FOCUS

Focus
Asia-PacificNewsletter of the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center (HURIGHTS OSAKA)

June 2021 Vol. 104

Contents
COVID-19 in North and Central Asia: Impacts,
Responses & Strategies to Build Back
This is an excerpt from a report on the
COVID-19 situation in Central Asia issued
in February 2021.
- UNESCAP Subregional Office for North
and Central Asia
Page 2Migrant Workers in Singapore: An Update
This an edited excerpt from the reportsubmitted by two non-governmentalorganizations (the authors) for the third
cycle of Universal Periodic Review ofSingapore in 2020.
- HOME and TWC2
Page 6
Kalash Community Under Threat
This a presentation on the issues facing the
Kalash community in Pakistan that threaten
its existence as an indigenous community.
- Sayed Gul Kalash
Page 9Chosen-seki as Stateless Residents: Is
Their Social Integration in Japan Possible?
This is a discussion of the situation of
Korean residents in Japan, with a specificfocus on those who refused to become
citizens of either South or North Korea, orto become naturalized Japanese citizens.
- Soo im Lee
Page 13

Editorial
Exacerbated Misery
COVID-19 can infect anyone - rich or poor, man or woman,
young or old, regardless of skin color, country, religious belief orpolitical opinion. Some are infected more seriously than others.
In the midst of COVID-19 pandemic, the poor and thevulnerable suffer from larger social and economic impacts.
Lockdowns and other restrictions on movement prevent themfrom earning their livelihood. Limited medical facilities andservices become scarce either due to need to accommodate
COVID-19 patients or as safety measure to avoid COVID-19
infections. The poor, especially those with disabilities andserious illnesses, are particularly affected by this situation.
Migrant workers lose jobs and get stranded in their places ofwork, unable to return home due to closed borders, including
those of their own countries. Women and girls suffer moredomestic violence and other forms of abuse while forced to stayhome during lockdowns or any other restrictions of movement.
The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated existing inequalities andhardships. The pre-pandemic misery of the poor and thevulnerable became more acute. The pandemic also led to therise of new vulnerable groups.
How to address the exacerbated misery of the poor and thevulnerable in the midst of the pandemic is an urgent matter thathas to be dealt with.

1

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JUNE 2021 VOLUME 104

COVID-19 in North and Central Asia: Impacts,
Responses & Strategies to Build Back*
UNESCAP, Subregional Office for North and Central AsiaC

ountries in the North andCentral Asian subregion
were relatively quick toimplement strict measures tocurtail the spread of COVID-19,
including border closures,
additional health screening andother requirements at bordercrossings, as well as othercontainment measures. These
measures often implied
additional costs and delays incross-border transport andtrade, which adversely affectednational and regional supply
chains. The increase in costs,
delays and disruptions
a m p l i fi e d p r e - e x i s t i n gconnectivity challenges in Asiaand the Pacific. Countries in thesubregion also introduced
lockdowns, curfews, closures ofbusinesses and schools, andrestrictions on gatherings.
Social Impact
The COVID-19 pandemic is
exacerbating pre-existing
inequalities and vulnerabilities
in the subregion, and it iscreating new vulnerabilities aslevels of poverty havei n c r e a s e d . To u n d e r s t a n dimportant aspects of
preparedness or resilience tothe current crisis, a goodstarting point is the UNDP
Human Development Index(HDI) that combines a country’s
average achievements in health,education and income.

HDI values in the subregion are
higher than the world averageo f 0 . 7 3 1 . H o w e v e r, t h einequality adjusted HDI value(which discounts for the humandevelopment cost of inequality)
shows a less positive picture,especially for Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
While access to basic services,such as drinking water andelectricity, is on par with world
averages, healthcare systems
show a larger degree of stress,
echoing the above-mentioned
impacts of underinvestment in
the health sector. The relatively
low (i.e., negative) scores forvulnerable employment(defined as the total percentageof own-account workers andcontributing family workers1) inthe subregion are noteworthy as
this represents a large part of
the workforce that is most likely
to be negatively affected by thecrisis. The low number ofbroadband subscriptions showsa large gap in the ability tomake use of digital services
which have become such animportant component of
successfully coping with theimpacts of the pandemic.
Vulnerable Population Groups
The COVID-19 pandemic andits wider socioeconomic
impacts affect different
population groups in different
ways. Vulnerable population2

groups often live in the marginsof their societies and economies
and they experience poorer
working and living conditions,barriers to social protection andhealthcare services, weakersafety nets and stigma.2 In thecontext of the COVID-19 crisis,
vulnerabilities show themselves
i n s e ve ra l d i m e n s i o n s o r
spheres.
First, there are vulnerabilities in
the health sphere. People areexposed to infection, and other
health issues have be en
aggravated by the shift in focusof healthcare capacities topandemic response.
Next, there are vulnerabilities inthe social sphere which result
from government measures torestrict contact and mobility tostop the spread of the disease.
Further vulnerabilities arise
from diminished incomes ofhouseholds and fiscal space ofgovernments and civil society
organizations. Additionally,
there are vulnerabilities in theeconomic sphere. TheC OV I D - 1 9 p a n d e m i c h a s
created economic and labour
shocks that disproportionately
affect vulnerable groups –including women and girls,
older people, migrants andpeople with disabilities – whoare more likely to work in
insecure, informal employment.

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFICOne major indicator ofvulnerability is age, with older
people and youth having higher
levels of vulnerability, though fordifferent reasons. Older people
are considered as a high-risk
group for COVID-19 infections
as they are much more likely tosuffer a severe case of thedisease, and globally, 75 percent of COVID-19 related deaths
are among those 65 years andolder.3 Older people are also
more vulnerable to secondary
effects, such as social isolation,neglect and abuse, and limitedaccess to services. Suchvulnerabilities already existed
before the pandemic but theyw e r e m a g n i fi e d u n d e r
lockdowns or other restrictionsof movement when more andmore services shifted into thedigital sphere.
Youth are less likely to beaffected by the direct healthimpacts of COVID-19, but theyf a c e n e g a t ive i m p a c t s o n
educational outcomes by school
closures or in their school-towork transition. Inequalities inaccessing quality education thatexisted before the pandemic
w e r e i n t e n s i fi e d d u r i n g
lockdowns, when access tolearning was available only
through electronic devices andrequired a stable Internet signal.
For older youth, the school-towork transition may beinterrupted as fewer employers
are hiring. As the pandemic
continues, young people are
more likely to suffer from stressand anxiety as theiremployment prospects andfinancial security are lesscertain than those of older age
groups.
Greater health risks andsocioeconomic vulnerability

