December, 2019

Director of Research Center for Nuclear
Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University(RECNA)
Fumihiko Yoshida, PhD
President of the Sejong InstituteHaksoon Paik, PhD

Co-authors
Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia
(PSNA) Co-Chairs
Emeritus Professor, Victoria University, Australia
Michael Hamel-Green, PhD
Director of Nautilus Institute, United States.
Peter Hayes, PhD

Executive Summary
The authors of this policy proposal
identified some major end goals, basedon discussions at the SEJONG-RECNA
workshop. For us, these major end goals are
the absolute minimum outcomes if peaceand long-term security are to be secured forthe region. These end goals include the needfor a final peace settlement of the Korean
War; a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
to agree on cooperative security principles
and approaches; the establishment of apermanent Northeast Asian regional security
forum or organization; the establishmentof a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in
Northeast Asia; and the implementationof a regional energy security system topromote peaceful and sustainable energy
development for all countries in the region.
Even if these major end goals were shared
among stakeholders regarding a peacefuland denuclearized Korean Peninsula andcorrelated regional sustainable peace andsecurity, disagreement exists as to themeans through which these goals might befulfilled. Much of the policy dialogue isanchored in national interests and limited bypartial perspectives.
Taking the full complexity of the situation
into account, this report presents acomprehensive framework and develops a
set of short and long-term policy options
that aim to realize a comprehensive regional

1

security framework and specific strategic
goals such as denuclearizing the Korean
Peninsula and settling peace on the Korean
Peninsula. Specific pathways that may leadto these outcomes are also explored.
The resulting policy options are summarized
below:

Korean and Northeast Asian Peaceand Regional Security
1. End the Korean War by:• Taking the first steps that set inmotion a peace process that createsconditions that generate trust, peace,
and thereby enable the end of war andthe denuclearization on the Korean
Peninsula; and• Taking the first measures to initiate
cooperative approaches to realizing
comprehensive peace and security in
the Northeast Asian region.
2. Conclude a peace treaty for transforming
the armistice into a peace regime on the
Korean Peninsula by:• Negotiating a peace treaty to build
a lasting and stable peace regime,
as stated and envisioned in the 2018
Inter-Korean Panmunjom Declarationand the U.S.-DPRK Singapore jointstatement.
• Participation by South Korea (ROK),
North Korea (DPRK), the UnitedStates, and China

Executive Summary

3. As early as possible, the US, Japan, theROK and the DPRK should commit tonegotiating a Northeast Asian Treatyof Amity and Cooperation aimed atachieving reconciliation and lasting
security, peace, and prosperity for thewhole Northeast Asian region.
• This initiative can be strengthened byefforts to promote wider membershipand commitments from China,
Russia and Mongolia as well as theinternational community.
4. Establish a permanent Northeast Asian
regional security framework to:• Promote dialogue and negotiations on
peace and denuclearization within theregion; and• Advance and develop cooperative
security approaches to deal with all
sources of conflict within the region.
5. Establish an NWFZ in Northeast Asia.
6. Within an NWFZ in Northeast Asia,
provide an assurance to all parties ofaccess to energy resources.

Peace and Security on the Korean
Peninsula
1. Support the September 19 military-tomilitary cooperation measures promotedby the Pyongyang Joint Declaration of
September 2018 by:• Offering training and joint operations
in modern mine removal techniquesthat support humanitarian retrievalof combat and civilian casualties andtheir forensic identification;• Offering to engage in jointhydrographic research to map the east
and west coast seabeds to facilitate
acoustic detection of illicit use offishing resources by non-Korean
vessels; and• Undertaking joint maritime searchand-rescue training exercises.
2. Envision changes in ROK and DPRK
conventional-force postures that support
peaceful denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula by:• Reconfiguring their respective militaryforces to reduce the threat to eachother and reduce the prospective
military role by the United States in
an inter-Korean war so that over time,
there is less and less rationale for
US military forces based in Korea toretain capacities for redeployabilityor ranges that might entangle interKorean military affairs into great
power military contention in the region
at large, especially in naval and aerial
units.
• Examining closely the military
implications of reduced dependence
on nuclear extended deterrence, andthe adjustments in conventional forcesneeded by the two Koreas to facilitatea reduced role of nuclear threats thatwill accompany a negative nuclear

2

security assurance to the DPRK fromthe United States; and from the othernuclear-weapon states to both Koreas
should a NWFZ be established in
the Korean Peninsula or in Northeast
Asia.
3. Demonstrate both Koreas’ commitment
to reducing hostility to each other.
4. Assist the DPRK in setting up an export
control system that meets international
standards and would cover items such as
small arms and/or dual use equipment.

Dual-Track Approach to Establish
Both a Comprehensive Security
Framework and Nuclear Weapon
Free Zone in Northeast Asia(a) Comprehensive Security Framework
1. Aim to moderate and reverse the nuclear
arms buildup in the region under aNortheast Asian comprehensive security
framework.
2. Enhance the role of civil society increating a regional comprehensive
security zone by promoting crossborder cooperation and shared “transgovernmental” coordination andharmonization of standards in market andother institutional governance of sharedsocial life.
3. Increase regional energy security by
convening a regional energy planningand infrastructure task force of senior
officials and private energy investors3and utility managers to develop common
strategies and collaborative projects
that exploit or create regional energy
interdependence in ways that increase
comprehensive energy security.
(b) NWFZ in Northeast Asia
1. Design and then establish a Northeast
Asia NWFZ to address the specificnature of existing and potential nuclear
threats within the region through thefollowing provisions and measures:• A requirement that all signatories
in this NWFZ complete the verified
dismantlement of any nuclear
weapons and related facilities within a
specified time in advance;• Prohibition of conventional or otherattacks on civilian nuclear facilities;• P r o h i b i t i o n o f n u c l e a r- c a p a b l eballistic missiles;• Establishment of a regionalverification agency similar to theBrazilian-Argentine Agency for
Accounting and Control of Nuclear
Materials (ABACC);• Multilateral control of enrichment
facilities and fissile materials andstockpiles;• A possible ban on the reprocessing of
irradiated uranium or thorium; and• Full transparency of all past andpresent nuclear-weapon facilities andprograms.
2. Undertake confidence- and trust-building

Executive Summary

approaches to maximize the prospects
for successful negotiation of regional
denuclearization and the conclusion of alegally binding NWFZ treaty, including:• Adoption of a reciprocal step-by-step
approach rather than an all-or-nothing
approach, including the training of
DPRK officials and technical officers
on obligations under UN Security
Council Resolution 1540 obligations
in relation to nonstate actors;• Separation and separate treatment of
the issue of chemical and biologicalweapons from the issue of nuclear
weapons;• Study tours of other regions where
NWFZ treaties are in force, including
Latin America, Southeast Asia andthe South Pacific; Track 1.5 and Track2 regional consultations on NWFZ
options; and• Negotiation of secure regional
real-time military communication
systems to support crisis avoidance,
management and resolution.

Developing Regional and International
Support for a Northeast Asia NWFZ
in the context of a Comprehensive
Security Framework
This end-state should be realized byundertaking the following measures:
1. The three neighbouring nuclear-weapon
states—the United States, China, andRussia—should support a regional
Korean/Northeast Asia nuclear weapon
free zone through legal provisions within
the main body of the treaty requiringthem to enter into binding commitments
not to• Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against the parties;• Station or deploy nuclear weapons
within the zone; and• Assist treaty parties in development,
research or acquisition of nuclear
weapons.
2. Building wide support for a Northeast
Asia NWFZ proposal by incorporating
it into a larger vision of peace,denuclearization, and human security forthis region including:• The development of a comprehensive
security framework to be presented inways that can be readily understood andappreciated at governmental, media, andcivil society levels; and• Greater coordination andcommunication among actors
such as NGOs, experts, politicalrepresentatives, and the media about
issues associated with comprehensive
security framework.

Possible concerned actions to betaken by Japan and the ROK
1. Japan should initiate direct dialogue
with the DPRK based on the spirit

4built in the 2002 DPRK-Japan
Pyongyang Declaration, which includes
normalization of relationships between
the two countries;• Japan and the DPRK should discuss
abduction issues in the context of
normalization of diplomatic relations
between the two countries; and• Deferred Japanese economic
cooperation with the DPRK should
be discussed in the context of amultilateral settlement that realizes
the denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula.
2. Japan and the ROK should reexamine
security policy dependent on nuclear
deterrence and explore an alternative
security policy built on the new regional
security regime proposed here:• Japan, as the only nation that has
experienced an attack with nuclear
weapons, should start to reexamine
its security posture, which is highly
dependent on the US “nuclear
umbrella,” that is, nuclear extended
deterrence based on the US-Japan
Security Treaty.
• This effort should consider emerging
technologies that could undermine
effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.
• The ROK too should reexamine its
dependence on US nuclear extended
deterrence to help facilitate thedenuclearization and peace settlement

5of the Korean Peninsula.
3. Japan and the ROK should be preparedto multilateralize the peace anddenuclearization process in Northeast
Asia after a critical give-and-take deal isconcluded in the US-DPRK negotiations
and this deal is implemented in aparallel, simultaneous-action manner by
the United States and the DPRK.
4. Japan and the ROK should consider joint
collaborative projects to reduce nuclear
threats during the denuclearization
process such as “cooperative threat
reduction” initiatives, addressing also
the safety and security risks of civilian
nuclear fuel cycle programs in the region.

