MMRCDISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

No. 510

Literature Survey: Field-Based Studies of Supply
Chain Robustness
Young Won ParkPaul Hong
Takahiro Fujimoto
Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Economics,
Saitama University, Saitama, Japan
Manufacturing Management Research Center, Graduate School of Economics,
Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, Japan
Information Operations & Technology Management Department, University ofToledo, Toledo, Ohio, US
Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
June, 2019東京大学ものづくり経営研究センター
Manufacturing Management Research Center (MMRC)
Discussion papers are in draft form distributed for purposes of comment and discussion. Contact the author for
permission when reproducing or citing any part of this paper. Copyright is held by the author.
http://merc.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/mmrc/dp/index.html

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LITERATURE SURVEY: FIELD-BASED STUDIES OF SUPPLYCHAIN ROBUSTNESS 1
Young Won Park1,∗, Paul Hong2
and Takahiro Fujimoto3
1

Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Economics, Saitama University,
Saitama, Japan;
Manufacturing Management Research Center, Graduate School of Economics, Faculty of
Economics, University of Tokyo, Japan
2
Information Operations & Technology Management Department,
University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio, US
3Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan

1
This discussion paper is a reprint of the content, but not the formatting, of chapter 2, "Literature Survey" in Fujimoto, T. and D. A.
Heller (eds.) (2018) Industries and Disasters: Building robust and competitive supply chains. Hauppauge, NY: Nova sciencepublishers, pp. 31-60. ISBN: 978-1-53612-905-2, Based on the Agreement Between the authors and NOVA science publishers.
∗
Corresponding Author: ywparkjp@gmail.com.

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Abstract:
This paper points out the relative lack of field-based research on supply-chain disruptions
caused by disasters. We show how field-based studies of supply chain robustness complements
the existing literature on supply chain management (SCM) and business continuity planning(BCP), with its focus on real-world cases and analysis of firm responses to disasters through alens that emphasizes firm capabilities. We also highlight the important role of information
management, leadership, and coordination across the supply chain in disaster preparation andrecovery.

Keywords:
Field-based studies, Supply chain robustness, Business continuity plan, Supply chain
disruption, Risk management practices, Hurricane Katrina, Integrative manufacturing
information system, Supply chain leadership3

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Field-Based Studies of Supply Chain Robustness
Fujimoto (2019) presented the general framework and purpose of field-based studies of supply chain
robustness, e.g., to shed light on how manufacturing firms and industrial sites (genba) improve boththeir supply chain robustness and resilience against major disasters when global competition is intense.
In this paper, we will review the existing literature tackling this issue in the areas of business economics,
organizational studies, supply chain management, business continuity planning, and so on.
To state our conclusion first, we think that, although ample existing literature has analyzed how
firms and business organizations manage risks and uncertainties, including supply chain disruptions
caused by disasters, there have been relatively few academic works that have explored principles andprescriptions regarding supply chain robustness and competitiveness based on empirical field studies
of how actual firms behave and learn in such situations.
In recent decades, researchers have examined complex issues encompassing risks,vulnerabilities, and uncertainties in dynamic external environments and vast networks of suppliers(Cusumano and Takeishi 1991, Lambert and Cooper 2000, Oke and Gopalakrishnan 2009, Ellis et al.
2011, Sawik 2011, Schmitt and Singh 2012). Many of these studies on supply chain management(SCM) and business continuity planning (BCP) examine theoretical models of risk occurrence or
discuss general risk management practices.
However, little is known about how firms come to a realistic understanding of field level (e.g.,genba-based) needs before implementing top-down directives. Just as effective product development
requires a clear understanding of final customers, so is the case with risk management implementation.
Lack of appreciation of field level challenges too often results in unrealistic disaster risk planning
execution. Hence, this volume presents “field-based (genba-based)” case studies regarding the risk
management practices of firms in countries that have experienced frequent supply chain disruptions
caused by natural disasters, such as certain Japanese manufacturing firms and factories facing
intensifying global competition in the post-Cold War era.
For this purpose, recent studies on SCM risks and their mitigation or BCP strategies will be
reviewed in this paper, mainly focusing on organizational responses to supply chain disruptions due tonatural disasters (Altay and Ramirez 2010, Day et al. 2012, Park et al. 2013, Fujimoto and Park 2014).

1.2. Buffers or Capabilities
Our literature review suggests that there have been at least two main approaches to the issue of howorganizations deal with environmental uncertainties and unpredictable changes. One focuses on buffers,
or organizational slack, and the other concentrates on firms’ organizational capabilities. Let us discussthese two concepts in this order.

