The Japan‐US‐Asia Dialogue“An East Asian Community andthe United States”
Conference Papers

June 22, 2006
Toranomon Pastoral
Tokyo, Japan

Co‐sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC)
The Pacific Forum CSIS

Supported by
The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP)Table of Contents
1. Program ……………….………………………………………………………… 1
2. Biographies of the Panelists ………….…………………………………… 2
3. Keynote Papers ……………….………………………………………………… 4
Session Ⅰ“An East Asian Community after the First East Asia Summit”(1) Paper Presenter ………………………………………………………………………………
by Dr. JIMBO Ken, Senior Research Fellow, the Japan Forum on International Relations

4(2) Paper Presenter ……………………………………………………………………………… 19
by Dr. FUKUSHIMA Akiko, Director of Policy Studies and Senior Fellow, National Institutefor Research Advancement

Session Ⅱ“An East Asian Community and the United States″(1) Paper Presenter …………………………………………………………………………… 40
by Mr. Ralph COSSA, President, the Pacific Forum CSIS
(2) Paper Presenter …………………………………………………………………………… 56
by Mr. Simon TAY, Chairman, Singapore Institute of International Affairs

4. An Introduction to GFJ ……………………………………………………… 79
5. An Introduction to CEAC …………………………………………………… 82
6. An Introduction to Pacific Forum CSIS ………………………………… 85

1. Program“The Japan-US-Asia Dialogue:
An East Asian Community and the United States”

June 22, 2006 / Toranomon Pastoral

Co-Sponsored by the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ),
the Pacific Forum CSIS and the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC)
Supported by the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP)

Thursday June 22, 2006
9:30

Registration

10:00-12:30

Session Ⅰ

Opening Remarks (7 min)Moderator
Paper Presenter (15 min)Paper Presenter (15 min)Lead Discussant (7 min)Lead Discussant (7 min)Lead Discussant (7 min)Free Discussions (90 min)12:30-13:30

Break

13:30-16:00

Session Ⅱ

Moderator
Paper Presenter (15 min)Paper Presenter (15 min)Lead Discussant (7 min)Lead Discussant (7 min)Lead Discussant (7 min)“Laurel” Toranomon Pastoral, 5th Floor
An East Asian Community after the First East Asia Summit
Prof. ITO Kenichi, President, the Global Forum on Japan (GFJ)
Prof. TANAKA Akihiko, Professor, the University of Tokyo
Dr. JIMBO Ken, Senior Research Fellow, the Japan Forum on International Relations
Dr. FUKUSHIMA Akiko, Director of Policy Studies and Senior Fellow, National
Institute for Research Advancement
Dr. Edy PRASETYONO, Head of Department of International Relations, Centre forStrategic and International Studies (CSIS) (Indonesia)
Dr. Prapat THEPCHATREE, Chair, ASEAN Studies Program, Institute of East AsianStudies, Thammasat University (Thailand)
Dr. Charles MORRISON, President, the East-West Center (US)All Participants

An East Asian Community and the United States
Prof. Jae Ho CHUNG, Professor and Chair, Department of International Relations,College of Social Sciences, Seoul National University (Korea)
Mr. Ralph COSSA, President, the Pacific Forum CSIS (US)Mr. Simon TAY, Chairman, Singapore Institute of International Affairs (Singapore)
Dato’ Mohamed JAWHAR Hassan, Chairman and CEO, Institute of Strategic andInternational Studies Malaysia (Malaysia)
Prof. TANAKA Akihiko
Dr. Charles MORRISON–Break (5 min) –Free Discussions (90 min)Closing Remarks (2 min)All Participants
Amb. KAI Noritake, Governor, GFJ

12. Biographies of the Panelists[Foreign Panelists]
Prof. Jae Ho CHUNG

Department of International Relations, College of Social Sciences, Seoul
National University
Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 1993. Served as Visiting Senior Fellow, East Asian Institute, National
University of Singapore (2004) and NAPS Fellow, The Brookings Institution (2002–2003). Concurrently, serves various
positions including Advisory Council Member, Ministry of Unification, Advisory Council Member, National Security
Council and KIDA‐Fellow, Korean Institute for Defense Analysis. He is the Founding Coordinator of the Korean
Association of Chinese Political Studies (KACPS). Specializing in Chinese politics, especially center‐province relations
and Sino‐Korean relations.

Mr. Ralph COSSA

President, Pacific Forum CSIS
Served in the United States Air Force (1966‐93), achieving the rank of Colonel, and last serving as Special Assistant to
the Commander‐in‐Chief, U.S. Pacific Command. Served previously as Deputy Director for Strategic Studies, theNational Defense Universityʹs Institute for National Strategic Studies. Concurrently Board Member of the Council on
U.S.‐Korean Security Studies and the National Committee on U.S.‐China Relations (NY), Member of the International
Institute for Strategic Studies (London) and the Asia Foundationʹs Task Force on Americaʹs Role in Asia. Also, Memberof the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Experts and Eminent Persons Group and Founding Member of the Steering
Committee of the multinational Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP).

Dato’ Mohamed JAWHAR Hassan

Chairman and CEO, Institute of Strategic and International Studies
Malaysia
Served in various positions in the government including Director‐General, Department of National Unity,
Under‐Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Director (Analysis) Research Division, Prime Minister’s Department,
Principal Assistant Secretary, National Security Council, and Executive Secretary, Border Security Committee
Malaysia/Thailand. Concurrently Member, National Unity Advisory Panel, Member, Penang State K‐ICT Council, andSecretariat Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific.

Dr. Charles MORRISON

President, the East‐West Center
Ph.D. in international relations from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Serving as aninternational chair of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC). Founding member of the U.S. Asia PacificCouncil, the U.S. National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation and a member of the U.S. Committee for
Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific. Served as a chair of the U.S. National Consortium of APEC Study Centers, a
director of the Centerʹs Program on International Economics and Politics and a former U.S. Senate aide and a researchadviser to binational Japan‐U.S. commissions. He specializes in issues on Asia Pacific international relations U.S. Asia
policy and trade policy.

Dr. Edy PRASETYONOHead of Department of International Relations, Centre for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS)
B.A. from University of Indonesia in 1989, and MA and Ph.D. from Birmingham University in 1999 and 2001,
respectively. Served as a visiting fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) (1991), a visiting researcher,
Australian Defense Studies Center (1993), and a visiting lecturer, Air Force Staff College (1992‐1997). Concurrently,
serving as a member of the Indonesian Committee, Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), avisiting lecturer at the Naval Staff College, Indonesia, and visiting lecturer of Joint Staff College Indonesia. His
research interests include security issues in Asia Pacific, defense and military studies.

Mr. Simon TAY

Chairman, Singapore Institute of International Affairs
LL.B Hons. from National University of Singapore, LL.M from Harvard University, and Fulbright Scholar at Harvard
Law School (1993‐94). Served in various positions including Adviser to the Singapore delegation to the WTO
Ministerial meeting in 1999, Senior Member of the Singapore delegation in the World Summit on Sustainable
Development in 2002, and Nominated Member of the Singapore Parliament (1997‐2001). Currently serves on a numberof international and regional expert and eminent person panels, including the ASEAN Regional Forum register ofeminent persons and experts, the APEC peer review process on trade, and the Eminent Persons Group on the
ASEAN‐Japan Centre.

2

Dr. Prapat THEPCHATREE

Chair, ASEAN Studies Program, Institute of East Asian Studies,Thammasat University
B.A. in Political Science (International Affairs) from Thammasat University; M.A. in Political Science (International
Relations) from Ohio University; Ph.D. in Political Science (International Relations) from University of Georgia. Served
positions such as Counsellor, Division 4, East Asian Department, MFA; Director of Center for International Policy
Studies (CIPS), and Associate Dean for Research and Development, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University.
His research interests are ASEAN, Thai Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Security, andInternational Political Economy. Also the Vice President of the Association for American Studies in Thailand.

[Japanese Panelists]
Dr. FUKUSHIMA Akiko

Senior Fellow and Director of Policy Studies, National Institute for
Research Advancement (NIRA)
M.A. from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and Ph.D. from Osaka University.
Served as Adjunct Professor, Keio University (2000‐02), Visiting Professor, University of British Columbia (2002‐03),
and Visiting Professor, Kuwait University in 2005. Served as members for numerous committees of the Japanese
government including the Defense Strategy Study Group and the Defense Agency’s Council on Defense Facilities.

Prof. ITO Kenichi

President, GFJ/ President, CEAC
Graduated from Hitotsubashi University and studied at Harvard University. Entered Japanese Foreign Service in 1960
and served various positions, including embassies in Moscow, Manila, Washington and Director of First Southeast
Asian Division until 1977. Since then until 2006 he was a professor of international politics at Aoyama‐Gakuin
University. He concurrently serves as a founding president of the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), theGlobal Forum of Japan (GFJ) and the Council on East Asian Community(CEAC). He is also a professor emeritus of
Aoyama‐ Gakuin University.

Dr. JIMBO Ken

Senior Research Fellow, The Japan Forum on International Relations
Ph.D. from Keio University in 2005. Served as Research Fellow, the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)(1999‐2003), Director of Research, the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) (2003‐04), and Executive Secretary
at the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC). Concurrently serves as Assistant Professor at Keio University, Senior
Fellow at Keio Research Institute, Advisor on foreign policy at Foreign Affairs Division, Policy Research Council at
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and Adjunct consultant on foreign policy at Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).

Amb. KAI Noritake

Governor, GFJ
Graduated from Hitotsubashi University. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1964. Served various positions
including Director of the First Africa Division, Deputy Chief of Protocol, Ambassador to Panama, Ambassador to
Lebanon, Ambassador to Tunisia, Professor at Kagoshima Prefectural College in 2003. Concurrently, Executive
Director of the Japan Forum on International Relations.

Prof. TANAKA Akihiko
Professor, the University of Tokyo
B.A. from the University of Tokyo, Ph.D. from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Served in various positions
including Visiting Professor, Rhur‐Universitaet (1986‐87), Senior Associate Member, St Antony’s College, Oxford(1994‐95), Member, Asia‐Europe Vision Group (1998‐99), Member, East Asia Vision Group (1999‐2001), Member,
Initiative toward Japan‐ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership Discussion Group (advisory group for
Chief Cabinet Secretary) in 2002. His research includes theories of world politics, contemporary international
relations in East Asia, and issues in Japan‐U.S. relations.

(Alphabetical order)33. Keynote Papers
Session I: “An East Asian Community after the First Asia Summit”

Dr. JIMBO Ken
Senior Research Fellow, The Japan Forum on International Relations

Emerging East Asian Community?
Political Process

Introduction
Regionalism and Regionalization in East Asia and wider Asia‐Pacific region have accumulated as
multi‐layered frameworks of Mega‐regionalism, sub‐regionalism and various forms of Ad‐hoc multilateralism 1 .
Among various types of regional framework, the recent trend represents the rise of “East Asia” especially since1997, the year launching of the ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting.

Although it is relatively a new trend to forge

regional cooperation based on the ASEAN+3 processes, there have already been 48 official Meetings among 17
areas (eg. finance, trade and investment, labour, health, IT, tourism, education, etc.) come into force under theframework of 10+3 process 2 .

Based on such accumulative regionalization process, the East Asian Summit (EAS)

launched since December 2005 represents the significant milestone of community building in East Asia.
Although the term “East Asia” has been given a birth as the political process, its signified image(signifier) as a region has been varied by observers.

One of the most important fundamentals of East Asia has

been the de facto regionalization represented by the drastic expansion of intra‐regional exchanges and increased
interdependence among countries in the region, particularly after the late 1990’s.
During the last 10 years, the trade volumes between Japan and China, China and South Korea, andChina and ASEAN have increased by four, eight and six fold respectively.

In the figure of 2003, the East Asian

intra‐regional trade share has marked 53.3% (including Taiwan and Hong Kong) while it was only 33.6% in 1980.
The figure exceeded the rate of NAFTA (44.5%) and getting closer to the rate of EU (60.3%).

Its share of the

global GDP accounts for one fifth, and countries in the region now hold about a half of the world foreign
reserves.

Moreover, with the increased trends of horizontal production networks in the manufacturing sectors,

East Asia has provided the cross‐border ‘integrated economic space’ to forge dynamic competitiveness.
The functional regionalization in East Asia has facilitated by a growing awareness of enormous
1
2

T.J. Pempel, Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region (Cornell University Press, 2005)
ASEAN Secretariat, “ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation” http://www.aseansec.org/16580.htm
4potential and opportunities of closer regional cooperation on common interests and concerns.

It is noteworthy

that several major incidents after the late 1990s played a role as a vital catalyst for foundation of various
ASEAN+3 processes.

One is the financial crisis in 1997, which awakened people of the region to the need of aregional approach to secure their financial institutions and financial markets.

The other is the rise ofthasymmetrical threats such represented by the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001, which underscored theimportance of regional cooperation in addressing terrorism and other transnational issues.
In dealing with these events, regional networks of functional cooperation have spread swiftly inwide‐ranging issues, such as finance (the Chiang Mai Initiative and the Asian Bond Market Initiative), various
types of Free Trade Agreements, and transnational issues (terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, sea piracy, trafficking
in persons, non‐proliferation and public health), etc.

Although functional cooperation does not automaticallydefine the fixed membership in nature, ASEAN+3 formats has provided a common divisor as a regularized
official process to cover these functional agendas.
Finally, the regionalization in East Asia as a community building is more comprehensive process.
The term ‘community’ is again a multifaceted concept of which many observers have different images 3 .

Mostbroad sense of community could be defined as a group of countries sharing some values in common (sharedvalues), having a sense of giving oneself to another (attribution), and interact beyond functional bases(comprehensiveness).

If those dimensions are applied, the record of building bloc process of ASEAN+3 andEast Asian Summit could be characterized as a process of community building 4 .

The “Joint Statement on East

Asian Cooperation” agreed at the third ASEAN+3 Summit in November 1999 outlined the member countries’commitment to economic, social and political areas of cooperation and called for each Ministerial process toengage in the process. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration at the First East Asian Summit in December 2005 has
also identified the process of “dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest andconcern with the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia”.
This paper tries to focus on opportunities and obstacles for the East Asian Community by especially
focusing on the political process of ASEAN+3 and East Asian Summit.

First, the paper underscores theframework of analysis, which aims to provide the current trends of creating a ‘region’.

Second, the paper

analyses the process of the ASEAN+3 and East Asian Summit to extract the commonality and diversity of theconcept of “East Asia”. Finally, the paper outlines the current ad‐hoc cooperation mechanism and its possibility
to apply in context of new regionalism.
1.

Framework of Analysis:

Nature of “Post”‐ Mega Regionalism

First Wave of Regionalism: Failure in 1960s
The term ‘region’ could be defined in various terms.
the multilateral groupings of neighboring nations.

In international relations, it generally indicates

However, when it comes to the term ‘regionalism’, it rather

suggests a functional relation that bundles multiple nations with their political, economic and cultural
inheritance, often based on the advantages geographical proximity 5 .

If one tries to look into the ‘regionalism’

we need realize that it is the dynamic concept of geopolitics/economics, which rests between the global
governance and the bilateral rational choice of the government.

Thus, ‘Regions’ are fluid and complex mixturesof physical, psychological, and behavioral traits that are continually in the process of being re‐created and3This confusion might further deepen by how the concept is introduced (or translated) in local languages. For example,
the term kyotodai（共同体）in Japanese indicates high degree of adhesion within the group bundled by consanguinity andownership, which is more determined concept than the casual ‘group of people sharing (something) in common’.
4
In this regard, areas of cooperation of which ASEAN+3 and East Asian Summit cover are more comprehensively defined
than APEC (economic oriented) and ARF (political-security oriented) process.
5
Robert Z. Lawrence, Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration (Washington DC: The Brooking Institution,1996).
5redefined 6 .
Historically, after the WWII, it is often said that there have been three waves of regionalism 7 .

The first

wave arose in 1960s, among the members in West Africa, Latin America and Caribbean States etc.

These

regionalisms took form as Free Trade Area, Customers Union and other trade agreements with taking advantageof the special treatment in the GATT Article 24th.
It is to our common knowledge that these first waves of regionalism ended in failure (except for theoriginal European Community and EFTA) because of various reasons. 1) there were no participation of big
economies to these regional gathering, 2) these regions tended to pursue the import substitution policy, and 3)
they rather emphasized the protection of national industry sectors through preferential trade agreement andstrong protectionist policy.

Some lessons learned from the failure of the first wave was that the region pursuing

the import substitution among small and medium size economy will lose their competitiveness and decrease its
validity, especially the international economy became more interdependent in 1970s 8 .
The Second Wave in 1980s: Premise of ‘Open Regionalism’
The Second Wave, derived from the famous term by Prof. Jagdish Bhagwati, came along in late 1970s
and 80s with the rising of wider regionalism or ‘mega‐regionalism’ based on the principle of the ‘open
regionalism’ 9 .

Rising East Asian economy and the decline of the dominant economic status of the United States(“After Hegemony”: Robert Keohane) had both promoted the relative rise of regional groupings such as the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) process.
The concept of open regionalism has also been applied to the political and security cooperation in the
Asia Pacific.

Based on the strategic environment after the end of Cold War in Asia, nearly 20 countries inAsia‐Pacific have agreed to form the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 to promote confidence building
among nations by increasing exchanges among officials/non‐officials contacts and transparency of their security
policies.
The premise of the open regionalism was based on ‘inclusiveness’ and ‘equality’, where countries in theregion are, in principle, open to participate in the forum.

The membership of the regime is based on theexistence in the region, not exclusively by its characteristics. “Engagement” was the core principle for this typeof multilateral cooperation by the inclusion of the states, as the APEC engaged Taiwan and Hong Kong, and ARF
successfully engaged China, Russia, enlarged ASEAN, India, Pakistan and North Korea.
The Third Wave: Rise of Bilateralism/Ad‐hoc Mechanism to form Region
As we entered in the 21st century, we have now witnessed the new forms of regionalism in Asia, which
does not necessarily adhere to this unequivocal inclusive nature.

The emerging impetus of bilateralism andfunctionalism ―such as bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and other functional cooperation― are made up
by the capability and the willingness of actors.

Although, most of the existing coalitions have the principles ofopen memberships and do not exclude the future participation of non‐member, the tacit assumption of suchcoalitions of the willing does not necessary includes the countries that are reluctant to cooperate within theframework.

It virtually leads to the politics of exclusion.

The primary benefit of such coalition of the willing may be; they could evolve cooperation withlike‐minded states to ensure higher level of cooperation.
6

It could even be regarded as a counter argument

T.J. Pempel, Remapping East Asia, p.4; Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, eds., The Political Economy ofRegionalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).
7
Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panagariya eds., New Dimensions in Regional Integration (Cambridge University Press, 1993).
8
Also, these LDCs pursued attempting such unions sought to allocate industries by bureaucratic negotiation and to tie trade
to such allocations, rather than use trade liberalization and hence prices to guide industry allocation. Ibid, p.28.
9
Jagdish Bhagwati, “Regionalism and Multilateralism: an overview” in Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panagariya eds., New
Dimensions in Regional Integration, op.cit.
6toward ‘inclusive region‐based’ cooperation like the APEC and the ARF, which recently failed to address
vigorous developments for cooperation as long as participating countries “continue to move at a pace
comfortable to all participants and on the basis of consensus.”

Instead, the coalition of the willing will set up

the higher degrees of cooperation without the interference of external actors, and invite them after the coalition
has set up the agenda.
This paper tries to argue that the current process of ASEAN+3 is more likely to be based on the
networks of such bilateral frameworks and agreements.

Financial Cooperation such as Chaingmai initiative isthe bundle of bilateral swap arrangements; other functional cooperation is also being made through coalitions of
the willing.
2.

Development of ASEAN +3 Framework

Financial Cooperation
The ASEAN+3 process have been developed by the efforts to recover from the Asian currency crisis.
Even today, the most advanced area of cooperation within ASEAN+3 is in the field of financial cooperation.
Before having the idea of Chaingmai Initiative, Japanʹs initial proposal to create a $100 billion AsianMonetary Fund (AMF) was aborted due to opposition from the United States and the IMF.
said to be reluctant to go with the idea.
turning point.

Also, China was

The overall sentiment, however, has changed substantially in 1998 as a

After witnessing currency crises in Russia and Central America, the U.S. has come round to

thinking that it would be more positive to let Japan play a greater role in financial cooperation in Asia.

China

has also realized that the stabilization of the global economy, particularly that of the Asian economy, is crucial toits own economic development, and thus has come to support the idea of creating a region‐wide framework forcurrency stabilization 10 .
As a major step in this direction, the Chiang Mai Initiative, a network of bilateral currency swap
agreements, was launched in 2000. The Chiang Mai Initiative is also meaningful as a confidence‐building step.
It has introduced a crisis prevention mechanism and sent out a message that Asian countries would join forces inthe event of crisis.

Such signaling is quite important because it discourages to some extent speculative moves

by foreign funds and provides some assurance that a crisis would subside at an early stage even if one occurred.
Beyond the Chaingmai Initiative, ASEAN+3 is currently seeking for establishment of Asian Bond
Market, to fund especially to Small and Medium Enterprises in East Asia to subsidize the mid and long‐term
capital resources.

In addition to the Bond Market Initiative, there are several ideas are floated to stabilize

regional financial and equity market.

Some argues that East Asian countries could shift from the current defacto dollar peg system to a band, basket and crawling (BBC) regime with each country pegging its currency to adifferent currency basket.

For instance, South Korea, which competes with Japan in exports, should adopt abasket in which the yen carries substantial weight.

The trade volume between the two countries may not affectrather than their concern on competitiveness in the global market, that is, in exports to the U.S. and Europe.
Newly industrialized economies (NIEs) are generally in the same situation. They should peg theircurrencies more closely to the yen rather than to the dollar so as to avoid negative impacts from the volatility ofdollar‐yen exchange rates. But the yen could dominate a much smaller portion of the currency basket for China
and other countries that are far behind Japan in economic development and do not compete with Japan inexports. They can change the composition of their currency baskets according to changes in their respective trade
structures. When countries come to have similar trade structures, the precondition for forming an optimum
currency area, they can move into the second stage, which would be to peg their currencies to a single, common
currency basket.
10

Phillip Y. Lipscy, “Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal” Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol.3, No.1 (Spring2003).
7

Functional Cooperation
On the functional cooperation, there are wide array of cooperation in progress including trade andinvestment, IT, transnational issues, development assistance, energy security, environmental preservation,
disaster prevention, food security and health care.

As mentioned earlier, there are 48 consultative bodies

covering 17 areas exist within the ASEAN+3 frameworks in progress.

What is important here is that the scopeof participating countries in such cooperation is decided flexibly and openly according to the characteristics ofeach area. Countries outside the ASEAN+3 frameworks such as Australia, New Zealand, India and the UnitedStates play important role in the functional cooperation.
Functional approach compared to the institutional approach attempts to create a various types ofcommunity through the promotion of cooperation in individual fields, rather than building comprehensive
institutional and legal frameworks from the outset.

Such functional approach is more likely to promote

cooperation in East Asia since East Asia has enormous diversity and disparities which makes such approachmuch more appropriate.
The challenges we face today is to how to converge one functional cooperation with another.

If wepromote various types of FTAs (from Economic Partnership Agreement to Early Harvest‐type FTA) without any
coordination, the nest of FTAs contains different types of standards which make the ‘Spaghetti Bowl’ Effect.

It

is very important to network those bilateral bases of cooperation to regional one, with having high standards ofcooperation and harmonization of rules and standards.
Other functional fora were added to the ASEAN+3 framework; the Economic Ministers Meeting washeld first in Yangon on 2 May 2000 and has been held annually since then. As Table indicates, other areas such aslabor, agriculture, tourism, energy, and environment are also now being discussed at the ministerial level.
Table:

Scope of ASEAN+3 Cooperation

Area

Year of Establishment

Political and Security

2000

Economic, Trade, and Investment

2000

Finance and Monetary

2000

Agriculture, Fishery, Forestry

2001

Labour2001

Environment

2002

Tourism

2002

Culture and Arts

2003

Energy2004

Health2004

Information Technology and Communications

2004

Social Welfare and Development

2004

Transnational Crime and Counter‐Terrorism

2004

Science and Technology (SOM only)

2001

Youth (SOM only)

2004

Source: This table is slightly modified from that which is presented in the ASEAN Annual Report, 2003‐2004, p. 66,<http://www.aseansec.org/AR05/PR‐Partnership.pdf>.
Political and Security Cooperation

8

From the mid‐1990s increased support for an East Asian grouping. These included:The inauguration of the Asia‐Europe Meetings (ASEM) in 1996, which explicitly involved dialogue
between Europe and an ʹAsian sideʹ;

The traumatic impact on many regional economies of the Asian financial crisis from mid 1997, which
prompted many regional states to consider the desirability of greater cooperation to forestall any future
crisis and to add greater ʹweightʹ for Asia in relations with international institutions such as theInternational Monetary Fund;

APEC’s inability to maintain the momentum towards trade liberalisation it had in the mid 1990s;



A continuing sense that the ongoing development of regional groupings in Europe (the EU) and theAmericas (the North American Free Trade Agreement) should be accompanied by greater East Asian
cooperation; and

China’s dynamic economic growth which stimulated a rise in the importance of trade among thecountries of East Asia.

All these developments contributed to the opening up of ʹpolitical spaceʹ for an East Asian grouping 11 .
One of the most significant milestones of the ASEAN+3 political processes is the agreement on ‘Joint
Statement on East Asia Cooperation’ at the third ASEAN+3 Summit in November 1999. ASEAN+3 leaders haveagreed upon the issue areas of economic cooperation, monetary and financial cooperation, social and humanresources development, scientific and technical development, cultural and information areas, development
cooperation, political‐security area and transnational issues. should be covered by this process, and mentionedthat “political and other fields” are important as follows12:・ in the political‐security area, they agreed to continuing dialogue, coordination, and cooperation toincrease mutual understanding and trust towards forging lasting peace and stability in East Asia;
・ in the area of transnational issues, they agreed to strengthen cooperation in addressing common
concerns in this area in East Asia.
Another important development in Manila was the informal breakfast attended by the leaders of China,
Japan and South Korea. Within the ASEAN+3 gathering, the ‘+3’ component of three‐way cooperation was much
weaker than the corresponding ASEAN cooperation. In fact, there had never been a summit among the leadersof the three countries in Northeast Asia. At the initiative of Japan’s Prime Minister Obuchi, the three leadersagreed to have a separate meeting of their own for the first time.
With the third meeting in Manila, ASEAN+3 clearly established a life of its own as a viable international
institution in East Asia. It was determined that its summit would be held annually; it defined the scope of thegroup’s activities as being very comprehensive; it created functional ministerial meetings; and it created anadvisory panel to consider future directions. Annual summits, however, have continued to be the focal point for
ASEAN+3 cooperation. At the 2000 Singapore summit, a range of new ideas were raised such as the desirabilityof transforming the ASEAN+3 summit into an East Asian Summit and desirable forms of free trade in the region.
President Kim Dae Jung proposed the establishment of an East Asia Study Group (EASG) composed ofgovernment officials to ‘explore practical ways and means to deepen and expand the existing cooperation’among ASEAN+3; it was tasked to ‘assess the recommendations of the EAVG’ and to ‘explore the idea and11

Richard Stubbs, ‘ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?’, Asian Survey, v. 42 no. 3, May - June 2002, pp.
440–455
12ASEAN Secretariat, “Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation” (28 November 1999).
http://www.aseansec.org/5469.htm
9implications of an East Asian Summit’.13
The EAVG presented its report to the ASEAN+3 summit in November 2001 with the opening statement
stating, ‘We, the people of East Asia, aspire to create an East Asian community of peace, prosperity and progress
based on the full development of all peoples in the region.’14 The goals the EAVG agreed upon to create an East
Asian community included:
・ To prevent conflict and promote peace among the nations of East Asia;
・ To promote trade, investment, finance and development in the region;・ To advance human security and well‐being, in particular by facilitating regional efforts forenvironmental protection and good governance;
・ To bolster common prosperity by enhancing cooperation in education and human resources
development; and・ To foster the identity of an East Asian community by encouraging active exchanges and regulardialogues at both the governmental and non‐governmental levels.15
The report, based on these goals in mind, made 57 concrete recommendations including 22 major
recommendations encompassing five areas of cooperation: economic, financial, political and security,environment and energy, and social, cultural and education. The most noteworthy recommendations included:
・ Establishment of the East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and liberalisation of trade well ahead of
the APEC Bogor Goal;・ Establishment of a self‐help regional facility for financial cooperation;
・ Adoption of a better exchange rate coordination mechanism consistent with both financial stability
and economic development.
・ Evolution of the annual summit meetings of ASEAN+3 into the East Asian Summit.
The East Asia Study Group examined all EAVG recommendations and presented its report to the 2002
Phnom Penh Summit. This was the first substantive government‐level policy agreement reached within the
ASEAN+3 process. The EASG report positively assessed the EAVG report by saying: ‘It provided East Asian
countries with a good compass to show the right direction towards a bright future of East Asia.’ 16 After
examining all EAVG recommendations, the EASG concluded that 17 of them should be selected as ‘short‐termmeasures’ to be implemented, and nine of them should be selected as ‘medium‐term and long‐term measures torequire further studies’ 17 .
The EASG report was significant in the sense that the newly established framework of ASEAN+3 could
agree at all about concrete measures of joint action. However, it revealed its limitations too; the EASG virtually
postponed its judgment on difficult issues by designating them as ‘medium‐term and long‐term measures’. For
example, the four recommendations of the EAVG listed above were all categorized as these ‘medium‐term andlong‐term measures’ that required further study. Nonetheless, although limited, the outcomes from the EASG
report do show a willingness to move beyond talk into substantive policy actions.
While officials of the EASG deliberated over various measures in 2001 and 2002, the regional political
momentum moved from Seoul and Tokyo to Beijing. President Kim Dae Jung’s failure to improve theNorth‐South relationship after a historic visit to Pyongyang in 2000 led to declining approval ratings in 2001 andcompromised him during the 2002 presidential campaign. A series of leadership changes deprived Japan ofopportunities to shape regional policies. Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, who was a strong supporter of Japan’s
ties with ASEAN+3, was replaced by Yoshiro Mori after falling ill in April 2000. Mori, unable to improve his
13
14

Final Report of the East Asia Study Group, ASEAN+3 Summit. (Phnom Penh, 4 November 2002), p. 64.
Towards and East Asian Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress. East Asian Vision Group Report, 2001. p.

6.
15

Towards and East Asian Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress, p. 16.
Final Report of the East Asia Study Group, p. 13.
17
Final Report of the East Asia Study Group, p. 13.
16

10

popularity, was forced to resign next spring and Junichiro Koizumi took office in April 2001. Koizumi, thoughimmensely popular when he assumed the prime ministership, was slow to focus on developing an Asia policy.
Rather his immediate task was to improve relations with the United States and to cooperate with the US and theinternational community after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
3.

Regional Actors and East Asian Community

ASEAN
In past years, ASEAN strives to become more of a coherent community, through the establishment of an
three ASEAN Community (articulated in the Bali Concord II in 2003) that constitutes ASEAN Security
Community and an ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio‐Cultural Community.

These reactions

are motivated by how ASEAN try to coordinate two difficult questions: that is to deal within the problems in
ASEAN, especially forging trade and investment through FTAs at the same time to deal with theunderdeveloped nations namely Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) through the redistribution
polity.

ASEAN also wanted to lead the process of regionalism in East Asia, by defining its own concept ofcommunity building earlier than any other actors in this region in order to maintain their position of “drivers’seat” in regionalization process.
ASEAN’s recent efforts have also shown just how difficult it is to get these nations – some of which havebeen closely aligned for over 30 years – to think and act as one, especially in the political and security arena.
Developing a lowest common denominator for security cooperation among these ten diverse nations is difficult
enough.

If current established multilateral community‐building mechanisms, such as the ASEAN, APT, theASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) “gathering of economies” areany indication of the willingness of East Asian nations (regardless of how the term is defined) to seriously
address issues of regional governance, but one should not expect much progress soon.
In building the ASEAN Community, ASEAN Member Countries are now committed to developing an
ASEAN Charter to provide the constitutional framework for ASEAN.

The ASEAN Charter, which will be alandmark constitutional document embodying fundamental principles, goals, objectives and structures of
ASEAN cooperation capable of meeting the needs of the ASEAN Community and beyond.

It is noteworthy that

the Charter aims to promote democracy, democratic institutions, human rights, transparency and good
governance 18 .

