Religiosity and Religious Public Policy:
A Cross-National Comparison
Pen-Hsuan Lin

Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao

Institute of Economic and Social Studies,

Institute of Sociology,

National United University, Taiwan

Academia Sinica, Taiwan

1 Preface
The 20th century was a pivotal period for the development of religions around the world. It
was a turbulent time for new religious movements and revival movements throughout the
globe: the mass suicide of close to 900 members of the People's Temple in the Guyanese
rainforest in 1978 (Melton 1999: 220) and the 1995 sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo
underground by the Aum Shinrikyo sect shocked the world. Soon after we entered the 21st
century we witnessed the 911 attacks on the World Trade Center Twin Towers in New Yorkon September 11, 2001, after which Islam and terrorism have become, in many people's
minds, virtually synonymous. This last event apparently fulfilled predictions made by SamuelP. Huntington in his The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, publishedin 1996.
There is also a sense, however, in which religions have played a very positive role in the
public sphere. From the early Moral Re-armament (MRA) movement to the anti-nuclear,environmental protection and world peace movements, religion has been becoming
increasingly influential, and religious groups have been seeking to further expand theirinfluence on public life. Naturally, for religion to move beyond the private sphere into the
public, it would require a democratic, pluralistic social system, together with assurances ofreligious freedom, if it is going to make its influence felt in society. Just how to deal with thequestion of religion in any kind of public policy involving the public sphere is, in itself, apublic policy issue. The aim of this paper is to investigate, with the aid of data fromcross-national surveys, the reactions of the public in seven Asian countries to public policy
related to religion; whether or not members of the public in those countries react differently tothese policies depending on their relationship to religion; and the factors influencing thesereactions.
2 Literature Review
One of the major debates in the sociology of religion in the 20th century involves
secularization theory, an idea that has dominated this area of sociology in the Western worldfrom the 1960s on (Beckford 1990: 55). The term has frequently been used in academic

