Financial Stability Issues in Emerging Market and Developing
Economies

Report to the
G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors

Prepared by:
A Task Force of the Financial Stability Board andStaff of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
November 2, 2011

2
Contents

Page

Foreword ....................................................................................................................................3
Glossary .....................................................................................................................................4
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................5I.

Introduction ....................................................................................................................8II.

Application of International Financial Standards ........................................................10
A. Supervisory Capacity and Legal Framework ..........................................................11
B. Consolidated Supervision of Financial Conglomerates ..........................................12
C. Pace of Adoption of International Financial Standards ..........................................13
D. Recommendations ...................................................................................................14

III.

Promoting Cross-Border Supervisory Cooperation .....................................................15
A. Cross-Border Supervisory Cooperation and Information Sharing ..........................16
B. Recommendations ...................................................................................................19

IV.

Expanding the Regulatory and Supervisory Perimeter ................................................21
A. Inadequate Regulation and Supervision of NBI Sector ..........................................22
B. Recommendations ...................................................................................................24

V.

Management of Foreign Exchange Risks ....................................................................25
A. Limiting Currency Mismatches ..............................................................................26
B. Developing Short-Term Domestic Currency Money and Government Securities
Markets ........................................................................................................................27
C. Developing Instruments to Hedge Exchange Rate Risk .........................................28
D. Recommendations ...................................................................................................29

VI.

Developing Domestic Capital Markets ........................................................................30
A. Developing the Domestic Investor Base .................................................................31
B. Addressing Market Illiquidity .................................................................................31
C. Ensuring Robust Market Infrastructure ...................................................................31
D. Recommendations ...................................................................................................32

VII.

Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................................................34

Annex I. Characteristics of Financial Systems in EMDEs ......................................................38
Annex II. Compliance with International Standards for Financial Supervision ......................52
Annex III. Additional Information on Financial Stability Issues in EMDEs ..........................64
Annex IV. Members of the EMDEs Task Force......................................................................72

3
FOREWORD
At the November 2010 Summit in Seoul, the G20 Leaders asked the FSB, IMF and the WorldBank to deliver a report on financial stability issues that are of particular interest to emerging
market and developing economies (EMDEs). This request reflected a recognition that the postcrisis financial regulatory reform debate had focused mainly on addressing the problems that hadarisen in the financial systems of advanced economies (AEs). It also reflected the importance ofpreserving financial stability in EMDEs, which are increasingly becoming an engine of growth
for the global economy and helped contribute to global financial stability during the recent crisis.
The focus of the paper is on five key financial stability issues in EMDEs, which have been
selected on the basis of their degree of materiality for a reasonably broad range of EMDEs; theirimplications for regulatory, supervisory or other financial sector policies; and the extent to whichthese issues are not already being addressed by other international workstreams.
The paper does not cover other financial stability issues that may also be relevant for EMDEs but
are addressed in other G20/FSB workstreams. Such issues include the management of sizeable
and volatile capital flows; the design of policy measures to address the risks arising fromsystemically important financial institutions; the development of macro-prudential policy
frameworks; the creation of effective resolution tools and regimes for financial institutions;strengthening the oversight and regulation of the shadow banking system; and reforming thefunctioning of over-the-counter derivatives and commodities markets. Reports on all of theseissues will be submitted at the same time to the G20, and this paper should be seen in the context
of this broader package.
The paper was prepared by a Task Force (see Annex IV) comprising FSB members, staff of the
IMF and World Bank, and senior policymakers from some emerging market and developing
economies outside the FSB.

4
GLOSSARY
ABF
ABMI
AEs
AEC
ASEAN
BCBS
BCP
CEE
CGIF
CNBV
EMDEs
EMEAP
FSAP
FSB
FSI
FX
GDP
ICPs
IAIS
IOSCO
ISG
MFIs
MMoU
MoU
NBFCs
NBIs
NGOs
OTC
PAIF
RMB
ROSC
S&C
SIFIs
SHF
WEO

Asian Bond Fund
Asian Bond Markets Initiative
Advanced Economies
ASEAN Economic Community
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
Central and Eastern Europe
Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility
National Banking and Securities Commission (Mexico)
Emerging Market and Developing Economies
Executives‘ Meeting of East Asian and Pacific Central Banks
Financial Sector Assessment Program
Financial Stability Board
Financial Stability InstituteForeign Exchange
Gross Domestic ProductInsurance Core Principles
International Association of Insurance Supervisors
International Organization of Securities Commissions
Intermarket Surveillance Group
Microfinance Institutions
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding
Memorandum of Understanding
Non-bank Financial Companies
Non-bank Institutions involved in lending and deposit-taking activities
Non-governmental Organizations
Over-the-counter
Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund
Chinese Renminbi
Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes
Standards and Codes (Initiative)
Systemically Important Financial Institutions
Federal Housing Corporation (Mexico)
World Economic Outlook

5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) comprise a large and diverse groupwhose financial systems have grown in importance over the last decade. Based on theclassification of countries used by the IMF in its World Economic Outlook (WEO),
150 economies are classified as EMDEs, including 10 members of the G20. They differ
substantially in terms of economic size, level of development, legal and institutional frameworks,
and other factors that affect financial systems. Over the last 10 years, financial systems in
EMDEs have grown significantly vis-à-vis those in advanced economies (AEs). Although they
proved resilient during the global financial crisis, they are now facing important new challenges.
Some key characteristics of financial systems in EMDEs are particularly relevant for
financial stability. Since EMDEs are a large and diverse group, they do not all share the samefinancial system characteristics; in fact, many characteristics vary as much across EMDEs as
between EMDEs and AEs. However, in general, financial systems in EMDEs tend to berelatively smaller in size, more concentrated and less complex than systems in AEs, with banks
playing a large role while capital markets and other financial institutions remain relatively underdeveloped. Other prevalent (although not universal) features include greater dependence on
foreign capital, weaker institutional frameworks and market infrastructures, important capacity
constraints, a relatively greater involvement of the state in the financial system, and greater useof international currencies for domestic financial transactions (―financial dollarization‖).
Against this background, this paper focuses on five key financial stability issues in EMDEs:


Application of international financial standards. Most EMDEs have strengthenedbanking supervision and the quality of securities regulation and insurance supervision
over the past decade, helping them withstand the effects of the global financial crisis. The
principal challenges in this area relate to supervisory capacity constraints, incomplete
legal frameworks, the ability to adequately regulate and supervise financial and mixedactivity conglomerates, and the adoption of international standards at a pace consistent
with the level of those countries‘ financial development and supervisory capacity.

Promoting cross-border supervisory cooperation. In countries where foreign banks
play a significant role, the inherent conflicts of interest between the home and hostjurisdictions can prevent adequate supervisory cooperation and information sharing andcomplicate risk assessments and cross-border resolution. In response, many EMDEs andsome AEs require foreign banks to enter as subsidiaries and sometimes apply additional
prudential measures (‗ring-fencing‘) to safeguard the interests of local stakeholders.



Expanding the regulatory and supervisory perimeter. In many EMDEs, small-scale
non-bank lending and deposit-taking institutions play an increasingly important role. As
it has expanded, this sector has become increasingly complex and interconnected with therest of the financial system. The rapid pace of growth, sometimes combined with6
deteriorating asset quality, may potentially have adverse consequences to financial
stability in some EMDEs. Several factors contribute to this situation, including an
inadequate regulatory framework and limited supervisory resources and capacity.
Management of foreign exchange risks. The volatility in nominal exchange rate
movements, compounded by sizeable capital flows, can create important foreignexchange risks. These risks are especially prominent in EMDEs with thin domestic
financial markets, significant financial dollarization, or limited markets to hedge currency
mismatches. Banks may be exposed to such risks either directly via net open positions
that cannot be efficiently hedged, or indirectly as a result of lending to borrowers whose
asset-liability profiles and revenue sources expose them to exchange rate fluctuations.



Developing domestic capital markets. Compared to AEs, capital markets in EMDEs are
more shallow and susceptible to sudden price movements and greater disruption that may
undermine confidence in their integrity. The development of the domestic investor base,measures to address market illiquidity, and improvements in market infrastructure areimportant building blocks to address some of the related financial stability issues.

The international community can play an important facilitating role to help EMDEs
address these issues (see the table with key recommendations below). The steps that theinternational community can take include supervisory capacity development through targeted
and well-coordinated technical assistance; the development of guidance by standard-setting
bodies in areas of concern for EMDEs (Basel III, management of foreign exchange risks, etc.);
and the promotion of further cross-border supervisory cooperation and information exchange.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from these financial stability issues and therecommendations to address them. First, the breadth of issues that are covered reflects thewide diversity of financial systems in EMDEs. This heterogeneity implies that, while the issues
and associated recommendations are relevant for a broad range of EMDEs, their relative
importance and cost-benefit trade-off differ widely across countries or even for the same country
over time. Second, many financial stability issues arise from underlying structural features of
EMDEs. Addressing these issues cannot therefore be separated completely from addressing
broader structural features of the economy. Third, financial stability is closely linked to financial
development. In that sense, steps to promote financial development in EMDEs (if wellsequenced) can also support financial stability. At the same time, however, it is important toensure that regulatory and supervisory frameworks and financial sector policies not only support
but also keep up with market development to avoid creating new sources of financial instability.
There is a need to continue to bring issues of relevance for EMDEs to the attention of theinternational community. The IMF, the World Bank and the FSB, particularly via its regional
consultative groups, have an important role to play in that regard. In addition, international
bodies should take into account EMDE-specific considerations and concerns in designing newinternational financial standards and policies.

7

Key Recommendations


EMDEs should take further measures to enhance financial stability, including by strengthening
supervisory independence, resources and capacity; adjusting prudential frameworks to reflect thegrowth in, and the risks arising from, small-scale non-bank lending and deposit-taking
institutions; strengthening the management of foreign exchange risks; promoting the developmentof a domestic investor base; taking measures at both national and regional levels to deepen capital
market liquidity; and ensuring the robustness of the infrastructure for clearing and settlement
systems.



The international community should send a clear and consistent message on the appropriate paceof adoption of the Basel II/III framework in EMDEs. The more financially-integrated EMDEs—
especially those that belong to the G20/FSB and participated in the development of thisframework—should adopt the framework according to the agreed timetable. Other countries, withless internationally integrated financial systems and/or with substantial supervisory capacity
constraints, should first focus on reforms to ensure compliance with the Basel Core Principles andonly move to the more advanced capital standards at a pace tailored to their circumstances.



The international community should continue to promote the development of supervisory
capacity in EMDEs through targeted and well-coordinated technical assistance and other capacity
building activities. In addition, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), theInternational Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and the International Organization of
Securities Commission (IOSCO), with input from the IMF and World Bank, should take stock of
the range of practices on resources and capacity—including on staffing and skill levels, training
certification programs, and financing options—and identify good practices to strengthensupervisory authorities in EMDEs.

Home supervisors for large international banks should provide host supervisors, particularly whenthose banks are systemically important in the host jurisdiction, with timely, accurate andcomprehensive information on the parent bank via supervisory colleges and crisis management
groups and/or via enhanced bilateral relationships.



The IOSCO and IAIS should work with EMDEs to promote adoption of multilateralarrangements, such as the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding, to facilitate cooperationand information exchange in the securities and insurance sectors.



The BCBS should provide guidance on: (1) the application of new measures included in Basel III
to EMDEs that do not intend to adopt the advanced approaches of Basel II; and (2) the steps that
EMDE supervisors can take to monitor and address the buildup of direct and indirect foreignexchange risks. The BCBS should also take stock of the range of practices on supervisory
approaches, prudential regulations and data reporting and disclosure requirements for small-scale
non-bank lending and deposit-taking institutions.



The BCBS, IAIS and IOSCO should report to the FSB on progress made in meeting the above
recommendations by end-2012. The IMF and the World Bank should continue to assess the
progress made by EMDEs in enhancing their financial stability frameworks.

8
I. INTRODUCTION
1.
At the November 2010 Summit in Seoul, the G20 Leaders asked the FSB, IMF and
the World Bank to deliver a report on financial stability issues that are of particularinterest to emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs).1 This request reflected arecognition that the post-crisis financial regulatory reform debate had focused mainly on
addressing the problems that had arisen in the financial systems of advanced economies (AEs). It
also reflected the importance of preserving financial stability in EMDEs, which are increasingly
becoming an engine of growth for the global economy and helped contribute to global financial
stability during the recent crisis.
2.
The EMDEs comprise a large and diverse group whose financial systems havegrown in importance over the last decade. Based on the classification of countries used by the
IMF in its World Economic Outlook (WEO), 150 economies are classified as EMDEs, including
10 members of the G20.2 They differ substantially in terms of economic size, level ofdevelopment, legal and institutional frameworks, and other factors that affect financial systems.
Over the last 10 years, financial systems in EMDEs have grown substantially vis-à-vis those inAEs—for example, their banking assets increased from about 19 percent of the global banking
system at end-2000 to about 27 percent at end-2009.
3.
Financial systems in many EMDEs proved resilient during the global financial
crisis, although they are now facing important new challenges. Underlying this resilience areseveral distinct factors, including stronger macroeconomic fundamentals, lower reliance onwholesale funding as part of a more traditional banking business model, minimal exposure to
US subprime mortgage assets, as well as improvements that have been achieved in policy
frameworks and financial supervision and market infrastructures in recent years. However,
EMDEs remain exposed to global risks arising from the sizable sovereign debt overhang and theongoing repair of financial sector balance sheets in many AEs. They are also experiencing
volatility in commodity export prices and significant capital inflows, which may be contributing
to overheating, excess credit growth, higher leverage, and elevated asset prices. In many
EMDEs, the appropriate policy response will involve not only a prudent macroeconomic
approach but also policies directly aimed at preserving financial stability.
4.
Some key characteristics of financial systems in EMDEs are particularly relevant
for the analysis of financial stability issues. Since EMDEs are a large and diverse group, they
do not all share the same financial system characteristics (see Annex I); in fact, many
characteristics vary as much across EMDEs as between EMDEs and AEs. However, in general,
financial systems in EMDEs tend to be relatively smaller in size, more concentrated and less1
2

See the Seoul Summit Declaration (http://www.g20.org/Documents2010/11/seoulsummit_declaration.pdf).

The definition of EMDEs can vary depending on the criteria used by different organizations and market
participants (e.g., size of economy, level of per capita income, equity and debt market capitalization, etc.).

9complex than systems in AEs. Banks play a large role—typically accounting for 85-90 percent offinancial system assets—while capital markets and other financial institutions remain relatively
under-developed even though they have been growing rapidly in some EMDEs in recent years.
Other prevalent (although not universal) features include greater dependence on foreign capital,
weaker institutional frameworks and market infrastructures, important supervisory capacity
constraints, a relatively greater involvement of the state in the financial system, and greater useof international currencies for domestic financial transactions (―financial dollarization‖).
5.
Against this background, this paper focuses on five key financial stability issues in
EMDEs:


Application of international financial standards. Most EMDEs have strengthened banking
supervision and the quality of securities regulation and insurance supervision over the past
decade, helping them withstand the effects of the global financial crisis. The principal
challenges in this area relate to supervisory capacity constraints, incomplete legal
frameworks, the ability to adequately regulate and supervise financial and mixed-activity
conglomerates, as well as adopting international standards at a pace consistent with the levelof those countries‘ financial development and supervisory capacity.

Promoting cross-border supervisory cooperation. In countries where foreign banks play asignificant role, the inherent conflicts of interest between the home and host jurisdictions canprevent adequate supervisory cooperation and information sharing and complicate risk
assessments and cross-border resolution. In response, many EMDEs and some AEs require
foreign banks to enter as subsidiaries and sometimes apply additional prudential measures(‗ring-fencing‘) to safeguard the interests of local stakeholders.



Expanding the regulatory and supervisory perimeter. In many EMDEs, small-scale nonbank lending and deposit-taking institutions play an increasingly important role. As it has
expanded, this sector has become increasingly complex and interconnected with the rest of
the financial system. The rapid pace of growth, sometimes combined with deteriorating asset
quality, may potentially have adverse consequences to financial stability in some EMDEs.
Several factors contribute to this situation, including an inadequate regulatory framework andlimited supervisory resources and capacity.

Management of foreign exchange risks. With the growing reliance on flexible exchange
regimes in many EMDEs, the nominal exchange rate is often more volatile, especially during
shifts in the global economic environment. While this flexibility provides important benefits,
the resulting volatility—which can be compounded by sizeable capital flows—can alsopresent risks. These risks are especially prominent in EMDEs with thin domestic financial
markets, significant financial dollarization, or limited markets to hedge currency mismatches.
As a result, banks may be exposed to foreign exchange risk either directly via net open
positions that cannot be efficiently hedged, or indirectly as a result of lending to borrowers
whose asset-liability profiles and revenue sources expose them to exchange rate fluctuations.

10

Developing domestic capital markets. Compared to AEs, capital markets in EMDEs are
more shallow and susceptible to sudden price movements and greater disruption that may
undermine confidence in their integrity. When faced with negative investor sentiment,
liquidity in those markets can erode quickly, causing panic sales and contagion effects
resulting in disorderly markets and financial instability, as evidenced by a number of crises
affecting EMDEs in the past two decades. The development of the domestic investor base,measures to address market illiquidity, and improvements in market infrastructure areimportant building blocks to address some of the related financial stability issues.

6.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section reviews how well
EMDEs have applied international financial standards in light of their capacity constraints, anddiscusses areas where international guidance could be improved. The third section examines theeffectiveness of the current framework for cross-border supervision and suggests ways to further
improve international cooperation among supervisory authorities. The fourth section addresses
the oversight of small-scale non-bank lending and deposit-taking institutions, which have grown
rapidly in recent years outside the regulatory perimeter in many EMDEs. The fifth section
reviews policy actions that EMDEs can take to improve the capacity of their financial systems to
manage exchange rate risk. The sixth section presents steps to develop domestic capital markets
in EMDEs in order to ensure a more diversified financial system and thereby build resilience.
The final section concludes and summarizes the main recommendations.
II. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STANDARDS7.
The international community attaches importance to the adoption andimplementation of international financial standards by all countries because they promote
the stability of financial systems at national and global levels. In particular, 12 key standards
have been designated by the FSB as deserving priority implementation depending on country
circumstances.3 They include three key standards—on banking supervision, securities regulation,and insurance supervision—that are being assessed for all countries, including EMDEs, by the
IMF and the World Bank as part of their Standards and Codes (S&C) Initiative.4
8.
Most EMDEs have strengthened banking supervision over the past decade, helping
them withstand the effects of the global financial crisis (see Annex II for details).5 Areas
3

The 12 key standards, as well as other standards that are complementary in nature and cover particular functional
areas, are included in the FSB Compendium of Standards, which provides a one-stop, easy-to-understand reference
for the various economic and financial standards that are accepted by the international community as important forsound financial systems - see http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/index.htm for details.
4

The S&C Initiative was launched in 1999 and was designed to strengthen the international financial architecture
through the development, dissemination, adoption, and implementation of international standards and codes (seehttp://www.imf.org/external/standards/index.htm). The IMF and the World Bank recently completed a review of thisinitiative (available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/021611.pdf).
5

These findings are based on 58 assessments completed by the IMF and World Bank since 2006 in the areas ofbanking, insurance and securities regulation and supervision in EMDEs. The analysis includes 42 Basel Core

(continued)

11
where these gains were most evident include capital adequacy frameworks; accounting andreporting systems; supervisory techniques; licensing procedures; policies to address problem
assets and loan loss provisions; and proper authorization for the conduct of banking activities.
Progress has also been made in monitoring and mitigating risks associated with related lending
and large exposures.
9.
The quality of insurance supervision and securities regulation in EMDEs has
improved as well. In some of the countries reviewed, insurance supervisors and securities
regulators have a clear mandate, with sufficient authority, independence, and legal protection.6
Areas for improvement include better enforcement powers and procedures (in the case of
securities regulators) and stronger group-wide supervision, resolution and liquidation procedures,and disclosure of financial conditions (in the case of insurance supervisors).
A. Supervisory Capacity and Legal Framework
10.
There is scope in many EMDEs to make further progress in strengthening
supervisory capacity and legal frameworks. Countries across all regions have faced challenges
in complying with those Basel Core Principles (BCPs) that address the governance, resourcesand operational independence of bank supervision. Political pressures can influence supervisory
matters, while supervisors lack legal protection for official actions.
11.

