Some Observations, thoughts and a working
perspective for Covid-19 challenges in Japan:
Adaptive governance under high systemic risk

Norio Okada
IDiARRG, Kwansei Gakuin University
Professor Emeritus, Kyoto University
DIJ DWIH Web-Forum 27 May 2020

Covid-19 as it stands
in Japan• https://covid19japan.com/
as of 25 May 2020• c.a. 275.4 thous. Tested
•
•
•

17.3

confirmed(positive)
14.1 recovered
0.856 deaths
4.95% case fatality rate
6.4 deaths per million

in Germany• https://www.worldometers.info/c
oronavirus/country/germany/
last updated 25 May 2020• c.a. 3, 147.8 thou. tested(limited in number)•
180.3 confirmed••

161.2 recovered
8.37 deaths
4.6 % case fatality rate
99.6
deaths per million

What characterizes Japanʼs approach so
far includes• Cluster-focused (prioritized)• Yet-low-level of PCR test cases• (Soft) “State of emergency” was declared at the national government and also at local
governmentsʼ level• “Jishuku” request (voluntary restraint efforts strongly requested by governments,
without legal enforcement and penalties)• Without complete lockdowns (“80%” activity cut efforts strongly requested to eachindividual and corporation by the governments at national and local levels.)• Governmentsʼ (particularly at national level) slow decision and implementation
process to provide quick supports for economic survival measures.

• “Not so impressive(?)” risk/crisis communication capability” by top
national leaders; in contrast with some local governors and mayors wholook much better and confident. (Osaka model, Tokyo alert, Tottori
ʻSMART governance approachʼ(named by Okada), etc.)• Specialistsʼ advisory board (mostly from infectious diseases and publichealth) was set up by the national government. The board takes aninfluential role but there remains room for improvement.
• National governmentsʼ “Criteria for decision-making” are considered so
far not well-formalized or consistent; accountability problems..

But one may argue: so far, Japan is not so bad (orrelatively doing well)in performancehttps://web.sapmed.ac.jp/canmol/coronavirus/death.html• Lower deaths in number and rate
Japan : 4.95 % case fatality rate; 6.4 deaths per million
Germany: 4.6 % case fatality rate; 99.6 deaths per million↓Some specialists say: reasons may include• (Scarcely so far) Avoiding medical care collapses.
↓• Cluster-focused approach works (at least in the initial stage)• Japanese peopleʼs health-and clean-minded culture and attitudes, conformity pressure, etc.
seem to be somehow working (e.g. face-mask effective ?)• Or FACTOR “X”??

My viewpoint and approach• Integrated Disaster Risk Management (and Governance)
IDRiM Society http://www.idrim.org/

Persistent Disruptive
Stressors (PDSs)• Roles of National vs. Regional, Local (Community) Planning andManagement• Participatory Risk Governance (vs. More top-down )• Adaptive Risk Governance (vs. Non-adaptive )SMART GovernanceTwo points to be highlighted•

Roles and Relations of National, Regional, Local
Planning and Management to be redesigned•

Adaptive Governance (SMART ) and Participatory Risk Governanceto be more promoted at more local levels(Community)• □ Policy implications also for Integrated Disaster Risk Governance(e.g. Nankai Trough Mega-earthquake Disaster)• □ How urban planning and design needs to be changed?

Persistent(Catastrophes)
Disruptive
Stressors (PDS)

Climate change
dynamics
Demographic
changeMegadisasterCommunity
SocialchangeInfectious disease(like Coronavirus)

Globalization
8

SMART Governance• Small(er) and Solid (er)• Modest and Multiple• Anticipatory and Adaptive• Responsive and Risk-concerned• Transform (change)
Participatory Governance at regional and local levels
9Spiral dynamics oftransformation
More anticipatory insteadof reactive
https://www.bing.com/images/search?view=detailV2&ccid=teg2fRsy&id=1817086714698073DAAC1153ABE7DD6BD4FA8A41&thid=OIP.teg2fRsy
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75&selectedIndex=0

Question #0
Japanʼs Halfhearted Coronavirus Measures Are Working Anyway
BY WILLIAM SPOSATO | MAY 14, 2020, 4:01 PM FOREIGNPOLICY• Despite indifferent lockdowns and poor testing, Japan seems to be
skipping the worst of the pandemic.
• It is difficult to know if the country has just been lucky or if itʼs a matterof good policy. ??????
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/14/japan-coronavirus-pandemiclockdown-testing/
My point is : we should pay more attention to coping capacity of local
governments and communities: SMART Governance seems to be working
relatively well so far.