JUNE 2021 VOLUME 104
interact with differentiatedstructural conditions in thesubregion, such as age
d i s t r i b u t i o n , l a b o u r f o rc e
participation
andunemployment. There are somecountries in the subregion witha relatively high proportion ofolder people (ageing societies),
such as the Russian Federationor Georgia, and some withrelatively young populations,such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
Among the older populationgroups, labour participation
varies greatly. It is highest inGeorgia, which could be anindicator of insufficient social
protection, such as pension.
Similarly, Kyrgyzstan has a large
proportion of young people, and20.5 per cent of youth were notin education, employment, or
training even before the
COVID-19 pandemic. This is anominous indication of levels ofvulnerable youth during the
pandemic, especially if one
takes into account youth staying
at home who otherwise would
have opted for international
labour migration or who dependon relatives’ remittances to meettheir basic needs. Whenjuxtaposed with the health risk
from COVID-19, a differentiatedpicture of vulnerability emerges.
Experience has also shown that
women
are
often
disproportionately affected
because they are more likely to
be in vulnerable employment
and are typically employed in
sectors particularly hard-hit by
the pandemic, such as theservices industry and informal
sectors. Women also make up alarge proportion of frontline
responders, such as healthprofessionals.

3

A rapid gender assessment incountries of Europe and Central
Asia revealed that in
Kazakhstan, during the firstwave of the pandemic, salaries
of women who were part of theassessment had decreased by 50
per cent. Further, among allgroups of employed women,
self-employed women suffered
the worst economic
consequences, with 25 per centlosing their jobs (compared to
21 per cent of self-employedmen) and another 49 per centhaving reduced working hours.
More than 14 per cent of
women respondents lost theirjobs and 41 per cent had areduction in paid working
hours.4
Moreover, due to prevailing
gender roles in the subregion,
women bear the double burdenof exposure to the pandemic
and a heavy workload, as many
caregivers at home and incommunities are women. Childcare, care for people withdisabilities, care for older
people, care for those who aresick, including from COVID-19,
a n d i n c r e a s e d c a r e g iv i n gfunctions due to lockdowns anda reduction in services fall
disproportionally on women.
The above-mentioned
assessment found that on
average, 70 per cent of womenspent more time on at least one
unpaid domestic work activity,
such as cleaning, cooking,laundry and looking afterchildren (especially during
school closures), which issignificantly higher than for men(59 per cent).
This has also affected their timeand, therefore, the employment
or livelihood activities theywould otherwise take on.

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
Furthermore, the enforced
confinement of families and theincreased stress levels caused by
the uncertainty and concerns
over income have had severe
implications for women’s safety
at home, with recent months
seeing a surge in domestic
violence across the subregion.
A particularly vulnerable groupduring the COVID-19 pandemic
are people with disabilities. The
World Health Organization
estimates that 15 per cent of theworld’s population have someform of disability. Barriers to thefull and effective participationand inclusion of people withdisabilities in society are
structural and pre-date
COVID-19. Moreover, many
people with disabilities
experience intersecting
disadvantages when disabilities
interact with othercharacteristics including gender,
age, ethnicity, income or placeof residence.
Many people with disabilities
are poor and in vulnerable
employment without adequates o c i a l p r o t e c t i o n . E S CA P
research indicates that thedifference in poverty rates
between people with disabilities
and the general population canbe as high as 20.6 per cent, andpeople with disabilities are two
to six times less likely to be
employed than those without
disabilities. During the
pandemic, these disadvantaged
circumstances make people
with disabilities more
vulnerable, especially thosewith existing health conditions.
For example, due to social
distancing rules, people
providing support services had
to temporarily pause their work

JUNE 2021 VOLUME 104
to protect themselves andpeople with disabilities against
additional infection risks. Manyother essential support services
are no longer available.
M i g r a n t s h av e a l s o b e e nseverely affected by COVID-19
containment measures. Internalmigrants are usually drawn tocapital cities or to othereducational and industrial
centres. Experience from former
crises has shown that migrants
are among the first to bedismissed when companies faceeconomic downturns. In
destination countries, many
migrants are dependent on foodand basic supplies donated byinternational organizations,charities and embassies.
C o n s e q u e n t l y, f a m i l i e s o f
migrants stay without income
and social safety nets backhome.
Besides the consequences offinancial hardship (due tooverreliance on remittances),
migrants often work underhazardous conditions withlimited or no access to healthservices and social protection.
Living in overcrowded
accommodations and travelling
via crowded transportationroutes increase migrants’
exposure to infection.
Furthermore, migrants are likely
to face significant challenges inaccessing a COVID-19 vaccine.
For legal labour migrants, theexpiration of their residency andwo r k i n g p e r m i t s i n s o m edestinations is a concern. In the
R u s s i a n Fe d e ra t i o n , t h epresident signed a decree thatallows migrant workers to stay
and work in the country until 15
December 2020 without
providing the necessary

4

documents, 5 which was awelcomed measure. Further
support needs to be targeted
towards migrant communities tohelp them retain a legal status
and prevent the exacerbation ofsocioeconomic conditions.
Other vulnerable groups that
faced disadvantages, exclusionand discrimination even before
the pandemic include ethnic
minorities, prisoners and thelesbian, gay, bisexual andtransgender (LGBT) community.
This brief does not analyse allvulnerable
groupscomprehensively, however, it isimportant to highlight a groupcalled the “missing middle” thatemerged during the COVID-19
pandemic.
While the middle and uppermiddle income groups are
employed in the formal
economy and are covered bysocial security, and many ofsociety’s poorest are covered bytargeted social assistancetransfers, the missing middle is a
newly vulnerable populationgroup consisting of formerly
non-poor informal workers,
occasional or “gig” and parttime workers, long-term
unemployed people, and labour
migrants who have lost theirsource of livelihood, but do notmeet criteria for State support.
The missing middle is now more
apparent, and people in thisgroup are in a situation ofvulnerability, living on less than
$3.20 per day or at the poverty
l i n e o f $ 5 . 5 0 p e r d a y.
Government strategies must
focus on adequately supportingthem.
Poverty and Inequality
As already mentioned, the
COVID-19 pandemic increased

