Philosophical Review
What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
Author(s): Thomas Nagel
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 83, No. 4 (Oct., 1974), pp. 435-450
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183914
Accessed: 23-06-2016 16:41 UTC
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WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A BAT?

CONSCIOUSNESS is what makes the mind-body problem
really intractable. Perhaps that is why current discussionsof the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong.
The recent wave of reductionist euphoria has produced several
analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to

explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction.' But the problems dealt with arethose common to this type of reduction and other types, and whatmakes the mind-body problem unique, and unlike the water-H20
problem or the Turing machine-IBM machine problem or thelightning-electrical discharge problem or the gene-DNA problem

or the oak tree-hydrocarbon problem, is ignored.
Every reductionist has his favorite analogy from modern

science. It is most unlikely that any of these unrelated examples

of successful reduction will shed light on the relation of mind tobrain. But philosophers share the general human weakness for
explanations of what is incomprehensible in terms suited forwhat is familiar and well understood, though entirely different.
This has led to the acceptance of implausible accounts of themental largely because they would permit familiar kinds of
reduction. I shall try to explain why the usual examples do not

1 Examples are J. J. C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism (London,i963); David K. Lewis, "An Argument for the Identity Theory," Journal of
Philosophy, LXIII (i966), reprinted with addenda in David M. Rosenthal,

Materialism & the Mind-Body Problem (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., I971); Hilary
Putnam, "Psychological Predicates" in Capitan and Merrill, Art, Mind, &Religion (Pittsburgh, i967), reprinted in Rosenthal, op. cit., as "The Nature of
Mental States"; D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London,i968); D. C. Dennett, Content and Consciousness (London, I969). I have expressed earlier doubts in "Armstrong on the Mind," Philosophical Review,

LXXIX (1970), 394-403; "Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness,"

Synthese, 22 (I97I); and a review of Dennett, Journal of Philosophy, LXIX
(1972). See also Saul Kripke, "Naming and Necessity" in Davidson andHarman, Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht, I972), esp. pp. 334-342;
and M. T. Thornton, "Ostensive Terms and Materialism," The Monist, 56(1972).

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THOMAS NAGEL

help us to understand the relation between mind and body-why, indeed, we have at present no conception of what an explanation of the physical nature of a mental phenomenon would be.
Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be muchless interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless. The mostimportant and characteristic feature of conscious mental phenomena is very poorly understood. Most reductionist theories do
not even try to explain it. And careful examination will showthat no currently available concept of reduction is applicable toit. Perhaps a new theoretical form can be devised for the purpose,but such a solution, if it exists, lies in the distant intellectual
future.

Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs
at many levels of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its
presence in the simpler organisms, and it is very difficult to say
in general what provides evidence of it. (Some extremists havebeen prepared to deny it even of mammals other than man.) No
doubt it occurs in countless forms totally unimaginable to us, onother planets in other solar systems throughout the universe. But
no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has
conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something
it is like to be that organism. There may be further implications
about the form of the experience; there may even (though I

doubt it) be implications about the behavior of the organism.
But fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if andonly if there is something that it is like to be that organism-

something it is like for the organism.
We may call this the subjective character of experience. It is
not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive

analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible
with its absence. It is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory
system of functional states, or intentional states, since these could

be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved like people though
they experienced nothing.2 It is not analyzable in terms of thecausal role of experiences in relation to typical human behavior2 Perhaps there could not actually be such robots. Perhaps anything complex
enough to behave like a person would have experiences. But that, if true, is afact which cannot be discovered merely by analyzing the concept of experience.
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WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A BAT?

for similar reasonsA I do not deny that conscious mental statesand events cause behavior, nor that they may be given functional.

characterizations. I deny only that this kind of thing exhausts
their analysis. Any reductionist program has to to be based on an
analysis of what is to be reduced. If the analysis leaves somethingout, the problem will be falsely posed. It is useless to base thedefense of materialism on any analysis of mental phenomena that.
fails to deal explicitly with their subjective character. For there

is no reason to suppose that a reduction which seems plausible
when no attempt is made to account for consciousness can beextended to include consciousness. Without some idea, thereforeof what the subjective character of experience is, we cannot;
know what is required of a physicalist theory.

