LOCATING VIETNAM-JAPAN’S STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP IN THE
CHANGING EAST ASIAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE
Thuy Thi Do

Abstract:
Unlike the other complicated bilateral relationships in East Asia, Vietnam and Japan are the twogenerally ‘problem-free’ neighbours. Despite having been ‘strategic partners’ since 2006, due todomestic and external constraints, until recently this strategic partnership was mainly confined tothe economic domain. However, with the changing regional political landscape stemming from
China’s growing unilateralism and assertiveness in territorial disputes, the ambiguity of U.S.
commitment to Asia, and the lack of effective multilateral frameworks for conflict managementin the region, there is posing a need for Vietnam and Japan to strengthen their strategic
partnership as a hedge against a number of economic, security, and strategic challenges ofmutual concerns. Cooperation in security and strategic realms has been witnessed since 2011 andin March 2014, Hanoi and Tokyo decided to elevate their ties to a new level of ‘Extensive
Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia.’ This paper analyzes how Vietnam andJapan locate their strategic partnership in the overall foreign policy of each country and thepossibilities for furthering the relationship in the time to come. It argues that there are chances
for Vietnam-Japan’s Strategic Partnership to tap into its full potential given the good politicaland people-to-people trust they have forged, the extent to which their economies can mutuallycomplement, and the many strategic concerns and interests they share. The paper also suggeststhat an enhanced strategic partnership between Vietnam and Japan will not only serve the twocountries’ interests but also contribute to promoting regional peace and prosperity, particularly inthe context of evolving US-China geopolitics and ASEAN-driven regionalism.
Keywords: Vietnam-Japan partnership, Japan-ASEAN relations, US-China geopolitics, East
Asian IR, East Asian Security

Thuy Thi Do is a Visiting Fellow at The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). She is also a lecturer at The
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and a PhD candidate in the Department of International Relations at The
Australian National University. The views expressed in this paper are the author’s own and do not reflect those of
any institutions with which she is affiliated.
The author would like to thank Dr. Tomotaka Shoji (The National Institute for Defense Studies), Dr. Yasuyuki
Ishida and Ms. Yuko Hirabayashi (JIIA) for their kind assistance throughout the research fellowship. She is also
grateful to Prof. Motoo Furuta and Prof. Akio Takahara (University of Tokyo), Prof. Yoshihide Soeya (Keio
University), Prof. Tran Van Tho (Waseda University), Prof. Koichi Sato (Oberlin University) and Dr. Seiichiro
Takagi (JIIA) for helpful discussions on the research topic.

11. Introduction
Last year Vietnam and Japan marked the 40th anniversary of the establishment of theirdiplomatic relations. Despite many international, regional, and national upheavals affecting bothcountries in the past four decades, the economic, political, and cultural relations between
Vietnam and Japan have been continuously extended; and mutual understanding and trust
between the two countries’ leadership and peoples have significantly deepened. Since thebilateral relationship was resumed in 1992, there have been regular exchange visits by highranking leaders that serve as a springboard for lifting the bilateral relations into a new height. In
2002, Vietnam and Japan agreed to promote their relations in accordance with a guideline of‘ensuring partnership, long stable’. During the visit to Vietnam of the Japanese Minister of
Foreign Affairs in July 2004, Hanoi and Tokyo signed the Joint Statement ‘Toward a Higher
Sphere of Enduring Partnership’. In October 2006, during an official visit to Japan by Vietnam’s
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, the two countries decided to open a new phrase ofcooperation ‘Toward a Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia’. The five areas ofthis ‘strategic partnership’ as stated in the Joint Statement are: promotion of dialogue; Japan’s
economic assistance to Vietnam; economic relations; cooperation in science and technology;
Mutual Understanding between the Peoples of the Two Countries; and Cooperation in theInternational Arena. The Strategic Partnership was formally concluded in 2009 during the visit toJapan of Vietnam’s Communist Party General Secretary Nong Duc Manh, and since then annual
dialogues have been held to further map out the substance of this framework.1 As the backboneof the strategic partnership, economic cooperation has been developed very successfully,
particularly since the Vietnam-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (VJEPA) came into force
in 2009. In the security realm, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the enhancement ofdefense cooperation was concluded in October 2011, and the first maritime security talk washeld in Hanoi in May 2013. In the formal talks to conclude the Vietnam-Japan Friendship Yearin December 2013, the two Prime Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the comprehensive
development of the strategic partnership between Vietnam and Japan.2
To date, the strategic partnership framework has been established in a comprehensive andsubstantial manner. This research, however, argues that there remains more room for the
relations to be brought into full play, particularly in realizing the aims of the two countries’
leaders upon coining this ‘strategic partnership’ framework, which not only to serves the twocountries’ national interests but more importantly, promotes ‘peace and prosperity in Asia’. It is
the researcher’s strong belief that the Vietnam-Japan strategic partnership has great potential tobe further enhanced, particularly when compared to other ‘strategic partnerships’ they have withother states. On the Vietnamese side, relationship with other important partners like China andthe United States often entail domestic divisions, given the lingering historical skepticism andunresolved maritime disputes with China, or ideological differences and ‘barriers’ over humanrights issues and relics of the Vietnam War with the United States. Meanwhile, strengthening
bilateral relations with Japan almost forms a general consensus among the Vietnamese elite andpublic circles. The heart-felt support of Vietnamese people toward the victims of the tsunami andearthquake that hit Japan in 2011 and their admiration of how the Japanese people handled thehardship is one of the many examples to illustrate the solid ground of the empathy among the1
2

Government Portal of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on November 12, 2013, accessed January 12, 2014.
Vietnam News Daily, December 16, 2013, “Viet Nam and Japan pledge to strengthen strategic partnership”

2

people. On the Japanese side, enhanced interactions with Vietnam (and ASEAN more broadly)
are crucial to hedge against the ups-and-downs with Northeast Asian neighbors due to the history
issue and territorial disputes, as well as the rather ambivalent US commitment in defending
Japan’s core interests. Prime Minister Abe’s first foreign visits to Vietnam, Indonesia, andThailand following his return to power in the late 2012 and his visiting all ten ASEAN members
within the year 2013, culminating in the high-profile Japan-ASEAN Summit at the end of theyear clearly manifests an ‘ASEAN-pivot’ trajectory of Japan’s current administration. More
importantly, both Japan and Vietnam, as one may witness, are facing numerous challenges
stemming from the global financial crisis, domestic economic slowdown, and a changing
political landscape in the region. East Asian security and stability are being challenged by
evolving dynamics in China and the Korean peninsula, as well as by multiple power transitions
among regional powers. These developments may entail potential threats, such as the escalationof territorial disputes in East and South China Seas, 3 nuclear proliferation, or even militaryconfrontation among regional states. Furthermore, while parts of this region enjoy unparalleled
growth in economic and political power, the recent global economic recession has imposed
financial constraints on some countries and their security strategies. In this context, Prime
Minister Abe has recently called for Vietnam and Japan to ‘play a more active role’ inmaintaining regional peace and security, particularly in the face of their growing maritime
tensions with China.4
Against this background, this research aims to explore the possibility of a further enhanced
strategic partnership between Vietnam and Japan, particularly in the political and security arena,
given recent developments in East Asian political landscape. It will also analyze how a stronger
Vietnam-Japan strategic partnership would impact the regional architecture on a wider scale. I
will assess the Vietnam-Japan strategic partnership and its implications in the regional arena atthree levels: the Vietnam-Japan bilateral relationship; Vietnam’s and Japan’s bilateral relations
with other powers (e.g. China, the United States, and ASEAN); and the possible contribution of
the Vietnam-Japan enhanced strategic partnership to the regional architecture in-the-making (e.g.
ARF, ADMM+, TPP etc.). Some policy recommendations will also be suggested throughout the
paper.

2. Locating the Strategic Partnership in Vietnam and Japan’s Foreign Relations
Japan in Vietnam’s national development strategy and multi-directional diplomacy
Vietnam’s foreign policy over time has been shaped by many factors, to name but a few, its
ideology and values, national interests, domestic politics, regional and international contexts,
leadership’s identities, and the other country’s policy toward itself. During the Cold War,
Vietnam adopted an ideology-driven foreign policy as Hanoi chose to ally with the socialist bloc
to materialize its utmost goal of national independence and unification. However, toward the endof the Vietnam War following the conclusion of the Paris Agreement in early 1973, Hanoi
started approaching capitalist countries in search for foreign capital to reconstruct its war3

The South China Sea is called the ‘East Sea’ in Vietnam. For the purpose of convenience (to distinguish with theEast China Sea), I will use the term ‘South China Sea’ throughout this paper.
4
http://vccinews.com/news_detail.asp?news_id=27977, February 25, 2013; accessed December 14, 2013.

3

ravaged economy. Japan was then seen as an economic and technological powerhouse that could
potentially contribute to Hanoi’s efforts for national reconstruction. This policy shift was met
with significant changes in Japan’s Southeast Asia policy, which strived toward a more
‘autonomous diplomacy’ (jishu gaiko), culminating in the enunciation of the Fukuda doctrine inAugust 1977. Bilateral diplomatic relations were established on September 21, 1973 and Japan
started to provide official development assistance (ODA) to Hanoi soon after Vietnam was
unified in April 1975.5
The subsequent upheavals, however, suspended Vietnam’s foreign relations (including that withJapan) for more than a decade (1979-1991). China decided to launch a border attack to ‘teachVietnam a lesson’ following Hanoi’s earlier decision to formally ally with the Soviet Union in1978 and its intervention in Cambodia in early 1979. Although Vietnam managed to stall theattacks from both ends (China in the North and pro-China alliance against Vietnamese
occupation in Cambodia in the South), it came at the ‘price’ of a decade-long economic embargo
and international isolation by the US, China, and ASEAN countries, not to mention anothermilitary attack by China in 1988 to take over a number of islets controlled by Vietnam in theSouth China Sea. These conflicts, if anything, have taught Vietnam a bitter yet precious lesson
about alliance politics - that it should not be over-reliant on a big power’s willingness to defend
Vietnam’s interests and that it should not go with one power against the other. That ‘Distantwater won't help put out a fire close at hand’ (‘nước xa không cứu được lửa gần’) is something
Vietnam has drawn on from its own experience dealing with its two former allies – China andthe Soviet Union – during this period of Sino-Soviet split. Signs of an emerging global détente
among the big powers starting from the latter half of the 1980s, and Hanoi’s own awareness ofserious domestic problems following decades of wars and international isolation were theunderlying factors that facilitated Vietnam’s reform process, beginning with the ‘Doi Moi’
(Renovation) policy in 1986. In this light, Vietnam made radical changes in its strategic thinking,known in Vietnamese as ‘Đổi mới tư duy đối ngoại’ (‘new thinking in diplomacy’). Hanoi
gradually settled the thorny Cambodia issue; normalized its relations with ‘former enemies’ and‘hostile forces’ like China and the US; re-established ties with other capitalist powers (including
Japan) and financial institutions; as well as initiated negotiations with ASEAN counterparts for amembership. The end of the Cold War in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union andsocialist bloc, which once served as ‘the cornerstone of Vietnam’s Foreign Policy’ officially put
an end to this ideology-driven and alliance-based thinking, and re-oriented Vietnam’s Foreign
Policy toward a ‘multifaceted’ and ‘omni-directional’ one.
In the ‘Doimoi’ era, Vietnam pursues a self-declared foreign policy of independence, sovereignty,
openness, multilateralization, diversification of external relations and proactive integration into
the world. With the guiding motto evolving from ‘more friends, less enemies’ to ‘Viet Nam iswilling to become a friend and reliable partner of all countries in the world community, strivingfor peace, independence and development,’ 6 Hanoi aims to maintain and secure a peaceful5Japan provided 8.5 billion yen in October 1975, 5 billion yen in 1976, 4 billion yen in April 1978, and 10 billion
yen in July 1978. See more: Yoshihide Soeya, “Japan’s policy towards Southeast Asia: Anatamy of Autonomous
Diplomacy and the American factor” in Chandran Jeshurun, ed., China, India, Japan and the Security of Southeast
Asia, (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1993), p. 99.
6
At the Xth Party Congress in 2006, Hanoi added that Vietnam should strive toward being “an active andconstructive member in the international community, striving for peace, cooperation and sustainable development,

4

environment and creating a more favorable international environment conducive to national
construction and defense, thus enhancing the position and prestige of Vietnam in theinternational arena. Although security issues such as the regime’s stability and territorial disputes
with China still loom large in Vietnam’s strategic thinking, Hanoi saw the threat of further lag
behind other regional states in economic development as more urgent. 7 As a result, theCommunist Party (CPV) decided to launch a comprehensive economic reform within the country(shifting from a centralized to a market-oriented, multi-component economy) and began to open
up its economy for foreign trade and investment. Japanese companies were among the firstforeign investors to pour capital in Vietnam despite all the barriers and obstacles in terms ofinfrastructure, legal framework, and investment environment in the early 1990s. As for official
exchanges, the Japanese government renewed aid to Vietnam in 1992 and actually played a keyrole in calling for the international community and international financial organizations, such as
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) and OECD countries, to restore
ties with Vietnam and assist its economic development. The two countries exchanged MFN
status in 1999 and their bilateral economic relations have been steadily developed ever since.
As the economy has been growing fast over a decade (7-8% annual GDP growth during the
1992-2006 period), the CPV increasingly bases its legitimacy on its socio-economic performance.
This, however, also ‘presents the Party and the government with a new challenge: to maintain
uninterrupted economic development.’8 As Hanoi increasingly depends on external exchanges
for its economic wellbeing, economic tasks have increasingly manifested themselves inVietnam’s diplomatic activities, culminating in the introduction of the so-called ‘Economic
Diplomacy’ or ‘Diplomacy for the purpose of Economic Development’. Accordingly, political
diplomacy should be closely combined with external economic activities with the aim tomobilize more external resources, expand export markets and establish ties with more partners toserve the socio-economic development, so as to turn Vietnam into an industrialized andmodernized country by 2020. As Vietnam is determined to ‘achieve the major targets ofindustrialization and modernization of the country, one of high priorities in Vietnam’s
multifaceted and multi-directional diplomacy has been given to the strengthening of substantial
relations with advanced economies to mobilize external resources for the country’s development.
Being the region’s top trading partner and ODA provider, and a source of capital andtechnologies, Japan is of great significance to Vietnam’s development.’ 9 In recent years,
Vietnamese leaders have repeatedly referred to Japan as their ‘first ranking economic partner’ or‘most important development partner’, given the fact that the latter has become their top ODA
actively participating in regional and international cooperation.” See more: The Government Portal of the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, “Viet Nam's Present Foreign Policy”, accessed December 16, 2013.
7
Vietnam’s Defence White Paper 2009 identifies four major security challenges: (1) impact of the global financial
crisis on Vietnam’s economy and the danger of “further lagging behind” other regional states; (2) the threat by“hostile forces… to incite violence and separatism” in order to undermine domestic stability; (3) disputes oversovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the territories in the East Sea [South China Sea]; and (4) nontraditional security issues (specifically illegal trafficking of weapons and drugs, piracy, organized transnational
crimes, terrorism, illegal migration and immigration, environmental degradation, climate change, and epidemics).
8
Tran Truong Thuy and Nguyen Minh Ngoc, “Vietnam’s Security Challenges: Priorities, Policy Implications andProspects for Regional Cooperation” in Security Outlook of the Asia Pacific Countries and Its Implications for the
Defense Sector, (NIDS Joint Research Series No. 5, 2010), The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, p. 103.
9Dinh Thi Hien Luong, “Vietnam–Japan Relations in the Context of Building an East Asian Community”, AsiaPacific Review, (Vol. 16, No. 1, 2009, pp. 100-130), p. 108.