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
vulnerability to job loss and lossof livelihoods. Many workingage men and women across thesubregion are self-employed,
work informally, or are labour
migrants. As such, they are
p o o r l y c ove r e d by s o c i a l
protection schemes, and areparticularly vulnerable to falling
into poverty. The percentage of
people living in extreme poverty(defined by the World Bank at$1.90 per day), had been
declining steadily in thesubregion over the past few
decades and was relatively
small before the onset of the
COVID-19 crisis. Uzbekistan
had the highest number ofindividuals living in extreme
poverty, with Tajikistan andGeorgia each at about 5 per
cent.
The COVID-19 induced crisis isincreasing the number ofextremely poor people acrossthe subregion. The latest WorldBank estimates of one million
additional people living in
extreme poverty for the Europe
and Central Asia region. The
number of people living on lessthan $3.20 per day will increaseby two–three million and thenumber of people living on lessthan $5.50 per day will increaseby an even larger margin (six–eight million). On a positivenote, the World Bank revised its
estimates downward to somee x t e n t b e t w e e n Ju n e a n d
S e p t e m b e r.
Futuredevelopments will depend bothon the severity and length of thepandemic in the subregion andon continued and well-targeted
support measures ofGovernments. During the firstfew months of the pandemic,
many people could rely on
short-term coping mechanisms,
such as depleting existent

JUNE 2021 VOLUME 104
savings and taking on debt.
However, these options were
exhausted as the pandemic
continued, of course, withnegative longer-term impacts on
m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l p ove r t y,which goes beyond income andaccess to assets, such as
remittances, and expresses itself
through the lack of access tocore social services, such as
health and education, and also
services such as heating orelectricity.
Unequal access and unmet
needs are particularly being
magnified by the COVID-19
crisis. Inequalities acrossmultiple dimensions, including
income, access to basic
infrastructure and services or
power (and “having a voice”),
were already on the rise in thesubregion before COVID-19. Of
particular note for North andCentral Asia are gender gaps in
the workplace, education andaccess to services, with womenbeing at a disadvantage relative
to men.
This policy brief recommends
the following for subregional
cooperation:
Protect people and facilitate
inclusivity in social services– The pandemic highlights
the vulnerabilities in social
systems across thesubregion. Emphasis needs
to be placed on publichealthcare funding, targetingvulnerable populationgroups and ensuring accessto quality education.
*This is an excerpt of the policy
brief entitled COVID-19 in
North and Central Asia:
Impacts, Responses & Strategies
to Build Back Better issued in
February 2021 by the Economic

5

and Social Commission for Asiaand the Pacific (ESCAP) as partof the Framework on
Socioeconomic Response to
COVID-19.
For further information, pleasecontact:
Nikolay
Pomoshchnikov, Head, ESCAP
Subregional Office for North
and Central Asia; e-mail:pomoshchnikov@un.org.
Endnotes
1 UNDESA and ILO, https://desa.un.org/unmigration/
documents/retreat/
UNpercent20WOMEN_Indicat
or_vulnerable_employment.pdf.
2 W H O ( 2 0 2 0 ) , Fa c t s h e e t
October 2020: Vulnerable
Populations during COVID-19
Response, www.euro.who.int/_ _ d a t a / a s s e t s / p d f _ fi l e /0 0 0 7 / 4 6 6 1 0 8 / Fa c t s h e e t October-2020- vulnerablepopulations-COVID-19.pdf.
3 World Health Organization,“Coronavirus disease(COVID-19)
Globalepidemiological situation,” p.
1. 4 October 2020,
www.who.int/docs/defaultsource/coronaviruse/situationreports/20201005-weekly-epiupdate-8.pdf.
4 UN Women (2020), The impact
of COVID-19 on women’s andmen’s lives and livelihoods in
Europe and Central Asia:
Preliminary results from a Rapid
Gender Assessment, https://eca.
unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2020/07/theimpact-of-covid19-on-womensand-mens-lives-andlivelihoods.
5 Russian Federation, Ministry of
the Interior, Letter as of 15
September 2020 No. 1/10382.
S e e h t t p : / / l e g a l l a b o r. r u /n o r m a t i v n o pravovayabiblioteka/item/353pismo-ministerstvavnutrennikh-del-rf-1-10382.

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JUNE 2021 VOLUME 104

Migrant Workers in Singapore: An Update*
HOME and TWC2

F

rom April 2020, COVID-19
began to affect large
numbers of migrant workers
residing in worker dormitories
in Singapore. Dormitories were
progressively placed under
lockdowns from the beginningof April, affecting all
dormitories by the end of thesame month. Lockdowns were
only partially lifted to enable
workers to return to work in lateAugust 2020, and as of October
2020, have not been fully lifted
even though new positive casesof COVID-19 among migrant
workers have been below
twenty a day for weeks.
Despite a clear provision inlegislation that regardless ofwhether there is actual work forthe foreign employee, theentitlement to salary remains,1
the Singapore government
issued obfuscating advisories
through April and May 2020
that signaled official blessing forthe reduction of salaries.2
While the statements hint atgetting consent from employees
before implementing salary
reductions, in light of the much
lower bargaining power of
migrant workers, claims of
having obtained consent should
be seen as highly questionable.
In any case, Transient Workers
C o u n t To o ( T W C 2 ) a n d
Humanitarian Organisation for
Migration Economics (HOME)
have received many reports
from workers that theiremployers have unilaterally
reduced their salaries or havenot paid anything at all during
the lockdown.
Some advisories issued by theg o v e r n m e n t h av e f u r t h e r
confused the issue of salary
entitlements by linking them tolevy rebates given by thegovernment,3 even when
legislation provides no suchlinkage. Yet, at other times,
government statements
continue to aver that salaries
must be paid to workers,4 which
add to the confusion.
Advisories from the government
also indicated that employers
should pay wages on the basisthat the lockdown period betreated as consumption of theworkers’ medical leavee n t i t l e m e n t , t h u s l e av i n g

