Pli 9 (2000), 248-56.

A Superior Existentialism
Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, translated by
Daniel W. Smith (London: Athlone Press 1999)

KEITH ANSELL PEARSON

Thirty years after its publication in France in 1969 Klossowski’s Vicious
Circle has been published into English in a superb translation by Daniel
Smith, well-known for both his excellent translations of, and commentaries
on, Deleuze. Klossowski’s text is often compared in stature to such classic
and momentous readings as Heidegger’s two-volume study, mostly
composed of lectures given during 1936-40 and Deleuze’s 1962 Nietzsche
and Philosophy. Such comparisons, however, miss the essential
incomparable character of Klossowski’s text. It is one of those rare things,
a text that is unique, singular, and incomparable. It may well be the most
extraordinary text on Nietzsche ever composed, as well as one of the most
disconcerting and disquieting. It has a certain communion with Bataille’s
writings, including his own text of Nietzsche, but on account of its
trenchant insights, exacting rigour, and exquisite precision, it goes way
beyond anything one encounters in Bataille’s book on Nietzsche. It is not abook that one can readily recommend as an essential text that anyone
concerned with Nietzsche must read, simply because it is a quite terrifying
reading of Nietzsche. At the end of it the reader, or should I say thisreader, experiences utter vertigo. Where Bataille’s attempt to makeNietzsche impossible and unusable can often read like a series of
unconvincing postures and poorly conceived riddles, in Klossowski’s text
these aspects of Nietzsche are pursued with an absolute rigour and asustained logic of disablement.
Klossowski is a truly great writer and reader. His knowledge ofNietzsche’s texts, including many Nachlass fragments from the 1880s(many of which do not appear in the English edition based on the Forster-Keith Ansell Pearson

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Nietzsche compilation), as well as rare material from Nietzsche’s
schooldays at Schulpforta (including a horror story called ‘Euphorion’), isimpressive. Klossowski has a rare understanding of the details ofNietzsche’s thinking and of what is truly at stake in it. His book takes us
further into the treacherous depths of Nietzsche’s thought than any otherstudy I know. Reading the text afresh in translation in 1999 I had thedistinct feeling that its readers still lie in the future. The danger with thisbook is that it will be read too cavalierly in terms of the alleged
fashionable tropes of deconstruction or poststructuralism, such as theincompleteness of meaning, the infinite play of interpretation, etc. This
would be a great shame since such institutionalised readings miss its
crucial dimension and fail to engage with what makes this such aconvincing and remarkable text, namely, the fact that it has penetrated thestrange depths of Nietzsche’s thought and shows what this amounts to, notonly for his critique of language and meaning, but for his engagement with‘life’ in terms of both a theory of knowledge and a theory of evolution.
A certain and undetected Bergsonism hovers over the book, which I
shall touch on shortly. It strikes me, upon encountering a few of them, thatthe commentaries on this remarkable and singular text have completely
failed to come to terms with what distinguishes it as a book on Nietzsche.
They have understandably concentrated their focus on Klossowski’s
privileging of the experience of eternal return but this has been done inisolation from the rest of the book. As a result these commentaries provide
little more than perfunctory, even cavalier, comprehensions of the text.
One recent commentator, for example, has classified it as moving from an‘existential’ reading of eternal return to a ‘deconstructive’ one.1 But thisstrikes me as a lazy conception of the book and of how Klossowski seeks
to unravel and to stage an encounter with the central problem ofNietzsche’s writing, that of teaching the unteachable (ultimately for
Klossowski the thought of eternal return is unteachable and even
unthinkable – it is beyond thought, beyond communication in language,
beyond the human condition). There is little that is deconstructive in thisbook, and the existentialism that informs its understanding of eternal return(as beyond language and social consciousness), takes its inspiration notfrom deconstruction but from Bergson, notably his supremely antinomical
modernist tract, Time and Free Will.

1

D. Smith, Transvaluations: Nietzsche in France 1872-1972 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1996), pp.150-164.

