Opera&onal Earthquake Forecas&ng inJapan: A Study of Municipal Government
Planning for an Earthquake Advisory or
Warning in the Nankai Region

A Collabora)ve Project of the Disaster Preven)on Research ins)tute, Kyoto
University and the Natural Hazards Center, University of Colorado, Boulder

Funded by the US – Japan Founda)on and the Japan Society for the Promo)onof Science
April, 2023

Operational Earthquake Forecasting in Japan: A Study of Municipal Government
Planning for an Earthquake Advisory or Warning in the Nankai Region
Table of Contents
Title Page, Abstract and Key Words

1

I.

Introduction

3

II.

Operational Earthquake Forecasting (OEF)
in Theory and Practice

6

III.

OEF in the Nankai Region: Our Study Objectives

8

IV.

Methods of Study

13

V.

Findings

15

Factors Associated with Having a Plan
Jurisdiction Type
Population Size
Disaster Management Department
Size of Disaster Management Department
Concerns Expressed Regarding Planning for SEWI
Analysis by Relative Hazard
Exceptional Planning
Prefectural Leadership and Jurisdictional Planning
Summary of Factors in Having or Not Having Plans
Specific Components of SEWI plans

24

Hierarchical Cluster Analysis of “Divided” Plans

30

VI.

Discussion

32

VII.

Conclusions and Planned Interventions

34

VIII. Limitations of the Study

37

IX.

References

37

X.

Appendix40

1Operational Earthquake Forecasting in Japan: A Study of Municipal Government
Planning for an Earthquake Advisory or Warning in the Nankai Region

A Report to the US-Japan Foundation and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science

James D. Goltz, Katsuya Yamori, Hideyuki Shiroshita, Yu Matsubara, Takashi Sugiyama andKazuya Nakayachi

Abstract
A team of social scientists from the US and Japan have conducted a study exploring theextent to which municipal governments in Japan including prefectures, cities, towns and villages
have developed plans for response to an operational earthquake forecast (OEF) from the Japan
Meteorological Agency (JMA) indicating that seismic activity in the Nankai Trough region has
elevated the short-term probability that a major and possibly tsunami-genic earthquake may
occur. Employing both survey research and in-depth interviews, our team explored various
aspects of the science behind the alerting system, guidance from the national government ofJapan, planning by local jurisdictions and other aspects of the planning environment focused ona possible future Nankai Trough major earthquake. The survey included questions regarding
actual planning actions that might have been included in a response plan for receipt of “special
earthquake warning information (SEWI)” as well as questions regarding challenges in the planning
process, expectations that an earthquake would follow the issuance of an alert and whether
planning would reduce the number of fatalities and injuries if the earthquake occurs during thealerting period. We also conducted in-depth interviews that explored the scientific basis for thealerting system, sought insights from those who had conducted previous studies of local planningand asked working disaster managers in the Nankai region what they had done to plan and if
plans had not been developed, the reasons for not planning. Our survey netted 469 responses
from a total of 736 jurisdictions included by the Japanese government in the Nankai region, bothprefectures and municipal governments, a response rate of 63%. We conducted a total of 17 indepth interviews. In general, we found that a majority of jurisdictions have response plans forreceipt of an alert from the JMA; however, the plans lacked a number of planning elements
considered important from a disaster management perspective. In addition, many smaller
jurisdictions lacked the staffing, resources and guidance to form comprehensive response plans.
Our report identifies both the strengths and weaknesses of existing plans and outlines a programfor improving planning in the region.
Key Words: Operational earthquake forecasting, Nankai region, municipal government, special
earthquake warning information (SEWI)

2

I.

Introduction

At first glance, one might point to the catastrophic March 11, 2011 Great East Japan
Earthquake and Tsunami which caused 18,000 fatalities and a major nuclear accident at
Fukushima and conclude that the current effort to identify precursory seismic activity in advanceof a possible similar event in the Nankai region is a direct result of the 2011 catastrophe. But thisconclusion would fail to consider the history of scientific efforts to forecast major earthquake
events in Japan which date back to the mid-1970’s. It was during the decade of the 1970’s that
optimism emerged that scientists would soon predict earthquakes, that is, issue statements on aroutine basis identifying the time, location, and magnitude of a future earthquake with arelatively high level of accuracy. This optimism stemmed to a large degree from an apparent
successful intermediate and short-term prediction in China for a magnitude 7.3 earthquake thatstruck the Haicheng area (Liaoning Province) on February 4, 1975. The Haicheng earthquake
prediction was the first successful scientific forecast that was followed by an evacuation ofresidential buildings credited with saving thousands of lives. Subsequent earthquake prediction
failures in China and elsewhere dampened but failed to extinguish attempts to forecast futureearthquake occurrences (Bolt, 2006; Hough, 2016)
In Japan, an early attempt to predict an earthquake focused on the Tokai region. The
region has a long history of major earthquakes the most recent of which are the 1707 Hoei
magnitude 8.6 event and two earthquakes in 1854, the Ansei Tokai and Ansei Nankai earthquakes,
both magnitude 8.4 events which occurred 32 hours apart (Matsu’ura, 2017). Based on thehistory of large magnitude earthquakes in the Tokai region, seismologists placed the average
recurrence interval at approximately 120 years. Thus, the Tokai region, an area of central Japan
along the Pacific Coast between Nagoya and Tokyo, became the focal area for prediction of amajor earthquake. The scientific effort to accurately predict the next Tokai earthquake wasaccompanied by legislation identifying how the national government would respond should
precursory seismic activity warrant a short-term warning for the region (Rikitake, 1979).
The Large-Scale Earthquake Countermeasures Act of 1978 passed during the 84th sessionof the Japanese Diet in June 1978 and was enacted in December of the same year. The Act has
as its objective the mitigation of earthquake hazards in the Tokai region (Rikitake, 1979) which
was to be designated “an area under intense measures against earthquake disaster” (p. 553).
These measures included a dense monitoring network including sea bottom seismographs,
tiltmeters, volume strainmeters, tide gauges, and instruments for monitoring groundwater level
and radon contents. If this network revealed anomalies believed to be consistent with theimminent occurrence of a major earthquake, as assessed by the Prediction Council (asuborganization of the Coordinating Committee for Earthquake Prediction), a warning would be
conveyed to the Prime Minister via the Director General of the JMA. Upon receiving such awarning, the Prime Minister could exercise emergency powers granted by the Countermeasures
Act to initiate actions that would mitigate the hazards that a major earthquake in this heavily
populated region would pose (Goltz and Roeloffs, 2020).

3

These actions included the creation of a Central Disaster Prevention Council that would
be chaired by the Prime Minister and formulate a basic response plan for the period of thewarning, which though unspecified in the legislation, was “short-term” encompassing “several
hours to a few days” (Rikitake, 1979, p.555). Also mandated to develop response plans wereprefectures, municipal governments and organizations of the private sector including hospitals,
bus and rail transportation companies, refineries, hotels and department stores. The
Countermeasures Act gave the Prime Minister emergency powers that included mobilization of
the Self Defense Forces and their deployment in the region prior to the predicted earthquake.
Emergency powers were also extended to prefectural and municipal governments allowing themto order suspensions of rail and oil refinery operations, regulate highway traffic and utilize
privately held resources for emergency use. In the ensuing 43 years since the act was
implemented, an earthquake emergency that would have caused these measures to be invoked
has not occurred.
The spirit of optimism regarding earthquake prediction was not universally shared
among seismologists of the time and the Large-Scale Earthquake Countermeasures Act, with its
assumed high probability that precursory seismic activity would be followed by a major
earthquake and the extensive interventions it facilitated, were controversial from the
beginning. An editorial in the Japan Times (2016) that examined the history of the act and thecontroversy that followed recalled that the National Land Agency which at the time theCountermeasures Act was passed had responsibility for disaster prevention, was reluctant toimplement the law due to a lack of scientific consensus that accurate short-term predictions
could be made with confidence, certainly with the confidence implied in the Act. The mostoutspoken critic of the Act and the Tokai prediction has been seismologist Robert Geller, ofTokyo University who in an April 2011 issue of Nature argued “it is time to tell the public franklythat earthquakes cannot be predicted, to scrap the Tokai prediction system and to repeal the
LECA (Large-Scale Earthquake Countermeasures Act)” (Geller, 2011, p. 409). Geller further
argued that the characteristic earthquake model and the seismic gap hypothesis that were thebasis for the prediction had failed to identify the source zones of most large earthquakes that
had occurred after the Act was passed, including the Great East Japan Earthquake of March2011 which was regarded as having a low probability of generating a huge tsunami-genic
earthquake (Geller, 2011).
Criticism of the Countermeasures Act, including intense scientific criticism, did not result
in revision or repeal of the legislation, though growing concern about the hazard posed along theentire length of the subduction zone (Japan Trough) off the Pacific Coast of Japan increased after
2000. In 2002 the Japanese Diet passed the Act on Special Measures for Promotion of Tonankai
and Nankai Earthquake Disaster Management (see Figure 1 for this region) a law that gave thePrime Minister the power to designate “countermeasures promotion areas” within which
disaster prevention measures must be implemented including mandating the development ofearthquake disaster response plans by local governments in the extended region due tosignificant risk of major earthquakes in the Tonankai and Nankai regions (Umeda, 2013; Japan
Times, 2017). Acknowledging the scientific inability to make high probability forecasts, additional
legislation and public policy required enhanced seismic monitoring in these regions, but set aside
4

the declarations and aggressive response measures contained in the Large-Scale Earthquake
Countermeasures Act of 1978.
Figure 1: Tokai, Tonankai and Nankai Regions of the Nankai TroughSource: Japan Agency for marine-Earth Science and technology(https://www.jamstec.go.jp/donet/rendou/en/about/index.html)

The Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of March 11, 2011, which occurred in thenorthern portion of the Japan Trough, reinforced an existing seismological assessment that the
subduction zone along the entire length of the Pacific Coast of Japan presented a major risk oflarge magnitude tsunami-genic earthquakes. This risk assessment combined with anunderstanding that short-term high probability forecasts were not possible, created a dilemma
for both scientists at the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) and local jurisdictions in the Nankai
region where the long-term forecast for a major earthquake was estimated to be 70-80% in thenext 30 years. It must be noted that the provisions and measures including the emergency
powers available to the Prime Minister under the 1978 Act were never modified or suspended;however, it is unlikely that these powers and measures would be invoked based on potential
precursory seismic activity in the Nankai region. In summary, we can conceptualize the current
status of anticipating earthquake occurrences in Japan as a gradual transition from a bold
earthquake prediction for a specific region to an extension of the zone of concern to the southof Tokai and a more nuanced and cautious approach to response to possible earthquake
precursors. This approach is consistent with what seismologists now define as operational
earthquake forecasting.

II.

Operational Earthquake Forecasting (OEF) in Theory and Practice

While acknowledging that accurate short-term earthquake prediction is not possible
based on current scientific understanding of the earthquake rupture process, a group ofseismologists following the L’Aquila, Italy earthquake of April 6, 2009 convened an international
commission to discuss how potentially precursory seismic activity could be handled from a public

5risk communication perspective. That is, if earthquake activity such as earthquake swarms (theoccurrence of small to moderate size earthquakes in a relatively confined space time window),
somewhat larger earthquakes in areas known to have experienced large damaging earthquakes
in the past or anomalous changes in measured crustal activity (e.g., slow slip events) occur, theprobability of large earthquakes may increase over a short period of a few days. As explained byseismologist Thomas Jordan, “the probability of large earthquakes in a region known to beseismically active is not constant, but varies over time based on the occurrence of seismic activity
in that region” (Jordan et al., 2014, p. 955). Thus, operational earthquake forecasting has been
defined as involving two key activities: “the continual updating of authoritative information about
the future occurrence of potentially damaging earthquakes, and the officially sanctioned
dissemination of this information to enhance earthquake preparedness in threatenedcommunities” (Jordan et al., 2011). OEF can be examined from the standpoints of both scienceand practice.
From a scientific perspective, proponents of OEF distinguish between a prediction as “adeterministic statement that a future earthquake will or will not occur in a particular geographic
region, time window, and magnitude range” from a forecast which “gives a probability (greaterthan zero but less than one) that such an event will occur” (Jordan, et al., 2011, p. 319). Theseauthors further note that over days and weeks, earthquake sequences show clustering in timeand space, for example, the occurrence of aftershocks following large events. This clustering canbe used to formulate forecasts that account for changing earthquake probabilities in the shortterm. While the value of long-term forecasting for seismic safety is well established, short-term
forecasts are problematic in that earthquake probabilities “may vary over orders of magnitude,but (are) typically low in an absolute sense (<1% per day)” (op cit., p.319). There are many
phenomena that have been proposed as precursory to earthquakes including earthquakes thatlater prove to be foreshocks to large events, slow slip events (episodic tremor and slip), strain
rate, seismic velocity and electrical conductivity changes, radon emissions, electro-magnetic
signals, thermal anomalies and even unusual animal behavior (Jordan et al., 2011). Models
employed to forecast earthquakes also vary, but models based on earthquake clustering andstatistical seismology seem to be the most robust at present (Jordan et al., 2011).
From a practical perspective, there has been a debate in the seismological literature(Jordan, 2013; Jordan et al., 2014; Wang and Rogers; 2015) about whether changes in regional
seismic activity, including measured changes in the absence of earthquakes, justify publicannouncements of enhanced short term seismic risk. This debate has centered around threebasic questions: can large earthquakes be forecast with short term probabilities high enough to
be useful in promoting seismic safety; how can forecasts be used by government entities topromote seismic safety; and, how best to communicate information on short-term enhanced
seismic risk to the public? (Jordan et al., 2010). Critics contend that the probabilities, in the shortterm of a few days, are too low for serious levels of hazard mitigation (e.g., vacating seismicallyvulnerable structures), that OEFs should not be employed by governmental agencies except as
aftershock forecasts and that the risk of adverse public reactions do not justify releasing forecasts
to the public (Wang and Rogers, 2015).

6

Proponents of OEF have responded to this critique first by noting that short-term
forecasts are not intended to be stand alone products, but one component for guiding mitigation
actions based on scientific information regarding earthquake risk. More specifically, OEF critics
have focused on more costly and aggressive measures like evacuating vulnerable structures as
tests of OEF usefulness, when a range of far less disruptive measures that would potentially save
lives and prevent serious property damage are available to disaster planners. OEF proponents
respond to critic’s concern with adverse societal response to short-term low probability forecasts
as reflecting a poor understanding of human behavior in crisis. Proponents cite social science
research indicating that people in hazard situations do not panic, but respond in a rational andadaptive manner (Clarke, 2002). Jordan et al. (2014) note that a conceit among disaster experts(and we would add some government officials) is that people fail to understand and will
misinterpret probabilistic forecasts; however, social science research has shown that people inresponse to hazard warnings need, and will seek out consistent, authoritative information on
potential hazards (Mileti and DeRoeum, 1995). This information from reliable and authoritative
sources will prevent an information vacuum allowing rumor and amateur predictions to prevail(Jordan and Jones, 2010). Proponents of OEF also reject critic’s assumptions that scientists who
conduct earthquake hazard analyses should be the arbiters of thresholds for hazard forecasts,
recognizing that those who receive alerts have different thresholds for notification and acting on
hazard warnings (Jordan et al., 2014).
In demonstrating the type and level of actions that are warranted under a low probability
and high consequence earthquake forecast, Field and colleagues (2015) identified a number ofactions that are useful preparedness measures that are relatively low cost and minimallydisruptive. Building on social science research (Mileti and Peek, 2002) that identifies periods ofenhanced hazard potential as teachable moments for preparedness and response readiness,these authors recommend that organizations engaged in earthquake education re-emphasize
measures like having an emergency supply of water and food, having a family emergency plan,
reviewing safety strategies during the shaking, securing heavy household furnishings andspending less time in potentially vulnerable buildings. Organizations with relatively low warning
thresholds like hospitals, utilities, transportation lifelines and emergency services can review
emergency plans, cancel leaves, open emergency operations centers and hold drills and exercises
during the warning period. Given that our principal interest in this study is in local government
actions in response to an advisory or warning for a major tsunami-genic earthquake in the Nankai
Trough, we were eager to know whether actions including evacuation of vulnerable people intsunami zones, the identification of safe evacuation sites, establishment of shelter sites,
provisioning of those shelters, having a plan to communicate with residents during a forecast andother measures had been implemented.

III.

