Some New ‘Wicked Problems’ of the Asia-Pacific Regional Maritime
Security: Can Solutions be Found?
Captain (Ret.) Sukjoon Yoon
Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy
Abstract
Regional maritime security has clearly wanted improved structures andmechanisms since early 2010. In 2011 Dr. Sam Bateman published anarticle, “Solving the ‘Wicked Problems’ of Maritime Security: Are
Regional Forums up to the Task?” identifying a number of intractableproblems. Recently, Bateman’s list has been overshadowed by a varietyof new ‘wicked problems’ and all parties continue to dig the hole deeper.
These new issues faced by the East Asian nations include: the impact ofdomestic politics upon maritime security, the difficulty of striking abalance between the US and China, the struggle for self-reliant defense
through rearming, the dearth of alternative models for maritime
cooperation, the blurring of operational roles between navies andcoastguards, and the reluctance to turn to legal mechanisms of dispute
resolution. In Bateman’s original exposition, the ‘wicked problems’
were directly applicable to current maritime security, but denoted some
negative outlook. This paper is hopeful that the nations of the region
might be willing to put the past behind them, so that some of themounting catalog of issues can be resolved. If effective solutions are
ever to be found, then the nations in dispute will inevitably have to adopt
a more flexible mindset and break out of the perilous and unproductive
cycles of action and reaction. The key aim of this paper is to identify
trust-building strategies through which the nations of the region can
mitigate their quarrels and collaborate in solving the challenges ofregional maritime security, including both old and new ‘wicked
problems’.
Keywords: Sino-American maritime rivalry, Regional maritime security,
Maritime cooperation, Naval forces & coast guard

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Introduction
This article considers the implications of some new ‘wicked
problems’1 in the East Asian seas, which are affecting regional maritime
security in a variety of unexpected and unwelcome ways. It analyses the
specific issues and the factors impeding the realization of achievable andappropriate solutions. Remarkably, it is the looming prospect of theworst scenarios, involving widespread, intense and persistent maritime
confrontations and conflicts around the region which may stimulate fresh
thinking and provide the impetus required for finding alternative
solutions. The new ‘wicked problems’ faced by the East Asian nations
include: the impact of domestic politics upon maritime security, thedifficulty of striking a balance between the US and China, the struggle
for self-reliant defense through rearming, the dearth of alternative models
for maritime cooperation, the blurring of operational roles betweennavies and coastguards, and the reluctance to turn to legal mechanisms ofdispute resolution. The key aim of this paper is to identify trust-building
strategies through which the nations of the region can mitigate theirquarrels and collaborate in solving the challenges of regional maritime
security, both old and new. Is it possible to find any grounds for
optimism, and is there hope for a more peaceful and secure region in the
future?
The Original ‘Wicked Problems’ of Maritime Security
In 2011 Dr. Sam Bateman published an article, “Solving the ‘Wicked
Problems’ of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to the Task?”,which identified a number of issues that have proved strongly resistant tosolution and are seriously compromising the maritime security of theregion. Bateman’s list of ‘wicked problems’ included the different
interpretations of the United Nations Convention of the Law of Sea(UNCLOS), the failure to preserve good order at sea, the numerous
conflicting claims to maritime jurisdiction, the implications of increased
naval activity in the region, and the lack of settled maritime boundaries.
He was optimistic about the prospects for solving these problems, basedon some indications of a new willingness to acknowledge past mistakes,
but his hope has proved vain, and his expectations have been
overshadowed by some new ‘wicked problems’ not on his original list.2
As well as these ‘wicked problems’ there are also long-standing
problems, and all of them involve highly complex issues which aredestabilizing the national and international maritime security

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environment of the region.3
In Bateman’s original exposition, ‘wicked problems’ were notdirectly applicable to current maritime security, but denoted some
negative outlook.4 They could be defined as robust and divisive
perspectives upon regional maritime security with a negative impact onnational and regional maritime strategy and policy, especially relating to
the potentially chaotic transition from the current major maritime power,
the US, to an emerging maritime power, China, and to the fundamental
discrepancies between preserving maritime rights and interests andsecuring maritime peace and good order. Such ‘wicked problems’ aretypically compounded by deeply held suspicion and distrust left overfrom existing friction over long-standing problems, by extraneous
domestic factors like unruly nationalism, by the inevitable involvementof third parties in maritime disputes, and by the trend toward rearming
and transferring naval arms among allies.5
In the changing maritime environment the new set of ‘wicked’maritime problems may be distinguished from traditional maritime
problems such as naval rivalry from historical legacies, territorial
disputes in confined seas or around islands, and various transnational
maritime threats collected together under the heading of maritime
insecurity. Although these long-standing problems have been managedby bilateral or multilateral maritime cooperation mechanisms formulated
by established maritime actors and coastal nations with an interest in
regional maritime security issues, the new ‘wicked problems’ may notprove as amenable to negotiation, which will have serious consequences
for maritime peace and stability. There has been some movement toward
addressing regional maritime security, and such developments have
perhaps provided grounds for optimism. Thus, the South China Sea(SCS) disputes are the subject of talks on implementing the ASEANChina Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea(DOC). Unfortunately very little progress has been made, due to theincompatible differences inside and outside the region, leading to a
general lack of momentum.6
Even when progress has been made, as over the Somali pirate threatsaround the Gulf of Aden, it has done nothing to shake the traditional
thinking on regional maritime security: the long-standing problems
persist, being largely blamed on the misinterpretation of UNCLOS.
Meanwhile, the region is smoldering with emerging new ‘wicked
problems’: intractable frictions and vicious confrontations have led to

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new depths of distrust, between China and Japan over the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute in the East China Sea (ECS), andbetween China and ASEAN over the SCS disputes; and there has also
been vigorous peer competition between China and the US, and between
China and Japan, to control and consolidate their use of the East Asian
Seas and maintain or establish regional maritime dominion.
A Survey of Emerging New ‘wicked problems’: Maritime Security in
TurmoilA number of new and emerging ‘wicked problems’ can be identified,
which are likely to disturb or disrupt maritime peace and good order inthe seas of East Asia, with the prospect of a severe deterioration in
maritime security, leading to potentially unmanageable or unpredictableconsequences.
Hard-to-Control Domestic Factors
The nations of the region are constrained in their approach to thelong-running maritime territorial disputes by strong domestic sentiments,
with domestic politics, often stridently nationalistic, bearing much of theblame for regional maritime insecurity.
Recently, however, East Asia claims to have had enoughconfrontation and friction. Throughout the region, and also in the US,
new administrations have come to power, and, remarkably, all havespoken in support of regional maritime peace and cooperation,
apparently moving beyond the political clashes of 2010-2012 which
proved so divisive. The most surprising convert to this new approach theyoung North Korean leader, Kim Jung-un, has appealed for improved
relations. The new East Asian leaders are focusing on new issues,
notably on ensuring increased social welfare and health provisions,despite the slowdown in their economies, which should divert the most
uncontrollable displays of popular nationalism. Across the varied
political systems in East Asia, the new leaders from the US, China,
Japan, North and South Koreas are dynastic successors, and they may
feel more able to take a moderate approach to maritime sovereignty
issues. Initially, they may face opposition from more conservative
forces, but, with the current maritime territorial disputes becoming morevolatile and violent the new leaders are seeking to restrain monolithic
nationalism and other internal factors from escalating into physicalconfrontation.

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So far, however, the new governments in the region have taken arobust attitude toward regional maritime security, following a win-all-orlose-all strategy, especially concerning the acquisition of natural
resources from the sea, as part of a broader emphasis upon maritime
jurisdictional interests and historical rights, while still abiding within theregulations of UNCLOS. During the last decade, in response to theirdomestic constraints, the nations of the region have taken turns playing at
being the “good government” or the “bad government” in their approach
toward maritime disputes. In order to be perceived by their people as a“good government,” the Chinese leaders are turning towards their “bluelands,” including their maritime territorial waters and Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZs), demonstrating that that self-sufficiency is nolonger an adequate strategy to ensure their national prosperity.
This hard-line approach can be seen from Beijing’s formal
designation of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands as a “core interest” opens up
the possibility of the very worst scenarios in their dispute with Tokyoand makes the slide toward armed conflict harder to reverse.7 The
sudden decision by the Japanese government to bring three of the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands into public ownership, as well as blatanthistorical revisionism by the Chinese had already fanned the flames.
Recently, the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe chose an awkward
moment to indulge his own impulse toward historical revisionism bysignaling his unwillingness to endorse the statement made by an earlier
Prime Minister, Tomichi Murayama, apologizing for Japan’s wartime
militarism. There was also a visit by 168 Japanese politicians to the
Yasakuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are commemorated inrisking damage to relations with Seoul and Beijing – and Washington,
too.8 Tough attitudes also prevailed in the dispute over the Kuril Islands,
known as “The Northern Territories” or Chishima Islands in Japan.
Facing strong internal nationalist sentiments, neither Japan nor Russia
has been willing to agree a resolution.9 The Japanese government insiststhat the Northern Territories were occupied by the Soviet Union at theend of the Second World War, and, given Japanese domestic sentiment,
has meant that their ownership has remained in dispute ever since,
preventing these two nations from signing an official peace treaty. It is
unfortunate that the US can no longer mediate from a position of strength
in these deteriorating situations. In the absence of the US as a credible
moderator of the competing claims, in the ECS between China andJapan, and in the SCS between China and ASEANs, domestic factors

