10New Insights in

Climate Science
2019

GLOBALCARBON
project

Future Earth Health Knowledge-Action Network

Title: 10 New Insights in Climate Science 2019
Produced by: Future Earth and the Earth League
Layout and graphics: Jerker Lokrantz/Azote
Printed on recycled, FSC-certified paper.
Please cite this report as: Pihl, E., Martin, M.A., Blome, T., Hebden, S., Jarzebski, M.P., Lambino, R.A., Köhler, C., Canadell, J.G., Ebi,
K.L., Edenhofer, O., Gaffney, O., Rockström, J., Roy, J., Srivastava, L., Payne, D.R., Adler, C., Watts, S., Jacobsson, L., Sonntag, S., 10
New Insights in Climate Science 2019, Future Earth & The Earth League, Stockholm, 2019

Content
Introduction

4

1. The world is not on track5

2. Climate change is faster and stronger than expected

8

3. Climate change leaves no mountain summit behind

11

4. Forests are under threat, with global consequences

14

5. Weather extremes – a “new normal” in 2019

17

6. Biodiversity – threatened guardian of earth’s resilience20

7. Climate change threatens food security and the health of hundreds of millions22

8. Most vulnerable and poor hardest hit by climate change

24

9. Equity and equality pivotal to successful climate change mitigation and adaptation

26

10. Time may have come for social tipping points on climate action

28

References

31

Credits

373

Introduction
The world continues to emit greenhouse gases while
our planet’s climate is changing faster than ever.
This document will let science speak. Manydifferent scientific assessments and new researchfindings have revealed the uncomfortable resultthat many risks with global warming may have been
underestimated and that our planetary machinery
is, if anything, changing more rapidly than projected.
In 2019, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change alone published two landmark reports: on“Climate Change and Land” and “The Ocean and
Cryosphere in a Changing Climate”. The world’s
leading climate science organizations have joined
forces to provide a scientific synthesis, “United in
Science”, summarizing among other findings thegap between decarbonization commitments and acarbonizing reality. Thousands of recent scientificpublications are available, shedding light on (de)carbonization, accelerated changes in the physicalstate of the climate system, the importance andthe precarious situation of the biosphere, and theaggravating impacts these will have on humansocieties.

As these spread and replicate, social systems could
pass a threshold – so-called social tipping points –after which changes rapidly accelerate. Although
the science around social tipping points is still
nascent, but rapidly evolving, this report will also
highlight the phenomena around climate-inducedsocial movements that are growing in frequency andscale. There is rich evidence of social movements,
with clearly defined objectives, bringing abouttransformational changes throughout history. Suchmovements have invariably placed the spotlight on
issues of fairness and equity, which researchers now
increasingly highlight as pivotal in making successful
climate policies.
This document intends to take up the latest andmost essential scientific findings published in an
extraordinary year – the climate science year inreview.

Simultaneously, over the last few years there havebeen a growing number of climate-related initiatives
that are being implemented across all economic
sectors over various timescales and regional scales.

4

1

The world is not on track

Despite increasing drivers of reduced emissions, such as growthin green energy, institutions divesting from fossil fuels, and somecountries phasing out coal power, the fossil industry is still growing
and global leaders aren’t yet committing to the necessary emissions
cuts. We are not on track to reach the Paris Agreement.
Key new insights▪▪

Greenhouse gas emissions continue to increase and the gap between current trends and agreed
climate targets has widened▪▪

Existing and proposed energy infrastructure commits us to 850 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide
emissions if operated during its full life cycle, twice the budget available for stabilizing the climate
at 1.5°C above pre-industrial level▪▪

The use of coal has slowed down and is declining in many countries. There is increasing financial
divestment from fossil fuels, but the overall size of the fossil-fuel industry continues to increase
with robust growth in the oil and natural gas sectors.

▪▪

In order to achieve ambitious climate targets Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) in some form is likely
needed but comes with great risk and costs and shouldn’t be viewed as a substitute for mitigation

5 years – 70% faster than anticipated by the UNindustry agency ICAO5. The International Maritime
Organization also predicts large increases in shipping
emissions, on average by 29% to 2030 and 95% to2050 across all future socio-economic scenarios6.
Despite growing awareness of climate change,
consumer preferences for heavier vehicles (SUVs)
has led to their doubling of the market share in a
decade. SUVs are heavier than other private vehicles
and often with diesel engines, consuming more
fuel despite progress in energy efficiency and being
responsible for higher air pollution than equivalentgasoline engines. SUVs were the second mostimportant cause for increased global emissions in theenergy sector (after power) between 2010 and 20187.

The current levels of fossil fuel use and infrastructure
paint a worrying picture for successfully achieving
the agreed climate targets. Oil and natural gas use isincreasing rapidly (1.4% and 2% per annum)1. Total
global CO2 emissions from the combustion of fossil
fuels and land-use change have increased about 1%
per annum over recent years2. The UN “Environment
Emissions Gap Report 2018” finds the gap between
countries’ unconditional nationally determined
contributions (NDCs) in 2030 to have widened to 15
Gt (billion tonnes) per year of CO2 compared to the
2°C target and 32 Gt per year compared to the 1.5°C
target3. In comparison, total anthropogenic CO2
emissions are currently 41 Gt².
Coal power may be bucking the trend. Global useof coal reached a peak in 2013, decreased slowly
afterwards and had some modest growth again
over the past two years1. The EU has roughly halved
its coal use since 19904 and the United States andCanada report a 40% decline since 2005¹. However,decreases in coal use in North America and the EU
are to a large degree outweighed by investments indeveloping and transitioning economies. In addition,certain sectors are showing strong emission growth.
Global aviation emissions have increased by 35% in

Existing infrastructure such as power plants,
industries, and roads cause carbon emissions
throughout their lifetimes. Building new fossil-based
infrastructure today locks the world into further“committed emissions” for many decades to come.
If existing infrastructure is operated throughout its
full life cycle as done historically, it will emit 660 Gt(range 230–1500 Gt), equivalent to 18 years of current
fossil CO2 emissions⁹. Proposed power plants would
add another 190 (40–430) Gt CO2. Together, existing5and proposed energy infrastructure represent
committed emissions of 850 Gt CO2, about twice
as much as the carbon budget for the 1.5°C target(420–580 Gt from January 2018)9,10. Worldwide, there
are currently 1,200 coal plants in various stages ofplanning and construction8. Avoiding high future
emissions requires lowered utilization rates as wellas early retirements or retrofits of power plants andindustries. Renewable energy now produces 26% of
global electricity and with continued rapid expansion,planned or existing fossil production could besubstituted11. The installed capacity of solar and wind
power has grown 58-fold between 2010–201812.
Avoiding investments today that become a lock-in tofossil infrastructure would save both emissions andstranded assets. A shift in investments from fossil
fuels to renewable energy could be underway. Morethan 100 globally significant financial institutions
have developed formal restriction policies forinvestment in coal mining and/or coal-fired power
plants since 201311. Investments in renewable power
and fuels in 2018 totalled USD 305 billion, thecorporate sourcing of renewables have doubled since

Capacity of coal power plants that are operating, proposedor cancelled8.

the year before and capacity additions were higher
than net additions of fossil power12.
However, investments continue to flow to coal power,
oil, and gas extraction. Since the Paris Agreement
was adopted (2016–2018), 33 global banks haveinvested USD 1.9 trillion in fossil fuel companies14.
OPEC is assuming that oil demand will continue

Committed emissions from fossil fuel infrastructure compared to pathways to 1.5°C (IPCC SR1.5 P1) and 2°C (RCP2.6). The committed
emissions exclude some of the current CO2 sources, such as land-use change and the calcination process in cement manufacturing.
Therefore, the 1.5°C and 2°C scenarios start at higher levels. Based on Tong et al, Nature, 20199 and Grubler et al, Nature Energy, 201824

6

to increase and that satisfying this demand would
require upstream investments (in extraction,refineries, etc.) of USD 11 trillion up to 204015. Fourof the top five investors in fossil fuels are US based14.
When it comes to coal power, four of the top fiveinvestors are Chinese banks14.

including the feasibility and pollutant implications of
manufacturing the absorbing chemicals at large-scale
as well as the need for sequestration and transport
infrastructure, and risks associated with relying ontechnology that’s still in early development20. Direct
Air Capture could also be associated with utilizationof the captured CO2 to replace products that would
otherwise be based on fossil carbon. Ahead of Direct
Air Capture, the first priority for carbon capture andstorage/utilization should be major CO2 point sources,
such as cement factories, pulp and paper mills, andwaste incinerators21.

In the absence of strong emissions reduction, removalof CO2 from the atmosphere and safely locking it
away has become a requirement to avoid exceeding
1.5°C global warming. According to the IPCC Special
Report on Climate Change and Land, the greatest
potential for Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) is innature-based methods (afforestation, reforestation,and soil carbon sequestration in croplands andgrasslands) and bioenergy with carbon capture andstorage (BECCS)16. However, such solutions will
require substantial investment, they could take up
significant areas of land, and are likely to negatively
affect biodiversity and freshwater availability17,18.
Model-based decarbonization pathways suggest that,
globally, conversion of up to 7 million sq km – 12 times
the area of France – to forest area by 2100 is needed tolimit warming to 1.5°C or 2°C16.

