Space Situational Awareness

EUROPE’S WAY TO
SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS(SSA)

Report 10, January 2008
Wolfgang Rathgeber, ESPI

European Space Policy Institute1

Report 10, January 2008

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Report 10, January 20082

Space Situational Awareness

Table of Contents
Executive Summary...............................................................................................41

Introduction...................................................................................................62

Definition of Terms and Scope .......................................................................73

2.1Space Situational Awareness and Space Surveillance .................................... 7

2.2

Dual and multiple use............................................................................... 7

Key Aspects of a European SSA System .........................................................8
3.1

Data Policy ............................................................................................. 8

3.2

Business Model and Operational Questions ................................................ 15

4

Link to future Space Traffic Management.....................................................19

5

The Role of ESA............................................................................................20

6

The Way Forward .........................................................................................21

Annex ..................................................................................................................23
Current European Facilities ................................................................................ 23
Acronyms ........................................................................................................ 24
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................26

List of Figures and Tables
Number

Title

Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3
Figure 4
Figure 5
Figure 6

CFE Data Flow
TerraSAR-X Data Flow
ORFEO Configuration
Potential European SSA System Data Flow
Current Transatlantic Data Sharing
Potential Future Transatlantic Data Sharing

Table 1
Table 2
Table 3

Definitions of SSA and Space SurveillancePros and Cons of different Operators
Current European Facilities capable of Space Surveillance

European Space Policy Institute3

Report 10, January 2008

Executive Summary
the mechanisms to control and enforce
compliance with these rules and procedures.
Numerous data policies exist for different
sensor systems. They have to be accounted
for when setting up an umbrella data policy
for a system of systems.

This report deals with important implicationsof setting up a European system for Space
Situational Awareness (SSA). It aims at
contributing to the successful implementationof such a system by discussing issues of data
policy and operational questions. Thus, theintent is to foster debate within and beyond
the community. The addressees of the report
are ESA, which is currently taking the lead in
SSA matters, its Member States, the EU, andpolicy makers, who have already discussed
the topic on platforms like the European
Inter-parliamentarySpace
Conference(EISC), as well as the general public.

Data flow is an important element of data
policy. This analysis looks at various
implemented examples: The US CFE Support
Pilot
Programme,which
iscurrently
distributing space surveillance data; theGerman TerraSAR-X programme, which is
being realized in a PPP as the first of its kind;and the French/Italian ORFEO system, which
is a genuine multiple use programme.
Legal aspects are another building block of
the data policy. National law will play animportant role when distributing SSA data.
This is especially true in the context ofFreedom of Information Acts (FOIA) thatgovern the use of public data. The recently
adopted German law on satellite data security
constitutes a piece of legislation to ensure
national security, while preserving business
opportunities for private stakeholders selling
satellite-based
imagery.
Europeanandinternational conventions on information
handling exist as well.

Background
According to the definition of a potential SSA
user group gathered by ESA, Space
Situational
Awarenessconsistsofunderstanding and maintaining awareness of
the Earth’s orbital population, the spaceenvironment, and possible threats. Space
Surveillance is considered the first stage of
SSA.
Europe has come to depend heavily on spacetechnology and its applications. Against thisbackdrop, SSA capability is increasingly being
recognized as a key requirement. Currently,
Europe relies heavily on SSA data from the
US. However, European efforts to establish a
SSA system are underway, being led by ESA.
The system is to be set up for multiple use,
implying that it has been developed to serve
different user communities (e.g. civilian andmilitary) right from the beginning.

Implementation Issues
Regarding the business model of a future
European SSA system, a decision has to betaken on how commercial the system shouldbe, i.e., to what degree profit orientation
should be allowed or even targeted. If profit
orientation is wanted, sufficient business
opportunities for commercial stakeholders
have to be ensured. It will be crucial for theEuropean SSA system to offer products andservices with added value compared to SSA
data that is freely available from othersources.

Several open issues have to be settled as acondition for the successful implementation,
proper functioning, and efficient operation ofa European SSA system. Most of thequestions that arise are interdependent and abalance needs to be found for two or morepotentially contradicting requirements andconcepts. Critical aspects include, among
other things, data policy, the business model,
and operational questions.

Operational and institutional aspects include
the question of who will be in charge ofsystem operation, maintenance and updates,
who controls the overall system performancetechnically and financially, as well as whooverseescompliance
with
rules
and
procedures. Existing or newly created entities
could be charged with these tasks. Different
hardware and system architecture options
have been suggested in various studies. A
strongly centralized approach will facilitate

Data Policy
The data policy sets out the rules andprocedures for handling and distributing
information collected by sensors (raw data)
and manipulated or refined in subsequentsystem stages (processed data) as well as

Report 10, January 2008

4

Space Situational Awarenesscharged with implementation and initial
operation of a European SSA centre. Systemprocurement is another possible task. In any
case, ESA’s vast knowledge in the SSA
domain, incorporated, for example, in its
Space Debris Office, needs to be integrated
into the planned European system.

global SSA data sharing between regional
SSA systems in the long run.

Perspectives
There is a link between a European SSA
system and the global Space Traffic
Management (STM) regime that is to be set
up. SSA information is needed to check andenforce compliance with the rules andprocedures of such an STM regime. This
stresses the need for cooperation among thevarious regional SSA systems, because STM
is inherently global. Since STM also deals
with access to space and return from space,
air traffic must be accounted for in a SSA
system as well.

As a synthesis, this report gives some
general observations and suggestions forfurther action with a view to contributing to
the swift settlement of open questions as wellas to an efficient implementation andoperation of a future European SSA system.
The observations made relate to public
outreach, political support, the system’s
added value, the structure of motivation,international cooperation issues, a common
basis of understanding, the multiple use
nature, the initial design approach, aprecursor solution and support for an STM
regime.

The role of ESA in a future European SSA
system may take on various forms. Beingheavily involved and currently taking the leadin the associated efforts, ESA could be

European Space Policy Institute5

Report 10, January 2008

1. Introduction
Modern societies have become increasingly
dependent on space technology and its
applications. The European Space Policy1 of2007 acknowledges that space is a strategic
tool for independence, prosperity, industrial
development, technological and scientificprogress. These benefits, however, imply ahigh vulnerability. To protect space assets
and to ensure their smooth operation, it isimportant to establish a state of space
situational awareness (SSA). This, in short,refers to knowing the location and function of
relevant space objects and to realizing
different kinds of space-related threats likespace debris. SSA also allows the monitoringof compliance with international treaties andmitigation measures.

Against this backdrop, ESPI has conducted a
project on implications of a future European
SSA system. This report, based on desktop
studies and interviews, is the result of the
project. It aims at exploring different existing
strategies and schools of thought with regard
to selected topics crucial to implementation.
Special attention is being given to the issueof data policy and associated questions.
Within the framework of the project, ESPI
also held an expert meeting in Vienna on 6
September 2007 to discuss data policy,
institutional issues, and political boundary
conditions of a European SSA system5.
Elements of the presentations and thediscussions of the meeting have been used
for this report as well.

