Missing Persons:
A Case Study in Morphological Universals*
Jonathan David Bobaljik
University of Connecticut
rev. January 2008

1. Introduction
Morphological universals have, in one form or another, figured prominently in discussions of
linguistic universals since the rise in attention to the topic normally associated with the work ofJoseph Greenberg. For example, roughly half of the more than 2000 proposed universals in the
Universals Archive1 involve morphology, and morphology (or morphosyntax) pervades
textbooks on language universals (see, e.g., Croft 2003). There are, to be sure, many different
types of purported morphological universal, ranging from generalizations over affix ordering (1),through morpheme inventories and contrasts (2), to proposed universals of form at the interface
with phonology (3).
(1)

Affix-order universals (see especially Bybee 1985, Cinque 1999, Julien 2000, Rice 2000)
If morphemes expressing features/categories A and B occur in the same word, then B iscloser to the root than A.

(2)

Admitted:

A-B-root
root-B-A

Excluded:

Examples:A=case; B=number
A=tense; B=(progressive) aspect
A=external case; B=internal case

*B-A-root*root-A-B(Greenberg 1963, Universal 39)(Blansitt 1975, Julien 2000)(Moravcsik 1995, Suffixaufnahme)

Inventory universals (implicational)
If a language has gender distinctions in the first person [i.e., pronouns], it always has
gender distinctions in the second or third person, or in both. (Greenberg 1963, Universal
44; Corbett 1991:131).
If a language has a dual number, it also has a plural (Greenberg 1963, Universal 34; seealso Corbett 2000).

*The work reported here forms a part of a joint project with Uli Sauerland, supported by the Alexander von

Humboldt Foundation and the National Science Foundation, grant #BCS-0616339. For discussion of this material, I
am grateful to Andrea Calabrese, Michael Cysouw, Harry van der Hulst, Andrew Nevins, Uli Sauerland, Susi
Wurmbrand, two reviewers and participants in courses at the University of Connecticut and the LSA Summer
Institute (2005). I also thank Carlos Buesa-Garcia for his assistance with some of the research reported here.
1 http://typo.uni-konstanz.de/archive/intro/index.php. As of June 27, 2007, 946 of the 2028 universals involve

morphology (including inflection) and almost exactly half of these are categorized as “absolute”, i.e., rather thanstatistical.

1

A language never has more gender categories in non-singular numbers than in the
singular (Greenberg 1963, Universal 37)(3)

Universals of form (i.e., without reference to meaning / features)Templatic morphology is always defined in terms of prosodic, rather than segmental,
templates. For example, partial reduplication may attach a “light syllable”, but cannot be
specified directly as CV. (McCarthy and Prince 1986[1996])
In partial reduplication, copying is always Edge-In. Thus, prefixing reduplication copies
from the left edge of the base (AB-ABCD, *CD-ABCD) while suffixing reduplication
copies from the right (ABCD-CD, *ABCD-CD); (after Marantz 1982, who identified thisas a trend, see Nelson 2003 for the claim that it is universal, with accounts of apparent
counter-examples)

The literature on morphological universals revolves largely around two questions (parallel tothose asked for syntax, see Newmeyer, this volume). The first concerns the empirical validity ofclaims for absolute, exceptionless universals, as opposed to statistically significant trends. The
second (assuming that some universals are indeed absolute) lies at the heart of the formalistfunctionalist debate: do the true universals reflect properties of our genetic endowment (theformalist position) or do they emerge from cross-cultural tendencies in speech act settings (thefunctionalist position)? Another dimension of this question is whether the universals represent
properties peculiar to language (and hence clues to the form of Universal Grammar), or merely
the reflexes of more general aspects of human cognition.
In this brief paper, I offer a case study of three closely related morphological universals of a typethat has received somewhat less attention than those in (1)-(2). Specifically, the generalizations
constitute absolute, rather than implicational, universals ranging over morpheme inventories.
They have the form that certain well-defined, and a priori plausible, morphological contrasts
never occur. I submit that universals of this sort provide a good argument (given the current stateof knowledge) for the formalist view, i.e., that there are universal constraints on possible
morphemes: a Universal Feature Inventory.
The universals in question range over contrasts in the domain of person marking (pronouns,
clitics and agreement), and more narrowly in the attested atomic inventories of person marking.2
The universals can be understood with reference to what Sokolovskaja (1980) terms the seven“meta-persons”. A descriptive vocabulary that incorporates the three traditional features (1, 2, 3)
allows for the expression of a seven-way contrast along the dimension of person, independent of
any other feature (such as number), as shown in (4).

2 That is, these universals range over inventories that are not subject to further morphological segmentation;

additional contrasts can be created by combination of morphemes—see section 2.

2

(4)

The seven meta-persons.
1+2
1+2+3
1
1+3
2
2+3
3

speaker(s) and hearer(s); no “others”
speaker(s), hearer(s), and other(s)speaker(s) only
speaker(s) and other(s), hearer(s) excluded.
hearer(s) only
hearer(s) and other(s)other(s) only

Despite the logical possibility of a seven-way contrast, certain distinctions are nevermorphologized; the maximal attested contrast (holding all else constant) is the four-way contrast
in (5b). Many languages show even less: in languages lacking an inclusive/exclusive opposition(such as English), the first four meta-persons are as subsumed under the “first person plural”
pronoun, we, a point noted already by Boas (1911:35).
(5)

a. possible
1+2
1+2+3
1
1+3
2
2+3
3

b. attestedc. binary}“inclusive”[+spk, +hr]}“exclusive”[+spk, -hr]}“second person”[-spk, +hr]}“third person”[-spk, -hr]

The universals are given in (6), under two formulations, which are equivalent for present
purposes. Further clarification of these universals is given below.3(6)

Person universals
a. As restrictions on contrasts
U1

No language distinguishes [1+1] from [1+3].

U2

No language distinguishes [2+2] from [2+3].

U3

No language distinguishes among [1+1+2], [1+2+2] and [1+2+3].

b. As restrictions on forms
U1

No language has a special morpheme for (true) [1 PL].

U2

No language has a special morpheme for (true) [2 PL].

3 It is important to keep in mind that the discussion here regards contrasts in person, independently of other features

such as number. Thus many, possibly most, languages have a distinct form referring to {2} (a set containing just thehearer) as opposed to {2,3} (a hearer and one other), for example German du ‘you.SG.’ vs. ihr ‘you.PL’, but this is adistinction of number, not person. Crucially, the plural form is not restricted to [2+3] (hearer + other) and is also
used to address multiple hearers [2+2]. See below for further discussion and examples.

3

U3

No language has a special morpheme for ‘comprehensive’ person [1+2+3].

