two million users in Germany tohandle complaints about unlawful content and to publish a biannual transparency report. The law
refers to 21 criminal statutes under the Germany Criminal Code (StGB), which fall into the broad
categories of hate speech or political extremism, terrorist or unconstitutional content, violence, harmful
or dangerous acts, defamation or insult, privacy, and sexual content. Social networks must take down
obviously unlawful content within 24 hours of a complaint and, where legality is not obvious, 7 days.
Transparency reports must include data about the number of complaints, the number of complaints
that resulted in take down, and take down times, among other information. NetDG refers to content
and does not specifically mention advertising, though at a minimum social media influencer paid
promotions would fall under the definition of content. The limited list of criminal statutes in scope
restrict NetzDG to tackling only extreme forms of harm in this advertising. According to H2 2021
NetzDG transparency reports, the most complained about categories of content on YouTube 181 were
hate speech or political extremism, defamation or insults, and sexual content, while on Facebook 182 themain issues were defamation, insult and incitement to hatred.

●

In Ireland, the Member State in which Meta, Google and Twitter are established in the European Union,
the Online Safety and Media Regulation Bill183 was published in January 2022. It establishes theMedia Commission, a new regulatory body, and creates a regulatory framework including a definitionof harmful online content, and binding online safety codes.

175

https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Vedtak/Beslutninger/Lovvedtak/2020-2021/vedtak-202021-146/
https://i--d-vice-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/i-d.vice.com/amp/en_uk/article/88nmy4/norway-retouching-social-media-law
177
Autorité de Régulation Professionnelle de la Publicité
178
https://www.arpp.org/actualite/resultats-observatoire-influence-responsable-2021/
179
https://www.arpp.org/certificat-influence-responsable-inscriptions/180
https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=1245
181
https://transparencyreport.google.com/netzdg/youtube?hl=en
182
Facebook, NetzDG Transparency Report, January 2022
183
https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/d8e4c-online-safety-and-media-regulation-bill/176© 2022 Spark Ninety55

United States
In the US, advertising is regulated by federal and state law, with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)taking a leading role, alongside self regulation. Advertisers are the main subject of this regulation. Relevantfederal laws include the FTC Act, the Lanham Act and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act. States also regulate advertising through consumer protection statutes and statutes
regulating certain practices. The FTC is the main regulator responsible for enforcing federal laws relating toadvertising, while state attorneys general and local district attorneys enforce state and local laws. Certain
vertical market agencies also have a role in regulating advertising in their industries, such as US Food andDrug Administration (FDA) which regulates drug advertising. There are also various self-regulatory bodies,such as the National Advertising Division (NAD)184.
The FTC is applying existing law to address some emerging online advertising issues, backed up by thethreat of strong penalties. For example, in November 2021 it provided guidance about the disclosure ofadvertising in social media influencer posts185. The FTC has the power to issue substantial fines. In March
2020, it reached a settlement requiring Teami, a maker of detox teas, to return $1 million to consumers due
to misleading claims and influencers not disclosing paid endorsements about the products which continued
after an initial warning in 2018186. It also sent letters to the influencers concerned warning that influencers
who fail to make adequate disclosures about their connections to marketers are subject to legal
enforcement action by the FTC187. In October, 2021, the FTC sent a Notice of Penalty Offenses to more than
700 businesses about influencer marketing and a range of other practices relating to endorsements,
testimonials and reviews that it considers to be deceptive188. This forms a basis for potential future action inthese cases.
In the privacy field, the FTC has also fined OpenX, an online open display advertising intermediary, $2
million for allegations of collecting personal information from children under 13 without parental consent, aviolation of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule (COPPA Rule) 189. Democratic lawmakers
introduced the Banning Surveillance Advertising Act (BSAA) which would prohibit advertisers fromtargeting ads to consumers, with certain exceptions190.

184

Frankfurt Kurnit Klein & Selz PC, Advertising and marketing in the USA, 11 April 2019.
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/1001a-influencer-guide-508_1.pdf
186
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2020/03/tea-marketer-misled-consumers-didnt-adequately-disclosepayments-well-known-influencers-ftc-alleges
187
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/1823174teamiwarningletters.pdf
188
https://www.fenwick.com/insights/publications/ftc-issues-notice-of-penalty-offenses-for-endorsement-and-testimonial-marketing189
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2021/12/advertising-platform-openx-will-pay-2-million-collectingpersonal-information-children-violation
190
https://www.adexchanger.com/privacy/even-if-targeted-online-advertising-isnt-banned-take-note-of-which-way-the-wind-isblowing/185© 2022 Spark Ninety56Annex 1: Review of Online
Advertising Harms© 2022 Spark Ninety

57

The following sections provide an update on the nature and scale of consumer and industry harms relating
to online advertising, as set out in the taxonomy of harms. Where possible, the study team has illustrated
each category of harm with real examples drawn from the media, industry reports, use of services, and areview of the Meta Ad Library. Importantly:●

Meta is the only platform to offer a comprehensive searchable ad library191. The use of examples ofharmful advertising on Facebook or Instagram in this document does not imply that other social
media platforms do not also serve harmful advertising - though these other platforms are currently
less transparent than Meta.

●

Ad Library operates a keyword search. Searches were conducted on selected keywords related to
relevant harms. Bad actors (i.e. criminals) are likely to avoid using ad wording that references any
activity in violation of platform policies. Therefore, many instances of harmful advertising may havegone unidentified by these searches.

●

The Ad Library shows only ads that are currently running192. Therefore, it does not provide information
about ads that were identified as harmful and taken down by Meta. Some of the examples presented
in this document may have subsequently been taken down by Meta or have stopped running, thus
they will no longer be available to view in the Library.

Each section provides an indicative rating of the relative incidence and severity of the category of harmusing the following key. These ratings are based on the assessment made in section 2.2.
Relative incidence/severity: ⬤ = Low, ⬤ = Medium, ⬤ = High.
Trend: ⇩ = Decreasing, ⇨ = Relatively stable, ⇧ = Increasing.

Malicious advertising
Relative incidence: ⬤ High | Relative severity: ⬤ High | Trend: ⇨ stable
Malicious advertising (also referred to as malvertising) is specific to open display advertising and involves
the use of malicious computer code. This code is delivered via the advertising creative content (theelectronic file that represents the ad) or an ad tag or landing page. It executes on the user’s browser and/or
device to steal information, take over the browser or device, or download unwanted content. In many cases,
the intention is to perpetrate fraud, such as using hijacked browsers to generate false actions that fuelattribution fraud (a form of ad fraud) or using stolen data or passwords to access people’s financial
services. As such, there is an overlap between this category of harm and fraudulent advertising, below.
The level of malicious advertising is relatively low as a proportion of total ad impressions, but high inabsolute terms due to the large number of impressions served every day. Cyber security vendor Confiant
estimates that about 0.159% of programmatic open display ad impressions had a security violation in Q4
2021, including malicious clickbait, forced redirects, criminal scams and other dangerous activity193. This
number excludes malicious ads that go undetected. This is likely to account for around a million or more
open display advertising impressions daily, given that billions of impressions are served daily in the UK.
Levels of malicious advertising are elevated in the alternative display advertising ecosystem (see Supply
chains section). Cyber security company White Bullet found that fraud and malware represented 3% of UK
ad impressions on piracy apps and 19% of ads on piracy websites194.
It is difficult to determine the impact of malicious advertising. Where malicious advertising initiates fraud,
such as the theft of data in order to hack bank accounts, individual losses can be significant. However,
191

Snap Inc. has a political ad library.
With the exception of ads that are about issues, elections or politics where Meta stores ads in the library for 7 years.
193
Confiant, Malvertising and Ad Quality Index , Q4 2021
194
White Bullet, How regulation and outreach reduce ad placement on piracy websites, 2022.
192© 2022 Spark Ninety

58

consumers hacked in this way are unlikely to know that malicious advertising led to malware attacks that
led to these losses.
Example: Hidden malicious ads
This mobile ad hides behind a legitimate-looking ad and mimics an error message in appearance. The user
is tricked into pressing ‘install’ which downloads malware onto the device, allowing cyber criminals tohijack the user or deliver a payload (malicious software)195.
Figure 17: Example of a hidden malicious mobile ad

Fraudulent advertising, including scams
Relative incidence: ⬤ High | Relative severity: ⬤ High | Trend: ⇧ Increasing
Paid-for online advertising is used to promote a range of frauds and scams. Since 2020, there appears tohave been an increase in the variety of scams, with recent reports including but not limited to:●

Celebrity clickbait-driven cryptocurrency/financial scams. These scams generally involve ads linking
to fake news articles about rapid profit from cryptocurrency investing (and in some cases binary
trading and foreign exchange), with links to scam websites designed to defraud victims. Ads may
appear on paid search, open display or social display. In open display ads, scammers generally use
cloaking methods to spoof landing pages (deceive intermediaries and platforms into believing that thelanding page is a legitimate website the scammer has mimicked). They also operate a large number ofdomains (websites).

●

Clone scams (diversion fraud). Scammers buy sponsored search advertising for keywords relating totrusted brands. The ads display URLs similar to the trusted brand URL and click through to “clone”
websites designed to look identical to trusted brand websites. Consumers are defrauded throughphishing (capturing personal information and passwords for e.g. banking services) on fake website
logins or by telephone on fake customer services numbers provided on the clone sites 196. In shopping

195
196

https://www.confiant.com/news/bad-mobile-ads-contribute-to-churnhttps://www.theguardian.com/money/2021/jul/15/retired-detective-lost-life-savings-in-a-clone-firm-investment-scam© 2022 Spark Ninety59

clone scams (see below), consumers are scammed into paying for non-existent products. In clone
cryptocurrency wallet scams, fraudsters buy search terms referring to popular crypto wallets, such as
Phantom and MetaMask. These ads direct consumers to imitations of these crypto wallets wherephishing scams are perpetrated197.
●

Government services copycats and intermediaries. Copycat websites offer government services suchas driving licence and passport renewals with little to no additional benefit. In 2018, five people wereconvicted for defrauding UK consumers with websites that mimicked government agency sites 198. In
2021, Which? found that “rip off” intermediary sites were using Google and Bing to advertise
expensive driving licence renewal services that consumers don’t need, in violation of platform
policies199. Results for Google and Bing searches on ‘driving licence renew’ both put 3 sponsoredlistings for ‘rip off’ intermediary sites ahead of the DVLA website listing 200.