Director of Research Center for Nuclear
Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University(RECNA)
Fumihiko Yoshida, PhD
President of the Sejong InstituteHaksoon Paik, PhD

Table of Contents
Executive Summary

p.1

1. Introduction

p.7

2. End Goals for Korean and Northeast Asian Regional
Security

p.10

3. Peace and Security in the Korean Peninsula

p.15

4 . D u a l - Tr a c k A p p r o a c h t o E s t a b l i s h i n g B o t h aComprehensive Security Framework and a Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia

p.24(a) Comprehensive Security Framework

p.25(b) Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia

p.32

5.Developing Regional and International Support
for a Northeast Asia NWFZ in the Context of aComprehensive Security Framework

p.39

6. Japan and the ROK: Possible Actions

p.44

7. Conclusion

p.48

8. List of participants in the SEJONG-RECNA workshop

p.50
6

1. Introduction
One of the most urgent tasks in the nuclear
world is finding a way to denuclearize
the Democratic People’s Republic ofKorea (DPRK) and the Korean Peninsula.
Admittedly, the challenges are enormous,but, once the process of denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula is initiated, the goal ofa cooperative security regime in Northeast
Asia, including a nuclear weapon free zone,
becomes more credible.
Over the course of 2018-2019, interKorean dialogue has resulted in politicaldétente and military confidence-building
measures on the peninsula. The drasticchange of political atmosphere surrounding
the Korean Peninsula started from the
Panmunjom Declaration by President
Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong Un
in April 2018 in which the Republic ofKorea (ROK) and the DPRK agreed to“make joint efforts to alleviate the acutemilitary tension and practically eliminate
the danger of war on the Korean Peninsula”
and “actively cooperate to establish apermanent and solid peace regime on the
Korean Peninsula.” They also “confirmed
the common goal of realizing, throughcomplete denuclearization, a nuclear-free
Korean Peninsula.”1
Furthermore, in the 2018 Pyongyang
Declaration, the leaders of the ROK and the
DPRK stated that “(t)he two sides agreed to
expand the cessation of military hostility inregions of confrontation such as the DMZ(Demilitarized Zone) into the substantial
removal of the danger of war across the entire
Korean Peninsula and a fundamental resolutionof the hostile relations.” It also emphasizedthat “(t)he two sides agreed to cooperate
closely in the process of pursuing complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”2
After the historic US-DPRK summit
meeting in Singapore in June 2018,
President Trump and Chairman Kim signed
a statement reaffirming, as was declared in
the April 27 2018 Panmunjom Declaration,that President Trump committed to provide

1 2018 Panmunjom Declaration https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/04/27/national/politics-diplomacy/full-text-panmunjomdeclaration/#.XRl2U-j7SUk.
2 2018 Pyongyang Joint Declaration http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5476/view.do?seq=319608&srchFr=&amp%3BsrchTo=&amp%3BsrchWord=&amp%3BsrchTp=&amp%3Bmulti_itm_seq=0&amp%3Bitm_seq_1=0&amp%3Bitm_seq_2=0&amp%3Bcompany_
cd=&amp%3Bcompany_nm=&page=1&titleNm=.

7

1. Introduction

security guarantees to the DPRK, andChairman Kim reaffirmed his firm andunwavering commitment to complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Both leaders also agreed that “the UnitedStates and the DPRK will join their efforts
to build a lasting and stable peace regime on
the Korean Peninsula.”3
Although the second US-DPRK summit atHanoi in February 2019 meeting did not
produce a written agreement, it “offered
neither a breakthrough nor a breakdown.”4
Furthermore, substantial parts of the 2018
Pyongyang Declaration are still alive. For
the first time in the last several decades, “thetwo Koreas may come to terms with eachother, making it impossible for third parties,
including the United States to go to war in
Korea.”5
On June 30, 2019, President Trump staged
a surprise visit to the DMZ (DemilitarizedZone) and was greeted by Chairman
Kim. President Trump, Chairman Kim,
and President Moon had a short meetingand expressed their wish to pursue thenegotiations. The working-level negotiation
between the United States and the DPRK is
expected to resume soon.

We need to objectively assess the negative
impacts of the Hanoi summit, but at thesame time, we also need to consider andprepare constructive policy initiatives for“the substantial removal of the danger of
war across the entire Korean Peninsula
and a fundamental resolution of the hostile
relations” that would promote “the processof pursuing complete denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula”6 and a permanent
peace settlement there.
New developments taking place on bothsides of 38th parallel can be described
as a great transformation. How can we
encourage the continuation of this greattransformation? How can we dismantle thecore structure of the hostile confrontation
after seven decades of division in the
Korean Peninsula?
With these questions in mind, the Sejong
Institute in the ROK and Nagasaki
University’s Research Center for Nuclear
Weapons Abolition (RECNA) in Japanco-hosted, in cooperation with the Panelon Peace and Security of Northeast Asia
(PSNA), a two-day workshop on policy
proposals for the denuclearization process.
Twenty-six experts from South Korea,

3 Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s
4Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit
4 Ramesh Thakur, “Kim–Trump summitry: Neither breakthrough nor breakdown”
http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/psnaactivities/21394.
5 Peter Hayes, , “Ending the Korean War and Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula: No Bullets, No Bombs Needed,” Paper to Panel on
Peace Building and Provision for Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula, Nuclear Weapon-free Future of the North East Asia, Nagasaki
Peace Hall, at 6th Nagasaki Global Citizens Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, November 16, 2018.
6 Ibid.

8Japan, the United States, China, Russia,
Germany, and Australia participated. Ourpolicy proposals are a product of intensive
discussions and a constructive exchange ofcritiques.
It is apparent that there is no quick fix orcomplete solution. Many obstacles andimplementation challenges are ahead.
Although we have to admit this reality,
in the aftermath of the irresponsible anddangerous military threats exchanged
between the United States and the DPRK
in 2017, it is also obvious that war is not
an option. Negotiations are a necessity,
not a choice. Once regional leaders,through bilateral and multilateral dialogue
and diplomacy, recognize that a broadconsensus exists that “a multilateral security
cooperation arrangement needs to beinstitutionalized, whether to complement
the existing security order or to create
a new one,” we will have a chance tomove forward to establish “a framework
for reconciliation, peace, stability andco-prosperity” 7 To realize this desirable
end-state, this report also identifies anddescribes an array of policy options
and proposed actions that the ROK andJapan should also undertake in concert,recognizing that cooperation between
these two states is an essential element ofa negotiated, multilateral strategy in thecreation of comprehensive security in theregion, including the denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula.
To this end, political steps are urgently
needed to change policies so that theybuild trust, commitment, and momentum
to achieving a negotiated solution to theconflict with the DPRK.
Director of Research Center for Nuclear
Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University(RECNA)
Fumihiko Yoshida, PhD
President of the Sejong InstituteHaksoon Paik, PhD
Co-authors
PSNA Co-Chairs
Emeritus Professor of Victoria University,
Australia
Michael Hamel-Green, PhD
Director of Nautilus Institute, United States.
Peter Hayes, PhD

7 Kyung Hwan Cho, “Feasibility of Regional Security Framework in Northeast Asia”, Presentation Paper for SEJONG-RECNA
workshop on June 1-2 2019.

9

2. End Goals for Korean and Northeast Asian Regional Security

2. End Goals for Korean and Northeast
Asian Regional Security
The SEJONG-RECNA workshop identified
a number of wider end goals for Korean andNortheast Asian peace and denuclearizationand for regional security. The workshop
concluded that several major end goals need
to be established if peace and long-term
security are to be secured for the region:a final peace settlement of the Korean
War; a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
to agree on cooperative security principles
and approaches; the establishment of apermanent Northeast Asian regional security
forum or organization, which would meet
annually; and the establishment of a regionalenergy security system to promote peacefuland sustainable energy development for
all countries in the region. More specificproposals that would contribute to, or
provide pathways for, these major goals are
discussed in following sections.
Two of the key barriers to diplomaticnegotiations aimed at peace and stability
in the region have been the high levels of
hostility and distrust reflected in militaryconfrontation dating back to the Korean
War and the absence of channels forregional dialogue. The result has been an
undue reliance on external bilateral military
alliances to address perceived security
threats.
The failure to negotiate a final peace
settlement of the 1950-53 Korean War
continues to reinforce North Korea’s
sense of being besieged and continues toundermine trust in current negotiations
on denuclearization, especially in thecontext of continued imposition of severe
economic sanctions. North Korea has
frequently highlighted the need for an end
to the “hostility” it perceives on the part of
the United States, particularly in the formof recurrent annual large-scale joint USROK military exercises near the DMZ. In
2018, however, both the United States and
DPRK took unilateral initiatives to open
the window for diplomatic approaches tothe issues. The United States and the ROK
temporarily suspended their large scale

10joint exercises, and North Korea suspended
its nuclear and long range ballistic
missile testing.
The April 2018 Panmunjom Declaration
between Chairman Kim Jong-un andPresident Moon Jae-in called for “bringing
an end to the current unnatural state ofarmistice” and “establishing a robust peace
regime on the Korean Peninsula” as a matterof urgency. 8 At the June 2018 Singapore
summit between Kim Jong-un and President
Trump, both leaders similarly declared theirintention to “build a lasting and stable peace
regime on the Korean Peninsula.”9 A final
peace settlement of the Korean War, either
through restructuring of the UN Command
under which the war was fought, or througha new multilateral peace commission
involving other countries, is essential if thelong-standing distrust and hostility between
the parties is to be overcome.
While the Hanoi summit was inconclusive,
both the United States and the DPRK havecontinued to declare their willingness tonegotiate. One of the most important initialsteps is to declare and conclude a final
Korean War peace settlement. Conclusionof such an agreement would pave the way

for a raft of measures to reduce, defuse,and eventually eliminate high-risk formsof military deployment and confrontation,
particularly in and close to the DMZ.
The negotiation of a Treaty of Amity andCooperation for Northeast Asia would be
an important step toward agreement on
principles and approaches for ensuring
peace, denuclearization, and security in theregion. It could incorporate such principles
as mutual respect for independence andsovereignty, settlement of differences bypeaceful means, renunciation of the use offorce, and economic and environmental
cooperation. An important central principlethat such a treaty could seek to incorporate
would be that of cooperative security.
This would encourage member states toadopt defense and security postures that
do not undermine other states’ security or
provoke deadly arms races but rather serve
to enhance the joint security of regional
states. It could also serve to insulate theregion from externally imposed greatpower conflicts or wars with devastating
humanitarian and economic consequences.
An important precedent for the valueof such a treaty is the 1976 Treaty ofAmity and Cooperation in Southeast

8 2018 Panmunjom Declaration between Chairman Kim Jong-un and President Moon Jae-in http://www.korea.net/Government/CurrentAffairs/National-Affairs/view?subId=641&affairId=656&pageIndex=1&articleId=3412.
9 Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit, 12 June 2018. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statementpresident-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/.