The Charter will include ‘political norms and values’ that would promote transparency andaccountability among members.
China
In the meantime, China, which had long been reluctant and passive to any multilateral cooperative
frameworks, began to take active initiatives to cultivate its relationship with ASEAN countries. Prime Minister
Zhu Rongji, at the ASEAN+China summit in November 2000, proposed to establish an FTA between China and
ASEAN countries. 19 In the next year’s summit, Zhu agreed with his ASEAN counterparts to conclude an FTA
between ASEAN and China within ten years. At the 2002 ASEAN+China summit, China and ASEAN concludeda ‘Framework Agreement of Comprehensive Economic Cooperation’, which stipulated approaches andmodalities to facilitate economic cooperation including an FTA. This agreement included a provision to realize
trade liberalization immediately in some sectors, known as the ‘Early Harvest program’. 20 In 2003, China became
the first dialogue partner of ASEAN to sign its Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.
18

Since then China has

Christopher Roberts, “The ASEAN Charter: A Crossroads for the Region?” IDSS Commentaries, 1 September 2005.
http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/publications/Perspective/IDSS602005.pdf
19
Based on this decision, an ASEAN-China Expert Group on Economic Cooperation was created; its report was submitted
to the ASEAN+China summit in 2001. See <http://www.aseansec.org/newdata/ asean_chi.pdf>.
20<http://www.aseansec.org/13196.htm>.
11continued to expand the scope and depth of its cooperation with ASEAN, with a new bilateral dispute resolution
mechanism being agreed upon in 2004 and cooperation in disaster planning and relief operations being
undertaken in 2005. 21
When the idea of an East Asian Community was floated, it becomes more obvious that China wasseeking more than just economic benefits through its approaches to ASEAN.

By compromising with ASEAN

over the South China Sea dispute and China’s accession to the TAC―ahead of Japan and other nations― wasalso an important steps to improve political relations with ASEAN 22 .
U.S.
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made a speech on the US’s Asia policy on March 19, 2005 at
Sophia University in Tokyo.

The “Pacific Community” and “openness and choice” were the keywords when

she outlined the regional architecture.
The future of Asia and the Pacific community will be defined around two great themes ‐‐ openness andchoice.

Instead of closed societies or economies, instead of spheres of influence, we stand for an open

world. Instead of an exclusive club of powers, we stand for a community open to all. But states mustchoose. They must choose whether to be a part of that community of openness, accepting the
responsibilities that go with it.

The United States and Japan have already made that choice, and weare honored to have a democratic Japan as a friend.
――Speech by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 23
Prior to that speech, Japan and United States have issued “Joint Statement of the Japan‐US Security
Consultative Committee” on February 19th, with having recognition of welcoming the “development of various
form of regional cooperation” while stressing the “importance of open, inclusive and transparent regional
mechanisms” as a bilateral common strategic objective in the region 24 .

The term “regional cooperation” clearly

included the recent strives for developing East Asian frameworks.

At the Rice speech, however, suchembracement of other regional cooperation was not reiterated, but the “Pacific community” was the only concept
when she described the region.
It is still unclear whether the US perceives the East Asian grouping would serve the US regional
interests.

Several in the US, including ex‐Vice Secretary of State Richard Armitage, openly opposed the idea of

East Asian community (and holding of East Asian Summit).

There seem to be three concerns were raised.

First, the East Asian community would create or increase the Chinese sphere of influence in the region.

Given

that growing economy and political influence of China, building of a regional framework without the US might
create China‐led community, thus to disturb the US engagement in East Asia.
Second, the East Asian community will challenge the flexibility of bilateral “hub‐spokes” systems thus
to increase the transaction cost in both security and economic relations.

Third, the East Asian community mightserve as an excuse to delay the democratic transition of authoritarian regimes in the region by introducing an
Asian model of governance.

With these factors, the US seems to have rejected to apply the analogy oftrans‐Atlantic relations, where NATO and EU play the complementary role.

The logic became more clear when

US tries to emphasize the trans‐Atlantic relations as “community of democracies”, in contrast with thetrans‐Pacific relations.
Japan
21

Source: ASEAN-People’s Republic of China, < http://www.aseansec.org/4979.htm>.
Susumu Yamakage, “The Construction of an East Asian Order and the Limitation of the ASEAN Model”, Asia-Pacific
Review, Vol.12, No.2, 2005
23
Condoleeza Rice, “Remarks at Sophia University” (March 19, 2005) http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43655.htm
24“Joint Statement of the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee” (February 19, 2005)
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/42490.htm
2212

Japan had long been reluctant to engage in any kind of bilateral FTAs but seeing the emergence ofincreasing complex network of FTAs throughout the world, finally decided to start seriously focusing on the
conclusion of an FTA agreement. The first country Japan with which it did so was Singapore, which had few
sensitive export products to Japan. The negotiations started in October 2000 and were concluded by January 2002
when Prime Minister Koizumi visited Singapore. In his policy speech delivered in Singapore, Koizumi proposedto create a ‘community that acts together and advances together’.25 In the subsequent summit in Phnom Penh,
ASEAN and Japan issued a ‘Joint Declaration on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership’ (CEP), and in the2003 summit, they concluded a ‘Framework for Comprehensive Economic Partnership’. As building blocks toestablish a Japan‐ASEAN CEP, bilateral FTA negotiations were started in December 2003 between Japan and
Thailand, between Japan and the Philippines, and between Japan and Malaysia. Japan and South Korea also
agreed to start bilateral FTA negotiations in 2003. Since then Japan has also acceded to the Treaty of Amity andCooperation (in 2004) but still remains far behind China in terms of bilateral agreements, treaties andmemoranda with ASEAN.
In 2002 Policy Speech, Prime Minister Koizumi mentioned Australia and New Zealand as potential
partners in ‘expanded’ East Asian community, suggested the potential enlargement of the concept of East Asia.
Since Japan has become a late comer, however, in the bilateral FTA dynamics especially with ASEAN member
states, it has been fallen behind to find new core attachment to develop relations with ASEAN, notably the TAC
accession.

Japan’s failure to make concessions to the ASEAN nations in the course of trade liberalization

negotiations has also slowed the progress of economic partnership26.
Japan’s stance towards East Asian Community became clearer when Japanese government floated the“Issue Paper” at ASEAN+3 Foreign Minister’s Meeting in June 200427.

In the Issue Paper, Japanese government

reaffirmed the importance of enhancing regional cooperation, and analyzed that 1) ASEAN’s leading role incommunity building, 2) functional cooperation plays the prominent role, 3) ASEAN+3 should involve otherregional actors, and 4) ASEAN+3 should continue to articulate principles such as openness, transparency,
inclusiveness and conformity with global norms and systems28.
Japanese government also raised points to clarify regarding the modality of East Asian Summit in the“Issue Paper”.

Especially, 1) fundamental objective of the East Asian Summit, 2) difference between East Asian

Summit and ASEAN+3 Summit, and 3) organization of East Asian Summit have been repeatedly mentioned inquestion format.

By laying out these agendas, Japanese government seek to have the Summit which could becompatible to 1) Japan’s security commitment with the United States, 2) Japan’s economic engagement in thisregion and APEC/WTO process, and 3) promoting openness and inclusiveness of the Summit process.
4.

East Asian Summit and East Asian Community

Political Process of East Asian Summit I: Modality A and A’
Another item on the agenda for East Asian countries is the commencement an East Asian Summit. The
issue, which was virtually put on the shelf after the proposal of EAVG, was materialized by holding the first East
Asian Summit in December 2005.

The original idea of EAS derived from the EAVG proposals, then by EASG asa medium and long term goals.

However, Malaysia, who happened to be the host country of APT in 2005,

strongly wanted to pursue this goal because they had a legacy of EAEC in early 1992, they wanted this concept
in their hands.
In earlier thoughts on East Asian Summit was not conceptualized fully to create a new regionalframework.

Rather, it was more like upgraded version of ASEAN+3 process replaced by renamed as “East25<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0201/speech.html>.
Susumu Yamakage, ibid.
27“Issue Papers provided by the Government of Japan” (25 June, 2004) http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/issue.pdf
28
Ibid.
26

13

Asia”. But several considerable challenges and political struggles came across, before/during the ASEAN+3
Vientianne Summit in 2004.
China has made clear their hope to hold the Second East Asian Summit in 2007, a year before the Beijing
Olympic.

With coordination with Malaysia, both countries tried to set the modality as: 1) East Asian Summit

should be held once in two years, 2) ASEAN and non‐ASEAN countries may host in rotation, 3) its membershipwill be ASEAN+3 (Modality A).

In response to the Chinese proposal, Japan raised an additional proposal

which tried to transform from single Chair to Co‐Chair system comprised of ASEAN and non‐ASEAN countries,
and Japan wanted to co‐chair with Malaysia at the first Summit (Modality A’29)30.
As for the membership issue, Beijing – anxious to entrench its influence over and even dominance of
this regional forum from the outset – wished to restrict participants to Southeast and Northeast Asian states (thatis, the existing ASEAN+3 members). But Tokyo favored a more all‐encompassing grouping in which China’s
power and influence would implicitly be balanced by the presence of extra‐regional stakeholders, mostimportantly the United States.
Neither modality A nor A’, however, worked out.

At the ASEAN+3 Vientianne Summit in 2004,

Philippines strongly opposed to both ideas since Philippines were to be scheduled to host the ASEAN+3 Summit
in 2007 (until Myanmar declines its chairmanship in 2006), which makes conflict between hosting of ASEAN+3
and East Asian Summit at the different venue. Certainly, Philippines thought that ASEAN+3 process would bediluted and lose the influence as a Chair.
Indonesia, and to some extent, Vietnam and Myanmar opposed to the idea of Modality A/A’ at theVientiane Summit, because they thought that the ASEAN could be marginalized in the East Asian Summit
process, since the +3 countries may have stronger influence over it.
to create the framework which would lose the ASEANʹs grip.

They thought that it might be not too wise

They insisted that the integration process of

ASEAN should come first.
Japan was positive but with having certain level of ambivalence about East Asian Summit.

Her

original position was that East Asian groupings should include countries like Australia and New Zealand, since
Japan attach importance of these liberal democracies.

APT would become a process for further independence offinancial cooperation, trade and investment but if it is upgraded to East Asian Summit, they claimed thatcountries beyond ASEAN+3 should be included at least as dialogue partners.
Political Process of East Asian Summit II: Modality B
Then, there were important sea change in spring of 2005 when every country tried to seek for anagreeable modality of the East Asian Summit.

Singapore started to think that India, who has been claiming tobecome a member of East Asian Summit, should not be ignored due to their rapid economic growth. Singapore,
Vietnam and Indonesia began proposing that Australia and New Zealand could be invited with different reasonsin their mind.

For Singapore and Indonesia, their prosperous neighbors are also in down‐under. For Vietnam,

it might also be beneficial for them to counter‐balance Chinese influence in the region, then to give ways tointroduce resources and funds from multiple nations.
Meanwhile, ASEAN came up to consensus of inviting Australia, New Zealand and India as full‐fledged
29

At the “Issue Paper” proposed by the Japanese government, Japan promoted the “double-track” approach to invite
Australia and New Zealand as a “dialogue partner”. “In this case, an EAS would consist of both a ‘core session’ held by
ASEAN+3 alone and an ‘expanded session’ in which both ASEAN+3 and regional partners would participate. In the ‘core
session’, ASEAN+3 would discuss key issues related to community building. In the ‘expanded session’, ASEAN+3 would
brief the regional partners of their discussions in the core session. Other wider issues could also be discussed in the‘expanded session’. Ideas from experiences in the PMC could be drawn upon in arranging the ‘expanded session’” Japan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Issue Paper (June 2004)30
On the ground of policy planning, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thought that China may have a bigger bargaining power
to obtain the role of Chair, since Japan has already had Japan-ASEAN Special Summit Meeting in December 2003.
Interview with MoFA officials (August 2004).
14

members, not as a observer or dialogue partner. During that process, ASEAN has created the three criteria forparticipation for East Asian Summit and floated to other +3 members.

These are, East Asian Summit members

should 1) have close relations with ASEAN, 2) be a full‐dialogue partner with ASEAN and 3) be the signatory of
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) (Modality B).
With the Modality B becoming a least common denominator, the ASEAN once again became the centerof the community building process, and to be expanded in to wider East Asian Summit process. The annual
meeting of the East Asian Summit shall be organized by the ASEAN Secretariat in consultation with the othermembers.

Eventually, ASEAN member states, and other members of the Summit have agreed that ASEAN shallhost the annual meetings of the East Asian Summit, which will be held in conjunction with the ASEAN Summit
annual meeting.

Thus, the East Asian Summit will be held under the chairmanship of ASEAN.

The decision to invite Australia and New Zealand as a formal member to the Summit was part of an
attempt by Singapore, Indonesia and Vietnam with having a full support, shortly afterwards by Japan 31 .

The

ASEAN countries demanded Australia sign a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as a precondition for being
invited.

The Howard government was at first reluctant to sign the treaty but decided it was a modest

concession compared to the benefits of being a founding member of the new summit conference 32 .

Australia

has gained formal admission into the East Asian Summit by acceding to the TAC. Alexandra Downer, Australia’s
Foreign Minister, said it would be keen to participate in the East Asia Summit, although some countries have
opposed its membership. Australia has long baulked at signing the TAC claiming it could conflict withobligations under its security treaty with the US.

Some Asian countries also regard Indiaʹs membership of thegroup as a further balance to China. The Indians have traditionally not been active in the region because ofisolationist economic policies but as a result of the market opening policy which began fourteen years ago they
now want to pursue engagement with East Asia 33 .
Conclusion: Emergence of Dual Image of East Asian Community: Whither ASEAN+3 or East Asian Summit?
The 16 participants in the first East Asia Summit

met on 14 December 2005. The meeting was

relatively short (at three hours) and few specific decisions were made: the emphasis was on developing
communication among the members.

Malaysia’s Prime Minister Badawi, the chair for the meeting, in his

Chairmanʹs Statement described the Summit as a ʹleaders‐ledʹ gathering that initiated confidence‐building
among the members as a first step towards more substantial collaboration.
The main issues discussed during the Summit included the need for de‐nuclearization of the Korean
peninsula, terrorism, avian flu, sustainable development, the need for progress in the Doha round of WTO
negotiations and the role which the EAS should play as a complement to existing cooperation dialogues(including ASEAN+3) in the process of community building in the region.
The ʹKuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asian Summitʹ indicated that it will be a ʹforum for
dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern, and with the aim ofpromoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asiaʹ.
31

It affirmed that the East Asian Summit is

As stated in the footnote 27, Japan’s position until early 2005 was to invite Australia and New Zealand as ‘dialogue
partners’ not as full-fledged members.
32
In a speech on 1 December 2005, Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer suggested that the characterand direction of the East Asia Summit may take some time to become apparent but welcomed the fact that Australia would
be an inaugural participant. Mr Downer stated that “This is just the first meeting and nothing is set in stone. And if there is tobe an emergence of an East Asian community, it will not, in my view, be built around one institution or meeting. An East
Asian community will emerge for practical reasons, not for ideological reasons. APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum,
ASEAN plus three, and the East Asia Summit will all contribute to an open but increasingly integrated region…” “The East
Asia Summit is only in its very first iteration and will take some time to bed down. But we can say now that we have aregional architecture that serves Australia's interests well. It is open and inclusive. It addresses security and economic issues
in a practical way and Australia has a very strong voice in how it develops.” Frank Frost and Ann Rann, “The East Asian
Summit: Issues and Outcomes” Australian Parliamentary Library E-Briefs, 17 January, 2006.
33
David Hale, “The East Asian Summit”, Asia Media, December 12, 2005.
15

intended to be an ʹopen, inclusive, transparent and outward‐looking forum, in which we strive to strengthen
global norms and universally recognized values, with ASEAN as the driving force working in partnership withother participants of the East Asia Summitʹ. The Summit would be ʹconvened regularlyʹ, would be hosted andchaired by an ASEAN member and would be held ʹback to back with the annual ASEAN Summitʹ.

The Summit

participants issued a specific declaration on avian flu, with a commitment to report all outbreaks rapidly andtransparently, and to take steps to ensure that the disease does not develop into a form which could betransmitted directly between humans.
The existence of multiple and even competing fora will allow the core group of East Asian countries toretain the leadership role in driving regional integration.

At the same time, it will allow them to accommodate

interests from outside the region to a certain extent, thereby reducing possible misgivings about an East Asian
community evolving into an exclusive bloc.
Whether or not the newly launched East Asia Summit will play a central role in regional integration in
the future, its occurrence points to potentially bright prospects for the East Asian community.

It will be a very

different, but possibly even more successful, model of regionalism from those we have seen so far in other partsof the globe.
A large part of the original rationale for bringing together leaders from across East Asia was to lay thefoundations for an institutionalized, pan‐regional community with both economic and security dimensions. The
precise ambit of such a community, let alone its modus operandi, is still undefined. As with the East Asian
Summit, greater attention has focused on the community’s potential membership. While India and Japan havecontinued to favor using the East Asian Summit, with its wider membership, as the basis for a community, it was
clear that once the summit’s membership had diversified to include non‐East Asian states, China could only
accept the more exclusive ASEAN+3 as the basis for a regional community.

This Chinese prescription, based

essentially on power‐political reasoning, finds some sympathy in states like Malaysia and Thailand.
While the Kuala Lumpur Declaration at the end of the summit failed to indicate what part, if any, theEAS might play in establishing the regional community, informal remarks by the summit chairman indicatedthat he did not see Australia, India and New Zealand as future members of it. Nevertheless, in practical terms
these three states are increasingly integrating with East Asia and possess in Japan a major East Asian ally. Theiraim will be to join a regional community primarily concerned with facilitating trade and investment, and like
Japan they will not want to be part of any grouping that China might attempt to use as a vehicle for regional
domination. A larger question concerns the extent to which an East Asian community, whether its membershipwere inclusive or exclusive, might be able to achieve significant consensus on economic and security issues given
the fundamental rivalries that exist amongst combinations of major players such as China and Japan, and China
and India.

16

Appendix: A
Kuala Lumpur Declaration (East Asian Summit)
SHARING the view that the East Asia Summit could play a significant role in community building inthis region;
FURTHER RECOGNISING the need to support efforts to build a strong ASEAN Community which willserve as a solid foundation for our common peace and prosperity;
DO HEREBY DECLARE:FIRST, that we have established the East Asia Summit as a forum for dialogue on broad
strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting
peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia.
SECOND, that the efforts of the East Asia Summit to promote community building in this region will beconsistent with and reinforce the realisation of the ASEAN Community, and will form an integral partof the evolving regional architecture.
THIRD, that the East Asia Summit will be an open, inclusive, transparent and outward‐looking forum
in which we strive to strengthen global norms and universally recognised values with ASEAN as thedriving force working in partnership with the other participants of the East Asia Summit.
FIFTH, that:
Participation will be based on the criteria for participation established by ASEAN;
The East Asia Summit will be convened regularly;
The East Asia Summit will be hosted and chaired by an ASEAN Member Country that assumes theASEAN Chairmanship and held back‐to‐back with the annual ASEAN Summit; andThe modalities of the East Asia Summit will be reviewed by ASEAN and all other participating
countries of the East Asia Summit.
Chairman’s Statement (ASEAN+3 Summit)
2. We signed the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the ASEAN Plus Three Summit to reaffirm ourcommitment to ASEAN Plus Three cooperation, which has achieved substantial progress in the lasteight years. We agreed to continue holding the ASEAN Plus Three Summit annually in conjunction
with the ASEAN Summit to guide and provide political momentum to East Asian cooperation andcommunity building efforts.
3. We agreed that the ASEAN Plus Three process will continue to be the main vehicle in achieving that
goal, with ASEAN as the driving force, and with the active participation of the ASEAN Plus Three
countries, in order to promote shared ownership. We reiterated our common resolve to realise an East
Asian community as a long‐term objective that would contribute to the maintenance of regional andglobal peace, security, progress and prosperity
16. We welcomed the convening of the first East Asia Summit (EAS) on 14 December 2005 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia. We shared the views that the EAS should be convened annually and that the EAS
will play a significant role in this region. The EAS will be consistent with and reinforce ASEAN’s efforts
in building the ASEAN Community. We recognised that the EAS will contribute to the evolving
regional architecture. We look forward to a fruitful deliberation of the EAS.

17

18

Dr. FUKUSHIMA Akiko
Director of Policy Studies and Senior Fellow, National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA)

Preliminary draft, not for citation

Political and Security Cooperation in East Asia?

Introduction
Friedberg contends that East Asia is “ripe for rivalry and a place likely to emerge as the “cockpit ofgreat‐power conflict.” １ Does this assertion truly apply? If it does apply, it certainly applies to the political andsecurity areas. In East Asia, the development of regionalism has been led by economics, in particular trade, as
discussed in Chapters Two and Three. Regionalization of economies in East Asia has led regionalism.
Regionalism involves the process of institution creation to promote regional cooperation. Such institutions aredesigned to deal with transnational issues faced by countries in the region. In contrast regionalization is anatural process for regional cooperation as has been the case of East Asian economies. According to 2003
statistics, the ratio of intra‐regional trade in East Asia, while lower than that of the European Union (EU), washigher than North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA’s) in terms of exports. Deepening tradeinterdependence has motivated countries in East Asia to either conclude or negotiate Free Trade Agreements(FTAs) or more comprehensive versions of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Region‐wide FTAs or
EPAs has also been on the table for discussion. Witnessing interconnected financial market at the time of 1997
Asian monetary crisis, ASEAN+3 has also established initiatives for financial cooperation, including the Chang
Mai Initiative and a proposal for an Asian Bond Market, as described in Chapter Three. These initiatives were
prompted by the 1997 Asian financial crisis when countries learned through the impact of a crisis in Thailand
spreading to other countries in the region. This sent a message how the final market is regionalized.
However, in the political and security arenas, regional cooperation, not to mention regional integration, hasbeen identified as a tremendous challenge at best. Sino‐Japanese rivalry and surging nationalism have often been
cited as impediments for regional cooperation. Regionalization in the political and security areas has surely been
limited but has recently been on the rise on non‐traditional transnational security issues. Meanwhile regionalism
in East Asia has not been promoted consciously enough to lead regionalization of security. The post Cold War or
post‐post Cold War East Asia is still divided, with national security and sovereignty still strong in theperceptions. East Asia has therefore elements of competitive security that demands traditional deterrence andcrisis response mechanisms against the backdrop of the remaining flashpoints from the Cold War namely Korean
peninsula and Taiwan straits. Moreover, Sino‐US military confrontation cannot be excluded with the recent build
up of Chinese military power which is reportedly beyond the need for the contingency over Taiwan straits. US
Department of Defense in its annual report to congress on Military Power of the People’s Republic of China in its
2006 edition stated that “China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field
disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages.” ２ Moreoverwith the advent of globalization and trigger by 9.11, non‐traditional security threats are gaining higher profile
than ever before in East Asia which increases the need for cooperative security and common security approach in
the region. In analyzing East Asia, we need to employ all three theories of international relations, namely realism
19that considers balance of power and national confrontations, but also liberalism that tries to promote security bymultilateral institutions as well as constructivism that promotes security system based not on power but on
norms.
In hindsight, the building of a comprehensive East Asian community could not have been a topic ofdiscussion during the Cold War. The region has long been fragmented and has not shown any signs for cohesion.
However, with the end of the Cold War, in part due to the impact of the movement towards further regional
integration in Europe, nations in the Asia Pacific region established the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC) conference in November 1989, incidentally in the same month that the Berlin Wall, the symbol of theCold War, was dismantled. Given the success of APEC, in the post Cold War setting the process was expanded
beyond the economy, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an intergovernmental multilateral security
dialogue process, was launched in 1994. It is worth noting that the regional process established in the 1990s took
the format of ASEAN+X rather than a pure multilateral form. The most notable example of this framework was
ASEAN+3, the three being Japan, China and South Korea, created in 1997. The ASEAN+3’s 1999 Joint Statement
on East Asia Cooperation took the unprecedented and significant step of including transnational political andsecurity issues as areas of cooperation, in addition to cooperation in the traditional economic field. ３
Despite this statement, however, the legacy of the Cold War still lingers in East Asia, and it can be argued
that the region has a long way to go in building a collective security community. Since the end of the Second
World War, many countries in East Asia have secured their national and regional security through bilateralalliances and treaties with the United States, forming the so‐called hub‐and‐spoke architecture. It is phenomenalthat these “spokes” have not developed a “wheel” amongst them. During the Cold War spokes remained tied tothe hub but not each other. When it comes to a collective security community, it has been consistently argued itdoes not have a substantial meaning if the current East Asian security environment remains and if it does not
involve its hub, the United States in post Cold War and in post‐post Cold War context.
Americans have argued against an East Asia community concept, particularly after the announcement of
the East Asia Summit to be held. For example Richard Armitage expressed his opposition to the concept of an
East Asian community in May 2005 in an interview with the Asahi Shimbun, asserting that the attempt to build
an East Asian community without the United States would be a serious mistake, and that China is anxious to
exclude the United States from consultations. ４ Should community building in East Asia progress, the questionof US participation in a community in one form or another must be considered. Since mid‐2005, US opposition to
East Asian community building and an East Asia Summit has lessened after it was decided that India, Australia
and New Zealand would be added to the list of participants in the East Asia Summit, leading the United States tobelieve that the Summit would no longer be a China‐centered process. Nonetheless, how to relate with theUnited States remains an issue for the discussion and practice of East Asian community building, particularly inthe political and security areas.
With regard to East Asian community building, Japan has its share of opponents and proponents, inaddition to those who maintain a skeptical position. Opponents of the concept deny the possibility of creating an
East Asian community, even in the area of the economy, arguing that countries in the region do not share values
which would form the basis of community building and thus are not ready to yield sovereignty for a regional
community. Naoki Tanaka, President of the 21 Century Public Policy Institute in his report to the House ofCouncilors in 2005 argued that East Asia, despite its growing economic regional interdependence, cannot
complete its regional economic network alone; East Asian nations rely heavily on the United States forabsorption of their goods, and an East Asian Economic community excluding the United States does not makesense. Tanaka considers the Korea‐US FTA negotiations currently underway as an example of a move that
opposes the building of a community in East Asia. ５ Taro Yayama, a critic, argues that it is impossible to consider
an East Asian community that includes China, because the Chinese have been indoctrinated by the educational
system to hate Japan. ６ Mineo Nakajima, President of Kokusai Kyoyo University also argues that East Asia’s
20political and cultural diversity is too overwhelming to make economic or functional cooperation feasible.
Nakajima asserts that China’s continentality, Korea’s pensularity and Japan’s insularity create cultural andcivilizational differences too large to bridge, making East Asian community building unrealistic. ７
Skeptics, by contrast, agree with building an East Asian Economic community, but have strong doubts
regarding community building beyond the economic areas of trade and finance. They are strongly skeptical withregard to the feasibility of a political and security community in East Asia. Toshio Watanabe, President of
Takushoku University, also argues that East Asia community is not possible if China and Korea must
institutionalize anti‐Japanese sentiment to survive as a cohesive nation, that is for domestic political unity. ８
Watanabe, however, agrees on merit in East Asia regional free trade area. ９ Noboru Hatakeyama, former Vice
Minister of Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, also argues that a community building requires thatmembers share values and are willing to share burdens with other members. Hatakeyama argues that Japan does
not share values with China and South Korea and that an East Asian community is therefore unfeasible.
Hatakeyama though asserts that it is feasible to create an East Asia Free Trade Agreement (EAFTA) which does
not require yielding of sovereignty. １０
On the other hand, proponents of community building, with some degree of caution, see a possibility forcommunity building in East Asia that includes the political and security fields.

Hitoshi Tanaka, former Vice

Minister of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and currently Senior Fellow of Japan Center for International Exchange,
argues for the building of an East Asian community, but does not envisage it in the near future. Tanaka observes
that Japanese foreign policy is at a crossroads sixty years after the end of the Second World War, and faces
challenges of relative decline of Japan’s national strength against a background of population decline. Tanaka
argues that in ten to fifteen years the economic and military power of China and India will be comparable to
Japan. Although their path towards the future growth may not be smooth, Tanaka observes there is no doubtthat several strong countries will emerge in Asia. In that multipolar East Asia, Japan would require a stableregional order to survive and community building would be one of the paths available to the nation. Hitoshi
Tanaka also observes that it would be difficult for East Asia to aim at a value community that shares common
values like skeptics but should at first aim towards a functional community achieved through functional
cooperation. １１ Makoto Taniguchi, President of Iwate University, argues that community building in East Asia
would contribute not only to the economic development of the region but also to political stability, and thus be oftremendous benefit to Japanese economic development and security. Taniguchi asserts that the development ofan East Asian community into a broader Asian community would strengthen Asian identity, and this community
would be comparable to NAFTA and EU. １２ Yoshihide Soeya, Professor of Keio University, also argues in favorof an East Asian community, and explicitly of a security community. Soeya asserts that this is the ultimate
destination of East Asian community building. When a security community is created in Asia, he argues that it
would absorb the functions of the Japan‐US Security alliance; however, he also argues that during the process ofcommunity building it would be essential for Asia to be prepared for all possible security threats. １３ Takashi
Shiraishi, Vice President of National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), promotes functional
cooperation, including cooperation in the area of non‐traditional security issues, in East Asia and underscores
the difference between community building in East Asia and in Europe. While Europe has built a community inthe classic sense, East Asia is characterized by webs of bilateral relationships; the challenge is how to developthese bilateral relationships into a community, that is web to network. Shiraishi also identifies that the linkage
between an East Asian community and the Japan‐US alliance as a major challenge in community building.
While there is a consensus across the board that the Japan‐US alliance is essential in maintaining security
from the perspective of traditional security issues, opinions are divided on whether regional cooperation on
non‐traditional security issues including terrorism, piracy and arms, narcotics and human trafficking, energy
and environment, and infectious disease can benefit the region and the United States. １４ Proponents ofcommunity building believe that it would serve as a vehicle for the achievement of regional stability and also as21

a way for Japan to field more effective Asia policy, while opponents and skeptics, as indicated above, deny thepossibility of community building beyond the economy.
This chapter examines the prevailing framework for regional cooperation in political and security fields inEast Asia, a possible road map for East Asian political/security community against a background of changing
strategic relationships in Asia, a road map for functional cooperation and functional integration, and a linkage
between East Asia and the United States. It concludes by considering the challenges and opportunities forpolitical and security cooperation and conclude with an observation whether or not the diversity of cultures,
economies and political systems in the region will enable the establishment of a viable organization in East Asia.

East Asian Political/Security Cooperation: Reality Check
Since the achievement of peace in Cambodia in the early 1990s, there has been no major war in East Asia.
Since the end of the Cold War, compared to other parts of the world East Asia has been relatively stable and freefrom violent conflicts. Against this backdrop of political stability, despite the Asian financial crisis in 1997, East
Asian countries have prospered economically. Smooth economic growth has encouraged stability in the region
and vice versa.
However, in the early twenty‐first century East Asia still carries legacy of the Cold War time confrontations.
It has been suggested that if a Third World War should break out, the first shot would most likely be heard in
East Asia, in particular Northeast Asia. Given the existence of potential security risks in the region, is theestablishment of a political and security community feasible?
In the past half a century, peace and stability in the Asia‐Pacific region has been maintained by a web ofbilateral security relations with the United States, forming a hub‐and‐spoke architecture. These alliance relations,combined with national defense capabilities, have maintained deterrence and provided for response to potential
contingencies in the region. Since the end of the Cold War bilateral alliances with the United States have evolved
from a focus on a specified threat to a focus on regional security. In the post‐post Cold War era non‐traditional
security threats such as terrorism have surged as a focus in the region. The bilateral security treaties in East Asia,
in addition to their traditional role, have gained a feature of being public goods for regional security.
America’s allies in the region, the “spokes,” did not develop relations among themselves during the ColdWar.