5

donor since 2006 (accounting for 30% of the total foreign assistance for Vietnam), their biggest
foreign investor both in terms of registered and disbursed capital, and their third largest trading
partner (as of 2013).10 Japan also supported Vietnam's bid to join the WTO in 2006 and was thefirst G7 country to recognize Vietnam’s full market economy status in 2011. So far, Japan is the
only foreign country selected by Hanoi to support its long-term industrialization process as
manifested through the ‘Vietnam's Industrialization Strategy in the framework of Vietnam Japan cooperation toward 2020, vision to 2030’. In the talks with Prime Minister Abe during his
first overseas visit to Vietnam in the second term, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dungreportedly said that ‘intensifying and consolidating the friendly and cooperative relationship withJapan is not only the consistent guideline and top priority of the foreign policy but also thestrategic choice of the Party and Government of Vietnam.’11
This ‘top priority’ and ‘strategic choice’, apart from the economic dimension, should havesomething to do with Hanoi’s assessment of Japan’s role in its heightened tensions with China in
the South China Sea. In its independent, self-dependent, and multi-directional foreign policy
which aims to effectively combine strengthening internal capabilities and cultivating mutual
beneficial relationships with various partners and institutions in the region and the world arena,
Hanoi does place its relations with regional neighbors (particularly those with whom it shares theborders) and big powers at the core of its foreign policy. Japan fits into this category both as aregional neighbor and a big power, as viewed by Hanoi. As learnt from the past, cultivating
viable and long-term relationships with neighboring countries is a must to ensure a stablesurrounding environment for preserving Vietnam’s security and territorial integrity. Althoughmanaging relations with China (which shares not only land but also maritime borders with
Vietnam) remains a top priority in this regard, Hanoi also attaches great importance to its
relations with Japan, South Korea and other ASEAN countries as a ‘hedge’ against its traditional
suspicion of Beijing’s intentions. In its regional policy, Hanoi increasingly identifies itself as an
ASEAN member and has been proactively promoting regional integration with the hope that
‘institutional membership will constrain potential Chinese aggression by tying China down, andby binding regional states together.’ 12 This is also in line with Japan’s and other ASEAN
countries’ desire to ‘socialize’ China and hedge against great power rivalry by means ofmultilateral cooperative mechanisms. Boosting relations with Japan, in this light, is seen as
increasing Hanoi’s leverage power whilst reducing its over-reliance on China in security andeconomic terms respectively.
Hanoi’s strategy toward Japan along with other big powers, however, is delicate balancing whichaims to forge as many equidistant and mutually dependent relations with all major powers
without leaning too much on any one side. As a small country ‘having been strongly influenced
historically by major powers such as China, France, Russia and America, Vietnam has developed
an astute sense of balance in maneuvering its way through the world’, as a Japanese scholar has
10

Foreign
Minister
Pham
Binh
Minh’sinterview
with
the
Voice
of
Vietnam,
http://english.vov.vn/Politics/VietnamJapan-relations-will-continue-to-grow-steadily/265153.vov,
accessed
December 20th 2013.
11
Voice of Vietnam, “Việt Nam – Nhật Bản: Đối tác chiến lược tin cậy và bền vững” (Vietnam-Japan: A reliable andsustainable strategic partnership), assessed January 16, 2014.
12
Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia”, International Security, (Vol. 32, No. 3,
Winter 2007/2008, pp. 113-157), p. 129.

6

precisely noted. 13 Hanoi’s skillfulness in the art of balancing diplomacy is manifested in its
maneuvers to forge multiple interdependent relationships with major powers both in bilateral andmultilateral arrangements so that ‘… anybody wanting to violate Vietnam’s sovereignty would
be violating the interests of other countries as well.’14 The logic, as a Vietnamese high-ranking
leader, Former Deputy Prime Minister and Trade Minister Vu Khoan, succinctly puts it, is that‘the more interdependent ties we can cultivate, the easier we can maintain our independence andself-reliance, like an ivory bamboo that will easily fall by standing alone but grow firmly inclumps.’ 15 This ‘clumping bamboo’ philosophy looms large in Vietnam’s arrangement of its
strategic partnerships.16 Post-Cold War Vietnam has no formal allies but has so far secured 13
strategic partnerships, with Russia (2001), Japan (2006), India (2007), China (2008), South
Korea, Spain (2009), United Kingdom (2010), Germany (2011), Italy, France, Indonesia,
Singapore and Thailand (2013) and two ‘comprehensive partnerships’, with Australia (2009) andAmerica (2013).17 This makes it one of the few countries in the world, and the only ASEAN
country, that is either a ‘strategic’ or ‘comprehensive’ partner to all five UN permanent members.
In 2013 alone, Hanoi built five new strategic partnerships and exchanged successful highranking visits with all of its strategic partners — most noticeably with China, Japan, India,
Russia and the United States.
As can be seen, building strategic or comprehensive partnerships with important partners has
become a trend in Vietnam’s balanced and multi-directional foreign policy. It is important tonote that whilst these countries are leading economic partners of Vietnam (accounting for about
80% of Vietnam’s total trade turnover), not all meet the ‘strategic’ criteria in security terms.18
Among Vietnam’s strategic partnerships, those with Russia and China – Vietnam’s two former
allies – are classified by Hanoi as ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’. This is the highest levelof ‘strategic partnership’ framework that Vietnam has with foreign countries, which implies
cooperation in all fields and at all levels.19 Other potential partners of Vietnam in strategic terms
may be the United States, India, and arguably Japan, given their mutual concerns with China’s
13

Professor Yasushi Watanabe of Keio University, “Rethinking Japan-U.S. Relations through a Visit to Vietnam”,
http://www.wochikochi.jp/english/foreign/2013/04/vietnam-Japan-us.php
14
Nguyen Hong Thach, quoted in Carlyle A. Thayer, “Sino-Vietnamese Relations: The Interplay of Ideology andNational Interest”, Asian Survey, (Vol. 34, No. 6, June 1994), p. 528. See also Goh 2008, op. cit.
15
Vu Khoan, Interview with Vietnamnet, December 20, 2013. For more information on Vietnam’s ‘clumping
bamboo’ diplomacy, see my commentary on the East Asian Forum (April 3, 2014) titled “Is Vietnam’s bamboo
diplomacy threatened by pandas?”, available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/04/03/is-vietnams-bamboodiplomacy-threatened-by-pandas/
16
Apart from the two special relationships with Laos and Cambodia, Hanoi started using the term ‘strategic
partnership’ in 2001 to identify those countries with which it has developed comprehensive bilateral relations andthoseviewedasparticularly
significant
toits
national
interests.
CarlyleA.
Thayer,http://tuanvietnam.vietnamnet.vn/2013-07-31-viet-my-vi-sao-chua-la-doi-tac-chien-luoc-, accessed December 26,
2013.
17
Unlike the strategic partnership framework, a comprehensive partnership does not necessarily include a joint
mechanism to monitor the implementation of concluded agreements and a long-term Plan of Action to promote
cooperation in key areas.
18
The trade turnover between Vietnam and 13 strategic partners in 2013 reaches $148 billion, accounting for almost
80% of Vietnam’s import-export turnover. Japan alone accounts for 30% of ODA provision for Vietnam with $1.4
billion commitments in 2013.
19
Russia has always been the largest supplier of defense equipment for Vietnam whilst China has a strategic
importance to the country’s security and stability given its geographical proximity and ideological similarities.

7

increased military presence in the region and its assertiveness in maritime disputes in the Eastand South China Seas. Most recently, the strategic partnership with Japan has been elevated to a
new level of ‘Extensive Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia’, reflecting Vietnam’s
recognition of the growing importance of its relationship with Japan in its overall foreign
relations.
List of Vietnam’s important partners
Level ofrelationshipCountry

Specialrelationship
Comprehensive
strategic
partnership

Strategic
partnershipYear of cooperative framework
establishment

RegionLaos

1977

Cambodia

2005

Southeast
Asia

Russia2001: Vietnam’s first strategic partner
2012: upgraded to comprehensive
strategic partnership

Eurasia

China

2008

East Asia

Japan

2006: Joint statement towards
Strategic Partnership
2009: Strategic Partnership concluded
2014: Elevated to Extensive StrategicPartnership

India

2007

South Korea

2010

Indonesia

2013

Singapore

2013

Thailand

2013

Spain

2009

UnitedKingdom2010

Germany

2011

France2013

Italia2013

Netherlands

2010(Strategic partnership on Climate
Change Adaptation and Water
Management)

Denmark

2011(Strategic partnership in the areas of
Climate change, Environment, Energy
and Green growth)

Australia

2009

United States

2013

Issue-based
strategic
partnership

Comprehensive
partnership

8

East Asia

Southeast
Asia

EuropeEuropeAsiaPacificVietnam in Japan’s ‘Look South’ strategy and its emerging ‘pivot to ASEAN’
For decades, pursuing postwar pacifism and strengthening the security alliance with the UnitedStates have served as the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy. However, since the end of theVietnam War, Japan has sought to expand its influence in Asia. The 1977 Fukuda doctrine marks
its first re-engagement with Southeast Asia. Japan’s involvement in the settlement of theCambodia conflict by offering venue for meetings and sending peace-keeping troops toCambodia under the UN auspice was another big step in setting Japan’s foothold in the region.
During the 1990s, Japan started to support and actively participate in multilateral arrangements
in East Asia, and at the same time strengthen bilateral relations with ASEAN countries.
Southeast Asia ranks high in Japan’s Foreign Policy under Abe which is based on the threepillars of strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, deepening cooperative relations withneighboring countries, and strengthening economic diplomacy as a means to promote therevitalization of the Japanese economy.20
Japan’s regional policy, however, is facing challenges stemming from its institutional constraints
and the dynamics of evolving power transition in East Asia. At the domestic level, Japan’s two“lost decades,” as the result of a lagging economy and frequent changes in leadership, haveplaced a restraint on its commitment to Asia. At the regional level, Asia for the first time
witnessed both Japan and China’s resurgence as big powers, and the ambivalence of the U.S.’
long-term commitments to Asia due to its own domestic budget restraints. As a further matter,
this power transition process is taking place in a region that lacks effective multilateralframeworks to prevent the vicious circles of security dilemma and potential conflicts. Given
Japan’s diminishing geopolitical space in Northeast Asia, Tokyo is increasingly ‘looking South’
by concluding strategic partnerships with Australia (2006), India (2007), and ASEAN (fivebilateral strategic partnerships with ASEAN members and one with ASEAN itself). This is seen
as a ‘dual hedge’ against difficult relationships with its Northeast Asian neighbors as well asTokyo’s own concerns about the US’ long-term commitment to defend Japan and its presence in
East Asia (e.g. over Senkaku islands).21 This ‘Look South’ strategy and the emerging ‘pivot to
ASEAN’ are also substantial in realizing the key objectives of Abe’s foreign policy, which are:economic revitalization; maritime security; and expansion of the sphere of influence. In all ofthese areas, Japan sees Vietnam as ‘a strategic partner that shares common interests.’22

20

Foreign Policy Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida to the 186th Session of the Diet,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pp/page18e_000037.html, accessed January 7th 2014.
21
Corey J. Wallace, “Japan's strategic pivot south: diversifying the dual hedge”, International Relations of the AsiaPacific, (Vol. 13, No. 3, 2013), p. 479-517.
22Japan Times April 15, 2013, “Japan, Vietnam to hold maritime security talks in May”.

9

List of Japan’s Key Partners
Level ofrelationship
Alliance

Strategic
partnershipCountry

Year of cooperative
framework establishment

United States

1960

Indonesia

2006

Vietnam2006: Joint statement
towards Strategic Partnership
2009: Strategic Partnershipconcluded
2014: elevated to Extensive
Strategic Partnership

The
Philippines

2011

ASEAN

2011

Thailand2012

Cambodia

2013

India

2006

Australia

2007

The United
Kingdom

2012

RegionAsiaPacific

ASEAN

Asia –
Pacific
EuropeChina

2008
Mutually Beneficial
Relationship Based on
Common Strategic Interests

South Korea

1998
A New Japan-Republic ofKorea Partnership towards
the Twenty-first Century

Russia1998
Creative Partnership
2+2 dialogue started in Dec.
2013

Eurasia

The European
Union

Just completed the thirdround of negotiations for a
strategic partnershipagreement

EuropeOther
importantpartners

East Asia

First, as economic diplomacy is a key component of the Japanese Foreign Policy under Abe,
Tokyo has many incentives to engage Southeast Asia and Vietnam. Prime Minister Abe himself
has straightforwardly stated that ASEAN’s integration plan to unite into a single market with thetotal value of $2,000 billion and a population of 600 million by 2015 is a big attraction to10

revitalize Japan’s lagging economy which has been stranded in a decade-long deflation with anincreasingly ‘greying’ population. 23 At present, Japanese companies increasingly look at
Southeast Asia as an additional destination for investment (the so-called ‘China plus One’
Investment Strategy). Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia are on Japanese investors’ top list as
they are, in the words of Japanese Chief Cabinet Yoshihide Suga, ‘the leaders of economic
growth in the region which puts them right in the center of interests of Japan.’24 Among the three
countries, Vietnam has increasingly attracted the largest investment from Japan. According toJapanese investors, Vietnam has many advantages in attracting FDI, such as its ‘large’ and‘robust’ population, skilled workforce, experienced technicians, security and stability. For
Japanese economists and especially Japanese businesspeople, the first condition for doing
business is a stable environment, and Vietnam is currently considered to have the most stableenvironment.25 In addition, Vietnam has ‘effectively used Japan’s ODA in accelerating economic
restructuring, improving infrastructure, and in combating environmental pollution, infectious
diseases, and in poverty reduction and hunger elimination, etc.’, and its ‘impressive
achievements in socio-economic development and modernization thanks to Japan’s ODA in
recent years have encouraged Japan to consider increasing ODA for Vietnam.’26 In fact, since2011, Vietnam has been Japan’s largest ODA recipient country, making it ‘the most important
ODA partner of Japan’.27

Japan’s investment in Thailand (blue), Indonesia (red), and Vietnam (green) during the 20092012 period (Dashed line: projects; box: total capital)(Source: Retro, cited from Vietnamnet28)
23

Tuoi Tre News January 16, 2013, “Japan PM on why he chose Vietnam for 1st visit”.
24
Ibid.
25
Vnexpress October 5, 2012, “Nhật Bản khẳng định vị trí nhà đầu tư số một tại Việt Nam” (Japan reaffirmed as No.
1 investor in Vietnam)
26
Dinh Thi Hien Luong, op. cit., p. 111.
27
Vnexpress January 31, 2013, “Việt Nam là đối tác ODA quan trọng nhất của Nhật” (Vietnam is the most ODA
partner of Japan)
28
Vnexpress October 5, 2012, op. cit.

