Image: iStock / Sze Soong Teoh

POTENTIAL USE OF LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONSIN A KOREAN CONTEXT

Eva Lisowski
Prepared for the

Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use
in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)
Co-sponsored by
The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA),
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, and
The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)
with cooperation ofPanel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia
Additional funding by the MacArthur Foundation

February 22, 2022
Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA), Project Year 1

1About the Author
Eva Lisowski is a member of the Nuclear Weapons Education Project at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, from where she graduated in 2020 with a BS in Nuclear Science &Engineering. Her prior publications include evaluations of the attractiveness of fissile materials
in advanced nuclear reactors to weapons of mass destruction construction, and analysis of fissile
material production in India following the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement. Her current work
focuses on simulating the consequences of nuclear weapon detonations and missile strikes
targeting civilian nuclear reactors. As a young member of the American Nuclear Society and2019 Summer Fellow at the United States Nuclear Industry Council, Ms. Lisowski has
participated in nuclear energy advocacy at the Massachusetts State House and on Capitol Hill in
Washington D.C. Ms. Lisowski has studied and conducted research at the Tokyo Institute ofTechnology and hopes to contribute to nuclear security and non-proliferation by strengthening
US-Japan research collaboration. She returned to Tokyo Tech in September 2021 to pursue an
MS in Nuclear Science & Engineering.

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Abstract
This report explores the potential uses of low-yield nuclear weapons in the context of a possible
conflict on the Korean Peninsula. It starts with a definition of low-yield weapons—typically,
weapons with yields of ten kilotons or less that are designed to be nonstrategic or “tactical”
weapons used with shorter-range delivery systems, prepared for the purpose of attacking troops
or battlefield infrastructure. The paper then reviews the history of United States legislation
regarding low-yield weapons and describes three generic scenarios in which foes possessing lowyield weapons might choose, or not choose, to use them during a military conflict. Examples ofradioactive fallout maps are provided based on HYSPLIT modeling for explosions of 0, 3 and 10
kilotons at a location in the Korean demilitarized zone at different times of the year. The arsenals
of low-yield weapons in the states possessing nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia, as well as theUnited States, are compared, and seven possible “use cases” for low-yield nuclear weapons
involving the Korean Peninsula are put forward.

Note on Sources and Content
This report has been prepared based on a survey of the current literature and opinions on these
topics to initially advise the development of plausible nuclear use cases for a three-year modelingproject spearheaded by RECNA, PSNA, Nautilus Institute, and APLN. One-on-one interviews
were conducted with topical experts Mike Hynes,1 Jungmin Kang,2 Feroz Khan,3 Henry
Sokolski,4 and Frank von Hippel,5 although the contents of this report do not necessarily reflect
their views. This report suggests possible cases in which low-yield nuclear weapons may be
used, generally and specifically regarding the conflict on the Korean Peninsula. It does not
thoroughly address the plausibility of such cases, and a more in-depth treatment of this topic is
required to fully understand the breadth and complexity of nuclear deterrence theory involving
low-yield nuclear weapons.

1Bele, Jean, Michael Hynes, and Robert Redwine. MIT Nuclear Weapons Education Project. Last modified 2021.
"Jungmin Kang." Biography found at Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Last modified 2021.
3"Feroz Khan, BG (Retired)." Naval Postgraduate School. Last modified August 2021.
4"Henry D. Sokolski, Executive Director." Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Accessed September 2021.
5"Frank von Hippel." Princeton University: Program on Science & Global Security. Accessed September 2021.
2

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Introduction
The first nuclear weapon had a yield of approximately 20 kilotons,”6 or kt, based on Manhattan
Project tests and weapons detonated in World War II. Although nuclear weapon states now havethe capability to detonate weapons with yields thousands of times greater than this (megatonscale weapons), the resulting devastation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki showed that the destruction
and death caused by relatively small weapons is appalling enough. For this reason, nuclear
weapon states developed and continue to maintain “low-yield” nuclear weapons or nuclear
weapons with adjustable yields, including low-yield options in their arsenals—weapons
originally designed to be used in “tactical” missions that attempt to avoid the staggeringly highcivilian death tolls seen in World War II. Two of the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Treaty-compliant nuclear-armed states party to the conflict on the Korean Peninsula—the UnitedStates and Russia—possess low-yield nuclear weapons. The publicly-reported and observed
nuclear arsenals of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) do notinclude low-yield nuclear weapons, but both states possess weapon technology that could be
reduced to yields of 10 kt or less. If a nuclear-armed state were to detonate a low-yield nuclear
weapon, it might be to minimize or avoid civilian casualties, to achieve “limited” or “tactical”
military objectives, to try to avoid an all-out nuclear war, to limit damage to its international
reputation, or as a demonstration or warning strike.
During the Cold War, nuclear weapon states deployed low-yield nuclear weapons (LYNWs – 10
kt or less) to be used primarily in tactical or nonstrategic missions, such as deterring the advanceof conventional military forces on the battlefield. As conventional weapon systems evolve to beable to home in on their targets, LYNWs may become somewhat obsolete or unneeded to offset
enemy conventional forces. Modern-day scenarios resulting in escalation to the use of LYNWs
on the Korean Peninsula may be replaced by the use of highly-advanced drones or precisionguided munitions. For nations lacking an advanced military, however, the use of LYNWs may
still be perceived as advantageous on the battlefield. Simulations of LYNWs suggest that theintentional use of LYNWs in a traditional Cold War-era manner is unlikely because theradioactive fallout may have a negative impact on the user’s own territory or forces. Somescenarios can be envisioned, however, in which a state may attempt to use a fallout cloud to its
own advantage.
More likely is that a LYNW might be detonated as a demonstration or warning strike, toincapacitate naval forces, or through accident. To develop plausible scenarios involving thesesuggestions, it is important to reason why the state would choose a low-yield nuclear weapon
over a conventional weapon.

