Name: Mark Cooper

Organization: Consumer Federation of America

Submission ID: 138

COMMENTS OF
THE CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA
on theTRANSITION OF THE INTERNET ASSIGNED NUMBERS AUTHORITY

CONTENTSSUMMARY

1

I. INTRODUCTION
A. CFA Analysis of the Internet and Its Governance
B. Outline

6

II. THE TRANSITION OF IANA FUNCTIONS
A. The Organic Internet Governance Model
B. The NTIA and the IANA Transition
C. The Proposed Adaptation of the Internet Institutions
D. The Adaptation of the Internet Resource System to Incorporate
the IANA Functions
1. Fundamental Rules and Principles
2. Operational Rules

8

III. THE INTERNET AS A FOCAL CORE GLOBAL RESOURCE SYSTEM AND
THE MATURATION CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION
A. The Economic Basis of Internet Success
B. Participatory Governance
C. The Global Nature of the Success of the Internet
D. Architecture, Social Policy and Governments

19

APPENDIX A: CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA AND STAFF ANALYSISOF THE INTERNET AND THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION

29

MARK COOPER
DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH
REDACTEDSEPTEMBER 2015

SUMMARY

Conclusions and Recommendations
The Consumer Federation of America (CFA) is pleased to have the opportunity tocomment on the transition of basic Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions to
expanded oversight by organic, Internet institutions. For over 25 years, CFA has been involvedin the analysis of the Internet and been a vigorous advocate for an open Internet (see Appendix
A). As we anticipated in a January 1990 paper, the Internet has become a remarkably dynamic
engine of progress and an extremely consumer and citizen friendly space.
Our experience and analysis lead us to conclude the following.


The conditions established by the National Telecommunications Information Administration(NTIA) to govern the transition will ensure the continued functioning and responsible
oversight of the IANA functions.



The governance structure proposed by the Internet institutions will meet the NTIA
requirements, as long as both aspects – the stewardship role of the IETF (Internet
Engineering Task Force) and the reform of the internal governance of Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) – are fully implemented as proposed.

This is a critically important moment to implement the IANA transition andaccomplishing a smooth transition in the time frame laid out by NTIA is extremely important toachieve these and other beneficial outcomes. Several additional benefits beyond the specificgoals set out by the NTIA will be realized by a smooth transition.


The condition proposed by the NTIA of not having government-led oversight over the IANA
functions will advance the broad and important principle that governments should not seek tomanipulate Internet architecture for policy purposes.



The proposals in their current form strengthen the unique form of Internet governance not
only by bringing a core Internet operational function under its authority, but also byreforming ICANN to add Internet governance principles to its structureThe governance structure proposed by the Internet institutions develops a model that may
have wider uses as the digital economy expands by building a structure that can bringdifferent types of organizations into cooperative relationships under the broad Internet
governance principles.

The proposals focus squarely on the oversight of the operational functions and avoid getting
into policy issues. While architecture and operational choices have policy implications, weare convinced that the Internet will suffer severely if architecture becomes a major
instrument of policy. Defending the independence of the technical design and operation of
the Internet from narrow policy choices in the transition is extremely beneficial.

These potential improvements in the governance of the Internet come at a crucial momentin its development. The digital mode of production is passing through what we call a “quarter
life crisis,” a period that others have called the “turning point” or “critical juncture.” This is aperiod in which a dramatically successful technological revolution must develop the institutions
1

to guide the full deployment of the dominant technology. The adaptation of the successful
institutions to deal with wider tasks, while preserving and extending the principles on which thatsuccess was based, is crucial. Our analysis shows that the proposed IANA transition, if fully
implemented as proposed, is an important step in the right direction.
SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSISThe Internet Resource System
We base these conclusions on a quarter of a century of detailed analysis of the factors that
contributed to the success of the Internet and the ways in which the proposed transition affects
those factors. We view the Internet as a resource system – in fact the focal core resource
system of the digital mode of production, which is why its smooth functioning is so important.
The premise of the analysis is that resource systems succeed by organizing users and uses into
coherent structures that allow the resource to be developed and utilized by the members of thecommunity. The resource system is a structure composed of rules that stipulate who can dowhat, and a governance structure that develops and enforces the rules, as summarized in Table
ES-1 in the form of 10 challenges (questions). Within the space defined by the rules, we findparticipants (users), who are allowed to conduct activities (uses) that exploit the resource (units)subject to monitoring (information) and control (enforcement), which includes conflict resolution
and sanctions.
TABLE ES-1: THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF A RESOURCE SYSTEM
How does the resource system come into existence: Constitutional rules govern the way the overall resources system isconstituted, particularly how collective choice rules are defined.
How can the operation of the system adapt? Collective choice rules embody the procedures by which the operational rules arechanged.
How does the system work? Operational rules govern the activities that take place within the borders of the resource system.
How are users awarded rights? Boundary rules specify how participants (users) enter or leave their positions.
Who gets to use the resource and who oversees it? Position rules associate participants with an authorized set of actions (uses).
How is the resource measured and controlled? Aggregation rules specify the transformation function to map actions into
outcomes (Units).
How are users allowed to exploit the resource? Authority rules specify which sets of actions are assigned to positions (units)
and how those actions will be overseen (enforcement)
How do actions impact the resources and other users? Scope rules specify the set of outcomes that may be affected.
What are the incentives, taxes and fines that elicit proper behaviors? Payoff rules specify how benefits and costs are
required, permitted, or forbidden in relation to players, based on the full set of actions taken and outcomes reached, as well as
how the provisioning and maintenance of the resource system will be provided for..
What flow of information best encourages, manages, and distributes the resources? Information rules specify the
Information available to each position for purposes of monitoring and enforcing compliance with rules.

Source: Based on Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, chapters 7 and 9.

We have shown that the Internet exhibits a large number of characteristics that areassociated with successful resources systems. The Internet is a resource system in which anyone
can do anything as long as it comports with the Internet protocols (IP). The protocols create aflow of resource units continuously with no restrictions on content. Users have the opportunity
to design their uses or operate their private networks in ways that can deal with the capacity ofthe system to handle traffic. Decentralized, user-based, local knowledge is allowed to play alarge role in the resource system, an important characteristic that enables it to produce large
benefits and scale. The success of the system encourages the community of users to invest
substantially in its maintenance, provisioning and expansion.
2

In the beginning and for a significant period of development, the architects and users of
the Internet were a fairly small, homogeneous set of engineers who shared norms, values, and a
pragmatic problem-solving world-view. The perceived benefits expected from cooperation werequite large and non-commercial. The essential principle of the Internet was to allow local
autonomy around a core set of communications protocols, without dictating the structure andincentives within local networks. The protocols were designed to resolve conflicts overresources in a low-cost manner. The nature of the users and the resources system made it “easy”
to decentralize decision-making and rely on distributed knowledge and assets to build thesystem.
An environment that promoted cooperation and decentralization gave rise to the
distinctive model of Internet governance. The foundation of the model is direct democracy inwhich each member of the community has the right to participate in the decision making process.
Moreover, membership in the community is entirely open. The fact that the base of the model isa highly participatory form of direct democracy does not mean there is no structure to decision
making. There are rules of discussion and choice among alternatives striving towarddemonstration of consensus. Positions of authority exist that have responsibility for taking final
decisions or implementing them. A selection process to fill those positions is clearly articulated,subject to rules of openness and transparency. Accountability to the community is effected
through the transparency of discussion and decision making and a relatively easy process ofrecall.
Ultimately, the success of the Internet rests on the economic benefit it delivers to its users
and society with the cooperative/collaborative nature of the system. We have argued that theInternet provides solutions to (reduce the severity of) several classic economic dilemmas:
provisioning and maintaining a common-pool resource, delivering a public good with massive(positive) externalities and reducing transaction cost problems (asymmetric information plus
others) in a way that allows a much closer fit between supply and demand. The Internet at theheart of the digital economy constitutes a fundamental shift in the mode of production based on adramatic expansion of the benefits of cooperation and collaborative production. The importanceof the Internet resource system is magnified by the fact that communications and information
flow are increasingly central to economic activity and have long been at the heart of important
political and social processes.
The IANA Transition
We believe that the structure proposed for the IANA transition affects almost every oneof the rules and elements of the Internet resources system in a positive manner (see Table ES-2).
First, the key elements that affect the users of the resource systems – users, units, uses,
outcomes, are unaffected by the transition. There is a strong commitment to preserving thefunctioning of the Internet as is. Second, the decision of the U.S. government to step out of its
stewardship role and transition to independent oversight is a constitutional choice decision. One
can argue that the condition that oversight not be government-led is both a constitutional choice
and a collective choice decisions. Another key collective choice decision is the reliance on themulti-stakeholder governance.
This approach to the oversight of the IANA functions is consistent with Internet
3

governance model and the general approach to oversight of all other Internet function. It creates
greater consistency across all of the critical operational functions of the Internet.

