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Citation: Japan's Territories Series, Japan Digital Library (March 2018)
http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/digital_library/japan_s_territories.php

A China Watcher’s Perspective

Senkaku Islands were nothing more than “navigation markers” in premodern China
Contradiction in the Chinese stance revealed in historical documents and materials relating to the
Senkaku Islands (Part 1) April 24, 20151
Satoshi Hirano, Professor, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, The University of Tokyo
We often hear about “Japan distancing itself from China,” with various problems in doing business with
China, such as friction in Japan-China relations, rise in wages, or contractual troubles, causing Japanese
corporate investment in China to reduce significantly last year (2014), with money shifting from China
to Southeast and South Asia instead.
However, Japan cannot expect everything to move in its favor. Indeed, China is focusing increasingly
on dealing with Japan in a way that serves its own best interests. As a result, Japan-China relations arelikely to continue to display complex interactions. This trend can be seen most obviously in the sharp
rise in the number of Chinese tourists visiting Japan, symbolized by the so-called bakugai, or explosive
shopping spree, and the much-reported problems surrounding membership of the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) last year. The bilateral meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
and Chinese President Xi Jinping on April 22, 2015 at the 60th anniversary of the Asian-African
Conference in Indonesia could be viewed as another aspect of this complex relationship.

Leaders of Japan and China meet for the first time in 5 months at the Asian-African Conference(Photo: Xinhua News Agency/Aflo)
1

This article was originally published as 平野聡（東京大学大学院法学政治学研究科教授）「尖閣は前近代中国にとって『航路標識』にすぎない：尖閣関連資料から見る中国の矛盾（前編）」『Wedge Infinity』2015 年 4 月 24 日.
1China continues to insist “Chogyo Island (Uotsuri Island; China calls it Diaoyu Island) = Taiwan”
While China ostensibly adopts a soft-track approach, it also continues to restrain Japan by persistently
emphasizing its “victory in the war against fascism” 70 years after the end of the war.
China is expected to hold a military parade to coincide with the date of September 2 on which Japansigned the Instrument of Surrender of Japan on the USS Missouri (the actual parade might be scheduled
for September 3). This is aimed at strengthening command of the Chinese Communist Party andnationalism, by “reconfirming the Chinese people’s history of suffering and honorable victory as it
looks to the future.” While appealing for Japan to look at history straight on, China says this is notintended to show a hostile attitude towards Japan but to pioneer a future together.
However, whenever China talks about the “war on fascism,” there is no doubt that the Senkaku Islands
are always behind it.
China insists that because Japan unconditionally returned Taiwan to China upon its surrender, it should
also instantly and unconditionally return “Chogyo Island which is part of Taiwan.” China has insisted
that the fact that Japan still hasn’t returned the island is a sign that Japan does not recognize the resultof World War II, the war against fascism, and is a country that does not follow the world order. Everytime the Senkaku Islands are featured in the news, it is always accompanied with the formula showingthat “Chogyo Island =Taiwan.”
Disputing Japan’s announcement on a map
On March 16 this year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan updated its PDF file “About the Senkaku
Islands” on its official website. The map of the People’s Republic of China issued in 1969 by the
National Administration of Surveying and Mapping of the People’s Republic of China displayed
Fukken (Fujian) Province and Taiwan Province, and showed that China had continued to use the nameSenkaku Islands until approximately 1970. China responded to this by repeating the same formula,“Chogyo Island =Taiwan.”
The next day on March 17, Hong Lei, spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
Republic of China said the following at the regular press conference (a full transcript of this is available
on the Chinese Foreign Ministry website).
“The point that Chogyo Island and its surrounding islands are part of Chinese territory is an undisputable
fact, and we have sufficient history and legal proof. It is impossible to overturn this historical fact even
if some people waste a lot of time and effort to find a few maps. If necessary, we are quite prepared tofind one hundred or one thousand maps which prove that Chogyo Island clearly belongs to China.”
