SERIESPAPERDISCUSSIONIZA DP No. 6666Good Jobs, Bad Jobs, and the Great Recession:
Lessons from Japan’s Lost Decade
Ryo Kambayashi
Takao Kato

June 2012

Forschungsinstitut
zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Studyof Labor

Good Jobs, Bad Jobs, and theGreat Recession: Lessons fromJapan’s Lost Decade
Ryo Kambayashi
Hitotsubashi University

Takao Kato
Colgate University, IZA, CJEB (Columbia),
TCER (Tokyo) and CCP (Aarhus)

Discussion Paper No. 6666
June 2012
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IZA Discussion Paper No. 6666
June 2012

ABSTRACTGood Jobs, Bad Jobs, and the Great Recession:
Lessons from Japan’s Lost Decade*This paper provides novel evidence on the long-term effect of the Great Recession on thequality of jobs, in particular whether the Great Recession results in the replacement of “goodjobs” (characterized by high wage/benefit, job security, and opportunity for training anddevelopment) with “bad jobs” (characterized by the lack of such attributes). Unfortunately
there is not yet sufficiently long data from the recent Great Recession that enable
researchers to study fully its long-term consequences for the labor market structure. To thisend, we examine Japan’s Lost Decade, the original Great Recession that occurred two
decades ago. First, insofar as male workers are concerned, we find evidence against the
popular narrative that during Japan’s Lost Decade there was a significant shift of thecomposition of employment toward “bad jobs.” Second, we find that the composition of
female workers shifted significantly toward “bad jobs” and that such a shift occurred primarily
through an increased use of a hybrid employment contract of nonstandard employment withindefinite contracts. Third, young women in Japan made considerable progress in shifting thecomposition of their employment toward “good jobs” during Japan’s growth decade preceding
the Lost Decade. We find that such progress was entirely undone during the GreatRecession. Obviously the Great Recession affects the quantity of jobs and policy makers
ought to pay immediate attention to such quantity effects. However, the Great Recession
may also have more long-term structural effects on the quality of jobs.
JEL Classification:
Keywords:

J63, J64, J41

job quality, good jobs, bad jobs, Great Recession, Lost Decade, Japan

Corresponding author:
Takao Kato
Department of Economics (Persson 222)
Colgate University
13 Oak Drive
Hamilton, NY 13346
USA
E-mail: tkato@colgate.edu*

This research was facilitated by Kato’s extended visit to Hitotsubashi University as Visiting Scholar
and Kambayashi’s extended visit to the OECD as Consultant in OECD Employment Analysis andPolicy Division. We are grateful for their hospitality. The opinions expressed and arguments employed
here are the responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the OECD. Much ofthis paper draws on Kambayashi (2010) which was supported by Kosei-Rodo Kakenhi (H20-policyyoung-017). Kambayashi, Ryo. “Jyoyo Hi-seiki Rodosha no Shosoh (Several Aspects on Non-regular
Employees in Recent Japan),” Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series 120. March 2010 (inJapanese).

1. Introduction
One of the most pressing issues facing the U.S. and many other advanced market
economies is to assess the long-term effects on their labor markets of the financial meltdown in
the fall of 2008 and the subsequent Great Recession. 1 To respond to the urgent need to inform
policy makers on such an important issue, researchers have been undertaking various research
projects. Reflecting the persistence of high unemployment rates in the U.S. and most other majoradvanced market economies, much of such recent research naturally focuses on job loss andlong-term unemployment (see for example Farber, 2011; 2012, David and von Wachter, 2011;
and Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender, 2012).
Thus far researchers have not paid as much attention to long-term structural effects on thelabor market of the Great Recession. For instance, it will be of great relevance and interest to
policy makers to find out whether the Great Recession resulted in a significant change in thenature and quality of jobs as opposed to the quantity of jobs. More specifically we address thequestion of whether the Great Recession results in the replacement of “good jobs” (characterizedby high wage/benefit, job security, control over own work, and opportunity for training anddevelopment) with “bad jobs” (characterized by low wage, weak job security, lack of control
over own work, and limited opportunity for training and development) or vice versa (seeKalleberg, 2011 for the recent good job/bad job framework). 2,3
Since structural changes such as the replacement of “good jobs” with “bad jobs” tend to1

Though the Great Recession in the U.S. officially ended in 2009, we refer to the ongoing
economic stagnation with persistent high unemployment rates as the Great Recession in this paper.
2
Acemoglu (2001) provides a theoretical model of the determination of the composition of “goodjobs” and “bad job” in the economy.
3
Recently the creation of “good jobs” and “bad job” during the Great Recession has become ahot political issue. Governor Perry buttressed his presidential candidacy by often citing his strong job
creation record in the state of Texas during the Great Recession, while his opponents argue that the bulkof jobs created in Texas during the Great Recession are “bad job”.

1

occur gradually over many years, it is somewhat premature to study fully the long-term
consequences of the Great Recession for the labor market structure. After all, it has been only a
few years since the Great Recession began.
Fortunately, there was another Great Recession across the Pacific two decades ago. At
the end of 1980s, the financial and real estate bubble were burst rather violently in Japan, which
set the country into a prolonged economic stagnation, or the “Lost Decade”. Notwithstanding
some important differences between Japan’s lost decade and the Great Recession, there are some
intriguing similarities (Koo, 2008). A number of serious attempts have been made to contrast theGreat Recession to Japan’s “Lost Decade” in the 1990s, in search for historical lessons withregard to the causes and consequences of such severe and prolonged recession as well as
appropriate policy responses (see, for instance, Hamada, Kashyap, and Weinstein, 2011 andHoshi and Kashyap, 2010).
This paper provides the first rigorous evidence on the long-term effects on the labormarket structure of Japan’s Great Recession which began in early 1990s and lasted for a decade.
Specifically in the ensuing section we provide sufficient background information on the structureof the Japanese labor market and describe “good job” and “bad jobs” in the Japanese context. We
then discuss two commonly used methods to identify the “good job” and “bad job” segments of
the labor market in Japan, and measure the size of each segment.
In section 3 we document changes in the composition of employment (“good jobs” vs.
“bad jobs”) during Japan’s Great Recession, and provide econometric evidence on the economic
consequences of such changes. In section 4, we focus on the fate of youth who are often
considered a major victim of Japan’s Lost Decade. Summary, interpretations and policy
implication are offered in the concluding section.

