FOCUS

Focus
Asia-PacificNewsletter of the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center (HURIGHTS OSAKA)

June 2019 Vol. 96

Editorial

Contents
Update on Indigenous Peoples of Malaysia
This is a report on the current situation ofindigenous peoples in Malaysia regarding
existing beneficial programs as well as thecontinuing challenges in ensuring
protection and realization of their rights.
- SUHAKAM
Page 2A Critique on the New Ainu Policy: How
Japan’s Politics of Recognition Fails to Fulfill
the Ainu’s Indigenous Rights
This is an analysis of the 2019 law on Ainu
that uncovers the underlying “colonial
policy” of the Japanese towards the Ainu.
- Leni Charbonneau and Hiroshi Maruyama
Page 7
New Gwangju Declarations
This is a short introduction of thedeclarations adopted during a conference
held in Gwangju city in May 2019 on theright to justice, right to peace and right toculture.
- Praveen Kumar Yadav
Page 11
Women’s Right to Worship in Sabarimala
Temple Upheld
This is a short explanation of the Supreme
Court of India declaration on theunconstitutionality of the rules of
Sabarimala temple in Kerala state that ban
the worship in the temple of women fromages ten to fifty.
- HURIGHTS OSAKA
Page 13

Full Recognition
State recognition of sections of the population as indigenous
peoples is an important first step. And yet, such recognition is in
bad faith if it is not based on the historical fact that such people
have been living on their ancestral land since time immemorial.
Such recognition is discriminatory if it means assimilation to thelarger non-indigenous society.
From a human rights perspective, recognition as indigenous
peoples is not a matter of state granting rights to such peoples.
Recognition should mean an acceptance by the state of theindigenous peoples’ rights as their inherent rights.
Necessarily, recognition in this case means protecting the rights
of indigenous peoples to their ancestral land, culture, language,social systems and economic activities. The state has theobligation to protect the indigenous peoples from displacementfrom their ancestral land and other abuses, in addition to its
obligation to provide whatever is available to secure theirwelfare (health, education, etc.).
Full recognition as indigenous peoples restores the rights andopportunities that they have been deprived of.
Indigenous peoples have rights deserving protection andfulfillment, as much as respect from the government and society
as a whole.

1

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JUNE 2019 VOLUME 96

Update on Indigenous Peoples of Malaysia*
SUHAKAMT

he Indigenous Peoples (IP)of Malaysia are collectively
called the Orang Asal.1 They arecomposed of the aborigines(Orang Asli) of Peninsular
Malaysia and the natives of
Sabah and Sarawak. Together,
the Orang Asal makes up 13.8
percent of the total populationof Malaysia.2
By virtue of Articles 73,3 74(1),4
and 74(2) 5 of the Federal
Constitution of Malaysia, both
the Federal and Statelegislatures have jurisdiction
over the administration of theO r a n g A s a l i n M a l ay s i a ,whereby, depending on thes u b j e c t m a t t e r, t h eadministration of the Orang Asal
could either fall under theFederal or State jurisdiction, or
could form the matter underboth the Federal and Statelegislatures concurrently. The
Federal Constitution’s Ninth
Schedule provides several lists
that enumerate the matterswhich are either under the
separate or shared jurisdictiono f t h e Fe d e ra l a n d S t a t elegislatures.6
Good Practices in Promoting
and Protecting the Rights of theOrang Asal in Malaysia
i. E s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e
Legitimate/Special Interestsof the Orang Asal in
Malaysia and their Protection
The foremost important piece oflegislation that establishes andprotects the special interests of
the Orang Asal in Malaysia is
the Federal Constitution of
Malaysia. The Federal
Constitution, while
underscoring that all persons
are equal before the law, has a
few exceptions for the Orang
Asal, in that it allows foraffirmative action for theprotection and advancement of
the special interests of Orang
Asli in Peninsular Malaysia andnatives of Sabah and Sarawak.
In the context of the Orang Asliin Peninsular Malaysia, whilet h e Fe d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o ngenerally proscribes
discrimination,7 Article 8(5)(c)states that those antidiscrimination provisions do notprohibit “any provision for theprotection, well-being or
advancement of the aboriginal
peoples of the Malay peninsula(including the reservation ofland) or the reservation toaborigines of a reasonableproportion of suitable positionsin the public service.”8
Further, the Federal Constitution
affords the special position andprotection to the natives of
Sabah and Sarawak. Article
153(1) of the Federal
Constitution provides that “itshall be the responsibility of theYang di-Pertuan Agong [King] tosafeguard the special position of
the Malays and natives of any of
the States of Sabah and Sarawak
and the legitimate interests ofother communities in2

accordance with the provisionsof this Article.”9 Article 153
goes on to specify theapproaches in order to protect
thoselegitimate
interests,
such as establishing quotas forentry into the civil service, as
well as for the attainment ofpublic scholarships andeducation.10
With respect to native land in
Sabah and Sarawak, Article
1 6 1 A ( 5 ) o f t h e Fe d e ra l
Constitution has excluded theapplication of Article 8
concerning equality and nondiscrimination to any State lawthat seeks to reserve or alienate
land for their natives, or forgiving the natives preferential
treatment for the alienation ofland by the State.11
ii. Representation of the Orang
Asal in the Government
In Malaysia, representation of
the Orang Asal and theirinterests in the Government isguaranteed by the Federal
Constitution. In the context of
the Orang Asal’s representationin the Senate, Article 45(2) ofthe Federal Constitution, which
provides the composition of the
Malaysian Senate, states thefollowing:12
The members to beappointed by the Yang diPertuan Agong shall bepersons who in his opinion
have rendered distinguishedpublic service or haveachieved distinction in the

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
professions, commerce,
i n d u s t r y, a g r i c u l t u r e ,cultural activities or social
service or are representativeof racial minorities or arecapable of representing theinterests of the aborigines.
With respect to the Orang Asal’s
representation in the public
service, Article 8(5)(c) of theFederal Constitution allows forthe reservation of a reasonableproportion of suitable positionsin the public service especiallyfor the Orang Asli in Peninsular
Malaysia.13 Additionally, Article
153(2) provides that the Yang diPertuan Agong shall exercise hisfunction under the Constitution
and federal law to reserve for,among others, the natives of
Sabah and Sarawak, reasonableproportions of positions inpublic service (other than the
public service of a State).14
iii. Native Court
The Native Court Enactment
199215 provides for a three-tiernative court system in Sabah
including a Native Court ofAppeal, a District Native Court
and a Native Court,16 whereas
in Sarawak, there is a six-level
court system including a Native
Court of Appeal, a Resident
Native Court, a District Native
Court, a Chief’s Superior Court,a C h i e f ’s C o u r t , a n d a
Headman’s Court.17