11

Second, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines, all of whom Japan has concluded
Strategic Partnership and Economic Partnership Agreements with, are also important members of
ASEAN, which has a favourable public opinion of Japan. When asked by the Vietnamesenewspaper Tuoitre on why he chose Vietnam and other ASEAN countries for his first foreign
visit in the second term, Prime Minister Abe said:
I have decided to visit three countries: Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia, countries thatplay an important role as ‘the center of development’ of the 21st century. Increasing
cooperation with those three nations is very important to contribute to development andstability of the region… Vietnam is the first country I visit since taking the Prime
Ministerial office. Japan and Vietnam have common concerns in Asia Pacific, with bothassisting each other in economic matters.29
These common concerns of Hanoi and Tokyo not only target Beijing’s military modernizationand its territorial ambition in the East and South China Seas but also ‘the strategic implicationsof economic overreliance on China’s future economic growth and the potential for intersecting
economic and military coercion.’30 It is important to note that China is the biggest trading partnerof both Japan and Vietnam while being the country that causes them the largest trade deficits.
Vietnam in particular has a trade deficit of $23.7 billion (out of the total $50.21 billion two-way
trade turnover) with China in 2013, a 44.5% increase when compared to 2012.31 Some Japanesescholars like Takayuki Ogasawara, therefore, have straightforwardly argued that ‘developing
Vietnam's export industries will help keep it from being overwhelmed by China incompetitiveness. Japan and Vietnam should avoid a heavy dependence on China that would
narrow both countries' freedom of action.’32 For example, in an effort to overcome China’s nearmonopoly of the supply of rare-earth elements, the two countries have opened a joint research
centre in Hanoi to improve extraction and processing of the materials from Vietnam’s large
untapped rare earth reserves.33
Japan also considers Southeast Asia an important sphere of influence for its big power diplomacy,
particularly in winning the sub-region’s support for its bid for a permanent seat at the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC). In this respect, Vietnam’s enhanced status in ASEAN has
increasingly attracted Japan’s attention as an important potential player in East Asian politics. It
should be noted that Vietnam was one of the few ASEAN countries that gave its consistent
support from the very beginning for Japan’s UNSC bid despite China’s diplomatic pressure.34
Japan also recognizes the role that Vietnam, with its diplomatic ties with North Korea, could
play in the Korean issue. Prime Minister Abe has asked Vietnam to keep pressing North Korea to29

Tuoitre News, January 16, 2013, “Japan PM on why he chose Vietnam for 1st visit”, op. cit.
Wallace, op. cit.
31
China Daily, January 29, 2014, “China remains Vietnam's biggest trade partner in 2013”.
32
Takayuki Ogasawara, “The Prospects for a Strategic Partnership between Japan and Vietnam, AJISS-Commentary,(No.124, June 16, 2011), The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies.
33
Vietnam is reckoned to be in the top ten in the world in terms of rare earth reserves. BBC News June 20, 2012,“Asian countries challenge China on rare earth minerals”
30

34

When Japan first bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council in 2005, only Singapore andVietnam showed support for Japan due to diplomatic pressure applied to other nations in the region by China. See
Wallace, op. cit.

12

resolve the issue of its abducting Japanese citizens, which prevents Tokyo and Pyongyang fromnormalizing relations. 35 Hanoi and Tokyo have also effectively coordinated on international
forums as well as other regional mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS),ASEAN and
the China, Japan, and South Korea (ROK) Summit (ASEAN+3). Moreover, considering the listof Vietnam and Japan’s important partners, it is conspicuous that they have many common
partners in the Asia-Pacific region, suggesting that there are chances for Hanoi and Tokyo tocooperate beyond their bilateral framework.
Third, Japan’s Southeast Asia policy under the Abe’s administration for the first time includes
explicit security and defense dimensions. Although Japan has always been ‘an importanteconomic player that enjoys positive public sentiment in most Southeast Asian countries’, its
policy toward Southeast Asia never went beyond the 1977 Fukuda doctrine, in which Japan
stressed the building of mutual trust with Southeast Asia and pledged to forever renounce
military power.’36 Now, Prime Minister Abe confirms that he wants to go further in economic
relations as well as broaden cooperation in the security area. Japan has also committed to further
strengthening interconnectivity in terms of trade and investment, people, and culture between
Japan and ASEAN. In security terms, Tokyo pledges to ‘actively promote joint training,
exercises and capacity building assistance in addition to its cooperation in the field of disastermanagement’ as declared in its latest National Defense Program Guidelines.37 Abe’s regional
policy, in addition to bolstering military alliance with the US, will place emphasis on maritime
security and Japan’s identity as ‘a sea-faring nation’ in maritime Asia which includes Australia
and India. This is evident in his vision of a ‘security diamond strategy’ whereby ‘Australia, India,
Japan and the U.S. state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons
stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific’, seen as a counter to China’s‘String of Pearls’ Strategy.38
In this context, Japan sees Vietnam, together with the Philippines and Indonesia, as potential
actors that will play an important role in driving ASEAN regionalism as well as in maintaining
the regional balance amid China’s rising assertiveness in territorial disputes. During his visit toVietnam in September 2013, Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera stated that Vietnam is
one of the most important partners of Japan; for that reason, Japan wants to continue deepening
its relations with Vietnam, including in the security and defense realm. In talks with his
Vietnamese counterpart, Minister Onodera suggests that Vietnam should play a more active rolein preserving peace and stability in Asia, an aspect of special interests for Japan.39 Increased
interactions and exchanges in the security and defense areas have been strengthened since 2011.
If this trend is to continue, it will open a new page in Vietnam-Japan relations that will movebeyond their traditional economic cooperation.
35

Kyodo News, October 7, 2013, “Japan, Vietnam to tighten maritime relations amid China threat”.
Phuong Nguyen, “Japan’s Pivot Should Be Sustained: View from Southeast Asia”, Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, accessed January 18, 2014.
37
Japan’s National Defense Program Guideline for FY 2014, available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/96_abe/documents/2013/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NDPG(Summary).pdf,
accessed January 25, 2014.
38
Yuka Hayashi, Abe’s Diamond Defense Diplomacy, The Wall Street Journal (January 17th, 2013).
39
Thanhnien News, http://www.thanhnien.com.vn/pages/20130916/viet-nam-la-mot-trong-nhung-doi-tac-quantrong-nhat-cua-nhat-ban.aspx, accessed December 7, 2014.
36

13

3. Toward a comprehensive strategic partnership
Given that both countries attach such great significance to their strategic partnership and that for
the first time in the history of their bilateral relations, security and defense cooperation isconsidered as a sphere of enhanced interaction, my hypothesis is that, subject to the twocountries’ political will and further cultivating efforts, the relationship can be largely extended
and developed into a comprehensive strategic partnership – the highest level of strategic
partnership framework that Vietnam has so far only had with Russia and China. In the FriendshipYear of 2013, the two countries’ leaders agreed to chance a breakthrough and to open a newphase in the development of their bilateral relationship. During a state visit to Japan of Vietnam’s
President Truong Tan Sang in March 2014, the two sides decided to elevate their ties to a newlevel of ‘Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia’. Without a doubt,
bilateral relations are currently at its best in history. Three pillars – people exchanges, economic
cooperation, and security ties – hold special meaning in promoting this strategic partnership in amore intensive and extensive manner.
Deepening political trust and people-to-people exchanges
One of the solid foundations for the Vietnam – Japan relations is the regard both nations hold formutual trust and all-round cooperation as valuable assets. Regular high-ranking visit exchanges
and senior leadership meetings have helped enhance political trust and the effectiveness ofbilateral cooperation, especially via the Vietnam-Japan Cooperation Committee. Alongsideofficial cooperation channels, people-to-people diplomacy has strengthened the long-termsustainability of the Vietnam-Japan strategic partnership, guaranteeing its vigorous growth into
the future. Although its official relationship only began 40 years ago, Vietnam and Japan have along history of people-to-people relations which can date back to the the eighth century, when aVietnamese Buddhist monk named Phat Triet carried out missionary work in Japan. Later on in
the sixteenth century Japanese merchants came to start their business and set up ‘Japanese towns’
in Hoi An and Pho Hien in the central and northern Vietnam. As the first country in Asia tosuccessfully modernize itself to become a powerful country and avoid Western domination,
Japan served as an inspirational model and a hub for Vietnamese patriots to come study the wayof liberating their country from French colonization and revive their nation. Such was the Dong
Du Movement (Toyu Undo or Donzu Undo in Japanese, Phong trào Đông Du in Vietnamese), led
by the great patriot Phan Boi Chau. At the peak of this Movement, there were about 200
Vietnamese students being sent to Japan in 1907. Although this Movement were short-lived, due
to the complicated historical context at the time, Phan Boi Chau’s famous quote that
‘Vietnamese and Japanese people have common cultural and racial traits and that they locate in
the same region’ (‘đồng văn, đồng chủng, đồng châu’) still lives on to describe the similarities
and closeness between the two peoples and societies to date.40
However, there was a dark period in the history of bilateral relations due to the Japanese militaryoccupation in Indochina during World War Two. The dual colonial oppression of the French andJapanese militaries was largely responsible for the Great Famine in 1945 (Nạn đói Ất Dậu)throughout Vietnam that claimed lives of approximately two million Vietnamese. Japan was also
indirectly involved in the Vietnam War, as a supporter of the US policy to combat the ‘threat’ of
40

The international conference commemorating the Vietnam-Japan Friendship Year, titled “Vietnam-Japan’s
relations: 10 years revisited and future orientations”, Hanoi, September 2013.

14

communism from North Vietnam.41 However, unlike the case of China and South Korea, the‘historical issue’ has not been a destructing factor in Vietnam-Japan relations. National
reconciliation between Vietnam and Japan has been a successful case given three factors: Japan,
as the aggressor, accepted its responsibilities and expressed good will to ‘heal the wound’;Vietnam, as the victim, was willing to let go and build new relations; and the international
environment was conducive for reconciliation.
From the Japanese side, after the war Tokyo signed with former South Vietnamese government
Ngo Dinh Diem a reparations agreement in May 1959, for an amount of 39 million dollars with 5
years of deferred payment. This was done in the form of purchases by the Japanese governmentof goods and services supplied by Japanese companies, which played an important role instrengthening the economic ties between Japan and Southeast Asian countries, particularly bypromoting Japanese exports.42 ‘Reparations’ continued in the form of Japan’s ODA to Vietnam
after the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1973 and since 1992 when bilateral ties was restored.
A joint comprehensive research project titled ‘The 1945 Famine in Vietnam: the Historic
Remnants’ (‘Nạn đói năm 1945: Những chứng tích lịch sử’) co-edited by Professors Le Van Tao
and Motoo Furuta attracted the contribution of many Vietnamese and Japanese intellectuals. It
investigated the roots and consequences of the great famine in Vietnam in an intensive andextensive manner. When the research outcome was published in 1995 and later translated into
Japanese and English, it provided the Japanese and Vietnamese public with evidence of the scaleand severity of the starvation. 43 Since its publication, the Japanese Government has been
voluntarily paying reparations by means of non-returned aids and ODA loans for Vietnam. With
its meaning and academic values, this project was awarded the National Prize for Science andTechnology by the Vietnamese Government in 2010. Professor Motoo Furuta has emphasized
during his presentation of the research findings at Vietnamese University of Social Sciences andHumanities in Hanoi that: ‘A full understanding of historical truths is a solid basis for thefriendship between the Vietnamese and Japanese peoples. And this project has contributed tofurther strengthening the foundation of the strategic partnership between the two countries.’44
From the Vietnamese side, Hanoi did not raise the historical issue during negotiations for theestablishment of diplomatic ties in 1973, as it accepted the war-related settlement between Japanand the former South Vietnamese Government and was eager to launch a new relation withJapan to reconstruct its war-ravaged country. In fact, although having suffered so much fromwars against foreign aggression throughout its history, Vietnam tends to adopt a ‘future-oriented’
outlook vis-à-vis with its former enemies (note that all the former foes of Vietnam have now
become its strategic or comprehensive partners). In its long history of national defense, theJapanese military occupation was quite short and perhaps not as brutal as the Chinese, French, or
41

According to Kazuhiko Togo, whilst the Japanese government supported the US in the Vietnam War, Japanesepublic opinion saw this war more in the context of a fight for independence by the Vietnamese people against
French and American ‘imperialist powers’. Political tension permeated Japan throughout the 60’s. Kazuhiko Togo,
Japan's Foreign Policy 1945-2003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy (Kazuhiko Date: 2005), p.199.
42
Kazuhiko Togo, Japan's Foreign Policy 1945-2003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy (Kazuhiko Date: 2005), p.
197.
43
See Le Van Tao and Motoo Furuta (eds), Nạn đói năm 1945 ở Việt Nam: những chứng tích lịch sử (The 1945
Famine in Vietnam: the Historic Remnants) (Tri Thuc Publishing House: Hanoi, 2011).
44
http://ussh.vnu.edu.vn/gs-nhat-ban-thuyet-trinh-ve-nan-doi-nam-1945-o-viet-nam/5896, accessed February 12,
2014.