While an account of the physical basis of mind must explain
many things, this appears to be the most difficult. It is impossible

to exclude the phenomenological features of experience from a,reduction in the same way that one excludes the phenomenalfeatures of an ordinary substance from a physical or chemical
reduction of it-namely, by explaining them as effects on theminds of human observers.4 If physicalism is to be defended, thephenomenological features must themselves be given a physicalaccount. But when we examine their subjective character it:
seems that such a result is impossible. The reason is that every
subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single
point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physicaltheory will abandon that point of view.

Let me first try to state the issue somewhat more fully than byreferring to the relation between the subjective and the objec,
tive, or between the pour-soi and the en-soi. This is far from easy.
Facts about what it is like to be an X are very peculiar, so peculiarthat some may be inclined to doubt their reality, or the signifi.
cance of claims about them. To illustrate the connection between
3 It is not equivalent to that about which we are incorrigible, both because
we are not incorrigible about experience and because experience is present inanimals lacking language and thought, who have no beliefs at all about theirexperiences.

4Cf. Richard Rorty, "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories," The

Review of Metaphysics, XIX (i965), esp. 37-38.
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THOMAS NAGEL

subjectivity and a point of view, and to make evident the importance of subjective features, it will help to explore the matter in
relation to an example that brings out clearly the divergence
between the two types of conception, subjective and objective.

I assume we all believe that bats have experience. After all,they are mammals, and there is no more doubt that they haveexperience than that mice or pigeons or whales have experience.
I have chosen bats instead of wasps or flounders because if one
travels too far down the phylogenetic tree, people gradually shed
their faith that there is experience there at all. Bats, although moreclosely related to us than those other species, nevertheless present
a range of activity and a sensory apparatus so different from oursthat the problem I want to pose is exceptionally vivid (though it
certainly could be raised with other species). Even without thebenefit of philosophical reflection, anyone who has spent sometime in an enclosed space with an excited bat knows what it is toencounter a fundamentally alien form of life.
I have said that the essence of the belief that bats have experience is that there is something that it is like to be a bat. Now

we know that most bats (the microchiroptera, to be precise)
perceive the external world primarily by sonar, or echolocation,

detecting the reflections, from objects within range, of their own
rapid, subtly modulated, high-frequency shrieks. Their brains aredesigned to correlate the outgoing impulses with the subsequentechoes, and the information thus acquired enables bats to makeprecise discriminations of distance, size, shape, motion, andtexture comparable to those we make by vision. But bat sonar,
though clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation
to any sense that we possess, and there is no reason to supposethat it is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine.

This appears to create difficulties for the notion of what it is liketo be a bat. We must consider whether any method will permit

us to extrapolate to the inner life of the bat from our own case,5and if not, what alternative methods there may be for understanding the notion.
5 By "our own case" I do not mean just "my own case," but rather thementalistic ideas that we apply unproblematically to ourselves and otherhuman beings.
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WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A BAT?

Our own experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range is therefore limited. It will not help to try
to imagine that one has webbing on one's arms, which enables
one to fly around at dusk and dawn catching insects in one's

mouth; that one has very poor vision, and perceives the surrounding world by a system of reflected high-frequency soundsignals; and that one spends the day hanging upside down by
one's feet in an attic. In so far as I can imagine this (which is notvery far), it tells me only what it would be like for me to behave
as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to knowwhat it is like for a bat to be a bat. Yet if I try to imagine this, I
am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task. I cannot perform it either byimagining additions to my present experience, or by imagining

segments gradually subtracted from it, or by imagining somecombination of additions, subtractions, and modifications.
To the extent that I could look and behave like a wasp or abat without changing my fundamental structure, my experiences

would not be anything like the experiences of those animals. On
the other hand, it is doubtful that any meaning can be attachedto the supposition that I should possess the internal neurophysiological constitution of a bat. Even if I could by gradual degrees

be transformed into a bat, nothing in my present constitution
enables me to imagine what the experiences of such a futurestage of myself thus metamorphosed would be like. The best
evidence would come from the experiences of bats, if we only
knew what they were like.

