Credit: iStock/ Perytskyy

KOREAN PENINSULA NUCLEAR ISSUE: CHALLENGES ANDPROSPECTS
Anastasia Barannikova
Prepared for the

Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use
in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)
Co-sponsored by
The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA),
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, and
The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament(APLN)
with cooperation ofPanel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia
Additional funding by the MacArthur Foundation
February 3, 2022
Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA), Project Year 1

1About the Author
Anastasia Barannikova is a research fellow at ADM Nevelskoy Maritime State University(Vladivostok, Russia) and non-resident senior fellow of Mongolian Institute of Northeast Asian
Security and Strategy (Mongolia).
She was a visiting fellow at Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) in 2019, James
Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies (CNS), Middlebury Institute of International Studies
in 2020 and Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University in 2021. She holds PhD in
History from ADM Nevelskoy Maritime State University.
Barannikova is the author of more than 100 publications in scientific journals, newspapers, andblogs, including articles in Russian, English, Chinese, Korean, Mongolian, and Japanese
languages. Her research interests include (but not limited by) regional (Northeast Asia) security
and nuclear non-proliferation: Korean Peninsula, reunification, DPRK foreign and domestic
policies, DPRK nuclear and missile program, nuclear posture.

Abstract
For the last three decades 1 the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue (KPNI) has been considered as
one of the most serious threats to security and stability in NEA (Northeast Asia). To date, noneof the efforts by the international community—including Six-party talks, pressure and diplomaticefforts, and more recently, activity started by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea(DPRK) in 2018-2019—have yielded tangible results in addressing the issue. This puts into
question the viability of the existing approaches to the DPRK and the feasibility of achieving a
KPNI solution.
Keywords: Korean Peninsula, Nuclear Issue, DPRK, Denuclearization, Balance of PowerThe 1990s are taken as a starting point here, as at that time relations between the DPRK and US deteriorated, theDPRK threatened to withdraw from the NPT, and the first nuclear crisis started.
1

Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA), Project Year 12How Did the DPRK Become Nuclear?
How the North Korean nuclear program started
The DPRK’s national nuclear program started in 1952, when the North Korean government
established its Atomic Research Institute. The dominant opinion among scholars is that the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was able to start and develop its nuclear
program mainly due to the technical and technological assistance of the USSR and China. The
technological base of the North Korean nuclear program, however, started forming during theJapanese annexation of Korea. One of the technical bases of Japan's nuclear program was locatedin the northern part of Korea, near the city of Heungnam (now Hamhung). Though speculations
that the Japanese wartime nuclear weapons program achieved any significant results lackevidence, North Koreans were able to “inherit” at least mined and processed uranium as well as
the knowledge acquired during the work of DPRK scientists and technicians at Japanesefacilities. The “fathers” of the North Korean nuclear program were also educated in Japan during
the colonial period. 2
After the end of Korean War, the DPRK was able to acquire advanced technologies and educate
its specialists in the leading universities of the USSR as a part of Soviet-North Korean
cooperation in peaceful atomic energy use (and other uses for radioactive elements). Later, thespecialists from the DPRK received applied nuclear training in China and studied in othercountries including Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic, etc. In 1965 the Soviet Union
supplied and installed an IRT-2000 research nuclear reactor, a radiochemical laboratory, a K60000 cobalt installation and a B-25 betatron (a particle accelerator for electrons) at Yongbyon.
The radiochemical laboratory was very advanced by the standards of that time. Particularly, it
made it possible, among other things, for the DPRK to separate radioactive isotopes from spent
nuclear fuel and thus to extract weapon-grade plutonium. 3
By the 1970s, the North Korean nuclear program had begun to accelerate beyond the assistanceprovided by other states. The DPRK modernized its reactor and increased its capacity without
notifying the USSR. During this time, the DPRK is reported to have begun exploring thepossibility of creating its own nuclear weapons. 4 At the beginning of the 1970s the DPRK
focused on developing a full nuclear cycle that would provide the technical capability to produce
nuclear weapons. Along with external factors—the permanent military threat from the UnitedStates and unstable relations with allies—the DPRK was likely motivated by the efforts made by
the Republic of Korea (ROK) to develop its own nuclear program. At the beginning of 1970 apolitical decision was made in the ROK to launch a military nuclear program. Already in 1974
Japan’s Secret War: How Japan’s Race to Build its Own Atomic Bomb Provided the Groundwork for North Korea’s
Nuclear Program. Robert K. Wilcox, 2019; Ilya Dyachkov. Evolution of North Korean nuclear program in the context
of nuclear non-proliferation in Northeast Asia (second half of XX-beginning of XXI century). Dissertation. 2014.
3
Georgiy Kaurov. “A technical history of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Relations,” in The North Korean Nuclear
Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia, Edited by James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y.
Mansourov, New York: Routledge, 2000. P. 15-17.
4
Rozhkov O.V. “Yadernaya programma KNDR” [“The DPRK’s Nuclear Program”]. Rozhkov O.V, March 18, 2003.
https://www.armscontrol.ru/course/lectures03a/ovr30318.htm
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South Korean scientists were close to creating nuclear weapons. The United States received
information about the ROK’s plans to create a prototype of a nuclear charge and acquire
advanced missile technologies (in particular, solid-fuel engines), and pressed the ROK to stop
those activities and to ratify the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1975. Despite theattempt of the United States to keep the ROK’s nuclear weapons-related research a secret, therapid progress of the South Korean nuclear program spurred North Koreans to accelerate theirown efforts in the nuclear sphere. Moreover, the ROK secretly continued nuclear experiments 5
after 1975, a fact that only became known to the international community in the beginning of the
2000s. DPRK intelligence was able to obtain information about those experiments much earlier.
This period (the 70s) is also notable for the fact that the DPRK started military cooperation withPakistan and cooperated with China in the sphere of ballistic missiles technologies. 6
The DPRK signed the NPT in 1985, as a prerequisite for technical cooperation with the USSR on
the construction of a light water nuclear power plant in the DPRK. In the mid-1980s the DPRK
also started construction of a 50-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon with the assistance of China andPakistan. 7 Cooperation with Iran also started during that period. During the period of the IranIraq war (1980-1988) Iran started buying North Korean ballistic missiles. In response Iran sharedsensitive data from their missile test-launches, thus helping the DPRK to further advance its
technologies. Depending on the foreign policy situations at various times during that period, thetwo countries cooperated as testing grounds for missile development for each other. 8 Their
cooperation in the sphere of nuclear and missile development continued through the beginning of
the 2000s. 9 In the 1990s the DPRK acquired uranium enrichment centrifuge technology 10
through Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan and designs for a uranium warhead that Pakistan had
likely obtained from China. In exchange, Pakistan received North Korean missile technology.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the DPRK was able to obtain sensitive missile
technologies and hire missile specialists from former Soviet states, including Russia andUkraine. 11 For example, the latest breakthrough in DPRK intercontinental ballistic missile
Kang Jungmin et al. “South Korea’s Nuclear Surprise,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Vol. 61, No. 1. 2005.
January/February. P. 40.
6Eleanor Albert. “North Korea’s Military Capabilities,” The Council on Foreign Relations, November 16, 2020,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-military-capabilities.
7Peter Huessy., "The Chinese Obstacle to a Nuclear Deal with North Korea," The Council on Foreign Relations, July8, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinese-obstacle-nuclear-deal-north-korea
8
Iranian specialists observed missile launches from North Korean test-sites and North Koreans, in their turn, wereable to observe missile launches in Iran, thus checking their own technologies and modifications on the othercountry’s territory. (Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. North Korean Military Proliferation in the Middle East and Africa: Enabling
Violence and Instability. University of Kentucky Press, 2018 (Chapter: “The North Korea-Iran Nuclear Connection,”
pp. 81-94).
9
Paul K. Kerr, Steven A. Hildreth, Mary Beth D. Nikitin. “Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear
Cooperation”, Congressional Research Service, February 26, 2016, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43480.pdf
10Kutchesfahani, Sara. “Case Study: The Khan Network.” Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Nonproliferation:
Achieving Security with Technology and Policy, edited by James Doyle, 2nd ed., 2011, pp. 561-574. Amsterdam:
Elsevier; IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Riseof Proliferation Networks. London: IISS. 2007. P. 72.
11
Simon Shuster. "Inside the Doom Factory: How North Korea Built a Nuclear Arsenal on the Ashes of the Soviet
Union", Time, February 1, 2018, https://time.com/5128398/the-missile-factory /5