Slack and Buffers
Organizational slack refers to resources that exceed what is required for an organization that pursues
efficiency to achieve its immediate goals, including buffer inventories, surplus production capacity, andexcess personnel (Cyert and March 1963, Bourgeois 1981). This may be seen as inefficiency, but it may
also be regarded as a source of effective adaptation to changes within the organization, including its
own innovations. Organizational slack may have a negative impact on a firm’s overall performance,
but it may also have positive effects if the level of slack is not disproportionate (Majumdar 1998, Tan
2003).

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Another related concept is that of boundary spanning (Thompson 1967). Organizations asinteractive systems respond to environmental uncertainty in both proactive ways (e.g., prudent efforts
to reduce potential uncertainty in advance) and responsive ways (e.g., constructive initiatives for
implementing information-processing capabilities to deal with normal uncertainty) and achieveorganizational requirements for survival and growth (Penrose 1959, March and Simon 1958, Lawrenceand Lorsch 1967, Galbraith 1973, Trkman and McCormack 2009). This requires an organization todevelop central value-creating processes within its “technical core”, which supports its efforts toachieve productivity requirements based on stability and continuity of value creation and delivery
processes (Thompson 1967, Harney 2004). Consequently, when facing uncertainties, an organization
tries to insulate its technical core by setting up “boundary spanning units”, acting as buffers between
said stable core and the fluctuating external environment, thus consistently achieving desirable levelsof profit (Knight 1921, Aldrich and Herker 1977, Tushman and Scanlan 1981). This core-boundary
view of organizations is useful to explain much of what we have observed in modern manufacturingfirms and industries.

Capabilities
The second key notion regarding an organization’s adaptation to internal and/or external changes is thatof organizational capabilities (Nelson and Winter 1982, Grant 1991, Fujimoto 1999), which are often
described as a system of organizational routines to achieve stable and relatively high organizational
performance against rivals in the long run. The concept includes both ordinary/static capabilities toreach a certain level of performance and dynamic/evolutionary capabilities to rapidly and effectively
change structures and performance vis-à-vis competitors (Teece and Pisano 1994, Fujimoto 1999).
In this paper, we focus on organizational capabilities in manufacturing and supply chain
management, or a system of organizational routines that govern flows of value added (e.g., the value
stream) to the customers in the market (Schonberger 1982, Monden 1983, Goldratt and Cox 1984, Ohno
1988, Clark and Fujimoto 1991, Fujimoto 1999). The flow-oriented approach to manufacturing implies
a broad definition of manufacturing (monozukuri in Japanese) as the creation and transmission of valuecarrying design information to customers, which involves development, purchasing, production,
distribution and sales of goods and services, because value is assumed to reside in design information(Clark and Fujimoto 1991, Fujimoto 1999, 2007). This design-based view of manufacturing stands incontrast to the narrow definition of manufacturing seen simply as transforming physical materials.
By adopting the aforementioned perspective, based on organizational capabilities inmanufacturing that control and improve flows of design information to customers, researchers may
analyze the competitiveness and robustness of manufacturing systems and supply chains in an
integrated manner. That is, competitiveness refers to the effectiveness and stability of the flows in termsof speed, efficiency and accuracy, whereas robustness concerns the continuity of said flows whendrastic environmental changes, such as a disaster, occur.
This design-information-flow-oriented approach leads us to infer that organizations or theirunits that are capable of improving supply chain competitiveness (e.g., kaizen) may also be capable ofquickly recovering from supply chain disruptions, since the two capabilities are both related toenhancing the flow of value-carrying design information from suppliers and assemblers to customers.
In a sense, daily shop floor improvements, or kaizen, deal with numerous microscopic disasters
and flow disruptions. Likewise, a large-scale project to recover even from an unprecedented supply
chain disruption, when broken down into a series of tasks, may be regarded as a large-scale kaizen
process. Thus, our flow-oriented capability perspective leads us to the hypothesis that supply chain

5competitiveness and robustness can be improved simultaneously, as they stem from a similar kind offlow-building capability.

