Forest Peoples
Programme

Tom Griffiths
June 2007

Seeing ‘RED’?
‘Avoided deforestation’ and the rights ofIndigenous Peoples and local communities

Seeing ‘RED’?
‘Avoided deforestation’ and the rights ofIndigenous Peoples and local communities
Tom Griffiths

This report was produced with the support of the Charles Stewart Mott
Foundation, the Moriah Fund and SwedBio
Sections of this report may be reproduced provided that acknowledgement ismade to the author and Forest Peoples Programme

Reprint, August 2007

© Forest Peoples Programme, 2007
Spanish edition:‘RED’: ¿Alerta Roja?
La ‘deforestación evitada’ y los derechos de los Pueblos
Indígenas y las comunidades locales

Bahasa Indonesia
edition:“RED”: AWAS?
“Pencegahan deforestasi” dan hak-hak Masyarakat adatdan komunitas lokal

French edition:« RED » Alerte rouge ?
La « déforestation évitée » et les droits des peuples
autochtones et des communautés locales

Portuguese edition:“RED”
O “Desmatamento Evitado” e os direitos dos
Povos Indígenas e comunidades locais

Cover photographs:

Inset: A villager at Ruwa, Mount Elgon, Uganda,
displays cartridge cases from bullets fired at people
working on their land in the disputed carbon offset
plantation in the boundary area of Mount Elgon
National Park, August 2006.
Background: FACE carbon offset plantations on theslopes of Mount Elgon, adjacent to the village of Ruwa.

Photo credits:

Jutta Kill, FERN

Seeing ‘RED’? ‘Avoided deforestation’ and the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities

Contents

Executive Summary

1

Acronyms

2

I

Introduction and Background

3

II

Common and distinct approaches to avoided deforestation

5

III

Existing avoided deforestation initiatives and proposed pilot schemes

9

IV

Unanswered rights, equity, accountability and livelihood concerns

10

V

Next steps?

15

Annex 1

Forests in past negotiations on global climate policies

17

Annex 2The Stern Review on Avoided Deforestation

18

Annex 3Controversial World Bank proposal for a Global Forest Alliance20

Endnotes

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Seeing ‘RED’? ‘Avoided deforestation’ and the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities

Seeing ‘RED’? ‘Avoided deforestation’ and the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities

Executive Summary‘Avoided deforestation’ (AD) – referring to the prevention or reduction of forest loss in order toreduce emissions of global warming gases – has become a key issue in policy debates about climatechange. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s scientific body is due toreport on how to achieve ‘Reduced Emissions from Deforestation’ (RED) at its next ‘Conference of theParties’ to be held in Bali, Indonesia in December 2007. Proponents of RED want incentives forforest conservation to be part of the Kyoto Protocol’s trading instruments during its next phase (post2012). Proposals for global and regional ‘avoided deforestation’ funds are also multiplying rapidly.
The World Bank is seeking to become the lead international agency heading up global RED
initiatives. In mid-2007, the Bank is asking the G8 group of industrialised countries to give politicaland financial backing to its contentious plans for a new Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)
that would pilot schemes to reduce emissions from deforestation in five tropical countries.
The core idea is for Northern countries to pay Southern countries to reduce forest clearance within
their national borders. One proposal is to give them aid money for the purpose. Another is forSouthern countries to sell the carbon locked up in their forests to the North to allow Northernindustries to continue polluting as usual under a global system of carbon trading. Others suggest thatfunding for AD schemes should come from a combination of public funds and the carbon market.
All such schemes have important implications for how forests are managed, who manages them, andwhat may or may not be allowed to happen in them. What are the implications of these changes forthe hundreds of millions of indigenous people and other forest-dependent communities whose
livelihoods, cultures and futures are bound up with forests? This briefing is designed to alert
community advocates and other policy-makers to this little-discussed issue. It notes similarities andkey differences between different AD proposals and documents concerns over initiatives like theWorld Bank’s Global Forest Alliance (GFA) and FCPF. It cautions that rapid expansion of AD
schemes without due regard to rights, social and livelihood issues risks:• renewed and even increased state and ‘expert’ control over forests• overzealous government support for anti-people and exclusionary models of forest conservation
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(evictions, expropriation) to protect lucrative forest carbon ‘reservoirs’
unjust targeting of indigenous and marginal peoples as the ‘drivers’ of deforestation
violations of customary land and territorial rights
state and NGO zoning of forest lands without the informed participation of forest dwellers
unequal imposition of the costs of forest protection on indigenous peoples and local communities
unequal and abusive community contracts
land speculation, land grabbing and land conflicts (competing claims on AD compensation)
corruption and embezzlement of international funds by national elites
increasing inequality and potential conflict between recipients and non-recipients of AD funds
potential conflict among indigenous communities (over acceptance or rejection of AD schemes)

If these risks could be eliminated or reduced, then AD policies and increased funding outside carbon
trading might offer opportunities for some indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities.
However, simple assurances from global agencies and governments that the potential problems with
top-down AD policies can be overcome through ‘certification’ and ‘participatory approaches’ are notgood enough. There is a need for more solid guarantees that the human and customary rights offorest peoples will be respected and that the priorities of indigenous peoples and local communities
will be properly addressed in any future AD policies and programmes. As a first step, it is essentialthat indigenous peoples and other grassroots movements become fully involved in the debate about
the pros and cons of avoided deforestation in global climate policies.

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Acronyms
AD

Avoided deforestation

A/R

Afforestation/Reforestation

BCF

Biocarbon Fund (of the World Bank)CANIClimate Action Network International (NGO network)

CBD

Convention on Biological Diversity

CCB

Climate, Community and Biodiversity (Standards)

CDM

Clean Development Mechanism

CERD

Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination

CIFOR

Center for International Forestry Research

COICA

Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin

COP

Conference of the Parties

CR

Compensated reduction

CRN

Coalition of Rainforest Nations

ETS

EU Emission Trading Scheme

FCPF

Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (a proposal of the World Bank)

FPIC

Free, prior and informed consent

FPP

Forest Peoples Programme

FRA

Forest Resource Assessment (of the FAO)

FSC

Forest Stewardship Council

GEF

Global Environment Facility

GFA

Global Forest Alliance (proposal of the World Bank)

GHG

Greenhouse gas

IAITPTF

International Alliance of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests

IFC

International Finance Corporation (of the World Bank Group)

IFIPCCInternational Forum of Indigenous Peoples on Climate Change

IIEDInternational Institute for Environment and Development

IPCC

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

LULUCF

Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry

MOP

Meeting of the Parties

NCAS

National Carbon Accounting System (of Australia)

ODA

Official Development Assistance

ODI

Overseas Development Institute

PCF

Prototype Carbon Fund (of the World Bank)PES

Payment for Environmental Services

RED

Reduced Emissions from Deforestation

REDD

Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

RER

Reference Emission Rate

RUPES

Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental Services (of ICRAF)

SBSTA

Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (of the UNFCCC)

TFAP

Tropical Forestry Action Plan (previously of World Bank and FAO)UNFCCC

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

WRMWorld Rainforest Movement

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I

Introduction and Background

After repeated warnings from scientists, civil society and indigenous peoples that climate change isalready underway and set to accelerate, there are signs that most governments today accept that
more effective measures must be taken to tackle global warming. It is increasingly recognised that
deforestation, particularly in the tropics, contributes between 18 and 20% of all annual global
emissions of CO2, and that in some countries like Brazil it accounts for up to 75% of the country’s
annual release of CO2 from human activity each year. Consequently, there is a growing international
consensus that future policies to combat climate change must include measures that seek to reduce
deforestation in tropical countries.
Renewed calls for incentives for avoided deforestation under the UNFCCC

Despite earlier controversies over the inclusion of forests under Kyoto (Annex 1), policies to avoid
deforestation using economic incentives to encourage tropical countries to protect their carbon
reservoirs in standing forests have recently been put forward by Southern and Northerngovernments, conservation NGOs, private consultants, some natural scientists and so-called ‘carbon
finance’ companies.
In December 2005, the Coalition of Rainforest Nations1 led by Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea
presented a formal proposal for reducing GHG emission from deforestation to the 11th Conference of
the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC and first Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol(COP11/MOP1). At the same meeting, several NGOs and scientists led by Environmental Defense
reiterated earlier calls for inclusion of forests under Kyoto’s trading instruments.2 As a result, COP11
requested that its Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) evaluate the issueof avoided deforestation and climate change mitigation and report back to UNFCCC COP13/MOP3 in
December 2007. The UNFCCC has already organised two international meetings on avoided
deforestation (in July 2006 and March 2007).3
A major boost to global options for RED mechanisms for climate change mitigation came when theBrazilian government, which is opposed to linking RED schemes to carbon trading, presented its own
avoided deforestation proposal based on public funding at a workshop of the UNFCCC Subsidiary
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) in September 2006 and again at UNFCCC
COP12 in November 2006 (see below).4
The AD agenda rose even higher on the global climate change agenda with the publication of the UK
government’s influential Stern Review on Climate Change in early 2007. Ex-World Bank economist
Sir Nicholas Stern suggests that avoided deforestation measures should be included in the post-2012
commitment period under Kyoto, but urges that action to prevent deforestation on a large-scale must
be taken as soon as possible through pilot avoided deforestation schemes to test methodologies andiron out any remaining technical and social difficulties (Annex 2).5
World Bank seeks to be lead global agency on avoided deforestation