I think we should not stop China from trying to find such maps, if there exist any. Perhaps it was because
they couldn’t find one that the Chinese government repeated its usual formula the next day, stating that
“Chogyo Island is part of Taiwan and so Japan should give that part of Taiwan back.” China insists that,regardless of the point that they wrote the name “Senkaku Islands” on the map, the fact that they wrote
the island even though they were beyond the regular space of the map in itself is proof of “sovereignty.”
Hong Lei went on to say:
“In order to show a complete picture of the jurisdiction of Fukken (Fujian) and Taiwan Provinces, we
illustrated the northern part of Fujian Province, the southern part of Taiwan Province, and Chogyo
Island and its surrounding seas as “extras” exceeding the width of a regular map. That in itself is ample
and valid proof that Chogyo Island is part of China.”
Then on April 8, another spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Hua Chunying, referring toJapan’s policy of digitizing large volumes of documents and materials already collected by Japan to2create and publicize a database, made the following statement, while reinforcing what Hong Lei said
above:“Many maps at the time of the Ming and Qing Dynasties clearly have Chogyo Island on them, and thename Chogyo Island was widely used on Western maps prior to the Sino-Japanese War. However hard
Japan tries to find a few documents, make fragmentary judgements and try to disrupt history, you cannotchange the fact that Chogyo Island is part of China. Recently, Japan greatly manipulated a text
concerning a 1969 Chinese map, but conversely this only served to firmly prove that Chogyo Island ispart of China. I would ask Japan to wake up and take much greater care when it publishes documents.
It should not do such superficial and clumsy thing.”
If you look at the 1969 map carefully, just as China says, the Senkaku Islands are shown well beyond
the regular width of the map as the islands far offshore from Fukken (Fujian).
However, if “China did assert sovereignty over Chogyo Island from the Ming and Qing Dynasties,” if“the West did know the island name broadly as Chogyo Island” and if “Chogyo Island was part of
Taiwan,” then why did they not write “Chogyo Island” on the map in the first place? The National
Administration of Surveying and Mapping is after all the National Administration, so they would havebeen representing the will of the state of China when they wrote “Senkaku Islands” on the map.
Modern international law judges that China also consistently recognized Japan’s “Senkaku Islands.” Aslong as China and Japan operate as sovereign nations under modern international law, China should
abide by the logic of that law.
China’s doubtful claims that the Senkaku Islands are “within China’s realm of coastal defense”
and “is part of Taiwan”
So just what is “the reasonable foundation based on International jurisprudence” on which China insists?
Soon after the Yoshihiko Noda administration acquired ownership of the Senkaku Islands, China issued
a “Chogyo Island White Paper” stating conditions prior to Japan’s occupation of Taiwan at the SinoJapanese War (in short, the situation that Chogyo Island was used and managed as part of Taiwan).
Those conditions are outlined below (The Foreign Ministry of Taiwan = Republic of China explains
substantially the same way. If you are interested, you can watch the YouTube video in Japanese on its
official website.)*There are many notations and written documents of “Chogyo Island” on Ming and Qing maps provingthat China was the first to discover and use “Chogyo Island.”*In the written records of Chinese official envoys (Sakuho-shi) sent to acknowledge Ryukyu as its
tributary state, the territorial border was “Kokusuiko (Heishuigou; black water ditch)” (Ryukyu Trough)on the west of Kume Island, and the “Kokusui (Heishui; black water)” to the east and “Sosui (Cangshui;
deep blue water)” to the west were recognized as being different sea areas. Heishuigou is the border for
China, and Chogyo Island which is inside it is part of China.
*Map notations from the Ming and Qing Dynasties onwards show that Chogyo Island is within thescope of China’s coastal defense.
*In particular, Chogyo Island was part of Taiwan. Nihon Ikkan (Riben Yijian) (1556), written by Zheng
Shun’gong who visited Japan, described Chogyo-Sho (Chogyo Island) as part of “Shoutou (Xiaodong)”(Taiwan). In Shihei Hayashi’s Sangoku tsuran zusetsu (An Illustrated Description of Three Countries),
Chogyo Island is colored the same color as China, not Ryukyu.
*The island appears as “Chogyo-Sho” on some Western maps.

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The following research explores in depth whether these claims are correct or not and whether they fit
the historical context.