TABLE ES-2: THE HIGH LEVEL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED IANA TRANSITIONCONSTITUTIONAL RULESCOLLECTIVE CHOICE RULES

OUTCOMESTERMINATE STEWARDSHIPMULTI-STAKEHOLDER GOVERNANCE
NON- GOVERNMENT LED
By-law Amendment process

PRESERVE FUNCTIONICANN By-Law changes

Preservation of Function

OPERATIONAL RULES
BOUNDARY

INFORMATIONAGGREGATIONOPENNESS
Institutional
Reorganization

TRANSPARENCY
Transparency
policyunchanged

POSITIONPARTICIPANTS (user) INFORMATION (monitor)

New committees
PTI within ICANNIFR Review Function
Customer Standing
IFR Review

Customers

AUTHORITY RULESACTIONS (uses)

Reviews
Complaints
Board appointment& removal

Complaint paths
Recall, Reconsider

Sole Member

Performance Metrics
Annual Update

Multi-stakeholder
intensified

CONTROL (enforce)
ACCOUNTABILITY
Performance Reviews
Budget and Plan oversight,
Leadership by Ombudsman
Review Committee

NET BENEFTIS/COSTS (units)
SCOPE RULES
Reviews

Positive Externalities
Selective & strategicdelegation of responsibility
to self-organized, selfgoverning policy sectors.

Institutionalizing self-organizing
policy sectors would serve tolegitimize the collective in theseself-governing communities

Principle of Non-Governmental
Interference in architectural decision

Holding accountable the sectors
and powerful actors by
establishing effective monitoring
and accountability

Principle of separation of architecture andpolicy, to the greatest extent possible

LEGEND:
ALL CAPS & UNDERLINED= ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK,SMALL CAPS = NTIA
Plain text Underline = IETF/RIR;
Italics = ICANN,
boxes = positive externalities (beneficial, unintended
consequences of the transition process and proposals

4Because the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the Regional Internet Registries(RIRs) are built on the Internet governance principles their primary adaptation is to extend theirauthority to the IANA functions. Thus, we observe an expanded relationship between the IETF
and ICANN. This involves a series of reviews and audits and a new contractual relationshipbetween ICANN and the RIRs to ensure the functions are being properly provided and managed.
These IETF and the RIRs can be said to take on (replace) the stewardship role.
The proposals for reform of ICANN strengthen the confidence in its oversight of thesefunctions by amending its bylaws (constitutional and collective choice decisions) to incorporate
fundamental principles into bylaws and to strengthen the process for amending the bylaws. With
new principles raised to a higher level in the bylaws and a wider process for challenging actions,the principles should be binding on ICANN behavior.
NTIA has also set several conditions that affect important operational rules – openness (aboundary issue), transparency (an information and control issue), and accountability (acontrol/enforcement issue). The IETF and the RIRs also have formally identified roles in theseoversight functions. ICANN undergoes two transformations in its internal operational. First a
new subsidiary, designed according to the Internet governance model, is created within ICANN– the Post Transition IANA (PTI) – for the purpose of managing the IANA functions. Second,
ICANN’s internal structure is modified to promote more participation and ensure more
oversight. Many more decisions are subject to reviews by external committees constituted by thecommunity and complaints that can be made by individual members of the community. The
potential targets of the potential complaints are defined broadly, with specific IANA functions
explicitly covered. The ability to recall individual members of the board or the entire board isalso expanded, as is oversight over the budget and plans as they affect the IANA functions.
Table ES-2 makes the interdependence of the transfer of stewardship to organic Internet
institutions and the reform of ICANN clear. Both are necessary to achieve the desired outcome.
Without the reform of ICANN, the transfer of stewardship would not be effective. With bothproposals implemented, the role of multi-stakeholder models would be expanded. The Internet
institutions would exercise close review of the IANA functions that ICANN implements. The
ability of the community to participate in the ICANN IANA functions would expand throughcomplaint and recall processes. We see these changes as not only meeting the conditions set out
by NTIA, but also enriching the Internet’s institutional structure at a critical juncture of its
development.
Our analysis rests on the broad principles and macro-structures that we show are thefoundations of the success of the Internet. There are many details in the proposals that should
and will certainly be debated by the Internet community. Our advice is to ensure that the details
comport with the broad principles and macro-structure. However, if the proposals are
implemented as outlined, we believe that this is a case where the devil is not in the details.
The Internet principles and the structure proposed for the transition would be strong enough toultimately override concerns about any details. Indeed, it must be recalled that the Internet hasdeveloped according to a pragmatic approach (rough consensus and running code) in which
norms, guided by strong basic principles, are worked out in practice. Those norms can only
grow if ICANN is reformed in a way that subjects it to the principles of the Internet governancemodel of direct community involvement.
5

I. INTRODUCTION
A. CFA ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNET AND ITS GOVERNANCE
The Consumer Federation of America (CFA) is pleased to have the opportunity tocomment on the transition of basic Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions to
expanded oversight by organic, Internet institutions and the reform of Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). We view this as an opportunity to take a major step
forward toward ensuring the success of the Internet as the dominant, global communications
network and the core resource system of the digital economy.
For over 25 years, in academic articles, research reports, legislative testimony andregulatory filings CFA and its staff have been vigorous advocates for an open Internet (seeAppendix A). As we anticipated in a January 1990 paper,1 the Internet has become aremarkably dynamic engine of progress and an extremely consumer and citizen friendly space.
Our earlier analysis led us to conclude that the success of the Internet, as one of thepillars of the digital revolution, rests on a combination of unique technologies and institutionalarrangements that exist in an expanding space between the market and the state. The Internet isbuilt on a uniquely open protocol developed and managed through a multi-stakeholder processthat strives for consensus in a participatory, direct democratic process. The expansion of this new
space enriches and strengthens the institutional fabric of society, while magnifying and reordering the important roles and functions of both the market and the state. Two decades later,
we conducted an analysis of the challenges that the Internet faces as it becomes the dominantmeans of communications and commerce in the digital mode of production.2 Based on theanalysis of the success of the Internet, we developed principles and recommendations for the
expansion of the Internet governance. The conditions stipulated by the National
Telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA) for the transition and the proposals by
the Internet institutions, comport with those principles.3
The importance of the IANA transition goes well beyond the technical questions ofmanaging and preserving the smooth operation of the Internet, a goal on which there is virtually
unanimous agreement. We view the IANA transition as an opportunity to expand and strengthen
the governance model at a key moment in the development of the Internet. The IANA transition
provides an ideal opportunity to advance the Internet as the digital revolution matures. The
criteria developed by the NTIA and the response of the Internet institutions can support andfurther the development of the Internet in important ways:


Re-affirm the commitment too open communications networks and protocols ando the unique, multi-stakeholder model as the vehicle for Internet governance

1Mark Cooper, Expanding the Information Age for the 1990s: A Pragmatic Consumer Analysis, January 11, 1990
Mark Cooper, “Why Growing Up is Hard to Do: Institutional Challenges for Internet Governance in the “Quarter Life Crisis of the of theDigital Revolution,” Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law, 2013. 11(1). (hereafter, (Quarter-life Crisis”),
http://www.jthtl.org/content/articles/V11I1/JTHTLv11i1_Cooper.PDF
3
The proposals analyzed here were developed by working groups formed by the Internet community, the IANA Stewardship Transition
Coordination Working Group (guided by the Internet Architecture Board, and chaired by two executives from the Internet Engineering Task
Force) and the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability.
2

6



Establish the structural principle and normative condition thato governments should not determine Internet architecture oro impose social policy decision on architecture.

Affirm the principle thato architecture should be as independent of policy as possible, ando remain neutral on social policy issues, while supporting the widest possible array ofpolicy alternatives to address social issues.

Establish an approach in which different types of institutions can co-exist and coordinate
their operation around the core principles of Internet governance.

We purposely choose the word adapt, rather than reform, to describe the overall process
because reform is frequently associated with some sort of failure – “Reform means the
improvement or amendment of what is wrong, corrupt, unsatisfactory.”4 The characterization
grounded in failure does not apply as a general proposition to the Internet and the digital
revolution. This is a case where the need for change derives from remarkable success, notfailure, because the dramatic growth of the resource system strains its own governanceinstitutions and because the resource system has expanded so rapidly and penetrated so deeply
into so many aspects of social life that it is having a huge impact on society. The fact that thedriving force for change is a broad pattern of success, rather than failure, does not make it lessurgent, but it does create a very different orientation than reform driven by failure – thechallenge of preserving and extending what is working well is prominent, if not paramount.
While adaptation is the watchword for the organic Internet institutions, reform of ICANN
is a necessary as part of the transition to bring it more into conformance to the central principlesof the Internet governance model. In these comments we apply the findings of our earlier
analysis to the institutional structure proposed for the transfer of the IANA functions. We showthat the principles that NTIA has laid down for the transition of the IANA functions are a subsetof the broader principles outlined in our earlier analysis. The proposals of the Internet institutions
meet those conditions, if fully implemented, meet those conditions.
B. OUTLINE
The comments are divided into two Section. Section II begins with a brief description of
the unique Internet governance model, followed by a description of the IANA transition in termsof the conditions established by NTIA and the proposals of the Internet institutions in response.
It then presents an evaluation of the proposals in terms of the model we have developed todescribe the success of the Internet as a resource system and the challenges it faces as the digitalmode of production matures. In Section III we show why the transition will preserve andpromote the success of the Internet. We do so by summarizing the framework we developed
earlier to analyze the success of the Internet.

4.

Reform, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform (last modified Sept. 19, 2012, 9:24 PM).