OEF in the Nankai Region: Our Study Objectives

Operational earthquake forecasting, despite being relatively new as a scientific concept
has been implemented in practice in several countries including the US (Roeloffs and Goltz, 2017,
Goltz, 2015, Bakun et al., 1987), Italy (Marzocchi et al.,2014), New Zealand (Gerstenberger et al.,2014) and other seismically active nations. It has now been implemented in Japan. As in other7

nations in which OEF programs are in operation, the program in Japan is not explicitly labeled as
OEF, but the program that exists in the Nankai region and, as of December 2022, on the entire
Pacific Coast of Japan is clearly an OEF program. Cabinet Office (Government of Japan) White
Papers in 2015 and 2019 outlined the program, identified the Nankai region which extends from
Suruga Bay (Shizuoka Prefecture) to the northeast facing area of Kyushu Island, as the region at
highest risk of large potentially tsunami-genic earthquakes. The region includes 707 municipal
governments (cities, towns and villages) located in 29 prefectures (Cabinet Office, 2015). Thesejurisdictions were defined as those that would be subject to 6- shaking intensities on the Japan
Meteorological Agency’s intensity scale (See Figure 2). A total of 139 jurisdictions (See Figure 3)
were identified as being at risk of both strong earthquake shaking and a tsunami of 30 centimeters
or more that would arrive within 30 minutes of a major earthquake (Areas of Special
Reinforcement of Nankai Earthquake Tsunami Evacuation Measures).
Figure 2: Map of Maximum Intensity Distribution in the Nankai Region

Figure 3: Maximum Tsunami height at High Tide in Nankai Region

Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, White Paper: Disaster Management in Japan 20158

Once established as the region of greatest concern for a major earthquake and tsunami,
the Nankai Megaquake Countermeasures Working Group, set up in 2012 within the Central
Disaster Management Council, developed estimates of the impact of a very large tsunami-genic
earthquake. The estimates (published in May 2013), depending on the location of the earthquake
in the Nankai Trough, would claim between 32,000 and 323,000 lives, destroy between 940,000
and 2,386,000 structures and cause JPY169.5 trillion in direct losses (See Tables 1 and 2).
Following the release of the various reports on the seismic potential in the Nankai Troughincluding the impact estimates in 2013, the Special Measures Act for Tonankai and Nankai
Earthquakes (Act No. 92 of 2002) was amended to advance comprehensive earthquake disasterrisk reduction actions that addressed response to an earthquake and tsunami.
Table 1: Estimate of fatalities and Damage to Structures (August 2012)

If major damage sustained in the
Tokai Region
If major damage sustained in the
Kinki Region
If major damage sustained in the
Shikoku Region
If major damage sustained in the
Kyushu Region

Number of Structures Destroyed
and/or Burned Down
954,000-2.382,000

Fatalities
80,000-323,000

951,000-2,371,000

50,000-275,000

940,000-2,364,000

32,000-226,000

965,000-2,386,000

32,000-229

Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, White Paper 2015, Disaster Management in Japan

Table 2: Estimates of Economic Impact (March, 2013)
Damage to Assets (Affected Regions)
•
•
•

•
•

Estimated Value of Damage
JPY169.5 trillion
JPY148.4 trillion

Total Losses
Private Sector
Quasi-Public Sector (Electricity, Gas,
Telecommunications and Railways)
Public Sector
Impact on Economic Activity (All ofJapan)
Due to Lower Production/Service
levels. Due to Disrupted
Transportation/Road and Railway

JPY 0.9 trillion
JPY 20.2 trillion
JPY44.7 trillion
JPY6.1 trillion

Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, White Paper 2015, Disaster Management in Japan

Having laid the legislative groundwork for comprehensive response planning for a major
Nankai Trough earthquake and tsunami, the Cabinet Office in March 2018 established theWorking Group on Disaster Risk Management for Anomalous Phenomena along the Nankai
Trough (Cabinet Office, 2019). It was this working group that established what would become
Japan’s OEF system. Three scenarios were identified and described, that if they were to occur, theJapan Meteorological Agency (JMA) would convene a council of scientists to determine whether
an alert will be sent to jurisdictions in the defined Nankai region warning them that the probability
9

of a major earthquake had increased for a period of a few days. These scenarios included amagnitude 8 class event, a “partial area rupture,” deemed most likely in the eastern portion of
the Nankai Trough. The occurrence of this scenario earthquake is estimated to occur once in 100
to 150 years and would represent a significant probability gain, that is, a follow-on similar or larger
event is 100 times more likely than the normal background seismicity rate. The scenario is basedon the two most historically recent major earthquakes in the region including the 1944 MW 8.2
Tonankai earthquake and the 1946 Mw8.6 Nankai event. Previous major earthquakes (both Mw
8.6) in Tokai and Nankai occurred 32 hours apart in 1854.
Two additional scenarios were regarded as raising the short-term probability of a major
earthquake and tsunami. The first is a magnitude 7 class event, a “limited area rupture” expected
to occur in the region with a frequency of once in 15 years and represents a probability gain of“once in a few hundred times.” (Cabinet Office, 2019, p. 56). A slow slip event as recorded on
strainmeters may, after qualitative assessment and if regarded as anomalous, constitute the third
scenario that could trigger an alert by the JMA to local jurisdictions in the region. Such eventsoccurred in the days prior to the March 11, 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami. The
three scenarios represent two levels of assumed risk. The magnitude 8 scenario would be a major
damaging event whether or not a follow on “twin earthquake” were to occur and in addition to
triggering a major response effort and would prompt a “major earthquake warning” for adjacentregions within the Nankai Trough. Magnitude 7 class earthquakes (“limited area rupture”) or slow
slip events are expected to occur more frequently and, in the case of the earthquake, cause farless damage. These scenario events would be evaluated by the JMA and, if deemed precursory toa much larger earthquake, an earthquake advisory would be announced.
The scenarios determine the actions recommended by the Cabinet Office which differ fora warning and advisory. First, we should point out the protocol to be followed upon theoccurrence of any of these scenario events. The JMA will evaluate the occurrence of anearthquake or measured seismic activity that conforms to one or more of the scenarios andreport to the national government within 2 hours; the national government will provide
instructions to prefectural and municipal governments in the designated Nankai region on
disaster management actions that should be taken during the period (one week) in which the
major earthquake risk has increased; and, if during the week-long period a major earthquake
does not occur, local governments in the region are instructed to stand-down (evacuation is
specifically mentioned), but encourages residents to remain alert. After scientists have assessed
the situation and determined that the earthquake risk has increased based on one or more of the
scenarios, and in consultation with the national government, the JMA will release an alert (either
an advisory or warning) via a nationwide press conference. The national government will set up
a disaster management headquarters and encourage prefectures and municipal governments todo the same. The most fundamental disaster management recommendation in the 2019 White
Paper and elaborated in a 2022 White Paper is the evacuation and sheltering of vulnerable
populations, both elderly residents and those with mobility limiting disabilities at the outset ofan alert.

10

As a caveat in presenting recommended planning activities for local government(including residents) and business and industrial organizations, the Guidelines for Formulating
Disaster Risk Management Measures Based on Various Nankai Trough Earthquake Scenarios (1stEdition) on March 29, 2019 caution that in planning, entities must seek a balance between therisk of an earthquake and the impact of disaster management measures on the maintenance of
day-to-day life and business activities. And second, those encouraged to plan for “special
earthquake warning information” are advised that accurate prediction of the timing of anearthquake is impossible, nor is it possible that disaster management measures will assure safety.
With these cautions stated, the guidelines provide the following recommended actions
for a warning based on a partial area rupture (Mw8). Local governments with mapped tsunami
inundation zones are advised to identify groups that because of age, disability or location(considering probable tsunami arrival time) would not be able to evacuate safely after theearthquake has occurred and plan for their evacuation upon issuance of a warning. Residents
living in buildings with poor resistance to earthquake ground motion should also be advised toevacuate during the warning period. Shelter for these proactively evacuated residents must be
considered in local government plans including the number of shelters needed, transportation ofevacuees to these shelters and staffing and provisions for the shelters. After a week has transpired
and a major earthquake has not occurred, a major earthquake advisory will be in effect for an
additional 2-4 week period. For a major earthquake advisory, based on an earthquake of Mw7 ora slow slip event, local jurisdictions are advised to review earthquake preparedness and, if theadvisory is based on an earthquake, consider proactive evacuations. An advisory based on anearthquake in the Mw 7 range will be in effect for a week after which residents should be advised
to be alert for aftershocks while returning to normal activities. In an advisory based on a slow slip
event, the period in which the advisory is in effect will vary and may extend beyond a week basedon scientific assessments as to the length of the slip event.
Companies in the Nankai region are advised to develop plans to protect the safety of
employees and customers in the event of a major earthquake and consider measures that would
not imperil the lives of employees if facilities are located in a proactive evacuation area. They arealso encouraged to inspect and mitigate damage likely to occur to equipment and facilities if amajor earthquake and tsunami occur. Reasonable measures should be considered to avoid
hazards during a warning (e.g., changing delivery routes, and in general, modifying activities thatare otherwise routine that may imperil employees during a major earthquake warning).
Companies in the Nankai region are also encouraged to cooperate with municipal government by
assisting in community planning. For example, providing supplies to evacuation shelters. Utility
and lifeline organizations are encouraged to anticipate service levels if a major earthquake (Mw8)
occurs affecting their service areas. Advice associated with a major earthquake advisory forcompanies includes reviewing earthquake preparedness measures and disaster management
consistent with the situation posed by the occurrence of the earthquake or slow slip event(Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2019, 2021)
Our research group considers these recommended measures for municipal government,
corporations and residents to be reasonable and consistent with a low probability, high11consequence earthquake warning or advisory for the Nankai region. Based on operational
earthquake forecast planning in other nations and the disaster management experience of thefirst author and principal investigator of this study, these recommended measures could be
supplemented with additional activities to better prepare the region for receipt of a major
earthquake warning or advisory. The focus of our assessment is specifically local government;
business and industry are important stakeholders, but their planning needs are outside the scopeof this study. We would add to those recommendations of the Cabinet Office and the various
disaster management councils that have provided guidance to local government: provisions forongoing warning/advisory period communication between local government and residents; aprogram in which home preparedness is emphasized; close coordination between local
government and the prefecture in which the city, town or village is located including coordination
with community based groups and volunteers; and, implementation of drills and exercises,
particularly exercises involving evacuation and sheltering plans. Thus, the objective of thisassessment is to determine whether our sample jurisdictions in the Nankai region have OEF plans
and the measures existing plans contain. We also wish to discover the concerns local disastermanagers have in planning for receipt of special earthquake warning information including theirviews on the likelihood that an earthquake will follow a warning or advisory and whether planningwill save lives and avoid major property damage.

