当報告の内容は、それぞれの著者の著作物です。
Copyrighted materials of the authors.

タイトル：「東南アジアのイスラームと文化多様性に関する学際的研究 国際ワークショッ
プ『東南アジアにおける文化多様性（３）』」（2012 年度第 2 回研究会（通算第 4 回目））
日時：2013 年 2 月 3 日（日） 14:00-18:00
場所：マルチメディアセミナー会議室（306）
共催：コタキナバル・リエゾンオフィス
使用言語：英語

報告（１）Julkipli Wadi（University of the Philippines, The Philippines）“Reframing Policy, Transforming Struggle: Philippine Dynamics of Identity Formationand Self-determination”
This paper posits that southern Philippines is up for a new context ofmajority-minority relation given the dual or parallel development of government“reframing policy” and the emergence of new mode of struggle in Moro fronts. Suchdevelopment, while aimed to clinch anew a win-win solution in the age-old Mindanao
conflict, inevitably faces new dynamics of identity formation and protracted pursuit ofself-determination. It is shown when the Pnoy Aquino Administration hardly mincedwords to declare that the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is a failed
experiment. The statement was received across political divide with varied reactions
ranging from accolade to disavowal and sheer disagreement. Those who seek politicalchange and reform in the ARMM and envision new structural arrangement in Moroareas praised President Benigno Aquino for his position as Malacanang gears up toestablish new political entity in Bangsamoro areas. Those slighted took it that pastendeavors of governance, development, economic assistance in the ARMM, could just berendered into irrelevance with such too sweeping remarks. Whatever impacts such
position and plan bring, it reveals long-standing government’s propensity of politicalexperiment in Mindanao. If the ARMM is a failed experiment, ergo, the rest of pastpolitical and administrative tiers and pertinent units and offices created, abolished andrecreated anew must also be failed experiments. By extension, too, the “Bangsamoro” aspolitical entity must be an experiment, too, while yet to be chiseled from October 2012
to 2016 and onward into post 2016. In different but related vein, the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) as part of its compromise with Philippine government agreed
in the “Ten Decision Point Principles” that the new political arrangement must be a“secular political entity,” a position that would have been difficult to pass with the MILF
Central Committee had it been offered in the early days of the MILF given its originally“Islamic” orientation. Yet recently, the MILF easily accepts such condition as itreconfigures its politics and strategy and gears up to transform its mode of struggle
from revolutionary to parliamentary. The study examines whether reframing politics ismutually inclusive with new mode of transformative struggle or critical in forging new
relation of identities and the pursuit of re-framed version of self-determination.

報告（２）Abhoud Syed M. Lingga（Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, The Philippines）“The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro: Opportunity to Address Muslim
Minority Problem in the Philippines”
On October 15, 2012 the Philippine Government (GPH) and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB).
The paper attempts to find out if the FAB can provide the opportunity to address thegrievances and the aspiration of the Bangsamoro people for self-governance and what
are the challenges.
As the conclusion, I point out that The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro is aviable compromise that balances the assertions of the Bangsamoro people to their rightto self-determination and the protective assertion of the Government to preserve its
territorial integrity. It provides flexibility for the Bangsamoro to organize institutions
that maybe different from the national institutions. Successful implementation of theAgreement will provide lessons for governments and minorities how to address
territorial self-determination conflicts.

報告（３）Ken Miichi（ILCAA Joint Researcher, Iwate Prefectural University）“Contemporary Social Changes and Cultural Plurality within Muslim Politics: A Case ofJakarta’s Gubernatorial Election in 2012”
Position of Islam has been problematic in Indonesian politics. Political parties havebeen divided by secular nationalist and Islamic parties and tension between them werevery tense during the Sukarno’s era. It has been changed as Islamization proceeded on
the one hand and the unity of Indonesian nation-state (so called Negara Kesatuan
Republik Indonesia: NKRI)

becameaccepted generally on

theotherhand,secular/Islamic state debate had rifted.
However, increasing of religious intolerance in Indonesia has widely reported andconcerned in recent years. In fact there are tens of violent incidents related to religious
differences including attacks against Christian churches, members of Ahmadiyah sects
and more recently Shia school in Madura. A controversial decision to cancel Lady Gaga’s
concert in Jakarta strengthen this image to Western media. In addition, several surveys
showed increasing intolerance among Muslim majority in Indonesia. How can weunderstand plurality and complexity of social and political situations in Indonesia?
This presentation analyzes the Jakarta’s 2012 gubernatorial election in which Islamwas contested. The incumbent candidate Fauzi Bowo (Foke) emphasized its origin as aBetawi, Jakartan native ethnicity, and some of his supporters claimed that the leader
must be a pious Muslim. Because Betawi’s cultural identity is tightly connected withIslam and the rival candidate Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was a less-Islamic Javanese andhis running mate Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) was a Chinese Christian, religious
differences became very important during the campaign. As Jokowi-Ahok won theelection in the end, it was generally considered that religious campaign did not work.
However, it was very slight victory for Jokowi and some areas which Foke won
coincided with Betawi Muslim concentrated areas. Several influential Betawi ulama
clearly supported the incumbent candidate. Foke diligently visited mosques and zikir
gatherings. Jokowi used religious symbols, too, more defensive way. His campaign was
more concentrated to local markets, but he made a symbolical umroh pilgrimage justafter the first round election. Jokowi also visited several Arabic habib religious leadersin order to deny his secular outlook. After the election Jokowi and Ahok wore Betawi’s
folk clothes in order to appeal their closeness to public and probably for reconciliation
with Betawi constituency.
This presentation will analyze results of the gubernatorial election through utilizing
both quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative analysis includes national census,
opinion surveys and detailed election results and qualitative analysis has conducted
through on-going extensive field research. Taking account of changing geographical andsociological settings, the author highlights multi-layered features of contemporary
Muslim politics through the analysis.