2

2. “Good jobs” and “Bad jobs” in Japan
In the 1980s, reflecting the impressive rise of Japanese firms as world-class competitors,
the Japanese employment system became a source of wonder for many corporations around theworld and a popular subject of research for scholars in industrial relations, human resource
management, and labor economics. The Japanese employment system consists of clusters ofpractices that are often distinct from the traditional Anglo-American model of flexible labormarket and hierarchical labor-management relations that are apt to be adversarial. A variety of
specific employment practices have been considered key elements of the Japanese employment
system. The following practices are often said to constitute a coherent set of elements of theJapanese employment system.
1. The practice of “lifetime employment” (or implicit long-term employment guarantees forthe regular workforce) and the reward system which fosters lifetime employment (e.g.,seniority wage system in which wage is detached from specific job and seniority plays asignificant role in wage determination). 4
2. Employee involvement and problem solving activities at the grass roots level intended toprovide workers with opportunities to exert discretionary effort, acquire useful local
knowledge, and share it with their co-workers, and higher-level engineers and managers.
They include Shopfloor Committees (SFCs); and various Small Group Activities, such as
QC circles; Zero Defect; Kaizen; JK activities; and cross-functional problem solving
teams.
4

The term “lifetime” is somewhat of a misnomer since except for executives, Japanese workers
have been typically subject to mandatory retirement that occurs around age 60. A precise definition of thepractice of lifetime employment is therefore implicit long-term employment contract that ends at
mandatory retirement for the regular workforce. In addition, the practice of “lifetime employment” does
not necessarily mean that layoffs never happen in large Japanese firms. It has been documented thatJapanese firms, even large ones, did lay off some of their regular employees, following the first oil crisis(see, for example, Koike, 2005, Suruga, 1998, Nakata, 2003, Chuma, 2002).

33. Incentive schemes, such as employee ownership and profit sharing, which align theinterest between workers and the firm, and hence reward them for their wholehearted
participation in such employee involvement programs.
4. Extensive information sharing mechanisms (often called Joint Labor-Management
Committees, JLMCs) involving cooperative enterprise unions to minimize information
asymmetry and facilitate the alignment of interest between labor and management.
5. Careful screening and extensive training aimed at increasing worker ability to effectively
participate in employee involvement/problem solving activities and information sharing
meetings. 5
The Japanese employment system developed over time during the postwar era and was
well-established and deep-rooted in the Japanese society by the end of the high growth period. It
probably contributed significantly to the rise of the Japanese economy (Aoki, 1990, Koike, 2005,
Morita, 2005).
There are, however, a group of Japanese workers who are not covered by the
aforementioned practices of the Japanese employment system and hence do not enjoy long-term
employment, employee participation (both financial and non-financial), and extensive on-the-job
training. Such workers constitute the secondary segment of the Japanese labor market, and often
function as a shock absorber in economic downturns by being the first to let go. Such secondary
segment workers are said to be paid lower wages, enjoy less generous benefit, less control overtheir work, and weaker job security than those primary segment workers covered by the Japaneseemployment system (see for instance Koike, 2005 and Rebick, 2005).
In short, the primary and secondary segment jobs of the Japanese labor market fit well the5

Scholars somewhat differ in the relative importance of each practice (see for example, Koike,
2005, Aoki, 2000, Itoh, 1994, Morita, 2001; 2005, Moriguchi and Ono, 2004 and Rebick, 2005).

4

descriptions of “good jobs” versus “bad jobs” in the recent good job/bad job framework (e.g.,
Kalleberg, 2011). One of the most commonly-held views on Japanese labor market responses to
the Great Recession was that Japanese firms in response to the Great Recession increased theiruse of secondary segment workers relative to primary segment workers (Rebick, 2005, andFarber 2007a). In the framework of “good jobs” versus “bad jobs”, such a popular narrative
suggests that Japan’s Great Recession might have shifted the composition of employment toward“bad jobs”.
Measuring the size of the primary (“good job”) and secondary (“bad job”) segments of
the Japanese labor market is an elusive enterprise (Ono, 2010). There are essentially two
commonly-used methods to identify the primary and secondary segments of the Japanese labormarket. The first method is to take advantage of a distinction used in Japan’s labor force surveys
between employees on indefinite contracts and employees on fixed-term contracts, and consider
employees on indefinite contracts primary segment workers and employees on fixed-term
contracts secondary segment workers.
The second method is based on an alternative distinction between employees being on the
track of “seiki no jyuugyouin (standard employees)” and other employees (nonstandard
employees), and consider such standard employees primary segment workers and other
employees secondary segment employees.
In principle, it is possible, however, for a worker to be on the standard employment track
yet on a fixed-term contract (standard employees on fixed-term contracts). Likewise, it is also
possible for a worker to be on an indefinite contact yet not on the standard employment track(nonstandard employees on indefinite contracts). If such hybrid categories of workers are rare, itwill not matter which method we use to define the primary and secondary segments of the5

Japanese labor market. As shown below, however, it turns out that that is not the case at all andthat nonstandard employees on indefinite contracts have become increasingly popular over theyears, and ultimately have outnumbered nonstandard employees on fixed-term contracts (often
considered the most natural form of contingent work). 6

3. Did the composition of employment shift toward “bad jobs”?
Guided by the conceptual framework discussed in the previous section, we divide thepopulation aged 18-70 into the following groups: (i) standard employees on indefinite contracts(employees on the standard employment track and on indefinite contracts); (ii) nonstandard
employees on fixed-term contracts (employees not on the standard employment track and on
fixed-term contracts); (iii) standard employees on fixed-term contracts (employees on thestandard employment track yet on fixed-term contracts); (iv) nonstandard employees on
indefinite contracts (employees not on the standard employment track yet on indefinite contracts);(v) self-employed; and (vi) others (primarily those not in the labor force).
From the Employment Status Survey for 1982-2007 we calculate the proportion of eachgroup for 1982, 1985, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007. The Employment Status Survey (ESS) is theJapanese counterpart of CPS tenure supplements of the U.S. 7 Figure 1 shows such proportions
including both male and female, while Figures 2 and 3 show them for male and female
separately. First, overall the proportion of standard employees on indefinite contracts (who will
be clearly identified as primary “good job” segment workers by either of the two methods
6

The relevant literature is relatively small yet rich in content (e.g., Houseman and Osawa, 2003,
Ozeki and Wakisaka, 2006, Honda, 2006, Esteban-Pretel, Nakajima, and Tanaka, 2011, Asano, Ito and
Kawaguchi, 2011). However, on our reading of the literature, no prior study examines those hybridgroups and uncovers the relative importance of holding the title of “seiki no jyuugyouin” and being on
indefinite contracts.
7
One major difference between the ESS and CPS is its size. The ESS contains almost nine times
more households than CPS.

