北東アジア非核兵器地帯設立への包括的アプローチ

提言

Proposal:
A Comprehensive Approachto a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone

RECNA March, 2015
Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition,
Nagasaki University（RECNA）

The Logo represents a deformed Chinese character“ 出 ”, which means “exit” or “departure”. Here it
symbolizes the “exit” from the nuclear deterrence and“departure” for a Northeast Asia Nuclear WeaponFree Zone. Nagasaki is famous for its port “Dejima”
or Exit Island, the only port open to overseas during
the period of national isolation in Japanese history.

Acknowledgement
We would like to express our deepest appreciation to Dr. Morton H.
Halperin (the U.S., Senior Advisor, Open University Foundations), Dr. Peter
Hayes (Australia, Executive Director, Nautilus Institute for Security andSustainability), Dr. Shen Dingli (PRC, Associate Dean, Institute of International
Studies, Fudan University), Dr. Chung-in Moon (ROK, Professor, Yonsei
University), Dr. Kiho Yi (ROK, Director, the Center for Peace and Public
Integrity, Hanshin University), Ambassador Dr. Jargalsaikhan Enkhsaikhan(Mongoila, Chairman, Blue Banner), and Dr. Kazumi Mizumoto (Japan, Vice
President, Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University), for theirvaluable comments on the manuscript of this book.
We would also like to express our gratitude to the staff at Nagasaki
University, including Dr. Shigeru Katamine (President, Nagasaki University),
Dr. Susumu Shirabe (Vice President, Nagasaki University), and Dr. Byung-dug
Jun (Professor, Nagasaki University) for their consistent understanding andsupport for this research, and to Ms. Shiho Hayashida for all her help in
publishing this book.

Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University（RECNA）
1-14 Bunkyo-machi, Nagasaki, 852-8521, Japan
TEL. +81 95 819 2164 / FAX. +81 95 819 2165
E-mail. recna_staff@ml.nagasaki-u.ac.jp
http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp

Proposal: A Comprehensive Approachto a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
Co-Authors (in alphabetical order)
Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA)HIROSE Satoshi (Professor, Vice Director)
NAKAMURA Keiko (Associate Professor)
SUZUKI Tatsujiro (Professor, Vice Director)
UMEBAYASHI Hiromichi (Professor, Director) Chief Editor

CONTENTS
Summary and Proposals ……………………………………………………………… 01
Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………… 20
Chapter 1

Northeast Asiaʼs Current State of Dependence on
Nuclear Weapons ………………………………………………………… 24■ Japanʼs Dependence on Nuclear Deterrence■ South Koreaʼs Dependence on Nuclear Deterrence■ North Koreaʼs Nuclear Deterrence Development■ Mongoliaʼs Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status

Chapter 2

Demand from the Global Nuclear Disarmament Objective … 40

Chapter 3

7KH6LJQLÀFDQFHRID1RUWKHDVW$VLD
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and the Halperin Proposal … 46

Chapter 4

The Possibility of North Koreaʼs Denuclearization ……… 52■ The Kim Jong-un Regimeʼs Policy Intent■ The Technological Side of North Koreaʼs Nuclear Weapon Capabilities■ The International Response to North Koreaʼs Developing Nuclear
and Missile Capabilities

Chapter 5

A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearizationof Northeast Asia ………………………………………………………… 62■ Validity of Halperinʼs Six Elements■ Proposal of a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement
for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”■ Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty■ Current State of Affairs in Nations Involvedin the Comprehensive Approach for a NEA-NWFZ■ Views to the Diplomatic Process

Box 1
Box 2
Box 3
Box 4
Box 5
Box 6

Six-Party Talk Timeline ………………………………………………………………
Existing Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones in the world ………………………………
Proposals on a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone ……………………
North Korean Nuclear Tests …………………………………………………………
North Korean Satellite/Ballistic Missile Launch Tests …………………………
UN Security Council Resolutions and related statements
on North Koreaʼs Nuclear Tests and Projectile Launches ………………………

35
42
48
55
57
59

REFERENCES ………………………………………………………………………………… 72
APPENDIX International Workshop Program (#1 〜 #3) ……………………………… 82

Summary and Proposals
Introduction
Nagasaki University was a victim of the atomic bombing in August 1945 and founded
the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNA) three years ago. This proposal
is written by the RECNA. The proposal will be submitted to concerned states and theinternational community and has been written with the sincerest of hopes that it serves as aproposal for policies so that Japan, being a victim of nuclear bombs, can contribute to realizing
a nuclear weapon free world.
Japanʼs civil society played a critical role in conceptualizing a Northeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ) over past decades. However, the various forms that a NEANWFZ might take did not gain much traction with states in the region (except for Mongolia)
although these forms gained substantial local and city government-level support. In 2011, aconceptual breakthrough occurred when renowned international political scientist Morton H.
Halperin (former Special Assistant to the U.S. President) was commissioned by Nautilus
Institute to provide a framework whereby states could establish the geo-strategic conditions
that would realistically realize a NEA-NWFZ. Halperin proposed to establish a NEA-NWFZ as
an element of a Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in NEA. He presented thisconcept at the Nautilus Institute workshop in Tokyo in November 2011.
The RECNA has held three international workshops in Nagasaki, Seoul and Tokyo inorder to examine and develop the Halperinʼs proposal, and to make this Proposal. The
workshops received support from other institutes that share interests in the comprehensive
approach, including the Nautilus Institute. However, the RECNA is responsible for allcontents of this Proposal.
This Proposal does not deal with the entire scope of Northeast Asian security; instead,
it focuses on denuclearization issues while considering the implication denuclearization would
have on regional security. On top of denuclearization, Northeast Asia is faced with various hot
button issues, such as; territorial disputes, disputes on historical records, and rising militarytensions stemming from United States, Japan, and Chinaʼs new defense policies. Issues
surrounding the denuclearization of Northeast Asia are not entirely unrelated to these
problems; however, as this proposal will demonstrate, the NEA-NWFZ can be pursued
relatively independently from these other issues. Furthermore, solving the nuclear weapons

01Chapter 1 Northeast Asiaʼs Current State of Dependence on Nuclear Weaponsissue will have a positive inÁuence on various other issues.
th

The 70 memorial of the end of the PaciÀc War is in 2015. In Northeast Asia, Japanʼscolonization of Korea came to an end in 1945 and brought with it the National Liberation of
Korea. However, it was the same year that led to the division of the Korean Peninsula andstrained U.S.-North Korea and Japan-North Korea relations that are ongoing even today. Itthwill also be the 70 anniversary since the atomic bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. There
are people (“hibaku-sha”) still living in Japan and both Koreas who are experiencing medical
aftereffects from the bombings and are “living testaments to the inhumanity” of nuclear
weapons. We hope that this proposal will contribute to satisfying the yearning of the region
for the uniÀcation of the Korean Peninsula and for a world free from nuclear weapons.

Chapter 1
Northeast Asiaʼs Current State of Dependence on Nuclear Weapons
ROK and Japanʼs Dependence on Extended Nuclear Deterrence
The Northeast Asian regionʼs nuclear confrontation is severely aggravated as North
Koreaʼs nuclear weapons development program is currently triggering Japan and South
Koreaʼs stronger dependence on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. The result is aheightened risk of nuclear weapon use, whether intentional or not, and is diminishinginternational efforts towards achieving a nuclear weapon free world. There are many
intertwining elements creating the current situation. These elements include North Korea
feeling the U.S. nuclear weapons are a threat to its regime, a risk that there will be a growingbase of Japanese and South Korean proponents for developing their own nuclear weapons
should their trust in depending on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence be rattled, and the factthat strengthening of the missile defense system in the region as a means of extended
deterrence could be seen as a threat to China. In order to resolve recent nuclear tensions in
the Northeast Asian region, it is necessary to consider resolving all these issues.
The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 and radioactive
contamination of the Japanese Àshing boats in 1954 by a U.S. hydrogen bomb test have left ananti-nuclear weapon sentiment in the hearts of many Japanese. As a result, the Atomic
Energy Basic Act of 1955 banned the military use of nuclear energy. On the other end of thespectrum, were Japanese policies adopted to depend on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence
following Chinese nuclear weapon tests in 1964. Introduced by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in
1968, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles stated that “Japan shall neither possess,02

Chapter 1 Northeast Asiaʼs Current State of Dependence on Nuclear Weapons

manufacture, nor allow to bring in nuclear weapons”, and was coupled with Japanʼsdependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Since focus has been placed on North Koreaʼs
nuclear weapon development program, Japan and the U.S. have enhanced discussions on
possible measures to maintain the credibility of the extended nuclear deterrence, yet thediscussion about the non-nuclear elements of deterrence has also been included. The “Twoplus-Two” meeting involving the top defense and diplomatic officials from the two nationsreafÀrmed its “commitment to the security of Japan through the full range of U.S. militarycapabilities, including nuclear and conventional” (Paragraph 1.6).
Even though Japan has non-nuclear weapon policies in place, the fear of Japangaining its own nuclear arsenal does not go away. The demeanor of a small fraction ofpoliticians and certain government bureaucraciesʼ attitudes towards nuclear weapon
dependence are typically the cause of these anxieties (Paragraph 1.7). One reason for
suspicions over Japanʼs intent towards nuclear armament is how Japan is incapable ofproducing a logical explanation for its plutonium policies. In context of the Northeast Asian
region, this issue has become a backdrop to South Koreaʼs argument for its nuclear
sovereignty (Paragraph 1.8).
North Korea and South Korea were at the peak of a possible nuclear war during theCold War. Beginning in 1958, the United States began deploying tactical nuclear weapons inSouth Korea, which were not removed until 1991 following the end of the Cold War. It goes
without saying that South Koreaʼs armed forces had cooperated with U.S. armed forces inmaintaining nuclear war scenarios in ROK. In 1992, however, the two Koreas made agroundbreaking Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula. It came into effect together with “The Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange between the South and the North”. The preambleof the Joint Declaration even stated that their goal was “to create conditions and an
environment favorable to peace and peaceful unification of Korea”. Thus, the declaration
linked denuclearization intimately to reuniÀcation. The Joint Declaration on Denuclearization
not only banned the production and development of nuclear weapons but also agreed to “notpossess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities” (Paragraph 1.10).
The South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission set forth by the Joint Declaration
on Denuclearization crumbled and it became evident that North Korea was developing its
nuclear program. Aimed at preventing the development, South Korea worked closely with the
U.S. to carry out diplomatic efforts. South Korea simultaneously strengthened its dependence
on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. The ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting, which has
been held annually since 1968, between the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of
National Defense has repeatedly reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to provide its “Nuclear

03

Chapter 1 Northeast Asiaʼs Current State of Dependence on Nuclear Weapons

Umbrella”. The two nations agreed to intensify the extended deterrence following North
Koreaʼs Àrst nuclear weapons test in 2006 and established the “U.S.-South Korea Extended
Deterrence Policy Committee” in 2011. The U.S. stated that it would “provide and strengthen
extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military capabilities, including the
U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities”, which once againemphasized the element of non-nuclear, conventional weapons in its extended deterrence(Paragraph 1.11).
While there had been a demand in South Korea for nuclear sovereignty to develop a
nuclear program, North Koreaʼs development of their nuclear program gave steam to newefforts in South Korea. Following North Koreaʼs third nuclear test in February 2013, a survey
showed 70% of the South Korean population backed developing their own nuclear weaponsand several influential politicians reportedly expressed their desire for nuclear armament.
Also, South Korea strongly emphasized their desire to amend the ROK-U.S. Agreement for
Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy into an agreement that includes a “comprehensive consent”
clause similar to the one that Japan has under the Japan-U.S. Agreement, which continuously
allows Japan to reprocess spent nuclear fuel.
In accordance with the Obama administrationʼs “Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)”, therole of nuclear weapons in nuclear deterrence is to be reduced while strengthening
conventional weaponʼs role for extended deterrence in South Korea and Japan, which is awelcome move. Considering the tremendous destruction that nuclear weapons can cause,
however, the sheer presence of any nuclear component in extended deterrence prevents
alleviating nuclear tensions in Northeast Asia. It is necessary to develop the concept of“non-military (deterrence) – strong, trusting political relationships between the
United States and its allies and partners”, as was referred to in the same NPR.

North Koreaʼs Development of Nuclear Deterrence
The graphite-moderated reactor came online in 1986 after North Korea signed theNPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) in 1985. However, confrontations
over the IAEAʼs inspection regarding the DPRKʼs initial declaration, as required by the NPT,
became heated and North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993. The
situation led to rigid U.S.-DPRK meetings, which negotiations became the prototype of all
following meetings regarding North Koreaʼs nuclear program.
It is, therefore, safe to say that the fundamental logic for North Koreaʼs nuclear
weapons program and its possible denuclearization was set in the agreement reached in June
1993 at the U.S.-DPRK Meeting. This fundamental logic had repeatedly appeared in later
negotiations with some modifications. The logic is built towards achieving the following

04

Chapter 1 Northeast Asiaʼs Current State of Dependence on Nuclear Weapons

two principles: “guaranteeing the security assurance against the threat and use offorce, including nuclear weapons” and “denuclearizing Korean Peninsula withSURSHUYHULÀFDWLRQV\VWHPV”.
The 1994 “Agreed Framework between the U.S. and the DPRK” added the element ofenergy assistance. The Joint Statement agreed on at the Six-Party Talks in September 2005
added the element of consultations between the concerned state parties with the intent of
normalizing U.S.-North Korea and North Korea-Japan diplomatic relations and to promote a
lasting peace in Northeast Asia. Even today, this important element should form the base ofagreements. As will be demonstrated later, the September 19thJoint Statement remains

crucial, even in 2015. North Koreaʼs diplomatic strategy since 2006, in which the DPRK
continued to negotiate for denuclearization while conducting nuclear tests, can be deÀned as a
diplomacy that attempts to eliminate the threat against its regime and to normalizeinternational relations by playing both the processes and the products ofdeveloping nuclear deterrence as diplomatic cards. It must be assumed that such
diplomatic strategy will continue taking place.
The 1994 Agreed Framework between the U.S. and the DPRK and its establishment of
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in 1995 demonstrated
promising success towards the end of 2000 (Paragraph 1.13). However, the U.S. policy did
not continue because of the administration change, and the relationship between the U.S. andNorth Korea, which the Bush administration viewed as being a part of the Axis of Evil,became its worst. As a result, the KEDO process crumbled. Certain success and the ultimate
failure of the KEDO process left a lesson to be learned. One lesson, which could be a precedentmoving forward, is that KEDO succeeded in a multilateral scheme where the EU and nineother countries were involved in the U.S.-ROK-Japan centered program. On the other hand, amechanism must be introduced to prevent hard-earned agreements from failing when acentral player goes through administration changes.
The Six-Party Talks agreed on initial actions in February 2007 that were in line with
the September 19thJoint Statement and North Korea froze three Yongbyon facilities (5megawatt Experimental Reactor, the Reprocessing Plant (Radiochemical Laboratory) and the
Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Facility). They also established Àve working groups. One group
deserving of attention is the “Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism”. It was a
possible platform for a more comprehensive discussion relating to denuclearization. In Octoberof the same year, the six parties agreed on its second phase actions, which called for “thedisablement of three facilities at Yongbyon” and “a complete and correct declaration of all its
nuclear programs” by North Korea. It was estimated that, as of April 2009, the former
agreement to disable North Koreaʼs facilities was 80% completed. Reaching an impasse on the05

Chapter 2 Demand from the Global Nuclear Disarmament Objective

latter, the Six-Party Talks have not been held since December 2008.
In April 2009, North Korea announced its launch of the Juche Nuclear Industry,
decided to build an experimental light water reactor in Yongbyon, and publicized that it would
begin enriching uranium to feed the reactor. In November 2010, Siegfried Hecker, a former
Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and other U.S. experts were invited to take atour of the Yongbyon facilities. The Kim Jong-un regimeʼs nuclear deterrence policies and thepossibility of denuclearization will be detailed in Chapter 4. North Koreaʼs diplomatic
position towards denuclearization remains unchanged, however, in that it is attempting todevelop nuclear deterrence and to remove a threat towards its regime.

Chapter 2
Demand from the Global Nuclear Disarmament Objective
The strong tide of global efforts, following President Obamaʼs Prague speech, towards
achieving a “Nuclear Weapon Free World” first manifested itself in the NPT Review
Conferenceʼs 2010 Final Document. Each state party agreed that it “affirms that all Statesneed to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain aworld without nuclear weapons” and “expresses its deep concern at the catastrophic
humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons”. Moreover, all State Parties
committed to “pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective ofachieving a world without nuclear weapons”. Namely, in this commitment, all state parties,
both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, agreed to place political obligations on state
governments to evaluate security policies that stood in the way of achieving this goal and toalter such policies (Paragraph 2.1).
In 2013, the UN General Assembly held the sessions of the “Open-ended Working
Group (OEWG) to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament
negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons”. The
OEWG report clarified the political obligation placed on each and every signatory
government per the 2010 agreement by noting a new concept that “States have differentiatedroles and functions”. It goes without saying that nuclear weapon states were emphasized toveriÀably reduce and eventually eliminate its nuclear weapons. The OEWG report, though,added that non-nuclear weapon States “have a role in promoting global nuclear disarmament”
and that non-nuclear weapon States under extended nuclear deterrence could fulÀll the role of“reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines”. The OEWG further discussed

06

Chapter 3 The Signiﬁcance of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and the Halperin Proposal“the role of nuclear weapon free zones in challenging the value and legitimacy of
nuclear weapons” (Paragraph 2.2).
A deepening awareness of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapon use has led to a
no-use declaration that states, “It is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that
nuclear weapons are never used again, under any circumstances”. Certain states attempted to
discourage such an argument from growing by emphasizing the critical role nuclear deterrence
plays in guaranteeing security. Analyzing the controversy objectively, however, it iscontradictory to emphasize the impact on humanity that using nuclear weapons could have
while refusing to declare to not use nuclear weapons. This contradiction can be resolved
by pursuing security policies that deny the very possibility of using nuclear
weapons (Paragraph 2.3).
Included in the final document of 2010 NPT Review Conference was the need “tofurther diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security
concepts, doctrines and policies”. This statement is significant in that, on top of reducing
nuclear weapon hardware, it calls for a reduction of nuclear weapon policies. A standardized
reporting format is necessary to assure the transparency of these reductions. Therefore, theNon-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), which is a 12-nation group that
includes Japan, has developed such a standard reporting format. One criterion in the standard
format was to report “measures taken to diminish the role and signiÀcance of nuclear weapons
in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies”. It was pointed out that states withsecurity policies dependent on extended nuclear deterrence were also required to report thiscriterion (Paragraph 2.4).


6LQFHDGHÀQLQJFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIGLVFXVVLRQVUHJDUGLQJREOLJDWLRQVXQGHU

the NPT is a demand for policy changes by nations dependent on extended nuclear
weapon deterrence. Japan and South Korea setting policies towards achieving a
Northeast Asia nuclear weapon free zone would contribute greatly to increasing the
NPTʼs credibility and promoting denuclearization of the world (Paragraph 2.5).

Chapter 3
The Significance of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon
Free Zone and the Halperin Proposal
North Koreaʼs developing nuclear weapons program intensified Japan and South
Koreaʼs dependence on nuclear deterrence, which has heightened the regionʼs nuclear

07

Chapter 3 The Signiﬁcance of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and the Halperin Proposal

confrontation. Anxieties of a nuclear domino effect in Japan and South Korea cannot beignored. The situation would be further complicated should Japan, South Korea, and the U.S.
implement a joint missile defense program as a military response under the assumption that
North Koreaʼs developing ballistic missile program is linked to the development in their
nuclear weapons program. The complication arises from the fact that the missile defense
program would theoretically diminish the strength of Chinaʼs strategic nuclear weapons.
The regionʼs progressing nuclear dependence runs counter to the international
communityʼs goal of achieving a “Nuclear Weapon Free World”. The reaction to heightened
regional tensions caused by North Koreaʼs nuclear weapons should not be to respond withstrengthening dependence on extended nuclear deterrence or any military might, as iscurrently the case. Rather, focus should be placed on establishing a Northeast Asia Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ), which would be the foundation for a cooperative security
system in the region. ReÁecting on the political obligations developed in the global nuclear
disarmament arguments after the 2010 NPT Review Conference and placed on non-nuclear
weapon states under extended nuclear deterrence, Japan and South Korea have an importantrole to play in this effort. Being the only country to have experienced nuclear bombings, Japan
has an exceedingly large responsibility (Paragraph 3.1).
There have been various, detailed proposals since the end of the Cold War for a NEANWFZ. At present, the Three-plus-Three Arrangement, including its various modiÀcations, isconsidered to be a concise and pragmatic, fundamental structure. In this scheme, Japan,
South Korea and North Korea would be the “Intrazonal States” and the U.S., Russia, andChina̶nuclear weapon states under NPT with deep ties to the region̶would be the“Neighboring Nuclear Weapon States”. The Intrazonal States would form a geographic
nuclear weapon free zone and would be required to assume non-nuclear obligations similar toother NWFZ treaties. The Neighboring Nuclear Weapon States would be required to provide
security assurances not to attack the zone with nuclear weapons and, hopefully, withconventional weapons (negative security assurances) as parties of the treaty itself rather thanof its protocol (Paragraph 3.2). Details of the NEA-NWFZ are found in Chapter 6.
The 2011 Halperin Proposal was significant in that it shifted the framework of thearguments on a NEA-NWFZ from scheme-centered arguments to approach-centeredarguments. In order to overcome the difficulties he had faced in working towards North
Korean denuclearization, Halperin proposed establishing the NEA-NWFZ as one of the six
elements for a “Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia”. Halperinsuggested that six elements to be included in the Comprehensive Agreement are as follows: 1.
Termination of the State of War, 2. Creation of a Permanent Council on Security, 3. Mutual
Declaration of No Hostile Intent, 4. Provisions of Assistance for Nuclear and Other Energy, 5.

08

Chapter 4 The Possibility of North Koreaʼs Denuclearization

Termination of Sanctions, and 6. Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.
The Halperin Proposal has been backed for the following reasons that include
Halperinʼs own arguments for the case: 1. Accepting North Koreaʼs de facto nuclear weapon
state may collapse the international non-proliferation system and lead to a domino effect inJapan and South Korea. 2. Therefore, international efforts, which should be tangible, should
continue so long as there remains even a sliver of hope that North Korea can be denuclearized.
3. There must be a new approach that avoids placing blame for stalled past negotiations
towards denuclearization of Korean Peninsula on one another. 4. Although there is a need for
a comprehensive approach that simultaneously solves multiple pending issues, the approachshould not attempt to solve all of the regional security issues at once. Rather, it should be a
restrained approach that comprehensively solves issues directly related to denuclearization. 5.
Reaching an agreement on the denuclearization issues could shape the discussion on solving
the regionʼs other security issues.