7

II. THE TRANSITION OF IANA FUNCTIONS

A. THE ORGANIC INTERNET GOVERNANCE MODEL
One of the primary benefits that we see in the transition of the IANA functions is thestrengthening of the commitment to the Internet governance model. We use the term Internet
governance model to refer to a specific and unique approach to a multi-stakeholder global
governance institutions.
The foundation of the model is direct democracy in which each member of thecommunity has the right to participate in the decision making process. Moreover, membership in
the community is entirely open. The fact that the base of the model is a highly participatory
form of direct democracy does not mean there is no structure to decision making. There are rulesof discussion and choice among alternatives striving toward demonstration of consensus.
Positions of authority exist that have responsibility for taking final decisions or implementing
them. A selection process to fill those positions is clearly articulated, subject to rules of
openness and transparency. Accountability to the community is effected through thetransparency of discussion and decision making and a relatively easy process of recall.
This is quite different from the traditional form of representational democracy that has
been widely practiced over the past couple of centuries. In that model, a subgroup of thecommunity – sometimes defined by geography, sometimes by shared attributes like economicroles (e.g. business, labor) or institutional affiliation (e.g. academia, civil society) – selects
representatives who participate in the decision making process, presumably to reflect theinterests of their group. Much of the work of the representational democracy tends to be carriedout through voting, with different types of decisions subject to different thresholds (majority,
supermajority). Given the representational basis and electoral mechanism, a great deal of effort
goes into ensuring fairness of participation in the selection of representatives and the decision
process.
These are models of democracy with different strengths and weaknesses. No model ispure and some elements of different approaches to democratic decision making can often be
found within a single institution. We believe the Internet governance model is preferable
because it exhibits profoundly democratic values, grew organically within the community andhas been effective at ensuring the smooth functioning of the communications protocol through aremarkable period of growth. Therefore, it is important to rely on it and adapt it and adapt key
Internet governance principles to the ever changing and expanding Internet resource system.
Effective reform of ICANN is particularly important in this regard.
At the same time, in the real world of an extremely complex, rapidly expanding global
network, the key characteristics of the Internet governance model – direct democracy, open
participation, transparency, consensus, accountability – are relative not absolute. Directionalityof change is crucial. The adaptation of institutions to emerging challenges should preserve theirbasic characteristics, while striving to improve and move the institution toward the ideal
governance models. The NTIA and the proposals put forward by the Internet institutions adopt
this approach. As proposed, they expand the scope of the existing organic Internet institutions
and infuse the core principles of the Internet multi-stakeholder governance model into other8

institutions involved in the management of the Internet or the execution of important Internetfunctions.
B. THE NTIA AND THE IANA TRANSITION
After almost two decades of filling a formal “stewardship” role over ICANN, which was
setup as a temporary measure to transition to oversight by the Internet community, the NTIA has
proposed to complete the process. The NTIA has presented a series of principles for thetransition to ensure the smooth functioning of the Internet by extending the Internet governancemodel to the IANA functions.5

Outcome: Ensure the continued success of the Internet by continuing its smooth functioning
and scalability

Governance: Apply the traditional Internet governance model to all of the IANA functions,
includingo Multi-stakeholder processes
o Openness and transparencyo Accountabilityo Participation



Independenceo Not government-led

The NTIA has set these as the condition the transition must meet for it to step out of its
stewardship role. We agree that if these conditions are satisfied, it would be appropriate for the
U.S. government to do so. We also conclude that the institutional infrastructure proposed by theInternet community goes well beyond the minimum that the NTIA demanded, strengthening theInternet governance structure in important ways. To appreciate this, and properly evaluate the
NTIA conditions, these comments address issues beyond the simple compliance with the NTIA
conditions.
The answers to four fundamental questions provide critical context for evaluating the
proposals.
What is the nature of Internet success?



How is it related to the Internet governance model?



Why insist on independence from governmental oversight?



Why resist efforts to micro-manage Internet architecture in pursuit of specific policies in thecontext of the IANA transition?

Answering these broader questions in these comments by providing empirical evidence
grounded in the history of the Internet serves two functions.
5

NTIA Announces Intent to Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions,” March 14, 2014, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntiaannounces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions

9The answers can contribute to the recognition that this is good policy – i.e. the NTIA
conditions are correct and the Internet community responses are adequate.

This, in turn, can help to secure consensual support from the Internet community, which is anecessary condition for a successful transition.

C. THE PROPOSED ADAPTATION OF THE INTERNET INSTITUTIONS
The proposal put forward by the Internet community not only meet the NTIA conditions,but also enhance the multi-stakeholder process and provide a path for addressing a broad range
of Internet governance issues (see Figure II-1). Proposals were also put forward to significantly
reform the internal governance structure of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names andNumbers (ICANN). The changes bring it more closely into line with the Internet governancemodel (see Figure II-2). We believe this new institutional framework could provide a model formany issues that entails significant global technical challenges. Full implementation of each
proposal is a necessary condition for meeting the NTIA criteria; combined they are sufficient.
At a general level, the transition can be described as follow. The U.S. fulfills its
commitment to transition the IANA functions to oversight by the Internet community byterminating its contract with ICANN. To achieve the goals set out for the transition, the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) strengthens its Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) withICANN and ICANN enters into a new contractual relationship (Service Level Agreement, SLA)
with the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). Through these agreements, the IETF and the RIRs
exercise significant oversight over the IANA functions for the same purpose as the U.S.
stewardship.
At the same time, ICANN’s internal structure must be reformed in two ways to ensure
proper functioning and effective oversight in the absence of the stewardship role of the U.S.
government. It must establish a new independent subsidiary, designed according to thefundamental Internet governance model (i.e. the multi-stakeholder model), to execute the IANA
functions (Post-Transition IANA, PTI). ICANN must also reforms its general internal structure
and operations to come closer to the Internet governance model. Absent these changes in
ICANN, an alternative path may be to shift full responsibility for the IANA functions to theorganic Internet institutions, which have been successful at performing the other core functionsof operating the Internet.6
The relationships between the IETF, ICANN and the Internet community are governedby a series of review processes and evaluations incorporating many elements of the Internet
governance model to ensure accountability of the responsible institutions and the continued
smooth performance of the IANA function. The internal reforms and new processes reflect thenature of the Internet governance model in two ways – the prominent role played by organic
Internet Institutions and the application of key Internet governance principles (e.g. direct,
participatory democracy, consensus as the basis for change) across the board.

6

The IANA Stewardship Proposal (p. 3) identifies the three IANA functions and the responsible organizations as protocol parameters (IETF),
numbers (RIR) and domain names (ICANN).

10

D. THE INTERNET AS A REMARKABLY SUCCESSFUL RESOURCE SYSTEM
The major changes in oversight of the IANA functions in the proposals were backed up
with several hundred pages of detailed definitions and implementation steps. In this section we
identify the specific changes intended to meet the conditions laid out by NTIA by showing whichof the major structures and rules of the Internet resource system that will be affected. We do so
by locating those changes within the framework of the decision rules that govern the Internet as a
focal core resource system and the structure of the participatory governance model of multistakeholder organization that grew organically within the Internet institutions. This is based on
our earlier analysis as described in Section III.
The premise of our analysis is that resource systems succeed by organizing users and uses
into coherent structures that allow the resource to be developed and utilized by the members of
the community (see Figure II-3). The resource system is a structure composed of rules that
stipulate who can do what, and a governance structure that develops and enforces the rules. The
structure responds to a series of challenges that the resource system must overcome if it is to be
successful. Within the space defined by the rules, we find participants (users), who are allowed
to conduct activities (uses) that exploit the resource (units) subject to monitoring (information)and control (enforcement), which includes conflict resolution and sanctions.
Our framework was developed by combining elements of the works of two Nobel
laureates – Douglas North’s New Institutional Economics (NIE) and Elinor Ostrom’s
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD).7 As the names suggest, North and Ostrom bothemphasize the importance of institutions in economic development and success. While theyrecognize the important roles played by the market and the state in economic success, they both
identify significant limitations of each. The institutions that they identify exist between themarket and the state to help overcome significant dilemmas that neither the state nor the market
can resolve on their own. In our view, the Internet exists in the space between the market andthe state. Because of its location, the Internet has been a space that is friendly to innovation,
economics development and democratic expression. The IANA transition expands that space.
As shown in Table II-1, the Internet exhibited most of the empirically identified
characteristics that make for successful cooperation to deal with a social/economic dilemma.
The Internet is a resource system in which anyone can do anything as long as it comports with
the Internet protocols. The protocols create a flow of resource units continuously, with norestrictions on content. If there is congestion, the users are told to back off and each knows whatneeds to be sent to complete the communication. Users have the opportunity to design their uses
or operate their networks in ways that can deal with the capacity of the system to handle traffic.
The essential principle of the Internet was to allow local autonomy around a core set ofcommunications protocols, without dictating the structure and incentives within local networks.
Decentralized, user-based, local knowledge plays a large role in the resource system, whichenables it to produce large benefits. The success of the system encourages the community ofusers to invest substantially in its maintenance and provisioning expansion. There may be someuses that the resource system is not well-suited for, but there are always work-arounds, and the7

Cooper, “Quarterlife Crisis.”13

TABLE III-1: RESOURCE SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS CONDUCIVE TO INTERNET SUCCESSFUNCTIONS & RULE
Structure and Units
Boundary Rules
Position Rules

Control
Appropriation Rules
Provision Rules
Users and Uses
Collective Choice

PayoffGovernanceMonitoring

Enforcement
Information:
Socio-ecological Setting
External Drivers

DESIGN PRINCIPLESFAVORABLE CONDITIONSClarity of Membership
Clarity of Resource
Congruence between
Membership & Resource

Size of resource system: Very large territories are unlikely to selforganize given the high cost of defining boundaries … monitoring
use patterns and gaining ecological knowledge. Very small
territories do not generate substantial flows of valuable products.
Thus, moderate size is most conducive to self- organization.