So if extrapolation from our own case is involved in the ideaof what it is like to be a bat, the extrapolation must be incompletable. We cannot form more than a schematic conception of what

it is like. For example, we may ascribe general types of experienceon the basis of the animal's structure and behavior. Thus we
describe bat sonar as a form of three-dimensional forward per-ception; we believe that bats feel some versions of pain, fear,
hunger, and lust, and that they have other, more familiar typesof perception besides sonar. But we believe that these experiences
also have in each case a specific subjective character, which it isbeyond our ability to conceive. And if there is conscious life else439

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THOMAS NAGEL

where in the universe, it is likely that some of it will not be describable even in the most general experiential terms available tous.6 (The problem is not confined to exotic cases, however, for itexists between one person and another. The subjective characterof the experience of a person deaf and blind from birth is notaccessible to me, for example, nor presumably is mine to him.
This does not prevent us each from believing that the other's
experience has such a subjective character.)

If anyone is inclined to deny that we can believe in the existence of facts like this whose exact nature we cannot possibly
conceive, he should reflect that in contemplating the bats we arein much the same position that intelligent bats or Martians7
would occupy if they tried to form a conception of what it was
like to be us. The structure of their own minds might make it
impossible for them to succeed, but we know they would be wrong
to conclude that there is not anything precise that it is like tobe us: that only certain general types of mental state could be,ascribed to us (perhaps perception and appetite would be concepts
common to us both; perhaps not). We know they would be wrong
to draw such a skeptical conclusion because we know what it is liketo be us. And we know that while it includes an enormous amountof variation and complexity, and while we do not possess the
vocabulary to describe it adequately, its subjective charater ishighly specific, and in some respects describable in terms that canbe understood only by creatures like us. The fact that we cannot
expect ever to accommodate in our language a detailed description of Martian or bat phenomenology should not lead us todismiss as meaningless the claim that bats and Martians haveexperiences fully comparable in richness of detail to our own. It
would be fine if someone were to develop concepts and a theory
that enabled us to think about those things; but such an understanding may be permanently denied to us by the limits of our
nature. And to deny the reality or logical significance of what

6 Therefore the analogical form of the English expression "what it is like"is misleading. It does not mean "what (in our experience) it resembles," butrather "how it is for the subject himself."
Any intelligent extraterrestrial beings totally different from us.
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WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A BAT?

we can never describe or understand is the crudest form of cogni-

tive dissonance.
This brings us to the edge of a topic that requires much morediscussion than I can give it here: namely, the relation between
facts on the one hand and conceptual schemes or systems of repre-

sentation on the other. My realism about the subjective domain
in all its forms implies a belief in the existence of facts beyond thereach of human concepts. Certainly it is possible for a humanbeing to believe that there are facts which humans never will

possess the requisite concepts to represent or comprehend. Indeed,
it would be foolish to doubt this, given the finiteness of humanity's
expectations. After all, there would have been transfinite numbers

even if everyone had been wiped out by the Black Death before
Cantor discovered them. But one might also believe that there arefacts which could not ever be represented or comprehended byhuman beings, even if the species lasted forever-simply because
our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of therequisite type. This impossibility might even be observed byother beings, but it is not clear that the existence of such beings,
or the possibility of their existence, is a precondition of thesignificance of the hypothesis that there are humanly inaccessible
facts. (After all, the nature of beings with access to humanly
inaccessible facts is presumably itself a humanly inaccessible

fact.) Reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us,
therefore, to the conclusion that there are facts that do not consist
in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language. We

can be compelled to recognize the existence of such facts without
being able to state or comprehend them.

I shall not pursue this subject, however. Its bearing on the
topic before us (namely, the mind-body problem) is that it enables

us to make a general observation about the subjective characterof experience. Whatever may be the status of facts about what
it is like to be a human being, or a bat, or a Martian, these appear

to be facts that embody a particular point of view.

