AsiaBarometer's Achievements, Underutilized Areas of the Survey Materials, andFuture Prospects 1
Takashi Inoguchi
University of Tokyo
University of Niigata Prefecture
Prepared for Staffan Lindberg and Benjamin Smith, eds., “Special Issue on the
Barometers”, Newsletter of American Political Science Association's Comparative
Democratization Section, forthcoming in fall 2012.
Introduction
The AsiaBarometer is the most comprehensive comparative public opinion survey everconducted in Asia, which covers East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Central
Asia. 2 The AsiaBarometer has achieved a task which had never been undertaken
before and would not be feasible in the near future had the project not started, which is
to carry out national sample surveys in the entire continent of Asia for a period of six
years. The AsiaBarometer distinguishes itself from other survey projects in two
important respects: (1) it covers the entire Asian continent, that is 31 countries except
from Timor-leste and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; (2) it focuses on daily
lives of ordinary Asian peoples and peoples of three adjacent countries: Russia,
Australia, and the United States. The AsiaBarometer might be as well called an Asian“quality of life” survey.
Asia is a huge continent of enormous dynamism and diversity, which is evident in its
geographic, cultural, economic, political, linguistic and other dimensions. In
geographical terms, the continent may be divided into East Asia (China, Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan), Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines,
Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, Brunei), South Asia (India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, the Maldives and Afghanistan), and Central
Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Mongolia).
In cultural terms, Asia is home to five major civilizations: Christianity, Islam,
Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism. In political terms, many types of politicalregimes coexist in the region. If the categories used in the 2011 Democracy Index as
developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit 3 are applied to characterize thecontinent's political systems, then it turns out that the AsiaBarometer covers four full
democracies (Japan, South Korea, Australia and the United States), eight flawed
democracies (Taiwan, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Indonesia, Mongolia, Malaysia andthe Philippines), and eight hybrid regimes (Hong Kong, Singapore, Bangladesh,
Cambodia, Bhutan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Nepal) and 10 authoritarian regimes(Russia, Kazakhstan, China, Vietnam, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Laos, Myanmar,
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). From the economic point of view, we cover high income
countries like Japan, Singapore and Brunei, and low income countries like Afghanistan,
Myanmar, and Tajikistan. 35 languages are used to carry out the AsiaBarometer, ands
the survey has run every year between 2003 and 2008 with a different Asian subregion
covered each year.
What Has Been AccomplishedThe principal objective of the AsiaBarometer is to examine the quality of life in Asia. To
pursue that objective, we have used face-to-face interviews throughout the continent.
1

In order to describe and explain daily lives of ordinary people as embedded in a wider
society, questions pertaining to such subjects as personal health, interpersonal trustand confidence in social institutions, political orientations and international relations.
Inclusion of such auxiliary questions enables a researcher to make sense of thequality of life in Asia’s immensely diverse social settings. This objective has beenaccomplished by the AsiaBarometer. The subsequent description of its
accomplishments is divided into three categories: methodological, theoretical andsubstantive.
Methodologically, the fact that the surveys were conducted in 29 Asian countries (plus
Hong Kong) and in three Western countries for a period of six years allowed for as
many as four different types of comparative analyses. These analyses included
comparisons within each sub-region of Asia, between sub-regions, between Asian andWestern countries, and within each Asian country over time. Because our focus was on
daily lives of ordinary people in Asia, we have been able to execute surveys of a normal
kind, i.e. nation-wide random sample surveys, even though authoritarian regimes,
hybrid regimes and flawed democracies amount to 27 political systems in Asia. Yet, wehave been able to carry out surveys in all of 27 non-democratic Asian countries because
our principle has been to accommodate a regime’s deletion of certain kinds of questions
with simultaneous retention of the rest of the questionnaire. In not a single country
has been our request to conduct AsiaBarometer rejected. Still, we did not ask
authorities in Timor-leste and North Korea to let us carry out the AsiaBarometer.
North Korea is known for rejection of such requests in principle. Timore-leste wasjudged to be risky for internal volatility reasons in 2002 when we considered to carryout the survey there. The fact that the AsiaBarometer has been successfully executedin such a large number of countries, including in authoritarian regimes, represents astrategic victory of the project achieved at the time when Asia was changing rapidly
and in a very complex manner. If the AsiaBarometer covered only full democracies anda few flawed ones, the dynamics of Asia's democratization could not be fully capturedby the project. To achieve that task, AsiaBarometer had to survey also politically
volatile countries such as Thailand, Myanmar and Nepal. As a matter of fact, we wereable to analyze the Thailand's democratization process with two surveys, one
conducted before and the other after the country's military coup of 2006.4
From the theoretical perspective, these comparisons enabled us to test a variety oftheories, including those of modernization, globalization, the clash of civilizations andthe Asian values hypotheses. Building on individual responses to the quality of life
questions, Inoguchi/Fujii 5 have proposed to divide Asian societies into a few types
depending on their characterization in terms of the degree of materialism, postmaterialism and public sphere dominance. The position of societies categorized withinthese dimension was subsequently fruitfully compared to their categorization within
regime type classification provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit. One may ask at
this point why we have used for our purposes the EIU classification instead of the morecommonly applied regime type classifications in political science, which are Freedom
House and/or Polity? The reason is that EIU political system classification criteria are
more sensitive to the Asia's enormous diversity and its ongoing rapid transformation.
As far as political activism in daily life is treated as an aspect of democratic
participation, our results suggest that globalization enhances democracy. Turning to
the clash of civilizations hypothesis, Inoguchi/Collet6 argued after analyzing public
opinion trends that its plausibility may have been reduced as a result of the increasingtide of globalization. In this context, the clash of values which takes place within eachsociety becomes more pronounced than the cross-national value conflicts.7
2

Substantively, the AsiaBarometer has focused on the perceived quality of life among
Asians. The most notable findings on the quality of life data include the following three
1) High economic achievers and highly democratic citizens of Japanese, South Koreans
and Taiwanese are the least happy in Asia and in the world whereas the lowest income
getting societies of South Asia are the happiest in Asia, suggesting the roles that
religion and community play in reaching what John Stuart Mill calls the "happinessby the way"; 2) One might identify five societal patterns in Asia, with their qualities
exhibiting certain mixes of materialism (survival), post-materialism (social relations)and public sphere (state dominance). Here materialism means survival-driven lifestyle,post-materialism means social relations-driven lifestyle and public sphere dominancemeans the lifestyle strongly constrained by the state's imposition and regulation; 3)
Deeply rooted in the aspects of social relations pertaining to the quality of life,
interpersonal trust and confidence in social institutions are complex phenomena togauge and assess. Empirical examinations of trust and confidence suggest that these
phenomena could be to a large extent explained by broad, historically shaped andaccumulated patterns of political culture, such as belief in human nature preached in
Confucianism and Hinduism, individual utilitarian calculus bred under Britishcolonialism, and compliance with social system which emerged under communist
regimes.8
Underutilized DataFirst, one should mention the policy priority expressed by citizens in 29 countries as towhich policy area one should give first priority to, especially pension and defense. The
hypothesis named “geriatric peace” by Mark Haas is being tested. By geriatric peace wemean that as the aged population increases and enhances its political voice, it starts toprioritize government spending on pensions rather than on defense. The testing of thegeriatric peace hypothesis points to the need to develop more meaningful indicators
tapping such socioeconomic characteristics as income, education and occupation, andthe cultural characteristics of language and religion. In most Asian countries except forSouth Asia the long-term demographic trend of aging has already been examined.
Inoguchi and Fujii empirically test the geriatric peace hypothesis country by country in
Asia. The overall result seems to point to the correctness of the hypothesis. However,whether these preferences are translated and legislated into government action needs
further research. The distributive dimension of life qualities needs to be analyzed
systematically in order to address the increasingly controversial issue of equality andjustice. 9
Second, analyzing responses to interpersonal trust questions by the Chinese andJapanese, I have been developing a hypothesis about what these two national groups
have in mind when asked about interpersonal trust with the question, "Do you thinkthat people can be trusted or one cannot be too careful about other persons?" Chinese
seem to have in mind primarily their family, thus receiving a higher figure of trust
whereas Japanese seem to have in mind primarily unfamiliar persons outside thefamily, thus producing a lower figure of trust. But this is still an area where the dataremains to be fully explored.
Third, multi-linguage surveys pose a serious question of linguistic sameness. The
AsiaBarometer uses English for the master questionnaire and then translates it into
35 languages. Part of the difficulties arising in the process is due to the peculiarity of
the English language. A good example is a sentence “one cannot be too careful indealing with people”. This sentence represents two components, cannot and too, which3may not be easily and accurately rendered to some local languages in one sentence.
How can one assure that one's translation of this sentence into Tamil or Burmese iscorrect and similarly nuanced? Another example is the range of choices available when
one needs to choose one of the five options: very positive, positive, neutral, negative orvery negative regarding questions like: “overall do you trust other persons?” ManyJapanese respondents tend to choose neutral or at least neither very positive nor very
negative especially when the context of a question is not sufficiently specified. Thisphenomenon makes the task of assuring cross-national linguistic sameness moredifficult. To this question I do not see any pragmatic, but only disciplined answer.
Future Prospects
The AsiaBarometer has produced a substantial body of research. Most immediately
forthcoming is the massive volume entitled The Mirror That Reflects the Minds ofAsian People. One volume of approximately 1500 printed pages, this book collects
many articles analyzing AsiaBarometer survey data, published in reputed journals on
the quality of life. Three other books that use the AsiaBarometer data have been
published on the topic.10 Reflecting on the AsiaBarometer's products, one first of allneeds to address the agenda which concerns the need to consolidate infrastructure forthis kind of empirical social science projects, which require large scale data processing,analysis and storage.11
First, in the phase two, surveys will need to be conducted every year with a regular setof questions asked for every country and another set of questions asked for subregions
in order to acquire more localized, contextualized and nuanced data.
Second, infrastructure building is slow but steady. Unlike the European Union-fundedor sponsored polling and academic institutions, Asian institutions do not coordinate
very much. Yet, one positive and encouraging sign in this regard is the steady increasein the number of academic institutions collaborating with one another. The
AsiaBarometer is a very good example of such a practice. Whenever the AsiaBarometer
decides to execute surveys in a country X, it is expected that locally residing academics
are sought after to analyze the data, write a country profile and analyze relevant
subjects. A recently conducted survey of AsiaBarometer users worldwide has revealed
the need to execute AsiaBarometer regularly, say every year, and more widely. This is achallenging call.
Third, the national and global sampling methodology needs to be discussed andimproved. By national sampling I mean a normal way of handling surveys using thenational unit as given and comparing the national or sub-group averages. These arecalled cross-national surveys. By global sampling I mean a process through which
global population is divided into numerous sampling blocs with similar population.
Thus if one carries out a survey in the ASEAN member countries, their population size
vis-a-vis the entire global population determines the number of sampled respondents.
Instead of using the same amount of money for Brunei (population of approximately
300,000) and Indonesia (population of close to 300 millions), for instance, the global
sampling can execute surveys with smaller costs and similar scientific credentials.
To encourage the hope for the future regarding the aforementioned two points, I would
like to propose to establish an international journal of social research. While US-edited
journals are “autocentric” in a sense that their own competitive dynamics often semiautomatically rejects submissions from outside, and while European solidarity of pollorganization with pooled resources is admirable, one may ponder about publishing a4journal of social research attuned to grasp and analyze more localized, contextualized
and nuanced social behavior.

1 I am grateful to Doh Chull Shin, Staffan I. Lindberg, and the Editorial Board of the
APSA CD Newsletter for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
2 Takashi Inoguchi, "Demographic Change and Asian Dynamics: Social and Political
Implications," Asian Economic Policy Review 4 (June 2009): 142-157; and Takashi
Inoguchi and Seiji Fujii, The Quality of Life in Asia: A Comparison of The Quality ofLife in 29 Asian Countries and Societies (Amsterdam: Springer, 2012), forthcoming.
3 Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2011 (London: Economist Intelligence
Unit, 2012).
4 Satoru Mikami and Takashi Inoguchi, "Legitimacy and Effectiveness in Thailand,
2003-2007: Perceived Quality of Governance and Its Consequences on PoliticalBeliefs," International Relations of the Asia Pacific 8 (September 2008): 279-302.
5 Inoguchi and Fuji, The Quality of Life in Asia.
6 Christian Collet and Takashi Inoguchi, "Is Globalization Undermining the Clash of
Civilizations? A Test of Huntington among the Publics of Greater Asia and thePacific," Japanese Journal of Political Science 13 (2012), forthcoming.
7 Takashi Inoguchi, “Clash of Values across Civilizations,” in Russell Dalton and HansDieter Klingemann, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007): 240-258.
8 Inoguchi and Fujii, The Quality of Life in Asia. and Takashi Inoguchi, “Social
Capital in Ten Asian Societies,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 5 (May 2004):
197-211.
9 Mark Haas, “A Geriatric Peace? The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging
Populations,” International Security 32 (Summer 2007): 112-147; Doh Chull Shin andTakashi Inoguchi, eds., The Quality of Life in Confucian Asia (Amsterdam: Springer,2010); and Inoguchi, Takashi and Seiji Fujii (forthcoming) Geriatric Peace in Asia.
10 Takashi, Inoguchi, ed., The Mirror That Reflects the Minds of Asian People (Tokyo:
Nishimura shoten, 2012), forthcoming; and Inoguchi and Fuji, The Quality of Life inAsia. The books on this topic which use the AsiaBarometer data also include Inoguchi
and Fujii (2010), and Shin and Inoguchi (2010).
11
Takashi Inoguchi(2001) “Research
and Teaching
Infrastructure:
Social/Behavioral Sciences(East Asia and Pacific),” in Neil J. Smelser and Paul B.
Baltes, eds., International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences 26 (2011):
7489-7493

5

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Is Globalization Undermining Civilizational Identities? A
Test of Huntington's Core State Assumptions among the
Publics of Greater Asia and the Paciﬁc
CHRISTIAN COLLET and TAKASHI INOGUCHIJapanese Journal of Political Science / Volume 13 / Special Issue 04 / December 2012, pp 553 - 585
DOI: 10.1017/S1468109912000266, Published online:

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1468109912000266
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Japanese Journal of Political Science 13 (4) 553–585
doi:10.1017/S1468109912000266


C Cambridge University Press 2012

Is Globalization Undermining Civilizational
Identities? A Test of Huntington’s Core State
Assumptions among the Publics of Greater
Asia and the Paciﬁc
CH R I STIAN COLLETInternational Christian University, Tokyo
collet@icu.ac.jp
TA K A S H I I N O G U C H I

Professor Emeritus of the University of Tokyo and President of the
University of Niigata Prefecture
inoguchi@ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp

Abstract
Samuel Huntington’s inﬂuential clash of civilizations hypothesis (Huntington,
1993; Huntington, 1996) has been widely debated, but empirical tests of his ideas aboutcore states remain limited at the micro-level. In this paper, we bring new evidence tobear, focusing on the ‘cauldron of civilizations’: Greater Asia and the Paciﬁc. Using
the AsiaBarometer, we examine the extent to which publics in the region identify
with the core states of the supposedly most contentious civilizations in the region –the US, China, and Iran – and the factors that inﬂuence those perceptions. We giveattention to the role of globalization and nationalism and whether both may be
subsumed by religiosity as Huntington suggests. Our descriptive evidence afﬁrms someof the tensions between the US, China, and Islamic-predominant Asia identiﬁed by
Huntington as areas of potential conﬂict. At the same time, we ﬁnd no evidence
to suggest that attitudes toward core states are zero-sum; Asian publics often see
rival powers as mutually good inﬂuences. Using multivariate analysis, we ﬁnd that
religiosity, as the clash paradigm surmises, boosts Iranian inﬂuence and undermines
American inﬂuence in several predominantly Islamic states. We also ﬁnd, contrary to
Huntington, that overall exposure to foreign cultures leads to a more positive assessmentof American inﬂuence among Chinese and Pakistanis, as well as American perceptions
The authors thank Wolfgang Jagodzinski, Ijaz Gilani, Russ Dalton and Chong-min Park for theircomments on previous drafts.