6workers without medical leaveshould they later fall ill andneed it.
By contradicting legislation,these statements suggest areluctance on the part of thegovernment to enforce
legislation when it comes tosalary entitlements andrepresent a regression ofprotections for migrant workers.
Freedom of Movement andSocial Rights Decimated in the
Wake of COVID-19
Migrant workers’ freedom of
movement and social rights
were decimated when migrant
worker dormitories were locked
down because of high infection
rates of migrant workers starting
April 2020. Workers werelargely confined to their rooms

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
shared typically by twelve totwenty men with consequently
high risk of cross-infection.
More recently, dorm residents
were allowed to return to work,
albeit under tightly controlled
transport arrangements, but theyremain largely barred fromleaving their dormitories forsocial activities and leisure. The
only exceptions are for medical
treatment and, in theory, anarrow window of only threehours per weekly rest day forgoing to “designated recreation
centers” purpose-built for low
wage workers, though it isenvisaged that the hours will
increase as COVID-19 recedes.
TWC2 found through atelephone survey that, in reality,
very few workers have evenenjoyed the three-hour rest day
window.5 Rest days are assigned
by employers and dorm
residents may not leave theiraccommodation even in thehours after work (e.g., evenings)
if it is not their assigned rest day.
This ban on access to leisureand social activities outside ofdorms has been in effect for six
months and is still largely ineffect as of October 2020.
The power to confine workers
inside dormitories wasformalized when, on 2 June
2020, the government amended
legislation6 to require employers
to confine dorm residents intheir accommodation. Further
amended in September 2020,
the regulations still give thegovernment the power tocontrol when dorm residents
may
leave
their
accommodation, and this isbeing done through a phonebased digital application for“exit passes”.

JUNE 2021 VOLUME 104
The resulting effect is that muchof workers’ freedom of
movement, even to seek
medical help where no priorappointment has beenscheduled, has been placed in
the hands of the government,
their employers or dormitory
operators. It can be very difficultf o r wo r k e r s t o r e a ch t h eauthorities or civil society
organizations for help when
they are physically confined.

Employment Claims Tribunal(ECT) which adjudicates claims.
The filing procedure at the ECT
is formal and labyrinthine,
requiring a high level of legal
literacy. Because filing can only
be done online and in English,d i g i t a l l i t e r a c y, s u i t a b l e
hardware and fluency in English
are needed to accomplish thetask -- none of which would
generally be the case for lowwage migrant workers.

It could be argued that suchdraconian measures are anecessary public health measure;the scientific or epidemiologicalnecessity of this cannot be
assessed by HOME or TWC2.
But the reason for resorting to
sweeping intervention affecting
hundreds of thousands of people
on the basis of their migration
pass status, rather than on
individual health risks, was thefailure of the government to takeeffective action to control thecontagion in migrant workers’
accommodation in the firstplace. The prior policies ofpromoting worker dormitories
that house migrant workers inhigh density accommodation –often twenty men to a room indouble decker bunks – likely
created infection vulnerability.
The workers have paid the pricein terms of their health; andcontinue to pay a price extracted
out of their freedom of
movement, even as the rest ofSingapore began resuming nearnormalcy in early June 2020 after
only eight weeks of lock-down.

Most workers becomecompletely dependent on the
instructions of court or ministry
officers; or, if available, the helpof civil society organizations.
Yet, some workers have reportedt h a t g o v e r n m e n t o f fi c i a l s
discourage them for seeking
help from civil society
organizations.

Employment Claims Tribunal:
Multiple Barriers to MigrantWorkers
Employment disputes,
unresolved at the mediation
stage, are escalated to the7Workers have been stripped ofa g e n c y, a u t o n o m y a n dempowerment to take the caseforward themselves, to choose
their options and to decide
exactly how to proceed. This iscompletely at odds with thesystemic and structural
assumptions of an adversarial
adjudication model.
Not only are proceedings in
English – which disempowers
and disadvantages workers -- asthe ECT has become moreformalized and the procedures
more “document-ized” over the
few years of its operation, theprocess has tilted towards
written submissions. At oral
hearings, interpretation,
however imperfect andinadequate, had been mostly
available, but more and more,
the ECT has been asking for“Hearing statements” in written
form, thus emasculating theFOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
migrant worker andcompromising access to justice.
Decisions of the ECT can only
be appealed to the High Courton two narrow grounds,
namely: if there is a question oflaw, or that the claim is outside
the jurisdiction of the ECT.7 The
former means that where thelaw on an issue is settled law(and therefore there is noquestion of law), even if the ECT
has misapplied the law, noavenue of appeal is available.
TWC2 and HOME have
handled several cases that werestymied by this barrier.8
Poor Enforcement of Court
Orders and Settlement
Agreements
HOME and TWC2 haveencountered many cases wherea migrant worker, even when heor she has in hand a court order
or court-registered settlementagreement, is unable to obtain
payment of the stated amount.9
The Singapore government takes
the view that enforcement ofcourt orders is a private civil
matter. When workers bring to
officials’ attention that court
orders or settlement agreements
remain outstanding, the mostc o m m o n a dv i c e g iv e n t oworkers is to take out a Writ of
Seizure and Sale, a process that
incurs upfront costs with a poor
success rate. For workers who
have been owed salaries andare therefore short of money,
this is an unrealistic course ofaction.
Even when TWC2 has tried,with the aid of pro-bonolawyers, to enforce a
judgement, we have more often
been met with failure rather
than success.10