circles, although there has been a considerable amount of confusion as to exactly what itmeans (Dobbelaere 1984: 200). The debate remained a major topic in the sociology ofreligion right up to the late 1980s. While it is less discussed in the literature on the subject in
the US now, it is still necessary to look into the topic if we are to investigate changes inreligious belief.
As far as the origins of the concept is concerned, Berger points out that the term
“secularization” itself referred to the removal of property or territory from the ecclesiasticalauthorities and their transferral to secular state institutions in the wake of the Wars of
Religion, and that it often carried with it ideological and judgemental significance (1967:106).
The Italian scholar Franco Ferrarotti identified the earliest appearance of the concept of
secularization as the year 1648 (Ferrarotti 1993), at a time when Roman Catholics andProtestants within the region of Westphalia were engaged in fierce fighting. The subsequentsigning of the Peace of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years' War lead to the emergence of
the idea of secularization, essentially the process by which the Roman Catholic property was
to be removed and confiscated. Warner (1993) and Dobbelaere (1981:8-9) come to the sameconclusions.
In fact, every author working in the sociology of religion has their own interpretation of theconcept of secularization, both in its theoretical and practical application. For Berger,
secularization refers to the process by which the social and cultural spheres become divorced
from the religious system and religious symbolism, effectively coming out from under the"sacred canopy." However, when one talks of the social and the cultural being divested of thereligious, one is also implying a secularization of consciousness. That is to say, progressively
fewer people view the world about them and their everyday existence within a religious
framework (1967: 107-8). Berger calls the former objective secularization and the lattersubjective secularization, although the two are interrelated (Berger 1967: 129-130).
One of the major contemporary proponents of secularization theory is Bryan Wilson. In his
first work (Wilson: 1979) he vociferously argues for the inevitable demise of religion,
although he subsequently concedes that religion will continue to exist as a personal choice,albeit having very little influence in society. The secularization model, then, does not predict
the terminal decline of religions, just that it shall continue to exist within the private sphere,
and will perhaps emerge in new forms of expression. Consequently, the secularization or
religion also implies the privatization of religion.
Dobbelaere (1981) has identified three different levels of secularization, which he termed
laicization, religious change and less church involvement. Laicization refers to the fact thatreligion no longer functions as an institution that can legitimize or consolidate, and was nolonger capable of one of social control or socialization. Religion's importance to society has
receded over time, to the point where it has retreated back into the private sphere and is nolonger intimately involved in the public sphere. Religious change refers to the process
following the Church's loss of its religious monopoly, at which point all religious groups were
obliged to package their teachings as a "religious commodity" in the pluralistic market of
religions. This required the religions to change their organizational structure so that it wasmore bureaucratic and professional, and for them to make compromises with their teachings,
incorporating modern values of various kinds. Less church involvement refers mainly to thedilution of an individual's personal involvement with a church or feelings of a religious nature,in which said individual goes to church to worship less often, and participates in fewer church
activities.
In general, secularization describes people's retreat from engagement with religion and thefact that they no longer view the world in supernatural terms, in addition to the fact that
religion can no longer dictate what happens in public affairs, political or economic, within asociety, and that culture and the arts (and, it goes without saying, education) are no longer
beholden to the proscriptions of religion. In other words, one of the major repercussions ofsecularization is the gradual loosening of religion's hold over the various spheres of life insociety. Secularization, then, essentially involves the privatization of religion.
In The De-secularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, a collection of
lectures published in a book by Peter Berger (Berger 1999), the secularization theory wasessentially debunked as something that was now really only relevant in academic circles.
Casanova (1994) argued that it was by no means a foregone conclusion that a given society
would move in the direction of secularization, and that this was contingent on structural
conditions and historical factors. He also noted a trend of religions all over the world
re-engaging in the public sphere or public affairs. He called these religions “public religions.”
Religions can bring certain things to public affairs as they become engaged in this sphere,
including their teachings, the commitment of their members, and the actual resources they haveat their disposal. These can provide the ideological basis for democratic, economic justice andreligious movements, just as they can provide the practical resources these movements require(Sherkat and Ellison: 1999). In addition, the very engagement of religious groups in the publicsphere can have the effect of creating social capital (Chang 2004). However, if religions are toparticipate in public matters, and to have any kind of influence in public life, they require a
democratic, pluralistic society that offers guarantees of religious freedom, frequently one thathas a separation of church and state, that allows religious groups the freedom of religious belief,the right of association and the right of expression. That is to say, in taking an interest in otherpeople or in society, religious believers or religious groups might well maintain that this is an
issue on the level of the individual, but the individual influencing one person after the next is
sufficient to cause changes to occur in society. In addition, it is also possible that people cometo the conclusion that if they want to realize their good intentions, the most effective way to do
this is by influencing public policy.
At one point religious believers or religious groups may come to feel that their religious
freedoms are coming under threat, or that religious equality or religious freedoms need someform of guarantee in public policy. It is often at this time that such social activity becomes apublic policy issue, but it can also happen the other way around: the fact that this activity
becomes a public policy issue can be the thing that makes individuals and groups aware of the
problem. Of course, religious freedom can also be intimately tied up with the cultural freedomsof minority groups (Wellens 2009), as the culture of a certain ethnic group can be closely
related to a certain religion. When a certain ethnic group feels its culture has become subject torepression, the importance of religious freedom becomes all too apparent.
Generally speaking, in the West, religious freedom is known as the “first freedom.” It isregarded as the standard by which all others, which, to some extent, exist as a result of it, aremeasured. Marty (2000: 49) notes that these other freedoms naturally follow in places where
religions are allowed to flourish. An awareness of public policy issues often springs from anawareness of religious issues and of religious freedom. In the East, the general populace andreligious believers have a different approach and attitude to religion than their counterparts inthe West. The question is, compared to other public issues, what factors influence the way thegeneral population and religious believers view public issues related to religion? This is what
this paper seeks to explore.
3 Research Methods
(1)

Data

In this paper we shall use the 2006 AsiaBarometer survey data for statistical analysis andcomparison. AsiaBarometer is a large scale sampling survey of countries in Asia, including
East Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia and South Asia, developed, and coordinated by,Professor Takashi Inoguchi, the renowned Japanese sociologist. The surveys commenced in
2003, and consist of face-to-face interviews based on questionnaires of corresponding content
localized and translated into the language of the country in which it is carried out by local
survey companies. The questionnaires cover everyday aspects of the daily lives of the generalpopulace, including questions on family life, neighbors, work, social and political systems, andthe economy. The headquarters is located in the Tokyo Satellite Office of the University of
Niigata Prefecture, and the project is organized by the Research and Information Center for
Asian Studies, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo. The 2006 survey covered
seven countries, including China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and
Vietnam. The sample size was approximately 1000 for each country, with the exception ofChina, which had a sample size of 2000 due to the size of its population.
(2)

