Why Can’t I Keep My Surname? An Analysis of the Fairness andWelfare of the Japanese Legal System

Makiko Omura
Faculty of Economics, Meiji Gakuin University
makiko@eco.meijigakuin.ac.jp

Discussion Paper No. 17-02
December 2017

Why Can’t I Keep My Surname? An Analysis of the Fairness andWelfare of the Japanese Legal System

Makiko Omura
Faculty of Economics, Meiji Gakuin University
makiko@eco.meijigakuin.ac.jp

Abstract
This study examines the welfare and fairness of Japan’s current versus revised family
law, which will enable husbands and wives to retain their premarital surnames. We
compare welfare in these two legal states, with a married couple’s welfare dependent
on marriage–surname choice. The external preferences of anti-revisionists arereviewed by the fairness criteria of impersonality or extended sympathy. Utilisingweb-based survey data, we conduct nonparametric rank analysis and parametricanalysis of willingness to pay for surname retention and legal support. Moreover,structural equation analysis via a multiple indicators multiple causes model isconducted incorporating surname attachment and fairness as latent variables. We
show that welfare can be increased by the revised law, and that external disutility of
the legal revision is invalid on fairness grounds.

Keywords: fairness; family law; gender; welfare; external preferences; surname
JEL Classification : D63; J16; K36; Z13

1

1. IntroductionMore than three decades have passed since Japan’s ratification of the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
in 1985, and yet, Japan’s insufficient efforts to fulfil its obligations were criticised byindependent experts at the CEDAW Committee meeting in 2003, 2009, and again in 2016,
and remain largely unchanged.1 The Committee experts pointed out that Japanese civil
legislation remained discriminatory in such areas as requiring a common married
surname, different minimum marriage ages for men and women, a ban on women’s
remarriage within six months of divorce, 2 and discrimination against children born
outside legal marriage. The committee expressed concern that the Japanese government
may not have taken the Convention’s binding provisions seriously.3
In this study, we examine whether Japan’s proposed dual surname (DS) system, whichallows husbands and wives to choose to retain their original surnames, will be ‘welfare’improving and fairer than the current system, in which a married couple ought to have acommon surname (CS).4 We first briefly review the current legal situation and arguments
for and against the DS system in Japan. We then present an analytical framework of
welfare improvement, comparing the current and revised legal states. We review thefairness of these states, based on the criteria proposed by Rawls (1958, 1971/1999),
Harsanyi (1955), and Suppes (1966), also referring to philosophical discussions on‘external preferences’. After introducing the empirical framework and the data collected1

As of May 2015, 189 states have ratified or acceded to the treaty. The United States is the only country
which has not done so in OECD countries.
2
The ban on remarrying within 300 days was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in December
2015, although the restriction remained in place for 100 days, and the ruling became effective after cabinet
approval in March 2016. Nonetheless, the CEDAW Committee condemns the prohibition imposed only on
women for being discriminatory against women.
3Asahi Shimbun. 2009. ‘U.N. panel raps Japan on women's issues’ July 25.
http://www.asahi.com/international/update/0724/TKY200907240216.html (in Japanese).
4
The word ‘welfare’ is utilised here, however, the concept applied here can be considered in a broader
sense, such as ‘capability’ in Sen’s sense.

2

from web-based surveys, we provide an overview of the current situation in Japan, andanalyse the possibilities and magnitude of welfare and fairness improvement from the DS
system, through a non-parametric and parametric analysis of willingness to pay (WTP)
and a multiple indicators multiple causes (MIMIC) generalised structural equation model.
We conclude with policy recommendations. Although this study examines the DS system
in Japan, the welfare and fairness methodologies could apply to various matters.
2. Current situation and legislative background
Under the current Japanese Civil Code (Article 750), a married couple must have a unified
surname upon their marriage, taken from either of them.5 The law prescribes either ofthe surnames to be adopted as the new couple’s family name, and thus, it seems prima
facie egalitarian. However, the reality is that 96 % of all couples and 97.1% of firstmarriage couples adopted the husband’s surname in 2015, almost unchanged for a decade(Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, MHLW, 2017). If couples do not wish tochange their original surnames upon marriage, there are currently two options available.
One is to have a de facto or common-law marriage, in which they consider themselves
married, are recognised as such by others, and may have a religious or non-religious
marriage ceremony, or some celebration that publicly announces their marriage.
However, they are not legally recognised in the official marriage registry, and the couple
will not have certain legal rights such as, for instance, default inheritance rights inprinciple or rights to make ‘significant’ decisions for partners, such as agreements for
operations, except for sterilisation, as defined by the Maternal Protection Law. Only oneof the parents of a child born to a de facto married couple can be registered as a legal
parent, where the mother is the default. A child born without a legal father is classified asillegitimate in the family register, with only half the inheritance right of a legitimate child,

5This article applies to all cases in which both partners of the couple are Japanese citizens.

3although this law, judged unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, was finally amended in
December 2013.6
The second option for retaining one’s original surname upon marriage is for one partner
to utilise his/her original surname as an alias, after a formal marriage registry. In fact, oneof the major concerns regarding surname change relates to those who continue to work
after marriage. Although the Japanese employment rate for married women is still low
compared to other developed countries, the ratio of double-income households to all
working households has been increasing. It was 37.05% in 1989 and increased to 42.05%
in 2004, 53.7% in 2007, and 57.2% in 2012, based on the latest available employment
structure statistics (Statistics Bureau and the Director−General for Policy Planning ofJapan, 2007, 2013).7
2.1 Existing Problems: Professional and Personal Rights
Sudden change of surnames can cause certain inconveniences to working women.
Goldin and Shim (2004) show that in the US, whether a woman ‘made a name’ for herself
before marriage matters significantly in the choice of retaining her original surname.
Hoffnung (2006), using the same data for a 10 year-longitudinal survey, found that those
who chose non-traditional marital names had greater career commitment. Indeed, a namechange can incur adverse effects on a professional career, nullifying her achievement
record and/or confusing her clients, students, colleagues, business partners and the like.
For an academic or researcher, a surname change may practically nullify her publication
record. For a teacher, a surname change can confuse the students and parents. For asalesperson, a surname change may confuse her customers and may even spoil her sales
record. People whose names are publicly known may have already been using a public
name, continued use of which has been largely accepted. In Japan, it is only recent that66
7

The ratio of children born outside wedlock is extremely low in Japan compared to other OECD countries
Households in the agricultural sector are excluded from working households.

4

ordinary people have been allowed to retain their maiden names in the workplace, albeit
at their employers’ discretion. Recently, a female teacher reached a settlement with her
employer private high school that allows her to continue using her maiden name after
marriage, mediated by the Tokyo High Court, following the dismissal by the Tokyo
District Court (The Japan Times, 17 March 2017). Moreover, although an alias may beutilised in a professional situation, this is not the case in the sphere of public
administration, such as salary payment, tax, health insurance, public benefit, passport,
and driving licenses. Consequently, the rule of using the officially registered surname
extends to bank accounts, credit cards, and other things that require submission of official
identification. Thus, the utilisation of alias is not considered sufficient to overcome
various complications associated with surname change.
Another major claim for enabling DS in Japan and elsewhere relates to identity andrespect for ancestral name.8 With the current CS system, either partner in a couple has tochange his/her birth surname and this can pose a serious obstacle to the marriage itself,
especially if he/she is the only child. The significance of ancestry and surname continuity
is also found in other countries (Scheuble & Johnson, 1993; Klein, Stafford, &Miklosovic, 1996) and is indicated by the fact that certain cultures regard hyphenatedsurnames as the standard, such as in Spain and Portugal. Mizuno (2007), in her elaborate
analysis of Japanese Family Law, argues that ‘legal marriage has come to be considered
as a combination of forcing one to renounce their family name and submit to the violationof personal privacy rights brought about by the family register system’ (p. 154).9 Indeed,
the recent law suit by a female teacher, cited above, was labelled as “personal right
infringement suit” by one of the major newspapers Mainichi in Japan.

8

In Japanese culture, ‘keeping the ancestral grave’ is considered important and usually a wife will be buried
in her husband’s family grave. This tradition, which has started to change in recent decades, reinforces theimportance of family continuity and name-keeping especially for one-child families.
9
She makes particular reference to the Japanese ie system, a patriarchal household system that forms theconceptual foundation of family registry.

52.2 Legislative Situation
In Japan, discussions regarding the amendment of the Civil Law have been ongoing since
the late 1970s. Major discussions revolved around concerns over practical inconveniences
for women’s work life rather than egalitarian concerns or personal identity. Thus, a major
trend was set toward acceptance of alias in the workplace. The trend has shifted graduallyto a ‘selective DS system’, in which husbands and wives each are allowed to keep theirown surnames upon marriage, if desired. As part of its commitment to meeting the
CEDAW obligations, Japan enacted the Basic Law for a Gender−Equal Society (Law No.
78 of 1999) in 2000, and established the Bureau of Gender Equality to deploy various
policies. Legislative reform proposals to allow selective DS were prepared by the
Ministry of Justice in 1996 and again in 2010. Ultimately, these proposals were notsubmitted to the Diet due to ‘variations in people’s opinion’, although it is primarily due
to the failure to reach ‘consensus’ among the leading Liberal Democratic Party (Japan
Ministry of Justice 2014). 10 The Supreme Court delivered its first judgement on theconstitutionality of the current Civil Code Article 750 requiring CS on 16 December
2015, ruling it to be ‘established institution and rational, thus not unconstitutional’, andleaving the matter to be discussed in the Diet, although 5 out of 15 judges decided that it
was unconstitutional. 11 To date, the reform proposal has not yet been brought tosubstantive deliberations.
2.3 Concerns for Legislative Change and Other Country Experiences
There are various claims for and against amending the Civil Code to legalise the DS
option. Many claims are similar to those observed in the US some 40 years ago, when

10

The Liberal Democratic Party at both the national and local levels is infamous for its conservative sexist
values.
11
On the same day, another judgement was delivered on Civil Code Article 733, restricting divorced
women from remarrying for 300 days. The Supreme Court ruled that part of the restriction exceeding 100
days was unconstitutional.

6

there were concerns about ‘threat to familial harmony and stability’, as well as expected‘confusion in record−keeping and legal relationships’ (Gordon, 1974, pp. 1514–1515).
Such social norms seem to have persisted for some time: according to a study by Scheuble
and Johnson (1993), one−third of American men believe that a woman should always
change her name to that of her husband and more than 50% believe that a woman shouldchange her name if she has or plans to have children. A brief summary of the major
opinions of the pro-revisionists and anti-revisionists in Japan is provided in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
Despite the ‘fear’ of DS opponents that family values will be degraded, it would be
difficult to find evidence of DS itself ‘causing’ family value degradation in othercountries. Indeed, divorce rate in Japan has steadily been increasing for most years whilemarriage rate decreasing. The ratio of divorce rate to marriage rate has changed from
0.098 in 1970 to 0.217 in 1990, and 0.362 in 2010 (MHLW, 2016). 12 Moreover, theproposed legal revision is a selective surname system; a couple can always opt for aconventional choice, which is the default. Our data suggest that DS couples would be aminority, similar to the observations in other countries where such options are legalised,such as the case in Norway where traditional marital surname choice prevails in 80% of
the cases even the legal default is name keeping (Noak and Wiik, 2008). The options
elsewhere typically include DS, hyphenated surname, and birth surname as middle name.
For instance, a Norwegian case study by Noak and Wiik (2008) reports that traditional
marital surname choice prevails in 80% of the cases, that is, wives adopt husbands’
surnames, even though women were granted equal rights to retain their original surnames
in 1980. Moreover, the legal default in Norway is name keeping: those wishing to change
their names must notify authorities. The role of ‘default choices’ revealed in the work of

12

Marriage rate and divorce rate are defined as the case numbers per 1,000 population in any given year.
The latest figure is 0.346 in 2016.