JUNE 2019 VOLUME 96
o betrothal, marriage,
divorce, nullity ofmarriage and judicial
separation;o adoption, guardianshipor custody of infants,
maintenance ofdependants andlegitimacy;o gifts or succession
testate or interstate; and• o t h e r c a s e s o f wh i chjurisdiction is conferred
upon the Courts by the
Enactment or any written
law.19On the other hand, theoperation of the Native Courts is
not without challenges. Some ofthe stumbling blocks that
impede effective execution oflegal practice in the court
system include:• The lack of jurisdiction of
Native Courts in respect ofany cause or matter within
the jurisdiction of the Civil
or Syari’ah Courts;20• Lack of staff in the Native
Courts. Native Courts staff
are normally seconded
from district offices, whichm ay a t t i m e s l e a d t oGenerally, both Native Courts in
S a b a h a n d S a r awa k h av e
jurisdiction to preside over:18• cases arising from a breachof native law or custom
where all the parties arenatives;• cases involving native law,custom relating to:3

conflict of interest, inparticular cases against the
government or its officials;• The involvement ofpolitical powers in theappointment of District
Chief, Native Chief andvillage chiefs who are key
Native Courts personnel;21• Lack of financial resources
to ensure effective
operation of the courts; and• Awareness and practice ofc u s t o m s a n d A d a t bycurrent younger leaders as
the future preservation andadherence of customs
heavily depend on theiractual practice.22
Despite the above challenges,
the Native Court in Malaysia is
an important institution as it
empowers the natives in Sabah
and Sarawak to realize theirright to maintain their juridical
system. At the same time, thisinstitution is able to preserve theadherence to the Adat among
the natives. The Native Court isalso a cheaper alternative forthose who wish to bring theirmatter to court, in comparison to
the Civil and Syari’ah Courts.23

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The following section highlights
some of the contemporary andpersisting issues that impede thepromotion and protection of therights of the IP in Malaysia.
Challenges
i. Customary Land rights
The IP have a special bond with
their customary land, which ispart of their identity. Customaryland constitutes an integral
element of their culture and wayof life. Through their deep
understanding of, andconnection with the land,
indigenous communities havebeen able to manage theirresources for generations.
The Federal Constitution of
Malaysia gives a certain level ofprotection for the natives of
Sabah and Sarawak to continue
their special relationship with
their land, including spellingout the fiduciary obligation of
the Federal and State
Governments that ensures therespect, recognition andprotection of customary land
rights. However, the Orang Asliin Peninsular Malaysia is left out
in this specific provision.
Mainstream development andforest conservation have greatly
infringed the IP’s claim to theircustomary land. This often
means that their livelihood andfuture are seriously threatened.
Many indigenous communities
continue to be expelled fromtheir territories under the pretextof the establishment ofprotected areas, including forest
reserves and national parks.
Forced displacement of the IP
from their traditional lands as aresult of laws and policies thatfavor the interests of commercial

JUNE 2019 VOLUME 96
companies and the Government
are major factors in theimpoverishment of thesecommunities.
Over the years of conducting
various studies and receiving
c o m p l a i n t s f r o m t h e I P,SUHAKAM has found that many
issues exist with regard to native
customary right (NCR) to land,such as:• Lack of or non-recognitionof NCR to land by theGovernment;• Differing perspectives of
NCR to land between the
Government and the IP;• The refusal by theGovernment to accept
indigenous perspectives to
NCR to land as affirmed byFederal Court decision;• Slow processing of native
land claims and gazettingof IP reserve lands;• Inadequate compensation;• Transactions on ownershipof land that do not follow
proper procedures;• Encroachment into and/or
dispossession of native landthrough development
aggressions; and• NCR land gazetted intoparks and other protectedareas.
The violations against the IP’s
land rights continue to affect not
only their livelihood, but also
their cultural and traditional
practices as well as identity. In
addition, many development
projects have negative
repercussions towards theecosystem, affecting the IP’sright to clean environment,
which, according to Article 2924
of United Nations Declaration4on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP), must be
respected.
Various development projects
by t h e G o v e r n m e n t h av e
negatively affected indigenous
communities especially their
NCR to land. Among theseprojects are:(a) Bakun Dam, Sarawak
The construction of the Bakun
Dam, one of the largest dams in
Asia, has forced thousands ofindigenous communities to ber e l o c a t e d . Th i s i s c l e a r l yinconsistent with Article 1025 of
UNDRIP.
(b) Tasik Chini, Pahang
Logging, clearing of land for
agriculture and unstructured
mining activities at the vicinityof Lake Chini in Pekan, Pahang,
have affected eleven indigenous
villages around the Lake.
Pollution and forest
deterioration have resulted inlower income, social conflict
and threats on those advocating
for their rights among affectedindigenous communities.
Land issues do not only affectIP’s rights to life, to own
property, to practice theirculture, traditions and topreserve their identity, but also
affect the whole ecosystem andtheir right to clean environment,
which according to Article 29 of
UNDRIP, must be respected.
(ii) Free, Prior and Informed
Consent (FPIC)
During the Public Hearings of
SUHAKAM’s NI on the Land
Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
SUHAKAM received numerous
complaints from the IP
regarding the non-application of

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
the principle of Free, Prior andInformed Consent (FPIC) for
development projects affecting
them. Indigenous communities
have the right to decide whether
they will agree to the project or
not once they have a full andaccurate understanding of theimplications of the project onthem and their customary land.
However in Malaysia, ther e s p e c t t owa r d s t h e F P I C
principle is nearly non-existent,
and as such, violates theinternational standard.
Numerous reports andcomplaints show that the Socialand Environmental Impact
Assessments (SEIA/EIA) that are
required before certain projects
commence were not conductedin a proper manner and that
communities were often notconsulted.
(iii) Education
Education of indigenous
children is at a worrying level.
Many indigenous children fail tomaster the 3M skills (reading,writing, arithmetic). In addition,
the number of indigenous
children who drop out fromschools before Standard Six isa l a r m i n g .26 A s a r e s u l t ,indigenous students fail tomaster core subjects, including
the Malay language, English,
Mathematics and Science. For
example, almost 50 percent ofindigenous children at Kampung
Kolam Air Pantai, Seremban in
Negeri Sembilan have beenreported to be uninterested ingoing to school, 27 while ahigher number of indigenous
children were reported to have
dropped out in Sabah andSarawak.28
Most of Orang Asli students
claim that the main reasons for