553

554 christian collet and takashi inoguchi
of China. When foreign exposure inﬂuences perceptions of Iran, the effect is modestly,
but consistently, negative. Taken together, the ﬁndings raise questions about two key
assumptions of the Huntington framework – civilizational identity formation andcultural resurgence – and suggest that alternative approaches in recent civilizations
literature show greater empirical promise.

1. Introduction‘It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conﬂict in this new world
will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among
humankind and the dominating source of conﬂict will be cultural . . . The fault
lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future’ (Huntington, 1993:
22). So began Samuel Huntington in one of the most provocative, cited, debated,and examined assertions in international affairs of the last two decades. Despite thevoluminous critical discussion that the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis has generated, andthe civilizational dialogue it has helped to inspire, questions remain about whether there
is an empirical basis for claims about the differences between cultures and whether suchan approach to world politics, in the face of modernity, is warranted. Huntington’s maincontention – that strengthened religious identities, revived traditions, and irreconcilable
values will deﬁne post-Cold War conﬂict – has yielded a wave of assessments. His notionthat such conﬂicts are built around civilizational identities at ‘the micro level’ throughgrowing cultural afﬁliation with core states has not.
Our purpose is to address this gap. We ask two questions. First, to what extent do
publics show culturally based afﬁnities toward core states? And, second, is religiosity
a driving factor behind these afﬁnities, as Huntington suggests, or does nationalism
and globalization mitigate its impact? The answers to both are important insofar as
afﬁrmative evidence may not only suggest a basis for a civilizational consciousness
through the discernment of ‘friend’ and ‘foe’, but may suggest that globalization ishaving the boomeranging, or ‘culturally resurgent’, effect upon which the clash model
rests.
Our focus is on attitudes in what Huntington refers to as the ‘cauldron ofcivilizations’: the Asian Paciﬁc. A region suffering from undercoverage in other analysesof Huntington’s assertions, Asia is home to three in every ﬁve of the world’s citizens,
six of the ten most spoken languages, and seven of the world’s nine civilizations (asdeﬁned under his framework). The analysis that follows, based on surveys in 28 Asiansocieties, including Russia and the United States, is therefore well positioned to address
the two questions Huntington raises.
2. The debate continues
With a citation count in excess of 10,700 in Google Scholar as of July 2012 (andmore than 17,000 if one includes its 1993 precursor in Foreign Affairs), The Clash of
Civilizations continues to stimulate debate, particularly in light of the 9/11 attacks

is globalization undermining civilizational identities? 555
and America’s incursions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. A full consideration ofthis vast, interdisciplinary literature – as well as the numerous popular critiques – iswell beyond the scope of this paper. Broadly speaking, the scholarly discussion has
proceeded on two fronts. The conceptual debate centers on the use of civilizations
as units for a post-Cold War framework for world politics. The empirical/evidentiary
discussion, which has grown out of and, in turn, shaped the conceptual debate, focuseson Huntington’s expectations for conﬂict – and the evidence yielded by an assortmentof quantitative tests.
Simpliﬁed, Huntington’s theory rests on three assertions. The ﬁrst is that conﬂict
between states, once predicated on Cold War bipolarity, is giving way to conﬂict
predicated on religious differences. Huntington envisions these as ‘fault line’ encountersthat are primarily ‘local wars between local groups with wider (1996: 268) connections’.
The second assertion follows: such ‘wider connections’ are facilitated by core states(e.g., the United States, China) who, in essence, act as representatives of their respective
civilizations (e.g., Western, Sinic). Core states are crucial because they are ‘viewed bytheir members as the principle source . . . of the civilizations culture’ (135) and ‘likeolder members of a family . . . provide relatives with both support and discipline’ (156).
They rarely engage in conﬂict themselves, but structure a multicivilizational world bydominating member states at the macro-level and serving as beacons at the micro-levelthat ‘attract those who are culturally similar and repel[ling] those who are culturally
different’ (155). Core states are thus central to a civilizations-based politics because, on
the ground, they promote and reinforce civilizational identities.
The third assertion is that globalization strengthens the power of core states as lociof civilizational identity because it produces a ‘resurgence’ of tradition and religiosity.
Arguing against notions of modernization as a Westernizing or homogenizing force,
Huntington contends that it instead
promotes de-Westernization and the resurgence of indigenous cultures in two
ways. At the societal level, modernization enhances the economic, military,and political power of the society as a whole and encourages the people of thatsociety to have conﬁdence in their culture and to become culturally assertive.
At the individual level, modernization generates feelings of alienation andanomie, as traditional bonds and social relations are broken, and leads tocrises of identity to which religion provides an answer (Huntington, 1996: 76).
How does globalization strengthen civilizational alignment? ‘In today’s world’,
Huntington contends, ‘improvements in transportation and communication haveproduced more frequent, more intense, more symmetrical and more inclusive
interactions among people of different civilizations. As a result their civilizational
identities become increasingly salient . . . These broader levels of civilizational identity
mean deeper consciousness of civilizational differences and of the need to protect what
distinguishes “us” from “them”’ (1996: 129) (Figure 1).
Where an armada of critics have taken exception to Huntington’s ‘essentialism’(see Hall and Jackson, 2007), categorization scheme, for modeling civilizations as556 christian collet and takashi inoguchi

Figure 1. Simpliﬁed Huntington Theory of Core State Role in Civilizational Identity
Formation

regional über-states and for exaggerating the likelihood of war between ‘the West’,‘Islam’, and ‘Confucian’ societies (summarized nicely by Fox, 2005), his notions about
the role of globalization and core states in the formation of a new (or renewed) regional
identity have been subject to less scrutiny. Amartya Sen makes the case that ‘the mostlimiting feature of the civilizational approach . . . [is] the mind-boggling shortcut istaken in trying to understand our sense of identity’ which ‘puts each of us into alittle box of a single sense of belonging, to wit, our alleged perception of oneness with
our respective “civilization”’ (2008: 6). But this is to merely restate the conventional
belief in the social sciences that identities are multifarious, ﬂuid, situational, strategic
as well as constructed (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2000); it does not account for theformation and salience, as has been widely examined in Europe, of transnational
political identities rooted in religiosity and the perceived threat of ‘foreign’ cultures(Nelsen et al., 2001; McLaren, 2002). It may be, as Steven Walt (1997) argues, that ‘theneglect of nationalism’ is instead the ‘Achilles heel of the civilizational paradigm’ as it hasoften been for Europeanization (e.g., Carey, 2002), and, as Henderson and Tucker (2001:
333) contend, ‘the nation, and not the civilization, appears to be the largest identity
group to which people consistently swear fealty in the post- Cold War era’. But that, too,remains debatable for, in a number of developing countries, as well as the US, surveys
show individuals saying their religious identity is comparable to, or precedes, theirnational identity (e.g., Pew, 2011; Sinnott (2006) examines this in Asia). Huntington, in
fairness, does not entirely dismiss nationalism, but subordinates it to his independent
variable of particular interest, religiosity, contending that the fusion of the two mobilizes
civilizational consciousness. Civilizational identities may be underspeciﬁed (Senghaas,
1998) and, as Sen claims, ‘solitarist’ in Huntington’s model, but this neither renders
them inconceivable (see Hall and Jackson, 2007) nor incompatible with either the state(e.g., Wendt, 1994) or nationalism (e.g., Duara, 2001).
Those who embrace the potential of civilizations as political units, and credit
Huntington for raising their proﬁle in international relations, have had little to say about
the role of core states, appearing at times to take the formation of civilizational identities
for granted1 . Katzenstein (2010: 7) concedes that ‘under speciﬁc conditions, political1

An exception is Jackson (2010).

is globalization undermining civilizational identities? 557
coalitions and intellectual currents can create primordial civilizational categories’
but contends that the dynamic of intercivilizational interaction is one of peacefulexchange, not conﬂict. This middle-ground position, which credits Huntington but
places civilizations as ‘malleable’ ‘weakly institutionalized social orders’ shaped bycontemporary ‘technological orders’ reﬂects two inﬂuences: Eisenstadt’s (2001) ideas
about ‘modernity as a distinct civilization’ and the empirical strand in the literature
where the body of evidence has, in Katzenstein’s phrasing, become ‘so damaging[to the primary clash hypothesis] that by now it must be considered to be factuallywrong’ (2010: 8). The predominant ﬁnding in several of these studies indeed appears
devastating – ‘clashes’ have historically occurred within, rather than between,
civilizations (Russett et al., 2000; Henderson and Tucker, 2001; Henderson, 2005;
Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006) and intercivilizational conﬂict, when it does appear,
is less likely to escalate into war (Tusicisny, 2004). But other ﬁndings are nuanced:
modernization itself may be facilitative of conﬂict (Chiozza, 2002); states from similar
cultures tend to join the same international organizations (Beckﬁeld, 2008); the West’s
greater likelihood of engaging in conﬂict appears due to its tendency to act collectively,
like a civilization (Ellis, 2010; Charron, 2010); that cross-cultural and religious conﬂict
has generally been on the rise (Fox, 2004, 2007; Roeder, 2003). Huntington, therefore,
may poorly explain the past, but enough evidence has emerged to keep his ideas alive
as observers anticipate alignments and conﬂicts of the future, particularly those that
may involve ‘The West’ and ‘Islam’. ‘I still harbor doubts about whether the radical
Islamists knocking at the gates of Europe . . . are the bearers of a whole civilization’,
initial critic Fouad Ajami (2008) writes. But ‘clearly, commerce has not delivered us outof history’s passions [and] the World Wide Web has not cast aside blood and kin andfaith’.
It is reﬂections like these, along with a persistent media narrative (Seib, 2004),
that has helped keep the clash discussion alive even as Huntington’s third assertion –about globalization-induced resurgence at the micro-level – has remained secondary
to the empirical discussion. Exceptional are papers dealing with European and Islamic
publics, including a series of analyses based on the World Values Survey. In contrast
to the aggregate level studies, the ﬁndings are generally sympathetic to Huntington,particularly in demonstrating cohesion among Islamic values and contrasts with theWest. Inglehart and Christian Welzel contend that the Huntington-inspired boundaries
in their ‘cultural map of the world’ (based on two dimensions of factor scores in
the WVS) manifest ‘real’ differences, arguing that ‘societies with a common cultural
heritage do fall into common clusters’ (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 66, emphasis
original) (recalling Huntington’s own notion that civilizations are ‘meaningful entities,
and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real’)2 . Inglehart and2

The zones have been criticized for superimposing Huntington’s debatable civilizational map layer, along
the lines of several others who challenge Huntington’s categorization scheme (Bonikowski 2010; Haller
2002).

558 christian collet and takashi inoguchi
Pippa Norris ﬁnd further that Islamic publics show stronger afﬁnities for religious
leadership than do Western publics and that cleavages exist on social dimensions, suchas gender and sexual equality – what they term the ‘true clash of civilizations’ (Norrisand Inglehart, 2002; Inglehart and Norris, 2003 see also Esmer, 2002). They point out
that the cultural differences involve ‘Eros far more than Demos’: once development
and socioeconomic diversity are controlled, Islamic publics show stronger support for
democratic ideals than those in Western states. But where this poses a challenge to thepolitical aspects of the ‘clash’ hypothesis, it does little to alter Huntington’s substantive
conclusion: what remains an outlier in the world are the egalitarian and libertarianvalues of the West. Marsh (2009), also drawing upon the WVS, ﬁnds that the effects ofHuntington’s civilizational categories on values (relative to the West) are, in fact, larger
than those produced by individual level variables.
As the West’s core state, perceptions of the United States would presumably
be important in deﬁning civilizational identities. Yet, despite several comparative
studies after 9/11, few cultural patterns have been revealed in this regard, for the antiAmericanism that emerged after the Iraq invasion was felt at least as deeply in parts ofWestern Europe as in the Middle East. Chiozza (2009) ﬁnds, in fact, that foreign viewsof the US are structured similarly across different cultural zones, although Europeans
tend to be more critical of policy where attitudes toward the American people andpresident combine to shape the impressions of Islamic publics. Studies of foreign
opinion toward other core states are scarce, although comparative surveys generally
point to intercivilizational heterogeneity (Esmer, 2002; Diez-Nicolas, 2003), within‘Islam’ (e.g., Acevedo, 2008; Rose, 2002; Furia and Lucas, 2006) as well as ‘Confucian’societies (Dalton and Ong, 2005; Kim, 2010; Park, 2011). The question that remains, as
far as Huntington is concerned, is whether the presumed core states outside the Westare capable of generating similar afﬁnities and enmities as the US and, with particularregard to the theoretical question of civilizational identity, whether such attitudes may
be culturally rooted and enduring.

3. Hypotheses
As such, we expect that:
H1 In-civilization (member state) publics will afﬁliate more strongly with thecore state of their civilization than out-civilization publics.
Hence, Western-inﬂuenced publics will be more inclined than others in Asia to view
the US as a positive inﬂuence and Sinic publics will be more inclined than others, ceterisparibus, to view China as a positive inﬂuence. Where the lack of a core Islamic state
makes afﬁliation an open question, it would follow that

is globalization undermining civilizational identities? 559
H1a Citizens in predominantly Islamic states in Asia will identify more closelywith Iran and be more inclined to see it as a positive inﬂuence than those in Sinic
or Western-inﬂuenced civilizations.
Where Huntington’s emphasis is on religions and their differing values, he makes
multiple references in his book to the ‘revitalization of religion’ as a factor that‘reinforces’ cultural differences and civilizational identities. Extending this, it would
seem reasonable to suppose that perceptions of core states, if civilizationally derived,
would be inﬂuenced by the degree of commitment to one’s religion. This is presumably
because those most committed to their religion would be more likely to perceive
threats to their values and see core states as potential bulwarks capable of preserving
the integrity of those values (Ellingsen, 2005). Hence, we expect thatH2 As religiosity within given member state publics increases, perceptions of incivilization core states will improve and perceptions of out-civilization core states,
ceteris paribus, will decline.
H3 As nationalism within given member state publics increases, perceptions of
in-civilization core states will increase and perceptions of out-civilization corestates, ceteris paribus, will decrease.
Finally, to address the expected impact of globalization, we hypothesize that
H4 As exposure to foreign cultures within given member state publics increases,
perceptions of in-civilization core states will increase and perceptions of outcivilization core states, ceteris paribus, will decrease.
4. Data and ﬁndings
To test these hypotheses, we employ data from the AsiaBarometer, pooled fromthe project’s four waves in 2005 and 2008. In 2005, the predominantly Islamicstates of the former Soviet Union (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,and Uzbekistan) were surveyed along with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India,
Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. In 2006, Japan, China, andSouth Korea were included along with Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand were in the 2007 wave,
while the 2008 wave again included China, India, and Japan, but expanded to cover
Australia, Russia, and the United States.
Taken together, the pooled dataset includes the attitudes of 11 predominantly
Islamic societies; seven Buddhist societies, ﬁve Sinic societies, and four Western
societies, along with India and Nepal among predominantly Hindu societies, Russia
representing Orthodoxy and Japan – a mixture of seven of Huntington’s civilizations(Table 1). This yields a total of 15 intracivilizational and 61 intercivilizational dyads

560 christian collet and takashi inoguchi
Table 1. Country coverage of AsiaBarometer and civilizationalgrouping, per Huntington (1996, 26–7)

Buddhist

Hindu

Islamic

Japanese
Orthodox
Sinic

Western

BhutanCambodia
Laos
Mongolia
Sri Lanka
Thailand
India
India
Nepal
Afghanistan
BangladeshIndonesia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Malaysia
Maldives
PakistanTajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Japan
Japan
RussiaChina
China
Singapore
South Korea
TaiwanVietnam
Australia
Hong Kong
Philippines
United States

BT
KH
LA
MN
LK
TH
IN
IN
NP
AF
BD
ID
KZ
KG
MY
MV
PK
TJ
TM
UZ
JP
JP
RU
CN
CN
SG
KR
TW
VN
AU
HK
PH
US

2005
2007
2007
2005
2005
2007
2005
2008
2005
2005
2005
2007
2005
2005
2007
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2006
2008
2008
2006
2008
2006
2006
2006
2006
2008
2006
2007
2008

N

% ID Muslim in Sample

801
1012
1000
800
813
1000
1238
1.05
800
874
1008
1000
800
800
1000
821
1086
800
800
800
1003
1012
1055
2000
1000
1038
1023
1006
1000
1000
1000
1000
1002

1.4
0.2
0
2
19.9
1.7
2.8
4.2
0.8
99.8
85.5
91.9
31.9
76.4
62.7
NA
97.7
96.6
95
71.5
0
0
6.6
0.7
2
21.4
0
0
0
2.5
0.1
1
0.7

for analysis. The surveys were administered face-to-face in the country’s predominantlanguages, using stratiﬁed, multistage random sampling to determine household andrespondent eligibility. In some developing countries, the sampling frame was biased
toward urban centers and quotas were set to meet the age and gender proﬁle of thecountry as indicated in its national census.
The value of using the AsiaBarometer to test Huntington’s core state assertions lies
not only in its wide coverage of Asian publics, but in its offering of appropriate measures(described below), including several that differ from those used in papers based on the

is globalization undermining civilizational identities? 561
WVS. Yet, like the WVS and other large-scale comparative survey projects, the data face
limitations in terms of cross-cultural/national measurement equivalence, translationand comprehension (Stegmueller, 2011). Minato (2008), in a review, notes further
that the delicacy of political questions in the AsiaBarometer may have introduced
biases and inconsistencies across contexts, particularly those where respondents live
under authoritarian regimes. The reader is thus cautioned that data collected undersuch circumstances may be susceptible to additional error and that, due to the need
to obtain approval from authorities to execute the project in some societies, that all
standard political items from the AsiaBarometer questionnaire may not have been asked
in all countries. In such instances, where our model could not be tested, countries were
dropped after the descriptive analysis. The reader is cautioned further that the single
year studies in several countries may have introduced idiosyncratic, cross-sectional
effects endemic to the year of data collection. Additional methodological caveats andlimitations concerning speciﬁc in-country data collection efforts, along with completeﬁeldwork reports, can be obtained at https://www.asiabarometer.org/en/surveys byclicking on the appropriate survey year.

