DRAFT

China’s Evolving ReconnaissanceStrike Capabilities
Implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Ian Easton
February 2014

|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |Ian Easton is a Research Fellow at the Project 2049 Institute. He also recently served as avisiting fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) in Tokyo. Before his current
fellowship at the Project 2049 Institute, he spent some two years at the Center for Naval Analyses(CNA) as a China analyst. Prior to that, he consulted for a Taiwanese software company, theDefense News Asia Bureau Chief, and the Foundation on Asia-Pacific Peace Studies. Mr. Eastonholds an M.A. in China studies from National Chengchi University in Taipei, a B.A. ininternational studies from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and a certification inadvanced Mandarin Chinese. He received his formal language training at National Taiwan
Normal University’s Mandarin Training Center in Taipei, and Fudan University in Shanghai.
*** The author would like to acknowledge and thank JIIA for its generous support of thisproject. He is especially thankful for the guidance provided by Tetsuo Kotani, and in particularfor his leadership during three research trips to Yokosuka, Ishigaki and Okinawa. In addition,
the author would like to thank Toshiro Iijima, Nobuyasu Abe, Seiichiro Takagi, Kyoichi
Wakayama, Yasuyuki Ishida, Asuka Mastsumoto, and Alan Vick for their comments andsuggestions, which served to greatly improve this paper’s analysis and conclusions. Finally, theauthor is indebted to the men and women of the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Navy, theJapanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese Ministry of Defense, the Japanese Self
Defense Forces, and the Japanese Coast Guard for their invaluable insights and assistanceduring the course of this research. While they remain unnamed, their contributions to this paper
are many and much appreciated.
Cover Image: Surface-scanning radar screen [Wikimedia Commons]

About the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) is a private,nonpartisan policy think-tank in Tokyo that is focused on foreign
affairs and security issues. In addition to a wide range of research
projects, the institute promotes dialogues and joint studies with otherinstitutions and experts at home and abroad; examines Japanese
foreign policy and makes proposals to the government; anddisseminates information on international relations to the public. The
institute, together with a large network of affiliated scholars, aims toserve as an indispensable resource on international affairs in acomplex world.
About the Project 2049 Institute
The Project 2049 Institute seeks to guide decision makers toward amore secure Asia by the century’s mid-point. Located in Arlington,
Virginia, the organization fills a gap in the public policy realm throughforward-looking, region-specific research on alternative security andpolicy solutions. Its interdisciplinary approach draws on rigorous
analysis of socioeconomic, governance, military, environmental,
technological and political trends, and input from key players in theregion, with an eye toward educating
the public
and informing
policyEASTON
02.2014|2
debate.

|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |Introduction
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is investing considerable resources into a militaryarchitecture that has the potential to alter the strategic fabric of the Western Pacificregion. This includes the development of multiple redundant sensor capabilities formonitoring a vast maritime domain extending off of China’s coastline and deep into the
Pacific. China’s expanding reconnaissance infrastructure is designed to support an arrayof precision strike capabilities for targeting ships at sea, command and control nodes,
air bases, ports, and other critical facilities. The purpose of these reconnaissance-strikecapabilities is to undermine the Unites States military’s ability to project power into theregion during periods of crisis or conflict to meet its security commitments to its allies
and coalition partners.
How China’s reconnaissance-strike capabilities develop in the years ahead will be a key
determinant influencing the evolution of regional stability. Indeed, China’s ability tohold strategic assets at risk in times of conflict with conventionally armed projectiles
will challenge the security of Beijing’s maritime neighbors to a far greater degree than its
development of aircraft carriers or other traditional ship or aircraft platforms. Precision
strike assets such as modern ballistic and cruise missiles based on road mobile
launchers are exceedingly difficult to defend against and inherently destabilizing.
However, China’s weapons systems are not invulnerable to countermeasures that could
be fielded in the years ahead.
Japan is one of the countries that will be most directly impacted by China’s evolving
reconnaissance-strike capabilities. Both Tokyo and Beijing are deeply distrustful of theothers’ intentions due to a long list of historical grievances, and, more recently, the twosides have seen a sharp downturn in their relationship due to a territorial dispute in the
East China Sea. To minimize the potential for conflict erupting, it will be important forJapan and the United States to strengthen their alliance as a stabilizing force to balanceagainst China’s growing military power. Given the budgetary constraints facing theAmerican military, wise investments and a more “normal” Japanese force posture willbe essential to keep the region peaceful as China becomes more militarily capable.
This paper will examine China’s emerging reconnaissance-strike capabilities and discuss
their implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance. It will begin by describing China’s
increasing capabilities, and explain why they would be destabilizing to regional security
if left unchecked. Next, this paper will explore efforts currently underway in China toassure its capacity to acquire, track and target adversaries’ naval and air operations.
Then it will assess capability gaps in the Japanese and American militaries that create
vulnerabilities China could exploit to undermine the defensive utility of the alliance.
Finally, this paper will conclude with a brief set of recommendations on
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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |countermeasures that Tokyo and Washington could take to assure the defense of Japanin the years ahead.

China’s Reconnaissance-Strike Posture
There has been a clear trend in recent years toward an increased Chinese presence andassertiveness in its surrounding waters or “near seas.” 1 This trend reflects theculmination of numerous factors, but at its most essential level can be explained by the
evolving strategic needs of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership in Beijing. As
an unelected political organization, the CCP’s claim to legitimacy has traditionally been
based upon its delivery of economic success, its protection of China’s territorial
sovereignty, and its championship of national pride. However, for a number of years
there have been growing doubts about the CCP’s ability to maintain domestic stability, 2
and more recently observers have raised serious questions about China’s economic
health.3 These challenges appear to have driven the CCP to resort to the exploitation of
territorial sovereignty issues in the East and South China Seas to shore up its legitimacy
and bolster nationalistic sentiment.
At the same time, the CCP may be seeking to exploit maritime security issues, especiallythose in the East China Sea, as part of its Taiwan policy. Indeed, the CCP’s approach has
been centered on fostering a sense of shared external threat with the Republic of China(ROC) by conflating their respective territorial sovereignty claims. This strategy appears
to have been a key (if largely under-noticed) driver of China’s gambit in the East China
Sea.4 For this reason, the Japan-Taiwan fisheries agreement in 2013 – considered bymany as a major diplomatic achievement – demonstrated Japan’s capacity to cement an
official de-conflating of the dissimilar PRC and ROC campaigns to assert sovereignty
over the Senkaku Islands (known as Diaoyu Dao in China, and Diaoyu Tai in Taiwan).5
Beijing’s maritime political maneuvering also appears to be driven by perceptions of aU.S.-Japan security alliance that is in relative decline when compared to the ascendantcapabilities of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Though still far behind interms of naval and aircraft hardware – and critical operational software – the PLA has
an advantage that the U.S. military and the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) cannot
match: theater missiles. In recent years, the PLA’s strategic missile force, the Second
Artillery, has begun deploying “game-changing” projectile weapons that the U.S. andJapan are ill-equipped to defend against. These new weapons include the now infamous
anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) as well as growing fleets of ballistic missiles andground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) for attacking land-based targets. The Chinese
military is also investing heavily in anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) for attacking
maritime targets.
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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |However, the PLA’s strike capabilities would be of little actual utility without a robust
network of intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) assets to support them.
Much like a combat marksman relies on his telescopic lens to hit distant targets, theSecond Artillery requires ISR in order to deliver precision strikes. According to naval
experts, the Earth’s curvature limits line-of-sight ISR from China’s military aircraft tosome 150-200 nautical miles. 6 As such, the PLA has invested in large numbers ofsatellites for wide-area maritime surveillance and reconnaissance.
The PLA Navy (PLAN) has also deployed a large fleet of submarines for operations
around China’s littorals, while deploying an over-the-horizon radar system formonitoring China’s coastline and beyond. Likewise, elements of the PLA and theChinese Coast Guard have fielded a growing fleet of “tattle-tale” ships that covertly
collect intelligence while ostensibly engaged in benign activities such as fishing,environmental research, and satellite tracking. Chinese military and security officials arebolstering this network of aircraft, satellites, submarines, radars and ships withunmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) specifically designed for maritime surveillance
missions. They also appear to be developing near space vehicles for maritime ISR
collection missions.
In sum, China’s reconnaissance-strike capabilities present the U.S. and Japan with aconsiderable challenge. The PLA’s capabilities are problematic because they are
centered on offensive missiles systems optimized for large “surprise-attack” raids. 7
Because the PLA’s missile launch units have little defensive utility, they engender asense of vulnerability when not used at the opening of a conflict. During crisis situations
this has the potential to drive the PLA to maintain a more aggressive posture than mightotherwise be the case. During peacetime, the PLA’s strike capabilities also require ISR
collection efforts to “prepare the battlefield.” As a result, the PLA’s reconnaissance
operations have begun intruding into American and Japanese territorial waters. 8
Moreover, recent Chinese maritime operations have been conducted in a fashion thatsuggests the PLA seeks to intentionally heighten the possibility of unintended incidents
and regional tensions in order to extract concessions from its neighbors.9
China’s reconnaissance-strike capabilities are also potentially destabilizing to regional
security because they encourage geostrategic competition. For example, the largest of
the uninhabited Senkaku Islands, Uotsuri-shima, is capped with a hill that towers 363
meters (1190 feet) above the East China Sea. Japanese military strategists andintelligence officials worry that the PLA could invade the island in order to establish aradar station on that strategic highpoint.10 Given the elevation, a notional radar stationon the island would drastically improve the Chinese ISR “picture” of the East China Sea,
and could potentially give the PLA continuous coverage into the Philippine Sea. 11 While
this scenario seems unlikely given the high level of vigilance Japan has demonstrated in
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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |

maintaining its control over the Senkaku Islands, nations bordering the South China Sea
have not been as fortunate. Indeed, the PLA has constructed radar stations and otherelectronic intelligence collection platforms on a number of geographic features in the
Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands that both Vietnam and the Philippines claim as theirterritory.12 This has raised Chinese tensions with Hanoi and Manila, while also stoking
worries in Tokyo that Japan could be next.13

China’s Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities14
The Asia-Pacific is defined by a vast maritime expanse unlike that found anywhere elseon earth. Military operations in this environment require the delivery of rapid effects
over great distances. Such effects can only be delivered through the exploitation ofaerospace power.15 As a maritime power, the United States is poised to deliver its power
projection effects primarily from a small number of forward deployed air bases andaircraft carrier groups. However, the land territory available to the U.S. for projecting
power in the Western Pacific is limited. In contrast, China, as a continental power, ispoised to deliver its power projection effects from a large number of dispersed, landbased missile launch sites. In any conflict, it would enjoy abundant strategic depth, andoperate close to the battle space, with less vulnerable internal lines of logistics.16
Recognizing the geographic advantage it would have over the U.S. in any conflict withJapan and/or Taiwan, the PLA has prioritized the development of long-range missiles inorder to be able to strike American ships and air bases before they would be able toproject power into the region. 17 China’s precision strike capabilities are currently
centered on ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles that have ranges between 500
and 2,000 kilometers. 18 These theater missiles are loaded on transporter erector
launchers (TELs) that are highly survivable due to their mobility and ease ofconcealment. The PLA bolsters its theater missile capabilities with cruise missiles
launched from aircraft, ship and submarine platforms.
STRIKE CAPABILITIESBallistic Missiles. The PLA’s Second Artillery Force fields the world’s largest andmost capable inventory of theater ballistic missiles for delivering nuclear andconventional strikes. In recent years, the Second Artillery has deployed an increasing
number of conventionally armed ballistic missiles that have sufficient ranges to target
virtually any point on Japan. These missiles are all solid-fueled and road mobile, making
it difficult for a defender to predict when and where they will be launched. Further
advancing their lethality, significant investments have been made into improving
warhead accuracies and payloads while also developing methods to defeat ballistic

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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |missiles defenses such as the Patriot-3 (PAC-3) and Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) missileinterception systems fielded by Japan and forward deployed U.S. forces.
Initially, the only theater ballistic missile in the PLA arsenal that could reach Japan was
the medium-range Dongfeng-21C (DF-21C).
However, according to Taiwanese
intelligence officials, the Second Artillery Force has also begun deploying a new
medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), the DF-16, which is reportedly aimed at“counter-intervention” missions. According to their assessments, the DF-16 would be
primarily intended for targeting U.S. air and naval bases in Japan during a
confrontation over Taiwan. The PLA is also extending the range of its DF-11 and DF-15
short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) across from Taiwan, giving them notional
coverage of increasingly large sections of the East China Sea. Of even greater concern,
the Second Artillery began initial deployments of the DF-21D ASBM in late 2010. The
purpose of the DF-21D “carrier killer” is to threaten U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups
operating in the Western Pacific.19 It could also pose a threat to Japan’s Hyūga-class andIzumo-class helicopter carriers.20
Looking ahead, the Department of Defense’s 2013 report on China’s military powerassessed that the PLA is developing conventional intermediate-range ballistic missiles(IRBM) for near precision strike missions against targets up to 5,000 kilometers away.21
These missiles could eventually be used to threaten the U.S. territory of Guam, theMarianas Islands, Palau, Northern Australia, Alaska, and U.S. bases in the Middle Eastand the Indian Ocean. If the PLA’s conventional IRBM program is successful, it ispossible that China could develop the means to threaten Hawaii and the West Coast of
the United States with conventional intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) by
sometime in the early-to-mid 2020s.22

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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |Cruise Missiles. After decades of sustained investments in advanced cruise missile
procurement, the PLA currently fields some of the world’s most cutting-edge cruise
missile systems. China has produced large numbers of ground-launched cruise missilesthat are capable of standoff precision strikes. Having previously obtained cruise missiles
from Russia, the PLA in recent years has been acquiring considerable numbers ofdomestically built systems. These include the Second Artillery Force’s ground-launched
Changjian-10 “Long Sword” (CJ-10) land attack cruise missiles (LACM); PLAN’s
ground- and ship-launched Yingji-62 “Eagle Strike” anti-ship cruise missile; and the
PLA Air Force’s Yingji-63 and CJ-20 LACMs.
With up to 500 missiles deployed on 40-55 road-mobile, tri-canister launchers in theSecond Artillery Force, China’s strategic CJ-10 LACM may be of particular concern to
U.S. and Japanese defense planners. The CJ-10 is reported to have a stealthy design anda range of over 1,500km, giving the PLA the ability to notionally place all of Japan’s
main islands within the threat envelope of its cruise missiles. Likewise, the PLAN
operates around 100 JH-7 fighter-bombers and some 30 H-6M maritime bombers thatare armed with ASCMs. According to the Department of Defense, these could have astrike radius of over 1,500km. For its part, the PLAAF operates a small number of H-6K
bombers equipped with LACMs that have maximum strike ranges out to Guam.23
At both the tactical and strategic levels, China’s advanced cruise missiles have serious
implications for regional security in the East China Sea and beyond. Like China’s highlysuccessful ballistic missile systems, cruise missiles are technologically challenging (andexpensive) to defend against. However, unlike ballistic missiles, cruise missiles are able
to strike from any direction and fly at very low altitudes, making them even harder todetect and counter. Cruise missiles are also more accurate and inexpensive to build thanballistic missiles and, because of their relatively small size, can be launched from avariety of platforms, further adding to their stealth and agility. Like ballistic missiles,
they also represent a major proliferation risk.

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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |RECONNAISANCE CAPABILITIESThe PLA’s ability to conduct maritime strike missions is likely to be limited by the rangeof its ISR capabilities. To expand its maritime battlespace awareness, the PLA isinvesting in at least seven capabilities that could allow it to monitor activities in the East
China Sea and beyond: 1) manned aircraft platforms; 2) satellites; 3) submarines; 4)maritime surveillance ships; 5) over the horizon radars; 6) unmanned aerial vehicles;
and 7) near space flight vehicles.24
Manned Airborne Platforms. The PLAN’s naval aviation branch operates a small
number of land-based aircraft for maritime patrol. The naval variant of the Y-8 aircraft
serves as the PLANs principle maritime patrol aircraft. It carries an array of sensors for
detecting and monitoring aircraft, surface ships and submarines. 25 The newly
established Chinese Coast Guard also has a small number of aging aircraft for
conducting maritime patrol. In recent months, these aircraft have been intercepted inJapan’s Air Defense Identification Zone by Japanese F-15s operating out of Naha Air
Base in Okinawa.26 While Chinese airborne ISR platforms such as the Y-8 provide somemaritime domain awareness, they are too limited in number to provide sufficient
coverage. They are also vulnerable to mechanical failure and accident prone. 27 In a
conflict situation, it seems unlikely that they would be capable of providing actionable
ISR to theater missile launch units on a regular basis.