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For Klossowski, Nietzsche was a thinker of the near and distant future,a future he says which has now become our everyday reality. However,everything depends on knowing how we ought to read Nietzsche.
Klossowski is ingenious in his response. He argues throughout the bookthat Nietzsche’s key thought-experiments are simulations and simulacra
and that his thought unfolds in terms of the simulation of a ‘conspiracy’.
The Nietzschean conspiracy is not, of course, that of a class but of an
isolated individual ‘who uses the means of this class not only against his
own class, but also against the existing forms of the human species as awhole’ (p. xv). The second key component of the reading is the claim that
Nietzsche’s thought revolves around delirium as its axis and, furthermore,that it is incredibly lucid on this issue (Klossowski’s unfolding of thedrama of Nietzsche’s last days in Turin in his final chapter makes for sometruly chilling and remarkable reading since it demonstrates in a way that isboth convincing and unnerving that there was something completely lucid
about Nietzsche’s descent into muteness and madness). Klossowski insists
that, conceived in terms of a project of delirium, Nietzsche’s thoughtcannot simply be labelled ‘pathological’. It is far too knowing about itself
for this: ‘his thought was lucid to the extreme, it took on the appearance ofa delirious interpretation – and also required the entire experimental
initiative of the modern world’ (p. xvi). According to Klossowski,
Nietzsche interrogates the nature and conditions of thinking and of
philosophy – what is the act of thinking? what is philosophy? – like nothinker before or since. As a result he ended up producing a body of workthat challenges both the principle of identity (the authority of language, of
the code, of the institution) and the reality principle (consciousness, thesubject, the ego, substance, etc.). His new demonstration – ‘required byinstitutional language for the teaching of reality’ – takes the form of the
movements of a ‘declarative mood’. Ultimately this contagious mood, or
what Klossowski calls the ‘tonality of the soul’, supplants thedemonstration and both thought and life become ‘mute’. The limits of theprinciples of identity and reality are inevitably and inexorably reached. By
the end of the Introduction of the book we have in place a theme that will
become one of the text’s most important features: the opposition between‘culture’ (society, language, and consciousness), which is based on theintention to teach and learn, and the tonality of the soul, which operates on
the level of intensities that can be neither taught nor learnt. This opposition
is a dramatic transposition into the heart of Nietzsche’s darkness of theessential thematic of Bergson’s first published text, Time and Free Will.

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This text begins with out the phenomenon of intensity and intensive
magnitudes, moves on to a conception of duration as a virtual multiplicity,and then arrives at a twofold conception of the ‘self’, the ‘superficial’ selfof language and society and the ‘deep-seated’ self of duration andintensity. Klossowski’s text is informed by this configuration of the self
and the priority of lived experience. He was, of course, a keen reader ofHeidegger (whose two volumes on Nietzsche he translated into French in1971). However, the ‘authenticity’ at stake in his reading of Nietzsche is
not that of historicality and resolution but rather of intensity and thedissolution of both identity and reality. The opening chapter ofKlossowski’s text entitled ‘The Combat against Culture’ presents
Nietzsche as a thinker ‘beyond the human condition’, that is, one whochallenges and puts to the test the knowledge, practices, customs, andhabits which make up Western culture (p. 6). In response to the ‘levelling
powers of gregarious thought’ Nietzsche champions the alternative‘erectile power of particular cases’. Since morality is by definition thedomain of gregariousness, it is viewed as the ‘principal “metaphysicalvirus”’ of thought and science’ (ibid.).
Chapter Two, ‘The Valetudinary States at the Origin of a Semiotic of
Impulses’, is where we encounter for the first time in the text
Klossowski’s presentation of eternal return. This is then staged crucially inchapter three entitled ‘The Experience of Eternal Return’, with chaptersfour through to six are devoted to bringing out and examining the various
aspects of the doctrine, including the scientific (chapter five) and thepolitical (chapter six). It is clear that for him the most crucial dimension of
the thought-experiment is to be found in the descriptions Nietzsche gave
his Sils experience in August 1881 ‘6000 feet beyond man and time’.
Klossowski accords a tremendous privilege to this event in Nietzsche’s life
since it provides access, he holds, to the tonality of the soul and theintensities of lived experience which are beyond knowledge and outsidecommunication. However, because everything that is at stake in Nietzscheis made dependent on this momentous experience in Klossowski’s readingit also becomes the vulnerable point in that reading. The problems with
Klossowski’s reading need to be pinpointed precisely. Before identifying
them, let me outline his conception of eternal return and the character of its
experience.
Klossowski approaches the eternal return in terms of asking thequestion, ‘what kind of invention does it provide?’ The invention is a
deeply paradoxical one, not only because it is attempting to respond to the252

