THE ART OF THE SUMMIT DEAL
Talk at RECNA Moscow May 31, 2018
Leon V. Sigal
Director, Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project
Social Science Research Council, New York
•North Korea has tested a thermonuclear warhead but it may need another test or two tovalidate its performance. It has test-launched mobile intermediate-range missiles andICBMs to deliver them but has yet to perfect a reentry vehicle, its guidance, or longerrange solid-fuel missiles. It is churning out plutonium and highly enriched uranium at arate of five or six bombs’ worth a year.

•“North Korea just stated that it is in the final stages of developing a nuclear weapon
capable of reaching parts of the United States,” President-elect Donald Trump tweeted aday after Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Day speech last year. “It won’t happen.”•By stopping nuclear and missile testing just short of having a proven thermonuclear
weapon and an ICBM to deliver it to all of the United States, Kim Jong Un has made it
possible for President Trump to achieve his wish – but only if dialogue continues and theU.S. is prepared to negotiate in earnest and live up to its commitments.

•Washington believes that the pressure of sanctions and the threat of war brought Kim to
the negotiating table. Yet Pyongyang signaled the current changes in policy more than
three years ago. Demanding that Pyongyang suspend nuclear tests without getting
anything in return had only delayed diplomatic give-and-take for five years, enabling it toadd to its nuclear capacity and boost its bargaining leverage in the meantime. Trump, bydropping those preconditions, opened the way to the summit.

•Kim may be willing to commit to denuclearize, Trump’s ultimate goal, but in return for acommitment to denuclearize Kim will want Trump to pledge to end enmity. These
reciprocal commitments could form the basis of a summit declaration. Trump has spoken
in favor of a peace treaty and normalization of relations, key elements of reconciliation.

•An end to U.S. enmity has been the Kims’ aim for thirty years. Throughout the Cold War,Kim Jong Un’s grandfather, Kim Il Sung, had played China off against the Soviet Union
to maintain his freedom of maneuver. In 1988, anticipating the Soviet Union’s collapse,
he reached out to reconcile with the United States, South Korea and Japan in order toavoid overdependence on China. The North need has become greater as China’s powergrew.

•From Pyongyang’s vantage point, that aim was the basis of the 1994 Agreed Framework,
which committed Washington to “move toward full normalization of political andeconomic relations,” or, in plain English, to end enmity. That was also the essence of theSeptember 2005 Six Party Joint Statement which bound Washington and Pyongyang to“respect each other’s sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize
their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies” as well as to “negotiate apermanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.”•For Washington, the point of these agreements was the suspension of Pyongyang’s
nuclear and missile programs. For nearly a decade under the Agreed Framework, when it
had no nuclear weapons, the North shuttered production of fissile material and stopped
test-launches of medium and longer-range missiles. It did so again from 2007 to 2009.
Both agreements collapsed, however, when Washington did little to implement its
commitment to reconcile and Pyongyang reneged on denuclearization.

•Trump’s willingness to hold a summit meeting with Kim Jong Un did not come as acomplete surprise to the North Koreans. They were aware of his repeated expression ofinterest in negotiations during the presidential campaign. They noted his willingness togo ahead with token flood relief – the first U.S. humanitarian aid in five years – which
President Obama had authorized on his last full day in office. They welcomed Trump’sreceptivity to open talks in the New York channel in March. They did not miss his May 1
interview with Bloomberg News when, after saying that “under the right circumstances Iwould meet with [Kim],” Trump was remarkably respectful: “If it would be appropriate
for me to meet with him, I would absolutely. I would be honored to do it.” And they
appreciated his dropping preconditions for talks.

•Pyongyang saw Trump’s ominous tweets as weapons of mass distraction. As KCNA saidon September 26 as the crisis intensified, “U.S. imperialist warmongers are bluffing.”•Although Washington and Pyongyang repeatedly issued deterrent threats, the drumbeatof war was mostly bluster. Briefings by the Joint Chiefs of Staff made clear thatpreventive war would be catastrophic, as JCS Chairman Joseph Dunford and Defense
Secretary Jim Mattis said repeatedly. In Mattis’ words, it would be “more serious interms of human suffering than anything we have seen since 1953." That is the generals’
way of saying, Don’t go there.

•War talk may be catnip – or click bait – to the news media, as Trump knows, but if thetalk had any purpose beyond drawing attention to himself or arousing his political base, it
was to intimidate Pyongyang or stampede Beijing into putting more pressure on in themistaken belief that China is the key to dealing with North Korea. If so, it failed.