●

Investment scams. According to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), investment and trading scams
usually involve promises of guaranteed high returns. A search on the term ‘50% return on investment’on Facebook Ad Library yielded results including an ad for InveXup labelled ‘50% minimum
guaranteed ROI’ which appears to be too good to be true (see below). Google and Bing searches forthe same term returned no suspicious paid-for results.

●

Miracle health scams. Advertising promises that products such as creams or cannabidiol (CBD) items
cure chronic or terminal diseases, provide rapid weight loss or offer other implausible health benefits.
Ads often click-through to fake news pages supporting their claims, with onward links to ecommercesites. These ads appear on paid search (see below). The project team did not find examples on
Facebook Ad Library.

●

Online shopping fraud. Consumers are enticed by products advertised at heavily discounted rates,
then find that after paying, these products are not delivered or are substituted by lower-value
products. Commonly, the retailer website disappears shortly afterwards in a classic exit scam. Which?
reported ads for these frauds appearing on social media and sponsored search results201.

●

Subscription scams. This is a variant of online shopping fraud where a consumer buys an item(s) at an
online checkout, then later discovers they have been signed up to a monthly payment subscription
without their knowledge.

●

Fake ticketing/ticket fraud. Websites offer consumers tickets to events, often when the tickets areeither not yet available or are sold out. After purchasing, consumers either never receive tickets, orreceive fake tickets that will not gain them entry into the event when checked by security. The
websites used to do this often have similar URLs to well known and trusted legitimate ticket sellingwebsites.202 It is unclear the extent to which these websites are advertised with paid-for advertising.

●

Other cryptocurrency scams. Various schemes, such as ads luring consumers with cryptocurrency
giveaways: a search of Facebook Ad Library using the term ‘Bitcoin giveaway’ identified results for 7
active and inactive ads203, including an ad that advertises Elon Musk ‘Giving out Bitcoin’204. These ads
have the hallmarks of scams, but have not been validated as such.

197

https://www.theverge.com/2021/11/4/22763015/cryptocurrency-fake-wallet-phishing-scam-google-ads-phantom-metamask
https://www.asa.org.uk/news/asa-welcomes-sentencing-of-criminals-behind-fraudulent-copycat-websites.html
199
https://www.which.co.uk/news/2021/06/rip-off-checking-firms-appear-in-73-of-driving-licence-renewal-searches-which-warns/
200
Searches conducted by Spark Ninety on 21 March 2022.
201
https://www.which.co.uk/news/2020/11/nearly-one-in-ten-scammed-by-adverts-on-social-media-or-search-engines/
202
https://www.actionfraud.police.uk/a-z-of-fraud/ticket-scams
203
Search conducted on 23/02/2022
204
Facebook ad ID 267529162030891 appeared on Instagram, Facebook and Messenger.
198© 2022 Spark Ninety60

●

Other frauds. Fraud involving promotion by online advertising reported to Action Fraud in 2020/21
included the categories of betting, competitions, courses, employment offers, fake legal documents,
rentals and pets (buying of puppies and kittens)205 - in addition to the categories listed above.

In many cases, scams involve fake celebrity endorsement on the ad and/or a scam website (see next
section). Ads for these scams may appear on open display, social display, sponsored search, and lessfrequently on social media influencer posts. The mix of these channels used varies by category of fraud. For
example, clone scams use search advertising in order to narrowly target search terms related to the cloned
brand.
Table 23: Relative levels of scam advertising by category of paid-for advertising - indicative guide
Category

Open display

Social display

SearchInfluencer

Celebrity clickbait driven scams

●●●

●●○

●●○

○○○

Clone scams (diversion fraud)

○○○

●○○

●●●

○○○

Copycat government site scams

○○○

●○○

●●●

○○○

Investment scams

●○○

●●○

●●●

●○○

Miracle health scams

●○○

●●○

●●●

●○○

Online shopping scams

●○○

●●○

●●○

○○○

Subscription scams

○○○

●●○

○○○

○○○

Key: ○○○ = low, ●●● = high. Comparison of levels is valid within rows not between rows.

There are high levels of scam advertising in the UK, especially celebrity clickbait driven scams:●

From 1 March 2021 to 25 March 2022 the ASA received 1,251 reports of potential scams via its quick
reporting form (Scam Ad Alert system) of which 23% (288) were in scope (fitted the definition of ascam, involved paid-for advertising) and 6% (67) resulted in Scam Ad Alerts. The majority of thescams for which the ASA issued alerts fit the description of celebrity clickbait scam advertising. Of thescam ad alerts 14 (21%) related to ads seen on social media sites and 53 (79%) related to ads seen inother online media, such as open display advertising on publisher websites or apps.

●

Over the period June 2020 to September 2021 participating platforms and networks who responded
to an ASA information request removed or suspended 765 ads and/or accounts as a direct result of
information provided by the Scam Ad Alert System. 135 of these related to alerts for an ad seen on
their platform and 630 to alerts for an ad seen on other platforms, highlighting the value of crossplatform intelligence sharing.

●

35,115 Action Fraud reports in 2020/21 were identified as being related to fraud enabled by online
advertisements, based on keyword analysis. Total estimated loss from these reports was about £400
million206. This data includes fraud initiated by paid-for advertising and non-paid for advertising suchas organic search results and social media posts. Only fraud reports where victims self-reported
relevant keywords (e.g. ads, pop up, banner) are counted, therefore this data is likely to underestimate
the total number of reported frauds initiated by online advertising.

205

City of London Police / National Fraud Intelligence Bureau, Fraud Enabled by Online Adverts 2020/21 – Dip Sample report,
November 2021. Involved analysis of Action Fraud reports. Quoted in the DCMS consultation on reviewing the regulatory frameworkfor online advertising in the UK: The Online Advertising Programme - Impact Assessment.
206
City of London Police / National Fraud Intelligence Bureau, Fraud Enabled by Online Adverts 2020/21 – Dip Sample report,
November 2021. Involved analysis of Action Fraud reports. Quoted in the DCMS consultation on reviewing the regulatory frameworkfor online advertising in the UK: The Online Advertising Programme - Impact Assessment.
© 2022 Spark Ninety61●An estimated 9 million people (17%) have been targeted by a scam on social media, according to anationally representative survey conducted by Which? in November 2021207. This data includes paidfor advertising as well as other forms of targeting on social media.

●

An estimated 300,000 people in the UK were victims of subscription frauds, with total losses ofapproximately £75m, according to fraud investigator Gillian Schonrock208. These estimates do not
distinguish between fraud initiated by paid-for advertising and organic (non paid-for) social media
posts.

The frequency of scam advertising and losses from it are likely to have increased since 2020, though data islimited and does not capture the period after platforms introduced financial services advertiser verificationin 2021.
●

The Media Trust, a digital safety company, found that the number of distinct outbreaks of malicious
programmatic display scam ads it detected increased 66% from 1,213 in December 2020 to 2,013 in
May 2021209. Scam ad attacks generally occur in spikes.

●

Investment fraud losses in the UK almost doubled from £55.2 million in the first half of 2020 to£107.7 million in the same period in 2021210. UK Finance claim that many of those who fall victim tosuch scams do so after seeing enticing adverts on social media211.

●

In the US there is rapid growth in all forms of fraud originating on social media, though the data does
not distinguish between fraud originating from paid-for advertising, organic non-paid for advertising,and messaging on social media platforms.

Figure 18: US reports of and losses from fraud originating on social media212

Figure based on fraud reports directly to the FTC indicating a monetary loss and identifying social media as
the method of contact.

207

https://press.which.co.uk/whichpressreleases/paid-for-advertising-desperately-needed-in-the-online-safety-bill-amid-epidemicof-fraud-which-warns/
208
Quoted by BBC, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-60464668
209
The Media Trust, Scam Ads: Evolution and increase in Scam ads in the Digital Ecosystem, June 2021.
210
UK Finance, 2021 Half Year Fraud Report, 22nd September 2021.
211
https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/press/press-releases/government-coordinated-action-needed-fraud-losses-rise-30-cent
212
FTC, Data Spotlight, Social media a gold mine for scammers in 2021, January 2022.
© 2022 Spark Ninety

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Although the overall level of scam advertising is high, there appears to have been a reduction in theamount of investment scam advertising in paid search results, following the introduction of UK financial
services advertiser verification213 on 30 August 2021. Which? conducted a Bing search for ‘compare bestsavings rates’ on 20th September 2021, revealing adverts for 4 firms listed by the FCA as potentiallyharmful214. A Spark Ninety repeat of this search on Google and Bing on 20th March 2022 yielded noadverts for companies on the FCA’s warning list, indicating a potential improvement.
Example - Celebrity clickbait cryptocurrency scams
The following example shows a celebrity clickbait cryptocurrency scam found from a sponsored search
result215. ① Sponsored Google search result for the term “investment schemes”. ② Fake news article withthe false celebrity endorsement (in this case the use of Holly Willoughby and Philip Schofield appearing todiscuss the matter on television). ③ Cryptocurrency scam page that unwitting users are then taken to by
the link in the fake article.
Figure 19: Scam advert, landing page and scam page

①

②
213

https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/10770884?hl=en-GB
https://www.which.co.uk/news/2021/10/fake-ads-rife-on-bing-as-investment-scams-jump-84/.
215
Google search conducted on 30th March 2021. Google has since introduced verification of financial services advertisers to address
financial scam ads.
214

© 2022 Spark Ninety

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③
Example: Clone scams - Search advertising for clone sites
The following example shows a clone scam for the bank Revolut. ① Sponsored Google search result for
the term “Revolut Business” which is placed by a clone website. ② Clone website where people are
defrauded.
Figure 20: Search result and landing page (website) for a clone scam①②

© 2022 Spark Ninety64

Example: Search advertising placed by sites intermediating government services216
The following example illustrates search results for the term “driving licence renew” on ① Google and ②
Bing. In each case, three sponsored results from “rip off” intermediary sites are listed ahead of the DVLA
website. These sites are not fraudulent, but the DVLA advises people to use the official government
website when applying for driving licence renewals217.
Figure 21: Search results for ‘driving licence renew’

①

②

216

Searches conducted by Spark Ninety on 21 March 2022. All sponsored results were for sites offering driving licence renewal
services. These sites state that they are not affiliated with the DVLA and list benefits they offer over and above dealing wi th the DVLA
directly, such as error checking. However, it is questionable whether these services justify the fees charged (e.g. £81).
217
https://www.rac.co.uk/drive/news/driving-law/licence-renewal-scam-dvla/© 2022 Spark Ninety65

Example: Health scams - weight loss creams and pills advertised on paid search218
The following examples show Bing search results for ① “weight loss cream”219 and ② “lose weight
permanently pills”220. The sponsored search results are likely to include “miracle health” scam products,
though it was not possible to test these products as part of this project.
Figure 22: Search results for ‘weight loss cream’ and ‘lose weight permanently pills’

①

②

218

Searches conducted by Spark Ninety on 21 March 2022. All sponsored results were for sites offering driving licence renewal
services. These sites state that they are not affiliated with the DVLA and list benefits they offer over and above dealing with the DVLA
directly, such as error checking. However, it is questionable whether these services justify the fees charged (e.g. £81).
219
Spark Ninety Bing search for ‘weight loss cream’, conducted on 23/02/2022. Similar results were found on Google.
220
Spark Ninety Bing search for ‘lose weight permanently pills’, conducted on 23/02/2022.
© 2022 Spark Ninety66Figure 23: Example: Possible investment scam - InveXup Facebook ad promising 50% ROI per annum221
It was not feasible as part of this project to test whether this advert is for a scam, but there are reasons for
suspicion: the advertised return on investment appears too good to be true and InveXup is not on the FCA
Financial Services Register.