4.1. Dependent variable
The dependent variable, core state inﬂuence, is an item that asks, ‘Do you think
the following countries have a good inﬂuence or a bad inﬂuence on your country?’ It
is an appropriate measure for the study because the use of ‘inﬂuence’ represents aneffort to tap into deeper cultural afﬁnities and economic values that go beyond current
events, leaders or diplomatic relationships of-the-moment (though, of course, the item
may capture some of these feelings as well). China and the United States were tested in
all four waves; Iran in 2005 and 2006. Respondents were asked to assess inﬂuence on a
5-point ordinal scale, ranging from ‘bad inﬂuence’ to ‘good inﬂuence’, with a neutral
option ‘neither good nor bad inﬂuence’ in the middle.
Table 2 displays the descriptives. Attitudes toward US inﬂuence vary more widely
than those concerning Chinese or Iranian inﬂuence. Where Cambodians and Filipinos
appear to be among the most favorable toward American power in Asia, Russians havethe least favorable impressions. Views among Islamic publics, on the whole, lean toward
neutrality; the negative opinions of Malaysians and Indonesians appear to be offset by
the positive opinions of Afghans and Tajiks. Chinese view American inﬂuence as mostly‘bad’; Australians and Japanese appear ambivalent. Indians see US power as something
generally ‘good’ for India.
Chinese inﬂuence is viewed most negatively by Mongolians and Japanese;
Americans and Taiwanese are also inclined to see it as ‘bad’. Russians and Australians
have neutral opinions. Chinese power is, on the whole, perceived more favorably in
Islamic Asia than among the other publics of the Sinic civilization, where South Korea
and Vietnam retain substantial negative/neutral views. Pakistanis and Afghans areamong those who are most consistently positive about Chinese inﬂuence.

562 christian collet and takashi inoguchi
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, US, Chinese and Iranian
inﬂuence (5 point re-scale: 1 = ‘Bad’, 5 = ‘Good’), by country and civilizationgrouping
US

Buddhist
BT
KH
LA
MN
LK
TH
Hindu
IN
NP
Islamic
AF
BD
ID
KZ
KG
MY
MV
PK
TJ
TM
UZ
Japan
Russia
Sinic
CN
SG
KR
TW
VN
Western
AU
HK
PH
US

CN

IR

N

Mean

SD

SE

Mean

SD

SE

Mean

SD

SE

801
1012
1000
800
813
1000

3.64
4.35
3.34
3.68
3.28
3.65

0.88
0.82
1.05
0.83
1.14
0.89

0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.03

3.01
3.59
4.05
2.36
4.04
3.74

1.03
0.92
0.90
1.11
0.83
0.76

0.04
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.02

3.01

0.51

0.02

2.95
3.09

0.48
0.57

0.02
0.02

2290
800

3.61
3.61

1.03
0.84

0.02
0.03

3.37
3.93

1.03
0.72

0.02
0.03

3.17
3.00

0.89
0.35

0.03
0.01

874
1008
1000
800
800
1000
821
1086
800
800
800
2015
1055

4.35
3.19
2.56
2.77
3.05
2.63
3.35
2.81
3.55
3.42
2.88
3.11
2.39

0.92
1.11
1.19
0.98
1.16
1.18
1.27
1.12
1.06
1.08
1.17
0.94
0.95

0.03
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.02
0.03

4.30
3.98
3.26
3.08
3.07
3.73
3.57
4.30
3.86
3.54
3.29
2.62
2.99

0.75
0.85
1.00
1.00
1.19
0.76
1.21
0.82
1.01
0.81
1.10
0.91
0.82

0.03
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.02
0.03

3.81
3.40

1.07
0.81

0.04
0.03

2.72
2.94

0.84
0.74

0.03
0.03

3.20
3.81
4.16
3.14
2.87
2.50

0.93
0.86
0.81
0.98
0.84
0.78

0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.02

3000
1038
1023
1006
1000

2.70
3.78
3.18
3.69
3.33

1.00
0.90
1.04
0.83
0.97

0.02
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03

3.12
2.71
2.74
2.75
2.79

0.60
0.81
0.66
0.69
0.63

0.01
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.02

1000
1000
1000
1002

2.96
3.20
4.22

1.05
0.82
0.78

0.03
0.03
0.02

2.58

0.66

0.02

3.76
3.09
2.90
3.3

0.87
0.91
1.01
0.96

0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03

3.07
3.64
3.47
2.83

0.88
0.79
1.01
0.92

0.03
0.02
0.03
0.03

The positive feelings that emerge in Islamic Asia toward China are not reciprocated – at least as far as Iran is concerned, toward whom the Chinese appear to haveneutral impressions. Yet Chinese opinions of Iranian inﬂuence are more positive thanothers in their immediate neighborhood, particularly Hong Kong and Singapore.
Iran’s power is viewed most favorably, as we expected, among predominantly Islamic

is globalization undermining civilizational identities? 563
Full Sample

4.5

Islamic Only

4.5

Afghanistan

Cambodia
Philippines

Japan

2.5
2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

USA

USA

3

Singapore
Thailand
India
Nepal
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Laos
VietnamMaldives
Sri Lanka
Bangladesh
South Korea Hong Kong
Kyrgyzstan
Australia
Uzbekistan
Pakistan
Kazakhstan
Malaysia
Indonesia
RussiaTaiwanBhutan3.5

Afghanistan

44
Mongolia

Sinic Only

3.5
3

Singapore
TaiwanMongolia
BhutanIndia
Nepal
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Vietnam Sri MaldivesHong KongKorea LankaBangladesh
Japan SouthKyrgyzstan
Uzbekistan
Pakistan
KazakhstanChina

2.5
2
2.5

China

3

3.5

4

4.5

Iran

5

China

Pakistan
Afghanistan

4
3

Sri LankaBangladesh
Nepal
Singapore
Hong Kong
Maldives
Turkmenistan
India
VietnamUzbekistan
South Kyrgyzstan
Korea
Kazakhstan
BhutanTaiwanJapan
Mongolia

Tajikistan

2
2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

Iran

Figure 2. Scatterplots of Country-level Mean Perceptions

publics like Tajikistan and Pakistan. Kazakhs and Uzbekis, at the same time, appear to
be more critical.
4.1.1. Core state perceptions: are they zero-sum?. Figure 2 plots the means from
Table 2 against one another in an effort to examine whether public perceptions of corestates may be related, particularly in a negative way. If Huntington’s assumptions aboutcore states have some empirical basis, we would expect to see publics engaged, in azero-sum fashion – not only identifying with the core state of their civilizations, butviewing competitive core states adversely.
In none of these plots does such a pattern emerge. The only one that reaches
a standard level of signiﬁcance is when the perceptions of China are regressed on
perceptions of Iran (N = 20, b = 0.78, p < 0.01, α = 0.22, Adj.R2 = 0.38). When the
Asian Islamic states are isolated in the analysis, the amount of variance the simple
model predicts in Chinese perceptions increases (N = 9, Adj.R2 = 0.68).
4.2. Independent variables
There are three independent variables of interest in this analysis. The ﬁrst, foreign
exposure, is a 6-point additive index developed from a battery of items that asks
whether:

High

564 christian collet and takashi inoguchi
Thailand
China
South Korea
India
Maldives
TaiwanVietnamBhutanSri Lanka
SingaporeJapan

Malaysia
Bangladesh
Philippines
Indonesia

Nationalism

United States
Nepal

Laos

Hong Kong

Pakistan

Mongolia
Australia
Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan

CambodiaTajikistan

Kazakhstan
RussiaAfghanistan

Low

Turkmenistan

Low

High

Religiosity
Islamic

Sinic

Figure 3. Scatterplot of Nationalism x Religiosity, weighted by Level of Foreign Exposure• A member of [Rs] family or a relative lives in another country.
• [R has] traveled abroad at least three times in the past three years, on holiday
or for business purposes.
• [R] has foreign friends in his home country.
• [R] often watch[es] foreign-produced programs on TV.
• [R] often communicate[s] with people in other countries via the internet or
email.
• [Rs] job involved contact with organizations or people in other countries.
The second, nationalism, is measured by asking whether R can ‘recite the national
anthem [of her/his country] by heart’ (0 = no; 1 = yes). The third variable of interest,
religiosity, also measures a practice. It asks the respondent ‘How often do you pray or
meditate?’ (1 = never; 5 = every day). The country-level descriptives for the independent
variables are presented in Appendix Table 1.
4.2.1. Exploring religiosity, nationalism and foreign exposure in the Asian Paciﬁc.
In Figure 3, we plot the means for each of the three variables of interest in a ﬁrst effort tounravel the interplay of religion, nationalism, and foreign exposure in the Asian Paciﬁcregion.

is globalization undermining civilizational identities? 565
Publics in the Sinic civilizational grouping (shown in lighter gray) are generally
characterized by low religiosity and high levels of nationalism. China appears to
be an outlying case and, as indicated by its small circle, reveals a low level offoreign exposure among its citizens. Generally, each of the countries in the upper left
quadrant of the plot, which include Japan and Thailand, have lower levels of foreign
exposure, making Singapore stand out for its apparent cosmopolitanism and moderate
religiosity. Predominantly Islamic publics (in black) are more diverse. Where residents
of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, like Russia, exhibit low levelsof religious practice or national attachment, those in Maldives, Malaysia, Indonesia,
and Bangladesh reveal high levels of both. Afghans appear to be strong worshippers
and weak nationalists. Pakistanis lean toward faith over country. Uzbekis lie somewherein the middle. Like Sinic publics, many Islamic citizens have little interaction with theworld. The Singaporean exception for Asian Islam would be Maldives, followed indegree by Uzbekistan and Malaysia.
Figure 3 reveals something further about the publics of core states. Where China
and Russia lie at opposite poles of nationalism, but are similarly low in terms of
religiosity, Indians are high on both measures. Americans, who appear similar to themore globally engaged Buddhist publics and Singapore on these measures, are notably
more nationalistic and religious than their Westernized counterparts in Australia.
Filipinos appear to combine strong nationalism with faith, placing them alongside other
Southeast Asian Islamic publics, like Indonesians and Malaysians, as well as Indians.
4.3. Model speciﬁcation
At the individual level, we can specify a model where the probability of citizeni ,within a given countryj , will perceive the inﬂuence of core statek
Pr(core state inﬂuencek = m | x ij = F (τm −xβ)−F (τm−1 −xβ)
will be explained byxβ = β1ij (civilization grouping)as well as nationalism, and foreign exposure
β2ij (religiosity) + β3ij (nationalism) + β4ij (foreign exposure)Controls include ordinal measures of standard of living (‘How would you describe yourstandard of living?’ (1 = low; 5 = high) and education (1 = low, 3 = high), as well as
gender (1 = male) and age. Following Huntington, we anticipate potential interaction
between religiosity and nationalism. Hence, a full model with a set of controls and theinteraction term would look likexβ = β1ij (civilization grouping) + β2ij (religiosity) + β3ij (nationalism)566 christian collet and takashi inoguchi

Buddhist
China
Hindu
Islamic
Japan
Russia
Sinic
US
China
Iran

Western
−50

0

50

100

150

Figure 4. Percent Change in Odds of Seeing Core States as a “Good” Inﬂuence, by
Civilization \ vis-a-vis the Reference Group (Islamic for the US, Western for China andIran), with Other Factors Held at Their Means+ β4ij (foreign exposure) + β5ij (standard of living) + β6ij (education)+ β7ij (gender) + β8ij (age) + β9ij (nationalism*religiosity)

4.4. Core state afﬁnities: is there a micro-level basis for a civilizationalframework?
Figure 4 displays the effects of civilization grouping on the dependent variables withthe other variables in the model held at their means. The bars represent, ceteris paribus,
the odds of having a one standard deviation more positive view of the core state vis-a-vis
the reference group (in each case, the reference group selected was identiﬁed as theHuntington-deﬁned strongest potential adversary (1996, 245). Because China appears
to be an outlier (and because Chinese respondents represent a disproportionately large
slice of the pool), it was separated from the other Sinic countries.
The results are mixed. On the one hand, citizens of other Westernized societies
in Asia are more likely than the reference group (Islamic) to show afﬁnity for the US,
but they are outpaced by Buddhist and Sinic countries outside of China. Russians andChinese are, in fact, less likely than Islamic citizens to view the US as a ‘good’ inﬂuence.
With regards to Chinese inﬂuence, other Sinic societies show no statistically signiﬁcantdifference from the reference group – Westernized societies. Rather, it is residents in
predominantly Islamic countries that show the highest probability for admiring Chinese
inﬂuence – twice as much, relatively speaking, as the next most admiring publics inis globalization undermining civilizational identities? 567
Buddhist countries. Japanese, rather than Western publics, appear to be least inclined
toward seeing Chinese power in a ‘good’ sense.
In the case of Iran, the evidence is supportive. Citizens within the Islamic
civilization grouping are 156% more likely to have a (one standard deviation) betterview of Iran’s inﬂuence than those in Westernized Asia. Among the other civilizations
tested, Chinese, Hindu, and Buddhist publics are also more inclined than the contrastgroup to see Iranian inﬂuence favorably. Sinic countries are less distinguishable, but
the difference still meets a standard level of signiﬁcance (p < 0.05). As with their viewsof China, Japanese appear to be signiﬁcantly less likely than the reference group to view
the power of Iran favorably.
Separate ordered logit models were run in each country using each the threedependent variables. The complete results appear in Appendix Tables 2–7. The
remainder of the analysis is devoted ﬁrst to a general discussion of the variables ofinterest on each of the three core states, the US, China, and Iran, respectively, which isfollowed by a summary discussion.
4.5. Explaining core state inﬂuence: the United States
4.5.1. The effects of religiosity, nationalism and foreign exposure. Religiosity hascomplex effects on views of American power in the Asian Paciﬁc. In China and Russia,
religion interacts with nationalism. This indicates that the heightened perceptions ofAmerican inﬂuence generated by religiosity in these countries depresses as levels ofnationalism increase. In Japan, religiosity lowers the probability of seeing the US as a‘good’ inﬂuence. In Australia, it increases the same probability – consistent with what
we would expect from a predominantly Christian public.
In eight of the 11 states in the Islamic grouping, religiosity has no direct impact
on views of US inﬂuence. In Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan, the effect is in the
expected negative direction. Among Malaysians, nationalism and religiosity appear tomutually depress perceptions of American inﬂuence. At the same time, nationalism
boosts perceptions of US inﬂuence, as witnessed in the cases of Tajikistan and Laos.
Foreign exposure, ceteris paribus, improves perceptions of the United States inseveral societies across civilizational groupings. In Vietnam, its effect is signiﬁcant at
p < 0.05; in China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the z-score of the coefﬁcient reaches
a higher standard p < 0.001. Among Indonesians, foreign exposure has a reductiveinﬂuence.
4.5.2. Controls: standard of living and education. Of the control factors included
in our US model, two emerged as important: self-reported standard of living andeducation. Increases in living standard lead to positive perceptions of Americaninﬂuence among Russians, Singaporeans, and South Koreans as well as among nonChinese Sinic countries as a whole. Among predominantly Islamic publics, higher
standards of living raise attitudes toward the US in Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Pakistan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. They depress perceptions in Malaysia and Turkmenistan.