These challenges can undermine the effectiveness of other supervisory tasks, such as:Corrective and remedial actions. In a number of countries, particularly in Africa, banksupervisors lack an adequate range of tools to implement timely corrective actions. In
some cases, these shortcomings relate to the absence of proper legal powers, but in othercases supervisors lack the de facto authority to take forceful and timely measures against
a problem bank. In some countries, the supervisor is required to obtain government
approval for corrective and remedial actions, which can delay or terminate the process.



Risk management and operational risk. In about half of the EMDEs reviewed, banksupervisors lack the ability to assess the effectiveness of banks‘ risk management
practices, especially the adequacy of capital in relation to the risks undertaken by thebank. In many cases, a shortage of expertise in the supervisory agency is the source of
this shortcoming. This capability is especially important for those EMDEs that haveapproved the use of the advanced approaches in Basel II in their jurisdiction, which allowbanks to rely on historical data and internal models for the determination of credit risk

Principles (BCP) assessments; 7 International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) assessments; and9 International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) assessments.
6

The insurance and securities sectors in many EMDEs are relatively small and fewer countries have undergone an
IAIS or IOSCO assessment. Therefore, while the findings should be interpreted cautiously, the review provides a
glimpse into certain strengths and weaknesses of the regulation and supervision of these sectors.

12estimates and capital requirements. This lack of supervisory capacity spills over toassessing other risks as well, such as market and interest rate risks.
12.
The lack of adequate regulatory capacity is also evident in securities markets
surveillance and enforcement. In the majority of EMDEs reviewed, securities regulators do nothave adequate civil or administrative enforcement powers and often rely on the criminal
authorities for enforcement purposes, which can hinder their credibility and effectiveness. The
lack of sufficient operational independence and powers is also a challenge as compliance rates
with the relevant principles are low in this area. However, the main challenge relates to the actual
capacity of the regulator to conduct surveillance and adequately implement supervisory
programs, as well as to appropriately use its disciplinary powers. While some EMDEs haveinvested in sophisticated surveillance systems, it has been more difficult to build the appropriatetechnical capacity to understand and monitor the linkages and potential risk transmissions acrossmarket segments. This is particularly evident in conducting surveillance over the derivatives andcommodities markets as compared to the equities market. For example, in a recent survey,7 while
80 percent of EMDEs surveyed had either a derivatives market or a commodities exchange intheir jurisdictions, only 57 percent conducted inter-market surveillance.
B. Consolidated Supervision of Financial Conglomerates
13.
Supervisors often lack the legal basis or expertise to monitor and control the risks
arising from financial conglomerates, especially those that belong to mixed-activity
economic groups. Roughly three-fifths of the EMDEs reviewed had difficulties withconsolidated supervision, particularly of financial conglomerates, as well as with the ability toapply prudential norms to the foreign operations of the conglomerate where appropriate. Many
countries, such as Brazil, have strengthened their legal frameworks for consolidated supervision,
while other countries are in the process of evaluating alternative legal approaches. However, thescope of consolidated supervision often does not allow a supervisor to monitor all entities within
a financial conglomerate, especially foreign operations. Supervisors often do not have powers to
enforce regulations and require corrective action for all entities within a conglomerate. The
situation is even more acute with respect to financial conglomerates that form part of broader
mixed-activity economic groups. This is a structure present in many EMDEs, particularly in
Latin America and Asia, whereby the financial activities of the group are often used to support
the non-financial businesses (for example, a retailer that extends consumer credit via its banking
affiliate to promote the purchase of its products). Supervisors often lack the legal authority toobtain basic information regarding beneficial ownership and intra-group transactions, which
undermines their ability to supervise capital adequacy and compliance with related-party lending
rules.

7

See report on ―Approaches to Market Surveillance in Emerging Markets‖ by the Emerging Markets Committee of
the IOSCO (December 2009, available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD313.pdf).

13
C. Pace of Adoption of International Financial Standards
14.
Supervisors in some EMDEs can feel compelled to adopt new international financial
standards even when these standards may not be a priority for their jurisdiction. Standard
setters and international organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank, have emphasizedthat EMDEs should strive to adhere to regulatory and supervisory standards elaborated in the
BCP, IOSCO and IAIS principles and at a minimum implement the Basel I standard. In addition,
EMDEs should adopt more sophisticated international standards in a timeframe appropriate for
their financial system characteristics and supervisory capacity. However, national authorities
may feel the need to adopt all new standards in order to keep pace with peers, or as a result ofpressures from global financial institutions operating in their jurisdictions that prefer to be
subject to a single standard for their worldwide operations.
15.
An example of this issue concerns the adoption of the Basel II/III framework (seeBox 1 in Annex III). A worldwide survey conducted in 2010 by the Financial Stability Institute(FSI)8 indicated that 112 countries intend to implement all pillars of Basel II by 2015, with 65 of
those planning to implement the more advanced approaches of internal ratings based models for
credit risk embodied in Pillar 1.


The complexity of designing and implementing the capital calculations of Basel II/III canprove challenging for all countries—not just EMDEs. The implementation of even thestandardized approach can be technically complex in practice and requires the authorities
to make numerous judgments (e.g., whether and how to use external credit ratings) that
may overwhelm local capacity. Inconsistencies or ambiguities in the application of thecapital rules at consolidated versus solo levels may create challenges for host EMDEs.9



While certain elements of the Basel II/III framework—such as the definition of capitaland the supervisory review of a bank‘s risk and capital management practices—are very
relevant and may be useful to implement quickly, the full-scale adoption of theframework may distract many EMDEs—particularly low-income countries—from morebasic and urgent reform priorities. These countries should improve their supervisory
capacity and their compliance with the BCPs before dedicating resources to the adoptionof advanced capital and liquidity methodologies and requirements.

16.
This issue will become increasingly important with the promulgation of new
international standards in the aftermath of the financial crisis. A wide variety of standards in
8

See the ―2010 FSI Survey on the Implementation of the New Capital Adequacy Framework‖ (BIS Occasional
Paper No. 9, August 2010, available at http://www.bis.org/fsi/fsipapers09.pdf).
9

For example, the capital charges for the same sovereign issuer can vary between the parent and subsidiaries of a
global bank. Sovereign debt usually carries a zero capital charge when it is denominated and financed in domestic
currency; however, global banks and their home supervisors may treat host country sovereign debt held by theiroverseas subsidiaries as foreign debt and therefore impose a higher capital charge.

14
financial regulation and supervision has been issued in recent years, with the main focus being
on regulators and supervisors in AEs. Maximizing supervisory effectiveness under tight resource
constraints requires appropriate sequencing and prioritization. In EMDEs with limited humanand financial resources, the adoption of such standards would need to proceed at a paceconsistent with countries‘ supervisory capacity and level of financial system development.
D. Recommendations
17.
Greater efforts are needed to bolster supervisory capacity and independence,
strengthen legal frameworks, and reinforce the supervision of financial groups in EMDEs.
Specific recommendations include:National authorities in EMDEs should ensure that appropriate legal underpinnings are inplace to protect banking, securities and insurance regulators and supervisors; that there isoperational independence in the enforcement of corrective and remedial actions; and that
there are adequate budgetary resources and competitive salaries to support recruitment,
training, compensation, and staff retention capacities.10 Supervisors in EMDEs should
also be given the legal authority to monitor risks, set prudential requirements, designate alead supervisor and apply remedies as needed for financial conglomerates.



The international community should send a clear and consistent message on theappropriate pace of adoption of the Basel II/III framework in EMDEs. The morefinancially integrated EMDEs—especially those that belong to the G20/FSB andparticipated in the development of this framework—should adopt the framework
according to the agreed timetable. Other countries, with less internationally integrated
financial systems and with substantial supervisory capacity constraints, should first focus
on reforms to ensure compliance with the BCPs and only move to the more advanced
capital standards at a pace tailored to their circumstances.11



The BCBS should issue guidance on the application of new measures included in Basel
III—such as capital buffers, leverage ratio, and liquidity requirements—to EMDEs that
do not intend to adopt the advanced approaches of Basel II.



The international community should continue to promote the development of supervisory
capacity in EMDEs, particularly through technical assistance. This needs to be targeted

10

Many of these themes are echoed in the recommendations included in the report on the ―Intensity andEffectiveness of SIFI Supervision‖ that was issued in November 2010 by the Financial Stability Board (available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101101.pdf).
11

The IMF and the World Bank had prepared such guidance in the context of Basel II implementation. See―Implementation of Basel II - Implications for the World Bank and the IMF‖ (July 2005, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2005/072205.htm) and the relevant IMF Board discussion (PublicInformation Notice No. 05/154, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2005/pn05154.htm).

15
on specific areas based on sound diagnostic work (such as IMF-World Bank assessments)
and good coordination among donors. The efficiency and effectiveness of technicalassistance may be aided by the development of supervisory certification programs (e.g.,by the FSI or the Toronto Centre12), the encouragement of research to provide soundunderpinnings for policy reform, the channeling of funds to multilateral initiatives (e.g.,
the FIRST Initiative13), the posting of long-term resident experts in relevant agencies, andby financial support from donors for staffing supervisory agencies in selected cases. The
experience of more financially developed EMDEs, as well of those EMDEs that recently
obtained AE status, may also be particularly relevant and useful in this context.
The Joint Forum, in updating the Principles for the Supervision of Financial
Conglomerates, should develop additional guidance to assist with the identification andcontrol of the risks arising from financial conglomerates, particularly those that belong tomixed-activity economic groups.



The BCBS, IAIS and IOSCO, with input from the IMF and World Bank, should takestock of the range of practices on resources and capacity—including on staffing and skill
levels, training certification programs, and financing options—and identify goodpractices to strengthen supervisory authorities in EMDEs.
III. PROMOTING CROSS-BORDER SUPERVISORY COOPERATION

18.
Foreign-owned banks have a sizable presence in many EMDEs. Such institutions
account for a large share of financial system assets, and are often systemically important in viewof their size or interconnectedness. In particular, foreign-owned banks account for 70 percent ormore of total financial system assets in many countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE);
over 40 percent of system assets in much of the Caribbean and Latin America; and up to
50 percent of system assets in a few Asian countries (see Figure 18 in Annex III). Many of thesebanks belong to large global banking groups from AEs, although smaller regional banks from
EMDEs have also been expanding in other EMDEs more recently such as, for example, South
African and Nigerian banks in sub-Saharan Africa. In many cases, the domestic subsidiary of a
global bank may be important for the host country, even though it may only represent a small
share of the global bank‘s total consolidated assets (see Table 7 in Annex III).
19.
The entry of foreign banks can bring benefits to host countries’ financial systems
and economies at-large. These benefits stem from efficiency gains brought about by newtechnologies, products and management techniques as well as from increased competition.
Moreover, as foreign banks may have better access to resources from abroad, they usually have12
13

See http://www.bis.org/fsi/aboutfsi.htm and http://www.torontocentre.org/.

The Financial Sector Reform and Strengthening Initiative (http://www.firstinitiative.org/) is a multi-donor grant
facility providing technical assistance to promote financial sector strengthening.

16
more stable funding and lending patterns than domestic banks. They also hold a moregeographically diversified credit portfolio and hence would not be as significantly affectedduring periods of stress in the host country.
20.
However, the presence of foreign-owned banks also entails potential risks for host
EMDEs. Liquidity or solvency problems may spill over from a parent bank to its operations inhost countries. For instance, foreign-owned banks in CEE relied heavily on external funding(primarily from their parent banks) to support rapid credit growth, which reinforced the credit
boom experienced by those countries prior to the global financial crisis and then aggravated theeffects of the crisis on their economies. In Latin America, most of the foreign-owned(particularly Spanish) banks fund their operations through domestic retail deposits, helping
diminish their dependence on funding from the parent bank. However, the financial soundness ofthe parent bank can influence the volume of lending by these banks through local operations aswell as through cross-border transactions. Common lender problems may also be present when abank operates in many EMDEs. For instance, during the financial crisis, there were worries by
national authorities in CEE that the problems experienced in some of these countries could affectthe availability of credit and the viability of operations of foreign banks more broadly throughout
the region.
A. Cross-Border Supervisory Cooperation and Information Sharing
21.
In EMDEs where foreign banks play a significant role, the inherent conflicts ofinterest between home and host authorities can raise financial stability concerns. The
conflicts of interest arise because respective supervisory authorities are mandated to protect
depositors and safeguard financial stability in their own country and because of insufficient
coordination between them. As a result, home authorities are cautious about sharing information
with host authorities on adverse material changes in the global condition of banking groups.
Moreover, the interests of the parent bank and its operations in the host country can also differ
since the optimization of capital, liquidity and risk management strategies may not be the same atdifferent levels within the group. The optimization also differs depending on the mode of entry ina foreign jurisdiction, which can take the form of branches14 or subsidiaries.15 The global
financial crisis illustrated that liquidity flows within international groups can become a source ofcontagion, which prompted regulatory responses in some countries.

14

A branch typically has no legal personality separate from its parent. Thus, in principle, under a branch structure,
all of the parent bank‘s assets are available to cover all of its liabilities in case of resolution or liquidation, regardlessof their geographic distribution.
15

A subsidiary is locally incorporated and the parent bank‘s liability is limited to the capital it holds in it. In
principle, subsidiaries have an independent board as well as local liquidity and risk management practices; however,many international banks have centralized practices in which the boundaries of the individual legal entity may be
blurred. While managing risks on a consolidated basis makes sense from an economic perspective, the existence ofdifferent legal entities may limit the free movement of resources between institutions belonging to the same group.

17
22.
The current international framework for cross-border supervision does not provide
sufficient powers and rights to information to the host country in some cases. The
framework16 recommends that the host authority should obtain the prior consent of the homeauthority, as well as ensure that the home authority practices effective consolidated supervision,
before allowing a subsidiary or branch to operate in its jurisdiction. The home authority isentitled to obtain from the cross-border bank all the information it needs to effectively discharge
its supervisory responsibilities. However, the converse is not fully envisaged and strongly
emphasized in the framework, and host authorities do not always receive sufficient informationon the overall financial health of the parent bank.
23.
The absence of effective cross-border resolution frameworks makes it difficult tomanage the risks associated with foreign financial institutions. Uncoordinated measureswhen a firm faces stress—such as requiring a transfer of assets—could strengthen one affiliate at
the expense of the other parts of a global institution. Uncertainty about the ability of national
authorities to take action can delay or raise the cost of resolution. Weaknesses in cross-borderresolution can also add to moral hazard for global systemically important financial institutions(SIFIs), by tilting the incentives in favor of public sector support to resolve difficulties withindividual affiliates to avoid the costs, complexities and disruption of cross-border resolution.
Following the financial crisis, supervisory and regulatory efforts have been steered mainly fromthe perspective of improving consolidated supervision by the home supervisor. Although there
has been intensified focus on options to improve supervisory cooperation in normal, andparticularly in crisis, times, less attention has been paid to the specific issues affecting hostsupervisors, particularly those whose financial systems are dominated by foreign owned banks.
24.
Several countries have put in place regional agreements to facilitate information
sharing and cooperation. Within the European Union, financial institutions with cross-border
operations may establish a branch or subsidiary in the host country, with branches subject to thesupervisory framework of the home authority and subsidiaries of the host authority. One of thesupervisors is identified as the consolidating supervisor, with responsibility for the consolidated
supervision of the entire banking group. Supervisors are required to share information, drawing
on established channels and procedures. Other European cooperation agreements also proved

16

The BCBS issued a set of minimum standards and set out recommendations for their effective implementation in―Minimum Standards for the Supervision of International Banking Groups and their Cross-Border Establishments‖(July 1992, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc314.pdf) and ―The Supervision of Cross-Border Banking‖ (October 1996,
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs27.pdf). Additional principles for the cross-border implementation of the Basel II
Framework were formulated in ―High-level principles for the cross-border implementation of the new Accord‖(August 2003, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs100.pdf) and ―Home-host information sharing for effective Basel II
implementation‖(June 2006, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs125.pdf). Finally, two papers prepared by the Joint Forumon the supervision of financial conglomerates - the ―Framework for Supervisory Information Sharing‖ (1999a,
http://www.bis.org/publ/joint02.pdf#page=53) and ―Principles for Supervisory Information Sharing‖ (1999b,
http://www.bis.org/publ/joint02.pdf#page=95) - are also applicable to cross-border issues.

