Better Foundation 1

Commentary on Towards a Balanced Social Psychology
Abstract:
65 words
Main Text:
1,254 words
References:
360 words
Total Text:
1,684 words

Building An Even Better Conceptual Foundation
First Author:
Tatsuya Kameda
Department of Behavioral Science
Hokkaido University
Sapporo Japan 060-0810+81-11-706-3042
tkameda@let.hokudai.ac.jp
http://lynx.let.hokudai.ac.jp/members/kameda
Second Author – send all correspondence to this author:
Reid Hastie
Center for Decision Research
Graduate School of Business
University of Chicago
Chicago IL USA 60637
773 834 9167
reid.hastie@gsb.uchicago.edu

Abstract
Krueger and Funder spend too much time on their critique of some classic
studies in Social Psychology. They should have spent more time developing
their constructive ideas about better methodologies and, especially, better
conceptual foundations for the field. We endorse their exhortation to consider

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Better Foundation 2social behavior in its ecologically adaptive context and we present a few ideasof our own about how to develop a more comprehensive conceptual
framework.

Text
Krueger and Funder are unhappy with two traditions of research in Social
Psychology. They provide a biting and occasionally witty critique of classic
demonstrations of misbehavior (over-conformity, over-obedience, and failures
to help) and the heuristics and biases approach to social cognition. Many of
their insights into weaknesses of these approaches have merit, although theirrelentlessly negative perspective vastly undervalues the enormous positivecontributions of research from these traditions. Any school of behavioral
research can be subjected to scathing criticism; indeed the authors’ own
Realistic Accuracy Model is also limited in many ways.
Acknowledging that there is something to learn from a critical evaluation ofthese major pillars of the social psychological canon, we were more interested
in Krueger and Funder’s affirmative suggestions for improvements in methods
and theory. Most of their suggestions are methodological and we havealready expressed our enthusiasm for the correspondence framework for theanalysis of degrees of accuracy (see Hastie & Rasinski, 1987, for an introduction
to the correspondence-coherence distinction, a discussion of “methodologicallogics” for judgment research, and a comment on the manner in which the null
hypothesis test has obstructed the study of social judgment). And, likeKrueger and Funder, we find the Bayesian framework to be conceptually
superior to the Neumann-Pearson null hypothesis testing approach. But, theiressay does not help us understand the persistent popularity of the traditional
approach. Perhaps there is an important lesson to be learned from the failureof the Bayesian approach to catch on in any major scientific field.
Since we are in essential agreement with Krueger and Funder’smethodological imperatives, we would like to focus our attention on theirsuggestions for a stronger conceptual foundation for the field of Social
Psychology. Krueger and Funder view social behavior as central to humanadaptation. They argue that it is essential to place social cognition in an2

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interpersonal context and to evaluate its overall adaptive success by acost-benefit analysis. For example, referring to Funder’s (1995) Kenny’s (1994)
frameworks for social judgment and personality perception, Krueger andFunder emphasize that social interactions are an ecologically indispensable
ingredient of social cognition. Social interactions determine what types ofinformation are available and relevant to a perceiver, and prescribe theappropriate standards of accuracy by which to evaluate social judgment.
Krueger and Funder also note that in the two traditions they criticize, “Theparadigmatic study presents social stimuli directly to participants, thus
bypassing relevance and availability completely, and bypassing the task of cuedetection. Traditional studies of social cognition concern the utilization stageexclusively” (p.39).
We agree that considering interpersonal processes is essential to a more
ecologically balanced picture of social behavior and cognition. But, we believethat Krueger and Funder’s recommendation about how to salvage social
psychology still does not effectively banish the ubiquitous bias toward thestudy of “individual minds operating in a social vacuum,” which has haunted
cognitive social psychology. For example, Funder’s Realistic Accuracy Model
does not consider the rich context of multiple, partially redundant, substitutablesocial cues (Why else would they say that, “Accuracy is a difficult andremarkable achievement” [p. 39] and indicate the level of accuracy can bepredicted by a simple multiplicative calculation?), nor is it clear where thepromised cost-benefit analysis fits into the framework (Figure 2). General
criticisms of such individual-focused frameworks have been raised elsewhere(e.g., Nye & Brower, 1996) and we will not repeat them. Instead let us sketch
our conception of a more comprehensive framework for social interdependence
that extends Krueger and Funder’s suggestions for a more balanced Social
Psychology.
Everyone agrees that the ultimate goal of Social Psychology is to provide
insights and causal theories of everyday social behavior. No socialpsychologists question this truism. But “social” seems to mean different things
to different social psychologists. For some, “social” means being motivated by
the immediate social policy implications of the research findings. Krueger andFunder suggest that this motivation is one reason for the emphasis on biases
and social mis-behavior in some textbooks (e.g., Katzko, 2002). For others, like3

