This article was translated by Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting (MURC, https://www.murc.jp/English) from Japanese
into English as part of a research project sponsored by the Government of Japan to promote academic studies on Japan's
territories. MURC takes full responsibility for the translation of this article. To obtain permission to use this article beyond thescope of your personal use and research, please contact MURC by e-mail (info@murc.jp).
Citation: Japan's Territories Series, Japan Digital Library (March 2018)
http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/digital_library/japan_s_territories.php

U.S. Department of State Documents regarding the Dispute over Territorial Sovereignty
over Takeshima (Addendum) = Documents = *Takashi Tsukamoto
Contents
Introduction
Document 1: Letter from Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Departmentof State to E. Allan Lightner, Charge d'affaires, a.i., American Embassy, Korea on November 5,1952
Document 2: Letter from E. Allan Lightner, Charge d'affaires, a.i., American Embassy, Pusan, Korea to Kenneth
T. Young, Jr., Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State on December
4, 1952
Document 3: Memorandum entitled, “Possible Methods of Resolving Liancourt Rocks Dispute between Japanand the Republic of Korea” by L. Burmaster, the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department ofState on July 22, 1953
Document 4: Memorandum in regard to the Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima Island) Controversy by William T.
Turner, Minister-Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Japan on November 30, 1953
Document 5: Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Tanaka, Fist Secretary, Embassy of Japan, and others Subject: “Japanese Proposal to refer Liancourt Dispute to Security Council” on November 16, 1954
Document 6: Memorandum of Conversation with the Minister Shigenobu Shima, Japanese Embassy - Subject:“Liancourt Dispute” on November 17, 1954
Conclusion

Introduction(The Treaty of Peace with Japan and Takeshima)
One point at issue in the dispute over territorial sovereignty over Takeshima between Japan andthe Republic of Korea is how Takeshima is addressed by the Treaty of Peace with Japan (SanFrancisco Treaty) of September 8, 1951. Specifically, there is the issue of whether Takeshima wasdesignated as part of Korea to be renounced by Japan or conversely the Treaty finally confirmed
its retention by Japan. Regarding this point, I, the author, have translated and introduced U.S.
diplomatic documents in the [Japanese] magazine Reference twice in the past, and clarified thefact that in the final stages of drafting the peace treaty while the Government of the Republic ofKorea requested that “Dokdo” (the Korean name for Takeshima) be added to the provision on
Korean territory to be renounced by Japan in the draft treaty, the U.S. Government refused thisamendment to the draft treaty because Takeshima is Japanese territory.1* This article was originally published as 塚本孝「竹島領有権紛争に関連する米国国務省文書（追補）」島根県竹島問題研究会〔第１期〕最終報告書、2007 年 3 月、79-89 頁.

1

Reviewing the key points, on July 19, 1951 Yang You-chan, the Republic of Korea Ambassador
to the United States, presented an official letter requesting to replace the text which reads, “Japan,
recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including theislands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet,” in the provision in the draft treaty as of June 1951
(the revised U.S.-UK draft) on Japan’s renunciation of Korea with “… confirms that it renounced
on August 9, 1945, all right, title and claim to Korea and the islands which were part of Korea
prior to its annexation by Japan, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton, Dagelet, Dokdo
and Parangdo.” The U.S. Government responded in an official letter to the Ambassador of the
Republic of Korea dated August 10, 1951 from Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State, on behalfof the Secretary of State, which reads as follows. “As regards the island of Dokdo, otherwise
known as Takeshima or Liancourt Rocks, this normally uninhabited rock formation was according
to our information never treated as part of Korea and, since about 1905, has been under thejurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Office of Shimane Prefecture of Japan. The Island does notappear ever before to have been claimed by Korea.” As a result, this provision was not amended
and the legal status of Takeshima as Japan’s territory was confirmed.
In recent years, however, there have been claims on the Internet that new secret U.S. diplomatic
documents have been discovered showing the U.S. subsequently changed its position andrecognized that Takeshima is Korean territory.2 While I did not mention this in particular during
my report at the 3rd meeting of the Takeshima Issue Research Group on September 27, 2005, theInternet has gained great power as new form of publishing, so to contribute to an accurate
understanding of the facts, here I would like to introduce a few U.S. diplomatic records additionallythat I did not introduce in my previous articles (and the report to the research group).
(Report by the U.S. Embassy in Japan Dated October 3, 1952)
The document being introduced on the Internet as the change of the U.S. position is the report
entitled “Koreans on Liancourt Rocks” dated October 3, 1952 cabled by John M. Steeves, the First
Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Japan, to the United States (the Department of State).3
At that time, the U.S. Navy Authority stationed in the Republic of Korea was not aware that
Takeshima was being used as a bombing range for the U.S. forces stationed in Japan, so after the
Authority approved a request from the Government of the Republic of Korea to dispatch ascientific expedition to Ulleungdo (Dagelet) and Dokdo (Takeshima, Liancourt Rocks), theexpedition was bombed. (More precisely, the head of the scientific expedition reported thatfishermen from Ulleungdo who were fishing at Dokdo encountered bomb dropping by U.S.
military planes, and scarecely escaped into caves). This incident was reported in the Dong-a Ilbo,
an ROK newspaper, on September 21, 1952, and this induced the U.S. Embassy in Japan to send
this report to the U.S. Department of State.
1

