Disability & Society

ISSN: 0968-7599 (Print) 1360-0508 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cdso20

From advocacy to service provision: statetransformation and the disability rights movement
in Taiwan
Heng-hao Chang
To cite this article: Heng-hao Chang (2017) From advocacy to service provision: statetransformation and the disability rights movement in Taiwan, Disability & Society, 32:3, 308-322,
DOI: 10.1080/09687599.2017.1294050
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2017.1294050

Published online: 02 Mar 2017.

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Date: 17 April 2017, At: 23:18

Disability & Society, 2017VOL. 32, NO. 3, 308–322
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2017.1294050

From advocacy to service provision: state transformationand the disability rights movement in Taiwan
Heng-hao Chang
Department of Sociology, National Taipei University, Taipei, Taiwan

ABSTRACTThis research uses the development of the disability rights
movement in Taiwan as a case study to analyze the impact
of state transformation, in particular marketization of social
welfare policy, on the disability rights movement. First,
the institutionalization of the disability rights movement
enabled it to expand its organizational structure and become
involved in shaping policy. Secondly, when disability rights
organizations started to undertake state-funded projects,
their focus shifted from advocacy to service provision. Thirdly,
competition for limited state-funding gave the organizations
led by urban-middle class advocates a significant advantage
over small, community-based NPOs and gathered significantly
greater resources. Finally, this paper suggests that, in a context
in which the state did not provide basic social services for
its citizens with disabilities, the institutionalization of SMOs
turned advocacy groups into service providers. Although thenumber of disability civic organizations increased, the voicesof advocacy groups were weakened.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 14 April 2016
Accepted 8 February 2017
KEYWORDS

Advocacy; civil society;disability rights movement;
state transformation; social
policyPoints of interest• This article investigates the relations between disability rights organizations
and the government in Taiwan.
• The article shows that when the Taiwanese disability rights movement advocated for disability welfare, the government adopted a new policy in which it
subcontracted services for disabled citizens to disability rights organizations.
• Disability rights organizations became service providers and their focus
shifted from advocacy to service provision.
• The market mechanism put disability rights organizations in competition for
limited funding.
• The consequence of this policy resulted in unequal distribution of social services to disabled persons.
CONTACT Heng-hao Chang

henghaoc@mail.ntpu.edu.tw© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis GroupDISABILITY & SOCIETY﻿ 309

Introduction
A number of studies have addressed the connections between social policy, charity
organizations, and the disability rights movement from a comparative perspective.
This research uses the disability rights movement in Taiwan as a case to analyze
the impact of state transformation on an advocacy movement. In the course of thecountry’s democratic transition from 1986 to 2000, the government gave funding
to many disability rights social advocacy groups to provide services to disabled
people. This funding transformed many disability social movement organizations
into service-oriented, philanthropic non-profit organizations (NPOs).1 The possibility of disabled citizens gaining rights equal to those of able-bodied citizens
thus has become dependent on a quasi-market system in which advocacy groups
and NPOs compete for limited state funding and charitable donations. In a sense,groups once engaged in advocacy have become subcontractors to the state under
new welfare policies. Under this marketized system, urban, middle-class families
have the greatest access to social services, worsening the disparity between socioeconomic classes.