•Why? As Beijing well understands, on four occasions when China and the United States
cooperated in the U.N. Security to impose tougher sanctions – in 2006, 2009, 2013, andthis fall, North Korea responded by conducting nuclear tests in an effort to drive themapart.

•Washington’s preoccupation with getting Beijing to impose tougher sanctions overlooks
the fact that it is North Korea, not China that the U.S. needs to persuade. Pyongyang’s
desire to end enmity could yield Washington much greater leverage than further sanctions.

That is the significance of the cancellation of B-52 flights by the U.S. and ROK military
and Trump’s rejection of the Libya model pushed by Bolton.
•While Washington does not want a prolonged negotiation, Trump has backed away fromhis demand for rapid denuclearization: “It would certainly be better if it were all in one,”he said on May 22. “Does it have to be? I don’t think I want to totally commit myself.”
He noted, “There are certain conditions that we want, and I think we'll get thoseconditions. And if we don't, we don't have the meeting. ...If it doesn't happen, maybe itwill happen later.” Secretary of State Pompeo also hinted at a willingness to reciprocate if
the North took “credible steps.”•Both sides held out the prospect that a summit could still be held. In calling off the June
12 date Trump wrote Kim, “I feel it is inappropriate, at this time, to have this longplanned meeting,” adding that “ultimately, it is only that dialogue that matters.” TheNorth held out the prospect of a summit. Speaking on Kim Jong Un’s authorization, First
Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan affirmed that “we remain unchanged in our goal and ... wehave the intent to sit with the U.S. side to solve problem regardless of ways at any time.”•That past is prologue. Now is the time for secret negotiations, perhaps brokered by Seoul,to pin down credible steps by both sides. U.S. steps to end enmity and normalize relations
is in the works could help to induce the North to suspend production of fissile material. If
the North were to disclose the location of its suspect enrichment facility, that would allow
its shutdown to be monitored remotely, but delaying suspension to negotiate detailed
verification would allow time for more Pu and HEU to be produced and more missiles tobe fielded in the interim.

•In return, the U.S. could offer diplomatic normalization, relax Trading with the Enemy
Act sanctions imposed before the nuclear issue arose for yet a third time and have South
Korea resume energy assistance it unilaterally halted in 2008.

•Such a standstill agreement would give President Trump the success he wants. If hedemands too much, however, he could torpedo the summit, an outcome he would prefer
to avoid.

•A starting point for verification would be for the North to declare how much Pu and HEU
it has produced and how many nuclear weapons it has. That declaration would be subject
to subsequent verification. In turn, that will require further steps to end enmity, including
the start of a peace process in Korea, a commitment to diplomatic recognition startingwith an exchange of liaison offices, energy aid, and reciprocal inspections in South Korea.

•The chances of persuading North Korea to go beyond another temporary suspension to
dismantle its nuclear and missile programs are slim without movement by Washingtonand Seoul political and economic normalization, a peace agreement or treaty for a formal
end to the Korean War, and negotiate regional security arrangements, among them anuclear-weapon-free zone that would provide a multilateral legal framework fordenuclearization or ultimately an alliance with Washington. 1

1•The peace process can begin with a peace declaration by the U.S., South and North Korea.
To replace the Military Armistice Commission, the U.S., North and South Korea could
establish a “peace mechanism,” a joint military committee to negotiate confidencebuilding measures in the West Sea like a joint fishing area, a shipping lane for North
Korean vessels, and mutual reduction of artillery nearby, as well as other measures toavert deadly clashes. The resolution of border disputes and further thinning out of forcesalong the DMZ could open the way to a formal agreement or treaty under U.N. auspices
to end the Korean War. China might be a signatory, as well as Russia and Japan as
guarantors.

•Whether Kim may be willing to disarm and what he will want in return is mere
speculation. Concrete proposals for reciprocal steps and diplomatic give-and-take is the
only way to find out.

•Dismantling production facilities and disarming will take several years. So willconvincing steps toward reconciliation. Only then will we learn whether Kim is willing togive up his weapons.

•If negotiations fail to stop North Korean arming, the U.S. and its allies can continue torely on deterrence. Yet some steps each side takes to bolster deterrence raise the risk ofdeadly conflict, as the March 2010 sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan inretaliation for the South’s shooting up of a North Korean naval vessel the previous
November and the subsequent exchange of artillery fire in the West Sea show. So eventhen, we will need to complement deterrence with diplomatic engagement to reduce therisk of war, just as it took the Cuban missile crisis to get the United States and the Soviet
Union to negotiate in earnest.

A version of such a comprehensive settlement is sketched out in detail at https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnetspecial-reports/general-roadmap-and-work-plan-for-nuclear-diplomacy-with-north-korea/