The World Bank has always been fast to capture (and engineer) new global initiatives whereconsiderable North-South financial flows may be anticipated – as it did in the late 1980s and early
1990s with the Global Environment Facility (where it remains the main implementing agency andstill controls the trust funds). So too in international carbon finance the Bank has been a lead player.6

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In 2006 and early 2007, the World Bank has placed avoided deforestation and carbon forestry at
centre stage of its controversial proposal for a new ‘Global Forest Alliance’ (GFA) with large
conservation NGOs, like the Nature Conservancy, Conservation International, WWF, and the private
sector. This proposal for a mega-fund for forests, which so far hardly been discussed with civil society
outside a closed group of big conservation NGOs, would be managed by the World Bank and would
seek to increase the Bank’s interventions in the forest sector in developing countries (see Annex 3). At
the moment, the World Bank is proposing a ‘Forest Carbon Partnership Facility’ (FCPF) thatwould sit within its proposed GFA to ‘test the feasibility’ of different methodological approaches topayment schemes for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation – REDD (seediscussion below on the major difference between RED and REDD proposals). The World Bank is
now seeking high-level political backing for its carbon forestry and AD proposals from G8
industrialised countries (Annex 3).

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II

Common and distinct approaches to avoided deforestation

Scrutiny of various governmental and non-governmental avoided deforestation proposals shows thatmost put forward similar arguments and include similar elements in their plans for avoided
deforestation schemes. These are that:• Compensating governments, the private sector and forest owners to protect forests would
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establish positive economic values for standing forest and discourage forest clearance for otherusesPowerful economic incentives are required to counter the proximate economic drivers ofdeforestation (e.g., oil palm expansion, industrial tree plantations, conversion to agriculture,hydrocarbon extraction, etc.)
Countries that can demonstrate verifiable reductions in deforestation rates or maintain forest
carbon stocks (forest cover) above agreed minimum targets would be paid compensation througha global and/or regional RED funding mechanism(s)Verification of forest cover and deforestation rates would be based on a combination of satellite
remote sensing images backed up by ground truthing (site visits)
RED schemes would use a national or country-level carbon accounting approach (not projectlevel accounting) in order to enable cross-sectoral national land use planning and to reduce
monitoring and verification ‘transaction costs’
Previous concerns about ‘additionality’, ‘leakage’, accurate carbon accounting and verification(Annex 1) would be largely resolved through advances in remote sensing technology,7methodological progress in carbon accounting8 and the use of the country or ‘entire national
forest system’ as the unit of account (although it is acknowledged that there are still scientific andverification ‘details’ to be worked out, tested and agreed)
Forest carbon reservoirs are not guaranteed permanent stores of carbon, but RED schemes toprotect standing forests can ‘buy time’ and reduce CO2 emissions while more effective mitigation
strategies and technologies are developed for permanent emission reductions.9
There would be a need for ‘strong rules’ that would discourage the removal of forestfrom land that has been subject of AD funding or involved in the generation ofcompensation payments for reduced deforestation (financial sanctions etc).10

Notwithstanding the above similarities, governmental and NGO proposals for avoided deforestation
are markedly different in a number of ways and these differences may be critical in forthcoming
public debates and intergovernmental negotiations on this topic. The first marked difference among
different AD proposals relates to the choice of funding mechanisms for such schemes.
Public funding approaches

The Brazilian government proposes the establishment of an international trust fund which would
compensate efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation drawing upon voluntary contributions
from governments in industrialised countries. Other proposals, such as that of the Kyoto2 initiative
run by environmental activists in the UK, recommend that AD funds be secured from a tax oncarbon-based extractive companies at the point of production (not emissions). Some proportion ofthis tax revenue, say 10%, would then be channelled to an international avoided deforestation fundused to reward countries for their emissions reduction efforts through forest conservation.11 Such acarbon tax might generate many billions of dollars annually and so might deliver some fraction of
those billions to a global fund to slow down or eliminate deforestation.12

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Market-based approaches

The Coalition of Rainforest Nations and most conservation NGOs, and obviously carbon financebusinesses, are pushing for compensated reduction financed through carbon emission ‘reduction’
credits.13 These market advocates maintain that public international funds would never generate therequired volume of funds to provide attractive and sustained economic incentives for developing
countries to keep their forests standing. European governments tend to be more in favour of a tradebased scheme, presumably to increase volumes and reduce prices of pollution rights in the EU
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). The UK government, for example, is proposing that the rainforestsof the Congo basin be protected through carbon trading:‘…the challenge for the international community – for all of us – is to change the economic
incentives facing the government (of DRC): to make it more rewarding to preserve forests thanto cut them down. In the end, the only way we are going to do this is through a global carbon
trading scheme …. So the (World) Bank needs to expand its work on sustainable rainforest
management by piloting new ways to provide alternative incomes for people living in
rainforests, rather than from cutting them down, as we move towards a system of carbon
trading’ (emphasis added)14

World Bank pushing carbon markets

Though the World Bank promotes a mixed funding approach to avoided deforestation (see below), on
balance the Bank is a major pioneer and advocate of carbon trading. Like other carbon market
advocates, Bank economists stress that only markets will deliver enough funds for effective global
efforts to mitigate climate change. Indeed, the finance plan for its proposed Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility assumes that the fund will operate almost entirely on market-based funds by
2014 (Annex 3).15
In 2007, there appears to be an emerging consensus among proponents of avoided deforestation thata mixed approach to RED funding is required.16 Public funds (ODA) would be used to fund initial
pilot schemes to test methodologies and to fund ‘carbon inventories’, monitoring and enforcement
needs, capacity-building and technical assistance work with governments, while the carbon credit
market might in time channel the bulk of funds for reduction compensation payments (either
through voluntary or regulated carbon trading schemes).17
A second marked key difference between AD proposals relates to what to include or exclude fromsuch schemes.
RED or REDD?

Some AD advocates wish to include not only avoided deforestation, but also reduced emissions fromavoided forest degradation i.e., Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation(REDD). Proponents of REDD maintain that a genuine ecosystem and landscape approach to
avoided deforestation must encompass both healthy standing forests and degraded forests. Advocatesof REDD include the Coalition of Rainforest Nations (CRN) mentioned above and the World Bank –which seems to be trying to harness avoided deforestation funds to finance its (much criticised)conventional tree plantation offset projects.
Countries without high deforestation rates strongly advocate AD rewards for forest landscaperestoration and ‘rehabilitation’ given that their forests are not subject to high rates of clearance, whencompared to other developing countries. The government of India, for example, notes that
restrictions of rewards to efforts to reduce deforestation would unfairly penalise countries that are

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expanding ‘forest’ cover. India cautions that confining compensation to avoided deforestation – withpayments based on deforestation rates may create a perverse incentive for unscrupulous
governments to accelerate deforestation before 2012 or to threaten to implement expensive (bogus)
land clearance development schemes to drive up the compensation payment per hectare of forest.18
Countries like Indonesia that have already deforested large areas and have severely degraded forest
through unsustainable industrial logging also advocate afforestation and ‘restoration’ activities underavoided deforestation schemes.19 Private companies involved in the international carbon economy
also seek to include afforestation, plantation schemes and payments to reduce forest degradation
under REDD.
Critics of this broad approach to ‘avoided deforestation’ payment schemes point out that measuring
degradation is difficult. On this issue, most scientists agree that existing remote sensing technology
may not be sufficient for verifying the state of degradation of standing forests to an acceptable degreeof accuracy. Those that advise against inclusion of afforestation schemes as part of avoided
deforestation compensation point out that such forest restoration components risk suffering from thesame leakage and additionality problems that have plagued carbon sink plantation initiatives (Annex
1). There is also the concern that by including forest degradation there is the risk of opening up a canof definitional worms that will only serve to hinder effective UNFCCC negotiations. This group, which
includes Brazil, thus propose that the UNFCCC and international agencies restrict compensated
reductions to avoided deforestation – RED.
Baselines or targets?

Most existing market and non-market AD proposals, including that of Brazil, propose thatcompensation payments be made according to national performance. This would be judged against abaseline set by a country’s average annual deforestation rate that would be known as its Reference
Emission Rate (RER). Some carbon finance companies are advocating an alternative cap and tradeapproach. Under this latter framework, payments would be made to maintain carbon reservoirs at or
above an agreed target based on ‘an approximation of the amount of carbon currently held’ in acountry’s ‘forest carbon reservoirs’, which would give the country the option to ‘sell credits andtransfer equivalent forest areas of forests to protected reserves, or carry out deforestation
activities, or a combination of both.’20 (!!)
Mega-bucks for forests and forest conservation?