Supply Chain Robustness
In this context, supply chains are essentially interpreted as design information flows of tangible
materials and intangible value components between firms and customers. By combining the coreboundary view of organizations and the design-based concept of manufacturing, this paper aims to
explore previous research on supply chain disruptions (Fujimoto and Park 2014), focusing mainly on
the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011.
Indeed, a recent study by Gupta et al. (2016) shows that earthquakes (33 papers) and hurricanes(22 papers) are the two most frequently investigated types of disasters, followed by terrorism (12papers), accidents (8 papers) and floods (6 papers). Our analysis also rests on the assumption that thetechnical cores of firms (e.g., plants/factories, support facilities, transportation systems) require timely
design information flows.
Disasters are by nature severe and unpredictable and providing reasonable estimates of theirprobability is extremely difficult (Knight 1921, Chakravarty 2011). Supply chain disasters temporarily
shut down parts of the design flows to customers (Park et al. 2013). Such supply chain disruptions are
extraordinary for two reasons: (i) instead of playing their normal stabilizing role, the technical cores offirms may become a source of increasing costs; and (ii) rather than retaining their normal function of
insulating the technical core, the buffers in the boundary-spanning units are redirected toward
maintaining the functionality of the whole chain (Fujimoto and Park 2014).
Supply chain disruptions caused by disasters force manufacturing firms to choose between
robustness, e.g., preparing for rare but real future disasters, and competitiveness, e.g., striving tooutperform their current rivals. Heavy investments to achieve robustness against possible disasters maylead to a reduction in the allocation of normal resources to enhance competitiveness. Robustness isneeded in exceptional situations, whereas competitiveness is an everyday requirement. This was
definitely the case with the Great East Japan Earthquake, which occurred in a period of moderatedomestic performance and intense global competition. Harney (2004) discusses theoretical models of
business continuity planning (BCP), or mitigation responses to possible disasters. Conversely, we
examine the actual practices of better-performing firms after recent disasters occurred in Japan. Our
analysis focuses on how manufacturing firms that have suffered serious damage to their technical coresbalance the complex requirements of supply chain robustness and global competitiveness (Fujimoto2012a, Park et al. 2013, Fujimoto and Park 2014).

2. EXISTING WORKS ON SCM AND BCP
Keeping in mind the aforementioned competitive situation and technological evolutions during
the post-Cold-War period and early 21st century, let us briefly analyze the parts and materials
most affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake – the weak links in the supply chains. Threeindustries whose recovery was particularly slow and had a rather strong impact on theoperations of assembly manufacturers are discussed in this section: (i) semiconductors, such as
on-board microcontrollers for controlling devices, (ii) functional chemicals, such as synthetic
rubber, and (iii) high value-added, simple piece parts containing advanced materials
technologies.

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2.1. Views from Supply Chain Management (SCM)
Manufacturing firms face frequent disruptions in their supply chains because of a variety of man-madeand natural threats, which expose them to significant business risks (Park et al. 2013). Unexpected but
devastating events disrupt business processes in numerous ways, among which: component parts
shortages, product design changes, manufacturing stoppages, logistics breakdowns and humanitarian
emergencies (Drummond 2004, Duncan et al. 2011, Schmitt 2011, Thun and Hoenig 2011). In general,
three broad categories of supply chain risks are identified in the value chain in relation to: supply,
demand, and miscellaneous dimensions (Oke and Gopalakrishnan 2009). The risk of disruptions
ascribable to natural disasters is regarded as a supply-related risk. Table 1 summarizes value chain risks
and disruptions.
In view of these considerable supply chain challenges, researchers have investigated the criticalresponses of manufacturing firms at multiple levels (Kleindorfer and Saad 2005, Braunscheidel andSuresh 2009, Roth et al. 2008). After careful review, four streams of supply chain disruption responses
can be identified.
The first stream concerns risk management models aimed at promoting system flexibility anddynamic capabilities to boost competitive advantage (Sawik 2011, Liao et al. 2010, Maon et al. 2009).
Mitroff (1988) and Mitroff et al. (1996) present crisis response models in cases of disaster. Craighead
et al. (2007) underline the importance of supply chain mitigation capabilities (SCMC). Their conceptualmodel of supply chain disruption responses suggests that: (1) Supply Chain Design Characteristics—
such as density, complexity, and node criticality—increase the Severity of Supply Chain Disruptions,(2) Supply Chain Mitigation Capabilities—such as recovery and warning—reduce the Severity ofSupply Chain Disruptions. In particular, after examining recent studies dealing with the decisionmaking process for managing disasters, Gupta et al. (2016) identify the following eight subcategories:(1) Decision support systems (DSS), (2) Multi-agency decision making, (3) Information processing, (4)Systems modeling, (5) Supply chains, (6) Equity and public risk, (7) Near-miss events and (8) Fundraising.
The second stream provides management insights into coping with disaster events (Maon et al. 2009,
Ellis et al. 2010, Ellis et al. 2011). In particular, a dual-cycle model analyzes the practices of agencies
offering aid in case of supply chain disruptions, in terms of: (1) prevention and planning and (2)response and recovery (Park et al. 2013). Three major contributions are offered: a concise account of
current practices and the particularities of disaster relief supply chains compared with commercial
SCM; challenges and barriers to the development of more efficient SCM practices, classified into
learning, strategizing and coordinating, and measurement issues; and a simple, functional model forunderstanding how collaboration between corporations and disaster relief agencies might help relief
agencies meet SCM challenges. In addition, Ellis et al. (2011) suggest that sense-making processes
impact on the actions that firms take to mitigate supply chain disruption risks, and they develop sevenpropositions that advance the social and psychological factors that drive the idiosyncratic nature of
supply chain disruption response decision-making.
The third research stream identifies the key stages of crises. According to Hong et al. (2012),
in the first stage, detection, early warning signals of a crisis are detected in the unfolding reality. The
second stage, occurrence, inevitably results in tangible damage. Organizational responses aim at
minimizing negative impacts and containing the scope and intensity of the crisis. In the third stage,
recovery, firms begin to enact procedures to resume normal business activities. The final stage, e.g.,crisis resolution, involves reviewing all crisis management activities, assessing outcomes anddeveloping plans for improving crisis management capabilities. Fink (1986) also pinpoints four stages
in crisis situations: (1) the prodromal stage identifies looming disasters through internal indicators and7external warnings (e.g., government sources); (2) the acute stage reveals tangible and measurable
damage; (3) the chronic stage requires facing the aftermath of a crisis in terms of repair and recovery
needs assessment; (4) the resolution stage has to do with examining the outcomes of the specific disaster,deriving lessons and implementing actionable changes.