18
useful in the recent crisis.17 Central American and Caribbean as well as some African countries
have agreed on regional Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) among financial supervisors.
25.
Actions by host EMDEs alone cannot resolve the inherent conflicts of interest thatstand in the way of effective consolidated supervision and cross-border resolution. Most
countries are not members of a regional union that allows for agreements on supra-national
legislation, while an agreement among a sub-region of smaller countries (such as Central
America) would not necessarily promote better cooperation with supervisors of parent banks that
operate globally. Even within highly integrated regions, cross-border cooperation in a crisis is far
from complete. For instance, in the Nordic-Baltic region, MoUs are not legally binding, which
can make it difficult to secure a mandate to pursue enforcement actions. Subsidiarization andring-fencing (see below), which may be adopted by national authorities to protect the interests ofdomestic depositors, may nevertheless create some inefficiencies in the allocation of capital andliquidity that can limit or reduce global banks‘ activities and complicate cross-border resolution.
26.
Many EMDEs require foreign banks to operate as subsidiaries and to be subject totheir supervision.18 A subsidiary structure allows the host supervisor to exercise more
supervisory control and oversight responsibility, which is particularly important in the case offoreign banks that can access domestic deposit insurance or have a systemic presence in the hostcountry. Since the host country has supervisory responsibility and would bear the cost of a standalone resolution of the subsidiary, it subjects such entities to additional prudential norms in orderto ensure a sound oversight framework. These may include corporate governance requirements
on board members at the local entity to ensure that they appropriately oversee risk management
operations and, in some cases, a requirement to maintain key infrastructure and back officesystems in the host country.19
27.
Other tools used by host authorities include regulatory and supervisory measures(‘ring-fencing’) to protect the local stakeholders of the branch or subsidiary. These
measures include asset pledge or maintenance requirements for branches in order to assure thatsufficient assets will be available in their jurisdiction in the event of failure of the parent bank;guidance or requirements that foreign banks operate through stand-alone subsidiaries; and17

The European Bank Coordination Initiative (Vienna Initiative) brought together the various stakeholders of EUbased cross-border banking groups that are systemically important in Central and Eastern Europe, in order to discuss
crisis management and resolution issues and to avoid a massive and uncoordinated withdrawal of these groups fromthe region that would have triggered a systemic banking crisis. Countries in the Nordic-Baltic region have signed ageneral MoU as well as institution-specific MoUs on crisis management arrangements among the relevant national
supervisors.
18

In Latin America as well as Central and Eastern Europe, most foreign-owned banks operate as subsidiaries. The
experience is Asia is mixed, as some countries (like Korea) permit a branch structure, while other countries (such as
China and Malaysia) rely entirely on subsidiaries.
19

New Zealand is an example of an AE whose banking system is dominated by foreign banks that uses a
combination of cross-border cooperation between supervisory authorities as well as subsidiarization and otherprudential measures (e.g., limits on outsourcing functions and corporate governance requirements).

19
limitations on inter-affiliate transactions, including transfers of assets, to prevent contagion andto protect the creditors of a given legal entity.20 In the case of a domestic subsidiary of a foreignbank or affiliate within a financial group, the host authorities may impose limits on intra-grouptransactions in order to protect the domestic entity from contagion by the parent and prevent theoutflow of funds to the detriment of the domestic entity.21 These measures, however, do entail
some risks, as they may increase the probability of knock-on defaults in the group andcomplicate crisis management, and may adversely affect credit supply in the host country.
B. Recommendations
28.
Supervisory colleges for large international banks should include host authorities if
those banks are systemically important for the host’s financial system. Supervisory colleges
have been created for such banks as mechanisms to facilitate the exchange of information andcooperation. It would be impractical and unrealistic to expect all host authorities of global banks
to be involved in these colleges. However, it is important to ensure that all host authorities areinvited to participate in supervisory colleges of global banks that may be systemic in their own
jurisdictions, even if the bank‘s activities in that jurisdiction are less relevant from the homecountry perspective. Host authorities in some of the larger EMDEs believe that there is a strong
case for such participation being at the core college level if the global bank is systemic in theirown jurisdictions. The home supervisor should continue to take the lead role in organizing thecollege, but needs to ensure that the arrangements reflect the scale and complexity of the banking
group as well as the needs of other supervisors of that group.22 In that context, it will be
important to ensure that host supervisors - particularly where the global bank is systemicallyimportant in their jurisdiction - receive timely, accurate and comprehensive information from thehome supervisor. Such information sharing should be underpinned by appropriate legal
agreements and confidentiality safeguards where necessary. As part of its reporting to the FSB in2012 on the functioning of supervisory colleges23, the BCBS should report on the adequacy ofmembership and information sharing arrangements from the perspective of host authorities.

20

During the financial crisis, the exposures of Mexican subsidiaries to their parent banks abroad increased sharply.
In March 2011, the authorities modified their regulation so that banks operating domestically would have to deductfrom regulatory capital all exposures with related parties (including parent banks) that exceed 25 percent of core
capital.
21

See ―Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group‖ by the BCBS (March 2010, at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf) and ―Risk Management Lessons from the Global Banking Crisis of 2008‖ by
the Senior Supervisors Group (October 2009, at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0910a.pdf).
22

See ―Good practice principles on supervisory colleges‖ by the BCBS (October 2010, available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs177.pdf).
23

One of the recommendations in the FSB‘s report on reducing the moral hazard posed by SIFIs calls for the
standard-setting bodies to report by end-2012 on how to improve the operation of supervisory colleges (October
2010, available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101111a.pdf).

20
29.
A similar approach needs to be undertaken for crisis management groups. Crisis
management groups are being formed to assist with cooperation over resolution matters. The
FSB‘s predecessor (Financial Stability Forum) had set out principles for cross-bordercooperation in crisis management to which crisis management groups should adhere.24 The
principles state that home authorities should ensure that all countries in which the firm has
systemic importance are kept informed of the arrangements for crisis management that have beendeveloped. Crisis management groups should provide for information sharing and cooperation on
recovery and resolution plans with all parties that would be significantly affected.
30.
Bilateral and regional agreements may be a valid alternative to full participation insupervisory colleges and crisis management groups. These agreements, which can take theform of a MoU, include cooperation procedures, the general allocation of supervisory
responsibilities between host and home supervisor, the minimum content for information
sharing, the confidentiality provisions prevailing in each country, as well as aspects referring totechnical cooperation, operational contacts and bilateral meetings.25 Whenever possible, these
agreements should enhance preparedness for, and facilitate the management and resolution of, across-border crisis affecting the firm.
31.
Home and host authorities in EMDEs should further develop mechanisms for crossborder supervisory cooperation and information sharing of their own financial institutions.
Current efforts at the international level, including supervisory colleges, focus primarily on
global banks that are typically incorporated in AEs. However, banks headquartered in some
EMDEs are expanding in other EMDEs, usually in a sub-regional context, and it is imperative
for home and host authorities to ensure adequate information exchange and cooperation in bothnormal and crisis times. Technical assistance from international organizations can play animportant role in achieving this goal.
32.
Another crucial step would be to move forward with efforts to set up a stronger
international framework for cross-border cooperation over crisis resolution. The FSB‘s Key
Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions includes important elementsof cross-border cooperation. In particular, they call on countries to seek convergence ofresolution regimes through the legislative changes needed to incorporate the tools and powers set
out in the Key Attributes into the national regimes. Greater convergence of national resolution
regimes should facilitate cross-border cooperation and coordination. In addition, the Key
Attributes stipulate that national laws and regulations should not discriminate against creditors on
the basis of their nationality, the location of their claim or the jurisdiction where it is payable,
24

See ―FSF Principles for Cross-Border Cooperation on Crisis Management‖ (April 2009, available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904c.pdf).
25

See ―Essential elements of a statement of cooperation between banking supervisors‖ by the BCBS (May 2001,
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs83.pdf) and ―Principles Regarding Cross-Border Supervisory Cooperation‖
by IOSCO (May 2010, available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD322.pdf).

21
recognizing that authorities will only be willing to cooperate if creditors in home and hostjurisdictions are treated fairly. The Key Attributes set out a presumption in favor of cross-bordercooperation, but reserve the right of discretionary national action if necessary to achieve
domestic stability in the absence of effective action (including cross-border cooperation andinformation sharing) by the home authority. The FSB has also set out the essential elements ofinstitution-specific cooperation agreements that should be in place for all global SIFIs.
33.
Multilateral arrangements in the securities and insurance sectors, such as the
IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU)26 and the IAIS MMoU,27
should also be promoted in order to facilitate cross-border cooperation and informationexchange. Currently, only around 50 percent of EMDE jurisdictions are Appendix A signatories
to the IOSCO MMoU. Several EMDE jurisdictions have not been able to become a full signatory
to the MMoU due to legal constraints in their ability to obtain and provide securities
enforcement-related information. In order to ensure information sharing and effective crossborder cooperation to combat capital market violations, it is imperative that regulators that docurrently not have the requisite powers bring about necessary legislative changes to fully comply
with the MMoU requirements; IOSCO is providing technical assistance to support this process(see Box 2 in Appendix III). Cross-border cooperation among EMDEs must also extend to morepreemptive and proactive efforts, including supervision and surveillance.28
IV. EXPANDING THE REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY PERIMETER
34.
Small-scale, non-bank institutions involved in lending or deposit-taking activities(NBIs) play an increasingly important role in many EMDEs. For the purposes of this paper,
NBIs include savings and credit cooperatives, microfinance institutions (MFIs), credit unions,finance companies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).29 They form a very diverse
range of entities that are especially important in providing services to households and micro,
small and medium-sized enterprises. Their growth over the past few years has been significant incertain regions, notably in Africa; both in response to the need to expand financial access beyond
the banking system, but also because of factors that may not always be welfare-enhancing (e.g.,
tax arbitrage, onerous banking regulations, etc.). According to a World Bank survey, NBIs
accounted for as much as 15 percent of the total volume of deposits worldwide in 2009. In many26

See ―Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange ofInformation‖ by the IOSCO (May 2002, at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD126.pdf).
27

See ―Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation and Information Exchange‖ by the IAIS
(February 2007, available at http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/IAIS_MMoU.pdf).
28

The only multilateral surveillance-specific arrangement in place is the Intermarket Surveillance Group (ISG),
which provides a framework for the sharing of information and the coordination of regulatory efforts amongexchanges and market regulators that perform front-line surveillance in order to address potential inter-market
manipulations and trading abuses (https://www.isgportal.org/home.html). Only 5 EMDEs are signatories to the ISG.
29

Other entities that fall under the category of non-bank financial institutions - such as pension funds, mutual funds,
insurance companies, broker-dealers and asset management companies - are not included in this discussion.

22
EMDEs, NBIs have more extensive branch networks than banks in rural areas and provide
financial access to under-served segments of the population, thereby playing a critical role inpoverty alleviation and economic empowerment of marginalized and vulnerable communities.30
35.
As it has expanded, the NBI sector has become increasingly complex andinterconnected, including with the banking sector. In a number of countries, various formal,
semi-formal or informal entities have emerged that provide financial services.
Interconnectedness between banks and NBIs has grown significantly. Banks are partnering with
MFIs to reach out to previously-neglected segments of the population, often providing them withliquidity support. Banks have also established agency arrangements with non-bank outlets (e.g.,
postal offices, gas stations, groceries) for the promotion of branchless banking. The growth of
Mobile Network Operators that facilitate branchless banking has also blurred the traditional
distinction between banks and NBIs.
A. Inadequate Regulation and Supervision of NBI Sector
36.
The asset quality of NBI portfolios has deteriorated in a number of countries, partly
as a result of poor risk management and the rapid and uneven expansion of the industry.
Private investors, attracted by the high returns and low loan losses prior to the crisis, have maderelatively large amounts of funds available to many MFIs, enabling them to expand lending
capacity. Moreover, large banks began moving down-market to enter the microfinance market;
many savings and loan institutions aggressively expanded micro-lending in urban markets;
telecom companies started offering mobile money; and governments continued to provide
subsidized lending programs. However, a number of these firms suffer from important
institutional weaknesses, including a lack of proper governance, poor management quality andstaffing, and absence of internal controls. The ensuing erosion of lending discipline contributed
to a deterioration in asset quality in some EMDEs (e.g., in West Africa), particularly in theaftermath of the financial crisis.
37.

The deteriorating asset quality of NBIs can be attributed to several factors:

Inadequate regulatory framework. Deficiencies in the licensing and regulatory
frameworks have facilitated the proliferation of financially weak and poorly managed
institutions. MFIs in many countries do not adhere to prudential regulations either
because of the absence of a regulatory body or because the supervisor has insufficient
capacity. Licensing regimes are lax or sometimes non-existent, creating opportunities forregulatory arbitrage. For instance, a problem that arose in CEE was the role of these
institutions in circumventing banking sector regulations. In particular, when CEE
regulators tried to slow down the credit growth that preceded the crisis, new lending was30

For example, in a number of West African countries (e.g., Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d‘Ivoire and Niger), deposittaking MFIs have more depositors than commercial banks.

23
increasingly channeled through NBIs. This reduced the effectiveness of prudential
measures and had adverse consequences for financial stability.31
Weak supervisory capacity. Supervisory frameworks have not kept up with the rapid
growth of NBIs and are not yet fully developed. The lack of proper supervision isparticularly severe in the case of NBIs given the multitude of entities and the priority
accorded to supervising the banking sector. While NBIs may be small in size, they areimportant in terms of access to finance and can generate disproportionate reputational
effects, particularly if they are involved in deposit-taking activities. Scarce resources
coupled with limited availability of qualified staff, analytical tools and technology havebeen major obstacles.

Political constraints. The financial health of the NBI sector can also be undermined bypopulist policies, including a willingness by politicians to allow (or even encourage)
borrowers not to repay their loans.32 The laudable objective set by governments anddonors of promoting access to finance, notably through non-bank sources of funding, has
not always been matched by adequate attention to establishing proper regulation andsupervision.

38.
The rapid pace of growth of the NBI sector, combined with worsening asset quality,
may potentially have adverse consequences for financial stability in some EMDEs. To theextent that NBIs are increasingly moving into—or are interconnected with—traditional financial
intermediation, their failure may adversely impact depositors and, under certain circumstances,result in contagion to other financial institutions.33 High debt levels observed in some NBI
markets could potentially give rise to the kind of ―debtor revolt‖ that took place in Nicaragua in2009 or to the crippling debt problems of farmers in Southern India. In this regard, social
instability that could affect the business climate and jeopardize financial stability cannot be ruledout and warrants attention, at least in a few EMDEs in Africa, Central America and South East
Asia. Moreover, the erosion of public confidence in NBIs may encourage further growth in theinformal financial system and thus undermine public policies to promote financial inclusion.

31

Similarly in India, branch licensing for banks is subject to a regulatory process, whereas branches can be freely
opened by nonbank financial companies (NBFCs). In fact, some banks have launched NBFCs within their group toskirt these regulations.
32

See, for example, (i) the spearheading of a ―no pago‖ movement in Nicaragua; (ii) the circulation of a written chitin 2008 proclaiming a loan waiver in the Punjab Province of Pakistan, which encouraged microfinance borrowers
not to repay their loans; and (iii) the passing of an Ordinance in Andhra Pradesh, India, encouraging borrowers toquestion their obligation to repay.
33

For example, certain finance companies in India had become heavily dependent on mutual funds and commercial
banks for their funding needs prior to the global financial crisis. Following significant institutional investor
redemptions and the freezing of bank credit lines brought about by the crisis, the Reserve Bank of India had to stepin and provide liquidity and other forms of support to them (see Box 3 in Annex III).

24
B. Recommendations
39.
EMDEs should consider adjusting their regulatory framework to reflect the growthin, and the risks arising from, NBIs. A ―one size fits all‖ solution is not appropriate given thediversity of these institutions. However, it is no longer advisable to allow NBIs, particularly
MFIs, to continue growing outside a proper regulatory framework. A suitable system may
include defining permissible activities clearly in licenses and identifying criteria for regulation
based on the nature and scale of NBI activities. Where necessary, this should involve theadoption of prudential norms on capital adequacy, loan classification and provisioning, loan
rescheduling and write-offs, governance, and Board composition on NBIs. These prudential
norms would apply to those institutions that take deposits (and perhaps exceed a size threshold),
and would need to be accompanied by appropriate supervisory and enforcement powers to beable to detect problems and resolve troubled institutions.34 By contrast, credit-only institutions
might be subject only to conduct-of-business and consumer protection norms, although this may
also depend on the extent to which they are linked to the rest of the financial system (see Box 4
in Annex III for the case of non-bank mortgage lenders in Mexico).
40.
EMDEs should also consider alternative ways to strengthen the supervision of NBIs
given capacity constraints. Supervisory arrangements for NBIs vary significantly across
EMDEs, with some entities supervised by bank supervisors, others by the ministry of finance orother ministries, and others remaining outside the supervisory perimeter. As mentioned above,
NBIs could be subject to supervision if they are to be given authorization to take deposits fromthe public via conventional (e.g., branches) or other channels (e.g., mobile banking).
Policymakers will need to find the right balance between the need to subject relevant NBIs tominimum oversight while ensuring continued supervision of the banking sector. A graduated,cost-effective approach that would involve progressively more intensive forms of supervision
depending on the size and complexity of a NBI is warranted. In this regard, some form ofdelegated supervision might be appropriate—whether to an apex institution or to second-tierinstitutions—at least for smaller entities. NBI examiners will need specialized skills andtechniques to assess products, delivery mechanisms and credit portfolios, which differ
substantially from those of conventional retail banks. Given the number of institutions involved
and the dearth of supervisory resources, it would be desirable to apply risk-based supervision
whenever possible by focusing on the most important entities and sources of risk. Inter-agency
coordination should also be encouraged when more than one agency is involved in supervision.
41.
Data collection, reporting and disclosure requirements for the NBI industry alsoneed to be improved. Official indicators do not always provide an adequate and timely pictureof the soundness of the industry in some EMDEs - such as, for example, loan quality, liquidity
and concentration risks - making it difficult to take appropriate supervisory actions. In that34

Mexico, for example, has subjected to supervision some entities (such as cooperatives) that pass a critical asset
size in order to protect depositors‘ interests and members‘ contributions.

25
regard, it would be important to continue with initiatives already underway by the United
Nations Development Program and the World Bank to assess data needs and to explore thefeasibility of developing offsite surveillance mechanisms. It would also be important to put inplace supporting infrastructure, such as industry-wide credit bureaus, since the lack of credit
history data on borrowers is a systemic weakness observed in many EMDEs. Repositories ofcredit information bring down the cost and time of loan underwriting, and help avoid client overindebtedness. Land title registries would also provide lenders valuable information in credit
decisions.
42.
Additional work is needed at the international level on the regulation andsupervision of NBIs. The lack of international standards for the sector has been pointed out as aproblem; however, the sector is too diverse and heterogeneous to support standardized norms
that would be suitable to all entities. At the same time, NBIs are growing rapidly in importanceand number, and these changes merit attention from the international community. One solution
would consist for the BCBS to leverage and build upon its recent work on microfinance. The
BCBS document in this area is an important step forward as it suggests that the BCPs generally
offer a suitable framework for microfinance supervisors, although some tailoring is required
according to the type, size, and complexity of transactions, and the need to contain compliancecosts for institutions as well as supervisors.35 The BCBS could follow up this work by taking
stock of the range of practices in certain key areas for NBIs undertaking bank-like activities,
such as on supervisory approaches, prudential regulations (i.e., capital adequacy, loanclassification and provisioning, loan rescheduling and write-offs, governance, Board
composition) as well as data reporting and disclosure requirements.
V. MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISKS
43.
Many EMDEs have introduced more flexibility in their exchange rate regimes overtime. This increased flexibility can promote a more efficient allocation of resources and asmoother adjustment of external current account balances. Nonetheless, it can also mean periodsof high exchange rate volatility, often in response to shifts in global economic conditions
resulting in sizable capital inflows or outflows (as experienced by many EMDEs) and highvolatility in those flows. Moreover, many EMDEs have thin domestic financial markets, which
can exacerbate the volatility of the exchange rate and other asset prices in response to shocks,
such as surges in capital inflows. In EMDEs with weaknesses in the structure of their domestic
financial markets, currency volatility can therefore present risks to financial stability. In
particular, the build-up of currency mismatches on bank and borrower balance sheets, whencombined with sharp fluctuations in the exchange rate, can heighten credit and liquidity risks atfinancial institutions and result in a sharp deterioration in their financial condition.

