Broadening the Dialogue:
Exploring Alternative Futures
to Inform Climate Action
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Research. Innovation. Sustainability

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Jennifer Garard, Amy Luers - Future Earth
Jonathan Star - Scenario Insights
Robert Laubacher - MIT Center for Collective Intelligence
Casey Cronin, Hannah Roeyer, Catherine Witherspoon - ClimateWorks Foundation

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Futures CoLab and ClimateWorks Foundation extend sincere thanks to the teammembers who contributed to the project and to the report, and to all the participants who took
the time to provide comments.
For designing and running the online scenario exercise: Annalyn Bachmann (MIT Center forCollective Intelligence), Johannes Bachhuber (MIT Center for Collective Intelligence), Hélène
Osterman (Future Earth), and Kristine Brossard (Future Earth)
For editing and conducting analyses for the report: Andréa Ventimiglia (Future Earth) and
Moritz Woehl (MIT Center for Collective Intelligence)
For designing the report: Samuel Stacey (Cultivate Communications) and Paula Monroy(Future Earth)
For reviewing and contributing to the report: ClimateWorks programs staff, including Anthony
Eggert, Justin Guay, Dan Hamza-Goodacre, Amy Malaki, Jan Mazurek, Charles McElwee, Shilpa
Patel, Prodipto Roy, Ruth Sego, and Tao Wang
We would also like to thank Alyson Surveyer (Future Earth) for providing strategic direction andguidance throughout the exercise.

About Futures CoLab
Futures CoLab brings together a network of experts—with diverse backgrounds and from allaround the world—to engage in facilitated dialogues using an online platform. The goal ofthese dialogues is to collectively explore the implications of global systemic challenges and to
propose potential responses. Futures CoLab is a collaboration between Future Earth and the
MIT Center for Collective Intelligence.

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FOREWORD
The prosperity and livability of communities around the world increasingly depend on ourcapacity to tackle climate change. As recent science—and real-world events—remind us, timeis short and the stakes are high. To avoid unacceptable impacts, we must drive the emissions
that cause climate change to net-zero by roughly mid-century, an extraordinary challenge thatwill require rapid, sustained, transformative change across the global economy for decades
to come.
The ClimateWorks Foundation mobilizes philanthropy to address climate change. We recognize
the powerful role philanthropy can play—working with partners in civil society, government, andthe private sector—to advance climate solutions. To help philanthropists deploy resources as
strategically as possible, we offer global analysis and insights to inform what climate philanthropy
does today and to cast light on changes and possibilities ahead.
This report reflects ClimateWorks’ interest in broadening the dialogue around how the world
might change between now and 2050 and how alternative futures could shape decarbonization
pathways. We teamed with Futures CoLab, a partnership of Future Earth and the MIT Center forCollective Intelligence, to conduct a facilitated scenario development exercise using an online
platform. More than 150 people from 38 countries participated, contributing perspectives fromacademia, civil society, business, think tanks, and government. Participants identified driversof change, collaboratively developed four future scenarios, and explored the implications of
those scenarios for climate action and climate philanthropy—not to arrive at definitive answers,
but to expand our shared understanding of what the future may hold, and consider how current
climate strategies may fare in a multiplicity of possible futures.
Some of the outcomes of this thought exercise aligned with our expectations, and somesurprised us. Notably, many of the trends identified in this report are responses to climate
impacts already underway, such as shifts in food production or migration patterns. Inequality
and inequity were highlighted as significant risks into the future across all scenarios. We werepleased to see novel opportunities for decarbonization emerge between now and 2050, evenin the most challenging scenarios.
We hope you find this report interesting and valuable, and we look forward to continuing this
dialogue, incorporating an ever-wider set of voices, insights, and ideas as we all work together
to achieve our climate goals and create a future in which everyone can thrive.

Charlotte Pera
PRESIDENT AND CEO, CLIMATEWORKS FOUNDATION

4EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
It is impossible to predict what the world will be like in 2050, but it is possible to shape thatworld. To do so, it is necessary to anticipate and reflect upon a range of plausible futures that
can illuminate potential opportunities and risks on the horizon.
This was the starting point for the ClimateWorks Futures CoLab exercise exploring alternative
futures for climate mitigation philanthropy. The exercise took place during the summer of2018 and brought together over 150 participants from 38 countries to engage in a facilitatedscenario development exercise through an online platform.
The process began with participants identifying drivers of change, or forces with the potential
to shape the world over the coming decades. In Section I of this report, these drivers areorganized into four categories of relevance to climate action: public engagement andmobilization, decision-making and power, accountability and financial responsibility, andculture and social norms. We then categorized the drivers based on their relative status ofdevelopment. Some drivers were characterized as trends, or forces that are already evident
and exerting an influence today. Others were described as emerging developments, drivers
that represent nascent forces on the horizon whose impact is not fully certain yet. Finally, a few
drivers were characterized as wildcards, or forces that are highly uncertain but are importantto keep in mind when considering forward-looking climate mitigation strategies.
Four scenarios that emerged from the exercise are outlined in Section II.
• Hollowed Out describes a world characterized by extreme inequality, where power isconcentrated with a small group that controls global systems and platforms.
• National Rivals depicts a future where protectionist policies dominate and hostility between
nation states, especially over resources, abounds.
• Connected Communities and Cities is a world where decentralized, local leadershipbecomes increasingly important, though tensions between urban and rural areas andinequalities within cities persist.
• Consumers in Charge describes a future controlled largely by corporations and theconsumers they serve, leading to tensions between the push for material consumption andthe push for sustainability.
We chose not to focus on a fifth scenario that emerged from the exercise: Trust Returns. This
fifth scenario conformed roughly to what many people hope becomes our future. It outlines
a positive narrative, for which many actors may already be planning, implicitly or explicitly. As
such, exploring the Trust Returns scenario in more depth would not shed light on blind spots
in current plans and strategies in the same way as the other four.
Section III of the report explores some implications of the scenarios for future climate action.
After a brief background on the current focus areas for climate mitigation philanthropy, eachof the four scenarios is revisited from the perspective of how current strategies and programs
may fare. Which strategies or programs may be at risk in each future world? Which may
remain valid, or increase in significance? What types of threats may emerge as these futureworlds develop, and what new opportunities could arise? Asking these questions serves tochallenge assumptions about the future and identify gaps in current thinking.

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CONTENTS

Executive summary ..................................................................................................................................

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Overview of ClimateWorks’ 2050 explorations ....................................................................................

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Introduction to the Futures CoLab exercise .........................................................................................

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Section 1:

Major drivers: Trends, emerging developments, and wildcards ................................. 10

1.1 Public engagement and mobilization .............................................................................................. 11
1.2 Decision-making and power .................................................................................................................. 13
1.3 Accountability and financial responsibility ................................................................................... 17
1.4 Culture and social norms ......................................................................................................................... 20

Section 2:

Four potential scenarios ............................................................................................................................... 24

2.1 Hollowed out ..................................................................................................................................................... 26
2.2 National rivals ................................................................................................................................................... 27
2.3 Connected communities and cities .................................................................................................. 29
2.4 Consumers in charge ................................................................................................................................. 32

Section 3:

Climate mitigation philanthropy ..................................................................................................... 35
3.1 Current focus areas for climate mitigation philanthropy ................................................. 35
3.2 Four scenarios: Implications for climate action ................................................................... 36
3.3 Conclusions and next steps ......................................................................................................... 41

Appendix:

Process and participants .................................................................................................................. 43
About the process ..................................................................................................................................... 43
About the participants ............................................................................................................................. 43
Evaluation and feedback ....................................................................................................................... 45

OVERVIEW OF CLIMATEWORKS’ 2050
EXPLORATIONSIn 2017, the ClimateWorks Foundation began internal discussions and analyses of potential
2050 carbon reduction goals to achieve a well-below 2°C pathway. Knowing that we must aim
for net-zero carbon emissions by mid-century, ClimateWorks asked how climate mitigation
philanthropy could best support a transition to a net-zero-carbon world.
In 2018, we broadened engagement and worked to deepen our 2050 analysis, including
holding a stakeholder event in June 2018 with experts from research, philanthropy, academia,
industry, and public office, and conducting this innovative exercise with Futures CoLab in Julyand August 2018.

No one knows what the world will look like in 2050, but weknow profound changes lie ahead.
It is impossible to predict what the world will be like in 2050, but it is possible to shape thatworld. Designing strategies to steer society effectively toward net-zero carbon is complicatedby the rapidly shifting socio-economic, political, and technological landscape. Anticipation is
crucial, as failing to think in advance about potential disruptions may upset even the bestlaid plans.
The transition to a low-carbon economy is gaining steam, amidst other megatrends suchas expanding inequality and new developments in artificial intelligence (AI) and automation.
Strategic foresight to inform decisions needs to be cognizant of developing trends, potential
drivers of change, and how change happens.
Today’s dominant economic paradigm still prioritizes growth with limited consideration for the
direct and indirect effects of that growth on broader values of health, sustainability, and wellbeing. Increasing demand for energy and resources may lead to scarcity and conflict, while
increasingly evident climate impacts may exacerbate political divides and will challenge our
traditional systems.
The shift from incremental to transformational change will occur in different ways aroundthe world, and ClimateWorks is applying both a regional and a global perspective. We
also recognize that even in the most challenging future scenarios, novel opportunities for
decarbonization between now and 2050 will emerge.
While there is more to explore, research, and learn, society cannot afford to wait until we know
all the answers. Undertaking exercises such as the one described in this report help us tochallenge our assumptions about the future, identify blind spots, and assess opportunities andrisks, ultimately allowing us to design and adapt strategies that are more appropriate for thechanging world we will all face between now and 2050.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE
FUTURES COLAB EXERCISE
Futures CoLab uses an online facilitated dialogue process to elicit the collective intelligenceof an international network of experts, from a range of sectors and fields, to explore the risks
and solutions to global systemic challenges. In this exercise, ClimateWorks and the FuturesCoLab team engaged a global network of experts in strategic foresight, to explore scenariosof socio-economic, political, and technological developments that could impact climate action
over the next 30 years.
Scenarios are routinely used as mechanisms for strategic foresight across a wide variety of
sectors—including military, commercial, and non-profit—to inform decisions in a world increasingly
characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA).1 Anticipation is critical in
the VUCA world—failing to consider potential disruptions in advance may upset even the bestlaid plans. Strategic foresight is strengthened by capturing a diversity of perspectives, helping
to overcome the biases we as humans often have when thinking about the future2 and to better
capture the constantly shifting dynamics that will shape the world in coming decades.
To this end, the ClimateWorks Futures CoLab exercise brought together 150 people from 38
countries to engage in a qualitative facilitated online dialogue3 over a four-week period between
July 9 and August 3, 2018. The first week solicited ideas for, and discussions around, driversof change. During the second week, participants were asked to combine drivers and discussstorylines, short narratives about a possible future based on combinations that could co-occur orreinforce one another. In the third week participants were guided through a process to critique,refine, and prioritize storylines. In the final week participants fleshed out a final set of storylines.
No preconceived theories or assumptions framed the exercise and online dialogue.
Participants provided their input to general prompts and responded to the inputs of others.
These inputs and discussions were grouped into common themes and then gradually
winnowed down into core insights and a coherent narrative. The synthesis and integration ofthese discussions are presented in this report.
The Futures CoLab process complements scenarios that others have developed to help
society understand the implications of a changing climate and the magnitude of thechallenges ahead. For example, the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs)4 used by theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, were designed to enable climate researchersand policy analysts to build internally consistent, quantifiable pathways for climate mitigation.
In contrast, the ClimateWorks Futures CoLab exercise explores the broader dynamic context
in which climate mitigation actions will take place. It is intended to provide a nimble approachto engaging a wide diversity of participants in exploring what may be on the horizon but
not on our radar. Given the constantly shifting dynamics that will shape the world in coming
decades, it is critical to continuously anticipate and reflect on a range of plausible futures that
may influence climate mitigation strategies. Futures CoLab provides a platform and process
for these types of regular foresight exercises.

1

Bennett, N. and Lemoine, J. 2014. What VUCA really means for you. Harvard Business Review 92 (1/2)

2Kahneman, D. 2011. Thinking Fast and Slow. Farrar, Strauss and Giroux: New York, USA.

3

Konno, N., Nonaka, I. and Ogilvy, J. 2014. Scenario planning: The basics. World Futures 70, 28-43.

4O’Neill, B.C., Kriegler, E., Ebi, K.L., Kemp-Benedict, E., Riahi, K., Rothman, D.S., van Ruijven, B.J., van Vuuren, D.P., Birdkmann, J., Kok, K., Levy, M. and Solecki, W. 2017. The roads ahead: Narratives for shared socioeconomic pathways
describing world futures in the 21st century. Global Environmental Change 42, 169-180.