Independent and dependent variables

For this survey the dependent variables were respondents' awareness of issues related toreligion as well as their attitudes towards it. The 2006 AsiaBarometer survey included fourquestions on public issues related to religion itself, these being question numbers 25, 27, 31 and
44. Question 25 asked, “Which, if any, of the following issues cause you great worry? Pleasechoose all issues that cause you serious worry.” Item 27 on this list of issues was “religious
fundamentalism.” In Question 27 respondents were given the statement “Any society has somekinds of inequality” and then asked, “In which of the following areas do you think equality
should be most eagerly promoted in your society? Please indicate three that are most important
to you.” “Religion” was the sixth item on the list. Question 31 asked, “How well do you think
the [your country’s] government is dealing with the following issues?” Item (i) on thefollowing list of options was “religious conflict.” Finally, Question 44 went, “Here is a list ofqualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Please select two you consider to be
most important.” “Religiosity” was the seventh item.
Of these dependent variable questions, Questions 25, 27 and 44 were multiple response
questions, of which one option was related to religion, and this was in each case treated as adichotomous variable during statistical analysis. Question 31 was an ordinal variable, and forthe purposes of binary logistic regression analysis the four options were changed to either“well” or “not well.”
The independent variables section of the survey included questions on gender, age, level of
education and nationality, as well as five other sections which included options on the religious
idea, religious practices, how people identified with religion, people's trust in religious groups,
and the particular religion they affiliate with, if any.
Religious ideas were dealt with in one question, Question 49, which asked, “Do you believe inan unseen spiritual world that can influence events in the world we see around us?” andrequired the respondent to choose from “I definitely believe”; “I somewhat believe”; “I do notreally believe”; or “I do not believe at all.” The subject of religious practices was restricted to
one question only, this being, “How often do you pray or meditate?” with possible answers of“Daily”; “Weekly”; “Monthly”; “On special occasions”; or “Never.”Issues related to religious identity were dealt with in three questions, mainly on the individual's
assessment of the importance of religion. Question 19, for example, was, “Throughout theworld, some people also see themselves as belonging to a transnational group (such as Asian,people of Chinese ethnicity, people who speak the same language or practice the same religion).
Do you identify with any transnational group?” with option four being, “Religious group that I
am believing in and practicing.” In Question 21_1 respondents were asked, “Which of thefollowing social circles or groups are important to you?” and Question 21_2 followed with “Of
those, which one is the most important to you?” Option 12 was “religion.”
The variables obtained from the options ticked by respondents in the answers to these threemultiple response questions were added together to calculate the total score for independent
variables.
The respondents' trust in religious groups and religious professionals was addressed in
Question 24, which asked, “For each of the following events, please rate the importance of
having a religious institution (such as mosque, church, temple, and shrine) or a religious
professional (such as imam, priest, and monk) involved.” The specific events listed were births;
weddings; festivals or holidays; and funerals. These counted as four ordinal variables andwere followed by the four options “Very Important”; “Somewhat Important”; “Not really
Important”; and “Not at all important.” The answers for all four events were added together andconverted into the independent variable “trust on religious professionals.”
The specific religion the respondent affiliated with was addressed in Question F9, which asked,“Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion? If yes, which?” This question
was designed to discover the respondent's subjective identification with a particular religion. It
included a total of 14 options to choose from, including “none.”(3) Research Hypotheses
According to the aim of this research and the dependent and independent variables, thepresent paper puts forward the following hypotheses.
Hypotheses 1: The stronger an individual's religious ideas, the more they are likely tofeel that religion is an important public issue.
Hypotheses 2: The more an individual is engaged in religious practices, the more they
are likely to feel that religion is an important public issue.

Hypotheses 3: People with a religious belief are more likely to feel that religion is an
important public issue.
Hypotheses 4: Respondents from different religious traditions do not all view the movetowards making public policy on issues related to religion in the same way.