Literature review
Social movement research shows that external resources and institutional structure
reshape organizational structure and tactics of social movement organizations.
Classic resource mobilization theory states that the emergence of new resources
supports mobilization through the social movement sector (McCarthy and Zald
1987). In particular, when the welfare budget expands in the public sector, thegovernment generally offers social movement organizations the opportunity
to receive funding to expand their organizations’ services (McCarthy and Zald
1987; McCarthy, Britt, and Wolfson 1991). While government funding provides anopportunity to expand an organization’s reach, it also transforms the organization.
Piven and Cloward (1979) point out that when an elite group leads the processof institutionalization, organizations typically become less radical and the social
movement goes into decline. Skocpol (2003) also shows that changes in government regulations, class structure, and professionalization and the emergence of
new media since the 1960s have transformed many US national social movement
organizations into interest groups that rely on a large professional staff to conduct
fundraising, media relations, and lobbying. Civil organizations, Skocpol argues,
advocate ‘for’ the people, but not ‘from’ the people, leading to ‘diminished democracy.’ Jenkins and Eckert (1986) do not believe that professionalization necessarily
results in either the development or the decline of a movement; they argue thata professional elite channels communications between social movement organizations and the state.
Studies of disability rights movements in democratic countries other than
Taiwan have addressed the movements’ relationships to welfare resources. Priestley310 ﻿H.-H CHANG(1999) argues that the market-oriented community care system in the United
Kingdom has reshaped the organizational goals and organizational autonomy ofdisabled people’s organizations. In a study focused in Northern Ireland, Acheson
and Williamson (2001, 100) argue that ‘for disabled people, welfare structures areboth a source of their dependence while at the same time offering one of the
few potential routes to activism.’ In other words, disability advocacy groups need
governmental resources, but relying on government funding can weaken their
voices. Thus, relations between government and charity organizations have been
a central concern for the disabled people’s movement. Shakespeare (2006) findsthat disabled people’s movements criticize the discourse of charity even as they
rely on charitable organizations’ services. Thus, Shakespeare calls for a change inthe traditional ideology of charity needs and for the disabled people’s movement
to maintain relations with charity organizations. Oliver (2009) points out that theeffective incorporation of disability rights organizations into the state and over-reliance on big charity organizations to speak for disabled people will weaken the
disabled people movement and reshape its agenda.
Resource mobilization theories suggest that welfare resources impose costs
even as they provide significant resources. It is difficult to refuse the resources they
provide, but institutionalization compromises social movements. Charity resources
might play similar contradictory roles for disability rights’ organizations. The relationship between welfare resources and charity organizations is thus an area worthy of investigation. Studies on welfare resources to date have not addressed how
the welfare resources distributed through NPOs influence social movements.
Many scholars recognize the danger of marketization of civil society. They callfor accountability and transparency among civic organizations (Ku 2000; Kuan, Kao,and Pelchat 2003). They also point out that ‘consumers’ – those who need social
welfare – do not have much autonomy to choose services. Their voices have beenchanneled through the advocacy groups that set up welfare regulations. Wang
and Chang’s (2000) study of child care service found that the private managementof the public facilities system does not promote diverse welfare services. Instead,service providers aim to fulfill the needs of the ‘majority’ in order to maximize
their ‘profit.’ Consequently, this system reproduces unequal distribution of welfare
resources.
This research investigates research questions about welfare resources, charity
organizations, and the disability rights movement in relation to Taiwan. Since the1980s, parents’ organizations and charity organizations have promoted disability
rights in the country. This research will discuss how the new government policy
known as ‘private management of public facilities’ (公辦民營Gong-ban-ming-ying)is likely to transform disability rights organizations in Taiwan; the impact of the
new welfare sources on the disability rights movement; and the consequence ofthe private management of public facilities in terms of the distribution of disability
welfare in Taiwan.

DISABILITY & SOCIETY﻿ 311

Context: democratic transition and state–society relations in Taiwan
From 1986 to 2000, Taiwan transformed from an authoritarian developmental
state to a liberal democratic state. Research shows that burgeoning civic organizations had significant influence on the progress welfare policies. For example,
Wong (2004) suggests that the democratic transition provided a space for thesocial movement sector to promote welfare policies. Through media advocacy
and strategic alliances with factions in different parties, social welfare movement
activists pushed the state to define welfare policies and passed the well-regarded
National Health Insurance in Taiwan. Thus, the developmental state was not weakened, but strengthened.
Many studies have also highlighted the burgeoning of civic organizations after
martial law was lifted (Hsiao 1996; Ku 1999, 2003; Kuan, Kao, and Pelchat 2003).
According to governmental registration records, 65% of the 3014 foundations
and 29,496 associations operating in Taiwan in 2002 were established after 1987
(Kuan, Kao, and Pelchat 2003). Instead of directly challenging the state by pressing
for democracy, civic associations started to play multiple roles, including fulfillingcheck-and-balance advisory functions in government, channeling society’s voice tothe state, and providing direct services (Ku 1999, 2003). Many disability rights advocacy groups at this time attempted to build coalitions at the national level and ally
themselves with other civic organizations. The League of Welfare Organizations forthe Disabled and the Parents’ Association for Persons with Intellectual Disabilities(PAPID) exemplify this trend (Chang 2007). However, National Health Insurance
might be an exceptional result of democratic transition. Other social welfare movements have not had the success of the Alliance for National Health Insurance thatdrove its adoption. The labor movement and environmental movement, for example, have not succeeded in many of their agendas, although some activists wererecruited into the new government.
Under a liberal regime, multiple social forces have the ability to influence thestate policy; democratization weakened the autonomy of the state (Ho 2005a,
2005b). Further, as Beckett (2006) argues, disability rights movements are different
from identity-based and cultural-based social movements, because organizations
also advocate for the distribution and discourse of rights and citizenship to thepeople it serves. Taiwan’s disabled people’s movement began to develop in 2004
(Chang 2015). Therefore, the identity politics issue in post-industrial society was
not a significant issue in Taiwan during the transformation of the state.
In a liberal democratic system, most civic organizations cannot be completely
detached from the state. Social issues need to be addressed through public policy,
which in turn has an impact on the values, organizational structures, and functionsof civic organizations, whether directly or indirectly. While Taiwan implemented
many liberal social welfare policies during the transition to democracy, it did so by
incorporating private management of public facilities into Taiwanese civic society.
Private management of public facilities is a governmental policy of outsourcing