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1 SECTION
MAJOR DRIVERS: TRENDS, EMERGINGDEVELOPMENTS, AND WILDCARDSThe participants of the ClimateWorks Futures CoLab exercise highlighted multiple critical drivers
that are likely to shape the next few decades, ranging from demographic shifts to evolving societal
values. To help make sense of these many drivers, we grouped them into four categories:•

public engagement and mobilization;•accountability and financial responsibility;•

decision-making and power;•

culture and social norms.

Each of the drivers were then characterized as trends, emerging developments, or wildcards.
Trends refer to tendencies already evident in today’s world. Emerging developments include
nascent forces on the horizon, whose impact have not yet been fully realized. Wildcards
include forces that remain highly uncertain but are interesting and important to track.
This section outlines these trends, emerging developments, and wildcards (summarizedin Table 1) and is supplemented by direct quotes (set in italics) taken from contributions
submitted by participants during the online exercise.

Table 1. Trends, emerging developments, and wildcards across the four categories of drivers
relevant to climate action.

Trend

PublicEngagement &Mobilization

Decision-Making &Power

Accountability& FInancial
Responsibility• Citizens are
informed— andmisinformed• Changing balanceof geopoliticalpower• Responsibility forclimate impacts
across scales• Interaction ofdifferent age
groupsEmerging
Development• Networks oflocal, bottom-up
initiatives• Continuingdebate on
historicalresponsibility• Developments innational politicallandscapes• Impact of
emerging
innovations• Climate impacts indefining profit andincorporating risks

10 • SECTION 1• Influence ofaugmented/
virtual reality• Sharing
innovations,software, and data

• Use of newtechnologies• Shifts in foodproduction andconsumption• Changing
economicparadigms andmeasures ofgrowth• Transformations
in behavior andlifestyles• Reshaping how
climate policy is
madeWildcard

Culture & Social
Norms• Riskier climate
mitigation
options• Human values
and transition
to a circular
economy1.1 Public Engagement and Mobilization
Question
How might public engagement and mobilization change in the next 30 years andwhat might this mean for climate action strategies?

Collective response
We see a clash between positive and negative trends, for example between greatertransparency and calculated misinformation. The most decisive factors will bemaking human sense of overwhelming data and using credible messenger and/ortransmission modes.

Summary of drivers
8 More data is causing citizens to become increasingly informed—and misinformed
8 The values and interaction of different age groups will affect engagement and mobilization
8 Networks of local, bottom-up initiatives are set to reshape engagement and mobilization
8 Augmented/virtual reality might influence citizens’ self-awareness and willingness to 		engageTrend

Emerging Development

Wildcard

8 TrendMore data is causing citizens to become increasingly informed—and misinformed
The next 30 years will see more data created, shared, and used. Improved access to data willcontinue to spread through expanded use of the internet, social media, smart phones, andother devices. Advances in science and technology, including for example “attribution science
constantly improving, connecting extreme weather impacts more conclusively to climatechange,” or innovations in satellite monitoring, could alter the quality and persuasiveness of
information, potentially influencing public opinion on the reality and risk of climate change. The
accuracy of such information, however, is not at all guaranteed. The balkanization of internet
communities into self-reinforcing echo chambers and efforts to manipulate public opinion withfalse news stories, are already leading some to question the definition of facts. Furthermore,
information overload can lead to confusion regarding what is real or not. Continuation or
acceleration of these developments could polarize society further and have a strong impact
on how—and why—people mobilize.
Amidst more data, it will become critically important to process and interpret what is actuallyseen and heard, as lived experience can be particularly persuasive in shifting perspectives.
Shifting the narrative around climate change to focus on a broader suite of humanexperiences could unite groups that are currently highly polarized and motivate engagement.
A more unifying narrative might emphasize the “comprehensive damage of fossil fuel use” inboth the short- and long-term, highlighting the overlap between climate change and othersectors, for example the more immediate negative health impacts of fossil fuel emissions via
reduced air quality. Emphasizing both individual, short-term interests as well as longer-term,

SECTION 1 •11more abstract risks in climate policy could smooth implementation. As climate impacts suchas sea level rise, heat waves, and extreme weather events become impossible to ignore,
there could be a “window of opportunity […] to galvanize political action.” We may see theemergence of new constellations of actors urging more aggressive action based on a newrecognition of the severity of the problem.
Some experiences, however, such as nuclear disasters or geo-engineering effects, could resultin “mass mobilization against certain technologies as a backlash to severe side effects” andcould hamper climate innovation efforts. It is also possible that worsening climate impacts
could trigger resignation in citizens who feel it’s too late to mitigate, especially if climate
sensitivity is higher than anticipated.
As the public becomes informed they could become more engaged, for example, by organizing
demonstrations or putting pressure on politicians and corporations. More citizens might also
contribute to citizen science projects or involve themselves in “open, participatory processes
at the science-policy-society interface to facilitate learning about the policy solution space.”
Others, whose livelihoods depend on the continuation of the current fossil fuel energy economy,
could remain unconvinced that the costs of mitigation are worthwhile. People in this situation
might mobilize in support of relying primarily on geo-engineering or carbon removal strategies.

8 Trend
The values and interaction of different age groups will affect engagement and 			mobilization
The social values of different age groups are likely to affect mobilization and engagement.
We are already seeing “international mobilization of youth for action on environment, in turn
putting pressure on other actors.” Activists from younger generations are organizing massdemonstrations or pursuing legal action to demand more sustainable governmental policy andcorporate decisions. Over time, we might also see older generations supporting their children
and grandchildren to push for more proactive legislation. But many nearing retirement age arelikely to be resistant. Their priorities will be to maintain their pensions or other benefits thatmight be affected by more radical policy change.

8 Emerging Development
Networks of local, bottom-up initiatives are set to re-shape engagement and mobilization
Technology advances could help disparate grassroots groups connect and collaborate on
an unprecedented scale. This might involve creating networks to share resources (including
money, information, or ideas) to help empower local-scale initiatives, or aggregation services
so that consumers can measure and track the environmental impacts of different products to“leverage their collective purchasing power at scale.”
Networks of bottom-up initiatives have the potential to connect local interests with global
scale. These “glocalized networks” might respond to tangible, first-hand experiences at a local
level, while also helping share lessons learned across the world, bridging between different
scales, knowledge systems, sectors, and worldviews. Promoting networks of grassroots groups
could also help to overcome the perceived “elitist cast to sustainability movements,” which
many believe currently hampers efforts to be more inclusive.
Decentralized networks may, however, run into ideological clashes due to the disparate
origins of their constituent initiatives. Competing interest groups may try to discredit ordiminish the effectiveness of such networks by exploiting minor differences in ideologies.
Investments in supporting and strengthening broader networks of local initiatives that seek to

12 • SECTION 1

promote climate action goals could help to overcome this, for example “providing access totransnational information and social networks.”

8 Wildcard
Augmented/virtual reality might influence citizens’ self-awareness and willingness to 		engageAs Augmented Reality and Virtual Reality become more accessible, strategically employing
these tools could help to “build empathy for those suffering from extreme weather events”
and other impacts of climate change, thereby encouraging the public to mobilize. These typesof technologies could allow people to “test, track, and change their assumptions [regarding
the lived experiences of people around the world], leading to self-aware economies.” This
presupposes that these technologies would be powerful enough to make people begin caring
for others whose lives are drastically different and far-removed from their own. Combining
the use of such technologies with educational programs geared to building a sense of global
community and compassion could enhance their impact.
On the other hand, these technologies could provide distractions from real life for large
numbers of people, diverting their attention from pressing issues such as climate change.
This could obstruct efforts to mobilize the public and could even lead to a breakdown ofcommunity bonds and a rise in individualism.

1.2 Decision-making and power
Question
How might decision-making and power change in the next 30 years and what might
this mean for climate action strategies?

Collective response
Economic power will likely be more concentrated and political decision-making will be
more diffuse. Multi-party strategic alliances will be crucial to getting anything done.

Summary of drivers
8 Changes to the current balance of geopolitical power will have significant impacts on
climate action strategies
8 Developments in national political landscapes may lead to increased tensions and/or tostrengthened collaboration
8 Climate action strategies will be affected by whether organizations consider climate as
they define profit and incorporate risks into decision-making
8 New considerations and contributions could reshape how climate policy is made8 Sharing innovations, software, and data might provide opportunities and new challenge

Trend

Emerging Development

Wildcard

SECTION 1 •138 Trend
Changes to the current balance of geopolitical power will have significant impacts on 		climate action strategies
Multiple potential shifts in global geopolitics could be on the horizon, dependent, inter alia,
on countries wielding power, conflict, and the role of international institutions. Each of theseelements is summarized below.
Global powers
China may reclaim “its historic role as a center of global affairs,” driven by the One Belt One
Road and other initiatives promoting China-centric regional and global development. China
is already beginning to take the lead in regional and international climate negotiations andmay prioritize climate mitigation in coming years, to maintain this leadership role or possibly
to respond to “constraints from Europe, Canada and partners on the Chinese market due towasteful industrial production systems.” China may resort to “exporting high-carbon activities
and related workforce to recipient nations unable to resist,” particularly to developing
countries, leveraging its position to mitigate its own domestic emissions at the expenseof others.
The United States has a critical role in shaping climate action. In future years, we could
see the United States emerge as a global leader on climate change through strengthened
efforts and innovations in relevant domestic industries, enhanced, for example, by providing
economic incentives to renewable industries to render them competitive in national andinternational markets. Or the United States may, by contrast, fail to adapt to changing
geopolitical circumstances, and remain plagued by increasing polarization within the country,
relying on increasingly reactive rather than proactive governance in global negotiations.
The standing of fossil fuel exporting nations may be jeopardized as they face declining
revenues and “fiscal crisis and social unrest,” partially as a result of asset-price correction,
which would have reverberating effects on the entire world. They may strive to “disrupt global
collaboration on zero-carbon energy” by using their influence at the global scale to ensure
continued reliance on fossil fuel energy. Alternatively, these nations may switch gears andinvest heavily in renewable energy technology, paving the way for a more sustainable futureand less uncertain sources of national revenue. This second possibility depends strongly on
the types of incentives present to motivate such a transition.
Conflict
Geopolitical power shifts might also be driving factors related to conflict. Conflicts may
arise over access to resources, for example water, and could create a negative feedback
loop, where destruction from conflict further exacerbates the resource scarcity that incited
it. Resource conflicts might also lead to diminished capacity to sequester carbon due toplant growth and limit the productive potential of land through unsustainable use. Conflicts
may occur over other issues as well: trade and tariffs, energy supply, land-use, or spacecolonization, all of which could disrupt climate action strategies, destabilize political systems,
or contribute to higher emissions.
The nature of conflict will also change significantly; instances of cyber-attacks and cyberterrorism will increase as society relies increasingly on autonomous and digital systems. In
fact, “the battlefield landscape no longer resembles the ways wars were fought in the mid- tolate-20th century,” which carries uncertain outcomes for climate action.
The role of international institutions
Given the potential for significant changes in the balance of geopolitical power, it is also
possible that international institutions such as the United Nations may lose legitimacy or
be rendered ineffective. This means that the current system of goal-oriented, voluntaryinternational governance may collapse. As “sovereignty strengthens in post-colonial states,

14 • SECTION 1

solutions may emerge from issue-based coalitions that bypass universal institutions,”
prioritizing “ad-hoc problem-solving coalitions” in place of traditional intergovernmental fora.
Another intriguing possibility for the future, that cuts in the exact opposite direction, is thatinternational relations becomes an outdated concept and is replaced by the idea “that thepolitical system needs to treat the world as a single space.” Such a development could pave
the way to more efficient multi-scale collaboration, cultural and educational exchanges tofoster empathy, and potentially even a shift towards recognizing the legal rights of natureworldwide. Power could also move away from nation states altogether, as transnational
corporations continue to amass wealth and influence and operate in ways that transcendborders and disregard national regulations.