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(ICBM) technologies was made possible by the acquisition of high-powered engine technology
from Eastern Ukraine. 12

Responsibility of the USSR/Russia and China
As is clear from the previous section of this paper many countries, directly or indirectly,
voluntary or involuntarily, and regularly or occasionally, have contributed to the development of
the North Korean nuclear program in the past. Does this mean that they bear responsibility forthe current situation in which the DPRK has acquired and is constantly improving its nuclear
arsenal?
While providing technical and technological assistance in the field of peaceful nuclear energy,
the USSR could not know and thus was not responsible for the intention of the DPRK leadershipto start a military nuclear program. Given the experience of Korean War and lingering conflicts
on the peninsula, a nuclear-armed DPRK was not in the interests of the USSR. Moreover, the
USSR had had a previous negative experience in nuclear cooperation with China. After the
USSR provided assistance to China in the nuclear sphere, a cooling of Soviet-Chinese relations
occurred. As a result, Moscow gained a new nuclear-armed rival in the Far East. In this context
the USSR would have been willing to carry out cooperation with the DPRK only in the sphere of“the peaceful atom.” Moreover, the DPRK was just one of the number of countries cooperatingwith the USSR on nuclear technologies. The USSR carried out cooperation with the DPRK in the
nuclear sphere up to certain limits and on a general basis. 13 Mirroring the “Atoms for Peace”
initiative declared by the US president in 1953, the USSR concluded agreements on assistance innuclear research and on the peaceful use of atomic energy with a number of countries—Hungary,
Poland, Romania, the PRC, and others—during the 1950s.
So, on the one hand, the USSR should not be blamed for the decision of the DPRK to transfer its
nuclear program to a military footing. On the other hand, the inconsistency of policies of the
USSR, and then of Russia, might have influenced the DPRK's nuclear ambitions. The DPRK
established allied relations with the USSR by signing a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Mutual Assistance in 1961. Already by 1962, however, the Cuban missile crisis occurred. The
inconsistency of the USSR government was perceived by Pyongyang as a betrayal to Cuba andinterpreted as a readiness to betray other smaller socialist countries. 14 That case convinced the
DPRK of their ally’s unreliability and of the need to take care of its own security. Since the
DPRK’s enemy (the United States) was a nuclear state, it was logical that the DPRK had to rely
upon its own nuclear deterrent to protect itself. There were other cases after the Cuban missile
Richard Engel and Kennett Werner. "North Korea's new missile technology may have Soviet roots", NBC News,
March 2, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/north-korea-s-new-missile-technology-may-have-sovietroots-n852231; “The secret to North Korea’s ICBM success”, IISS, August 14, 2017,https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2017/08/north-korea-icbm-success13
Ilya Dyachkov. Evolution of North Korean nuclear program in the context of nuclear non-proliferation in
Northeast Asia (second half of XX-beginning of XXI century). Dissertation. 2014.
14
James Person. "The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Origins of North Korea’s Policy of Self-Reliance in National
Defense," Cold War International History Project Bulletin 18, October 2012, URL:
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/misc/NKIDP_eDossier_12_North_Korea_and_
the_Cuban_Missile_Crisis.pdf
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crisis that served to deepen mistrust of Moscow in the eyes of Pyongyang. The situation
regarding the transfer to the DPRK of nuclear power plant technology is also an example. The
DPRK joined the NPT as a sine qua non for the construction of a nuclear power plant in the
DPRK with assistance from the USSR. That nuclear plant, however, was never built. After thecollapse of the USSR the DPRK lost its major ally and bilateral military, political, andideological cooperation was curtailed. This change might have given the DPRK’s leadershipanother confirmation that its decision to go nuclear on its own was the right decision. Despite therestoration of relations between Russia and the DPRK in the 2000s, a formal military alliance
between the countries has never been revived. 15
Currently, Russia takes a neutral position on the Korean Peninsula and is limited to support ofChina on issues related to this region in general and with regard to the KPNI in particular. The
DPRK’s nuclear program is viewed by Russia as a threat to the nonproliferation regime, but not
as a direct threat to Russia’s security. However, Russia’s approach to the NPT and nuclear
proliferation is conservative enough. 16 At the same time there are discussions in some expert
circles in Russia about the “nuclear emancipation” of the DPRK and recognizing it a “lesser
nuclear state.” These opinions echo those of Chinese scholars.
As for China, its motives might have differed from those of the USSR, as much as the motives ofmodern China differ from those of Russia. There are opinions that China made a conscious
decision to arm its allies with nuclear weapons technology in 1980. At the same time theparticipation of China in developing nuclear weapons abroad could be only indirect and only
limited to assistance to Pakistan, which, in turn, provided nuclear weapons technologies to the
DPRK via Dr. Khan’s network. Several key Chinese banks and a specially-created holding
company funded the North Korean missile and nuclear technology programs in the recent past, 17
and China has remained the DPRK’s trading partner after the latest United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) sanctions were imposed on the DPRK.
One of the goals behind China’s support for arming the DPRK with nuclear weapons could be
Korean reunification under a North Korean regime. Another is splitting the US-ROK alliance.
China may have believed that development of the North Korean nuclear weapon program andfailure to denuclearize the peninsula would eventually lead the United States to pull its militaryforces out of the ROK. 18 However, despite all of the changes over time, and the periodic talks
about reduction/withdrawal of the US troops and other problems within the US-ROK alliance,
the alliance is still alive. There is also a permanent risk that in response to the DPRK “nuclear
threat” Japan and the ROK may decide to go nuclear. Such a development is considered
15 New Russia-North Korea Friendship and Good-Neighbor Cooperation Treaty, signed by the DPRK and Russia in
2000 to replace the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of 1961, omitted provisions onpolitical and military cooperation between the two countries.
16
Russia recognizes only those countries that had produced and tested nuclear weapons before January 1, 1967,
as nuclear weapons states. Russia categorizes de facto nuclear countries, including the DPRK, Israel, India, andPakistan as nonnuclear states.
17
Peter Huessy, "China, and North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions", The Nuclear Security Working Group,https://nuclearsecurityworkinggroup.org/asia/china-and-north-korea-s-nuclear-ambitions/18
Peter Huessy, "The Chinese Obstacle to a Nuclear Deal With North Korea", The Council on Foreign Relations, July8, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinese-obstacle-nuclear-deal-north-korea