15

American historical records in Vietnam. Japan’s post-War pacifist orientation and its active
contribution to the socio-economic development in Vietnam after the reestablishment of ties in1992 is another factor taken into account by the Vietnamese Government and people. As Mr.
Nghiem Vu Khai – Chairman of the Vietnam-Japan’s Friendship Association has noted,‘entering the life of the Vietnamese with the charm of sakura blossoms, practicality of numerous
products like household utensils, motorbikes or at a more macro level, vital transport works,
Japan has been closely associated to Vietnam in a very natural and close manner’.45 Last but notleast, the post-Cold War environment whereby most countries focus on economic cooperation
and regional integration and the emergence of common interests have created favourable
conditions for Vietnam and Japan to ‘let the bygones be bygones.’
As the result of this reconciliation process, the Vietnamese public to date has held a quitefavorable image of Japan. According to a survey in 2004 by Asia Barometer, Japan ranks secondin Vietnamese people’s best images of foreign countries (only after Russia).46 In another survey
on public opinion on Japan in Six ASEAN countries conducted by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in 2008, Vietnamese people gave the most positive answers to all the questionnaires
about Japan. In particular, 98% of the interviewees believe that Japan is a trustworthy friend toVietnam and 100% welcome Japanese companies coming to establish factories and facilities intheir localities. Vietnamese people also chose Japan as the most important partner for Vietnam
both in the present and immediate future.47 In the same survey, 87% of the Vietnamese people
consider Japanese acts during the Second World War to no longer be a problem now (the highest
rate among ASEAN people). Even with controversial issues like the Yasukuni visits by JapanesePrime Ministers, the Vietnamese people tend to be more sympathetic to the Japaneseinterpretation as they believe that China has somehow ‘politicized’ the issue and is ‘double
standard’ themselves, given their own historical records in Vietnam.48 The empathy between the
Vietnamese and the Japanese peoples despite their bitter past could well serve as a model fornational reconciliation in East Asia by ‘closing the past behind to look toward the future’.
As for Japanese people, Vietnam is the country in Southeast Asia they feel the most close to.
Speaking in Vietnam to open the Japan-Vietnam Friendship year, Prime Minister Abe
commented that ‘[he himself has]many times visited Vietnam and [feels] very close to thecountry. [He thinks they] need to increase people exchanges further and to make the atmosphereof this friendship year more exciting on many levels… As Prime Minister, [he] will do [his] best
to further boost ties between the two countries.’49 According to Prof. Motoo Furuta – Presidentof the Japan-Vietnam Friendship Association, this strategic partnership should take the peopleto-people exchanges as the foundation to further consolidate the political trust and good
45

Thoi Dai, “Japan – Vietnam Relationship: Ever Beautiful as the Sakura”, February 6, 2012
Kazuya Yamamoto “Vietnam from the Perspective of the Asia Barometer Survey: Identity, Images of Foreign
Nations, and Global Concerns”, Memoirs of the Institute of Oriental Culture, 150 (March 2007), p. 320.
47
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/survey/qa0803.pdf, accessed
January 12th, 2014.
48
As an example, see a commentary on Prime Minister Abe’s recent visit to the Yasukuni Shrine that has received
many supporting comments from Vietnamese netizens, “Đừng lợi dụng đền Yasukuni để kích động thù hằn dân tộc”
(Do not make use of the Yasukuni Shrine to provoke hatred among peoples), http://www.baodatviet.vn/thegioi/quan-he-quoc-te/dung-loi-dung-den-yasukuni-de-kich-dong-thu-han-dan-toc-2363502/, accessed January 18th
2014.
49
Tuoitre News, January 16, 2013, “Japan PM on why he chose Vietnam for 1st visit”, op. cit.
46

16

sentiments among the peoples. Promoting ties with Vietnam received ‘complete consensus’
from the Japanese public. 50 The friendship between the two peoples was most clearly
demonstrated by Vietnam’s heart-felt support for the Japanese victims of the March 2011
earthquake and tsunami. Japanese people, having suffered enough from nuclear-related disasters,
have in return sincerely warned both the Japanese and Vietnamese governments about possible
negative effects of Japan’s plan to export nuclear power plant technology to Vietnam – acontroversial issue within Vietnam.51 In terms of tourism, Vietnam has become an increasingly
popular destination for Japanese tourists. There has been a surge in the number of Japanese
tourists since Hanoi unilaterally exempted short-term visa for Japanese citizens in 2004. Last
year Vietnam received almost 600,000 Japanese tourists (accounting for about 10% of the total
foreign visitors to the country in the year), and according to the Vietnamese embassy in Japan
there were about 80,000 Vietnamese tourists to Japan in 2013 (a double increase from 2012).
This number is expected to increase if the Japanese government loosens visa requirements for
Vietnamese citizens in the time to come.
With regard to human resources development, it should be reminded that it was the training ofVietnamese students in Japan that opened the relationship between the two peoples in the premodern history. Education and training, therefore, has been and should be a prioritized field ofcooperation. In recent years, Japan is among the most generous non-returned aid providers for
Vietnam in this field. As a result, the number of Vietnamese students in Japan has been growing
steadily. When the two countries reestablished ties in 1992, there were only 92 Vietnamesestudents in Japan but this number has increased to 4,373 in 2012 (an 8.4% annual increase),ranking Vietnam as the fourth nation with the largest number of students in Japan (after China,
South Korea, and Taiwan). 52 This number however remains modest when compared to thenumber of Vietnamese students going to other world-class education hubs like United States,
United Kingdom, and Australia. According to Prof. Motoo Furuta, the Japanese government has
a plan to receive about 300,000 foreign students in the future, of which it desires to have 10%
made up of Vietnamese students (approximately 30,000 students).53 A remarkable step toward
this goal is the Japanese government’s pledge to help train 1,000 Vietnamese doctoral students ina 13-year-long project worth JPY 20 billion, funded through ODA starting from fiscal
2008. Among the fields of study, Vietnam is placing priority on advanced technologies, such as
information technology, mechanical engineering, materials and nanotechnology, as well as
agriculture, shipbuilding and medicine.54 At the same time, the Japanese government should also
encourage Japanese students to go to Vietnam for language, area studies, as well as other cultural
exchanges. It is hoped that once the Vietnam-Japan University Project, which was agreed by the50

Personal interview with Prof. Motoo Furuta at the University of Tokyo, January 9, 2014.
The Japan-Vietnam Friendship Association, headed by Prof. Motoo Furuta, has sent letters of objection of theplan to both governments. Interview with Professor Motoo Furuta, op. cit.
52
Japan Student Services Organization, “International Students in Japan 2012”, February 2013
http://www.jasso.go.jp/statistics/intl_student/data12_e.html, accessed February 5, 2014.
53
Motoo Furuta, “Lưu học sinh Việt Nam sang Nhật Bản: Lịch sử và Triển vọng” (Vietnamese students in Japan:
history and prospect), Paper presented at the International conference commemorating the Vietnam-Japan
Friendship Year, titled “Vietnam-Japan’s relations: 10 years revisited and future orientations”, Hanoi September
2013.
51

54

Hanoi Times, “Japan to help train 1000 Vietnamese doctoral students”, March 4, 200817

two governments in 2013, is put into operation, it will attract not only Vietnamese students
interested in Japan studies but also Japanese students interested in Vietnam studies.55
Labor export from Vietnam to Japan is a potential field for further cooperation. As the Japanese
population is ‘greying’, Japan will increasingly rely on foreign workers to keep its economy infunction. Therefore, the Japanese government has recently decided to open its labour market andcreate job opportunities to increase the number of Vietnamese workers in Japan, especially in thehealth service. Since 1992, Vietnam has sent about 31,000 workers and interns to Japan. In
recent years, this number has countinued to increase (2009: 5,500; 2010: 5,000; 2011: 7,000;
2012: 8,500 people).56 At present, there are about 20,000 Vietnamese workers and interns inJapan, with that accounting for one third of the total number of Vietnamese people in Japan.
Japan has also started to receive and train nurses and care-workers from Vietnam within theframework of the 2011 Economic Partnership Agreement. These Japan-trained human resources(including students, workers, and interns) will serve as a bridge for technology and experiencetransfer from Japan to Vietnam, that can create a ‘new Dong Du Movement’ to facilitate thesocio-economic transformations in Vietnam if utilized to its fullest.
As Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung once said, the growing relationship between Viet Nam andJapan is based on strong political trust, and as Japan’s former Ambassador to Vietnam, Yasuaki
Tanizaki emphasized, the Vietnam-Japan relationship has its origin in the mutual understanding
between the two people for joint cooperation and development.57 Therefore, in the coming time
the two governments and peoples should continue to nurture their mutual confidence and further
promote exchanges between the peoples, particularly among the younger generation.
Boosting economic relations
Economic cooperation has served as the backbone of the Vietnam-Japan strategic partnership, as
Hanoi and Tokyo recognize their ability to complement each other’s strengths for common
development. As a Vietnamese senior diplomat observes, ‘Japan has advantages in capital,technology, management skill but needs more cooperation in international economic cooperation,
especially in Asia; Vietnam is rich in workforce, improving investment environment andpotential market with the population reaching 100 million in the coming years. In order to attainthe objective of a fundamentally industrialized country in 2020, Vietnam must attract resourcesfrom outside, including Japan, in capital and technology.’58 The conclusion of the Agreement for
the Liberalization, Encouragement, and Protection of Investment in December 2004 and theVietnam-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement in October 2009 have opened legal pathways
for the development of bilateral economic and commercial ties. So far, Japan is the first ranking
economic partner of Vietnam. As Vietnam’s biggest ODA donor, Japan has closely coordinatedwith Vietnam in most immediate tasks regarding the development of the socio-economic
55

Personal interview with Prof. Furuta Motoo, President of the Japan-Vietnam Friendship Association.
Vietnam’s Government Portal, “Làm sâu sắc hơn quan hệ đối tác chiến lược VN-Nhật Bản” (Further deepening
the Vietnam-Japan Strategic Partnership), December 9, 2013.
57
Vietnam Plus, “Quan hệ Việt-Nhật 40 năm và định hướng tương lai” (Vietnam-Japan relationship: 40 years inretrospect and future orientations), September 3, 2013.
58
Dang Minh Khoi (Director General, North East Asia Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam),“Vietnam-Japan: Broad and Profound Friendship”, http://vccinews.com/news_detail.asp?news_id=29063, accessed
February 15th, 2014.
56

18

infrastructure, assisted Vietnam in human resources development, modernization of financial
institutions, development of supporting industries, in compliance with Vietnam-Japan Economic
Partnership Agreement in force since 2009. Since 2006, Japan has been the biggest ODA
supplier to Vietnam, accounting for about 30% in the total ODA commitment from theinternational community. Tokyo committed nearly US$20 billion for Vietnam between 1992 and2011, supplying the highest ODA of approximately US$2.8 billion in the 2011 fiscal year, evenafter suffering its own internal economic problems and recovering from the aftermath of the2011 tsunami. Japan supplied around US$2.6 billion of ODA to Vietnam in the 2012 fiscal
year.59 According to Motonori Tsuno, Chief Representative of Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA) in Vietnam, ‘Japan always sees Vietnam as the most important ODA partner inthe world’. Mr. Tsuno gives three reasons as to why Japan continues to be the most generous
donor to Vietnam over the past twenty years: first, ODA for Vietnam has been utilized in an
effective manner and with great outcomes; second, Japanese ODA not only contributes toVietnam’s development but is also mutually beneficial for joint development by using ODA tobuild infrastructure in Vietnam which in turn facilitates Japanese investment in Vietnam; and last
but not least, ODA has contributed greatly to further consolidate and deepen the friendshipbetween the two governments and peoples.60
Japan is also Vietnam’s biggest investor, both in terms of registered and disbursed capital with
1990 valid projects capitalized at US$32.667 billion, primarily focused on the processing andmanufacturing industries. This number is expected to continue to rise as Japanese investors arelooking for new destinations to replace China for fear that political tensions between Japan and
China will affect their businesses in the time to come. Japan is committed to continue its supportof Vietnam effectively by deploying large-scale infrastructure projects such as Lang Hoa Lac
High Tech Zone, Nghi Sơn Oil Refinery Plan, Ninh Thuan Nuclear Power Plan, North-South
Expressway, Lach Huyen Port, Vietnam Space Center etc. The Japanese Government is also
taking a Vietnamese proposal for a Vietnam-Japan Friendship Hospital into serious consideration.
In July 2013 the two countries approved ‘Vietnam’s industrialization strategy within theframework of Vietnam-Japan cooperation by 2020 and vision toward 2030’ and is currently
preparing the Plan of Action for its implementation. Under this framework, Japan has pledged toinvest in six key industrial sectors in Vietnam, including consumer electrics/electronics, foodprocessing, shipbuilding, agricultural machinery, environment and energy conservation andautomobile/spare part manufacturing. 61 The program, focusing on industries of strategic
significance to Vietnam’s future economic development, is tailored to enhance thecompetitiveness of Vietnamese enterprises when the tariff barrier in the ASEAN Free Trade
Area (AFTA), and other free trade agreements, is lifted by 2018 and 2020, respectively.
Plans for the establishment of two specialized industrial zones in the northern and the southern
regions for Japanese investors are also in the making.62 They have also completed the fourthphrase of the Vietnam-Japan Joint Initiative on improving Vietnam’s investment environment
and are now implementing the fifth phase.
59

Nhan Dan, Editorial, “Promoting and deepening the Vietnam – Japan strategic partnership”, accessed December 7,
2013.
60
VnExpress, “Việt Nam là đối tác ODA quan trọng nhất của Nhật” (Vietnam is the most important ODA partner ofJapan), January 31, 2013.
61
62

Tuoi Tre News, “Japanese govn’t to back 6 key industries in VN”, December 5, 2013.
Ibid.

