Proposal:
A Comprehensive Approachto a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone

Summary

RECNA March, 2015
Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition,
Nagasaki University（RECNA）

Proposal: A Comprehensive Approachto a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
Summary
Co-Authors (in alphabetical order)
Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA)HIROSE Satoshi (Professor, Vice Director)
NAKAMURA Keiko (Associate Professor)
SUZUKI Tatsujiro (Professor, Vice Director)
UMEBAYASHI Hiromichi (Professor, Director) Chief Editor

The Logo represents a deformed Chinese character“ 出 ”, which means “exit” or “departure”. Here it
symbolizes the “exit” from the nuclear deterrence and“departure” for a Northeast Asia Nuclear WeaponFree Zone. Nagasaki is famous for its port “Dejima”
or Exit Island, the only port open to overseas during
the period of national isolation in Japanese history.

Acknowledgement
We would like to express our deepest appreciation to Dr. Morton H.
Halperin (the U.S., Senior Advisor, Open University Foundations), Dr. Peter
Hayes (Australia, Executive Director, Nautilus Institute for Security andSustainability), Dr. Shen Dingli (PRC, Associate Dean, Institute of International
Studies, Fudan University), Dr. Chung-in Moon (ROK, Professor, Yonsei
University), Dr. Kiho Yi (ROK, Director, the Center for Peace and Public
Integrity, Hanshin University), Ambassador Dr. Jargalsaikhan Enkhsaikhan(Mongoila, Chairman, Blue Banner), and Dr. Kazumi Mizumoto (Japan, Vice
President, Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University), for theirvaluable comments on the manuscript of this book.
We would also like to express our gratitude to the staff at Nagasaki
University, including Dr. Shigeru Katamine (President, Nagasaki University),
Dr. Susumu Shirabe (Vice President, Nagasaki University), and Dr. Byung-dug
Jun (Professor, Nagasaki University) for their consistent understanding andsupport for this research, and to Ms. Shiho Hayashida for all her help in
publishing this book.

Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University（RECNA）
1-14 Bunkyo-machi, Nagasaki, 852-8521, Japan
TEL. +81 95 819 2164 / FAX. +81 95 819 2165
E-mail. recna_staff@ml.nagasaki-u.ac.jp
http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp

Summary and Proposals
Introduction
Nagasaki University was a victim of the atomic bombing in August 1945 and founded
the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNA) three years ago. This proposal
is written by the RECNA. The proposal will be submitted to concerned states and theinternational community and has been written with the sincerest of hopes that it serves as aproposal for policies so that Japan, being a victim of nuclear bombs, can contribute to realizing
a nuclear weapon free world.
Japan’s civil society played a critical role in conceptualizing a Northeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ) over past decades. However, the various forms that a NEANWFZ might take did not gain much traction with states in the region (except for Mongolia)
although these forms gained substantial local and city government-level support. In 2011, aconceptual breakthrough occurred when renowned international political scientist Morton H.
Halperin (former Special Assistant to the U.S. President) was commissioned by Nautilus
Institute to provide a framework whereby states could establish the geo-strategic conditions
that would realistically realize a NEA-NWFZ. Halperin proposed to establish a NEA-NWFZ as
an element of a Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in NEA. He presented thisconcept at the Nautilus Institute workshop in Tokyo in November 2011.
The RECNA has held three international workshops in Nagasaki, Seoul and Tokyo inorder to examine and develop the Halperin’s proposal, and to make this Proposal. The
workshops received support from other institutes that share interests in the comprehensive
approach, including the Nautilus Institute. However, the RECNA is responsible for allcontents of this Proposal.
This Proposal does not deal with the entire scope of Northeast Asian security; instead,
it focuses on denuclearization issues while considering the implication denuclearization would
have on regional security. On top of denuclearization, Northeast Asia is faced with various hot
button issues, such as; territorial disputes, disputes on historical records, and rising militarytensions stemming from United States, Japan, and China’s new defense policies. Issues
surrounding the denuclearization of Northeast Asia are not entirely unrelated to these
problems; however, as this proposal will demonstrate, the NEA-NWFZ can be pursued
relatively independently from these other issues. Furthermore, solving the nuclear weapons

01Chapter 1 Northeast Asia’s Current State of Dependence on Nuclear Weaponsissue will have a positive inﬂuence on various other issues.
th

The 70 memorial of the end of the Paciﬁc War is in 2015. In Northeast Asia, Japan’scolonization of Korea came to an end in 1945 and brought with it the National Liberation of
Korea. However, it was the same year that led to the division of the Korean Peninsula andstrained U.S.-North Korea and Japan-North Korea relations that are ongoing even today. Itthwill also be the 70 anniversary since the atomic bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. There
are people (“hibaku-sha”) still living in Japan and both Koreas who are experiencing medical
aftereffects from the bombings and are “living testaments to the inhumanity” of nuclear
weapons. We hope that this proposal will contribute to satisfying the yearning of the region
for the uniﬁcation of the Korean Peninsula and for a world free from nuclear weapons.

