New Governments, Renewed Purpose
The 19th Japan-US Security Seminar

A Conference Report
Brad Glosserman
Rapporteur
Jointly sponsored by
The Consulate General of Japan in San Francisco
The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
and the Pacific Forum CSIS

Co-hosted by
Yoshiji Nogami and Ralph A. Cossa

Issues & Insights
Vol. 13-No. 11
J.W. Marriot Hotel
San Francisco, CA, USA
March 2013

Japan Institute of International Affairs
The Japan Institute of International Affairs (www.jiia.or.jp) is a private, non-profit
research institution specializing in international affairs. Based in Tokyo and founded in
1959, it conducts research and fosters international exchanges designed to help formulate
Japan’s foreign policies. JIIA helped found and serves as the secretariat for the Pacific
Economic Cooperation Council’s Japan National Committee. It publishes a variety of
periodicals and books in Japanese and English, and convenes a number of annual symposia
with research institutes throughout the world.

Pacific Forum CSIS
Based in Honolulu, Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org/) operates as theautonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington, DC. The Forum’s programs encompass current and emerging political,
security, economic business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue
undertaken with the region’s leaders in the academic, government, and corporate areas.
Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from aroundthe Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings andrecommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout
the region.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements …………………………………………………………………… iv
Foreword
By Yoshiji Nogami and Ralph A. Cossa ……………….………………………….

v

Executive Summary…..…………………………………………..……………….….. vii
Conference Summary
Brad Glosserman, Rapporteur ………….…………………………………………..
Appendix A: Agenda
Appendix B: Participant Listiii

1

Acknowledgements
The Pacific Forum CSIS wishes to thank the Japan-US Security Treaty Division in
the North American Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Consulate
General of Japan in San Francisco, and The Japan Institute of International Affairs for theirsupport and guidance in this project. Particular thanks go to the Sasakawa Peace
Foundation for their support of the Young Leaders Program. Additionally, we are gratefulto the many security specialists, in and out of government, both in Japan and the UnitedStates, who took time out of their busy schedules to join us in San Francisco to discuss anddevelop recommendations for improving the vital Japan-US security relationship.
The views expressed here do not necessarily represent the views of the US or
Japanese governments, the co-sponsoring institutes, or the group of workshop participants
as a whole.

iv

Foreword
The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and the Pacific Forum CSIS werepleased and honored to again co-host the 19th annual Japan-US Security Seminar on
March 15-16, 2013. Our chief task this year was properly assessing the regional security
environment as North Korea ramped up its provocative behavior and bellicose rhetoric andChina increasingly asserted itself in regional affairs, regardless of the unease that thoseactions created among neighbors and other concerned parties. We struggled to understandthe motivations of those governments and others; without a proper appreciation of theirthinking, it will be difficult if not impossible to fashion policies that will safeguard
regional peace and security.
Designing and implementing appropriate polices has been complicated by domestic
politics in each country. Japan went through a change of government with the LDP’slandslide victory in the December parliamentary elections, and the new administration inTokyo had little time to find its feet; fortunately, its long experience in power facilitated
the transition. Now, the world is watching to see if Prime Minister Abe and his new teamcan revive the economy and provide the political stability that are the prerequisites to astrong and confident Japan. Meanwhile, President Obama has won a second term in the
White House. That victory promises policy continuity, but a large turnover among political
appointees in the foreign policy and security bureaucracies means that there will bequestions about implementation and priorities. As always, personal relationships will play
an important role in alliance management.
Fortunately, support for the alliance is strong in both countries. The impact ofOperation Tomodachi continues to reverberate, reminding both publics of the importanceof their partnership. There are many opportunities for the two countries to cooperate acrossa range of issues and both governments appear eager to seize those moments as they arise.
Of course, obstacles remain but the prospects for the alliance appear brighter than they
have for many years. Indeed, one of the key purposes of this meeting is to look ahead andto try to chart a course for success.
We are grateful to all the participants and especially keynote speaker Ambassador
Thomas Schieffer for taking time from their busy schedules to join us and share theirthoughts. Their commitment, insights, and ideas for the future of the alliance made thisconference a success. We would also like to thank Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
The Japanese Consulate in San Francisco for their generous support for this project.

Yoshiji Nogami
President
Japan Institute of International Affairs

Ralph A. Cossa
President
Pacific Forum CSISv

vi

Executive Summary
The Japan-US alliance confronts a challenging security landscape. North Korea
continues to develop missile and nuclear capabilities, China is flexing its muscles, andeven if Beijing doesn’t court a confrontation with other nations, the possibility of an
accident, miscalculation, or mistake makes that prospect real. Russia too seeks to extend its
power and influence, and ongoing economic modernization throughout Asia sharpens thecompetition for resources in the region. Bitter partisanship and political gridlock in the US
and Japan’s reluctance to devote sufficient resources to its military overshadow thecontinuity in policies in both capitals and send worrying signals to allies and adversaries in
the region. Especially troubling is the friction between Japan and South Korea, twocountries that should be cooperating to meet shared challenges and concerns.
China poses particular problems for the alliance. There is no simple or single
explanation for China’s troubling behavior in recent years; Beijing’s policies reflect avariety of views and actors. There was agreement that China is an opportunistic country,
eager to right perceived historical grievances and expand its influence in the region.
China’s readiness to see containment whenever its ambitions are frustrated, an apparent
need to distract its populations from home grown ills, and its increasingly problematic
relationship with Japan – victory in World War II legitimates the CCP’s claim to rule
China – all make resolution of problems with China difficult. China is also probing theJapan-US alliance to test its resilience and to introduce insecurities. It is incumbent on bothsides to counter this strategy with a firm position that concedes nothing to China anddoesn’t reward Beijing’s misbehavior.
Foreign policy making is complicated by domestic politics in each country. The US
must counter the notions that it is not committed to its “rebalance” to Asia or that partisansquabbles in Washington will undermine its commitment to regional security. Meanwhile,
Japan needs to continue the economic reinvigoration process promised by Abenomics; thatwill be the foundation for its re-emergence in regional affairs. History issues remain
problematic and there is a risk of friction between the two countries because of divergent
views of their significance.
An important element of Asian regional dynamics is the divergent economic
performances of key players. The Chinese outlook is rosy with the overwhelming majorityof Chinese positively assessing their performance and prospects; less than a third ofAmericans have a similarly optimistic outlook, and the Japanese assessment is darker still.
This confidence (or lack thereof) has a powerful impact on perceptions and performance,
shaping outcomes. Abenomics is designed to help turn Japanese thinking around; thedecision to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership is considered a very encouraging sign, bothfor the economic potential and the indication of political leadership in Tokyo. It is
important for Japan and the US to see such deals as more than mere trade agreements; they
are strategic in nature and have a value that goes beyond the determination of tariff levels.
One potential wild card is the shale gas revolution. Exploitation of those resources has theability to transform economic and security relations, not only for the US but for Japan as
well.
vii

