OSIPP Discussion Paper : DP-2018-E-007

Explaining the Undemocratic Results of Democratic Revolutions:
The Necessity and Rationality of Democratic Slogans
May 2, 2018

Taku Yukawa*
Associate Professor, Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP)

Kaoru Hidaka
Invited Researcher, Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP)【 Keywords 】 democratic revolution, post-revolution, democratic stagnation,
electoral fraud【Abstract】Why democratic revolutions do not always result in democratization?
Existing research suggest a “semblance” of democratic revolution leads to astagnant democratization: since the participants of the revolution are notcommitted to democratic values in the first place, there are no advances indemocratization after the revolution. However, these works have significant
shortcomings. First, the question of why the slogan of democracy is adopted
although democratic values are not sought out has not been clarified. Second,
post-revolution analysis of how it will affect politics thereafter has been
overlooked. To fill these gaps, we point out three strategic rationalities andnecessities behind the semblance: (1) organizing large scale dissident movements
in a country; (2) attracting international support; and (3) imitating successful
examples from the past. Further, we focus on the phenomenon whereby
fraudulent elections in the post-revolution period are tolerated by citizens, eventhough they protested against the fraudulence at the time of the revolution. The
results will hamper a shift in the source of legitimacy from a revolution todemocracy, thereby lead to a stagnated democratization. Evidence from the 2003
Rose Revolution in Georgia supports this theory.
Corresponding Author. Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University,
Address: 1-31 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPAN.
Email: yukawa@osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp
1*1. Introduction
This paper considers the effect of democratic revolutions on democratization. “Democratic revolution”
is a relatively new term and phenomenon. Revolutionary research has been around in political science for along time. Revolution is often defined as “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and classstructures accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below”1, with researchers
basically referring to “revolution” as political change resulting from conflict among classes, involving alarge number of people participating in violent, short-term movements 2 . The Chinese and Cuban
revolutions are typical examples.
Since the 1980s, a new type of revolution has started to occur3. Centered in urban areas, these are basedon non-violent methods including protests and demonstrations4, with much of these falling outside thedefinition of conventional revolutions. A representative example is the 1986 People Power Revolution in
the Philippines. In response to the outbreak of this new type of revolution, Goldstone put forth a broader
definition, suggesting this was “an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications forpolitical authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization andnon-institutionalized actions that undermine existing authorities”5. The democratic revolutions consideredin this paper are categorized as such new types of revolution. Thompson defined democratic revolutions as“spontaneous popular uprisings which people topple unyielding dictators and begin a transition process
which leads to the consolidation of democracy”6. As mentioned above, this is characterized by the main
participants being urban residents and, in addition to being non-violent, these movements can besummarized as involving demands for democratic reforms, as well as the denunciation of fraudulent
elections or coups.
In this paper, we do not concern ourselves with clarifying factors that contribute to the success or failureof democratic revolutions. We do not explore the conditions under which revolutionary forces cause
governments to fall. Naturally, large numbers of citizens entering the streets to demand democracy does
not always result in the existing system being overturned. Mass protests and demonstrations sometimes
result in regime change but, sometimes, such efforts are suppressed and fail to topple the existing system,
such as in China in 1989, and Myanmar (then known as Burma) in 1988. In this sense, naturally thequestion of just what kind of protests by common people leads to the overthrowing of authoritarianregimes presents an intriguing topic and, indeed, there have been studies on the so-called “democratizationfrom below”. However, in this paper we do not seek to consider the success or failure of revolutions on thisbasis. Rather, we take up the question of whether the new regime created after the fall of an authoritarianregime will be democratic or not.
Intuitively, one would think that a democratic regime would follow a democratic revolution, as thepeople have carried out demonstrations that call for democracy and have actually succeeded in banishing a
dictator. Logically, the regime that follows certainly cannot be a dictatorship. However, in reality it has
been pointed out that cases exist where democratic revolutions have not resulted in democracies 7 .
Specifically, the so-called Color Revolutions8 of Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005),
as well as the Arab Spring that occurred in Tunisia and Egypt in 20119 are perfect examples of this.
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Following revolutions in these countries, no democratic institutional reforms were carried out, excessive
power was concentrated in the president, the power of the former regime was restored after the revolution,
elections were found to be fraudulent, the media was not independent, corruption increased, the rule of law
was inadequate, civil liberties were restricted, opposition parties had weak parliamentary powers, andsimilar characteristics were identified.
So, generally, what is the relationship between democratic revolutions and democracy? First, consider
how the Democratic Index changed before and after democratic revolutions. To that end, we must first
identify what examples of democratic revolutions exist; that is, we need to settle on a universe of
democratic revolutions. To date, attempts to list democratic revolutions are limited to Thompson (2004)
and Beissinger (2013). We therefore comprehensively sampled democratic revolutions referencing both.
Table 1 shows the difference in degree of democratization between the year previous to the revolution and
one year after the revolution using the Polity IV score, which is an index of democracy.
Country/Year

Polity IV
Pre-Revolution Post-Revolution

Sudan (1984)-7

7

Phillipines (1986)-6

8

South Korea (1986－87)-5

6

Romania (1987)-5

6

Czechoslovakia (1989)-7

8

Bulgaria (1989)-7

8

Benin (1989－90)-76

Nepal (1990)-2

5

Mali (1991)-7

7

Madagascar (1991)-7

7

Thailand (1992)-1

9

Indonesia (1998)-7

6

Serbia (2000)-6

7

Georgia (2003)

5

7

Ukraine (2004)

6

6

Kyrgyzstan (2005)-3

4

Nepal (2006)-6

6

Thailand (2006)-5

4

Kyrgyzstan (2009)

1

7

Tunisia (2011)-45

Egypt (2011)-6-6

Table 1. Democratic revolutions and the progress of democratization.

Summarized in this manner, with regards to the cases of Georgia, the Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan amongst
the chain reaction of system changes referred to as the Color Revolution and Egypt for the Arab Spring, we
can see that the degree to which democratic revolutions brought about democratization was limited. This isconsistent with the fact that it has been pointed out in existing research that the Color Revolution and ArabSpring did not produce democratization. On the other hand, other democratic revolutions saw
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fundamentally significant progress in democratization. While amongst these there is the case of the Sudan,
where four years after revolution, there was a coup d'état that led to regression back to an authoritariansystem, immediately after the revolution a democratic administration was indeed established.
Therefore, some democratic revolutions bring about dramatic democratization, while others—like theColor Revolution and Arab Spring—do not. The latter amongst these is enigmatic and requires analysis.
Why do large-scale protests obstinately aimed at democratization not result in democratic systems despite
the fact that they have toppled authoritarian regimes? In other words, in the present paper, we pose thequestion of why democratic revolutions do not always result in democratization.
Consequently, in this paper we concentrate on the semblance of democratic revolution10. In other words,
because the entities that participated in the revolution were not committed to democratic values in the firstplace, it is claimed that there were no advances in democratization after the revolution. However, there are
inadequacies in existing research, so it is not possible to answer the question of why some democratic
revolutions do not bring about democratization. First, the question of why the slogan of democracy isadopted despite the fact that democratic values are not sought out has not been clarified. In other words,
the rationality or necessity of semblance has not been clarified. Second, post-revolution analysis is
inadequate. That is to say, as democratic revolutions are all about semblance, the point of view on how itwill affect politics thereafter has collapsed. In this paper, we felt it necessary to clarify these two points toanswer the above question.