Table 1. Classification of value chain risks and disruptions
Type Classification
Example of Classification
Mitigation Response Strategies
Import Restrictions
Temporary import restrictions Better
planningandco(Highlikelihood,
Low on steel components or other ordination of supply and demand;
flexible capacity building
impact)raw materials
Climate Change
Global warming
Betterplanningandco(Low
likelihood,Lowordination of supply and demand;
flexible capacity
impact)2010 BP Oil Spill
Identifying
supplychain
Supply risks and Man-made Disasters(Low
likelihood,Highvulnerability points and having
disruptions
impact)contingency plans
Natural Disasters
2011 Japanese Tsunami;
Identifying
supplychain(Lowlikelihood,
High 2005 Hurricane Katrina
vulnerability points and having
impact)contingency plans
Loss of Key Suppliers
Disappearance of suppliers Multiple sourcing strategy(Medium
likelihood, throughmergers
andModerate impact)
downsizing
Demand Variability
Changing customer tastes and Better
planningandco(Highlikelihood,
Low preference for affordable and ordination of supply and demand;
Impact)quality products (e.g., frugal flexible capacity
innovation)
Product Hazards
Toyotarecallsdue
to Educating customers(Lowlikelihood,
High accelerator failures
impact)Epidemic Outbreak
2002-2004 SARS (severe acute Educating customers
likelihood,
High respiratory syndrome) outbreak
Demand risks and (Low
impact)in China
disruptions
Consumer Fads
Cabbage Patch Dolls
Better planning and flexible(Medium
likelihood,capacity
Moderate impact)
Ban on Ingredients
Ban on toy components Multiple sourcing strategy(Medium
likelihood, containing leadModerate impact)
Forecasting Errors
Unanticipated demand changes Better
planningandco(Highlikelihood,
Low in emerging markets
ordination of supply and demand;
flexible capacity
impact)Fluctuating Gas Prices
1970s Oil Crisis;
Cost reduction/ competitiveness(Medium
likelihood, 2015-2016 Low Gas Prices
in operations; managing demandModerate impact)
incentives
forpromotion,customers
Miscellaneous risks Changes in Regulatory Rules Changing Trade Regulation Cost reduction in operations;(Medium
likelihood, Policies (USA, China)
lobbyingand disruptions
Moderate impact)
PETA (People for the Ethical International Animal Rights Cost reduction in operations;
Treatment of Animals)
Movement
lobbying(Medium
likelihood,Moderate impact)
Category

Source: Adapted from Oke and Gopalakrishnan (2009).

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The fourth stream emphasizes the constructive planning of supply chain disruption responses(Park et al. 2013, Fujimoto and Park 2014, Brandon-Jones et al. 2014). Duncan et al. (2011) present aframework, Continuity of Operations Planning (COOP), to plan for man-made or natural disasters,
along with some concrete examples. COOP is a tool that aids organizations in staying in business under
extreme circumstances. Knemeyer et al. (2009) develop a process to proactively plan for catastrophic
risk events. They introduce an innovative methodology used by the insurance industry to quantify thelevel of risks according to the types of catastrophic events and the locations of supply chain partners.
Braunscheidel and Suresh (2009) show that internal cross-functional collaboration, external integration(involving key suppliers and customers) and external flexibility have an extremely strong and positive
influence on a firm’s supply chain agility.
In brief, these SCM risk management models concentrate on strategic, organizational andmanagement practices to prevent and plan for various forms of supply chain disruptions. However,these studies do not take into consideration the interdependent nature of global production networks
and the complexity of evolving technologies. Beyond these theoretical disruption response models,there is a need to better assess vulnerability to supply chain disruptions and discover effective response
mechanisms based on actual fieldwork (Wagner and Neshat 2010, Fujimoto and Park 2014).