JUNE 2019 VOLUME 96
the high percentage of school
dropouts among them are due
to:29• Low socioeconomic level many choose not to go toschool in order to earn aliving;• Poor transportation
facilities to bringindigenous children toschools;• Lack of awareness on theimportance of formal
education;• Lack of motivation;• Poor health; and• L u k e wa r m a t t i t u d e o fparents towards truancy
problems.
The academic achievement of
Orang Asli students in school isstill very low compared to other
Malaysians.30(iv) Economic development
The IP in Malaysia are sadly,
often associated with poverty
and low income. It wasestimated in 1999 that 50.9
percent of the Orang Asli falls
below the poverty line, while
15.4 percent falls under thehardcore poor category. 31
Indigenous economic system ischaracterized by small but
diverse economic activities,
placing great importance onland resources, economic selfsufficiency, social support andbarter trade.32
The IP have varied occupations
and ways of life. Orang Aslicommunities such as the Orang
Laut, Orang Seletar and Mah
Meri, for example, live close to
the coast and are mainly
fishermen. Some Temuan, Jakun
and Semai people have taken to5permanent agriculture and now
manage their own rubber, oilpalm or cocoa farms. About 40
percent of the Orang Asli
population - including Semai,
Temiar, Che Wong, Jahut,
Semelai and Semoq Beri however, live close to, or within
forested areas. Here they
engage in hill rice cultivationand do some hunting andgathering. These communities
also trade in petai (a type ofbean), durian, rattan and resins
to make their ends meet. A verysmall number of theseindigenous communities,
especially among the Negrito
groups (such as Jahai and Lanoh)
are still semi-nomadic,
preferring to take advantage ofthe seasonal bounties of theforest. A fair number also live inurban areas and are engaged inboth waged and salaried jobs.33
Among the issues that impedeeconomic development andgrowth for the IP in Malaysia arelarge-scale land development
programs, non-recognition ofindigenous subsistence
economic activities and lack ofopportunities.
(v) Legal system
IP possess their own traditional
judicial system, which covers
legal aspects includingc u s t o m a r y l a w s , c o n fl i c tresolution and arbitration andtheir traditional institution that
implements and monitors its
legal system.
In the states of Sabah andSarawak, native courts for the IP
had been formalized by the
British colonial rulers inrecognition of the traditional
legal systems. These courts, play
an important role in resolving
disputes within the indigenous

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
communities. However, suchcourts do not exist in Peninsular
Malaysia for the Orang Asli. In
this regard, many advocates of
the rights of the IP are calling
for the establishment of native
courts in Peninsular Malaysia.
Native Courts serve as a crucial
mechanism in recognizing theindigenous legal system.34
Conclusion
While there are still many issues
concerning the rights of the IP
in Malaysia that need to belooked into and addressed,
efforts have been made byvarious stakeholders to findmeasures that may mitigate if
not resolve these issues. Someof these measures have provento be effective and some caneven be considered as goodpractices.
In addressing the rights of the IP,
it is crucial to take cognizanceof some of the main concerns,
which are as follows:i. Restitution of customarylands that have not been
given such recognition,
redress mechanisms for theloss of the land, review
compensation payment
made on land taken fordevelopment andenhancement of thecapacity of land
departments;
ii. Adoption by government
bodies of the human rightsbased approach todevelopment with theapplication of the Free,
Prior and Informed Consent
principle;
iii. Promotion of sustainable
development models withactive involvement andparticipation of the IP in

JUNE 2019 VOLUME 96
Forest Management andother areas, which do nothave an adverse effect ontheindigenous
communities; andiv. Immediate implementationof corrective measures on
indigenous issues
especially in relation to
health, education,
economic development,
civil and political
reformation, laws andpolicies as well as socialand cultural heritage.
For further information, pleasecontact: SUHAKAM, 11th Floor,
Menara TH Perdana, Jalan
Sultan Ismail, Kuala Lumpur
50250, Malaysia; ph 603-2612
5600; fax 603-2612 5620; email:
humanrights@suhakam.org.my;www.suhakam.org.my.
* This is an edited excerpt of thereport prepared by the
SUHAKAM under the project
entitled "South East Asia
National Human Rights
Institutions Forum (SEANF)
Project on Good Practices in
Promoting and Protecting theRights of Indigenous Peoples."Endnotes
1 Human Rights Commission of
Malaysia (SUHAKAM), Reportof the National Inquiry into theLand Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, (SUHAKAM, 2013).
2 Ibid.
3 Fe d e ra l C o n s t i t u t i o n o f
Malaysia, (n. 11), Article 73.
4 Ibid., Article 74.
5 Ibid., Article 74(2).
6 Ibid., Ninth Schedule.
7 Ibid., Article 8(1), 8(2), 8(3),8(4).
8 Ibid., Article 8(5)(c).

6

9 Ibid., Article 153 (1).
10 Ibid., Article 153(2), 153(3),153(4), 153(8A).
11 Ibid., Article 161A(5).
12 Ibid., Article 45(2).
13 Ibid., Article 8(5)(c).
14 Ibid., Article 153(2).
15 Native Court Enactment, 1992
[En. No. 3/1992]; Native Courts
Ordinance, 1992 [Ord. No.
9/92].
16 Native Court Enactment, 1922
(n 51).
17 Native Court Enactment, 1922
[En. No. 3/1992]; Native Courts
Ordinance, 1992 [Ord. No.
9/92].
18 Laws of Malaysia. Interpretation
O r d i n a n c e ( D e fi n i t i o n o f
Native) Cap 64 [10 December
1952], Section 2; Native Court
Enactment (n. 51); Native
Courts Ordinance, 1992 (n 51).
19 Ibid.
20 Native Court Enactment (n. 51),
Section 9.
21 Ramy Bulan, “Indigenous
Peoples and the Right toParticipate in Decision Making
in Malaysia” in International
Expert Seminar on Indigenous
Peoples and The Right toParticipate in Decision Making,
Chiang Mai, Thailand, 20-22
January2010,<www2.ohchr.org/english/
issues/indigenous/
ExpertMechanism/3rd/docs/
c o n t r i b u t i o n s /UniversityMalaya.doc>
accessed 16 September 2014;Native Court Rules 1993;
Native Courts Ordinance, 1992
(n 51); Native Court Enactment(n. 51).
22 Ramy Bulan (n 56) 10.
23 Nancy Lai, “Upko fully backs
proposed Native Judicial Dept.”
Borneo Post Online(Penampang, 12 July 2010)<www.theborneopost.com/
2010/07/12/upko-fully-backsproposed-native-judicial-dept/>
accessed 29 October 2014.
24 UNDRIP (n 48), Article 29.