Fair, orderly, efficient
Incentive to contribute
Reflect local conditions
and be congruent

Predictability of system dynamics: System dynamics need to be
sufficiently predictable that users can estimate what would
happen if they were to particular rules or no entry territories.

Participation
Power to act

When users… have full autonomy at the collective choice level tocraft their own rules, they face lower transactions costs as well
as lower costs in defending a resource against invasion by others.
When some users of any type of resource system have entrepreneurial
skill and are respected as local leaders as result of priororganization for other purposes, self- organization is more likely.
Users need to observe some scarcity before they invest in
self-organization. Distribution of costs is proportional to benefits.

Cost/Benefit
Present
Community
Professional
Monitor appropriation& condition of the resource

Graduated response
Accountable
Local Knowledge
Flow for monitoring
Government recognitionof rights to organize
Economics

Nested enterprise

Due to the cost of observing and managing a system, selforgaqnization is less likely with mobile resources. Group size isalways relevant, but its effect on self-organization depends on othervariables and the types of management tasks envisioned.
Norms/social capital: Users of all types of resource systems whoshare moral and ethical standards regarding how to behave in groups
they form, and thus the norms of reciprocity, and sufficient trust in one
another to keep agreements will face lower transaction costs in reaching
agreements and lower costs of monitoring.
Rapid, low cost arenas to resolve conflicts
When users share common knowledge of relevant system
attributes, how their actions affect each other, and rules use
in other systems, they will perceive lower costs of organizing.
The long term sustainability of rules devised at a focal level depends
on monitoring and enforcements as well as their not being overruledby larger government policies... Larger scale governance systems mayeither facilitate or destroy governance systems at a focal level.
Market integration may effectively remove control of a resourcefrom a user group… external integration alters local incentives, frequently
by decreasing dependence on the resource used by a community… whenmembers are not as dependent on the resource, their welfare is not asstrongly tied to cooperative behavior.
When a resource is connected to a larger socio-ecological system,
governance activities are organized in multiple, nested layers.
Establishing rules at one level, without rules at the other levels willproduce an incomplete system that may not endure over the long term.

Source: Michael Cox, Gwen Arnold, and Sergio Villamayor Tomas, “A Review of Design Principles for Community-based Natural
Resource Management,” Ecology and Society, 15 (4) 2010; Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 258); Beyond Market and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems,
Prize Lecture, December 8, 2009, p. 422.

vast array of activities that it came to support swamped the things it could not do precisely
because there is so much freedom for users to figure out how to get things done.

15

For a significant period of development, the architects and users of the Internet were afairly small, homogeneous set of engineers who shared norms, values, and a pragmatic problemsolving world-view. The perceived benefits expected from cooperation were quite large andnon-commercial. The essential principle of the Internet was to allow local autonomy around acore set of communications protocols. The protocols were designed to resolve conflicts overresources in a low-cost manner (best effort, with the end-points responsible for dealing with thequality of output). The nature of the users and the resources system made it “easy” todecentralize decision-making and rely on distributed knowledge and assets to build the system.
Over the course of the youth and adolescence of the Internet resource system, its
remarkable success transformed almost every one of the conditions that facilitated Internet
success. We now have a large number of much more diverse users spread over a vast geographic
space creating an exaflood of much more complex and heterogeneous outputs. The complexityand heterogeneity challenge the predictability. Diversity reduces the sharing of norms. The
expansion of the Internet as a communications resource system brings it into conflict with thetelecommunications resource system on which it depended for its success. Commercialization
changes the motivations of actors and their willingness to cooperate, leading some commercial
interest to seek to completely overturn key rules. The growing social and political importance of
the Internet led some government to challenge the core principle of openness. The resource
system must adapt to these challenges, while preserving the core principles that drive its success.
E. ADAPTING INTERNET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE IANA TRANSITION
While the continued smooth performance of the IANA functions suggests that growth is
not the direct source of the pressure for the transition of the IANA functions to Internet
community oversight, indirectly it may be. The increasing quantity and diversity of trafficcarried raises an increasing number of technical architectural issues that can be affected by the
IANA functions. Strengthening and extending Internet governance and precluding government
involvement in these architectural decisions will make them easier to deal with. Even if the U.S.
government had not made the initial commitment to temporary stewardship, this would be agood moment to step out of that role to increase the legitimacy of the independent Internet
governance mechanism.
We believe that the proposed initial changes meet the NTIA condition and will moveglobal Internet governance in a very constructive direction. Ultimately, the proposals must be
accepted and implemented, but given the strong set of proposal, we think the outcome will beoverwhelmingly positive. Figure II-4 locates the major changes embodied in the transition interms of the structure and rules (ALL CAPS, BOLD, UNDERLINED). We identify the sourceof the change, NTIA (SMALL CAPS, BOLD), IETF (bold underlined), and ICANN (bold, italics),
as well as some positive externalities, i.e. beneficial unintended consequences of the proposedchanges (boxes, plain text).
1. Fundamental Rules and Principles
This discussion starts from the top of the Figure II-4 and works toward the bottom. This
reflects the hierarchy of rules that govern the resource system. The decision of the U.S.
government to step out of its stewardship role and transition to independent oversight is a
16

FIGURE II-4: THE HIGH LEVEL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED IANA TRANSITIONCONSTITUTIONAL RULESCOLLECTIVE CHOICE RULES

OUTCOMESTERMINATE STEWARDSHIPMULTI-STAKEHOLDER GOVERNANCE
NON- GOVERNMENT LED
By-law Amendment process

PRESERVE FUNCTIONICANN By-Law changes

Preservation of Function

OPERATIONAL RULES
BOUNDARY

INFORMATIONAGGREGATIONOPENNESS
Institutional
Reorganization

TRANSPARENCY
Transparency
policyunchanged

POSITIONPARTICIPANTS (user) INFORMATION (monitor)

New committees
PTI within ICANNIFR Review Function
Customer Standing
IFR Review

Customers

AUTHORITY RULESACTIONS (uses)

Reviews
Complaints
Board appointment& removal

Complaint paths

CONTROL (enforce)
ACCOUNTABILITY

Sole Member

Performance Metrics
Annual Update

Multi-stakeholder
intensified

Performance Reviews

Budget and Plan oversight,
Leadership by Ombudsman
Review Committee

NET BENEFTIS/COSTS (units)

Recall, Reconsider
SCOPE RULES
Reviews

Positive externalities and unintended benefits of a smooth transition
Positive Externalities
Selective & strategicdelegation of responsibility
to self-organized, selfgoverning policy sectors.

Institutionalizing self-organizing
policy sectors would serve tolegitimize the collective in theseself-governing communities

Principle of Non-Governmental
Interference in architectural decision

Holding accountable the sectors
and powerful actors by
establishing effective monitoring
and accountability

Principle of separation of architecture andpolicy, to the greatest extent possible

LEGEND:
ALL CAPS & UNDERLINED= ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK,SMALL CAPS = NTIA
Plain text Underline = IETF/RIR;
Italics = ICANN,
boxes (plain text) identify positive externalities (beneficial, unintended
consequences of the transition process and proposals

17constitutional choice decision. One can argue that the condition that oversight not be
government-led is both a constitutional choice and a collective choice. These are very high leveland fundamental choices. This approach to the oversight of core Internet function is consistent
with the Internet governance models and the approach to oversight of all other Internet functions.
It creates greater consistency across all of the critical operational functions of the Internet.
Regardless of what one thinks of whether the U.S. stewardship was necessary or how it
was executed, the current constitutional and collective choice decisions move in the right
direction. They move the oversight of the IANA function in the direction of the uniquely
successful model of participatory, multi-stakeholder governance that evolved organically in theInternet community. As discussed in Section III, the developments of and on the Internet since
the initial decision to make the stewardship role temporary – the remarkable growth and global
penetration of the Internet – support the correctness of the constitutional choice to transition to
stewardship by Internet institutions.
The goals adopted by the NTIA enshrine the major aspects of Internet governance andoperation, seeking to ensure its continued success and the smooth performance of the IANA
functions. Key collective choice decisions include the reliance on multi-stakeholder governanceand insistence that the oversight not be led by a governmental entity. Indeed, we believe thegeneral principles of non-governmental interference is a positive externality of the transition that
supports the general proposition that, to the greatest extent possible, Internet architecture should
not be used to solve policy problems.
ICANN is most affected by these rule changes because it is not an organic Internet
institution organized according to the Internet governance principles. As such, it needs strong
oversight. Removing stewardship is the basic change that triggers the need for some alternative
mechanism to ensure the proper execution of the IANA functions. The IETF/RIRs step into thestewardship role.
The Accountability Group proposal for ICANN should strengthen the confidence in its
oversight of these functions by amending its bylaws (constitutional and collective choicedecisions), to incorporate fundamental principles into bylaws and to strengthen the process foramending the bylaws. With new principles raised to a higher level in the bylaws and a wider
process for challenging actions that are deemed by members of the community to violate thebylaws, the principles should be binding on ICANN behavior. There are no changes in the other
Internet institutions at this level, since their structures already reflect the full Internet governancemodel. Their expanded role simply pulls new responsibilities under that model.
At this level we see two additional important positive externalities. First, the transition
follows the principle of delegating decisions to direct participants and user communities (thesubsidiarity principle).8 Demonstrating the ability to adapt the core institutions in this way is an
important outcome because the need for change and adaptation will not stop with or be limited to
the IANA transition. As the Internet settles in as the focal core resource system of the digitalmode of production, it will be asked to handle and adapt too many other changes. The first
choice should be to adapt the original organic institutions. Second, successfully handling this8

The idea of subsidiarity is frequently associated with geographic location, i.e. local communities. On the Internet the community is defined byusers, regardless of where they are physically located.