4 Data analysis and Research Findings
1. The degree of concern about religious issues by respondents from each country.
As part of this survey respondents were asked whether they were concerned about religious
fundamentalism; whether they thought their government should be doing more to promotereligious equality; whether they felt satisfied with how their government was dealing withreligious conflict; and whether they considered religiosity to be a worthwhile value to teachchildren at home. These four questions, taken as dependent variables, were used to investigate
the degree of concern respondents in the various countries had about issues related to religion.
In all, of the 29 issues, respondents from the countries included in the survey were mostconcerned with the issue of poverty (51.0%), followed by health (47.1%). Only 5.9% of
respondents said they were concerned about religious fundamentalism, only marginally higherthat those concerned about the fast pace of technological change (4.3%) or the dominance ofcorporate power (5.7%). There was, however, considerable variance in the degree of concern
felt about religious fundamentalism depending on the country. Table 1 shows that respondents
from Singapore and Japan were more concerned about this issue than respondents from othercountries were.
In terms of which types of equality should be eagerly promoted in society, the highest
proportion selected income/ wealth equality (61%), followed by equal opportunities in
education (62.7%). Only 6.6% of respondents felt that religious equality should be eagerly
promoted. Again, by country, the highest proportion of respondents selecting the religious
option were those in Singapore, with 15.4% believing that religious equality should bepromoted more.
There was, however, considerable differences to how survey respondents answered thequestion on the government's handling of religious conflict. Overall, 36% of respondents were
unsatisfied with how their government was dealing with religious conflict, but the figure wasmuch higher in Japan and South Korea, at 72.1% and 60.8%, respectively. In Singapore, bycontrast, only 4.7% of respondents were unhappy with the way their government washandling religious conflict.
On average, 3.7% of survey respondents thought that religiosity was a worthwhile quality toencourage children to learn at home, significantly less than those who considered honesty(38.5%), independence (37.4%), or diligence (32.8%) worthwhile. A proportionately slightly
higher number of respondents from South Korea and Singapore, 7.1% and 8.4%, respectively,
agreed that religiosity was a worthwhile quality to encourage children to learn at home.
Table 1 Percentage of Agreement between Survey Respondents in the Four Dependent
Variables
Religious
Religious
Fundamentalism
Religiosity
Equality
ConflictTaiwan36
68
562
30(3.60%)(6.80%)(60.20%)(3.00%)
Hong Kong
45
46
678
45
(4.50%)(4.60%)(75.40%)(4.50%)
Japan
72
68
209
24
(7.20%)(6.80%)(27.90%)(2.40%)
Korea
28
54
359
73
(2.70%)(5.30%)(39.20%)(7.10%)
Singapore
120
160
930
87
(11.60%)(15.40%)(95.30%)(8.40%)
China
127
139
1379
32
(6.40%)(7.00%)(70.40%)(1.60%)
Vietnam46006(4.60%)(0.00%)(0.00%)(0.60%)
474
535
4117
297
Overall(5.90%)(6.60%)(64.00%)(3.70%)

Statistically, the differences between the countries in the survey in the above four questions
did attain a level of significance, demonstrating that differences do indeed exist in theattitudes the people of these countries have towards the four questions. All in all, however,regardless of the differences in their respective political and social systems, the majority of
the countries in the survey have already attained a high degree of secularization, and religious
issues are not seen as overly important. The notable exception was with the question about
religious conflict, in which respondents from both Japan and South Korea demonstrated aconsiderable level of concern, expressing low levels of satisfaction with their respective
governments in how they were dealing with religious conflict.

2. Factors influencing concerns about religious issues
In order to ascertain the effect of each independent variable on the four dependent variables,
we undertook binary logistic regression analysis on each, the results of which are shown in
Table 2.
Table 2 Binary Logistic Regression Analysis on the Four Dependent Variables
Religious
Religious
Fundamentalism
Religiosity
Equality
ConflictsignificancesignificancesignificancesignificanceLogistic Regression
B
B
B
B
Country**
.311
.000
.004
.000
Hong Kong.493.072 -.283.228 1.242.990.000 15.482
Japan
.355
.180
.025
.912 -.747.990.000 15.370
Korea
-.805
.008 -.633.008 -.460.000 -.219 1.000
Singapore
1.018
.216
.290 2.954
.991
.000
.000 14.025
China
.722
.056
.778
.996
.991
.003
.000 13.319
Vietnam*.269.321 -18.628.989-1.047 1.000
Gender**
.345
.419
.086
.179 -.532
.408
.001
.000
Age
.001
.766 -.009
.006
.040
.032 -.060.039
Education**
.206
.127
.000
.001
Mid Education
.285
.152
.219
.083
.049 -.185.008 -1.391
High Education
1.009
.098
.332
.084
.000 -.235.000 -1.673
Unseen Spiritual World-.092.122 -.107.066 -.026
.478
.049
.891
Pray or Meditation-.060.230 -.158.029.358 -.239
.367
.000
Trust of Religious
.366
.011
.865 -.534
.279
.496
.000
.000
Organization
Religious Identity
.556
.607
.173
.032
.971
.000
.000 -.121
Importance of Religious-.006.737 -.030
.095
.019
.082
.209
.059
Professional
Religion**
.130
1.000
.001
.035
Other Christian
.584
.264
.222
.005
.975 -14.311
.992
.012
Muslim (Sunnah)
1.103
.232
.393 -.123.746 -14.883
.996
.000
Muslim (Shiah)-18.315.999 1.049.399 19.745.999 -12.694
.999
Hindu
.081
.862
.636
.065 -.780.111 -14.612.997
Buddhist (Mahayana)
.227
.140
.217
.147
.037
.681
.425
.599
Buddhist (Theravada)
1.104.153 -14.356.998 -20.816 1.000.613 1.000
Confucian-17.809.999 2.205.129 -11.301.999.009 -1.506
Sikh-18.884.999.649.621 18.693.999 -14.241.999
Taoism
.399
.168
.094
.695
.557
.993
.000 -12.868
Shintoism-18.424.999.401.616 -.681.324 -15.017.999
Catholic
1.125
.332
.258
.245 1.509.224.000 -.347
Other
.979
.145 -.200.475 -14.639.997.006 -.892
Constant-4.676.000 -1.323
.002
.734
.007 -19.477.987