Takashi Tsukamoto, “San Furanshisuko Joyaku to Takeshima” [“The San Francisco Peace Treaty andTakeshima”], Reference, No. 389 (June 1983), pp. 51-68; Takashi Tsukamoto, “Heiwa Joyaku to
Takeshima (Sairon)” [“The Peace Treaty and Takeshima (Revisited)”], Reference, No. 518 (March 1994),
pp. 31-56.
2
Hangetsujo Tsushin No. 111 (June 1, 2005; Table of Contents 12), http://www.han.org/a/halfmoon/hm111.html#No.822
3
http://dokdo-research.com/temp8.html.
2

The first half of the report has a passage which reads:
The rocks […] were at one time part of the Kingdom of Korea. They were, of course,
annexed together with the remaining territory of Korea when Japan extended its Empire
over the former Korean State. However, during the course of this imperial control, theJapanese Government formally incorporated this territory into the metropolitan area ofJapan and placed it administratively under the control of one of the Japanese prefectures.
Therefore, when Japan agreed in Article II of the peace treaty to renounce “all right, title
and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet,” thedrafters of the treaty did not include these islands within the area to be renounced. Japanhas, and with reason, assumed that its sovereignty still extends over these islands. For
obvious reasons, the Koreans have disputed this assumption.
Viewed in its entirety, this passage says that the drafters of the peace treaty did not include
Takeshima within the area to be renounced, so Takeshima has not been renounced and remains
under Japanese sovereignty, but those who are arguing that the U.S. changed its position seem towant to claim that the U.S. position had changed and that this was then the final stance of theUnited States, indicating the comment in the text from the First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy inJapan, that the rocks were part of the Kingdom of Korea and were annexed when Japan extended
its empire.
There are, however, the following types of questions about that understanding. In general, reports
from diplomatic missions to their home countries are just reports, and what is written there is notnecessarily the official position of the home country government. Diplomatic missions report
information to their home countries, which they collect by reading newspapers, contacting
government officials and citizens of the host countries, and communicating with their own
embassies in nearby countries. They make policy proposals, and ask for instructions about which
actions they should take. It is only when the government of the home country takes some sort ofaction after receiving such reports that it becomes important as the action and view of thatgovernment.
In this case, in his report, the First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Japan says that, because theinformation that the Liancourt Rocks had been designated as a bombing range and were dangerous
had already been disseminated throughout the U.S. military, when the U.S. Embassy in Japanlearned the information that the U.S. Navy Authority in Pusan had granted permission for thescientific expedition to travel to Dokdo, the U.S. Embassy in Japan asked the Far East Command
to inform the Navy Authority in Pusan not to grant permission. He called the attention of the U.S.
Government (Department of State) with the following conclusion (the final paragraph).
It is considered that the recent reassertion of the danger zone on these rocks should suffice
to prevent the complicity of any American or United Nations Commanders in any further
expeditions to the rocks which might result in injury or death to Koreans. However, owing
to the crude implementation of Government controls in Korea, it is questionable that all
independent Korean fishermen can be dissuaded from continuing their expeditions into
these rocks. There therefore exists a fair chance that sometime in the near future American3

bombs may cause loss of life or other incidents which will bring the Korean efforts torecapture these islands into more prominent play, and may involve the United States
unhappily in the implications of that effort.
(Memorandum from the U.S. Embassy in South Korea dated October 15, 1952)
Meanwhile, E. Allan Lightner, the Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the U.S. Embassy in the
Republic of Korea, sent a letter with an attached memorandum entitled “Use of Disputed Territory(Tokto Island) as Live Bombing Area” to Robert Murphy, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, and sent
the same report to the U.S. State Department.4 The memorandum states:
Although this Embassy is not in possession of complete information regarding the
Department’s views on the ownership of Tokto Island (also called Dokdo, Takeshima, or
the Liancourt Rocks), it appears that its status is unsettled. Despite the Korean
Government’s request in July 1951 that the Japanese renounce any claim to this island in
the Peace Treaty, no action was taken to insert such a provision in the treaty draft.
The memorandum then mentions SCAPIN and other reasons for the Republic of Korea territorialassertions,5 and says:
It seems doubtful that the United States would wish to become involved in the controversy
by taking a position as to whether Japan or Korea has sovereignty over this island.
However, it appears from Tokyo’s despatch… [dated] October 3 [the above-stated report“Koreans on Liancourt Rocks”] … that the Joint Committee implementing JapaneseAmerican security arrangements has … “agreed that these Rocks would be designated asa facility of the Japanese Government” where unexpended bomb loads might be dumped.
The implication of agreeing with the Japanese on such an arrangement is that the UnitedStates recognizes Japanese sovereignty over Tokto.
In conclusion, the Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the U.S. Embassy in Korea writes:
It appears that continued usage of the Island as a live bombing area may involve the UnitedStates in a territorial dispute as well as adverse publicity and/or legal action in the eventthat fishermen, who use the Island occasionally, are killed or injured by bombs.
(Response from the U.S. Department of State)
Upon receiving the report from Tokyo and the memorandum from Pusan, how did the U.S.
Department of State respond? That is the U.S. diplomatic record translated and introduced in thispaper.
4

http://dokdo-research.com/temp9/html.
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction Notes (SCAPIN) were orders issued by theoccupying forces (Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers). SCAPIN No. 677 of January 29, 1952
prohibited Japan from exercising governmental or administrative authority over Takeshima. (For details,
see the articles cited in Footnote 1). However, the disposition of territory is fundamentally outside theauthority of the occupying forces (it should be determined by peace treaty) and SCAPIN No. 677 includes
a provision stating “nothing in this directive shall be construed as an indication of Allied policy relating to
the ultimate determination of Japanese territory.
5

