IEEJ：November 2022 © IEEJ2022

IEEJ
2023
Outlook

Energy, Environment and Economy
Challenges for achieving both energy security
and carbon neutrality
Overview

Rejean CASAUBON
Seiya ENDO
Ryou ETOU
Hiroshi HASHIMOTO
Takehiro IWATA
KAN Sichao
Kenji KIMURA
Yoshikazu KOBAYASHIKen KOYAMA
Ichiro KUTANI
Tetsuo MORIKAWA
Soichi MORIMOTO
Taiju MORIMOTO
Tomoko MURAKAMI
Hideaki OBANE
Junichi OGASAWARA
Keisuke OTA
Atsuo SAGAWA
Yoshiaki SHIBATA
Shigeru SUEHIRO
Yukari YAMASHITA
Akira YANAGISAWA
Emiri YOKOTA
Masato YOSHIDAExecutive summary

Executive summary
Global energy supply and demand outlook (Reference
Scenario)
Energy consumption will continue to increase despite energy efficiency that will
improve to address climate change and energy security▌

Under the Reference Scenario, and from the perspective of climate change and energy
security, the rate at which the world’s energy intensity per unit of gross domestic product(GDP) will decline is faster than in the past. However, as the macroeconomy expands
beyond the rate of decline, global energy consumption in 2050 will increase by 1.3 times
from 2020 to 17 649 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe). The Reference Scenario
incorporates past trends and the expected eﬀects of the extension of energy andenvironmental policies and technologies to date.

▌

The lack of upstream investment and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have raised
concerns about a stable and suﬃcient supply of fossil fuels to meet the overall
consumption which will continue to increase at an annual rate of 0.8%. The use of natural
gas will grow at an annual rate of 1.3%, mainly to supply the power generation sector andwill approach oil which is the largest energy source. Oil will expand at an annual rate of
0.7%, increasing mainly in the aviation, shipping, and petrochemical feedstocks sectors.
Against the backdrop of air pollution and climate change, coal will peak around 2030 and
begin to decline, falling below 2020 levels in 2050.

▌

Expectations for more non-fossil energy are growing as many countries aim to becomecarbon neutral. Solar photovoltaics, wind, and others will see the largest growth,
increasing 3.9 times in 2050 compared to 2020. However, the share of non-fossil energy intotal primary energy consumption will increase only slightly, from 20% in 2020 to 23% in
2050.

▌

Consumption in China, which had until recently driven the global demand growth, will
peak around 2030 before turning downward while demand in India, the Middle East andNorth Africa, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will continue toincrease. India’s consumption will surpass that of the United States and ASEAN’s will
surpass that of the European Union in the 2040s, making Emerging Market andDeveloping Economies in the energy and environmental ﬁelds all the more important.

Middle Eastern oil producers take advantage of their low production costs to lead
crude oil supply. Russia is suffering from a severe shortage of upstream investment
due to embargoes and sanctions, and its rate of decline is accelerating.
▌In the medium-term, until 2030, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC) and non-OPEC will both increase crude oil production. However, in Europe andEurasia, where oil production was expected to decline over the medium to long term even

IEEJ Outlook 2023

1

Executive summary

before the Ukrainian war, the impact of Western countries’ embargoes and sanctions will
deepen Russia’s lack of upstream investment and accelerate the pace of decline.
Production in North America, led by the United States which increased output
dramatically in the 2010s, will peak around 2030.
▌

From 2030, OPEC, especially the Middle East OPEC members with their abundant oil
reserves and cheap production costs, will become increasingly prominent despite
increases in production from Latin America. The share of OPEC crude oil in the global oil
supply will rise from 34% in 2020 to 44% in 2050.

▌

Total world crude oil trade will increase as a result of rising oil demand. Imports will fallin Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, where
demand will decline, but imports from non-OECD countries will increase at a faster pace.
Asia’s dependence on imports will continue to rise, and while inﬂows from the Americas
will increase, the Middle East will remain the largest supplier. Non-OECD Europe/Central
Asia, especially Russia, will see an accelerated decline in exports to Europe and become
more dependent on the Chinese market.

The LNG market is expanding due to abundant supply potential, but the outlook is
uncertain▌

The United States, the world’s largest producer and consumer of natural gas, will continue
to increase its production of natural gas, especially shale gas. Until about 2030, production
will increase at an annual rate of about 1% and then stabilise.

▌

Australia, which slightly surpassed Qatar as the world’s largest exporter of liqueﬁed
natural gas (LNG) in 2020, will experience steady growth in production. The increase is inpart due to projects centring on the provision of complementary gas to existing LNG
production facilities. The increase will moderate after 2030.

▌

In the Russian Arctic, construction is progressing for a second major LNG export project
which had reached the investment decisions. However, the future of this project is
uncertain due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Achieving decarbonisation is, realistically, a long-term commitment▌

Decarbonisation has accelerated faster in Advanced Economies such as the United Statesand Europe. Emerging Market and Developing Economies have announced theirintention to become carbon neutral, despite a long run coal demand that will expand in
Asia, including India and ASEAN excluding China, and Africa. Global coal production
will increase until the early 2030s in response to demand but after that, it will start to
decline; the downward trend will intensify in the 2040s.

▌

Steam coal production will increase from 5 950 Mt in 2020 to 6 537 Mt in 2040 mainly due
to increased demand for power generation. It then begins to slowly decline, reaching
6 311 Mt in 2050. Production of coking coal, used mainly as a raw material for steel
production, will gradually decline from 1 014 Mt in 2020 to 824 Mt in 2050.

2

IEEJ Outlook 2023

Executive summary

Electricity generation is expanding rapidly in Asia. Natural gas-fired power generationis the biggest source of electricity▌

Global electricity generation will grow at an annual rate of 1.8%, rising to 45 777 TWh in
2050, 1.7 times higher than in 2020. 95% of that increase comes from Emerging Market andDeveloping Economies. Continuing its rapid economic growth, electricity generation in
Asia will increase at an annual rate of 2.1% to reach 23 313 TWh in 2050, roughly half of
the world’s requirements.

▌

Although coal has the largest current share of the global power generation mix, natural
gas will be the largest source of electricity in 2050. With a continuing upward trend inelectricity demand in both Advanced Economies and Emerging Market and Developing
Economies, ensuring a stable supply of natural gas remains an urgent and a long-term
issue.

▌In Advanced Economies, renewable energy will overtake natural gas as the largest sourceof electricity in the ﬁrst half of the 2020s due to its rapid adoption. Of these, solar
photovoltaic and wind, which have output variability, will account for 25% of theelectricity generated in 2050. Measures to deal with these output ﬂuctuations and the
expansion of the network connecting the sites suitable for power generation and thelocation of demand will be issues.

▌

In Emerging Market and Developing Economies, renewable energy, especially wind, willcontinue to increase and replace coal as the largest power source in 2050. However, therole of coal-ﬁred power generation in supporting the robust demand for electricity is nosmall matter, and it is necessary to develop a highly predictable investment environment
and address environmental issues, such as air pollution.

▌

The role of nuclear is being recognised anew in Japan, Europe, and other countries fromthe perspectives of climate change countermeasures and ensuring energy security,especially after Russia invaded Ukraine. However, although new construction starts areunderway, mainly in Asia, nuclear will not grow faster than the rate of increase inelectricity demand through 2050, reducing its share of the power generation mix to 7%.

Advanced Technologies Scenario
Even under the Advanced Technologies Scenario, reaching global carbon neutrality
by 2050 is far from being achieved. Further promotion of energy efficiency andclimate change measures will require the full mobilisation of all means possible.
▌

The “Advanced Technologies Scenario” anticipates maximum carbon dioxide (CO2)emission reduction measures based on the application opportunities and acceptability insociety, including the full-scale introduction of newly factored hydrogen, and enhancedenergy security measures. It should be noted that this outlook is a forecast-type of exercisethat projects in the future based on the premise of the introduction of technology, etc. It
contrasts with a backcast-type analysis that deﬁnes a future “landing point” and charts apossible path to reach it. Global ﬁnal energy consumption under the Advanced

IEEJ Outlook 2023

3

Executive summary

Technologies Scenario will be reduced by 5.2% in 2030 and 23.5% in 2050 compared to theReference Scenario.
▌

Primary energy consumption will decline by 4.4% relative to the Reference Scenario in
2030 but will increase relative to 2020. After 2030, the reduction will accelerate as energy
eﬃciency continues to improve. The reduction from the Reference Scenario in 2050 will
only reach 18.5%, which is less than that of ﬁnal energy consumption of 23.5%. This is dueto the increased use of electricity and hydrogen, which have energy transformation losses.

▌

Fuel switching will also advance, reducing fossil fuel primary energy consumption by
1.1 Gtoe relative to the Reference Scenario in 2030 and 5.1 Gtoe in 2050. Despite asubstantial growth in non-fossil energy of 0.4 Gtoe in 2030 and 1.8 Gtoe in 2050, the world
cannot continue to maintain and improve its economy, society, and livelihoods without
fossil fuels, even in the Advanced Technologies Scenario.

▌

Energy-related CO2 emissions will be 31.2 Gt in 2030 (down 1.4% from 2020) and 16.9 Gt
in 2050 (down 46.5%). In this scenario, CO2 emissions would signiﬁcantly reduce to levels
equivalent to the Announced Pledges Scenario of the International Energy Agency (IEA)
released in its “World Energy Outlook 2021”. Consequently, such scenario is still far froma worldwide “Net Zero” emissions. The reduction from the Reference Scenario willamount to 20.1 Gt in 2050, of which China and India accounted for 38.1%.

▌

One of China’s 2030 targets for Nationally Determined Contribution is to reduce CO2
emissions intensity per GDP by more than 65% from 2005 levels, which is roughly
equivalent to the Reference Scenario results. India’s target of a 45% reduction in intensity,
in its 2022 update, is roughly equivalent to results in the Advanced Technologies Scenario.
On the other hand, the set targets to reduce emissions by the United States (50% to 52%
reduction from 2005 levels), the European Union (55% reduction from 1990 levels), andJapan (45% reduction from 2013 levels), will fall short of the Advanced Technologies
Scenario results.

▌

As expected, the Advanced Technologies Scenario requires less investment in fossil fuels
than in the Reference Scenario, but further low-carbon investment in renewable energy
and energy eﬃcient equipment is required. The investment required in the 2040s, underthe Advanced Technologies Scenario, is $35 trillion (at 2015 prices), $20 trillion more thanin the 2010s, or an increase of $6 trillion from the Reference Scenario in the 2040s. The
cumulative global energy investment requirement by 2050 will reach $88 trillion, or an
average of $2.9 trillion per year.

Energy security strategy to address the Ukraine crisisand the energy transition▌

A growing number of Asian countries are declaring themselves as also aiming at carbon
neutrality. In addition to building a new energy infrastructure, free of carbon emissions,
the world must focus on big problems that cannot be solved easily in the limited time wehave (between 30 and 40 years). The problems include the mass disposal of existing

4

IEEJ Outlook 2023

Executive summary

equipment and job displacement, due to reworking the energy system. There is also agreat deal of uncertainty surrounding the speciﬁc means of realisation.
▌

Asia faces a variety of challenges stemming from energy security. In emerging anddeveloping Asia, where high economic growth is expected, it is essential to provide stably
and inexpensively a large amount of energy. Considering the current trend toward a
return to coal due to soaring energy prices, the amount of renewable energy available andtheir integrating costs, the transition from coal to natural gas is the realistic path forward.
In doing so, the ﬁrst phase of switching from coal to natural gas will involve increasing
supply investments outside Russia while presenting a practical solution to the supply andcost problem. In the second phase, decarbonisation will be achieved by adding various
measures, including the use of renewable energy and decarbonised natural gas.

▌

The so-called “4R technologies” is a tool to realise the decarbonisation of fossil fuels.
Among them are the use of blue hydrogen produced by capturing CO2 generated during
manufacturing, the introduction of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology inmanufacturing plants and power plants, and carbon recycling technology that uses thecaptured CO2 for other purposes.

Response to strengthening stable power supply andimportance of nuclear power generation▌

Under electricity deregulation, power generation facilities that are used infrequently inthe market – with fewer generating opportunities – will be suspended anddecommissioned. The introduction of renewables power generation has been expanded
based on government support measures and in part caused the suspension and abolitionof thermal power generation in many developed countries due to the decline in operating
rates and the deterioration of proﬁtability. As a result, the remaining power supply
capacity of the entire electricity system declined. With a sudden surge in demand forelectricity triggered by extreme heat or severe winter, combined with output declines andoutages of power generation facilities (also caused by heat and cold waves), there aresituations in which the balance between supply and demand becomes tight.

