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Role and Problems of the Scientific Committee of theInternational Whaling Commission in terms of Conservation andSustainable Utilization of Whale Stocks
Joji MORISHITA1 and Dan GOODMAN2
1

Fisheries Agency, Government of Japan
1-2-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8907, Japan
2
The Institute of Cetacean Research
Toyomi Shinko Bldg., 5F, 4-5 Toyomi-cho, Chuo-ku, Tokyo 104-0055, Japan

Abstract
The deep philosophical and political divisions between the International Whaling Commission(IWC) member countries that support managed whaling activities and those opposed to any harvestingof whales has caused a seriously dysfunctional situation at the IWC. The IWC Scientific Committee,
reflecting the division of the whole organization, has been failing to provide consensus scientific advice
on important whale conservation and management issues. Strong personal positions on the issues related
to whaling, the influence of national government positions on scientists and advocacy have polarized
the debates within the Scientific Committee. Scientific uncertainty and the precautionary approach haveoften been misused to promote anti-whaling positions. Furthermore, considerable effort and energy havebeen spent collecting as many names as possible on working papers to demonstrate that many share acertain view with the original author. This voting-like practice gives a false impression that a larger
number of co-authors means a greater plausibility of the views expressed. This dysfunctional situation
not only prevents proper conservation and sustainable utilization of whale stocks but also sets a bad
precedent for other natural resource management issues. The Scientific Committee and its advice are
becoming increasingly irrelevant to decisions regarding the management of whales and it is legitimate
to ask whether under current circumstances it is even needed. However, science has never been the realissue behind the dispute. Unless the Commission and its member governments change their institutionalized dysfunctional discourse and procedures, it is naive to expect outputs from the Scientific Committee that are useful for the sustainable use and management of whale resources in accordance with theobjectives of the ICRW.
Key words: the International Whaling Commission (IWC), Natural resource management,
Precautionary principle, Scientific uncertainty, Sustainable utilization, Whaling

1. Introduction
Article V(2) of the 1946 International Convention
for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW)(1) requires that
regulations adopted by the International Whaling
Commission (IWC) shall, inter alia, be based on scientific findings. However, it has been argued (Iino &Goodman, 2003) that ‘it is in large measure the failure
by the majority of the IWC members to comply withthis Article of the Convention in good faith that hascaused the current dysfunctional situation of the
IWC.’
The purpose of this paper is to focus more closelyon the current situation within the Scientific Committee and a number of specific issues as they relate to
Global Environmental Research9(2)/2005: 157-166
printed in Japanthe attempts by anti-whaling members of the IWC toprevent the sustainable utilization of whale resources.
In doing so, we examine the adoption of the moratorium on commercial whaling in 1982 without advice
from the Scientific Committee that such a measure
was required for conservation, the development of the
Revised Management Procedure and its application to
North Pacific minke whales, the adoption of sanctuaries that prohibit whaling irrespective of the status ofstocks, and changes in the membership and focus of
the Scientific Committee whose agenda dissociatedthe Committee’s work from science and its primaryobjective related to the provision of management
advice for the sustainable utilization of whales.
On all of these issues, we agree with Aron (2001)©2005 AIRIES

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J. MORISHITA and D. GOODMAN

that ‘the role of science in its [the IWC’s] decision
making has been generally ineffective’ and with
Heazle (2004) that ‘science and its various shortcomings have never been the real issue behind the IWC’svarious disputes and policy decisions.’ We also sharethe concerns expressed by Butterworth (1992) at ‘theuse of alleged scientific concerns as a surrogate rationale for this [animal rights] standpoint’ and that, ‘ifscience is manipulated or rendered irrelevant on issues
where public emotion can be tapped, it will simultaneously become redundant on less emotive environmental issues, to the detriment of long-term conservation.’

2. Background
2.1

The ICRW
The purpose of the ICRW as set out in the lastparagraph of its Preamble is ‘…to provide for theproper conservation of whale stocks and thus makepossible the orderly development of the whaling industry.’ The Preamble also notes that ‘it is essential
to protect all species from further overfishing’ and that
‘whale stocks are susceptible of natural increases if
whaling is properly regulated.’
In order to meet the objective of the Convention,
and with particular reference to science, Article V empowers the IWC to adopt regulations with respect tothe conservation and utilization of whale resources
which must be based on scientific findings and, Article VIII provides that ‘notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention’ special permits may by issued for the killing of whales for scientific purposes.
Taken together, it is clear that what have now become
the primary two paradigms for those involved with the
management of living resources, that is, consistent
application of the fundamental principle of sciencebased policy and rule making and sustainable use,(2)were already in the minds of the drafters of the ICRW
almost 60 years ago.
2.2 Brief review of historical developments
At the outset, however, the IWC did little to prevent or slow the overfishing of whales, particularly in
the Antarctic (Tonnessen & Johnsen, 1982). Scientific advice in the 1950s urging lower quotas was opposed by the majority of members who were all whaling nations and this eventually led to the collapse of
Antarctic stocks. The dozen or so scientists who
participated in the Scientific Committee during thisperiod were well-known whale biologists but there
were no scientists from the rapidly evolving field of
population dynamics and abundance estimation (Aron,
2001). The resulting scientific uncertainty concerning
the status of stocks meant that there were no compelling arguments for reducing catches at the expense of
the whaling industries (Heazle, 2004).
In 1960, the IWC set up an independent Committee of Three (later Four) Scientists to provide advice