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Madrian and Shea (2001) on a retirement plan does not seem to be functioning here. Noakand Wiik (2008) claim that name choice is closely linked to ‘gender ideology’. In the US,
the legal default in most places is for both spouses to keep their pre-marital names, yetmost women choose the most conventional surname, because ‘naming choices areconstrained by the social and historical context in which they are made’, and ‘current
preferences are endogenous to the state’s previous mandatory regime’ (Emens, 2007).
Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that a selective surname system would provoke any
drastic change in social values in Japan.
In general, opinions on Japan’s selective DS system seem to be still divided, although afair proportion of the public accept the law amendment, based on government and web
surveys cited below. Ultimately and ideally, the society should decide whether to allow
the right to choose DSs. Put another way, the society should decide whether such aprovision is ‘desirable’ in the sense that it is fairer and/or welfare increasing for thesociety. In order to consider the welfare and fairness of the law pertaining to the surname
choice, we present a simple analytical model in Sections 3 and 4.
3. Welfare improvement analytical framework
One characteristic of the proposed law change for the selective DS system is that it will
additionally allow DS as one option for married surname, and thus, will not deny or
restrict the choice of CS, which currently is the sole choice.13 Therefore, it seems there
are only people who would benefit from the additional option, and thus, it would be
welfare and Pareto improving. Table 2 depicts the choice sets and welfare of a couple interms of marriage and surname choice. Each individual in the couple is categorised into
one of three types according to their own surname preference, retain, change, andindifferent. Couples with change–change preferences, where both parties wish to change

13

Of course, a case may be considered in which a married couple combines both surnames withhyphenation, but this option is beyond current considerations in Japanese society.

8their pre-marital surname to those of the partners, are considered rare; this option isunavailable in the proposed legal change and thus omitted. Here, two right sets are
assumed: (1) Sm for rights to a marriage choice set containing m1, ‘exercise a right to legal
marriage’ and m0, ‘relinquish a right to legal marriage’; (2) Sn for rights to a surname
choice set containing n1, ‘exercise a right to keep one’s surname’, and n0, ‘relinquish aright to keep one’s surname’.14 The weak preference ordering for the choice of marriage
right, satisfying reflexivity, transitivity, and completeness, is defined as: ∀m∈Sm, m1 ≿m0, that is, ‘exercise a right to legal marriage (m1)’ is weakly preferred to ‘relinquish aright to legal marriage (m0)’. 15 Given Japanese family law, we assume that a legal
marriage is strictly preferred to m1 ≿ m0 and ~ (m0 ≿ m1), where ‘~’ indicates negation,and the corresponding welfare is WH(m1) > WL(m0), where superscripts H and L denotehigh and low, respectively.16 As for surname choice, ∀n∈Sn, n1 ≿ n0, that is, ‘exercise aright to keep one’s surname (n1)’ is weakly preferred to ‘relinquish a right to keep one’s
surname (n0)’. For a retain individual, n1 ≿ n0 and WH(n1) > WL(n0), while for a change
individual, n0 ≿ n1 and WH(n0) > WL(n1). For an indifferent individual, ‘retaining
surname’ and ‘changing surname’ is equally as good, n1 ≿ n0 and n0 ≿ n1, and thus,
WH(n1) = WH(n0). There is only one case, the retain–retain case in state1, in which
preferential ordering between m and n is revealed; choosing to marry and sacrificing theright to a preferred surname reveals m1 ≿ n1, while choosing not to marry but retain one’s
preferred surname reveals n1 ≿ m1.
[Insert Table 2 around here]

14

While it is more usual to consider S as a direct choice set of ‘legal marriage’ or ‘retain surname’, ourchoice assignment over a right highlights the fact that certain individuals have to relinquish the right.
15
Since the choice set contains only two choices in case of marriage, transitivity contains a hypotheticalelement. Here, reflexivity implies that ∀m1 ∈Sm: m1 ≿ m1 and completeness implies that ∀m1,m0 ∈Sm: (m1≠ m0) → (m1 ≿ m0) ˅ (m0 ≿ m1), where ˅ indicates the inclusive ‘or’ or alternation.
16
Given current circumstances, it is presumed that legal marriage can occur only among heterosexual
couples who are not within the third degree of kinship, and a married surname can be only either partner’s
surname, although the same framework can apply to other issues, such as same-sex marriage.

9Based on preference ordering, the marriage−surname welfare of the retain–retain couple
in state1 (S1), WHH−WHL or WLH−WLH is inferior to that in state2 (S2), WHH−WHH. The
welfare of retain–retain is actually inferior to any other couple combination. Since thewelfare of all other couple types is the same in S1 and S2, social welfare in S2 is superior
to that in S1. Accordingly, it seems to be a natural conclusion to change the family law toallow for selective DS. Thus, why should there be opposition? The opposition comes frompeople who would incur disutility from other people’s decision to have DSs. They argue
that DSs would degrade family norms of the society and be harmful to children. For them,the current legal status entails a single equilibrium they consider justifiable and proper.
Thus, we cannot use a simple Pareto criterion to judge different legal states since thestatus quo would be justified automatically. Such external concerns do not enter a couple’s
welfare function regarding their marriage–surname choice, and so, the question arises
whether they should be given any consideration in the social welfare function.
4. External preferences and fairness
How much of the ‘external (dis)utility’ of the DS system by outside parties, in particular
the CS−proponents, should be counted in a civilised society?17 Going back to Bentham(1789/1823, pp. 14–16), a founder of modern utilitarianism who recognised theimportance of the roles of legal institution, objects to ‘the principle of sympathy andantipathy’, by which he meant external approbation or disapprobation of certain actions
without any consideration for the happiness of the party whose interest is in question.
Bentham’s critical successor Mill (1859/1951) warns against the majority’s imposition ofits values and preferences on the minority, arguing that “public opinion means, at the best,some people’s opinion of what is good or bad for other people; while very often it does
not even mean that; the public, with the most perfect indifference, passing over the17

Although the topic of this study is DS in Japan, this argument can be applied to any issues concerning
equality of entitlements in which certain groups are denied their personal rights.

10pleasure or convenience of those whose conduct they censure, and considering only theirown preference” (pp. 188–189). Similarly, the contemporary American philosopher
Dworkin (1977/1997) asserts that a personal preference for own enjoyment and an
external preference for another’s enjoyment should be distinguished (his italics). He
claims that ‘[i]f external preferences tip the balance, then the fact that a policy makes thecommunity better off in a utilitarian sense would not provide a justification compatible
with the right of those it disadvantages to be treated as equals’ (Dworkin, 1977/1997, p.
282).
Seeing that the sort of external or ‘extrinsic’ utility we deal with should not be includedin the social welfare function, there remains a question of fairness given different levels
of welfare currently obtainable by retain−change couples and retain−retain couples,leaving aside cases involving indifferent surname preference without any harm.18 This inturn requires some sort of interpersonal comparison.19 As Sen (1970, p. 131) states, oneof the most practiced and accepted methods of interpersonal comparison is to ‘try to put
oneself in the position of another’. We consider a few variants of such an approach,proposed by Rawls (1971/1999), Harsanyi (1955), and Suppes (1966).20 We consider
here only cases in which legal state preference and surname preference match. Thus, inthis case a CS-proponent (pro-CS, CSp) or anti-revisionist, who resists the legal
amendment and can avail himself of the preferred surname choice retain−change as acouple, puts himself in a DS-proponent (pro-DS, DSp) or revisionist’s shoes, who cannot
avail herself of the preferred surname choice retain−retain, and vice versa. There is

18

This fairness concern would correspond to ‘moral preferences’ defined by Harsanyi (1977, p. 635),
which enforces ‘a special impersonal and impartial attitude, that is, a moral attitude, upon himself’. The
definitions and distinctions Harsanyi applied to ‘personal preferences’ and ‘moral preferences’ are notequivalent to those of Dworkin’s ‘personal preferences’ and ‘external preferences’. Nevertheless, Harsanyi(1977, p. 635) states that ‘moral preference’ influences one’s behaviour on ‘rare’ occasions, and thus, heseems to have been considering strict impartiality. He defines several other preferences in his work.
19
While Bentham regarded welfare straightforwardly calculable and comparable, Mill did not.
20
Sen (1970) provides a concise and excellent discussion regarding their arguments related to the issuesof equity and justice..

11

certainly another individual who is policy indifferent although we do not need to consider
it for our purpose.
First, consider the situation of Rawls’ (1971/1999) ‘original position’ in which the ‘veil
of ignorance’ prevails; in this case, an individual does not know in which state of theworld he or she would be born, nor whether he or she would be born as a DSp or a CSp,or as female or male. In that case, which conception of justice, or more precisely in ourcase, which state of the world is to be chosen? In the original position, according to Rawls(1958, p. 165), two principles of justice would have been chosen. The first states ‘each
person participating in a practice, or affected by it, has an equal right to the most extensive
liberty compatible with a like liberty for all’. The current situation, which effectively
denies equal right to the liberty of choosing one’s preferred surname type as well as thatof retaining one’s original surname, is not in accordance with this principle. The second
principle states that ‘inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they
will work out for everyone’s advantage, and provided that the positions and offices towhich they attach, or from which they may be gained, are open to all’ (Rawls, 1958, p.
165). This essentially means that individuals should have equal opportunities to pursue
their interests. According to these principles of justice, derived from Rawls’ fairness
criterion, state2 (S2) should be chosen over state1 (S1) by everyone, and everyone could
choose a preferred surname upon legally marrying.21
For impersonality concerns, Harsanyi (1955, p. 1977) applies the impersonality
principle or what he calls ‘ethical preferences’, ‘imaginative empathy’, or ‘similarity
postulate’. 22 In particular, we can use his utilitarian criterion assuming as if equi-

21

These principles may be considered as maximin (maximum minimorum) solution to social justice,achieved by maximising the welfare of the least well-off individual and chosen by people in their original
position (1971, p. 152). Applying the rule utilitarianistically in this case, the welfare of DSp is to be
maximized. Simply, we may say that S2 is better than S1 in terms of the egalitarian concern.
22
According to Harsanyi, interpersonal utility comparisons require the ‘similarity postulate’ that indicatessimilarity in our basic psychological reaction to alternatives after making proper allowances for personal
differences (1977, pp. 639–641). Although the word ‘empathy’ is used, it is in imaginative form and not12

probability of being born type i in a state S, where i= DSp or i= CSp type. Furthermore,
Harsanyi assumes a rational choice under uncertainty, where a society/individual
preference should satisfy the von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) axioms or theequivalent Marschak postulates.23 Without any loss of generality, we may assume that
there are only two types in the aforementioned model depicted in Table 2 – DSp represents
a retain–retain couple while CSp represents a retain–change couple – and that societal
welfare consists of the sum of welfare of these two types only.24 The social welfare+
function of each state can be defined as 𝑊% = ∑,)∈- 𝜌) 𝑈) where legal state S∈{1,2}, andindividual type T∈ {DSp, CSp} with ρi = Prob(T) for individual i. In line with Harsanyi’s
cardinal−utility postulate, we may assign for now a utility value of UCS = 1 for CSp in bothstates S1 and S2 and for DSp in the latter state, and of UDS = 0.5 for DSp in S1 regardlessof their choice of marriage, as we have already seen their welfare ordering in Section 3.
With an equi-probable 1/2 chance of being type DSp or CSp, we have societal welfare of
S1, W1=3/4· W2, always being lower than that of S2, W2.
For Suppes (1966), the interpersonal comparison involves a comparison of eachcombination of type and state. Here, equi-probability applies to being type i in a state S,
where i corresponds to type DSp or CSp, and being in state S, which corresponds to S1 or
S2. Again, we can assume having types DSp (retain–retain) and CSp (retain–change) only.

equivalent to external preferences discussed earlier. The same argument applies to Suppes’ terminology of‘extended sympathy’.
23
Harsanyi (1955, p. 316) notes that ‘an individual’s impersonal preferences, if they are rational, mustsatisfy Marchak’s axioms and consequently, must define a cardinal social welfare function equal to thearithmetical mean of the utility of the utilities of all individuals in the society’. He defends his applicationof vNM stating that ‘even though a person’s vNM utility function is always estimated in terms of his
behaviour under risk and uncertainty, the real purpose of this estimation procedure is to obtain cardinalutility measures for the relative personal importance he assigns to various economic (and non-economic)
alternatives’ (1977, p. 643).
24
Here, it is postulated that (DSp → retain–retain) and (CSp → retain–change), which makes the current
set consisting of mutually exclusive and exhaustible types. Although one’s actual choice may not be
coherent with one’s political disposition in reality, it does not affect the conclusion of our analysis. As we
can see from Table 2, the inclusion of other combination types does not affect the total or average welfare
difference between S1 and S2.