568 christian collet and takashi inoguchi
The role of education is less consistent. A higher level of education in China
increases perceptions of US inﬂuence. In several Islamic states – Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan,and Pakistan – the effect of higher education is, ceteris paribus, depressive on such
attitudes.
4.6. Explaining core state inﬂuence: China
4.6.1. The effects of religiosity, nationalism, and foreign exposure. Religiosity, on
the whole, appears to play a small role in shaping impressions of Chinese inﬂuence.
In Singapore, Tajikistan, and Maldives, the effect is negative, meaning greater religious
devotion in those publics is, ceteris paribus, likely to decrease the probability of seeing
Chinese power in a positive light. In Bangladesh, however, the effect is positive.
The inﬂuence of nationalism is more apparent, appearing to inﬂuence views ofChina primarily in her immediate sphere of inﬂuence: Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong,and Bhutan. In the case of Singapore, nationalism depresses views of Chinese inﬂuence;for the others, the effect is positive.
As with perceptions of American inﬂuence, attitudes toward Chinese inﬂuenceincrease in several Asian publics with greater levels of foreign exposure. Noteworthy
are the boosts given by cultural interaction in American, Taiwanese, and Vietnamesecontexts. Similar patterns are found among Afghans, Bangladeshis, Maldivians, andTurkmens. Indonesians again are an exception, showing lower likelihood of viewing
Chinese power as ‘good’ as their exposure to foreign cultures increases.
4.6.2. Controls: standard of living and age. Perceptions of China, as observed in
the American model, can be linked to increases in standard of living. This pattern ismanifest in Russia, South Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan, and Indonesia.
A generational lens on perceptions of Chinese inﬂuence is evident in the data. In
the American and Japanese samples, age is negative, indicating that Chinese inﬂuence isviewed more negatively as the respondent gets older. Education appears to have mixed
inﬂuence. It has a reductive impact on the views of Americans, but boosts the views ofRussians, Afghans, Bangladeshis, and Malaysians.
4.7. Explaining core state inﬂuence: Iran
4.7.1. The effects of religiosity, nationalism and foreign exposure. Religiosity, along
the lines of our hypotheses, boosts Iranian inﬂuence in several Islamic publics, including
Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Recall that in Pakistan we also
witness the reductive effect of religiosity on American inﬂuence, a pattern that would
be anticipated by Huntington. Nationalism plays no role in views of Iran, with one
exception, China, where it interacts with religiosity. The sign on the interaction term
is positive, producing an effect that is contrary to what is witnessed when US inﬂuenceis the dependent variable (Figure 5).
Where the reputations of the United States and China appear, in large part, tobeneﬁt from public exposure to foreign cultures, the impact on Iran is the opposite.

A
.5

0

−.5

−1

−1.5
1

2

3

4

Religiosity Scale
Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.

5

Marginal Effect of Nationalism on Impression of Iranian Influence

Marginal Effect of Nationalism on Impression of US Influenceis globalization undermining civilizational identities? 569

B
2

1.5

1

.5

0

−.5
1

2

3

4

5

Religiosity Scale
Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.

Figure 5. Marginal Effect of Nationalism on Chinese Views of the US (A) and Iranian (B)Inﬂuence. Graphs plotted using (Boemke (2008).)

As publics in India, Hong Kong, and Singapore, as well as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, andUzbekistan, gain in cross-cultural interaction, their perceptions of Iranian inﬂuence on
their respective countries decline.
4.7.2. Controls: education, living standard and gender. Where education appears
to have a reductive impact on views of Iranian inﬂuence (South Korea, Taiwan, andTajikistan), increases in living standard appear to have a positive impact in some Islamic
publics (Kazakhstan, Maldives, and Pakistan). An interesting, and unexpected, gendereffect is witnessed across several Asian publics. Among Chinese, Bangladeshis, andTajiks, the effect of being male is positive on impressions of Iranian inﬂuence; among
the publics of Hong Kong, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan, the effect is negative.
4.8. Summary: assessing the potential for intracivilizational cohesion andintercivilizational clash
The ﬁndings are summarized in Tables 3, 4, and 5. Plus (+) and minus (–) signs
represent positive and negative logit coefﬁcients whose z-scores reach a p < 0.05
standard or higher, respectively; zeroes (0) represent those that do not meet thisstandard.

570 christian collet and takashi inoguchi
Table 3. Summaries from multivariate models: assessing
intracivilizational cohesion among Western, Sinic, and Islamic publics

Western

Sinic

Islamic

PH –> USAU –> USHK –> US
SG –> CNKR –> CN
TW –> CNVN –> CN
PK –> IR
AF –> IR
BD –> IR
TJ –> IR
TM –> IR
KG –> IR
KZ –> IR
UZ –> IR

Religiosity

Nationalism

Foreign Exposure

0
+
0
–
0
0
0
+
0
0
0
+
+
0
+

0
0
0
–
0
+
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
+
+
0
0
0
0
0
–
–
–

Three points bear restating. First, nationalism plays a limited role in shaping
perceptions of the world’s hegemons in the region – with the exception of publics
within, or in immediate proximity to, China. Second, increased levels of religious
practice have the effect of both raising the proﬁle of Iranian inﬂuence and lowering the
proﬁle of American inﬂuence. Religiosity in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan,as displayed in solid lines in Figure 6, reveals positive, statistically signiﬁcant marginal
effects on the ‘rather good’ and ‘good’ response categories in the Iranian model.
Conversely, Figure 7 exhibits the positive effects on the two negative categories, ‘rather
bad’ and ‘bad’, for the American model among Indonesians (7a) and Malaysians (7b).
Pakistan appears to be the better ﬁt for Huntington, where religiosity boosts ‘rather
good’ and ‘good’ responses to Iranian inﬂuence (6c) and ‘rather bad’ and ‘bad’ responses
to American inﬂuence (7c).
The third point is that foreign exposure (dashed lines) often mitigates the effects
of religiosity. With regard to Iran’s inﬂuence in Turkmenistan, the boost given byreligiosity remains the stronger effect of the two; in Kazakhstan, religiosity has noeffect. For Uzbekis and Kyrgyz, however, the effect of foreign exposure is essentially the
mirror of that offered by religion, boosting ‘bad’ and ‘rather bad’ responses at roughly
the same rate that religiosity increases the ‘rather good’ and ‘good’ responses. With
regard to American inﬂuence in Indonesia and Malaysia, foreign exposure appears tocontribute to the negative inﬂuence of religiosity and nationalism. But in Pakistan, it
boosts ‘rather good’, ‘good’, and ‘neutral’ responses – a counterweight to the effect ofreligiosity.

is globalization undermining civilizational identities? 571
Table 4. Summaries from multivariate models: assessing intercivilizational
clash among Western, Sinic and Islamic Publics

Sinic/Western

Islamic/Western

Islamic/Sinic∗

CN –> US
SG –> USKR –> USTW –> US
VN –> USAU –> CN
HK —> CNPH –> CN
AF –> USKZ –> USKG –> US
TJ –> USTM –> USUZ –> US
ID –> US
MY –> USPK –> USBD –> USMV –> USHK –> IR
AF –> CN
KZ –> CN
KG –> CN
TJ –> CN
TM –> CNUZ –> CN
ID –> CN
MY –> CN
PK –> CNBD –> CN
MV –> CN
CN –> IR
SG –> IR
KR –> IR
TW –> IR
VN –> IR

Religiosity

Nationalism

Foreign Exposure

+∗
0
0
0
+
0
0
0
0
0
0
+
0
0
–
–
–
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
+
–
+∗
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
+
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
–
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
–
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

+
0
0
0
+
+
+
0
+
0
0
0
0
0
–
0
+
0
0
–
+
0
0
0
+
0
–
0
0
+
+
0
–
0
0
0

Effect produced by interaction with nationalism

Across civilizations, there are publics where foreign exposure lifts Chinese andAmerican inﬂuence. For China, as we discussed, statistically signiﬁcant effects appear
among a handful of Islamic publics; comparable ﬁndings for the US would be thosefound in the Buddhist civilizational category. Where the two are at roughly equal
public standing, like Afghanistan or Vietnam, the effects of foreign exposure are572 christian collet and takashi inoguchi
Table 5. Summaries from multivariate models: assessing intercivilizational
clash among Orthodox, Japanese, Buddhist and Hindu publics.

Orthodox/Western
Orthodox/Sinic
Japanese/WesternJapanese/Sinic
Hindu/Western
Hindu/Sinic
Buddhist/Sinic

Buddhist/Western

Islamic/Hindu
Islamic/Buddhist

RU –> USRU –> CN
JP —> USJP –> CNIN –> US
NP–> USIN –> CN
NP —> CNBT –> CN
KH –> CNLA –> CN
LK –> CN
MN –> CNTH –> CNBT —> USKH –> USLA –> US
LK –> US
MN –> USTH –> USIN –> IR
NP —> IR
LK –> IR
BT –> IR
MN –> IR

Religiosity

Nationalism

Foreign Exposure

+
0
–
0
0
0
0
0
+
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
+
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
–
0
0
0
0
0
0
+
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
+
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
+
+
+
0
0
–
0
0
0

comparable. In others, like Australia or Laos, one of the hegemons enjoys a greater
beneﬁt. Notably, foreign exposure has similar effects on Chinese impressions of US
inﬂuence and American impressions of Chinese inﬂuence (Figure 8).
5. Discussion
One of the key assumptions of the ‘clash of civilizations’ framework revolves aroundthe role of publics and their tendencies to discern ‘us’ from ‘them’ in geopolitical terms.
This, according to Huntington, forms the basis of civilizational identities which, in turn,offer a basis for structuring international affairs. Following this logic, we surmised thatpublics would identify more strongly with the core states of their civilizational grouping
and, as such, view the core states of rival civilizations more negatively. We also surmisedthat religiosity would strengthen those attachments. Globalization, deﬁned here as anindividual’s everyday exposure to foreign cultures, would strengthen this pattern and, if
Huntington’s resurgence model were evident across publics, would work in a negative
direction and exacerbate impressions of core states of out-civilizations.

is globalization undermining civilizational identities? 573(a) Turkmenistan(b) Kazakhstan(c) Kyrgyzstan(d) Uzbekistan(e) Pakistan

Figure 6. Marginal Effects of Religiosity (solid lines) and Foreign Exposure (dashed) on
Iranian Inﬂuence within Central Asian Publics (other variables held at their means)574 christian collet and takashi inoguchi(a) Indonesia(b) Malaysia(c) Pakistan

Figure 7. Marginal Effects of Religiosity (solid lines), Nationalism (dotted) and Foreign
Exposure (dashed) on American Inﬂuence within Predominantly Islamic Publics (othervariables held at their means)is globalization undermining civilizational identities? 575
What we ﬁnd in the Asian Paciﬁc context are patterns that are more complex thanthose suggested by the Huntington model. There is some evidence, at a descriptive
level, of divisions between the United States, China, and predominantly Islamicstates – primarily among the Indonesian, Malaysian, and Pakistani publics. Someof this can be attributed to religiosity and, to a lesser extent, nationalism, as well as theinteraction between the two. Moreover, there is evidence in our analysis of central Asian
Islamic public afﬁliation with Iran as a potential core state. In half of the predominantly
Islamic publics we tested, religiosity boosts opinions of Iranian inﬂuence. Consistent
with some of Huntington’s more controversial assertions about an ‘Confucian Islamic
connection’, moreover, we ﬁnd that several of these publics do indeed view China morefavorably vis-a-vis the United States. The same goes for Chinese views of Iran. Support
for the United States in Australia and Russia can be explained, in part, by increased
levels of spiritual commitment, which lends further weight to some of Huntington’s
assumptions about the evolution of ‘The West’.
At the same time, perceptions of core state inﬂuence do not manifest as a zerosum game. In other words, where publics may identify more strongly with one relative
to another, in doing so they do not necessarily perceive out-civilization core states
substantively as ‘bad inﬂuences’. Some predominantly Islamic publics see both Iranand America, in real terms, as either neutral or good inﬂuences; in terms of the UnitedStates and China, only Pakistan and Malaysia appear to clearly favor the latter. Taiwan
and South Korea edge (or hedge) toward the US. This, combined with the ongoingantagonisms between the Chinese and Japanese publics, calls into question predictions
about a cohesive Sinic civilization acting under the banner of Beijing. One of the key
barriers would appear, as critics have asserted, to be the role of nationalism. But theeffects do not extend much beyond the immediate Chinese sphere in Southeast Asia.
Tension over territorial issues in the region since the timing of the surveys, in fact, may
be inspiring nationalisms that are wary of growing Chinese power.
The challenge to Huntington, rather, comes with the inﬂuence of globalization.
Indonesia appears to ﬁt the resurgent response that he predicts, but it is unique.
Instead, higher degrees of foreign exposure tend to improve perceptions of foreignstate inﬂuence in some of the notoriously contentious intercivilizational dyads in the
study, notably between Chinese and Americans. Foreign exposure, at the same time,often works against the inﬂuence of Iran, particularly in central Asia. Rather thanimminent conﬂict, the evidence presented here suggests greater competition between
American and Chinese soft power and development initiatives, while also suggesting
the potential for improvement, at the micro-level, in Sino−US relations.
Ultimately, Huntington’s expectations about the deterministic inﬂuence of religion
on identity formation appear to be overstated. To the extent that it may be structured
around core state afﬁnities or enmities, a civilizational identity would appear to besusceptible to inﬂuences that pull it in conﬂicting directions. Exposure to imported
products, traveling or communicating with others abroad has, in the face of greater
religious and nationalist sentiments, the capacity to boost public perceptions of states

