Session 4 South Korean Politics under Social Conflicts

World Society and Prisoner’s Human Rights:The National Ratification of the Convention Against Torture, 1984~2000
Min Kyung Kim(MA Student, Korea University)

Abstract This study focuses on a specific national display of human rights
commitment and the national ratification of the UN Convention Against Torture andOther Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). I emphasize thepositive influence on ratification of CAT of crucial time points. For the this study, I
address the two argument frame as theoretical background. The world society
perspective assert that the human rights regime and its theorization gives rise to alogic of appropriateness that leads nation-states to present themselves as entities
affirming human rights, especially in the international arena. World society perspectiveemphasize the importance of cultural or institutional frames. On the other hand, therational actor models assert that countries are not homogeneous, thus will react
differently to external pressure. That is, nation-states have their own social andpolitical structures and public belief systems that may align with or work in opposition
to the norms and beliefs articulated by world society. From these argument frames, I
examine several hypotheses, emphasizing the positive influence on ratification of CAT
of crucial time points with event history analysis. The final analysis include 174
countries having a total of 115 events (this mean that instance of ratification of CAT)
over the time period 1984-2000. The results from the event history analyses of therating of becoming party to CAT are shown that (1) old nation states and state's
level of torture, which has a positive effect of CAT ratification. But economic
development and western countries was not consistently significant. On the otherhands, turning to the world society perspectives, strong results were found for eachmodel. (2) Establishing of National Human Rights Institutions, and having morememberships in IGOs, INGOs, HRIGOs and HRINGOs increases the rate of CAT
ratification. From these results, an effects of external normative and endogenous
factors influences consistent with the national ratification of CAT.

Keywords: UN CAT. human rights. rational actor model. world society. global culture.

INTRODUCTION
Since the World War Ⅱ, human rights has become the most central value in theworld. And over the latest years, the struggle against torture has become a central
concern of human rights. Torture is a serious crime in the international law, therefore
the world society make effort to diminish the acts of torture. The first international
legal text specifically outlawing 'torture' was the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights 19481) and then International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 19662) also
prohibiting torture. The first treaty prohibiting torture -the European Convention on

Human Rights- was adopted in 1950(Walter Kälin, 1998). Today, there are no Statejustified torture. Most of nations, take up the position that one's own country
prohibiting torture. However, the present situation call into question that States haveagreed in principle with the need for prohibiting torture rather than the State will
substantially prevent acts of torture. Amnesty International published report, Torture in

the Eighties, which found that “more than a third of the world's governments haveused or tolerate torture or ill-treatment of prisoners”(Amnesty International, 1984). In
these situation, the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,

Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) became the first binding
international instrument exclusively dedicated to the struggle against one of the mostserious and pervasive human rights violations of our time. This convention adopted in
1984.
This paper focuses on a specific national display of human rights commitment andthat is national ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. I emphasize the positive influence on
ratification of CAT of crucial time points. I address the two argument frame astheoreticalbackground

for

the

study.

First

argument

frame

is

"worldsocietyperspectives", another argument frame is "rational actor models".
The world society perspective assert that the human rights regime and its
theorization gives rise to a logic of appropriateness that leads nation-states to1) No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment(Article 5).
2) No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In
particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation(Article 7).

- 1 -present themselves as entities affirming human rights, especially in the international
arena and assumes that nation-states vary with respect to how much access they
have to the appropriate scripts and norms. On the other hand, the rational actor
models assert that countries are not homogeneous, and thus will react differently to
external pressure. That is, nation-states have their own social and political structuresand public belief systems that may align with or work in opposition to the norms andbeliefs articulated by world society. Social structural, political, and cultural factors are
three important sets of domestic influences as rational actor models. From a worldsociety perspectives and rational actor models, I examine several hypotheses,
emphasizing the positive influence on ratification of CAT of crucial time points with
event history analysis.

THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE (CAT)The drafting of the Convention Against Torture was commenced by the UN
Commission on Human Rights in 1978, and the document was adopted by theGeneral Assembly in 1984. This convention, the term "torture" means "any act bywhich severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted ona person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or aconfession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or issuspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, orfor any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity" (Article 1). The Convention
Against Torture stipulates explicitly in Article 2 that countries under the Convention are
obliged to “take effective legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures toprevent acts of torture.” This particular provision formally established the specific legal
obligation of the state to prevent torture.
Article 4 of the Convention Against Torture makes clear that the crime of torture isof a “grave nature.” Article 11 of the Convention Against Torture requires states to“keep under systematic review interrogation rules, instructions, methods and practices,
as well as arrangements for the custody and treatment of persons subjected to any
form of arrest, detention or imprisonment.” Article 11 professionalizes the practices of- 2 -interrogation and mandates the creation of a record of actual practices, thereby
enhancing not only education, but transparency and accountability as well.
Article 13 imposes upon a state party the obligation to ensure that any individual
who alleges they have been subjected to torture has the right to complain to stateauthorities.
The Convention also establishes institutions and procedures to effect implementationof its goals. It establishes a Committee Against Torture (Article 17) and outlines theCommittee’s functioning (Article 18). The Committee Against Torture is empowered to
examine reports from state parties to the Convention and to inquire into allegations ofsystematic practices of torture (Articles 19 and 20). The Committee Against Torture isalso empowered to accept complaints from states alleging a particular state’s
noncompliance with the Convention (Article 21). However, this power might only be
exercised with the explicit consent of the state alleged to be in non-compliance.
Under Article 22, the Committee Against Torture may receive complaints fromindividuals against the state and is to report annually to state parties and to the UN
General Assembly(Nagan and Atkins, 2001).

<Figure 1> Cumulative Percentage of Ratifications of the Convention Against Tortureand Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984-2000.
70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Source: United Nations
Since its adoption in 1984 and up to 2000, the cumulative percentage of countries
that ratified the convention increased. This pattern evidenced in figure 1. By 2000,- 3 -115 countries had ratified the CAT (see Appendix). This finding is caused by overall
increase in the number of economically, politically, or culturally modern countries in
the world. This mean that overall increased in ratification reflects the state's domestic
factors. And as noted earlier, I also insist that these increased in ratification reflects
the world society perspectives.

THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS
In this section, I consider theoretical perspectives on compliance with international
human rights treaties. I opt to blend the two scholarships in the two broad
approaches, which I group under the labels "rational actor models" and "world society
perspectives". Each theoretical approach provides useful complementary insights into
the ratification of treaty.

RATIONAL ACTOR MODELS

The rational actor models beliefs that state's behavior is motivated by self-interest,
and this interest is determined by the structure of the international system ofpower(Waltz, 1979). States and individuals that guide them are rational self-interested
actors that calculate the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action ininternational realm and act accordingly. In this view, compliance on international law
and treaty does not hold a privileged position. It is one of a series of tools available
to the relevant actors in their ongoing battle to achieve their self-interested ends.
Compliance does not occur unless it furthers the self-interest of the parties by, forexample, improving their reputation, enhancing their geopolitical power, furthering theirideologicalends,

avoiding

conflict,or

avoiding

sanction

by

a

more

powerfulstate(Hathaway, 2002).
Rational actor models assert that countries are not homogeneous, and thus willreact differently to external pressure. That is, nation-states have their own social andpolitical structures and public belief systems. Social structural, political, and cultural
factors are important sets of domestic influences as rational actor models.
Economic modernization leads to political stability and increased respect for humanrights, so increasing possibility of ratification. The poorest countries, with substantial- 4 -social and political tensions created by economic scarcity.
Political culture and regime type seem to be the principal political conditions. The
dominant attitudes and beliefs of a society are considered to be of great importanceinthe choiceofmethods

of politicalcontrolandtherelative

propensityofgovernments to violate human rights. The governments operate within the liberal
tradition are likely to observe their citizen's human rights. By contrast, communitariansocieties in which the community or the state has priority over the individual, will not
be receptive to the observance of human rights(Mitchell and McCormick, 1998).
Cultural modernization is indeed a very contentious idea, as in the contrast between"west countries" and "non west countries". But the underlying mechanism throughout
these argumentsisthat internalchangesinthedirectionofgreatersocietalmodernization. From these perspectives it is less costly, and thus more likely, for amore modern society to ratify a treaty that express a point of a view more consistent
with its internal modern arrangements. (Wotipka and Ramirez, 2007).
The preceding discussion motivates five hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1a: More economic developed countries are more likely to ratify CAT thanless economic developed countries.
Hypothesis 1b: Western countries are more likely to ratify CAT than non-Westerncountries.
Hypothesis 1c: Old nation-states are more likely to ratify CAT than New sovereignstates (old nation-states means that established before 1945).
Hypothesis 1d: There are significant relationship between CAT ratification and State's
level of torture.
Hypothesis 1e: There are significant relationship between CAT ratification and State's
level of political rights.