19

Japan’s FDI in Vietnam during the 1993 – 2012 period
Unit: million USD. Source: Jetro63(Left axis: total capital, right axis: number of projects)
Japan is also Vietnam’s third biggest trading partner (after China and the United States) and oneof its most important exporting markets. The goal of raising bilateral trade turnover to US$15
billion by 2010 was realized two years ahead of schedule. In 2012, trade turnover reached $25
billion. Import-export turnover hit US$24.7 billion in 2012, with US$13.1 billion from
Vietnamese exports like crude oil, garments and textiles, transport vehicles, and spare parts, andUS$11.6 billion from imports such as machinery, equipment, computers, electronic products andcomponents, and iron and steel.64 They are also well on their way to doubling the two-way tradeturnover from the US$21.181 billion in 2011, a target set in their 2011 joint declaration. The
Japanese Government will also consider Vietnam’s suggestion that the former creates favorable
conditions for its agricultural products to enter the Japanese market. Hirohoko Sekiya, chief
consultant of the Japan Economics Research Institute, told a Vietnamese newspaperthat Japanese businesses have paid a great deal of attention to four sub-units including seafood,rice, coffee and vegetable processing.65 If Vietnam could improve these products, then it would
increase its exports sharply. Cooperation in the field of agriculture will, therefore, rank high on
the agenda of bilateral cooperation in the time to come.

63

Vnexpress, October 5, 2012, “Nhật Bản khẳng định vị trí nhà đầu tư số một tại Việt Nam” (Japan reaffirmed as
No. 1 investor in Vietnam)
64
Pham Binh Minh, op. cit.
65
Tuoi Tre News, “Japanese govn’t to back 6 key industries in VN”, December 5, 2013.

20

It can be seen that Japan has played an important role in the national construction of Vietnam.
Over the past 20 years, Japan has unceasingly provided Vietnam with ODA, FDI, tradeopportunities as well as transferred its development experience to Vietnam with hope that
Vietnam can become a strong and viable economy for the purpose of promoting its people’s
well-being. However, due to the inherent limits in its internal capabilities, including the low
starting point of the economy as well as the loss of resources through corruption and waste,
Vietnam has been unable to make full use of these sources to accelerate its course toward
becoming an industrialized and modernized country. Given that Vietnam is on the threshold of
becoming a middle-income country and that there have been signs of economic slow-down since2007, economic Professor Tran Van Tho of Waseda University suggests that Vietnam should
consider using Japanese capital in a more efficient manner in the coming time. Specifically,
Hanoi should have a plan to reduce ODA within the next 10 years, striving toward ‘graduatingfrom ODA’ (stop receiving) within the next 15-20 years, and at the same time learn from other
Asian countries’ experience in utilizing Japanese funding for the purpose of their nation building(such as the case of South Korea in infrastructure construction and Thailand’s success in building
their own automobile manufacturing industry).66 To continue attracting Japanese FDI, Hanoi also
needs to accelerate its reform performance and make improvements in the investment climate,including the infrastructure and the quality of human resources. During a recent survey, about
70% of Japanese companies working in Vietnam said they plan to expand their business in the
country if Hanoi creates a more favorable environment for their investment. 67 In return,
Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang has recently confirmed that Vietnam is committed tocreating every favorable condition for Japanese investors and that the country has ‘engaged inbuilding a state governed by law, expanding democracy, enhancing administrative and judicial
reform, and restructuring the economy and growth model’.68 Only by providing conditions to
avoid the ‘middle income trap’ and to advance itself into the higher level of development can
Vietnam accelerate its industrialization process and increase its competitiveness.
Strengthening security and defense cooperation
Security and defense cooperation is the ‘new kid on the block’ in Vietnam-Japan StrategicPartnership. For years, it had been considered a ‘sensitive issue’ in the bilateral relations, given
the low-profile disposition of Japan in the regional security due to constitutional restraints aswell as Hanoi’s consideration of Beijing’s reactions. Things started to change since 2009 when
China made a series of assertive moves in its territorial disputes with its neighboring countries.
Most recent examples include the unilateral establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ) in the East China Sea and the imposition of fishing rules in the South China Sea in 2013.
Tokyo and Hanoi share common interests in maintaining the status quo in their territorial
disputes with China, and the freedom of navigation and aviation in the East and South China
Seas. For Japan, in addition to defending its sovereignty over the Senkaku Island and its
territorial waters against China’s incitement, the safety of its SLOCs is a vital security interest, as
66

Tran Van Tho, “Quan hệ Việt-Nhật trong quá trình phát triển kinh tế Việt Nam: Vài gợi ý cho giai đoạn tới(Vietnam – Japan Relations in the Development Process of Vietnam’s Economy: Some implications for the nextstage). Paper presented at the International Conference commemorating the 40th Year of Vietnam-Japan Diplomatic
Establishment titled “Vietnam-Japan relations: 40 years revisited and future orientations” Hanoi, September 3, 2013.
67
Voice of Vietnam, “Enhancing Vietnamese-Japanese comprehensive strategic cooperation”, March 21, 2013.
68
Ibid.

21

over 80 per cent of its oil imports from the Middle East pass through the South China Sea. South
China Sea routes are even more critical to Japan’s energy security since the shutdown of its
nuclear power plants in the wake of the 2011 tsunami. Maintaining maritime security hence is
one of Tokyo’s main interests in engaging with ASEAN countries. The ‘strategic use of ODA’and loosened arms export restrictions highlighted in Japan’s 2010 National Defense Program
Guidelines (NDPG) provided legal pathways for Tokyo’s maneuvers. According to the 2010
defense guidelines, ‘in non-traditional security fields, Japan will promote practical cooperation
by utilizing SDF capabilities, including disposal of landmines and unexploded shells. Japan will
also strive to establish and strengthen regional cooperation practice and support the capacity
building of countries in the region.’69 In 2012, Japan launched a brand-new program of military
assistance, under the objective of setting in its NDPG to ‘actively contribute to regional stability’.
Tokyo subsequently announced its plan to support Southeast Asian countries to cope with nontraditional security issues such as pirates, terrorists, smugglers and other criminal elements at sea
as well as to protect their waters from the intrusions of foreign boats by means of capacity
enhancement and provision of patrol vessels modeled after its Coast Guard cutters, fundedthrough official development assistance (ODA). As an ‘issue of great interest’ to the Abe’s
Government, Japan offered Indonesia three patrol vessels in 2007, and the Philippines ten in2013, and will provide Vietnam with coast guard cutters in the time to come.70
For Vietnam, territorial dispute with China in the East Sea (South China Sea) remains the biggest
external security concern, particularly since China’s is increasing exerting its ownership in
disputed waters. In December 2012, two Chinese fishing vessels cut cables of Vietnamese vessel
Binh Minh II when it was doing seismic oil exploration work in the water within Vietnam EEZ
in the South China Sea, provoking strong opposition from Hanoi. Vietnamese fishermen havealso been repeatedly harassed by Chinese fishing and law enforcement boats around the Paracel
Islands. In March 2013, a Chinese vessel opened fire on a Vietnamese fishing boat. Vietnam,
however, has few vessels capable of monitoring and chasing intruders. Hanoi has therefore
attempted to enhance its maritime capabilities to safeguard its fishing grounds and fishermen
operating in those waters. In January 2013, the General Department of Fishery within Vietnam’s
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development formed a fishery surveillance force with an eye
on protecting Vietnamese fishing boats operating in the South China Sea. In October 2013,
Hanoi added three domestic built patrol vessels to its fleet and at the same time renamed its
Maritime Police force to Vietnam Coast Guard to be consistent with international practices andboost international cooperation. With increased training, funding and operation of a fleet of
patrol ships and three Casa-212-400 aircrafts, the Coast Guard is responsible of enhancing law
enforcement, rescue operations and environmental protection in the territorial waters along thecountry’s coastal line of more than 3,200 kilometers and sovereign sea areas. Vietnam is alsoprioritizing its military modernization with an 82% increase in its military spending since 2003.
The Vietnamese navy is the main beneficiary with a commission from Russia of two 2000 ton
Gepard-class frigates in 2006 and six Kilo-class submarines in 2009.71
69

National Defense Program Guidelines, December 17, 2010, Ministry of Defense,
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2011/daijin_e.pdf, accessed January 20th, 2014.
70
The Asahi Shimbun, “Japan Coast Guard vessels and equipment in high demand in S.E. Asia, Africa”, September
30, 2013,
71
The Wall Street Journal, “Vietnam Strengthens Coast Guard Amid South China Sea Tensions”, September 1,
2013,

22

Against this background, Hanoi and Tokyo started enhancing their security and defense ties. In
July 2010, they agreed to implement a subcabinet-level ‘two-plus-two’ dialog (meeting involving
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense), a close security arrangement that Japan
only has with the United States, Australia, India (and Russia since the late 2013). In 2011, thetwo defense ministers signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Japan–Vietnam Defense
Cooperation and Exchange, which sets forth, among other items, the regular holding of viceministerial level talks, the regular basis mutual visits by working-level, service and cooperation
on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.72 In September 2011, the Viet Nam Air Defence
and Air Force and Japan Air Self-Defence Force pledged to promote cooperation in training andexchanges of delegations, especially in military aviation. In 2013, the Japanese Defense Minister
visited Vietnam, marking a more intensive and extensive level of bilateral cooperation between
the two defense ministries. During the talks, the two Ministries of Defense agreed to cooperate inhuman resource training, bomb and mine clearance, modernization of Vietnamese marine police
forces, and military technical areas.73 In terms of multilateral cooperation, Vietnamese Chief of
the General Staff Do Ba Ty proposed a stronger sense of cooperation between the two sides on
multilateral forums, especially those in the region, including ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
ASEAN Defence Ministerial Plus Meeting (ADMM+) and that on disaster relief, humanitarian
aid and military medicine, during his visit to Japan in 2013. He believed that ‘boosting
cooperation would contribute to bring the defence ties between the two countries and the twoarmies to a new stage of development, suitable with interests of Vietnam and Japan.’74
In the bilateral defense cooperation with Japan, Vietnam is particularly showing keen interest in
learning from Japan’s naval and maritime security expertise as ‘Japan is the only country in Asia
that understands naval tactics’.75 Each year several Vietnamese students are sent to study at the
National Defense Academy of Japan in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture. 76 Hanoi also
dispatched a fact-finding team to Japan in July 2013 to learn how to enhance its patrol activities.
Vietnamese Maritime Police officials also called for closer cooperation with their Japanesecounterparts when the Japan Coast Guard Academy's training vessel Kojima made a port call at
Da Nang in central Vietnam in late July 2013. During their first-ever talks on maritime security
with the participation of senior officials from the two countries’ foreign and defense ministries in
Hanoi in May 2013, the two sides exchanged views on Japan’s possible provision of patrol
vessels above 1,000 tons in an effort to help Vietnam strengthen its capacity to protect its
rights.77 Discussions on enhanced maritime security cooperation and Japan’s provision of patrol
vessels to Vietnam, which was delayed in 2013 due to technical issues and Vietnam’s
consideration of China’s reaction, have been sped up in the wake of China’s sudden deploymentof Haiyang 981 oil rig into Vietnam’s EEZ in early May 2014.78 Negotiations will likely be72

http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no24/leaders.html, accessed January 15th, 2014.
TuoiTre News, “Vietnam, Japan vow to strengthen military ties”, September 13, 2013.
74
Vietnamese People’s Army Newspaper, “Vietnam and Japan boost defence cooperation”, April 16, 2013.
75
The Japan Times, “Vietnam seen as a potential role model for Japan”, June 14, 2014.
76
Ibid.
77
The Japan Times, “Vietnam to hold maritime security talks in May”, April 15, 2013.
73

78

The technical issue regarding Japan’s provision of coast guard vessel to Vietnam is that Japan’s ODA can only be
used for non-military purposes whilst the Vietnam Coast Guard, despite its recent name change, remains under the
Defense Ministry control. The Japanese Government has urged Vietnam to consider separating its Coast Guard from23

wrapped up during the upcoming visit to Hanoi by Japan’s foreign minister Fumio Kishida and it
is expected for Vietnam to receive these vessels in 2015. Vietnam and Japan Coast Guards havealso promoted cooperation in rescue, environment protection, and other capacity-building
activities. Capacity building in combating pirates and terrorism, meanwhile, is of lesser interest
to Vietnam compared to other maritime countries in the Mallaca Straits. Japan can also assist
Vietnam Coast Guard (and its Navy more broadly) in an indirect way and in the long run byhelping strengthen its shipbuilding industry – one of the six key industries in Vietnam, as noted
earlier, to receive more investment from Japan in the time to come. An unofficial source also
stated that the Japan's self-defense force is currently helping Vietnam train submarine crews.79 In
December 2011, the commander of the Vietnamese Navy visited Japan to be briefed about thearchipelago’s submarine fleet and at the time, some training activities had already taken place.80
This is quite understandable given that Vietnam is preparing for the operation of the six kiloclass submarines recently purchased from Russia, as two have already been transferred toVietnam in early 2014. In late 2012, with the relaxing of Japan’s arms export restrictions, former
defense minister Kitazawa indicated that Japan is considering selling submarines to Vietnam.81 Ifthat is the case albeit not in the near-term future, it would diversify the sources of Vietnam’s
defense equipment which are mainly restricted to Russia and some European countries.
Another potentiality may be cooperation in the joint development of South China Sea resources.
As Hanoi considers the threat of a Chinese attack on the Vietnamese controlled islands and rocks
as unlikely in the immediate future, ‘the issue of defending sovereign rights and jurisdiction on
exclusive economic zones and the continental shelf has become more prominent than the issuesof sovereignty claim over ‘land features’ of the Paracels and the Spratlys.’ 82 This is clearly
manifested in the ongoing confrontation between Vietnam and China over the placement ofChina’s oil rig Haiyang 981 into Vietnam’s EEZ since early May 2014. Oil exploration, in thislight, is of great significance to Vietnam, not only in economic but also in security terms. Hanoi
is the leading oil producer in the region, with 26% of its national production coming from South
China Sea fields. The profit from oil and gas exploration of PetroVietnam (a state joint-venturein the oil and gas industry) in 2012, for example, was VND13,000 billion (approximately
US$650 million), a substantial source for the country’s modest budget.83 Although economic
benefits cannot be taken for granted, what seems to be more strategically important is thesovereignty issue. Hanoi, therefore, wishes to ‘rob in’ more international partners in oil
development ventures to ‘internationalize’ the stakeholders in its maritime disputes with China.
So far, the country has been successful in enlisting Russian (Rosneft and Gazprom), Indian(OLV), British (BP), American (Exxon Mobil and Murphy), and other ASEAN oil companies in

the military to make it eligible to acquire new patrol vessels and other equipment from Japan within the frameworkof Japanese aid programs.
79
Ibid.
80
Céline Pajon, “Japan and the South China Sea Forging Strategic Partnerships in a Divided Region”, Asie.Visions
60, (Center for Asian Studies, The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri), January 2013).
81
Wallace, op. cit., p. 490.
82
Tran Truong Thuy & Nguyen Minh Ngoc, op. cit.
83
Vnexpress,
http://kinhdoanh.vnexpress.net/tin-tuc/doanh-nghiep/ngan-sach-co-them-7-200-ty-tu-lai-dau-khi2894255.html, accessed January 23rd, 2014.