18

initial major adaptation will deepen the legitimacy of the Internet governance institutions andincrease the confidence that they can handle the increasingly complex challenges the Internet
faces. Just as the ability to find a communications protocol that allowed diverse networks toseamlessly interconnect and interoperate, the ability to find an institutional approach that allows
diverse forms of organization to interoperate in the space of technical policy would facilitate theexpansion and smooth operation of the Internet.
2. Operational Rules
NTIA has also set several conditions that involve important operational rules – openness(a boundary issue), transparency (an information and control issue), and accountability (a control
issue). As noted earlier, ICANN goes through two transformations in its internal operational
level.
First a new subsidiary is created within ICANN, the Post Transition IANA (PTI) for thesole purpose of managing the IANA functions. It is designed according to the Internet
governance model.
Second, ICANNs internal structure is modified to promote more participation and ensure
more oversight. ICANNs corporatist decision making structure remains in place. The
membership and participation in ICANN is still based on representation of specific subgroups inthe process and on the board. Voting remains the primary vehicle of participation. The increasein the participation of the community comes in the form of reviews and complaint processes.
ICANN subjects many more decisions to reviews by external committees constituted by thecommunity and complaints that can be made by individual members of the community. The
potential targets of the potential complaints are defined broadly, with specific IANA functions
explicitly covered. The ability to recall individual members of the board or the entire board isalso expanded, as is oversight over the budget and plans as they affect the IANA functions. The
elements of direct democracy and accountability to the Internet community are crucial to a
successful transition.
Because the IETF and the RIRs are already built on the Internet governance principles
their primary adaptation is to extend their authority to the IANA functions. Thus, we observe an
expanded MOU between the IETF and ICANN. This involves a series of reviews and audits toensure the functions are being properly provided and managed. We have a new contractual
relationship between ICANN and the RIRs.

III. THE INTERNET AS A FOCAL CORE GLOBAL RESOURCE SYSTEMAND THE MATURATION CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION
In this section we briefly elaborate on several key points made in Section II, focusing onimportant reasons that adaptation should move in the direction embodied in the NTIA conditions
and the response of the Internet Institutions. We cover four areas – economics, governance, theglobal nature of the Internet, and the tension between architecture and policy.

19

A. THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF INTERNET SUCCESS
Institutions located between the market and the state can ground their economic success(superiority) in a number of possible economic dilemmas. Ostrom has been closely associatedwith the debate over social organization to exploit common-pool resources and produce public
goods9 but that is far from the only economic dilemma that non-market institutions may be called
on to address. North argues that the exploitation of knowledge poses a challenge that markets
may not meet well and his list of challenges includes other well-known sources of market failure.
The Western world evolved from a simple world of personal exchange to the complex interdependentworld that… [e]conomic historians have typically described … in terms of growth in the size of markets
until today we glibly talk about a global economy. Just how does it work? Sociologists looking
empirically at information networks describe an immensely complicated communications structure thatpulls the dispersed knowledge together in order to use it effectively in the growth of productivity of themodern economy. . . . It is only when that specialized knowledge can be integrated with othercomplementary knowledge at low cost that it is very valuable. The interconnections necessary to
combine distributed knowledge effectively entail much more than an effective price system, although thatis an essential prerequisite. The essential public goods, asymmetric information, and ubiquitousexternalities require that institutions and organizations be created to integrate this dispersed
knowledge. . . .10

The economic dilemma that the Internet navigates could be classified as a common-poolresource, a public good with massive (positive) externalities or a transaction cost problem(asymmetric information plus others).11 Any of these would provide a basis for concluding that
there was an economic benefit that could be captured by cooperation. Or, it can be argued thatthe immense power of the Internet and its remarkably quick rise to dominance reflects the factthat it addresses all of these perennial sources of market failure in significant ways. The
importance of the Internet resource system is magnified by the fact that communications andinformation flow are increasingly central to economic activity and have long been at the heart ofimportant political and social processes. Thus, the Internet provides uniquely useful solutions toseveral increasingly important social/economic dilemmas.
We have argued that this economic transformation is not limited to more and better waysof doing old things. The digital economy constitutes a fundamental shift in the mode of
production based on a dramatic expansion of the benefits of cooperation and collaborative
production and a reduction in the cost of collective action.12 The traditional analysis of public
9.

Elinor Ostrom, Prize Lecture: Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems (Dec. 8, 2009), available
at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/ostrom_lecture.pdf., at 408-09 (“Contemporary research on theoutcomes of diverse institutional arrangements for governing common-pool resources (CPRs) and public goods at multiple scales builds onclassical economic theory while developing new theory to explain phenomena that do not fit in a dichotomous world of ‘the market’ and ‘thestate.’ . . . The market was seen as the optimal institution for the production and exchange of private goods. For nonprivate goods, on theother hand, one needed the government to impose rules and taxes to force self-interested individuals to contribute necessary resources andrefrain from self-seeking activities. Without a hierarchical government to induce compliance, self-seeking citizens and officials would fail togenerate efficient levels of public goods . . . .”)10. North, supra note 15, at 120-21. Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner and James Walker, Rules, Games & Common-Pool Resources (1994) at 193,
194, 217.
11. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks (2006); Brett Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and CommonsManagement, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 917 (2005). Benkler is most closely associated with the commons argument, although he has a very broad
perspective; Frischmann emphasizes the externalities view.
12. Mark Cooper Mark Cooper, “Access to the knowledge commons in the digital age,” Consumer Policy Review, 16:3 (2006), From Wifi to
Wikis and Open Source: The Political Economy of Collaborative Production in the Digital Information Age, 5 J. on Telecomm. & High
Tech. L. 125 (2006) http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/From%20Wifi%20to%20Wikis%20and%20Open%20Source.pdf, From Wifi to
Wikis and Open Source: The Political Economy of Collaborative Production in the Digital Information Age, 5 J. on Telecomm. & High
Tech. L. 125 (2006 ) http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/From%20Wifi%20to%20Wikis%20and%20Open%20Source.pdf

20and private goods – their rivalrous nature and exclude ability – must be expanded to reflect that
fundamental transformation of the economic terrain (see Exhibit III-1).
Some goods have long been recognized as non-rivalrous – utilization by one person does notpreclude utilization by another – and non-excludable – the benefits flow widely and it is difficult
to exclude some from enjoying those benefits, even though they do not contribute to the
production of the good. Collaborative goods go father, increasing the benefits when more users
are included, increasing efficiency by increasing utilization through the sharing of the resources
and providing a better fit between supply and demand by expanding reliance on local knowledge
and end-user input. The characteristics that produce the benefits – intensive utilization of theresources by cooperation, reduced transaction costs, increased range of options – applies not only
to purely digital goods. The immense improvement in the ease of communications affects a wide
range of economic activities making cooperation and collaboration much easier, so much so thatthe very logic of collective action has been transformed.
EXHIBIT III-1: CHARACTERISTICS OF COLLABORATIVE GOODS

Source: Mark Cooper, “From Wifi to Wikis and Open Source: The Political Economy of Collaborative
Production in the Digital Information Age, Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law, 2006.
5(1), p. 129; “Access to the knowledge commons in the digital age,” Consumer Policy Review, 16:3 (2006).

Failing to recognize the broad economic basis of the Internet’s success seriously
underestimates its value and power as a cooperative solution to important social and economic
dilemmas. More importantly, in order to avoid undermining the dynamic economic engine of theInternet in the process of responding to the maturation challenges, the rich and complex set ofsocial and economic dilemmas it addresses must be considered. Preserving the smoothfunctioning and open nature of the Internet, as the focal core resources system of the digital
economy, is critically important for sustaining the economic benefits.
B. PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE
As noted above, the governance institutions that evolved were designed to emphasize
participatory, polycentric decision making. The decentralized, individual responsibility fordecision making was reinforced with regional organizations where possible to infuse the local
21

input into decision making.
Our analysis shows that this orientation in governance is consistent with broader trends inpolitical organization, such as implementation of principles of subsidiarity and regulatory
reform.13 There is a strong thread in the literature on regulatory reform that is animated by therecognition that representative democracy has significant deficits and the public has changed inits demands, desire and capacity for participation.
An EU White Paper from 2000 on parliamentary democracy notes the challenge of
maintaining the connection between representative political institutions and the public as theinformation age progresses.
Parliamentary territorial representation entails the involvement of a select few in law- and policy-making
and provides a reliable basis for well-organized deliberation and decision-making. It enables in manycases more or less effective and reliable legislative action judged to be legitimate. Of course, sucharrangements risk a de-coupling between Parliament and “the people.” Two institutional arrangements
were supposed to limit such de-coupling, namely regular parliamentary elections and a free press. But,
as suggested in this [p]aper, much more is needed. Modern citizenry does not consist of a homogeneousmass public, or merely supporters of one or more parties. They are increasingly complex in their
judgments and engagements. They make up an ensemble of publics and differentiated interests andcompetencies.14

