Missile Defense and the Security Dilemma:
THAAD, Japan’s “Proactive Peace,” and the Global Arms Race
J.J. Suh
Since Seoul and Washington announced “an alliance decision” to deploy a Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea in July 2016, the little-known
weapon system has given rise to intense public protests throughout South Korea while
triggering a series of counter-measures by the North as well as China and Russia. THAAD, amissile defense system designed to destroy an incoming enemy missile at a high altitude, has
the potential not only to undermine the strategic balance between the United States andRussia as well as China but also to drive an arms race in Northeast Asia to an
unprecedentedly dangerous level. Japan too is directly contributing to the global and regional
strategic instability as it is engaged in operating two THAAD radar units and co-developing amore advanced missile defense system with the U.S. At the same time, Tokyo leverages its
participation in the U.S.-led missile defense system to weaken or remove constitutional andlegal constraints on its military. THAAD currently serves as a wedge that widens the growing
strategic gulf between the continental powers and the pacific alliances led by the U.S. at atime of growing tensions in East Asia and the western Pacific.
Tracing the chain of actions and reactions involving THAAD, I develop an argument that the
involved states are caught in a security dilemma. 1 To do that, I first distinguish two different
paths of the security dilemma. While scholars and practitioners have used the security
dilemma concept since John H. Herz first suggested it in his 1950 article, few have explicitly
noted two different ways in which it affects international relations. The dilemma emerges asmeasures taken by states to meet their security needs have the effect of increasing insecurity
for others, who feel in turn compelled to take countermeasures. Barry Buzan aptly
characterizes the dilemma as follows:
A structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after theirsecurity needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others
as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as
potentially threatening. 2
A careful analysis of the workings of the dilemma reveals two different ways in which it
affects states’ interactions even if they stem from the same basic logic. First, two states can becaught in an ever-intensifying arms race due to the security dilemma. A state’s defensive
1

I have written a detailed analysis of the security dilemma between the two Koreas and the U.S. elsewhere. See 서재정. "사드와 한반도 군비경쟁의 질적 전환: '위협의 균형'을 무너뜨리고 선제공격으로?". 창작과비평 43, no. 2 (여름 2015): 414-40. [徐載晶, “サー ドミサイルと朝鮮半島軍費競争 の
質的転 換: 「脅威の均衡」を壊 して先制攻撃 に？” 季刊『創作と批評』日本語版 2015年 夏号 (通卷168
号 ) http://jp.changbi.com/?p=1643]
2

Barry Buzan, People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-

Cold War Era, Second Edition, (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 1991), p. 27.

measure is a potentially offensive capability to an adversary, which is compelled to take its
own defensive measure that will look potentially offensive to its adversary. The outcome is avicious cycle in the form of an arms race. Second, the dilemma is not limited to two states,
but affects their allies, friends, adversaries, neighbors, etc. An ever increasing number ofstates is caught up in the dilemma, resulting in a geographical expansion of the arms race. I
call the first the intensive path of the security dilemma and the second the extensive path.
THAAD, Two Koreas, and the United States
Distinguishing these two paths helps us see the two different but related dangers being
generated by THAAD. The U.S. and North Korea, on the one hand, are caught in an intensive
security dilemma to the extent that one’s security measures intensify the other’s sense of
insecurity, prompting counter-measures, which in turn intensify one’s sense of insecurity. The
intensive security dilemma lies at the heart of an asymmetrical arms race between the twostates. 3 The action-reaction chain, on the other hand, is not limited to these two actors. Their
security dilemma extends to other states whose security is affected by their actions andreactions. North Korea’s weapons systems targeted at the U.S. military affect Japan’s andSouth Korea’s security as well, leading them to take countermeasures. U.S. weapons systems
directed against North Korea likewise increase Chinese and Russians’ sense of insecurity andencourage them to build up against what they worry could be used against them. The security
dilemma between the United States and North Korea thus expands its geographical scope toentrap their allies and neighboring countries in a security dilemma.
North Korea has thus far conducted six nuclear weapons tests and numerous missiles tests.
While it is all but impossible to tell whether its weapons systems are functional or what theirreal capacities are, it is certain that it has been developing the capacity to strike U.S. militaryfacilities and personnel in the region and the U.S. continent. It may even be suggested that
Pyongyang under Kim Jong Un’s leadership is engaged in a drive to acquire the capability. It
is notable—and directly relevant to our discussion of the security dilemma—that it conducted
its first nuclear test in 2006 when it was singled out as one of the countries in the “axis of evil”
with an unveiled threat of a preemptive strike by the George W. Bush administration and thatit conducted the four subsequent tests during the Obama administration that implicitly
excluded North Korea from its no-first strike policy. 4 Pyongyang indeed justifies its nuclear
weapons development in terms of security threats it alleges it has received from the UnitedStates.