▌

Until now, the assessment of a stable supply of electricity has been to evaluate thepossibility of a shortage of generating capacity (kW shortage) in response to increased
demand. As decarbonisation policies proceed in the future, it is expected that dependence
on a small number of power sources will increase. Another major issue is how to assess
the risk of a shortfall in the amount of electricity generated (kWh shortage) when facing
unforeseen events in a power source that the system heavily depends on.

▌

In a climate dominated by low-carbon arguments, the sharp rise in global fossil fuel prices
since around 2021 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 put greater
emphasis on securing a stable supply of energy. The role of nuclear in energy security is
once more being recognised in Japan, Europe and elsewhere. The importance of its
utilisation as a stable large-scale baseload power source under fossil fuel-ﬁred power
generation constraints has been highlighted anew.

IEEJ Outlook 2023

5

Executive summary▌

France and other countries announced ambitious nuclear targets while analysing the best
mix with renewables. Plans to build new nuclear power plants are also underway in the
United Kingdom and Eastern European countries. Expanding the operation of existing
nuclear power plants and restarting them in Japan attract global interest. Attention is
being paid to initiatives such as the introduction of a Regulated Asset Base (RAB) model,
which is under consideration in the United Kingdom and can be considered as providing
regulated returns to secure new investment in nuclear that will simultaneously achieve
decarbonisation and stable supply.

▌

Nuclear is considered important from the standpoint of energy security, but it is also
important for companies and countries in which nuclear is developed. A series of new
projects by Western companies have faced delays in construction times and higher costs
that far exceeded their original estimates. In one instance, it was pointed out that thecompany lost its construction know-how and was forced to change its design after
construction began, due to regulatory requirements.

Critical mineral issues and energy, and economic
security▌

To achieve carbon neutrality, a massive adoption of renewable energy, electric vehicles,
hydrogen and other low-carbon technologies is necessary. A new energy security
challenge is emerging, caused by tight supply and demand for rare minerals (criticalminerals), which are considered essential for these technologies. Like for fossil fuels, theseresources are unevenly distributed around the globe.

▌

In the Advanced Technologies Scenario, the supply and demand for lithium, cobalt,
neodymium, and dysprosium will be tight by the mid-2030s, mainly due to the increased
penetration of electric vehicles. For nickel and cobalt, there are concerns that the
cumulative demand by 2050 will exceed the sum of the total recycled supply and theresource reserves to cover long-term demand.

▌

Resources are concentrated in Chile, Argentina, Australia, and China for lithium,
Indonesia and the Philippines for nickel, the Democratic Republic of Congo for cobalt,
and China for the rare earth’s neodymium and dysprosium.

▌

There are short-term and long-term perspectives on energy security. Unlike “ﬂow-type”
commodities such as oil and natural gas, which can face a signiﬁcant impact in the eventof a sudden supply disruption caused by some disturbance, “stock-type” materials are
more resistant to short-term risks because even if a supply disruption occurs, the portion
already imported can be incorporated into renewable energy facilities to provide energy.
On the other hand, from a long-term perspective, it will be diﬃcult to achieve carbon
neutrality based on renewable energy, electric vehicles, hydrogen, etc., unless measures
are prepared in advance to address the tightening of global supply and demand anduneven distribution of resources for critical minerals. While it will be essential to increase
production at existing mines and promote the development of new mines for those typesof ore that are feared to be in short supply, there are concerns that resource development

6

IEEJ Outlook 2023

Executive summaryand export controls will be tightened in supplier countries in the future. Therefore, it goes
without saying that demand countries are required to not only strengthen resource
diplomacy aimed at securing interests, but they are also required to reduce importdependency and increase recycling rates to diversify sources of procurement, and topromote the development of technologies for non-use and reduced usage, as well as
alternative technologies.
▌

On the other hand, supplier policies and the prospects for developing recycling, shifting
and alternative technologies all involve uncertainty. Therefore, from the perspective ofenergy and economic security, consideration should also be given to balanced technology
choices aimed at avoiding excessive reliance on speciﬁc carbon-neutral technologies 1.

Economic impact of green investment▌

When investments in climate change measures create a virtuous cycle of emissions
reductions and economic growth, it is called “Green growth”. The results, however, may
not be realised or they may appear diﬀerently in diﬀerent economies and entities. It could
create new disparities – (1) among developed economies and emerging/developing
economies, (2) between developed and emerging/developing economies, (3) between
economies that rely on fossil fuel exports and those that do not, and (4) within the
population and citizens of the same economies.

▌

The cumulative additional green investment and consumption to realise the Advanced
Technologies Scenario amounts to $14 trillion (at 2015 prices). If this green investment andconsumption were carried out in a “No Financial Constrained” situation where the total
amount of funds available could be increased at will, the GDP in 2050 would increase by$20 trillion (11.2%, an annual average of 0.4%). On the other hand, under a “Financial
Constrained” situation in which the total amount of funds cannot be changed due tolimited economic and ﬁnancing capacity, GDP would be reduced by $6.2 trillion (3.5%, anannual average of 0.1%). “Financial constrained” means that incremental green
investments will be oﬀset by declines in investment and consumption in other areas.

▌

Under the No Financial Constrained Case, GDP and output would increase in many
economies, but would decrease in economies such as those in the Middle East and theformer Soviet Union that are highly dependent on mining (fossil fuels). In the Financial
Constrained Case, GDP and output will decrease in many economies. However, in somedeveloped countries and China, the decrease in the value of energy imports due to green
investment and consumption is signiﬁcant and GDP and output will increase,outweighing the decrease in investment in other sectors due to ﬁnancial constraints.

▌

Investment is a new demand and a source of growth. However, if other investments are
reduced in proportion to new investments in a situation of ﬁnancial constraints andWith the permission of the Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC), this article
presents a part of the results of its commissioned study, “Survey of Mineral Resource Supply and
Demand to Achieve Carbon Neutrality” (FY2022), and details of the results will be reported at aseminar scheduled to be held by JOGMEC on 10 November 2022.
1

IEEJ Outlook 2023

7

Executive summary

budget constraints, no new demand is created as a total amount. In addition, green
investment is unlikely to be a source of growth because it is not itself an investment toexpand production capacity. Relaxing ﬁnancial constraints and providing suﬃcient funds
are the key to achieving green growth.
▌

For smooth ﬁnancing, it is necessary to use not only government budgets but also green
ﬁnance, which is mainly funded by the private sector. It is important to clarify the
direction of the environmental policies to limit risks and encourage investment. How tolimit negative economic impacts and how to even out the diﬀerent impacts between
economies and industries is important.

8

IEEJ Outlook 2023

The 442nd Forum on Research WorkIEEJ Outlook 2023
Energy, Environment and Economy

Challenges for achieving
achievin both energy security
and carbon neutrality
Tokyo, 19 October 2022

IEEJ Outlook
ok 2023The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan,((-2FWREHU $OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG

The 442nd Forum on Research Work

19 October 2022

Global En
Energy Supply and Demand Outlookby 2050

Shigeru SUEHIRO
Econometric and Statistical Analysis GroupThe Energy Data and Modelling Center
The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan

What is IEEJ Outlook 2023?

The forecast type is a method of looking ahead to the future with various assumptions,starting from the present. On the other hand, the backcast type is a method of thinking
about how to take measures from the present, setting goals for the future.

z Conduct scenario analyses of technological and policy
developments and trends
Reference Scenario
A scenario in which the prevailing changes will continue
against the backdrop of current energy and environmental
policies
Advanced Technologies Scenario
A scenario in which energy and environmental technologies
are introduced to the maximum extent possible to ensure astable supply of energy and strengthen measures against
climate change

IEEJ © 2022

A part of last year’s “Circular Carbon Economy/4Rs Scenario” is reflected.
- Hydrogen-fired power generation, hydrogen direct combustion, hydrogen reduction
ironmaking, fuel cell vehicles, and synthetic fuel and synthetic methane
technologies are assumed.
- Supply limited to blue hydrogen or green hydrogen.

Power
gen.

Energy consumption composition (2050)

Buildings Transport Industry*z Quantify the global energy supply and demand structure
up to 2050
z Forecast-based outlook using econometric models andother tools

ReferenceAdv. Tech.

3%

ReferenceAdv. Tech.

5%

ReferenceAdv. Tech.

8%

ReferenceAdv. Tech.

2%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Fossil fuels

NuclearRenewables

Electricity and heat

Hydrogen + synthetic
fuels and methane* Includes the steel blast furnace sector

2

Increase in energy demand centring on India and ASEAN
Changes in primary energy demand (2020-2050)

20
17.6

14.0

15

14.4

10
5
0
2000

2010

2020

Emerging Market andDeveloping Economies
International bunkers
Advanced Technologies

2030

2040

2050

Advanced Economies
Reference

China

Emerging Market andDeveloping Economies

Gtoe

Primary energy demand outlook

India
ASEAN
Other Asia
AfricaMiddle East
Reference

Latin America
Europe/Eurasia

Advanced
Technologies

Advanced Economies

GtoeInternational bunkers
-1

0

1

2

z (Reference) Primary energy demand will continue to grow, increasing 1.3-fold in 2050.

IEEJ © 2022

z (Advanced Technologies) After peaking in the early 2030s, it will gradually decrease. Emerging Market andDeveloping Economies remain largely unchanged after the 2030s.
z In both scenarios, demand growth is centred on India and ASEAN. China, which has been driving demand
growth, will also peak by 2030 in the Reference Scenario.
3

Significant progress will be made in energy efficiency and low
ww-carbon
power generation (Advanced Technologies Scenario)
Electricity generated outlook

14

12.0

12
9.6

10
8

60

PWh

Gtoe

Final energy consumption outlook

50.8
45.8

9.1

40

7.0

26.7

6

20

15.4

4
2

0

0

Reference
2000

IEEJ © 2022

Industry

Transport

2020

Buildings, etc.

Advanced
Technologies

Reference
2000

2020

Advanced
Technologies
2050

2050

Non-energy use

Fossil fuelFossil fuel with CCS

Hydrogen

NuclearVariable renewables

Other renewables

z (Reference) Final consumption increases 1.2-fold. More than 40% of the increase will come fromtransportation, and more than 60% from electricity.
z (Advanced Technologies) Energy savings of 23% relative to the Reference Scenario. The electrification of
consumption is increasing. The share of electricity will rise to 39% (from 20% in 2020).
z Electricity demand will increase significantly in both scenarios. In the Reference Scenario, fossil fuel-fired aswell as renewables will meet the increased demand. In the Advanced Technologies Scenario, the share of
renewables will rise to 60%. The zero-emission power source, including thermal with CCS, exceeds 80%.
4

Dependence on fossil fuels continues
Primary energy demand outlook
6

1.2

5
4

Gt-LNG

Tcm

Natural gas and LNG demand outlook

0.8$GYDQFHG
5HIHUHQFH 7HFKQRORJLHV

3
2

0.4

1
0

0.0

IEEJ © 2022

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

LNG: Asia

LNG: Others

Natural gas: Reference

Natural gas: Adv. Tech.

z (Reference) Oil will continue to increase slightly, natural gas will increase 1.5 times, and coal will decline
after peaking around 2030. Demand for natural gas, mainly for power generation, grows, while LNG
demand doubles. Asian demand, in particular, will be the driving force.
z (Advanced Technologies) Oil and coal will decline in the 2020s, while natural gas will be the only fossil fuelto grow more than it is today. LNG demand remains around 400 million tonnes. Nuclear and renewables will
each double, but the share of non-fossil fuels as of 2050 is around 40%. However, about 20% of fossil fuels
are decarbonised (by CCS).
5

Emerging Market
Mand Developing Economies key to achieving carbon
neutrality
CO2 emissions outlook by region

37.0

35
30

20

10

20
16.9

15

Reference

10

15.7

5
0

Adv.
Tech.

Advanced Technologies

5

IEEJ © 2022

25

15

31.7

25

0
2000

GtCO2

GtCO2

Energy-related CO2 emissions outlook
40

2020

APS*
2010

2020

2030

APS*
2050

OECD
2040

Adv.
Tech.
2020

APS*
2050

Non-OECD

2050

z Energy-related CO2 emissions under the Reference Scenario continue to increase. On the other hand, underthe Advanced Technologies Scenario, it will peak in the first half of the 2020s and decrease to 17 GtCO2 by
2050. It would be on a par with the APS*, which incorporates countries’ carbon neutral declarations.
z In both the Advanced Technologies Scenario and the APS*, overall non-OECD emissions are only about
40% lower. Reducing emissions in developing countries is key to achieving global carbon neutrality. It will
also be necessary to keep an eye on whether developed countries can follow through on the declaration.
*APS: Announced Pledges Scenario (updated), estimates when countries’ stated policy goals are realised. Includes industrial processes. IEEJ estimates from IEA“World Energy Outlook 2021” (October 2021) and “Technical note on the emissions and temperature implications of COP 26 pledges” (November 2021).

