I’m Kato.
I will now give an overview of the financial results for the fiscal year
and the status of each business segment.

Let me start with consolidated performance.

There are three financial highlights.
First, the three main KPIs of EPS, ROE, and ROIC all achieved their targets.
Next is operating income.
With FinTech falling ¥1.5 billion short of plan, consolidated operating income was ¥38.8
billion, ¥2.2 billion less than planned. We are very sorry.
I’ll mention the factors behind the shortage later.
Finally, net income was lower than forecast, mainly due to lower-than-expected
extraordinary losses. The plan was achieved with a 21% increase to ¥21.5 billion.

Here are the three main KPIs.
All indicators recovered to near their pre-COVID-19 levels, ROE exceeded cost of equity
and ROIC was in line with WACC.

The main financial indicators.
Although the group's total transaction volume grew steadily and reached a record high,operating income fell ¥2.2 billion, short of the plan at ¥38.8 billion, we could not recoverto the pre-COVID-19 level.
Net income increased ¥3.7 billion to ¥21.5 billion, achieving the plan partly due to adecrease in extraordinary losses.

Revenue and operating income by segment.
Retail sales declined due to the impact of the downsizing of directly-managed specialty
stores, but operating income was ¥3.6 billion, almost as planned.
But, while sales revenue in FinTech expanded almost as planned to ¥150.6 billion, operating
income increased only slightly by ¥1.3 billion, short of the plan by ¥1.5 billion.

The breakdown of changes in operating income.
Excluding special factors, the real increase in operating income for this fiscal year was up
10% or ¥3.4 billion, up by ¥2.7 billion in Retail and ¥1.6 billion in FinTech.
Corporate eliminations diluted the income by ¥0.9 billion, mainly due to an increase in
Human capital investment.

Recurring revenue has expanded in conjunction with key measures since the previous
medium-term management plan.
contracted future recurring gross profit remained firm despite COVID-19.
As a result, gross profit is up 22% from March 2016, and contracted future recurring grossprofit with future cash flow being assured had a significant increase of 80% from March
2016.

ESG Status.
CO2 emissions were reduced by 340,000 tons from March 2017, achieving the plan,
mainly due to the increased use of renewable energy.
In addition, the company has been selected as a component of the DJSI World Index for
five consecutive years in external evaluations.

The status of each business.

First, the factors behind ups and downs of retail operating income.
Excluding special factors, the actual increase was ¥2.7 billion.
In addition to an increase in non-operational floor space and lower fixed-term rental
contract income than planned,
The rising power cost became a drag on the plan, but the issuance of cards tailored toeach individual’s interest through events greatly exceeded the plan, resulting in a ¥1.2
billion increase in card issuance fees or internal transactions with EPOS Card,and a ¥0.1 billion increase in overall retail sales from the plan.

Customer traffic, an important indicator, increased 1.1 times from the previous year to
170 million.
We will continue to expand non-retail tenants by an average of 10% per year.

Our plan is to exceed the pre-COVID-19 level at 210 million in March 2026.

15

The progress of stores that don’t sell, which is the key to increasing customer traffic.
The floor area of non-retail tenants increased 6% from the previous year to 56%,
showing steady progress in category conversion.
By the end of March 2026, we will increase the percentage to 70%.

Next, FinTech.

First, a breakdown of changes in operating income.
The main reasons for short operating income were rent guarantees and card-issuingcosts, indicated as "variable cost (2)" on the slide.
I will elaborate on the rent guarantee in Chapter 2, so let me talk about a gap with theplan in card issuance costs, which investors have been asking about for some time.

Card issuance costs are associated with two types of transactions:internal transactions that do not affect consolidated P&L and external transactions that do.