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deepest problems of life, but because it is doing so through the‘impossible’ mediums of language, pedagogy, culture, etc. Adherence tothe non-sense of life and ‘belief’ in return – and Klossowski argues that
this is all Nietzsche hoped for, that the doctrine would be met with belief –entails an ‘impracticable lucidity’ (p. 53). The project is not one ofrenouncing language, intentions, or even willing, but rather one ofevaluating them ‘in a different manner than we have hitherto evaluatedthem - namely, as subject to the “law” of the vicious Circle’ (ibid.). The
law of this circle has a specific non-sense to it, which is to do with theliquidation of meaning and goal. This is how Klossowski brings together
the thought-experiments of the later Nietzsche:
The ‘overman’ becomes the name of the subject of the will to
power, both the meaning and the goal of the Eternal Return. The
will to power is only a humanized term for the soul of the Vicious
Circle, whereas the latter is a pure intensity without intention. On
the other hand, the Vicious Circle, as Eternal Return, is presented asa chain of existences that forms the individuality of the doctrine’s
adherent, who knows that he has pre-existed otherwise than he now
exists, and that he will yet exist differently, from ‘one eternity toanother’ (p. 70).
This articulation of the doctrine reveals both the enormous influence of
Bataille on Klossowski’s configuration (or disfiguration) and gives
expression to his own unique conception of a new fatalism, that of
fortuity.2 This can be understood in terms of a ‘renewed version ofmetempsychosis’, in which the ‘richness of a single existence’ resides ininfinite possibilities of becoming-other, it resides in ‘affective potential’ (p.
71). Within the economy of the vicious circle one fortuitous soul isdissolved in order to give way to another equally fortuitous soul. The
experience of return is one of intensity, then, which ‘emits of a series of
infinite vibrations of being’ (p. 72). The promise of this new teaching is thepromise of a new creature coming into being, one that has gone beyond theestablished gregarious conditions of life and which no longer lives
according to the ‘durable fixity of species’. Moreover, ‘ The day humanbeings learn how to behave as phenomena devoid of intention – for every2

For Bataille on Return as a ‘mode of drama’ that ‘unmotiavtes the moment and frees
life of ends’ see his On Nietzsche, trans. B Boone (London: Athlone Press, 1992),
preface, p. xxxiii.

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intention at the level of the human being always implies its own
conservation, its continued existence – on that day, a new creature would
declare the integrity of existence’ (p. 139).
This reading is both impressive and disquieting. It becomes even more
so when Klossowski attempts to extend these insights to a conception ofNietzsche’s own organism and brain. Nietzsche’s body and organism
became, according to Klossowski, the battleground upon which thestruggle of life seeking to overcome itself to higher levels of intensity andenergy was played out. He interprets, boldly or foolishly depending on
one’s perspective, the collapse in Turin in terms of disproportion between‘the time of the pathos’ and the ‘time of the organism’. This gives rise to
an exchange or transaction in which the organism and the body ‘are theprice of the pathos’:In order to inscribe itself in the depths of his organism, the law of
the Eternal Return of all possible individuations, as the justice of theuniverse, required the destruction of the very organ that had
disclosed it: namely, Nietzsche’s brain…(p. 221)
Klossowski is decisive in his choice of reading the eternal return in termsof what I would like to designate as a ‘superior existentialism’ (theauthenticity of self-dissolution) and disregarding its cosmological aspects.
He endorses Lou Salome’s judgement that the search for a scientificfoundation to the doctrine is an error, though he does not give an accountof his reasons for adhering to this now widespread view. He does
entertain, with Salome, the wildly speculative claim that the reason why
Nietzsche was himself so keen to find proof of his doctrine in a cosmology
was because this would help him in the task of dissuading himself of adelirious intelligence: “Nietzsche no doubt believed he had gone mad since
he had received this thought. To prove the contrary to himself, he wanted
to appeal to science, he expected from science a proof that he was not thevictim of a pure phantasm” (p. 97). This claim rests on a highly selective
and tendentious reading of both the intellectual trajectory of Nietzsche’s
thought, especially his engagement with the natural and physical sciences,including the matter of time – which is well-established and of anadvanced character before the 1880s – and of the cosmology Nietzsche
worked on and outlined in the 1880s (a decade that witnesses Poincare’s
efforts to establish a recurrence theorem within the field of science, but towhich Klossowski makes no reference). In addition, it can be noted, that

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Salome and Klossowksi’s preference for construing Nietzsche’s relation tohis abysmal thought of Return almost entirely in terms of him sufferingfrom it, neglects the fact that he also derived great consolation from thisthought: ‘My consolation is that everything that has been is eternal: the sea
will cast it up again’ (WP 1065).
It is not that Klossowski ignores completely the relation between
Nietzsche and science; on the contrary, he has some stimulating things to
say about it. His stance on this issue is to argue that Nietzsche’s
researches into the biological and physiological sciences were only evermotivated by the needs of his own personal singularity or ‘particular case’.
Thus, Nietzsche wanted ‘to find a mode of behaviour, in the organic andinorganic world, that was analogous to his own valetudinary state…basedon this mode of behaviour, to find the arguments and resources that would
allow him to re-create himself, beyond his own self’ (p. 32). Science is an
ambiguous ally in Nietzsche’s inhuman project. On the one hand, it
explores life and the universe without being concerned about theconsequences for human behaviour with regard to the reality principle. On
the other hand, however, it is ‘essentially an institutional principle dictatedby reasons of security for the (gregarious) continuity of existence…’ (p.
134). Klossowski argues that Nietzsche projects the ‘conspiracy’ of his
teaching of the Vicious Circle against the ‘external conspiracy…of thescience and morality of institutions’. It is in this context that we can best
appreciate the meaning of Nietzsche positioning himself ‘contra Darwin’:‘The selection expounded by Darwin coincides perfectly with bourgeois
morality’. Natural selection ‘conspires with gragariousness by presenting
mediocre beings as strong, rich and powerful beings’ (p. 169). Klossowski
is right to make Nietzsche’s engagement with Darwinism central to areading of his texts, but I am not convinced that he has got to grips witheither the full complexity of Nietzsche’s response to Darwin or thechallenge Darwinism presents to any Nietzschean-inspired thinking of life.
Nietzsche’s thinking - notably the doctrine of will to power - reaches animpasse once it realizes that ‘Darwinism is correct’: ‘…the will to power
in which I recognize the ultimate character and ground of all change
provides us with the reason why selection is not in favour of the
exceptions and lucky strokes…’ (WP 685). Now if the triumph of reactive
values is not ‘antibiological’, as Nietzsche absolutely maintains, then what
becomes of the doctrine of will to power? If it ends up concurring with
Darwinism, then is the doctrine of Return Nietzsche’s attempt to find away out of this impasse? If these are the right kind of questions to pose,Keith Ansell Pearson