Currently, Europe does not have anautonomous capability for SSA. Some sensors
for Space Surveillance exist at the national
level, but they just provide part of thenecessary information. For the time being, abigger SSA system can only be sketched withdata t provided from abroad, mainly from theUnited States. However, efforts to set up aEuropean SSA system are underway. The
European Space Agency (ESA) has been
conducting an associated preparatory action.
A major decision upon whether and how toembark on a full SSA programme is expected
to be taken at the ESA Ministerial Council
Meeting in 2008.
These endeavours are politically backed by
the fact that the European Space Policy2
explicitly states that Europe should protect its
space-based capabilities against disruption,and by the fact that the establishment of an
independent SSA system is considered a key
requirementbyimportantpolitical
stakeholders3. In addition, various advisory
bodies have asserted the need for a European
SSA capability such as in the report by the“panel of experts in space and security”(SPASEC)
gatheredbytheEuropeanCommission4.

1

Resolution on European Space Policy, Space Council on
22 May 2007; ESA/C-M (2007) 1; Communication of theCommission to the Council and the European Parliament:
European Space Policy, 26 April 2007; COM (2007) 212
and ESA/C-M (2007) 2.
2
Ibid.
3
Conclusions of the Workshop on Space Security and theRole of the EU, Berlin, June 2007.
4
SPASEC Report, March 2005,
ec.europa.eu/comm/space/doc_pdf/article_2262.pdf.

Report 10, January 2008

5

Presentations were given by Luca del Monte (ESA),Lesley Jane Smith (University of Bremen), Ludger
Leushacke (FGAN), Laurence Nardon (IFRI) and Tomaz
Lovrencic (EUSC).

6

Space Situational Awareness2. Definition of Terms and Scope2.1. Space Situational
Awareness and Space
SurveillanceWithin the framework of this study, Space
Situational Awareness (SSA) is understood toconsist of understanding and maintaining
awareness of the Earth orbital population, thespace environment, and possible threats. Thisdefinition was prepared by a group of
potential SSA users gathered by ESA in thecourse of various sessions.

Understanding andmaintaining awarenessof the Earth orbital
population, the spaceenvironment, andpossible threats

Space Surveillance

Routine operational
service of timely
detection, correlation,
characterization, andorbit determination of
space objects

Table 1: Definitions of Space Situational Awareness andSpace Surveillance

In this context, Earth orbital population refers
to detection and /or tracking of man-madeobjects,
theidentification(andcharacterization) of detected objects and of
spacecraft manoeuvres, as well as thedetermination of orbit state, covarianceinformation,
spacecraft
attitude,
andantenna/instrument pointing.

The Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
initiative pursued by ESA is not meant toduplicateorcompetewithexisting
intelligence systems. In particular, thesystem is not planned to feature Ballistic
Missile Defence (BMD) or early-warning
capabilities. The new facilities planned areintended to complement current ones,
forming a system of systems, and to fillexisting gaps in data availability, thus
resulting in better coverage for users in
Europe and the rest of the world.

Space environment refers to detection and/or
the tracking of natural objects; detecting andunderstanding
interferences;man-made,induced environments; forecasting space
weather and its effects as well as predicting
the natural particulate environment and its
effects (meteoroids).

2.2. Dual and multiple use
An important distinction to be made is theone between dual and multiple use devices orsystems. In the further course of this study,
the following terminology will be used:

The possible threat refers to predicting andassessing the risk to humans and property on
ground and in air space due to uncontrolled
re-entries, detecting and assessing adversary
use or preparations for adversary use of or
upon space systems, detecting on-orbit
explosions and release events, predicting
and/or detecting on-orbit collisions, as well as
permanent or temporary disruption of
mission and/or service capabilities.

Dual use implies that the device or thesystem has been specifically designed for one
actor (e.g. the military) and then has beenused by other communities as well,regardless whether this was intended by theoriginally targeted user or not.

A first stage of Space Situational Awarenessis
Space
Surveillance,
understoodtocomprise the routine operational service oftimelydetection,correlation,
characterization, and orbit determination of
space objects. In this sense, SSA, comparedto Space Surveillance, covers additional andmore detailed aspects, and allows forplanning over an extended time. Table 1 lists
the definitions for the sake of clarity.

European Space Policy Institute

Space
Situational
Awareness (SSA)

Multiple use, on the other hand, implies thatthe system has been developed to serve
different
communities
right
from
the
beginning. As will be shown, this is how the
future European SSA system should be set
up. It should be noted that multiple use does
not have to be more expensive orcomplicated, since it may be considered the
optimum utilization of existing assets.

7

Report 10, January 2008

3. Key Aspects of aEuropean SSA Systemallowing for commercial exploitation. It is
worth adding that up to now, many data
policies have not been codified, but are basedon gentlemen’s agreements. Nevertheless,they exist for each sensor and they have tobe accounted for when setting up an umbrelladata policy for a system of sensors, since
they will not be changed according to thewishes of the system operator. In order todesign a data policy for the future European
SSA system, it is instructive to look at dataflowsincurrent
dual/multipleuseapplications. One obvious example is the US
Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE)
Support
Pilot
Programme,
since
this
programmecurrently
distributes
Space
Surveillance data. Other examples are theGerman TerraSAR-X programme and theFrench/Italian ORFEO system, both belonging
to the area of Earth Observation.

In the following, selected aspects crucial tothesuccessful
implementation,
properfunctioning, and efficient operation of aEuropean SSA System will be discussed. As
will be seen, most of the questions that arise
require the balancing of two or even morepotentially contradicting requirements andconcepts. This report does not aim at
specifying the correct amount of trade-off.
Rather, it will highlight the rationale of theunderlying competing ideas. The issues atstake include among others:•

A data policy answering the question of
who accesses what data, when and underwhich conditions, thus achieving a balanceof the need for sufficient information flows
with the necessity of respecting security
and privacy needs.

•

A business model representing attractive
revenue opportunities for private entities
at different system levels, establishing a
trade-off between a purely private and an
exclusively public set up in balancing
commercial interests with state or supranational control.

•

CFE Support Pilot Programme
The Commercial and Foreign Entity (CFE)
Support Pilot Programme is a mechanism toprovide US non-public or non-US space
operators with space surveillance support
through a web-based portal6. The available
data are an unclassified subset of theobservations and analyses made by the US
Space Surveillance Network (SSN). This
network is run by the US Air Force SpaceCommand (AFSPC) at the Cheyenne Mountain
Air Force Base, Colorado. However, it willsoon be transferred to the US Strategic
Command’s Joint Functional Component
Command for Space at Vandenberg Air Force
Base, California.