on quotas for whaling in the Antarctic. However, as
Aron (2001) has noted, ‘the Commission’s use of the
BWU (Blue Whale Unit) as its basic management tool
makes it clear that regulations were designed more tocontrol oil production and for the convenience of thewhaling fleets than to conserve whales’. Notwithstanding the recommendation of the Committee ofThree in 1963 that it be eliminated, the BWU
remained as the Commission’s management tool until
1972.
A turning point for whale preservation came with
the nearly unanimous adoption of a resolution callingfor a ten-year moratorium on commercial whaling at
the United Nations Stockholm Conference on the
Human Environment in 1972. The moratorium issue
was on the agenda for the Scientific Committee meeting immediately following the Stockholm Conference;
however, the Scientific Committee agreed by consensus that a blanket moratorium could not be scientifically justified (IWC/24/4R in: Report of the International Whaling Commission, 24th Meeting, London,1972).
However, in 1982, and with a substantial increasein new non-whaling membership, the Commission
decided that beginning with the 1986 coastal season
and the 1985/86 pelagic season and thereafter, catch
limits for commercial whaling were to be zero. This
provision which was subject to review by 1990, and iscommonly referred to as the IWC’s moratorium oncommercial whaling, was adopted without advice
from the Scientific Committee that such a measure
was required for conservation purposes. The primary reason given by those who supported adoptionof the moratorium in 1982 was the uncertainty concerning the status of the whale stocks and the effectsof continued catches.
2.3 Scientific committee membership, agenda andmodus operandi of science in the IWC
In 1976, 29 scientists representing eleven countries
and one intergovernmental organization participated in
the annual meeting of the Commission’s ScientificCommittee. The agenda for this meeting consistedof 21 items primarily focused on the status of stocks
and providing advice to the Commission on quotas forwhaling (IWC/28/2 in: Report of the International
Whaling Commission, 28th Meeting, London, 1976).
In contrast to this, the 2004 meeting of the ScientificCommittee was attended by 202 scientists from 30
member countries and eight international organizations, and included 41 ‘invited participants’ and one
representative from a non-governmental organization.
The 26-item agenda for the 2004 meeting included
numerous items which are regarded by approximately
half of the IWC member countries as outside of theCommission’s mandate such as small cetaceans, DNA
testing, environmental concerns, whalewatching,bycatch in fisheries and ship strikes (IWC/56/Rep 1
Annexes A and B1). These items are regarded asRole and Problems of The IWC Scientific Committee

being outside of the Commission’s mandate sincenone of the articles of the ICRW provide authority for
the Commission to deal with them.
This drastic change in the Scientific Committee
took place over a number of years, beginning with therecruitment of additional Commission members withan anti-whaling position in the late 1970s and coincided with the intentional insertion of increasing
equivocation in the scientific advice. This movement away from unanimous advice on importantscientific matters essentially left the Commission in aposition of having to make political rather than science-based decisions. Reports of the Scientific Committee clearly show a progression from unanimous
advice on the abundance estimates of whale stocks
and quota recommendations to the presentation ofminority views by a small number of scientists andfinally to statements of ‘some members’ and ‘othermembers.’ While in most cases, the expression ofdifferent or minority views are considered as a normal
and helpful part of scientific debate, in this case theminority views were presented only to prevent
scientific consensus which would support utilizationof whales.
Other problems occurred because, as Gulland(1988) noted ‘some people opposed to whaling largely
for ethical reasons have not been wholly objective intheir use of science. As passions rose in the IWC,
there were a number of participants who were selective in the data they used and the interpretations they
made.’ And of course the difficulties in dealing withuncertain data were exacerbated by strong personalphilosophies, which in some cases were influenced bynational positions (Aron, 2001).
These views have been confirmed by Butterworth(1992) who interpreted these problems as stemmingfrom ‘a debate in the IWC between some countries
wishing to preserve industries, employment and afood source based on whales, and others wanting theseanimals classed as sacrosanct’ within the context of aConvention which requires that the debate be conducted in a scientific guise, so that these hidden agendas have had to be played out in the Scientific Committee.
All of these problems have severely hampered theability of the Scientific Committee to provide management advice to meet the objectives of the Convention.
Unfortunately, these tendencies have become institutionalized as demonstrated in the following sections of
this paper.