In sum: the traditional three-value person system over-generates, allowing for the expression ofuniversally unattested distinctions.4 By contrast, a two-valued, binary feature system [±speaker]
and [±hearer] (or any equivalent notation) is not only restricted to a four-way contrast, it in fact
yields exactly the maximally attested contrasts and excludes precisely those distinctions that areunattested. In other words, the two-valued person feature system, lacking a feature “third
person”, admits of all and only the attested person distinctions in the world’s languages. To theextent that there is no other (say, language-external) explanation of why the unattested contrasts
should be impossible, this state of affairs constitutes a powerful argument in favour of the twovalue feature system over the traditional three-value alternative, as a property of Universal
Grammar.
The argument is by no means novel, nor is it wholly uncontroversial. With varying choices of thefeature labels, this argument has been presented and defended in one form or another by Ingram(1978), Harley and Ritter (2002), and in particular detail by Noyer (1997:chapter 2), and is
implicit in other work using a binary feature system (see Silverstein 1976, Anderson 1992). 5
Criticisms and challenges for the two-value system are raised in Zwicky (1977), Comrie (1980),
Plank (1985), and Cysouw (2003). Reviewing this well-worn example has in the first place theadvantage that the empirical basis is extremely well-documented. Major studies span more thanhalf a century (Forchheimer 1953, Sokolovskaja 1980, Cysouw 2003), with sample sizes on theorder of 500 languages (e.g., Forchheimer 1953:2; see in particular Cysouw 2003 for a review ofthe literature and cirticial discussion of the various means by which authors have assembled
samples). The relevant facts are clearly definable with a minimum of theoretical apparatus. And
while the universals are extremely robust, there is of course some measure of lingering debate
4 If the combining operator “+” is not included, only a three-way contrast is generated. This three-person system

undergenerates as it fails to admit languages showing an inclusive (speaker and hearer) vs. exclusive (speaker andothers, but not hearer) opposition in the first person. Although rare in Indo-European languages, and thus notrecognized by the ancients, such a distinction is common outside of the Indo-European family (see Cysouw 2003,
Filimonova 2005). An arbitrary number of further distinctions made by repeating elements to indicate cardinality ofreferets (2+2 vs. 2+2+2, vs. 2+2+2+2…) is not attested as a matter of person, as opposed to number and is excluded
from further consideration (see Sokolovskaja 1980:84, Cysouw 2003:77, and the exchange between Greenberg
1988, 1989 and McGregor 1989).
5 The labels [±speaker] and [±hearer] are from Ingram (1978), other authors have used [author] in place of [speaker](Halle 1997) and/or [±addressee] in place of [hearer] (Zwicky 1977) as well as pairs such as [±ego] vs. [±tu](Silverstein 1976) and [±I/me] vs. [±you] (Anderson 1992, Noyer 1997). The non-committal features [±1], [±2] arealso used; however, I have avoided using these here since I use [1,2,3] as more or less descriptive terms of the metalanguage. For the purposes of describing the inventories, the above combinations are essentially equivalent, as arevariants using privative, rather than binary features, though questions of interpretation arise in tying these to
explanations outside the morphology; see section 3.2 below. Note that a binary system using only [±speaker] and[±participant], also encountered in the literature, is not equivalent as it fails to draw the inclusive/exclusive
opposition (i.e., [+speaker, -participant] is either incoherent or equivalent to [+speaker, +participant], depending on
the interpretation of “-” values) and would need to be supplemented by an additional feature (see Sauerland, inpress, and Nevins 2007 for relevant discussion). See Nevins (2007) also for arguments that the simple two-featurebinary systems are insufficient to capture co-occurrence restrictions (specifically, the Person Case Constraint) andsyncretisms, and thus that a more elaborate system than the one presented here is required; Nevins argues for a[participant] feature in addition to speaker and hearer features. See also Harley and Ritter (2002) and McGinnis(2005) for related discussion including the question of whether the relevant features participate in a featuregeometry, and see Noyer (1997), Cysouw (2003) and Nevins (2007) for contrasting views regarding the nature of
the evidence from syncretism. The murkiness of the data on syncretism contrasts starkly with the sharpness of thegeneralizations considered here.

4about their validity. U2 is disputed by Comrie (1980) and Plank (1985) (see also Plank’s remarkson the Universals Archive). In addition, some descriptions of sign languages (not discussed in
the typological literature) appear to run counter to U2. As it happens, the putative counterexamples to U2 do not survive closer scrutiny (see especially Simon 2005). U3 is much lessoften discussed, the most important discussion being that in Cysouw (2003). Differences interminology might suggest a challenge to U3 from data presented in that work, and I turn below
to some further clarification of just what is at stake and what the evidence does (and does notshow). There is thus room to address the empirical basis of both universals, and I turn to this in
the next section.
In addition to the empirical domain, the attention that has been paid to these universals has led to
specific proposals regarding the account from both formalist and functionalist perspectives, sothese proposals may be directly compared, a task I take up in section 3. There, I show how andwhy the functional accounts of these universals that are on offer fall short. To the extent, forexample, that there is a literature investigating the understanding of person (speech act
participants) from a general perspective, it seems clear that the severely restricted inventory of
distinctions signalled in morphology is but a pale reflection of the far richer set of distinctions
that play a role in cognition. Likewise, current suggestions to deduce these universals fromconsiderations of frequency do not have any empirical support that I am aware of. As they
currently stand, such accounts appear to rest on conflicting hunches about “plausibility”,
awaiting demonstration. At our current level of knowledge, then, these universals thus point toaspects of language that are both universal and specific to language. In other words, these
universals provide one of the strongest cases for universal grammar, at least as regards auniversal feature inventory for (this domain of) morphology.
2. Missing Persons
I turn now to a closer examination of each of the universals in turn. After a brief elaboration of
the content of each one, I turn to apparent challenges in the literature. In the case of U2, tworecent works (Simon 2005, Cysouw 2003) have already surveyed—and dismissed—priorchallenges, and I will not dwell on repeating their discussions, focussing instead on apparent
challenges that have not yet been addressed in this literature. It bears reiteration that theuniversals in question are exceptionally robust and have borne up over decades. Despite theemphasis here on the apparent counter-examples, the vast majority of languages surveyed fallunquestionably within the parameters delineated by the universals. Greenberg’s characterizationof U2 as holding “with a few rare and doubtful exceptions” (1988:14) is here entirely apt. Yet
establishing that these are absolute universals rather than strong trends requires demonstratingthat even these rare and doubtful exceptions do not constitute true counter-examples, and it is tothis task that I turn below.
Before proceeding, it is important to call attention to the scope of the universals as holding ofcontrasts in monomorphemic, i.e., unsegmentable, person markers. Various languages haveperson markers that are transparent composites of atomic elements, a widely cited case being the
Tok Pisin inclusive yumi < 2SG yu and 1SG mi (Foley 1986:67). Compound pronouns are
particularly numerous in the Grassfields languages of Cameroon, and are to varying degrees
grammaticalized. They are reported to permit the explicit drawing of distinctions such as “youplural” versus “you and them” (see Cysouw 2003: chapter 5 for examples and analysis). The
universals in (6) are posited as restrictions on feature inventories, and thus, ultimately on
possible morphemes. The claim is that for example, [2+3PL], as opposed to [2PL], is not andcannot be expressed as a single morpheme, however nothing in the formulation of the universals
blocks the construction of a complex element from separate morphemes meaning [2PL] and [3].
Thus the existence of compound pronouns is consistent with the universals and with the formal
account. Importantly, the existence of compound pronouns demonstrates that the distinctions in5question are not only conceivable, they are also expressible in natural languages, and can be tosome degree grammaticalized in a broad sense (i.e., internally complex, but showing
morphophonological irregularities, for example). They are simply never morphemecized.
A related exclusion lies in the area of person distinctions that are ‘constructed’ of discrete person
and number marking. The most well-discussed case is that of Sierra Popoluca (see Zwicky 1977,
Noyer 1997:162-167, and Cysouw 2003:147-152). On the surface, this language appears to draw
a distinction between [1+2] and [1+2+3], in apparent violation of U3. However, the distinction
involves separate person prefixes and number suffixes. The person prefixes draw a four-way
contrast, exactly that described above. What is of interest is that the inclusive prefix [1+2] may
occur with or without the plural suffix. The question then is what the meaning of [1+2] nonplural is. Most treatments now converge on the opinion that such a contrast represents aminimal/augmented number system, whereby the “non-plural” forms represent the minimal
number of participants to meet the person requirements. For a [1], [2], or [3] category (moreaccurately [+speaker], [+hearer], or [-speaker,-hearer]), the minimal number is one, and thus
minimal/augmented converges with singular/plural. But exactly for the inclusive, the minimal
number must be two (speaker and hearer), with the “plural” being therefore more than two.
While it is true that different word forms will be used in a context including a speaker, a hearer
and one other person, on the one hand, and just the speaker and hearer, on the other hand, at its
core, this is no different from the observation that different pronouns will be used for reference
to a hearer and another person (German: ihr, French: vous, etc.) as opposed to just a single hearer(du, tu etc, respectively).6 The important message at this point is that this contrast is one ofnumber, not person. I return to the discussion of such cases in section 2.3.
2.1 [1 PL]—a pronoun for the masses(7)