Chapter 4
The Possibility of North Koreaʼs Denuclearization
At the March 31, 2013 Central Committee of the Workersʼ Party of Korea, First
Secretary Kim Jong-un introduced a new strategic line on “carrying out economic construction
and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously” and reaffirmed such a “promoting two
fronts simultaneously” strategy during his 2015 New Year Address. The new strategy is amanifestation of a crucial change in that it has relativized its “military first (Songun)
doctrine”. Depending on the circumstances, tensions could potentially rise as high as they did
in 2010. North Koreaʼs provocative shock techniques have been analyzed as being aimed ataltering the rules of the game and as difÀcult as it may be, it is crucial to be patient and reactwith a level head (Paragraph 4.1).
The North Korean Supreme Peopleʼs Assembly adopted a “Law on Consolidating
Position of Nuclear Weapons State” in April 2013 and set forth polices and doctrines for use of
nuclear weapons. Around the same time, North Korea announced the Yongbyon graphitemoderated reactor would resume operations, and satellite imagery taken in August 2013
showed expanded uranium enrichment facilities. These developments implied that North
Korea was solidifying its long-term position on maintaining its nuclear deterrence. But thisdoes not necessarily mean that North Korea contends that itʼs denuclearization is possible
only after “the global denuclearization”, or in other words after achieving a “World without

09

Chapter 4 The Possibility of North Koreaʼs Denuclearization

Nuclear Weapons”, as it was once stated by North Korea in the spring of 2013.
In June 2013 the DPRK National Defense Commission emphasized that thedenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula means “the complete one that calls fordenuclearizing the whole peninsula including South Korea and aims at totally ending the U.S.
nuclear threat to the DPRK” and then proposed “senior-level talks between the authorities of
the DPRK and the U.S.” North Korea has since repeated the same line of argument for its
denuclearization on the condition of complete elimination of threats. It can be inferred that
North Korea is staying their course in maintaining their nuclear deterrence while
attempting to diplomatically remove the U.S. threat. It should be considered that aVXIÀFLHQWSRVVLELOLW\RIGHQXFOHDUL]LQJ1RUWK.RUHDVWLOOH[LVWV(Paragraph 4.2).
Because of the limited availability of information, assessments of North Koreaʼs
nuclear weapon capabilities often differ. One thing that is certain from the three nuclear
weapon tests is that North Korea does in fact possess nuclear explosive devices. What has notbeen agreed on is whether or not North Korea has weaponized the devices to be loaded ondelivery vehicles (Paragraph 4.3). As of the end of 2014, it has been estimated that North
Korea is in possession of enough Àssile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) to
produce twelve nuclear warheads. According to the available information, North Koreaʼs
nuclear Àssile material production capabilities are rather limited. However, it is difÀcult topredict how North Koreaʼs capabilities will develop in the coming future. It is important torecognize that as more time lapses until denuclearization negotiations resume, themore time is available for the situation to worsen (Paragraph 4.4).
Since Àring its Àrst long-range ballistic missile, Taepodong-1, in August 1998, North
Korea has launched Àve long-range ballistic missiles/satellites. Rather than showing any signsof contradiction, publicly available technological information shows that all three launches
since 2009 were satellite launches. It would then be reasonable to assume that the 1998 and2006 launches carried the same purpose. However, it goes without saying that each of theselaunches leads to improving North Koreaʼs ballistic missile launching capabilities. The North
Korean missile issues should be treated as an issue for the dual-use and crossover
between space and ballistic missile technologies. The discussion needs to begin by
exploring what standards are expected of all nations (Paragraph 4.5).
The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly made Presidential Statements
and resolutions in response to North Koreaʼs nuclear weapon tests and “launches using
ballistic missile technology”. Nuclear weapon issues can be traced back to North Koreaʼsannouncement to withdraw from the NPT in 1993, whereas missile issues can be traced backto the moratorium on ballistic missile test launches that resulted from the U.S.-DPRK talks
following the Taepodong-1 launch at the end of August 1998. It is important to recall that the10

Chapter 5 A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia

U.N. Security Council resolution demanding North Korea to not conduct “any launch using
ballistic missile technology” Àrst appeared in Resolution 1874 in 2009, which was the resolvedin context of banning North Koreaʼs nuclear weapons development. When the primary issue
of weapons of mass destruction (especially nuclear weapons) at hand is resolved,
ballistic missile issue will become relatively a lesser concern (Paragraph 4.6).

Chapter 5
A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia
Halperinʼs six elements included in his Comprehensive Agreement remain necessary.
However, there must be a detailed deliberation on how to structure such elements into anagreement. Considering the processes and details for establishing a peace treaty that replaces
the armistice treaty, the element of “Terminating the Korean War” will be an especiallyenormous undertaking. In fact, what is necessary for a comprehensive approach in its initialstage is a fundamental treaty like something exempliÀed by the “Mutual Declaration of No
Hostile Intent”, which is one of Halperinʼs six elements. It should be a legal instrument to set
political and ethical standards for the future that respects equal sovereignty and establishes a
relationship based on respect and trust. In this respect, similar to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), a Northeast Asia TAC was proposed during theworkshop. As described above, this Proposal suggests that the agreement reached in acomprehensive approach should be composed of both legally enforceable, concise politicalagreements and agreements with details being introduced in phases (Paragraph 5.1).
Addressing the right of peaceful use of nuclear energy is included in Halperinʼs six
elements. This Proposal suggests adding elements regarding the rights of peaceful explorationof space and the ban of all weapons of mass destruction on top of nuclear weapons to thecomprehensive approach. These additional two elements will inevitably be brought up in thediscussion of the six elements. Rather than complicating the entire matter, resolving theseissues will smooth the process (Paragraph 5.2).

Proposal of a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement
for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”
Considering the history of past, failed joint statements among North Korea, U.S. andother countries, Halperin proposes a methodology where a legally binding agreement should
be made Àrst, and then followed by negotiations for details. In principle, this Proposal agrees

11Chapter 5 A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearization of Northeast Asiawith Halperinʼs methodology. When political leadership is weak, however, it can be difÀcult
and take too much time to go through parliamentary processes necessary to ratify legal
instruments (Paragraph 5.3).
Based upon such considerations, the “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the
Denuclearization of Northeast Asia” (CFA) is proposed in this Proposal as an instrument to beconcluded and effectuated by signatures of state heads of the Six-Party Talks. It would also be
possible, in this case, to include speciÀc provisions within the CFA that are requested to be
ratified and become strictly legally binding. Appointing an independent non-governmental,
authoritative expert group for support and verification of CFA processes could alleviate
concerns regarding the CFA being overruled by changing administrations. The expert groupwill be deeply involved in the process leading up to manifesting the CFA, and work for supportand veriÀcation to ensure continuity of negotiations after an initial agreement is reached.
SpeciÀc Chapters of a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearizationof Northeast Asia” are divided into “Declaratory” or “Actionable” categories and are composedof the following four (Paragraph 5.4):(1)Declare to terminate the Korean War and provide for mutual nonaggression,
friendship, and equal sovereignty among CFA state parties. States lacking
diplomatic relations will endeavor to succeed in normalizing its diplomatic relations.
Encourage negotiations among states concerned for the Korean War Peace Treaty.
(Declaratory)(2)Assure equal rights to access all forms of energy, including nuclear energy.
Establish a Northeast Asia Energy Cooperation Committee that is dedicated tocontributing to the stability of Northeast Asia and the peaceful reunification of the
Korean Peninsula. The invitation for committee members extends beyond the sixparties and is open to any state or state groups supporting the cause. Participation ofMongolia and Canada would be welcome. (Declaratory. Actionable details will bedecided by the Committee)(3)Agree on a treaty to establish a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. It
will include requirements to join the NPT and other details mandated to achieve a
NWFZ. Signatory states are obligated to join the Chemical Weapons Convention. The
agreement will protect the rights of signatory states for peaceful space exploration inaccordance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. An article will be provided to placecollective sanctions on states in violation of the treaty, while restricting any unilateralsanction imposed by an individual state party on account of treaty matters. (Actionable)(4)Establish a permanent Northeast Asia Security Council. The primary objectiveof this council will be to ensure the implementation of the CFA. The secondary objective

12

Chapter 5 A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia

will be, when appropriate, to serve as a platform for discussions involving various
Northeast Asian security issues. In the future, the council is expected to deal with morecomprehensive security issues. The council could host the veriÀcation mechanisms of
the NEA-NWFZ. The Six-Parties will form the initial members of the Council, while
member states of the Energy Cooperation Committee and any other states offering tocooperate for Northeast Asian security are welcome to be general members.
(Actionable)

Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty
The proposed “Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty” includes
characteristics unique to the region, as shown below:
State Parties: A six party treaty in a “Three-plus-Three Arrangement” (South Korea,
North Korea, and Japan are “Intrazonal States” and the U.S., China, and Russia are“Neighboring Nuclear Weapon States”) would be the most likely to succeed in the current
state of affairs. It would be even more desirable for Mongolia, a country with recognized
Nuclear Weapon Free Status, to join the NEA-NWFZ as a diplomatic strategy followingth

up its 20 anniversary of its nuclear weapon free declaration in 2012 (Paragraph 5.5).
Flexibility in Effectuating the Treaty: Doubts over achieving a NEA-NWFZ
repeatedly point towards the lack of mutual trust between the states within the region.
As the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which overcame difÀculties between Brazil and Argentina toenter into force, demonstrates, however, the system in which articles enter into force canbe Áexible in order to facilitate achieving a NEA-NWFZ. For instance, the entry-into-force
requirements of the NEA-NWFZ treaty can be provided for through ratification by thethree nuclear weapon states (U.S., Russia, China) and two non-nuclear weapon states(Japan and Korea). It may be plausible to provide an option for Japan and Korea towithdraw from the treaty after three to Àve years, if North Korea continues not to join. By
ratifying the treaty under this scheme, Japan and South Korea will enjoy security
assurances sooner against the potential threats from nuclear weapon states other thanthe U.S. As for the beneÀts to North Korea, an article can be included to provide North
Korea with a certain period of time to dismantle its nuclear weapons and facilities, while
the U.S. provides immediate security assurances in exchange for North KoreaʼsratiÀcation (Paragraph 5.6).
Requirements Prior to Negotiations: Considering that states with nuclear
weapons are involved in negotiating a NEA-NWFZ Treaty, there is a need to address theissue of guaranteeing that negotiations are held in good faith once the negotiationscommence. For example, North Korea would be requested to commit to a moratorium of13

Chapter 5 A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia

nuclear weapon tests and other nuclear weapon related activities. The United States,
South Korea, and Japan would likely be requested to commit to a moratorium of joint
military exercises around the Korean Peninsula. Such mutually agreed “prior
moratoriums” should be adopted before negotiations. The “prior moratoriums” should
also explore alleviating current sanctions imposed on North Korea (Paragraph 5.7).
Eliminating Dependence on Extended Nuclear Deterrence: When a NWFZ
treaty is fully implemented, international law prevents the threat or use of nuclear
weapons against the zone. This implies that non-nuclear weapon states within the NWFZ
do not need extended nuclear deterrence or a nuclear umbrella. This is why a NWFZ is arecommendable mechanism towards cooperative security that does not depend on nuclear
weapons. (Because the proposed CFA includes a non-aggression agreement, non-nuclear
weapons states in NEA-NWFZ are protected from attacks and threats by conventional
weapons, as well as by nuclear weapons. Considering past negotiations for a nuclear
weapon-free Korean Peninsula, the possibility of including conventional weapons in the
security assurances exists regarding a NEA-NWFZ.) Nonetheless, there are many
concerns and fear over losing the nuclear umbrella. The argument for the fear is thatstates will be defenseless if one state violates the treaty and either attacks or threatens to
attack other states. However, once a state violates the treaty, the treaty becomes null andvoid; the state of affairs will return to pre-treaty conditions, thus they will not be
defenseless. To further alleviate anxieties, the treaty could provide that states may takesanctions against the offender in accordance with international law and their individual
national constitution (Paragraph 5.8).

Views to the Diplomatic Process
United Nations has recently been a platform for furthering discussions on a NEAMWFZ. The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held in 2013 discussed the NEA-NWFZ.
The results were recommendations to the Secretary General that the UN consider taking
appropriate actions to establish the NWFZ and play a proactive role to establish regional forums
for transparency and trust. Such a proposal coming from the United Nations is a large leap
forward. Mongolian President Elbedgorj expressed his support for the NEA-NWFZ concept at
the United Nations High Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament in September 2013 andreported on the commencement of the “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security” tobuild trust, which was also a major step. As the UN Disarmament Commission reported in 1999,
any initiative to establish a NWFZ must come from the free will of the regional nations
concerned. In this respect, it is essential that Japan and South Korea, individually orcollectively, take initiatives to establish a NEA-NWFZ (Paragraph 5.10).

14

Chapter 5 A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia

Although there may be other possibilities, resuming the Six-Party Talks would beconsidered most appropriate and practical to ensure a credible platform for the discussion of
the “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”.
Reportedly, North Korea, China, and Russia share an afÀrmative attitude towards resuming
the Six-Party Talks at present. Considering that the United States is dealing with a vast
amount of diplomatic problems, it is time for Japan and South Korea to act. Considering the
NPT 2010 Final Document that expresses strong support of the Six-Party Talks, the upcoming2015 NPT Review Conference will be a signiÀcant diplomatic platform to address the issue.

Considering the above analyses, the following proposals are made for a “Comprehensive
Approach to a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon- Free Zone”:

15

Proposal
Proposal One:
Establishing a NEA-NWFZ should not be an attempt at merely
denuclearizing North Korea. Rather, the objective should be to solve
various security issues closely linked to the nuclear issues in Northeast
Asia through concluding a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement(CFA) for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”.
The CFA includes the following in its Chapters: (1) a declaratory chapter to terminate
the Korean War and to provide for mutual non-aggression, friendship, and equal sovereignty,(2) a declaratory chapter to assure equal rights to access all forms of energy, including nuclear
energy, and to establish a Northeast Asia Energy Cooperation Committee that is dedicated tocontributing to the stability of Northeast Asia and the peaceful reuniÀcation of the Korean
Peninsula, (3) a chapter to agree on an actionable treaty to establish a NEA-NWFZ that
includes all the necessary provisions for a NWFZ, (4) an actionable chapter to establish apermanent Northeast Asia Security Council, which will ensure the solid implementation of
the CFA and to be open to discuss the regionʼs other security issues. Through analyzing North
Koreaʼs international and national policies up to the present, this paper concludes there is asufÀcient possibility that North Korea will agree to a properly designed NEA denuclearization
process.

Proposal Two:
In addition to standard provisions for a NWFZ treaty, a NEANWFZ treaty should include the following elements:(1) the treaty will, at the very least, include all six states in the Six-Party Talks. North
Korea, South Korea, and Japan will form a geographic nuclear weapon free zone, and asneighboring nuclear states, U.S., China, and Russia will provide security assurances against
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as well as conventional weapons against the zone,(2) all parties are requested to join the Chemical Weapons Convention, (3) the treaty willassure the rights of peaceful exploration of space as provided for by the Outer Space Treaty,(4) North Korea is obliged to dismantle its nuclear arsenals and related facilities within a time

16

frame with ample allowance, (5) the entry-into-force provision of the treaty will be made withincentives to enhance the likelihood of North Korea, South Korea, and Japan joining thetreaty (Paragraphs 5.5 & 5.6).

Proposal Three:
The Six-Party Talks should be resumed to discuss the“Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization of
Northeast Asia”.
The Six-Party Talks established the working group for “Northeast Asia Peace andSecurity Mechanism”, which signifies its interest in exploring the denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula from a more comprehensive point of view. Considering the NPT 2010 Final
Document strongly supported the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, the international
community should unite to urge the resumption of the Talks before and after the 2015 Review
Conference. Rather than dragging in the past, the resumed Six-Party Talks should take a
fresh and bold approach, such as the “Comprehensive Framework Agreement” proposed here.

Proposal Four:
Utilizing the opportunity of existing international support topromote a NEA-NWFZ, regional non-nuclear states Japan and South
Korea should, individually or collectively, launch an initiative towards
establishing a NEA-NWFZ that includes the “Comprehensive Framework Agreement
for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”. In 2013, the United Nations Advisory Board on
Disarmament Matters recommended the Secretary General to consider appropriate action for
the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ. Also, the Mongolian president expressed his enthusiasm
in support of a NEA-NWFZ at the United Nations High-level Meeting on Nuclear
Disarmament in 2013. As can be found in a 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission
document, establishing a nuclear weapon free zone requires initiatives from the states within
the zone.

17

Proposal Five:
The year 2015 should be used as an opportunity to begin theprocesses for a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for
Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”.
The year is the 70thmemorial of the end of World War II, atomic bombings on

Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and the division of the Korean Peninsula. The international
community, and especially Northeast Asian nations, should make 2015 the year to beginendeavors towards achieving a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for Denuclearizationof Northeast Asia”. The CFA will be the foundation for easing tensions and normalizing
relations in NEA and for moving towards a cooperative regional security system.

Proposal Six:
By proposing to establish a NEA-NWFZ, Japan and South Korea
should fulfil their obligations set forth by the 2010 NPT Review
Conference and contribute to maintaining the credibility of the Treaty.
In the new review cycle following the 2010 NPT Review Conference, all State Parties,
including non-nuclear weapon States, have a political obligation to “pursue policies that are
fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear
weapons” (2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document, Action Plan 1). Furthermore,
instead of focusing solely on the reduction of nuclear weapon hardware, the Review
Conference agreed on the need “to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear
weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies”. In this context, theobligations posed upon non-nuclear weapon States relying on extended nuclear deterrence,such as Japan and South Korea, are clearer.

Proposal Seven:
Concerned states should consider establishing an independent
non-governmental “Expert Group for the Denuclearization of Northeast
Asia” so that denuclearization processes will not be influenced by18

administration changes within the concerned states.
Diplomatic negotiations between nations bear difficulties because they could be
influenced by unrelated international incidents, domestic political shifts, or conflicts.
Negotiations regarding the denuclearization in Northeast Asia have not been an exception. It
is, therefore, necessary to construct a device to minimize such negative influences.
Maintaining the wide-ranging public support, just as support by Japanese heads of local
municipality demonstrated, is one meaningful method of doing so. Furthermore, it isnecessary to consider establishing an “Expert Group for the Denuclearization of Northeast
Asia”, which would contribute towards maintaining stable negotiations by working parallel tothe negotiations. Concerned states should agree to establish and support such an “expert
group”.

19

Introduction

0.1

Nagasaki Medical School, one of the predecessors to Nagasaki University, waslocated just 500 meters away from the epicenter of the atomic bomb dropped by the UnitedStates of America on August 9, 1945. It was the Àrst plutonium bomb ever used in a war Àeldand only the second ever nuclear weapon, following the bombing of Hiroshima and claimed thelives of approximately 900 students and faculty staff on campus during the summer break.
Even today, the names of all who perished are inscribed in a monument at the Universityʼs
School of Medicine. Established as a national university following the war, Nagasaki
University has academically been dedicated to the medical field of radiation treatment.
Despite individual efforts, however, academic contributions to the disarmament of nuclear
weapons have been nonexistent at an organizational level. When U.S. President Obama madehis Prague address in April 2009, it acted as a catalyst for Nagasaki University to establish
the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA) in April
2012. Motivated by its objective to achieve and maintain a nuclear weapon-free world, theRECNA conducts research, disseminates information and is involved in nuclear disarmament
education; working closely alongside Nagasaki City and Nagasaki Prefecture. The results of
RECNAʼs first research project are being published in this book entitled “Proposal: A
Comprehensive Approach to a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone”.

20

0.2

As a victim of nuclear weapons, Japan should adopt a non-nuclear security policy if it

intends to further contribute to global nuclear disarmament, which will make it important topresent any policy options for the government to consider. This became RECNAʼs motivation
to delve into the research Àeld of a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in Northeast Asia. With
the expertise of the RECNA staff in mind, the NWFZ was also an optimal Àeld of research for
RECNA. Japanʼs civil society played a critical role in conceptualizing a Northeast Asia NWFZ
(NEA-NWFZ) over past decades. However, the various potential configurations of an NEANWFZ had limited appeal to states in the region (except Mongolia), despite gaining
substantial local and city government-level support. In 2011, a conceptual breakthroughoccurred when renowned international political scientist Morton H. Halperin (former Special
Assistant to the U.S. President) was commissioned by the Nautilus Institute to provide aframework whereby states could establish the geo-strategic conditions that would realisticallyachieve an NEA-NWFZ. Halperin proposed establishing an NEA-NWFZ as an element of a“Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in NEA (HALPERIN 2011) and presented
this concept at the Nautilus Institute workshop on East Asian Nuclear Security in Tokyo in
November 2011. This process-oriented concept was quickly adopted as a basis for
implementing an NWFZ strategy in various countries, including Japan. Against this backdrop,
the RECNA set out a research project entitled “Developing a Comprehensive Approach to a
Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone”.

0.3

Since 2012, the project organized three annual international workshops, which

focused on examining a comprehensive approach to establishing an NEA-NWFZ. The Àrstworkshop was entitled “Developing a Comprehensive Approach to an NEA-NWFZ: WorkshopI”; held at Nagasaki University in December 2012 to share the research objective and widely
disseminate Halperinʼs proposal. The second workshop held at Hanshin University in Seoul
in June 2013 was entitled “Envisioning Northeast Asia Peace and Security System:
Developing a Comprehensive Approach to an NEA-NWEZ Workshop II”. The program andtitle of the second conference were deemed Àtting, given the upcoming 60thanniversary of

the Korean Armistice Agreement in July 2013. The third conference, held in Tokyo in
September 2014, was entitled “Denuclearization of Northeast Asia and of the World −Developing a Comprehensive Approach to NEA-NWFZ: Workshop III”. In consideration of
the approaching year of 2015, which is the 70thanniversary of the atomic bombings in

Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the year of the NPT Review Conferences, the theme of a NEANWFZ was discussed in the context of global denuclearization at the third workshop. The
programs of the three workshops are attached in the appendix of this publication. This
paper is focused on nuclear issues in NEA, which is important for global nuclear

21

disarmament as well. Accordingly, this paper does not try to propose solutions to resolve all
security issues in Northeast Asia.

0.4

Halperin, who proposed the Comprehensive Agreement, has participated in all threeworkshops, which the Nautilus Institute, Hanshin Universityʼs Center for Peace and Public
Integrity, Mongolian NGO Blue Banner and the Hiroshima Peace Institute cooperated toorganize. The Nautilus Institute in particular, which has been dedicated to solving North
Korean security and energy issues and organized the 2011 workshop in Tokyo where Halperin
initially proposed the Comprehensive Agreement and follow-up workshops in Washington D.C.
and others, has been a close partner of RECNAʼs research project. Its Executive Director,
Peter Hayes, participated in all three workshops, while Hanshin Universityʼs Center for Peaceand Public Integrity hosted the second workshop in Seoul. Thus, three workshops have beensuccessful due to the participation and cooperation of many individuals and institutions.
However, RECNA will prepare this proposal, the outcome of the research project, in its own
capacity and also assume responsibility for all contents herein.

0.5

The decision to publish this Proposal in 2015 is meaningful. Even though Northeast

Asia experienced a historic turning point in 1945 when the Asia-PaciÀc War came to a close,remnants of the event continue to cause turmoil in the region. Considering the fact that 2015thmarks the 70 anniversary of the end of the war, the people of the region hope it will herald aleap of progress in resolving pending regional issues. Although the Korean Peninsula wasliberated from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, this year marked the starting point of thedivision that persists today. The nation is yearning for reunification, but military tensions
between North and South Korea remain unabated and a normal relationship has yet to beestablished between North Korea and Japan and North Korea and the U.S. The year of 1945
also marked the Àrst ever wartime use of nuclear bombs, on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. There
are still many atomic bomb survivors (“hibakusha”) in Japan and Korea who continue to sufferfrom lingering medical aftereffects. Despite advancing years, they continue to appeal to makeNagasaki the last place on Earth to have ever experienced a nuclear bombing and realize a
Nuclear Weapon-Free World. By proposing a comprehensive approach to a NEA-NWFZ, thispublication wishes to contribute to and capitalize on the 70thanniversary so that it may

become a critical turning point for the future.