35

See ―Microfinance Activities and the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision‖ by the BCBS (August
2010, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs175.pdf).

26
A. Limiting Currency Mismatches
44.
Many EMDEs exhibit significant financial dollarization (financial transactions
conducted in foreign currency) or liability dollarization (external foreign currency
liabilities). As recent experience illustrated, volatility in capital flows and exchange rates canquickly impair the balance sheet of any resident with a sizable net foreign currency liability
position or lead to sharp fluctuations in credit growth. Since banks often account for the bulk offinancial system assets in EMDEs, these risks frequently affect the banking system either directly
via net open positions that cannot be efficiently hedged (for example, due to the lack of swaps
markets of adequate maturity or depth), or indirectly as a result of lending to borrowers whose
asset-liability profiles (in terms of maturity and currency composition) and revenue sources
expose them to exchange rate fluctuations.
45.
Countries with high financial dollarization can supplement strong macroeconomic
policies with prudential regulations that encourage use of the domestic currency and help
internalize the cost of foreign exchange (FX) risk management. In addition to ensuring soundmacroeconomic fundamentals, including low and stable inflation, countries can promote the useof the domestic currency in several ways including: use in official transactions; removal of legal
tender status of foreign currency; exclusive coverage of domestic deposits in deposit insurance
schemes; use for constituting required reserves; increasing government borrowing in local
currency while promoting domestic bond markets; and favoring the domestic currency in thepayments system. In addition, prudential regulations can help the private sector internalize someof the FX-related risks via the adoption of measures such as: (i) tightening limits on open FX
positions; (ii) increasing liquidity, reserve or capital requirements on foreign currency liabilities
or assets; (iii) focusing risk-based supervision on FX risk management; (iv) stress testing thecreditworthiness of borrowers for exchange rate movements; and (v) removing FX restrictions
that lead to hoarding of foreign currency.
46.
There are many recent examples of countries that have used prudential or othermeasures to limit currency mismatches. From 2004-2007, several countries in CEE adopted avariety of prudential and administrative measures, such as differential and marginal reserve
requirements; higher capital requirements on foreign lending; tighter asset classification andprovisioning rules on foreign credit; higher risk weights on foreign currency denominatedmortgages; and setting lower loan-to-value ratios for foreign currency loans. Prudential policies
also helped several Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay)
to reduce financial dollarization. These measures included raising the provisioning requirements
on foreign currency loans, tightening requirements on the net open FX positions of banks,
applying differentiated risk weights (and hence capital requirements) on foreign currency loans,and imposing a financial transactions tax on foreign currency transactions. In 2003, Argentina
introduced a limit on the net global position in foreign currency of financial institutions andrestricted lending in foreign currency only to firms with revenues denominated in foreign
currency. In Korea, the authorities differentiated liquidity weights according to the asset classwhen calculating the foreign currency liquidity ratio, and set the minimum level of safe assets

27that banks should hold. Korea recently re-imposed its withholding tax on bond investments by
non-residents for equal treatment with residents. It has also imposed a macro prudential stability
levy—which varies by maturity—on non-deposit foreign currency liabilities of financial
institutions, effective since 1 August 2011. In India, the authorities‘ toolkit includes direct
administrative measures, such as quantitative ceilings and end-use restrictions.
47.
However, without supportive macroeconomic policies, prudential andadministrative measures can be much less effective. Credible and sustainable fiscal andmonetary policies will limit the risk of high inflation and strengthen the demand to denominate
financial assets and liabilities in domestic currency. A flexible exchange rate policy transfers to
the private sector the responsibility for managing the risk of currency volatility and can provide astrong incentive for residents to match their foreign currency assets and liabilities, particularly
when hedging markets exist (see below).
B. Developing Short-Term Domestic Currency Money and Government Securities Markets
48.
Financial markets in EMDEs are thinner, less liquid and have a smaller range of
instruments compared with AEs. The depth of domestic currency money markets varies
widely across EMDEs, with fairly deep and liquid short-term markets in a few countries (such as
Brazil, Korea and Mexico) but shallow markets in many others. The depth of such markets tends
to be constrained by perceptions of high counterparty risk and often a limited supply of highquality collateral, contributing to high spreads. An equally critical factor is the capacity of central
banks and the government to manage liquidity effectively so that the market is not subject tolarge liquidity swings, which can make market participants take precautionary liquidity that
limits their trading activity. Deep and liquid money markets in domestic currency provide banks
the primary mechanism through which to adjust intraday liquidity and manage financing needs
as well as facilitate the functioning of other financial markets, public debt management, andmonetary policy. Lower financial development in EMDEs can in turn lead to the concentrationof inflows into certain sectors - for example, real estate through bank intermediation—leading torapid asset price inflation with the attendant risks associated with sharp reversals.
49.
Over the past few decades, many EMDEs have adopted a wide range of measures todevelop these domestic currency markets. These steps include: (i) the development of market
infrastructure, such as sound payments systems and the introduction of central securities
depositories and transparent collateral management; (ii) the easing of restrictions on financial
markets, such as interest rate controls and administrative allocation of credit, to enhance thequality of information and facilitate pricing; (iii) the establishment of good government cash
management practices and sterilization mechanisms by central banks; and (iv) the developmentof the market for government securities, which provide relatively safe instruments for secondary
market trading and collateral for the money market. For example, Mexico developed a liquid
long-term government bond market in the last decade as a result of macroeconomic stability, thegrowth of the local institutional investor base, and proactive policies to consolidate benchmark
securities and foster market-making by primary dealers. Macroeconomic stability and effective

28
debt management policies also contributed to enhance liquidity and develop local currency
government bond yield curves in several other EMDEs, including Brazil, Turkey and South
Africa.36 China offers a more recent example of successful ongoing development of short-termmoney and government securities markets (see Box 5 in Annex III).
C. Developing Instruments to Hedge Exchange Rate Risk
50.
The large majority of EMDEs lack derivatives markets that could help financial
institutions, corporations and households to hedge risks from unexpected volatility inexchange rates and other asset prices. The active use of hedging instruments lets markets
distribute the FX risk among those participants who are willing and able to bear it, and this canpromote the efficiency of financial markets, lower borrowing costs and promote growth. Withlimited opportunities for hedging FX risk, private sector balance sheets are more vulnerable tothe effects of currency mismatches. So far, a few EMDEs (e.g., Mexico and South Africa) havedeveloped significant onshore over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets, which tend toconcentrate on hedging FX risk through forward contracts. Brazil also has extensive exchangetraded onshore derivatives markets. Derivatives markets in a few other EMDEs are smaller, andtheir currencies often trade in unregulated, offshore derivative markets through non-deliverable
forward contracts. However, for many EMDEs, particularly smaller and developing ones, thecreation of instruments and markets to hedge exchange rate risk may not be a realistic option in
the near future.
51.
A precondition for developing efficient hedging of FX risk is establishing a liquid
spot foreign exchange market in addition to domestic money markets. The authorities can
assist the development of this market, including by abolishing administrative restrictions andconducting transparent operations in it. The authorities can also develop timely and crediblereference interest rates to allow for the consistent and accurate pricing of cash and derivative
market instruments. It also helps to establish standardized methods for valuing positions in FX
and ease restrictions on bank foreign currency cash positions. The adoption of centralized
clearing and settlement systems can help reduce counterparty risk and other costs.
52.
Robust and transparent derivatives markets help participants manage risks and are
more likely to remain useable and liquid under stressed conditions. The FSB
recommendations to improve OTC derivatives markets promote standardization, clearing,exchange (or electronic platform) trading, and reporting of OTC derivatives transactions to trade36

See ―Local Currency Bond Markets in Emerging Markets: A Contribution to the Stability of the International
Monetary System‖, prepared by staff of the World Bank Group, with input from regional development banks, for the
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the G20 for their meeting in Washington, DC in April 2011. See
also ―Financial stability and local currency bond markets‖ by the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS
Paper No. 28, June 2007, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs28.pdf).

29
repositories.37 Further work is underway to address issues relating to interoperability and accessto central counterparties for smaller and cross-border market participants. In addition to the useof central counterparties, other internationally recognized FX settlement systems can also
effectively control counterparty risk.
53.
FX derivatives instruments require strong financial supervision, as they can create
vulnerabilities if used for taking open positions or funded at short maturities. The modest
currency volatility and sustained nominal appreciation observed in several countries in 2007-08
led some corporations to take important off-balance sheet FX exposures through derivative
positions, which subsequently led to significant losses in countries such as Brazil and Mexico.
The Korean authorities imposed several restrictions, including a limit on individual forward
contracts within underlying trade contracts and ceilings on financial institutions‘ FX derivatives
positions in proportion to their capital, in response to a maturity mismatch that originated inforward FX sales by shipbuilding companies.
D. Recommendations
54.
EMDEs should adopt a more proactive supervisory and regulatory stance withrespect to mitigating FX risks. The likely prospect that the factors driving capital flows andcontributing to FX risk will remain in place for some time underscores the importance ofapplying prudential norms to discourage the build-up of currency mismatches and developing
short-term money markets and instruments to hedge currency risk. This is particularly so sinceeven deep and liquid markets (where they exist) cannot fully insulate EMDEs from shocks
emanating from large capital inflows and FX transactions.
55.
EMDEs may also need to enhance their tools and capacity to identify the build-up of
FX risks at an early stage. In particular, timely information for on- and off-balance sheet
exposures of both banks and non-bank financial institutions, including overseas branches, canallow supervisors to monitor the development of net open FX positions. A liquidity coverage
ratio on foreign currency liquidity could help signal when net cash outflows under stress exceed
liquid assets denominated in foreign currency. Such an early warning system would require
improvements in the quality of data in many EMDEs, in particular on- and off-balancetransactions involving both financial and non-financial institutions and timely information on
capital flows.
56.
Better information sharing among countries can help EMDEs monitor these risks.
In many countries, domestic non-financial institutions may take open FX positions with nonresidents, which may escape the monitoring systems of the domestic supervisors. In this regard,
there are benefits to improving transparency and reporting in FX derivative markets worldwide,37

See ―Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms‖ by the FSB (October 2010, available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101025.pdf).

30such as through trade data repositories or by moving derivatives trading to organized exchanges,
while limiting or making more transparent the extent of OTC FX derivative operations.
57.
The BCBS can provide more guidance on the steps that countries can take to detectand monitor the buildup of FX risks and to develop appropriate prudential regulations toaddress them. Such guidance that could, for example, be included in Pillar 2 of the Baselframework and complemented by appropriate stress testing, should address both direct FX risks
as well as the credit risks arising from borrowers‘ FX exposures.
VI. DEVELOPING DOMESTIC CAPITAL MARKETS58.
The development of deeper domestic capital markets can improve the economy’s
ability to absorb shocks and manage financial risks. These benefits to financial stability
complement the critical role that capital markets play in efficient resource allocation and in
reducing over-reliance on the banking sector for the mobilisation of savings and financial
intermediation. Diversified capital markets provide investors with alternative asset classes intimes of financial stress. However, developing such markets is a long-term process that requires
proper planning and commitment as well as appropriate prioritization and sequencing.
59.
Capital markets in EMDEs have become more interlinked within the local andglobal financial systems, but remain vulnerable to changes in investor sentiment andcontagion effects. Compared to AEs, capital markets in EMDEs are more shallow andsusceptible to sudden price movements and greater disruption that may undermine confidence intheir integrity. Liquidity in those markets can erode quickly, causing panic sales and contagion
effects resulting in disorderly markets and financial instability, as evidenced by a number ofcrises affecting EMDEs in the past two decades.38
60.
This section focuses on key steps to develop the domestic investor base, address
market illiquidity, and improve key aspects of market infrastructure in order to mitigate
risks to financial stability. Other important building blocks include sound macroeconomic andfiscal policies, developing short-term domestic currency money and government securities
markets and instruments to hedge exchange rate risk (as described above), as well as developing
corporate bond markets39 and improving the quality and reliability of information disclosures.

38

See, for example, the report on ―Causes, Effects and Regulatory Implications of Financial and Economic
Turbulence in Emerging Markets‖ by the Emerging Markets Committee of the IOSCO (November 1999, available
at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD99.pdf).
39

See the Action Plan to support the development of local currency bond markets prepared by the G20 Working
Group on the Reform of the International Monetary System. A Task Force within the Emerging Markets Committeeof the IOSCO is also examining the issue of the development of corporate bond markets in emerging markets and is
expected to issue a report by the end of 2011.

31
A. Developing the Domestic Investor Base
61.
In many EMDEs, there is a lack of a sufficiently diverse and deep pool of investors
that can act as a source of stability in times of crisis. The efficiency of the intermediation
process in capital markets is highly dependent on the investor base, which should have a
combination of domestic retail and institutional investors as well as foreign investors. In most
EMDEs, there is rarely a balance across those three categories of investors and, as aconsequence, capital markets become vulnerable to the behaviour of the dominant class ofinvestors. For example, in times of capital flight by foreign investors (as a result of an exogenous
event) and in some cases by domestic retail investors (as a result of major changes in market
sentiment), the presence of strong domestic institutional investors with a predominantly domestic
investment mandate can play a key role in acting as a ―buffer‖ against severe price declines.
B. Addressing Market Illiquidity
62.
Market illiquidity remains a chronic problem in many EMDEs, and has aconsequential impact on the stability of the overall financial system. Thin and shallow
markets can also give rise to higher instances of market manipulation. Market illiquidity in
EMDEs mostly emanates from insufficient breadth in the investor base and other structuralproblems such as, for example, high concentration of ownership resulting in limited free float aswell as a lack of diverse products and participants. The low tolerance for risk, insufficient
diversity in investment strategies, a lack of market makers, relatively high friction costs andlimited channels for electronic trading are also causes of market illiquidity in EMDEs. The lackof adequate hedging markets also poses challenges to increasing liquidity and connectivity
between different market segments and asset classes. In addition, liquidity inflows to EMDEs are
generally cyclical in nature and driven largely by volatile capital inflows, which are susceptible
to sudden reversal in times of crisis.
C. Ensuring Robust Market Infrastructure63.
During the peak of the global financial crisis, a number of EMDEs implemented
measures to restrict financial market trading that sometimes proved to be
counterproductive. Examples included imposing limits on price declines or even closing down
domestic equity markets for several days.40 Halting operations in the context of well-defined,
transparent procedures provides market participants an opportunity to pause and assess market
conditions during significant market declines. However, when this is done in an unexpected40

For example, Indonesia closed its market for three days following the drastic fall of its index in October 2008; inRomania, two market closures were imposed in October 2008 due to increased market volatility and a significant
drop in the index; in Peru, three market closures were imposed at around the same period; Kuwait closed its market
for two days in November 2008, following a court order to protect investors from further losses after the bourse's
main index slid to the lowest point since July 2005; and Russia closed its market for four consecutive days in
September 2008, and four consecutive days in October 2008 due to extreme market volatility.

32
manner, these interventions can be destabilizing since investors seek more liquidity and begin
selling other assets. It is therefore important that market interventions in EMDEs are structured,transparent and systematic in order to mitigate potential systemic risk and maintain orderliness inthe market. The smooth functioning of domestic capital markets is critical to investor confidence,and their ability to continuously trade is important in times of severe market stress.
64.
The single market infrastructure framework common in many EMDEs gives rise toconcentration risks as well as clearing and settlement risks. Market infrastructure in many
EMDE capital markets generally lack substitutes and operate on a single vertical exchange
model as competition may be difficult to instill or maintain due to economies of scale. In
contrast, clearing and settlement in more developed economies may often occur in several
venues. Additionally, in many EMDEs, there is a high concentration of settlement banks which
can potentially affect financial stability should these banks fail and be unable to settle trades orquickly transfer the business, resulting in operational risk and potentially systemic failure. Past
experiences, such as the 1987 Hong Kong crash, have highlighted that, in order to manage risk in
the financial system, the regulation of central counterparties is imperative for market authorities
and regulators. However, many EMDEs do not yet subject the operation of clearing andsettlement services to inspection and periodic review and stress testing.
D. Recommendations
65.
EMDEs should promote the development of a domestic institutional and retailinvestor base. Institutional and retail investors play an increasingly important role in supportingthe capital formation process, and can act as a ―buffer‖ against severe price declines in times ofcapital flight. Being highly specialized and having substantial capital, institutional investors canalso foster more institutionally-based shareholder activism and encourage stronger corporate
governance. Ways to promote a diverse and deep pool of such investors include the mobilisationof savings through licensed collective investment schemes,41 the development of private
retirement schemes as an alternative investment vehicle, and greater investor education. IOSCO
is currently undertaking work to develop suitable recommendations in this area.
66.
EMDEs could also take measures to deepen market liquidity and to promote the useof shared market infrastructures. In addition to ensuring a sound macroeconomic
environment, EMDEs could take measures to promote liquidity in both government andcorporate debt markets as well as in equity markets. Government debt markets are essential tobuild a risk-free yield curve that would serve as a reference for other financial products and41

In some EMDEs, the setting-up of a national mutual fund can play a key role by building investor confidence andfamiliarity. National mutual funds facilitate the participation of a wider cross-section of the population, promote
diversification of risk and the hedging of financial portfolios and can become an important institutional investor
vehicle. This was, for example, the approach taken in Mauritius where the National Mutual Fund Ltd wasestablished as a joint venture between local private insurance companies and some government-controlled
companies in an attempt to encourage a strong domestic institutional investor base.

33
support liquidity in other markets, including the development of liquidity and risk management
instruments by financial institutions. Those markets are also essential for efficient monetary
policy and fiscal management in moments of stress. On the equity side, EMDEs could encourage
the divestment of state and family holdings to increase the free float of shares and liberalize
foreign equity limits to new investments. They could allow a wider range of services andproducts to be offered across all of these markets by, for example, introducing market making
facilities, full service and discount brokers, and arbitrage traders. There is also a need tostrengthen mechanisms to increase market connectivity that will facilitate greater access tointernational liquidity pools such as through direct market access. In that context, it is importantto recognize that smaller EMDEs face significant challenges in enhancing liquidity in, as well as
in building infrastructures for, their domestic capital markets. In such cases, regional initiatives
such as the recent integration of the Santiago, Lima, and Bogota stock exchanges in Latin
America, the plan to integrate capital markets in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) by 2015 (see Box 6 in Annex III), and the establishment of the Asian Bond Market
Initiative and the Asian Bond Fund (see Box 7 in Annex III) - would be alternative ways toachieve economies of scale in securities market infrastructures and to attract foreign investors.
67.
Dealing with severe price volatility requires a structured, transparent and widely
understood approach for market intervention. EMDE regulators need to consider the
introduction of various robust intervention tools (e.g., market-wide circuit breakers, trading halts,
price limits, etc.) as a means of providing market participants an opportunity to pause and assessmarket conditions during significant market declines. However, such market intervention
measures should have clear rules and parameters. This is particularly important for discretionary
market interventions, especially market closures, which may have the most severe impact andreputational damage on EMDE markets. This will also ensure that markets are notindiscriminately closed under political or stakeholder pressures. It is crucial to apply suchmeasures consistently across all exchanges and/or markets to prevent regulatory arbitrage. For
example, a recent survey of EMDEs42 shows less than half the markets halt trading in derivatives
when the underlying stock is halted. It is critical therefore for EMDE regulators to ensure thatrules on interventions aimed to ensure the stability and integrity of markets are consistent acrossall exchanges and/or markets.
68.
The robustness of the infrastructure for clearing and settlement systems should beassessed. Securities regulators, or other authorities as necessary, in EMDEs need to implement
periodic stress-testing of clearing and settlement systems. These tests should include assessmentsof the reliability and scalability of the system to handle stress volume, concentrated exposures,
and appropriate contingency plans to handle system interruption. This can be further
complemented by reviews of risk management procedures, back-up and information recovery ofthese systems to allow for timely recovery of operations and completion of the settlement
42

See report on ―Effectiveness of Market Interventions in Emerging Markets‖ by the Emerging Markets Committeeof the IOSCO (October 2010, available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD333.pdf).