Universal 1a.

No language distinguishes [1+1] from [1+3].

b.

No language has a special morpheme for (true) [1 PL].

This universal was first posited (not quite in these terms) by Franz Boas nearly a century ago(Boas 1911:35), and is undisputed as far as I can tell. No language has a special “chorus we”,
that is, a person marker used solely for a plurality of speakers, speaking together, and distinct
from any of the other first person plurals (Zwicky 1977:731, Cysouw 2003:74). Although Boas
deemed such an entity impossible (see section 3.2 below), others have suggested contexts inwhich the distinction could be drawn. Examples commonly cited include the speech of thechorus in Greek drama, crowds at sporting events (“we are the champions”), and religious rituals(such as group prayer), see Mühlhäusler and Harré (1990), and discussion in Cysouw (2003:7374).
There is a related issue, which is somewhat of an aside at this point, but is of potential relevance
below. Namely, the question has been raised as to whether it is proper to speak of first person“plurals” at all (to cover the attested senses of we). As Lyons (1968:277) noted (cf. Benveniste
1966:232-3):“[i]t is clear … that we (‘first person plural’) does not normally stand in the same
relationship to I (‘first person singular’) as boys, cows, etc., do to boy, cow, etc. The

6 There is a wrinkle in Sierra Popoluca, which is that plural marking is apparently facultative (Noyer 1997:166,

citing personal communication from Ben Elson).

6

pronoun we is to be interpreted as ‘I, in addition to one or more other persons’… In otherwords, we is not ‘the plural of I’: rather, it includes a reference to ‘I’ and is plural.’
The question is important in the present context, if we are to maintain the idea that it ismeaningful to cast discussions of person universals with reference to the cross classification of
person and number. It is indeed meaningful to speak of a first person plural, but it is important tonote that plural, for the first person, normally means an associative or group plural, rather than amultiplicity of individuals sharing the property [speaker].7 Note that this holds true even for
those languages in which plural morphology for first person markers is shared with themorphology for nouns, as in Mandarin Chinese (Corbett 2000:76), Sierra Popoluca (Elson
1960:218-220) and elsewhere (see Corbett 2000:76-77 and Cysouw 2003:68-72 for discussion
and additional examples).8(8)Mandarin

[1]
[2]
[3]

Sierra Popoluca

SG.

PL.

SG.

PL.

wǒ
nǐ
tā

wǒ-mennǐ-mentā-menʌčmičheʌ́č-tyammíč-tyamhéʔ-yahnoun: xuésheng‘student’

wó:ñ-tyam‘little.girl-PL’xuésheng-men‘student-PL’

It thus seems that UG does permit of the combination of [1] and [PL], and while this is often
expressed by a single, unanalyzable form (as in English we), it may be expressed transparently.
From this perspective, U1 is partially equivalent to saying that [plural] for the first person can
only be associative.
2.2 The elusive second person exclusive(9)

Universal 2a.

No language distinguishes [2+2] from [2+3].

b.

No language has a special morpheme for (true) [2 PL].

This universal parallels U1, substituting [hearer] for [speaker]. Many researchers explicitly or
implicitly distinguish the first person from the second person in terms of the ability to form true

7 Greenberg (1993:13) suggests this is true even for mass speaking: “Even the ‘chorus we’ is not really a plural of

the first person. Each person uttering it, whether the utterance is preconcerted or not, is referring to himself or
herself plus others.”
8 The plural marker –men in Mandarin is limited to pronouns and certain animate nouns; similarly the plural –tam in

Sierra Popoluca has a limited distribution among nouns, the plural suffix -yah being the more general (Elson 1960:
218). As Cysouw notes, it is exceedingly rare for pronominal paradigms to use a general nominal plural to indicate
plurality—when pronouns are transparently segmentable, the marker of plurality used in pronouns, if used in thenominal system, is often limited to a subset of nouns, generally those denoting humans. By contrast, in certain typesof agreement morphology, such as adjectival and participial agreement (typically described as lacking person
agreement), first and second person plural group systematically together with all other plurals. This is true of
associative plurals generally, according to Moravcsik 2003.

7

plurals; compare Lyons’s remarks on the ambiguity of you-PL to his remarks on we cited above(see also Zwicky 1977):“As a plural form, [you] may be either ‘inclusive’ (referring only to the hearers
present—in which case it is the plural of the singular you, in the same sense as
cows is the plural of cow) or ‘exclusive’ (referring to some other person, or
persons, in addition to the hearer, or hearers).” (Lyons 1968:277)
The validity of U2 has been disputed. For example, Comrie (1980:837) and Plank (1985:147)
have suggested examples of languages drawing exactly the distinction that English you-PL fails
to make. In an important recent contribution to this topic, Simon (2005) carefully reviews all of
the putative counter-examples in the literature (with the exception of sign languages, on which
see below). Simon demonstrates that none of the reported examples is compelling, and each isopen to plausible reinterpretation. This may be exemplified with one of the most often cited
examples of a second person exclusive, that of Abkhaz from Hewitt and Khiba (1979:157),
given in (10).
(10)