13

The individual’s ordering over the set of individual consequences here becomes (CSp|S1)~ (CSp|S2) ~ (DSp|S2) ≻ (DSp|S1). Thus, an individual is indifferent about being type CSp
in S1 or in S2 and being type DSp in S2, and either case is strictly preferred to being typeDSp in S1. Here, type DSp strictly prefers S2, while type CSp is indifferent between two
states S1 and S2. Now considering impersonality or ‘extended sympathy’, the following
can be said. A person strictly prefers to be type CSp in S2 than to be type DSp in S1, thatis, (CSp|S2) ≻ (DS |S1), and regards being type DSp in S2 (DSp|S2) at least as good as
being type CSp in S1, that is, (DSp|S2) ≳ (CSp|S1). Then, we may conclude that S2 is morejust than S1.25
Thus, based on our welfare model, not only societal welfare may improve in a state inwhich the law is changed to allow an extra option of DS, but such a societal state isconsidered fairer when we apply the fairness criteria of Rawls, Harsanyi, and Suppes.
Apart from these findings, given that surname is primarily an identifier of an individualand of family heritage, some argue that married surname choice is a matter of personal
right, whose choice should be left to individuals rather than society, and as such, thecurrent Japanese law infringes on a fundamental personal right.
5. Empirical models: individual marriage−surname choices
After considering an abstract analytical framework of choice preferences, we now
translate it into a more tractable and measurable formulation based on individual choices.
One way to assess the magnitude of welfare gain/loss is through the willingness to pay(WTP) for different legal states and surname retention, expressed by the respondents. As
is clear from Table 2, inferior welfare occurs only in the retain–retain couple case inwhich both parties want to retain their surnames, and the option is either for one of them

25

More generally, this can be considered a problem of social ordering of the i-th individual defined over
the Cartesian product of S and I, where S is the set of social states and I is the set of individuals. Such social
ordering is established in the form of placing oneself in the position of another, through the notion of‘extended sympathy’. For more discussion and formal proofs, see Suppes (1966) and Sen (1970).

14

to marry–change or for a couple to not marry–retain under the current law state, S1. While
it is known that there are certain people who have to change their surnames upon marriage
despite their wish to retain their surnames, it is not known how prevalent and strong such
wishes are. By allowing for an additional choice option, marry–retain with payment, theexpressed payment WTP-name is considered to reflect, to a certain extent, the desire toretain the individual’s surname.
In considering utility and fairness associated with individual choices, we postulate ahypothetical situation in which an individual reveals his preference to marry and to keep
his surname upon marriage when his partner also keeps her own.26 The individual choices
are yij, where marriage choice i = {0: not marry, 1: marry} and surname choice j = {0: notretain; 1: retain}, and thus, y10 = (marry–change); y11 = (marry–retain with payment); andy01 = (not marry–retain). With high (H) and low (L) relative magnitudes, assume theutility from legal marriage Um = mH, and mL otherwise, utility from retaining own surname
Un = nH, and nL otherwise, where superscript m and n designates marriage and surname,respectively. Note that the cost for an individual to keep her surname upon marriage isreflected in Un, where such cost may include costs of overcoming the unconventional
choice, such as negotiation, social pressure, and family obligation, net of theadministrative costs of changing surname, which we treat as a default cost of marriage
here.27,28 An individual’s decision-making problem can be expressed as:

26

Sen (1979, pp. 551–552) warns against the appropriateness of ‘revealed preference’ in measuring
utility and hence, welfare, namely, ‘if utilities are defined entirely in terms of choice, then a person will
be seen as maximizing his utility in every feasible choice’, and such assertion ‘is no more than atautology’. Indeed, the choice of ‘revealed preference’ may not reflect individuals’ true state of welfare orhappiness should such choice be made out of social or family obligation. Unfortunately, we have no way
of completely excluding such influence but can only expand the choice set.
27
Emens (2007) discusses the costs of making unconventional name choice in detail.
28
In terms of administrative costs, based on our crude estimation considering various administrative
procedures required for surname change and the associated opportunity costs, the cost of changing one’s
surname ranges from JPY 7,137 to JPY 18,210, based on the minimum wage and average full-time wage,
respectively. If we multiply these costs by the number of couples married in 2009 (approximately 360,000),
the total cost to society becomes JPY 2.6 billion or JPY 6.6 billion.

15

(1) yij =(𝑦45 | 𝑚8 , 𝑛; )1 (𝑦44 | 𝑚8 , 𝑛8 )(𝑦54 | 𝑚; , 𝑛8 )Ignoring legal preferences, a fair type chooses an option that permits his partner to retain
her surname (y10 or y11), even in the case of his own nH, while an unfair type fails to doso regardless. Incorporating the fairness aspect of the preferred legal state choice
discussed above, categorising individuals into CS-proponent, CSp or DS-proponent, DSp,
we obtain the following type–choice combinations:29
DS @ – 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟 → 𝑦)G = {𝑦45 , 𝑦44 }(2) = CS @ – 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟 → 𝑦)G = {𝑦45 }.
@CS – 𝑢𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟 → 𝑦)G = {𝑦54 , 𝑦44 }The probability of observing a choice outcome k is Pr(yij = k | m, n) = Pr(yij ≥ k | m, n) −Pr(yij ≥ k+1 | m, n), assuming that the choice ordering is k−1, k, k+1. Based on these typechoice set, the empirical analysis is conducted through a (1) WTP analysis and a (2)MIMIC analysis, as detailed below.
5.1 Willingness to Pay (WTP) analysis
In our empirical analysis, the magnitude of legal preferences is expressed through the
WTP for preferred state S in the form of donation to support their preferred legal state.
We regard such WTP for a legal state, WTP-legal, that is a public good, as a manifestationof extended sympathy/antipathy toward others’ choices. As seen in Section 4, external
preferences ought to be excluded from social welfare calculation; however, as indicatedby Dworkin (1977/1997), in reality, it is likely that there is certain interdependence
between personal and external preferences. Indeed, it may not be discernible whether the
WTP-legal of type DSp/CSp to change/keep the current legal state is for their own

29Here, CSp–unfair choices, y01 and y11, are considered unfair because the subject is not willing to change
his surname despite his preference for a CS, that is, he expects his partner to change her pre-marital surname.

16

preferences or for enabling/preventing others to choose DS. It is, therefore, consideredworthwhile to ascertain the magnitude of WTP-legal among pro-CS and pro-DS.
Each of WTP-name and WTP-legal is given by the following function:(3)

WTP = u2 (m’, n’, l’, c’ | S2) – u1 (m, n, l, c | S1),

where m, n, l, and c are marriage, surname, legal state choice, and cost associated withsurname retention, respectively. For an indifferent respondent, u2 = u1, and WTP = 0.
WTP in this survey is expressed by choosing a single fee range among 9 to 10 options ,ranging from ‘less than JPY 1,000’ up to ‘over JPY 1million’. Defining WTP* as a latentvariable in the range [−∞, ∞], the probability of a respondent’s observed WTP falling ina range τk ≤ WTP* <τk+1 is: 30(4)

Pr (WTP = k) = Pr (τk ≤ WTP* < τk+1) for k = 1 to K.

The lower bound of the expected values of WTP for N respondents is:(5)

𝐸;M 𝑊𝑇𝑃 = ∑,)T4 𝜏Q (𝑖)/𝑁 ,which is calculated and investigated through rank analysis via the Kruskal–Wallis testcomparing more than two groups, such as policy preferences, where no normally
distributed interval but an ordinal relation is assumed for the dependent variable. In
addition, logit and ordered logit is applied with a vector of additional regressors, x, inorder to elucidate factors that affect the demand for legal state and surname. The
probability of observing WTP = k for a given value of x is:31

30

The WTP analysis methods for payment cards showing different ranges of amounts are discussed in
Haab and McConnell (2002). We employ categorical WTP ranges, since asking an open-ended question
would likely confuse the respondents with too many options. In addition, since we are not interested inmeasuring their exact WTP, possible anchoring bias is considered less harmful. The notion of latent WTP*
here implies that such WTP* for different choices, such as DS and CS, can be placed along a continuum of
utility range, although WTP for each choice is considered separately here with non-negative values.
31
The logit model is considered here given the relatively small proportion of respondents who expressed
any WTP above zero. Although there are criticisms about using contingent valuation to assess preferences
for public goods, as reviewed in Diamond and Hausman (1994), our examination of ‘comparative WTP’
across different options that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustible is not considered vulnerable
to most criticisms, unless certain options are systematically more prone to bias than other options. Somepossible types of WTP bias are discussed where relevant.

17

(6)

Pr (WTP = k | x) = Pr (τk ≤ WTP* < τk+1 | x) = F (τk+1 − xβ) − F (τk − xβ).

5.2 Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) analysis
Given the difficulties of obtaining true WTP, the latent variables WTP-name* for retaining
surname and WTP-legal* for a preferred legal state are examined in different forms by
the MIMIC generalised structural equation model. The model construct is shown in
Figure 1; two latent variables Attachment and Fairness, determined exogenously in the
structural part, are manifested through several indicators in the measurement part.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
A latent variable, Attachment, is designed to reflect attachment to an individual’s premarital surname, indicating WTP-name* or utility of retaining surname.32 If Attachment
is found to be positive and significant for married surname decisions, this would suggestthat allowing DS would likely increase welfare by enabling individuals to make surname
decisions coherent with their attachment. Attachment is manifested through the following
four response ordinal indicators, from less attached to more attached: (1) surname
preference (q6); (2) opinion on surname representation (q1); (3) feelings about surnamechange (q4); and (4) opinion on the visit to one’s ancestral grave (q12), as detailed inTable 3. The model encompasses another latent variable, Fairness, whose positive/
negative coefficient indicates WTP-legal* or utility for a revised/current legal state. Like
Attachment, it is expressed through three response indicator variables that are considered
to reflect fairness or extended sympathy, in the order of less fair to fairer: (1) legal
preference (q5); (2) views on the inconvenience of using an alia (q2); and (3) surname
preference (q6).33 In addition, a categorical marriage−surname choice in the hypothetical

32

The MIMIC model is an extension of the standard item response theory model which extracts
information through covariances. See Muthén (1988).
33
The appropriateness of ordering is checked a posteriori via correlation coefficients and graphicalexamination. While all ordinal variables, q2, q5, and q6, exhibit coherence with Fairness and q4 and q6
exhibit coherence with Attachment, q1 and q12 exhibit no clear ordinal relationship with Attachment. See
Appendix II.