(Continued on page 15)

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A Critique on the New Ainu Policy: How Japan’s Politics
of Recognition Fails to Fulfill the Ainu’s Indigenous Rights
Leni Charbonneau and Hiroshi MaruyamaOn 19 April 2019, theJapanese parliament (Diet)
passed the New Ainu Policy(NAP) that replaced the 1997
Ainu Cultural Promotion Act(ACPA). When the NAP bill was
proposed on 15 February 2019,news of the bill was swiftly
picked up by both the Japaneseand international media. The
majority of the news reports
depicted the bill as a positive
measure and inferred that it
would serve as Japan’s long
overdue recognition of the Ainu
as Indigenous Peoples. This is apattern that has reemerged andcontinued with the news of theJapanese Diet’s passing of thebill into law, as widespreadpraise continues to resonate
through the media circuit overJapan’s recognition of the Ainu.
This recognition is in many
ways a culmination ofgenerations of Ainu struggle
against the colonial Japanese
government and, to echo thes e n t i m e n t o f m a ny o t h e rcommentators on the matter,can be seen as a step forward.1
This article, however, will shedlight on the misguided
perception of Japan’s NAP by
the media, and will voice
caution on the implications of
the supposed recognition of the
Ainu embedded within thepolicy. We argue that the NAP isa continuation of the colonial
domination to which the Ainu
have been subjected to forgenerations under the Japanesestate. This stance has two criticaldimensions. First, the operationof the politics of recognition in
the Japanese colonial context
preserves the exploitation of
marginalized communities likethe Ainu. Second, the Japanese
government through the NAP
merely reinforces its constraints
over Ainu self-determination
and autonomy. In doing so, we
demonstrate that the media, in
promoting these recent
movements by the Japanese
government, can be complicit in
the reproduction of an
exploitative colonial order when
it fails to critically assess the
motivations steering Japan’s“recognition” of the Ainu. Thisapproach is based on a
distinction between genuinely
t ra nsf o rm at ive a c t i o n a n daffirmative operations, the latterworks only to support the statusquo. True transformative action,
we argue, is found both in thecritical voices of the Ainu,
wh i ch t h e g ove r n m e n t i scontinuing to obscure throughsymbolic facades like the“recognition” offered by the
N A P, a n d a g e n u i n e
confrontation with colonial
history.
Media Praise of “Recognition”
The first news report of the
proposed bill in English was
published by the Asahi Shimbun
Press on 6 February 2019,2

7

following a joint meeting ofrepresentatives from the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party. The
article is titled, “Bill Finally
Recognizes the Ainu as
Indigenous People of Japan.”
The favorable word choice of“finally” suggests a forward
momentum, depicting the bill asa progressive deed on the partof the Japanese state. The Asahi
Shimbun perhaps set a
precedent with this tone in its
reporting, as several media
outlets followed in applauding
this assumed paradigm shift forJapan and its stance towards its
Indigenous inhabitants.3 Since
the passing of the bill into law
on 19 April 2019 the reception
by
the
media
has
overwhelmingly been the same,with Japan’s “recognition” given
priority in headlines.4
Despite the insinuation that thisrecognition of the Ainu
represents a significant shift inJapan’s attitude towards its
Indigenous (as well as
minoritized) civilians, it(recognition) should be seen as
a strategic tool to maintain acertain colonial order which has
been the status quo in the
country for generations. To see
this point, we must consider
what is at stake in ther e c o g n i t i o n t h a t Ja p a n i s
depicted as “giving” to the Ainu.
Recognition has long been
problematized by voices withinFOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC

JUNE 2019 VOLUME 96
purported to replace to fully see
how the new policy is simply acontinuation of colonial policy.
Ainu Exploitation

Protest against the new Ainu Policy by the Citizens' Alliance on the Examination of Ainu Policy, 3 March 2019, Sapporo

the colonized and minoritizedclasses, perhaps most notably
by Martinique-born Frantz
Fanon, who was criticallyengaged in struggles against
French colonial exploits in
Africa and who wasinstrumental in accelerating a
post-colonial discourse in the20th century. Drawing on
Hegel’s master/slave dialectic,
Fanon assessed the colonial
context as one in which thecolonizer grants recognition toits colonial subject in an effort
to construe a relationship ofdependence, and therefore
domination.5 The very
acknowledgement of existenceof a colonial subject becomesmarked by the colonizers’
recognition and therefore,
legitimation of the colonialsubject in the eyes of thecolonizer. In recognizing thecolonial subject as such, thecolonizer subjugates theIndigenous person to a set ofterms delimiting their
possibilities of existence. In
other words, when Indigenous
status is recognized by acolonizer in the form currently
underway in Japan, what isrecognized is indigeneity as
seen by the colonizer, instead ofthat which is freely determinedby the Indigenous people
themselves.
The NAP embodies this point inthat it takes a prescriptive
approach to Ainu culture andA i n u i n d i g e n e i t y. A n
examination of the contents of
NAP makes this clear. The
reference to the Ainu
indigeneity is only found in thefirst line of Article 1, whichstates the objectives of thepolicy. This line describes the
Ainu as the original inhabitantsof Hokkaido, and does so
without any admission to
Japanese colonial history. In
other articles of the NAP, theAinu are referenced in terms of
ethnicity, which paves a sly
deviation from Indigenous rights
and works to reproduce colonial
policy and attitudes towards
them. To fully understand thispoint, it is useful to first outline
what it is that the NAP is