Thus, the fundamental challenge in the economy of preserving a dynamic diverse productspace in which consumers play a more active role has a direct parallel in the polity. A diverse,knowledgeable citizenry that wants to be and is engaged in the policy process challenges theincumbent institutions. It can be argued that the Internet is ahead of the polity in that it has
provided a partial solution that took this direction. It should also be recognized that theframework for promoting and channeling civil society engagement to build a legitimate andeffective set of institutions is a work in progress.
The key to achieving the goal of enhancing democratization identified in the EU White
Paper is that as the state recedes; it must use the remaining “legal connection” to promoteparticipatory governance to ensure a larger direct role for the public. The principles ofparliamentary reform offered as a response to this growing democratic deficit can be applied
broadly to governance.
[W]e suggest consideration of reforms of parliamentary functions, role, and institutional arrangements
guided by principles such as the following:
The principle of exercising high selectivity – with respect to the policy areas in which Parliament
engages itself directly, for example in the formulation of specific or detailed laws and policies. This callsfor explicit consideration of the reasons for such focused involvement.
The principle to delegate whenever possible – a form of subsidiarity principle – to self-organizing policy
sectors, at the same time holding accountable these sectors or key or powerful actors in these sectors.
Part of this entails establishing effective monitoring and accounting arrangements.
Institutionalizing these self-organizing policy sectors would serve also to legitimize the collective
13.Cooper, Quarterlife Crisis.
14. T.R. Burns, The Future of Parliamentary Democracy: Transition and Challenge in European Governance, green paper for the Conference of
the Speakers of European Union Parliaments, Camera dei Deputati (It.)(Sept. 22-24, 2000).
http://www.camera.it/_cppueg/ing/conferenza_odg_Conclusioni_gruppoesperti.asp.

22

deliberations and decisions in these self-governing communities.
The principle of focusing on strategic problems and issues that cannot be readily delegated or dealt withthrough private interests or civil society. . . .15

This is a road map for transferring active decision-making from the state to civil society.
It is consistent with Ostrom’s observations on the nesting of governance of resource systems incomplex environments.
Given the wide variety of ecological problems that individuals face at diverse scales, an important designprinciple is getting the boundaries of any one system roughly to fit the ecological boundaries of the
problem it is designed to address. Since most ecological problems are nested from very small local
ecologies to those of global proportions, following this principle requires a substantial investment ingovernance systems at multiple levels—each with some autonomy but each exposed to information,
sanctioning, and actions from below and above.16

Concepts of regulation that rely on more direct and frequent involvement, collaborationand participation have been identified. We call it participatory governance.
Collaborative Regulation: The role and structure of the state are fundamentally transformed in achanging society. Governance is seen as a process of interaction between different social and politicalactors, and growing interdependencies between the two groups, as modern societies become ever more
complex, dynamic, and diverse.17
Reflexive Regulation: an entire infrastructure aimed at establishing… the right incentives for thosebearing the costs of regulation; the right participatory structure for shaping the instruments so that all
those affected have a voice in shaping them; the guarantee of legal certainty; and the possibility to holdactors accountable for the consequences of particular actions. 18
Civic Regulation: The goal of civil regulation is to fill the vacuum left by the contracting state and tocompensate for the “deficit of democratic governance that we face as a result of economic
globalization… Under civic regulation, the various manifestations of civil society act in a variety of ways
to influence corporations, consumers and markets…From civil regulation perspective, the state’s role isto provide mechanisms that will empower the institutions of civil society to make corporations moreaccountable.19
Participatory Governance: Informational Regulation, Regulatory Pluralism; various manifestationsof civil society act in a variety of ways to influence corporations, consumers and markets, often
bypassing the state… However, the evolving role of civil regulation has not taken place entirely divorced
from state intervention… a number of next generation policy instruments are geared to empower various
institutions of civil society to play a more effective role in shaping business behavior.20

C. THE GLOBAL NATURE OF THE SUCCESS OF THE INTERNET
The remarkable success of the Internet creates pressures for change. Even a successful
resource system must be able to adapt to change, while at the same time generating widespread
support to protect and reinforce the structures and rules that have allowed it to succeed, scale andspread. As noted in the introduction, recognizing the success of the digital communications
15. Id.
16. Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity 259 (2005), p. 258 (citations omitted).
17 .Hans Bredow Institute, Final Report: Study on Co-Regulation Measures in the Media Sector, University of Hamburg, June 2006
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/library/studies/coregul/final rep en.pdf, p. 15.
18. Sabine Weiland, Reflexive Governance — a Way Forward in Coordinated Natural Resource Policy?, REFGOV, Working paper series:
REFGOV-GPS-19, draft versionhttp://refgov.cpdr.ucl.ac.be/?go=publications&cat=1&subcat=2, p. 1.
19. Neil Gunningham, Compliance, Enforcement and Innovation, Http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/38/33947825.pdf, pp. 7…11.
20. Id., pp. 7, 10.

23personal, service may have contributed to its rapid spread.21 In one fifth the time, mobile
broadband has penetrated to about four times the level that wireline telephony. Whereas it took
over a century for wireline telephony to reach about 20 subscribers per 100 people, it took
mobile about two decades to reach 90. Mobile broadband has reach almost 50, as has theInternet. Even adjusting for the difference between personal and household communications, it
is clear that digital communications have penetrated farther and faster. It is interesting to notethat wireline penetration has begun to decline.
The global nature of the Internet is clearly suggested by the penetration of services andtechnologies. Contrasting the penetration of technologies in developed and developing nations
adds depth to this picture, as in the lower graph of Exhibit III-2. Even in developing nations, thepenetration of mobile broadband and Internet is over twice the penetration of wireline telephony,in one fifth the time.
As remarkable as the spread of the Internet and digital technologies has been, there is stilla great divide between developed and developing nations, with the penetration of Internet andmobile broadband in developed nations over twice that of the developing nations. There is also a
divide within developed nations, like the U.S., where as many as a quarter of households does
not have Internet at home.22 This divide is also an opportunity. Already the aggregate numberof users in the developing nations is over twice that of the developed nations. The extension of
the Internet to those not yet connected and the intensification of usage opens the possibility forthe continuation of dramatic expansion.
Another way to see the global nature of the Internet in the context of the end of U.S.
stewardship is to highlight the U.S. shares in the 2000 to 2014. The year 2000 is a useful starting
point because it was a couple of years after the U.S. committed to transferring its stewardshiprole to Internet institutions and data is readily available (see Figure III-3).
Even in 2000, the Internet was very much a global phenomenon, although the U.S. had adisproportionate share of usage and traffic. In 2000, the U.S. accounted for just under one-thirdof all Internet users and about one half of Internet usage. Today the U.S. accounts for about 10
percent of global users and about one-third of all traffic. It share of web sites is slightly larger
than its share of usage. To put these numbers in perspective, the U.S. accounts for about 5% of
the global population and 16% of global GDP. Thus the U.S. Internet presence is about twice its
simple demographic/economic share, but in the aggregate the non-U.S. share is much larger.
The Internet has always been global; today it is overwhelmingly so.
D. ARCHITECTURE, SOCIAL POLICY AND GOVERNMENTS
The IANA transition comes at a moment when the penetration of the Internet and thedigital revolution into society has triggered a host of concerns about social policy. Various
interests envision tinkering with the architecture to achieve some policy goal. This comes into
21. Mark Cooper, “The Central Role of Wireless in the 21st Century Communications Ecology: Adapting Spectrum and Universal Service Policy
to the New Reality,” Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, September 2011
22. Mark Cooper, “Broadband in America: A Policy of Neglect is not Benign,” in Enrico Ferro, Yogesh K. Dwivedi, J. Ramon Gil-Garcia, andMichael D. Williams, Eds., Overcoming Digital Divides Constructing an Equitable and Competitive Information Society,” IGI Global Press,
2009; “Reply Comments -- National Broadband Plan, Public Notice #30, Center for Media Justice, Consumer Federation of America,
Consumers Union, Open Technology Initiative, Public Knowledge, on Broadband Adoption,” Before the Federal Communications
Commission, In the Matter of A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, GN Docket No. 09-47, 09-51, 09-137, January 27, 2010;25