IV.

Methods of Study

The study employed multiple methods in this assessment of local governmentorganizational response to possible receipt of a short-term earthquake advisory or warning fromthe Japan Meteorological Agency. We reviewed documents published by the Japanese
government explaining the underlying scientific basis for the forecasting system andaccompanying recommendations regarding possible actions that could be taken by affected local
jurisdictions and businesses and industries if an alert is issued. We also examined previous
assessments of response options and challenges in responding to a possible alert conducted bynews organizations.
The centerpiece of our assessment was a survey with questions assembled by the study
team and administered by the Survey Research Center Company LTD based in Tokyo. The survey
questions (See Appendix A) explored a range of issues associated with prefectural and municipal
response to a low probability, high consequence alert which included: whether governments had,or had not, developed plans; concerns and issues encountered in developing plans; the type andlevel of support from higher levels of government needed for effective planning; assessments ofthe efficacy of planning (i.e., whether planning would save lives and protect property); sources ofplanning assistance; and, a battery of specific planning actions that included proactive evacuationof vulnerable people, promotion of preparedness actions by residents, provisions for public
information during an alert, cooperative actions involving various segments of the community(e.g., with community-based groups, businesses, other levels of government etc.), internal
procedures for mobilizing within the government itself, measures to curtail social and economic
activities in the interests of public safety and provisions for canceling an alert that was notfollowed by an earthquake. The survey questionnaire was emailed to 736 municipal government
12

organizations (29 prefectures and 707 municipal governments) identified by the national
government as at risk of a major earthquake and possible tsunami, targeting the agency withinjurisdictions responsible for planning (typically a disaster management department or section).
We received 469 responses, a return rate of 63.7% and the sample was generally representativeof the jurisdictions in terms of population and jurisdiction size. See Table 3 below. Figures 4 andTable 3: Survey Sample and Total Nankai Region by Jurisdiction Population

Valid

Region Total

Sample Total% Total Population

Prefectures

29

23

79.3

Over 500,000

14

10

71.4

200,000 - 499,999

41

28

68.3

50,000 - 199,999

182

124

68.1

15,000 - 49,999

236

153

64.8

8,000 - 14,999

78

48

61.5

5,000 - 7,999

64

37

57.8

Up to 4,000

92

46

Total

736

469

50.0
63.7

5 identify the jurisdictions included by the national government in the designated Nankai
Region. Figure 4 identifies those municipal governments with a significant risk of tsunami in a
major earthquake. Figure 5 includes all jurisdictions likely to experience 6- intensities on the
JMA intensity scale that includes 9 intensities with 7 being the strongest.
Figure 4: Jurisdictions at risk of Tsunami

Figure 5: All jurisdictions in Nankai Region

Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, White Paper, Disaster Management in Japan

Our survey was supplemented by 17 in-depth interviews with scientists (primarily
seismologists with the JMA and universities), journalists who had reported on and, in some cases
conducted their own studies of planning, and disaster managers responsible for earthquake
planning. The purpose of these interviews was to better understand the rationale for setting up
the forecasting system, identify and expand our understanding of how local governments
assessed the need for planning and explore any special circumstances or contingencies that13

existed for individual local governments. In some cases, the interviews were conducted in English
though most were in Japanese and translated for the American on the study team. All wereconducted via video conference and were of approximately one hour in duration. There was noset format as the questions varied depending on whether a scientist, journalist or disastermanager was being interviewed.
Survey data analysis employed SPSS Version 29 to carry out basic frequency counts andnon-parametric statistics for variables that were a combination of nominal, ordinal andcontinuous levels of measurement. The unit of analysis was local government based onquestionnaires completed by disaster management officials who represented sample
jurisdictions. The in-depth interviews conducted among municipal disaster managers included
questions designed to probe more deeply issues raised in the survey questionnaire or pursue
trends that were unanticipated at the outset of the study. In general, the in-depth interviews
deepened our understanding of disaster management issues, clarified scientific assumptions
behind the forecasting systems and, in the discussions with journalists, provided an outside
perspective which perhaps better reflected the views of the general public regarding the hazards
posed by earthquakes in Japan. The insights gained in these interviews will be reported asparaphrased statements rather than direct quotes; the interviews were conducted mainly inJapanese and translated into English by members of the research team.

V.

Findings

Factors Associated with Having a PlanAt the most basic level of our assessment, 84.4% of all jurisdictions in our survey sampleof 469 jurisdictions reported having plans for receipt of an earthquake alert from the JMA and15.6% indicated that they had no plan. This distinction marks a starting point for additional
analyses which consider the characteristics of jurisdictions with and without plans. Additionalquestions probed other factors that may influence planning including: jurisdiction type(prefecture, city, town or village), size (population), having a separate disaster management
department and the size of the department, geographic distance from the likely source of theearthquake, having tsunami inundation zones within their borders, challenges faced in developing
a plan and respondent assessment of the efficacy of planning. We examined each of thesepotential factors quantitatively examining basic frequency counts and the non-parametric statistic
Pearson Chi Square. We supplemented or survey findings with information from our in-depth
interviews.
Jurisdiction TypeWe first examined planning for an alert from the JMA by jurisdiction type. There was asignificant difference (Chi Square<.001) in planning between cities and prefectures on one hand
and towns and villages on the other. Towns and villages were less likely than cities and prefectural
governments to report having plans for response to receipt of an advisory or warning from the
JMA for a major earthquake in the Nankai region. See Table 4 below.
14

Table 4: Planning by Jurisdiction Type
Jurisdiction TypeCity
Plan for SEWI
Info?

1 Yes

Prefecture

Town

Village

226

23

131

16

396

90.0%

100.0%

78.0%

59.3%

84.4%

25

0

37

11

73

10.0%

0.0%

22.0%

40.7%

15.6%

251

23

168

27

469

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Count
%

2 No

Count
%

Total

Count
%

Total

Chi-Square Tests

Value

Asymptotic
Significance(2-sided)df

Pearson Chi-Square

28.594a3<.001

Likelihood Ratio

29.1863<.001

N of Valid Cases469

a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 3.58.

Population Size
A second test that overlaps jurisdiction type was to examine planning based on the
population of jurisdictions, assuming that the differences detected based on jurisdiction type area reflection of the size of the jurisdiction and thus the resources and personnel available to plan
for receipt of an alert that the short-term risk of a large potentially tsunami-genic earthquake has
increased. We found that population of the jurisdiction was significantly associated with thelikelihood that a jurisdiction has planned for this contingency. We found that prefectures andlarger jurisdictions were significantly (Chi Square<.001) more likely to have a plan than smaller
jurisdictions with populations of 49,999 or fewer. See Table 5 below.
Table 5: Planning for SEWI Information by Jurisdiction Population
Plan for Extra Info?
1 Yes
Population
GroupedPrefecture

Count
%

Over 500,000

Count
%

200,000 - 499,999

Count

15

2 No

Total

23

0

23

100.0%

0.0%

100.0%

100

10100.0%

0.0%

100.0%

27

1

28

%
50,000 - 199,999

Count
%

15,000 - 49,999

Count
%

8,000 - 14,999

Count
%

5,000 - 7,999

Count
%

Up to 4,000

Count
%

Total

Count
%

96.4%

3.6%

100.0%

114

10

124

91.9%

8.1%

100.0%

123

30

153

80.4%

19.6%

100.0%

35

13

48

72.9%

27.1%

100.0%

29

8

37

78.4%

21.6%

100.0%

35

11

46

76.1%

23.9%

100.0%

396

73

469

84.4%

15.6%

100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

Value

Asymptotic
Significance(2-sided)df

Pearson Chi-Square

24.676a7<.001

Likelihood Ratio

30.6677<.001

Linear-by-Linear
Association

18.666

1<.001

N of Valid Cases469

a. 3 cells (18.8%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 1.56.