4

I would like to state the conclusion first. Kenneth T. Young Jr., Director of the Department of State
Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, sent a letter dated November 5, 1952 to Pusan (the U.S.
Embassy in Korea was in Pusan at that time because of the Korean War), which included thefollowing points. (1) The Department of State has taken the position that these rocks belong toJapan and has so informed the Korean Ambassador to Washington. (2) During the course ofdrafting the Japanese Peace Treaty, the Korean Ambassador requested the Secretary of State in a
letter of July 19, 1951 to amend Article 2(a) of the draft treaty so as to include the islands of Dokdo(Liancourt Rocks) and Parangdo as well as Chejudo (Quelpart), Geomundo (Port Hamilton) and
Ulleungdo (Dagelet) among those islands Japan would renounce along with Korea’s independence.
(3) In his reply to the Korean Ambassador, the Secretary of State stated in a letter dated August
10, 1951 that the United States could not concur with the proposed amendment as it applied toTakeshima. (4) As a result, Article 2(a) of the Treaty of Peace with Japan makes no mention of the
Liancourt Rocks. (5) The action of the United States-Japan Joint Committee in designating theserocks as a facility of the Japanese Government is therefore justified. (Note: based on the
Administrative Agreement of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japanese facilities and areas are to
be provided to U.S. forces as bases, training ranges, etc.). (6) SCAPIN No. 677 … did not preclude
Japan from exercising sovereignty over Takeshima permanently. (7) When the islets were
designated as a bombing range for the Far East Air Force on September 16, 1947, it (SCAPIN No.
1778) provided that use of the range would be made only after notification through Japanese civil
authorities to the inhabitants of the Oki islands and Western Honshu. This letter was also reported
to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo.
In response to this report from the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs [Young],
Charge d’Affaires ad interim of the U.S. Embassy in Korea [Lightner] replied on December 4,
1952, writing that, “We had never heard of Dean Rusk’s letter to the Korean Ambassador in which
the Department took a definite stand on this question.” Lightner also reported that he has sent anote to the Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs which refers to Dean Rusk’s note toAmbassador Yang of August 10, 1951.
From the above, contrary to the claims by those arguing that the U.S. changed its position,according to the documents, it is clear that the U.S. government in fact reconfirmed its position ofAugust 1951.
In addition to these exchanges at the end of 1952, in the following year 1953 as well, after aJapanese patrol vessel was fired on from Takeshima [by South Korea], there are records showing
the considerations regarding settlement of the dispute over territorial sovereignty over Takeshima
and U.S. involvement in this issue by staff of the Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State,
and the U.S. Embassy in Japan. There are also records from 1954, after the Japanese Government
proposed to the Government of Republic of Korea that the dispute over territorial sovereignty overTakeshima be submitted to the International Court of Justice and the Republic of Korea refused,
in which staff at the Japanese Embassy in the U.S. ask those in charge at the Department of Statefor their opinion on referring the Takeshima dispute to the United Nations Security Council. In

5this paper, I also translate [into Japanese] and introduce the related documents as supplements tomy recent articles and report to the Takeshima Issue Research Group.6
Document 1: Letter from Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs,
Department of State to E. Allan Lightner, Charge d'affaires, a.i., American Embassy, Pusan, Korea
on November 5, 1952, also reported to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo
cc. American Embassy, Tokyo
Dear Al:I have read both Tokyo's despatch No. 659 of October 3, 1952, entitled, "Koreans on Liancourt
Rocks" as well as Pusan's Memorandum of October 15, 1952, entitled, "Use of Disputed Territory(Tokto Island) as Live Bombing Area" enclosed in your letter of October 16, 1952 to Ambassador
Murphy.
It appears that the Department has taken the position that these rocks belong to Japan and has so
informed the Korean Ambassador in Washington. During the course of drafting the Japanese Peace
Treaty the Republic of Korea's views were solicited, in consequence of which, the Korean
Ambassador requested the Secretary of State in a letter of July 19, 1951 to amend Article 2(a) of
the draft treaty so as to include the islands of Dokdo (Liancourt Rocks) and Parangdo as well as
Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet among those islands over which Japan would renounce right,
title and claim by virtue of recognizing Korea's independence. In his reply to the Korean
Ambassador the Secretary stated in a letter dated August 10, 1951 that the United States could notconcur in the proposed amendment as it applied to the Liancourt Rocks since according to his
information the Liancourt Rocks had never been treated as a part of Korea, they had been under
the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Office of Japan's Shimane Prefecture since 1905 and it
did not appear that they had ever before been claimed by Korea. As a result Article 2(a) of theTreaty of Peace with Japan makes no mention of the Liancourt Rocks:"Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title, and claim to
Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet."
The action of the United States-Japan Joint Committee in designating these rocks as a facility of
the Japanese Government is therefore justified. The Korean claim, based on SCAPIN 677 ofJanuary 29, 1946, which suspended Japanese administration of various island areas, including
Takeshima (Liancourt Rocks), did not preclude Japan from exercising sovereignty over this areapermanently. A later SCAPIN, No. 1778 of September 16, 1947 designated the islets as a bombing
range for the Far East Air Force and further provided that use of the range would be made only
after notification through Japanese civil authorities to the inhabitants of the Oki Islands and certain
ports on Western Hons[h]u.
Sincerely yours,
Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
6