The sums of money being put forward as required to finance RED schemes and pay countries
compensation are highly variable, but RED supporters suggest that there could be very large financial
rewards for avoided deforestation. According to a study commissioned by the Stern Review of eight
countries responsible for 70% of emissions from land-use change, the opportunity cost of income
from alternative land uses would be in the order of $5-10 billion annually, if all deforestation were to
stop.
Globally, the World Bank estimates that to reduce the annual rate of deforestation in developing
countries by 20%, avoided deforestation would cost between 2 and $20 billion annually, which would
put the price of halting deforestation altogether as high as $100 billion per year! In terms of potential
earnings for countries, estimates vary widely. However, most estimates predict substantial rewards
for forest conservation. In the case of DRC, for example, some commentators advise that AD
compensation might generate $2.7 to $33 billion US per year. Enthusiastic advocates of AD advisethat per capita incomes could, on paper at least, be raised by over 10% though they fail to explain how
citizens would truly enjoy raised incomes.21 On the ground, depending on the specific opportunity

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costs for alternative land uses in specific areas, the World Bank claims that compensation reduction
payments could range from between US$200 and $10,000 per hectare of forest. 22
Who would benefit and receive these compensation payments or rewards under AD?

Surprisingly, many AD proposals are often vague about which bodies, entities or persons would
receive compensation payments under an international RED scheme. Most proposals imply thatpayments would in large part be made to government ministries or treasuries, which in turn suggeststhat schemes would in part apply to forests deemed by the government and the courts to be ‘state’lands. AD proposals made by the Government of Indonesia suggest compensation funds could be
distributed among protected area authorities, ‘certified’ logging companies engaged in sustainable
forest management (SFM), initiatives to tackle illegal logging, payment for environmental services(PES) schemes and community-based forest management (CBFM) – though the Indonesian proposal
does not specify in detail which bodies or legal persons would receive funds for these initiatives.23
Could indigenous peoples and local communities benefit?

With so few concrete AD schemes in operation other than a few project-level schemes run by NGOs(see below), there is little concrete empirical evidence so far to judge to what extent AD and RED
programmes might benefit people at the local level. Studies by economists and advocates of payments
for environmental services (PES) are quite optimistic. PES economists suggest that, based on
emerging experience with PES schemes in some parts of Latin America, some livelihood gains can be
expected if the right terms and conditions are in place – particularly on economically ‘marginal lands’
like upland forest areas.24
The World Agroforestry Centre points to its Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental Services(RUPES) programme that operates in Indonesia, Nepal and the Philippines as positive examples.25 In
the case of indigenous communities with subsistence and barter economies it is suggested that nonmonetary benefits in-kind might be more culturally appropriate, while those indigenous communities
with some degree of monetisation might be compensated or ‘rewarded’ with small and regular
payments into community funds or to community projects.26
Studies of other PES schemes in Brazil and Bolivia have found these programmes have tended to be
top-down and have suffered ‘inadequate stakeholder participation’ and thus have been plagued by‘barriers to sustainability’.27 Independent NGO studies have found more disturbing findings incarbon forestry projects in the uplands of South America (Box 1) where environmental payment andcarbon forestry schemes have ended up leaving the communities worse off, indebted and locked into
unfavourable legal obligations to carbon finance and carbon forestry companies.28 Critics of PES also
point out that the commodification of life forms and ‘biodiversity’ (biodiversity credits, etc.)
undermines local (non-monetary) cultural, conservation and sustainable use values.29 Recent
indigenous case studies of carbon offset plantation schemes confirm that indigenous peoples areoften marginalised and fail to receive equitable benefits from such projects.30

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III

Existing avoided deforestation initiatives and proposed pilot schemes

At this time there are very few existing examples of AD or RED schemes, and most are pilot voluntary
initiatives financed by conservation and development NGOs. Examples include TNC’s the Climate
Action Project in Noel Kempff Mercado National Park in Bolivia31 and its Rio Bravo Conservation andManagement Area in Belize. IIED and CIFOR have examined some of these projects and found mixed
results.32 Most of these existing AD initiatives have yet to be critically assessed by social justice NGOs
and grassroots organisations.
In 2007, however, national-level initiatives to develop AD methodologies and carbon accounting are
gathering pace. The European Space Agency, for example, is to pilot carbon inventories anddeforestation monitoring using remote sensing technology in Bolivia and Cameroon.33 The WorldBank is inviting the governments of Papua New Guinea, Costa Rica and Indonesia, and regional
bodies in Brazil and the Democratic Republic of Congo, to fund forest protection through avoided
deforestation. The World Bank is seeking to persuade these countries to sign agreements to limit
carbon emissions from deforestation by 2009 or 2010, in return for $250 million investment.34
Initiatives by regional and local governments are also emerging in Asia and Latin America, and somedeveloped country governments are putting up regional funds for avoided deforestation. In April
2007, the Australian government announced a US$160 million fund for reforestation and avoided
deforestation in the Asia-Pacific region. At the end of April, the governors of Aceh and Papua andPapua Barat in Indonesia published a statement expressing interest in avoided deforestation schemes
and pledging that the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities would be respected in any
such programmes. The Governor of Aceh even suggested that he might place a moratorium on
industrial logging in the province if funds from AD can be secured.35
At the same time, in April 2007, the government of Ecuador has publicly stated that it would be
willing to forego oil and gas extraction in protected tropical forest areas in return for compensation
for avoided deforestation and the maintenance of its carbon reservoirs above and below ground.36
Although national-level schemes have yet to be developed it is clear that momentum for such largescale AD interventions is increasing and tropical countries, not least the members of the Coalition ofRainforest Nations (who prefer market-based approaches to AD finance), are already lining up to
take part in any internationally funded pilot schemes and so it looks very likely the World Bank will
strike deals with these governments in the near future.

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IV

Unanswered rights, equity, accountability and livelihood concerns

There are clear risks, but also potential benefits to be gained by indigenous peoples and forestdependent communities if forests become part of an international scheme for reducing GHG
emissions from deforestation. Most of the existing RED proposals make mention of the need forcommunity ‘participation’ and the provision of local benefits for forest communities. The Stern
review mentions the need to address forest peoples’ rights and responsibilities (Annex 2). The WorldBank’s GFA and FCPF proposals both mention support for community-based forest management:
but what would that really mean in practice? Experience in India has shown that such schemes havein certain ways increased state control over forests, and increased unwanted government
interventions in local customary systems of land tenure and natural resource management.37
Social risks associated with current AD proposals

Though social and poverty reduction issues are mentioned in most avoided deforestation proposals,
they are generally scant on details about how peoples’ rights will be fully respected and safeguarded,and how equitable and sustainable local benefits might be ensured under RED schemes.
Top-down and unsustainable forest policies?

At this stage, the majority of AD proposals stem from the World Bank, governments and large
conservation NGOs. There is much evidence to show that any global plans to save the world’s forests
devised without the full knowledge and agreement of forest peoples and local communities aredoomed to failure and such top-down policy-making often serves to reinforce the unequal status quo
in forest politics at the international, national and local levels.
A prime example of a previous failed global solution designed by the World Bank and FAO, which at
one point involved no less than 73 developing country governments, was the Tropical Forestry
Action Plan (TFAP) which was planned and implemented in the 1980s and early 1990s. Though the
TFAP talked a lot about participation and local livelihoods it ended up serving the interests ofgovernment agencies and the logging industry, despite its claims of support for ‘social forestry’. The
TFAP experience showed clearly that it is a mistake to develop forest policy from the top down andthat sustainable solutions can only come from the bottom-up, from forest owners and forest peoples
who actual live in and depend on the forest.38
Yet, so far at least, it is not at all clear that indigenous peoples and other forest peoples have been
consulted about the risks and potential benefits of the ‘avoided deforestation’ plans being promotedby their governments in league with international agencies. Accelerated global initiatives to promote
biofuels as part of climate change mitigation measures have been roundly criticised by indigenous
peoples and NGOs for failing to ensure proper public consultation.39 There is a danger that rapid
moves to adopt global policy measures on AD may likewise take place without proper considerationof potential social and rights impacts, and without the informed participation of potentially affectedrights holders.
In 2007, international deals on forests are still being negotiated between the World Bank anddeveloping country governments without the knowledge or involvement of forest peoples in thosecountries. This is even after the Bank has been repeatedly publicly condemned for its failure to
involve rights holders in its forest interventions in developing countries (as has happened recently in

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DRC where the Bank promoted industrial logging and a new Forest Code without adequate
participation of indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent people).40
Anti-people and exclusionary conservation

There are real risks that where RED funds are used to promote and ensure forest protection, asignificant proportion will be used by the State to equip forest protection agencies with jeeps, walkie
talkies, arms, helicopters and GPS in an outdated and anti-people ‘guns and guards’ approach toforest protection. In the same way, there is a serious risk that RED money may reinforce State andprivate sector control over forests and end up supporting outdated and unjust models of forest
protection.