Chapter 1
Northeast Asia’s Current State of Dependence on Nuclear Weapons
ROK and Japan’s Dependence on Extended Nuclear Deterrence
The Northeast Asian region’s nuclear confrontation is severely aggravated as North
Korea’s nuclear weapons development program is currently triggering Japan and South
Korea’s stronger dependence on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. The result is aheightened risk of nuclear weapon use, whether intentional or not, and is diminishinginternational efforts towards achieving a nuclear weapon free world. There are many
intertwining elements creating the current situation. These elements include North Korea
feeling the U.S. nuclear weapons are a threat to its regime, a risk that there will be a growingbase of Japanese and South Korean proponents for developing their own nuclear weapons
should their trust in depending on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence be rattled, and the factthat strengthening of the missile defense system in the region as a means of extended
deterrence could be seen as a threat to China. In order to resolve recent nuclear tensions in
the Northeast Asian region, it is necessary to consider resolving all these issues.
The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 and radioactive
contamination of the Japanese ﬁshing boats in 1954 by a U.S. hydrogen bomb test have left ananti-nuclear weapon sentiment in the hearts of many Japanese. As a result, the Atomic
Energy Basic Act of 1955 banned the military use of nuclear energy. On the other end of thespectrum, were Japanese policies adopted to depend on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence
following Chinese nuclear weapon tests in 1964. Introduced by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in
1968, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles stated that “Japan shall neither possess,02

Chapter 1 Northeast Asia’s Current State of Dependence on Nuclear Weapons

manufacture, nor allow to bring in nuclear weapons”, and was coupled with Japan’s
dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Since focus has been placed on North Korea’s
nuclear weapon development program, Japan and the U.S. have enhanced discussions on
possible measures to maintain the credibility of the extended nuclear deterrence, yet thediscussion about the non-nuclear elements of deterrence has also been included. The “Twoplus-Two” meeting involving the top defense and diplomatic officials from the two nations
reafﬁrmed its “commitment to the security of Japan through the full range of U.S. militarycapabilities, including nuclear and conventional” (Paragraph 1.6).
Even though Japan has non-nuclear weapon policies in place, the fear of Japangaining its own nuclear arsenal does not go away. The demeanor of a small fraction ofpoliticians and certain government bureaucracies’ attitudes towards nuclear weapon
dependence are typically the cause of these anxieties (Paragraph 1.7). One reason for
suspicions over Japan’s intent towards nuclear armament is how Japan is incapable ofproducing a logical explanation for its plutonium policies. In context of the Northeast Asian
region, this issue has become a backdrop to South Korea’s argument for its nuclear
sovereignty (Paragraph 1.8).
North Korea and South Korea were at the peak of a possible nuclear war during theCold War. Beginning in 1958, the United States began deploying tactical nuclear weapons inSouth Korea, which were not removed until 1991 following the end of the Cold War. It goes
without saying that South Korea’s armed forces had cooperated with U.S. armed forces inmaintaining nuclear war scenarios in ROK. In 1992, however, the two Koreas made agroundbreaking Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula. It came into effect together with “The Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange between the South and the North”. The preambleof the Joint Declaration even stated that their goal was “to create conditions and an
environment favorable to peace and peaceful unification of Korea”. Thus, the declaration
linked denuclearization intimately to reuniﬁcation. The Joint Declaration on Denuclearization
not only banned the production and development of nuclear weapons but also agreed to “notpossess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities” (Paragraph 1.10).
The South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission set forth by the Joint Declaration
on Denuclearization crumbled and it became evident that North Korea was developing its
nuclear program. Aimed at preventing the development, South Korea worked closely with the
U.S. to carry out diplomatic efforts. South Korea simultaneously strengthened its dependence
on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. The ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting, which has
been held annually since 1968, between the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of
National Defense has repeatedly reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to provide its “Nuclear

03

Chapter 1 Northeast Asia’s Current State of Dependence on Nuclear Weapons

Umbrella”. The two nations agreed to intensify the extended deterrence following North
Korea’s ﬁrst nuclear weapons test in 2006 and established the “U.S.-South Korea Extended
Deterrence Policy Committee” in 2011. The U.S. stated that it would “provide and strengthen
extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military capabilities, including the
U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities”, which once againemphasized the element of non-nuclear, conventional weapons in its extended deterrence(Paragraph 1.11).
While there had been a demand in South Korea for nuclear sovereignty to develop a
nuclear program, North Korea’s development of their nuclear program gave steam to newefforts in South Korea. Following North Korea’s third nuclear test in February 2013, a survey
showed 70% of the South Korean population backed developing their own nuclear weaponsand several influential politicians reportedly expressed their desire for nuclear armament.
Also, South Korea strongly emphasized their desire to amend the ROK-U.S. Agreement for
Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy into an agreement that includes a “comprehensive consent”
clause similar to the one that Japan has under the Japan-U.S. Agreement, which continuously
allows Japan to reprocess spent nuclear fuel.
In accordance with the Obama administration’s “Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)”, therole of nuclear weapons in nuclear deterrence is to be reduced while strengthening
conventional weapon’s role for extended deterrence in South Korea and Japan, which is awelcome move. Considering the tremendous destruction that nuclear weapons can cause,
however, the sheer presence of any nuclear component in extended deterrence prevents
alleviating nuclear tensions in Northeast Asia. It is necessary to develop the concept of“non-military (deterrence) – strong, trusting political relationships between the
United States and its allies and partners”, as was referred to in the same NPR.