Unsanctioned use of celebrity images
In many cases, scams use fake celebrity endorsement to lend credibility to their claims or otherwise use
celebrity images as a form of clickbait. Generally, scammers fake endorsement from celebrities who are
known for their business or financial acumen or are otherwise well known and trusted. Recent examples offake endorsement include:●

Duke and Duchess of Sussex - Bitcoin-related investment scams222●

Gareth Southgate - Bitcoin Bank cryptocurrency scam223●

Martin Lewis - Binary trading, energy companies, PPI reclaim firms, mortgage brokers and more224●

Peter Jones - CBD gummies and ‘miracle health’ products for conditions, e.g. arthritis●

Deborah Meaden - Health supplements225●

Holly Willoughby - Investment scams226●

Sir Richard Branson - Investment scams227

221

Facebook ad ID 1065404874316160, started running on Facebook and Messenger on 17 February 2022. Ad Library searched on 3
March 2022.
222
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-60040937
223
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/gareth-southgate-seeking-legal-advice-after-name-used-in-crypto-scam-fzgw75rbd
224
https://www.moneysavingexpert.com/shopping/fake-martin-lewis-ads/
225
https://conversation.which.co.uk/scams/dragons-den-fake-cbd-oil-deborah-meaden/
226
https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/12276183/fake-celebrity-endorsements-online-ads-scam/
227
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/celebrity-scam-tackled-by-ncsc© 2022 Spark Ninety67●

Jeremy Clarkson - Bitcoin-related investment scams228

Celebrity images are generally shown in ad creative copy and on landing pages. In some cases, celebrity
images are incorporated into faked compositions, such as the celebrity pointing at a product or brand image.
To date, fake endorsement has been limited to static display ads in the social and open display markets. It is
likely that video and audio celebrity likenesses and endorsements would be more difficult to fake. However,criminals might develop the capability to create fake celebrity videos in the near future. In 2021, a Russian
ad agency licensed the rights to Bruce Willis’s likeness and used artificial intelligence to create a deep fakevideo representation of him229.
Although there is limited data about the scale of fake celebrity endorsement, media reports about the issue
appear to be increasing in frequency and encompass a growing range of personalities. In November 2021,
14 celebrities wrote to the Prime Minister to demand action on this issue 230.
Fake endorsement can amplify consumer harms caused by scams (see above) and cause reputational
damage to celebrities. Scammers may be able to evade platform and intermediary ad checks by avoiding
direct reference to celebrity names, using fuzzy or side-angle celebrity images, and running multiple adversions from multiple accounts to avoid take-down after detection.
Figure 24: Peter Jones's image used to advertise ‘CBD gummies’ as a cure for arthritis231

228

https://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/beatthescammers/article-7508643/Beware-Bitcoin-Revolution-scam-fake-Clarksonendorsement.html
229
The Drum, Lessons from the agency that deepfaked Bruce Willis for a Russian ad campaign, September 2021.
230
https://www.moneysavingexpert.com/news/2021/11/martin-lewis--sir-richard-branson--deborah-meaden-plus-11-other-/231
Ad ID 4942916352422521 started running on 16/02/2022 across Facebook, Messenger, Instagram. Identified in Facebook Ad
Library on 22/02/2022.
© 2022 Spark Ninety

68Anatomy of a scam
Cyber security sources indicate that celebrity clickbait scam advertising is generally perpetrated by cybercriminals operating as “affiliates”. Their role is to place ads that drive visitors to cryptocurrency scamwebsites operated by other criminal organisations. Affiliates earn a commission of about $600 for each
visitor who “converts” (invests in the scam), according to an investigation conducted in the Netherlands,
with operators of scam websites making an average of $3,000 per victim232. It is likely that these criminal
affiliates advertise via social media, search and email, as well as online open display advertising, given thatsimilar ads linking to similar fake news/cryptocurrency scam landing pages have been detected on these
media.
Figure 13: The main criminal participants involved in celebrity clickbait scam advertising

Cyber criminal affiliates generally buy advertising through companies they set up to look like advertising
agencies. They buy advertising using multiple DSPs to limit the impact if a DSP account is blocked. In somecases, criminals use “cloaking” techniques to evade DSP advertising quality reviews. This techniqueinvolves creating reputable looking ads and landing pages, in some cases mimicking known brands, toshow to ad scanners (tools used by DSPs to check ads for malware or other policy infringements). These
ads exist in parallel with malicious ads and landing pages. In one operating model, the advertiser ad serveris programmed to serve ad scanners with innocuous reputable looking ads and landing pages, whileserving malicious advertising to targeted victims. The techniques used to evade detection are constantly
evolving.
There are a range of contributory factors that enable cyber criminals to run scam advertising campaigns,
limit the effectiveness of efforts to detect and take down these campaigns, and limit the deterrent effect.

232

https://www.npo3.nl/brandpuntplus/de-verborgen-industrie-die-bitcoinadvertenties-op-facebook-zet-ze-weten-niet-eens-datwe-bestaan© 2022 Spark Ninety

69

Table 14: Factors contributing to the problem of celebrity clickbait scam advertising
Factors enabling scam
attacks to occur●

Criminal actors can access theecosystem due to limited due
diligence on
advertisers/agencies●

Screening of ad creative andlanding pages is limited andmisses some scam ads

Factors limiting detection andmitigation of attacks●

Consumer reporting andcomplaints systems are
fragmented and complex●

There is no consistentidentification ofadvertisers/agencies throughout
the programmatic ecosystem●

Factors limiting the threat ofpenalties●

Cyber criminals operate fromoverseas jurisdictions and are
difficult for UK law enforcement
to reach●

There is limited law
enforcement resource to tackle
scam advertisingSome intermediaries are slow to
respond to reports of scamadvertising and block ads

Counterfeiting
Relative incidence: ⬤ Medium | Relative severity: ⬤ Medium | Trend: ⇨ stable
Ecommerce is one of the top 3 ways that UK consumers buy counterfeits, including major ecommerce sites
or “rogue” or “scam” websites233. Counterfeiting is focused on high-margin branded product categories,
such as fashion, beauty, toys and electricals. Like legitimate ecommerce, counterfeit products and services
are often promoted by paid-for advertising.
Counterfeiting is relatively widespread, but there is limited data about the extent of paid-for online
advertising of counterfeits:●

29% of UK consumers had knowingly purchased counterfeits and 16% had done so unknowingly 234.
The proportion of these consumers who purchased counterfeits online is unknown.

●

9% of EU consumers have been duped into buying counterfeit goods by online advertising 235, but theextent of paid-for advertising vs. organic (non paid-for) advertising is unknown. Industry reports imply
that organic search and social media promotion are the primary issues.

●

Paid-for social influencer marketing of counterfeits appears to be a large problem and is likely to be
growing. 10% of UK female consumers were prompted by social media endorsements to buy
counterfeits, and 13% of female UK consumers are more likely to purchase a counterfeit that is
promoted by an influencer236. Major influencers such as the Kardashians and Jenners have promoted
counterfeits.

●More than 70 consumer and apparel companies were confirmed to have been targeted by fraudulent
and infringing sponsored adverts on Instagram and Facebook from May 2017 to July 2020237.

●

Google removed 1.2 million ads for counterfeit goods globally in 2020. A further 46 million ads were
removed for copyright infringements, and 200 million for trademarks238.