The [U.S. Department of State] documents translated [into Japanese] in [the original Japanese versionof] this paper can all be accessed to view microfilm at the National Diet Library Modern Japanese
Political History Materials Room, LOT Reel 34, 0648-0651, 0665-0674.
6Document 2: Letter from E. Allan Lightner, Charge d'affaires, a.i., American Embassy, Pusan,
Korea to Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department ofState on December 4, 1952
Dear Ken:
Sorry to hear that your trip has again been postponed. However, we will very much look forward
to seeing you early in the new year.
I much appreciate your letter of November 14 in regard to the status of the Dokdo Island (Liancourt
Rocks). The information you gave us had never been previously available to the Embassy. We had
never heard of Dean Rusk's letter to the Korean Ambassador in which the Department took adefinite stand on this question. We of course knew of the ROK Government's desire to have Article
2(a) of the Peace Treaty amended to include Dokdo and Parangdo and conveyed that request in atelegram to the Department at that time, along with other ROK suggestions for amendments to thedraft treaty. We were subsequently made aware of the fact that Article 2(a) was not to be amended
but had no inkling that that decision constituted a rejection of the Korean claim. Well, now weknow and we are very glad to have the information as we have been operating on the basis ofwrong assumption for a long time.
I am sending with a transmitting despatch, a copy of the note that we have just sent to the Ministryof Foreign Affairs which includes as a final paragraph the wording suggested in the Department's
telegram no. 365 of November 27 and which refers to Dean Rusk's note to Ambassador Yang ofAugust 10, 1951.
Sincerely yours,
E. Allan Lightner, Jr.
Document 3: Memorandum entitled, “Possible Methods of Resolving Liancourt Rocks Dispute
between Japan and the Republic of Korea” by L. Burmaster, the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs,
Department of State to Robert J. G. McClurkin, Deputy Director and Alice L. Dunning, Office ofNortheast Asian Affairs on July 22, 1953
During the past six months the question of whether Japan or the Republic of Korea has sovereignty
over the Liancourt Rocks has been raised on three separate occasions. According to the Japaneseversion, in the latest incident on July 12, 1953, a Japanese vessel was patrolling the waters adjacentto the Liancourt Rocks when it was fired upon by Korean shore-based small arms and machineguns. The Japanese Foreign Office verbally protested the incident to the ROK Mission in Tokyo
on July 13, demanding the immediate withdrawal of Koreans from the Rocks. On July 14 Foreign
Minister Okazaki at a Cabinet meeting stated that the Japanese Government intends to explore
every possibility of settling the dispute amicably by direct negotiation with the Republic of Korea.
However, Okazaki also stated that it was conceivable that the question might later be submitted to
the United States or the United Kingdom for mediation. Some Japanese newspapers have also
indicated that as alternatives the question might be submitted either to the Hague Tribunal
7

(International Court of Justice) or to the United Nations; Jiji Shimpo has taken the somewhat
extreme view of suggesting that the Japanese Coastal Security Force be despatched to the Rock.
With regard to the question of who has sovereignty over the Liancourt Rock (which are also known
in Japanese as Takeshima, and in Korean as Dokdo), it may be of interest to recall that the UnitedStates position, contained in a note to the Republic of Korea's Ambassador dated August 10, 1951
reads in part:"....As regards the island of Dokdo, otherwise known as Takeshima or Liancourt Rocks,
this normally uninhabited rock formation was according to our information never treatedas part of Korea and, since about 1905, has been under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands
Branch Office of Shimane Prefecture of Japan. The island does not appear ever before tohave been claimed by Korea......"(This position has never been formally communicated to the Japanese Government but might wellcome to light were this dispute ever submitted to mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial
settlement.)
Since sending the August 10, 1951 note to the ROK Government, the United States Government
has sent only one additional communication on the subject. This was done in response to the ROK
protest of the alleged bombing of Dokdo Island by a United States military plane. The UnitedStates note of December 4, 1952 states:"The Embassy has taken note of the statement contained in the Ministry's Note that 'Dokdo
Island (Liancourt Rocks).....is a part of the territory of the Republic of Korea.' The UnitedStates Government's understanding of the territorial status of this island was stated in
Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk's note to the Korean Ambassador in Washington
dated August 10, 1951."
At the same time this note was sent it was hoped that this mere reiteration of our previously
expressed views would withdraw us from the dispute and might discourage the Republic of Korea
from "intruding a gratuitous issue in the already difficult Japanese-Korean negotiations."
Apparently our efforts to date have not had the desired effect.
Should the present efforts of the Japanese Government to solve the dispute on an amicable basisby direct negotiation with the Republic of Korea fail, there are several courses of action open to
the Japanese Government.
a) Request for United States Mediation—In the event the Japanese Government were to request
the United States to act as mediator, not only would the concurrence of the ROK have to beobtained, but the United States would be placed in the embarrassing position (notwithstanding thefacts in the case) of seeming to choose between Japan or Korea. As usual, the role of the mediator
is not a happy one. In view of this and of United States requirements and obligations to both thesecountries, it is believed preferable for the United States to extricate itself from the dispute to thegreatest extent possible.