3

J.J. Suh, “The Imbalance of Power, the Balance of Asymmetric Terror: Mutual Assured Destruction(MAD) in Korea” in Imbalance of Power: Transforming U.S.-Korean Relations, edited by John Feffer(New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 64-80.
4The Obama administration denied North Korea—that had left the NPT—the benefit of its

negative security assurance by “declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations" (15).
Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, (Washington, DC, 2010), p. 15.

Whatever the merit of its justifications, its actions and capabilities concern its adversaries. To
Koreans in the South, it does not give much comfort that Pyongyang presents its missiles andnuclear weapons as a deterrent, as its weapons exacerbate their sense of insecurity that theseweapons may be used against them. They thus look for ways to neutralize what they perceive
as a threat posed by the North. They have deployed counter-artillery systems that can destroy
the North’s long-range artilleries as well as missile defense systems like PAC-3s that can—atleast theoretically—knock out incoming missiles from the North mid-air. Furthermore,because they are concerned about the limited effectiveness of these defensive measures thatare designed to be employed only after the North’s attack, the South’s Ministry of National
Defense has adopted a preemptive strike doctrine as well as a “decapacitation plan.” 5
While THAAD is justified by Seoul as necessary to defend against the North’s missiles, it is acurious decision to deploy it in the middle of the country, far south of Seoul, rendering it
unable to protect the capital and most populous city. The decision looks more puzzling if one
adds the fact that the missile defense system is designed to intercept an incoming missile atthe altitude of 40km to 150km whereas North Korea’s missiles would have to fly much lower
to strike the South. It becomes completely confounding in light of the fact that THAAD is not
only ineffective against but also vulnerable to the North’s low flying short range missiles—of
which it has deployed hundreds—and long-range artilleries—of which it has thousands. 6
Only when the United States is brought into the strategic picture does the decision to position
THAAD in South Korea begin to makes sense. The United States has been a direct party to
the Korean War that has not ended 66 years after it began. While distance puts the U.S.
continent out of reach for North Korea’s weapons thus far, American policymakers are
increasingly concerned about the fact that their range is growing. It has thus taken
countermeasures, such as deploying PAC-3s, to protect its troops and ally in South Korea
against the North’s short-range missiles. In response to longer-range missiles, it operates SM3 systems on Aegis ships in the region and two AN/TPY-2 radars in Japan. Especially after
North Koreans succeeded in placing a satellite—Kwangmyongsong-3 Unit 2—in orbit inDecember 2012, the U.S. military accelerated missile defense programs in the region with thedispatch of two more Aegis ships to the western Pacific, the deployment of a THAAD system
in Guam, and the addition of 14 interceptor missiles to the ground-based missile defense
system in Fort Greely, Alaska. If Aegis and THAAD are designed to protect soldiers andcivilians in Japan, South Korea and Guam against intermediate-range ballistic missiles, the5

The Park Geun-Hye administration was in the process of implementing and practicing theseplans to strike the North first and remove its leadership before it could hurt them. These
measures, taken by the South to respond to the North’s moves, in turn deepened the latter’ssense of insecurity and ended up raising the tension over the Korean peninsula.
6

Yi Yong-in, “Expert rebuts Defense Ministry’s claims about THAAD missile interception,”