2. Prior Research
Why do some democratic revolutions not produce democracies? Unfortunately, there is not much priorresearch available on this point. First, as background to this question, there is debate on the point of
whether limited social movements involving non-violent participation, such as democratic revolutions, caneven be categorized as “revolutions” in the first place11. Second, research to date has almost without
exception concentrated on exactly which cases lead to the overthrow of existing regimes. Because it
assumes a binary confrontational dependent variable that addresses whether an existing regime can betoppled or not, post-revolution research has been insufficient. Third, although abundant research on
individual democratic revolutions exists, there is little in the way of cross-sectorial or theoretical inquiries.
Nonetheless, there have been studies that address the questions presented in this paper. Much present
research has been carried out from the viewpoint of why the Color Revolution did not produce
democracies. First, the most frequently identified factor is the weakness of civil society12. Because civilsociety was weak and divided, it was not able to counter situations where power was concentrated in thepresident after the revolution or corruption became prevalent.
Second, there were institutional factors at play. More specifically, it is often mentioned that institutional
design results in power being concentrated excessively in the president13. Accordingly, those seeking
concessions tend to congregate around the president, so checks and balances are not effective, making
authoritarian rule possible. In addition, institutional factors such as weak legislative power and politicalparties that are inequitable and lack transparency also promote such trends14. Third, we have international4

factors. It has been pointed out that international factors such as support from the US and the EU were
important in the success of the Color Revolution15, but involvement by the West declined after theserevolutions16. Considering revolution as the endpoint rather than the starting point of democratization, theUS and EU did not continue to support democratization post-revolution.
Summarizing the above studies, although the parties to the revolution— or at least the citizenry andsome elites— were fulfilling democratic values and attempting to build a democratic system, we see that
this was not realized due to structural obstacles of one type or another. On the other hand, research exists
suggesting that actors participating in the revolution, including citizens, were not pursuing democraticvalues17. Referred to as a “semblance of democratic revolution” by Beissinger (2013), this ultimately only
involved the outward appearance of a democratic revolution, and in fact there were no demands for
democratization; all that existed was dissatisfaction with the current administration due to poverty andsocial inequality. The same can also be said of the Arab Spring, where the people who participated in therevolution were not so much dissatisfied with non-democratic governance as they were with the economy18.
Thus, there was only the appearance of democratic revolution as presented by a negative coalition ofgroups dissatisfied with the government. This is why, following these revolutions, the coalitions, which
consisted of groups with a wide range of preferences that did not share democratic values, faced
dissolution, leading to political stagnation.
Related to this, Howard and Walters (2015) point out the existence of a “democratic bias”: while weknow that uprisings of the people do not necessarily lead to democratization and, despite the fact thatcitizen mobilization is not necessarily inspired by democratic norms, the media, researchers, and the policy
makers of other countries tend to arbitrarily frame these movements as “democratic revolutions.” Indeed,
the media depicted the Color Revolution and Arab Spring in a most positive light, describing them as“non-violent movements seeking democracy”19, while researchers early on framed the Ukraine’s Orange
Revolution as an example of a movement pressing for democratization20. Moreover, in May 2005 US
President George W. Bush visited Tbilisi, Georgia to take in the Revolution of the Roses and stated that itshould serve as a future precedent for the Caucasus and Central Asia21, while President Barack Obamadescribed the protests in Egypt as an “expression of people’s ‘pent-up frustration’ with the lack ofmeaningful reform in the country”22. In other words, there is a certain bias in the sense that observers also
tend to see popular uprisings as “democratic revolutions.”
Studies that used such methods as interviews with citizens who wholly participated in the revolutions, aswell as public opinion polls, to claim that the parties were not seeking democracy revealed the motivation
or internal aspects of the entities participating in the revolution. Through social surveys, such attempts arehighly valued for the fact that they empirically demonstrate a lack of commitment to democratic values.
Based on the results of empirical research, this paper shares a common ground for seeking out reasons for
democratic revolutions that do not result in democracy due to a lack of commitment to democratic values.
However, the present research has significant shortcomings, in that it does not clarify why democratization
was demanded in these revolutions despite a lack of support for democratic values. When it comes tomovements involving the large-scale participation of citizenry that result in governments quickly falling, it
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is by no means uncommon for these to not result in democracies. Therefore, there have been numerous
revolutions that have not advanced democracy. Looked at simply, the question is if, for example, an
economic recession or high unemployment rate is the main cause of frustrations, is this enough to fueldemonstrations? Just how can we understand this head-scratching phenomenon of revolution in the nameof democratization despite the fact that no democratic values are pursued? Prior research cannot answer
this. Below, we will first consider this matter both theoretically and hypothetically.