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6completely unacceptable for China. On the other hand, however, the nuclear arming of the ROK
would almost certainly mean the end of its military alliance with the United States, which isconsidered one of China’s strategic goals.
China’s top priorities are maintaining security in the region, preventing a military conflict,averting instability, and generally keeping the situation under control. For the sake of stability
and predictability, China may even be ready to sacrifice the DPRK’s nuclear disarmament.
Remarks by Chinese experts have indicated that China may be willing to reconcile itself to anuclear-armed DPRK. 19 It therefore cannot be ruled out that the Chinese leadership hopes topreserve and increase its influence on Pyongyang in the future. In such a case, a DPRK armed
with a small nuclear arsenal will not represent a threat to China. Beijing can also turn a “blindeye” to the North Korean nuclear program because it is an obstacle to inter-Koreanrapprochement, which would not serve China’s interests. China regards the entire Korean
peninsula as the sphere of its strategic interests and maintains “divide and control” tactics there.
However, despite the goals behind the assistance that countries, entities, and actors haverendered to the DPRK in the nuclear sphere, the transfer of the nuclear program to a militaryfooting was the DPRK’s own leadership’s decision and responsibility, and it was determined by
specific motivating factors.

DPRK Motivations for Acquiring Nuclear Weapons
Has the North Korean nuclear program ever been peaceful?
Initially the DPRK's nuclear program was supposed to be peaceful (it was, as noted above, anessential condition of cooperation of the USSR with the DPRK in the nuclear sphere) and wasaimed primarily at solving an energy deficit problem. Hydroelectric power plants (as well asother energy infrastructure) in the DPRK were destroyed by US air strikes during the Korean
War. Along with reconstruction of damaged energy systems it was decided to develop nuclear
energy, capable of compensating for the DPRK’s electric power deficit. The choice in favor
nuclear energy was also determined by the existence of North Korean reserves of uranium,
discovered in the DPRK at the end of the 1940s. The DPRK had not explored oil and gas
resources, and importing those fuels from other countries would have made it dependent on
external supplies, contrary to the DPRK ideology of self-reliance.
As was mentioned above, the political decision to start work on the creation of nuclear weapons
was made by the DPRK at the turn of the 1970s. However, no later than December 1962 theDPRK's line of the parallel development of its economy and of its national defense was adopted
at the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 4th Central Committee of the WPK (Workers Party of Korea).
This line is considered an early version of byungjin (parallel development) policy,
Sherwell, Peter, “China accepts nuclear North Korea and thinks US must do so too”. The Times. December 3,
2017. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/china-accepts-nuclear-north-and-thinks-us-must-do-so-too-qw59p5v2t
19

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implying economic construction and development of nuclear forces. 20 The context surroundingthat decision should also be taken into account. In 1961 the DPRK established allied relations
with the USSR and China by signing treaties of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.
These treaties could have eliminated the need to acquire its own nuclear weapons as the DPRK
obtained guarantees from Moscow, similar to those of the US "nuclear umbrella" for the ROK
and Japan. Pyongyang kept its distance from its allies, however, trying to preserve its
independence, playing on disputes between Moscow and Beijing and keeping its nuclear
program out of their control. The maintenance of secrecy around the DPRK nuclear program,even at that time, suggests that the program might be not have been that peaceful, and thedevelopment of energy sources and scientific know-how were not the only goals behind thenuclear program of the DPRK. Moreover, scholars 21 point out that in the early 1950s nuclear
technologies were associated primarily with weapons—those used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
as well as with those tested by the USSR in 1949. The concept of the "peaceful atom" simply did
not exist that time. The world's first nuclear power plant connected to a power grid was notlaunched until 1954.
Given the prevailing view of nuclear weapons at that time, it can be assumed that the DPRK's
nuclear program pursued military goals from the very beginning. The ROK's nuclear
experiments, which has become known to the North Korean intelligence earlier than to everyone
else, became a catalyst for the DPRK’s nuclear program, forcing the DPRK to voice its
ambitions openly.
Inconsistency demonstrated by the DPRK later, for example, by joining the NPT and the IAEA
and at the same time continuing military nuclear experiments, only prove that the DPRK always
had military goals for its nuclear program.