Abkhaz – plural pronouns
1PL
2PL
3PL

inclusive/generalħa(rà)
š˚a(rà)darà

exclusive
ħart
š˚art

Simon’s detailed review of the grammatical descriptions of Abkhaz and related languages, alongwith Hewitt’s own reservations about the interpretation of these forms, shows clearly that these
forms do not violate U2, on a variety of levels.
In the first place, it is not at all clear that the label ‘inclusive/exclusive’ corresponds to the
distinction in question. Simon notes the following from the grammar of Abkhaz published by the
Georgian Academy of Sciences.
The 1st person pl. pronoun ħara ‘we’ and 2nd person pl. pronoun š˚ara ‘you’ have parallel
forms: ħara/ħart and š˚ara/š˚art. ħara has an inclusive meaning, i.e., the speaker includes
the listener as well among the number of ‘we’. The exclusive meaning, excluding thelistener to whom the speech is addressed, is formed from the personal pronoun ħara ‘we’and the suffix –t, ħar-t, (cf. Abaz. ħarabarat ‘we without you’). In an analogous way, theform for the 2nd person pl. is also formed: š˚ara ‘you’, š˚ar-t (cf. Abaz. š˚arabarat ‘youwithout me’). (Aristava et al. 1968:35, translation – JDB).
Of note here is that the distinction for the second person is not presented as a distinction between
addressee with or without third persons, but rather as ‘you’ versus ‘you without me’ (although it
remains unclear what that distinction amounts to, given that the plain ‘you’ normally excludes
the speaker in any event). Also of note is that the forms in question are morphologically complex
and include an element –t that occurs also in demonstratives. Cysouw (2003:75, n.10, withattribution to R. Smeets) suggests a comparison to forms such as French: vous autres ‘youothers’, compare also the English collocation you there. Thus, while it may be in practice thatthese forms are restricted to a plurality of hearers and associates present, this component of
meaning seems to be not a part of the person feature, but rather contributed by the(independently occurring) deictic element –t’. 9 Note that the presence of the demonstrative
9 Although I say ‘in practice’, this may be an idealization. Thus Hewitt notes: “the strictly inclusive forms may andusually do appear where one would expect the exclusives” (Hewitt and Khiba 1979:156). Simon notes in addition

8

morpheme also shifts the pronouns out of immediate relevance for evaluating U2–the putative
distinctions are morphologically composed, and not expressed mono-morphemically (seecomments at beginning of section 2).
Another intriguing example of pronominal forms restricted to a plurality of those present, andexcluding persons not present but associated with the hearer, is to be found in peculiar uses ofpronouns that are not inherently second person at all, but may in special cases be used in such afunction. Tomioka (2006) describes a range of such examples.10 In some varieties of Japanese,zibun (which normally functions as a subject-oriented anaphor, roughly ‘self’) may be used torefer to the addressee (Tomioka draws a comparison to uses of ‘yourself’ in English in
expressions such as a waited addressing a customer with ‘And yourself?’). In combination withthe associative plural morpheme –ra, this pronoun is restricted to a group of addressees present,
and cannot include referents that are not present. This peculiar use of the reflexive (and otheritems, including similarly special uses of the first person plural to refer to addressees only,
compare the English ‘we’ used in addressing children or patients) would appear to be an example
of a dedicated second person plural, unusable for [2+3], exactly the entity excluded by U2.
Tomioka, however, argues that the relevant dimension here is neither person, nor presence, perse, but rather a shift in empathy whereby the speaker suggests a shift in point of view to that of
the hearer. Tomioka suggests further that the restriction to those present in the reference of the
pronoun lies in constraints on empathetic shifts, not in the meaning of the pronoun per se.11 I lay
further exploration of this intriguing array of phenomena aside, along with the family of otherspecial uses of pronouns, though I acknowledge that problems may well lurk here.
A potentially related complication concerns the possible existence of a “present” versus “absent”
contrast among pronouns. Milne (1921:17-18) presents a description of the pronominal system ofPalaung which, in place of the familiar inclusive/exclusive contrast, shows a distinction between
forms used “when some of the people to which we refers are not present” and distinct forms“when the people are all present.” Her description of the duals is quite explicit on this point, forexample drawing the contrast between “she and I” depending on whether both are present or not(although Cysouw 2003:225, n.21 notes that a subsequent description of Palaung presents these
forms as an inclusive/exclusive contrast of the familiar type). If Milne’s description is correct, itestablishes that a present vs. absent distinction is a feature that may be part of the morphologicalinventory and would interact with person. Such a feature in combination with second person
would be extremely difficult to tease apart from the putative [2PL] vs [2+3] distinction that isheld to be unattested. As luck would have it, the problem does not appear to arise, in that there
are no specific proposals for such a system requiring investigation.
Before proceeding further, it is worth adding to the discussion one other group of languages thathas been held to counter-exemplify U2, but which has not been discussed in the typologicalliterature on the subject. Specifically, sign languages, including ASL (American Sign Language)
are sometimes described as having many more distinctions of person than attested in spoken(2005:122-123) that none of the example sentences in Hewitt’s grammar have the putative exclusive forms, and theforms are moreover absent in many grammatical descriptions of Abkhaz. See below on the present/absent
distinction, which this resembles.
10 I thank Andrew Nevins for calling this work to my attention.
11 For example, Tomioka notes the use of we as second person in English as used by caregivers as another exampleof this phenomenon. While this is (I suspect) most often used in address to those present (‘How are we feelingtoday?’) it can certainly be used to refer to a third person if there is a sufficient empathetic connection, e.g., a parent
speaking about a child, even if the child is not present (‘We had a short nap today.’, cf. Siewierska 2004:215).

9

languages.12 Thus, describing ASL, Neidle et al. (2000:167) claim that “although … there is a
primary distinction between first and nonfirst persons, nonfirst person can be further
subclassified into many distinct person values.”
What is at issue here is the proper description of (apparent) person markers, both as independent
pronouns and as agreement morphemes in the verbs that have agreement. In sign languages, third
person referents in a discourse, whether present in the conversation or not, are assigned alocation in the signing space, and person markers (pronoun signs and agreement elements) point
to these locations. For referents that are physically absent, a (possibly arbitrary) location is used,with different referents having distinct locations. Since there may be arbitrarily many distinctions
made in the physical space, there may be arbitrarily many distinctions among third persons in agiven discourse. Importantly, unlike spoken language pronouns which are generally imprecise
about their referent (English she means only some salient third person), sign language pronouns
are generally unambiguous, picking out the particular referent assigned to a particular location(Sandler & Lillo-Martin 2006:26, 481). Note further that pronouns picking out multiple referents
involve pointing to the various referents in question (either in an encompassing arc movement or
via discrete pointings, with an associated meaning difference along the distributive/collective
dimension).
Second person pronouns involve the same pronoun signs as third person, but with the deictic
component oriented towards the addressee(s). Just as the various third person pronouns are
generally unambiguous and distinguish particular referents, so too do the second person
pronouns distinguish particular individuals from a group of potential addressees, by pointing tothem. In this way, “you1 + you2” (i.e., two addressees, both present) can be distinguished from,say, “you1 + her3” (an addressee, plus a particular referent present or not). This of course appears
to be exactly the distinction that is unattested in spoken languages (U2).
At this point, one might contend that the person markers in question are in fact morphologicallycomplex, composed of simpler elements. The supposed “you and her” is quite literally a
combination of the morphemes for [you] and [her]. This would place the pronouns on a par withcompound pronouns in other languages as discussed above. Yet even if we were to suspend thisconcern for the moment, it is not clear that the sign language pronouns mark additional person
distinctions as such. In contrast to the view that sign languages mark an arbitrarily large range of[person] distinctions—unattested in any spoken language—various researchers argue instead thatsign languages have only a single (non-first person) PRONOUN sign, with the pointing componentin effect a form of deixis or an overt manifestation of the referential index (see Meier 1990,
Lillo-Martin and Klima 1990, Sandler & Lillo-Martin 2006, Aronoff et al., 2004).13 That is, sign
languages systematically combine linguistic elements with extra-linguistic, spatial/gesturalcomponents. The deictic component of the person agreement system has been argued (see works
just mentioned) to be a part of a broader pattern which includes the direct expression of spatial
information, including source, goal and path. One class of verbs (the “spatial verbs”) display
agreement for this spatial information instead of for individual referents (“persons”). Both thepronominal system as briefly described above, and the broader incorporation of spatial reference,
are apparently universal among sign languages (Aronoff et al., 2004:28, Sandler and Lillo12 I thank Sandra Wood for first bringing the ASL facts to my attention, and Diane Lillo-Martin for discussion of

