AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE FOR DISASTER RESILIENCE

Australian Disaster Resilience Handbook Collection

TOOLKIT 2-3

Toolkit 2-3 Community
recovery case studies

AUSTRALIAN DISASTER RESILIENCEHANDBOOK COLLECTION

Toolkit 2-3 Community
recovery case studies
Toolkit 2-3
Supporting document for the implementation of Australian Disaster
Resilience Handbook 2 Community Recovery (AIDR 2018).
Case studies have been selected based on their utility as learning resources.
Inclusion here should not be taken as an indication that these examples represent
current best practice.

Handbook 2 Toolkit 2-3 Community recovery case studiesi© Commonwealth of Australia 2018 third edition

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Community recovery case studies (AIDR 2018)

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ii

Handbook 2 Toolkit 2-3 Community recovery case studies

Case studies
Case Study 1 – Community led
recoverRenewin’ Strathewen (2009 Black Saturday fires)
Strathewen in Victoria was one of many communities
devastated by the Black Saturday bushfires on 7
February 2009. In this town of 220 people, 27 died and
80 of a total of 120 homes were destroyed.
In the days following the disaster it became clear that
Strathewen had not been specifically highlighted inemergency planning before, during or after the fire.
Residents felt that the media also overlooked the plightof Strathewen, and that they were overshadowed bybigger and better-known locations such as Kinglake
and Marysville. It was clear that government and nongovernment agencies had commenced an enormous
recovery effort and it was felt that a small community
like Strathewen could be subsumed by other disasterrecovery imperatives unless they established a strong
and legitimate Strathewen voice.
Public meetings were held, and a steering group wasestablished to draft a constitution for an incorporated
association. The Strathewen Community Renewal
Association (SCRA) came into existence at a public
meeting on 28th June 2009.
SCRA applied for funding and set up processes toaccount for decisions and expenditures. 'One ofour greatest achievements has been to nurture anunderstanding that all of our residents and those inneighbouring Arthurs Creek whose lives are intertwinedwith Strathewen are part of the same extended fire
affected community. Our association is inclusive; theconstitution recognizes that living through fire is not the
only measure of belonging. There is no them and us …
We’ve strived from the first public meetings to manage
the potential for division by emphasizing a culture ofrespect, equity and consistency in our processes andtransparency in decision-making … Council’s willingness
to accept the uncertainties of a community led recovery,
their flexibility in proceeding at the community’s paceand respect for the SCRA agenda has been fundamental
in creating a very positive working relationship'.
Reference: Strathewen Community Renewal Association
2010, Supporting the recovery, Renewin’ Strathewen
Strathewen, Victoria.

Case Study 2 – Community
development in recovery—
adaptive change
Mackay Community Arts Project (2008 floods)
As part of the long-term recovery process following the2008 Mackay flood, Tropical Population Health Services
initiated a community arts project in collaboration with
the Department of Communities and Mackay Regional
Council. ‘Be kind to your mind … get involved in the arts’
aimed to bring people together, 18 months after the
event, to reflect on their experiences, to acknowledge
the inspiring community response during and after
the flood, and to strengthen individual and community
capacity for responding to and recovering from disasters
and for preparing for future disasters. The project
attracted 455 participants, and 1180 people visited theexhibition spaces.
The project was based on research that suggested
that strategies to engage communities in thinking andreflecting on their experiences after a disaster should
be undertaken at key points in recovery—in the short,medium and long term—and that these strategies should
engage government and community institutions beyond
the traditional welfare sector, especially those concernedwith the arts and the environment.
The community arts approach was chosen because
there is very strong commitment to the arts in Mackay(artists and arts organisations work in visual arts,
crafts, film, theatre, dance and music). Local artists
and arts organisations were invited to participate in a
one-day workshop on the role of the arts in community
recovery and mental health promotion to ensure an
agenda of inclusiveness for a wide range of audiences
and participants. They were then invited to submit anapplication for delivery of a series of sessions in their
particular fields with a focus on working in partnershipwith other artists and with community support services.
Sessions were planned to take place close to areas
most affected by the flood to enable easy access forparticipants. Showcase events were held locally to
attract a wide audience and an exhibition of all works washeld at Artspace. Seven local artists were engaged towork with the community.

Handbook 2 Toolkit 2-3 Community recovery case studies

1Projects included:•

artists working with groups at Beaconsfield,
Walkerston and the Women’s Centre using mixed
media, including pastels, felt, fibre and even recycled
teacups, to create works celebrating the local
neighbourhood and community spirit•

blacksmithing sessions conducted at a property at
Balnagowan•

digital photography sessions at Mackay City and
Gordon White libraries for people interested in using
their personal photographs to create visual stories of
their flood experiences•

production of a short film, Resilience, to show how
people who were affected by the flood have stood
together and emerged stronger from the disaster.