BECCS, DACCS, and similar options requiresafe underground storage. The solution being
implemented at the largest industrial scale today, subseabed storage, faces technological, economic, social,
and political barriers22. Extensive CDR deployment
in the future is unlikely without substantial work tominimize the barriers23. While some level of CDR is
likely to be needed to achieve the most ambitious
climate targets, it comes with great challenges. There
are some scenarios showing that reliance on CDR,
beyond nature-based methods, could still be avoided if
there was strong and immediate mitigation24,25.

Beyond nature-based methods, CDR still requires
significant upscaling and innovation. Among emerging
new technologies, Direct Air Capture with Carbon
Storage (DACCS) has gained increasing attention. With
this technology, CO2 is absorbed directly from theair and then stored in geological reservoirs. The firstcommercial direct CO2 air capture system came online
in 201819. The benefits of DACCS include not needing
significant amounts of land. A major drawback is
the high energy consumption, drawing down 30 Gt/
yr (73% of current CO2 emissions) is estimated torequire more heat than half of today’s primary energy
consumption and more than half of the electricity thatthe world produces today20. There are also other risks,7

2

Climate change is faster and stronger than expected
Key new insights▪▪

Observations show signs of continuing warming▪▪

Sea-level rise is accelerating▪▪

Relatively stable components of the earth system show signs of accelerated degradation, such asGreenland and Antarctic ice sheets▪▪

Further impacts especially on ice sheets and, consequently, on sea-level rise, have probably been
underestimated in the IPCC “Fifth Assessment Report”

Observations of key climatic variables show apersistent warming trend for the Global Mean
Surface Temperature (GMST), with signs ofaccelerating change, e.g., for sea-level rise1,2.
An analysis of GMST, conducted by the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and incomparison to pre-industrial (1850–1900) levels,
reveals that the last few years are the warmest
five-year period on record, and with 2015, 2016,2017, and 2018 being the four warmest individualyears1,2. Future warming could be faster and a global
temperature rise of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels
could be reached sooner than the central projectionin the IPCC special report on “Global Warming of
1.5°C” (in the year 2030 instead of 2040)3.

The ocean has taken up roughly 90% of theadditional heat in the climate system4,5; since the
IPCC “Fifth Assessment Report” (AR5), confidence
in these findings on ocean heat uptake has grown6.
This has consequences for the physical, chemical,
and biological properties of the oceans, e.g.,thermal expansion and thus sea-level rise, higher
temperatures of near-surface waters, enhanced
stratification, weakened circulation, and changes inoxygen content6,7. Marine heatwaves, for instance,
have doubled in frequency as satellite observations
reveal, affecting sensitive ecosystems such as coral
reefs, as well as seagrass meadows and kelp forests.
Marine heatwaves have also become longer lasting,more intense, and extensive8,9.
Scientific agreement has significantly grown thatanthropogenic climate change is the dominantreason for the observed rates of sea-level rise since197010,11,12,13,14. Consequences of the rising sea level are
an increase in extreme wave heights, as observedin satellite observations from 1985–20188,15, andextreme sea-level events; both will significantly
increase in future according to modelling studies6,10,16.
New analysis of model projections with highemission scenarios for the end of the 21st century
show substantially increased rates of sea-level risewhen compared with those reported in the AR56,17.
Analogous to that, recent literature investigated
the temporal behaviour of sea-level rise, confirmingthat it will continue to rise for centuries, even whengreenhouse gas emissions are curbed down6,17. If theParis Agreement targets are achieved and strong
mitigation measures are implemented, sea-level riseis projected to reach approximately 30–60 cm by

The mean global sea level has risen at an increasing rate, from
1.4 mm per year during the period 1901–1990, to 2.1 mm per year
during the period 1970–2015, and to 3.6 mm per year during
the period 2005–201510. The most recent decade (2009–2018)
experienced a sea-level rise of 4.6±0.15 mm per year2.

82100, while under a high-emission scenario sea-level
rise could amount to 60–110 cm, when looking at the“likely” range according to the IPCC nomenclature10.
However, considering the less likely, upper boundsof future sea-level rise projections, these numbers
almost double by 210017.

rise6,17,25. The melting and thinning rates of the
Antarctic ice sheet observed to date are at the upper
end of the projected range published in AR5. Since
then, process understanding and representationin models as well as observational records havesubstantially improved. However, the related
dynamics are still a major source of uncertainty inprojections of the future response of the Antarctic
ice sheets to climate change, and, hence, of sea-level
rise6,25. Consensus among experts has grown thatthese regions are more sensitive to global warming
and less stable than previously thought, and that AR5
estimates were too low. This refers especially to thehigh end of likely sea-level rise projections, whichwere estimated substantially lower in the former
reports6,10,17. It is recommended to take into accountthe increased numbers for projected future sea-level
rise for high-emission scenarios in decision-making
as an orientation for upper bounds6,10,17.

Projections show that what are considered extreme
sea-level events that rarely occur under today’s
climate, e.g., statistically every 100 years, will bemuch more common by the end of the 21st century
along the global coastlines under all Representative
Concentration Pathway (RCP) scenarios10,18. Many
coasts on low latitudes and many megacities on allcontinents will experience such events annuallyalraedy around the year 205010,16,19. Low-lying
countries will face similar risks, which is even morecritical for many of these states due to the geographic
lack of options to retreat. Fast and ambitious
mitigation is vital especially for those areas, since
low-emission scenarios will clearly dampen the rates
of sea-level rise and the increase in extreme sea-level
events10,20.

New research on Greenland’s ice sheet and its
response to global warming used satellite and model
data for the years 2003–2016. Observations highlightthe importance of oceanic forcing on mass loss,
through melting the outlet glaciers at their margins,
analogous to what is observed in Antarctica. Further, in
addition to warmer seas degrading the Greenland ice
sheet, atmospheric forcing can significantly enhanceglacier melt. If atmospheric warming continues
unabated, Greenland will continue to develop as amajor contributor to global sea-level rise26.

The main causes for the current rising sea level, as
mentioned, relate to thermal expansion and massloss through melting of glaciers and ice sheets,the latter process having gained dominance overthermal expansion10,17. The increased rate of sealevel rise is attributable to enhanced melting rates
from inland ice, namely from the Greenland andWest-Antarctic ice sheets10. Recent work based onsatellite data shows that mass loss from Antarctica
accelerated over the past 25 years21,22. Relevant
processes include melting of the ice-sheet margins
from below through warm ocean currents23. These
are driven by atmospheric circulation patterns, thefrequency and prevalence of which influences themelting conditions at the ice margins23,24. While theprocess is generally understood, it has been shownthat anthropogenic climate change is a plausible
major contributor to altered wind conditions during
the past decades. A trend has emerged, starting in
the 1920s, towards circulation patterns that leadto an acceleration of ice loss from the Antarctic
continent24. Model simulations project this trend tocontinue, including consequences for the melting of
the ice margins24.

As the large ice sheets influence sea-level rise, nearsurface lowland permafrost can influence climate
at a global scale, since additional outgassing ofgreenhouse gases further enhances temperature rise.
Lowland permafrost holds approximately double theamount of carbon than the atmosphere, a potential
source for both CO2 and CH4 (methane, the second
most potent greenhouse gas after water vapour)when frozen organic material thaws and decomposes.
The largest permafrost areas are situated in Arctic
and sub-Arctic regions, where warming rates are
more than double the global average due to Arctic
amplification27, which is projected to persist in
future25. It is uncertain whether the related positive
feedback is happening and permafrost areas are
already a source of CO2 and/or CH425. However, it isprojected that near-surface permafrost in the Arctic
will mostly disappear under a high-emission scenario,
which would lead to the release of tens to hundredsof billions of tonnes of CO2, leading to amplified
warming – the permafrost-carbon feedback25.

There is an ongoing debate whether hypothesizeddestabilization processes of the Antarctic outlet
glaciers will occur in the near future. These could
lead to severe, abrupt ice loss from ice-sheet margins
and would thereby critically accelerate sea-level

Projections of effects from warming and degrading9permafrost are based on models that include
the gradual degradation of permafrost due tothe background warming of near-surface airtemperatures. However, pulse events play animportant role as they disturb the local heatbalance, thereby fostering near-surface permafrost
to rapidly warm and/or thaw. Such factors include
wildfires, erosion on river banks and coasts, andfast formation of lakes as a response to melting ice
bodies and soil subsidence28. To date, many global
climate models lack these processes as well as
schemes that dynamically simulate the permafrostcarbon feedback. Both permafrost degradation andpossible resulting carbon emissions are probably
underestimated6.

warming cannot be explained with natural forcingsand variability alone, but only if the human factor istaken into account34. An investigation of the climate
history of the past 3 million years shows that glacialinterglacial cycles of the earth were steered by theplanet’s orbital parameters in combination withthe atmospheric CO2 content. While this is nothing
new in principle, the results once again show thatearth’s climate is very sensitive to atmospheric CO2
concentration35.
Searching for prehistoric climates that could serveas analogues for future climate, an analysis has been
done of temperature and concomitant CO2 contentsof the past 50 million years36. Following the study,
the Pliocene and Eocene climates are most plausible
analogues for the coming 250 years. For both highand low-emission pathways, climatic conditions
similar to those of the mid-Pliocene will become
most likely for many regions on earth by the middleof this century. While these would stabilize thereafter
under a mitigation scenario, large areas of the earth
would develop an Eocene-like climate by the 21stand 22nd centuries, if a “business-as-usual” scenario
is applied. Global mean temperatures were 2–4°C
warmer than pre-industrial levels during the midPliocene, and more than 10°C warmer in the early
Eocene. The upper bound for global sea-level rise fora climate similar to the mid-Pliocene is 25 m, which
would occur over very long timescales10.