11

2. End Goals for Korean and Northeast Asian Regional Security

Asia.10 In the aftermath of the devastating
Indochina Wars from 1946 to 1975, thistreaty provides cooperative security
guidelines for members of the Associationof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) andcontributed to the eventual negotiationof the 1995 Southeast Asian NWFZ
(Bangkok) Treaty. The ASEAN Treaty ofAmity and Cooperation now includes not
only all the regional states, but countries
outside the Southeast Asian region,
including Northeast Asian countries(North Korea, South Korea, and Japan),
China, India, and the United States. It has
also been endorsed by the UN General
Assembly and the European Union.
The 2005 six-party talks involving the two
Koreas, Japan, the United States, China,
and Russia, while not ultimately successful,
did show at least that agreement is possibleon the concept of setting up a Six-Party
Northeast Asia Security Council. This wasreflected in the September 2005 Six-Party
Joint Statement that referred to the Parties’agreement to “explore ways and meansfor promoting security cooperation in
Northeast Asia.”11 Other regions that havebeen successful in undertaking dialogue onregional security issues and establishing

NWFZs to restrain regional proliferationand external nuclear threats from nuclearweapon states stationing or deploying
nuclear weapons within their region havebenefited from the existence of regionalorganizations or forums. Such regional
bodies have facilitated negotiations onregional denuclearization either directly or
indirectly. This was certainly the case withthe role of the Organization of American
States (OAS) in relation to the Treaty of
Tlatelolco, the South Pacific Forum inrelation to the Treaty of Rarotonga South
Pacific, and, as noted above, ASEAN
in relation to the Treaty of Bangkok.
Northeast Asia has long suffered froman absence of regional mechanisms andforums for intraregional security dialogue,
a shortcoming that has left the region at
the mercy of adversarial bilateral alliances.
The recent breakthroughs in inter-Koreanand US-ROK-DPRK dialogue have opened
windows of opportunity for a resumptionof debate on the desirability of establishinga permanent Northeast Asian regional
security forum or organization that mightmeet on an annual basis or more frequently
as necessary. Such a body could not
only seek to find permanent solutions topeace and denuclearization issues on the

10 ASEAN, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, 24 February 1976, https://web.archive.org/web/20180810232530/
http://asean.org/treaty-amity-cooperation-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976/.
11 U.S. Department of State, Archive, Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing, September 19, 2005,
https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm.

12

Korean Peninsula, but also could address
region-wide issues involving Japan andneighboring states.
Wi t h i n a n y w i d e r d e n u c l e a r i z a t i o narrangements or regional NWFZ, there willneed to be an assurance to all parties ofaccess to energy resources. There will beregional needs for assistance to all parties inmoving towards sustainable energy sources
and usage, especially renewable forms ofenergy. In addition, a new regional energy
security system will need to assure the rightof the DPRK to access to the peaceful use
of nuclear energy. A regional arrangement
for nuclear energy can cover the sensitive
nuclear fuel cycle activities. In the case of
uranium enrichment, this would need tobe managed and controlled at a regionalrather national level although there is little
commercial need to add new enrichment
capacity worldwide. In the case of
reprocessing, there should be an agreement
to ban it as unneeded and dangerous
because it provides direct access to weaponusable plutonium. It would be preferable
to agree on a ban on both reprocessing
and enrichment, as agreed in the 1992
joint declaration between the ROK and
the DPRK.12 In terms of nuclear facilities,

IAEA safeguards could be complemented
and strengthened by the establishment ofa regional verification body similar to theBrazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting
and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC),
which monitors regional compliance with
nonproliferation obligations under theTreaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT.
The following four goals seek to embody a
new approach to achieving trust, confidencebuilding, and adoption of cooperative
security approaches in achieving peace anddenuclearization throughout the region.
Proposal 1: Conclude a final peace
settlement of the Korean War as:• A crucial first step toward establishing
the conditions for trust, peace, anddenuclearization on the Korean
Peninsula; and• A key step toward developing peace,denuclearization, and cooperative
approaches to security in the wider
Northeast Asian region.
Proposal 2: Negotiate a Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation in Northeast Asia
among the regional states by:• Including the US, Japan, ROK and

12 “Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”, February 19, 1992. In the
declaration, the item 3 states that South and North Korea shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.
https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31011.htm.

13

2. End Goals for Korean and Northeast Asian Regional Security

DPRK as the initial signers; and• This initiative can be strengthened byefforts to promote wider membershipand commitments from China,
Russia and Mongolia as well as theinternational community.

and governance mechanisms andagencies within the region.

Proposal 3: Establish a permanent
N o r t h e a s t A s i a n re g i o n a l s e c u r i t yorganization or forum to:• Promote dialogue and negotiations on
peace and denuclearization within theregion;• Advance and develop cooperative
security approaches to deal with all
sources of conflict within the region;and• Advance the establishment of a
Northeast Asia NWFZ, promoting
the move to a world free of nuclear
weapons.
Proposal 4: Establish a regional energy
security system to:• Promote and oversee regional
development of peaceful andsustainable energy resources within
the region, and• Establish regional energy
coordination, monitoring, verification

14

3. Peace and Security in the Korean
Peninsula
The Korean Peninsula is poised either totransform the Cold War system that divided
the Korean nation and to commence theconstruction of peace between the two
Koreas based on cooperation and trust, orto plunge back into military confrontationand tension with the risk of war and evennuclear war.
Since 1953, the two Koreas have oscillated
between confrontation and containment. On
three occasions, they veered sharply towards
outright war—1976, 1994, and 2010. In
2017, the leaderships of the DPRK, theROK, and the United States made implicit
and explicit threats to destroy each otherby military and nuclear attacks. The leadersof the DPRK and the United States werereduced to puerile comparisons of their
nuclear launch buttons and nuclear weaponsdelivery platforms were fired from anddeployed around the Korean peninsula—an extraordinarily irresponsible display of
threatening rhetoric from both sides.

15

The long-term standoff was interrupted bybrief moments of inter-Korean contact andreconciliation in 1991-92 and 2007. But thestandoff in Korea and the enormous militaryforces deployed in the tiny peninsula make
Korea one of the most dangerous, if not themost dangerous, places on Earth. Should
war break out, the resulting violence would
annihilate humans and nature alike ona scale not seen since World War II andthe atomic bombings of Hiroshima andNagasaki.
Given the multiple and complex domestic,
regional, and global forces at play in
Korea, no one could have predicted theastounding progress made to reduce tension
and to lay the foundation for long-lastingco-existence and eventual peace between
the two Koreas. This breakthrough was
brought about by the peaceful candlelight
revolution in South Korea and the demiseof the corrupt presidency of Park Geunhye and subsequent election of the Moon
Jae-in administration in May 2017. This

3. Peace and Security in the Korean Peninsula

radical shift laid the social and politicalfoundation for three inter-Korean summits
and three US-DPRK summits, and it
initiated unprecedented diplomacy between
the great powers and the two Koreas on thedenuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
Moon Jae-in’s adroit Olympics diplomacy
supplemented by “intelligence diplomacy”
among the DPRK, the ROK, and the UnitedStates facilitated the shift in US strategy
from primary reliance on military threats,
including displays of “strategic” nuclearcapable weapons in and around Korea,
to one of “maximum pressure” based on
sanctions. Similarly, Moon’s approach
helped change the DPRK strategy fromrapid-fire nuclear and missile testing toa freeze on such testing in return for afreeze on US-ROK military exercises thatrehearsed attacks on and decapitation of
the DPRK leadership. As a result, tension
subsided, nuclear threat-mongering ended,and serious albeit difficult negotiations
began between the United States and the
DPRK on dismantling the DPRK’s nuclear
fuel cycle and its nuclear weapons.
What made possible this period of relative
calm? Some attribute it to the fear inducedby each side’s military chest-thumping andrisk-taking. More likely is that the interKorean operational arms control agreement
and implementation of key measures
have ensured that no incidents occurredalong the DMZ and built confidence thatthe conditions that existed at the time theArmistice was signed might be restored,
at least in part. 13 This left to the future
further military-to-military discussions
between the two Koreas on the deepening
and expansion of the military measuresthat would build confidence that neitherside intends to attack the other. But it alsoprefigures redeployment or demobilizationof offensively postured forces and reduction
in military forces over time in ways thatwould facilitate a focus on the creation ofa prosperous shared future rather than one
based on military forces, isolation, and thecrushing effects of economic sanctions
against the DPRK.
These operational arms control measures
were implemented swiftly after the firsttwo summits between Moon and Kim—
at Panmunjom on April 27 and May 26,
2018—laid the groundwork for the third
summit, held on September 18-20 2018
in Pyongyang. On September 19, military

13 The July 1953 Armistice Agreement set limits on the introduction of new military forces and weapons systems into either Korea;
and also established a demilitarized zone. Over the decades, both sides have introduced many new military forces and weapons, andthe “DMZ” has become one of the most heavily fortified areas on Earth. The current round of inter-Korean arms control measures“restores” some elements of the Armistice within the DMZ and the Joint Security Area at Panmunjon. However, restoring the spirit of
the original agreement entails redeployment and disarmament of many offensive military forces in the two Koreas; and of course, thedenuclearization of the entire Korean peninsula, not just the disarmament of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons.

16

Figure 1

Source: Blue House 2018 pamphlet, scanned by authors with permission.

17

3. Peace and Security in the Korean Peninsula

Figure 2

Source: Blue House 2018 pamphlet, scanned by authors with permission.

officials from both Koreas signed an“Agreement on the Implementation of
the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in
the Military Domain.” The agreement
established buffer or “peace” zones near
the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) thatruns down the center of the Demilitarized

Zone on land and extends into the western
disputed sea on both sides of what UN
Command calls the Northern Limit Line.
In these zones, no artillery firing, major
exercises, or new weapons are allowed.
No-fly zones were created for helicopters(10 km), drones (15 km —and no North18

Figure 3

together to retrieve the remains of thosekilled in combat zones in the DMZ. Guard
posts have been dismantled. The Joint
Security Area has been restored to its pre1976 status, removing the division along the
MDL and all weapons.
Even the lighthouse on Yeonpyeong
Island—the island bombarded by North
Korean artillery in 2010—was relit in May
2019 to enable ships and fishing vessels
to navigate safely. However, it shines only
southward to avoid any risk of provoking
the DPRK, symbolizing the danger of war
that continues to stalk the two Koreas.

