Is the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Program driving aNew Nuclear Arms Race with Russia and China?

Frank von Hippel
Program on Science and Global Security
Princeton UniversityWorkshopWorkshop on “Responsibility and Role of Nuclear Powers
in Promoting International Peace and Security”
Russian Academy of Sciences Presidium, Moscow, May 31, 2018

President Putin said “yes!” on 1 March“I will speak about the newest systems of Russian strategic weaponsthat we are creating in response to the unilateral withdrawal of theUnited States of America from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty andthe practical deployment of their missile defence systems both in
the US and beyond their national borders…
“There are new missile defence systems installed in Alaska andCalifornia…one has already been created in Romania, while thedeployment of the system in Poland is now almost complete…newlaunching areas are to be created in Japan and South Korea. The US
global missile defence system also includes five cruisers and 30
destroyers, which, as far as we know, have been deployed to regionsin close proximity to Russia’s borders.”

Russia’s proposed response• Penetration aids (decoys, etc) “modestly priced systems to overcome
missile defence are installed on all of our intercontinental ballistic
missile complexes.” [In a rational world, this would be sufficient]• “Sarmat [ICBM] can attack targets both via the North and Southpoles.”• A “low-flying stealth [nuclear-powered cruise] missile carrying a
nuclear warhead, with almost an unlimited range.”• “unmanned submersible vehicles that can move at great depths…intercontinentally, at a speed multiple times higher than the speed ofsubmarines… can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads…toengage various targets, including aircraft groups, coastal fortifications
and infrastructure.”• “a high-precision hypersonic aircraft missile system…delivering
nuclear and conventional warheads in a range of over 2,000 kilometres”• hypersonic-speed, high-precision [boost-glide] weapons systems that
can hit targets at inter-continental distance and can adjust their altitudeand course as they travel.”China’s buildup of ICBM and SLBM warheads
puts a floor under Russian and U.S. bilateral reductions.
China now deploying ICBMs with multiple warheads.
120
10080SLBMs

ICBMs

6040200
2000

2005

20102015

Penetration aids can easily neutralize U.S. exoatmospheric interceptors. An example:

Anti-simulation. Put the warhead in an aluminized balloon andsurround it with other aluminized balloons, each with a little ~6-Wattheater in it to raise its temperature to a level comparable to that due tothe plutonium in the warhead.
https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/us-missile-defense/countermeasures#.WwBZ-ExFyM8

But that is not good enough for worst-case analysts

In 1968, designers of Moscow’s BMD system, which had 64 interceptors
thought they might be able to destroy one incoming warhead. The U.S. wasconfident that its penetration aids would work but, as insurance, decided tooverwhelm the system by targeting it with more than 100 warheads.
“The Protection Paradox,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2004, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2004.11460771

Concern about the new U.S. Navy SM Block IIA interceptor isthat, in the absence of countermeasures, it could be deployed todefend against strategic missiles.

Is it too late for limitations on U.S. BMD systems?

1. Key limit in 1972 ABM Treaty was 100 long-range interceptors. Today,
U.S. has 40 at Fort Greeley, Alaska plus 4 at the Vandenberg Air Force Baseand plans for expansion to a total of 104. A huge waste of money.
2. Key limit in 1997 Theater Missile Defense demarcation agreement was aninterceptor burnout speed of 3 km/second. U.S. has not yet deployed fasterinterceptors but plans to deploy hundreds of SM-3 Block IIA interceptors
with 4.5 km/sec burnout velocity on Aegis destroyers and at Aegis Ashoresites, starting in 2020. Can this deployment be limited?
800600SM-3 Block IB

SM-3 Block IIA

40020002010

2020

2030

2040

G.N. Lewis, “How Many SM-3 Block IIA Missiles? (updated), https://mostlymissiledefense.com/2018/05/20/update-to-how-many-sm-3-block-iia-missiles-may-20-2018//

Iran has not developed the nuclear weapons or longer-range
missiles that motivated Aegis Ashore installations and Iran’sSupreme Leader has ordered that such missiles not be developed.
eeLondonIf the order could
be turned into abindinginternationalcommitment,could that be abasis for US
withdrawal ofAegis Ashore
from EasternEurope?

Moscow

PragueWarsaw

SLV …
able of2015

AnkaraNew Solid MRBM
andShahab-3 Variant
2,000 kmShahab-3
1,300 kmRiyadhScud C
500 kmFateh-110
and Scud B
300 kmCritical steps to save nuclear arms-control
1. The U.S. should impose unilateral limits on its systems that could
be used for defense of the continental United States against
Chinese and Russian ballistic missiles.
2. Russia should similarly restrain itself with regard to adding newdimensions to the nuclear arms race.
3. Russian-US cooperation is required to save the INF Treaty. Bothsides have issues but they should be dealt with, not used as an
excuse to destroy the Treaty.
4. The New START Treaty should be extended for an additional 5
years to 2026 to hopefully get strategic arms control past thisdifficult period of Russian-U.S. relations.