6

discussed in the previous section) displays rather remarkable stability over time. During Japan’sGreat Recession, it did fall somewhat yet the magnitude of the fall was modest (42.7 percent in1992 to 37.9 percent in 2002). To be consistent, the proportion of nonstandard employees on
fixed-term contracts who will be unambiguously identified as secondary “bad job” segment
workers by either method also remained relatively stable throughout the period. During Japan’sGreat Recession, there was a corresponding moderate increase in the proportion of suchsecondary segment workers from 6.1 to 8.1 percent.
The most noticeable shift, however, took place among self-employed and nonstandard
employees on indefinite contracts. Self-employed workers as a percentage of the population aged
19-70 were over 20 percent in 1982 and since then they declined precipitously and reached
below 12 percent by 2007. In contrast Figure 1 shows a remarkable increase in the proportion of
nonstandard employees on indefinite contracts. In 1982 such a hybrid type was almost nonexistent yet by 2007 it reached the prominent status of 13 percent which actually exceeded theprevalence of self-employed. It is not immediately clear whether this hybrid should beconsidered “good jobs” or “bad jobs”. We will provide evidence which sheds light on this issue
after we discuss Figures 2 and 3.
When we disaggregate Figure 1 by gender, a sharper picture emerges. For the malepopulation, as shown in Figure 2, astonishingly standard employees on indefinite contracts as apercentage of the population aged 18-70 did not fall at all (actually rose from 58.3 in 1992 to
58.9 percent in 2002) during Japan’s Lost Decade. Insofar as male workers are concerned,
evidence does not support the popular narrative of significant shift of the Japanese labor force
from the primary to the secondary segment during Japan’s Great Recession. Note that the shareof male standard employees on indefinite contracts subsequently fell during Japan’s longest

7uninterrupted positive (though modest) growth in the postwar era and reached 53.4 percent in2007 and that correspondingly the aforementioned hybrid (nonstandard employees on indefinite
contracts) surged from 2.9 percent in 2002 to 7.2 percent in 2007.
Figure 3 (as contrasted to Figure 2) reveals some intriguing gender differences. During
the decade preceding its Great Recession (the heyday of the “Japanese miracle”), Japanesewomen increased their entry into the primary segment steadily (the percentage of female
standard employees on indefinite contracts rose from 23.8 in 1982 to 26.6 percent in 1992).
However, during the Great Recession, they lost what they had gained and the proportion of
female standard employees on indefinite contracts fell from 26.6 in 1992 to 22.1 in 2002. There
was a corresponding increase in the proportion of the hybrid (nonstandard employees on
indefinite contracts) from 8.6 to 13.9 percent.
Meanwhile, self-employment as a percentage of the female population has been
diminishing steadily over the last twenty five years from close to 20 percent in 1982 down to 8
percent in 2007. Back in 1982 self-employment was the second most common mode of work for
women and nonstandard employment with indefinite contracts was almost unheard of. By 2007,
they traded places completely--nonstandard employment with indefinite contracts became thesecond most common mode of work for women after standard employment with indefinite
contracts, whereas self-employment became one of the least common modes of work for women.
The literature on contingent work in Japan often ignores the steadily diminishingimportance of self-employment. An increase in nonstandard employment does not necessarilymean a decrease in standard employment. In the case of Japanese women, in 1992 (the beginningof Japan’s Lost Decade), nonstandard employment (including both indefinite and fixed-term
contracts) constituted 17 percent of the total female population aged 18-70. By the end of the8Lost Decade, nonstandard employment as a percentage of the total female population rose toalmost 25 percent. In other words, during Japan’s Lost Decade, nonstandard employment rose by
8 percentage points. However, it does not mean that standard employment as a percentage of thetotal population fell by 8 percentage points. It actually declined only by 4.5 percentage points.
Much of the discrepancy was due to a considerable fall in self-employment.
As shown below, a shift from standard employment to nonstandard employment turned
out to be a shift from “good jobs” to “bad jobs”. However, a shift from self-employment tononstandard employment does not necessarily mean a shift from “good jobs” to “bad jobs”, andit may well be a movement from “bad jobs” to “bad jobs”. Unfortunately the ESS does notprovide adequate data that will allow us to assess the economic consequences of shifting fromself-employment to nonstandard employment. Yet at least we ought to be cognizant of thepotentially important role that changes in self-employment may play in any discussions on thelong-term impact on the quality of jobs of the Great Recession.
To shed light on the relative importance of being on the standard employment track andbeing on indefinite contracts, and determine whether the rapidly rising hybrid type (nonstandard
employees on indefinite contracts) should be considered the primary “good job” segment or thesecondary “bad job” segment, we estimate the effects on worker outcomes of standard
employment track and indefinite contracts. We begin with a probit model of job loss rate and test
whether being on the standard employment track or being on an indefinite contract is morestrongly associated with job security. 8 Specifically we use the ESS for the most recent year
(2007), and create a dummy variable, jobloss=1 if an employee lost a job as a result of theemployer’s decision unrelated to his/her individual performance (such as downsizing and8

Farber (2009) estimates a similar probit model for the U.S., and we apply a similar specification
to our Japanese job loss data.

