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South African Foreign Policy and African Drivers Programme
A p r i l 2 013

The Foreign Policy of
Senegal Since 2000

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About SAIIAThe South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has a long and proud record
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About the south african foreign policy andafrican drivers Programme
Since the fall of Apartheid in 1994, South Africa’s foreign policy has prioritised thedevelopment of Africa. To achieve its ‘African Agenda’ objectives, South Africa needs tointensify its strategic relations with key African countries. SAIIA’s South African Foreign Policy
and African Drivers (SAFPAD) Programme has a two-pronged focus. First, it unpacks South
Africa’s post-1994 Africa policy in two areas: South Africa as a norm setter in the region andSouth Africa’s potential to foster regional co-operation with key African states and otherexternal partners, in support of the continent’s stabilisation and development. Second, it
focuses on key African driver countries’ foreign policy objectives that have the ability to
influence, positively or negatively, the pace of regional co-operation and integration.
SAFPAD assumes a holistic examination of the internal and external pressures that inform
each driver country’s foreign policy decisions by exploring contemporary domestic factors;
the scope of their bilateral relations; their role in the regional economic communities; andlastly their relations with South Africa.
SAIIA gratefully acknowledges the Danish International Development Agency andthe Swedish International Development Agency which generously support the SAFPAD
Programme.
Programme head: Tjiurimo Hengari, Alfredo.Hengari@wits.ac.za© SAIIA April 2013
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AbstracT
After President Abdoulaye Wade became president of Senegal in 2000 some apparentchanges in Senegalese foreign policy could be discerned. This paper considers the extent
to which that policy changed under his administration. It examines significant trends in theforeign policy of Senegal; the role played in them by national institutions; and the domestic
and international political backdrop.
A major issue is the extent to which foreign policy formulation and implementation
was taken out of the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of ‘classical’ diplomacy
in favour of increased involvement by specialist elements from government and non-stateorganisations. This has occurred largely in response to an increased emphasis on economic
issues that has also brought some realignment in Senegal’s international relationships,
away from traditional partners towards the emerging economic powers. There has also
been a revival of Pan-Africanist thinking with concomitant stress on African continental,
regional and sub-regional issues.
The paper examines the effects of increased personalisation of the foreign affairs
function, in particular of the much greater levels of intervention by the executive at theexpense of the legislature and judiciary. Such interventions may not be out of line withconstitutional and other statutory provisions but may nevertheless reflect both a lack ofsustained interest in foreign policy by legislators and a more fundamental shift in theparameters of control of foreign policy, in the quest for greater effectiveness in international
dealings. The paper concludes, however, that in common with that of many other states,
Senegal’s foreign policy shows a degree of institutional continuity that tends to transcend
temporary domestic and foreign political dynamics and interests.
Finally, the election of a new president in 2012 has to some degree marked a return toa more established and ‘classical’ foreign policy stance.

A BOUT THE A UTHOR
Alioune Sall is professor in Public Law at the Cheikh Anta Diop University, Dakar (Senegal).

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY & AFRICAN DRIVERS PROGRAMMEA BBREV I A T I ON S A ND A CRONYM S
AUEcowas
G-8
MAI
MFA
Nepad
OHADA
OAU

African Union
Economic Community of West African States
Group of Eight
Ministry of African Integration
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
New Partnership for Africa’s Development
Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa
Organisation of African Unity

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I NTRODUCT I ON

T

he Republic of Senegal in West Africa covers an area of more than 196 000km2 andhas an estimated population of some 13 million. From an institutional and politicalstandpoint it is best known for a multi-party system of relatively long standing by African
standards (although somewhat restrictive during the 1970s, it became more open from theearly 1980s). Senegal is very active on the international diplomatic scene, maintaining a
relatively neutral approach and in particular maintaining close ties with France, its former
colonial authority. Its international visibility is fairly high, as is shown by the large numberof its nationals involved in institutions within the UN or in various regional organisations.
In 2000, peaceful political change came to Senegal for the first time in its history when
Abdoulaye Wade defeated incumbent president Abdou Diouf in a presidential electionthat was generally regarded as fair. In that contest it was a desire for change, evident in
the victorious party’s slogan ‘sopi!’ (meaning ‘change!’), that prevailed. President Wade
lost office 12 years later in the election of March 2012. It may nonetheless be possible toestablish the extent to which Senegal’s foreign policy under his administration was affectedby this desire for change in domestic affairs, and to do this by measuring any shifts in thatpolicy that may have taken place subsequent to the 2000 election.
Any transformations in Senegalese diplomacy would be of interest on two levels. In
the first place the external policy of nation-states in general remains relatively constantbecause most of the time the long-term interests of the state tend to prevail over thevicissitudes of internal politics. Secondly, state diplomacy is often led by individuals whoseviews do not systemically reflect national political changes. In light of such factors it may
be useful to investigate the extent to which the electoral transition of 2000 influenced
Senegalese diplomacy; in other words, to assess the role of continuity and change inexternal policy.
This study revolves around three main areas, each of which must be examined
separately:• significant trends in the foreign policy of Senegal;• the role of institutions; and• the political reality.
The information in the present analysis originated in a June 2011 seminar organised by
the South African Institute of International Affairs; it was a gathering of people who had
directly participated in, or at least deeply considered, Senegalese external policy. The
study is also the outcome of enquiries and documentary research, particularly within
Senegal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The enquiry aimed to define the dimensionsof Senegal’s foreign policy, including its legal and institutional aspects; its practicaland empirical nature; the political stakes in play; the occasional subjective or personal
elements; and last but not least, the economic and financial dimension, which is subject
to bitter dispute both publicly and behind the scenes.