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may prove crucial in escalating tensions and increasing the chances of amilitary clash.
Trapped by Sino-US Maritime Rivalry
Another new ‘wicked problem’ is the challenge of striking a balancein an era of Sino-American maritime rivalry. This unwelcome
development confronts the nations of the region with a dilemma, making
it more difficult to maintain a strategic balance when Chinese maritime
power is waxing and US maritime power is waning. Surely, relations
with the US and China need not be a zero-sum game for East Asian
nations, yet the rise of China and the continuing tensions with the US has
already led to a reappraisal of their relations with the US. Because the
US is currently rebalancing to Asia, a policy proceeding in parallel with
China’s naval rise to become, potentially, a near-peer maritime
competitor, the other nations of this region have been greatly influenced
by Sino-American maritime hegemonic rivalry over the last decade, andthe pressures can only get worse.
For these nations, strategic autonomy is essential if they are to strikea successful balance between the rise of China and the US decline, which
requires a well-developed strategic sensitivity to regional maritime
security. Relations with the US have historically relied heavily uponmaritime security, despite the presence of US land forces in several
nations, including South Korea, Japan, and Australia; meanwhile, theireconomic dependence upon China has never been greater, and continues
to grow. The disparate interests expressed by the US and China
regarding the East Asian seas have obliged the other nations of the region
to strive for a balanced relationship between the two great regional
powers: China regards its maritime sovereignty as a “core interest” andthe US has designated the freedom of the East Asian seas as a “criticalnational interest”.10
At the same time as the US is beefing up its bilateral naval exercisesand drills with its allies and partners in the region in keeping with its“pivot to Asia” strategy, China is displaying its burgeoning militarymight through gunboat diplomacy in the disputed and politicallyturbulent waters of the ECS and SCS. Remarkably, the US navy sent an
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) and a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) to
participate in bilateral naval drills with its allies during the maritime
crises in the West/Yellow Sea, the ECS and the SCS over the last two
years. And until recently, the US navy remained committed to its pivot

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to Asia: with the relocation of a battalion-strength US Marine Corps toAustralia on a rotational basis; and the controversial and disruptive
deployment of the first US Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the USS
Freedom to Singapore in March 2013. This innovative vessel, sporting a
new ‘dazzle’ camouflage scheme, has been deployed to the Asia-Pacificfor an eight-month period and has already taken part in a series ofbilateral naval exercises known as Cooperation Afloat Readiness andTraining (CARAT) with regional coastal navies. For China, thecommissioning in September 2012 of the first Chinese aircraft carrier –the 58,000-tonne Liaoning – together with the demonstration two months
later that a Shenyang Aircraft Corporation J-15 strike fighter could
successfully take off from and land on the vessel, all is evidence that thePeople’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has evolving ambitions to
conduct “Far Seas” operations, as illustrated by <map 1>. It is
anticipated that the Liaoning will sustain a presence in the West/Yellow
Sea, and, in the foreseeable future, in the ECS and SCS as well. These
extraordinary Chinese efforts must be seen in the context of the Chinese
government’s ambition to bring larger aircraft carriers into service in thenear future, in the ECS and SCS, and to secure a dominant position in theWestern Pacific Seas where ESGs and CSGs have already been visitedby the US navy.
Map 1: The Chinese “First” and “Second” Island Chains(Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress:
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China(Washington, D.C.: 2012). p. 32)

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In reality, the changing numbers tell the nations of the region themost important facts about Sino-US maritime rivalry, and these numbers
are already having a marked strategic impact as the operational gaps
between two naval powers are acknowledged. Recently the US navy
revised its overall fleet size requirement from 313 to 306 ships – a severe
downscaling which reflects the ongoing budget crisis.11 The policy of“sequestration” is sure to damage the US navy’s forward deployment
capability in response to crises in the Asia-Pacific, despite the US pledgeof a pivot to the Asia-Pacific region. Even the existing US fleet has been
forced to shrink from 285 to 235 ships, with the US navy unable to meetcurrent expectations.12 The navy has started gradually standing down atleast four wings, beginning in April, and is already making adjustments
to the number of ships at sea. Air Force flying hours for training will also
be cut, and the Army will stop training all units except those deploying to
Afghanistan.13 In fact, as <Map 2> shows, the US needs to maintain two
strategic operational zones: a triangle in support of Japan; and aquadrangle to support South Korea and the core Asian allies and partnersof the US.14
Map 2: US Asia-Pacific Strategic Dynamics(Source: Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake, “Pivot point: Re-shaping US
maritime strategy to the Pacific,” Jane’s Navy International, April 2013, p. 22)

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According to IHI Jane’s Defence Weekly, as a result of the recent
sequestration, the February deployment to the Middle East of a CSG led
by the USS Harry Truman (CVN-75) has already been cancelled, leaving
just one carrier in the CENTCOM area of operations instead of the usual
two.15 And a recent issue of IHI Jane’s Navy International has revealed
that the ongoing budget impasse in the US Congress is causing delays tothe deployment of war fighting mission modules for the LCS program:the US navy wants to acquire 16 Anti-Submarine Warfare mission
modules, 24 Surface Warfare mission modules, and 24 Mine
Countermeasure mission modules.16 The impact of the sequestration isso severe that Dr. Euan Graham, senior fellow with Singapore’s Nanyang
Technological University, suggests that the LCS deployment should beconsidered merely symbolic and nothing more –simply for “presence”.17
The extent of Chinese naval assets, in contrast, has been growing
with marked increases in the Maritime Surveillance Agency (MSA)
vessels and aircraft used to protect China’s aggressive territorial claims
over the East/South China Sea. The MSA is equivalent to the US Coast
Guard, and it operates under the direction of the State Oceanic
Administration (SOA) in cooperation with the PLAN. The MSA has
recently announced a remarkable long-term strategy known as “the 700
ships plan,” the number to be achieved by 2020, to safeguard Chinese
maritime rights and interests by guarding approximately 6,400 islands inabout 1.9 million km of ocean.18 Then, there is the semi-indigenous
aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, the newly refurbished Dazhu Shan naval
base operating out of Qingdao on the Yellow Sea, the homeport ofChina’s North Sea Fleet. The Liaoning (pennant number 16) has been
seen accompanied by a support vessel, the Xi Xiake (pennant number88), together with some frigates and the PLAN’s new trimaran vessel, in
a 9 January 2013 image taken by DigitalGlobe.19 The PLAN is also
intending to build twenty of a new corvette, the Type 056, to use for“offshore” control –within the area known to the Chinese as the “firstisland chain,” and the first of these corvettes, the Bengbu, was built at the
Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard in Shanghai and entered service on 12
March 2013.20
These developments, and the ongoing Sino-US naval rivalry in thedisputed waters, threaten to overwhelm the nations of the region. They
hardly know what strategy to adopt, after the “Chinese Version of theMonroe Doctrine” which for the last few years has sought to convince its
neighbors to accept the Chinese maritime territorial claims as a fait

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accompli, and the US “Rebalancing to Asia” strategy which was
instrumental in provoking a truculent “militarism,” notably in Japan.21
Of all the new ‘wicked problems’, this one should surely encourage
the nations of the region to embrace a more collective burden-sharing
approach to mitigate regional maritime insecurity. Despite the US
efforts to reassure its allies and partners and assert its long-term interestin the Asia-Pacific region through its rebalancing initiative, a growing
body of opinion is questioning whether the US can actually retain its
capability to assure peace and stability in the region, particularly in themaritime domain, in the manner which the allies and partners of the US
have come to expect since the end of the Cold War.22 Thus, the April
2013 issue of IHI Jane’s Navy International carried an article titled“Pivot point: Re-shaping US maritime strategy to the Pacific” which
pointed out that “the rise of China’s maritime power indicates that allies
and partners have to reconsider whether that assumption [of the US role]
may be true or not”. Others have gone further, stating that “without
enabled allies or partners in the Asia-Pacific region, the US will not beable to exercise its naval capabilities and execute an effective maritime
strategy”.23 In another example Indonesia has expressed concerns aboutchoosing the “least bad” option to maintain its geographically strategic
position of thwarting its Archipelagic Sea Lanes (ASL), without
obviously picking sides in the big power game.24 Already, the PLAN’s“patrol and training missions” in the vicinity of regional transit passages,
such as the ASL, may be proving too close for comfort.25 While it is theprerogative and right of Beijing to conduct naval and maritime activities
in international waters within the provisions of international law, China’s
gunboat diplomacy in areas also claimed by other nations is
inflammatory, and will only serve to heighten tensions. If the US is toretain its access and the ability to project its naval power, then it is only amatter of time before US allies and partners are obliged to take on more
responsibility, with unpredictable consequences for their future
prosperity and for peace in the East Asia seas. Amid the ongoing SCS
territorial disputes, the economic development of Southeast Asia has
fuelled naval modernization and expansion of the region’s navies.26
Thus, Sino-US maritime rivalry traps the nations of the region in a
predicament: how can they maintain a strategic balance facing theunwelcome decline of the US and troubling rise of China?