Operationalquestionsregardingthestructural and procedural set up of aEuropean SSA system as well as theinstitutionalframework,balancingacentralized approach with a distributed
configuration and civilian utilization withmilitary requirements.

3.1. Data Policy
One critical prerequisite for efficient SSA
system operation is a suitable data policy,
which in the context of this study isunderstood to comprise the rules andprocedures for handling and distributing
information collected by sensors (raw data)
and manipulated or refined in subsequentsystem stages (processed data) as well as
the mechanisms to control and enforce
compliance with these rules and procedures.
Data policy is the answer to the question of
who accesses what data, when and underwhich conditions. Its task is to ensuresufficient information flows, while respecting
the need for partial confidentiality and

SSN consists of more than 20 military andcivilian sensors, both radar and optical,
ground-based (worldwide) and space-based.
The observations and measurements of the
network are used to calculate future
trajectories of the located objects. The
sensors are either dedicated, collateral or of
the contributing type. The primary mission of
dedicated sensors is Space Surveillance. They
can be operated by entities outside the
AFSPC or even outside the US. Collateral
sensors belong to the AFSPC, but have a
primary
mission
other
than
space
6

Report 10, January 20088www.space-track.org

Space Situational Awarenesssurveillance. Contributing sensors either
report to another USAF Major Command or
are under contract to AFSPC to provide spacesurveillance information7.

to fill the “US Strategic Command Form 1”. In
the process, they have to detail to whomthey transfer the data and why they want todo so. Users have to specify the further
utilization of the data and the number oftimes they want to share the data. They mustalso state the means of redistribution(written, oral, electronic, etc). Figure 1 shows
the data flow of the CFE Support Pilot
Programme.

The information on the CFE website aresatellite orbital data in the form of two line
elements, satellite catalogue messages,
projecttipmessages,satellite
decay
messages, predicted decay forecasts, satellite
box scores and satellite reports, updated atirregular intervals. The same information has
been provided by the NASA Orbital
Information Group (OIG) for many years.
Both real-time and historical data can berequestedandacquired[www.spacetrack.org]. The basic services are for free,
but advanced services like launch support,
conjunction assessment, end-of-life/re-entry
support or anomaly resolution are provided
for a fee (the amount has apparently not yet
been determined).

TerraSAR-X
TerraSAR-X is a German Radar remotesensing satellite for Earth Observation. It has
been implemented under a public-privatepartnership (PPP) between the German
Aerospace Centre (DLR) and EADS Astrium
GmbH as the first of its kind. The total costs
for building and constructing the satellite
amount to 130 million Euros. Roughly 100
million Euros come from DLR and theremaining 30 million Euros from EADS. The
setting up of the ground segment and thesatellite operation over the projected lifespanof five years will cost another 55 million
Euros. 45 million Euros of this sum arecovered by DLR and 10 million Euros by
Infoterra, a 100% subsidiary of EADS
Astrium, which is in charge of commerciallymarketing the data. The fact that industry isinvesting in this field shows that Earth
Observation data are of growing interest to
the private market. Maybe this will result in a
briskercommercialization
of
Earth

To gain access, CFE users have to register
online. By doing so, they agree “not totransfer any data”, including “the analysis oftracking data … to any third party without theprior express approval of the U.S. Secretaryof Defense or his delegatee”8. Users mustalso acknowledge that the requested data
might not be available, accurate or
exhaustive. In addition, they agree to use thedata at their own risk and expense, and not
to hold the US government liable forconsequential damages of any kind. To
redistribute data, registered CFE users have

SSN

part ofthe data

CFE

for free/for feeregistered users
if authorized
by DoDdata flow

other users
Figure 1: CFE Data Flow
7
8www.cdi.org/news/SSA/Jefferson.htm
www.space-track.org

European Space Policy Institute9

Report 10, January 2008

TerraSAR-X
Satellite

DLR G/S

Infoterra(EADS)
licensedata flow

Scientific
Community
X no resale

direct accesscustomers

regularcustomers
Figure 2: TerraSAR-X Data Flowcommercial utilization rights. It develops geoinformation products and markets the data.
Delivery of the data is through Infoterra or
via direct satellite access (upon purchase of alicense) for customers that have their own
reception
facilities
andprocessing
capabilities. It is worthwhile noting that datasubsets can be kept out of the distribution
process according to the provisions of theGerman law on satellite data security (which
will be discussed later on), and thatcommercial and scientific users are given
equal shares of the satellite’s observation
time. Figure 2 shows the data flow for the
TerraSAR-X programme.

Observation, similar to the development in
the telecommunications sector.
TerraSAR features a Synthetic Aperture
Radar (SAR), allowing high resolution
mapping around the clock, regardless of theweather conditions or sun illu
mination. It weighs around 1.200 kg andfollows an almost polar orbit of 514 km
altitude along the day-night boundary of the
Earth. Operating in the X-Band, it can switch
between Spotlight, Stripmap and ScanSAR
mode. Experimentally, it can also use theDual Receive Antenna (DRA) mode whichenables Along Track Interferometry. It isplanned to complement TerraSAR by another
Radar satellite called TanDEM-X, also to be
procured by means of a PPP. Flying inparallel, the two satellites will be able to workin an interferometric mode, generating a
digital terrain model of the complete surfaceof the Earth within two and a half years.

ORFEO
The Franco-Italian ORFEO (Optical and Radar
Federated Earth Observation) System is a
projectfor
optical
and
Radar
Earth
Observation specifically set up to serve theneeds of both civilian and military users. It isthus a multiple use system according to thedefinition above. The optical component
consists of the French PLEIADES satellite
developed by CNES, which is also the owner.
The radar component consists of the Italian
COSMO-Skymedsatellites
that
were
developed by ASI and are owned by ASI andthe Italian Ministry of Defence.

The TerraSAR PPP-Agreement between DLR
and EADS defines, among other things, theprogramme’s data policy. DLR is tasked withcommanding, operating, calibrating andreceiving data. Representing the state, DLR isthe owner of the TerraSAR-X data. It is incharge of processing and archiving the data
as well as distributing it to the scientificcommunity (both inside and outside DLR) via
an order interface. EADS/Infoterra, in
exchange for contributing to the development
costs of the satellite, gains the exclusive

Report 10, January 2008

The configuration of ORFEO was set up in anagreement between France and Italy signed

10Space Situational Awarenessother
sensors

COSMO-Skymed
Satellites

PLEIADES
Satellites

othersensors

ORFEO

ItalianCivilianUsers

FrenchCivilian
Users

ItalianMilitary
Users

FrenchMilitary
Usersdata flow
Figure 3: ORFEO Configurationin 20019. A cooperation scheme for Earth
Observation with optical and radar sensors
was implemented, also granting Italy accessto the French Helios 2 and SPOT 5 satellite
imagery. The first two COSMO-Skymedsatellites have already been launched,
whereas there has been a delay for the
PLEIADES. It is not yet clear how this delay
will affect the implementation of theagreement.

features interoperability, expandability, andmulti-mission/sensor capability. It is one of
the few Earth Observation systems of thatkind that are actually being implemented.
The two PLEIADES satellites are expected tooperate for five years as well. They weigharound 1.000 kg each and follow a circular
orbit
of
695
km
altitude.
Featuringstereoscopic
acquisition
capacity,
theirresolution is 0.7 m for the panchromatic bandand 2.8 m for the multi-spectral band. The
swath width is 20 km at nadir11.