3. Problems
3.1 Scientific uncertainty: from the new management procedure to introduction of the moratorium
The New Management Procedure (NMP) adopted
in 1974 and implemented for the 1975-1976 whaling
season was the first systematic attempt to place the159

management of whaling on a scientific basis with theaim of ensuring sustainability (Cooke, 1995). The
NMP was a set of rules for classifying stocks andsetting quotas for those stocks of whales which could
be exploited.
While the intention was that no stocks would be
depleted to below their MSY levels, arguments ofuncertainty in the science coming from the ScientificCommittee eventually led the Commission, with its
newly increased membership to proclaim the NMP
unworkable. In the view of some scientists the maindifficulty in applying the NMP was that there wereinsufficient data for its implementation, that for moststocks there was no reliable estimate of population
size or MSY or the relationship between the current
population and the MSY level and that there were no
guidelines as to how to cope with these uncertainties(Cooke, 1995).
From simulation of a whale population withcatches set according to the NMP, Cooke (1995) concluded that from both the conservation point of viewand the industry’s perspective, the NMP would not be
expected to perform well in the long term. He suggested that one of the main problems is that thevariances associated with population estimates meanthat there is always considerable uncertainty about thestate of the stock and that the NMP does not handle
this uncertainty in a robust way. Essentially, Cooke’s
arguments gave the anti-whaling members of theCommission a basis to say that because of these uncertainties the Commission was unable to set quotas
and at the same time ensure conservation of whale
stocks.
A quite different view of the NMP was held byother scientists including Aron who acknowledgedthat the uncertainties in the science related to the NMP
surfaced early in its application but noted that thiscoincided with a rapid increase in IWC members having strong anti-whaling sentiments (Aron, 2001). He
suggested that ‘The NMP, unlike the [later] Revised
Management Procedure (RMP), did not explicitly takeerrors into account in its formulation; however, ingenerating critical numbers, the low end of the estimates was selected to minimize the consequences oferror. Also the terms of the NMP were, by themselves, very conservative. The big problem was lessthe data issue, which was solvable, but more the factthat the NMP permitted whaling. This is the realissue of the RMP as well.’(3)This view is supported by the fact that more than
20 years after the moratorium was adopted as a temporary measure it remains in place despite advice
from the Scientific Committee that some stocks can besustainably harvested and despite the Commission’s
adoption of a risk-averse method (RMP) for calculating catch quotas developed by the Scientific Committee.
The net effect of these problems was that by theearly 1980s, the Scientific Committee was unable to160

J. MORISHITA and D. GOODMAN

reach a consensus on recommendations for classification and catch limits of stock subject to commercial
whaling (Kirkwood, 1992). This uncertainty in thescience related to application of the NMP was the primary reason quoted by those who supported the adoption of the moratorium on commercial whaling in
1982. In other words, the Commission’s main reason
for introducing the moratorium on commercial whaling was the argued inadequacy of the scientific database for harvesting whale populations without exposing them to undue risks (Butterworth, 1992).
As Gulland (1988) noted, ‘The moratorium neverhad much scientific backing because, even more thanold measures like the Blue Whale Unit, it makes no
distinction between stocks; some would be clearlyendangered by continued whaling at any level, while
we have no accurate assessment for others of how
many could be safely taken. For a few, such as Antarctic minke whales, it is clear that whalers could takesubstantial quantities for a period without damage tothe stocks even though we do not know the maximum
sustainable yield accurately.’
Gulland (1988) suggests therefore that while many
people welcomed the adoption of the moratorium as a
final end to whaling and a great victory for conservation, ‘if conservation means ensuring that catches are
kept within reasonable bounds, and that depleted
whale stocks are allowed to recover, the main victories
had been won earlier’ and that ‘if conservation meansa sensible balance between the current use of a resource, and conserving it for possible use in the future,
the moratorium was hardly a major victory. Some,myself [Gulland] included, consider it a setback.’
3.2 The Revised Management Procedure (RMP)
Following the adoption of the moratorium, the Scientific Committee began work on the development ofan alternative to the NMP for managing whaling withthe following three objectives:(i) stability of catch limits, which would be desirable for the orderly development of thewhaling industry;(ii) acceptable risk that a stock not be depleted
below some chosen level so that the risk ofextinction of the stock is not seriously increased by exploitation.
(iii) making possible the highest continuing yieldfrom the stock.
The alternative procedure was called the Revised
Management Procedure (RMP). Its development
involved extensive simulation testing of five different
proposed procedures to assess performance over awide range of possible scenarios and to compare robustness with that of the NMP even in the face of considerable uncertainty about the dynamics of whale
stocks (Kirkwood, 1992; Cooke, 1995). Cooke(1995) points out that the procedure is precautionaryor risk-averse, in that it specifically takes into accountuncertainty related to factors such as possible errors in