Policy coordination between Japan and the US will be more important than ever inthis evolving environment. There are concerns that the two countries have differing
priorities, especially when dealing with China. This is most manifest in the confrontation
over the Senkakus, which Americans see as important but Japanese consider “a touchstone
for the alliance.” There is some concern in Tokyo that the US will subordinate thisterritorial dispute to a broader set of issues that Washington has with Beijing. One way tominimize this fear is for Japan to strengthen its defense capabilities. At the same time, theUS must ensure that its policies are seen as ways to counter, but not contain, China.
There is a danger of divergent threat perceptions – or the perception of divergence.
It is important that the US recognize the emotional content of Japanese concerns: Japanese
territory is being threatened. Both countries must be better able to signal resolve, both toadversaries and to allies. This requires not only statements of purpose, but actual progressin the resolution of thorny issues that have hindered alliance modernization, such as
replacing Futenma Air Station. There should also be deeper discussions of roles, missions
and capabilities, as well as the inclusion of “new” domains such as cyber and space. Bothgovernments, singly and together, need to be thinking about contingencies that are 10-15
years ahead. Also, they should be explaining what their alliance is for, not just what it isagainst. Trilateral (Japan-US-South Korea) security cooperation is also necessary.
Ultimately, the US must better communicate its aims and ambitions in the region;
the rebalance is poorly understood, often because the US is explaining what the rebalance
isn’t, rather than what it is. Washington must also show greater sensitivity to Japaneseconcerns. That doesn’t mean that the US must defer to Tokyo on regional issues, but it
must not be – or seem to be – dismissive of its ally’s concerns.
For Japan, the new government must first restore confidence in Japanese leadershipamong the public and friends. That demands revitalizing the economy. Japan will also haveto increase defense spending and flesh out the bones of its “dynamic deterrence” policy.
The new government must show Americans, and Japan’s neighbors, that it understands
history and its implications.
Together, the two countries must articulate a shared vision of their partnership, of
which the Japan-US alliance is but a part. Once they have this vision, the two governments
can then redefine roles, missions, and capabilities that prepare them as nations and as analliance, to deal with an evolving security environment and over the horizon contingencies.
This will modernize their partnership and create opportunities for cooperation with third
parties. It will also shape the regional environment in ways that are congenial to our two
countries and present friends and allies with choices of our making, rather than leaving
them to the mercy of other nations.

viii

Conference Summary
Brad Glosserman, Rapporteur
Two simple messages dominated the 19th Japan-US Security Seminar. Americans
warned Japanese counterparts, “Don’t go there!” – don’t reopen history issues that would
antagonize neighbors and alienate supporters in the United States. Japanese countered witha bumper sticker of their own: “Be consistent” – reminding Americans that they must quiet
fears of inconsistency as Tokyo faces direct challenges from China and threats from North
Korea. All in all, it was a frank and candid discussion that probed some of the rawest
issues in the bilateral relationship, airing grievances and uncertainties. Yet, at its
conclusion, the 69 participants (52 senior Japanese and US attendees, along with 17 Pacific
Forum CSIS Young Leaders, all joining in their private capacities) had a better
understanding of each side’s concerns and confidence that the alliance had a solid
foundation to deal with the inevitable divergences. More importantly, we identified
important next steps for the two allies as they grapple with a changing security
environment and shifting political terrain in each capital.
‘A bleak situation’
For Yukio Okamoto (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), the security situationin East Asia is “bleak.” North Korea continues to develop missile and nuclear capabilities
and is trying to acquire the ability to threaten the US homeland. Russia too seeks to extend
its reach and influence, but President Vladimir Putin has thus far focused on the states ofthe former Soviet Union and his policies – despite the proclamation of a Russian “pivot”
toward Asia when he hosted the 2012 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders
Meeting – so far had little impact on the Far East. China has “limitless expansionary
ambitions,” aiming not only to rise but to reclaim what it has lost over the past two
centuries. Okamoto worries that Chinese aggression is not just the product of animus
toward Japan, but is also the natural outgrowth of a maritime strategy that aims forhegemony over the waters on both sides of the first island chain reaching towards thesecond island chain. Moreover, China’s rapid economic growth demands a national
strategy that includes not only military objectives but a desire to control resources
connected to those waters as well.
Okamoto acknowledged that actions in the US and Japan also contribute toheightened threat in the region. The “rebalance” to Asia is welcome, but absent realchanges in force structure, the policy remains more rhetoric than reality. The budget crisis
in Washington raises questions about the durability and dependability of the UScommitment to Japan’s defense (and Asia more generally). Japan, he said, is even more
culpable for the sense of threat. The US may be dealing with sequestration, but Japan has
swallowed de facto budget cuts for over a decade: the result, Okamoto argued, has been“systematic negligence of Japan’s defense structure.” But the problem isn’t just funding.
1Twenty years after the Persian Gulf War, Tokyo would answer as it did two decades earlier
if asked to contribute to that effort. Interpretations of the constitution would still force
Japan to sit on the sidelines. Politicians remain risk averse and bureaucrats (apart fromthose at the Security Seminar) continue to demonstrate a lack of imagination. For its part,the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have an overemphasis on safety. Finally, Japan’s failure topush through a solution to the Futenma issue “is an open invitation to China to be more
audacious.” Okamoto concluded that as long as that situation remains unresolved, theregion will not enjoy long-term stability.
Gordon Flake (Mansfield Foundation) highlighted an irony: there has been
considerable change in the region despite great continuity in regional politics. There werepolitical transitions in almost every country in Northeast Asia – President Obama faces a
new leadership in every country except in Mongolia – but in each case, the party mostinclined to stick to the status quo prevailed. And yet, like Okamoto, Flake sees a real
deterioration in the security environment.
He too blames the creeping modernization of North Korean missile and nuclear
capabilities and it’s over the top rhetoric. He is most worried about an accident or
miscalculation in Pyongyang that is driven by over confidence. Flake noted that South
Korean calculations have changed as well: no leader in Seoul can afford a less than robust
response. The danger of escalation following a North Korean provocation is real.
Meanwhile, relations between Tokyo and Seoul have deteriorated. While the primarysources of these difficulties are ROK domestic politics and the unique legacy issues ofPresident Park Gyun Hye, Prime Minister Abe doesn’t help when he reminds bothcountries of the close relationship between her father and his grandfather. Equallyworrisome is the chance of an accident, miscalculation, or mistake on the part of China.
Contributing to the sense of unease with China is escalating conflict in cyberspace. Finally,
Flake offered some thoughts about the Obama administration’s “rebalance.” He tried toplay down the hype, noting that there is considerable continuity in this policy as well.
Our discussion covered the landscape, or at least most of East Asia. While India
wasn’t mentioned in the prepared remarks, several participants applauded Delhi’s
increasing engagement with Japan and the US, and even within trilateral settings. Once
reluctant, India is now viewed as an active partner that is pushing ideas from trilateral
discussions. A Japanese participant noted that progress with India is easier when discussed
by militaries since there is less political interference in that setting.
The rest of the discussion teed up subsequent sessions as we exploreddevelopments on the Korean Peninsula and tried to parse motive forces behind the US
rebalance and the new Abe administration in Tokyo. All participants expressed concern
over the modernization of North Korea capabilities, while conceding that Pyongyang’s
bellicose rhetoric was more a reflection of weakness than strength. No one believed that2

