Summary Report
Developing a Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ: Workshop I
Nagasaki University, December 7-8, 2012
§ Preface
The following is a summary report of the First Workshop “Developing a Comprehensive
Approach to a NEA-NWFZ,” which was held at Nagasaki University, on December 7-8,
2012. It was cosponsored by the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition,
Nagasaki University (RECNA), Nagasaki University, PCU Nagasaki Council for Nuclear
Weapons Abolition (PCU-NC) and the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability,
in cooperation with the Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University, Hanshin
University, ROK and Fudan University, PRC.
This is not a time-sequential report of the workshop, but a substantive summary meant
to serve as basic reference material for future workshops on the same theme that areplanned by the same organizers as the First Workshop. While the discussion thatemerged in the workshop bore abundant suggestions and implications, it was
sometimes not well-focused on the theme of the workshop as a whole and each session.
Therefore, in this summary report, we translate those suggestions and implications into
language that is consistent with the objectives of the workshop and each session. Also,
after the Workshop, the DPRK conducted an additional satellite launch on Dec. 12,2012 and a third underground nuclear test on Feb. 12, 2013 and therefore, this report
includes some follow-up comments responsive to such developments when appropriate.
In these respects, the report constitutes neither an agreed upon statement of theparticipants nor of the co-sponsoring organizations. Responsibility for the contents is
entirely attributable to the RECNA.

§ Basic Understanding of the Halperin Proposal on “Comprehensive Agreement
on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia”
The Halperin proposal on a comprehensive agreement on peace and security (simply“Agreement” hereafter) is built on the basic recognition that: (1) The DPRK, or North
Korea, as a de facto nuclear weapons power, is not acceptable considering the seeming
inevitability that such a status would result in the pursuit of nuclear weapons, overtly or
covertly, by Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), which will, in turn, has serious
negative implications to the global non-proliferation regime. (2) Thus, a distinct
presence of the denial force, including international efforts to denuclearize the DPRK
1peacefully, must continue to remain robust. (3) Past efforts for the denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula are locked in a stalemate, and it is imperative to initiate a neweffort that is designed so as not to drag up the past. (4) To break the stalemate, acomprehensive agreement on peace and security in the region should be developed.
The Agreement must make it possible to draw an end picture of a nuclear weapon-free
NEA that will solve the pending issues and will be acceptable to all the parties
concerned, including the DPRK and the U.S. and its allies. (5) In order to urge
consideration by the DPRK, it is recommended that the Agreement be legally binding.
(6) The prior consultation process among parties other than the DPRK is important andneeds careful deliberations before the draft Agreement is officially proposed to the
DPRK. (7) The method of entry into force of the Agreement, e.g. the EIF sequenceamong elements of the Agreement and possible measures for conditional accession toappease mutual distrust, also need careful deliberation. (8) To assist in-depth
discussions, it is recommended that drafting of the Agreement commence.
The Halperin proposal for a comprehensive agreement includes the following six
elements:
1. Termination of the state of Korean War
Recently, this point has been stressed by the DPRK. This element of the Agreement
should be adhered to by the armistice nations and by the ROK, and perhaps by otherstate parties involved in the war. (cf: A statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued
late January 2013, interpreted as an advance pretext prior to its third nuclear test, states,"the DPRK drew a final conclusion that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is
impossible unless the denuclearization of the world is realized as it has become clear
now that the U.S. policy hostile to the DPRK remains unchanged…There can be talks
for peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the region in the future, but no talks
for the denuclearization of the peninsula." So the window of the dialogue is still open inthis regard.)
2. Creation of a permanent council on security
The Agreement should create a permanent council and organization to monitor andenforce its provisions, including verification of the implementation of the NWFZ to beestablished as the 6th element of the Agreement. While the scope of the council’s roleshould be limited to the objectives to enforce the Agreement in the initial period, it could
be left open as to whether the council might also become a forum to deal with generalsecurity problems in the region in the future. Countries other than the parties of the Six
Party Talks will be invited to join the council, including France, UK, Canada and2