Box 1

Impact of carbon forestry on indigenous peoples and peasant communities in the
Ecuadorian Andes.41

Voluntary carbon-offset plantation projects in the uplands of Ecuador reveal a series of potentialsocial, economic and livelihood impacts on indigenous peoples and local communities who haveentered into carbon offset projects in good faith. Several years into these voluntary offset projects,
the communities complain that they:• Were never properly informed by the carbon forestry company about actual net payments they

•
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•
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•

would receive per hectare (they were only advised gross rates per hectare without deducted
costs: they were not told that the company’s technical costs for planting, training, monitoring
and certification would be deducted from gross payments per hectare)
Were not informed about social and economic risks and potential costs and their legal
obligations under the project
Have not been advised of the purpose or logic of certified carbon credits and how they produce
income for the company
Were not told about penalty clauses under the contract before community members andleaders signed long-term agreements
Have been victims of manipulation or abuse of their own rules for free, prior and informed
consent
Have suffered economic displacement from communal grazing lands as a result of giving up
land for the project (based on incomplete and inaccurate promises of potential benefits)
Have had to use much of the modest payments under the scheme to pay for outside experts tocarry out technical work specified in the contract
Have endured long delays in payments from the company for work completed on time andaccording to contract
Have in most cases not received promised levels of income and employment
Are in several cases actually worse off and have become indebted in order to pay contract
penalties for failure to meet obligations (e.g., due to accidental fire damage to plantations)Have been sanctioned by large fines payable under contract penalty clauses
Have been indebted in some communities due to company accounting errors that have made‘over-payments’ for certain forestry works and have demanded repayment
Have had to bear almost all the unforeseen costs of the activity (replacement of failed seedlings
etc)
Have in one case been (falsely) threatened by company officials that their ancestral lands might
be compulsorily confiscated as a penalty for failing to carry out forestry activities stipulated
under the contract
Have had complaints and questions about company expenditures and accounting routinely
dismissed by company officials

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While there has been a welcome normative shift at the international level towards a more peoplecentred approach to forest conservation and protected areas due to pressure from indigenous peoples
and human rights activists, many countries, particularly in some parts of Africa and Asia, continue todeny the rights of forest peoples. These countries still apply anti-people and discriminatory
approaches to forest protection that penalise and criminalise indigenous forest dwellers.42
Significant financial AD rewards may induce State forest agencies and protected area authorities tostart overzealous enforcement of existing unjust forest protections laws using measures that will
unequally target marginal and vulnerable groups, including indigenous peoples and traditional
forest-dependent communities.43
In the worst-case scenario, in parts of Asia and Africa, RED funds risk being diverted to unjustly
settle nomadic and semi-nomadic forest dwellers, or to convert shifting cultivators into settled
farmers in the name of (non-forest based) ‘alternative sustainable livelihoods’. Such practices may
violate people’s right to culture and livelihood, weaken food security and undermine their traditional
practices.44 Such warnings are not scare-mongering, but rather based on actual practices happening
in forest areas today (e.g., forced evictions in the uplands of Thailand). Should AD schemes support
such relocation schemes, they would be undermining participating countries’ legal obligations toprotect customary use of biological resources and traditional knowledge under the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD) and various human rights conventions, including the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).
Violation of customary land rights and risk of land conflicts

In many tropical forest countries states fail to recognise the collective customary rights of indigenous
peoples over their ancestral forests, or only recognise a small portion of their traditional lands –legally defining the remaining forests as so-called ‘State land’.45 This issue is crucially important,because presumably the zoning of forests under any RED payments scheme and any benefit-sharing
plan under RED contracts would be in part determined by land tenure and ownership rights.
There is a real risk that governments, companies and conservation NGOs will ‘zone’ (carve up) forests
by demarcating protected areas, biological corridors, forest reserves and sustainable forest
management zones (certified logging) to receive AD payments to the exclusion or disadvantage ofindigenous and traditional communities.
Thus, the same potential problems of top-down land use planning and forest zonification exist with
RED schemes as they do with other approaches that depend on land-use zoning and land
classification – like the application of the High Conservation Value or ‘critical forests’ concepts.46
Given the potential earning capacity of standing forests, some States may become even morereluctant to recognise indigenous and local community customary ownership rights over forest lands.
RED compensation payments to governments may create a disincentive for forest and conservationand other government authorities to resolve long-standing land disputes in forest areas.
There is also the danger that relatively lucrative compensation rates per hectare of forest might drive
land speculation on forest frontiers and even in more remote forest areas. RED schemes therefore
risk driving the expropriation of customary lands.

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There is a risk that States and governments will make public commitments to respect rights in arhetorical way, but in practice use the AD funds to reinforce existing unjust conventional models andpolicies of forest protection. In the aforementioned case of Indonesia, for example, the governors
declare they will respect indigenous rights, but pledge that funds will be used to equip the forest
police.
Increased inequality and social conflict

Forests under top-down demarcation RED schemes might generate conflict over boundaries andbenefits both within and between rural landholders and forest owners. There is also the risk thatwithout careful measures to ensure equitable benefits in rural areas, AD payments might create rifts
between those communities or households receiving payments and those that are excluded, which
may include those without formal legal title to their lands and ‘landless’ people. In other words, AD
compensation might increase inequality in rural forest areas and risk creating intra- and intercommunity conflicts.
Corruption and fraud

The large sums of money that might be involved in RED also create a very real risk of corruption –especially given that some of the tropical countries with the worst deforestation rates are among themost corrupt in the world. Even where corruption and embezzlement can be avoided or controlled,there is still a strong risk that benefits will be captured largely by state agencies, local governments
and conservation NGOs rather than indigenous peoples and local communities – as has happened insome areas of the pilot avoided deforestation scheme in Noel Kempff National Park in Bolivia.47
Worse still, while companies, NGOs and state agencies might receive income, the direct costs offorest protection may unduly fall on indigenous and local resource users who may face restrictions on
hunting, fishing and shifting cultivation practices as a result of conventional exclusionary protected
forest area policies (as also happened in Noel Kempff).
Unjust contractual arrangements

Even if communities are able to negotiate direct benefits for AD schemes involving their traditional
forest lands, there is no guarantee that the terms of negotiation will be equal. There is a danger thatcompensation and forest conservation contracts will be drawn up to favour the State or company orconservation NGO and place undue costs or conservation duties on local community members, theirleaders and their organisations – as has happened in the carbon forestry contracts with indigenous
peoples in the uplands of Ecuador (Box 1).
All the above risks generate a series of critical questions that remain largely unanswered bygovernmental and non-governmental advocates for avoided deforestation schemes:• What guarantees will RED schemes put in place to ensure avoided deforestation programmes
fully uphold the human rights of indigenous peoples and other forest dwellers?

• How will RED ensure that communities and traditional land holders will be rewarded forprotecting the forests and not evicted from such forests?
• How will customary land rights and unresolved land claims be dealt with under AD rules andpolicies?
• Will indigenous peoples’ right to FPIC be genuinely respected? How will the problems ofmanipulated and engineered consent be overcome?
• What is to stop ruling and corrupt elites at the national level siphoning off the bulk of funds andbenefits for personal gain or their own political agendas?

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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

different proximate and underlying ‘drivers’ of deforestation? Who and how will these drivers be
identified?
Which rights-holders and related representative bodies will have the right to negotiate contracts
and compensation rates over which areas of forest and on what terms and according to whosecriteria and rules?
How will the international and national rules and criteria for access to AD schemes be agreed and
set in a participatory and equitable manner?
How can citizens and rights holders be sure that unfair or narrow rules will not be set bygovernments, companies, NGOs and forestry consultants largely for the benefit of these latterinterest groups?
If communities or groups of communities are able to collectively negotiate contracts: how will
asymmetric negotiations that might lock them into unfair contractual obligations be prevented?
Who will ‘absorb’ the unforeseen or accidental costs of AD when contracts are breached (andcompensated carbon is lost)?
If existing project-level carbon forestry has struggled to address the complexities of sustainable
forest management, how will these social and cultural complexities be effectively addressed on anational scale in RED schemes?
How will AD policies tackle the demand aspect of drivers of tropical deforestation?
How will transboundary (international) leakage between participating and non-participating
countries be prevented or at least minimised?
If AD schemes are to involve national forest policy making and planning, how will meaningful
citizen and indigenous participation be guaranteed?

Unresolved ethical and scientific criticisms of carbon trading

On top of all these legitimate questions about the social sustainability of global and national schemes
to compensate avoided deforestation, there also remain thorny questions about those RED proposals
that advocate funding through carbon trading. While community-government relations are often
asymmetric and skewed in favour of State agencies, so too negotiations with companies are all too
often unequal as the PROFAFOR case in Ecuador demonstrates (Box 1).
Receiving income via companies and the global carbon trading market could also raise potential
serious ethical issues for indigenous peoples and communities. This is because, ultimately, it is likelythat the great bulk of payments for carbon credits would flow from the same industrial and corporate
interests that continue to extract fossil fuels elsewhere, sometimes on the ancestral lands ofindigenous peoples – at serious cost to their environment, well-being and health. These sametransnational energy companies have, at the end of the day, engaged in the carbon trade mainly to
buy rights to continue polluting.48 For many indigenous peoples these contradictions are deeply
problematic and might well risk causing conflicts and divisions within and between theircommunities.

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V

Next steps?