person in sign languages. The description in the following remarks draws on Sandler and Lillo-Martin (2006),
especially chapters 21 and 25.
13 There is also a question of whether there is a first/non-first distinction (Meier 1990, Sandler and Lillo-Martin

2006) or no person distinction at all (Lillo-Martin and Klima 1990). For a review of differences between the first
person and the other forms, supporting first versus non-first as a genuine person distinction, see Sandler & LilloMartin (2006, chapter 21), and references therein.

10Martin 2006:371). On this view, the expression of a distinction such as [you + you] versus [you+ her] is not, in fact, a distinction of person, but rather one of spatial location. That such a
distinction is apparently universally expressible in sign languages and unattested in spoken
languages is plausibly, as the researchers cited have argued, attributable to the inherently visualspatial modality of sign languages, which allows for the overt manifestation of referential(ultimately spatial or deictic) indices. But for present purposes, the important aspect of thisconclusion is that the facts from sign languages can plausibly and profitably be described without
positing new or different person features. Sign languages provide no evidence that U2 is in any
way inaccurate.
2.3 Just you and me: the first person dual inclusive(11)

Universal 3a.

No language distinguishes among [1+1+2], [1+2+2] and [1+2+3].

b.

No language has a special morpheme for the comprehensive person [1+2+3].

In comparison to the previous universals, U3 has received substantially less attention. It might
appear that U3 is simply a corollary of U2—in effect, the content of U3 is the observation thatthe distinction excluded by U2 is not made among the inclusive pronouns. That is, U3 maintains
that no language draws a number-independent morphological distinction between an inclusive
meaning “speaker and multiple hearers” as opposed to “speaker, hearer(s), and at least one nonparticipant.”
Consider in this light the following passage from Cysouw (2003):[After U1 and U2 are recognized] “five categories remain from the seven logicalpossibilities as outlined in [(4)]… These categories all exist as grammaticalized
categories in the world’s languages… Some pronominal paradigms in the world’s
languages distinguish between the two categories 1+2+3 and 1+2.” (Cysouw 2003:77)
As it turns out, there is no substantive debate about the facts, and crucially no debate about thevalidity of U3. Cysouw’s aim is rather to establish the existence of a “minimal inclusive” [1+2]category independent of dual number in many languages. Cysouw’s focus is thus on cardinality,
and crucially, his intent is not to establish the existence of a dedicated [1+2+3] person marker in
any language (which would violate U3). Since Cysouw (2003) is the most comprehensive current
analysis of person, and since the clarifications below have not been reported in the literature, it
seems to me to be worth devoting some space to this issue.
The relevant questions turn around the analysis of the “first person inclusive dual”, brought togeneral attention in Thomas’s (1955) analysis of Ilocano (Cordilleran, Western Austronesian,Philippines) enclitic pronouns, and the subject of an exchange between Greenberg (1988, 1989)
and McGregor (1989).14

14 According to Cysouw (2003:85-90), this paradigm type is common. It is widespread in the Philippines and also

attested in Australia, Papua New Guinea, Africa, and to lesser degree, in the Americas. The Ilocano [1+2+3] pluraltayo appears to be morphologically complex, as are its cognates in Kapampangan and Maranao, for example, but wemay set this detail aside for the sake of argument.

11

(12)

Ilocano enclitic pronouns (traditional analysis, see also Rubino 2000)a.
1 incl1 excl2
3

singular

dual

*
co
mo
na

ta

plural
tayo
mi
yo
da

The item of interest in (12) is the pronoun ta. As Thomas describes it, “the use of that morpheme
is restricted to cooperative action by one speaker and one hearer; no one else may be included
under this pronoun” (Thomas 1955:205). One reason for the interest in this item is that there isno evidence for a dual number anywhere else in the language, and in fact, this is typical of
languages having a paradigmatic structure like (12) (Cysouw 2003:87). This fact led Thomas(1955) to propose an alternative analysis with only a two-way number contrast, but in which thenumber contrast is not singular:plural but rather (what later came to be known as)
minimal:augmented (Conklin 1962). The table in (13) presents one version of such an analysis.
(13)

Minimal-augmented analysis (Thomas 1955, Conklin 1962, Corbett 2000, Rubino 2005)b.
+sp,+hr+sp+hr-sp,-hr

minimalaugmented

ta
co
mo
na

tayo
mi
yo
da

A pronoun with “minimal” number denotes the minimum number of individuals necessary tosatisfy the basic meaning of the pronoun. Augmented number is anything more than theminimum. Thus, for simple first, second or third persons, minimal:augmented is equivalent tosingular:plural. However, in the inclusive, which requires both the speaker and the hearer, theminimal number is exactly two, and hence the augmented number is more than two.15
The minimal-augmented analysis of Ilocano-type paradigms is fully consistent with U3. Under
this analysis, the dimension of person is characterized by a four-way distinction, and the further
distinction that cross-classifies is number. In practice, reference to the dyad of speaker and hearer[1+2] and reference to the speaker, hearer and one “other” person [1+2+3] are picked out bydifferent pronouns (in Ilocano: ta and tayo, respectively) but this is a distinction of number, andnot a distinction of person. In this way, it is parallel to the distinction between reference to justthe one hearer, [2] and reference to the hearer plus one other [2+3], as in German du vs. ihr, etc.
These are irrelevant to U2 as the difference lies only in the nature of the number contrast, as isclear from the fact that when reference to more than one hearer is intended, the pronoun used isthe plural one, whether or not non-hearers are included.
Cysouw discusses the minimal-augmented analysis, and suggests instead an alternative. He
accepts that the number contrast in pronouns is different from the simple singular:plural