*Vast amounts of full translation and analysis of the records of the Ming and Qing Dynasties’ official
envoys (Sakuho-shi) to Ryukyu by Nobuo Harada (A handy conclusion of which can be found in
Senkaku Shotou—Sakuhou-ryukyushi-roku wo yomu (The Senkaku Islands: Read the Ryukyu envoy
records) published by Yoju Shorin (2006)).
*Detailed investigations by Nozomu Ishii based on a compilation of Chinese classical documents andvarious pre-modern and modern documents (see Nozomu Ishii’s Senkaku Hanbaku Manual: 100-dai(Senkaku Refutation Manual: 100 Materials) published by Shukosha (2014)).
Having perused the works of Harada and Ishii, as well as some of the documents and materials cited by
the Chinese side, I can highlight the following points as problems of the historical documents andmaterials referring to the Senkaku Islands and China’s claims.
*The place name “Chogyo-Sho” does appear in Chinese documentation. It is noted as being a small
island far out at sea in Ming and Qing coastal defense papers. It is also mentioned, along with a map, incompass operation orientation between Fukushu (Fuzhou) and Naha.
*However, these references only illustrate “knowledge” of the name. The Ming and Qing Dynasties
didn’t possess the skills to conduct distant voyages beyond the raging waves of the East China Sea, sothey relied on proficient crews dispatched by Ryukyu to conduct ocean voyages. Therefore, even if thename of island was recorded, it was the Ryukyu people who utilized the island.
*The feeling that the color of the sea is connected to one’s homeland is commonplace. However, making
a fluid junction between two sea currents a national border is a different matter. It is hard to assert astable recognition of that border, and some historical documents and records assert that the “Black
Water Ditch” doesn’t even exist, such as Qing Dynasty records from official envoy (Sakuho-shi) Li
Dingyuan. The maps used for compass orientation only show a row of islands in the sea, and do not
draw a clear national border line.
*In the Ming era, “Kelung (Keeling) Island”, in other words Taiwan, depicted in the same row of islands
as “Chogyo-Sho,” was not under the control of the Ming Dynasty in the first place.
*The recognition that “Chogyo-Sho = Shoutou (Xiaodong)” in Zheng Shun’gong’s Nihon Ikkan (Riben
Yijian) was not handed down to posterity.
*Sometime after the start of the Qing Dynasty, the western part of Taiwan eventually came under the
Qing control. However, up until the 1870s, Taiwan’s northern boundary was officially labeled as Jilong= Keelung and its environs, in an official geography book. The eastern region heading south frompresent-day Yilan (Hualien (Hualian in pinyin) and Taitung (Taidong in pinyin) Counties) was run by“Seiban (sheng ban; indigenous people)” and was not under Qing control. (That is precisely why Japan
dispatched troops to Taiwan in 1874 while the Qing Dynasty funded the operation.)
Based on these historical documents, the focus point is whether the Ming and Qing Dynasties really did
operate Chogyo-Sho within its “scope of coastal defense” and as “part of Taiwan.”
Recognition as“the island of navigation markers”
It is hard to consider China’s insistence on these points has been thoroughly investigated.
China cites the Ming period Bubishi (Wubei Zhi), a comprehensive military book by Mao Yuanyi (1621)
as prepotent evidence for its claim to Senkaku. However, if you peruse that book carefully, from the4

whole gist of the argument, which is not limited to proper nouns, the contemporary territory of “ChogyoSho,” domain recognition and coastal defense methodology will come to the surface.
The Wubei Zhi’s first section on Coastal Defense tells us that Chenqian (the small islands of Sekkou(Zhejiang) just south of Shanghai) is the boundary between mountains and sea, in other words, theborderline. The seas beyond that were infested by Wako pirates (mainly groups of Japanese armed
traders), so the Ming Dynasty made a resolute commitment to defend Chenqian (against the Wako
pirates) as its strategic frontline. To defend further offshore did not only pose too great a risk of troops
being sacrificed in sudden shallows, but also required too much effort, given the fact that the open
waters were infested by Wako pirates, so the Ming Dynasty encouraged to concentrate instead on
attacking Wako pirates in waters near the mainland coast to prevent them from trying to land,
recognizing this as a better strategy.