North Korea’s Development of Nuclear Deterrence
The graphite-moderated reactor came online in 1986 after North Korea signed theNPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) in 1985. However, confrontations
over the IAEA’s inspection regarding the DPRK’s initial declaration, as required by the NPT,
became heated and North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993. The
situation led to rigid U.S.-DPRK meetings, which negotiations became the prototype of all
following meetings regarding North Korea’s nuclear program.
It is, therefore, safe to say that the fundamental logic for North Korea’s nuclear
weapons program and its possible denuclearization was set in the agreement reached in June
1993 at the U.S.-DPRK Meeting. This fundamental logic had repeatedly appeared in later
negotiations with some modifications. The logic is built towards achieving the following

04

Chapter 1 Northeast Asia’s Current State of Dependence on Nuclear Weapons

two principles: “guaranteeing the security assurance against the threat and use offorce, including nuclear weapons” and “denuclearizing Korean Peninsula withproper veriﬁcation systems”.
The 1994 “Agreed Framework between the U.S. and the DPRK” added the element ofenergy assistance. The Joint Statement agreed on at the Six-Party Talks in September 2005
added the element of consultations between the concerned state parties with the intent of
normalizing U.S.-North Korea and North Korea-Japan diplomatic relations and to promote a
lasting peace in Northeast Asia. Even today, this important element should form the base ofagreements. As will be demonstrated later, the September 19thJoint Statement remains

crucial, even in 2015. North Korea’s diplomatic strategy since 2006, in which the DPRK
continued to negotiate for denuclearization while conducting nuclear tests, can be deﬁned as a
diplomacy that attempts to eliminate the threat against its regime and to normalizeinternational relations by playing both the processes and the products ofdeveloping nuclear deterrence as diplomatic cards. It must be assumed that such
diplomatic strategy will continue taking place.
The 1994 Agreed Framework between the U.S. and the DPRK and its establishment of
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in 1995 demonstrated
promising success towards the end of 2000 (Paragraph 1.13). However, the U.S. policy did
not continue because of the administration change, and the relationship between the U.S. andNorth Korea, which the Bush administration viewed as being a part of the Axis of Evil,became its worst. As a result, the KEDO process crumbled. Certain success and the ultimate
failure of the KEDO process left a lesson to be learned. One lesson, which could be a precedentmoving forward, is that KEDO succeeded in a multilateral scheme where the EU and nineother countries were involved in the U.S.-ROK-Japan centered program. On the other hand, amechanism must be introduced to prevent hard-earned agreements from failing when acentral player goes through administration changes.
The Six-Party Talks agreed on initial actions in February 2007 that were in line with
the September 19thJoint Statement and North Korea froze three Yongbyon facilities (5megawatt Experimental Reactor, the Reprocessing Plant (Radiochemical Laboratory) and the
Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Facility). They also established ﬁve working groups. One group
deserving of attention is the “Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism”. It was a
possible platform for a more comprehensive discussion relating to denuclearization. In Octoberof the same year, the six parties agreed on its second phase actions, which called for “thedisablement of three facilities at Yongbyon” and “a complete and correct declaration of all its
nuclear programs” by North Korea. It was estimated that, as of April 2009, the former
agreement to disable North Korea’s facilities was 80% completed. Reaching an impasse on the05

Chapter 2 Demand from the Global Nuclear Disarmament Objective

latter, the Six-Party Talks have not been held since December 2008.
In April 2009, North Korea announced its launch of the Juche Nuclear Industry,
decided to build an experimental light water reactor in Yongbyon, and publicized that it would
begin enriching uranium to feed the reactor. In November 2010, Siegfried Hecker, a former
Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and other U.S. experts were invited to take atour of the Yongbyon facilities. The Kim Jong-un regime’s nuclear deterrence policies and thepossibility of denuclearization will be detailed in Chapter 4. North Korea’s diplomatic
position towards denuclearization remains unchanged, however, in that it is attempting todevelop nuclear deterrence and to remove a threat towards its regime.