24

these joint-development projects.84 These are all foreign companies that may sustain diplomaticpressures from China. My guess is that Vietnam would also welcome Japanese oil companies
should they desire to join these ventures, particularly as Japan has already cooperated with
Vietnam in the Nghi Son Oil Refinery Plant Project.
Vietnam-Japan cooperation in the security and defense arena might not be restricted to maritime
security but may also span across a wide range of other traditional and non-traditional security
issues. The two countries agreed to commence the Vietnam-Japan deputy ministerial levelsecurity dialogue in 2014 to discuss crime information and regional and global security issues ofmutual interest during a visit to Vietnam by Kenji Furuya, Chairman of Japan’s National Public
Safety Commission and State Minister for Adduction Issues in July 2013. Vietnam also requests
Japan’s assistance in providing equipment and technology to deal with post-war consequences,
particularly delayed explosive ordinances and toxic chemicals as well as capacity building for
Vietnam’s peacekeeping forces within the UN frameworks.85 Japan also strongly sympathizes
with Vietnam’s struggle against the impact of climate change, as the latter stands to be among
the nations to be most seriously impacted by rising sea levels and other effects of climate change.
In 2010, the two countries signed an ODA Loan of 10 billion yen for the Support Program to
Respond to Climate Change. This program is expected to contribute to sustainable economic
development and the alleviation of climate change through implementation of measures that may
ease the effects of global warming such as greenhouse gas emission controls, and form specificresponses to the disaster risks that accompany climate change.86 Japanese partners also shareduseful experience of Japan’s reconstruction efforts in the aftermath of the devastating March2011 earthquake and tsunami and lessons for disaster prevention in Vietnam. Furthermore, theJapanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism has signed another MOU thatwill last until 2016 on natural disaster management with Vietnamese Ministry of Agriculture andRural Developmentto support to Vietnam’s climate change amelioration and natural disasterprevention efforts.87
It can be said that the ‘close-kit’ strategic partnership between Vietnam and Japan has become
clearly evident in all fields. A well-managed comprehensive relationship between Vietnam andJapan in the time to come will not only contribute to realizing the national development goals ofboth countries but will also give Hanoi and Tokyo more leverage and strategic confidence inmanaging their foreign relations, particularly in shaping the evolving security architecture in East
Asia.

84

http://www.baodatviet.vn/chinh-tri-xa-hoi/tin-tuc-thoi-su/dan-doi-tac-dau-khi-hung-manh-cua-vn-tren-bien-dong2360869/, accessed January 23rd, 2014.
85
Thanhnien News, “Việt Nam là một trong những đối tác quan trọng nhất của Nhật Bản” (Vietnam is one of themost important partners of Japan), September 16th 2013.
86
Japan International Cooperation Agency, Press Release June 18, 2010, “Signing of Japanese ODA Loan with theSocialist Republic of Vietnam: Promoting Policy Actions to Respond to Climate Change”
87
http://english.vov.vn/Society/Environment/Japan-provides-expertise-on-climate-change-mitigation/264881.vov,
accessed February 15th 2014.

25

4. Regional implications
Vietnam-Japan Strategic Partnership in US-China Regional Geopolitics
East Asia has recently become a central place for power competition between China and the US,
and now between China and Japan. China’s rapid economic growth, its double-digit annual
increase in military expenditure, and growing assertiveness in the East and South China Sea
disputes have raised common concerns in Washington, Tokyo, and Hanoi about the strategic
implications of China’s rise. The most comprehensive strategic response thus far is the US pivotor rebalancing to Asia to consolidate its ‘hubs-and-spokes’ alliances and reassure allies andpartners of US commitment amid China’s expanding military power. Japan is also making moves
toward becoming a ‘normal country’ to hedge against not only a more hostile China, but also thestrategic ambivalence of US willingness to defend Japan in a potential conflict with China overSenkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In this context, Tokyo openly supports the US rebalance to Asia whilst
pursuing its own ‘look South’ strategy. Accordingly, Japan will take greater responsibility insharing the burden with the US in its ‘rebalancing’ efforts by means of ‘strategic use of ODA’
for the purpose of providing maritime security capacity building skills to ASEAN countries,
among which Vietnam is a beneficiary. As stated in the 2012 U.S.-Japan Joint Statement of the
Security Consultative Committee, ‘…the U.S. Government plans to continue helping allies andpartners in the region to build their capacity with training and exercises. The Government ofJapan, for its part, plans to take on various measures to promote safety in the region, including
the strategic use of official development assistance, for example through providing coastal stateswith patrol boats.’88 Tokyo and Washington are also developing a security cooperation outreach
network based on a ‘Japan–U.S. Plus’ approach that would involve a third country like Vietnam,
Australia, or India.89
In this context, the US has started to identify Vietnam as a potential partner in its Asian pivot. To
date, factors generating the U.S. (and Japanese) interests in furthering its partnership with
Vietnam in strategic terms include the perception that Vietnam is becoming a ‘middle power’with commensurate influence in Southeast Asia, and arguably a powerful strategic actor to check
China’s assertiveness.90 As stated by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the ARF Meetingin Hanoi in July 2010 when Hanoi was then ASEAN Chair, the Obama Administration isprepared to ‘take the U.S.-Vietnam relationship to the next level’ and the US sees its relationshipwith Vietnam ‘not only as important on its own merits, but as part of a strategy aimed atenhancing American engagement in the Asia-Pacific and in particular Southeast Asia.’ 91
Washington has then courted Vietnam in a number of ways: boosting economic ties to help it beless reliant on the Chinese import market; including Vietnam (the only poor and non-capitalist
country) in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations; offering equipment including patrol
vessels, know-how, and capacity building to strengthen its coast guard and military; and callingfor Hanoi to play a more active and constructive role in maintaining peace and stability in the88

http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/js20120427.html, accessed February 7, 2014.
Mori Satoru and Nishihara Masashi, Building a Framework for Japan-US-Vietnam Trilateral Cooperation:
Analyses from Japanese perspectives, (RIPS Policy Perspectives, November 2011), p. 3.
90Mark E. Manyin, U.S.-Vietnam Relations in 2013: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy,(Congressional Research Service’s Report for Congress, July 26, 2013), p. 2.
91
IIP Digital US Embassy, July 22th 2010. “Clinton Says U.S. Seeks Expanded Relationship with Vietnam”
89

26

region. Since 2010, Hanoi and Washington have been negotiating for a ‘strategic partnership’framework. More recently, President Obama has just approved a new agreement on civilian
nuclear cooperation and increased US non-proliferation cooperation with Vietnam. During a trip
to Vietnam in late 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry announced that the United States would
give more than half of its assistance for maritime capacity building in Southeast Asia to Vietnam,
including the provision of five fast patrol boats for its Coast Guard. U.S. forces are also involvedin training Vietnamese personnel in maritime domain awareness, search and rescue, and disaster
response. Moreover, Washington is committed to support Vietnam in developing the Mekong
Delta Region, particularly in combating severe impacts of climate change.
In this context, it can be argued that the ‘China factor’ looms large in recent enhanced
interactions between the US, Japan and Vietnam. The enhanced partnership between Vietnam
and Tokyo be it in political, economic, or strategic terms, therefore, would be welcomed by
Washington and vice versa. Hanoi and Tokyo share common interests with Washington inchecking China’s assertiveness as well as in supporting US pivot to Asia, particularly in ensuring
the freedom of navigation and aviation in international waters and enhancing maritime security,
rule of law, and peaceful settlement of territorial disputes. Trilateral security cooperation can be
expanded to include other partners such as India and Australia, with whom Japan and Vietnam
have close relations. For example, Japan together with the United States and Australia areproviding capacity building assistance for Vietnam’s preparation to join UN peace keeping
forces. Another mechanism for trilateral cooperation is through US-led TPP negotiations which
Vietnam and Japan joined in 2010 and 2013 respectively. Vietnam is considered to be one of thelargest beneficiaries on the TPP. According to a study in 2011, admission to TPP will help
Vietnam add $46 billion to its GDP, a 13.6% increase. When TPP is concluded and takes effect,
it is expected for its GDP to have an additional $26.2 billion increase and this number willamount to $37.5 billion if Japan also joins in.92 Apart from its huge economic benefits, TPP
entails great challenges for Vietnam to commit to a comprehensive structural reform andincrease its transparency at home.
But unlike the Vietnam-Japan relationship which is generally ‘problem free’, relations between
the US and Vietnam, the two former enemies, still face significant obstacles beyond the warrelated relics e.g. POW/MIA and orange agent issues. Given their ideological differences, there
remains lingering skepticism in Hanoi that the United States’ long-term goal is to erode the CPV
power monopoly by means of ‘peaceful evolution’ (diễn biến hòa bình). So far, the human rights
issue remains the biggest obstacle for Hanoi and Washington to take a dramatic step forward intheir relationship. The US continues to link Vietnam’s human rights records with a ban on lethal
weapon exports to Vietnam and a failure to recognize Vietnam’s market economy status. At thepress conference with his US counterpart Leon Panetta in Hanoi in June 2012, Vietnamese
Defense minister Phung Quang Thanh mentioned that if the two countries are to fully normalize
relations, the US must lift its arms embargo on Vietnam. He also lamented earlier that the US did
not appropriately recognize the country's market economy. 93 Hanoi, in return, rejected US
92

Website of Ministry of Justice of Vietnam, “Tham gia Hiệp định đối tác kinh tế chiến lược xuyên Thái BìnhDương (TPP) – Cơ hội và thách thức đối với Việt Nam” (Participating in the Trans-Pacific Partnership –Opportunities and Challenges for Vietnam). See also Peter A. Petri, Michael G. Plummer, Fan Zhai, “The TransPacific Partnership and Asia-Pacific Integration: A Quantitative Assessment”, East West Center Working Paper
Series, (No. 119 October 24, 2011).
93
Asia Times Online, “US, Vietnam inch closer together”, June 12, 201227

proposal to host rotations of US troops and warships in Cam Ranh Bay. Thus far, Hanoi has notchanged its ‘Three Nos’ policy (no foreign military base in Vietnam’s territory, no military
alliance with foreign country, and no bilateral relations against a third party) in its defense
policy.94 These remaining differences explain why, despite high expectations, the two countries
came up with only a ‘comprehensive partnership’ framework in 2013, one step lower than the‘strategic partnership’ framework Vietnam has established with its other important partners like
Japan.
Moreover, whilst the ‘balancing’ dimension in Washington’s and Tokyo’s China policy is
obvious, Hanoi’s interactions with Beijing are more complicated and its response to China’s
increased assertiveness in the South China Sea is also more sophisticated. Japan, as a traditional
power in East Asian history and peer competitor with China in economic and military terms, has
the will and capability to counter-balance China in the context of China’s assertiveness interritorial issues in the East China Sea. Vietnam, meanwhile, is a small country that shares bothland and maritime borders with China, relies on Chinese imports, and has a significant power
gap with China in the South China Sea disputes. While being skeptical of China’s rise forhistorical reasons, Vietnam has few strategic options vis-à-vis China. In the past Hanoi has bothallied and opposed Beijing, but neither strategy seems to work nowadays. A bandwagoning
strategy is undesirable given Vietnam’s strong determination to preserve its independence andterritorial sovereignty, as well as the anti-China sentiment among the public. But a counterbalancing strategy is also unwise, as it would worsen relations with China and bring Hanoi great
economic hardship and insecurity - possibly disrupting overall foreign relations like during thedecade following their 1979 border war. Therefore, since the normalization of ties in 1991,
Vietnam has adopted a dual strategic position towards China: on the one hand, it sees China as
an indispensable economic and security partner; on the other hand, it seeks to hedge against
possible territorial encroachment by building up its naval forces and cautiously forging strategic
ties with other powers.
In this light, it can be argued that the extent to which Hanoi may further enhance its security anddefense cooperation with Washington and Tokyo largely depends on two factors: the dynamics
in the US-China-Japan triangular and the degree of assertiveness China would exercise in theSouth China Sea. Until early 2014, Hanoi has been walking the tight robe carefully in its
strategic collaborations with the US and Japan ‘so that it can be seen as acting independently
while keeping options open with China.’95 Renewed clashes with China over the deployment ofChinese oil rig into Vietnam’s EEZ since May 2014, however, have made it difficult for Hanoi tosustain this strategic ambivalence. For the first time since 1991, Hanoi is now ruling out the‘bandwagoning’ option in its China policy. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, after what he sees
as a blatant violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty and legitimate interests, clearly stated that
‘Vietnam never barters sovereignty for an unrealizable or conditional peace and friendship.’96
Several of Vietnam’s strategic partners and like-minded friends such as the US, Japan, thePhilippines, India, and Australia have joined Hanoi’s ‘coalition of the willing’ in denouncing
China’s growing unilateralism and aggressiveness. Hanoi has engaged in regular consultations
94

This policy is outlined in Vietnam’s National Defense Whitepaper 2009.
Asia Times Online, May 12, 2012 “Vietnam floats between China and US”
96
Voice of Vietnam, May 23, 2014, “PM: Vietnam never barters sovereignty for an unrealizable friendship”,
accessed June 1, 2014.
95

28

with Washington on how to react to the crisis and is now openly expressing its support forJapan’s ‘proactive pacifism’ in Asia. Clearly, while Hanoi will not change its non-alignment
policy to enter a military bloc any time soon, the ‘balancing’ dimension in Hanoi’s China policy
will become more evident if Beijing persists to push Hanoi into a corner.97
In short, Vietnam and Japan’s common strategic concerns – both being proximate to China,
fearful of its rise, involved in territorial disputes, and maintaining good relations with the US –have been and will be the underlying factor to boost their security and defense ties at the bilateraland multilateral levels. However, their different views and positions vis-à-vis China and the US
may put a ceiling on the extent of strategic cooperation. With the U.S. and Japan’s support,
Vietnam can now gain a more favourable strategic position to deal with its giant neighbour.
Hanoi however, will not go as far as to ally with Washington and Tokyo to openly counterbalance Beijing in the near future. As China’s neighbours, Vietnam and Japan also share acommon interest in economic interdependence and peaceful co-existence with China. From theVietnamese perspective, ‘to have peace, stability and security in the region, it is very importantfor [them] to have good relations with China so that [they] can enjoy mutual benefit.’98 That,
however, should not be a ‘conditional peace and friendship’ through coercion and use of force.
From the Japanese perspective, ‘both Japan and Vietnam hope that the rise of China will bepeaceful. More precisely, Japan and Vietnam have no wish to live under a ‘Pax Sinica.’ Dealing
with the rise of China should not be limited to one approach. Engagement has been, and will be,
the basic policy to ensure peace and prosperity in the region. It must be noted, however, thatbalancing is a key to successful engagement. Japan and Vietnam should cooperate in this regard
as well.99

Diagram: Vietnam and Japan’s common concerns and strategic options vis-à-vis US and China(Source: author’s own)
97

For more information on how the oil rig incident changed Vietnam’s strategic thinking, see my commentary on
the East Asia Forum (June 4, 2014) titled “Vietnam’s strategic outlook after Haiyang 981”, available at
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/06/04/vietnams-strategic-outlook-after-haiyang-981/
98South China Morning Post, “Hanoi plays up Beijing ties ahead of Panetta visit”, 03 June, 2012.
99
Takayuki Ogasawara, “The Prospects for a Strategic Partnership between Japan and Vietnam, AJISS-Commentary,(No.124, June 16, 2011), The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies.

