Human Security in North Korea
Greg Scarlatoiu
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK)
Abstract
North Korea allows its citizens no political participation, rule of law,freedom of expression, or non-discrimination. The economic insecurityof North Korea’s people largely depend on their loyalty-based songbun
social classification. Their food security is grim, with ongoing acutemalnutrition. Health security is lacking due to the widespread infectious
diseases. Environmental security has eroded largely due to the North
Korean regime‘s irrational industrial and deforestation policies. Personal
security and community security are severely challenged by the state’sinternal security agencies and the omnipresent surveillance. In order fora peaceful transition toward unification to occur, the North Korean
government would need to introduce genuine checks and balances upon
the powers of the Supreme Leader and the Workers’ Party of Korea. In
order to qualify for international assistance, the North Korean
government would have to cease committing crimes against humanity,and ensure the closure of its political prison camps and safe resettlementof its released prisoners. Moreover, North Korea would have to reduce
its astoundingly high military expenditure, accept international standardsof project monitoring and evaluation, and allow international technicalassistance in the process of collecting its national statistical data. Under
the third generation of Kim, the regime is instinctively focused only on
its top strategic objective—its own survival.
Keywords: North Korea, DPRK, Democratic Peoples’ Republic ofKorea, South Korea, Korean unification, trustpolitik, UN, UN
Commission of Inquiry, UN COI, human security, human rights,
economic security, food security, environmental security, politicalsecurity, community security, personal security, North Korean famine
The author wishes to thank HRNK staff member Rosa Park and former
interns Gyeore Lee, Grace Choi, Kyle Johnson, Bryce Kobayashi Daniel
Aum, Matthew Parsons, David Zeglen, and Yongsun Jin for their supportin producing this paper.

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Introduction
This paper presents an overview of the human security situation in
North Korea along the seven fundamental components identified in the
UN Development Program’s (UNDP) 1994 Human Development
Report: economic security, food security, health security, environmental
security, personal security, community security, and political security.
Focused on its own survival and the “byungjin line” calling for thesimultaneous development of the economy and nuclear weapons, Kim
Jong-un’s regime is unwilling to consider measures that could provide it
access to significant bilateral and multilateral donors. Nevertheless, what
North Korea truly needs to develop includes: an acceptance of increasedtransparency in the implementation of projects funded by foreign
entities; the application of internationally acceptable standards of projectmonitoring; the collection of undistorted statistical data; and the dramatic
reduction of its military spending. With a military expenditure rate of one
third of its Gross Domestic Product, membership in the World Bank, theAsian Development Bank, or even the China-led Asian Infrastructure
Development Bank would be impossible.
Development assistance cannot be disbursed to North Korea as longas the most egregious of human rights violations, especially North
Korea’s political prison camps, exist. As one considers the steps North
Korea needs to take in order to access vital sources of international
development assistance, it is essential to remember the recommendations
formulated by the UN Commission of Inquiry (UN COI) on Human
Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The UN COI
determined that crimes against humanity have been, and continue to becommitted in North Korea, and recommended that the North Korean casebe referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Beyond thosecritical recommendations, the UN COI report also provided a roadmap
for the modernization and development of North Korea. Fundamentally,
the UN COI report recommended that the North Korean government
undertake profound political and institutional reforms without delay inorder to introduce genuine checks and balances upon the powers of theSupreme Leader and the Workers’ Party of Korea.
Korean reunification will surely provide the key to solving most of
the critical issues facing the Korean Peninsula today, including North
Korea’s nuclear and missile developments, its crimes against humanity,and other grave human rights violations. Fueled by South Korean
capital, technology, and managerial know-how, a 75-million strong

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unified Republic of Korea would significantly enhance its role as aregional power. Railways and pipelines traversing the Korean Peninsulafrom south to north would enable Korea to further tap into the vast
resources of the Russian Far East and to expand its links to overseas
markets. A reunified, prosperous, and confident Korea would be a driverof stability and growth in Northeast Asia and beyond.
An ideal-case transition toward Korean reunification would involve
coexistence of the two Koreas for a certain period of time. Suchcoexistence could only be conceivable if the Republic of Korea andNorth Korea were willing to adopt profound political and institutional
reforms. Assuming a temporary coexistence scenario, a focus on
enhancing the human security of North Koreans would constitute a
critical stage in preparations for Korean reunification. A transitory,
human security-focused approach would likely avoid widespread
violence, bloodshed, or other catastrophic developments on the Korean
Peninsula.
Human Security Theoretical Framework
A relatively new concept in international relations studies, humansecurity is a bottom-up framework that analyzes people’s conditions in
the world in contrast to traditional security studies, which focus on states.
The concept first arose in the UN Development Program’s (UNDP) 1994
Human Development Report, which outlined seven main components ofhuman security: economic security, food security, health security,environmental security, personal security, community security, andpolitical security. Economic security is defined as a fear of losing one’s
job and a lack of economic mobility or opportunity, and is prevalent inboth the developing and developed world. Food security entails having
access to food at all times, and involves issues such as food access,availability, usage, and political stability. Various health concerns fallunder health security, including the spread of infectious disease within
and across borders as well as broader illnesses focused on individuals.
Environmental security has direct effects on every other aspect of humansecurity; poor environmental policy has vast negative effects on people’s
food security, health security, and economic security. Personal security
involves the safety of each individual in his or her society. Community
security examines the institutions and relationships established in society
and their effects on the individuals within each community. Politicalsecurity involves rights and freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom ofInternational Journal of Korean Studies  Vol. XIX, No. 2

127election, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, freedom to petition,
freedom from want, and freedom from fear. Each form of security is
distinct, yet also overlaps with the other components to create a broader
approach to security focusing on people and communities, thustranscending traditional borders.
Concerned with human life and dignity, human security naturally
coincides with human rights—the two are mutually reinforcing.1
However, there is also a clear distinction. The concept of human rights
is historically based on a universal framework that originated with the
major powers in the UN, in the aftermath of the two great conflagrations
and abysmal atrocities in the 20th century. The emergence of discourseon human security was the product of a convergence of factors at the endof the Cold War. The explosive rise in both the spread and demand for
democratization and international human rights opened a space in which
both “development” and concepts of “security” could be reconsidered.
Human security developed organically from both the developed anddeveloping world, promoting protection and empowerment. With nearly
half the world population living below the poverty line, humanconditions require vast improvement. Human security provides theframework for analyzing certain aspects of human conditions, while
human rights offer the legal framework for the international communityand states to abide by to protect individuals.
When examining each of the seven categories of human security, it
becomes evident that certain states have failed to provide security for
their citizens. North Korea is the one state that most blatantly fails at
providing every aspect of security for its citizens. Human rights also
“mutually reinforce” this failure by drawing attention to the failure of
North Korea to abide by its international legal obligations to uphold the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic and Social Rights, the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights, and other human rights instruments to which it has
acceded. The various degrees of economic insecurity of North Korea’s
people largely depend on their loyalty-based songbun social
classification. Their food security is grim and they experience ongoing
acute malnutrition. Health security is clearly lacking due to thewidespread infectious and vector borne diseases affecting a significant
portion of the population. Easily treatable diseases become lethal in
North Korea due to the lack of medical resources. Environmental
security has eroded largely due to decades of abuse by the North Korean

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regime as well as irrational industrial and deforestation policies. The
environmental disasters in North Korea, including floods and droughts,
will continue to threaten the people’s security. Personal security isseverely challenged by the state’s high homicide rate including extrajudicial killings, a vast gulag system of unlawful imprisonment, and an
all-pervasive fear of the regime and its internal security agencies.
Community security is not possible in North Korea due to its songbun
social classification system as well as the distrust among its citizens,
exacerbated by the all-pervasive surveillance centered on North Korea’s
inminban system of “neighborhood watch” units. Political security
simply does not exist in North Korea. In short, every freedom and right isabsent. The following sections will explore in further detail thedeficiencies of human security in North Korea.
Economic Security
Economic security requires an assured basic income. However, only
about a quarter of the world’s population may presently be economicallysecure in this sense. People in poor nations are not the only ones who
suffer from economic insecurity. People in rich nations today also feel
insecure because jobs are increasingly difficult to find and keep.
Economic security is deeply related to unemployment. In this sense,young people are particularly vulnerable to economic insecurity. As the
1994 Human Development Report noted, even in the United States in
1992, youth unemployment was at 14 percent. In the United Kingdom,
Italy, and Spain, youth unemployment in the same year was 15, 33, and34 percent respectively.2 Whether a job is temporary or not is anotherimportant factor. Those with temporary jobs may feel insecure
economically, since they can lose their job at any time. The situation inpoorer countries is more serious, because those in poor conditions cannot
survive even a short period of time without an income. Therefore, they
accept any work they can find, however unproductive or poorly paid.
Ultimately, economic security becomes an obstacle to the welfare ofsociety as a whole, as increasing poverty has a direct negative impact onfood and health security as well.
From an economic security point of view, North Korea is in a very
precarious condition. With incomes low and insecure, the efforts ofmany North Koreans who would seek support from their government areoften in vain. Allegedly a socialist state in the past, nowadays North
Korea lacks even the most fundamental forms of social security. While