Source: Yeonpyeon-do Island Deuendae Park, Incheon
Metropolitan City.14

Korean drones have been observed in theSouth since this agreement was struck), andfixed-wing planes (40 km on the eastern
DMZ and 20 km on the western side). Joint
fishing areas were created in the westernsea. Naval guns have been lowered; artillery
bunkers on land have been shuttered. Northand South Korean teams are working

One of the key measures of the agreement
was the one to revise what it referred toas military “operational procedures,” thatis, the rules of engagement on each side.
After 2010, the ROK had shifted to a more
offensive doctrine, known as “proactive
deterrence,” that entailed immediate andmassive retaliation for DPRK attacks.
Revision of these procedures and detailed
implementation to reduce the risk of war
requires regular contact and dialogue not
only via restored hotlines, but in the Korean
Joint Military Committee. Yet it has provendifficult to convene this committee due to

14 http://eng-itour.incheon.go.kr/foreign/eatdrink/spot.detail.do?cid=49352&bbsid

19

3. Peace and Security in the Korean Peninsula

North Korean reluctance to attend in thecontext of inter-Korean relations and USDPRK negotiations.
Thus, the military agreement and its
immediate implementation have createdtime and space for dialogue—mostimportantly, between the United States
and the DPRK. In effect, the agreement
has tamped down the tension and reduced
greatly the risk of war. But the agreement
has not yet advanced to the point where eachside is willing to address how it is postured
to destroy the other with conventional
forces. Nor has it specified what measuresneed to be taken to shift from an offensive
to defensive posture. This agenda, in turn,is held hostage to the fundamental conflictin Korea—the contested sovereignty overthe entire Korean Peninsula with neither
Korean state ready yet to relinquish its
claim over the other and to coexist as longas it takes for rapprochement at many levels
and in many dimensions to dissolve the core
conflict, and ultimately, for the two Koreas
to reunify in some form of confederation.
This standoff gives rise to the security
dilemma that continues to grip the
Koreas in a vice made of nuclear andconventional weapons. The United States
and UN Command are concerned that theinter-Korean arms control measures on
conventional forces may distract the ROKfrom focusing on nuclear disarmament of
the DPRK as the first priority, whereas the
ROK sees reduction of the confrontation andhostility that could lead to war and nuclear
war as the pathway to peace and eventually
to full North Korean nuclear disarmament.
This predicament, and the various drivers
outlined above, lead to the following policy
proposals to enable the two Koreas to expand
and deepen peace-building in Korea in waysthat support the denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula and eventually displace
the Cold War system that still prevails.
Proposal 1: Support the September
19 military-to-military cooperation
measures by:• Offering training and joint operations
in modern mine removal techniquesthat support humanitarian retrievalof combat and civilian casualties andtheir forensic identification;• Offering to engage in jointhydrographic research to map the east
and west coast seabeds to facilitate

20

•
•

•

•

•

21

acoustic detection of illicit use offishing resources by non-Korean
vessels;
Undertaking joint maritime searchand-rescue training exercises
Engaging in joint forest fire
surveillance and firefighting techniques
and operations, including training andmutual support;
Examining measures under the Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe to identify which of thesemight be tailored and adopted by thetwo Korean militaries;
Conducting joint monitoring andverification missions to ensure that themeasures in the military agreement
are sustained;
Creating opportunities for dialogue
between the Korean militaries atmany levels and in many channels—
some bilateral, some multilateral—
ranging from meetings of retired
military officers in rear areas to highlevel dialogue about what is entailed in
shifting from “escalation dominance”
to escalation management and war
avoidance as the primary principles formilitary planning and operations.

Proposal 2: Continue North-Southsummitry by:• Following through and checking that
implementation matches commitments
made and referring disputes toresolution mechanisms where needed;• Mandating and directing that
operational-level military-to-military
dialogue and mutual and reciprocal
actions occur to set new priorities
designated by the leaders on further
adjustments to military doctrines,
practices, and postures;• Identifying and committing to“breakthrough” trust-building
steps such as willingness to allow
transparency and inspections in new
ways and locations to demonstrateseriousness of intent;• Relentlessly pursuing an inter-Korean
peace declaration that ends the Korean
War; and• Committing to constitutional
amendments to end the competition
between the two Koreas forsovereignty.

3. Peace and Security in the Korean Peninsula

Proposal 3: Expand South Korean
sovereign control of ROK military forcesby:• Accelerating the transfer ofoperational wartime control of the
ROK military to the ROK from theUnited States; and• Exploring the future of UN Commandto create a replacement for theoriginal “The July 27, 1953 ArmisticeAgreement” that would include not
only the four primary participants in
the Korea War (the two Koreas, theUnited States, and China) but also
Russia, Japan, and the UN Command
allies, all of whom have the ability
to contribute in their own ways byengaging the DPRK on a political andmilitary basis.
Proposal 4: Envision changes in ROK
and DPRK conventional-force posturesthat support peaceful denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula by:• Providing educational programs,
study tours, and dialogue on training,
structural adjustment programs, andinvestment strategies that create jobs
and redeploy military infrastructureand factories in a productive mannerthat would be required for significant
demobilization of troops fromthe DPRK People’s Army, given
the transition experience of othercommunist states such as Vietnam,
Russia, and China.
• Reconfiguring their respective militaryforces to reduce the threat to each otherand reduce the prospective military roleby the United States in an inter-Korean
war so that over time, there is less andless rationale for US military forces
based in Korea to retain capacities forredeployability or ranges that might
entangle inter-Korean military affairs
into great power military contention in
the region at large, especially in naval
and aerial units; and• Examining closely the military
implications of reduced dependence
on nuclear extended deterrence andthe adjustments in conventional forcesneeded by the two Koreas to facilitatea reduced role of nuclear threats thatwill accompany a negative nuclear
security assurance to the DPRK fromthe United States and to both Koreas
from the other nuclear-weapon statesshould a NWFZ established in the
Korean Peninsula or in Northeast Asia.

22

Proposal 5: Demonstrate the ROK’s
commitment to reducing hostility by:• Providing early sanctions relief tothe DPRK in return for calibrated
denuclearization steps;• Using the ROK prerogative to provide
humanitarian and other assistance tothe DPRK; and• Encouraging sanctioning states tochange the timelines for review andrelief from other unilateral and UN
Security Council sanctions imposedon the DPRK.
Proposal 6: Assist the DPRK in setting
up an export control system that meets
international standards by:• Sharing best-practice export controls
including those of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, the Missile
Technology Control Regime, andthe Hague Code of Conduct Against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation; and• Providing training and support for
the DPRK to commence its reportingto the UN Security Council’s 1540
expert group and on implementationof its obligations to control the
proliferation activities of nonstate
actors.

23

4. Dual-Track Approach to Establishing Both a Comprehensive Security Framework
and a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia

4. Dual-Track Approach to Establishing Botha Comprehensive Security Framework anda Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia
Four trends in Northeast Asia have opened
a window of opportunity to end the Cold
War on the Korean Peninsula and enhance
regional peace and security:
1. The emergence of a “Kim Jong Unera” in the DPRK, including: a)the consolidation of his power inthe DPRK; b) his acquisition of a
sufficient nuclear-weapon capacity
to project a credible nuclear threat atleast to South Korea, Japan, China,
Russia, and parts of the UnitedStates, especially Guam and Alaska;c) his conclusion that the DPRK
must henceforth focus on economic
reconstruction; and d) his initiativein reaching out to President Trump in
2018.
2. The rise of the progressive andpragmatic ROK leadership of President
Moon Jae-In, who has skillfully
used diplomacy and demonstrated
a strong political will in actively
pursuing improvement in the inter-

Korean relationship at many levels
simultaneously while remaining in stepwith the United States.
3. The personal instinct of US President
Donald Trump that he can deal with
Kim Jong Un and achieve a foreign
policy success.
4. China and Russia’s disinclination toallow the United States to reassert its
dominance in Northeast Asia by being
the sole great power with effective
influence over the two Koreas,
thereby lending both Koreas effective
leverage over their great-power allies
or partners, and giving the two Koreas
more space to deal with each other.
The competitive relations in the region
between the great powers makes thecurrent framework for maintaining regional
peace and security—or insecurity—fluid
and unpredictable. This includes how thenuclear threat affects and degrades these
relationships.

24

To stabilize these complex dynamics,
a dual-track approach is needed to link
the creation of a comprehensive security
framework involving the great powers witha NWFZ. The zone could be inter-Korean orregional in scope. However structured andhowever phased, the specific steps that must
be taken are well known and the Korean
Peninsula denuclearization road map is welldefined.15
The timelines for North Korean nuclear
disarmament are not fixed. Some argue
that DPRK denuclearization may beachieved rapidly—in as little as one year.16
Others hold that it may take as long as
a decade. 17 Irreversible steps that would
make reconstituting a nuclear arsenalin the DPRK extremely challenging are
possible in one year with verification. But
a complete denuclearization, including
return by the DPRK to good standing
with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and reentry into theNonproliferation Treaty (NPT), would
require at least five years and likely
much longer. On the US side, US-ROK
denuclearization is simply a matter ofchanging deployment patterns and othersteps to demonstrate that the nuclear threat

25

is no longer aimed at the DPRK by thesetwo parties. The simplest way to achieve
this outcome is to allow DPRK inspectionsof US military bases in the ROK (USnuclear weapons were removed in 199192) as part of reciprocal monitoring andverification scheme. These physical realities
in turn set minimum and maximum times
in which a comprehensive security process
should be set in motion.

(a) Comprehensive Security
Framework
Section 3 examined the integral link
between the rate, pace, and sequencing of
DPRK denuclearization with that of theinter-Korean peace-building and operationalarms control and disarmament process.
However, the outer limit of the scope of
this inter-Korean process and the speedwith which it can proceed is set by the rate
and magnitude of the steps taken in thedenuclearization process, which in turndepends upon the results of the US-DPRK
dialogue. The two are inextricably linked
for the simple reason that the North Koreans
perceive—not without good reason—that
the United States is their main enemy andtherefore must be their primary interlocutor.
The continuation of Kim-Trump summit and

15 Morton Halperin, Peter Hayes, Thomas Pickering, Leon Sigal, “General Roadmap and Work Plan for Nuclear Diplomacy with North
Korea,” NAPSNet Special Reports, April 10, 2018, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/general-roadmap-and-workplan-for-nuclear-diplomacy-with-north-korea/.
RECNA, “Proposal: A Comprehensive Approach to a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone,” March 2015
http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/bd/files/Proposal_E.pdf.
16 M. Vazquez, “Bolton says there’s a one-year plan for North Korea to denuclearize, stays mum on WaPo report,” CNN, July 2018https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/01/politics/john-bolton-north-korea-nuclear-weapons/index.html.
17 Siegfried Hecker, Robert Carlin, and Elliot Serbin, “North Korea's Denuclearization: Status and Prospects,” CISAC, Stanford
University, April 2019,https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/april_2019_dprk_report_v3.pdf.