JUNE 2021 VOLUME 104
A potentially useful provision in
the Employment Act isinsufficiently used. Section
113A of the Act lifts thecorporate veil and makes any
director, partner, chief executive
or any member of the
management of a corporatebody who is responsible forsalaries and payments,
personally liable under the law
for offences committed underthe Act. Penalties include fines
and imprisonment.
Whilst making responsible
persons in a company
personally liable does notdirectly promote the payment ofcourt orders and agreed
settlements, a credible threat ofcriminal prosecution should
motivate accused persons tohonor court orders.
Unfortunately, the vast majorityof salary claims, even whenproved in the ECT, do not attract
prosecution. For example, there
were 1,301 claims heard at the
ECT in 201911 (both migrant
workers and locals) -- with thegreat majority being salary claims– and about 40 percent of cases
resulted in money orders issued
against employers,12 yet in 2019,
there were only nine directors
convicted for failing to pay
salaries.13
The low rate of prosecution
produces a sense of impunity
among delinquent employers
and is likely related to a poor
success rate for workers
collecting on their court orders
and agreed settlements.
On 28 February 2020, thegovernment told Parliament thatthey were “studying
recommendations to streamline
and simplify the enforcement of
judgments and orders.” No8details have yet beenannounced.
*The texts of this article aretaken from the Joint submission
HOME-TWC2 for UPR
Singapore 3rd cycle, http://
twc2.org.sg/wp-content/u p l o a d s / 2 0 2 0 / 1 0 /Joint_UPR_shadow_report_HO
ME-TWC2_2020_v3.pdf,
accessed on 29 September
2020.
The Humanitarian Organisation
for Migration Economics(HOME) was established in
2004 and runs programs to
uphold the rights of migrant
workers in Singapore. Transient
Workers Count Too (TWC2) is an o n - p r o fi t o r g a n i z a t i o nregistered in 2004 with atwofold mission: to assist
migrant workers in difficulty andto advocate for better policies.
For further information, pleasecontact: Transient Workers
Count Too, 5001 Beach Road,#09-86, Golden Mile Complex,
SINGAPORE 199588; ph +65
6247
7001;
email:info@twc2.org.sg; https://
twc2.org.sg.

Endnotes
1 Employment of Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations 2012, Fourth Schedule,Part III, paragraphs 4, 4A, 4B,
4C and 4D
2 TWC2, 13 April 2020, “COVID19: Media Statement,” 13 April
2020 (longer version).
3 TWC2, 4 May 2020, “Manpower Ministry’s advisory on
circuit breaker still unclear,”(Continued on page 12)

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JUNE 2021 VOLUME 104

Kalash Community Under Threat
Sayed Gul Kalash

The Kalashas comprise an
indigenous community
living in the three small valleys
of Biriu (Birir), Rukmo (Rambor)
and Mumorete (Bumborate) in
the District Lower Chitral,
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provinceof Pakistan.
The Kalashas have a uniqueculture of their own, and areconsidered to have one of theoldest living cultures in theworld. They speak an ancient
form of Indo-European Dardic
language. They have a richtradition of folklore, epics, lovesongs,
andidiomsdemonstrating a high standardof indigenous experience.
Theories on Origin
There are two main theories
regarding the origin of theK a l a s h c o m m u n i t y. S o m ehistorians consider them to be
the descendants of troops ofAlexander the Great who cameto an area that is now part of
Afghanistan and Pakistan in 327
B.C. They say that some Greek
cultural elements can partly be
identified in Kalash culture; thesports and games in Nuristan(wrestling and shot-put, etc.) for
example were supposedly
practiced in the ancient
Olympics. It is believed that the
Greeks influenced their music.
But there is no conclusive
evidence to support theAlexander the Great theory.

Archaeological investigation ofancient graves in Parwak (Upper
Chitral) as well as in
Gankoriniotek Singoor (Lower
Chitral) revealed remains of
Indo-Aryans. The radiocarbon
dating of the bone samples
collected from these sites ranges
from 1,000 BCE to 1,000 CE.
With the burial traditions of the
Indo-Aryans being practiced by
the Kalashas, some of thearchaeologists consider the
Kalashas to be Indo-Aryan
descendants.
Both theories are promoted by
the nonlocal writers and are
based on archaeological andethnological remains. None ofthese writers have ever tried toknow the perception of thelocal community about its
origin.

9Although the early history of the
Kalashas is covered in mystery,the oral traditions andarchaeological excavations
carried out in the region are
helping to shed light on theorigin of these unique people.
Kalash Culture and Traditions
The Kalashas have no daily
prayers like those in Islam andother religions. But they pray
and perform rituals throughtheir festivals. The frequency inholding these festivals made theKalashas become known as thehappiest people in the world.
They celebrate each and every
occasion in their daily life.
There are more than thirty
community festivals throughout
the year. In addition, there are
more than a dozen annual clan
and family feasts and ritualFOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
celebrations (for birth, death,marriage) and other familyc e l e b r a t i o n s . Th e a n n u a lcalendar is always full; anactivity is held every few days.
The most famous major festivals
are Chowmos, winter festival (8to 22 December each year),
Joshi Spring Festival (13 to 17May), Uchao Summer Festival(20 to 22 August) and Phoo
Festival in mid-autumn.
There are also other customs
and traditions that are no longer
existing due to rising cost ofliving (preventing the poor
Kalashas from practicing them)and lack of keen interest of the
new generation of Kalashas inthem. Gandao (celebrated toremember the death of amember of the family)
disappeared since 1993, Dur
Neweshi (celebrating a newhouse), and Sariyak (giving
honor to the marriage of adaughter and niece) are nolonger celebrated.

JUNE 2021 VOLUME 104
of Kalash culture incollaboration with the
Directorate of Archaeology andMuseums of the Government of
K hy b e r Pa k h t u n k h wa . Th e
acquisition of land for Kalash
festivals and graveyards has
already been processed.
Kalash Economy andGovernance
The Kalash community mainly
depends on forest resources,
raising animals and farming forlivelihood. Modernization has
become part of the Kalash
economy and the Kalashas aren ow e n g a g e d i n t o u r i s m ,managing hotels, doing small
businesses, employed ingovernment offices, etc.
The traditional Kalash
community leadership issomehow effective. Recently,
more than sixty male andfemale Qazis (community

Th e f o l l ow i n g c u s t o m s ,traditions and rituals are nolonger practiced due to lack ofinterest: Dewaka (sacrifice tothe fairies); Basun Marat (springs a c r i fi c e ) ; K i s h s a r a z(purification for cultivation);
Istom saraz (purification for goatmilk) and Kirik pushik (firstflower celebration).
Government Support
The Pakistani government has
been supporting the Kalash
community and is very
concerned about the protection
and preservation of Kalash
culture. Since 2018, thep r ov i n c i a l g ove r n m e n t o f
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa allotted
600,000 Rupees (around 4,000
US dollars) for the preservation