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Firstly, it is useful to ask whether or not Senegalese foreign policy since 2000 has shown
fractures or cracks, or if there is a continuity of policy albeit with different players. The
aim is to discover whether from 2000 foreign policy largely ceased to be the prerogative of
the MFA and of career diplomats, and was instead determined or co-determined by others.
Responses to this question demand delicate judgements. There is certainly competition
between the MFA and various other participants, but it is not possible firmly to state that
this has occurred only since 2000, even though it was more marked in some years of
the Wade presidency. It is, however, clear that the MFA and career diplomats no longer
hold a monopoly on external policy. This was particularly emphasised in presentations
by Ambassadors Kéba Birane Cisse1 and Seydou Nourou Ba2 during meetings at the West
African Research Centre in Dakar. There is no doubt that Senegalese external policy is
now led by ministries other than the MFA, at least in certain areas of a ‘technical’ nature.
The primary evidence for this is the open acknowledgement that a degree of authority
over diplomatic representatives exists in ministries outside the MFA. Thus Article 1of Decree No. 2000–296 of May 2000 indicates that the jurisdiction of the minister offoreign affairs exists only ‘subject to international assignments involving other ministers
as per their Decree of Assignment, notably, the Minister of Economy and Finance and theMinister of African Integration’.
Secondly, decrees dated 7 September 2007 laid down the parameters of those areas ofinternational activities subject to the jurisdiction of other departments of government.
This is the first and undoubtedly the most startling sign of a dilution of responsibilities
formerly held by the MFA and career diplomats.
Another fact must be highlighted at this point: that although there is already adepartment of regional integration within the MFA there is also a Ministry of African
Integration (MAI) responsible solely for African integration, and in effect a ministry ofAfrican external relations. Four comments may be made on the MAI as an institution.
Firstly, it serves to claim for itself a substantial share of foreign policy from the MFA,
given that a major portion of Senegalese diplomacy is already directed towards subregional integration organisations regarded as partners of the MAI. Often, the latter’s
responsibilities are not delegated by the MFA, which tends to enhance the autonomy of
the MAI. Secondly, the MAI has had an intermittent existence – sometimes it seems to
be a functioning institution, sometimes not. Thirdly, the MAI seems to enjoy a degreeof continuity: its existence was first noted at the end of the 1980s and references to it
began to appear in government circles well before the 2000 election. Finally, this kind of
institution is not unique to Senegal; the Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso each has this typeof autonomous ministry.
A further sign of the domination of technical factors in foreign policy is a practicethat has existed for some years of training groups of specialist diplomats at the National
Administration School of Senegal in Dakar. At one time, diplomatic training focused
exclusively on wider questions of state sovereignty, which were essentially political. Morerecently, however, foreign policy issues have become increasingly international in natureand their resolution less and less a national prerogative. In formulating its foreign policy
the state has had to take account of this change and the training of diplomats reflects
this new specialisation. Today, therefore, Senegalese students of diplomatic affairs can

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choose to specialise in narrower areas such as the environment, multilateral economic
negotiations or sub-regional integration. This incontestably points to a change in theformulation of Senegal’s foreign policy.
Enquiries in the department of legal and consular affairs at the MFA indicate thatin practice, staff from ‘technical’ ministries do become associated with international
negotiations. There are four steps to this process. First, once aware that negotiations arein train, the MFA requests the ministry responsible for the area concerned to select andappoint appropriate members to the Senegalese delegation; the technical ministry thenratifies the MFA proposal, which gives a legal basis for establishing the composition of thedelegation; the department of legal and consular affairs at the MFA prepares the protocols
and full powers of negotiation; finally, a nominal roll of approved delegates (which always
includes at least one member of the MFA), together with documents delineating powersof negotiation, is submitted to the prime minister for signature.
A further factor indicative of the increasingly technical nature of foreign affairs is theappearance of a new type of Senegalese diplomatic body, responsible for promoting thenational economy, and the incorporation of non-governmental institutions in its initiatives.
Chambers of commerce, for example, operate throughout Senegal and can readily help
define the scope of any overseas economic partnership; similarly the National Agency for
the Promotion of Investment, which is attached to the presidency, is particularly useful inforeign initiatives. Clearly, structures such as these have their own methods of operationthat in practice, and taken together, amount to a public relations policy directed towards
foreign investors. In the past such a function would have originated in the MFA andbeen implemented through Senegal’s overseas diplomatic representatives. This is no longer
always the case (the tourism sector, for example, now develops its own relationships withforeign partners through government channels). The best-known practical example ofthis new approach is the Coastal and Tourism Zone Planning and Promotion Company
of Senegal. Its authority was considerably extended by a decree of 2004. Seven years later
it independently signed an agreement for $142 million with a US-based global agency forsustainable tourism; in doing so demonstrating the extent to which Senegalese foreign
policy can improve its effectiveness by co-opting non-state players.
Such developments point to a reduction in the authority of the MFA and a dilution of
its influence in formulating and conducting foreign policy. That this policy is driven bytechnical, rather than traditional diplomacy was further underscored after 2000, throughthe shaping of an increasingly economy-centred policy with new foreign partners.
It can be categorically stated, however, that it was not the political changes of 2000
that prompted the new approach. Integration of the economic with the diplomatic is aworldwide phenomenon and developments in Senegal reflect this general global trend.
Many aspects of technical predominance had been apparent before 2000 and the politicalevents of that year merely confirmed, or in some way reinforced, them. In analysing
significant trends in Senegal’s foreign policy, therefore, a distinction must be drawn
between changes arising from developments worldwide, and those that relate specificallyto one particular country.
As Guy Carron de la Carrière, former director-general of the Paris-based foreign tradeagency Centre Français de Commerce Extérieur, noted: the dominant impression is thatof reduced state involvement in the markets, with the laws, or the ‘dictatorship’ being