Disaster Management Department
Since jurisdiction type and population suggest that smaller jurisdictions are less likely tohave plans than larger jurisdictions, we hypothesized that a contributing factor might be whether
or not the jurisdiction has a separate department with the responsibility for disastermanagement. One might think that in a nation as disaster prone as Japan, all municipalities would
have a unit responsible for risks faced by communities within their borders, but some very small
jurisdictions may have so few staff that responsibility for disaster management falls on one ormore staff whose primary responsibility is something else. Thus, a further test was to learn
whether or not a jurisdiction has a separate dedicated disaster management unit within thejurisdiction and having a plan or not. See Table 6 below. There was a significant

16

Table 6: Planning for SEWI With and Without a Disaster Management Department
Does municipality havededicated disastermanagement unit?
1 Yes
Plan for SEWI
Info?

1 Yes

Count

89

396

86.7%

77.4%

84.4%

47

26

73

13.3%

22.6%

15.6%

354

115

469

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Count
%

Total

Count
%

Total

307

%
2 No

2 No

Chi-Square Tests

Value

Asymptotic
Significance(2-sided)df

Pearson Chi-Square

5.752a1.016

Continuity Correctionb

5.064

1

.024

Likelihood Ratio

5.378

1

.020

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association

5.739

N of Valid Cases

469

1

Exact Sig. (2sided)

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.025

.014

.017

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.90.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

relationship (Chi Square<.05) between having a dedicated disaster management unit withinmunicipal government and having planned for a SEWI alert. Those jurisdictions without such aunit are significantly more likely to have not planned for receipt of a SEWI alert from the JMA thanthose that have a dedicated disaster management unit.
Size of Disaster Management Department
For jurisdictions that have a disaster management department, the question arose as towhether the size of the department makes a difference in whether or not the jurisdiction hasplanned for receipt of a SEWI alert (See Table 7). Thus, another test was to examine the numberof persons in disaster management sections within municipalities and having or not having a SEWI
plan. We found that the probability that a city has not planned for SEWI is highest among cities17with 4 or fewer personnel assigned to a disaster management section within the municipality (ChiSquare <.001).
Table 7: Having a Plan by Number of People in Disaster Management Unit
Number of people in disaster management
unit?
Up to 4
Plan for SEWI
Info?

1 Yes Count

5-6

7 - 10

11+

Total

77

77

76

77

307

%

73.3%

87.5%

91.6%

98.7%

86.7%

2 No Count
%

28
26.7%

11
12.5%

7
8.4%

1
1.3%

47
13.3%

Count

105

88

83

78

354

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Total%

100.0% 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

Value

Asymptotic
Significance(2-sided)df

Pearson Chi-Square

27.833a

3<.001

Likelihood Ratio

30.4563<.001

Linear-by-Linear
Association

26.092

1<.001

N of Valid Cases

354

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 10.36.

Concerns Expressed Regarding Planning for SEWI
Having established that smaller municipal governments are less likely to have plans andthat those with no or very small disaster management departments are also less likely to plan,
we turned to concerns expressed by survey respondents regarding challenges in planning for a
SEWI alert. The test consisted of cross-tabulating having a plan or not and concerns expressed
about planning for SEWI. For example, are jurisdictions without SEWI plans more likely to cite
staff shortages and other resource shortfalls as major deterrents to planning? See table 8.

18

Table 8: Having a Plan by Primary Concern about Planning for a SEWI Alertlargerquake
within afew
days isunlikely

We do
not want
to disrupt
business
activity

We donotwant totriggerpanic

Scientists lackskill toforecastquake

Ourjurisdiction
not atrisk

Lacktime toplan

Lackresources
and staff
to plan

Other,
pleasespecify

We havenoconcerns

11

15

209

7

9

16

73

9

47

1.8% 2.3% 4.0%

18.4%

2.3%

Plan
for
SEWI
Info?

1
Count
Yes %

2.8%

Count

2

Total

Count

2
No

%

%

2.7%

3.8% 52.8%
22.7% 31.5%

13
2.8%

23

17

3

2

8

18

1

4.1% 2.7%

11.0
%

24.7%

1.4%

24

91

10

2.1% 2.3% 5.1%

19.4%

2.1%

232

3.6% 49.5%

10

11

396

11.9% 100.0
1473

19.2% 100.061469

13.0% 100.0

Chi-Square Tests

Value

Asymptotic
Significance(2-sided)df

Pearson Chi-Square

17.231a8.028

Likelihood Ratio

16.2058.040

Linear-by-Linear
Association

8.434

1

.004

N of Valid Cases469

a. 6 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 1.56.

There is weak but significant relationship (Chi Square <.05) between the concerns
expressed about planning and having, or not having a plan. Those jurisdictions that have notdeveloped a plan are more likely than those with a plan to indicate that a lack of time, staffing
and resources was a primary concern and though the numbers are small, those without a plan
were more likely to express doubt that scientists had the skill to accurately forecast an earthquake
in the Nankai region. Though the option was not specific, those without a plan were more likely
to indicate that they have no concerns, perhaps an expression that the prospect of an earthquakeor more likely, the short-term forecast of an earthquake, is not of concern.
Our in-depth interviews revealed considerable diversity among local governments in theirplanning and concerns about planning for receipt of SEWI information. In our interviews (2) withKuroshio Town (Miyaue, 2022) we learned that, like many smaller jurisdictions, they had no plan
as of the beginning of 2022; however, the Hyuga-ken earthquake (IISEE, Building ResearchInstitute, 2022) of January 22, 2022, a magnitude 6.6 (initially reported as magnitude 6.8) eventin the Nankai Trough that was widely felt in the Kyushu and southern Shikoku region and though19

it fell short of the criteria for an advisory, served as motivation for Kuroshio Town (population
10,262) to begin development of a plan using both national government guidelines and theexample of neighboring Shimanto Town and Kochi City which had already developed SEWI plans.
With mapped tsunami inundation zones, Kuroshio focused on proactive evacuations including
identification of evacuees, evacuation routes and sheltering those evacuated. In Shimanto Town
(population 32,692), we were told (Nishioka, 2022) that the town’s plan predated the Hyuga-ken
earthquake, but prompted town officials to review the plan particularly evacuation proceduresfor the 800-1000 people in tsunami zones. More typical of smaller jurisdictions, Tobe Town
(population 20,217) in Ehime Prefecture reported having no plan in our survey, but in our in-depth
interview conducted several months later indicated that SEWI was not a priority though some
SEWI measures will be added to the general plan, due for revision this next fiscal year (Yasuoka,
2023). Tobe Town has no tsunami inundation zones and with a disaster management staff of 4,
did not anticipate development of a separate stand-alone plan for response to a SEWI alert.
Analysis by Relative Hazard
We created a three-fold division of jurisdictions into: 1) those with significant andimmediate tsunami risk; 2) those that do not have an immediate risk of tsunami, but are likely toexperience significant ground shaking; and 3) those jurisdictions that have significant groundshaking risks but border jurisdictions that are outside the government designated region for highimpact risk from a Nankai Trough major earthquake. This distinction set up a comparison ofplanning based on geographical distance from the worst effects of a major earthquake. We notefrom the table below (Table 9.1) that there are 91 jurisdictions that responded in our survey that
Table 9.1: Distribution of Nankai Jurisdictions Based on Relative Hazard
Cumulative
Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

1 High Hazard

91

19.4

20.4

20.4

2 Medium Hazard

79

16.8

17.7

38.1

3 Lower Hazard

276

58.87

61.9

100.0

Total

446

94.9

100.0

Missing System

23

4.9

Total

469

100.0

Valid

Percent

have both a severe shaking hazard from a major Nankai earthquake and an immediate tsunami
risk, here classified as “high hazard.” There are 79 jurisdictions that are subject to strong groundmotion (at least JMA 6 -) and are surrounded by jurisdictions that share this level of hazard, which
we classify as “medium hazard.” Finally, there are 279 jurisdictions that are also at risk of strong
shaking from a Nankai earthquake, but have a border with jurisdictions that are not consideredpart of the Nankai earthquake vulnerable region. The next step was to determine whether there
was a relationship between planning and distance from the high hazard zone. The cross tabulation
shown in Table 9.2 reveals that there was little difference between the high and medium hazard

20

jurisdictions, but a significant difference between the high and medium hazard jurisdictions andthose classified as lower hazard, the latter being less likely to have plans for receipt of an advisory
or warning from the JMA (Chi Square<.05).