8

Exploitation of Ainu people andlands has been ongoing for
centuries, though the colonial
era was solidified with theestablishment of the Meiji
government in 1868 and theformal incorporation of theisland of Hokkaido into theJapanese empire. In 1899, thecolonial government passed the
Hokkaido Former Aborigines
Protection Act, which
simultaneously worked to deny
the contemporaneous existenceof an aboriginal population
while aggressively assimilating
those identified as Ainu into theJapanese culture. This act was ineffect until 1997 when theJapanese government passed the
AC PA , wh i ch p r i m a r i l yregulated and constrained what
was allowed as “Ainu culture”
in the eyes of the Japanese state.
The NAP claims as its mission
the “realization of a society inwhich the Ainu can live with
their ethnic pride,” as is statedin Article 1 of the policy. Article
2 elaborates on the sentiment,by narrowly relegating thesources of Ainu ethnic pride tocultural products such as
traditional way of life, music,
dance, and cultural artifacts.
The language of the policy iserroneous in multiple respects.
First, the NAP and media reports
combine indigeneity withethnicity. NAP stresses theethnic pride of the Ainu, which
is drastically different from theiridentity and entitlements as
Indigenous peoples. Whilerights and representation as aminority group are essential forFOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
the Ainu and all minority
communities,6 NAP does notcontain the rights of the Ainu as
original inhabitants of
Hokkaido. The United Nations
Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous People (UNDRIP),
which Japan voted for, affirms
the right of Indigenous peoples
to self-determination, which is
the right to freely determine anddevelop their political status andto freely pursue their economic,
social, and culturaldevelopment.7 Also, the NAP
follows the ACPA by obstructing
the Ainu’s ability to develop
their culture on their own terms
by prescribing what is
considered as “Ainu culture.”
The NAP’s impediment to Ainu
self-determination also infringes
upon other international
agreements to which Japan is
p a r t y. T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a lCovenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
defines Indigenous cultures as
those with indispensable
communal ties to traditionallands and resources.8 It outlines
the states’ obligations on thisbasis:
States parties must therefore
take measures to recognize
and protect the rights ofIndigenous peoples to own,
develop, control, and use theircommunal lands, territories,
and resources, and where they
have been otherwise inhabitedor used without their free andinformed consent, take steps
to return these lands andterritories.

The NAP does not containprovisions regarding
reparations, which would be inline with genuine recognition ofIndigenous citizens and theirrights and entitlements on those

JUNE 2019 VOLUME 96
grounds. Rather, the recognitionin the case of the NAP is notabout facilitating the Ainu’s
realization of their rights but
about the manipulation of theterms of recognition so that itb e n e fi t s t h e J a p a n e s eg ove r n m e n t , a n d i t s ow n
m o t iva t i o n s . Th i s c a n b e
understood in the context ofongoing developments in Japan.
Ainu Culture and Economic
Gain
In 2020, in preparation for the
hosting of the summer
Olympics in Tokyo, Japan ispursuing a development
program that would stimulate
tourist-based revenue
throughout the entire country.
Hokkaido is one place that has
been the target of these
economic aspirations, and the
Ainu community has beenpulled into the scheme. One
particular locus is the town of
Shiraoi, which is currently
seeinglarge-scalereconstruction of an Ainu
cultural theme park. Of note in
the park is the so-called
Symbolic Space for Ethnic
Harmony, a mausoleum where
the ancestral remains currently
held in research institutions
across the country9 will beconsolidated despite decades ofprotest by Ainu activists for the
return of their families’ remains
to their places of origin. The
culture park is expected to draw
many tourists in coordination
with the upcoming Olympics.
These projects have fosteredconcerns about how Japan will
face pressure from theinternational community toreconcile its colonial past with
the Ainu, which has provided
some impetus for its recognitionof the Ainu. However, Japan’s

9recognition and its passing of
the NAP should be read as a
facade which facilitates
continued exploitation of the
Ainu - in this case for economic
gain. This was even madeexplicit by Chief Cabinet
Secretary Yoshihide Suga in the
aforementioned Asahi Shimbun
Press article, who wasinstrumental in drafting the NAP
and was quoted, “Having theworld understand the splendid
aspects of Ainu culture willcontribute to international
goodwill and lead to promotionof tourism.”10 [emphasis ours]
Thus, the motivations of theJapanese government in its
recent moves with the Ainu
legislation and its “recognition”
are clearly an attempt to extract
more use-value out of the Ainu,
their culture, and their land, forthe benefit of the state. Such a
relationship based on
exploitation is a textbook
example of colonizing tactics.
Yet, the NAP and the supposed“recognition” of the Ainu havebeen able to maintain a guise of
progress. A majority of themedia has fallen for this trap
and in its misguided
representation of theimplications of the NAP has
contributed to a perpetuation of
the colonization of the Ainu.
Under-represented Ainu
Th e f a c t t h a t t h e s e l f determination of the Ainu iscompromised with the NAP is adirect reflection of the structures
which created the policy. Ainu
representation in the drafting
process of the NAP has been
severely kept to a minimum.
Two primary advisory councils
are responsible for drafting the
NAP: The Advisory Council for
Future Ainu Policy and The

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
C o u n c i l f o r A i n u Po l i c y
Promotion. The objectives for
the NAP were established in
200911 by the former group in
its final report of that year, andthe Council for Ainu Policy
Promotion drafted the 2019 billin accordance with thoseoutlined objectives. On bothadvisory councils, Ainu
members are a minority. The
Advisory Council for Future
Ainu Policy, for example, hasonly one Ainu member among
the body of eight members.
Furthermore, there has not been
any observable effort to obtainremarks and consensus from thediverse voices and interests of
the Ainu community, such as
the double-minoritized groups
a s t h e K a r a f u t o12 A i n u
Association or the Ainu
Women’s Association. The lackof overall representation or
attempts at diversity
demonstrates the tendency of
government elites to
inaccurately homogenize theAinu, despite their vastdifferences across geographicallocations and interests. The NAP
then acts as a prescriptivist
document, which dictates
possibilities for the Ainu basedon inaccurate and impersonala s su m ption s, and wi thout
seeking adequate input from thevery people of concern. In thisway, the NAP is authoritativeand does not impart any selfdetermination or Ainu
autonomy. By its very nature,
the NAP does not transform acolonial relationship but rather
affirms it. It furthermore lacks afoundation of recognition ofcolonial history, which would
be a genuinely progressive formof recognition.
In conclusion, the media’s
reception of the NAP and its

JUNE 2019 VOLUME 96
fixation on recognition arecomplicit with government
schemes, which are ultimately
working to perpetuate theexploitation of the Ainu. The
passing of the NAP shouldpresent an opportunity tocritique the Japanese
government and its failure toacknowledge its legacies ofdispossession, as opposed to ablind, uncritical wave of support
for an empty and manipulative
form of recognition.
H i r o s h i M a r u ya m a i s t h e
Director of the Centre forEnvironmental and Minority
Policy Studies (CEMPOS), while
Leni Charbonneau is a
researcher in the Center.
For further information, pleasecontact: Hiroshi Maruyama,
Centre for Environmental and
M i n o r i t y Po l i cy S t u d i e s(CEMPOS);e-mail:hiroshi.maruyama0401@gmail.com; http://cemipos.blogspot.com/.