Chapter 2
Demand from the Global Nuclear Disarmament Objective
The strong tide of global efforts, following President Obama’s Prague speech, towards
achieving a “Nuclear Weapon Free World” first manifested itself in the NPT Review
Conference’s 2010 Final Document. Each state party agreed that it “affirms that all Statesneed to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain aworld without nuclear weapons” and “expresses its deep concern at the catastrophic
humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons”. Moreover, all State Parties
committed to “pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective ofachieving a world without nuclear weapons”. Namely, in this commitment, all state parties,
both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, agreed to place political obligations on state
governments to evaluate security policies that stood in the way of achieving this goal and toalter such policies (Paragraph 2.1).
In 2013, the UN General Assembly held the sessions of the “Open-ended Working
Group (OEWG) to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament
negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons”. The
OEWG report clarified the political obligation placed on each and every signatory
government per the 2010 agreement by noting a new concept that “States have differentiatedroles and functions”. It goes without saying that nuclear weapon states were emphasized to
veriﬁably reduce and eventually eliminate its nuclear weapons. The OEWG report, though,added that non-nuclear weapon States “have a role in promoting global nuclear disarmament”
and that non-nuclear weapon States under extended nuclear deterrence could fulﬁll the role of“reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines”. The OEWG further discussed

06

Chapter 3 The Significance of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and the Halperin Proposal“the role of nuclear weapon free zones in challenging the value and legitimacy of
nuclear weapons” (Paragraph 2.2).
A deepening awareness of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapon use has led to a
no-use declaration that states, “It is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that
nuclear weapons are never used again, under any circumstances”. Certain states attempted to
discourage such an argument from growing by emphasizing the critical role nuclear deterrence
plays in guaranteeing security. Analyzing the controversy objectively, however, it iscontradictory to emphasize the impact on humanity that using nuclear weapons could have
while refusing to declare to not use nuclear weapons. This contradiction can be resolved
by pursuing security policies that deny the very possibility of using nuclear
weapons (Paragraph 2.3).
Included in the final document of 2010 NPT Review Conference was the need “tofurther diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security
concepts, doctrines and policies”. This statement is significant in that, on top of reducing
nuclear weapon hardware, it calls for a reduction of nuclear weapon policies. A standardized
reporting format is necessary to assure the transparency of these reductions. Therefore, theNon-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), which is a 12-nation group that
includes Japan, has developed such a standard reporting format. One criterion in the standard
format was to report “measures taken to diminish the role and signiﬁcance of nuclear weapons
in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies”. It was pointed out that states withsecurity policies dependent on extended nuclear deterrence were also required to report thiscriterion (Paragraph 2.4).
Since 2010, a deﬁning characteristic of discussions regarding obligations under
the NPT is a demand for policy changes by nations dependent on extended nuclear
weapon deterrence. Japan and South Korea setting policies towards achieving a
Northeast Asia nuclear weapon free zone would contribute greatly to increasing the
NPT’s credibility and promoting denuclearization of the world (Paragraph 2.5).

Chapter 3
The Significance of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon
Free Zone and the Halperin Proposal
North Korea’s developing nuclear weapons program intensified Japan and South
Korea’s dependence on nuclear deterrence, which has heightened the region’s nuclear

07

Chapter 3 The Significance of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and the Halperin Proposal

confrontation. Anxieties of a nuclear domino effect in Japan and South Korea cannot beignored. The situation would be further complicated should Japan, South Korea, and the U.S.
implement a joint missile defense program as a military response under the assumption that
North Korea’s developing ballistic missile program is linked to the development in their
nuclear weapons program. The complication arises from the fact that the missile defense
program would theoretically diminish the strength of China’s strategic nuclear weapons.
The region’s progressing nuclear dependence runs counter to the international
community’s goal of achieving a “Nuclear Weapon Free World”. The reaction to heightened
regional tensions caused by North Korea’s nuclear weapons should not be to respond withstrengthening dependence on extended nuclear deterrence or any military might, as iscurrently the case. Rather, focus should be placed on establishing a Northeast Asia Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ), which would be the foundation for a cooperative security
system in the region. Reﬂecting on the political obligations developed in the global nuclear
disarmament arguments after the 2010 NPT Review Conference and placed on non-nuclear
weapon states under extended nuclear deterrence, Japan and South Korea have an importantrole to play in this effort. Being the only country to have experienced nuclear bombings, Japan
has an exceedingly large responsibility (Paragraph 3.1).
There have been various, detailed proposals since the end of the Cold War for a NEANWFZ. At present, the Three-plus-Three Arrangement, including its various modiﬁcations, isconsidered to be a concise and pragmatic, fundamental structure. In this scheme, Japan,
South Korea and North Korea would be the “Intrazonal States” and the U.S., Russia, andChina̶nuclear weapon states under NPT with deep ties to the region̶would be the“Neighboring Nuclear Weapon States”. The Intrazonal States would form a geographic
nuclear weapon free zone and would be required to assume non-nuclear obligations similar toother NWFZ treaties. The Neighboring Nuclear Weapon States would be required to provide
security assurances not to attack the zone with nuclear weapons and, hopefully, withconventional weapons (negative security assurances) as parties of the treaty itself rather thanof its protocol (Paragraph 3.2). Details of the NEA-NWFZ are found in Chapter 6.
The 2011 Halperin Proposal was significant in that it shifted the framework of thearguments on a NEA-NWFZ from scheme-centered arguments to approach-centeredarguments. In order to overcome the difficulties he had faced in working towards North
Korean denuclearization, Halperin proposed establishing the NEA-NWFZ as one of the six
elements for a “Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia”. Halperinsuggested that six elements to be included in the Comprehensive Agreement are as follows: 1.
Termination of the State of War, 2. Creation of a Permanent Council on Security, 3. Mutual
Declaration of No Hostile Intent, 4. Provisions of Assistance for Nuclear and Other Energy, 5.