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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |Satellite Platforms. To make up for its airborne platform deficiencies, the PLA has
launched a large number of satellites that are capable of supporting theater missile
operations with maritime reconnaissance data. These include electro-optical (EO)
satellites for digital imagery in the visual and near infrared spectrum; synthetic apertureradar (SAR) satellites for nighttime, all-weather imagery; and electronic intelligence(ELINT) satellites for locating and identifying ships by their electronic emissions. In
2012 alone, the PLA launched 11 new remote sensing satellites. It also launched threecommunications satellites and one relay satellite for beyond visual line of sight contact
with ground stations. More recently, China launched its third series of naval ocean
surveillance system (NOSS) satellites in September 2013.28 This underscores the keyrole space-based ISR plays in supporting the PLA’s strike capabilities.29
Candidate Reconnaissance Satellites Supporting PLA Strike Operations
Name
Yaogan 9 (A,B,C)
Yaogan 10
Tian Hui 1A
Yaogan 11
Shi Jian 11-03
Shi Jian 11-02
Hai Yang 2A
Yaogan 12
Shi Yan 4
Yaogan 13
Zi Yuan 1C
Zi Yuan 3A
Feng Yun 2F
Tian Hui 1B
Yaogan 14
Yaogan 15
Shi Jian 9 (A & B)
Huan Jing 1C
Xin Yan 1
Feng Niao (1 & 1A)
Yaogan 16 (A,B,C)
Gao Fen 1
Shi Jian 11-05
Yaogan 17 (A,B,C)
Feng Yun 3C
Kuai Zhou
Yaogan 18
Yaogan 19

Launch Date
Mar. 5, 2010
Aug. 10, 2010
Aug. 24, 2010
Sep. 22, 2010
July 6, 2011
July 29, 2011
Aug. 15, 2011
Nov. 9, 2011
Nov. 20, 2011
Nov. 30, 2011
Dec. 22, 2011
Jan. 9, 2012
Jan. 13, 2012
May 6, 2012
May 10, 2012
May 29, 2012
Oct. 14, 2012
Nov. 18, 2012
Nov. 18, 2012
Nov. 18, 2012
Nov. 25,2012
Apr. 26, 2013
July 15, 2013
Sep. 1, 2013
Sep. 23, 2013
Sep. 25, 2013
Oct. 29, 2013
Nov. 20, 2013

Satellite Type
Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS)
Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery
Military mapping satellite
Electro-optical (EO) imagery
Unknown, possible early warning satellite
Unknown, possible early warning satellite
Dual-use ocean monitoring satellite
Electro-optical (EO) imagery
Earth terrain mapping satellite
Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery
EO or SAR imagery satellite
Dual-use mapping satellite
Meteorological satellite
Military mapping satellite
Electro-optical (EO) imagery
Electro-optical (EO) imagery
Unknown military payload, possible ELINT
Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery
Unknown, possible NOSS
Unknown, possible NOSS
Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS)Electro-optical (EO) imagery
Unknown, possible early warning satellite
Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS)
Meteorological satellite
Rapid reaction imagery satellite
Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery
Electro-optical (EO) imagery

Sources: Gunter’s Space Page, Space Daily, Project 2049 Institute

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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |Submarines. The PLAN has the world’s largest fleet of diesel electric submarines, anda small but growing nuclear-powered attack submarine force, giving it a potentiallypowerful underwater reconnaissance capability. With some 40 modern attack
submarines currently fielded and up to 70 expected to be in service by the end of thedecade, the PLAN’s submarine force is designed to assist in efforts to achieve sea control
around the first island chain, to include countering U.S. and Japanese intervention in a
Taiwan conflict. The PLAN also fields nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) for avariety of long-range missions, including surveillance and surface interdiction missions
carried out with ASCMs and torpedoes. It currently has two second-generation Shangclass (Type-093) SSNs in service and may add up to five third-generation Type-095
SSNs in the coming years. The PLAN also operates eight upgraded Kilo-classsubmarines that are notable for their stealth and ability to launch advanced, Russianmade ASCMs. However, it is possible that PLAN submarines would find it difficult tosafely provide actionable ISR to land-based theater missile launch units during wartime
due to Japan’s high proficiency in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations. 30
Nonetheless, PLAN affiliated researchers continue to advocate for using submarines as
ISR platforms.31

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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |Maritime Surveillance Ships. China operates at least three fleets of maritime
surveillance, or “tattle-tale” ships, which fall under the respective jurisdictions of theChinese Coast Guard, the PLAN, and the PLA General Armament Department (GAD).
These ships have had an increasing presence in Japanese territorial waters in the East
China Sea, especially since September 2012. According to Japanese Coast Guard
intelligence sources, many of these ships are ostensibly disguised as fishing trailers –albeit without key equipment such as nets or tackle. 32 In 2012, Chinese naval
surveillance ships also reportedly began conducting operations in American waters off
of Hawaii.33 While speculative, it is also possible that the GAD’s space tracking and relay
ships operate near the Reagan Test Site in the Kwajalein Atoll and Wake Island tomonitor the progress of U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) testing.34 Technical datacollected could be exploited by PLA missile designers for penetrating American andJapanese BMD systems – something that is a key Chinese research priority. 35 The
paucity of available information makes it unclear the extent to which China’s fleets ofmaritime reconnaissance ships would be able to support PLA missile strikes against
maritime targets. However, PLA affiliated writings suggest that maritime
reconnaissance ship deployments were probably the earliest means China employed for
tracking U.S. carrier groups.36

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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |Over the Horizon Radars.37 In addition to airborne, space-based, subsurface, andsurface sensors for maritime reconnaissance, over the horizon backscatter (OTH-B)
radar systems are an important element of the PLA’s extended range air and maritime
surface surveillance architecture. Managed by both PLAN and PLAAF operators, a
network of OTH radar systems enables the PLA to detect aircraft carriers, airborne
assets, and other targets operating within range of the radar systems. Because OTH-B
radars emit pulses off the ionosphere to illuminate a target from the top down, detection
ranges can extend from 1,000 to 4,000 kilometers. Sea clutter and other resolution
issues are likely to significantly degrade the effectiveness of systems. Nonetheless,military technical writings produced by both Second Artillery and PLAAF affiliatedengineers evince confidence in the utility of OTH-B for maritime early warning.38 Whileunable to provide precise targeting data to missile launch units, the PLA’s OTH-B radarsystems could enable other sensors and ISR assets to narrow their search areas, greatly
speeding up detection times.39

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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. China’s development of large numbers of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV) for military missions extending into the Western Pacificrepresents a rapidly emerging capability for conducting maritime reconnaissance.
According to Chinese officials, China plans to construct 11 UAV bases along its coastline
by 2015 for maritime monitoring missions. As part of this program, the State Oceanic
Administration (SOA) – now part of China’s coast guard – completed a trial program in2011 that used UAVs in Liaoning Province to take aerial imagery of 980 square miles ofsea area. Reportedly, the PLAAF has already begun to deploy UAVs for missions near
the East China Sea, notably to an air base near Shuimen, Fujian. Authoritative estimatesstate that the PLAAF alone had over 280 UAVs in service by early 2011. More recently,
the PLAN aviation branch began UAV flights near the Senkaku Islands in September
2013.40 According to a retired Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff Department, China
is likely to field over 1000 medium and large sized UAVs in the coming years.
Looking farther ahead, Chinese UAVs will support the expansion of the PLA’soperational envelope, pushing its reconnaissance-strike capabilities farther out into theWestern Pacific. Chinese sources note that UAVs provide the ability to engage in highaltitude long endurance patrols unmatched by manned missions whose flight times are
restricted by the limits of human endurance. A robust network of ISR mission capable
UAVs, combined with satellites, “tattletale” ships, and other assets will make it
increasingly likely that the PLA will be able to locate enemy fleets at greater distances,
and, once discovered, track them continuously. This should be of particular concern to
the U.S. Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) because
according to Chinese sources, PLA operational thinkers and scientists envision attacking
U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups with swarms of armed UAVs and theater missiles inthe event of conflict.