Four of the seven artists organised local showcase
events and all participated in the culminating showcase
at Artspace. Media coverage, including print, television,
radio, and print and electronic community newsletters,
publicised the projects.
One-off projects such as the Mackay Community Arts
Project can assist with the strengthening of individuals
and communities after a disaster and assist withcharacteristics that build resilience. The immediate
impact on individuals that emerged from participant
feedback suggested individual empowerment andcommunity connection; for example:•

Many participants commented on how much easier
it was to talk about their flood experiences while
doing something creative and that the environment/
atmosphere made it feel safe to do so.

•Groups continued to meet after the official end of
the project to further develop their skills— individuals
indicated that they would participate in further art
classes.

•

Participants indicated that they were interested in
becoming volunteers in the community.

Mackay Regional Council libraries had increased
participation in their courses as a direct result of the
project.
More stories of how the creative arts cancontribute to community disaster recovery can befound here: http://placestories.com/community/
creativerecovery#!v=about

Case Study 3 – Communication
within one jurisdiction andmultiple agencies or locations
ACT Bushfire Recovery communication model(2003 Canberra fires)
The ACT Bushfire Recovery communication model, whichreflected the management structure, is an example of astructure set up to support a communications strategy.
The ACT [Australian Capital Territory] Bushfire Recovery
Taskforce, answerable directly to the Chief Ministerof the ACT, was set up within days of the bushfire.

2

Headed by Sandy Hollway, former Canberra resident,
senior Commonwealth public servant and CEO [Chief
Executive Officer] of the Sydney Organising Committee
for the 2000 Olympic Games, it consisted of five otherprominent Canberra people representing the ACT
community sector, ACT business, the ACT Government
and the directly fire-affected community.
The Taskforce was informed by a Community and Expert
Reference Group (CERG) of 15 people representing awide range of interested and affected groups in thecommunity, including business, professional and tradeorganisations, unions, community groups and local
politicians. The Taskforce and CERG were served by
a Secretariat consisting of six functional areas. Oneof the functional areas was the Communications andCommunity Relations Group, which was responsible forthe communication effort. CERG’s advice was channelled
through the Taskforce to the Secretariat for action.
The Secretariat was also able to call on all other ACT
departmental agencies for support and drew staff fromall areas of the ACT public service during the intensive
period in the first months after the bushfire.
Reference: Beckenham A & Nicholls S 2004,'Government communication strategies for community
recovery following the ACT Bushfires, January 2003’,
Australian Journal of Emergency Management, vol. 19, no.
4.

Case Study 4 - Communication
across multiple jurisdictions,
between multiple agencies andlocations
Hume region communication model (2009 Black
Saturday fires)
Another example of a communications strategy, thistime at a regional level in Victoria, comes from the
Hume region. This communication strategy focussed
communications between multiple geographic
communities.
'To support the multiple recovery processes operating
within Hume region after the February 2009 bushfires,it was critical to ensure that responses remained
coordinated; that communication and linkages
between all local, regional and state authorities wasclearly defined; and, that recovery was facilitated in an
integrated manner for all communities, regardless ofboundaries.
'A regional strategic communication model wasdeveloped for all recovery agencies tasked with recovery
in Hume region, inclusive of the interface between theurban or rural fringe and departmental boundaries.
'This model further enhanced the recovery management
process implemented by the Hume Regional Recovery
Committee on 18 February 2009 which was facilitated
and fostered by the Executive Committee through:•Inclusion—bringing together all relevant personnel,
authorities and agencies across all boundaries

Handbook 2 Toolkit 2-3 Community recovery case studies

•

Education—informing people and committees of allparticipant roles and responsibilities

recovery, and 16 water treatment facilities that wereaffected are back in operation.

•

Accountability—ensuring committees can deliver
what they agree to provide.'

Reference: Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction andRecovery Authority, 2009, 100 day report, State
Government of Victoria, Melbourne at https://www.
rdv.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/1203457/
VBRRA_-_100_Day_Report1.pdf.

The communication strategy identified linkages between
the various recovery committees and authorities
operating within Hume region. The strategy also clarified
how each recovery provider could directly or indirectly
communicate with one another and with impacted
municipalities, without replicating process or undermining
existing regional structures.
The Regional Recovery Executive Committee
included representatives from the following: Alpine,
Indigo, Mitchell & Murrindindi Shires; Department of
Sustainability and Environment, Regional Development
Victoria, Department of Primary Industries, Department
of Planning and Community Development, State
Emergency Services, Victoria Police, Country Fire
Authority and Department of Human Services.
Reference: White, K, 2010, Post incident analysis ofrecovery management February 2009 bushfires, Hume
Region, Hume Regional Recovery Committee, Victoria.

Case Study 5 – Psychosocial
impacts on workers
Case studies on the psychosocial impacts on workers
are forthcoming. Case study suggestions are also
welcome.

