AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies
IIPSRIPSInstitute for International
Policy Studies

The Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs(Secretariat)

Research Institute for
Peace and Security

Editor:Akio Watanabe
Editorial Board:
Masashi Nishihara
Naoko Saiki
Taizo Yakushiji
No.80.

28 December 2009

Online Publisher:
Yoshiji Nogami
President, JIIA

IMPROVED CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONSCONFUSING TO THE JAPANESE
Yasuhiro Matsuda
The relationship between China and Taiwan has
been rapidly improving since the China-friendly
administration of President Ma Ying-jeou wasinaugurated in Taiwan in May 2008. In contrast, theMa administration’s relations with Japan havealways been fraught with concerns on the part ofJapan, including that of Taiwan being swallowed up
into China and Ma’s latent anti-Japanese sentiment.
Meanwhile, suspicions have been lingering in some
The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and should
not be attributed to The Association of Japanese Institutes ofStrategic Studies.

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The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

circles in China and Taiwan that improved cross-Strait relations are notwelcomed by Japan. What on earth do improved cross-Strait relations and theMa administration’s Japan policy mean for Japan? What are Japan’s policy
options? This essay attempts to answer these questions by first comparing theMa administration with its predecessor.
Let’s examine the strained relations between China and Taiwan under
the presidency of Chen Shui-bian from the following three aspects: crisis, power
balance and economic interests. Firstly, it can be pointed out that Chen’s China
policy could have destabilized relations with China, even though concern over apossible crisis was not imminent. Secondly, since the power balance in East Asia
was maintained by continued cross-Strait confrontation, Japan did not have toworry about a sudden change in the status quo. Thirdly, Japan was unable toenvision the future of economic relations between China and Taiwan due to thelack of bilateral official channels between the two, although their economic ties
were rapidly deepening as a matter of practice.
Ma’s succession of Chen has improved Taiwan’s relations with mainland
China, eliminating Japan’s concern about a cross-Strait crisis. However, it has
also heightened the prospects for a shift in the regional balance of power toward
China. Meanwhile, deepening cross-Strait economic ties have made it easier forJapanese companies investing in Taiwan to envision future prospects.
In short, of the three aspects mentioned above, Japan’s utmost concern
is on the shift in the regional balance of power in favor of China, which is caused
mainly by the Taiwanese tilt toward China. The United States takes a totallydifferent stance from Japan on this. Since the US is directly responsible for
Taiwan’s security under the Taiwan Relations Act, it is more sensitive to thedanger of a possible cross-Strait crisis than Japan. On the other hand, as asuperpower outside the region, the US is less sensitive to the regional balance ofpower. Moreover, the US is dealing with tough issues such as the war on
terrorism and nuclear developments in Iran and North Korea, which always
require Chinese cooperation. Therefore, the US tends to take the start of the Ma
administration and improved cross-Strait relations as a positive sign.
With regards to Ma’s policy toward Japan, there is no question that it ishttp://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary2

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The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

of a friendly nature. In the first place, the Japanese and the Taiwanese sharevery strong feelings of friendship, and no leader can adopt policies that would
challenge such public sentiment. Furthermore, Ma has singled out Japan as acountry with which to form a “special partnership,” and organized related events
designed to consolidate the partnership. However, his mishandling of a collision
between a Taiwanese fishing boat and a Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel thatoccurred in the waters off the disputed Senkaku Islands, also known as theTiaoyutai Islands in Taiwan, soon after his inauguration as president escalated
the problem and caused anti-Japanese feeling within Taiwan to rise to the worst
level in the past two decades.
How could such conflicting things happen in Taiwan? The answer lies
not so much in Ma’s personality as in the fact that the Ma administration is basedon a power structure that is totally different from Chen’s. The Ma administration
lacks strong affinity for Japan at its power center and its support base includes apolitical force that harbors strong anti-Japanese sentiments. The force,embracing anti-Japanese forces in China and Hong Kong as well, appeals tonationalism by tactically utilizing the mass media and tends to politicize difficult
problems such as the dispute over the Senkaku Islands. That is why, eventhough Ma regards Japan as strategically important, he cannot sooth
anti-Japanese sentiments on the island, causing him to occasionally take ahardline stance on Japan.
The Japanese concern over the Ma administration derives from twofactors: the regional power shift and the administration’s power structure. Yet atthe same time, there are views that welcome the passage of a cross-Strait crisisand deepening commercial ties with Taiwan. Ma has embraced a pro-Japan
policy, but stumbled on the handling of the Senkaku issue. It would be moreaccurate to say that the Japanese are puzzled by these confusing messages
from Taiwan. Human beings are creatures that find it difficult to adapt to rapidchanges. Japan is still trying to find a satisfactory answer as to how to adapt to
the rapidly changing East Asian order, in which China and Taiwan are drawing
closer amid the rapid rise of China.
What policy options does Japan have? As long as China’s rise is

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The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

peaceful, an outright policy to balance it would be completely outdated. We needto take a more sophisticated approach. Firstly, while welcoming stabilized
relations between China and Taiwan, we need to keep reminding China toimprove military transparency and not to rely on military might. It has been lessthan five years since China adopted its de-facto status quo policy, exemplified by
the Anti-Secession Law, and it is not yet clear whether this will become Beijing’s
settled policy.
Secondly, in light of the upgraded cross-Strait relations, Japan shouldseek to upgrade relations with China and Taiwan respectively. For example, thesigning of an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) between
Beijing and Taipei could be an opportunity for Japan to strengthen the existing
frameworks for tightening economic ties both with China and Taiwan. Given theincreasing direct contact between Chinese and Taiwanese authorities, Japan
may consider increasing similar contacts with Taiwan on a needs basis.
Improved relations between China and Taiwan will in fact offer an opportunity forJapan to improve its relations with China and Taiwan. Japan does not need tostand on the sidelines to observe the improving bilateral relations.
Thirdly, Japan must avoid the erosion of its comprehensive nationalpower and work to strengthen it. At the same time, it needs to maintain anddevelop a stable and strong relationship with the United States. If Japan
continues its efforts to build an attractive nation, maintain sufficiently strong
power, and increase the number of friendly and cooperative nations, that would
reduce the level of perplexity felt by the Japanese regardless how much thepower shift toward China accelerates or how many times Taiwan’s administration
changes.

Yasuhiro Matsuda is Associate Professor of the Institute of Oriental Culture at
the University of Tokyo. He specializes in the political and diplomatic historyof Asia, the politics and external relations of China and Taiwan, andcross-Strait relations.

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