I am not adverting here to the alleged privacy of experience
to its possessor. The point of view in question is not one accessible only to a single individual. Rather it is a type. It is often

possible to take up a point of view other than one's own, so the
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THOMAS NAGEL

comprehension of such facts is not limited to one's own case.
There is a sense in which phenomenological facts are perfectly
objective: one person can know or say of another what the qualityof the other's experience is. They are subjective, however, in thesense that even this objective ascription of experience is possible
only for someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription
to be able to adopt his point of view-to understand the ascription in the first person as well as in the third, so to speak. The
more different from oneself the other experiencer is, the lesssuccess one can expect with this enterprise. In our own case we
occupy the relevant point of view, but we will have as muchdifficulty understanding our own experience properly if weapproach it from another point of view as we would if we tried
to understand the experience of another species without taking
up its point of view.8

This bears directly on the mind-body problem. For if the factsof experience-facts about what it is like for the experiencing

organism-are accessible only from one point of view, then it isa mystery how the true character of experiences could be revealedin the physical operation of that organism. The latter is a domainof objective facts par excellence-the kind that can be observed andunderstood from many points of view and by individuals withdiffering perceptual systems. There are no comparable imaginative
obstacles to the acquisition of knowledge about bat neurophysiol-

ogy by human scientists, and intelligent bats or Martians mightlearn more about the human brain than we ever will.
8 It may be easier than I suppose to transcend inter-species barriers with theaid of the imagination. For example, blind people are able to detect objects
near them by a form of sonar, using vocal clicks or taps of a cane. Perhaps if
one knew what that was like, one could by extension imagine roughly what it
was like to possess the much more refined sonar of a bat. The distance between
oneself and other persons and other species can fall anywhere on a continuum.
Even for other persons the understanding of what it is like to be them is only

partial, and when one moves to species very different from oneself, a lesser
degree of partial understanding may still be available. The imagination isremarkably flexible. My point, however, is not that we cannot know what it islike to be a bat. I am not raising that epistemological problem. My point israther that even to form a conception of what it is like to be a bat (and a fortiori
to know what it is like to be a bat) one must take up the bat's point of view.
If one can take it up roughly, or partially, then one's conception will also berough or partial. Or so it seems in our present state of understanding.
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WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A BAT?

This is not by itself an argument against reduction. A Martianscientist with no understanding of visual perception could under-

stand the rainbow, or lightning, or clouds as physical phenomena,

though he would never be able to understand the human concepts of rainbow, lightning, or cloud, or the place these things

occupy in our phenomenal world. The objective nature of thethings picked out by these concepts could be apprehended byhim because, although the concepts themselves are connectedwith a particular point of view and a particular visual phenomenology, the things apprehended from that point of view are not:they are observable from the point of view but external to it;
hence they can be comprehended from other points of view also,either by the same organisms or by others. Lightning has an
objective character that is not exhausted by its visual appearance,
and this can be investigated by a Martian without vision. To be
precise, it has a more objective character than is revealed in its
visual appearance. In speaking of the move from subjective toobjective characterization, I wish to remain noncommittal about
the existence of an end point, the completely objective intrinsic
nature of the thing, which one might or might not be able toreach. It may be more accurate to think of objectivity as a direc-

tion in which the understanding can travel. And in understanding
a phenomenon like lightning, it is legitimate to go as far away as
one can from a strictly human viewpoint.9
In the case of experience, on the other hand, the connection
with a particular point of view seems much closer. It is difficult
to understand what could be meant by the objective character ofan experience, apart from the particular point of view from which
its subject apprehends it. After all, what would be left of what it

was like to be a bat if one removed the viewpoint of the bat?
But if experience does not have, in addition to its subjective
character, an objective nature that can be apprehended fromI The problem I am going to raise can therefore be posed even if the distinc-tion between more subjective and more objective descriptions or viewpoints
can itself be made only within a larger human point of view. I do not accept
this kind of conceptual relativism, but it need not be refuted to make the pointthat psychophysical reduction cannot be accommodated by the subjective-toobjective model familiar from other cases.
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THOMAS NAGEL

many different points of view, then how can it be supposed thata Martian investigating my brain might be observing physicalprocesses which were my mental processes (as he might observe
physical processes which were bolts of lightning), only from adifferent point of view? How, for that matter, could a humanphysiologist observe them from another point of view?1o