2.2. Views from Business Continuity Planning (BCP)
In relation to managing natural disasters, the idea of business continuity planning (BCP) has received
much research attention (Zsidisin et al. 2005, Lindström et al. 2010, Czinkota et al. 2010, BrandonJones et al. 2014, Gupta et al. 2016). However, most studies deal with supply chain disruptions and alarge portion of these examine the relation between BCP and the effects of terrorism. For example,
Czinkota et al. (2010) discuss the relation between terrorism and global supply chain disruptions.
Supply chains can be affected by terrorism via both direct attacks and indirect effects, such as security
measures imposed by governments and private interests. Important components of global supply chainspotential vulnerability to attack include systems used for warehousing, transportation, andcommunications. Terrorism is primarily studied using game theory, assuming that the terrorists are one
player and the government is another player. Earthquakes and hurricanes have mostly been investigatedusing mathematical programming (Gupta et al. 2016). Studies on epidemics, floods, and accidents haveused real data, as they can be easily collected for these disasters. Thus, Czinkota et al. (2010) insist that
research should address how to strike the right balance between ensuring secure operations, the cost of
security and the efficiency of said operations. For BCP, they also suggest that the benefits anddrawbacks of using multiple suppliers should be reviewed anew.
These BCP-related works reflect the renewed emphasis on how firms can continue theirbusiness operations despite a variety of disruptions, trying to minimize their impact, achieve fast
recovery of operations and maintain normal business activities even in times of disruptions. Based on
past experiences with lean systems, total quality management (TQM), time-based competition and othersupply chain improvement initiatives, firms approach disaster planning with a collaborative andintegrative perspective. In the increasingly information-intensive business environment, protecting
strategic and routine information has become a crucial business priority.

2.3. Piece Parts and Consumables
The third example of automotive products affected by the 2011 Earthquake is simple pieceparts, such as screws and small springs, used in the roughly 30,000 parts of which an
automobile is composed, as well as materials, such as washing fluids, that are consumables

9
used in the manufacturing process. In general, automobile makers pay little attention to these
suppliers at the far end of the supply chain (fifth tier or lower), but quite a few of these small
to medium enterprises operated in the Tohoku area and suffered heavy damage, especially
suppliers for Toyota, which had opened a new assembly plant in the Tohoku region in 2010.
For very small suppliers such as these, the main challenge is not so much
substitutability or concentration but visibility to the automobile assemblers. In short, regardlessof how powerful Toyota’s supplier recovery assistance might be, if the locations of thesedamaged suppliers are not identified, their recovery cannot be assisted.
The automobile supply chain is extremely complex; hence, it is difficult to comprehend
it in its entirety, all the way down to the manufacturing of simple piece parts. In addition, during
normal periods without disasters, there is no need, contractually as well as technologically, forautomobile manufacturers to know about the product-process details of second-tier and lowertier suppliers, because first-tier suppliers will take care of detailed component designs andpurchases from sub-parts suppliers. In fact, this decentralized system—in which the first-tiersuppliers handle the second tier, the second tier handles the third, and so on—functions very
well at times of routine operations.
However, in an emergency such as this, when wide-area disruption of the supply chain
is caused by a disastrous earthquake, it is crucial for automobile assemblers to gather accurate
information on which suppliers are making what and where, all the way down to the 8th or 9thtier, so that they can be helped directly, if necessary, to avoid stoppages of vehicle assemblylines. Besides, some consumables, such as washing fluids for the heat treatment of a tiny spring,are even less visible, since they are not even listed in the product design information (e.g., billof materials) of the assemblers or suppliers.
In previous disasters, automobile assemblers like Toyota could provide effective
recovery assistance by being able to identify quickly which suppliers were damaged, because
the disaster-affected areas were rather concentrated. However, this time, due to the huge scaleof the disaster, even a month after the earthquake, the complete picture of exactly which
suppliers suffered damage was not yet available to the assemblers. For example, one monthafter the earthquake, Toyota’s headquarters reported that more than 100 parts manufacturers
had been hit by the disaster, but they could not tell exactly how many, although they eventuallycalculated the accurate number within two months. This was certainly a weak spot in Toyota’s
supplier system, known as one of the most competitive in the world in periods without disastersof this magnitude. Nonetheless, Toyota moved quickly and improved its supply chains in termsof visibility.
To sum up, the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake’s heaviest repercussions on global supply
chains were due to the following aspects: products and parts with high technologicalcomplexity requiring longer recovery times; higher concentration of production; lower
substitutability of supplies; lower portability of design information; and lower visibility of the
suppliers themselves.