North Korea could be convinced to give up its nuclear arsenal, especially after thecountry’s constitution was rewritten to include its status as a nuclear-armed state. Therewas general agreement that South Koreans have a more benign perspective toward China
than do Japanese or Americans. There was also a consensus that the new government inSeoul would be obliged to escalate when it responded to a North Korean provocation,
making crisis management more difficult.
As we tried to parse ROK thinking, consensus evaporated. Most Japanese wereinclined to attribute ROK ill will toward Japan to group think in Korea and a demand forpolitical correctness. One Japanese participant told the group that President Park could stop
the downward spiral in relations by halting the use of rhetoric about victims andvictimization. “If she stops, the rest of the country will stop.” Other Japanese participants
noted that their country has no monopoly on nationalism and complained about theunfairness of focusing on Japan when similar sentiments were visible elsewhere in theregion. Americans countered that notions of fairness have no place in discussions ofjustice. They argued that victimization of women is the core issue, and disputing numbersor legal responsibility misses the key point: this is a human rights issue, one thatcommands considerable support along the entire political spectrum in the US. Americans
cautioned Japanese counterparts that any argument that suggests a lack of sympathy forvictims is going to be a loser regardless of legal intricacies or historical norms. In acomment that reflected the sentiment of all Americans in the room, one US participant
argued that there is nothing Prime Minister Abe can do about the Kono Statement – otherthan affirm it – that will not make things worse.
Since Japan and South Korea make the same argument – it is up to the other side to
fix the problems that plague their bilateral relationship – US participants suggested that thetwo sides focus on goals that they share, such as Korean reunification under a democratic
government in Seoul, to demonstrate common interests and purpose. (One Japaneseparticipant reminded the group that for all their troubles, the two countries still haveworking relations and continue to press the limits of cooperation, even if they haven’t gone
as far as some would like.)
The topic that consumed the most time and energy was the US “rebalance” to Asia.
Japanese participants continued to question the significance of the policy, asking US
counterparts to focus more on what it is than what it is not. While Chinese officials andanalysts insist that the new policy is a renewed attempt to encircle or contain China, US
participants repeated the mantra that engaging China is one of the pillars of the rebalance.
The failure of Secretary of State John Kerry to mention the policy in his confirmation
hearings has fed a narrative that suggests the rebalance may not survive a second Obamaadministration; again, US participants pushed back, arguing that the foundations of therebalance were evident in the 2008 campaign, even if the policy hadn’t been labeled assuch. The driving force for the rebalance is the president and the White House, and the3policy itself will survive leadership changes at Foggy Bottom or the Pentagon. Bottom
line: the United States must do more to communicate the meaning, intent, and content of
the rebalance. Efforts to date haven’t quelled doubts about its purpose or answeredquestions about its implementation.
“Moving Forward Together: The Future of the US-Japan Alliance”
At the end of the first day, participants were honored to hear insights from former
US Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer during his evening keynote presentation. In his
remarks (available at http://csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_vol13no3.pdf),
Ambassador Schieffer provided his assessment of the state of the alliance and prospects forthe bilateral partnership with Prime Minister Abe and the LDP back at the helm. Schieffer
argued that Abe will provide the leadership that Japan has lacked for the last few years andwill strive to increase his country’s influence in the world. That means that Japan will join
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, that the country will change its interpretation of theconstitution to be a better ally and partner of the United States, and conclude thetransformation of the alliance that is needed to adapt it to 21st-century challenges. While
optimistic about the future, he cautioned the new government in Tokyo about revisiting
historical issues, particularly the “comfort women,” noting that “there is simply no supportof any kind for the position taken by some in Japan that that issue should be re-examined.”
Understanding China
We probed Chinese thinking more deeply in the second session. Brad Glosserman(Pacific Forum CSIS) noted that Chinese motivations are complex. No single factor
explains Beijing’s behavior. He identified several forces animating the Chinese leadership.
First, there is the leadership transition which reduces any inclination to compromise or doanything that might be construed as weak or insufficiently zealous in protection of national
interests. A second factor is a general sense of insecurity in China and a great sensitivity toslights real and imagined to national honor. That the Senkaku dispute involves Japan
makes it an especially touchy subject. Some of the blame for this sensitivity must be laidat the feet of the “Great Patriotic Reeducation Campaign,” which has embedded a
problematic view of Japan at the core of the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy. An
appalling misreading of Japanese politics and political dynamics has blinded Chinese
observers to the reality of what is going on in Japan and encouraged the worst
interpretations of Japanese intentions and developments. Political weakness in Japan also
encourages Beijing to take a harder line. Finally, Beijing is probing to see how tightly
coupled the US and Japan are. Beijing is testing US responses to challenges to its ally,suggesting that the US might not be a reliable partner and relying on it could be a mistake.
China doesn’t have a single strategy, speak with one voice, or act with one purpose
when it comes to foreign policy. There are many relevant actors, some of which have4