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economic conditions began to deteriorate in the late 1980s, the collapseof the Soviet Union and China’s demand for cash in its trade with North
Korea caused North Korea’s economy to shrink. In subsequent decades,
North Korea’s economy has never fully recovered. The situation was
dramatically exacerbated by the North Korean regime’s ideologicalrigidity and refusal to open up or reform. By the mid-1990s, the regime
was unable to support its people. Famine claimed around 3-5 percent of
the population (600,000 to 1 million people).3 In this economicallydifficult situation, North Koreans could hardly find jobs. Furthermore,
discrimination based on one’s songbun continued to determine access toeconomic opportunity. Here is one testimony on social classdiscrimination in the labor force:Miss Ban, from Sinuiju, was a good student who wanted to bea doctor. But her good grades were not enough as she wasturned down for medical school because she was from an
ideologically ‘unreliable’ family. Her grandfather was abusinessman who employed few dozen people. Officially, thegrandfather was from the exploitation class and, through guiltby association, so was she. Her parents were assigned towork on a cooperative farm. After that she tried to join the
Army but was denied that also. Miss Ban recalled, ‘They
said, ‘We don’t need a person who may betray us any moment
and whom we can’t trust.’ They think that I want revenge formy grandfather.4
For over six decades, songbun has been a tool for ensuring absoluteloyalty to the regime by determining citizens’ job and social status.
Unlike citizens in most countries, North Koreans have no freedom tochoose their job, and often can’t even get a job due to their status. In asituation of economic insecurity, famine in the 1990s killed hundreds ofthousands of people in North Korea. According to several authors,
including Andrew Natsios, it was those of lower songbun who wereintentionally sacrificed by a regime diverting precious resources to its
military and elites in the midst of a catastrophic humanitarian crisis.
As determining factor of economic security, the energy situation of
North Korea is dire. Fundamentally, the Korean Peninsula lacks
domestic sources of energy. North Korea is richer in coal deposits thanSouth Korea, but its deposits are still insufficient to power the country.

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North Korea, like South Korea, historically has had a high-energy use
economy. In the North’s case, this was caused by its industrial portfolio,
which was focused on heavy and chemical industries such as metals
machinery, chemicals, mining, and power that were bequeathed it largelyby the Japanese.5 For this reason, North Korea needs more energy
sources. However, the North’s isolation from the international system
and its poor economic condition have made it much more difficult toimport fossil energy sources such as oil. This energy insecurity, and theshortage of electricity in particular, is serious. Power outages affect eventhe capital city of Pyongyang. According to press articles based on incountry sources, there were frequent power outages right after the deathof Kim Jong-il. Even diplomatic offices were blacked out.6 In asituation like this, North Korean industries cannot be maintained, andNorth Koreans suffer as a result from further economic insecurity.
Food Security
The concept of food security was first established in the 1948 UN
Declaration of Human Rights. Following the Asian food crisis in the
mid-1970s, the World Food Conference defined food security in terms offood supply, price stability, and availability of basic food nationally andinternationally. In 1986, the World Bank Report on Poverty and Hunger
delineated the difference between transitory food insecurity and chronic
food insecurity. Transitory food insecurity was a result of natural
disasters and economic collapse while chronic food insecurity was
related to poverty and low incomes. Both transitory and chronic foodinsecurity are exemplified in North Korea’s severe food security
situation.
Marcus Noland notes that North Korea is the only “significantly
industrialized country to experience a peacetime famine.”7 The World
Food Program’s National Nutritional Report for 2012 reported that“global chronic malnutrition or stunting prevalence is 27.9% at thenational level...It is estimated that 475,868 children are stunted in [North
Korea],” while noting that stunting has an irreversible effect on acountry’s development.8
With the notable exception of the great North Korean famine during
the 1990s, the nuclear proliferation issue has eclipsed the food security
problem in North Korea. However, North Korea’s food insecurity has
major implications, where many of its citizens have suffered andcontinue to suffer from hunger and starvation. Since the mid-1990s,

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North Korea has suffered from continued, widespread food shortages andfamine that broke down its Public Distribution System (PDS). Between
1992 and 1993, the PDS rations were reduced by 20 percent.9 In 1997,
the famine’s peak year, the PDS could supply only 6 percent of the North
Korean population, in comparison to PDS supplying 60 percent of the
population pre-famine. 10
Mountains and uplands make up 80% of North Korea’s geography.
From the total population of 24,488,861, children under five are
1,705,620 (6.96%)11. Crops are mostly harvested from September to
October and agricultural activities largely take place in the spring. The
precarious food security situation in North Korea is strongly impacted by
the ecological deterioration and degradation of its natural resources that
directly affects the agriculture and food production.12 North Korea’s
main food production includes soybeans, potatoes, maize, and rice. In
2011, North Korea’s under-five mortality was 25.2 out of 1,000 live
births, and the infant mortality rate was 18.5 out of 1,000 live births.
From 2008 to 2010, the maternal mortality ratio decreased slightly from85.1 out of 100,000 to 76 out of 100,000.13.
Today, food security issues are still serious in North Korea.
According to the World Food Program and the Food and Agriculture
Organization, 2.8 million North Koreans, about 10 percent of the
population, are undernourished and lack vital proteins and fats in their
daily diet. North Korea’s food security problem is a consequence ofmany factors. During the first half of 2012, the drought greatly affectedsoybean production. Other contributing factors include economic
mismanagement and the North Korean regime’s food policies thatlargely benefit the government, military leaders, and the core of the “coreclass.” Jaime Koh points out that “in 1998, rations dropped from morethan 300 grams per person per day to just 100 grams, less than half of theamount needed for survival (World Food Program, 2005b).”14
A March 2013 report titled “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Final Report of the National Nutrition Survey 2012 September 17th toOctober 17th 2012” found stunting to be a serious issue in North Korea.
The data was a sample size of 423 children in the Pyongyang
municipality and 812 children in all other provinces. This research was acollaborative effort with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
Central Bureau of Statistics, UNICEF, World Health Organization(WHO), and World Food Program. The target population included North
Korean children aged 0 to 59 months and their mothers aged 15 to 49

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years. The survey found that the highest occurrence of stunting was in
Ryanggang, while Pyongyang had less stunting occurrences.
About 28 percent of North Korean children suffer from chronicmalnutrition and are stunted. Some provinces have higher stunting rates
and 4 percent of the population suffers from acute malnutrition,
including infants younger than 6 months of age. From September 17,
2012 to October 17, 2012, the survey estimated that 68,225 children were
acutely malnourished and 10,234 were severely and acutely
malnourished15. In the entire country, it is estimated that 475,868
children are stunted16. The survey results also found that there was nodifference in stunting between the sexes. Based on the mid-upper arm
circumferences (MUAC) method of measurement, Pyongyang has thelowest prevalence of acute malnutrition, and Ryanggang province thehighest. Furthermore, MUAC indicates that there is a lower prevalenceof acute malnutrition in children 36 months or older17.
Before the current report, the most recent national survey withnutrition indicators in North Korea took place in October 2009, revealingthat 32.4 percent of the North Korean children under five years old werechronically malnourished and 5.2 percent were acutely malnourished.18
North Korean women’s MUAC and anemia could negatively affect theirpregnancies. The main causes of anemia are dietary iron deficiency,
infectious disease, and key micronutrient deficiencies, such as folic acid.
Iron deficiency is a major indication of high anemia prevalence. The
March 2013 report states that anemia can result in a greater risk of dying
during the perinatal period, an increased risk of maternal mortality,
delayed or impaired mental and physical development in children, andreduced productivity19 in adult life. To address low food diversity among
pregnant women, North Koreans must have access to longer periods ofmulti-micronutrient supplementation.20
In North Korea, food security concerns must be addressed
concurrently and comprehensively with other human security issues,
namely health security and environmental security. The most criticaltime to prevent stunting in children is before they are 2 years old.
Adequate breastfeeding and complementary feeding practices greatly
affect their growth and learning capacity. 21 To prevent anemia among
mothers and their children as well as stunting early or even before
pregnancy, more resources are necessary to provide comprehensive
interventions that account for food security, agriculture, health, nutrition,water, sanitation, hygiene, and social protection. In addition, to prevent