Case Study 6 - Effects in thebuilt environment—practicalstrategies
Drinking water and waste water (2009 Black
Saturday fires)
After the Black Saturday bushfires on 7 February 2009,
the Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery
Authority worked with local water authorities to ensurethat drinking water and wastewater services weremaintained while damaged systems were returned topre-fire operations.
Many properties in fire-impacted areas use rain watertanks as their primary water supply. In the wake of thefires the Department of Sustainability and Environment,in conjunction with the relevant water corporations,provided free temporary water tanks and cleaning andwater carting services in and around the Kinglake area.
During the recovery phase, access to free reticulated
drinking water was provided at nine locations by
Gippsland Water, Goulburn Valley Water and Yarra Valley
Water at temporary standpipes and community watertanks.
More than 950 properties had their rainwater tanks
cleaned and about 1100 properties received oneoff 5000-litre water carting. Another 14 drinking
catchments are under restoration, rehabilitation andCase Study 7 - Effects in theeconomic environment—indirect
economic impacts
Cyclones Larry and Yasi - economic impacts
including the banana industry (Cyclone Larry 2006
and Cyclone Yasi 2011)
Cyclone Larry crossed the coastline of Far North
Queensland on 20 March 2006 causing widespread
damage to an area of more than 17,000 square
kilometres. The cyclone was reported to have caused
more than $1 billion damage, including about $550 million
in economic damage, $370 million in insurance claims and$216 million in disaster relief payments to councils.
Cyclone Yasi made landfall in Far North Queensland on
3 February 2011, again causing widespread damage toaffected areas and covering a much larger proportion of
Queensland, compared to previous cyclones including
Larry. Due to the size of the cyclone system and its
strong core, Yasi maintained cyclonic intensity further
inland than normal, and finally dissipated near Mount
Isa 22 hours after it first crossed the coastline. Total
losses from the storm are estimated at $3.5 billion, whichmakes it the costliest cyclone to ever hit Australia. By 5
February, $2 billion was confirmed to have been lost in
agriculture, mining and local government. An additional $1
billion was lost in the tourism industry.
A great deal of preparation and public notification took
place in the days prior to both cyclones, enabling someminimisation of property damage and preparations
resulting in the low injury and death toll attributed tothe cyclones. However, the damage to property wasconsiderable and the impact was strongly felt on theeconomy of the region and the lives of its people.
Both cyclones had severe implications for the banana
industry in Far North Queensland and therefore theeconomy of the entire region. Banana growers lost an
estimated 75-100 per cent of their crops in each event.
The industry took at least 12-18 months to return tofull production, and then additional years to sufficiently
recover from economic losses in each case. The
extensive workforce attached to the industry was
severely impacted (for example, the casual workers
who were to harvest the crops, the suppliers of thebagging for the bananas, the packers of the fruit, thetransporters of the fruit). Backpacker workers andother transient/casual workers left the region to findwork elsewhere, which further impacted the economic
stability of the region. Without the workers and othervisitors to the region, many hotels, cafes, restaurants,
retail outlets and tourist attractions were no longer able
to trade at their usual capacities.

Handbook 2 Toolkit 2-3 Community recovery case studies

3

Further impacts were the increased market cost of
the fruit, which had to be sourced from other states orimported. The costs of bananas soared to as much as$15 per kilogram, changing the fruit from an everyday
item affordable to most families, to more of a luxury item.
Both cyclones significantly affected other industries
as well. Cyclone Yasi destroyed 15 per cent of all sugar
crops in Australia (50 per cent in QLD), 20 per cent of
the avocado crop, and approximately 40 per cent of thepawpaw and papaya crops. Additional losses arose fromdamage to pumping stations, roads, bridges and otherinfrastructure. Coal ports were closed for a week at a
cost of $100 milion a day.
‘Employment, a social and community well-being
issue, also became a significant economic questionin supporting the economic viability of the region’.
Businesses and individuals had access to Natural
Disaster Relief Arrangements including concessionalloans. This was accompanied by a variety of employment
support programs, designed firstly to enable employers
to pay a viable wage to their work force and secondly,
under special employment programs to afford
meaningful cyclone recovery related work to theunemployed, notably, those who might have expectedseasonal employment if the cyclone had not intervened.
These employment programs met a dual need—toprovide jobs in the region and to provide a workforce forreconstruction.
A year on, employment in the region had been sustained
despite the impact of the cyclone on the economy andwas once again solid. The impact on primary producers
was severe with banana plantations, sugar cane, dairy,
timber, tree crops, aquaculture and tourism industries all
severely adversely affected. However, after a year the
economy was on a viable and self-sustaining footing,with some sectors such as retail and rental enjoying aboost to their business. Full recovery was considered tobe some way off into the future for many businesses.
Some long-term casualties remain such as producersof tree crops, where trees had been destroyed andnew trees were expected to take a number of years to
produce cash crops.
Further information and analysis undertaken by
Deloittte about the economic costs of the social
impact of natural disasters can be found at http://
australianbusinessroundtable.com.au
Reference: Operation Recovery Taskforce, 2007, The
final report of the Operation Recovery Task Force, Severe
Tropical Cyclone Larry, April 2007, Queensland State
Government, Brisbane.