population abundance estimates and possible impactsof environmental changes. The application of the
RMP is further precautionary in two ways, as agreed
by the Commission in 1991 (IWC Report of the 43rd
Annual Meeting, 1991 Appendix 4, Resolution on the
Revised Management Procedure): (i) the tuning
level is set at 0.72 meaning that after 100 years ofcatches based on quotas derived by the RMP, thepopulation remains at 72% of its pre-exploitation level
and, (ii) no quotas are provided for stocks below 54%of their pre-exploitation level.
The Scientific Committee completed most of its
work on the RMP at its meeting in 1992 and unanimously recommended adoption of the draft specifications. These were accepted by the Commission (IWC
Report of the 44th Annual Meeting, 1992- Appendix 3,
Resolution on the Revised Management System).
Then, in 1993, the Scientific Committee completed
the RMP and again, unanimously recommended its
adoption by the Commission.
However, theCommission failed to adopt the RMP in 1993, and that
resulted in the resignation of the Chairman of the
Scientific Committee.(4) In his letter of resignation, theChairman, Dr. Philip Hammond of the U.K. said, ‘ofcourse, the reasons for this [RMP not adopted by theCommission] were nothing to do with science,’ and,‘what is the point of having a Scientific Committee if
its unanimous recommendations on a matter of primary importance are treated with such contempt.’
As a further condemnation of the Commission’s action,
Hammond concluded, ‘I can no longer justify to myself being the organizer and spokesman for a Committee whose work is held in such disregard by the bodyto which it is responsible.’ Strong condemnationindeed.
Finally, the Commission did adopt the RMP at its
meeting in 1994 (IWC Report of the 46th Annual
Meeting, IWC Resolution 1994-5, Resolution on the
Revised Management Scheme). Although the RMP
has been applied to North Atlantic minke whales andto North Pacific minke whales, quotas have not been
implemented by the Commission and the moratorium
remains in place. There are however serious difficulties within the Scientific Committee in relation to
RMP implementation as illustrated by the case of
North Pacific minke whales, which took more than ten
years to complete.
3.3 Revised Management Procedure (RMP) forNorth Pacific minke whales
In addition to the long and unnecessary delays indeveloping and agreeing on appropriate simulations
trials, one of the major problems with the ScientificCommittee’s work on RMP implementation for North
Pacific minke whales was the decision in the final
stage in 2003 to assign equal plausibility to stock
structure scenarios not supported by data with thescenario supported by data.(5) While considerationof hypothetical stock structures is a valid strategy forRole and Problems of The IWC Scientific Committee

research purposes it is inappropriate for management
purposes in cases where there are stock structure scenarios strongly supported by scientific data. In otherwords, one could ask why it is necessary to collect thedata when the resulting science is given equal plausibility with a pure speculation without supportingdata.
The long delays (10 years) were simply part of astrategy to postpone deriving a quota to allow commercial whaling and had little to do with science,
whereas the decision concerning plausibility of various stock structure scenarios was simply anti-science.
This is particularly so given the fact that the RMP is afeedback system that allows for corrections to bemade in the way it is applied if additional data become
available.(6) The outcome of this decision was thatmost members of the Scientific Committee recommended an RMP variant that provided a quota of
about 135 minke whales. However, because of theway that the RMP assigns quotas to what are called‘small areas,’ the result was that almost all of this
could only be taken in offshore waters. For Japanese
coastal whalers this was problematic since these offshore waters were beyond the traditional coastal whaling area.(7) This process suited the political interests ofanti-whaling members of the IWC (Goodman, 2003)
since it meant that an unreasonably small quota wasprovided for an area that was operationally difficult
for the whalers and therefore unlikely to be utilized.
3.4 Review of sanctuaries
In 1979, the IWC adopted the Indian Ocean Sanctuary and in 1994, the Southern Ocean Sanctuary.
As with the moratorium, both were adopted without arecommendation from the Scientific Committee thatthey were required for conservation reasons. Most
recently, the Southern Ocean Sanctuary was reviewed
by the Scientific Committee at its meeting in 2004.
In addition to the problem of scientists simply presenting arguments in favor or against sanctuaries in support of the political positions of their governments on
this issue, there is also a serious problem within the
Scientific Committee concerning the criteria used to
conduct its reviews of sanctuaries (Goodman, 2003).
At issue is an instruction to the Scientific Committee contained in a resolution adopted by the Commission at its 2002 meeting (IWC Report of the 54th Annual Meeting, Resolution 2002-1 Guidance to the Scientific Committee on the Sanctuary review process)which specified that overlap of management measures,for example the moratorium on commercial whaling
and a sanctuary, cannot be used to invalidate any
long-term scientific or conservation value of a given
sanctuary. Not only does this instruction contradict
previous criteria (Annex E, Annual Report of the IWC
2001) that require consideration of a sanctuary in thecontext of other existing measures to protect whales, it
clearly restricts legitimate scientific debate concerning
required conservation measures. That this interpreta-