29Vietnam-Japan Strategic Partnership in ASEAN driven regionalism
Abe’s New Diplomacy toward ASEAN
Japan’s relations with Southeast Asia have continuously developed ever since Tokyo re-engaged
the region in the late 1970s. Its regional policy over the years, however, has not gone far beyond
the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine in which Japan pledged that it would never become a military power,
would build up a relationship of mutual confidence and trust with Southeast Asian countries inwide-ranging fields, and would cooperate positively with ASEAN and its member countries intheir own efforts as an equal partner. Although many subsequent Japanese governments haveissued ‘a doctrine’ on Japan-ASEAN relations, these policies often emphasize the significance ofeconomic cooperation and the three principles of the Fukuda Doctrine.100 Memories of Japan’s
military past, its constitutional restraints and frequent change in leadership also contribute toJapan’s low-profile disposition beyond the sphere of economic cooperation in Southeast Asia.
However, in recent years, there have been some remarkable changes in Japan’s Southeast Asia
policy. Since the Koizumi years, Japan has focused on cooperation with ASEAN in nontraditional security issues. In the face of competition with China, Japan’s promotion of humansecurity and non-traditional security is seen as ‘Japan’s desire to remain relevant and influential’in the region.101 There have been calls for Japan to play a more active role from within the region.
Rizal Sukma, Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta,
for example, has recently urged Japan to go beyond the traditional areas of economic cooperation‘to play a more strategic, political and security role, especially in soft security issues such as
disaster management, peacekeeping and peace-building.’102
Particularly during the second term of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan has promoted a ‘valuebased diplomacy’ and ‘proactive pacifism’ approach which is often hailed as ‘Abe’s New
Diplomacy’ if not an ‘Abe Doctrine’ toward ASEAN. Abe’s New Diplomacy asserts that
relations with ASEAN form ‘a supremely vital linchpin’ for Japan’s diplomatic strategy.103 His
message is simple and straightforward: Japan, while maintaining the Japan-US alliance as thecornerstone of its foreign policy, will also place importance on ASEAN as the hub for regional
cooperation; supporting the association’s unity and working together with its member countries
in building a twenty-first-century order for East Asia and the Asia-Pacific. 104 ‘Abe’s New
Diplomacy’ highlights, among other things, the common concerns and interests of Japan and
ASEAN in the rule of law and freedom of navigation on the seas, enhanced economic networks
and exchanges, and expansion of democracy and human rights. Abe himself clarifies, ‘we hope
to deepen and enhance cooperation, as ASEAN countries are Japan’s partners that share basic
values and strategic interests’.105 Abe’s New Diplomacy is actually promoting something called
100

Tomotaka Shoji, “China’s Rise and Japan’s Changing Approach toward Southeast Asia: Constraints andPossibilities” in Lam Peng Er and Victor Teo (eds), Southeast Asia between China and Japan, (Cambridge Scholars
Publishing, 2012) p. 64.
101
Ibid, p. 74.
102
Japan Times, “ASEAN jittery over major power rivalry in Asia”, December 12, 2012.
103
PM Abe affirmed this point at the joint press conference after a meeting with Indonesia’s President Susilo
Bambang in Jakarta during his first trip to Southeast Asia in January 2013.
104
Shiraishi Takashi, “Abe’s Visit to Southeast Asia and Japan’s Five New Diplomatic Principles”, available
http://www.nippon.com/en/editor/f00016/, accessed April 8, 2014.
105
Kyodo, “Japan, ASEAN discuss Japanese exports to combat disasters, terrorism”, February 18th, 2014.

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the 'Arc of Freedom and Prosperity,' based on common values. This concept has been advocatedby Taro Aso from the time he served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first Abe cabinet(2006-2007) and later under the his Premiership (2008–2009). However during these periods, theinitiative was labeled as a blatant move to encircle China, and it never really got off theground.106 Abe is currently reviving the idea with aims to promote ties with ASEAN to revitalize
the Japanese lagging economy and turn Japan from a passive to proactive political player tocontribute to shaping a favourable security environment in the region amid the China challenge.
Against this background, it is important to ask: How do ASEAN countries see this new role ofJapan? And how does the Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership fit into this new level ofcooperation between Japan and ASEAN?
Japan-Vietnam strategic partnership as an integral part of Japan-ASEAN relations
Arguably, Japan’s new diplomacy toward Southeast Asia under Abe has been welcome in
ASEAN for several political, economical, and security reasons which will be analyzed hereunder.
In this context, Vietnam, as an active ASEAN member that has good relations with Japan, is themost welcoming, facilitating, and benefiting country from an enhanced role of Japan in ASEANdriven regionalism. The Vietnam-Japan strategic partnership, therefore, should also be seen as anintegral part of Japan-ASEAN relations.
Politically, ASEAN is employing a diplomatic strategy of ‘omni-enmeshment’ and ‘complex
balancing’ toward big powers as argued by Evelyn Goh. ASEAN, a group of small and mediumsized nations, does not want a single power to dominate the region, particularly its importantwaterways. Of its relations with big powers, ASEAN has a dual fear. On the one hand, it does
not want relations among big powers to be too bad (e.g. a US-China or Japan-China naval
conflict) because ‘when the elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers’. On the other hand, it does
not want their relations to be too good (e.g. a G2 between the US and China) as they may collude
against ASEAN countries’ interests. The current complicated competition and rivalry among the
big powers have resulted in numerous ‘charm offensives’ toward ASEAN by the US, China,
Japan, Korea, India etc. In this context, ASEAN members have chosen a hedging strategy by not‘picking sides or excluding certain great powers, but rather by trying to include all the various
major powers in the region’s strategic affairs… so as to deepen interdependence and to deepen
their sense of having a stake in the region’s security, so that they would be more interested inhelping to maintain regional stability, mainly through political and diplomatic means.’107 Towardthat end, ASEAN seeks to involve as many big powers as possible through bilateralarrangements and ASEAN-led security cooperation mechanisms such as EAS, APT, ARF,
ADMM+ and other numerous multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements. The aim of this‘omni-enmeshment’ and ‘balance of influence’ strategy is to create overlapping spheres ofinfluence in the region which are ‘competitive but positive-sum’.108

106“Behind the New Abe Diplomacy: An Interview with Cabinet Advisor Yachi Shotaro (Part One)”,http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00089/, accessed February 5th, 2014.
107
Evelyn Goh, Great Powers and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies: Omni-enmeshment, balancing, andhiarchiacal order, (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, July 2007), p. 5. See also Evelyn Goh,
“Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia”, op. cit., p. 121.
108
Ibid.

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In this context, Evelyn Goh argues that Japan matters in the evolving regional order in at least
three dimensions: continuing US alliance and preponderance, socializing China, and developing
regionalism.109 While the notion of Japan’s role in strengthening US commitment in the region
and in developing ASEAN regionalism is clear, the ‘socializing China’ dimension is less so.
Instead, since 2010 when Sino-Japanese relations quickly deteriorated over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
issue and China increases its assertiveness in South China Sea disputes, many Southeast Asian
countries increasingly saw Japan as a potential counterweight in the face of a rising China.
Besides, ASEAN countries have been appreciative of Japan’s support of the structuring of theASEAN community and re-affirming ASEAN centrality in the regional architecture. Japanjoined the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 2004 and was one of
the first two countries that established a strategic partnership with ASEAN as a bloc. Thus far
Japan has actively participated in ASEAN’s regional cooperation mechanisms and madeimportant contributions. ASEAN’s welcoming of Japan as a political player in the region has
been manifested throughout the year 2013, particularly as the Summit commemorated ASEANJapan’s 40 years of relationship in Tokyo in December. One noticeable outcome of the summit
was that leaders of Japan and ASEAN agreed to adopt a Vision Statement on ASEAN-Japan
Friendship and Co-operation and a Plan of Action to implement the Vision Statement in order toencourage the ASEAN-Japan strategic partnership to continue developing in the coming decades.
At the Summit, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung affirmed Vietnam’s consistentpolicy of attaching great importance to the ASEAN-Japan strategic partnership, and suggested
that Japan and ASEAN continue to strengthen and deepen their relations while co-operating tosolve common issues in the region and around the world.110
Economically, ASEAN countries are now benefiting from a new wave of Japanese investment.
Japanese investors, given their concerns over the rising cost of production in China as well as thedeteriorated ties between Tokyo and Beijing, increasingly see ASEAN as a strategic area forinvestment. A December 2012 poll published in the Nikkei Shimbun found that 85 percent ofJapanese companies named Southeast Asia a priority destination for investment, while only 40
percent said the same of China. Meanwhile, Japanese investment in Southeast Asia has grownnearly twice as fast as in China. Southeast Asia also represents ‘an emerging production corridor
and a major potential market where Japan enjoys great popularity.’ 111 Economic cooperation
between ASEAN and Japan has witnessed robust developments in the recent years and Japan is
now one of ASEAN’s first ranking economic partners. At the 2013 Summit, ASEAN and Japan
completed negotiations on two charters on trade, services and investment under the ASEANJapan Economic Partnership Agreement, and agreed to co-ordinate closely to enhancenegotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in East Asia. Japanis also one of the leading ODA suppliers to ASEAN. Tokyo has pledged to continue supporting
ASEAN to build the ASEAN Community by 2015 and to improve regional connectivity throughthe Mekong-Japan mechanism. At the 2013 Japan-ASEAN Summit, Prime Minister Shinzo Abeannounced the five-year funding of JPY2 trillion (US$20 billion) to ASEAN connectivity
projects and efforts to narrow the development gap between the ten ASEAN member states.
109

Evelyn Goh, “How Japan matters in the evolving East Asian security order”, International Affairs, (Vol. 87, Issue
4, July 2011), pp. 887–902.
110
Nhan Dan, “Contributing to deepening the sound strategic partnership with Japan”, December 16, 2013.
111
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Abe Steps into Southeast Asia’s Spotlight: Japan
Reengages ASEAN”, January 18, 2013.

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Japan will also provide an additional US$100 million to the ASEAN – Japan Integration Fund,and US$3 billion for ASEAN to improve its managerial capacity and natural disaster response.112
In its assistance and investment policy in ASEAN, Japan places strategic importance on thedevelopment of the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) through the East West Economic
Corridor and the Southern Corridor. Much of the money from Tokyo’s 2012 pledge of ¥660
billion financial assistance, in the form of grants and loans, to ASEAN members’ infrastructure
projects will go toward investment projects under the GMS regional cooperation to improve
distribution networks between India and Japan with the construction of roads and ports. The idea
is to link Ho Chi Minh City in southern Vietnam with Phnom Penh in Cambodia and Bangkok in
Thailand, and end up at the Dawei Seaport in Myanmar, which faces the Indian Ocean. If thesemaritime routes can be established, it would lessen Japan’s reliance on the Malacca Straits, amajor maritime transport base that is rife with piracy. New routes would heighten safety as well
as decrease the time and cost of shipping.113 As a country located at the heart of the Mekong
Delta Region and a link between continental and maritime Southeast Asia, Vietnam plays animportant role in the construction of this route in particular and in the development of the
Mekong Sub-region in general. Therefore, among the 57 ODA projects that Japan has pledged toinvest in the Mekong region, 26 are located in Vietnam, including very important infrastructure
projects such as Lach Huyen Port, Terminal 2 Noi Bai International Airport, Long ThanhInternational Airport, Cai Mep – Thi Vai Port, Hoa Lac High Tech Zone, and metropolitan
railways in Hanoi and Hochiminh city etc.114 Japan is now looking to expand the supporting
model for Vietnam to the rest of the Mekong region with intensive investments ininfrastructure
projects in Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. For its part, Vietnam proposed at the 2013 MekongJapan Summit Meeting that Mekong countries and Japan continue to uphold their commitments
and the implementation of agreements on environmental protection, sustainable management anduse of the Mekong river, regional connectivity, socio-economic development co-operation,
health care, climate change, natural disaster response, food and energy security and more.115 The
Vietnam-Japan Strategic Partnership, therefore, plays a significant role in the development of the
Mekong-sub region, thus contributing to enhancing regional connectivity and narrowing theintra-regional development gaps toward building the ASEAN Community in 2015.
Strategically, ASEAN and Japan share many common concerns over maritime security, freedomof navigation and aviation, peaceful settlement of territorial disputes etc. In the recent years,
maritime security and non-traditional security issues are high on Japan-ASEAN’s agenda of
security and defense cooperation. Japan has pledged to work actively and responsibly within theframework of cooperation mechanisms, particularly the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and theASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM+). From 2008 to 2011, Tokyo has co-chaired
the ARF 32 Intercessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM-MS). The focus of the ISM-MS
is rather low key - information sharing, capacity building, and training - and still largely
concentrates on piracy. 116 Among these frameworks, Japan has high expectations for the112