The largest gap came from internal transactions, which take place every time a new card is issued
in Retail, and trigger consignment fees, but we hadn’t assumed a large expansion of these thisyear due to shrinking directly-managed specialty retail stores.
However, the actual growth of cards tailored to each individual’s interest through events, far
exceeded the plan, resulting in more revenue in Retail and an increase in expenses in FinTech,
which created a gap of ¥1.2 billion, respectively.
On the other hand, there was no gap in issuance costs for external transactions that affectconsolidated P&L.

The trend of card credit transaction volume expanded almost steadily throughout the year.
The third quarter performance appears to have declined a bit year-on-year, but it

demonstrated 144% vs 2019 or pre-COVID-19 level, so it looks the same as other quarters.
The fourth quarter also saw the largest quarterly growth of 146% from 2019.

The progress of card credit transaction volume.
The current fiscal year's total of 3 trillion ¥623 billion, a new record high, is ¥36 billion
higher than planned and on pace to exceed the medium-term management plan of ¥5.3
trillion.

In line with the steady expansion of transaction volume, the balance of installment andrevolving payment at the end of the year also exceeded the plan at a record high of¥399.1 billion.
The proportion of installment balance is also expanding, and we are on track to reach¥500 billion in March 2026.

The cash advance receivables at the end of this year stood at ¥133.8 billion, slightly
lower than planned, but since the decline from COVID-19 has been reversed sincebottoming out at the end of the previous year, sales revenue is expected to rise in the
future.

New memberships.
The number of cardholders increased by 30,000 from the plan to 740,000,
mainly due to more cards tailored to each individual’s interest, which is our strategic focus.
The proportion of these cards’ enrollment has expanded to 37%.

The number of cardholders expanded steadily, bringing the total number of cardholders to arecord high of 7.31 million at the end of March 2022.

The proportion of cards tailored to each individual’s interest and gold cards has risen to 52%.
These cards are becoming main cards for our users.

2000

1000

0

Bad Debt.
Although the balance of receivables at the end of the fiscal year increased significantly
along with the growth in transaction volume, bad debt write-offs are down from lastyear, and the bad debt ratio is improving at an all-time low of 1.6%.

Interest repayments.
The number of cases accepted, which is a leading indicator, has been declining since thesecond quarter of March 2022.
Its level has remained below the previous year's level consistently.
The balance of reserves is still adequate, but we will continue to monitor trends closely.

Co-creative investment.
We invested ¥3.7 billion in startup companies in March 2023 and ¥900 million in funds,
bringing the total investment amount to ¥4.6 billion.
The IRR of our startup investments to date is 16%, which is above the hurdle rate.

Profit from co-creative investees amounted to ¥1.3 billion, ¥200 million less than the plan.
We will further promote co-creation, aiming for ¥5.5 billion in March 2026.

Finally, capital allocation and balance sheet position.

Capital allocation.
This year, we bought back ¥20 billion of our shares to optimize capital.

Combined with ¥30 billion repurchased in the previous year, the total amount reached ¥50
billion and enabled us to optimize capital as in the medium-term management plan.
The investment in human capital, that will lead to future earnings, amounted to ¥9.1 billion,
which included the provision of the company’s shares to employees in February and associatedcosts during the term.

Finally, the balance sheet.
In order to realize the relevant capital policy and the “targeted balance sheets" and thechange in business structure from 2015, including ¥50 billion which I described earlier,the company has repurchased approximately ¥150 billion.
As a result, the year-end balance sheets have seen optimized capital positions in both
retail and FinTech.

That is all from me. Thank you very much.

This is Aoi.
First, in previous financial results briefings, after the financial summary, I usually ran you
through our "future directions“.
However, this time, given a concern of our shareholders and investors since the third
quarter, I would like to instead talk about the relatively recent progress of the mediumterm management plan and the future outlook.

Therefore, for the medium- and long-term direction, I will explain in detailat the IR Day on June 9.

Here is today's agenda.
Based on our dialogue with shareholders and investors, I would like to explain these four
points.

First, FinTech.
(1) Factors behind the failure to achieve operating income(2) the factors behind the slowdown in profit growth.