6

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. S.v. "nominal weapon." Retrieved August 12, 2021, fromhttps://www.thefreedictionary.com/nominal+weapon

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Definition of a Low-Yield Nuclear Weapon
Although there has been some debate over what constitutes a “low-yield” nuclear weapon, one
definition of “low-yield” is ten kilotons or less.7 Furthermore, some ambiguity exists with regard
to the exact definition of a “kiloton” (see Appendix A), with different states, and sometimes evenorganizations within states, often defining the term “kt weapon” somewhat differently.
During the Cold War, the United States and USSR developed and deployed strategic andnonstrategic nuclear weapons. Most analysts consider nonstrategic weapons to be shorter-range
delivery systems with lower-yield warheads prepared for the purpose of attacking troops or
battlefield infrastructure.8 They are also prepared for the purpose of homeland defense,
particularly in the Russian case.9 However, “low-yield” and “nonstrategic” are not synonymous.
Kristensen and Korda, writing in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,10 explain:
A frequent and widespread mistake in the public debate is to equate nonstrategic with low
yield. If a weapon has a low-yield option, so the thinking goes, then it’s a nonstrategic
weapon; conversely, if it has a high yield, then it must be a strategic weapon. The reality
is much more blurred and complex; some nonstrategic nuclear weapons have high-yield
options, some strategic weapons have low-yield options; some have both. (Kristensen &Korda, 2019, p. 254)
Therefore, it can be said that low-yield nuclear weapons are most often considered whenplanning nonstrategic (or “tactical”) and defensive nuclear use policies, but they are also
considered in strategic nuclear deterrence theory.
The nuclear weapon arsenals of the United States and Russia include low-yield warheads
prepared for use with both strategic and nonstrategic delivery systems. Strategic delivery systems
carrying low-yield warheads are submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and bomber
aircraft, which carry dial-a-yield warheads. Nonstrategic delivery systems are fighter aircraft,
antiballistic missiles for coastal defense, air defenses, ground-based mobile short-range ballistic
missile systems,11 and possibly bomber aircraft.

7

Woolf, Amy F. "A Low-Yield, Submarine-Launched Nuclear Warhead: Overview of the Expert Debate." Last
modified January 5, 2021. Congressional Research Service (IF11143).
8
Woolf, Amy F. "Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons." Last modified July 15, 2021. Congressional Research Service(RL32572).
9
Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda (2021), Russian nuclear weapons, 2021, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 77:2,
90-108, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2021.1885869.
10
Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda (2019), Tactical nuclear weapons, 2019, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:5,
252-261, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2019.1654273.
11
US and Russian ground-based short-range nuclear weapons were retired in 1991 by unilateral initiatives by US
President George H.W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, although other countries still maintain such
systems. See Arms Control Association (2017), “The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) on Tactical Nuclear
Weapons at a Glance,“ July, 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pniglance

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U.S. Legislation involving Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons
During the Cold War, although longer-range “strategic” nuclear weapons became the primary
focus of arms control negotiations, nonstrategic nuclear weapons “had a lower profile in policy
debates … possibly because they did not pose a direct threat to the continental United States.”12Some believe that the continued use and development of tactical nuclear weapons undermines
existing arms control agreements, and could trigger further arms races that increase the risk of
nuclear war.13
Domestically, the United States Congress has debated legislation to limit the research anddevelopment of low-yield nuclear weapons. Some argue that prohibiting the low-yield option
limits the United States’ ability to deter or respond to emerging threats, particularly regional
threats such as on the Korean Peninsula. Others argue that the development of very low-yield
warheads can lower the nuclear-use threshold by softening the “nuclear taboo.”
In 1993, the House Armed Services Committee argued that “very low yield nuclear warheads
threaten to blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear conflict, and could thusincrease the chances of nuclear weapons use by another nation.” As a result, an amendment to
the FY1994 National Defense Authorization Act known as the Precision Low-Yield Weapon
Design ban (PLYWD) was passed that banned research on and development of low-yield nuclear
weapons. This amendment defined “low-yield” as less than 5 kt. In 2001, following the
publication of reports arguing that low-yield nuclear weapons could aid in the destruction ofunderground facilities, the Bush Administration called for the repeal of PLYWD. In 2004, theamendment was modified to allow research on, but restrict engineering development of, lowyield nuclear weapons unless specifically allowed by Congress.14

Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons as Nonstrategic or “Tactical” Weapons
Some low-yield nuclear warheads have been developed to be delivered as “nonstrategic” or“tactical” weapons. The original purpose of these weapons was to stop the advance of militaryforces or incapacitate a military base as opposed to threatening an attack on a city, infrastructure
supporting the enemy’s war-making capacity, or civilian population. Even though improvements
in delivery systems and conventional military technology have blurred the distinction between
strategic and “tactical” weapons, the term “nonstrategic” still is used to describe nuclear weaponsthat would be detonated at shorter ranges and with lower yields to support a militarycommander’s mission with a limited scope. In theory, deployment is limited to the area of
military operations.15 However, it has been hotly debated whether the use of nonstrategic
weapons can actually remain limited to local battlefield consequences.
12

Woolf, "Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons," Summary.
Kristensen and Korda, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 2019,” p. 252.
14
Woolf, Amy F. "New Nuclear Warheads: Legislative Provisions." Last modified February 5, 2018. Congressional
Research Service (IN10854).
15
Woolf, "Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons," p. 8.
13

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The three scenarios summarized below introduce nonstrategic low-yield nuclear deterrence
theory. Any of these general scenarios could be used to envision a situation that may result in
nuclear first-use. If both states involved possess nuclear weapons, scenarios with follow-on
nuclear retaliation could then be analyzed.
Scenario 1: Cautious adversary deterred by low-yield nuclear deployment. Nation B invades
Nation A and both of them either have nuclear weapons or are covered by a “nuclear umbrella”
provided by a nuclear weapons state. Nation A announces that it has nonstrategic nuclear
weapons deployed in the battlefield and may detonate them to stop the advance of Nation B.
Because Nation B believes it is very unlikely for Nation A to follow through on the threat,
Nation B continues its advance, testing Nation A’s nuclear use threshold. Fearing that deterrence
has failed, Nation A becomes more committed to using its nuclear weapons on invading forces.
As tensions rise, uncertainty and confusion grow in the mind of Nation B’s commander, whose
invading army becomes so cautious in its advance that the operation becomes stalemated.
Therefore, the purpose of Nation A’s tactical nuclear weapon has been fulfilled successfully,
although the situation came to the brink of nuclear use before deescalating. Low-yield nuclear
weapons may be deployed but not detonated in a battlefield scenario in order to put the burdenof risk calculation on the leaders of the invading army.
Scenario 2: Low-yield deployment fails to deter a bold adversary, resulting in nuclear use
by the defending nation. As in Scenario 1, Nation A has deployed nuclear weapons in thebattlefield to cause confusion and hesitation in Nation B’s invading forces. Given that they are
deployed in or near Nation A’s own territory or forces, Nation B is obliged to calculate whether
Nation A will actually detonate the nuclear weapons. A bold Nation B decides to call Nation A’s
bluff and test its resolve by continuing the advance. Nation B advances so far that Nation A fears
that further advance will result in the capture of its entire country or a key military base or city.
Since Nation A’s policy declares the use of nuclear weapons as a last resort, Nation A decides todetonate a low-yield nuclear weapon on Nation B’s invading forces. They begin by using a lowyield, nonstrategic nuclear weapon to minimize damage to their own country. If nuclear use ispart of Nation B’s nuclear retaliation policy, Nation B may detonate one or more nuclear
weapons of various yields in a last resort effort to finish its campaign, or it may back down after
nuclear first-use by Nation A. If nuclear escalation continues, either side may end up threatening
an enemy city with a higher-yield strategic nuclear weapon. In this case, the low-yield nuclear
option was used to preserve international reputation and manageable damage because it wasused in defense on the nation’s own territory, which may lead to de-escalation of the conflict or
nuclear retaliation and escalation.
Scenario 3: Either nation skips the low-yield tactical option and threatens a strategic attack
on an enemy city or other large target in an attempt to avoid nuclear use altogether.
Defending Nation A knows that if it were to be pushed to the last resort and detonate a low-yield
nuclear weapon, it would still have broken the global “nuclear taboo.” Regardless of yield or
size, in the end it is still a nuclear weapon. Because Nation A would greatly prefer to avoid theuse of nuclear weapons entirely, it may instead try to rely on strategic deterrence, such as
threatening an entire enemy city with an ICBM. Some believe that such countervalue threatsprovide better deterrence to successfully halt a military advance because the consequences of