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imposed upon democratic authorities …. [I]n the same vein, the notion of an ‘economic
war’ is … [useful].’3
Leaving aside legal and institutional edicts and the impression of stable diplomatic
processes they convey, it is possible to detect less unambiguous aspects in the conduct ofSenegalese international relations. Foreign policy is a game in which battles are fought
for influence, with high financial stakes in play. An example might be the effect on
Senegal’s relations with China, of the affair that came to be known as the ‘billions of
Taiwan’. As an incentive to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Senegal
seemingly requested $7 billion in financial support from Taipei. Once granted, the loan
followed a circuitous route, and the money finally passed between heads of state in theform of a personal gift between friends, to be invested in ‘social sectors’. Media reports
confirm that there is no trace of these funds in the public treasury. During the 2012
presidential election campaign this transactional incident in Senegal’s foreign policy wasparticularly troublesome for two candidates, both of them former prime ministers under
President Wade.4

L A W A ND S T A TUTE
Senegalese foreign policy is usually carried out in compliance with the general, establishedpractice of an all-powerful executive authority determining the conduct of foreign affairs,in line with law, statute and convention. Nevertheless, elements peculiar to Senegal serve
to reinforce the monopolisation of external policy by the executive and, more specifically,by the presidency.
The executive
The president is at the heart of the foreign policy apparatus and his functions in that area
are many and varied. First, in a symbolic and general way, the head of state is responsible
for ensuring territorial integrity and national independence: the importance of this partof the presidential function is mentioned twice in Senegal’s constitution. In taking theoath of office the president commits to ‘devoting all [his] efforts to protecting territorial
integrity and national independence’ and ‘making every effort for the realisation of
African unity’ (Article 37 of the constitution). In addition, when setting out the generalfunctions of the president, the constitution refers to ‘guaranteeing the regular operationof institutions, national independence and integrity of the territory’ (Article 42). Under
the same provision, the president ‘determines the policy of the nation’. Clearly, foreign
relations are part of this national policy; hence the presidency is the constitutional entitythat in practice defines the direction of Senegalese external policy.
‘Territorial integrity and national independence’ are included in another duty of thepresident: that of taking measures deemed necessary in the event of a sudden crisis.
Exactly what would constitute such a crisis is not specified in the constitutional text
(Article 52) but it is clear that the international dimension is implicit and there is a strong
possibility that events to which the text refers might derive from, or refer to, some aspectsof foreign policy. Indeed, this is made explicit in a reference in the constitution to an event
through which ‘the institutions of the Republic, independence of the Nation, integrity of

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national territory or the implementation of international commitments are threatened ina serious and immediate manner.’
There exists, therefore, at least the hypothetical possibility that issues linked toforeign incidents could play a part in the event of such a crisis. In that case, too, it is thepresident who is supposed to react. Endowed with ‘exceptional powers’, as the text states,
he is charged to ‘take any [required] measure … to re-establish the regular operationof public authorities …’. Similarly, the presidency is the institutional authority throughwhich the state’s power of legation is exercised: that is, laws under which ambassadors areaccredited abroad and those by which Senegal receives ambassadors of other countries.
The president thus has an overall remit for diplomatic relations; and nothing in that area
can be considered formally without his specific authorisation.
There is a further provision in the constitution that reflects the unfettered powerof Senegal’s head of state. Under the provision that opens the chapter on international
treaties, it is the president who ‘negotiates international commitments’ (Article 95). Of
course, in practice the president does not take part himself and is merely kept informedof negotiations; hence this provision should not be interpreted literally. That said, thewording of this presidential authority is moot: it lays down that under the constitution thepresident of Senegal is charged with keeping a watchful eye on the country’s diplomacy.
Another distinctive aspect of Senegalese policy, not always found in the constitutionsof other African countries, is the use of the term international ‘commitments’ rather than,
as is normal in other countries, international ‘treaties’. The notion of an international
commitment is very wide. It covers not only arrangements that Senegal concludes withother states or international organisations, but also, by extension, actions which may
be obligatory on member states of organisations to which Senegal belongs. Thus, forexample, an obligatory resolution of the UN or a ruling by the Economic Community ofWest African States (Ecowas) may constitute an international commitment by Senegal
and logically the president should be advised of it. This condition helps strengthen thehead of state’s hold on the conduct of Senegal’s external relations.
In the same vein, it should be noted that the presidency is the authority whichapproves and ratifies Senegal’s treaties and agreements. The distinction between ‘treaties’and ‘agreements’ is inherited from France, which inserted this provision into its own
constitution in 1958. In doing so it gave the new French government the power torepresent France diplomatically, a power that had been previously solely in the hands ofthe president; thenceforward the government, represented by the prime minister or theminister of foreign affairs, was to approve agreements and the head of state ratify treaties.
This distinction was included in the constitution Senegal adopted after it became
independent in 1960, but it has not had the same practical effect as in France. There
are indeed treaties and agreements that require ratification or approval, but in Senegal
this is always done by the same person: the president of the republic. The distinction
made in Article 98 of the constitution therefore has no practical value, but neverthelesscomprises an additional irrelevance that reinforces presidential hyper-power over Senegal’s
foreign policy.
Two other external trends increase the influence of the president. The first of theseis the practice of summit diplomacy, in effect meetings between heads of state, possibly
accompanied by ministers of foreign affairs who in reality play no important role. Thesemeetings are not merely ornamental and they are not solely related to protocol; but

