Atoms for the Sustainable Future:
Recommendations on Nuclear Energy in the 21st Century

January 2008

Japan Institute of International Affairs
Taskforce on Atoms for the Sustainable Future

I.

Growing Hope for Nuclear Energy and Deepening Concerns over Nuclear
Threats

Nuclear energy has two facets. When it is used for peaceful purposes such as power generation,
medical services, agriculture and industry, it can make a contribution to the betterment of thequality of life. However, it also could be used for military or criminal purposes. Thus, there areboth great opportunities and great risks.
Nuclear energy can ease energy security competition. As economies grow, energy demands
also increase. For example, in Asia where there are rising energy- consuming countries such as
China and India, it is predicted that meeting the demand for energy will become a serious
challenge not only to each country but to the region as a whole. In other regions such as Africa
and Middle East, plans and express of interest in nuclear energy has been increasing. The
expectation that nuclear energy will fill the gap between energy demand and supply has
become very high.
Nuclear energy is also expected to contribute to global efforts to cope with the global warming
problem as its carbon dioxide emissions are much smaller than fossil fuel sources. Comparing
among major energy sources including non-fossil fuels, nuclear power is one of the mosteffective energy sources to reduce CO2 emissions.
Given the energy security and environmental challenges that we face, we believe that
promoting nuclear energy globally would provide an effective way to cope with thesechallenges. To this end, international cooperation should be deepened and expanded.
While we expect nuclear energy to play an increasing role that will better our lives, nuclear
energy also poses serious security challenges.
The world has had to live for more than sixty years with the serious threat of nuclear
devastation, a threat that is the result of the huge number of nuclear weapons that could destroy
the earth several times over. While this danger continues, we also face rising nuclear
proliferation threats caused by the diversion of peaceful nuclear programs to military use, orwithdrawal from international non-proliferation treaties and agreements, nuclear terrorism andthefts or illicit trade of nuclear materials by non-state actors.
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It is our hope that all nuclear threats will be reduced and eventually eliminated. All humanbeings should remember that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the goal of every
civilization. All nations must share a common goal regarding nuclear disarmament and makeevery effort to achieve it, while the legitimate security concerns of every nation must be
addressed in the course of achieving this goal.
We also recognize that no other actor, either state or non-state, should be allowed to possess
nuclear weapons and weaponization capabilities. Neither should any state and non-state actor
assist others’ proliferation activities. As the use of nuclear energy spreads, risks and threats thatarise from such activities would also rise. In particular, recent challenges such as cases of North
Korea and Iran present great risks of proliferation, illustrating insufficiency in international
mechanisms to oversee and prevent exploitation of peaceful nuclear activities for military
purposes.
One could divert peaceful nuclear facilities into military ones without detection, if safeguards
are not properly functioned for such facilities. One could use peaceful nuclear program toaccumulate materials and capabilities for military purposes, hiding such intentions, before it
would withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other international non-proliferation
obligations. Or, one might use peaceful nuclear program to cover clandestine nuclear activities.
Therefore, our great challenge is to establish universal principles for the promotion of nuclear
energy to contribute to sustainable growth of the global economy, solution of global warming
problems, and meeting energy security needs, in well balance with furthering efforts to pursue
the reduction of risks posed by threats of nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and existing
nuclear weapons. We also need to be reminded that concerns over safety of nuclear activities
have become further important for maintaining credibility and sustainability of nuclear energy
activities. The peaceful use of nuclear energy should not be exploited to acquire nuclear
weapons capabilities.
Nuclear terrorism is now perceived as one of the gravest security threats in nuclear-related
activities as it is an event with high intensity consequence. While the probability of such event
is not so high, once it happens, it would cause a serious damage on society in its economy,2social life, and security order. The security of nuclear materials and facilities must become apriority.
It is extremely important for the international community to make a long-term, sustainedcommitment to a ‘balanced’ approach to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in a world that issafer from nuclear risks. And we believe that various international fora including G8 Summit
meetings should provide platforms for discussing ways to cooperate toward this common goal.
Therefore, we recommend the international community to urgently address the following
issues.

II.