We appear to be faced with a general difficulty about psychophysical reduction. In other areas the process of reduction is amove in the direction of greater objectivity, toward a more accurate view of the real nature of things. This is accomplished by
reducing our dependence on individual or species-specific pointsof view toward the object of investigation. We describe it not interms of the impressions it makes on our senses, but in terms of
its more general effects and of properties detectable by meansother than the human senses. The less it depends on a specificallyhuman viewpoint, the more objective is our description. It is

possible to follow this path because although the concepts andideas we employ in thinking about the external world are initiallyapplied from a point of view that involves our perceptual apparatus, they are used by us to refer to things beyond themselvestoward which we have the phenomenal point of view. Therefore

we can abandon it in favor of another, and still be thinking about
the same things.

Experience itself, however, does not seem to fit the pattern.
The idea of moving from appearance to reality seems to make nosense here. What is the analogue in this case to pursuing a moreobjective understanding of the same phenomena by abandoning
the initial subjective viewpoint toward them in favor of anotherthat is more objective but concerns the same thing? Certainly it
appears unlikely that we will get closer to the real nature of humanexperience by leaving behind the particularity of our human pointof view and striving for a description in terms accessible to beings
that could not imagine what it was like to be us. If the subjective
character of experience is fully comprehensible only from one
10 The problem is not just that when I look at the "Mona Lisa," my visualexperience has a certain quality, no trace of which is to be found by someone
looking into my brain. For even if he did observe there a tiny image of the"Mona Lisa," he would have no reason to identify it with the experience.
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WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A BAT?

point of view, then any shift to greater objectivity -that is, lessattachment to a specific viewpoint-does not take us nearer tothe real nature of the phenomenon: it takes us farther awayfrom it.

In a sense, the seeds of this objection to the reducibility ofexperience are already detectable in successful cases of reduction;for in discovering sound to be, in reality, a wave phenomenon in
air or other media, we leave behind one viewpoint to take up
another, and the auditory, human or animal viewpoint that weleave behind remains unreduced. Members of radically different

species may both understand the same physical events in objective terms, and this does not require that they understand thephenomenal forms in which those events appear to the senses ofmembers of the other species. Thus it is a condition of their refer-ring to a common reality that their more particular viewpoints
are not part of the common reality that they both apprehend.

The reduction can succeed only if the species-specific viewpointis omitted from what is to be reduced.
But while we are right to leave this point of view aside inseeking a fuller understanding of the external world, we cannot
ignore it permanently, since it is the essence of the internal world,and not merely a point of view on it. Most of the neobehaviorism

of recent philosophical psychology results from the effort to sub-stitute an objective concept of mind for the real thing, in orderto have nothing left over which cannot be reduced. If we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the sub-jective character of experience, we must admit that no presently
available conception gives us a clue how this could be done.

The problem is unique. If mental processes are indeed physicalprocesses, then there is something it is like, intrinsically," to11 The relation would therefore not be a contingent one, like that of a cause
and its distinct effect. It would be necessarily true that a certain physical state
felt a certain way. Saul Kripke (op. cit.) argues that causal behaviorist andrelated analyses of the mental fail because they construe, e.g., "pain" as amerely contingent name of pains. The subjective character of an experience("its immediate phenomenological quality" Kripke calls it [p. 340]) is theessential property left out by such analyses, and the one in virtue of which itis, necessarily, the experience it is. My view is closely related to his. Like
Kripke, I find the hypothesis that a certain brain state should necessarily have445This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Thu, 23 Jun 2016 16:41:58 UTC
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THOMAS NAGEL

undergo certain physical processes. What it is for such a thing tobe the case remains a mystery.