6

Conclusionz Energy demand in China, which has been until recently driving global demand growth, will
peak and decline by around 2030. Instead, India and ASEAN will be the focus of increased
demand.
z Electricity demand will increase significantly in both the status quo world (Reference
Scenario) and the decarbonising world (Advanced Technologies Scenario). Stable power
supply and security will become more important in the future.
z Dependence on fossil fuels will continue. Fossil fuels accounts for 80% in 2050 under theReference Scenario and 60% in the Advanced Technologies Scenario (about 20% of which
is decarbonised). Stable supply of fossil fuels remains a key issue.

IEEJ © 2022

z Even the Advanced Technologies Scenario is far from achieving global carbon neutrality in
2050. In particular, further promotion of energy conservation and decarbonisation indeveloping countries will be key to the progress of global decarbonisation.

7

IEEJ © October 2022 All rights reserved

The 442nd Forum on Research Work

19 October 2022

Challenges and ResponseeS
Strategies forEnergy Security Under the New Reality

Ichiro KUTANIGlobal Energy Group 1
Strategy Research Unit
The Institute of Energy Economics, JapanA new
w realityz In recent years, climate change has been at the centre of energy and climate policy debates.
z But over the past year or so, the energy security crisis has never been greater.
z

Energy prices in Europe have soared since the middle of 2021 due to weather conditions (lowtemperatures in Spring 2021, prolonged wind deterioration) and unforeseen factors, such as a decline innatural gas supply due to breakdowns.

zRussia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Subsequently, Western countries decided to impose a(gradual) embargo on Russian energy. Russia responded by using its own energy exports as a weapon(Reduce export volume, take over assets).

z

Shortage of physical energy supply, especially natural gas, is a real threat.

z

International prices for all kinds of fossil fuels are at historic highs, in part because of the escalating
geopolitical risks of conflict with no way out.

z

In some developing countries, soaring prices of imported energy have strained their finances andhindered fuel procurement.

z Energy security is the foundation of people’s lives and all economic activities, and in the shortterm at least, securing energy supplies has become a top priority.

IEEJ © 2022

z However, there is no time to wait for action on climate change, and the question is how toreconcile energy security and climate action.
9

Key points of thiss report
1. Energy security strategy in view of war in Ukraine and energy transition
99
9Japan needs to prepare for unforeseen circumstances while continuing to seek to maintain its procurement of Russian LNG. To avoid a “scramble
under a zero-sum game”, it is necessary to reacknowledge the role of LNG and the importance of upstream investment, and to take concrete
steps to expand supply.
In Asia, decarbonisation, which follows the process of first shifting from coal to natural gas, is considered a realistic path considering the amountof renewable energy available and the economics considering integration costs. If the promotion of natural gas and LNG investment becomes a
reality, it will help stabilise markets and avoid the negative impact of Asia’s energy transition on regional economies.
Blue hydrogen and ammonia will play a major role in the decarbonisation of fossil fuels, but the high price of natural gas makes them
uncompetitive. Therefore, it is necessary to stabilise the natural gas market to ensure the introduction of blue hydrogen and ammonia.

2. Strengthening stable power supply and importance of nuclear power generation
9
9

In advanced countries, lopsided power generation mix and reduced supply capacity have increased vulnerability to risks such as heat waves, cold
waves and earthquakes. The shortage of kWh caused by fuel shortages due to fuel price hikes and fuel supplier risk has also become a problem.
Securing a stable supply has become an issue.
With the growing importance of energy security, the role of nuclear power generation is being reviewed and new plans are being developed.
Construction by China and Russia is currently dominant in the global market. Western companies are urged to apply the lessons learned fromcurrent projects.

3. Critical mineral issues in energy and economic security
9

The supply and demand for critical minerals such as lithium may become tight as the introduction of electric vehicles, renewable energy andstorage batteries increases. A multifaceted response is required to develop new mines, strengthen resource diplomacy, promote recycling, anddevelop technologies for non-use and reduced usage to ensure a stable supply. In addition, the supply and processing of critical minerals is highly
dependent on specific countries, and diversification of the supply chain is also a challenge.

4. Economic impact of green investment
IEEJ © 2022

9

In the real world, “green growth” may not be realised depending on the availability of funds and differences in industrial structures.
How to limit negative economic impacts and how to even out the different impacts between economies and industries is important.

10

Structure of thiss report
1. Energy security strategy in view of war in Ukraine and energy transition
2. Strengthening stable power supply and importance of nuclear power
generation
3. Critical mineral issues in energy and economic security

IEEJ © 2022

4. Economic impact of green investment

11

1.1
1 The challenges of response strategies
toward ending dependence on Russian natural gas
z The European Union’s policy of ending
dependence on Russia is different fromJapan’s.

12

z The EU is set to end its dependence on
Russia by 2027, but it must ensure stablesupplies until the time.
9

In the short term, they are exposed to
Russia’s threat amid uncertainty about
securing alternative supplies.

9This has led to a tightening of the global
LNG market.

10

IEEJ © 2022

8
6
4
2

z For Japan, it is desirable to continue tosecure Sakhalin 2 LNG both in terms ofequity participation and supply.
9

Qatar
Russia (LNG)
OthersUnited States
Russia (pipeline)

14

EU countries were highly dependent on
Russian natural gas, but Japan’s introductionof Russian LNG was more about source
diversification.

Mt of LNG equivalent9

LNG and Russian Pipeline Gas Supplies to EU and UK

0
1

Meanwhile, urgently needed to prepare forunexpected loss of equity participation andsupply.

4

7 10 14

2018

7 10 14

2019

7 10 12020

4

7 10 1

2021

4

7

2022

Source: Compiled from Cedigaz LNG Services, Eurostat, British trade
statistics, and Gazprom

12

1.1
1T
The
he challenges of response strategies
toward ending dependence on Russian natural gas
Prospect of existing LNG term contracts by Japanese companies[Measures for Japan]

IEEJ © 2022

50
40
30
20
10

Australia
Brunei
RussiaPortfolio players

Papua New Guinea
Qatar
United States

Malaysia
Abu Dhabi
Canada

2039

2038

2037

2036

2035

2034

2033

2032

2031

2030

2029

2028

2027

2026

0

2025

z As a way of laying the groundwork forthe future, clear message should be
advocated that both investment andprocurement from the project arelegitimate rights under the contract
and there is no reason to bethreatened by unilateral Russian
notification.

60

2024

z New development projects in Russia
will recede. The path to restoring
Russia’s future credibility as aninvestment destination and source ofimport is even more distant.

70

2023

z From 2026 onward, it is vital tosecure long-term LNG contracts fromother sources including new projects,
and to ensure investment to support
these new projects.

80

(Mt)

2022

z Until 2025, Japan is expected tosecure supplies from other projects
and portfolio players.

Indonesia
Oman
Mozambique

Source: Estimates based on various sources

13

1.2
2 The role and challenges of natural gas
in Asia’s energy transition and energy securityz A growing number of Asian countries have also declaredthemselves carbon neutral (CN), but the roadmap to achieve
this is unclear.

Energy mix of major Asian countriesJapan

z The energy supply and demand structure of Asian countries ishighly carbon intensive, and to realise CN, they need to restructure energy system in the limited time frame of the next
three or four decades.
z In addition, developing countries have unique challenges.

Viet Nam

Energy demand will inevitably continue increasing in the future,necessitating a stable supply of large amounts of energy.

Malaysia

9

Cheap energy supplies are essential in light of protecting lowincome people as well as industrial development,.

Indonesia

z Challenges exist in Asia’s energy transition.

z

Some countries have limited renewable energy availability.

z

There is a strong demand for energy affordability, and the cost of
integrating variable renewable energy will become an issue.

IEEJ © 2022

Renewable energy lacks strength to supply the fast growing energy
demand.

39%

34%

24%

15%

29%

29%

India

z

26%

41%

13%

24%

43%

China
0%
Oil

6%
19%

61%

Coal

8%

25%

52%

Thailand

9

24%

38%

27%

e.g., China by 2060, India by 2070, Indonesia by 2060, Viet Nam by 2050

20%

40%

60%

Natural gas

Nuclear

Hydro

8%
80%

100%

Other renewables

Source: Compiled from IEA “World Energy Balance
2022”

14

1.2
2 The role and challenges of natural gas
in Asia’s energy transition and energy securityz A two-stage decarbonisation scenario that takes advantage of natural gas (*) could be a realistic solution for Asia, whichfaces the challenge of energy transition (see previous page). But there are challenges.
* Can stably supply large amount of energy (high energy density). Can lower GHG emission by switching from coal.
Asian decarbonisation taking advantage of natural gas
Stage 1: Satisfy energy needs and achieve low carbonisation byswitching from coal to natural gas
Stage 2: Decarbonisation by commercialising various technologies
under development (hydrogen, CCUS) as well as avoiding making
natural gas asset stranded.

Challenges of natural gas••

The economics of natural gas has declined due to soaring prices.
There is concern that the role of natural gas will diminish as
investments in other decarbonised energy increase if the priceremains extremely high for an extended period of time.

z Asia’s energy transition/security will be more costly (right figure) andcould weaken Asia’s relative economic power against other region if
constraints on natural gas investment trigger its high price.

IEEJ © 2022

z Therefore, it is necessary to develop an environment for appropriate useof natural gas.
z

Clarify its role as a transition energyzPromotion of natural gas-related investmentz

Supporting technology to decarbonise natural gas (CCS, CCUS, hydrogen)12
10¢2019/kWhz The promotion of natural gas and LNG investment will not only help tostabilise the markets, but will also contribute to curbing the cost ofenergy transition/security in Asia and averting negative impacts on theregional economy.

The impact of fossil fuel prices on themarginal cost of electricity in ASEAN

8High Fuel Prices
Case

6

IEA-SDS Case

4
2
0
2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

2060

15

1.3
3 Importance of stabilising markets
to decarbonise fossil fuels (natural gas)z Blue hydrogen and ammonia play a central role in the decarbonisation of fossil fuels.
zBlue hydrogen/ammonia is also expected to play a role in shaping the market in the early stages ofhydrogen/ammonia introduction (Green hydrogen/ammonia is more difficult to implement early interms of both quantity and price).

z

The natural gas market needs to be stabilised in order to ensure the introduction of bluehydrogen/ammonia because blue hydrogen/ammonia cannot be competitive to materialise thescenario when natural gas price is high.
Green hydrogen

Blue hydrogen

2
5HQHZDEOHSRZHU)RVVLOIXHO+SURGXFWLRQ

+

:DWHU

+
SURGXFWLRQ+IEEJ © 2022

&2
&2 LVFDSWXUHGDQGXWLOLVHG RUVWRUHG
16Structure of this report
1. Energy security strategy in view of war in Ukraine and energy transition
2. Strengthening stable power supply and importance of nuclear power
generation
3. Critical mineral issues in energy and economic security

IEEJ © 2022

4. Economic impact of green investment

17

2.1
1T
The
he challenges of stable electricity supply under mmarket deregulation,
mass introduction of REs and soaring fuel prices
z In advanced economies, the power generation mix has changed significantly throughout the 2010s due to delegulation ofelectricity market, the promotion of decarbonisation policies, the expansion of renewable power generation, and low
primary energy prices through 2020, resulting in a downward trend in conventional power generation capacities. Overall,there is less reserve capacity and greater vulnerability to shocks.
z Electricity supply and demand becomes more vulnerable against external shocks such like heat waves, cold waves,earthquakes, and prolonged bad wind conditions. Examples include tight supply due to summer heat wave at the California
ISO from 2020 to 2022, rolling blackout due to cold wave at ERCOT, Texas in February 2021, and tight supply in Tokyo
area due to outage of power station due to earthquake combined with cold/heat wave in March/June 2022.

IEEJ © 2022

4

Electricity generated (PWh)z Withdrawal of power station for economic reasons is difficult topredict, making long-term reliability assessment difficult
thereby investment in new power generation difficult. The
United Kingdom is attempting to introduce technologies thatcan both decarbonise and provide a stable supply through a
support mechanism that takes into account the characteristics
of each next-generation technology. It is likely that similar
policies will prevail among countries and regions.

Electricity generated by source in EU 28
30%
25%
3
20%
2

15%
10%

1

Other renewables

Share of renewables

z In advanced economies, increasing number of country/region
are introducing capacity markets, which are a mechanism to
pay for the availability of supply capacity, to secure investment
for new capacities as well as to ensure operation of existing
capacities. But even in these countries, there have been cases
in which they are fail to secure sufficient supply capacity at atime when demand actually increases.