Table 9.2: Crosstabulation of Planning by Relative Earthquake Hazard
Plan for Extra Info?
1 Yes
Geospec 1 High Hazard

Count
%

3 Lower Hazard

10

91

89.0%

11.0%

100.0%

72

7

79

91.1%

8.9%

100.0%

220

56

276

79.7%

20.3%

100.0%

373

73

446

83.6%

16.4%

100.0%

Count
%

Total

Count
%

Total

81

2 Medium Hazard Count%

2 No

Chi-Square Tests
Asymptotic
Significance
Value

df

(2-sided)Pearson Chi-Square

8.277

a

2

.016

Likelihood Ratio

8.840

2

.012

Linear-by-Linear

6.205

1

.013

Association
N of Valid Cases

446

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 12.93.

We would have expected a more linear trend in which the high hazard jurisdictions, which
are at risk of both strong ground shaking and significant tsunami hazards, were more likely tohave planned than jurisdictions with shaking hazards alone. It must be recalled, however, thatmany of the local governments regarded as high hazard are small coastal cities, towns and villages
and that smaller jurisdictions are at a disadvantage in staffing and resources as indicated in boththe survey and in-depth interviews. It is significant that 81 or 89% of these jurisdictions reported
having plans despite the challenges faced by their typically small size (71.4% were jurisdictions ofless than 50,000 and 30.7% were less than 15,000 in population). Cities and towns were equally
likely to be in the high hazard zones, but cities usually have larger disaster management
departments and greater resources for planning that towns and villages. Typical of jurisdictionsin the lower hazard zone, Kai City (Yamamoto, 2023) in an in-depth interview, reported that the21main natural hazard in this Yamanashi Prefecture city of 76,038 was flooding and that the Nankai
Trough was quite far away and a lower priority for disaster planning.
Exceptional Planning
We grouped the 26 planning items into 5 categories, up to 5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20 and over
20 and examined the number reported by jurisdictions within the 29 prefectures in the sample.
The average number of planning actions reported was 8.38 (warning) and 6.76 (advisory) for
divided plans and 8.09 for combined plans. For combined plans, only 1 jurisdiction (in Ehime
Prefecture) reported having over 20 items in their plan, 18 (13.6%) reported having 16-20
planning actions and 88, the majority (66.7%) reported having taken up to 10 actions. The modal
category for combined plan jurisdictions (N=132) was category 2, 6-10 actions. For plans that
distinguished between actions for an advisory and warning: advisory plan (N=230) actions fell intomodal category 1 (up to 5 actions) and 78.3% fell into categories 1 and 2; for warning plans(N=247), 69.2% fell into categories 1 and 2 (up to 10 actions) and the distribution was bi-modal
for these same categories. Exceptional plans defined at those with 16 or more actions for dividedplans were 28 (5.9%) for warning and 20 (4.3%) for advisory plans. We cross-tabulated several
variables with having an exceptional plan for both combined plans and divided plans and there
were no significant relationships between having an exceptional plan and population size,
number of staff in disaster management, having tsunami zones in the jurisdiction, relative hazard,
jurisdiction type, main concerns in planning or jurisdiction type. In short, the factors that
distinguished between municipalities with and without plans failed to differentiate between weakor average plans and those we regard as exceptional.
Prefectural Leadership and Jurisdictional Planning
To the extent possible, we examined whether prefectural leadership may have an
influence on planning first by grouping cities, towns and villages into their respective prefectural
governments, then comparing prefectures according to the number of jurisdictions that haveplans versus those that do not. Second, we wished to know whether plans reported byjurisdictions differed by prefecture in terms of the number of plan actions contained within thoseplans. We received survey responses from all 29 prefectures in the Nankai region making tabular
display of planning by prefecture impractical, but an examination of jurisdictions with and withoutplans by prefecture reveals that there were statistically significant differences in planning among
prefectures for each of the two types of plans. Finally, we examined the plans of the 23
prefectures that participated in our survey to assess the extent of planning by the prefectures
themselves.
In general, those prefectures with a large number of Nankai jurisdictions (the range wasfrom 4-29 jurisdictions) tended to have larger percentages of jurisdictions with plans thanprefectures with a smaller number of affected jurisdictions. In every case, a majority of sample
jurisdictions within the 29 prefectures had plans, but in some cases the percentages ofjurisdictions with plans were quite large. In Okayama, Tokushima and Wakayama prefectures,
100% of the reporting jurisdictions within their boundaries have plans. A Chi Square test revealed
22that the differences between prefectures in whether or not the jurisdictions have plans were
statistically significant (<.001). This measure does not, however, distinguish between prefecturesin terms of the size of jurisdictions within prefectural boundaries. As we pointed out in previous
analyses, smaller jurisdictions face significant challenges in planning.
We also sought to determine whether there was a difference in the number of planning
items reported for jurisdictions by prefecture. We observed differences between jurisdictions
with combined plans (that is, plans that did not differ between actions for advisories andwarnings) and those that have separate plans for each type of alert. There were no significant
differences between prefectures on the number of items included in jurisdictional combinedplans, but there were for those that have divided plans. Since jurisdiction type and size of
population were significant factors in whether or not jurisdictions had plans, that is, villages andtowns and small jurisdictions in general were more likely than cities to have no plans, we
examined whether differences between planning among prefectures might be due to a prefecture
having a large number of smaller jurisdictions within its boundaries. Since jurisdiction size seems
to be the most salient factor and those jurisdictions with up to 49,999 in population tended to be
more likely not to have plans than larger jurisdictions (See Table 5), we collapsed size categories
into two (Up to 49,999 and Over 50,000) and cross-tabulated having a plan (yes/no) by populationin two categories for all prefectures.
The results were not straightforward. Some prefectures that had a disproportionate
number of small jurisdictions had larger proportions of jurisdictions without plans. For example,
Kagoshima Prefecture with 29 jurisdictions in the sample, has 23 smaller jurisdictions and 6 larger
ones. In terms of planning, 19 have plans and 10 do not; of the 10 without plans, 9 are smaller
jurisdictions. Similar patterns prevailed for Yamanashi and Kanagawa Prefectures that also havedisproportionate number of smaller jurisdictions. On the other hand, several other prefectureswith majority smaller jurisdictions have very high percentages of plans. For example, in
Wakayama and Tokushima Prefectures with 21 and 22 jurisdictions respectively in the sample
which are overwhelmingly smaller jurisdictions, 100% have plans. Kochi (with all smaller
jurisdictions, N=23), Hiroshima, Miyazaki, Nara and Shizuoka all with a majority of smaller local
governments achieved very high percentages of communities with plans.
Finally, we examined the number of planning items in the plans of the 23 prefectural
governments that participated in the survey and determined that five prefectures had exceptional
plans, that is, plans that contained at least 16 actions (16 actions for combined plans and at least
16 actions for either warning or advisory, for divided plans). The following prefectures had
exceptional plans: Gifu, Hyogo, Kanagawa, Okayama and Shizuoka. All of these prefectures except
Kanagawa had high percentages of jurisdictions with plans; however, there were no jurisdictions
within any of the high performing prefectures that have exceptional plans. Thus, it is difficult todetermine from the survey and statistical data whether prefectural leadership has made a
difference in jurisdiction planning. We will rely on in-depth interviews with prefectural disastermanagers to assess how much guidance and emphasis has been devoted to SEWI planning andon interviews with disaster managers within jurisdictions to determine the level of guidance andsupport they have received from their respective prefectural governments.
23