10

Judges) have been performing
their part though they use thegovernance structure under the
Pakistan local government
system.
Kalash Women
Kalash women still exercise
their traditional freedom ofchoosing and divorcing theirhusbands. They also freely
discuss issues in the community
such as the bashali system(segregating women who havemenstrual period), marriage andtourism activities (including
behavior of tourists that intrude
into their privacy). In case they
have a business, the womentake part in its operations. They
also play leading roles inreligious activities.
These, however, are the only
freedoms that they enjoy. Kalash
women have restrictions, similar
to those in other societies. In

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
education, if the parents could
afford to educate only one
child, they would educate theirson not their girl child. In thefamily, girls are always being
discouraged, never appreciatedfor their work. The home is theworkplace of the girls. They arealways judged by thecommunity on what they wear
and what they do. In casesomething wrong happens, thegirls are blamed. People say thatthe girls might have done
something wrong that caused
the problem.
Threats to Kalash Community
One threat to the existence ofthe Kalash community comes in
the form of “development”
brought by people outside thecommunity.
As aptly expressed by MaureenLines,
well-known
conservationist and adopted
member of the Kalash
community (known as Bibi Dow
in the community): “it's not the
Taliban that are going to ‘kill off’
the Kalasha, rather developmentin the ‘name of progress.’” 1
A report in Dawn newspaper
explains
In other words, ‘tourism notterrorism’ is the biggest threat
to the Kalasha.
The fascination around thetribe has often centered aroundtheir rumoured ancestral links
to Alexander the Great, theirpagan lifestyle and the fact thatthey produce their own wine in
the deeply conservative frontier
regions. Their vibrant dress,
I n d o - A r ya n f e a t u r e s a n dhypnotic ritual dances havealso added to the pull of

JUNE 2021 VOLUME 104
tourists to Chitral and theKalash valley.
Thus, when militants
threatened this somewhat
mysterious tribe, there wasm u c h m e d i a h y p e . Ye t ,amongst the ‘save the Kalasha’clamour that followed, a vital
aspect was missing from [the]discourse – the land rights of
the Kalasha and the issue of
their displacement due toincreased deforestation which
is robbing them of theirsustenance.
“All this worry of the Taliban,
the real threat is the land
problem,” says Lines. She goeson to add that hotels are taking
up scenic land and illegal
logging is leaving the areasusceptible to flooding.

The Kalash community sufferedfrom flooding in 2015 that
destroyed many houses andinfrastructures including theschool building.
N o n - K a l a s h a p e o p l e h ave
started constructing
infrastructures such as modernbuildings in the region thatslowly change the beauty andstructure of the Kalash
environment. There are also
incursions by non-Kalasha
people on the land and forestsin the Bomborate valley. The
K a l a s h a s h ave l o n g b e e nfighting the elite Royal Family toprotect their forests. Loss of theforests would mean loss ofeverything.
The Kalashas number around
4,000 at present. In a region
with a total population of
10,000, the Kalashas constitutea minority in their own place.
Though there is no single reason
for the declining of populationof the Kalash community, three11

m a j o r r e a s o n s h ave b e e nidentified: conversion to otherreligion; death; and birthcontrol (which has just started
and not that much prominent insome ways).
Poor Kalashas may convert toanother religion because theycannot afford holding culturaland traditional activities.
Modernization is also a threat tothe Kalash culture. Electronic,
print, and social media and theinsensitivity of tourism affect the
Kalash culture. The education
system is also silently killing the
Kalash culture.
Survival of the Kalash
Community
Preserving Kalash culture is very
difficult. We can preserve thetangible culture somehow but
not intangible culture.
Preserving one’s way of thinking
is not easy.
Anyhow, in my view, education
is more important and Kalash
language and culture must betaught in schools. In this way,
Kalash children can understandtheir own cultural values andfeel proud of themselves as
Kalashas.
I also think that a profound lackof education has kept mycommunity “backward” and thepeople unaware of their rights.2
There are challenges, however.
There is a lack of Kalasha
teachers and not all Kalasha
children are in school. Many
Kalasha children leave school
after the 7th or 8th grade. There
are many reasons for thisincluding marriage at a young
age. There is currently nomarriage law or rules andFOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
regulations for the community
regarding marriage. And theminimum age for marriage is
not set.
Secondly, making the Kalashas
economically strong isnecessary. Sustainable tourism ismost important to the Kalashas
to generate income for the area.
In this case, tourism should be
run by Kalashas and supportiveof their culture.
In 2013, when the Taliban threat
was exposed in the Dawn
newspaper, there were Muslims
who stepped forward to support
the Kalash community.

JUNE 2021 VOLUME 104
compassion make a peacefule n v i r o n m e n t . Pe a c e a n dharmony among the Kalashas
and the Muslims in the region
remain exemplary, a model for
the world.
It is necessary to mention how
the 3,000 year-old ancient
Kalasha culture has survived.
And much of the history of thisculture is still to be discovered.
Kalashas lived an isolated life
for a long time until tourism andglobal networking highlighted
them. The Kalashas need to finda way to minimize the effect of
tourism and global attention on
their culture.

In my observation, interfaitheducation in the region is very
important. I must say that weare living in peace because ofinterfaith harmony. Hate speech
can never be erased by counterhate speech, only love and

I am really concerned andalarmed at the situation. I am
not sure about Kalashas’ future.
Many Kalashas think the sameway. May God bless us while
hoping for the best.

Migrant Workers in Singapore:
An Update-fromdorms/, accessed on 30
September 2020.
Employment of Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations 2012, Fourth Schedule,Part III, paragraphs A, 2B and
2C.
Employment Claims Act, section
23(1).
TWC2, 25 June 2020, “Tribunal
makes two errors in Liakat’s salaryclaim,”
http://twc2.org.sg/2020/06/25/tri
bunal-makes-two-errors-in-liaka
ts-salary-claim/, accessed on 30
September 2020.
TWC2, 5 September 2019,“Straits Times Forum: Bosses offoreign workers ignore court
orders to pay up,”
http://twc2.org.sg/2019/09/05/st
raits-times-forum-bosses-of-forei
gn-workers-ignore-court-ordersto-pay-up/, accessed on 5 October 2020.