34
process. Moreover, it is critical that the robustness of the clearing participants be monitored on aregular basis, with special attention given to the adequacy of the collateral at the clearing houseand the counterparty exposures and financial conditions of settlement banks. Finally, EMDEs
should review closely the governance and conflict management arrangements to ensure thatsufficient resources are devoted to maintaining the robustness of trading, clearing and settlement
platforms.
69.
Regulatory capacity could be enhanced through an explicit mandate to monitor
systemic risk by securities regulators in coordination with other relevant bodies. In many
EMDEs and AEs, the role of securities regulators in contributing to the identification andmanagement of systemic risk is not well understood and defined. Appropriate regulatory reforms
or revisions to their mandate may be required to provide clarity in their roles and relationshipwith prudential regulators with regards to systemic risk. While securities regulators do not havetools to provide markets with liquidity in times of crisis, nor do they have direct supervision overbanks and the payment system, they do have direct authority and a regulatory toolkit forsupervision of a wide cross-section of market participants (especially in terms of their businessconduct) and of exchange-traded market infrastructures. Appropriate processes could therefore
be developed, and existing securities laws amended within EMDEs, to promote systemic stability
by formalising the securities regulator‘s role in monitoring, mitigating and managing systemicrisk in capital markets in coordination with other relevant bodies and within the existing
regulatory structures.43 The relevant international standard setters could assist in the formulationand operationalization of an appropriate systemic risk framework for this purpose.
VII.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

70.
The recommendations to strengthen financial stability in EMDEs reflect the wide
diversity of financial systems in these countries. There is a continuum that ranges from large,
sophisticated and internationally integrated countries with relatively deep and liquid capital
markets, to small, low-income countries with bank-dominated financial systems that are not wellintegrated with international financial markets. This heterogeneity implies that, while thefinancial stability issues in this report are relevant for a broad range of EMDEs, their relative
importance and cost-benefit trade-off differ widely across countries or even for the same country
over time.
71.
Many financial stability issues arise from underlying structural features of EMDEs.
Some structural features may enhance financial stability (e.g., greater reliance by banks on stablecustomer deposits rather than on wholesale funding), while others may be sources of systemic
43

See discussion paper ― Mitigating Systemic Risk A Role for Securities Regulators‖ by the Technical Committeeof the IOSCO (February 2011, available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD347.pdf), which
addresses the role that securities regulators play in promoting financial system stability. The paper notes that
promoting financial stability is a shared responsibility amongst the regulatory community and that it will require
strong coordination between securities regulators, central banks and prudential regulators in both EMDEs and AEs.

35
risk. For example, a reliance on foreign capital leaves EMDEs vulnerable to external shocks,
while scarce resources and weaker institutional frameworks imply that supervisory capacity
constraints are important. A small (but growing) domestic savings pool and the predominance ofsmall, family-owned firms in most EMDEs constrain the rapid development of capital markets.
Addressing these financial stability issues cannot therefore be separated completely fromaddressing broader structural features of the economy.
72.
Financial stability is closely linked to financial development. Several of therecommendations in this report call for improvements in institutional and market infrastructures.
In that sense, steps to promote financial development in EMDEs (if well-sequenced) can also
support financial stability. At the same time, it is important to ensure that regulatory andsupervisory frameworks and financial sector policies not only support but also keep up withmarket development in order to avoid the creation of new sources of financial instability.
73.

There are various measures that EMDEs can take to enhance financial stability:

Improving the effectiveness of supervision is still a critical issue for many EMDEs. Thisrequires greater resources and capacity, strengthened legal frameworks, and bettersupervision of financial groups. Supervisors in EMDEs need better legal protection for
their official actions and greater financial and operational independence.



National authorities in EMDEs should consider adjusting their regulatory and supervisory
frameworks to reflect the growth in, and the risks arising from, small-scale non-banklending and deposit-taking institutions. While a ―one size fits all‖ solution is not
appropriate given the diversity of these institutions, it is no longer advisable to allow
these institutions to continue growing outside a proper regulatory and supervisory
framework. Data collection, reporting and disclosure requirements for this sector alsoneed to be improved.



EMDEs could benefit from strengthening the management of foreign exchange risks.
Steps in this area include enhancing supervisory tools and the capacity to monitor thebuild-up of these risks at an early stage, and developing short-term local currency money
and government securities markets and instruments to hedge currency mismatches.



EMDEs should promote the development of a domestic investor base and take measures
at both national and regional levels to deepen capital market liquidity. They should also
ensure the robustness of the infrastructure for clearing and settlement systems.

74.
At the same time, the international community can play an important facilitatingrole to help EMDEs address these issues:

The international community should send a clear and consistent message on theappropriate pace of adoption of the Basel II/III framework in EMDEs. The morefinancially-integrated EMDEs—especially those that belong to the G20/FSB andparticipated in the development of this framework—should adopt the framework
according to the agreed timetable. Other countries, with less internationally integrated

36
financial systems and/or with substantial supervisory capacity constraints, should first
focus on reforms to ensure compliance with the Basel Core Principles and only move tothe more advanced capital standards at a pace tailored to their circumstances.


The international community should continue to promote the further development ofsupervisory capacity in EMDEs through targeted and well-coordinated technicalassistance and other capacity building activities. In addition, the BCBS, IAIS andIOSCO, with input from the IMF and World Bank, should take stock of the range ofpractices on resources and capacity—including on staffing and skill levels, training
certification programs, and financing options—and identify good practices to strengthensupervisory authorities in EMDEs.

Home supervisors for large international banks should provide host supervisors,particularly when those banks are systemically important in the host jurisdiction, withtimely, accurate and comprehensive information on the parent bank via supervisory
colleges and crisis management groups and/or via enhanced bilateral relationships. Suchinformation sharing should be underpinned by appropriate legal agreements andconfidentiality safeguards where necessary. As part of its reporting to the FSB in 2012 on
the functioning of supervisory colleges, the BCBS should report on the adequacy ofmembership and information sharing arrangements in such colleges from the perspectiveof host authorities.



The IOSCO and IAIS should work with EMDEs to promote adoption of multilateralarrangements, such as the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding, to facilitate
cooperation and information exchange in the securities and insurance sectors.



The BCBS should provide guidance on: (1) the application of new measures included inBasel III—such as capital buffers, leverage ratio, and liquidity requirements—to EMDEs
that do not intend to adopt the advanced approaches of Basel II; and (2) the steps that
EMDE supervisors can take to monitor and address the buildup of FX risks, including
both direct FX risk as well as the credit risk arising from borrowers‘ FX exposures. The
BCBS should also take stock of the range of practices on supervisory approaches,
prudential regulations and data reporting and disclosure requirements for different typesof small-scale non-bank lending and deposit-taking institutions in EMDEs.



The Joint Forum, in updating the Principles for the Supervision of Financial
Conglomerates, should develop additional guidance in EMDEs to assist with theidentification and control of the risks arising from financial conglomerates, particularly
those that belong to mixed-activity economic groups.



The IOSCO should provide guidance to securities regulators in EMDEs on ways topromote the development of a domestic institutional and retail investor base.

37
The BCBS, IAIS and IOSCO should report to the FSB on progress made in meeting theabove recommendations by end-2012. The IMF and the World Bank should continue toassess the progress made by EMDEs in enhancing their financial stability frameworks.

75.
There is a need to continue to bring issues of relevance for EMDEs to the attentionof the international community. The IMF and the World Bank, as well as the FSB including
through the establishment of its regional consultative groups, have an important role to play inthat regard. In addition, international bodies should take into account EMDE-specificconsiderations and concerns in designing new international financial standards and policies.

38
ANNEX I. CHARACTERISTICS OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN EMDES
76.
EMDEs comprise a large and diverse group of financial systems. Altogether,150 economies are classified as EMDEs (Table 1).44 There is substantial differentiation among
EMDEs in terms of economic size, level of development, geography, legal and institutionalframework, and many other factors that affect financial systems. In analyzing financial stability
issues in EMDEs, it is crucial to understand common trends as well as differences and the factors
driving them.
77.
Several characteristics appear particularly relevant for understanding the prevalentfinancial stability issues in EMDEs. The developing nature of their financial systems isreflected in their relatively small overall size, lower complexity, a dominant role of banks and a
relatively small role of nonbank financial institutions, thin capital markets, and greater
challenges in providing broad access to finance. Other prevalent (although not universal) features
include financial dollarization, importance of foreign capital, weaker institutional frameworks
and market infrastructures, important supervisory capacity constraints, and a relatively greater
involvement of the state in the financial system. However, many of these characteristics vary as
much across EMDEs as between EMDEs and AEs.
A. Structure of EMDE Financial Systems
78.
Financial systems in EMDEs have grown in relative importance in the last decade.
Over the last 10 years, financial systems in EMDEs have grown substantially vis-à-vis those indeveloped countries. Available data indicate that private sector credit in EMDEs has increased
by a factor of three between end-2000 and end-2009, compared to a doubling in AEs over thesame period. Correspondingly, EMDE banking systems have grown from about 19 percent of the
global banking system at end-2000 to about 27 percent at end-2009. Similarly, insurancecompany assets in EMDEs have grown from about 12 percent to about 20 percent of global
insurance sector assets.
79.
The EMDE financial systems tend to be smaller and less complex than theiradvanced economy counterparts. The smaller size is manifested both in absolute terms (e.g., asapproximated by total assets, private credit, or capital in dollars) and in relative terms (e.g., as aratio of total assets, private credit, or capital in relation to gross domestic product/GDP). For
example, the median ratio of private credit to GDP in EMDEs is about 20 percent, compared toabout 60 percent in advanced economies (Figure 1), although there are large differences acrossregions. The lower complexity is reflected, for example, in the EMDEs‘ generally lower degreeof interconnectedness to the global financial system.45 It is also reflected in their substantially44

Of the nineteen countries that are G20 members, ten are EMDEs. The definition of the EMDEs follows the IMF‘s
World Economic Outlook (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/pdf/statapp.pdf).
45

Of the twenty-five jurisdictions identified as having ―the most systemically important financial sectors‖ based on
their size and interconnectedness, only six are EMDEs (http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/082710a.pdf).

39
lower exposures to financial derivatives, both on the asset side and on the liabilities side
(Table 2).
80.
One facet of the lower complexity is the larger role of banks in EMDEs. The share ofbanks in the overall financial system is higher than in AEs (Figure 2). In recent years, some
EMDEs have experienced rapid growth of non-bank financial institutions. These were often partof financial conglomerates and private pools of capital such as mutual funds. Nonetheless, banks
still dominate in most EMDE financial systems.
81.
Financial systems in EMDEs are relatively concentrated. In many EMDEs, several
large banks, often the center of financial conglomerates (and in some case of mixed-activity
economic groups), account for a large share of financial system assets. The issue ofconcentration is not unique to EMDEs (concentration in many AE financial systems is also
considerable) and it is not universal among them (there are some EMDEs with relatively low
concentration), but it is more prominent among EMDEs (Figure 2).46 To some extent, this greater
concentration of the financial system reflects the more concentrated nature of the economies
themselves. For example, some of the EMDE economies (especially some of the smaller, lower
income ones) are dependent on relatively few sectors or industries. This economic concentration
increases risks in the financial system. Financial system concentration creates challenges, forexample, for consolidated supervision and in controlling the build-up of systemic risks.
Moreover, in EMDEs where concentration in the regulated/traditional banking sector is
combined with underdevelopment and financial repression, the result is greater prominence of―shadow banking institutions‖ (such as financial companies and micro lenders).
82.
Related in part to the dominant role of banks, many EMDEs have relatively thincapital markets. The thinness of the markets, illustrated for example by the relatively lower
turnover in stock markets (Figure 3), is reflected in greater volatility. Volatility in other markets(such as the foreign exchange market and the bond market) also tends to be higher, exposing thedomestic financial system to potentially greater exchange rate and interest rate shocks. Other
markets, such as interbank markets, also tend to be thin as reflected, for example, in the highaverage bid-ask spreads in those markets (Table 2). These high spreads are usually attributed toperceptions of high counterparty risk, relatively less stable macroeconomic environment, and insome cases a limited supply of acceptable collateral. The thinness of markets and high spreads
often lead to greater price volatility as well as challenges for monetary policy (the absence of theshort-term money market makes it difficult to facilitate the conduct and transmission ofmonetary policy), lender of last resort facilities, and systemic liquidity assistance. Moreover, theabsence of hedging markets creates challenges for the management of foreign exchange risks. To
some extent, the thin capital markets are the flip side of the dominant role of banks: in general,the more concentrated the banking system, the thinner the capital markets.
46

High concentration does not necessarily mean a small number of institutions. Many EMDEs also have a relatively
large number of small institutions, challenging supervisory resources further.

40
B. Performance of EMDE Financial Systems
83.
Comparing the financial soundness indicators of EMDEs and advanced economies
is challenging. A comparison of basic indicators suggests that, on average, EMDEs tend to haveslightly higher capitalization, higher nonperforming loan ratios, higher deposit-to-loan ratios,
higher shares of loans to the domestic economy (and residents), and higher profitability(Table 2).47 On aggregate, these differences seem to broadly offset each other: while risk
variables (e.g., volatility of bank returns) appear somewhat higher on average in EMDEs, thebuffers (average capitalization and average returns) appear somewhat higher.48 These differences
between the two groups are small relative to the differentiation among individual EMDEs in thetwo groups (epitomized by the regional differences, highlighted in Table 3).
84.
The comparison of financial soundness indicators also points to lower levels of
exposure to the household sector. One of the financial soundness variables that stands out inTable 2 is EMDEs‘ much lower level of household debt to GDP. Corresponding to this are
EMDE banks‘ lower exposures to residential real estate (Table 2). In turn, this may be a functionof (i) a relatively lower portion of households receiving regular salaries; (ii) more severe
information asymmetries in EMDEs; (iii) deficiencies in risk management and the institutionalframework supporting the financial sector (including bankruptcy laws, land registration, andcollateral rules); and (iv) the underlying economic structure, with an increasing part of the
population only now moving to the middle class and being able to afford the purchase of a home.
Indeed, some EMDEs that went through expansion in household lending over the last decade
subsequently saw a notable deterioration in performance, reflecting infrastructure weaknesses.
85.
Another relevant feature of the EMDE banking systems is high lending-deposit
spreads. The average spreads between lending and deposit rates in EMDEs are significantly
higher than in AEs (Table 2). Studies show that these higher spreads can be attributed to thestructure (e.g., the higher concentration in the system), performance (e.g., lower competition),
and weaknesses in the underlying infrastructure (e.g., credit bureaus, collateral recovery
regimes).
86.
In many EMDEs, the developing nature of their financial systems is reflected in amore limited access to finance. These challenges are manifested in lower degrees of penetrationof the population by financial institutions‘ branches (Figure 4) and client accounts, as well as
lower penetration by insurance and other non-bank financial services. The difficulties in accessare especially significant for households and small and medium enterprises, and they tend to be

47

A caveat to be mentioned here is that the quality of financial statements may be lower in some EMDEs relative toadvanced economies, with capital and earnings being possibly overstated.
48

The so-called z-score, which combines volatility of returns with the corresponding buffers, and has become apopular summary measure of soundness, is not significantly different in EMDE banks relative to their advanced
economy counterparts.

41
more pronounced in low-income EMDEs. Related to these challenges is also relatively lower
reach of the payments system.
C. Foreign Capital and Financial Dollarization
87.
Cross-border capital flows, and their volatility, play an important role in EMDEs;
an important element of this is a high degree of foreign ownership. In many EMDEs,
foreign-owned financial institutions account for a high share of financial system assets(Figure 5), and often are systemic in view of their size or interconnectedness. Foreign financial
institutions may be more resilient to local shocks given greater overall diversification and accessto additional resources at the parent financial institution. However, from a financial stability
perspective, there have also been concerns among some host-country supervisors in EMDEs thatdifficulties in the parent bank could lead to rapid capital outflows and spread to the host country
banking system. This, in turn, underscores the importance of effective cross-border supervisory
cooperation. It also implies that important trade-offs will need to be made as countries decide onwhether foreign banks should enter as branches or subsidiaries.49
88.
Another important feature of many EMDEs is financial dollarization. In a number
of EMDEs, a significant share of financial transactions is denominated in foreign currency(Figure 6). This feature is not universal, but it is a key issue in certain regions, for example in
Latin America and CEE. High levels of financial dollarization, which may be partly due to areliance on external sources of funding, can accentuate the financial system‘s vulnerability to
exchange rate fluctuations through currency mismatches. Such mismatches occur not only
directly in the financial system but also in its non-financial counterparts (e.g., corporate
borrowers), and could manifest themselves as credit exposures. Financial dollarization can alsointerfere with the transmission of monetary policy and complicate management of financial
safety nets. At the same time, it may reflect a lack of confidence in economic management (e.g.,monetary policy), which also hampers financial sector development and contributes to the buildup of vulnerabilities.50

49

For more information, see ―Subsidiaries or Branches: Does One Size Fit All?‖ by J. Fiechter et al. (IMF Staff
Discussion Note 11/04, March 2011, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1104.pdf).
50

Financial dollarization is the extreme form of limited use of domestic currency in financial transactions. Other
intermediate problems also exist, especially the difficulty that governments and firms have in issuing short and longterm debt in domestic and foreign capital markets.