considerable independence. Nonetheless, outside observers see continuity in Chinese
foreign policy. Indeed, the sensitivity of policy toward Japan means that is likely to stay on
its current trajectory even at times of tension because changing course – which, after all,reflects the current ruling consensus – takes authority and responsibility. Absent a crisis,
there are few reasons to take risks and try something new.
Given the complexity of Chinese foreign policy, the US and Japan must manage
expectations when dealing with China. Many of the most important drivers are domestic
and the strategic calculations are proceeding according to an internal logic. Signaling isimportant and the most important message is resolve and consistency. We should makeclear our expectations – respect for the rule of law, peaceful resolution of disputes, nounilateral actions that upset the status quo – of all parties and criticize any who violatethem. The US and Japan should be doing things that make sense without reference toChina, even though they may at some point have an impact on, or be directed at, the PRC.
Many of those views were shared by Akio Takahara (Tokyo University), whocharacterized Chinese behavior as “worrying.” He noted that the Chinese have been
escalating incursions into Japanese waters surrounding the Senkaku islands. Fortunately,
the Japanese reaction has been calm and prudent. Still, there is a dangerous risk of
escalation.
Takahara is worried about anti-Japanese propaganda in China that bears no
relationship to the real Japan. He argued that Chinese interest in the islands was driven
partly by the need for oil and gas resources, and the dispute serves as a distraction from thecountry’s social problems. The belief that the correlation of forces has swung in China’sfavor since the 2008 “Lehman Shock” has contributed to Chinese belligerence, as has fearof encirclement as a result of the US rebalance. China is on “heightened alert” and is
attempting to head off any encroachment on its national interests, real or imagined.
There is a foreign policy debate in China, one that focuses on whether to continue
to honor Deng Xiaoping’s admonition that China keep a low profile and bide its time. Tied
to this debate are perceptions of Japan: is it an independent actor or a cat’s paw of theUnited States? Is Japan a weak and shrinking power or one that is on the brink of amilitarist resurgence? Views of Japan also influence the appropriate response to thepurchase of the Senkaku islands by the Tokyo central government. Takahara believes thehardliners have prevailed and this has had a profound impact on views of Japan within
China.
The best response, according to Takahara, is a resolute position that concedes
nothing to China and doesn’t reward Beijing’s misbehavior. The two governments should“agree to disagree” – acknowledge that there is a problem (although sovereignty is
indisputably Japanese) and work toward a long-term solution. During this process, Japan5

should reach out to moderates in China to try to support and empower them as the country
continues its internal debates.
Our discussion returned to US perceptions of China and how those perceptions
influenced US foreign policy. Japanese participants wondered to what degree Americans
generally – not just those in the room – saw China as a threat? And if so, what kind of
threat? Economic? A challenge to US supremacy? An actual physical threat to US national
interests? Many Japanese believe, despite US protests to the contrary, that US policy
toward China has swung between engagement and confrontation. Some Japanese analysts
see a shift in US policy toward China within the first Obama administration, with the“China first” faction losing to the “alliance first” faction over time. For this group, therebalance is a sign of this swing.
There was agreement among all participants that domestic factors play a large rolein shaping Chinese behavior and there is a desire on the part of Beijing to redirect
unhappiness and unease toward foreign sources. There was also agreement that bad
behavior must not be rewarded and our two countries should work together to encourage
Chinese adherence to the rule of law and the peaceful, negotiated settlement of disputes.
Several participants reiterated Takahara’s call to figure out ways to influence domestic
debates in China and empower moderates. China must be persuaded that the forcible
correction of historical grievances is not a workable foreign policy.
While there was general skepticism about Chinese motives and intentions, it
seemed that Japanese discussants took a harder line against China than did Americans.
While US participants reiterated the US commitment to the defense of Japan and theinclusion of the Senkakus in the US-Japan Security Treaty (covered by Article 5, “territory
administered by Japan”), US analysis focused on the strategic value of the Senkakus. A
word of caution here: while this is understandable, Americans must be attentive to theemotions behind Japanese responses to Chinese behavior and not appear insensitive toJapanese concerns.
Domestic Politics
National sentiment featured prominently in our third session which explored theimpact of changes in domestic politics on the alliance. As in previous meetings, a speakerfrom each country assessed developments in the other. In his take on the United States,
Toshihiro Nakayama (Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan Institute of International Affairs)
contended that the alliance remains on track and a second Obama administration will
largely continue on its current track, with some minor shifts in policy. Obama willcontinue to readdress the excesses in US foreign and domestic policy that emerged in theBush administration; overall that means a focus on US domestic affairs and Nakayama
expects “something of a retreat from the world.”
6

Nakayama voiced worries about the new US foreign policy team. He has doubts
about Secretary Kerry’s priorities (echoing earlier complaints) and fears that Secretary
Hagel was badly damaged in his nomination fight. A more intense focus on the economy –whether jobs or the budget – could mean that Japan’s security concerns get short changedin the US strategic calculus. That is part of a larger issue: Nakayama worries about Japan’s
place in US foreign policy generally, fearing that a shrinking pool of expertise about Japan
could undermine its salience in US security and foreign policy planning.
Torkel Patterson (Group Pacific Inc.) echoed Nakayama’s final point, noting thatmost Americans don’t think about Japan. When they do, Japan is a brand, once
characterized by Sony, sumo, and sushi, and now associated with manga, anime, fashion,energy efficiency, cars, and high-quality food. But Americans will rise to the moment
when pressed, as they did in the aftermath of March 11, and that should reassure Japanese
about the deep ties between the two countries.
Patterson worries that the Shinzo Abe “brand” is that of a nationalist, which he is,but his image does not correspond to the man Patterson knows. He fears that Japanese
attempts to address history issues will make matters worse; in particular, any reassessmentof statements regarding comfort women will antagonize friends and supporters in the US.
He urged the Japanese government to do a better job of courting the media and to launch a
campaign to get Japanese views to US audiences. This task takes on more urgency given
an aggressive and relatively successful campaign by pro-Chinese groups in the US to gettheir message across.
In the discussion, Americans warned that a second Obama term is likely tounderperform. Second-term presidents tend to be lame ducks almost from theirinauguration; this often forces them to focus on foreign policy to build a legacy. The
division of government and the Republican Party – some would say “Tea Party” – grip on
the House of Representatives means that policy making will be difficult. One US
participant warned that division could continue until 2020.
Japanese participants explained that Abe is looking to serve two full terms in the
Kantei to restore the stability and leadership that have been missing since Koizumi left
office in 2006. His first objective, however, is prevailing in the summer House ofCouncilors ballot. To win, he has moderated positions and focused on the economy. One
Japanese participant warned that the prime minister is likely to stick to that approach as
long as he enjoys wide support; he worried that dwindling popularity will force Abe to rely
on a smaller, more nationalist circle of advisors. Another Japanese participant reminded thegroup that Japan has a Cabinet-style system and Abe has well-informed advisors andsupporters in the Prime Minister’s Office. The emphasis on his personality – the fear that
he is only hiding his true colors until after he wins a mandate in the Upper House election– is “too American.”7