(My) Questions: WHYs?
• WHY #1?: Japan is considered “UNPREPARED for this New Coronavirus
affection; less so for Germany?
• WHY #2? : Japanʼs (PCR) tests in number are considered “low” ascompared with Germany, South Korea and other countries• WHY #3?: Japan looks not so bad as far as minimizing the number ofdeaths---- the same with Germany• WHY #4?: Some local governments look doing better in adaptive
governance than the national government.

National government?
• Yes, there seem some policies introduced and constantly revised by thenational government.
• Japanese national governmentʼs approach so far is:reactive, reactive,.. adjustment approach(a very limited (passive and static) type of adaptive management)• Lack of formalization, transparency and accountability.
• Lack of leadership to provide a nation-wide consistent policy directive
endorsed by national roles of coordination and resource redistribution
among regional and local governments and communities.

National government (and the Parliament)
were slow to decide, change and act• Unprepared for this type of special new coronavirus epidemics/pandemics• It seemed there was some lag time that could have been strategically made us of
while China, Korea and Italy were fighting with this pandemics.
• Balancing economy and other high-priority political issues (e.g., Tokyo Olympic 2020)
with coronavirus crisis , which seemed to have delayed their decision• Lack of strong leadership (the central tower) at the national/central level• Japanʼs constitutional and legal systems as constraints(preventing governments from-forcing people to follow their orders )-governmentsʼ monitoring peopleʼs behaviors and privacy

In contrast, some local governments(Osaka, Tokyo, Hokkaido, Tottori, etc. )• they started with reactive but later more anticipatory, proactive
governance. (a good balance of top-down and bottom up strategies ona smaller, self-organized scale )Illustrations and evidence (as of 12 May, 2020 )Some Prefectures are doing better than The National Government

Some local governments and communities tend to be quicker andmore focused than the national government• 28 Feb. : Governor of Hokkaido Pref. Government : the first to declare astate of emergency at Hokkaido Pref. level• (2 March: Prime Minister Abe suddenly requested nation-wide closureof elementary, secondary and senior high schools. )• 19 March : Governments of Osaka Pref. and Hyogo Pref. requested
emergent need to stop inter-prefecture movements for the coming
three holidays (20-24 March).
• (16 April: Prime Minister Abe declared the first version of the state of
emergency )Influencing the national government?

• 5 May: Prime Minister Abe extended the State of Emergency till 30 May. (without any
criteria to judge when and how to stop (exit))• 5 May : Mr. Yoshimura, Governor of Osaka presented the Osaka Model with criteria tojudge when and how to stop (exit)) the administrative request for business sectors tominimize their operations.
• 14 May: Prime Minister Abe relaxed the State of Emergency, possibly with somecriteria to judge when and how to stop (exit))

Influencing the national government?

• 14 May: the Governor of Osaka has declared to remove the Osaka stateof emergency based on the committed criteria.
• 15 May: the Governor of Tokyo is to present the Tokyo Model (“Tokyo
Alert”)• Local governments and the National government seem in (healthy,
democratic?) tension. Hopefully, both could work morecommunicatively from now on.
• Local cultures and peopleʼs behaviors seem to be involved.
• Closer to frontlines and more sensitive and driven to enhance coping
capacity in an integrative manner.

“Osaka Model”:
Criteria for judging if the “Jishuku”(voluntary restraint) request can be relaxed or removed by
the governor of Osaka Prefecture
1. New corononavirus cases (7 day average) not attributable to known
clusters < 10 persons per day
2. Positive rate of those PCR-tested (7 day average) < 7 %3. Number of ICU hospital beds occupied < 60 %.
Based on constant surveillance and data collected
When all of the three criteria are met, Jishuku requests will be relaxed step bystep so as to allow social economic activities to recover gradually.

Tottori Prefectureʼs coping capacity challenged◆Some prior experience with Pandemic 2009H1N1•

Quick awareness and preparation for this Covid-19.

•

21 Jan., Special Headquarter to fight with COVID-18•

Decision to distribute to medical care people face masks stocked fornatural disasters•

20 Feb, Timely arranged a meeting with prospective stakeholders andthey all agreed and acted to rapidly increase the capacity ofaccommodating coronavirus-affected patients in hospitals from 12 to 322
beds (completed on 22 April 2020)•

Only three coronavirus cases (as of 20 May 2020)

Tottori Pref. is to be the first to introduce a drive-through
PCR test system , and also strengthen the ICU ECMO
treatment method.