The four COSMO-Skymed satellites, designed
for a lifespan of five years weigh around1.700 kg each and follow a sun synchronous
orbit of 620 km altitude. They are equippedwith X-Band SAR for ScanSAR, Stripmap andSpotlight operation. The latter is able toachieve submetric resolution, although thecorresponding data will be reserved for
defence use. A special orbital configuration
will also enable interferometry10. The
COSMO-Skymedsystemis
instructive,
because it has been designed to work in a
multiple use mode from the outset, andNeither COSMO-Skymed nor PLEIADES are to
be used exclusively for ORFEO. Thus far, ASI
hassignedanagreementwiththeArgentinean Space Agency on the joint
operation of COSMO-Skymed with future
Argentinean satellites. Likewise, CNES hassigned cooperation agreements regarding theuse of PLEIADES with Austria, Belgium, Spain(which will develop its own reception andprocessing means and will also have accessto high-priority programming), and Sweden(which will support data reception and TT&C).
Figure 3 shows a schematic, conceptual set
up of the ORFEO system with its externalinterfaces and its complex internal structure
shown as a black box.

9

Act of 10 January 2004, No. 20 on the Ratification andExecution of the Agreement between the Government of
the Italian Republic and the Government of the French
Republic regarding cooperation in the field of earth
observation, done in Turin on 29 January 2001, Gazzetta
Ufficiale (Official Gazette) 31 January 2004, # 25.
10
directory.eoportal.org

European Space Policy Institute11

11

earth.esa.int, smsc.cnes.fr/PLEIADES

Report 10, January 2008

the exception of
defence ministries).

However, these cooperation ventures are
subject to the constraints of the FrancoItalian agreement, which includes provisions
and guidelines for data handling, defining thegeneral principles valid throughout all
cooperation phases. Specific details like theuse of data are deferred to subsequent
negotiations and agreements. In broader
terms, the existing agreement ensures thesystem to safeguard defence interests likesecurity and mission request priority as wellas to meet civil or commercial user
requirements in terms of overall operational
capacity, rapid data access, availability,
image quality and service competitiveness.
Various user categories are discerned: public,
institutional,
privateandcommercial.
Accounting for users of the two contractual
parties’defenceministries,
different
obligations are listed, including the following
ones:•

Mission requests from the defence
ministries must be satisfied as a matter ofpriority.

•

Upon definition of “very urgent cases”, thesystem
must
allow
for
missionreprogramming and data processing
within the shortest possible time, putting
the specific request before any other,including
those
from
the
defenceministries.

•

Knowledge
about
missionrequests,planning and products of each defence
ministries must be restricted to thespecific defence ministry.

•

Compliance of the civil plan with thecommon security rules is controlled bygovernment security bodies.

•

The corresponding measures will be
carried out by a civil or military
coordinating body yet to be set up.

•

Secured connections between different
system components will be put into place.
Defence-related data will be encoded.

•

Defence ministry users will have freeaccess to raw data from civil archives,
according to the ORFEO data policy
agreement.

•

Defence-related
products
couldbetransferred to civil users after having been
degraded and declassified.

•

•

from

the

The parties will have access to the mission
requests of other system users.

Potential Data Flow of a Future European
SSA System
Following the considerations of existing Space
Surveillance and Earth Observation data flow
models, one could devise a data flow model
for a future European SSA system. A basic
sketch is given in Figure 4. Again, the boxes
are to be understood in a general way,encompassing the systems themselves – aspreviously stated, European SSA will be asystemofsystems.
Twobasicbranches/levels should be distinguished: The
national and the European one. In thiscontext, military entities are presumed tostay under national control for the time
being. At this point, the question of whoorchestrates, controls and supervises thecomplete system is not considered. It will be
addressed in the section on operationalquestions.
The sensor stage in Figure 4 is understood tocomprise reception facilities where necessary(e.g. for space-based sensors). National
sensors like the French GRAVES or theGerman TIRA already exist. European sensors(like the telescope of the European Space
Agency ESA on Mt. Teide), however, would
have to be augmented in the framework of afuture SSA system. The model foresees(selective) data exchange both in raw and inprocessed format. A crucial role will be playedby system interoperability, requiring, among
other things, standardized interfaces. The
decision on which data is to be released forexchange(alternately,
which
data
is
retained) is taken by the sensor operator,
followingcommon
rules
laid
down
beforehand.
The handling/processing stage involves all
institutions
concerned
withprocessing,calibration, refinement, archiving, etc. A
variety of actors like military bodies,agencies, public institutions or even privatecompanies are involved. Beyond this stage,
data format / product standardization is moredifficult to achieve than at the raw data
stage.
As before, the decision on which processed
data/products are to be fed into the common
system is taken by the producing entity inaccordance to the general system operation
rules agreed upon.

The parties will have the right ofveto/shutter control on mission requests
and on the release of archive data (with

Report 10, January 2008

requests

12

Space Situational Awarenesssensors

National

Interface

Europeanraw data

handling/
processing/archiving

EuropeanInterface

National

processed data

publicusers

Military/
Security

ESA

Agencies

EU

other

other

Science
X no resalecommercial/private users

Customers/Resellers

National

data flow

Europeanselection/degradation/declassification

Figure 4: Potential European SSA System Data Flow

European Space Policy Institute

13

Report 10, January 2008

Finally, the data/products are passed on to
the users, which will often be the sameorganizations that have been involved so far.
In addition to fulfilling their own needs, they
pass on part or all of their data to the systemfor common use. A special case is constitutedby the military that might not block data
completely, but degrade or declassify it
instead. In the suggested scenario, data
passes the public user stage before beingtransferred to (semi)commercial or private
users. This accounts for the fact that public
users will be the most important sensor
contributors, which should be rewarded bypriority use. If conditions change, this pattern
can be adapted accordingly.

many of its features will be displayed within aEuropean SSA system as well.
One of the similarities is that national law willplay a significant role for SSA data accessand distribution as well, because much of it
will be provided by national means.
Accordingly, the laws governing freedom of
information and access to public data
(Freedom of Information Acts FOIA) are, andwill remain, important for SSA data
distribution. In principle, they grant citizens
the right to access the data gathered bypublic authorities or agencies. At the sametime, all FOIA in force also state exemptions
from information access. Reasons not togrant access typically belong to one of thefollowing categories:

To ensure the smooth and efficient data flowof any future European SSA system, someissues will have to be addressed. For
example, national stakeholders must be
brought to participate and contribute to thesystem, both in terms of data and of funds.
At present, entities like the British Fylingdales
radar or the Norwegian Globus II radar do
not pass on their data to other European
states, just to the US. Furthermore, theparticipating and contributing entities will
have to be convinced to share as much of
their data as possible, given the fact thatthey will not pass on all the data they gather
to the European system. Also, the national
entities will need to be won over tostandardize their products.