Case Study 8 - Effects inthe economic environment—
intangible economic impacts
Uncertainty and its impacts—some economic
impacts for Port Arthur (1996 Port Arthur)On Sunday 28 April 1996, 35 people were killed and
22 injured by a gunman in Port Arthur and surrounds.

4

The economic impact of this disaster was significant
for both the state and the Tasmanian municipality. Port
Arthur itself was subsequently closed for three weeks.
Some businesses received additional short-term income
as a result of the media and government department
personnel who came to the area, and the negative impact
was delayed. Other businesses were very negatively
affected, immediately.
The estimated net effect of the loss of approximately
130,000 visitor nights is estimated to have meant$15.6 million less for the Tasmanian economy in 1996.
Around 400 jobs were lost as a result of this downturn
in tourism business. At a regional level, business revenue
was around 28 per cent less during the year after thedisaster. A 28 per cent drop in revenue is approximately$5.32 million or 166 jobs—a significant impact on theregional economy.
The local council recorded an additional $56,000 in
expenses (telephone costs, salaries etc.), which wasa burden on the 2200 permanent residents and ratepayers. The State Government contributed to these
expenses. In addition, the local council attributes someof the subsequent increase in rates to the disaster,although they ‘realised that everyone in the community
was hurting, and … endeavoured to keep any increases
down to a minimum’.
References: Noye, N, 1997, ‘The local government
response to the Port Arthur incident,’ in Port Arthur
seminar papers: a record of the proceedings of the Port
Arthur seminar, 11–12 March 1997, Melbourne, Victoria,
EMA, Canberra.
Wells, M, 1997, ‘The impact of the Port Arthur tragedy
on the regional economy,’ in Port Arthur seminar papers:a record of the proceedings of the Port Arthur seminar,
11–12 March 1997, Melbourne, Victoria, EMA, Canberra.

Case Study 9 - Effects inthe economic environment—
intangible economic impacts
Uncertainty and its impacts—foot and mouthdisease potential impact
The Productivity Commission published a report in 2002
on the potential impact of a foot and mouth disease
outbreak in Australia. In this report they assessed thepotential economic, social and environmental impacts ofa range of scenarios, on the agricultural sector in ruraland regional Australia and on the national economy.
Eradication and control of the disease potentially has anumber of adverse impacts on the natural environment.
These are primarily associated with the disposal ofanimal carcasses. Other natural environmental impacts
could arise from:•the disposal of other livestock products (such as milk)•

widespread use of disinfectants to decontaminate
infected properties•

a reduction in on-farm environmental improvement
measures such as soil conservation, tree planting and

Handbook 2 Toolkit 2-3 Community recovery case studies

salinity reduction arising from decreases in farm cashflow.
The Productivity Commission found that uncertainty
would relate to:•market effects—e.g., how long will markets be closed
and how reflective of next seasons prices are current
prices;•income effects—e.g., the availability of short-term
cash flow and the duration of expected impacts on
cash flow from market closures;•scientific aspects of the disease—e.g., how it started,
how it spreads, the possibility of recurrence, the roleof livestock farmers in the initial outbreak, and therole of livestock farmers and public authorities in the
spread and elimination of the disease; and•governmental effects—e.g., the timing and extent ofassistance and the effectiveness and consistency ofpolicy interventions designed to control the spread ofthe disease.

Uncertainty would be highest early in the outbreak prior
to knowledge about the extent of the outbreak andcontrol measures being established.
References: Productivity Commission 2002, Impact of afoot and mouth disease outbreak on Australia, Research
Report, AusInfo, Canberra, at https://www.pc.gov.au/
inquiries/completed/foot-and-mouth/report.

Case Study 10 - Effects inthe economic environment—
economic impact assessment
Great Divide Bushfires 2006–07, Shire of
Wellington, Victoria
The Socio-Economic Impact Assessment Model for
Emergencies was designed to provide an ‘impact
assessment framework and related templates toanalyse the impact of future emergencies on regional
districts’. To test the model, an analysis was undertakenof the 2006–07 Great Divide bushfires in the Shire of
Wellington, Victoria.
The analysis looked at key costs, benefits and impacts
including:•

direct costs (total $40.8 million) such as
infrastructure, crops and buildings•

indirect costs (total $25.2 million) such as businessdisruption, disaster response and clean up•

intangible costs (total $7.4 million) such as injuries,
cultural and environmental heritage•

benefits (total $7.7 million) such as government andinsurance payments within the shire•

the net cost of the fires to the Shire of Wellington,
which was determined to be approximately $65.7
million.

These figures are used in contexts such as government
budgetary considerations occurring in relation to
mitigation initiatives and risk management strategies.