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increasingly are forums where critical decisions are made. In principle there is nothing
to stop heads of state taking up any given issue, thereby short-circuiting more traditional
diplomatic networks such as those of the MFA or its diplomatic representatives abroad.
It is a new style of diplomacy that while certainly not unique to Senegal, obviously tends
to reinforce the hold of the executive in general, and the president in particular, over its
international policy. Summit diplomacy is frequently characterised by initiatives such as
the use of special envoys and other emissaries, which is disruptive of traditional foreign
policy channels. In the recent past, Senegal has frequently participated in this new kindof diplomatic game: its dispatch of emissaries to Ivory Coast in the 2002 civil war there,
and personal mediation in the internal political conflict in Mauritania after its coup d’étatin 2008, are cases in point.
The second trend is linked to efforts by continental African organisations – among
others – to establish a so-called ‘supreme body’ through a system of conferences of headsof state and government. It is hard to discern wherein this supremacy actually lies, but
the establishment of such institutions has the effect of accruing supplementary powers tomeetings of heads of state; and their attendant actions and decisions take on a quality thatcan extend to arrogating to themselves a form of immunity from jurisdiction (as is clear
from the practices of some African organisations).
Clearly, the powers of the Senegalese president in external policy are very important.
Per contra, the authority of government institutions under the control of the prime
minister is non-existent in foreign policy terms. It might have been more appropriate toplace the treaty-agreements mentioned earlier under the aegis of the head of governmentor the MFA, which is a properly constituted diplomatic body; but such devolution of
powers of diplomatic representation has not yet taken place (although presidential
monopoly control within the executive in practice derives from the functions granted
different ministers). Other, devolved powers vested in the legislature and judiciary are in
striking contrast to the presidential authority cited above, but even so the legislature has
been stripped of an important part of its rights with regard to foreign policy.
The legislature
The tenuous hold of parliament over external policy is demonstrated by the substantial
number of agreements concluded by Senegal that are completely out of parliamentary
control. These are so-called ‘simplified’ or ‘executive’ agreements, which come into force
not through a specific Act of Ratification but merely on the signature of a representativeof the state. This practice originated in the US, where such agreements have always beenpresented as reflecting a desire to avoid bottlenecks in the legislature. Such concerns –as well as the desire for speedy implementation – exist in other countries and Senegal
is no exception; the constitution recognises the possibility of concluding agreements
without the consent of parliament. Article 95 gives the president power to ratify orapprove international commitments ‘possibly’ [sic] on parliamentary authorisation: theword ‘possibly’ in this context indicates that such authority need not be sought. Indeed
Senegal, in line with several other countries, increasingly resorts to simplified agreements,
often signed by members of the executive (particularly ministers), but never subject toparliamentary scrutiny. Despite constitutional amendments in 1963, 1970, 1991, 1998
and (particularly) 2001, the provisions applying to the conduct of external relations have

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never varied. On a strictly legal and formal level, therefore, there is a high degree ofcontinuity in the organisation of Senegal’s international relations; the government has
consistently operated on the basis of established provisions.
In practice, like other parliaments in the world, the Senegalese legislature has expressed
itself in terms of foreign policy only through the act that authorises the president to
ratify or approve treaties and agreements. In those cases there is a set procedure. First,
through the MFA, the authorities conclude and sign an international treaty or agreement;
the legislature plays no part in negotiation procedures. The government (invariably
through the MFA) then prepares and submits a draft bill based on the signed agreement,
for ratification or approval; this text is adopted by the council of ministers, thereby
becoming a draft bill. Finally, parliament adopts the text, which then becomes an ‘act ofauthorisation of ratification’ that often consists of a single article, reading: ‘[T]he Presidentof the Republic is authorised to ratify the treaty … concluded by Senegal.’Should parliament reject the act of authorisation the president is obliged to submit to
its authority. In turn, if the act is adopted the president can ratify it by solemnly expressing
the commitment of Senegal to its provisions and signing the document, which thenbecomes the ‘letter of ratification’. This process notwithstanding, some categories of thetreaty cannot be enacted without parliamentary intervention. According to Article 96 of
the constitution these include:‘peace treaties, trade treaties, treaties or agreements in relation to international organisations,those which commit state finances, those which amend provisions of a legislative nature,
those which are in relation to the state of people, those which consist of the transfer,
exchange or attachment of territory.’

