Statement and Recommendationsof theCo-Chairs of the 3rd Panel on
Peace and Security of Northeast Asia (PSNA) Workshop
Moscow, May 31- June 1st, 2018
Sponsored by the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition,Nagasaki University (RECNA)

New Prospects for Dialogue and Denuclearization
We were heartened by a return to dialogue on Korean denuclearization
following the 27th April Panmunjom meeting and Declaration between theSouth Korean President Moon Jae-in and the North Korean Chairman, Kim
Jong-un. Following the alarming exchange of nuclear threats between US andNorth Korean leaders earlier this year, we welcome the Panmunjom
Declaration’s commitment to reducing tensions, establishing permanent
peace on the Peninsula, and achieving the “common goal of realising, throughcomplete denuclearisation, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula”. We also notethat both Koreas have taken several unilateral confidence building steps
towards these ends, including North Korean undertakings to halt nuclear andmissile testing and dismantle their nuclear weapon test site, South Korean/USwillingness to temporarily postpone joint military exercises till after the 2018
Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, and the steps to reduce confrontation acrossthe demilitarized zone.
Equally, however, we would be dismayed if the Trump-Kim June summit
meeting were not to go ahead as planned, and by any further exchange of
threats and counter threats. A nuclear conflict in this densely populated region
would be an unthinkable humanitarian catastrophe for the Koreas, Japan andacross the whole Asia Pacific region. With the presence of neighbouring
nuclear powers, China and Russia, such a conflict could escalate into a wider
nuclear war engulfing the whole world. Dialogue and diplomacy, rather thanresort to war, have never been more urgent if we are to achieve peace on thePeninsula.
We remain deeply concerned that the risks of devastating nuclear conflict inthis region are so grave that any initial dialogue will need to be rapidly
solidified into substantive internationally-recognized verified agreements oncomprehensive measures to create regional Northeast Asian peace, security
and denuclearization. The proposed Trump-Kim summit will be vital toachieving the necessary political will for a step-by-step peace settlement
process with its own verification requirements.
Studies conducted by PSNA experts have identified a number of steps thatwould be necessary in this process, including, most recently a Roadmap for
Nuclear Diplomacy in North Korea prepared by Morton Halperin, Peter Hayes,

2Thomas Pickering and Leon Segal. As the experts detail, key elements of thisRoadmap (modelled on the previous 2005 Six-Party Talks Joint Statement)
are to:• “Set up a Six Party Northeast Asia Security Council.
• Gradually relax sanctions over time.
• Declare non-hostility.
• Begin a peace process to replace the Korean Armistice with a peace
treaty.
• Provide humanitarian assistance to the DPRK and economic andenergy aid, especially aid which benefits thewhole region.
• Establish a nuclear weapons free-zone (NWFZ) in which to re-establish
DPRK’s non-nuclear commitment in alegally binding manner thatprovides a framework to dismantle its nuclear facilities and weapons.”
The first phase of this Roadmap would involve initial commitments by North
Korea to suspend all nuclear and missile tests, and fissile material production(including enrichment) in return for the US and ROK scaling back joint
exercises (especially those using nuclear capable systems); and to provide
energy and humanitarian assistance to DPRK.
A second phase would involve a resumption of Six Party talks without
preconditions, confidence building measures, verification of dismantlement ofrelevant test sites, and negotiations commencing on a new peace andregional security arrangement.
The final phase would include: the declaration and implementation of a legallybinding and internationally verified nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty (as in thecase of five other regions in the world together with the single state MongolianNWFZ); a final peace treaty agreed for the ending of the Korean War; andnegative security guarantees provided by the recognised nuclear-armedstates to all parties to a regional NWFZ.
Vital to successful implementation of such a Roadmap to Northeast Asian
Peace and Security will not only be the position of the two Koreas and theUnited States, but also other regional states, particularly Japan and Mongolia,and neighbouring nuclear powers, China and Russia, as well as the UN andwider international community.
In its role as a key regional state, we urge that Japan offer strong andsubstantive support to the new peace diplomacy inaugurated in the recentMoon/Kim Panmunjom Declaration. In particular, we call on its leadership topursue patient and considered diplomacy in joining six-party declarations on
the principles and goals of a Northeast Asian peace process; support acomprehensive Korean peace settlement; resolve outstanding issues innormalizing relations with North Korea; and offer the same kind of practical
diplomatic support for a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone as it didfor the successful establishment of the 2006 Central Asian Nuclear Weapon
Free Zone.

3Continued nuclear risks and dangers in Northeast Asia
We continue to hold grave fears about nuclear risks and threats in this region.
These risks include: the arms race consequences of missile defence systems
in the region, particularly the THAADS system and planned Aegis Ashoresystems; increased deployment of potentially nuclear capable vessels inNortheast Asian waters; tensions in neighbouring regions, such as the South
China Sea and the Taiwan Straits; and the long term threats posed byincreasing regional stockpiles of fissile materials. Some of these risks areanalysed, and solutions proposed, in specialist research presentations at thisPSNA Moscow Workshop.
In the case of THAADS missile-defence (MD) interceptor-rocket launchers
already positioned in South Korea and Aegis Ashore systems planned inJapan, we continue to be deeply concerned that, while at first sight thesemight seem purely defensive, such systems also have a dual role inaccelerating regional arms races because of a perceived need by targeted
adversaries to overwhelm any missile defence system by deploying increased
number of missiles and adding multiple warheads to each missile. In addition,such systems may well prove destabilizing given their long-range radar
surveillance capabilities extending into Chinese and Russian territories, andpotentially posing a pre-emptive strike risk serving to undermine China’s andRussia’s second-strike nuclear capability.
We also continue to be highly concerned about the potential for miscalculatedor accidental nuclear war as a consequence of previously expressed(excluding China which maintains a no-first-use policy) preparedness toengage in pre-emptive strikes by some nuclear-armed states. There is also
the risk of nuclear war resulting from early warning system computer errors,
and from cyber attacks on nuclear weapon systems. We are equallyconcerned about the development of new types of nuclear-armed
intermediate range and cruise missiles, which, even if conventionally armed,
might appear to be, and mistaken for, nuclear armed missiles.
Further, given the existing presence of nuclear weapons in North Korea, andpotentially nuclear-weapon-related facilities in other parts of the region, aneffective verification scheme and arrangements will need to be developed andimplemented to ensure all sides have confidence of compliance withagreements reached. Such a verification scheme would not only draw upon
appropriate safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) but also warrant establishment of a regional verification
agency with a more extended mandate to investigate compliance within theregion.