It is disconcerting that while world leaders, government delegations to the UNFCCC and large NGOs
are busy promoting avoided deforestation on the world stage, surprisingly few provide detailed
answers to address the concerns raised above. In some cases, such risks are not even acknowledged atall. It is as if some climate activists and NGO coalitions like CANI have become so obsessed withtargets, monitoring, measuring and implementing GHG reductions that they have overlooked thesocial and technological roots of the climate crisis, as well as the broader concerns and historicallessons of international forest policy-making. While mention is made of the need to protect
biodiversity, it is rare to see any mention at all of human rights or social issues.49 In the very worst
cases, raising social issues, at least for market-based AD advocates, is seen as a just a ‘side issue’50 oreven worse as a ‘distraction’ from the core task at hand: saving the planet.
Yet, surely all the lessons of forest policy-making and environment and development over the lastcentury should remind us that social and rights issues are fundamental to achieving sustainable
development and to securing effective measures to sustainably manage forests and protect biologicalresources and ecosystems. Are we unlearning lessons?
As governments and international agencies rush to establish pilot avoided deforestation schemes,
they must be reminded that states have a legal obligation to uphold human rights and fulfil
international commitments under environmental treaties. Protecting human rights is thus far from a‘distraction’ from the main global objective of combating climate change: governments have a legal
duty to uphold human rights.
Those AD supporters that do acknowledge that social, rights, livelihood, governance and equity issues
are important in AD policies, often point to emerging certification standards such as the Gold
Standard of the WWF51 or the Climate, Community and Biodiversity (CCB) standards52 developed
for carbon forestry and PES projects by forestry companies and NGOs as the way to address social
issues and safeguards in any future AD schemes. These certification approaches are also seemingly
the preferred approach of the World Bank Group.
The problem with reliance on certification standards, however, is that most are voluntary and cannot
be enforced and many of them, like the CCB standards, have not been widely tested on the ground.53
In relation to the use of certification for sustainable timber extraction within forests, it is clear thateven the best standards are often not implemented in forestry operations. Forest StewardshipCouncil (FSC) standards, for example – which are supposed to respect indigenous land tenure anduphold the principle of free, prior and informed consent – have been found lacking in Indonesia,
Guyana, Cameroon and elsewhere.54
More disturbing is that private sector investors, private Banks and the World Bank will all accept
logging company promises of improvements towards FSC standards to render them eligible for theirfinance even if the companies do not meet the standards in the present. This step-wise approachrisks AD payments or bonuses being paid to large commercial logging concession-holders forsupposed sustainable practices that may or may not actually be used in the future. Here there is aserious risk that AD funds will be wasted on ‘hot air’ and false promises unless certification oversight,
verification and compliance mechanisms are tightened considerably.

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Overall, when faced with the challenges of making AD schemes sustainable, social development andforestry think-tanks like the ODI and CIFOR have simply noted that ‘social standards’ need to be
developed for avoided deforestation and carbon forestry, including requirements for social impact
assessment.55 Clearly lip service on social commitments under AD policies is not adequate.
As a first step in addressing gaps in the AD policy debate, it seems essential that indigenous peoples
and forest movements worldwide commence serious internal dialogue on the pros and cons of
avoided deforestation schemes run by governments and the World Bank. Can these schemes
strengthen tenure rights and customary rights to resources, or are they doomed to strengthen thecurrent status quo to the detriment of indigenous peoples and local communities? If they coulddeliver genuine benefits for local people, what minimum guarantees are required to help ensure this?
If the risks and challenges identified in this briefing are not properly addressed, how can forest
peoples and their supporters stop governments and international agencies from agreeing a deal thatis bad for people?
Suggested next steps on this critical issue for forest peoples in the tropics include action to ensure:• Indigenous peoples and forest movements are directly engaged in the current international andnational debates on AD/RED policies and possible future mechanisms and approaches• Human rights; free, prior and informed consent (FPIC); respect for customary land and resource
•
•
•
•
•
•

rights; land tenure security; equitable benefit sharing and good governance are placed as central
issues in the AD policy discussion
Guarantees are forthcoming that customary rights will be recognised and respectedInternational and national AD forest policies adopt a rights-based approach to sustainable forest
conservation and forest management
Guarantees are secured that indigenous peoples will retain and recover control over their forests
and receive support for genuine community forest-based management56
Dialogue with AD supporters is undertaken in good faith and addresses both the potential benefits
from such schemes, and their risks, including ethical problems (of market funds) and existing
limitations and scientific gaps (like transnational leakage, measurement problems)
Any processes to identify national and local drivers of deforestation in tropical countries anddecisions on which drivers and underlying causes must be tackled to prevent deforestation must
involve forest peoples and forest-dependent communities
Any proposed standard-setting and rules for AD schemes at the international and national levels
fully involve potentially affected indigenous peoples and local communities and require full
conformity with international law

In short, there is an urgent need to make sure global climate change mitigation policies on avoided
deforestation are formulated with the full and effective participation of indigenous peoples and otherpotentially affected rights holders. Effective measures to tackle climate change and otherenvironmental crises must involve democratic and decentralised policy-making that involves
indigenous and civil society organisations in identifying and implementing sustainable solutions.57

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Annex 1

Forests in past negotiations on global climate policies

During tortuous intergovernmental negotiations on the first Kyoto commitment period (2008-2012),
questions over whether or not projects to protect natural forests should be included under the UNFCCC’s
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) caused heated debate. Following intense negotiations, naturalforests were in the end not included under the CDM. Only afforestation and tree plantation carbon sink‘offset’ projects were finally (and very controversially) considered eligible for carbon credits under the
CDM rules – despite strong opposition and serious concerns about the social and environmental problems
with tree plantation carbon sinks raised by indigenous peoples, social justice organisations and someenvironmental NGOs.58
The exclusion of forests from the CDM stemmed from a combination of ethical and scientific concerns
raised by some NGOs and scientists, as well as stiff opposition from governments like Brazil for reasonspartly linked to the politics of global trade. At the time, critics pointed out that forest carbon ‘reservoirs’ arenon-permanent and that they may suffer damage or ‘leakage’ cause by man-made or accidental forest fires
and even by natural disasters.59 Critics also noted that effective forest protection in one place might welldisplace deforestation and land conversion activities to another location within the same country thereby
failing to ensure ‘additionality’ (a net reduction) in controlling GHG emissions. The very real technicaldifficulties in accurately and objectively measuring and monitoring changes in carbon stocks in forests
were also highlighted.
Perspectives of Indigenous Peoples

Indigenous peoples point out that they suffer the direct consequences of climate change on theirenvironments, especially in the tropics, in the Arctic and in other fragile ecosystems. Indigenous
declarations, such as the 2002 Kimberley Declaration, have repeatedly warned governments of thedevastating impacts of climate change and called for major action to address global warming.60 In the
Amazon, the Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin (COICA) establishedthrough its own independent efforts the Climate Alliance with the peoples of European cities in 1990. Thispartnership is based on the principle of ecological debt and of support for indigenous peoples to protect
carbon reservoirs in tropical forests and secure their goals ‘… to attain their basic rights’ to self
determination, to own and control their traditional territories and to be able to ‘live and work in theirnatural environment according to their own development concepts.’61
Indigenous peoples have previously reached different conclusions about whether or not forests should be
included in the CDM. Some have questioned the ethics of trading carbon stocks on the international
market. Many reject the principle that industrial and corporate polluters can buy permission to continue
polluting by trading in forest carbon credits. They also dismiss the notion that the value of forests can be
reduced to the monetary value of their carbon stocks, and stress that for their peoples the non-monetarycultural and spiritual values of their forest are of utmost importance and must be respected. They maintainthat trade in carbon credits is unethical and irrational because it does not tackle the main root cause ofclimate change (continuing and increasing emissions from fossil fuels). They worry that trade in forest
carbon credits may establish perverse incentives for governments and big business to expropriate
indigenous peoples’ forests and displace their communities in order to capture carbon funds. In numerous
statements to the UNFCCC, indigenous peoples have asked for effective participation in climate change
negotiations to ensure that their rights and priorities are addressed. They have also consistently requested
access to the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund to help their peoples cope with the impacts of existing and futureclimate change in their territories.62
In other cases, most notably in Brazil, some indigenous peoples, with the support of the Washington-based
NGO Environmental Defense, have called for the inclusion of forests under the Kyoto Protocol.63 They haveadvocated that indigenous community projects and natural resource management initiatives should be
open to payments and credits under Kyoto or other frameworks.

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Annex 2The Stern Review on Avoided Deforestation

The Stern report proposes that one key action the international community should take to slow climatechange is to tackle ‘non-energy emissions’ by rewarding or compensating developing countries for reducing
deforestation. The review predicts that emissions from deforestation may reach 40 gigatonnes of carbon
dioxide (CO2) between 2008-2012, raising the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere by two parts per
million. The report states:‘Non-energy emissions make up one-third of total greenhouse-gas emissions; action here will makean important contribution. A substantial body of evidence suggests that action to prevent further
deforestation would be relatively cheap compared with other types of mitigation, if the right policies
and institutional structures are put in place.’ (Executive summary, page xiii)‘…the opportunity cost of forest protection in 8 countries responsible for 70 per cent of emissions
from land use could be around $5 billion per annum initially, although over time marginal costs
would rise.’ (xxvi)
Plea for immediate support for pilot schemes outside the UNFCCC

The report notes that current rules under the Kyoto Protocol do not allow avoided deforestation under the
CDM, though this could change from the second commitment period post 2012. In the meantime, it isargued that ‘…international support for action by countries to prevent deforestation should start as soon as
possible’ through pilot schemes, which ‘…could be based on funds with voluntary contributions fromdeveloped countries, businesses and NGOs’ (page 550)
‘Action to preserve the remaining areas of natural forest is needed urgently. Large-scale pilot
schemes are required to explore effective approaches to combining national action andinternational support.’ (xxv)
A non-market or market approach?