4. Dual-Track Approach to Establishing Both a Comprehensive Security Framework
and a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia

the US-DPRK dialogue do not necessarily
guarantee a diplomatic solution. However, it
is crucial to use this window of opportunity
before it closes. But the result of this
dialogue is uncertain. Possible outcomesrange from: a) zero denuclearization
and reversion to “fire and fury” rhetoricand threat displays by both sides; b) tiny
confidence-building measures that maintainthe status quo of “freeze for freeze” on
DPRK missile and nuclear testing on the
one hand, and suspension of US-ROK
large-scale military exercises and US
deployments of “strategic” (that is, nuclearcapable) platforms by the United States in
the ROK region (as shown in Figure 3) on
the other. Other permutations of “muddlingthrough” are also conceivable.
Concurrently with the imperatives toadvance DPRK denuclearization and interKorean conventional-arms reduction,
the great powers are accelerating themodernization of their nuclear weapons
and the deployments of such weapons in
the Northeast Asian region and surrounding
areas. They also are rapidly introducing
disruptive technologies into already fastgrowing conventional forces, thereby
constituting a new “multipolar” great-powersystem spanning the Eurasian continent.18

This system incorporates ballistic missile
defenses and space systems as well as
forces deployed across the region itself. A
regional comprehensive security system
must address the risks and instability
associated with these forces, not just thosein and around Korea.
This Policy Proposal therefore envisions
a regional security structure to be createdover the next five years that would be
associated with a deeper and more rapid
denuclearization process and thereby withexpanded inter-Korean conventional arms
control and disarmament processes—themost optimistic outcome shown in Figure 4.
Fortunately, the comprehensive regional
security structure that would be necessary
to create a “peace regime” at the regional
level and within Korea is well understood.
It entails the fulfillment of six conditions,
all of which are necessary for thecomprehensive security to be created, but
the sequencing of which can be varied
based on the political calculus of the parties
to the regional peace regime. These are:
1. Termination of the state of war. This isclearly a major objective of North Korea.
It should provide for a normalization ofrelations while providing support for the

18 Paul Bracken, "NC3 in a Multipolar Nuclear World: Big Structures and Large Processes,” NAPSNet Special Reports, May 14, 2019,https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/nc3-in-a-multipolar-nuclear-world-big-structures-and-large-processes/.

26

Figure 4

Source: Jongchul Park “Possible Scenarios of North Korea's Nuclear Negotiation and Policy Recommendations,” presentation paper for
SEJONG-RECNA workshop, June 1-2, 2019.

27

4. Dual-Track Approach to Establishing Both a Comprehensive Security Framework
and a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia

eventual unification of the peninsula. The
agreement should provide for opening theborder between the North and South andthe pulling back of military forces in the
Demilitarized Zone. The territorial disputes
between the North and South, including
at sea, should be settled, or, if that is not
immediately feasible, the two parties shouldcommit to their peaceful resolution. A
complicated multilateral peace treaty is not
required to terminate the state of war.
2. Creation of a permanent council on
security: However, a new treaty should
be concluded to establish a permanent
council on security. Such a treaty wouldsupersede the now moribund six-party
talks19 mechanism by creating a permanent
council and support organization to monitor
the provisions of the treaty and to provide aforum to deal with future security problems
in the region. In addition to the six parties
to the treaty, other states from the region
could be invited to join as full participants
or observers. The treaty might take the formof a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Northeast Asia, relegating the “peace treaty”
that terminates the Korean War ArmisticeAgreement to a side agreement, or simply
to national declarations or bilateral peace
treaties. How such a treaty would work is

explained in detail elsewhere in this Policy
Proposal.  
3. Mutual declaration of no hostile
intent: This is a key objective of North
Korea. This commitment must be embodied
in the treaty and affect all the parties’
relations with each other.
4. Provisions of assistance for nuclear
and other energy: The right of all parties
to the treaty to have access to necessary
sources of energy including nuclear power
will need to be affirmed. Any limitations
on North Korea will need to apply equallyto the other non-nuclear parties to thetreaty. A new multilateral framework might
be appropriate to deal with the nuclear
fuel cycle. North Korea will also wantassurances that its energy needs will be
subsidized. Beyond a general commitment,
this will probably need to be negotiated as aseparate agreement.
5. Termination of sanctions and response
to violations of the treaty: The parties tothe treaty will need to commit to refrainfrom the use of sanctions on any other party
to the treaty and to remove them from its listof state sponsors of terrorism. The parties
would reserve the right to collectively
impose sanctions on any state that violates
its commitments under the treaty.

19 “The six-party talks were a series of multilateral negotiations held intermittently since 2003 and attended by China, Japan, North
Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States for the purpose of dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program. The talks were
hosted in Beijing and chaired by China. North Korea decided to no longer participate in the six-party process in 2009. In subsequent
years, other participants, notably China, have called periodically for a resumption of the process”. https://www.armscontrol.org/
factsheets/6partytalks.

28

6. A nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ):
The treaty would contain a section thatwould create a NWFZ in Northeast Asia,
tailored to the specific circumstances of theregion—the subject of a separate section ofthis Policy Proposal.
The most urgent issue is how best to kickstart the process that realizes these six
conditions and thereby, the eventual creationof a comprehensive security framework
given the current, rapidly deteriorating
relations between the United States andChina over issues not related directly to
Korea or nuclear weapons, especially trade,sanctions, and technological leadership at a
global level.
Proposal 1: For the next Kim-Trumpsummit
The DPRK is perilously close to losing
trust in the negotiating process with theUnited States and separately, with the
ROK. As the great power, the UnitedStates must make an offer on the peaceand security front too big and too good forthe DPRK to refuse. In turn, the DPRK
must then make a major commitment
to put nuclear facilities and weapon
systems on the table, in a way that can be29

monitored and verified and, when enacted,
is irreversible.
As all the great powers probably will haveto provide guarantees to both Koreas inany realistic agreement, the fifth summit
might be announced at the fourth summit.
It would take place in early 2020 and could
be a four-leader summit (that is, the leadersof the United States, the ROK, the DPRK,
and China). The leaders would prefigure
the signing a peace declaration to end the
Korean War. Kim and Trump should makebold moves by:• Committing to negotiate a Northeast
Asian Treaty of Amity andCooperation that would aim to realize
reconciliation, security, peace, andprosperity in the region, including astatement of non-hostility, creationof a standing security council, andsix-party annual summits with asupporting infrastructure of meetings
involving regional security ministers
and other officials;• Proposing a breakthrough reciprocal“next big step” such as a measure to
dismantle the DPRK’s long-range
missiles and rockets in return for
creation of either a regional space4. Dual-Track Approach to Establishing Both a Comprehensive Security Framework
and a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia

launch consortium to include the
DPRK or a joint ROK-DPRK spacelaunch agency, with appropriate
safeguards and compliance with
MTCR, Hague Code of Conduct
Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation,and other agreements governing accessto space and missile proliferation; and• Creating a task force to develop a
regional and inter-Korean economicand energy development road mapthat provides timelines and specificcommitments for provision of
economic and energy support to the
DPRK economy.
Proposal 2: Regional deployments ofnuclear weapons
As part of the security dialogue under theTreaty of Amity and Cooperation, statesshould aim to moderate and reverse thenuclear arms buildup in the region by:• Creating a regional task force toreduce the risk of nuclear war byexamining how to engage in mutual
restraint including regional limitations
on the deployment of nuclear forcesin the region;• Studying the pros and cons of the
adoption of no first use declaratory

policies and force postures consistent
with no first use, either individually oras part of the nuclear negative security
assurances that would be given by the
nuclear-weapon states that are parties
to a regional nuclear weapon freezone treaty;• Examining the potential roles ofadjacent nuclear weapon free zones
in moderating and limiting the use of
nuclear threats not only against nonnuclear-weapon states but also among
nuclear-weapon states; and providing
opportunities to study and learn about
the NWFZs in Southeast Asia, theSouth Pacific, Africa, and Central
Asia and the lessons that can be drawn
from these zones for Northeast Asia;• Reviewing under a UN rubric or asa part of a regional security dialogue
how nuclear extended deterrence
operates in existing NWFZs and theextent to which nuclear-weapon states
have been willing to place portions of
their own territories under such zones
and to limit the operation of their
nuclear forces within such zones.
• Convening a regional task force oreminent-persons group to reportback to a regional security council on

30

the potentially destabilizing effectsof rapid introduction of disruptive
new technologies such as artificial
intelligence, quantum computing, andcyberwarfare on nuclear command,
control, and communications as wellas nuclear delivery systems, andpossible ways to restrain the offensive
dimensions of these new technologies
in conventional and nuclear forces
deployed in the region.
Proposal 3: Enhance the role of civilsociety in creating a comprehensive
regional security zone by:• Promoting cross-border cooperationand shared “trans-governmental”
coordination and harmonizationof standards in market and otherinstitutional governance of social life;• Adopting nuclear weapon free zones
at the city and provincial levels
and implementing commitments topractices such as divestment fromfirms involved in financing, insurance,and production of nuclear weapons
and their delivery systems; and• Fostering a regional awareness of the
precious world cultural heritage of thesurvivors and victims of the nuclear

31

bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
especially in the younger generation,as part of a regional and renewednational identity in each country.
Proposal 4: increase regional energy
security by:• Convening a regional energy planningand infrastructure task force of senior
officials and private energy investors
and utility managers to develop
common strategies and collaborative
projects that exploit or create
regional energy interdependence inways that increase comprehensive
energy security, including technical,
geographic, ecological, economic, andcultural attributes of national energy
security in each country in the region;• Conducting training of DPRK energy
practitioners on the requirements
for information transparency
and exchange in linking regionalenergy networks via the DPRK,
such as regional power grids,
pipelines, and energy-consuming
infrastructure such as railways, roads,
telecommunications, and ports; and• Investigating collaborative approaches
to overcoming desertification, acid

4. Dual-Track Approach to Establishing Both a Comprehensive Security Framework
and a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia

rain, and other sources of transborderatmospheric pollution; establishingdeposition monitoring stations in the
DPRK that record air pollution levels
with related training and support forparticipation in provision of data
to regional environmental science
networks; and providing support
for DPRK reforestation programs
aimed at ecological stabilization,transboundary biodiversity corridors,
and creation of carbon sinks in the
Korean Peninsula.