576 christian collet and takashi inoguchi

Figure 8. Comparing the Marginal Effects of Foreign Exposure on Chinese Attitudes
toward US Inﬂuence (solid) and American Attitudes toward Chinese Inﬂuence (dashed)that, in the Huntington frame, are destined to collide based on cultural or value
difference. This does not necessarily lead us to endorse the ‘universal civilization’thesis that Huntington makes considerable effort to refute, but does suggest thatmodernity, as Eisenstadt contends, may have its own effect upon the future identitiesof publics. If comparative politics and international relations should pursue thecivilizational paradigm further, Katzenstein’s middle-ground view that sees them as‘weakly institutionalized orders’ appears, at this point, to be the approach that is more
empirically plausible. Core states may help to deﬁne politics at the macro-level, but, inthe face of globalization, their role in deﬁning publics at the micro-level is far less clear.
About the authors
Christian Collet (Ph.D, University of California, Irvine) is Senior Associate
Professor at International Christian University, Tokyo, where he teaches courses
on public opinion, American and comparative politics. His work has appeared in
Perspectives on Politics, The Journal of Politics, Public Opinion Quarterly, Amerasia
Journal and Race/Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts and volumes from the
University of California Press and Rowman Littleﬁeld. He is the co-editor, with Pei-teLien, of The Transnational Politics of Asian Americans, published in 2009 by Temple
University Press.
Takashi Inoguchi is Professor Emeritus of the University of Tokyo and Presidentof the University of Niigata Prefecture. He specializes in Japanese politics, comparative
political behavior, and international relations. He has published numerous books andarticles, amongst which are Japanese Politics: An Introduction (Trans Paciﬁc Press,
2005), Political Cultures in Asia and Europe (Routledge, 2006), Citizens and the State(Routledge, 2008), Globalisation, Public Opinion and the State (Routledge, 2008), The

is globalization undermining civilizational identities? 577
Quality of Life in Confucian Asia (Springer, 2010), American Democracy Promotion(Oxford University Press, 2000), Reinventing the Alliance (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003),
The Uses of Institutions (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), Japanese Politics Today (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2011), The US–Japan Security Alliance (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), andQuality of Life in Asia (Springer, forthcoming in 2012). He is Executive Editor of theJapanese Journal of Political Science (Cambridge University Press) and Director of the
AsiaBarometer project.
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US
RU
MY
AU
ID
PH
SG
TH
JP
KR
VN
CN
IN
PK
AF
LK
HK
KH
LA
BD
TW
MV
BT
MN
NP
TJ
TM
KG
KZ
UZ

974
981
991
993
999
999
1032
1000
2001
1013
1000
2996
2287
1050
872
812
999
1012
1000
1007
1001
821
795
793
800
794
588
797
780
796

N

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Min

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Max

3.721
2.061
4.433
2.687
4.725
4.692
3.432
2.761
2.555
2.480
2.176
1.531
4.687
4.274
4.956
3.642
1.501
3.709
3.375
4.442
1.988
4.598
3.842
2.169
3.896
2.957
2.697
2.434
2.058
3.095

Mean

Religiosity

0.048
0.041
0.036
0.052
0.025
0.020
0.053
0.045
0.035
0.048
0.032
0.018
0.018
0.031
0.009
0.053
0.036
0.036
0.037
0.027
0.037
0.017
0.050
0.037
0.050
0.058
0.079
0.058
0.043
0.056

SE
1.493
1.299
1.126
1.632
0.783
0.642
1.696
1.422
1.574
1.543
1.014
0.996
0.884
1.012
0.272
1.501
1.135
1.157
1.182
0.841
1.155
0.491
1.402
1.038
1.406
1.621
1.918
1.629
1.206
1.578

SD
1002
1055
1000
1000
1000
1000
1038
1000
2015
1023
1000
3000
2290
1086
874
813
1000
1012
1000
1008
1006
821
801
800
800
800
800
800
800
800

N
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Min
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Max
0.712
0.215
0.820
0.467
0.730
0.784
0.813
0.969
0.793
0.898
0.792
0.923
0.866
0.499
0.141
0.815
0.495
0.361
0.638
0.797
0.821
0.862
0.818
0.494
0.661
0.329
0.131
0.364
0.230
0.420

Mean

Nationalism

0.014
0.013
0.012
0.016
0.014
0.013
0.012
0.005
0.009
0.009
0.013
0.005
0.007
0.015
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.015
0.015
0.013
0.012
0.012
0.014
0.018
0.017
0.017
0.012
0.017
0.015
0.017

SE

Appendix Table 1. Country-Level Descriptives for Independent Variables of Interest

0.453
0.411
0.384
0.499
0.444
0.412
0.390
0.173
0.405
0.302
0.406
0.267
0.341
0.500
0.348
0.388
0.500
0.480
0.481
0.403
0.383
0.345
0.386
0.500
0.474
0.470
0.338
0.481
0.421
0.494

SD
1002
1055
1000
1000
1000
1000
1038
1000
2015
1023
1000
3000
2290
1086
874
813
1000
1012
1000
1008
1006
821
801
800
800
800
800
800
800
800

N
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Min
6
5
6
6
3
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
6
6
6
6
4
6
6
6
6
6
5
4
5
6
6

Max
1.363
0.410
1.204
2.387
0.418
1.139
2.711
0.421
0.705
0.760
0.885
0.462
0.468
0.643
0.739
0.857
1.125
1.472
1.688
0.632
0.893
2.382
1.901
0.774
1.480
0.980
0.404
0.861
0.860
1.611

Mean
0.049
0.023
0.028
0.052
0.018
0.032
0.053
0.026
0.024
0.029
0.029
0.014
0.017
0.033
0.026
0.032
0.042
0.027
0.028
0.024
0.032
0.058
0.047
0.037
0.045
0.033
0.025
0.033
0.034
0.041

SE

Foreign Exposure

1.551
0.740
0.891
1.658
0.581
1.011
1.694
0.816
1.095
0.918
0.919
0.744
0.810
1.082
0.769
0.900
1.331
0.868
0.894
0.750
1.007
1.671
1.334
1.047
1.267
0.932
0.694
0.925
0.973
1.155

SD

is globalization undermining civilizational identities? 579

∗∗∗

0.33
(2.84)−0.18(0.37)
0.39∗∗∗(0.10)−0.04(0.07)
0.28∗∗(0.09)−0.01(0.14)
0.00(0.01)−0.14(0.57)−5.21∗∗(1.93)−3.13(1.90)−2.32(1.90)−0.78(1.90)
859

ID
−0.14
(0.74)−0.30∗(0.13)−0.40∗∗∗(0.11)−0.03(0.08)−0.22∗(0.11)−0.08(0.12)
0.00(0.01)
0.00(0.16)−3.22∗∗∗(0.69)−2.29∗∗∗(0.68)−0.71(0.68)
0.72(0.69)
999

BD

−0.16
(0.66)
0.02(0.12)
0.14(0.08)
0.10(0.08)−0.06(0.09)
0.21(0.12)−0.01∗(0.01)
0.07(0.15)−2.46∗∗∗(0.62)−0.86(0.61)
0.54(0.61)
2.11∗∗∗(0.61)
1006

p < .001 ∗∗ p < .01 ∗ p < .05

Obs

Con

Con

Con

Con

nat∗ rel

Age

Male

Educ

StLiv

ForEx

Rel

Nat

AF
0.31
(0.30)−0.11(0.06)−0.01(0.07)
0.17(0.10)−0.05(0.11)
0.00(0.13)
0.00(0.01)−0.14(0.12)−2.36∗∗∗(0.49)−0.32(0.48)
1.27∗∗(0.48)
3.46∗∗∗(0.52)
775

KZ
0.40(0.24)−0.04(0.05)−0.09(0.07)
0.22∗(0.09)−0.22∗(0.10)−0.23(0.13)−0.01∗(0.01)
0.03(0.08)−2.49∗∗∗(0.45)−1.31∗ ∗(0.44)
0.22(0.44)
1.65∗∗∗(0.45)
794

KG

MV
−1.16
(1.87)−0.56(0.37)
0.00(0.04)
0.23∗(0.09)
0.10(0.09)−0.02(0.14)
0.00(0.01)
0.48(0.40)−2.87(1.79)−2.19(1.79)−0.54(1.79)
0.40(1.79)
797

MY−1.08∗(0.51)−0.49∗∗∗(0.10)
0.02(0.07)−0.26∗∗(0.10)
0.19(0.10)−0.18(0.12)
0.00(0.01)
0.14(0.12)−4.37∗∗∗(0.60)−2.95∗∗∗(0.59)−1.83∗∗(0.59)
0.18(0.59)
991

Appendix Table 2. US Model: Islamic and Hindu Publics

0.23(0.54)−0.20∗∗(0.07)
0.20∗∗∗(0.06)
0.21∗∗∗(0.06)−0.30∗∗∗(0.09)
0.09(0.12)
0.00(0.01)
0.03(0.12)−2.01∗∗∗(0.39)−0.71(0.38)
0.71(0.38)
2.64∗∗∗(0.40)
1041

PK
0.82∗∗(0.29)
0.00(0.05)
0.01(0.07)
0.19∗(0.09)−0.17(0.10)−0.04(0.14)
0.00(0.01)−0.22∗(0.09)−2.69∗∗∗(0.43)−1.43∗∗∗(0.41)
0.06(0.41)
1.80∗∗∗(0.41)
790

TJ
−0.22
(0.41)−0.04(0.05)−0.11(0.11)−0.19∗(0.08)−0.14(0.15)−0.04(0.17)
0.00(0.01)
0.05(0.12)−3.58∗∗∗(0.52)−3.20∗∗∗(0.51)−0.48(0.49)
0.13(0.49)
564

TM
0.50(0.29)−0.01(0.05)
0.06(0.06)
0.23∗ ∗
(0.09)−0.15(0.11)−0.12(0.13)−0.01∗ ∗(0.01)−0.10(0.08)−2.00∗∗∗(0.49)−0.72(0.49)
0.55(0.49)
2.33∗∗∗(0.50)
796

UZ

−0.18
(0.59)
0.04(0.11)
0.07(0.05)
0.20∗∗∗(0.05)
0.30∗∗∗(0.06)−0.01(0.08)
0.00(0.00)−0.04(0.12)−2.09∗∗∗(0.60)−0.96(0.59)
0.97(0.59)
2.41∗∗∗(0.59)
2280

IN

0.67
(0.45)
0.09(0.09)−0.03(0.06)
0.02(0.11)
0.10(0.09)−0.26(0.15)
0.01(0.01)−0.06(0.11)−2.96∗∗∗(0.54)−1.21∗(0.48)
0.46(0.47)
3.37∗∗∗(0.49)
756NP

580 christian collet and takashi inoguchi

∗∗∗

Obs

Con

Con

Con

Con

0.25
(0.21)
0.18∗(0.08)
0.20∗ ∗ ∗(0.05)
0.04(0.05)
0.15∗ ∗
(0.05)−0.08(0.07)
0.00(0.00)−0.21∗(0.09)−1.30∗ ∗ ∗(0.28)
0.18(0.28)
1.97∗ ∗ ∗(0.28)
4.07∗ ∗ ∗(0.30)
2990

KR

−0.13
(0.37)
0.07(0.13)−0.06(0.07)
0.17∗(0.08)
0.01(0.11)
0.01(0.12)
0.02∗ ∗ ∗(0.01)−0.04(0.13)−1.35∗(0.58)
0.41(0.57)
1.52∗ ∗
(0.57)
4.23∗ ∗ ∗(0.59)
1011

SG

−0.45
(0.34)
0.02(0.08)−0.02(0.04)
0.18∗(0.08)
0.11(0.09)
0.13(0.12)−0.01(0.01)
0.04(0.09)−3.85∗ ∗ ∗(0.54)−2.43∗ ∗ ∗(0.50)−0.32(0.49)
1.54∗ ∗
(0.49)
1032

p < .001 ∗∗ p < .01 ∗ p < .05

nat∗ rel

Age

Male

Educ

StLiv

ForEx

Rel

Nat

CN
0.05
(0.30)−0.02(0.10)
0.02(0.06)−0.09(0.15)
0.12(0.10)−0.09(0.12)−0.01(0.01)
0.01(0.12)−4.56∗ ∗ ∗(0.65)−2.85∗ ∗ ∗(0.61)−1.22∗(0.60)
1.53∗(0.60)
998

TW
0.49(0.34)
0.25∗(0.11)
0.14∗(0.07)
0.15(0.09)−0.02(0.08)
0.30∗(0.12)−0.01(0.00)−0.17(0.13)−2.53∗ ∗ ∗(0.50)−0.43(0.47)
1.42∗ ∗
(0.47)
3.07∗ ∗ ∗(0.48)
1000

VN
0.54
(0.28)
0.13∗(0.05)
0.16(0.09)
0.39∗ ∗ ∗(0.09)−0.12(0.08)−0.17(0.12)−0.01∗(0.00)−0.23∗(0.12)−1.06∗ ∗(0.40)
0.97∗(0.40)
2.55∗ ∗ ∗(0.41)
4.80∗ ∗ ∗(0.48)
967

RU
−0.23
(0.18)−0.12∗(0.06)−0.05(0.04)
0.25∗ ∗ ∗(0.06)−0.09(0.07)
0.27∗ ∗
(0.08)
0.00(0.00)
0.12(0.07)−2.78∗ ∗ ∗(0.33)−0.81∗(0.32)
0.99∗ ∗
(0.32)
3.12∗ ∗ ∗(0.33)
1981

JP
0.02
(0.23)
0.11∗(0.05)−0.07(0.04)
0.03(0.07)−0.05(0.09)
0.32∗ ∗
(0.12)
0.00(0.00)−0.04(0.07)−2.41∗ ∗ ∗(0.40)−0.42(0.39)
0.82∗(0.39)
2.94∗ ∗ ∗(0.41)
982

AU
0.15(0.20)
0.04(0.09)−0.02(0.05)−0.13(0.11)
0.10(0.10)
0.05(0.12)−0.02∗ ∗(0.01)−0.02(0.11)−4.89∗ ∗ ∗(0.53)−2.13∗ ∗ ∗(0.47)−0.32(0.47)
3.03∗ ∗ ∗(0.51)
997

HK
1.38(0.95)
0.28(0.17)
0.02(0.07)−0.01(0.11)−0.16(0.09)−0.02(0.12)−0.01(0.00)−0.36(0.20)−4.11∗ ∗ ∗(0.90)−3.18∗ ∗ ∗(0.86)−1.36(0.85)
0.96(0.84)
990

PH

Appendix Table 3. US Model: Sinic, Orthodox, Japanese, Western and Buddhist Publics

0.48(0.48)
0.13(0.11)−0.08(0.05)
0.21(0.12)−0.33∗ ∗ ∗(0.09)
0.00(0.14)−0.01(0.01)−0.02(0.12)−4.05∗ ∗ ∗(0.69)−2.73∗ ∗ ∗(0.64)
0.37(0.62)
1.78∗ ∗
(0.62)
788

BT
0.04(0.41)
0.11(0.07)−0.02(0.07)
0.07(0.11)−0.06(0.10)
0.14(0.13)
0.00(0.01)−0.01(0.11)−4.87∗∗∗(0.66)−2.95∗∗∗(0.51)−1.35∗ ∗(0.49)
0.34(0.49)
1012

KH

MN
0.14
(0.32)
0.12(0.09)
0.17∗(0.07)
0.14(0.11)
0.15(0.09)
0.32∗(0.13)
0.00(0.01)
0.07(0.13)−3.46∗∗∗(0.56)−2.04∗∗∗(0.47)
0.96∗(0.45)
2.82∗∗∗(0.46)
788

LA
0.79∗
(0.39)
0.17∗(0.09)
0.20∗ ∗
(0.07)−0.27∗ ∗(0.09)
0.00(0.08)
0.11(0.13)−0.01∗(0.01)−0.07(0.10)−2.97∗∗∗(0.47)−1.46∗ ∗(0.46)
0.44(0.45)
1.81∗∗∗(0.46)
998−0.43(0.74)
0.05(0.15)
0.18∗(0.08)
0.16(0.09)−0.22(0.13)−0.46∗∗∗(0.13)−0.01(0.01)−0.04(0.16)−3.20∗∗∗(0.86)−1.65(0.85)−0.32(0.85)
1.26(0.85)
799

LK

0.47
(0.68)
0.02(0.21)
0.15(0.08)−0.23∗(0.12)
0.02(0.08)−0.01(0.12)−0.02∗∗∗(0.01)
0.00(0.21)−5.52∗∗∗(0.85)−2.93∗∗∗(0.79)−1.27(0.78)
0.97(0.78)
1000