312 ﻿H.-H CHANG

management of public programs to the private sector. In the case of a social welfare program, it refers to the state providing funding or facilities to NPOs thatthen manage and deliver social services (Liu 2000; Wang 2005). Taiwan’s social
welfare policy formed from a specific welfare model. It is similar to what Garon(1998) observed in Japan, where the government incorporated activists and civicorganizations in order to reduce the welfare burden of the state. In Taiwan, civicorganizations advocated for social rights for citizens but distrusted whether thestate would implement those rights efficiently. The state was unwilling to commit
to protecting its marginalized populations and had no fiscal budget set aside fora universal welfare program.
In the context where the government was not willing to expand its bureaucratic
body and civic organizations needed more resources to maintain their organization, Taiwan implemented the ‘private management of public facilities’ policy, inwhich the state contracted individual civic organizations to deliver social services.
This policy established a symbiotic relationship between state and civic organizations. Representatives of civic alliances held positions on governmental advisorycommittees and the government released social welfare funding to individual service-oriented NPOs. Individual civic organizations thus had to compete for financial support from the state to provide social services. At the same time, the state
gained power from civic service organizations by funding them. Marketization ofcare service has expanded state control over social services, rather than decreasing its intervention as reformers might have imagined (Wang 2005). This article
explores how disability rights organizations developed under the new policy andstate–society relationship.

Method and data
This study takes a realist approach to address the development of disability rights
organizations in Taiwan and to examine the impact of private management of the
public facilities policy on disability rights organizations and the disability rights
movement. I focus on two of the most influential disability rights social movement
organizations in Taiwan: PAPID and the League of Welfare Organizations for the
Disabled. PAPID is an umbrella association for 37 local parents’ associations and
12 associated foundations that provide direct services and are run by parents.
The League of Welfare Organizations for the Disabled is the major cross-disability
umbrella association for more than 100 disability-related civic associations.
Sources of data used in this research include secondary materials, participant
observation, and interviews conducted between 2003 and 2007. I collected andreviewed governmental documents on disability welfare, newsletters, and magazines from various disability rights advocacy organizations. I interviewed 38 disability rights activists (including leaders, staff, and participants in both advocacy
organizations and service providing organizations) selected through snowball
sampling.

DISABILITY & SOCIETY﻿ 313

Findings
Civic organizations in a quasi-service market
The private management of public facilities policy was first introduced in Taipei in1994 and quickly adopted nationally. With support from civic organization advocates and government officials, the policy became widely adopted nationallyafter 1997 (Huang 2000). Implementation of this policy immediately created aquasi-service market for civic organizations, particularly the newly emerging service-oriented NPOs. Under this system, civic organizations and NPOs competed forlimited state funding. The state established a set of regulations to determine whichorganizations would win its social welfare contracts. Thus, service NPOs became
subcontractors to the state. The people who would actually use the social welfare
program had little opportunity to articulate their needs with respect to the quality
and type of service the government made available. In addition, because statefunding was limited, NPOs had to find private funding and organize volunteers tomanage social services and facilities. NPOs therefore competed for state fundingon their ability to obtain private donations as well as on the state’s assessmentof the quality of services they could provide. Competing for charitable resources
became one of the main tasks of service-oriented NPOs. The service-NPO sector
expanded quickly between 1998 and 2007, generating significant competition
for limited charitable funds.
Most of the staff members I interviewed at civic organizations, including thoseat advocacy civic organizations and service NPOs, referenced the difficulty of competing for donations. Even volunteers were cognizant of the problem. For example,
one volunteer at a disability rights organization said:
It is very difficult to raise funds for our organizations these days. This is not only a resultof the economic downturn. There are simply too many charity NPOs these days. Last
week, we held a fundraising festival in Sun Yen-sen Memorial Park. A park regular toldme, ‘It is not that I do not want to support your organization. There are simply too many
events here. Volunteers approach me every week asking me to donate money or buy
some produce from their shelter workshop. I simply do not have enough money to contribute anymore.’ I was speechless and had no idea what to say to her. (Interview #38, 12
August 2003)