Mongolia.
3. Mutual declaration of no hostile intent
This has been a key objective of the DPRK when it negotiated with the US. Considering
the impact of the history of dictatorships in Iraq and Libya on the DPRK, we need means
to make such a commitment credible by the provisions of the Agreement.
4. Provisions of assistance for nuclear and other energy
It should be affirmed that all parties to the treaty have the equal right to accessnecessary sources of any kind of energy. Any limitations on the DPRK need to apply
equally to other non-nuclear states party to the agreement, especially the ROK andJapan. The DPRK will also want assurances that its energy needs will be subsidized
through some agreed mechanism.
5. Termination of sanctions
The parties to the Agreement will need to commit not to impose sanctions on any otherparty to the Agreement based on its nuclear programs as long as it fully adheres to thetreaty. The parties would reserve the right to collectively impose sanctions on any state
which violates its commitments under the Agreement. Each party to the treaty will haveto consider its national law in relation to imposing sanctions based on other reasons.
6. Nuclear weapons free zone
The Agreement would contain a chapter which would create a Nuclear Weapons Free
Zone in Northeast Asia (NEA-NWFZ). The principle idea of the NEA-NWFZ is asfollows: The ROK, Japan and the DPRK (and possibly other states including Mongolia
and Canada) would commit themselves not to manufacture, test (for any purpose) or
acquire nuclear weapons, nor to allow nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territory.
These non-nuclear states will re-join or remain parties of the NPT. The US, the PRC andRussia, as well as the UK and France, would agree to abide by the provisions of thetreaty. They would agree not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against any
non-nuclear state that was observing the terms of the Agreement.

§ General Assessment of the Situation of the DPRKAs a basis for discussion at the workshop, Peter Hayes provided an overview of thecurrent situation in the DPRK. His main points are as follows: The DPRK leadership
under young Kim Jong-Un is stable and more vigorous than it was under Kim Jong-Il,
while containing uncertainty due to his inexperience and lack of a personal politicalbasis for his power. The DPRK economy is trapped by poverty and will remain so as
long as it sticks to its nuclear irrationality. It will take huge reconstruction funding toovercome its economic problems.
3The DPRK’s nuclear arms are considered to be primarily political, not military, in nature.
Its nuclear threat is designed to coerce, not to deter. Furthermore its nuclear arms haveneither credible warheads nor delivery systems. The DPRK’s violent rhetoric of nuclear
threat against ROK, Japan and US are likely to be illegal and constitute nuclear
aggression under international law. The reality of this situation has to be heard by DPRK
leadership.
Deterrence arguments involving NEA have to be discussed from many angles. In
relation to the DPRK, it has a strong and credible deterrence without nuclear weapons,in spite of its lack of self-awareness of this point. Its conventional forces are inferior andnondurable, but still can inflict serious casualties and damage to the ROK and the US,
sufficient to deter their waging major wars against it. On the other hand, the DPRK
nuclear deterrence will not be credible for years to come, and also will provide no
military benefit to the KPA (Korean Peoples Army), considering the war fighting after thedeterrence fails. Nuclear weapons require major resources to deploy, complicate
military command and control, and constitute a distraction from the KPA’s major military
mission. The DPRK’s conventional forces have also manifested their own
characteristics during their recent conventional provocations that they seem to be
deterred from escalating beyond a certain level of violence.
US extended deterrence will be sufficiently strong and credible with conventional forces
only, operated by the US and its allies’ combined forces. The US extended nuclear
deterrence to Japan, ROK and Taiwan is weak, regressive and not credible.
Considering with any attack against the DPRK by means of nuclear ballistic missiles, we
see the problem of over-flight over the territory of Russia or China. The only realisticmeans of nuclear delivery will be bombers, but nuclear bombing will have serious
collateral effects to be avoided in a battle field like the Korean Peninsula.
In his in-depth and updated discussions on the nuclear issues in Northeast Asia, Peter
Hayes refutes conventional arguments and myths regarding nuclear deterrence and the
DPRK nuclear capabilities.