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Deficient Policy Guidelines and Operational Protocols
The lack of clear policy-based guidelines and operational protocols
for on-scene commanders to follow is a potential trigger for theescalation of current maritime conflicts in confined seas. This is anothernew and serious ‘wicked problem’ which seems likely to have a negative
impact upon regional maritime security. In disputed waters, both navies
and civilian administrative authorities often assert their military might,
and these frequent patrolling and safeguarding activities lead to increased
tensions between the rival claimants. It seems entirely possible that warlike confrontation could arise as a result of miscalculation or
misunderstanding during the ongoing military and physical posturing
between the quarrelling parties. In peacetime, navies should adopt asingle unified command and control structure and implement a “no firstuse policy.” Unfortunately, there is a culture of militarism whichpervades the Asia-Pacific region, exerting significant influence upon
official policy of nations like Russia, China, South Korea, North Korea
and Japan; so there is a tendency to conduct opaque and misleading naval
operations in the vicinity of the disputed areas, as can be seen from theexamples in the following paragraph. To ensure maritime security, theuse of armed force by naval powers should be rationalized andstandardized in two respects: Operational Plans (OPLANs) should beformulated to identify the Area of Operation (AO), and clear-cut Rules ofEngagement (ROE) should be promulgated. Whenever the nations of theregion formulate any operational decree, the extent of the AO must be
clearly specified and all naval operations should be restricted by detailed
OPLAN manuals.
Two recent, dangerous confrontations have demonstrated theurgency of this problem: between the PLAN and the Japanese maritime
self-defense force (JMSDF) near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in early
201327; and between Taiwan and the Philippines west of the Philippines
island of Batan on May 9, 2013, in which the Philippines coastguard shotand killed a Taiwanese fisherman.28 To ensure maritime security, both
Japan and China should identify which parts of the disputed areas havebeen designated as AOs. According to the nature of the operations
assigned by high command to the on-scene commander specific ROE
apply, and the AO should be determined by the Area of Interest (AOI)
and ROE protocols, rather than the Area of Responsibility (AOR) andwar-fighting manuals which apply during wartime naval operations. The
sea area in which the navies of China and Japan are drawing closer to

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war is, effectively, the high seas, so it is legitimate for them to conduct
peacetime operations pursuing their political and diplomatic objectives.
An AO in which the PLAN turned their fire-control radar on and off,
presumably without any input from their supreme command, is not an
AOR, but an AOI. In the case of Taiwanese-Philippines dispute in May
2013, the use of military weapons and systems could not be properly
sanctioned, even as a response to hostile actions by their opponents, suchas collision maneuvering and moving gunnery to aim toward ships at sea.
This problem arises from the “Fog of War,” following Clausewitz’s
aphorism that “war is the continuation of policy by other means”.
Given the blurring of lines between peacetime and wartime
operations in the disputed seas, there is reason to be seriously concerned
about the escalation of maritime territorial disputes, such as the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands altercation between the PLAN and the JMSDF,
into full-blown military confrontations. Actual physical skirmishes havealready occurred; in 2001 there was a collision between a US EP-3 navy
plane and a Chinese PLA Air Force J-8 jet fighter off the coast of
Hainan, and in 2009 the USNS Impeccable clashed with Chinese quasigovernmental vessels in the SCS. Naval assets deployed in near the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the ECS include relatively heavy guns,
missiles, and air assets such as ship-borne helicopters which provide
targeting. In this prolonged standoff between China and Japan, which
has continued for a year without any diplomatic consultations, a soundtop-down chain of command system with clear-cut operational
regulations including ROE and OPLANs should provide the on-scenecommanders with clear guidance, resulting in more prudent behavior
from individual units in chaotic situations. Apparently, rigid andambiguous command and control systems have apparently seriously
misled on-scene commanders in the recent incidents.
Both Japan and China should designate the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
AOR a joint operation of their land, navy and air forces and remove theirnaval assets from the joint chain of command. This would allow
effective unity of command for the joint forces. Japan has established a
Joint Chief of Staff of Self-Defense Forces for joint operations andchallenges, such as providing humanitarian assistance to victims oftsunamis and other natural disasters, with operational control over land,sea and air forces; but this helpful innovation has not been applied to the
JMSDF’s operations in disputed waters, such as the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands. It is imperative, given the lack of definite wartime OPLANs orInternational Journal of Korean Studies • Vol. XVII, No. 2

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peacetime ROE manuals, that naval operations be placed under a single
command and control apparatus. Well informed sources suggest that the
JMSDF was primarily to blame for misleading the Japanese Joint Chiefof Staff, the JMSDF, in the dangerous confrontations between the
JMSDF and the PLAN on the high seas near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
in early 2013.29 For China, because of the embedded linkages between
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the PLA and the Chinese
government, it is inherently unclear who is in charge; and many Chinawatchers have highlighted the consequences of these confused power
structures. The overlapping authority between the CCP and the PLA issurely a recipe for chaos when China uses military force in the disputed
areas.
Third Party Intervention and Involvement
External intervention in regional maritime disputes is emerging as animportant new challenge, which complicates the attempt by individual
countries to assert their national maritime jurisdictional rights and duties,
in particular concerning EEZs. Third party involvement in the bilateralor multilateral disputes in the East Asian Seas is aggravating matters byadding further layers of complexity. The recent ratcheting up of SinoAmerican maritime rivalry, rather than simply maintaining the regional
status quo, has led to more frequent direct and indirect intervention andinvolvement by China in maritime affairs, with the US response also
playing a more disruptive role.
Despite the fact that third parties have no legal rights or interests inbilateral maritime disputes in confined seas, the US has recently become
actively involved in the quarrels between China and Japan, and between
China and ASEAN members like Vietnam and the Philippines.30 While
one might hope for the US to set an example by acting responsibly, andavoiding behaving in such a way as to make regional maritime security
problems more intractable, it seems that US treaty obligations establishedduring the Cold War, specifically the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT)
security commitment to Japan, have persuaded the US to support Japanin its ongoing Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute with China, and may becausing the US to react more and more robustly to what it sees asprovocations by a near-peer adversary, China. When the US expressed
its concern about maritime escalation in both the ECS and SCS, giving
unexpected verbal assurances to its allies and partners by reiterating its
treaty commitments, especially the SFPT, there was an immediate

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deterioration in the regional maritime security environment. In the caseof the Scarborough Shoal stand-off between China and the Philippines in
April 2012, the US navy dispatched hi-tech Intelligence Surveillance andReconnaissance (ISR) assets, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
to monitor activities by Chinese factory fishing vessels. Reacting to the
SCS disputes, the US navy also conducted joint naval exercises with thenavies of weaker nations, such as Vietnam and the Philippines. During
2012, the US conducted more than 170 military exercises in the AsiaPacific region, with its Marine Forces Pacific involved in more than 100
exercises and events, spreading across 48 countries both inside andoutside the AOR; though the US’s imminently anticipated defense cuts
will likely have a negative impact on its allies and partners.31
Recently there have been several dangerous flare-ups around
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and Beijing has vehemently denounced Japan’s
decision to nationalize the ownership of these disputed ECS islands, but
the situation became more serious after Washington expressed its support
for the status quo, acknowledging Japanese sovereignty over the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Third party interference, in this case from
China, also undermined ASEAN’s attempt to reach agreement on a joint
communiqué implementing a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in
the South China Sea (DOC).32 At the July 2012 ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting, Cambodia, which held the rotating chair, strongly defended
China’s position.33 It is believed that Cambodia had come under heavypressure from China to block this protocol, which was intended toconstrain further encroachments upon ASEAN members’ maritime
sovereignty, particularly by China. ASEAN is now fragmented on SCS
issues, especially over the illegal fishing at the Scarborough Shoal
already mentioned and the award of oil concessions inside Vietnam’s
EEZ by the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC).34 For
ASEAN, the complex management mechanisms envisaged for DOC in
the implementation guidelines drawn up in 2012, with their legallybinding “Code of Conduct (COC),”35 represent the last best hope ofresolving such problems.36
Any US involvement in bilateral territorial disputes is very likely to
provoke a counter-response from China, which complicates the situation
further and has a negative impact on relations between China and its
neighbors.37 Indeed, the effect of these developments has beenmagnified by the maritime rivalry between the US and China.38 During
the recent Chinese power transition, the PLA was the dominant influence