3. Theory: The Necessity and Rationality of Democratic Semblance
Why do principals who are disappointed with their current governments and thus motivated toparticipate in revolution promote democracy in these revolutions? As noted in this paper, we believe that
this has something to do with rationality and necessity. We argue, factors that cannot avoid taking on theform of democratic revolutions exist, as does the pretext that it is easier to overthrow an existing regime bytaking on the form of a democratic revolution, and that these serve to encourage “sham” democratic
revolutions. This is why, after toppling a regime, democratic values are no longer pursued anddemocratization becomes stagnant.
So, what is the necessity of all of this? We want to point out three things here. First, the framing of a“democratic revolution” is a positive influence on the mobilization of citizens in the anti-government
movement. In the research of social movements, it has been argued that, with framing, a function forforming a collective identity of “us,” who share common values, and “them,” who do not, as well as afunction for clarifying justices and injustices on the government side exist23. The utility of this is also
important in the context of the democratic revolution.
It has been argued that the various actors participating in the revolution in fact form a negative coalition
whose only common point is a loose dissatisfaction with the current government24. In such cases, thedissatisfaction felt with the government is hardly uniform, because there is such a large degree of variationin preferences, it is by no means natural that these individuals would come together to demonstrate25. As
such, seen from the point of view of the anti-government elite that mobilizes the citizenry, this lacks the
symbols necessary to bring together a diverse range of citizens. Looking back on the history of revolutions,symbols that unite citizens include ideologies such as communism (China, Vietnam, Cuba) and religions
such as Islamic fundamentalism (Iran)26. In contrast, in a democratic revolution, democracy is considered
to function as a symbol for mobilizing a diverse coalition of citizens. In other words, forming a collective
identity built around pursuing democracy leads to smoother mobilization and organization.
Furthermore, the framing of a democratic revolution also functions to censure the injustices of thepresent regime. In other words, by framing the existing administration as “a powerful dictatorship”
opposed to “we who pursue democracy,” lends legitimacy to a movement. This in turn provides therevolution with a moral foundation.
The statement above is the domestic rationale for implementing dissident movements; second, there is aneed to appeal to the international community to gain support. After the Cold War, democracy was given
normative values in the international community, and the US, EU, and other powers began to adopt
6policies for promoting democratization. Specifically, this support for democratization came with a large
price tag, and democratic governance, democratic reversals of coups and the like were sought as conditionsof aid. Given such a set of circumstances, it is important to tout democracy even when rising up to topple
the government. In addition to providing material support for NGOs and similar organizations, it was very
important for the US and the EU to express public support for these revolutions. This is because, in
addition to contributing to the justification of the movement itself and encouraging citizens to mobilizeeven more, this had the effect of deterring violent repression from the ruling power27.
In this way, in the sense that promoting specific values draws support from foreign countries, when it
comes to international rationale, these are also similar to revolutions that have occurred in the past. In otherwords, in the era of the proxy wars of the Cold War period, when there were actual confrontations between
ethnic groups, in order to gain the support of the US or Soviet Union, it was of the utmost strategic
importance to align the movement with either “individualism” or “communism.” Thus, even in the case of
a local conflict, it was necessary to give semblance to ideological conflicts. Therefore, we understanddemocratic revolutions to have a similar composition.
We have observed that, for successful revolutions, advancing democracy is strategically usefuldomestically and internationally. So now, as a third reason for advancing democracy, we need to illustrateinternational influences. It has been pointed out that international influences affected the Color Revolution
and Arab Spring28. The democratic revolution that occurs in one country feeds revolution in others. As amechanism of this, the first instance is recognized as a successful case and is imitated. Successful
revolutions spread as a type of modular29. Accordingly, if the population was mobilized to topple theregimes in Serbia, Czechoslovakia, and Tunisia—which are successful precedent cases— in the name of
democracy, even if democratic values are not pursued in other countries, strategic considerations involving
the validity of democratic revolutions are established and spread.
In addition, with regards to the Color Revolution it is also important that this modular takes the form ofan “election revolution.” In other words, we have an innovative set of coordinated strategies and tactics
that used elections to mobilize citizens against semi-authoritarian incumbents 30 . There is a certain
rationality in inciting demonstrations against election irregularities. During revolutions, crowds become
problematic. Regularly held elections, on the other hand, are highly predictable and, because preparations
can be carried out in advance, these provide people with a single focal point, and are thus useful inovercoming the issue of crowds31. Given this state of affairs, election revolutions are recognized as aneffective strategy and have consequently spread. Also, as revolutions triggered by election fraud, inevitably
these will have to take the form of democratic revolutions.
Above, we have summarized the necessity and rationality of taking on the form of a democratic
revolution even when not pursuing democratic values. I would like to call your attention to the first andsecond of these three necessities, which are thought to be mechanisms that were especially prevalent in theinternational community following the Cold War. It was after the Cold War that democracies acquired
normative values in earnest32. Accordingly, whether acting as a symbol bringing diverse powers together ina given country, or acting to gain the support of the international community, it was after the Cold War that7

democracies first began to acquire normative values in earnest. Following the Cold War, therefore, it has
become harder to transform regimes by revolutions that are not democratic revolutions. The end of theCold War and the accompanying normative fluctuations surrounding democracy converged to transform
revolution into democratic revolution.

4. Case Study: 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia
In this section we examine the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia as a case study to demonstrate that thesemblance of democratic revolution: (1) is effective in organizing large scale dissident movements in acountry; (2) is effective in attracting international support; and (3) involves the imitation of successful
examples from the past. The case of the Rose Revolution is selected for three reasons. First, the Rose
Revolution has been widely viewed as a typical case of democratic revolution33. It was triggered by amassive electoral fraud of the ruling party, and Georgian citizens’ mass demonstrations calling for
democracy finally succeeded in getting rid of the then-president Edward Shevardnadze. Second, the Rose
Revolution provides an appropriate case to examine the rationality behind the semblance of democratic
revolution and its effect on democratic governance, since it was the opposition themselves that framed theRose Revolution as a democratic revolution. Throughout the revolution, protest leaders repeatedly
appealed democratic value to the citizens so as to expand the size of the demonstration. The protests’leader Mikheil Saakashvili declared in the climax of the revolution “There is a bloodless, democratic,
peaceful, velvet revolution going on in our country.”34 Following the statement, the framing of the“democratic Rose Revolution” rapidly spread to the media35. In this regard, we can exclude the possibilityof “democratic bias” in the case of Rose Revolution. Third, the Rose Revolution remains relatively
underexplored in the literature, although it is regarded as a representative example of democratic
revolution. This is because existing empirical research has resorted primarily to the social survey method,
and therefore has focused exclusively on the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine on which plenty of social
survey and public opinion polls has been done. Therefore it would be empirically valuable to illuminate thepolitical process of the Rose Revolution and its aftermath.