§ Necessity of Sustained Efforts and Comprehensive Strategy
In the workshop, there was general agreement that the emergence of a nuclear armed
DPRK as a fait accompli should not be allowed and efforts toward a nuclear weapons
4free Northeast Asia should be sustained. Halperin stated, “The costs of accepting a
DPRK operational nuclear capability are very high and we should not accept thisoutcome without at least one more sustained effort to find a solution.” In the Hayes
speech, he said, “The US and the regional states cannot and should neveraccommodate a nuclear-armed DPRK, as some have argued.”
For many of the Japanese participants, especially those from Nagasaki, thedenuclearization of the region is a natural requirement because the NEA is tied toHiroshima and Nagasaki tragic history and a third nuclear weapon use in this region
should be avoided by all means. However, a participant raised the problem of weakness
or absence of feasibility considerations in the past studies of the NEA-NWFZ. This isexactly why a comprehensive strategy is now the theme of the workshop. While there
were mixed assessments among participants on what the Six Party Talks had attained
or would attain, many seemed to agree that the “DPRK’s verifiable denuclearization
first” approach would not work anymore. The RECNA expressed that no doubt a new
approach was necessary to break the stalemate regarding the nuclear problems in NEA
and that the Halperin proposal on a Comprehensive Agreement provides a soundstarting point of the future strategy for us to move in the right direction.
It is noted that there was some confusion among participants in understanding theconcept of “comprehensiveness”. Obviously there are many international security
issues to be solved in this region, such as territorial disputes, historical issues causedby past Japanese invasion and colonial rule, abduction issues highlighted in Japan, andongoing military operations. These are all important, as well as substantial in nature,and might be raised in the future negotiation process for an Agreement that we are
discussing. However, as was pointed out in the workshop discussion, it should be clearthat our ‘comprehensiveness’ is a very limited concept and doesn’t mean to be all
inclusive, so that the strategy may be practical and robust. ‘Comprehensiveness’ here
should be focused specifically on our concern as to how a nuclear weapon free NEA will
be realized. In this respect, an Agreement should be as simple as possible, at least at
the outset, although there is no reason not to keep the door open for future possible
expansion.
The importance of the sustained efforts was also emphasized from the view point ofconfidence building among nations. Kazumi Mizumoto from the Hiroshima Peace
Institute said, “(W)e have to find a concrete solution in order to avoid a catastrophic
5

result, which might actually occur if the situation becomes worse due to the escalation ofcurrent hostilities among the nations in this region. To keep proposing the idea of a
NEA-NWFZ does function as a mechanism of confidence-building in NEA, and we needto think out a creative approach to change the atmosphere from the deadlock to trustand cooperation.