161

tion is justified is reflected by the fact that when the
resolution referred to above was adopted, the thenChair of the Scientific Committee told the plenary
session that she was ‘tempted to resign’ because sheviewed this as ‘restricting what the Scientific Committee can consider’ (verbatim record, IWC Annual
Meeting, 2002).
The point is that there is no scientific or conservation reason to have a sanctuary when the Commission
has already adopted a risk-averse RMP and has amoratorium on commercial whaling in place. During
limited discussion of this issue at the meeting of the
Scientific Committee in 1993, and with expression ofviews on both sides of this issue, the Scientific Committee agreed that individual scientists should makeknown their concerns to their Commissioners. This
was a very unsatisfactory outcome demonstrating
again the political nature of what should have been ascientific debate (Goodman, 2003), and, as expected,
the outcome of the 2004 review by the ScientificCommittee was what has become the now institutionalized ‘some’ and ‘others’ conflicting statementson all aspects of the sanctuary. Clearly, the ScientificCommittee was unable to provide useful advice to theCommission on this matter.
3.5 Review of lethal whale research programs
The discourse related to lethal research and in particular the review of research plans under Article VIIIof the Convention also illustrate the current dysfunctional situation in the Scientific Committee (Goodman,2003).
It is ironic and for purely political reasons thatwhile two recent scientific workshops on modelingmarine mammal-fisheries interactions, (NAMMCO,
Sept. 2002 and IWC, June 2002) concluded that suitable data and modeling approaches are not available
to provide reliable quantitative management advice on
the impact of cetaceans on fisheries, the majority
within the IWC Scientific Committee oppose thelethal whale research programs that would provide
data for the models needed to improve our understanding of ecosystem interactions.
Opposition to Japan’s research programs also denies the legitimate scientific need for data to improve
the implementation of the RMP. While the majorityof Scientific Committee members criticize these programs, at the same time, they insist on access to thedata derived from these programs to use in analyses
related to estimation of population abundance andstock structure. In this regard it is interesting to notethat when Japan’s research programs in the Antarctic
and the North Pacific were reviewed by a smaller
number of scientists from the Scientific Committee inworkshop settings, they concluded that the research
programs are providing valuable information(8),(9) andrecognized the need for lethal research to provide datafor improving our ability to manage marine resourceson an ecosystem basis.

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4. Causes of the Problems
4.1 Scientists as advocates and the role of NGOs
Strong personal positions on the issues related towhaling, the influence of national government positions on scientists and advocacy have polarized thedebates within the Scientific Committee. The increasing number of scientists from anti-whaling NGOs appointed by Governments as members of the ScientificCommittee has exacerbated this problem. Clearly forexample, one should question the scientific objectivityof representatives from NGOs with strong antiwhaling positions irrespective of science in thedebates of the Scientific Committee.
The issue of scientists as advocates is also relevant
to public debates on the whaling issue outside the
IWC forum. For example, in May 2002, 21 distinguished scientists including three Nobel laureates
signed an open letter to the Government of Japan.
Most of the scientists who signed the letter are notwhale biologists or involved with resource management issues. The letter was published as a World
Wildlife Fund advertisement in the New York Timeson May 20, 2002 and criticizes Japan’s whale research
program. Because the letter contains numerous errors of science and law(10), Aron et. al. (2002) expressed ‘concern that when scientist-advocates lower theirscientific standards in support of popular causes while
presenting themselves as scientists, science itself canbe diminished, as can the rights of resource users andcompetent management of the environment.’ They
argue that the errors in the letter and the lack of attention to relevant facts are a dereliction of a scientist’s
professional and ethical responsibility, particularly
regrettable when public trust in scientists’ judgments
is an important element in the development of national
policies on resource use issues.
4.2 Abuse of the precautionary principle
There are a wide range of formulations of the ‘Precautionary Principle’ but the most broadly accepted is
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development(1992) which declares that ‘Where there are threats ofserious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientificcertainty shall not be use as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.’(11)The ‘Precautionary Principle’ has, over the past
two decades become increasingly accepted as a
general principle of environmental policy and management. However, even the IUCN – The World
Conservation Union (Cooney, 2004) acknowledges
that ‘While an important and intuitively sensible
principle, the acceptance of the principle into law andpolicy and its implementation in practice has beenmarked by controversy and confusion.’ Cooney(2004) also notes that on one hand, ‘it is seen as afundamental tool for sustainable development, a safeguard for future generations, and countering atendency to overlook scientific uncertainties…’ whileon the other hand, ‘it is seen as anti-scientific, subject
to abuse, inherently Northern, anti-innovation, andanti-sustainable use.’
The ‘precautionary principle’ or ‘precautionary
approach’ is often mentioned in the discussions of the
Scientific Committee where it has been used to justify
impractical and unnecessarily restrictive management
measures to a much greater extent than in for example,
regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs).
While the moratorium on commercial whaling
adopted by the Commission in 1982 is perhaps thebest example of this since all whale stocks that had
been depleted from historic over-harvesting werealready protected by zero quotas, it is significant thatat least in this case it was recognized by the ScientificCommittee that such a measure was not required forconservation reasons.
The cases of the RMP and Sanctuaries are different
in the sense that in these cases, abuses of the precautionary approach have taken place in the ScientificCommittee. The RMP adopted in 1994 was designed
to provide risk averse harvest quotas for abundant
stocks. As Hammond noted,(12) ‘[O]ne of the mostinteresting and potentially far-reaching chapters in thescience of natural resource management came to aconclusion. The Commission could now put in placea mechanism for the safe management of commercial
whaling, regardless of whether or not the ‘moratorium’ was lifted.’ However, while the RMP is based on
sound scientific concepts and is regarded as one of themost precautionary procedures for the conservationand management of living resources, the use of
unrealistic stock structure scenarios without scientificbasis to recommend excessively restrictive catch
limits for North Pacific minke whales was an abuse of
the precautionary approach.
As is noted above, while the IWC’s sanctuaries arethemselves an abuse of the precautionary approachsince they apply irrespective of the status of stocks,
the discussions within the Scientific Committee concerning the conservation value or need for sanctuaries
have also involved abuse of the precautionary approach.
At the 2004 meeting of the Scientific Committee inSorrento, Italy, a group of external experts who wereassigned to conduct a review of the Southern Ocean
Sanctuary concluded that ‘Overall, the SOS – and
IWC Sanctuaries in general – are not ecologically justified. The SOS is based on vague goals and objectives
that are difficult to measure, lacks a rigorous approach
to its design and operation, and does not have an effective monitoring framework to determine whether
its objectives are being met. The SOS represents a‘shotgun’ approach to conservation, whereby a large
area is protected with little apparent rationale forboundary selection and management prescriptions
within the sanctuary. While a vast array of ecosystem-level and precautionary conservation benefits