9

“recommended” early retirement; bankruptcy and plant closing; and poor business performance)
during the previous year, 0 otherwise. 9 Due to the prevailing practice of mandatory retirement inJapan which was originally set at 55 (and then raised to 60 in the 1990s and 65 in the 2000s), we
focus on age 18 to 54.
Table 1 presents summary statistics where fixedterm=1 if an employee was on a fixedterm contract (as opposed to an indefinite contract) during the previous year, zero otherwise;
nonstandard=1 if an employee was not on the standard employment track during the previous
year, zero otherwise; female=1 if an employee is female, zero otherwise; age=years of age;
ten0to4=1 if an employee’s tenure with the firm was less than 5 years in the previous year, zerootherwise; ten5to9=1 if an employee’s tenure with the firm was between 5 and 9 years in theprevious year, zero otherwise; ten10to14=1 if an employee’s tenure with the firm was between
10 and 14 years in the previous year, zero otherwise; and ten15+=1 if an employee’s tenure withthe firm was greater than 14 years in the previous year, zero otherwise; juniorhigh=1 if an
employee’s highest educational attainment was junior high school during the previous year, zerootherwise; highschool=1 if an employee’s highest educational attainment was high school during
the previous year, zero otherwise; juniorcollege=1 if an employee’s highest educational
attainment was 2-year junior college during the previous year, zero otherwise; university=1 if an
employee’s highest educational attainment was 4-year university during the previous year, zerootherwise. Note that in creating these variables for employees who lost jobs, we use informationon their previous jobs from which they separated.
As shown in the table, the average annual job loss rate for Japanese employees age 18-54
was 3.7 percent in 2007. The proportion of employees on fixed-term contracts was around 7
9

We focus on employees, and hence self-employed individuals are excluded from the data. Our
key results change little even if we include self-employed individuals.

10percent, while the proportion of nonstandard employees was over 20 percent. Around 40 percent
were female. The average age was 38, and the majority of them were high school graduates. 10
Table 2 presents the probit estimates of job loss probability as a function of theaforementioned variables as well as other control variables (firm size, industry, occupation andlocation). Nearly all coefficients are estimated precisely. Most importantly the estimatedcoefficients on fixedterm and nonstandard are positive and statistically significant at the 1
percent level, confirming that employees on fixed-term contracts and nonstandard employees areindeed more likely to lose jobs and therefore enjoy less job security. The marginal effectestimates for fixedterm and nonstandard suggest that being not on the standard employment track
is substantially more damaging for job security than being on a fixed-term contract.
As expected, employees with longer tenure are found to be less likely to lose jobs; andmore educated employees are found to be less likely to lose jobs. The estimated coefficient on
age (and its marginal effect) is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting thatonce tenure is controlled for, older workers are more likely than younger workers to be midcareer hires, and thereby face weaker job security in Japan (Kambayashi and Kato, 2011b). The
estimated coefficient on female (and its marginal effect) is negative and statistically significant at
the 1 percent level. Once obtaining the status of standard employment and being on indefinite
contracts, female employees are actually less likely to lose jobs than their male counterparts. We
suspect this may be due to sorting – those female employees who earned the status of standard
employment on indefinite contracts in spite of various challenges associated with being female
employees possess unusual gifts that are not fully captured by our set of control variables. At any
rate, considering the rather small size of the estimated marginal effect of female, we may not
10

Unfortunately we are unable to use the ESS for earlier years, for the labor turnover module of
the ESS for earlier years does not provide data on whether or not an employee was nonstandard
employees during the previous year.

11want to overstate such sorting story.
To confirm that our key finding is not gender-specific, we repeat the same analysis formale and female employees separately. Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results for male andfemale employees. Reassuringly for both the male sample and the female sample the marginal
effects on job loss rate of being not on the standard employment track remain significant andconsiderably larger than the marginal effects on job loss rate of being on fixed-term contract (infact for female employees, the marginal effect of being on fixed-term contracts is no longer
statistically significantly different from zero). As such, our main finding of the relative
importance of being on the standard employment track to being on indefinite contracts is upheld
regardless of gender.
Next we estimate a standard Mincerian wage equation with log of hourly wage as afunction of a variety of individual and firm characteristics, augmented by fixedterm andnonstandard (two variables to identify the secondary segment workers). 11 As in the case of job
loss, we show the results for all employees first (Table 5) and then for male and female
employees separately (Tables 6 and 7). Good news about the wage regressions is that unlike inthe case of job loss, we need data only on current jobs and hence we will not need to rely on any
data on previous jobs from the labor turnover module of the ESS for which information on thestandard employment track is not available for earlier years. As such we are able to estimate thewage equation for 2007 as well as for earlier years.
As shown in Table 5, the estimated coefficients on nonstandard are consistently negativeand significant at the 1 percent level for each year over the last twenty five years. In contrast, the11

As in the case of many surveys of individuals in Japan, the ESS collects only categoricalearnings data. We calculate hourly wage by dividing median of each category of annual earnings byannual working hours which we also derived from two additional categorical data on annual working days
and weekly working hours.

12estimated coefficients on fixedterm are much smaller and mostly insignificant (actually of wrong
sign almost every time it is significant). The size of the wage penalty for being not on thestandard employment track has been considerable, rising from 16% in 1982 to 26% in 1997 andfalling to 21% in 2007. Note that the estimated wage penalty for nonstandard employees isconditional on age, age2, tenure, tenure2, education, industry, occupation, firm size, and location
as well as female. The estimated coefficients on female are negative and significant at the 1
percent level consistently for all years. The gender pay gap is sizable even after controlling forage, age2, tenure, tenure2, education, industry, occupation, firm size, location, as well as
fixedterm and nonstandard. In 1982, it was almost 40 percent and has been falling steadily toalmost 30 percent in 2007. Tables 6 and 7 again confirm that the relative importance of being on
the standard employment track to being on indefinite contracts for wage is not gender-specific.
Finally, in 2007, the ESS began collecting data on the incidence of company-sponsoredtraining and development. We use the 2007 ESS and estimate a probit model of the incidence ofcompany-sponsored training and development program – probability that an employee
participates in a company-sponsored training and development program as a function of
fixedterm, nonstandard and other control variables. Tables 8-10 present the marginal effectestimates for the overall sample, the male sample, and the female sample respectively. As shownin the tables, again what really matters is whether or not an employee is on the standard
employment track not whether she is on an indefinite contract or on a fixed-term contract. This istrue regardless of gender. Specifically the estimated marginal effect of nonstandard suggests thatafter controlling for the same set of control variables, being not on the standard employment
track makes an employee a 7 percentage-point less likely to participate in a company-sponsoredtraining and development program, which is not trivial considering that the likelihood of the13average employee participating in such a training is about 42 percent.
In sum, we find consistent evidence that insofar as worker outcomes (job security, wage,
and training and development opportunities) are concerned, being on the standard employment
track matters much more than being on indefinite contracts. Put differently, being not on thestandard employment track is strongly associated with weaker job security, lower wage, and lesstraining and development – “bad jobs.” No such strong evidence is found for being on fixed-term
contracts. Thus, we determine that nonstandard employees on indefinite contracts -- the rapidly
rising hybrid type is much closer to the secondary “bad job” segment.