233

Intellectual Property Office, Counterfeit goods research, 2 September 2020
Intellectual Property Office, Counterfeit goods research, 2 September 2020
235
European Union Intellectual Property Office, European Citizens and Intellectual Property report, 2020
236
Intellectual Property Office, Influencer report, November 2021
237
Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT), Fraudulent Advertising Online: Emerging Risks and Consumer Fraud,
2020.
238
Google, Ads Safety Report, 2020.
234© 2022 Spark Ninety

70

There are recent examples of paid-for counterfeit advertising across search, social display and classifieds,
and influencer marketing. Anecdotally, there appears to be a shift from advertising on paid search to social
media due to stronger ad safety procedures on Google Ads (buying platform of Google search ads).
Counterfeiting costs brands £9bn per annum in the UK in lost revenue, and accounts for 80,500 job losses
annually239. There is no data about the proportion of this loss that stems from paid-for online advertising ofcounterfeits. The proceeds of counterfeiting may fund terrorist groups, or organised crime groups that arelinked to human trafficking240.
Consumers who unknowingly purchase counterfeits are harmed by not receiving the product they
expected. In certain cases, consumers are also harmed by counterfeit products that do not meet safety
standards: 32% of UK consumers who had purchased more than one counterfeit good had suffered ahealth issue as a direct result, according to a 2018 report 241. A social influencer was left with chemicalburns after applying counterfeit make up242.
Major platforms have recently strengthened their policies and tools to deal with counterfeits. Meta provides
brands with a Commerce and Ads IP Tool that enables businesses to upload images of their brand andproducts for matching against Facebook and Instagram content in order to detect counterfeit listings 243.
One of the main reasons for paid-for advertising of counterfeits appears to be a lack of stringent checks onadvertisers and ad creative and landing pages. The influencer marketing ecosystem is more open tocounterfeit ads through bilateral deals between influencers (often small scale) and advertisers, without
checks on advertisers taking place.
Example: Kendall and Kylie Jenner promotion of fake AirPods
Kendall and Kylie Jenner (members of the Kardashian family) advertised knock-off Apple AirPods on
Instagram posts they made in 2020. At the time, they had a combined following of 322 million Instagram
accounts (this has subsequently increased to 526 million as of 11th February 2022). Although Apple had
previously pursued sellers of products infringing its intellectual property, it reportedly pursued neither Kylie
nor Kendall.
Figure 25: Illustration of an Instagram story from Kendall Jenner advertising fake Apple AirPods 244

239Intellectual Property Office, Counterfeit Goods Research, 2 September 2020.
European Police Office, Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment, 2013.
241https://www.incoproip.com/reports/counterfeit-products-are-destroying-brand-value/242
https://www.itv.com/news/2017-12-06/fake-makeup-the-toxic-truth-you-need-to-know-this-christmas
243
https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/facebook-adds-new-tools-to-enable-content-creators-and-ip-holders-todetect/597214/
244
Image of the Instagram story available at: BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53596192
240© 2022 Spark Ninety

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Example: Facebook ad for fake Versace clothing
A Facebook ad from ‘Luxury Outfit’, launched on 2nd March 2022, advertises knock-off Versace clothing245.
Whilst it is not advertised as ‘replica’ or ‘fake’, it can be assumed that the products on the linked website
are fake, as they include misspellings of the brand name, and are sold at suspiciously low prices.

Illegal and restricted activities, products and services
Relative incidence: ⬤ Medium | Relative severity: ⬤ High | Trend: ⇨ stable
Online advertising is being used to promote products, services or activities that are illegal or restricted in
the UK - and to promote legal products where advertising is illegal or restricted. Paid-for advertising of themost seriously harmful categories of illegal products, such as firearms and category A drugs, appears to be
rare. However, there is a problem with organised crime groups (OCGs) advertising sexual services provided
by trafficked people under their control. These adverts are placed primarily on classified advertising
platforms, including some generalist classifieds platforms and specialist classifieds platforms that focus on
adult services, known as Adult Service Websites (ASWs). The adverts placed by OCGs generally mimic
legitimate adverts placed by self-determined sex workers and may be paid-for advertising or free listings.
The scale of this problem is likely to be large, but is challenging to estimate due to the hidden nature ofmodern slavery and human trafficking. The demand for sexual services in the UK is high. The UK market
leading ASW received approximately 1.26 million visits per month from December 2020 to May 2021. The
number of potential victims of modern slavery referred to the Home Office increased by 20% in the lastyear; from 10,601 victims in 2020 to 12,727 in 2021. Sexual exploitation accounted for 16% of referrals in
2021246 (over 2,000 people). When the police rescue victims of sexual trafficking, in the overwhelming
majority of cases they are advertised on ASWs247.
There are several factors contributing to OCGs being able to place adverts on ASWs. First, it is difficult todistinguish adverts placed by OCGs from adverts placed by self-determined sex workers. ASWs may needto investigate advertiser IP addresses and credit card details to identify links between adverts, for example.
Second, age verification and moderation processes are inconsistent across different ASWs.
There is also online advertising that promotes legal products and services where advertising is prohibited inlaw, such as:●

Tobacco products248. In 2021, 26 UK influencers with a combined following of 2.2 million Instagramusers advertised nicotine products from the company Velo.

●

Prescription drugs or unlicensed drugs. Some influencers have been promoting the unlicensed weightgain drug Apetamin249; its status as an unlicensed drug means it has not passed the required
regulatory tests to ensure its safety, and thus it should not be sold, supplied or advertised 250.

●

Unregistered clinics offering cosmetic procedures, such as lip fillers. Some influencers have been foundto promote a competition requiring them to follow accounts run by Play Social, that in turn promoted
services ranging from unregistered lip filler injection clinics to breast enhancement surgery 251.

In addition, some advertising closely relates to illegal products, but is not prohibited (see the ‘Legal but
harmful’ section, below). Facebook was found to carry advertising for weapons-related products (e.g. body
245

Facebook ad ID 3130939743830652, launched 02/03/2022 on Facebook
Modern Slavery: National Referral Mechanism and Duty to Notify statistics UK, end of year summary, 2021.
247
National Crime Agency, Briefing: Adult Service Websites, April 2022.
248
The Tobacco Products Directive that came into effect in the UK in 2016 prohibits advertising for nicotine-containing e-cigarettes notlicensed as medicines on on-demand television, in newspapers and magazines, on the internet, in emails and in text messages
249
https://news.sky.com/story/apetamin-nhs-urges-instagram-to-clamp-down-on-dangerous-weight-gain-drug-12293940
250
https://www.bbc.com/news/health-56930654
251
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/instagram-influencers-plastic-surgery-gambling-b1856973.html
246© 2022 Spark Ninety72

armour, tactical gear) that do not fall under the definition of weapons252. It responded by introducing a banof weapons-associated gear253.
Platform and intermediary policies generally prohibit illegal advertising. In July 2021, Google announced aclamp down on advertising of weapons, drugs and other illegal products. It introduced a 3 strike system
whereby advertisers would be banned from Google platforms if they were found to be violating the termsof service regarding illegal products 3 times254.
Google removed 12.9 million ads for ‘dangerous products/services’ globally in 2020255, though it is unclear
how this category is defined and whether these ads were stopped before they started running or aftersome consumers had been exposed to them.
Example: Influencer promotion of prescription drugs
In April 2020, influencer Gemma Collins took to Instagram to post a paid-for Story advertising ‘SkinnyJab’,
a weight-loss injection that contained prescription-only medicine256. Whilst the product is not illegal,prescription-only medicines may not be advertised to the public. The ASA banned the advertising.
Figure 26: Illustration of a Gemma Collins post advertising SkinnyJab252

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/jan/26/facebook -ads-combat-gear-rightwing-users
https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/facebook-ban-ads-promoting-weapon-accessories-protective-gear-us-202101-16/
254
https://investorsking.com/2021/07/28/google-to-introduce-strike-based-system-to-clamp-down-on-advertisers-violating-googleads-policies/
255
Google, Ads Safety Report, 2020.
256
Case: https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/skinnyjab-ltd-a20-1064725-skinnyjab-ltd.html, Image of post available at:https://www.thesun.co.uk/tvandshowbiz/12865135/gemma-collins-breach-ad-rules-weight-loss-jab-posts/
253© 2022 Spark Ninety73Non-identified advertising
Relative incidence: ⬤ High | Relative severity: ⬤ Low | Trend: ⇧ Increasing
All advertising content must be obviously identifiable as such, and must be actively disclosed as advertisingin scenarios where it is unclear to the audience that they are being advertised to. The ASA has a series ofpublic rulings and public guidance, drawing out lessons from those rulings, that sets out what effective
disclosure should look like. Children are likely to be especially susceptible to non-identified or subtly
identified advertising. Ofcom found that just under half of 8–15-year-olds can correctly identify Google
search ads, and two-thirds of 12-15s are aware that influencers might be sponsored by brands257.
Recent issues with non-disclosure of advertising mainly relate to influencer marketing. In a limited 2020
study focused on influencers who had previously been contacted regarding non-disclosure of advertising,
the ASA found that only 35% of subsequent Instagram posts from 122 influencers included theappropriate disclosures258. There is no available data for compliance levels among other influencers, thoughcase reports indicate that there may be a high level of non-disclosure of advertising.
●

An ASA ruling from February 2021 upheld a complaint against TikTok influencer Luke Mabbott.
Within a sponsored collaboration with Boohoo.co.uk, his tag of #boohooman was deemed insufficientin clearly labelling the post as paid-for marketing259.

●

An ASA ruling from December 2021 upheld a complaint against Instagram influencer Adam
Cuthbertson, after his Instagram story promoting a product from The Lowcal Ltd was not obviously
identifiable as a marketing communication260.

Influencers with large followings appear to have professionalised and are mainly compliant, with the main
problems being unclear identification and non-identification among influencers with small followings.
Ofcom qualitative research with 20 creators found that medium scale (5,000 to 15,000 Instagram
followers) and large scale (20,000 or more followers) creators were typically aware of the need to declareadvertising, but only some smaller scale creators (fewer than 5,000 followers) were aware261. However,there was confusion around the rules over what constitutes an ad.
This is supported by data from France where a study of content posted by over 7,000 influencers foundthat 73.4% posts were identified as advertising, of which 32.2% could be more clearly or immediately
identified. Non-identification was a particular problem with small-scale influencers: 12.6% of influencers
with more than 1 million followers failed to identify sponsored posts, while this figure rose to 43.1% forinfluencers with fewer than 10,000 followers262.
Non-disclosure of influencer advertising is a global challenge. US influencers are widely followed by UK
consumers, accounting for a quarter of the 20 most liked influencers in the UK263. The FTC has guidelines
to help US influencers comply with the law around disclosure of paid promotions264. According to aMediakix study conducted in 2017, 93% of the top Instagram influencers did not label their sponsoredposts in accordance with the FTC regulations265. More recent data is not available.
In the US, the Strategic Organizing Center, a coalition of unions, raised a complaint with the Federal Trade
Commission claiming that Amazon could be “unlawfully deceiving” customers because it doesn’t clearly257