Reference: OESC (Office of the Emergency Services
Commissioner), 2008, The development of a socioeconomic impact assessment model for emergencies,
OESC, Victoria.

Case Study 11 - Effects in thenatural environment – plants andanimals
Coorong, Lower Lakes and Murray mouth recovery—
the importance of ecosystem function to social,economic and built recovery (drought and water)
The Coorong, Lower Lakes and Murray mouth ecosystem
has suffered drought and long-term impacts due tothe allocation and use of Murray–Darling Basin water
resources in the upper reaches of the river system. Thiscase study demonstrates the role of natural systems
and the services they provide in underpinning economic,
social and built environments.
The region is protected as a Ramsar Wetland ofInternational Importance. It contains a wide range offlora and fauna (including many migratory wading birds
that spend summer in Australia), many of which areendangered or threatened. The area is a popular tourist
destination, and in 2008 approximately 138,000 people
visited the Coorong National Park. Nearly 28,000 people
live in the region, and because a majority of people are
employed in industries that rely on water from the Lower
Lakes, the local economy is heavily dependent on thehealth of the whole Lower Lakes system.
The region and surrounding areas are the central
homelands of the Ngarrindjeri people. Creation
stories about Yarluwar-Ruwe (sea country) reveal thesignificance of the relationship between the country andthe people both physically and spiritually.
The flow-on effects of ecosystem decline in this region
include impacts on the following areas:•

fishing: low water levels prevent commercial fishing—fishers identify that this results in a halving of theirincome and lay off of staff•

agriculture: dairy farmers and graziers have to reduce
genetic breeding livestock, begin feed lotting cattle,
or have bought and carted water—there is now lessemployment on farms (which negatively impacts
town businesses and essential services) and someland managers have sold out, while others haveundergone major changes•

viticulture: local growers and irrigators haveexperienced significant emotional, physical andfinancial strain and job losses with ongoing water
management issues•

business: small businesses and town businesses
report business downturn, and economic andemployment loss (particularly in businesses directly
associated with water activities and tourism) andproperty values decreased•

boating: the boating, tourism and recreation industry
was severely impacted, in some cases with 80 per

Handbook 2 Toolkit 2-3 Community recovery case studies

5

cent loss of business and subsequent businessclosure and loss of employment••

infrastructure: water-based infrastructure (forexample, jetties and pipelines) was ‘marooned’
above the water line and was unable to be used, andinfrastructure was damaged (levy banks damaged bydrying phase, river banks slump, boats stranded on
dry land)health: reported increase in mental health issues
due to economic impacts and an increase in physicalhealth complaints (skin and eye irritation) due tocontact with lake water; concern about increased
mosquitoes; concern about an increase in dust
storms; Indigenous community identified at risk by
medical practitioners•

education: a loss of jobs and families moving out of
the region resulted in a drop-in school enrolment
numbers and a reduction in teaching numbers•

community: increasing demand on community
services; tensions and conflicts between community
groups with competing interests and changes to thedemographics of communities•

environment: native fish translocated then taken
into captive breeding facilities to ensure survival of
the species/populations, lake and river fringe habitat
degraded, change in water quality, exposure of acidsulphate soils, frog species decline, migratory birds
affected.

Reference: DEH (Department for Environment andHeritage), 2010, Securing the future: a long-term plan for
the Coorong, Lower Lakes and Murray Mouth, Department
for Environment and Heritage, Adelaide.

Case Study 12 - Project cycle—
needs assessment
Rapid Impact Assessment
Some states and territories have developed the Rapid
Impact Assessment (RIA) framework/tool to assist
agencies with providing recovery services to affected
communities during the initial stages of an emergency.
The RIA life cycle begins with collecting data about the
impact of an emergency—gathering and verifying thisdata during the first 48 hours of an emergency. Data
includes information on people, residential property,
environment and community infrastructure affected by
the emergency event. RIA provides a standard process
for collecting, collating, analysing and distributing
information for all agencies involved with emergency
response and recovery.
Arrangements for activation vary. Usually, control
agencies can initiate RIA when the size and scale of theemergency requires additional resources for assessmentof the impact of an emergency.
[NB: Specific case studies are welcome to provide
further insight into how this framework has been
implemented in their jurisdiction.]

6

Case Study 13 - Implementationof services/ activities—casemanagement
Canberra bushfire recovery—case management in
the recovery process (2003 Canberra bushfires)
After the 2003 Canberra bushfires, case management
provided an individual or family-level service response,
which was complemented by community work. This
meant that issues reflected in family units could be
responded to with community-wide information, supportand education programs.
In non-disaster circumstances, these interventions areprovided by separate government agencies applying
different criteria. After the Canberra bushfires, casemanagement and community development approaches
were integrated to provide whole-of-community service
to individuals, families and communities. This model
provides dedicated, flexible, accessible and quick service
to people in distress. Pathways were sought for people
through organisational silos, and ‘red tape’ was unravelled
or cut.
Case managers, known as Recovery Workers, provided:•

personal support to individuals, families andcommunity through the recovery process via home
visits, office drop ins and telephone contact•

assessment of the social, emotional, financial
and practical needs of individual, families and thecommunity in the short, medium and long term•

information about services and support available andsmooth access to these services•

advocacy for flexibility in service provision by
government and non-government agencies, anda conduit between affected individuals and the
management structure through provision of
information and feedback on concerns and issues.