Based on this understanding, the scope of coastal defense was limited to the mainland coastal areas andsmall nearby islands within a stone’s throw. More distant islands such as the Senkaku Islands were
resting grounds for Wako pirates and were dangerous because they were surrounded by shallows andineffective to defend. In this kind of world, it was considered better not to get involved.
As a result, the following factors all become clear:*The forts and sentinel posts depicted on coastal defense maps are all concentrated on the mainland
coast, and there are none on offshore islands.
*There are only vague expressions, statuses and relationships with offshore islands, such as “ChogyoSho” and “Kelung (Keelung) Island.”*Originally, the Ming Dynasty was not powerful enough to extend its jurisdiction and uphold the claim:
Taiwan = Kelung (Keelung) Island.
*The Chinese official envoys (Sakuho-shi) did not have sufficient seafaring skills. As a result, Ryukyu
people and Wako pirates freely roamed and dominated the East China Sea area, and they were theleading characters who enjoyed the most effective presence in the area.
Therefore, it is probably accurate to describe the Senkaku Islands, en route from Fukushu (Fuzhou) toNaha, as an ocean route marker that was used for compass orientation. As long as it was an uninhabitednavigation marker, Ryukyu people probably felt they had come home when for the first time they saw
Kume Island. Even with the geographical understanding of the Ming Dynasty, they would have known
that their territory did not extend further than the islands just off the coast of Sekkoku (Zhejiang) andFukken (Fujian). (If it had obviously extended further, they should have noted this earlier in Ittoushi(Yitongzhi; Records of the Unity), or other official records.)
It is clear that the Senkaku Islands were terra nullius in pre-modern times, and a grey zone without aclear borderline.
(Go to Part 2)

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A China Watcher’s Perspective

China unable and unwilling to accept the Senkaku Islands are not part of
TaiwanContradictions in China’s stance revealed in historical documents and materials relating to the Senkaku
Islands (Part 2) April 27, 2015 2
Satoshi Hirano, Professor, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, The University of Tokyo
So how did “management and coastal defense of the Chogyo-Sho” change with the transition from theMing to the Qing Dynasty? Qing continued to depend on Ryukyu people for navigation to the Ryukyus
and while the Qing Dynasty overthrew surviving Ming retainer Zheng and brought western Taiwan
under its control, eastern Taiwan was left for many years in the hands of Seiban (sheng ban; indigenous
people) and was not directly managed. It is reasonable to think that the status of the Senkaku Islands as
an ownerless navigation marker also remained in the Qing Dynasty.
Senkaku Islands located far to the northeast of “Taiwan’s northernmost border”
Despite this, in its “Chogyo Island White Paper,” China (and Taiwan on its official foreign ministry
website) make the point that the Qing Dynasty was “controlling Chogyo-Sho,” focusing on “Chogyodai (Daioyutai)” mentioned in the dynasty’s book of regional records, Taikai-Shisaroku (Taihai
shichalu, Huang Shujing, 1736). There is plenty of room for doubt regarding this assertion.
The second volume, Bubi (Wubei; on military defense) notes the northernmost border of Taiwan to be
at Kelung (Keelung), and Tanshui (Danshui). It is clear from the text of the records of then local officialsthat the Senkaku Islands, which are located so far northeast of the above-mentioned northernmost border,
were not historically considered as “part of Taiwan.”
In addition, the book goes on to talk about coastal defense policy, saying that navy was not equipped to
do battle on the open seas, so they would try to come into harbor areas to wage war, making the coastal
areas the real battlefields. As with the Ming rulers before them, the Qing rulers recognized that the stageof coastal defense is along the coastline and in ports where people live. They were not consideringcrossing the raging waves to conquer distant uninhabited islands and bring them into the coastal defensearea.
To make doubly sure, where the place name “Chogyo-dai” does appear in the book, it is in a text listingfishing and harbor ports and bays on a southern, anticlockwise route around the Taiwan Strait from
Kaohsiung City and Fengshan. In this part, Bianliao and Jia-li-Tau (Jialu Village) appear after Fengshan.
