Possible Options for International
Management of Plutonium Stockpile
The 3rd Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia (PSNA)
Workshop“Responsibility and Role of Nuclear Powersin Promoting International Peace and Security”
Moscow, May 31- June 1st, 2018
Dr. Tatsujiro Suzuki
Director, Professor
Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki
University(RECNA)
suzukitatsu@nagasaki-u.ac.jp

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Global Fissile Materials Stockpile is increasing(2017.6)• Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU):
1,338.6 ton: ~ 20,916 Hiroshimabombs eq. (64kg/bomb)• Plutonium (Pu): 511.4 ton: ~85,241
Nagasaki bombs eq.(6kg/bomb)• TOTAL of 106,157 bombs eq. (+655bombs eq. increase from 2016)• Most of HEU stockpile is for military
use and its total amount is decreasing.
• 70% of Pu stockpile is for non-militaryuse, and its stockpile is increasing due
to reprocessing activities• Especially, Japan’s stockpile (48 tons) isoutstanding among non-nuclear
weapon states.

Source: RECNA, http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/bd/files/fissile_material2017ENG.pdf

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Global Stockpile of Separated Plutonium is increasing

Source; Zia Mian, Alex Glazer, “Global Fissile Material Report 2015: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material
Production,” presented at NPT ReviewConference, May 8, 2015.
http://fissilematerials.org/library/ipfm15.pdf“We encourage States to keep their stockpile of separated
plutonium to the minimum level, both as consistent withnational requirements.” – 2014 the Hague Nuclear Security
Summit Communique3

Four reprocessing countries have largest civilian
plutonium stockpile

RussiaReprocessing
Countries

UKUSFranceJapan

Source; Zia Mian, Alex Glazer, “Global Fissile Material Report 2015:Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Production,” presented at NPT
Review Conference, May 8, 2015.
http://fissilematerials.org/library/ipfm15.pdf
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“Mitigating Security Risks from Separated
Plutonium: Some near term steps” by John
Carlson(1)Minimizing Stocks• Committing to keep separation (reprocessing) in balance withconsumption. Ensuring the rate of reprocessing output is consistent
with the capacity to consume such output• Considering mechanism and incentives to encourage states todeclare surplus or “excess plutonium” (ex. If there is no plan to use
plutonium within a defined period)• Such “excess plutonium” could be placed under IAEA control or could
be made available for consumption elsewhere• Consider development of regional or multinational plutonium storage
schemes• Take appropriate actions for management and disposition of excess
civilian and military plutonium
www.nti.org/media/documents/NTI_Paper_Mitigating_Security_Risks_FIN
AL-April2018.pdf

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“Mitigating Security Risks from Separated
Plutonium: Some near term steps” by John
Carlson(2)Mitigating Risks• Thorough review of technical, economic rationale for reprocessing• Commit to convert Pu into less sensitive forms• Minimizing the number of sites• Regularly review adequacy of security• Avoid production of weapon-grade plutonium• Identify non-essential holdings of plutonium and undertake appropriate
actions to deal with these (as those for HEU)
• Encourage facilities already using plutonium (MOX) to use excess plutonium• Place all civilian and excess military plutonium under IAEA safeguards• Discourage reprocessing and encourage direct disposal or interim storage
under bilateral cooperation agreement
www.nti.org/media/documents/NTI_Paper_Mitigating_Security_Risks_FINALApril2018.pdf
6Need a new “norm”: Possible Four Options
1. Enhanced transparency by strengthening
International Plutonium Management Guideline(INFCIRC/549)
2. International Plutonium Storage (under thecustody of IAEA) of “excess” plutonium
3. International cooperation on plutonium
disposition
4. Moratorium and possible phase out ofreprocessing.
71. Enhancing International Plutonium
Management Guideline (INFCIRC/539)• National Statement should include:• Specify “Demand” (consumption/disposition) for the next 3years• Restrain “Supply” (reprocessing) up to the amount specified by
the demand, including current stockpile• Define “excess” stockpile (beyond the quantity defined above)• Numbers should be in kg rather than tons (follow Japan)• Specify sites where separated plutonium is stored (follow Japan)• Include HEU stockpile if any• Review of national nuclear fuel cycle policy (cost, rationale,environmental impacts, safety etc.)8Plutonium Stockpile in Japan(as of the end of 2016)2016 (kg)2015 (kg)