Reference: ACT Bushfire Recovery Taskforce, 2003,
The report of the Bushfire Recovery Taskforce, Australian
Capital Territory, Publishing Services for ACT Bushfire
Recovery Taskforce, Canberra.

Case Study 14 - Local community
consultation groups
East Coast bushfires, Tasmania, 2006
This case study provides an example of the nongovernment organisation sector and all three levels ofgovernment working together and with the community.
This approach has now become a common one inaffected communities.
The Affected Area Recovery Committee (AARC) for
the East Coast area of Tasmania was set up to feed
community information to a Community Recovery
Reference Group, which was made up of one community
representative from each of the local communities
affected by the fires. Each of these representatives

Handbook 2 Toolkit 2-3 Community recovery case studies

engaged with and represented their local communities.
The AARC identified that the local government involved
had been stretched. The AARC wanted to provide
resources to support leadership of the community
recovery.
A Disaster Recovery Coordinator (DRC) was appointed toprovide executive support to facilitate priorities for theCommunity Recovery Reference Group and to feed backinto the AARC. This position was:•funded through Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery
Arrangements•

supported by local government through provision of
an office and administrative support•

under the auspice of the Australian Red Cross.

Advantages of this model are that the:•DRC can be someone the community can trust to
articulate its concerns to the AARC (dependent on
the selection process for the position)•

Where the DRC comes from outside the region, they
are less likely to represent one locality within thatparticular local government•

DRC can bring disaster recovery and community
development experience, including the recognition
that the community might not want to replace (ormight not be best served by replacing) what wasthere before•

DRC can be established early in the recovery
operation and can then transition out of the role toenable local facilitation of the Community Recovery
Reference Group and the recovery process.

Case Study 15 - Cultural andspiritual factors
Social recovery via a regional arts project (Cyclone
Ului 2010)
Tropical Cyclone Ului crossed the Queensland coast
just north of Mackay in March 2010. It tracked acrossthe coast and was caught in the hinterland at the small
township of Eungella. The immediate effects were thatup to 50,000 households were without electricity foras many as 12 days. This area was flooded two years
previously, so the community was anxious about theevents that occurred.
After initial assistance measures, including support fromlocal nongovernment organisations, the emergenceof a group of people who were homeless or at risk of
becoming homeless was identified. The medium-term
activity included the partnering of two organisations(Red Cross and Lifeline) to case manage this group, to
expedite any rebuilding with them and to engage with thecommunity in relation to its experiences of the cyclone.
This engagement occurred primarily through women’sarts and crafts groups and some one-off visits to small
townships for lunch at local hotels. The partnership of
the two organisations received a regional arts grant,with the support of the local council, to continue anarts project within the community. This case study

illustrates community development that started withthe emergence of a small group of people at risk ofhomelessness and developed into a regional arts projectthat ran until December 2010.
Through development of a multi-agency management
group and engagement with the council, the community
is better prepared for coming cyclone seasons andsupport has been offered to a variety of groups andpeople to continue to assist their recovery.

Case Study 16 - Donated goods
and services and material aid
Black Saturday and pallets of toothbrushes (2009Black Saturday Fires)
Immediately after the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires
in Victoria, 25,000 pallets of material aid were donatedand delivered to metropolitan Melbourne. Semi-trailers
and individuals arrived in the fire-affected areas, having
driven from interstate, and on arrival looked for foodand accommodation—and warehousing and materials
handling equipment to offload the goods. The donatedgoods were not sorted or categorised.
The role of the media in relation to material aid cannot
be underestimated, but they can provide a conduit for
misinformation or ill-informed requests for goods. A
caller to a radio station stated that no toothbrushes wereavailable. Later that day 25 pallets of toothbrushes—orapproximately 100,000 pieces— were donated. It took 18
months to distribute them even though these items wererequired immediately after the event.
National guidelines for managing donated goods havenow been endorsed (2011) and are a useful guide to theprocess and how to address related issues.

Case Study 17 - Principles
of ecologically sustainable
development
Ecologically sustainable development and marinepests
In the case of marine pest incursions, pests often
become established before they are detected, andin most cases, they are unable to be eradicated.
There is normally no concept of recovery. In certain
circumstances, pests may be detected early, or may
be confined within a restricted area, which enables
eradication to be attempted. When implementing
interventions for marine pest incursions, public benefits
should be maximised, and intervention not applied unlessthere is a clear case (or likelihood) that benefits exceed
costs.
An example of a marine pest in Australia is the incursionof black striped mussels into the Port of Darwin. Someinterventions (for example, the use of poison or biocide
to kill the mussels) will result in collateral environmental
damage for which there may be a recovery process.