A US participant countered that while Americans may have a distorted view of the
new prime minister, the new prime minister has an equally distorted view of how the USsees him. The tumultuous tenure of Yukio Hatoyama should not be used as the benchmark
for the DPJ government; the Japan-US alliance was doing quite well in the final year of
DPJ rule under Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. The discussant warned that an “ABM –anything but Minshuto” policy would backfire given the progress made in the last year of
DPJ rule: “It isn’t enough to not be the DPJ.” Moreover, there is a danger that the LDP’s
talk about “saving the alliance” could raise expectations to levels that would be hard tomeet. Delaying hard decisions until after the summer ballot is a sure way to frustrate
Washington. At the same time, US participants made it clear that they want a strong andsteady hand on the wheel in Tokyo. While most Americans can’t name the Japanese prime
minister, they do want a confident and healthy partner. The US doesn’t seek to hold Japanback, but it does want to work with its ally to accomplish shared goals and objectives.
Finally, several Japanese participants expressed frustration with US warnings about
reopening the history issue. As one explained, “the vast majority of Japanese acknowledge
what Japan did in World War II.” The problem is rising frustration with the notion thatJapan must accept without question the assertions of Chinese and Koreans about history.
He added that the maritime territorial disputes are for many Japanese increasingly asymbol of “outrageous and ungrounded” claims made under the guise of dealing withhistory. He urged Americans not to accept counter claims and arguments without hearing
the Japanese side.
The return of geoeconomics
Since the global financial crisis of 2007-8, the Security Seminar has spent timeassessing geoeconomic issues in the Japan-US alliance. We also tackled those problems
during the first years of the seminar, but military and security concerns overshadowed
economic issues during the last decade, pushing them from the agenda. The prospect of achanging regional balance of power, driven by the economic rise of China, stagnation in
Japan, and political paralysis in the US (mostly the product of budget politics) has obliged
us to again take up these topics.
Charles Morrison (East West Center) began by highlighting differences inperspectives among Chinese, Americans, and Japanese. A recent Pew survey showed that
83 percent of Chinese think their economy is in good shape and 82 percent believe they areheading in the right direction. By contrast, only 32 percent of Americans characterize theireconomy as good and just 29 percent think it is heading in the right direction. AmongJapanese, the numbers are alarming: just 7 percent believe their economy is in good shapeand a mere 20 percent say they are heading in the right direction. Prolonged stagnation has
deprived Japan of the means to make an impression on the world; as two examples,
Morrison noted that Japan’s share of global manufacturing is shrinking as is its Overseas
8Development Assistance. A revitalization of the economy and the rekindling of confidence
and purpose in Japan are vital to both the country and the alliance. Much hope rides on the
Abe administration, and it is off to a good start, but Morrison warned that the real root ofJapan’s problems isn’t deflation but the absence of investment and growth opportunities.
He highlighted the country’s demographic challenges and the failure to empower women.
On the plus side, Japan by virtue of its geography, has extensive maritime claims, and byextension, substantial maritime resources as well.
This elevates the significance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). It isn’t just a
trade deal. Rather it’s a vehicle for political and economic change in Japan. But, Morrison
warned, neither the future of the TPP, nor Japan’s successful use of it to bring aboutreform, is guaranteed. At the same time, Morrison noted that the TPP plays another vitalrole: it solidifies an Asia-Pacific architecture that firmly welds the US to Asia.
Yoshiji Nogami (Japan Institute of International Affairs) noted that geoeconomics
seems to be changing more rapidly than geopolitics, pointing to the BRICs – the groupingof Brazil, India, Russia, and China – that had such promise only a decade ago when it was
postulated, but is now considered something of a relic. No one expected Brazil to growmore slowly than Japan, or for India’s potential to be strangled by domestic politics, or for
Russia’s fate to be so deeply intertwined with the ebbs and flows of global energy prices.
China remains a mystery: Beijing is still trying to cope with the after-effects of the massive
stimulus package that was employed to stave off the global downturn in 2007, a task that is
made even harder by the unreliable statistics generated in China. Corruption, rising wages,
and an unbalanced economy – one that relies too heavily on investment and exports –make economic stability a real challenge. Meanwhile, Europe faces the possibility of its
own lost decade as it tries to save the euro (if not the union) and balance budgets. While
ASEAN has managed to weather the turbulence, prospects are uneven. Nogami concluded
that there is no bright spot in the world economy.
Some dark spots are less gloomy, however. The US, for example, has thefundamentals for growth. Its corporate sector has cash and households are in the last stagesof deleveraging. If the political system can reach some consensus, recovery is a possibility.
Japan too has pieces in place for a recovery. There is the prospect of stable politicalleadership, and a government that grasps the need for reform. Yen depreciation is a
stimulus to growth that can make restructuring more palatable, and the scheduled increasein the consumption tax is an important first step toward getting a grip on spiraling debt.
Nogami, too, sees TPP as a litmus test of Tokyo’s attitude toward reform. While there arereasons to contemplate the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP,
another, less demanding trade negotiation), it is a lowest common denominator approach totrade. It has merits for ASEAN, but Japan must take a broader view of such deals.

9Some participants took issue with the speakers’ characterization of the economy. A
US participant argued that the consensus view (globally, not just in the room)
underestimated the speed of the transition to a non-Western dominated world. All richeconomies are heavily indebted and it will take decades for them to deleverage. He
questioned the assertion that China faces insurmountable challenges. He believes it cancontinue on its current path for some time, although there is a danger of overconfidence
and overextension.
Energy politics and economics consumed much of the discussion. We had a spirited
debate about the impact of the shale gas revolution. Exploitation of these resources means
the US economy will be less reliant on government policy. It will lower energy prices,
spurring growth, producing higher tax revenues, and reducing the current account deficit.
Some Japanese participants feared that it would decrease US attention to and involvementin the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Americans pushed back against that assertion, arguingthat the US has an ongoing stake in regional stability as well as security and maintenanceof sea lines of communication. The opportunity to tap US liquid natural gas supplies has
powerful implications for Japan’s nuclear policy: if the country has alternative energy
sources, then the nuclear energy equation is transformed. At present, the Abe government’s
determination to continue the high reliance on nuclear power is at odds with a public
sentiment that is overwhelmingly in favor of closing all nuclear power plants. Reconcilingthese two positions may prove to be the biggest challenge for the Abe administration
opined one Japanese participant.
US participants challenged the rosy view of Abenomics, wondering whether thegovernment would follow through on structural reforms necessary to sustain economic
growth, especially if the economy recovers. Reassurance was forthcoming: Americans
should have more confidence in the “third arrow,” said one Japanese participant, because
the impetus for change was coming from the private sector.
Finally, the TPP was a source of considerable discussion. Many in the room saw
the trade agreement as a part of a broader strategy to consolidate the existing balance ofpower in the region. Or, to put it crudely, TPP is another way to contain China. Most
Americans pushed back hard against that idea, insisting that it was an attempt to revitalize
trade negotiations and to create a “gold standard” for such deals. A US participant argued
the ultimate goal should be to make TPP so big and so compelling that “China has to join.”
National Security Politics and Strategic Cooperation
In his examination of National Security Politics and Strategic Cooperation, Takashi
Kawakami (Tokushoku University) highlighted the divergence in Japanese and US views
about China: while Tokyo sees Beijing as a threat, he characterized the US position as one
that sees China as a partner. This could be a result of a broader shift: China is a rising10