22

23

Chapter 1

Northeast Asiaʼs Current State of
Dependence on Nuclear Weapons

1.1

This chapter outlines each Northeast Asian countryʼs current state of dependence on

nuclear weapons and the influence it has on the international security relationship in theregion. The four nations in the region subject to this review are Japan, the Republic of Korea(South Korea, ROK), the Democratic Peopleʼs Republic of Korea (North Korea, DPRK) andMongolia. Although Mongolia is also geographically a neighbor to Central Asian nations, withwhich it maintains close relations, the state identifies itself as a nation of Northeast Asia
(ENKHSAIKHAN 2012). The Peopleʼs Republic of China (China) and the Russian Federation(Russia) have small portions of territorial areas that fall into the Northeast Asian region andthe United States of America (U.S.) has military bases located in South Korea and Japan.
These three nations, all nuclear weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT), are involved in the nuclear weapons policies of the aforementioned four nations in theregion. Accordingly, the relationship between these nuclear weapon states and the four NEA
nations will be examined when necessary. Holistic discussions regarding the international
security of the region, require discussing hot-button issues such as territorial disputes,
historical acknowledgements and risks of military balance at an escalated level arising from
Chinaʼs strengthening military capabilities, Japanʼs growing military strength and policy andthe U.S. rebalancing its Asia-PaciÀc presence. Issues surrounding the denuclearization24

of Northeast Asia are not entirely unrelated to these aforementioned problems;
however, as this proposal will demonstrate, the theme of regional denuclearization
can be pursued relatively independently. Furthermore, solving the nuclear weaponsissue will boost solving various other international security issues in the region.

1.2

This chapter concludes that the current state of Northeast Asiaʼs dependence on

nuclear deterrence is best described by a picture of North Koreaʼs nuclear armament policy
driving Japan and South Korea to intensify their dependence on an extended U.S. nuclear
deterrent, which, in turn, results in the region remaining in a state of high nuclear
confrontation. The result is a heightened risk of the tragic scenario of nuclear weapons being
used, intentionally or accidentally and undermines the international communityʼs efforts torealize a nuclear weapon-free world. It also solidiÀes and perpetuates the ground for a nuclear
domino effect, where South Korea and Japan lean toward their own nuclear armament. The
U.S. extended deterrence however, which is strengthened to cope with the North Korea
nuclear program, includes not only nuclear but also non-nuclear deterrence (particularly
missile defense). This shift began with U.S. President Bushʼs 2001 “Nuclear Posture Review”
which introduced “New Triads” (U.S. DOD 2002), which the Obama administration built on in
the context of “reducing the role of nuclear weapons” in its “Nuclear Posture Review” in 2010
(U.S. DOD 2010). Given the tremendous destruction that nuclear weapons can cause,
however, their political signiÀcance remains relevant, even under extended nuclear deterrencewith fewer nuclear components, which is why North Korea continues to perceive the U.S.
extended deterrence as a threat to overthrow its regime. The result is North Koreaʼs constantnuclear weapons policies, in which it Áaunts its development of nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles capabilities as deterrence capabilities to nuclear attacks and as diplomatic cards fornegotiations to eliminate the threat of being overthrown.

1.3

Northeast Asiaʼs dependence on nuclear weapons is characterized by anothersignificant trait, which originates from the relationship among the U.S., China and Japan.
The nuclear tensions between the U.S. and China, meanwhile, arise from opposing global
strategies. Though initially caused by confrontations regarding the political status of Taiwan,
modern-day nuclear tensions reflect a fight for hegemony. Conversely, Japan, which chose
independence under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty following WWII, made it clear that it willprotect itself from Chinaʼs nuclear force by leveraging the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence,
after China conducted nuclear tests in 1964. China, however, sees the provision of the U.S.
extended nuclear deterrence to Japan as intended to work against China to start with. The
recent Japanese request to strengthen the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence against North

25

Korea has inevitably fueled suggestions that it is also directed at China. Regardless of the factthat the U.S. has reduced the role of nuclear weapons in its present-day extended deterrence,the situation with China remains unchanged, particularly because the current U.S. extended
deterrence capabilities, which includes missile defense capabilities as the core component, will
neutralize, or at least weaken Chinaʼs strategic nuclear strength. In this way, even though
Japanʼs response to North Koreaʼs nuclear development program is regional, the response will
reawaken global nuclear rivalry and represents another characteristic of the nature of nuclear
dependence in Northeast Asia, which cannot be ignored. Conversely, if Northeast Asiaʼscurrent situation of nuclear dependence were transformed through measures allowing theextended deterrence to be effectively reduced, it would contribute substantially to global
nuclear disarmament.

1.4

North Korea, South Korea and China share concerns over Japan becoming a nuclear

armed state. In 1990, Major General Stackpole of the U.S. Forces Japan, stated that the roleof the United States military in Japan, as per the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, was to act as
the “cap of a bottle” to prevent Japan from re-emerging as a military superpower. The
generalʼs frank statement reflects fear among Japanʼs neighboring countries of Japan
becoming a military superpower and obtaining nuclear arms. The Chinese and South Korean
governments have questioned Japanʼs intentions over its recent stockpiling of plutonium;
clearly, concerns regarding Japanʼs nuclear armament have not faded. With regard to therecent debate reviewing Japanʼs right to collective self-defense, Professor Joseph Nye pointed
out that the need for such collective self-defense capabilities must be confirmed andemphasized the importance of avoiding antagonism with China and South Korea, who arewary of Japanʼs right-wing extremism and militarism (NYE 2014). In light of Japanʼs current
situation, there is undeniably concern that Japan could potentially harness its economic,
technological and industrial capabilities to strengthen its military, including nuclear weapons(NAKANO 2014). Considering the fact that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons andChina expanding its military prowess, experts in the field warn that there is legitimate
concern over Japan becoming a nuclear armed state if Japanʼs trust in the U.S. “Nuclear
Umbrella” wavers and the nuclear threat in Asia grows (CHOSUN ILBO 2013).

Japanʼs Dependence on Nuclear Deterrence

1.5

As a non-nuclear weapon state, Japan signed the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons Treaty (NPT) in June 1976 and guaranteed the international community that it
would not possess nuclear weapons. The nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in

26

August 1945 and radiation exposure on tuna Àshing boats from U.S. hydrogen bomb tests on
the Bikini Atoll in March 1954 have since cemented opposition to nuclear weapons within
Japanese civil society. Japan enacted the Atomic Energy Basic Law in 1955 and began
developing nuclear energy. It reads, “The research, development and utilization of nuclear
energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, shall aim to ensure safety and shall be performed
independently under democratic administration and the results obtained shall be publicizedso as to actively contribute to international cooperation.” (Article 2) and thus prohibits themilitary use of nuclear energy. When China conducted its nuclear weapon tests in 1964, Japan
reaffirmed the aforementioned article and decided to rely on the U.S. extended nuclear
deterrence. This saw Japan adopt three Non-Nuclear Principles stating that “Japan shallneither possess, nor manufacture, nor allow the bringing in of nuclear weapons”. In fact,
during a plenary session of the House of Representatives on January 30, 1968, Prime Minister
Eisaku Sato introduced the Four-Pillar Nuclear Policy, namely 1) to observe the Three NonNuclear Principles, 2) to work toward global nuclear disarmament, 3) to rely on the U.S.
nuclear deterrence in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and 4) to promote theuse of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (SATO 1968). Japanʼs current nuclear policies
generally adhere to this framework. Japanʼs new self-defense policies, detailed in the“National Defense Program Guideline for FY2014 and beyond”, state that it will be “observing
the Three Non-Nuclear Principles” and “with regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, theextended deterrence provided by the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core, is indispensable”.
As well as confirming policies of dependence on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, theguideline states “Japan will play a constructive and active role in international nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation efforts so as to achieve the long-term goal of creating aworld free of nuclear weapons” (JAPAN NSC 2013).

1.6

The United States of America welcomed Japanʼs dependence on its extended nuclear

deterrence, which has repeatedly been guaranteed in multiple mutual agreements. Reviewed
and updated in 1997, the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” states that “to meetits commitments, the United States will maintain its nuclear deterrent capability” (JAPAN-U.
S. SCC 1997). The Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) met in May 2007
following North Koreaʼs first nuclear weapon test. The SCC focused on the U.S. extended
deterrence in more detail and stated that the “U.S. extended deterrence underpins the defenseof Japan and regional security. The U.S. reaffirmed that the full range of U.S. militarycapabilities ̶ both nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities ̶ form
the core of extended deterrent and support U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan”(JAPAN-U.S. SCC 2007). The second most recent SCC joint statement, ignoring theunexpectedly simple 2014 SCC, stated that “the SCC reaffirmed the indispensable role our27two countries play in the maintenance of international peace and security and reconÀrmed ourAllianceʼs commitment to the security of Japan through the full range of U.S. militarycapabilities, including nuclear and conventional” (JAPAN-U.S. SCC 2013). Such statementon extended deterrence coincides with the Obama administrationʼs “Nuclear Posture Review”(NPR) of 2010. The NPR states that one of the primary objectives of U.S. nuclear policy shouldbe “strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners”. Furthermore,
U.S. nuclear weapons “contribute to Alliance cohesion and reassure allies and partners who
feel exposed to regional threats” but that going forward, the fraction of nuclear weapons used
for nuclear deterrence will be reduced while the percentage of non-nuclear weapons will grow
(U.S. DOD 2010). Although reducing the percentage of nuclear weapons is a positive step
forward, the sheer presence of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia, as was discussed in
Paragaph 1.2, prevents nuclear tensions from improving. As affirmed in the same NPR
report, it is important to focus more on the non-military extended deterrence, which means
deterrence by “non-military – strong, trusting political relationships” (U.S. DOD 2010).

1.7Japan has repeatedly stated, directly and indirectly, that it would have to take up

its own nuclear weapons should trust in U.S. extended nuclear deterrence policies bequestioned. Regarding the provision of security assurance to North Korea, which was
expected to be discussed at the Àrst six-party talks in August 2003, Masashi Nishihara, thenpresident of the National Defense Academy of Japan, bluntly opined “Washington should
not sign a pact stating it has no intention of launching a nuclear attack on North Korea”. He
went on to declare the possibility of Japanese nuclear armament if “Tokyo could no longer
rely on its alliance with Washington and thus might decide to develop its own retaliatory
nuclear weapons” (NISHIHARA 2003). In reference to the Obama administrationʼs “Nuclear
Posture Review” (NPR) in 2008, a Japanese media outlet printed that a Japanese
government representative and specialist was opposed to the U.S. Congressional
Commissionʼs proposal to retire the nuclear Tomahawk cruise missile (TLAM/N). Then
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Katsuya Okada, responded to this issue in January 2010 byclarifying that he had written a letter to the U.S. Secretary of State and Secretary of
Defense in December 2009 that said “if, hypothetically, such a view were expressed, it would
clearly deviate from my own views, which are in favor of nuclear disarmament” (OKADA
2009). History suggests that Japanʼs government is dependent on and seeks out the U.S.
extended nuclear deterrenc, which parties in the U.S. have exploited. Such events have also
resulted in many other nations believing that if Japanʼs trust in the U.S. extended nuclear
deterrence fails, Japan may become a nuclear armed state. As was the case with nuclear
Tomahawk, the U.S. policies on nuclear weapons reduction was threatened to be derailed by
Japanʼs policy to depend on U.S. nuclear umbrella. Considering the fact that one of the28

pillars in its Four-Pillar Nuclear Policy involves promoting global nuclear disarmament, thissituation seems hypocritical.

1.8

In response to international concerns, Japan adopted a “No Plutonium Surplus

Policy” in 1991 and to improve transparency, the annual “Plutonium Management Report” haspublished details of Japanʼs plutonium stockpile since 1993. The most recent Plutonium
Management Report published in September 2014 stated that as of the end of December 2013,10.8 tons of Japanʼs massive 47.8 ton stockpile of plutonium was held domestically and 36.3
tons in Europe (JAEC 2014). Ever since TEPCOʼs (Tokyo Electric Power Company)
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011, the use for such large amounts of plutonium has
remained unclear. Even amid such uncertainty, the new Strategic Energy Plan (JAPANMETI 2014) published in April 2014 spells out the policy for “Promotion of the Nuclear Fuel
Cycle”. International and Japanese specialists have expressed the view that this policy will
increase the stockpile and adversely impact on international nuclear non-proliferation efforts(TAKUBO & VON HIPPEL 2013), (US-JAPAN NUCLER WORKING GROUP 2013).
These arguments can be broken down into the following:
1. Lack of Rationale for Nuclear Fuel Cycles: in light of the uncertainty surrounding nuclear
power plants, continuing nuclear fuel cycles (reprocessing) is irrational.
2. Concern of “Potential Nuclear Weapon Capabilities”: the lack of rationale suggests thatJapan is intentionally attempting to gain nuclear weapon capabilities.
3. Negative impacts on Discouraging Other Nationʼs Reprocessing Activities: because Japan
received complete support from the United States for reprocessing, South Korea has also
demanded the same in their U.S.-ROK. Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (KOREANJOONGANG DAILY 2014).
4. The Very Existence of a Plutonium Stockpile Threatens Nuclear Security: stockpiling alarge volume of plutonium and transporting that stockpile pose a significant nuclear
security risk.
In response to such international criticisms, Japan declared in March 2014 that it
would hand all its plutonium and highly-enriched uranium used at the Fast Critical Assembly(FCA) over to the United States and the U.S.-Japan Joint Statement reiterated theircommitment to the global reduction of special nuclear materials (JAPAN-U.S. LEADERS
2014). Japanʼs plans for using plutonium have, however, remained largely unchanged andinternational tensions regarding the matter remain unresolved.

29

South Koreaʼs Dependence on Nuclear Deterrence

1.9

According to records by the United States Department of Defense, deployment of

nuclear bombs and nuclear artillery at U.S. bases in South Korea began in January 1958
(NORRIS, ARKIN & BURR 1999). It occurred in the course of development of history as
shown below: The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed in July 1953 for the ceaseÀre of
the Korean War; The Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the ROK was then signedin October the same year and brought into effect in November 1954; The Neutral Nations
Supervisory Committee was established via the Korean Armistice Agreement, but
confrontations between the U.S. and Soviet Union diminished its functionality. Nuclear
weapons deployed in South Korea were aimed at North Korea and it was said that “the only
place in the world where nuclear weapons face a non-nuclear foe is South Korea” (ARKIN &FIELDHOUSE 1985). It has been estimated that there were 660-686 weapons before 1977,
249 in 1983 and 151 in 1985 (HAYES 1990) at the Kunsan Air Base. Nuclear Weapons
deployed included nuclear bombs, nuclear artillery, surface-to-surface missiles (Honest John,etc.), surface-to-air missiles (Nike-Hercules) and nuclear mines, among others. They were
deployed in South Korea throughout the Cold War. A major joint military exercise between
the U.S. and South Korea, dubbed Team Spirit, began in 1976 and was carried out until theend of the Cold War. Perceiving each of these exercises as a provocative nuclear war rehearsal,
North Korea assumed pre-war positions, which sparked further repeated escalations ofmilitary tensions on the Korean Peninsula. While depending on the U.S. nuclear deterrence,
including the deployment of the U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil, South Korea internationallycommitted itself to being a non-nuclear state by joining the NPT in April 1975, a year earlier
than Japan.

1.10

After the Cold War, in accordance with the so-called Presidential Initiative between

Bush and Gorbachev, followed by Yeltsin, the U.S. removed all its nuclear weapons from thesoil of South Korea. In September 1991, President Bush announced that the United States
would withdraw all land- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons. The U.S. Department of
Defense notified North Korea in December the same year that it had removed all nuclear
weapons from South Korea. South Korean President Roh Tae-woo then declared on December
18, 1991 that there were no nuclear weapons on the soil of South Korea. According to the 1991
Command History of the U.S. PaciÀc Command, which the Nautilus Institute obtained, theU.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff told the U.S. PaciÀc Command that the U.S. sealift ships authorized
to transport nuclear weaponry should be used as a priority to remove nuclear weapons fromSouth Korea and that the removal should commence before the U.S.-ROK Military Committee

30

Meeting (MCM) and U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) that were scheduled in
November. These documented records coincide with the sequence of events that are publicly
known as described above. The global security environment improved when the Cold War
ended, as exemplified by the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons, which also heralded
improved inter-Korean relations. In December 1991, the two Koreas signed “The Agreement
on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchange and Cooperation” followed by the “Joint
Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” inJanuary 1992; two significant agreements which came into effect in February 1992. The
following statements within the Joint Denuclearization Declaration are of particularsignificance. First and foremost, the preamble of the Joint Statement reads that theagreement would “create conditions and an environment favorable to peace and the peacefulunification of Korea”; hence, the agreement recognizes the objective of unifying the twocountries. Article One declares that “South and North Korea shall not test, manufacture,
produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons” and Article Three promises“South and North Korea shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment
facilities”. Considering that both nations had already signed the NPT, the Àrst article does notstate anything new. The third article, however, declaring neither country would produce Àssile
materials, which could potentially be used to develop nuclear weapons, was groundbreaking
and contrasted with Japanʼs progress. The difference between Japan and the two Koreaʼs
progress is undeniably stark. Following Japanʼs negotiations with the United States, it wasgiven permission to fully operate the Tokai Nuclear Processing Plant in 1981. A new JapanUS Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in 1988 also gave Japan comprehensive consent to buildand operate the commercial scale Rokkasho Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Facility for thirty
years, at which Japan installed a uranium enrichment facility in 1992. The North-South
Korea Joint Denuclearization Declaration continued to serve a vital role for nuclear
disarmament negotiations on the Korean Peninsula and in discussions for a NEA-NWFZ.

1.11

As the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission provided for by the Joint

Denuclearization Declaration failed and North Koreaʼs nuclear development program
emerged, South Korea was driven to strengthen diplomatic efforts in cooperation with theUnited States to prevent North Koreaʼs nuclear program. Simultaneously, South Korea
strengthened its dependence on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. The ROK-U.S. Security
Consultative Meeting, which has been held annually since 1968, between the U.S. Secretaryof Defense and South Korea Minister of National Defense has repeatedly reaffirmed theUnited States commitment to extend their “Nuclear Umbrella” to South Korea. A joint
communiqué from the meeting held in 2006, just ten days after North Korea conducted its
first nuclear weapon test in October, stated that the U.S. “offered assurances of firm U.S.

31

commitment and immediate support to the ROK, including continuation of the extended
deterrence offered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty”(ROK-U.S. SCM 2006). Similar to the extended deterrent provided to Japan, the Obamaadministration emphasized that the U.S. extended deterrent was not limited to nuclear
deterrence. Furthermore, the 2011 SCM founded the “ROK-U.S. Extended Deterrence Policy
Committee”. The most recent joint communiqué from 2014 promises to do the following inregard to extended deterrence: “The Secretary reafÀrmed the continued U.S. commitment toprovide and strengthen an extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of militarycapabilities, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike and missile defense
capabilities” (ROK-U.S. SCM 2014). While there had been a demand in South Korea for
nuclear sovereignty to secure free hands to develop a nuclear program, North Koreaʼsdevelopment of their nuclear program revitalized national nuclear arguments in South Korea.
Following North Koreaʼs third nuclear test in February 2013, a survey showed 70% of South
Koreans supported efforts to develop their own nuclear weapons and some influential
politicians stated their desire for nuclear armament, which became subject to critical analysis(HAYES & MOON 2014). The South Korean President herself expressed concerns about therisk of nuclear domino triggered in the ROK (BAKER & GALE 2014). South Korea strongly
emphasized its desire to amend the ROK-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement. Rather than a joint
agreement where South Korea is allowed to reprocess spent nuclear fuels on case-by-casebasis, South Korea requested a continued “comprehensive consent” clause, similar to that citedby Japan, which allowed it to reprocess spent nuclear fuels at will (KANE 2010). The request
for comprehensive consent in reprocessing spent nuclear fuels was denied and the existing
nuclear agreement was extended to March 2016 (U.S. DOS 2014). Considering current
conflicts, such as Japanʼs rights to reprocess spent nuclear fuels, this issue is bound toresurface.

North Koreaʼs Nuclear Deterrence Development

1.12

North Koreaʼs nuclear weapon program has been developed by primarily using

plutonium produced at its 5MWe graphite-moderated reactor near Yongbyon. The graphitemoderated reactor first came online in 1986; a year after North Korea signed the NPT.
Confrontations over the IAEAʼs inspection on the initial declaration by North Korea, as
required by the NPT, became heated and North Korea announced its withdrawal from the
NPT in March 1993. The situation led to a rigid U.S.-North Korea Meeting and thenegotiations shaped the mold for all following meetings regarding North Koreaʼs nuclear
program. Held on June 11, 1993, the negotiations concluded and reached agreements that the
U.S. would provide North Korea with security assurance against the threat and use of force,32

including nuclear weapons and that the Korean Peninsula would be denuclearized according
to the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement, among others. Also agreeing to continue
negotiations in future, North Korea suspended its decision to withdraw from the NPT(PEOPLEʼS KOREA 1993). The two core elements of “security assurance to North
Korea against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons” and“GHQXFOHDUL]LQJ.RUHDQ3HQLQVXODZLWKDYHULÀFDWLRQPHFKDQLVP” became a patternthat shaped the mold for all following agreements toward denuclearizing North
Korea. Later negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea, as well as implementing IAEA
inspections on fuel removal from the graphite reactor, became strained and the multiple
problems involved saw the situation deteriorate to the brink of war, known as the 1994 crisis.
Former U.S. President Carter visited North Korea in June 1994 and met with then DPRK
President Kim Il-sung to mediate a deal to resume talks. Part of the mediated deal was thatin exchange for North Korea freezing its graphite-moderated reactor and reprocessing
facilities, high-level talks between the two countries would resume in Geneva. The high-leveltalks in October 1994 created the “Agreed Framework between the United States of America
and the Democratic Peopleʼs Republic of Korea” (“Agreed Framework”), according to which the
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was founded in March 1995.

1.13

The Agreed Framework called for North Korea to halt all operations at the graphite

reactor and related facilities in exchange for two 1000 MW light water reactors provided by
KEDO and a supply of fuel oil as provisional energy aid. In the Agreed Framework, the UnitedStates guaranteed to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against North
Korea and North Korea would observe the 1992 Joint Denuclearization Declaration, among
others. It is most notable that on top of security assurances, energy aid was added to
the negotiating table and negotiations achieved agreement to revitalize the Joint
Denuclearization Declaration. Founded by an agreement between the United States,
Japan and South Korea, KEDOʼs Executive Board was later joined by the European Union.
Nine countries, including New Zealand, Australia, Canada and Indonesia, joined KEDO one
by one from 1995 to 2000. Having multiple countries participate in KEDO strengthened theguarantee that North Korea would continue to participate in the process. Furthermore, by
taking time throughout the process to build mutual trust, this unprecedented, comprehensive
and ambitious approach targeted efforts to overcome mutual distrust and achieve a nuclearfree Korean Peninsula. The North Korean Àring of the Taepodong ballistic missile in August
1998 brought with it a new set of problems. In response, the United States assigned former
Secretary of Defense William Perry as the U.S. North Korea Policy Coordinator to conduct a
review of the U.S. policy toward North Korea. Perryʼs public report, released in October 1999,
stated that KEDOʼs processes had successfully frozen North Koreaʼs nuclear program. The

33

report also suggested that to maintain the frozen nuclear program, the U.S. take acomprehensive and integrated approach to issues while coping with inevitable subsequenttensions (PERRY 1999). The Sunshine Policy adopted in February 1999 by President Kim
Dae-jung and the Inter-Korean Summit between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il in June 2000
paved the way to reaching the pinnacle of KEDO processes in October 2000. Jo Myong-rok,
who was First Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission of North Korea and North
Koreaʼs number three, visited Washington and met with President Clinton and Secretary ofState Madeleine Albright. The DPRK-US Joint Communiqué said that “the two sides statedthat neither government would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed thecommitment of both governments to make every effort in future to build a new relationshipfree from past enmity” (U.S. & DPRK 2000). The United States Congress had consistently
resisted supplying North Korea with fuel oil. However, it may be safe to say that the KEDO
process had almost succeeded, despite many twists, turns and challenges along the way.
Secretary Albright visited Pyongyang ten days later and met with Supreme Leader Kim Jongil. KEDOʼs processes demonstrated that cooperation among multiple nations andimproved relations between North and South are crucial in engaging North Korea
in international efforts.