TH

is globalization undermining civilizational identities? 581

BD

ID

KZ

KG

MY

MV

PK

TJ

TM

UZ

IN

NP

∗∗∗

p < .001 ∗∗ p < .01 ∗ p < .05

Nat

−0.92
1.35
−0.40
−0.41
0.28
−0.56
−2.63
0.83
−0.07
−0.10
0.05
0.66
0.57
(2.60)(0.77)(0.74)(0.31)(0.24)(0.58)(1.91)(0.58)(0.29)(0.51)(0.30)(0.58)(0.49)
Rel
−0.40
0.30∗
−0.03
−0.09
0.05
−0.22
−0.75∗
0.12−0.13∗∗
0.08
0.03
−0.02
0.06
(0.34)(0.15)(0.13)(0.06)(0.05)(0.11)(0.38)(0.07)(0.05)(0.05)(0.05)(0.11)(0.09)
0.34∗∗∗ −0.24∗
−0.03
0.14
−0.02
0.18∗∗∗ 0.07
−0.08
0.28∗ −0.05
0.14∗∗ −0.09ForEx
0.27∗∗(0.09)(0.09)(0.11)(0.07)(0.07)(0.07)(0.04)(0.06)(0.07)(0.12)(0.06)(0.05)(0.07)
StLiv
0.10
0.13
0.23∗∗ −0.01
0.07
0.01
0.29∗∗
0.31∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗
0.02
0.05
0.04
0.34∗∗(0.07)(0.08)(0.08)(0.10)(0.09)(0.11)(0.09)(0.06)(0.09)(0.09)(0.09)(0.05)(0.11)
∗
∗
∗
Educ
0.22
0.22
−0.02
−0.13
−0.19
0.23
−0.06
0.08
0.04
0.03
0.08
0.08
0.29∗∗(0.09)(0.09)(0.11)(0.11)(0.10)(0.11)(0.09)(0.09)(0.10)(0.17)(0.11)(0.06)(0.10)
0.59∗∗∗ −0.04
−0.11
0.22
0.12
0.20
0.29∗
0.04
0.02
0.20
0.03
0.36∗
Male −0.32∗(0.14)(0.13)(0.12)(0.13)(0.13)(0.12)(0.14)(0.13)(0.14)(0.18)(0.13)(0.08)(0.16)
0.00
−0.01
0.00
0.01
−0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
−0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
Age
−0.01∗(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.00)(0.01)
nat∗ rel 0.14
−0.13
0.04
0.13
−0.04
0.15
0.82∗
−0.11
0.02
−0.12
0.03
−0.20
−0.06
(0.53)(0.17)(0.16)(0.13)(0.08)(0.13)(0.40)(0.13)(0.09)(0.14)(0.08)(0.12)(0.11)
Con−7.87∗∗∗ −2.74∗∗ −2.80∗∗∗ −3.54∗∗∗ −1.69∗∗∗ −6.92∗∗∗ −4.44∗−3.36∗∗∗ −2.96∗∗∗ 0.8−1.94∗∗∗ −2.86∗∗∗ −4.63∗∗∗(1.89)(0.86)(0.69)(0.50)(0.44)(0.97)(1.85)(0.57)(0.44)(0.53)(0.50)(0.58)(1.11)
∗∗∗
∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗
∗∗
−1.07
−1.61
−1.92
−0.46
−3.37
−2.70
−2.75
−2.12
1.45 −0.67−1.57−1.61∗∗
Con−6.94(1.81)(0.74)(0.69)(0.49)(0.44)(0.67)(1.84)(0.50)(0.42)(0.54)(0.49)(0.58)(0.54)
2.20∗∗
0.28
−0.09
1.01∗
−1.43∗
−1.37
0.32
−0.49
0.85
0.11
0.80
Con
−3.44∗(1.75)(0.73)(0.69)(0.48)(0.44)(0.66)(1.84)(0.41)(0.41)(0.49)(0.58)(0.51)
Con−1.56
3.88∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗
1.60∗∗
2.20∗∗∗ 1.33∗−0.31
1.84∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗
2.44∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ 3.72∗∗∗(1.75)(0.73)(0.69)(0.49)(0.44)(0.66)(1.84)(0.42)(0.41)(0.50)(0.58)(0.53)
Obs
859
1006
999
775
794
991
797
1041
790
564
796
2280
756

AF

Appendix Table 4. China Model: Islamic and Hindu Publics

582 christian collet and takashi inoguchi

HK

−0.09
0.66∗∗(0.23)(0.21)
0.06−0.10(0.05)(0.09)
0.09∗
0.14∗∗(0.04)(0.05)
0.04
0.11(0.08)(0.12)
0.25∗ ∗
0.06
(0.09)(0.11)
0.29∗
0.55∗ ∗ ∗(0.13)(0.12)−0.01
0.01∗(0.00)(0.01)−0.04
0.00(0.07)(0.11)−2.01∗ ∗ ∗ −4.14∗∗∗(0.42)(0.69)−0.28−0.97∗(0.40)(0.49)
0.91
1.89∗ ∗ ∗(0.41)(0.49)
4.46∗ ∗ ∗3.70∗∗∗(0.44)(0.51)
982
997

AU
0.14
(0.93)−0.10(0.17)−0.09(0.07)
0.13(0.10)−0.02(0.09)−0.23(0.12)−0.02∗ ∗ ∗(0.00)−0.06(0.20)−4.04∗ ∗ ∗(0.84)−3.13∗ ∗ ∗(0.84)−1.62(0.83)
0.83(0.83)
990

PH
0.21(0.19)
0.05(0.06)
0.02(0.04)
0.04(0.06)−0.01(0.07)
0.16(0.08)−0.01∗∗(0.00)−0.04(0.07)−2.30∗∗∗(0.33)−0.18(0.32)
1.73∗∗∗(0.32)
3.58∗∗∗(0.35)
1981

JP

p < .001 ∗∗ p < .01 ∗ p < .05#proud measure used for nationalism variable

∗∗∗

0.15
(0.35)
Rel
0.01(0.08)
ForEx
0.20∗ ∗ ∗(0.04)
StLiv−0.04(0.08)
Educ −0.22∗(0.11)
Male−0.16(0.12)
Age−0.01∗ ∗(0.00)
0.00
nat∗ rel(0.09)
Con−3.55∗ ∗ ∗(0.50)
Con−1.61∗ ∗(0.49)
Con
0.53(0.49)
Con
2.15∗ ∗ ∗(0.50)
Obs
955

Nat

US
−1.28∗ ∗ ∗(0.34)−0.19∗(0.08)−0.04(0.04)
0.24∗ ∗
(0.08)
0.01(0.09)
0.29∗(0.12)
0.00(0.01)
0.26∗ ∗
(0.09)−4.51∗ ∗ ∗(0.57)−3.07∗ ∗ ∗(0.51)−0.44(0.49)
1.30∗ ∗
(0.49)
1032

SG

TW

0.07
1.04∗ ∗ ∗(0.37)(0.29)
0.06
0.14(0.13)(0.10)−0.03
0.16∗ ∗
(0.07)(0.06)
0.20∗
0.23(0.08)(0.13)
0.17
0.14(0.10)(0.10)−0.08−0.10(0.12)(0.12)
0.00
0.01(0.01)(0.01)−0.06−0.15(0.13)(0.12)−2.24∗∗∗
0.00(0.58)(0.58)
0.03
1.67∗ ∗
(0.56)(0.58)
1.65∗ ∗
3.14∗ ∗ ∗(0.57)(0.58)
4.43∗∗∗
5.82∗ ∗ ∗(0.59)(0.61)
1011
998

KR

VN

RU

−0.15∗−0.15
0.13(0.07)(0.34)(0.29)
−0.12
0.02
0.07
(0.07)(0.11)(0.05)
0.16∗
0.18∗∗
0.01(0.06)(0.07)(0.09)
0.27
0.13
0.19∗
(0.14)(0.10)(0.09)
0.15
0.10
0.16∗
(0.10)(0.08)(0.08)
−0.09
0.29∗
0.01
(0.12)(0.12)(0.13)
0.01
0.00
0.00
(0.01)(0.00)(0.00)
0.21∗ ∗
0.11
−0.06
(0.07)(0.13)(0.12)−1.15−2.34∗∗∗ −2.27∗ ∗ ∗(0.59)(0.50)(0.43)
0.50
−0.73
−0.07
(0.58)(0.48)(0.41)
1.92∗ ∗
1.54∗∗
2.04∗ ∗ ∗(0.59)(0.48)(0.42)
4.60∗∗∗
2.95∗∗∗
5.12∗ ∗ ∗(0.61)(0.49)(0.48)
967
1000
967

TW#

Appendix Table 5. China Model: Western, Japanese, Sinic, Orthodox and Buddhist Publics
1.21∗∗(0.45)
0.16(0.10)
0.09(0.05)
0.11(0.13)−0.26∗∗(0.09)−0.40∗∗(0.14)
0.01(0.01)−0.18(0.11)−1.00(0.61)−0.22(0.61)
2.21∗∗∗(0.62)
3.57∗∗∗(0.63)
788

BT

LA

MN

−0.95∗
0.62
0.04(0.40)(0.39)(0.31)
0.00
0.12
0.06
(0.07)(0.09)(0.09)
0.00
0.07
0.00
(0.07)(0.07)(0.07)
0.09
0.12
0.02
(0.11)(0.09)(0.10)
0.03
0.09
0.04
(0.10)(0.08)(0.09)−0.03
0.48∗∗∗ −0.11(0.12)(0.13)(0.13)
0.00
0.01∗
0.01
(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)
0.28∗ ∗ −0.04
0.04(0.11)(0.11)(0.13)−3.40∗ ∗ ∗ −2.51∗∗∗ −0.48(0.51)(0.53)(0.42)−1.74∗ ∗ ∗ −0.85
0.72(0.48)(0.47)(0.42)−0.02
0.68
2.21∗ ∗ ∗(0.47)(0.46)(0.42)
2.15∗ ∗ ∗2.64∗∗∗
3.84∗ ∗ ∗(0.48)(0.47)(0.46)
1012
998
788

KH

0.59
(0.69)−0.01(0.14)
0.13(0.08)
0.20∗(0.09)−0.01(0.13)
0.26(0.13)−0.01(0.01)−0.06(0.15)−5.09∗∗∗(1.07)−2.77∗∗∗(0.84)−0.09(0.81)
1.63∗(0.81)
799

LK

0.40
(0.70)
0.27(0.21)−0.01(0.08)−0.10(0.12)
0.16∗(0.08)
0.33∗ ∗
(0.12)−0.01∗(0.01)−0.12(0.21)−4.43∗ ∗ ∗(0.88)−2.69∗ ∗(0.82)−0.24(0.81)
2.40∗ ∗
(0.81)
1000

TH

is globalization undermining civilizational identities? 583

∗∗∗

−0.18
(0.80)
0.03(0.16)
0.15(0.09)
0.16(0.09)
0.10(0.10)
0.52∗∗∗(0.14)
0.00(0.01)
0.12(0.18)−2.85∗∗∗(0.78)−1.70∗(0.74)
1.94∗∗(0.75)
3.38∗∗∗(0.75)
1006−0.81(2.12)
0.04(0.31)
0.01(0.08)−0.03(0.07)
0.08(0.08)−0.18(0.13)
0.00(0.01)
0.19(0.43)−3.54∗(1.56)−1.86(1.55)−0.68(1.55)
0.89(1.55)
859

p < .001 ∗∗ p < .01 ∗ p < .05

Obs

Con

Con

Con

Con

nat∗ rel

Age

Male

Educ

StLiv

ForEx

Rel

Nat

BD

AF
0.59
(0.33)
0.00(0.07)−0.21∗∗(0.07)
0.30∗∗(0.11)−0.11(0.12)
0.14(0.14)
0.00(0.01)−0.14(0.13)−1.66∗∗(0.53)−0.22(0.52)
2.82∗∗∗(0.53)
4.26∗∗∗(0.57)
775

KZ
0.18(0.29)
0.19∗∗(0.06)−0.18∗(0.08)
0.03(0.11)−0.17(0.12)−0.06(0.15)−0.01(0.01)−0.10(0.10)−3.21∗∗∗(0.54)−1.96∗∗∗(0.53)
1.57∗∗(0.53)
3.39∗∗∗(0.56)
794

KG
−0.62
(2.10)−0.25(0.42)−0.03(0.04)
0.28∗∗(0.10)
0.02(0.10)
0.10(0.16)
0.00(0.01)
0.25(0.45)−2.49(2.03)−1.76(2.03)
1.43(2.03)
2.41(2.03)
797

MV

Appendix Table 6. Iran Model: Islamic and Hindu Publics−0.25(0.54)
0.15∗(0.07)
0.07(0.06)
0.22∗∗∗(0.06)
0.04(0.09)−0.39∗∗(0.12)
0.00(0.01)
0.03(0.12)−3.33∗∗∗(0.47)−2.23∗∗∗(0.42)
0.43(0.40)
2.29∗∗∗(0.41)
1041

PK
0.07
(0.30)
0.03(0.05)−0.11(0.08)
0.09(0.09)−0.40∗∗∗(0.11)
0.47∗∗(0.15)−0.02∗∗(0.01)−0.05(0.09)−6.47∗∗∗(0.66)−4.41∗∗∗(0.47)−2.77∗∗∗(0.44)−0.60(0.43)
790

TJ
0.71(0.46)
0.10∗(0.05)−0.04(0.12)−0.17(0.09)
0.19(0.16)−0.41∗(0.18)
0.00(0.01)−0.23(0.13)−2.33∗∗∗(0.54)−1.83∗∗∗(0.53)
1.32∗(0.53)
2.12∗∗∗(0.53)
564

TM
0.43(0.32)
0.14∗(0.06)−0.14∗(0.06)
0.13(0.09)−0.11(0.12)
0.25(0.14)
0.00(0.01)−0.05(0.09)−1.87∗∗∗(0.54)−0.62(0.53)
2.27∗∗∗(0.54)
4.32∗∗∗(0.58)
796

UZ
0.69(0.84)
0.17(0.16)−0.14∗(0.07)−0.03(0.07)
0.27∗∗(0.08)
0.20(0.11)
0.00(0.00)−0.15(0.18)−1.44(0.83)−0.57(0.83)
2.06∗(0.83)
4.05∗∗∗(0.84)
1234

IN

0.29
(0.94)−0.13(0.18)−0.15(0.13)
0.17(0.21)
0.18(0.19)−0.01(0.31)
0.00(0.01)
0.07(0.22)−3.94∗∗∗(1.04)−2.89∗∗(1.00)
3.85∗∗∗(1.02)
6.16∗∗∗(1.16)
756NP

584 christian collet and takashi inoguchi

∗∗∗

997

−0.44
(0.28)−0.11(0.09)−0.11(0.06)−0.05(0.10)−0.07(0.11)−0.24(0.13)
0.00(0.00)
0.14(0.10)−2.48∗∗∗(0.50)−1.06∗(0.49)
2.76∗∗∗(0.52)
4.90∗∗∗(0.70)
988−0.09(0.21)
0.03(0.09)−0.10∗(0.05)
0.18(0.12)
0.05(0.11)−0.32∗(0.13)
0.00(0.01)
0.06(0.12)−2.39∗∗∗(0.52)−0.26(0.51)
3.89∗∗∗(0.54)

p < .001 ∗∗ p < .01 ∗ p < .05

Obs

Con

Con

Con

Con

nat∗ rel

Age

Male

Educ

StLiv

ForEx

Rel

Nat

JP

HK
−0.16
(0.29)−0.13(0.11)
0.14(0.07)
0.01(0.08)
0.04(0.07)
0.33∗∗(0.10)
0.00(0.00)
0.24∗(0.12)−4.26∗∗∗(0.45)−2.21∗∗∗(0.41)
1.86∗∗∗(0.40)
3.89∗∗∗(0.42)
1994

