The UN and Non-Governmental Roles
in Keeping on the Track the Negotiation and Implementation of theAgreements
toward Peace and Denuclearization in Northeast Asia
Hiromichi Umebayashi,
Visiting Professor, RECNA and Special Advisor, Peace Depot Inc.
Introduction
After taking office in May 2017, Moon Jae-in, President of the ROK(Republic of Korea), called to Kim Jong-un, Chairman of the DPRK
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) State Committee, to participate in
the 2018 Winter Olympic Games and to resume inter-Korean dialogues, firstin Berlin in July and again in New York in September. Kim Jong-un
responded to it in his 2018 New Year’s address. Since then, the international
community has been witnessing dramatic changes on the Korean Peninsula,including a very much positive result of the inter-Korean Summit on April 27,
2018 and ongoing diligent efforts for a historic US-DPRK Summit.
At this stage of the evolution of the efforts for peace anddenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and beyond, it will be meaningful
to consider in detail about some critical issues that may come up in the near
future after a bilateral summit reaches any agreements. The process ofnegotiations for acceptable measures and their implementation that follow
the summit agreements would not be straight-forward but possibly take awinding course. This paper discusses on the roles of the UN and nongovernmental players in keeping on the track such negotiation andimplementation processes.
Consolidation of Clear Common Goals through Multilateralization
As for the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, the April 27
Panmunjom Declaration describes that two Koreas “confirmed the common
goal of realizing, through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean
Peninsula.” But it is not a sole goal but one of four component goals, withthree others such as non-aggression agreement, mutual phased disarmamentand pursuit of a peace treaty to end Korean War, for a larger goal to “establish
a permanent and solid peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.”
Any possible agreements on common goals that could be reached at
the US-DPRK summit will also come out in similar form of a set ofagreements. They will hopefully include a CVI Denuclearization of the1Korean Peninsula on one hand and a properly warranted security assurance
on the other hand.
When bilateral agreements at the highest level are reached, areasonable next step will be to make those common goals more solid and firm
through multilateralization. Given recent close contacts among heads ofseveral nations concerned, a six party State Heads Joint Declaration would
be a good possibility. It could be organized to take place, for instance, at the2018 ARF to be held in Singapore in early August this summer. All the sixstates are members of ARF and the Singapore may be the venue of the coming
US-DPRK summit as well.
Prolonged Time Necessary for a Success
The process to materialize the common goals will take time, involving
further negotiations for intermediate agreements for measures and theirimplementation. However, it should not matter once the shared common goals
are credible and solid.
There are two major reasons why the process will necessitate
considerable time span. One relates to the DPRK’s constant contention on theroot cause of its embarking the development of nuclear deterrence for selfdefense. The DPRK has been showing remarkably consistent position, saying,as is quoted from the statement of its UN Ambassador last October, “Itspossession of H-bomb and ICBM is a part of self-defensive measures to put adefinite end to the nuclear threats and hostile policy of the U.S. and safeguard
its sovereignty, right to existence and development.” This logic continues
unchanged starting from the DPRK’s statement prior to the first undergroundnuclear test in October 2006 to the recent remarks by Kim Jong-un. Thismeans the DPRK will be ready to discard its nuclear deterrence measures
only when it is 100 % confident on the end of such root cause. The verifiablecredibility of the US security assurance will be essential for the DPRK’s CVID.
The other reason relates to the deeply-rooted mutual distrust amongnations concerned. Regarding the relationship between the DPRK and the US,
Robert Gallucci, the US chief negotiator of the hard-woven 1994 Agreed
Framework, reflects his negotiations with his North Korean counterpart
Kang Sok-gu, DPRK Vice Foreign Minister, saying, “Kang Sok-gu told me hedidn’t trust the United States, and I of course told him that we didn’t trust
the DPRK.” 1 Such distrust has historical roots and is not exceptional between
some of other two countries in the region.
Under these circumstances, a CVID process has also to be a step bystep trust building process, which will take considerable time to be successful.
2A phased approach with the principle of "commitment for commitment, action
for action" adopted in the 2005 Joint Statement is worth revisiting and isrevised according to the past lessons.