4.1 Framing for Revolutionary Movements and Effect to Mobilization
In the evening of the 2003 parliamentary elections which triggered the revolution, Georgian opposition
parties were divided by their positions toward Shevardnadze, and competing with each other for votes
rather than forming a common front against the ruling party, Citizens' Union of Georgia36. Of the four main
opposition parties, the competition between National Movement-United Front (NM) led by Saakashvili
and Burjanadze Democrats (BD) led by Nino Burjanadze and Zurab Zhvania were particularly intense dueto their personal relationship. Saakashvili, for example, criticized the opposition stance of Zhvania rightbefore the November parliamentary elections, saying “If the President calls Zhvania tomorrow, he will run
without hesitation and stand with him. This is the conclusion I have made as a result of [my] relations withhim.”37
The lack of unity in the opposition persisted even after the exposure of an electoral fraud. When the
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Central Electoral Commission (CEC) began to release its fraudulent numbers, the NM wanted the CEC torecognize its victory since exit polls and the Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) both showed the NM had won
the election, whereas the BD who positioned in distant third among opposition parties did not want toacknowledge the result and called for new elections. After the NM and BD agreed to form the coalition andbegan protest calling for the resignation of Shevardnadze, Burjanadze herself articulated that she was not
calling for Shevardnadze’s resignation and was only demanding that ballots be recounted or that the votebe invalidated in Georgia's most controversial election districts38. In this regard, a real picture of therevolutionary movement was a negative coalition among different classes with diverse preferences, united
primarily by their common rejection of the incumbent regime.
Therefore, protesters had to integrate the revolutionary movement into a unified opposition and makethe mobilization and organization smoother. A member of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) admits
that the popular understanding of the Rose Revolution with hundreds of thousands of people coming to thestreets in support of a unified opposition was, to a great extent, the narrative the revolutionary government
encouraged39. The actual size of the demonstrations were not more than fifteen thousand in the first tendays or so, therefore many participants in fact feared the demonstrations would dissipate after a few days40.
Under such circumstances opposition began to use the framing of democratic revolution, in order toenlarge and maintain the revolutionary movements as a unified opposition.
Revolutionaries in fact did not actively employ the slogan of democratic revolution from the beginningof the protest movement. After Saakashvili became the primary leader of the demonstrations, he took an
approach of stimulating Georgian nationalism to mobilize people. For example, Saakashvili conducted amarch to Tbilisi from Zugdidi, the birthplace of Merab Kostava, the leader of independent movements
against Soviet Union, and Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the first president of Georgia, to appeal to the people’s
memory of state building.
However, as the mobilization grew, opposition leaders began to put forward the democratic value of therevolution. When the Defense Minister declared that the situation “has really turned uncontrollable,”
Zhvania described the circumstances as “People are really desperate…They understand if they miss thischance…then whatever can be considered democracy in Georgia would be over.”41 Similarly, Burjanadze
criticized that the regime’s election fraud “just crosses out Georgian democracy.”42 In response to these
critics Shevardnadze camp also countered by referring to democracy: “It's very important to change apresident by means of election and not by revolution” and otherwise we “cannot build up a democratic
country.”43 As such, democratic values came to emerge as a focal point of the revolution.
Also, as the revolution proceeded, protest movements began to emphasize the contrast between “we who
pursue democracy” and “those who espouse dictatorship.” On the one hand, protesters appealed to citizens
to rally under the flag of democracy, claiming that “We will not accept the death of democracy in Georgia,
we will not accept the Parliament that was appointed rather than elected, we will not accept stealing of thevotes and we will not accept the ballot fraud”44 and “Whole Georgia should stand up for our rights.”45 On
the other hand, protesters depicted Shevardnadze camp as a “post-Soviet dictator who ignored the will of
his people”46 and “all those bandits”47 “…will step down like Slobodan Milosevic,”48 who was ousted in
92000 Bulldozer Revolution. Based on this dichotomy, protesters censured the regime’s injustice intarnishing democracy and legitimacy, claiming that “These [election] results are illegitimate…It is a coupby the dictator Shevardnadze.”49
Protesters’ such framing of a democratic revolution effectively prompted mobilization and organizationof a negative coalition of diverse citizens, as we can find its influence in the participants’ discourses. For
example, Mukhti (charge), a keyword spread throughout the revolutionary process, indicates that a
unification grew inside the protest movements. According to participants, Mukhti implies a feeling of“uniting,” “we are together…Everybody feels the same things together, in a same situation.”50 Such aperception of mass togetherness among participants was created by skillful framing by Saakashvili;“Saakashvili always connects. People feel connected with him, together, the same. Mukhti is created fromthis unity, from feeling together.”51
Participants also revealed that Saakashvili and other leaders’ critics on the regime’s injustice, had amajor effect on their decision to join opposition movements, by taking advantage of the election fraud.
Before that, “people had always thought, “what could overthrow them?”52. In this regard, opposition
leaders “knew how to say what people needed to hear,” and effectively censured the regime’s injustice,claiming that “look, the government has falsified the elections and we must defend our votes.” 53
According to participants, “This was the point from which we could make a revolution and kick out thatgovernment,” and “If not for…Saakashvili and others coming out and telling people “look what the
government doing with you, what it has done with your votes, with your constitutional right to vote,” thenmaybe we would have swallowed this…”54