Many NPOs turn to public relations campaigns in their competition for donations.
Some have started advertising their services in the media in order to compete fordonations. Large, professional, service-oriented NPOs have public relations departments and invite celebrities to represent their organizations. Charity events such asconcerts and festivals have become routine for many big NPOs. NPO staff members
agree that advertising is a necessary evil if their organizations are to survive, but,they say, they are in danger of becoming little more than fundraising machines.
The NPOs that receive state funds to operate a social welfare program may actually struggle because of winning the state’s contract. These contracts demand more

314

 ﻿H.-H CHANG

services than they pay for. One staff member of the Yu-chen Foundation expressed
relief that his organization had not won a social welfare project in Taipei City:
We did not get this project this time. I am not sure if I should feel good or bad. I feel bad
because we did not get the project. It means that our proposal was not good enoughand we lost the chance to serve the needy. However, I also feel a lot of relief, because
if we got the project, we would have to find more funding to cover the costs. I am notquite sure that we can handle it any more. (Interview #3, 28 April 2003)

This individual’s statement suggests the dilemma that disability rights civic organizations and NPOs face. While NPOs may pursue government contracts as a way toprovide better social services, they might not have enough financial resources toprovide these services as they intended. Yeh (2005) notes that fundraising became
the priority of youth welfare NPOs in Taiwan and that people who work in theseorganizations express concern over the conflict between fundraising and clientinterests.
From advocacy to service provision
The policy providing for private management of public facilities also indirectly
puts pressure on advocacy civic organizations to become service NPOs. This isevidenced in the history of disability civic organizations. Before 1992, local parents’organizations and the first national parents’ association, Hsin-lu, provided both
advocacy and services to disabled people and their families. The disability rights
movement at the time advocated for governmental support for disability-relatedsocial services and government regulation of private care institutions. Disability
civic organizations might receive some funding from the government, but theymostly relied on fundraising to maintain their organizations. In 1992, the Hsin-lu
Foundation split and became a service-oriented NPO providing professional
service to disabled people. PAPID was then founded as a membership-based advocacy organization aimed at policy research, lobbying, and holding the government
accountable for its actions.
The city of Taipei’s introduction of guidelines for private management of public
facilities in Taipei in 1994 created new opportunities for civic organizations to professionalize and provide direct services. This also transformed people’s perceptionsof welfare programs and NPOs. One activist recalls:
We soon realized that the members of PAPID had started to demand direct service
from civic organizations. We used to represent the needy groups in their demands fora governmental welfare program. But when more and more civic organizations started
to carry governmental social projects and resources became limited, members wanted
to see the ‘meat’ [meaning value] from the organizations. The pre-existing service civicorganizations simply could not serve all the needs of the population. (Interview #8, 5
May 2003)

Many local chapters of PAPID started to help local organizations establish
foundations to provide direct social services. Some of the early groups started by

