Name: Nicola Treloar

Organization: Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment; New Zealand

Submission ID: 56

As attached.

Nicola Treloar
ICANN Governmental Advisory Committee Representative for New Zealand
Senior Policy Advisor | Communications Policy | Building, Resource, and Markets Group |Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment
NEW ZEALAND

by email: public-­‐comments@ianacg.org

8 September 2015

Response to proposal to transition the stewardship of the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA)
The New Zealand Government wishes to acknowledge the work of the IANA StewardshipTransition Coordination Group (ICG) in preparing the combined proposal to transition the IANA
functions, and the extensive work undertaken by the operational communities to provide thatforms the basis of this proposal.
The proposal has been developed through amultistakeholder, bottom-­‐up process that has sought to balance stakeholders’ objectives andensure the IANA functions operator is responsive to the needs of each of the operationalcommunities.
New Zealand is supportive of the United States Government’s proposal to transfer
responsibility for the IANA function to the multistakeholder community, and the principles theUnited States has established for the transition.
The resilience, stability and security of the Internet are of paramount importance to NewZealand. In our view, the transition decision needs to be made carefully, and any new
arrangement should have at least the same level of responsibility, responsiveness andreliability as that of the current arrangements.
We consider the ICG proposal broadly meets the requirements for successful transition of theIANA functions, while noting the remaining implementation items to be completed that arelisted in the proposal. However, the New Zealand Government wishes to note the following
aspects of the proposal that are critical to the transition and/or require further consideration:
Enhancements to ICANN’s accountability are necessary for a successful IANA transition: We
consider the ICANN accountability work being progressed by the Cross Community Working
Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability is necessary in order to fulfil the NTIA criteria fortransition. The CCWG-­‐Accountability work includes, among other things, measures that will
ensure that no single stakeholder group can take control of the IANA functions operation, andCommerce, Consumers, and Communications Branch
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
15 Stout Street, PO Box 1473, Wellington 6140, NEW ZEALANDthat there is sufficient accountability within the names community to ensure that themultistakeholder model will be supported and enhanced in the future.
Escalation process should focus on ensuring stability and security: We consider that aseparation process for the IANA functions operator is necessary to support the stability of theInternet, and to act as an effective accountability mechanism should any issues arise with theoperation of Post-­‐Transition IANA. While initiating a separation process does raise stability
concerns, we would note that the reverse may also be an issue: if security or stability issues
were the reason for seeking separation, a lengthy escalation mechanism could exacerbate
these issues. For this reason, we would question whether the separation process could beinitiated when a specific set of criteria are fulfilled, rather than having to exhaust theescalation remedies first.
ccTLD delegation/redelegation appeals process: The proposal notes the CWG-­‐Stewardship’sview that no appeals mechanism should be developed that would apply to ccTLD delegations
and redelegations.
The CCWG-­‐Accountability 2nd Draft Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations reflects asimilar view. In this document, Stress Test 21 considers a situation where a government
demands ICANN rescind responsibility for management of a ccTLD from an incumbent ccTLDmanager. Noting the ccNSO Policy Development Process (PDP) that is underway on delegation
and redelegation of ccTLDs, this document proposes to exclude ccTLD delegation/redelegation
issues from any appeal mechanism.
While we acknowledge the commitment of the ccNSO in developing a clearer process forccTLD delegation/redelegation, we do not consider an active PDP is sufficient rationale forexcluding ccTLD delegation/redelegation from the IRP.
The PDP process will need to balance the expectations of both governments and ccTLDmanagers, and the breadth of approaches taken to ccTLDs means the PDP is unlikely to be afast process. If ccTLD delegation/redelegation is excluded from an appeals process (such as theIRP) this risks leaving both existing ccTLD managers and governments without effective
recourse in the event of a dispute. While the existing process for delegation/redelegationneeds improvement, these decisions should still be subject to review to ensure that due
process has been followed and documented.

Commerce, Consumers, and Communications Branch
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
15 Stout Street, PO Box 1473, Wellington 6140, NEW ZEALAND