WORLD SOCIETY PERSPECTIVES

A

rational

actor

modelsfocusesonastate'sendogenous

characteristics.

Conversely, world society perspectives argue that state are embedded in andconstituted by an exogenous world society(Meyer et al., 1997). World society
perspectives

maintainthat

aglobalculture- 5 -promulgatescognitive

framesandnormative

prescriptions

that

constitutethelegitimate

identities,

structures,

andpurposes of modern nation-states(Meyer, Boli, and Thomas, 1987). World society
perspectives refers to a theoretical approach that pays special attention to cognitive,
cultural, and normative dimensions of organizational reality(Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
Legitimacy is a core element in this approach, as organizations are thought toenact

scripts

composedofstandardized

elements

deemedlegitimate

in

their

environments. The core argument is that models and norms that are institutionalized
at the world level acquire assumed status over time and influence policy makers at
the national level. As many governments organize and restructure their national
polities around global models and standards of appropriate behavior, a growing
number of states share isomorphic political and social structures that are harmonious
with the international model (Meyer, Boli et al., 1997; Boli and Thomas, 1999).
In the case of ratification of international treaties, the world society approach
predicts that the policy decision to ratify is often a symbolic gesture to signal thatthe government is not a deviant actor, and does not necessarily lead to compliant
practices with the treaty. In other words, ruling elites might ratify a treaty to gain
legitimation in international society(Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005).
World society perspectives have suggested three primary mechanism to explain
when states are most susceptible to world cultural influences. The first is the strengthof a country's linkages to the central polity. The more active states are intransnational governance regimes(e.g., the UN) and global civil society, the more
likely they are to adopt. As embodiments and carriers of world culture, international
non-governmental organizations(INGOs) are effective at spreading global human rights
norms. Membership in international governmental organizations(IGOs) is important as
well, because it is here that human rights conventions are debated, drafted.
Participation in international meetings or conferences provides another mechanism bywhich world cultural norms are consolidated, articulated, and diffused throughout theworld.
Seconds, some have argued that participation in human rights conference more
directly persuades, socializes, or otherwise influences state that have not yet ratified
the conventions to do so.
A third mechanism posited by institutional theorists is imitation(DiMaggio and Powell,1983). As the number of countries adopting a practice or ratifying a treaty increases,- 6 -other countries perceive that practice or treaty as legitimate and adopt it themselves,
regardless of its practical relevance.
The preceding discussion motivates four hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2a: Countries are more likely to ratify CAT if a National Human Rights
Institutions were established.
Hypothesis 2b: The stronger a state's linkage to the wider world of international
treaties, the greater is its likelihood of ratifying the CAT
Hypothesis 2c: The stronger a state's linkage to the wider world of organizations (IGO
and INGO), the greater is its likelihood of ratifying the CAT.
Hypothesis 2d: A state's likelihood of ratifying the convention increases as the othercountries throughout the world or one's region have already ratified it.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: DATA AND METHODS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: RATIFY THE CAT

I examine the rate at which states ratify the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment from the time it was available
for ratification (1984) to 2000. The data were coded from the United Nations. The
event studied is whether a country ratifies CAT in a given year during the time period.
When it does, it receives a value of 1 for that year. For those years in which a
country does not become party to CAT, the country receives a score of 0.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

In order to estimate my hypothesis, I use several independent variables. I begin
with a set of endogenous variable.

GDP per capita. National economic development measured by real Gross Domestic
Product(GDP) per capita in constant US$ (2000). It is logged to correct for a skewed
distribution. The idea that national economic development strengthens democratic
institutions and increase the possibility of ratification.

- 7 -Western status. I define Western status to include most of Western Europe as well as
the "White settler" colonies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Austria, and theUnitedStates.

These

Westerncountries

typically

experienced

earlierpolitical

modernization. The data were coded from the CIA's World Factbook. Westerncountries receives a value of 1, non-Western countries receives a score of 0.

New sovereign nations.

I include a measure of new sovereign nations. The data

derivedfromestablished

the

CIA's

World

after

1945,

that

Factbook.

countries

New

receives

nation-states

means

a

1,

value

of

that

State

otherwise,oldnation-states means that state established before 1945, that countries receives avalue of 0.

State's level of torture. For the coding, I used second material. Hathaway(2002)
generated the data on torture by coding the sections on torture in the United States
Department of the State Country Reports on Human rights. Torture index ranges from
1 to 5(low: 1, High: 5).