* Vietnam is omitted from the item of religious conflict in the survey.
** Reference points for variables as follows: for nationality, Taiwan; for gender, female; foreducation, a low level of education; for religious affiliation, "none."
Table 2 shows that religious idea had no impact on the four dependent variables, and that the
impact of the frequency of religious practices such as praying or meditation was also
negligible. The only effect that reached levels of significance was that regarding religious
equality, with a negative regression coefficient, showing that the higher the frequency ofreligious practices, the less the respondent believed that the government should be eagerly
promoting religious equality. The independent variable of the importance of religious
professionals did not produce any impact on the four dependent variables. Trust in religiousorganizations did have an impact on concerns about religious fundamentalism and religious
conflict, and identification with a religious group also had an impact on concerns about
fundamentalism and religious equality. The more trust respondents had in religiousorganizations, and the more they identified with religious groups, the more they wereconcerned about the problem of religious fundamentalism. Also, the more they trusted
religious organizations, the less satisfied they were with the way their governments were
dealing with religious conflict.
When we look at the type of religion we see that, largely speaking, this had very limited effecton the four dependent variables. Certain findings were quite surprising. For example,
Christians, Sunnah Muslims, Catholics and followers of other religions were more concernedwith the issue of fundamentalism than were respondents with no religious affiliation;
Confucians were more likely to feel that their government should be doing more to promotereligious equality; and Taoists felt more satisfied with how their government was dealing withreligious conflict.
Next we come to three sociological/ demographic variables of gender, age and level of
education. The impact of age on the three dependent variables of religious equality, religious
conflict and religiosity did reach levels of significance, albeit with very low regression
coefficients. Gender only affected attitudes towards religious fundamentalism and religious
equality, with males tending to be more concerned. Education only had an effect on religious
fundamentalism and religious conflict: the higher the level of education, the more concerned
respondents were with religious fundamentalism, but the more satisfied they were with theway their government was dealing with religious conflict. There seems to be a contradiction
here that is not easily explained.
We can use Taiwan as a reference point for the nationality variable. The impact of thisvariable was only really observed on the religious fundamentalism and religious conflict
dependent variables. A comparatively higher proportion of respondents in Singapore andChina believed religious fundamentalism to be cause for concern, and a comparatively lower
proportion felt this way in South Korea. In terms of governments' handling of religious
conflict, every country showed different results to Taiwan's. A higher proportion of
respondents in Japan and South Korea, compared to those in Taiwan, expressed dissatisfaction
with their governments' dealing with the problem, and a higher percentage of those in Hong
Kong, China and Singapore, again compared to those in Taiwan, said they were satisfied.
5 Conclusion and Discussion
This study took the four questions of whether respondents were concerned about religious
fundamentalism; whether they thought their government should be doing more to promotereligious equality; whether they felt satisfied with how their government was dealing withreligious conflict; and whether they considered religiosity to be a worthwhile value to teachchildren at home, as dependent variables to investigate seven countries in a 2006 survey. We
discovered that these religious issues did not receive a high level of concern, far different
from with other secular issues, and that a low proportion of respondents considered that
religiosity was a worthwhile value to encourage children to learn at home. In general we canconsider these seven countries, despite the considerable differences in their respective
political and social systems, to be highly secular societies.
Religious ideas and religious practices had no discernible impact on the four dependent
variables. Analysis using respondents with no religious affiliation as a reference point
revealed that religious believers are no more concerned about religious issues, nor will theyplace more importance on religiosity as a desirable value to encourage their children to learn
at home. The differences in these four dependent variables are mainly concentrated in thedependent variables of religious fundamentalism and religious conflict, with the dependent
variables of level of education and nationality having a relatively large impact. Higher levelsof education is one of the achievements of secularization, so a higher level of concern about
religious fundamentalism is to be expected, and the impact of nationality reflects thedifferences in the respective political and social systems of each country. The type of religion
had a negligible influence on the four dependent variables. No support was found for any of
the four hypotheses proposed in this paper.

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