3. COUNTERMEASURESDISRUPTIONSANDINFRASTRUCTURESFOR

SUPPLY CHAIN

3.1. Major Disasters in Japan and the USA – A Comparison
Broadening the Research Scope
The literature on supply chain risk management has discussed various types of disruptions (Whybark
2007, Trkman and McCormack 2009, Oloruntoba 2010, Hong et al. 2012, Schmitt and Singh 2012,
Park et al. 2013, Fujimoto and Park 2014, Brandon-Jones et al. 2014, Gupta et al. 2016), as the numberof studies on supply chain risk and disruption management has substantially increased after the10
beginning of this century. Prior to 2000, most research in this area tended to focus on discrete aspectsof supply chains. For example, research discussions included: (1) time-phased resource allocation for
production/distribution systems (Carlson 1982, Monden 1983), (2) implementation of the just-in-time
concept and inventory management (Wildemann and Carlson 1987, De Smet and Gelders 1998,
Whybark 2007), (3) supporting innovative problem-solving with strategic sourcing and agile
manufacturing (Nishiguchi 1994, Nishiguchi and Beaudet 1999), (4) scheduling in recoverable
manufacturing systems (Daniel and Guide Jr. 1997), (5) controlled manufacturing environment
practices (De Smet and Gelders 1998) and (6) stochastic lot scheduling problems (Sox et al. 1999).
In recent years, the scope of research has been extended to cover both macro- and micro-levelsupply chain disruptions. In particular, since supply chain disruptions occur with few or no warning
signals, contingency planning and recovery measures require strategic and operational flexibility androbustness in competitive markets (Liao et al. 2010, Chakravarty 2011, Wallace and Choi 2011, Parket al. 2013, Fujimoto and Park 2014, Brandon-Jones et al. 2014, Gupta et al. 2016). National disasters
often destroy regional and national infrastructures and disrupt national and global supply chain
networks. Roth et al. (2008) highlight the serious damage to global food supply chain flows due torecent natural disasters. Ellis et al. (2011) review 79 supply disruption risk (SDR) studies and examine
three stages of the decision-making processes (e.g., enactment, selection and retention) that involvesocial and psychological factors. In response to serious natural disasters (e.g., floods, earthquakes andtsunami), considerable research addresses logistic issues in immediate disaster areas (Altay andRamirez 2010, Day et al. 2012).

The Great East Japan Earthquake
One of the turning points in the study of supply chain disruptions and recoveries was the 2011 Great
East Japan Earthquake (GEJE), among the largest in modern history and, in many respects, quite
extraordinary. The combined impact of the earthquake, tsunami and aftershocks—and of the related
accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant—on domestic and global supply chains acrossindustries was serious. Surprisingly, consumer sales remained steady and strong, thanks to the rapid
reconfiguration of supply and distribution networks (MacKenzie et al. 2012). However, in the aftermathof the disaster, there was a great deal of debate over realistic approaches to improve the robustness of
supply chains in case of rare but possible future disasters (Park et al. 2013, Fujimoto and Park 2014,
Olcott and Oliver 2014). The GEJE struck areas with a high concentration of facilities that suppliedcomponents, parts and materials across the globe. For a while, the interconnected global supply chainspredictably experienced major disruptions. At the time of this disaster, the exchange rate was about 80
yen per USD, compared with 360 yen in 1970, around 240 yen in 1985, and about 120 yen in 2000. In
this sense, the GEJE has been called the first huge and wide-area disaster to happen in a high-cost
country facing global competition (Fujimoto 2012a).
Then, how did Japanese firms and factories respond to this unprecedented disaster? Given themagnitude and complexity of the aggregate damage, it is worth analyzing the nature of the responsive
measures implemented, as these may teach us some important lessons. For this purpose, immediately
after the GEJE, the Manufacturing Management Research Center (MMRC) of the University of Tokyo
began a series of studies, whose most significant findings are reported in field-based studies of supply
chain robustness.
Hurricane Katrina
Recent natural disasters in the US have occurred in fairly stable geological conditions and emergency
needs were mostly addressed from socio-economic and public policy perspectives (Comfort et al. 2010,