Hankyoreh, February 17, 2016.
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/730794.html [accessed on April 30,
2017]Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) is designed to intercept an ICBM whose trajectoryfrom North Korea would fly over Alaska.
The THAAD system, particularly its radar AN/TPY-2, deployed in South Korea acquires
significance in this strategic context. If North Korea should succeed in developing an ICBM
and launch it against the U.S. continent, its trajectory would follow the great circle that goes
through Alaska, making Fort Greely the ideal location for an anti-ballistic missile system.
And yet, the radar based in Alaska is too far beyond the horizon to observe a launch or earlyflight of an ICBM from the North. An AN/TPY-2 radar in the South can fill the gap in thecritical early phase by detecting an ICBM launch and relaying its trajectory to the GMD in
Fort Greely. In addition, if the North should attempt an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attackby flying the device southward along the path taken by the Kwangmyongsong satellite, theradar could serve as a critical early detection system that relays its early flight path to themissile defense systems—for example, Aegis ships equipped with SM3 systems—operatingin the region. 7 THAAD’s interceptor missiles also can be employed to shoot down the EMP
device during its ascent. The following maps show the two possible paths that North Korea’s
ICBM or satellite could take to reach the U.S. continent.
[Figure about here]
It is thus at least plausible that the U.S. military views the THAAD as a defense against North
Korea’s potential capability to harm itself. But against the background of the mutual balanceof threat that maintains a cold peace over the peninsula, its missile defense may be perceived
by the North Koreans as an attempt to neutralize their deterrent and thus gain a first-strikecapability. 8
Japan’s Proactive Contribution to Missile Defense
Japan is also part of the expanding security dilemma. As Japan has been actively pursuing
missile defense capabilities, it like the United States promotes its programs with reference tothe national security threat posed by the North. Its missile defense programs, which had
existed since the early 1990s, accelerated after North Korea’s “Taepodong missile” test in
1998 and led to the cabinet decision to acquire missile defense systems in 2003. In recent
years North Korea’s nuclear and missile “threats” have fueled, or been used to justify, the7

An EMP attack involves the detonation of a nuclear device at high altitude that produces anelectromagnetic wave to cripple electronic communications and strike a blow at electricity andcommunications. Foster, John S. Jr. et al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to theUnited States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack Volume 1: Executive Report, 2004; andFoster, John S. Jr. et al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack: Critical National Infrastructures, April 2008.
8

Suh, Jae-Jung. "The Imbalance of Power, the Balance of Asymmetric Terror: Mutual Assured

Destruction (MAD) in Korea." In The Future of Us-Korean Relations: The Imbalance of Power,edited by John Feffer, 64-80. London; New York: Routledge, 2006.

Abe cabinet’s drive to expand Japan’s military capability and reach and to weaken
constitutional and other restraints. The drive is in turn exacerbating already tense security
conditions in Northeast Asia.
The Ministry of Defense started deploying the Patriot systems (PAC-3) in 2007, and had 24
batteries of PAC-3 and six Aegis sea-based BMD operational by the end of 2016. Not only
has it acquired missile defense systems such as PAC-3 and SM-3 from the United States, but
it also cooperates with its ally to develop a more advanced system and to integrate Japan’s
missile defenses with America’s. The cabinet included in its 2004 National Defense Program
Guideline a plan to develop and manufacture a missile defense system jointly with the UnitedStates, and made an agreement with the Bush administration the following year to develop a
new generation intercept missile. As per the agreement, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
participates in a joint project with Raytheon to develop the SM-3 Block IIA, particularly thenose cone, rocket motors, and steering control section for the missile. Japan spent roughly thesame amount of money on the project, $1.5 billion by 2012, as the U.S. did. 9 The system wasflight-tested in December 2015 and October 2016, and made a successful intercept test in
February 2017. 10
Furthermore, the Abe cabinet has used cooperation on missile defense as leverage to further
its “pro-active contribution to peace,” expanding the scope and reach of US-Japan military
cooperation and the geographic reach of the Japanese military far from its borders. As Japan
increased its cooperation, such as moving its Missile Defense Command to a U.S. airbase andintegrating its missile defense systems and America’s, the Constitutional ban on collective
security emerged as a serious obstacle. In 2014, the Abe cabinet seized the issue to reinterpret
the Constitution so that the Self-Defense Forces might provide U.S. forces protection against
North Korean missiles outside Japan. Also, it leveraged the co-development of the SM-3 IIA
slated for deployment in Europe to revise the 47-year old ban on weapons exports and adopt
the “three principles of defense equipment transfers” (防衛装備移転 三原則) the same
year. 11 One critical rationale for passing the security-related bills in 2015 was the need to9