Role and Problems of The IWC Scientific Committee

have been invoked for the establishment of the SOS,
in reality this large-scale sanctuary does little morethan provide a false sense of security by assuming that
protections for whale populations are in place. In fact,
the SOS does not protect or mitigate other threats toSouthern Ocean whale stocks and the marine ecosystems upon which these populations depend, including:pollution, habitat degradation and loss, introduced
species, and global climate change.’ (Zacharias et al.
2004)
This statement clearly demonstrates that the IWC
sanctuaries are not management measures supported
by objective science. However, even in the ScientificCommittee, scientists from anti-whaling countries
have insisted that sanctuaries are necessary on thebasis of the precautionary approach even when they
duplicate total protection provided by the moratorium.
4.3 Voting on science / public participation in science
Although public participation and voting are very
important and essential concepts of democracy, in thefield of scientific pursuit of truth these procedures
may not be appropriate and may even be detrimental.
This is because public sentiment and beliefs are often
inconsistent with scientific facts and because modern
and advanced science is often much more complicatedthan the simple explanations and statements that reachthe public. We believe that in many cases within the
Scientific Committee, the need for transparency is
misinterpreted as a need for public participation or theneed for inclusion of public perceptions in the debates
and that a process more resembling voting than proper
peer review is employed. This damages the scientificcredibility of Scientific Committee outputs.
In the recent meetings of the Scientific Committee,
considerable effort and energy have been spent collecting as many names as possible on working papers
to demonstrate that many share a certain view with theoriginal author. This voting like practice gives a false
impression that a larger number of co-authors means agreater plausibility of the views expressed. Moreover,since richer countries and non-governmental organizations can and do send larger numbers of ‘scientists’ to
the Committee, economic power can produce a false
sense of scientific truth.
In addition to the problem of instances where data
which cannot be scientifically verified have been provided by both scientists and non-scientists to the Scientific Committee, there are also problems related todata collected in the course of activities which did not
follow a rigorous scientific data collection protocol(e.g. whalewatching). Such data can be useful andcomplementary to systematically collected scientific
data however, in the IWC, some regard these data as areplacement for, or superior to, the data collected byscientific research which involves lethal sampling.
The suggestion that such less rigorously collected data
or even anecdotal information should be emphasized163

and that they have an equal or higher level of validity
than data obtained from lethal research is an imposition of a value judgement which is not based on theactual scientific value of data. The claim is inappropriately based on an apriory view against lethal study
on whales. This also represents another problem thatthe discussion appears as if scientific validity is theissue while the real problem is not. This deception
could confuse legitimate discussions on the scientificvalue of research based, anecdotal and traditional user
knowledge.
4.4 Scientific uncertainty as a political tool
Like the precautionary principle, scientific uncertainty is often used in the IWC to justify unnecessarily
restrictive management measures.
One longtime member of the Scientific Committee
responding to a question as to whether in retrospect,
the adoption of the moratorium was justified on the
grounds of prevailing uncertainties responded that ‘inthe sense that the adoption of the moratorium forced
the development of the RMP, which directly addressedscientific uncertainties in assessment, then I think it
was justified. On the other hand, in the sense that themoratorium has now become what we all feared it
might, an indiscriminate and permanent ban on whaling, then I don’t think it was justified.’(13)The adoption of the moratorium on commercial
whaling and its maintenance under present circumstances clearly demonstrates that it is political agendas
that determine the Commission’s decisions and thatscientific uncertainty is simply a tool used in pursuitof political objectives. In this sense, Heazle (2004) has
also concluded that the ability of the Scientific Committee and science to influence IWC policy has been
severely limited by the management priorities of particular members or groups within the commission andtheir willingness to either invoke or ignore uncertainty
issues in pursuit of those priorities.
4.5 Hidden agenda
Delays in the development and implementation of
the RMP have raised serious questions about the roleof the Scientific Committee. Aron (2001) for example, refers to the failure of the Commission to adopt
the RMP in 1993 as ‘a severe blow to the role of the
Scientific Committee,’ and Butterworth (1992) notesthat ‘during the years that the RMP was being developed, the scientific argument has provided a convenient front for a hidden agenda – opposition to resumedcommercial whaling is not really a conservation but
rather an animal rights issue, backed by powerful public pressure groups opposed to any killing of certain
special animals such as whales.’Butterworth’s observations led him to ask, ‘How
likely are the scientific committees of international
fishery organizations to provide an objective scientificbasis for political decision makers given the manner inwhich they are constituted? Is there any real role for164