1.14

The administration change took place in the U.S. and when President G. H. Bushlabeled North Korea the “Axis of Evil” in his State of the Union address in January 2002, it
toppled the already wobbly balance of denuclearization negotiations in the Korean Peninsula.
Suspicions of North Korea enriching uranium terminated KEDOʼs processes in October 2002
and North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. Although there
were objections to the validity of the withdrawal procedure taken by the DPRK, the threemonth cooling-off period expired and North Korea withdrew. Within this timeframe, the U.S.
began the Iraq War after having labeled Husseinʼs regime the “Axis of Evil”, just as it had
done to North Korea. It is presumed that these developments largely inÁuenced North Koreaʼssubsequent national strategy. In an effort to bring North Korea back to the negotiating tableto peacefully resolve nuclear issues, China initiated the Six-Party Talks in August 2003,
which involved China, North Korea, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the U.S.. ThroughDecember 2008 there were six rounds and thirteen official Six-Party Talks sessions, withdetails of the talks found in Box 1. When North Korea conducted its Àrst underground nuclear
weapon test during the Six-Party Talks in 2006, it appeared North Korea was adopting
diplomacy that attempted to eliminate the threat against its regime and normalizeinternational relations by playing both the processes and products of developing
nuclear deterrence as diplomatic cards. One key negotiator stated ̶ in retrospect ̶they should have recognized that in light of North Koreaʼs nuclear test, it would take time to34

Box 1

Six-Party Talk Timeline
August 27-29, 2003:

First RoundThe party conÀrmed to work to resolve North Koreaʼs nuclear issue throughpeaceful means.

February 25-28, 2004:

Second RoundFollowed by two working group meetings, all parties reafÀrmed the objectiveof achieving a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula. The U.S. demanded
a CVID (“complete, veriÀable, and irreversible dismantlement”)

June 23-26 2004:

Third Round
There was disparity between North Korea and the U.S., South Korea, andJapan regarding the range, verification, and compensation for freezing
North Koreaʼs nuclear program as an initial step for dismantling North
Koreaʼs nuclear weapons.

July 26-August 7, 2004:

Fourth Round First Session
All concerned nations agreed on signiÀcant principles to establish nuclear
free Korean Peninsula, normalize Japan-North Korea and U.S.-North Korea
diplomatic relations, provide economic and energy assistance, and outline
the “Safety Guarantee” document. The meeting adjourned and a consensus
could not be reached regarding North Koreaʼs rights for peaceful use of
nuclear power and its uranium enrichment facility.

September 13-19, 2005:

Fourth Round, Second Sessionth
The parties released its first joint statement on September 19 . The
statement conÀrms to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula through a peacefuland veriÀable manner, to respect North Koreaʼs rights for peaceful use of
nuclear energy, to provide North Korea with a light water nuclear reactor,
to normalize the diplomatic relations between Japan-North Korea, U.
S-North Korea, and to stabilize North Korea through economy/energy aids.

November 9-11, 2005:

Fifth Round, First Session
The parties had detailed discussions on how the to implement the Joint
Statement, but adjourned without reaching a consensus because North
Korea opposed U.S. Ànancial sanctions. (During this meeting, North Korea
conducted missile tests and its Àrst nuclear experiment.)

December 18-22, 2006:

Fifth Round, Second Session
A work plan submitted by China, the chairperson, was discussed. The
meeting adjourned with disagreement from North Korea, which demanded
the U.S. to terminate its Ànancial sanctions on North Korea.

achieve nuclear disarmament and negotiations should have proceeded with a long-term
perspective (PRITCHARD 2007).

1.15

The Six-Party Talks agreed on the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005, which

included commitments to security assurances (including conventional weapons) andelements from the Agreed Framework, such as the 1992 Joint Declaration and provision ofenergy assistance. In addition, it also included new elements such as the agreement for North35

February 8-13, 2007:

Fifth Round, Third Session
The parties agreed on “First Phase Actions” to shut down and seal the
nuclear facilities around Yongbyon. In exchange, the parties would provide
North Korea with fuel oil, and aid to its economy, energy, and humanresources. The parties created five working groups, which are as follows:“Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (Chairperson: China)”, “Economy
and Energy Cooperation (Chairperson: South Korea)”, “Normalization ofJapan-North Korea Diplomatic Relations (Chairperson: U.S./North Korea)”,“Normalization of U.S.-North Korea Diplomatic Relations (Chairperson:
U.S./North Korea) and “Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism(Chairperson; Russia)”.

March 19-22, 2007:

Sixth Round, First Session
The five working groups established during the Fifth Round reported on
their progress. North Korea refused to substantiate negotiations due to U.S.
Ànancial sanctions and the meeting was adjourned.

July 18-20, 2007:

Sixth Round, Head of Delegation Meeting
North Korea halted operations of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and it was
found that the IAEA had begun operations in North Korea. Agreements
were not reached regarding the “Second Phase Actions”.

September 27-30, 2007:

Sixth Round, Second Sessionth
To achieve the September 19 Joint Statement, the parties agreed on thesecond phase of actions for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, normalizing
diplomatic relations between the parties, and the provision of economic &energetic aid to North Korea (dated October 3).

July 10-12 2008:

Sixth Round, Second Head of Delegation Meeting
The parties agreed on the need of a verification mechanism to verify the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and a monitoring mechanism tomonitor each party stateʼs fulfillment of and respect towards thecommitment. Agreements were also reached towards disabling the Yongbyon
nuclear facilities, providing economic and energy aid, stabilizing the region,and holding ministerial conference. An unofÀcial six-party meeting was laterrd
held in Singapore on July 23 , where the U.S. removed North Korea from its
list of state sponsors of terrorism (October 10).

December 8-10, 2008:

Sixth Round, Third Head of Delegation Meeting
Japan, U.S., South Korea and Russia could not reach a consensus with
North Korea in terms of a veriÀcation system. This has been the last SixParty Talk as of January 2015.

Korea to rejoin the NPT and the need for consultation among the parties concerned to promote
lasting peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula (SIX-PARTY TALKS 2005). The
September 19 Joint Statement is still cited as a key international agreement regarding thedenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (for instance NPT 2010-8). Based upon the Joint
Statement, the Six-Party agreed to the initial phase actions to freeze North Koreaʼs three
Yongbyon facilities (the 5 MWe Graphite Reactor, the Reprocessing Plant or Radiochemical
Laboratory and the Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facility) in February 2007. The party alsoestablished five working groups. One group deserving of attention is the “Northeast Asia

36

Peace and Security Mechanism Working Group” (SIX-PARTY TALKS 2007-1). It deservesattention for its potential as a platform for a more comprehensive consultation on regional
security, including the establishment of an NWFZ in Northeast Asia. The Six-Party Talks also
agreed on the second phase of action in October the same year, while the two primary actions
were “the disablement of the three Yongbyon facilities” and “a complete and correct declarationof all nuclear programs of North Korea” (SIX-PARTY TALKS 2007-2). North Korea made apublic demonstration of demolishing the cooling tower of the graphite reactor in June 2008 to
fulfill part of the disablement action. According to a U.S. Congressional Research Service
Report, the disablement proceeded in eleven phases, which were 80% complete as of April
2009 (NIKITIN 2013). However, the Six-Party Talks became deadlocked over the process ofverifying the “complete and correct declaration” by North Korea. The Heads of Delegation
meeting of the Six-Party Talks held in December 2008 was the partyʼs last talk. Although
issues of verifying North Koreaʼs nuclear program could have been given more time andpassed to “third-phase actions”, the challenges arising from a possible U.S. administration
change seem to have posed difÀculties.

1.16

In April 2009, North Korea publicly announced its launch of Juche Nuclear

Industry and the decision to build an experimental light water reactor in Yongbyon (KCNA
2009-2), then to begin enriching uranium as fuel for the reactor (KCNA 2009-4). Siegfried
Hecker, a former Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and other U.S. experts wereinvited to view the Yongbyon facilities in November 2010 (HECKER 2010). They found a
10MWt small, light water reactor in its initial construction stage and a surprisingly modern
centrifuge cascade facility, as commented by Hecker, to enrich uranium. According to him,
North Korean experts explained the enrichment facilities were up and running and they wereintending to make up a six-stage cascade with 2000 centrifuges to enrich uranium andproduce uranium dioxide fuel, although they had yet to acquire such technology. North
Koreaʼs regime passed to Kim Jong-un in December 2011, yet the national strategy of striving
to gain nuclear deterrence, as a means of regime protection, has remained unchanged. In April
2013, the Supreme Peopleʼs Assembly adopted the “Law on Consolidating the Position of a
Nuclear Weapons State”, which set forth policies regarding nuclear weapons and a doctrine forthe use of such weapons (KCNA 2013-6). The doctrine declares that the Supreme Commanderof the Korean Peopleʼs Army is authorized to give the order to use nuclear weapons only whenwaging war against an invading nuclear weapon state and that North Korea will not threaten
to use or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, unless they have joined ahostile nuclear enemy who attacks North Korea. The doctrine continues to state North Korea
will observe strict rules on the security management of nuclear weapons and will not let
nuclear weapons, technology or nuclear substances be smuggled out, etc. Reliable conÀrmation

37

that North Korea has successfully weaponized a nuclear bomb, however, remains pending. In
April the same year, North Korea announced that the Yongbyon graphite reactor had resumed
operations (KCNA 2013-7) and satellite imagery taken in August showed expanded uranium
enrichment facilities (ALBRIGHT & AVAGYAN 2013). Further analysis of North Koreaʼs
recent activities, including details of their nuclear capabilities, can be found in Chapter 4.

Mongoliaʼs Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status

1.17

Sandwiched between two massive countries with nuclear weapons ̶ Russia andChina ̶ Mongolia has received international recognition thanks to its unique “Single State
Nuclear Weapon-Free Status”. Following the end of the Cold War, in February 1992, the“Mongolian Peopleʼs Republic” was renamed “Mongolia” under a new constitution, In October
the same year, then President Ochirbat stated in his address to the United Nations that
Mongolia had declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone, to contribute toward regionaland global disarmament and trust (OCHIRBAT 1992). On that note, the president went on to
say that the Cold War had eroded national independence and sovereignty and that theconclusion of the Cold War gave nations like Mongolia high expectations of the new era̶particularly that which was spelled out in the United Nations Charter. The Mongolian nuclear
weapon-free declaration reÁected the new Mongolian governmentʼs strategy founded at a timeof change (ENKHSAIKHAN 2014). In December 1998, the United Nations General Assembly
resolution titled “Mongoliaʼs International Security and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status” (A/RES/53/77) was adopted without a vote. This was a welcome response to Mongoliaʼs own
declaration and also recognized that such effort would contribute to the peace, safety andstability of the region. Furthermore, Mongolia legislation adopted the “Law of Mongolia on its
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status” in February 2000 (UNGA 2000). This law prohibited any
individual, legal entity, or state from developing, acquiring, possessing, deploying, ortransporting nuclear weapons, etc. on the territory of Mongolia. It is also notable that thesame law also allows NGOs and individuals to exercise “public oversight” in implementing
legislation regarding the nuclear-weapon-free status.

1.18

The largest challenge in maintaining Mongoliaʼs “Single State Nuclear Weapon-

Free Zone” is to secure a legally binding security assurance from states with nuclear weapons.
In response to Mongoliaʼs request, Àve nuclear weapon states ̶ the P5 ̶ expressed a jointstatement in October 2000 titled: “Statement on Security Assurances in Connection with
Mongoliaʼs Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status”. Although the statement reaffirmed the politicalintent from the P5 to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against

38

Mongolia, it fell short of offering Mongolia legally binding security assurance. A UNsponsored, non-governmental group meeting of experts was held in September 2001 in
Sapporo, which involved individual experts from the P5 and Mongolia examining various
models ranging from “minimal model” to “comprehensive model”. The former model was
limited to a trilateral treaty between China, Mongolia and Russia that would agree to prohibit“deploying, storing, or passing nuclear explosive devices through Mongolian territory”. The
latter model required the participation of the Àve nuclear weapon states, dealing with a widerange of threats to Mongoliaʼs national security (UMEBAYASHI 2011). Mongoliaʼs diplomaticefforts toward the P5 continued hereafter and declarations were announced in October 2012 toreafÀrm the P5 joint statement on security assurances (UNGA-UNSC 2012). However, this once again - fell short of a legally binding framework (UMEBAYASHI 2014-1). Mongoliaʼsnational government has ofÀcially committed its position in backing a NEA-NWFZ. During
the United Nations High-Level Panel on September 26, 2013, Mongolian President Elbegdorj
declared his intent to work with the countries of Northeast Asia in evaluating the potential to
make the NEA-NWFZ a reality on an informal basis (ELBEGDORJ 2013). Mongolia plays asigniÀcant role in efforts to establish a NEA-NWFZ.

39

Chapter 2

Demand from the Global Nuclear
Disarmament Objective

2.1

The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the reinforcement of nuclear weapon

dependency in Northeast Asia goes directly against the tide of the world striving for a “world
without nuclear weapons”, as driven by President Obamaʼs Prague speech. Following the
Prague speech, the 2010 NPT Review Conferenceʼs Final Document included adopting a
64-point “Action Plan”, which was the Àrst step toward success. The Final Document included
phrases such as “nuclear weapons convention” and “agreement on a framework of separate,mutually reinforcing instruments”, etc. It further provided crucial instructions by stating that
the NPT “affirms that all States need to make special efforts to establish the necessary
framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons” (NPT 2010-2) and“expresses its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of
nuclear weapons” (NPT 2010-1). The review conference also promised speciÀc action plans to“rapidly move toward an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear
weapons” (NPT 2010-5) and “further diminish the role and signiÀcance of nuclear weapons in
all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies” (NPT 2010-6). The Final Documentʼs
action calling for “all States and parties to commit to pursuing policies that are fullycompatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons”(NPT 2010-3) is a reminder that both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states are40both responsible for achieving the goals set forth. This call for action epitomizes what needs tobe done to achieve a NEA-NWFZ.

2.2

Even though the Conference on Disarmament (CD)

̶ the only disarmament

negotiation forum ̶ has stalled, there have been increasing efforts to establish platforms tonegotiate “the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear
weapons”. Austria, Mexico and Norway submitted their “Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear
Disarmament Negotiations” resolution to the United Nations General Assembly First
Committee in 2011 (AUSTRIA, MEXICO & NORWAY 2011). This resolution reworks theCDʼs four main agendas into two categories and tried to bring the long-standing confrontation
regarding the priority of issues to an end. The three countries determined, however, that theresolution would Ànd it difÀcult to attract widespread support and it was withdrawn. Named
after a December 2012 resolution of the same title, an “open-ended working group (OEWG) todevelop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations to achieve
and maintain a world without nuclear weapons” was established. The OEWG convened forÀfteen days at the United Nations Headquarters in Geneva over the course of three sessions
held in May, June and August 2013, at which government ofÀcials, international institutions,experts and NGOs freely exchanged ideas. The OEWG was concluded on August 30 after
manifesting a report “Discussions and proposals” chapter (OEWG 2013). According to Article
VI of the NPT Treaty, all nations must bear responsibility for nuclear disarmament. In
addition, the OEWG report introduced a new concept that “states have differentiated roles
and functions” to fulÀll this responsibility. The group added that “non-nuclear-weapon States
have a role in promoting global nuclear disarmament”. The OEWG report then introduces the“role of non-nuclear weapons States under extended nuclear deterrence guarantees” in“reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines”. The report also stressed therole played by “nuclear-weapon-free zones in challenging the value and legitimacy of nuclear
weapons” (See Box 2 for more information about the existing nuclear weapon-free zones in theworld). The context of the OEWG report implies that if states dependent on extended
nuclear deterrence select policies for a NEA-NWFZ, it would be a step forward inglobal nuclear disarmament.

2.3

Spurred on by the 2010 NPT Review Conferenceʼs Final Document, an approach topush the stalled nuclear disarmament discussion forward has prioritized the “Humanitarian
Consequences of Nuclear Weapons”. This discussion focuses on the signiÀcance of problems
stemming from extended nuclear deterrence. The joint statement released in May 2012 duringst

the 1 Preparatory Committee for 2015 NPT Review Conference initially had 16 signatory41

Box 2

Existing Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones in the world
What are Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones?
NWFZs are an international legal scheme whereby a geographical area is created inwhich no nuclear weapons exist. The significance of this scheme is not only to prohibit thedevelopment, manufacture, and deployment of nuclear weapons within the zone, but also tomake nuclear-possessing states commit to not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons
against the states within the zone (provision of “negative security assurance”). NWFZs can also
serve as an effective conÀdence-building measure among regional states and concerned states,
as well as to contribute as important regional efforts to creating norms toward the global
prohibition of nuclear weapons.
There are Àve existing NWFZs, and each one is stipulated by an international treaty.
The Antarctic Treaty is a kind of NWFZ treaty. In addition, Mongoliaʼs nuclear-weapon-freestatus has been recognized by the international community.
There are three characteristic in common among the existing NWFZs. The Àrst is the“nonexistence of nuclear weapon.” In these zones, the acquisition, possession, deployment,
testing and use of nuclear weapons are prohibited. Secondly, in concept, security assurances
are provided by the nuclear weapon states. This means that the use or threat to use of nuclear
weapons against countries within the zones is prohibited. Moreover, regional organizations
established in conjunction with NWFZ Treaties can contribute to strengthening mutualconÀdence by solving regional disputes and problems such as non-compliance with the treaty ina regional and peaceful manner. In addition to the above, the right of the States Parties to use
nuclear energy peacefully is often stipulated in NWFZ Treaties.

④ African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty(Treaty of Pelindaba)● Opened for signature: April 11,1996● Entered into force: July 15,2009● Number of signatory states:50, Number of stateparties:39① Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean(Treaty of Tlatelolco)● Opened for signature: February 14, 1967
● Entered into force: April 25,1969● Number of states parties:33(including all nations in the region)② South Paciﬁc Nuclear Free-Zone Treaty(Treaty of Rarotonga)● Opened for signature: August 6,1985● Entered into force: December 11,1986● Number of states parties:13③ Treaty on the Southeast Asia NuclearWeapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)● Opened for signature: December 15,1995● Entered into force: March 27, 1997
● Number of states parties:10(including all nations in the region)⑤ Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone inCentral Asia
● Opened for signature: September 8, 2006
● Entered into force: March 21, 2009
● Number of states parties:5(including all nations in the region)⑥ Mongoliaʼs Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status● On December 4,1998, the United Nations
General Assembly recognized its nuclearweapon-free status by adopting the resolution
submitted by Mongolia.
● On February 3,2000, the Law of Mongolia on its
nuclear-weapon-free status was adopted.
⑦ The Antarctic Treaty● Opened for signature: December 1, 1959
● Entered into force: June 23,1961● Number of states parties:50(including 5 nuclear weapon states)

42

states, including Norway, Switzerland and Austria and has since continued to gain support.
The Àfth “Joint Statement on Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons”, announced
in 2014 during the UN General Assembly First Committee, saw 155 states sign. In parallel tothe joint statement gaining support, a “Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear
Weapons” was held in March 2013, February 2014 and December 2014 in Oslo Norway,
Nayarit Mexico and Vienna Austria, respectively. In connection to the extended nuclear
deterrence, the attitudes of the Japanese government toward these developments have caught
attention. Japan had not signed the first three joint statements, but finally did so for the
fourth joint statement in October 2013. The joint statement says that “it is in the interest of
the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, under any
circumstances”, which can be interpreted as a de facto declaration of the non-use of nuclear
weapons. Heightened domestic public opinion shifted Japanʼs attitude toward supporting thestatement. Meanwhile, it became apparent that certain non-nuclear weapon states attempted
to restrain the developing discussion on the inhumanity of nuclear weapons. Japan supported
the joint statement delivered by Australia, which emphasized the need to “address theimportant security and humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons.” Analyzing this
response objectively, it is contradictory to emphasize the impact on humanity thatusing nuclear weapons could have while refusing to commit not to use the same.
This contradiction can be resolved by shifting current security policies in favor of
those which eliminate the very possibility of using nuclear weapons. One of thealternative policy options to this situation will pave the way for a nuclear weaponfree zone.

2.4

The statement to require to “rapidly move toward an overall reduction in the global

stockpile,” which appeared in NPT documents and elsewhere, not only puts the spotlight on
the U.S. and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenal, but also intends to reemphasize thecommitment “to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types ofnuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed”. Furthermore, instead of focusing solely on
disarming nuclear weapon hardware, the need “to further diminish the role and signiÀcance of
nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies” has been also
discussed. This reveals the need to pursue manifesting a transparent and veriÀable “Report”
on the various soft and hard aspects of nuclear disarmament. The 2010 NPT Review
Conference Final Document lists concrete measures toward nuclear disarmament whichshould be taken by nuclear weapon states. It also urges nuclear weapon states to adopt a
standard reporting form to submit a report regarding their implementation of these measures(NPT 2010-4), (NPT 2010-7). The “Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative” (NPDI),
founded by Japan and Australia, submitted a working paper to the First Session of the43Preparatory Committee in 2012. The submission, titled “Transparency of nuclear weapons:
the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative” (NPDI), introduced a “Standard ReportingForm” (NPDI 2012). On top of reporting on the production of Àssile material and the number,
type and deployment status of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, the form would havestates report on the past yearʼs “measures taken to diminish the role and significance of
nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies”. South Africa
represented the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) at the First Session of the Preparatory
Committee and expanded on the aforementioned measures. The NAC stated that nuclear
weapon states and their nuclear weapon-free alliances must report on the instruments andplans to diminish the role of nuclear weapons (MABHONGO 2012). This trend demonstrates
that we have reached a point where VSHFLÀFGHWDLOHGHIIRUWVKDYHEHFRPHQHFHVVDU\RQ
the part of states dependent on extended nuclear deterrence to eliminate
dependence on nuclear weapons.

2.5

As demonstrated above, recent global disarmament discussions demand that

non-nuclear weapon states, particularly those dependent on extended nuclear
deterrence, make policy changes. Considering the clear impact using nuclear weapons
would have on humanity, North Korea must halt its nuclear weapons program and Japan andSouth Korea must alter their nuclear weapon dependence policies. It goes without saying that
if these states feel threatened by nuclear weapons, then policies guaranteeing security should
address the matter. To formulate and achieve comprehensible policies, states within thepotential NEA-NWFZ must continue efforts to achieve the NWFZ. For example, South Korea
and Japan can illegitimatize nuclear weapons by establishing policies that eliminate
dependence on the nuclear umbrella, which would contribute signiÀcantly to improving thenorms to prohibiting nuclear weapons from the region and beyond. This would also contributeto global nuclear disarmament. Japan, which is the only nation to have experienced atomic
bombings in wartime, in Nagasaki and Hiroshima, should reafÀrm its responsibility to Àll therole of leading international nuclear disarmament and work with Korea, which is also home to
many nuclear bomb victims. The two nations can collaborate to select policies that movetoward a NEA-NWFZ, and now have the opportunity to make a large, international impact.
The inÁuence on NATO and other nuclear alliances would surely also be signiÀcant.