18

situation in which the respondent faces a name−retaining partner is applied to indicate
either Attachment or Fairness, where choices are, marry–change surname, not marry–retain surname, and marry–retain surname with payment, plus unsure (q7). In the
structural part, both latent variables are determined by a range of sociodemographic
factors, such as gender, age, education, marital status, income, and city size; furthermore,
the number of visits to one’s ancestral grave in the past year is included as a determinantof Attachment.
Let y be a vector of response indicator variables that can be dichotomous, ordinal, or
multinomial, η be a vector of latent variables assumed to be continuous, v and λ beintercept and slope measurement parameters, where the intercept is applicable only in themultinomial case, and ε be the vector of measurement errors. The measurement part ofthe structural model for individual i is expressed as(7)yi = vi + λi ηi+ εi,

and the latent construct follows the linear structural equation system with a vector ofsociodemographic factors xi as regressors:(8)ηi = γi x i+ ζi,which produces the following reduced-form solution for y:(9)yi = vi +λi γi xi + λi ζi + εi,

where λ and γ form vectors of coefficients, and ε and ζ are well-behaved residuals
assuming normality. Here, it is assumed that personal characteristics xi determine thelatent variable ηi, and the response item yi will covariate according to the ηi’s variations.
6. Data
For empirical analysis, we use a set of primary data collected through theinternet/web−based surveys because relevant public opinion survey data on the DS
system collected by the Japan Office of Public Relations in 1996, 2001, and 2006, are19

available only in aggregate form. 34 The web survey (MainWeb2009) conducted in
December 2009 comprises 13 questions and several sub-questions on the topic with anadditional 10 basic sociodemographic questions. Like most web−based surveys in Japan,
this survey uses registered web users cum consumers who can earn shopping/reward
points by completing the survey questionnaire.35 In order to adjust the skewed gender–
age distributions typical of internet survey respondents with a higher representation of
those aged 30–40 years, we utilise a stratified random sampling by applying a
proportional allocation based on the gender–age strata in the population.36 In addition,
the number of survey request emails sent to randomly selected respondents was controlled
at the state/prefecture level in order to reflect the regional population distribution. The
email recipients decide whether to visit the survey website to respond to the questionnaire.
Out of 12,985 requests sent, 2,746 (21.14%) accessed the survey site and 2,124 (16.35%)
completed surveys within 4 days. The effective sample size was reduced to 2,000 after
data cleaning. The average and median response time was 7'02'' and 5'40'', respectively.37
Descriptive statistics are given in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 around here]34

Any original disaggregated data of any survey conducted by the Japan Office of Public Relations are
discarded after the production of its report, which provides only aggregated results, and thus, areunavailable even for academic purposes (personal communication with ministry staff). There were fiveother preceding surveys on DS in 1976, 1984, 1987, 1990, and 1994, although the earlier studies had nolegal amendment to permit DS but focused more on the use of alias. It is only since the 2006 survey that
DS and alias are distinguished. The latest survey was conducted in 2012.
35
The questionnaire used the POTORA site managed by NTT-Navispace. The registered users, called‘monitors’, have to register their personal details, and their record undergoes a regular personal
identification validity check. The monitor characteristics are highly similar to any other web-based survey
monitor panels, with a larger representation of those living in major cities and those aged 30–40 years.
36
While there is a concern for measurement error and selection bias by using a stratified random sampling
method, this method is considered to generate less bias compared to complete random sampling withposteriori weight application. For instance, we could have applied weights for each variable for the analysis
according to the population distribution. However, this posteriori method is considered to produce a higher
magnitude of bias, especially if there is very low representation of certain groups with particularcharacteristics.
37
Respondents who took too short a time to complete the questionnaire were judged ‘non-serious’ andwere removed from the effective sample, together with obvious contradictory responses.

20This web survey is partly supplemented by another web survey that was a trial survey
carried out a few months earlier, in October 2009, with four topic−related questions andthree basic personal information questions (TrialWeb2009). The survey requests were sent
to randomly selected research monitors, yet without any stratification, and 2,279 replies
were collected.38
While there are studies questioning the validity of web−based surveys (Honda &Motokawa, 2005), others support its validity and effectiveness (Koch and Emrey, 2001;
Hudson et al., 2004; Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2006). In order to compare the web andgovernment surveys, we deliberately include several of the same questions in the web
surveys. Comparing them, there are similarities and discrepancies among the survey
responses, and no clear conclusion regarding the survey method superiority could bereached. There seems to be no specific type of trend or bias across all questions, yet there
are certain comparative characteristics. First, older generations tend to be moreconservative, in the sense that they have more negative views regarding the DS system,
explicitly or implicitly. This tendency is seen particularly for the government surveys,
which have disproportionately higher ratios of senior respondents aged 60+ years. On thecontrary, the younger respondents in the government surveys tend to be more ‘liberal’ or‘non-traditional’ in accepting the DS system than their web-survey counterparts. It is
worth noting that the summary results of government surveys are misleading in thatneither the disproportionate age representation nor the respondents’ localities are adjusted
a posteriori. Another noteworthy point is that TrialWeb2009 responses are relatively more
liberal, even after adjusting for their disproportionately higher ratio of younger

38This survey was administered as a trial survey by Cross Marketing Inc., one of the largest survey
companies in Japan, which has high quality-control measures. Because of the complete random sampling
method, gender–age sampling weights are applied. Age categories are in 5-year intervals and respondents’ages vary between 18 and 69 years.

21generations. 39 Descriptive statistics are given in Table 3 and a list of questions andresponse options are provided in Appendix I.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
7. Overview of the current Japanese situation and surname perceptions
Out of the total sample of 2,000, there are 655 men and 824 women who have beenmarried, including divorced and widowed respondents. Of those who changed theirsurnames, women constitute 95%, which is lower but close to the official figure of 96%
reported by the government (MHLW, 2017). About 30% of men and 17% of women who
have changed their surnames have used alias thereafter, suggesting inconvenience in theworkplace associated with surname change.
For opinions regarding surname (q1), respondents were allowed multiple responses withthree main response options, ancestry, oneself, and couple, and the major response isancestry, chosen by 31.8% of respondents as a sole option, and 66.1% in combination
with other options. While this suggests significance of surname lineage, a higher
proportion of men choosing this response is likely to reflect the fact that womencommonly have to abandon their surnames upon marriage. Likewise, a higher ratio ofmen connect their surnames with oneself as an individual (distinguishing oneself fromothers), while a higher ratio of women associate surname with couple (name that
represents family, with the husband and wife at its core). Nonetheless, the oneself
response is reduced for married men by 7.7% and increased for married women by 2.9%.
A Pearson-χ2 test of equal distribution suggests similarities between single men andwomen and dissimilarities between married men and women in the opinions.
For preferences regarding the proposed legal amendment (q5), the most popular opinion
is pro-DS, accounting for 38.8% of responses, followed by pro-alias, accounting for22

28.4%, and by pro-CS, accounting for 25.3% (Table 3 Panel B). The remaining
respondents replied other or uncertain. Regarding gender−wise response ratios, womenare more agreeable to the legal change, and less agreeable to keeping the current state,with the distributional difference statistically significant at the 0.000 level. In addition,
there are statistically significant differences for the responses across age–gender groups,
where the highest proportion of pro-DS is for female respondents in their 20s and 40s, thehighest proportion of pro-alias is for female respondents in their 30s and 50s, and thehighest proportion of pro-CS is for male respondents in their 60s and 50s.
Regarding the type of surname respondents wish to have (q6), 55.6% prefer to have CS
and 11.4% prefer to have DS. Of those wishing to have DS, we observe nearly twice ashigh a ratio of women to men, 14.8% to 7.8%, respectively. A multinomial logit analysis
shows that women are more likely to want DS rather than CS compared to men with arelative risk ratio of 1.97, at a p-value of 0.000. At the same time, 33% of the respondentsof either gender remain unsure about their preference, indicating possible flexibility ofviews or indifference. Of the pro-DS, 20.5% (male: 14.1%; female: 26%) wish to haveDS, while 39.2% (male: 37.8%; female: 40.5%) do not wish to have DS and 40.3% areunsure about their surname choice, of whom half are currently married. The observationthat the majority of those pro-DS who are agreeable to the law change do not choose DS
for themselves matches the actual situations in other countries, where DS is alreadyavailable. This fact also supports the use of two latent variables, Fairness, which reflects
extended sympathy, and Attachment, which reflects own utility.
Regarding whose surname to take, among those respondents who prefer to have CS(q6_1), a striking gender difference prevails, in which men expect to take their own
surname while women expect to take their spouse’s surname. Of those who reply wishing
to have a CS as a married couple, 95.3% of the own responses are men. On the other hand,
97.4% of spouse’s responses are chosen by women. The results reflect the current social
practice of almost always adopting a husband’s surname as a CS. Nonetheless, single men
23are less salient in this tendency and are more likely to reply spouse’s or either. This
statistically significant difference may suggest perceptive evolution and/or naïveté.
Cross-tabulating the CS preference (q6_1) and legal state preference (q5) across gender,a majority of men choose own and a majority of women choose spouse regardless of legal
preferences, although this tendency is particularly high for pro-CS with statisticalsignificance. Among those women who are pro-CS, there are only few own responses: 15(2.8%) out of 534. While the ratio of either is higher for pro-DS and pro-alias, suchtendency is observed particularly for women, with gender difference being statisticallysignificant at the 1% level.
8. Estimation results
The magnitude of welfare gain/loss is examined through WTP expressed by the
respondents. The WTP-name for surname retention indicates the utility gain fromallowing DS. The WTP-legal for supporting a preferred legal state indicates extended
sympathy or external utility towards the CS, alias, or DS system, while that for sustaining
current state indicates extended antipathy or external disutility against the revised legal
system.
8.1 WTP-name for retaining surname
For the marriage–surname choice in the hypothetical situation facing a surname-retaining
partner, the majority prefer marry–change (y10), the second major response is uncertain,
followed by marry–retain with payment (y11) and not marry–retain (y01), for both datasets,
as shown in Table 3 (Panel B q7). Although no table is shown here, there is a higher
proportion of women choosing marry–change while nearly double the proportion of menchoose marry–retain with payment. The majority of those who choose not marry–retain
are male respondents whose choice suggests that the utility of retaining the surname islarger than that of getting legally married, Un > Um, a case that currently leads to de facto
marriage. However, this option is avoided by the majority, regardless of legal-state24

preference, indicating that Um > Un for most respondents. On fairness, 72.2% of antirevisionist pro-CS men wish to keep their names as married surnames, and among those,
24.5% responded that they would not change their own surname in the hypotheticalsituation, choosing marry–retain with payment or not marry options. This implies thatthese men wish to have CS while being resolute in keeping their own surnames, failingto meet the fairness criteria.
The sub-question asking about the WTP to retain own surname (q7_1) applies only tothose who replied marry–retain with payment in q7. Not surprisingly given current
practice, nearly twice as many males express positive WTP-name compared to women inboth data sets: 105 males versus 60 women in MainWeb2009 and 80 men versus 48
women in TrialWeb2009. The major and median categories are the lowest <JPY 5,000(approximately US$ 55 as of December 2009) for both genders in MainWeb2009, and
JPY 10,000 ≤ ~ < JPY 30,000 for men and JP Y5,000 ≤ ~ < JPY 10,000 for women in
TrialWeb2009. The differences between the two surveys may be due to the way in which
the question was formed: MainWeb2009 specified the payee to be a public administration
office, while TrialWeb2009 did not specify any payee but asked the question in a generalmanner. Although the respondents are not asked for their reasons for no WTP, they may
well feel it unjust or unfair to have to pay the public administration if they consider thatsurname choice is a basic individual right, which could result in a ‘protest−zero’ responsein which zero value is stated despite their genuine positive demand for the good.40
Analysing the lower band of expected WTP-name for surname across three legal
policy−preference groups and across gender, shown in Table 4 Panle A, pro-DS all, men
and women have the highest values, apart from pro-alias men in TrialWeb2009. The
expected WTP-name is statistically different between genders in all cases except for (4)40

A study by Whitehead (2006) on the WTP for a special fishing permit allowing holders to retain thepresent quota found the major reason for zero WTP in the CVM method was that respondents fundamentallydisagreed with the policy and perceived such policy as unfair.