Motivating Factors
Researchers studying nuclear proliferation propose numerous classifications of factors
motivating countries to develop nuclear weapons. Harald Müller and Andreas Schmidt
formulated the following list of factors motivating countries to develop nuclear weapons:security, considerations of status and prestige, internal factors (domestic policy), and the factorof technical progress. 22 Sico van der Meer analyzed existing theories on nuclear (non-)proliferation motivations and reduced them to four factors of influence: (1) Capabilities, (2)Security, (3) International Norms and Perceptions, and (4) Domestic Political Context. 23

Seong-chang Cheong. "The Anatomy of Kim Jong Un's Power", Global Asia,
https://www.globalasia.org/v9no1/cover/the-anatomy-of-kim-jong-uns-power_seong-chang-cheong
21
Ilya Dyachkov. Evolution of North Korean nuclear program in the context of nuclear non-proliferation in
Northeast Asia (second half of XX-beginning of XXI century). Dissertation. 2014.
22
Harald Müller and Andreas Schmidt. “The Little Known Story of De-Proliferation: Why States Give Up Nuclear
Weapon Activities” in William C. Potter with Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (eds.), Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in
the 21st Century, Vol. 1 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).
23
Sico van der Meer. ”States’ Motivations to Acquire or Forgo Nuclear Weapons: Four Factors of Influence,”
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies VOLUME 17, ISSUE 1 (2016) pp 209-236,
20

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8Mark S. Bell in his article “Nuclear opportunism…” offers an explanation for why different
states use nuclear weapons to facilitate different combinations of six foreign policy
behaviors: aggression, expansion, independence, bolstering, steadfastness, and compromise. The
theory of nuclear opportunism presented in his article argues that states in different strategic
circumstances have different political priorities. 24
The DPRK motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons might look like those shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Potential DPRK Motivations for Acquiring Nuclear Weapons
Security
Status and prestige
Domestic factors (policy,
ideology)
Technological progress
Foreign-policy factors
Economic considerations

The most likely adversary being a nuclear-weapon state;complex relations with/between allies; rejection of alliances;need for deterrence against neighboring states
Being seen as “a nuclear power in the East”
Justification for economic problems; making nuclear-weapon
status part of the Constitution
Mastering the technologies required for militarization of thenuclear program
Aspiration to neutrality; political independence; need for an
instrument of deterrence vs. major powers; pursuit offoreign-policy goals
Emphasis on nuclear weapons as the most economicallysensible instrument of deterrence

Security was a primary motivating factor for North Korean leadership when it made a decision toinitiate its national nuclear program in 1952. The DPRK faced a real nuclear threat to its security
during the Korean War. Harry S. Truman, then the president of the United States, admitted thepossibility of use of nuclear weapons in Korea in his speech during the press conference inNovember of 1950. 25 Several months after that he authorized the transportation of nuclear bombsand deployment of atomic-capable B-29s in Okinawa. The United States conducted a series oftraining atomic bombings of the DPRK involving B-29s equipped with dummy or conventionalbombs. “Operation Plan 8-53” was designed providing for the use of “large numbers of nuclear
weapons” against China, Manchuria, and the DPRK. 26 The memories of atomic bombings ofHiroshima and Nagasaki were still very much fresh in the minds of the people of the region, so
these preparations and statements were taken seriously even by the USSR and China, not tohttps://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/201802/States%E2%80%99_Motivations_to_Acquire_or_Forgo_Nuclear_Weapons%20_August_2016.pdf
24Mark S. Bell. ”Nuclear opportunism: A theory of how states use nuclear weapons in international
politics,“ Journal of Strategic Studies 2019, VOL. 42, NO. 1, pp 3–28,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2017.1389722
25
Wayne Thompson and Bernard C. Nalty. Within limits: the US Air Force and the Korean War. Air Force History
and Museums Program. 1996; Harry S. Truman. “The President’s News Conference. November 30, 1950”. URL:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/news_conferences.php?year=1950
26“Korean War Project. Operation Plan 8-53: MAR RCT LEX III. 1ST Marine Division [REINF] FMF [NOTE: FOLDER 2
OF 2]”, http://www.recordsofwar.com/korea/USMC/Box%2020-12.pdf

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9mention the DPRK. Threats emanating from new, powerful weapons might have pushed the
DPRK to start and develop its own national nuclear program.
It should be noted that security threats were real at the moment when the DPRK’s national
nuclear program was initiated. One of the important factors influencing the DPRK’s decision
was the inequality, at the time, between the nuclear forces of the United States and of USSR, themain ally of the DPRK. Actually, the United States had a nuclear monopoly at that time. It was
the only country capable of delivering a nuclear bomb to a distant target. Washington had about
300 warheads by the beginning of the Korean War, 27 while Moscow was in possession of about
ten. The USSR conducted its first test of nuclear weapons only in 1949, while the United Statesused nuclear weapons against Japan already in 1945. Such an inequality of nuclear arsenals
caused concerns not only within the Soviet leadership but also for its allies. The situation
changed later, when the USSR built up its own nuclear arsenal and when China joined thenuclear club in 1964.
The Foreign policy factor, that is, complicated relations with allies, added to security concerns.
As Russian historians point out, 28 after the liberation of Korea from the Japanese occupation,neither the USSR nor the United States were determined to give the Koreans independence andthe opportunity to create their own state. Instead, they facilitated the creation of two antagonistic
governments—loyal to the USSR in the North and pro-American in the South—thereby
strengthening the contradictions that later led to the Korean War. After the war ended with thesigning of the Armistice agreement, the big powers continued to keep Korean states in theirorbit, partly out of fear of another conflict. That situation did not meet the interests of Kim Il
Sung, the first president of the DPRK, who wanted his country to gain independence and did notwant to play a role of “younger brother.” He partly succeeded in that. Despite formalizing allied
relations with the USSR and the PRC in 1961, that alliance had nothing in common with thealliance of the United States with ROK. Non-interference of allies in the country's security,
military affairs, and foreign policy were the cornerstone of the alliances of the DPRK with the
USSR and China. While keeping its relative freedom and independence, the DPRK could enjoy
security guarantees and a balance between its two nuclear neighbors. The DPRK’s alliance with
the USSR, however, dissolved with the collapse of the USSR itself. The Treaty signed between
DPRK and the PRC is still in force, but relations between the two countries have not always beensmooth. Moreover, Beijing has made it clear that if the DPRK initiated an attack on the ROK,
China wouldn't help the DPRK pursue such an attack. Given the fact that it is extremely difficult
to confirm or deny the source of provocation in modern conflicts, one can hardly predict how anally will behave, nor what will be the price for assistance. Neither is it possible to predict how
relations between two countries will develop in the future. For the DPRK, having its own forces(including nuclear weapons) seems more secure and reliable from this point of view.
A Technological factor also played an important role in the development of North Korean
nuclear program. The DPRK had access to advanced technologies from the very beginning of its
Carl A. Posey. "How the Korean War Almost Went Nuclear", Air & Space Magazine, July 2015,
https://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/how-korean-war-almost-went-nuclear-180955324/
28
Natalya Kim. "North and South Korea: the history of division," PostNauka, March 3, 2016,
https://postnauka.ru/faq/60783.
27