8b) Submission to the International Court of Justice—Notwithstanding the fact that neither Japan
nor the Republic of Korea is a member of the United Nations, both may be parties in a case before
the ICJ provided that both agree to comply with the conditions laid down by the Security Council.
At present these conditions are that both states would deposit with the Registrar of the International
Court of Justice a declaration accepting the Court's jurisdiction in accordance with the UN Charterand the Statute and Rules of the Court, undertaking to a comply in good faith with the Court's
decision and accepting the obligations of a Member of the United Nations under Article 94 of theCharter. The difficulty with this plan would seem to be whether Japan could obtain the concurrenceof the Republic of Korea to join with Japan in presenting the dispute to the International Court ofJustice and if this were done, whether the ROK would abide by decision of the ICJ if it were
negative.
c) Submission to the United Nations General Assembly or Security Council—Japan would havethe right unilaterally to bring the Liancourt Rocks dispute to the United Nations under Article 35
section 2 of the United Nations Charter, which states:"A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security
Council or of the General Assembly any dispute, to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, forthe purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Chapter.",
if it were willing to state, as required by Article 33 of the UN Charter, that the Liancourt Rocks
dispute was one "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." It isindeterminable at this time whether Japan would be willing to go that far. It is also unlikely that
the United States and/or the other Members of the anti-Soviet bloc in the United Nations would
want to add this grist to the Soviet propaganda mill.
Recommendation
1. NA/J [Japanese Affairs of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs] recommends that the
Department of State take no action at this time inasmuch as Foreign Minister Okazaki has statedthat the Japanese Government will try to settle the dispute with the ROK Government by direct
negotiation.
2. However, if the Japanese Government requests the United States Government to act as amediator in this dispute, NA/J recommends that:a) the United States should refuse;b) the United States should suggest that the matter might appropriately be referred to theInternational Court of Justice. The United States could inform the Japanese Government that
this procedure might be preferable to submitting it to the United Nations for the reasons statedabove.
3. If the Japanese Government requests the legal opinion of the United States Government on thisquestion, NA/J recommends that the United States should make available to the Japanese9Government the United States position on the Liancourt Rocks as stated in the Rusk note of August
10, 1951.
Concurrences
NA/K [Korean Affairs of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs] concurs.
Document 4: Memorandum in regard to the Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima Island) Controversy by
William T. Turner, Minister-Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Japan on November 30, 1953
Ambassador Allison contends (Tokyo's 1306, November 23) that the United States is "inescapably
involved" in the Takeshima dispute. In evidence, he points to the Rusk note of 1951 and to the
Potsdam Declaration, the Peace Treaty, etc.
There can be no question that the United States has committed itself to an attitude in this matter.
However, I fail to see that the commitment carries with it the obligation to intervene between twocontestants who are now sovereign nations and who have available to them ample machinery forsettlement of such disputes. I cannot believe that a dispute of such essentially unimportant nature
will lead to a situation serious enough to justify an intervention by us which could only create
lasting resentment on the part of the loser. This is certainly no time to exacerbate our relations witheither country. I think that this hands-off position should be maintained regardless of the validityof the claim of either party. I think that the Department is on firm grounds in maintaining that theUnited States Government is "not legitimately involved in this matter" as has already been pointed
out in the Department's note to the Embassy.
The Liancourt Rocks case appears to have aspects in common with that of Shikotan Island, off thecoast of Hokkaido, which was occupied by Soviet troops in 1945. We have publicly declared ourview that this Island belongs to Japan, but no one in Japan or elsewhere seriously expects us totake military action under the Security Treaty to reclaim this Island for Japan. I think we need not
feel undue anxiety even in the unlikely contingency that Japan should invoke the Security Treaty
with respect to the Liancourt Rocks.
Nevertheless, I do not think we can or should continue to withhold indefinitely an expression of
our position in this matter, particularly if the dispute continues to worsen. Sooner or later theJapanese will get wind of the Rusk letter and will then resent our failure to inform them ofsomething which would measurably strengthen their position. Even if they do not, I think we would
be remiss in not apprising the Japanese of a position which we have consistently maintained andwhich we are under no obligation not to divulge.
Accordingly, I suggest that we adopt the following course of action:
1. Express to the ROK Government our concern over repeated clashes with the Japanese over the
Liancourt Rocks.
2. Remind the ROK of our previous statement of view (the Rusk letter); express strong hope that
settlement can be reached with the Japanese; state that the United States seeks to avoid any form10