New research on Arctic greening shows that
additional plant growth is not sufficient tosignificantly mitigate or offset outgassing ofgreenhouse gases from these areas. Although
growing season lengthens and temperatures rise,
growing conditions remain difficult for plants due totemperature and water stress. This is projected topersist in future29,30.
Regarding greenhouse gas concentrations, not only
are concentrations of CO2 on the rise, atmosphericconcentrations of CH4 have resumed their growthsince 2007 and doubled in growth since 201431.
Methane concentrations are now at a record high of
257% of pre-industrial levels1. Sharp cuts in methane
concentrations are needed to achieve the Paris
goals. The reason for the acceleration since 2014is strongly debated, but observations of stronger
emissions across the southern tropics suggest
wetlands drove part of the growth in response to thewarm El Niño phases of the Southern Oscillation;
isotope measurements of the gas support this view32.
The sensitivity of methane emissions from wetlands
during high-temperature periods suggests a future
potential climate feedback associated with risingtemperatures, which would be impossible to prevent
whilst temperatures continue to rise. Other likely
co-drivers from the emissions increase since 2007
include increased emissions from agriculture in thetropics and fossil-fuel use at mid-latitudes in thenorthern hemisphere33. These emissions could be
reduced by changing livestock diets and throughbetter systems for detecting and stopping methaneleaks in oil and gas infrastructure.

The pace of contemporary rise in greenhouse gas
concentrations is unprecedented in the climate
history over the past 66 million years37. Current
rates of greenhouse gas emissions from humanactivities are substantially larger than during thestrong warming that marks the early Eocene. In
consequence, the rise of global mean temperatures
and the changes in affected earth systemcomponents such as sea-level rise and the shift ofclimatic zones poses an unprecedented challenge tothe speed of evolution of the biosphere, as well as tohuman adaptation capacity.

Palaeo (prehistoric) studies show how contemporary

10

3

Climate change leaves no mountain summit behind
Key new insights▪▪

Diminishing glaciers, snow, ice, and permafrost are observed in mountains. Mountain glaciers areon average estimated to have lost roughly half a tonne of mass per square meter – about 0.5 m inthickness – per year in 2006–2015.

▪▪

Changes to glaciers, snow, and ice in mountains influence water availability in the mountaincatchments and the lowlands, possibly affecting billions of people▪▪

Climate change irreversibly affects mountain ecosystems and their biodiversity, reducing the areaof biodiversity hotspots, causing species to go extinct, and compromising the capacity of mountains
to provide key ecosystem services▪▪

Adaptation to climate change is possible but its effectiveness is severely constrained under highemission scenarios.

Consequences of climate-related changes in snow
and glaciers on the amount and seasonality of waterrunoff are already observed in snow-dominated andglacier-fed river basins, and are also predicted tocontinue into the future1,4. The average winter snow
melt runoff is projected to increase, and spring waterrunoff peaks to occur earlier1. The average annual
runoff from glaciers in most mountain regions are
expected to reach a peak followed by a decline by
the end of the 21st century1. These projected trends
are particularly concerning, given that ~1.4 billion
people (23% of the world’s lowland population) areprojected to depend on runoff contributions frommountains by mid-21st century under a middle-ofthe-road scenario5. Many of the world’s biggest or
fastest growing cities, such as Dar es Salaam with an
expected 13 million citizens in 2035, are particularly
at risk as they depend on nearby mountains fortheir drinking water. Risks are magnified by likely
alterations in precipitation patterns or increased
frequencies and magnitudes of droughts7.

Mountains are at the forefront of climate change
impact. Considerable changes to the cryosphere(glaciers, permafrost, snow, and ice) are recorded
worldwide with cascading effects on water
availability in both the mountain catchment andthe lowlands. Globally, glacier mass in mountainregions, excluding the Arctic and Antarctic,
declined by 123±24 Gt (billion tonnes) per year
from 2006–2015. This is about 500 kg per m2 ofglacier, or like shaving off 0.5 m from the glacierseach year1. There has been a particularly large
average mass loss observed in the southern Andes,
Caucasus and Central Europe (over 850 kg per m2
and per year). The smallest losses, but with highlocal variability, are seen in High Mountain Asia
(150±110 kg per m2 and per year)1. Permafrost,which in high mountain regions covers an area
ranging from 3.6 to 5.2 million km2 (roughly
equivalent to the size of the EU) is being affectedby an increase in temperature throughout theEuropean Alps, Scandinavia, Canada, and Asia1.
The number of days of snow cover has declined innearly all regions, and decreases are particularly
striking at lower elevations1. Further large-scaledeglaciation can be expected under both high- andmoderate-emission scenarios1,2,3.

Changes in climate also affect mountain ecosystems
and their biodiversity at an accelerating pace.
Findings from long-term ecological monitoring8,9,10
and large-scale assessments6,11 are consistent:
climate change has resulted in unprecedented
redistributions and losses of habitats and species
along altitudinal gradients and increases thevulnerability of mountain ecosystems to additional
stressors such as invasive species12. Assessments
and predictions unanimously speak to rapid andirreversible changes in mountain biodiversity andObserved and projected glacier, snow, and permafrost
decline will continue to impact the frequency,
magnitude, and location of most related natural
hazards in mountains, including landslides androckfalls, with exposure of people and infrastructureleading to increases in disaster risks1,6.
11

Bondo landslides in Switzerland, 2017. Melting glaciers and thawing
12
permafrost create new hazards and increase the risk of disaster losses.
Image credit: Marco Giacometti/Mountain Research InitiativeProjected regional glacier mass evolution between 2015 and 2100 relative to each region’s glacier mass in 2015 (100%) based on three
Representative Concentration Pathways emission scenarios. Adapted from IPCC SR Oceans and Cryosphere, 2019.

ecosystems – with estimated losses in the area ofindividual biodiversity hotspots across the Hindu
Kush Himalaya of >70%6 – and to the imminent
extinction of numerous species, including many
endemic ones13,14.

tourism, and energy1. A key opportunity to lessen
impacts and support biodiversity is to encourage
diversity in livelihood options for mountaincommunities under conditions of global change20,
recognizing that indigenous and local knowledge inmountain regions play a key role in conservation andmanagement21. Multi-purpose and integrated water
management approaches across multiple scales canbe effective at addressing impacts and leveraging
opportunities from climate-related changes to thecryosphere and water resources in mountains4.
However, global mitigation and adaptation measuresin mountain regions are a prerequisite to sustainable
mountain development, and depend on urgent
and ambitious actions to provide the supporting
conditions for their effective implementation4.

Beyond biodiversity, climate change – alone or in
combination with other drivers such as land-use
change15 – affects mountain ecosystems in theirfunctions and in the services they deliver, such as
food, forest products, tourism, and not least theprovision of clean water to half of humanity16,17.
Rising temperatures can disrupt traditional crop
productions, such as coffee in the Jimma area of
Ethiopia under a business-as-usual scenario18. To
increase resilience under climate change, conserving
the large variety and genetic diversity of traditional
crops and cultivars used in subsistence farming
systems in mountains, notably in the Hindu Kush
Himalaya6, is particularly important.
Together with gradual and abrupt changes ingovernance and socio-economic activities, climatechange is a key driver of change in mountain socialecological systems19. Observed and projected climatechange translate to numerous impacts to humansocieties living in and dependent on mountains,with negative impacts on livelihood options andsupporting sectors such as agriculture, pastoralism,
13

4

Forests are under threat, with global consequences
Key new insights▪▪

The world’s forests are a major CO2 sink, absorbing about 30% of anthropogenic CO2 emissions▪▪

Anthropogenic forest fires driven by land-use alternation have been reducing major CO2 sinks▪▪

Climate change globally amplifies wild forest fires▪▪

CO2 emissions increase forest photosynthesis capacity to a certain degree, but temperature
increases cause tree mortality and reduce overall carbon storage capacity▪▪

Fighting deforestation and encouraging reforestation, along with sustainable forest management
and other natural climate solutions are important and cost-effective options for reduced net
emissionsaround 1°C5. Thus, threats to forests have local as well
as global consequences for human livelihoods andwell-being, and the entire biosphere.