FinTech's operating income for the year is ¥42.5 billion versus a target of ¥44 billion ,we missed our target by ¥1.5 billion.
The main reason was the failure to meet rent guarantee targets.

Although rent guarantee sales had expanded steadily, growth slowed this fiscal year andfell short of projections.

This was due to sluggish growth in new contracts with a higher unit price than ongoing
contracts.
New contracts have been steadily expanding through introductions from large partnercompanies such as Able and Nasic, but have slowed down since COVID-19 due to delaysin the development of partner companies.

Accordingly, we will achieve our goal of ¥25 billion for the final year of the medium-term
management plan by developing new business partners and strengthening rent
guarantees for offices and tenants.

Next, the slowdown in profit growth.
FinTech's operating income has increased in the range of ¥3-4 billion annually prior to
COVID-19.
In contrast, the increase in profit for the current year slowed to ¥1.3 billion.

There are two factors:
the increase in issuance costs due to a sharp recovery in new enrollments, and a slow
recovery in installment fees.

First, the status of new memberships.
The number of new members during the current year has recovered to pre-COVID-19
levels, with a rapid growth of 740,000 new members.

On the other hand, the unprecedented 130,000 increase in new members led to asignificant increase in issuance costs, up ¥2.2 billion, which put pressure on profits.

The number of new cardholders is expected to reach 1 million in the final year of theMedium-Term Management Plan, because it exceeded the plan for the fiscal year.

Issuance costs increase in line with the increase in the number of new cardholders.
However, the increase will be around ¥500 million, which is lower than the current fiscal
year's level, thus mitigating the impact on profits.

Next is the slow recovery of finance charges on installment and revolving payments.
The charges had been stagnant since pandemic but began to recover this fiscal year withan increase of ¥3.1 billion.
Yet, the increase was less than pre-COVID-19 increase of ¥4.5 billion.

On this matter, we have received a question as to why finance charges have notrecovered despite the recovery of installment and revolving transactions.
To answer this question, I would like to explain how FinTech monetization works.

First, FinTech incurs issuance costs as new cardholder is acquired.
Second, affiliate commissions increase as usage grows.
As usage increases, installment and revolving transactions also increase.
As the balance increases, finance changes increase.
However, there is a time lag between the increase in transactions, balance, and thefinance charges.
This has led to a slow recovery of finance charges.

Therefore, although delayed by about one year, the finance charges are expected torecover to 10% growth in the next fiscal year and beyond, on par with the pre-COVID-19
level.

Based on the above, here is the outlook for FinTech's operating income.
With profit growth returning to the pre-COVID-19 level from the next fiscal year, thetarget of ¥53 billion for the final year of the Medium-Term Management Plan is expected
to be achieved.

Then this is the status of Retailing.

Retailing transactions were initially assumed to recover from pandemic in the fiscal year
ending March 2024.
However, since actual results have been below expectations, the recovery is expected to
be delayed by one year.

In addition, due to unexpected factors such as the rising cost of electricity, we haverevised our operating income plan for the fiscal year ending March 2024 downward from
¥9 billion to ¥7 billion.

However, we believe that we can achieve the operating income target of ¥12 billion for
the final year through the following four measures.
I will explain the details of these measures.

The first is the reduction of non-operational floor space.
Even after the transition to fixed-term rental contracts, non-operational floor spaceremained at high level due to the voluntary withdrawal and the impact of COVID-19.
However, non-operational floor space is expected to be halved from about 10,000 tsubo
to about 5,000 tsubo due to the end of the voluntary withdrawal in this fiscal year, in
addition to the recovery from pandemic.
This is expected to improve profits by about ¥2 billion.

Second, the increase of per-tenant revenue from fixed-term revenue contract.
Per-tenant revenue from new tenants increase in line with the change in category fromretailing to food and service.
In fact, the actual revenue from new tenants in the period was ¥53,000, 26% increase
compared to the previous tenant.
In addition, value increase associated with contract renewals will resume after being
forced to stagnate due to pandemic impact.
The combined profit improvement is expected to be ¥2 billion.