8 Emerging Development
Developments in national political landscapes may lead to increased tensions and/or to 		
strengthened collaboration
We are currently witnessing a rise in populist political movements around the world. Thesedevelopments could be accelerated and intensified as worsening climate impacts, food andwater scarcity, mass migration, and declining employment all lead to greater fear of change.
Insular decision-making and nationalist entrenchment could generate “declining social capitaland diminishing trust in governments” (as well as other institutions), increasing polarization
between different groups within nations, and increasing inequality. Such trends could
continue to have a negative impact on international cooperation and the collaborative global
governance of issues such as climate change.
Amid these shifts, however, there could be opportunities for transformational change. New
ways to govern emerging technologies, which could include ideas about how benefits shouldbe allocated more broadly, for example, through commons-oriented intellectual property
regimes, could be developed. These might emphasize maximizing welfare overall andminimizing inequality—pushing towards “governance for equity rather than for profit.” New waysof thinking about energy systems could also emerge that focus on “my energy first,” prompting
a shift towards local, sustainable energy sources to increase energy independence. Politicalchange may emerge as a result of societal backlash. Groups may fight back against nationalist
policies and strive to foster collaborative development. We could see reforms in publiccampaign financing to reduce the power of wealthy special interest groups, a new “rational
populism” movement emphasizing carefully considered proposals that appeal to the masses
while also prioritizing sustainability transformations, or even a shift towards participatory or
direct democracy. Changes in the political landscape more conducive to climate mitigation
could be supported by inexpensive communications technology, accessible data anddecentralized information, and new alliances between public and private sector actors.
The role of science in public decision-making is another key area where different outcomesmay emerge. On the one hand, there are signs of “growing distrust in science and technology”
and “declining trust in experts.” This could be exacerbated in coming years by cyber-attacks
further undermining trust in scientific institutions, as well as by scientists failing to “consider
the social impacts” of policy advice. Conversely, new forms of governance might recognize
the inherent need for “actionable knowledge” and rely increasingly on transdisciplinaryscientific inputs and inclusive scientific assessments. New governance approaches of this sort
could support co-designed science and policy strategies, convene multi-stakeholder expert
committees, and co-develop systemic interventions. Scientists are increasingly active in the
public sphere, employing social media and other fora to discuss and disseminate findings,
often encouraged by funding agencies. This could further pave the way for transdisciplinary
research projects, which integrate scientific research to create specific services, thus opening
up new research and development opportunities, while also making science more accessible
to the public.

SECTION 1 •15

8 Emerging Development
Climate action strategies will be affected by whether organizations consider climate as
they define profit and incorporate risks into decision-making
As our economy becomes increasingly digital, intangible, and interconnected, we mightsee corporations (and governments) employing “integrated accounting to redefine profit
including external costs” and more explicitly incorporating environmental and social risks into
investment decisions, with natural capital becoming a more central concern for business.
Strategic investments in the short term could lead to a “race to the top, driving fasterclimate action,” and investments in developing country infrastructure could speed global
decarbonization significantly.
Emerging technology could allow investment funds, banks, and the public sector to basedecisions on considerations other than the purely financial. For example, big data andartificial intelligence “could enable the convergence of climate science with policy andtechnology scenarios to yield decision-ready climate risk information,” paving the way
for lower-risk investment and policy decisions. Changes in the way financial incentives
are structured may also have a strong impact. For example, rewarding patient capital
investments in low-carbon technology through tax exemptions or credits could help ramp
up such investments. Repricing climate change using insurance could be a successful
strategy to set a price for climate risk across multiple policies. Including climate risks as animportant factor in decision-making can also make green investments more cost-effectivein the long-run. For example, investments into water infrastructure could focus on exploring“blended engineering approaches” combining traditional and green engineering with natural
infrastructure to find the most efficient pathway to human water security with minimal 		trade-offs.

8 Emerging Development
New considerations and contributions could reshape how climate policy is madeMainstreaming climate policy across multiple governmental departments, or taking a “whole
government approach,” could have positive benefits for improving success, for example
by coupling policies to stop deforestation with those aimed at improving health outcomes
and food security, such as within the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Broadening
the cultural diversity in decision-making could also be beneficial and be supported byensuring that “social inclusion models are embedded into all elements of decision-making
and including justice in environmental policy.” Integrating horizontal and vertical governancestructures, for example more closely linking the work of separate departments operating on
the same level while also strengthening ties across scales, could help make governments
more resilient and more effective.
Should diversity in decision-making increase, however, it could become difficult to ensurethat different perspectives are given equal weight, as access to data and technology is quite
uneven. Giving diverse voices equal weight would also be important to avoid more powerfulgroups taking over the process. Furthermore, ostensibly more pressing policy issues orcrises such as rising inequality, geopolitical tensions, or intensifying (cyber-) terrorist attacks,
may distract from climate action or “undermine action on sustainability” more broadly. This
could prove to be the case even when climate change is one of the underlying causes, forexample, with mass migration. Ineffective governance mechanisms could also lead to theemergence of difficult-to-regulate informal economies in response to unmet “local social,economic, environmental needs.”

16 • SECTION 1

8 Wildcard
Sharing innovations, software, and data might provide opportunities and new challenges
New approaches that seek to share innovations more widely by treating them as public
goods—examples include open-source licensing of new technologies and public datarepositories—have significant potential in terms of decarbonization. Opening up access could
help to “speed the diffusion of innovation in both renewables and hydrocarbon efficiency
value chains,” incentivizing broader use. It could lend support to the development of green
infrastructure by making innovations available for all to use, and sharing lessons learned.
Open, public data, in combination with improved measurement and monitoring technology,
could make it “hard to hide [pollution] sources and easier to forecast effects.” This could also
help to overcome issues faced in research with dispersed or incompatible data by enhancing
and normalizing data sharing.
The open sharing of innovations and data does, however, carry risks. Some observers view
open-source software and public databases as easier to hack, and the prevalence of theInternet of Things, and connected systems in general, could increase the impact of cyberattacks. This combination could decrease confidence in open-source technologies and publicdata. Cyber-attacks could also accelerate the decline in trust in scientific institutions, create
confusion amongst scientific communities, and even influence global geopolitics. They could
also affect the pace of innovation itself: “technology backlash from cyber-attacks (e.g. scandal
over privacy infringement) can lead to a decline in innovation.”

1.3 Accountability and financial responsibility
Question
How might accountability and financial responsibility evolve in the next 30 years andwhat might this mean for climate action strategies?

Collective response
Morality, in particular regarding who is obligated to pay whom, ought to matter. It
isn’t clear, however, that it will. Publicly-provided goods will come under increasing
financial pressure as wealthier users opt out.

Summary of drivers
8 Responsibility and accountability for climate impacts at different scales will have a 		significant influence on climate action strategies
8 Continuing debate on historical responsibility and legacy emissions will have implications
for whether international cooperation prospers or breaks down
8 Emerging innovations may promote accountability and transparency, or may increase
inequalities
8 Riskier climate mitigation options, such as geo-engineering, may eventually have serious
impacts both on reaching climate targets and on equality and equity

Trend

Emerging Development

Wildcard

SECTION 1 •17

8 Trend
Responsibility and accountability for climate impacts at different scales will have asignificant influence on climate action strategies
Who should be held accountable for the immediate and direct impacts of fossil fuel use,
climate change, and related environmental problems? Problems such as “flooding, foodinsecurity, and air pollution are first and foremost seen as local issues” and citizens may
demand a rapid response from local governments, whereas national governments tend tobe farther removed and slower to act. As climate impacts becomes more consequential,
it is possible that the “center of gravity for climate action could shift to the local scale,”especially as the impacts of climate change become increasingly visible.
At the same time, local accountability may be accompanied by sharing of management
responsibility across borders, since many environmental challenges (including climatechange) are transboundary by nature. Furthermore, regional systems of governance cannot
simply be overturned, regardless of demands from citizens for more local action. Morestreamlined and efficient transboundary management regimes may be possible throughinnovations such as increasingly accurate measuring and monitoring technology, throughadopting common practices, and through the integration of cyber-physical systems,
where management is augmented by AI. “Carefully negotiating shared responsibility andtransparency of resource management across borders” and at different levels may be a
crucial step to complement local approaches, as well as developing nested, polycentric
governance approaches that can foster closer interaction of governance systems at
different scales.

8 Trend
Continuing debate on historical responsibility and legacy emissions will have 		
implications for whether international cooperation prospers or breaks down
One way to think about historical responsibility for past greenhouse gas emissions is asa “cumulative climate debt [based on] legacy emissions.” In this line of thinking, somecountries have developed their economies by capitalizing on cheap energy from fossil fuels
to the detriment of the rest of the world. Many developing countries already make this casein international negotiations, but their arguments could become more vehement and they
could begin to demand payment for the damages caused by those who have “overdrawn
their CO2 credit cards.” There may also be social pressure from public actors and groups toforce or shame countries (or corporations) into paying. One example might be viral hashtag
campaigns such as “#ClimateCriminal.”This could create a standoff, where developing countries are demanding payment anddeveloped countries are simply unable to pay the full price without facing severe economic
turbulence or are simply unwilling. Without reaching an agreement, international cooperation
could suffer. These groups, however, could also come to an agreement in which developed
countries pay some recompense for their historical emissions to help developing countries
fund decarbonization efforts. Developed countries could agree to use innovation-sharing
as a form of payment, for example, in the realm of renewable energy technologies. “Newinternational processes set up beyond UNFCCC strengthen effective regional collaboration,”and might complement or improve upon existing mechanisms to address the issue ofhistorical responsibility.

18 • SECTION 1

8 Emerging Development
Emerging innovations may promote accountability and transparency, or may increase 		inequities
Emerging technological innovations have the potential to revolutionize how consumers andproducers interact. The Internet of Things, AI, and Blockchain all offer the promise of drastically“improving the efficiency and transparency of supply chains.” This could shed light on wastefulproduction and distribution processes, enable tracking of protected species and limit biopiracy,
and allow consumers to monitor supply chains and demand more sustainable products.
Consumers would thus have the tools to hold corporations accountable. Corporations could
begin exploring new and innovative pathways to add value to products and services, and “takeon a more integrated, macro-economic role on climate” mitigation and adaptation. Narrowing thespace between science and business could support this transition, encouraging corporations tocollaborate with scientists in fostering sustainable business practices.
On the other hand, some innovations may have unintended negative side-effects. One of
the most ubiquitous examples is the potential of AI to destroy jobs, leading to “technologicalunemployment.” Another example is how the increasing decentralization of service provision
for electric power may have catastrophic impacts on equity via the so-called “Utility Death
Spiral.” As electricity users increasingly produce their own power and go off-the-grid, utility
companies will face declining profits and raise costs for other users. This will prompt additional
users, beginning with those most financially well-off, to invest in their own power production,yielding additional price increases. The last to switch from energy provided by traditional
utility companies in this situation would be those with the least available capital to cover the
initial costs of switching over. The same dynamic could play out for other infrastructure-based
services, such as water, sanitation, waste, and transportation, particularly in situations wheretraditionally wealthier users have subsidized services for lower-income customers. This raises
questions regarding who will be responsible for ensuring equity when new technologies are
deployed and highlights the need for forward-looking strategies to consider side-effects.

8 Wildcard
Riskier climate mitigation options, such as geo-engineering, may eventually have serious
impacts both on reaching climate targets and on equality and equity
As climate impacts become increasingly severe, pressure to consider more extreme solutions
is likely to grow, in particular if greenhouse gas emissions reductions remain inadequate.
A breakdown in negotiations on addressing historical responsibility for emissions could
exacerbate the shift towards higher-risk, lower-cost “band-aid” options, such as solar
geo-engineering.
One possibility is that “a single country, a small group of countries, or even a wealthy
individual may take matters into their own hands and unilaterally deploy solar geo-engineering
without appropriate governance.” This could lead to international conflicts and uncertain
side effects that may disproportionately affect vulnerable populations that are least able toprotect themselves, reinforcing inequalities. Furthermore, society could become reliant on
geo-engineering, thus delaying mitigation action since impacts may be ignored as long as
geo-engineering is continued. On the other hand, international organizations could forge an
agreement on responsible use of geo-engineering, outlining governance mechanisms before
they are needed.

SECTION 1 •19

1.4 Culture and social norms
Question
How might cultural and social norms change in the next 30 years and what might thismean for climate action strategies?

Collective response
Social norms grow out of the predominant economic system. Current trends areexacerbating inequality. Technologies are not neutral—they propagate positive or
negative human behavior. It will require conscious and determined intervention tobend the curve toward sustainability.

