New Diplomacy Compass
Crossing Borders, Demystifying Japan

January 2022

Overstepping the Boundaries ofthe Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy:
Turning Japan’s Self-Defense Force into a Military

without Constitutional Amendments
Shigeru Handa
Defense Journalist
Due to restrictions set forth in the Japanese Constitution which stipulate the renunciation of war, Japan’s SelfDefense Force (SDF) is only permitted to use military force for self-defense when there is an invasion by anothercountry. This exception to using military force is stated in the Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy. The SDF are notpermitted to carry out preemptive attacks nor use military forces to protect other countries through collective defense.
In September 2015, however, the Abe administration enacted security legislation that allows the right to collectivedefense, thereby changing the roles and duties of the SDF. Many constitutional law scholars criticize this security
legislation as “unconstitutional,” as it would allow, for example, the SDF to participate in a U.S.-initiated war.
In December 2018, the National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) and the Medium-Term Defense Program(MTDP), a five-year plan for purchasing weapons, were also revised under security legislation. The new guidelines
called for the conversion of the destroyer, Izumo, into an aircraft carrier capable of standoff strike attacks. Izumo is adefensive weapon that detects and repels enemy submarines in the event that Japan is invaded by another country.
Nonetheless, by upgrading and equipping it with F-35 fighter jets, Izumo has been transformed into an offensiveweapon.
The government has stated that with regards to attacks on enemy military bases, “If it is determined that there is noother option to prevent a missile flying in from another country, it is within the scope of ‘self-defense’ and is legallypossible to attack the military base in which the missile was launched” (Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama’s responseat the Diet in 1951) . Each time the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has test-fired a ballistic missile,the members of the Diet, including those from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), have called for an Enemy Base
Attack Capability, but it has not been implemented. However, following the suspension of the planned deploymentof the Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense system in June 2020, then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the LDP
Defense Committee considered and proposed the Enemy Base Attack Capability as an alternative policy. PrimeMinister Yoshihide Suga, who has acknowledged his role as the Abe Administration’s successor, stated in a cabinet
meeting in December 2020 that they will continue discussions on the Enemy Base Attack Capability. Nevertheless,-1-

New Diplomacy Compass
Crossing Borders, Demystifying Japandespite postponing the decision on this issue, the government decided to extend the attack range of Japan's surfaceto-ship missiles. If the range of the missile is extended, it can be diverted to attack enemy military bases. The
government is now faced with a seeming contradiction in stating that, “Although the policies for the Enemy Base
Attack Capability are still under consideration, we will hold weapons that can be used for this attack.”
This inconsistency has been present since the 2018 NPDG allowed weapons to have standoff strike capabilities. For
example, there is the Joint Strike Missile (JSM), a Norwegian-made missile with a range of approximately 500
kilometers that Japan has begun importing under the defense budget of fiscal year 2018, and the Joint Air-toSurface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), which are both U.S.-mademissiles with a range of approximately 900 kilometers that Japan is considering importing. If the Japan Air SDF
launches these missiles from fighter aircraft above the Sea of Japan, they can reach the DPRK; if they are launchedabove the East China Sea they can reach China.

In the past, the Japanese government stated that “Any offensive weapon that exceeds the minimum force necessary
for self-defense is not permitted” (Director General of the Defense Agency Tsutomu Kawara’s response at the Dietin 1988). These banned weapons included intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range strategic bombers, andthree types of attack aircraft carriers. However, long-range missiles, including the JSM, have the same effect as thelong-range strategic bomber, and the destroyer Izumo is an attack aircraft carrier. As a consequence, the SDF has
had offensive weapons that are not permitted by the Constitution.
Weapons are not the only things that are changing. Due to the restrictions of the Exclusively Defense-Oriented
Policy, the SDF has been carrying out training in seas and air space within the Japanese territory and its vicinity. In2016, then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe proposed the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy to counter the Beltand Road Initiative (BRI), a global infrastructure development strategy adopted by the Chinese government in 2013.
After this proposal, the training of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) went beyond the Japanese
territory and its vicinity. Beginning in 2017, the JMSDF began annual joint training with the U.S. and India called
Malabar Exercise. The JMSDF dispatched two destroyers to the Indian Ocean to conduct training that simulate
actual warfare. Beginning in 2018, in addition to the Malabar Exercise, the JMSDF regulated the Indo-Pacific
Deployment (IPD) every year and dispatched two to three destroyers to the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea
for approximately two months. Since then, the training has been based on the premise of using military force.
Especially in the South China Sea, the JMSDF have repeatedly conducted anti-submarine warfare drills to contain

Chinese Navy submarines. The military tension between the U.S. and China has been increasing in the South China
Sea because the U.S. Navy sent out naval vessels to conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in
response to China reclaiming atolls to build a military base. The presence of the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy navalvessels in the South China Sea will restrain activity by the Chinese Navy. Additionally, the four countries that makeup the QUAD - Japan, the U.S., India, and Australia - are also conducting joint training in the Indian Ocean torestrain the Belt and Road Initiative. The training conducted by the JMSDF in the Indian Ocean and the South
China Sea, which is far beyond Japanese territory, is to “prepare for actual warfare” rather than “for the sake oftraining.” Needless to say, the potential enemy is China. It is significant that in the summer of 2021, the Biden
Administration ended the 20-year-long War on Terror in the Middle East, thus possibly making U.S. forces
available to East Asia.

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Crossing Borders, Demystifying JapanThe 2018 NPDG clearly states the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance and proposes the joint use of the U.S.
military bases in Japan and the SDF bases. The Nansei Islands, which stretch out 1200 kilometers from Kyushu toOkinawa, act as a breakwater to prevent the Chinese Navy from advancing to the Pacific Ocean. There are morethan 70% of U.S. military-dedicated facilities and bases for Ground, Maritime, and Air SDF on the main island ofOkinawa. Furthermore, the Ground SDF has established garrisons to deploy surface-to-ship and surface-to-air
missile units on islands scattered throughout the Nansei Islands, such as Amami Oshima, Miyakojima, andIshigakijima. At the same time, using the Force Design 2030, announced in 2020, the U.S. Marine Corps conducteda major overhaul of its operations and has adopted the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO).
EABO deploy small military units to remote islands in strategic locations in advance, to create bases for attack andmilitary supply to stop the Chinese military from advancing to the Pacific Ocean. If a counterattack is expected, theentire military unit will move to another remote island. Although the U.S. military is the strongest regular army inthe world, the Marine Corps is trying to engage in guerrilla warfare. When this occurs, the SDF bases in Nansei

Islands will be the perfect stepping-stone for the U.S. Marine Corps to operate from.
In conclusion, the role of the SDF has gone beyond the boundaries of the Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy andis working in unity with the U.S. military to act as a powerful deterrent to the Chinese military. It can be said thatthe SDF has become a military without constitutional amendments. As a result of the Pacific War, Japan has been
trying to maintain peace in Asia through diplomatic, cultural, economic, and human exchanges but these intentions
are becoming uncertain.

Shigeru Handa
Defense Journalist and Adjunct Professor at Dokkyo University and Hosei University. After working at theShimotsuke Shimbun, Shigeru Handa joined the Chunichi Shimbun in 1991 and served as an editor and senior staff
writer at the Tokyo Shimbun. In 2007, he was awarded the 13th Peace and Cooperative Journalist Fund of Japan
award for his column, New Thought on Defense (in Japanese), which was published in the Tokyo Shimbun and theChunichi Shimbun.

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