It is only recently in the post Cold War that “spokes” have started to form a partial “wheel,” as illustrated

in the TCOG talks and Japan‐Australia‐US trilateral talks. In the area of military exercises, third countries havestarted to either participate in or send observers to bilateral exercises. For example, Team Challenge, held in May
2002 combined bilateral exercises between the US and Thailand (Cobra Gold), the US and Australia (Tandem
Thrust) and the US and the Philippines (Balikatan); 22 countries sent observers to these exercises. China sent
observers to the Cobra Gold exercises. The background to these multilateral exercises was a 2001 article entitled“From Wheel to Webs: Reconstructing Asia‐Pacific Security Arrangements” by Denis Blair of CINCPAC. １５ The
security community proposed by Blair is different from the pluralistic security community proposed by Karl W.
Deutsch. １６ The precondition of Deutsch’s security community is the sharing of common values such as acommitment to freedom and democracy. In such a community national conflicts can be solved peacefully
without resorting to military force. In contrast, Blair’s proposal was to establish a security community bydeepening bilateral relations and creating a network or web of alliances. His proposal was, however, not further
pursued due to 9.11. Following 9.11 the United States opted for a coalition of the willing in the war against terror,
which has provided support for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.
Another example of the coalition of the willing is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). PSI was
proposed by the Bush administration in December 2002 to control the flow of weapons of mass destruction, theirdelivery systems and related materials to and from states and non‐state actors. President Bush announced thePSI concept during his visit to Poland in May 2003 and called on countries to participate. From Asia, Japan,
22

Australia and Singapore are participating in the PSI. In September 2003 Australia hosted the maritime
interdiction exercise “Pacific Protector,” and in October 2004 Japan hosted “Team Samurai 04”off Sagami Bay
and Yokosuka Port. Australia, Singapore, Cambodia, the Philippines, New Zealand and Thailand participated in
the latter. In PSI, principles are agreed by a series of conferences and exercises are conducted with an emphasis
on preventive interdiction. Participants voluntarily participate in PSI when they share the objective. This is dueto the fact that existing arms control and disarmament negotiations at the United Nations are based onconsensus which often prevents substantive progress

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
During the Cold War, Asia went through the hot wars such as the Korean War and the Vietnam War, andregional security was not addressed. Since the end of the Cold War, against the backdrop of relative regional
stability, regional security has come to be recognized as a viable approach.
The major considerations from the perspective of regional security are (1) whether or not threats are
specified or unspecified, (2) whether threats are internal or external and (3) whether security measures arelimited to military means or more comprehensive political, diplomatic or economic means. When threats are
specified and external, security must be ensured by military means and by establishing alliances. On the other
hand, unspecified internal threats should be responded to by preventing disputes from escalating into conflicts
by means of a national and regional framework. When internal disputes develop into violent conflicts, thenational/regional framework will be used to solve them peacefully. Especially when national governance isfailing, multilateral regional and/or international framework is useful to settle conflicts. Regional mechanisms
can also be effective in curbing and preventing both unspecified internal and external threats, i.e. non‐traditional
threats. In East Asia today both specified and unspecified as well as internal and external threats exist whichshould be addressed by military as well as cooperative security measures. Thus, in addition to the traditional
alliance network, the region also needs a regional framework to deal with complex non‐traditional security
threats.
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is an example of such a cooperative security framework, although it
does not possess means of coercion. In 1990 when Australia and Canada proposed an Asian version of theConference on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), ASEAN countries declined the idea on the grounds thatthe security environments of Asia and Europe were different, and the European security approach therefore did
not apply to Asia. However, in 1993 the ASEAN Post‐Ministerial Meeting agreed to create the ARF as a venue todiscuss regional security issues. ARF Ministerial Meetings have been held annually since the first in 1994; North
Korea has participated in the ARF since 2000. 23 Asian Pacific countries, or almost the entire region, and the EU
currently participate in the ARF. In 2004, an ARF unit was created in the ASEAN Secretariat to support ARF
activities. In the intervals between the annual Foreign Ministers Meetings, the ARF holds Senior Officials
Meetings (SOM) and Inter‐sessional Group (ISG) meetings.
The ARF is not institutionalized like frameworks for cooperative security in Europe such as theOrganization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It is still a framework for discussion and does not
implement actions like election monitoring, protection of minorities and field missions for peacebuilding as the
OSCE does.
At the Second ARF Ministerial Meeting held in 1995 a concept paper was adopted that indicated a roadmap of ARF, from phase one of confidence building measures, phase two of preventive diplomacy and phase
three of approaches to conflicts. The ARF today thus functions as a venue for participants to discuss regional
security issues. When the ARF was launched, some regional countries were skeptical with regard to multilateral
security dialogue. The ARF therefore could not take up sensitive issues like the Spratley Islands dispute as an23

agenda for its meetings. Over the years, however, the ARF has helped to reduce mistrust and nurture a sense of
mutual assurance among members. After 1997 Asian financial crisis the ARF stalled somewhat, but has come totake up sensitive issues such as the Korean Peninsula as well as the Spratley Islands. Although the ARF hasdeveloped a dialogue role in the region, its effectiveness has been questioned. When it attempted to move fromphase one, confidence building measures, to phase two, preventive diplomacy, China asserted that there was anoverlap between confidence building and preventive diplomacy and the ARF could not agree on moving to thepreventive diplomacy phase. After some difficulties in July 2001 the Eighth ARF ministerial meeting adopted thePaper on the Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy and the ARF Register of Experts/Eminent Persons.
Due to Chinese pressure owing to its concern on a possible interference by the ARF members into its domestic
affairs under the name of preventive diplomacy, preventive diplomacy at the ARF was defined as applicable tointer‐state conflicts and not to intra‐state conflicts. The ARF, however, could not make any significant progress inpreventive diplomacy; it was not able to take effective measures in East Timor after the referendum forindependence, and had to rely initially on multinational forces and subsequently UN peacekeeping missions. For
its peacebuilding, it had to rely on UN mission. In the recent instability caused by dissatisfied former soldiers in
May 2006, East Timor has to ask the dispatch of Australian troops to recover peace and safety.
Although East Asia certainly needs more time before a pluralistic security community can be created, theARF and ASEAN+3 despite their shortcomings can in the interim work on non‐traditional transnational security
issues. In Karl Deutsch’s concept of a security community, the nations of the region must basically trust eachother and share common values. East Asia, in conceiving its future collective security community, must startfrom building trust among countries in the region. As a roadmap for regional cooperation and for an eventual
community building East Asian way, functional cooperation in non‐traditional security fields such ascounter‐terrorism, piracy, energy, environment, infectious disease and drag trafficking would be productive bothfor trust building and for practical benefits it would generate. The growing number of transnational security
threats would increasingly demand such cooperation in the region.
In preparing and planning such cooperation, political/security dialogues are necessary. When the ARF wascreated in 1994, opinions were divided as to whether multilateral politico‐security dialogues were useful andsustainable. However, multilateral dialogues like the ARF have come to be recognized not as a substitute but as asupplement to hub‐and‐spoke alliance relations. The EASR announced by the US Department of Defense in 1995
also recognized that dialogues do not substitute for alliance relations or forward deployment of the United States,
but rather supplement them. The 2003 Japanese Diplomatic Blue Book indicated that Japanese security policy
centers on the nation’s alliance with the United States but also seeks to strengthen bilateral or multilateraldialogues for the peace and stability of the Asia Pacific region. However, other than ARF and ASEAN+3, there isno intergovernmental politico‐security dialogue in the region specifically. What we have are track two dialogues,
as described in the following section.

Track Two Dialogues
Dialogues initiated by the private sector, generally think tanks and research institutions, are termed “track
two,” as opposed to “track one” intergovernmental dialogues. Government officials may, however, participate intrack two meetings in a personal capacity. This is sometimes referred to as “track one and a half.” At track two
meetings, participants can float new ideas which it is perhaps too early to propose at official intergovernmental
meetings, and can speak their minds in ways that they cannot in official meetings. Track two discussions cantherefore help to trigger intergovernmental dialogues or prepare the groundwork for official discussions on
sensitive and complex issues. Together with scholars, former government officials play an important role in track
two meetings. Regional epistemic communities such as the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International
24

Studies (ASEAN‐ISIS), the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia‐Pacific (CSCAP) have played an
important ideational role in support of inter‐governmental regional institutions. In the context of East Asian
community building, the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) established by ASEAN+3 and the Network of East
Asian Think Tanks (NEAT) that was established on the basis of EAVG’s recommendations are good examples oftrack two processes.
The number of track two dialogues in the Asia pacific region has increased since the 1990s, as shown in
Figure 1. Figure 1 is based on data from the Dialogue and Research Monitor, １７ initially compiled by Canadianuniversities and subsequently by the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE). Given that the number of
meetings varies depending on how they are counted, these numbers should not be considered absolute; however,they do give a good idea of trends of track one and two meetings since the 1990s.

Figure 1: Evolution of Politico-Security Dialogues in Asia Pacific Region

210
200
190
180
170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
34
30
20
10
3
0
1993

196

Track 1
Track 2
149

93

90

85

112

70
81
46

49

49

48
45

20
19
1994

23

1995

18

17

11

10

1996

1997

1998

1999

17
2000

9
2001

2002

2003

2004

Year

Source: Japan Center for International Exchange(JCIE) "Dialogue and Research Monitor Towards Community Building in East Asia"(http://www.jcie.or.jp/drm/index.html)

Figure 1 includes a variety of track two processes: bilateral and multilateral, for specified objectives and forgeneral exchange of views, institutionalized and ad hoc. During the 1990s the number of track two meetings in
the region peaked at 93, but this figure had declined to 20 in 1999. Because the region had little experience of
track two meetings in the preceding decades, they were initially organized with considerable enthusiasm;
however, they were soon criticized for excessive growth and a lack of results. Jokes circulated recommending
non‐proliferation of track two meetings, and suggesting that CBM referred to “conference building” rather than“confidence building” measures. The decline in the number of track two meetings was further influenced by the1997 Asian financial crisis, which deprived track two meetings of funding. During the same period of time, track
one meetings have been fairly constant in terms of the number of annual meetings. However, the benefit of track
two meetings as a way of deepening mutual understanding and trust has been recognized; as Figure 1 shows,the number of meetings has registered a substantial increase since 2000, reaching 196 meetings in 2004. Thisphenomenal growth reflects the fact that non‐traditional and human security issues have been taken up at track
two meetings since 9.11. The latest Research and Dialogue Monitor of 2005 observes that “terrorism featured in one
quarter of all Track 1 meetings and proved to be the most frequently dealt with of any single issue…topics suchas maritime terrorism, piracy, and cyber crimes were prevalent, particularly in Track 1, indicating the level ofconcern about these issues at the governmental level. Other non‐traditional security issues that were important
subjects of discussion included transnational crimes, especially human trafficking, drugs trafficking and arms
25

trafficking.” １８

It is also worth noting that the number of track one meetings, which had been around ten or

twenty at the maximum in the 1990s, grew to 112 in 2004. This is partly due to meetings convened by ASEAN+3,
which can be classified as functional cooperation, １９ as described in the next section. Both track one and two
meetings have taken up non‐traditional security issues which have been increasing with greater regional
interdependence and the concomitant increased flow of people and goods across national borders.

A Road Map for Functional Cooperation in East AsiaThus, because East Asia has not reached the stage of creating a pluralistic security community in Karl
Deutsch’s sense, the region cannot rely on a collective security community to ensure regional security. East Asia
has to remain dependent on a web of bilateral alliances with the United States. However, regional security
cooperation can play the role of “peacekeeper” in East Asia. The process can be commenced from cooperation inpractical areas, in which participants share common benefits, i.e. functional cooperation. In other words, given
lack of trust and common threat perceptions, East Asia cannot adopt an institutional approach in promoting
regional cooperation in political and security fields in immediate future. East Asia can move forward to
substantive collaboration on the myriad complex issues In hindsight, the germ of the European Union, which hasreached the stage of developing a common foreign and security policy, was the creation of European Coal andSteel Community, which was nothing but functional cooperation. In fact, triggered by the financial crisis theregion went through in 1997, ASEAN+3 has embarked on the creation of a network of functional cooperation in
the financial area. The report of the EAVG recommended concrete functional cooperation. These
recommendations were further examined and grouped into short‐term and long‐term goals by theinter‐governmental East Asia Study Group (EASG). As short‐term measures, the report recommended
strengthening mechanisms for cooperation on non‐traditional security issues and poverty reduction. As
medium‐term and long‐term measures, the report recommended numerous fields including building aframework for energy policies, strategies and action plans. Incidentally, among the medium‐term and long‐termmeasures, the EAVG recommended promoting the evolution of the ASEAN+3 Summit into an East Asian
Summit. The latter has been realized in December 2005 although it was not the evolution of the ASEAN+3
Summit but the simultaneous holding of the two Summits. Of the numerous forms of functional cooperation
envisaged by ASEAN+3, the next sections consider cooperation in the areas of counter‐terrorism, energy,
environment and piracy as illustrations.

Counter‐terrorism Cooperation
Terrorism is not a new security threat. Neither it is a particularly new phenomenon to Asia, although thecurrent terrorist threat is clearly different from the secular communist insurgencies during the Cold War.
Moreover, the scale of the 9.11 attacks and the means used in them drastically increased the perception of the
security threat represented by terrorism.
Asia has its own indigenous terrorist groups, for example the MILF in the Philippines and al‐Jemaahal‐Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia. In recent years JI, which declares its goal to be the creation of a pan‐Southeast Asia
Islamic caliphate has been responsible for a series of bomb attacks in the region including bomb blasts in Bali in
October 2002 and October 2005, attack on the J.W.Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2003 and attack outside theAustralian embassy in Jakarta in September 2004. Figure 2 shows the number of terrorist attacks in 2005 byregion based on data from the Report on Incidents of Terrorism published by the US National Counterterrorism
Center. The combined figures for East Asia and the Pacific and South Asia are higher than for the Near East,26

which had the highest number in 2005.

Figure 2: International Terrorist Attacks by Region (2005)

10,000

8,728

9,000

Dead - 14,602

8,000

Number of Attacks - 11,111

7,000
6,000
5,000

4,230

3,974

4,000

3,017
3,000
2,000
1,000

875

760
253

1,007

851 867780
371

0AfricaEast Asia and Pacific Europe and Eurasia

Near East

South Asia

Western Hemisphere

Source: National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) "Report on Incidents of Terrorism 2005"(http://wits.nctc.gov/Reports.do)

After 9.11, the US government launched a war against terror, regarding terrorism as a war. Although theinternational community was initially sympathetic with the US, opinion has since been divided over the attack
on Iraq and other aspects of US policy. In Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea have experienced a surge ofanti‐Americanism. Nonetheless, by contrast with Europe, most East Asian governments supported the Bushadministration’s war against terror. Some argued that 9.11 forced the US to take an interest in Asia again, andthat terrorism in Asia can only be controlled by the United States. East Asian governments have been criticizedby the citizens of their nations for their support of the US, but terrorism represents a considerable threat in theregion. Moreover, the attacks in London during the G8 Summit in July 2005 were a reminder that international
terrorism not only targets specific countries, but also the infrastructure and values of the civilized world.
Prevention of and countermeasures against transnational terrorism are common interests of East Asian
countries. No country opposes cooperation in the area of counter‐terrorism. In fact, since 9.11 existing regionalframeworks have promoted concrete cooperation in this area. As an illustration ASEAN on November 4 adopted
Prevention of transnational terrorism is certainly a common interest of East Asian countries. No country
opposes cooperation to counter terrorism. As terrorism is most often transnational in terms of actors and victims,
regional cooperation would be effective in addition to than national measures. In fact, since 9.11 existing regional
cooperation frameworks in Asia‐Pacific have been promoting concrete cooperation to prevent terrorism. As an
illustration, immediately after 9.11, on November 4, 2001, ASEAN adopted the Declaration on Joint Action toCounter Terrorism, which included practical measures, with ASEAN nations agreeing to “review and strengthen[…] national mechanisms to combat terrorism” and to establish “regional capacity building programmes toenhance existing capabilities of ASEAN member countries to investigate, detect, monitor and report on terrorist
acts.” ２０ ASEAN meetings have continued to condemn terrorist attacks and have suggested numerous regional
cooperation initiatives for preventing and combating terrorism
The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference, despite its focus on economic cooperation, also
reacted to 9.11 and has taken up international terrorism as an agenda every year since 2001. On October 21, 2001,
APEC leaders, at the strong urging of the United States, declared their condemnation of and determination to
respond to international terrorism. ２１ On October 26, 2002, APEC leaders announced the Los Cabos Statement
on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth, declaring their commitment to blocking the financing of terrorist
27

organizations, promoting cyber‐security and cooperating in capacity building through counter‐terrorism‐related
training. ２２ The Los Cabos Statement led to the creation of the Counter‐Terrorism Task Force (CTTF). ２３ On 21
October, 2003, the APEC Leaders’ Statement, under the heading of “Enhancing Human Security,” declared acommitment to “dismantle, fully and without delay, transnational terrorist groups that threaten the APEC
economies.” The declaration also mentioned the implementation of a Health Security Initiative to “help APEC
prevent and respond to regional health threats, including naturally‐occurring infectious disease andbio‐terrorism,” in addition to the establishment of a “regional trade and financial security initiative within the
Asian Development Bank to support projects that enhance port security, combat terrorist finance, and achieve
other counter‐terrorism objectives.” ２４ With the campaign on Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR), APEC
has cooperated in countering terrorism from the economic perspective through measures that protect cargo,
ships, international aviation and people in transit and prevent money laundering. In their 18‐19 November 2005
Declaration, APEC leaders made a commitment to further strengthen their efforts on counter‐terrorism beyond
the economy by dismantling transnational terrorist groups, eliminating the danger posed by the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related items, and confronting other direct threats tothe security of the region. ２５ Previously, when it was proposed that security be included in the agenda, APEC
participants could not reach consensus as Taiwan, which is not a country, participates in APEC, and somemembers resisted the idea of discussing security issues with such a participant. However, since 9.11, APEC hascome to collaborate on the terrorism issue which has significant implications on economic activities.
The ARF has also condemned and responded to terrorism. The ARF issued “the Statement on Measuresagainst Terrorist Financing,” making a commitment to freeze terrorist assets, exchange information and outreachand provide technical assistance “in developing and implementing necessary laws, regulations and policies tocombat terrorist financing and money laundering.” ２６

ARF created the Inter‐sessional Meeting onCounter‐Terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM on CT‐TC). At the first meeting, held in Karambunai, Sabah,
Malaysia in March 2003, co‐hosted by Malaysia and the United States, the adoption of the ARF Statement on
Cooperative Counter‐Terrorist Actions on Border Security was proposed. In 2004 ARF ministers adopted the ARF
Statement on Strengthening Transport Security against International Terrorism, and agreed to review its
implementation every year. ２７
East Asian countries have held numerous meetings on counter‐terrorism issues which have contributed
to the growth of track one meetings and have held intensive discussions under existing regional frameworks tocombat terrorism since 2001; they have also embarked on improving law enforcement programs and operations,disrupting terrorist financing, capacity building on intelligence collection, analysis, distribution and exchange,
and the enhancement of global commitments in the region. In Malaysia the Southeast Asia Regional Centre forCounter‐Terrorism (SEARCCT) has been established to conduct training to counter terrorism. East Asian
countries share a practical interest in preventing and responding to terrorism, due to the practical benefits ofdoing so.

Maritime Cooperation: Fighting against Piracy
The Straits of Malacca extends approximately 900 kilometers; 80,000 vessels cross it a year, including
numerous oil tankers transporting crude oil from the Middle East to East Asia. Due to the economic growth of
East Asia, the number of ships crossing the Straits of Malacca has increased significantly, and the quantity of oil
transported is growing every year. According to Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies based in Singapore
around 30 percent of world trade and 50 percent of world energy needs pass through the Straits each year. ２８
However, ships in the Straits are the targets of pirate attacks. It is also reported that piracy has become more
violent in recent years. Pirates are now armed with stronger weapons such as AK47 assault rifles and even rocket
28

launchers.
Table 1: Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
1998

2000

2002

2003

2004

2005

Malacca Strait

6

112

24

15

35

10

South China Sea

94

140

112

114

86

81

Indian Ocean

25

109

46

77

31

39

East Africa

19

29

14

11

7

22

West Africa

22

33

39

59

43

21

South America

38

41

53

60

40

24

Mediterranean Sea

2

2

3

1

‐

‐

Source: International Maritime Organization (IMO)ʺ Report on Acts of Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships Annual report ʺ, regional analysis of reports on acts of piracy andarmed robbery against ships which were reported to have been allegedly committed(http://www.imo.org/HOME.html)

In March 2005, the Japanese tug boat Idaten was attacked by pirates during a voyage through the Straits ofMalacca. Its crew were taken hostage, but later returned to Japan. The case sent a message home once again that
the Straits of Malacca is prone to piracy.
According to International Maritime Organization (IMO) statistics, the South China Sea and the Straits ofMalacca record a high incidence of piracy, as shown in Table 1. The combined incidence of piracy in these twoareas gives East Asia the highest incidence of piracy in the world. Because of this high incidence, functional
cooperation to combat the problem is already underway. Thus, due to multilateral strict control measures thenumber of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Straits of Malacca which reached 112 in2000 has reduced to ten in 2005. After Tsunami off Sumatra and Indian Ocean in December 2004, incidence ofpiracy has declined which is reflected in the figures in Table 1. It was analyzed that pirates themselves were hit
by tsunami and could not act. Moreover pirates are afraid of relief ships which led them to be cautious. However,they have started to be active again because economy has recovered from Tsunami damage and ships which aretargets of piracy have resumed their voyage. There is therefore no room for complacency on piracy.
Why are there so many pirates in the region? According to Yoshihiko Yamada of the Nippon Foundation,
when the Kingdom of Malacca became a colony of Portugal in 1511, Malaccans resisting the colonization fled toislands on the Indonesian side and earned their living by fishing. However, seeking more income in addition tofishing and sometimes as resistance to imperial powers, they became pirates. ２９Pirates have aimed at cargoes and ships themselves in the past. The ships seized have been repainted in
unpopulated harbors and their names are changed, after which they are used in acts of piracy. Cargoes are soldon the black market. Petroleum products, particularly refined gasoline and kerosene, which have high added
value, have been specific targets of piracy. Recently although sea robbery remains to be the most common type ofattack, pirates are increasingly going after kidnap‐for‐ransom. Thus, it is a recent trend to hijack smaller vessels
rather than larger vessels. Since pirates are after ransom, they attack smaller tankers and tug boats which areslow in their speeds and easier to board and seize than larger boats.
The trigger for regional cooperation against piracy in East Asia was the Alondra Rainbow incident. This
Panama‐registered ship was owned by Imura Kisen in Imabari City, Ehime Prefecture, Japan. When attacked by29

pirates in October 1999, the boat was on loan to Tokyo Senpaku and manned by a Japanese captain and chiefengineer and fifteen Filipino crewmen. On October 22 1999, the ship loaded 7000 tons of aluminum ingots at anIndonesian port and departed for Miike port in Fukuoka Prefecture. However, soon after its departure fromIndonesia, contact with the ship was lost. It was attacked by pirates in the Straits of Malacca and the entire crew
was forced to board another ship. The Alondra Rainbow was taken to Sarawak, Malaysia, repainted and given
the new name of Global Venture; it was later seized by the Indian coast guard. The search for the ship and theinvestigation of the case involved eight countries, clearly indicating that regional cooperation is absolutely
necessary for countering piracy. For example, when a vessel is in Indonesia’s jurisdiction, the Malaysian
authorities cannot pursue it and vice versa, which impedes the pursuit and arrest of pirates. Action against
piracy clearly requires transnational cooperation to be effective and efficient.
Given the need of regional cooperation to deter and respond to piracy, the late Japanese Prime Minister
Keizo Obuchi thus proposed an international conference to combat piracy in the region at the ASEAN+3 Summit
Meeting on November 28, 1999. In April 2000 his proposal was realized. Japan hosted the Regional Conference
on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships involving coast guard agencies and maritime policy
authorities in East Asia. The conference produced an outline of piracy measures for Asian countries to forge
partnerships in implementing. Since then Asia Regional Experts’ Meeting on Piracy has been held every year.
Sovereignty and different national priorities have, however, been obstacles to cooperation, not allowing“hot pursuit.” In the case of the Idaten, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore have been conducting a joint patrol,
but the three countries did not share the information that the vessel used by the pirates was a stolen boat.
Collaboration after the attack was also reported as insufficient, due to the complexity of territorial issues in thestraits. As it involves sovereignty of the littoral states, the dispatch of coast guard vessels is decided by eachcounty.
In November 2004 ASEAN, China, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Japan negotiated the Regional
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, which, once ratified,
will be a legal framework for regional cooperation. An information center has also been established in Singapore
for sharing of information on piracy. Functional cooperation is thus already underway against piracy. It is worth
noting that anti‐piracy measures are being promoted not by naval cooperation but by coast guards. Countries
that do not possess coast guards are creating them, as in the case of Malaysia and Indonesia. Anti‐piracy
cooperation, however, faces the challenge of surmounting the question of jurisdiction among countries in theregion which prevents pursuit and other effective control measures. Pirates are transnational in their activities
and control measures must therefore also be transnational. However, police agencies and coast guards cannot
exercise their powers beyond national borders. Pirates are taking advantage of these limitations and areescaping.
In addition to piracy there are other potential threats on the sea, including terrorism. East Asia needs todevelop a scheme whereby maritime security including sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) can be ensured
without infringing sovereignty and jurisdictional limits. Maritime security is so closely tied to economic andenergy security of East Asia as described in the following section. Sea lanes of communication constitute thelifeline of East Asian economies reliant on energy from other regions and on exports to others.

Energy Cooperation
The need to secure an energy supply has at times acted as a causative factor of war. The pursuit of oil
resources was one of the reasons for Japan’s expansion into Asia and attack on the Allied powers more than halfa century ago. Following the occupation of southern Indochina by Japanese troops in June 1941, the US, the UK
and the Netherlands froze Japanese assets, ensuring that the nation, which does not possess significant
30

indigenous oil resources, was unable to purchase oil. Japan therefore made plans to gain access to oil resourcesin Southeast Asia, leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor and the seizing of Indonesian oil fields owned by the
Dutch East India Company by Japanese paratroop units. Energy has therefore been directly related to security.
In hindsight, functional cooperation on energy in the form of the creation of the European Coal and Steel
Community after World War II was the commencement of the process of European integration. The intention
behind this initiative was to prevent a third world war by controlling coal and steel, which are essential materials
for warfare. Energy security was the main agenda during the oil crisis in 1970s, and has once again emerged as acommon topic in the region in the twenty‐first century, against a background of spiraling oil prices. Energy has
been politicized. Some resource rich countries have opted to limit FDI and to nationalize energy relatedcompanies. Some buyers on the other hand have opted to buy up resources overseas. Energy security has two
facets; at the macro level energy security means competition for natural fossil fuels and is a national security
issue with geopolitical and geo‐economic aspects, as demonstrated by the fact that energy supply can be a factor
in causing war and territorial disputes. At the micro‐level, energy security is a question of how energy supply issecured, including sea lane security. At the latter level, energy cooperation has been explored since the 1990s in
Asia, in particular in Northeast Asia. This is due to the fact that energy demand in Asia has increased
significantly due to the phenomenal economic growth of the region. Some former oil exporters, including China,
have become oil importers. Since the 1990s, proposals have been made for the creation of a Northeast Asian
Energy Community, in which resource‐rich countries like Russia and the Central Asian states and resource‐poor
but financially rich and technologically advanced countries like Japan and Korea cooperate in a variety of ways,
including the construction of oil and gas pipelines. Energy cooperation has long been identified as the mostpromising form of functional cooperation for the region since 1990s, but the proposals have remained at thestage of discussion. This is because of low crude oil prices in the past 15 years and competition between oil
consuming countries over bilateral trade with oil producing countries, a situation that has not been conducive to
multilateral cooperation in oil and gas import.
Both the EAVG and the EASG also recommended functional cooperation on energy within the frameworkof ASEAN+3. The ASEAN+3 Energy Ministers’ Meeting has been held since 2004. APEC also organized aworking group on energy cooperation and has promoted dialogues among member countries. With higher oil
prices, the oil demand and supply situation in the region is making energy cooperation more mutually beneficial
than ever.
Figure 3: Trend of World Primary Energy Consumption

Mtoe
18000

16487
16000

East Asia

14000

World

14404

12194
12000
10579
9951
10000
8628
8000

7156
5458

6000

4684
3936
4000

3158
2679

2343
1716

2000

1169
506

0
1971

1980

1990

2000

2003

2010

2020

2030

Year

Source: International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Balances of OECD Countries 2002-2003: 2005 Edition , Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries 2002-2003: 2005
Edition , and World Energy Outlook 2004
Note: East Asia in the projection of 2010, 2020 and 2030 includes Japan, Korea, China and the following countries according to the OECD's regional definition: Afghanistan,
Bhutan, Brunei, Chinese Taipei, Fiji, French Polynesia, Indonesia, Kiribati, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, New Caledonia, Papua
New Guinea, the Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Vietnam and Vanuatu.

31

Figure 4: Share of East Asia in World Primary Energy Consumption (2003)

China 13.48%
Japan 4.89%
Korea 1.94%
Indonesia 1.53%
Thailand 0.84%
Malaysia 0.54%
Vietnam 0.42%
the Philippines 0.40%
Singapore 0.21%
Myanmar 0.13%
Brunei 0.03%

others 75.63%

Source: International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Balances of OECD Countries 2002-2003: 2005 Edition, Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries 20022003: 2005 Edition , and World Energy Outlook 2004

In addition to soaring energy prices, East Asia has more consumers than producers of primary energy.
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) of the OECD, world primary energy consumption will
increase by 2.1 percent per annum from 2000 to 2030, as shown in Figure 3. Compared to figures for 1971, Asia’s
primary energy consumption has increased five‐fold while overall world consumption has increased only
two‐fold. As shown in Figure 4, Asia’s share of world energy consumption increased from 9.3 percent in 1971 to
24.4 percent in 2003, and is predicted to reach 28.4 percent in 2030. In terms of increase from 1971, Malaysia andThailand have increased their consumption by eight times, Indonesia and Korea by five times, China by threetimes and Japan by two times. China now consumes more energy than Japan. Excluding Japan the increase of
primary energy consumption in East Asia due to economic growth has been phenomenal, greater than thatobserved in any other region.
Particularly China’s oil consumption has grown due to its economic growth, its low energy efficiency,
increasing automobile ownership and surging petrochemical production. Since 1990 the number of automobiles
registered in China has risen roughly twenty‐fold. China is the fastest growing automobile market in the world.
With five million car sales in 2004, it is already the world’s third largest car market, and The Economist predicts
that it will become the largest between 2010 and 2015.

Almost all of China’s automobiles will use oil‐based fuels,and virtually all of the oil required will come from imports. China’s oil consumption passed Japan’s in 2002, andthe nation became the second largest consumer in the world after the United States. According to the IEA
forecast, Chinese oil imports will grow from the current 2 million barrels a day to 10 million barrels a day in 2030.
Although China is still the world’s fifth largest oil producer, continuing to draw on large fields in the northeast,
such as Daqing, environmental and infrastructural problems and the nation’s reluctance to offer incentives forforeign investment in oil development make it unlikely that China will produce significantly more oil in future.
In addition, again according to IEA statistics, East Asia’s intraregional oil production in 2002 was 308 million tons,
which represents only 8.4 percent of the world total. It is predicted that other oil producing nations in the region,such as Indonesia and Vietnam, will reduce production from 2010 unless they discover new reserves. Indonesia
has not conducted new oil exploration, and had to reduce its gasoline supply by 5 percent in 2005. Declining oil
reserves are also affecting electricity supply in the country.
This imbalance between demand and supply of oil in East Asia may become an Achilles’ heel for
economic development and stability of the region. Moreover, East Asia depends heavily on Middle Eastern oil.
32

According to IEA data, dependence on Middle Eastern oil in 2003 was 87.1 percent for Japan, 79.8 percent for
Korea, and 50.9 percent for China. Oil stockpiling is not well‐developed in East Asia, and if supply from theMiddle East should be disrupted for some reason, it may have a major effect on economic activity in the region.
In addition, the oil import route from the Middle East involves a long and dangerous sea route termed an “arc of
instability,” including the Strait of Malacca.
Thus, demand for oil in East Asia is growing and intra‐regional supply is on the decline, and this maylead to competition over drilling rights for oil and gas, including offshore rights. The Sino‐Japanese dispute in
the East China Sea is one such example. In East Asia, a shortage or disruption of oil supply would undermine
energy security both at the macro and micro level. East Asia has numerous reasons to identify common interestsand promote functional cooperation in the area of energy.
First and foremost, stable energy supply should be achieved not by competition but by cooperation. An oil
pipeline from Russia to East Asia, in particular to China, South Korea and Japan, would be an option to consider.
It is reported when Russia develops untapped oil and gas resources particularly in its Far East, the world supply
and demand would improve. The region must also work on geographical diversification of its energy supply.
Meanwhile, the region must make collective efforts to secure sea lanes for the transportation of oil, given its highlevel of reliance on Middle Eastern oil.
Secondly the region should also seek improved energy efficiency. Improvement in energy efficiency is said
to be worth a major discovery of a reservoir. China has already implemented efforts to better energy efficiency. In
1993, China’s energy efficiency was one‐twentieth Japan’s, but that figure has now been reduced to one‐seventh.
In July 2005, China began to introduce automobile fuel efficiency standards that require new cars to achieve up
to two miles more per gallon. The introduction of a fuel tax is also being considered in China. The nation has also
started to work on the achievement of increased energy efficiency in industry. It is claimed that increased energy
efficiency can reduce consumption in China by 30‐40 percent. Japanese companies have started their cooperation
to China for example in steel making to improve their energy efficiency.
Thirdly, the development of an oil stockpile that can be used in case of emergency by creating an Asian
version of IEA has been proposed. East Asia must diversify its energy supply towards nuclear power,hydroelectric power and natural gas. There is currently no natural gas pipeline in the region. Supply of gas bypipeline to Japan, Korea and China from the abundant reserves in Eastern Siberia has been proposed. ３０ This
long‐standing proposal now has a greater economic incentive than ever, given the higher prices of oil. Suchtransnational pipeline will have significance not only for energy supply but also for regional security.
Fourthly, the region should also attempt to develop new, alternative and renewable energies such as
nuclear power, solar power, wind power, bio‐fuel etc. Collective development projects and sharing of
information would prevent the duplication of effort in this area.
Numerous regional energy initiatives have been proposed or are currently underway; ASEAN+3 haslaunched ASEAN+3 Ministers on Energy Meeting since 2004 with one of the ASEAN countries serves as co‐chairin alphabetical order and one of the +3 countries serves as co‐chair. ASEAN+3 SOM has also launched an annual
meeting on energy in 2002 by the Japan’s proposal to discuss common issues. They have also createdBiomass‐Asia Workshop which is an annual event involving Asian countries which use biomass. East Asia
would benefit from combining these initiatives under a regional framework. Regional cooperation should belinked to global initiatives, including the Joint Oil Data initiative, in which many Asian countries are
participating. Functional cooperation on energy can offer visible benefits for participants and has a potential fora good model case for cooperation when designed well. With skyrocketing oil prices, energy cooperation is more
promising than the preceding decade.