Summary of drivers
8 The use of new technologies will impact the success of different sustainability strategies
8 Shifts in food production and consumption patterns will affect culture and sustainability
8 Changing economic paradigms and measures of growth could lead to a complete 		redesign of climate action strategies
8 Transformations in behavior and lifestyles could require re-evaluating priorities for climate
action8 The evolution of human values may eventually lead to a transition to a circular economy

Trend

Emerging Development

Wildcard

8 Trend ►The use of new technologies will impact the success of different sustainability strategies
New technologies may have lasting impacts on society and on sustainability, but theseare often difficult to predict in advance. As a result, “humility in technological foresight” iswarranted. Automated vehicles, combined with the emerging business model of “mobility-asa-service,” could significantly challenge individual car ownership as the aspirational model for
personal transport. Clothing and textiles may be redesigned with sustainability in mind—fully
biodegradable, with heating and cooling incorporated. Replacements for plastics, especiallysingle-use plastics, could help overcome our collective “plastic dependence.” Smart hometechnologies may decrease energy use, and biotechnologies such as algae for material
production and fuel could revolutionize the way we produce and consume resources. 3D
printing could overhaul the way material items are produced, or we might see a shift towards
dematerialization, or an “absolute reduction in the quantity of materials required to serve
economic functions in a society.” 3D printing, in combination with innovations in industrial
processes and the development of new types of raw materials, could also change theface of heavy industry. Potential changes could include the development of lower-impact
alternatives to cement, increased efficiency and decreased invasiveness of mining practices,

20 • SECTION 1

or more streamlined production of wind turbines. Delays in the emergence of these typesof innovations could, in some cases, lead to infrastructure lock-in and slow the transition tosustainability in resource-intensive sectors.
Technology could also reinvent how business is done. High fidelity teleconferencing may
reduce or replace business travel—though only if the cost of flying increases significantly,
service-based business models could limit material consumption, new manufacturing
processes could emerge in response to resource scarcity, or technology could foster a“transition from oil economy to bio economy [with regards to] fuel, food, and materials.” While
such advances have a high potential for encouraging sustainable business, technologies
that enable sustainability could also fail to take hold in light of continued bias toward longestablished practices.
Technology developments that seem set to have an influence in one direction may also end
up having unexpected consequences that boomerang the other way. Given their potential
impact on society, the governance of emerging technologies is a central concern. Will
emerging technologies increase or decrease inequality? In the case of energy, strategies for“increased efficiency and decreased cost profiles of lower-emissions options can actuallylead to increased demand and consumption,” in particular when cost, as the single mostimportant determinant of consumption, falls so low that it triggers significantly increased
energy demand. The same could hold true for investments in health care, where increasing
lifespans can lead to higher energy demand in the long run. Similarly, advances in AI could
yield more efficient processes, but the emissions reduction benefits could be undercut by
increases in overall consumption. Despite these potential drivers of greater consumption,
there is evidence that factors such as increased consumer education and smart technology
can reduce consumption over time.

8 Trend ►Shifts in food production and consumption patterns will impact culture and 		
sustainability
Investments in agricultural technology promise to yield climate co-benefits. For example,
lab-grown meats, genetic engineering, and ocean and land fertilization could simultaneously
reduce carbon-intensity, increase soil carbon storage, increase crop yields (and foodsecurity) and improve health outcomes. Domestic agricultural policies could reinforce thesetrends by focusing on co-benefits between health and environmental systems and could beenhanced by broad shifts in the palate tastes and preferences of citizens. A related potential
development could be a “significant rise in vegan or vegetarian diets around the world”
which are increasingly seen as both healthy and sustainable. But another trend could push in
the opposite direction; as developing countries grow, many are shifting “toward increasingly
Westernized diets” as a demonstration of wealth—consuming more energy-intensive, lesshealthy food, and losing the cultural heritage inherent in their culinary history.
Climate variability could also overhaul the global food production system. Which crops canbe produced where has a significant impact on local diets as well as on lifestyles, foodsecurity, and health. Urbanization may make local, city-based food production more common,as inhabitants see first-hand the cost of being dependent on food imports and the risk ofcities turning into “food deserts.” In addition, some communities—including for example
indigenous herder societies—could risk losing their traditional ways of life by transitioning
away from animal-based diets. Efforts to promote such a transition may well be consideredmorally and ethically questionable.

SECTION 1 •21

8 Emerging Development
Changing economic paradigms and measures of growth could lead to a complete
redesign of climate action strategies
There are already signals that the current economic system, which has led to significant
inequality as well as environmental degradation, is not sustainable in the long term. Many
hold that it should be replaced with an arrangement that “enhances natural life support
systems” and in which “morality prevails over strict legality.” Alternatively, others havedenounced relying only on morality as opposed to institutionalized legal systems given thepotential of multiple contested moral systems vying for control, the possibility of empowering
opaque or even corrupt “moral” leaders, and in particular the risk that insufficiently reliable
and stable legal systems could increase inequality and inequity. One option might be that
future systems integrate moral and legal concerns, systematically considering principles offairness and equity, for example, when considering and enacting new regulations. De-growthor zero growth movements may become the norm out of necessity, as other systems become
increasingly unsustainable. The concept of the green economy, based on the notion that
economic growth could be decoupled from ecological and climatic changes, has gained
prominence in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Market-based systems, which haveyielded the type of competition that has led to numerous tragedy-of-the-commons situations,
could be replaced by a win-win decision making model emphasizing the need to findsystems-level solutions in collaboration with a broader diversity of stakeholders.
Figuring out how exactly this might be accomplished is a critical area of study. Exploring
the potential of alternative measures of economic growth is no longer a marginal topic, butrather, one increasingly addressed in academia and beyond. Moving towards a measureof growth that emphasizes “happiness, natural capital, […] or other sustainable well-being
indicators” could be encouraged by strategic support from governments and philanthropists.

8 Emerging Development
Transformations in behavior and lifestyles could require re-evaluating priorities forclimate action
A key determinant of whether a new economic paradigm prevails is whether peopleinternalize this shift and change their behaviors. To what extent will people adopt
meaningful lifestyle changes in the decade ahead? Teaching about new behaviors andmore sustainable lifestyle choices in educational curricula could tip the scales in favor ofsustainability. “Rethinking the ideal of sufficiency and the good life could prioritize social
images and lifestyles which remain within planetary boundaries.” This could include making
high-consuming, high-waste lifestyles socially unacceptable, as evidenced, for example,
by government regulation banning single-use plastic in the European Union, a recent
development that could significantly reduce demand for low-density petrochemicals.
Encouraging education of women and girls and prioritizing education on climate change andsustainable development could have multiple co-benefits for limiting population growth andincreasing workforce participation. There are strong factors pushing back against culturalchanges that would reduce consumption, however, including the increasing ease of remoteconsumption via online shopping and on-demand delivery infrastructure.
Many believe that a first step towards motivating lifestyle changes on a broader scale
would be to connect inequality more explicitly with emissions and to emphasize equity as“a precursor to solving challenges and seizing opportunities related to climate change.”
This could foster a stronger push to make cheap, but clean, forms of energy available tolower-income households, recognizing that much of the world’s affluence was built on theback of cheap fossil fuel energy. This would be important to ensure that lifestyle changes
that encourage a more sustainable world are possible not only for the wealthy but also areaccessible worldwide.

22 • SECTION 1

8 Wildcard
The evolution of human values may eventually lead to a transition to a circular economy
A number of crises, due to resource scarcity and asset-price correction for example, are likely
to erupt in coming years. The ways in which society will respond to such crises is uncertain,
but one possibility could be a renewed focus on recycling and reuse, such that “circular
economy principles [may] become the ‘norm’ across industries and global value chains.”
Innovations such as the Internet of Things and advances in how Blockchain is used could
help to streamline the inherently “complex global system for supply and use of materials” andimprove tracking, thereby removing excuses for unsustainable consumer choices. Government
interventions could encourage this transformation, for example through regulatory incentives,
taxes, or fees to encourage a circular economy at scale, or legislation to stop the use of
single-use materials altogether.
It is also possible, however, that society may react to resource crises with fear and resignation.
Many may feel that incremental changes are simply insufficient and forgo the attempt.

SECTION 1 •23

2 SECTION
FOUR POTENTIAL SCENARIOSScenarios are stories about the future. They should not be interpreted as predictions.
Instead, they are descriptions of possible ways the world could evolve.5 The scenarios
presented below describe different possible futures that pose challenges—and offer
opportunities—for decarbonization between now and 2050. They were developed from ideas
drawn directly from inputs provided by participants in the online exercise.
The exercise resulted in five scenarios—alternative futures that might unfold in the world
over the next 30 years. In this report, we expand upon the four scenarios deemed mostvaluable to providing insights for developing forward-looking strategies for climate action.
We chose not to focus on the fifth scenario that emerged from the exercise: Trust Returns.
This fifth scenario conformed roughly to what many people hope becomes our future. For
example, it describes a world where institutions and governance structures remain flexible
enough to be adapted and revitalized to cope with the increasing challenges posed byclimate change. Since this scenario outlines a positive narrative, many actors may alreadybe planning for such a future, implicitly or explicitly. As such, the Trust Returns scenario
does not shed light on blind spots and gaps in current thinking. Instead of building out that
scenario in full, we have chosen to focus on these four scenarios:•

Hollowed Out•

Connected Communities and Cities•

National Rivals•

Consumers in Charge

Figure 1 illustrates the general conditions underlying these scenarios and the relationshipbetween them, and summarizes each scenario in terms of power, conflict, economics,
and innovation.

5		 Wilkinson, A. and Kupers, R. May 2013. Living in the Futures. Harvard Business Review.

24 • SECTION 2

Figure 1. ClimateWorks Futures CoLab Scenarios*
BROAD POWER BASE

Connected Communities
and Cities

Consumers in Charge• Who Holds Power: Decentralized, local
movements and leadership• Sources of Conflict: Tensions between
urban and rural areas, due to inequalities
within cities• Focus of Innovation: Decentralized
technologies, social and governanceinnovations• Sources of Conflict: Tensions between
corporations encouraging material
consumption• Economics: Market-based system evolving
to a more sustainable model, search tobalance consumption (vs over- or underconsuming)• Focus of Innovation: Shift towards

sustainable products, non-material
consumption

National Rivals

Hollowed Out• Who Holds Power: Nation states,
especially those that can maintaindomestic stability and project power• Who Holds Power: A small numberof elite technologists who control
dominant global ecosystems andplatforms• Sources of Conflict: Nation to nation
hostility in search of resources andstrategic advantage

GLOBAL IDENTITIESLOCAL IDENTITIES• Economics: Local experimentation, hardto operate at scale• Who Holds Power: Corporations and theconsumers they serve• Sources of Conflict: Extreme inequality,
inability of most to control changes
happening around them

• Economics: Mostly protectionist,
nationally-oriented• Economics: Capitalist and concentrated• Focus of Innovation: Large scale national
level investments in energy, infrastructure,
military• Focus of Innovation: Digitization,
automation, AI, biotechnology,
surveillance

NARROW POWER BASE

* The fifth scenario which emerged from the exercise, Trust Returns, is not elaborated on here. This scenario featuresa broader power base, where citizens from around the world engage more strongly in decision-making, and a
mixture of local and global identities, including emphasis on smaller-scale grassroots organization with a view
towards the global implications of everyday actions.

In the next sections, we examine each of the four scenarios, beginning with an overview of themain driving forces and the general conditions occurring in that world between now and 2050.
We then explore in more detail from the perspective of the four key areas relevant to climate
action: public engagement and mobilization; decision-making and power; transparency andresponsibility; culture and social norms.

SECTION 2 •25

2.1 Hollowed out
Hollowed Out is a world characterized by heightened inequality. As technological developments
take over more aspects of everyday life, in the 2020s power (and wealth) becomes vested ina small number of executives who control capital, resources, and algorithms. The ascendanceof this group creates a narrow power base. This elite is not content with heading up large
corporations—they have broader ambitions to “govern society in place of elected officials[leading to] private governance,” which begins to take shape at the start of the 2030s.
While the lives of the elite grow more comfortable, life for most people becomes more
precarious. Middle income jobs in all sectors of the economy are severely disrupted byautomation. Developing countries are affected the most, as basic manufacturing and service
level employment is hit hard. National tax bases diminish, while public services, social safety
nets, and infrastructure suffer. Some people gain a degree of security and affiliation byaligning with one of the few technology ecosystems that span the globe. As regular jobs
become less available, many turn to virtual worlds for their entertainment.
Greenhouse gas emissions peak and then even slowly decrease in the medium-term into theearly 2040s, since the wealthy elite have access to renewables and private micro-grids. Most
people no longer have resources for mass consumption, travel, and other high-emissions
activities, relying instead on more local and virtual experiences and forms of entertainment.
Foreign aid is cut as elites let developing countries face growing crises on their own. While
many become resigned, a sizeable minority look for new affiliations and values in a hollowedout world.

Public Engagement and Mobilization
Extreme inequality, a lack of employment opportunities, corruption, and climate change
impacts (which make traditional subsistence lifestyles challenging) lead to strong objective
motivations for public engagement and mobilization to change the system. But as power
is increasingly vested narrowly in a small number of elites and as cultures become moreindividualized, it becomes difficult to motivate large numbers of people to campaign forchange. Furthermore, “given the extent of inequality (with many people struggling to survive)
and the lack of resources to fund such movements, progress is slow and participation formany people is difficult.”
Movements that do arise use new communication technologies and social media to organize.
These technologies also enable citizens from around the world to develop a global identity
and to align the goals of various movements. As data surveillance is prevalent, networks arecareful not to become too radical in their demands for change, in case their movements
are blocked. More successful mobilization campaigns appeal to the values of the wealthyelite. They encourage participation through local innovation and competition, for example bypromoting small-scale experiments and prizes.
Over time, local organizations form alliances across the globe which strive to improve healthand education outcomes, increase food and water security, and provide at least some public
services with the limited resources available to them. Improved sensor technology supports
these alliances in efforts to publicize air and water quality issues and advocate for improvement.