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infant mortality, breastfeeding needs to begin earlier in North Korea, andthe continuation of breastfeeding should be promoted for children up to
two years of age.22
In October 2011, the Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission(CFSAM) confirmed the ongoing need for food assistance to North
Korea’s vulnerable populations. The CFSAM recommended distributing
super cereals and other nutritional supplements to the most vulnerable
North Koreans in order to focus efforts on combating malnutrition andthe lack of dietary diversity. According to the 2012 UNDP Human
Development Index, the average North Korean’s life expectancy is 69
years.23
Food aid to address food security
North Korea has suffered from chronic, massive food shortages atleast since the mid-1990s.24 In 2008 and 2009, the U.S. agreed toprovide 500,000 metric tons of food aid to North Korea. Five U.S. nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were to distribute 100,000 metrictons, while 400,000 metric tons were to be distributed through the World
Food Program. Eventually, the North Korean government refused to
conduct a nutritional survey included in the program terms of reference,
asked the five NGOs to leave, and terminated the program. At the end of
the day, only half of the 100,000 metric tons distributed by the NGO
consortium led by Mercy Corps reached the rightful recipients. In 2011,
North Korea once again requested large-scale food aid from the U.S.,
South Korea, and several other countries.
Food aid to North Korea is a challenging issue for the United States,
since the North Korean government has refused to allow internationallyacceptable standards of program monitoring, or to enable the equitable
distribution of food among its citizens. Another major obstacle is theNorth Korean government’s restrictive measures to prevent donating
entities from operating and moving freely inside the country.25 Much of
the food assistance is allegedly diverted to the North Korean military andelites and often redirected to private markets instead of being disbursed
to the most vulnerable groups. Nevertheless, although hampered bydiversion and lack of transparency, according to humanitarian assistancegroups on the ground, at least some of the food aid is likely to have fed
millions of North Koreans during the famine in the mid to late 1990s.26
If U.S. humanitarian aid to North Korea is ever resumed, it should
involve collaborative, fully accessible, and verifiable work with theNorth Korean government and UN agencies to address the serious issues

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of chronic and acute malnutrition in North Korea. Unfortunately, due to
the North Korean government’s ideological rigidity and refusal to abide
by internationally accepted standards of program monitoring andevaluation, that prospect is ever more remote. More than twenty years
after the “Arduous March” that killed hundreds of thousands, if not
millions of North Koreans, donor fatigue makes the prospect of food aid
look even grimmer.
According to WHO standards, North Korea’s global chronicmalnutrition and stunting prevalence affects 27.9 percent of its
population and is seen as a “medium” public health concern. Stunting
not only significantly impacts children’s development, but also thecountry’s development. As suggested by the survey, to prevent stunting,multi-sectoral interventions combining mother and child feeding andhygiene practices, health, water and sanitation for health (WASH), andagriculture must be targeted early on, beginning before pregnancy andcontinuing up to two years old. Furthermore, North Korean hospitals
and communities should continue programs that manage acutemalnutrition and detect more affected children earlier.27
Health Security
There have been some encouraging improvements in health security inNorth Korea in recent years, most notably in vaccination rates, but there
are still many serious obstacles to overcome. Furthermore, because ofhealth security’s connections to the other components of human security,
failing to appropriately address issues such as the spread of drug-resistanttuberculosis or the lack of access to health facilities in rural areas willlead to further troubles. Insecurities in other areas, such as foodshortages and economic troubles, also lead to health insecurity.
Linking health security to the broader concept of human security
began with the UNDP’s 1994 Human Development Report, which
identified health as a distinctive feature of human security.28 Since then,two different views of health security have emerged: a “statist” ornational security one, focused on preventing the spread of diseases acrossborders or the destabilization of a country, and a “globalist” view,
focused on the individual and looking at a much broader range of healththreats.29
At the most basic level, there is a general consensus on the types ofhealth issues viewed as threats to health security: “the threat emanates
either from the cross-border spread of infectious diseases, whether

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naturally occurring, deliberate or accidental; or from the effect of major
health crises on state stability and sovereignty.” 30 Globalists expanded
this definition to include other threats such as water and sanitation issues,
natural and man-made disasters, unemployment, and transportation
safety issues.31
Health security is intimately linked with the other components ofhuman security. Environmental degradation, for example, can threaten
food security and cause starvation. A disease outbreak can shift
government resources to health care at the expense of other issues, andeconomic insecurity can result in a lack of basic services, such as cleanwater and safe sanitation, which exacerbates health challenges.32
North Korea’s isolation largely exempts it from the “statist” analysesof health security, although its porous border with China could lead tothe spread of disease and the movement of severely malnourished people
outside of the state. The globalist view of health security is more
relevant to looking at health in North Korea due to the connections
between the health of the people and their well-being in other regards.
Threats to health security, of which many exist in North Korea, arelargely reflective of other serious problems that need to be addressed by
the government and the international community.
Many North Koreans are malnourished and susceptible to disease
and other health problems. In 1995, more than two million children andhalf a million pregnant mothers were determined to be on the verge ofstarvation.33 Food security has improved since the famine, due to thedevelopment of markets as a “coping mechanism,” but the lack of food isstill evident. In 2008, half of the households surveyed by the UN said
that they ate only two meals per day.34 Desiree Jongsma, UN resident
coordinator in North Korea, said in March of that year that more than
two-thirds of the population were still “chronically food insecure.”
These people remain dependent on foreign food aid to survive, but thatfood aid has been sporadic in recent years due to North Korea’s strained
relationships with many other countries.35 Furthermore, serious questions
remain regarding the transparency of food aid distribution and thediversion of such aid.
The food security threat is exacerbated by songbun, North Korea’ssocio-political classification system. Robert Collins found that the
government set food distribution priorities based on songbun, whichmeant that regions with many people of a lower songbun faced aparticularly tough time during the famine. These areas were

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disproportionately rural and in the north of the country, and the people
living there are still dealing with the health fallout today. According to
Collins, “[a] consequence of individuals being classified with poor
songbun a decade ago led to their descendants being disadvantaged infood distribution today. Those descendants not only suffer from greatermalnutrition, but poorer health care as well.”36
Chronic malnutrition has weakened the immune systems of many
North Koreans, which makes these people more susceptible to disease.
An iron-deficient diet is also common, especially in pregnant women.
This has led to high rates of anemia among women and has heightened
the risk of maternal death or pregnancy complications.37 The highincidence of anemia is surely the result of poor food distribution, rather
than availability, as seaweed is abundant off the shores of both Koreas
and is one of the best natural sources of iron.
A second factor in assessing the health security of North Korea is thegovernment’s ability to provide health care. Especially in a country thatis still presumably “socialist,” such as North Korea, public healthprotection is a public good that must be provided by the government, but
the government of North Korea is, in most respects, unable to do so.38 A
look at funding for health care demonstrates this point. Overseas
development assistance (ODA) to North Korea has chronically been low.
In 2007, for instance, ODA was just $4.10 per person, with less than
$1.00 of that allocated for health aid. This low ODA, when coupled withthe minimal investment of the North Korean government in health (lessthan $0.30 per person annually), results in a low health system capacity
and a population struggling with numerous health issues.39 A 2012 study
said that ODA is low because, when it comes to North Korea, “theboundaries between international cooperation, health security, and thepractice of foreign policy remain unclear.” 40
There are also significant barriers to the access of health services formany people in North Korea. A lack of fuel and energy supplies meansthat hospitals and clinics often need to work without electricity.
Shortages of medicine and blood supplies are also common, especially inrural areas, and have been reported to cause maternal deaths.41 A 2010
Amnesty International report noted a further difficulty in access to healthcare services. Although the government claims that there is universal
and free health care, in reality, even basic health services are hard to
obtain and doctors now often charge for their help. Those who cannot
afford to pay are turned away.42

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The long-fought tuberculosis (TB) epidemic in North Korea is anotable example of the ways in which the country’s threats to healthsecurity affect the health of the people. Treating tuberculosis requires
expensive medicine and access to health care, both of which are hard tocome by for many people. As a result, North Korea’s TB infection rates
have risen rapidly, and drug-resistant forms of the disease account for aquickly increasing portion of the cases.43 The disease is thought to affectat least 5 percent of the population, with thousands of deaths each year.44
The presence of many people susceptible to the disease, along with theinability to treat it, makes TB a problematic health threat that the North
Korean government has yet to find a way to address.
Health security - possible solutions
Some of the recent successes in addressing health security threats
have come in the form of international partnerships with the North
Korean government and health system. This has been the case withvaccinations, especially for children.45 Vaccination rates plummeted
during the famine in the 1990s, but the vast majority of children now
receive recommended vaccinations.46 Following a measles outbreak in
2006, for example, the WHO helped to plan and carry out a measles
vaccination program that ultimately protected the majority of the
population from the disease. The North Korean government covered theoperating costs of the vaccination drive, while the WHO covered the costof supplies and preparations.47 Other international programs have also
had a positive impact on the state of health care in North Korea. A fiveyear WHO-South Korean designed program supplied equipment andtraining for county hospitals and thousands of community clinics acrossNorth Korea. This program aimed to increase health care access forpeople around the country, particularly for women and children.48
Communicable disease is not limited to a particular songbun
category, although those of similar songbun are likely to be grouped
together. More people of low songbun live in some of North Korea’s
northern provinces, while the members of the core class are concentrated
in urban areas, primarily in the capital city of Pyongyang. For thatreason, the authorities are more likely to cooperate with international
agencies and NGOs keen on vaccination campaigns. However, without
adequate access to those who need assistance the most or to any healthcare facilities inside the country, effective, comprehensive programs
addressing the health insecurity of North Koreans will not be possible.