4. What about youth?
Finally, another popular narrative with regard to the victims of Japan’s Lost Decadeconcerns youth (see, for instance, Genda, 2003). To this end, we repeat the same analysis,
limiting the sample to the relevant youth population aged 22-30. Figures 4-6 summarize theresults. Overall, we find evidence in favor of this popular narrative. As shown in Figure 4, among
youth, there was a ten-percentage point drop in standard employees on indefinite contracts as apercentage of the population during the Great Recession (63.5 in 1992 to 53.8 percent in 2002).
There was a corresponding rise in nonstandard employees on indefinite contracts as well as
nonstandard employees on fixed-term contract. Japan’s Lost Decade was indeed accompanied
by a shift of the composition of youth employment toward “bad jobs.”
An intriguing historical gender difference is revealed in Figures 5 and 6. Among maleyouth, the proportion of standard employees on indefinite contracts remained quite high around76-77 percent during Japan’s growth decade preceding the Lost Decade. During the Lost Decade,however, it declined by about 10 percentage points, and during the post-Lost Decade recovery

14

period, there was no recovery in the proportion of standard employees on indefinite contracts. In
contrast, during Japan’s growth decade of 1982-1992, young women in Japan had a significant
stride toward “good jobs” – standard employees on indefinite contracts as a percentage of therelevant population rose by about ten percentage points from below 40 percent in 1982 to close
to 50 percent in 1992. It appears as if nearly all of such gains were lost during Japan’s Lost
Decade. Meanwhile, nonstandard employment with and without indefinite contracts aspercentages of the population surged from 6.2 to 14.6 percent and from 6.4 to 10.7 percent
respectively.
In sum, it is the case that for both genders the composition of youth employment shifted
significantly toward “bad jobs” during Japan’s Great Recession. For young women in Japan,such a loss of “good jobs” during Japan’s Great Recession meant a complete undoing of progress
they had made during the preceding decade.

5. Concluding remarks: Summary, Interpretations, and Policy Implications
This paper has provided novel evidence on the possible long-term effects of the GreatRecession on the nature and quality of jobs as opposed to the quantity of jobs. More specifically
we have addressed the question of whether the Great Recession results in the replacement of“good jobs” (characterized by high wage/benefit, job security, and opportunity for training anddevelopment) with “bad jobs” (characterized by the lack of such attributes). Since structuralchanges such as the replacement of “good jobs” with “bad jobs” tend to occur gradually overmany years, it is somewhat premature to study fully the long-term consequences of the mostrecent Great Recession following the financial crisis in the fall of 2008 for the labor market
structure. After all, it has been only several years since the Great Recession began, and there is15

not yet sufficiently long data that enable researchers to study their long-term effects. To this end,
we have chosen to look across the Pacific and examine Japan’s Lost Decade, the original GreatRecession that occurred two decades ago.
Overall we have found evidence that is not consistent with the popular narrative thatJapan’s Lost Decade was accompanied by a significant shift of the composition of employment
toward “bad jobs.” In particular, we have found no evidence for such a shift insofar as the total
male population is concerned. However, we have found that the composition of female
employment shifted significantly toward “bad jobs” and that such a shift occurred primarily
through an increased use of a hybrid employment contract of nonstandard employment withindefinite (open-ended) contracts.
Perhaps most revealing findings concern Japanese youth employment. We have foundthat the composition of youth employment shifted significantly toward “bad jobs” during Japan’sGreat Recession. Particularly young women in Japan made considerable progress in shifting thecomposition of their employment toward “good jobs” during Japan’s growth decade preceding
the Lost Decade. Unfortunately our evidence indicates that such progress was entirely undone
during the Great Recession.
We interpret the undoing of the progress made by Japanese women (especially young
women) as follows. As discussed earlier, the Japanese employment system was established as acoherent cluster of complementary employment policies and practices during the postwar highgrowth era. Many argued (and some provided evidence) that the Japanese employment system
contributed significantly to the rise of the Japanese economy (Aoki, 1990, Koike, 2005, Morita,
2005, and Kato and Morishima, 2002)
The strong complementarity of various elements of the Japanese employment system or16

institutional complementarity makes the Japanese employment system responds to external
shocks slowly (Aoki, 2000). Instinctive and hasty changes even in one element of the Japaneseemployment system may cause the whole system to halt due to the intricate complementaryinterplay between the changing element and the remaining elements of the system. As such,deliberate and prudent responses are more reflective of the nature of the Japanese system.
For instance, a rushed decision to break implicit long-term employment contracts andterminate some of their “lifetime employment” workers will undermine incentive for theremaining “lifetime employment” workers to continue to invest in firm-specific human capital,and produce and share with their supervisors valuable firm-specific local knowledge.
Furthermore, such a rushed decision may have a lasting negative reputational effect onprospective employees in the future.
How then did the Japanese employment system achieve downward labor input
adjustments necessitated by prolonged stagnation without jeopardizing the aforementioned
incentive for the remaining “lifetime employment workers” and amplifying the negative
reputational effect? To answer this question adequately will require an understanding of thedecade preceding Japan’s lost decade or the bubble period. During the bubble, many Japanesefirms experienced severe labor shortages. As a way to respond to such labor shortages, theJapanese employment system converted some of the secondary “bad job” segment into theprimary “good job” segment. Many of those who benefited from this conversion were women(Moriguchi and Ono, 2004 and Ariga, Ohkusa and Brunello, 1999).
Such expansion members of the primary segment of the labor market probably started toinvest in firm-specific human capital and produce firm-specific local knowledge and share itwith the firm as a result of newly granted admissions to the primary segment. The cost of17