5%

Wind and solar PV
OilNatural gas
Coal
Hydro
NuclearShare of renewables

0

0%
1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2021

Source: Compiled from IEA “World Energy Balance 2022”

18

2.1
1T
The
he challenges of stable electricity supply under mmarkett deregulation,
mass introduction of REs and soaring fuel prices
z In Europe, where many countries are abolishing coal-fired power generation as a policy in their efforts todecarbonise, wind power generation has become low in output since around the autumn of 2021, andwholesale electricity spot prices have soared due to rising natural gas prices. This, combined with war in
Ukraine, has led to a protracted crisis. In addition, during the summer of 2022, a combination of heatwaves caused power station to shut down and output to fall, further tightening the reserve capacity. A
shortage of natural gas supplies from Russia heading into winter could lead to electricity shortages.
z In China and India, where the share of coal-fired power generation is high, planned power outage due tocoal shortages also occurred in 2021 and 2022. In January 2021, wholesale electricity spot prices soared
in Japan due to LNG shortages. These are all issues of “kWh shortage” associated with fuel constraints.
The conventional kW shortage still needs to be addressed, but in addition, the kWh shortage also needs tobe addressed.

IEEJ © 2022

z Until now, the adequacy of supply capacity (the possibility of a kW shortage) has been an indicator toassess supply stability. However, on the other hand, quantitative assessment of risk of a kWh shortage,
including the risks in the fuel supply countries, is difficult. Quantitative assessment of the kWh shortage
risk would be a major issue for future policy response.

19

2.2
2 Trends to promote nucl
nuclear power under the new reality
and future challenges
z Nuclear
N lpower generationti
isi promisingi i
as a zero-emission baseload power source. In addition, nuclear could play a roleby taking advantage of its characteristics as the demand for energy security intensifies.
z In the case of the United Kingdom and France, to reach ambitious policy goal, bold measures are taken that diverge inpart from the market deregulation policy. These policy examples may have important implications for Japan.
Examples in United Kingdom

Examples in France

Adhering to the necessity of nuclear•
The Government announced the Energy Security Strategy inearly April 2022. The strategy includes an ambitious target for
nuclear to cover 25% of electricity supply by installing up to
24 GW by 2050.

Strategies based on a long-term perspective•
In February 2022 (before the Russian invasion of Ukraine),
President Emmanuel Macron said at least six of the next
generation of the European pressurised water reactors (EPR 2)
would be built and eight more would be considered.

9

Nuclear, which is capable of stable power generation, is
considered to have attracted renewed attention because thecountry is necessary to prepare for the situation in which theoutput of wind power, which is increasing every year, is not as
expected, and it is also necessary to break away fromdependence on fossil fuels, including natural gas, in the future.

Supporting measures•
A review of the support mechanism (so called RAB model) isunder consideration to promote the investment for new reactors.
The current mechanism (Contract for Difference, CfD) isdesigned to support only when power station start operation,and it does not sufficiently contain the uncertainty of nuclear
project, which requires large investments and long
construction period before generate a profit.

IEEJ © 2022

9

9
9

•

This strategy is sought to be based on the results of ananalysis published in October 2021 by transmission system
operator RTE.
Scenario analysis of the long-term power mix. The study
resulted to identify that achieving carbon neutrality without
new nuclear power capacity is unrealistic, and that the total
cost of the electricity system, including integration costs, ischeaper in a scenario where assumes the addition of nuclear
capacity.

Planning and implementation based on the long-term
perspective is ideal since decision-making and construction of
nuclear power takes a long time.

Strengthening the state-led implementation system•
In July 2022, Prime Minister Élisabeth Borne announced a plan
to fully nationalise power giant Électricité de France (EDF) in
order to make a strong push for decarbonisation.

20

2.2
2 Trends to promote nucl
nuclear power under the new reality
and future challengesz China and Russia dominate the world nuclear market (figure), although there is a trend away fromdependence on Russia.
••••

Finland cancelled its contract to build the Hanhikivi 1
Ukraine plans to install nine Westinghouse-built light water reactors.
Poland has established partnerships with U.S. and French companies.
On the other hand, construction of Russian nuclear reactors is underway in China, India, Turkey, Bangladesh, Hungary,
Egypt and other countries.

z Delays and cost overruns have been seen in new development of Western countries in recent decades due
to a sharp decline in the number of new projects and the loss of construction know-how.
•

Growing emphasis on energy security alone cannot ensure Western companies to seize business. The key is whether
they can take advantage of the lessons learned from current projects.
54%

Planned61%

IEEJ © 2022

Under
construction

By Russia

0

By China

20

By others

40
Unit

World’s under construction and planned nuclear reactors(As of 1 January 2022)
60

80

Source: Compiled from “World Nuclear Power Plants” (2022 edition)of Nuclear Power in the World, published by the Japan Atomic
Industrial Forum.

21

Structure of this report
1. Energy security strategy in view of war in Ukraine and energy transition
2. Strengthening stable power supply and importance of nuclear power
generation
3. Critical mineral issues in energy and economic security

IEEJ © 2022

4. Economic impact of green investment

22

Analysis frameworkz Analysed supply and demand balance of critical minerals.
Î Comparing supply and demand, and comparing cumulative demand and resource reserves + recycled
supply as time series (up to 2050)
Subjected technologies and mineralsz Carbon neutral (CN) technologies: renewable energy, stationary storage batteries, electric vehicles, fuelcell vehicles, water electrolysis, etc. (decreases in mineral demand due to abolish of conventional
technologies are also considered. Demand for non-carbon neutral technologies also considered)z Critical minerals: Copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, silicon, dysprosium, neodymium, platinum,
palladium, rhodium, and vanadium
Methodology
z Demand = Amount of CN technology installed ¼ Mineral resource intensity of technology
í&RQYHQWLRQDOWHFKQRORJ\WREHUHSODFHG¼ Mineral resource intensity of technology.

IEEJ © 2022

z Supply = Mine production + Recycling supply.
Production from mine = f(mine development stage, production capacity),
Recycled amount = Waste amount ¼ Product recovery rate ¼ Recycling rate.

23

Analysis: example of Nickel and Lithium
Supply-demand
outlookComparison of cumulative demand andreserves (+ recycled supply)

Nickel (Ni) (used in lithium-ion batteries)
12

Mt

z In the Advanced Technologies Scenario(ATS) in which the electrification of theautomobile advances greatly, the demand
will increase more than 3 times fromcurrent levels by 2050.
z In ATS, demand will exceed supply (mineproduction + recycling) around 2035.

10

Demand [Advanced
Technologies]

8

Supply [Advanced
Technologies]

6

Demand [Reference]4

Supply [Reference]2

Reserves + supply
from recycling
Demand0Demand, of which: Noncarbon neutral uses

0

z Cumulative demand in ATS through 2050
will exceed reserves (+ recycled supply).

2022

Lithium (Li)

2030

2040

2050

1.8

z In ATS, demand will exceed supply (mineproduction + recycling) around 2030.

1.2

Demand [Reference]

0.8
0.6

Supply [Reference]

0.4
Demand, of which: Noncarbon neutral uses

0.2
0.0
2022

2030

2040

150

200

Other power generation
VehiclesWater electrolysis
Indonesia
RussiaOthersDemandSupply [Advanced
Technologies]

1.0

Mt

Reserves + supply
from recycling

Demand [Advanced
Technologies]

1.4

100

2050

0

5

10

Wind, solar PV
Stationary fuel cells
Replacement in-vehicle battery
Non-carbon neutral uses
Chile
Argentina
United States
Recycling

15
Mt

20

25

30

Other power generation
VehiclesWater electrolysis
Australia
China
OthersIEEJ © 2022

z Cumulative demand in ATS through 2050
will be slightly below reserves (+ recycled
supply).

1.6

Mt

z Demand will grow significantly mainly with
the increase in electric vehicles. In ATS, it
will increase by more than 10 times fromcurrent levels by 2050.

50

Wind, solar PV
Stationary fuel cells
Replacement in-vehicle battery
Non-carbon neutral uses
Australia
BrazilPhilippines
Recycling

24

Uneven distribution of critical mineralsz Reserves of many critical minerals are unevenly distributed around the globe.
z However, geographical distribution of reserves and downstream processes is often different. For example,
Indonesia has the largest share of nickel production, while China has the largest share of primary nickel
production after refining.

IEEJ © 2022

Country-wise share of reserves

United States
CanadaMexicoBrazilPeru
Chile
Argentina
Cuba
Australia
Indonesia
Philippines
Viet Nam
China
Kazakhstan
RussiaZimbabwe
DR Congo
South Africa
OthersCu(copper)
5%
1%
6%
0%
9%
23%
0%
0%
11%
3%
0%
0%
3%
2%
1%
0%
4%
0%
33%

Co
(cobalt)
1%
3%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
7%
18%
8%
3%
0%
1%
0%
3%
0%
46%
0%
9%

Ni
(nickel)
0%
2%
0%
17%
0%
0%
0%
0%
22%
22%
5%
0%
3%
0%
8%
0%
0%
0%
21%

Li
V
(lithium)(vanadium)
3%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
1%
0%
0%
42%
0%
10%
0%
0%
0%
26%
25%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
7%
40%
0%
0%
0%
21%
1%
0%
0%
0%
0%
15%
11%
0%

Note: Compiled from USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2022

Country-wise production shareof ore and primary nickel (2019)
PGM(platinum
REO
group)(rare earth)
1%
2%
0%
1%
0%
0%
0%
18%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
3%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
18%
0%
37%
0%
0%
6%
18%
2%
0%
0%
0%
90%
1%
0%
4%

Ore production
Americas
EuropeJapan
China
Indonesia
Philippines
Other Asia
Oceania
RussiaAfricaOthers

11%
2%
0%
4%
35%
13%
8%
6%
9%
2%
10%

Primary
nickelproduction
12%
17%
8%
34%
16%
0%
3%
8%
0%
3%
0%

25

Supply and demand balancee (Advanced Technologies Scenario)z Reserves + recycling < Cumulative demand (until 2050): Nickel and cobalt
z Early supply shortage concerns: lithium, cobalt, neodymium and dysprosiumz Uneven distribution and geopolitical risks: nickel, cobalt, graphite, platinum-group metals, neodymium,dysprosium and vanadium&XPXODWLYHGHPDQGWKURXJKí UHVHUYHVUHF\FOHGVXSSO\Co
Democratic Republic of theCongo, Australia, Indonesia

Today

Ni

Australia, Indonesia, Brazil,
Russia, Philippines

Timing of tight
VXSSO\-demandbalance2030

Chile, Australia, Argentina, China

IEEJ © 2022

China

2050

2040

Chile, Australia, Peru,
MexicoCu

LiSouth Africa, Russia, Zimbabwe South Africa, Russia,

Turkey, China, Brazil
China

High uneven distribution
and geopolitical risks
Low and medium uneven
distribution and geopolitical
risks
Country name: Major production
areas

Dy

C

Nd

V

China, Australia,
Russia, South Africa

Pt

United States

Rh

Pd

South Africa, Russia, Zimbabwe

Si

Note: Cu (copper), Li (lithium), Si (silicon), Ni (nickel), Co (cobalt), C (graphite), Pt (platinum), Pd (palladium), Rh (rhodium), Nd (neodymium), Dy (dysprosium) and V (vanadium)

26

Reference: Major uses of critical minerals

IEEJ © 2022

2UH

0DMRUXVHV&X FRSSHU:LQGSRZHUJHQHUDWLRQVRODUSKRWRYROWDLFVSRZHUJHQHUDWLRQHOHFWULFYHKLFOHVEDWWHULHV+RZHYHU
LWLVRIWHQXVHGRXWVLGHRI&1WHFKQRORJ\/L OLWKLXP/LWKLXPLRQEDWWHU\

6L VLOLFRQ

6RODU39+RZHYHULWLVRIWHQXVHGRXWVLGHRI&1WHFKQRORJ\

1L QLFNHO/LWKLXPLRQEDWWHULHV+RZHYHUVWDLQOHVVVWHHODQGKHDWUHVLVWDQWVWHHODUHWKHPDLQDSSOLFDWLRQV

&R FREDOW/LWKLXPLRQEDWWHULHVVSHFLDOVWHHO& JUDSKLWH/LWKLXPLRQEDWWHULHVPHWDOFUXFLEOHVPROGVHOHFWULFIXUQDFHHOHFWURGHVHWF

3W SODWLQXP([KDXVWJDVFDWDO\VWVIRUDXWRPRELOHVHOHFWURFDWDO\VWVIRUIXHOFHOOVDQGZDWHUHOHFWURO\VHUV

3G SDOODGLXP([KDXVWJDVFDWDO\VWVIRUDXWRPRELOHVHOHFWURFDWDO\VWVIRUIXHOFHOOVDQGZDWHUHOHFWURO\VHUV

5K UKRGLXP([KDXVWJDVFDWDO\VWVIRUDXWRPRELOHV

1G QHRG\PLXP(OHFWULFYHKLFOHPRWRUVPDJQHWVLQZLQGSRZHUJHQHUDWRUV'\ G\VSURVLXP(OHFWULFYHKLFOHPRWRUVPDJQHWVLQZLQGSRZHUJHQHUDWRUV

9 YDQDGLXP(OHFWURO\WHIRUUHGR[IORZEDWWHULHV2WKHUWKDQ&1WHFKQRORJ\DGGLWLYHVWRVWHHODUHPDLQ

27

Response requiredz Under the Advanced Technologies Scenario, the cumulative demand for nickel and cobalt by 2050 will
exceed the reserves (+ recycled supply). Also, demand for lithium, cobalt, neodymium and dysprosium
will exceed supply by around 2030.
z With respect to these critical minerals, it is necessary to develop technologies that contribute toincreasing the recycling rate, in conjunction with increasing production at existing mines and developing
new mines.
z In order to secure critical minerals, it is necessary to develop recycling, non-use and reduced usage
technologies, as well as acquisition or rights and long-term purchase contracts. Diversification of criticalminerals is also important.
z Currently, the supply of critical minerals is an oligopoly of several countries. The introduction of new
regulations and tax regime on resource development and exports in producing countries may cause
supply constraints for demand countries. Therefore, it is necessary to pay close attention to the policy
trends of producing countries. Diversification of the supply chain is also an issue to be addressed, since
processing such as refining is concentrated in specific countries such as China.