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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |Near Space Vehicles.41 Chinese analysts view the realm between the atmosphere andouter space – “near space” – as an area of future strategic competition.42 Near space ischaracterized in Chinese documents as the region between 20 and 100 kilometers above
the Earth’s surface. This area is generally too high for oxygen breathing aircraft, and too
low for satellites to orbit. While currently underdeveloped, the PLA Second Artillery andChina’s defense R&D community have become increasingly interested in near spacevehicles for future long-endurance reconnaissance missions. For such missions, SAR
and ELINT sensor payloads appear to be the priority. Another area of priority may be
the development of electronic warfare suites suitable for near space vehicles.
One prominent PLA affiliated engineer, Zhang Xixiang, has advocated for using nearspace vehicles deployed 60-90 kilometers in altitude over China for persistent maritime
surveillance and electronic warfare missions extending 1,000 kilometers into the East
China Sea and South China Sea.43 According to his technical research, PLA near spacevehicles could be used as electronic warfare platforms to enable attacks on U.S. aircraft
carriers with missiles and aircraft platforms. Zhang writes: “In the areas of the East Sea
and off our southeast coast, a foreign country’s aircraft carrier formations regularly
conduct activities. This has become a threat to China’s security. Near space platforms
could be deployed with the necessary electronic equipment to give us the ability tosupport missiles and aircraft during attacks on them [carrier formations].”44
Aside from using near space vehicles for maritime surveillance and electronic warfare
operations against aircraft carrier groups, he also envisions using near space platforms
for jamming land-based early warning radars. According to Zhang: “There are certain
countries that have deployed missile defense systems around our surrounding areas tointercept our missiles systems...We could use near space platforms with jamming
equipment to support [our missile attacks] by jamming enemy interceptors’ early
warning radars, tracking
radars, and terminal guidanceradars.”45This research illustrates the
dynamic nature of China’s
evolving reconnaissance-strikecapabilities, and their serious
implications for American andJapanese air and missile
defenders in the western
Pacific.
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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |Gaps and Vulnerabilities in the U.S.-Japan Alliance
The alliance that binds the United States and Japan has served as an anchor of peace
and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region for over half a century. American power
projection, enabled by bases on Japanese territory, is foundational to the efficacy of thealliance. The U.S. military has two critical platforms for power projection in the AsiaPacific. They are air bases and aircraft carriers. Each is important for a different set of
reasons, and each has its own respective set of strengths and weaknesses. U.S. Air Forceair bases – and Navy and Marine Corps air stations – have the advantage of space. In
wartime, air bases allow hundreds of heavy fighter, bomber, transport, reconnaissance,
airborne early-warning and control, and tanker aircraft to deliver high sortie rates
around the clock. However, air bases are inherently vulnerable to theater missile attacks
because their size and static nature makes them easy to target.
In contrast, aircraft carriers are far smaller, typically only supporting 44 strike aircraft,and producing 120 sorties in their twelve hours of daily operation.46 Nonetheless, U.S.
nuclear powered aircraft carriers have the advantage of mobility, making them difficult
to target and giving them a high degree of survivability. Their speed also allows them toconduct operations in a flexible manner unavailable to air bases. Aircraft carriers can go
anywhere in the world and can arrive off coastlines before adversaries know they are
there. However, when compared to air bases on land, aircraft carriers have little built inresiliency. Unlike airbase runways, which can be repaired within hours of an attack,aircraft carrier decks, once damaged, are generally unusable for at least several months.
Aircraft carriers are also more challenging to maintain during combat operations forlogistical reasons.
Recognizing the unique strengths and vulnerabilities that exist in America’s forward
deployed air bases and aircraft carriers, the PLA’s strategy is to use theater missiles
against these key pillars of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and thereby threaten Washington’sability to meet its legal commitments to regional allies and coalition partners. The PLA’s
reconnaissance capabilities are one key variable in the equation. Without accurate andtimely information on the status of U.S. air bases and the location of aircraft carriers,
the PLA would not be able to conduct effective missile raids. As such, it makes sense for
the U.S. and Japan to develop and demonstrate capabilities for waging a “blinding”
campaign against the PLA’s sensor systems, especially its space-based ISR assets.
However, the U.S. and Japan have few proven capabilities for conducting suchoperations.
To make matters worse, the U.S. and Japan have centralized their power projection
enterprise into a small number of vulnerable facilities, offering the PLA the potential toachieve out-sized strategic effects with a relatively limited number of conventionally
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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |

armed theater missiles. This is especially true if the PLA could catch the 7 th Fleet’s only
forward deployed aircraft carrier, the USS George Washington, in port or during
vulnerable periods of transit in Tokyo Bay or around Kyushu.47 However, even without
such attacks, the PLA could still be able to threaten critical naval facilities that provide
U.S. carrier strike groups with support they rely on to conduct operations. Moreover, by
threatening the small number of JSDF bases on Okinawa and Kyushu that help defend
U.S. air bases and carrier groups from air, missile, and submarine threats, the PLA
could gain a significant tactical advantage.
This situation has led Japanese strategists to worry that the PLA’s rapidly emerging
reconnaissance-strike capabilities could give China conventional strike parity in theforeseeable future, and, by so doing, undermine the U.S.-Japan alliance. Indeed, with
U.S. aircraft carriers and airbases in and around Japan so potentially vulnerable to the
PLA’s missiles, some American observers have already begun calling for a strategy to
conduct off-shore control and potentially abandon the U.S. commitment to a robust
forward deployed presence in Japan.48 Others have suggested that the U.S. should take amore conciliatory approach to China by unilaterally limiting its arms sales to security
partner nations. 49 These developments, while not reflective of official policy inWashington, have served to heighten Tokyo’s sense of a looming security crisis.

Toward a Stronger Alliance
The United States and Japan have begun to take a number of steps to adapt to therapidly changing regional security environment being driven by China’s reconnaissancestrike capabilities. On the U.S. side, the Obama Administration has pledged to rebalanceor “pivot” the resources and energies of the nation toward the Asia-Pacific, and thePentagon is developing the Air-Sea Battle concept of operations. On the Japan side,
Prime Minister Abe is working to normalize the nation’s military by pushing legislation
through the Diet that would confirm Japan’s right to collective self-defense. And boththe U.S. and Japan are engaged in an extended dialogue on their evolving roles,
missions and capabilities as alliance partners. However, these measures, whilenecessary, are not sufficient. In order to assure the long term health of the alliance –and with it regional security and prosperity – there are at least three additional steps
that decision-makers in Washington and Tokyo should consider.
I.

Base Hardening and Resiliency50

As defense budgets tighten, there will be a natural tendency to attempt to cut corners
and do more with less. One of the first targets is likely to be military facilities. Whileperhaps understandable from a narrow bureaucratic perspective, it defies logic to allow
critical bases to remain vulnerable to China’s increasingly lethal missiles. This isEASTON 02.2014| 17

|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |

especially true with the three Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) bases on or near the
East China Sea; at Naha, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru. Unlike air bases in northern Japan,
which were hardened during the Cold War to defend against a potential war with theformer Soviet Union, Tokyo has not invested adequately in protecting its bases in theSouthwest. In particular, JASDF has strikingly few hardened aircraft shelters for its
fighters at these airfields.51
U.S. bases are also vulnerable to China’s reconnaissance-strike capabilities. Most
important are the air force bases at Yokota, Kadena, and Misawa; the naval bases at
Yokosuka and Sasebo; and the Marine Corps air stations at Iwakuni and Futenma.52
These seven facilities represent the cornerstone of U.S. power projection in the AsiaPacific. They are irreplaceable. Without them, it would be highly difficult for the U.S. tofight and win a war in Asia. Although the U.S. is capable of generating and sustaining
combat power from outside Japan, the American military would be significantly lesseffective without access to these forward operating bases, and their loss could mean the
difference between victory and stalemate – or worst.

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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |Unlike the U.S. military, which enjoys some measure of operational flexibility due to its
other bases in the region, the JASDF has no choice but to operate from Japanese
territory. It is therefore difficult to understand why Tokyo would leave the vast majorityof its air combat power sitting on parking ramps in the open or in unhardened hangars.
There are only 15 shelters at the U.S. air base in Kadena (a trivial number compared tothe operational requirement), and none at the Marine Corps air stations at Futenma andIwakuni. Therefore, the JASDF would be unable to use U.S. shelters in the event ofconflict due to space limitations. To its credit, JASDF appears to have taken some initial(if inadequate) measures to harden its command and control, fuel, and munitions
depots – and appears to have deployed air and missile defense units to its three bases on
Okinawa and Kyushu. However, these bases suffer from a lack of extra runways andlimited parking ramp space; their aircraft remain profoundly exposed; and Japan’s
rapid runway repair capabilities remain uncertain at best.53 The JASDF also has yet todevelop its potential to operate effectively in a dispersed manner across the some 100
civilian airfields in Japan that have long enough runways to support fighter aircraft.54
Fortunately, there are a number of cost-effective solutions to the problems Japan andthe U.S. face. For the price of five F-35 Lightening II fighter aircraft, the JASDF and
U.S. Air Force could construct approximately 100 hardened aircraft shelters on Okinawa
and Kyushu capable of protecting up to 200 fighters.55 This would equate to spending
some 500 million dollars to protect 10 billion worth of combat assets.56 Similarly, for thecost of one littoral combat ship, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps could construct enoughshelters and hardened hangars to house a mix of 188 fighters, helicopters and tilt-rotor
aircraft. 57 Other exposed aircraft could be protected inside revetments designed tomitigate the effects of small sub-munitions and near misses. 58 These would beparticularly useful for protecting large, high-value aircraft unable to fit inside hardened
shelters.59 Revetments could also be constructed to protect living and work facilities forthe thousands of personnel that are required to keep a fighter wing operational.
Thousands of revetments could be built for the cost of a small number of theabovementioned hardened aircraft shelters. 60 Likewise, investments are needed into
redundant and deeply buried command and control centers; extra or alternate runways,
taxiways, and parking ramps; and hardened power, fuel and logistical facilities. Also
worthy of further development, electro-magnetic and visual deception techniques–
especially when combined with force dispersal–would serve to confuse target planning
officers in the PLA and degrade the terminal guidance systems on their missiles.
However, investing in hardening, dispersal, deception, and other relatively affordable
and effective defense measures is not enough. Once adequate preparation is made for all
critical platforms and personnel to survive missile raids, investments need to be madein maintaining the capacity to quickly recover from attacks and get back in the fight.61
Resiliency is about being able to thrive in a wartime environment through the
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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |

optimization of recovery speeds. When properly done, it allows forces to keep sortie
rates higher than the enemy would otherwise anticipate and catch them unprepared.
The PLA’s strategy hinges upon its ability to destroy critical facilities and force the longterm closure of bases to help it achieve air superiority. If the U.S. and Japan were able torapidly deploy military engineering teams for heavy repair missions, they could
drastically reduce the impact of missile attacks, and quickly retake and retain theinitiative. This would have the effect of undercutting the PLA’s strategy through thedisruption of its core planning assumptions, and thereby alter China’s incentives toengage in offensive operations. More importantly, investing in hardening and resiliency
would demonstrate resolve in the face of a serious adversary threat. The opposite is also
true. Failing to invest in needed defenses in the face of a clear threat risks sending themessage Japan is not fully committed to its defense and the U.S. is not fully committed
to its ally and to the region. A campaign to better safeguard bases in Japan through amix of active and passive defensive measures is therefore needed both to assuage
concerns and to help deter war.
II.

Counter Reconnaissance

Another critical, but often overlooked and underemphasized, element required forprotecting the U.S. ability to project power in the face of China’s emerging
reconnaissance-strike capabilities is counter reconnaissance. 62 It is essential that the
U.S. and Japanese militaries develop the means to wage a “blinding” campaign against
the sensor and communications networks that are foundational to PLA missile
operations. As previously discussed, the PLA’s strike capabilities would be of little actual
utility without a robust network of ISR assets to support them, much in the same waythat a combat marksman’s skills go to waste without a telescopic lens.
The Second Artillery requires ISR in order to deliver effective strikes against all of its
potential targets. Aircraft carriers at sea, and other mobile and fleeting targets are themost difficult to acquire, track, and engage in near-real time. The human software andtechnological hardware required for conducting these types of missions is exceedingly
vulnerable to disruption because the “kill-chain” requires high-levels of jointness andcomplexity. However, the PLA does appear to recognize its inherent weaknesses in thisarea, and is attempting the necessary reforms to strengthen its integration ofreconnaissance and strike capabilities.
It will likely take a minimum of several more years of maturation before the PLA
considers its C4ISR systems reliable enough for conducting near real-time attacks.
Nonetheless, the strategic importance of aircraft carriers is such that the U.S. Navy will
be reluctant to commit the “queens” of its fleet to uncertain environments. The specterof even immature ASBM capabilities could limit the role of carriers in projecting power.
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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |For this reason, there is a compelling need for developing proven capabilities forparalyzing the battle-networks enabling potential Chinese ASBM attacks.
In contrast to aircraft carriers, air bases and other static facilities critical for projecting
power are relatively easy for the PLA to strike because missile units targeting them do
not require near real-time ISR. The advent of space-based satellite constellations for
positioning, navigation and timing data could enable the PLA to conduct precisionattacks on pre-selected fixed targets with abbreviated kill-chains. Nonetheless, timely
reconnaissance is still required for assuring the effectiveness of missile raids, both
before and after attacks. PLA planners would need reconnaissance before attacks tomake sure that the desired targets, be they F-22s on the runway or Aegis ships in port,
have not moved to an alternate location. After a notional attack, PLA planners would
need reconnaissance for producing battle damage assessments and planning the next
raid. The intelligence required does not have to be near real-time, but it still has to betimely to be effective.
It will therefore be important for the U.S. and Japan to further develop a range ofcapabilities for denying the PLA access to its reconnaissance capabilities. At the low endof the spectrum, this could include special operations missions to board and detain thecrews of suspected surveillance vessels – or to attack coastal radar sites. It could also
include engaging airborne sensor platforms, land-based radars and other relatively"soft” PLA targets with electronic warfare or kinetic attacks. At the higher end of thespectrum, it would require the disabling or destruction of critical sensors onboard
Chinese reconnaissance satellites in low earth orbit. Currently the easiest way for the
U.S. and Japan to assure the incapacitation of Chinese satellites would be to engage
them directly with specially modified SM-3 missiles or some other type of interceptor.
However, the threat of producing an unacceptably high level of space debris would
argue against such attacks.
Instead, cyber operations or cruise missile attacks directed against the PLA’s network ofsatellite ground stations would be preferable. If developed, high powered laser or otherdirected energy weapons could also be employed by the U.S. and Japan for thecounterspace mission. Ultimately, the priority target for any counter reconnaissancecampaign waged against the Second Artillery would be the command and control nodes
where the PLA integrates its reconnaissance and strike capabilities. These C2 nodes arelikely to be located in remote and deeply buried bunkers. Nonetheless, they could bevulnerable to cyber attacks or physical sabotage. Preparing the battlefield to the greatest
extent possible with both digital and human agents would help. During a conflict,something as simple as sending an intelligence asset (or cruise missile) to cut shallowly
buried PLA fiber optic lines could make a significant contribution.
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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |III.

Conventional Counterstrike

Beyond base hardening and counter reconnaissance, conventional counterstrikecapabilities are essential for deterring and defeating potential PLA missile attacks.
Conventional counterstrike is ultimately what power projection is all about. While
missile defense and counter reconnaissance capabilities serve to mitigate the worst
effects of precision strikes, they are unable to respond to them in a proactive manner.
Only conventional counterstrike capabilities against Chinese command posts and TELs
would allow American and Japanese forces to quickly regain the initiative after a PLA
missile raid. In the era of missile-centric warfare, targeting the “archer” is a must.
Yet Japan has no current capabilities for striking PLA missile launch units, and the U.S.
Air Force only has two platforms with the advanced low observable (stealth) capabilities
required for penetrating China’s formidable array of air defense systems. These two
platforms are the B-2 bomber and the F-22 fighter. Unfortunately, they are each limitedin their utility when it comes to hunting mobile targets. The B-2 bomber is restricted in
the effects it can deliver because, at a total of some twenty aircraft in the entire U.S.
fleet, there are simply not enough of them to maintain sufficient presence over potential
assembly or launch sites. The Air Force does have enough F-22 fighters for relatively
large scale operations, but they are too limited in range to be able to stay over Chinese
airspace for short periods of time on each sortie. Fuel limitations drastically limit theirability to penetrate deep into Chinese airspace. They may be limited to targeting
command posts and TELs operating in coastal areas.
The U.S. Navy is potentially well positioned to contribute to the conventionalcounterstrike mission. Cruise missiles carried aboard navy submarines and aegis ships
are highly capable for precise long-range strikes, and some advanced variants are able toloiter above pre-selected areas while searching for targets. Theoretically, these could hit
transitory targets such as road-mobile TELs, especially when paired with small UAVs in“hunter-killer” teams.63 However, it is unclear how well such capabilities would perform
in denied air space characterized by interlocking adversary air defense and advanced
electronic warfare systems – especially when satellite communications links were
disrupted. 64
The Navy’s F/A-18s Super Hornets are less capable for counterstrike missions. Even
assuming that they could operate from forward positioned air stations or aircraft
carriers (not a given in the face of China’s missile threat to bases and ships) F/A-18s,
like other fourth generation fighters, would not be able to penetrate China’s air defenses
without high attrition rates until a major suppression operation had paved the way
forward, something that could take weeks (perhaps even months) for F-22s, B-2s andother platforms to fully execute. In the interim, the PLA’s missile units would likely have
EASTON 02.2014| 22

|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |launched their requisite missile raids, and PLA aircraft could have achieved air
superiority over desired airspace.