Forests are foundational pillars of land ecosystems,
human sustenance, and cultures. Loss of forests is
not only detrimental for the livelihood of people,
but also for over half of all globally known terrestrial
plant and animal species inhabiting these regions1,
alongside serious consequences for both the local
and global climate. Forests contain approximately
80% of the terrestrial biomass2 and act as a major
CO2 sink, taking up 11.6 Gt CO2 per year3, which isequal to one third of global CO2 emissions fromfossil fuels4. Removal of ~50% forests in a tropicalregion can increase the local average temperature by

Loss of forest and associated carbon release
persists into the 21st century
Deforestation along with other anthropogenic
land-use changes accounts for 13% of the global
anthropogenic CO2 emissions4, becoming one of the
major causes of climate change3,4. Of the forest loss
in the period 2005–2013, 62% could be attributed

Map of observed fire emissions 1999-2014 showing where fire is increasing (orange) or decreasing (blue). Adapted from Arora and Melton,
Nature Communication, 2018. (CC BY 2.0)

14

to expanding commercial cropland, pastures andtree plantations6. A significant fraction of emissions
related to deforestation in 2010–2014 was driven byinternational trade (29–39%)6. While the southernhemisphere is facing the most severe deforestation,
the northern hemisphere is increasing its tree cover7.
This phenomenon could be partially attributed todisplacing commercial land use from the north to thesouth6.

term average10. The most devastating and largest
fires in the Amazon region were observed in the early
2000s, driven by massive clearing for agriculture
and cattle grazing11. In South East Asia, higher fire
frequencies can be found for Myanmar, Thailand,
Cambodia, Indonesia, and Laos11. In Indonesia, hazecaused by fires ignited for clearing forest for palm
oil plantations poses a substantial human healththreat12.

Anthropogenic forest fires driven by land-use
alternations are a threat to forests in Africa, Latin
America, and Asia. In Africa, prolonged fires occur
widely in the sub-Saharan region8. Most of this comesfrom large-scale changes to land-use in western
Ethiopia and western tropical Africa9. In 2019, there
was an observed increase in the number of fires in
the Amazon region compared to 2018, alarming theinternational community, but the number of fires andassociated emissions were in fact close to the long-

In recent years, there has also been observed regional
increase in wild forest fires such as in Western US
and Alaska, Canada, Russia, and Australia as a resultof prolonged droughts8,13. The combined effect ofnatural and anthropogenic fires to the Amazon
and wild fires of boreal forests means we could be
losing a major carbon sink14. Significant increases
in the number, magnitude and duration of fires
occur in cycles. For instance, the El Niño events that
regularly change southern hemisphere circulation

Spotlight: Ethiopia and Bhutan
Ethiopia, a tree-planting champion,
managed to plant 350 million trees
in a single day29.

Photo: ILRI/Apollo Habtamu (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)

Bhutan preserves 60% of its land
under forest cover and more than
51% of the country is protected,
the largest percentage of any Asian
country30.

Photo: Antonio Morales García (CC BY-SA 2.0)15

season and decreasing rainfall during dry season20.
Increasing incidences of prolonged droughts haveincreased the occurrence of Amazon wildfires.
This process is driven by a decrease in oceanic
moisture inflow that triggers vegetation-atmosphere
feedbacks, in turn decreasing cloud formation andrainfall21. Climate change and particularly maximum
temperatures and air moisture are estimated tointensify wildfires22, and globally fires are persisting
for longer due to droughts8,13.

magnify wild and anthropogenic fires. The impactof the 2015–2016 El Niño on the terrestrial carbon
cycle was a lowered net uptake of CO2, mainly by
drying natural forests15. The net CO2 emissions
from tropical Africa are estimated at 5.4 and 6 Gt
per year for the years 2015 and 2016, respectively9.
This corresponds to about one-tenth of total global
greenhouse gas emissions. But on a global scale,
long-term observations for the 1960–2009 period
suggest general reduction in CO2 emissions from fires
due to fire suppression, and landscape fragmentation
reduced land carbon uptake by 0.48 Gt CO2 per year,
corresponding to ~19% of the global land carbon
uptake16.

Climate change can also reduce photosynthesis,
intensify evaporation, and increase tree mortality
in response to widespread drought23. Prolonged
drought and heat above 29.5°C have been shownto strongly increase tree mortality24,25. Many pinetree populations in Central Europe and Northern
America are declining due to drought and associatedvulnerability to bark beetles26,27.

Climate change impacts forests and theircarbon sink capacity
In the face of climate change, forests show analtered capacity to serve as carbon sinks compared
to pre-industrial climate conditions. For example,
trees grow faster when “fertilized” by higher CO2
concentrations thus increasing photosystems andCO2 absorption from the atmosphere. However, thelifetime of trees may be shortened, meaning thatthe long-term sequestration effect is also affected17.
Interdependence between higher stem productivity,
faster tree turnover and shorter carbon residence
time also limits carbon storage18. “Fertilizing” by
CO2 has another limitation: there is a shortage ofphosphorus in natural ecosystems that will inhibit
tree growth despite more CO2 being available in theatmosphere19.

Potential of restoration and protection ofnatural forests as a climate solution
At the current level of CO2 atmosphericconcentrations, the fertilization effect is still giving
positive carbon uptake, so stimulating forest growth
can be considered a climate change mitigation
measure16. Reforestation, stopping deforestation,and sustainable forest management, together
with other natural climate solutions are viable andcost-effective options that could close the gap inemissions reductions required by 2030 under theParis Agreement28.

A significant intensification of the hydrological cycleof the Amazon has been seen with strongly increased
precipitation and river runoff during the wet165

Weather extremes – a “new normal” in 2019
Key new insights▪▪

Some extreme weather continues to become more likely and more severe▪▪

Increasing number of extreme events are region-specific▪▪

Europe has seen a particularly strong increase in heat extremes▪▪

The duration of extreme weather events is anticipated to increase in a 2°C world▪▪

Synchronous extremes are risky in a globally connected world▪▪

Societies often don’t have time to fully recover from extreme events before another one hits▪▪

Ambitious mitigation can curb risks but with 1.5°C warming, regionally dangerous levels will bereachedtotal annual rainfall there could fall by 15–30% in the
21st century and intensify storms3. On the other sideof the globe, in Mongolia, extremes are influenced
by the El Niño-Southern Oscillation in the Pacificas well, but here extreme precipitation has slightly
decreased between 1960–2017, while warm extremes
significantly increased, especially during the night4.
Typical characteristics of any region, however,are not necessarily set in stone. For example, the“drought in the north – floods in the south” pattern
in China, which is a natural feature that has been
observed to increase due to climate change in thepast, has shifted in recent years (more droughts inthe south, more extreme precipitation in the north),accompanied by severe economic losses5.

Record-breaking extreme weather and climate
events have continued to dominate the headlines
in 2019, drawing public attention to the role playedby anthropogenic climate change. The public
outcry has been accompanied by an increasingly
comprehensive and robust scientific literature
attributing the increase in frequency and intensity ofevents – such as unprecedented wildfires in Siberia
and the Amazon region and record monthly global
temperatures – to climate change. The impact
of such events goes beyond mere record setting
and environmental damage. The material andhuman costs are especially high when vulnerable
communities are affected.
Attribution science, estimating how much more
severe an extreme event has been due to climatechange, has come a long way in the past decade1.
Throughout 2019, scientists have sought tounderstand extreme events related to heat, drought,
floods and cascades of events. Here we explore somein more detail.

The duration of extreme events is strongly correlated
to their impact. For example, hurricane stalling(when storms grind to a slow crawl or halt), as
increasingly observed along the North American
coast, is associated with stronger rainfalls. The
cause for this particular increase, however, may lie
in natural variability6. Impactful extremes can also
be overlooked when focusing at daily mean values:
hourly rainfall extremes – typically thunderstorms– can have strong impacts, like urban flooding or
landslides. The strength of hourly rainfall extremes
has been observed to increase in Australia, lies above
the range of natural variability, and is around twice
as high as expected from scaling considerations
involving temperature rise and higher moisture
content in the air7. This is also the case for daily

Around the globe
Globally, most land regions are experiencing
increases in persistent rainfall extremes, which last
several days2. In every region, however, the situationis special. For example, while a strong influenceof El Niño conditions on torrential rainfall on thesouthern edge of the Atacama Desert has been
observed in the past, model simulations suggest
17Multi-model analyses suggest that in a 2°C world,
the duration of extremes will severely increase – forinstance, the persistence of events that are bothwarm and dry in eastern North America could
increase by 20%13. Weather extremes in the far north
could accelerate permafrost thaw14,15 and wildfires16,
causing further releases of greenhouse gases andthereby contributing to “positive” feedback loops ofglobal warming17.

rainfall extremes in the French Mediterranean: themean intensity is estimated to have increased by
22% over the 1961–2015 period, which is about one tothree times higher than what one would assume fromthermal scaling considerations8.

Persistent heatwaves
Although this year’s record-breaking heatwaves in
Europe still await full scientific analysis, it seems
clear that they came with deleterious implications
for human health. Heatwaves with a similarfrequency would have likely been around 4°C coolera century ago. Europe has seen a strong increasein heat extremes, to a larger extent than predictedby climate models. Possible reasons include soil
moisture feedbacks and jet-stream dynamics, not yet
sufficiently well represented in climate models9.