Political rights. There are significant relationship between CAT ratification and state's
level of political rights. So, I captured this variables for study. Freedom House's
yearbook that surveys comparative freedoms. Each nation is assigned an 'overall
freedom rating' - a level of political rights. Political rights index ranges from 1 to7(low: 1, high: 7)

National Human Rights Institutions. National Human Rights Institutions harmonized withinternational law. National Human Rights Institutions received a world culture, andconvey the world culture to the nation. So, there are strong relationship between
National Human Rights Institution's existence and participation of international treaties.
For the study, I used second data. Koo(2007) generated the data on year of foundingby coding the National Human Rights Institutions Forum and Human Rights Watch.

Intergovernmentalorganizational

and

forms

Nongovernmentalofotherssuch

Organizations.
as

There

intergovernmental

are

more

obviousorganizations(IGOs),

including OECD and UNESCO, and international nongovernmental organizations(INGOs)- 8 -that define and provide recipes for proper nation-states activities. The strength of astate's "embeddedness" in the world society is measured by the number of its
memberships in international organization, both governmental and nongovernmental.
Membership data for both IGOs and INGOs come from the Yearbook of International

Organizations(UIA: Union of International Associations). And the contributions ofhuman rights international governmental organizations(HRIGOs) and human rights
international nongovernmental organizations(HRINGOs) have become even more criticalin the contemporary international human rights regimes. So, I especially include
country memberships in human rights international governmental organizations(HRIGOs)
and human rights international nongovernmental organizations(HRINGOs). This datacoded by Tsutsui&Wotipka.
Descriptive statistics of the independent variables are displayed in Table 1.

<Table 1> Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis.
TheoryVariable
GDP per capita(constant 2000 US$)

Min
4.04

Max
10.52

Mean
7.14

Std.Dev
1.49

rational

Dummy variable of western countries

0

1

.08

.27

actor

Dummy variable of new sovereign nations

0

1

.74

.44

State's level of torture

1

5

3.14

1.41

State's level of political rights
National Human Rights Institutions (dummy)

1
0

7
1

3.91
.07

2.26
.26

modelsworld
society

IGOs memberships

4

119

42.21

15.89

INGOs membership

0

9.37

5.25

2.37

HRIGOs memberships

1

17

8.10

3.03

HRINGOs memberships

0

146

37.36

32.16

METHODS OF ANALYSIS

Event history analysis is an appropriate tool to explain events occurring toindividuals or in this case, countries over a specified period of time. As the use of
event

history

analysis

becomesincreasingly

pervasive,

more

and

more

issuesconcerning phenomena at the national level have been examined using this method.
Event history analysis offers a more dynamic method in that it provides coefficientsdemonstrating the influence of explanatory variables on the rate of treaty ratification,a single, non-repeatable event involving discrete change. Event history analysis also
allows for the possibility that some cases(countries) will not experience an event, as- 9 -in the case of countries that have yet to ratify CAT, if ever. The data are"right-censored" in that I do not know if or when these countries will ratify the treaty
in the future. The set of states at risk of becoming a party to CAT is made up of all
the countries in the world. Countries that gained their independence during this time
period get inserted into the risk set the year in which they become independent.
Assuming that changes in the hazard rate are function of changing covariates, I used
an exponential model. In such models, the hazard rate is constant over time,
following an exponential distribution. Accordingly, the change of the hazard rate overtime in the exponential model only depends on the change of the values of the
independent variables(Allison, 1984).

- 10 -RESULTS
The results from the event history analyses the rate of becoming party to CAT are
shown in Table 2. The final analysis include 175 countries having a total of 115
events(instance of ratification of CAT) over the time period 1984-2000. I report 6
different models using differing combinations of variables.

<Table 2> Exponential Models of Rate of Ratification of CAT, 1984~2000
Model 1Model 2Model 3Model 4Model 5Model 6

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

(S.E)

(S.E)

(S.E)

(S.E)

(S.E)

(S.E)

rational actor models
.06

.10

.02

.06

.07

.08

(.08)

(.08)

(.08)

(.08)

(.08)

(.08)

GDP per capita (logged)

.30

.10

-.03

-.0004

.11

.11

(.36)

(.37)

(.37)

(.36)

(.37)

(.36)

-.45*

-.42+

-.42+

-.24

-.47*

-.39+

(.23)

(.23)

(.23)

(.23)

(.23)

(.23)

-.13+

-.11

-.08

-.10

-.13+

-.13+

(07)

(.07)

(.07)

(.08)

(.07)

(.07)

.04

.02

.05

.04

.03

.01

(.05)