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7such an attack are so high that it isn’t worth the risk for invading Nation B, even if actual nuclear
detonation is unlikely. Threat of imminent strategic attack can be a preferable strategy if itenables the country to both stall enemy military operations and avoid nuclear use.
These scenarios only begin to introduce the complex strands of deterrence theory that havemotivated the deployment of low-yield, nonstrategic nuclear weapons, although relying on themfor military deterrence is not attractive. Similar scenarios could develop in which each nation has
different motives, such as deterring against the deployment of modern conventional weapons,
invasion by naval troops massing along the coast, or the (re-)deployment of nuclear weapons by
a nuclear weapons state to provide a nuclear umbrella to a non-nuclear state in a regional
conflict, to suggest a few. Escalation scenarios might include factors such as nuclear use policies
regarding retaliation, or factor in how mutually assured destruction can play into strategic
nuclear deterrence, which would complicate Scenario 3 by making it more difficult for nations tomake credible countervalue threats.
Some believe it is very unlikely for a nation to detonate a nonstrategic nuclear weapon, even a
low-yield weapon, for three reasons, highlighted below:
1. If a low-yield nuclear weapon were detonated in the battlefield, the risk to thenation’s own troops and nearby borders might be too great, depending on height ofburst and other factors.
2. Low-yield nuclear weapons decrease the nuclear use threshold. The nation guilty of
nuclear first-use would break the global “nuclear taboo,” harming its international
reputation. Instead, it could be preferable to threaten a higher-yield countervalue
strike (such as against a major city) to achieve deterrence. Because the threat is more
severe, in theory, strategic nuclear weapons provide better deterrence, decreasing the
likelihood that a nuclear weapon of any kind will actually be used.
3. Advances in conventional military technology have increased the effectiveness andavailability of precision-guided munitions and drones, arguably decreasing the needfor low-yield nuclear weapons, depending on the specific circumstances of battle andthe decisions of acting military commanders.
To approximate the possible radioactive fallout that could result from the detonation of a lowyield nuclear weapon, simulations of nuclear detonations were performed using the NOAA-ARL
HYSPLIT software.16 The parameters used for these simulations are listed in Appendix B. Lowyield Uranium-235 fission devices of 10 kt and 0.3 kt were simulated as both airbursts andsurface-bursts above ground at the third tunnel17 along the 38th Parallel, which is 27 miles from

16

Stein, A.F., Draxler, R.R, Rolph, G.D., Stunder, B.J.B., Cohen, M.D., and Ngan, F., (2015). “NOAA's HYSPLIT
atmospheric transport and dispersion modeling system,” Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc., 96, 2059-2077,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/BAMS-D-14-00110.1
17
Two North Korean tunnels beneath the Korean Demilitarized Zone were discovered in 1974-75. An incomplete
third tunnel was discovered 27 miles (44 km) from Seoul in 1978, possibly designed for a surprise attack on Seoul
by North Korea. This tunnel has been described as a “tunnel of aggression” by South Korea. [J. F. Vesecky, W. A.

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8Seoul. The fallout due to a nuclear weapon detonated near the ground depends significantly on
the prevailing wind speed and direction, as illustrated in Figure 1, which compares the fallout
patterns due to a 10-kt surface-burst modeled on weather conditions prevailing on August 1 andJanuary 1, 2021.

Figure 1: Nuclear fallout patterns four days after detonation from 10-kt surface-bursts
modeled for weather conditions prevailing on August 1, 2021 (left) and January 1, 2021
(right). Doses below 100 rem would be expected not to have short-term effects.
Figure 2 illustrates hypothetical fallout extents as a result of 10-kt and 0.3-kt nuclear weapon
detonations on August 1, 2021—surface-bursts and airbursts.

Nierenberg, and A. M. Despain (April 1980). “Tunnel Detection.” SRI International (JASON Technical Report).
Federation of American Scientists. JSR-79-11.]

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A

B

C

D

Figure 2: Nuclear fallout from low-yield detonations measured in accumulated radiationdose (rem18) after four days: (A) 10-kt airburst, (B) 10-kt surface-burs t, (C) 0.3-kt airburst,(D) 0.3-kt surface-burst.

18

The radiation levels indicated in the figures above are in units of rem or “Roentgen equivalent man,” a measureof the health effects of doses ionizing radiation on the human body. By way of comparison, the United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission provides the following guidance on how radiation doses correspond to different
exposure guidelines and radiation health effects:• 0.1 rem: Annual Dose Limit for Individual Members of the Public due to USNRC-licensed nuclear facilities• 5 rem: Annual Dose Limit for Radiation Workers (USNRC)• 10 rem: Definitive increased risk of cancer in lifetime.
• 50 rem: Considered a large radiation dose by the USNRC.
• 100 rem: Mild radiation sickness, Nausea, reddening of skin
Source: "Radiation and Its Health Effects." United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Last modified March 20,
2020. https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/radiation/rad-health-effects.html

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10This arbitrary scenario is for illustrative purposes only and is not posed here as a plausible
nuclear weapons use case. These first-pass approximate simulations illustrate the potentially farreaching consequences even low-yield nuclear use can have in a regional conflict. Low-yield
nuclear attacks may have greater localized fallout because the optimum height of burst of lowyield weapons to maximize overpressure effects is closer to the ground; surface or near-surfacelevel weapons result in greater fallout.