Therefore, to deter China from exploiting its reconnaissance-strike capabilities forlaunching potentially devastating attacks on Japanese and forward deployed U.S.
targets–especially against the critical bases in Misawa, Yokota, Yokosuka, Iwakuni,
Sasebo, Kadena and Futenma–military leaders in Tokyo and Washington should focus
their foremost energies on conventional counterstrike. Developing and demonstrating acredible capacity for holding the PLA’s command posts and missile launch units at risk
is critical for maintaining allied air superiority and sea control.
More broadly, conventional counterstrike will be important for keeping the PLA fromachieving long-term conventional strike parity with the U.S. in the Western Pacific.
Eventually, if the PLA’s reconnaissance-strike capabilities are not met with superior
conventional force, the U.S. and Japan will be forced to place a greater emphasis on
nuclear force – something that could spiral out of control in a conflict and lead to an
unintended nuclear war. It is therefore essential to the future peace and prosperity of
the Asia-Pacific region that smart investments are made to bolster conventionalcounterstrike capabilities in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Recognizing that the U.S. will take time to fully recover after two long wars and a greatrecession, Japan should be encouraged to do more to contribute to the conventionalcounterstrike mission. With the F-35 program now many years behind schedule, it
makes sense for Tokyo to study options for deploying conventionally armed ballistic andcruise missiles. Indeed, Japan’s civilian space program has recently developed andEASTON 02.2014| 23

|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |launched one of the world’s most advanced solid-fueled space launch vehicles. 65 If
required, these rockets could be converted into ballistic missiles for the deterrent
mission with relatively little modification. 66 Less controversial would be a Japanese
decision to partner with American companies to produce next-generation, long-range
cruise missiles. Such a program would benefit from Japan’s cutting edge aerospaceengineering capacities – and have the added benefits of increasing joint operability andbringing unit costs down.
Looking ahead, the PLA’s evolving reconnaissance-strike capabilities are going to force
some difficult choices in Tokyo and Washington. It is critical that they be made with aneye toward deterring aggression through strength. If the past shows students of militaryhistory anything, it’s that muddling through and hoping for the best in the face of an
emerging threat only serves to increase the risk of conflict. There are no easy solutions
to the challenges Japan and the U.S. face. Improving base hardening and resiliency,
counter reconnaissance, and conventional counterstrike capabilities is the place to start.

Notes
1 For example, Japan scrambled its F-15 interceptors at Naha Air Base on Okinawa in response to Chinese

intrusions into Japan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea 15 times from April
1, 2012 to June 30, 2012. During the same period of time in 2013, the number of scrambles had increased
to 69. By August 2013, Japan was scrambling its fighters on a daily basis. See Hannah Beech, “Angry
Skies: Japanese Jets Scramble as Tensions With China Escalate,” Time Magazine, September 18, 2013, at
http://world.time.com/2013/09/18/angry-skies-japanese-jets-scramble-as-tensions-with-chinaescalate/. Chinese naval activity in the East China Sea, the Philippine Sea, and the South China Sea has
also increased dramatically from 2008 to present, and further increases are expected. Interviews withJapanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) Officials in Tokyo, February and August, 2013; andinterview with Japanese Maritime Self Defense (JMSDF) officers and Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) official
in Okinawa, August, 2013.
2 For example, see Murray Scot Tanner, “It’s Not About the Economy,” New York Times, March 1, 2011, at

http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/02/28/why-is-china-nervous-about-the-arabuprisings/its-not-about-the-economy; Andrew Jacobs and Jonathan Ansfield, “Well-Oiled Security
Apparatus in China Stifles Calls for Change,” New York Times, February 28, 2011 at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/world/asia/01china.html?pagewanted=all; “Hearing andRoundtable: China’s Internal Dilemmas,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
February 25, 2011, at http://www.uscc.gov/Hearings/hearing-and-roundtable-china%E2%80%99sinternal-dilemmas.
3 Derek M. Scissors, “Should America Root for a Reforming China?” The National Interest, October 16,

2013, at http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/should-america-root-reforming-china-9241; Richard
Silk, “Chinese Consumers Step Back, Pinching Firms,” Wall Street Journal, August 22, 2013, at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324619504579028523534713550.html; and “Global
Economy: Fear of Fed and China Slowdown take a toll,” Reuters, July 14, 2013, at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/14/economy-global-weekahead-idUSL4N0FI3BN20130714.

EASTON 02.2014| 24

|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |4 See Banyan, “Seas of Trouble,” The Economist, May 18, 2013, at

http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21578106-taiwan-and-china-share-same-maritime-claims-havevery-different-interests-seas-troubles.
5 Interview with MoFA official in Tokyo, August 2013.
6 Greg Chaffin, “China’s Navy and Air Force: Advancing Capabilities and Missions–An Interview withAndrew S. Erickson,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, September 27, 2012, at
http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=276#.UkWPdj9kmUM.
7 For an excellent assessment of Chinese views on the necessity for preemption, see Roger Cliff, et al.

Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States(Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2007), pp. 31-34, accessible online at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG524.pdf.
8 Kiyoshi Takenaka, “Japan defense chief wants more surveillance in key areas east of islands,” Reuters,

September 27, 2013, at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/27/us-japan-defenceidUSBRE98Q0AT20130927; and Andrew S. Erickson, “Pentagon Report Reveals Chinese Military
Developments,” The Diplomat, May 8, 2013, at http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/08/back-on-trackpentagon-report-reveals-chinese-military-developments/.
9 See Bill Gertz, “China driving U.S. out of Asia,” Washington Times, January 22, 2014, at

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jan/22/inside-the-ring-china-trying-to-drive-us-out-ofas/; and watch “Schieffer Series: Crisis in the East China Sea: Strategic Implications of China’s Air
Defense Identification Zone,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 15, 2014, at
http://csis.org/event/schieffer-series-crisis-east-china-sea-strategic-implications-chinas-air-defenseidentificatio. For a detailed study on the issue, see Mark E. Redden and Phillip C. Saunders, “Managing
Sino-U.S. Air and Naval Interactions: Cold War Lessons and New Avenues of Approach,” China Strategic
Perspectives, No. 5, September 2012.
10 Interviews with Japanese analysts and Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials in Tokyo, July-August 2013;

and email exchange with high ranking MoD official in October 2013.
11 However, one official pointed out that such an undertaking would be a “logistical nightmare” that Japan

could easily counter. Another official pointed out that the island has little fresh water available, and whatwater is available may be poisonous to humans. Interviews with Japanese MoD and Coast Guard officials
in Tokyo and Naha, July-August 2013.
12 James C. Bussert, “Facilities in the South China Sea reflect technologies otherwise hidden,” Signal,

October 2003, at http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/80.
13 Interviews with Japanese MoD and MoFA officials in Tokyo, July-August 2013.
14 Unless otherwise noted, this section draws from Ian Easton and Randall Schriver, Assessing Japan’s

National Defense: Toward a New Security Paradigm in the Asia-Pacific (Arlington, VA: Project 2049
Institute, June 2013), accessible online at
http://project2049.net/documents/assessing_japan_national_defense_easton_schriver.pdf.
15 For more on this topic see Mark A. Stokes and Ian Easton, Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia-

Pacific Region: Implications for Stability in the Taiwan Strait and Beyond (Arlington, VA: Project 2049
Institute, May 2010), accessible online at
http://project2049.net/documents/aerospace_trends_asia_pacific_region_stokes_easton.pdf.