Endnotes
1 The bill for a New Ainu Policy
was described as such by Ainu
activist Shiro Kayano in an
Asahi Shimbun Press article inFebruary 2019. Shiro is the sonof Shigeru Kayano, a renowned
Ainu activist and the first Ainu
member of the Japanese Dietfrom 1994-1998. The New Ainu
Policy was described in a similar manner by Mark John Winchester, a scholar of Indigenous
studies, in a CNN article dated
20 April 2019.
2 The Asahi Shimbun, “Bill finallyrecognizes Ainu as indigenous
people of Japan,” 6 February 2019,www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201
902060037.html.
3 Notable articles are:

10

The Mainichi, “Gov't backs billrecognizing Ainu as indigenous,
gives cash support,”
https://mainichi.jp/english/articl
es/20190215/p2g/00m/0fp/0490
00c;
The Japan Times, “Japan to recognize indigenous Ainu people
f o r t h e fi r s t t i m e , ”
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/20
19/02/15/national/japan-recogni
ze-indigenous-ainu-people-firsttime/; Xinhuanet, “Gov’t approves bill recognizing Ainu as
indigenous people,”
www.xinhuanet.com/english/20
19-02/15/c_137825149.htm;
Simon Denyer, “Japan prepareslaw to finally recognize andprotect its indigenous Ainu people,” The Washington Post, 15
February
2019,
www.washingtonpost.com/worl
d/asia_pacific/japan-prepares-la
w-to-finally-recognize-and-prot
ect-its-indigenous-ainu-people/2
019/02/15/2c85a0d8-3113-11e
9-ac6c-14eea99d5e24_story.ht
ml?utm_term=.812dd23e378.
4 Emiko Jozuka, “Japan’s ‘vanishing’ Ainu will finally be recognized as indigenous people,”www.cnn.com/2019/04/20/asia/
japan-ainu-indigenous-peoplesbill-intl/index.html;
Kyodo News, “Law enacted torecognize ethnic Ainu minority
a s i n d i g e n o u s p e o p l e ,”https://english.kyodonews.net/n
ews/2019/04/6bc1e5ce7de6-la
w-enacted-to-recognize-ethnicainu-minority-as-indigenous-pe
ople.html.
“Law recognizing indigenous Ainu
enacted,” NHK, 20 April 2019,www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/new
s/20190419_26/.
5 For an excellent treatment ofFanon’s theory of recognition in
the colonial context see:
Coulthard, G.S., “Subjects of
empire: Indigenous peoples andthe ‘politics of recognition’ inCanada,” 2007.

(Continued on page 15)

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC

JUNE 2019 VOLUME 96

New Asian Declaration on Human Rights
Praveen Kumar Yadav

The Asian Human Rights
Commission (AHRC) and
the Gwangju-based May 18
Memorial Foundation presented
the Asian Declaration on 18
May 2019 during the 39th
anniversary of the Gwangju
Uprising. The Declaration has
three major components: rightto justice, right to peace andright to culture.1
The Asian Declaration was
adopted in 2018 on theoccasion of the 20th anniversaryof Asian Human Rights Charter:A P e o p l e ’s C h a r t e r. I t
supplements the 1987 Asian
Human Rights Charter, which
was also jointly launched in
Gwangju city by the AHRC and
May 18 Memorial Foundation
on 17 May 1987. The Asian
Charter drew inspiration fromthe great struggles for freedomin Asia, including the struggle of
the Gwangju citizens in 1980.

killings, torture and enforced
disappearances that used tooccur twenty years ago are stilltaking place in Asian countries.
Extrajudicial killings have takenplace allegedly under theleadership of President Rodrigo
Duterte in the Philippines, while
they may take the form of“enforced disappearances” inBangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
and many other countries as
well.
The implementation of ratified
United Nations human rights
conventions has been limited inmany countries in Asia. Existing
national mechanisms to addresshuman rights violations andprovide remedy and reparation
are seen as ineffective; whileother Asian countries do nothave such mechanisms.
On the other hand, violence
and internal and inter-state
conflicts are rampant in Asia.

Need for a New Declaration
Over the past twenty years, theAHRC, the May 18 Memorial
Foundation and other humanrights activists and organizations
promoted the Asian Human
Rights Charter by raising humanrights issues with governments
and the peoples in Asia andurging them to recognize these
problems and find ways toeffectively resolve them.2
However, not much progresshas been achieved over the past
two decades. Extrajudicial

Gwangju Asia Forum 201811

In light of the situation in Asia,
three issues were considered as
needing more emphasis in
human rights work: justice,peace and culture.
Consultation Process
During a period of almost two
years from 2017, the AHRC and
May 18 Memorial Foundation
held subregional consultation
workshops in South andSoutheast Asia (and one
c o n s u l t a t i o n wo r k s h o p i n
Geneva) with human rights
activists and defenders on thedrafting of documents thatwould supplement the Asian
Human Rights Charter. In theseworkshops, participants
discussed the human rights
situation (specifically relating to
the right to justice, right topeace and right to culture) in
their respective countries.

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
On 17-21 February 2018, a
final consultation workshop washeld in Kathmandu attended byhuman rights experts, lawyers
and academicians from different
Asian countries. The final draftof the Asian Declaration was
prepared in this workshop.
The final draft of the declaration
was further discussed with apanel of experts andparticipants during the Gwangju
Asia Forum 2018 held in
Gwangju city. On 16 May
2018, Mr John Joseph Clancey
spoke on the right to justice, Mr
Sanjeewa Liyanage spoke on
the right to culture, and Ms
Sriprapha Petcharamesree, PhD,
spoke on the right to peace. Mr.
Basil Fernando, Policy andProgram Director at the AHRC,
chaired this panel discussion.3
Highlights of the Asian
Declaration
The Asian Declaration reaffirms
the right to effective remedy in
Article 2 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) in declaring the“Right to Justice.” The “Right toJustice” is meant to stress theneed for remedy to humanrights violations committed by
the state.
The “Right to Peace” addresses
the existence of violence andconflicts in the region. The“Right to Culture” recognizes
the diversities existing within
and among societies in Asia.4
The Asian Declaration calls on
State, civil society organizations
and other organs of the society
to fulfil their obligation topromote peace education andeducation for peace. It
encourages further promotion of
the right to cultural diversity by

JUNE 2019 VOLUME 96
adjusting to changing realities.
The Declaration states:5
Cultural diversity is bestprotected when all otherhuman rights are respected.
Culture should not be used
as a tool to infringe on thehuman rights of certain
individuals, especially thatof women. Cultural identity
is important for the wellbeing and dignity of
individuals
andcommunities. No one
should be denied rights on
the grounds of culturaldifferences.