DISABILITY & SOCIETY﻿ 315

parents or parents’ associations include Yu-chen (育成) social welfare foundation in
Taipei (started in 1995), Xi-han-er (喜憨兒) social welfare foundation in Kaohsiungcity (started in 1995), and the Mu-xin (牧心) Developmental Center in Tai-tong(started in 1997). Xin-Xin-Er (星星兒) focused on autism (started in 1999). Many
more foundations followed.
The establishment of so many organizations made it seem as though the state
was releasing resources and nurturing a vibrant civil society. However, the statetransferred the responsibility of providing services to the NPOs. Because it failed
to fully fund these services, this nurturing was attenuated at best. One staff member working for a service non-governmental organization recounted that she hadargued at a public hearing: ‘We [civic organizations] have to perform multiple
functions: raising charity funds, providing services, and at the same time dealing
with state regulations’ (Interview #8, 5 May 2003).
Many studies have shown that when civic organizations and NPOs started towork with the state they faced dilemmas as to whether they should directly engage
in social service and governmental policy implementation or continue in theiradvocacy role (Ku 2000; Liu 2000; Wang 2000). Although PAPID survived as anumbrella advocacy non-governmental organization, many of its local chapters nolonger functioned as advocacy groups. Rather, local civic organizations spent moretime and energy carrying out governmental social service projects. One member
remembers it became less likely that members of the organization would participate in advocacy activities (Interview #6, 5 May 2003). Another active member
expressed concern that the local organization would give up its advocacy role tofocus on managing a small-scale care center after it won a government contract(Interview #33, 9 August 2003).
The private management of public facilities policy weakened the advocacy
activity of civic organizations. Many NPOs emerged to carry out partially funded
governmental welfare projects. Both the number of individuals committed to civicorganizations and the number of civic organizations increased, but each member
had a more superficial commitment to the organizations and therefore a decreased
willingness to participate in advocacy. Such organizations began to consist of what
Pekkanen (2004) terms ‘members without advocates.’ In Skocpal’s (2003) words,
this change results in ‘diminished democracy.’
Distributive injustice in the social welfare program
When civic organizations and NPOs compete for state-funded programs, theyusually have to find other sources of funding in order to maintain their professionalism and improve their quality of service. The market mechanism pushes
NPOs to ‘maximize’ their ‘profits.’ Accordingly, competition to provide services atthe lowest possible cost should decrease quality of service. However, NPOs are notprofit-seeking organizations. Their ‘consumers’ have little choice in selecting their‘product’ – the social welfare program. As advocacy groups became ‘managers’ of316 ﻿H.-H CHANG

social services, the allocation of charity funds and distribution of welfare services
became uneven.
Disability rights activists have to deal with ambiguous boundaries between
non-profit principles and the profit-making ideology of the market. They do not
engage in profit-making, but competing for resources from the government has
some similar features. In one case, a well-known welfare NPO contracted with a
private public relations firm in order to publicize itself and raise charitable funds.
The private company received half of the funds raised as a commission. The public
relations firm utilized many resources and funds for advertising on television andother public media and invited well-known celebrities to represent the NPO. The
NPO became well known and received a huge amount of donations. The private
public relations company also gained significant profit.
Other NPOs criticized the NPO that had contracted with the public relations
firm, arguing that it had betrayed its donors by giving half of the funds to theprivate company. The NPO argued that it had made the best choice and obtained
money that would allow it to provide better services. In fact, many large NPOs
cooperate with the private sector and celebrity spokespeople in a similar manner,
although the profit-sharing approach taken in this case was unusual. One activist
who worked for a similar large NPO told me: ‘I really think that it is unethical tohire a private company to publicize our organization, but every NPO is doing it.
We have no other choice’ (Interview #27, 30 July 2003). The market had clearly
invaded the civil society sector.
In establishing the policy of private management of public facilities, the government set up scales to measure the level of disability and socioeconomic backgrounds of people who would need the services the NPOs provided. If NPOs
targeted ‘the easier-to-serve disabled population,’ they could show better ‘outcomes’ to the public, which meant more ‘profit.’ One staff member working in an
advocacy organization points out the inherent injustice in this approach:You know, these days, NPOs are competing to serve fewer disabled people, because you
can get better results. In contrast, NPOs are less willing to serve severely disabled populations because it takes more resources. A lot of the time, people with severe disabilities
do not make much progress in a short period of time. You just do not get much reward.
It is not only that people want to mentally feel like they are helping someone to makeprogress. Charity donors want to see results as well. (Interview #9, 12 May 2003)

Most interviewees in this study understood that NPOs were designed to help
disabled people regardless of their socioeconomic background or the variety ofresources they might need. Representatives and members of NPOs constantly
expressed anxiety regarding their desire to serve as many people as possible while
ensuring that they could compete with other NPOs. Sun (2004) notes that underthe marketized system, service NPOs are more likely to target ‘consumers’ fromupper middle-class families when they deliver state-sponsored social services
because these families are more likely to bring charitable donations. A long-term
activist sighed and told me: ‘If the system turns out that rich parents raised a huge