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in China’s dealings on maritime issues with Japan and also with someASEAN members: planes were dispatched to the Philippines andVietnam for maritime geographical survey purposes, and to safeguard the
MSA operations near disputed waters in the ECS and SCS. The PLA
clearly interprets recent US involvement with the bilateral maritime
territorial disputes as an aggressive stance, and is therefore treating the
disputing parties in an adversarial manner, systematically seeking tocounter US naval activities in East Asian seas.
Blurring the Operational Roles of the Navy and Coastguards
There has been a recent tendency for the distinction between thenature and functions of different kinds of maritime assets, especiallybetween navies and coastguards, to be obscured. The relationshipbetween maritime law enforcement and security forces has also become
more complex, which has impacted situations with overlapping claims todisputed islands in the East Asian seas. The standard arrangement is forthe coast guard to protect civilian fisheries and sea-borne commercial
activities within a legal framework, while the navy concentrates on sea
control duties. The enhancement of national coastguard fleets across theregion, and the expansion of their role, is taking place for a variety of
economic, legal and constitutional reasons. Bateman mentions several: torelieve an overburdened navy from missions and roles in whichneighboring countries might perceive it as threat, to sidestep the
restrictions of a pacifist constitution by deploying more “sensitive” coast
guards rather than the navy in disputed waters, and to allow budgetary
resources not allocated to defense spending to be diverted to a country’s
maritime operational assets.39
To some extent, however, the practice of employing coast guards toprotect maritime sovereignty and for jurisdictional issues is a misuse ofnaval assets, with coastguards overstretched by the functions and roles of
the navy. In theory, the coastguard provides support for navies in theirmilitary role, whereas navies support the coastguard in their policing andlaw enforcement duties. Recently, some nations in the region, especiallyChina, have deliberately blurred the distinction between the two, which
has made maritime operations in the disputed waters of the ECS and SCS
increasingly complex. China has highlighted the active role of its coast
guard through its long-term plans to build coast guard vessels for use in
the disputed waters. This has also been shown by the overextended roles
and missions of China’s Maritime Surveillance Force (CMSF) operating

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under the SOA, which has been used to bolster naval deployments toprotect Chinese core interests in the ECS and SCS. Indeed, the CMSF is
as much a political tool as the PLAN in promoting China’s vision for arenewed “Middle Kingdom” regional order. So, while the US navy andcoastguard are struggling to fund extended operations, laboring under
their unachievable fleet plans, the Chinese SOA is building strong andcapable MSA vessels, planning 700 ships by 2030, to protect their selfdefined maritime rights and interests in the region.40 This calculated
blurring of the distinctions among major maritime forces, between theroles of navy and coastguard in the disputed waters, is another new‘wicked problem’ undermining the maritime security of the region.
Advanced Missile Technology and WMDs in Regional Seas
There is a growing problem with advanced missile technology andweapons of mass destruction (WMD), which a number of nations havebegun deploying in East Asian seas. The maritime dimension of therebalancing of US military powers involves the shifting of more scalable
expeditionary forces, whether air, naval or marine units, into the theaterof the surface seas, and enhancing them to allow a more agile andflexible response, but still basing them in preventive positions, such as
Guam, Hawaii, Australia, and Singapore. In consequence, the strategic
importance of the regional seas is increasing; a prime example of this is
the US reaction to the North Koreans conducting a successful long-range
three-stage rocket test, and also its third nuclear test. The airspace overthe high sea has become a main theater in which both offensive anddefense postures are vulnerable to long-range missile threats, so the US
decided to deploy its “strategic missile patrol” assets to the region, andJapan and South Korea became a part of these networks.41
China, for its part, has successfully launched its first ever ship-based
long-range tactical weapon known as the DH-10 cruise missile (similar
to a Tomahawk) and is operating an ex-Russian aircraft carrier, whichlacks first-class naval technology or capacity, however, and is building
more carriers to achieve its objective to be seen as a strong nation.42
Furthermore, the Chinese asymmetric warfare strategy, designed tocounter US naval supremacy, is a hybrid of various naval strategies
known as Anti-Access(A2)/Area Denial(AD) and aims to push US naval
forces out of Asia, most importantly beyond the so-called “first island
chain.” As part of this strategy, China has developed an indigenous
long-range ballistic nuclear missile known as the DF-21 or the “Anti-

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Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM)”.
Nor is Japan willing to be left out: when military indications revealed
that North Korea was moving missiles to the east coast of the Korean
Peninsula, Japan seemed to relish the prospect of shooting down a North
Korean missile. With much publicity, the Japanese government
deployed its PAC-3 advanced Patriot missile system in central Tokyo todeter and target North Korea’s three-stage missiles, the debris fromwhich presumably fell somewhere on or around the Japanese islands
during the launch in early 2013.43 The US also supported Japan’s
installation of an AN/TPY-2 early warning radar in western Japan to
improve monitoring of North Korea’s ballistic missile launches; and, on
May 16, 2013, the US Missile Defense Agency successfully conducted aflight test of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system from the
USS Lake Erie (CG-70), resulting in the interception of a separating
ballistic missile target over the Pacific Ocean by the Aegis BMD 4.0
Weapon System and the SM-3 Block 1B guide missile.44
As for South Korea, the planned deployment of about 50 Rafael
Spike NLOS electro-optical guided missile systems to the West/Yellow
Sea is public knowledge. This is intended to deter long-range artillery
attacks, especially to protect the Yeonpyeong Island from a repeat of the2010 shelling by North Korea, which asserts a territorial claim close to
the Northern Limit Line (NLL), believing that the NLL was imposed
unilaterally by UN officials after the 1950-1953 Korean War.45 North
Korea recently fired several KN-02 surface-to-surface short-range
missiles off its east coast on three consecutive days.46 In fact, thesemissiles are essentially conventional weapons and systems to cover the
littoral area, rather than ballistic missiles able to be launched against
continental opponents beyond the horizon, but, taken together with North
Korean long-range/short-range ballistic missiles, some operational andsome under development, which may be capable of carrying nuclear
warheads, it is clear that regional maritime territorial disputes have
expanded beyond the surface of the seas to the airspace above them.
This enlargement of the theater of conflict constitutes another ‘wicked
problem’ for regional maritime security.
Lack of New Maritime Security Initiatives
In recent times the Asia-Pacific region has failed to generate any new
maritime security initiatives applying to the common maritime security,and this deficit now appears to present another emerging new ‘wicked

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problem’: the region desperately needs to come up with a new approach
toward maritime security. Existing policies have produced persistentfriction and confrontation, and the new political leadership must try to
alleviate the traditional problems of maritime security as part of abroader strategic détente with their rivals and potential adversaries,
whilst remaining close to their chief ally, the US. Over the past few
years, the ROK, Japan and those ASEAN members involved in maritime
territorial disputes in the ECS and SCS have made behaved in a
fragmented manner, which has constrained their policy choices andallowed the US and China to play games of “good cop” and “bad cop.”
In this moment of political transition across East Asia, and in the US, a
new and cooperative vision of maritime security initiatives is urgently
needed.
If either the US or China were truly a good cop, they would surely bepresenting some definite new maritime security initiatives. The AsiaPacific region is in dire need of new strategic guidance, different
maritime security settings, and improved sharing of maritime
capabilities. When Hu Jintao was Chinese president, he put forward theconcept of the “Harmonious Sea,” but this is hardly what the nations of
the region have witnessed, and, in reality, they have good reason be
suspicious of the PLAN and the SOA, given recent demonstrations of
their maritime prowess, and their ability to dominate weak andvulnerable nations. President Hu also declared that the Chinese fleet
should stand ready to uphold Chinese interests, and the current president,
Xi Jinping, has emphasized the importance of safeguarding a strong
country with a strong navy.47 So far as the US is concerned, its present
maritime strategy was announced in 2007:“A Cooperative Strategy for21st Century Sea Power” also called “CS-21” or “The 2007 Maritime
Strategy.” Unfortunately, it fails to grasp the new maritime geopoliticalreality, ignoring new threat perceptions and the prospect of new regional
maritime partnerships. It was intended to replace the obsolete Global
Maritime Partnership, which aimed at a 1,000-ship navy, but critics
noted that it did not explicitly acknowledge the rise of China or any
threat represented by this development. The new strategy was widely
seen as an attempt by the US to leverage the capability of its allies andpartners to ease its own budget burden. It has also been interpreted as away for the US to exploit regional actors’ familiarity with the intricaciesof their maritime environs, and to extract detailed data from its allies andpartners about the hydrology and meteorology of local waters, thus

