Eritrea Ethiopia: The Light at the End of the Tunnel After 1998
By BrunoJanuary 9, 2014
It is history now that the first half of the 1990s saw a remarkable change in the paradigm ofrelations between the newly independent state of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republicof Ethiopia. In the initial euphoria regarding these events that was unfolding in the horn politics,
there was much talk and writings of the <end of the conflict history>, <a new age of peace>,<renaissance>, and <strategic alliances and cooperation>. But as event continued to unfold, ifanything has happened, it was the return of the past history with a vengeance.
The same analogy was amplified in the bigger projection, by many politicians and politicalscientists, after the fall of the Berlin wall in all corners of the world, but if anything has
happened it is not congruent to what was promised by the new world order following this event.
For many who had monitored and followed events and their contours prior to this tragic
conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea which started at the borders, there was nothing new that
surfaced. The relations between two countries were not in relative peace during those earlyyears of the 90s. Ethnic tensions and problems were mounting inside Ethiopia. Economic
inequalities and marginalization of the Ethiopian disenfranchised population was increasing.
Social injustices were becoming rampant. The political legitimacy of the regime in Ethiopia
and its federal system was being openly used as an instrument to divide the population deeper
on the basis of ethnic lines. Cross cutting issues like diverse range of actors with apparently
irreconcilable differences over the protection and attainment of their material and politicalinterests were increasing.
The preservation of the historical, ideological, political and cultural values of the “Tigrian”
political leadership in Ethiopia and the fulfilment of the need for some form of recognizednational identity at the expense of other ethno lingual groups in neighbouring nations werebeing manifested vividly in the contours of the new political map of the Horn: including but not
excluding in the political and geographical borders of the two countries Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Therefore, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to understand the undercurrent which leading to theborder conflict between the two countries, which remarkably changed into full-fledged war inno time, was definitely a spill over and extreme manifestation of such and other embroiled
problems brought forward from the past genesis of the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF).

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Surrounded and influenced by these and similar events, third party mediation in its raw Cold
War form and content resurfaced once again to provide a resolution formula so that the conflict
would not become an epicentre to other tangential and inherently usual problems of conflict ofinterest in the region.
There was a serious concern of many politicians and political scientists that this event could
lead into dismemberment and division of Ethiopia on ethnic line. Internecine power rivalry in
the political leadership of Ethiopia will follow. US, Russian, European regional security
interests and relationships could be affected adversely. Thus, every effort was made to containor deter the conflict quickly by facilitating mediation by proxy including putting an impositionof arms embargo to both countries.
The Ethiopian political leadership, which has been a beneficiary during the Cold War period insuch kind of situations i.e. during the conflict of Ethiopia-Somalia in 1978, Ethiopia-Sudan in
1975 and Ethiopia-Eritrea in the thirty years war since 60s, seeking external military andpolitical support, was quick to play the old tune and drums of war.
It presented this conflict as being a democratic and legal process in Ethiopia verses
undemocratic and illegal process in Eritrea.
Many well-known political elements of opportunism and new recruits in the Horn of Africa, as
well as in Eritrea and Ethiopia, joined and started playing the famous ‘eskestta’ music again.
Terrorists newly harboured in the region started clapping in unisons.
Initial interventions, which came from all angles to provide facilitative environment to put aquick end to the border conflict, ended with no success.
Even though Ethiopia failed short of getting outright military support in its long-term
objectives as it did during the Cold War, it succeeded in getting a substantial external material
and financial support to pursue its objectives in this war to further its long held policy in theHorn of Africa.
In spite of this, and other related developments in the war fronts, the border conflict between
Eritrea and Ethiopia entered its anti thesis and the demarcation of the political lines in theborder were completed in 2002.
Yes, there was a general consensus and realization by all concerned elements that this conflicthas sparked a political dilemma between the two countries, which will have a profound deeprooted implication to the states, organizations, and citizens of both countries. Therefore, the2complexity that this mediation has to endure, as a given factor, was obviously equally
proportional to it.
Yes, it was also equally important at any stage to note that the mediation of this particularconflict is definitely going to become a very important example and chapter in the subject ofconflict resolution for many local and international politicians, scientists and students for manyyears to come.
Yes, naturally, it did also become one of the favourite subjects of debates and disagreements
too.
But, those series of interpersonal meetings and negotiations between the two governments,
intergroup meetings between IGAD leaders, interventions of organization like the OAU andother regional organizations, inter-communal group meetings by citizens of both countries, andactive participation of the UN and the Security Council and the level of intervention achieved
can not be reversed; because, it was crowned by the political acceptance of both parties for a
conduit and a decision to be made by a third party.
The role of this party was clearly defined in the Algiers Agreement of December 2000. In thisAgreement, the two Parties have unequivocally agreed to hand over the determination of abinding and final settlement of this conflict to an outside mutually agreed authoritative body
called the Eritrea – Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC).
It was obvious from these framework of Agreements, signed by both, that the effectiveness of
this mediation depended, not wether the decision was partial or impartial, but on the crucial
issue of the implementation of the strategies and tactics by which the decision is to be deployedon the borders of the two countries by this Commission.
Therefore, it would be counter productive to shift away the achievements of this Commission
by using instruments of coercive diplomacy, economic embargo, sanctions or facilitative
problem solving mediums or any other mechanism of workshops of pressure at this level.
Academically speaking it is true that between any parties in a conflict the nature of mediation isdependent on a number of factors like the sources of the conflict, the history of trust or hostility
between the parties, their predisposition to negotiate and compromise, and the nature andtiming of the request or offer of any mediation.
But looking back into the background of this conflict, the avenue and widow of opportunity
opened by this Commission is the only light in sight at the end of this treacherous andprolonged tunnel.

3Therefore international community should play a constructive and conscious role to abort
further catastrophic human tragedy in the Horn of Africa by putting its full backing to thedecision of the Eritrea – Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) and support the natural
evolution of peace process between the two states.
More than any time in the past, it is now that the parties to this Agreement should be shownhow to put their hands were their mouth is and not where the alms or arms are because this is
the only genuine solution to this conflict on the table that denies others from provoking or
starting war under unlawful political pretext for their development in the Horn. Cold War
policies must not blind UNSC. History will ask their judgments. Regional peace and stability isclearly at steak here. It must not be a way of life.

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