08

Chapter 4 The Possibility of North Korea’s Denuclearization

Termination of Sanctions, and 6. Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.
The Halperin Proposal has been backed for the following reasons that include
Halperin’s own arguments for the case: 1. Accepting North Korea’s de facto nuclear weapon
state may collapse the international non-proliferation system and lead to a domino effect inJapan and South Korea. 2. Therefore, international efforts, which should be tangible, should
continue so long as there remains even a sliver of hope that North Korea can be denuclearized.
3. There must be a new approach that avoids placing blame for stalled past negotiations
towards denuclearization of Korean Peninsula on one another. 4. Although there is a need for
a comprehensive approach that simultaneously solves multiple pending issues, the approachshould not attempt to solve all of the regional security issues at once. Rather, it should be a
restrained approach that comprehensively solves issues directly related to denuclearization. 5.
Reaching an agreement on the denuclearization issues could shape the discussion on solving
the region’s other security issues.

Chapter 4
The Possibility of North Korea’s Denuclearization
At the March 31, 2013 Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, First
Secretary Kim Jong-un introduced a new strategic line on “carrying out economic construction
and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously” and reaffirmed such a “promoting two
fronts simultaneously” strategy during his 2015 New Year Address. The new strategy is amanifestation of a crucial change in that it has relativized its “military first (Songun)
doctrine”. Depending on the circumstances, tensions could potentially rise as high as they did
in 2010. North Korea’s provocative shock techniques have been analyzed as being aimed ataltering the rules of the game and as difﬁcult as it may be, it is crucial to be patient and reactwith a level head (Paragraph 4.1).
The North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly adopted a “Law on Consolidating
Position of Nuclear Weapons State” in April 2013 and set forth polices and doctrines for use of
nuclear weapons. Around the same time, North Korea announced the Yongbyon graphitemoderated reactor would resume operations, and satellite imagery taken in August 2013
showed expanded uranium enrichment facilities. These developments implied that North
Korea was solidifying its long-term position on maintaining its nuclear deterrence. But thisdoes not necessarily mean that North Korea contends that it’s denuclearization is possible
only after “the global denuclearization”, or in other words after achieving a “World without

09

Chapter 4 The Possibility of North Korea’s Denuclearization

Nuclear Weapons”, as it was once stated by North Korea in the spring of 2013.
In June 2013 the DPRK National Defense Commission emphasized that thedenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula means “the complete one that calls fordenuclearizing the whole peninsula including South Korea and aims at totally ending the U.S.
nuclear threat to the DPRK” and then proposed “senior-level talks between the authorities of
the DPRK and the U.S.” North Korea has since repeated the same line of argument for its
denuclearization on the condition of complete elimination of threats. It can be inferred that
North Korea is staying their course in maintaining their nuclear deterrence while
attempting to diplomatically remove the U.S. threat. It should be considered that a
sufﬁcient possibility of denuclearizing North Korea still exists (Paragraph 4.2).
Because of the limited availability of information, assessments of North Korea’s
nuclear weapon capabilities often differ. One thing that is certain from the three nuclear
weapon tests is that North Korea does in fact possess nuclear explosive devices. What has notbeen agreed on is whether or not North Korea has weaponized the devices to be loaded ondelivery vehicles (Paragraph 4.3). As of the end of 2014, it has been estimated that North
Korea is in possession of enough ﬁssile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) to
produce twelve nuclear warheads. According to the available information, North Korea’s
nuclear ﬁssile material production capabilities are rather limited. However, it is difﬁcult topredict how North Korea’s capabilities will develop in the coming future. It is important torecognize that as more time lapses until denuclearization negotiations resume, themore time is available for the situation to worsen (Paragraph 4.4).
Since ﬁring its ﬁrst long-range ballistic missile, Taepodong-1, in August 1998, North
Korea has launched ﬁve long-range ballistic missiles/satellites. Rather than showing any signsof contradiction, publicly available technological information shows that all three launches
since 2009 were satellite launches. It would then be reasonable to assume that the 1998 and2006 launches carried the same purpose. However, it goes without saying that each of theselaunches leads to improving North Korea’s ballistic missile launching capabilities. The North
Korean missile issues should be treated as an issue for the dual-use and crossover
between space and ballistic missile technologies. The discussion needs to begin by
exploring what standards are expected of all nations (Paragraph 4.5).
The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly made Presidential Statements
and resolutions in response to North Korea’s nuclear weapon tests and “launches using
ballistic missile technology”. Nuclear weapon issues can be traced back to North Korea’s
announcement to withdraw from the NPT in 1993, whereas missile issues can be traced backto the moratorium on ballistic missile test launches that resulted from the U.S.-DPRK talks
following the Taepodong-1 launch at the end of August 1998. It is important to recall that the10

Chapter 5 A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia

U.N. Security Council resolution demanding North Korea to not conduct “any launch using
ballistic missile technology” ﬁrst appeared in Resolution 1874 in 2009, which was the resolvedin context of banning North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. When the primary issue
of weapons of mass destruction (especially nuclear weapons) at hand is resolved,
ballistic missile issue will become relatively a lesser concern (Paragraph 4.6).