42
D. Institutional Frameworks and Capacity Constraints
89.
Available data suggest that EMDEs have relatively weaker institutionalframeworks.51 This is illustrated, for example, by the indices approximating the quality of thefinancial sector regulatory framework (Table 3). It is brought up also by the Reports on the
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) assessments undertaken in recent years by the IMF
and the World Bank, mostly in the context of the FSAP. These assessments also tend to indicate
relatively lower levels of compliance with international standards in EMDEs. Across the threemajor assessment areas (banking, insurance, and securities regulation), advanced economies tend
to have higher levels of compliance than EMDEs, with the difference in compliance levels being
bigger between high-income and medium-income economies than between medium-income andlow-income economies.52 The assessments also suggest weaknesses in market and financial
infrastructure.53
90.
In many EMDEs, especially the smaller and less developed ones, institutional
weaknesses reflect important capacity constraints. FSAP assessments for EMDEs tend topoint out capacity constraints both in the regulatory and supervisory framework (e.g., shortagesof well-trained staff in supervisory agencies) as well as in financial institutions (e.g., weak risk
management capacity). Capacity constraints are particularly binding in many smaller, lowerincome EMDEs and are accentuated by the salaries in the public sector, which tend to berelatively lower vis-à-vis the domestic private sector.
91.
The role of the state in the economy tends to be greater in EMDEs than in AEs. In
particular, direct state ownership in banks tends to be higher in EMDEs (Figure 5). There is widecross-country differentiation, with some major EMDE financial systems dominated by majority
state-owned banks, and with others having virtually no such institutions (Figure 7). Examples ofmajor EMDEs where the state plays an important role in finance include Brazil, Russia, India,
and China. Beyond direct ownership, the state is also involved via credit ceilings, guarantees,
subsidies, and—in some EMDEs—interest rate limits. The state also tends to be a relatively large
debtor, and sometimes creditor, to the financial system in several EMDEs.
92.
The differences in institutional frameworks needs to be taken in context. First, there
are important cross-country differences within these wide country groupings, with some EMDEs(e.g., small, low-income countries) facing important constraints and tradeoffs, while others (e.g.,larger, medium-income countries) having relatively sophisticated institutional frameworks.
51

More generally, EMDEs tend to score less favorably in terms of broader indexes of institutional strength, such as
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp).
52

For a detailed analysis of the compliance rankings, see ―Quality of Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision
Around the World‖ by M. Čihák and A. Tieman (August 2008, IMF Working Paper No. 08/190, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08190.pdf).
53

For the methodology and the published assessments, see http://www.imf.org/external/standards/index.htm.

43Second, EMDE financial systems tend to be less complex than those in advanced economies,
limiting to some extent the adverse impact of the institutional weaknesses. Indeed, the global
financial crisis illustrated that even countries with advanced institutional frameworks can face
major financial difficulties when financial institutions and products become too complex and thecomplexity is not matched by the quality of the framework. Third, the available data do not yet
capture the impact of reforms in institutional frameworks in EMDEs as well as in developed
economies in response to the global financial crisis (indeed, many of these reforms are stillongoing, so a full evaluation would be premature).
93.
Another important structural characteristic of EMDEs is the prominence of familyowned enterprises. Both the structure of the corporate sector (dominance of small and mediumsized firms) as well as the dearth of public capital sources (at least until recently) are explanatory
factors. This makes the establishment of corporate governance standards and the strengthening ofminority investor rights for companies that wish to raise funds from public markets of particularimportance to EMDEs.
E. Recent Trends
94.
Recent experience, both during the global financial crisis and in its aftermath, has
highlighted the relative robustness of the financial systems of many EMDEs. One of themost pronounced features of the post-crisis environment thus far has been the two-speed
recovery—modest in advanced economies and robust in EMDEs.
95.
Underlying this macro resilience are improvements in financial system resilience of
EMDEs. One can point to some visible successes, such as increased capital and liquidity buffers
as well as strengthened asset classification standards and exposure limits, in many EMDEs. Also,
there was a substantial improvement in most EMDEs in important parts of their financial
infrastructure as illustrated, for example, by the growing reach of credit registries (Figure 8).
There has also been some (albeit slow) progress in strengthening underlying legal frameworks,
although there are substantial differences among countries (Figure 9).
96.
In response to the global financial crisis, policy makers around the world, including
in EMDEs, took measures to ease the perceived credit crunch and kick-start lending.
EMDEs that were less financially integrated (such as in Sub-Saharan Africa) or that had stronger
macroeconomic and financial system fundamentals (such as those in Latin America) havegenerally been less affected by the crisis. Some emerging economies—particularly in CEE andparts of the Middle East and East Asia—have attempted to match developed countries by
increasing deposit insurance coverage and introducing blanket guarantees to prevent capitaloutflows or destabilizing bank runs. A few countries have introduced selective controls on
capital outflows. Capital support has focused mostly on expanding the equity base of stateowned banks as a way to increase lending (these banks played an important counter-cyclical role
during the crisis in some EMDEs), as a preemptive measure, or as a means to assist troubled
financial institutions. There have been relatively few instances of banking system-wide problems

44
due to a significant accumulation of nonperforming loans. In many EMDEs, the crisis has
manifested itself mainly through terms-of-trade and investment (rather than financial) links,
including drops in commodity prices, remittances, and foreign direct investment. The pressures
were particularly severe for countries that relied on capital inflows to expand economic activity
and domestic financing. Finally, deleveraging around the world is leading to the crowding out ofriskier borrowers, particularly small and medium-size enterprises. Thus, many EMDEs haveadopted a range of measures—including unconventional ones—to avoid a credit crunch andkick-start lending.
97.
The global financial crisis has also triggered some improvements in policy
frameworks for financial stability. These include the introduction of new tools and frameworks
for macroprudential policy. For example, many EMDEs have recently set up new organizations
or councils tasked with ensuring financial stability. It would be, however, too early at this point
to evaluate the impact of these reforms, given that many of them are ongoing.
98.
Capital inflows to emerging markets have rebounded but remain volatile. While
inflows are not yet excessive in most markets, closing output gaps and rising inflation complicate
policy responses. There are pockets of rising corporate leverage and evidence that weaker firms
are accessing capital markets, making corporate balance sheets vulnerable to external shocks.
99.
In the post-crisis environment, emerging market economies are facing newchallenges associated with strong domestic demand, rapid credit growth, relatively
accommodative macroeconomic policies, and large capital inflows. Some regions, including
East Asia, have experienced rapid credit growth (Figure 10). Their main macro-financial
challenge is to limit overheating and a buildup of vulnerabilities. Emerging market economies
have continued to benefit from strong growth relative to that in advanced economies,
accompanied by increasing portfolio capital inflows. This is putting pressure on some financial
markets, contributing to higher leverage, potential asset price bubbles, and inflation. It will
therefore be important to contain the buildup of macrofinancial risks to avoid future problems
that could inhibit their growth and damage financial stability. In many EMDEs, this will entail atighter macroeconomic policy stance, and, when needed, the use of macroprudential tools as wellas improvements in microprudential supervisory oversight and risk management capacity toensure financial stability. Increasing the financial sector‘s capacity to absorb higher flows
through efforts to broaden and deepen local capital markets will also help.

45
Table 1. Emerging Markets and Developing Economies, 2011

Numbers of Jurisdictions
Total

Included in
WDR data

of which:
EMDEs
Advanced

213

150

63

South Asia

8

8

0

Europe & Central Asia

58

27

31

Middle East & North Africa

21

18

3

East Asia & Pacific

36

19

17

Latin America & Caribbean

39

32

7

Sub-Saharan Africa

48

46

2

North America

3

0

3

19

10

9

140

54

of which (by region):of which (by G-20 membership):
G-20 members

Not in G-20
194
Source: World Bank (World Development Report).

Table 2. Financial Soundness Indicators, end-2009(percent, unless indicated otherwise)
EMDEs
Advanced
Average St.Dev. Average St.Dev.
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets
17.0
3.2
14.0
2.3
Regulatory Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets
14.1
3.2
11.5
2.1
Capital to assets
10.6
3.0
6.2
2.3
Nonperforming loans to total gross loans
5.3
3.8
4.0
2.9
Customer deposits to total (noninterbank) loans
101.8
57.5
94.5
27.7
Loans to residents (as percent of total loans)
91.2
12.0
72.7
21.1
Loans to domestic economy (as percent of total loans)
84.6
16.6
65.0
19.3
Foreign-currency-denominated loans to total loans
46.5
29.6
21.1
15.5
Foreign-currency-denominated liabilities to total liabilities
47.2
28.3
23.7
17.7
Return on assets
1.1
1.5
0.5
0.6
Return on equity
9.5
15.2
7.4
11.1
Gross asset position in financial derivatives to capital
33.2
69.6
222.1
279.9
Gross liability position in financial derivatives to capital
33.4
68.9
228.1
281.7
Spread btw reference lending and deposit rates (bp)
611.5
299.2
321.5
99.6
Spread between highest and lowest interbank rates (bp)
536.3
637.3
41.7
61.7
Nonfinancial corporations: total debt to equity
153.3
87.7
119.9
58.4
Household debt to GDP
22.7
9.2
89.8
42.5
Residential real estate loans to total loans
15.9
10.1
27.8
12.3
Commercial real estate loans to total loans
10.2
9.0
10.8
8.1
Source: IMF Financial Soundness Indicators database; IMF staff calculations.

46

Table 3. Financial Soundness Indicators, end-2009(in percent, unless indicated otherwise)
EMDEs by selected regions (averages)
Europe & Lat. Am. & Middle East South East Asia
Cen. Asia Caribbean & N. Africa Asia
& Pacific
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets
15.7
16.9
15.7
19.5
16.3
Regulatory Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets
12.9
14.1
10.7
16.2
13.3
Capital to assets
9.9
10.7
…
11.3
10.1
Nonperforming loans to total gross loans
7.2
2.7
8.3
3.5
2.5
Customer deposits to total (noninterbank) loans
64.2
97.4
…
180.5
142.1
Loans to residents (as percent of total loans)
85.0
87.5
…
97.1
92.6
Loans to domestic economy (as percent of total loans)
75.2
82.2
…
…
94.6
Foreign-currency-denominated loans to total loans
50.5
40.7
…
69.1
15.6
Foreign-currency-denominated liabilities to total liabilities
45.7
45.0
…
53.3
16.5
Return on assets
0.2
1.8
1.2
0.8
1.7
Return on equity
0.6
16.5
11.5
8.1
18.9
Gross asset position in financial derivatives to capital
6.2
39.7
…
…
2.2
Gross liability position in financial derivatives to capital
6.8
39.8
…
…
1.4

Sources: IMF Financial Soundness Indicators database, Global Financial Stability Report.

Table 4. Quality of Financial Sector Regulatory Framework, 2008
EMDEs

Advanced

Average

St.Dev.

Average

St.Dev.

Index of financial reform

9.5

5.8

15.5

5.1

Banking supervision

0.6

0.8

1.5

1.1

Credit controls

1.5

1.1

2.3

1.0

Directed credit

1.5

1.1

2.2

1.0

Entry barriers

1.8

1.2

2.3

1.0

Credit ceilings

0.6

0.5

0.8

0.4

Source: IMF Financial Reforms database.

47

Cummulative distribution acrosscountries (percent of all countries)

Figure 1. Financial Sector Size Across Countries, 2009 (or Latest Data)
100
90

90

99

95

99

95

90

80

75

70

75

60

50

50

EMDEs

50

Advanced economies

40
30
25

20
10

10
5
1

0
0

25

5

10
50

100

150

200

250

Private credit to GDP (percent)
Source: World Bank Financial Structure database.

Figure 2. Financial Sector Structure, 2009 (or Latest Data)

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Concentration (assets of top 3 banks as percent of
total financial assets)

percent

percent

Banks' share in total financial institutions' assets(percent )EMDEs

Advanced

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

EMDEs

Advanced

Source: IMF Financial Soundness Indicators database. Source: IMF Financial Soundness Indicators database.

48

Cummulative Distribution AcrossCountries (percent of all countries)

Figure 3. Stock Market Turnover, 2009 (or Latest Data)
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

95

90

75

95

90

99

99

75

50

50

EMDEs

Advanced economies
25

25

10
5
1
0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Stock Market Turnover Ratio (Value Traded/Capitalization)
Source: Standard & Poor’s (World Development Indicators).

Cummulative Distribution AcrossCountries (% of all countries)

Figure 4. Financial Access: Branches, 2009 (or Latest Data)

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

90

95

90

75

99

95

75
50

EMDEs

50

Advanced economies
25

25

10
10
5
1
0
10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Number of Branches Per 100,000 Adults, Commercial Banks
Source: IMF's Access database.

80

90

49
Figure 5. Foreign and State-Owned Banks, 2009 (or Latest Data)

share in total banking assets(%)

90

majority foreign-owned
majority state-owned

80
70

60
50
40

30
20
10

0

EMDEs

Advanced

Sources: World Bank Banking Regulation and Supervision database.

Figure 6. Financial Dollarization, End-2009 (or Latest Data)% of total loans and liabilities,
respectively

80
foreign currency denominated loans
foreign currency denominated liabilities

70

60
50
40

30
20

10
0
EMDEs

Source: IMF Financial Soundness Indicators database.

Advanced50% of total banking sector assets

Figure 7. Bank Ownership in Selected EMDEs, 2009 (or Latest Data) 1/
100%
90%
80%

Foreign

70%
60%

Private domestic

50%
State

40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

MexicoPolandBrazilRussia

India

China

Source: BankScope, individual banks, country authorities.
1/ Defined according to majority on ownership.

Figure 8. Credit Information Sharing in EMDEs, 2005–11

percent of adults covered

50%
45%

Public registries

40%

Private bureaus

35%
30%
25%

20%
15%
10%
5%
%
2005

2006

2007

2008

Source: World Bank Group’s Doing Business Indicators.

2009

2010

2011

51
Figure 9. Legal Rights, EMDEs, 2005–11
10strength of legal rights index(0 to 10)

9
8
7

6
5
4

3
2

1
0
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Source: World Bank Group’s Doing Business Indicators.

Figure 10. Private Credit to GDP in EMDEs, 2000–09
80

Private credit / GPD

70

60
50

40
30

20
East Asia & Pacific
Latin America & Caribbean

10

Europe & Central Asia
Middle East & North Africa

0
2000

2001

2002

2003

Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

52
ANNEX II. COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR FINANCIAL SUPERVISION
100. This section provides details regarding the findings from 58 assessments completed
by the IMF (Fund) and the World Bank (Bank) since 2006 in the areas of banking,insurance, and securities regulation and supervision in EMDEs. Specifically, the analysis
includes forty-two BCP assessments54; seven IAIS assessments; and nine IOSCO assessments.
Experience with BCP Assessments
101. The BCP findings are based on assessments using the revised principles andmethodology promulgated by the BCBS in October 2006. Initially formulated in 1997, theprinciples set forth the minimum standards for sound practices in banking supervision, whichhave been used by the IMF and World Bank to assess banking supervision in the context of the
FSAP and the ROSCs. A strong and effective framework of banking supervision, as reflected inhigh compliance with these standards, helps lay the foundation for financial stability.55
102. The banking supervisory systems in all EMDEs exhibit a high degree of compliancein most areas. The majority of EMDEs (over 60 percent) are compliant with 75 percent of theprinciples.56 Moreover, over 80 percent of the EMDEs are compliant with 40 percent of theprinciples. The areas of higher compliance (over 80 percent of countries) include strongsupervisory accounting and reporting systems, supervisory techniques, licensing, capital
adequacy frameworks, policies to address problem assets and provisions; and proper
authorization for the conduct of banking activities (Table 5 and Figure 11).
103. The areas exhibiting a notable level of non-compliance are limited in EMDE
banking supervisory systems. These areas are risk management, consolidated supervision,
market risk and interest rate risk. However, EMDEs could strengthen their systems in a numberof areas.
104. It is difficult to compare the levels of compliance for EMDEs assessed after 2006 to
those of the AEs assessed after 2006 due to sample size. The sample size for AEs is only four,
so the ability to make any firm conclusions is limited. Nevertheless, the level of compliance forthis small group is also high with the majority of all countries (over 60 percent) compliant with
96 percent of the principles (Figure 12). EMDEs do appear to have higher compliance ratings forthree principles. Such areas that favor EMDEs relate to licensing (CP3), capital adequacy (CP6),and supervisory techniques (CP20).
54

The review includes countries that have been assessed between 2007 and 2010.

55

Periodic reviews of the BCP findings have been conducted and submitted to the IMF Board in 2000, 2002, 2004,
and 2008. The discussion in this paper focuses solely on EMDEs.
56

BCP ratings are compliant, largely compliant, materially non-compliant, and non compliant. For the purpose ofthis analysis, ―compliant‖ includes compliant and largely compliant and ―non-compliant‖ includes materially noncompliant and non-compliant.

53
105. An important weakness across the EMDE spectrum is consolidated supervision(CP24). In this regard, 57 percent of EMDEs are non-compliant in this area. Many constraints
may be present that would contribute to low levels of compliance. Legal constraints and lack of
information may limit the supervisor‘s surveillance capabilities; however, irregularities identifiedin cross-border financial groups could affect the stability of banks located in the home country
and supervisors need to have the powers, capacity, and determination to monitor cross-borderbasis and take appropriate actions, if necessary. Securing the ability to monitor non-banks in afinancial group is becoming more and more important, especially after the recent financial crisis.
Many of these issues also relate to cross-border cooperation and information exchange.
106. There appears to be a fairly even distribution of non-compliance for CP24 acrossincome baskets; however, distribution across regions varies (Table 6 and Figure 13). For
example, the range of non-compliance for income levels is between 50 percent and 58 percent
with the widest disparity between high and medium income levels. There is a wide disparity
among the various regions with the highest degree of non-compliance observed in the Western
Hemisphere region (86 percent) and the lowest degree of non-compliance observed in the Europe
region (45 percent).57
107. The level of non-compliance for exposure to related parties (CP 11) is considerable
for some regions. In the Middle East, Asia Pacific and Western Hemisphere regions, the noncompliance rate is about 40 percent. Related party lending is potential area of abuse which arises
from granting credit to non-arms-length and related parties including companies and individuals.
Major abuses have occurred in various countries that have subsequently led to crisis situations.
Consequently, it is important that banks grant credit to such parties on an arm‘s-length basis andthat the amount of credit granted is adequately monitored.
108. Another concern relates to the sound governance, adequate resources and sufficient
operational independence of the supervisor (CP 1.2). While 40 percent of countries overall
are materially compliant or non-compliant in this area, supervisory independence and resources
are an issue for most regions, with Asia Pacific and Western Hemisphere exhibiting at least a
50 percent noncompliance rate. Governments in many countries continue to interfere insupervisory matters and act as the ultimate decision maker for the conduct of supervision. In
addition, many supervisors are not adequately resourced or have the necessary skills to meet theincreasing demands placed on supervisors. This is apparent when evaluating the capacity related
to the development of supervisory processes for the various risk management areas.
109. Weaknesses in risk management practices (CP7) continue to be an issue. A key
lesson from the financial crisis is that banking organizations and their supervisors need to57

The sample sizes for the regions vary, which may distort the results somewhat. For example, Asia Pacific andWestern Hemisphere are each represented by seven countries; while the European and African regions are
represented by 11 and 12 countries, respectively. The Middle East is represented by five countries.

