OSIPP IRC-Korea Foundation Project
Korea and Japan in the Evolving China US-Relations
Report on the Special Roundtable“Japan and Korea in China-US Relations: A Reappraisal of the Post-War Order”
2020 AAS-in-Asia Conference, Online
31 August – 4 September 2020

Dr Carmina Untalan
IAFOR Research Centre, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University

OSIPP IRC-Korea Foundation Project
Korea and Japan in the Evolving China US-Relations
Report on the Special Roundtable“Japan and Korea in China-US Relations: A Reappraisal of the Post-War Order”
2020 AAS-in-Asia Conference, Online
32 August – 4 September 2020

Dr Carmina UntalanIAFOR Research Centre, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University

I. Roundtable Abstract
This roundtable examines Japan-Korea relations by focusing on the bilateralrelationship's rapidly changing international context. Rather than focusing on
the dominant issues particular to Japan–Korea relations, this project looks at
the two powerful drivers of East Asian international politics of late, namelyChina and the US, that inform and influence Japan and Korea’s domestic
politics and international behaviour. As such, the interest of this project is togive greater attention to the interaction between Japan’s and Korea’s relations
with both China and the US in order to shed light to the spill over effect ofChina-US relations on Japan-Korea relations. It aims to be both an exercise inreappraising America’s hub-and-spokes system in the context of changing
power dynamics from the China challenge, and an attempt to assess thehistorical significance of Japan–Korea relations in the transformative phaseof modern East Asian politics.
II. Roundtable Members
Haruko Satoh, Osaka University, Japan (chair)
Brendan Howe, Ehwa University, South Korea
Jaewoo Choo, Kyung Hee University, South Korea
June Park, National Research Foundation of Korea, South Korea
Kei Koga, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Xianfeng Yang, Yonsei University, South Korea
Mingjiang Li, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
III. Average Number of Attendees/Audience
75-80 conference participants

2III. Introduction (Haruko Satoh)a. South Korea and Japan have similar interests in Southeast Asia within theAmerican-led hub-and-spokes system.
b. The panel discusses the prospects and challenges of a South
Korea-Japan bilateral relations that could influence great power politics
between U.S. and China.
c. Introduction of discussants and their key topics.

IV. Brendan Howe: Focus on Non-traditional security (NTS)a. Despite the challenges in traditional security areas under US-China
leadership contestation and Korea and Japan relations, t​ here is more cause
for optimism in the NTS arena.
b. Old state-centric models of traditional security are insufficient to address
current challenges​ such as COVID-19​ ​that require far more than themanagement of conflict and war prevention among states.
c. Security actors (X axis)♦ Need to realize that security actors are not only states. Security also
involve non-state actors: TNC, civil society, international organization♦ State responses have actually led to more conflict.
♦ Superpowers/state actors are causing more problem than addressing
the problem.
♦ Changing conditions: great power contestation no longer tenable,
unlike before where we could rely on the U.S. as the “voice of reason”;
even after Trump it would be difficult for the U.S. to get back tonormalcy
d. Security threats (X axis)♦ Look outside the box: non-state-centric threats, existential threats,
pandemics, climate change, refugees, transnational cybercrime areintegral to regional security.
e. Why is a broader view of security (X and Y axes) necessary in East Asia?
♦ Region is predominantly state-centric; the Westphalian view ofinternational politics still prevails; state sovereignty is still defended.
♦ BUT​ NTS gave opportunities for other actors to shine and tocooperate:- Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have a tradition of NTS
promotion especially in Southeast Asia e.g. New Southern Policy(South Korea and Taiwan), Human Security Initiative (Japan)- Although Japan and South Korea are still constrained bytraditional geopolitics, they have freedom to act in these areas3f.

vital for their “niche diplomacy” of having an impact in the globalstage.
- Less well-known instances of cooperation in NTS area e.g.
development and peacekeeping operations.
- Vietnam and Singapore applauded for how they dealt with
COVID-19 security environment; they may lack the moral
authority as quasi-authoritarian states and the societal
contributions.
Conclusion♦ With the failure and abdication of great power leadership, NTS
cooperation between South Korea and Japan ​may end up not only bewithin their own national interest, but also a​ strategic necessity​.
♦ NTS action might spill-over other sites for cooperation between Japanand South Korea; if not confidence-building and de-escalation of therhetoric and between the two​.
g. Comments and segue to next speaker (Haruko Satoh)♦ Hung-up on rhetoric, and broad support-base to antagonize each other.
South Korea’s “anti-Japan” makes them more vulnerable in the contextof US-China rivalry e.g. THAAD incident- Created a thorny atmosphere, which might require a clean slate tocommunicate with each other where NTS could be a space.
- The challenge is we cannot be seen to work together, but thisdoes not mean there are no opportunities.
♦ South Korea (Moon Jae-in Administration)- A matter of South Korea’s long-term vision regarding reunificationand denuclearization; current administration is a radical departurefrom the past, which was not explicitly anti-Japan.
- Aggravation also changed Japanese public opinion regarding
Koreans.
♦ Japan (Abe Shinzo Administration)- Also contributed to the antagonisms e.g. curb semi-conductor
exports- Withdrawal of the GSOMIA Treaty.
♦ We need to recalibrate. W​ hat are the openings for both South Korea
and Japan to pursue less antagonistic relations? Is the relationshipreparable​?
V. Jaewoo Choo: Politicization and the securitization (P and S) of NTS
a. Question: do we want to go with NTS or emerging security?