•

Requested data areother means as well.

available

through•

Data are planned to be published.

•

National security or defence interests areconcerned.

•

International relations are endangered.

•

Data contain health, safety or personal
information.

An example of a new type of national law isgiven by the German Satellitendatensicherheitsgesetz SatDSiG (Satellite Data
Security Act)13 adopted in 2007 in view of the
new
Earth
Observation
systems
like
TerraSAR-X. The intent of the law is to makesure that Earth Observation data from
German satellites or satellites operated byGerman ground stations do not endanger the
security interests of Germany or its allies, thereference
level
being
constituted
byworldwide freely available data. The law
incorporates a semi-automatic parametricsensitivity analysis of requested image
products. A numerical value is calculated foreach request, taking into account therequesting person and the user, scene
location,
sensormode,
processing
parameters and the timeliness of datadelivery. If this value is below a threshold,the provider can pass on the scene. If thevalue exceeds a threshold, the request has tobe authorized by German authorities. Thisapproach allows for political adjustments inthe course of operation, while not interferingwith the main part of the business.

The best incentive for national stakeholders
to follow these requirements is the creationof win-win-situations in which sharing dataand spending extra time or costs is rewardedby access to complementary data or products
not available otherwise. Another question is
how the multiple use character of SSA data
can be accounted for appropriately. If military
entities are to pass on some of their sensitive
or classified data, they will need to be able torely on the careful handling of this data.
Legal Aspects
Having a look at data flows reveals only partof the picture, because once the desired flows
have been defined, realization is only amatter of technology. To develop a full blown
data policy, one will also have to pay
attention to formal and legal aspects
governing data access and distribution. In
this regard, it is instructive to have a look at
the Earth Observation sector12, because

European legislation exists as well and willprobably increase in significance for SSA data

12

Smith, Lesley Jane and Catherine Doldirina,
Proceedings of the ESA/ESTEC Symposium on Spacest
Options for the 21 Century, February 2007.

Report 10, January 2008

13

Bundesgesetzblatt 2007 I, Nr. 58, Bonn, 28 November
2007.

14

Space Situational Awareness
distribution,astheEuropeansystemcomponents become more numerous andimportant. There is a 2001 Regulation on
public access to documents of the European
Union (which might become relevant if the EU
takes part in a future European SSA
system)14 and a 2003 Directive on the re-useof public sector information15. The latterstates that there is no obligation of publicauthorities to allow re-use of documents andthat they are entitled to charge fees thatfacilitatea“reasonable
return”
on
investment. The European initiatives GMES
(Global Monitoring for Environment andSecurity) and INSPIRE (Infrastructure for
Spatial Information in Europe)16 will influence
the data policy of a future European SSA
system as well. This is due to the fact thatthey depend heavily on data sharing andinteroperability
betweendifferent
subsystems.

pass on in their jurisdiction. This seems toreflect an overall trend.

It is also instructive to look at current data
distribution
modelsininternationalorganizations. The World MeteorologicalOrganization (WMO) has adopted a resolution
on the free and unrestricted exchange of
meteorological data and products17, relying
on a three-tier approach:

One has to check whether and to what extent
data distribution models like the three-tierapproach are applicable to a future European
SSA system. It will also have to be examined
whether SSA data constitute a public good or
are of public interest. If this applies, citizens’
access to public authorities’ data will beaffected. In addition, public authorities might
essentially
gain
accesstoprivately/commercially collected data. This
has implications for the business model thatwill be discussed next.

•

A minimum set of essential data andproducts required to accurately describe
and forecast the weather and climate is tobe provided on a free and unrestrictedbasis.

•

Additional data and products required tosustain WMO programmes at the global
level are to be exchanged freely, as longas the members retain the ability to placejustified conditions upon the data and there-export of the products for commercial
purposes.

•

The European Space Agency also has its data
distribution models laid down in the Earth
Explorer Data Policy or the Envisat
Exploitation Policy. On behalf of its Member
States, ESA maintains ownership of all
primary data and ESA-derived products. They
are protected by database rules, copyrightlaws and other forms of Intellectual Property
Rights (IPR). There are two categories of use
with different distribution modes and prices.
For research and application development
supporting the mission objective the data is
distributed solely under ESA responsibility,
only for project purposes and at the cost of
reproduction. For all other uses, ESA appoints
distributing entities that are in charge ofdelivering services and are fully free to set
the prices.

3.2. Business Model andOperational Questions
Before setting up a business model for a
future European SSA system, one needs to
ask the basic question how commercial thesystem should be, i.e., to what degree is
profit-orientation to be allowed or eventargeted. The system could either be runcompletely by public entities or completely bycommercial entities, or by a combination of
both. Depending on the system philosophy
and configuration, the degree of profit
orientation will change. The same is valid viceversa. It should be borne in mind that theexamples of ISS utilization and Galileo haveshown that a purely commercial orientation
may not be sufficient for successful system
implementation.

Data and products exchanged under WMO
auspices for research and education
communities for their non-commercial use
are to be accessible in an open andunrestricted manner.

The resolution’s wording implies that only the
first category of data shall be accessible in afree and unrestricted way, the data of theother two categories should be madeavailable. In any case, national authorities
remain quite free to decide which data to
14

Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliamentand of the Council of 30 May 2001.
15
Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 17 November 2003.
16
Directive 2007/2/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 14 March 2007.
17
WMO Resolution 40, 26 October 1995.

European Space Policy InstituteIf profit orientation is desired, sufficientbusiness
opportunitiesforcommercial
stakeholders have to be ensured. Thesebusiness opportunities can arise internally(for commercial entities taking over part of15

Report 10, January 2008

commercial exploitation, associated issues
and technical boundary conditions have to beconsidered.

the system operation) or externally (forcommercial entities selling system data orderived products to customers outside thesystem). A special case of commercial
entities
pursuing
internalbusiness
opportunities could be constituted by sensors
or processing units that are run within apublic private partnership (PPP), constructedpublicly and operated privately.

Regarding the operational and institutional
aspect, some basic questions have to beanswered. Who will be in charge of system
operation, maintenance and updates? Whocontrols the performance of the overallsystem (both technically and financially)?
Who oversees and enforces rule/procedurecompliance? Should an existing entity be
picked or a new one created? Should theconcessionaire model be applied? Should theoperator be public (civilian), military orcommercial? Table 2 gives some pros andcons for the different kinds of operators.