model. The state must provide legal clarity in selectively delegating more authority toautonomous, self-organizing policy sectors. In all cases, it is extremely important to seek toensure that the institutions exhibit the key characteristics for successful oversight, including
monitoring institutions for transparency, participation, and accountability. The process ofinstitutionalization discussed earlier is important. While it is clear that the state plays animportant part in launching the authority of the alternative governance approach, over time,
successful and effective alternatives build independent authority and trust. The ability of thestate to revoke the authority shrinks. Eventually, any effort to rescind the authority becomes
illegitimate. This is that moment for the IANA functions.
Ironically, this analysis suggests that the last act of the government, as it steps out of its
stewardship role, should be to ensure that the new structure is well-designed to achieve the goalsof smooth performance, effective oversight and multi-stakeholder governance. By stating theconditions, NTIA has moved in that direction. It need not be passive in the process, however.
Because the moment is critical, it should use its influence to ensure that the transition proceedssmoothly and is fully implemented.
This analysis indicates that the successful model should not be asked to take on tasks forwhich it is not well suited. Internet governance involves highly technical issues that weredebated primarily by technicians in an open format. The challenges that are primarily economic,
social, and political will be difficult for the Internet institutions to deal with. The perception of
the nature of the challenges varies greatly across stakeholders and nations, with some seeing thefunctionalities technology provides as positive or negative, depending on the point of view of the
stakeholder. To a significant degree technology creates possibilities, while policies influence oreven dictate which paths are chosen. The ability to separate technical from policy issues issufficient to promote this balanced outcome.
E. Conclusion
This discussion of success of the Internet and the reform of representative democracy toincrease the effectiveness of governance in the digital age reinforces the evaluation of the impactof the transition on the Internet resource system presented in Section I. The NTIA conditions
and the Internet institution proposals fits squarely into this understanding of the direction
necessary to adapt regulatory institutions to the digital age.
(1) Selectivity: Be highly selective and rigorous in analyzing areas where government action
may not be necessary, where self-organizing groups can perform the functions. Two
decades of performance with very little government involvement make it clear that the
IANA functions no long need government stewardship, if they ever did.
(2) Strategic use of state power: State power should be focused on where state action isnecessary based on substance, competence and process (i.e. the state is the only
agency with competence and the tools to accomplish the goal without undermining
other values.) Policy matters are best dealt with by the state in spheres where the state
has the authority, tools and competence.
(3) Delegation of authority: Local groups with the expertise and direct involvement are
frequently best suited to accomplish goals, where local can be a substantive area as27

much as a geographical area. The Internet institutions are the proper home for thesefunction.
(4) Accountability: Ensure accountability as responsibility is transferred. The proposals
involve several layers of accountability.
(5) Legitimacy: Use the receding power of the state to legitimize self-organizing groups toexercise authority. This is the intent of the transition.
(6) Participatory governance: Attend to the participatory structure to ensure democratic
effectiveness. The Internet governance model is strong in this aspect.
(7) Recognize the nested nature of resource systems and locate responsibility for decision
making and governance at the appropriate level. The Internet is inherently global andgovernance should be.
The two threads of the proposed post-transition institutional structure are intertwined inthis list of reforms. The organic, Internet institutions are quintessential self-organized groups
that function according to strong principles of participatory, direct democracy. Accountability is
the purpose of the ICANN reform. Subjecting its corporatist, representational structure to close
oversight by the organic Internet institutions and injecting key elements of the Internet
governance model into its internal governance are the glue that holds the mixed institutionalmodel together. Successfully developing an effective mixed model could provide a benchmark
for dealing with governance issues in the future.
These comments have demonstrated that a smooth transition to stewardship of the IANA
functions to Internet institutions is long overdue. The conditions set down by the NTIA and the
responses of the Internet institutions will ensure the continued successful performance of theInternet. These conclusions are arrived at by evaluating the proposed transition from theperspective of our detailed study of the success of the Internet over the course of a quarter of acentury. The conclusions are at a high level, resting on the broad principles and macro-structural
frame we have developed.
There are many details in the proposals that should and will certainly be debated by theInternet community. Our advice is to ensure that the details comport with the broad principles
and macro-structure. However, if the proposals are implemented as outlined, we believe that
this is a case where the devil is not in the details. The Internet principles and the structure
proposed for the transition would be strong enough to ultimately override concerns about any
details. Indeed, it must be recalled that the Internet has developed according to a pragmatic
approach (rough consensus and running code) in which norms, guided by strong basic principles,
are worked out in practice. Those norms can only grow if ICANN is reformed in a way that
subjects it to the principles of the Internet governance model of direct community involvement.

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APPENDIX A:
Consumer Federation of America and Staff Analysis of theInternet and the Digital Revolution
Academic articles:"Delivering the Information Age Now," Telecom Infrastructure: 1993, Telecommunications Reports, 1993; "Protecting the Public
Interest in the Transition to Competition in Network Industries," The Electric Utility Industry in Transition (Public Utilities
Reports, Inc. & the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, 1994); “Open Access To The Broadband
Internet: Technical And Economic Discrimination In Closed, Proprietary Networks,” University of Colorado Law Review, Vol.
69, Fall 2000; “Progressive, Democratic Capitalism In The Digital Age,” 21st Century Technology and 20th Century Law: WhereDo We Go from Here? The Fund for Constitutional Government, Conference on Media, Democracy and the Constitution,
September 27, 2000; “The Role Of Technology And Public Policy In Preserving An Open Broadband Internet,” The Policy
Implications Of End-To-End, Stanford Law School, December 1, 2000, “Antitrust As Consumer Protection In The New
Economy: Lessons From The Microsoft Case, Hastings Law Journal, 52: 4, April 2001; “The Digital Divide Confronts the
Telecommunications Act of 1996: Economic Reality versus Public Policy,” in Benjamin M. Compaine (Ed.), The Digital Divide:
Facing a Crisis or Creating a Myth? (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001); “Inequality In The Digital Society: Why The Digital Divide
Deserves All The Attention It Gets,” Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal, 2002; Open Architecture as Communications
Policy (Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School, 2004) “Collaborative Production in Group-Forming Networks:
The 21st Century Mode of Information Production and the Telecommunications Policies Necessary to Promote It,” The State of
Telecom: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, Columbia Institute on Tele-Information, October 2005; “The Economics ofCollaborative Production in the Spectrum Commons,” IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum AccessNetworks, November 2005; “Information is a Public Good,” Extending the Information Society to All: Enabling Environments,
Investment and Innovation, World Summit on the Information Society, Tunis, November 2005 ; “The Importance of OpenNetworks in Sustaining the Digital Revolution,” in Thomas M. Lenard and Randolph J. May (Eds.) Net Neutrality or Net
Neutering (New York, Springer, 2006); “The Economics of Collaborative Production: A Framework for Analyzing the Emerging
Mode of Digital Production,” The Economics of Open Content: A Commercial Noncommercial Forum, MIT January 23, 2006;“Access to the knowledge commons in the digital age,” Consumer Policy Review, 16:3 (2006), “Governing the Spectrum
Commons,” Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, October 2006; “From Wifi to Wikis and Open Source: The
Political Economy of Collaborative Production in the Digital Information Age,” Journal on Telecommunications and HighTechnology Law, 5:1, 2006; “Network Neutrality,” Toll Roads? The Legal and Political Debate Over Network Neutrality,
University of San Francisco Law School, January 26, 2008; “Broadband in America: A Policy of Neglect is not Benign,” inEnrico Ferro, Yogesh K. Dwivedi, J. Ramon Gil-Garcia, and Michael D. Williams, Eds., Overcoming Digital Divides:
Constructing an Equitable and Competitive Information Society,” IGI Global Press, 2009; “The Failure Of Market
Fundamentalism: What Are The Issues In The ICT Sector?” The New Economics of ICT: Implications of Post-NeoclassicalEconomics for the Information Communications Technology Sector, Columbia University, March 20, 2009; “The Central Role ofWireless in the 21st Century Communications Ecology: Adapting Spectrum and Universal Service Policy to the New Reality,”
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, September 2011; “Crowd Sourcing Enforcement: Building a Platform for
Participatory Regulation in the Digital Information Age,” presentation at The Digital Broadband Migration: The Dynamics ofDisruptive Innovation, Silicon Flatirons Ctr. Feb. 12, 2011; “Structured Viral Communications: The Political Economy andSocial Organization of Digital Disintermediation,” Journal on High Telecommunications and High Technology Law, 9:1, 2011;“Why Growing Up is Hard to Do: Institutional Challenges for Internet Governance in the “Quarter Life Crisis of the Digital
Revolution,” Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law, 2013. 11(1). “The Long History and Increasing
Importance of Public Service Principles For 21st Century Public Digital Communications Networks,” Journal on
Telecommunications and High Technology Law, 2014; “The Digital Past as Prologue: How a Combination of Public Policy andPrivate Investment Produced the Crowning Achievement (to Date) of Progressive (American) Capitalism,” Regulating the
evolving broadband ecosystem, AEI/University of Nebraska Forum, Federal Communications Commission, September 10, 2014;“The Political Economy of Progressive, Democratic Capitalism and the Success of the Internet: Toward a Theory of Dynamic
Innovation and Distributive Justice in the Digital Mode of Production, “ The Digital Broadband Migration: First Principles for a
Twenty First Century Innovation Policy, Session on, Jurisprudence for Innovation, Silicon Flatirons, February 9, 2015;“Progressive Capitalism in the Information Age: Regulatory Institutions for a Dynamic, Digital Economy Securing the Golden
Age of the Digital Revolution with Traditional, Progressive Values in a New Regulatory Framework,” Back from the Ashes:
Regulation Intervention in an Online World and its Implications, Columbia Institute for Tele-Information, April 17, 2015; Gene
Kimmelman and Mark Cooper, “Antitrust and Economic Regulation: Essential and Complementary Tools to Maximize
Consumer Welfare and Freedom of Expression in the Digital Age,” Harvard Law & Policy Review, 9, 2015.