15 A more elaborate version occurs in some languages of Australia (and elsewhere) and is referred to as having athree-way number contrast between minimal:unit-augmented:augmented (Corbett 2000, Cysouw 2003). A “unitaugmented” number is a dual wherever minimal is equivalent to singular, but for the inclusive pronouns, minimal =2, unit-augmented =3 and augmented > 3,

12

opposition found elsewhere (see also section 2.1 above), yet chooses to represent the first person
dual inclusive as part of a five-way person contrast in the non-singular number (Group), as givenin (14) with Cysouw’s labels.
(14)

Singular-Group analysis (Cysouw 2003:90)
Singular

1
2
3

co
mo
na

Group
tayo
ta
mi
yo
da

1+2+3
1+2
1+3
2+3
3+3

While Cysouw’s arrangement of the paradigm is chosen to highlight patterns of neutralizationand syncretism across languages, the analysis, and in particular the label [1+2+3] is, somewhat
misleading in the context of the present discussion. Given that Cysouw defines [3] as “other”,
i.e., neither speaker nor hearer (Cysouw 2003:6), the analysis is not strictly speaking correct forthe pronoun tayo, as far as I can tell from published descriptions and brief consultation withnative speakers and experts. The augmented inclusive pronoun tayo is used in contexts including
the speaker, hearer and “others” (as in (15b’)), but crucially is also used in contexts involving the
speaker and multiple hearers, but excluding non-participants (15a’). In other words, the pronountayo denotes 1+2+X, where X may be hearers or others and, contrary to the letter of Cysouw’s
description, does not specifically include “other” in its denotation. By contrast, the minimal
inclusive pronoun ta does exclude 3rd persons in its denotation, but does so only by virtue ofminimal number; in fact, it also excludes reference to multiple hearers as this would no longer
constitute minimal number.
(15)

Eva and her husband Phil have three kids. One evening, Eva and the kids are in the
kitchen; Phil is on his way home from work. The kids are asking Eva if they can eat, andEva says:
a.
b.
a’.
b’.

(Not yet kids.)
We will wait for (your) father to come home. [we = 1+2+2+2, not 3]
Then we will (all) eat together.
[we = 1+2(+2+2)+3]
Saantay(o) pay nga mangan.
Urayentayo ni daddyyo nga agawid.
Satayonto mangan[tayo = 1+2+2+2, not 3][tayo(n) = 1+2(+2+2)+3]

Cysouw also discusses the related language Kapampangan in this regard. Replying to asomewhat different argument in Greenberg (1989), Cysouw states that “[t]he [Ka]pampangan
pronoun tamu is built from the parts ta (1+2) and mu (2), but its meaning is clearly 1+2+3, not
1+2+2 as Greenberg would have it” (Cysouw 2003:77). To the extent I have investigated thematter for Kapampangan, the facts are parallel to Ilocano: there is an inclusive dual kami, whichis restricted to the speech act dyad, while the plural inclusive tamu covers both [1+2+3] and[1+2+2] (i.e., multiple hearers, but no third persons), in contrast to a literal interpretation of
Cysouw’s remark. The ambiguous nature of tamu is already suggested by the glosses of theplural form in Gonzalez (1981:172) who provides three senses for it: “you (plural) and I; you andwe; you (plural) and we”. This is confirmed by (rather superficial) consultation with speakers
data for contexts similar to (15). Thus both sentences in (16) translate the English ‘We will eat
together’; the pronoun kaming in (16b) is unambiguously dual (you and I), while the pronoun

13

tamung, (Cysouw’s 1+2+3) can be used either for [1+2+3] or [1+2+2], i.e., multiple hearers, but
not including others not present.16
(16)

a.

Kaibat pwede tamung mangan.
‘Then we will eat together’b.

Kaibat pwede na kaming mangan.
‘Then we will eat together’

Similar remarks apply to the description of Limbum, a Grassfields language of Cameroon(discussed in Cysouw 2003:87). Just as in Ilocano and Kapampangan, there is a distinction
between [1+2] and [1+2+3], but the distinction is one of number—the “special” form [1+2] isrestricted to a dual number. Cysouw cites the brief description of the pronouns from Fransen(1995:179). The description stresses the cardinality of the special form sȍ, which is restricted to agroup of “only two people”. Importantly, the description provides no basis for thinking that theplural inclusive sìì requires reference to a third person, as a [1+2+3] category would seem to
imply.
In personal communication (2006), Michael Cysouw suggests that a better interpretation of “3”in the non-singulars in (14) might be “and associates”, making explicit the connection withassociative plurals noted in section 2.1 above, rather than “other”. Thus, the pronoun inventory
contains eight members, which may be listed as in (17).
(17)

a.
b.
c.

[+sp,-hr], [-sp,+hr], [-sp,-hr][+sp,+hr][+sp,+hr,+A], [+sp,-hr,+A], [-sp,+hr,+A], [-sp,-hr,+A]

Since “+A” is no longer defined as “other”, the Ilocano facts are now properly described:[+sp,+hr,+A] is ambiguous between [1+2+2] and [1+2+3], and the only distinction that can be
drawn is that between [+sp,+hr] and [+sp,+hr,+A], a distinction of number (±A). The eightcategories in (17) are exhaustively characterized by three binary features: the two person features[±sp,±hr] and the number feature [±A]. There are exactly four [-A] categories (17a-b), and four
corresponding [+A] categories, precisely as on the minimal/augmented analysis. Cysouw’semphasis is on the inherent cardinality of the groups—the three in (17a) are singular, while thefive others are necessarily of cardinality greater than one. But there is no incompatibility here, so
far as I can see. UG provides for exactly and only the distinctions in (17), but the fact thatprocesses (such as agreement) that are sensitive to singular vs. non-singular divide may yield a
3:5 split—grouping (17b) together with (17c)—simply tracks the actual cardinality necessitatedby the semantics of the features (cf. McGregor 1989). Although [+sp,+hr] is not [+A], it cannot
be singular. Its cardinality follows from its semantics, and its minimality follows from thesystem, in which it stands in contrast with [+sp,+hr,+A]. For this reason, the non-plural [+sp,+hr]
is (normally) dual. Although [±A] thus does not match up precisely with number in the sense of asingular-plural contrast, the contrast seen in languages with a first-person inclusive dual is still,featurally, best understood as one of number. Holding number constant, what remains
uncontroverted is that no language draws a distinction between “pure inclusives” (only speakers
and hearers) and “complete inclusives” (pronouns that necessarily include an “other” alongside
the speech act dyad).
In sum, despite general scepticism in the functional-typological literature about whether there
exist any absolute universals (see discussion and references in Newmeyer, this volume), U1-U3
16 For sharing their expertise on Ilocano and Kapampangan, I am grateful to Sheila Iiams, Lourdes Corpuz, Carl

Rubino, Aaron David and Jason Paul Laxamana.