Handbook 2 Toolkit 2-3 Community recovery case studies

7

Long-term effects of serious marine pests (which areusually prolific ecosystem engineers) are normallyan irreversible change in the ecosystem community
structure and lead to the formation of a new orderof biological assemblage (pers. comm., John Barker,
Marine Policy Officer, Department of Sustainability andEnvironment Victoria, 8 March 2011).

Water: run off from the fire entered street drainsthat went under a primary school and led towards
the Helena River. Damming of drains protected theriver during the incident. Hundreds of thousands oflitres of contaminated water had to be pumped fromdrains after the fire and all drains had to be thoroughly
decontaminated.

Case Study 18 - Guiding
questions and principles ofnatural environment recovery—
treat risks

Ground water: the firefighting water, contaminated withchemicals, sank into the ground water. A significant
monitoring program over a number of years determined
the spread of the three ground water contamination
plumes, which were heading towards the river. About nine
years after the fire, a reactive membrane was installed tointercept the plume and protect the river.

An action to treat risks—and the benefits of action(2005 Eyre Peninsula fires)
During the Eyre Peninsula bushfires of 2005, loss offences led to stock encroaching on areas of native bushthat were environmentally sensitive. The issue wasmanaged by re-establishing fences to contain and lookafter stock. A side benefit of this quick action was that itprovided protection for native vegetation.
Later in the recovery process agreements and a grants
program were put in place between the Departmentof Environment and Heritage and local communities tofence off heritage areas specifically to protect the native
vegetation.
[NB: Additional case studies from other jurisdictions arewelcome to provide further insight.]

Case Study 19 - Guiding
questions and principles ofnatural environment recovery—
communicate and consult
Bellevue hazardous waste fire, 2001
The hazardous waste facility fire at Bellevue, Western
Australia, on 15 February 2001 has been described as
the biggest hazardous materials fire in Australian history.
Hundreds of thousands of litres of mixed hazardous
waste were burned. The dense smoke plume rose into
the sky and travelled towards the central business
district of Perth. Residents were evacuated. More than
two million litres of water were applied to extinguish thefire.
During the fire decisions had to be made to manage
environmental impacts and recovery. Initial clean-up
costs were about $5.6 million.
Air: air monitoring was not possible during the fire;
however, air-monitoring units were set up around thesite in the days after the fire to determine the hazards
to public health. Swabs were taken of nearby properties
to test for contaminated fall out. Significant community
concerns arose relating to possible contamination.
Testing of soils, sheep wool and other environmental
media was undertaken over an extended period.

8

Soil: a large amount of contaminated soil was removed
from the site and surrounds, and a large contaminatedsite investigation was undertaken to determine any risks
and limitations on land use.
Waste: a specialised drum shredding and waste
collection machine was designed and constructed. Six
months after the fire, the drums were processed, and thewaste encased in concrete, painted in impervious paintand disposed of in a class 4 landfill.
Social impacts: there was significant and extended
media coverage and a resultant stigma to the suburb
name. A Parliamentary Inquiry was conducted and madenumerous recommendations. A dedicated Pollution
Emergency Response Unit was set up to monitor air
emissions during hazardous materials incidents. A healthregister was set up for those possibly exposed to thefire.
Economic impacts: the company received the majority ofPerth’s hazardous liquid wastes. The only other facility
was shut down by the government in 2003, resulting in
waste having to be transported at least 800 kilometresfor disposal. Property values in the suburb were affected.
Increased regulation of hazardous waste and chemicalindustries was introduced.
Reference: Four Corners, 2002, ‘Too hot to handle’,Australian Broadcasting Corporation, at www.abc.net.
au/4corners/stories/s478800.htm.

Case Study 20 - Naturalenvironment recovery
Natural environment recovery - Lower Eyre
Peninsula fire, 2005
Bushfire on 11 January 2005 burned more than 83,000
hectares in one day, crossing from one side of Eyre
Peninsula to the other and consuming nearly everything
in its path. Tragically, nine lives were lost. More than
42,000 livestock perished, more than 90 homes weredestroyed, and nearly $17 million worth of primary
production was lost. The total estimated cost was morethan $100 million.
The Department of Primary Industries South Australia(PIRSA), along with a major collaborative approach acrossgovernment and community, responded to the needs ofHandbook 2 Toolkit 2-3 Community recovery case studies