44

45

Chapter 3

The Signiﬁcance of a Northeast Asia
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
and the Halperin Proposal

3.1

As was introduced in Paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3, North Koreaʼs developing nuclear

weapons program intensiÀed Japan and South Koreaʼs dependence on nuclear deterrence andhas heightened the regionʼs nuclear confrontation. Anxieties over a nuclear domino effect inJapan and South Korea cannot be ignored. As well as increasing the risk of nuclear war, thecurrent situation heightens the psychological sense of being threatened, which leads to rising
military tensions and the risk of not only nuclear but also conventional military confrontation.
Although it is welcome that the United States has reduced the role of nuclear weapons in its
extended deterrence, this change in policy will not reduce the aggressive mindset in thecurrent nuclear confrontation as long as any trace of nuclear weapons is involved. The resultis overall security instability in the region. The regionʼs escalating nuclear dependence runs
counter to the international communityʼs goal of achieving a “Nuclear Weapon-Free World”. It
also extraordinarily diminishes the role to be played by Japan, as the only country to haveexperienced nuclear bombings, in promoting global nuclear disarmament. The situation would
be further complicated should Japan, South Korea and the U.S. respond militarily with a joint
missile defense program to the assumption that North Koreaʼs developing ballistic missile
program implies a development in their nuclear weapons program. Because such missile
defense capability would theoretically also diminish the effectiveness of the Chinese strategic

46

nuclear forces. This is an example of how regional tensions stemming from North Koreaʼs
nuclear weapons program impede global nuclear disarmament efforts. Achieving a NEANWFZ will lay the groundwork for a regional security system that eliminates such tensions.
As part of the international communityʼs nuclear disarmament efforts, non-nuclear weapon
states dependent on extended nuclear deterrent are demanded to act as mentioned in
Chapter 2. The NEA-NWFZ initiative would serve as an example from Japan and South
Korea to respond to such a call.

3.2

Since the end of the Cold War, various concrete proposals have been made to achieve

an NEA-NWFZ as a step forward in establishing regional security. Box 3 shows a list
representing such proposals, organized by year. At present, the Three-plus-Three
Arrangement, including its various modiÀcations, is considered a simple and pragmatic basic
structure. A model treaty has been drafted based on this arrangement (UMEBAYASHI 2005).
In the NEA-NWFZ treaty with the Three-plus-Three Arrangement, the three states involved,
namely South and North Koreas and Japan are categorized as “Intrazonal States” and theother three states involved, the U.S., Russia and China, all of which are nuclear weapon states
under NPT with deep ties to the region, are categorized as “Neighboring Nuclear Weapon
States”. The Intrazonal States would form a geographic nuclear weapon-free zone and berequired to assume non-nuclear obligations similar to existing NWFZ treaties. A Neighboring
Nuclear Weapon State would become a full state party of the treaty, as opposed to a party of
its protocol and assume the obligation to refrain from committing any acts against the nonnuclear provisions of the treaty and provide security assurances not to attack the zone with
nuclear weapons, hopefully even with conventional weapons (negative security assurances). If
Mongolia, which has received UN General Assembly recognition for its nuclear weapon-freestatus, were to opt for membership of an NEA-NWFZ, a Four-plus-Three Arrangement
would be optimal. However, as was shown in Paragraphs 1.17 & 1.18, it entirely depends
upon the choice of Mongoliaʼs diplomatic strategies in the post-2012 era. No doubt it isnecessary for the zone to receive negative security assurances from all Àve nuclear weapon
states. In this scheme, France and England, which are not “Neighboring Nuclear Weapon
States”, would be requested to provide such security assurances through a protocol of thetreaty. It will be appropriate from the geographical perspective to have the U.S., Russia andChina all directly involved in the treaty. It is no accidental coincidence that all states of theThree-plus-Three Arrangement are members of the Six-party Talks.

47

Box 3

Proposals on a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
Date, Year

Submitted by

Proposal Contents

March, 1995

John Endicott, et al.

Limited Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (LNWFZ),
involving only non-strategic weapons. A CircularZone with 2000 km radius centered on Panmunjom
and later an elliptical zone to include part of Alaska,
U.S..

1995

Andrew Mack

NWFZ involving the ROK, DPRK, Japan and Taiwan.

March, 1996

Kumao Kaneko

A Circular Zone with 2000 km radius centered on
Panmunjom. Different obligations posed on nuclear
weapons state and non-nuclear weapons states.

May, 1996

Hiromichi Umebayashi

Three plus Three nations arrangement involving
ROK, DPRK and Japan as non-nuclear weapons
states and China, Russia, U.S. as nuclear weapons
states.

October,
1997

John Endicott, et al.

Northeast Asia League of Non-Nuclear States,
involving the ROK, Japan and Mongolia (and DPRK
if possible) as a phase I formation of the LNWFZ.

December,
2003

Seongwhun Cheon, Tatsujiro
Suzuki

Proposal of a concept for a tri-party treaty between
Japan, ROK, and DPRK to achieve long-term goals
set at the six-party talks.

April, 2004

Hiromichi Umebayashi, et al.

A model NWFZ treaty with six nations, drafted based
upon a Three plus Three nations arrangement.

Spring 2007

J. Enkhsaikhan

An approach to form a zone through relevant nonnuclear constituent statesʼ attaining single state
NWF status.

August, 2008

Democratic Party of Japan
Disarmament GroupA draft treaty proposal based upon a Three plus
Three arrangement.

November,
2008

Jaejung Suh

Adding protocols for the multilateralization of the
Joint Declaration for the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula

May, 2010

Peter Hayes, et al.
(Nautilus Institute)

Idea for initially forming then expanding a NWFZ
between Japan and ROK.

November,
2011

Morton H. Halperin

An approach to conclude a comprehensive agreementon key elements including the establishment of a
NEA-NWFZ, with a view to overcome the stalled SixParty Talks.

October,
2012Peter Hayes, et al.
(Nautilus Institute)An approach beyond the Six-Party Talks where
Japan, ROK, DPRK, Mongolia, and Canada form a
NWFZ and involves the five nuclear-weapon states.
DPRK will gradually join the party.

（UMEBAYAHI 2014-1, 2）

48

3.3

In 2011, Halperin proposed achieving an NEA-NWFZ as an element of a“Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia” (HALPERIN 2011,2012, 2014). SigniÀcantly, it shifted the framework of the arguments on an NEA-NWFZ fromscheme-centered (focused on the geographic scope) to approach-centered (focused on theprocess to achieve) arguments. Halperinʼs proposal carried weight for several reasons; he used
to work in formulating U.S. policies toward Asia at several U.S. administrations; the U.S. has
been considered by the DPRK as the primary source of national threats that prompt it todevelop nuclear deterrence; and therefore the U.S. has been a state with which North Korea
wants to negotiate. The Halperin Proposal was shared and backed at the First Workshop for
the following reasons (RECNA 2013). 1) Accepting North Koreaʼs possession of nuclear
weapons as a fait accompli may potentially lead to a domino effect in Japan and South Korea,
which could then trigger the collapse of the international non-proliferation regime. 2)
Accordingly, robust international efforts, which should be tangible and verifiable, should
continue as long as hope remains, however minute, that North Korea can be denuclearized. 3)
Past efforts to denuclearize North Korea have stalled. A new approach for negotiations isneeded to avoid repeating past failures, which involve placing blame on one another for thereason negotiations failed. 4) Although there is a need for a comprehensive approach thatsimultaneously solves pending issues, this approach should not attempt to solve all theregionʼs security issues at the same time. Rather, it should be a restrained approach thatcomprehensively solves issues directly related to regional nuclear issues. As such, theHalperin Proposal is uniquely valuable and criticisms on it for repeating and rehashing othercomprehensive proposals will not Àt (e.g. GREEN 2012).

3.4

There are six primary elements in Halperinʼs proposal for a comprehensive security

agreement. As Kurosawa pointed out, although details of each element have been slightly
altered, there have been no major changes since the initial introduction in 2011
(KUROSAWA 2014). The six elements are: 1) Termination of the State of War, 2)Creation of a Permanent Council on Security, 3) Mutual Declaration of No Hostile
Intent, 4) Provisions of Assistance for Nuclear and Other Energy, 5) Termination ofSanctions and 6) Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. In recent years, North Korea hasrepeatedly expressed its desire to achieve the first element. There have been various
suggestions for the process to convert the Korean War Armistice Agreement into a peace
treaty and the details to be included in the peace treaty, but Halperin does not delve into this.
However, he does mention that South Korea should be involved in the treaty, as well as thethree armistice nations. The role of the second element̶a permanent council̶would,
naturally, be to implement the agreementʼs provisions. However, there have been no detailed

49

discussion regarding whether the council should handle broader security issues in the region.
This council would also include more countries than those in the Six-Party Talks. The
declaration of no hostile intent (third element) is reminiscent of the U.S.-DPRK Joint
Communiqué that took place in 2000 (Paragraph 1.13, U.S. & DPRK 2000). There were no
details regarding what the mutual declaration between other nations would be. Just as
previously, there is a need to provide North Korea with energy assistance. The fourth point,
however, emphasizes that limiting North Koreaʼs access to nuclear energy is discriminatory
and cannot be allowed. The Àfth element prohibits nations in the comprehensive agreementfrom individually placing sanctions on one another due to nuclear issues. However, the treaty
should have provisions to allow sanctions to be imposed on states that violate the treaty.
Halperin does not make any suggestions on how to lift sanctions currently placed by the UN
Security Council resolutions. There are many details in the proposal regarding the sixth
NWFZ element. While retaining the basic Three-plus-Three Arrangement, Halperin suggests
the possibility of inviting Mongolia and Canada, as non-nuclear weapon states and France andthe U.K. as nuclear weapon states, to the treaty. Further, there are provisions for North Korea
to dismantle its nuclear arsenal and thoughts on how to handle remaining nuclear weapons
should Korea be reunified before completing the dismantlement. Halperin also devises anentry-into-force provision to increase the incentives for North Korea to join the treaty andprovisions for the transition period. He also examines the possible entry-into-force provisions
for Japan and South Korea to feel more secured in joining the treaty (HALPERIN 2014).
Details regarding this are discussed in Chapter 5. If an NEA-NWFZ is established by solving
these six elements, it could be a catalyst toward constructive discussions over broader security
issues in the region.

50

51

Chapter 4

The Possibility ofNorth Koreaʼs Denuclearization

The Kim Jong-un Regimeʼs Policy Intent

4.1

At the March 31, 2013 Central Committee of the Workersʼ Party of Korea, First

Secretary Kim Jong-un introduced strategies on “carrying out economic construction andbuilding nuclear armed forces simultaneously” (KCNA 2013-5), which the 2015 New Year
Address reconfirmed (KCNA 2015). Rather than focusing on North Korea maintaining its“military Àrst” policy line, it is far more important to focus on the fact that North Korea isrelativizing its “military Àrst” policy line. It can be said that “the end of sonʼgun (military Àrststrategy) is thus main meaning of byungjin (move two things simultaneously strategy)”(FRANK 2014). Developing North Koreaʼs economy would require developing Northeast
Asiaʼs economic alliances, which, it is argued, would also require solving nuclear issues (KOO
2014). First Secretary Kim Jong-unʼs political regime will be stable, but the economic
destitution is likely to be long-lasting (HAYES, TANTER & DIAMOND 2012). They will
pursue efforts to open the economy slowly and under strict control. Although the execution ofJang Sung-taek, who was North Koreaʼs number two government official, was shocking,experts do not believe it implies a shift in strategy (MOON 2014). It is unlikely that the Kim
Jong-un regime would engage in provocations that would trigger a full-scale war on the52

Korean Peninsula. While it cannot be ruled out that events similar to the ROKS Cheonan
sinking in 2010 and bombardment of Yeonpyeong, which heightened tensions, will recur,
North Korea appears to be calculating the level at which they ratchet up tensions. Since suchtension escalation by North Korea is considered a shock technique aimed at altering the rulesof the game, it is crucial to react with a level head, however difÀcult.

4.2

This section focuses on analyzing the Kim Jong-un regimeʼs policies in relation todenuclearization issues. Just after a year in office, North Korea successfully launched asatellite in December 2012. The United Nations Security Council Resolution responded byintensifying sanctions on North Korea in January 2013. North Koreaʼs Ministry of Foreign
Affairs then stated that “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is impossible unless thedenuclearization of the world is realized.” (KCNA 2013-1) and that “there will no longer
exist...the September 19 joint statement”, then “overall efforts should be directed todenuclearizing big powers, including the U.S., rather than the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula” (Statement by the DPRK. National Defense Commission, KCNA 2013-2). At
around the same time, the regime restructured its policies to strengthen its position as anuclear weapon state (KCNA 2013-6), as was introduced in Paragraph 1.16. The shifting
policies implied that North Korea was solidifying a long-term position on maintaining its
nuclear deterrence. However, this strategic line does not necessarily mean that North Korea
has taken a rigid position that its denuclearization is impossible before the “world-wide
denuclearization” or “a world without nuclear weapons” is attained. Rather, it has soon become
apparent that it maintains an open window to negotiate denuclearization while consolidating
the domestic system as a nuclear armed state. The DPRK National Defense Commission
released a “crucial” statement in June 2013, which deÀned that the denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula should be “the complete one that calls for denuclearizing the whole
peninsula, including South Korea, and aims to eliminate the U.S. nuclear threats to the DPRK
and then said “We propose senior-level talks between the authorities of the DPRK and theU.S.” (KCNA 2013-8). This means that North Korea suggested the denuclearization processcontingent on the removal of U.S. threats, as before. In September 2013, the DPRK ViceMinister for Foreign Affairs, Pak Kil-yon, attended the United Nations High-level Meeting on
nuclear disarmament and expressed a similar attitude with regard to its denuclearization(PAK 2013). It can be inferred that North Korea is sticking to its policy of maintaining
nuclear deterrence while attempting to diplomatically remove the U.S. threat. In fact, North
Korea has never mentioned that its nuclear weapons were intended to give it parity or
dominance; rather, the weapons have consistently been a means of self-defense. There is stillVXIÀFLHQWSRWHQWLDOWRDFKLHYHDGHQXFOHDUL]HG1RUWK.RUHD53

The Technological Side of North Koreaʼs Nuclear Weapon Capabilities

4.3

It has been confirmed that North Korea conducted three nuclear weapon tests in2006, 2009 and 2013, which demonstrated that North Koreaʼs nuclear capabilities aregradually improving. General information regarding these three nuclear tests can be found inBox 4. The October 2006 nuclear weapon test is estimated to have had a nuclear weapon yieldof less than 1 kiloton (U.S. DIRECTOR OF NI 2006), (PABIAN & HECKER 2012) andmost experts agree that North Korea “failed to meet their target”. That is because a single
kiloton is signiÀcantly below the 10a20 kiloton nuclear weapon yield sought after in a typicalÀrst nuclear weapon test (KIM 2013). The second experiment in May 2009 had an estimatednuclear weapon yield of several megatons ̶ 4a6 times the yield of the Àrst (U.S. DIRECTOR
OF NI 2009), (PABIAN & HECKER 2012). According to public records, there have been no
detections of radioactive nuclides, which would be evidence of a nuclear explosion (KIM 2013),(CTBTO 2009). The third experiment in February 2013 is estimated to have had a nuclear
weapon yield similar to the second (several kilotons) and is considered by experts to have beena “success”. The Àrst two experiments were plutonium bombs, and although the evidence ismissing, the third experiment may have utilized uranium (KIM 2013), (CTBTO 2009). North
Korea stated that the third experiment used “a smaller and light A-bomb unlike the previous
ones, yet with great explosive power”, which would imply that North Korea had successfully
developed a nuclear bomb that could be Àtted to a missile (KCNA 2013-3). There have beenvarious opinions regarding this statement. In February 2013, one expert published that “North
Korea has the capability to mount a warhead on the Nodong missile” (ALBRIGHT 2013) andanother publication in April 2013 printed that the U.S. Department of Defense has “moderateconÀdence” that North Korea had acquired the ability to miniaturize nuclear warheads so thatthey could be Àtted to ballistic missiles” (SHANKER, SANGER, & SCHMITT 2013). There
are opposing opinions even within the U.S. government (ibid), (SCHMITT 2013) and otherexperts have said that “there is no evidence” (THIELMANN 2013). The Federation ofAmerican Scientists (FAS), which is an authority on evaluating nuclear weaponry, released
that there is “no publicly available evidence that North Korea has operationalized its nuclear
weapons capability” (KRISTENSEN & NORIS 2014). Conversely, on January 6, 2015 theSouth Korean Ministry of National Defense released a statement saying North Korea“appeared to have made a ʻsignificantʼ advance toward making a nuclear warhead smallenough to Àt onto a long-range missile” (CHOE 2015). Continuing to analyze North Koreaʼs
nuclear capability is crucial. There has also been discussion regarding North Koreaʼsambiguous public statements. In March 2014, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs
stated that North Korea would use “more diversiÀed nuclear deterrence” and would “not ruleout a new form of nuclear test for bolstering its nuclear deterrence” (KCNA 2014-1). There54

has been much speculation regarding the details of these new tests but North Koreaʼs“calculated ambiguity has been a feature of national nuclear postures” (LEWIS 2014),(BERGER 2014).

Box 4

North Korean Nuclear Tests
stth

1 Test: October 9 , 2006
■ Nuclear Weapon Yield: 0.5a1.0 kt
Fissile Material: Plutonium
1)
North Korean Statement : Successful experiment using domestically developed technology. No riskof radiation exposure.
th
U.S. Director of National Intelligence: ConÀrmed on October 16 that a nuclear experiment took
place and that the nuclear weapon yield was below 1.0 kiloton.
3)
CTBTO: Magnitude 4.1■ Scientiﬁc Findingsth
U.S. Director of National Intelligence: A statement released on October 16 said that radioactiveth
nuclides were detected in samples collected on October 11 .
CTBTO: The IMSʼs (International Monitoring System) Yellowknife Seismological Array in Canadard3)announced on October 23 that it had detected Xe133 .
2

nd

th

Test: May 25 , 2009
■ Nuclear Weapon Yield: 2a7kt
Fissile Material: Plutonium
4)
North Korean Statement : A new plateau was reached with improved explosive power and control
technology.
5)
CTBTO: Magnitude 4.52
th

U.S. Director of National Intelligence: A June 15 statement announced that the nuclear weapon
6)yield was estimated at being several kilotons .
■ Scientiﬁc Findings
No radioactive nuclides were detected.
rdth

3 Nuclear Test: February 12 , 2013
■ Nuclear Weapon Yield: 7.4a25kt
Fissile Material: Undetermined whether plutonium or uranium was used.
North Korean Statement: Higher nuclear weapon yield and a smaller, lighter nuclear bomb.
DiversiÀed its nuclear deterrence capabilities.
9)
CTBTO: Magnitude 5.0
U.S. Director of National Intelligence: A February 12th statement announced that the nuclear
10)
weapon yield was estimated at being several kilotons .
■ Scientiﬁc Findings
CTBTO: Xe131m and Xe133 were detected 55 days after the experiment at Takazaki. The Ussuriysk
11)
Astrophysical Observatory also detected the isotopes .

1) KCNA 2006-2
5) CTBTO 20099) CTBTO 2013-1

552) U.S. DIRECTOR OF NI 2006
6) U.S. DIRECTOR OF NI 2009
10) U.S. DIRECTOR OF NI 2013

3) CTBTO
4) KCNA 2009-3
7) PARK 2013
8) KCNA 2013-3
11) CTBTO 2013-2

4.4

One method of measuring North Koreaʼs nuclear capabilities would be to assess its

stockpile and production capacity of Àssile material (highly-enriched uranium and plutonium).
There have been estimates that by 2012, North Korea had produced four to eight nuclear
warheads (KIM 2013), (SIPRI) and, assuming sustained production, would haveapproximately 12 nuclear warheads as of 2014 (ALBRIGHT & WALROUND 2012),(HECKER 2015). It is necessary to continue pursuing the relevant issue while keeping in
mind that North Koreaʼs volume of fissile material will continue to grow if left unchecked.
Nevertheless, considering the relatively small volume of fissile material in North Korea
compared to other nuclear weapon states, the situation should be handled with a level head. It
was estimated that North Korea had produced 40 to 50 kilograms of plutonium prior to their
2006 nuclear weapon experiment (HECKER & LIOU 2015). Taking into consideration thethree nuclear experiments, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)
estimated that North Korea possessed 30 to 34 kilograms as of December 2014 (TASS 2014).
North Korea announced the resumption of operations at the graphite-moderated reactor(Paragraph 1.16) ,(KCNA 2013-6) and satellite images conÀrmed the reactor was operational(ALBRIGHT & KELLEHER-VARGANTINI 2014-1), (HANSEN 2013). Afterward, however,
the reactor ceased operations for an unconÀrmed reason and there are worries that the spent
nuclear fuel is being reprocessed (ALBRIGHT & KELLEHER-VERGANTINI 2014-2). It
also appears as though construction of the experimental light water reactor set for completionin 2012 has been delayed (ALBRIGHT, KELLEHER-VERGANTINI & YOU 2014). North
Korea would theoretically gain the capacity to produce 20kg of plutonium per year once thelight water reactor is completed (ALBRIGHT & WALROUND 2012). It would also appear as
though North Korea is increasing its uranium enrichment capabilities. Satellite imagery
shows the expansion of the Yongbyon enrichment facilities. Furthermore, the possibility of
another smaller enrichment facility cannot be ruled out. Much about North Koreaʼs plutonium
production and enriched uranium (degree of enrichment and general capabilities) remains
uncertain, but it is expected that the country will gain the technological capability over the
next two years to produce four to six nuclear weapons (HECKER 2015). It is crucial that
dialog with North Korea recovers as soon as possible and that policy is needed toensure the involvement of North Korea. The longer it takes for denuclearization
negotiations to resume, the more time is available to do no good.