Compound, cascading, and connected
eventsIncreasingly, societies will have to adapt tocompound and cascading events18,19. Compound
events (from a combination of different climate
drivers and hazards) can amplify the risk of severe
impacts significantly20. In California, a combinationof extreme heat and dryness amplifies wildfire risk
affecting air pollution and food production: climatechange has doubled the probability of years that areboth warm and dry in the same location (relative tothe 1961–1990 baseline)21. Cascading events do notleave enough time for societies to recover before thenext event happens.

The jet stream – a fast-moving band of air 11 km up
in the atmosphere – is increasingly showing signs of
unusual behaviour, probably due to Arctic warming.
This is affecting weather in the northern hemisphere,
for example, leading to hot air from Africa reaching
France and Germany and resulting in temperatures
as high as almost 46°C in France in June 2019. The
connection between the northern ocean, sea ice,and temperatures in the Arctic10,11 has been at thecentre of a number of northern hemisphere extreme
weather events in summer 201812, like heatwaves andrainfall extremes. The associated wave pattern in theatmosphere has been occurring more often in recent
decades, but the attribution to global warming is stilla field of active research.

There is increasing scientific evidence that extreme
events – just like known, large-scale phenomena
such as the El Niño-Southern Oscillation – canbe connected across continents12. New methods
based on network analysis and advanced statisticalmethods may help in predicting these events in the
future22,23.

During summer, the polar jet stream weakens and can take on a more wave-like appearance. When the waves get stuck in place they create
significant high and low pressure centers which can cause extreme weather events. There is some evidence that climate change can impact
the shape of the jet stream and the frequency of extreme summer weather events, such as in Europe 2018 and 2019. Image courtesy: 5W
Infographics/Jen Christiansen/Scientific American 03, 201918

Looking to the future

Spotlight: Oceans

Climate change is forcing us to reconsider the notionof an extreme event. What was once considered
unlikely or rare (both in terms of the intensity andfrequency) is becoming part of a “new normal”. This
fundamental shift in our climate system has reachedlevels now being felt by societies across the globe.
Whether in the form of the hottest summer, longest
drought, or largest wildfire on record, repetitive
record breaking is becoming a feature of popular
discourse around climate change. The impactsof these extremes are furthermore being felt bysocieties in myriad forms, including increased foodprices due to crop failures, health impacts of theoutbreak of water-borne diseases or heatwaves, ordirect property damage from storms. Even whenpursuing policies that are considered to be consistent
with the 1.5°C aim, there will be increased risksof some regional extremes reaching dangerous
levels for ecosystems and societies over the coming
decades26.

Extreme heat is not just a phenomenon
experienced on land. Knowledge of ocean
heatwaves is expanding. Climate change isincreasing the severity of ocean heatwaves,with temperature anomalies of almost
7°C recorded in some places24. Since 1982,
the number of days experiencing marine
heatwaves has doubled. If global averagetemperature reaches 1.5°C, the numberof days is expected to increase by a factorof 16. This jumps to a factor of 23 for a 2°C
rise25. Today, 87% of marine heatwaves are
attributable to human-induced warming,with this ratio increasing to nearly 100%
under any global warming scenario exceeding
2°C26. Ocean heatwaves are killing coral
reefs and reducing fish harvests. Moreresearch is required to better understandthe coexistence of risk factors, such as heat,ocean acidification, and deoxygenation, inorder to devise better adaptive strategies.

19

6

Biodiversity – threatened guardian of earth’s
resilience
Key insights
▪▪
▪▪

▪▪

▪▪

Terrestrial biodiversity is suffering from climate shifts, with 14% local species loss on average
predicted already at 1–2°C warming – to more than one-third in a business-as-usual scenario
Coral reefs – marine biodiversity hotspots – are at high risk of extinction, due to ocean acidification,
warming, heatwaves, and other anthropogenic pressures. At 2°C warming, at least 99% of coral
reefs will disappear together with their ecosystem services, which sustain over 0.5 billion people atpresent
Rising water temperatures increase the risk of decreasing fish populations due to changes inmarine food webs. In freshwater ecosystems, fish die-offs may double by 2050 and increase
fourfold towards the end of the century due to extreme summer temperatures
Natural climate solutions are an essential contribution to mitigation, but nowhere near enough toensure climate stability

Terrestrial biodiversity

Climate change threatens biodiversity globally, on
land as in the ocean. At the same time, biodiversity
is a key feature of stable ecosystems, providing –among many other services to humanity – carbon
stocks and sinks (absorbing about a quarter of humanemissions) and thereby guarding the earth system’s
resilience against the disruption from anthropogenic
carbon emissions1,2,3. Therefore, it is urgent to put ahalt to ecosystem degradation.

The response of terrestrial biodiversity to climatechange will heavily depend on how soon we canhalt global warming. Even at 1–2°C global warming,
terrestrial ecosystems could lose 14% of their current
local species on average, with those species losing
35% of their suitable habitat4. For a temperature
increase beyond 3°C, entire taxonomic groups will
not be able to respond and adapt. Current business as
usual, leading us to a 4°C+ world, would result in onethird of local species disappearing, with their suitableclimate area reduced by more than half4.
Both land-use change and shifts in climate conditions
weaken the resilience of natural ecosystems
individually, but also because these pressuresinteract5. For example, the combination of land-use
change and climate change can explain more thanhalf of the observed biodiversity shifts on Mount
Kilimanjaro, while seen individually they account for
only about one-third6.
The establishment of protected areas, a common
strategy to preserve biodiversity, requires
adjustments in a changing climate, because natural
ecosystems, especially in temperate and northernhigh-latitude biomes, are expected to experience
pressures that potentially force them to migrate into
anthropogenically changed areas7. Transboundary
agreements therefore need to complement national
solutions, based on coordinated monitoring of

Average loss of local species in ecosystems on land at different
levels of global warming. Based on systematic review by Nunez etal, Climatic Change, 20194.

20

Natural climate solutions

species within an ecosystem perspective8. At thesame time, protected lands (and waters) face anuncertain future. For example, industrial-scale
resource extraction and development9 in the
United States and many Amazonian countries
has downgraded protection levels or downsized
designated areas.

The threats to biodiversity and healthy populations
are all the more alarming as these are key elements
for the earth system’s resilience – they enhance
the stability of ecosystems in the face of disruptiveor gradual changes. Ecosystems regulate the local
climate and some play host to huge carbon stocks
and sinks.

Marine and freshwater ecosystems

Natural climate solutions based on carbon storage
or stockage in forests, wetlands, and grasslands
have for some time been important in the debate
on climate mitigation15. Whilst the quantificationof their potential remains contentious16, there is
general agreement that they are an essential part of acomprehensive mitigation portfolio, highlighting thecentral role of the ecosphere within the earth system.
However, even with the highest estimates of theirpotential as carbon sinks, decarbonization of theeconomy remains an unavoidable imperative17.

Coral reefs – marine biodiversity hotspots – areparticularly vulnerable to ocean warming andacidification. Even if global warming is limited to
1.5°C, reef ecosystems are projected to decline bya further 70–90%2. At 2°C warming, coral reefs willalmost completely disappear, shrinking to around
1% of their original extent2. Marine heatwaves
trigger mass bleaching and mortality if cumulative
heat exposure exceeds the critical thresholds fordifferent groups of species10,11. Ocean acidification
is another major factor leading to coral mortality1.
The degradation of coral reefs threatens ecosystemservices that sustain the livelihoods of more than
500 million people1.
Marine heatwaves and ocean warming are also
ultimate causes of regime shifts in kelp forest
ecosystems12. Rising water temperatures will affectmarine food webs through species-specific effects onlife cycle events. Contrasting shifts in the predator
and prey populations lead to a temporal mismatchin food demand and supply, potentially causing
fish population to decline by mid-century in higher
latitudes. This effect is likely to be less pronounced in
the temperate zone13.
Rising temperatures also render freshwater
ecosystems more vulnerable to catastrophic
ecological events. Fish die-offs under summer heat
extremes may double by 2050 in temperate lakesof the northern hemisphere and increase morethan fourfold by late century, with the effect being
particularly pronounced on lower latitudes14.

21

7

Climate change threatens food security and thehealth of hundreds of millions
Key new insights▪▪

Undernutrition will be the greatest health risk of climate change with declining agricultural
productivity, particularly in drylands in Africa and high mountain regions of Asia and SouthAmerica▪▪

Increasing concentrations of CO2 will reduce the nutritional quality of most cereal crops, withhundreds of millions of people in South East Asian and sub-Saharan African countries worst
affected▪▪

The combined effects of climate change and the rise in CO2 concentrations are projected to resultin a 20% reduction in the global availability of protein by 2050▪▪

Global fish stocks are set to further decline with climate change, with an additional 10% of the
global population facing micronutrient deficiencies as a result

Climate change reduces agricultural yields

and an increased risk of obesity and diabetes; these
impacts can affect health and welfare throughout
life. Over the coming decades, these impacts could
worsen, as higher concentrations of CO2 directly
affect plants. The global availability of protein is
projected to fall by 4.1%, iron by 2.8%, and zinc by
2.5% at CO2 concentrations expected by 20504,5.
Multiple rice varieties show large declines in most B
vitamins at CO2 concentrations expected later thiscentury, but not for vitamin E6. As rice underpins
the diets of so many of the world’s poorest people in
low-income countries, this could affect the nutrient
status of 600 million people6.