EASTON 02.2014| 25

|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |16 For more on the role geography plays in driving Chinese strategy, see Ian Easton, China’s Military

Strategy in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional Stability (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute,
September 2013), pp. 8-9, accessible online at
http://www.project2049.net/documents/China_Military_Strategy_Easton.pdf.
17 Ibid., p. 8.
18 Ibid., p.11.
19 Of the recent literature on the DF-21D, see Andrew S. Erickson, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile(ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories and Strategic Implications (Washington D.C.: Jamestown
Foundation, May 2013). See also Henry J. Hendrix, At What Cost a Carrier? (Washington D.C.: Center
for National Security Studies, March 2013), accessible online at
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Carrier_Hendrix_FINAL.pdf.
20 Although a number of factors could make it considerably more difficult for the PLA to acquire and track

Japanese helicopter carriers. Unlike U.S. aircraft carriers, Japanese helicopter carriers do not operate
fixed wing aircraft, so they have reduced electronic emissions signatures during air operations. This
lowers the probability that Chinese electronic intelligence (ELINT) sensors on aircraft and satellites would
be able to detect them. Likewise, Japanese helicopter carriers’ smaller wakes would also make finding andtracking them with air and space-based synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sensors more difficult; and theirsmaller radar cross sections would make detection with over the horizon backscatter (OTH-B) radars lesslikely. Nonetheless, if they were acquired and tracked, their slower speeds and relatively limited operatingareas could leave them more vulnerable to Chinese attack. For details on Japan’s newest helicopter
carrier, see Hiroshi Hiyama, “Japanese Navy Unveils Biggest Warship Since WWII,” Defense News,
August 6, 2013, at http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130806/DEFREG03/308060004/JapaneseNavy-Unveils-Biggest-Warship-Since-WWII.
21 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 (Arlington, VA:

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), p. 42, at
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf.
22 This estimate is probably somewhat overly pessimistic. While China has been able to field large

numbers of advanced SRBMs over the past decade, its production of conventional MRBMs has takenplace at a much slower pace. This calls into question China’s ability to develop and field large numbers of
IRBMs and then move on toward developing conventionally armed missiles with intercontinental ranges.
Nonetheless, defense planners are tasked with assuming the worst. Some naval planners, for example,
take it for granted that the PLA will eventually be able to hold the Third Fleet’s ships in Hawaii and San
Diego at risk with long range ballistic and cruise missiles. However, the veracity of such estimates is
unknowable at the current time.
23 However, it should be noted that due to range (fuel) limitations these bombers would not be able to fly

low radar evading flight paths on their way out past the first island chain. Only by flying high in less dense
air could they hope to get close enough to launch their LACMS on Guam. Given their large radar crosssections, these antiquated PLA bombers would be easy targets for American, Japanese and Taiwanese air
defenders long before they could get within range of Guam.
24 While beyond the scope of this study, other reconnaissance capabilities including signals and cyberintelligence operations and human intelligence operations are also major areas of focus for the PLA. For
more see Mark A. Stokes and L.C. Russell Hsiao, Countering Chinese Cyber Operations: Opportunities
and Challenges for U.S. Interests (Arlington, VA: Projeect 2049 Institute, October 2012), at
http://project2049.net/documents/countering_chinese_cyber_operations_stokes_hsiao.pdf; Mark A.
Stokes, Jenny Lin, and L.C. Russell Hsiao, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Signals Intelligence
and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, November 2011), at

EASTON 02.2014| 26

|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |http://project2049.net/documents/pla_third_department_sigint_cyber_stokes_lin_hsiao.pdf; andPeter Mattis, “The Analytic Challenge of Understanding Chinese Intelligence Services,” Studies inIntelligence, September 2012, pp. 47-57, at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-ofintelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-56-no.-3/pdfs/MattisUnderstanding%20Chinese%20Intel.pdf.
25 “Yun-8X Maritime Patrol Aircraft,” SinoDefence, February 23, 2009, at

http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/specialaircraft/y8mpa.asp.
26 Interview with Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) officers in Okinawa, August 2013.
27 Interview with JASDF officers and JCG officials in Okinawa and MoD officials in Tokyo, August 2013.
28 Gunter Dirk Krebs, “Yaogan 9, 16, 17,” Gunter’s Space Page, September 2, 2013 at

http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/yaogan-9.htm. See also, Ian Easton and Mark A. Stokes, China’s
Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Developments: Implications for U.S. Air and Naval Operations(Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, February 2011), at
http://project2049.net/documents/china_electronic_intelligence_elint_satellite_developments_easton_stokes.pdf.
29 For an excellent discussion on the subject, see Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin, “Space, China’s Tactical

Frontier,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, October 2011, pp. 733-761.

30 Interviews with multiple U.S. and Japanese naval experts in Washington and Tokyo, December 2012

and August 2013; and Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) P-3C unit in Okinawa, August
2013. For an interesting, but non authoritative, Chinese source on the subject, see Wang Yifeng and Ye

Jing, “The Sino-Japanese Submarine Incident and Our Nuclear Submarine Penetration Capability [从中日核潜艇事件看我国核潜艇的突防],” Shipborne Weapons, January 2005, pp. 27-31.
31 For example, one relatively recent PLAN affiliated study explored the effectiveness of submarine-based

radar for battlefield reconnaissance missions. See Xia Ming, “An Assessment of the Effectiveness ofSubmarine Radar Reconnaissance Equipment [潜艇雷达侦察装备效能评估],” Jianchuan Dianzi Duikang[Shipboard Electronic Countermeasures], April 2010, p. 40.
32 Interview with JCG officials in Tokyo, August 2013.
33 Andrew S. Erickson, “Pentagon Report Reveals Chinese Military Activities,” The Diplomat, May 8,

2013, at http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/08/back-on-track-pentagon-report-reveals-chinese-militarydevelopments/; and author’s interview with Japanese naval expert in Tokyo, September 2013.
34 For an excellent article on China’s fleet of potentially dual-use space tracking and maritime surveillanceships, see Andrew S. Erickson and Amy Chang, “China’s Navigation in Space,” Proceedings Magazine,
April 2012, pp. 42-47, at http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-04/chinas-navigation-space.
35 Of the many PLA research articles focused on finding ways to defeat U.S. ballistic missile defense

systems, see Zhang Changfang, et al., “Overview of America’s Ballistic Missile Defense C2BMC System
Development [美国弹道导弹防御 C2BMC 系统发展综述],” Zhuangbei Xueyuan Xuebao [Journal of theEquipment Academy], June 2012, pp. 60-63.
36 For example, see Nie Yubao, “Electronic Warfare in the Struggle against Aircraft Carrier Formations [与航空母舰编队作斗中的电子战],” Hangtian Dianzi Duikang [Aerospace Electronic Countermeasures], No.

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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |1, 1997, pp. 47-48. See also Xu Minfei, et al., “Analysis on Possible Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile and Related
Technologies that are Needed [试析弹道导弹反航母的可能性及需要解决的相关技术],” Guofang KejiCankao [National Defense Reference], December 1997, pp. 126-130.
37 Unless otherwise noted, this section draws from Military and Security Developments Involving thePeople’s Republic of China 2013 (Arlington, VA: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), p. 42 and 68, at
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf, and Mark A. Stokes and Ian Easton,
Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region: Implications for Stability in the Taiwan Strait
and Beyond (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, May 2010), pp. 19-20, at
http://project2049.net/documents/aerospace_trends_asia_pacific_region_stokes_easton.pdf.
38 See Zhang Shaolei and Su Lina, “Over-the-Horizon Radar and its Application in Reconnaissance and

Early Warning [天波超视距雷达及其在侦查预警中用],” Gaoxiao Like Yanjiu [High Efficiency Physics
Research], 2010, p. 100; and Wang Anyi and Yang Tiaomin, “Research Assessment of Sky Wave Over-theHorizon Radar Maritime Detection Effectiveness [天波超视距雷达对海探测效能评估研究],” Kongjun
Leida Xueyuan Xuebao [Journal of Air Force Radar Academy], June 2012, p. 199.
39 For an example of PLAN collaboration with the Second Artillery in this area, see Peng Ruihui, et al.,“Analysis of ESM Cueing 2D Radar Located at Different Sites [导地配置下 ESM 对 2D 雷达的引导分析],”
Xiandai Leida [Modern Radar], January 2009, p. 13.
40 Edward Wong, “Hacking U.S. Secrets, China Pushes for Drones,” New York Times, September 20,

2013, at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/21/world/asia/hacking-us-secrets-china-pushes-fordrones.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
41 Unless otherwise noted, this section draws from Mark A. Stokes and Ian Easton, Evolving Aerospace

Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region: Implications for Stability in the Taiwan Strait and Beyond(Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, May 2010), pp. 19-20, at
http://project2049.net/documents/aerospace_trends_asia_pacific_region_stokes_easton.pdf.
42 See Li Jun, et al., “Research on Information Countermeasures to Near Space Platforms [对临近空间平台的信息对抗问题研究],” Daodan Yu Hangtian Yunzai Jishu [Missiles and Space Vehicles], No. 6, 2008, p.
23.
43 Zhang Xixiang, “Electronic Warfare Payload Technologies for Near Space Platforms [临近空间平台电子战载荷技术],” Journal of the Chinese Academy of Electronics and Information Technology (CAEIT),
April 2010, pp. 113. Note that Zhang (b. 1933) is an award winning academician in China’s Academy
Engineering and a technology consultant to the 863-8 program committee. A 1955 graduate of the PLA
communications engineering academy, he is said to have had a strong influence on the PLA’s electronic
warfare community, having personally cultivated many of its core technical units.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Henry J. Hendrix, At What Cost a Carrier? (Washington D.C.: Center for New American Security,

March 2013), p. 6, at
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Carrier_Hendrix_FINAL.pdf.
47 Interview with Japanese maritime security expert in Tokyo, September 2013.