Environment Cooperation
33

The other side of the coin of energy consumption is pollution which is transboundary in nature, including
global warming and climate change caused by carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases. The depletionof biodiversity and the issue of disposal of hazardous materials also represent environmental problems. Because
pollution spreads via air and water, its impact is not contained by national borders but extends to neighboring
countries and entire regions. Environmental issues thus demand collective measures. Given East Asia’s
phenomenal economic growth, balancing environmental protection and economic growth is an increasingly
important policy agenda. Environmental issues must be approached by global measures but be augmented byregional measures particularly in East Asia.
The region’s reliance on coal has, for example, produced sulfur dioxide emission causing acid rain, air
pollution and smog. China’s increasing coal consumption has increased the load on the environment which has
generated numerous problems for neighboring countries. East Asia needs to coordinate its environmental
policies, take collective steps and establish common environmental standards to mitigate the problem ofpollution in the region.
Being aware that environmental issues have at times led to regional disputes, the EAVG proposed “theestablishment of a comprehensive East Asian environmental cooperative body which includes a disputesettlement mechanism and a regional environmental database” ３１ and also that “an East Asian Environment
Ministers’ Meeting be organized periodically for the coordination of regional environmental projects.” ３２ While
the former has yet to be implemented, the latter proposal has already been realized. ASEAN+3 Environment
Ministers’ Meeting was launched in 2002 by the proposal of ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment
which has been meeting since 1981. The meeting has identified ten priority areas; namely (1) global environment,(2) forest fires and cross‐border haze, (3) coastal and marine environment, (4) sustainable forest management, (5)sustainable management of natural parks and reserves, (6) freshwater resources, (7) environmental education, (7)promotion of environmentally suitable technology and cleaner production, (9) urban environment management
and governance, and (10) harmonized monitoring, reporting and database for sustainable development. In
addition, the Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting among Japan, China and Korea (TEMM) has been held
since 2000.
Although these inter‐governmental meetings have not yet produced a joint projects, awareness of theimportance of environmental conservation has increased in East Asia, prompting the region to work on the
reduction of air pollution in particular. With consumption of fossil fuels projected to increase in future, it will beessential to enhance environmental standards. As air pollution and acid rain influence health in the short term,
the incentives for adopting the necessary measures are clear, and East Asian nations have already started to
introduce, de‐NOX and de‐SOX equipment.
The effects of global warming, by contrast, are generated over the long term. The phenomena ofdesertification and climate change associated with global warming occur so gradually that they do not motivate
actors to take immediate countermeasures. However, CO2 emissions in East Asia are certainly increasing, andaction needs to be taken now to avoid future environmental problems.

34

Figure 5: Trend of World Energy -related CO2 Emissions
MT of CO2

45000
40000

38214

East Asia

35000

33226

World

30000

27817
25597
23906

25000
21324
18659

20000
15000

14662
11829
9771

10000

6898

5798
5000

1827

2833

7659

4273

0
1971

1980

1990

2000

2003

2010

2020

2030

Year

Source: International Energy Agency (IEA), CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion 1971-2003: 2005 Edition and World Energy Outlook 2004
Note: East Asia in the projection of 2010, 2020 and 2030 includes Japan, Korea, China and the following countries according to the OECD's regional definition:
Afghanistan, Bhutan, Brunei, Chinese Taipei, Fiji, French Polynesia, Indonesia, Kiribati, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar,
New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Vietnam and Vanuatu.

As shown in Figure 5, worldwide energy‐related CO2 emissions increased approximately 2.5‐fold from1971 to 2003 while CO2 emissions in East Asia increased approximately six‐fold due to the region’s highconsumption of coal. East Asia’s CO2 emissions represented 12.5 percent of the world total in 1971, but this figure
had increased to 27 percent in 2003.
CO2 emissions increased approximately 1.5‐fold in Japan, four‐fold in China, five‐fold in Vietnam, eight‐foldin South Korea and Singapore, ten‐fold in Malaysia and Thailand and twelve‐fold in Indonesia. It is clear that
East Asia must reduce its carbon dioxide emissions to halt any further degradation of the environment.
The Kyoto Protocol took effect in February 2005. The Protocol was an epoch‐making step towards
mitigating global warming. However, it entails problems. Major CO2 emitters like the United States and China
have not ratified the Protocol. Moreover, the Protocol does not oblige developing countries to reduce theircarbon dioxide emissions. Emissions by the countries that have committed to the Protocol represent only 30
percent of world total CO2 emissions. Even when these countries reduce their emissions as required by theProtocol, it will only reduce world emissions by two percent. This will represent only a marginal improvement.
The Kyoto Protocol provides for three measures to supplement emission reduction efforts and to achieve
reduction targets, namely Joint Implementation, the Clean Development Mechanism and emissions trading. The
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) offers the possibility of regional cooperation. If East Asia utilizes the
CDM and developed countries in the region cooperate with developing countries to reduce their emissions ofgreenhouse gases, it would lead to further transfer of environmental technology. Developed countries in returnwould receive CO2 emission credits that could be used towards the achievement of numerical targets required by
the Kyoto Protocol. As an illustration, if Japan implemented a CDM project in China, in addition to Japan
receiving credit, Chinese emissions of greenhouse gases would be reduced, thus reducing air pollution. The
benefits are mutual.
CDM is a mechanism enabling environmental problems to be ameliorated as economic development is
promoted. However, CDM procedures are cumbersome, and only few projects have to date been approved.
Cooperation will be required to increase the user‐friendliness of CDM. If more countries can effectively use CDM
in global warming measures, it would have a positive influence on post‐Kyoto Protocol framework
consultations.
35Regional cooperation on the environment in East Asia has mainly been limited to conferences as describedabove. Moreover, actual cooperation is still at the level of bilateral or sub‐regional cooperation. Japan for
example has concluded a bilateral Agreement of Cooperation for Environmental Protection with China in 1994
and Japan‐China Environmental Cooperation for Twenty‐first Century in 1997. The latter has led to action suchas to rebuild model cities for environmental protection namely Chong Quing, Dalian and Guiyang and to build acomputer network to gather and disseminate environment‐related information. Southeast Asia has sufferedfrom haze due to forest fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan, leading to a Southeast Asian action plan ontransnational haze pollution And the introduction of regional monitoring and emergency measures on forest
fires.
The Asia‐Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, ３３ involving Australia, China, India,
Japan, South Korea and the United States, is also underway. This was originally proposed by President Bush to
substitute for US non‐ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. This Partnership involves voluntary practical measurestaken by these six countries in the Asia‐Pacific region to create new investment opportunities, build local
capacity and reduce barriers to the introduction of clean, more efficient technologies. .
Yellow dust is another transboundary pollutant from China, reaching Korea and Japan.

Infuture, these bilateral and sub‐regional or voluntary environmental initiatives should be developed into a
combined regional framework for environmental cooperation. With post‐Kyoto Protocol frameworks being
considered, it is essential to establish measures for incentives for developing countries to take part inenvironmental conservation efforts. Environmental issues should be approached collectively and have thepotential to enable viable regional functional cooperation like in the case of energy cooperation.

Functional Cooperation leading to Functional Integration?
Will these initiatives for functional cooperation on terrorism, energy, environment, piracy and infectious
disease lead to the functional integration of East Asia? Will functional cooperation lead to functional integration?
As described in the preceding section, it seems the region is heading for multiple overlapping schemes forfunctional cooperation sometimes involving different members. Skeptics regarding East Asian community
building argue that functional cooperation will not lead to regional community unless the region comes toembrace a common vision and values. Nonetheless, it is too early to indicate that functional cooperation will notlead to integration of any sort in East Asia. If East Asia develops a sense of regional partnership throughfunctional cooperation, it is plausible that the region will express a common political will. Regional collective
measures in functional areas would certainly contribute to global issues as well. For example, against a backdropof soaring energy prices and increased demand, East Asia may have more opportunities to influence global
energy policy by acting as a region.
East Asia still has flashpoints and is not likely to create a politico‐security community with substantive unitof power at any time soon. It is impossible for East Asia to substitute the hub and spoke bilateral alliancearchitecture with a community, but it can supplement web of alliance structures. Functional cooperation onpolitical and security would focus mainly on non‐traditional security issues while the region embraces hard
security issues. The purpose of such cooperation would thus be to mitigate political confrontation and toenhance stability in East Asia, that is, to keep the peace. Whether political and security cooperation in East Asia
leads to community building depends on the region’s future efforts. Very skillful architects are required topromote political and security cooperation in the region.
This cooperation also needs eventually to be buttressed by common values and visions. The Policy Reportof the CEAC in 2005 states that “ The Community’s ideals must envisage mutual security within a security
community (no‐war community), promote prosperity founded on a balance between economic competition andcooperation and ensure a community of progress dedicated to such values as freedom, democracy and respect
36

for human rights.” ３４

Linking East Asia Community with the United States
Promotion of the East Asian community concept has to be considered in terms of its implications forJapan’s relations with the United States, which represent the basic pillar of Japanese diplomacy. The alliance was
the only realistic security option for Japan during the Cold War, considering the threat emanating from theSoviet Union. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the necessity for the Japan‐US
alliance was questioned. A rape incident involving American soldiers in Okinawa in June 1995 posed a further
question on the need of the US troops in Japan. However, with the test launch of Nodon missiles by North Korea
and with the Joint Declaration on Japan US security, the alliance has gained new momentum and has beenstrengthened. The Japanese government released the new National Defense Planning Guidelines (NDPG) in
December 2004 based on the recommendations of the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, the so‐called
Araki report. The NDPG stated that the objectives of Japanese security policy is to prevent any threat fromdirectly reaching Japan and to reduce the chances of any threat arising in various parts of the world in order toprevent it from reaching Japan. The Guidelines stated that Japan will achieve these objectives through its own
defense preparedness, its alliance with the United States and cooperation with the international community.
Thus, the Japanese government envisions the Japan‐US alliance as a foundation of its security and defense policy.
On its part, the United States has deployed 100,000 troops in the Far East and 45,000 troops in Japan as a forward
deployment. This forward deployment is now being reviewed as a part of a transformation of the global
deployment of US forces. The alliance has been serving two purposes; one is defense of Japan and the other is thepeace and stability of Asia‐Pacific. In the Joint Statement of United‐States‐Japan Security Consultative Committee,
so‐called 2+2, issued on May 1, 2006 confirmed this point by stating that “The U.S.‐Japan Alliance … is theindispensable foundation of Japan’s security and of peace and stability in the Asia‐Pacific region.” It also statedthat realignment “will lead to a new phase in alliance cooperation and strengthened alliance capabilities in theregion.” ３５Some in the United States have argued that the East Asian community concept is a framework to exclude
the United States from Asia and an attempt by China to lead regional integration. In Japan many argue strongly
that the presence of the United States is essential for the stability of East Asia and a community concept without
the United Sates is simply laughable. Others argue that Japan is overly reliant on the United States, and that thecreation of regional communities such as the EU and NAFTA is the trend of the times.
Certainly the United States has been an important market for East Asian countries, which have depended
on export‐led economic growth. Even in the post‐Cold War and post‐post Cold War eras, the United States is thestabilizer of a security environment which continues to be uncertain and unpredictable. As mentioned above,
there is an argument to the effect that the Japan‐US alliance should be further enhanced rather than instituting
security cooperation in the region. ３６ The argument should not be a simple discussion of whether to exclude or
include the United States. One should remember that Europe has the EU for its regional economy and NATO for
its security, the latter of which surely include the United States. Likewise, the regional economy and security inEast Asia should be considered in a flexible manner. East Asia requires the presence and engagement of theUnited States. Simultaneously, the alliance network should not negate functional cooperation in East Asia and in
this respect also the United States would in certain areas be an essential partner of East Asian functional
cooperation. This approach from East Asia would help to keep the United States engaged in multilateralism inAsia despite its orientation towards unilateralism and isolationism.
At the same time, an East Asia community should be an open one. There are other regional frameworks
such as APEC and the ARF. Regional cooperation in East Asia should be linked to these Asia Pacific institutions.
In so doing it would be essential to revitalize these existing regional institutions. The ARF has been in a stalemate,37and should be rehabilitated so that it can be linked to East Asian efforts. This would be the best way to link East
Asia and the United States. An active linkage would benefit both. It is incumbent upon the United States andEast Asia to revitalize these existing institutions in exploring functional cooperation.

In Concluding
East Asian linkages are still less institutionalized. Yet transboundary non‐traditional security issues
introduced in this Chapter, from counter‐terrorism, piracy, energy to environment demands the region to workcollectively for their individual and regional benefits. The region’s emerging connections have, however, hardly
displaced national interest and national identity if not nationalism. The region has lacked motivations andincentives for ties across the region. National pull has overwhelmed regional pull. National sentiments remainconspicuously strong. It appears that the achievement of a political and security community in East Asia
represents a more difficult goal than the achievement of an economic community. It has been argued that thepolitico‐security area is the Achilles heel of an East Asian community concept. ３７ In this there is a consensus
among commentators, no matter what their position regarding East Asian community building is.
However, for the peace, stability and prosperity of East Asia, proactive efforts should not be limited toeconomic regional integration or regional free trade areas, but should aim at an eventual comprehensive
community or partnership including political and security areas. ASEAN proposed a Security Community of its
own in October 2003 at the time of the ASEAN Summit. A road map for building a security community is being
discussed, but the road has turned out to be rocky, as exemplified by the aborted agreement for creating
peacekeeping forces in ASEAN. Such efforts should not be limited to Southeast Asia. Northeast Asia should also
work on its own regionalism to balance East Asia perhaps as an extension of Six‐party talks on North Korean
nuclear development to non‐traditional security issues. Energy and environment cooperation introduced in this
Chapter has attracted numerous proposals for sub‐regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. Security andeconomy are linked. Peace enhances economic growth and stability and vice versa. Instead of declaring an East
Asian politico‐security community impossible, functional cooperation on non‐traditional security issues should
be given a chance. Meanwhile, we should explore whether we can extend functional cooperation to community
building, with the political objective of creating a community without war. This would produce by‐products. The
vision making would compel Japan and countries in East Asia to conceive their respective Asia policies. Whenthe immediate Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait issues are settled, an opportunity will emerge to create acollective security community in East Asia. Functional cooperation can at least pave the ground for suchdiscussion to take place when time comes. Furthermore, multilateralism can sometimes ease bilateral frictions
and tensions by offering venue for bilateral contacts.
The achievement of a community without war can be a strong common vision for East Asia. None in theregion can disagree to a vision of this sort. Despite many obstacles, it might be worth while to cerate thebackbone of an East Asian community by examining the limits and potential of political and security cooperationin East Asia. Functional cooperation on non‐traditional security threats introduced in this Chapter can offer
experiences for regional countries to harvest merits of working together.
１

Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International Security 18, 3 Winter 1993;
5-33.
２
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006, 1.
３
ASEAN Secretariat, “Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation,” 28 November 1999,
http://www.aseansec.org/2051.htm.
４“Higashiajia Kyodotai ni Hantai [My Opposition to East Asian Community],” Asahi Shimbun, May 1, 2005.
５
Naoki Tanaka, http://www.21ppi.org/japanese/hitokoto/tanaka215.html
６
Taro Yayama, “Chugoku no Higashiajia Kyodotai Sakubo ni noruna [Don’t Play Along with China’s Schemes for East
Asian Community],” Sankei Shimbun,December 22, 2005
38

７

Mineo Nakajima, “Higashiajia Kyodotai ha Genjituron nanoka?” Sankei Shimbun, August 1, 2005.
Toshio Watanabe, “Higashi ajia kyodotai ha seiritsu suruka [Can East Asia community be built?]” in Nihon no Higashi
Ajia Senryaku [ Japan’s Policy towards East Asian Economic Integration, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 2005, 207.
９Ibid., 218
１０Noboru Hatakeyama, “Higashiajia Kyodotai no Genso wo Suteyo [Give up the Fantasy of East Asian Community],”
Chuokoron, September 2005, 154-161.
１１
Hitoshi Tanaka, “21seiki Nihongaiko no Senryakuteki Kadai [Strategic Issues for 21st Century Japanese Diplomacy],”
Gaiko Forum, No.207, (October 2005), 8-13.
１２
Makoto Taniguchi, “Kikiteki Ajia Gaiko wo Ikani Tatenaosuka [How Will We Remake Asian Diplomacy?],” Chuo
Koron,, 2006 April, 314.
１３
Yoshihide Soeya, “Higashi Ajia Kyodotai Tenbo to Kadai: Kyuukyoku wa Anzen Hosho Kyodotai [East Asian
Community: Problems and Prospects – A Security Community is the Ultimate Goal],” Nihon Keizai Shimbun,, November 28,
2005.
１４
Takashi Shiraishi, “ASEAN Jiku ni Tenkai [Evolution of East Asian Community around ASEAN],” Yomiuri Shimbun,
September 4, 2005.
１５
Denis C.Blair and John T.Hanley Jr., “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements,” The
Washington Quarterly, vol.24, no.1, Winter 2001.
１６
Karl W. Deutcsh, Sidney A.Burrell, Robert A.Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichteman, Raymond E.Lindgren, Francis
L.Loewenheim, Richard W.Van Wagenen, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in
the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957,
１７
Prior to 1999 the data on dialogues was compiled initially by the University of Toronto and subsequently by the
University of British Columbia.
１８Japan Center for International Exchange, Dialogue and Research Monitor: Towards Community Building in East Asia,
Vol 3 July-December 2004, iv.
１９“Database on the Functional Cooperation Progressing in the ASEAN+3 and Other Regional Frameworks in East Asia,”
compiled by Government of Japan in June 2005 shows 48 regional frameworks by ASEAN+3 for functional cooperation.
２０
ASEAN Secretariat, http://www.aseansec.org/5620.htm
２１
APEC secretariat, 2001 APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration: Meeting New Challenges in the New Century, Shanghai,
China, 21 October 2001, http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/leaders_declarations/2001.html
２２
APEC secretariat, 2002 APEC Leaders’ Statement on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth, Los Cabos, Mexico, 26
October 2002, http://www.apec.org/leaders_declarations/2002/statement_on_fighting.html
２３
APEC secretariat, APEC Leaders Issue Counter-Terrorism Statements,
http://www.apec.org/apec/news_media/2002_media_releases/261002_mex_leader
２４
APEC secretariat, APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting Bangkok Declaration on Partnership for the Future, Bangkok,
Thailand, 21 October 2003, http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/leaders_declarations/2003.html
２５
APEC secretariat, APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting Busan Declaration, Busan, Korea, 18-19 November 2005,
http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/leaders_declarations/2005.html
２６
ASEAN secretariat, ARF Statement on Measures Against Terrorist Financing, Bandar Seri Begawan, 30 July 2002,
http://www.aseansec.org/12004.htm
２７
ASEAN secretariat, ASEAN Regional Forum Statement on Strengthening Transport Security Against International
Terrorism, Jakarta, 2 July 2004, http://www.aseansec.org/16250.htm
２８
Sam Bateman, Catherine Zara Raymond and Joshua Ho, “Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: An
Agenda for Action,” Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Policy Paper, May 2006, 8.
２９
Yoshihiko Yamada, Umi no Terorizumu [Maritime Terrorism], PHP Shinsho, 2003, 158-163.
３０
http://nagpf.org
３１
East Asia Vision Group Report 2001, Towards an East Asian Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress
Paragraph 73.,
３２
ibid., paragraph 74.
３３
The White House, ”Fact Sheet: President Bush and the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development,”
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2005/07/20050727-11.html
３４
The Council on East Asia Community(CEAC), Policy Report “The State of the Concept of East Asian Community andJapan’s Strategic Response thereto,” August, 2005, 7
３５
United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee Document, “Joint Statement,” May 1, 2006.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0605.html
３６
Toshio Watanabe, “Higashi ajia kyodotai ha seiritsu suruka [Can East Asia community be built?]” in Nihon no Higashi
Ajia Senryaku [ Japan’s Policy towards East Asian Economic Integration, Toyo Keizai Shinposha,218
３７Masahiro Kohara, Higashi Ajia Kyodotai [The East Asian Community], Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 2005, 248
８39

Session II: “An East Asian Community and the United States”

Mr. Ralph COSSA
President, the Pacific Forum CSIS

East Asian Community and the United States: U.S. View‐‐ One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?

In the past 12 months, there has been a great deal of movement surrounding the effort to establish an
East Asia community. I hasten to add, however, that “movement” does not necessarily or always mean progress.
Not all the movement has been in the forward direction.

Some has been sideways, some even backwards.

While it would be unkind to describe the process as “one step forward, two steps back,” there certainly has notbeen any “great leap forward” either.
The one step forward was the convening of the inaugural East Asia Summit (EAS) in Kuala Lumpur in
December 2005 and the efforts since then to develop the principles and modalities that will define the future roleand mission of this new multilateral gathering. But, as continued disputes and confusion over its composition,
direction, and relationship to both broader and more selective existing mechanisms reveal, East Asia
community‐building still has a long way to go. It is also clear to this author that the EAS will not provide thefoundation of an East Asia community, but rather is more likely to serve as a broader‐based endorsement orvalidation mechanism for a companion East Asian‐only effort. In this respect, the EAS may prove to be one step
backwards rather than toward the establishment of an East Asian community.
Meanwhile, it remains difficult to discuss U.S. attitudes toward East Asia regionalism or thedevelopment of an East Asian community since an East Asian community has yet to really be defined – muchless credibly emerge.

Generally speaking, the United States has been an active partner in many of theinstitution‐building and/or community‐building efforts that have emerged in East Asia during the post‐Cold
War era, including the two preeminent Asia‐Pacific multilateral organizations, the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) “gathering of economies” which includes (at U.S. instigation) an annual “Leaders Meeting,”
and the security‐oriented, ministerial‐level ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
In recent years (unlike the early 1990s), Washington has been generally supportive of – or at least not40

actively opposed to – even those multilateral organizations in which it was not a member, such as ASEAN Plus
Three (A+3), which is comprised of the ten ASEAN countries (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) plus China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. In
fact, the Bush administration, despite its (sometimes‐deserved) reputation for unilateralism elsewhere, has been
particularly supportive of East Asian and broader Asia‐Pacific multilateralism.
Bush administration attitudes may be changing, however. At a minimum, serious questions are now
being raised regarding the nature, intent, and future direction of East Asia community‐building in general andthe EAS in particular, and about the motivation of some of its key proponents. As noted at this gathering lastyear, one lingering question, at least from an American perspective, is the extent of U.S. involvement in East Asia
community‐building; should Washington be included as a member, or as an observer, or not at all, in thisevolving East Asia community?

Arguments can be made both pro and con. How and why Washington is

excluded could be as important as whether or not it is invited to participate.
When it comes to the EAS, it is not clear if Washington even desires a seat at the table – getting
President Bush to two Asian summits in any given year, especially if scheduled only a few months apart, would
be no mean feat, not to mention the problem of bringing President Bush into direct contact with the leader ofMyanmar, whose legitimacy Washington does not recognize. Nonetheless, the Bush administration has made it
clear that it is interested in learning more about the composition of the group, the criteria for membership, andmost importantly (and still largely undefined) its mission, objectives, and priorities.
To date, the Bush administration has not rejected some form of U.S. involvement in the EAS. Last year,
in the run‐up to the inaugural EAS, I raised a number of questions regarding the nature and intent of the EAS
and the broader East Asia community‐building effort. In this paper, I will revive those questions and provide
answers where possible, while highlighting new and remaining questions which still preclude determination ofa definitive U.S. position.
Before looking at more recent events, it is helpful to remember how we got to where we are today. As aresult, I will first review Washington’s evolving attitude toward multilateral cooperation and regionalism in East
Asia, to ascertain what kind of ultimate response one should expect from the United States regarding regional
attempts to further develop an East Asian community – with or without Washington’s direct participation. I will
provide an American perspective, not the American perspective. This paper represents my personal views, while
merely speculating about the evolving and future views of the U.S. government, which remains generally
circumspect on the subject.
In the final analysis, much will depend on who leads the East Asian community.

Will ASEAN remainin the driver’s seat? If so, can 10 drivers steer a steady course? If not, who will emerge?

As the real economic

giant in East Asia, one could argue that leadership should go to Japan. Ironically, a decade ago, when others in
the region seemed prepared to accept Japan as the so‐called “lead goose,” Japan was hesitant to assume this role.
Today, Tokyo seems more willing to take a leadership role (although this remains debatable). However, “history”
issues, many self‐inflicted, have made it difficult for Japan to emerge from the shadow of its own past, even as it
seems to be entering into the shadow of the region’s emerging new giant, China.

Will China be the presumptive

or defacto leader of this new East Asia Community? If so, will that leadership be benign or will it be aimed – orbe perceived by the U.S. as being aimed – at limiting or replacing Washington’s (and Tokyo’s) influence in theregion.
41

It is also important at the onset to put East Asia regionalism into context. No one seems to be promoting
or anticipating a European Union‐type arrangement.

Attempts by Indonesia over the past few years to bind

ASEAN more closely together, through the establishment of an ASEAN Community (comprised of an ASEAN
Security Community, an ASEAN Economic Community, and an ASEAN Socio‐Cultural Community) haveshown just how difficult it is to get these nations – some of which have been closely aligned for over 30 years – tothink and act as one, especially in the security arena. Developing a lowest common denominator for security
cooperation among these ten diverse nations is difficult enough; imagine adding China and Japan to the mix(much less one or both Koreas). If current established multilateral community‐building mechanisms, such as theASEAN, A+3, the ARF, and APEC are any indication of the willingness of East Asian nations (regardless of how
the term is defined) to seriously address issues of regional governance (and the “interference in one another’sinternal affairs” that true regional governance requires), one should not expect much progress soon.
Most importantly, from a U.S. perspective, will be how an East Asian community relates to the region’s
other multilateral organizations and initiatives – both institutionalize (like the ARF and APEC) and ad hoc (likethe Six‐Party Talks and the Proliferation Security Initiative). Its relationship to the ARF and APEC in particularwill be part of what Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill has referred to as the “Pan‐Asianism vs.
Pan‐Pacificism” debate. Another key factor affecting Washington’s attitude will be the willingness (or lackthereof) of emerging East Asia mechanisms to adopt global norms, especially in the areas of counter‐terrorism
and counter‐proliferation and the promotion of free and open markets. Will the new East Asia community
reinforce existing multilateral efforts to accomplish these goals or dilute them? Will it help the states of theregion to more effectively address growing transnational challenges . . . or provide another excuse for avoiding
such efforts? These questions and some preliminary answers will be explored in this paper.
Background
During the Cold War and immediate post‐Cold War era, Washington’s leaders (and most other regional
policy‐makers) viewed the idea of institutionalized East Asia multilateral security cooperation with a great dealof apprehension and suspicion.

In 1991, when then‐Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama suggested at an

ASEAN Post‐Ministerial Conference (PMC) gathering that a forum be established to discuss regional security
issues, his remarks were not well‐received.
to such an idea.

The U.S., under President George H.W. Bush, was particularly coolMore comfortable with a one‐on‐one approach to security issues in Asia, U.S. officials at thetime were hesitant to embrace multilateral approaches to addressing security concerns.
As the Cold War faded into history, however, there has been a decided shift in regional attitudes toward,
and U.S. support for, multinational security initiatives in Asia.

On the U.S. side, the first clear signal of this shiftcame in 1993 when then‐Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord identified “acommitment to enhanced multilateral security dialogue” as one of the incoming Clinton Administrationʹs ten
priority policy goals for Asia.
Of equal importance, voices were concurrently being raised within ASEAN calling for the introductionof security‐related issues into PMC deliberations.

One significant example occurred at the 1992 ASEAN PMC in

Manila when a joint statement was issued calling for the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes involving theSpratly Islands (claimed in whole by China and Taiwan and in part by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, andVietnam). While ASEAN had been in existence since 1967, it had historically been reluctant to delve into security
42matters, even amongst its own members, much less with its external dialogue partners.
Regional non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) were also calling for greater multilateral security
dialogue both at the official and NGO level.

In 1991‐92, the Honolulu‐based Pacific Forum CSIS joined forces

with the Seoul Forum for International Affairs, the Japan Institute for International Affairs, and ASEAN ISIS ‐‐ aloose coalition of Southeast Asian institutes focusing on Asian security and international studies ‐‐ to promoteformalized track‐two (non‐governmental) and official security dialogue.

Their leadership led to theestablishment in late 1992/1993 of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), an NGO
focused on multilateral security dialogue and regional confidence building.

The CSCAP founding statement

also strongly endorsed the creation of official security dialogue mechanisms.
President Clinton added the icing to the cake in July 1993 when he firmly embraced the concept ofmultilateral security dialogue in Asia, calling it one of the four pillars of his vision for a ʺnew Pacific community.ʺ
This change in attitude was solidified at the 1993 ASEAN PMC meeting when the PMC dialogue partners met
informally over lunch with representatives from China, Russia, Vietnam (which was not yet a member of
ASEAN), and other PMC observers, to talk about security matters.

The group decided that they would

reconvene the following year in the precedent‐setting ASEAN Regional Forum.
President Clinton also proposed and then in the fall of 1993 served as the first host of what has now
become an annual APEC Leaders’ Meeting. (APEC itself dates back to 1989.) While focused on broader regional
trade issues, this gathering of the region’s heads of state quickly took on a political and at least quasi‐security
role, just by its mere existence.

This was then followed by the July 1994 inaugural meeting of the ARF in

Bangkok, which again provided a clear signal that attitudes regarding multilateral security dialogue werechanging, both in the United States and throughout Asia.
While instituted during the Clinton era, both the ARF and the APEC Leaders Meeting have thus far
enjoyed strong support from the current U.S. administration as well, witness President George W. Bush’s
willingness to attend the October 2001 Shanghai APEC meeting in the immediate wake of September 11th and thepresence of Secretary of State Colin Powell at all four ARF meetings held during his tenure in office (something
neither of his predecessors could claim).
While Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (deservedly) received widespread criticism for missing her
first ARF meeting in July 2005 – she was ably represented by her Asia‐oriented deputy, Robert Zoellick –Washington has reaffirmed its commitment to the ARF several times since then and has sent strong assurancesthat Dr. Rice will be at the 2006 meeting in Malaysia.
The Bush administration’s early support for East Asian multilateralism was reinforced in the WhiteHouse’s September 2002 National Security Strategy for the United States of America (NSS) which expressed theconviction that “multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom‐loving nations” and further statedthat the U.S. would build upon the stability provided by institutions such as ASEAN and APEC “to develop a
mix of regional and bilateral strategies to manage change in this dynamic region.”
This was reinforced in the 2006 NSS. Consistent with its theme of promoting freedom and democracy, it
noted that existing institutions like the ARF and APEC can play a “vital role” when it comes to “the spread of
freedom, prosperity, and regional security.”

It also noted that “new arrangements, such as the U.S.‐ASEAN
43

Enhanced Partnership, or others that are focused on problem‐solving and action, like the Six‐Party Talks and the
PSI [Proliferation Security Initiative], can likewise bring together Asian nations to address common challenges.”
In short, the Bush administration has renewed and reinvigorated U.S. interest in the ARF and APEC
and, against some initial regional resistance and criticism, insisted on a multilateral approach, under the
Six‐Party Talks, for dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem. On a somewhat more contentious note, it
has also placed a great deal of importance on “ad hoc multilateralism” – the PSI, for example, serves as a
primary vehicle in the U.S.‐led global effort to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Howsuch “coalitions of the willing” will interact with standing multilateral mechanisms, or for that matter with
Washington’s traditional bilateral alliances, has yet to be fully determined, however.
Pro‐Multilateralism, with Caveats. As a general rule, Washington has historically viewed Asia Pacificmultilateral organizations as useful vehicles both for promoting greater political and economic cooperation andfor enhancing regional security. This support for multilateral institutions – in the Asia Pacific and globally – has
one important caveat, however: No U.S. administration, be it Republican or Democrat, is likely to allow suchinstitutions to be seen as substitutes for or as threats to U.S. bilateral alliances and other security arrangements.
This was clearly spelled out in the 2006 NSS: “Asian nations that share our values can join us inpartnership to strengthen new democracies and promote democratic reforms throughout the region. Thisinstitutional framework, however, must be built upon a foundation of sound bilateral relations with key states in
the region.” Like the Clinton administration before it, the Bush administration does not see bilateral andmultilateral efforts as being in tension; rather, they complement one another.

As a general rule, East Asian

multilateral organizations are seen as useful tools in pursuing U.S. national security objectives.
During its first term in office, the George W. Bush administration was also cautiously supportive ofmultilateral organizations, such as ASEAN Plus Three and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which
do not include the U.S. In its second term, however, the Bush administration is starting to cast a more watchfuleye, especially on those organizations established and/or dominated by China, to ensure that these do not
represent efforts to diminish Washington’s (or Tokyo’s) involvement or interests in the region.
This has been especially true since July 2005, when the Beijing (and Moscow)‐driven SCO (which also
involves four Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) called for the U.S. to set
a date for the withdrawal of its forces from Central Asia during a summit meeting in the Kazakhstan capital of
Astana. The SCO proclamation called on the U.S. and its coalition partners to “decide on the deadline for the useof the temporary infrastructure and for their military contingents’ presence” in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan – at
the time, the U.S. had roughly 1,000 troops each at airfields in Karshi‐Khanabad in Uzbekistan and Manas in
Kyrgyzstan – “as the active military phase in the anti‐terror operation in Afghanistan is nearing completion.”
By the end of that month, it became obvious that one of the hosts – Uzbekistan, which had come underincreasing criticism from the U.S. and the international community in general for its harsh repression ofprotestors in Andijan in May – was not going to wait for the U.S. to set its own deadline; on July 29, Uzbekistan
gave Washington 180 days to vacate Karshi‐Khanabad.