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aiding US naval operations; and also to enhance information sharing andestablish joint command and control structures, thus speeding up US
responses to shifts in regional affairs.48
As a consequence of resource constraints, however, both China andUS may face a strategic challenge, driving them toward more innovative
thinking and the formulation of new maritime security initiatives. The
US is already refocusing its 21st century strategy away from Europe with
its pivot to Asia strategy, and China has already executed its infamous
A2/AD defensive strategy, and is conducting for “Far Seas Operations.”
Concerns over the threat of China’s naval build-up is the primary driver
shaping the defense policy and strategy of East Asian nations who have
responded by striving for more self-reliant defense policies, rearming andinvesting primarily in their naval forces. These new approaches whichhave been made possible by decades of economic growth anddevelopment.49 The US sequester involves a huge defense cut,approximately $46 billion, and this has raised concerns among its allies
about the effect on US arms exports: whether and how these cuts will
delay planned deliveries of weapons and systems built by the US
manufacturers.50 Asian nations have proved willing to expand theirdefense capabilities in spite of economic constraints, and according toDefense News, “the Asia-Pacific will comprise 26% - nearly US $200
billion – of global naval and maritime security builds in the next 20 years
as complex relationships and rivalries drive procurements designed forparticular regional challenges”.51 With Asia becoming increasingly
mired in strategic uncertainty at sea, there are several indications of theregional rearming trends: increasing defense budgets, enhancing power
projection capabilities, procuring modern weapons and systems fromoutside the region, and recapitalizing defense industries to produce avariety of indigenous platforms. Although the pivot to Asia is awelcome contribution by the US, the East Asian nations need to exploit
the consequent momentum and take bold steps to advance their intraregional relationships. For example, maritime security cooperation
between Japan and the Philippines has been reinvigorated, with various
new joint initiatives, due to their shared perception of the threat from
China.52 None of the nations in the region can afford to ignore the factthat China’s defense budget continues to enjoy extraordinary doubledigit growth.53 Some commentators have argued that China’s defense
modernization is a natural outcome of its economic development, butothers remain troubled by the lack of transparency and the prospect of134

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China’s military prowess expanding far beyond the regional theater.
The table below presents the various maritime security regimes
implemented by the US in the Asia-Pacific area, but none of them isreally appropriate for the current regional maritime security environment,
and this threatens to become another new ‘wicked problem’. It is surely
time to develop a new overarching maritime security structure to ensure
maritime peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
Table 1: US Maritime Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Maritime
Region

Title

PSI

MDA

RMSI

1,000Ship
Navy /
GMP57

AgencyUS Dept. of StateUS Coast
Guard

USPACOM

US Navy

US Navy,
Marine Corps,
Coast Guard

Area

Worldwide/
GlobalLittoral

AsiaPacificRegionGlobalWorldwide/
GlobalUnity ofeffort topreventtransnation
al threats

Implementa conceptof 1,000Ship Navyto deternonmilitary
threats

Promotemaritime
security andprosperity
across the
globe

Focus

54

Deter & Disrupt
WMD

55

Safeguard
maritime
safety,security
and access

56

CS-21 / 2007
Maritime
Strategy

Reluctance to Resort to Legal Solutions
The reluctance to seek to resolve maritime disputes through legalistic
mechanisms is another new ‘wicked problem’ afflicting the East Asian
region. Historical legacies, Cold War frictions and confrontations, andregional rivalries between peer competitors, such as between China andJapan, have caused fundamental and intractable maritime insecurity
problems; but, until recently, it was possible to hope that these longstanding problems could be addressed by legal means, through theapplication of UNCLOS.

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Maritime security within the region could surely be more effectively
sustained through rules-based solutions, following legal judgments under
UNCLOS, rather than the current model which depends upon competingthrough power politics. On 22 February 2013, the Philippines, being nolonger willing to tolerate unilateral Chinese actions in occupying
numerous reefs in the West Philippines Sea, submitted a claim against
China to UNCLOS. China justified its occupation and building upon
Mischief Reef, McKennan Reef, Gaven Reef and Subi Reef, by referring
to a map from the 1940s with nine dashes, “the nine-dashed line,” which
covers almost the entire SCS.58 The Philippines was careful in its
Notification and Statement of Claim to say “it was not seeking
arbitration over sovereignty disputes to islands or delimitation ofmaritime boundaries that China had excluded from arbitral jurisdiction,”
stating that its maritime disputes with China were “about theinterpretation and application by State Parties of their obligations under
the UNCLOS,” and could therefore be submitted for resolution. In
response to this proposal, however, China rejected the Philippines’
request for an UNCLOS arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with
Annex VII and insisted that bilateral negotiations were the only solution
appropriate for such maritime territorial disputes.59 The Chinese haveasserted that the Philippines’ Statement of Claim “was historically andlegally incorrect and contained unacceptable accusations against
China.”60
The delimitation of overlapping maritime jurisdictions in the region
has also become more contentious after a new expansionary move by
China. In December 2012, China made a partial submission to theUnited Nations Secretariat concerning the outer limits of its continental
shelf in the East China Sea, declaring that its continental shelf naturally
extends into the Okinawa Trough. This broadens China’s legal claims
beyond the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, as the trough runs just north ofJapan’s southern Ryukyu Islands and would overlap Japan’s 200 nautical
miles EEZ. These extravagant Chinese claims have sparked significant
Sino-Japanese tensions recently.61
By relentlessly pursuing such
hypothetical rights, ignoring the opportunity to obtain legal resolution of
intractable problems and inciting profound resentment among theirrivals, the individual nations of the region are creating a new ‘wicked
problem’ and aggravating the existing maritime insecurity.

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The Urgent Need for a Common Approach to Regional Maritime
Security
For the time being, maritime security seems critical to individual
national security for the East Asian region, and for some nations it merits
first place on their national security agenda. However, the region seems
still unready for maritime cooperation, with lingering tit-for-tat games
between neighboring countries disrupting maritime peace and goodorder. Several tracks exist for discussing regional maritime security
mechanisms: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and its various subcommittees; the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies (HACGA); andthe Council of Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)
working together with the Regional Cooperation Agreement on
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).
These forums take a variety of approaches and are likely discussing theold issues, but they are very reluctant to talk about the new challenges
and have produced very little of immediate use in terms of defined plansof action – there is an urgent need to secure the common maritime
interests of the region, specifically to ensure the freedom of shipping andto deter the recurring bilateral conflicts and confrontations.62
The best course would be for every nation in the region to agree towork together to preserve their common interests at sea, defining
regional maritime security along the lines of: national and multinational
efforts to maintain good and peaceful order at sea, and the safety andsecurity of shipping, so as to permit countries to pursue their maritime
interests and to develop their marine resources in an ecologicallysustainable and peaceful manner in accordance with international law.
Any such consensus must also establish agreement that illegal andunilateral activities at sea or inadequate arrangements for the safety andsecurity of shipping are detrimental to good order at sea and should not
be tolerated.
Unfortunately, since UNCLOS came into effect as the customaryinternational maritime law of this region after receiving the necessary
ratifications in 1997, there have been so many different concepts ofmaritime security among the nations of the region that they have beenquite unable to agree upon any conceptual basis for a common approachto regional maritime security. Given the essential importance of seaborne
trade, which is fundamental to the economic growth and prosperity of theregion, it seems obvious that most nations share an interest insafeguarding the freedom of navigation and ensuring the safety ofInternational Journal of Korean Studies • Vol. XVII, No. 2

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shipping, but constructive agreement has proved elusive. Some blame
the unfortunate complexity of the region’s geography and theambiguities which arise in the application of UNCLOS to the semienclosed seas of East Asia.63 Others blame third party involvement in
the region’s bilateral disputes, so that the rights and duties of the coastal
countries are not in full accordance with the international law, but are
determined by alliance obligations which are constrained by geography.64
Fortunately there are very few countries, only Taiwan and South
Korea, in fact, whose approach to maritime issues adheres to rigid
traditional attitudes; where the national defense agenda is dominated bymilitary threats from enemies or historical adversaries, and the protectionof national interests and sovereignty at sea.65 Indeed, since the end of theCold War, such traditional maritime security concepts have gradually
become less significant around the seas of the region; so it is anappropriate time, in fact it is rather urgent, for the nations of the region toagree upon a common definition of regional maritime security so as tosafeguard their common interest in peace and stability upon which theireconomic prosperity depends.
Looking at the general timeline of the maritime conflicts andtensions during the last few years, from 2010 through the start of 2013, itis clear that existing institutional mechanisms have failed to address thenew ‘wicked problems’ arising between the coastal nations and the usersof specific areas, most obviously the EEZs and disputed sea areas likethe Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the ECS and Scarborough Shoal in the
SCS. There has been a general reluctance to address the direct casualfactors affecting maritime security, so the region remains blighted by aplethora of highly complex challenges which have so far defied solution,
and all of these ‘wicked problems’ are exacerbated by Sino-US maritime
rivalry. Unfortunately, very few regional initiatives for common
maritime security have been produced by the relevant existing
multilateral forums and their various sub-forums and committees,
principally the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, CSCAP, ARF, theARF Inter-Session Meeting on Maritime Security, and the Maritime
Security Expert Working Group established by the ASEAN Defense
Minister Meeting Plus.66 What can be done to address this deficit? How
can robust institutional mechanisms be established to resolve both thelongstanding maritime issues and the new ‘wicked problems’ of regional
maritime security? This author, perceiving the opening of a rare windowof opportunity promising possible progress, offers the following