CN
−0.40
(0.35)
0.05(0.09)−0.12∗∗(0.04)
0.21∗(0.09)−0.16(0.10)−0.06(0.13)−0.01(0.01)−0.02(0.10)−2.74∗∗∗(0.53)−1.38∗∗(0.52)
1.83∗∗∗(0.53)
3.53∗∗∗(0.57)
1032

SG
−0.40
(0.44)−0.03(0.15)
0.08(0.08)−0.08(0.10)−0.41∗∗(0.13)−0.03(0.14)−0.02∗∗∗(0.01)
0.00(0.15)−5.27∗∗∗(0.69)−3.61∗∗∗(0.68)
0.48(0.67)
3.05∗∗∗(0.82)
1011

KR
−0.12
(0.33)−0.14(0.11)
0.07(0.07)
0.01(0.15)−0.28∗∗(0.11)
0.06(0.13)
0.01(0.01)
0.13(0.13)−3.09∗∗∗(0.65)−1.13(0.64)
2.48∗∗∗(0.65)
4.49∗∗∗(0.71)
998

TW

Appendix Table 7. Iran Model: Western, Japanese, Sinic and Buddhist Publics

0.20(0.43)
0.05(0.14)
0.01(0.08)−0.12(0.12)
0.14(0.10)
0.05(0.15)
0.00(0.01)−0.12(0.16)−2.77∗∗∗(0.61)−1.42∗(0.60)
3.14∗∗∗(0.61)
5.28∗∗∗(0.74)
1000

VN
−0.07
(0.70)−0.19(0.16)−0.02(0.08)
0.29(0.18)−0.02(0.14)−0.29(0.21)
0.01(0.01)
0.17(0.18)−2.80∗∗(0.94)−1.88∗(0.92)
3.40∗∗∗(0.93)
5.09∗∗∗(0.97)
788

BT
0.00(0.52)
0.12(0.15)−0.10(0.11)
0.12(0.18)−0.05(0.15)−0.07(0.22)
0.00(0.01)
0.01(0.22)−3.08∗∗∗(0.75)−2.11∗∗(0.73)
3.59∗∗∗(0.75)
5.04∗∗∗(0.81)
788

MN

0.33
(0.88)
0.04(0.18)−0.08(0.10)
0.14(0.12)
0.05(0.17)−0.12(0.17)−0.01(0.01)−0.16(0.19)−4.40∗∗∗(1.06)−2.63∗(1.02)
1.57(1.02)
3.97∗∗∗(1.05)
799

LK

is globalization undermining civilizational identities? 585

121219Multiple Modes of Well-being

Multiple Modes of Well-Being in Asia
Takashi Inoguchi
President, University of Niigata Prefecture
Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo
To be included in Wolfgang Glatzer, ed., Global Handbook of Well-Being and Quality of

Life: from the Wealth of Nations to the Well-Being of Nations, Springer in cooperation
with the University of Frankfurt.
* Supported in part by a grant from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.
November 2012: No. 13000411-903-30053698-3701-0001
Abstract: In this chapter I propose the typology of societies in Asia on the basis of 50 odd
thousand respondents to the AsiaBarometer Surveys conducted every year between
2003 and 2008. Each respondent was asked to choose five from among 25 lifestyleaspects such as health, home, diet. job and family. I factor-analyzed responses society bysociety with five societal types using the two heavily loaded dimensions after varimax
rotation: materialism, post-materialism, and public sector dominance. Ab type(materialism dominance followed by post-materialism: Japan, Indonesia, Afghanistan,
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan), Ac type (materialism followed by public sector dominance:
China, South Korea, Taiwan, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Nepal,
Mongolia), B type (post-materialism followed by materialism: Hong Kong, Malaysia,
Thailand, Vietnam, Kyrgyzstan), Ca type (post-materialism followed by public sector
dominance: Brunei, the Philippines, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan), Cb
type (public sector dominance followed by materialism: Singapore and the Maldives.
This is a thoroughly evidence-based typology of societies as seen from bottom in thedaily lives of ordinary people in Asia.
Key words: lifestyle aspects, materialism, post-materialism, public sector dominance,
evidence-based typology of societies, AsiaBarometer, 28 Asian societies,
1. INTRODUCTION
The definition of well-being depends primarily on subjective assessment about how you
feel about yourself in society. Especially the adjective, well, is bound to be highly1121219Multiple Modes of Well-being

subjective. Thus when we discuss well-being, multiple modes of well-being is a naturalphrasing. Hence, well-being is defined by how positively or negatively an individual
feels about her/his existence in society, whether it is about happiness, health, prosperity,accomplishment, or whatever other area is under consideration. This definition is quite
appropriate when I examine well-being in Asia. Asia is not only demographically dense
but also economically dynamic. But most important here is the diversity of well-being in
Asia. And this is why I titled my essay multiple modes of well-being. Thus, leading to
my use of multiple well-beings.
Multiple well-beings might remind one of multiple modernities. Multiple modernities
contain the dimension of time and evolution. The idea is that modernity is not a
singular evolution of society that commences with the liberation of art from Christianity(e.g., Rafael), science (e.g., Gallilleo), politics (e.g., Reformation) through the industrial
revolution and democratization as experienced in Western Europe. There must be many
distinctive paths observed in reaching modernity. Also, modernity is defined in so many
ways. Hence, the ascendance of the concept of multiple modernities has gained ageneral acceptance (Eisenstadt, 2002, 2006). In a similar vein, multiple well-beings
should be examined. One of the most important features of multiple well-beings is thatit can be specified not only at the national level but also at the individual level. Thisfeature distinguishes itself from multiple modernities. That multiple well-beings can be
specified at the individual level enables this concept to be amenable to scientificempirical testing of the strictest kind. The concept of multiple modernities is alsoamenable to scientific empirical testing (Bates & Levi et al. 1998). But it is not of astrict kind. It is more by the case study or systematic comparative method. In thisrespect multiple well-beings allow one to be used as a pluri-potent concept: Pluri-potent
is most frequently used in relation to a stem cell that has multiple potentials in its
growth. This stream of analysis excludes individual well-being, group well-being,
national well-being, supra-national well-being (regional well-being, well-being by
religion, well-being by beliefs, well-being by gender, well-being by race, well-being byclass, well-being by income level, well-being by educational level, well-being bylanguage, etc).
2. MULTIPLE WELL-BEINGS AS PRIORITIZED LIFE ASPECTS
In the AsiaBarometer Survey (Inoguchi, 2012; Inoguchi & Fujii, 2012) that we executed
annually between 2003 and 2008, we posed five questions in areas that impact the
respondents’ perception on quality of life and lifestyle. Life aspects include such items
2

121219Multiple Modes of Well-being

as health, home, job, family, income, being devote, and medical care, and workplace
success. We have 50,000 odd observations in the AsiaBarometer Survey. We simply
count the number of chosen priorities in all of Asia and by country.
Question: Of the following lifestyle aspects or life circumstances, please select the five thatare most important. (Twenty lifestyle aspects or life circumstances are listed in
the surveys in 2003, 2004, and 2005. Twenty-five lifestyle aspects or life
circumstances are listed in the surveys in 2006, 2007, and 2008. The selection of“none of the above” and “don't know” responses are listed.)
Table 1.
Lifestyle Aspects Each Respondent Asked to Choose Five from among Those Listed Below.
Not
Importantmentioned
Lifestyle Aspects
1 Appreciating art and culture
10
2 Being able to live without fear of crime
10
3 Being devout
10
4 Being famous
10
5 Being healthy
10
6 Being on good terms with others
10
7 Being successful at work
10
8 Contributing to your local community or to10society
9 Don’t know
10
10 Dressing up
1
0
11 Earning a high income
10
12 Enjoying leisure1
0
13 Expressing your personality or using your10
talents
14 Freedom of expression and association *1
0
15 Having a comfortable home
10
16 Having a job
1
0
17 Having access to good medical care if required
1
0
18 Having access to higher education (beyond
10compulsory schooling)
19 Having enough to eat
10
20 Having pleasant community to live *1
0
21 Having safe and clean environment *1
0
22 Living in a country with a good government *1
0
23 None of the above
1
0
24 Owning lots of nice things
10
25 Raising children *10
26 Spending time with your family
10
27 Winning over others10*Aspects numbered 21 through 25 were added to surveys in 2006, 2007, and 2008.
3

121219Multiple Modes of Well-being

Asia-wide refers to the regions of East, Southeast, South, and Central Asia. For thecountries within these regions, the most highly prioritized life aspects or domains are in
the following order: health, home, diet, job, and family.
National diversity is our focus. To better and more parsimoniously handle national
diversities, we have factor-analyzed country by country, with a varimax rotation,prioritized life aspects or domains (for details, see Inoguchi & Fujii, 2012). Threefactors have emerged: the materialist factor, the post-materialist factor, and the public
sector dominance factor. The materialist factor is determined by such priorities as
housing, standard of living, household income, health, education, and job. The
post-materialist factor is characterized by such priorities as friendships, marriage,
neighbors, family life, leisure, spiritual life, and public safety. The public sector
dominance factor is composed of such priorities as condition of the environment, social
welfare system, and democratic system. The materialist factor is also called the
QOL-sustaining factor, whereas the post-materialist factor is called the QOL-enriching
factor and the public sector dominant factor is called the QOL-enabling factor. It is
worth remembering that, when the factor analysis was applied Asia-wide to all the 29
countries, the first factor's eigenvalue is 5.4, compared to the second factor's value of 1.0
and the third factor's eigenvalues of 0.5. Thus, from an Asia-wide perspective, thematerialist factor is dominant. The post-materialist and public sector dominance factors
are auxiliary. Here, it is important to note that: (1) the materialist factor is not always
the most important in life; (2) the post-materialist factor is not always the second mostimportant factor, which develops after the materialist factor is met in life; and (3) the
public sector dominance factor is not always the least important of the three factors.
National diversity is pronounced. That is determined by the configuration of life
prioritizing of individuals and many other factors that are above individual preference
and also beyond individual control.
To view national diversity, we factor-analyzed life aspects or domain priorities country
by country. Here, it is very important to note at the outset that not all countries exhibit
an overwhelming dominance of the materialist factor. If we look at the first two factors
only and categorize country types on how the three factors are deemed important interms of the size of eigenvalues country by country, the following life priority types canbe listed: Ab, Ac, Ba, Bc, Ca, Cb.

4

121219Multiple Modes of Well-being

Table 2.
Generating society typology through life aspect prioritizing from bottom (factor
dimensions after varimax rotation.)
1

2

Ab

materialism

post-materialismAcmaterialism

public sector dominanceB

post-materialism

materialismCa

post-materialism

public sector dominanceCbpublic sector dominancematerialism

Because there is empirically no Bc type, the distinction between Ba and Bc is notnecessary. Therefore, we use B, and not Ba or Bc. Hence, there are five life priority types
empirically: Ab, Ac, B, Ca and Cb. Which countries fit one of these types?
Ab five societies: Japan, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.
Ac ten societies: China, South Korea, Taiwan, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Bangladesh,
India, Nepal, and Mongolia.
B five societies: Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Kyrgystan.
Ca six societies: Brunei, the Philippines, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, andKazakhstan.
Cb two societies: Singapore and the Maldives.
Ab refers to the materialist factor dominance, followed by the auxiliary post-materialist
factor. The following five countries belong to the Ab type: Japan, Indonesia, Afghanistan,
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Ac refers to the materialist factor dominance, followed by
the auxiliary public sector dominance factor. The following ten countries/societies are of
the Ac type: China, South Korea, Taiwan, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Bangladesh,
India, Nepal, and Mongolia. B refers to the post-materialist factor dominance, followedby the auxiliary materialist factor. The following countries/societies belong to the B
type: Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Kyrgystan. Ca refers to thepost-materialist factor dominance, followed by the auxiliary public sector dominancefactor. The following six countries/societies are of Ca type: Brunei, the Philippines,
Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Kazakhstan. Cb refers to the public sector dominancefactor, followed by the auxiliary materialist factor. The following countries/societies areof the Cb type: Singapore and the Maldives.
5121219Multiple Modes of Well-being

The above life priorities based typology and its "membership" may not be familiar tosome readers. To other readers, materialism and post-materialism are familiar from theimmensely influential writings of Ronald Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997, 2005). However,his meaning of these two concepts is very different from our meaning of the terms. Here,materialism refers to QOL-sustaining and post-materialism refers to QOL-enriching. In
addition to materialism and post-materialism, prioritized life aspects also reflect thosepublic sector dominant societies. This is called the public sector dominant dominancefactor or the QOL-enabling factor, because without public sector infrastructure andpublic policy management, people's lives are sometimes unsustainable. The use of these
two terms are very clearly differentiated from Inglehart's use of materialism andpost-materialism. Due to the lack of better concepts, we use materialism andpost-materialism in a very different sense. Our use is justified because our concepts are
based on prioritized life aspects in Asia, much closer and broader concepts of life
preference patterns. It is very critical to note at this point that these types are rooted in
a comprehensive, systematic, and empirical analysis of the daily life priorities asreported by 50,000 odd respondents throughout Asia (Inoguchi and Fujii, 2012; cf. Kato,
2012). The picture that emerges of these countries/societies represents, in a sense, asnapshot from below. In other words, the result is an evidence-based typology ofsocieties.
3. PROFILES OF COUNTRIES/SOCIETIES AS SEEN FROM BELOW

Ab type: Weak State-Strong Society
The Ab type social system includes Afghanistan, Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, Tajikistan,and Uzbekistan. Let me examine each country one by one. Lifestyle priorities in
Afghanistan are: diet, health, home, being devout, and job in this order. It is significant
to note the high priority given to diet and being devout. The life domains that weighheavily on the materialist factor are: marriage, standard of living, household income,health, education, job, and neighbors. The valuable point in this data is the high priority
given to marriage, capped by the materialist factor. The life domains that are prominent
on the post-materialist factor are: housing, friendships, family life, and spiritual life.
The life domains that figure heavily on the public sector dominance factor are: conditionof the environment, social welfare system, democratic system, and leisure.
Let me turn to Indonesia. Lifestyle priorities in Indonesia are: health, diet, home, being
devout, and job in this order. In this country study, the significance of the data is the6121219Multiple Modes of Well-being

high ranking given to being devout. The life domains that emphasize heavily on thematerialist factor are: housing, standard of living, household income, education, and job.
The life domains that rise to prominence for the post-materialist factor are: friendships,
marriage, health, neighbors, public safety, family life, and spiritual life. The life
domains that are significant in the public sector dominance factor are: condition of theenvironment, social welfare system, democratic system, and leisure.
In Japan, lifestyle priorities in are: health, family, job, home, others in this order. It is
worth noting that others receive a high priority in Japanese society. Attention to others
is very much a matter of social survival (Inoguchi, 2011; Nakane, 1970). The life
domains heavily featured on the materialist factor are: housing, standard of living,household income, education, and job. The life domains highly valued in the
post-materialist factor are: friendships, marriage, health, family life, leisure, andspiritual life. The life domains that played prominently in the public sector dominancefactor are: neighbors, public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system,and democratic system. The prioritized life aspects in Japanese society appear to beroughly harmonious with Inglehart’s materialism and post-materialism. This
convergence is natural as Ingelehart deals primarily with advanced industrial
democracies, and Japan is one of them in Asia.
In Taiwan, lifestyle priorities are not available as life priorities were not measured
there. The life domains expressed heavily in the materialist factor of Taiwan are:standard of living, household income, health, job, leisure, and housing. The value placedon leisure on the materialist factor for Taiwan is significant. The life domains highly
appreciated in the post-materialist factor are: friendships, marriage, neighbors, family
life, and spiritual life. The life domains valued heavily in the public sector dominancefactor in Taiwan are: public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system,and democratic system.
In Tajikistan, lifestyle priorities are: health, diet, home, job, and income in this order.
The valued life domains that emerge from the materialist factor are: housing, standardof living, household income, health, education, job, democratic system, leisure, andspiritual life. It is important to note that such life spheres as democratic system, leisure,and spiritual life play heavily on the materialist factor. The life domains that rise toprominence in the post-materialist factor are: friendships, marriage, neighbors, public
safety, and family life. It is significant that public safety is part of the leading life7121219Multiple Modes of Well-being