25

for TrialWeb2009, which is significant only at the 0.10 level. Likewise in Panel B, thedifference across surname preference (whether one wishes to have a DS or CS) and acrossgender is highly significant, where want-DS have the highest values by large margins in
all cases, but want-CS men in TrialWeb2009. A non-parametric analysis of rank, applying
the Kruskal−Wallis test, reveals significant statistical differences for WTP-name acrossthe legal state preferences and surname preferences in both surveys, regardless of subcategorisation by gender.41[Insert Table 4 around here]
As shown in Table 5 WTP-name (Panel A), all logit estimations find pro-DS to haveodds ratio of more than 2 including estimation (3) with only male subsample, and nearly
4 when interacted with male, at the 0.001 significance level vis-à-vis their base categories
pro-alias. Male is found to have odds ratio of over 2 in estimates (1) and (4). It is worth
noting that pro-CS interacted with male also has odds ratio of over 2, indicating surname
attachment amongst pro-CS men. Surname preference want-DS has statisticallysignificant and high odds ratio of around 4 for all estimations, except for that of 2.6 formale only estimation. Another variable of statistical significance is education, withpositive effects. Thus, we see that having legal preference of pro-DS, wishing for DS,
being male, and/or having more education makes the individual significantly more likely
to be willing to pay for retaining his/her surname, holding other factors constant.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
8.2 WTP-legal for preferred legal state

41

In terms of preferred legal state, positive WTP-name is observed most frequently among pro-DS
regardless of gender, with a particularly high proportion among women (66%). Within the pro-CS group,
less than 1% of women (two) express WTP-name in MainWeb2009 and none do so in TrialWeb2009, while
there are 8.6% and 9% of their male counterparts, respectively. Fisher’s exact test, suggests statisticallysignificant gender differences in all cases except pro-alias and want-DS in MainWeb2009, and pro-DS in
TrialWeb2009.

26

While q5 suggests how people think about the current state of law, the follow-up question
q5_1 elucidates how strongly people feel about it through their WTP to support apreferred legal state. The majority report having no WTP regardless of legal options ineither MainWeb2009 or TrialWeb2009. There are relatively few who expressed WTPlegal: 3% of respondents for MainWeb2009 and 9% for TrialWeb2009. In both surveys,
there may be cases of no WTP-legal due to disincentives for giving money to promote a
certain policy that is typically a public good, or due to ‘protest−zero’. Despite theseprobable interpretations, the very few positive WTP-legal to support their preferred legal
policy state suggests a small magnitude of external utility at the societal level.
The largest group to express positive WTP-legal is pro-DS in both surveys―5.1% and11.6% in the main and trial surveys, respectively. The ratio of WTP-legal response issimilar across genders for pro-DS, while for pro-CS, two to three times as many men
expressed their WTP-legal compared to women in both datasets, indicating ‘strong’opposition to the DS system from pro-CS men (‘strong’ here means ‘with some positive
WTP-legal’). This tendency is supported by the logit and ordered logit estimates in Table
5 WTP-legal (Panel B) that while pro-CS interacted with male has the highest odds ratioof nearly 6 in estimation (7) and (10), pro-CS without male interaction is not statisticallysignificant in other estimations. On the other hand, pro-DS coefficients are found to bestatistically significant with high odds ratio with/without male interaction.
The chosen WTP-legal amount ranges, which are collected only in MainWeb2009, arerelatively low (less than JPY 1000 ≈ US$ 11) in most cases. At the same time, we observe
respondents expressing their WTP of non-trivial amounts. As shown in Panel A of Table
6, there is a significant difference between men and women in terms of the lower band of
expected WTP-legal by the legal policy type; while the pro-CS type has the highest value
among men, the pro-DS type has the highest value among women.42 Despite the fact that42

While Pearson-χ2 suggests a statistically significant difference in WTP-legal across the three legal
preference groups only at the 0.10 level, the non-parametric Kruskal–Wallis test suggests a statistically27hypothetical WTP-legal may not necessarily reflect respondents’ true external utility, theobservation exhibits gender disparity, particularly among those who prefer the current CS
institution. With regard to surname preference, as shown in Panel B of Table 6, there is astatistically significant difference, where want-DS men and women both express higher
values by large margins compared to want-CS and uncertain groups.43 Although there islittle positive WTP-legal, the results indicate that societal individual average welfare is
expected to increase if the law is revised, despite the magnitude of external utility being
relatively small for the society. In addition, it is suggested that legal preferences are lesslikely to be external preferences for those who want DS.
[Insert Table 6 around here]

8.3 MIMIC estimation results of attachment and fairness
The results of the structural equation analysis with the MIMIC model shown in Table 7
contain coefficients for six estimations (1)~(6) with varying variable inclusion for all
samples and subsample estimations (7) for male and (8) for female. The first part (PanelA) shows the measurement and the second part (Panel B) shows the structural estimations
as specified in Figure 1, followed by the goodness-of-fit statistics. The latent variables
Fairness and Attachment are both designed to have positive measures, and each
respondent’s attribute xi is allowed to have different degrees of fairness and attachment tosurname. The following discussion, pertaining primarily to all sample estimation, withsome remarks on subsample estimation, concentrates on the results of marriage-surname
choice (q7) in the measurement part.
A brief look at the structural part of Fairness in Panel B first, statistically significant
robust results suggest that those who are female, are divorced, have more years ofsignificant difference at the 0.01 level.
43
The Kruskal–Wallis test of equality of distribution indicates statistically significant differences acrossthe groups. Fisher’s exact test, applied to test for equality of proportions in small samples, shows
statistically significant gender differences in all WTP-legal among the want-CS respondents.

28

education and/or live in large cities, or those who are single male, are more likely to havehigher degrees of Fairness. For Attachment, there is no clear gender difference, whileboth single and divorced, as well as income have statistically significant robust positivecoefficients. Turning to the measurement part in Panel A, each estimation model has aslightly different construct particularly for the estimation of surname–marriage response
indicators (q7). While models (1)–(3) and (8)–(9) for subsamples have the usual MIMIC
structure, models (4)–(7) have extra categorical variables, legal preference (q5) and/or
surname preference (q6) in place of latent variables in order to observe their particulareffects.44 For each latent variable, one response variable is constrained to 1, which is thealias opinion (q2) for Fairness, and surname opinion (q1) for Attachment, with eachorganised as an ordinal indicator.
[Insert Table 7 around here]
Finally, we inspect the categorical marriage–surname choice (q7) indicators, withuncertain as the base outcome. Faced with a surname−retaining partner, those who choose
marry−change (y10) (1.q7), loadings of Fairness are found to be positive and statisticallysignificant in all four estimations as well as in male subsample estimation (8). On theother hand, those of Attachment are found to be negative and significant in all fiveestimations and two subsample estimations with high magnitudes, which is a reasonablefinding since they are agreeable to change their surname. When legal preference (q5) is
included instead of Fairness in estimation (4), all legal preference types of pro-CS, proalias, and pro-DS have positive loadings vis−à−vis uncertain, understandably, as most
respondents choose to change their surnames in the hypothetical situation. On the other
hand, legal preference (q5) interacted with male included in estimation (5) exhibits
statistically significant negative coefficients for pro-CS and pro-alias. Regarding surname
preference (q6) included instead of Attachment in model (6), want-CS has significant

44

As aforementioned and specified in Figure 1, surname preference is considered to manifest one’s fairness
and surname attachment, and the result is robust to the inclusion of either latent variable.

29positive loading vis−à−vis uncertain, although want-CS interacted with male in model(7) displays significant negative loading. These results suggest that pro-CS, pro-alias andwant-CS men are unwilling to change their own surname despite their CS preference.
Indeed, sex dummy for male included in models (2), (4) and (6) has statisticallysignificant negative coefficients of around −0.57~−0.77, although those effects must be
calculated as −0.64~−0.66 by offsetting with a statistically significant negative Fairness
multiplied by their negative coefficients for male in the structural part estimating
Fairness. Such negative loadings confirm our earlier finding that men are less willing tochange their surnames despite their preference for CS.
Turning to marry-retain surname with payment (y11) (2.q7), loadings of Fairness arefound to be positive and significant in all six estimations including those of subsamples
with higher magnitudes of around 0.9~1.2, while Attachment exhibits opposite loading
signs with or without statistical significance. As expected, male has significant positive
loadings of 0.64 and 0.74 in models (2) and (6), respectively, although it should be offset
to 0.23 and 0.42, respectively, given significant latent variables. Regarding legal
preference in model (4), all types have positive and high loadings in the range of 3.3 to
4.0 at the 0.001 significance level. While it is a reasonable finding for pro-DS, it also
indicates that pro-CS and pro-alias types are willing to pay to retain their surnames
despite their legal preference opposing DS allowance. The magnitude of loadings is in
the order of pro-DS > pro-CS > pro-alias, which is coherent with the findings of the WTPname analysis. The results are similar with slightly less magnitudes for male subsample
estimation (results not shown). Among the estimates with male interaction in model (5),only pro-DS is statistically significant with positive loadings. Regarding surname
preference in model (6), want-DS and want-CS both have statistically significant positive
loadings over 1, although want-CS is significant only at the 10% level when interactedwith male in model (7).

30The third category, not marry−retain (y01) (3.q7), is distinctive in having significant
negative Fairness loadings in all four estimations plus male subsample estimation,
indicating it to be an unfair choice that female, single/divorced, educated, and large city
inhabitants are less likely to choose. The non-significance of Attachment across models
suggests that those who choose not marry and retain surnames may do so for reasons
other than surname attachment. Male has highly significant positive loadings for thischoice, even after offsetting the effects through the latent constructs. In terms of legal
preference in estimation (4) and (5) with male interaction, only pro-CS is statisticallysignificant with loadings of 2.22 and 2.39, respectively. This is coherent with our earlier
findings. Regarding surname preference, statistically significant loadings are 2.36 forwant-CS and 2.94 for want-DS, respectively in model (6), and 3.48 for want-CS with maleinteraction in model (7).
The results for the last two choices , marry-retain surname with payment (2.q7) and notmarry−retain (3.q7), suggest that even though pro-CS oppose the legal change and wantCS want to have common married surnames, they are unwilling to take on their partners’
surnames, and would rather avoid doing so by paying or not marrying. Given that thesetwo choices are more likely to be taken by males, it is deduced that pro-CS and/or wantCS men oppose the legal change, because they do not consider themselves the subject ofsurname change, and thus, fail to put themselves in the shoes of others.
9. Conclusions
We reviewed the current situation in Japan regarding married surnames, especially thelegal situation, and arguments for and against the introduction of a selective dual surname
system. Based on our analytical framework, it was found that the proposed legal change
improves societal welfare, disregarding the external preferences of anti-revisionists.
External preferences, analysed from the perspectives of Bentham, Mill, and Dworkin,elucidated the issue of justifiable composition of social welfare, leading to the discussion31

on fairness. Based on the fairness criteria of Rawls, Harsanyi, and Suppes, conceptualisedas ‘putting oneself in others’ shoes’, the revised legal state was shown to be chosen by
everyone as a fairer state.
The empirical assessment of welfare improvement by surname retention and that offairness was conducted through parametric and non-parametric willingness to pay
analysis as well as generalised structural equation analysis applying the MIMIC model.
The analytical framework and methodology used here offer a completely novel approach,and may be applied to other social issues that involve intangible notions.
The willingness to pay for surname retention revealed that men, regardless of their legal
preference, were significantly more likely to have positive figures on average, although
women wishing for dual surname had a higher likelihood of willing to pay and retain theirsurnames compared to their men counterparts. Indeed, the MIMIC analysis suggested thata dual surname option can increase the welfare of those attached to their surnames. In
contrast, the willingness to pay for preferred legal policy was nil for the majority,
indicating that incentive to support a preferred legal policy is generally small. Still, thehighest expected willingness to pay was expressed by the pro-revisionist and those whowanted dual surname, suggesting inseparable internal and external preferences andpossibility of societal welfare gain if the law were revised. A striking gender difference
among the anti-revisionist and those who want common surname suggested stronger
opposition to the legal revision originating especially from men.
For the marriage–surname choice in a hypothetical situation in the MIMIC analysis,
those who chose not to marry in order to retain their surname were shown to be ‘unfair’.
The fact that this choice as well as that to marry but retain their surname with payment
were made by male anti-revisionists signified that they failed to meet the fairness criteria;
they oppose the legal change and want common surname, yet they would not change theirown surname even when their partners have to retain theirs. Thus, those men reckonedthat their female counterparts were to change their surnames regardless of the situation.
32

In general, the majority of people supported legal revision to allow dual surname,
although there were still those opposed to the revision. Gender disparities were evident
in that women, typically in the position to change their own surnames, were moreagreeable to the legal revision. For surname choice, the majority of men expected to taketheir own surname and the majority of women expected to take their spouses’ surname.
Although we observed a possible sign of perceptive evolution toward a more neutral
choice of surname among younger generations, many of those who were agreeable to thelegal revision actually did not wish to have dual surname themselves or remained unsure
about it. Thus, the proposed revision is most likely to result in greater options rather thana radical change in the social institution or family values, which the opponents fear. This
seems to be in line with the observations from other countries we have seen above. From
both the welfare and fairness perspectives, the legislative amendment allowing theselective dual surname system should be pursued. The fact that anti-revisionist arguments
dominate current government decision making may denote skewed parliamentary
representation on this matter.