Toward a More Balanced Approach to Promoting Peaceful Use of Nuclear
Energy with Strengthening Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation

We reaffirm that each nation has the “inalienable right” to enjoy the benefits of the peacefuluse of nuclear energy in conformity with the provisions of non-proliferation and safeguards
obligations in the NPT and the IAEA Statute. This ‘inalienable’ right should not permit theacquisition of sensitive nuclear materials and technology without transparent and plausibleplans for strictly peaceful programs.
Since nuclear energy promotes energy security and better protects the environment, werecognize the importance of international cooperation in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear
energy. At the same time, it is important that all nations be aware of the risks related to theintroduction of nuclear power.
Recommendation 1: Establish the “Three S” as universal guiding principles for safe andsecure development of nuclear energy activities
Due to dual nature and necessity of risk management of nuclear energy, states that
intend to introduce peaceful nuclear activities must take into account; a) Safety of
their facilities and operation; b) Security of facilities and materials; and c)
non-proliferation (or Safeguards). (“Three S”: Safety, Security, and Safeguards) Thereis a new international environment for nuclear activities in which the threat ofterrorism is rising, and the needs for nuclear energy have been increasing indeveloping countries. Therfore, demand is increasing for wider and clear awareness of3

the indispensability of “Three S” for the introduction and operation of nuclear power
and for the harmonization and , where necessary, strengthening of the rules andregulations governing the “Three S” in an integrated manner, so that the world canenjoy the benefits of nuclear energy while minimizing the nuclear risks. With suchintegrated, where necessary strengthened and streamlined framework of the “Three S”,
prerequisite for the introducing and operating nuclear energy activities will become
clearer, and the transparency and sustainability of international cooperation andtechnology transfer for the peaceful use of nuclear energy will be enhanced.
The G8 should endorse the “Three S” for strengthening nuclear security, nuclear
safety and non-proliferation rules and guidelines, and appropriate international fora
such as the IAEA could discuss and decide details. It would also be useful to invite
nuclear industry into discussion on “Three S” as they have expertise, and are, in manycases, primarily responsible for building and operating nuclear facilities.
It is not our desire to discriminate between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ by setting up thisframework. Rather, we propose that the international community (in particular G8
countries) should provide necessary assistance (both technically and financially) tostates which have nuclear power plants, or have plans to introduce nuclear power
programs to meet requirements of “Three S”. For safe and peaceful promotion,mechanisms for international cooperation should be established in the areas oftechnical assistance such as human resource development as well as sharing bestpractice in safety, security and non-proliferation activities.
Recommendation 2: Provide appropriate international financial assistance schemes tonuclear energy programs and projects in developing countries
Capital procurement would be a key to expand nuclear energy worldwide. Nuclear
power generation needs a large initial capital investment and requires a long-term
payback period. Developing countries need to attract international capital for their
nuclear programs. Therefore, the international community should offer innovative
financial mechanisms, with which private and public investment for the constructionof nuclear reactors would be facilitated, as the IAEA General Conference requested to
the Director General of the IAEA (cf. GC(50)/res/13, September 2006 andGC(51)/res/14, September 2007). Other existing financal mechanisms such as World
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Bank loans and OECD guidelines for export credit, which currently discriminate
against nuclear projects, should be made available for nuclear power projects.
It may also be worth examining the linking of financial support through mechanisms
mentioned above with the fulfillment of “Three S” guidelines since it would
contribute to enhancing safety and security of nuclear activities, and non-proliferation.
Recommendation 3: Address nuclear energy as an effective tool for coping with global
warming and make appropriate schemes to incorporate nuclear energy into such efforts.
Currently, there is no incentive or mechanism to facilitate the utilization of nuclear
energy for environmental purposes while nuclear energy is quite effective in terms of
reducing CO2 emission. Such discrimination against nuclear energy might undermineinternational efforts to cope with global warming. We urge the international
community to acknowledge that nuclear energy would be an effective way tocontribute to containing the increase of CO2 emissions. Relevant mechanisms should
be available for nuclear energy projects. In particular, we back the creation of a policy
mechanism to systematically incorporate the promotion of nuclear energy in theefforts to tackle global warming in the new round of negotiations.
Recommendation 4: Address safety and liability properly both in the domestic regulatory
framework and in international cooperation
We recognize that nuclear safety and liability are important issues when introducing
nuclear energy program. Confidence in the safety of nuclear power operation is anindispensable basis for promoting nuclear energy. Obtaining such confidence shouldbe put a high priority by government and industry in introducing nuclear power
plants.
Lack of a nuclear liability scheme could also be a serious obstacle for states which
would provide cooperation and assistance in peaceful nuclear activities. All statesshould establish liability legislation and a mechanism for compensation related tonuclear accidents, which would be in conformity to internationally established norms
and principles for nuclear liability.