Anyone who is familiar with the geography of Taiwan would instantly recognize that this was
describing a route around the southern part of Taiwan from today’s Pingtung to Taitung (Taidong)County, and is unlikely to suddenly leap north of “the northernmost part of Taiwan,” “Kelung(Keelung).”
In the middle of this list of place names, the texts wrote about the east area of the Bashi Channel
separating the Philippines and Taiwan as being an “area with no fortress anymore, where only small
fishing boats come and go.” This would suggest that officials didn’t have control over the area that iscurrently Taitung (Taidong) County and Hualien (Hualian) County. The listing ends by saying, “there
is a vast ocean beyond the mountains and, to the north, a mountain called Chogyo-dai, which could
berth 10 or more large ships, and you can go by cedarwood ship as far as Xuepolan in Tsongau.
2This article was originally published as 平野聡（東京大学大学院法学政治学研究科教授）「尖閣は台湾の一部分ではないことを読み取れない中国：尖閣関連資料から見る中国の矛盾（後編）」『Wedge Infinity』2015 年 4 月 27 日.
6Among these places, “Xuepolan in Tsongau” corresponds to the mouth of the Xiuguluan River near
Jingpu in Hualien (Hualian) County (Reference: Zheng Hailin’s “Study on Chogyo-dai and Xuepolanin Tsongau in Huang Shujing’s Taihai shichalu,” Haixia Pinglun, 269, May 2013). I happen to own a
Taiwan road map entitled “Taiwan Gonglu Daren Ditu Daquan” (Taiwan Giant Public Road Map)published by Huwai zhenghuo Tushu (2007). Looking at that, you can see a small island called “Xibulan”
near the mouth of the river. “Xuepolan” and “Xibulan” sound very similar. If you consider that thesetwo places names could have derived from the Ami people and been given different Chinese characterswhen writing the name, then you understand that this record relates to a list of ports appearing in orderas you head south, anticlockwise along the coast from Fengshan to Jingpu in Hualien (Hualian) County.
Somewhere along the way they would probably have turned from the Bashi Channel into the Pacificand seen a natural small island port which they called “Chogyo-dai.” Considering Taiwan’s topography,
you can probably tell that this is the current Chenggong in Taitung (Taidong) County. There is a scenic
set of island reefs called “Sanxiantai,” which would correspond exactly with Chogyo-dai.
Incidentally, the text of “The Chogyo-dai Islands are part of the Republic of China” on the official
website of Taiwan=Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan refers to the “large ocean beyond themountain with Chogyo-dai to the north.” It interprets mountain to mean Taiwan, and understands thephrase to mean “in the ocean north of Taiwan.” However, when you talk about “beyond the mountains”
in Taiwan, it usually refers to today’s Hualien (Hualian) and Taitung (Taidong) Counties, east of thetall mountain ranges that pierce central Taiwan. The reason for this is that, up until the 1870s, the Qing
Dynasty was only able to control the Western half and the Northeast part of Taiwan. I wonder, is it only
me who considers it natural to assume that the “vast ocean stretching out from here” would be the coastof Hualien (Hualian) and Taitung (Taidong) Counties?
If the book was really referring to the Senkaku Islands, then, provided that Chogyo-Sho appears on theleft of Kelung (Keelung) Sho=Taiwan, when seen from the mainland, from as early as the Ming period,
surely it would be more natural for it to appear after the place names in Northeast Taiwan (today’s Yilan
County). However, that is not written in the book, and, as I mentioned earlier, the book states that
Taiwan’s northernmost part is today’s Keelung.
“Chogyo-dai” is a common place nameSo, let’s look at some of the historical documents that refer to today’s Yilan County. Another documentthat China cites as “proof that Chinese officials in Taiwan controlled Chogyo Island” is Jusan Fukken
tuushi (Chongzuan Fujian Tongzhi; Multiple Fujian Annales) (1871) which lists Chogyo-dai as a placename of the Kebalan (Kabalan) administrative office, the former Yilan County.