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Fully addressing the factors leading to health insecurity will also require
addressing the other threats to human security. Addressing foodinsecurity, in particular, would make the population less susceptible todisease.
Environmental Security
J.C. Glenn and T.J. Gordon defined environmental security as the“environmental viability for life support with three sub-elements:
preventing or repairing military damage to the environment, preventing
or responding to environmentally caused conflicts, and protecting theenvironment due to its inherent moral value.”49 Braden R. Allenby
recognized the political aspects of this relatively new phenomenon,
calling it “the integration of environmental issues and national security
considerations at a national policy level.”50 Environmental security
places this responsibility on the government to ensure its viability in thewider realm of human security. The Korean Peninsula has undergone
much environmental upheaval since the Korean War, accelerated bycompetition between the North and South to industrialize. The
environmental crisis in North Korea traces its roots in the Korean War,when wildfires swept through forests in the 1950s. Development
projects carried out to industrialize North Korea saw the regime neglect
the environmental impact of those projects.
The droughts that brought on the widely publicized famine of 1994
and the devastating floods of 2011 and 2012 emphasized the importanceof environmental security in North Korea. These instances also illustrateenvironmental security’s reach into the other aspects of human security.
This section will examine the environmental security challenges ofclimate change, deforestation, and industrialization through the North
Korean rust belt, while maintaining focus on North Korea and the
Korean Peninsula as a whole.
Climate change
In the last few decades, climate change has become an accepted
phenomenon in the international community as a considerable force andhas ushered a shift in a focus toward taking measures to protect theenvironment. The Kyoto Protocol’s adoption in 1997 and ratification in2005 denote an incremental step in broadcasting the international
community’s awareness of this issue. To this end, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) outlined several hazards that

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139exacerbate climate change, including land degradation due todeforestation, change in precipitation rates, decreased crop yields fromchanges in local temperature, and extreme weather events.51 Each ofthese hazards has been identified in dictating North Korea’s level ofenvironmental security.
Severe climate disasters have affected North Korea since 1991.
Weather events have proven costly for the North Korean people,
dramatically reducing the food output for the already impoverishednation. The regime acknowledged climate change as the root cause of
these events through the KCNA, the state-controlled news outlet. In
2002, KCNA announced, “The repeated natural disasters that hit North
Korea are attributable to the abnormal weather caused by global
warming. The speed of warming in Korea at present is three times theaverage speed of global warming.”52 While this statement demonstrates
a sense of urgency in addressing climate change, the aforementioned
climate hazards should dictate North Korea’s focus in regard to solving
the environmental security dilemma on their half of the peninsula. While
quick to blame external factors, the North Korean regime has yet toadmit that its own irrational policies are the root cause of severe
environmental insecurity in North Korea.
Deforestation: Short-term Gain with Long-term Consequences
A root cause of climate change involves more than just the trend of
global temperature change.
Many researchers and environmental
scientists conclude that accelerated climate change has everything to dowith heavy deforestation brought on by programs focused solely on
economic development. The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO) defines deforestation as a process wherein the land is transformed
for other uses through “human-induced” conversion (usually for
agriculture or settlement uses) or natural disasters (i.e., volcanic
eruptions, earthquakes, and flooding).53 As noted by Lester R. Brown,
the world’s forests are shrinking at a rate of 13 million acres per year as
humankind pursues open land for agriculture, lumber, and other forestry
byproducts.54 In practical terms, manmade deforestation can come about
in a variety of interlinked ways. These methods include farmers clearing
a few acres of forest for the purposes of subsistence agriculture, cutting
down trees and burning them in a process called “slash and burn”
agriculture or logging.55

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Deforestation presents significant long-term problems for theenvironment outside of the Korean Peninsula. When trees are cut down,
it causes habitat loss for various species of animals and alters the Earth’s
climate. It contributes to climate change because the cut down trees,
which usually intake carbon to produce and release oxygen, instead
release large stores of carbon into the atmosphere. The peninsula’s
capacity to deal with climate change decreases because the deforested
area can no longer take in greenhouse gases, which are subsequently
released into the atmosphere.56
Studies conducted over the past few decades indicate that mass
releases of carbon into the atmosphere contribute to the global
temperature increase that alters rainfall patterns, leading to unexpected
torrential rains or drought periods when rainfall is predicted. Removal offorests dries topsoil, leading to topsoil erosion and potentiallyuncontrollable mudslides during periods of rainfall. Eventually, topsoil
erosion outpaces new soil formation, which leads to infertile ground andthe further release of carbon matter into the atmosphere. Soil erosion
has been characterized as “the silent global crisis,” highlighting the factthat soil stores more carbon (2,500 billion tons) than what currently
resides in the atmosphere (760 billion tons), according to soil scientist
Rattan Lal of Ohio State University.57 North Korea’s landscape has
fallen victim to these conditions, making it an environmentally degradednation.
Following the environmental devastation of the Korean War, theregime’s economic agenda took precedence over environmental
concerns.58 Deforestation in the North has caused South Korea toundertake dam and levee construction projects in order to help prevent
any flooding from reaching Seoul via the Kumgangsan dam on the Han
River.59 In U.K.-based risk analysis firm Maplecroft’s 2012 study, North
Korea ranked third among 180 countries with “extreme” deforestation,
only behind Nigeria and Indonesia. North Korea’s position in this study
should not be surprising, given the many reports chronicling the North’s
desperate food situation and the frequent natural disasters that havefurther crippled food production. In Jaime Koh’s work on the humansecurity of North Korean refugees, she revealed that the natural disastersof 1994 destroyed approximately 90 percent of arable land in North
Korea, leading to widespread famine and hunger from which the country
has never fully recovered.60 Environmental insecurity from deforestationand climate change has severely altered North Korea’s food security

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situation. For example, the flooding and mudslide events in 2011 and2012 exacerbated the food security situation to the point that the UN
declared a state of emergency, with the death toll ranging from 88-160
people.
North Korea is but one contributor to the global phenomenon of
rapid deforestation. As mentioned earlier however, its contributions
have exacerbated climate change because of its heavy dependence on
deforestation to spur economic growth. Deforestation’s effects havewide reaching implications for climate change and, to a larger extent,other areas of human security. In a centrally planned economy such as
North Korea, where private property is non-existent, deforestation is theresult of government policy, as could be reforestation.
The most relevant precedent could be the reforestation of South
Korea, possibly the least celebrated of South Korea’s success stories. In
the early 1960s, under the direction of then Forestry Minister Jang
Kyung-soon, South Korea managed to restore its depleted forests in a
relatively short period of time.61 The key to this South Korean success
was to get local communities involved in looking after the saplings
planted in pits that were filled with a 20 cm layer of farmland mud. Inorder to incentivize villagers to protect the trees, they were offered flour
from U.S. PL 480 assistance.62 The same solution, however, would be
difficult in North Korea, where fuel is scarce, the winters long and cold,
and private property non-existent. North Korean villagers, desperate tokeep their homes warm in the winter, are known to cut down saplings
and use them for fuel. Planting grass instead would not be the answer, as
in North Korea grass is also pulled, dried, and burned in stoves in thewinter. One possible answer could be to incentivize villagers by offering
them coal, the same way that the South Korean government offered its
citizens flour in the 1960s. However, this would require a resource shift
geared towards the people, rather than regime survival, which seems
unlikely under the current political circumstances in North Korea.
Industrial challenges to environmental security
The effects of North Korea’s fledgling industrial sector, combinedwith deforestation significantly deteriorate the country’s environmental
security. Aging and inefficient industries coupled with worker underproductivity characterize the northeastern region of North and South
Hamgyong and Ryanggang provinces, referred to as the “Rust Belt.”
While a well-acknowledged phenomenon by some analysts, there is a

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dearth of research on this region. Years of underinvestment, shortages ofspare parts, and poor maintenance have caused chronic damage to its
industrial capital stock. Regrettably, these industries are directed tocontinue operation. This diminished industrial output amounts to a
fraction of its potential at pre-1990 levels, according to the CIA World
Factbook.63
Measuring the industrial impact on the environment is quite difficult.
Although analysts and researchers speculate about the North’s inefficientindustries, reliable data cannot currently be obtained due in part to theregime’s tight control over statistical data and the uncertainty of themethods used to record such data. It is generally known that North
Korea maintains an old industrial development model that relies onheavy industries and mining—sectors that often harm environmental
security. According to the Bank of Korea’s 2010 Gross Domestic
Product Estimates, agriculture, forestry and fishing fell 2.1 percent,mining 0.2 percent, electricity, water, and gas 0.8 percent, and lightindustry 1.4 percent, while production in heavy industries (e.g., steel
production) saw a slight rise of 0.1 percent.64 North Korea clearly still
focuses its resources on the environmentally harmful sectors of heavy
industry and mining, which total 36.3 percent of national GDP compared
to 34.6 percent in 2008.65 While economic output has decreased,industry still plays a major role in damaging environmental security.
There are indications that North Korea is somehow following
China’s pattern in regard to slowing industrial production. The Chinese
rust belt in the Liaoning province provides a case study for North
Korea’s aging industries. China’s legacy of industrial concentration in
the northeast region began in the Maoist era, when the Korean War cut
China off from much of the world, forcing it to rely on Russia forindustrial inputs.66 This caused industry to migrate to Manchuria, due toits proximity to Russia. The Liaoning province provided cheap labor formuch of China’s efforts to take advantage of a globalizing world in the
1980s. However, by the 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant
the end of an integral market for the region’s goods. The Central
Committee hit the region with mass layoffs and factory closures, thus
garnering the rust belt moniker.67 Workers protested for more stringent
environmental standards in the name of workers’ health. The case of
China’s rust belt is only partially relevant to North Korea for a variety ofreasons, namely the dearth of region-specific economic data and the lackof academic focus on this subject.