(b) Nuclear Weapon Free Zone inNortheast Asia
An internationally recognized and legallybinding regional nuclear weapon freezone treaty is an essential component of a
Northeast Asian comprehensive security
framework. Previous bilateral agreements
and nonbinding declarations, such as the
1992 Korean Joint Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,
have foundered on the failure to include
legally binding treaty obligations, adequate
verification and compliance requirements,and security assurances from the relevant
nuclear-weapon states. NWFZ treaties inother regions, such as the Tlatelolco Treaty

in Latin America, the Rarotonga Treaty in
the South Pacific, the Bangkok Treaty inneighbouring Southeast Asia, the Pelindaba
Treaty in Africa, and the Semipalatinsk
Treaty in Central Asia, have all been
relatively successful in restraining both
intraregional proliferation and the stationing
and deployment of external nuclear
weapons in their regions.
With increasing rivalry between the
Unite d Sta te s a nd China , Nor th e a s t
Asia is especially vulnerable not only to
proliferation within the region but also
deployment of nuclear weapons by external
nuclear powers, with associated risks ofcatastrophe for the region and the world in
the event of miscalculation, pre-emption,or accidental nuclear launches by external
nuclear powers. The need for such a regionwide NWFZ is further accentuated by
the threshold capacity of Japan for rapid
development and production of nuclear
weapons, given its possession of large
plutonium stockpiles and the technologicalcapacity for quick production of nuclear
weapons and their means of delivery, as
well as future potential deployment of shortand intermediate-range missile systems in
the context of Japan’s alliance relationship32

with the United States. The perceived
weakness of the nonproliferation norm in
the ROK is also a matter of concern in thisregion, given its past record of undertaking
enrichment research and its expressed desire
to acquire plutonium reprocessing capability
in the future.
Many of the conditions that have facilitatedthe successful negotiation of denuclearizedzones in other regions of the world now
exist in Northeast Asia. Both Koreas are
currently engaging with each other—andwith the United States, China, and Russia,
on denuclearization, Korean rapprochement,
and a settlement of the Korean War. Japan,
for its part, has relinquished previous
preconditions for negotiating with North
Korea. However, bilateral and politicaldeclarations are no substitute for legallybinding treaty commitments on establishinga verifiable regional NWFZ involving
appropriate security guarantees from therelevant nuclear powers. Unless the treaty
also includes expansion of the zone toinclude Japan, this may—in the short or
longer term—jeopardize Korean Peninsula
denuclearization initiatives given North
Korean concerns or perceptions about US
strike potential from Japanese bases and33

the absence of region-wide commitments toprevent nuclear threats or first use.
North Korea’s possession of nuclear
weapons, uranium enrichment capabilities,
and demonstrated ballistic missile
capabilities will need to be addressed
through stringent provisions requiring
verified time-bound dismantlement ofsuch weapons and capabilities. Five otherexisting NWFZs have similarly faced thepresence of nuclear weapon in various
forms, including Latin America at the timeof the Cuban Missile Crisis; the South
Pacific in the form of extensive British,
US, and French nuclear testing; Africa
in the form of South African nuclearweapon possession under the apartheid
regime; and Central Asia with Russian
nuclear testing and missile deployment in
Kazakhstan. In Southeast Asia, the UnitedStates had deployed nuclear weapons
including those for anti-submarine
warfare in the Philippines. In all thesecases, dismantlement of nuclear facilities,
destruction or removal of nuclear weapons,or discontinuance of nuclear-weapon testingor stationing was achieved prior to the
NWFZs coming into force. In the case of
the Korean Peninsula, the concurrent need

4. Dual-Track Approach to Establishing Both a Comprehensive Security Framework
and a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia

for treaty-bound security assurances will
mean that nuclear-weapon dismantlement
will need to proceed within a time-boundperiod following the treaty’s entry into
force. Consistent with the legal precedentof the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons, such a time-bound period
must be clarified in advance.20 In addition
to the need for regional verification andcompliance systems tailored to this region,
there needs to be a special provision tosafeguard existing civilian nuclear facilities
from conventional attacks. This mighttake a form similar to that in the Pelindaba
Treaty, which specifies in Article 11 that“each Party undertakes not to take, or assist,or encourage any action aimed at an armed
attack by conventional or other means
against nuclear installations in the African
nuclear weapon free zone.”21 This would beapplied to the DPRK once it was compliant
with its obligation to dismantle its nuclear
weapons and related nuclear facilities
during a time-bound period for verified andcomplete disarmament.
Both the NPT and the new Treaty on theProhibition of Nuclear Weapons refer to theright and desirability of regional groupingsto establish NWFZ zones. The five NPT-

recognized nuclear-weapon states haveall demonstrated previous preparedness
to respect and offer security assurance toregional NWFZs. They have signed therelevant security assurance protocols forfour of the five existing zones in populated
regions and are believed to be about
to sign the protocols for the remaining
one, for Southeast Asia. The three main
regional states—North Korea, South
Korea, and Japan—can and should exercise
their sovereign power to work toward
establishing such a zone for Northeast Asia.
While this will also require consultation
with allies, membership in military alliances
has not necessarily been an obstacle to theestablishment of NWFZs in some otherregions (for example, the South Pacific andCentral Asia). In the absence of an existingregional security forum, the three states
could take the step of holding a regionalsummit to discuss a regional road map for
denuclearization, non-proliferation, andreduction of nuclear risks in the region.
Japan and South Korea could take a leadingrole in convening such a summit, especiallysince Japan has now relinquished previous
preconditions for meeting with North Korea.
To lay the groundwork for such a regionalsummit, regional entities such as the

20 http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/tpnw/text.
21 http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/pelindaba/text#.

34Northeast Asian UN Global Partnership for
the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC),
or the UN University could organize a series
of informal discussions at both diplomaticand civil society levels between regional
actors, as well as in consultation with theUnited States, China and Russia. Suchdialogues might be conducted in Mongolia
under its “Ulaanbaatar” process.
Given the high level of distrust that has
plagued previous diplomatic efforts toresolve Northeast Asian nuclear and security
issues—exacerbated and perpetuated by the
failure to conclude a final peace settlementof the Korean War—confidence- and trustbuilding initiatives are urgently needed totake advantage of the recent windows ofopportunity opened by the ROK-DPRK
and US-DPRK summits. There was broadconsensus among regional experts at the
SEJONG-RECNA workshop that a numberof key trust- and confidence-building
approaches are essential. In the ongoingnegotiations, a step-by-step reciprocatedapproach is needed, rather than insisting
on complete unilateral denuclearization
up front if negotiations are to continue.
Each side needs to demonstrate willingness
to proceed with phased steps involving

35

both denuclearization and military deescalation, thereby encouraging confidence
in proceeding to the next step. There isa risk that the progress already achieved
could be reversed by insistence on all-ornothing conditions. To enhance trust in thecurrent diplomatic process, there should
also be a review of the existing coercive
UN economic sanctions regime, recently
renewed for another 12 months, to reflecta more calibrated willingness to graduallylift sanctions in accord with demonstrable
steps towards denuclearization. Positive
assistance could also be provided to North
Korea to enable its officials to be better
trained in a range of internationally agreed
procedures to avoid nuclear weapons falling
into the hands of nonstate actors. At thesame time, there are a number of practicalNorth-South reconciliation initiatives
that can be supported and pursued at bothgovernmental and civil society levels.
In the context of debates and deliberation
on national and security policies anddoctrines, it is useful to develop and update
model treaties that seek to show how
concerns over implementation, verification,compliance, outcomes, and governancecan be addressed and incorporated. While4. Dual-Track Approach to Establishing Both a Comprehensive Security Framework
and a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia

much research has already been conducted,
RECNA, the Sejong Institute, PSNA, andpartner research groups and institutes should
pursue further research on the specificnature, scope, boundaries, and negotiation
pathways for a Northeast Asia/Korean
NWFZ.
The following proposals relate not only tothe regional coverage of a Northeast Asia
NWFZ but also to the ways in which it willneed to be designed to meet the special
features of this region and to the major steps
that will need to be taken to bring it about,including a regional summit and a numberof confidence- and trust-building approaches
that could and should be pursued.
Proposal 1: Establish a legally binding
Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free
Zone Treaty (NWFZ):• Verified by the IAEA and multilateralregional agencies similar to ABACC• Underpinned by commitments to
refrain from using nuclear weaponsor threatening to do so and security
guarantees from the NPT-recognized
n u c l e a r- w e a p o n s t a t e s ( U n i t e dStates, China, Russia, United
Kingdom, and France);• Covering the wider Northeast
Asian region, including not only the
Korean Peninsula but also Japan andMongolia; and• Potentially first applying to the
Korean Peninsula but incorporating
provisions for Japan (and potentially
Mongolia) to join at a later stage inaccordance with a comprehensive
road map for denuclearization in theregion.
Proposal 2: Design of a Northeast Asian
NWFZ to address the specific nature ofexisting and potential nuclear threats
within the region through the following
provisions and measures:• Ve r i f i e d d i s m a n t l e m e n t b y a l lsignatories, in this NWFZ, of any
nuclear weapons and related facilities
within a designated time period
specified in advance (consistent withsimilar provisions in the UN Treaty on
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons);• Prohibition of conventional or otherattacks on civilian nuclear facilities;• P r o h i b i t i o n o f n u c l e a r- c a p a b l eballistic missiles;• Establishment of a regionalverification agency similar to36

ABACC;• Multilateral control of enrichment
facilities and fissile materials andstockpiles;• A possible ban on the reprocessing of
irradiated uranium or thorium; and• Full transparency of all past andpresent nuclear-weapon facilities andprograms.
Proposal 3: The two Koreas, Japan,
and Mongolia hold a regional summit
to discuss a regional road map for
denuclearization, non-proliferation, andreduction of nuclear risks in Northeast
Asia, with• Japan and South Korea taking the leadin convening the summit as a priority
initiative;• Japan preparing the way by areaffirmation of its three non-nuclear
principles;• Preparation for such a regionalsummit by first holding informal
discussions between all parties at both
diplomatic and Track 1.5 levels; and• Consultations on such a regionalsummit with the UN secretary-general
and with China, Russia, and theUnited States as the principal allies/

37

partners of the regional states.
Proposal 4: Confidence- and trustbuilding approaches to maximize theprospects for successful negotiationof regional denuclearization and theconclusion of a legally binding NWFZ
treaty, including:• Adoption of a reciprocal step-by-step
approach rather than an all-or-nothing
approach, including training of
DPRK officials and technical officers
on obligations under UN Security
Council Resolution 1540 in relation to
nonstate actors;• Separation of the issue of chemicaland biological weapons from the issueof nuclear weapons;• Study tours of other regions where
nuclear weapon free zone treaties arein force, including Latin America,
Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific;• Track 1.5 and Track 2 regional
consultations on NWFZ options;• Negotiation of secure regional realtime military communication systems;• Breakthrough unilateral gestures, suchas invitations for DPRK inspectionsof ROK/US facilities in South Korea
to verify that all US nuclear weapons

4. Dual-Track Approach to Establishing Both a Comprehensive Security Framework
and a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia

have been withdrawn; and• Further reconciliation measures
between North and South Korea
in accord with the Panmunjom
Declaration.
Proposal 5: Further research to assist
policy development and negotiation of aregional Northeast Asia NWFZ including:• Adapting existing model treaties toreflect the specific current conditionsin the region in the context of the
Panmunjom Declaration and recent
summits, as well as new nuclear andmilitary developments within theregion, including missile defences
and potential deployments ofintermediate-range missiles;• Verification systems, particularly
establishing a regional verification
agency;• Clarification of the legal anddiplomatic steps require to implementa NWFZ in this region; and• the practical modalities for negotiating
the zone.