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10national nuclear program. Due to the less close cooperation between the DPRK and the USSR
than, say, between the United States and ROK, Pyongyang would likely receive necessary
knowledge and technologies later than Seoul, and the USSR less willingly rendered assistance tothe DPRK in the sphere of nuclear technologies. The ROK received a research reactor in 1957,
while the DPRK received its research reactor only in 1965. The ROK built its first nuclear
power plant in 1978, while the agreement between the DPRK and USSR was only signed in1985 and has not, to this day, been implemented. The DPRK, however, has been constantly
compensating for that gap, first, with its focus on independent experiments and domestic
technologies, and later by with obtaining sensitive technologies through grey and black-market
schemes.
It can be suggested that the factor of prestige was also motivating for the DPRK ever since themoment of initiation of its nuclear program, although the program was initially associated withthe acquisition and development of civilian nuclear technologies. As a former colony, Korea
might have needed to break from the negative experience of the past and gain prestige in theinternational arena. Mastering civilian nuclear technologies was associated with industrial
modernization, making it a possible route to acquiring the status of a developed country. Later,when the DPRK transferred its nuclear program to a military footing, the prestige became
associated with having nuclear weapons and technologies like few big powers have—ICBMs,
the hydrogen bomb—that is, being a part of a privileged nuclear club.
The DPRK arsenal has become not only a symbol of prestige but also an integral part of its
domestic policy. The nuclear status of the DPRK was enshrined in its constitution in 2012 andplays an important role in its domestic propaganda. The nation’s nuclear potential partly justifies
the economic hardships the people have suffered for many years. At the same time the ability of
the DPRK to develop weapons like the “big powers” and its new status as the “nuclear power ofthe East” engenders national pride. Due to the long-term application of skillful propaganda,
based on the presence of external threat, the North Korean people are convinced that nuclear
weapons prevent invasion and chaos in their Motherland, and therefore that the policy carried out
by the DPRK leadership that resulted in creation of the DPRK’s nuclear shield is successful andsmart. Thus, nuclear weapons have become, among other achievements, a proof of thelegitimacy of North Korean regime. The abandonment of nuclear weapons in such circumstances
would undoubtedly have serious consequences both for security and for the image of the
DPRK’s leadership.
Finally, focusing on nuclear weapon may be economically more efficient than engaging in aconventional arms race with countries with much larger economies. Nuclear weapons serve as adeterrent against both nuclear and conventional attack. Due to country-specific factors, the
DPRK’s nuclear weapons program is much cheaper than that of the United States and Russia.
The DPRK does not need to spend huge sums for salaries for its specialists for materials
purchase. North Koreans did not develop their nuclear weapons from scratch; they weredeveloped based on the experience of other countries, information obtained by DPRK
intelligence services, and via cooperation with other state and non-state actors.
Nowadays, it is extremely difficult to single out the main motivating factor for the DPRK’s
acquisition of nuclear weapons. Although still considered as a priority, the security consideration
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11has undergone transformations for decades. It is not the threat of nuclear and other direct
aggression now that drives the DPRK to the nuclear path. The probability of military conflict
between the United States and the DPRK even with the use of conventional weapons is arguably
pretty low. Geographical position is the best military advantage and the best deterrent that the
DPRK has available. Any invasion of North Korean territory would inevitably touch the interestsof China and involve the participation of Russia, as Russia has close ties with China. Given thecurrent levels of nuclear deterrent held by Russia and China, the United States would unlikely
risk war with them and thus would not initiate conflict with the DPRK. The DPRK would also
not be interested in starting a conflict with the United States, not just because of the inferiority of
its conventional weapons and its insufficient retaliatory capabilities, but also because of fear of
losing its sovereignty. Importantly, big countries—the United States, China, and Russia —arerather interested in maintaining status quo in the region. This is the best guarantee of absence of
conflict in the near-term.
At the same time the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons guarantees that North Korean
territory will not be used by big powers as a battlefield and protects its regime from both outside
and inside. In the latter case the security factor is closely interconnected with factors of prestige
and domestic policy considerations.

Current Stalemate
Denuclearization models
There has never been unity among the main actors involved in the Korean nuclear crisis as to
how it might be resolved. From the point of the DPRK, the solution would be removing thenuclear threat from the United States. 29 Russia and China consider the Korean Peninsula nuclear
issue (KPNI) as an entire complex of security problems in Northeast Asia. 30 31 The United“DPRK Government Denounces U.S., S. Korea's Sophism about "Denuclearization of North,” KCNA Watch, July 6,
2016, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1546383733-821103229/dprk-government-denounces-u-s-s-koreassophism-about-denuclearization-of-north/30“Settlement of the nuclear problem of the Korean peninsula and Russia’s position,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofRussian Federation official website, http://www.mid.ru/diverse/-/asset_publisher/zwI2FuDbhJx9/content/rossia-iuregulirovanie-situacii-na-korejskom-poluostrove
31
Ilya Dyachkov. “Nuclear problem of the Korean peninsula: approaches to threat assessment,” Vestnik
Tambovskogo universiteta, 2014, https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/yadernaya-problema-koreyskogo-poluostrovapodhody-k-otsenke-ugroz; Den Sik Kan, “Nuclear problem of the Korean peninsula,” Altai School of Political
Studies, June 27, 2015, http://ashpi.asu.ru/ic/?p=3250
29

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12States 32 33 and ROK, 34 however, recognize the DPRK nuclear issue only, and thus speak about
denuclearization only of the DPRK. 35
Based on these varied understandings of the KPNI, each country has its own vision of
denuclearization. The DPRK believes that denuclearization has to be global and start with the
Korean peninsula, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Denuclearization as seen by the DPRK 36
US ActionsFirstly, all the nuclear weapons should be opened to
public, first of all, which the United States has neither
acknowledged nor denied after bringing them to the
ROK.

DPRK Actions

The DPRK will also take steps in response to it, and adecisive breakthrough will be made in realizing thedenuclearization on the Korean peninsula.

Secondly, all the nukes and their bases should bedismantled and verified in the eyes of the world
public.
Thirdly, the United States should ensure that it would
never bring again the nuclear strike means to the ROK,
which the United States has frequently deployed on
the Korean peninsula and in its vicinity.
Fourthly, it should commit itself to neither
intimidating the DPRK with nukes or through an act of
nuclear war nor using nukes against the DPRK in any
case.
Fifthly, the withdrawal of the US troops holding theright to use nukes from the ROK should be declared.