The third is to strengthen events.
We plan to improve profits by ¥1.5 billion by increasing the floor space and improving
occupancy rates and per-store revenue through OMEMIE, an online store opening
service.

The fourth is growth in E-commerce.
With the active participation of professional talents through mid-career hires,
advertising and CRM were improved.
This improved SEO measures and the number of store visits increased.
Therefore, transactions recovered.
We aim to further improve performance by improving UI/UX, and to achievetransactions of ¥30 billion in the final year of the Medium-Term Management Plan.
This will result in a profit improvement of ¥1 billion.

In addition to the above measures ① through ④,
we aim to achieve our mid-term plan target of ¥12 billion in operating income throughpersonnel and other cost reductions.

Next, I will explain the competitive situation and future growth potential in FinTech fromviewpoints of1) competition with QR code payment service providers
and2) competition with other credit card companies.

First of all, this is an overview of the cashless market.
While credit cards account for 84% of the overall ¥111 trillion market, QR code
payments account for just 7%, and their growth is slowing.

The figure here explains why the scale of QR code payments is so small.
The vertical axis shows the amount of payment.
More than ¥5,000 is large payment, and lower than ¥5,000 is small payment.
The horizontal axis indicates whether the payment is one-time or regular payment.
When we break down household consumption expenditures of ¥300 trillion with these
two axes, we find that the market for large or regular payments, which credit cards aregood at, is approximately ¥240 trillion, accounting for 80%.
While the market for small and one-time payments, which QR code payment is targeting,is only ¥60 trillion.
The reason why the scale of QR code payments is small is because the market they are
targeting is small.

Therefore, QR Code companies are looking to expand into the upper and right domainsof the market through the issuance of credit cards, as a future strategy.

billion

In response to this, EPOS Card's strategy is to thoroughly strengthen regular payments,
focusing on the first quadrant, which is the opposite of the QR code area.
This is the strategy maximizing share of household finances.
By promoting card payments for rent, the largest household expense item, as well as forutilities and insurance payments, the transactions of regular payments have tripled overthe past seven years to about ¥1 trillion.

In addition, we have been expanding QR code payments.
Through the promotion of VISA Touch and e-money charges, the transactions of small
amount payments have increased seven-fold in four years to approximately ¥250 billion.
This is the fastest growing category of EPOS Card usage.
In addition, its transactions exceed that of food, approaching commercial facilities.
In this way, we can confirm that EPOS Card's strategy has almost no blind spots in thecompetition with QR code payments.

Second, there is competition from other credit card companies that offer large point reward.
We have been asked if EPOS Card can maintain its competitiveness against those who areincreasing the number of cardholders by offering large point reward.
Let us respond to such a question.

Comparing the number of cardholders of major e-commerce cards and QR code cards withthose of EPOS Card, others exceed EPOS Card, with the major e-commerce card being aboutfour times larger than EPOS Card.
On the other hand, operating income of EPOS Card is ahead of the major e-commerce cardcompanies, and five times ahead of the QR code companies.
The reason for this reversal may lie in the large-scale point reward.

The e-commerce and QR code companies spend about ¥600 billion annually forrewarding points.
In contrast, EPOS Card spends only about ¥30 billion.
This is about one twentieth of their spending.
This difference in point costs leads to the difference in the number of cardholders.
On the other hand, however, the point cost also puts pressure on profits, leading to thereversal of operating income.
Thus, the strategy of large-scale point reward proves to be a "double-edged sword”.

So how is it possible for EPOS Card to realize a large profit with a small number of cardholders?
Here is a diagram to explain how it works.