4.2 International Appeal
The second rationale behind the semblance of the democratic revolution is an appeal to international
community to gain support for protest movements. First, protesters had to gain material supports from theinternational community, especially from the EU and the US. In the growing tide of democratic promotion
after the end of the cold war, the pro-western Shevardnadze administration had enjoyed enormous financial
support from the west in the name of democratic assistance. Indeed, since the mid-1990s Georgia hasreceived more money per capita from the US than any other post-Soviet countries, and it ranked second
only to Israel with respect to US aid55.
Such material supports for democracy from the west contributed to the success of the Rose Revolution.
For instance, the exit poll and the PVT conducted on the polling day was funded by the US-based NDI and
the Soros Foundation. The Soros Foundation also financially supported various anti-government
movements, such as creating the Georgian student-based NGO Kmara which took initiative in therevolution, and connecting Kmara members and opposition political leaders to Otpor activists in Serbia todevelop their skills in the demonstration, and backing domestic monitoring effort by civic groups such as
International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy and Georgian Young Lawyers Association.
The pressure from the Bush administration at the time indicates that these assistance to revolutionary
movements in fact aimed towards democratization. In January 2003, Bush sent a letter to Shevardnadze,10demanding to “provide fair and free coming to the power of the new generation of leaders after 2003 and2005 elections.”56 Also in July 2003, former Secretary of State James Baker met with Shevardnadze andproposed a formula for representation of the various parties on the electoral commissions at each level57.
Under such circumstances, revolutionaries had a strong incentive to characterize the revolution as aprocess to western countries’ beloved democratization.
The second merit for opposition to appeal the democratic value internationally is to get the moral
legitimacy of being supported by international community, thereby making mobilization smoother. For
instance, a statement by the International Election Observation Mission, issued on the next day of thepolling, concluded that the elections “have regrettably been insufficient to enhance the credibility of either
the electoral or the democratic process.”58 Also, when the final election results were released by the CEC,
State Department spokesman Adam Ereli clarified the position of the US, stating: “We are deeply
disappointed in these results and in Georgia's leadership…The results do not accurately reflect the will of
the Georgian people but instead reflect massive vote fraud.”59
These official supports from the west contributed greatly to the mobilization. In response to the US
government’s accusation against the electoral fraud, the size of the mobilization of the revolution
dramatically increased, with thousands of cars of protesters marching toward Tbilisi, demanding
Shevardnadze’s resignation.60 Citizens surged into the Freedom Square with US national flags in theirhands, indicating the influence of obtaining an endorsement from the US on the legitimacy of and citizens’
decision to participate in the demonstration. After the revolution there was a billboard erected in downtown
Tbilisi with the words “Thank you, USA” on it61.
Thirdly, international appeal helped revolutionary movements by deterring the regime’s violent
repression. For instance, US Department of State repeatedly called on all sides to “refrain from the use offorce or violence.”62 Revolutionary movements used such external pressures to illegitimate the regime’s
violence, criticizing that “The US seeks for peaceful resolution of the current crisis. We want the same, but
Shevardnadze is the one, who seeks for opposite, destabilization and civil confrontation.”63
Such an approach to abstain the regime from using force indeed contributed to the peaceful resignationof Shevardnadze in the final stage of the revolution. When Shevardnadze declared state of emergency andmore than 10,000 troops faced off against opposition supporters, US Secretary of States Colin Powell and
UN Secretary General Kofi Anan urged Shevardnadze to peacefully work with the opposition64. Theinternational call for restraint led Defense Minister as well as military and police commanders to declarethat they would not use force against their fellow citizens65. As a result of the expectation of a “bloodlessrevolution” fostered by external deterrence effect, the mobilization reached to around 25,000 protesters, apart of which stormed into parliament and made Shevardnadze accept his resignation66.
Shevardnadze himself pointed out that “the coup was prepared over several months, everything wasthought through in advance and everything was built on one idea—Shevardnadze won't spill blood”67.
Thus, under circumstances of “even beating demonstrators with rubber sticks would sound like violenceagainst democracy”68, the things moved forward from the perspective that the regime would not use force
against the protesters.
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4.3 International Influences
Thirdly, the revolutionary movements of the Rose Revolution recognized the Serbian Bulldozer
Revolution in 2000 as a successful precedent case and tried to emulate their method of mobilizing citizens
in the event of electoral fraud. That is, since successful model for them took the form of an electoral
revolution, their protest movements were also necessarily promoted under the cause of democracy.
Already in 2002, leaders of the opposition were seriously taking account of the resignation of
Shevardnadze by “Serbian scenario,” frequently contacting Serbian activists in order to learn how toorganize mass protest movements69. In April 2003, Georgian student-based NGO Kmara was establishedunder the financial support of the Soros Foundation. Kmara was obviously modeled after Serbia’s Otpor;their strategies were similar, targeting politically apathetic urban youth, and organized in leaderless,horizontal structure.
Thus the revolutionary movements, of both elites and citizens, obviously emulated the electoral
revolution method of Serbian Bulldozer Revolution. They carefully planned to develop theanti-government movements at the timing of elections in which the fraud was expected70. In May 2003,
when the regime obstructed acceptance of the new election code regarding the composition of the CEC,
opposition regarded these efforts as regime’s preparation for effectively rigging the vote71. Saakashvili
later stated that “If you had asked people in opinion polls in June, “Would you go out on the street todemonstrate if needed?” 90% of them would have responded that they would not have gone out on thestreet no matter what happened.”72 Indeed, the protest against government resistance to reforming the
CEC did not trigger widespread demonstrations at the time. Also, several other protests in the periodleading to the 2003 parliamentary elections, such as a student-led demonstration of several thousand
against the government’s pressure on the independent television channel Rustavi-2 in October 2001, did
not enlarge any further. That is, the revolution did not happen spontaneously; political elites carefully
prepared and effectively used the scheduled elections as a focal point to solve the collective action problem
inherent in a revolution.
As observed above, the Rose Revolution was purposefully framed as a democratic revolution to make iteasier to overthrow the existing regime. That is, behind the semblance of “democratic Rose Revolution”
there were strategic rationalities and necessities in mobilizing a diverse negative coalition of citizens,
gaining public support from the international community to justify the movement and thereby deter violent
repressions from the ruling power, and emulate the successful precedent cases of electoral revolution.

5. Post-revolution：Tolerance of Electoral Fraud
This paper has presented the necessity and rationality of uprisings as democratic revolutions, even incases where there is no effort to pursue democratic government, empirically demonstrating through casemethod the functioning of these types of mechanisms. Now we will analyze the time periods that followed
the overthrow of revolutionary and authoritarian regimes. For cases of democratic revolutions that do not
involve the pursuit of democratic values, we will clarify the mechanisms by which one can observe12whether democracy has taken hold or not. In so doing, the present paper focuses on the phenomenon
whereby fraudulent elections are tolerated by citizens.
What is of utmost importance here is that there be a shift over to normal politics once the revolution
ends via free and fair elections73. This is because this produces the first steps towards legitimacy. Directly
following a revolution, the fact that the administration has been toppled by an outside force or by someother non-constitutional means becomes a source of legitimacy itself. However, in order to realize ademocratic administration, efforts must be made using legitimate procedures to transform the source oflegitimacy into access to authority. Thus, there must be a shift to a system where those selected as a resultof equitable and fair elections become legitimate rulers. For example, in the Philippine revolution of 1986,
the People Power movement overthrew the Marcos regime and on February 25, 1986 Corazon Aquino
assumed the office of President, but this was only the beginning of democratization74. Through thecompetitive elections that were carried out thereafter, taking advantage of the legitimacy provided by
selection via a democratic process, Aquino was able to consolidate political power after overcoming a
power struggle with the military.
In this sense, irregularities occur in elections, and if citizens tolerate these, the results will lack the mostfundamental conditions for realizing democratic governance. Also, in a democratic revolution that is
nothing more than semblance, because the citizenry does not seek democratic values, but rather
participates in the movement solely out of dissatisfaction with the current administration. After the
revolution fraudulent elections will likely be tolerated. As a result, without any transformation oflegitimacy to a free and impartial election, the fact that a revolution has occurred will forever continue as asource of legitimacy, with power concentrated with the president and informal clientelism networks
gaining importance.
This paper covers the Georgia election of 2004 based on awareness of the above issues. Soon after the
resignation of Shevardnadze, Georgian presidential elections were held in January 2004, and arevolutionary leader Saakashvili was elected with overwhelming majority, gaining around 96% of the total
votes. Regarding the quality of the election, OSCE observers criticized “the lack of truly competitive
political environment” and “the political imbalance in the composition of the election administration.”75
First, since the rival candidates declared “boycott,” none of the major political parties presented candidates
besides the NM and BD, thus “offering no choice to the electorate” and therefore the election process “maynot be desirable as precedents for future elections in Georgia.”76 Second, election commissions werecomposed of the ruling parties enjoying a dominant position, and consequently, two-thirds of the CEC
were appointed by the revolutionary government77.
Two months later, the parliament elections were held in March 2004 and National Movement-Democrats(NMD) led by revolutionary leaders won 135 out of 150 seats. According to the OSCE report,“developments during the post-election period, posed a challenge to the integrity of election results insome districts.” 78 First, the tabulation of results was marred by many irregularities, such as the“negotiation” of the results by members of the election administration79. Second, voter turnout showed “anumber of anomalous or implausible results,” such as implausible turnout in excess of 100%80. Third, the13