Commercial
entities
pursuing
externalbusiness opportunities will have to be able tooffer products and services with added value
compared to those freely available. The
added value may consist of the fact that the
product and services are guaranteed on acontractual basis, i.e., the provider can beheld liable if products and services are notavailable or the quality is deficient. The
rendered quality and quantity would have tobe defined in Service Level Agreements(SLA). The added value can also consist inproviding reliability information about thedata, e.g., in the form of covariancematrices, or in providing the actual osculating
elements describing the object trajectory, notjust averaged two line elements (TLE) or purepositional data. Classical candidates forpurchase of SSA data/products are customers
like spacecraft operators, Launch and Early
Operation Phase (LEOP) service providers,insurance companies, space application(telecommunication,satellite
navigation)
service providers, etc. Space weather data
can be of interest to airlines, electricity
suppliers and grid operators, etc. Moreinnovative marketing models include data
warehouses for commercial operators, where
system data are available for external
analysis without interfering with the actual
system’s operation. In the context ofOperator
Public (civilian)

Military

Commercial/Concessionaire

If one chooses a commercial operator, it isworth considering the application of aconcessionairemodel.
Hereby,one
understands the exclusive operation of abusiness under a contract or license. The
operator of the business is called theconcessionaire. It pays a fixed sum or ashare in revenues to the entity that is entitledto grant the licence or operating rights. The
latter often include the transfer of existing
infrastructure to the concessionaire.
Where public services are run by aconcessionaire, the government transfers therights to operate, maintain and invest in
public assets to a private company. The
Galileo case, in which an industry consortium
was to be awarded a concession by the
Galileo Joint Undertaking (GJU) formed by EC
and ESA is a special example in the spacesector, because the concession did not only
comprise system operation and maintenance,
but deployment as well. The concessionaire

Pros
Installation, regulation andoperation done by same
body/related entities;
Clear cut liability;
Serving publicwelfare/commonwealth;
Data sharing attitude
Experienced and effective
operation;
Robust and reliable procedures
Cost efficient;
Liability on contractual basis;
Actively seeking
customers/users;
Experience in marketingCons
Subject to state influence
Difficult governanceNo data sharing attitude;
Subject to national interests;
Longer development andprocurement cycles;
Conservative handling
Profit-oriented;
Subject to political influence;
Difficult public control;
Unclear property questions might
hinder maintenance

Table 2: Pros and Cons of different Operators

Report 10, January 200816

Space Situational Awareness

CanadaState 1

State 2

USA

State 3

State 4

North America

EuropeFigure 5: Current Transatlantic SSA Data Sharing

The question of centralization touches uponcooperation between regional SSA systems
like a North American or a European one.
Such cooperation is needed over the longrun, because SSA endeavours need to be
conducted globally. “Regional” in this context
refers to SSA cooperation between states
within a geographically limited area, resulting
in non-complete coverage of space byground-based means. Figure 5 schematicallyshows the present situation with regard totransatlantic data sharing. Current European
SSA data sharing is done bilaterally, withsome states sharing data with the US
exclusively, and others receiving data fromthe US only. The existence of various possible
data paths can create a situation of unwanted
data spill-through with difficult accountability.

model bears certain similarities to publicprivate-partnerships
such
as
the
one
mentioned in the chapter on TerraSAR-X. In
both cases, the public sector is able to offer
infrastructure or services at a relatively low
cost. In addition, responsibility assigned to
private entities leads to better risk allocation,
while keeping the public sector accountablefor certain aspects of service provision. The
drawback of these models is weaker public
influence on the actual system operation.
Different hardware and system architecture
options have been suggested in various
studies by ESA internally as well as byexternal consortia within the framework of
the ESA General Studies Programme (GSP)
and the General Support and Technology
Programme (GSTP). They either employ a
distributed approach, a centralized concept ora mixture of both.

CanadaFigure 6, on the other hand,potential future set up that

State 1

State 2
node

node
USA

shows ais morelink to otherregional nodes

State 3

North America

State 4

EuropeFigure 6: Potential Future Transatlantic SSA Data Sharing

European Space Policy Institute

17

Report 10, January 2008

region according to regional data policies andpass on a subset of these data for interregional SSA data exchange.

centralized: Each regional system has aregional hub for data exchange. This hub canbe either virtual or a physical centre. It canserve either as a communication port only, or
it can be charged with tasks like dataarchiving or system guidance. For a North
American SSA system, the situation is not too
different from the present, where the US andCanada already run NORAD together. In any
case, the regional hubs are the unique linking
points to other regional SSA systems. This
leads to a clear accountability for interregional SSA data exchange. Figure 6 isactually a top view on a three dimensional
data sharing pattern, because the regional
hubs can incorporate a multiple levelapproach: They can exchange data within theReport 10, January 2008

The
choicebetweencentralized
anddistributed architecture also occurs at themeta level: It would have to be decided
whether the regional hubs communicate with
each
other
directly,
incorporatinga
distributed approach, or whether they are alllinked to each other via a hub of hubs,
constituting a centralized solution. If thesecond alternative is chosen, the question ofa global SSA authority with its associatedpolitical aspects arises.

18

Space Situational Awareness

4. Link to future Space Traffic Management
It is obvious that the existence of a functional
SSA system is the precondition for a futureSpace Traffic Management (STM), which canbe defined as “the set of technical andregulatory provisions for promoting safe
access into outer space, operations in outerspace and return from outer space to Earthfree from physical and radio-frequency
interference”18.
•

A future STM regime will comprise various
areas,
includingthesecuringof
information needs, concrete traffic rules
and mechanisms for implementation andcontrol19. These areas have direct links to
SSA:•

Securing information needs is the very
core task of an SSA system. Providing asound information base by sharing
knowledge about what is going on in
space and about space weather is aprerequisite for meaningful space traffic
rules.

•The traffic rules could include right-of-way
provisions,manoeuvre
prioritizations,keep-out-zones, safety corridors andspecialregulations
forsatellite
constellations. Compliance with these
traffic rules can only be checked if thesupervising entity is capable of SSA.

expanded. These considerations could also
influence the question of the SSA system
operator. As already mentioned, SSA
information revealing compliance with traffic
rules is needed for their implementation andcontrol.
It has to be decided if the operator of the
SSA system (who has access to all the
relevant data) should also be in charge ofenforcing STM rules and procedures, similarly
to a highway police on earth that collects
motion data of road traffic participants andenforces the law on this basis. Should the
SSA system operator also be the STM ruleenforcement entity, it will have to be picked
or created accordingly, allowing for scalability
in terms of staff and competence.
It is obvious that the operator of a European
SSA system, being a regional actor, could
only contribute to STM rule enforcement to alimited extent, because STM is a truly global
concept. Accordingly, various regional SSA
system operators would have to cooperate tosupport STM. As has been stated before, suchcooperation is facilitated by a centralizedarchitecture.
STM deals with all phases of space traffic –access to space, operation in space andreturn from space. As a consequence,
integration with air traffic management has
to be achieved. Due to the different physicalboundary conditions, this does not mean
identical regimes, but compatible ones. Thishas to be reflected technically: the SSA
system should be interoperable with air traffic
control systems to fully support STM
throughout the three phases describedabove.