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science, or does the IWC example serve only to showhow vulnerable science is to reduction to irrelevancy,
give hidden agendas such as economic considerations
or animal rights?’

5. Discussion – Why the Problems Are a Problem
The objective of the International Convention for
the Regulation of Whaling is understood as sustainable use of whale stocks on the basis of the best scientific evidence. This accords with the concept of sustainable development prescribed in Agenda 21 (Rio
Declaration, 1992) and reaffirmed by the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg,
2002).
However, as described in this paper, the current
situation of the IWC is far from satisfactory for fulfilling its prescribed missions. The discussions in the
Scientific Committee are becoming increasingly irrelevant to the deliberations and decisions of the IWC.
Furthermore, much of the Scientific Committee debate
has been degraded to the level of political discourse.
The goal of many anti-whaling members of the IWC
is a permanent ban on commercial whaling irrespective of the stock status of whales. Even if sciencedemonstrates that some species of whales are abundant and that they can be utilized in a sustainable
manner (and science does so demonstrate), the scienceis irrelevant to the policy of strong anti-whaling countries. For them, the whaling issue is not about scienceand consequently, science has no real place to contribute to the whaling issue. However, since the discussions within the Scientific Committee and the Commission often require a scientific guise, science is misused to justify political objectives. This is one of the
major reasons for the ongoing impasse at the IWC.
This situation in the IWC is problematic because it
has set a bad precedent for the management of otherresources. The whaling issue has created an exception to the principle of sustainable utilization by prohibiting commercial whaling ‘irrespective of stock
status’ of whale species. Unfortunately, whales are notthe only exception. Charismatic species such as elephants and sharks are receiving the same ‘honor’ atmeeting of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna andFlora (CITES) where prohibitions or restrictions on
international trade are imposed.
This has become an increasing problem in international governance where questions such as who candecide such exceptions and on the basis of what criteria need to be considered. Unfortunately, justification for such exceptions are often explained as ‘world
opinion’ or abuse of the precautionary principle as
described above rather than being based on scientificfindings. Also, too often, ‘world opinion’ is the viewof special interest groups and/or the media indeveloped western countries. These issues are notlimited to the management of natural resources but arealso pertinent to many other international negotiations
where scientific deliberations affect the course of the
discussions and the final decisions. This would include global warming and biodiversity among others.
Further, because sustainable utilization of abundantspecies of whales has been denied, these species areunder-utilized. Almost without exception, the users
and the potential beneficiaries of these resources are
citizens of developing countries, small indigenous
communities, or coastal communities with a long
tradition of the utilization of whales and where whales
have significant economic, social and cultural importance. This is not surprising since for the most part,
people in these situations have little influence on the
media which create ‘world opinion,’ nor do they havethe political power to influence governments. Thismeans that the imposition of an exception to the principle of sustainable utilization on the basis of ‘world
opinion’ involves human rights and social justice issues.
Continuation of the moratorium resulting from thecurrent situation in the IWC is also cause for concern
because whales occupy the top place in the marine
ecosystem and therefore the trends in their stock abundance have great effects on the whole ecosystem. The
moratorium on commercial whaling irrespective of thestatus of whale stocks appears to have provided achance for the recovery of such species as fin whales
and humpback whales that had been heavily harvestedby the time the moratorium was implemented. However, zero quotas for these species alone would haveproduced the same result. On the other hand, minke
whales that were robust and abundant even at the timethe moratorium was implemented have been given achance to increase further. The situation was even better for minke whales because a large amount of foodand habitat became available to them as a result of thepast harvest of other large whales that had created an
expanded ecological niche. Similarly, seals have been
increasing recently in many parts of the world oceans
as seal hunting has been severely curtailed because of
the animal rights movements. This increase of marine
mammals has caused serious concerns about possible
competition between fisheries and marine mammals inmany important fishing grounds of the world. The
enlarged top portion of the food web may, throughpredation, be causing serious shifts in the whole marine ecosystem which includes commercial fisheries
resources.