With EPOS Card, many cardholders reach Gold Card status at a relatively early stage as they
increase the card usage.
This makes it the main card and accelerate their use at merchants.
As the usage at merchants increases, installment and revolving transactions increase, and thebalance grows.
As the balance grows, revenues from finance charges increase over time.
And when rent guarantees and other services are added to these, revenues increase even more.
In this way, EPOS Card increases its earnings by building up various transactions in a multi-layered

manner as it builds up customer loyalty and long-lasting relationships with its customers.
If the point reward strategy is "market share- focused," ours is LTV focused strategy.

The result of this LTV-focused strategy is clearly demonstrated by the measure ofcontracted future recurring gross profit.
Comparing EPS and contracted future recurring gross profit over the seven years fromthe fiscal year ended March 2016 to this fiscal year, contracted future recurring grossprofit has grown by 1.8 times, while EPS has grown by 1.5 times.
For your reference, the stock price has increased by 1.3 times.
Since corporate value is the discounted present value of the sum of future cash flows,
we believe that contracted future recurring gross profit is a better indicator of essential
corporate value than EPS or periodic profit and loss.
Therefore, we continue to focus on LTV and increase our corporate value by expanding
contracted future recurring gross profit.

EPOS TOGETHER Card

This is the future direction based on those.
First, we strengthen “cards tailored to each individual's interests” for attracting more
cardholders.
Especially, HERALBONY card, which is "a card that helps propel society forward every
time it is used," enables customers to donate a portion of their spending to artists withdisabilities.
This has been supported by many customers.
Similarly, the number of cardholders of “cards tailored to each individual's interests” isincreasing, which enable them to donate points to offer support for individual
preferences by using the card.
We see great potential in this shift in consumer values regarding credit card choices.

There is a reason why we say this.
Consumers are more focused on the financial benefits to them from their point of view.
And cards with large point reward are serving this need.
On the other hand, cardholders of “cards tailored to each individual's interests” emphasize
the opposite value, "the joy of supporting others”.
We believe that this shift in values will continue to grow over the mid- to long- term as the
economy matures.

Accordingly, by introducing a point donation service for other EPOS Cards and Gold cards
along with “cards tailored to each individual's interests”,
we will expand the number of cardholders with our unique differentiation strategy
without being caught in the red ocean of point reward competition.

In addition, we will develop a new service that follows the rent guarantee for realizing
revenues of multiple layers.
This is called Embedded Finance, meaning that we embed financial services into nonfinancial services.
By developing and launching these services one after another, we will add further depth
to our multi-layered revenue structure.
For specific details, please refer to the responsible team in the segment of the MediumTerm Management Plan on IR DAY.

This is shareholder return.

To realize the ideal balance sheet, we introduce DOE from this fiscal year to improve
capital efficiency and achieve long-term stable dividend.
8% is set as a guide for DOE.
This is calculated by multiplying ROE target of 13% or more for the final year of theMedium-Term Management Plan by the current dividend payout ratio of 55%.

Estimated dividend per share.
With the introduction of DOE, the dividend per share for the year ending March 2024 is
expected to be ¥101, ¥42 increase from this fiscal year.
Thereafter, the dividend should continue to increase moderately.
The dividend in the final year of the mid-term plan is expected to be almost the same asoriginally planned.

In addition, share buybacks limit equivalent to 10% of outstanding shares, or a maximumof ¥40 billion, is set to allow for flexible share buybacks in case future profitability is not
fully factored into the share price.

Finally, this is our outlook for the full year.
All three KPIs, EPS, ROE, and ROIC, are expected to achieve our original plans.

Segment income is expected to increase 94% to ¥7 billion in Retailing, and 8% to ¥46
billion in FinTech.

The forward-looking statements contained in this presentation are based on information available atthe time of preparation of this presentation and certain assumptions that MARUI GROUP deems to
be reasonable. The forward-looking statements may differ materially from actual results due to avariety of different factors. Please direct any inquiries to the IR Department (E-mail: marui-ir@0101.co.jp).

That is all from me.
Thank you for your attention.