4.5

This section evaluates the technological aspects of North Koreaʼs missile issues. Since

firing its first long-range ballistic missile, Taepodong-1, in August 1998, North Korea haslaunched Àve long-range ballistic missiles/satellites. Although there was no press release prior
to the launch of Taepodong-1, North Korea revealed four days later that it had successfully

56

launched its Àrst satellite (KCNA 1998). There has been no third-party evidence showing thatsuch satellite made it into orbit. Ever since, North Korea has issued some form of press release
either before or after its launches. See Box 5 for details of launches since 1998. In 2006, North
Korea launched seven missiles, including the Taepodong-2. In its press release, the country
then attempted to legitimize its missile development program as a means of restoring militarybalance, citing the Iraq War and the U.S. accusing North Korea of being the “Axis of Evil”(KCNA 2006-1). Although one-sided, the press release detailed North Koreaʼs stance on
consistency regarding the moratoriums it agreed with the U.S. and Japan regarding missile
launches. In 2009, North Korea announced prior to the launch that it would outÀt the Unha-2
rocket to launch the Gwangmyeongseong-2 satellite (KCNA 2009-1). Regarding the twolaunches in 2012, North Korea explains that it failed to launch the Unha-3 outÀtted with aGwangmyeongseong-3 in April, but then succeeded in December. In relation to three launches

Box 5

North Korean Satellite/Ballistic Missile Launch Tests
stAugust 31 , 1998

1) 2)

Taepodong-1 (Also known as Paektusan Ilbo-1 or Unha-1 in North Korea )3)
Performance:
North Korea announced it was a three-stage rocket . A three-staged system2),4),5)is generally assessed as having improved the payloadʼs propulsion. It
has also been suggested that the launch was an attempt to launch the
5)
Gwangmyeongseong-2 satellite . The firing range was estimated at2)

Launch Site:
Results:thJuly 5 , 2006

2,000a2,900km and the payload was approximately 100a200kg .
Musudan-ri
The Àrst stage plummeted into the Sea of Japan, and the second into the
Pacific Ocean. Although the claim has not yet been confirmed, North
3)
Korea announced it had succeeded in launching its Àrst satellite .
2),4)

Taepodong-2 (Paektusan Ilbo-2 or Unha -2)。
Performance:
Because there is no video footage for this missile test, it is not known
whether or not it was the same rocket as the Taepodong-2 launched in4)2009 . The Japanese Government believes it was a two-stage ballistic

Launch Site:
Results:

missile, which used a new type of booster in the Àrst stage and a Nodong in6)
the second stage. The Àring range was estimated to be 6,000 kilometers .
Musudan-ri
After the rocket reaches a few kilometers altitude in under a minute after
launch, the Àrst stage of the rocket breaks apart midÁight̶as opposed to6)separating̶and the fragments fall near the launch site . Seven missiles
were launch in succession. The third rocket was the Taepodong-2.

thApril 5 , 2009

1) AOKI 2014
6) JMOD 2007
11) JMOD 2014

57

Taepondong-2 (three-staged rocket, Unha-2)
4)
Performance:
Three-staged rocket . The Japanese Government believes the rocket
was derived from the Taepodong-2. For example, it may have been a
two-staged missile with a propulsion system attached to the7)
payload̶hence making it a 3-staged rocket .

2) KIM 2013
7) JMOD 2010

3) KCNA 1998
8) KCNA 2009-1

4) SCHILLER 2012
9) KCNA 2012-1

5) ELLEMAN 2013
10) KCNA 2012-2

since 2009, publicly available technical information does not contradict the assumption that
all three launches were satellite launches. Also it would be reasonable to assume that the1998 and 2006 launches carried the same mission. It is natural, however, that each of theselaunches will help improve North Koreaʼs ballistic missile launching capabilities. Whileclaiming launches were nothing more than satellite launches, North Korea implied its
capability to attack the mainland U.S. in its propaganda against the U.S. (e.g. KCNA 2013-4).
The successful December 2012 satellite launch also indicates that North Koreaʼs three-stage
rocket technology is improving. However, North Koreaʼs inability to control its satellite
indicates its guidance technology has yet to mature. In general, the capability to launch asatellite does not immediately confirm the ability to launch an intercontinental ballistic
missile. There are tests necessary for the heavier payload weight and atmospheric reentry,
etc. that differ from those requested to launch a satellite (ELLEMAN 2013). Analysis ofthApril 13 , 2012

Launch Site:
Results:

Musudan-ri
The rocket flew more than 3,000km before plummeting into the7)PaciÀc Ocean . Although North Korea announced the launch was a
success, there has been no evidence that the satellite entered orbit2), 4)and is thus widely viewed as being a failure .

Summary:

Prior to the launch, North Korea announced on February 24 that it
would deploy the Gwangmyeongseong-2, an experimental
8)communication satellite, by launching an Unha-2 Rocket.

Modiﬁed Taepondong-2 Model (Unha-3)
Performance:
Three-stage rocket derived from the Taepodong-2.
Launch Site:
Tongchʼang-dong (Known as the “Sohae Satellite Launching Station”
in North Korea.)
Results:
The rocket launched the Gwangmyeongseong-3 climate satellite,
9)
which failed to enter orbit .
Summary:thDecember 12 ,
2012

th

North Korea announced the launch in advance and showed the
preparation stages to foreign observers. The satellite was launchedwithout the presence of observers.

Modiﬁed Taepongong-2 Model（Unha-3）
Performance:
Three-staged rocket derived from the Taepodong-2. Varying nations have2)
estimated the Àring range to be between 3,400 and 15,000 kilometers .
Results:

Summary:

North Korea announced that the earth observation satellite
10)
Gwangmyeongseong-3, Type 2 successfully entered orbit .
International authorities have verified the claim. North Korea
1)
launched its own satellite faster than South Korea . The Japanese
Ministry of Defense stated that North Koreaʼs missile development
11).
had “entered a new stage”
North Korea announced the launch in advance and registered with
the United Nations under the Convention on the Registration of
Objects Launched into Outer Space.

58

fragments from the Unha-3 recovered by South Korea showed that the rocket was suitable forlaunching a satellite but not for launching a ballistic missile (WRIGHT 2013). Other experts
argue that North Koreaʼs threat of ballistic missiles is nothing more than a political
performance (SCHILLER 2012). The North Korean missile issues should be considered as
exemplifying the problem of dual-use technology that has applications for both space
exploration and ballistic missile development. The discussion needs to begin on the basis of auniversal standard applicable to all nations.

Box 6

UN Security Council Resolutions and related statements on North
Koreaʼs Nuclear Tests and Projectile Launchesth

May 11 , 1993

thNovember 4 ,
1994

th

July 15 , 2006th

October 6 ,2006

Security Council Resolution 825 (1993)
The Council urges North Korea to recall the North-South Korea Joint Denuclearization
Declaration and to reconsider its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Statement by the President of the Security Council S/PRST/1994/64
The Council welcomed the Agreed Framework between the United States of America andthe Democratic Peopleʼs Republic of Korea and the freezing of North Koreaʼs graphitemoderated reactors and other related facilities. The Council requests the IAEA resume
its Safeguards Agreement.
Security Council Resolution 1695 (2006)th
The Council condemns the multiple missile launches North Korea conducted on July 5
and demands the country suspend its ballistic missile programs. The Council also banned
other nations from providing missile related materials and technology to North Korea.
Statement by the President of the Security Council S/PRST/2006/41
The Council condemned the Foreign Minister of North Koreaʼs announcement ofrdupcoming nuclear tests made by the Foreign Minister of North Korea on October 3 . It
urged North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks.

thOctober 14 ,
2006

th

April 13 , 2009th

July 13 , 2009

59

Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006)
The Council condemns the nuclear weapon experiment North Korea conducted on Octoberth
9 and demands the country to suspend all nuclear tests and launching of ballistic
missiles. In response to North Koreaʼs Àrst nuclear test, the resolution invokes Chapter
VII, Article 41, of the UN Charter, and sanctions against North Korea by banning allimports of military equipment to the nation.
Statement by the President of Security Council S/PRST/2009/7
thCondemns North Koreaʼs missile launch conducted on April 5 .
Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)th
The Council strongly condemns North Koreaʼs second nuclear test conduct on May 25 .
In response to the second nuclear test, the Council demanded DPRK to terminate its
nuclear tests and “any launching using ballistic missile technology.” This was theCouncilʼs Àrst time to use such an expression. Under Chapter VII, Article 41, of the UN
Charter, additional sanctions against North Korea, including freezing its assets andbanning Ànancial trades, were invoked. Additionally it requested members of the UN toreport on the progress made towards implementing the sanction.

The International Response to North Koreaʼs Developing Nuclear andMissile Capabilities

4.6

The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly made Presidential Statements

and passed resolutions in response to North Koreaʼs nuclear weapons tests and launches using
ballistic missile technology. Box 6 summarizes these actions in historical order. The nuclear
weapons issues can be traced back to North Koreaʼs withdrawal from the NPT in 1993. The
missile issues can be traced back to the 1999 moratorium on ballistic missile tests (announcedthJune 7 , 2010thJune 10 , 2011thApril 16 , 2012

Security Council Resolution 1928 (2010)
The Council reiterated the request for reports on progress towards invoking sanctions
against North Korea in resolutions 1718 and 1874, and extended the deadline forsubmission of the report.
Security Council Resolution 1985 (2011)
Extended the mandate of an expert panel to monitor sanctions against North Korea, anddirected the framework regarding the structure and deadline of the report.
Statement by the President of Security Council S/PRST/2012/13th
The Council condemned North Koreaʼs missile launch conducted on March 13 , statingthat it violated the Security Councilʼs Resolution that suspended “any launch that uses
ballistic missile technology”.

thJune 12 , 2012nd

January 22 ,
2013

th

March 7 ,2013thMarch 5 ,2014

Security Council Resolution 2050 (2012)
The Council extended the mandate of an expert panel to monitor sanctions against North
Korea, and directed the framework regarding the structure and deadline of the report.
Security Council Resolution 2087 (2013)
The Council condemned North Koreaʼs missile tests and demanded the country terminate
all nuclear tests and “any launch that uses ballistic missile technology.” Invoking Chapter
VII, Article 41, of the UN Charter, the Council resolved to strengthen the sanctions
against North Korea by freezing its assets, banning financial trading, and travel. It
requested other nations to report the condition of the sanction against North Korea.
Security Council Resolution 2094 (2013)th
The Council strongly condemns DPRKʼs third nuclear test held on February 12 , anddemands the country to terminate all nuclear tests and “any launch that uses ballistic
missile technology.” Invoking Chapter VII, Article 41, of the UN Charter, the Council
decided to strengthen the sanction against North Korea freezing its assets, banningÀnancial trading, and traveling. Additionally it requested members of the UN to reporton the progress made towards implementing the sanction.
Security Council Resolution 2141 (2014)
The Council extended the mandate of an expert panel to monitor sanctions against North
Korea, and directed the framework regarding the structure and deadline of the report.

60

by DPRK Foreign Ministry, KCNA 1999), which was a result of U.S.-North Korea talks after
the Taepodong-1 launch at the end of August 1998. The UN Security Council Resolution 1874
passed in 2009 banned North Korea “from any launch using ballistic missile technology”. Itshould be reminded that this demand to ban “any launch using ballistic missile technology”
was introduced by linking such technology to North Koreaʼs nuclear weapon development
program. It is also undeniable that North Korea has the same right to launch satellites into
orbit for peaceful purposes as the rest of the world. The problem lies in using this technology
to deliver a weapon of mass destruction. There is a need to clarify the correlation between the
nuclear weapon problem and the ban on the “launch using ballistic missile technology”.
Especially, when economic/Ànancial sanctions are concerned, the issues of nuclear weaponsand other weapons of mass destruction and those of missile launches have to be carefully
distinguished because the consensus foundation of international law differs quite signiÀcantly
between the two. In the former issues, there have been solid legal foundations such as NPT,
Chemical Weapon Convention and Biological Weapon Convention. Solving the primary issue
of weapons of mass destruction (particularly nuclear weapons) will subsequently reduce thegravity of the ballistic missile issues. The issue of reasonable arms control of ballistic missiles
is not simple and should be discussed separately (RECNA 2013).

61

Chapter 5

A Comprehensive Approachto the Denuclearizationof Northeast Asia

Validity of Halperinʼs Six Elements

5.1

Halperinʼs six elements, introduced in Paragraph 3.4, are an appropriate starting

point for feasibly achieving the denuclearization of Northeast Asia. Resolving the firstelement, “The Termination of the Korean War”, would mean settling the negative historicallegacy of the region. Taking into account the fact that North Korea has repeatedly demanded
an end to the Korean War recently (for example KCNA 2010), this is undoubtedly an issue
that should be addressed and included in the comprehensive approach. However, agreeing on
the details and negotiation process of a peace treaty, which would replace the Korean
Armistice Agreement, will likely be a great undertaking, in itself. There are many criticalissues, such as the Maritime Military Demarcation Line, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty andthe handling of U.S. Forces stationed in the ROK. and their joint military exercises based
upon the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and ROK. There is also the vital issue ofreunification of the two Koreas. Under the comprehensive approach, concise politicalagreements and specific details should be considered in staged phases with an enforceable
legal framework. This element and the third element, “Mutual Declaration of No Hostile
Intent”, are closely related. The U.S. China, DPRK and ROK would be central to negotiating62this Àrst element. If these four nations and more speciÀcally the U.S.-DPRK and ROK-DPRK,
were to mutually declare a non-hostile intent, element one will likely be achieved in substance.
A paper that refers to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC)
provides useful information for this purpose (HAYES 2014). The TAC expresses equality ofsovereignty, refraining from intervention in the domestic affairs of another nation, nonaggression, prohibiting subversion of a nation and the right to national existence.
Denuclearizing North Korea has been negotiated consistently in relation to North Koreaʼsenergy development. The KEDO served that purpose (Paragraph 1.13) and the Septemberth

19 Joint Statement of the Six-Party-Talks stated that “the light water reactor offer to North
Korea will be discussed at an appropriate time” while also mentioning “economic cooperationin areas of energy, trade and investment”. As such “provisions of assistance for nuclear andother energy” ̶ the fourth element ̶ is essential to a comprehensive approach. There is alsoa need to reach a mutual agreement that deals with North Koreaʼs current ʻJuche Nuclear
Industryʼ (Paragraph 1.16). Considering that North Korea is adamantly resisting sanctions
imposed by the UN Security Council, the fifth element “Termination of Sanctions” will beessential to reach a comprehensive agreement. Halperinʼs second element of establishing a
Permanent Security council is mandatory to implement an enforceable legal framework. Thus,
although there may be many adjustments to be made in the comprehensive approach toward
establishing a NEA-NWFZ, Halperinʼs Six Elements are valid and should be included.

5.2

Certain elements not included in the Six Elements have been applied in this section.

The first is the right to peaceful exploration of space. North Korea has repeatedly
opposed sanctions that have been imposed for launching satellites. The comprehensive process
to resolve the nuclear problems requires that all state have the right to develop spacetechnology for peaceful purposes. At present all the member states of the Six-Party Talks are
members of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Mutual agreement on an international level for
handling ballistic missile launches is lacking, as was discussed in Paragraph 4.6 anddiscussions within a regional framework are difÀcult. Furthermore, solving issues regarding
ballistic missiles are not necessarily vital to resolving nuclear issues. The other element
introduced here is eliminating concerns over chemical weapons. All states participating in the
Six-Party Talks join the Biological Weapon Convention, but as for the Chemical Weapon
Convention, North Korea is yet to be a member. The September 19 Joint Statement provided
security assurances against both nuclear and conventional weapons use (Paragraph 1.15). If
this can be accomplished as part of the comprehensive process, the agreement would be easily
extended to ban and eliminate chemical weapons regionally. These additional two elements
toward a comprehensive approach will inevitably surface in the discussion of the six elements.
Rather than complicating the entire matter, resolving these issues will smooth the process.

63With regard to the “provisions of assistance for nuclear and other energy” element, thechallenge will be to address equal rights for the “nuclear fuel cycle” in the context ofdenuclearization and the provision of energy to stabilize North Korea. The objective of theformer subject would be the “regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle”. An examination of theʻAsian Super Gridʼ is proposed to resolve the latter (SUZUKI 2014).

Proposal of a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the
Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”

5.3

Halperinʼs six elements in his “Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in

NEA” and two additional elements closely tied to them, the right for peaceful spacedevelopment and chemical weapons ban, are considered below to examine how to be organized
in a “Comprehensive Approach for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”. Considering thehistory of past, failed joint statements among North Korea, U.S. and other countries, Halperin
proposes a methodology in which the legally binding outline of the Ànal agreement should be
agreed to start with, followed by negotiations of the details (HALPERIN 2011, 2014). This
Proposal agrees with this Halperinʼs methodology. When political leadership is weak, however,it can be difficult or take too long to go through the parliamentary process necessary for alegal instrument to be ratified. In this proposal, we suggest concluding a legally binding
document called a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearizationof Northeast Asia” (CFA), which is to be signed by heads of the member states of the SixParty-Talks. Appointing an independent group of non-governmental, authoritative experts
for support and verification can alleviate concerns regarding the CFA being overruled bychanging administrations. The expert group will be deeply involved in the process leading up
to manifesting the CFA and work for support and verification to ensure the continuity ofnegotiations after initial agreement is reached.

5.4

The characteristics of each element introduced in the comprehensive approach are

not uniform. Some elements may be issues and others may be organizational matters; some
may be simple and others complicated. Accordingly, the speciÀcs of the CFA are proposed to
be organized in four Chapters as shown below and are classified as either “Declaratory” or“Actionable”.
1) Declare to terminate the Korean War and provide for mutual non-aggression,
friendship and equal sovereignty among CFA state parties. States lacking diplomatic
relations will endeavor to succeed in normalizing their diplomatic relations. Encouragenegotiations for a peace treaty among the states concerned for the Korean War.

64

(Declaratory)
2) Assure equal rights to access all forms of energy, including nuclear, to be accompaniedby commitments to exclusively peaceful use. Establish a Northeast Asia Energy
Cooperation Committee that is dedicated to contribute to the stability of Northeast
Asia and the peaceful reuniÀcation of the Korean Peninsula and a stable Northeast
Asia. The invitation for Committee members extends beyond the Six-Parties and isopen to any state supporting the cause. (Declaratory. Actionable details will be decided
by the Committee.)3) Agree on a treaty to establish a NEA-NWFZ. The treaty will provide for all
actionable measures that regulate a nuclear weapon-free zone. It is advisable toensure the treaty reflects the ideas introduced in Paragraphs 5.5 - 5.8. Signatory
states are obligated to join the Chemical Weapons Convention. The agreement willprotect the rights of signatory states to peaceful space exploration in accordance withthe 1967 Outer Space Treaty. An article will address imposing sanctions on states inviolation of the agreement and restrict a state party from independently imposing
sanctions on another state party. (A Complete treaty. Actionable)
4) Establish a permanent Northeast Asia Security Council. The primary objective of
this council will be to enforce the CFA. The secondary objective will be, whenappropriate, to serve as a platform for discussions involving various Northeast Asian
security issues. In future, it would be advisable to become a platform for morecomprehensive discussions regarding regional security issues. This council could also
be positioned to serve as a mechanism to verify the NEA-NWFZ. The Six-Parties will
form the executive council while member states of the Energy Cooperation
Committee and any states or international organizations offering cooperation toachieve peace and security in Northeast Asia are welcome to be general members.
(Actionable. Details of the Council will be provided in this chapter.)

Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

5.5

Halperinʼs proposal depicts the geographical scope of a NEA-NWFZ centered on

North Korea, South Korea and Japan, adding Mongolia, Canada and others for possible
participation. The proposal also states that a uniÀed Korea should also be a non-nuclear stateand is essentially similar to the “Three-plus-Three Arrangement” and correlates to it.
Mongolia declares itself as being a Northeast Asian state (ENKHSAIKHAN 2012), but thenation has yet to express its interests to join a NEA-NWFZ. Mongolian efforts toinstitutionalize its nuclear weapon-free status through negotiations with China and Russia,
followed by the P5 have been concluded with some success in October 2012 (Paragraphs 1.17

65

and 1.18). Because of this achievement, it is unlikely, under current circumstances, that
Mongolia will propose the subsequent step. The outcomes of Mongoliaʼs negotiations with theP5 have not been perfect, however and a legally binding security assurance, which is
Mongoliaʼs primary desire, has yet to be achieved. Accordingly, there is the potential forchange in the situation after a certain period has elapsed and an opportunity presents itself.
Because countries including Canada may convolute the regional deÀnition of “Northeast Asia”,
a regionally definable treaty may be more effective, unless there is an obvious diplomaticadvantage to including Canada. Nevertheless, Mongolia and Canada can serve a vital role asmembers of the “Energy Cooperation Committee” and “Northeast Asia Security Council”
provided for in the CFA.

5.6

Doubts over achieving a NEA-NWFZ repeatedly point toward the lack of mutual

trust and conÀdence between the states within the region. As the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which
overcame hostilities between Brazil and Argentina, demonstrates, however, a system inwhich articles enter into force can be structured to overcome trust issues andachieve a NEA-NWFZ, regardless of distrust among the states. More specifically, as
Halperin suggested, the treaty could be structured to go into effect when the three nuclear
weapon states (U.S., China and Russia) ratify the treaty and when two non-nuclear weapon
states (Japan and ROK) do so. However, it would be plausible to include an option for Japanand Korea to secede from the treaty if North Korea did not join the treaty within three to Àve
years. (HALPERIN 2011) Amending the treaty as such would effectively remove Japan andSouth Koreaʼs concerns and encourage positive participation from both countries toward
promptly effectuating the treaty. A significant merit for Japan and Korea to accelerate
implementation of the treaty is obtaining security assurances from non-alliance nuclear
weapon states. For Japan, it will resolve the threat of Chinaʼs nuclear weapons. Hayes also
recognizes the right for Japan and Korea to exclude certain articles from the treaty. Once thearticles are removed, however, the treaty will be ratiÀed and immediately come into effect forthe signatory states (HAYES, TANTER & DIAMOND 2012). North Koreaʼs suspicions andconcerns toward the nations concerned are deeply rooted. To resolve these suspicions, thetreaty would specify that North Korea would join the treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state.
Furthermore, as long as North Korea remains nuclear weapon-free, the U.S. and other nuclear
weapon states will provide legally binding negative security assurance. Halperin proposesthat North Korea would be allowed a speciÀed timeframe to dismantle nuclear weapons andnuclear weapon-related factories and facilities. During this time frame, North Korea would bepermitted to join the treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state, even if its disarmament is notcomplete. The U.S. would immediately provide security assurances during this timeframe(HALPERIN 2014).

66

5.7

In reality, not all Japan and South Koreaʼs concerns about North Koreaʼs nuclear

weapons capability will be resolved by the entry-into-force processes detailed in Paragraph5.6. The threat of nuclear weapons existed in the region prior to negotiations for a NEANWFZ treaty. Once the negotiations begin, however, the threat of nuclear weapons is replacedby suspicions of whether negotiations are being executed in good faith. This is also true ofNorth Korea. North Korea may be possessed by a threatening idea whether or not the U.S. isnegotiating in good faith. The unique nature of these relationships stem from the fact thatstates with nuclear weapons are attempting to achieve a NWFZ and requires priordeliberation. These problems may be resolved by agreeing on several moratoriums prior tonegotiations to assure negotiations are held in good faith. North Korea would need a
moratorium on nuclear tests and other nuclear weapon-related activities. The U.S., South
Korea and Japan would likely need a moratorium on joint military exercises around the
Korean Peninsula. In relation to prior moratoriums it would be desirable to consider somemeasures to alleviate sanctions currently imposed on North Korea.

5.8

Some Japanese and South Korean politicians and policy makers supporting the NEA-

NWFZ are fearful of losing U.S. extended nuclear weapon deterrence. The sentiment is deeply
rooted and they are not alone. A lack of understanding the nuclear weapon-free zone often
sparks such fears. Conversely, it may be the unnecessary fear of what happens when thetreaty is broken. In reality, nuclear weapon-free zones are protected by international law thatprohibits attacks and threats with nuclear weapons, which is known as the negative security
assurance. Accordingly, non-nuclear weapon states need not rely on extended nuclear
deterrence to form a NWFZ. This fundamental principle must be understood and wasemphasized at the workshops (DHANAPALA 2014), (MANTELS 2014). This is why a
NWFZ is encouraged as a framework of cooperative security that does not depend
on nuclear weapons. (Because the CFA includes a mutual agreement of non-aggression, the
NEA-NWFZ would also be an area that does not permit the use or threatened use of
conventional weapons. Considering past negotiations on the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula, it may be possible to include conventional weapons as part of security assurances
to be provided in a NEA-NWFZ treaty.) There is a need to respond, however, to an
ineradicable doubt toward enforcing the law amidst the current, international political scene.
The doubt is that non-nuclear weapon states will be defenseless, should the treaty be violated
and the states are threatened by nuclear attacks. Once this occurs, the treaty will immediately
be null and void and international affairs will return to a state unbound by a treaty. If thealliance with the U.S. continues, actions will be taken according to this alliance. To calm this67

doubt, Halperin suggests that the treaty include an article purporting that if any of the stateparties were to violate the treaty by using or threatening to use nuclear weapons, the treaty
would be nulliÀed. Moreover, other states parties can take sanctions against the offender inaccordance with the international law and in methods their individual national constitution
allows (HALPERIN 2014). Although this is a natural condition for any treaty, including thisarticle within the treaty is intended to eliminate concerns. Conversely, emphasizing conditions
to eliminate concerns may misleadingly suggest that the mentality toward extended nuclear
deterrence in the NWFZ remains unchanged.