While this no doubt reflects Uzbek President Islam

Karimov displeasure over Washington’s criticism of his dismal human rights record, it is doubtful it could haveoccurred without Moscow and Beijing’s consent, if not active encouragement and support. As a result, this action
has raised serious questions about Beijing’s (and Moscow’s) motives, and resulted in a more watchful eye being
44

cast on exclusionary East Asia multilateralism.
While the U.S. is still not attempting to actively block or interfere with East Asia regionalism efforts likethe A+3 and SCO that exclude the U.S., it is closely monitoring their future direction and carefully examining the
motives of those who seek to guide them.

Meanwhile, the Bush administration continues to state its clear

preference for “inclusive” Asia‐Pacific regional efforts that include Washington, despite some of the inherent
perceived weaknesses.
A brief examination of Washington’s involvement in and attitude toward the region’s two premierbroader Asia‐Pacific community‐building organizations – the ARF and APEC – may lend some insight into its
view of East Asia regionalism in general.
The ARF: “Very, Very Useful” but Limited
The 25‐member ARF brings together foreign ministers from the ten ASEAN states plus Australia,
Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Korea, North
Korea, New Zealand, and the United States, plus Pakistan (since 2004) and most recently (2005) Timor‐Leste, forannual security‐oriented discussions.

It received broad support during the first four years of the George W.

Bush administration, being described by then‐Secretary of State Powell as “very, very useful” after his first ARF
meeting.
As noted earlier, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice missed her first opportunity to participate in the
ARF when “scheduling conflicts” caused her to miss the July 2005 ministerial in Vientiane. Laos; an omissionthat openly raised questions about Washington’s continued commitment to East Asia regionalism and wasdeemed “unfortunate” by ASEAN leaders. However, the presence of her deputy, Robert Zoellick (a highly
respected old Asia hand) helped to assuage these concerns. At a 10+1 side meeting with ASEAN ministers,
Zoellick helped to initiate a US‐ASEAN Enhanced Partnership proposal to deepen U.S. cooperation with the ten
Southeast Asian nations on a broad range of issues.
Various ARF study groups (called Inter‐sessional Support Groups or ISGs) have provided a vehicle for
the U.S. to move the multilateral process along in areas important to Washington, such as preventive diplomacy,enhanced confidence building, counter‐proliferation, and maritime (including search and rescue) cooperation; allof which help promote greater transparency and military‐to‐military cooperation. Most importantly, since Sept.
11, 2001, the ARF has helped focus regional attention on, and has served as an important vehicle for practicalcooperating in, fighting terrorism.
At the ARF meeting in Jakarta in July 2004, the assembled ARF Ministers repeated annual pledges tofight terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction through ARF Statements on “Strengthening
Transport Security Against International Terrorism” and a “Statement on Non‐Proliferation.” They also
confirmed their intentions to further institutionalize the ARF process through the establishment of “an ARF
Unit” within the ASEAN Secretariat to serve as a de facto ARF Secretariat, to assist “in carrying out the mandates
outlined in the paper on the Enhanced Role of the ARF Chair” and to support the Experts and Eminent Persons
Group.
Annual counter‐terrorism pledges were repeated at the 2005 ARF Meeting in Vientiane, Laos in July
2005, with China and Brunei agreeing to host an Inter‐sessional Meeting on Counter‐Terrorism and45

Transnational Crime. The big news coming out of Vientiane was the announcement that Myanmar would skip its
turn, after Malaysia, to chair ASEAN (and hence the ARF) in mid‐2006, thus avoiding a confrontation between
ASEAN and Washington (among others), who had pledged to send only low‐level representatives to any ARF
meeting hosted by Myanmar.
Generally speaking, the ARF seems well‐suited to serve as the consolidating and validating instrument
behind many security initiatives proposed by governments and at non‐official gatherings, and has become auseful vehicle in the war on terrorism. But, from a U.S. perspective, its contribution to the regional security orderremains somewhat constrained.

For example, Taiwan has not been permitted to participate and the PRC has

insisted that ʺinternal Chinese affairsʺ not be on the agenda, effectively blocking ARF discussion of cross‐Strait
tensions despite their obvious broad regional implications.

The Chinese have even been reluctant to address

conflicting claims in the South China Sea at the ARF, insisting instead on separate talks with ASEAN or with theother claimants on an individual basis.
Few expect the ARF to solve the region’s problems or even to move rapidly or pro‐actively to undertakethat mission. The agreement to ʺmove at a pace comfortable to all participantsʺ was aimed at tempering thedesire of more Western‐oriented members for immediate results in favor of the ʺevolutionaryʺ approach
preferred by the ASEAN states, which all too often seems to see the process as being as (or more) important as its
eventual substantive products.

The

Asian preference for ʺnoninterference in internal affairsʺ also has

traditionally placed some important topics essentially off limits, although this may be changing (witness
ASEAN’s increased willingness to comment on Myanmar’s domestic politics). Nonetheless, it seems safe toassume that the evolution of the ARF from a confidence building measures ʺtalk shopʺ to a true preventive
diplomacy mechanism (as called for in its 1995 Concept Paper) will be a long and difficult one.
APEC: Cautiously Testing the Security Waters
APEC is first and foremost a “gathering of regional economies” – it is not referred to as a gathering ofstates or governments due to the presence in its ranks of Hong Kong and Taiwan.

It started out as an informal

dialogue group, growing from an original 12 members (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, theRepublic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States) in 1989
to 15 in 1991 (with the addition of China., Hong Kong, and “Chinese Taipei”) to its current strength of 21, withthe addition of Mexico and Papua New Guinea (1993), Chile (1994), Peru, Russia, and Vietnam (1997).
Institutionalization began in February 1993, when the APEC Secretariat was established in Singapore.
While primarily aimed at managing the effects of growing economic interdependence, APEC has had
an important political and security role as well, especially since the 1993 Seattle meeting when President Clinton
invited the APEC heads of state and government to the first of what have now become regular annual Leaders’Meetings designed to elevate the importance of this economic gathering.

The Leadersʹ Meetings have become

an important vehicle for fostering political relations in addition to raising the level of economic dialogue andputting pressure on the regionʹs leaders (and especially the host state) to move the process forward.
APEC’s Evolving Political/Security Role.

The political and even strategic significance of the Leaders’ Meetings

was first underscored in Auckland in 1999, a gathering that was significant more for what happened outside the
APEC venue than inside the meeting.
corridors.

Security issues dominated the side discussions and the talk in the

Not the least of these was the growing (and well‐founded) concern over the deteriorating security
46

situation in East Timor.

The Auckland meeting was fortuitous in that it provided an opportunity for regional

leaders, including President Clinton and Australian Prime Minister John Howard, to work out arrangements for
the Australian‐led multinational peacekeeping mission (INTERFET) that was subsequently sent to East Timor.
Obtaining on‐the‐spot Chinese approval of this effort, made possible by Indonesia’s reluctant acceptance of theintervention, helped assure UN Security Council authorization of the subsequent UN operation, the United
Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET).
were major players(It should be noted that neither ASEAN nor the ARF

in the East Timor crisis, demonstrating their limited utility as crisis response mechanisms.)

This remains the case today, with Malaysia alone among ASEAN providing military assistance to Timor‐Leste in
response to recent cries for help.
In similar fashion, APEC 2001 provided an important vehicle for President Bush to explain
Washington’s war on terrorism to his Asian colleagues and to garner their support.

In addition to the usual

annual APEC Leaders’ Declaration, the assembled leaders also issued an APEC Leaders’ Statement on
Counter‐Terrorism ‐‐ the first political document to be issued in APEC’s 13‐year history ‐‐ which unequivocallycondemned the September 11 attack and deemed it “imperative to strengthen international cooperation at alllevels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner.”

This was considered a real victory for President

Bush and no doubt helped to increase APEC’s (or at least the Leaders Meeting’s) relevance in his eyes.
The APEC Shanghai meeting also provided President Bush with his first opportunity to meet directlywith Chinese President Jiang Zemin, which helped to end the downward slide in Sino‐U.S. relations underway
since Bush’s inauguration (and especially after the collision between a U.S. reconnaissance plane and a Chinese
jet fighter over the South China Sea in April 2001). The two leaders were able to put the relationship back on
track, aided by China’s willingness to cooperate in the battle against terrorism.
Security matters continue to be discussed at the Leaders Meeting, not to mention at the numerous sidesummits that normally accompany this gathering.

For example, at the October 2003 APEC Leaders Meeting in

Bangkok, the final communique referred to cooperation on combating proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), while President Bush used the occasion, and his side meetings with the leaders of South
Korea, Japan, and China, to call on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons aspirations, while repeating his
offer to provide Pyongyang with written assurances that the U.S. does not intend to attack North Korea.
Similar efforts took place at the 2004 APEC Leaders Meeting in Santiago, Chile and at the November 2005 APEC
meeting in Busan, Korea.
At the Busan Leader’s Meeting, the major focus was on a strong statement in support of the critical
World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Development Agenda round slated to take place the following month(with little success) in Hong Kong. In addition to other agreements on energy cooperation, on a roadmap toassess progress on the Bogor Goals of trade liberalization, and on several anti‐terrorism measures, APEC leaders
also agreed to establish the “APEC Initiative on Preparing for and Mitigating an Influenza Pandemic.”(Afterthe tsunami disaster in late 2004, government leaders became more alert and responsive to the need for acollective approach to prepare for such cross‐border threats.)
President Bush met jointly with the six ASEAN members of APEC along the sidelines of the 2005 APEC
Leaders Meeting, in what constituted his first‐ever U.S.‐ASEAN Summit and which resulted in a desire, by allconcerned, for continued meetings.

Discussions are now underway to make this a regular event. The setting isparticularly attractive to Washington since Myanmar is not a member of APEC.
47

As long as APEC provides a useful venue not only for the promotion of free trade but also for fighting
the war on terrorism, we can expect that Washington will continue to be an active player. However, as with the
ARF, it will remain more suited to talking about security problems than to actually helping to implement
solutions. In addition to the usual drawbacks associated with East Asian multilateralism (as discussed below),
APEC has the added “problem” of including Taiwan. Rather than using this venue as a vehicle for incorporating
Taiwanese views and concerns into the regional security debate in a “non‐governmental” setting, Beijing has
tried to block any substantive security‐oriented activities and to further isolate Taiwan from the dialogue
process.
Multilateral Pluses and Minuses
In short, American policymakers generally believe that Asia‐Pacific multilateral organizations such as
the ARF and APEC are useful vehicles both for promoting greater political and economic cooperation and forenhancing regional security. While such organizations hold many promises for Asia, it is important tounderstand their limits, as well as the opportunities they present.

A comprehensive security arrangement or

NATO‐type alliance aimed at containing or responding to a specified threat simply does not apply to a post‐Cold
War Asia.

Rather, East Asia multilateral security mechanisms should be viewed more as confidence building

measures aimed at avoiding or dampening the possibilities of (rather than reacting to) crises or aggression.
Peacekeeping and disaster relief operations and non‐traditional security issues (such as refugee problems,
maritime safety, pollution, and other environmental and safety issues) also seemed well‐suited to a multilateralapproach.

In many instances, the process is as important as the product.

Efforts that build upon and seek to complement, and not to replace, existing bilateral and ad hoc
relationships that already exist in Asia are of particular value from a U.S. perspective.

Any effort that isperceived at undermining U.S. bilateral dealings, and especially those that seek to diminish or replace America s
key bilateral security alliances, are sure to be rejected by Washington both today and by any futureadministration.
More generally speaking, Asian multilateral security mechanisms can serve as important vehicles forpromoting long term peace and stability.
regional security matters.

They provide a framework for continued direct U.S. involvement in

They offer a means for Japan, China, and Russia, among others, to become more

actively involved in regional security affairs in a manner that is non‐threatening to their neighbors.

They also

provide a forum for exposing North Korea to regional realities while facilitating bilateral dialogue between the
North and South Korea, Japan, and the U.S., respectively. They also provide a mechanism for other regional
actors to be heard, while contributing to a sense of regional identity and a spirit of cooperation and confidencebuilding.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, they have also become increasingly relevant for coordinating regional views andefforts in the war on terrorism.
Nonetheless, their utility remains limited, especially in the security arena, for two primary reasons.
First, while steps have been taken since the 9‐11 terrorist attacks to put some operational substance behindcooperative efforts, these organizations still largely remain dialogue mechanisms which talk about – rather thanrespond to or deal effectively with – emerging security challenges. And second, Taiwan has been systematically
excluded from many of these mechanisms and one of the region’s greatest security challenges – cross‐Strait
relations – has been purposefully kept off the security dialogue agenda at Beijing’s insistence.

As long as thesecharacteristics prevail, the prospects and promises of multilateral security cooperation in the Asia‐Pacific region,at least from a U.S. perspective, will necessarily be limited..
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Ad Hoc Multilateralism: The PSI and Six‐Party Talks
If Washington has only limited confidence in institutionalized multilateral mechanisms (like the ARF,
APEC, and the United Nations), it is developing a clear preference for ad hoc or tailored multilateralism aimed ata specific task or objective and comprised of a “coalition of the willing.”

The multinational force assembled forthe war in Iraq provides one example, as does the aforementioned Proliferation Security Initiative.
Proliferation Security Initiative.

The PSI was first laid out in a speech by President Bush in May 2003 andformalized at a 11‐nation meeting (involving Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Spain, the UK, and the U.S.) in Madrid a month later. It is “a global initiative with global reach,” underwhich coalition members have agreed “to move quickly on direct, practical measures to impede the trafficking inweapons of mass destruction (WMD), missiles, and related items.” As such, it is clearly “task‐oriented.” It
represents cooperation for a specific, clearly‐defined purpose, as opposed to dialogue for dialogue’s sake or insupport of more generic objectives. In Sept. 2003, in Paris, the 11 core participants agreed on a Statement ofInterdiction Principles “to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop
[WMD] shipments . . . consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks,
including the UN Security Council.”Over 70 nations have expressed support for these principles.

Other major Asia‐Pacific participants beyond the initial PSI core group include Canada, the Philippines,
Russia, and Singapore. Others, like China and South Korea, claim they support the PSI’s objectives but haverefrained from directly participating, in part due to North Korean objections. PSI participants have conductednumerous air, ground, and (mostly) sea interdiction exercises to develop and demonstrate its capability toprevent illicit trafficking in nuclear weapons and fissile material. In October 2004, Japan for the first time hosted
a PSI interdiction exercise in Tokyo Bay, involving nine naval and coast guard ships from Australia, France,
Japan, and the U.S., providing yet another example just how deeply involved Tokyo has become in bilateral andmultilateral security cooperation. The most recent Asia‐Pacific exercise was hosted by Australia.
Six‐Party Talks. The best example of task‐oriented ad hoc multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia is theSix‐Party Talks, established by Washington to deal with the specific issue of denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula. The talks were also intended, and served, to multilateralize what many initially viewed as a bilateral
U.S.‐DPRK problem.
The creation of the six‐party process, in this author’s opinion, may represent one of the Bushadministration’s finest diplomatic hours. [Please note that I am addressing here the creation of the multilateralprocess, not its results to date.] This initiative draws from the lessons learned during the first North Korea
nuclear crisis, where – despite close coordination and consultation – Washington was widely perceived asunilaterally cutting a deal with Pyongyang before sticking Seoul and Tokyo with the bill. While Pyongyang
argued for bilateral consultations (and a separate U.S.‐DPRK non‐aggression pact), Washington rightfully
insisted this time that participation by Seoul and Tokyo was “essential.”

It also acknowledges the importantrole that China, and to a lesser extent Russia, must play if multilateral security guarantees are to be part of the
final solution (as most would agree they are). Finally, the Bush administration recognized and tried to workaround Pyongyang’s strategy of trying to play all sides against one another by presenting different, conflicting
messages depending on the audience.
All this is not to argue that the crisis could not have been handled better; it is to say that the multilateral49

approach represents the most logical avenue toward crafting a long‐term solution that achieves not only
Washington’s immediate goal of stopping nuclear proliferation but also addresses the needs and concerns ofNorth Korea’s immediate neighbors. The concept calls for working level discussions as well as plenary sessions,in order to dig more deeply into the problems associated with the nuclear standoff and broader peninsula
security issues and concerns. It also facilitates bilateral discussions within the six‐party framework, thus
providing political cover for direct contact between Washington and Pyongyang.
All of this presumes a resumption of the Talks and the eventual willingness of the DPRK to honor its
commitment to bring about “the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner,” asoutlined in the Six‐Party Talks Sept. 19, 2005 Joint Statement, the first mutually agreed product to result from two
years of sporadic meetings in the six‐party framework. The Joint Statement represented the first real sign oftangible progress in identifying common principles and objectives. It may yet provide a basis for future progress,
if or when North Korea makes the “strategic decision” to abandon its nuclear weapons programs and return tothe negotiating table. Unfortunately, events since that date suggest that this decision has not yet been made by
Pyongyang.
The creation of the Six‐Party Talks mechanism provides a framework for broader Northeast Asia
multilateral cooperation in the future.

If the Talks eventually succeed, most parties agree that a moreformalized mechanism must evolve in order to implement the agreement, provide necessary security assurances,and monitor compliance, as well as facilitate whatever aid packages are associated with the final accord. If theTalks fail, some would argue that there will be an even greater need for some form of institutionalizedcooperation in order to manage the danger posed by a presumed (and self‐confessed) nuclear
weapons‐equipped North Korea, if the other parties are prepared for this level of cooperation. If and how thesix‐party mechanism transitions into a more institutionalized Northeast Asia forum will help determine thedegree of future security cooperation in this East Asia subregion and Washington’s involvement in it.
East Asia Summitry: Much Ado About Something?
While Washington focused on ad hoc initiatives and Asia‐Pacific regionalism, the states of East Asia
have continued their community‐building efforts.

As noted earlier, in December 2005, Malaysia convened thefirst East Asia Summit. It should be noted that the EAS was not the only summit taking place in Kuala Lumpur
at that time. ASEAN leaders also met amongst themselves, with their Plus Three partners, and in individual
ASEAN Plus One meetings with their Australian, New Zealand, and Indian counterparts. This was the second
time that Canberra and Wellington and the third time that New Delhi participated in this conclave. Russian
President Vladimir Putin also appeared on the ASEAN summit scene for the first time, conducting his first A+1
dialogue. He was also invited to meet with, but not to officially join, the other 16 assembled leaders at the firstannual so‐called A+3+3 East Asia Summit.
Whither the EAS? Was the inaugural East Asia Summit (EAS) “much ado about nothing,” as many critics are
already claiming, or “a historic event whose future impact is likely to be as significant as the first [1976] ASEAN
summit,” as Barry Desker, head of Singapore’s influential Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, argues?
[PacNet 55B, Dec. 23, 2006,“Why the East Asian Summit Matters”] The answer is: it’s too soon to say.
While it remains unclear just what the EAS will eventually become, an analysis of the first meeting
makes it fairly clear what it will not be: it will not form the base of the much‐heralded but still dormant East Asia
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community. That role appears destined, in this author’s opinion, to remain with the more exclusive ASEAN Plus
Three gathering. It is also highly doubtful that it will, or wants to, pose a threat to U.S. interests.
The EAS host, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, made it abundantly clear that the ten
ASEAN countries and their Plus Three partners constituted the core, noting that “You are talking about acommunity of East Asians; I don’t know how the Australians could regard themselves as East Asians, or the New
Zealanders for that matter.” “We are not talking about members of the community,” Badawi continued, eventhough Australia, New Zealand, and “our immediate neighbor” India have “common interests in what ishappening in the region.” The architects of East Asia community‐building, he clearly inferred, would all be
Asians, with the A+3 (vice EAS) participants providing the base. While his comments indicated that India might
one day be able to slip its nose into the tent, Australia and New Zealand clearly would not. A+3 would drive hetrain (with ASEAN hoping to remain the conductor). The EAS would provide a vehicle for outsiders to endorse
the community‐building effort; it “could play a significant role,” but would not be an integral part of (much lessdrive) the process.
For his part, Australian Prime Minister John Howard, while noting that the EAS had “exceeded my
expectations,” argued that APEC, rather than the EAS or A+3, should remain “the premier body.” APEC, he
noted, has the “great advantage” of including the United States. We would note that it also includes Taiwan(a.k.a., Chinese Taipei) – another “great advantage” –but excludes several of the lesser developed ASEAN

states, including Myanmar (which from Washington’s perspective may be yet another plus).
The EAS Chairman’s Statement underscored, twice, that ASEAN will be the “driving force” behind East
Asian community‐building. The KL Declaration on the Summit declares that future meetings “will be hosted andchaired by an ASEAN Member Country . . . and be held back‐to‐back with the annual ASEAN Summit.” Beijing
had suggested that it host the second round but ASEAN remains as concerned about sharing driving privileges
with its other community members as it does allowing outsiders a greater say in the community‐building
process.
The Chairman’s Statement and KL Declaration both acknowledge that building an East Asia
Community is “a long term goal.”First priority will go toward building “a strong ASEAN Community which

will serve as a solid foundation for our common peace and prosperity.” This should make Indonesia happy:
Jakarta, which had previously put forth its own proposals for building an ASEAN Community, had believed thatpushing for the EAS was premature. Prime Minister Badawi had been the primary proponent of the EAS,
apparently catching Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (among others) by surprise when hepushed for the EAS at last year’s summit in Vientiane. That was before Australia and New Zealand were added
to the mix, which clearly curbed Badawi’s enthusiasm.
Addressing Washington’s Concerns.

At present, there is little cause for Washington to be concerned about theEAS. Participants are quick to point out that the United States is welcome to join (even if this is a bit
disingenuous, since it realized Washington’s stance on the TAC when it made signing this treaty a precondition
for membership). It is not clear that Washington even desired a seat at the EAS table – getting President Bush to
two Asian summits in four weeks would have been no mean feat. Nonetheless, Washington continues to watch
the EAS closely to see if certain members attempt to move this embryonic organization in a direction that runs
contrary to U.S. interests.
In an apparent attempt to address one of Washington’s potential concerns, the KL Declaration noted51

that the EAS would be “an open, inclusive, transparent, and outward‐looking forum in which we strive tostrengthen global norms and universally recognized values.” Washington’s membership would still require it to
accede to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), something the Bush administration (like its
predecessors) has been reluctant to do. Observer status appears possible, however (and is more likely to besought by Washington).
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao seemed to be opening the door for this when he noted that the EAS should“welcome the participation of Russia” and “strengthen contact with the United States, the European Union, andother countries.” Wen stressed that the EAS would not be “closed, exclusive, or directed against any particularparty.” (Secretary Zoellick had warned Beijing that it should not use its participation in multilateralorganizations like the EAS to “maneuver toward a predominance of power” or otherwise be seen as deliberately
trying to undercut Washington’s influence or interests. Beijing, among others, clearly heard this message.)
Still undefined is how the EAS (or the A+3, for that matter) will interact with broader regionalorganizations such as APEC or the ARF. Hopefully, this will be one of the modalities to be addressed by EAS
participants when they next convene in December 2006 in Cebu, Philippines. As noted at the onset, how the EAS
relates to the region’s other multilateral organizations and initiatives – both institutionalized (like the ARF andAPEC) and ad hoc (like the Six‐Party Talks and the Proliferation Security Initiative) – will also be a key factor
affecting Washington’s attitude, as will its adoption of global norms, especially in the areas of counter‐terrorism
and counter‐proliferation. Will the EAS (or A+3, for that matter) reinforce or dilute these efforts? Will it help
regional states more effectively address growing transnational challenges . . . or provide another excuse foravoiding such efforts?
The answers to these questions will help determine Washington’s attitude toward the EAS and any
subsequent East Asian Community. To the extent this new grouping signals its willingness to coexist with
Washington, and is not seen as threatening or attempting to undermine Washington’s bilateral alliances, its own
central role in East Asian security affairs, or the broader Asia‐Pacific regional institutions in which it participates,
there is little reason to expect objections from Washington or a serious effort to discourage or derail this or any
other regional community‐building efforts.
TAC: Why Not Join?
in the EAS.

For its part, Washington should begin exploring the possibility of seeking observer status

It should also be asking itself why it continues to resist acceding to the TAC. The oft‐statedcontention that this would somehow undercut America’s Asian alliances appears unfounded: two of
Washington’s Asian allies – Thailand and the Philippines – are charter members of ASEAN, while the other three– Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea – have now acceded to the TAC without any perceptible impact on
Washington’s network of bilateral alliances.
As a member of the ARF, Washington has already endorsed the purpose and principles of the TAC “as acode of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional
confidence‐building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security cooperation.” Perhaps it’s time to take thenext step, in order to demonstrate its commitment to regional prosperity and stability and to underscore its
support for East Asia community‐building.
Is Community‐building Possible? While much attention has been paid to the Bush administration’s reaction to
East Asia community‐building, the biggest threat to this effort comes not from Washington but from within the52

“community.” The sad truth is, with or without Washington’s acquiescence, East Asia community‐building is notgoing to be easy, given rising nationalism in Japan, China, South Korea, and elsewhere.

Even within ASEAN,

there are clear differences of opinion regarding the focus and intent of the EAS, especially between Indonesia
and Malaysia. Meanwhile, unless and until Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul can more effectively channel or control
their respective nationalist tendencies, it is difficult to image a true East Asian community taking shape.
The primary catalyst for today’s tensions has been Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichro’s
continued visits to the Yasukuni Shrine – he made his 2005 visit on Oct. 17 and is expected to go again this year
before he relinquishes the premiership (perhaps on August 15) –along with lingering disputes over textbook

renditions of history. Japanese textbooks have come under the most scrutiny, given the approval of one
controversial textbook series in particular (which has been adopted by less than one percent of Japan’s publicschools), but textbooks in South Korea and especially China would also fail most objectivity tests (and we won’t
even try to add North Korean textbooks to this mix).
Prime Minister Koizumi argues that he is merely honoring his campaign pledge to continue paying
tribute to Japan’s war dead – there are over 2 ½ million souls interred at Yasukuni, unfortunately including 14
World War Two “Class A” criminals, the source of the controversy. But, Mr. Koizumi has also sworn to preserve,
protect, and promote Japanese national security interests, and his continued annual visits to the Shrine aremaking this increasingly impossible to do, at least when it comes to promoting harmony in the immediateneighborhood, much less attempting to create a sense of East Asia community.
Meanwhile, the failure of the U.S. to speak out publicly on this issue, combined with the (correct)
impression that the U.S. stands firmly behind Mr. Koizumi and his quest for acceptance of a greater political andsecurity role in East Asia, has translated into increased ill will against Washington, especially from its other key
East Asia ally, South Korea. President Bush was questioned repeatedly during his November 2005 visit to Japan,
Korea, and China about his reaction to the “antagonizing” Yasukuni visits. While he reportedly did discuss theissue with Koizumi in private, in public, Bush repeatedly ducked the question, responding instead that “I believe
a useful role for me, as someone who is friendly with the three leaders involved, is to remind people that it isbest to put the past behind and move forward in the future.” Unfortunately the high profile visits make putting
the past behind impossible. [For more on this topic, see PacNet #53, Dec. 6, 2005, “Yasukuni Shrine: Time toMake a Deal.”]Evolving U.S. Attitudes: Pan‐Asianism vs. Pan‐Pacificism
Until recently, the U.S. has been circumspect regarding the EAS and East Asia community‐building in
general, stating that it reserves judgement on the EAS until its mission and objectives become clear and that, inprinciple, it supports more “inclusive” approaches. However, during a recent visit to Southeast Asia, Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill noted that U.S. “engagement with Southeast
Asia continues to broaden and deepen. The dynamism of the region means that our relationship is in a constantstate of evolution, which has given rise to renewed debate and discussion about regional fora, and whether theyshould be inclusive or exclusive. Correspondingly, the concept of pan‐Asianism vs. pan‐Pacificism has also
re‐emerged.”
The U.S. has not objection to East Asia regionalism per se, Hill argued, noting that “it is entirely
understandable that Asia is looking to strengthen its own regional institutions, just as other regional groupingsin other parts of the world have done the same. This drive is a reflection of the remarkable and still growing
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pattern of intra‐Asian economic and financial integration, and is not surprising ‐‐ and we welcome it.”
Hill then repeated concerns about the proliferation of multilateral initiatives and the danger of“meeting fatigue”: “But we need to think hard and clearly about the question of how we can integrate pan‐Asianand trans‐Pacific fora. We have heard much debate about the East Asian Summit. Before coming to any
conclusions, we need to look at the whole landscape ‐‐ and indeed the seascape ‐‐ of proliferating regional fora ‐‐ASEAN+3, APEC, ARF, and the EAS ‐‐ to determine how the pieces can fit better together. The goal should be toachieve synergy and avoid redundancy and duplication.”
Hill also reaffirmed Washington’s concern about how the EAS would relate to broader‐based
multilateral efforts involving the U.S.: “With respect to the East Asia Summit, the U.S. continues to watch withinterest how this forum will develop. As I mentioned earlier, APEC and the ARF are vital components of ourrelationship with Asia and Southeast Asia. We want to continue to work with you to ensure we donʹt dilute theeffectiveness of these institutions and the important cooperation they foster. The United States is and will remain
deeply involved in the transformation of Southeast Asia.”
East Asia Community‐Building: Unanswered Questions
One objective of this paper is to stimulate questions for others to answer, in order to better determine if
Washington will see this phenomenon as supportive of its national security interests or designed to threaten or
inhibit them. Allow me to end this paper, therefore, with a laundry list of questions (with limited commentary).
Many are left over from last year’s CEAC dialogue.
‐ What are the objectives of Indonesia’s ASEAN Security Community (ASC) proposal and what are the prospectsof ASEAN successfully pursuing this effort? Will the ASC help set a more positive security agenda for the ARF or
for the emerging East Asia community? My guess is that Washington would welcome a more pro‐active ASEAN
that put more emphasis on security cooperation and joint approaches to security challenges.

The ASCemphasis on promoting democracy and individual rights, if seriously supported and pursued, would also be in
keeping with Washington’s regional and global objectives. Merely paying lip service to these objectives, on theother hand, will reconfirm negative opinions about ASEAN’s seriousness and long‐term direction.
‐ Is Indonesia prepared to lead ASEAN in developing an ASC and in setting the agenda for the EAS? Are theother ASEAN members (and especially Malaysia) prepared to follow? Will ASEAN remain in the A+3 driver’s
seat for the ASF, A+3, and emerging EAS? If not, who will lead, and in what direction? Can/will Japan step
forward and exercise leadership behind the scenes and act in concert with other friends of Washington (likeSingapore and Australia) to ensure that the EAS does not evolve in a manner that runs contrary to U.S. interests?
‐ Is the East Asia Summit the primary vehicle for building and sustaining the East Asia community?

Are thetwo synonymous? I have already argued that they are not, but the distinction has yet to be made by the EAS
itself. The relationship needs to be better defined, since there are many competing views of what constitutes East
Asia and what vehicles will best create this sense of community.

Since the various multilateral initiatives

provide a mind‐boggling array of combinations (one even includes Persian Gulf countries), it is getting more andmore difficult even to define East Asia, much less to determine which effort or efforts are helping to establish thedesired sense of community. India’s future role is of particular interest here.
‐ Who gets to come to the EAS, in what capacity, and by what criteria? The EAS was initially envisioned as part54

of the A+3 process but appears destined to go beyond these 13 states. Why? How do the A+3 and EAS differ?
What is the EAS mission statement and objectives? (To date, more time has been spent debating about who
should join than determining what should be discussed.)‐ The creation of the EAS, as called for in the A+3 Vision 2020 Plan, was seen by some as an effort by the larger
East Asia powers, like China, Japan, and/or even the ROK, to try to gain increased control in shaping the agenda,
a role up to now largely played by ASEAN. Is the decision that EAS members have to sign up to the ASEAN
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) an effort by ASEAN to reassert its central role, or just a clever way tokeep Washington (among others) out . . . or both?
‐ Finally, repeating Secretary Hill’s key question, how do members of the East Asian community – whoever they
may be – define the relationship between Asia‐only mechanisms such as A+3 and broader efforts such as the ARF
and APEC?

Which type efforts will receive pride of place? Clearly it does not have to be, and is unlikely to be

described as “either‐or.” But, where will the focus and bulk of the effort be?
mutually reinforcing?

Will the outcomes and efforts beWill the East Asia effort help set the stage for and supplement or even advance thebroader dialogue or will it be used as an excuse for inaction?

If the former, how does one create avenues ofinteraction between East Asian and Asia‐Pacific mechanisms to enhance their mutually supporting roles.?
Until the answers to these questions become clear, it will be difficult to determine the prospects for thecreation of a true East Asia community and/or Washington’s receptivity to this effort.

Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS [www.pacforum.org], a Honolulu‐based non‐profit research instituteaffiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. He can be reached at
pacforum@hawaii.rr.com or directly at racpacforum@cs.com.

55

Mr. Simon TAY **Chairman, Singapore Institute of International Affairs

An East Asian Community and the United States: A View from ASEAN *Introduction
In December 2005, the first East Asian Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. While this is a new andquite unprecedented event, it is one that has been considerably, and variously, anticipated and interpreted.
The summit grows from a growing but still nascent sense of regionalism in East Asia, and may both markand add to the momentum and strength of this sentiment. The path to this first summit has been paved by eventsin recent years, especially the ASEAN+3 process that has brought together leaders from the ten ASEAN member
states with their counterparts from the three Northeast states of China, Japan and South Korea. Indeed, theASEAN+3 process has grown beyond summitry to provide a framework for initial Asian cooperation on diverse
transnational issues such as finance flows, with the Chiang Mai initiative, and public health in the wake of SARS.
For these 13 states, therefore, the East Asia Summit (EAS) would have represented something of a logical next
step forward from the ASEAN+3 process. But the attendance at the EAS was not limited to the ASEAN+3 states.
It was expanded to include India, and Australia‐New Zealand. This expansion was quite deliberately decided,and both arises from and reflects back on the nascent sense of East Asian regionalism and on the relationship ofEast Asian to the USA. This is especially when we consider that the ASEAN+3 process will continue in parallelwith the EAS.
It is in this context that this paper will consider the prospects for an emerging East Asian community, and its
relations to the USA.
What is driving the nascent and growing sense of East Asian regionalism? To what ends is the region being
driven? What factors in international relations among the states– such as the triangle of US‐China‐Japan relations,and within ASEAN ‐‐ can shape the regional architecture?
First, I will examine what would appear to be the main factors that have emerged to drive the current andstill nascent sense of regionalism in East Asia, postulating some reasons that some may wish to exclude the USA.

**

LLM (Harvard) LLB Hons (National University of Singapore) serves as Chairman, Singapore Institute of International Affairs

and teaches international law as an associate professor at the National University of Singapore, and as a visiting professor at
Harvard and the Fletcher School .
*Paper for An International Workshop organized by the Council on East Asian Community, Tokyo, June 2006. Revised from adraft for discussion presented at the 2005 workshop.

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Secondly, I will seek to characterize characteristics of the emergent East Asian regionalism and examine some
preferred principles that would allow the most stable and mutually beneficial relationship of this emergent
regionalism. Thirdly, I will suggest how the USA might best respond to these developments in East Asia, andwhat Asians should do, both for the benefit of East Asian regionalism, as well as vis a vis the USA. In so doing, I
will glance upon the triangle of relations between the USA, Japan and China, which is a key to strategic outlooksin the Asia Pacific, as well as upon the ASEAN.
While ASEAN cannot be considered a major power, the grouping of smaller to medium‐sized states issomething of a hub in much of the regional frameworks. I will both describe this role and consider if ASEAN canbe a positive influence on the emerging East Asian regionalism as a “soft power”.
These discussions are necessarily exploratory, given that the EAS and East Asia’s regionalism as a whole are a
recent phenomena. Positions are still less than fully crystallized. Views differ from one Asian country to another,and have evolved over time. Additionally, US attitudes towards East Asia – which will be major drivers, andperhaps even determinative of the prospects of this phenomenon ‐‐ are shifting and often seem ambivalent,
especially in relation to China.
This is, as such, a situation in which what states and leaders decide to do would matter; in which humanagency is very much at play. Thus while conclusions are not easy, we can hope that what can be explored andconsidered may be make small contribution in informing the policy processes in play. The essay does, as such,offer several policy suggestions to Asians, ASEAN and Americans.
To the Asians, I suggest that we should be prepared to develop closer intra‐Asian cooperation on issues ofcommon concern, to deal with both regional issues as well as impacts arising from globalization. However, while
we may wish for a rapprochement between China and Japan, this cannot be commanded and there are few signsof a resolution at hand. Without this, I suggest that East Asians must be prepared to be patient and work for thelong term, and through a series of patchwork and more limited cooperative schemes, rather than expecting aclear regional vision to be annunciated and agreed shortly. Therefore, for the near and middle term, East Asia
will be more of a framework for cooperation and understanding, rather than a “community”; a word thatsuggests many more and deeper shared bases and values for coming together.
To ASEAN, I suggest that they must recognize they are presently a hub for East Asia’s regionalism and must
seize this opportunity to contribute to the process positively. ASEAN’s role must however be recognized as
resulting from a default in relations among the major Asian powers, and cannot be taken for granted. ASEAN
can and should therefore seek to grow into this default role by moving ahead clearly and quite quickly with its
ambitions for an ASEAN community, in the fuller sense of that word, “community”. As it does go forward withthese ambitions, ASEAN should also seek to emerge as a “soft power” in Asia, with a positive influence arisingfrom the values, norms and institutions that it practices and embodies, as a model for the wider region.
To the Americans, I first suggest that the USA must accept and understand its exclusion from the first EAS
and many of the emerging East Asian frameworks. Secondly, all EAS states and especially those who are allies
and friends of the USA should seek to ensure that while the EAS does not include the USA as a participant, thevital interests that they share with the USA are sufficiently accounted for and protected. Efforts to convey this to
the USA, both as intentions going into the EAS and as results emerging from it, should be redoubled. To Asians
and especially Americans, I suggest that we need to work to revive relations across the Pacific and indeed takethe existing relationships and institutions to new and higher levels. In this, relations of the USA with states in
Asia must broaden beyond the almost singular focus on the global war against terrorism that some feel indealings with Washington DC and rise above the existing base that provided by the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) processes.
57

Reasons for Regionalism: Neutral or Anti‐Americanism?
Some suggest that regionalism in East Asia is a natural phenomenon that has little to do with the USA anddoes not demonstrate anti‐American sentiment. There is considerable truth in this. Regionalism that brings
proximate states together to cooperate is not in opposition to the forces of globalization that link all states moreclosely together than ever, and especially to the USA as the primary economic actor and only post Cold war
superpower. Regionalism has been a companion to globalization, and not its opponent. For while globalization
connects all states and societies more closely, proximate and neighboring states are more closely connected toeach other inter se, than to states which further away and/ or are more different in make up.
Globalization is not a complete and neutral phenomenon in this regard. Simple facts such as the cost of
telecommunication and transport demonstrate its incompleteness and unevenness. Geography and distancehave been reduced as determining and primary factors, but nevertheless do still matter. Cultures and societies
too, while being much more open to exchange and influence, persistently resist homogenization. This is true not
only in Asia. It is even more clearly visible in Europe and in North America. Regionalism has arisen and thrived
in parallel to, and not necessarily in conflict with, globalization. In this view therefore, East Asian regionalism isnatural, neutral and indeed long overdue.
Support for this idea of a “neutral” East Asian regionalism is, for example, evidenced by economic data. This
witnesses both the predominant place of trade and investment between the USA and Asia, as well as the rapid
growth of intra‐Asian economic ties. It does not seem to be an either/ or situation.
Yet Asia has no strong and enduring history of unity and accepted commonality, whether in polity, culture,
language or religion. The antecedents of East Asian regionalism have been brief and contested. One such period
was in the 15th century, when the Ming Empire of China ruled the waves and, in the pre‐colonial period,
extracted an acceptance of suzerainty from most of the kingdoms in East and SE Asia.

A second incident was

the Japanese co‐prosperity sphere during WWII. Neither sets a happy precedent for East Asian regionalism.
Even within ASEAN, after nearly four decades of association, national sovereignty has tended to trump
integration in economics and certainly politics. While this has gathered pace, the ASEAN efforts still do not rival– both in aspiration and even more so in reality – the integration of the European Union. As such, we may
conclude that East Asia has no precedent in regionalism, and only a limited and very recent movement forwardin this direction.
Why then East Asia now?
To understand this, I think it is necessary to go beyond the “neutral” factors that I have briefly canvassed. I
would join others in suggesting that less neutral factors are adding to the emergence of an East Asian
regionalism that, in some settings and instances, the USA will not be party.
These factors are, in approximately chronological order: first, attitudes about the USA during and after the
1997 crisis that swept through Asia; secondly, the failure of APEC; thirdly, the need for a competent andcompetitive regionalism in Asia; fourth, the reception of US security policies, post 9/11; and, fifth, the rise of
China and the responses among different Asian neighbours.
During and after the 1997 “Asian” crisis
The economic crisis that started in mid 1997, spread quickly among almost all economies in East Asia, withlittle regard to the real differences in their economic fundamentals and little coordinated response by thecountries affected. While the crisis has abated, the sense among some in East Asia is hat the USA could andshould have done more. For example, in Thailand and South Korea (both US allies), negative comparisons weredrawn to the level of US assistance to the help given to Mexico when the NAFTA neighbour was earlier struck by58

a financial crisis.
The role of international financial institutions (IFI), especially the IMF, was also brought into question. While
there were no better mechanisms that were readily available, Asians have been among those who argue thatmany of the prescriptions were ineffective or indeed counter‐productive. In the years since the crisis, more havecome to share aspects of this view, including well‐known US‐based economists like Krugman and Stiglitz. Yetefforts at reform and policy changes within the IMF and IFIs are still wanting.
Criticisms of the IMF and IFIs, moreover, rebound on the USA as – rightly or otherwise – some perceive that
Washington DC sets and controls the agenda for them. To some of these critics in Asia and elsewhere, the“Washington consensus” is not named innocently for the headquarters of the IMF and World Bank, but bespeak
a consensus shared by the powers that be in Washington DC itself.
The Failure of APEC
While the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process continues, there is some sense that it has insome ways, “failed”. This sense of failure comes from at least two sources.
The first, and probably quite unfair criticism, is that APEC failed to respond to the Asian crisis. It is fair topoint out that APEC was never intended nor intended to serve such a purpose. But the criticism sticks in somequarters; critics ask that, if little or no response could be made to such a crisis, what is the point of APEC?
The second source of criticism over APEC is perhaps a more measured one. This is that the USA and othermajor economies have ceased to regard APEC as of being sufficiently important to be used as a mechanism forenabling and managing economic cooperation and integrations between the APEC members. Some would trace
this to the impasse between the USA and its close ally, Japan, over trade liberalization measures. Focus on APEC
has diminished, as compared to a decade ago. Some now believe that, given the present trajectories, there is little
prospect of achieving the APEC Bogor goals by the stated deadlines.
In the wake of these developments, more and more states in Asia and the Pacific have sought to turn to the
WTO, only to find delays and faltering there too. Again, impasses relate mainly to the major economies. Only
Japan, India and China would have much influence in the WTO negotiations and their positions markedly differ.
Thus, the effort to move ahead in the WTO is beyond the influence of many Asian states.
As such, Asians who have tried to find ways forward for economic liberalization have turned to anotheravenue: regionalism and sub‐regionalism. While WTO and APEC remain, greater stock than before is being
given to sub‐regional and bilateral economic partnerships and trade agreements.

Regional agreements include

ASEAN’s efforts to implement its FTA (already in force) and move ahead towards an economic community withfuller integration, and “ASEAN+1” FTAs with (separately), China, India, South Korea and Australia‐New
Zealand. Bilateral agreements also have multiplied , including those concluded between Japan and Singapore,and being negotiated with other ASEAN member states like (separately) Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia.
A “track 2” experts group has begun to talk about an East Asian FTA. Australia and New Zealand too have notbeen excluded in this FTA “fever”, with FTAs concluded or in negotiation with Asian states such as China,
Singapore, and Thailand.
In contrast, non‐Asian states have been relatively less active. Exception to this are the US‐Singapore FTA, andrecently proposed European Union‐ASEAN FTA.
Many questions have been raised about the efficiency and efficacy of these bilateral and sub‐regional FTAs
in Asia as they relate to business and to the actual creation and liberalization of trade. It is true that many arecomplex, while others are superficial, and all are uncoordinated in respect of their terms so there is no59

consistency between them. However, in this context, I do not point to their economic use, but rather as
evidencing and influencing broader thoughts about regionalism among Asians.
A Competent and Competitive Asian Regionalism
In the wake of the Asian crisis, Asians have come in these recent years to better appreciate theirinterdependence. This appreciation has gone beyond the question of financial flows that were implicated in the1997 crisis.
Other areas such as trade and investment and environmental pollution demonstrate the interdependencies in
the region or sub‐regions of East Asia. Some examples of this are the haze from Indonesian fires, the acid rain
and yellow dust from China that impacts NE Asia, and unsustainable and often illegal logging in ASEAN
countries to meet the demand of Japanese and Chinese markets (especially since China has banned domestic
logging). Public health concerns over SARS and Avian Flu have been other manifestations of the negative face ofan increasing interdependence without sufficient governing structures and regimes.
Even in sensitive areas such as violent political upheaval and gross human rights abuses, there is a growing
awareness and moral interdependency among many of the people of Asia. While many issues in this area remain
off‐limits among Asians, sporadic issues such as the crisis in East Timor after the vote of free choice in 1998, andcurrent developments in Myanmar have attracted wide‐spread concern among Asians. Institutionally as well, theASEAN regional forum, which includes non‐ASEAN members and covers a wider geographical footprint in Asia,
has begun to move into a phase for developing preventive diplomacy among its members.
In toto, whether in economics, environmental or other fields, Asians now give greater recognition to the needfor cooperation to manage their existing and still growing integration. Regionalism, is this view, is a process forcompetently handling globalization and interdependence. It is also a competitive issue among Asians, given
parallel developments in Europe and continued feeling that the USA, with or without allies and neighbours, has
the weight to determine global matters where its national interest is felt to be involved.
US security policies, Post 9/11
A fourth factor has been the US security policy, post 9/11, and its prosecution of a global campaign against
terrorism. While there was initial support for the USA across Asia, reactions are not uniform. Some states arestaunch US supporters and have been proactive in their own domestic fight against terrorism. Others have been
ambivalent and even reticent in responses, preoccupied with their own domestic power politics. Criticism andopposition to the US policies has risen.
Polls and surveys point to this trend across Asian societies, especially in the wake of the US‐led “invasion” of
Iraq and the revelation of human rights abuses in Abu Gharib and allegations of mistreatment at Guatanamo.
Criticism of US policies among some quarters also relate also to wider issues, such as the question of Palestineand Israel.
Such sentiment is strongest perhaps in Asian countries, such as Indonesia, and Malaysia, where there are
Muslim majorities. Yet it has grown even in societies where Muslims are only a minority or quite absent. Indeed,in some countries like South Korea – without Muslims and historically intertwined with and dependent on the
USA – sentiments among common people about the USA have soured. In many cases, this change in attitude to
the USA relate to the US policies not only about terrorism in the global theatre, but its implications in thenational and local spheres. America’s post‐9/11 agenda has complicated existing internal conflicts andinsurgencies in Southeast Asia.
The change in sentiments in Asia towards the USA has paralleled changes in many European societies.
60However, it would seem that European criticisms more greatly emphasize questions of human rights and of theobservation of international law.
Indeed, while Asian opinions have shifted about the USA, post‐911, there seems to be a considerable
difference in the tenor and level of criticism as compared to Europe. Asia states did not join France and Germany
in leading opposition to the U.S.‐led action.
Public opinion is not the chief difference. As in Europe, there is no strong and widespread domestic support
among the peoples of Asia for American action in Iraq. Indeed, in some societies, as noted briefly, anti‐American
sentiments have risen sharply.
The majority of Asian states have nevertheless continued to support the USA or at least measure and limit
their criticisms and opposition, to varying degrees and in different ways. These relate to a realist – if not realpolitick – calculation of the role of the USA in economics and security. There is a calculation of the costs of openly
opposing the Bush administration on post 9/11 issues, after the admonition that, “either you are for us, or againstus”. There are also some benefits to the governments in the region. In the American post‐9/11 agenda, Asia has
again received American attention, and Asian governments have generally been quick to respond to align theirinterests and agendas to America’s. Equally, most have sought to prevent direct interventions into their territories
and domestic affairs by cooperating with the United States.
Thus, many Asian governments face an increasing tension between their external commitments to support
the United States and these internal views and demands within their societies and among their citizens. Whilesome Asians dissent, this realist logic prevails in thinking that it is best to ally with the United States. Its policiesof “benign selfishness” offer the closest match to world interest—the desire for free trade, rule of law, freemovement of capital and people, as well as security for persons and property. In this view, stability in Asia may
be provided by a hegemonic power, provided it is relatively benign.
However, the prospect of ensuring that U.S. interest in Asia and the world is indeed benign and broadly
supported has to contend with a number of factors. Chief among these is that the post‐9/11 agenda in the USA
responds first and most directly to American domestic opinion (some might say, “only”). This means that there
will be severe limits to how much influence other countries, including those in Asia, can have in persuading the
US administration in any direction that is contrary to the views of the American voter. American exceptionalism
in treaties and multilateral settings illustrates the concerns that Asian and other states have about thedependability and benign character of America internationally.
The necessary corollary of this concern is that Asians should find frameworks to depend less on the USA andalso to collectively influence the USA.
The Rise of China
This brings up the fifth factor that bears mention in context of the East Asian community and the USA: therise of China. This phenomenon has been long predicted and yet still attracts controversy in interpretation andprediction.
China of late has done much to assure the world and especially the region of its intentions for a “peacefulrise”. This has been well received, bar cross‐Straits relations, with an increased levels of comfort with South
Korea and, especially, ASEAN member states. With ASEAN as a grouping, China’s initiative in proposing an FTA
and deepening its economic and trade ties have been welcome. On the security front, while much remains to bedone, the agreement on a Code of Conduct in the South China Seas and a generally more forthcoming
engagement with China in the ASEAN Regional Forum and other frameworks have lessened the tensions thatonce marked the relationship, especially after the Mischief Reef episode.
61

Questions of course remain. This is especially in respect of relations between a rising China and the USA, as
the incumbent and pre‐eminent power. Sino‐Japanese relations also pre‐occupy strategic thinking as well, given
both the historical issues and (even more importantly in my view) the present and forward looking issues ofaccommodating these two giants in the emerging frameworks for Asian regionalism. For the newer ASEAN
members, questions over the headwaters of the Mekong, that lie in China, will continue and perhaps grow in
coming years.
National differences in Asian’s attitudes to China also can be traced to economic competitiveness andprospects of complementarity, as well as to historical differences. There is, as such, considerable variation evenamong the remaining Asians of how we do and should look at the rise of China (which is worthy of further
study).
Notwithstanding this diversity, the rise of China raises two primary issues in the context of East Asian
community and the USA. The first of these issues is the ability to imagine an Asia that is less centered on theUSA, as it is at present. If the predictions of China’s rise prove true, there could be a rebalancing of the economic
center for Asia – which still predominately exports to the US market and depends quite considerably on
cross‐Pacific investment and trade. In politics and security too, there would be changes, with China’s promises ofa “multi‐polar” world providing a contrast to the existing arrangements that center on Washington DC as the
hub of various bilateral agreements and alliances.
The second of these issues is connected but the different: the need for Asians to proactively pursue ways toengage China and shape its policies towards the rest of Asia. This is especially important if and when US‐China
relations grow more competitive and perhaps tense. If so, many Asians would like to have the option of having
an independent policy towards China, rather being reflexively aligned to the US position. At the same time,some in the USA may be concerned that such “independence” merely disguises the slip of these Asian states into
the orbit of a China that they do not trust.
This issue took on more life in 2005, as we approached the EAS, and have continued to gain pace in somequarters. A number of different constituencies in the USA are raising issues of contention with China, such as therevaluation of its currency, the promotion of democracy and cross‐Straits issues and the build up of Chinese
military forces. US policies towards China have changed in tenor from Clinton to Bush, and from early‐termBush to post 9/11 Bush, swinging between the poles of “cooperation” and “strategic competitor”. Of late, instatements such as those by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the direction seems to be toward the latter poleof China as a strategic competitor. (I shall survey these concerns slightly more below, in discussing the criticaltriangle of relations in the Asia Pacific between USA, China and Japan.)
Taken together, the five factors surveyed have created a much greater sense of doubt among Asians about the
USA in its global and regional role than existed during the Cold War or its immediate aftermath. A strongly“anti‐American” sentiment exists but perhaps only among a minority. Asians in responding to the post Cold War
order (disorder) in general and post 9/11 Bush in particular, seem to swing between the poles of fearing that US
would ignore us and that US would intervene unilaterally, at the whims of its domestic audiences. The answer ofsome East Asians ‐‐ that we wanted a sustained, knowledgeable and consultative American engagement – seems
an almost impossible wish.
The post 9/11 USA has declined in “soft power” and suasion in Asia, while China has gained in standing andacceptability: thus, the rise of the Chinese dragon is in parallel with the wounding of the American eagle, in acoincidence that may bring misgivings and perhaps sudden shifts. Nevertheless, the main driving forces for thesense of East Asian regionalism are not, in my view, anti‐Americanism.
62

Nor, however, are they completely neutral in my estimate.
There is a growing ambivalence about the USA among more Asians.

This “love‐hate” attitude finds

expression in the now popular adage, “Yankee go home … and take me with you.” There is an emerging wish
for a greater independence and capacity in Asia. More Asians now believe it is the time that their countries andtheir region mature and grow beyond the unequal relationship with and dependency upon the USA, so that
Asians can do about what matters most to Asia.
Versions and Principles of East Asian Regionalism
In surveying the five factors above, I hope that I may not be mistaken to suggest that this is a single orpredominant Asian opinion or perspective on the various issues raised. As I hope has been clear, there is a great
variety among the Asian states and peoples whether we look at Asian perspectives on the rise of China, thedifferent responses to US actions and policies post 9/11 or the varied experiences in the Asian crises.
Accordingly, there is no single and agreed vision about the future of East Asia as a region. There is instead aquite broad and even bewildering range of suggestions of what East Asians can and should do together. Some
examples include an East Asian Union, ala Europe, and an Asian currency.
I do not wish in this section to canvass the suggestions given to date or to add my own to the considerable
and still growing list. Instead, I would like to list some principles that should, in my view, guide the evolution of
East Asian regionalism and also to suggest broad directions or versions of East Asian regionalism.
From the observations of the driving forces and limits of East Asian regionalism, several principles may besuggested.
Open and Flexible Caucus
First, it should be an open and flexible caucus, not an exclusive group or bloc. This is especially given that theUnited States and other countries may be concerned about being excluded, and the existing reliance of many inthe region on the United States for both security and economics. The new East Asian regionalism might therefore
serve as a caucus, to discuss and agree on mutually acceptable positions to bring before larger institutions.
Indeed, where positions cannot be agreed, East Asian states can and should have the latitude after dialogue totake their own position, and expect that it be understood and respected by its neighbours.
This way, East Asian regionalism would not detract from Asia Pacific and international efforts, but serve to
make them more effective and representative. More, the East Asian regionalism can seek out areas of cooperation
and begin to build institutional capacity in these areas. In this regard, the ASEAN+3 and EAS are significant
markers and can evolve as primacy mechanisms, but they should not be the only ones. The evolution of the EAS
in terms of the states attending is itself a marker of openness and flexibility needed to move ahead.
Functionality and Interdependence
Second, East Asian regionalism should have functionality and interdependence, not political fixity, ideology orsome easy and false sense of shared civilization. One of the most constructive factors is the need to manage andcooperate in the face of integration and globalization. This emphasizes that the new regionalism should befunctional. This will test the tendency to include and exclude members on largely political grounds. An exampleof this would be in the field of economic and financial cooperation in the region. This has been emphasized in the
ASEAN+3 process and also in the EAS, with the inclusion of India and the Pacific‐2. If we accept the ASEAN+3 ornewer EAS as a fixed or only structures, then we would exclude important economies such as Hong Kong andTaiwan, in preference to smaller and more isolated economies. The new regionalism should instead be inclusive,with reference to the function that each member can bring to the issue.
63

Leadership by Issues
Thirdly, the leadership in East Asian regionalism should be led by issues, and not by great powers. If we lookat traditional modes of regionalism, central leadership seems critical, as discussed earlier in the chapter for theneed of a benevolent great power. However, without a historical reconciliation between China and Japan, thiswill not be possible in East Asia. The region lacks a single leader who is acceptable and able. There aresuggestions that the small and medium sized countries, such as South Korea, and ASEAN might therefore leadthe region.
They may have a special and larger role to play than expected, but they cannot offer permanent and strong
leadership of the traditional type in the region. East Asian regionalism therefore might have to look at newer andmore limited forms of leadership in the region. This could be offered by having leaders on different issues.
Leadership would arise from the initiative and interests of different state. This would follow principles of
equality more closely than the idea of ‘great power’ leadership. In this way, the new East Asian regionalism
might accord with many of the aspirations voiced in ASEAN and the Asia Pacific.
It is also important that leadership offered in East Asia be one that is benevolent and takes into account theinterests of all, especially the smaller and weaker states. If some Asians chaff under US domination (which had
been relatively benign and even helpful for many in the Cold War), they should not come together only to
exchange one domination for another.
Coalitions of the Willing
Fourth, the region should be led by coalitions of the willing (although some new term may be necessary,
post‐Iraq). The above principles, in total, suggest that East Asian regionalism and its manifestation in the EAS
should not be a fixed bloc or union with permanent membership and permanent leaders. Instead it should be aframework for like minded states to caucus and act in coalition. These coalitions can arise from certain issues oreven events. They may then dissolve or evolve to new issues. As the need arises they would work with existingregional and sub‐regional institutions.
The idea of the EAS has demonstrated this is extending beyond the geographic definition of East Asia, to raft
together other countries such as Australia and New Zealand and India.. But of course in the created foraof the

EAS and A+3, where states are agreed participants, the direction of the grouping as a whole needs to proceed at apace that all can agree to.
Beyond “Asian Values”
Lastly, in giving voice to regionalism, East Asians should avoid a state‐selected version of “Asian values” andidentity, as we witnessed in the early 1990s. This had argued that, in the then predicted rise of Asia to equality
with Europe and North America, Asians could and would legitimately differ in questions of democracy andhuman rights. Asians would as such be exceptions to what are arguably “universal” aspirations and values. We
should recognize that the map of governance in East Asia has changed considerably in the last decade by looking
at the developments in the states of the EAS.
In ASEAN, the change in Indonesia post Suharto as tipped the scales to make the grouping as a whole much
more comfortable with the ideas of democracy and human rights. After all, in addition to the new Indonesian
democracy, there are vigorous (if imperfect democracies) in Thailand and the Philippines and voting
democracies in Malaysia and Singapore (albeit with dominant parties in place). The ASEAN efforts about
Myanmar/ Burma may not succeed in changing the regime (and certainly not by ASEAN’s sole efforts), but they
do reflect changes in how ASEAN thinks and seeks to act to promote and protect basic standards of democracy,
human rights and governance.
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In North East Asia, South Korea and Japan are established democracies. In the wider East Asia, democracy isvery much part of the national ethos in India, Australia, New Zealand. 1
I do not mean to argue here that democracy and human rights can and should be entrenched within what
East Asians stand for and collectively should promote. I only mean to argue that defensive and negative
attitudes to these ideals, as seen in the earlier Asian values debate, are unwarranted. From this, my more generalargument is that East Asians should not rush into declaring any agreed, “Asian values”, lest an artificial, state‐led
list of such values be foisted on the project. While interactions will increase among East Asians, there are dangers
in tying too tightly the ideas of interdependence (especially economic interdependence) with values or morals in
a community. We should distinguish between three uses of the idea of increased unity: as interdependence andcooperation; as increasing similarity between the states and societies that are so interdependent and cooperative;
and as a consciousness of a shared humanity or culture.
East Asians should prefer regional institutions and a growing sense of cooperation and identification witheach other, without exceptionalism. Even as Asians cohere more closely, there can and should be interactions
with international norms and practices. Globalization and regionalization, as such, are running in tandem, andnot as an either/ or choice.
Three Models for East Asia
The principles that I have suggested above stand in contrast to others, as a range among three directions orversions about the possible future of East Asian regionalism. These, for discussion, can be clustered around three“models”.
The first of these would be an “East Asia adrift”. This is much as existed before the ASEAN+3 and EAS
processes, and (some might argue) still exists today. While different East Asian states have considerable strengths
in economics, security or other fields, the region as a whole offers little synergy and positive interactions. Instead,intra‐East Asia engagements continue without much function, energy, leadership or high aspiration. The
regionalism remains fragile and indeed fractured. In this version, nothing much happens. Or certainly nothing
happens that upsets that present status quo and the USA as the key actor in East Asian affairs.
On the other end of the range of possibilities for an East Asian future is an “East Asian bloc”. In this, East
Asians would aspire to a much higher degree of integration, perhaps ala the European Union. However, the East
Asian bloc would one that would be closed or even opposed to the USA and other non‐Asian states. It might also
be based on a fixed set of “Asian values” as perceived by leaders and elites, rather than being more open to
global influences, and the aspirations of citizens.
In between these two poles, a third possible version is one that can be described as “East Asian Identity
without Exceptionalism”. In this scenario, East Asians develop sufficient processes and institutions to deal withfunctional interdependence and better recognize an emerging sense of institutional identity. Yet these identities,
institutions and processes remain open to influences from other states and from within different societies, andevolve over a longer period, allowing for adjustments.
Some of the principles underlying these three contrasting versions or directions for East Asian regionalism
are outlined in the following table:

1

I have excluded mention of Taiwan, a democracy, as it did not attend the EAS.
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East Asia “Adrift”

East Asia “Identity without

East Asian “Bloc”

Exceptionalism”
Membership

Focus on ASEAN, andEast Asian process, centred on

East Asian process,Asia‐Pacific processes.

ASEAN+3, but open to USA,

closed and evenothers in region and to global

opposed to USA andinstitutions

global institutions.

Use

Dialogue

Function and interdependence

Ideology

Leadership

ASEAN‐led (ARF), US or

Issue‐led, including smaller andGreat power leadershipleader‐less rotation (APEC)

medium sized powers

and rivalry

Informal, minimal“Coalitions of the willing”, with

Consenus for unified,secretariats and non‐binding

bilateral, ASEAN and ASEAN+1

region wide agreement

undertakings

processes, and growing

Organization

institutionalization
Identity“Pacific Way” with tension

Interdependence andbetween ASEAN andinstitutional identity“Asian” Values

Western approaches

Perceptions about ASEAN+3 have warmed both in Northeast Asia and ASEAN. It has also made some usefulcontributions with the financial swops arrangement and with the discussion of the SARS outbreak; bothdemonstrating the usefulness of this framework in preparing for future crisis and even helping deal with present
ones. There is some optimism looking forward to the first EAS, notwithstanding the rise in Sino‐Japanesetensions, and possible friction in the US‐China relationship.
If East Asian regionalism attempts too much it risks opposition from the USA, which may feel that it is being
left out from developments that might impact its strategic interests. If so, there are dangers that US allies andfriends might defect from East Asian efforts. American pressure is traced by a number of accounts to the failuresof the earlier proposal by Malaysia’s Dr Mahathir for an East Asian Economic Grouping and to the idea of the
Asian Monetary Fund, discussed earlier. Given the importance of the US to many Asian states, including its allies
Japan, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines, strong US opposition is likely to be fatal to the newer regional
efforts as well.
Even left to themselves, East Asians may prefer not to attempt too much, too quickly. The region’s historicaland on‐going divides prevent such commitment and pace. There has, for example, been no rapprochement
between Japan and China. There are also questions of developmental divides among the 13 states: the gap
between Japan and the Lao PDR, for example, is as stark a gap as any in the world, and far beyond existing gaps
in the European Union.
On the other hand, if East Asian regional efforts attempt too little and too slowly, they risk failure and a
downward trend in perceptions with time and perhaps the passing of new events. As in the case of APEC,
differences of expectations among members and the failure to respond to crisis may change perceptions frompositive to negative.
Between these two dangers, the ASEAN+3 and EAS processes should have to balance different needs andtread something of a middle ground. East Asian regionalism should also be nimble in order to progress. In thisregard, we should come to see that the ASEAN+3 and EAS will not, of their own, suffice to bring about an East
66

Asian community. While significant, it is not determined that the ASEAN+3 or EAS will be the only or main
mechanisms for East Asian cooperation and community.
Many other institutions and processes can and perhaps will play a part – and often in ways that were notoriginally imagined.