Mechanisms for implementation and control
would most likely be based on aninternational treaty, with the subsequent
rules of the road and standards being drafted
as soft law. Ultimately, this might result in asort of outer space policing. Again, this will
require SSA capability.
The question what institution will be incharge of operative STM oversight iscurrently being discussed in academic circles.
A new body might be created, or the
responsibility of an existing one might be
18

Schrogl, Kai-Uwe. “Space traffic management: The newcomprehensive approach for regulating the use of outerspace – Results from the 2006 IAA cosmic study.” Acta
Astronautica Jan. 2008: 272-76.
19“Space Traffic Management. The new comprehensive
approach for regulating the use of outer space”, ESPI
Flash Report #3, Vienna, 2007.

European Space Policy Institute

19

Report 10, January 2008

5. The Role of ESA
before handing over responsibility to thedesignated system operator. In any case, itwill make sense for a future European SSA
system to integrate existing know-how, bothat the national and European levels. In theimportant area of Space Surveillance, forexample, the expertise of the ESA’s European
Space Operations Centre (ESOC) needs to beincorporated. ESOC’s Space Debris Office(SDO) offers a wide range of services, suchas conjunction event analysis or de-orbit andre-entry support. It also provides softwaretools for system, sensor simulation orenvironment modelling as well as forcorrelation, like MASTER (Meteoroid andSpace
DebrisTerrestrial
Environment
Reference Model), DRAMA (Debris Risk
Assessment and Mitigation Analysis) or
PROOF (Programme for Radar and Optical
Observation Forecasting). In addition, it
maintains the DISCOS (Database andInformation System Characterising Objects inSpace) to track all space debris.

The responsibilities and duties of ESA within afuture European SSA system depend on thesystem configuration chosen. If ESA is tasked
with procurement or parts thereof, different
approaches can be taken - either big bang or
spiral procurement.
Big bang procurement stands for provision of
the complete system at one specific point oftime. While allowing for efficient system
optimization from the very outset, thecomplexity of this endeavour often hinders
successful
implementation.
Moreover,experiences from system operation underreal-world conditions can no longer be drawn
on easily as regards hardware once thesystem has been fully deployed.
Spiral procurement, on the other hand, refers
to providing system parts over an extended
period of time, supplying the different
components on a piecemeal basis. This
increases the time needed for systemcompletion, but fitting the subsystems into an
existing system frame is easier andexperiences gathered in real-life operation
can be applied in the development of thesubsystems to be added. Aside from that, thecontinuous procurement and development
process is sustainable, because it ensuresevenly distributed capacity utilization, a
prolonged build-up and preservation oftechnological know-how.

DISCOS is fed from various sources, including
the aforementioned SSN and the ESA
telescope at Mt. Teide, Tenerife. If needed,
additional data are provided by the TIRA
(Tracking and Imaging Radar) of the German
FGAN. The SDO’s role in a future European
SSA system could be the one of technicalconsultancy, supplying state of the art
knowledge and being less involved in routine
operation.

Of course, ESA’s role within a future
European SSA system could also exceed
merely procurement. In fact, the complete
systemdevelopment,
deployment
andoperation could be performed within theframework of an optional ESA programme. In
this manner, the participating states could
decide upon the level of funding they provide
and profit from the geographical returnprinciple. At the same time, programme
execution
could
rely
on
establishedmanagement structures well suited for the
space sector.
If a centralized architecture for the future
European SSA system is chosen, a minimalversion of ESA’s role could consist of initiallyrunning the centralized unit for system
guidance,
introducing,testingandestablishing procedures and best practices

Report 10, January 200820

Space Situational Awareness6. The Way Forward
setting up a possible global SSA system inthe long run.

Looking at the considerations put forth andtaking up the issues that have been touched
upon both explicitly and inherently, some
general observations and suggestions forfurther action can be given with a view tocontributing to the swift resolution of open
questions
as
well
as
the
efficient
implementation and operation of a future
European SSA system:

Cooperation•

With a view to such a potential global SSA
system, Europeans should acquire a SSA
systemthat,beyondnecessarily
duplicating core functions of other regional
SSA systems, has the potential to supply
additional information complementary toother systems’ data. This will facilitate
exchange between all systems. Space
Weather data are a prime candidate for
initiating global cooperation in SSA.
Relevant sensors should be put on future
European space assets like the Galileo
satellites, and the gap after the SOHO
mission has to be filled.

•

International and regional cooperation
should also be supported by common
definitions to establish a sound basis ofunderstanding. The notions of “civilian”,“military”,“public”,“institutional”,“private” or “commercial” should beclarified and used in a uniform way.
Furthermore, the different implications of
the terms have to be considered. For
example, Space Situational Awareness isunderstood to be self-standing in Europe,
while the US tends to see it as a pre-stageof both defensive and offensive counterspace concepts.

General Approach••

Awareness of the importance of aEuropean SSA system should be raised
and increased. It should be made clear todecision-makers and to the public that aninterruption of space services would cause
most severe damage to European andglobal well-being. Public outreach will be
more difficult to achieve here, because aEuropean SSA system will not offer
tangible benefits to the citizens as space
applications do.
A European SSA system should be broadly
supported and backed at the highest
political level. Important stakeholders
have already expressed their interest. Thisnow has to translate into sufficient fundingthat must be managed efficiently. An
optional ESA programme for SSA could be
an adequate solution. In addition, the EUshould become involved in line with its
general role and under the auspices ofEuropean Space Policy. Eventually, this
could make SSA another European space
flagship project like Galileo or GMES.

•

A European SSA system must offer added
value with regard to currently available
SSA information from the United States.
Such added value could consist incompleteness, increased reliability andtimeliness, new products and services andthe availability of data on a contractual
basis implying liability.

•

The motivation for Europe to have a SSA
system should not just be to free itself
from dependence on the US. Rather,
Europe should try to establish an own
capability so that it has something to offer
and is able to interact with others on
equal grounds. This is a precondition for

European Space Policy InstituteInitial and Mid-term Design

21•

Being envisaged as user-driven, aEuropean SSA system has to be set up in
a genuinely multiple use fashion. In thiscontext, multiple use should not be seen
as a feature introducing additional
complexity and cost. Instead, it should berecognized as an optimum usage ofavailable assets. Taking into accountmilitary interests will be a challenge for
ESA that has been reconsidering its
understandingof
securityanditstreatment of associated issues.