Current Low-Yield Nuclear Weapon Arsenals
United States
As of November 2020, the US Department of Defense maintained an approximate total stockpile(all yields included) of 3,700 nuclear warheads, 1,750 of which are deployed. Land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
account for approximately 400 and 1,000 warheads, respectively. There are about 300 warheads
at bomber bases within the United States and 100 nonstrategic weapons stationed at bases in
Europe.19 The remaining nonstrategic nuclear weapons are in storage within the United States.
Table 1 summarizes the US low-yield nuclear weapon stockpile, a subset of an estimate made by
Kristensen and Korda in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in January 2021.20

Table 1: U.S. low-yield Nuclear Forces, 2021
Type / Designation
SLBMs (Strategic)
UGM-133A Trident II D5/LE
Mk-4A
Bombers (Strategic)
B-52H Stratofortress
B-2A Spirit
Nonstrategic forces
F-15E, F-16 DCA

Year
deployed

Warheads x yield (kilotons)

Warheads(total)2019

1-2 W76-2 x 8 (MIRV)

25

1961
1994

ALCM/W80-1 x 5-150
B61-7 x 10-360
B83-1 x low-1,200

528
322

1979

1-5 B61-3/-4 bombs x 0.3-170

230

Out of all low-yield weapons in the US nuclear arsenal, none are designed to be mounted on
ICBMs, and only approximately twenty-five out of nearly 2,000 SLBMs warheads are low-yield.
Bombers and fighter aircraft carry dial-a-yield warheads capable of yields within the ranges
shown in the table.
The United States Trump Administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recommended
the development of low-yield nuclear weapons to aid in deterrence against regional aggression.
The 2018 NPR specifically calls for the modification of a small number of existing W76-1 90kiloton two-stage thermonuclear warheads to single-stage warheads to limit the yield to around 8
19

Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda (2021), “United States nuclear weapons, 2021,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, 77:1, 43-63, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2020.1859865.
20
Ibid., p. 44.

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kilotons. These low-yield weapons were intended to replace high-yield versions of theseweapons so that the number of deployed warheads does not increase.21 Since the Biden
Administration has yet to publish its own NPR, it remains to be seen if and how the development
and modernization of the US low-yield nuclear stockpile may change course in the near future.

RussiaThe nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation are roughly equivalent as aresult of bilateral arms control agreements between the two nations. As of 2021, Russia isestimated to have approximately 1,600 deployed strategic warheads on ballistic missiles and atbomber bases. Russia’s approximately 1,900 nonstrategic warheads are all held in reserve. The
nation is currently working to modernize its nuclear arsenal to replace many Soviet-era
weapons.22
Table 2 presents a subset of Kristensen and Korda’s summary of current Russian nuclear forces,
focusing only on Russia’s stockpile of low-yield nuclear weapons.23

Table 2: Russian low-yield nuclear forces, 2021
Type / nameYear
deployed

Nonstrategic and defensive weapons
ABM/Air/Coastal defense
S-300/S-400 (SA-20/SA-21)
1992/2007
53T6 Gazelle
1986
SSC-5 Stooge (SS-N-26)
2015
Land-based air
Bombers/fighters (Tu-22M3
1974-2018
DD(M3M) / Su-24M / Su-34 /DDMiG-31K)
Ground-based
SS-26 Stone SSM
2005
SSC-7 Southpaw GLCM
SSC-8 Screwdriver GLCM
2017

Warheads x yield (kilotons)

Warheads(total)1 x low1 x 101 x 10~290
68
25

ASMs, ALBM, bombs~500

1 x 10-10070

1 x 10-100

20

China
As of November 2021, it is estimated that China possesses the world’s third-largest nuclear
arsenal, with a stockpile that includes around 350 operational warheads. China is currently
working to further expand and, like Russia, modernize its nuclear arsenal.24

21

Ibid., p. 45.
Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda (2021), “Russian nuclear weapons, 2021,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
77:2, 90-108, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2021.1885869.
23
Ibid., p. 91.
24
Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda (2020), “Chinese nuclear forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 76:6,
443-457, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2020.1846432.
22

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12China possesses several megaton-scale warheads estimated to be 3.3 Mt and 4-5 Mt, but most of
its known warheads are estimated to be in the 200-300 kiloton range—almost all mounted onland-based short, medium, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and a small fraction on
SLBMs. It has not been reported that China possesses any low-yield nuclear weapons in its
arsenal, but in recent years, a renewed effort has been made to develop weapons carriable byaircraft that could be classified as non-strategic.25

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)The size and characteristics of the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal have been cautiously estimated by
Kristensen and Korda. The DPRK is estimated to have enough fissile material to construct 40-50
nuclear warheads but might have assembled 10-20 warheads for delivery by medium-range
ballistic missiles.26
From 2006-2016, the DPRK conducted five low- to mid-yield underground nuclear tests,
gradually increasing in yield from a suspected 0.7–2 kt fizzle in 2006 to two Trinity-like 7–25 kt
tests in 2016. Finally, one additional, much-higher-yield test (estimated at 70–280 kt) was
conducted in 2017.27 Although its nuclear testing history demonstrates that the DPRK is capableof detonating low-yield nuclear weapons, it is not clear whether the DPRK is prioritizing
research on and production of higher-yield thermonuclear weapons or lower-yield fission
weapons. If the DPRK is prioritizing single-stage fission weapons with yields of 10–20 kt, it may
have enough fissile material to build 40–50 of these weapons.28
In any case, it has been observed that the DPRK is developing short, medium, long-range, andintercontinental ballistic missiles. According to Kristensen and Korda, “no credible public
information demonstrates that North Korea has developed nuclear warheads for delivery systems
other than ballistic missiles … If North Korea had wanted …, it could potentially have developed
a gravity bomb for delivery by a medium-range bomber.”29

Low-Yield Nuclear Weapon Use Cases
The following nuclear weapon use cases might be envisioned in light of the three generalscenarios illustrated earlier in this report. In-depth analyses would be required to thoroughly
evaluate the plausibility of each case.