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Krueger and Funder, “social” means that the stimulus that is being perceived
and judged is another human being; the most social aspect of the framework is
an analysis of agreement-disagreement between two perceivers of a target
person. And for still others (including us), “social” means adaptive, strategicinteraction in a matrix of enduring and shifting social relationships.
The perceiver-target framework is too limited and it excludes importantfactors of social motivation and strategic interaction. Without a broader theoryof motivation and social interdependence we fear research will simply continue
to produce lists of “effects” and “biases,” that under some conditions may
materialize in interpersonal perception (cf., Table 1). Although Krueger andFunder do not acknowledge it, the heuristics and biases approach to socialcognition did more than simply catalogue biases and errors. The underlying
conception of the mind, implicit in this approach, included a “cognitivetoolbox” architecture with optional reliance on alternative heuristic judgment
strategies. The strategies were associated with fundamental cognitive
capacities (memory retrieval, similarity evaluation, causal simulation) that wereresponsible for the distinctive signature biases that were byproducts of relianceon each strategy (cf., Kahneman & Frederick, 2003). Even some of the harshest
critics of the heuristics and biases approach, have adopted this basic conceptualframework (e.g., Gigerenzer, et al., 1999). But, a cognitive architecture is only
part of a comprehensive conceptual framework (cf., J.R. Anderson, 1990; N.H.
Anderson, 1996).
We think that Krueger and Funder’s recommendation to consider theecological context of social behavior should be taken more seriously. Only a few
social psychologists have grappled with the adaptive character of socialinteractions. Indeed, we see little evidence that Krueger and Funder haveseriously addressed these issues. However, this challenge has been acceptedby behavioral ecologists studying animal behavior (e.g., Dawkins & Krebs,
1978; Hauser, 1996). Interaction and communication among animals are often
deceptive and manipulative, as well as cooperative. And, even some of themost mysterious animal social behaviors can be understood as solutions to theadaptive problems of securing essential resources such as food, mating
opportunities, social power, et cetera (Byrne, 1995). This is no different forhumans! Game theory and Evolutionary Game Theory provide truly
comprehensive frameworks to understand the adaptive essence of social4

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interaction (e.g., Gintis, 2000; Maynard-Smith, 1982). These approaches comewith powerful analytic and simulation tactics for theory building as well as
original observational and experimental methodologies. More than twenty-fiveyears ago Kelley and Thibaut (1978) attempted to introduce social psychologists
to Game Theory, but their effort was unsuccessful. We think SocialPsychology has made a major error by myopically ignoring these important andproductive approaches. Without more comprehensive foundations,frameworks like the Realistic Accuracy Model will continue to generate
superficial lists of “descriptive patterns,” but miss deeper insights into thecauses of social behavior.
We can point to a few illustrations of the kind of research we advocate.
Camerer (2003) provides an accessible and profound introduction to the aspectsof Game Theory most relevant to Social Psychology (and reading Kelley &Thibaut, 1978, is still instructive). Kameda, Takezawa & Hastie (2003) report an
exemple study of the development of adaptive social norms; Kameda &Nakanishi (2002, in press) report cost-benefit analyses of social conformity.
We applaud Krueger and Funder’s goal of promoting the development of abalanced social psychology. But, we want to exhort social psychologists totake their adaptive theme further. Even limited target-perceiver theories likethe Realistic Accuracy Model need a more comprehensive foundation that deals
with interdependencies among social agents.

References
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Anderson, N.H. (1996). A functional theory of cognition. Mahwah, NJ:Erlbaum.
Byrne, R. (1995). The thinking ape: Evolutionary origins of intelligence.
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Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategicinteraction. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

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Better Foundation 6Campbell, D.T. (1974). Evolutionary epistemology. In P.A. Schlipp (Ed.), The
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Dawkins, R. & Krebs, J.R. (1978). Animal signals: information ormanipulation? In J.R. Krebs & N.B. Davies (Eds.), Behavioral ecology(pp.282-309). Oxford: Blackwell.
Gintis, H. (2000). Game theory evolving: A problem-centered introduction tomodeling strategic behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hastie, R., & Rasinski, K.A. (1987). The concept of accuracy in social
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Hauser, M.D. (1996).
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The evolution of communication. Cambridge: MITKahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited:
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Kameda, T., & Nakanishi, D. (2002). Cost-benefit analysis of social/culturallearning in a non-stationary uncertain environment: An evolutionary
simulation and an experiment with human subjects. Evolution andHuman Behavior, 23, 373-393.
Kameda, T., & Nakanishi, D. (in press). Does social/cultural learning increasehuman adaptability? Rogers’s question revisited. Evolution and HumanBehavior.
Kameda, T., Takezawa, M., & Hastie, R. (2003). The logic of social sharing: An
evolutionary game analysis of adaptive norm development. Personalityand Social Psychology Review, 7, 2-19.
Katzko, M.W. (2002). The rhetoric of psychological research and the problemof unification in psychology. American Psychologist, 57, 262-270.

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Kelley, H.H., & Thibaut, J.W. (1978). Interpersonal relations: A theory ofinterdependence. New York: Wiley.
Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the theory of games. New York:Cambridge University Press.
Nye, J.L. & Brower, A.M. (Eds.) (1996). What's social about social cognition?:
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