2022 NPT Review Conference: Nuclear Abolition Not on the Agenda
Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy*
September 8, 2022
Due to a “Nyet” from Russia, states parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) did
not reach consensus on an outcome document for the 10th Review Conference of the treaty, held
1-26 August 2022 at the United Nations in New York City. Though the point was not plainly
stated, clearly Russia could not accept provisions in the draft relating to the Zaporizhzhia
nuclear power plant, one of which stresses the need to ensure control of the facility by competentUkrainian authorities. While the draft outcome document was not adopted, it is worth examining
it in some detail, both because it will serve as an important, albeit informal, reference point for
future NPT discussions and because of what it reveals about the state of things in the wider
world. Our focus is on issues relating to nuclear disarmament, not those relating to preventing
the spread of nuclear arms and to nuclear power.
The Consequences of Another Failure to Adopt
What are the negative consequences of the failure to adopt an outcome document? Very little waslost in terms of a concrete, operational program on nuclear disarmament, as discussed below. The
impact on the legitimacy of the NPT regime is somewhat imponderable, but it is certainly not
positive, especially given that the last review conference, held in 2015, also failed to produce an
outcome document. The real problem for the legitimacy of the NPT and for establishing a world
free of nuclear weapons lies elsewhere: The five states acknowledged by the treaty to possess
nuclear arms—the US, UK, France, Russia, and China—have not delivered on the disarmament
obligation set out in NPT Article VI and the commitments to implement that obligation agreed atconferences in 1995, 2000, and 2010.
Indeed, the most regrettable thing about not having an agreed outcome document this time is that
it would have reaffirmed the commitments made at past conferences. That reaffirmation was nota certainty going into this conference, and it will not be in the future (depending in good part at
the next conference, to be held in 2026, on the nature of the US presidential administration).
The commitments include such measures as the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon
states to accomplish the elimination of their nuclear arsenals and reductions leading to thatelimination. Further commitments include diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security* Principal author: John Burroughs, Senior Analyst

policies to minimize the risk of their use and to facilitate the process of elimination; bringing theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force; and negotiating a treaty ending productionof fissile materials for nuclear arms. Those and some other past commitments are so closely tied
to the effective implementation of the Article VI obligation as to supply criteria for assessment ofcompliance with the obligation, as this article explains. They therefore cannot be read out ofexistence. Still, their reaffirmation would have been to the good, reinforcing the foundation for
new—measurable and time-bound—commitments.
Missing: A Pathway to a World Free of Nuclear Weapons
What was missing in the draft outcome document was a pathway, or pathways, to implementing
Article VI and related commitments. That was not for lack of proposals from states and civilsociety, among them:•••

The Non-Aligned Movement, a large group of Global South states, recommended that theconference “emphasize the need to start negotiations without further delay on a phased
program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework oftime” and that the conference call for the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmamentof a comprehensive convention on the prohibition and elimination of such weapons.
The New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and SouthAfrica) stressed the imperative of implementation of past commitments and proposed
strengthening accountability for such implementation through enhanced transparency andmeasurability including time frames and benchmarks for progress.
A working group of the civil society Abolition 2000 Network for the Global Eliminationof Nuclear Weapons proposed an intersessional process to examine measures necessary
for nuclear abolition and a commitment to adopt no later than 2030 a framework orconvention for the complete elimination of nuclear arsenals no later than 2045.

What the draft document had instead, in essence, were vague commitments of the NPT nucleararmed states to make “every effort to further decrease the global stockpile of nuclear weapons”(para. 187.16, p. 26) and to present national reports twice in the five-year review cycle to be
discussed in meetings preparing for the next review conference (para. 187.35, p. 28). The UnitedStates and Russia also committed to pursue negotiations on “a successor framework to New
START before its expiration in 2026, in order to achieve deeper, irreversible and verifiablereductions in their nuclear arsenals.” (para. 187.17, p. 26)
The nuclear-armed states further committed to “risk reduction” initiatives such as engaging indialogue “on addressing the root causes of international tensions” and making every effort toimplement crisis management arrangements like crisis-proof communication lines. (para. 187.37,pp. 28-29) They additionally committed to engage in dialogue with non-nuclear weapon statesconcerning the latter’s “grave concerns … regarding the expansion of nuclear forces andqualitative improvement of nuclear forces, including the development of advanced nuclear
weapons and new types of delivery systems.” (para. 187.19, p. 26) Given the Article VI2