Climate change is already affecting food production
by reducing agricultural yields, especially in thetropics. Already more than 820 million people haveinsufficient food2. Poorer food availability affects
human health by increasing the incidence of stunting– reduced growth and development. These are risks
that are most acute for low- and middle-income
countries dependent on rain-fed agriculture1.

Climate change reduces food’s nutritional
quality
The food security impacts of climate change go
beyond risks to food’s availability. Increasing
concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere, which
drives climate change, will also reduce the nutritional
quality of major cereal crops, exacerbating foodsecurity challenges over the coming decades.

Research indicates that by 2050, the global availabilityof protein could fall by 19.5%, iron by 14.4%, and zincby 14.6%. This accounts for the effect of increasing
concentrations of CO2 on nutrient content, as well
as reductions in productivity due to climate change,alongside projected improvements in technology,
market responses, and shifts in diets, crop production,
food prices, and income8. Other research indicates theimpact of increasing concentrations of CO2 on humannutrition would primarily affect people in South East
Asia and sub-Saharan African countries9. The publichealth intervention of providing vitamin supplements
could partly avert the disease burden. The health risks
are amplified when considering the impact of reduced
forage quality on livestock, which are already proteinstressed, with reduced weight-gain. Adaptation
responses could include enriching grassland forage
with nitrogen fertilizer or promoting nitrogen-fixing
species10.

Research indicates that undernutrition will be thegreatest health risk of increasing CO2 concentrations
and climate change1. Micronutrient deficiencies
already cause a large burden of disease globally, with
1.5 billion people deficient in iron, zinc, and othermicronutrients2; 45% of mortality in children underfive is attributable to undernutrition3.
Micronutrient deficiencies adversely affect a wide
range of health outcomes, particularly affecting
maternal and child health and with possible adverse
impacts on cognitive development, metabolism,
22

Productivity decline to hit some regions
harder than others

the century11. The strongest declines are projected
for temperate to tropical regions. Other researchwarns that 10% of people could face micronutrient
deficiencies driven by fish declines over the coming
decades. The impact of declining fisheries will
hit some places harder than others: low-latitude
nations where human nutrition is most dependent
on wild fish would see the combined consequencesof climate change, population pressure, and weakfisheries governance leading to the worst impacts onhuman health12.

While at high latitudes warmer temperatures are
improving yields in some crops, at lower latitudes
yields are declining due to the combination ofwarming and dryness, changes in precipitation
patterns, and greater frequency of extreme events,
such as floods and droughts, causing crop failure.
Droughts are the most destructive climate-related
extremes, causing more than 80% of agricultural loss
and damage across all agricultural sectors2. By 2050,
drylands in Africa and the high mountain regions ofAsia and South America could be particularly badly
affected. For example, declines in productivity of up
to 46% are projected for rangelands in western Africa
under a business-as-usual emissions scenario, with
substantial risks for 180 million people dependent
on livestock farming7. The risks to food access will
increase with additional warming: in South East Asia,
per capita crop production is projected to decline by
one-third at 1.5–2°C warming, with more substantial
reductions in yield predicted above 2°C7. Interacting
pressure for water supplies during droughts, forexample from the energy sector, could restrict
its availability for crop irrigation, highlighting theimportance of developing less water-intensive power
generation in water-stressed regions14.

Loss and damage set to worsen
Climate change also will increase loss and damage
throughout the food system, for example due tocontamination of crops before or after harvest
by moulds and fungi. The IPCC special report on“Climate Change and Land” warns that mouldrelated mycotoxins – which survive food processing
and pose a serious threat to human and livestock
health, with impacts ranging from acute poisoning
to immune deficiency and cancer – are expected
to increase with rising temperatures and increased
frequency of extreme events7. Up to three times moremycotoxin contamination of wheat is projected fornorth-west Europe in the coming decades. The healthimpacts of mycotoxins are most severe in Africa13.
To buffer the combined impacts of climate change
and rising concentrations of CO2 on food’s quality andavailability, the Food and Agriculture Organizationof the United Nations calls for increased equitable
distribution and innovation in food production,and the continued development of low-input andlow-impact aquaculture2. The challenges to publichealth due to decreased micronutrient content ofcrops could be partly addressed by plant breeding.
New interventions are needed to address declines inprotein and B vitamins.

Marine food supplies to significantly
declineClimate change is an additional pressure on alreadydeclining stocks of fish and shellfish, importantsources of human dietary protein and nutrients. A
comprehensive assessment combining climate andecosystem models found that under a business-asusual emissions scenario, the total weight of marine
animals – including fish, invertebrates, and marine
mammals – could decline by 17% by the end of

Farmers drying rice on the
ground in Sri Lanka. Photo:
Nils Kautsky/Azote

23

8

Most vulnerable and poor hardest hit by climatechangeKey new insights▪▪

Vulnerability to climate change impacts is high in countries and parts of the population with low
incomes▪▪

Failure to address and adapt to climate change will have disastrous consequences for hundreds ofmillions of people, mainly the very poorest, and will hinder development in developing countries▪▪

Failure to mitigate and adapt could push 100 million people below the poverty line by 2030▪▪

Climate change “hotspots” will push tens to hundreds of millions to migrate, mainly within borders
by 2050

Climate change strikes hardest at the poor andmarginalized. While all of us will be affected byclimate change, the poor are more vulnerable todrought, flooding1, high temperatures2, and othernatural disasters with low capacity to adapt. They arealso more vulnerable when disaster hits – they losea far greater proportion of their savings or resources
compared to the rich. Poor people also receive lesspost-disaster support from external agents and do nothave social and financial safety nets3.

stabilizing climate as well as in reducing poverty. For
instance, under scenarios with policies for inclusive
economic growth and social protection for the poor,

Poverty contributes to vulnerability but, at the sametime, vulnerability reinforces and locks people inpoverty3,4. Natural disasters drive poverty. Conservative
estimates of the average number of people pushed
into poverty each year due to flooding and drought
reach 26 million5 and this number may increase as
extreme events become more frequent and intense.
At the country level, those with low or medium-low
incomes have weaker capacity to adapt to the risksof climate change; the opposite is the case in high or
medium-high income countries6. Global exposure to
multi-sector risks (including droughts, water stress,
heat events, crop failure, etc.) approximately doubles
between a 1.5°C and 2°C global mean temperature
increase, and doubles again with a 3°C rise7. Poor
populations have been estimated to be 8–32 times
more vulnerable to these risks than those experiencing
sustainable socio-economic development. The regions
projected to be worst impacted are Asia and Africa7.
As the frequency of natural and climatic hazards
increases, escaping poverty will be particularly
difficult, even with progress on the SDGs7. Thishighlights the urgency of taking integrated action in

Maps showing multi-sector risks (at least two sectors surpassing
tolerable levels) for geographic regions at different levels of global
warming. Adapted from Byers et al, Environ. Res. Lett., 2018.7

24

climate change impacts on poverty may be mitigatedat least until 2030. However, without adaptationand management of climate change, an estimated
100 million could be pushed below the poverty line
by 20308. By 2050, lack of proper adaptation could
depress growth in agricultural yields by 30%, increase
the number of people lacking sufficient water by 1.4
billion, and force hundreds of millions from theirhomes in coastal cities9. All these impacts could leadto serious setbacks for the internationally agreed
objective of eradicating extreme poverty8.

million up to as many as 143 million people (about 2.8%of the population) may need to migrate within their own
countries by 2050 due to climate change18. The worst
effects could be avoided if concerted action is taken to
reduce emissions and support development18.
While migration is an important adaptation strategy,
displacement brings with it a myriad of social, political,
and humanitarian issues. A heavy burden is placedon receiving destinations, especially those that lack
the resources to manage large-scale displacements10.
Surrounding areas such as urban and urban fringes need
to be ready to provide infrastructure, resources, andsocial support systems for migrants. Climate change
is considered to be a threat multiplier, intensifying
existing conflict where resources are scarce19. Therefore
ways to mitigate security threats and conflicts should
be anticipated. Policymakers can prepare by ensuringflexible social protection services and including
migrants in planning and decision-making.

For vulnerable communities, an additional challenge
is forced displacement when homes become
uninhabitable or livelihoods are lost. In addition tosudden mass migration due to extreme weather
events, slower and progressive climate risks such as
drought, soil erosion, and sea-level rise are projected
to induce more migration from low-lying coastal zones,
small island developing states, and less favourable
agricultural areas over the next century. Forced
migration is expected to happen much sooner10. In
2018, weather-related disasters triggered new incountry displacements of 16.1 million people, mostly
from East Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific11.

A global Task Force on Displacement was establishedby the UN for the purpose of identifying integrated
approaches to avert, minimize, and address climaterelated displacement issues20. Legal and political
implications for in-migrants also need to be consideredas they seek to be integrated into the receiving
destinations. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly,
and Regular Migration21, formally endorsed at the
UN conference in Morocco in 2018, is an initial stepin providing protection measures for climate change
migrants.