What moral should be drawn from these reflections, and whatshould be done next? It would be a mistake to conclude thatphysicalism must be false. Nothing is proved by the inadequacyof physicalist hypotheses that assume a faulty objective analysisof mind. It would be truer to say that physicalism is a position
we cannot understand because we do not at present have any

conception of how it might be true. Perhaps it will be thought
unreasonable to require such a conception as a condition ofunderstanding. After all, it might be said, the meaning ofphysicalism is clear enough: mental states are states of the body;mental events are physical events. We do not know which physicalstates and events they are, but that should not prevent us froma certain subjective character incomprehensible without further explanation.
No such explanation emerges from theories which view the mind-brain
relation as contingent, but perhaps there are other alternatives, not yet
discovered.
A theory that explained how the mind-brain relation was necessary would
still leave us with Kripke's problem of explaining why it nevertheless appears
contingent. That difficulty seems to me surmountable, in the following way.

We may imagine something by representing it to ourselves either perceptually,
sympathetically, or symbolically. I shall not try to say how symbolic imagina-

tion works, but part of what happens in the other two cases is this. To imagine
something perceptually, we put ourselves in a conscious state resembling thestate we would be in if we perceived it. To imagine something sympathetically,
we put ourselves in a conscious state resembling the thing itself. (This method

can be used only to imagine mental events and states-our own or another's.)
When we try to imagine a mental state occurring without its associated brain
state, we first sympathetically imagine the occurrence of the mental state: thatis, we put ourselves into a state that resembles it mentally. At the same time,

we attempt to perceptually imagine the non-occurrence of the associatedphysical state, by putting ourselves into another state unconnected with thefirst: one resembling that which we would be in if we perceived the nonoccurrence of the physical state. Where the imagination of physical features isperceptual and the imagination of mental features is sympathetic, it appears
to us that we can imagine any experience occurring without its associatedbrain state, and vice versa. The relation between them will appear contingent
even if it is necessary, because of the independence of the disparate types ofimagination.

(Solipsism, incidentally, results if one misinterprets sympathetic imagination
as if it worked like perceptual imagination: it then seems impossible to imagine
any experience that is not one's own.)
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WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A BAT?

understanding the hypothesis. What could be clearer than thewords "is" and "are"?

But I believe it is precisely this apparent clarity of the word"is" that is deceptive. Usually, when we are told that X is r weknow how it is supposed to be true, but that depends on a conceptual or theoretical background and is not conveyed by the "is"alone. We know how both "X" and "r" refer, and the kinds ofthings to which they refer, and we have a rough idea how the two
referential paths might converge on a single thing, be it an object, aperson, a process, an event, or whatever. But when the two termsof the identification are very disparate it may not be so clear how
it could be true. We may not have even a rough idea of how thetwo referential paths could converge, or what kind of things theymight converge on, and a theoretical framework may have to besupplied to enable us to understand this. Without the framework,
an air of mysticism surrounds the identification.
This explains the magical flavor of popular presentations offundamental scientific discoveries, given out as propositions towhich one must subscribe without really understanding them.
For example, people are now told at an early age that all matteris really energy. But despite the fact that they know what "is"means, most of them never form a conception of what makes thisclaim true, because they lack the theoretical background.
At the present time the status of physicalism is similar to thatwhich the hypothesis that matter is energy would have had if
uttered by a pre-Socratic philosopher. We do not have the beginnings of a conception of how it might be true. In order tounderstand the hypothesis that a mental event is a physical event,

we require more than an understanding of the word "is." Theidea of how a mental and a physical term might refer to the samething is lacking, and the usual analogies with theoretical identification in other fields fail to supply it. They fail because if weconstrue the reference of mental terms to physical events on theusual model, we either get a reappearance of separate subjective

events as the effects through which mental reference to physicalevents is secured, or else we get a false account of how mental
terms refer (for example, a causal behaviorist one).