CEC selectively cancelled the results in some districts in “legally questionable” procedures81.
Overall, the quality of two founding elections held in post-revolution Georgia were highly
questionable82. Certain NGO members also pointed out that the extremely high results did not suggest
these elections were free or fair either83. Therefore, in both cases opposition parties criticized the election
fraud by Saakashvili camp and declared not to accept the election results. For example, after thepresidential election, a leader of the Labor Party Natelashvili criticized that he would not recognize
Saakashvili as the president, and that Saakashvili’s coming to power was “unfair and immoral.” 84
Similarly, after the parliamentary elections, the leader of the Democratic Union for Revival Aslan
Abashidze claimed that the NMD rigged the election by buying votes85, and refused to recognize the result,along with the Labor party.
Despite these critics by opposition leaders, however, there was no demonstration or protest movement
against the election fraud in Georgia at this time 86 . Compared with the mass protest against theShevardnadze regime’s election fraud just few months before, Georgian citizens’ reaction was surprisingly
calm, even though Saakashvili’s seizure of power was consolidated with more than 95% of the vote, andeven though Saakashvili said that he did not “see the point of having any opposition deputies in thenational parliament.”87. They welcomed the new president Saakashvili and a landslide victory of the NMD,
laying their hopes for solving various problems such as poverty, unemployment, and corruption88. A former
deputy of the ruling party who split with Saakashvili described the post-revolution political environment
stating that “a democratic revolution led to this anti-democratic situation and now we have something
between Russia and Turkmenistan.”89
Under such circumstances, Saakashvili, who now became “a state builder first and a democrat
second,” 90 began to consolidate the presidential power. It was symbolized by the constitutional
amendment in February 2004, through which the president gained the power to dissolve Parliament, andthe right to dismiss and appoint the newly created position of Prime Minister. Under this“superpresidential” system, Parliament became an implementer of executive initiatives and the electoral
laws were amended six times between 2004 and 2008, to magnify the dominance of the leading party91.
As illustrated above, the fraudulent founding elections were tolerated by Georgian citizens, who did not
pursue democratic values but successfully overthrew the government through the semblance of ademocratic revolution. As a result, in the post-revolution Georgia, the source of legitimacy did not shift
from the revolution to democracy, hence leading to the stagnant democratization. In this sense, the appeal
of democratic values which led the revolution success, was not useful anymore for political leaders in the
post-revolution political situation, as indicated in the Saakashvili’s discourse in legitimizing his position.
During the revolution period, Saakashvili portrayed himself as an embodiment of western democrats,
stating that “I was really raised on American democracy, not only my studies but much more…For me, theclosest thing in terms of political orientation is John McCain. We're very close.”92 However, the image of
the western democrats in Saakashvili’s discourse dissipated after the revolution. Instead, Saakashvili began
to compare himself with founding fathers such as David the Builder, Ben Gurion, De Gaulle, and Ataturk93.
That is, Saakashvili chose a new symbol of nationalism rather than democracy in consolidating his power14

in the post-revolution political environment.
The Georgia Public Opinion Barometer, a survey conducted in 2006, indicates that the legitimacy inpost-revolution Georgia remained in the memory of the revolution and did not shift to the democratic one94.
According to the survey, a majority of the respondents did not consider Georgia democratic (only 24.7%
did consider Georgia democratic). This is worse than 2003 when the Rose Revolution occurred (46.6%).
Further, 77.0% thought that a lay person cannot exert any influence on decisions, and 70.9% felt that
equality under the law was not observed in Georgia. Despite these stagnation of score regarding democracy,
however, the biggest share in trust in state institutions was the president (43.7%). That is, the revolutionary
leader Saakashvili still gained the trust of Georgian citizens without any transformation of legitimacy todemocracy.
The tolerance of election fraud by citizens after the semblance of democratic revolution such as thisstand in stark contrast with the post-revolution process of democratic revolutions by citizens who
genuinely pursue democratic values. For example, in 1990 Bulgaria parliamentary elections, which were
held right after the Bulgaria revolution of 1989, as many as 100,000 opposition supporters marched in thecapital city of Sofia, calling for fresh elections to be held. Similarly, in the founding elections after thePhilippine revolution of 1986 and the June Democratic Movement of 1987 in South Korea, opposition
parties held demonstrations accusing the government of election fraud.
These protest movements against the founding elections could be seen as a genuine demonstration
seeking democratic values, since it is hard to assume that dissatisfaction against a revolutionary
government heightened rapidly in such a short period of time and expressed as a semblance of democratic
revolution. In contrast to these genuine democratic revolutions, in the cases of a democratic revolution thatis nothing more than semblance, as observed in the Rose Revolution in Georgia, citizens who do not
pursue democratic values tend to tolerate the post-revolution election fraud. As a result, semblance of
democratic revolution hamper a shift in the source of legitimacy from a revolution to democracy, thus
leading to a stagnated democratization.