of intervention in this matter but if clashes continue to occur we may be forced to give publicity
to the Rusk letter and to reiterate the view expressed therein; suggest that if the ROK can notaccept the view expressed in the Rusk letter, it take steps toward arbitration or appeal the matterto the ICJ.
3. In case the foregoing steps do not alleviate the situation, seek an appropriate occasion to
publicize the Rusk note and disclaim any desire to intervene in this matter.
William T. TurnerDocument 5: Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: “Japanese Proposal to refer Liancourt
Dispute to Security Council” on November 16, 1954
Participants:
Mr. Tanaka [Hiroto], Fist Secretary, Embassy of Japan
Mr. Matsuoka [Yasuhiro], Third Secretary, Embassy of Japan
Mr. Eric Stein, UNF, Department of States
Miss. Katherine B. Fite, L/FE, Department of States
William G. Jones, NA/K, Department of States
Richard B. Finn, NA/J, Department of States
Marjorie McMullen, NA/J, Department of States
Mr. Tanaka and Mr. Matsuoka of the Japanese Embassy visited at their request at the Departmentof State on November 16, 1954 at 4:45 p.m.
Mr. Tanaka said that his Government is considering the possibility of bringing before the Security
Council the Japan-ROK dispute over Takeshima with a view to obtaining an SC recommendationthat the dispute be taken to the International Court of Justice. He stated that his Government hadin late September formally suggested to the ROK that the issues be taken to the ICJ for arbitration,and that in a Note Verbale of October 28 the Koreans had stated their refusal. In the face of the
ROK’s action in establishing a lighthouse on Takeshima and unilaterally proclaiming sovereignty
over this disputed territory, the Japanese Government felt constrained to take somecountermeasures, particularly because of the pressure of Japanese public opinion. Since the disputecannot be brought before the ICJ without Korean consent, the Japanese Government thought a
recommendation by the SC that the matter should be put before the ICJ would at least focuses
world opinion on the fact that Japan was willing to permit impartial consideration of the merits ofthe dispute, while the ROK was not. If Japan decided to pursue this course, Mr. Tanaka wondered
whether the United States would vote in the SC in favor of referral of the issue to the ICJ.
In answer to Mr. Stein’s question, Mr. Tanaka confirmed that Japan’s recent exchange with Korea
with respect to submitting the dispute to the ICJ was only the latest in a long series of attempts by
Japan to reach a satisfactory settlement with the ROK on the issue. Mr. Stein indicated that it
would appear to be legally possible for the Japanese to bring the issue before the SC under Article
35, paragraph 2, of the Charter, which provides that non-UN members may bring to the attentionof the Council any dispute to which it is a party. He added that there were precedents for such
11

action, citing the Corfu Channel dispute between the UK and Albania as appearing on the surface
to be a similar dispute and one which was handled in a similar manner. Mr. Stein confirmed that
the ICJ could not consider the issue without the consent of both parties and said that Albania had
submitted to the jurisdiction of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case. Mr. Matsuoka indicated theJapanese were familiar with this case.
Mr. Jones stated that while we were not in a position to offer any firm views on the matter at thepresent time, it would seem that the proposed Japanese action would serve little practical purpose
and that any small satisfaction which Japan might gain on moral grounds would be far outweighedby the increased agitation to ROK-Japan relations. He added that while he did not want to appear
too optimistic, he had reason to believe that the chances for improved ROK-Japan relations wereat the moment in ascendancy, and he thought it would be more unfortunate if Japan undertook any
action now which might disturb the situation to Japan’s ultimate loss.
Mr. Finn agreed with Mr. Jones that Japan would appear to have little to gain and perhaps muchto lose by resorting to this proposed measure. He stated that in any case, he would assume that amatter of this nature would be taken up on a higher level by the Embassy, perhaps by Ambassador
Iguchi with the Secretary, before the Japanese made any final decision to proceed. Mr. Jones
pointed out that the present time would be particularly unpropitious for the proposed action by
Japan in view of the upcoming consideration of the Korean question in the General Assembly. Mr.
Tanaka confirmed that his Government did not intend to bring the matter up until the current
General Assembly has adjourned.
Mr. Jones then said that he wanted to tell Mr. Tanaka and Mr. Matsuoka on a confidential basis
why he was hopeful with regard to improved ROK-Japan relations. The United State had justreached with the ROK agreement on several important points of US-ROK policy. Among thesewas agreement by the ROK that purchases in connection with the Korean rehabilitation program
would be made …goods of comparable quality could be obtained for the best price. This meansincreased purchases in Japan. While this might in itself be considered a small price for Japan, it
could be the beginning of a more relaxed policy by the ROK toward Japan and could conceivably,with careful cultivation by everyone concerned, lead to a better atmosphere for future negotiations
on outstanding issues, including Liancourt.
Mr. Tanaka thanked us for the informal exchange of views. Mr. Finn expressed the hope that
nothing would be done until we had an opportunity to discuss the matter further with our own
people and with the Japanese. Mr. Tanaka assured us that he would keep us informed and requested
that the matter be treated confidentially.
Document 6 Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: “Liancourt Dispute” on November 17, 1954
Participants:
Minister Shigenobu Shima, Japanese Embassy
Mr. W. J. Sebald (William J. Sebald), Deputy Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. R. B. Finn (Richard B. Finn), Officer in Charge, Japanese Affairs