The new UN Nuclear Weapon Prohibition Treaty (NWPT)The recent July 2017 adoption of the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons (NWPT), supported by 122 non-nuclear UN Member States, willserve to outlaw nuclear weapons in a similar way to how chemical and4
biological weapons have been stigmatized and prohibited under internationallaw. The new treaty seeks to mobilize the world community in applying
normative pressure on states still possessing or relying on nuclear purported
deterrents. It appeals to these states to rethink the global humanitarian,
economic and environmental consequences of even a limited nuclear war.
Such globally catastrophic impacts would extend far beyond the borders of
those states who justify their continued nuclear reliance on the basis ofnational rather than global security interests. The nine current nuclear-armed
states have largely sought to ignore the wider humanitarian and global threats
posed by nuclear weapons, whether launched deliberately, accidentally or bymiscalculation. We call upon all states, including nuclear “umbrella” states, tomove towards reducing reliance on nuclear weapons as part of their defenceor military postures, and to sign the NWPT treaty at the earliest opportunity.
Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Initiatives and NPT Action Plan
While the 1968 Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty does not include all nucleararmed states (Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea stand outside it), theNPT does oblige the five NPT-recognised nuclear-weapon states to reducereliance on nuclear weapons, and to move towards total nuclear
disarmament, particularly under Article VI which requires states to pursue
negotiations in good faith on “cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear
disarmament”, and under the agreed Action 5 of the 2010 NPT Review
Conference committing nuclear-weapon states to “promptly engage with aview to…diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all
military and security concepts, doctrines and policies”. The five nuclearweapon states, China, France, Russia, UK and US, are all embarked onprograms to modernize their nuclear armaments and delivery systems, whileat the same time arguing that the NPT is the proper forum for disarmament
negotiations. As we approach the 2020 NPT Review Conference, we callupon the nuclear powers to take seriously their agreed obligations towards
reducing the role of nuclear weapons and move more decisively towards
nuclear elimination.
Recommendations•We urge that all sides move quickly to build upon the historic interKorean Panmunjom Moon-Kim Declaration on peace anddenuclearization to begin substantive negotiations on a permanent
Korean War peace settlement.

•If the US-North Korean Singapore June Summit does not go ahead asplanned, we urge the leaderships of both countries to reschedule thesummit at the earliest possible time in the spirit of the Panmunjom
Declaration. We note that both governments have continued to declarethat they are prepared to hold the summit.

•We further urge that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea(DPRK), the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan, together with5Russia, China and the United States, establish a Six Party Northeast
Asia Security Council to oversee these negotiations.
•On the basis of the expert studies undertaken by PSNA, RECNA andthe Nautilus Institute, we recommend that a legally binding andinternationally verified treaty be negotiated to establish a NortheastAsian regional nuclear-weapon-free zone, initially covering the Korean
Peninsula but potentially, by later agreement, including Japan andMongolia. The treaty, given binding security guarantees from the five
NPT-recognised nuclear states, will end the need for reliance onextended nuclear deterrence.

•We strongly recommend that regional states, in consultation with theIAEA, begin work on developing a Northeast Asian regional verification
scheme and agency that will serve to complement and reinforce IAEA
safeguards within the region, and to ensure that all parties haveconfidence in compliance with agreed denuclearization arrangements
and treaties.

•We urge all sides to show all possible care and restraint in avoiding
any further military actions and provocative statements (especiallyconcerning regime change) that could be misconstrued as posing an
immediate or longer-term threat to the other side and which mightundermine potential peace and denuclearization negotiations.

•We encourage all states which currently rely on nuclear weapons(directly or indirectly) to commit themselves in forthcoming NPT
PrepCom and Review Conferences to taking demonstrable steps toreduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security postures and tosign and ratify the new UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons at the earliest possible time.

•In the light of withdrawals from previous agreements by some treaty
parties, including North Korean withdrawal from the NPT, and USwithdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), and, mostrecently, US withdrawal from the Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan ofAction (JCPOA), we strongly urge that civil society groups and theinternational community insist on the principle of irreversibility innuclear disarmament treaties and agreements, and the incorporation ofprovisions against unilateral and/or short notice withdrawals from
Northeast Asian peace and denuclearization treaties.

•Finally, we urge Japan, as a key regional state, to fully support andassist the above regional moves for peace and denuclearization in
Northeast Asia, including by normalizing its own relations with North
Korea and through offering support and resources to establish aregional nuclear-weapon-free zone.

6Co-Chairs of Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia (PSNA)Michael Hammel-Green
Emeritus Professor, College of Arts and Education
Vitoria University
Australia
Chung-in Moon
Co-chair
Asia Pacific Leadership Network for
Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)
Republic of Korea
Hiromichi Umebayashi
Visiting Professor, Former Director of RECNA
Japan