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Carbon tax credits and the environment ignored
As early as January 2011, North Korea expressed an interest inentering the business of earning carbon tax credits through the creationof clean energy projects. Under the Clean Development Mechanism(CDM) in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, North Korea could earn
tradable carbon credits for emissions reduction programs. These tradable
credits are called Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) and can bebought by richer nations that need to meet emissions caps.68 CDM
approved emissions caps for 38 nations and companies as of 2012,
thereby establishing a global carbon market.69 Although partial funding
from CDM looks to provide incentives to expand the carbon market
beyond 38 nations, analysts believe that Pyongyang is simply using thisprogram to generate hard currency to avoid the financial setbacks of the
UN Security Council’s sanctions. Some industry analysts believe that
North Korea could gain 241,000 CERs from its seven hydroelectric
plants and earn approximately $1.3 million from the market.70 Thisworries outside observers, who believe the regime will direct thiscurrency toward developing its nuclear and long-range ballistic missile
programs.
Overall, the currency generated via carbon credits does not appear tosolve any of North Korea’s problems affecting environmental security.
While maintaining the guise of environmental concern, the North Korean
regime has not made any serious effort to address issues of deforestation,
climate change, or its industrial capacity. North Korea must seriously
reevaluate its developmental priorities, because neglecting environmental
security may prove to be a grave miscalculation that will cause suffering
for the people and also create larger problems for the regime.
Community Security
Community security is described by UNDP’s 1994 Human
Development Report as the protection of people from the loss of
traditional relationships and values as well as from sectarian and ethnic
violence.71
While group membership is a requisite element ofcommunity security analysis, the impetus behind community security is
the protection of the individual, overlapping with personal security.72
This reflects the overarching theme that human security elevates theprotection of an individual over any state or community.73 Given thatissues of community security often include violence and oppression froman outside force, community security is categorized as freedom from

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fear.74 This section expands upon the concept of community security andanalyzes the overall situation in North Korea by applying the community
security framework.
Community security stems from the belief that most people derive
security from their membership in a group--family, community, racial or
ethnic group—which provides a cultural identity, reassuring set ofvalues, practical support, and even physical protection.75 For example,
many tribal societies operate on the principle that heads of households
protect the weaker members of the family from outside forces. 76
However, communities can also perpetuate oppressive practices toward
their members.77 One important consequence of community conflict isthat it erodes trust, namely in people, communities and existing
government institutions, thus undermining social cohesion.78
Community security covers two types of conflicts: 1) intracommunity tension, where a community oppresses some of its own
members, and 2) inter-community tension, where members of one
community harm members of another community.79 An example ofintra-community conflict is the practice in Africa, where hundreds ofthousands of girls suffer genital mutilation each year under the banner ofcommunity tradition.80
In comparison, inter-community conflicts
involve disputes between different communities, particularly ethnic or
religious groups.81 In several nations, ethnic tensions lead to violent
conflicts often over ethnic hostility or limited access to opportunities andresources.82 In the former Yugoslavia, more than 130,000 people were
killed and more than 40,000 women raped in “ethnic cleansing.”83 In
Afghanistan, there was a violent dispute between the Kuchis andinternally displaced persons driven from their homes by military forces.84
These comprise examples where ethnic conflict broke down community
social structures and then engendered distrust between different subcommunities at clan, tribe, and ethnic levels.85
Both intra-community and inter-community conflicts exist in North
Korea. Regarding intra-community conflict, the North Korean
government has sharply divided North Koreans based on the songbun
system, giving rise to intra-community tension among the different
classes: the hostile class, the wavering class, and the core or loyal class.86
The songbun system was originally created to replace the old Confucian
feudal system of the Chosun Dynasty and Japanese colonialism thatfavored the ruling elite with one that empowered the working class.87
While the stated intent was to create a society of complete social

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equality, the Kim regime has historically used the classification system
to isolate and eliminate perceived internal threats, enhance loyalty, andultimately strengthen its dynastic grip on power.88
Every individual is identified and categorized into a songbun
classification from birth, measured by their loyalty or their family’s levelof political allegiance to the Kim regime.89 All other distinctions andvalue in terms of personal and social worth, including one’s skills or
abilities, are secondary to one’s perceived political loyalty.90 Songbun
pervades every area of one’s life, from access to common resources tothe justice system.91 For members of the loyal class, the government
provides exclusive privileges and benefits to reward and encourage
further fidelity.92 In contrast, those in the hostile class are referred to as“impure elements,” and suffer the most traumatic victimization.93 The
government’s systematic discrimination of every human being in North
Korea has ripple effects on how citizens perceive each other andthemselves, leading to class tension and undermining social cohesion.94
Moreover, the government regularly sends undercover spies to monitor
disloyal sentiments among the populace.95 Those who report information
about treacherous behavior are handsomely rewarded, while those who
allegedly commit treasonous acts are severely punished,96 often passing
liability to three generations of their family members.97 As it strives tomaintain its own preservation at any cost, the North Korean regime has
employed methods such as the relentless surveillance of its people,
punishment of those deemed disloyal, systematic brainwashing, andsevere restrictions of information in the country.
In North Korea, the extent and depth of surveillance isunprecedented. North Korea’s current population is almost 25 million.
Its three internal security agencies, the Ministry of State Security (MSS),
the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and the Military Security
Command (MSC) comprise 270,000 agents.98 In North Korea, every
family has to participate in inminban, a “neighborhood watch” system
involving weekly meetings, self-criticism sessions, and reporting on
one’s neighbors. Due to the obstinate surveillance of the population, thedegree of social cohesion in North Korea is low, with civil society nonexistent.
In North Korea, brainwashing begins early; babies are still in thecradle when they are taught to point to the portraits of the Great and Dear
Leaders. The relentless indoctrination of North Korea’s children
continues throughout their school years. Even if some parents

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understand the regime is brainwashing their children, they will keep
silent to avoid getting into trouble. Young people in their late teens andearly 20s brought down the totalitarian regimes of Nicolae Ceausescu inRomania, Ben Ali in Tunisia, and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. In North
Korea, most men between the ages of 17 and 27 are in the military,
subjected to ever more intense brainwashing. By the time they complete
their service, the “age of revolution” has already passed, as they are
overwhelmed by other concerns, such as finding ways to make ends meetor establishing a family.
The methods aiming to ensure the survival of the regime,
surveillance, control, coercion, punishment, brainwashing, andinformation control continue to result in the unparalleled suppression ofhuman rights in North Korea. With constant and extraordinary pressure
to betray one’s neighbor, especially in poverty-stricken areas where thereward is food, songbun and the surveillance system have generated
skepticism and distrust in communities where individuals tend to give up
their neighbor rather than risk their own downfall.99 This pressure
undermines the reciprocal trust required for all community members towork together, and can further destabilize community security.
Furthermore, the Kim regime has supplanted the traditional family
structure wherein the eldest male of a family is the head of thehousehold. While North Korea is still a largely patriarchal society, theKim dynasty has replaced the role of the eldest man as the “Great
Father” for each household, and expects undivided loyalty first andforemost to the Kim regime.100 This notion is enforced through repeatedpropaganda and draconian penalties. Children are taught to betray theirfamilies if they learn that their parents are planning some form of
disloyalty to the Kim regime.101 As a result, these measures continue tothreaten the traditional family structure within North Korea.
Regarding inter-community conflict, North Korea is a predominately
homogenous community102 and has in part maintained its homogeneity
through “ethnic cleansing,”103 One example of such cleansing is thepractice in political prison camps and other detention facilities, long or
short-term, of infanticide of inter-racial babies, usually Sino-Korean.
The typical case involves a North Korean woman living in China who isimpregnated by a Chinese man and then repatriated to North Korea. The
North Korean government kills these interracial children, citing limited
food supplies, which should not be used to feed “children of foreign
fathers.”104 Consequently, racially motivated infanticide undermines