Ofcom, Children and parents: media use and attitudes report, 2020/21
https://www.asa.org.uk/static/dd740667-6fe0-4fa7-80de3e4598417912/Influencer-Monitoring-Report-March2021.pdf
259
https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/boohoo-com-uk-ltd-in-association-with-luke-mabbott.html
260
https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/the-lowcal-ltd-g21-1121210-the-lowcal-ltd.html
261
Ofcom, VSP Content Creators and Community Standards, September/October 2021.
262
https://www.arpp.org/actualite/resultats-observatoire-influence-responsable-2021/
263
YouGov, The most popular influencers in the UK, Q4 2021.
264
FTC, Disclosures 101 for Social Media Influencers
265
https://mediakix.com/blog/celebrity-social-media-endorsements-violate-ftc-instagram/258© 2022 Spark Ninety74label sponsored search results266. According to the complaint, labels indicating that a search result issponsored appear several seconds after a page loads, thus obfuscating ads for a short period. Sponsoredsearch results on amazon.co.uk appear with the label ‘sponsored’ which was not noticeably delayed whentested in March 2022267, indicating that this issue is not replicated in the UK and/or has been resolved.
Failure to disclose advertising can be harmful to users as it can give a false impression on the effectivenessof the services or products being advertised, as well as by not pushing users to think more critically about
what they are seeing.
Example: Non-identified ads on Instagram
A post from Instagram influencer Amber Rose Gill promoted a beautician on 23rd December 2021, with nodisclosure as to the nature of the arrangement of the promotion. The caption and demonstration video
within the post heavily imply that it was a sponsored piece of influencer marketing, but the Instagram ‘paid
partnership’ tool has not been used, and the caption does not feature identifying hashtags, such as ‘#ad’ or‘#sponsored’268.
Figure 27: Illustration of an Amber Rose Gill social media post

Similarly, a post from Instagram influencer Chloe Khan on February 5th 2022 promoted a car rental service
with a photograph and a caption, but with no disclosure as to the nature of the sponsorship arrangement 269.
Whilst we cannot categorically determine that these posts were paid-for sponsorships, the tagging of the266

https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/12/08/amazon-search-results-ftc-complaint/
Various search terms were input into www.amazon.co.uk viewed on the Chrome desktop browser over a fibre broadband
connection on 3 March 2022.
268
https://www.instagram.com/p/CX1D0UXskNm/
269
https://www.instagram.com/p/CZm8vlfMnzE/
267© 2022 Spark Ninety75

relevant brands and the lengthy advocation of the brands, which are otherwise unrelated to the lives andwork of the influencers involved, heavily suggests a paid arrangement.
Figure 28: Illustration of a Chloe Khan social media post

Misleading advertising
Relative incidence: ⬤ High | Relative severity: ⬤ Medium | Trend: ⇧ Increasing
Online advertising may mislead consumers by making false claims, failing to disclose risks, notsubstantiating claims, exaggerating, and a range of other reasons. 82% of ASA complaint cases aboutpaid-for online advertising in 2021 related to potentially misleading advertising. The total number of thesecomplaint cases increased by 51% to a total of 6,364 in 2021, driven by a 92% increase in potentiallymisleading social influencer advertising complaint cases to 3,541 in 2021. 27% of video sharing platform
users say they were exposed to potentially harmful or misleading advertising, of whom 51% claimed to see
this advertising at least weekly, and 53% took action such as clicking the report button270. 18% of users
experienced harmful or misleading advertising on Facebook, 10% on Instagram, 9% on Twitter and 8% on
YouTube. This data does not distinguish between misleading and other forms of harmful advertising, or
paid-for and non-paid-for advertising; therefore, exposure to paid-for misleading advertising is likely to be
below the 27% of video sharing platform users cited above.

270

Ofcom, User Experience of Potential Online Harms within Video Sharing Platforms. Data is from the Ofcom Video-sharing platform
usage & experience of harms survey 2021.
© 2022 Spark Ninety76

There are case reports of misleading ads across all online advertising categories: search, social display,
open display, influencer marketing and classifieds. Issues that have emerged since 2020 include:●

Omission of risk warnings in ads for cryptocurrency investments. The ASA has upheld cases againstsocial display ads for Skrill271 and Coinbase272, a YouTube influencer ad for Exmo273, and an open
display ad for eToro274.

●

Use of filters on images in influencer posts to mislead consumers about the effectiveness of cosmetic
products. The ASA upheld a case against an influencer ad for a We are Luxe t/a Tanologist Tan
product275.

●

Ads linked to misinformation. The ASA upheld a case against Pheka Agency Co Ltd for an ad claiming
to offer protection from harm that it implied is caused by electromagnetic radiation produced by mobile
phones and laptops276.

One of the reasons for misleading online advertising is the large volume of advertising campaigns run bysmall-scale advertisers who are unlikely to invest as much attention to compliance as major brands.
Example: Use of filters on images in social influencer posts
A complaint against an ad from Instagram influencer Elly Norris for a tanning product from Skinny Tan was
upheld by the ASA. It was deemed misleading for her use of an Instagram filter when demonstrating theeffects of the product.277
Figure 29: Illustration of Elly Norris social influencer posts

271

https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/skrill-ltd-a21-1118717-skrill-ltd.html
https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/coinbase-europe-ltd-a21-1123058-coinbase-europe-ltd.html
273
https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/exmo-exchange-ltd-a21-1122405-exmo-exchange-ltd.html
274
https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/etoro--uk--ltd-a21-1123324-etoro--uk--ltd.html
275
https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/we-are-luxe-ltd-t-a-tanologist-tan-in-association-with-cinzia-baylis-zullo.html
276
https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/pheka-agency-co-ltd-a20-1064871-pheka-agency-co-ltd--unconfirmed-.html
277
Elly Norris ASA case: https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/skinny-tan-ltd-in-association-with-elly-norris.html
272© 2022 Spark Ninety

77

Example: Misleading debt clearance advertising
One common form of misleading ad is those that appear to advertise debt clearance services. The ad below
ran across Facebook, Instagram and Messenger from 13th September 2021. In the view of the study team,
it is similar to ads that the ASA has ruled against, upholding complaints against them for misleading
consumers by overstating the ease with which debt can be cleared, falsely implying a relationship with agovernment department, and falsely implying that the advertiser is a debt clearance service themselves,rather than a company that hands leads onto third parties 278.
Figure 30: Social media advert for debt clearance

Offensive advertising
Relative incidence: ⬤ Medium | Relative severity: ⬤ Low | Trend: ⇧ Increasing
Although the CAP Code makes reasonable allowances for ads in bad taste and accepts that many adverts
are likely to cause degrees of offence to some, it prohibits ads that are likely to cause serious or widespread
offence to many people. The ASA notes that an ad shouldn’t necessarily be banned just because somepeople find it awkward, unpleasant or irritating. Ads that are deemed to go beyond irritation and cause
serious or widespread offence include ads containing violence, adult content, gore or otherwise shocking
material, or causing offence on the grounds of race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability or age.
When considering cases of offence, the ASA takes into account who is likely to see the ad, the context inwhich it appears (primarily what it is promoting), and the prevailing societal standards of the time 279.
6% of ASA paid-for online advertising complaint cases in 2021 related to offensive advertising. The total
number of these complaint cases was 454, a 37% year-on-year increase. Video-on-demand services
accounted for the largest proportion of complaint cases (35%), followed by social media (28%), web
display (11%) and app display (10%).

278

Facebook ad:
https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active_status=all&ad_type=all&country=GB&q=539253880675053&sort_data[direction]=desc&sort_data[mode]=relevancy_monthly_grouped&search_type=keyword_unordered&media_type=all
Related ASA article: https://www.asa.org.uk/news/asa-takes-action-against-misleading-debt-advice-ads.html
279
Advertising Standards Authority, Bad taste or offensive?, 7th October 2016.
© 2022 Spark Ninety

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Cases cover a range of platforms, and the ASA has upheld cases against offensive online advertising
including:●

Sexism and the objectification of women, including in ads placed in mobile games. An adult content ad
featuring female nudity was placed in a mobile game by an unknown person/company 280. An in-gamead produced by Rangosious Public Holdings depicted a player taking steps to remove a woman’s
clothes whilst she was asleep using an array of weapons and tools281. A paid-for ad on Facebook forconstruction machinery retailer JMac, was ruled to be sexist and offensive for its depiction of women in
hard hats and bikinis282. These cases and other intelligence may suggest there is an issue with non-UK
companies placing ads directed at UK audiences that objectify women.

●

Extreme language. Banter King, an online novelty goods retailer, advertised its products in the Sky
Sports app, including mugs emblazoned with expletives 283.

●

Racism. The ASA has recently launched a report into the potential harms deriving from the portrayals
and representation of race and ethnicity in UK advertising. While extremely rare, cases of overtly racist
ads occasionally appear in paid-for online advertising. Examples are more likely to be found in organic(non paid-for) advertising content, although they appear infrequently. A 2021 ASA case upheld acomplaint against an organic Facebook post from JD Recruitment depicting a woman in blackface,deemed to be racist and sexist and thus likely to cause widespread offence284.

Example: Objectification of women
The ASA upheld a complaint against a paid-for video ad for online clothing retailer PrettyLittleThing. The
ad featured multiple women wearing lingerie-style clothing in a variety of seductive poses. The complaint
accused the ad of objectifying women and being overly sexualised and thus causing widespread offence,
which the ASA agreed with. The ad was a pre-roll ad on YouTube seen on 29th October 2019.285
Figure 31: Illustration of a video advert for PrettyLittleThing280

https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/person-s--unknown-a21-1105222-person-s--unknown.html The advertiser fraudulently identified
themselves using the domain name of a well-known ecommerce site in order to buy programmatic advertising.
281
https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/rangosious-public-holdings-ltd-a21-1121548-rangosious-public-holdings-ltd.html
282
https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/jmac-ltd-g21-1126174-jmac-ltd.html
283
https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/banter-group-ltd-a21-1108787-banter-group-ltd.html
284
www.asa.org.uk/rulings/jd-recruitment-group-ltd-a21-1124963-jd-recruitment-group-ltd.html
285
ASA ruling: https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/prettylittlething-com-ltd-cas-583039-y6l1x6.html. Image of ad available at:https://www.today.com/style/pretty-little-thing-ad-banned-uk-being-offensive-t173478© 2022 Spark Ninety

79

Example: Advertising involving offensive language
An ad from novelty goods retailer Banter King appeared as a display ad on the Sky News mobile app, withphotos of a number of different mugs emblazoned with rude messages. The ad was seen on 27th April
2021, and faced complaints to the ASA for its use of offensive language. On the 8th September 2021, thecase against the ad was upheld, deemed to be likely to cause widespread offence286.