power, while US power is declining. In fact, the two countries have mutual vulnerability,
but China seeks to change the status quo via managed confrontations with nations on its
periphery, testing US alliances for weakness.
Meanwhile, the US priority is getting its economy back on track. The result is sharp
rhetoric when it comes to foreign policy but weak implementation of policy. Kawakami
worries that the US may embrace an offshore balancer approach to Asian security,
disengaging to some degree and intervening in regional security affairs only to protect thestatus quo and maintain the existing balance of power. The potential disconnect between
Japanese and US thinking is apparent when Kawakami explained that from Tokyo’s
perspective, the Senkaku dispute is “a touchstone for the alliance.”
He conceded, however, that Japan too must do more to strengthen its own
capabilities, but the two countries need to push ahead with a discussion of new Japan-US
defense guidelines. He is also eager to see more trilateral (Japan-US-ROK) cooperation,even though the history issue is a powerful obstacle to progress. Nevertheless, Kawakami
believes North Korea can provide the glue for three-way coordination and the US should
facilitate that process.
Evans Revere (Albright Stonebridge Group) offered three challenges and aconcern. The first challenge is North Korea, which has acquired the ability to threaten all
its neighbors with nuclear-armed missiles. As he pondered ways to increase pressure on
Pyongyang and force it to behave, he concluded that China remains central to any solution,although he isn’t optimistic about the chances of altering Beijing’s calculus. He warned
against over-reacting to the North’s rhetoric, while calling for an assessment of ourcollective ability to respond to a provocation.
China constitutes the second challenge. It is acting in new and assertive ways,
largely “because it can.” He worries that historical and political conditioning will lock
China into an adversarial view of Japan, one that sees its neighbor as threatening. Thatworldview, as well as developments in Japan, has fueled a desire to teach Japan a lesson.
He would like to see ongoing dialogue between Tokyo and Beijing over the territorial
dispute, and is concerned about the efficacy of Japan’s embrace of “dynamic deterrence.”
The third challenge is Japan-ROK relations, the difficulties of which were evident
in the failure to conclude the intelligence sharing and acquisition and cross servicing
agreements. Poor relations between these two neighbors complicate the defense of the
ROK and must provide some comfort to Pyongyang and Beijing.
Hanging over all regional concerns is the US rebalance. Revere fears that it isperceived in the region – and especially by China – as exclusively military and as an
attempt to contain Beijing. This perception has disinclined Beijing to cooperate with the
US even when such cooperation is in China’s interest. While Beijing may believe that it is11

in China’s interest to characterize the policy as being aimed at China – and scare offcountries that worry about being drawn into a second Cold War -- the US must counter thatnarrative.
His final concern is history. Revere, along with many other Americans, finds theprospect of revision of official Japanese statements about history “very troubling.” Heurged the new government in Tokyo to leave those statements alone.
The final discussion covered two broad sets of issues – threats and responses. There
was in the last session, as throughout the meeting, a sense that Japanese and US threat
perceptions diverged. Simply put, Japanese seem more concerned by a Chinese threat
while US attention is more focused on a Korean Peninsula contingency. Several Japaneseparticipants again commented on the “volatility” of US policy toward China (and again
Americans pushed back against that characterization). Moreover, they reminded US
counterparts of the emotional content of these issues. As one pointed out, “this is the firsttime the Japanese people have a real sense of the possibility that Japanese territory can bemenaced by an external enemy.” Another Japanese participant explained that his country
sees the Senkaku dispute as a test of the durability and stability of the global order. A
failure to defend peaceful dispute resolution could have far-reaching consequences.
Several US participants flatly asked whether Japan feared abandonment; the response wasthat the concern “was more nuanced” than that. One Japanese participant described the
feeling as “don’t go wobbly on us.”The question then was how to avoid the perception of a lack of resolve, and how tosuccessfully repulse Chinese probes and North Korean belligerence. The alliance is making
progress. The 2012 decision to delink the Futenma move from the larger package ofrealignment measures was an important development but that was only the removal of an
obstacle; “it’s now time for positive steps” argued a Japanese speaker. For its part, Japan
seeks a more substantive discussion of security cooperation and, in particular, a refinementof bilateral planning and a deepening of discussions on roles, missions, and capabilities.
Continuation of the extended deterrence dialogue is an important part of this process, as
are attempts to figure out how the two countries can make real the promise of “dynamic
deterrence.” Participants from both countries endorsed discussions in “new” domains, suchas space and cyber. All agreed that the two countries need to get ahead of the curve andlook over the horizon, preparing for contingencies that are 10-15 years away. This sort ofplanning will allow the two countries to shape the security environment rather than merely
respond to it. A US participant offered that the US wants “to think big and bold” anddiscuss roles, missions, and capabilities that “truly add value to the alliance and are big andflexible enough to encompass other contingencies.” A Japanese participant reminded thegroup that it is as important that the alliance speak regularly about what it is for and notjust what it is against.
12