5The international community should provide cooperation with states which would liketo introduce nuclear energy, in establishing a regulatory framework and administrative
capacities in properly addressing safety and liability.
Recommendation 5: Universalize the Additional Protocol and enhance the export control
regime(1) Pursue universalization of the Additional Protocol
We believe that universalization of the Additional Protocol (AP) to IAEA safeguards
agreements is one of the most important and effective ways to check nuclear
proliferation. We recognize that it would be difficult to make the AP obligatory now.
However, in the spirit of cooperation, and given the shared interests in reducing
nuclear threats, the international community must create a more effective way toutilize the AP in multilateral and bilateral ways, for the objective of non-proliferation.
(2) Make adherence to Additional Protocol a condition for nuclear trade
Strengthening export control measures is essential for preventing proliferation. We
strongly encourage the NSG to adopt adherence to the AP as an additional condition
for supplying nuclear related materials and technology in the NSG guidelines. If it isdifficult, G8 countries may voluntarily declare that concluding the AP will be a
condition for the supply of nuclear materials and technology.
While we are aware of concerns over its unconditional extension, a moratorium by the
G8 regarding the transfer of sensitive technology and materials to additional statesshould be extended until a proper guideline or mechanism to regulate nuclear trade isestablished. In the meantime, we encourage the G8 and NSG to continue to discuss
this issue.
Recommendation 6: Explore ways to utilize Assurance of Fuel Supply and MultilateralApproaches to nuclear fuel cycle for promoting non-proliferation and sharing nuclear
energy opportunities.
(1) Reliable assurance of supply as key to effective multilateral mechanisms
Assurance of fuel supply for non-nuclear fuel cycle states (or multilateral approaches
to nuclear fuel cycle) has significance in shaping and embedding robust
non-proliferation norms and habits in the international community. The introductionof such mechanisms would contribute to non-proliferation.
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Given Article IV of the NPT, it would be impossible to force all states to join a fuelsupply mechanism. But it is important to discuss assurance of supply and multilateralapproaches as it would contribute to strengthening international non-proliferation
norms. Reliable fuel supply assurance mechanisms are a realistic option to keep
nations from developing their own enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.
(2) Multilateral mechanisms should not create new nuclear ‘haves’ and‘have-nots’
International interdependence is already a fact in the area of nuclear fuel supply, and it
will be increasingly important as most ‘national’ fuel cycle programs haveinternational elements. Therefore, for some countries -- such as those with small scale
nuclear programs -- it would be more efficient to rely on an international mechanism
as a backup to fuel procurement through market mechanisms. Multilateral approaches
may provide an alternative measure for states to procure nuclear fuels. Furthermore,international interdependence would help ensure that ‘national’ programs would notdivert into military purposes as interdependence could function as a mutual oversightmechanism.
We are aware of concerns about these mechanisms. First, such multilateral fuel cycle
arrangements should not distort existing, relatively well-functioning market
mechanisms for fuel procurement. Second, consumer states would be concerned overwhether they could become a producers’ cartel for nuclear energy, which would
extend control over not only the fuel market, but also consumer states’ sovereignty
over nuclear programs. There is also concern that such mechanisms could fix thestatus of supplier states (or ‘nuclear haves’) and consumer states (or ‘nuclear
have-nots’) – in other words, they could create another form of discrimination in theinternational nuclear order. Therefore, it is necessary for such a mechanism to beflexible enough to accept various types of contribution by member states, dependingon what they can provide to the mechanism. Such mechanisms must be inclusionary
rather than exclusionary. Third, Focusing on enrichment service in the multilateralapproaches or assurances of supply is not sufficient in coping with the risk of fuelsupply disruption. Envisioning such mechanisms should also pay attention to otherfunctions in the front end process, such as mining, conversion, and fuel fabrication.
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Recommendation 7: Address concerns over the backend of fuel cycle
We should also look at the entire nuclear fuel cycle, from mining to spent fuelmanagement. Most countries with civilian nuclear reactors face problems related to
management of spent fuel. To make international assurance of supply credible andattractive, we need to address the management of the backend of the fuel cycle.
Providing viable spent fuel management options would further increase the reliabilityof international mechanisms for managing the nuclear fuel cycle.
We also should be reminded that effective management of backend of fuel cycle isimportant in the context of both non-proliferation as well as nuclear security, andutilization of resources. Measures should be taken for increasing transparency on
stockpile of recovered uranium and plutonium. The stockpiles of plutonium should bemaintained at appropriate size, and they must be properly protected. For the sake ofutilizing them as resources, we may pursue efficient use of recovered uranium andplutonium, such as burning at reactors. It would also contribute the reduction of thestockpiles of such materials.
Recommendation 8: Strengthen enforcement and implementation mechanisms for
non-proliferation(1) Strengthen supplementary measures
Policy measures such as UNSCR1540 and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
are important elements of the international non-proliferation regime. They can play arole in filling gaps that are not covered by other conventional non-proliferation
mechanisms such as export controls and IAEA safeguards.
(2) Make conditionalities for withdrawal from NPT
The exploitation of the provision for withdrawal in the NPT (Article X) is a great
concern, especially after North Korea’s declaration of withdrawal. Exploitation of
Article X could undermine the effectiveness of NPT norms. Conditionality forwithdrawal from NPT may be properly addressed at the NPT Review Conference.
(3) Strengthen the linkage between IAEA and UN Security Council for
enforcement
Enforcement against cases of non-compliance is necessary to maintain the credibility
and reliability of the international non-proliferation regime. In this sense, the linkage
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of the IAEA and the UN Security Council, which is prescribed in the IAEA Statute,should be reinforced in a way that strengthens the capacity for enforcing
non-proliferation rules. The international community’s demonstration that it is united
and will not tolerate non-compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements through the
adoption of resolutions at the UN Security Council, and imposing sanctions byresolutions would strengthen non-proliferation, and deter potential proliferators.
(4) Proper combination among dialogue through ad hoc forum, incentives, andenforcement is important
In the meantime, addressing region-specific or issue-specific security concerns in
multilateral fora other than the UN or IAEA can provide effective ways to reduce
nuclear threats, and supplement efforts through the UN or IAEA. For example, for
imminent proliferation problems such as North Korea and Iran, multilateralnegotiation frameworks like the Six-Party Talks and EU3 plus 3, respectively, canplay a significant role to secure channels for dialogue with countries concerned andfind solutions. The proper combination and balance among dialogue, incentives, andcredible enforcement with possibility of sanctions should be utilized for resolving
existing proliferation problems.
Recommendation 9: Deepen and widen international collaboration in developing
proliferation-resistant technology and sophisticated safeguards and verification
technology
A proper combination of political, institutional and technological measures would
strengthen capabilities to cope with nuclear proliferation problems. In this sense, thedevelopment of proliferation-resistant technology is one promising approach tostrengthening non-proliferation efforts. The international community should be further
engaged in developing more proliferation-resistant fuel cycle and nuclear reactor
technologies and more effective safeguards technologies, through international
collaborations such as INPRO, GIF and GNEP. The technological approach to nuclear
non-proliferation is important as it might create new ways to pursue nuclear energy
while promoting non-proliferation. The technological approach and international
cooperation to spur innovative research and development for safer and secure nuclear
technologies could be effective approaches as they could supplement othernon-proliferation measures.
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III.