Decision-Making and Power
Political, corporate and technology elites maintain control over most resources—physical,
financial, and especially digital. “By using this power to restrict access to resources, theyfurther cement their own position.”
As elites grow in power, many national and local governments lose their legitimacy andinfluence. It is hard to run a country (or a city) in 2040 without access to traffic data, pollution

26 • SECTION 2

trends, and economic information. This data is now held by powerful tech companies andbanks, so governments are forced to align with the values of the algorithm owners. This isa natural development for nations with autocratic systems, but it is a wrenching change forliberal democracies.
Governments that choose to go it alone are unable to deal with growing problems suchas migration, poverty, food insecurity, and deteriorating infrastructure, including grid
infrastructure. The wealthy elite are left to fill the gap left by floundering authorities, andprivatized services become commonplace. Governments that find ways to work with elites
and control masses of data are able to work effectively. China’s government, for example,
enhances its power and influence, as it has decades of experience in working closely withlarge, influential high-tech organizations.
As climate concerns mount, the most powerful elite-driven corporations see advantages
to greening their operations and make progress towards mitigation. They focus theirattention on low-carbon innovation, seeing it as the dominant version of corporate social
responsibility.
In the latter part of this scenario, as some elites worry more about governance of society,“a new class of innovators and entrepreneurs emerge focused on unique and disruptive
business models.” These innovators and entrepreneurs gain political power by appealing to
the elites, but then use their power to counter the prevailing trends and begin to address
rampant inequalities. They endeavor to restructure their business strategies to emphasize
environmental and social justice. This begins a slow process of re-engaging with a publicthat has been removed from decision-making for decades. Blockchain technologies andmachine learning are harnessed to enable smarter energy usage. Over time, distributed
peer-to-peer renewable energy grids are developed, providing cheap and equitable accessto carbon-free electricity off the traditional grid.

Accountability and Financial Responsibility
Foreign aid through traditional channels falls sharply, as governments choose to spend theirdwindling capital closer to home. Many developing countries find themselves in dire straits
as they strive to deal with worsening environmental conditions and increasing poverty, alongwith reduced financial and technological assistance.
Despite a world rich in information, it becomes more “difficult to assess the transparencyof supply chains.” As elites grow more powerful, many resist calls for greater oversight of
their operations. Following multiple attempted cyber-attacks, corporate leaders react by
restricting access to repositories of information, software, and innovations.
In a highly individualized world with low trust in institutions, it becomes common for
wealthy elites to embark on unilateral innovations aimed at solving large-scale problems.
Investments in space travel and discrete solar geo-engineering activities rise sharply,
affecting communities in unforeseen ways.
Over time, bottom-up movements striving to overturn opaque governance begin to takeresponsibility for crumbling infrastructure and many other services that have suffered under
the rule of global elites.

Culture and Social Norms
Lifestyles and behavior are driven by extremes, with a small number of wealthy individuals(and their close circles) consuming most resources and the rest of the world’s population
battling it out for the remains. Cultures shift towards a more competitive, individual
existence, with only isolated instances of cooperation. As environmental conditions worsen,
elites “build private and exclusive compounds isolated from worsening environmental
conditions” and the rest of the planet. The most ambitious are planning seriously tocolonize Mars.

SECTION 2 •27

2.2 National rivals
National Rivals is a world where nation states begin in the 2020s to eschew international
agreements and cooperation, leading to hostility, conflict, and the devastation of the global
commons. Government actions are geared toward ensuring the security and compliance ofdomestic populations. Power is mostly vested narrowly in large, resource-rich nations thatcan maintain a unitary identity and mission—primarily autocratic states. A “growing numberof refugees and migrants are at high risk due to their unofficial status and the lack of global
recognition of their plight.”
As countries strive for greater strategic independence, many begin to pursue “green industrial
policies” as a source of competitive advantage. Throughout the 2020s and 2030s, nations
invest heavily in both renewables and other available domestic sources to achieve energy
security, and some shift toward a bio-based economy to capitalize on locally available
resources and avoid relying on imports. In a hostile world, rivals find themselves in a “raceto the top” as they strive to achieve full energy and resource independence and develop
more sustainable practices in doing so. However, without international collaboration, climate
impacts worsen. While those with the most power and resources at their disposal canisolate themselves from deteriorating environmental conditions, as multiple tipping points
are surpassed, this becomes increasingly difficult. Eventually, extreme measures must be
considered to protect those in power both from climate impacts as well as from the adverse
effects of an increasingly disaffected and fractious populace. From the 2040s onward,
research and development increasingly focuses on geo-engineering and carbon removal
mechanisms, which become seen as fixes to halt or lessen climate impacts. Many nations
invest heavily in minimizing the risks of deploying geo-engineering within their borders, without
much consideration of the risk to others.

Public Engagement and Mobilization
High inequality between countries prompts social movements that begin in lower-income
states but spread as citizens of higher-income countries become more aware of the sufferingof others through communications technology and virtual experiences. Resistance groups
emphasize “compassion and empathy [as guiding principles] in a last-ditch effort to savehumanity.”
Underground societies emerge in response to increasingly authoritarian national governance,
attempting self-governance at the local scale (but out of sight of surveillance) and creating
black markets which begin to spread and merge with compassionate resistance movements.
Due to the breakdown in international relations and ensuing strict border policies, many ofthese networks remain constrained by national boundaries and identities remain rooted inlocal- or national-scale experience.

Decision-Making and Power
National leaders push their own interests and agendas, sometimes collaborating, but mostly
engaging in hostile rivalry and conflict with one another. Decisions are made with national
priorities at the forefront; some generate net benefits for the planet, such as promoting
green energy policy to secure energy independence, but many prove damaging, for example
refusing to export food and water despite rampant “malnutrition and outright starvation in
many parts of the world.”
Borders and boundaries are strengthened, causing tensions and anguish to those forced toflee due to environmental conditions and public health crises. Global trade becomes limited,
and trust between countries is at an all-time low. Global corporations are the last bastion ofinternational cooperation and fight to keep it alive, but eventually give into political pressure,and most restructure into national units.

28 • SECTION 2

Given the lack of cooperation at the global scale, progress on reducing emissions is patchy.
During times of outright conflict, reducing emissions is, at best, a secondary consideration.
In periods of tension but not active hostility, nations ramp up investment in alternative energy
and other technologies in search of a competitive advantage over others. Investment inincreasingly aged grid infrastructure suffers, as attention is on policing borders rather thaninternal infrastructure. As increasingly desperate nations begin unilaterally experimenting withlarge-scale deployment of geo-engineering and carbon removal mechanisms closer to 2050,
without coordination between them, unpredictable and catastrophic effects may occur.
Partly as a result, a “my energy first” discourse emerges which emphasizes transitions
to locally-feasible renewables as a means to secure energy sources. Locally produced
bio-based products become more commonplace because of advances in chemicalengineering. Though increasing military expenditures stress national budgets, national
governments see sustainability transformations as a new form of space race, investingheavily in research aimed at alternative energy and suspending fossil fuel resource
extraction. As climate impacts become more dire, due to the lack of cooperation between
nation states, investments in adaptation measures rise in richer countries that can afford
them. Eventually, as existing adaptation measures become increasingly insufficient and thecost of adequate protection from climate impacts rises, governments begin to prioritize geoengineering and carbon extraction options.

Accountability and Financial Responsibility
Years of limited-to-no global cooperation make countries increasingly secretive andunwilling to share information with one another. This breakdown in global cooperation also
leads to limited technology transfer between countries, slowing the pace of technologicalinnovation and reducing the spread of new energy technologies. Paranoid leaders cause
mistrust to rise and conflicts to escalate quickly. As the role of global corporations isincreasingly limited to the national scale, transparency in supply chains actually increases;
as supply chains become more limited in scope, they also become easier to monitor 		and track.
International agreements become relegated to the annals of history, and actions such as
geo-engineering or ocean fertilization are taken by countries with little consideration ofconsequences outside their borders. Domains that were previously subject to international
agreements are now fiercely contested, as nation states fight to secure scarce resources.
Ocean mining becomes common, Arctic shipping lanes are disrupted by conflict, andAntarctica becomes a new battleground as Chinese, Russian and American militaries use
drones and autonomous ships to fight over territory.

Culture and Social Norms
National cultures and traditions are dominant and are strongly pushed by governments
looking for ways to build national pride amid difficult economic times. Populations areencouraged to buy local and national products, and they often have few other options, since
imports are expensive due to protectionist policies.
Life for immigrants and refugees is dangerous and uncertain. It becomes difficult for
refugees to find any safe haven, as they are typically housed in border camps with little
hope of international cooperation to find solutions. Immigrants’ rights are steadily eroded,
to the point where many have become stateless and unregistered. As populist rhetoric isnormalized, xenophobia becomes more common and socially accepted.
There are very few global social norms, in contrast to the hopes that many held in theearly years of the 21st century. Now, cultures and values are notably different from nation tonation. Only networks of “underground societies and resistance movements” maintain somesemblance of contact between countries.

SECTION 2 •29

2.3 Connected communities and cities
Connected Communities and Cities is a world where national governments are unable tocope with the economic, social and environmental challenges of the 2020s, so people lookinstead to their local areas—communities and cities—for leadership. The trend of urbanization,
prevalent in the fastest growing countries since the 1990s, continues. Cities and local areas
have one major advantage over larger scale national governance—they can be flexible in
the way that they organize their systems. As national power recedes, cities have the scope
to experiment with new governance structures that are better suited to local characteristics.
Local identities flourish alongside increasingly strong communities.
Some communities invest heavily in intelligence in their pursuit of becoming a “smart
city.” Others decide to eschew most technology to make their communities more liveable.
Technology developments allow for efficient economic activity at a smaller scale; forexample, 3-D printing and decentralized power grids enable local manufacturing and energy
production. Societal transformations toward sustainability also take place—people consumeless meat, for example, and support investments in finding alternative, more efficient sourcesof protein.
Despite the overall trend of urbanization, and the many benefits of using a local approachto address challenges, not all urban areas thrive. Many cities will be highly susceptible toclimate risks, for example, with millions in the 2020s and 2030s exposed to “climate andenvironmental hazards including flooding due to rising sea levels as many cities are locatedat the coastlines.” Furthermore, “increasing heat waves in cities (intensity, duration, and extent)
make vulnerable populations highly exposed.” Greater disease burdens, including for example
an “explosion of communicable illnesses,” is another risk in dense urban settlements where
inhabitants’ immune systems may already be weakened due to pollution exposure. Inequalities
will be exacerbated, as some citizens and some cities are more vulnerable to these effects
and less equipped to respond effectively than others. Some cities in the Global South struggle
to adapt to the rapid pace of change given resource constraints. Cities will also face thechallenge of managing rising inequality within their urban areas and between cities and rural
areas (which become merely providers of natural resources and cheap labor to cities).

Public Engagement and Mobilization
This is a world of enthusiastic public engagement, as people feel that they have a voice intheir local communities. “Social movements … become institutionalized as political parties
at the city level.” Technology is harnessed to promote mass engagement in decisionmaking. Youth movements—focused on concerns like environmental justice, gender equality,
education, and health—become platforms where the local leaders of tomorrow can emerge.
Resilience and solidarity become central points around which people mobilize, and thisencourages development of green infrastructure, urban food production, investments in smart
cities, and urban emissions reductions. Such changes are born out of an increased sense ofsolidarity in the face of climate change as a unifying challenge across communities. For somecities, progress is slow, since legacy infrastructure is expensive to replace. But many local
communities manage to become “seedbeds for co-creation and co-transformation,” with newforms of governance and collaboration emerging via art, spirituality, and mindfulness. A formof peer pressure is exerted to overcome, to some extent, the free rider problem.
The most effective responses integrate rural and urban communities into collaborative,
decentralized networks, spurred on by public engagement pushing for innovation andtechnology sharing, risk- and opportunity-sharing mechanisms, and coordination of local
governance priorities and strategies. As the trend of urbanization accelerates, as it isexpected to do in coming years, the influx of rural inhabitants to urban centers maintain ties

30 • SECTION 2

with their rural communities and, empowered by strong local leaders advocating for recent
immigrants, mobilize to ensure that the relationship between urban and rural populations is
optimized without leaving rural areas behind. This includes incorporating elements of rural
culture and traditions into urban lifestyles, and eventually paves the way for the collaborative
management of coupled urban-rural systems. The use of AI to design and optimize
such networks from a systems approach generates efficiency, on an ethical basis, on an
unprecedented scale.