(.05)

(.05)

(.05)

(.05)

(.05)

western countries
new sovereign nations
state's level of torturestate's level of political rights

world society perspectives
1.08***

National Human Rights Institutions(.24)
1.03**

IGOs memberships (logged)

(.30)
.22**

INGOs membership (logged)

(.07)
.48+

HRIGOs memberships (logged)(.27)
HRINGOs memberships (logged)

.32**
(.12)

-2.85***-3.25***-6.57***-4.31***-3.79***-3.96***(.62)-196.75(.65)-188.40(1.29)-190.21(.77)-190.06(.83)-195.08(.78)-193.02

Number of ratifications

115

115

115

115

115

115

Number of countries

174

174

174

174

174

174

Yearly spells

2019

2019

2019

2019

2019

2019

Constant
Log likelihood

Note: +P<.1 *P<.05 **P<.01 ***P<.001- 11 -

REFERENCES

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- 13 -

Appendix A. Countries Used in the Analysis and Year of Ratification.

Year

Country

Albania

CountryYear
1994

Estonia

1991

Marshall Islands

Algeria

1989

Ethiopia

1994

Mauritania

AngolaCountryFiji

Mauritius

1992
1986

Antigua and Barbuda

1993

Finland1989

MexicoArgentina

1986

France1986

Micronesia

Armenia

1993

Macedonia

1994(Republic of) Moldova

Australia

1989

Gabon

2000

Mongolia

Austria

1987

GambiaAzerbaijan

1996

Georgia
Ghana

Bahamas1995

Morocco

1993

1994

Mozambique

1999

2000

Namibia

1994

1988

Nepal

1991

Netherlands

1988
1989

Bahrain

1998

GreeceBangladesh

1998

GrenadaBelarus

1987

Guatemala1990

New Zealand

Belgium

1999

Guinea1989

Nicaragua

Belize1986

Guinea-Bissau

Benin

1992

GuyanaBhutan

Year

Niger
1988

Haiti

1998

Nigeria
Norway1986

Bolivia

1999

Honduras

1996

Oman

Bosnia and Herzegovina

1993

Hungary

1987

Pakistan

Botswana

2000

Iceland

1996

Palau

Brazil

1989

India

Bulgaria

1986

Indonesia

Burkina Faso

1999

Iran

Paraguay

1990

Burundi

1993

Iraq

Peru

1988

Cambodia

1992

Ireland

Philippines

1986

Cameroon

1986

Israel1991

Poland1989

Canada

1987

Italy

1989

Portugal

1989

Cape Verde

1992

Jamaica

Germany

1990

Panama1998

1987

Papua New Guinea

Japan

1999

Romania

1990

Chad

1995

Jordan1991

Russian Federation

1987

Chile

1988

Kazakhstan

1998

Rwanda

China

1988

Kenya

1997

Saint Vincent andColombia

1987

Kiribati

Central African Republic

Comoros
Congo

1996

Congo(Brazzaville)

the Grenadines

Korea (Republic of)1995

Sao Tome and Principe

Kuwait1996

Saudi Arabia

1997

Kyrgyzstan

1997

Senegal

1986

Seychelles

1992

Costa Rica

1993

Laos

Cote d'Ivoire

1995

Latvia1992

Sierra Leone

Croatia

1992

Lebanon

2000

Singapore

Cyprus1991

Lesotho

Slovakia

1993

Czech Republic

1993

Liberia

Slovenia

1993

Denmark

1987

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

1989

Solomon Islands

Djibouti

Lithuania

1996

South Africa

1998

Dominica

Luxembourg

1987

Spain

1987

Dominican Republic

Madagascar

Sri Lanka

1994

Ecuador

1988

Malawi

Egypt

1986

MalaysiaSaint Lucia

El Salvador

1996

Maldives

Sudan

1996

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Equatorial Guinea

Mali

1999

Suriname

Eritrea

Malta

1990

Swaziland- 14 -

Appendix A. Countries Used in the Analysis and Year of Ratification.

CountryYear

Sweden1986

Switzerland

1986

Syria
Tajikistan

1995

Tanzania
Thailand
Togo

1987

Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia

1988

Turkey1988

Turkmenistan

1999

Uganda1986

United Kingdom

1988

Ukraine

1987

United Arab Emirates
Uruguay

1986

U.S.A

1994

Uzbekistan

1995

Vanuatu
Venezuela

1991

Viet Nam
Samoa
Zambia1998

Zimbabwe- 15 -