•

Varioushardwareandarchitectural
solutions for a European SSA system havebeen suggested by different studies. A

Report 10, January 2008

connectivity
andprocedural
harmonization. Setting up what has beencalled a European SSA system of systems
will involve not only adding new facilities
to the existing ones, but also linking them
together in a 3C manner: comprehensive,
coherent and clever.

decision on the final set up should take
into account the desired amount of systemprofit orientation. A key role will be playedby data policy. However, a chicken andegg situation where data policy design
waits for hardware configuration and viceversa has to be avoided. Accounting forthe fact that there is a strong interlink
between the two processes, they should
initially be run in parallel with iterative
adjustments on both sides.
••

The first step in building up a European
SSA system should be to enhancecooperation between existing national andEuropean facilities. Common features ofdifferent architectural solutions should be
identified and implemented as a scalable
precursor. Interoperability should be
increased by means of standardization,

Report 10, January 2008

22

Provisions should be made for the SSA
system to support a global STM regime.
This would include an interface to air
traffic control systems, since STM will
have to govern the whole domain of spacetravel, comprising access to space, theoperation in space and the return fromspace. Covering all three of these phases
will account for a possible future situation
where Member States and private“spaceliners” operate side by side.

Space Situational Awareness

Annex
Current European Facilities

Radar

The following is a list of currently available European facilities20 that are capable of Space
Surveillance, although it might not be their main activity. Technical details are not specified here
since they could not be assessed for all facilities, being partially classified. Appearance in this table
does not necessarily imply that the respective facilities are (fully) available for a future European
SSA system.

Name
GRAVES

Location
Broyes-dePesmes andRevest-du-Bion,
FranceOperator
ONERA, owned by
French Ministry of
Defence

Remarks
Bistatic, capable of creating anautonomous catalogue

Fylingdales

Fylingdales Air
Force Base, UKPart of SSN, no data sharing withother European states

Globus II

Vardø, Norway

TIRA

Wachtberg,
Germany
Brest, France(Homeport)
various
Scandinavian
sites
Toulon andOdeillo, France
Haute
Provence,
FranceCalern Palteau,
FranceHerstmonceux,
UK, Gibraltar,
Cyprusclose to Bern,
Switzerland

British Ministry of
Defence (together
with US)
NorwegianIntelligence Service(together with US)
FGAN

Armor
EISCAT
SPOC

opticalROSACETAROT
PIMS
ZimlatFrench MoD(DGA/DCE)
Multinational
scientific network
French MoD
CNESPart of SSN, no data sharing withother European states
Capable of tandem mode withradiotelescope Effelsberg
Mounted on the “Monge” tracking
ship
Provides range and Doppler data
only
Capable of providing initial orbits
for some objects
Precise orbit determination near
geo

CNES

To be used together with Rosace

British MoD

Used by IADC

University of Bern

Primarily used for satellite laser
ranging

Table 3: Current European Facilities Capable of Space Surveillance

20

Hitchens, Theresa and Thomas Valasek. European Military Space Capabilities. Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense
Information (CDI), 2006.

European Space Policy Institute23

Report 10, January 2008

Acronyms

3C
AFSPC
ASI
BMD
CFE
CNES
DEM
DGA
DISCOS
DLR
DRA
DRAMA
EADS
EC
EISC
EISCAT
ESA
ESOC
ESPI
ESTEC
EU
EUSC
FGAN
FOIA
G/S
GEO
GJU
GMES
GRAVES
GSP
GSTP
IADC
IFRI
INSPIRE
IPR
ISS
LEOP
MASTER
MoD
NASA
NORAD
OIG
ORFEO
PIMS
PPP
PROOF
SAR
SatDSiG
SDO
SLA
SOHO
SPASEC
SPOC
SPOT
SSA
SSN
STM
TAROT

Report 10, January 2008

Comprehensive, Coherent and Clever
Air Force Space Command
Agenzia Spaziale Italiana
Ballistic Missile Defense
Commercial and Foreign Entities
Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales
Digital Elevation Model
Délégation Générale pour l’Armement
Database and Information System Characterising Objects in Space
Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt
Dual Receive Antenna
Debris Risk Assessment and Mitigation Analysis
European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company
European Commission
European Interparliamentary Space Conference
European Incoherent Scatter Radar
European Space Agency
European Space Operations Centre
European Space Policy InstituteEuropean Space Research and Technology Centre
European Union
European Union Satellite Centre
Forschungsgesellschaft für Angewandte Naturwissenschaften
Freedom of Information Act
Ground Segment
Geostationary Earth Orbit
Galileo Joint Undertaking
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security
Grand Reseau Adapté à la Veille Spatiale
General Studies Programme
General Support and Technology ProgrammeInter Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee
Institut Francais des Relations Internationales
Infrastructure for Spatial Information in EuropeIntellectual Property Rights
International Space Station
Launch and Early Operation Phase
Meteoroid and Space Debris Terrestrial Environment Reference Model
Ministry of Defence
National Aeronautics and Space Association
North American Aerospace Defense Command
Orbital Information Group
Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation
Passive Imaging Metric Sensor
Public-Private Partnership
Programme for Radar and Optical Observation Forecasting
Synthetic Aperture Radar
Satellitendatensicherheitsgesetz (satellite data security law)
Space Debris OfficeService Level Agreement
Solar Heliospheric Observatory
Space and Security Panel of Experts
Système Probatoire d’Observation du Ciel
Satellite Pour l’Observation de la TerreSpace Situational AwarenessSpace Surveillance Network
Space Traffic Management
Télescope à Action Rapide pour les Objets Transitoires

24Space Situational Awareness
TIRA
TLE
TT&C
UK
US
WMO

European Space Policy Institute

Tracking and Imaging Radar
Two Line Elements
Telemetry, Tracking and Command
United Kingdom
United States
World Meteorological Organization

25

Report 10, January 2008

Acknowledgements
ESPI and the author would like to thank all the experts who have provided input to this study in theform of interviews, discussions, presentations and general points of view. Their knowledge andunderstanding helped to shape the report and to look at the content from different angles.
The author would also like to thank Dr. Serge Plattard and Prof. Dr. Kai-Uwe Schrogl from ESPI for
their supervision and guidance throughout the project duration.

Report 10, January 200826

Space Situational AwarenessMission Statement of ESPIThe mission of the European Space Policy Institute (ESPI) is to carry out studies andresearch to provide decision-makers with an independent view on mid- to long termissues relevant to the use of space.
Through its activities, ESPI contributes to facilitate the decision-making process, increases
awareness on space technologies and applications with the user communities, opinion leaders andthe public at large, and supports students and researchers in their space-related work.
To fulfil these objectives, the Institute supports a network of experts and centres of excellence
working with ESPI in-house analysts.

European Space Policy Institute27

Report 10, January 2008

www.espi.or.at

Report 10, January 200828