Amy Butler, “MDA Still Sees 2018 Deployment In Restructured SM-3 IIA Plan,” Aerospace Daily &Defense Report, Aug 7, 2012. http://aviationweek.com/awin/mda-still-sees-2018-deploymentrestructured-sm-3-iia-plan [accessed on January 8, 2017] The system was flight-tested in
December 2015 and October 2016, and made a successful intercept test in February 2017.
10

Schildt, Amanda. "U.S. Succeeds in Next Flight Test of Advanced Missile Defense Interceptor."

Raytheon Company, 12.08 2015. http://raytheon.mediaroom.com/2015-12-08-U-S-succeeds-innext-flight-test-of-advanced-missile-defense-interceptor [accessed on January 8, 2017]. Missile
Defense Agency, “US, Japan Successfully Conduct First SM-3 Block IIA Intercept Test,” February 4,
2017. http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=98719 [accessed on April 21, 2017]11

The cabinet justifies its decision with a reference to the U.S. that “同盟国 である米国 及びそれ以外の諸国 との安全保障・防衛分野における協力の強 化に資するものである。 [Such transfer also con
tributes to strengthening security and defense cooperation with Japan’s ally, the United States

collaborate with the U.S. military against the North’s nuclear missiles.
Missile Defense, China and Russia
These measures, all justified in terms of the threat posed by the North’s nuclear missiles, havein turn caused not only the North to take further countermeasures, such as developing asubmarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that would render THAAD useless. Also theyaffect China’s security, expanding the chain of security dilemma further. THAAD radar
stationed in South Korea, even if intended to monitor North Korea, has an effective range thatcan cover China. If the radar is configured as a Forward Based Mode (FBM) in which it
relays tracking data to a remote missile defense system, its range can be as long as 3,000 km,
enabling it to look deep into China. The radar in such a mode will be able to monitor
activities of China’s missiles and relay an early warning to the GMD in Alaska so that the U.S.
may intercept the missiles mid-air. This can de facto deprive Beijing of its second strikecapability and open to Washington the possibility to strike China first without worrying about
retaliation from Chinese ICBM’s.
Figure 2) THAAD radar in South Korea may monitor China
Following the extensive path of the security dilemma, the U.S. missile defense system now
adversely affects China’s sense of security, prompting it to take countermeasures. Beijing has
been particularly vocal about its opposition to THAAD that it views as a missile defense
system that can be used against its strategic missiles, thereby destabilizing the strategicbalance with the United States. Immediately after Seoul and Washington announced theirdecision to deploy THAAD in July 2016, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei statedthat its deployment would “sabotage the strategic security interests of regional countries
including China and regional strategic balance.” 12 Ministry of National Defense
Spokesperson Yang Yujun further asserted that, in response to THAAD deployment, China
will “take necessary measures to safeguard China’s strategic security and regional strategic

as well as other countries.]” http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000033552.pdf; and http://www.
mofa.go.jp/files/000034953.pdf [accessed on April 28, 2017] Its Implementation Guidelines ope
ns the door to export weapons to Europe by including “米国 を始め我が国 との間で安全保障面での協力関 係がある諸国 [countries cooperating with Japan in security including the U.S.]” http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000033553.pdf; and http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000034954.pdf [accessed on April 28, 2017]12