14

remain solid candidates. We may thus move on to the question of how these might best be
explained.
3. Explaining absences
Positing that UG makes use of the two-value feature system [±speaker,±hearer], crucially withno feature “other” or "3", provides a degree of explanation of the observed universals.
Specifically, the binary system allows for the expression of all and only the attested distinctionsof person. The unattested distinctions are never grammaticalized because the grammatical
apparatus for expressing them does not exist within UG. This discovery in and of itself—absent acompelling independent account—provides an argument for UG, that is, constraints on possible
languages. As with any principle of UG, the account only goes so far. In particular, thepostulation of a substantive universal accounts for why any one language has certain properties,
but does not answer the question of why UG has this feature system and not others.
Functionalist discussions purport to offer inherently superior accounts on this score. An answer
to the question of why UG is the way it is, and not some other way, would be a major advance inunderstanding. More specifically, if the universals above could be shown to follow from general
cognitive properties, independent of language, then hard-wiring them into the feature system
may be superfluous. There are at least two types of functionalist explanation for the person
universals currently on offer, and I will consider each one in turn, arguing that they range fromuncompelling to unsupported by the evidence. One view holds that the unattested distinctions are
possible in principle, but of such vanishingly small functional load that they would never begrammaticalized (Cysouw 2003:76). Another view holds that the unattested distinctions areindeed impossible, but due to general properties of the cognitive representation of discouse:
namely, the way in which we conceive of conversations necessarily yields only the attested
contrasts. The feature system may allow for additional distinctions, but these would be unusable,
in a manner more or less parallel to the cliché example of *[+hi,+low] in phonology: thegrammar (feature logic) need not exclude such a representation, but it will always be unusable
for system-external reasons. This latter view has been explicitly offered for U1 only as far as I
know (Boas 1911:39); Levinson (1988) might be read as endorsing an extension to U2, although
Levinson’s suggestion amounts to a proposal specific to language, and is thus a variant of the
UG/formalist proposal sketched above. I address each of these in turn.
3.1 Functional load
In discussing the empirical validity of U1 and U2, Cysouw (2003:76) writes:“[t]he cateogries 1+1 and 2+2 are thus possible linguistic categories, but they are notgrammaticalized in human language. This absence can be explained by noting that theconversational settings in which the semantic categories 1+1 and 2+2 are attested are
extremely marked.”
The context of this passage makes it clear that Cysouw is offering an explanation for U1 and U2.
That is, the “absence” of 2+2 quite unambiguously refers to the absence of a form distinguishingmultiple hearers from hearer + others (but see the remarks on “3” in section 2.3 above). The
explanation proposed is that such a distinction has a vanishingly small functional load and canthus never give rise to a morphologized person distinction. Unfortunately, two key pieces of the
explanation are missing.
On the one hand, no data is given to support the claim that the relevant contexts are indeed rare.
For example, given some representative sample of second person plural forms, just how rare is15the multiple hearer meaning, as opposed to the meaning hearer plus others?17 To attempt a crude
estimation
of
this,
I
had
an
onlinecorpusofSpanishinvestigated(http://www.corpusdelespanol.org, consulted June 2007). Occurrences of the 2 PL vosotros werecounted, and coded where possible for whether they referred to multiple hearers [2+2], hearer
plus others [2+3]. In the corpus available, only 64 pronouns occurred with context and for the
majority of these, the context was not sufficient to unambiguously determine the pronominalreference. However, for those where the reference was clear, 13 were multiple hearer contexts as
opposed to only 4 for hearer plus others. If the results are at all representative, this would appear
to undermine the position that the [2+2] context is in any relevant way marked in actual usage.
Further, no independent threshold of grammaticalizability is provided. What counts as‘extremely marked’ to a sufficient degree as to be universally impossible to grammaticalize? The
claim of extreme markedness thus seems to rest on a hunch about plausibility. On this point,
researchers apparently simply differ in their hunches. Thus while Cysouw appears to consider thefunctional load of the contrast negligible, comparing the quotes from Lyons in sections 2.1 and
2.2 above suggests that Lyons found the functional load of the second person contrast plausible
enough to be worthy of identification, and in this, significantly distinct from that in the first
person. Likewise Zwicky (1977) criticizes the binary feature system, in part because it fails toallow for the inclusive/exclusive contrast in the second person (U2), stating that he knows of no
language that draws the distinction “but expect[s] that there are some” (p.729). As it happens,
Zwicky was to be disappointed—the universal is absolute, however, the fact that researchers
simply differ starkly in their assessment of the a priori plausibility of the contrast underscores theneed for an empirical basis to the argument.18 Of course, this does not defeat the possibility of an
explanation in terms of functional load, but it seems safe at this point to say that nothing beyond
a speculation is currently on offer. To the extent that Lyons, Zwicky and others are correct intheir assessment of the relevant contrast as being sufficiently salient in discourse, this would
appear to speak against this particular functional explanation.19
At this point, we leave the explanation in terms of functional load as an unsubstantiatedspeculation, and turn to the question of whether a language-external explanation of the universals
is plausible in light of what is known (or conjectured) about the language-independent cognitive
representation of communication.
17 Cysouw, following McGregor (1989), offers a particularly narrow sense of the relevant contexts, noting, withregard to multiple hearers, that “eye contact with more than one person is only achieved in specific situations, likeclass address” (p.77). Since eye contact is not necessary for the use of second person singular forms (i.e., when theissue of multiple hearers is not at issue) its relevance here eluded me.
18 I would hazard a guess that, at least in conversation, reference exclusively to multiple hearers (2+2+…) is at least

as common, if not more so, than a good number of the finer distinctions that one does find morphologized in, say,tense and aspect systems, or in extremely rich case systems. If correct, this should challenge, if not refute, the notionthat simply counting the degree to which a relevant context occurs in everyday speech is the relevant determinant ofgrammaticalizability.
19 Newmeyer (2005:13) mentions U1 and notes a potential direction of functional explanation attributed to Martin

Haspelmath, namely, that “innovations always begin with individual speakers, not with groups of speakers.” The
presumed underlying assumption is that a pronoun used exclusively for mass speaking would require a simultaneous
innovation by a group, which Haspelmath contends is impossible. However, I would dispute the implicit assumption
here, since there are various forms of mass speaking, such as liturgical contexts, in which a single figure leading the
speech provides the text to be repeated (repeat after me). Such forms of speech can and do have characteristics thatare different from everyday speech, and thus provide, in principle, an avenue whereby a sufficiently charismatic
individual may innovate a form specific for mass speaking. I thank Fritz Newmeyer and Martin Haspelmath fordiscussion of this point.