(Continued from page 8)

http://twc2.org.sg/2020/05/04/m
anpower-ministrys-advisory-oncircuit-breaker-still-unclear/ accessed on 29 September 2020.
4 TWC2, 22 August 2020, “Doesone minister even know what
another minister is doing?,”
http://twc2.org.sg/2020/08/22/d
oes-one-minister-even-know-wh
at-another-minister-is-doing/,
accessed on 29 September
2020.
5 TWC2, 17 September 2020.
“Research finding: Only a handful of workers have had restd ay s o u t f r o m d o r m s ,”http://twc2.org.sg/2020/09/17/research-finding-only-a-handful-of-workers-have-had-rest-days-out

6

7
8

9

12

Sayed Gul Kalash, a member ofthe Kalash community, is anarchaeologist working on theworld heritage site in Taxila
under the Directorate ofArchaeology and Museums
Government of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa.
For further information, pleasecontact Sayed Gul Kalash,gulkalash@yahoo.com.

Endnotes
1 “Embrace of the Kalasha,”Dawn, 20 May 2014, https://w w w. d a w n . c o m / i n - d e p t h /kalash/.
2 See also “Embrace of the
Kalasha," ibid.

10 TWC2, 17 June 2018, “Whencourt orders are worthless: theZach Engineering case”.
http://twc2.org.sg/2018/06/17/w
hen-court-orders-are-worthless-t
he-zach-engineering-case/, accessed on 5 October 2020.
11 State Courts Annual Report
2019, page 82.
12 Parliamentary reply by the Minister for Manpower Josephine Teo
to Member of Parliament Walter
Theseira on 18 February 2020,
as reported in the Hansard,
https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/spr
s3topic?reportid=writtenanswer5732, accessed on 10 October
2020.
13 Ministry of Manpower webpage: “Employers convictedunder the Employment Act”.
https://www.mom.gov.sg/emplo
yment-practices/employers-conv
icted-under-employment-act#/,
accessed on 10 October 2020.

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC

JUNE 2021 VOLUME 104

Chosen-seki as Stateless Residents:
Is Their Social Integration in Japan Possible?
Soo im LeeO

ld-timer Koreans in Japanare descendants ofcolonial-era migrants who
moved from Korea to Japan1
during the first half of thet w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y. T h e yconstitute one of the largest
postcolonial populations whose
civic rights and direct
participation in the society havebeen blocked due to the“nationality clause” and theirstatus as foreign residents.
Of the total number offoreigners living in Japan(almost three million as of June2019), Korean residents in Japan(commonly termed the Zainichi
Koreans) constitute the second
largest foreigner group after the
Chinese. Of the total number(309,282) of special permanent
residents (the former colonialsubjects and their descendants),
278,465 have South Koreannationality and 27,150 are
called Chosen-seki residents.
Chosen is their geographicalorigin as a substitute fornationality, and Chosen-seki is alegal status assigned by theJapanese government to ethnic
Koreans in Japan who neither
have Japanese nor Koreannationality.
Zainichi Koreans in Japan are
divided into two distinct ethnicorganizations. Those who are
pro-Pyongyang and those who
do not want to take either sideof the divided nation (North orSouth Korea) belong to theGeneral Association of Korean
Residents Union in Japan(Japanese: Chosen-Soren;
Korean: Chongryun). Those with
South Korean nationality andthose who are naturalized
Japanese citizens belong to the
Korean Residents Union in
Japan (Japanese: Mindan). These
organizations have provided
indispensable support to ethnic
Koreans living and working inJapan who lacked legal
protection. They were especially
important for first-generation
Koreans who were not eligiblet o r e c e ive s o c i a l w e l f a r ebenefits from the Japanese
government.
Revocation of Japanese
Nationality
Few Japanese know orunderstand that these old-timers
were once forced to take up
Japanese nationality during theperiod when the Japaneseimperial government ruled
Korea as a colony from 1911 to
1945. But just before Japan
ratified the San Francisco Peace
Treaty with the US and theAllied Powers, the former
colonial subjects were deprivedof suffrage rights, and then the
revocation of their Japanesenationality followed. Since then,
Koreans in Japan were placed
under the Alien Registration
Law. In summary, Koreans weretreated as second class citizens

13during the colonial period andeven the basic rights they had asJapanese nationals werewithdrawn in 1952.
Discrimination
The plight of Zainichi Koreanshas been described as “Japan’s
hidden apartheid” by Hicks(1998). During the period of
U.S. occupation of Japan,
General Douglas MacArthur
received instructions from the
U.S. government to designate
Koreans as either “liberated
nationals” or “enemy nationals.”
The Alien Registration Law(enacted on 2 May 1947, Edict
No. 207) had Clause 11 thatprovided for “Koreansdesignated by the Ministry ofJustice, as well as Taiwanese, tobe considered foreigners for thetime being.” As a result, former
colonial subjects with limited
Japanese citizenship wereregistered as foreigners andwere obligated to carry at all
times an alien registration
document; which had the word
“Korean/Chosen/朝鮮” without
stating it officially as nationality.
This resulted in a vague legal
status for the former colonialsubjects and their descendants.
Foreigners suffered numerous
discriminatory measures underthe Alien Registration Law.
When this law was repealed in2012, the new Basic Resident
Registration Act was supposed

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
to treat foreign residents equal
to the Japanese nationals. In
reality, foreign residents are still
the target of discrimination.
Zainichi Koreans as Special
Permanent Residents
The 1965 Treaty on Basic
Relations between Japan andthe Republic of Korea led to theJ a p a n - Ko r e a L e g a l S t a t u sAgreement of the same year.
Under this agreement, Koreans
who chose the Republic ofKorea as their country were
granted “permanent residence”
s t a t u s . Th e g r o u n d s f o rdeportation have been
considerably eased comparedwith those for other foreign
nationals. The qualification topermanently reside in Japan canbe inherited until the second
generation, while the status of
the third generation and beyond
was scheduled for discussion
after twenty-five years. Those
who did not choose theRepublic of Korea as theircountry remained stateless since
relations between Japan and the
Democratic People's Republicof Korea (DPRK) had not beenformally established.
On 1 November 1991, theJapanese government granted
the “former colonial subjects
and their descendants” with“special permanent resident/特別永住者” status. This is basedon the Special Act on
Immigration Control for those
who have relinquished Japanese
Nationality pursuant to the San
Francisco Peace Treaty withJapan (1991, Act No. 71) / 日本
国との平和条約に基づき日本の国籍を離脱した者2 等の出入国管理に関する特例法（平成３年
法律第71号）.” The Japaneseprovision “離脱したもの/