obligation to negotiate regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, this is avery weak commitment indeed.
Lacking was any commitment to multilateral negotiations, at least negotiations involving the five
NPT nuclear-armed states. The first draft of the outcome document, released August 22, included
a commitment of the five to “a dialogue to establish a multilateral nuclear arms control
framework” (para. 152.14, p. 24), but that provision did not make it into the final draft. During
the conference, China stuck to its longstanding position that it will not participate in arms control
until the US and Russian nuclear arsenals are substantially reduced. Notably, given its reported
plans to expand its nuclear arsenal, China successfully opposed the inclusion of a provisioncalling for a moratorium on production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons; it is the only oneof the NPT nuclear-armed states not to have declared adherence to such a moratorium.
Many governments conveyed that they were very dissatisfied with the overall approach taken by
the final draft outcome document, though they also said they had been prepared to support
adoption of the document. For example, on August 26, in the closing plenary, New Zealandexpressed its “deep disappointment at how little advancement was possible on nuclear
disarmament, notwithstanding the overwhelming demand from non-nuclear weapon states.” New
Zealand also expressed “deep disappointment” that a consensus outcome document was notpossible due to Russia’s stance, explaining that “irrespective of the strengths and weaknesses of[the draft outcome], it did represent a sign of the collective cooperation so sorely needed at thistime of global uncertainty and insecurity.” Also in the closing plenary, Malaysia said: “Many ofus in this room had consistently emphasized the need for balance across the three pillars of theNPT [disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy]. Unfortunately, thesheer refusal to take concrete, measurable and time-bound actions towards nuclear disarmamentby the nuclear weapon states has been and continues to be the major impediment in striking thisbalance.”
Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Sharing
Concerning Russia’s occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, the United States andother NPT states parties insisted on provisions such as those stressing the need to ensure controlof the facility by Ukraine’s competent authorities (para. 187.50, p. 30); supporting IAEA “efforts
to restore the safety and security of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities and materials, within its
internationally recognized borders” (para. 187.95 p. 35; emphasis supplied); and considering that“attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes have dangerous
political, economic, human health, and environmental, implications and raise serious concerns
regarding the application of international law, which could warrant appropriate action inaccordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations” (para. 100, p. 15). It is
defensible that NPT member states took this approach in connection with a treaty devoted in partto the promotion of “peaceful uses of nuclear energy,” though the reference to “internationallyrecognized borders” in particular seems almost designed to elicit a Russian objection blockingconsensus.