The EAS may well evolve, to include countries that meet its criteria. Some are alreadyproposing Russia and Pakistan to attend the next EAS. There is fluidity in the regional frameworks that we haveto expect, and something of an alphabet soup of dialogues and processes. After all, this seems to have been theexperience in bringing Europe together, when many institutions other than the European Union played theirpart. East Asians will need to learn more from those European experiences and adapt (not blindly adopt) them totheir own circumstances. There will be a certain experimentalism in East Asian regionalism.
Sketching A Region: From A+3 to EAS …and Beyond?
But even if the frameworks for East Asian regionalism will be experimental, it will still be easier to describe or
predict them than it will be to try to answer a more central question: Will the various processes – A+3, EAS or
whatever else emerges – be effective? Or will these be epi‐phenomenal, without significant and sustained
impacts on the region?
In this section, I shall briefly trace the steps in moving to add the EAS to the A+3, and then briefly discuss twounderlying factors that can determine the success or failure of East Asian regionalism. The first and perhaps
major determining factor is the triangle of relations between the USA, China and Japan. The second and lessemphasized factor is, I suggest, the development of ASEAN and its ambitions to become a community.
The original notion of an East Asian Community is traced back to a suggestion by the then premier of
Malaysia, Dr Mahathir Mohammed, in 1990. This suggestion was not however taken up with enthusiasm.
Instead, it was torpedoed. Links across the Pacific were instead preferred, to include the USA and other partners
in the APEC process.
The A+3 process was then launched in the second half of the 1990s, as the first framework exclusively among
Asian member states. While this started slowly, it was notable for increasing engagement among the Northeast
Asian states, and generating a number of schemes for functional cooperation among the A+3 states. This also
revived the echo of Dr Mahathir’s suggestion, of a grouping among Asians only.
On this basis, some began to consider the A+3 as a basis for beginning a community among East Asians. A
group was appointed by the governments to set out a vision for this community. ASEAN then agreed to hold thefirst EAS.
As the first EAS approached, the response from the USA to being excluded from Asian summitry has been
mixed, and has changed over time. For a considerable time, it seemed that Washington DC did not notice the
EAS or did not object to its exclusion. Certainly, the earlier summit meetings among the A+3 leaders elicited nostrong opposition from the USA or request to be included.
Yet more soundings from some in the USA in the run up to the EAS indicate a questioning and perhaps
quarrelsome attitude to its exclusion. This has echoed early positions of the USA against the East Asian
Economic Grouping, mooted by then Malaysian premier, Dr Mahathir Mohammed, even before the formation of
the Asia Pacific Economic Community. Some have also been reminded of the US objection to the idea of the
Asian Monetary Fund, mooted by some in Japan and the region, during the financial and economic crises that
arose in 1997‐98. In both cases, a strong American, “No”, combined with doubts among some Asian states toderail these initiatives.
Yet, for the EAS, even the allies and closer friends of the USA in the region, such as Japan, South Korea and67

Singapore, seem to have agreed that the USA should not be included in the first summit. The EAS, unlike theearlier suggestion by Mahathir for an EAEC went ahead. Why?
I suggest this was because of accommodations taken to differentiate the EAS from the A+3 and indeed theearlier EAEC proposal. We should recall that the initial expectation among some was that the EAS would include
only the A+3 member states. The major change expected was not a change in who would attend, but that the EAS
could be hosted and chaired by one or another of the three Northeast Asian states, and not only ASEAN member
states (as is the case with A+3). This would, if adopted, have meant that the NE Asian states would more equal in
the process and, given the greater economic and strategic weight of these states, there would be some danger
that the NE Asian states – China, Japan and South Korea – might come to dominate the EAS.
This was not to be.
Rather than being limited to the A+3 states, the EAS that emerged took the effort to include other states.
There was considerable discussion on who should or should not attend the first EAS. Criteria was discussed andfinally agreed to decide on states to be invited to the EAS, in addition to the ASEAN+3 states. The criteria
includes acceptance of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), a central agreement on interstate relations
among ASEAN states and others who agree to it, in relation to ASEAN. 2
With this, the EAS expanded beyond the ASEAN+3 states and even beyond the geographic notion of East
Asia in including India and the Pacific‐2 of Australia and New Zealand. The EAS has also agreed that stats tohost the future summits will, for the present at least, be confined to the ASEAN member states.
The EAS that has eventuated has several characteristics that differ from the original idea of the A+3 evolving
to be the EAS, and of course the older idea of Mahathir for an EAEC. The first characteristic is that ASEAN willremain the central hub of the new summit process. For all its relative weakness, ASEAN is the most acceptablecentral hub with the region, and the EAS recognizes and consolidates ASEAN’s role.
A second characteristic is the effect of the wider membership. To those who feared a possible domination by
China in tension with US interests, this offers expectations that the new framework would be more balanced
since Australia is a close US ally and US‐India ties have grown much closer in recent years, and this adds the US
allies of Japan, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines as well as Singapore (which has a strategic frameworkwith the USA) within the grouping.
A third characteristic is the decision to make the EAS a process that focuses on leaders, with a minimal of
scripting and preparatory work by officials. Even when the leaders met, the format was a “1+1” allowing only
one other person in the main room with the leader. This has meant that the first EAS has provided a useful anddirect exchange among the leaders. It also means that the EAS does not enjoy a fuller bureaucratic system tofollow up (or indeed initiate) proposals. One benefit is that the EAS does not, in this regard, attempt to duplicate
the A+3 schemes of functional cooperation that have arisen.
A fourth characteristic of the EAS results from the first three. Given ASEAN leadership, the broader
membership, and the focus on leaders, we should expect that the EAS will move forward slowly. Indeed, the2Many find the TAC uncontroversial in that it reiterates principles of interstate cooperation and the peaceful settlement of disputesthat are drawn from the UN Charter. Indeed, to some the TAC has even been criticized as being too bland. Some suggest, however,that the TAC requires neutrality and may run to counter bilateral defence alliances with the USA or other countries. Thissuggestion is held by some notwithstanding that the Philippines and Thailand, both original TAC signatories, are US allies.
68skeptic may wonder if indeed it will move forward at all. 3
In addition to these four characteristics of the EAS itself, there are external factors that will impact the
progress of East Asian regionalism, and our perceptions of this phenomenon. Two key factors are, first, the great
triangle of relations between the USA, China and Japan; and, secondly, the developments within ASEAN.
The Great Triangle
It is not possible for this essay to do justice to the fuller considerations of the great triangle of relations in the
Asia Pacific between the USA, China and Japan, or even to any single leg of this triangle. It is however importantto sketch some of the ways in which this triangle impacts on East Asian regionalism.
Where the triangle is stable, and relations among these three major powers is relatively settled, East Asian
regionalism is unlikely to be seen as a possible threat by the USA, or cause fear of American exclusion.
Conversely, where relations within the triangle are tense, this possibility is increased. The prospects of East Asian
regionalism are therefore affected by changes in the great triangle.
This is perhaps most clearly seen in the US‐China relationship. This relationship has gone through various ups
and downs during the Bush administration alone. At present, it seems to be heading towards an increased senseof competition and tension. There are economic issues such as the trade surplus and question of the value of theYuan. There are security issues such as China’s rearmament, as strongly raised by US Defence Secretary
Rumsfeld, as well as the question of cross‐straits ties. There are perennial questions about democracy, humanrights and standards in environmental protection and labour rights. As a whole, some might feel that there isbroad, if strange, coalition of Americans against China: from the union‐friendly freeing the loss ofcompetitiveness and jobs, to the hawkish right wingers, through to those advocating democracy and humanrights abroad.
On China’s part, there is also a segment who believe that a confrontation with the USA is inevitable overthese issues or, more generally, simply because the world has not known the peaceful co‐existence of two great
powers. They see the US structure of alliances – both old as well as post‐9/11 – as efforts to encircle China, notonly in East Asia but also in Central Asia and much of the world. Such thinkers may therefore be supportive ofChina’s current “charm offensive” and talk of its “peaceful rise”. But for them, unlike others, these are not aspermanent foreign policy, but only ways to win friends and political space and time for the time being, as thecountry grows and strengthens.
How does this impact the rest of East Asia? Looking at this US‐China leg of the triangle, some would trace
one of the reasons for the inclusion of Australia and India for the EAS, as compared to the A+3. In the A+3
process itself, we may recall that when the process started, the USA felt relatively comfortable while it was Chinathat showed some initial resistance. Some among the Chinese expressed concern that the A+3 process was aimedby the rest of the Asian states at corralling China, like Lilliputians trying to tie down Gulliver. China’s emphasis,at that point, was to prefer bilateralism in its dealings with Asian states, notably in relation to conflicting claims
with different ASEAN member states over the South China Seas. However, more recently, China seems to much
more comfortable and indeed supportive of the A+3, and has also embraced intra‐Asian multilateralism. On thestill fraught question of the South China Seas, it has supported a code of conduct among the claimant states.
China has conducted a very successful “charm offensive” and increased its influence among Asian states,
including most in ASEAN. Thus China has warmed to the A+3 process and has come to engage actively andprominently in the framework. Indeed, its presence in the A+3 has been so strongly felt that some have feared
that, again like Gulliver, China would not just burst the bonds tied by the Lilliputians, but pull them along at theend of the string.
3

Looking forward, some now suggest that countries like Russia and Pakistan should join in the EAS. This remains to be agreed. If

the EAS is expanded to include these states, some fear it may become (more) unwieldly.
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How China responds to the EAS framework remains to be seen. But at present, my reading is that China will go
along with the EAS but is expecting that the A+3 will remain the more important and functional regionalframework. This view is also taken in a number of ASEAN member states, including Malaysia who hosted the
EAS and has developed close relations with China.
The growing regional role and influence of China has impacted another leg of the great triangle, between
China and Japan. Sino‐Japanese relations have remained poor and indeed grown more tense in recent years. The
visits by Japanese premier Koizumi to the Yazakuni shrine, and the protests in response to the visits, areemblems of this, with violent protests in the streets of China and a diplomatic impasse to high‐level meetings.
Worse, simmering beneath the shrine visits are wider and deeper differences about war time issues, and history
books. Looking ahead, the view is bifurcated. On one hand, the economic figures of trade and investment show
deep complementarities between the two economies, for mutual benefit. On the other hand, there appears to besome danger of a political competition and even conflict, underscored by China’s efforts to strength her militaryforces and develop its maritime capabilities, in tandem with Japan’s seeming wish to be a “normal” country withan unabashed military capacity. Nationalism in both countries seems to be resurgent and may be of a narrow,nastier type in some quarters.
These difficulties in Sino‐Japanese relations matter a great deal to the project of East Asian regionalism. East
Asian regionalism would gain tremendously if these two Asian giants could come to a rapprochement, akin to
the French‐German partnership that drove European integration. East Asian regionalism can survive andproceed (albeit with some uncertainty and less pace) if Sino‐Japanese relations are cool. But if Sino‐Japaneserelations turn sharply for the worse – to a frosty cold or even boiling over – this could disrupt the early
beginnings of East Asian regionalism.
In recent years, ASEAN member states have seen a form of positive competition between the two giants inrelation to them, as China and then Japan have come forward to offer FTAs and forms of assistance. But thissense of positive competition may be turning for the worse. When we look at Japan’s ties to ASEAN member
states and to its nearest neighbour, South Korea, we may have to conclude that Japanese influence in the region
seems to have ebbed in a number of respects, despite its continuing largesse to many of the states in the region.
Given this, Japan seems to have faced something of a choice in its foreign policy priorities: whether to continue
and intensify its efforts to strengthen relations with the rest of Asia, or to re‐prioritise its relations with the USA
and a more global role, in tandem with the USA. While perhaps the choice is never as stark or clear, there aresigns and statements by Japanese leaders that they have chosen to re‐prioritise their alliance with the USA. An
alliance once described as being adrift by the well known Japanese commentator, Yoichi Funabashi, has now
been celebrated by both American and Japanese leaders as a key priority.
There are those who expect that, as such, Japan will begin to play a larger role in global affairs, including
peace keeping and the use of its military power. If this characterization of Japanese policy choices is correct, thishas a strong impact on the prospects of an East Asian regionalism that, while not being anti‐American, is more
independent of the USA than it is presently.
What Can ASEAN Do?
In its near 40 years of existence, ASEAN has had its share of both critics and lovers. Criticisms mounted
especially after the 1997 financial crisis when the grouping was unable to cooperate to address the cross‐borderflows that affected so many of its member states, and also stood to one side on political and security issues, suchas the separation of East Timor from Indonesia. There was a sharp fall in ASEAN’s standing. In the years since,
the rise of China now occupy many more minds than the happenings in ASEAN. So too does India. A visible
sign of this was the decision by US Secretary of State Rice in 2004 whose first tour of Asia was marked by a visit
to India and then to China, leapfrogging over Southeast Asia. In that same year, she skipped the annual ARF.
In 2006, almost a decade after the crisis, how should we look at ASEAN? Is it a central and influential player70

in Asia and the Pacific, or a powerless, marginal association? Has ASEAN responded to the challenges of theserecent years, and what direction do these responses signal for the grouping?
There was an initial denial in some quarters that ASEAN needed to respond and change to the challenges ofglobalization, as revealed in the 1997 crisis and its aftermath. However, more and more ASEAN leaders andpolicy‐makers have come to recognize that changes are needed. Changes are afoot within ASEAN. These will
evolve the “ASEAN way” and modes of cooperation among its member states. Indeed, these changes will, if
carried through, transform the grouping. These changes, moreover, are important not only to ASEAN member
states and their peoples as “internal” issues to ASEAN. Potentially, these changes will also have “external”
consequences, to impact ASEAN’s standing and its ability to influence the relations among major powers in thewider region.
ASEAN leaders at their summit in 2003 declared their ambition to create an ASEAN community. This
community will feature three pillars – in the spheres of economics, security and socio‐cultural affairs – that arepresently being discussed and defined. The leaders have also commissioned an eminent persons group (EPG) toconsider an ASEAN Charter. These initiatives have been followed up with discussions and plans among ASEAN
officials. There is an understanding that grouping must go beyond the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA)
towards greater economic integration. ASEAN Defence Ministers met in 2006, for the very first time. The Charter
EPG has met thrice and expects to deliver its report by end 2006.
The ASEAN skeptic can of course point out that these are merely meetings, with no clear cut deliverables todate. This is true. However, those watching ASEAN more closely may discern a difference in the level ofambition, and the conception of ASEAN. The agreement to move towards “community” is not banal, but
represents a quite radical change in conception for ASEAN, which for so long was seen and defended as an“association”. The differences between these concepts of “community” and “association” are considerable, andportend fundamental changes in how the ASEAN member states cooperate, and to what ends they should
cooperate. A new direction has been set.
The pace in which ASEAN can move in this new direction remains to be seen. Given the diversity of its
member states – in economics, political systems, culture and experience with the wider world – it will likely be
difficult to move quickly. However, the political will among most ASEAN member states to make those changes
is now higher than it has been before.There is more effort and thinking about making ASEAN’s workingsstronger and more efficient. Issues are being considered, like the norm of non‐intervention, the weakness of theASEAN secretariat, and the lack of development assistance and transfers amongst ASEAN member states.
The need for ASEAN to go beyond official circles is also more recognized. Consultation with
non‐governmental organizations, with businesses and with national Parliaments is beginning to change the circleof voices that guides developments in the region. Even more, efforts are beginning to reach out to the wider
publics in the member states; to make ASEAN better known to the peoples.
These internal changes represent a quite radical rethinking about ASEAN; not just by intellectuals andobservers, but also those who are in power, and advising governments. Before the crisis, most ASEANists
disregarded European models of community building as being unsuitable and unnecessary. Today, there is moreinterest in learning from other regional experiments, even if the mandate is to adapt and not to blindly adopt. We
should expect that ASEAN will change, more quickly than in the past, even if not fast enough to satisfy some.
As such developments unfold, ASEAN will move towards what some scholars have termed, “legalization” –with norms and rules that are agreed and then are monitored for compliance. This does not necessarily meanthat ASEAN will become as institutionalized and legalistic as some other regional groupings, like the European
71

Union. Nor will the ASEAN secretariat and organs be transformed overnight into autonomous bodies like theEuropean Commission. But these trends in the increased importance of rules, institutions and rule compliancesuggest a marked shift from previous ASEAN habits of informality and having very minimal institutions. This isimportant work not only for ASEAN in itself, but for the grouping’s potential in influencing regional order.
The changes outlined above promise to transform ASEAN internally. They also potentially affect how
ASEAN relates to other powers in the wider region. It has been an oft‐declared ambition for ASEAN to be in thedriver’s seat for such relations; this aspiration remains in that place in the ARF. Doubts however have emerged in
the past years of the crisis about the ability and indeed the credibility of ASEAN in this role. Bilateral ties with
the USA have been reinforced. The rise of China and its influence has also been marked and some believe that it
will seek to play a larger and perhaps dominant regional role. Others, looking at the continuing role of Japan andthe rise of India, suggest the rise of a concert of powers to accommodate the different Asian powers.
Some believe that, in this context, ASEAN is doomed to be a marginal presence. Yet, while it is true that
ASEAN cannot and does not harbor ambitions to contend for power, ASEAN is presently a default hub for
relations in the region. Looking forward, I would argue that ASEAN can indeed be a significant player as a “softpower” in the region. This conception of “soft power”, first developed by Joseph Nye, defines the ability to
influence and achieve one’s ends, even without the raw calculations of military strength and of economic
prowess.
ASEAN’s present place as a hub in the region is marked by three phenomena: the free trade agreements in
Asia; the ASEAN+3 process; and the East Asian summit. These are limited to Asian states and possibly offer the
beginnings of a regional order that gives expression to a nascent Asian regionalism.
The evolution of free trade and economic agreements among Asians is an example of this. The offer by China
to ASEAN for a free trade agreement (FTA) may be seen to be a major impetus for Japan to go beyond theeconomic partnership agreement that it concluded with Singapore (the JSEPA), and reach out to some ASEAN
member states with bilateral FTAs. After initial agreements with the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia, it isexpected that Japan will also negotiate a wider FTA with ASEAN as a whole. These FTA developments have, inturn, played a part in influencing South Korea to begin a negotiation with ASEAN. Taken together with ASEAN
negotiations with Australia‐New Zealand, and with India, we may surmise that ASEAN has become a default
hub for economic relations among the Asian states.
While some or much of this may result from the rivalries between China on one hand, and the USA, Japanand US surrogates on the other, there are positive aspects of these developments for both ASEAN, and(arguably) for the wider region. For rather than splitting ASEAN and the region into two spheres of influence,thus far, these developments have helped East Asia take steps towards closer economic cooperation andintegration – albeit in a patchwork manner, rather than a grand design for community or union. The evolution of
the EAS is imprinted by these same factors. As discussed earlier in this essay, the EAS re‐emphasizes the central
position for ASEAN to play in regional order, as a grouping most acceptable to all.
However, ASEAN must recognize the role it currently occupies is a default role. ASEAN is in the centre notbecause of its intrinsic and irreducible strength or worth but because there is no other acceptable actor. In somesenses, ASEAN’s main “strength” is its relative weakness and neutrality. While ASEAN enjoys this hub status, it
should avoid choosing between aligning itself with one major power or another, either broadly or (worse)
permanently.
ASEAN should increasing work towards sharing perspectives towards the major powers and developing
common stances in their relations. This is ambitious, given the diversity among ASEAN member states in their72

economic, political and cultural outlooks. But steps in this direction are not impossible; this is especially if we
accept that the common points among ASEAN member states need not be comprehensive to cover all issues inadvance, and instead seek to develop them more organically, in response to new undertakings and events. For
example, in the negotiation of the ASEAN‐China FTA, ASEAN member states are finding that, despite andbecause of their differences, they do best to sit down together to discuss and understand each other’s positions
before responding to China. Other examples show the possibility and strength of common agreement onpolitical and security issues: ASEAN’s common stance on China after the Mischief Reef incident in the early
1990s, and of course, the unity of the then ASEAN member states in pursuing their political campaign against
the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. In like manner, if ASEAN member states can confer amongst
themselves on vital issues concerning the major powers, on a timely basis, they can similarly seek out shared
positions that may well accommodate their diversity, and better advance their common interests; somewhat akinto a limited form of a common foreign policy.
In this way, ASEAN should aim to emerge as a “soft power” in the region, whose norms, values andinstitutions are admired as being acceptable and indeed something of a model for the region. Thus far, ASEAN’s
relations with the major powers in Asia (and indeed with each other) have predominantly been viewed throughthe optic of realism and calculations of power. But this must change in the future and be complemented by agreater recognition of the potential role of ASEAN as a “soft power”,
ASEAN is working towards greater integration among its member states and, in the process, reviewing its
norms and institutions for cooperation. We must expect that, in a number of areas, especially concerning ASEAN
economic integration, rules and rule enforcement within ASEAN will be more greatly emphasized than in thepast. The institutions of ASEAN, including the ASEAN secretariat and the meetings of the senior officials, will
also need to be consolidated and focused to be more efficient and effective. It is critical that ASEAN mustemphasize and work towards ASEAN community, the “internal” goal discussed earlier.
These internal and external changes and challenges intertwine for ASEAN. The role for ASEAN in the region
cannot be predicated on calculations of power. Rather, if ASEAN is to influence the region, its contributions androle will be in the nature of developing norms and institutions for the wider region. Part of these will inevitably
draw from ASEAN norms and modes of cooperation. For example, in the coming together of the EAS, eachattending state was required to have accepted the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. This exemplifies theability and use of having ASEAN serve to guide the regional development in terms of its norms and values.
However, while ASEAN ways may be commended for the wider regional order, they cannot and should not
be commanded.

Indeed, ASEAN must recognize that its own modes and norms are evolving, and remain open

to change and improvement. This often reflects the internal changes within ASEAN member states. For instance,
the emphasis that ASEAN has brought to bear on the domestic situation in Myanmar is not merely reflective ofthe downward trend in that country. It also reflects the upsurge in the ethos of democracy among some othermember states, especially in post‐Suharto Indonesia. This emphasis on democracy would have been
unimaginable in the pre‐crisis ASEAN. It demonstrates how ASEAN is evolving and incorporating new norms
and values into its expectations for its member states and how they are to cooperate with each other.
Such an evolution stands ASEAN in good stead. The potential contribution of ASEAN lies not in trying tobalance power with power in Asia. ASEAN’s potential in influencing the regional order lies instead in a renewed
form of “open regionalism” with norms and values, and the development of ASEAN “soft power” in handlingits own region and also providing possible models for wider regional cooperation and order.

73

How We Should RespondBased on the observations offered above, I shall now turn to some policy recommendations for those Asiansin the EAS, for ASEAN, and for the USA.
The future of East Asian regionalism and community does not lie, however, exclusively within Asian hands.
Given the role of the USA in the region, what it does and how it responds is important and indeed critical to theemerging regionalism. There is some sense that East Asian regionalism has come this far, towards the first EAS,
because Washington DC did not notice it, or if it did, that it was comfortable that its primary interests would not
be adversely affected. Otherwise, some believe, that an American “veto” would have been exercised, as it wasagainst Mahathir’s proposal for an East Asian Economic Grouping.
During the ASEAN+3 processes, US suspicion and antagonism was largely avoided. This is due, in part, tothe pre‐existing APEC framework that has not been displaced by the ASEAN+3. Another positive factor was thegenerally supportive attitude of most East Asian countries to the USA, post‐911, despite the sentiment of some ofthe peoples of the region. A third factor was that the USA seems to have been preoccupied and, if indeed
Washington DC’s thinkers considered the prospects of East Asian regionalism, thought it very limited. Thisappears to be changing with the EAS. While American interest in East Asia is critical and much wanted, a senseof alarm, and American opposition to the EAS and East Asian community are unwarranted and would becounter productive.
The USA can legitimately rely on its allies and friends in the region to ensure that its/ their vital interests are
not compromised by whatever might happen at the EAS. Indeed, all of East Asia would be well served if suchbilateral dialogues between the USA and its Asian allies like Japan, Australia, Thailand, South Korea and thePhilippines, and other close friends like Singapore, would be energized and directed towards a dialogue on the
EAS and underlying issues and factors in East Asian regionalism. In this, I would hope that Asian perspectives
on the five factors that this paper has surveyed might be conveyed to the USA. This is especially as regards
different and varied Asian perspectives on the rise of China, and on America’s policies, post 9/11.
We should however have caution over what might be called, “excessive bilateralism” in which one or more
US allies and friends would be seen (or see themselves) as surrogates to protect any and all US interests to thepoint that it might up‐end the East Asian efforts at going forward. One sign of such “excessive bilateralism” hasbeen the suggestion that the US will engage in military training with Japan and Australia, which some haveregarded as a warming up of a potential alliance to counter and contain China. To be a useful friend to the USA
in Asia, these states will have to realize that they must be in and of Asia, as much as to be a US friend.
Having said what I hope the USA will not do, what positive suggestions can be offered? Given my argumentthat the ASEAN+3 and EAS cannot be the only mechanisms, I would point to the possibilities of increasing anddeepening US engagement with East Asians in different fora. Two existing processes that deserve greaterattention and effort are APEC and the ASEAN Post Ministerial Dialogue with the USA.
In asking that we relook at APEC, we should be reminded that APEC itself initially represented a change in
US policies. In the 1990s, there was a policy shift for the US, through then Secretary of State Baker, to express
support for a new Asia Pacific architecture, which would comprise a framework for economic integration, acommitment to democratization, and a revamped defense structure for the region. The Clinton administrationembraced the concept of multilateral security dialogue as one of the four pillows of the ‘new Pacific community’,and expressed support for several potential areas of dialogue including APEC.
There were several considerations that contributed to Washington’s appraisal of policies and APEC, but none
was more important than the prediction that US power could no longer perform the coordinating role74

characteristic of the Cold War period. The assessment by many in this period was that the two traditional pillarsof American predominance in Asia – the American wallet in the form of its markets and overall financial
presence, and the US security muscle from its bilateral alliances and military bases – were both diminishingassets.
This possibility has thus far remained unproven. Indeed, the past decade seems to have gone in the opposite
direction, with the USA emerging as the pre‐eminent power.
Nevertheless, I would argue that APEC needs to be re‐energized as an overarching relationship with PacificAsia (ASEAN, Northeast Asia, the Pacific‐2 of Australia and New Zealand and India). This would be a goodforum to address trans‐Pacific issues, to place China‐US relations in a broader context, and also to serve as asafety net in the event that, as was earlier predicted, traditional sources of American influence – of its economic
wallet and its security muscle – should wane. APEC’s broad agenda of cooperation can also be useful for the USA
to demonstrate a much broader engagement with Asia, beyond the sometimes singular focus on terrorism andsecurity.
Some have already suggested that the USA needs to be more mindful of public relations and perceptions inEast Asia. I would go further to suggest that a real dialogue about US policies and their communication isneeded, to guard against unintended consequences and the continued reduction of their “soft power” toinfluence and persuade, and serve as an example to be admired and emulated.
In re‐looking at the ASEAN‐US post ministerial conference, Americans sometimes wonder why they should
bother at all with a grouping of ten smaller to middle sized countries. Terrorism post 9/11 has provided
something of an answer and reason for American attention to the region. But terrorism is also proving a narrowlens that obscures as much as it reveals.
One thing that seems to have been obscured is the relative importance of ASEAN in East Asian regionalism.
In addition to the ASEAN+3 process, it should be noted that ASEAN is the hub for trade and economic ties.
There are also separate spokes under negotiation to link it to China, Australia‐New Zealand, and India, as well
as discussions of links to Japan and to South Korea.

Much of this has been possible not because of ASEAN’s

strength – whether economic or in terms of security. Rather, it has been because of ASEAN’s politicalacceptability in providing a relatively neutral and positive hub to many different states in Asia.
Additionally, Some ASEAN member states like Singapore and Thailand have also shown themselves to becapable of taking initiative through bilateral agreements and then helping steer the rest of ASEAN in the same
direction. ASEAN’s own integrative efforts towards an economic community, and with security andsocio‐cultural communities coming after, also bear mention.
In this regard, it would serve the USA well to engage ASEAN more fully and in more rounded perspectives
as a means of remaining engaged and vital to East Asian developments. A free trade agreement with more
ASEAN member states or with ASEAN as a whole would be one policy option. At present, the USA has only
concluded an FTA with Singapore.
Another suggestion would be to have an ASEAN‐US summit, regularly if not annually. China, Japan andothers in East Asia already have such arrangements with ASEAN. I have previously suggested that, in part, thiscan be achieved on the sidelines of the APEC Summit as seven out of the 10 ASEAN member states attend the
APEC Summit (from the US point of view, it is politically significant that Myanmar/ Burma is not one of them).
This eventuated in 2005, in the months before the EAS. At the very least, this practice should be continued, withthe prospect of a full summit for the future.
In sum, to the Americans, I would make the following suggestions. First, the USA must accept and75

understand its exclusion from the first EAS and many of the emerging East Asian frameworks. Secondly, all EAS
states and especially those who are allies and friends of the USA should seek to ensure that while the EAS does
not include the USA as a participant, the vital interests that they share with the USA are sufficiently accounted
for and protected. Efforts to convey this to the USA, both as intentions going into the EAS and as results
emerging from it, should be redoubled. To Asians and especially Americans, I suggest that we need to work torevive relations across the Pacific and indeed take the existing relationships and institutions to new and higher
levels. In this, relations of the USA with states in Asia must broaden beyond the almost singular focus on the
global war against terrorism that some feel in dealings with Washington DC and rise above the existing base thatprovided by the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) processes.
It is not however only the USA to whom I would offer policy suggestions in proceeding with East Asian
regionalism. Asians and ASEAN too have responsibilities to undertake.
To the Asians, I suggest that we should be prepared to develop closer intra‐Asian cooperation on issues ofcommon concern, to deal with both regional issues as well as impacts arising from globalization. However, while
we may wish for a rapprochement between China and Japan, this cannot be commanded and there are few signsof a resolution at hand. Without this, I suggest that East Asians must be prepared to be patient and work for thelong term, and through a series of patchwork and more limited cooperative schemes, rather than expecting aclear regional vision to be annunciated and agreed shortly.
Therefore, for the near and middle term, East Asia will be more of a framework for cooperation andunderstanding, rather than a “community”; a word that suggests many more and deeper shared bases andvalues for coming together. East Asians will need a vision of their future, but they will also need pragmatism andpatience in their efforts to achieve those visions. Practically applied, East Asians may well have to accept thatmajor “hard security” issues such as the cross Straits issue and North Korea will be beyond East Asians for thepresent and foreseeable future, and be slower and more diffident in approaching issues of political and security
concerns.
East Asians may wish instead to focus on issues of functional cooperation and economic agreements. These
are of no lesser importance in many ways. Indeed, given different conceptions of security, if East Asians cancooperate effectively on issues such as preventing a new financial crisis or pandemics, and dealing with major
natural disasters like the Tsunami and the earthquake in Java, these are arguably contributions that will benefit
ordinary Asians in ways that are as important (if not more so) than the hard security issues.

If East Asians wish

for more ambition, their attention and cooperation in the middle term might turn to issues such as Myanmar –which would centrally involve India and China alongside ASEAN – or Timor Leste.
To ASEAN, I suggest that they must recognize they are presently a hub for East Asia’s regionalism and must
seize this opportunity to contribute to the process positively. ASEAN’s role must however be recognized as
resulting from a default in relations among the major Asian powers, and cannot be taken for granted. ASEAN
can and should therefore seek to grow into this default role by moving ahead clearly and quite quickly with its
ambitions for an ASEAN community, in the fuller sense of that word, “community”.
As it does go forward with these ambitions, ASEAN should also seek to emerge as a “soft power” in Asia,with a positive influence arising from the values, norms and institutions that it practices and embodies, as amodel for the wider region. The ASEAN processes and institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum, must be
strengthened accordingly. ASEAN member states must also continue to strengthen their habits of dialogue on
issues on which they will face differences and seek to find more common positions and indeed policies in respectof important issues in their relations with the major powers. The national interests of each ASEAN member state
does not need to be abandoned, but skilful diplomacy and some degree of restraint will be needed to bring76

ASEAN closer together and make it more effective in the wider region.
Conclusion: Visions, Contingencies and Assurances
Some hanker for a longer‐term vision or roadmap for East Asian regionalism. This is not notwithstanding thefact that an East Asian Vision Group, formed by experts and eminent persons, has concluded its work someyears ago with a broad report. Like Europe, they hope for politicians and others to give regular affirmation to an
ideal of union, of community, or some other form of deeper association and integration in the region.
There are very real limits to a realism that is bereft of ideals and broader visions and values. Yet I would
argue that ideals, visions and values in East Asia should be more appropriately developed over the longer term,
rather than concocted here and now by governments or their surrogates.
There are doubts, contestation and differences among East Asian members that I have touched upon and thatcannot be wished away. Given this, if we were to attempt another vision, the vision would in some ways be
captive to these differences. As such, rather than a vision that might unify the governments and peoples of theregion, it may instead divide them.
A hasty declaration of visions, values and ideals for East Asian regionalism may also unnecessarily upset
relations with the USA. This is not just an issue for those in the region who are friends and allies of the USA, butalso for those whose relations remain in balance, or are in flux.
For much that is happening in East Asian regionalism is necessarily contingent and contested. This is not only
the situation within and among Asians, with different histories, priorities and hopes. The sense of contingency
and contestation is also present when we think, as we must, of the relations between a more institutionalized
East Asian process and identity and the USA, which has been for so long and is still in many respects the
predominant pillar of the region, even if it is not physically part of it.
What we should therefore seek to offer in the near term, over the next few years, is not a new vision of East
Asia or a categorical decision about Asia‐American relations. Assurances instead should be offered.
These assurances relate to the principles for East Asian regionalism that should be preferred – such as its
openness and functionality – as well as to the willingness and even fond wish to broaden and deepen
engagement with the USA in parallel to East Asian regionalism.
Such assurances do not of course settle things for the long term. However, I hope that if given and taken, suchassurances would allow the emerging and still nascent sense of East Asian regionalism to go forward with an
America that is not watching as an outsider in alarm or opposition, nor ignoring these developments. Rather,with these assurances, Asians can hope for an America that is fully engaged and watchful with both anticipation
and awareness that if things go right, East Asian regionalism can better serve both Asia and US engagements in
Asia.