Strangely enough, we may have evidence for the truth of some447

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THOMAS NAGEL

thing we cannot really understand. Suppose a caterpillar is locked
in a sterile safe by someone unfamiliar with insect metamorphosis,
and weeks later the safe is reopened, revealing a butterfly. If theperson knows that the safe has been shut the whole time, he hasreason to believe that the butterfly is or was once the caterpillar,
without having any idea in what sense this might be so. (Onepossibility is that the caterpillar contained a tiny winged parasitethat devoured it and grew into the butterfly.)
It is conceivable that we are in such a position with regard tophysicalism. Donald Davidson has argued that if mental events
have physical causes and effects, they must have physical descriptions. He holds that we have reason to believe this even though
we do not-and in fact could not-have a general psychophysicaltheory.12 His argument applies to intentional mental events, but
I think we also have some reason to believe that sensations are
physical processes, without being in a position to understand how.
Davidson's position is that certain physical events have irreducibly mental properties, and perhaps some view describable inthis way is correct. But nothing of which we can now form a conception corresponds to it; nor have we any idea what a theory
would be like that enabled us to conceive of it.13
Very little work has been done on the basic question (fromwhich mention of the brain can be entirely omitted) whether any
sense can be made of experiences' having an objective characterat all. Does it make sense, in other words, to ask what my experi-

ences are really like, as opposed to how they appear to me? Wecannot genuinely understand the hypothesis that their nature iscaptured in a physical description unless we understand the more
fundamental idea that they have an objective nature (or that objective processes can have a subjective nature).14
12 See "Mental Events" in Foster and Swanson, Experience and Theory (Amherst,
1970); though I don't understand the argument against psychophysical laws.
13 Similar remarks apply to my paper "Physicalism," Philosophical Review

LXXIV (i965), 339-356, reprinted with postscript in John O'Connor, Modern
Materialism (New York, I969).

14 This question also lies at the heart of the problem of other minds, whose
close connection with the mind-body problem is often overlooked. If one
understood how subjective experience could have an objective nature, one
would understand the existence of subjects other than oneself.
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WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A BAT?

I should like to close with a speculative proposal. It may bepossible to approach the gap between subjective and objectivefrom another direction. Setting aside temporarily the relation
between the mind and the brain, we can pursue a more objective
understanding of the mental in its own right. At present we arecompletely unequipped to think about the subjective characterof experience without relying on the imagination-without taking
up the point of view of the experiential subject. This should be
regarded as a challenge to form new concepts and devise a new
method-an objective phenomenology not dependent on empathy or the imagination. Though presumably it would not cap-

ture everything, its goal would be to describe, at least in part, thesubjective character of experiences in a form comprehensible tobeings incapable of having those experiences.
We would have to develop such a phenomenology to describe
the sonar experiences of bats; but it would also be possible tobegin with humans. One might try, for example, to develop concepts that could be used to explain to a person blind from birthwhat it was like to see. One would reach a blank wall eventually,

but it should be possible to devise a method of expressing in objective terms much more than we can at present, and with muchgreater precision. The loose intermodal analogies-for example,"Red is like the sound of a trumpet"-which crop up in discussions of this subject are of little use. That should be clear toanyone who has both heard a trumpet and seen red. But struc-tural features of perception might be more accessible to objective
description, even though something would be left out. And concepts alternative to those we learn in the first person may enable
us to arrive at a kind of understanding even of our own experience
which is denied us by the very ease of description and lack of
distance that subjective concepts afford.

Apart from its own interest, a phenomenology that is in thissense objective may permit questions about the physical15 basis
15 I have not defined the term "physical." Obviously it does not apply justto what can be described by the concepts of contemporary physics, since we
expect further developments. Some may think there is nothing to prevent
mental phenomena from eventually being recognized as physical in their own
right. But whatever else may be said of the physical, it has to be objective. So
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THOMAS NAGEL

of experience to assume a more intelligible form. Aspects of sub-jective experience that admitted this kind of objective description
might be better candidates for objective explanations of a morefamiliar sort. But whether or not this guess is correct, it seems
unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be contemplated
until more thought has been given to the general problem of sub-jective and objective. Otherwise we cannot even pose the mindbody problem without sidestepping it.16
THOMAS NAGEL
Princeton University

if our idea of the physical ever expands to include mental phenomena, itwill have to assign them an objective character-whether or not this is doneby analyzing them in terms of other phenomena already regarded as physical.
It seems to me more likely, however, that mental-physical relations will
eventually be expressed in a theory whose fundamental terms cannot be placed
clearly in either category.

16 I have read versions of this paper to a number of audiences, and am
indebted to many people for their comments.

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