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inter-community cohesion between Chinese and Korean citizens, though
the Chinese government has yet to raise serious concerns about the
genocide of its own progeny. The songbun system and violent practices
against non-Korean ethnic groups are severe and ongoing threats tocommunity security in North Korea. Other elements undermining
community security in North Korea include: food shortages, family units
breaking up after the death of members and/or the dispersal of members
in search of food, orphans and street children, and women reportedly
trafficked to China and subsequently sold as rural brides or prostitutes.105
Personal Security
Personal security, as defined in the UNDP’s 1994 report, concerns
the protection of individuals from violence in its multiple forms,“whether from the state or external states, from violent individuals andsub-state actors, from domestic abuse, or from predatory adults.”106 As acomponent within the framework of human security, personal security
involves the application of human security in its narrowest form. Since
the inception of human security, two major schools have emerged in an
attempt to reach consensus regarding what entails human security—the
Freedom from Fear school and the Freedom from Want school.
Personal security is an essential component of Freedom from Fear,with proponents arguing that limiting the practice of human security tothe protection of individuals from violent conflict allows for a more
effective approach toward ensuring human security worldwide. Thisapproach “conceives of human security negatively, in terms of theabsence of threats to the physical security or safety of individuals... All
individuals are seen as possessing inalienable and fundamental rights to‘life, liberty and property’ by virtue of their common humanity.”107
The topic of personal security bears unique implications for North
Korea compared to other violent conflict-ridden developing countries.
Whereas major organizations such as the Commission on Human
Security identify interstate and intrastate war and transnational terrorism
as issues of chief concern to personal security, the situation in North
Korea is characterized by a near-state monopoly on the use of violence tocontrol the lives of its citizens.108
In North Korea, “human security is stymied by the lack of politicalspace for alternatives to state ideologies and restrictions on civil liberties
imposed […] to ensure [… the regime’s] own survival, rather thanproviding for […]citizens.”109 The major threat to personal security is

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not violent conflict, but the state itself. The current regime has held
power for almost seven decades without any successful challenges to its
leadership or any democratic institutions to do so. As a result, theregime’s embrace of physical and non-physical violence to repress its
citizens has persisted without consequence.
State-sanctioned violence in North Korea
The North Korean regime relies upon violence as the ultimate means
to assert its legitimacy over its citizens. This brand of violence takes
many forms, but its application is characterized by its indiscriminate,arbitrary, and draconian nature. The conditions within the regime’s
extensive gulag system and the extremely violent punishments
committed against prisoners pose the gravest threat to personal security.
In North Korea any citizen “suspected of wrong-doing, wrong-thinking,wrong-knowledge, wrong-association, or wrong-class-background (orsongbun)…‘crimes that are not really crimes’” is, along with up to three
generations of one’s family, subject to imprisonment in one of a varietyof political prisons.110 These forced labor facilities detain some 80,000
to 120,000 prisoners in total throughout North Korea. Political prisoners
must endure conditions well below the international guidelines set in The
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and the UN
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice.111
North Korean defectors who experienced life in these labor camps
report the following physical and non-physical forms of violence in thecamps:112










Collective punishment
Forced disappearances and incommunicado detention without
trial
Systemic and severe mistreatment
Induced malnutrition
Slave labor
Exorbitant rates of deaths in detention
Informants and intra-prisoner hostilities
Executions
Other extreme punishments

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Racially motivated forced abortion and infanticide also compriseissues threatening the personal security of North Korean women andchildren.
International Human Development Indicator: Homicide in North
Korea
Number of intentional homicides (per 100,000 people)
HDI

Country

Year: 20081

Norway0.6

2Australia

1.2

3

United States

5.3

4

Netherlands

1.0

5

Germany

0.9

6

New Zealand

1.2

7

Ireland0.9

8

Sweden0.8

9

Switzerland

0.6

10

Japan

0.5

11

Canada1.8

12

Korea (ROK)

2.3

101

China

1.6

..*

Korea (DPRK)

15.2†

Rank

Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011 Global Study on Homicide
Trends, Contexts, Data
* Country missing from recent report.
† Country information on causes of death unavailable for most causes.

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The homicide rate in North Korea greatly surpasses the average of its
neighbors in East Asia, and serves as a stark contrast to the personal
security of South Korean citizens, with a rate of 15.2 homicides per
100,000 people as opposed to South Korea’s rate of 2.3. The
impoverished conditions characterizing life in North Korea exacerbate
the spread of violent crime among its citizenry, which then hampers thecountry’s economic development. As the UN Office on Drugs andCrime (UNODC) states, “There is a clear link between violent crime anddevelopment: crime hampers human and economic development; this, inturn, fosters crime. Improvements to social and economic conditions go
hand in hand with the reduction of violent crime.”113
Political Security in North Korea“Political security” focuses on the individual’s rights and freedoms
in the political area rather than on the state’s political security.114 The
term is often used to refer to governmental stability or state security fromoutside countries. However, in the context of human security, this term
includes individuals’ security.
If national security is also about the political freedom of a state tochoose its diplomatic partners/adversaries and to regulate its internalaffairs, so also human security is about the political freedom of anindividual to associate with others (civic freedom) as well as the freedom
to live private life without undue interference from fellow citizens andstate authorities (basic freedom)”.115
Whether or not a state guarantees individuals’ basic political humanrights is the key point to measuring political security. Therefore, thestate’s political system is related to the degree of people’s politicalsecurity in that state. This section will clarify the concept of politicalsecurity and discuss the factors that can affect political security.
Contents of Political Security:
Each human being is entitled to the basic human right to freedom,
equality and respect. Political security refers to protection against humanrights violations.116 The violation of these rights in the political arena,such as in the electoral process and suffrage, can be referred to aspolitical insecurity. Human rights and political security are the cementthat holds together the foundation for human security in all seven criticalareas. Mahbub ul Haq117 explains that political freedom contains fourInternational Journal of Korean Studies  Vol. XIX, No. 2

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distinct elements: political participation, rule of law, freedom of
expression, and non-discrimination.118
Contents of Political Insecurity
Repression, systematic human rights violations, excessive
militarization,119 systematic torture, enforced disappearances,120 politicaldetention, imprisonment, police used as agents of repression, andgovernment control of the ideas and information of individuals andgroups create severe political insecurity.121 In Freedom House’s “2014
Freedom in the World Index,” North Korea belongs to a group of ten
countries ranked as “worst of the worst” for both political rights and civil
liberties.
Effective Factors of Political Security:
The State’s political system
A state’s political system determines its degree of political security.
The democratic system is the ideal system for political security, because
the democratic system is based on respect for basic human rights andsystematic freedom and equality. This is demonstrated by politicalpluralism and participation in the electoral process. Therefore, a state’s
degree of democratization can be an indicator of the individuals’ politicalsecurity.
The State’s political stability
A state’s political stability can significantly impact the degree of its
citizens’ political security.122 When a state is politically unstable, it
becomes significantly more vulnerable to a coup d’etat or dictatorial rule.
A dictatorship can easily undermine political security. Usually, it isbased on military power.123 Prioritizing government spending on the
military instead of social programs allows the military to repress
individual citizens through brute strength.
In North Korea, political security is blatantly violated. This section
analyzes the state of political security in North Korea through each
aforementioned characteristic of political security.
Democratization and the Freedom StateAs mentioned before, the extent of democratization can indicate astate’s political security in that democratic political systems tend to152

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include political pluralism and freedom. Even if North Korea declares its
political system to be democratic, this is only pseudo-democracy.
According to C. J. Friedrich and Z. K. Brzezinski, North Korea can be
defined as an authoritarian dictatorial state. The North Korean
dictatorship relies on its military power by focusing on its military-firstpolicy (Songun). About 30 percent of North Korea’s GNI124 is used fornational defense expenditures, and there are 1.19 million active forces (5percent of the North Korean population) and 7.7 million reserve forces(32 percent).
Especially the Ministry of State Security (MSS, formerly State
security Department), but also the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) andthe Military Security Command (MSC) keep public order through theirextensive networks of informers and secret police apparatus. In recent
reports, Freedom House classified North Korea as “Not Free,”125 with its
political rights and civil rights measured at 7, the lowest possible score.
Political rights “enable people to participate freely in the politicalprocess, including the right to vote freely for district alternatives inlegitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties andorganizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on
public policies and are accountable to the electorate.”126 Civil liberties“allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational andorganizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without
interference from the state.”127 Therefore, due to the very nature of its
political system, it is virtually impossible for political security to exist in
North Korea.
Electoral System and Suffrage
A free and fair electoral system and suffrage can indicate the level ofpolitical pluralism and basic human rights.128 Even though an electoral
system exists in North Korea, it is merely an imitation of a truly freesystem. Just one major party, the Korean Worker’s Party, controls North
Korean politics. There are two other parties according to the 67 th articleof North Korea’s constitution,129 but they are merely “paper parties,”
complicit with the KWP. North Korea’s electoral system especiallylacks equality. Elections in North Korea provide only two choices tovoters: “yes” or “no.” Because the vote is not secret, it is very difficultfor people to vote against the regime or its candidates, who often win by
99% of the vote.