Selected References•

Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of South East Asia, Oxford University
Press, 2000.

•

Lowell Dittmer, “East Asia in the New Era in World Politics”, World Politics, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Oct. 2002), p.
52•

Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, eds., Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization andInternational Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
77

•

Rosemary Foot et al (eds.) Order and Justice in International Relations, Oxford University Press, 2003.

•

Funston, J. (1998), ASEAN:•

J. Garofono, “Power, Institutions and the ASEAN Regional Forum”, Asian Survey 42(3) (May/ June 2002),

Out of its Depth. In Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.20 No.1 (April).

p.502‐521.
•

Goldstein, Judith, et al (eds.) Legalization and World Politics, MIT Press, 2001•

JCIE, Cross Sectoral Partnerships in Enhancing Human Security, Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building
Asia’s Tomorrow, JCIE 2000.

•

Victor Mallet, “Introduction: A Miracle that Went Sour”, in the Trouble with Tigers, 1998, p.1‐23.

•

Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power (London: Oxford University press, 2002).

•

TV Paul and John Hall (eds.) International Order and the Future of World Politics, Cambridge University
press, 1999.

•

Peter Preston, “Reading the Asian Crisis: History, Culture and Institutional Truths”, Contemporary
Southeast Asia, Vol. 20 No.3, Dec 1998, p.241‐260.

•

Ruggie, J. (1993). Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution. In J. Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism
Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form. New York: Columbia University Press.

•

Simon SC Tay, Hadi Soesastro and Jesus Estanislao (editors) Reinventing ASEAN, ISEAS 2001.

•

Simon SC Tay (editor), “Sketching Regional Futures: Pacific Asia in 2022”, JCIE 2004.

•

Simon SC Tay, “ASEAN and East Asia; A New Regionalism?” in Reinventing ASEAN (ISEAS, 2001),
p.206‐225.

•

See Simon SC Tay, Asia, America and Global Governance, published in Global Governance (Winter 2003)•

Simon SC Tay, A More Insecure World: Conflicting Perspectives, Security Dialogue, Vol 36 (3): 402‐404,
Sage publications, 2005.

•

Tay, S. (1996), Human Rights, Culture and the Singapore Example. McGill Law Journal, Vol.41 No.4
(August).

•Tay, Simon, “Asia and the United States After 9/11: Primacy and Partnership across the Pacific”, in the
Fletcher Forum on International Affairs, Vol. 28:1 Winter 2004, at p. 113‐132.

•

Walt, S. (1987), The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

•

Waltz, K. (1979), Theory of International Politics. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison‐Wesley Publishing
Company.

78

4. An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)(1) Introduction【Objectives】 As we embrace the 21st century, international relations are becoming increasingly interdependent,
and globalization and regionalism are becoming the big waves. In this global tendency, communicating with the world,
especially neighboring countries in the Asia‐Pacific region at both governmental and non‐governmental level, is one of
the indispensable conditions for Japan to survive. On the basis of such understanding, The Global Forum of Japan(GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in the field ranging frompolitics and security to economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business, opinion and political leadersboth in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss about the formulation of new orders in global and regional
arenas.
【History】 The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance.
Accordingly, there were expressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals
and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within this context, it was realized that to revitalize the summit meetings there
must be free and unfettered exchanges of private‐sector views to be transmitted directly to the heads of theparticipating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister Okita Saburo, U.S. Trade Representative William
Brock, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne Davignon, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward Lumley, as
representatives of the private‐sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular
Forum in Washington in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic
summits themselves had made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forumestablished by the American and Japanese components of The Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in
Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum was intended as a facilitatorof global consensus on the many post‐Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out to open its
discussions not only to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of theworld. Over the years, the gravity of The Global Forumʹs activities gradually shifted from its American component(housed in The Center for Strategic and International Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forumon International Relations), and, after the American component ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of theJapanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter act as an independent body for organizing
bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by‐laws accordingly. At thesame time, The Global Forumʹs Japanese component was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in linewith the principle that the organization be self‐governing, self‐financing, and independent of any other organization.
【 Organization】 The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non‐profit, non‐partisan, and independent
membership organization in Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy‐oriented matters ofbilateral, regional and global implications. While the secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International
Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on International Relations.
Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of Hattori Ichiro, Okita
Saburo, Takeyama Yasuo, Toyoda Shoichiro in 1983, GFJ is currently headed by Okawara Yoshio as Chairman and Ito
Kenichi as President. The membership is composed of 13 Business Leader Members including the two Governors,
Mogi Yuzaburo and Toyoda Shoichiro; 80 Opinion Leader Members including the four Governors, Ito Kenichi, Kai
Noritake, Okawara Yoshio, and Shimada Haruo; and 30 Political Leader Members including the two Governors,
Hatoyama Yukio, and Tanigaki Sadakazu. Financially the activities of GFJ have been supported by the annual
membership fees paid by 14 leading Japanese business corporations (with 2 corporations, Toyota Motor Corporation
and Kikkoman Corporation contributing 5 shares each and the other 11 corporations contributing 1 share each) as well
as by the grants provided by The Japan Foundation, Japan‐ASEAN Exchange Projects, The Tokyo Club, The
Japan‐Korea Cultural Foundation, The Daiwa Bank Foundation for Asia and Oceania, Toshiba International
Foundation, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, etc. Watanabe Mayu serves as Executive Secretary.
【Activities】Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1996, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges
with the Quadrangular countries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring
countries in the Asia‐Pacific region including US, China, Korea, Taiwan, ASEAN countries, Australia and India, for the
purposes of deepening mutual understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been
active in collaboration with international exchange organizations in those countries in organizing policy‐oriented
intellectual exchanges called “Dialogue.” In order to secure a substantial number of Japanese participants in the“Dialogue”, GFJ in principle holds these “Dialogues” in Tokyo. A listing of topics of “Dialogues” and its overseas
co‐sponsors in last five years is given below.
Year Month2002 February
May
September
November
2003 January
April
October
2004 July
September
November2005 April

Topic
The Japan and ASEAN: Cooperation for Peace and Prosperity in the
Asia‐Pacific Region
Japan‐China Relationship in the world
Japan and Australia: Perspectives on Cooperation in Asia and PacificJapan and Korea: Working Together for The Future of East Asia
The Japan and ASEAN: Cooperation for Peace and Prosperity in the
Asia‐Pacific Region
Entrepreneurship in Asia
Japan‐Taiwan Dialogue: New Situation in Asia‐Pacific region andJapan‐Taiwan Cooperation
A Roadmap towards East Asian Community
Future Prospect of East Asian Community and Japan‐China
Relationship
The Japan‐ U.S. Korea Dialogue: Future of Korean Peninsula andJapan‐U.S.‐Korea Security Cooperation

November

The Prospect of East Asian Community and Japan‐Korea
Cooperation
The Prospect for East Asian Community and Regional Cooperation
Peace and Prosperity in the Wider Black Sea Area and the Role ofJapan

2006 February
June

Review and Perspective of the Japan‐Taiwan Relationship
The Japan‐US‐Asia: An East Asian Community and the United States

June

79

Co‐sponsor
ASEAN ISIS
China Association for International Friendly Contact (China)
Australian Consortium (Australia)
The Seoul Forum on International Affairs (Korea)
ASEAN ISISThe Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs (US)Foundation on International & Cross‐Strait Studies (Taiwan)
ASEAN ISIS
China Association for International Friendly Contact (China)
The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, The Fletcher
School, Tufts University (US), Yonsei University Graduate
School of International Studies (Korea)
Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation
Initiative (Korea)
ASEAN ISIS
University of Shizuoka, The Black Sea University
Foundation (Rumania), The International Center for BlackSea Studies (Turkey)
Taiwan International Studies Association（TISA）
Pacific Forum CSIS (US), the Council on East Asian
CommunityAs of February 1, 2006

(2) Membership List of The Global Forum of Japan(123Members)

NAKANISHI Terumasa, Professor, Kyoto University
NAGANO Shigeto, President, Japan Forum for Strategic Studies
NISHIKAWA Megumi, Foreign News Editor, Mainichi Newspapers
OKONOGI Masao, Professor, Keio University
ONUMA Yasuaki, Professor, University of Tokyo
OSANAI Takayuki, Foreign Policy Critic
OWADA Hisashi, Judge, International Court of Justice
OHYA Eiko, Journalist
RYU Ketsu, Professor, Waseda University & Visiting Scholar, Columbia University【Chairman】
OKAWARA Yoshio, President, Institute for International Policy Studies【President】
ITO Kenichi,President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
【Business Leaders】(13 Members)[Governors]
MOGI Yuzaburo, Chairman and CEO, Kikkoman Corporation
TOYODA Shoichiro, Honorary Chairman, Toyota Motor
Corporation[Members]
HIRAIWA Gaishi, Advisor, The Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
IMAI Takashi, Honorary Chairman, Nippon Steel Corporation
KOBAYASHI Yotaro, Chairman and Chief Corporate Advisor, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
KUSAKARI Takao, Chairman, Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha
MATSUNO Haruki, Chief Executive Counselor, Member of the Board, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
OKAYAMA Norio, Chairman, Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd.
SAWADA Hideo, Chairman, H.I.S Co.,Ltd.
SEYA Hiromichi, Senior Corporate Adviser, Asahi Glass Co., Ltd.
TAKAGAKI Tasuku, Senior Advisor, The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd.
YAGUCHI Toshikazu, President, Biru Daiko Co., Ltd.
TBD(to be determined), Kajima Corporation【Opinion Leaders】(80Members)[Governors]
ITO Kenichi,President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
KAI Noritake, Councilor, The Japan Forum of International Relations Inc.
OKAWARA Yoshio, President, Institute for International Policy Studies
SHIMADA Haruo, Professor, Keio University

SAKAKIBARA Eisuke, Professor, Waseda University
SAKAMOTO Masahiro,Senior Research Fellow, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
SHIRAISHI Masaru, Professor, Kyoto University
SOEYA Yoshihide, Professor, Keio University
SONE Yasunori, Professor, Keio University
SUMIDA Nagayoshi, President, The Sankei Shimbun
TAHARA Soichiro, Journalist
TAJIMA Takashi, Guest Professor, Toyo Eiwa Women's University
TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, Rikkyo University
TAKAHASHI Kazuo, Professor, International Christian University
TAKASHIMA Hatsuhisa, Press
Secretary/Director-General
forPress and Publications, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
TAKUBO Tadae, Guest Professor, Kyorin University
TANAKA Akihiko, Professor, University of TokyoTANAKA Toshiro, Professor, Keio University
TANI Masahito,President, National Personnel Authority
TANINO Sakutaro, Former Ambassador to China
UEDA Takako, Professor, International Christian University
URATA Shujiro, Professor, Waseda University
WAKABAYASHI Masatake, Professor, University of Tokyo
YAMAZAWA Ippei, President, International University
YONEKURA Seiichiro, Professor, Hitotsubashi University
YOSHITOMI Masaru,President & Chief Research Officer, Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry[Members]
AKASHI Yasukazu, Foreign News Editor, Jiji Press【Political Leaders】(30Members)
AKASHI Yasushi, Chairman, The Japan Center for Conflict Prevention[Governors]
AOKI Tamotsu, Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
HATOYAMA Yukio, Member of the House of Representatives (DPJ)AMAKO Satoshi, Professor, Waseda University
TANIGAKI Sadakazu, M.H.R. (LDP)ASOMURAKuniaki,Executive Director, The Japan Center for Conflict Prevention
CHUMA Kiyofuku, Journalist[Members]
EBATA Kensuke, Defense Commentator
ABE Shinzo, Member of the House of Representatives (LDP)
FUKAGAWA Yukiko, Professor, University of TokyoAICHI Kazuo, M.H.R. (LDP)
GOMI Norio, Professor, Rikkyo Graduate School of Business
AIZAWA Ichiro, M.H.R. (LDP)
GYOHTEN Toyoo, President, Institute for International Monetary Affairs
HOSODA Hiroyuki, M.H.R. (LDP)
HAKAMADA Shigeki, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
IWAKUNI Tetsundo, M.H.R. (DPJ)
HAMADA Takujiro, Former Member of the House of Councillors
KISHIDA Fumio, M.H.R. (LDP)
HANAI Hitoshi, Professor, Reitaku University
KOIKE Yuriko, M.H.R. (DPJ)
HARUNA Mikio, Special Correspondent, Kyodo News
KOMIYAMA Yoko, M.H.R. (DPJ)
HASEGAWA Kazutoshi, President, Japan-Australia-New Zealand Society
MAEHARA Seiji, M.H.R. (DPJ)
HATA Kei, Vice Principal, Sakushin Gakuin
MASUHARA Yoshitake, M.H.R. (LDP)HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
NAKAGAWA Masaharu, M.H.R. (DPJ)ICHIKAWA Isao, Executive Advisor for Financial Affairs, Keio University
SHIOZAKI Yasuhisa, M.H.R. (LDP)
INA Hisayoshi, Columnist, The Nikkei Newspaper
SONODA Hiroyuki, M.H.R. (LDP)
INOGUCHI Takashi, Professor, University of Tokyo
TAKEMASA Koichi, M.H.R. (DPJ)IOKIBE Makoto, Professor, Kobe University
TANAHASHI Yasufumi, M.H.R. (LDP)ITO Eisei, Corporate Auditor, Toyota Auto Body Co., Ltd.
TSUCHIYA Shinako, M.H.R. (LDP)
IWAMA Yoko, Associate Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
UEDA Isamu, M.H.R. (NK)IZUMI Hajime, Professor, University of Shizuoka
ASAO Keiichiro, Member of the House of Councillors (DPJ)
JIMBO Ken, Assistant Professor, Keio University
ARAKI Kiyohiro, M.H.C. (NK)
KAKIZAWA Koji, former Minister of Foreign Affairs
HATA Yuichiro, M.H.C. (DPJ)
KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy
HAYASHI Yoshimasa, M.H.C. (LDP)
KANEKO Kumao, President, Japan Council for Economic Research
HIRONAKA Wakako, M.H.C. (DPJ)
KOHNO Masaru, Professor, Waseda University
KATOH Shuichi, M.H.C. (NK)
KOJIMA Atsushi, Corporate Officer, The Yomiuri Shimbun
SEKOU Hironari, M.H.C. (LDP)
KOJIMA Tomoyuki, Professor, Keio University
SUZUKI Kan, M.H.C.(DPJ)
KOKUBUN Ryosei, Professor, Keio University
TAKANO Hiroshi, M.H.C. (NK)
KONDO Tetsuo, President, Institute for New Era Strategy (INES)
TAKEMI Keizo, M.H.C. (LDP)KUBO Fumiaki, Professor, Keio University
YANASE Susumu, M.H.C. (DPJ)KUMON Shumpei, Senior Executive Director, GLOCOM, International University of Japan
KUSANO Atsushi, Professor, Keio University【Executive Secretary】
MANO Teruhiko, Professor under special assignment, Seigakuin University
WATANABE Mayu
MATSUMOTO Kenichi, Professor, Reitaku University
MIYAMOTO Nobuo, Diplomatic Commentator
MIYAZAKI Isamu, Honorary Advisor, Daiwa Institute of Research
MIYOSHI Masaya, Chairman, J-Wave, Inc.
[Note] DPJ: Democratic Party of Japan
MORIMOTO Satoshi, Professor, Takushoku University
LDP:Liberal Democratic Party
NK: New Komeito
MURATA Koji, Associate Professor, Doshisha University
NAKAGANE Katsuji, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
NAKAHARA Nobuyuki, Senior Advisor, Financial Services Agency
In Alphabetical Order80

(3)Acknowledgement

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is grateful to its“Business Leader” members listed below for theirgenerous contributions. Their support is making theactivities of the Forum financially sustainable.

[GFJ Governors] [5 share]
Toyota Motor Corporation
Kikkoman Corporation[GFJ Members] [1 share]
Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd.
Kajima Corporation
Nippon Steel Corporation
Tokyo Electric Power Co.
Asahi Glass Co. Ltd.
The Bank of Tokyo‐Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd.
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd
Biru Daiko Co., Ltd.
H.I.S. Co., Ltd.
Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha

(I th

81

d

f

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t)

5. Introduction to the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC)[Inauguration]

The concept of an “East Asian Community” has been spread quietly but steadily leading to the formation of a gigantic trend in
the East Asian region. “The Council on East Asian Community” (CEAC) was inaugurated in Japan on May 18, 2004, considerably
triggered by the launching in 2003 of “The Network of East Asian Think‐Tanks” in Beijing and of “The East Asia Forum” in Seoul in
2003. The establishment of CEAC was called for by 10 Think‐Tanks such as the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) andthe Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), and 30 scholars such as TANAKA Akihiko, Professor of the University of Tokyoand YOSHITOMI Masaru, President & Chief Research Officer of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry. CEAC
consists of representatives from wide‐ranging fields in Japan who are interested in the concept of an “East Asian Community”,
including those who represent businesses corporations such as Nippon Steel Corporation and Toyota Motor Corporation, andgovernment agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy, Trade andIndustry. Growing momentum for East Asian Community has finally come to take root in Japan whose attitude towards the issuetended to be passive until recently.

[Organization]
As an all‐Japan intellectual platform covering business, government, and academic leaders, CEAC aims at the strengthening ofintellectual collaboration, the building of intellectual foundation, and the sharing of strategic ideas among them. The membershipof CEAC consists of 12 think‐tank members, 64 individual members and 15 corporate members as of today. CEAC elected
NAKASONE Yasuhiro, former Prime Minister of Japan, as Chairman, and ITO Kenichi, President of JFIR, as President at its
Founding Meeting. The basic policy of the management of the Council is directed by the “Caucus” comprising its President andvice‐Presidents. The “Policy Plenary Meeting”, which is attended by the members of CEAC, conducts policy‐debate among its
members, and produce policy recommendations as occasions demand.

[Activities]
The activities of CEAC consist of the following four pillars: (1) the Policy Plenary Meeting, (2) the Task Force, (3) the e‐CEAC, and(4) the International Exchange. (1) The “Policy Plenary Meeting” is a forum where the members of CEAC are assembled topromote policy debate. “The State of the Concept of East Asian Community and Japan’s Strategic Response thereto” was the theme
for the first year’s discussions in the “Policy Plenary Meeting,” which produced a policy report at the end of the year. (2) The “Task
Force”, assisting the deliberations of the Policy Plenary Meeting drafted a policy report which was adopted by the Policy Plenary
Meeting for publication as a set of policy recommendations to be signed by those members of the CEAC who endorse it. (3) The“e‐CEAC” is an online network both in Japanese and in English for the purpose of publicity and enlightenment both inside andoutside Japan and is accessible at http://www.ceac.jp/. (4) The “International Exchange” is a series of programs including theholding in Tokyo of the “Japan‐China Dialogue” in September 2004、the “Japan‐Korea Policy Dialogue” in April 2005 and theJapan‐ASEAN Dialogue in June 2005. Also, the “International Exchange” programs include the dispatching of CEAC members tosuch meetings as “Network of East Asian Think‐Tanks” (NEAT) 2nd Annual Conference in Bangkok in August 2004, and the “EastAsia Forum” 2nd Annual Conference in Kuala Lumpur in December 2004. The 3rd NEAT Annual Conference was held in Tokyo in
August 2005.

CEAC 4 Activities

Research
Policy recommendations

1. Policy Plenary Meeting

4. International Exchange

3. e-CEAC

Official Process of
ASEAN+3
Government of Japan

2. Task ForceFeedback[CEAC Secretariat][Address] c/o The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR)
2‐17‐13‐1301 Akasaka, Minato‐ku, Tokyo 107‐0052[Tel]+81‐3‐3584‐2193[Fax] +81‐3‐3505‐4406[E‐mail] ceac@ceac.jp[URL] http://www.ceac.jp/

82

ASEAN+3
Summit Meetings
Foreign Ministers’ Meetings
Finance Ministers’ Meetings
Economic Ministers’ Meetingsetc.

As of April 19, 2006

Membership List of the Council on East Asian Community[Councilors]
INOUE Masayuki
KUSAKA Kazaumasa
SASAE Kenichiro
WATANABE Hiroshi
YABUNAKA Mitoji[Advisors]
ARAKI Hiroshi
CHO Fujio
HATA Tsutomu
IMAI Takashi
MAKIHARA Minoru
MIYAHARA Kenji
MIYAUCHI Yoshihiko
NARITA Yutaka
TATEISI Nobuo
UESHIMA Shigeji[Chairman】
NAKASONE Yasuhiro[Vice Chairmen]
HATTORI Yasuo
INOUE Akiyoshi
ITO Yoshiro
KAKIZAWA Koji
[President]
ITO Kenichi

As of June 1, 2006

HIRANUMA Takeo
HIRONAKA Wakako
HIRONO Ryokichi
HONMA Masayoshi
ICHIKAWA Isao
IGUCHI Yasushi
INOGUCHI Takashi
IOKIBE Makoto
ISHIGAKI Yasuji
ITO Takatoshi
KAKIZAWA Koji
KAWAI Masahiro
KAWATOU Akio
KIKUCHI Tetsuro
KIMURA Fukunari
KINOSHITA Toshihiko
KOJIMA Tomoyuki
MANO Teruhiko
MATAEBARA Yutaka
MATSUDA Iwao
MIYAGAWA Makio

Member of the House of Representatives
Member of the House of Councillors
Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
Professor, the University of Tokyo
Executive Adviser for Financial Affairs, Keio University
Professor, Kwansei Gakuin University
Professor, Chuo University
Professor, Kobe University
Councilor, The Japan Forum on International Relations
Professor, the University of Tokyo
Former Foreign Minister of Japan
Professor, the University of Tokyo
Chief Economist, Development Bank of Japan
Chief Editorial Writer, Mainichi Newspapers
Professor, Keio University
Professor, Waseda University
Professor, Keio University
Professor under special assignment, Seigakuin University
Editor-In Chief & Managing Editor, The Japan Times
Member of the House of Councillors
Acting Director, the Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs
MORIMOTO Satoshi
Professor, Takushoku University
NAGAOKA Noboru
Editorial Writer, Asahi Shimbun
NAKASONE Yasuhiro Former Prime Minister of Japan
NUKAGA Fukushiro
Member of the House of Representatives
OE Hiroshi
Professor, the University of Tokyo
OE Shinobu
Editorial Writer, The Yomiuri Shimbun
OKABE Naoaki
Editorial Page Editor, Nihon Keizai Shimbun
OKONOGI Masao
Professor, Keio University
Director of the Seiron Section, The Sankei Shimbun
SAITO Tsutomu
SAKAKIBARA Eisuke Professor, Keio University
SHIMADA Haruo
Professor, Keio University
SHINDO Eiichi
Professor Emeritus, Tsukuba University
SHIOYA Takafusa
Ex. President, Institute for Research Advancement
SHIOZAKI Yasuhisa
Member of the House of Representatives
SHIRAI Sayuri
Professor, Keio University
SHIRAISHI Takashi
Vice President, National Graduate Institute for
Policy Studies
SOEYA Yoshihide
Professor, Keio University
TAJIMA Takashi
Visiting Professor, Toyo Eiwa University
TAKAHARA Akio
Professor, the University of Tokyo
TAKUBO Tadae
Visiting Professor, Kyorin University
TAMURA Jiro
Professor, Keio University
TANAKA Akihiko
Professor, the University of TokyoTANAKA Hitoshi
Senior Fellow, Japan Center For International
Exchange
TANAKA Toshiro
Professor, Keio University
TANIGUCHI Makoto
President, Iwate Prefectural University
TOMIYAMA Yasushi
Editorial Writer Jiji Press
URATA Shujiro
Professor, Waseda University
WATANABE Toshio
President, Takushoku University
YAMAKAGE Susumu
Professor, the University of Tokyo
YAMASHITA Eiji
Professor, Osaka City University
YAMAZAWA Ippei
President, International University of JapanYANAGIMOTO Takuji Member of the House of Representatives
YOSHIDA Haruki
President, The Yoshida Labo for Economics
and Industry, Inc.
YOSHITOMI Masaru
President & Chief Research Officer, ResearchInstitute of Economy, Trade & Industry[Corporate Members] (15 Members)
ARAKI Hiroshi
Advisor, Tokyo Electric Power Co., Ltd.
CHO Fujio
Vice Chairman, Toyota Motor Corp.
HATTORI Yasuo
Vice Chairman, Seiko Epson Corp.
IMAI Takashi
Honorary Chairman, Nippon Steel Corp.
INOUE Akiyoshi
President, Sanyu Appraisal Corp.
ITO Yoshiro
President, Itogumi Co., Ltd.
KASHIMA Ikusaburo
Director, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.
Ltd.

Director-General for International Affairs,
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology
Vice-Minister for International Affairs,
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
Director-General, Asian-Oceanian Affairs
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vice-Minister of Finance for International Affairs
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan
Adviser, Tokyo Electric Power Co., Ltd.
Vice Chairman, Toyota Motor Corp.
Member of the House of Representatives
Honorary Chairman, Nippon Steel Corp.
Senior Corporate Advisor, Mitsubishi Corp.
President & Chief Executive Officer, Sumitomo Corp.
Chairman & CEO, Orix Corp.
Principal Advisor, Dentsu Inc.
Executive Advisor, Omron Corp.
Advisor, Mitsui & Co., Ltd.
Former Prime Minister of Japan
Vice Chairman, Seiko Epson Corp.
President, Sanyu Appraisal Corp.
President, Itogumi Co., Ltd.
Former Foreign Minister of Japan
President and CEO, The Japan Forum on
International Relations, Inc.

[Vice-Presidents]
President, Institute for International Monetary Affairs
GYOHTEN Toyoo
HATAKEYAMA Noboru Chairman and CEO, Japan Economic Foundation
ISHIGAKI YasujiCouncilor, The Japan Forum on International
Relations
ITO Motoshige
President, Institute for Research Advancement
KURODA Makoto
President, Center for Information on Security
Trade Control
MIZOGUCHI Zembei
President, Japan Center for International Finance
NAITOH Masahisa
Chairman & CEO, the Institute of Energy
Economics, Japan
OKAWARA Yoshio
President, Institute for International Policy Studies
SATOH Yukio
President, the Japan Institute of International Affairs
TAKAGI Yuki
Governor, Agriculture, Forestry and fisheries
finance Corporation
TANAKA Akihiko
Professor, the University of Tokyo
President, Research Institute for Peace and Security
WATANABE Akio
YAMAMOTO Tadashi
President, the Japan Center for International
Exchange
YOSHIDA Haruki
President, The Yoshida Labo for Economics
and Industry, Inc.
YOSHITOMI Masaru
President & Chief Research Officer, ResearchInstitute of Economy, Trade & Industry[Auditors]
ICHIKAWA Isao
Executive Adviser for Financial Affairs, Keio University
NAKAMURA Kimikazu President, Sankyu Inc.
[Think-tank Members] (13 Members)
President, Institute for International Monetary Affairs
GYOHTEN Toyoo
HATAKEYAMA Noboru Chairman and CEO, Japan Economic
Foundation
ITO Kenichi
President and CEO, The Japan Forum on
International Relations, Inc.
ITO Motoshige
President, National Institute for Research
Advancement
KURODA Makoto
President, Center for Information on Security
Trade Control
MIZOGUCHI Zembei
President, Japan Center for International Finance
NAITOH Masahisa
Chairman & CEO, the Institute of Energy
Economics, Japan
OKAWARA Yoshio
President, Institute for International Policy Studies
President, the Japan Institute of International Affairs
SATOH Yukio
TAKAGI Yuki
Governor, Agriculture, Forestry and fisheries
finance Corporation
WATANABE Akio
President, Research Institute for Peace and Security
YAMAMOTO Tadashi
President, Japan Center for International Exchange
YOSHIDA Susumu
Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Economic
Research Institute for Northeast Asia
[Individual Members] (66 Members)
AMAKO Satoshi
Professor, Waseda University
Professor, Organization for Asian Studies, Waseda University
AOKI Tamotsu
FUKAGAWA Yukiko
Professor, Waseda University
FUKUSHIMA Akiko
Director of Policy Studies and Senior Fellow,
National Institute for Research Advancement
FUNADA Hajime
Member of the House of Representatives
FURUKAWA Motohisa Member of the House of Representatives
GOMI, Norio
Professor, Rikkyo University
HAKAMADA Shigeki
Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
HARUNA Mikio
Special Correspondent, Kyodo News
HATA Tsutomu
Member of the House of Representatives
HAYASHI Yoshimasa
Member of the House of Councillors

MAKIHARA Minoru
MIYAHARA Kenji
MIYAMOTO Keishi
MIYAUCHI Yoshihiko

Senior Corporate Advisor, Mitsubishi Corp.
President & Chief Executive Officer, Sumitomo Corp.
Representative, Arigatou Foundation
Chairman & CEO, Orix Corp.

NAKAMURA Kimikazu President, Sankyu Inc.
NARITA Yutaka
Principal Advisor, Dentsu Inc.
TATEISI Nobuo
Executive Advisor, Omron Corp.
UESHIMA Shigeji
Advisor, Mitsui & Co., Ltd.
[Planning Committee]
Chairman KAKIZAWA Koji Individual Member, CEAC
Member ISHIGAKI Yasuji Individual Member, CEAC
Member YOSHIDA Haruki Individual Member, CEAC
[Executive Secretary]
FUKUDA Toshio
In Alphabetical Order83Acknowledgement

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC) is grateful to its “Corporate
Members” listed below for their generous contributions. Their support is making
the activities of the Council financially sustainable.

[Corporate Members]
Arigatou Foundation
Dentsu Inc.
Itogumi Co., Ltd.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
Mitsubishi Corporation
Mitsui & Co., Ltd.
Nippon Steel Corporation
OMRON Corporation
ORIX Corporation
Sankyu Inc.
Sanyu Appraisal Corporation
Seiko Epson Corporation
Sumitomo Corporation84

6. Introduction of the Pacific Forum CSIS
Based in Honolulu, Hawaii, the Pacific Forum CSIS operates as the autonomous Asia‐Pacific arm of the Center
for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. founded in 1975, the thrust of the Forumʹs work is tohelp develop cooperative policies in the Asia‐Pacific region through debate and analyses undertaken with theregionʹs leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. The Forumʹs programs encompass current
and emerging issues in political, security, economic/business, and oceans policy issues. It collaborates with a
network of more than 30 research institutes around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives anddisseminating its projectsʹ findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and publics
throughout the region.
An international Board of Governors guides the Pacific Forumʹs work; it is chaired by Brent Scowcroft, former
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Forum is funded by grants from foundations,
corporations, individuals, and governments, the latter providing a small percentage of the forumʹs $1.2 million
annual budget. The forumʹs studies are objective and nonpartisan and it does not engage in classified or
proprietary work.
The Pacific Forum staff is dedicated to playing an active role in fostering understanding of the Asia‐Pacificregion in Hawaii, as well as in the broader international community. To this end, the Forum’s senior staff has
participated in public speaking engagements for many community organizations and is regularly involved inmedia interviews and discussions both in the U.S. and abroad. In addition, the Pacific Forum enjoys
collaborating with the Japan‐America Society of Hawaii, the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council, the East‐WestCenter, and the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, as well as with local educational institutions such as the
University of Hawaii, Hawaii Pacific University, and Brigham Young Hawaii.
The Pacific Forum has various programs and projects such as Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific (CSCAP). CSCAP was founded in 1993 by Pacific Forum and nine other institutes as the first region‐wide
forum to foster multilateral security dialogue. Other founding institutes are based in Australia, Canada,
Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Additional member
committees include Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, Papua New Guinea,
Russia, Vietnam, and the European Union. Taiwan scholars also participate, increasing CSCAP’s inclusivity.
CSCAP members seek to enhance regional security and stability through dialogue, consultations, andcooperation on concrete policy issues and problems of mutual concern. CSCAP’s research and analyses support
and complement the efforts of regional governments and official multilateral dialogue mechanisms.
In addition to the weekly PacNet and the quarterly Comparative Connections journal, the Pacific Forum also
publishes the Issues & Insights series, which consists of in‐depth analyses authored by Pacific Forum staff, seniorassociates, and outside scholars, including participants at various Pacific Forum conferences and workshops.
These are available free of charge from the Forum as well as on‐line. The Forum also publishes its research in the
CSIS Significant Issues Series and in The Washington Quarterly, New Asia, and other journals both in the U.S. andabroad. Pacific Forum’s experts regularly contribute commentary and editorials to major regional publications
such as the International Herald Tribune, The Japan Times, The Korea Times, The South China Morning Post, and The
Asia Times OnLine, among others.

85

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
2‐17‐12‐1301, Akasaka, Minato‐ku,
Tokyo, 107‐0052, Japan
TEL: +81‐3‐3584‐2193 / FAX: +81‐3‐3505‐4406
URL: http://www.gfj.jp / E‐mail: info@gfj.jp

The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC)
2‐17‐12‐1301, Akasaka, Minato‐ku,
Tokyo, 107‐0052, Japan
TEL: +81‐3‐3584‐2193 / FAX: +81‐3‐3505‐4406
URL: http://www.ceac.jp / Email: info@ceac.jp

The Pacific Forum CSIS
1001 Bishop St. Pauashi Tower, Suite 1150
Honolulu HI 96813
TEL: 808/521‐6745 FAX: 808/599‐8690
Email: pacforum@hawaii.rr.com