54
enhance the effectiveness of the risk-management systems. This holds true for all EMDEs where
45 percent of these countries are non-compliant in this area. However, the range of compliance ismore apparent across regions and income levels than observed for consolidated supervision. In
this respect, the degree of non-compliance ranges between 25 and 58 percent across income
levels and between 27 and 71 percent across regions. Western Hemisphere appears to have thelowest level of compliance while Europe appears to be stronger in this area.
110. A few notable differences across the EMDE regions exist with respect to certain
strengths and weaknesses in the countries’ supervisory systems. For example, one of the
major weaknesses observed in the African region relates to the framework supervisors haveestablished to pursue corrective and remedial actions against banks. Almost 67 percent ofcountries in this region are non-compliant in this area (CP23). This contrasts with other regions
where the degree of compliance is much higher.58 In some cases, the shortcomings in the African
region relate to absence of proper legal powers, but for others, the powers are provided for, but
are not being used effectively and supervisors are not proactive and forceful in taking timely
measures against a delinquent bank. The ability to act and the will to act are two pillars of goodsupervision.59
111. Another major weakness that is more pronounced in one region than the others
relates to operational risk (CP15). The degree of non-compliance for the Western Hemisphere
region was approximately 85 percent whereas for the other regions, the degree of compliance
ranges between approximately 60 and 90 percent. Many shortcomings derive from a shortage ofstaff and expertise as well as absence of regulations or formal policies. As a result, supervisors
may rely on internal and external auditors for assessing this risk, including IT risk, which is notin line with international best practice. The integrity of bank IT systems is a cornerstone ofoperational risk management under Basel II because banks rely on historical data for thedetermination of risk estimates. Additional staff and specialized training on these risks areneeded to effectively supervise these risks. In addition, operational risk is still an evolving risk
discipline and the Basel Committee recently issued a consultative paper on operational risk
which updates an earlier version discussing the sound practices for management and supervisionof operational risk. The principles outlined in the report are discussed within the context of threeoverarching themes: governance, risk management and disclosure.60

58

The degree of compliance for the other regions for CP23 ranges between 71 and 100 percent.

59

See ―The Making of Good Supervision: Learning to Say No‖ by J. Viñals, J. Fiechter et al (IMF Staff Position
Note 10/08, May 2010, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1008.pdf).
60

Operational risk is also part of the Basel II capital adequacy framework which is designed to take into accountchanges in bank and risk management practices.

55
Experience with IAIS Assessments
112. As an international standard-setting body, the IAIS plays an important role inpromoting financial stability in the insurance sector. Its membership includes insurance
regulators and supervisors from over 190 jurisdictions and contributes to an effective forum forstandard-setting and implementation activities by providing opportunities to share expertise,
experience and understanding.
113. The IAIS Insurance Core Principles (ICPs) provide a globally-accepted framework
for the supervision of the insurance sector. The existing 2003 IAIS ICPs are currently in the
final stage of revisions with the intent of adopting the complete set of 26 revised ICPs andcorresponding standards and guidance material in October 2011. These revisions reflect thechanging supervisory systems and practices and also incorporate FSB recommendations forenhanced supervision that are included in the report on Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFISupervision.
114. The ICPs apply to insurance supervision in all jurisdictions regardless of the level ofdevelopment or sophistication of the insurance markets and the type of insurance products
or services being supervised. It is recognized that supervisors will need to tailor certain
supervisory requirements and actions in accordance with the nature, scale and complexity of
individual insurers. In this regard, supervisors should have the flexibility to tailor supervisory
requirements and actions so that they are commensurate with the risks posed by individual
insurers as well as the potential risks posed by insurers to the insurance sector or the financial
system as a whole. This is provided for in the revised ICPs and standards where relevant.
115. The implementation of the ICPs and standards relevant to group-wide supervision
may vary across jurisdictions depending on the supervisory powers and structure within ajurisdiction. Regardless of the approach, the supervisor must be able to demonstrate that in
effect, the outcome is similar to having the supervisory requirements applied directly on thoseentities within the insurance group from which the risks are emanating. This is to ensure
effective group-wide supervision, which includes ensuring that all relevant group-wide risks
impacting the insurance entities are addressed appropriately.
116. Taking into account these new developments, particularly those resulting frompronouncements by the G20 and FSB, the IAIS has focused its implementation activities onareas such as supervisory cooperation and the assessment of observance of standards. As aresult, three new working parties were formed to focus on Education, Standards Observance andSupervisory Cooperation among supervisors.
117. As part of the Standards Observance Subcommittee’s work plan, the subcommittee
will be conducting self-assessments of the FSB-recommended topics relating to mandate,supervisory powers and consolidated supervision in 2011. Deficiencies and corrective action

56plans are to be outlined in a letter to the FSB chair and shared with FSB peers by end of March2012.
118. The IAIS findings analyzed in this paper are based on a group of assessments
undertaken after 2006 which includes only seven EMDEs (Figures 14, 15).61 Given the small
sample size, these findings should be viewed very loosely and interpreted cautiously and theissues identified here may not be deemed to be representative of all EMDEs. Nevertheless, thefew countries assessed provide a glimpse into certain strengths and weaknesses of the regulationand supervision of the global insurance sector.
119. Overall, the ratings indicate that these countries appear to have fairly soundregulatory and supervisory systems. Over 80 percent of the countries were considered to be―observing‖62 four core principles related to the supervisory system and entity. For example, thefew EMDEs assessed have established laws that include clear supervisory objectives and fully
empower the supervisory authority to achieve its objectives and conduct its functions in atransparent and accountable manner. In addition, over 60 percent of the countries wereconsidered to be in observance of 15 additional core principles.
120. The major weaknesses identified in this small sample relate to certain aspects ofsupervision and to information disclosure for market participants. In particular, over
70 percent of the countries assessed were found to be deficient in the laws, regulations, criteria,
and procedures for dealing with insolvency and winding–up of the insurer; group-wide
supervision; and the disclosure of relevant quantitative and qualitative information regarding
financial condition, risks, and management and corporate governance of insurance activities(CPs 16, 17, and 26). While it is difficult to draw any substantive conclusion as to whether theseweaknesses represent a significant gap in EMDEs overall, it is noteworthy to compare to theadvanced countries, where the sample size for all assessments is much larger (18 countries). In
this group, the level of compliance in these areas is much higher.63
Experience with IOSCO Assessments
121. The IOSCO issued its first set of principles, Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation, in 1998 and updated the methodology in 2003. The principles were updated in
61

A total of 28 ICP assessments have been conducted using the 2003 methodology (18 in AEs and 10 in EMDEs).
Over 50 percent (16) were conducted prior to 2006 (13 in AEs and three in EMDEs). Since 2006, only 12 ICP
assessments have been undertaken (five in AEs and seven in EMDEs). Of the seven EMDEs assessed, four are highincome countries, two are middle income countries and one is a low income country.
62

Ratings for the IAIS assessments are defined as observed, largely observed, partly observed and not observed. For
this analysis, ―observed‖ includes observed and largely observed and ―not observed‖ includes partly observed andnot observed.
63

The range of compliance is between 72 percent and 100 percent for all assessments using the 2003 methodology,
and 80 percent and 100 percent for all assessment conducted after 2006.

57
June 2010; however, no assessments have been conducted using the new standards. The
main revisions included adding nine new principles and deleting one. The IOSCO principles areused in the FSAP to diagnose the quality of the securities regulatory system.
122. The IOSCO findings discussed below are based on a group of assessments
conducted after 2006 which includes only nine EMDEs (Figures 16 and 17).64 As with the
IAIS assessments, this sample size is very low and very few solid conclusions regarding theregulatory and supervisory frameworks are likely to be drawn for all countries. Nevertheless, a
few observations can be made.
123. The degree of compliance is high for this group of EMDEs. 65 The majority of thecountries (at least 64 percent) assessed after 2006 were found to have implemented 80 percent of
the principles and 80 percent of the countries had implemented almost half of the principles. Thislevel of compliance is much higher than the entire group of EMDEs that has been assessed overthe past 10 years. Based on the findings for this latter group, the majority of countries were
found to have implemented only 27 percent of the principles. This trend could be viewed quite
positively; however, since the post-2006 sample size is so small, it is difficult to draw thisconclusion.
124. The main weakness identified in the post-2006 EMDEs group concerns theenforcement of securities regulation. The majority of EMDEs (64 percent) do not havecomprehensive inspection, investigation, surveillance, or enforcement powers. While showing aslight improvement over the years, it still appears that this has been a longstanding issue in
EMDEs as these findings are broadly in line with the findings for EMDE countries assessed prior
to 2006; however, the sample size for this group is much larger. For this latter group, the nonimplementation rate was 67 percent based on a sample size of 50 countries. The advanced
EMDEs lag behind other EMDEs in this respect as 100 percent of the assessments showed non
implementation. However, the sample size comprises only two countries, so, it is unlikely thisholds true for all others.

64
65

A total of 83 IOSCO assessments have been conducted on EMDE countries using the 1998 principles.

Ratings for IOSCO assessments are defined as fully implemented, broadly implemented, partly implemented, andnot implemented. For this analysis, ―implemented‖ includes implemented and broadly implemented and ―notimplemented‖ includes partly implemented and non implemented.

58
Table 5. EMDE Compliance with BCPs
High ComplianceCore Principle

2 : Permissible Activities
1.3 : Legal Framework
1.1 : Responsibilities of Supervisor
21 : Supervisory Reporting
1.4 : Legal Powers
6 : Capital Adequacy
9 : Problem Assets, Provisions, and Reserves
20 : Supervisory Techniques
22 : Accounting and Disclosure

Percent of Countries
Assessed:Compliant / Largerly
Compliant
93
90
86
86
83
83
81
81
81

Low ComplianceCore Principle

24 : Consolidated supervision
7 : Risk management practices
13 : Market risk
16 : Interest rate risk in the banking book
12 : Country and transfer risks
1.2 : Independence, accountability and transparency
15 : Operational risk
18 : Abuse of financial services
25 : Home-host relationships
5 : Major acquisitions
23 : Corrective and remedial powers of supervisors
10 : Large exposure limits
11 : Exposure to Related Parties
Source: International Monetary Fund.

Percent of Countries
Assessed:
Materially NonCompliant / NonCompliant
57
45
43
43
43
40
40
36
36
31
31
29
29

Table 6. Dispersion for Consolidated Supervision: By Income Level and Region

Core Principle:

Consolidated
Supervision

Exposure to
Related Parties

Risk Management

Corrective andIndependence,
Remedial Powers Accountability, andof Supervisors
Transparency

Operational Risk

Percent of Countries Assessed: Materially Non-Compliant / Non-Compliant

Income Level
High income
Medium income
Low income

50
59
58

25
23
42

25
45
58

0
22
67

25
32
67

13
41
58

50
57
45
60
86

17
43
18
40
43

42
43
27
60
71

67
29
0
20
29

42
71
9
40
57

42
43
9
40
86

RegionSource: International Monetary Fund.

59

AfricaAsia Pacific
EuropeMiddle East
Western Hemisphere

60

Percentage of Countries Assessed

Figure 11. BCPs (2006 Version): All EMDE Assessments (42 Countries)

100

Compliant

Non Compliant

80
60
40
20

SP11
SP12
SP13
SP14
SP15
SP16
CP2
CP3
CP4
CP5
CP6
CP7
CP8
CP9
CP10
CP11
CP12
CP13
CP14
CP15
CP16
CP17
CP18
CP19
CP20
CP21
CP22
CP23
CP24
CP25

0

Core Principles

Source: IMF Standards and Codes database.

Percentage of Countries Assessed

Figure 12. BCP (2006 Version): Advanced Country Assessments (4 Countries)

100

Compliant

Non Compliant

80
60

40
20

SP11
SP12
SP13
SP14
SP15
SP16
CP2
CP3
CP4
CP5
CP6
CP7
CP8
CP9
CP10
CP11
CP12
CP13
CP14
CP15
CP16
CP17
CP18
CP19
CP20
CP21
CP22
CP23
CP24
CP25

0

Core Principles

Source: IMF Standards and Codes database.

0

100

0
Compliant

80

60

40

20

Non Compliant

80

60

40

20

Core Principles

BCP Principles of Banking Supervision: 2006 Version
EMDE Western Hemisphere (7 Countries)
Compliant Non Compliant

80

60

40

20

Core Principles

Source: IMF Standards and Codes database.
Percentage of Countries Assessed

Non Compliant
1000Core Principles

BCP Principles of Banking Supervision: 2006 Version
Middle East (5 Countries)

100

0

SP11
SP12
SP13
SP14
SP15
SP16
CP2
CP3
CP4
CP5
CP6
CP7
CP8
CP9
CP10
CP11
CP12
CP13
CP14
CP15
CP16
CP17
CP18
CP19
CP20
CP21
CP22
CP23
CP24
CP25

Compliant

Percentage of Countries Assessed

Percentage of Countries Assessed

BCP Principles of Banking Supervision: 2006 Version
Africa (12 Countries)

SP11
SP12
SP13
SP14
SP15
SP16
CP2
CP3
CP4
CP5
CP6
CP7
CP8
CP9
CP10
CP11
CP12
CP13
CP14
CP15
CP16
CP17
CP18
CP19
CP20
CP21
CP22
CP23
CP24
CP25

100
SP11
SP12
SP13
SP14
SP15
SP16
CP2
CP3
CP4
CP5
CP6
CP7
CP8
CP9
CP10
CP11
CP12
CP13
CP14
CP15
CP16
CP17
CP18
CP19
CP20
CP21
CP22
CP23
CP24
CP25

0

SP11
SP12
SP13
SP14
SP15
SP16
CP2
CP3
CP4
CP5
CP6
CP7
CP8
CP9
CP10
CP11
CP12
CP13
CP14
CP15
CP16
CP17
CP18
CP19
CP20
CP21
CP22
CP23
CP24
CP25

Percentage of Countries Assessed
100

SP11
SP12
SP13
SP14
SP15
SP16
CP2
CP3
CP4
CP5
CP6
CP7
CP8
CP9
CP10
CP11
CP12
CP13
CP14
CP15
CP16
CP17
CP18
CP19
CP20
CP21
CP22
CP23
CP24
CP25

Percentage of Countries Assessed

61

Figure 13. BCP Compliance by Region
BCP Principles of Banking Supervision: 2006 Version
EMDE Europe (11 Countries)
CompliantCompliant

Non Compliant

80

60

40

20

Core Principles

BCP Principles of Banking Supervision: 2006 Version
Asia and Pacific (7 Countries)
Non Compliant

80

60

40

20

Core Principles

62

Percentage of Countries Assessed

Figure 14. ICPs (2003 Version): All EMDE Assessments after 2006 (7 Countries)

Observed

100

Non Observed

80
60
40

20

CP26

CP27

CP28

CP26

CP27

CP28

CP25

CP24

CP23

CP22

CP21

CP20

CP19

CP18

CP17

CP16

CP15

CP14

CP13

CP12

CP11

CP10

CP9

CP8

CP7

CP6

CP5

CP4

CP3

CP2

CP1

0

Core Principles

Source: IMF Standards and Codes database.

Percentage of Countries Assessed

Figure 15. ICPs (2003 Version): All EMDE Assessments (10 Countries)

Observed

100

Non Observed

80
60

40
20

Core Principles

Source: IMF Standards and Codes database.

CP25

CP24

CP23

CP22

CP21

CP20

CP19

CP18

CP17

CP16

CP15

CP14

CP13

CP12

CP11

CP10

CP9

CP8

CP7

CP6

CP5

CP4

CP3

CP2

CP1

0

63

Percentage of Countries Assessed

Figure 16. IOSCO: EMDE Assessments after 2006 (9 Countries)

Implemented

100

Non-Implemented

80
60
40
20

Q26

Q27

Q28

Q29

Q30

Q26

Q27

Q28

Q29

Q30

Q25

Q24

Q23

Q22

Q21

Q20

Q19

Q18

Q17

Q16

Q15

Q14

Q13

Q12

Q11

Q10

Q09

Q08

Q07

Q06

Q05

Q04

Q03

Q02

Q01

0

Core Principles

Source: IMF Standards and Codes database.

Percentage of Countries Assessed

Figure 17. IOSCO: All EMDE Assessments (50 Countries)

Implemented

100

Non-Implemented

80
60
40
20

Core Principles

Source: IMF Standards and Codes database.

Q25

Q24

Q23

Q22

Q21

Q20

Q19

Q18

Q17

Q16

Q15

Q14

Q13

Q12

Q11

Q10

Q09

Q08

Q07

Q06

Q05

Q04

Q03

Q02

Q01

0

64
ANNEX III. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON FINANCIAL STABILITY ISSUES IN EMDESBox 1. International Standards for Banking Supervision
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has issued guidance and standards
intended primarily for addressing issues pertaining to its member countries, with particularfocus on internationally active banks. This guidance, however, has also become of paramountimportance in influencing banking supervision worldwide. Acknowledging its role beyond its
member countries, the BCBS has always tried to make clear the circumstances under which its
guidance should be applied. For example, the BCBS capital framework aims to reflect bestpractices and offer a range of options with increasing levels of complexity covering a full rangeof markets and banks, and BCBS members are expected to refer to it as minimum criteria
without necessarily implementing the capital framework for all banks.
Basel I, as the first capital standard to be issued, was originally targeted to banks undertaking
international business. Over time it has been broadly implemented by most countries and for all
kinds of banks. In that sense, Basel I can be regarded as an important step in strengthening
capital requirements in financial systems with various levels of complexity, as well as for the
first time providing a standard method of comparison of banks‘ soundness worldwide.
Basel II was designed to provide a more risk-sensitive approach to calculating minimum capitalrequirements. Basel II offered a range of options with increasing levels of sophistication andcomplexity, with applicability to a variety of banks and banking systems worldwide. Based on athree-pillar framework, Basel II reflected the BCBS understanding that capital requirements
alone were not enough to ensure the soundness and stability of financial systems. While itbroadened capital requirements (Pillar 1) beyond credit and market risk by incorporating
operational risk capital charges, it also recognized the role played by banks themselves andbank supervisors in ensuring the appropriate levels of capital beyond minimum capitalrequirements (Pillar 2), as well as market discipline in promoting the safety and soundness offinancial systems (Pillar 3). The BCBS, however, stated clearly that implementation of Basel IImight not be a priority for non-member countries and that each supervisor should consider its
benefits with regard to local conditions. The Basel II approaches have to be chosen in light ofparticular circumstances in local jurisdictions and should not be expected to be implemented in
the same way in every jurisdiction.
Basel III was introduced as a complement to Basel I and Basel II and in principle its elements
are expected to be relevant to banks and financial systems of all kinds. Basel III was designed
to address the lessons of the financial crisis by enhancing banking sector resilience, reducing
the probability and severity of banking crises through a series of measures comprisingmacroprudential and microprudential elements. Enhancements to the prior framework include asignificant increase in the level and quality of capital, a leverage ratio, capital buffers, and aliquidity framework.