16

3.2 Extended egocentricity
A language-external explanation would be provided (thus rendering superfluous the argument fora substantive universal feature inventory) if it could be shown that the unattested distinctions
cannot be simply conceptualized, and thus cannot be expressed in language in simple terms,
regardless of the formal apparatus.
Looking first at U1, the absence of a contrast between a plurality of speakers versus [speaker andothers], Franz Boas suggested that such a contrast was impossible on, partly, languageindependent grounds. Thus, he took “first person” [1] to denote not the speaker but rather theself, and wrote: “[a] true first person plural is impossible, because there can never be more than
one self.” Boas 1911:35). A similar viewpoint characterizes remarks by Benveniste (1971:202),
Sokolovskaja (1980),20 and others. Greenberg (1993) terms this argument the uniqueness of theego.
Although this appears at first blush to be a typical functionalist explanation, offering an accountfor a linguistic universal in terms of a generalization that is independent of language, onreflection, it can be seen that this falls squarely within the formal mode of explanation, relying
directly on a claim about the universal feature inventory as a restriction peculiar to language. The
aspect of the account that is language-independent is the uniqueness of the ego.21 For the sake ofargument, we may grant that to be correct as a matter of human psychology. But the account of
the linguistic facts rests entirely on the premise that the morphological category “first person”
universally denotes [ego], and can never be, say, the conventional discourse role of speaker.
What is doing the explanatory work in excluding a true first person plural is this latter premise,that is, an assumption about an irreducible property of language, an aspect of the universal
feature inventory.22 Boas’s conjecture explains (without need for any additional stipulation) why
the plural of a first person must be associative, but it does so only if there is a universal inventoryof possible grammatical features, and this inventory includes [ego] but does not include[speaker].
The considerations just mentioned cover only U1. We may ask at this point whether there is aparallel to the uniqueness of the ego that would hold for U2 (and U3), say, a uniqueness of the tu.
Greenberg rejects this possibility explicitly: “The ego has two linguistically relevant
peculiarities. It is unique, and unlike the second or third person it has no true plural.” (Greenberg
1993:13, emphasis added). In contrast to Greenberg, Levinson (1988:183) suggests it “may bethat pronouns universally exhibit a ‘prototype’ semantics (Fillmore 1982) based on a canonicalsituation of utterance where there are only two participants, so that the … notions ‘speaker’ and‘addressee’ exhaust the relevant participant roles.” Levinson may thus be read as suggesting a

20 Sokolovskaja (1980) does not include U1 in her list of 50 putative universals regarding personal pronouns, andinstead stipulates as a part of her notational apparatus that the speaker is always singular (i.e., unique), see her“limitation 1” (p.85).
21 It is probably important to distinguish ego from the related notion of deictic center. The latter may indeed be amore appropriate source for the grounding of the first person, but I will leave these further refinements aside.
22 See Lyons (1977) and Zwicky (1977), who stress the need to distinguish between speech act roles andmorphological/grammatical categories of person, and suggesting that there are universals of language governing therelation between these. I have suggested that Zwicky was wrong in certain details, but his point is fundamental inevaluating purported language-external (i.e., functional) explanations, as discussed in the main text.

17

unique tu alongside the unique ego in the universal feature inventory, see also Benveniste(1966:232).23
If correct, this would indeed be a notable discovery, because it is very clearly a property oflanguage and not a property of general cognition. Indeed, the context of Levinson’s remarks is anassessment of the rich array of categories for the analysis of speech act participant roles that arisein the literature on sociolinguistics and the ethnography of speaking (Levinson discusses inparticular the work of Erving Goffman, e.g., Goffman 1981). What is striking is how few ofthese distinctions are grammaticalized in the morphology of person. Where the linguistunderstands a notion of, say ‘addressee’, Goffman and those following him posit an array offiner distinctions (for example, between the addressee, to whom the utterance is addressed, thetarget, to whom the message is addressed, and the hearer, who happens to actually hear theutterance; the three need not coincide in actual utterance events). The suggestion from Levinson
noted above was offered as a speculative answer to the question “why should most languages
utilize first- and second-person grammatical categories that are indifferent to all the finer
distinctions that are possible?” (Levinson 1988:183). It is thus abundantly clear that Levinson,
and those on whose work he draws, quite explicitly see the problem as being one of linguistic,
and not conceptual or cognitive, universals.
In sum, an account of U1-U2 in terms of the uniqueness of the ego and even more so of theuniqueness of the tu is does not constitute a functional account at all, but is rather a formal
account—a specific proposal regarding the restricted universal inventory of features from which
the grammatical categories in the world’s languages may be constructed.24
4. Conclusion
The conclusion seems inescapable, on the basis of the known facts. It is a universal andfundamental organizing principle of morphology that there are only two grammatical persons,namely first and second, in the sense that the dimension of person in natural language isexhaustively characterized by these two features, which in combination yield a four-way
contrast. To be sure, there is room for further refinement in establishing the precise features, forexample (i) whether these are binary (as in (18b)), or privative with underspecification for third

23 What Levinson might have in mind is something like the following: Just as Greenberg suggested that the speaker

understands “we” even in chorus contexts to mean “I (unique) and those associated with me”, the addressee will
always understand plural ‘you’ as addressed to “me (unique) and those associated with me”. In other words,
although the speaker may address multiple individuals simultaneously, the hearer will always “hear” the utterance as
directed towards themself—the unique ego—and associated others. My thanks to Irene Heim (p.c. 2005) forsuggesting this way of thinking about what a “unique tu” might mean. Taking this direction further, it may then be
instructive to think of the opposition ego vs. tu not as reference to [speaker] vs. [hearer], but rather as a distinction oforientation: ‘originating from’ vs ‘directed towards' the ego / deictic center, on analogy to other aspects of deixis (cf.
German hin vs. her, away from vs. towards the deictic center (speaker)).
24 Levinson argues that some of the finer distinctions are in fact expressed in some languages. For example,

differences between ‘source’ and ‘speaker’ are drawn in the distribution of evidentials. The observation constitutes
further support for the main thesis here: the finer-grained distinctions that are universally unattested in the (simplex)
morphology of person-marking are in fact distinguishable elsewhere in language. This argues strongly against the
proposition that the absence of the distinctions in person morphology can be reduced to a general language-external
property. See also Cysouw (2003:6-8).

18

person (as in (18c)),25 (ii) whether these are part of a geometry, and (iii) how precisely thefeatures are defined with respect to speech act participants ([speaker/hearer] vs. [ego/tu], etc.).
(18)

a. notional
1+2
1+2+3
1
1+3
2
2+3
3

b. binaryc. privative[+spk, +hr]

[speaker, hearer][+spk, -hr][speaker][-spk, +hr][hearer][-spk, -hr][ ] (unspecified)This is a noteworthy discovery, and has proven eminently robust, having survived more scrutiny,
over a larger range of languages, than most, if not all, other morphological universals. The
universals in U1-U3, which motivate the two-valued system, have been discussed andinvestigated over more than 50 years of work, and some 500 languages. The categories involved
are extremely well-defined and accessible, thus it is clear what a relevant counter-example would
look like. Indeed, counter-examples have been proposed, but as discussed above, none has
survived closer inspection. This discovery is all the more important for the study of linguistic
universals as it has resisted explanation from language-external considerations. Proposed
functional explanations, such as the uniqueness of the ego (and perhaps of the tu) are notlanguage-independent properties of cognition, but amount in fact to recognition of the formalist
position, that there are indeed substantive linguistic universals that constitute discoveries about
limitations on possible morpheme inventories. That is, what the study of person marking teaches
us is that there are indeed well-defined, conceivable meanings, that are simply inexpressible assimplex elements. The atomic feature inventory of Universal Grammar is limited, and it istherefore meaningful to speak of possible and impossible morphemes.
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