reneging on implicit long-term contracts with such expansion members is, however, still
substantially lower than the cost of doing so with the original members since the amount of firmspecific human capital investment and firm-specific local knowledge production are still smaller
for the expansion members than for the original members. Moreover, the breach of the implicit
long-term contracts has both immediate adverse incentive effect on the remaining members andlasting negative reputational effect on prospective members in the future. Such adverse effects ofcontract breach are also likely to be smaller when the victims of such contract breach are theexpansion members with a relatively short history of being in the primary good job segment
rather than the original members.
In light of the aforementioned difference in the cost of contract breach, it appears to berational for Japanese firms in dire need for employment adjustment to withdraw their promise of“good jobs” from the expansion members of the primary segment (e.g., female workers) while
continuing to honor their promise of “good jobs” to the original members. In other words, theexpansion members appeared to have served as an elaborate shock absorber and helped Japanesefirms honor their promise of “good jobs” to the original members, which in turn contributes tothe stability of the Japanese employment system.
To further shed light on the nature of the movement of female employment (especially
youth female employment) toward “bad jobs” through the rising use of nonstandard employment
with indefinite contracts, we study the industrial and occupational breakdown of employees who
fall into this category of employment. Figure 7 shows the industry distribution of nonstandard
employees on indefinite contracts. As a reference we also show the industry distribution ofstandard employees on indefinite contracts in Figure 8. Nonstandard employment with indefinite
contracts is particularly popular among retail and wholesale services and hospitality industries.

18

In terms of occupations, likewise, as shown in Figures 9 and 10, service occupation is a popular
destination for the hybrid model (nonstandard employment with indefinite contracts). The
movement toward “bad jobs” through the rising use of the hybrid employment contracts(nonstandard on indefinite contracts) appears to correspond to the movement from the
manufacturing-based employment system to the service-based employment system. 12
One cautionary finding from the paper has been the potentially important role of changes
in self-employment. Specifically for women a rise of nonstandard employment does not translate
immediately into a fall of standard employment. In fact, only a half of the rise of nonstandard
employment as a percentage of the total female population translates into the fall of standard
employment during Japan’s Lost Decade, for during the same period self-employment as apercentage of total female population also fell significantly. We have shown that a movementfrom standard employment to nonstandard employment is likely to be a shift from “good jobs” to“bad jobs”. Nevertheless it is not clear if a shift from self-employment to nonstandard
employment is a movement from “good jobs” to “bad jobs”.
Let us conclude by discuss some policy lessons from Japan’s lost decade. During the Lost
Decade, Japan’s unemployment rate never exceeded 5.4 percent. A quick comparison of OECDharmonized unemployment rates among major advanced economies over the last twenty five
years gives us an impression that Japan weather her own Great Recession rather well in terms of
the labor market outcomes. When we go beyond the quantity of jobs and start analyzing thequality of jobs, however, a more nuanced assessment of the labor market outcome during Japan’sGreat Recession emerges – heterogeneous labor market effects of the Great Recession.
For policy makers who are concerned about the long-term effect on the labor market of
12

Unfortunately the ESS changed its industry classification system in 2007, which makes it
difficult to construct those figures consistently for earlier years.

19the recent financial crisis and ensuing global Great Recession, Japan’s Lost Decade provides avaluable lesson. Obviously the Great Recession affects the quantity of jobs and policy makers
ought to pay immediate attention to such quantity effects. However, it is quite plausible that theGreat Recession may have more long-term structural effects on the nature and quality of jobs.
Such quality effects may appear only after a long gestation period and can be difficult to detect.
Nonetheless precisely because of their potentially profound consequences for the wellbeing ofworkers and the society, policy makers may need to be particularly cognizant of the long-term
effects of the Great Recession on the structure of the labor market in general and any shifts of thecomposition of employment in particular.

20

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22

Table 1 Summary Statistics for Probit Analysis of Job Loss in 2007
observation
mean
1512080.037
jobloss
151208
0.071
fixedterm
1512080.212
nonstandard
1512080.393
female15120837.846age
15120815.358age2/100
1512080.284
ten0to4
1512080.219
ten5to9 (base)1512080.139
ten10to14
1512080.358
ten15+
1512080.061
juniorhigh (base)1512080.621
highschool
1512080.091
juniorcollege1512080.227
university
Sources: the Employment Status Survey, 2007.
Notes: For variable definitions, please see text.

23

Table 2 Probit Estimates of the Determinants of Job Loss Probability in 2007: All employees
Dependent Variable: Jobloss=1 if the employee lost a job during the previous year, 0 otherwise
fixedterm
nonstandard
femaleage
age2
ten0to4ten10to14
ten15+
highschool
juniorcollege
university
obs
obs prob

Coeff.

s.e.

0.053
0.208
-0.051
0.072-0.0830.309-0.053-0.332-0.045-0.044-0.120

0.023
0.018
0.017
0.005
0.007
0.017
0.022
0.021
0.024
0.032
0.030

**
***
***
***
***
***
**
***
*
***
151208
0.037

M.E.

s.e.

0.003
0.014
-0.0030.004-0.0050.022-0.003-0.019-0.003-0.003-0.007

0.002
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.002
0.002
0.002

**
***
***
***
***
***
**
***
*
***

Sources: the Employment Status Survey, 2007.
Notes: For variable definitions, please see text. The omitted tenure category is 5-9 years of tenure (ten5to9). The omitted educational attainment
category is junior high school or less. Firm size, industry, occupation and location are also controlled for.
***significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level.

24

Table 3 Probit Estimates of the Determinants of Job Loss Probability in 2007: Male employees
Dependent Variable: Jobloss=1 if the employee lost a job during the previous year, 0 otherwise
fixedterm
nonstandardage
age2
ten0to4ten10to14
ten15+
highschool
juniorcollege
university
obs
obs prob

Coeff.

s.e.

0.122
0.218
0.077
-0.0830.314-0.114-0.426-0.035-0.044-0.107

0.042
0.031
0.008
0.010
0.024
0.031
0.028
0.031
0.057
0.037

***
***
***
***
***
**
***

***

M.E.

s.e.