Reducing Nuclear Threats

In order to make the world safer from nuclear threats, all types of security threats derived from
nuclear activities should be equally addressed. While a balanced approach for promoting
peaceful use of nuclear energy with strengthening safety, security and safeguards intends tostrengthen non-proliferation and suppress nuclear terrorism, reducing existing nuclear weapons
is another important element in the pursuit of a world free from nuclear threats, enjoying
benefits of nuclear energy.
We recognize that the ‘grand bargain’ among the three pillars of the NPT -- non-proliferation,
peaceful use of nuclear energy, and nuclear disarmament – continues to be a vital part of theinternational non-proliferation regime, and each component should be addressed. In particular,
it should be reminded that political commitment by nuclear-weapon states of further efforts ofnuclear disarmament, which was reassured repeatedly at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference and the 2000 Review Conference, must be faithfully pursued. In order to further
widen and strengthen global non-proliferation campaign, disarmament efforts by all nuclear
armed states are indispensable. In this context, we need to revisit the importance of addressing
and adopting measures for nuclear disarmament.
Recommendation 10: Reemphasize nuclear disarmament and reaffirm the totalelimination of nuclear weapons as an important goal for human civilization
We believe that all nuclear-weapon states, whether de facto or de jure, share a heavy
responsibility in reducing nuclear threats from the world. They all should commit tofurther efforts toward nuclear disarmament, and take concrete steps toward totalelimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, we welcome the progress made bycertain states including the United States and Russia on nuclear arms reduction andurge that further concrete steps would be taken by the United States and Russia inachieving less reliance on nuclear weapons for a stable strategic balance, especiallythrough negotiation for post-START I and post-SORT strategic arms control
arrangements of two countries. Such efforts by the United States and Russia would
lead other countries to make their commitments to reducing nuclear weapons. We
believe that such progress will serve to create favorable international circumstances10