First, the northernmost tip of Kebalan was Sandiao, which is Sandiaojiao Cape near today’s Fulong
town in Xinbei City. You can see that there is no mention at this moment of Chogyo-Sho far away fromthe northeast of Keelung. Moving south from Sandiaojiao, we see an order of place names starting with
Wushigang, Guiyu (Guishan Island), Wuweicheng (Yilan), and Suao. Beyond that, we see the samereference as in Taikai-Shisaroku (Taihai shichalu), “There is a vast ocean beyond the mountains and to
the north is Chogyo-dai, a port so deep that it could berth a thousand large ships. Then you can proceedby cedarwood ship to Xuepolan in Tsongao.” The Qing’s control at the time only extended as far southas Suao on the east coast of Taiwan. Hualien (Hualian) and Taitung (Taidong) Counties to the south
were said to be the lands of the Seiban (sheng ban; indigenous people).
Accordingly, the “Chogyo-dai” referred to here would be a place name that appeared on the way southfrom Suao. It is hard to believe that, just after referring to the Senkaku Islands, which are far out to sea
in a northeasterly direction, the records would jump back to the southbound journey towards Jingpu in
Hualien (Hualian) County. Therefore, the “Chogyo-dai” mentioned here probably refers to Hualien(Hualian), because you would not say that the Senkaku Islands have deep ports. It is also possible that
there is a misprint in the text, confusing 10 and 1,000, in which case it could mean today’s Chenggong
township that can berth that many ships in the port. It is also possible that, for areas that were not under7

effective Qing control in 1870, they could simply have taken the descriptions directly from TaikaiShisaroku (Taihai shichalu).
The place name “Chogyo-dai” is very common and could be seen anywhere, starting with the ChineseState Guesthouse. The Chinese (and the Taiwanese) governments are so keen to find some historicalreference to their control of Chogyo-Sho that they pounce on any reference to Chogyo-dai without
investigating the place name or geographical location in any great depth.
We should make judgements based on entire historical documents and materials
In conclusion, the Senkaku Islands are not part of Taiwan. The reference in Zheng Shun’gong’s Nihon
Ikkan (Riben Yijian) in the Ming period was not handed down to posterity. While Shihei Hayashi’s map
painted the Senkaku Islands and the Chinese mainland the same pink (pink is also used for many otherplaces such as Ogasawara and Kamchatka), it did not paint Taiwan and Senkaku the same color. China
should examine more carefully the contexts in which “Chogyo” appears in classical Chinese documents
and materials, how ocean regions were used, how the nature of coastal defense awareness andgeographical understanding were like at that time, how sustainable is the claim that Chogyo Island waspart of Taiwan, and how China itself publishes maps and official documents in pre-modern and modern
times.
Returning to the case of the map of Fukken (Fujian) of 1969, the Senkaku Islands were displayed beyond
the usual frame for probably the same reason as they were on the Ming period coastal defense map. In
other words, although the Ming Dynasty didn’t control them, it needed to take care of them as a place
which should be noted where Wako pirates might start to put down roots. Also, the Senkaku Islands
were under the U.S. administration in 1969. The islands were like a sword piercing China, which wasin confrontation with the U.S. and the Soviet Union at the time. The islands were purposely singled out
as a place to pay special attention to, and that is probably why China jotted the name of Senkaku outside
the usual map frame.
If China has chosen the phrase “history is a great teacher” as its motto, now is the time to face up to that
history. Instead of pouncing on proper nouns that appear in historical documents, I hope China willconsider these matters based on the historical documents in their entirety.
China has not done this and, especially since 2012, has been making improper claims. Today, China
continues to make implausible claims and statements. I am worried about a situation in which Japan isdrawn into participating in a China-led international financial framework and is once again confronted
with unilateral Chinese measures. I am sure that many other Japanese people would not want to see thissituation either.
I believe the desire to welcome Chinese tourists who want to know the true Japan, and the growing
sense of caution about China’s less-than-honest approach over the past few years (reflected in theworsening results of surveys of Japanese people’s views of China) have come from the same
fundamental features of Japan, which has determinedly pursued pacifism and actively helped to promote
China’s development. Before criticizing Japan as a “troublemaker that still ignores the outcome of theSecond World War,” I think China should recognize the reality of Japan as it is today. That would serveas an important foundation to substantiate the significance of the very recent Japan-China bilateralsummit meetings.

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