DISABILITY & SOCIETY﻿ 317

amount of charity funding and mostly used it for their own intellectually disabledchildren, that is not what we want’ (Interview #28, 30 July 2003). Many said that
civic organizations had ‘a long road to go’ before they would be able to provide
services in accord with the needs of various disabled populations. When they could
not serve everybody, they favored the wealthier segment of the population.
This market mechanism also worsens, or at least does not improve, the gap
between urban and rural social welfare programs. When the national advocacy
association, PAPID, was founded in 1992, its mission was to bridge the gap insocial welfare services in different regions. For example, in Taipei City, a variety of
programs and disability pensions were available, while many rural areas still lacked
even a budget to build ramps for wheelchair access to buildings. Advocates callthis condition ‘one country, two systems,’ emphasizing the discrepancy in welfare
systems operating in urban and rural areas within Taiwan. As the social welfare
service market formed, small NPOs in rural areas were unable to compete withlarge NPOs in urban areas. One NPO manager at a small NPO pointed out:
We simply do not have the energy or ability to compete with these well-known foundations. They have all the media attention, government funding, and private donations.
They even decide whom they would like to serve. We are taking care of those severely
disabled people who were abandoned by these well-known foundations. (Personal conversation, 23 August 2003)

Although his claims require more systematic study, they do suggest that market mechanisms marginalized small NPOs. Another manager of a rural instituteexpressed his frustration:
I know that PAPID advocates the well-being of disabled people. However, PAPID has tobe held responsible for the marginalization of our institute. PAPID advocates and asks
the government to set up regulations and standards in order to ensure the quality ofsocial welfare services. However, the government did not provide corresponding funding. We are trying our best to serve the needy population. How can they ask for highquality service, but not give money? Only rich foundations in urban areas can satisfy
those regulations. We can only try our best and hope that the government won’t be too
picky. (Personal conversation, 25 August 2003)

Even those working in well-funded foundations recognize the uneven distributionof welfare resources and over-reliance on volunteerism among small NPOs operating under insufficient funding. A member of a well-known foundation expressed
as much when he said:
We [four foundations] were called the ‘four major gangs’ [四大寇Si-Da-Kou], because wecontracted the most governmental welfare projects. It was not like we really wanted to
be in charge of every project, but you need to reach a certain level of professionalism inorder to provide good quality services. We actually worked very hard and tried to covera wide range of needy populations. However, the overall problem is that the government does not provide sufficient resources and at the same time sets up a high standardof regulations. As a result, the big charity foundations worked very hard to get private
donations and small NPOs simply could not survive or had to operate on the edge of thelaw. (Interview #27, 26 June 2003)

318 ﻿H.-H CHANG

Those working in well-funded foundations even recognize that the policy has
resulted in uneven distribution of welfare resources and too much reliance on
volunteerism among small NPOs operating under insufficient funding. Charity
civic organizations such as the United Way in Taiwan (聯合勸募 Lian-he-quan-mu)
can do little to offset the inherent inequalities in the system. One United Way representative said: ‘What we can do is very limited. We do not have many resources
at all and there are so many demands from different civic associations. All we cando is selectively support some organizations’ (Interview #35, 13 August 2003).
Decentralization of the state further worsened the unequal distribution of social
welfare nationwide. In 2000, as a result of the restructuring of the administrative
system, local governments became responsible for their own disability welfare
budgets. Chou and Kroger (2004) show that although the social protection law
passed on a national level, in most parts of the country the local governments
were reluctant to execute social policy for their disabled and elderly populations.
In practice, ‘community care’ continued to mean family home care with almost no
public or governmental support. In many cases, local governments simply ignored
welfare services when planning their budgets. Total government spending on
welfare actually decreased and was unequally distributed after the new policy
came into effect (Chou, Wang, and Lin 2005; Lin 2000; PAPID 2001).
This had an impact on the disability rights movement’s tactics. Lin Hui-fang,
the secretary-general of PAPID, explained:
After the decentralization policy, we had to redirect our organizational strategy. The
battlefield was at the national level before. Under the new policy, we have to empower
local parents’ associations to keep a close eye on the local budget and policy implementation. However, in practice, it is a very difficult task, partly because local parents’ associations usually do not have enough resources to engage in the policy-making process.
(Interview #6, 5 May 2003)