JUNE 2021 VOLUME 104
Ridatsu shitamono” that means“relinquished their nationality
voluntarily,” does not reflect thereality that the nationality of thecolonial subjects was revokedby the Japanese. This law
lumped together the pro-South
Korea Koreans, pro-Pyongyang
Koreans, and Taiwanese who
were once Japanese nationals
and granted them special
permanent residence permits.
The Zainichi community is
rapidly aging, like the rest ofJapanese society and it might
disappear before the status of
Zainichi Koreans becomes
legally stable. Moreover, about
9 , 0 0 0 Ko r e a n s a p p l y f o r
Japanese citizenship throughnaturalization annually. The
number of marriages between
Koreans and Japanese has
increased as well, with morethan 80 percent of Korean youth
marrying Japanese. Under thecurrent nationality law based on
jus sanguinis principle, children
obtain the citizenship of their
Japanese parent(s). See theauthor’s discussion of this issue
i n h e r b o o k D e p r ive d o fJapanese Nationality Zainichi
Koreans; the Dawn of Japan’s
Immigration Policy (2021, inJapanese).
Are Children Political Tools?
Despite the Koreans’ highdegree of social and cultural
assimilation into the Japanesesociety, the Chosen-seki Koreans
try to maintain their own culture
and language by maintaining
their own ethnic schools called
Korean ethnic schools.
Several well-publicizede x a m p l e s o f h a t e s p e e chtargeting these Korean ethnic
schools have been recorded. In

14

Deprived of Japanese Nationality
Zainichi Koreans; the Dawn ofJapanʼs Immigration Policy– Soo im Lee (2021)

December 2009, January 2010,
and March 2010, anti-Korean
activists staged threedemonstrations chanting
a b u s iv e s l o g a n s , s u ch a s“ c h i l d r e n o f s p i e s ,” v i aloudspeakers against a Korean
primary school in Kyoto. They
claimed that the school illegallyused a nearby park as aplayground for more than fifty
years. The school did in fact use
the park, but with permission
from Kyoto City and the local
residents’ association. After the
rallies, the ultra-rightists
uploaded videos of thedemonstrations online. Since
the demonstrations and thesocial media posting of theincidents severely traumatized
the students, teachers, andparents, the school filed alawsuit in 2010. The lower court
ruled in its favor.
On appeal, the Supreme Court
upheld the lower court decisionin December 2014, andFOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
dismissed the appeal of theultra-rightist activists. The
Supreme Court ordered thelatter to pay some twelve
million Yen in damages to theschool and banned them fromdemonstrating in the vicinity
again. It was an epoch-making
ruling since the Supreme Court
determined that the ultra-rightistgroup’s activities constituted“racial discrimination” asdefined by the International
Convention on the Eliminationo f A l l Fo r m s o f R a c i a l
Discrimination.3
Korean ethnic schools, whicha r e d e fi n e d a s p r i v a t e
miscellaneous (kakushu)
schools, are legally entitled tostate and local government
subsidies. In fact, a number of
local governments provide
subsidies, albeit in small
amounts, to Korean schools. But
the national government does
not offer subsidy of any kind.
In April 2010, the “Tuition
support for high school
students” system was launchedunder the administration of the
Democratic Party of Japan. In
addition to the “Ichijo School/１
条校” stipulated in Article 1 of
the School Education Law, it
was an epoch-making systemthat also covered specialized
training colleges andmiscellaneous schools forforeigners. On 24 November
2010, however, Prime Minister
Naoto Kan ordered the“freezing” of the processing of
the application for subsidy by a
Korean ethnic school, Chosun
High School, following North
Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong
Island in South Korea. In
September 2011, the freeze waslifted, but the Democratic Partyof Japan administration

JUNE 2021 VOLUME 104
postponed the continuation of
application processing until thesecond Shinzo Abeadministration (December 2012)
excluded the Korean ethnic highschools from getting tuition
support for high school students.
The Minister of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science andTe c h n o l o g y, H a k u b u n
Shimomura, remarked at a press
conference on 28 December
2020 that “the lack of progresson the abduction issue, theclose relationship between
C h o n g r yo n ( Ko r e a n ) a n d
Chosen Soren (Japanese: 朝鮮総連) and its impact on thecontent of education, personnel,
and finances … led us to repeal
the legal provisions that form
the basis for the [processing ofsubsidy application] of Korean
schools.” Citation of “lack ofprogress on the abduction
issue” as one reason for the
exclusion of Korean ethnic
schools symbolizes the reality inJapan. In other words, the coreof the problem is that Japan’s
political and diplomatic policies
infringe on students’ right tolearn. In Japan, Korea bashingseems to cover everything.
Chosen-seki children study
together with South Koreans andJapanese nationals in Korean
ethnic schools. These children
are the fourth generation oreven the fifth generation offormer Japanese colonialsubjects. Very little progress has
been made and it is still unclear
when these Korean
communities will be treatedequally in Japanese society.
References
Soo im Lee (2021). Deprived ofJapanese Nationality Zainichi

15

Koreans; the Dawn of Japan’s
Immigration Policy (『剥奪された在日コリアンの日本国籍、日本の移民政策の幕開け』),
Tokyo: Akashi Shoten.
Hicks, George. (1998). Japan’sHidden Apartheid: The Korean
Minority and the Japanese.
B u r l i n g t o n , V T: A s h g a t e
Publishing.
Soo im Lee is a Professor
Emeritus of Ryukoku University.
For further information, pleasecontact: Soo im Lee, Ryukoku
University, 67 Tsukamotocho,
F u s h i m i - k u , Ky o t o , J a p a n612-8577;
e-mail:lee@biz.ryukoku.ac.jp,
sooimlee0202@gmail.com;
www.biz.ryukoku.ac.jp/~lee/.

Endnotes
1 Koreans in Japan are referred toas oldcomer foreigners incontrast to newcomer
immigrants who came to Japanin post-1980.
2 The underlined emphasis isadded by the author.
3 Kyodo, "Top court finalizes
ruling against anti-Koreangroup's hate speech," The Japan
Times, 11 December 2014,www.japantimes.co.jp/news/
2014/12/11/national/socialissues/top-court-finalizes-rulinganti-korean-groups-hatespeech/.

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