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press

Conference,” July 8, 2016,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1378753.shtml. [accessed on
January 8, 2017]; PRC Ministry of National Defense, “Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference,”
September 29, 2016, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2016-09/29/content_4740052.htm[accessed on January 8, 2017]

balance.” 13 Fan Changlong, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, warned in a
meeting with the U.S. national security advisor that “U.S. insistence on deploying the[THAAD] system in South Korea will . . . severely undermine the China-U.S. strategic
mutual trust.” 14
Turning its warnings into actions, China ratcheted up the pressure on South Korea inaccordance with, and retaliation for, the steps taken by Seoul in preparation for THAAD
deployment. After the Lotte Group consented to Korea’s Ministry of National Defense
request to convert its golf course into a base for THAAD, Chinese authorities intensified
pressure on the group by conducting thorough audits, safety and sanitary inspections of its
businesses and closing down almost half of them throughout China. 15 Beijing was reported
on March 2, 2017, just days after Seoul started preparing a base for THAAD, to direct
Chinese travel agencies to stop selling Korea travel packages, triggering a 40% drop in thenumber of Chinese visitors within a month. 16 Such a precipitous drop dealt a serious blow to
Korea’s tourist industry for which Chinese made up almost half of foreign visitors. Following
a series of smaller scale yet visible punitive measures such as a cancellation of K-pop stars’scheduled performances in China, these measures deepened Koreans’ worry that theireconomy might suffer yet more in the coming months after the missile defense system wasinstalled.
More directly relevant to my discussion of the security dilemma are Chinese suggestions thatmilitary responses would be in order. Yang Yujun, spokesman for the Ministry of National
Defense (MND), stated that China would “take necessary measures to safeguard China’s
strategic security and regional strategic balance” in response to THAAD deployment. 17 After

13

PRC Ministry of National Defense, “Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference,” September 29,

2016, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2016-09/29/content_4740052.htm ; PRC Ministry of
National Defense, “Sun Jianguo Meets ROK Defense Minister Han Min-ku,” June 4, 2016,
http://www.mod.gov.cn/topnews/2016-06/04/content_4670059.htm. [accessed on January 8, 2017]14

PRC Ministry of National Defense, “CMC Vice Chairman meets with U.S. National Security

Advisor,” July 25, 2016, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2016-07/26/content_4701372.htm[accessed on April 22, 2017]15

홍창진, 심재훈, 최현석, 신호경, “中보복 한식당·항공업계로 확산…롯데마트 99곳중 절반 문닫아,”연합뉴스, March 8, 2017.
http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2017/03/08/0200000000AKR20170308177600074.HTML?inpu
t=1195m [accessed on March 10, 2017]16

Korea Immigration Service, Ch’uripkuk.oikukinchongchak tonggyewolbo [Entrance/Exit andForeigner Policy Monthly Statistics] (March 2017), April 21, 2017.
17"Defense Ministry's Regular Press Conference on September 29." China Military Online,

September 29, 2016. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2016-09/29/content_4740052.htm

the THAAD system was actually deployed in Songju in April 26, 2017, he pointedly
remarked that China’s military would protect the nation’s safety and the region’s stability
with “realistic military exercises” and “new weapons systems.” 18 If he was vague about
specifics, others filled in details. Luo Wian (羅援), a retired General, suggested in an op ed in
the Global Times (環球時報) ten responses including a surgical strike, a saturation attack,and a soft kill. 19 Another military specialist stated in an interview with the Global Times that
if THAAD is deployed, Songju will become a target of the rocket force that operates China’s
strategic nuclear missiles.” 20
Chinese reactions are driven by their perception that THAAD is intended not to protect South
Korea but rather to serve as part of U.S. global missile defense systems. Wang Qun, Director
General of the Arms Control Department of the PRC Foreign Ministry asserted in a speech to
the UN General Assembly that the U.S.-ROK THAAD deployment decision was linked to the
U.S. effort to deploy a global missile-defense system.
The issue of missile defense system concerns global strategic stability and mutual trust
between major countries. The deployment of global missile defense systems by the U.S.
seriously undermines the strategic security interests of related countries. It will impede thenuclear disarmament process, trigger regional arms race [sic], and escalate militaryconfrontation. Particularly the deployment of the THAAD system by the U.S. in the ROK
will in no way help address the security concerns of relevant parties, realize denuclearizationof the Korean Peninsula and maintain peace and stability on the Peninsula. 21
This is a view shared by Russians. While Russians are not directly affected by THAAD, they
too suspect that it is part of a global missile defense system that the United States is[accessed on April 24, 2017]18

진병태. "中국방부 "신형무기 장비로 韓사드 대응훈련 할 것"(종합)." 연합뉴스, April 27, 2017.