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36

Table 1. Opinions for and against the legal amendment regarding selective dual surname (ds) system
Pro-Dual Surname (revisionist)

Anti-Dual Surname (anti-revisionist)

The current law

The revised law• restricts and possibly harms professional achievement of
those who are required to change their surnames• inflicts emotional distress on those who are required tochange their surnames as they feel forcefully incorporated
into their spouse’s family• is inegalitarian, since the majority of those who are
required to change their surnames are women• is costly and requires efforts to change surname, e.g.
changing bank accounts, credit cards, driver’s license• forces de facto couples to endure disadvantages in termsof taxation and social credit• does not reflect the changes in public awareness regarding
the social institution of marriage• allows different surnames which would harm family ties
and result in a dysfunctional family• is a threat to the current system, which is a part ofJapanese culture and tradition• creates a problem in determining the surnames ofchildren• may lead to a situation in which the children of families
with different surnames are bullied

Table 2. Choice-sets and welfare of a couple wishing to get married
Couple Surname Preference Types
State

ChoiceRetain–Retain
HH

W (m1, n1),State1:Marry

Current

Not

WLH (m0, n1),

law

marry

WLH (m0, n1)State2:

Marry

Revised

Not

law

marry

HL

W (m1, n0)

WHH (m1, n1),
HH

Retain–Change

Retain–Indifferent

HH

HH

W (m1, n1),

W (m1, n1),

HH

Indifferent–

ChangeIndifferent

HH

WHH(m1, n1),

HH

W (m1, n1),

W (m1, n0)

W (m1, n0)

W (m1, n0)

WHH(m1, n0)

-

-

-

-

WHH(m1, n1),

WHH(m1, n1),

WHH(m1, n1,0),

WHH (m1, n1,0),

HH

HH

Indifferent–

HH

HH

W (m1, n1)

W (m1, n0)

W (m1, n1,0)

W (m1, n0)

-

-

-

-

WHH (m1, n1,0)-

Notes: m1 = exercise the right to legal marriage; m0 = relinquish the right to legal marriage; n1 = exercise the right to keep
one’s surname; n0 = relinquish the right to keep one’s surname; Wij indicates welfare from marriage (i) and surname (j) choices,where superscripts i,j=H, L indicate high welfare and low welfare, respectively.

37

Table 3. Descriptive statistics (A) and frequencies (B and C)
Panel A: Numerical and Ordinal Variables(a)Min
Max
Variable

Variable

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Min

Max

q1_surname_opinion

3.36

0.89

1

4

q2_alias_opinion

2.81

1.18

1

4

q12_gravevisit_view

2.70

0.56

1

3

sex

1.52

0.50

1

q4_ change_feeling

2.11

1.23

1

2

4

age

49.25

14.72

20

86

q5_legal_preference

2.82

1.20

q6_surname_prefer.

1.56

0.69

1

4

education year

13.75

2.15

6

18

1

3

marital status

1.86

0.65

1

4

q7_marriage–surname

1.81

q11_num_gravevisit

1.92

1.25

1

4

income_self

4.39

4.39

0.5

15

2.24

0

9

city size

2.18

1.30

1

4

Panel B: Fairness and Attachment Related Ordinal/Categorical Variables(b)Freq.
Percent
Freq.
Fairness

Percent

Attachment

q2_alias_opinion

q1_surname_opinion

1. no_inconvenience

498

24.9

1. couple

225

11.25

2. uncertain

112

5.6

2. couple & self/ancestry

495

24.75

3. too_bad

663

33.15

3. self/ancestry

1,166

58.3

727

36.35

114

5.7

1. pro-CS (common surname)

505

25.25

1. united/newlife

999

49.95

2. uncertain

130

6.50

2. mixed

215

10.75

3. pro-alias

567

28.35

3. no_feel/uncertain

362

18.1

4. pro-DS (dual surname)

775

38.75

21.2

-

1.15

4. strange/selfloss
q6_surname_preference

424

23

1. common surname (CS)

1,111

55.55

2. uncertain

661

33.05

228

11.4

4. better_not
q5_legal_preference

other
Fairness/Attachment

q7_marriage–surname

4. uncertain/otherq4_surname_change_feeling

1. marry–change

1,329

66.45

2. marry-retain with payment

169

8.45

3. dual surname (DS)q12_gravevisit_view

3. not marry–retain

54

2.7

1. no_need/no_want

109

5.45

2. neither/uncertain

376

18.8

3. need/want

1,515

75.75

Panel C: Personal Information Related Ordinal/Categorical Variables(b)Freq.
Percent
Freq.

Percent

sex

city size(c)a. male964

48.2

1. others

1,010

50.5

b. female
marital status

1,036

51.8

2. special

156

7.8

3. medium

302

15.1

a. single

521

26.05

4. large

532

26.6

b. married

1,298

64.9

c. divorced

118

5.9

d. widow

63

3.15

Notes: (a) Ordinal variable mean and SD values in panel A are calculated by treating ordering expressed in panel B as numericalvalues for descriptive purpose; (b) Ordered variables are itemised by numbers and categorical variables are itemised by alphabets.
Ordering of q2, q5 and q7 is from less fair to fairer, and that of q1, q4, q6, q7 and q12 is from less attachment to more attachment,
as explained in the main text section 5.2; (b) city size categorisation is based on it legal population as of 2009: large city (daitoshi) ≥ 500,000, medium city (chuukaku-shi) ≥ 300,000, special city (tokurei-shi) ≥ 200,000, others < 200,000; n=2000; SD is
standard deviation.
Data Source: MainWeb2009.

38

Table 4. Lower bound of expected willingness-to-pay for surname retention (ELBWTPn) and rank
analysis by legal preference (q5) and surname preference (q6) across gender

Panel A: WTP-name by legal preference (q5)malepfemale

p

p

DS

AL

CS

DSp

516.5671.77

416.72215.41365.881012.98

388101

236604

19257142560831112447322881370854772765 / 355

16 / 242

2 / 209

43 / 420

15 / 325

25 / 492

108 / 775

31 / 567

0.066

0.010

0.102

0.046

0.051

0.139

0.055

DS

AL

ELBWTPn

583.09873.34rank sum

280657N(a)23/ 283

P(WTP>0)

0.081

0.183

p

all

CS

CS

p

p

p

(1)

ALp

(2)

(3)

343.94(4)ELBWTP

2489.53230.63910.2

0.0

870.6

318.9

1567.6

1899.51930.4rank sum

3297224778682814361771876134913250375069091090000

606472N(a)25 / 284

36 / 412

19 / 245

0 / 167

43 / 533

5 / 30125 / 451

79 / 945

24 / 546

P(WTP>0)

0.088

0.087

0.077

-

0.081

0.017

0.055

0.084

0.044

Panel B: WTP-name by surname preference (q6)malewant-CS

want-DS

femaleuncertain

want-CS

want-DSall
uncertain

want-CS(5)

want-DS

uncertain(6)

ELBWTPn

924.961323.71306.1870.80

2271.2062.93

490.58

Rank sum

55150280708.53442925221271710783053721070000

251787649663N(a)54 / 546

19 / 68

32 / 343

7 / 565

37 / 147

16 / 318

61 / 1111

56 / 215

48 / 661

P(WTP>0)

0.099

0.279

0.093

0.012

0.252

0.050

0.055

0.261

0.073

(7)

2279.20

189.16(8)ELBWTP

3989.02891.3

773.4

59.7

3112.7194.1

2192.03025.7471.1

rank sum

7406621088864510585753691886994789671320000

297585930025N(a)58 / 636

10 / 92

18 / 406

6 / 536

34/ 1428 / 443

64 / 1172

44 / 234

26 / 849

P(WTP>0)

0.091

0.109

0.044

0.011

0.239

0.018

0.055

0.188

0.031

Notes: (a) N for positive WTP and N for all observations; 13 and 24 incoherent cases (pro-CS & want-DS) are excluded for MainWeb2009
and TrialWeb2009, respectively.
Pearson χ2 for ELBWTP: (1) χ2 =100.711 (54df), pr=0.000; (2) χ2 =66.428 (24df), pr=0.000; (3) χ2 =84.478 (63df), pr=0.037; (4) χ2 =37.796 (27df), pr=0.081; (5) χ2 =176.012 (30df), pr=0.000; (6) χ2 =121.072 (12df), pr=0.000; (7) χ2 =181.078, pr=0.000; (8) χ2 =102.806(18df), p=0.000.
Kruskal–Wallis χ2 with ties for rank WTPn: (1) χ2 =81.708 (9df), pr=0.0001; (2) χ2 =56.659 (4df), pr=0.0001; (3) χ2 =46.301 (7df),
pr=0.0001; (4) χ2 =20.982 (3df), pr=0.0001; (5) χ2 =133.543 (5df), pr=0.0001; (6) χ2 =101.847 (2df), pr=0.0001; (7) χ2 =134.135 (5df),
pr=0.0001; (8) χ2 =81.001 (2df), pr=0.0001.
Data Source: MWeb2009 for (1), (2), (5), and (6); TWeb2009 for (3), (4), (7), and (8).