IEEJ © 2022

z There are uncertainties in policies of resource producing country, prospects for developing technologies
for recycling, non-use and reduced usage. Therefore, it is important to balance technology choices fromthe perspective of energy and economic security and the sustainability of critical minerals.

28

Structure of this report
1. Energy security strategy in view of war in Ukraine and energy transition
2. Strengthening stable power supply and importance of nuclear power
generation
3. Critical mineral issues in energy and economic security

IEEJ © 2022

4. Economic impact of green investment

29

Background of the analysis/DVW\HDU,((-2XWORRNUDLVHGLVVXHVWKDWVKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGGXULQJWKHFRXUVHWRZDUGVFDUERQQHXWUDOLW\- “Green growth” is expected, in which investments in climate action will form a virtuous cycle of emissions
reductions and economic growth, but the effects may vary by economy and actor.
- That can create new gaps: (1) disparities among advanced economies and among developing economies,(2) disparities between advanced and developing economies, (3) disparities between economies that
depend on fossil fuel exports and those that do not, and (4) disparities among citizens.

IEEJ © 2022

In this background, “IEEJ Outlook 2023” provides a quantitative assessment of how climate change
investment (green investment) impacts countries or regions, and what disparities may arise.

30

Analytical methodz Quantitative assessment of the impact of green
investment* on national economies

Increase in green investment and consumption* Regard difference of investment in the Advanced
Technologies Scenario to the Reference Scenario.

«Case settings»
1R)LQDQFLDO&RQVWUDLQHG&DVH
Additional green investment will have a positive
spillover effect as well as multiplier effect through1) an increased demand Î 2) Increased incomeÎ 3) increased consumption(This case represent common concept of green
growth))LQDQFLDO&RQVWUDLQHG&DVH

IEEJ © 2022

Since funds have a constrain, the amount spenton green investments reduces other investments.
Furthermore, since green investment itself is not
an investment to expand production capacity, it isalso considered that production and income will
decrease through a decrease in production
capacity due to a decrease in other investments.

Decrease in other investment
and consumption
Increase in intermediate
inputsp
Increase in spilloverp
production
Increase in income[Primaryripple effect]

Decrease in intermediate
inputsp

Decrease in production
capacity
p y

Decrease in spilloverp
production

Decrease in production

Decrease in income

Decrease in income

Increase in investmentpand consumption

Increase in spilloverƉƌŽĚƵĐƟŽŶ

Decrease in investmentpand consumption[Multiplier effect]

Decrease in spilloverproduction
Decrease in income

Increase in income[1/ No Financial Constrained][2/ Financial Constrained]

31

Green growth is unlikely when there are constraints in funds
Changes in production in 2050
(By region. Compared to Reference Scenario)
8%

10%

20%

15%

11%

13%

15%

15%
6%

2%

z Without financial constraints, global production
would increase by 9.8%, while with constraints it
would decrease by 3.7%.
z Regardless of financial constraints, the production
value will decline in economies such as the Middle
East, which is highly dependent on mining (fossil
fuels).
z Advanced economies are more likely to enjoy
green growth, while developing countries are not.

10%

-2%

-1%

-2%

-4%

Total

-3%

Other services-4%

No Financial Constrained

Trade

Energy-20%-26%Constriction

-30%

-4%

Public Services-1%

Finance, Insurance &Real estate

-1%

-12%
-16%

Communication &Transport

-1%

-10%

Manufacturing(processing)-4%

Mining

-6%

-25%

China

10%

0%

-0%

Financial Constrained

18%

10%

-20%
AfricaMiddle East

Latin America

Advanced Asia

Advanced Europe

North America

No Financial Constrained

12%

-7%

-11%
-17% -19%

-30%

17%

-0%

-5%

-20%

IEEJ © 2022

8%

Manufacturing(material)

3%

Agriculture

3%

World

-1%

-2%

8%

Advanced Economies

0%
-10%

11%

3%

Emerging Market andDeveloping Economies

17%
8%

Other Europe/
Eurasia10%

Other Asia

20%

Changes in production in 2050
(By industry. Compared to Reference Scenario)

Financial Constrainedz Regardless of financial constraints, theproduction value of mining and energy supply
related to fossil fuel will decrease.
z GDP accelerates by an average of 0.4% a year
without financial constraints and decelerates
by 0.1% with constraints(IEA analysed acceleration of 0.4% in the 2020s intheir Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario *).

* IEA (2021), Net Zero by 2050 - A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector

32

Conclusionz Although “green growth” is expected in green investment, many economies are unable to enjoy it if
there are financial constraints.
z Regardless of financial constraints, advanced economies are more likely to enjoy green growth, whereas
emerging and developing economies are not. In the real world, there are advanced economies withmoney to spare and developing economies without money to spare, and the economic gap between thetwo can become wider.
z In order to raise funds smoothly, it is necessary to utilise green finance, which mainly consists of private
funds, as well as government budgets. It is important to clarify the direction of environmental policy inorder to limit risks and encourage investment.
z Regardless of financial constraint, economies highly dependent on fossil fuel exports are negatively
affected. It is necessary to break away from dependence on the fossil fuel industry, and re-education(reskilling) of workers will be important for smooth labour movement from declining industries to otherindustries.

IEEJ © 2022

z In a world striving for a low-carbon society, new disparities between economies or industries may arise.
It is important to limit negative economic impacts and to even out the different impacts among
economies and industries. If the availability of funds lead to greater inequality, it is also necessary foradvanced economies to provide financial support to emerging and developing economies that cannot
afford it.

33

Thank you for your attention.

IEEJ © 2022

Co-authors
Hiroshi HASHIMOTO

Gas Group, Fossil Energies & International Cooperation Unit (1.1)

Yoshikazu KOBAYASHI

CCUS Group, Fossil Energies & International Cooperation Unit (1.3)

Junichi OGASAWARAElectric Power Industry & New and Renewable Energy Unit (2.1)

Kenji KIMURA

Nuclear Energy Group, Strategy Research Unit (2.2)

Yoshiaki SHIBATA

New Energy System Group, Electric Power Industry & New and Renewable Energy Unit (3.1)

Shigeru SUEHIRO

Econometric & Statistical Analysis Group, Energy Data and Modelling Center (3.1, 3.2)34

,((- 2XWORRN,((-
RRN,((-

Reference materials

Geographical coverageCountries/regions in the world are geographically aggregated into 42 regions.
Especially the Asian energy supply/demand structure is considered in detail, aggregating
the area into 15 regions. That of the Middle East is also aggregated into 8 regions.

Advanced Europe

North America-U
United St
States- Canada-U
Unitednited Kingdom
King-G
Germany- FFrance
r
rance
- It
Italy
ttaly
- Others

Other Europe/Eurasia-R
Russiaussia-O
Other Fo
Former Soviet U
Union-O
Other Emerging andDeveloping Europe

Middle East
Latin America,((- 2XWORRN,((-

-M
Mexicoexico-BBrazil-C
Chile- Others

Intl. Bunkers- AviationA- Marine
Source: [Map] www.craftmap.box-i.net-Saudi
-Sa
Sa
aud
audi
a
udi
di ArabiaArra
abia
a - IIran
r
ran
- Ir
Iraq
raq - UA
UAE
U
AE - Ku
A
Kuwait
K
-Q
Qata
Qatar
ar - Oman- Others

Africa- So
Southouth A
Africa (R(Rep. of)-N
North Africa
Af- Others

Asia

- Ja
Japan
apan
a
pan - China
C a - IIndia
n
ndia
-C
Chinesehinesee Taipei
Taip
Ta pe
T
pei
ei - Korea
K
Ko-H
Hong Kong
Kong
g - IIn
Indonesiandndondonesian-M
Malaysia - Philippines
P
Phi
Phili
-T
Thailandhailand - Vi
Viet
Vet Name-S
Singapore
ingaporre - Myanm
ingapore
MyanmarM-B
Bruneirunei D
Darussalam- Others

OceaniaO
i- Australia
A- New Zealand37Modelling framework
Major assumptions
Macroeconomic modelCalculate GDP-related indices,
price indices, activity indicesincluding material production,etc. consistently.

Technology assessment
model,((- 2XWORRN,((-

Use a bottom-up approach to
calculate future efficiencies ofappliances, vehicles, etc.

Optimal power
generation planning
model
Calculate the cost-optimal
power generation mix to meetthe projected future electricity
demand.

GDP, population, energy
prices, exchange rates,international trade, etc.

Energy supplydemand model
Econometric model to project
future energy supply anddemand by regression
analysis of historical trends
based on the energy balancetables data of theInternational Energy Agency.
This model calculates energy
demand, supply andtransformation as well as
related indices including CO2
emissions, CO2 intensities andenergy self-sufficiency ratios.
Experts’ opinions

World trade model
Use the linear programming(LP) method to calculate thefuture international tradeflows of crude oil, petroleum
products, etc.

Computable generalequilibrium model
Estimate economic impacts
induced by changes in energy
supply and demand, based on
input-output table data.

Climate change modelCalculate future GHG
concentration in theatmosphere, temperature rise,damage caused by climatechange, etc.
38

Basic scenarios in IEEJ Outlook
Reference Scenario,((- 2XWORRN,((-

Reflects past trends with technology
progress and current energy policies,
without any aggressive policies for
low-carbon measures

Advanced Technologies
Scenario
Assumes introduction of powerfulpolicies to address energy security andclimate change issues with the utmost
penetration of low-carbon
technologies

Socio-economic
structure

Stable growth led by developing economies despite slower population growth.
Rapid penetration of energy consuming appliances and vehicles due to higher
income.

International energy
prices

Oil supply cost increases along withdemand growth.
Natural gas prices converge among
Europe, North America and Asia
markets.
Coal price decreases due to request
for decarbonization.

All prices decrease along withdecrease in demand due to progressin energy saving and request for
decarbonization

Energy andenvironmental policies

Gradual reinforcement of low-carbon
policies with past pace

Further reinforcement of domestic
policies along with international
collaboration

Energy andenvironmental
technologies

Improving efficiency and declining
cost of existing technology with past
pace

Further declining cost of existing andpromising technology
39

Assumptions

Population
CAGR

Composition

North America
Latin America

0.5%

Asia

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

Oth. Europe/Eurasia

6

Advanced Europe-0.02%
2.0%

World

0.7%
0%

4.7

4.2

1%

3%

2%

Asia
Latin America

2

0.7%

-1%

Middle East

4

Oceania

Oceania
Africa0.0%

Africa1980-2020
2020-2050

2.4

7.8
1.3

1.2%

Advanced Europe
Oth. Europe/Eurasia

8

0.4%

Middle East

9.6

10
Billion

0.4%

North America
0.6

0.8

2020

2050

0

Compound annual growth rate

40
Assumptions

Real GDP
CAGR

North America

Composition

200

2.0%

Latin America$2015 trillion

2.9%

Asia

3.6%

Middle East

100

2.2%

AfricaAfrica

50

2.4%

World

Advanced Europe
82

2%

4%

6%

Compound annual growth rate

0

Middle East
Asia
Latin America

28

2.8%
0%

81

19

4.5%

Oceania

OceaniaOth. Europe/Eurasia

1.6%

Oth. Europe/Eurasia,((- 2XWORRN,((-

30

150

2.9%

Advanced Europe

1980-2020
2020-2050

185

21
2020

North America
38
2050

41

Assumptions

Reference :Advanced Technologies :International energy prices

Natural gas

Crude oil
150 $/bbl

20 $/MBtu
15

100

Japan
Europe (UK)
United States

10
50

5

0

0

1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Coal

CIF import prices for Japan

1 000 $/toe

150 $/t

800,((- 2XWORRN,((-

100

600
400

50

200
0

0

1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Note: Historical prices are nominal. Assumed future prices as real in $2021.