the community with an organised, prepared and equipped
response team with established protocols, systems andpersonnel. PIRSA responded to the immediate needs ofprimary producers and landholders. Teams immediately
assisted landholders in assessing stock and destroying
animals. Local livestock agents were quick to coordinatetransport and agistment for surviving animals.
The Minister for Primary Industries offered grants ($2million in total) to assist landholders in paying immediate
costs, and funds were made available within 24 hours of
their announcement. Within two days of the bushfire, thehot north winds returned, and the second major issue
arose with extreme wind erosion events moving soil fromthe exposed land. In the short- to medium-term recovery
phase, landholders were overwhelmed with the list ofthings to do to prepare their properties for the return ofagisted livestock and the coming cropping season. They
were also dealing with the emotional and physical traumaof the fire.
State government agencies provided a comprehensive
range of support. ‘Getting started’ workshops weredelivered within the first month after the bushfire.
These focused on preparation for return to productive
agriculture as well as rebuilding. Information assisted
landholders to think about the opportunities, not thelosses (rethinking fencing locations, reassessing
livestock priorities, managing biodiversity return).
According to participants, the most valuable elementof the workshops was ‘looking after yourself and yourfamily’. While working with response and recovery,a long-term re-establishment support program wasdeveloped.
In a collaboration between PIRSA, the Eyre Peninsula
Natural Resources Management Board, Department
for Environment and Heritage, Department of Water,
Land and Biodiversity Conservation and the AustralianGovernment, a two-year program of support wasdeveloped and funded through the state government andNatural Heritage Trust Program. The package recognised
the potential opportunity to increase sustainability,
viability and resilience of the affected communities. The
program focused on providing a facilitated approachto assist landholders in their longer term, strategicplanning while recognising the continued levels of stressand trauma. Grants to assist landholders to develop abusiness plan and access grants to implement projects
to assist in long-term sustainability and viability werealso available.

Case Study 21 - Naturalenvironment recovery
Restoring the landscape—the Goulburn Broken
region, 2009 (2009 Black Saturday fires)
Over 400 separate fires burned across Victoria on andaround 7 February 2009, on what became known asBlack Saturday. A total of 255,417 hectares were burnedand 173 lives lost. Over 2100 homes were damaged,leaving over 7000 people homeless.

The Goulburn Broken catchment covers 2.4 million
hectares from just north of Melbourne to the Murray
River. The catchment has dry-land agriculture, intensive
irrigation and public land, and is home to more than
200,000 people, including major urban centres at
Seymour, Benalla and Shepparton. The region was
severely affected by the Black Saturday fires. The
aftermath of the fire posed a serious challenge to theability of the catchment community and agencies
responsible for natural resource management to deal
with the assessment, planning and restoration of thefire-affected areas.
Responding to the fire, identifying the assets destroyed
or at risk on private land and waterways, and developing
response plans was the task confronting the Goulburn
Broken Catchment Management Authority (GBCMA),
along with its partner agencies in private and public
land management. At the core was the need to rebuild
engagement with the community and to start thelong process of restoring ecosystem function. In
the immediate post-fire period the main task was toreconnect with the community and to begin the job ofreinstating critical assets on public and private land.
GBCMA worked with state and federal agencies to getfinancial support for the recovery program.
The Community Environment Fire Recovery Coordinating
Committee was established with representatives from all
the agencies and groups contributing to the fire recovery
effort to coordinate the natural resource management
recovery work. Landcare networks and groups and theDepartment of Primary Industries (DPI) were the first to
engage with the communities. In the post-fire period DPI
and Landcare ran a series of field days on issues thatwere foremost in the minds of landholders. These were
held at strategic locations across the burned area tomaximise the opportunities for community participation.
These were the catalyst for the later rapid uptake ofworks on private land. Landcare groups and support
staff coordinated the volunteer clean-up program. The
Landcare groups assisted agency staff to advise andimplement service delivery opportunities. They werea critical conduit for information flow to and from thecommunity, and in engendering community support
for operational tasks. Landcare was at the forefront,
managing some very sensitive issues around illegal
clearing and providing much-needed leadership.
The coordinating committee focused on urgent
rehabilitation works prior to the onset of winter, and thenon specific flora and fauna requirements (for example,
assessing impacts on fire-sensitive plant species, andre-establishing nesting boxes for possums). A major
focus was on controlling the impacts of pest plants
and animals, as the fire opened up vast areas of new‘invade-able’ land. In the 12 months after the fire, morethan $6 million was committed to recovery operations.
All landholders in the burned area were contacted or hadaccess to specialist advice and community support.
More than 800 hectares of critical habitat has
been protected and works have been carried out totranslocate or create critical elements of habitat for
15 threatened species. Weed control has been carriedout on 400 hectares. Some 500 volunteers assisted

Handbook 2 Toolkit 2-3 Community recovery case studies

9more than 50 landholders to address immediate issues
such as fence recovery, tree planting, woody weed
control, erosion control and nesting box installation.
The magnitude and rapidity of the response was only
possible because of the investment in human and social
capital in the catchment. The recovery program has been
funded through Landcare, Caring for Our Country andstate government programs.

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Handbook 2 Toolkit 2-3 Community recovery case studies

www.aidr.org.au

Australian Disaster Resilience Knowledge Hub
www.knowledge.aidr.org.au