1) DPRK Nuclear Response to Advancing Forces
One plausible DPRK nuclear first-use case might be triggered if the DPRK government felt
overtly threatened by invading forces. Perceiving that the most effective or only way to halt an
25

Ibid., p. 453.
Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda (2021), “North Korean nuclear weapons, 2021,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, 77:4, 222-236, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2021.1940803.
27
Kenausis, Luisa. "Status of World Nuclear Forces: North Korea." MIT Nuclear Weapons Education Project.
Accessed September 19, 2021. https://nuclearweaponsedproj.mit.edu/Node/63
28
Kristensen and Korda, “North Korean nuclear weapons, 2021,” p. 223-24.
29
Ibid., p. 232.
26

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enemy’s advance and preserve the existence of the state would be to detonate a nuclear weapon,
the DPRK might target the battlefield directly, detonate a weapon over open land or sea as ademonstration of resolve, or even attack a countervalue target. As illustrated in Scenario 2, a
low-yield option might be attractive here to minimize damage to their own country as much as
possible, or in the hopes of preventing further nuclear escalation. There are certainly manyreasons to favor a low-yield nuclear option over a high-yield one.

2) Redeployment of US nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula
The aforementioned United States 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recommended thedevelopment of new low-yield options for the nuclear arsenal to enhance the “flexibility andrange of its tailored deterrence options … important for the preservation of credible deterrence
against regional aggression.”30 This implies that the United States would not rule out the use of
low-yield nuclear weapons in response to threats on the Korean Peninsula. Though subsequent
NPRs may adopt different doctrines, this precedent cannot be discounted. This NPR outlines a
nuclear response policy in reaction to “attacks on the U.S. or allied civilian population or
infrastructure, attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warningand attack assessment capabilities,”31 including significant non-nuclear attacks. Other threats that
may lead to a nuclear response are the rapid growth or emergence of chemical, biological, cyber,and conventional aggression.32
On the Republic of Korea (ROK) side, the issue has also been hotly debated, recently reignited in2017 by the DPRK’s latest nuclear test.33 Critics of redeployment argue that deterrence using
low-yield tactical nuclear weapons on the 38th-parallel is obsolete due to advancements made inprecision-guided munitions and surveillance technology since the Cold War. The perceived
obsolescence of tactical nuclear weapon technology by some military and political figures was
one reason why tactical nuclear weapons were removed from the ROK in 1991.34

3) Nuclear response to deployment of ships in the Sea of JapanUse of a low-yield nuclear weapon on the sea may be appropriate if the attacking nation aims to
avoid local fallout over nearby civilian populations. One hypothetical case: in an attempt to takeout an aircraft carrier or naval fleet, the fallout may unexpectedly blow towards land, increasing
the risk of nuclear escalation/retaliation. To imagine this case, why the attacking force would
choose a nuclear option over a modern conventional option must be explained. (For example, theattacking force may not possess modernized or sufficient conventional forces.)

30

Nuclear Posture Review: 2018. Online: U.S. Department of Defense, 2018. Accessed September 25, 2021.
Ibid., p. 21.
32
Ibid., p. 38.
33
German Radio. "South Korea to Bring Back US Tactical Nuclear Missiles?" DefenceTalk.com, September 8, 2017.
https://www.defencetalk.com/south-korea-to-bring-back-us-tactical-nuclear-missiles-70430/
34
Keck, Zachary. "4 Reasons America Shouldn't Send Nuclear Weapons to South Korea or Japan." The National
Interest, September 15, 2017. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/4-reasons-america-shouldnt-sentnuclear-weapons-south-korea-22339
31

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144) Incapacitate a military base or deny regional accessA state could try to incapacitate an enemy military base, deny access to a region, or create abuffer zone by attempting to use local nuclear fallout to prevent anyone from accessing that area.
The author is not aware of any historical precedent or doctrine that would suggest this to be alikely scenario, but by examining Figure 1, it can be hypothesized that, by detonating a nuclear
weapon of a specific yield at a carefully-selected height of burst, and keeping in mind prevailingor predicted wind patterns, in theory a desired fallout effect could be produced.
Such a preventative strike might be made with the goal of denying an enemy force access to acertain area, or passage through a certain area, due to radioactive contamination. There are,however, several factors that might make this case unlikely. Since most military bases are
somewhat near a civilian population, it would be difficult to completely avoid collateral damage
or collateral fallout, decreasing the attractiveness of this option. Second, it may be that mostmodern armies can now operate in low-fallout circumstances using protective gear anddecontamination equipment, allowing the army to acquire access to the military base anyway.
Given these various considerations, when developing hypothetical use cases, it must be
thoroughly reasoned why nuclear weapon use would be necessary to incapacitate a military baseor deny regional access in lieu of conventional weaponry.