38

5. Developing Regional and International Support
for a Northeast Asia NWFZ in the Context of aComprehensive Security Framework
Beyond the specific proposals in thepreceding sections above relating to aregional approach in Northeast Asia to
a Comprehensive Security Framework
and NEANWFZ, a number of further
proposals advanced in the SEJONGRECNA workshop are seen as necessary
to generate wider support for the zone
within the region and internationally. These
proposals include the possible need to makekey nuclear-weapon states direct parties
to any treaty; the possibility of holding a
regional Asia-Pacific conference on thehumanitarian and environmental impacts ofany nuclear conflict in the region; the needfor contextualizing the NEANWFZ concept
and proposal within a wider vision of thepeace, denuclearization, and humansecurity benefits of establishing such azone within a comprehensive security
framework; and encouragement of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and sympathetic governments to advancediscussion papers at the 2020 NPT
Review Conference on the desirability of

39

establishing such a NEANWFZ.
The critical regional importance of securingcredible security assurances against using or
threatening to use nuclear weapons should
be ensured – possibly by including the three
NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states—
the United States, China and Russia —asdirect parties to the treaty rather than theprevious precedent of relying on protocols
to the main treaty. This would avoid thelengthy delays that have frequently occurredin nuclear-weapon-state final ratificationof treaty protocols and would ensure that
regional states would benefit immediatelyfrom negative security assurances. Those
assurances are a crucial aspect affecting
whether regional states, particularly North
Korea, would be prepared to join a NWFZ
at the very outset. Direct inclusion of theUnited States, China, and Russia in thetreaty would require special legal drafting to
identify the binding provisions that would
particularly apply to these states, including
provisions that would provide binding5. Developing Regional and International Support for a Northeast Asia NWFZ
in the Context of a Comprehensive Security Framework

guarantees against the use or threatened useof nuclear weapons and the stationing or
deployment of nuclear weapons within theregion. Further research, however, is neededon the relative legal and political advantages
and disadvantages of having the relevant
nuclear weapon states join as direct parties
compared to securing their prompt accession
to binding treaty protocols signed at the sametime as the main treaty.
As in the case of the three intergovernmental
conferences on the humanitarian impactsof nuclear weapons in Oslo (2013), Nayarit(2014), and Vienna (2014), which raised
new global awareness of the unappreciatedglobal impacts of even a limited nuclear
war, and which paved the way for the2017 UN Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons, a regional conferenceon such impacts within the Asia-Pacificregion would help raise awareness at bothgovernmental and society levels of the
stakes and catastrophic risks involved incontinued reliance on nuclear weapons
as part of regional security arrangements.
Indonesia, as a strong advocate of nuclear
disarmament and a leading force in theestablishment of the Southeast Asia NWFZ,
and New Zealand, as an active member of

the New Agenda Group within the United
Nations, could be expected to be supportiveby becoming co-convenors. Japan, as the
only country to experience nuclear attacks
in war at Nagasaki and Hiroshima, would
be crucial in enabling wider regional
understanding of nuclear-weapon impacts,
as indeed was the case at the 2014 Vienna
Conference on humanitarian impacts, atwhich hibakusha survivors of the atomic
bombings provide moving testimony on
the human impacts of such weapons. 22
Highlighting the experience of the
Korean survivors would be an important
contribution to shared understanding of themeaning of these terrible events.
Such a conference could commission
new research on the humanitarian andenvironmental impacts of a limited
nuclear war in the Asia-Pacific region
similar to the research already conductedb y To o n , R o b o c k , Tu r c o , B a r d e e n ,Oman and Stenchikov (2007) on theconsequences of a limited nuclear
conflict in South Asia. 23 This would
encourage better regional understanding
among policy-makers, the media, andwider society of the likely regional andglobal humanitarian and environmental

22 Regarding humanitarian and environmental impacts of a limited nuclear war, the expert study organized by Hiroshima City was
published as “Report from the Committee of Experts on Damage Scenarios Resulting from a Nuclear Weapons Attack” (Nov 2007).
This study includes a scenario for a 1 kiloton explosion in a modern city caused by a terrorist.
http://www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/www/contents/1269591515524/files/houkokue1.pdf.
23 Toon, Owen B.; Alan Robock; Richard P. Turco; Charles Bardeen; Luke Oman & Georgiy L. Stenchikov (2007). "Consequences ofregional-scale nuclear conflicts" (PDF). Science. 315 (5816): 12245. doi:10.1126/science.1137747. PMID 17332396

40

consequences of even a limited nuclear
war in Northeast Asia.
There is still an underappreciation acrossthe whole region of nuclear risks andconsequences, and there is a need tocommunicate a positive vision of what
can be achieved through establishing a
regional NWFZ and pursuing principles ofcooperative security rather than military andnuclear confrontation. This vision will need
to be pursued by a coalition of civil society
groups, experts, politicians, and opinion
writers. Support also should be actively
sought through the UN and sympathetic
governments beyond the region, such as
Indonesia and New Zealand.
Article VII of the NPT explicitly includes
reference to the “right of any group of States
to conclude regional treaties in order toassure the total absence of nuclear weapons
in their respective territories.”24 Successive
NPT review conferences have sought inparticular to create a Middle Eastern zone
free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
The Middle East, like Northeast Asia, isa region where nuclear proliferation has
already occurred, in the form of Israel’s
acquisition of nuclear weapons, and where

there are now fears that other states, suchas Iran, may seek such weapons. Following
previous NPT review conference decisions,a UN conference on a Middle Eastern
WMD-free zone was held in New Yorkin November. It seems timely for NGOs
and sympathetic governments to advancediscussion papers at the NPT 2020 Review
Conference on the feasibility and desirabilityof a NWFZ in the Northeast Asia region.
Further, as proposed in Recommendation
7 of the March 2019 Kyoto Appeal of
the Eminent Persons Group (establishedby Fumio Kishida, the Japanese foreign
minister), there should be a renewed
commitment by both nuclear-weapon andnon-nuclear-weapon states to pursue legallybinding security assurances to non-nuclearweapon states parties to the NPT andnuclear weapon free zone treaties.25 While
nuclear-weapon states have generally been
prepared to offer such security assurances to
NWFZs, they often have been slow in actual
ratification of the relevant NWFZ treaty
protocols and have so far been reluctant tooffer such assurances more generally to all
non-nuclear-weapon states who are parties
to the NPT. The failure of nuclear powers tooffer such assurances most certainly creates

24 http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt/text.
25 For the Kyoto Appeal, see: https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000469293.pdf.

41

5. Developing Regional and International Support for a Northeast Asia NWFZ
in the Context of a Comprehensive Security Frameworkdisincentives for some states who perceive
themselves to be under nuclear threat from anuclear-weapon state to join or remain in the
NPT, as was most likely the case for DPRK,
and may well become the case for Iran.
Proposal 1: The three neighbouring
nuclear-weapon states—the UnitedStates, China, and Russia—should
support a regional Korean/Northeast Asia
NWFZ through legal provisions within
the main body of the treaty requiringthem to enter into binding commitments
not to:• Use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against the parties;• Station or deploy nuclear weapons
within the zone; and• Assist treaty parties in the development,
research, or acquisition of nuclear
weapons.
Proposal 2: In cooperation withcivil society, Japan and South Korea
should seek to convene an Asia-Pacificconference on the regional humanitarianand environmental consequences of apotential nuclear conflict in the AsiaPacific, with agenda items that would
include:• Cooperation with other like-mindedcountries such as Indonesia and
New Zealand in co-convening theconference;• Commissioning relevant research
to inform the conference on thehumanitarian and environmental
impacts of even a limited nuclear
conflict in the Asia-Pacific region; and• Gathering testimony from survivorsof nuclear attacks and testing within
the Asia-Pacific region.
Proposal 3: To gain wider support, theNortheast Asia NWFZ proposal shouldbe part of a larger vision of peace,denuclearization, and human security forthis region including:• The development of a comprehensive
security framework to be presented inways that can be readily understoodand appreciated in government,
media, and civil society; and• Greater coordination andcommunication among actors
such as NGOs, experts, politicalrepresentatives, and the media about
issues associated with comprehensive
security framework.

42

Proposal 4: At the Track 2 level, there
should be encouragement of government
experts and associated advisory panels(such as Japan’s Eminent Persons Group)
to prepare working papers on:• the feasibility and desirability of
establishing a NEANWFZ for
circulation at the 2020 NPT Review
Conference; and• and seeking the inclusion ofnegotiations towards a NEANWFZ
in the NPT Action Plan possibly
arising out of the 2020 NPT Review
Conference.
Proposal 5: In accord with
Recommendation 7 of the Kyoto Appealof the Group of Eminent Persons for
Substantive Advancement of Nuclear
Disarmament, nuclear-weapon and nonnuclear-weapon states should pursue therealization of legally binding security
assurances to non-nuclear-weapon statethat are:• parties to the NPT; and• parties to nuclear weapon free zone
treaties.

43

Proposal 6: Research bodies working
in this field should seek funding fromrelevant regional governments andfoundations for commissioning specificresearch on the humanitarian andenvironmental impacts of even a limited
nuclear war in the Asia-Pacific region,
including:• Building on the research on regional
impacts already undertaken by Toon,
Robock, Turco, Bardeen, Oman andStenchikov; and• Further updating and consolidating
research on the experience of victims
and survivors of nuclear-weapon use
and testing in the Asia-Pacific region.