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Political Prison Camps and Public Executions
North Korean political prison camps are infamous for human rights
violations. In North Korea, there are at least four, arguably five, still
operational political prison camps, with a total prison population
estimated at 80,000 to 120,000. The political prison camps are operated
by the Ministry of State Security (Kukka-anjon-bowi-bu).130 Any
presumed political, ideological, and sociological “deviants” suspected ofwrong-doing, wrong-thinking, wrong-knowledge, wrong-association, or
wrong-class-background against the Kim regime are deported to andimprisoned within the political prison camps.131 These political prisoners
are subject to collective punishment132. The perceived wrong-doers,along with up to three generations of their extended families, areapprehended by police authorities and forcibly deported to the camps
without any judicial process or legal recourse whatsoever, often forlifetime isolation and punishment comprised of hard labor in mining,
timber-cutting, farming, and related enterprises133.
Internment camps are located in central and northeastern North
Korea134. They comprise labor colonies in secluded mountain valleys
completely isolated from the outside world135. With the exception ofCamp 25 in Chongjin, North Hamgyung Province, which is more similar
to a penitentiary, the prisons consist of a series of sprawlingencampments measuring many miles long and wide.136 Prisoners
experience torture and inhumane treatment.137 Public and secret
executions of prisoners, especially in cases of escape attempts138, in
addition to infanticide (forced abortions and baby killings upon birth),often occur.139 Consequently, the mortality rate is very high because
many prisoners die due to forced labor combined with induced
starvation,140 illnesses, work accidents, or torture. 141
Public executions constitute a type of grave human rights violation.
The death penalty, often without judicial due process, is adjusted for awide variety of political and common crimes 142. Attempts to escape fromthe country or from the prison camps may also result in execution on the
spot.143 Personnel in the criminal justice system have wide discretion
and are allegedly authorized to operate without regard to any kind of due
process or the formal legal rights of citizens.144 Drug trafficking,embezzlement, murder, robbery, rape, drug dealing, smuggling, piracy,
and vandalism have been reported to be cause for execution. In 2011,
two people were executed in front of 500 spectators for handlingpropaganda leaflets floated across the border from South Korea.145

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Recent reports indicate that as many as 70 senior officials have been
executed under the Kim Jong-un regime, as a part of North Korea’s
ongoing purge.
Conclusion
The concept of human security provides a comprehensive framework
for understanding the profound economic, food, health, environmental,
personal, community, and political insecurity of North Koreans. An
overview of the human security theoretical framework and its application
to North Korea confirms that none of the seven components of humansecurity can be examined in isolation. In North Korea, although some ofthe human insecurity may have been the result of natural disasters, themajor threat to the human security of North Koreans is the state itself.
The human security of North Koreans has degraded not because of interor intra-state war, sub-state actors, or international terrorism. Rather, it isthe very North Korean state that has refused to allow—for the sake ofmaintaining three generations of the ruling family in power— democratic
institutions or space for alternatives to state ideology. Deprived ofpolitical participation, rule of law, and freedom of expression, deeply
affected by government surveillance-induced lack of social cohesion, thepeople of North Korea are denied the opportunity to coalesce in order toimprove their human security, or to seek comprehensive, meaningful
overseas development assistance for that purpose. In order to understandand alleviate the acute human insecurity affecting North Koreans, one
has to grasp that human rights and political security are the cement that
holds together the foundation for all seven areas of human security. To
improve the human security of North Koreans, one has to begin byadvancing their human rights.
Furthermore, the process of developing and bringing North Korea
into the 21st century through focusing on human development can takeplace only if greater transparency and adequate standards of projectmonitoring and evaluation are allowed. The reclusive regime needs toseek international technical assistance in order to collect real, reliable,
actionable statistical data vital to conducting needs assessments. Before
one even begins the conversation about North Korea dramaticallyreducing its military expenditure, the Kim regime would have to regainsome of the international trust it has squandered over the past decades by
breaching all international obligations it has assumed. If trust rebuilding

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were at all possible, perhaps the best starting point would be thedismantlement of North Korea’s political prison camp system.
Notes:
1 “Human Security Now: Protecting and empowering people,” Commission on Human

Security, 2003, p. 11.
2 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1994, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1994), p.25.
3 “Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China,” The
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2009, p.11.
4 Sergey Soukhorukov, “I escaped North Korea after famine, violence,” The Telegraph,
August 5, 2007.
5 Kent E. Calder, “Korea’s Energy Insecurities: Comparative and Regional Perspectives”,
Korean Economic Institute of America, 2005, p.29~30
6 Jeong-an Kim, “Frequent power outages in diplomatic offices in Pyongyang”, Dong-a
Ilbo, February 1, 2012.
7 Marcus Noland, “Transition From the Bottom-Up: Institutional Change in North
Korea,” International Institute for Economics. March 20, 2006, accessed April 3, 2013,
http://iie.com/publications/papers/noland0306.pdf.
8 “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Final Report of the National Nutritional
Survey 2012 - September 17th to November 17th 2012,” World Food Program. March
2013, accessed April 2, 2013.
http://www.wfp.org/sites/default/files/DPRK%20NNS%20Final%20Report_eng%20201
3f_0.pdf.
9 Jaime Koh, “Human Insecurities or Liabilities? The Changing Security Paradigms andthe Case of the North Korean Refugees,” in Benny Teh Cheng Guan, Human Security:
Securing East Asia’s Future, ebook: Springer, 2012.
10 Ibid.
11 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Final Report of the National Nutritional
Survey 2012 - September 17th to November 17th 2012”
12 Ajmal Qureshi, "A Decade of Food Insecurity in North Korea," Harvard Asia
Quarterly 11 (2008): 41-45.
13 “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Final Report of the National Nutritional
Survey 2012 - September 17th to November 17th 2012”14 Jaime Koh, “Human Insecurities or Liabilities? The Changing Security Paradigms andthe Case of the North Korean Refugees,”
15 North Koreans in Desperate Need of Food After Floods," CNN, August 6, 2012,
accessed March 28, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/03/world/asia/north-koreafloods.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.

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23 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2013: The Riseof the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World, (New York: United Nations
Development Programme, 2013).
24 Mark Manyin and Mary Beth Nikitin, Foreign Assistance to North Korea,(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 2, 2014).
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 William Aldis, "Health security as a public health concept: a critical analysis," Health
Policy and Planning 23, no. 6 (2008): 369-375.
29 Simon Rushton, "Global Health Security: Security for Whom? Security from What?"
Political Studies 59, no. 4 (2011): 786-787.
30 Ibid, p. 782.
31 Mirta Roses Periago, "Human security and public health," Rev Panam Salud Publica
31, no. 5 (2012): 355.
32 James R. Campbell, "Human Health Threats and Implications for Regional Security inSoutheast Asia," in Benny Teh Cheng Guan, Human Security: Securing East Asia’s
Future, ebook: Springer, 2012, p. 178.
33 Ajmal Qureshi, "A Decade of Food Insecurity in North Korea," p. 43.
34Thomas Spoorenberg and Daniel Schwekendiek, "Demographic Changes in North
Korea: 1993–2008." Population and Development Review 38, no. 1 (2012): 136.
35 “Millions of N. Koreans Dependent on Food Aid,” AFP, March 15, 2013,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hAu1s_jPxFg7popdOHMlVCjdk
5Ow?docId=CNG.f698263de118cda141f82ef235878878.391
36 Robert Collins, Marked for Life: Songbun, (Washington, DC: Committee for Human
Rights in North Korea, 2012), pp. 67-68.
37 “North Korea: The Crumbling State of Health Care in North Korea,” Amnesty
International, July 15, 2010: 15 and 17,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA24/001/2010/en/13a097fc-4bda-4119-aae573e0dd446193/asa240012010en.pdf.
38 Ibid, p. 187
39 John Grundy, Kathryn Bowen, Peter Annear, and Beverley-Ann Biggs. "The
Responsibility to Protect: Inequities in International Aid Flows to Myanmar and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea and their Impact on Maternal and Child Health."
Asian Studies Review 36, no. 2 (2012): 174-176.
40 Ibid, 172-173.
41 Ibid, 179-180.
42 Ibid, 1-2.
43 “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea TB Country Profile,” World HealthOrganization,
https://extranet.who.int/sree/Reports?op=Replet&name=/WHO_HQ_Reports/G2/PROD/
EXT/TBCountryProfile&ISO2=KP&outtype=html.
44 Ibid, p. 14.
45 “DPRK - Key Facts 2010,” World Health Organization,
http://www.dprk.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Home_DPRK_fs.pdf
46 Ibid.