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recommendations:First, action-reaction phenomena should be defusedthrough discreet bilateral negotiations between thequarreling parties. From time to time, official views on
disputed issues become distorted by popular reaction,
especially by nationalistic movements and heated public
antipathy against perceived insults to sovereignty byrival nations. Such trends have proved particularly
destabilizing over recent years, affecting maritime
environments throughout East Asian Seas ranging fromthe West/Yellow Sea, and the ECS to the SCS. To limit
the negative impact from such reactions, the best course
would be to internationalize the maritime jurisdictionaland boundary disputes of the region. This would givethe disputing parties some breathing space, and allow
them to muster the political will to play a moreconstructive role in contributing to regional maritime
good order and stability. Beyond the official and formal
dialogues, there is a real opportunity for Asian countries
to address many outstanding issues. Since 2010 somevery assertive attitudes have prevailed, and it is timesome lessons were learned: expanding maritime
jurisdictional claims to the limits of continental shelves
has produced only trouble and instability.
Second, multilateral forums should urgently consider thesuitability of international law to strengthen regional
peace and stability. This should involve disputing
parties in a process whereby they accept joint
responsibility for implementing a new concept ofconsensual regional maritime security, integrating policy
suggestions from all sides. In this way gray areas of
UNCLOS could be addressed by international forums,
and extended or amended as appropriate. In its present
form the convention seems inadequate for resolving
regional maritime disputes, being capable of too-flexible
a range of interpretations, and it is therefore essential to
begin by developing a common understanding of thelimitations of UNCLOS, which may then help to ease

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the recurring tensions. Of course, it is crucial for the US
to ratify UNCLOS as soon as possible, so that, instead ofbeing a mere observer the US can play an active part in
the dialogue to build a new maritime regime. US
participation in UNCLOS will surely contribute tomaintaining maritime peace and stability in the AsiaPacific region, by helping to provide credibleinternational regulation and sound principles formaritime security.67 Among the benefits of updating theconventional context of maritime jurisdiction in the ECS
and SCS and the rights and duties of coastal states inmaritime zone, particularly relating to the EEZs, would
be a welcome reduction in the likelihood of a
miscalculation leading to serious maritime conflict.
Third, the best way to avoid such dangerous accidents inthe ECS and SCS is to define clear ROE for maritime
forces and law enforcement agencies. Recent clashes
over fishing rights, such as those between and Japanover the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and between China
and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal, in
which the Chinese MSA and fishery protection agency
were involved, have demonstrated the importanceestablishing ROE covering how to deal with nonmilitary maritime threats. In the clash with Japan, theChinese government responded by conducting largescale naval contingency exercises near the disputed seas
which provoked a crisis when the PLAN targeted
JMSDF naval vessels and helicopters with fire-control
radar in January and February 2013.68 In January 2012,
the Philippines government made a good start in moving
to reduce the chances of unintended conflict bypromoting a COC in which the SCS was defined as aZone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation,
which is a good model for other nations operating in
disputed waters to emulate. It would be useful for allparties in the region to continue discussing the further
implementation of the DOC guidelines in the near
future, with the deliberations of the “Expert Committee
on Safety of Navigation and Communication at Sea”

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being especially significant due to its contentious
nature.69
Fourth, international legal regimes should be reserved asa last resort, when bilateral means have failed to bringabout a peaceful resolution and settlement of disputes.
The involvement of external powers in regional
maritime security only tends to muddy the waters, withthe reactions inevitably provoked, making the disputed
issues more complex and intractable. Bilateral discourseon maritime cooperation should become the customary
approach to these matters, rather than relying upon
military tools to rationalize legitimate rights and duties,
and transparent, effective and appropriate methods must
be devised to resolve the recurrent tensions. It is
unfortunate that the implementation of the DOC protocolhas been held up by multilateral negotiations within
ASEAN identity or central and with China. Individual
bilateral settlements are not sufficient to resolve all theissues, however, as shown by the recent unofficial
agreement on fisheries between Taiwan and Japan: at atime of heightened tension between China and Japanover the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, this agreement upset
China further, adding more fuel to the fire. It was also
disappointing that the Philippines and China were unable
to reach agreement to bring the nine-dashed line issue
before an international tribunal subject to UNCLOS
arbitration.70 Although the Philippines avoided making
their claim specific to their sovereignty disputes with
China, phrasing it in terms of clarifying the obligationsof states under UNCLOS, China rejected even thiscareful approach as invalid and offensive. International
legal regimes tend to produce winners and losers, and soshould be reserved as a last resort.
Some Suggestions: The Challenges for 2013 and Beyond
Further suggestions should be considered for the future of AsiaPacific regional maritime security. Is there a way to persuade both the
US and China to accept a new conception of rules-based maritime peaceand stability? Are there any useful stepping-stones toward maritime

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cooperation, and curtailing the tit-for-tat power games? The othernations of the region certainly have good reason to sustain and evenexpand their contributions to maritime security in support of the common
welfare. Much depends on whether the stakeholders in the Asia-Pacificregion make any progress in the directions suggested below. The US andChina are not working well together to resolve the new ‘wicked
problems’, East Asian countries are divided among themselves, and there
is a general lack of respect for international regulatory norms like
UNCLOS. Dire as the situation seems, we must hope that the intractable
territorial disputes, with the threat they present of wider conflict, will
provide an impetus to formulate a basic “code of cooperation” underwhich a future region maritime security mechanism can be designed.
Looking first at the US: the Senate should approve UNCLOS andmoderate its stance on treaty obligations established during the Cold War,such as the 1951 SFPT. As a non-member of UNCLOS, the US can takeno position on the legal merits of the competing claims to sovereignty,
and as long as it maintains that the only US national interest is inprotecting the freedom of the seas, there is nothing that the US can do toprotect its allies’ claims in the disputed areas. Both these policies
undercut any US attempts to mitigate the ‘wicked problems’ of the East
Asian seas. President Barack Obama’s administration has recently sought
to persuade the US Senate to approve the UNCLOS, but this has proved
contentious.71 Critics are opposed to China’s expansive maritime
territorial claims, especially in the SCS. It seems unlikely that US
approval of UNCLOS will limit US naval operations or constrain its
naval capability, but perhaps it will dissuade the Chinese from theirattempts to implement a Chinese version of the Monroe Doctrine andexpand their maritime territorial claims in East Asian Seas. Merely
adopting UNCLOS, implying a clearer US commitment to freedom of
the seas in the region, is far from being a solution; in fact, it may lead torenewed tensions and increasing Sino-American maritime rivalry. Yet, asa party to UNCLOS, the US will have a formal role in these maritime
disputes, and could therefore implement a deliberate policy, rather thansimply falling back on its Cold War security commitment to its allies inthe disputed waters. Washington would have to find a way tocompromise over the disputed issues; otherwise they would become ageopolitical constraint for the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific region. Also,
as a member of UNCLOS, the US might reactivate its “Regional
Maritime Security Initiative,” already in abeyance for two decades. This

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was intended to permit the US to help willing nations enhance their naval
capabilities, and, by cooperating, to leverage their ability to identify,
monitor and intervene in regional maritime territorial disputes.
Turning next to China: the Chinese should tone down their shrill
claims to historical precedents which have always overshadowed rulesbased regimes and norms in their approach toward the disputed seas.
This would be a low-cost, low-risk regional strategy to show goodwill totheir neighbors, including the US. Although the Chinese have, broadly,
pursued the restoration of the middle kingdom regional order, they havegiven no specific details. China is widely regarded as a “rising great
power,” but the Chinese government has not publicly set out any grandstrategy for the direction it is taking. China should acknowledge that theparts of the SCS which are within the EEZs of ASEAN members are not
relevant to its historical sovereignty. Most importantly, Chinese
authorities should provide a clear-cut clarification of their unilateralclaim to all-encompassing maritime jurisdiction in the SCS, based on thenine-dashed line, explaining how this infamous line can be reconciled on
the navigational charts of the SCS with UNCLOS regulations. Further
constructive steps which the Chinese might take include apologizing totheir weaker neighbors for their inconsistent and assertive attitudes
which have sometimes betrayed an outdated imperial mindset, andaddressing their neighbors’ concerns about recurring disputes over “coreinterests” in the ECS and the SCS.
As for the other nations of the region: there is a clear need for asenior-level regional meeting at which strategic consultations can takeplace, gradually building capacity for larger steps, until, ultimately,
establishing regional regulatory norms with enduring stability throughbilateral and multilateral cooperation. Recent conflicts between China
and the US in the SCS, represents a game of “tit-for-tat”: one player
reacts to the actions of the other player, and that one responds in turn.
From the East Asian perspective, the only way to attain all-inclusive
stability in the regional security environment may be to acknowledge
jointly the significance of the new ‘wicked problems’, so that by acting
together they can play a decisive role in deterring such tit-for-tat games
between the US and China in the confined seas.
Finally, a new “code of cooperation” is needed in East Asia: only inthis way can trust be rebuilt, the trap of Sino-American rivalry can be
avoided, and the disparities and differences among the nations of theregion can be bridged. Such a code could do much to alleviate East