6.Japan and the ROK: Possible Actions

6. Japan and the ROK: Possible Actions
Today we are closer than ever before
to ending the Korean War. The very
favourable political situation in the Korean
Peninsula, created by the US-DPRK summit
declarations and the summit declarations
between the ROK and the DPRK in 2018,is critically significant for the security of
not only the ROK but also Japan. There isan absolute need for us to take constructive
actions. All regional players—but China
and Japan, in particular—should support
a comprehensive security strategy inNortheast Asia, including the creation of a
NWFZ to resolve the Korean problem.
Although ROK-Japan relations areoften marred by politically sensitiveand differing views related to territorial
disputes, history textbooks, and “comfort
women” and “forced labor” issues, these
problems should not become an obstacle toa process of denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula and a future NWFZ. Instead,the two neighboring countries should takeactions, both jointly and independently,

to prevent a military conflict in thisregion and promote a sustainable peaceby establishing a comprehensive security
framework. To this end, we propose
specific actions below.
1. Japan should initiate direct dialogue
with the DPRK
• Japan should start a dialogue with the
DPRK based on the spirit of the 2002
DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration,
which includes a commitment
to normalization of relationships
between two countries;• Abduction issues should be discussed
in the context of normalization of a
diplomatic relationship between thetwo countries; and• Deferred economic cooperation
should be discussed in the context ofa multilateral settlement that realizes
the denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula and includes a suitableintermediary, such as the World
Bank.26

26 2002 DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration says: “The Japanese side regards, in a spirit of humility, the facts of history that Japancaused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Korea through its colonial rule in the past, and expressed deep remorse andheartfelt apology. Both sides shared the recognition that, providing economic co-operation after the normalization by the Japaneseside to the DPRK side, including grant aids, long-term loans with low interest rates and such assistances as humanitarian assistancethrough international organizations, over a period of time deemed appropriate by both sides, and providing other loans and credits
by such financial institutions as the Japan Bank for International Co-operation with a view to supporting private economic activities,
would be consistent with the spirit of this Declaration, and decided that they would sincerely discuss the specific scales and contents ofthe economic co-operation in the normalization talks.”
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html.

44

2. The ROK should prevent military
exercises and drills from escalating
to political conflicts that damage
the overall process of implementing
the 2018 ROK-DPRK summit joint
declarations by:• Establishing bilateral or multilateralrisk management mechanisms among
the ROK, the United States, theDPRK, and Japan; and• Using the Inter-Korean Joint
Military Committee established by
the ROK and DPRK in their InterKorean Agreements in the Military
Domain to be a core body to play risk
management roles by coordinating
officials from other military forces.

•

•

•

•

•
3. Japan and the ROK should reexamine
security policy dependent on nuclear
extended deterrence and explore analternative security policy built on the
new regional security regime proposed
here:• Japan, as the only nation that has
experienced attacks with nuclear
weapons, should start to reexamine
its security posture, which is highly
dependent on the US “nuclear
umbrella”—that is, nuclear extended

45•

deterrence based on the US-Japan
Security Treaty.
This effort should consider emerging
technologies that could undermine theeffectiveness of nuclear deterrence.
The ROK also should reexamine its
dependence on US nuclear extended
deterrence.
The ROK and Japan should seek
alternative measures to minimize therole of the US nuclear umbrella andeventually abandon it.
This approach will contribute
immensely to establishing a NWFZ in
Northeast Asia based upon negative
security assurance from the nuclearweapon states.
Jointly or independently, the ROK
and Japan should launch efforts todetermine how to reduce the rolesof nuclear weapons in their security
policies, taking advantage of thecurrent positive security environmenton the Korean Peninsula and beyond.
One option is to prepare working
papers for the 2020 NPT Review
Conference. This would be asignificant contribution to global
nuclear disarmament by the nucleardependent countries, Japan and the6.Japan and the ROK: Possible Actions

ROK, located in the region where
nuclear confrontation has been amatter of serious concern in recent
years.
4. The ROK and Japan reestablish
bilateral (ROK-Japan) and trilateral(ROK-Japan-US) policy-coordinating
frameworks to pursue and substantiate“Complete Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula” in a final, fully
verifiable manner by:• Having intensive and frequent policy
discussions among the ROK, Japan,
and the United States to create peaceand stability on the Korean Peninsula;• Restoring international trust andconfidence in policy implementationby the key players in the region;• Setting aside controversial andemotional bilateral issues in order toprioritize their common security goalup front; and• Considering reviving the so-called
TCOG (Trilateral Coordination andOversight Group) process which was
an invaluable policy-coordinating
forum in the late 1990s.

5. T h e R O K a n d J a p a n s h o u l d b ep re p a re d t o m u l t i l a t e r a l i z e t h epeace and denuclearization process
in Northeast Asia after a criticalgive-and-take deal is concludedin the US-DPRK negotiations
and is implemented in a parallel,
simultaneous-action manner by the US
and the DPRK.
• In preparation for such a need,consider four-party talks (ROK,
DPRK, United States, China) fora peace settlement on the Korean
Peninsula and a new six-party process
to assure realization of both the 2018
summit declarations and agreements
and the 2005 six-party statement with
relevant updates.
6. Japan and the ROK should consider
joint collaborative projects to
reduce nuclear threats during thedenuclearization process such as“ c o o p e r a t i v e t h re a t re d u c t i o n ”
initiatives, addressing also the safety
and security risks of civilian nuclear
fuel cycle programs in the region.
		 Similar to the Cooperative Threat
Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) initiatives
taken by the United States to reduce

46

nuclear security risks in former Soviet
Union, Japan and the ROK could
help establish a program to reduce
the security risks in denuclearizationof DPRK. Possible measures include:(a) Improving material accounting
and control measures of plutonium
or highly enriched uranium in the
DPRK; (b) Helping with dispositionof the highly enriched uranium andplutonium owned by DPRK; (c)Employing scientists and engineers
previously working on military
programs in the DPRK; and (d)Exploring a regional (multilateral)
framework might be appropriate
to deal with the nuclear fuel cycle,
including uranium enrichment andspent fuel reprocessing.

47

7. Conclusion

7. Conclusion
Northeast Asia is the region where “(t)he
intensification of big power competition
and rivalry between the United States
and Russia, and more importantly
between the United States and China,
creates unprecedented challenges forregional stability.” Subsequently andunfortunately, “the increasingly competitive
US-China geopolitical interests in thisregion could considerably hinder theirpotential cooperation to achieve DPRK
denuclearization, peace settlement on the
Korean Peninsula, and the NEANWFZ(Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free
Zone). At the same time, DPRK would seek
to take advantage of the growing big powercompetition.”27
For regional peace and stability in Northeast
Asia, therefore, what is urgently needed is
to share a recognition that the states andpeople in this region are at a crossroad ofrisks and hopes:(1) The risks include:(a) “unprecedented challenges forregional stability” triggered bygeopolitical and strategic competitions
among the United States, Russia, andChina; and(b) the possibility of more tests and thebuildup of nuclear arsenals and ballistic
missile capabilities by the DPRK.
(2) The reasons for hope include:(a) the signing by the leaders of the ROK
and the DPRK of the 2018 Panmunjom
Declaration and Pyongyang Declaration,
which included a commitment to“cooperate closely in the process of
pursuing complete denuclearizationof the Korean Peninsula” and alsoemphasized that “(t)he two sides agreed
to expand the cessation of military
hostility in regions of confrontation suchas the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) into
the substantial removal of the danger of
war across the entire Korean Peninsula
and a fundamental resolution of thehostile relations;”28 and(b) continuation of dialogue between theleaders of the United States and DPRK.

27 Tong Zhao, “Towards North East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone――How do we move forward from Peace in Korean Peninsula to
North East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone for regional peace and security?,” Presentation Paper for SEJONG-RECNA workshop,
June 1-2 2019.
28 2018 Pyongyang Declaration, http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5476/view.do?seq=319608&srchFr=&amp%3BsrchTo=&amp%3
BsrchWord=&amp%3BsrchTp=&amp%3Bmulti_itm_seq=0&amp%3Bitm_seq_1=0&amp%3Bitm_seq_2=0&amp%3Bcompany_
cd=&amp%3Bcompany_nm=&page=1&titleNm=

48

Considering this unprecedented historicalcrossroad, we need to contemplate what canminimize those risks and maximize hopes.
As a result of the two days of discussions
at the SEJONG-RECNA workshop, we areconvinced that the optimum and practicalpolicies laid out in this Policy Proposal“From Peace on the Korean Peninsula toa Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free
Zone” will contribute to empowering a new
dynamic that can lead us to a sustainable
peace with mutual trust in this region.
Finally, we are reminded of U.S. President
John F. Kennedy’s warning, in his address
before the General Assembly of the United
Nations on September 25, 1961, that “(t)heweapons of (nuclear) war must be abolished
before they abolish us.”29 By using the samekind of logic, we hope to abolish not only
nuclear weapons but also nuclear risks inNortheast Asia before they abolish us.
Fumihiko Yoshida and Haksoon Paik

29 For the full text of this Kennedy speech, see https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/unitednations-19610925.

49

8. List of participants in the
SEJONG-RECNA workshop
From ROK⃝ Kyung Hwan Cho, Visiting Research Fellow, Department of Security Strategy Studies,
Sejong Institute (ROK)⃝ Ildo Hwang, Assistant Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy (ROK)⃝ Jungmin Kang, Independent Nuclear Analyst / Former Chair of South Korea’s Nuclear
Safety and Security Commission (ROK) / PSNA Member⃝ Jinwook Kim, Minister-Counselor, Embassy of the Republic of Korea (ROK)⃝ Joon Hyung Kim, Professor, Handong Global University (ROK)⃝ Myon Woo Lee, Vice President, Sejong Institute (ROK)⃝ Haksoon Paik, President, Sejong Institute (ROK)⃝ Jongchul Park, Distinguished Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification(ROK)

From Japan⃝ Seiji Endo, Professor, Seikei University (Japan) / PSNA Member⃝ Satoshi Hirose Vice Director, RECNA (Japan) / PSNA Member⃝ Byungdug Jun, Professor, Nagasaki University (Japan)⃝ Masakatsu Ota, Senior Feature Writer Section, Kyodo News / Visiting Professor, RECNA(Japan)⃝ Tatsujiro Suzuki, Vice Director, RECNA (Japan) / PSNA Member⃝ Masao Tomonaga, Visiting Professor, RECNA (Japan) / PSNA Co-Chair⃝ Hiromichi Umebayashi, Visiting Professor, Former Director of RECNA (Japan) / PSNA
Member⃝ Fumihiko Yoshida, Director, RECNA (Japan) / PSNA Member

From other countries⃝ Toby Field Dalton, Co-Director, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace (USA)⃝ Michael Eric Hamel-Green, Emeritus Professor, Victoria University Melbourne (Australia) /PSNA Co-Chair⃝ Peter Hayes, Director, Nautilus Institute (USA) / PSNA Co-Chair⃝ Frank Niels Von Hippel, Emeritus Professor of Public and International Affairs, Program on
Science and Global Security, Princeton University (USA) / PSNA Member⃝ Angela Uther Kane, Senior Fellow, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation(Austria) / PSNA Member⃝ Anton Khlopkov, Director, Center for Energy and Security Studies (Russian Federation)⃝ Elisabeth I-Mi Suh, Research Assistant, German Institute for International and Security
Affairs (Germany)Mark
Byung-Moon Suh, Council Member of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World⃝
Affairs (Germany) / PSNA Member⃝ Tong Zhao, Fellow, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy (China)
50