The Asian Declarationencourages discussion of theissues regarding justice, peaceand culture. Human rights
defenders and those interested
in the cause of human rights are
urged to use the Declaration as
guidelines in generating wider
discussion of the issues.
The AHRC and the May 18
Memorial Foundation plan tointegrate the Asian Declaration
into the existing Asian Human
Rights Charter: A People’s
Charter.
Dissemination
The AHRC and the May 18
Memorial Foundation haveorganized subregional
workshops in Sri Lanka6 andIndonesia7 to discuss the rights
to justice, peace and culture.
Other workshops and events forthe discussion of the Asian
Declaration, in addition to theannual Gwangju Asia Forumand the May 18 Academy bothorganized by the May 18
Memorial Foundation, areplanned.

12

Praveen Kumar Yadav is ahuman rights researcher from
Nepal.
For further information, pleasecontact him by e-mail:iprav33n@gmail.com.

Endnotes
1 “Asian Declaration,” Mayzine,
volume 12, April 2019, www.
5 1 8 . o r g / M ay z i n e / 2 0 1 9 0 4 /subpage/sub0101.php.
See Basil Fernando's keynote
address delivered on 16 May
2018 at the Gwangju Human
Rights Forum, “WORLD: Asian
Human Rights Charter
represents the spirit of the
Gwangju uprising,”
23
May
2018,
w w w. a h r c h k . o r g /ruleoflawasia.net/news.php?
id=AHRC-STM-026-2018.
3 Asian Human Rights
Commission, “SOUTH KOREA/
HONG KONG: Gwangju Asia
Forum
2018,”
www.humanrights.asia/news/a h r c - n e w s / A H R C ANM-022-2018/.
4 “Asian Declaration,” op. cit.
5 “Asian Declaration,” ibid.
6 "Activists from South Asia
Discuss on Gwangju
Declarations in Sri Lanka,"
Foundation News, Mayzine,
volume 10, October 2018,
http://518.org/Mayzine/
201810/subpage/sub0302.php.
7 "Foundation, AHRC kicks off
Asian Human Rights Charter
workshop in Indonesia,"
Mayzine, volume 11,
D e c e m b e r 2 0 1 8 , w w w.
5 1 8 . o r g / M ay z i n e / 2 0 1 8 1 1 /subpage/sub0501.php.

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC

JUNE 2019 VOLUME 96

News in Asia-Pacific

Women’s Right to Worship in Sabarimala Temple Upheld
HURIGHTS OSAKAT

he Supreme Court of India
ruled in 2018 that theprohibition of women between
the ages of ten and fifty fromworshipping at the Sabarimala
Temple, a famous pilgrim
temple in the state of Kerala,
was unconstitutional. The
prohibition is provided in the1965 Kerala Hindu Places of
Public Worship (Authorisationof Entry) Rules. These rules
implement the 1965 Kerala
Hindu Places of Public Worship(Authorisation of Entry) Act.

Sabrimala temple by virtueof Rule 3(b) of the 1965
Rules violates the right ofHindu women to freely
practise their religion ande x h i b i t t h e i r d e vo t i o ntowards Lord Ayyappa. Thisdenial denudes them of
their right to worship. The
right to practise religion
under Article 25(1) isequally available to both
men and women of all age
groups professing the samereligion.

The Sabarimala Temple isdedicated to the Hindu deity
Sree Ayyappa, and worshippers
are required to practiceabstinence for forty-one days
before entering the temple.

After the ruling came out,
several groups filed review
petitions seeking its reversal.2
Many worshippers of the temple
also protested the Supreme
Court ruling.3

2006 Petition
In 2006, the Indian Young
Lawyers Association and otherparties filed a petition1 with theSupreme Court of India seeking
to declare the rule (Rule 3[b] of
the Kerala Hindu Places of
Public Worship [Authorisationof Entry] Rules) prohibiting
women from worshipping at the
Sabarimala temple asunconstitutional. On 28
September 2018, the Supreme
Court through the Chief Justice(Dipak Misra) and another
Justice (A.M. Khanwilkar) ruledthat(iii) The exclusionary practicebeing followed at the

Sabarimala Temple4

13

Court Rationale
The Supreme Court decision
discusses the question ofequality in relation to practicing
spiritual beliefs. It explains:
There is inequality on thepath of approach tounderstand the divinity.
The attribute of devotion
to divinity cannot be
subjected to the rigidity
and stereotypes of gender.
The dualism that persists
in religion by glorifying
and venerating women as
goddesses on one handand by imposing rigorous
sanctions on the other
hand in matters of
devotion has to be

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
abandoned. Such adualistic approach and an
entrenched mindset results
in indignity to women anddegradation of their status.
The society has to undergo
a perceptual shift frombeing the propagator ofhegemonic patriarchal
notions of demanding
more exacting standards ofpurity and chastity solely
from women to be thec u l t iva t o r o f e q u a l i t ywhere the woman is in noway considered frailer,
lesser or inferior to man.
The law and the society
are bestowed with the
Herculean task to act aslevellers in this regard...

The court further states:
Th e s u bve r s i o n a n d
repression of women
under the garb of
biological or physiologicalfactors cannot be given theseal of legitimacy. Any rule
based on discrimination orsegregation of women
pertaining to biologicalcharacteristics is not only
unfounded, indefensible
and implausible but canalso never pass the musterof constitutionality.