Decision-Making and Power
Strong local leadership becomes the center of decision-making and power in this scenario.
Some leaders are ambitious, seeking nothing short of systemic urban transformation. Others
are more modest, trying to make needed changes at an incremental pace. Advancesin communication technology are harnessed to enable direct, participatory democracy,
broadening the power base as more inclusive decision-making processes are developed.
Some local authorities are able to grow their tax revenue in novel ways and to use theirinfluence “to pressure corporations [operating within city limits] into decreasing emissions
and other harmful environmental practices.” While corporations still operate across multiple
cities and across the globe in this scenario, the increasing concentration of power in urban
centers, and the increasingly open and transparent communication and coordination between
them, enables cities to band together to resist a corporate “race to the bottom.” Public-private
partnerships become increasingly important, helping to drive research and innovation in
strategically important directions, and to enable access to emerging technologies.
However, rural areas are at risk of being left behind in this scenario. Due to urbanizationand growing urban populations, city leaders have comparatively more power and influence.
As a result, the interests of rural inhabitants are often under-represented, and people wholive in the countryside risk being “neglected from many of the services and communities
present in cities.” In a worst-case scenario, “rural areas may simply become massive resource
extraction hubs.”
The tension between local action and a global-scale problem such as climate change is asignificant barrier to mitigation. While multiple positive changes take place locally, coordinating
global action among a larger number of local actors proves even more difficult than having
nation states negotiate in international fora. Overcoming this barrier could require rethinking
current governance arrangements such as the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change. One possible alternative model could rely on virtual communication tools
to foster deliberation among a larger number of diverse community-level leaders. Another(and not mutually exclusive) option would be to embark upon a complete upheaval of current
governance structures, creating a nested, polycentric global governance regime better suited
to a world with different power dynamics. This could feature knowledge transfers between
cities, scaled up to state-, national-, regional-, and eventually global-level coordination.

Accountability and Financial Responsibility
Decisions made locally are tested with greater scrutiny, and local leaders are held moreaccountable than national leaders for immediate climate impacts. While still complex, decisionmaking at a local scale allows proponents to openly acknowledge and debate the trade-offs
inherent in policy-making, for example between different interest groups, or between sectoral
gains and losses. Facilitated by new forms of communication technology, as well as by higher
levels of education, citizens become more involved than ever before in local governance,
participating directly in making it transparent and accessible. Improved sensor technologies
allow citizens direct access to information about air and water quality and to hold local leaders
accountable—particularly important in the face of increasing urbanization. Local citizens also
push for increased transparency in corporate activities, using their “collective purchasing
power as leverage to make demands for sustainable practices.”

SECTION 2 •31

While there is much progress and experimentation in news ways of governing, not all cities areable to cope. For some cities, the flow of people into urban areas leads to a sprawling informal
economy, difficult to regulate and highly opaque.

Culture and Social Norms
As power and responsibility shifts to cities, there is a wide variation in their economic andsocial experiences. Without the regulating factor of national government, inequality between
places increases as wealthier, first-mover cities adapt earlier. Others “bear the brunt of
the passive neglect or active hostility to climate change action by the national (or state)
government, and their populations will lack the surplus wealth, time, energy, education, andresources to fight back”. Social justice becomes a major ethical problem as inequalities
persist and are, in some cases, exacerbated.
Gentrification becomes a major issue as well, as lower-income individuals get priced out ofcity centers, with detrimental effects on the cultural heritage of many groups.

2.4 Consumers in charge
This is a world in which billions reach middle-class status by the 2020s, fueling a global
economy focused on consumption growth. Global corporations are the most powerful entities
in this world. They satisfy the demands of these consumers through innovation, for example inmobile computing technology, making it easier for people to access products, services andinformation drawn from around the world. As global economic growth continues, governments
largely stay out of the way, allowing corporations to operate freely across borders.
The consumer boom of the 2020s encourages material-based patterns of economic activity
and diets increasingly revolve around processed foods, meat products, and refined sugars.
The growing middle-class demand automobiles, air travel, refrigerators, internet access, andsame-day package delivery. The increased pressure on energy and resources spurs someinnovation, but mostly leads to scarcity and resource depletion. By the late 2020s, excessive
consumption leads to damaging pollution and congestion in major cities. Asset-pricecorrection and other drivers lead to a global financial crisis, with impacts on quality of lifearound the world, on global trade, and on investments in innovation. Alongside this, extreme
weather events devastate economic centers of power in Asia, Europe and the United States.
Recovery and rebuilding efforts continue into the late-2030s, and a movement emergesthat takes a hard look at economic growth and the levels and type of consumption required
across the world. There is a growing realization of a severe mismatch between consumption
in different places. Leaders from all walks of life—religion, culture, business and government—
step up. Together, they strive for “balanced consumption” making resources more accessible
to those who consume too little and discouraging excessive consumption by those who
consume too much. Based on public pressure, consumption-based emissions accounting
emerges as the dominant paradigm, further supporting this more globally balanced approachto consumption. As citizens face related pressures and threats around the world, a global
identity begins to emerge with its roots in consumption mentality, but eventually expanding
toward more sustainable, longer-term thinking by the 2040s.
This push toward a different model for consumption is reinforced and supported byconsumers themselves. Having suffered in the environmental and economic disasters of
the late 2020s and early 2030s, they actively seek out products, services and experiencesthat use less energy and fewer resources. New services are set up to calculate and rate theecological footprint of a product instantly, “providing consumers with real-time information

32 • SECTION 2

on the products they consume” and allowing them to make purchasing decisions based onthese values. Consumers also increase their support for businesses that provide accessible,
appropriate products to low-income consumers in order to “avoid inequality and poverty
traps.” All businesses—from start-ups to global corporations—innovate and redesign theiroperations and businesses toward a circular economy model. Empowered by technology torender supply chains more transparent and distributed sensors to monitor local air quality andclimate conditions, consumers themselves emerge as powerful in this scenario; even though
corporations may have had the power at some point, power ends up distributed broadly
amongst consumers all around the world.

Public Engagement and Mobilization
In the early years of this scenario, public engagement is motivated primarily in response to
the negative effects of continuing (and increasing) overconsumption—in particular resource
scarcity, leading to pollution and public health crises. Over time, as resource scarcity gets
worse and health crises become more regular and damaging, social movements arise topush for a more sustainable, natural existence and healthier lifestyles. Successful movements
are those that start early, based on weak signals of change. Movements that mobilize later
find that they are often too late to reverse consumption patterns, especially in developing
countries, where the resources to make a shift to sustainable consumption are lacking.
In broad terms, many movements become mainstream. Consumers push toward moresustainable consumption and call for a “just transition” to new patterns of economic activity. As
the middle class grows, education improves, creating a generation that is far better placed tounderstand the negative impacts of overconsumption. They create a mass consumer movement
to encourage a shift toward “dematerialization” or consumption of non-tangible goods.
Further, such movements find that the most powerful message is one around balanced
consumption. This phrase recognizes that the global economic system is already remarkably
productive, and progress can occur by rethinking the nature of relationships within it andrecognizing that “most of the world is under-consuming food, resources, and energy.” Forexample, balancing energy consumption could mean ensuring that those who have not been
consuming enough to maintain a sustainable and healthy lifestyle are able to have more, andthose over-consuming energy (primarily wealthier households) better understand the need for
restraint and greener energy alternatives. Overall this creates a more efficient and effective
global system, and the message of balanced consumption as a rallying cry for movements ismore appealing and potent than one based more narrowly on stopping overconsumption.

Decision-Making and Power
During the 2020s, power shifts toward global corporations as they become more influential
in serving the needs of the growing consumer class. The relationship between governments
and corporations varies across the world (with different approaches in China, Europe and theUnited States), but the general trend is toward more corporate influence.
As climate and financial crises hit in the late 2020s, decision-making becomes increasingly
reactive. Corporations and governments scramble to invest in fixes, as their focus turns
to emergency response and disaster preparedness. Some corporations look to invest in
ambitious technology schemes around geo-engineering and bioengineering.
Over time, many in society begin to realize that solutions will not only come throughtechnological investments and fixes. Just transitions, they discover, require mechanisms toprotect workers, the poor, and vulnerable groups. Some corporations resist and lobby againstsocial protections that threaten profits. Instead, they argue for greater privatization and market
liberalization in order to rekindle growth following the crises.
Most consumers, however, align with corporations that acknowledge a more fundamental
change is needed and promote more sustainable policies. Over time, it becomes mainstream for

SECTION 2 •33

organizations to integrate climate risks into decision-making and “impose voluntary mitigation
strategies.” New business models emerge, led by start-ups and young business leaders, whichemphasize services over material goods, localized production, and for-benefit rather thanfor-profit strategies. Corporations look to rebalance their own activities, with more sustainable
offerings in developed markets and a far greater emphasis on boosting consumption in poor
areas. More national governments and statistical agencies move away from Gross Domestic
Product as a measure of growth and toward more sustainable well-being indicators.
By 2040, in some countries, corporations become willing to partner with governments aroundpolicies that would have seemed implausible three decades ago: major tax reform to tax
externalities rather than labor, wealth redistribution, and “including representatives for the
future in governments.”

Accountability and Financial Responsibility
Corporate supply chains become more integrated as they serve billions more consumers
around the world. But the crises of the late 2020s (e.g. financial crisis, infectious diseases,
devastation of ports from storm surges) create major disruptions for the existing global systemof trade.
As they rebuild in the 2030s, corporations reshape their supply chains, using AI to manage
the whole, complex system of production and consumption more effectively “throughdis-embedded and disinterested intelligence.” Real-time information makes the processtransparent, and consumers can access data to guide their purchase decisions.
Smarter, more responsive logistics and production arrangements help to restructure theglobal economy toward the new set of emerging values around environmental and social
responsibility.

Culture and Social Norms
In the early years of this scenario, material consumption and technology fixes best represent
the prevailing culture—largely an individualistic, acquisitive set of values. Diets that include
large quantities of meat and processed foods are seen as a status symbol associated withhaving reached the middle class. As societies realize that the root of the problem lies in
consumption patterns, there is a transition toward new social norms and cultural practices,
particularly those emphasizing a more connected, systemic outlook; a responsible relationshipto natural resources; and reuse and fixing of goods rather than disposing of them. Lifestyleand behavioral changes follow suit which are in line with these norms.
Emerging values regarding more sustainable consumption pave the way toward a “shift toa fully circular economy” while also supporting sharing economy principles. It is important
to note that, for many societies without access to an abundance of resources, sharing andcircular economy principles are already the norm, with re-use of resources and sharing limited
transportation a matter of necessity rather than a matter of convenience. That being said,
communities with greater or growing access to resources may still require a push to enable
this type of lifestyle change. If there is a shift in social norms, significant public support fortechnological innovations that facilitate the transition to a circular economy may well follow.
Furthermore, the shift toward non-tangible consumption and decreased consumption of meatand processed foods leads to improved health outcomes as well as sustainability. Recognitionof these co-occurring benefits helps to further embed sustainable consumption as asocial norm.

34 • SECTION 32

3 SECTION
CLIMATE MITIGATION PHILANTHROPY
In this section, we explore some of the possible ramifications of the different future worlds
identified in the ClimateWorks Futures CoLab exercise for current strategies employed inclimate mitigation philanthropy. This section is not intended to serve as a guide, but rather, asa thought exercise for how different programs and strategies may fare in an uncertain future,and to shed light on challenges and opportunities for current and future action.

3.1 Current focus areas for climate mitigation
philanthropy
Climate mitigation philanthropy has coalesced broadly around achieving the goals of theParis Agreement. This entails holding the increase in global average temperatures this century
to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5°C. Over the last few years, the global context and policy landscape hascontinued to evolve. Figure 2 below summarizes the projected aggregate global progress
toward meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement.

Figure 2. Emissions and expected warming based on pledges and current policies [Climate
Action Tracker, 2018]
2100 WARMING PROJECTIONSEMISSIONS AND EXPECTED WARMING BASED ON PLEDGES AND CURRENT POLICIESGLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS GtCOZe / YEAR200

WARMING PROJECTED
BY 2100

150

BASELINE
4.1 - 4.8OC

100

CURRENT POLICIES
3.1 - 3.7OC
PLEDGES
2.6 - 3.2OC

50

Historical

2OC CONSISTENT

0-50

1.5OC CONSISTENT

1990 200020102020 2030

2040 2050 2060

2070

2080 2090

2100

SECTION 3
2 •35

Looking ahead to possible alternative futures, climate mitigation philanthropy must consider
the following current trends and notable patterns.
1. After three years of flat emissions, 2017 saw a rise in energy-related CO2 emissions.
2. The continued rapid deployment and falling costs of clean energy technology are heartening, though thus far only four of 38 analyzed technologies in various sectors by the International Energy Agency are on track for what is needed to meet long-term climate goals.6
3. Despite clear signals on the inevitable long-term shift away from coal, there is a bifurcationof governments that continue with thermal coal expansion and others that are committing
to phase out coal completely.
4. 2017 was the second-worst year on record for tropical tree cover loss, eclipsed only by
2016. In total, the tropics experienced 15.8 million hectares (39.0 million acres) of tree coverloss in 2017, an area the size of Bangladesh.7
5. Subnational and non-state action are gaining prominence as mechanisms to support implementation of national-level policy work, as well as further reducing the emissions gap by
several gigatons CO2 eq per year.
6. Climate mitigation philanthropy is growing, but resources are not commensurate with thescale of the challenge posed by climate change and still represent less than two percentof philanthropic foundation giving.
It is with these trends in mind that we must explore the four alternative futures highlighted
by the ClimateWorks Futures CoLab exercise, extrapolating what these trends may mean for
future climate action efforts.