0.007
0.013
0.004
-0.0040.019-0.005-0.021-0.002-0.002-0.005

0.003
0.002
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.001
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.002

***
***
***
***
***
**
***

***

91769
0.031

Sources: the Employment Status Survey, 2007.
Notes: For variable definitions, please see text. The omitted tenure category is 5-9 years of tenure (ten5to9). The omitted educational attainment
category is junior high school or less. Firm size, industry, occupation and location are also controlled for.
***significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level.

25

Table 4 Probit Estimates of the Determinants of Job Loss Probability in 2007: Female employees
Dependent Variable: Jobloss=1 if the employee lost a job during the previous year, 0 otherwise
Coeff.

s.e.

M.E.

s.e.

fixedterm
nonstandardage
age2
ten0to4ten10to14
ten15+

0.033
0.223
0.072
-0.0900.295
0.029-0.195

0.027
0.023
0.008
0.010
0.024
0.033
0.034

0.003
0.018
0.006
-0.0070.025
0.002-0.014

0.002
0.002
0.001
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.002

highschool
juniorcollege
university
obs
obs prob-0.0350.040-0.0030.003-0.032-0.102

0.046
0.052

-0.002-0.007

0.003
0.003

***
***
***
***
***

**

***
***
***
***
***

**

59439
0.046

Sources: the Employment Status Survey, 2007.
Notes: For variable definitions, please see text. The omitted tenure category is 5-9 years of tenure (ten5to9). The omitted educational attainment
category is junior high school or less. Firm size, industry, occupation and location are also controlled for.
***significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level.

26

Table 5 OLS Estimates on the effects on log of hourly wage of being on fixed-term contracts and being not on the standard
employment track over 1982-2007: all employees

Year
Dependent variable
fixedterm
nonstandard
femaleObservations
Adj. R­squared

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

1982

1987

1997
1992
ln (hourly wage)

2002

2007

-0.034 ***(0.004)0.004(0.004)0.000(0.004)0.015 ***
(0.003)0.001(0.003)0.018 ***
(0.003)-0.160 ***-0.173 ***-0.227 ***-0.256 ***-0.220 ***(0.004)(0.003)(0.003)(0.003)(0.003)-0.208 ***(0.003)-0.391 ***-0.365 ***-0.373 ***-0.351***-0.331 ***-0.292 ***(0.002)(0.002)(0.002)(0.002)(0.002)(0.002)3109300.587

3128960.568

4051550.562

3936140.556

3422590.522

346561
0.461

Sources: the Employment Status Survey, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007.
Notes: For variable definitions, please see text. All regressions include the following controls: age, age2, tenure, tenure2, education, industry,
occupation, firm size, and location. Standard errors in parentheses.
***significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level.

27

Table 6 OLS OLS Estimates on the effects on log of hourly wage of being on fixed-term contracts and being not on the standard
employment track over 1982-2007: male employees

Year
Dependent variable
fixedterm
nonstandard
Observations
Adj. R­squared

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

1982

1987

1997
1992
ln (hourly wage)

2002

2007

-0.047 ***(0.005)-0.019 ***(0.006)-0.035 ***(0.005)-0.011 **(0.005)-0.002(0.005)0.032 ***
(0.005)-0.110 ***-0.122 ***-0.135 ***-0.187 ***-0.196 ***-0.221 ***(0.005)(0.005)(0.004)(0.004)(0.004)(0.004)2096430.545

2073360.539

2609170.525

2536910.529

2174030.508

2147290.460

Sources: the Employment Status Survey, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007.
Notes: For variable definitions, please see text. All regressions include the following controls: age, age2, tenure, tenure2, education, industry,
occupation, firm size, and location. Standard errors in parentheses.
***significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level.

28

Table OLS Estimates on the effects on log of hourly wage of being on fixed-term contracts and being not on the standard employment
track over 1982-2007: female employees

Year
Dependent variable
fixedterm
nonstandard
Observations
Adj. R­squared

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

1982

1987

1997
1992
ln (hourly wage)

2002

2007

­0.033 ***­0.015 ***­0.020 ***­0.012 **(0.006)­0.008(0.006)(0.005)(0.005)(0.005)(0.005)­0.160 ***­0.151 ***­0.228 ***­0.243 ***­0.213 ***­0.185 ***(0.005)(0.005)(0.004)(0.004)(0.004)(0.004)

1012870.432

1055600.421

1442380.427

1399230.434

1248560.412

1318320.351­0.009 *Sources: the Employment Status Survey, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007.
Notes: For variable definitions, please see text. All regressions include the following controls: age, age2, tenure, tenure2, education, industry,
occupation, firm size, and location. Standard errors in parentheses.
***significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level.

29

Table 8 Probit Estimates on the marginal effects on the incidence of company-sponsored training of being on fixed-term contracts andbeing not on the standard employment track in 2007: All employees

Dependent variables

Pro (participation incompany­sponsored training
and development program)

fixedterm

0.004(0.004)

nonstandard-0.072 ***(0.003)female­0.007 ***Observations(0.002)
Pseudo R­squared

345238
0.139

Obs. Probability

0.417

Predicted Probability

0.403

Sources: the Employment Status Survey, 2007.
Notes: For variable definitions, please see text. All regressions include the following controls: age, age2, tenure, tenure2, education, industry,
occupation, firm size, location, hourly wage, annual hours worked, and intention to quit. Standard errors in parentheses.
***significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level.

30

Table 9 Probit Estimates on the marginal effects on the incidence of company-sponsored training of being on fixed-term contracts andbeing not on the standard employment track in 2007: male employees

Dependent variables

Pro (participation incompany­sponsored training
and development program)

fixedterm-0.003(0.006)

nonstandard
Observations-0.071 ***(0.004)

Pseudo R­squared

213936
0.116

Obs. Probability

0.425

Predicted Probability

0.414

Sources: the Employment Status Survey, 2007.
Notes: For variable definitions, please see text. All regressions include the following controls: age, age2, tenure, tenure2, education, industry,
occupation, firm size, location, hourly wage, annual hours worked, and intention to quit. Standard errors in parentheses.
***significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level.