Current State of Affairs in Nations Involved in the Comprehensive
Approach for a NEA-NWFZ

5.9

This chapter will introduce the state of affairs in Japan, South Korea and North

Korea. The Japanese government has recently come to ofÀcially discuss the issue of NEANWFZ. The most recent edition of a P.R. publication of “Japanʼs Disarmament and NonProliferation Policy” (Edition 6, March 2013) reads, “the Three-plus-Three Arrangement, inwhich Japan, South Korea and North Korea form a nuclear weapon-free zone and the U.S.,
China and Russia provide negative security assurances, is recently gathering attention.”
Natsuo Yamaguchi, Chief Representative of Komei Party and Katsuya Okada, former Foreign
Minister of Japan and current President of Democratic Party of Japan, spoke at the Third
Workshop Public Session in September 2014, both giving words to the effect that Japanʼs
proposal for a NEA-NWFZ may incentivize North Korea to denuclearize. Support from Japanʼspublic sector and mass media are also high. Over 540 heads of local governments have signed
a petition to show support toward establishing a NEA-NWFZ. In April 2014, the Hiroshima
and Nagasaki mayors submitted the signatures to UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon. The
majority of discussions to promote a NEA-NWFZ in Japan, however, are conducted in thecontext of denuclearizing North Korea and weak in emphasizing the obligation under NPT for
nuclear dependent non-nuclear weapon states to eliminate their dependence on nuclear
deterrence in their security policies. The Japanese government has been steadfast in its
position that “the situation of the region is premature” and has yet to take any actions to move
forward. In South Korea, discussions regarding “Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula” areoften strongly associated with reuniÀcation issues. However, in various sectors of the ROK,
there are growing opportunities where the theme of “Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”, notjust “Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” is raised for discussions. Cheju Peace Forumhas discussed this subject several times. The Kim Dae-jung Peace Memorial Symposium in
October 2014, for example, hosted a session named “Options for Nuclear Weapons Free
Northeast Asia”. Also, the South Korean Chapter of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-

68

Proliferation and Disarmament (PNND) has held study sessions on a NEA-NWFZ. Joint
efforts by Parliamentarians and citizens groups from Japan and South Korea have continued.
As for North Korea, historically there has been little reference specifically to NEA as a
NWFZ (PAIK 2014). There is no doubt that North Korea has received literature and updated
information on the comprehensive approach, including a NEA-NWFZ, but there has been no
detailed response. The Rodong Sinmun of the DPRK recently carried an article that reÁectedon the 1994 agreed framework and referred to a NWFZ. It reads “The DPRK put forth a
proposal for building a nuclear-free zone through peaceful dialog and negotiations andcombined it with the method of removing the U.S. nuclear threat by relying on internationallaw.” (KCNA 2014-2). More details and the context of the article remain unknown.

5.10

This section introduces the state of affairs of the U.S., China and Russia, based on

ideas from researchers. As for the U.S., various reactions were available to Halperinʼs proposal
at the workshop organized by the Nautilus Institute in Washington D.C. in October 2012. The
workshop received comments from a broad spectrum of experts. Those include the following. A
supportive comment is that a new policy for engagement, such as the comprehensive
agreement, is necessary instead of repeatedly demanding a CVID (complete, verifiable andirreversible disarmament) of DPRK nuclear weapons (BOSWORTH 2012); The theme of a
NEA-NWFZ is an appropriate and new challenge for the Six-Party Talk (GOODBY 2012).
Opinions on adverse influences on Japan-U.S. and ROK-U.S. security relationships wereexpressed, followed by suggestions to remedy them (SHIFFER 2012). Some remarks
expressed skepticism and difficulty (GREEN 2012) and apprehension toward Japan andSouth Koreaʼs wavering trust in extended nuclear deterrent of the U.S. (SMITH 2012). Manyof the divergent views on Halperinʼs proposal seem resolvable by understanding the proposal
in more detail. At present, it is recognized that this issue is relatively low on the Obamaadministrationʼs long list of diplomatic priorities, including issues of the Middle East andUkraine. Accordingly, the administration will not initiate a move, but would also not oppose
moves by Japan and South Korea to take the initiative (HALPERIN 2014). Throughopportunities to discuss the proposal with many experts from China, it became evident thatthose who correctly understood the details of the proposal did not object (SHEN 2014).
Russian specialists will likely also agree once the speciÀcs of the proposed NEA-NWFZ arethoroughly understood. Russia is working to strengthen economic relations with the Korean
Peninsula and cautious of growing U.S. inÁuence seeks to stabilize the region. Furthermore,
Russia has traditionally supported progress of discussions within the Six-Party Talks
framework (MIZIN 2012). Russia served to chair the “Northeast Asia Peace and Security
Mechanism Working Group” (Paragraph 1.15) established at the Six-Party Talks. It isreported that, in the working group in question, there were growing efforts to put the issue of69

the denuclearization of North Korea in more comprehensive security issues of the region(NIKITIN 2014).

Views to the Diplomatic Process

5.11

The United Nations has recently been a platform for furthering the discussion athand. Angela Kane, the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs,
expressed her thoughts when visiting Nagasaki in August 2012. Her view was that there wasa dire need to denuclearize the Middle East and Northeast Asia, but that it was difÀcult for
the regions to make progress in (YAMAZATO 2012). This is likely a common understandingat the United Nations. The 59th

and 60th

sessions of the Advisory Board on Disarmament

Matters held in 2013 discussed the NWFZ and specifically denuclearizing Northeast Asia.
Reports from these sessions showed various opinions regarding the establishment of the NEANWFZ were shared and included recommendations to the Secretary-General. The board
recommended that the UN consider taking appropriate actions to establish the NWFZ andplay a proactive role in establishing regional fora for transparency and conÀdence building(UNGA 2013). Since the initiative to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone should emanate
exclusively from States within the region concerned (UNDC 1999), the role for the UN to playat this stage is limited; however, such recommendations submitted by the UN are a large leap
forward. As was mentioned, the UN is currently capable of serving a vital role in the processof confidence building. Emphasis should be placed on the efforts of Mongolian President
Elbedgorj from the One State Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. He expressed his support for the
NEA-NWFZ concept at the United Nations High-Level Panel in September 2013 andcommenced the “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security” for conÀdence building(ELBEGDORJ 2013). It is desirable for the UN to take part in these discussions. Meanwhile,held at Daegu, South Korea in November 2013, Chinaʼs Chen Jian, former Under-Secretaryth

General of the United Nations and former Ambassador to Japan, spoke at the 13 East Asian
UN system seminar (CHEN 2013). He expressed the view that a collaboration of proactive
initiatives between Japan and Korea was essential to achieve a NEA-NWFZ. Frequently
discussed throughout this proposal, Japan and South Korea have a crucial role in developing
the NEA-NWFZ diplomatic process. In 2013, the South Korean Government announced their“Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) (ROK MOFA 2013). It is desirable
for each state to take such initiatives toward promoting international dialog in the region.

5.12

The Ànal section of this paper will examine the platform for discussions and theprocesses to achieve, regarding a “Comprehensive Approach for the Denuclearization of70

Northeast Asia” or more speciÀcally regarding a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for
denuclearization in Northeast Asia” that has been proposed in this book. Although there may
be other possibilities, resuming the Six-Party Talks would be the most appropriate andpractical way to ensure the platform for this discussion. The Six-Party Talks has alreadyestablished the “Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism Working Group”,
expressing its interests in discussing denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in wider
context. Efforts are currently underway to resume the Six-Party Talks and reportedly North
Korea, China and Russia share an affirmative attitude (NEBEHAY 2014). Although somebelieved it would be best to scrap the Six-Party Talks in favor of a fresh start with a newplatform and new ideas (RECNA 2013), North Korea and Chinaʼs opinions are crucial at thistime and it is also critical to secure Chinaʼs continuous involvement in efforts to denuclearize
Northeast Asia. It is also important that, as can be found in the consensus Ànal document of
the 2010 NPT Review Conference (Paragraph 1.15, NPT 2010-8), the international
community unanimously holds high expectations of the Six-Party Talks. As for the UnitedStates, it has been incapable of launching a new initiative to engage North Korea since the socalled Leap Day Agreement between the U.S. and North Korea on February 29, 2012 failed in
the resuming Six-Party Talks due to the missile launch by North Korea. It was just after the
DPRK regime shift took place from General Secretary Kim Jong-Il to First Secretary Kim
Jong-un. The U.S. visibly has its hands full with urgent issues in the Middle East, Ukraine
and Afghanistan. Considering the discussions in this book of proposals, it is an opportunity forJapan and South Korea, independently or collaboratively, to take the lead. The Six-Party
Talks should resume and be a platform for these discussions and work to achieve mutual
agreements for a comprehensive approach. Just as Halperin consistently emphasizes, it isvital that Japan and Korea examine policy details and explore various routes and venues for
close consultations with the U.S.. China and North Korea before actually resuming the SixParty Talks (HALPERIN 2011, 2012, 2014). Considering the NPT 2010 Final Document
strongly supports the Six-Party Talks (NPT 2010-8), the upcoming 2015 NPT Review
Conference will be a signiÀcant diplomatic platform to address the issue.

71

REFERENCESALBRIGHT David, 2013, “North Korean Miniaturization,” 38 North, 13 February, 2013. http://38north.
org/2013/02/albright021313/
ALBRIGHT David & AVAGYAN Robert 2013, “Recent Redoubling of Floor Space at North Korean Gas
Centrifuge Plant – Is North Korea doubling its enrichment capacity at Yongbyon?” Institute for Scienceand International Security, Imagery Brief, August 7, 2013
ALBRIGHT David & KELLEHER-VERGANTINI Serena 2014-1, “Monitoring Activity at Yongbyon
Nuclear Site,” Institute for Science and International Security, Imagery Brief, April 23, 2014
ALBRIGHT David & KELLEHER-VERGANTINI Serena 2014-2, “Yongbyon: Monitoring Activities
during Shutdown of 5 MW Reactor,” Institute for Science and International Security, Imagery Brief,
December 5, 2014
ALBRIGHT David, KELLEHER-VERGANTINI Serena & YOU, Won Gi 2014, “Activities Detected at
North Koreaʼs Yongbyon Nuclear Site,” Institute for Science and International Security, Imagery Brief,
August 5, 2014
ALBRIGHT David & WALROUND Christina 2012 “North Koreaʼs Estimated Stocks of Plutonium andWeapon-Grade Uranium,” Institute for Science and International Security, August 16, 2012.
AOKI, Setsuko 2014, “Kita-Chosen-no ʻJinko-Eisei Uchiage to Shosuru Misairu Hasshaʼ no Kokusai-Ho
Jo No Ichizuke,” (in Japanese), Japan Association of Disarmament Studies Newsletter, No. 16, March
20, 2014
http://www.disarmament.jp/pdf/NL16.pdf
ARKIN William M. & FIELDHOUSE Richard W. 1985, “Nuclear Battle Fields: Global Links in the Arms
Race,” Ballinger, 1985
AUSTRIA, MEXICO & NORWAY 2011, “Taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations” (A/C.1/66/L.21/Rev.1), 25 October 2011
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com11/res/L21Rev1.
pdf
BAKER Gerard & GALE Alastair 2014, “South Korea President Warns on Nuclear Domino Effect,” The
Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2014
BERGER Andrea 2014, “Calculated ambiguity and the DPRKʼs nuclear capability,” www.nknews.
org/2014/06/calculated-ambiguity-and-the-dprks-nuclear-capability/
BOSWORTH, Steve 2012, “Dealing with North Korea – A possible alternative approach,” presented at aworkshop ‘New Approach to Security in NE Asia: Breaking the Gridlock,’ October 9-10, 2012,
Washington DC
CHEN Jian 2013, comments to the speech on NEA-NWFZ given by one of the authors of this book
(Hirose Satoshi) at the 13th East Asian Seminar on the United Nations “New Global Challenges to
Security and East Asian Leadership in the United Nations” held at Daegu, ROK on November 15-16,

72

2013
CHOE Sang-Hun 2015, “North Korea has made a ʻsigniÀcantʼ advances in nuclear arms program, Southsays”, The New York Times, January 6, 2015.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/07/world/north-korea-has-made-significant-advances-in-nucleararms-program-south-says.html
CHOSUN ILBO 2013, “Is Japan Eyeing Nuclear Armament?” The Chosunilbo English Edition, October24, 2013
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/10/24/2013102400866.html
CTBTO (Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization), “The CTBTVeriÀcation Regime Put To the Test – The Event in the DPRK on 9 October 2006.” (last accessed on
Jan. 15, 2015).
http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2007/the-ctbt-verification-regime-put-to-the-test-theevent-in-the-dprk-on-9-october-2006/
CTBTO 2009, “Experts Sure About Nature of the DPRK Event,” June 12, 2009http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2009/experts-sure-about-nature-of-the-dprk-event/
CTBTO 2013-1, “On the CTBTOʼs Detection in North Korea,” Press Release 2013/02/12, Vienna, 12
February 2013
http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2013/on-the-ctbtos-detection-in-north-korea/
CTBTO 2013-2, “CTBTO Detects Radioactivity Consistent with 12 February Announced North Korean
Nuclear Test,” Press Release 2013/8, Vienna, 23 April 2013
http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2013/ctbto-detects-radioactivity-consistent-with-12february-announced-north-korean-nuclear-test/
DHANAPALA Jayantha 2014, “Denuclearization of Northeast Asia and of the World,” presented at
Workshop III on Developing Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ, Sep 14-16, 2014
http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/bd/files/Amb.-DhanapalaDENUCLEARIZATION-OF-NORTHEAST-ASIA-AND-OF-THE-WORLD.pdf
ELBEGDORJ Tsakhia 2013, Statement at the High=Level Meeting of the UN General Assembly on
Nuclear Disarmament, 26 September, 2013
ELLEMAN Michael 2013, “Prelude to an ICBM? Putting North Koreaʼs Unha-3 Launch Into Context,”
Arms Control Today, March 2013
ENKHSAIKHAN Jargalsaikhan 2012, Speech at UN General Assembly, September 17, 2012
ENKHSAIKHAN Jargalsaikhan 2014, “Mongoliaʼs search for security in the nuclear age,” Disarmament
Review, Japan Association of Disarmament Studies, Vol. 5, 2014
FRANK Ruediger 2014, “Can North Korea Prioritize Nukes and the Economy at the Same Time?” Global
Asia, Vol. 9, No. 1, spring 201473

GOODBY James 2012, “Regional Framework for a Comprehensive Security Settlement: Does It Work?”,presented at a workshop ‘New Approach to Security in NE Asia: Breaking the Gridlock,’ October 9-10,
2012, Washington DC
GREEN Michael J. 2012, “A Northeast Regional Security Framework: Does it Work?”, presented at aworkshop ‘New Approach to Security in NE Asia: Breaking the Gridlock,’ October 9-10, 2012,
Washington DC
HALPERIN Morton H. 2011, “A Proposal for a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in Northeast Asia,” Global
Asia Vol. 6, No.4, winter 2011. Originally presented at ʻEast Asia Nuclear Security Workshop,ʼNovember 11, 2011, Tokyo, cosponsored by Nautilus Institute, MansÀeld Foundation, and Asia-PaciÀc
Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN).
HALPERIN Morton H. 2012, “A New Approach to Security in Northeast Asia: Breaking the Gridlock,”
7KH$VLD3DFLÀF-RXUQDOVol. 10, Issue 34, August 20, 2012
HALPERIN Morton H. 2014, “Time to strike a comprehensive security deal in Northeast Asia,” POINT
OF VIEW, Asia & Japan Watch, September 11, 2014
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/opinion/AJ201409110012
HANSEN Nick, 2013, “Major Development: Reactor Fuel Fabrication Facilities IdentiÀed at Yongbyon
Nuclear Complex,” 38 North, December 23, 2013
HAYES Peter 1990, “PaciÀc Powderkeg–American Nuclear Dilemma,” Lexington Books, 1990
HAYES Peter 2014, “Overcoming US-DPRK Hostility: The Missing Link Between a Northeast AsianComprehensive Security Settlement and Ending the Korean War,” presented at Workshop III on
Developing Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ, Sep 14-16, 2014
HAYES Peter & MOON Chung-in 2014, “Should South Korea Go Nuclear?” EAF Policy Debate No. 7,thEast Asia Foundation, July 28 , 2014
HAYES Peter, TANTER Richard & DIAMOND Joan 2012, “General Assessment of the DPRK Nuclear
Situation,” presented at the Workshop on Developing Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ,
December 7-10, 2012
http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/bd/Àles/Peter-Hayes1.pdf
HECKER Siegfried S. 2010, “A Return Trip to North Koreaʼs Yongbyon Nuclear Complex,” Center forInternational Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Nov. 20, 2010 http://cisac.fsi.stanford.
edu/sites/default/Àles/HeckerYongbyon.pdf
HECKER, Siegfried S. 2015, “The real threat from North Korea is the nuclear arsenal built over the last
decade,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 7, 2015.
http://thebulletin.org/real-threat-north-korea-nuclear-arsenal-built-over-last-decade7883
HECKER, Siegfried S. & LIOU William 2015, “Dangerous Dealings: North Koreaʼs Nuclear Capabilities
and the Threat of Export to Iran,” Arms Control Today, vol. 37, no. 2, March 2007

74

JAPAN AEC (Atomic Energy Commission) 2014, “The Current Situation of Plutonium Management inJapan (in Japanese,「我が国のプルトニウム管理状況について」),” Secretariat of Japan Atomic Energy
Commission, Cabinet OfÀce, September 16, 2014
http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei/siryo2014/siryo31/siryo3.pdf
JAPAN METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) 2014, “The Strategic Energy Plan of Japan (inJapanese,「エネルギー基本計画」),” April 2014
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/category/others/basic_plan/pdf/140411.pdf
JAPAN MOD (Ministry of Defense) 2007, “DEFENSE OF JAPAN (Annual White Paper) 2007.” 2007
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2007.html
JAPAN MOD 2010, “DEFENSE OF JAPAN (Annual White Paper) 2010.” 2010
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2010.html
JAPAN MOD 2014, “DEFENSE OF JAPAN (Annual White Paper) 2014.” 2014
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2014.html
JAPAN NSC (National Security Council) 2013, “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 andbeyond,” approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2014/DOJ2014_reference_web_1031.pdf
JAPAN-U.S. LEADERS 2014, “Joint Statement by the Leaders of Japan and the United States onContributions to Global Minimization of Nuclear Material,” March 24, 2014
http://www.mofa.go.jp/dns/n_s_ne/page18e_000059.html
JAPAN-U.S. SCC (Security Consultative Committee) 1997, “Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense
Cooperation,” September 23, 1997
JAPAN-U.S. SCC (Security Consultative Committee) 2007, “Joint Statement − Alliance Transformation:
Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation,” May 1, 2007
JAPAN-U.S. SCC (Security Consultative Committee) 2013, “Joint Statement − Toward a More Robust
Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities,” October 3, 2013
KANE Chen 2010, “Nonproliferation Issues in U.S.-ROK Nuclear Cooperation,” presented at U.S.-ROK
Workshop on Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation, January 20, 2010
http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/ChenKane100120.pdf
KCNA 1998, “Successful launch of Àrst satellite in DPRK,” “Foreign Ministry spokesman on successful
launch of artiÀcial satellite,” Korean News, September 4, 1998
KCNA 1999, “DPRK not to launch missile,” Korean News, September 24, 1999
KCNA 2006-1, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Its Missile Launches,” Korean News, July 6, 2006
KCNA 2006-2, “DPRK Successfully Conducts Underground Nuclear Test,” Korean News, October 9, 2006
KCNA 2009-1, “Preparations for Launch of Experimental Communications Satellite in Full Gear,”
Korean News, February 24, 2009, and “DPRK to launch its Satellite Soon,” Korean News, April 4, 200975

KCNA 2009-2, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Vehemently Refutes UNDCʼs Presidential Statement,” KoreanNews, April 14, 2009
KCNA 2009-3, “KCNA Report on One More Successful Underground Nuclear Test,” Korean News, May
25, 2009
KCNA 2009-4, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Declares Strong Counter-Measures against UNSCʼs ʻResolution
1874ʼ,” Korean News, June 13, 2009
KCNA 2010, “DPRK Proposes to Start of Peace Talks,” January 11, 2010
KCNA 2012-1, “DPRKʼs Satellite Fails to Enter Its Orbit”, Korean News, April 13, 2012
KCNA 2012-2, “KCNA Releases Report on Satellite Launch,” Korean News, December 12, 2012
KCNA 2013-1, “DPRK FM Refutes UNSCʼs “Resolution” Pulling up DPRK over Its Satellite Launch,”
Korean News, January 23, 2013
KCNA 2013-2, “DPRK NDC Vows to Launch All-Out Action to Defend Sovereignty of Country,” KoreanNews, January 24, 2013
KCNA 2013-3, “KCNA Report on Successful 3rd Underground Nuclear Test,” Korean News, February 12,
2013
KCNA 2013-4, “No One Will Survive DPRKʼs Retaliatory Strike: Rodong Sinmun,” Korean News, March
28, 2013
KCNA 2013-5, “Report on Plenary Meeting of WPK Central Committee,” Korean News, March 31, 2013
KCNA 2013-6 “Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State Adopted,” Korean News, April 1,
2013
KCNA 2013-7, “DPRK to Adjust Uses of Existing Nuclear Facilities,” Korean News, April 2, 2013
KCNA 2013-8, “DPRK Proposes OfÀcial Talks with U.S.,” Korea News, June 16, 2013
KCNA 2014-1, “DPRK FM Blasts for Taking issue with DPRK over its Justifiable Rocket Launching
Drills,” Korean News, March 30, 2014
KCNA 2014-2, “U.S. Can Never Evade Blame for Blocking Solution to Nuclear Issue: Rodong Sinmun,”
Korean News, October 21, 2014
KCNA 2015, “Kim Jong Unʼs New Year Address,” Korean News, January 1, 2015
KIM Duyeon 2013, “Fact Sheet: North Koreaʼs Nuclear and Ballistic Missiles Programs,” Center forArms Control and Association, July 2013
http://armscontrolcenter.org/publications/factsheets/fact_sheet_north_korea_nuclear_and_missile_programs/#
KOO Kab-woo 2014, “Kitachosen no Gaiko Seisaku to Tohoku Ajia no Heiwa,” (in Japanese,「北朝鮮の外交政策と東北アジアの平和」), The Journal of Peace and Community Studies, No. 4 『( 平和・コミュニティ
研究』第 4 号 ), 2014
KOREAN JOONGANG DAILY 2014, “Negotiation of the ROK-US Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is a76

multi-dimensional equation, (Kanbei Genshiryoku Kyotei no Kosho wa Kouji Hoteishiki)” (1) (2),December 15, 2014. (in Japanese)
http://japanese.joins.com/article/039/194039.html?servcode=100&sectcode=120
http://japanese.joins.com/article/040/194040.html?servcode=100&sectcode=120
KRISTENSN Hans M & NORIS Robert S. 2014, “Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2014,” The
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, August 26, 2014
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/70/5/96.full.pdf+html
KUROSAWA Mitsuru, “An Observation about the Up-dated Agreement,” presented at Workshop III:
Developing Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ, Sep 14-16, 2014
http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/bd/Àles/Profkurosawa_140915-Workshop3.pdf
LEWIS Jeffrey 2014, “North Korean Nukes 2.0?” 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea, April 4,
2014
MABHONGO, Xolisa 2012, Statement on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition at the First PrepCom forthe 2015 Review Conference of NPT, 3 May 2012
MANTELS Valere 2014, “Extended deterrence and a Nuclear weapon Free Zone in NE Asia,” presented
at Workshop III: Developing Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ, Sep 14-16, 2014
http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/bd/files/Dr.-MantelsReviewing-the-validity-of-extended-nucleardeterrence-in-NE-Asia2.pdf
MIZIN Victor 2012, “Russiaʼs Core Issues,” presented at a workshop ‘New Approach to Security in NE
Asia: Breaking the Gridlock,’ October 9-10, 2012, Washington DC
MOON Chung-in 2014, “Shocking, But Not a Game Changer: Unravelling Regime Dynamics in PostJang North Korea,” 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea, Feb. 24, 2014
NAKANO Akira 2014, “Nuclear Report: Koreaʼs Unfading Doubt about Japanʼs Nuclear Armament,” (inJapanese), The Asahi-Shinbun Digital, ( 朝日新聞デジタル版 ), August 19, 2014
http://www.asahi.com/articles/ASG7S44KNG7SPTIL00S.html
NEBEHAY Stephanie 2014, “Exclusive: North Korea envoy says door is open on nuclear issues, rights,
abductees,” Reuters, Oct 2, 2014
NIKITIN Alexander 2014, “Prospects for Denuclearization in Northeast Asia and Policy of Russia,”
presented at Workshop III on Developing Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ, Sep 14-16, 2014
http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/bd/Àles/Prof.-NikitinNEA-and-Policy-of-Russia1.pdf
NIKITIN Mary Beth 2013, “North Koreaʼs Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues,” CRS Report for Congress(RL34256), April 3, 2013
NISHIHARA Masashi. 2003, “North Koreaʼs Trojan Horse,” The Washington Post, Aug. 14, 2003
NORRIS Robert S., ARKIN William M. & BURR W. 1999, “Appendix B: Deployments by Country, 19511977,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55(6), November, 1999