See also “陸退將：可外科手術定點清 除THAAD,” CNA News, March 2, 2017.
http://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/201703020031-1.aspx [accessed on April 23, 2017]19“陸退將：可外科手術定點清 除THAAD,” CNA News, March 2, 2017.

http://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/201703020031-1.aspx [accessed on April 23, 2017]20

김귀근. "中 '성주 타격' 도넘는 협박…한미, 사드 조기배치 '맞불' " 연합뉴스, 03.01 2017.

http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2017/03/01/0200000000AKR20170301072200014.HTML?inpu
t=1195m [accessed on April 23, 20107]
21"Statement by Ambassador Wang Qun, Director-General of the Arms Control Department of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, at the General Debate of the First Committee of the 71st
Session of the UNGA." October13, 2016.
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1405391.shtml [accessed on April 24,
2017]constructing against Russia and China. In his opening address at the 6th Moscow Conferenceon International Security on June 26, 2017, Sergey Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister,
specifically called THAAD in Korea “part of the US global missile defence shield [that] has
an especially destabilising effect” and warned of “catastrophic consequences for the Korean
Peninsula and Northeast Asia in general.” 22 Russians perceive THAAD in Korea and the
Aegis-Ashore systems in Europe as part of the global missile defense system being built by
the U.S., as can be seen in Lavrov’s statement, and criticize the missile defense systems in
Europe as such. Their suspicion was consolidated when Washington did not stop its missile
defense program in Europe—the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)—that italleged was aimed at Iranian missiles even after having reached an agreement with Teheran.
Russian analysists note that the MK-41 launch pad used for the Aegis-Ashore can also be
used by such intermediate range cruise missiles as Tomahawk against their country. They areparticularly alarmed that according to the EPAA the Pentagon plans to deploy in Poland theSM-3 IIA—that is being jointly developed with Japan—that has the capability to intercept
Russian ICBMs. Suggesting that the American Aegis-Ashore missile defense system alreadydeployed in Romania in May 2016 was part of U.S. strategic nuclear force, Putin warned, in
response to the perceived threat, that he was being “forced to consider measures to neutralize
the increasing threat to Russia’s security.” Some Russian analysts have made more pointed
warnings that the Aegis-Ashore systems in Europe will be targeted with Russian missiles
such as Kalibir cruise missiles used in Syria. Others have mentioned the use of Sukhoi Su-34
strike fighters as a possible response.
Thus Russians and Chinese have found a common ground in their shared concern about andtheir opposition to U.S. missile defense systems. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin expressed ina joint statement in June 2016 “concern over the unilateral deployment of anti-missile
systems all over the world” because it “has negatively affected global and regional strategicbalance, stability and security.” They specifically mentioned that they were “strongly opposedto the deployment of the Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense system in Europe and thepossible deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in northeast Asia,
which severely infringe upon the strategic security interests of countries in the region.” 23 The
statement was filed with the United Nations as an official document on July 8th, 2016, the day
when Seoul and Washington announced THAAD deployment, to bring their concern to global
attention. Their joint opposition was further supported by the member states of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization who noted the “inadmissibility of ensuring own security at the costof the security of others” in the Tashkent Declaration of the Fifteenth Anniversary of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization in June 2016. They expressed their shared concern that“unilateral and unlimited build-up of missile defense systems by one state or group of states,
without taking into account the interests of other countries, can be harmful to international
22

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks at the Sixth Moscow Conference on International

Security, Moscow, April 26, 2017. http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news//asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2737799 [accessed on April 29, 2017]23“China, Russia sign joint statement on strengthening global strategic stability,” Xinhua, June 26,