“Remarks with Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha at a Press Availability by Mike Pompeo,” US
Department of State official website, May 11, 2018, https://2017-2021.state.gov/remarks-with-republic-of-koreaforeign-minister-kang-kyung-wha-at-a-press-availability/index.html
33“Remarks with Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha at a Press Availability by Mike Pompeo,” U.S.
Department of State official website, May 11, 2018, https://2017-2021.state.gov/remarks-with-republic-of-koreaforeign-minister-kang-kyung-wha-at-a-press-availability/index.html
34
Ibid.
35
Simon Denyer. “Confusion over North Korea’s definition of denuclearization clouds talks,” The Washington Post,
January 16, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/confusion-over-north-koreas-definitionof-denuclearization-clouds-talks/2019/01/15/c6ac31a8-16fc-11e9-a896f104373c7ffd_story.html?utm_term=.a608bd330636
36
KCNA. “DPRK Government Denounces U.S., S. Korea's Sophism about ’Denuclearization of North‘” (2016.07.06)
32

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The United States adheres to its complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization model(CVID) providing for unilateral practical steps by the DPRK in exchange for vague promises
from the United States.
There are also more flexible approaches like:• A conditional, reciprocal, incremental denuclearization (CRID) model proposed by
Chinese scholars and providing for a series of steps both by the DPRK and the UnitedStates.37 As a result of this approach, the DPRK would be left in possession of a small
number of nuclear weapons. 38•

Managing deterrence, 39 providing imposing quantitative and qualitative restrictions on the
DPRK nuclear arsenal rather than eliminating it.

•

De-militarization, 40 providing for the transfer of nuclear and missile program of the DPRK
to peaceful footing.

•

Reducing/dismantling the DPRK’s ICBM program, 41 which provides for the DPRK
relinquishing all of the ICBMs that represent a threat to the United States but keeping therest of its capability intact, or the country keeping only the civilian component of its nuclear
program.

Why don’t current approaches to the DPRK nuclear issue work?
The obvious weakness of almost all of the approaches to the DPRK nuclear issue is that they
provide for exact unilateral steps expected of the DPRK. At the same time the steps that must be
taken by the United States are mentioned in much less specific terms. An example is shown in
Table 3.
37 Song Sang-ho, “Officials, experts call for greater multilateral peace cooperation in East Asia,” Yonhap News,
November 28, 2018, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20181128004051315
38
Georgy Toloraya. “From CVID to CRID: A Russian Perspective,” 38North.org, December 26, 2018,https://www.38north.org/2018/12/gtoloraya122618/
39
Ankit Panda, “The Right Way to Manage a Nuclear North Korea,” Foreign Affairs, November 19, 2018,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-11-19/right-way-manage-nuclear-north-korea; John K.
Warden and Ankit Panda, “Goals for any arms control proposal with North Korea,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,
February 13, 2019, https://thebulletin.org/2019/02/goals-for-any-arms-control-proposal-with-north-korea/
40
Siegfried S. Hecker, Elliot A. Serbin, and Robert L. Carlin. “Total Denuclearization Is an Unattainable Goal. Here’s
How to Reduce the North Korean Threat,” Foreign Policy, June 25, 2018,https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/25/total-denuclearization-is-an-unattainable-goal-heres-how-to-reduce-thenorth-korean-threat/ ; Siegfried S. Hecker, Robert L. Carlin, and Elliot A. Serbin. “A Comprehensive History of North
Korea’s Nuclear Program,” Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation, April 2019,https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/content/cisac-north-korea
41
Hongyu Zhang, Kevin Wang. "A nuclear-armed North Korea without ICBMs: the best achievable objective," The
Nonproliferation Review, 2019. Vol. 26, No 1-2, pp. 143-153.

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Table 3: Conditional, Reciprocal, Incremental Denuclearization
DPRK Actions

US Actions- Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty and elimination of all nuclear weapons Conditional, reciprocal, and synchronized US
test facilities;
steps including phased sanctions relief, adeclaration of intent to end the Korean War,- A halt to the production of nuclear
and a permanent peace treaty.
weapons;- Disablement and then destruction of all
production facilities;- An end to all nuclear design and research
activity in this area, with a particular focus on
the North’s ICBM program;- The end of production of weapons-gradefissile materials, closure and eventual
dismantlement of certain facilities; andlimitation and reduction of nuclear charges.

None of the approaches provide adequate explanation of the security guarantees the UnitedStates and international community would give the DPRK in exchange for its nuclear arsenal. At
the same time these guarantees constitute the key element of any deal with the DPRK.
“Declarations of intent” or “convincing” would not seem strong arguments for Pyongyang.
Actually, vague formulations like those do not differ too much from the promise of the DPRK
“to take steps” in response to exact actions expected from the United States. None of theapproaches provides explanations of how the DPRK can secure its right to self-defense without
nuclear weapons. It is natural for the DPRK to compensate its conventional inferiority against
the United States with a nuclear deterrent. If the DPRK is deprived of this deterrent, it
automatically becomes vulnerable. 42 Some propose ideas such as forming military alliances with
China and/or Russia. 43 There are, however, numerous obstacles to such alliances as well as
negative consequences for regional security. First, both of these countries—as well as the DPRKJames Hackett. “The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula,” International Institute for Strategic
Studies, June 11, 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2018/06/military-balance-korean-peninsula
43
Philip Bobbit. “Only China can solve the North Korea problem—by inviting it to come underneath its own nuclear
umbrella,” UnHerd, February 19, 2018, https://unherd.com/2018/02/china-can-solve-north-korea-probleminviting-come-underneath-nuclear-umbrella/
42

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itself—hold negative attitudes about traditional (leader - satellites) military blocs and alliances. 44
Second, any such alliance would likely be perceived as adversarial to the US-ROK-Japan
alliance, which would have troubling implications for regional security. Third, such an alliancewould only deepen divisions between two Korean states.
At the same time even adequate security guarantees may appear not sufficient to convince North
Korean leadership to abandon nuclear weapons. The DPRK is a typical realistic state, or HyperRealist State, 45 whose leadership regards military power (rather than any alliances orpartnerships) as the only guarantee of security. Nuclear weapons are an instrument of preventing
a foreign military intervention and a regime change. It enables Pyongyang to assert its interests,
bolster the regime, and consolidate the authority of the regime. Importantly, despite the hopesthat nuclear ambitions of the DPRK depend on its regime, so once the regime changes in the
DPRK, it will give up its nuclear weapons, in a country like the DPRK the regime can bechanged from inside only. And any new government will be interested in maintaining its
legitimacy and achieving certain goals. So it seems more logical for them to keep the nuclear
arsenal, which has proven to be an efficient tool of security, domestic policy, and diplomacy.
The statements by DPRK leadership in its state media provide the following evidence:•

The DPRK prefers to rely on its own resources in protecting its national interests,
providing its own defense, and pursuing its foreign policy course.