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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |48 See T.X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict,” INSS Strategic

Forum, June 2012, at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a577602.pdf.
49 For example, see Piin-Fen Kok and David J. Firestein, Threading the Needle: Proposals for U.S. andChinese Actions on Arms Sales to Taiwan (Washington D.C.: East West Institute, September 2013), at
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/s/aa6ynk4jhad2b93/TAS.pdf.
50 This section benefited greatly from a detailed briefing on the history of air base defenses presented byAlan Vick at the RAND Corporation in Arlington, VA, January 2014. It also draws from the email
exchanges that followed. The author is indebted to Alan Vick for sharing his knowledge about aircraft
shelters. He is also indebted to Stacie Pettyjohn at RAND for the thoughtful introduction.

51 Google Earth imagery taken in the 2012-2013 timeframe indicates that there are four hardened sheltersat Naha, six at Tsuiki, and four at Nyutabaru. Each shelter could protect two fighters in an emergency (orperhaps even three), but housing more than one fighter at a time inside a shelter significantly reduces
sortie generation rates and greatly increases the risk that a mechanical mishap or one “lucky shot” froman adversary ballistic or cruise missile would destroy multiple fighters.
52 However, it is important to note that not all seven bases are equally vulnerable. For example, the U.S.

Air Force took measures to significantly harden Misawa Air Base in northern Japan during the Cold War.
It has also invested in a buried (and perhaps hardened) command and control facility at Yokota Air Base.
For its part, Naval Activities Yokosuka has some underground office spaces. Presumably, the U.S. andJapanese militaries also operate hardened military facilities at undisclosed locations. Indeed, numerous
underground military facilities were constructed in the region during the Second World War, and manyare rumored to have been maintained. Nonetheless, according to private interviews, even many of thehardened U.S. bases in Japan have potentially serious gaps requiring further investment.
53 Note that all three (Naha, Tsuiki, and Nyutaburu) currently have only one runway apiece, with minimal

taxiways, parking ramp space, and hangar facilities. Naha Air Base, arguably now one of Japan’s mostimportant strategic facilities outside of Tokyo, has to share this single runway with aircraft from theMaritime Self Defense Force, the Japanese Coast Guard, and the local international airport. The latter ofwhich is responsible for more than 150 flights daily according to its Wikipedia page. See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naha_Airport. Fortunately, a second runway is planned for construction onreclaimed land. However, it is unclear whether this project (scheduled for completion around 2019) will
include an expansion of facilities for the military. Interview with JASDF and JMSDF officers at Naha Air
Base, August 2013.
54 Interview with high-ranking MoD official in Arlington, VA, January 2013.
55 This (very rough) estimate assumes an F-35 unit cost of 100 million dollars, for a total budget of 500

million dollars. If we assume that a modern hardened aircraft shelter would costs five million dollars toconstruct in Japan, than 100 could be built on this budget. However, prices vary considerably. For
example, hardened aircraft shelters reportedly cost 3.2 million dollars each for the U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers to build in South Korea in 2004. See Franklin Fisher, “New shelters promise brighter days
ahead for Osan mechanics,” Stars and Stripes, March 30, 2004, at http://www.stripes.com/news/newshelters-promise-brighter-days-ahead-for-osan-mechanics-1.18211. Inflation, local conditions, and otherfactors would increase costs in Japan. As such, five million per shelter is an optimistic estimate. A moreconservative estimate might posit costs up to ten million per shelter. Nonetheless, because they would
protect assets that are far more valuable, including fighter aircraft, pilots, and maintenance crews – andhave a deterrent value that is impossible to quantify – hardened aircraft shelters are well worth theexpense.
56 This (again, very rough) estimate assumes that a mixture of fifth generation and fourth generation

fighter aircraft would be housed inside these shelters. It further assumes that two aircraft would be placed

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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |in each shelter. The ten billion dollar estimate is reached simply by adding the approximate cost of 50 fifth
generation fighter aircraft (5 billion) to the approximate cost of 150 fourth generation fighter aircraft (5billion). The same number can be reached by taking fourth generation fighters out of the equation
altogether, and simply assuming that one fifth generation aircraft is housed inside each shelter. In any
event, the cost estimates used for fourth and fifth generation fighter aircraft are probably overly
conservative. They also fail to take into account the value of pilots, ground crews, equipment, deterrence,etc.
57 This estimate assumes a Littoral Combat Ship unit cost of $470 million dollars per ship. This notional

budget would be sufficient to purchase 94 the above mentioned five million dollar hardened aircraft
shelters. However, the sheltered aircraft number is a very rough estimate, as Navy and Marine Corps
aircraft generally have folding wings (and rotor blades) for carrier and amphibious ship operations. This
attribute could allow for placing a larger number of aircraft in shelters when compared to U.S. Air Forceaircraft. In actual practice, it would be unlikely that either the Navy or Marine Corps would consider theneed to shelter aircraft that could be deployed to mobile aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships intimes of high tension. Moreover, they might not be inclined to shelter their remaining fighters, helicoptersand tilt-rotor aircraft for three reasons: 1) most of these aircraft could be dispersed to short or semiprepared airfields; 2) shelters would create complications for tilt-rotor aircraft operations that they do not
for fighters due to space limitations; and 3) there would be institutional aversion because sheltering
would denote a defensive and static (as opposed to offensive and expeditionary) posture. Nonetheless,given the importance of air stations in Japan for supporting U.S. Navy and Marine Corps operations in theregion (and given the volume of aircraft likely to be parked at these sites in a crisis), it is important thatmeasures are taken to assure they could withstand missile attacks.
58 A revetment is a steel or reinforced concrete wall or earthen works enclosure that surrounds a parked

aircraft on three sides and is open in the front.
59 For example, the U.S. Air Force has a number of revetments at Kadena Air Base on Okinawa to protect

its large reconnaissance, AWACS, transport and aerial refueling aircraft. Interview with USAF officer at
Kadena Air Base, November 2013.
60 While cost estimates for revetments are currently unavailable, note that a relatively recent example of alarge scale revetment building project can be seen in the U.S. Air Force’s 1993 construction of 2.5 miles ofrevetments to protect army helicopters deployed to Mogadishu, Somalia. These revetments were installed
by a 19 member team, suggesting that the cost was quite low. See Ronald B. Hartzer, “Heritage to
Horizons: Commemorating 60 Years of Air Force Civil Engineering History,” Air Force Civil Engineer,Vol. 15, No. 3, 2007, p. 19, at http://www.afcec.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-120926-122.pdf.
61 For more detailed discussions and recommendations on air base hardening and resiliency, see Roger

Cliff, et al. Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for theUnited States (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2007), pp. 31-34, accessible online at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG524.pdf, p. 95-96; John
Stillion and David R. Orletsky, Airbase Vulnerability to Conventional Cruise-Missile and Ballistic-Missile
Attacks: Technology, Scenarios, and U.S. Air Force Responses (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 1999),
pp. xv-xvii, accessible online at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/1999/MR1028.pdf ; and see also
Alan Vick, Snakes in the Eagles Nest, A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases (Arlington, VA: RAND
Corporation, 1995), accessible online at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2006/MR553.pdf.
62 For more, see Jan Van Tol, et al., AirSea Battle: A Point of Departure Operational Concept(Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 2010), pp. 56-60; and Roger
Cliff, et al. Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the

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|China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities |United States (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2007), p. 107, accessible online at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG524.pdf.
63 John Reed, “Navy Partnering Tomahawks and Small Drones as Hunter-Killers,” DefenseTech, April 20,

2012, at http://defensetech.org/2012/04/20/navy-partnering-tomahawks-and-small-drones-as-hunterkillers/.
64 For an example of Chinese military technical research in these areas, see Shen Guiming, et al., “Noiseand concentrated false targets jamming effects analysis [噪声加密集假目标复合干扰效果分析],” Hangtian
Dianzi Duikang [Aerospace Electronic Countermeasures], March 2012, pp. 35-37; Chen Baoquan, et al.,“Space Electronic Attack Systems Combat Effects and Development Policy [空间电子攻击的体系作战效用
及发展对策],” Hangtian Dianzi Duikang [Aerospace Electronic Countermeasures], No. 1, 2012, pp. 11-13.
65 Interview with Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency official in Tsukuba, September 2013.
66 Interview with MoD scientist in Tokyo, August 2013; and MoD official in Tokyo, September 2013.

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