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The draft document is silent or nearly so on other NPT-related issues raised in relation to theRussian invasion of Ukraine, namely President Putin’s threat of resort to nuclear arms should
other states intervene militarily to oppose the invasion, and the announcement of a nuclearsharing arrangement between Russia and Belarus. At least part of the reason for this approach
must be that condemning those developments would have raised the question of why similar
practices of the United States and NATO are acceptable.
Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy examined the international law applicable to nuclear
threats in a paper for the NPT Review Conference and, at more length, in a working paper for thefirst meeting of states parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons held in June.
In brief, based on the 1996 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, threats to use
nuclear arms, whether defensive or aggressive, are illegal because use of the arms is illegal underinternational humanitarian law. Such threats are also illegal when made as part of a war ofaggression, as in the case of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, or otherwise in violation of the UN
Charter's prohibition of non-defensive threats of force.
Nonetheless, despite the egregious Russian threats, the most that the draft document could
manage on the subject of nuclear threats was a commitment of the NPT nuclear-armed states “torefrain from any inflammatory rhetoric concerning the use of nuclear weapons,” (para. 187.37, p.
28) and recitations of the UN Charter's prohibition of the threat or use of force except in selfdefense. (para. 128, p. 18; para. 156, p. 21) The first draft had contained a commitment to refrainfrom “directly and indirectly threatening the use of nuclear weapons, inter alia, for military
coercion, intimidation and blackmail.” (para. 152.32(c), p. 26) One can imagine that, with thepossible exception of China, which has a declared no-first-use policy, the NPT nuclear-armed
states could not see how they could successfully distinguish in various circumstances possible
threats of use of nuclear arms envisaged in their doctrines, including against conventionallyarmed forces, from “coercion” and “intimidation.”As set out in the LCNP NPT paper, “nuclear sharing” is a peculiar arrangement, predating theNPT, between the United States and several NATO states in which pilots in those NATO states
are trained and equipped with aircraft to deliver US-supplied nuclear bombs should the US
president ever authorize releasing the bombs from US custody for such purpose. In June,President Putin of Russia and President Lukashenko of Belarus announced the development ofwhat sounds like a similar arrangement. Despite the existence of the NATO practice, nuclear
sharing appears incompatible with the NPT, based on the text of the treaty and on commitments
made at NPT review conferences in the post-Cold War era.
During the Review Conference, China repeatedly opposed nuclear sharing, making arguments
similar to those in the LCNP paper. China likely is concerned about the possible establishment of
nuclear sharing arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region; in fact, there has been some recent
discussion to that effect in Japan. Other states paid little attention to the issue of nuclear sharing
as such in public sessions of the conference, and there is no mention of the issue in the draft final
document. However, the first draft of the report of Main Committee I, which addressed4disarmament, contained a provision recognized the importance of reporting by states that are partof military alliances with NPT nuclear-armed states “on steps taken to reduce and eliminate therole of nuclear weapons in national and collective security doctrines.” (para. 23, p. 4) Such steps
would certainly include ending nuclear sharing. The provision attracted strong and sustained
criticism from states allied with the United States; though defended vigorously by other states, it
was dropped from the committee’s report.
Additional Issues
Among the numerous other significant issues discussed during the Review Conference, we will
briefly mention the following. On the positive side:• The draft outcome document acknowledges that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons has entered into force and held its first meeting of states parties in June. (para.
127, p. 18)• The document refers in a more than cursory manner to the catastrophic humanitarianconsequences of use of nuclear arms, and it states that states parties commit to comply at
all times with international humanitarian law and the UN Charter. (para. 7, p. 25; para.
124, p. 17) Because use of nuclear weapons is irreconcilable with humanitarian law, acommitment to non-use of the weapons should have been added; however, the NPT
nuclear-armed states are not ready for that step.
• The document reaffirms support for implementation of the 1995 NPT resolution on
establishment of a zone free of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the Middle
East, and acknowledges the recent process to this end set in motion by the UN General
Assembly. (paras. 165, 172, pp. 22-23) However, several states from the region statedthat the provisions should have been stronger and more pointed.
• The document welcomes the attention in recent years to assistance to victims of nuclear
weapons use and testing and to environment remediation following such use and testing.
(para. 125, p. 17)• The document includes a commitment of states parties “to ensure the equal, full andeffective participation and leadership of both women and men in the NPT implementation
and review and to further integrate a gender perspective in all aspects of nucleardisarmament and non-proliferation decision-making processes.” (para. 187.41, p. 29)
On the negative side:• No progress was made on strengthening assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear weapon states, a longstanding and insistent demand of those states.
For an argument that the NPT nuclear-armed states should update their unilateralassurances made in 1995 by removing conditionality, see the LCNP paper.
• A statement that the NPT nuclear-armed states should adopt no-first-use policies includedin the first draft outcome document (para. 15, p. 24) is absent from the final version.
• No significant commitment was made regarding AUKUS, the arrangement under which
the United States and United Kingdom are to supply Australia with submarines poweredby highly-enriched uranium fuel. Rather, the final draft simply notes the importance ofdialogue on the topic of naval nuclear propulsion, and states that non-nuclear weapon5•states pursuing such technology should engage with the IAEA in an open and transparent
manner. (para. 36, p. 6) For an argument that any such submarines should be powered bylow-enriched uranium, see the LCNP paper.
The first draft of the outcome document noted that in its 1996 Advisory Opinion theInternational Court of Justice found that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faithand bring to a conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects understrict and effective international control. (para. 131, pp. 20-21) France objected that
inclusion of the ICJ’s finding is a selective reading of the opinion. The United States
objected on the ground that the finding is “legally incorrect,” an objection rebutted byLCNP’s John Burroughs in a piece for Reaching Critical Will’s News in Review. Thesentence regarding the finding disappeared from the final draft, which simply recalls theAdvisory Opinion. (para. 131, p. 18)

On balance, and even putting aside the fact that an outcome document was not adopted due to theRussian position, the 10th NPT Review Conference did very little to advance the cause ofachieving a world free of nuclear weapons, a world promised by the NPT. There will need to be achange of course toward nuclear abolition if humanity is not to be condemned to living for still
more decades with the very real risk of social and environmental catastrophe, even catastrophe
so devastating that it renders unviable human society in its current form.

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