12Mr. Shima called at his request on November 17 at 3 p.m.
The minister said he first wished to express appreciation for the kind treatment accorded Prime
Minister Yoshida and second that he wished to pay his respects to Mr. Sebald now that the latter
had assumed his new position as Deputy Acting Secretary.
Mr. Shima stated that he would like to inquire informally regarding the views of the United States
on a Japanese proposal to submit to the UN Security Council the controversy with the Republic ofKorea over the Liancourt Rocks. The Japanese proposal would request the Security Council toapprove a recommendation that this issue be presented to the International Court of Justice fordecision. Mr. Shima said that his Government had not yet decided to submit such a proposal to the
Security Council and first wished to ascertain informally the views of the United States
Government. The Minister stated his personal view that Japan would not submit this problem to
the Security Council if it were not assured of United States support of Japan’s recommendationthat the issue be referred to the International Court.
Minister Shima explained that Japan had by note dated September 25, 1954 proposed to the
Republic of Korea that this matter be taken directly to the International Court. The ROK had bynote dated October 28 rejected this proposal. Mr. Shima said the dispute over the Liancourt Rocks
was a long standing one.
Mr. Sebald said that of course Japan was free to do as it thought best in presenting its case andcommented that he had personally followed this controversy over a long period of time. He stated
his opinion however that the Security Council would wish to be answered that the two parties wereunable to reach agreement through bilateral negotiations and the Council might consider thatbilateral efforts had not yet been fully explored. He also stated that the ROK answered reluctant todiscuss any proposal to submit this issue to the International Court, if the ROK refused to discuss
the issue before the Security Council or before the International Court, Japan would not succeed
in obtaining a hearing of its case. Mr. Sebald expressed the view that it is important for Japan tokeep its claim alive and not to permit its rights to be prejudiced by default. He suggested that anote to the ROK or other periodic formal statements would serve this purpose.
Minister Shima said that Japan of course intended to press its claim and expressed the view thatJapanese public opinion is satisfied that the Government is doing what it can. He stressed that theGovernment feels it has a strong case and desires early solution. He noted that the U.S. militaryforces in Japan had listed Liancourt Rocks as a military facility granted to their use under the
Administrative Agreement and had later returned this facility to Japanese control. Mr. Shima said
this appeared to constitute US recognition of the validity of Japan´s claim. Mr. Sebald commented
that US relations with the ROK had recently improved and he noted that the US-ROK Mutual
Defense Treaty was being brought into force on November 17 and that the general understanding
had been agreed to in Seoul. He expressed confidence that relations between Japan and the ROK
would improve in the future although this of course would take time.
Minister Shima said he was pleased to learn of these favorable developments although hewondered how they might lead to an improvement of Japan’s relations with the ROK. He inquired
whether the US was considering designation of an American mediator who might assist in Japan13

ROK negotiations. Mr. Sebald said that he would personally prefer to see the two Governments
iron out their difficulties by themselves and that he doubted whether an American mediator would
be successful in the absence of willingness by Japan and the ROK to negotiate by themselves. He
said the US would however try to assist in bringing the parties together and facilitating theirnegotiations. Mr. Sebald stressed US interest in the development of a sense of interdependence on
the part of nations in Northeast Asia.
Minister Shima thanked Mr. Sebald for his views and said he would report further to his
Government.
Conclusion
As seen from the U.S. Department of State records introduced in this paper, the U.S. Government
has taken the stance that the dispute over territorial sovereignty over Takeshima should be settled
between Japan and the Republic of Korea and that the United States has no intention of working
as a mediator, while maintaining the position expressed to the Republic of Korea Ambassador in
the process of drafting the Peace Treaty with Japan that Takeshima is Japanese territory.
The U.S. understanding is that, in general, mediating a territorial dispute between other nations isto play an unfavorable role (“The United States would be placed in the embarrassing position …
of seeming to choose between Japan or Korea.” “As usual, the role of the mediator is not a happyone.” Document 3); that the Takeshima dispute does not concern international peace and security(“I cannot believe that a dispute of such essentially unimportant nature will lead to a situation
serious enough to justify an intervention by us which could only create lasting resentment on thepart of the loser.” Document 4); and that the confrontation between the Eastern and Western blocks
under the Cold War at that time was also relevant (“It is also unlikely that the United States and/or
the Other Members of the anti-Soviet bloc in the United Nations would want to add this grist to
the Soviet propaganda mill.” Document 3). Regarding the Senkaku Islands as well, when China(Taiwanese authorities) began claiming sovereignty in 1970 even though the United States had
exercised administrative authority over these islands for many years as part of the Nansei Shoto(Okinawa) under Article 3 of the (San Francisco) Peace Treaty and even though the U.S. was using
the Senkaku Islands as bombing ranges, the U.S. responded, “Under… the Peace Treaty withJapan… the term [the Nansei Shoto], as used in the treaty, was intended to include the Senkaku
Islands,” “It is anticipated that administration of the Ryukyus will revert to Japan in 1972,” and“With respect to any conflicting claims, we consider that this would be a matter for resolution by
the parties concerned.” 7 Regarding the Northern Territories issue, while the United States
supported the Japanese position on the four islands in a memorandum to Japan dated September 7,
1956, the U.S. stated that Japan cannot admit the Kurile Islands as Soviet territory under agreement
between Japan and the USSR, and that their disposition should be determined by the U.S. and other
Allies.8 In addition to legal arguments concerning the Peace Treaty, it seems the international
7“Senkaku Retto Ryoyu ni kansuru Beikokumusho McCloskey Hodokan no Shitsugi Oto,” [“Questions
and Answers of Robert McCloskey, Spokesman of the Department of State, regarding Sovereignty over
the Senkaku Islands,”], Kikan Okinawa [Okinawa Quarterly], No. 63 (December 1972), p. 165.
8
Gaimusho Happyoshu [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Announcements], No. 4 (Jan. 1957), pp. 49-50. The
original text is “U.S. Position on Soviet-Japanese Peace Treaty Negotiations,” Department of State14