Nhan Dan, “Contributing to deepening the sound strategic partnership with Japan”, December 16, 2013.
The Asahi Shimbun, “Japan pushing 'southern corridor' linking Vietnam and Myanmar”, November 19, 2011.
114
Voice of Vietnam, “Việt Nam-Nhật Bản: Đối tác chiến lược tin cậy, bền vững”, December 12, 2013
115
Nhan Dan, “Contributing to deepening the sound strategic partnership with Japan”, December 16, 2013.
116
Céline Pajon, op. cit., p. 16
113

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ADMM+ forum which Vietnam initiated during its 2010 ASEAN Chairmanship. 117 Thismechanism was hoped to serve as an effective platform for consultation, building confidence,and finding areas of practical cooperation in the defense sector. At the Inaugural ADMM+ in
Hanoi, the Defence Ministers agreed on five areas of practical cooperation to pursue under thisnew mechanism: namely maritime security; counter-terrorism; disaster management;
peacekeeping operations; and military medicine. The ADMM+ has one Experts Working Groupdevoted to maritime security which meets twice a year since July 2011. It has focused so far on
capacity building and information sharing regarding anti-piracy and the protection of sea-lanes ofcommunication (SLOCs), among other themes. 118 Vietnam and Japan have also closely
coordinated within the framework of ASEAN-Japan security cooperation. At the fourth deputyministerial level ASEAN-Japan defence cooperation conference in Tokyo on March 13th 2013,
Vietnamese Deputy Defence Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh expressed his hope that ASEAN
members and Japan will enhance links to ensure maritime security and compliance withinternational law. Vinh said countries should adopt a proper awareness of regional security,especially through the interpretation and application of the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and standardised behaviour to international law in an open andtransparent manner, to ensure maritime security and safety as well as peace in the region.119 Most
recently, Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang has hailed Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s
initiative on consultations with ASEAN countries to hold informal meetings between Japan and
ASEAN involving ministers in charge of defense matters to discuss non-traditional security
issues including disaster prevention. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in return welcomed the fact that
Vietnam is positively considering the possibility of convening the third Expanded ASEAN
Maritime Forum this year, and stated that the two sides should cooperate toward the success ofthe Forum.120
In the face of increased regional tensions due to territorial disputes, ASEAN and Japaneseleaders affirmed during their 2013 Summit Meeting that maritime peace, stability and prosperity
are in the common interest of the region and the world, and stressed the importance of ensuring
maritime security, safety and freedom, as well as achieving the resolution of disputes by peacefulmeans in accordance with international laws. They also welcomed official consultations between
ASEAN and China on the Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea. Given the importanceof the South China Sea as a transport route for 80% of Japanese oil and other transported goods
and pending such a legally binding framework between ASEAN and China, Japan is currently
seeking to support ASEAN countries in strengthening their Coast Guards and their capacity
building skills. This includes the provision of patrol boats to the Philippines, Indonesia, andVietnam. Japan also assists ASEAN countries in building national defense and militarycapability to handle non-traditional security issues due to climate change and other emerging
issues, such as hi-tech crime and cyber security. Japanese government is also seeking to promote
direct arms exports to support the defense infrastructure of ASEAN countries. In December 2011,
Tokyo decided to ease the restrictions imposed under its Three Principles on Arms Exports.
While maintaining the basic philosophy of restraining exports, overseas transfers of defense
117

The first ADMM+ meeting in Hanoi in 2010 was ADMM+8, namely Australia, China, India, Japan, Republic ofKorea, New Zealand, Russia, and the US.
118
ASEAN website, accessed March 10th 2014.
119
Vietnam Plus, “Vietnam wants stronger ASEAN-Japan defence tie”, March 13, 2013.
120
Vietnam Plus, “Vietnam, Japan lift bilateral relations to new height”, March 18, 2014.

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equipment are now allowed in cases that contribute to peace and advancement of international
cooperation.121 In this context, Japan invited senior defense officials from ASEAN countries to ameeting in Okinawa on February 18th 2014 to discuss the joint development of equipment tocombat natural disasters and terror. On this occasion, Japan showcased its post-disaster technicalsupport in infrastructure-building and the introduced Japanese defense equipment, such as
infrared radars and unmanned robots to clear explosives.122 As the Chinese approach to ASEAN
in the South China Sea dispute is ‘the soft are seized, the hard are released’ (欺软怕硬), given
the power asymmetry between China and ASEAN, enhancing ASEAN’s defense capacity by the‘strategic use of ODA’ and relaxation of arms export restrictions by Japan has a strategic
importance to ASEAN maritime security. From the Japanese perspective, ‘ASEAN’s own
strength and resilience against China’s growing maritime pressure is an important vanguard fordenying China’s creeping expansion to the contested territorial waters. Such resilience would
also sustain the status-quo that creates better conditions for ASEAN’s diplomatic negotiations
vis-à-vis Beijing.’123
ASEAN is clearly becoming more and more receptive to Japan’s security initiatives. JapanASEAN cooperation in strategic terms, however, is also facing a number of restraining factors
such as ASEAN disunity in South China Sea disputes, different views vis-à-vis China and Japanamong its members, and a lingering fear of Japan’s re-militarization. Despite many diplomaticefforts, ASEAN has so far failed to adopt a common approach in dealing with China in the South
China Sea, as can clearly be seen during Cambodia’s 2012 ASEAN Chairmanship. The prospectof a Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China remains distant despite ASEAN’s efforts tohold a round of consultations with Beijing last September. Amid heightened tensions between
Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and historical issues, ASEAN countries arealso trying to forge balanced relations between the two powers. As ASEAN is striving toward
establishing the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015, it needs to build up its relations with
China - the bloc’s largest trading partner. ASEAN will therefore need to calibrate its ties withJapan carefully to avoid overtly provoking China. Moreover, Prime Minister Abe’s New
Diplomacy vision of embedding human rights and liberal values in Japan’s ASEAN policy could
present challenges for Japanese engagement in Southeast Asia. Only half of the ASEAN
countries are democracies and all struggle with human rights to some extent. If Japan upholds
these values very strongly, it could ‘alienate potential economic partners.’ 124 ASEAN also
expresses different reactions about Japan’s attempts to become a ‘normal country’. For example,
the Philippines is the most vocal in supporting the rearming of Japan and its revision of its
pacifist constitution as a way for Japan to become a potential ‘significant balancing factor’ toChina.125 Vietnam, as aforementioned, also wishes for Japan’s enhanced strategic role in theregion and stronger ASEAN-Japan defence ties. Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, and Malaysia,
however, are hesitant to antagonize Beijing due to their growing economic and political ties.
Meanwhile, the positions of other important ASEAN members like Indonesia and Singapore are
121

Ken Jimbo, “Japan Should Build ASEAN's Security Capacity”, (AJISS-Comentary, No. 150, May 30, 2012).
The Japan Times, “Japan, ASEAN reach disaster, terror deal”, February 19, 2014.
123
Ken Jimbo, op. cit.
124
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Abe Steps into Southeast Asia’s Spotlight: Japan
Reengages ASEAN”, January 18, 2013.
125
Financial Times, “Philippines backs rearming of Japan”, December 9, 2012. See also Céline Pajon, op. cit., p. 34.
12235

more prudent. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono welcomed Japan's efforts tofortify regional security but urged transparency in Tokyo's efforts to raise its military profile.126
Similarly, Singapore’s Foreign Minister said weeks after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to
Yasukuni Shrine that he understands the need for Japan to strengthen the military given
mounting concerns over its own security but urges that Japan must ‘do more’ to assure neighborsof its intentions as it builds a stronger military. 127 Understandably, much of Southeast Asia
suffered under Japanese occupation in World War II and its leaders have been wary of potential
Japanese militarism resurgence.
In order to allay all these skepticism and win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of ASEAN people,
Japan in the coming time should continue promoting its public diplomacy and soft power, as it
has successfully employed in the case of Vietnam. After all, post-war Japan has followed its
pacifist trajectory and has played a significant role in facilitating the economic take-off of many‘dragon’ and ‘tiger’ economies in the region, including China itself. ASEAN countries and its
people also value Japan’s contribution in helping build the ASEAN community, fostering
regional integration, narrowing development gaps, backing sustainable development in the
Mekong sub-region and responding to regional challenges e.g. natural disasters. Particularly thefact that Japan acts as a ‘China contrast’ has improved the country’s image and prestige inSoutheast Asia recently. One of the big diplomatic wins for Japan against China was Japan’s
quick reaction and generous support to Typhoon Haiyan, which ravaged the Philippines in earlyNovember of 2013. While Beijing ‘looked miserly and disingenuous’ in its response, Tokyo‘reacted with vigour and purpose’, pledging more $50 million in assistance and deploying 1000
members.128 PM Abe also scored points with the region by highlighting in his recent Shangri-La
keynote speech, Japan’s commitment to valuing the rule of law and preventing the change ofstatus quo by force and coercion in the context of a series of China’s recent unilateral andaggressive actions against Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines recently.129 Hanoi, stuck in its
current stand-off with China over the oil rig incident, has expressed its appreciation for Japan’s
pledge to give its utmost support for Vietnam in its territorial dispute with China, and is now
openly advocating Japan’s proactive pacifism in Asia. Meanwhile, Singapore Prime Minister Lee
Hsien Long also welcomes Japan's desire to contribute to peace and security in the region, within
the framework of its security pact with the United States.130 Undoubtedly, Japan’s consistent
support to ASEAN in addressing emerging security issues and preserving regional order will
help consolidate Japan’s foothold and soft power in the region.

Conclusion
The Vietnam-Japan relationship is that of two mutually complementing economies and strategic
partners of many common interests. It serves as the solid foundation for any further enhancementof their ties. In March 18, 2014, a new page has been turned in their bilateral relations - during
126

AP, “Japan pledges $19 billion in aid to ASEAN region”, December 14, 2013.
Japan Times, “Do more to assure region, Singapore tells Japan”, January 13, 2014.
128
The Diplomat, “Japan Doubles Down on ASEAN”, December 23, 2013.
129
The 13th IISS Asian Security Summit -The Shangri-La Dialogue-Keynote Address by Shinzo ABE, Prime
Minister, Japan; available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page4e_000086.html, accessed June 5, 2014.
130
The Strait Times, “Japan's desire to boost peace welcomed by Singapore”, June 1, 2014.
127

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the state visit of Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang to Japan, the two countries agreed toelevate their ties to a new height – an Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in
Asia. President Sang and PM Abe state that this new level of cooperation reflects political trust
as well as deep and extensive development of the bilateral relations in all areas, which is in thefundamental and long-term interests of the two countries’ peoples, meeting their expectation tocontribute to the peace, stability, cooperation, and development of the region and the world.
Speaking at the event, President Sang said: ‘We agree to elevate the two countries’ relations. The
new cooperative framework has reflected the strong and extensive growth in the VietnameseJapanese strategic partnership and set out major orientations for our relations in the future.’131
During the informal talks, they promised to be ‘all-weather friends’ – a manifestation of
profound trust and confidence among the two peoples.
Given their shared common interests and the solid foundation of high political trust and the deep
empathy among the two peoples they have cultivated, it can be said that now is the best time in
the history of Vietnam-Japan bilateral relations with no major hindrances for furthering the ties
at the bilateral level. The fruit of this enhanced strategic partnership between Vietnam and Japanis not only limited to the two countries’ benefits but will also have significant impact on the
promotion of regional cooperation, particularly through ASEAN-driven regionalism. The
strategic partnership also bears significance in strategic terms with Japan’s (and U.S.) support tostrengthen Vietnam’s and ASEAN’s resilience amid the uncertainty of China’s intentions interritorial disputes. The ‘China factor’ in this light has been and will be exerting a push-and-pull
effect on the bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Vietnam/ASEAN and Japan/UnitedStates. Given Vietnam’s (and ASEAN’s) complex interactions with China and theirunwillingness to choose sides, as well as Japan’s domestic restraints, it is best for Japan (and US)
to exercise ‘indirect balancing’ by giving a number of potential middle powers in ASEAN,
especially Vietnam, the chance to strengthen their own capabilities. As the former US Secretaryof Defense Leon Panetta said during his visit to Vietnam in 2012: ‘It is in the interest of stability
to have a strong Vietnam, a strong Indonesia, a strong Philippines, a strong Singapore and strong
nations throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Frankly, the most destabilizing situation would be if
we had a group of weak nations and only the United States and China were major powers in thisregion. So the key to future stability, to future prosperity, to the future in which all of our people
can enjoy a better life - the key to that is ensuring that all nations develop their capability,
develop their economy, develop their trade and develop the kind of relationship that will bringthese nations together, not apart...’132 Hence, the security and geostrategic dimension overlaps
with economic and political dimensions in Japan’s strategic partnerships with Vietnam and
ASEAN. In this context, Vietnam has strongly expressed its hopes that Japan would continue
making active and constructive contributions to peace, stability and prosperity in the region andthe world. Other countries in ASEAN are likely to welcome Japan as a political player and astrategic actor, as long as Japan itself does not force them to take sides or arouse fear with its remilitarism.
During his visit to the United States in 2012, China’s then Vice President Xi Jinping was quoted
saying, ‘The vast Pacific Ocean has enough room to accommodate both the United States and131

Voice of Vietnam, “Enhancing Vietnamese-Japanese comprehensive strategic cooperation”, March 21, 2014.
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Press Briefing with Secretary Panetta and Vietnamese Minister of Defense
Gen. Phung Quang Thanh from Hanoi, Vietnam, June 04, 2012.
132

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China.’133 In response, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was quoted saying ‘I think,after all, the Pacific is big enough for all of us’.134 Without a doubt, the US-China geopolitics isthe most important strategic relationship in East Asia. This does not deny, however, the necessityand possibility for other regional players like Japan, ASEAN, and Vietnam to contribute toshaping a favourable environment for their own security and economic interests. In this context,
Japan and Vietnam/ASEAN share a common interest in ensuring that the changing strategicbalance in East Asia will not become detrimental to the stability, security, and prosperity of theregion, and that any unilateral attempts to change the status quo with coercion and force should
be discouraged. In this light, enhanced strategic partnerships between Japan and
Vietnam/ASEAN - the legitimate stakeholders in maintaining regional peace and security - will
help shape a balanced multipolar regional order that is not solely dependent on the ambivalent
dynamics of US-China geopolitics.

133
134

The Washington Post, “Views from China’s Vice President”, February 13, 2012
NBC News, “'Big enough for all of us': Clinton says US can work with China in Pacific”, September 1, 2012.

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