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Asian pessimism, and also to square China’s unyielding concern for its
sovereignty and territorial integrity with the right of the US to conduct
frequent naval exercises near the disputed sea areas. Trust is essential if
a balance is to be struck between the “allies” and “enemies” of one orother great powers, and thus reduce the threat to regional security. In
particular, adapting to a discrete new code of cooperation may engender
new security environments. A successful articulation of a common codeof cooperation requires significant steps from many parties in the region,
including:144•

To lessen the chances of great power confrontations in the
East Asian seas, they should behave consistently andreliably. In particular, the US should be clear, in its relations
with long-standing allies and partners, to avoid misleadingthem about long-term strategic considerations, or forcing
them into a provocative posture where they feel obliged tostart building up their military capabilities to defend against
a potential Chinese adversary.

•

To improve the current situation in the ECS and the SCS,
nations in the region should identify existing avenues tomitigate the ‘wicked problems’ and seek to develop new
ones. Bateman has already suggested a list of useful forums
for intergovernmental security cooperation in the AsiaPacific: the ARF, the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Plus
Three (APT), the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus
(ADMM Plus), the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) on
Maritime Security, and the Maritime Security Expert
Working Group (MSEWG) established by the ADMM Plus.
Various regional multilateral mechanisms already exist, atleast in embryo, and these bodies should be properly utilized
to address the new ‘wicked problems’ in so far as theyintersect with the appropriate mandates.72•

To moderate tit-for-tat games between the US and China, thenations of the region should distance themselves from any
use of force by the two great powers to support claims ofterritorial sovereignty. A good example is the ROK’s
successful dual track strategy pursued despite the threats
from, and stand-off with, North Korea. China, in particular,International Journal of Korean Studies • Fall 2013

should express its scrupulous commitment to scrupulously
respecting existing international laws and regulations,instead of continuing with its inconsistent and assertive
stance.
•To build momentum to effectively address the ‘wicked
problems’ of regional maritime security, a wide variety ofdivergent stances must be accommodated among theclaimants in the territorial disputes. All the nations of theregion should therefore show good faith by taking every
opportunity to engage in meaningful participation in futurebilateral or multilateral dialogues.

Conclusion
In his original analysis, Bateman was hopeful that the nations of theregion might be willing to put the past behind them so that the ‘wicked
problems’ could be resolved. Unfortunately, there is no sign of such
peace and harmony breaking out anytime soon; on the contrary,
Bateman’s list has been overshadowed by a variety of new ‘wicked
problems’ and all parties continue to dig the hole deeper. As should beclear from the recommendations and suggestions made in this article,
however, Bateman was correct in suggesting that if effective solutions
are ever to be found to mitigate the ‘wicked’ maritime problems, thenations solved in dispute will inevitably have to adopt a more flexible
mindset and break out of the perilous and unproductive cycles of action
and reaction.
It can be seen from the recent rifts between China and Japan over the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, that domestic factors are probably the mostintractable of the new ‘wicked problems’, both for individual nations andfor regional maritime security. Also, there has been a general failure toreflect the view from within the region itself in recent developments
affecting East Asian maritime security, and disturbingly few resolutions
and/or initiatives which contain any long-term perspective. Since 2010
the nations of the region have been confronted by a strategic dilemma inwhich regional maritime security has been held hostage to Sino-US
rivalry. Thus, maritime disputes have continued to fester, becoming evermore raucous and intractable, and increasingly threatening to break out
into serious and violent confrontation.
This is a time of political transition in the US and across Northeast
Asia, and, although the US has recently updated its policy toward East

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Asia with the pivot/rebalance, other new governments have yet toindicate their approach to maritime affairs. They should seize theopportunity to encourage a fresh and cooperative vision: now is themoment to demonstrate restraint and cultivate trust. In this context, it
would be very helpful if a “Senior Dialogue for Maritime Affairs” could
be established among the nations of the region (like that between China
and the US). Such a forum is surely essential if the ‘wicked problems’ of
regional maritime security, both old and new, are to be resolved. Thereis such a confusing tangle of strategic problems: with overlapping issues
and multiple challenges to be unraveled; with power shared between
strong and weak states, and between nations in dispute and third parties.
A new forum in the mold of the Sino-US Senior Dialogue, but with abroader membership, might be able to balance the interactions between
chronic threats and acute issues, to address the ‘wicked problems’ ofmaritime security without disrupting existing bilateral maritime legal
arrangements. Somehow, the nations of East Asia must find a way tocooperate in building new structures of regional maritime security
appropriate for the twenty-first century. In conclusion, there is still hopethat we can reverse the current trend, in which the regional maritime
environment becomes ever more insecure; but this will require all parties
to work much harder at building a deeper bond of trust. Simply stated,
however, there will never be a better time for it.
Notes:
1

The phrase “new ‘wicked problem’” was inspired by an earlier analysis ofmajor, complex and long-term issues: See Sam Bateman, “Solving the ‘Wicked
Problems’ of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to the Task?”
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 33, No.1 (2011).

2

See Sukjoon Yoon, “Regional Maritime Security: Old Issues and New
Challenges,” a paper presented at theJoint Workshop on Common Concerns for
Maritime Security and Safety co-hosted by the Korea Institute for Maritime
Strategy (KIMS), the SLOC Study Group – Korea, and the Institute of East andWest Studies (IEWS) on April 30 2013, at KIMS, Seoul, Korea.

3

See Vijay Sakhuja, Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century: Strategic
Transactions China, India and Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 2011), and Geoffrey Till, Yoon Sukjoon, et al. (eds.), Korean
Maritime Strategy: Issues and Challenges (Seoul: Korea Institute for Maritime
Strategy, 2011).

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4

The characterization of ‘wicked problems’ in this paragraph draws from Sam
Bateman, “Solving the ‘Wicked Problems’ of Maritime Security: Are Regional
Forums up to the Task?” pp. 1-28.
5

See Sukjoon Yoon, “Sino-American Rivalry in the South China Sea: Time for
the ROK to Project its Middle-Power Role, a paper presented at the 4thInternational Workshop, “South China Sea Cooperation for Regional Security
and Development”, November 19-21 2012, at Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam,

6

See Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘China at Odds with U.N. Treaty,” USNI News,
Monday, March 11, 2013.

7

According to Japan Times, 26 April 2013, the Chinese government officials
asserted that the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are one of China’s “coreinterests.” See Royal Canadian Navy, International Outlook, 30 April 2013.
8

Kelly Gershaneck, “Xi and Abe on the Brink: Can the US Help Avert Armed
Conflict?”PacNet, #31, Friday, May 3, 2013.
9James Hardy, “Abe, Putin to start peace treaty talks, ”Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8
May 2013, p. 14.
10

Concerning Chinese policy, see Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive
Behavior, Part One: On ‘Core Interest’”, China Leadership Monitor, No. 34,
2011, pp. 1-25; and, Royal Canadian Navy, International Outlook, 30 April
2013. For US policy, see Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An
Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institute Press, 2012, p. 105.
11

Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. Navy Cuts Fleet Goal to 306 Ships,” Defense
News, February 11, 2013, p. 23; and, John T. Bennett and Marcus Weisgerber,“Three Weeks To Craft a Deal,” Defense News, March 4, 2013, pp. 1, 8; and,Grace Jean, “US Navy reduces fleet goal,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 13 February
2013, p. 12.
12

Andrew Tilghman, “Adm. To Congress: Act Now or We Lose 50 Ships,”
Defense News, May 14, 2012, p. 13.

13

Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake, “Pivot point: Re-shaping US maritime
strategy to the Pacific,” Jane’s Navy International, April 2013, pp. 22-29.
14

Ibid, p. 26.

15

Ben Sheppard, “The cruelest cut,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 10 April 2013, p.
31.

16

Grace Jean, “First LCS deploys, but US fiscal challenges will delay mission
modules,” Jane’s Navy International, April 2013, p. 5.

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17

Euan Graham, “Freedom Arrives: What Next for the LCS?”RSISCommentaries, No. 074/2013, 24 April 2013.
18

http://news.usni.org/news-analysis/news/chinas-700-ship-navy, released
February 6, 2013.