Stern suggests that the establishment of a ‘specialised fund’ has advantages over market-based payments
because non-market funds could be targeted where they can provide most benefit at the country level, andcould be used to tackle poverty reduction and underlying ‘drivers of deforestation’ (pages 550-551). The
review proposes that such a fund could finance pilot avoided deforestation schemes in the short term andmay even be an alternative to market-based solutions. Nonetheless, market-based solutions are not ruledout by Stern: ‘…in the longer term, there are good reasons to integrate action to reduce deforestation withincarbon markets’. One option suggested is markets for ‘...biodiversity credits or deforestation credits. Thesecredits would operate in a similar way to carbon credits, with demand coming in from those who wanted toinvest in forestry projects linked to corporate social responsibility or other goals.’ (551)
Proposal for national-level avoided deforestation schemes

Like other recent avoided deforestation proposals, Stern prefers country-wide schemes (though these may
include project-level actions). Stern advocates a comprehensive national approach in part to combat‘leakage’ within a country’s borders (displaced deforestation). The problem of transnational leakage isnoted, but not addressed in detail. (549)
Does Stern address social and equity considerations?

The Review does recognise the need to address tenure issues: ‘At a national level, defining property rights
to forestland, and determining the rights and responsibilities of landowners, communities and loggers, is
key to effective forest management. This should involve local communities, respect informal rights andsocial structures…’ (page xxvi). It is also stressed that ‘Clarity over boundaries and ownership, and theallocation of property rights regarded as just by local communities, will enhance the effectiveness of

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property rights in practice and strengthen the institutions required to support and enforce them’ (page541). Stern also notes the risks of perverse incentives created through incorrect baselines, corruption, rentseeking behaviour and the capture of benefits by national elites (pages 549-550), but proposes few concretemeasures to avert or minimise these risks.

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Annex 3Controversial World Bank proposal for a Global Forest Alliance64

In 2006 and early 2007, the World Bank has developed a proposal for a new mega-fund for financing
forest sector projects and programmes in developing and middle-income countries. The Bank states thatone key objective of the GFA is to create a ‘more effective’ global alliance to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions from forests, and ‘secure the provision of environmental services’. The Bank plans to use thismega-fund to implement its 2002 Forest Strategy with a strong added emphasis on climate funding. A key
expected outcome of the GFA will be increased World Bank interventions and finance in theforest sector in developing countries.
Current schedule for the GFA

•
•
•
•

Consultation with ‘existing and potential partners’ (February-May 07)
Broader consultation process (March 2007-October 2007)
Formal launch: June 2007
Beginning of operations in ‘early 2008’

Who will be the partners in the proposed Global Forest Alliance?

According to the Bank, the GFA will foster ‘stronger and broader coalitions’ between the World Bank andforest-based industrial companies, forest-related agencies, the international research community, large
conservation NGOs, developing country NGOs, bilateral and multilateral donors, wealthy philanthropistsand ‘business interests’ who will work together to ‘eliminate barriers to investment in the conservation andsustainable use of forests.’
Background and rationale

The GFA concept has been developed principally in consultation with the main US conservation
organisations based in Washington DC, including WWF, TNC, and Conservation International, without
any comparable engagement with southern NGOs, indigenous peoples, or even much evidence of
involvement of Southern governments. The Bank and large NGOs are creating the GFA with the particular
aim of capturing potential climate funds, including through the Bank’s proposed Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility (avoided deforestation) (see below), the Biocarbon Fund (reforestation) and marketbased payment for environment services (PES) systems.
The GFA and avoided deforestation targets

The GFA hopes to support new instruments that reward countries for ‘keeping forests in place’ and will
promote ‘international partnerships’ based on financial credits for ‘avoided deforestation’.
Some key proposed Bank GFA targets for 2015••

Conservation of 1 billion tons of CO2 by reducing the global rate of deforestation, through improved
baseline and monitoring approaches to support funding from the Bank’s Bio-Carbon Fund and‘emerging Avoided Deforestation mechanisms’, and the strengthening of markets for global
environmental services
50 million ha of new protected areas and 120 million ha of PAs under improved management,
including by 2015, including strengthening of the capacity of ‘national government Forest
Services’ to protect and manage protected areas.

Serious concerns regarding the Bank’s GFA proposal

There are growing concerns among civil society organisations and some governments that there is a risk ofa serious conflict of interest in the GFA concept whereby the conservation NGOs that are to benefit fromWorld Bank funds are consulted to design the structure and function of the body that will prioritise anddisburse the money. Critics also point out that the GFA proposal focuses on crude quantitative ‘targets’ andGriffiths

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not on quality in forest policy-making and forest management. Those critical of the Bank’s plans also point
to the potential contradictions between its various targets: more protected areas, more certified forests,
more private sector investment, more ‘community’ forestry, and more ‘protected’ carbon.
Despite references to ‘community forest management’, overall the 2007 GFA proposal is based on
discredited and outdated timber-centric Bank models of forest ‘development’ and the promotion ofcertified logging, large-scale plantation forestry and continued IFC finance for the paper and pulp sectors.
World Bank-G8 Proposal for a ‘Forest Carbon Partnership Facility – FCPF’65

The FCPF is being promoted by the World Bank with German government backing in order to ‘set thestage’ for an anticipated inclusion of REDD schemes under the UNFCCC for its next reductionscommitment from 2012. The proposed FCPF would thus be set up outside the UNFCCC, but would ‘takeaccount’ of the current and forthcoming UNFCCC negotiations. In May 2007, the World Bank is preparing
a detailed ‘Information Memorandum’ on the FCPF proposal for consideration at the June 2007
Heiligendamm G8 summit in which it will urge G8 members to support the FCPF ‘…as a framework forpiloting activities in developing countries that would reduce CO2 emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation (REDD).’
It is proposed that the FCPF will undertake pilot activities that would:
•

•

•
•

•
•

Test the feasibility of different methodological approaches to REDD payment schemes, such as
methods for measuring and estimating ‘national reference rates, monitoring and verification’ forapplication in a future global ‘scaled-up system’
Prepare 20 or 30 developing country governments for a future global REDD incentive system throughcapacity building for (i) compiling a baseline ‘reference scenario’ and a ‘credible estimate of theirnational carbon stocks and sources of forest emissions’; and (ii) developing a national REDD strategy
that would ‘take into account their priorities and constraints’. The Bank proposes that these activities
would be funded by its other main funding mechanism – the GFA
Pilot national REDD schemes in at least five developing countries
Finance ‘specific [forest protection] activities’ in the pilot countries that would be planned andimplemented by ‘national institutions and governments, in partnership with critical civil society
stakeholders’. This might include ‘better enforcement of regulations prohibiting deforestation’,support to protected area systems, national government budget support; support for fire
prevention and suppression services; (iv) support for national certification initiatives; or (v)targeted payments for environmental services… ‘directly to beneficiaries’
Channel money to ‘Private actors’ through government bodies
Use both market and non-market approaches, including funds from bilateral development agencies,
public IFIs, the IFC, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and foundations.

Potential negative social and livelihood impacts sidelined yet again?

In a workshop held in Berlin in April 2007 to discuss the outline FCPF proposal, some governments raisedquestions about the capacity of any FCPF to deliver local benefits and highlighted concerns about risks of
REDD schemes supporting unjust existing forest laws. However, the Bank’s March 2007 concept note only
briefly acknowledges that: ‘Equity in the payment scheme, including community participation, will be an
important factor for the program’s sustainability’. The Bank and other advocates of the Facility have notaddressed social risks and perverse incentives to enforce unjust forest protection laws. The Bank simply
proposes ‘sharing lessons’ from pilot activities, without substantive actions or initiatives to address social,
rights and accountability issues.