6. Conclusions
Science cannot solve all international governanceissues related to resource use, and it is in many instances not even neutral, since science needs to be
funded and its objectives are often politically determined. However, it is clear that science provides
better guidance to difficult international negotiations
than political coercion and cultural imperialism sinceRole and Problems of The IWC Scientific Committee

it provides a more rational playing field. It is for thisreason that the fundamental principle of science-based
policy and rule making has become the primary paradigm of resource management
Following the 56th Annual Meeting of the IWC(July 2004, Sorrento, Italy), eleven anti-whaling members of the IWC proposed to either substantially restrict or totally eliminate activities under Article VIIIof the ICRW which stipulates the right of the contracting governments to conduct lethal research on whales‘notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention.’ This proposal denies the value of a standard scientific tool of research on whales even though thetechnique is widely accepted in the field of biology formany other species. This attempt to impose an ethicalview that research on whales should not involve lethal
studies has now taken the form of a proposal to amend
the ICRW creating a new phase in the debates on
whaling.
How should the Scientific Committee respond to
this new development? Should they respond? In part,the Scientific Committee has already responded tothese questions by noting that, at least for minke
whales in the Antarctic, ‘…there were non-lethal
methods available that could provide information
about the population age structure (e.g., natural markings) but that logistics and the abundance of minke
populations in Areas IV and V probably precluded
their successful application’ (IWC document 49/4
Report of the Scientific Committee, 1997). Furthermore, this response does not address the need forlethal research to obtain quantitative data on whale
feeding required for ecosystem models. Notwithstanding this, the Scientific Committee and its advice
are becoming increasingly irrelevant to decisions regarding the management of whales and it is legitimate
to ask whether under current circumstances it is evenneeded.
At the same time, it must be recognized that theabove described problems related to the functioning of
the Scientific Committee are primarily the result of
the dysfunctional nature of its parent body, the Commission. Scientific uncertainty issues have been an
important factor in shaping the IWC’s various policy
choices but the science has never been the real issue
behind the various disputes and policy decisions.
Political agendas are what have determined the parameters of policy making and the resultant decisions(Heazle, 2004). Unless the Commission and its
member governments change their now institutionalized dysfunctional discourse and procedures, it is naive to expect outputs from the Scientific Committeethat are useful for the sustainable use and managementof whale resources in accordance with the objectivesof the ICRW. As Aron (2001) opined, ‘The IWC and
its use of scientific advice is an anomaly in the worldof resource management agencies. I am unaware of
any resource commission charged with regulating harvests that has failed to establish quotas given scientific165

advice that provides a strong rationale for a safe harvest.’
Notes(1) International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling,
Dec. 2, 1946.
(2) These principles are included, for example, in the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982,
arts. 61 and 119, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1281 and 1219, Agenda
21, June 14, 1992, para. 17.56, the FAO Kyoto Declaration and Plan of Action on the Sustainable Contribution ofFisheries to Food Security and the FAO Code of Conduct
for Responsible Fisheries, Oct. 31, 1995, arts. 6.4, 6.5 and
7.
(3) Correspondence with Aron quoted in Heazle, 2004.
(4) Letter of resignation from Dr. Philip Hammond, Chairmanof the Scientific Committee to Dr. R. Gambell, Secretary
to the Commission. May 26, 1993.
(5) Report of the Scientific Committee, IWC/55/Rep1. p.13.
(6) Comparing this decision on the North Pacific minke whale
stock structure with the case for bowhead whales also
illustrates the ‘double standards’ used by the ScientificCommittee. For bowhead whales, up till 2004, there was
no attempt to apply theoretical methods to genetic data as
was insisted on for North Pacific minke whales, yet the
Scientific Committee accepted the assumption that there
was no stock structure in the bowhead population.
(7) Report of the Scientific Committee, IWC/55/Rep1. p.14.
(8) Report of the Intersessional Working Group to Review
Data and Results from Special Permit Research on Minke
Whales in the Antarctic, Tokyo, 12-16 May 1997. In:
Rep. Int. Whal. Commn. 48, 1998 pp. 377-393.
(9) Report of the Workshop to Review the Japanese Whale
Research Programme under Special Permit for North
Pacific Minke Whales (JARPN). In: J. Cetacean Res.
Manage. 3 (Suppl.), 2001, pp 375-413.
(10) For example, the letter states that ‘Japan has refused tomake the information it collects available for independent
review (2nd paragraph of the open letter).’ Contrary to thisclaim, the IWC hosted two meetings to review the resultsof Japan’s research programs in 1997 and 2000 where all
the data were made available for review and analysis.
Furthermore, even when limited to the Antarctic research
program, 163 scientific documents had been submitted to
the Scientific Committee during the period from 1987 to
2004. In addition, 79 papers based on the Antarctic research had been published in peer-reviewed scientificjournals. Aron et. al. (2002) has more detailed descriptions about other errors.
(11) Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (June14, 1992, princ. 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5 (1992).
(12) Same reference as for the note number 5 above.
(13) Dr. Peter Best of South Africa quoted in Heazle, 2004.

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(Received 22 April 2005, Accepted 1 July 2005)