42

Assumptions

Energy and environmental technology
2050
2020

Reference

Advanced

Assumptions for Advanced Technologies Scenario

Technologies

Improving energy efficiency
Intensity in steel industry

0.266

0.254

0.200

0.089

0.070

0.054

8%

66%

95%

14.5

26.7

40.2

100

161

215

100

155

189

38%

45%

46%

Biofuels for transport (Mtoe)

91

154

268

Nuclear power generation capacity (GW)

408

477

767

Wind power generation capacity (GW)

731

2 243

4 460

Solar PV power generation capacity

708

3 033

6 013

0

0

1 247

38%

44%

84%

Industry

Transport

Buildings(ktoe/kt)
Intensity in non-metallic
minerals industry
Electrified vehicle share inpassenger car sales
Average fuel efficiency in new
passenger car (km/L)
Residential total efficiency(Y2020=100)
Commercial total efficiency

Power

Thermal generation efficiency(Power transmission end‫ك‬

100% penetration of Best Available Technology by 2050.

Cost reduction of electrified vehicles.
Promotion measures including fuel supply infrastructure.
*electrified vehicle includes hybrid vehicle, plug-in hybrid vehicle, electric vehicle andfuel-cell vehicle

Efficiency improvement at twice the speed for newly installed appliance,
equipment and insulation.
Electrification in space heating, water heater and cooking (clean cooking indeveloping regions).
Financial scheme for initial investment in high-efficient thermal power plant.

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

Penetrating low-carbon technology
Development of next generation biofuel with cost reduction.
Relating to agricultural policy in developing regions.
Appropriate price in wholesale electricity market.
Framework for financing initial investment in developing regions.
Further reduction of generation cost.
Cost reduction of grid stabilization technology.
Thermal power generation capacity withCCS (GW)
Zero-emission generation ratio (incl. CCS)

Efficient operation of power system.
Installing CCS after 2030 (regions which have storage potential except foraquifer).
Efficient operation of power system including international power grid.

43

Reference Scenario

Population, GDP, energy and CO2Advanced Economies

Emerging Market and Developing Economies

Population

300

Population

300

Real GDP

309

Real GDP

Primary energy consumption

Primary energy consumption

CO2 emissions

CO2 emissions

200

200
170
141
131
128

Y2020=100
Y2020=100
102
94
77

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

100

100

0

0
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

44
Reference Scenario

Primary energy consumption
By region
20 000
Mtoe,((- 2XWORRN,((-

15 000Intl. bunkers
Oceania
AfricaOth. Europe/Eurasia
Advanced Europe
Middle East
Asia
Latin America
North America

By energy source
20 000
Mtoe

Other renewables
17 64916 94816 007

Hydro
Nuclear

15 000Natural gas

13 96312 833Oil
Coal

10 000

10 000

5 000

5 000

10 0228 747

001990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

45

Reference Scenario

Primary energy consumption (by region)
Energy consumption
10 000
Mtoe

Changes (2020-2050)

North America
Latin America
Asia
Middle East

8 000

Advanced Europe
Oth. Europe/Eurasia
Africa6 000

Oceania

4 000

Mtoe

CAGR

Asia

2 148

1.0%

Africa470

1.5%

Middle East

428

1.5%

Latin America

394

1.4%

Oth. Europe/Eurasia

70

0.2%

Oceania60.1%,((- 2XWORRN,((-

2 000

North America
0

-57

-0.1%

Advanced Europe -210

-0.5%1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

46
Reference Scenario

Primary energy consumption (by energy source)
Energy consumption
6 000
Mtoe

Coal
Oil
Natural gas
Nuclear
Hydro
Other renewables

4 000

Changes (2020-2050)
Mtoe

CAGR

Natural gas

1 514

Oil

Other renewables,((- 2XWORRN,((-

2 000

1 007

0.7%

908

1.4%

Nuclear

166

0.7%

Hydro

144

1.1%

Coal -53

0

1.3%

0.0%

1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

47

Reference Scenario

Primary energy consumption (by sector)
Energy consumption
5 000

Industry

Mtoe

Transport

Mtoe

Buildings, etc.
4 000

Changes (2020-2050)

Non-energy use

CAGR

Gen. & trans. losses

1 080

1.0%

995

1.1%

Gen. & trans. losses

Transport

Other transf.
3 000

Industry
2 000

Non-energy use

429

1.3%

Buildings, etc.

329

0.3%

Other transf.

228

0.6%

1 000
,((- 2XWORRN,((-

0.7%

624

0
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

48
Reference Scenario

Final energy consumption
By energy source

By sector
14 000Mtoe
12 000

14 000

OthersBuildings, etc.

Mtoe

Electricity

Transport

12 000Natural gas

Non-energy use

Industry
10 000

10 000

8 000

8 000

11 951
11 467
10 918

Oil
Coal

9 573
8 820

7 014

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

6 236
6 000

6 000

4 000

4 000

2 000

2 000

0

0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

49

Reference Scenario

Oil consumption
By region
120
Mb/d
100

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

80

By sector

Intl. bunkers
Oceania
AfricaOth. Europe/Eurasia
Advanced Europe
Middle East
Asia
Latin America
North America

120

Transformation

Mb/dNon-energy use

100

80

60

60

40

40

20

20

Transport
Industry
77

106

103

Buildings, etc.
87

107

86

68

0

0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

50
Reference Scenario

Crude oil production
By region
120
Mb/d
100

80

AfricaEurope/Eurasia
Middle East
Asia & Oceania
Latin America
83
83
North America
75

Changes (2020-2050)

105

108

109

90

Mb/d
Middle East

17

Latin America

565North America

60

Africa40

20,((- 2XWORRN,((-

3

0

1

Asia & Oceania-3Europe/Eurasia-4

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

51

Reference Scenario

Net exports and imports of oil

North America

88Latin America

2020

3

2030
2050

5

2
2

9
7
6

Oth. Europe/Eurasia

3
3

Africa,((- 2XWORRN,((-

Middle East

India

4
6

ASEAN

4
6

Japan, Korea& Chinese Taipei

6
7
6

9
10
8

Advanced Europe

33

26

1

20

40

20

Other Asia

1
2
3

Oceania

1
1
1

Mb/d
20

20

Net import

Net export

0

Net export

11
13
11

China

0

12

9

20

Mb/d
40

Net import

52
Reference Scenario

Petroleum product consumption
Amount
120
Mb/d
100

80

Other products
LPG
Heavy fuel oil
Gas/Diesel oil
KeroseneJet fuel82
Naphtha73

Shares
100%

95

98

100
80%

79

64

60%

60
40%
40
20%

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

20

0

0%
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

53

Reference Scenario

Major trade flows of crude oil (2021)
Unit: Mb/dOther Europe / Eurasia

Advanced
Europe

4.1
1.7

1.5

0.5

Japan,
p
Korea and
Chinese Taipei

1.2

1.2

Southeast Asia

1.2

1.4
0.5
,((- 2XWORRN,((-

China

South Asia

Africa1.3

5.2

Middle East4
4.2

2.2

North America

Latin America

4.4
Oceania

Note: 0.5 Mb/d or more are shown

54

Reference Scenario

Major trade flows of crude oil (2050)
Unit: Mb/dOther Europe / Eurasia

Advanced
Europe

1.3
2.3

2.5

0.9
Africa4.6

Middle East1
10.3

China

1.4

North America

0.5

1.6

Japan,
p
Korea and
Chinese Taipei

0.5
0
5

South Asia

0.7

0.6

Southeast Asia

5.1

0.5
2.3

0.5
Latin America,((- 2XWORRN,((-

3.3
Oceania

Note: 0.5 Mb/d or more are shown55

Reference Scenario

Natural gas consumption
By region
7 000
Bcm
6 000
5 000
4 000

By sector

Intl. bunkers
Oceania
AfricaOth. Europe/Eurasia
Advanced Europe
Middle East
Asia
Latin America
North America

7 000Transformation

Bcm

Non-energy use

6 000

Buildings, etc.

5 000

5 748

Transport

5 179

Industry

4 539
3 943

4 000
3 258

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

3 000

3 000

2 000

2 000

1 000

1 000

0

2 465
1 982

0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

56
Reference Scenario

Natural gas production
By region
7 000

Oceania

Bcm

Africa

6 000
5 000

Bcm
5 871

Oth. Europe/Eurasia
Advanced Europe

5 292

Middle East

4 626

Asia
Latin America

4 000

Changes (2020-2050)

4 028

North America
3 233

3 000

2 467
2 033

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

2 000

Africa486

Middle East

466

Asia

463

North America

257

Latin America

200

Oceania

1 000
0

106

Advanced Europe-66

Oth. Europe/Eurasia-69

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

57

Reference Scenario

Net exports and imports of natural gas

2020

125
195
196

North America

2030

Latin America

0
17

291
338
341

Advanced Europe,((- 2XWORRN,((-

288

600

77
77

300

Net export

35
69
166
41

28

Other Asia

300

Bcm
600

11

107
127
198
600

Net import

15

32

Oceania
0

183
190
201
221

Japan, Korea &Chinese Taipei

133
176
290

Middle East

India

ASEAN

263
228
168

Africa

124
163
135

2050
57

Oth. Europe/Eurasia

China

300

0

300

Bcm
600

Net import

Net export

58
Reference Scenario

LNG demand

800

745

Mt
700

627
Int'l bunker

600
485

500
400

AfricaEurope372

Middle East

300

Asia

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

200

Latin America

100

North America
0
2021

2030

2040

2050

59

Reference Scenario

Major trade flows of natural gas (2021)
Unit: Bcm

Advanced
Europe187

Other Europe/Eurasia

22
MiddleEast37,((- 2XWORRN,((-

Africa46

North America

Japan, Korea andChinese Taipei

China

31
16
1
6
South Asia

39

24

15

49

19

33

84

28
16

65

46

Southeast
Asia

Latin
America

Oceania

Pipeline
LNG

60
Reference Scenario

Major trade flows of natural gas (2050)
Unit: Bcm

Advanced
Europe15
164
Middle81

26

Other Europe/Eurasia

90
Africa 25

55

25

20

15
27
South
Asia
40

25
74
SoutheastAsia
24,((- 2XWORRN,((-

45
49

14

59

Japan, Korea andChinese Taipei

China

North America

Latin
America60
Oceania
70

Pipeline
LNG

61Reference Scenario

Coal consumption
By region
7 000
Mtce
6 000
5 000

Oceania
AfricaOth. Europe/Eurasia
Advanced Europe
Middle East
Asia
Latin America
North America

4 000

By sector
7 000Transformation

Mtce

Non-energy use

6 000

Buildings, etc.

5 000

Transport 5 220 5 345
Industry

4 000,((- 2XWORRN,((-

3 174
3 000

3 000

2 000

2 000

1 000

1 000

0

5 632 5 525

5 269

3 307

0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

62
Reference Scenario

Coal production
By region
6 000
Mtce
5 000

4 000

Oceania
5 617 5 510
5 459
Africa
235
5 244
5 23
35
Oth. Europe/Eurasia
Advanced Europe
Middle East
Asia
Latin America
North America
3 177 3 255

3 000

2 000

Changes (2020-2050)

Mtce
Africa64

Latin America

38

Oceania

21

Asia

2

Middle East

0

Oth. Europe/Eurasia,((- 2XWORRN,((-

1 000

-27

Advanced Europe
North America

0

-67
-247

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

63

Reference Scenario

Net exports and imports of coal

North America

76
87
102

Latin America

33
33
29

2020
2030

111
107
76

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

198
179
96
303
306
239
8
20
57

Other Asia
10
13
10

Middle East
300

163
219
331

Japan, Korea &Chinese Taipei

62
70
78

600

India

ASEAN

165
147
158

Africa

233
238
179

2050

Advanced Europe

Oth. Europe/Eurasia

China

0

Oceania
300

Mtce
600

600

Net import

Net export

358
373
405
300

0

Mtce
600

300

Net import

Net export

64
Reference Scenario

Coal production (steam and coking coal)
Steam coal
7 000
Mt
6 000

6 476

6 537

5 950

Coking coal
1 200

6 311

Mt

1 014
926

Oceania
5 000

1 000
864

824

Africa800

Oth. Europe/Eurasia

4 000

600

Advanced Europe

3 000

Middle East,((- 2XWORRN,((-

2 000

400

Asia
200

Latin America

1 000North America

0
2020

2030

2040

2050

0
2020

2030

2040

2050

65

Reference Scenario

Major trade flows of steam and coking coal (2021)
Unit: Mt

4

62

Advanced
Europe20

4Other Europe/ Eurasia

2

21
5

18

52

Mongolia

9
16
577
8 6
Japan,
p
Korea and
China

22
13

5

32
13

4

3

55
25

53

8

ASEAN, etc.