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Endnotes

1 Bangladesh, Bolivia, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chile, Congo, Colombia, Costa Rica, DR Congo,

Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya,
Lesotho, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Samoa, Solomon Islands,
Thailand, Uruguay, Uganda, and Vanuatu (see http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/eng/ )2 Moutinho, P, Santilli, M, Schwartzman, S and Rodrigues, L (2005) Why ignore tropical deforestation? A
proposal for including forest conservation in the Kyoto Protocol
http://ftp.whrc.org/policy/COP/Brazil/moutinho%20et%20al%20%202006%20%20Unasylva%20222_2730.pdf See also Moutinho, P and Schwartzman, S (Eds) (2005) Tropical Deforestation and Climate Change
Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental da Amazônia and Environmental Defense, Belém and Washington DC
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/4930_TropicalDeforestation_and_ClimateChange.pdf
3 UNFCCC (2007) Report on the second workshop on reducing emissions from deforestation in developing

countries FCCC/SBSTA/2007/3 http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/sbsta/eng/03.pdf
4 Government of Brazil (2006) Positive incentives for voluntary action in developing countries to address
climate change: Brazilian perspective on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation Paper presented to UNFCCC
COP 12, Nairobi, Kenya, November 2006.
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/dialogue/application/pdf/wp_21_braz.pdf For local government REDD
proposals in Brazil, see – Viana,V M, Cenamo, M C and Manfrinato, W (2006) Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation in Amazonas, Brazil: a State government’s proposal for action
http://www.sds.am.gov.br/programas_02.php?cod=2485
5 Stern N (2007) The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review HM Treasury/Cabinet Office: CUP,
Cambridge at page 547
6 The World Bank now manages no less than 10 different global carbon funds worth US $2 billion on behalf of 16
governments and 64 private companies. These funds include the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF), ‘Biocarbon Fund’(BioCF), Community Development Carbon Fund, the Netherlands Clean Development Facility, the Italian
Carbon Fund, the Spanish Carbon Fund and the Danish Carbon Fund, among others.
7 The European Space Agency claims that it has developed a framework for Global Monitoring for Environment

and Security (GMES) that includes a remote sensing Forest Monitoring project using GMES Sentinel satellites
which would provide ‘global coverage every five days with a resolution of 10 metres’ – see European Space
Agency (2006) ‘ESA backs incentives for developing countries avoiding deforestation’ Press release
http://www.esa.int/esaLP/SEMOKCC4VUE_LPgmes_0.html
8 Fearnside, P (2003) ‘Avoided Deforestation in Amazonia as a Global Warming Mitigation Measure: the case of

Mato Grosso’ World Resource Review 15(3)(2003):352-361
9 See, for example, Smith, K, Mulungoy, R and Sayer, J (2005) ‘Harnessing carbon markets for tropical forest

conservation: towards a more realistic assessment’ in Sayer, J (Ed)(2005) Earthscan Reader in Forestry andDevelopment Earthscan, London and Sterling at page 329. See also, Chomitz, K M (2006) Policies for nationallevel avoided deforestation programs: a proposal for discussion Background paper for policy research report on
tropical deforestation, Revised Draft 1.3
http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/documents/ChomitzAvoidedDeforestationrev1.3.pdf
10 CAN International (2007a) Reducing emissions from deforestation in development countries: approaches tostimulate action Climate Action Network International Submission to international workshop on ‘Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation’, February 2007 at page 7.
11 http://www.kyoto2.org/
12 Tickell, O pers. comm., May 2007

13 Environmental Defense (2006) Compensated reduction – a positive incentive for tackling the largest source ofgreenhouse gas emissions in the developing world
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/4875_CompensatedReduction_Overview.pdf
14 Speech by Secretary of State, Hilary Benn, on The Future of the World Bank, Royal Africa Society/School ofOriental and African Studies, London http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/Speeches/world-bank-april07.asp
15 See, World Bank (2007) presentation at http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/ppts/robert_watson.ppt#356,1,Slide 1
16 See, for example, Ebeling J and Tippmann R (2007) International policy for avoided deforestation – reachingsynergies for environment and development Presentation by Ecosecurities to Yale workshop on Financing for
Forest Conservation, 2-3 March 2007

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Seeing ‘RED’? ‘Avoided deforestation’ and the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities

17 CAN International (2007a) op. cit. CANI (2007b) Report of Workshop on Reducing Emissions from

Deforestation in Developing Countries, 7-9 March 2007 – Cairns, Australia Unpublished internal report
18 Government of India (2007) Indian Proposal: An Alternatve Policy Approach to Avoided Deforestation:compensated conservation Presentation to 2nd UNFCCC workshop on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in
Developing Countries, 7-9 March 2007, Cairn, Australia
http://unfccc.int/files/methods_and_science/lulucf/application/pdf/070307kishwan.pdf
19 Government of Indonesia (2007) Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries (REDD)
Paper submitted to UNFCCC SBSTA by the Government of Indonesia

20 Prior, S, Streck, C and O’Sullivan, R (2006) ‘Incentivising avoided deforestation – a stock based methodology’Submission by the Cente for International Sustainable Development Law to the COP UNFCCC in response tocalls for views on the issue of avoided deforestation issues at its 11th Session, March 2006. Chomitz, KM, Buys, P,
De Luca, G, Thomas TS and Wertyz-Kanounnikoff, S (2007) At loggerheads? Agricultural expansion, poverty
reduction, and environment in thr tropical forests World Bank, Washington D.C. at page 204
21 See, for example, Butler, R (2006) ‘Avoided deforestation could help fight third world poverty under global

warming pact: $43 billion could flow into developing countries’ Mongabay.com bulletin October 31, 2006
22 Chomitz, KM, et al (2007) op. cit.. at page 195
23 Government of Indonesia (2007) Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries (REDD)
Paper submitted to UNFCCC SBSTA by the Government of Indonesia
http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/NR/rdonlyres/4E81DB28-410F-4885-ACB6-6CA802603A32/0/indonesia.pdf
24 See, for example, Robertson, N and Wunder S (2005) Fresh tracks in the forest: assessing incipient payments
for environmental services initiatives in Bolivia CIFOR, Bogor
25 ICRAF (2006) ‘Clean Rivers, Lighted Lights: monetary rewards for reducing sediment’ RUPES Sumberjaya

Brief No.2, World Agroforestry Centre, Bogor; ICRAF (2007) ‘In Bakun, indigenous peoples use modern
mechanisms for selling environmental services to preserve a tradtional way of life without its poverty traps’ Site
Profile: RUPES Bakun ICRAF, Baguio City
26 Wunder, S (2006) ‘Are direct payments for environmental services spelling doom for sustainabe forest

management in the tropics’? Ecology and Society11 (2):23
27 May, P, Boyd, E, Chang, M and Veiga Neto, F C (2005) ‘Incorporating sustainable development in carbon

forest projects in Brazil and Bolivia’ Estudos Sociedade e Agricultura 1 (2005)
28 Granda, P (2005) Carbon Sink Plantations in the Ecuadorian Andes: impacts of the Dutch FACE-PROFAFOR
monoculture tree plantations’ project on indigenous and peasant communities WRM Series on Tree Plantations
No. 1, WRM, Montevideo
29 Karsenty, A (2004) ‘Des rentes contre le développment? Les nouveaux instruments d’acquisition mondiale dela biodiversité et l’utilisation des terres dans les pays tropicaux’ Mondes en développment 127(3):1-9. See also,
Friends of the Earth International (2005)Nature for Sale: privatization - the impacts of privatizing water andbiodiversity FOEI, Amsterdam http://www.foei.org/en/publications/pdfs/privatization.pdf See also Global
Forest Coalition (2007) Potential Policy Approaches and Positive Incentives to Reduce Emissions from
Deforestation in Developing Countries A submission to the Secretariat of the Framework Convention on Climate
Change http://www.wrm.org.uy/GFC/material/Incentives_Reduce_Emissions.html
30 See, for example, Makelo, S (2006) The DRC Case Study: the impacts of carbon sinks of Ibi-Batéké Project on
the indigenous Pygmies of the Democratic Republic of Congo http://www.internationalalliance.org/documents/Climate%20Change%20-%20DRC.pdf
31 Nature Conservancy (2007) Climate Action Project: Noel Kempff Mercado National Park, Bolivia
http://www.nature.org/initiatives/climatechange/work/art4253.html
32 May, PH, Boyd, E, Veiga F and Chang M (2004) Local sustainable development effects of forest carbon

projects in Btrazil and Bolivia Environmental Economics Programme, IIED, London; Robertson, N and Wunder
S (2005) op. cit.
33 http://dup.esrin.esa.it/news/news125.asp
34 Wynn, G (2007) ‘World Bank eyes $250 mln deal to save forests’ Reuters, Thu May 3, 2007
35 Governors of Aceh, Papua and Papua Barat (2007) Declaration of the Governors of Aceh, Papua and Papua

Barat on Climate Change April 26, 2007, Nusa Dua, Bali
36 ENS (2007) ‘Ecuador Seeks Compensation to Leave Amazon Oil Undisturbed QUITO, Ecuador, April 24, 2007’

http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/apr2007/2007-04-24-04.asp

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Seeing ‘RED’? ‘Avoided deforestation’ and the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities

37 See, for example, Griffiths, T, Rebbapragada, R and Kalluri, B (2005) ‘The Great ‘Community Forest
Management’ Swindle In India – critical evaluation of an ongoing World Bank-financed project in Andhra
Pradesh’ in Broken Promises: how World Bank policies fail to protect forests and forest people’ rights World
Rainforest Movement, FPP, RF-UK, EDF, Global Witness – see www.forestpeoples.org.
38 Colchester, M and Lohmann, L (1990) The Tropical Forestry Action Plan: What Progress? WRM and The