•

The DPRK is trying to wring the maximum benefit from its geopolitical situation.

•

The DPRK believes that peace is possible only when there is a balance of power between
different nations that is grounded in their ability to inflict unacceptable damage (ideally,mutual destruction) on each other.

These principles, on the one hand, contradict the concept of a liberal world order that puts
international laws and mechanisms above the national interests of the state. The DPRK is an
outsider to the “liberal” world order, and it does not recognize its rules. Nor does it trust any“guarantees” of the liberal world. On the one hand, the DPRK is not unique in this respect. Rareis the country that would adhere to international law at the expense of its own national interests
and would sacrifice its security and even survival for vague promises and guarantees. Indeed,
modern treaties and agreements tend to have short lives. They tend to remain in force only solong as they serve the interests of the strongest party. “Big powers” imposing rules and laws forothers do not always obey these rules. It is sufficient to recall the failure of the “nuclear five” to

The governments of Russia and China have adhered to the policy of strategic partnership rather than alliance. As
for the DPRK, it has been a member of non-aligned movement (NAM) and supporter to the ideas of neutrality andindependence, which are connected to the country’s state Juche ideology.
45
For more details see: Daniel Wertz, “The U.S., North Korea and Nuclear Diplomacy,” The National Committee on
North Korea, October 2018, https://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/history-u.s.-dprkrelations
44

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16comply with the Article VI of NPT, 46 to undertake the bad practice of dividing countries into
“good proliferators” and “bad proliferators” and to apply other double standards. The nuclear
five, from the point of the DPRK, do not have the moral right to impose the rules they do notobey themselves. They do not have the right to establish proliferation norms as they do not obey
these norms and were the first (and the worst) proliferators leading to the current number ofnuclear states. From the point of view of a realistic DPRK it would be risky to strike a deal withsuch an unreliable partner as the modern international community and stake its security and longterm goals on vague promises and guarantees that can be easily withdrawn.
Another weakness of the existing approaches is that they provide compensation for DPRK
nuclear weapons as a means of security only. However, security, as was concluded above, is not
the only and not the most important driving factor in the DPRK’s development of nuclear
weapons. Since nuclear weapons possession and development has become a symbol of the
DPRK’s prestige and an integral part of its ideology, disarmament could very well destabilize thecountry’s leadership. If a nuclear deterrent has been created to achieve certain geopolitical goals,
it is clear that the DPRK has to achieve these goals prior to any talks about denuclearization.
For the international community, from this point of view, negotiations with the DPRK on the
nuclear problem will never bring any tangible result. Any talks will rather bring benefits to theirmost active participants, including the DPRK, rather than disarmament or other serious andmeaningful shifts in the status quo.

Future Threats
It should be recognized that the instability caused by an emerging nuclear DPRK has become
stable enough to become a new status quo. Scholars make the point that a nuclear DPRK has
become an ideal stabilizer rather than a threat. 47 Indeed, North Korean nuclear weapons havebecome an integral part of regional security and of the new regional order. KPNI with the DPRK
nuclear program in the center has become an essential part of the new status quo and balance ofpower. So, it cannot be eliminated without damage for the whole security architecture. The only
possible way to denuclearize the DPRK and keep the balance is to reverse all changes anddecisions put into practice under the pretext of the “North Korean nuclear threat” by thecountries of the region, or at least stop all military development. This is an impossible condition.
The arms race in the region and globally is continuing, and that means that the countries of the

Article VI of Non-Proliferation Treaty states that: «Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date andto nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control». At the same time, “nuclear five” never stopped to develop their nuclear programs, improve
the strategies and concepts of nuclear deterrence, and build up strategic nuclear weapons.
47
Hongyu Zhang, Kevin Wang, "Why the United States Needs North Korea to Stay Nuclear," National Interest, June24, 2018. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-the-united-states-needs-north-korea-stay-nuclear-26382
46

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region are not interested in the settlement of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, and any
denuclearization talks will be just talks.
At the same time, continuing old approaches and applications of pressure in dealing with the
DPRK in this new reality pose threats of destabilizing security and balance of powers not only in
NEA but also globally.
Though the DPRK has not yet resumed nuclear and ICBM tests, this situation cannot lastforever. The DPRK has created reliable regional retaliatory potential only. In order to acquirereliable long-range retaliatory potential the DPRK needs tests, including flight tests of new
missiles. The technological factor is not the only one driving the DPRK to test. The need to test
may also be instigated by domestic policy and propaganda considerations. The lack of economic
development and of results of diplomatic efforts must be explained by the DPRK leadership to
its people, and some positive results (for example, new powerful weapon) should bedemonstrated to compensate.
UNSC and unilateral sanctions have had no effect on the DPRK nuclear and missile programs.
The stance adopted by the DPRK may set a further example for other countries that have also
found themselves under sanctions. That result would reduce the effectiveness of this policy
instrument, which already has a very questionable track record in terms of achieving its desired
effect and humanitarian impacts. 48 Importantly, sanctions and pressure are not associated with
the DPRK’s nuclear program by North Koreans. There is a belief that the nuclear issue is used asa pretext rather than a sincere concern. 49 Sanctions are therefore considered to be aimed at theregime of the DPRK, not at its nuclear weapons.
Despite the sanctions regime, China remains the DPRK’s nearly sole trading partner. The latest
WPK Congress also reiterated the course to rapprochement of the DPRK with its neighbors—
Russia and China. These two countries are interested in maintaining stability in the DPRK andthus are ready to support its regime. If the current negative trends in US-China and US-Russia
relations continue in the future, it may lead to an emerging PRC-Russia-DPRK bloc opposite to
the US-ROK-Japan alliance.
Further tensions may lead to further nuclear proliferation in NEA and beyond. The problem of
nuclear proliferation associated with the DPRK is multifaceted. On the one hand, there is thevery fact of acquiring of nuclear weapons by the DPRK, which is considered a proliferator. On
the other hand, there is a problem of further proliferation of nuclear weapons in different ways.
First, the North Korean nuclear program may give a pretext to ROK/ Japan/ Taiwan for going
nuclear. We may speak only about the pretext because the true intentions, motives, perceptionsof threats and adversaries differ for these countries, relative to the DPRK. Second, the DPRK
may become an encouraging example for other countries under the sanctions and pressure by theinternational community. It has created a precedent of withdrawing from the NPT, and currently
A.A. Belkevich. “A Study of Global Experience of the Use of Economic Sanctions in Foreign Policy,” Izvestiya
Tulskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. No 1: 284-293. https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/issledovanie-mirovogoopyta-primeneniya-ekonomicheskih-sanktsiy-vo-vneshney-politike49“DPRK Opposes All Forms of Sanctions and Pressure.” KCNA, December 12, 2011.
48