Withal, the power of the Senegalese legislature is greatly attenuated. One reason forthis is that foreign policy does not always interest parliamentarians, whose institutional
culture lends itself more to purely national matters, often those linked to local orparochial concerns. There is no strong evidence to indicate that Senegalese politicians areinterested in diplomatic issues. True, the government may be induced into a declaration
on some aspect of foreign policy, but in the main this happens only through requests
from individual members of parliament – there is no institutionalised framework fordiscussion of diplomatic issues, or at least not one that is ever used. The establishment ofso important an institution as an overseas ministry has not changed this. One might hopethat current intensification pressure on the international relations portfolio might lead therepresentatives of the people to become more interested in foreign issues. For the moment,
however, foreign policy is seen as outside the range of parliament, and no doubt partly forthis reason the quality of human resources allocated to it requires improvement. It is equallyevident that parliamentarians are not informed from the outset of matters that mightinterest them: for example parliament was entirely excluded from any discussion of two
recent agreements on the socially significant issue of migratory flows, that were concluded
respectively with France and Spain and implemented by way of simplified agreements.
A second, more institutional reason for limits on legislative power is thatparliamentarians have no authority to amend international texts submitted to them.
Should they require a draft to be modified or changed in detail they are obliged toapproach the executive authority that originally negotiated the agreement, which in turn

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should initiate talks with the other party to effect the change. There is no evidence in
official records of parliamentary debates of any such approach having taken place.
Finally, there is nothing in Senegalese law that enables, let alone obliges, parliament tofollow up on the application of agreements that it has ratified. In most countries it is to be
expected that any amendment or revocation of such an agreement would itself be subject
to fresh debate by parliamentarians. This process does not exist in Senegal, which adds tothe impression that parliament is not an important factor in external policy.
The judiciary
The judiciary authority of Senegal influences foreign policy only in a very peripheral andindirect way. Courts and tribunals are not involved in determining such policy; although
in fulfilling their duty to pronounce on legal matters they can examine international
agreements. Such scrutiny takes place for two main reasons.
The first is to ensure that international commitments comply with the constitution.
It is of course to be expected – in Senegal as in many other countries – that before
concluding international agreements, national authorities ensure conformity of theagreement with both national and international standards (most importantly with theconstitution) because national laws form part of the international legal structure. Hencelegal scrutiny is preventive in nature, to ensure that before the state commits itself toan international agreement the latter must be examined in the light of the state’s own
laws. In Senegal, this control is exercised through the office of the constitutional counsel,
who is a judge of the constitutional court. It must however be noted that such juridical
intervention in foreign policy is extremely rare. To date, despite the establishment in 1992
of a special constitutional tribunal, there has been only one case of direct confirmation oflegal compliance: a decision in December 1993 on the treaty establishing the Organisation
for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA).
The general failure by the constitutional counsel to intervene in legal aspects of foreign
policy is a matter for regret. One way to improve the situation could be to give members ofparliament the right to question the judge on the constitutional conformity of any foreign
agreement (importantly, the OHADA opinion was delivered at the request of the president,
not parliament). Parliament already enjoys this right of scrutiny over domestic law; hence
one might extend the principle of parliamentary notification to treaty issues and hope thatover time the innovation would not become a dead letter. Deputies from minority parties
might even find an ally of sorts in the constitutional counsel.
The second reason for judicial scrutiny of an international treaty instrument is‘regulation of agreements’: the procedure by which judges decide, at the request of
a litigating party, to strike down any national regulation that would contravene aninternational commitment of the state. At present, the regulation of conventions insuch disputes is deplorably bad. This is undoubtedly related to ignorance of Senegal’sinternational commitments on the part of lawyers and magistrates. In the 36 years of
its existence (1960–1992 and 2009 to the present) the Supreme Court of Senegal hasdelivered only five decisions on international treaties.
There is a striking contrast between the number of international instruments likely
to be applied in Senegal, and the absence of disputes in relation to them. Few litigants
are prepared to seek guidance from arguments at international level which would help

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them win cases before Senegalese courts. For example, there is little doubt that legal
instruments on freedom of movement adopted by sub-regional organisations suchas Ecowas and the West African Economic and Monetary Union could be useful indomestic legal processes concerning nationals of their member states. It would, however,appear that no legal decision has been delivered regarding acts such as those relating
to three Ecowas protocols (respectively of 1979, 1986 and 1990) concerning the freemovement of people; even though incidents of victimisation of immigrants at border zones
are commonplace. In addition, although the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women has bound Senegal since 1985, the country’s
family code still contains somewhat discriminatory provisions that fail to take into account
this international commitment. As far as can be ascertained there has been no importantjudgement on any of these points, even though the primacy of international over nationallaw is enshrined in Article 98 of the Senegalese constitution.

BEYOND L A W : THE POL I T I C A L RE A L I TY
Legalistic and doctrinal scrutiny of Senegal’s foreign policy is clearly only one of several
possible approaches and it is worthwhile moving beyond formal provisions to focus onpracticalities. The question then becomes one of examining wider developments andcharacteristics of Senegalese diplomacy since 2000. From that standpoint, three main
trends emerge.
Economic and commercial
The first of these is the importance in modern diplomacy of economic and commercial
considerations. This is based on an increasingly pressing need for national economic
development, as well as the cultivation of emerging countries as new diplomatic partners.
Against this background, in the first decade of this century Senegalese diplomacy has
revived a concept that originated in the 1970s when there was much talk of a newinternational economic order. This is the idea of South–South dialogue.
Senegal is now heavily involved in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development(Nepad), which is based on a sense that processes of development aid or assistance havereached their limit, and that the African continent is rich rather than intrinsically poorand has everything to gain from economic exchanges between its nations. Nepad also
rests on the idea that the involvement of three or four of the continent’s leading economic
powers can have beneficial effects on the development of other African countries. It istrue that almost 10 years after it was established, in terms of concrete results, Nepad
has fallen short of the hopes placed in it. Undeniably it has its limitations, including
the excessive importance attached to individuals and an inadequate institutional orconsensual foundation. Nevertheless, as a project it is a good example of the mobilisationof Senegalese diplomatic resources to commercial or economic ends.
The stress on commerce in diplomacy is also manifested in Senegal’s alliances with
newly industrialising states, bonds that are very firmly centred on economic ties. The
former Senegalese diplomat Ousmane Camara has drawn attention to the renewalof co-operation between Senegal and countries from the Persian Gulf, as well as withS A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 141