Legal but harmful advertising
Relative incidence: ⬤ Medium | Relative severity: ⬤ Medium | Trend: ⇧ Increasing
There is a broad range of legal advertising that has the potential to harm consumers, including alcohol,
health treatments and cosmetic surgeries, gambling, e-cigarettes, foods and soft drinks high in fat, salt orsugar, and motoring. Adverts involving harmful depictions such as glamorising knives also fall into thiscategory, as do ads associated with body image (see next section).
There is very limited evidence about the extent of this category of advertising, as distinct from mistargeted
advertising (see section below). However, there are various examples of legal but harmful online
advertising:●

The promotion of nicotine products by influencers: whilst certain nicotine products are not illegal to
advertise to an age-appropriate audience, and age filters for posts on Instagram can hide certain
content from users under the age of 18 (assuming they have inputted their age accurately), thepromotion of nicotine products beyond treatments to help stop smoking could encourage nicotine
addiction and result in smoking and the resultant health issues. 26 British influencers, with a combined
2.2 million followers, were part of a social media campaign in 2021 to promote flavoured nicotine
pouches from Velo287.

●

The promotion of unhealthy foods by ‘kid influencers’: research by the American Academy of Pediatrics
found that over 90% of food and drink products promoted by child influencers (influencers aged 3-14
years with large audiences amongst children) on YouTube were for ‘unhealthy branded’ products288.

●

The promotion of high-risk investments: there have been cases of influencers promoting crypto andinvestment schemes with no mention of the extremely high risk involved. Kim Kardashian is currently
being sued by investors for her promotion of EthereumMax, a crypto currency that, at the time of thepromotion in June 2021, was only one month old with unknown creators and a misleading namesimilar to the well-known crypto currency, Ethereum289.

Example: nitrous oxide on social media and sponsored search advertising
Nitrous oxide, also known as laughing gas, is used medicinally for its anaesthetic and pain relief effects,
and commercially as an aerosol propellant in whipped cream canisters. It is also inhaled recreationally togenerate euphoria, and is the second most popular drug in the UK amongst 16 to 24 year olds, with 8.7%
of Britons in that age bracket using it in 2020, equivalent to approximately 549,000 people290. There werean average of 4 deaths from recreational nitrous oxide use annually over the period 2010 to 2019291.
Nitrous oxide is legal to sell for commercial purposes, but is illegal to sell for recreational use as per thePsychoactive Substances Act 2016292.

286

ASA ruling: https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/banter-group-ltd-a21-1108787-banter-group-ltd.html
The Guardian, Firms under fire for using UK influencers to push nicotine products, 8th November 2021.
288
American Academy of Pediatrics, Child Social Media Influencers and Unhealthy Food Product Placement, 1st November 2020.
289
BBC, Kim Kardashian sued in crypto ‘pump and dump’ case, 12th January 2022,
290
Office for National Statistics, Drug Misuse in England and Wales, 9th December 2020.
291
The Guardian, How Britain got high on nitrous oxide, 27th November 2021.
292
Home Office, ‘Home Secretary seeks expert advice on laughing gas’, 3rd September 2021.
287© 2022 Spark Ninety80Adverts for nitrous oxide whipped cream chargers have been identified on Facebook, Instagram293 andTiktok294. The study team found an example of a ‘cream charger’ ad shown on Facebook and Instagram295.
In some cases, advertised delivery times of ‘1 hour’ and/or late evening slots, such as 5pm-2am, imply thatthe target market may be recreational users not the restaurant trade. Ads for 7 different providers of nitrous
oxide canisters also appear in Bing-sponsored search results for ‘cream chargers uk’296, and a further 10
appear in Google-sponsored search results for the same phrase297.
Figure 32: Google sponsored search results for ‘cream charger’298

Example: Influencers promoting high-risk investments in unsafe crypto schemes
In June 2021, Kim Kardashian promoted the ‘EthereumMax’ coin (not to be confused with genuine Ethereumcoin) to her 250+ million Instagram followers 299. This coin was only a month old and its creators are
unknown. This makes it a highly risky investment and a potential harm to unwitting consumers, who may
interpret the promotion by a high-profile influencer and the name similar to that of a well-known
cryptocurrency as a seal of safety.

293

Spark Ninety search of Facebook Ad Library using term ‘cream chargers’ conducted on 03/03/2022 found 24 examples of active
NO2 ads that started running in the UK over the period 01/02/2022 to 03/03/2022. None of these ads encouraged or endorsed
recreational use, and all advertised it as a catering product.
294
https://www.vice.com/en/article/m7eywy/tiktok-is-hosting-ads-for-whipped-cream-but-its-actually-nitrous-oxide
295
Ad ID: 336567101740846 on Facebook Ad Library (from search for ‘Cream Charger' on 24/02/2022). This ad went live on 23rd
February 2022 across Instagram, Facebook and Messenger.
296
Spark Ninety Bing search for ‘cream chargers UK’, conducted on 03/03/2022, found 7 sponsored results for providers of NO2.
297
Spark Ninety Google search for ‘cream chargers UK’, conducted on 03/03/2022, found 10 sponsored results for providers of NO2.
298
Spark Ninety Google search for ‘cream chargers UK’, conducted on 03/03/2022. Websites promoted by the ads include
https://www.discountcream.co.uk/mosa-cream-chargers-48-pack-154-p.asp?gclid=Cj0KCQiA64GRBhCZARIsAHOLriKkGcctl6VwOSfv36jzKavaZJeFqXT91znzM1ls-SPrkYN2tvC7tMaAiJwEALw_wcB, and https://www.creamsupplies.co.uk/cream-chargers-lisswhip-case-600, and more.
299
FS Tech, Influencers are promoting risky and non-existent crypto tokens, warns FCA, September 2021.
© 2022 Spark Ninety81Advertising contributing to body image concerns
Relative incidence: ⬤ Medium | Relative severity: ⬤ Medium | Trend: Unknown
Advertising can be harmful when it uses imagery and/or messaging that contributes to people’s body
image concerns. It may portray or present body types, cosmetic interventions or certain
behaviours/lifestyles in an unhealthy way, or a way that creates undue pressure to conform.
61% of adults and 66% of children feel negative or very negative about their body image most of the time,with those at most risk of developing poor body image including early adolescents, women and girls, LGBT
people and higher weight300. Negative body image can affect people’s lives in many ways, contributing to
low self-esteem; mental health conditions such as depression, anxiety and body dysmorphic disorder; areluctance to visit the doctor, exercise or participate in activities; and the use of anabolic steroids or
medication to lose weight.
The media and advertising are just two of many influences on body image, with other factors including
peers, families and dating apps301. Although brands can have a positive influence on body image, such as
the Dove Real Beauty advertising campaign, there are several ways in which advertising can contribute tonegative body image, including:●

Ads involving idealised, unrealistic and/or unhealthy body images●

Ads using filtered and/or retouched images to create false impressions and mislead people●

Ads exploiting insecurities, pressure to conform, or body shaming to sell interventions●

Ads relating to body image targeted to vulnerable groups, such as under-18s●

Ad placement in harmful body image content e.g. brands sponsoring posts by influencers who present
an unrealistic body image

This advertising may relate to products and services that help individuals to change their appearance, suchas cosmetic procedures, weight loss, fitness, beauty, health and clothing - or in other categories ofadvertising.
The incidence of paid-for social media advertising that contributes to body image concerns is difficult toquantify. The majority of people reported seeing adverts on social media for weight loss organisations,gyms, shapewear, cosmetic dental treatment, non-surgical cosmetic treatment or muscle-building products
during 2020. 50% of adults and 39% of young people also reported seeing adverts for cosmetic surgery 302.
However, this data does not provide information about whether these adverts represent body image in a
harmful way.
The news media and blogs report issues with social media advertising relating to body image, such as
repetitive shapewear advertising on Instagram303, and growing investment in TikTok and Pinterest
advertising, such as by shapewear brand Shapermint304.
There have been issues in influencer marketing, with promoters using filters, such as those found on
Instagram, to unfairly reflect the effects of certain beauty products, and thus the prevailing societal beauty
standards.

300

House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee, Changing the perfect picture: an inquiry into body image, Sixth Report of
the Session 2019-21, 23 March 2021.
301
Government Equality Office, Negative body image: causes, consequences & intervention ideas, August 2019.
302
House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee, Body Image Survey Results, First Special Report of Session 2019-21
303
https://medium.com/fearless-she-wrote/instagrams-fatphobic-and-sexist-advertising-has-pushed-me-too-damn-far5ed9a844e74
304
Digiday, ‘Eyeballs are shifting’: Why a DTC shapewear company is spending big on Pinterest and TikTok, 17 February 2022.
© 2022 Spark Ninety82

Example: Influencers using filters to promote beauty products
The ASA upheld against influencer Elly Norris on 3rd February 2021 for her promotion of Skinny Tan on
Instagram, for using a filter in the paid promotion, distorting reasonable body image ideals in the process. 305
Similarly, the ASA upheld a complaint against influencer Cinzia Baylis-Zullo for promoting a tanning
product from We Are Luxe Ltd whilst using an Instagram filter.306
Figure 33: Illustration of Elly Norris (left) and Cinzia Baylis-Zullo (right) posts307

Example: social media advertising for personal training services
The following examples are 3 of 21 live ads for Ultimate Performance London City personal training
services listed on Meta Ad Library in April 2022308. 12 of the 21 ads show “before” images, with beforeand-after images available on the company’s website. The ads are distributed on Facebook, Instagram,
Messenger, and apps in the open display advertising market via Facebook Audience Network.

Mistargeting
Relative incidence: ⬤ Medium | Relative severity: ⬤ Medium | Trend: ⇩ Decreasing
For the purposes of advertising regulation, mistargeting involves the promotion of certain products andservices to an inappropriate audience, such as age-restricted ads for alcohol or gambling served on media
properties or in contexts disproportionately popular with the protected age group (children aged 15 oryounger, and young people aged 16 or 17). The CAP code prohibits age-restricted ads from being directed
at people under age through the selection of media or the context in which they appear, with clarificationthat no medium should be used to display these ads where more than 25% of the audience is measured to
be under age.
Monitoring studies indicate that children continue to be exposed to age-restricted advertising on websites,
apps, social media and influencer posts aimed at child audiences, though at relatively low levels. The ASA

305

ASA ruling: https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/skinny-tan-ltd-in-association-with-elly-norris.html
ASA ruling: https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/we-are-luxe-ltd-t-a-tanologist-tan-in-association-with-cinzia-baylis-zullo.html
307
Image of these posts available at: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9218259/Instagram-influencers-banned-using-photofilters-boost-look-beauty-products.html
306

308

https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active_status=all&ad_type=all&country=GB&view_all_page_id=1742613586023834&search_type=page&media_type=all Accessed 3 April 2022.
© 2022 Spark Ninety83

used avatar online accounts mimicking the behaviour of young people to see if advertisers were reaching
young people with age-restricted ads on YouTube channels and 49 different children’s websites.
The conclusion of the reports, which ran from April 2020 to March 2021, was that, whilst the majority of
online ads are targeted in line with the regulations outlined in the CAP code, there were some breaches.
From April 2020 to March 2021, the ASA found:●

101 advertisers that acted in breach of the advertising targeting rules.