Missile defense will play a key role in strengthening defense and deterrence. North
Korean threats make it even more necessary to hone those capabilities, even though such
efforts are certain to elicit howls of protest from China. Planned missile defense
deployments will not – and are not designed to – threaten China’s deterrent and most
Chinese strategists know that. They rightfully fear, however, the prospect of deeper
operational integration of Japanese and US forces, given the political and security
implications of that stronger relationship.
Ultimately, both sides need to convince China that the US will stand with Japan in
the event of conflict. A US participant suggested that Chinese protests over US statements
and concern over the rebalance – even if exaggerated – make plain that Beijing knows
where the US will be in a contingency. As Japan and the US talk to China, both singly andas an alliance, the two countries should be clear that China is not by definition theiradversary; Beijing’s actions will be instrumental in defining these relationships.
All participants also agreed on the need to promote trilateral security cooperation
with the ROK. North Korea can provide the glue for such cooperation. Unfortunately,
South Korea’s new president, Park Gyun-hye, has never spoken out in favor of trilateral
cooperation with Japan and the US. That could reflect concern in Seoul that enhanced
cooperation could consolidate Cold War divisions on the Korean Peninsula at a time when
the ROK feels it must be able to reach out to China to engage the DPRK. While China has
a role to play in dealing with North Korea, there was palpable concern about the idea thatthe road to Pyongyang runs through Beijing: this sort of thinking could give China toomuch leverage over decision making.
Looking ahead
The 19th Japan-US Security Seminar was a frank and curious discussion.
Remarkably for two countries that have enjoyed considerable continuity for the last few
years – the change in government in Tokyo notwithstanding; views of the alliance in the
DPJ under Noda very much resembled those of the LDP – there was considerable debate
about the meaning and impact of policy. The comfort level between both sides remains
high – while there is a new government in Tokyo, key players on foreign and security
policy are familiar. Nonetheless, there were questions, quite frankly, about trust. Japan
worries about the US commitment to regional security and its readiness to stand with Japanagainst China. The US worries that Japan may reopen the history question and unleash atsunami of grievance.
This brief summary makes plain each government’s immediate tasks. The US must
convince its allies that it can devote attention to its economic ills and not neglect its foreign
policy and security commitments. For Americans, the ability to do two things at once is agiven. Apparently, however, our allies, partners, and adversaries are not convinced. At the13same time, there is a yawning gap between US policy and objectives and how they areinterpreted by foreign audiences. More work must be done to better communicate our aims
and ambitions in the region; the rebalance is poorly understood, partly because ofdeliberate misrepresentation by some and partly because of poor salesmanship. The US is
continually explaining what the rebalance isn’t; more time should be spent defining what it
is. Regional governments are paying close attention to our actions, which speak louder
than words. Finally, the US must show greater sensitivity to Japanese concerns. That is not
to say that Washington must defer to Tokyo on regional issues, but there were times when
the US seems insensitive to hot button, emotion-laden issues in Japan. We can disagree,
but the US must not be – or seem to be – dismissive of our ally’s concerns.
Japan’s tasks are no loss significant. The new government’s first and most pressing
assignment is the restoration of confidence in Japanese leadership among its public andfriends. That will require, most critically, progress on revitalizing the economy. Hard
choices are required on issues such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership – the decision to join
the negotiations is only a first step – and base realignment. At some point, Japan will haveto increase defense spending and flesh out the bones of its “dynamic deterrence” policy. At
the same time, the new government must show Americans, and Japan’s neighbors, that it
understands history and that it isn’t captive of fringe domestic constituencies. This
demands more than a mere public relations campaign.
Together, the two countries must articulate a shared vision of their partnership, of
which the Japan-US alliance is but a part. Once they have this vision, the two governments
can then redefine roles, missions, and capabilities that prepare them as nations and as analliance, to deal with an evolving security environment and over the horizon contingencies.
This will modernize their partnership and create opportunities for cooperation with third
parties. It will also shape the regional environment in ways that are congenial to our two
countries and present friends and allies with choices of our making, rather than leaving
them to the mercy of other nations.

14

APPENDIX A
19TH ANNUAL

JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY SEMINAR
March 15-16, 2013
J.W. Marriott Hotel • San Francisco, CA
AGENDA
Friday, March 15
3:00PM

Welcoming Remarks
Yoshiji Nogami, JIIA President
Ralph Cossa, Pacific Forum CSIS President

3:15-5:00PM

Session I: Security Perspectives
Japan Presenter: Yukio Okamoto
US Presenter: Gordon FlakeIn this survey of security outlooks, we compare the two countries’ assessment of theregional security environment. Participants will identify top security concerns –broadly defined – and prioritize them. What does each country consider a threat to its
security and prosperity? Has this threat perception changed since we last met? In
particular, is there greater danger of military conflict in East Asia? Why? President
Vladimir Putin has said that Russia now sees Asia as key to its future. What is theimpact of this shift? Do the two countries agree on the priority of challenges outside
East Asia? While China is part of this discussion, an in-depth assessment of China
will be taken up in the next session.
6:30- 9:00PM

Reception/Dinner
Keynote Address: Amb. J. Thomas Schieffer

Saturday, March 16
9:00-10:15AM

Session II: Understanding China
US Presenter: Brad Glosserman
Japan Presenter: Akio Takahara

How does each country characterize or assess Chinese behavior, militarily anddiplomatically, in the last year? Has China become more belligerent? If so, why? If
not, why has Beijing acted the way it has? How do participants assess Chinese
behavior in the South China Sea? Is it different from Chinese behavior regarding the
Senkakus? Have our two countries responded properly to these incidents? How can
we influence Chinese behavior and decision making? What have been the economic
implications and consequences of increased Sino-Japanese tensions? Which sidestands to gain or lose the most – politically and economically – from such tensions?
10:15-10:30

Break
A-1

10:30-12:00

Session III: Domestic Politics

3A [Japanese presenter: Toshihiro Nakayama]: How do Japanese assess the state of
US politics? What has been the impact of US elections on foreign policy? What are theprospects for resolving the gridlock in Washington? How do Japanese assess the new
US foreign policy team?
3B [US presenter: Torkel Patterson]: How do Americans assess the state of Japanesepolitics? What has been the impact of the December elections in Japan? What is themeaning and significance of the Osprey protests in Japan?
12:00-1:30PM

Lunch

1:30-3:00PM

Session IV: The Return of Geoeconomics
US Presenter: Charles Morrison
Japan Presenter: Yoshiji Nogami

This session explores each country’s understanding of the role of economics ininfluencing regional dynamics and the institutions that shape economic interactions. Is
there a tension between economic relations and security partnerships? How does eachcountry prioritize transpacific institutions with those in its own region (i.e., the ASEAN
Plus Three and NAFTA in relation to APEC)? Is there a tension between them? How
does each country assess of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), APEC, theComprehensive Economic Partnership of East Asia (CEPEA), and APEC? Should
Japan consider tighter ties to the US as suggested at last year’s meeting?
3:00-3:15PM

Break

3:15-5:00PM

Session V: National Security Policies and Strategic Cooperation
Japan Presenter: Takashi Kawakami
US Presenter: Evans RevereThis session focuses on implementation of the two countries' national security policies- the "rebalance" and the National Defense Program Guidelines - and their implications
for the alliance. Has the rebalance proceeded as anticipated? What problems havearisen? Has the US deterrent been impacted by regional developments? How? How has
Japan implemented "dynamic deterrence?" How have efforts to improve jointness andmaneuverability proceeded? What more needs to be done? How does each side assess
strategic cooperation and the review of US-Japan defense cooperation, in particular?
What could be the new elements for the revised, if any, the Guidelines for Japan-US
Defense Cooperation? What more can be done to make such efforts more effective?
Can the two countries agree on a vision for alliance cooperation? What is it? Are there
opportunities for trilateral security cooperation with South Korea and US? What limits
such cooperation? What can be done to remedy these limitations?