5. Conclusion“Revolution” refers to the phenomenon whereby a regime is overthrown in a very short amount of time.
The question of exactly what kind of political process follows is an extremely important subject incomparative politics. Given an awareness of these types of issues, in this paper we have revealed politicalmechanisms by which democratic revolutions that do not produce democracies occur. This paper argues
that, even if it does not involve the pursuit of democratic values, the strategically rational act of posing as arevolution calling for democracy: (1) is effective in organizing large scale dissident movements in acountry; (2) is effective in attracting international support; and (3) involves the imitation of successful
examples from the past.
These mechanisms empirically demonstrated in the case of the Rose Revolution in Georgia above could
be applied to other democratic revolutions as well. For example, we can find out strategic rationalities andnecessities behind the semblance in the Orange Revolution of 2004 in Ukraine. First, regarding the15domestic rationale in organizing large scale protest movements, there was a surprising degree of diversity
among the participants in the Orange Revolution, among basic issues such as favorable economic
system and NATO membership 95 . Therefore, throughout the revolution process protest leadersemphasized the contrast between “revolutionaries who seek democracy” and “the regime who hamper it,”thereby criticized the regime’s injustice to smoothen the mobilization. For example, opposition leader
Yushchenko declared his election would be a victory of democracy, and denounced the regime “who would
cheat (on the election)” as “like cockroaches.”96
Second, protesters in the Orange Revolution received official support from the international community
by calling for democracy. When the irregularities in the election were exposed, the EU and the US quickly
articulated their critics on the rigged election97. At the final phase of the revolution, US Secretary of State
Collin Powell and Polish President Aleksandr Kwasniewski discouraged the regime from the use of force
during the standoff between Ukrainian armed forces and Orange revolutionaries98, leading the crisis to apeaceful settlement99. Opposition leaders participated in the standoff also admitted that these externalinterventions were useful in providing moral support100.
Third, the Orange revolutionaries had necessities in setting a goal of democracy in order to imitate
successful electoral revolutions in the past. Orange protesters indeed repeatedly made contact with activists
in Serbia and Georgia to learn the strategies such as “making a democratic appeal to politically neutral orinsufficiently informed voters,” and “rallying society in the event of electoral fraud.”101 Campaign leadersof the leading opposition party Our Ukraine also prepared to mobilize demonstrations in the event that theelection fraud would be likely102.
So far, we have demonstrated the rationalities and necessities of semblance in the case of the Color
Revolution. Now we would like to briefly examine the applicability of our theory to other democratic
revolutions, using the Tunisian Revolution of 2010 which triggered the subsequent Arab Spring as a casestudy. Participants to the Tunisian Revolution consisted of heterogeneous category in terms of theirreligion, job, region, and so forth103. Therefore, from the perspective of Tunisian General Union of Labor
who took initiative of the anti-government movement, it was essential to overcome the diversity ofparticipants’ preference to make a success of revolution. This is why Tunisian revolution which started as ademonstration calling for nothing more than economic reform, came to appeal to the civil rights andcriticize the regime’s corruption under the slogans of “Bread, dignity, and social justice,” “Work is a right,
O you gang of thieves.”104
In addition, Tunisian revolutionaries framed the revolution as democratic in order to get the international
support, thus lowering the risk of a violent repression by the regime. For protesters, the US democratic
promotion in the Middle East, in particular President Obama’s June 2009 Cairo speech which reinvigorated
US pro-democratic stance, set expectations that the US would support democratic revolutions
everywhere105. President Obama indeed proclaimed his support for the protest movement during therevolution process, referring to the principle of democracy106. Also, the US ambassador to Tunis, Gordon
Gray, informed Ben Ali that he had to leave power, and that he could not count on exile to the UnitedStates107.
16

These supports from international community contributed to deterring the regime’s suppression as well.
EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Štefan Füle, for instance, called for restraint
in the Tunisian Revolution that sought democratic values; “We want to express our support and recognition
to the Tunisian people and their democratic aspirations…In this regard, we urge all parties to show
restraint and remain calm in order to avoid further casualties and violence.”108 After that, Tunisian armed
forces began to refuse to follow the regime’s order to crack down on revolutionary movements, which
contributed greatly to the success of the revolution by lowering the risk of a much bloodier scenario109.
Hyde (2011) points out that after the Cold War, even non-democratic countries came to look likedemocracies, at least in an institutional sense. Following the Cold War, the same thing occurred withregards to revolutions: even if a revolution did not actually call for democracy and was simply born out of
dissatisfaction with the present regime, a necessity and rationality born out of appearing as a democratic
revolution was generated.
Furthermore, we highlight that the phenomenon of tolerance for fraudulent elections can be seen as afeature of the “post-revolution politics” of democratic revolutions that do not actually seek democratization.
For example, even if protests break out at the time of the revolution in the wake of fraudulent elections,such behavior will no longer be seen with regards to election irregularities post-revolution. In the sensethat it does not bring about a shift in the source of legitimacy, this definitively harms post-revolution
democratization.
We cannot assume that democratization will spring forth out of a democratic revolution. Quite naturally,
there will be no democratization unless the people of the country demand democracy. In post-revolution
politics, the extent of fraud in elections and the reaction of citizens to such phenomenon will constitute animportant touchstone.

Notes
1

Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge; New

York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 4.
2

Charles Fairbanks, “Revolution Reconsidered,” Journal of Democracy 18 (January 2007), 42-57.

3

Jack Goldstone, “Toward a Fourth Generation of revolutionary Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science, 4 (2001),

139-187.
4Mark Beissinger, “The Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” American

Political Science Review, 107 (August 2013), 574-592.
5

Goldstone, p. 142.

6

Mark Thompson, Democratic Revolutions: Asia and Eastern Europe (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), 1.

7

Ibid, p. 119; Marc Morje Howard and Mier Walters, “Mass Mobilization and the Democracy Bias,” Middle East Policy, 22(June 2015), 145-155; Henry Hale, “Democracy or Autocracy on the March? The Colored Revolutions as Normal Dynamics
of Patronal Presidentialism,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 39 (September 2006), 305-329.

17

8Theodor Tudoroiu, “Rose, Orange and Tulip: The Failed Post-Soviet Revolutions,” Communist and Post-Communist

Studies, 40 (September 2007), 315-342.
9George Joffe, “The Arab Spring in North Africa: Origins and Prospects,” The Journal of North African Studies, 16(December 2011), 507-532.
10

Beissinger.

11

Thompson, p. 3

12Tudoroiu.

13

Hale.

14

Malanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak, “Party Politics After the Colour Revolutions: Party Institutionalisation and

Democratisation in Ukraine and Georgia,” East European Politics, 30 (January 2014), 86-104.
15

Mark Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of

Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions,” Perspectives on Politics, 5 (June 2007), 259-276; Sharon Wolchik, “Putinism
Under Siege: Can There Be a Color Revolution?” Journal of Democracy, 23 (July 2012), 63-70.
16

Christoph Stefes and Jennnifer Sehring, “Wilted Roses and Tulips: The Regression of Democratic Rule in Kyrgyzstan andGeorgia,” in Gero Erdmann and Marianne Kneuer, eds., Regression of Democracy? (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2011), 221-247.
17

Beissinger, 2013.

18

Dawn Brancati, “The 2011 Protests: Were They about Democracy?” The Washington Quarterly, 36 (Winter 2013), 25-35.

19

John Glenn, Framing Democracy: Civil Society and Civic Movements in Eastern Europe (Stanford: Stanford University

Press, 2003).
20

Adrian Karatnycky, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution”, Foreign Affairs. 84 (March/April 2005), 35-52.

21

Beissinger, 2007, p. 261.

22

Brancati, p. 26.

23

William Gamson, Taking Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

24

Beissinger, 2013; Andrew Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005).

25

Mark Lrving Licbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

26

Misagh Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
27Maria Stephan and Eric Chenoweth, “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict,”

International Security, 33 (Summer 2008), 7-44.
28

Henry Hale, “Regime Change Cascades: What We Have Learned from the 1848 Revolutions to the 2011 Arab Uprisings,”

Annual Review Political Science, 16 (2013), 331-353.
29

Beissinger, 2007.