4,359
3,364
3,109
9,844 (6,605)

4,359
3,364
3,109
10,832 (7,307)

20,83916,21737,056 (24,516)

20,88816,24837,115(24,574)

46,900(31,121)

47,947(31,881)

Stock in Japan (Pu total)
Reprocessing Plants
MOX Fuel Plant
Stored at Reactors
Sub-total (Pu fissile)
Stocks in Europe (Putotal)
UK
FranceSub-total :Pu total(Pufissile)
Total (Pu fissile)

Source: Japan Atomic Energy Commission (2017)
http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/kettei/170801_e.pdf
http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/kettei/170801_e.pdf

2. International Plutonium Storage• Put plutonium under IAEA custody. Withdrawal of plutonium can beimplemented only when its owner country can demonstrate such“demand”• OPTION A: Storage of only “excess” civilian plutonium stockpile• OPTION B: Storage of only ALL civilian plutonium stockpile• OPTION C: Storage of ALL civilian and “excess” military stockpile• Storage site:• In order to minimize transportation, it is better to keep plutonium inexisting storage sites• Transfer such plutonium to final disposition place only when such plan isconfirmed• Encourage nuclear weapon states to accept “excess” plutonium from
non-nuclear weapon states103. International Cooperation in plutonium
disposition

Taking over (accepting) foreign-owned plutonium stockpile• UK: Proposed to take ownership of foreign owned plutonium stored in UK in2011.

• “the UK would be open to consider the merits of taking over ownership of that foreign
plutonium and to manage with existing UK plutonium; any such change in ownershipwould need to be in compliance with inter-governmental agreements and subject toconclusion of acceptable commercial arrangements” – “Management of the UK’s plutonium
stocks: a consultation on the long-term management of UK owned separated civil plutonium”, February2011.
"https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/4
2766/1243-uk-plutonium-stocks.pdf• France once agreed to take separated plutonium from commercial reprocessing
contract with Taiwan (it was denied later by Taiwan government) in 2015. (“Taiwantenders spent fuel reprocessing contract”, Shaun Burnie, with Mycle Schneider, March 18, 2015,
http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2015/03/taiwan_tenders_spent_fuel.html )• US accepted returning of Japan-owned plutonium from Fact Critical Assembly(FCA) in 2014.
• International Cooperation on R&D of disposition of plutonium (non-MOX option).

114. Moratorium and possible phase-out ofreprocessing• Pugwash Council Statement (2015/11)• Reprocessing to separate plutonium should end in all
countries, including all nuclear weapon countries,
whether for energy or weapon purposes.

• Moratorium of reprocessing for civilian purposes• Only four countries (Russia, France, UK and Japan) areconducting civilian reprocessing– They could agree not tocommit to further reprocessing until existing stocks will
be reduced below “excess” amount• Negotiate to establish a new norm: Commitment to NO
new reprocessing plants unless the demand for plutonium
is proven by nuclear power plant owners.
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REFERENCE

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International plutonium management
guideline (INFCIRC/549)
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc549.pdf• 9 States (Belgium, China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Switzerland,UK, US) established the Guidelines for management of plutonium.
• Policies for the Management of Plutonium• Consistent with its national decisions on nuclear fuel cycle which will ensure
the peaceful use of the safe and permanent disposal of plutonium.
• Strategy will take into account:• the need to avoid contributing to the risks of nuclear proliferation,especially during any period of storage before the plutonium is either
irradiated as fuel in a reactor or permanently disposed of;• the need to protect the environment, workers and the public;• the resource value of the material, the costs and benefits involved andbudgetary requirements• the importance of balancing supply and demand, including demand forreasonable working stocks for nuclear operations, as soon as practical.

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International plutonium management
guideline (INFCIRC/549)
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc549.pdf

1. Occasional brief statements explaining its national strategy for
nuclear power and the nuclear fuel cycle
2. An annual statement, in the format set out at Annex B, of its
holdings of all plutonium subject to these guidelines; and3. An annual statement, in the format set out in Annex C, of its
estimate of the plutonium contained in its holdings of spent civil
reactor fuel.
- It will be ready to join with them in reviewing these guidelines in thelight of experience with their application and changing circumstancesat an agreed time not less than five years after the date on which theseguidelines are notified to the Director General of the Agency.

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