Local PAPID leaders noted how much more difficult it was for parents’ associations in rural counties (such as Tainan and Kaohsiung) to establish foundations inorder to provide services. Only urban parents’ associations had the resources to
do so. An evaluation conducted by PAPID also suggests that institutes in urban
and wealthy counties provide services of a much higher quality than those inrural areas.
In short, the marketization of social welfare projects and the decentralizationof the government put the responsibility for creating an enabling environment
on local civic organizations and governments. While the resources in different
regimes have varied, the distributive justice of the welfare program has become
questionable. Disability NPOs are incentivized to target urban, middle-class, disabled people who need less support. In urban areas, NPOs are able to get moreresources and find more people to serve, while middle-class families bring moreresources to civic organizations. Serving people with less need for institutional
support makes it possible for NPOs to present their services as more effective. It

DISABILITY & SOCIETY﻿ 319

allows them to present inflated outcomes to the government, the public, and the
media, which puts them in a better position to solicit donations.

Conclusion
How does welfare resource expansion in Taiwan affect social movements? This
article examines the private management of public facilities and its impact on the
disability rights movement in Taiwan. Classic resource mobilization theory suggests that new resources support the development of social movements (Acheson
and Williamson 2001; McCarthy and Zald 1987). In addition, marketed-oriented
policy transforms social movement organizations’ missions (Priestley 1999). This
article shows that the introduction of private management of public facilities policy resulted in increasing numbers of NPOs. However, the policy also created aquasi-market for service NPOs in which civic organizations gained resources fromthe state to carry out welfare projects. Civic organizations had to compete with eachanother in order to receive government funding and societal recognition. In thisprocess, a market ideology gradually penetrated into the civic organization sector.
Many social movement organizations have been compelled to manage state
welfare projects and restructured to act as service providers. The state reincorporated civil society by releasing welfare projects to NPOs. Although the number ofcivic organizations increased dramatically in two decades, the level of civic participation and advocacy activities actually decreased. In other words, although thenew policy brings new resources to these organizations, they have a weakening
voice.
Resource mobilization theory does not emphasize the distribution of publicfunding and its consequences. In the context of Taiwan, the decentralized welfare
spending structure has resulted in an uneven distribution of welfare resources.
The new quasi-market could not realize distributive justice in the welfare system.
NPOs used market strategies, including spending money on fundraising and signing-on celebrity representatives, to market their services. The distribution of charity
resources relied on the civility of the NPOs. Resources tended to be distributed to
big NPOs in urban areas. In many cases, rural and small NPOs were forced to run
below governmental standards or to close down. Decentralization of the state
further marginalized the welfare programs in poor counties. In other words, theresult of the quasi-market and the transformation of the civic organization sector
resulted in unjust distribution of social welfare services and a weakening of civilsociety.
The disability rights movement advocated a paradigm switch from charity torights. In the rights paradigm, it is the state’s responsibility to provide an enabling
environment for people with different needs. In the Taiwanese authoritarian developmental state era, disability welfare was considered to be each family’s individual
responsibility. This study shows that the post-authoritarian state did commit towelfare state policies that had not been covered during the authoritarian era. Wong

320

 ﻿H.-H CHANG(2004) points out that the developmental state in Taiwan moved toward a welfare
state after its democratic transition. He describes the country’s transformation
as a reverse of the neoliberal globalization under which many western countries
privatized their welfare programs. However, a close analysis of the disability rights
movement in Taiwan shows that the state provides scant social services to individual citizens. Instead, it adopted a policy that is heavily reliant on goodwill donations
from society. Disability rights continue to be primarily a family responsibility.
Priestley (1999) suggests that marketization of community care policy would
redirect the independent living movement in the United Kingdom. Oliver (2009)
predicts that the close relations between the state and charity organizations
would reshape the goal of the disabled people’s movement. A similar process
has occurred in Taiwan. Disability rights civic organizations with a strong membership (such as PAPID) served as national advocacy associations. Under the new
government policy, however, advocacy was weakened as organizations diverted
their energies to competing for resources so they could provide social services.
This quasi-market welfare subcontract system also resulted in uneven distributionof social welfare resources.

Note
1. 
For analytic purposes, I use the term ‘civic organizations’ to refer to any social groups
organized by concerned citizens, including social movement organizations, nongovernmental organizations, NPOs, and interest groups. ‘Social movement organization’usually refers to a social group promoting social change by raising public awarenessand reforming public policy. NPOs that provide social services, whether or not they are
funded by the government, are also called service-oriented civil organizations.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding
This work was supported by National Science council Taiwan [grant no. NSC 101-2420-H-305002-MY2].

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