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members of the BRICS group (Brazil, India, Russia, China and South Africa).5 Senegal
has also intensified its relationships with countries such as Iran, Morocco and Dubai,
to an extent that seemingly causes concern among traditional economic partners suchas France. The most striking example of this realignment was the decision to entrust
to Dubai interests the construction of the ambitious Diamniadio development scheme:an economic and commercial project that aims to create thousands of jobs within anindustrial site of more than 2 500ha about 40km from Dakar, and to open up the Dakar
region as a whole. Companies associated with the Dubai Ports World group signed amemorandum of agreement with the Senegalese government in December 2006. It is
anticipated that the site will host 600 companies within five years and total funding forthe project, largely sourced through the US foreign aid agency Millennium Challenge
Corporation, is estimated at $1 billion.6
Dubai also has powerful interests in other sectors, including Senegal’s hotel industry.
According to the Chamber of Commerce of the Emirates, commercial exchanges between
Senegal and Dubai increased from $14.2 million in 2003 to $184 million in 2009.7 Personal
relationships between the Emirates authorities and President Wade’s son are no secret:the latter is a powerful government minister with an accumulation of portfolios covering
infrastructure, transport, energy and international co-operation. The diplomatic alliancewith Dubai is therefore the result of a combination of economic and personal associations.
Other similar developments have taken place: For example, Morocco was selected as a
strategic partner for the former national air transport company Air Sénégal International,
and an Indian enterprise was selected to manage freight at the port of Dakar (to thedetriment, it was suggested, of the French investment and industrial group Bolloré, which
has a powerful presence in Africa). The new economic and commercial ties with China,also, are important enough to have produced immediate and marked effects in Senegal’s
domestic economy, particularly with regard to availability of consumer goods.
Since 2000 Senegal has frequently been invited to diplomatic meetings with a strong
economic thrust, such as the summits of the G-7 (Group of Seven) and G-20 (Group of
Twenty) groupings, and Senegal was also invited (with other African states including
Algeria, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Malawi and Nigeria)8 to the June 2010 Toronto
G-8 (Group of Eight) summit and to the 2011 G-8 meeting in Deauville, France. The
declaration adopted at the end of that meeting led to important economic negotiations
with other African countries present.9
This economic emphasis in diplomatic affairs is not, of course, confined to Senegal but
relates to more general developments worldwide: it is clear that the era when diplomacy
mainly centred on matters of sovereignty and high politics has come to an end.10 While
Senegal is no exception to this global rule, it nevertheless remains true that the new thrustof its diplomacy is a significant aspect of the country’s recent history. As noted earlier, thedevelopment imperative helps explain this shift, but it is also fair to add that President
Wade was himself interested in economic matters and in general African affairs11 and wasfamiliar with the new trend.
Pan-Africanist developments
The second main tendency in the country’s new diplomatic stance arises from a renewedinterest in Pan-Africanism and African economic and political integration. Pan-Africanist

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thinking in Senegal goes back to 1963 and the establishment at the meeting in Addis
Ababa that established the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which was charged withbringing about the union of African nations. This prompted changes in Senegalese foreign
policy strategies that were approved at the highest level. The re-emergence of the PanAfrican theme, however, comes after some decades in which it was more or less forgotten.
This may be due both to factors concerning the African continent as a whole, and thoseparticular to Senegal.
General factors include the development of African international organisations andthat of the OAU. Although some change was evident from the beginning of the 1990s,
it was only after 2000 that those organisations were subject to substantial changes
arising from a perceived need for wider integration among African nations. In pursuitof this end, member states felt it necessary to concede a degree of national sovereignty,
and consequently to surrender wider powers and jurisdiction to the new institutional
structures. This was true of sub-regional organisations but primarily of the OAU, whichin 2000 changed its name to the African Union (AU). Behind the change of name lay
a change of philosophy, as member states acknowledged the need to strengthen theorganisation. At the same time, thinking within the AU turned to the establishment of thefirst elements of a ‘government of Africa’. This new environment was bound to influencenational diplomacy, and governments in turn were obliged to make pronouncements on
the changes in train; hence the question of Pan-Africanism once again arose as a topic ofdiscussion between states.
Senegal tacitly accepted the strength of its involvement in the new structure by joining
states such as Libya in calling for immediate African political unity. This represented achange in the Senegalese position from the 1960s to the 2000s. In 1963 when the OAU
was founded, Senegal was itself going through a gradual, progressive shift towards
national unity, as the then President Léopold Senghor had acknowledged at the Addis
Ababa conference. By 2000, however, Senegal’s domestic situation had changed radicallyand the country featured among advocates for the immediate establishment of politicaldecision-making structures at a global level. Clearly this position, taken with factors suchas Nepad, leads to Senegalese diplomatic positions so avant-garde that they might be seen
as somewhat reckless in their allegiance to the cause of African unity. The political analyst
Abdou Lô has drawn attention to this aspect,12 while the former Minister of Foreign
Affairs Cheikh Tidiane Gabio13 has noted the high stakes nature of this Pan-Africanist
orientation, as well as pointing out some more subjective aspects, such as disagreements
among institutional or personal leaders that are more or less cloaked from the public gaze.
Of course, assessment of the Pan-Africanist issue as it affects the recent external
policy of Senegal must be qualified. More precisely, one might query the nature of PanAfricanism per se. If an abstract political idea such as this is to have a chance of quickly
becoming concrete reality, it must reflect the material economic interests of member states
and a sense of the practicality of the solidarity between them. It is by no means evident
that when Pan-Africanism re-emerges into the fierce light of rigorous intellectual scrutiny,
it will correspond with the new economic realities; nor is it clear that in the real world
an institution based on political solidarity can maintain its economic cohesion. Several
observers have pointed to aspects of co-operation between various parties in Africa that
tend to put the Pan-African project at risk; a case in point is the extreme weakness of
co-operation between Senegal and states in central Africa.14