§ Relation to Global Efforts for Nuclear Disarmament
It was also clear that the emergence of a new nuclear weapon holder in NEA would
undermine global efforts for a nuclear weapon free world, the renewed vigor of which
had risen worldwide since 2007, and were later supported by Barak Obama’s
Administration in the US. In the workshop and following public symposium, there weremany arguments from the global nuclear disarmament perspective.
Randy Rydell from UN Office of Disarmament Affairs noted in his speech that, “All the
NWFZ treaties associate their respective zones with global disarmament. Thus thesezones are far more significant than just a measure to strengthen regional peace andsecurity. They have also helped to de-legitimize nuclear weapons per se, rather thanjust their spread, testing, or use.” Also he added, “(W)hile the cumulative establishmentof regional zones will not alone suffice to produce a world free of nuclear weapons, thisis in fact their common larger goal. To this extent, the zones represent one of the best
examples today of how multilateral anti-nuclear-weapon norms are taking root at theregional and local levels.”
In relation to the NEA-NWFZ, Mizumoto noted that such a zone would reduce the role ofnuclear weapons in the security policy of Japan and the ROK, and Japan’s global
initiative for nuclear disarmament will gain more credibility, saying, “Under the
NEA-NWFZ with a denuclearized DPRK, the negative security assurance provided by
China and Russia, and no hostile intent, the US (extended) nuclear deterrence will nolonger be a “vital element,” (and) Japan will be able to terminate the (nuclear umbrella)policy and be given more credibility for its non-nuclear policy and disarmament
initiative.”
Not only the establishment of a NWFZ enhances global disarmament efforts, but also the otherway around can happen, namely the vigor of such global efforts increases pressure on
non-nuclear countries to adopt a policy toward a NWFZ. Examples were shown by
Hiromichi Umebayashi from RECNA with regard to Japan, and examples that are6relevant to the ROK as well. One example occurred in relation to the joint statement on
the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, set forth by Norway, Switzerland etc. at
the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference in April 2012 as well
as at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2012. Japan, which,according to its own statement, knows more than any other countries about thehumanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, did not join in the statement because thestatement conflicts with its national security policy which relies upon US extended
nuclear deterrence. Strong public protests occurred against the government’s refusal tojoin in the statement, which added pressure to the policy review by the Japaneseadministration.
Another example demonstrates that the logic advanced in global nuclear disarmament
forums has reached a level that may restrict non-nuclear countries that rely upon
extended nuclear deterrence, thus it works in favor of pursuing possible establishmentof a new NWFZ. The NPDI (Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative), a ten-nationgroup initiated by Japan and Australia, presented a working paper entitled,“Transparency of Nuclear Weapons” at the 2012 NPT PrepCom as an effort toimplement the action plan for nuclear disarmament, unanimously adopted at the 2010
NPT Review Conference. In this working paper, they develop a standard report form to
be used by nuclear weapon states (NWS) in order to secure progressive nuclear
disarmament in a transparent manner. In the standard form they propose, a NWS has toreport on “the measures taken to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons
in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.” The NPDI requests its rapid
implementation by encouraging NWS to start reporting in 2013 PrepCom. Obviously thisrequest should be directed not only to NWS, but also to states adopting security policy
involving extended nuclear deterrence like Japan, Germany, Netherland and Canada,
all members of the NPDI. The establishment of a NWFZ is a typical means toward asecurity arrangement to reduce and eliminate the role of nuclear weapons regionally.
Such inter-relationship between global and regional nuclear disarmament policies wasreferred to by Rydell as follows: “with respect to these (NWF) zones, nuclear weapons
politics is operating on both local and global dimensions.”§ Creative Ideas and discussions for a NEA-NWFZ
The most productive aspect of the Nagasaki workshop was seen in the ideas developed
regarding the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ, the sixth element of the Agreement
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proposed by Halperin. An obvious question to be addressed is how a NWFZ treaty candeal with a state already armed with nuclear weapons like the DPRK.
Hayes proposed an innovative idea as to how a NEA-NWFZ treaty can embrace the
DPRK as a full party to the treaty from the outset. According to his presentation basedon a paper by three authors from the Nautilus Institute including himself, “The DPRK
can be admitted at the outset as a full party, but also can be provided time to comply
fully, which could not happen in less than two years, and might take as long as a decade
to complete. During this time, nuclear weapons states can calibrate the degree to which
their legally binding guarantee of non attack using nuclear weapons to the extent thatthe DPRK has disarmed its nuclear weapons, and reverted to non-nuclear weapons
state status in compliance with its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations, as well as
fulfilling the requirements to establish confidence that it has not only dismantled its
weapons, but abandoned fully its aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons and to
become a nuclear-weapons state. In turn, the other non-nuclear weapons states whose
territory is covered by a NEA-NWFZ can waive the clause in the standard treaty text
whereby the treaty comes into force only when all states have ratified and come into
compliance, thereby entering it into force only on their own territory.” As Hayes refers,
this waivering arrangement draws on the precedent of the Tlatelolco Treaty.
The idea is also accompanied by an additional innovative clause to be applied to
non-nuclear weapon states, which says to the effect that, “Non-nuclear states such as
South Korea and Japan could pull out of the treaty after five years if the North had not
dismantled its nuclear programs.”
The calibration by nuclear weapons state regarding their security assurances inproportion to the DPRK’s implementation of its non-nuclear commitments, and thescenario to allow ROK and Japan to withdraw, will have various ramifications and needmore articulation, especially in relation to the verification system to be provided in thetreaty. However, as Hayes said, they are considered to be technically surmountable.
Halperin also discussed these issues in his speech and provided other ideas, including
a treaty provision that gives the ROK and Japan more flexibility when they consider
withdrawal due to the slow progress of the DPRK’s compliance with the treaty’s
non-nuclear obligations.
A Japanese participant raised a question about the possibility that China’s
8intermediate/medium range nuclear missiles might be pulled back by a certain distancefrom the border line of the NEA-NWFZ. The implication of the question was to meet theperception existing in the Government of Japan that a NEA-NWFZ should mitigate thenuclear threat from China by means of physical measures. To this question, there was apositive personal response from a Chinese participant. Theoretically the concept will
have to be applied to all the relevant nuclear weapon states in a NEA-NWFZ. This
concept has been known as the “thinning-out” in the NWFZ studies. The idea of“thinning-out” was introduced in the context of the Nordic NWFZ in 1970s to withdraw
Soviet nuclear weapons from areas close to Finland’s eastern border and the Baltic Sea
coast. (cf. Jan Praviz) We will need more studies on the merits, if any, and feasibility of
the concept in relation to the specific situation of a NEA-NWFZ, but it seems worth
further research on this subject.
A question was raised regarding whether a NWFZ should be composed of contiguous
territorial areas because the Halperin concept involves countries which are
geographically separated. It was noted that all the precedents of the existing NWFZs
are made up of contiguous territories or territories not intervened by other countries
excluded from the Zone. However, there seemed to be a shared understanding among
participants in the workshop that there is no general rule or official documents to requirea NWFZ to be as such. It is also note-worthy that a Comprehensive Agreement itself is
not a NWFZ treaty, but embraces chapters other than a NWFZ.
In the workshop, an explanation was given regarding the outline of a NEA-NWFZ treaty
drafted