We interviewed a retired disaster manager from Shizuoka prefecture (Iwata 2022) which
we characterized as having an exceptional plan. The prefecture is part of the Tokai area (within
the Nankai region) and was of major concern under the Tokai prediction, thus knowledge aboutmajor earthquakes and commitment to planning are legacies of the Large-Scale Earthquake
Countermeasures Act of 1978. The prefecture is large and divided into four areas for coordinationof disaster management that would mobilize as crisis management bureaus under the SEWI plan
for an advisory or a warning. These crisis management bureaus could request assistance, as
needed, from the Self Defense Forces or other response agencies. The prefecture also used its
taxation prerogatives to raise and direct funding to municipalities to develop earthquake
countermeasures. We were also told that Shizuoka had planned a series of workshops to promote
SEWI planning for municipal governments, but the Coronavirus pandemic interfered and theworkshops have not yet been held. Our interviewee, a geoscientist as well as a disaster manager,
was a member of the Central Disaster Management Council’s Disaster Prevention Measures
Executive Committee (Cabinet Office) that developed recommended actions for the Nankai
Region. Thus, leadership for development of SEWI plans for municipalities has been exercised bythis prefecture.
Summary of Factors in Having or Not Having Plans
The great majority (84.4%) of our sample municipalities in the Nankai region reported
having plans to respond to an advisory or warning from the JMA that the short-term probabilityof a major subduction zone earthquake has increased. A total of 73 or 15.6% of the sample
reported having no plan for this contingency. Our initial set of statistical tests sought to distinguishbetween those municipalities with and without plans. We discovered that smaller jurisdictions—
villages, towns and smaller cities—up to 49,999 in population --are less likely to have plans forreceipt of SEWI alerts than larger cities and prefectural governments. Another significant factor
in planning is whether or not the jurisdiction has a dedicated disaster management unit and, thesize of that unit. Jurisdictions that have no dedicated unit and those whose disaster management
departments are small, particularly those with 4 or fewer staff are at a disadvantage in planningfor SEWI alerts. Finally, we determined that jurisdictions without plans are more likely to cite asa major concern resource and staff shortages as impediments to planning. Town and Village
governments were significantly more likely to cite staff and resource shortfalls than cities in thesample.
Specific Components of SEWI plans
The survey contained 26 planning actions organized into six related “blocks” that, in theprofessional judgement of the investigators and based on existing OEF plans, were reasonable inthe context of a short-term low probability earthquake warning. The 26 planning actions are
displayed below organized by their respective block. The jurisdictions that reported having plans• Evacuation Block- Developed a plan for issuing evacuation instructions to residents in tsunami zones- Identified vulnerable populations to be proactively evacuated24

- Planned for location and operation of evacuation shelters- Planned for provision of material needs (stockpiles) for shelters- Planned for stockpiling and inspecting stockpiles at shelters•

Home Preparedness Block- Encourage home preparedness, in general- Encouraging storage of emergency water and food
- Encouraging development of family plan for reuniting in an emergency- Reinforcing recommended personal safety actions during an earthquake- Taking measures to prevent fires- Encouraging the acquisition of emergency items (e.g., flashlight, portable radio, etc.)- Become acquainted with evacuation routes and locations of safety•

Communication Block-Plan for jurisdiction to communicate with residents regarding an alert during the alert
period•Coordination/Cooperation Block- Response actions in cooperation with neighborhood associations and volunteers- Response action in coordination with prefectural government and JMA- Response in coordination with businesses and industries within jurisdiction- Response in cooperation with schools and public facilities- Response in cooperation with non-government social welfare facilities- Response in coordination with local universities and researchers•

Internal Mobilization Block- Plan for assembling senior jurisdiction management at the outset of a SEWI alert- Establishment of a disaster management headquarters- Conducting drills and exercises of plan and/or plan elements- Plan for cancellation or continuation of an alert•

Postponement of Activities Block-Provisions to suspend use of roads, bridges and buildings with low earthquake
resistance-Calls for residents to cancel or postpone non-essential activities-Calls for organizations to postpone non-urgent activities (e.g., elective surgery,production of hazardous materials, etc.)

were asked if their plans included these individual planning actions, if their plans differeddepending on whether the alert was an advisory or a warning and if their plans were the samefor both a warning or an advisory. We discovered that two-thirds of reporting jurisdictions divided
their plans between warning and advisory and the remaining third did not distinguish between
these two types of alerts. We first wanted to determine the average number of planning actions
taken by all jurisdictions and discovered that the mean number of actions for jurisdictions that25

distinguished between a warning and an advisory was 8.4 for warnings and 6.8 for an advisory.
For jurisdictions that did not distinguish between actions planned for a warning or an advisory,
the average number of actions was 8.1. As mentioned earlier, 73 reporting jurisdictions had noplans and 47 jurisdictions (12.7%) had “exceptional” plans, those which contained 16 or more of
the planning actions listed in the questionnaire. We will present each “block” of planning itemswith the frequencies in which they were checked as components of SEWI plans.
Evacuation of vulnerable people: evacuation was one of the specific planning actions mentioned
in the national government’s 2019 White Paper on the Nankai Trough. This block has 5 items:
plans to issue evacuation instructions, identification of those to be evacuated, support forevacuation shelter operation plans, stockpiling shelter necessities for evacuees and for checking
and inspection of stockpiles. See Tables 10.1 and 10.2.
Table 10.1: Percentage (%) of Respondent Jurisdictions Reporting that Actions are Part of Plan
Evacuation
Issued Evac
ID of Early
Shelter Ops Check/Inspect Provision
Block
Instructions
Evacuees
StockpilesofStockpiles
Advisory
16.5
13.0
15.7
44.3
11.7
N=230
Warning
35.2
34.4
41.7
51.4
19.8
N=247
Table 10.2: Percentage (%) of Respondent Jurisdictions Reporting that Actions are Part of Plan
Evac Block
Issued Evac
ID of Early
Shelter Ops Check/Inspect Provision
Instructions
Evacuees
StockpilesofStockpiles
N=132
43.2
35.6
7.0
47.7
15.2
In most cases, those municipalities that have separate plans for an advisory and a warning,
have implemented more activities for a warning than for an advisory and the jurisdictions that do
not distinguish between the two types of alerts more nearly resemble the separate plan groupfor warnings in having issued instructions and identifying those to be proactively evacuated, butless so in regard to shelter preparations. Overall, the frequencies of implementation on allmeasures are less than one might expect given that the national government’s guideline (2019,
Government of Japan, Cabinet Office White Paper) specifically mentioned proactive evacuationsof vulnerable populations in its recommendations to local governments that would receive a SEWI
alert, if issued.
Home Preparedness: communicating preparedness information to residents should be an
ongoing activity of municipal governments in areas with earthquake risk, but periods of enhanced
earthquake potential associated with SEWI may offer an opportunity to do so during which
residents are more acutely risk aware. This block has 7 items: promoting preparedness in general,calls for stockpiling food and water, establishing family communication and meeting places,

26considering earthquake response strategies (e.g., Drop, Cover and Hold On), measures to prevent
fire, having emergency supplies and knowing evacuation routes and sites. In response to thegeneral question regarding the promotion of home preparedness for SEWI 60.9% of all
jurisdictions that had separate plans for a SEWI warning and advisory response reported that they
had done so and 53% of those with combined plans. See tables 11.1 and 11.2.
Table 11.1: Percentage (%) of Respondent Jurisdictions Reporting that Actions are Part of Plan
Home
Home Food & Comm/Mtn Safe Acts
Fire
Emergency
Evac
Prep
prep
H2O
Place
in EQ
Prevention
Supplies
Routes/
Block
Sites
Advisory 60.9
40.0
40.4
21.3
22.2
31.3
44.8
N=230
Warning 59.5
42.1
43.7
21.9
23.1
35.6
51.8
N=247
Table 11.2: Percentage (%) of Respondent Jurisdictions Reporting that Actions are Part of Plan
Home
Home
Food & Comm/Mtn
Safe
Fire
Emergency
Evac
Prep
Prep
H2O
Place
Acts in Prevention Supplies Routes/Sites
Block
EQ
N=132
53.0
49.2
41.7
29.5
22.0
35.6
48.5
While majorities of jurisdictions, whether plans are separate or combined regarding
advisories and warnings, have emphasized home preparedness in their SEWI plans, inclusion of
specific elements of home preparedness fall off in number of plan inclusions. An important paper
by Field and colleagues (Field et al., 2017) identified specific home preparedness measures as animportant opportunity in operational earthquake forecasts. The small number of jurisdictions
that mentioned having included recommendations regarding how to respond when an
earthquake occurs and fire prevention is particularly disappointing.
Emergency Public Information: this one item “block” sought to determine whether local
jurisdictions had planned for communicating with residents about SEWI during an advisory or awarning, assuming the public demand for information would intensify during this period. See
Tables 12.1 and 12.2.
Table 12.1: Percentage (%) of Respondent Jurisdictions Reporting that Actions are Part of Plan
Public Information Block
Emergency Public Information Plan
Advisory N=230
30.4
Warning N =247
33.2
Table 12.2: Percentage (%) of Respondent Jurisdictions Reporting that Actions are Part of Plan
Public Info Block
Emergency Public Information Plan
N=132
25.8