The latest research employing more accurate coastal
elevation data, indicates that the size of the global
coastline exposed to sea-level rise is triple thanpreviously predicted12. Most at risk of inundation are
in eight Asian countries: China, Bangladesh, India,
Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, and Japan;
and larger proportions of these populations will bethreatened with displacement due to inundation12.
More people live in cities, and coastal cities are denser.

There is an urgency in immediately increasing
action on mitigation and adaptation. Low carbon
development pathways that offer co-benefits for thepoor should be prioritized. Adaptation will help avoid
larger economic losses due to recovery or rebuilding.
Effective adaptation could generate positive economic
returns between 2–10 times the investments9. A global
investment in adaptation of USD 1.8 trillion in five areasfrom 2020–2030 could generate USD 7.1 trillion in net
benefits9. Significant climate finance should be directedto adaptation in vulnerable areas and populations. There
are many adaptation measures and policy responses
that can be considered such as government funding forplanned retreat or relocation of communities to safer
ground, policies for assisting rural-urban or interisland migration, and ecosystem-based disaster risk
reduction22. Interventions should prioritize those that
suffer the most23. What is important is to ensure thatthe social and environmental benefits of adaptation willaccrue to the most vulnerable and the poorest of thepoor.

Cities are recognized as both a locus of problems anda home to positive steps to address climate change13.
Resilience planning in cities requires addressing social
equity issues, including power, politics, and justice14,15,16.
It is suggested that failure to do so is likely to lead to3 billion people, mostly in the global south, living inslums by 205013 versus about 1 billion today17. These
are communities with limited governance and unzoned
lands that are exposed to climate-related hazards suchas floods. Poor housing and basic services amplify therisks for individuals and households. Enabling thesecommunities to adapt to climate change is a priority13.
Projecting the future number of people who could be
displaced is challenging given the multiple drivers for
migration and the difficulty of disentangling motives. A
new modeling attempt focused on sub-Saharan Africa,
South Asia, and Latin America, estimates from 31
25

9Equity and equality pivotal to successful climatechange mitigation and adaptation
Key new insights▪▪

Success and failure of climate policies highlight the importance of addressing social issues▪▪

Social justice is an important factor for societal resilience in the face of climate change, vital forboth local and global cooperation to facilitate mitigation and adaptation

Achieving the Paris Goal of staying well below 2°C of
global warming requires sets of aggressive and diverse
policies. Among these, important measures are fiscal
reforms, such as removing fossil-fuel subsidies while
putting a price on carbon. Fossil-fuel subsidies, which
effectively lead to a negative carbon price, are stillcommon practice and disproportionately benefit
richer households. Fossil-fuel subsidies are estimatedto be 3.5 times larger than the financing required tomeet the SDGs for basic social protection, universal
health, and education1.

However, the success of climate policy depends
on social acceptance. A growing body of literatureshows perceived fairness, trust in the government,
policy effectiveness, and how revenues are used, tobe crucial factors for new policies to be accepted2,3,4.
Mitigation policies that are not articulated
appropriately and not accompanied by measures
for social equality could trigger events like the
Yellow Vest protests in France3,5, the recent unrest in
Ecuador that was stoked by increased oil prices (notdirectly linked to mitigation policies), or potentially

Miners and residents of the miners zone of Asturias demonstrate in Langreo, Spain, against close-downs and financial cuts in the carbon sector.
Through agreements with unions and compensation schemes, Spain have been able to shut down most coal mines. (Photo: Matthibcn)

26

Social justice and equity is not just something toconsider for mitigation policies to be effective, but
important for adaptation and building resilienceto the impacts of climate change. High inequality
has been identified as a contributing factor whenresource depletion has driven civilizations to collapse
in the past, and threatens the ability of our current
civilization to survive climate change and otherenvironmental changes9. Climate change effects onnatural hazards can increase inequality10, whereas
from a fairness perspective adaptation should reduce
it11, hence it is likely that across-the-board national
public support for adaptation may be elusive.

populist politics. Justice and fairness in mitigation
is essential to avoid “my country or my planet”
conflicts6.
Socially sensitive fiscal reforms incorporate solutions
to three key issues: the equitable distribution of
costs, avoiding carbon “leakage” to places with lax
policy, and public support. In theory, implementing
compensation measures can address a problem
with emission trading and other carbon pricing
schemes: that they are either accepted but too low
to be effective, or high enough to be effective but not
accepted by the public3.
When considering perceived fairness and efficiencyof policies, policymakers must be sensitive tothe political context they are in. For instance,
voters oriented towards the political left may bein opposition to compensation measures if they
are framed as tax cuts4, and the acceptance forcarbon taxes may be higher if revenues are used forenvironmental projects rather than compensation
schemes1,4.

Adaptation processes often become unequal
negotiations between local government andcommunities: the outcomes of those negotiations
often depend on the influence of the communities
concerned, their ability to pay12, as well as the local
government’s appetite and capacity to engage.
Social justice and equality requires the adaptation
processes to be inclusive, (not just “informed”13),
the communities concerned having agency14 andequality before the law12. A conversation on what to
do needs to start early and involve the communityfrom the beginning15, and the engagement has to be
deep and an evolving process. Measuring the successof adaptation programs should be done in the mostvulnerable part of the population, not throughaverage statistics11.

Without due consideration of social issues, rollingout low carbon urban development policies has
the potential to increase inequality7. Policymakers
should also consider intergenerational equity. Given
the high risks and large uncertainties in the climate
system response and the high costs of delaying
action, carbon prices should begin at high levels toforce strong mitigation in the near term rather thanpushing risks and costs to coming generations8.

27

10 Time may have come for social tipping points on
climate action

Time is running out. Climate reality shows it, science states it, andstudents and protesters around the globe express it with their strikes –acting now is the only possible solution to solve the climate crisis. The
Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) can only
be achieved with a worldwide transformation towards decarbonization.
This insight refers to the civil movement for urgent action that is growing
with increasing evidence of the risks involved with global climate change,
and when it can be expected to make an impact.
Key new insights▪▪

Public opinion polls indicate that an increasing number of citizens in various countries are seriously
concerned about climate change▪▪

Historic evidence shows that 21–25% of a population needed to change their behaviour to enact
significant system-level changes▪▪

Deep and long-term transformations driven by a great diversity of actors are needed to meet theParis Agreement and the SDGs▪▪

Recent massive civil protests are getting close to the thresholds where we could expect “tipping” ofsome socio-economic systems

Global emissions are still rising and the world is
not on track towards the necessary reductions. As
shown in Insight 1, drivers for reduced emissions,such as growth of renewable energy, change inpublic opinion, policy regimes, and consumer habits
are clearly not strong enough to counter drivers ofincreased emissions, even after decades of climate
awareness. Should drivers for reduced emissions
continue growing at a linear pace, it would be
impossible to stay within the carbon budgets fora likely chance of a stable climate. However, themassive civil climate-related protests we currently
observe may be bringing the world closer to expected
thresholds of “tipping” the global socio-economic
system towards a decarbonizing state1,2. Public
opinion polls indicate that an increasing number ofcitizens in various countries are seriously concerned
about climate change3.

non-linear and exponential rates. Such phenomena
can be observed in both natural and socio-economic
systems; change is rarely linear. Historical examplesof small interventions leading to large effects
include, for example, the slave trade ban that
initiated the global slavery abolition movement in
the 19th century4,5, the feminist movement that led
to women achieving voting rights in the majority ofcountries in the 20th century6, and the introductionof subsidies in the EU agricultural policy that
dramatically changed the food production system inEurope7. There are key socio-economic subsystems,
where critical interventions have the potential tolead to crossing a tipping point at which the global
socio-economic system would be decarbonizing in a
non-linear way. These interventions include revealing
moral implications of fossil fuels, divesting fossil-fuelassets, subsidizing renewable energy generation,
strengthening climate education and engagement,
and disclosing information on greenhouse gas
emissions. Activating multiple tipping interventions

Tipping-like phenomena refers to movements thatreach a point where the rate of change accelerates in28

Climate activism is a modern form of civil
engagement that mobilizes many young people inactivism, these often involve their own parents, which
in turn participate in political processes. An analysisof the Fridays for Future (FFF) movement – aninternational, non-party, independent and decentral,organized, climate-strike movement, realizing
climate change as the biggest threat to the humancivilization – states that many of the members
believe that their protests will cause change and thatchanging their own behaviour and consumption isrelevant to fight climate change10. As consumption
behaviour and households are responsible for 72%
of greenhouse gas emissions, these are in theory
important keys for reaching the Paris Agreement,
shaping future emission pathways11. However, policy
measures need to accompany behavioural change.

increases the chances to reach the goal3.
Nonetheless, social changes should be accompanied
by changed policy measures to push systemic tipping.
There are empirical examples showing that in thesocial, economic, and technology realms small sharesof population or users can change the dominantbehavioural or norm patterns. Historical studies
show that only 3.5% of the population is needed
to be engaged in nonviolent resistance, even to
topple brutal dictatorship8. In Germany, almost 1.5
million people participated in the Climate Strike on
September 20. This is only 1.9% of the population, butnever before have so many people demonstrated forbetter climate policy in this country. Research showsthat the fraction of a population needed to adopt
alternative behaviour to create system-level change
is in a range between 21% (smallest successful
minority) and 25% (the largest unsuccessful
minority)9. Studies also show that civil resistance ismore successful when using nonviolent than violent
methods8,9.