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it demonstrates resistance to sanctions and defends its right and equality to the “big powers” interms of nuclear weapons. Third, the DPRK may start selling sensitive technologies to othercountries for different reasons.
The last scenario of nuclear proliferation is the most realistic and serious threat. At the sametime, it would be the result of not only and not so much the nuclear status of the DPRK but ratherof the attitude of other countries with respect to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons status. It is not asecret that economic development is a priority goal for the DPRK. The content analysis of
published statements and speeches by North Korean government proves that (see Table 4).

Table 4: DPRK Government Statements and Speeches Touching on Economic Topics
Criteria
Economicdevelopment

2016

50

Economy – 142
Prosperity – 24

2019

51

Mentions

Economy – 42
Prosperity – 82020 52

Economy, economic– 58
Prosperity – 6
Self-reliance – 18
Sovereignty – 6
Juche – 4

Economy, economic –92
Prosperity – 6
Independence – 16
Juche – 8
Self-reliance – 8
Sovereignty – 4
Security – 4
Peace, peaceful – 10
War - 7
Hostile, hostility – 14
Threat – 11
Power, powerful – 50
Military – 19
Defense – 26
Nuclear – 35
Strength – 31
Forces – 42
Weapon – 19

Independence Independence - 130
Juche – 110
Sovereignty – 22
Self-reliance – 14

Independence – 18
Self-reliance – 10
Juche – 10
Sovereignty – 4

Security
issuesSecurity – 22
Peace, peaceful – 36
War – 30
Hostile, hostility – 15

Peace – 17
Hostile, hostility – 15
Threat – 3
Security – 3

Hostile, hostility – 13Security – 8
Threat – 6
Peace – 2

Defense – 8
Military – 6
Powerful – 6
Strength – 6
Nuclear – 3

Power, powerful – 16
Forces – 14
Strength – 15
Nuclear – 11
Weapon – 8

Military might Power, powerful – 170
Military – 68
Defense – 33
Nuclear – 30
Strength – 28

2021 53

The sanctions regime makes economic development almost impossible. The DPRK economy is
kept afloat by China, which is interested in stability on its own borders. However, thiscontradicts the very idea of self-reliance, which is the state ideology of the DPRK regime.
Dependence on economic cooperation with one country gives that country leverage and a certain“Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un's Report to the Seventh Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on the Work of
the Central Committee (Full Text),” Korean Central News Agency, June 20, 2016.
51“Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un's Policy Speech,” KCNA, April 14, 2019.
52“Fifth Plenary Meeting of Seventh Central Committee of Workers' Party of Korea Held,” KCNA, January 1, 2020.
53“Great Programme for Struggle Leading Korean-style Socialist Construction to Fresh Victory. On Report Made bySupreme Leader Kim Jong Un at Eighth Congress of WPK,” KCNA, January 9, 2021.
50

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power that cannot help but cause concerns for the North Korean leadership. Moreover, economic
cooperation with China is pretty modest and can’t help the DPRK achieve its ambitious goals.
The only possible way for the DPRK to get significant financial resources in the current
situation, where investments are impossible and economic cooperation is limited to one country,
is to sell its nuclear and missile technologies. The nuclear weapons and missile technologies thatthe DPRK has developed could be of interest to other states and to non-state actors. And one ofthe purposes of tests and launches is to demonstrate new weapons systems to potential buyers.
Kim Jong-un promised not to proliferate nuclear weapons, however, he also reserved the right totake all necessary steps “to protect the supreme interests of the state.” 54 Supreme interests may
mean ordinary national interests, including economic development. The need for resources tobolster this development may become one of the potential motivations for nuclear and missile
proliferation by the DPRK.

Conclusion
Despite its famous nuclear ambitions, the DPRK does not oppose the idea of denuclearization.
On the contrary, this idea was voiced by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and has been reiterated by
Kim Jong Un. Particularly, it is enshrined in the Article 9 of the country’s Law on Consolidating
Position of Nuclear Weapons State. 55 Kim Jong Un could also be quite sincere when he told then
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that he did not want his children “to carry the nuclear
weapon on their back their whole life.” But since the DPRK nuclear program is a result ofcomplex of security problems in NEA, it is logical that the DPRK may consider abandoning its
nuclear path only if these problems are solved. That is what North Koreans mean when speaking
about global denuclearization. As global denuclearization is nearly impossible, the adherence of
the DPRK to idea of denuclearization demonstrated via official statements and vague promises“to take steps” (which are mistakenly perceived as a real intent to disarm) seem to be just abargaining chip for negotiations with the international community. The DPRK is mirroring theperceived unfair game of the international community. And the international community seems
to accept this game (otherwise it would try to apply alternative approaches to negotiate with the
DPRK).
While the talks for talks are going on, however, it is important to focus on more urgent issues.
By focusing solely on the denuclearization of the DPRK, the international community risks
missing other, more serious problems for the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Under
present conditions, preventing further proliferation, which is more possible and feasible, should
be prioritized over the attempts to reverse the irreversible—that is, to reverse the nuclear statusof the DPRK. The task of the international community is to freeze nuclear proliferation at thecurrent level, in other words, to make the DPRK the last state to acquire nuclear weapons.

54
55

KCNA
“Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State Adopted”, KCNA, April 1, 2013.

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As for the DPRK, it will only be possible to speak about reduction of and control over its nuclear
weapons. Its current policy of creation of diverse and multiple nuclear weapons suggests that in
the future the DPRK will be ready to sacrifice some of them, keeping the most powerful andefficient systems in its current arsenal. However, the DPRK’s nuclear status will not be
discussed. It has already become an integral part of the new world order and balance of power inthe region. Forced (the only option as there will be no voluntary) disarmament of the DPRK
would inevitably disrupt the fragile balance of power in the region and the region’s peace.

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