Germany and Japan Comparison(Ortwin Renn and Norio Okada share the following views.)• Emphasis on Governance (SMART governance Model)• Main Objective: to find the best effective and fair balance between national(federal) and regional (local) level• Four main targets:- The central government should provide the means for local communities todevelop the coping capacity to effectively deal with crisis such as Covid-19- The central government should provide the general guidelines andintervention points (when action is required) but leave it to the local units todecide how to implement and enforce these guidelines.
- The central government needs to have a nationwide monitoring system inplace so that it is informed about the performance of each unit and thegeneral diffusion of the disease- If critical targets are exceeded or local units are unable to issue effective
management measures the central government should be well prepared tointervene and make sure that further spread is prevented

Common Lessons• Invest in resilience not only efficiency• Allow plurality of knowledge and management styles but make sure they all
follow the same rationale• Be sure that decisions about measures include an analysis of positive andnegative side effects (trade-offs)• Be sensitive to local conditions and special circumstances• Rely on an adaptive and inclusive governance structure (SMART model)• Socio-cultural contexts to be well-reflected.

Anyway, itʼs too early to make any concluding assessments• We all are just in the initial co-learning stage to cope with Covid-19.
• It is expected to become decade-long marathon challenges triggered by
Covid-19.
• In Japan, Germany, etc.
• In a local town or community, big cities, prefectural regions, and the nation ofJapan.
• SMART governance under Persistent Disruptive Stressors may serve a usefulworking framework to address this super-systemic risk issues.

Covid-19 Adaptive Marathons series-All Japan, Prefectures, Cities, local
communities…

888553m marathon

http://cdn.amanaimages.com/preview640/1036100001
2.jpg

The Second Wave

All Japan

InteractingA local community
Marathon Systemic
Risk Spiral Paths

The First Wave
JAPANʼs
Coping capacities
http://amanaimages.com/info/infoRF.aspx?S
earchKey=10596000001

GERMANYʼsmatter!

Thank you for your kind attention!

Appendix

How are they related from IDRiM perspctive?
Mega Earthquake and Coronavirus Compared• Nankai Trough Mega Earthquake
Disaster• High uncertainty and complexity• Long-lasting with multiple waves ofshocks(twin or triple mega- shocks conceivable)• Preparedness matters(Not well-prepared.)• Emergency Declaration changes themode of criticality• Enforcement or Adaptive Change of
Peopleʼs attitudes/behaviors(Not by enforcement)• Coping capacity development matters
SMART governance at regional andcommunity levels• COVID-19• High uncertainty and complexity• Long-lasting with multiple waves of shocks• Preparedness matters(Not well-prepared.)• Quarantine and Border control
Tests and Isolation
Emergency Declaration changes the mode of criticality• Enforcement or Adaptive Change of Peopleʼs
attitudes/behaviors(Not by enforcement)• Coping capacity development matters
SMART governance at regional and community levels
30

Negative impact: Covid-19 delaying
Nankai Trough Earthquake Preparedness• https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASN4V6GSHN4QUTIL03R.ht
ml (Asahi Shinbun news April 26, 2020)• 60 percent not yet prepared for designating “pre-disasterevacuation areas” for Nankai Trough Earthquake Disaster• Coronavirus may be delaying the process.

31Types of governance
Conventional
SMART
governancegovernance• Fixed plan of action• Practice to follow• No change of rule
• Uniform and homogeneous• Framework is given• Conventional inertial force• Practice and implementation• Flexible plans of actions to
support• Resilient room for change ofrule• Diverse and heterogeneous• Working framework(hypothesis) to be tested andrevised• Anticipatory and adaptive
dynamics

32

Types of governance
Conventional
SMART
governancegovernance• Stable and determined state• Limited span of time
• Non-systemic risk
environment• Unstable and high uncertain
state• Longer span of time
• Systemic risk environment

33

National government Local government
with local communities• Conventional governance• Bureaucratic sectional
control• Cross-sectional and topdown coordination seemingly
poorly exercised• Conventional combined with
SMART governance• Local autonomy combinedwith participatory
governance• Some prefectural andmunicipal governments
are so far doing well, others
not34

Why are we so slow in removing bottleneck
such as in PCR test upscaling ?
How can we be more anticipatory andadaptive?