A-2

5:00-5:30PM

Session VI: Wrap up and conclusions

Final thoughts with special emphasis on how to make the 20th seminar a landmark
event.
6:30PM

Reception/Dinner at Consul General Hiroshi Inomata’s Residence

A-3

A-4

APPENDIX B
19TH ANNUAL

JAPAN-US SECURITY SEMINAR
March 15-16, 2013
J.W. Marriott Hotel • San Francisco, CA
Participant ListJapan
Mr. Hiroyuki Akita
Nikkei Shinbun

Mr. Yoichi Kato
National Security Correspondent
Asahi-Shimbun

Prof. Nobumasa Akiyama
Professor, Hitotubashi University
Adjunct Fellow, JIIA

Prof. Takashi Kawakami
Professor, Takushoku University
Mr. Kazuo Masuda
Director, Japan-US Defense Cooperation
Division, Ministry of Defense

Mr. Hideki Asari
Deputy Director General
The Japan Institute of International
Affairs

Prof. Toshihiro Nakayama
Professor, Aoyama Gakuin Universiry
Adjunct Fellow, JIIA

Mr. Takehiro Funakoshi
MinisterEmbassy of Japan in ROK

Mr. Hiroyuki Namazu
Director, Japan-US Security Treaty
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Junichi Ihara
Director-General, North American
Affairs Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ambassador Yoshiji Nogami
President
The Japan Institute of International
Affairs

Ms. Keiko Iizuka
Senior Political Writer
Yomiuri-Shinbun

Mr. Yukio Okamoto
Senior Fellow, Center for International
Studies, Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology

Consul General Hiroshi Inomata
Consulate General of JapanSan Francisco

Mr. Atsuo Suzuki
Defense Councilor (Deputy Director
General), Ministry of Defense

Mr. Yoshihiro Iseri
First Secretary
Embassy of Japan, Washington, DC

Prof. Akio Takahara
Professor, University of Tokyo
Adjunct Fellow, JIIA

Prof. Matake Kamiya
Professor
National Defense Academy of Japan
B-1

Mr. Nobushige Takamizawa
President
National Institute for Defense Studies

Mr. Kyosuke Matsumoto
Senior Coordinator
Japan-US Defense Cooperation Division,
Ministry of Defense

Mr. Shigeo Yamada
Minister, Political Section
Embassy of Japan, Washington, D.C.

Mr. Tomohiko Satake
Fellow, Defense Policy Division, Policy
Studies Department
National Institute for Defense Studies

Japan Observers
Mr. Takashi Hirai
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division
North American Affairs Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

US
Ambassador Michael H. Armacost
Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow
Asia Pacific Research Center
Stanford University

Mr. Shinichi Ikawa
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
Division
Ministry of Defense

Mr. Ralph A. Cossa
President, Pacific Forum CSIS

Mr. Kentaro KaiharaCounselor, Political Section
Embassy of Japan Washington, D.C.

Ms. Paige Cottingham-Streater
Executive Director
US-Japan Friendship Commission

Mr. Keisuke Kodama
Deputy Director, Japan-US Security
Treaty Division, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs

Mr. L. Gordon Flake
Executive Director
The Maureen and Mike Mansfield
Foundation

Mr. Tetsuo Kotani
Research Fellow
The Japan Institute of International
Affairs

Mr. Brad Glosserman
Executive Director
Pacific Forum CSIS

Mr. Masayuki Masuda
Senior Fellow, Northeast Asia Division,
Regional Studies Department
National Institute for Defense Studies

Mr. Christopher B. Johnstone
Director for Northeast Asia
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense(Policy)

Dr. Asuka MatsumotoResearch Fellow
The Japan Institute of International
Affairs

Mr. James A. Kelly
Counselor and President Emeritus
Pacific Forum CSIS
Mr. Marc Knapper
Director, Office of Japanese Affairs
US Department of State

B-2

Dr. Robert A. Madsen
Senior Fellow
MIT Center for International Studies

CDR Daniel Fillion, USN
Japan Country Desk Officer
Joint Staff J-5 Pentagon

Dr. Charles E. Morrison
President
East-West Center

Mr. David W. Hamon
Distinguished Analyst and Director
Asia Pacific Project
Analytic Service (ANSER)

Mr. Torkel Patterson
Principal
Group Pacific Inc.

Dr. Richard Katz
Editor-in-Chief
The Oriental Economist Report

Mr. Evans J. R. Revere
Senior Director
Albright Stonebridge GroupMr. Dan Sneider
Associate Director for Research
Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Stanford University

Dr. Brad Roberts
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense
PolicyUS Department of Defense

Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders
Japan
Dr. Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi
Resident Vasey Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS

Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer
Former US Ambassador to Japan
Dr. Amy E. SearightPrincipal Director for East Asia
Asian & Pacific Security Affairs Officeof the Secretary of Defense

Mr. Akira Igata
Doctoral Student - Keio University
Mr. Yusuke Ishihara
Non-Resident SPF Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS

Ambassador Marc Wall
Foreign Policy Advisor
United States Pacific Command

Mr. Kei Koga
Research Fellow
The Belfer Center for Science andInternational Affairs, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard
University

Mr. James P. Zumwalt
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asia and Pacific Affairs
US Department of StateUS Observers
Mr. Peter Ennis
US Correspondent/Columnist,
Weekly Toyo Keizai
Writer/Publisher, Dispatch Japan

Ms. Mihoko Matsubara
Former Resident SPF Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS
Ms. Ayako Mie
Multimedia Journalist
The Japan Times

B-3

Dr. Masamichi Minehata
Research Fellow
University of Bradford, UK

Mr. Eric Sayers
Defense Policy Advisor
Office of Congressman J. Randy Forbes

Ms. Aiko Shimizu
Student
University of Pennsylvania Law School

Staff
Ms. Ellise Akazawa
Public Relations and Outreach
Coordinator
Pacific Forum CSISUS
Ms. Linnea DuvallInternational Relations Specialist
US Pacific Command

Ms. Nicole Forrester
Director - Young Leaders Program
Pacific Forum CSIS

Dr. Leif-Eric Easley
Assistant Professor, International
Security and Political Economics
Division of International Studies
Ewha University

Mrs. Christina Hatfield-Mattos
Conference & Travel Coordinator
Pacific Forum CSIS
Ms. Brooke Mizuno
Program Officer
Pacific Forum CSIS

Mr. Justin Goldman
Former Resident SPF Research Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS
Mr. John Hemmings
Resident WSD- Handa Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS
Mr. Adam Liff
Ph.D. Candidate - Princeton University
Ms. Jenny Lin
Resident SPF Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS
Mr. Vincent Manzo
Defense and National Security Group
Fellow
Center for Strategic and International
Studies
Mr. Jonathan Miller
Senior Policy Officer - Asia-Pacific Desk
Canada Border Services Agency

B-4