2016. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/26/c_135466187.htm [accessed on June 27, 2017]and regional security and stability.” 24
Not only have Russians and Chinese expressed their common opposition to what they
perceive as U.S. efforts to establish global missile defense systems, they have also increased
their collaboration to counterbalance increasing military cooperation among the United States,
Japan, and South Korea. In short, the result has been an acceleration and intensification of anarms race in the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia and the world. THAAD, a little known
missile defense system, may well be the proverbial mouse that shakes the mountains, exceptthat it holds the danger to explode them altogether.
Denuclearization and De-escalation?
Can we get out the security dilemma? John H. Herz originally coined the concept not toremind us that we are condemned to the inevitability of the security dilemma but to alert us tothe barrenness of what he called “cynical realism” that power only determines the outcome ofinternational relations. He suggested that a realistic understanding of the security dilemma
was essential but a dose of idealism would be needed in order to devise a way out of thegloomy reality. Hence he called for “realist liberalism.”
The “liberalism” that is currently missing in the realism of the arms race can perhaps berecovered from the past. The past quarter century of the “North Korean nuclear crisis”
includes important periods when the crisis was attenuated and managed with diplomacy. The
Geneva Agreed Framework of 1994 and the Six Party Talks process represent remarkableachievements that froze and then disabled the North’s nuclear facilities and brought the
involved parties to not just a negotiation over the nuclear weapons issue but also a discussionof creating peace in the region. While their failure to bring about the ultimate goal—thedenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and a peace regime—is commonly held up as
evidence of their ineffectiveness, their interim accomplishments look much more impressive
than the results of the military confrontation and sanctions that subsequently prevailed.
Negotiations succeeded in slowing down the North’s nuclear and missile activities and held
out the possibility to trade them with peace; hardline policies resulted in six nuclear tests andcountless missile launches by Pyongyang as well as heightened tensions and global arms
races. The contrast could not be starker.
Those who still advocate more pressure and hardline policies are “cynical realists” whorefuse to learn from reality. Given that the grim reality of the arms races was triggered by
THAAD systems and that the missile defense systems were justified in terms of the threats
posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, a realist liberal search for a solution
may as well start with the past successes in rolling back the North’s programs through thenegotiations with Pyongyang. A new round of negotiations can perhaps help complete theunfinished journey toward denuclearization and a peace regime. It should be born in mind
that Pyongyang held out a prospect of negotiations at its 2016 party Congress. 25 A spokesman

24

The Tashkent Declaration of the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization, June 24, 2016.
25

See JJ Suh, “Half Full or Half Empty? North Korea after the 7th Party Congress,” The Asia-Pacificfor the DPRK government took a step further: he announced in its most authoritative
statement yet on July 6 2016 its commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
by calling the goal “the injunction [유훈] left by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and theunwavering will of the party, the military and the people” 26 It took South Korea’s Moon JaeIn to take advantage of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics to explore the possibility ofnegotiations left open by Pyongyang. The current round of diplomacy holds the potential tohelp move the peninsula towards denuclearization and peace, and the THAAD, and missile
defense systems in general, would have to be addressed as part of the process.

Journal, Vol. 14 Issue 14 No. 9 (July 15, 201).
26“조선정부 미국의 핵무기공개와 남조선부터의 핵철페 요구,” 조선통신, July 6, 2016.

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-k.htm [accessed on April 29, 2017] [The official English translation on
the site does not include this phrase.] See also Moon, Chung-in. "Basis for a Breakthrough in
Pyongyang Statement?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July 14 2016).

Figure 1) The red lines in the top map show trajectories of an ICBM from North Korea to theUnited States. Fort Greely in Alaska occupies a strategic location that can intercept missileson these trajectories. The yellow line in the bottom two shows a trajectory a satellite can take,possibly delivering an EMP attack.

Figure 2) A THAAD radar stationed in South Korea can be configured to track China’s
ICBM’s and relay the data to a missile defense system in Alaska so that the missiles can be
destroyed before they reach their intended targets in the U.S.
https://mostlymissiledefense.files.wordpress.com/2016/07/tpy-2longrange-track.png