●

74% of the advertisers found to be in breach of the regulations were categorised as breachingregulations surrounding the targeting of ads for food that are high in fat, salt or sugar (HFSS), withapproximately half of those ads for products that are highly unlikely to appeal to children.

●

90% of the advertisers in breach of the rules were not found to breach the rules again after being
contacted by the ASA regarding the issue; 10% subsequently re-broke the rules.

●

The ASA worked further with the advertisers that re-breached the regulations, all of which havesubsequently assured the ASA they have implemented block lists or inclusion lists to proactively
address the issue and ensure that ads were responsibly targeted.

●

Despite only accounting for 20% of the examined media throughout the duration of the monitoring
study, 47% of the advertisers found to breach the regulations regarding the targeting of HFSS
products did so exclusively on YouTube309.

Table 24: ASA avatars monitoring of children’s media: number of ads that broke CAP rules
Category

Q2 2020 310

Q3 2020 311

Q4 2020 312

Q1 2021 313

Alcohol

10

6

6

7

E-cigarettes and Tobacco

1

0

0

0

Gambling

70

5

3

29

HFSS

78

102

27

117

Weight control

0

14

11

5

A report by Nesta, a UK charity, investigated the targeting of young people with unhealthy food and drink
marketing online in November and December 2021. They used 284 people living in the UK aged 13-16 to
crowdsource data about the frequency and effect of the exposure of young people to potentially damaging
ads for unhealthy food and drink products. They recorded 4,879 food and drink ads in the time period; 60%of these were paid-for ads, and the rest were other forms of marketing. They found:●

70% of the ads were for products deemed ‘unhealthy’.

●

Over 7% of the participants were exposed to adverts for alcohol.

●

Participants living in lower income households (less than £29,000 annual household income)encountered approximately 50% more ads for unhealthy food and drink products than participants
living in higher income households (£29,000 or more annual household income).

309

ASA, Protecting Children Online, 30th November 2021.
ASA, Protecting Children Online Q2 2020, 26th August 2020.
311
ASA, Protecting Children Online Q3 2020, 20th November 2020.
312
ASA, Protecting Children Online Q4 2020, 11th February 2021.
313
ASA, Protecting Children Online Q1 2021, 7th July 2021.
310© 2022 Spark Ninety84●After the data was collected, 80% of participants stated that food and drink marketing had asignificant influence on their eating and drinking habits314.

The ASA has been proactive in dealing with isolated incidents of influencers promoting alcohol/ageinappropriate products and investigating audience demographics of the influencers involved. A case against
influencer Francesca Perks and Sazerac UK Ltd was upheld by the ASA, after Francesca, aged 22 at thetime, took part in a sponsored social media promotion for Southern Comfort. The complaint was upheld
because Francesca was under the age of 25 at the time; the CAP code states that anyone promoting
alcohol in a marketing communication must be, or seem to be, over the age of 25 years old, to ensure that it
is not overly appealing to young people315.
In 2021, tests also highlighted the availability of options to target advertising to children on Facebook,though the company has since addressed this issue. The Tech Transparency Project, an online campaign forinternet safety, submitted test ads to Facebook that attempted to target teenagers in the US with ads in
categories such as alcohol, weight loss, pills, gambling, dating and smoking. The ads targeted interest
categories, such as ‘diet food’ and ‘poker’. It found that these ads were approved by Facebook within
hours316. Since then, Facebook has banned all interest-based targeted ads aimed at those under the age of18; since these changes, under 18s can only be targeted by age, gender and location317.

Targeting vulnerable people
Relative incidence: ⬤ Low (limited information) | Relative severity: ⬤ Medium | Trend: Unknown
Targeting vulnerable audiences directly or by proxy may cause harm in certain circumstances. For example,
gambling ads targeting individuals who have taken steps to stop receiving targeted gambling marketing
communications, or fraudulent ads targeting those with a history of falling for scams. In addition, young
people may be especially susceptible to influencer advertising for high-risk financial products such as day
trading. 1.8 million Britons began to trade shares during the COVID-19 pandemic318, potentiallyencouraged by hundreds of investment influencers.
There is very limited information about the scale of this issue. There are reports of vulnerable people being
exposed to advertising that causes harm as a consequence of their vulnerability. However, there is a lack of
information about whether this advertising was intentionally targeted towards them - as opposed to being
targeted towards a mass audience or a broad spectrum of audience segments of which they happen toform a part.
●In 2020, anecdotal evidence suggested that gambling addicts were being bombarded with online
display ads for gambling services319.

●

In 2020, there were numerous reports of young people with eating disorders being exposed totriggering adverts on TikTok. The company responded by banning adverts for under 18s that promotea harmful or negative body image320. Meta has also updated its advertising policies to prohibit ads that
demonstrate extreme weight loss, such as ‘before-and-after’ photos321.

314

Nesta, Online food and drink marketing to young people, February 2022.
https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/sazerac-uk-ltd-G19-1041900.html
316
https://www.techtransparencyproject.org/articles/pills-cocktails-and-anorexia-facebook-allows-harmful-ads-target-teens317
https://www.reuters.com/technology/facebook-will-restrict-ad-targeting-under-18s-2021-07-27/318
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/big-rise-in-online-share-trading-as-influencers-tempt-the-young-fxztjl0tr
319
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/stories-52506113
320
https://www.dazeddigital.com/life-culture/article/50566/1/eating-disorder-sufferers-on-the-danger-of-weight-loss-ads-on-tiktok
321
https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads/prohibited_content/personal_health315© 2022 Spark Ninety85

Discriminatory advertising
Relative incidence: ⬤ Low (limited information) | Relative severity: ⬤ Medium | Trend: Unknown
Online advertising has the power to target certain audiences, and in doing so exclude certain otheraudiences. This exclusion becomes an issue when it causes discrimination on the basis of protectedcharacteristics and causes harm. Online “opportunity” advertising (jobs, credit and housing) is at risk of
discrimination when targeting is used.
There is limited evidence of discriminatory targeting in the UK. In the US, an investigation by the Mark Up in
February 2021 found that Google Ads services had allowed advertisers to prevent people classified by
Google as gender ‘unknown’ (including some nonbinary and transgender people) from seeing adverts forjobs, houses and financial services322. Google contended that it offers users an ‘Add custom gender’ option
and the unknown category is intended to refer to individuals where it has been unable to determine or infer
the user’s gender. They stated at the time that they were working quickly to resolve the issue323. A US
report into discriminatory Facebook ad targeting found that certain marginalised ethnic groups were notbeing advertised housing opportunities in the same way that other groups were324. A report from theCentre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI) found that women and ethnic minorities were being
discriminated against through targeted advertising, with women less likely to see adverts for STEM jobs
than men, and Asian men more likely to see adverts encouraging them to be taxi drivers compared to otherethnic groups325. This data may not be accurate today as it was from research conducted in 2016.

Ad fraud
Relative incidence: ⬤ High | Relative severity: ⬤ High | Trend: ⇨ Stable
In the programmatic open display market, ad fraud involves cyber-criminals creating fake traffic (such as
using botnets to mimic real consumers), audience data, context or actions to syphon revenue from thedisplay advertising ecosystem. Double Verify reported that in the year to April 2021 the overall global
volume of fraud/sophisticated invalid traffic (SIVT), in terms of the number schemes detected and thenumber of devices and impressions affected, did not materially change year-on-year326.
In the UK, Double Verify estimates post-bid levels327 of sophisticated invalid traffic at 1.9% in the year to
April 2021, a 17% year-on-year increase, compared to a 30% decrease globally from 2.0% to 1.4%. In
contrast, IAS estimates that levels of ad fraud after optimisation (use of anti-fraud security solutions) are
below 1% of ad impressions across desktop and mobile display formats in the UK, with a decrease in fraudlevels in three out of four categories (see below).

322

https://themarkup.org/google-the-giant/2021/02/11/google-has-been-allowing-advertisers-to-exclude-nonbinary-people-fromseeing-job-ads
323
https://themarkup.org/google-the-giant/2021/02/11/google-has-been-allowing-advertisers-to-exclude-nonbinary-people-fromseeing-job-ads#:~:text=Google's%20policies%20forbid%20ads%20targeting,with%20federal%20anti%2Ddiscrimination%20laws.
324
https://www.brookings.edu/research/solving-the-problem-of-racially-discriminatory-advertising-on-facebook/
325
Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation, Online targeting: Final report and recommendations, 4th February 2020.
326
Double Verify, Global Insights Report 2021
327
Refers to SIVT/fraud levels in advertising impressions purchased, not in advertising impressions available for sale.
© 2022 Spark Ninety86Table 25: Average optimised-against-ad fraud levels, UK - measured by IAS328
Category

H1 2019

H1 2020

H1 20212-year change (pp)Desktop display

0.9%

0.6%

0.9%

0

Desktop video

0.8%

0.6%

0.7%

-0.1ppMobile web display

0.5%

0.5%

0.2%

-0.3ppMobile web video

-

0.4%

0.2%

-0.2pp (YoY)