3.2 Four scenarios: implications for climate action
The following pages outline a set of key implications for climate mitigation efforts that
potentially stem from each alternative future. We assess where current assumptions or
strategies are at risk of being undermined in a given scenario versus which of theseassumptions and strategies would remain valid, as well as what new threats and opportunities
we believe are likely to emerge in each scenario. In looking across these four categories, we
can better think about what steps we can take now to forestall the most significant threats,and how we might best capitalize on emerging opportunities.

Hollowed out
Summary: In this alternative future, while there are still valid technology-driven pathways
offering low- or zero-carbon solutions, many of the challenges relate to increasingly unequal
political power, with limited means for public engagement around climate action and influence
by independent actors. Technological advances may also provide unanticipated opportunities,
in particular around efficiency, logistics, and life cycle analysis of embedded carbon in
supply chains.

6		 International Energy Agency, Tracking Clean Energy Progress, May 20187		 Global Forest Watch, “2017 was the Second-Worst Year on Record for Tropical Tree Cover Loss,” June 201836 • SECTION 3

At Risk

Still Valid

Grassroots engagement as everyone may
be plugged in and tuned out. Bots could
increasingly drown out fact-based, humanstorytelling.

Zero emission vehicles (ZEVs) will continue
to drive down costs; the public will also
have more mobility options (including rideshare, car-share, bike-share, etc.).

NGO influence: Increasing consolidationof political and economic power could
undercut traditional advocacy.

Phasing out fossil fuels and phasing insustainable energy sources still driven
by changing economics and pursuitof increased energy security. New
opportunities may accelerate this transition.

Government capacity: There will be fewer
government resources to go around if
taxation systems don’t keep pace withchanges.
Open flow of trade and technology: Climate
models count on diffusion of advanced
technology across borders.

We can expect major leaps forward
on super-efficient appliances, such as
refrigeration, air conditioning, and heating,among others.
New developments in nanomaterials will
drive down the cost of carbon removal via
direct-air capture, and CRISPR can increase
capacity for natural systems to remove andstore carbon.

Emerging Threats

New Opportunities

Greater economic inequality,
including rampant unemployment andunderemployment, means we may needother ways to provide sustenance and toprevent political disruption or even violent
outbreaks.

There are a number of ways AI might
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, reducetransaction costs, pave the way for circular
economies, sharing, and higher utilization(“AI for Good”). For example, ongoingadvances in information technology could
improve:

The ability to exploit near-earth orbit andthe solar system will engender new conflictsin space.
Competing government priorities may shiftenvironment to a lower position. This may
be accompanied by a lack of coordination
between government and the private sector.
Declining influence of labor as a politicalconstituency, especially in developed
economies.
Ever-growing data management andsecurity issues may threaten or distractfrom a variety of climate action strategies.
Geo-engineering emerges as a compelling
response to climate impacts. Threat level
depends on the governance systems
in place.

- Smart mobility services, traffic
management and freight movement- Climate forecasting and effective
adaptation- Food production and distribution- “Efficiency first” infrastructure
Distributed peer-to-peer renewable energy
grids with cheap and equitable access toelectricity.
Life cycle analyses with greatertransparency regarding embedded carbon
are promising.
Satellite applications for managing forestsand carbon sinks (like methane leakage
ideas) could transform monitoring andplanning.

SECTION 3 •37

National rivals
Summary: In this alternative future, multilateral efforts at progress would likely unravel over time,leaving the main drivers of climate progress to come from national self-interest. There would still
be some serious tailwinds for action on renewables and even energy efficiency, from an energy
security perspective, but trade barriers will limit both the sharing of new technologies as wellas other options for connected carbon markets, and higher military expenditures will stress theavailability of budgets for energy investment. New challenges may also arise, particularly aroundsecurity of the power grid and competition for raw materials for new technologies.

At Risk

Multilateral agreements and related
timetables (e.g. Paris Agreement, ICAO,
Kigali phase-down) may come undone.
Multilateral and even bilateral financing andclimate-friendly foreign aid would dry up
and halt progress on decarbonization in
many parts of the world.
Protectionism creates barriers fortechnology transfer.
Cross-border carbon trading.
Greater military expenditures and lower
growth due to protectionism stressnational budgets.

Still Valid

Renewables, especially for energy security
and independence.
National-level plans and policies that
depend on a more top-down approach to
implementation.
Green growth plans focused on domestic
industry.
Corporate commitments to monitor andtrack supply chains and reduce emissions
over time.
State and city leadership when working in
partnerships with national governments.
Energy efficiency driven by needs to ensure
energy security, minimize fuel shortages,
or both.

Emerging Threats

New Opportunities

The “my energy first” mindset may lead toa resurgence in fossil fuel use in countries
and markets where they are plentiful; petrostates may push to produce and sell as
much oil as possible while they still can.

Technology and advances from spillovers
from new “Manhattan” projects or increases
in investment in research and development
could be possible.

Explosion in surveillance technology
may stifle political movements calling forincreased action on climate threats.

Explosion in drone technology leading
to “eyes everywhere” could also allow foremissions monitoring and transparency insupport of climate action.

Attacks on electrical grids, both physicaland cyber, will lead to greater uncertainty
and costs to try to maintain grid reliability.

Smarter, more productive agricultural
practices focused on food security could
emerge, including engineered proteins.

We may see hoarding and shortage ofnoble metals vital to advanced energy,transport, and emissions control systems.

Potential for greater emphasis on
distributed generation as more households
pursue energy security by moving “offthe grid.”

Reversion to primitive energy sources may
threaten the most easily accessible forests
and reverse trends in deforestation.

38 • SECTION 3

Military may emerge as advocate forgreater adaptation and mitigation, given
first-hand understanding of dangers ofclimate change.

Connected communities and cities
Summary: In this alternative future, with a decentralization of power, strategies that focus oninternational or multilateral policy-making may lose efficacy, and the implementation of largescale national-level policies may not go as planned. Many core efforts, such as renewables,
energy efficiency, and ZEVs, however, would still remain valid. As cities increasingly become
testbeds of different types of policies and practices, some may exacerbate inequality andtensions, while some others may take leadership roles, all amidst a more engaged citizenry.
At Risk

Still Valid

International cooperation and agreements(e.g. UNFCCC negotiations) might lose
efficacy if they don’t include cities, states,
regions, etc.

Renewables, especially distributed forms ofenergy generation.

National, macroeconomic policies
that depend on more distributed
implementation could be at risk.
It may become difficult to marshal
capital and/or political support for large,
expensive, society-wide climate-beneficial
undertakings such as high-speed rail or
integrated electrical grids.

Emerging Threats

Many cities and regions may end up ‘left
behind’ as climate impacts become more
severe.
Further shifts to walled communities,
leaving less unified, less resourced
people(s) behind.
Growing power imbalance between urban
and rural citizens.
Coordinating and connecting climate action
among a higher number of local actors.
City-based strategies that provide
amenities for the rich may exacerbate
inequality.

Energy efficiency, driven by a desire toconserve local resources.
ZEVs, especially shared versions owned andcontrolled by localized fleets.
City-based strategies, as well as state andprovincial level policy actions.
Corporate commitments, particularly inpartnerships with local governments.

New Opportunities

New forms of citizen engagement
are possible that build on advancesin communications and information
technologies.
Localized “leave it in the ground” or “100%clean” legislation, or even local approaches
to carbon taxes.
Accelerated growth of the sharing economy,
including mobility services and major
appliances, leading to reduced energy
consumption overall.
Changes in social values toward meaning
and connectedness, creating potential for
reducing consumption.
Novel types of trans-boundary cooperation
given community-based actions for climate
mitigation.

SECTION 3 •39

Consumers in charge
Summary: In this alternative future, given a surge in consumption, there are risks that countries
will not meet their near-term international pledges and emissions reductions targets and locking in of wasteful behavioral norms. As the pendulum swings in the 2030s, however, there may
be new opportunities to redefine global agreements, investor agendas, and corporate social
responsibility. While there may be pressure for accelerated carbon removal or geo-engineering,
circular economy strategies and increased citizen and consumer awareness may both lead to
rapid declines in subsequent emissions.
At Risk

Near-term peaking emissions, as surging
consumption ensures we do not meet 2020
climate targets or Paris Agreement targets.
Consumer preferences in the short term
may lock-in future emissions pathways andreduce opportunities for more sustainableconsumption.
Increased consumption patterns put
growing pressure on land and ecosystems
for food and natural resources.

Still ValidEngaging with consumer behavior as aneffective lever toward climate action.
Despite failure to meet 2020 or 2025
targets, international agreements to lower
global emissions re-emerge as key in the2030s and 2040s.
Energy efficiency becomes valued more
highly as wealthier consumers demand
the same level of energy services in a
decarbonized economy.

Corporate disclosure efforts may not affectnon-consumer-facing companies that can
fly below the radar, avoiding meaningful
emissions reductions.

Increased private investment in renewableenergy, as it enables corporations to makeand meet environmental promises.

Emerging Threats

New Opportunities

Spikes in emissions continuing through the2030s will render 2°C and near-2°C pathways
infeasible without massive negative emissions
or geo-engineering.

Increased citizen awareness andengagement builds political will for climate
action by governments and corporations.

Social and environmental protections are
dependent upon powerful corporations continuing to cooperate with governments.
Increasing AI threatens job security, though
after 2030 this threat is at least temporarily
addressed by improved social protections.

Supply chains able to manage complex
system of production and consumption
more effectively.

Circular economy strategies gain
tremendous ground.
A higher societal valuation of the natural
world and ecosystem services provides
further boost to efforts to manage
deforestation and land carbon sinks.
Consumer awareness creates heightened
opportunity to decarbonize diets while also
improving human health outcomes.
Consumption-based emissions accounting
offers opportunities to understand true
individual and national carbon footprints.

40 • SECTION 3

3.3 Conclusions and next steps
Over the past decade, climate mitigation philanthropy has focused on seizing the best nearterm opportunities to reduce clean technology costs, lock-in greenhouse gas emissions
reductions, and protect key carbon sinks, mindful of what is required through 2030 to meeta well-below 2°C goal. Given the findings of the recently released IPCC Special Report on
Global Warming of 1.5°C,8 allowing warming to exceed 1.5°C could have even more significant
impacts than previously thought, and urgent action to avoid this can no longer be delayed.
Recent progress is heartening, but as evidenced in the Special Report, we still have asignificant challenge ahead. Global climate goals require that emissions peak by 2020, thenmake a steady and steep decline through 2050, seeing net-zero emissions after mid-century(which will require carbon removal), and negative emissions subsequently.
This ClimateWorks Futures CoLab exercise is not meant to predict specific futures that climate
philanthropy must address now. Rather, it was designed to probe at the multiplicity of possible
futures out to 2050. This will help all actors (researchers, analysts, advocates, campaigners,etc.) to stress-test strategies and programs against a range of scenarios and to see emerging
trends that, regardless of precise outcomes, may affect future efforts at climate action. What
strategies remain robust? How do these scenarios challenge current efforts? What specificchallenges might be faced in different regions of the world in the different scenarios?