by

the

“PNND

(Parliamentarians

for

NuclearNon-proliferation

andDisarmament) Japan Working Team to Promote a NEA-NWFZ”. Although the draft
outline doesn’t reflect the updated situation in the region, it has some provisions uniqueto the NEA region, including one relevant to Japan and the two Koreas. It is the nuclear
disarmament education obligation, such as the transmission to present and future
generations of the stories of the damage, short term and long term, inflicted on the
citizens and cities by the atomic bombs dropped in 1945.

§ Extended Nuclear Deterrence (END) and NWFZ
One of the constant themes at the workshop was the relationship of extended nuclear
deterrence to a NWFZ as already seen above.
Alyn Ware discussed the case of Australia which is a central member of the South
9

Pacific NFZ but maintains its policy to depend on END of the US. Ware pointed out that,
although Australia could join the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SP-NFZ) Treaty onlywith this contradictory policy, it could lead to the conclusion of the treaty, thus
contributing to bringing the Zone into existence. As a result, on the positive side,
Australia enacted its ‘SP-NFZ Treaty Act 1986’ to ban not only manufacturing andpossession but also research and development of nuclear weapons, and then took apositive position in getting 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion and has shown leadership inorganizing an International Commission such as Canberra Commission and ICNND(International Commission for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament). However,on the negative side, Ware said, it has allowed port visits of the US nuclear capable
ships and maintained negative position in the ICJ follow-up resolution at the UN General
Assembly.
While there were varying understandings on the Australian END policy, there wasagreement in acknowledging some value of the flexible attitude in formulating a NWFZ.
As Ware pointed out, it will allay concerns, whether legitimate or not, of those who
believe in END and make it easier to get Japan and the ROK to join a NEA-NWFZ. Suchassertion coincides with experiences frequently gained in Japan during the conversation
with governmental officials and parliamentarians. It is undeniable that the END
constitutes a key issue to be addressed in order to expand supporters of a NEA-NWFZ
beyond those already in favor.
According to discussions in the workshop, two further points should be noted regarding
the flexibility on END. One is an obvious legal argument. In a NEA-NWFZ treaty, which
is a legally binding international treaty, there will be no need of END for non-nuclear
state parties as long as the treaty is in effect and fully observed by all the state parties
because there is no nuclear threat to be deterred because of the provision of negative
security assurances. The other point is that efforts to dispel the illusion or myth ofprotection afforded by END will have to be continued. In doing this, a precaution will benecessary because such criticism on the credibility of END protection tends to invite theargument for requesting the US more stringent military procedures to ensure theimplementation of the END.

§ Other Elements of a Comprehensive Agreement
The issue of missile control in NEA was discussed as a potential additional element to
be included in a comprehensive agreement. There were very productive discussions.
10It became clear that the actual concern of missiles was related to the process by which
to lift the sanction on the DPRK by the UN Security Council resolutions and that ageneral regional missile control per se was not an issue in this regard. It is, in fact, a partof Halperin’s fifth element of the Agreement. Since the UNSC resolution prohibits any
launch conducted by the DPRK using ballistic missile technology, it will be necessary to
discuss when and under what conditions this sanction is to be lifted.
A view was expressed that, once the nuclear issue is solved, missiles would not be aserious problem. This means that, at least in the NEA regional context, we can focus on
solving nuclear issues and that the sanction in relation to nuclear and ballistic missile
issues can be dealt with as a single set of issues. In this respect, as was discussed in
the workshop, the way the DPRK ballistic missile launches are reported in the media inJapan and the ROK is confusing and misleading and needs to be corrected. This
confusion comes partly from the text of the UNSC resolution itself, thus prudent
handling of it will be requested with the parties concerned in drafting and operating theAgreement. As for verification of the peaceful launch of rockets, it was noted that there
has been a variety of research on this topic in the past and that the distinction between
military and peaceful test launches is considered to be technically possible and will not
become a major problem.
How to deal with the nuclear fuel cycle in NEA is undoubtedly one of the complex issues
to be discussed in the Agreement. It is related to energy security needs, and thus, theenergy assistance needs, of the DPRK, and to the scope of obligations on non-nuclear
states of a NEA-NWFZ. The discussions on this issue in the workshop were again very
productive and we obtained a reasonable common basis for future studies. The current
disparity, in which only Japan enjoys the right of reprocessing and enrichment, is anunhappy prerequisite, but we will have to start from this point. The real question is inwhich direction to move. It will take some time to develop an agreed upon direction
among the parties concerned; therefore, it will be wise to note that the treaty outline
developed by the PNND Japan Working Team suggests that a NWFZ treaty stipulate
the establishment of a Planning Mechanism for Future Energy Cooperation with a strict,credible mandate and leave the issue to the future process. As was noted in theworkshop, the Fukushima disaster and Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle policy to follow should
and will have critical bearing on that future process.
A seemingly common view shared in the workshop was that the stockpiling of plutonium
11