4

91

4

13

4

Indonesia

Latin America

214

21

South Africa

8Australia

17 21

21

Colombia

66043,((- 2XWORRN,((-

5

4

India

195

Africa20

North America

Chinese Taipei

MiddleEast

4Russia6
Notes: Total value of steam and coking coal. 2 Mt or more are shown. South Africa includes Mozambique.
Source: Estimated from IEA “Coal Information 2022”, “TEX Report”, etc.

66

Reference Scenario

Major trade flows of steam and coking coal (2050)
Unit: Mt

6

14

Advanced
Europe22

6Other Europe/ Eurasia

Mongolia 48
21
411
Japan,
p
Korea and
10 42 China
Chinese Taipei

Middle
East

4
6

41

2

23
7

15

RussiaIndia

10
Africa

3

58

142
2

ASEAN, etc.

6

39
91

43

90
,((- 2XWORRN,((-South Africa

32

16

3
Notes: Total value of steam and coking coal.
2 Mt or more are shown.
South Africa includes Mozambique.

Australia

7

23
15

5

23
3

4
Colombia

6

21

18

Indonesia

22North America

9

104

99

4
33

5

168

Latin America

8

4

67

Reference Scenario

Final consumption of electricity
By region
45 000TWh
40 00035 00030 000,((- 2XWORRN,((-

25 000

By sector

Oceania
AfricaOth. Europe/Eurasia
Advanced Europe
Middle East
Asia
Latin America
North America

45 000

Buildings, etc.

TWh
40 000Transport

39 631

Industry
34 11635 00028 60830 00022 77325 000

20 000

20 000

15 000

15 000

10 000

10 000

5 000

5 000

0

17 88412 694
9 698

01990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

68
Reference Scenario

Power generation mix
Electricity generated
50 000TWh

Other renewables

45 777

Hydro
Nuclear

40 000Shares

39 845Natural gas
Oil

100%

80%

33 593Coal
30 00026 72160%

21 53920 00015 42840%

11 84420%,((- 2XWORRN,((-

10 0000%01990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

69

Reference Scenario

Energy-related CO2 emissions
Emissions

Changes (2020-2050)

25
GtCO 220

15

GtCO 2
North America
Latin America
Asia
Middle East
Advanced Europe
Oth. Europe/Eurasia
AfricaOceania

Asia

10

5
,((- 2XWORRN,((-

CAGR

0

0.7%

3.5

Africa1.3

2.6%

Middle East

0.7

1.1%

Latin America

0.6

1.3%

Oceania

-0.1

-0.5%

Oth. Europe/Eurasia

-0.1

-0.1%

Advanced Europe

-0.9

-1.1%

North America

-1.0

-0.8%

1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

70
Reference Scenario

Energy-related investments (2021 – 2050)
By sector40

By region

Total $74.0 trillion
Asia

33.9
Nuclear, 1.8$2015 trillion

30

North America

26.4

Biofuels and hydrogenn , 0.6
Coal, 1.820

10,((- 2XWORRN,((-

Thermal, 4.00

Renewables
15.0

Transmission
anddistribution
13.0
Electricity
supplyNatural gas
10.9

Oil
13.0

Fuel supply

27.0
11.4

Middle East

8.8

Advanced Europe

7.8

Africa6.1

Industry , 2.1

Latin America

6.0

Buildings, etc.
5.7

Oth. Europe/Eurasia

5.6

13.8

Transport
6.0
Efficiency

Oceania

1.40Electricity supply
Fuel supply
Efficiency

10

20

30

$2015 trillion

71

Advanced Technologies Scenario

Primary energy consumption
By region

By energy source

20 000Coal
OilNatural gas
NuclearHydroyOther renewables

6 000

Mtoe

17 649Mtoe

14 3774 000

16 00715 00015 297
13 96310 000 8 747
Advanced Economies,((- 2XWORRN,((-

5 000

Emerging Market and Developing Economies

2 000

Intl. bunkers
Reference
Advanced Technologies
001990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Note: Solid lines stand for Advanced Technologies Scenario anddotted lines stand for Reference Scenario.

72
Advanced Technologies Scenario

Final energy consumption
By sector

By energy

15 000

6 000

Mtoe

Mtoe

Coal
Oil
Natural gas
Electricity
Others11 951
10 91810 0004 000

10 351
9 573

9 144

6 236
5 000

Industry

2 000

Transport,((- 2XWORRN,((-

Buildings, etc.
Reference
Advanced Technologies
001990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Note: Solid lines stand for Advanced Technologies Scenario anddotted lines stand for Reference Scenario.

73

Advanced Technologies Scenario

Share of passenger vehicle
New sales
100%

Stock

7%
8%

22%

20%

27%

16%

20%

10%

40%

28%

91%

49%

31%

33%

30%

17%
5%

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

2030

14%

Plug-in hybrid
vehicle

29%

2050

2030

Reference

2050

4%

8%
9%

43%

20%

95%

Hybrid vehicle

0%
2020

Battery electricvehicle

19%

77%

19%

56%
20%

17%

15%

80%

60%

3%
4%

Fuel cell vehicle

63%
Natural gas
vehicleConventional
engine vehicle

22%

40%

11%
2020

2030

2050

Reference

Advanced
Technologies

2030

2050

Advanced
Technologies

74
Advanced Technologies Scenario

Fuel efficiency of passenger vehicle
New sale-basis

Stock-basis

40.2

km/L
40

km/L
40
34.9

33.4
30

30

26.1

24.4
26.7
22.8

20

19.8

18.8
10

Advanced
Technologies

14.5

15.9
10

13.4

Reference,((- 2XWORRN,((-

23.7

17.6

20

Advanced
Technologies
Reference

0

0
2020

2030

2040

2050

2020

2030

2040

2050

Note: Litres of gasoline equivalent75

Advanced Technologies Scenario

Energy efficiency in buildings sector
Residential

Commercial
200
Y2020=100
180

250
Y2020=100

215

200

160

172

150

80

100

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

100

60

Advanced
Technologies

Advanced
Technologies

40

Reference

Reference

20

0

134

116

100

119

50

155
119

120

141
100

149

140
161

129

189

0
2020

2030

2040

2020

2050

2030

2040

2050

76
Advanced Technologies Scenario

Energy intensity improvement in industry sector

60%

Improvement rate vs. 2020

50%
49%
40%

43%

39%

36%

30%

31%
25%

20%

26%
21%

18%

10%

Iron & steel

Non-metallic
minerals

ChemicalPaper & pulp

Advanced
Technologies

Reference

Advanced
Technologies

Reference

Advanced
Technologies

Reference

Advanced
Technologies

Reference

Advanced
Technologies

4%

Reference,((- 2XWORRN,((-

0%

Other industries

77Advanced Technologies Scenario

Biomass
Biofuels for transport
Intl. bunkers
Oceania
AfricaOth. Europe/Eurasia
Advanced Europe
Middle East
Asia
Latin America
North America 154

300
Mtoe
250
200
150

Solid biomass

268

2 000
Mtoe

OthersPower generation
Industry
Buildings, etc.

1 500

1 242

1 328

1 215

1 260

156

1 023
1 000

116
91

100

500

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

50
0

0
2020

2030

2050

Reference

2030

2020

2050

2030

2050

Reference

Advanced
Technologies

2030

2050

Advanced
Technologies

78
Advanced Technologies Scenario

Power generation mix
Electricity generated
60 000TWh
50 00040 00030 000Hydrogen
Other renewables
Hydro
Nuclear
45 777
7Natural gas with CCS
Natural gas
Oil
33 593

Power generation capacity

50 800

21 000GW
18 000
15 00034 600
12 00026 7219 000

20 00018 49310 803

7 081

6 000

10 000,((- 2XWORRN,((-

Hydrogen
Other renewables
Hydro
NuclearNatural gas with CCS
14 252Natural gas
Oil
Coal with CCS
Coal 9 422

3 000
0

0
2020

2030

2050

Reference

2030

2050

Advanced
Technologies

2020

2030

2050

Reference

2030

2050

Advanced
Technologies

79Advanced Technologies Scenario

Wind and solar PV power generation capacity
Wind
5 000
GW
4 000

3 000

Solar PV

Oceania
AfricaOth. Europe/Eurasia
Advanced Europe
Middle East
Asia
Latin America
North America

4 460

6 000
5 000
4 000

2 243

2 000

1 982

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

Oceania
AfricaOth. Europe/Eurasia
Advanced Europe
Middle East
Asia
Latin America
North America

6 013

3 033

3 000

1 273
1 000

7 000
GW

1 990

2 000

731
1 000

0

1 247
708

0
2020

2030

2050

Reference

2030

2050

2020

Advanced
Technologies

2030

2050

2030

Reference

2050

Advanced
Technologies

80
Advanced Technologies Scenario

Nuclear power generation capacity and thermal power generation efficiency
Nuclear
1 000
GW
800

600

Oceania
AfricaOth. Europe/Eurasia
Advanced Europe
Middle East
Asia
Latin America
North America
408

442

477

Thermal power generation efficiency(generation end)
50 %
767

46
46.4
45
525

45.5

43.3
40.1
1

400

40
37.6
6

42.7

40.2

200

Advanced
Technologies,((- 2XWORRN,((-

35
0
2020

2030

2050

Reference

2030

Reference

2050

Advanced
Technologies

30
2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

81

Advanced Technologies Scenario

Energy-related CO2 emissions
By region

By technology

45

45

GtCO 2

GtCO 2
37.0

35.5

30

31.7

North America
Latin America
Asia
Middle East
Advanced Europe
16.9
Oth. Europe/Eurasia
AfricaOceania
Intl. bunkers
Reference
Advanced Technologies

20.6,((- 2XWORRN,((-

15

0
1990

30

31.2

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

37.0

35.5

31.7

31.2

20.6
Efficiency
Biofuels

15

Wind, solar, etc.
Nuclear16.9

Fuel switching
CCS
Reference
Advanced Technologies

0
1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

82
Advanced Technologies Scenario

Energy-related investments (2021 – 2050)
Changes from Reference Scenario

100

10.6

Thermal, 4.830

Renewable
s
22.7

20

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

10

0

80

24.3
18.0

Industry , 3.2

Biofuels and hydrogenn , 0.9
CoalC
9
Coal,l 0
0.9
Buildings, etc.
12.0
Natural gas
Transmission
8.4
anddistribution
Transport, 9.2
Oil, 7.8
15.3
Electricity
supplyFuel supply

Efficiency

74.0

11.8

-8.4

88.1

60

40
Efficiency
20

Fuel supply
Electricity supply

0
Reference40$2015 trillion$2015 trillion

Nuclear, 2.9

Advanced
Technologies

Total $88.1 trillion(Fuel supply)

45.7(Electricity
supply)50(Efficiency)

By sector

83

Asia

Reference Scenario

Primary energy consumption
By region
10 000Mtoe
8 000

By energy source
10 000

Others

Mtoe

Korea
Japan

8 000

ASEAN

Hydro
Nuclear

7 735

Natural gas
Oil

India
6 000

Other renewables

China

6 000

8 200

7 175
6 052

Coal
4 783

4 000

4 000
2 861
2 081

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

2 000

2 000

0

0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

84
Asia

Reference Scenario

Final energy consumption
By sector
6 000
Mtoe
5 000

Non-energy use
Buildings, etc.
Transport
Industry

4 000

By energy source
6 000

Others

Mtoe

Electricity

5 000

5 264

Natural gas

4 892

Oil

4 545

Coal

3 923

4 000

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

3 159
3 000

3 000

2 000

2 000

1 000

1 000

0

1 973
1 529

0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

85

Asia

Reference Scenario

Oil consumption
By region

By sector

50

Others50

Transformation

Mb/d

Korea

Mb/d

Non-energy use

Japan

Buildings, etc.

ASEAN

40

Transport

40

India

39

42

36

Industry

China

30

30

30
24

20

19

20
13

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

10

10

0

0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

86
Asia

Reference Scenario

Natural gas consumption
By region

By sector

2 000

Others2 000

Transformation

Bcm

Korea

Bcm

Non-energy use

1 500

Japan

Buildings, etc.

ASEAN

Transport

India

1 500

1 600

Industry

1 345

China
1 079
1 000

1 000

799
541

500

500

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

278
138
0

0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

87

Asia

Reference Scenario

Coal consumption
By region
6 000

Others
Korea

Mtce

Japan

5 000

6 000

Transformation

Mtce

Non-energy use
Buildings, etc.