aspects in the post-materialist factor. The life domains that are particularly valued in
the public sector dominance factor are: condition of the environment and social welfare
system.
In Uzbekistan, lifestyle priorities are: health, home, income, job, diet in this order. The
life domains that stood out in the materialist factor are: housing, standard of living,household income, health, education, job, neighbors, leisure, and spiritual life. It is
important to note that neighbors, leisure, and spiritual life are included in this category.
They are associated closely with survival (Dadabaev, 2006). The life domains that
determined the post-materialist factor are: friendships, marriage, and family life. The
life domains heavily loaded on the public sector dominance factor are: public safety,
condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system.
It is not too odd to characterize Afghanistan, Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, Tajikistan, andUzbekistan as a weak state, but strong society. A strong society is exemplified by theheavy emphasis given to certain life priorities on the materialist factor, such asneighbors, others, spiritual life, family life, and public safety. Chie Nakane's (1970)
account of Japanese society, Takeshi Matsui's (2011) account of Pushtun tribal
communities, and Timor Dadabaev's account of Uzbekistan neighborhood communities
roughly corroborate this feature of the Ab type social system. The societal picture thatemerges in the next section reveals similarities with societies not conventionallyassociated with the picture that emerged in the abovesection, most notably by regime
type (Dahl, 1971; Linz, 2000; Blondel, 2012).
Of the five countries/societies, Japan and Indonesia are noted for their weakstate-strong society pattern. In another survey-based study (Blondel & Inoguchi, 2006),
which focused on Asia and Europe, citizens' identities, citizens' confidence in the state,
and citizens' satisfaction in the performance of the state in 18 countries/societies are
examined. Canonical correlation analysis of those responses has yielded thecountries/societies types on a diagram in which Japan and Indonesia are spatiallysimilar in their location. Both countries/societies are noted for weak identity, weak
confidence in the state, and weak satisfaction in the state's performance.
Afghanistan arguably has no state of which to speak. It has strong tribal communities(Matsui, 2011). Tribal groups have a very strong sense of self-identity. They reside andmove as their herds search for new grass growing on the plains. Their group solidarity8121219Multiple Modes of Well-being

and fierce spirit to fight tenaciously against what they consider to be intruders are wellknown. The Pushtuns and Baluchis are two such groups that anthropologist Matsui(2011) portrays vividly. The capital city of Kabul is dependent on foreign assistance andresources.
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are states of the former Soviet Union. Now separate fromtheir twentieth-century legacy, these states do not exercise very much authoritarian
power vis-à-vis society. Rather ethnic groups are strong in community development andprotection (Dadabaev, 2011).
Let us turn to the Ac type social system. It amounts to ten societies with four subtypes.
Let us examine Ac1, Ac2, Ac3, Ac4 one by one.

Ac type: Strong Society – Strong StateAc1 includes China and South Korea. Lifestyle priorities in China are: health, home, job,
medical care, and low crime rates. The life domains greatly appreciated by thematerialist factor in China are: housing, standard of living, household income,education, and job. The life domains in the public sector dominance factor in China are:public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, democratic system,
and leisure. The life domains readily apparent in the post-materialist factor in China
are: friendships, marriage, health, neighbors, family life, and spiritual life.
Lifestyle priorities in South Korea are: health, home, family, job, and income. The life
domains heavily favored in the public sector dominance factor in South Korea are:housing, standard of living, household income, health, job, leisure, and spiritual life.
The life domains that stand out in the public sector dominance factor in South Korea
are: public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democraticsystem. The life domains strongly appreciated in the post-materialist factor in South
Korea are: friendships, marriage, neighbors, and family life.
The common dominant features of China and South Korea are strong society and strong
state. A strong society is defined by individualism and clan organization. Individualism
sometimes verges on anarchism in pursuit of wealth and the clan's defense. In contrast,
the state recruits and develops privileged elite corps by a sort of meritocracy, within
which a strong state apparatus is forged. Hence, a strong society and a strong state(Wright, 2010; Henderson, 1968).
9

121219Multiple Modes of Well-being

Ac2 includes Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. Lifestyle priorities in Cambodia are: diet,health, home, job, and income. The life domains strongly valued in the materialist factor
in Cambodia are: housing, friendships, marriage, standard of living, household income,health, education, job, neighbors, and family life. The life domains appreciated in the
public sector dominance factor in Cambodia are: public safety, condition of theenvironment, social welfare system, and democratic system.
Lifestyle priorities in Laos are: health, diet, home, job, and family. The life domains
valued in the post-materialist factor in Cambodia are: leisure and spiritual life. The life
domains emphasized in the materialist factor in Laos are: housing, standard of living,household income, health, education, job, and family life. The life domains heavily
supported in the public sector dominance factor in Laos are: neighbors, public safety,
condition of the environment, social welfare system, and spiritual life.
Lifestyle priorities in Myanmar are: health, diet, being devout, home, and job. It is
important to note that being devout is highly ranked as a life priority. Myanmar is astrongly Buddhist society. The life domains rated prominently in the post-materialist
factor in Laos are: friendships, marriage, and leisure. The life domains heavily
preferred in the materialist factor in Myanmar are: housing, friendships, standard ofliving, household income, health, education, and job. The life domains greatly supported
in the public sector dominance factor in Myanmar are: neighbors, public safety,
condition of the environment, family life, leisure, and spiritual life. The life domains
valued in the post-materialist factor in Myanmar is: marriage (Fave & Knoop, 2012).
Common to Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar is a strong presence of continental Indian inSoutheast Asian states. Common to all three systems is the blurred distinction of what
is normally regarded as the public and the private. Both co-mingle, serving the daily lifeof people. Hills, floods, and contesting tribal groups prevent the state from being too
heavily intrusive on society. In other words, the state exercises power where the society
maintains its hold. An extreme example is the dominant Burman ethnic group of
Myanmar who controls the federal state and must cope with armed ethnic minorities(Steinberg, 2009; Taylor & Hlaing, 2005).

The Ac3 type social system includes Bangladesh, India, and Nepal.
Lifestyle priorities in Bangladesh are: health, medical care, low crime rates, being
10

121219Multiple Modes of Well-being

devout, and home. The life domains that are heavily favored in the materialist factor in
Bangladesh are: housing, friendships, standard of living, household income, health,education, and job. The life domains strongly preferred in the public sector dominancefactor in Bangladesh area: neighbors, public safety, condition of the environment, social
welfare system, and democratic system. The life domains robustly chosen in the
post-materialist factor in Bangladesh are: marriage, family life, leisure, and spirituallife.
Lifestyle priorities in India are: health, home, diet, job, and family. The life domains
valued in the materialist factor in India are: housing, friendships, marriage, standard ofliving, household income, health, education, job, and neighbors. The life domains thatemerged in the public sector dominance factor in India are: public safety, condition of
the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. The life domains thatare valued in the post-materialist factor in India are: family life, leisure, and spirituallife.
Lifestyle priorities in Nepal are: health, diet, job, work, and low crime rate. The life
domains that ranked highly in the materialist factor in Nepal are: housing, standard ofliving, household income, health, education, job, leisure, and spiritual life. The life
domains strongly favored in the public sector dominance factor in Nepal are: public
safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. The
life domains strongly endorsed in the post-materialist factor in Nepal are: friendship,
marriage, neighbors, and family life.
Bangladesh, India, and Nepal have an Indianized state structure of British colonial
bureaucratic authoritarianism in which society never yields. In other words, thepenetration of the state is shallow. Takashi Inoguchi (2007) reveals, by factor analysis
applied to the perception of trust in ten Asian countries, that British colonial legacy
looms large, second to the perception of human nature (good vs. evil), and followed bycommunist systemic influence.

The Ac4 type system includes Mongolia. Lifestyle priorities in Mongolia are: health,home, diet, job, and medical care. The life domains heavily selected in the materialist
factor in Mongolia are: standard of living, household income, health, education, job,family life, leisure, and spiritual life. The life domains strongly supported in the public
sector dominance factor in Mongolia are: public safety, condition of the environment,11121219Multiple Modes of Well-beingsocial welfare system, and democratic system. The life domains that receive highratings in the post-materialist factor in Mongolia are: neighbors, housing, friendships,
and marriage. A pronounced feature of the Mongolian system is the absolute importanceof family, geography, geology, and climate along with its neighbors, Russia and China.
The state comes in to sustain lives (Humphrey & Sneath, 1999).

The B type system has five societies: Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, andKyrgyzstan. Lifestyle priorities in Hong Kong are: not available as they have not beenmeasured.
The life domains heavily favored in the post-materialist factor in Hong Kong are:friendships, marriage, health, education, family life, leisure, and spiritual life. The life
domains in the materialist factor in Hong Kong are: housing, standard of living,household income, and job. The life domains that emerged in the public sector dominantfactor in Hong Kong are: neighbors, public safety, condition of the environment, social
welfare system, and democratic system.
Lifestyle priorities in Malaysia are: health, home, diet, family, and job. The life domains
highly endorsed in the post-materialist factor in Malaysia are: friendships, marriage,
neighbors, family life, leisure, and spiritual life. The life domains that are greatly
valued in the materialist factor in Malaysia are: housing, standard of living, householdincome, health, education, and job. The life domains heavily favored in the public sector
dominant factor in Malaysia are: public safety, condition of the environment, social
welfare system, and democratic system.
Lifestyle priorities in Thailand are: health, diet, home, job, and family. The life domains
highly endorsed in the post-materialist factor in Thailand are: housing, friendships,
marriage, neighbors, family life, leisure, and spiritual life. The life domains valued in
the public sector dominance factor in Thailand are: standard of living, household income,health, education, and job. The life domains strongly rated in the public sector dominantfactor in Thailand are: public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system,and democratic system.
Lifestyle priorities in Vietnam are: health, job, diet, home, and work. The life domains
frequently selected in the post-materialist factor in Vietnam are: friendships, marriage,
education, family life, leisure, and spiritual life. The life domains widely supported in
12121219Multiple Modes of Well-being

the materialist factor in Vietnam are: housing, standard of living, household income,health, and job. The life domains valued in the public sector dominance factor in
Vietnam are: neighbors, public safety, condition of the environment, and social welfare
system.
A common quality among Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam is that all four
places are more or less havens for new settlers where competition and coexistence must
be well handled among near-strangers. Post-materialist features are salient andmaterialist features are just as strong. However, state power is receding. A Vietnamese
proverb aptly depicts the situation: state power is up to the bamboo gate (Woodside,2006). The proverb is especially suitable for northern Vietnam, but is not necessarily
applicable to central and southern Vietnam, where state power has limited penetrationof the markets of settlers and strangers.

Ca type: Societies where post-materialist features are dominant; include Brunei, thePhilippines, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Kazakhstan. Lifestyle priorities in
Brunei are: health, home, diet, family, and job. Lifestyle priorities in Bhutan are: health,home, diet, job, and workplace success. The life domains emphasized in the public sector
dominant factor in Brunei are: job, neighbors, public safety, condition of theenvironment, social welfare system, family life, and leisure. The valued life domains in
the materialist factor in Brunei are: standard of living, household income, health, andeducation. The important life domains in the post-materialist factor in Brunei are:education, friendships, and marriage.
Lifestyle priorities in the Philippines are: diet, health, home, job, and family. The life
domains appreciated in the public sector dominant factor in the Philippines are: public
safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. The
life domains heavily esteemed in the materialist factor in the Philippines are: housing,standard of living, household income, health, education, and job. The life domains
valued in the post-materialist factor in the Philippines are: friendships, marriage,
neighbors, family life, leisure, and spiritual life.
Lifestyle priorities in Pakistan are: health, diet, home, being devout, and income. The
leading life domains in the public sector dominant factor in Pakistan are: public safety,
condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. The life
domains prominent in the materialist factor in Pakistan are: housing, friendships,
13121219Multiple Modes of Well-being

standard of living, household income, health, education, and job. The life domains
valued in the post-materialist factor in Pakistan are: marriage, neighbors, family life,
leisure, and spiritual life.
Lifestyle priorities in Sri Lanka are: health, diet, home, family, and job. The life
domains most cherished in the public sector dominant factor in Sri Lanka are: public
safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. The
life domains deemed important in the post-materialist factor in Sri Lanka are: housing,friendships, standard of living, household income, health, education, and job. The life
domains valued most in the materialist factor in Sri Lanka are: marriage, neighbors,family life, and spiritual life.
Lifestyle priorities in Kazakhstan are: health, job, home, medical care, and income. The
life domains most appreciated in the public sector dominant factor in Kazakhstan are:public safety, condition of the environment, social welfare system, and democraticsystem. The life domains most important in the materialist factor in Kazakhstan are:housing, standard of living, household income, health, and job. The life domains
strongly valued in the post-materialist factor in Kazakhstan are: friendship, marriage,
education neighbors, family life leisure, and spiritual life.
A common feature of Brunei, the Philippines, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, andKazakhstan is the domineering behavior of state. However, in each country it is a weakstate domineering among a centrifugal society, with each component of society asserting
itself sporadically. Pakistan represents a dominating state and a strong society, whichhas prompted one of the authors of this volume to titled his book, Pakistan (Lieven,2012).

The Cb type system includes Singapore and the Maldives.
Lifestyle priorities in Singapore are: health, home, job, family, and diet. The valued life
domains in the public sector dominant factor in Singapore are: public safety, condition of
the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. The life domains
heavily favored in the post-materialist factor in Singapore are: housing, marriage,
neighbors, family life, leisure, and spiritual life. The life domains strongly appreciatedin the materialist factor in Singapore are: standard of living, household income, health,education, and job.

14

121219Multiple Modes of Well-being

Lifestyle priorities in the Maldives are: diet, medical care, low crime rates, health, andjob. The life domains most selected in the public sector dominant factor in theMaldives are: standard of living, household income, health, education, job, neighbors,
public safety, condition f the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system.
The life domain valued in the materialist factor in the Maldives is: family life. The life
domains most appreciated in the post-materialist factor in the Maldives are: housing,friendships, and marriage.
A common feature to Singapore and the Maldives is that the state is really dominant.
The society is seemingly compliant and docile. However, outside the framework of
regulation and imposition by the state, society is more vibrant in Singapore (Koh & Ling,
2000).

5. Conclusion
Guided by the notion of multiple modes of well-being, I have constructed a typology ofsocieties based on life priorities. The strength of this method is that it is evidence-basedin that each respondent's responses to life priorities are nationally aggregated by factor
analysis with varimax rotation and that the combination of two of the three large
factors, materialism, post-materialism and public sector dominance, enables me to haveeight society types in Asia as summarized below:
Table 1.
Society Typology through Life Aspect Priorities from Bottom (Factor Dimensions after
Varimax Rotation)
Ab typematerialism followed by post-materialism
weak state/strong society
Japan, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan

Ac typematerialism followed by public sector dominancestrong society/strong state

Ac1

China, South Korea (East Asia)

Ac2

Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar (Southeast Asia)

Ac3

Bangladesh, India, Nepal (South Asia)

Ac4

Mongolia (Central Asia)

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121219Multiple Modes of Well-being

B typepost-materialism followed by materialism
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Kyrgyzstan

Ca type

Brunei, the Philippines, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan
post-materialism followed by public sector dominance

Cb typepublic sector dominance followed by materialism
Singapore, the Maldives

The definitions of materialism, post-materialism, and public sector dominance are inother words, quality-of-life-sustaining, quality-of-life-enriching, andquality-of-life-enabling factors. They are somewhat different from those used by
Inglehart. However, our use of these concepts are more encompassing of various life
priorities and thus more widely and universally applicable. Our deliberations of theseconcepts are more systematically evidence-based. I have also examined a large body ofliterature concerning typology of societies, especially in relation to the state. Although
my examination was not done systematically and thoroughly for all 27 societies in Asia
in this article, it is safe to say that basic validity of my proposed typology is justified.

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121219Multiple Modes of Well-being

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