31

Table 10 Probit Estimates on the marginal effects on the incidence of company-sponsored training of being on fixed-term contracts
and being not on the standard employment track in 2007: female employees

Dependent variables

Pro (participation incompany­sponsored training
and development program)

fixedterm

0.002(0.005)

nonstandard
Observations-0.058 ***(0.004)

Pseudo R­squared

131302
0.187

Obs. Probability

0.404

Predicted Probability

0.384

Sources: the Employment Status Survey, 2007.
Notes: For variable definitions, please see text. All regressions include the following controls: age, age2, tenure, tenure2, education, industry,
occupation, firm size, location, hourly wage, annual hours worked, and intention to quit. Standard errors in parentheses.
***significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level.

32

Figure 1 Different categories of workers as percentages of the population aged 18-70 in Japan: 1982-2007
100

90

80

70

60

50

40

21.6

19.5

2.7

3.8

5.5
0.5

6.1
0.3

17.9

15.7

5.5

7.0

6.1
0.4

6.5
0.4

11.9
13.5

9.4

12.9

8.1

7.8

0.2

0.2

37.9

38.3

2002

2007

30

20

40.7

40.9

42.7

42.1

1982

1987

1992

1997

10

0
standard employees on indefinite contracts
non‐standard employee on fixed‐term contracts
self‐employedstandard employees on fixed‐term contracts
non‐standard employees on indefinite contracts

33

Figure 2 Different categories of workers as percentages of the population aged 18-70 in Japan: 1982-2007 and male

100

90

80
23.7
16.8

70

60

1.6
3.5
0.6

4.8
5.3
0.3

21.7

20.6

18.5

15.9

1.8
3.8
0.5

2.4
3.8
0.5

2.9
4.1
0.5

7.2

58.3

59.1

5.5
0.3

50

40

30

58.2

53.9

58.9

53.4

20

10

0
1982
1987
1992
standard employees on indefinite contracts
non‐standard employees on fixed‐term contracts
self‐employed

1997
2002
2007
standard employees on fixed‐term contracts
non‐standard employees on indefinite contracts

34

Figure 3 Different categories of workers as percentages of the population aged 18-70 in Japan: 1982-2007 and female
100
90
80
70
60
7.9
50
19.6

30

12.9

10.2

8.6

11.1

13.9

8.4
0.2

0.3

17.3

40
3.8

15.4

5.8

7.4
0.3

8.3
0.2

23.8

24.0

9.0

20
10

18.6

26.6

25.5

10.9

10.0

0.1

0.1

22.1

23.3

0
1982
1987
1992
standard employee on indefinite contracts
non‐standard employee on fixed‐term contracts
self‐employed

1997
2002
2007
standard employees on fixed‐term contracts
non‐standard employees on indefinite contracts

35

Figure 4 Different categories of workers as percentages of the population aged 22-30 in Japan: 1982-2007
100

90

80

70

60

9.0
1.9
4.5
0.4

5.6

4.7

6.8

4.2

6.0

2.8

5.1
0.4

5.4
0.3

6.2
0.5

2.8
3.8
10.5

14.7

8.7

8.4

0.3

0.3

53.8

53.2

50

40

30

57.5

59.9

63.5

60.8

20

10

0
1982

1987
1992
standard employees on indefinite contracts
non‐standard employees on fixed‐term contracts
self‐employed

1997
2002
2007
standard employees on fixed‐term contracts
non‐standard employee on indefinite contracts

36

Figure 5 Different categories of workers as percentages of the population aged 22-30 in Japan: 1982-2007 and male
100

90
9.7
80

1.0
3.4
0.6

7.6

6.6

1.5
4.0
0.4

2.3
3.9
0.4

5.9
3.4

5.0

3.7

4.7
0.5

6.5

10.4

70

6.9
0.4

7.3
0.4

60

50

40

76.0

76.4

77.3

74.1
65.9

30

63.4

20

10

0
1982

1987
1992
standard employee on indefinite contracts
non‐standard employee on fixed‐term contracts
self‐employed

1997
2002
2007
standard employee on fixed‐term contracts
non‐standard employee on indefinite contracts

37

Figure 6 Different categories of workers as percentages of the population aged 22-30 in Japan: 1982-2007 and female
100

90

80
1.8

70
3.5

4.5
60
6.0
50

40

8.4

4.0

2.8

6.8
0.2

5.6
0.2

6.2

8.7

6.4
0.3

7.8
0.4

2.5
14.6

10.7
0.2

19.1

9.5
0.2

30
49.3
20

39.0

47.1

43.2

41.2

42.6

10

0
1982

1987
1992
standard employee on indefinite contracts
non‐standard employee on fixed‐term contracts
self‐employed

1997
2002
2007
standard employees on fixed‐term contracts
non‐standard employees on indefinite contracts

38

Figure 7 Industry distribution of nonstandard employees on indefinite contracts
forestry, 0.0 mining, 0.0
agriculture, 1.0 construction, 3.0
fishery, 0.1

government, 0.7

others, 4.3

misc. services, 14.5

manufacturing, 16.7

integrated services, 0.4
public utilities, 0.2
communucation, 2.7

education, 3.2

transportation, 4.5
medical services, 9.1

hospitality, 9.7

retail/wholesale, 26.4

real estate, 1.1
finance/insurance, 2.3

39

Figure 8 Industry distribution of standard employees on indefinite contracts
agriculture, 0.7
others, 2.5 fishery, 0.1 mining, 0.1
forestry, 0.1

government, 5.6construction, 8.6

misc. services, 11.0
integrated services, 1.1
manufacturing, 21.8
education, 5.2

medical services, 10.4

public utilities, 1.0
communucation, 4.5
hospitality, 2.4
real estate, 1.0
finance/insurance, 3.5

retail/wholesale, 14.3

40transportation, 6.2

Figure 9 Occupational distribution of nonstandard employees on indefinite contracts
administrative,
0.1
others,
3.3 specialist, 7.8

production andconstruction, 29.8

clerical, 24.1

transportation andcommunucation, 2.2
agricultural, 1.0

sales, 13.6
service, 17.0

security, 1.041

Figure 10 Occupational distribution of standard employees on indefinite contracts
others, 2.4

specialist, 18.8

production andconstruction, 26.4

administrative, 1.3

clerical, 23.8transportation andcommunucation, 4.3
agricultural, 0.9
security, 2.5

service, 6.2

sales, 13.5

42