Supporting, Monitoring and Mediating Roles
It will be important to craft ways and schemes for keeping on the trackthe negotiations and implementations to materialize the common goals.
UN RolesThe roles to be played by the UN are obvious in thisrespect as was illustrated by Moon Jae-in, who asked Antonio Guterres, UN
Secretary General, for his and UN’s support of the Panmunjom Declarationin May 2 just after the Inter-Korean Summit. Reportedly, Secretary General
Guterres “promised to designate a U.N. disarmament official to work with theSouth Korean government” to support the peace settlement of the Korean
Peninsula. 3 The UN can strengthen the foundation of the agreed commongoals through resolutions for support adopted in the General Assembly and/orin the Security Council. Such resolutions could even establish a committee tomonitor and act, if necessary and appropriate, to sustain the progress toward
the common goals.
In addition to such roles to influence and organize member states, theUN has a unique capacity to connect governmental efforts with nongovernmental potentiality. It can provide opportunities to establish nongovernmental groups, including expert groups, to support the governmental
process. The RECNA suggests in its 2015 report 4 that regional states
establish and support an independent expert group, which will monitor andmediate, if necessary, to minimize negative influences upon the diplomatic
process exerted by unrelated international incidents and domestic politicalshifts or conflicts. Such expert group could also be established within theframework of the UN.
Civil Society Roles
The roles played by civil society, including
parliamentarians, journalists, academics and expert communities, aresubstantial in sustaining the progress. One of their key roles is to keep thepublic receiving timely and unbiased information.
Given substantial division in the public opinions in the US, the ROK
and Japan regarding the way how the peace process should be designed, theGovernments of these countries will be exposed to domestic pressures indifferent directions. Influential civil society groups, such as the association ofnuclear-free local authorities, religious groups for peace, parliamentarians
network for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and physiciangroups have already considerable experiences in the peace and3denuclearization process in Northeast Asia. Their expertise should attract
more attention than ever in the current diplomatic opportunities in the region.
The below are just a few examples for their past activities.
A “Joint Statement by Parliamentarians of Japan and the Republic ofKorea on Denuclearization of Northeast Asia” was issued in May 2010 andwas endorsed by ninety-three cross-party parliamentarians from the twocountries as of July 2011. They stated “Security based on nuclear deterrence
will not bring real peace to the region. Rather, it will perpetuate insecurity
rooted in arms races of distrust and never-ending confrontation,” and arguedfor a nuclear weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia.
An international organization Mayors for Peace, headed by Mayor ofHiroshima, and a national organization National Council of Japan Nuclear
Free Local Authorities, headed by Mayor of Nagasaki, as well as 546
individual mayors in Japan as of 2017, endorsed the ‘Statement of Support
for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone’, saying “it is an urgent andtimely initiative both for strengthening the global tide toward a Nuclear
Weapon Free World and for achieving regional stability and peace inNortheast Asia.”
In addition, people of faith in Japan has initiated their call for Japanto act toward a nuclear-free Northeast Asia.
These examples illustrate potential roles to be played by civil society
in coming period of negotiations and implementation to achieve the agreed
common goals. Their role will be especially important in their capacity toprovide unbiased reliable information to the ordinal public, which will beeffective for mediation among different public opinions and political forces.

Robert Gallucci, An ACA Press Conference, “Progress and Challenges In
Denuclearizing North Korea,” Arms Control Today, May 2002
2 Yonhap, “President Moon requests U.N. role in building peace with North Korea,”May 1, 2018
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2018/05/01/0301000000AEN20180501006251
315.html
3 Jennie Oh, “U.N. chief agrees to participate in Korea peace efforts,” UPI, May 1, 2018https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2018/05/01/UN-chief-agrees-to-participatein-Korea-peace-efforts/2631525160950/
4 Satoshi HIROSE, Keiko NAKAMURA, Tatsujiro SUZUKI and Hiromichi
UMEBAYASHI, “Proposal: A Comprehensive Approach to a Northeast Asia
1

Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,” March 2015.

http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/bd/files/Proposal_E.pdf

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