for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation toward total elimination of nuclear
weapons.
Recommendation 11: Address security incentives for nuclear proliferation
To that end, nuclear-weapon states should take measures that diminish the role ofnuclear weapons in security policy to minimize the risk that such weapons would everbe used, and to facilitate a process that ends in their total elimination. These measures
should include efforts to eliminate other weapons of mass destructions such as
chemical and biological weapons and to improve regional security environments, inparticular in conflict-stricken regions since existence of such weapons could be used
for the justification of pursuing nuclear weapons.
We also recognize the importance of confidence building for reducing nuclear threats
and anxiety by increasing the transparency of both military and civilian nuclear
activities, including nuclear doctrines and nuclear energy plans.
Recommendation 12: Achieve early entry-into-force of the CTBT and start negotiation
on an FMCTWe recognize the importance of the CTBT and an FMCT in supplementing the NPT
in further reducing nuclear threats. We urge states that have not signed or ratified the
CTBT to do so swiftly. And we urge members of the Conference on Disarmament not
to block FMCT negotiations. In the meantime, we urge all nuclear armed states both
inside and outside NPT declaring moratorium of production of fissile materials forweapons purposes, respecting the spirit of an FMCT. Furthermore, we request all
nuclear armed states strengthen accountancy and control of their fissile materials fornuclear weapons and disclose information on their status for confidence building
purposes.
Recommendation 13: Strengthen international efforts to combat nuclear terrorism andnuclear security concerns
Coping with threats of nuclear terrorism is the current security priority. Theinternational community should unite to confront these threats under the International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material and Nuclear Facilities, and by strengthening domestic measures of control
11and management over materials and security of facilities. Yet a global effort to copewith nuclear terrorism could be more effective. To do this, G8 countries should offer
assistance to other countries to implement effective accounting and control over thestockpile of nuclear, radioactive and other radiological materials.
The Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction (nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical) was launched at the G8Kananaskis Summit in June 2002 to cope with the growing threat of terrorists
acquiring such weapons and materials. The G8 and their partners have been
implementing specific projects, including the securing of nuclear materials, thedismantlement of nuclear submarines and destruction of chemical weapons, in Russia.
Because the prospect of related materials, equipment and technology falling into thewrong hands is a global danger, the activities under this Partnership should be
globally expanded in scope and membership. In this sense, the G8 Global Partnership
could be utilized as a channel for providing necessary financial and technicalcooperation to countries urgently necessitating measures to strengthen security andphysical protection of nuclear and radiological materials, and implement
UNSCR1540.
We also take note on the importance of sharing information, expertise and bestpractice among like-minded countries on nuclear security and physical protection as
well as protecting sensitive information. In particular, efforts to facilitate information
sharing and mutual cooperation among nuclear operators and facilities should bepromoted.
Conclusion
The world faces serious challenges that could threaten the survival of the human race.
Tightening energy supply and global warming are among these imminent challenges. Safe andsecure utilization of nuclear energy will play an important role in coping with these problems,by easing pressure from energy security needs and supplying energy with much less CO2
emission than other major energy sources.
Yet, nuclear energy also poses serious security and safety challenges. It is extremely importantthat peaceful use of nuclear energy takes into account nuclear security against terrorist
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activities, the safe operation of nuclear energy facilities, and preventing proliferation. Without
addressing these challenges, the peaceful use of nuclear energy cannot be promoted. Therefore,
we must take a balanced approach to strengthen nuclear safety, security, and non-proliferation
measures as well as to promote peaceful use in an appropriate, effective manner. In this regard,
the “Three S” would provide a useful conceptual framework to comprehensively deal with
nuclear risks while developing safe and secure nuclear activities. In addition, nuclear
disarmament should be further promoted. Promotion of nuclear disarmament would strengthen
norms of the international non-proliferation regime, and thus it would encourage states to beengaged in global non-proliferation efforts. We believe that respecting the “Three S” concept
in promoting nuclear energy and sincere promotion of nuclear disarmament are essential forthe promotion of nuclear energy to gain universal legitimacy and confidence.
It may take time to realize and implement measures to meet these challenges. But risks are
imminent. The G8 must take the initiative in discussing concrete actions and taking immediate
steps to reduce such risks.

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Members of the Task Force
Tetsuya Endo, Ambassador, Former Vice Chairman, Japan Atomic Energy Commission
Yumi Akimoto, Chief Executive Emeritus, Mitsubishi Materials Corporation
Masahiko Asada, Professor, Kyoto University
Takahiko Ito, Advisor, Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.
Yoji Uchiyama, Professor, Department of Risk Engineering, University of Tsukuba
Toshio Okazaki, President, Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Shinichi Ogawa, Director of Research Department, the National Institute for Defense Studies
Hiroshi Nakanishi, Professor, School of Government, Kyoto University
Nobumasa Akiyama, Associate Professor, Hitotsubashi University

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