Ad fraud has followed ad spending, with growth of connected TV (CTV) advertising expenditure leading to
the emergence of fraud schemes on this platform. Double Verify estimates the CTV fraud/SIVT violation
rate was 0.4% globally in the year to April 2021.
The preceding rates of invalid/fraudulent ad impressions refer to post-bid or post-optimisation and exclude
any fraud that is not detected by the ad verification vendor. Levels of invalid/fraudulent ad impression prebid/optimisation are much higher. IAS estimates global rates of 9.4% for desktop display in H1 2021, 7.2%
in desktop video, 5.5% in mobile web display, and 2.7% in mobile video329.
Cyber-criminals are constantly adapting their tactics, devising schemes to exploit weaknesses in the adtech ecosystem. Double Verify suggests that data centre traffic, where server-side ad insertion (SSAI) istargeted (see example below) accounted for the majority of fraud/sophisticated invalid traffic on desktop
and mobile in the year to April 2021, with bot fraud having the largest share on CTV330.
Since 2020, there has been the first conviction of a perpetrator of ad fraud, through international law
enforcement action. In 2021, Aleksandr Zhukov, the self-proclaimed “Russian King of Fraud”, was convictedof charges in the US, where he was prosecuted for using a bot farm and rented servers in order to create
fraudulent internet traffic and inflating the cost of advertising331. His ‘Methbot’ scheme used 1,900 servers,
creating millions of illegitimate ad views on major websites, such as the New York Times and the WallStreet Journal. The total earnings from the fraud were valued at $7 million. Zhukov was arrested in Bulgaria
in 2018 then extradited to the US. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison by the US Department ofJustice332.
Industry has also introduced standards to help identify direct sellers and intermediaries involved in the
trading of programmatic advertising inventory, including sellers.json and RTB Supply Chain Object 333. Thisbuilds on the ads.txt standard that lists authorised sellers. These standards help buyers to identify
illegitimate sellers, helping to combat certain types of ad fraud. It is unclear to what extent adoption ofthese standards has reduced fraud or displaced activity to alternative schemes.
The direct victims of ad fraud are advertisers who buy counterfeit advertising. Publishers are also affected
due to advertisers buying counterfeit advertising instead of legitimate publisher advertising inventory. In
2020, direct losses to ad fraud were estimated to be in the range £7 million (supply chain fully optimised)to £100 million (one-third of the supply chain fully optimised and the rest non-optimised). This order ofmagnitude estimate is likely to still be valid, due to growth in programmatic expenditure offset by adecrease in fraud rates.
Influencer fraud is another type of ad fraud. It can involve influencers purchasing followers on social media
platforms in order to give a false impression of the size of their reach online, thus allowing them to charge
328

Sources: IAS, Media Quality Report, H1 2019. IAS, Media Quality Report, H1 2021.
IAS, Media Quality Report, H1 2021.
330
Double Verify, Global Insights Report 2021
331
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-28/russian-king-of-fraud-is-found-guilty-of-online-ad-scam332
https://www.anura.io/blog/king-of-ad-fraud-sentenced
333
https://iabtechlab.com/sellers-json/329© 2022 Spark Ninety87artificially inflated prices for sponsored posts. Inadvertent influencer fraud may also occur, where bots use
the comments sections of influencers’ posts to promote their fake accounts. Whilst this does not involve
deliberate action from the influencer, advertisers are still defrauded with exaggerated engagement
statistics. A study by HypeAuditor in May 2021 found that fake engagement on social media could costadvertisers close to $800 million a year worldwide, and that a quarter of US influencers have more than
30% of their comments on Instagram posts from non-human, inauthentic accounts334.
Example: ‘RapidFire’ connected TV fraud scheme
In 2021, ad verification company Method Media Intelligence (MMI) uncovered the ‘RapidFire’ scam, which
allegedly generated $10 million monthly revenue, with an estimated cost to advertisers of $20 million,
after considering fees and transactional costs.
The scheme used automation tools, including a Python script, to create counterfeit bid requests that
spoofed CTV ad inventory across a large number of apps, IP addresses and devices. This method subverted
the need for a bot farm to load apps/play content until ad breaks, making it efficient and scalable. It
exploited the vulnerability of server-side ad insertion (SSAI) in common with many other fraud schemes: in
2020, DoubleVerify identified more than 12 SSAI-based fraud schemes335.
MMI identified the perpetrators of the scam as a 5-member team of former ad tech professionals basedoutside the US, running an ad network called HyperCast. A fake company was registered in Nevada andappeared to operate legitimately, but this business was used to send the counterfeit bid requests to ad
exchanges for monetisation through real-time bidding.

Brand safety risk
Relative incidence: ⬤ Medium | Relative severity: ⬤ Low | Trend: ⇨ Stable
The Internet Advertising Bureau (IAB UK) defines brand safety as keeping a brand’s reputation safe whenadvertising online. Brands want to avoid their ads being placed next to inappropriate content, including
adult, violence, hate speech, bullying, terrorism, crime, drug abuse and malware. The Global Alliance for
Responsible Advertising (GARM) has developed a Brand Safety Floor & Sustainability Framework336
identifying categories that are not suitable for any advertiser.
Brands have different preferences about where their advertising can be placed, often involving specificsensitivities, such as (hypothetically) car manufacturers wishing to avoid advertising around news about
traffic accidents. The online advertising industry has started referring to the concept of ‘brand suitability’,
which involves managing both brand safety floor risks (minimum standards) and advertisers’ custom
requirements.
Levels of unsafe programmatic advertising inventory/placement in the UK appear to be decreasing, though
the data is not well defined. DoubleVerify found that 8.1% of UK programmatic ad impressions (measured
post-bid) violated brand suitability in the year to April 2021, a 10% year-on-year decrease337. IAS foundthat 3.0% of UK desktop display pages scored were a brand risk in H1 2021, compared to 3.1% in H1
2020338. Over the same period, risk in desktop video decreased from 5.7% to 1.6%, mobile web increased
from 3.3% to 3.4%, and mobile web video decreased from 6.3% to 2.2%. In all of these categories, only
0.1% of pages were measured as ‘high’ or ‘very high’ risk. It is not clear what thresholds and methods
DoubleVerify and IAS use to identify risky content/impressions and how these have changed over time.

334

HypeAuditor, State of Instagram Fraud in the USA, May 2021.
https://videoweek.com/2021/10/18/are-we-making-progress-on-ssais-fraud-vulnerabilities/
336
https://wfanet.org/leadership/garm/garm-resource-directory-%28weblog-detail-page%29/2020/09/23/Brand-Safety-Floor-Sustainability-Framework
337
Double Verify, Global Insights Report 2021
338
IAS, Media Quality Report, H1 2021
335

© 2022 Spark Ninety

88However, there continue to be examples of misplacement of online advertising in specific high-risk content
categories, such as piracy services. Piracy websites and apps generated estimated annual ad revenue of$1.3 billion globally339. White Bullet identified examples of brands’ advertising on these services, withbrands accounting for 36% of UK ad impressions on piracy websites and 97% of UK ad impressions on
piracy apps in 2021340.
Advertising that is misplaced causes damage to a brand’s reputation through association with unsafe
content and can provide funding for the providers of content that is harmful to consumers and society as awhole, such as piracy and misinformation. Conversely, the reputation of legitimate publishers is at risk fromplacement of harmful or inappropriate advertising.
Brand safety solution vendors such as IAS, DoubleVerify, Cheq and White Bullet provide technology andtools to help brands and agencies to avoid misplacement of advertising. In some cases, advertisers haveused brand safety tools in a relatively blunt way, preventing advertising placement on legitimate publisher
services, thus harming publisher revenues. At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic many publishers started
to block pandemic related keywords and/or news sites. Their approaches later became more refined,
reducing rates of blocking legitimate publishers. DoubleVerify found that the share of brand safety
violations driven by keyword blocking fell from 13% in May 2020 to 7% in April 2021341.

Inaccurate audience measurement, attribution and reporting
Advertisers may suffer losses if they base their investment decisions on incorrect information about theaudiences available to target, the audiences their ads reached, and the actions taken by these audiences asa result of seeing their advertising. In the social display market, there is limited independent verification of
platform reporting data. As a consequence, reporting errors have occurred, such as:●

In 2020, Facebook discovered that data used to drive its “conversion lift” metric was in error and had
affected several thousand advertisers for over 12 months342. This error led to a conversion lift tool
provided by Facebook incorrectly reporting the incremental impact of Facebook ads on conversions(e.g. sales). Facebook offered ad credits to advertisers it determined to have been “meaningfully
affected” by the issue.

●

In November 2020, LinkedIn disclosed two measurement issues that led to over-reporting of somecampaign metrics for impression and video views. Thus advertisers paid LinkedIn for some video views
that did not occur. These issues potentially affected more than 418,000 customers over a period of
more than two years. However, LinkedIn claims that 90% of these customers saw an impact of lessthan $25 and it offered them ad credits as compensation 343.

The scale of this issue is unclear, given limited independent verification. There are comparable issues in the
open display market, though this ecosystem is more open to independent ad quality verification. Audiencemeasurement and attribution is highly complex and there are multiple factors contributing to theemergence of issues, such as a lack of transparency and competition issues around the market power ofmajor platforms.

339

Digital Citizens Alliance and White Bullet, Breaking (B)ads: How Advertiser-Supported Piracy Helps Fuel A Booming Multi-Billion
Dollar Illegal Market, August 2021.
340
White Bullet, How regulation and outreach reduce ad placement on piracy websites, 2022.
341
Double Verify, Global Insights Report 2021
342
https://www.adexchanger.com/platforms/facebook-conversion-lift-measurement-issue-goes-undetected-for-12-months/
343
https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/linkedin-discovers-ad-metric-error-which-lead-to-over-400k-advertisers-bein/588960/© 2022 Spark Ninety

89Annex 2: ASA Complaint
Case Data© 2022 Spark Ninety90Figure 34: Number of ASA complaint cases relating to paid-for online advertising by category, 2021

Importantly, the number of ASA complaint cases is not a direct measure of the relative levels of harmbecause:●Consumers might be more likely to complain about some forms of potential harm than others.

●

Not all ASA complaint cases involve harm: only 16% of complaint cases relating to paid-for online
advertising resulted in an advice notice or formal/informal investigation, with 84% being outside the
ASA’s remit or where the ASA determined that no breach of the advertising codes occurred and nofurther action was required. See breakdown of complaint cases by action taken, below. The ratio ofcomplaints to harm might differ by category of advertising.

© 2022 Spark Ninety91Figure 35: Number and growth of ASA complaint cases relating to paid-for online advertising by
category, 2021

Some trends may be driven by the Covid-19 pandemic and not be representative of long-term patterns. It isalso possible that the propensity of consumers to complain about different issues changed between 2020
and 2021 which would distort the trend data.
Figure 36: Breakdown of ASA complaint cases by action taken, 2021

© 2022 Spark Ninety92www.sparkninety.com