5) Accidental detonation caused by invading forces
Even if it becomes counterproductive to use nuclear weapons to deny access to a military base as
described in case #3, there might be another possibility that could result in the escalation of
nuclear war – the accidental detonation of an enemy’s low-yield tactical nuclear weapons causedby military forces unknowingly attacking or invading a base where nuclear warheads are
deployed for strategic or non-strategic deterrence. In this case, the invading nation may suspectthat this was not in fact an accidental detonation, but rather an intentional use of low-yield
nuclear weapons, and it may retaliate with its own low-yield nuclear use.

6) Low-yield nuclear demonstration alongside conventional combat
Because it has been said that the deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons lowers the thresholdof nuclear use, demonstration strikes with low-yield nuclear weapons on land or sea might be
attractive to a nation that wishes to avoid a direct nuclear attack but to also maintain credible
deterrence in the face of rising military tensions and possible large-scale nuclear escalation.

7) Low-yield nuclear use is met with a more powerful conventional attack
Due to the aforementioned technological advancements made in modern weaponry, it may bethat if a state with relatively primitive nuclear weapon technology detonates a low or mid-yield
nuclear weapon on military forces with very advanced conventional capabilities such as theUnited States, nuclear war may remain limited to preserve the international reputation of theUnited States. This has perhaps been made possible by the development of conventional
technology that is so advanced that the United States does not feel the need to respond to anuclear attack with another nuclear attack. In this way, the technological advancement of
conventional weaponry could cause a nuclear conflict to remain “limited” following thedetonation of a nuclear weapon.

Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA), Project Year 1

158) Russian and Chinese involvement on the Korean Peninsula
It is generally thought to be unlikely that either Russia or China would become embroiled in a
nuclear exchange on the Korean Peninsula by detonating their own nuclear weapons. For several
reasons, these states are more likely to support the DPRK by bolstering its conventional
capabilities than by detonating their own nuclear weapons. (1) They may be interested inpreserving the DPRK as a state because it provides a buffer zone between US allies and theirown territory; (2) the DPRK no longer needs a nuclear umbrella like the ROK, given that the
DPRK now has its own nuclear weapons arsenal, and (3) it is in their interest to keep the UnitedStates embroiled in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, thereby diverting the its attention fromconflicts or potential conflicts elsewhere in which Russia and/or China have interests. An
unprecedented nuclear use on the Korean Peninsula might quickly lead to a dissolution of the
DPRK or the end of the Korean conflict, and subsequent withdrawal of US troops from the ROK,
freeing the United States to turn its attention to tensions in Eastern Europe or the South China
Sea.

Conclusion
Low-yield nonstrategic nuclear weapons were developed and deployed during the Cold War forthe purpose of providing a “tactical” deterrent against the advance of conventional troops, but intheory, low-yield weapons can be used to achieve a variety of effects. It was originally thoughtthat the use of low-yield nuclear weapons might be necessary to offset overwhelming enemy
conventional forces.
As conventional weapon systems evolve to become more sophisticated, the use of low-yieldtactical nuclear weapons becomes less attractive for nations with highly advanced militarytechnologies. Modern weaponry such as precision-guided munitions, drones, and advanced
surveillance technology can now be used to achieve many of the same effects for which Cold
War military planners sought to use low-yield nuclear weapons. A low-yield nuclear option may,
however, still be attractive for nations looking to compensate for perceived conventional militaryinferiority. Therefore, a hypothetical nuclear exchange in the shadow of evolving contemporary
technologies must consider many new factors that were not necessary to contemplate in
traditional nuclear deterrence and detonation theory.
Plausible nuclear use cases on the Korean Peninsula should be based on an understanding ofcontemporary technological evolutions and their political effects and how these may intertwine
with or precipitate a low-yield nuclear use. This will require an understanding of nuclear andconventional deterrence theory outside of the traditional Cold War-era line of thought. Low-yieldweapons as both strategic and nonstrategic weapons could be considered in light of conventional
technology advancements.
Future research priorities to aid in responding to these issues include conducting interviews withmore national security and technical experts in the nations party to the Korean conflict. A deeper
dive into the technicalities of modern conventional weaponry and low-yield nuclear warheads
and their delivery systems could aid in understanding how conventional technological evolutions
Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA), Project Year 116

affect the plausibility of nuclear weapons use. It may also help to acquire a better understanding
through simulations of how the height of burst of a low-yield nuclear weapon affects
infrastructure damage, nuclear fallout, the electromagnetic pulse from detonation, and othernuclear weapon effects. Finally, understanding prevailing wind patterns on the Korean Peninsula
corresponding with various heights of burst will be of interest when examining nuclear fallout
effects.