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Personal influence
The third tendency in today’s Senegalese diplomacy is an increased personalisation that
centres on the presidency. Given that the legal and institutional environment of Senegal
in itself makes for a strong presence on the diplomatic scene of the head of state – to thepoint where other powers are drastically reduced – this would be the case regardless of
the individual in power. What is in question is more a matter of the personal approachof the head of state, and of his diplomatic style; subjective factors that must be taken
into consideration alongside the more objective elements that guarantee the preeminence of the head of state in the conduct of international relations. Personalisationof Senegalese diplomacy under the Wade presidency resulted in the conjunction of legal
and constitutional elements with personal considerations. Of the four heads of state that
Senegal has had to date, President Wade is undoubtedly the one whose conduct of foreign
policy has been the most individualistic.
Such an approach certainly can have its advantages, particularly in the context ofmediation or conflict resolution, when the confidence inspired by the mediator may
carry some weight. It can, however, also present problems in that endorsement by
individuals often means setting aside legal mechanisms and procedures; and also because
the behaviour of the person concerned can act as an obstacle to negotiation albeit
simultaneously building confidence. It is obvious that this may give rise to tensions withother states by crystallising enmities or misunderstandings between the parties.
Some statements by President Wade caused concern in certain quarters: at the
opening of a forum on racism, xenophobia and intolerance in Dakar in January 200115
the president declared that ‘the Burkinabe are experiencing at this time in the Ivory Coast
what no African is experiencing in Europe.’ This statement was sufficiently incendiaryto all but torch the diplomatic relationship between Senegal and Ivory Coast.16 During a2010 diplomatic storm that arose when former Chadian President Hissène Habré, whose
extradition had been requested by Belgium, took refuge in Senegal, a statement by thepresident exposed contradictions in the Senegalese position. ‘Frankly, I regret having
accepted [the presidential] portfolio,’ he declared, ‘because I did not obtain the … support
that I was seeking. At the next AU summit, I will say ‘‘take back your post”, or I am
going to send Habré back to some other place … I am clearly saying this, I am going to
get rid of him’.17 A third instance arose after the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti when
the president made a purely personal decision that Senegal should host several Haitian
university students. In a speech on 13 October 2010 at the foot of the ‘Monument of theAfrican Renaissance’, President Wade declared:‘[W]e estimated that it was necessary to give our brothers and sisters from Haiti the rightto escape from the recurring disasters in their country and establish themselves at home,in Africa … I wanted to put words into action to demonstrate the humane relationship …
which unites Africa with its Diaspora’.

This personalisation of foreign policy has induced something of a malaise among a numberof people, to the extent that several former diplomats voiced regret over the ‘relegation of
the administration’ through a game of personal alliances that can leave outsiders with noinstitutional anchor.

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These facts do not, however, translate into a politicisation of public office in the realms
of foreign policy. Although President Wade was able to make a very personal impression on
diplomacy and to attract into the diplomatic corps some individuals of a more quotidian
background, it cannot be said that political rot has entirely taken over the diplomaticfunction. Essentially, the Senegalese diplomatic cadre continues to emerge by way ofopen competition within the civil service and promotion is according to fairly transparent
criteria: alarm bells on the politicisation of personal careers have not yet sounded.
Unquestionably it is this last aspect that explains why, even if diplomats are concerned
about certain directions of foreign policy, they do not react in a hostile manner and as a
unified body. There is in Senegal a culture of high public office, a respect for authority
and a sense of duty that together do not make for revolt against authority. Diplomats are
not formed into a more or less specific union, they do not express themselves publicly
about their country’s diplomatic choices and they cannot contest the way in which theauthorities, and particularly the president, represent Senegal overseas. Undoubtedly thisattitude towards authority owes much to the fact that access to diplomatic careers remains
relatively stable.
The present situation does not call for a wholesale re-think of the legal structures thatgovern the conduct of international relations in Senegal. On the contrary, this paper simply
indicates that the president of the republic, while he must remain a major diplomatic
authority, is nevertheless accumulating too much power in that area as a consequence ofa more general problem: the outrageously presidential and personal nature of the entire
political system in Senegal, as well as in other comparable countries.