situation in 1956 also greatly influenced this approach. The U.S. did not intend to take the lead tohold a meeting of the Allies, and reach a final territorial settlement on the Kuriles. In short, theactive involvement of third countries in the settlement of territorial issues cannot be expected.9
Nevertheless, what is important for the (Takeshima) territorial issue is not that the U.S.
subsequently firmly maintained its position that Takeshima is Japanese territory and thatconversely its “real intention” not to want to be involved in the dispute was revealed, but rather,as made clear in my previous two articles (Footnote 1, above) and through the Department of State
documents introduced this time as an addendum, it is the reconfirmed fact that “Japan’s retentionof Takeshima was fixed by the San Francisco Peace Treaty.” That is, Takeshima was Japanese
territory as of the end of the Second World War. However, as a result of accepting the Potsdam
Bulletin, Vol. 35, No. 900 (September 24, 1956), p.484. The United Kingdom and the European
Parliament have also given some support to Japan’s position on the Northern Territories issue. Regarding
this point, see Takashi Tsukamoto, “Reisen Shuengo no Hoppo Ryodo Mondai” [“The Northern
Territories Issue Since the End of the Cold War”], Kokusaiho Gaiko Zasshi [Journal of International Law
and Diplomacy], Vol 105, No. 1 (May 2006), p. 96; P6_TA (2005) 0297 European Parliament resolution
on relations between the EU, China and Taiwan and Security in the Far East, (July 7, 2005)
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-20050297+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
9
With the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, the twocountries concluded the “Exchange of Notes concerning the Settlement of Disputes between Japan andthe Republic of Korea” (June 22, 1965). It is explained that this is for the settlement of the Takeshima
dispute (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, Regarding Japan-Republic of Korea Treaties, Nov. 1965, pp.
24-26). The Exchange of Notes prescribed, “The governments of both countries will first settle bilateral
disputes through diplomatic channels, and when settlement cannot be reached in this way, they will workat settlement through conciliation following procedures agreed on by the governments of both countries.”
Conciliation is one of the means of settling international disputes, primarily political disputes, using aframework whereby a multiple conciliation committee gives recommendations on settling the dispute.
(For example, when there are five committee members, the countries that are parties to the dispute may
each select one member from their own nationals and one member from another country, and the two
members from other countries may chose the third member or the chairperson from the other country,etc.). Plans such as having U.S. politician backed by the authority of the U.S. serve as conciliator may
involve difficulties for the same reasons presented here.
However, it seems the Republic of Korea explains (domestically) that the Takeshima issue lies outside thescope of this Exchange of Notes concerning the Settlement of Disputes, and the Government of Japan has
stated, “This is not limited to settlement by conciliation, so in case there are various obstacles, we canreturn to the beginning, with settlement by means such as the International Court of Justice orinternational arbitration, and there are various methods” (reply by Minister of Foreign Affairs Etsusaburo
Shiina, Minutes of the 50th Diet, House of Representatives plenary session; No. 5, p. 65; October 16,1965), so it is not necessary to adhere too strictly to this Exchange of Notes format. The Republic ofKorea insists that the Takeshima issue is not a subject of the Exchange of Notes concerning the
Settlement of Disputes because Takeshima (Dokdo) is territory of the Republic of Korea and therefore nodispute exists. In response to such assertions, the Government of Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) cites
the following advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice and judgments of the Permanent
Court of International Justice* and stated that whether there exists an international dispute is a matter forobjective determination. (*1. Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding theinterpretation of peace treaties between the Allies and Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania; 1950. 2.
Judgment in the Mavrommatis case between Greece and the U.K.; 1924. 3. Judgment in the caseconcerning German interests in Upper Silesia between Germany and Poland; 1925).
15Declaration which limits Japanese sovereignty “to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu,
Shikoku and such minor islands as we [the Allies] determine,” there was a possibility that the“minor islands” except the four major islands that were originally Japanese territory could havebeen removed from Japanese territory by the determination of the Allies. During the occupationof Japan, some equivocal events such as SCAPIN No. 667, which suspended Japan’s exercise ofadministrative rights over Takeshima (Footnote 5, above) occurred, but ultimately it was the Peace
Treaty that determined which islands Japan retains and which were separated from Japan. The
Republic of Korea requested that Takeshima (Dokdo) be added to the article stipulating therenunciation of Korea by Japan as part of Korea, and the U.S. Government which drafted the treaty
denied the Korean request with the reason that Takeshima is Japanese territory. Thus, Takeshima
was not removed from Japan by the Peace Treaty,10 and its retention by Japan was determined.

10

The format of listing the islands to be retained by Japan was considered at one time during the processof drafting the Peace Treaty. The treaty that was finally adopted, however, prescribes the areas to be
separated from Japan. Some argue that Japan lobbied for the Peace Treaty to stipulate that Takeshima isJapanese territory but that such a provision was not included. However, this is an argument that does not
grasp the structure of the peace treaty.
16