35

Organizational bottlenecks blocking
seamless workflows at different levels
Private sector operations

Bypassing A

Entrance
counterLevel 1

Bypassing
B
Level
2

Task 1

Task 2Inquiry
counterLevel 3
Task 3Test
centerDesignatedHospital

Government-run operations
36

A. The national (or local)political leader should own
this wide perspective (landscape)and exercise strong top-down coordination!

37

B. Speedy capacity expansion prepared and exercised foreach task process!
(by making use of the expected time lapse till full capacity )Private sector operations
Bypassing A

Entrance
counterLevel 1

Bypassing
B
Level
2

Task 1

Task 2Inquiry
counterLevel 3
Task 3Test
centerGovernment-run operations
Capacity Capacity
expansion expansion

DesignatedHospital38

C. With a broad perspective in hand, strong political will andpower should be exerted to bypass bottlenecked processes(Sector-based administrators resist to interact with outsides.)Private sector operations
Bypassing A

Entrance
counterLevel 1

Bypassing
B
Level
2

Task 1

Task 2Inquiry
counterLevel 3
Task 3Test
centerGovernment-run operations
Capacity Capacity
expansion expansion

DesignatedHospital39

Remove bottlenecks (step 3)（Small, Middle, Large）
PCR Test cases

Small change at the third bottleneckDo

The second action plan made and implemented :Opening a local restaurant in the former school.

Check
C

D

(step 2)
Small change at the next bottleneck
The action plan as a hypothesis should
be practiced and tested:dcpActionP

Plan(step 1)
Small change at the first bottleneck• Switch from reactive to anticipatory
and proactive

D. Reactive to
Anticipatory(and proactive)
and run withtwo parallel
channels(tracks)• Run on the main tack but set up
another track for another operation duesoon• Become prepared for another mode of
critical situation by making best use of
the time gained before the fist track
operation reaches its full capacity.
• Ready to shift focus to another track
while running on the first track inparallel.
41

Appendix2
My four whys?

42

WHY #1?: Japan is considered “UNPREPARED
for this New Corona virus affection; less so forGermany? What kinds of lessons?
• Anyway, no country was well-prepared; so was Japan.
• How can we switch timely from reactive to more anticipatory,
proactive adaptive approach?
• Why not anticipate and feed-forward our lessons to the next
and one after next virus WAVES (PDSs) in a longer span oftime !
43

WHY #2? : Japanʼs (PCR) tests in number are
considered “low” as compared with Germany,
South Korea and other countries• How can we switch timely from reactive to more anticipatory,
proactive adaptive approach?
• Starting with the cluster approach looked fine in the firststage. But why is it so slow and difficult for Japan to move tothe next stage? - Timely switching to increasing the numberof pcr (and other) tests in parallel with the cluster approach.
• My working hypothesis (adaptive governance) proposed
44

WHY #3?: Japan looks not so bad as far as
minimizing the number of deaths• Quite possibly, it was a kind of “so far viable” strategy intended by the
National Government advised by the “Specialistsʼ advisory board” set
up in March 2020.ned• Citizens seemed quick to enhance Japanʼs health and clean living styles(face masks, washing hands, having space between persons, etc. )Maybe also “conformity culture” prevents infection from spreading..
• Given “request-based order” instead of “legally enforced change ofaction and order.” (and privacy-concerned information management
and legal systems, etc. )• But without enough testing and checking the number of infected people,
can we be so optimistic to go mainly with the current approach?
⇒Definitely, “NO.”45

WHY #4?: Some local governments look doing
better in adaptive governance than the national
government.
• How can we switch timely from reactive to more anticipatory,
proactive adaptive approach?

• It looks so far that SMART governanceworks much better and effective for local
governments and smaller communities.
46Appendix 347

Toyonaka City (Osaka Pref.) officials voluntarily
support the City-run Hospital by making hospitalgown substitutes from plastic hospital gowns
27th April 2020

https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2020042600112&g=soc

Private-sector also joins in adaptive
governance (by forming new partnerships)• A sporty yacht company produces medical gowns• High-tech companies produce high-quality face masks• Tourist-oriented hotels offer idle rooms for light infectedpatients or for medical staff who wish to stay close to their
hospitals and to stay separate from their family members• The list goes on as “viable practices for their survival efforts
as well as for offering urgently needed support.
49

Change request Perfectionism (linear logic)
National government
Local government
Headquarter

Headquarter(Private ‒sector central office)

Local

Bottom-up

Coronavirus
CrisisLocal government
branches, (Local private
sector) and Community

Top-down Central

National government Regional
branches(Regional Private-sector)

Adaptive practice(spiral logic )Bottleneck