CONCLU S I ON
In common with virtually every country on the globe and in particular those in Africa,
Senegal has seen elements of its foreign affairs reflect more general developments. The
domination of technical aspects of foreign policy, and today’s stress on economic diplomacy,
which by its nature is less focused on matters of national sovereignty per se, has alreadybeen noted, as has the more Pan-Africanist dimension of foreign policy since 2000.
Moreover, since March 2012 when President Wade was defeated in the polls by former
Prime Minister Macky Sall, Senegal has gone through a second major political change. In
the short time since then some changes in foreign policy, not necessarily spectacular or
revolutionary, have become apparent.
The first is that Senegal has reverted to a more traditional diplomatic approach. In
this respect three developments can be observed. The first of these is the restorationof a prioritised relationship with France. The very first trip by the new head of stateoutside of Africa was to France. Beyond the obvious symbolism, this visit resulted insignificant financial support from France in the wake of President Sall’s assessment that
Senegalese public finances were in a worrying state. This first visit took place only days
after President Nicolas Sarkozy lost the French presidential election, and a second took
place soon after Sarkozy’s successor François Hollande assumed office. Senegal–France
bilateral agreements have already been concluded, with an ease and smoothness that has
prompted some domestic criticism. (Unquestionably these developments are related to
Senegal’s support for Jean Ping, the Gabonese candidate campaigning for a renewed term

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as president of the African Union Commission and who in the event was defeated by hisSouth African rival Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. By supporting a candidate from anotherFrench-speaking country Senegal embellished its Francophone credentials.)
Secondly, under the new president there is noticeably more concern that Senegal should
maintain a good name among international institutions. The new broom is demonstrating
his regard for good governance, which explains a wave of audits and other enquiries aimed
at exposing the illicit enrichment of previous leaders – relevant jurisdiction in this area
dates from 1981, but has never been seriously applied – and ensuring the repatriation ofwrongfully acquired property. France and the US were quick to offer their assistance inthis endeavour.
Third is the restoration of ‘good neighbour’ relationships. In an interview with
Jeune Afrique in June 201218, President Sall clearly indicated a shift from the previous
government’s approach to managing these relationships, which had been less than optimal
with countries such as Gambia – an enclave of Senegal – or Mauritania. Indeed, thepresident’s very first journey abroad took in first Gambia then Mauritania. None of thesenew developments, of course, implies that some established aspects of foreign policy will
not survive. Existing relationships with Kuwait, for example, were reinforced through aJuly 2012 agreement with the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development to provide$8 billion in loans to Senegal.
While at first glance it might appear that the new political environment that arose after
2000 also changed Senegalese foreign policy, closer study shows that this rather simplistic
view must be rejected. Political change did not, in and of itself, jeopardise the policy
continuity associated with more classical conventional diplomacy in Senegal.

ENDNOTE S
1

Ambassador KB Cisse, ‘Les institutions et les structures qui définissent la politique extérieuredu Sénégal’. (details of place and date unavailable).

2

Ambassador SN Ba, ‘La politique étrangère du Sénégal en Afrique de lOuest et en particulier
avec ses voisins immédiats’. (details of place and date unavailable).

3

Carron De La Carriere G, ‘Omniprésente économie’, in Charillon F (ed.), Politique étrangère:
nouveaux regards. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2002, pp. 244–245.

4

The money received from Taiwan apparently would have been transferred to the account of ason of the envoy of the head of state, the French businessman Pierre Aïm. A communiqué fromthe Office of the President of the Republic dated 5 February 2006 admitted to the receipt offunds. For details, see Le Témoin (Niamey), 12–18 December 2006. Press reports on this affair
resulted in no denial or legal proceedings from the authorities. For more recent developments,
see Le Quotidien (Dakar), 7 December 2011.

5
6

Carron De La Carriere G, op. cit.
Republic of Senegal, Projet de la Plateforme du Millénaire de Diamniadio. Poverty impact analysis,
final report. Dakar: Agence de Mise en Oevre de la Plateforme du Millénaire de Diamniadio,
16 May 2007. p. 4.

7

La Gazette (Dakar), 22 September 2010.

8

See http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20100625.

9

See http://news.alibo.com/spip.php.

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10

Communication par Alioune Fall, ‘Les facteurs politiques et économiques intérieurs qui
influent sur la politique étrangère du Sénégal: Rôle de la société civile et de laide étrangère
dans la définition de la politique étrangère du Sénégal, la politique étrangère du Sénégal et lesmédias’.

11
12

Wade A, Un destin pour lAfrique. Paris: Editions Karthala, 1989.
Lo AK, ‘La politique étrangère du Sénégal au sein de l’Union Africaine et pour le projet desEtats Unis dAfrique’.

13

Gadio CT, ‘Coopération diplomatique Sénégal/Afrique du Sud sur les questions touchantl’Afrique de l’Ouest, l’Afrique Australe et le continent africain’.

14

Kaba I, ‘Les relations entre le Sénégal et les pays de la Communauté Economique des Etats del’Afrique Centrale (Ceeac)’.

15‘L’Afrique de l’Ouest dans la zone des tempêtes’, Le Monde Diplomatique, March 2001.

16

Alphonse Djédié, diplomatic adviser to Ivory Coast President Gbagbo, declared: ‘One has theright to support one candidate, but … [not] to conspire with a view [to] destabilisation’. The
Embassy of the Ivory Coast in Dakar published a communiqué denouncing ‘an unfriendly act’,
http://french.peopledaily.com, accessed 10 November 2010.

17

See www.afriqueavenir.org, accessed 11 December 2010.

18

See Jeune Afrique, 2685, 24–30 June 2012, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2685p026-032.xml0/.

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S A I I A’ s f u n d i n g P r o f i l e
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Development Cooperation Agency, the Canadian International Development Agency,
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