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then the truly key issue becomes that of the adequacy or inadequacy of
eternal return as a response to biological and cultural evolution. What canbe said is that it is inadequate to simply assert, as Klossowksi does, that
Nietzsche equated Darwinism with bourgeois morality. On the contrary,for Nietzsche, Darwin’s theory of evolution is the correct one – even at thelevel of will to power. This is why he tells us that his engagement takes
place around a ‘problem of economics’. In short, Nietzsche seeks to
identify within evolution a different energetics, one in which ‘“Duration”
as such has no value’ (WP 864). In neither case, then, that of Darwinism
or Nietzscheanism, are we dealing simply with a problem of morality but
rather with a problem of economics and energetics.
The intelligence of this text on the Vicious Circle demands an exact
engagement. For me the most important problem of Klossowski’s reading
revolves around the manner in which it unknowingly takes over the central
antinomy of Bergson’s early text and produces through its lens aninterpretation of the eternal return as the paradoxical doctrine of mutenesspar excellence. He refuses to work through the terms of the antinomy andinstead sets it up a kind of a priori antagonism between intensity andinstitution, or, in Nietzsche’s terms, as an irreconciliability between‘becoming’ and ‘knowledge’, within which eternal return is bound up withthe ecstatic experience of intensity that escapes any attempt to fix anddetermine its meaning or significance. This acceptance on Klossowski’s
part of Nietzsche’s separation of becoming and knowledge has importantconsequences, for it basically means that the project of metaphysics has
been deemed to be an impossible and unnecessary one from the start (thisin stark contrast to the later Bergson and also the entire oeuvre of Deleuze
from a philosophy of difference to a philosophy of concepts). It is thisrefusal of metaphysics, and of the generation of knowledge beyond thehuman condition, that distinguishes Klossowski’s text and the treacherous
way it aims to show this to be the necessary, albeit paradoxical, outcomeof the pursuit ‘of’ knowledge (do we pursue knowledge or does it pursue
us?).
Ultimately, for Klossowski, Nietzsche is not someone who thinks
beyond the human condition. Rather, he is an exploding machine who
dissolves this condition and who feels the dissolution of all identity andreality, and so is, in some quasi-mystical sense, beyond truth andknowledge, beyond metaphysics and science. This explains why he spends
so little time on Nietzsche’s attempts to come up with some cosmological
proof of the doctrine. For Klossowski this is not because the thought is

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ethical but because both the ethical and cosmological renditions of thethought-experiment miss the essential point of it, chiefly, that it is outsideof thought altogether. All the stress is placed on the ecstasy and the agonyof the 1881 summit experience in Sils-Maria. For Klossowski this is thedecisive turn in Nietzsche’s lived experience. His subsequent attempts towork out the meaning of what had happened to him – when he says forexample that life comes up with the thought as a means of its own selfenhancement and overcoming – are doomed attempts to communicate
what is beyond communication and to make sense of an irreducible nonsense. There is an excellent chapter on Nietzsche’s political philosophy,
one of the finest accounts of this dimension of Nietzsche to be foundanywhere, where Klossowski aims to show that this is another misdirectedattempt on Nietzsche’s part to use the doctrine of return to calculative
effect in the service of a politics that promotes a new discipline andbreeding.
The disjunction between life and knowledge on which so much of his
staging of the case of Nietzsche rests proves a fateful, and perhaps
ultimately fatal, choice for Klossowski to make since it condemns
Nietzsche to isolation and solitude as his irrevocable destiny, playing therole of a simulator of thought, the supreme conspirator-actor in
Klossowski’s stage production of the filthy lessons of philosophy, one whoteaches the unteachable, thinks the unthinkable and who attempts tounthink thought and then falls, unsurprisingly, into complete (andunsimulated?) muteness and madness.