77

NPDI (Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative) 2012, “Transparency of nuclear weapons,” NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.12, 20 April, 2012
NPT 2010-1, “I.A.v. of Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions,” 2010 NPT Review
Conference Final Document, Volume I Part 1, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), 18 June, 2010
NPT 2010-2, “I.B.iii. of Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions,” 2010 NPT Review
Conference Final Document, Volume I Part 1, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), 18 June, 2010
NPT 2010-3, “Action 1 of Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions,” 2010 NPT Review
Conference Final Document, Volume I Part 1, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), 18 June, 2010
NPT 2010-4, “Action 5 of Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions,” 2010 NPT Review
Conference Final Document, Volume I Part 1, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), 18 June, 2010
NPT 2010-5, “Action 5A of Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions,” 2010 NPT Review
Conference Final Document, Volume I Part 1, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), 18 June, 2010
NPT 2010-6, “Action 5C of Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions,” 2010 NPT Review
Conference Final Document, Volume I Part 1, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), 18 June, 2010
NPT 2010-7, “Action 21 of Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions,” 2010 NPT Review
Conference Final Document, Volume I Part 1, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), 18 June, 2010
NPT 2010-8, “Other regional issue,” Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions, 2010 NPT
Review Conference Final Document, Volume I Part 1, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), 18 June, 2010
NYE Joseph 2014, “Interview with Dr. Joseph Nye” (in Japanese) The Asahi-shimbun Digital ( 朝日新聞
デジタル版 ), March 16, 2014
http://digital.asahi.com/articles/ASG3H51V7G3HUHBI01G.html?_requesturl=articles/
ASG3H51V7G3HUHBI01G.html&iref=comkiji_txt_end_s_kjid_ASG3H51V7G3HUHBI01GOEWG (Open-Ended Working Group) 2013, “Proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear
disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons,”
A/68/514, October 9, 2013th

OCHIRBAT Punsalmaagiin 1992, Address at the UN General Assembly 47 Session, 25 September 1992,
A/47/PV.13, 6 October, 1992
OKADA Katsuya 2009, “Letter to Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, United States ofAmerica,” 24 December, 2009http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/gaisho/pdfs/g_1001_01.pdf
PABIAN Frank V. & HECKER Siegfried S. 2012, “Contemplating a third nuclear test in North Korea,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Web-Edition, 6 August, 2013
PAIK Haksoon 2014, “Security Environment of Northeast Asia and Prospects for the Six-Party Talks: A
South Korean View,” presented at Workshop III on Developing Comprehensive Approach to a NEANWFZ, Sep 14-16, 201478

http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/bd/files/Dr.Paik_for-websitePAIK-Security-Environment-ofNEA-Prospects-for-SPTs.pdf
PAK Kil Yon 2013, Statement at the high level meeting on nuclear disarmament of the 68th UN General
Assembly, New York, 26 September 2013.
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/HLM/26Sep_DPRK.pdf
PARK Jeffrey 2013, “A broader reading of seismic waves from North Korea,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, 26 Feb. 2013
PEOPLEʼS KOREA 1993, “Joint Statement,” The People’s Korea, June 19, 1993
PERRY William J. 1999, “Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings andRecommendations,” October 12, 1999
PRITCHARD Charles L., “Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb,”
Brookings, 2007
RECNA 2013, Summary Report of ʻDeveloping a Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ Workshop I,
Nagasaki University, December 7-8, 2012,ʼ August, 2013
http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/bd/Àles/Summary-Report-Ànal1.pdf
ROK & DPRK (Republic of Korea & Democratic Peopleʼs Republic Korea) 1992, “Joint Declaration on
The Denuclearization of The Korean Peninsula,” January 20, 1992
http://www.mofa.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/engreadboard.jsp?typeID=12&boardid=318&seqno=305870 (last accessed on February 6, 2015)
ROK MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 2013, “Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative,” 2013
http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/North_Asia/res/eng.pdf
ROK-U.S. SCM (ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting) 2006, “The 38thSecurity Consultative

Meeting Joint Communique,” October 20, 2006
th

ROK-U.S. SCM (ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting) 2014, “Joint Communique: The 46 ROK-U.S.
Security Consultative Meeting,” October 23, 2014
SATO Eisaku 1968, Response to the Question of Masayoshi OHIRA at the Plenary Session of the Houseof Representatives, Diet Minutes, January 30, 1968
SCHIFFER Michael 2012, “Impact on Nuclear Extended Deterrence,” presented at a workshop ‘New
Approach to Security in NE Asia: Breaking the Gridlock,’ October 9-10, 2012, Washington DC
SCHILLER Markus 2012, “Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat,” RAND Technical
Report, 2012
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012/RAND_TR1268.pdf
SCHMITT Eric 2013, “New Details on Disclosure Regarding North Korea,” The New York Times, April
18, 2013
SHANKER Thom, SANGER David E. & SCHMITT Eric 2013, “Pentagon Finds Nuclear Strides by North

79

Korea,” The New York Times, April 11, 2013
SHEN Dingli 2014, “A realistic Approach to Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone: A Chinese
View,” presented at Workshop III on Developing Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ, Sep 1416, 2014
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Website on North Korea, http://www.sipri.
org/research/armaments/nuclear-forces/north-korea (last accessed on Jan. 15, 2015).
SIX-PARTY TALKS 2005, “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,” September 19,
2005
SIX-PARTY TALKS 2007-1, “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,” February
13, 2007
SIX-PARTY TALKS 2007-2, “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,”
October 3, 2007
SMITH Sheila A. 2012, “U.S.-Japan Core Issues,” presented at a workshop ‘New Approach to Security in
NE Asia: Breaking the Gridlock,’ October 9-10, 2012, Washington DC
SUZUKI Tatsujiro 2014, “Energy and Nuclear Cooperation in Comprehensive Agreement for Security inNortheast Asia,” presented at Workshop III on Developing Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ,
Sep 14-16, 2014
TAKUBO Masafumi & VON HIPPEL Frank 2013, “Ending reprocessing in Japan: An alternative
approach to managing Japanʼs spent nuclear fuel and separated plutonium,” Report of theInternational Panel on Fissile Material, November 2013
http://Àssilematerials.org/library/rr12.pdf
TASS 2014, “North Korea speeds up nuclear program, say American experts,” December 24, 2014
THIELMANN Greg 2013, “Sorting Out the Nuclear and Missile Threats From North Korea,” May 21, 2013
http://www.armscontrol.org/Àles/TAB_Sorting_Out_North_Korea_2013.pdf
UMEBAYASHI Hiromichi 2005, “Proposal of A Model Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone
Treaty,” included in Peace Depot Working Paper No.1 E ʻA Model Treaty on the Northeast Asia
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone,ʼ November, 2005
http://www.peacedepot.org/e-news/workingpaper1.pdf
UMEBAYASHI Hiromichi 2011, “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones,”（in Japanese,「非核兵器地帯」), Iwanami
Shoten, 2011
UMEBAYASHI Hiromichi 2014-1, “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones,”（in Korean,「゚䟋ⶊ₆㰖╖」), Seohaemunjip,
2014
UMEBAYASHI Hiromichi 2014-2, “A Proposal for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,”presented at Kim Dae-jung Presidential Library Conference, Seoul, Dec 10, 2014
http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/eyes/no3/80

UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) 1999, “Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basisof arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned,” Report of the
Disarmament Commission, Annex I, General Assembly Official Records, Fifty-fourth session
Supplement No.42 (A/54/42), 1999
UNGA 2000, “Law of Mongolia on its nuclear-weapon-free status, adopted on 3 February 2000,”
A/55/56-S/2000/160, 29 February, 2000
UNGA 2013, “Work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters – Report of the Secretary General,”United Nations General Assembly Document, A/68/206 (2013)
UNGA-UNSC 2012, “Letter dated 20 September 2012 from the Permanent Representatives of China,
France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and theUnited States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,”
A/67/393-S/2012/721, 26 September, 2012
U.S. DOD (Department of Defense) 2002, “Findings of the Nuclear Posture Review,” BrieÀng Slides of
the US Department of Defense, January 9, 2002
U.S. DOD 2010, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” April 2010
U.S. DOS (Department of State) 2014, “Extension of the Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation
Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea,” March 18, 2014
U.S. DIRECTOR OF NI (National Intelligence) 2006, “Statement by the OfÀce of the Director of National
Intelligence on North Korea Nuclear Test,” October 16, 2006
U.S. DIRECTOR OF NI 2009, “Statement by the OfÀce of the Director of National Intelligence on North
Koreaʼs Declared Nuclear Test on May 25, 2009,” June 15, 2009
U.S. DIRECTOR OF NI 2013, “Statement by the OfÀce of the Director of National Intelligence on North
Koreaʼs Declared Nuclear Test on February 12, 2013,” February 12, 2013
U.S. & DPRK 2000, “U.S.-D.P.R.K. Joint Communique,” October 12, 2000
http://www.state.gov/1997-2001-NOPDFS/regions/eap/001012_usdprk_jointcom.html
U.S.-JAPAN NUCLEAR WORKING GROUP 2013, “Statement on Shared Strategic Priorities in the
Aftermath of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident,” The Maureen and Mike MansÀeld Foundation, April
18, 2013.
http://mansfieldfdn.org/mfdn2011/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/US-Japan-Nuclear-Working-GroupStatement.pdf
WRIGHT David 2013, “Markus Schillerʼs Analysis of North Koreaʼs Unha-3 Launcher,” All Things
Nuclear, February 22, 2013
http://allthingsnuclear.org/markus-schillers-analysis-of-north-koreas-unha-3-launcher/
YAMAZATO Yutaro 2012, “Kyoiku Joho Teikyou de Kyoryoku Simesu,” (in Japanese) The Nagasaki
Shimbun, P.25, August 10, 201281

Workshop Ⅰ

82

Workshop Ⅰ

83

Workshop Ⅰ

84

Workshop Ⅰ

85

Workshop Ⅱ  

                  "!$ # % &   

# 8   #   &%'&()  **!

 > + :!5+ >+# -! '    & ?>  & !   0  5 *( -.  #








                    "  !  
'%$#)#(& &   !  *,   + %-#+     0/.

        '    '11 -!

2  *3 / )2   0/.

4 5

   6' , *7   '      3 -  5    0  * ! .

 14 3  ( 2( *3 / ,

 ,34.  6%% 8

2-! *3 / (.   0.
   0/. (# 3   &#)%( *%9  0  ,   +      .
 8#3# ';'1:1 4<  *3 / &  !  3      .
   $#%4 8 2
=

$ 



, 

>

6 !





*3 / & !   0/.

     '    3   &#)%( *%9  0  ,   +      .

  86

Workshop Ⅱ  



4 5

   ' *(

 #0  + 1

3

 * ! .

           

 &/ &#63% (  5 7  .

 -!  ! 31&6'# *,   + 7%( 4  .
 8  !  %4&(#4&#*#@  %9  5   3
 #5  #% *A @ -  5  ' .

  + 3,.

, 


$ 



 '   ) 4 !  *,   + -33+ & !   0/. B#4#'# 4

 *#    3 + %-#.

 7  #      3   # 
 $    (!

@  C   - 

 " ! 

 ' : !  ! 

  9 (   " -  !
D



0 #      !  


:





 7;

5 

'%$#)#(& &   !
D=

$ 



,

 " !                           87         Workshop Ⅲ

Denuclearization of
Northeast Asia and of
the World― Developing a Comprehensive Approachto NEA-NWFZ: Workshop III
September 14㸦Sun㸧-16㸦Tue㸧, 2014Tokyo҅ிỴἊỴỉ᩼ఋ҄ểɭမỉ᩼ఋ҄ᴾḘ҅ிỴἊỴ᩼ఋτ֥‫࠘ע‬ồỉѼਙႎỴἩἿὊἓὉὁὊἁἉἹἕἩḫᴾᵐᵎᵏᵒ ࠰ ᵗ உ ᵏᵒ ଐίଐὸ῍ᵏᵔ ଐί້ὸᴾ ிʮᴾ
ᴾ

1

88

Workshop Ⅲ

CONTENTS/ ┠ḟ࣭PROGRAM in English㸦ⱥㄒࣉࣟࢢ࣒ࣛ㸧 

p. 3-6

࣭PROGRAM in Japanese㸦᪥ᮏㄒࣉࣟࢢ࣒ࣛ㸧p. 7-10

Hosted by/ ୺ദNagasaki University/ 㛗ᓮ኱ᏛResearch Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University /㛗ᓮ኱Ꮫ᰾රჾᗫ⤯◊✲ࢭࣥࢱ࣮㸦RECNA㸧

Co-sponsored by/ ඹദ
PCU Nagasaki Council for Nuclear Weapons Abolition㸦PCU-NC: Council comprised of Nagasaki Prefecture, City andUniversity㸧/ ᰾රჾᗫ⤯㛗ᓮ㐃⤡༠㆟఍
Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability/ ࣀ࣮ࢳࣛࢫ◊✲ᡤ
Center for Peace and Public Integrity, Hanshin University, ROK/ 㡑ಙ኱Ꮫᖹ࿴࡜බඹᛶࢭࣥࢱ࣮㸦㡑ᅜ㸧
Institute of International Studies, Fudan University , PRC/ ᚟᪦኱Ꮫᅜ㝿ၥ㢟◊✲ᡤ㸦୰ᅜ㸧Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation 㸦CPDNP㸧/ ᪥ᮏᅜ㝿ၥ㢟◊✲ᡤ㌷⦰࣭୙ᣑᩓಁ㐍ࢭࣥࢱ࣮Hiroshima Peace Institute㸦HPI㸧, Hiroshima City University / ᗈᓥᕷ❧኱Ꮫᗈᓥᖹ࿴◊✲ᡤ
International Peace Research Institute, Meiji Gakuin University 㸦PRIME㸧 / ᫂἞Ꮫ㝔኱Ꮫᅜ㝿ᖹ࿴◊✲ᡤ
Blue Banner, Mongolia / ࣈ࣮ࣝࣂࢼ࣮㸦ࣔࣥࢦࣝ㸧
Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament 㸦PNND㸧 / ᰾㌷⦰୙ᣑᩓ㆟ဨ㐃┕㸦PNND㸧In Cooperation with/ ᚋ᥼
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan/ እົ┬Nagasaki City/ 㛗ᓮᕷHiroshima City/ ᗈᓥᕷHiroshima Peace Culture Foundation/ ᗈᓥᖹ࿴ᩥ໬ࢭࣥࢱ࣮
United Nations Information Centre/ ᅜ㐃ᗈሗࢭࣥࢱ࣮

The Logo represents a deformed Chinese character " ฟ ", which means "exit" or"departure". Here it symbolizes the "exit" from the nuclear deterrence and "departure" fora Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Nagasaki is famous for its port "Dejima" orExit Island, the only port open to overseas during the period of national isolation in Japanese
history.

ᮏࣟࢦࡣࠊ₎Ꮠࡢࠕฟࠖࢆࢹࢨ࢖ࣥ໬ࡋ࡚ࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ㙐ᅜ᫬௦ࡢ᪥ᮏ࡛၏୍㛤࠿ࢀ࡚࠸ࡓ ࡛࠶ࡿ㛗ᓮࡢࠕฟᓥࠖࢆ࢖࣓࣮ࢪࡋࠊ᰾ᢚṆ࠿ࡽࠕฟ࡚ࠖࠊ໭ᮾ࢔ࢪ࢔㠀᰾රჾᆅᖏ࡬࡜ࠕฟⓎࠖࡋࡼ࠺ࠊ࡜࠸࠺ព࿡ࡀ㎸ࡵࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ

2

89

Workshop Ⅲ

9/14

Sunday, September 14, 2014 㸦Venue: Grand Prince Hotel, NEW Takanawa㸧wa㸧

14:30㸫15:30

Press Conference 㸦Conference Room: Hakugyoku㸧

15:30㸫16:00

Registration 㸦Conference Room: Tenpyo㸧

16:00㸫16:10

Introduction by Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI

16:10㸫17:40

Session I: Global Denuclearization and Northeast Asia
With the 2015 NPT Review Conference approaching, the gap between the ones who call for alegal prohibition of nuclear weapons based on their inhumanity and those who continue toemphasis on the “step-by-step” approach, claiming that time is not ripe yet for such a legal
discussion, has become more evident. Against such a background, policies taken by
non-nuclear weapon states which rely on the extended nuclear deterrence have become
increasingly critical. This session will focus on issues related to global nuclear disarmament,
and, in such context, on nuclear issues related to the peace and security of Northeast Asia, andexamine the significance of establishing a NEA-NWFZ.

Chair: Yukio SATO
Speakers: Heather WILLIAMS“Global nuclear disarmament and the role of non-nuclear weapon states”
Valere MANTELS“ Extended deterrence and a Nuclear weapon Free zone in NE Asia”
Alexander I. NIKITIN“Prospects for Denuclearization in Northeast Asia and Policy of Russia”
Discussants: Yoshiki MINE
Takao TAKAHARA
18:00㸫20:30

Dinner Session 㸦Open session㸧 㸦Conference room: Heian㸧Chair: Shigeru KATAMINE
Keynote: Jayantha DHANAPALA“Denuclearization of Northeast Asia and of the World”
Remarks: MP from LDP 㸦TBC㸧
Natsuo YAMAGUCHI
Katsuya OKADA
Messages: Edward MARKEY 㸦TBC㸧
Tomihisa TAUE
3

90

Workshop Ⅲ

9/15

Monday, September 15, 2014 㸦Venue: Meiji Gakuin University, 2nd Building, RM 2401㸧

9:00㸫10:30

Session II: Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Securityin Northeast Asia
In 2011, Dr. Morton H. Halperin proposed a “Comprehensive Agreement on Peace andSecurity in Northeast Asia” as an idea for a diplomatic process to overcome the stalemates
regarding efforts that had been underway in various ways to denuclearize Korean Peninsula.
This is an initiative aimed at establishing a NEA-NWFZ, while solving, as a comprehensive
package, other outstanding issues that have close relation. This session will discuss his
updated proposal, taking recent situation into consideration.

Chair: Nobuyasu ABE
Speakers: Morton H. HALPERIN“A Comprehensive Agreement for Security in Northeast Asia”
Mitsuru KUROSAWA“An Observation about the Updated Agreement”
Discussants: Bo-Hyuk SUH
Alexander I. NIKITIN
Yasushi NOGUCHI
11:00㸫12:30

Session III: Northeast Asian Security Environment
This session will overview the security environment of Northeast Asia as a backdrop of a“Comprehensive Agreement” discussed in Session II to help improving such an approach aswell as to study possible changes in the regional security environment resulting from pursuing
and realizing a “Comprehensive Agreement.”

Chair: Chung-in MOON
Speakers: Dingli SHEN
“Chinese views on NEA-NWFZ”
Hak-soon PAIK
“Security environment of Northeast Asia and Prospects for the Six-Party Talks: A
South Korean View”
Kab-woo KOO“A Psychological Approach to North Korea’s Nuclear Deterrence: Nuclear
Discourse of the Kim Jong Un Regime”
Discussants: Hirofumi TOSAKI
Kiho YI
4

91

Workshop Ⅲ

14:00㸫15:30

Session IV: Specific Issues to Examine the Comprehensive
AgreementThis session will deepen the understandings of each element contained in a “Comprehensive
Agreement,” identify difficulties involved in each element, and develop possible measures that
could be taken in order to solve such difficulties.

Chair: Nobumasa AKIYAMA
Speakers: Peter HAYES“Overcoming US-DPRK Hostility: The Missing Link Between a Northeast AsianComprehensive Security Settlement and Ending the Korean War”
Tatsujiro SUZUKI“Energy and Nuclear Cooperation in Comprehensive Agreement for Security inNortheast Asia”
Keiko NAKAMURA“Present sanctions and the process to a Comprehensive Agreement”
Discussants: Sun-song PARK
Hideya KURATA
16:00㸫17:30

Session V: Players for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia
This session will discuss possible roles taken by various actors, including state governments,
parliaments and parliamentarians, and civil society, in order to achieve a Comprehensive
Agreement and a NEA-NWFZ.

Chair: Kiho YI
Speakers: Jargalsaikhan ENKHSAIKHAN“Mongolia's Nuclear Weapon Free Status: a regional dimension”
Alyn WARE“Roles of Parliamentarians”
Masao TOMONAGA“Roles of Civil Society”
Discussants: Bo-Hyuk SUH
Kazuhiko TAMAKI
Satoshi HIROSE
Ihkpyo HONG
17:30䠉17:40

Closing Remarks by Peter Hayes and Susumu SHIRABE
592

Workshop Ⅲ

9/16

Tuesday, September 16, 2014 Related Events

9:30㸫11:00

Japan-Korea Researchers Caucus 㸦Open to all participants㸧㸦Venue: Grand Prince Hotel Takanawa, Conference room Suzuran㸧Moderators: Sun-song PARK, Satoshi HIROSE

13:30㸫15:00

PNND Japan Parliamentary Forum 㸦Open session㸧㸦Venue: 1st Members' Office Building of the House of Representatives, conference RM 2㸧
Chair: Taro KONO
Speakers: Morton H. HALPERIN
Mikyung LEE
Cheik LEE
Ikpyo HONG

15:00㸫15:50

Visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

18:30㸫20:00

NGO Forum 㸦Open session㸧㸦Venue: Meiji Gakuin University㸧
Speakers: Horton H. HALPERIN
Bo-Hyuk SUH
Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI

6

93