4Brendan Howe: NTS vs emerging security: the latter is about theemerging challenges to state security while the former has referent
objects other than the state.
b. ​Politicization and securitization of NTS impedes any progress ofROK-Japan bilateral relations.
♦ Whether it is for domestic politics or not is debatable, but we are stuckwith politicization and securitization:- We already know that cooperation among states is vital when it
comes to daily needs such as water and energy.
- NTS concerns, when politicized and securitized, become traditional
security concerns​.
♦ Need to look at the processes involved.
- The most damaged country would be South Korea​, especially whenit comes to territorial disputes in the South China Sea andprotecting the sea lanes in Southeast Asia.
- Sanctions served as retaliatory measures e.g. Korean peninsula
case where both North and South are being sanctioned by Chinaand Japan- If we do not examine these, we could expect more sanctions andmilitary deployments in the region.
♦ Great power allies need to play a more constructive and positive role.
- Absence of great power leadership: not necessarily the US, but lookat the context of the region (China and Japan)- Emphasis on the leadership role of Japan to reach a more concreteconclusion where South Korea could play a role as a middle power,and Japan as a regional power.
- With China rising as a communist state, the value of democracy
and liberalism are endangered.
♦VI. Xianfeng Yang: Difference in geostrategic conditions of Japan and South Korea
a. Geostrategic divergence between Japan and South Korea- Economic dependence on China in terms of market and trade, U.S.
in terms of security- Yet, a closer look reveals that Japan and South Korea’s priorities
are different which will impact the balance of relations.
b. Issues of divergence- ​We need to also talk about how to deal with North Korea​.
- Bigger problem for South Korea than Japan- Japan is peripheral to denuclearization, reunification and otherissues of long-term peace in the Korean peninsula.

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-Underlying issues of Pan-Korean nationalism which affects thegeopolitical positioning of Korea e.g. first Korean Summit; South
Korean public opinion reflect positive views on North Korea.
- Summit between Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un illustrate how South
Korea is marginalized in other instances.
c. South Korea’s polarized domestic politics- Makes it harder for South Korea to choose given its alliance withthe US.
d. Conclusion- For Japan, dealing with China and US is much simpler andstraightforward, while for South Korea it is a lot more complicated.
VII. Kei Koga: Japan-South Korea-India Relations and prospects in multilateralism
a. Is there a possibility to facilitate Japan-South Korea relations in themultilateral setting?
- The existing multilateral and trilateral relations did not improve therelationship between Japan and South Korea because they are notinstitutionalized​.
b. Context- East Asian geopolitical setting; frictions in trade and security between
China and US great powers, yet there are also trends emerging in EastAsia, such as strategic visions of middle and emerging powers (e.g.
FOIP, Southern Policy, and India’s Act East Policy.
- Rise of multilateralism e.g. Japan, India, US and Australia QUAD
meetings, but they have yet to translate to concrete policy action; weare not sure when they will be institutionalized formally; issues withexisting perception gaps and level of commitment to the region.
- We have yet to see to what extent is the US willing to commit in theIndo-Pacific; China’s increase in assertiveness.
- Are there other frameworks we could look at? Can middle powers
cooperate to decrease dependence?
c. Status of Japan-South Korea bilateral relations- Joint Declaration for Partnership (1999) improve relations but thisrelationship was not institutionalized; remained in the context ofmultilateral framework.
- If issues such as history problem come up, the two parties just halt
the partnership because of its informal nature.
d. Status of Japan-India Bilateral relations are improving- Improving e.g. PM Mori’s visit to India (2000s) in cooperative
frameworks especially in the economic field (other examples 2+2,leadership dialogues and exchanges)