65
Figure 18. Foreign Ownership in Selected EMDEs (2009-10)
Percent of banking system
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
C
ro
R atiaomaBu n ialg
Li ari
th a
ua
ni
La a
tv
M ia
ex
ic
Po o
H l an
un d
ga
ry
Pe
U ru
kr
a
Pa i neki
stan
In Chi
do le
ne
si
Eg a
Ar y
ge pt
nt
Th i na
ai
la
Tu nd
r
C ke
ol y
om
M b
Sa al iau d aysi A iaPh rabi li i appine
Ka Br sTa z ak az il
iw hs
an ta
,C n
hi
na
Ve U
A
ne E
zu
e
R la
us
s
Ku i aw
aitSou t Indhi
Af ar
Ec ic a
ua
do
C r
hi
na

0

Source: Central Banks and Bank

Source: National authorities.

Table 7. Importance of Host Operations to Selected Foreign Banks vs. Importanceof Selected Foreign Banks to Host Banking Systems(Percentage of parent bank group assets or host country banking system assets)

MéxicoPeru

Santander

Scotiabank

ING

NordeaRaiffeisen

Swedbank

Unicredit

Chile

HSBC

BrazilCitibank

Argentina

Eastern Europe

BBVA

Latin America

1.0

0.2

0.2

0.6

0.0

Parent
Bank

0.0

0.0

2.5

0.0

0.6

5.8

2.9

4.4

7.1

0.0

Country

0.7

0.0

8.9

0.0

15.3

0.0

1.7

3.0

13.7

0.0

Parent
Bank

0.0

0.5

0.0

4.8

0.0

0.0

1.3

2.9

8.6

0.0

Country

0.0

13.6

0.0

47.1

1.7

0.0

0.5

0.0

3.3

0.1

2.1

0.0

0.1

2.9

0.1

Parent
Bank

6.8

0.0

1.1

20.4

4.7

Country

0.0

10.0

0.0

20.7

3.4

12.8

4.7

1.4

3.4

0.4

Parent
Bank

0.7

1.1

5.4

0.0

3.6

21.8 20.8

8.0

12.7

3.7

Country

4.8

1.8

2.1

0.0

10.0

1.8

0.1

0.1

0.0

1.7

Parent
Bank

0.1

0.0

3.9

0.0

0.5

22.1

2.8

2.0

1.0

15.0

Country

1.0

0.0

5.8

0.0

5.3

Bulgaria

Estonia

LatviaPolandUkraineNote: Only the assets of branches and of subsidiaries in which the bank has equity participation
greater than 50 percent are included.
Sources: National authorities, IMF, Fitch, Banks’ annual reports.

66

Box 2. IOSCO’s Technical Assistance to Jurisdictions Listed on Appendix B of the MMoU
In June 2010, the IOSCO‘s Presidents Committee resolved to pursue full implementation of the
IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation andthe Exchange of Information (IOSCO MMoU) by asking all Appendix B* members of IOSCO toapply to become full signatories to the MMoU by 1 January 2013.
Since the new Resolution, IOSCO‘s main focus has been to implement a strategy to graduate
Appendix B member jurisdictions to full MMoU signatory status. A key component of the strategy
is the provision of technical assistance to members that need support in revising their legislation inorder to give comfort that the proposed changes will address the issues previously identified thatprevented them from becoming signatories to the MMoU.
IOSCO has received by June 2011 requests for technical advice from 17 jurisdictions, all of themfrom emerging markets, which referred to the adequacy of proposed amendments for compliancewith the IOSCO MMoU. In the majority of cases, the provision of technical advice has beenorganized through the formation of working groups at IOSCO level (MMoU Team from the General
Secretariat and members of the Verification Teams responsible for the assessment of the MMoU
applications) focusing on the draft legislation submitted by the members.
In addition to the technical advice, when making legislative proposals intended to address theidentified deficiencies, jurisdictions are likely to seek confirmation from the IOSCO group that is
responsible for assessing the MMoU applications. This more formal assessment on whether theidentified gaps have been properly addressed is referred to as a ―Preliminary Assessment‖ and isgiven by the relevant IOSCO group. IOSCO had received by June 2011 requests for Preliminary
Assessment from 4 jurisdictions, and it expects this number to increase by the end of the year.
_______________________________________________________* Members listed on Appendix B do not fulfil all the requirements set by the MMoU, but they arecommitted to seek the legal authority necessary to enable them to become full signatories(Appendix A).

67

Box 3. Impact of the Financial Crisis on Non-Bank Finance Companies (NBFCs) in
India
The global financial crisis and its impact on the domestic economy adversely affected the
NBFC sector, with significant stress on its asset quality, liquidity and funding costs. The
impact differed depending on the structural features of each NBFC, e.g. asset-liability
maturity profiles and type of assets financed. The NBFC sector had deep funding interlinkages with mutual funds and commercial banks. Mutual funds, the prime source of funds
available to NBFCs, were major subscribers to commercial paper and debentures issued by
the NBFCs, in addition to certificates of deposit issued by banks. The drying up of liquidity,
with mutual funds themselves facing redemption pressure, coupled with tightening foreign
funding, put pressure on the NBFCs. Those NBFCs having larger asset-liability mismatchesand greater dependence on mutual funds for funding were affected more severely.
With the stock market hit by the selling pressures created by the contagion from the global
financial crisis, institutional investors started redeeming their investments in money market
funds. Rollover of maturing short-term instruments floated by NBFCs became difficult. The
borrowing portfolio of NBFCs faced steep deceleration. The credit crisis was followed by anincrease in interest rates in October and November 2008, which resulted in a widespread
crisis of confidence that made banks reluctant to lend to NBFCs; already sanctioned credit
lines froze. Demand for finance fell as loan book and investment growth of several NBFCs
slowed down considerably. Deteriorating business conditions led to fears of increased
defaults in repayments. Stock prices of NBFCs crashed on the back of rising non-performing
assets and several companies closed their operations. Some international NBFCs closed
down their operations in India. The segment which was hit hardest was vehicle financing,which had long-term assets and short-term liabilities. NBFCs that had overseas parents wereable to mobilize some temporary liquidity support.
In recognition of the liquidity needs the Reserve Bank of India announced a series ofmeasures to provide support to the financially stressed NBFCs in 2008-2009. They wereallowed, as a temporary measure, to raise short term foreign currency borrowing undercertain conditions. They were also allowed to temporarily borrow from the central bankliquidity adjustment facility through the commercial banks. They were given more time tocomply with increased capital adequacy requirements. Risk weights on banks‘ exposure to
NBFCs were reduced. NBFCs also benefitted from the RBI‘s refinance facility. Systemicallyimportant non-deposit taking NBFCs were permitted to augment their capital by issue of
perpetual debt instruments qualifying for capital. They were also given access to an indirect
lender of last resort facility (traditionally available only to banks) through a special purpose
vehicle against commercial paper collateral of good quality issued by them.
Since then, asset-liability management in NBFCs has been closely supervised, capital
adequacy requirements enhanced, and supervision and reporting requirements tightened.

68

Box 4. The Evolution of Non-Bank Mortgage Lending in Mexico
Sofoles (Limited Purpose Financial Institutions) began providing mortgage finance whencommercial banks faced recapitalization problems after the 1995 crisis and were notextending mortgages. Sofoles are supported in part by the Federal Housing Corporation(SHF), a development bank for housing, and are regulated and subject to information
disclosure requirements by the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV). In
2006, they were allowed to evolve into multi-purpose non-regulated entities (and changed
their names accordingly to Sofome), except in the case of subsidiaries of commercial banks
or financial holding companies that are regulated and supervised by the CNBV. In addition,
Sofoles/Sofomes that secure funding through the debt market are subject to CNBV oversight.
Sofomes must register with the National Commission for the Protection of Users of Financial
Services (Condusef), and periodically disclose their lending rates in a standardized format fortransparency purposes. By minimizing the regulatory burden, it was expected that financial
costs of credit would be lowered.
Sofoles/Sofomes do not take deposits and fund themselves mainly through commercial banks
and commercial paper. Since their funding is more expensive relative to banks, they
increasingly relied on securitization of mortgages. During the crisis, heightened risk aversion
made it very hard for Sofoles/Sofomes to refinance their short-term debt, as markets dried up
and counterparty risk was at its highest. From late 2008, there has been no mortgage-backed
security originated by Sofoles/Sofomes. Deterioration of asset quality and growing levels of
non-performing loans also greatly weakened their financial performance. In the midst of thecrisis, the SHF started a partial guarantee program of 65 percent of short-term debt issued bysome mortgage Sofomes/Sofoles, which played a key role in allowing capital market funding
to these intermediaries. Although there was a sharp decline in the mortgage loan portfolio
originated by Sofomes, mortgage loans originated by other agencies and intermediaries, suchas banks and Infonavit (the private workers‘ housing fund) have remained stable. The crisis
exposed the business model‘s vulnerabilities, and three of the largest Sofomes were severely
affected: one of them went bankrupt and the other two were nearly bankrupted.
The growth deterring effect of the international crisis for this sector, coupled with the limited
size and interconnection with the rest of the financial system, meant that the financial distressof Sofoles/Sofomes had no systemic or financial stability repercussions. Although theeconomic crisis is in part to blame for the rapid asset deterioration, the business model ofSofoles/Sofomes does have important shortcomings. The dependence on securitization makes
them highly vulnerable to market conditions.
The relevant authorities are undertaking efforts to collect accurate information about
exposures in order to carry out effective monitoring of the sector, recognizing that its size
and interconnections with other financial intermediaries may become a source of systemicrisk in the future.

69

Box 5. The Development of China’s Interbank and Bond Markets
Starting in 1997, China began to develop its interbank and domestic bond markets through thefollowing steps:Enhance market infrastructure. Steps in this area included improvements in the clearing& settlement system (the introduction of delivery vs. payment settlement, straight
through processing, and electronic commercial draft system) and the creation of amarket-making mechanism to facilitate transactions and increase liquidity. Most
recently, the Shanghai Clearing House is conducting research on providing centralized
clearing services for OTC products traded on the interbank market.

Strengthen institutions. A 3-pillar mechanism was established to oversee the market that
includes the supervisory agency (the People‘s Bank of China), a self-regulatory private
sector institution, as well as market discipline. Regulations were issued by thesupervisory authority, and master agreements were signed by market players under the
self-regulatory framework. Over time, credit rating agencies, accounting firms and otherinstitutions were introduced to the bond market, which supported a merit-based
registration system for bond issuance. The establishment of a credit enhancement
agency—China Bond Insurance Co. Ltd—helped promote risk sharing and broadened
access to credit by small- and medium-sized enterprises.

Establish benchmark interest rate. The Shanghai Inter-Bank Offered Rate (Shibor) was
launched in 2007 to provide the benchmark interest rate in cash and derivative markets.

Diversify and broaden market participants. The range of market participants wasbroadened over time. More recently, locally incorporated foreign banks, financial leasing
companies, and auto finance companies were allowed to publicly issue financial bonds.
Foreign renminbi (RMB) clearing banks, central banks or monetary authorities, andbanks participating in cross-border trade RMB settlement business, were allowed tomake RMB investments in the interbank market.



Expand range of products. More products with a wider range of maturities have become
available on the interbank market, including short-term commercial paper (introduced in2010), short-term financing bills (introduced in 2005), medium-term notes (introduced in2008), and collective small and medium-sized enterprise bills (introduced in 2009).
Treasury bills with a maturity of 1 year or less and treasury bonds with a maturity of up
to 50 years were added to the product mix, which has contributed to an improved yield
curve.

70

Box 6. ASEAN Securities Regulators Agree on Roadmap to Integrate Capital Markets by
2015
The ASEAN securities regulators reached an agreement in 2009 on the roadmap to integrate
ASEAN capital markets under the objectives of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)
Blueprint 2015. The roadmap, known as ―the Implementation Plan‖, sets out strategic actionplans for capital market integration and provides key milestones to be achieved during 20092015 by ASEAN members.
The Implementation Plan was initiated by the ASEAN Capital Markets Forum, a group
comprising heads of securities regulators for discussion of capital market policy issues. The
project was endorsed by the ASEAN Finance Ministers at their 2008 meeting and received
support from the Asian Development Bank through its regional technical assistance programon Strengthening Southeast Asian Financial Markets. The Implementation Plan was also
guided and overseen by a group of experts in international capital markets.
The AEC Blueprint 2015 envisages an integrated market which is stronger and more efficientwhere ASEAN products are viewed as an asset class and where investors would be able totrade ASEAN capital market products freely in any ASEAN exchanges at a competitive fee
from a single access point with market intermediaries that can provide services throughout theregion based on home country approval. The growing competition from global players, and thepressures for consolidation and efficiency enhancements due to technological advancement
make regional integration of capital markets a priority. The ongoing global financial crisis andeconomic slowdown have had a large impact on ASEAN capital markets and strengthen thecase for accelerating the pace of ASEAN capital market integration.
Recognizing the differences in stages of development among ASEAN members, theImplementation Plan takes a phased approach to integration and liberalization. For example,
during Phase I (2009-2010), the focus has been on wholesale markets for institutional andqualified investors, such as accepting offering documents presented in a common language andgoverned by the law of the issuer‘s jurisdiction. Mutual recognition of rules for securities
offerings will take place in Phase II (2011-2012), while investors can trade ASEAN exchange
products freely in Phase III (2013-2015).

71

Box 7. Asian Bond Fund and Asian Bond Markets Initiatives
Based on the lessons of the Asian financial crisis, two important regional initiatives for developing deep and liquid
domestic bond markets have been introduced in the East Asia-Pacific region: the Executives‘ Meeting of East Asia
Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP)66 Asian Bond Fund (ABF) initiative, and the ASEAN Plus Three67 Asian Bond
Markets Initiative (ABMI).

1. EMEAP ABF Initiative

Figure 19. ABF1 Framework

The EMEAP ABF initiative was first launched in June 2003. The first stage,
EMEAP central
called the ABF1 (Figure 19), is a basket of U.S. dollar-denominated bonds
banks/monetaryissued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign issuers in EMEAP economies,
authorities
excluding Australia, Japan, and New Zealand.
AroundThe second stage, called the ABF2 (Figure 20), was launched in December
US$1 bn2004. The ABF2 invests in local currency-denominated bonds issued bysovereign and quasi-sovereign issuers in the same eight EMEAP markets. It Bank for International Settlements(BIS Investment Pool)comprises (i) the Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF), an exchange-tradedfund investing in the eight EMEAP markets, and (ii) the eight single-market
funds investing in their respective markets. The PAIF is listed on the Stock
Exchange of Hong Kong and the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and the eight singleUS dollar-denominated sovereign
market funds are also open to private sector investments. The size of the PAIF
and quasi-sovereign bonds ineight EMEAP economies
in particular, has been growing steadily, reflecting strong investor demand for
Asian financial product (Figure 21). The ABF initiative has also acted as acatalyst for regulatory and tax reforms, and for improvements in the financial infrastructure of EMEAP markets.

Figure 20. ABF2 Framework

Figure 21. Fund Size
(USD bil.)Around
US$1 bn

Fund of Funds
Parent fundAround
US$1 bn

EMEAP central
banks/monetary
authorities

4

Pan-Asian Bond
Index Fund
(PAIF)

ABF2 Sub Funds

PAIF

3

2

China
Fund

Hong
Kong
Fund

Indonesia
Fund

Korea
Fund

Malaysia
Fund

Philippines
Fund

Singapore
Fund

Thailand
Fund

1

11/3

10/9

10/3

09/9

09/3

08/9

08/3

07/9

07/3

06/9

Local currency-denominated bonds issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereignissuers in eight EMEAP economies

05/10

0

(Source) BIS

2. ASEAN Plus Three ABMI
The ASEAN Plus Three ABMI was launched in August 2003, with the aim of developing efficient and liquid bondmarkets in Asia, and thereby enabling better utilization of regional savings for its investments and mitigating overreliance on foreign currency funding. Among its achievements, the Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility (CGIF)
was established in November 2010. The CGIF is a trust fund of 700 million U.S. dollars. The primary function is toprovide guarantees for local currency-denominated corporate bonds issued by firms in the region.
66

EMEAP comprises 11 central banks and monetary authorities in the East Asia and Pacific region.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) plus China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.
67

72
ANNEX IV. MEMBERS OF THE EMDES TASK FORCE

Chair

Sangche Lee
Commissioner
Korean Financial Services Commission

Argentina

Sergio Chodos
Member of the Board of the Central Bank and Deputy Superintendent of
Financial Institutions
Central Bank of Argentina

Botswana

Moses D Pelaelo
Deputy Governor
Bank of Botswana

BrazilCleofas Salviano Junior
Senior Advisor, Financial System Regulation Department
Central Bank of Brazil

CanadaLawrence Schembri
AdviserBank of Canada

China

Zhang Tao
Director General, International Department
People‘s Bank of China

Costa Rica

Alvaro García
President
National Council of Financial System Supervision

India

Meena Hemachandra
Chief General Manager, External Investments and Operations
Reserve Bank of India

Indonesia

Muliaman D Hadad
Deputy Governor
Bank Indonesia

Japan

Shinobu Nakagawa
Associate Director-General, International Department
Bank of Japan

Korea

Tae Soo Kang
Director General, Financial System Stability Department
Bank of Korea

MexicoPascual O’Dogherty
Director General, Financial Stability Department
Bank of Mexico

73

RussiaVladimir Chistyukhin
Director, Financial Stability Department
Central Bank of the Russian Federation

Saudi Arabia

Turki Dhaifallah Almutairi
Economic Specialist
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
Francis Selialia
Head, Macroprudential Analysis Division
South African Reserve BankSouth Africa

Spain

José María Roldán
Director General, Banking Regulation
Bank of Spain

TurkeyMehmet Yörükoğlu
Deputy Governor
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey

UgandaLouis Kasekende
Deputy Governor
Bank of Uganda

USA

Gerard Dages
Senior Vice President, Emerging Markets & Institutional Affairs Group
Federal Reserve Bank of New York

BCBS

Karl Cordewener
Deputy Secretary General

IAIS

Hari Narayan
Chairman, IAIS Implementation Committee(Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India)

IOSCO

Tuncay Yildiran (on behalf of EMC Chair)Director of Investment Services
Capital Markets Board of Turkey
Ranjit Ajit Singh (on behalf of EMC Vice-Chair)
Chair, Secondary Markets Group, EMC(Managing Director, Malaysia Securities Commission)

BIS

Ramon Moreno
Head, Economics for Latin America and the Caribbean
Monetary and Economic Department

IMF

Christopher Towe
Deputy Director, Monetary and Capital Markets Department
Robert Rennhack

74World Bank

Assistant Director, Monetary and Capital Markets Department
Consolate K. Rusagara
Director, Financial Systems Department
David Scott
Program Manager, Prudential Oversight Unit
Financial Systems Department

European Central Bank

Marcel Fratzscher
Head, International Policy Analysis Division

FSB Secretariat

Costas Stephanou
Rupert Thorne