30

Wolchik, p. 64.

18

31

Joshua Tucker, “Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions,”

Perspectives on Politics, 5 (September 2007), 535-551.
32

Michael McFaul, “Democracy Promotion as a World Value,” The Washington Quarterly 28 (Winter 2004-05), 147-163.

33

Lincoln Mitchell, Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia’s Rose Revolution (Philadelphia: University ofPennsylvania Press, 2009).
34

The Times, November 22, 2003.

35

The Globe and Mail, December 1, 2003.

36

Jaba Devdariani, “Georgia: Rise and Fall of the Façade Democracy,” Demokratizatsiya, 12 (Winter 2004), 79-115.

37

Civil Georgia, September 8, 2003. Accessed January 13, 2018. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=4901

38Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, November 19, 2003.

39

Mitchell, 2009, p. 63

40

Ibid.

41

The Washington Post, November 12, 2003.

42

Ibid.

43

Ibid.

44

Civil Georgia, November 8, 2003. Accessed January 13, 2018. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=5448

45

Civil Georgia, November 10, 2003. Accessed January 13, 2018. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=5459

46

The New York Times, November 30, 2003.

47

The Washington Post, November 12, 2003.

48

Civil Georgia, November 10, 2003.

49

Edmonton Journal, November 21, 2003.

50

Kelli Hash-Gonzalez, Popular Mobilization and Empowerment in Georgia’s Rose Revolution (New York: Lexington

Books, 2012), 71.
51

Ibid, 70-98.

52

Ibid, 88.

53

Ibid, 88.

54

Ibid, 88-89.

55

Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, “Bringing Down Dictators: American Democracy Promotion and Electoral

Revolutions in Postcommunist Eurasia,” Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies Working Paper Series, 5 (July
2007): 1-25.
56

Civil Georgia, January 22, 2003. Accessed January 13, 2018. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=3045

57

Charles Fairbanks, “Georgia's Rose Revolution,” Journal of Democracy 15 (April 2004), 110-124.

58“Georgian Parliamentary Elections Marred by Confusion over Voter Lists,” The International Election Observation

19

Mission, November 3, 2003.
59

The Times, November 22, 2003.

60

Civil Georgia, November 21, 2003. Accessed January 13, 2018. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=5581

61

Lincoln Mitchell, “Democracy in Georgia Since the Rose Revolution,” Orbis, 50 (Autumn 2006), 669-676.

62

Associated Press International, November 22, 2003; Civil Georgia, November 19, 2003. Accessed January 13, 2018.

http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=5559
63

Civil Georgia, November 18, 2003. Accessed January 13, 2018. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=5550

64

The Washington Post, November 23, 2003.

65

The Washington Post, November 24, 2003.

66

Civil Georgia, November 22, 2003. Accessed January 13, 2018. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=5584

67

Independent, December 1, 2003.

68

Ramil Aliyev, “The Georgian Rose Revolution: Challenges And Supports For Ensuring The Non-Violent Outcome in A

Post-Soviet Society,” Journal of Azerbaijani Studies, 8 (2005): 1-91.
69

Jonathan Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet

Union (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2005), 179.
70

Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, “Youth and Electoral Revolutions in Slovakia, Serbia, and Georgia,” The SAIS

Review of International Affairs, 26 (Summer-Fall 2006), 55-65.
71

Devdaliani, p. 104.

72

Zurab Karumidze and James Wertsch, Enough! The Rose Revolution in the Republic of Georgia (New York: Nova Science

Publishers, Inc., 2005), 23.
73

Thompson, p. 122.

74

Ibid, p. 27.

75

OSCE/ODIHR, Georgia Extraordinary Presidential Election 4 January 2004 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation

Mission Report (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2004), 1.
76

Ibid, pp. 8-9.

77

Ibid, pp. 6-8.

78

OSCE/ODIHR, Georgia Partial Repeat Parliamentary Elections 28 March 2004 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation

Mission Report, Part 2 (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2004), 1.
79

Ibid, pp. 20-21

80

Ibid, p. 2.

81

Ibid, pp. 22-23.

82

Laurence Broers, “After the Revolution: Civil Society and the Challenges of Consolidating Democracy in Georgia,”

Central Asian Survey, 24 (September 2005), 333-350.

20

83

Francoise Companjen, “Georgia,” in Donnacha Beacháin and Abel Polese eds., The Colour Revolutions in the Former

Soviet Republics: Successes and Failures (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 13-28.
84

RIA Novosti, January 06, 2004.

85

The Irish Times, April 6, 2004.

86

Susan Hyde and Nikolay Marinov, “Which Elections Can Be Lost?” Political Analysis, 20 (Spring 2012), 191-210.

87

The Guardian, April 1, 2004.

88

The Washington Post, January 26, 2004.

89

The Times, March 29, 2004.

90

Mitchell, 2006, p. 674.

91

Miriam Lanskoy and Giorgi Areshidze, “Georgia’s Year of Turmoil,” Journal of Democracy, 19 (October 2008), 154-168.

92

The Washington Post, November 26, 2003.

93

Financial Times, July 10, 2004.

94

Nano Sumbadze, Georgia Public Opinion Barometer 2006 (Tbilisi: Institute for Policy Studies, 2006).

95

Beissinger, 2013, pp. 582-583.

96

The Times, November 2, 2004.

97

The Globe and Mail, November 25, 2004.

98

Michael Mcfaul, “Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution,” International Security,

32 (Fall 2007), 45-83.
99

Ibid, p. 72.

100

Ibid.

101

Pavol Demes and Joerg Forbrig, “Pora: “It’s Time” for Democracy in Ukraine,” in Anders Åslund and Michael McFaul

eds., Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, 2006), 85-102.
102

McFaul, 2007, pp. 63-64.

103

Peter Schraeder and Hamadi Redissi, “Ben Ali's Fall,” Journal of Democracy, 22 (July 2011), 5-19.

104

Sami Zemni, “The Roots of the Tunisian Revolution,” in Larbi Sadiki ed., Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring:

Rethinking Democratization (New York: Routledge, 2015), 77-87.
105

Michelle Angrist, “Understanding the Success of Mass Civic Protest in Tunisia,” The Middle East Journal, 67 (Autumn

2013), 547-564.
106

The White House, “Statement by the President on Events in Tunisia,” January 14, 2011. Accessed January 13, 2018.

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/14/statement-president-events-tunisia
107

Schraeder and Redissi, p. 13.

108

European Union, “Joint Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Štefan Füle on the21

Events on Tunisia,” January 14, 2011. Accessed January 13, 2018.
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/ashton/media/www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/118873.pdf
109

Schraeder and Redissi, p. 15.

22