Chapter 5
A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia
Halperin’s six elements included in his Comprehensive Agreement remain necessary.
However, there must be a detailed deliberation on how to structure such elements into anagreement. Considering the processes and details for establishing a peace treaty that replaces
the armistice treaty, the element of “Terminating the Korean War” will be an especiallyenormous undertaking. In fact, what is necessary for a comprehensive approach in its initialstage is a fundamental treaty like something exempliﬁed by the “Mutual Declaration of No
Hostile Intent”, which is one of Halperin’s six elements. It should be a legal instrument to set
political and ethical standards for the future that respects equal sovereignty and establishes a
relationship based on respect and trust. In this respect, similar to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), a Northeast Asia TAC was proposed during theworkshop. As described above, this Proposal suggests that the agreement reached in acomprehensive approach should be composed of both legally enforceable, concise politicalagreements and agreements with details being introduced in phases (Paragraph 5.1).
Addressing the right of peaceful use of nuclear energy is included in Halperin’s six
elements. This Proposal suggests adding elements regarding the rights of peaceful explorationof space and the ban of all weapons of mass destruction on top of nuclear weapons to thecomprehensive approach. These additional two elements will inevitably be brought up in thediscussion of the six elements. Rather than complicating the entire matter, resolving theseissues will smooth the process (Paragraph 5.2).

Proposal of a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement
for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”
Considering the history of past, failed joint statements among North Korea, U.S. andother countries, Halperin proposes a methodology where a legally binding agreement should
be made ﬁrst, and then followed by negotiations for details. In principle, this Proposal agrees

11Chapter 5 A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearization of Northeast Asiawith Halperin’s methodology. When political leadership is weak, however, it can be difﬁcultand take too much time to go through parliamentary processes necessary to ratify legal
instruments (Paragraph 5.3).
Based upon such considerations, the “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the
Denuclearization of Northeast Asia” (CFA) is proposed in this Proposal as an instrument to beconcluded and effectuated by signatures of state heads of the Six-Party Talks. It would also be
possible, in this case, to include speciﬁc provisions within the CFA that are requested to be
ratified and become strictly legally binding. Appointing an independent non-governmental,
authoritative expert group for support and verification of CFA processes could alleviate
concerns regarding the CFA being overruled by changing administrations. The expert groupwill be deeply involved in the process leading up to manifesting the CFA, and work for supportand veriﬁcation to ensure continuity of negotiations after an initial agreement is reached.
Speciﬁc Chapters of a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearizationof Northeast Asia” are divided into “Declaratory” or “Actionable” categories and are composedof the following four (Paragraph 5.4):(1)Declare to terminate the Korean War and provide for mutual nonaggression,
friendship, and equal sovereignty among CFA state parties. States lacking
diplomatic relations will endeavor to succeed in normalizing its diplomatic relations.
Encourage negotiations among states concerned for the Korean War Peace Treaty.
(Declaratory)(2)Assure equal rights to access all forms of energy, including nuclear energy.
Establish a Northeast Asia Energy Cooperation Committee that is dedicated tocontributing to the stability of Northeast Asia and the peaceful reunification of the
Korean Peninsula. The invitation for committee members extends beyond the sixparties and is open to any state or state groups supporting the cause. Participation ofMongolia and Canada would be welcome. (Declaratory. Actionable details will bedecided by the Committee)(3)Agree on a treaty to establish a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. It
will include requirements to join the NPT and other details mandated to achieve a
NWFZ. Signatory states are obligated to join the Chemical Weapons Convention. The
agreement will protect the rights of signatory states for peaceful space exploration inaccordance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. An article will be provided to placecollective sanctions on states in violation of the treaty, while restricting any unilateralsanction imposed by an individual state party on account of treaty matters. (Actionable)(4)Establish a permanent Northeast Asia Security Council. The primary objectiveof this council will be to ensure the implementation of the CFA. The secondary objective

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Chapter 5 A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia

will be, when appropriate, to serve as a platform for discussions involving various
Northeast Asian security issues. In the future, the council is expected to deal with morecomprehensive security issues. The council could host the veriﬁcation mechanisms of
the NEA-NWFZ. The Six-Parties will form the initial members of the Council, while
member states of the Energy Cooperation Committee and any other states offering tocooperate for Northeast Asian security are welcome to be general members.
(Actionable)

Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty
The proposed “Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty” includes
characteristics unique to the region, as shown below:
State Parties: A six party treaty in a “Three-plus-Three Arrangement” (South Korea,
North Korea, and Japan are “Intrazonal States” and the U.S., China, and Russia are“Neighboring Nuclear Weapon States”) would be the most likely to succeed in the current
state of affairs. It would be even more desirable for Mongolia, a country with recognized
Nuclear Weapon Free Status, to join the NEA-NWFZ as a diplomatic strategy followingth

up its 20 anniversary of its nuclear weapon free declaration in 2012 (Paragraph 5.5).
Flexibility in Effectuating the Treaty: Doubts over achieving a NEA-NWFZ
repeatedly point towards the lack of mutual trust between the states within the region.
As the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which overcame difﬁculties between Brazil and Argentina toenter into force, demonstrates, however, the system in which articles enter into force canbe ﬂexible in order to facilitate achieving a NEA-NWFZ. For instance, the entry-into-force
requirements of the NEA-NWFZ treaty can be provided for through ratification by thethree nuclear weapon states (U.S., Russia, China) and two non-nuclear weapon states(Japan and Korea). It may be plausible to provide an option for Japan and Korea towithdraw from the treaty after three to ﬁve years, if North Korea continues not to join. By
ratifying the treaty under this scheme, Japan and South Korea will enjoy security
assurances sooner against the potential threats from nuclear weapon states other thanthe U.S. As for the beneﬁts to North Korea, an article can be included to provide North
Korea with a certain period of time to dismantle its nuclear weapons and facilities, while
the U.S. provides immediate security assurances in exchange for North Korea’s
ratiﬁcation (Paragraph 5.6).
Requirements Prior to Negotiations: Considering that states with nuclear
weapons are involved in negotiating a NEA-NWFZ Treaty, there is a need to address theissue of guaranteeing that negotiations are held in good faith once the negotiationscommence. For example, North Korea would be requested to commit to a moratorium of13

Chapter 5 A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia

nuclear weapon tests and other nuclear weapon related activities. The United States,
South Korea, and Japan would likely be requested to commit to a moratorium of joint
military exercises around the Korean Peninsula. Such mutually agreed “prior
moratoriums” should be adopted before negotiations. The “prior moratoriums” should
also explore alleviating current sanctions imposed on North Korea (Paragraph 5.7).
Eliminating Dependence on Extended Nuclear Deterrence: When a NWFZ
treaty is fully implemented, international law prevents the threat or use of nuclear
weapons against the zone. This implies that non-nuclear weapon states within the NWFZ
do not need extended nuclear deterrence or a nuclear umbrella. This is why a NWFZ is arecommendable mechanism towards cooperative security that does not depend on nuclear
weapons. (Because the proposed CFA includes a non-aggression agreement, non-nuclear
weapons states in NEA-NWFZ are protected from attacks and threats by conventional
weapons, as well as by nuclear weapons. Considering past negotiations for a nuclear
weapon-free Korean Peninsula, the possibility of including conventional weapons in the
security assurances exists regarding a NEA-NWFZ.) Nonetheless, there are many
concerns and fear over losing the nuclear umbrella. The argument for the fear is thatstates will be defenseless if one state violates the treaty and either attacks or threatens to
attack other states. However, once a state violates the treaty, the treaty becomes null andvoid; the state of affairs will return to pre-treaty conditions, thus they will not be
defenseless. To further alleviate anxieties, the treaty could provide that states may takesanctions against the offender in accordance with international law and their individual
national constitution (Paragraph 5.8).

Views to the Diplomatic Process
United Nations has recently been a platform for furthering discussions on a NEAMWFZ. The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held in 2013 discussed the NEA-NWFZ.
The results were recommendations to the Secretary General that the UN consider taking
appropriate actions to establish the NWFZ and play a proactive role to establish regional forums
for transparency and trust. Such a proposal coming from the United Nations is a large leap
forward. Mongolian President Elbedgorj expressed his support for the NEA-NWFZ concept at
the United Nations High Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament in September 2013 andreported on the commencement of the “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security” tobuild trust, which was also a major step. As the UN Disarmament Commission reported in 1999,
any initiative to establish a NWFZ must come from the free will of the regional nations
concerned. In this respect, it is essential that Japan and South Korea, individually orcollectively, take initiatives to establish a NEA-NWFZ (Paragraph 5.10).

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Chapter 5 A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia

Although there may be other possibilities, resuming the Six-Party Talks would beconsidered most appropriate and practical to ensure a credible platform for the discussion of
the “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”.
Reportedly, North Korea, China, and Russia share an afﬁrmative attitude towards resuming
the Six-Party Talks at present. Considering that the United States is dealing with a vast
amount of diplomatic problems, it is time for Japan and South Korea to act. Considering the
NPT 2010 Final Document that expresses strong support of the Six-Party Talks, the upcoming2015 NPT Review Conference will be a signiﬁcant diplomatic platform to address the issue.
Considering the above analyses, the following proposals are made for a “Comprehensive
Approach to a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon- Free Zone”:

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Proposal
Proposal One:
Establishing a NEA-NWFZ should not be an attempt at merely
denuclearizing North Korea. Rather, the objective should be to solve
various security issues closely linked to the nuclear issues in Northeast
Asia through concluding a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement(CFA) for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”.
The CFA includes the following in its Chapters: (1) a declaratory chapter to terminate
the Korean War and to provide for mutual non-aggression, friendship, and equal sovereignty,(2) a declaratory chapter to assure equal rights to access all forms of energy, including nuclear
energy, and to establish a Northeast Asia Energy Cooperation Committee that is dedicated tocontributing to the stability of Northeast Asia and the peaceful reuniﬁcation of the Korean
Peninsula, (3) a chapter to agree on an actionable treaty to establish a NEA-NWFZ that
includes all the necessary provisions for a NWFZ, (4) an actionable chapter to establish apermanent Northeast Asia Security Council, which will ensure the solid implementation of
the CFA and to be open to discuss the region’s other security issues. Through analyzing North
Korea’s international and national policies up to the present, this paper concludes there is a
sufﬁcient possibility that North Korea will agree to a properly designed NEA denuclearization
process.

Proposal Two:
In addition to standard provisions for a NWFZ treaty, a NEANWFZ treaty should include the following elements:(1) the treaty will, at the very least, include all six states in the Six-Party Talks. North
Korea, South Korea, and Japan will form a geographic nuclear weapon free zone, and asneighboring nuclear states, U.S., China, and Russia will provide security assurances against
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as well as conventional weapons against the zone,(2) all parties are requested to join the Chemical Weapons Convention, (3) the treaty willassure the rights of peaceful exploration of space as provided for by the Outer Space Treaty,(4) North Korea is obliged to dismantle its nuclear arsenals and related facilities within a time

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frame with ample allowance, (5) the entry-into-force provision of the treaty will be made withincentives to enhance the likelihood of North Korea, South Korea, and Japan joining thetreaty (Paragraphs 5.5 & 5.6).

Proposal Three:
The Six-Party Talks should be resumed to discuss the“Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization of
Northeast Asia”.
The Six-Party Talks established the working group for “Northeast Asia Peace andSecurity Mechanism”, which signifies its interest in exploring the denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula from a more comprehensive point of view. Considering the NPT 2010 Final
Document strongly supported the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, the international
community should unite to urge the resumption of the Talks before and after the 2015 Review
Conference. Rather than dragging in the past, the resumed Six-Party Talks should take a
fresh and bold approach, such as the “Comprehensive Framework Agreement” proposed here.

Proposal Four:
Utilizing the opportunity of existing international support topromote a NEA-NWFZ, regional non-nuclear states Japan and South
Korea should, individually or collectively, launch an initiative towards
establishing a NEA-NWFZ that includes the “Comprehensive Framework Agreement
for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”. In 2013, the United Nations Advisory Board on
Disarmament Matters recommended the Secretary General to consider appropriate action for
the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ. Also, the Mongolian president expressed his enthusiasm
in support of a NEA-NWFZ at the United Nations High-level Meeting on Nuclear
Disarmament in 2013. As can be found in a 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission
document, establishing a nuclear weapon free zone requires initiatives from the states within
the zone.

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Proposal Five:
The year 2015 should be used as an opportunity to begin theprocesses for a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for
Denuclearization of Northeast Asia”.
The year is the 70thmemorial of the end of World War II, atomic bombings on

Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and the division of the Korean Peninsula. The international
community, and especially Northeast Asian nations, should make 2015 the year to beginendeavors towards achieving a “Comprehensive Framework Agreement for Denuclearizationof Northeast Asia”. The CFA will be the foundation for easing tensions and normalizing
relations in NEA and for moving towards a cooperative regional security system.

Proposal Six:
By proposing to establish a NEA-NWFZ, Japan and South Korea
should fulfil their obligations set forth by the 2010 NPT Review
Conference and contribute to maintaining the credibility of the Treaty.
In the new review cycle following the 2010 NPT Review Conference, all State Parties,
including non-nuclear weapon States, have a political obligation to “pursue policies that are
fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear
weapons” (2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document, Action Plan 1). Furthermore,
instead of focusing solely on the reduction of nuclear weapon hardware, the Review
Conference agreed on the need “to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear
weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies”. In this context, theobligations posed upon non-nuclear weapon States relying on extended nuclear deterrence,such as Japan and South Korea, are clearer.

Proposal Seven:
Concerned states should consider establishing an independent
non-governmental “Expert Group for the Denuclearization of Northeast
Asia” so that denuclearization processes will not be influenced by18

administration changes within the concerned states.
Diplomatic negotiations between nations bear difficulties because they could be
influenced by unrelated international incidents, domestic political shifts, or conflicts.
Negotiations regarding the denuclearization in Northeast Asia have not been an exception. It
is, therefore, necessary to construct a device to minimize such negative influences.
Maintaining the wide-ranging public support, just as support by Japanese heads of local
municipality demonstrated, is one meaningful method of doing so. Furthermore, it isnecessary to consider establishing an “Expert Group for the Denuclearization of Northeast
Asia”, which would contribute towards maintaining stable negotiations by working parallel tothe negotiations. Concerned states should agree to establish and support such an “expert
group”.

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