In the context of behavioural and normative change,
more research is needed on what can unleash theneeded behavioural changes and which lifestylechanges have the potential to spread exponentiallyProtesters with signs demand that action be taken to address climate change. Millions of people around the world are taking part in the
climate strikes to demand urgent action on the emergency (Photo: Rrodrickbeiler).

29

six SDG transformations are necessary to achieve
SDGs like (1) education, gender, and inequality; (2)health, well-being, and demography; (3) energy
decarbonization and sustainable industry; (4)sustainable food, land, water, and oceans; (5)sustainable cities and communities; and (6) digital
revolution for sustainable development. Eachof these six transformations describes a majorchange in the organization of societal, political, andeconomic activities that transform resource use,
institutions, technologies, and social relations toachieve key SDG outcomes15. Those transformations
are needed to reach the Paris Agreement and theSDGs – they have the ultimate goal of enhancing
human prosperity and reducing inequalities. The
expansion of sustainability science is also necessary
to guide the societal transformations that areneeded to reach the SDGs. Integrated efforts ofresearchers, decision makers, policy specialists andcivil society are required to design pathways for thetransformations that lead to Paris and the SDGs.

and at scale when supported by specific policy
measures. Changes in the social norm system should
not be underrated since they can have a strong
influence on changes in policy, law, and governance.
Environmental movements like FFF struggling to tip
the social scale towards swift and concerted climate
action, can be considered to be the consequenceof a successful climate education that has become
more present in school curriculums today than 20
years ago1,13. This illustrates that there is increasing
understanding of climate change risks in at least
some societal spheres.
Both the Paris Agreement and the UN Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) require deep and longterm transformations that involve complementaryactions by governments, business, social and naturalsciences, and civil society. Transformations are themoments in history when the meta choices – the“choices about the choices” – are made and in which
agents get involved in the collective process ofdesigning the new institutional system. However,there are also examples of social movements
initiated by supposed marginalized groups who
can have a strong voice if they act collectively13. It
is important to recognize the different dimensionsof human agency. Individuals who act only as
consumers are unlikely to change the system rules.
The recognition of the strategic and political agency
of individuals acting as citizens and membersof societal groups is necessary in a democratictransformation process13.
Solving the climate crisis can be a chance forworld leaders to join forces with citizen groups
and grassroots organizations and work together
to achieve a more just and equitable future14.
By achieving change in six key areas – energy
transformation, education, digital revolution,
sustainable food, land agriculture, and oceans – thephysical, biological, human, and managed systemsof our planet can be sustainably maintained. The

30

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36

Credits
Future Earth and The Earth League would like to thank the members of theeditorial board, the corresponding and contributing authors, reviewers, and thesecretariats for their contributions. The report was made with support fromthe Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Future Earth Health
Knowledge-Action Network, Global Carbon Project (GCP), Global Mountain
Biodiversity Assessment (GMBA) and Mountain Research Initiative (MRI).
Authors (besides those affiliated to Future Earth, The Earth League, and PIK)
and reviewers have contributed to the report in their individual capacities. Their
affiliations are only mentioned for identification purposes.

Editorial board• Prof. Dr Johan Rockström, director of the
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research,co-chair of Future Earth Advisory Committee, andco-chair of The Earth League• Prof. Joyashree Roy, Bangabandhu Chair
Professor, Asian Institute of Technology• Prof. Leena Srivastava, Deputy Director Generalfor Science at the International Institute forApplied Systems Analysis, co-chair of Future Earth
Advisory Committee, and The Earth League• Dr Josep Canadell, executive director, Global
Carbon Project• Prof. Kristie Ebi, director, Center for Health andthe Global Environment (CHanGE), Rohm & Haas
Endowed Professor in Public Health Sciences,
University of Washington• Prof. Dr Ottmar Edenhofer, director of the
Mercator Research Institute on Global Commonsand Climate Change, director of the Potsdam
Institute for Climate Impact Research, professor
at Technische Universität Berlin, and The Earth
League• Owen Gaffney, director of International media
and strategy, Stockholm Resilience Centre

Corresponding author• Dr Erik Pihl, Future EarthContributing authors• Dr Maria A. Martin, Potsdam Institute for Climate
Impact Research• Dr Davnah Payne, Global Mountain Biodiversity
Assessment (GMBA)• Dr Sebastian Sonntag, The Earth League• Prof. Simon Watts, Brighton Observatory ofEnvironment and Economics, and National
University of Singapore• Dr Carolina Adler, Mountain Research Initiative(MRI)• Dr Tanja Blome, The Earth League• Prof. Kristie Ebi, University of Washington• Dr Sophie Hebden, European Space Agency(ESA)/Future Earth• Lisa Jacobson, Future Earth• Dr Marcin P. Jarzebski, Future Earth• Claudia Köhler, Potsdam Institute for Climate
Impact Research• Dr Ria A. Lambino, Regional Centre for Future
Earth in Asia/Research Institute for Humanity &Nature37

Reviewers• Dr Michelle Lim, Adelaide Law School, Universityof Adelaide• Prof. Shaun Lovejoy, McGill University• Prof. Wolfgang Lucht, Potsdam Institute for
Climate Impact Research, Humboldt University
Berlin• Dr Pamela McElwee, Rutgers University• Dr Lisa A. Miller, Institute of Ocean Sciences at
Fisheries and Oceans Canada• Dr Mostafa M. Naser, Edith Cowan University(ECU)• Dr Karachepone N. Ninan, Centre for Economics,
Environment and Society• Dr Martin Obermaier, GOPA and ECO• Dr Yuko Ogawa Onishi, Regional Centre for
Future Earth in Asia/Research Institute for
Humanity and Nature• Dr Geir Ottersen, Institute of Marine Research (inNorway)• Dr Davnah Payne, Global Mountain Biodiversity
Assessment (GMBA)• Dr Colin Quinn, United States Agency forInternational Development (USAID)• Prof. Veerabhadran Ramanathan, University ofCalifornia at San Diego, and The Earth League• Prof. Thomas Reuter, University of Melbourne,
and World Academy of Arts and Science• Prof. Peter Schlosser, Global Futures Laboratory,
ASU, and co-chair of The Earth League• Dr. Jane Singer, Kyoto University• Prof. Kazuhiko Takeuchi, Institute for Global
Environmental Strategies, The Earth League• Dr Pedro Henrique Campello Torres, Institute ofEnergy and Environment, University of São Paulo• Dr Chadia Wannous, Towards A Safer World
Network, and Future Earth One Health project• Prof. Simon Watts, Brighton Observatory ofEnvironment and Economics, and National
University of Singapore• Dr Charlie Wilson, Tyndall Centre for Climate
Change Research• Dr Ibouraïma Yabi: LACEEDE, DGAT, and Univ. of
Abomey-Calavi• Dr Anna M. Zivian, Ocean Conservancy/Ocean
KAN Development Team• Dr Carolina Adler, Mountain Research Initiative(MRI)• Md. Arfanuzzaman, Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations• Prof. Xuemei Bai, Australian National University• Prof. Govindasamy Bala, Indian Institute of
Science• Dr Ana Bastos, Ludwig-Maximilians University• Dr Aliyu Barau, Bayero University Kano
• Dr Annette Bolton, Institute of Environmental
Science and Research Ltd (ESR)• Dr P. Ciais, Laboratoire des Sciences du Climat etde l’Environnement• Prof. Dr. Felix Creutzig, Mercator ResearchInstitute on Global Commons and Climate Change,
and Technical University Berlin• Dr Alessandra Conversi, National ResearchCouncil of Italy (CNR)• Dr Alex Godoy-Faúndez, CiSGER, Universidad delDesarrollo• Ingo Fetzer, Stockholm Resilience Centre and
Bolin Center for Climate Research• Dr Gabriel Filippelli, Indiana University• Dr Mayra E. Gavito, Universidad Nacional
Autónoma de México
• Dr Mukesh Gupta, Asian University for Women• Prof. Sir Brian Hoskins, Grantham Institute for
Climate Change, The Earth League• Dr Mercy Ijenyo, Dalhousie University• Dr Michela Izzo, Guakía Ambiente• Prof. Samuel Jaccard, University of Bern
• Prof. Daniela Jacob, Climate Service Center
Germany (GERICS), Helmholtz-Zentrum
Geesthacht, and The Earth League• Dr Joni Jupesta, Sinarmas Agribusiness and Food
• Dr Aino Kulonen, Mountain Research Initiative(MRI)• Dr Sigrid Kusch-Brandt, University of Padua• Prof. Tim Lenton, Global Systems Institute,
University of Exeter, The Earth League• Prof. Sebastian Leuzinger, Auckland University ofTechnology• Dr Brantley Liddle, Energy Studies Institute,
National University Singapore

38

GLOBALCARBON
project

Future Earth Health Knowledge-Action Network

Future Earth is governed by the International Science Council (ISC), Belmont Forum of funding
agencies, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), theUnited Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations University (UNU), theWorld Meteorological Organization, and the Science and Technology in Society (STS) forum.