by Japan should have a moratorium or be terminated as soon as possible. A reason for
it raised in the session was that it would also lead Japan to develop the dry-cask storageof the spent nuclear fuels, a safer method than current pool storage. Internationalization
or regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle was also discussed in the workshop, butthere was a mixed view on the issue. It was pointed out that the politics behind thescene of such arguments in Japan is that those who want continuation of nuclear power
plants are apt to discuss internationalization, but without putting forth any specific plans
for Japan to undertake. There was clarification regarding the argument that the pursuitof a NWFZ is deeply related to the issue of reprocessing spent fuels, but the pursuit of a
NWFZ is not a policy to prohibit nuclear power plants.

§ Players and Forums for Future Efforts
Shared concerns were expressed in the workshop as to how any idea such as
developed by Halperin will be brought up to the level of a state policy option. A
Japanese proverb is relevant in this regard, “It is better to get down to work than toworry about it.” A successful leap in this effort could happen at any time, and we should
continue to develop and spread ideas. This said, there were various suggestions in theworkshop.
The Chinese participant believes the Six Party Talks could still be a viable venue tosolve nuclear issues of the NEA, and says China is committed to its leading role in it.
There were some comments to urge China to exert much stronger influence upon the
DPRK and more pressure should come from within the country in this respect.
Mongolia was frequently cited in the workshop as a country that can play a key role indeveloping a NEA-NWFZ. It was also cited as a possible state party to aComprehensive Agreement. There were a number of reasons expressed for thisposition.

Mongolia has a two-decade-long record of a strong anti-nuclear weapons

policy since 1992. It is a country located in NEA, as is self-identified as such, andmaintains good relations with the DPRK as well as with all other countries in the region.
And, it expresses a policy willing to support denuclearization of the region. When we
pursue state-level involvement, Mongolia stands at the closest position in favor of it.
These reasons were shared among the workshop participants. It was also noted thatstate-level involvement is a necessary condition for any UN level discussion to start on
the topic of NEA-NWFZ.

12

There were discussions about the role of civil society in strengthening public support
andengaging

government

officials

andpolicymakers,including

roles

of

parliamentarians and mayors. Strong support for a NEA-NWFZ by mayors in Japan was
exhibited in the workshop. Also it was shown in the workshop that there were ongoingcooperative efforts on this issue between PNND Japan and PNND Korea. The
importance of a people-to-people channel was also discussed in the workshop. Whileno specific arrangement was suggested, the idea of establishing multilateral
cooperation to assist the people in the DPRK was mentioned. It was said that such an
attempt would inevitably involve cooperation among the people in China. In relation to
the role of the civil society, Yi Kiho from the ROK pointed out the importance ofgovernance among civil societies that will ensure the effective inter-relationship ofvarious groups and the continuity of subjects to be pursued. He argues that there arediverse civil society actors like local governments, parliamentarians, universities andcivil groups, but a mechanism to bridge their activities is lacking.
In Nagasaki, the workshop played a critical role in elevating the issue of a NEA-NWFZ
and the idea of a comprehensive approach to a level of common concern shared among
key researchers and leaders of the community. It also provided a basis to spread theissue to other areas in Japan, including the Hiroshima and Tokyo metropolitan areas.
Such a process led by academic researchers and supported by concerned civil groups
will be effective as ground work to engage officials at the government level if
implemented in many cities in other parts of NEA.

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