Ecologist, Penang and Sturminster Newton. See also Hildyard N, Hegde P, Wolverkamp P and Reddy S (1998)
Same Platform, Different train: the politics of participation
http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/item.shtml?x=51958
39 Global Forest Coalition (2007) From Meals to Wheels: the social and ecological catastrophe of agrofuels GFC
and Global Justice Ecology Project. See especially, Tauli-Corpuz, V and Tamang P (2007) Oil Palm and other
Commercial Tree Plantations: impacts on indigenous peoples’ land tenure and resource management systems
and livelihoods UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 6th Session, New York, 14-25 May 2007
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/6session_crp6.doc
40 Counsel, S (2005) ‘Democratic Republic of Congo – after the war the fight for the forest’ pp.11-19 in Broken
Promises: how World Bank Group policies fail to protect forests and forest peoples’ rights FPP, WRM, ED, DTE,
Global Witness, RF-UK, Sinkswatch. Moreton-in-Marsh and Monetevideo. See also Inspection Panel (2006)
Report and Recommendation on Request for Inspection, Democratic Republic of Congo: Transitional Support
for Economic Recovery Credit Operation (TSERO) (IDA Grant No. H192-DRC) and Emergency Economic andSocial Reunification Support Project (EESRSP) (IDA Credit No. 3824-DRC and IDA Grant No. H064-DRC)
Inspection Panel, Washington, DC
41 Granda, P (2005) Carbon Sink Plantations in the Ecuadorian Andes: impacts of the Dutch FACE-PROFAFOR
monoculture tree plantations’ project on indigenous and peasant communities WRM Series on Tree Plantations
No. 1, WRM, Montevideo
42 Colchester, M (2003) Salvaging Nature: indigenous peoples, protected areas and biodiversity conservation
WRM and FPP, Montevideo and Moreton-in-Marsh
43 Colchester, M, Boscolo, M, Contreras-Hermosilla, A, Del Gatto, F, Dempsey, J, Lesccuyer G, Obidzinski, K,
Pommier, D, Richards, M, Sembiring S N, Tacconi, L, Vargas Rios M T and Wells, A (2006) Justice in the Forest:
rural livelihoods and forest law enforcement CIFOR, Bogor
44 See, for example, Griffiths, T (2005) Indigenous Peoples and the Global Environment Facility (GEF)
Indigenous Peoples' experiences of GEF- funded Biodiversity Conservation - A critical study FPP, Moreton-in-

Marsh
45 See especially, International Alliance of Indigenoius and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests (2005) Our

knowledge Our Survival: Traditional Forest Related Knowledge and the Implementation of RelatedInternational Commitments IAITPTF and CIFOR, Chiang Mai and Bogor. See also: Colchester, M (Ed)(2001) A
survey of indigenous land tenure FPP, Moreton-in-Marsh.
46 ‘Focus on High Conservation Value Forests’ WRM Bulletin No. 114 January 2007
http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/114/viewpoint.html#Policy

47 May, PH, Boyd, E, Veiga F and Chang M (2004) Local sustainable development effects of forest carbon

projects in Btrazil and Bolivia Environmental Economics Programme, IIED, London at pages 85.
48 For a detailed and through examination of the scientific and ethical problems with carbon trading and carbon

markets, see Lohmann, L (2006) ‘Carbon Trading: a critical conversation on climate change, privatisation andpower’ Development Dialogue No.48 (September 2006)
49 See, for example, the CAN update on avoided deforestation published at the 26th meeting of the UNFCCCSBSTA – CAN (2007) ‘Code REDD’ Eco, 11 May, 2007. See also the report of the a two day workshop held in the
UK at Chatham House and reported on by the Royal Society of Birds (RSPB) that seemingly did not addressrights, equity and poverty issues as central themes in the organisation of the dicussion. The report suggests
thatthe topic barely came up in the open discussions that focus on finance and technical issues above all – RSPB
(2007) Workshop on Reducing Emissions from Tropical Deforestation RSPB and Chatham House, 16-17 April,
2007
50 Cf. Wunder, S (2005) Payments for Environmental Services: Some Nuts and Bolts, CIFOR, Bogor at page 22.
51 WWF – the Gold Standard – background and overview
http://assets.panda.org/downloads/thegoldstandardoverview.doc
52 http://www.climate-standards.org/

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53 CCB to date has only certified two PES carbon forestry projects in China and Panama - see
http://www.climate-standards.org/news/news_feb2007.html

54 See Colchester, M, Sirait M and Wijardjo B (2003) The Application of FSC Principles 2 & 3 in Indonesia:

Obstacles and Possibilities WALHI and AMAN, Jakarta. Colchester, M (2006) ‘Guyana: Controversial Barama
certificate further tarnishes FSC’s reputation’ WRM Bulletin No. 105, April, 2006. See also WRM (2003)
Certifying the Uncertifiable. FSC Certification of Tree Plantations in Thailand and Brazil
http://www.wrm.org.uy/actors/FSC/uncertifiable.html
55 Smith, J and Scherr, SJ (2002) Forest Carbon and Local Livelihoods: assessment of opportunities and policy

recommendations CIFOR Occasional Paper No. 37, CIFOR, Bogot; Peskett, Brown, D and Luttrell, C (2006) Can
payments for avoided deforestation to tackle climate change also benefit the poor? Forest Policy andEnvironment Programme – FPEP, ODI, London
56 The Mumbai - Porto Alegre Forest Initiative http://www.wrm.org.uy/statements/Mumbai/index.html
57 Indigenous Peoples’ Statement (2007) Indigenous Peoples Major Group – Opening Statement UN

Commission on Sustainable Development, Inter-active Session with Major Groups – Monday, April 30, 2007
58 See, for example, WRM (2000) ‘The Mount Tamalpais Declaration’ WRM's bulletin Nº 39, October 2000.

WRM (2000) Climate Change Convention: Sinks that stink WRM, Montevideo
http://www.wrm.org.uy/actors/CCC/Sinks%20that%20Stink.rtf
See also, FERN (2000) ‘Brussels boiling over on carbon sinks issue’ EU Forest Watch Issue 47 - Special Report:
Climate Change http://www.fern.org/pubs/fw/srnov00.pdf . IFIPCC (2001) The Bonn Declaration Third
International Forum of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities on Climate Change 14-15 June, 2001
http://www.tebtebba.org/tebtebba_files/susdev/cc_energy/bonndeclaration.htm
59 Humphreys D (2006) Logjam: deforestation and the crisis of global governance Earthscan Forestry Library,

Earthscan: London and Sterling at page 207
60 Kimberley Declaration
http://www.treatycouncil.org/The%20Kimberley%20Declaration%20International%20Indigenous%20Peoples%
20Summit%20on%20Sustainable%20Development.pdf
http://www.terradaily.com/reports/More_Than_50_Tribes_Convene_on_Global_Warming_Impacts_999.htm
l See also ENS (2007) ‘Indigenous Peoples on Climate Change Front Lines’ http://www.ensnewswire.com/ens/apr2007/2007-04-19-03.asp
61 Climate Alliance Manifesto http://www.klimabuendnis.org/english/association/511a.htm See also, theClimate Alliance Declaration http://www.klimabuendnis.org/buendnis/5120222.htm

62 See IFIPCC (2000a) ‘The Quito Declaration on Climate Change Negotiations - Recommendations ofindigenous peoples and organizations regarding the process of the framework convention on climate change’
Quito, Ecuador, May 4-6, 2000.; IFIPPC (2000b) ‘Declaration of the First International Forum of Indigenous
Peoples on Climate Change’ Lyon, September 4-6, 2000; IFIPCC (2000c) ‘Second International Indigenous
Forum on Climate Change - Declaration of Indigenous Peoples on Climate Change’ The Hague, November 1112,2000; IFIPCC (2001) ‘The Bonn Declaration Third International Forum of Indigenous Peoples and Local
Communities on Climate Change’ Bonn, 14-15 June, 2001; Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities Caucus(2001) Declaration to Seventh Session of the Conference of the Parties United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change Marrakech,October 29 to November 9, 2001 – declarations available at
http://www.tebtebba.org/tebtebba_files/susdev/cc_energy/cc.html Indigenous Peoples' Caucus (2002)
Statement on Climate Change to COP8, UNFCCC COP 8, UNFCCC, New Delhi, October 23 - November 1, 2002
Indigenous Peoples' Caucus (2004) Declaration of the Indigenous Peoples Attending COP 10, UNFCCC Buenos
Aires, December 6 – 17, 2004
63 Colchester, M (2001) ‘Capturing carbon: dilemmas for forest peoples’ WRM Bulletin No. 48, July 2001

64 World Bank (2007) Global Forest Alliance: proposal for a comprehensive approach to the conservation andsustainable use of the world’s forests SDN Forest and Carbon Finance Teams, World Bank, Washington, DC
February 15, 2007
65 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility: Concept Note, March 2007; Non-Paper on the Forest Carbon Partnership
Facility - Chair’s summary of the Berlin Workshop Discussions Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation andDevelopment and Federal Minsitry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, G8, April
2007

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Proposals are emerging for global policies to promote‘Reduced Emissions from Deforestation’ (RED) to help combat
climate change. This FPP report analyses these proposals andoutlines the need for urgent debate on the social and rights
issues that risk being overlooked.

Forest Peoples Programme
1c Fosseway Centre, Stratford Road
Moreton-in-Marsh, GL56 9NQ, UK
Tel: +44 (0)1608 652893, fax: +44 (0)1608 652878
email: info@forestpeoples.org
http://www.forestpeoples.org