11
Oloruntoba 2010, Dave 2015, Parsons 2016). Several differences between Japanese and US disastercases can be pinpointed.
First, natural disasters—Hurricane Katrina, in particular—involve both short-term disruption
and long-term recovery in the economic, social and political spheres. The damaging impact from natural
disasters on the needy is far greater than on the affluent. The extent of community life disruption andecosystem destruction has had much heavier repercussions on the vulnerable at the time of the disasterand during the post-disaster recovery process (Fussell 2015). From a political economic standpoint, thefocus is primarily on restoring normal cultural, social and economic activities. Policy priorities concern
building innovative public-private partnerships, implementing timely response mechanisms (e.g.,
privatization of government services and crisis communication network capabilities) and providing
affordable housing and job opportunities (e.g., massive federal- and state-level support) to people in thedisaster-stricken regions (Kapucu 2006, Garnett and Kouzmin 2009, Rockwell and Block 2010,
Mancuso et al. 2011, Obama 2015).
Second, recent natural and man-made disasters (e.g., BP Oil Spill) have occurred in the southernpart of the US, far away from the major manufacturing centers of the Midwest, East and West. Also
due to vast outsourcing of supplier activities to Mexico, China and other cost-competitive countries, thelong-term impact on manufacturing has been fairly minimal. Additionally, in most cases, after a brief
period of import restrictions, business life normalcy is soon recovered (Parsons 2016).
Third, some of the disasters that have affected the US in recent years are expected to recur
somewhat regularly (cyclone seasonality), whereas the 2011 Japanese earthquake was a much lesscommon type of catastrophe. Hence, in the US the strategic management of disasters is generally
discussed from the standpoint of diverse stakeholders from governmental entities, businessorganizations, and individual communities in terms of building cognitive disaster responsive mindsets
and physical infrastructure network mechanisms (McGuire and Schneck 2010, Thévenaz and
Resodihardjo 2010). The role of humanitarian logistics has also been reviewed to implement effective
disaster coping mechanisms (Tatham and Kovács 2010, Day et al. 2012, Chakravarty 2011). As for fastbusiness recovery, routine and ordinary preparations (e.g., emergency response plans, storm
preparations, staff communication) have had little impact on organizational performance.
On the other hand, external factors (e.g., severity of disasters, extreme population dislocation),post-disaster problems (e.g., loss of customer base and staffing inadequacy) and swift responses (e.g.,high level of coordination among private and public organizations, improved preparedness andcollaborative community culture) are crucial to organizational performance (Corey and Deitch 2011,
Chakravarty 2014, Paul and MacDonald 2016). These studies suggest that disaster planning requires arealistic understanding of field level needs in all phases—prior disaster planning, disaster coping
responses, and post-disaster recovery. In this sense, the real issue is not how to implement top-down
disaster planning directives but how to strengthen bottom-up need translation processes.

3.2. Digital Manufacturing and Supply Chain Disruptions
Integrative Manufacturing Information Systems
As is argued in field-based studies of supply chain robustness, firms have to prepare for the fact thattoday’s major disasters occur amidst intense global competition—yet, this is also the era of digitization.
Thus, an area of research that needs to be developed further is that of digital information systems, suchas ICT, big databases and digital manufacturing.
As an example, we propose the design information view of the whole supply chains as a means
to respond to disruptions (Fujimoto 2012a, Park et al. 2013). There are at least three elements in thisframework: an integrative manufacturing information system (IMIS), virtual dual sourcing (VDS) and12collaborative electronic database infrastructure (CEDI). Extending the various process models of supply
chain risk management, the supply chain design information perspective adopts a design-informationflow-based view of manufacturing (monozukuri in Japanese) that includes not only production but also
development, procurement, sales, marketing, and services that are connected via an integrative IT
system, or IMIS (Park et al. 2012a).
IMIS aims at linking not only physical flows of products and materials but also their upstream
and downstream activities (Clark and Fujimoto 1991, Park et al. 2012, Youn et al. 2012, Park et al.
2013). We define the key processes that are connected by IMIS as follows: (1) fuzzy front-end process
for concept definition and product architecture (Ulrich 1995, Hong et al. 2004, Reid and Brentani 2004,
Hong et al. 2005); (2) product planning process for integrating customer needs—expressed or
unspoken—and design information (Karsak et al. 2002, Doll et al. 2010); (3) product design process
for visualizing design information (Park et al. 2011, Park et al. 2012a); (4) lean procurement andmanufacturing for transferring design information through media choices (Womack and Jones 1996,
Wallace and Choi 2011); (5) sales and marketing processes for providing design information tocustomers (Jayachandran et al. 2005, Hong et al. 2005); (6) maintenance process routines for managing
design information (Tsang 2002).
Park et al. (2013) show how of these all processes can be integrated through the BOM (Bill ofMaterials). Namely, RD-BOM (Research and Development BOM), PP-BOM (Product Planning BOM),
E-BOM (Engineering BOM), P&M-BOM (Procurement and Manufacturing BOM), MS-BOM(Marketing and Sales BOM) and S-BOM (Service BOM) must be integrated so that design information
can circulate from market needs into product development, manufacturing, sales, etc.