Common themes and conclusions
Across all futures, there is a clear case for an acceleration in the deployment of renewableenergy, and distributed generation technologies are likely to become more and more diffuse.
While past efforts at energy efficiency have lagged behind potential savings, this exercise
shows that many key drivers toward energy efficiency may yet grow stronger over time.
Strategies to support renewable energy and energy efficiency, appear robust across all futures
explored and are likely to only become more fundamental to climate action over time.
We also see the importance of aligned economic and political conditions underlying all of
the scenarios. Even if prices are such that cleaner options are the smarter choice, strong
incumbents can promote fiscal and regulatory policy that supports emissions-intensive
industries and energy sources, and erects barriers to prevent the transformation to a clean
economy. As costs for low-carbon options continue to decline, we must remember that
economics are a necessary but insufficient condition for widespread market adoption and amore sophisticated approach to the political economy of the transition is required.
The shift to clean low-carbon transportation systems looks likely to continue, though growing
resistance from entrenched interests will continue to require diligent efforts to counter
misinformation, inform key policy actions, and expand the coalition of interest groups
demanding action. Further action will be needed to ensure legitimate concerns for equity,
access, and labor are managed properly so that we can expand the co-benefits of thistransition and convert would be opponents to clean transport advocates. Progress on themost carbon-intensive form of travel, flying, remains challenging across all futures, given thetechnological difficulty of decarbonizing the sector and the rapidly growing demand for air
travel in some scenarios.
In all scenarios, we can assume a continued rapid progression of communications andinformation technologies—though the distribution of access to these technologies and their

8		 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). “Global Warming of 1.5°C, an IPCC special report on the impactsof global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in thecontext of the strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, andefforts to eradicate poverty.” Draft version available online: http://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr15/

SECTION 3 •41

use differs markedly between more and less egalitarian scenarios, with different implications.
We also see that some challenges of AI and automation, such as polarized labor markets
and increased inequality, might ultimately be transformed into opportunities that require new
approaches to just governance and the development of improved decision support systems
and policies.
Even in those scenarios where a higher level of equality is assumed, we are still grapplingwith inequality within and between different cities or states. Global and local inequality
creates grievances that can stymie action on longer-term efforts including climate change
mitigation. In both of the scenarios where local and nationalist identities dominate, climate
action becomes harder due to the failure of the global commons. There are still opportunities,
however, for local, climate-positive actions due to the decentralized and local nature of somerenewable energy supplies and more widespread deployment of low-cost sensor technologies
that will provide real-time access to relevant data and information.
Finally, many of the trends identified in the process of developing this report are in fact
responses to the climate impacts we are already beginning to see. Even for actors focusedon climate mitigation efforts, it will be essential to pay attention to the early impacts of climatechange and the geopolitical issues it will create in the coming years. The lines between
economic drivers and climate drivers will only blur further in the future, and this is an evident
threat across all scenarios in different ways.

Further questions for consideration• What do these common themes mean for philanthropic strategies for climate change
mitigation?
• What questions will require more attention and research in the coming years?
• How might developments in AI/automation lead to economic and societal dislocation, or to a
new world of opportunity and efficiency gains?
• How much can/should climate mitigation philanthropy engage in just transition andequitable transition issues, and in what capacity?
• What risks might existing climate mitigation strategies face in a world with rapidly increasing
and extreme inequality?”• How might processes for making and shaping policy change in a world where the balanceof power shifts among actor groups at multiple scales?
• What might be the implications for mitigation strategies in a future characterized by rapidly
increasing consumption that exceeds current projections?
• What novel opportunities for decarbonization between now and 2050 emerged from thisexercise?

APPENDIX3
42 • SECTIONAPPENDIXPROCESS AND PARTICIPANTS
The ClimateWorks Futures CoLab exercise was an online, interactive scenario development
process that took place over four weeks, from July 9 to August 3, 2018. It included 154
participants from 38 countries. The purpose of the exercise was to explore possible futuresthat could emerge between now and 2050 and identify relevant implications for climate
mitigation strategies and programs.

About the process
Participants engaged via a bespoke, facilitated online scenario process developed by the
Futures CoLab team. In the first week, participants brainstormed drivers of change—factors
with the potential to shape the world over the next 30 years. Participants submitted titles andshort descriptions of drivers into one of six categories: social, technological, environmental,
economic, political, and international relations. Given the large number of drivers submitted,
the Futures CoLab team grouped drivers prior to week two.
In the second week, participants voted on the groups of drivers they thought would have themost significant impact on the future, regardless of probability. They also combined groupsof drivers into storylines, short narratives about a possible future based on combinations that
could co-occur or reinforce one another. After participants voted on the groups of drivers
and contributed storylines, the Futures CoLab team developed scenario axes, each of which
outlined how the world might develop in sharply different ways along a key dimension.
In week three, participants critiqued and refined these scenario axes, with substantial
discussion occurring. These discussions, the central questions they raised, as well as the
inputs from the first two weeks—in particular the storylines contributed during week two—
provided the materials the Futures CoLab team used to sketch the outlines of five 		
potential scenarios.
In the fourth and final week, participants fleshed out these five scenarios by responding to aset of guiding questions. The responses brought these potential future worlds to life in greater
detail and also highlighted relevant implications for climate action strategies in general andclimate philanthropy in particular.

About the participants
A total of 410 individuals were invited to participate, including many members of the Future
Earth expert community as well as participants at the ClimateWorks Foundation 2050 Today
event held on June 14-15, 2018. A total of 154 of these invitees agreed to participate fromaround the world, with a slight skew toward developed countries; more than 70 percent werefrom North America and Europe, with the remainder from Asia/Pacific, Latin America, andAfrica (see Figure 3). The timing of the exercise during the summer holiday period madeit difficult for many people who wanted to participate to engage. A variety of sectors wererepresented, including academia, civil society organizations, national labs and think tanks,business, and government (see Figure 4). Approximately one-third of participants were female
and two-thirds male.

APPENDIX •43

Figure 3. Participants by region
NORTH AMERICA (43%)
EUROPE (27%)

AFRICA (4%)
LATIN AMERICAAND CARIBBEAN(6%)
ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC (20%)

Figure 4. Participants by sector
Business (12%)

Government (3%)

Technology
and innovation (10%)

Academia (44%)

Consulting / Advisory (2%)

Research Organizations* (16%)

Social scienceand humanities (27%)

SECTOR

Science technology,
engineering, math (17%)

Social sciences
and humanities (11%)
Science technology
engineering, math (5%)
Civil Society (25%)
International scope (12%)
Regional scope (7%)* Where Research Organizations include government labs and think tanks.

44 • APPENDIX

Philantropy (6%)

Integrating multiple perspectives, from a diversity of participants, is a major advantage
of conducting a scenario development exercise online. Participants from different walksof life provided very different inputs into the process at different stages. For example, inearly phases, participants from developing countries tended to emphasize the central
role indigenous and local knowledge should play in mitigation, the need for multi-scale
approaches, and the potential for informal governance regimes to emerge in coming years.
Activity levels varied across the four weeks of the exercise. Analysis of active participants(those who contributed at least once during the four-week exercise, a group comprising 76%
of participants) showed that nearly all contributed during the first week, with smaller numbers
contributing during each subsequent phase (see Figure 5). The group that remained active
during later parts of the exercise made an average of nearly five contributions each during
the final week. The fall-off in participation may have been due to timing: the final two weeks ofthe exercise occurred during late July and early August, when many participants wereon vacation.

Figure 5. Activity level across the exercise
CLIMATEWORKS FUTURES COLAB EXERCISE PARTICIPANT ACTIVITY
6

ACTIVITY PER PHASE

5

80%

4

60%

3
40%

2

20%

1
0

% OF ACTIVE USERS PER PHASE

100%

0%
WEEK 1			WEEK 2			WEEK 3			

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CONTRICUTIONS PER ACTIVE USERWEEK 4PARTICIPATION (% OF ACTIVE USERS)

Evaluation and feedback
Following up on the exercise, participants were sent an evaluation survey, and 27% responded.
Over three-quarters of respondents reported that they spent more than one hour participating
weekly, and approximately the same number enjoyed participating. Some comments included:“the exercise [was] very participative and open, allowing a broad range of views to beconsidered,” and “it was interesting to see initial suggestions across a wide range of domains
then filtered into a manageable set of considerations.”
Though participants were satisfied overall, some suggested that the quality and quantityof dialogue between participants could be strengthened. One noted that “a deeper
understanding would have been achieved having members discuss in real time via a chatchannel.” and another proposed that future exercises could “shift toward commenting onothers’ suggestions, rather than posting one’s own.”

APPENDIX •45

46 • APPENDIXAPPENDIX •47

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
A partial list of participants in the ClimateWorks Futures CoLab exercise is provided below.

Prof. Imran Ahmad, Australian National
University

Rebecca Herst, U. of Massachusetts,
BostonProf. Roberto F. Rañola, Jr., U. of thePhilippines Los Baños

Carlo Altamirano, Arizona State
University

Prof. Cecilia Hidalgo, U. of Buenos Aires

Prof. Christopher Rapley, University
College London

Prof. Xuemei Bai, Australian National
University and Beijing Normal University
Marjory Blumenthal, RAND Corporation
Dr. Christopher Bren d’Amour, Yale
University
Dr. Austin Brown, U. of California, Davis
Prof. Stephen Chambers, London
School of Economics and Political
ScienceDr. Sander Chan, German Development
Institute
Dr. Kung-Yueh Camyale Chao,
International Climate Development
Institute

Alice Hill, Hoover Institution
Prof. Jochen Jaeger, Concordia
University

Prof. Mark Reed, Newcastle University
Prof. Thomas Reuter, U. of Melbourne

Dr. Ravi Jain, Amazon

Dr. Isabel Rosa, Bangor University

Dr. Pedro Jaureguiberry, Universidad
Nacional de Córdoba, CONICET

Dr. Bas van Ruijven, International
Institute for Applied System Analysis

Tim Johnson, Aviation Environment
Federation

Prof. Marc Saner, U. of Ottawa

Dr. Ann-Kathrin Koessler, U. of
Osnabrück
Dr. Martin Kowarsch, Mercator ResearchInstitute on Global Commons andClimate Change

Dr. Michelle Scobie, University of theWest Indies
Alicia Seiger, Stanford Steyer-Taylor
Center for Energy Policy and Finance
Dr. Robert Simon, Protect Our Power

Amy Larkin, RESOLVE Energy Shift andNature Means BusinessNavjot Bir Singh, Centre for Youth andSocial Development

Sylvia Lee, Facebook
Prof. Diana Liverman, U. of Arizona

Dr. Mark Stafford-Smith, Commonwealth
Scientific and Industrial Research
Organisation

Hélène Côté, U. de Québec à Chicoutimi

Dr. Michael Mastrandrea, Near Zero

Dr. Asuncion Lera St.Clair, DNV GL

Dr. Roger Cremades, Hemholtz-Zentrum
Geesthacht

Dr. Nilson Ariel Espino Méndez, SUMA
Arquitectos

Prof. Masa Sugiyama, U. of Tokyo

Prof. Narendra N. Dalei, U. of Petroleum
and Energy Studies

Prof. Marie-Jean Meurs, U. de Québecà Montréal

Dr. Paul Dewick, U. of Manchester

Dr. Sergio Missana, Climate Parliamentand Stanford University Santiago
ProgramProf. William C. Clark, Harvard University
Prof. Maurie Cohen, New Jersey Instituteof Technology and Tellus Institute

Dr. Diana Dogaru, National Academy of
Romania
Dr. Thomas E. Downing, Global Climate
Adaptation Partnership
Dr. Seita Emori, National Institute forEnvironmental Studies, Japan
Dr. Jaqueline da Luz Ferreira, Instituto
Escolhas
Dr. Ajay Gambhir, Imperial College
LondonGreg Gershuny, Aspen Institute
Dr. Arunabha Ghosh, Council on
Energy, Environment and Water andEnvironment Pollution Authority

Ina Möller, Lund University
Dr. Cristina Monge, Ecodes
Prof. Normand Mousseau, U. deMontréal and Institut de l’Énergie
Trottier
Dr. Chipo Mukonza, U. of South Africa
Dr. Kimberly Nicholas, Lund University
Kathryn Myronuk, Singularity University
and Synthesis & Convergence
Janos Pasztor, Carnegie Climate
Geoengineering Governance Initiative

Dr. Joseph Tembo, Copperbelt
University
Alison Tickell, Julie’s Bicycle
Nigel Topping, We Mean BusinessProf. Diarmuid Torney, Dublin City
University
Brad Townsend, Center for Climate andEnergy Solutions
Shafqat Ullah, Sourcevo Innovations
Prof. Paul Upham, Leuphana University
Dr. Robert Van Buskirk, Kuyere! andEnervee
Bina Venkataraman, Broad InstituteProf. Coleen Vogel, U. of WitwatersrandAmbreen Waheed, Responsible
Business Initiative

Dr. Stuart Gill, SecondMuse

Prof. Mark Pelling, Kings College
LondonKate Gordon, Paulson Institute and
RIDGE-LANE Limited Partners

Prof. Sergio Peña-Neira, Universidad
Mayor

Prof. Aarti Gupta, Wageningen University

Kelsey Perlman, Carbon Market Watch

Prof. Gail Whiteman, Lancaster
University and World Business Council
on Sustainable Development

Prof. Andrea Haefner, Griffith University

Prof. Toby Peters, U. of Birmingham andHeriot-Watt University

Prof. Lei Zhang, Renmin University of
China

Dr. Enrico Ponte, GeoAdaptive

Dr. Gina Ziervogel, U. of Cape Town

Dr. Dan Hammer, National Geographic
and The Earth Genome

Dr. Bill Weihl, Sierra Club Foundation
and Caltech Resnick InstituteFor more information, please contact:
Jennifer Garard • Future Earth • jennifer.garard@futureearth.org 				Casey Cronin • ClimateWorks Foundation • casey.cronin@climateworks.org