39

Table 5. Logit and ologit estimation of willingness-to-pay for surname retention (WTP-name) and forlegal state (WTP-legal)
Panel B: WTP-legal

Panel A: WTP-nameordered logit

q5_uncertain

q5_pro-DS

logit

ordered logit

(a)

(4)

1.066

1.232

1.08

2.148+

1.487

2.146+[0.314][0.430][0.318][0.959][0.791][0.958]0.139+

0.265

0.142+

0.000

0.000

1

[0.143][0.278][0.146][0.001][0.001][.]2.078***

2.831***

2.115***

2.581*

1.911

2.610*[0.460][0.851][0.470][0.994][0.950][1.005](1)
q5_pro-CS

logit

(2)

(3)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(a)

(9)

(10)

q5_pro-CS

2.394*

2.458*

5.996**

5.964**#male[0.878][0.906][4.072][4.050]q5_uncertain

0.36

0.372

0.000

1

#male

[0.379][0.392][0.003][.]q5_pro-DS

3.805***

3.993***

5.703**

5.776**#male[1.189]q6_want-CS

0.766

q6_want-DS[0.931]maleage[1.258]

0.763

1.199

0.752

[0.170][0.169][0.320]4.070***

3.943***

2.578**[0.903][0.861][0.996][3.673][3.721]

0.749

0.873

0.851

1.525

0.867

0.845

[0.167][0.167][0.297][0.289][0.718][0.295][0.288]4.271***

4.135***

2.145*

2.066+

2.593

2.124*

2.039+[0.966][0.811][0.786][1.549][0.804][0.776]2.345***

2.465***

1.680+

1.688+[0.445][0.476][0.485][0.488]

1.009

1.009

1.009

1.012+

1.012*

0.999

1

1.002

0.999

1

[0.006][0.006][0.007][0.006][0.006][0.009][0.009][0.012][0.009][0.009]education_

1.173***

1.172***

1.115*

1.176***

1.175***

1.078

1.079

1.084

1.08

1.081

year

[0.049][0.049][0.055][0.049][0.049][0.068][0.068][0.087][0.069][0.069]income

0.986

0.986

0.97

0.985

0.985

0.931+

0.929+

0.965

0.929+

0.927+[0.021][0.021][0.029][0.021][0.021][0.036][0.036][0.048][0.036][0.036]

city_special
city_medium
city_large

0.856

0.871

0.8

0.817

0.83

0.363

0.361

0.242

0.354

0.354

[0.297][0.303][0.346][0.287][0.292][0.267][0.266][0.250][0.261][0.261]

1.016

1.026

1.402

0.98

0.989

0.752

0.756

0.395

0.74

0.743

[0.249][0.251][0.398][0.243][0.245][0.304][0.306][0.248][0.299][0.301]

0.988

0.981

1.096

0.968

0.96

0.88

0.877

0.679

0.864

0.863

[0.200][0.198][0.286][0.198][0.196][0.272][0.272][0.291][0.268][0.267]

N

1964

1964

944

1964

1898

1964

1964

944

1834

1834

Ll

-697.3-694.4-433.8-489.1-486.3-308.3-307.3-171.5-251.1-250.1

Chi2

152

157.8

51.04

154.8

148.7

34.22

36.21

16.03

26.22

28.14

AIC

1430.61430.8901.7

1004.31002.5

648.7

652.7

372.9

526.2

528.3

BIC

1531.1

1548

984.1

1076.91085.8

738

758.7

445.7

592.4

605.5

Notes: (a) (3) and (8) are estimates for male only. Cut-off points for ologit and constant for logit are omitted. Results are shownin exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios). For categorical variables, base categories are, q5_pro-alias, q6_uncertain, female, andcity_other (towns). Significance level + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; standard errors in parentheses.
Data Source: MainWeb2009.

40

Table 6. Lower bound of expected willingness-to-pay for legal state (ELBWTPl) and rank analysis bylegal preference (q5) and surname preference (q6) across gender

Panel A: WTP-legal by legal preference (q5)malepro-CS

pro-DS

femalepro-alias

pro-CS

pro-DSall
pro-alias

pro-CS(1)

pro-DS

pro-alias(2)

l

ELBWTP

63.62

33.84

45.47

9.58

61.94

3.08

40.66

49.07

21.17

rank sum

283808359058239253205460423733316276489268782790555529N(a)11 / 283

17 / 355

6 / 2424 / 20919 / 420

3 / 325

15 / 492

36 / 775

9 / 567

0.039

0.048

0.025

0.019

0.045

0.009

0.030

0.047

0.016

P(WTP>
0)Panel B: WTP-legal by surname preference (q6)malefemalewant-CS

want-DS

uncertain

47.99

283.82

rank sum

547250N(a)21 / 546
0.039

All

want-CS

want-DS

uncertain

want-CS

want-DS

20.31

8.89

75.38

0.03

25.22

167.4870542.5

3385545516291506923164121100000

2212346549665 / 688 / 343

7 / 565

9 / 147

10 / 318

28 / 1111

14 / 215

18 / 661

0.074

0.023

0.012

0.061

0.031

0.025

0.065

0.027

(3)
ELBWTPlP(WTP>
0)

uncertain

(4)
9.10

Notes: (a) N for positive WTP and N for all observations; 13 incoherent cases (pro-CS & want-DS) are excluded.
Pearson χ2 for ELBWTP: (1) χ2 =33.381 (36df), pr=0.594; (2) χ2 =24.698 (16df), pr=0.075; (3) χ2 =43.320 (20df), pr=0.002; (4) χ2=31.281 (8df), pr=0.000.
Kruskal–Wallis χ2 with ties for rank WTPl: (1) χ2 =18.461 (7df) and pr=0.0101; (2) χ2 =15.638 (4df) and pr=0.0035; (3) χ2 =17.324(5df) and pr=0.0039; (4) χ2 =10.253 (2df) and pr=0.0059.
Data Source: MainWeb2009.

41

Table 7. Generalized structural equations MIMIC estimations

(1)

(2)

(3)

Indicators
q2_alias_opinionFairness
q1_surname
opinionAttachment
q5_legal_prefer
ence
Fairness

sex_male(7)(8 (a)male(9) (a)female

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

[.]

[.]

[.]

[.]

[.]

[.]

[.]

[.]

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

[.]

[.]

[.]

[.]

[.]

[.]

[.]

[.]

[.]

1.371***

1.458***

1.474***

1.155*

1.155*

1.374***

1.469***

1.666***

1.194***[0.302][0.180][0.175][0.477][0.477][0.356][0.198][0.292][0.234]2.006***

1.995***

1.836***

2.600**

3.071***[0.312][0.325][0.274][0.980][0.657]1.432**

2.249***

2.084***

2.688***

2.634***

2.495***

1.905***

2.771**

1.539***[0.448][0.434][0.371][0.543][0.520][0.519][0.404][0.844][0.313]

1.155***

1.227***

1.523***

1.523***

1.417***

1.034***

0.748***

1.809***[0.181][0.186][0.194][0.193][0.189][0.181][0.163][0.326]-0.368***-0.520***-0.441***[0.095][0.112][0.114]q12_gravevisit_
opinionAttachment

Attachment

(6)

[.]

q4_surnamechange feelings
Attachment

1.q7_marry–changeFairness(5)

Panel A: Measurement Partq6_surname
preference
Fairness
Attachment(4)0.377**

0.214*

0.332**

0.303**

0.372*

0.070[0.130][0.102][0.114][0.106][0.159][0.137]-0.963***-1.262***-1.432***-1.019***-1.064***-0.718***-2.390***[0.193][0.226][0.252][0.169][0.161][0.207][0.539]-0.573***[0.139]-0.772***-0.628***[0.127][0.117]q5_pro-CS

1.911***

q5_pro-alias

2.214***

q5_pro-DS

2.156***[0.246][0.235][0.232]q5_pro-CS

z

#male

[0.191]q5_pro-alias-0.610***#male[0.185]q5_pro-DS-0.269#male[0.177]q6_want-CS

1.339***[0.140]q6_want-DS

0.168[0.213]q6_want-CS-0.368**#male[0.134]42

q6_want-DS

0.176

#male

[0.397]

constant
2.q7_marry–retain withpayment
Fairness
Attachment

1.283***

1.544***

1.394***-0.0191.934***

1.556**

1.409***

0.422

2.320**[0.281][0.330][0.371][0.298][0.238][0.125][0.081][0.319][0.709]0.941***

1.018***

0.911***

0.918***

1.005***

1.190***[0.186][0.168][0.161][0.201][0.244][0.285]-0.266-0.638**-0.595**0.355

0.477*-0.835**-0.020[0.169][0.217][0.208][0.221][0.231][0.275][0.494]

sex_male

0.643**

0.364+

0.737***[0.210][0.188][0.213]q5_pro-CS

3.432***[1.035]q5_pro-alias

3.349**

q5_pro-DS

4.092***[1.025][1.013]q5_pro-CS

0.459

#male

[0.302]q5_pro-alias-0.141#male[0.314]q5_pro-DS

1.016***#male[0.222]q6_want-CS

1.145***

q6_want-DS

1.711***[0.251][0.280]q6_want-CS

0.366+#male[0.221]q6_want-DS

2.012***#male
constant
3.q7_notmarry–retain
Fairness
Attachment
sex_maleq5_pro-CS[0.447]-1.874***-2.100***-1.387***-5.028***-1.584***-3.321***-1.147***-1.952**-3.594***[0.419][0.447][0.370][1.021][0.265][0.508][0.148][0.620][0.944]-0.860**-0.869***-1.089***-0.478*-1.328**-0.248[0.288][0.255][0.303][0.237][0.498][0.653]-0.087

0.095

0.242

0.069

0.067

0.184

3.327

[0.310][0.362][0.346][0.511][0.486][0.392][2.561]

1.154**

1.243***

1.426***[0.391][0.373][0.367]2.223**[0.782]q5_pro-alias

0.979[0.724]q5_pro-DS

0.827[0.662]q5_pro-CS

2.393***#male[0.436]q5_pro-alias

0.961+#male[0.527]q5_pro-DS

0.788

#male

[0.536]q6_want-CS

2.361***

43

[0.530]
q6_want-DS

2.942***[0.656]q6_want-CS

2.081***#male[0.405]q6_want-DS

1.776*#male[0.869]constant-1.940***-3.052***-2.495***-4.319***-3.202***-4.871***-3.162***-1.793**-7.339+[0.401][0.472][0.490][0.813][0.437][0.580][0.361][0.565][3.764]

LatentPanel B: Structural Part

Fairnessmale-0.450***-0.373***-0.373***-0.343***-0.406***[0.072][0.072][0.100][0.100][0.086][0.073]-0.002-0.00265-0.005-0.005-0.004-0.0020.001-0.006[0.003][0.003][0.003][0.004][0.004][0.003][0.003][0.004][0.005]0.080***

0.058***

0.0541**0.076*

0.076*

0.079**

0.048**

0.034+

0.110**[0.023][0.017][0.017][0.031][0.031][0.024][0.017][0.020][0.034]0.253*

0.339***

0.356***

0.280*

0.280*

0.237*

0.324***

0.432**

0.161[0.108][0.094][0.090][0.129][0.129][0.107][0.096][0.136][0.145]marriage_

0.314+

0.455**

0.470**

0.375+

0.375+

0.285+

0.454**

0.439+

0.463*

divorced[0.171][0.156][0.153][0.219][0.219][0.171][0.157][0.234][0.224]age
education_year
marriage_single-0.372***-0.408***[0.090]-0.004

marriage_

0.017-0.022-0.0388

0.119

0.119

0.037

0.010

-0.004

0.021

widow

[0.218][0.190][0.182][0.294][0.294][0.227][0.200][0.389][0.270]-0.006-0.010-0.00864-0.002-0.002-0.007-0.006-0.012-0.006[0.008][0.007][0.007][0.010][0.010][0.009][0.008][0.010][0.012]0.001-0.049-0.0558

0.009

0.009

0.010

-0.049-0.0680.040[0.147][0.129][0.125][0.163][0.163][0.147][0.131][0.157][0.225]incomecity_special
city_medium
city_large

0.085

0.060

0.0574

0.119

0.119

0.090

0.089

0.147

-0.047[0.108][0.096][0.094][0.123][0.123][0.108][0.100][0.126][0.158]0.273**

0.252**

0.239**

0.313**

0.313**

0.276**

0.274***

0.104

0.423***[0.090][0.078][0.076][0.106][0.106][0.092][0.080][0.104][0.127]

Attachment
sex_maleage
education_year

0.046

0.056

0.179**-0.091+-0.089+-0.093+0.055[0.112][0.065][0.067][0.051][0.051][0.053][0.071]-0.004-0.004-0.003-0.003-0.003-0.003+-0.005+-0.006-0.002[0.003][0.002][0.002][0.002][0.002][0.002][0.003][0.004][0.003]0.010-0.0030.000397