Virtual Dual Sourcing
From this design information point of view, supply chain disruption management further considers how
to secure and maintain continuity of design information flows to customers (Park et al. 2013). Following
this design-based framework, Fujimoto (Fujimoto 2011, Fujimoto and Park 2014) suggests virtual dual
sourcing, an approach that involves quick design information transfer from damaged production lines
to substitutive lines that may be as effective as actual dual tooling/sourcing with lower costs. Virtual
dual sourcing is also discussed in field-based studies of supply chain robustness including Fujimoto(2011) and Fujimoto and Park (2014).
Maon et al. (2009) explain the utility of IT for fulfilling the mission of disaster relief agencies
in terms of: (1) prevention and planning and (2) response and recovery. Specifically, information
technology infrastructures are vital to respond to information needs in all crisis management stages(prevention, planning, response and recovery). Identification, protection, and preservation ofcollaborative electronic database infrastructures (CEDIs) becomes one of the most important aspects ofcontinuity of operations planning (COOP) (Schackow et al. 2008, Duncan et al. 2011). Furthermore,
information technology infrastructures represent a potentially high-performing supply chain instrument.
An actual large-scale database developed by Toyota for improving the visibility of damaged
suppliers will also be discussed elsewhere in this volume. Overall, the effective application of advanced
ICT and the use of databases are becoming invaluable tools to prepare for and respond to supply chain
destructions caused by major disasters.

3.3. Supply Chain Leadership and Coordination
Leadership
Another important aspect of supply chain recovery and restoration is leadership within the whole supply
chain. Not only do firms in a given supply chain possess different levels of transactional power,

13financial/productive resources, manufacturing capabilities and knowledge, but they also have different
levels of capabilities and knowledge as to how total supply chains can recover from disruptions.
Companies with more abundant resources and capabilities, such as Toyota in the following case studies,
will be more likely to help other firms in the chain recover from damage. We call them supply chain
leaders or “leading firms” in recovery assistance.
For example, Park et al. (2013) identify four types of firms in supply chains in terms of theircapabilities for design information transfer (e.g., leaders or followers) and the geographical dispersion(Mitchell 2007, Duncan et al. 2011) of the supply chain in question (e.g., global or local). The fourtypes are: Domestic Supply Chain Leader; Domestic Supply Chain Follower; Global Supply Chain
Leader; Global Supply Chain Follower. Park et al. (2013) then describe how the abovementioned fourtypes might respond to supply chain disasters in relation to design information portability,
substitutability, supply chain dispersion, supply chain disruption response cost and supply chain risks.

Coordination and Integration
Coordination and integration between firms in the damaged supply chains are also crucial for effective
supply chain recovery and restoration. Braunscheidel and Suresh (2009) argue that external integration
with key suppliers is important to maintain supply chain functions even in case of catastrophic natural
disasters, since it helps secure essential services and timely acquisition of strategic materials.
An effective method is to have contractor agreements for rapid recovery in case of sudden
disasters (Altman 2006, Ceniceros 2008, Duncan et al. 2011, Hong et al. 2012, Park et al. 2013).
Arranging flexible information flows with key suppliers may help meet pressing needs during natural
disasters and unexpected supply chain disruptions (Braunscheidel and Suresh 2009, Fujimoto 2011). A
number of studies also examine the role of IT systems that make virtual dual sourcing feasible (Mitchell
2007, Schackow et al. 2008, Maon et al. 2009, Duncan et al. 2011, Fujimoto 2011, Park et al. 2013,
Fujimoto and Park 2014).

CONCLUSION
Effective risk management during catastrophic natural disasters requires drawing on lessons andconsidering implications based on actual field experiences. A firm’s top managers may not necessarily
have a good understanding of the actual realities associated with natural disasters. By virtue of theirpositional status, they may take a leading role in formulating and implementing risk management
practices based on an “ideal” understanding of what the world should be. Thus, the discrepancies
between upper-level planning and lower-level implementation are too often the result of a failure tounderstand the real field level needs. Such gaps may include:(1) Contrasts between senior management intentions/goals and operational program efforts. Senior
managers tend to understand risk management from a much more philosophical and strategic
perspective, whereas operation plans focus on task/process specific details.
(2) Divergence between OEMs’ stated expectations and the actual requirements met by suppliers.
Expectations are initially set in broad terms, while suppliers tend to direct their efforts towardspecific requirements.
(3) Incongruity between operational program goals and floor level execution. Operational programlevel goals also tend to be quite broad but floor level execution has to do with much simpler
task-specific details.

14
The ineffective integration of upper-level goals/expectations and lower-level process efforts
may explain why risk management implementation has yielded inconsistent results.
The likelihood of serious risk events—either natural or man-made—may be rare but it is very
real. Field level managers are much more aware of the realities of disruptions than the senior managers.
Thus, it is crucial to achieve greater harmonization between top-down leadership processes (e.g.,planned goals/intent at the upper level vs. implementation details at the field level) and bottom-up
empowerment processes (e.g., realistic assessment of needs at the field level vs. formulation of strategic,planned goals).

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