6-Even if there are perception gap, there are mitigated by thesedevelopments.
e. Status of South Korea-India bilateral relations- Weakest link, but there are efforts e.g. New Southern Policy Southeast
Asia and India.
f. Opportunities for Action​India as a possible hub where the two could meet.
Functional areas such as infrastructural cooperation: India​ has
human resources, South Korea has technology and Japan’s experience
withinfrastructure development.
g. Challenges- Uncertainty with the COVID-19 situation.
VIII. June Park: Tech-wars and COVID-19 in Japan and South Korea Relations
a. Context♦ NTS and technology cannot be separated anymore♦ Difficulties in predicting; so many changes which makes us more
vulnerable to the expectation of other changes that would come along.
♦ Tech wars (e.g. chips race, semiconductor sector) and geopolitical
discussion of why the conflict could be heightened even with theresults of the US Presidential elections this year.
b. U.S. and China tech wars
♦ Tech split: not a complete economic decoupling, but tech decoupling islikely although it would take time.
♦ The semi-conductor link to the US, China, Japan and South Korea
relations.
- US and European countries such as the UK and France banning
Huawei 5G technology.
- Curbing semiconductor supply; banning transactions with Huawei
is a way to curb semiconductor supply to China and otherinterested affiliates is the core of these policies.
♦ How does the decoupling of tech is exacerbated by COVID-19?
- The geopolitical side: Who gets to rule and obtain revenue fromworldwide and widespread standardization?
- The US is ahead in term of system and microchip
development; South Korea is only ahead in terms of memory
chips.
- Change in the leadership as the industry progresses; t​ he real
driving force behind tech wars is the US drive to curb
advanced semiconductors to China, not just Huawei.
- System and memory chips may be under US sanction- The geoeconomics side: the implications of contactless economy
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-Increase in the demand for related technology.
Pre-trade war (pre-January 2018); existence of export curves
the phase of worldwide outbreak- Post-COVID tech wars e.g. AI, surveillance issues, social
media, WTO ROK-Japan case file are interlinked; together withleadership changec. Possible scenarios in the Post-COVID era♦ Contactless economy as a norm
♦ Change in leadership: post-US presidential elections may exacerbate
the tech wars; change in Japanese PM may not have an impact in theongoing semiconductor case; promises of new South Korea leadership
are uncertain.
♦ The drive for the technology conflict is mainly about US and China​.
VIX. Mingjiang Li: Assessment of China’s Health Silk Road in the COVID-19 Context
a. Did China’s health diplomacy contribute to its soft power?
b. Context♦ Historically, it is less known that the silk road functioned as channel for
health cooperation i.e. dissemination of health-related knowledge andproducts e.g. acupuncture.
♦ Recent resurrection of the public health cooperation initiative by theChinese government calling it “Health Silk Road” (concept inauguratedin Xi Jinping’s visit to Uzbekistan).
♦ Establishment of various health cooperation initiatives in East andCentral Asia since 2015 e.g. Lifeline Express Project, Peace Arc
providing medical services, engagement with international institutions
such as WHO.
c. The COVID-19 outbreak changed the seemingly positive environment for
the Health Silk Road.
♦ Health Silk Road quickly became part of China’s Emergency/Health
Diplomacy e.g. offering increased medical assistance with Italy,France, Spain (including staff, protective suits, masks, respiratorsand testing kits); China’s neighborhood diplomacy in Southeast
Asia, also in Africa
d. Impact of China’s Health Silk Road in its soft power♦ Positive reception reflected in the survey; majority thought China
handled the pandemic better than the US.
♦ Soft power perceptions vary in the West and East e.g. Pew
Research polls show negative perception of China.
♦ The Health Diplomacy did not make a significant contribution toChina’s soft power, yet it confirms the pattern in China’s soft power8

we have seen: ​it tends to do well in the developing world, but there
is a huge deficit in the Western world.
X. Open Foruma. On India being a hub for enhanced Japan-South Korea dialogue♦ Kei Koga: could work because multilateral settings usually include
great powers US and China, which affects the configuration ofcompliance; but if India is there, then both countries do not need toworry as much, more frank conversations could take place; economic
incentives could be a common meeting point despite politicaldifference; digital could be a good area cooperation because this iswhere the great power rivalries are currently intensifying.
♦ Brendan Howe: Good idea to keep great powers out in regional
cooperation; Japan is partially to blame because whenever there is asuggestion for regional cooperation, Japan is always keen to bring theUS in which keeps others from listening to Japan.
XI. Key Points/Inquiries that Emergeda. What are the promising areas of cooperation between Japan and SouthKorea?
♦ NTS, multilateral projects with Southeast Asia and India, departurefrom great power politics towards niche diplomacy and assuming
middle power roles.
b. What are the hurdles to these opportunities?
♦ Predominance of Westphalian, state-centric conduct of international
politics in the region; politicization and securitization of NTS issues,tech wars between US and China; diverging geostrategic interests andpriorities between South Korea and Japan.
c. What could be done to mitigate these hurdles?
♦ Look at the less known initiatives where Japan and South Korea share
a common ground e.g. NTS in Southeast Asia; broaden the scope ofpartnerships within and beyond the region; acknowledge thecomplicated nature of each country’s domestic politics; become lessdependent on great power allies in dealing with problems in theregion.

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