This view addresses the stanceof the Kerala government andtemple worshippers on the
supposed unclean condition of
women who are menstruating,and thus girls and women fromage ten to fifty are not allowed
to enter the temple and its
precincts.
In this light, the court states:(vi) The notions of publicorder, morality and healthcannot be used as

JUNE 2019 VOLUME 96
colourable device torestrict the freedom tofreely practise religion anddiscriminate against
women of the age group of
10 to 50 years by denying
them their legal right toenter and offer theirprayers at the Sabarimala
temple.
(xii) The language of both theprovisions, that is, Section
3 and the proviso to
Section 4(1) of the 1965
Act clearly indicate that
custom and usage must
make space to the rights ofall sections and classes of
Hindus to offer prayers at
places of public worship.
Any interpretation to thecontrary would annihilate
the purpose of the 1965
Act and incrementally
impair the fundamental
right to practise religion
guaranteed under Article
25(1). Therefore, we holdthat Rule 3(b) of the 1965
Rules is ultra vires the1965 Act.

Current Situation
The Supreme Court of India has
not yet acted on the petitions forreview filed by several groups tooverturn its ruling on the issue.
And the Kerala government’s
tourism promotion of the
Sabarimala temple maintains
the prohibition. One website
accessed on 14 June 2019 has
the following statement:5
People of all castes andcreeds are permitted into
the temple. However, entry
is not allowed to women
between 10 and 50 yearsof age.

14

A final Supreme Court decisionaffirming the right of all women
to enter the Sabarimala temple
can lead to a review of otherreligious practices in India that
discriminate against women.

Endnotes
1 I n d i a n Yo u n g L a w y e r s
Association & Ors. v. The Stateof Kerala & Ors., Supreme Courtof India, Writ Petition (Civil) No.
373 of 2006.
2 Satya Prasoon,“Review
Pe t i t i o n s i n S a b a r i m a l a ,”Supreme Court Observer, 17
October 2018,http://
scobserver.clpr.org.in/beyondthe-court/review-petitions-insabarimala.
3 BBC News, “Sabarimala: The
Indian god who bars womenfrom his temple,” 19 October
2018, https://www.bbc.com/
n e w s / w o r l d - a s i a india-45901014.
4 Photo from Times Headline, “51Women Below 50 Have Entered
S a b a r i m a l a , K e r a l a Te l l s
SupremeCourt,”
www.timesheadline.com/india/
kerala/51-women-below-50have-entered-sabarimala-keralatells-supreme-court-28520.html.
5 S e e K e r a l a To u r i s m ,w w w. k e r a l a t o u r i s m . o r g /destination/sabarimala-temple/
47.

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
Update on Indigenous Peoplesof Malaysia(Continued from page 6)

25 UNDRIP (n 48), Article 10.
26 Johari Talibet al., “Bagaimana
kanak-kanak Orang Asli gagal
di sekolah?,” MALIM: Jurnal
Pengajian Umum Asia Tenggara
8, 2007, 51-76,<http://
journalarticle.ukm.my/1142/1/1.pdf>.
27 Utusan Online, “50% anak Orang
Asli enggan kesekolah,” Utusan
Online (Seremban, 26 September2011) <www.utusan.com.my/u t u s a n / i n f o . a s p ?
y=2011&dt=0927&pub=Utusan_
Malaysia&sec=Selatan&pg=ws_03.htm#ixzz2FYUwQem5>,
accessed 20 December 2012.
28 L i z G o o c h , “ I n d i g e n o u s
M a l ay s i a n s M i s s S ch o o l ,Agency Finds,” The New YorkTimes Online (Kuala Lumpur, 9September
2012)

A Critique on the New Ainu
Policy(Continued from page 10)

6 The term wajin refers to the majority Japanese ethnic group,
and any other group is considered a minority. This would include populations with extended histories in Japan suchas the Zainichi Koreans andother migrant groups. This also
includes the Indigenous inhabitants of Okinawa, who have yet
to receive acknowledgement of
their Indigenous status as the
Ainu have.
7 Indigenous Peoples and theUnited Nations Human Rights
System, Fact Sheet No. 9,
www.ohchr.org/documents/publ

JUNE 2019 VOLUME 96< w w w. ny t i m e s . c o m /2012/09/10/world/asia/10ihteducmalay10.html>, accessed
1 August 2013.
29 B a s e d o n a r e s e a r ch by
University Utara Malaysia
entitled “Children of the Orang
Asli Minority in Malaysia:
Achieving the Malay Language
Literacy” carried out by Abdul
Sukor Shaari, Nuraini Yusoff,
Mohd Izam Ghazali and Mohd
Hasani Dali in 2011.
30 Toh Kit Siang, Pendidikan
Orang Asli: Projek Sarjana
Muda, Universiti Kebangsaan
Malaysia, Bangi. 2008.
31 Prof. Madya Dr. Mohd Fauzi
Mohd Harun et al., “Analisis
Faktor Kemiskinan Orang Asli:
Aplikasi Model Multinomial
Logit,” in Technical Report,
Institute of Research,
Development
andCommercialization (Universiti
Te k n o l o g i M A R A , 2 0 1 0 )<http://eprints.uitm.edu.my/
3
3
0
4
/
1
/

LP_MOHD_FAUZI_MOHD_H
ARUN_10_24.pdf>.
32 Jannie Lasimbang, “Prinsip
Sistem Ekonomi dan Teknologi
Orang Asal” in World
Indigenous Peoples Day, heldin Sabah, 8 August 2011.
33 Colin Nicholas, “The Orang
Asli of Peninsular Malaysia,”
M a g i c R ive r, 1 9 9 7 ,www.magickriver.net/oa.htm,
accessed on 8 August 2012.
34 Jannie Lasimbang, ‘Sistem
Perundangan Orang Asli di
Malaysia’ in Round Table
Discussion on Indigenous
Legal System, held on 18 May
2012.

icationslivepage.apple.co.jp/fs9r
ev.2.pdf
8 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, United Nations,www.ohchr.org/EN/Professional
Interest/Pages/CESCR.aspx
9 There are currently over 1600
Ainu remains being held hostage, with over 1000 of thesebeing stored at Hokkaido University. Ainu activists have beenfighting for the return of theseremains to their villages of origin for decade, as many of themwere taken without free, prior,and informed consent fromtheir respective Ainu relatives.
10 The Asahi Shimbun, op. cit.
11 S e e t h e F i n a l R e p o r t :https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ainu/dai10/siryou1_en.pdf

12 The Karafuto (Sakhalin) Ainu
were forcibly relocated to Hokkaido as a result of Japan’s geopolitical contentions with Russia.

15

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