19

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. & James Hardy, “China’s carrier makes home at new
North Sea Fleet naval base,” Jane’s Navy International, April 2013, p. 6.
20“PLAN names first Corvette,” Jane’s Navy International, April 2013, p. 5.

21

See Sukjoon Yoon, “Chinese Maritime Hegemony and Implications for
Korean Policy on China,” Dokdo Research Journal, vol. 15, Autumn, 2011, pp.
81-89; Sukjoon Yoon, “The Emergence and Consolidation of a Chinese Versionof the Monroe Doctrine: Implications for Korea’s China Policy,” KAS Journal
on Contemporary Korean Affairs, 1/2013, Comprehensive Security in Northeast
Asia : Maritime Security (Seoul: Konrad Adenauer Stifung, 2013); Toshi
Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise andthe Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval InstitutePress, 2010).

Ⅰ

22

Grace Jean, “PACOM faces challenge of sequester, spending cuts,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, p. 10.
23

Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake, “Pivot point: Re-shaping US maritime
strategy to the Pacific,” p. 28.
24

See Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, “The US Rebalancing to Asia: Indonesia’s
Maritime Dilemma,” RSIS Commentaries, No. 073/2013, 24 April 2013.

25

Dr. Tang Siew Mun, “The Beting Serupai incident”, PacNet, #27, Monday,
April 22, 2013.

26

Dzirhan Mahadzir, “Building capabilities,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 May
2013, pp. 26-31.

27

Kosuke Takahashi and James Hardy, “Chinese frigates Locked on to JMSDF
ship, helo,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 13 February 2013, p. 16.
28

Royal Canadian Navy, International Outlook, 16 May 2013.

29

From personal interviewed an anonymous naval expert from the Japanese
Maritime Self-Defense Force in 12 April 2013, Seoul, Korea.
30

For ASEAN’s problem, see Ian Storey, “ASEAN Is a House Divided,” The
Wall Street Journal, June 15-17, 2012, p. 11.

31

U.S. Defense Secretary Lean Panetta, “Crisis Drives Policy: The Price Is Lost
Trust From the People,” Defense News, February 18, 2013, p. 21; and, Robbin

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International Journal of Korean Studies • Fall 2013

Laird and Ed Timperlake, “Pivot point: Re-shaping US maritime strategy to the
Pacific,” p. 24.
32

Terms of Reference of the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the
Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct Parties in the South China
Sea: http://www.aseansec.org/16888.htm and http://www.aseansec.org/
16885.htm and http://www.aseansec.org/documents-20185-DOC.pdf. Released
April 23, 2013.

33

Don Emmerson, “ASEAN Stumbles in Phnom Penh,” PacNet #45, Tuesday,
July 19, 2012.

34

For details of DOC, see Carlyle A. Thayer, “ASEAN’s Code of Conduct in
the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community–Building?” The AsiaPacific Journal, Vol. 10, Issue 34, No. 4, August 20, 2012. For CNOOC’s takeon this issue, see http://en.cnooc.com.cn/html/news/2012-0623/english.322127.html.
35

For ASEAN’s“Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea(Draft)”, and
the People’s Republic of China, “Code of Conduct on the South China Sea(Draft by the Chinese side), both from March 2000, see http://www.scribd.com/
doc/103248217/Thayer-Challenges-to-ASEAN%E2%80%99s-Cohesion-ThePolicy-of-Constructive-Engagement-and-a-Code-of-Conduct-for-the-SouthChina-Sea.

36

For details, see Carlyle Thayer, “Deference/Defiance: Southeast Asia, China
and the South China Sea”, a paper presented to a panel “onDifference/Diffusion, Deference/Defiance: Unpacking China-Southeast Asia
Relations”, at the 2013 International Studies Association Annual Convention,
San Francisco, April 5, 2013.

37

Grace Jean, “USS Freedom set to deploy to Asia,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 6
March 2013, p. 10; and, Robert Foster, “China gets maritime recon boost with
MA60 MPA,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 6 March 2013, p. 16.
38“Special Report: Expanding Markets: Middle East-Pacific Rim,” Defense
News, February 11, 2013, pp. 11-14.

39

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Naval Modernization inSoutheast Asia: Nature, Causes, Consequences (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, 2011), p. 18.

40

Sean Reilly, “U.S. Coast Guard Struggles to Fund Operations,” Defense News,
December 10, 2012, p. 12.

41

Geoff Fein, “USAF C-band to track Asian space launches,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, 28 November 2012, p. 14.

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42

Norman Friedman, “Chinese Tomahawks?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
September 2012, pp. 88-89; and, Robert Foster and Richard Scott, “China
commences carrier flight trials,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 December 2013, p. 5;
and, Jon Grevatt, “Chinese shipbuilder hopes to expand capabilities following
carrier rebuild,” Jane’s Navy International, December 2012, p. 33; and, Jon
Grevatt, “CSSC appoints first chairman and board of directors,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, 22 August 2012, p. 23.

43

James Hardy and Allison Puccioni, “North Korea ‘moving missiles’ to east
coast,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, pp. 5, 15.
44James Hardy, “Japan, US promise ISR co-operation,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,
8 May 2013, p. 17;
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/news/2013/space-130516dod01.htm?_m... Released 27 May 2013.
45

Sebastien Falletti, “South Korea delays Spike NLOS deployment,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, 28 November 2012, p. 14.

46

See Royal Canadian Navy, International Outlook, 21 May 2013.

47

Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s
Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy, p. 1; and, Edward Wong,“China’s new leader puts emphasis on strong military,” International Herald
Tribune, December 15-16, 2012, pp. 1, 4.

48

Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s
Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy, p. 204.

49

Wendell Minnick, “Responding to Beijing: Asia Markets Strengthen As China
Turns Bully,” Defense News, February 11, 2013, pp. 11-12; and, Wendell
Minnick and Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Asia-Pacific Spending Spree,” Defense
News, April 29, 2013, pp. 13, 14.

50

Marcus Weisgerber, “Sequester Could Delay U.S. Arms Exports”, Defense
News, March 4, 2013, pp. 1, 8.
51

Wendell Minnick and Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Asia-Pacific Spending Spree,”p. 13.
52

Julius Caesar I. Trajano, “Japan-Philippines Relations: New Dynamics inStrategic Partnership,” RSIS Commentaries, No. 037/2013, 28 February 2013.
53

Jon Grevatt, “Chinese defence budget continues to increase,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, 13 March 2013, p. 5.

54

Proliferation Security Initiative

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55

Maritime Domain Awareness56

Regional Maritime Security Initiative

57

Global Maritime Partnership

58

James Hardy, “Philippines takes China to UNCLOS tribunal over South China
Sea scrap,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 30 January, 2013, p. 8.
59James Hardy, “China Rejected Philippines’ Arbitration Tribunal on South
China Sea Issues,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 22 February, 2013, p. 8.

60

See Carlyle A. Thayer, “China at Odds with U.N. Treaty,” USNI News, March
11, 2013.

61

Daily Intelligence Brief, World Naval Edition, 18 December 2012, Courtesyof the Office of the Asia-Pacific Advisor, Maritime Forces Pacific.
http://mail2.daum.net/hanmailex/ViewMail.daum?method=print&folderId-id%25E. Released February 1, 2012.
62

Sam Bateman, “Solving the ‘Wicked Problems’ of Maritime Security: Are
Regional Forum up to the Task,” pp. 17-20.

63

Sam Bateman, “UNCLOS and its Limitations as the Foundation for a
Regional Maritime Security Regime,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,
vol. 19, no. 3 (Fall 2007), pp. 27-56.

64

Li Mingjiang and Zhang Hongzhou, “Restructuring China’s Maritime Law
Enforcement: Impact on Regional Security,” RSIS Commentaries, No. 050/2013,
1 April 2013.

65

Sebastien Falletti, “South Korea delays Spike NLOS deployment,” p. 14.

66

Sam Bateman, “Solving the ‘Wicked Problems’ of Maritime Security: Are
Regional Forums up to the Task,?” pp. 17-21.

67

See Sukjoon Yoon, “Sino-American Rivalry in the South China Sea: Time for
the ROK to Project its Middle-Power Role”.
68

Kosuke Takahashi and James Hardy, “Chinese frigates Locked on to JMSDF
ship, helo,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 13 February 2013, p. 16.
69

An agreement on implementation of the DOC guidelines at a China-ASEAN
senior officials meeting held in Beijing, January 2012, set up four expert
committee on maritime scientific research, environmental protection, search andrescue, and transnational crime.

70

James Hardy, “China Rejected Philippines’ Arbitration Tribunal on South
China Sea Issues,” p. 8.

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71

Commander Bradley May, “The U.S. Senate Should Ratify UNCLOS,” U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2012, p. 10.
72

Sam Bateman, “Solving the ‘Wicked Problems’ of Maritime Security: Are
Regional Forums up to the Task?” pp. 17-18.

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