Research Reports
Expanding the Information Age for the 1990s: A Pragmatic Consumer Analysis, January 11, 1990; Developing the Information
Age in the 1990s: A Pragmatic Consumer View, June 8, 1992; A Consumer Road Map to the Information Superhighway: Finding

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the Pot of Gold at the End of the Road and Avoiding the Potholes Along the Way, January 26, 1994; Protecting the Public
Interest in the Transition to Competition in Network Industries, June 14, 1994; The Meaning of the Word Infrastructure, June 30,
1994; Mergers and Deregulation on the Information Superhighway: The Public Takes a Dim View: Results of a National Opinion
Poll, September 1995; Universal Service: An Historical Perspective and Policies for the 21st. Century, August 1996; Evolving
Notions of Universal Service, October 18, 1996; The Need for Telephone Lifeline Programs in New Jersey: An Update, July
1998; The Digital Divide, February 1999); Keeping the Information Superhighway Open for the 21st Century, December 1999;
Monopoly Power, Anticompetitive Business Practices and Consumer Harm in the Microsoft Case, December 1999; Creating
Open Access to the Broadband Internet: Overcoming Technical and Economic Discrimination in Closed, Proprietary Network,
December 1999; Transforming the Information Superhighway into a Private Toll Road: Ma Cable and Baby Bell Efforts toControl the High-Speed Internet, October 1999; Who Do You Trust? AOL And AT&T … When They Challenge The Cable
Monopoly Or AOL And AT&T. When They Become The Cable Monopoly?, February 2000; Open Access Phase July 13, 2000;
Disconnected, Disadvantaged and Disenfranchised, October 11, 2000; A Roadblock On The Information Superhighway:
Anticompetitive Restrictions On Automotive Markets, February 2001; Does the Digital Divide Still Exist? Bush Administration
Shrugs, But Evidence Says “Yes,” May 30, 2002; Democratic Discourse in the Digital Information Age: Legal Principles andEconomic Challenge, February 2003; The Public Interest in Open Communications Networks, July 2004; Expanding the Digital
Divide and Falling Behind in Broadband, October 2004; Online Deliberation: Mapping The Field; Tapping The Potential From
The Perspective Of A Media/Internet Activist, August 2005; Mapping the Terrain in the Battle Over Access to Knowledge in the
Digital Information Age, June 2006; Efficiency Gains and Consumer Benefits of Unlicensed Access to the Public Airwaves: theDramatic Success of Combining Market Principles and Shared Access, January 2012; E-Book Price Fixing Violates The
Antitrust Laws And Harms Consumers, April 9, 2012; Digital Disintermediation and Copyright in the 21 st Century: Lessons
From The Transformation Of The Music Sector, November 2013.

Testimony and Comments:"Testimony of Dr. Mark N. Cooper Director of Research of the Consumer Federation of America on H.R. 3636, The National
Communications Competition and Information Infrastructure Act of 1993, and H.R. 3626, The Antitrust Reform Act of 1993 andthe Communications Reform Act of 1993" before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, Committee on Energy
and Commerce, United States House of Representatives, February 3, 1994; “Reply Comments Of The Consumer Federation Of
America And Consumers Union,” before The Federal Communications Commission. In The Matter Of Deployment Of Wireline
Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Etc., CC Docket Nos. 98-146, 98-147, 98-11 98-26, 98-32, 98-78,
98-91, CCB/CPD Docket N. 98-15 RM 9244, October 10, 1998; “Petition to Deny of Consumers Union, Consumer Federation, etal, Joint Application of AT&T Corporation and Tele-Communications Inc. for Approval of Transfer of Control of Commission
Licenses and Authorizations, Federal Communications Commission, CS Docket No. 98=178, October 28, 1998; “Petition to
Deny of Consumers Union, the Consumer Federation of America, Media Access Project and Center for Media Education,” In the
Matter of Application of America Online, Inc. and Time Warner for Transfer of Statement before the en banc Hearing in the
Matter of the Application of America Online, Inc. and Time Warner, Inc. for Transfer of Control,” Federal Communications
Commission, July 27, 2000; “Comments Of Texas Office Of Public Utility Counsel, Consumer Federation Of America,
Consumers Union,” Federal Communications Commission, In The Matter Of Inquiry Concerning High Speed Access To The
Internet Over Cable And Other Facilities, GN Docket No. 00-185, December 1, 2000; “Reply Comments Of Texas Office Of
Public Utility Counsel, Consumer Federation Of America, Consumers Union,” Federal Communications Commission, In The
Matter Of Inquiry Concerning High Speed Access To The Internet Over Cable And Other Facilities, GN Docket No. 00-185,
January 11, 2001; “Tunney Act Comments of Consumer Federation of America, Connecticut Citizen Action Group, ConnPIRG,
Consumer Federation of California, Consumers Union, Florida Consumer Action Network, Florida PIRG, Iowa PIRG,
Massachusetts Consumer’s Coalition, MassPIRG, Media Access Project, U.S. PIRG”, in the United States v. Microsoft Corp,
Civil Action No. 98-1232, (Jan. 25, 2002); “Comments Of The Texas Office Of Public Utility Counsel, Consumer Federation Of
America, Consumers Union, Media Access Project, And The Center For Digital Democracy,” Federal Communications
Commission, In the Matter of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities Universal
Service Obligations of Broadband Providers Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of
Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review –Review of Computer III and ONA Safeguards And Requirements, CC
Dockets Nos. 02-3395-20, 98-10, July 1, 2002; “From Cheap Seats To Expensive Products, Anticompetitive Practices From The
Old Economy Can Rob Consumers Of The Benefits Of The Internet, Statement of Dr. Mark Cooper on behalf of The Consumer
Federation Of America,” before The Subcommittee On Commerce, Trade And Consumer Protection, July 18, 2002; “Antitrust
Should Promote Competition on Top of Well Regulated Infrastructure Platforms,” Antitrust Modernization Commission,
December 5, 2005; “Competition and Convergence,” Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, March 30.
2006; “Competition and the Future of Digital Music,” House Judiciary Committee, Antitrust Task Force, February 28, 2007;“Comments on Behavioral Tracking and Targeting,” Federal Trade Commission, Town Hall Meeting on Ehavioral Advertising:
Tracking, Targeting and Technology, November 16, 2007; “Comments of the Consumer Federation of America, Consumers
Union and Free Press, In the Matter of Broadband Industry Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52, June 15, 2007; “Reply Commentsof Consumer Federation of America and Consumers Union,” In the Matter of the Petition of Free Press, et al. for Declaratory
Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application Violates the FCC’s Internet Policy Statement and Does not Met an Exception for“Reasonable Network Management,” and Vuze, Inc. to Establish Rule Governing Network Management Practices by Broadband
Network Operators, Broadband Industry Practices, Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, WC Docket No. 07-52, CS

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Docket No. 97-80, February 28, 2008; “Statement Of Dr. Mark Cooper, Director Of Research, Consumer Federation Of America
to The Federal Communications Commission,” Broadband Workshop On The Unserved And Underserved, August 12, 2009;“Reply Comments -- National Broadband Plan, Public Notice #30, Center for Media Justice, Consumer Federation of America,
Consumers Union, Open Technology Initiative, Public Knowledge, on Broadband Adoption,” Before the Federal
Communications Commission, In the Matter of A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, GN Docket No. 09-47, 09-51, 09137, January 27, 2010; “Dr. Mark Cooper, on behalf of Consumer Federation of America, Free Press, Consumers Union before
the U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Communications, Technology, and the Internet of the Committee on
Energy and Commerce regarding “An Examination of the Proposed Combination of Comcast and NBC Universal,” February 4,
2010; “Testimony of Dr. Mark Cooper, on behalf of Consumer Federation of America, Free Press Consumers Union before theCommerce Committee,” U.S. Senate regarding “Consumers, Competition and Consolidation in the Video Broadband Market,”
March 11, 2010; “Testimony Of Dr. Mark Cooper On Competition In The Evolving Digital Marketplace,” Subcommittee On
Courts And Competition Policy, Committee On The Judiciary, U.S. House Of Representatives, September 16, 2010; “Comments
Of The Consumer Federation Of America,” to the U.S. Department Of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force, Docket No.
101214614‐0614‐01, RIN 0660‐XA22, Information Privacy And Innovation In The Internet Economy, January 28, 2011;“Comments Of The Consumer Federation Of America,” In the Matter of Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities
of Spectrum Through Incentive Auction Revisions to Rules Authorizing the Operation of Low Power Auxiliary Stations in the698-806 MHz Band, Public Interest Spectrum Coalition; Petition for Rulemaking Regarding Low Power Auxiliary Stations,
Including Wireless Microphones, and the Digital Television Transition, Amendment of Parts 15, 74 and 90 of the Commission’srule,” Regarding Low Power Auxiliary Stations, Including Wireless, Federal Communications Commission, Docket No. 12-268
ET, WT Docket No. 08-166, WT Docket No. 08-167, Docket No. 10-24, January 25, 2013; “Reply Comments of the Consumer
Federation of America,” In the Matter of Technological Transition of the Nation’s Communications Infrastructure, GN Docket
No. 12-353, February 25, 2013; Comments of the Consumer Federation of America, Before the United States Department ofCommerce, Patent and Trademark Office, Copyright Policy, Creativity and Innovation In The Digital Economy, November 13,
2013; “Consumer Federation of America Reply to The Department Of Justice,” Request For Comments in the Review of ASCAP
and BMI Consent Decrees, August 6, 2014: “Petition to Deny of the Consumer Federation of America,” before Federal
Communications Commission, In the Matter of Applications of Comcast Corporation, Time Warner Cable Inc. and Charter
Communications Inc., For Consent to Transfer Control of Licensees and Authorization; Petition to Deny of the Consumer
Federation of America, et al., MB Dkt No. 14-57, August 25, 2014; Comments of the Consumer Federation of America, In the
Matter of the Open Internet Remand, Federal Communications Commission, GN Docket No. 14-28, July 15, 201431