5 000

ASEAN
India

4 000

3 000

3 000

2 000

2 000

4 625 4 638

Transport
4 197

Industry

China

4 000

By sector

4 489

3 441

1 480
1 126

1 000

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

1 000

0

0

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

88
Asia

Reference Scenario

Final consumption of electricity
By region

By sector

25 000

Others

25 000

Buildings, etc.

TWh

Korea

TWh

Transport

Japan
20 000

ASEAN
India

Industry

20 46520 00017 613China
15 00014 65715 00010 985
10 000

10 000
6 678,((- 2XWORRN,((-

5 000

5 000

3 252
1 822

0

0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

89

Asia

Reference Scenario

Energy-related CO2 emissions
Emissions
12
GtCO 2

Changes (2020-2050)
GtCO 2

China

CAGR

India
India

ASEAN

3.6

3.4%

Japan

9

Korea

ASEAN

1.5

2.3%

OthersOthers

6

0.6

2.2%

Korea

-0.04

-0.3%

Japan

-0.3

-1.3%

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

3

China

0

-1.8

-0.7%

1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

90
Asia

Reference Scenario

Energy-related investments (2021 – 2050)
By sector
20

By region

Total $27.0 trillion
China

15.6
Nuclear, 0.6

India,((- 2XWORRN,((-

$2015 trillion

Thermal, 2.0

100

Renewable
s
5.8

6.3

ASEAN

5.0

6.3

Biofuels and hydrogen
Industry , 1.4
Transmission
0.1
Coal, 1.3
andBuildings, etc.
Natural gas
distribution
2.8
2.1
7.2
Transport, 2.1
Oil, 1.5
Electricity
supply10.9

Fuel supply

Efficiency

5.1

Others

2.1

Japan

1.9

Electricity supply
Fuel supply

Korea

0.8
0

Efficiency
5

10

15

$2015 trillion

91

Asia

Advanced Technologies Scenario

Primary energy consumption
By region

By energy source

10 000

4 000

Mtoe

Mtoe

Coal
Oil
Natural gas
Nuclear
Hydro
Other renewables

8 200
8 000

7 175

3 000

6 881

6 000

China

6 052

6 416
2 000

India
4 000

ASEAN
Other Asia

2 081,((- 2XWORRN,((-

2 000

1 000

Reference
Advanced
Technologies

0

0
1990

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Note: Solid lines stand for Advanced Technologies Scenario anddotted lines stand for Reference Scenario.

92
Asia

Advanced Technologies Scenario

Final energy consumption
By sector

By energy source

6 000

2 500

Mtoe

Mtoe

5 264
4 545

2 000

4 361

4 000

Coal
Oil
Natural gas
Electricity
Others

4 063

3 923

1 500

1 000
2 000

1 529

Industry
Transport

500,((- 2XWORRN,((-

Buildings, etc.
Reference
Advanced Technologies

0
1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

0
1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Note: Solid lines stand for Advanced Technologies Scenario anddotted lines stand for Reference Scenario.

93

Asia

Advanced Technologies Scenario

Power generation mix
Electricity generated
30 000TWh
25 000
20 000
15 000Hydrogen
Other renewables
Hydro
Nuclear23 313Natural gas
Oil
Coal
16 925

Power generation capacity
10 000GW

6 000

Hydrogen
Other renewables
Hydro
7 544
NuclearNatural gas
Oil
Coal

4 000

3 472

24 4478 000
17 347

9 295

5 582

4 931

12 56710 000
2 000

5 000

0

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

0
2020

2030

2050

2030

Reference

2050

2020

2030

Advanced
Technologies

2050

Reference

2030

2050

Advanced
Technologies

94
Asia

Advanced Technologies Scenario

Supply and demand balance of fossil fuels
Oil

Natural gas

Coal

4 000
Mtoe
3 000
2 000

1 097

1 449

1 874

1 859
1 333

1 095

1 000

273

393

755

347

320

753
294

376

310

0
1 000
2 000

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

3 000
4 000

Production
DemandNet imports
2020 2030 2050 2030 2050
Reference Advanced
Tech.

2020 2030 2050 2030 2050
Reference

AdvancedTech.

2020 2030 2050 2030 2050
Reference

Advanced
Tech.

95

Asia

Advanced Technologies Scenario

Energy-related CO2 emissions
By region

By technology

25

25

GtCO 2

GtCO 2

20

19.4

18.3

15

15.9

16.1
China

20

18.3

15

16.1
15.9
Efficiency

India
10

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

5

Biofuels
10

ASEAN

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

4.7

8.9

Fuel switching
CCS
Reference

Advanced
Technologies
1990

Nuclear5

Reference0Wind, solar, etc.

8.9

Other Asia

4.7

19.4

Advanced Technologies

0
2050

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

96
Asia

Advanced Technologies Scenario

Energy-related investments (2021 – 2050)
By sector
30

Changes from Reference Scenario

Total $35.0 trillion

40
4.9

-1.8

35.0

4.8
30

Fuel supply
Electricity supply

Advanced
Technologies

0(Fuel supply)

Buildings, etc.
3.3
Transmission
on
Biofuels and hydrogen 5.6
and0.2
distribution
Coal, 0.6
Natural gas 1.5 Transport, 3.7
8.1
Oil, 0.9
Electricity
Fuel supply
Efficiency
supplyEfficiency

10(Efficiency)

0

11.3
Industry , 1.9

20(Electricity
supply)Renewables
9.6
10,((- 2XWORRN,((-

Nuclear, 1.0
Thermal, 1.8

27.0

Reference$2015 trillion

20$2015 trillion

20.5

97

ChinaEnergy consumption
Primary energy consumption

Mtoe
5 000

4 000

Other renewables
Hydro
NuclearNatural gas
Oil
3 791
Coal
3 499

Final energy consumption

3 000
Mtoe
2 500
3 617

3 407

2 105

2 229

2 000

3 000

2 592

1 676

1 500

2 000

1 000

1 000

500
0

0

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

Non-energy use
Buildings, etc.
Transport
Industry 2 301
2 182

2020

2030

2050

2030

Reference

2020

2050

2030

2050

Reference

Advanced
Technologies

2030

2050

Advanced
Technologies

98
China

Supply and demand balance of fossil fuels
Oil

Natural gas

3 000
Mtoe

Production

2 000

Net imports

1 000

Coal

Demand

466

591

569

547

886
365

104

138

174

124

6

135

368

146

85

0
1 000

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

2 000
3 000
2020 2030 2050 2030 2050
Reference

AdvancedTech.

2020 2030 2050 2030 2050
Reference

AdvancedTech.

2020 2030 2050 2030 2050
Reference

Advanced
Tech.

99

ChinaPower generation mix
Electricity generated
15 000TWh

10 000Hydrogen
Other renewables
Hydro
Nuclear
11 473Natural gas
Oil
9 933
Coal

Power generation capacity
Hydrogen
Other renewables
Hydro
3 911
NuclearNatural gas
Oil
Coal
2 881

5 000
GW
11 1644 000

10 138
3 000

7 732

4 835

3 297

2 053
2 000
5 000
1 000

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

0

0
2020

2030

2050

Reference

2030

2050

2020

Advanced
Technologies

2030

2050

2030

Reference

2050

Advanced
Technologies

100
China

Energy-related CO2 emissions and investments
CO2 emissions

Investments(2021 – 2050)

1220Efficiency
BiofuelsWind, solar, etc.
3.8
Nuclear
Fuel switching
CCS
Reference
Advanced Technologies

42.2,((- 2XWORRN,((-

2

0
1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

2.0

14.1

10.9
10

Efficiency

5

Fuel supply
Electricity supply

0
Advanced
Technologies

6

-0.7

(Fuel supply)

8

1.9

15

(Efficiency)

8.3

9.5

Reference

10.1$2015 trillion

10(Electricity
supply)10.7

GtCO 2101

IndiaEnergy consumption
Primary energy consumption
3 000
Mtoe

2 000

Final energy consumption

Other renewables
Hydro
NuclearNatural gas
2 172
Oil
Coal

2 000
Mtoe

1 500

Non-energy use
Buildings, etc.
Transport
Industry

1 443

1 590
1 299
1 000

1 052
1 000

1 230

859

813

596

872
500

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

0

0
2020

2030

2050

2030

Reference

2050

2020

Advanced
Technologies

2030

2050

Reference

2030

2050

Advanced
Technologies

102
India

Supply and demand balance of fossil fuels
Oil

Natural gas

Coal

1 000
Mtoe

651

586
500
172

293

267

326
29

51

169

53

91

103

220

133

140

0

500

Production
Demand,((- 2XWORRN,((-

Net imports
1 0002020 2030 2050 2030 2050
Reference Advanced
Tech.

2020 2030 2050 2030 2050
Reference

AdvancedTech.

2020 2030 2050 2030 2050
Reference

Advanced
Tech.

103

IndiaPower generation mix
Electricity generated

TWh
6 000

Power generation capacity

Hydrogen
Other renewables
Hydro
Nuclear
5 240
Natural gas
Oil
Coal

6 097

2 000
GW

Hydrogen
Other renewables
Hydro
Nuclear
1 418
Natural gas
Oil
Coal

1 500

4 000

2 000

1 000

2 823

2 689

822
693

1 533

500

382

0

0

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

1 784

2020

2030

2050

2030

Reference

2020

2050

2030

2050

2030

Reference

Advanced
Technologies

2050

Advanced
Technologies

104
India

Energy-related CO2 emissions and investments
CO2 emissions

6(2021 – 2050)

Efficiency
BiofuelsWind, solar, etc.
Nuclear
Fuel switching
CCS
Reference
Advanced Technologies

4

10
1.4
8

5.6

6.3
$2015 trillion

8
GtCO 2

Investments

3.2

-0.4

8.5

1.2

6

4
Efficiency
2

2.7
2.1

2020

2030

2040

2050

Advanced
Technologies

2010(Fuel supply)

2000(Efficiency)

0(Electricity
supply)

0

0.5

1990

Electricity supply

2.5
Reference,((- 2XWORRN,((-

2

Fuel supply

105

ASEAN

Energy consumption
Primary energy consumption
2 000
Mtoe

1 000
Mtoe
900

Other renewables
Hydro
NuclearNatural gas
Oil
1 420
Coal

1 500

Final energy consumption

800

Non-energy use
Buildings, etc.
Transport
Industry

700

1 217

901

694
618

588

600
954

1 000

931

500

447

400

673

300

500

200
100
0

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

0
2020

2030

2050

Reference

2030

2020

2050

2030

2050

Reference

Advanced
Technologies

2030

2050

Advanced
Technologies

106
ASEAN

Supply and demand balance of fossil fuels
Oil
500
Mtoe

250

Natural gas

Coal

375
212
127

188

197

170
35

23

120

74
-64

0
-156

-34

-37
-99

250

Production,((- 2XWORRN,((-

DemandNet imports

500

2020 2030 2050 2030 2050
Reference

AdvancedTech.

2020 2030 2050 2030 2050
Reference

AdvancedTech.

2020 2030 2050 2030 2050
Reference

Advanced
Tech.

107

ASEANPower generation mix
Electricity generated
4 000
TWh

3 000

Power generation capacity

Hydrogen
Other renewables
Hydro
3 161
NuclearNatural gas
Oil
Coal

2 000

3 420

2 000
GW

Hydrogen
Other renewables
Hydro
NuclearNatural gas

1 500

Oil
Coal

1 135

1 000

1 673

1 654

684

626

1 075

423

500

1 000

0

0

,((- 2XWORRN,((-

1 383

2020

2030

2050

2030

Reference

2020

2050

2030

2050

2030

Reference

Advanced
Technologies

2050

Advanced
Technologies

108
ASEAN

Energy-related CO2 emissions and investments
CO2 emissions
Efficiency
BiofuelsWind, solar, etc.
Nuclear
Fuel switching
CCS
Reference
Advanced Technologies

8
0.9
3.0

2.0
2

1.5

4

Efficiency
Fuel supply
Electricity supply

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Advanced
Technologies

2000(Fuel supply)

0(Efficiency)

00.3

Reference,((- 2XWORRN,((-

6.4

5.1

1.3

1

-0.3

0.7

2

1.7

1990

6

(Electricity
supply)3(2021 – 2050)$2015 trillion

4
GtCO 2

Investments

109

The tables for IEEJ Outlook 2023 are currently available athttps://eneken.ieej.or.jp/en/whatsnew/442.html.
The full text will be available early 2023 at the same URL.

IEEJ Outlook 2023
October 2022
The Institute of Energy Economics, JapanIEEJ © 2022

Contact : report@tky.ieej.or.jp