0.023*

0.024*

0.019+

0.001-0.0270.013[0.017][0.015][0.014][0.011][0.011][0.011][0.015][0.021][0.017]0.737***

0.493***

0.466***

0.462***

0.460***

0.517***

0.597***

0.762***

0.252*[0.140][0.102][0.099][0.081][0.081][0.088][0.115][0.158][0.102]marriage_

0.812***

0.522***

0.486***

0.507***

0.504***

0.569***

0.614***

0.637*

0.393**

divorced[0.175][0.138][0.133][0.113][0.114][0.115][0.147][0.253][0.127]

marriage_

0.145

0.035

0.0688

0.004

0.006

0.025

0.051

1.021**-0.225widow[0.218][0.189][0.184][0.150][0.151][0.156][0.205][0.384][0.160]income0.033**

0.031***

0.0306***0.017**

0.018**

0.016**

0.028**

0.030*

0.027***[0.012][0.008][0.008][0.006][0.006][0.006][0.009][0.013][0.008]-0.283*-0.233*-0.219*-0.178*-0.178*-0.180*-0.228+-0.142-0.248*[0.127][0.107][0.105][0.085][0.085][0.089][0.119][0.174][0.125]0.004-0.008-0.0154

0.025

0.025

0.004

-0.0530.124-0.166+[0.098][0.082][0.080][0.066][0.066][0.068][0.088][0.125][0.094]0.079-0.068-0.0657

0.029

0.026

0.017

-0.106-0.079-0.071[0.079][0.066][0.065][0.056][0.056][0.058][0.074][0.106][0.069]marriage_single

city_special
city_medium
city_large
num_grave--0.0279+-0.034*-0.039*visit[0.015][0.014][0.018]

44

N

1987

1987

1987

1987

1987

1987

1987

957

1030

Log-likelihood-10336.7-12405.1-13782.1-12508.9-12527.3-13900.7-13845.2-6026.2-6266.4

AIC20761.3

24914.2

27670.3

25131.825168.6

27917.3

27802.4

12146.3

12626.8

BIC

21007.525205.1

27966.825450.7

25487.528241.8a28115.7

12374.912858.9

Notes: (a) Model (7) is estimates for male sub-samples and model (8) is estimates for female sub-samples, both corresponding tomodel (2). The integration method for optimization applies mean-and-variance adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature, and a different
stepping algorithm is used in non-concave regions. For categorical variables, base categories are, q4_nofeeling, q5_uncertain,
q7_uncertain, sex_female, marriage_married, and city_other (towns). Significance level: + p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001;
standard errors in parentheses.
Data Source: MainWeb2009.

45

Structural part

Measurement part

Figure 1. The MIMIC modelz1: Legal
Preference (q5)(categorical)

y1: Legal
Preference (q5)(ordinal)

y2: Alias
Opinion (q2)(ordinal)

z2: Surname
Preference (q6)(categorical)

y3: Marriage–
Surname Choice(q7) (categorical)

y4: Surname
Preference (q6)(ordinal)

η2:
Attachment

η1:
Fairness

y5: Surname
Representation
Opinion (q1)(ordinal)
y6: Surname
ChangeFeelings (q4)(ordinal)y7: Grave Visit
Opinion (q12)(ordinal)

X: Gender; Age; Education; Marital Status; Income; City Size; Num. of Grave Visit

46

APPENDIX I: LIST OF QUESTION AND ANSWERS

Q1
Main

&

Question:

Answer choices:

How do you think of a surname, what does it mean to you?

(1) yourself; (2) ancestor; (3) couple; (4) other;(5)(multiple answers (ma))

don’t know

Do you think there would be some kind of inconvenience(1) there are inconveniences & better not to haveat a workplace if a person has to change her surname due

them; (2) there are inconveniences but that’s the way

to marriage? If you think there are some inconveniences,it goes (too bad); (3) there are inconveniences but not

how would you feel about it? (single answer (sa))

sure how I feel; (4) there is no inconvenience; (5)

Trial
Q2
Main

&

Trial

don’t know
Q3
Main

&

(SQ2). Some people think that one can avoid the(1) inconvenience can be avoided; (2) there would

inconvenience caused by surname change through the use

still be some inconvenience; (3) don’t know

Trial

an alias or “tsusho.” How do you think about this idea? (sa)Q4

Question 4. How would you feel if your surname is(1) united; (2) new life; (3) strange; (4) self-loss; (5)changed due to marriage? Please answer regardless of yourno feel; (6) other; (7) don’t know

Main

&

Trial

marital status. (ma)Q5

How do you think about amending the current law to allow(1) no need to revise the law;Mainselective dual surnames which permit each of the couple(2) fine to revise the law to allow dual surnames;

to retain their original surnames should they wish to do so?

(3) fine to revise the law to allow an alias officially;

The current law dictates that a married couple must have a(4) other;common surname. (sa)(5) don’t know

Currently, a married couple must have a common surname.

(1) no need to revise the law;

However, there are views that it is better to amend the law(2) fine to revise the law to allow dual surnames;in order to allow married couples to retain their original(3) fine to revise the law to allow an alias officially;surnames should they wish to do so. What do you think(4) don’t know

Q5 Trial

about such views? (sa)Q5_1

If an NGO which promotes a legislative policy that

(1) no need to revise the law & no wish to donate;

Main

coincide with your own opinion on dual surname system,(2) no need to revise the law & wish to donate;

would you make any donation to this NGO? (s.a.)(3) fine to revise the law to allow dual surnames &no wish to donate;(4) fine to revise the law to allow dual surnames &wish to donate;(5) fine to revise the law to allow an alias officially& no wish to donate;(6) fine to revise the law to allow an alias officially& wish to donate;(7) others/don’t know

Q5_1

The previous question has asked your opinion about the(1) not willing to pay for my opinion to be reflectedTrial

law amendment to allow dual surnames for marriedin policy making;couples. In order for your opinion to be reflected to policy(2) willing to pay some money for my opinion to be

making, would you be willing to pay some money? (sa)reflected in policy making; (3) don’t know

How much donation are you willing to make?

(1) less than 1,000yen;

Q5_1_1~3
Main(2) 1,000~<5,000yen;(3) 5,000~<10,000yen;

47

(4) 10,000~<30,000yen;(5) 30,000~<50,000yen;(6) 50,000~<100,000yen;(7) 100,000~<200,000yen;(8) 200,000~<500,000yen; (9) 500,000~
Q6 MainIf the legislation is amended to allow a married couple to(1) yes, want dual surnames;& Trialretain their own original surnames, would you wish to(2) no, don’t want dual surnames;choose dual surnames as a couple upon marriage? Please(3) don’t know

reply regardless of your marital status. (sa)Q6_1

For those who replied (2) “No” in Q6, whose surname(1) my own surname;Mainwould you like to take as a married couple? (sa)(2) my spouse’s surname;(3) either one; (4) don’t know

Q7

If you ever have to change your own surname upon

(1) change surname;Mainmarriage, what would you do? (sa)(2) if changing the surname can be avoid by paying
designated fees for public administration, will do so;(3) give up getting married;(4) don’t know

Q7 Trial

If you ever have to change your own surname upon

(1) change surname; (2) if can avoid changing themarriage, what would you do? (sa)surname by paying money, will do so; (3) give up
getting married because do not want to pay money
nor to change surname; (4) either/don’t know

Q7_1

For those who replied (2) “pay fees if can avoid changing(1) less than 5,000yen;

Main

the surname,” how much are you willing to pay to the(2) 5,000~<10,000yen;

public administration? (sa)(3) 10,000~<30,000yen;(4) 30,000~<50,000yen;(5) 50,000~<100,000yen;(6) 100,000~<200,000yen;(7) 200,000~<500,000yen;(8) 500,000~<1,000,000yen;(9) 1,000,000~

Q7_1

You have answered “if can avoid changing the surname by(1) less than 1,000yen;

Trialpaying money, will do so” in the previous question. How(2) 1,000~<5,000yen;much are you willing to pay? (sa)(3) 5,000~<10,000yen;(4) 10,000~<30,000yen;(5) 30,000~<50,000yen;(6) 50,000~<100,000yen;(7) 100,000~<200,000yen;(8) 200,000~<500,000yen; (9) 500,000~

48APPENDIX II: EMPIRICAL BAYES MEANS OF PREDICTED LATENT VARIABLES-2empirical Bayes means for Fairness
-1
0
1
2

3

Predicted latent Fairness over an ordinal response variable q2 (opinion on surname inconvenience)across gendernotmarry uncertainchange pay & retain

notmarry uncertain

malechange pay & retain

female-2

empirical Bayes means for Fairness
-1
0
1
2

3

Predicted latent Fairness over an ordinal response variable q5 (legal preference) across gender

pro-CS

uncertain

pro-alias

pro-DS

pro-CS

uncertain

male

pro-alias

female49

pro-DS-2

empirical Bayes means for Fairness
-1
0
1
2

3

Predicted latent Fairness over an categorical response variable q7 (marriage-surname choice) acrossgendernot marry uncertainchange pay&retain

not marry uncertain

malechange pay&retain

female

50

n
ta
i

pa

y&

re

ge

in

an

ch

ry
ar

ce
un

tm

rta

n

pro-alias

no

y&

re

ta
i

ge

in

an
pa

ch

ry
ar

ce
un

tm

rta

n

uncertain

no

pa

y&

re

ta
i

ge

in

an

rta

ar

ce
un

tm

ch

ry

n

pro-CS

no

pa

y&

re

ta
i

ge

in

an

ch

rta

ce
un

no

tm

ar

ry

-2

empirical Bayes means for Fairness
-1
0
1
2

3

Predicted latent Fairness over an categorical response variable q7 (marriage-surname choice) across q5(legal preference)

pro-DS-2

empirical Bayes means for Fairness
-1
0
1
2
3

Predicted latent Fairness over an categorical response variable q7 (marriage-surname choice) acrossgender and q5 (legal preference)pro-CS uncertainpro-alias pro-DS

pro-CS uncertainpro-alias pro-DS

male

femalenot marrychangeuncertain
pay&retain

51

st
ra

male

52

e/
se

s

os

female
e)

k

e

r/d

(-v

th
e

-v

e)

+v

e&

+v

lif
e(

l/o

lfl

fe
e

ed

w

k

e)

(-v

r/d

e

empirical Bayes means for Attachment
-1
0
1
2
3

male

ng

no

ix

d/
ne

m

ite

s

th
e

os

l/o

lfl

fe
e

-v

e)

+v

e&

lif
e(

+v

w

ed

e/
se

no

ix

d/
ne

m

ite

ng

un

st
ra

un

se
l

se
l

e

e

r

r

st
or

pl

pl

n/
ot
he

ce

ou

co
u

f/a
n
ce
rta
i

e

e

st
or

pl

pl

n/
ot
he

ce

+c

st
or

se
l

ce

un

f/a
n

ce
rta
i

f/a
n

ou

co
u

+c

st
or

se
l

ce

un

f/a
n

empirical Bayes means for Attachment
-1
0
1
2
3

Predicted latent Attachment over an ordinal response variable q1 (surname opinion) across genderfemalePredicted latent Attachment over an ordinal response variable q4 (surname change opinion) acrossgender-1

empirical Bayes means for Attachment
0
1
2

3

Predicted latent Attachment over an ordinal response variable q6 (preferred surname) across genderCS

uncertain

DS

CS

male

uncertainDSfemale-1

empirical Bayes means for Attachment
0
1
2

3

Predicted latent Attachment over an ordinal response variable q12_1 (opinion ancestral grave visit)
across gendernoneed/nownat neither/dk

need/wantnoneed/nownat neither/dk

malefemale53

need/want