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Appendix A: Technical Definition of a Kiloton
Since the days of the Manhattan Project, when the use of US Customary Units was still common
in science and engineering in the United States, the definition of the nuclear “kiloton” hasremained slightly ambiguous. Here follows a summary of the various definitions used and somepotential consequences of this ambiguity.
The original authoritative source on nuclear weapons, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3rdedition by Glasstone and Dolan, published by the United States (US) Department of Defense and
US Department of Energy in 1977, defines “kiloton energy” as “1012 calories. This isapproximately the amount of energy that would be released by the explosion of 1 kiloton (1,000tons) of TNT.” Furthermore, “the basis of the TNT equivalence is that the explosion of 1 ton of
TNT is assumed to release 109 calories of energy.”35
Table 1.45 from that source (reproduced below) summarizes various equivalents to one kilotonof TNT. According to Glasstone and Dolan, “the calculations are based on an accepted, althoughsomewhat arbitrary, figure of 1012 calories as the energy released in the explosion of this amountof TNT.36
Table 1.45: Equivalents of 1 Kiloton of TNT• Complete fission of 0.057 kg (57 grams or 2 ounces) fissionable material• Fission of 1.45 x 1023 nuclei• 1012 calories• 2.6 x 1025 million electron volts (MeV)• 4.18 x 1019 ergs (4.18 x 1012 joules)• 1.16 x 106 kilowatt-hours• 3.97 x 109 British thermal units
Glasstone and Dolan explain the origin of some ambiguity surrounding these definitions:
The majority of the experimental and theoretical values of the explosive energy released
by TNT range from 900 to 1,100 calories per gram. At one time, there was someuncertainty as to whether the term “kiloton” of TNT referred to a short kiloton (2 x 106
pounds), a metric kiloton (2.205 x 106 pounds), or a long kiloton (2.24 x 106 pounds). In
order to avoid ambiguity, it was agreed that the term “kiloton” would refer to the releaseof 1012 calories of explosive energy. This is equivalent to 1 short kiloton of TNT if the

35

Glasstone, Samuel, and Philip J. Dolan. 1977. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons. 3rd ed. N.p: United States
Department of Defense and Department of Energy. https://www.dtra.mil/Portals/61/Documents/NTPR/4Rad_Exp_Rpts/36_The_Effects_of_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf
36
Ibid., p. 13.

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energy release is 1,102 calories per gram or to 1 long kiloton if the energy is 984 calories
per gram of TNT. (Glasstone & Dolan, 1977, p. 13)
Despite the formal definition equating one kiloton to a tera-calorie, Lawrence Livermore and Los
Alamos National Laboratories have debated the kiloton definition37 based on the immediate
versus delayed fission yield of nuclear weapons. The total energy released is equivalent to about
240 MeV per fission. However, a fraction of this fission energy is carried away in neutrinos anddelayed radioactive decay (fallout). Therefore, some consider the true definition of a kiloton tobe equivalent to the immediate explosive yield of 180 MeV per fission.

37

Pincus, Walter. "2 Labs Battle To Be No. 1." The Washington Post, December 12, 1978.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1978/12/12/2-labs-battle-to-be-no-1/20a1a894-4867-4f9d97d0-183c6c6d844e/

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Appendix B: HYSPLIT Simulation Parameters
Parameter

Surface-burst

Airburst

Meteorology data
(Wind speed/direction, precipitation)

GFS 0.25-degree38"

0.3 kt & 10 kt"

2021 08 01 00 00 UTC"

37.915, 126.698"0m

147, 474 m390m 0m
631 m 2560 m
947 m 3840 m
1353 m 5486 m

Each cloud layer is raised by
the HOB.
(Ex. 1353 m +147 m)

6 minutes"

0.775 / 0.15 / 0.075

0.9712 / 0.0283 / 0.0005

𝑋 ~ 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑁(𝑑 = 0.407µm, σ = 4)
2.5

𝑋 ~ 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑁(𝑑 = 0.150µm, σ = 2)
3

# Particle Size bins

100"

Particle Density

2.5 g/cc

4.8 g/cc

Total Run Time

96 hours"

Spacing: 0.05°
Span: 20°
Layer Heights: 0, 300 m

"

Yield
Date / Time
Ground Zero Coordinates
Height of Burst (HOB)
40

Cloud Layers

Release Duration41
Activity Distribution(cap / skirt / stem)

42

Particle Size Distribution43
Moment of Distribution

Output Grid

Acknowledgement: The author gratefully acknowledges the NOAA Air Resources Laboratory(ARL) for the provision of the HYSPLIT transport and dispersion model and meteorology data
used to produce the fallout maps in this publication.

38

Meteorology data provided by the NOAA Air Resources Laboratory through the READY website athttps://www.ready.noaa.gov/index.php
39“Optimum” HOB for airbursts estimated based on comparison to Hiroshima/Nagasaki HOBs, which were selected
to maximize the area affected by an overpressure of 10-15 psi. Equation in Glasstone and Dolan, The Eff. Of Nuc.,p. 110.
40
Ibid., p. 34. Top of stabilized cloud height.
41
Ibid., p. 32. Length of time it takes for the mushroom cloud to stabilize.
42
Philippe, Sébastien, Sonya Schoenberger, and Nabil Ahmed. "Radiation Exposures and Compensation of Victimsof French Atmospheric Nuclear Tests in Polynesia." Moruroa Files. Last modified March 9, 2021. Cornell University(arXiv:2103.06128v1). Activity Distribution and other parameters selected from this previous study.
43
Norment, H G. “DELFIC: Department of Defense fallout prediction system. Volume I – fundamentals. Final report
16 Jan-31 Dec 79.” United States.

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