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47 “WHO Assists North Korea in Controlling Measles Outbreak,” World HealthOrganization, http://www.who.int/immunization/newsroom/north_korea_measles/en/.
48 “WHO and Republic of Korea Continue Support for Women and Children’s Health in
DPRK,” World Health Organization, February 13, 2007,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/notes/2007/np06/en/.
49 Ke Chung Kim, “Environmental Security: Agenda Item for the Inter-Korean Summit.”
Policy Forum 07-074, Nautilus Institute, October 3, 2007.
http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/environmental-security-agenda-itemfor-the-inter-korean-summit/#axzz2OqgDdZx0.
50 Braden R. Allenby, “Environmental Security: Concept and Implementation.”International Political Science Review, 21, no 1 (2000): 5,
http://www.jstor.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/stable/1601426.
51 Benjamin Luke Habib, “The Implications of Climate Vulnerability for North Korean
Regime Stability.” The International Journal of Climate Change: Impacts andResponses, 1,1 (2009): 84, accessed March 28, 2013,
http://drbenjaminhabib.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/ben-habib-c09_15583_theimplications-of-climate-vulnerability-for-north-korean-regime-stability.pdf
52 John Parnell, “Is Climate Change the Real Ticking Time Bomb in North Korea?”
Responding to Climate Change, February 13, 2012, accessed March 28, 2013,
http://www.rtcc.org/is-climate-change-the-real-ticking-time-bomb-in-north-korea/.
53 “Reducing Emissions From Deforestation in Developing Countries,” The Food andAgriculture Organization of the United Nation, March 30, 2006, accessed April 1, 2013,
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2006/smsn/igo/002.pdf
54Lester R. Brown, “Eroding Futures: Why Healthy Soil Matters to Civilization,” The
Futurist, 24 (July-August 2011), accessed April 1, 2013,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/874499102?accountid=8285.
55 “Deforestation,” National Geographic, accessed April 2, 2013,
http://environment.nationalgeographic.com/environment/global-warming/deforestationoverview/.
56 “Deforestation”
57 Brown, “Eroding Futures: Why Healthy Soil Matters to Civilization,” 26.
58 Joanna M. Foster, “Q and A: North Korea’s Choked Environment,” The New YorkTimes, March 30, 2012, accessed April 1, 2013,
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/q-and-a-north-koreas-choked-environment/
59 Robert A. Francis, “The Impacts of Modern Warfare on Freshwater Ecosystems,”
Environmental Management, 48 (2011), 989,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/896758474?accountid=8285.
60 Jaime Koh, “Human Insecurities or Liabilities?: The Changing Security Paradigms andthe Case of North Korean Refugees,” 20.
61 Kyung-soon Jang, Na-nun Ajik-do Mum-chool-soo Opta, [I Still Cannot Stop]. 2007:
106-107. (cannot insert comment on footnote, but this is missing publisher information
and I cannot find anything about the source)
62 Ibid.
63 “Korea, North” CIA World Factbook, accessed April 3, 2013,https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html

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64 “Gross Domestic Product Estimates for North Korea in 2010,” The Bank of Korea,

November 3, 2011: 2, accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nkuploads/GDP_of_North_Korea_in_2010.pdf.
65 “Gross Domestic Product Estimates for North Korea in 2010,” 4.
66 Albert Keidel, “The Economic Basis for Social Unrest in China,” The Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, May 26, 2005: 6, accessed April 4, 2013,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/keidel_social_unrest.pdf.
67 “Reforming the North-east: Rustbelt Revival,” The Economist, June 16, 2012, accessed
April 4, 2013, http://www.economist.com/node/21556988.
68 David Fogarty, “North Korea Seeks to Earn Hard Currency Via Carbon Credits,”
Reuters, March 6, 2011, accessed April 4, 2013.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/07/us-korea-north-carbonidUSTRE7260NA20110307.
69 Parmeswaran Ponnudurai, “North Korea Eyes Carbon Market,” Radio Free Asia,
January 29, 2011, accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/energy01292011014842.html.
70 Ladka Bauerova and Alessandro Vitelli, “North Korea, Eco State?” Bloomberg
Businessweek, May 31, 2012, accessed April 4, 2013,
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-05-31/north-korea-eco-state.
71 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1994; see also
James Ohwofasa Akepninor, Modern Concepts of Security, (Bloomington, IN:
AuthorHous, 2012): 73.
72 See United Nations Development Program, The Human Security Framework andNational Human Development Reports, (online publication: United Nations, 2006): 5.
73 Ibid.
74 Human Security Unit, United Nations, Human Security in Theory and Practice:
Application of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for
Human Security 23.
75 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1994, 31-32.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 United Nations Development Program, Afghanistan: Security with a Human Face,
Challenges and Responsibilities, National Human Development Report 2004, (ebook:United Nations Development Program, 2004), 7
79 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1994, 31-32.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 United Nations Development Program, Afghanistan: Security with a Human Face,
Challenges and Responsibilities, National Human Development Report 2004, 241.
85 Ibid.
86 Robert Collins, Marked for Life: Songbun
87 Ibid, 8-10.
88 Ibid, 6.
89 Ibid, 6
90 Ibid, 54.

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91 Ibid, 7, 43-84.
92 Ibid, 6-7.
93 Ibid, 7.
94 Blaine Harden, Escape from Camp 14, (New York: Penguin Books, 2013): x (“Shinand thirty of his classmates when they walked past the compound housing the camp
guard’s children, who rained heavy stones down on the prison children, shouting‘Reactionary sons of bitches are coming!’”)95 Gause E. Ken, Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment: An Examination of
the North Korean Police State, (ebook: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea,2013):42, 49 http://hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_Ken-Gause_Translation_5_29_13.pdf
96 Ibid, 46-47
97 Ibid, 5.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid, 56
100 Seong Guk Park, Call Him “Father”, DAILYNK January 26, 2012,
http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=8724
101 Harden, Escape from Camp 14, x.
102 Robert Collins, Marked for Life: Songbun, 8.
103 David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag, (online; the Committee for Human Rights in North
Korea, 2012), 166.
104 Ibid, 152-154
105 Jaime Koh, “Human Insecurities or Liabilities?: The Changing Security Paradigms
and the Case of North Korean Refugees,” 21.
106John Baylis et al., The Globalization of World Politics; An Introduction to
International Relations, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 492.
107 Giorgio Shani et al., Protecting Human Security in a Post 9/11 World, (ebook:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 4.
108 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering
People, (New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003) 6.
109 John Baylis et al., The Globalization of World Politics, 503.
110 David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag 25.
111 Ibid, 27.
112 Ibid, VIII.
113 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011 Global Study on Homicide: Trends,
Contexts, Data, (online: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 5.
114 Kanti Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,” Kroc InstituteOccasional Paper 19 (2000): 3,
115 Kanti Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,” 23-24
116 Ibid, 27
117 Mahbub ul Haq, Reflections on Human Development, (Oxford New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995).
118 Hideo Sato, “Seeking Global Human Security A Proposal of Human Security Index(HSI) and Japan’s ODA Strategy in Human Security,” 經濟硏究, 30 (2009): 9.
119 Kanti Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,”16.
120 UNDP, op.cit., 32. (it is not clear to which UNDP source these footnotes 128-131 arereferring)

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121 UNDP, op.cit., 33.
122 UNDP, op.cit., 32.
123 UNDP, op.cit., 32.
124 Institute for Peace Affairs, 100 Issues on the Korean Unification and North Korea,(Seoul: Bumwoosa, 2012), 93.
125 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2013,” (2013): 17.
126 Hideo Sato, “Seeking Global Human Security A Proposal of Human Security Index(HSI) and Japan’s ODA Strategy in Human Security,”12.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid, 8.
129 “North Korea guarantees democratic party and social organizations free activity
condition,” Article 67 of the North Korean Constitution
130 David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag, 28.
131 David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag, 25.
132 Institute for Peace Affairs, 100 Issues on the Korean Unification and North Korea,(Seoul: Bumwoosa, 2012), 93.
133 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2013,” (2013): 17.
134 Mark McDonald,"North Korean Prison Camps Massive and Growing". The New YorkTimes, May 4, 2011.
135 David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag, 27.
136 David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag, 27.
137 Nicholas D. Kristof, "Survivors Report Torture in North Korea Labor Camps". The
New York Times, July 14, 1996.
138“White paper on human rights in North Korea 2009.” Korea Institute for National
Unification, (2009): 74-75, accessed March 26, 2013,
http://www.kinu.or.kr/2009/0727/white2009_e.pdf
139 The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, op.cit., 148-54
140 "Running Out of the Darkness," TIME Magazine, April 24, 2006.
141 "N. Korean Defectors Describe Brutal Abuse," The Associated Press, October 29,
2008.
142 Mark McDonald,"North Korean Prison Camps Massive and Growing". The New YorkTimes, May 4, 2011.
143 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Department of State,"Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011 Korea, Democratic People's
Republic of,"
144 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United States Department of State,"Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011 Korea, Democratic People's
Republic of,"
145 “Public Executions over Leaflets,” Radio Free Asia, January 24, 2011,
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/executions-01242011112449.html

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