27

From a disaster management perspective, effective communication between governmentand residents regarding a possible impending hazard is a critical necessity. The small number ofinclusions of this component in jurisdictional plans is both surprising and disappointing. The
assumption being made here is that residents, once an advisory or warning is issued, will look to
local government for response recommendations, an explanation of what to expect during analert and, of equal importance, what the jurisdiction is going to do to protect residents from thehazard. The lack of planning for this contingency is a major omission on the part of jurisdictions
that have not included this action in their plans.
Cooperation/Coordination: these 6 items sought to identify points of cooperation andcoordination between jurisdictions and organizations in the community. They included: withneighborhood associations and voluntary disaster prevention organizations, prefectural offices
and the JMA, businesses and industry, schools and other public facilities, non-governmental
welfare facilities and local universities. See Tables 13.1 and 13.2.
Table 13.1: Percentage (%) of Respondent Jurisdictions Reporting that Actions are Part of Plan
Cooperation NH & Vol Pref & JMA
Bus & Ind
Sch &Pub
Welfare
Local
Block
Orgs
Facilities
Facilities
Universities
Advisory
21.3
32.2
17.8
25.7
15.2
1.7
N=230
Warning
28.7
36.0
25.5
39.3
23.1
2.0
N=247
Table 13.2: Percentage (%) of Respondent Jurisdictions Reporting that Actions are Part of Plan
Cooperation
NH & Vol Pref & JMA Bus & Ind Sch & Pub
Welfare
Local
Block
Orgs
Facilities
Facilities Universities
N=132
33.3
36.4
31.8
41.7
27.3
3.0
Another assumption is that coordination and cooperation between the local government
and various organizations and institutions within government agencies and between local
government and community organizations is a useful and vital component of disaster planning.
In nearly every type of organizational coordination, fewer than half of the jurisdictions in thesample have identified these groups as points of outreach and coordination. For smaller
jurisdictions, one might argue that coordination with community organizations is a means ofovercoming staffing and resource shortfalls necessary for effective planning. One notabledifference between jurisdictions with separate vs. unified plans is the somewhat greater
likelihood that unified plans have included these measures in their plans.
Disaster Management Mobilization: this block is associated with plans to mobilize a response toreceipt of an advisory or warning from the JMA for the Nankai region. It includes 4 items:
mobilizing senior jurisdiction management, establishing a disaster management headquarters,
drills or exercises of mobilization plans prior to receipt of SEWI and provisions to cancel an expired
alert (in coordination with the prefecture and JMA scientists). See Tables 14.1 and 14.2.

28

Table 14.1: Percentage (%) of Respondent Jurisdictions Reporting that Actions are Part of Plan
Internal Disaster Mobilize Senior
Establish
Advance Drills
Provision to
Mngt BlockManagement
Disaster HQCancel Alert
Advisory N=230
52.6
63.0
15.7
20.9
Warning N=247
55.9
74.9
16.2
21.1
Table 14.2: Percentage (%) of Respondent Jurisdictions Reporting that Actions are Part of Plan
Internal Disaster
Mobilize Senior
Establish
Advance Drills
Provision to
Mngt BlockManagement
Disaster HQCancel Alert
N=132
47.0
61.4
22.7
14.4
Majorities of jurisdictions in the sample have included in their plans the mobilization ofsenior personnel and establishing a disaster management headquarters. The exception is unified
plan jurisdictions which fell slightly below 50%. Surprising is the small number of municipalities
that have conducted drills of their plans and have considered the cancellation of an alert.
Although alert cancellation or continuation is not a measure left to local governments (the JMA
would handle this detail), local jurisdictions should plan to communicate what measures
implemented during an alert can be suspended and what might be continued for safety reasons.
Suspension/Postponement of Non-Essential Activities: this block of 3 items sought to identify
any activities that jurisdictions considered non-essential and that could be postponed during anadvisory or warning for safety reasons. These items included: suspended use of buildings, roads
and bridges with low earthquake resistance, recommendations to residents to postpone nonessential activities, and recommendations to all organizations to postpone non-essential
activities. See tables 15.1 and 15.2.
Table 15.1: Percentage (%) of Respondent Jurisdictions Reporting that Actions are Part of Plan
Suspension of Activities Suspend Use of EQ
Residents to
Organizations toBlock
Vulnerable
Susp Non-essential
Susp Non-Essential
Structures
Activities
Activities
Advisory N=230
5.2
8.3
3.9
Warning N=247
10.5
8.1
3.6
Table 15.2: Percentage (%) of Respondent Jurisdictions Reporting that Actions are part of Plan
Suspension of Activities
Suspend Use
Residents to Susp
Organizations to
Blockof EQ Vulnerable
Non-Essential
Susp Non-Essential
Structures
Activities
Activities
N=132
7.6
6.8
3.8
Our expectations were that these measures would not be widely implemented as a low
probability forecast may not justify significant disruption of social and economic activities withina jurisdiction. Whether high risk activities such as the processing of hazardous materials, high-29

rise building construction or occupation of known earthquake vulnerable structures should besuspended was an issue that our research group considered in our in-depth interviews. The
prevailing view in nearly all in-depth interviews was that these activities were inconsistent with alow probability earthquake forecast.
Hierarchical Cluster Analysis of “Divided” Plans
In the previous section we presented frequencies and percentages of actions as “blocks”
or as they were grouped in the survey questionnaire and reported by jurisdictions as having been
included or not in plans. A more analytical display of actions by jurisdictions with divided plans isbased on a statistical procedure called Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (IBM, 2023) that identifies
relatively homogeneous groups of cases based on selected characteristics. In the case of dividedplans, those which distinguish between actions for a warning and an advisory, there are four
possible combinations of responses which are clustered based on frequency as reported byjurisdictions from most frequent to least frequently included in plans. The four possible responses
are displayed in Table 16. Like the “blocks” in the previous section, the resulting analysis produced
Table 16: Four Types of Actions in Divided Plans
Warning
Advisory
Yes
Yes
No
No

Name

Yes
No
Yes
No

Type 1
Type 2Type 3
Type 4six clusters, but the order in which they are displayed in Table 17 below is based on the frequency
in which specific combinations occur providing a clearer picture of divided plans. The “cluster”
that reveals the SEWI planning action that a significant majority (73%) of jurisdictions haveincluded in their plans is the establishment of a disaster response headquarters upon receipt of
a warning or an advisory. This basic measure was recommended in the Cabinet Office guidanceand constitutes a fundamental step in executing additional actions in an emergency.
The second tier or cluster is comprised of actions in which Types 1,2 and 3 combinationsof actions constitute a majority, though not overwhelmingly so, varying from 50.3% to 61%. These
actions included checking stockpiles of shelter supplies for evacuations, promotion of home
preparedness (in general), calls for residents to be aware of evacuation routes and sites of safety
and actions to mobilize senior jurisdiction management upon receipt of a SEWI alert. Also, notethat the rare Type 3 action combination in which an action is planned for an advisory but not awarning is most prevalent for promoting home preparedness, a basic and typical action in lowerlevel alerts. The third cluster includes actions in which Types 1-3 combinations vary from 33% toTable 17: Hierarchical Clusters Reflecting Actions Taken based on Four Types of Actions (N=256)
Type 1 (Y/Y)
Type 2 (Y/N)
Type 3 (N/Y)
Type 4 (N/N)
Action
1
2

143
96

42
31

2
6

30

69
123

Establish Disaster HQ
Ck Shelter Stockpiles

3

4

5

6

129
102
119
89
93
69
68
74
58
27
48
49
47
40
33
36
48
37
27
34
4
12
19
8

18
26
19
15
15
19
14
15
39
22
6
8
24
23
24
4
4
50
58
69
1
14
1
1

11
1
2
3
0
3
2
0
1
0
1
2
2
1
2
0
0
1
3
2
0
0
0
1

98
127
116
149
148
165
172
167
158
207
201
197
183
192
197
216
204
168
168
151
251
236
236
246

Promo Home Prep
Ck Evac Routes/Sites
Mobilize Senior Mngt
Home Prep Food/H2O
Home Com/Meet Plc
Home Emerg Supplies
Pub Info During SEWI
Coop w/JMA & Pref
Coop w/sch & Pub Fac
Stockpiles for evacs
Prom Safe Acts in EQ
Home Fire Protection
Coop w/comm groups
Coop w/Bus & Indus
Coop w/Soc Welfare
Adv Drills for SEWI
Act for post SEWI
Issue Evac Instructions
Identify Vuln Groups
Support for Pro Evacs
Coop w/Universities
Avoid Use of Vuln Infra
Res Cancel Activities
Orgs Cancel Activities

42% and include three household preparedness measures, storing emergency food and water,
having a plan for family members to communicate and reunite during a warning or advisory andhaving emergency items for use if there is an earthquake (e.g., flashlight, gloves, first aid manual,
extra medication etc.). Also, among this third cluster are planning for jurisdictions to provide
public information to residents during a SEWI alert and two actions involving coordination withother organizations including organizations external to the jurisdiction (e.g., prefecture or JMA)
and internal (e.g., schools and public facilities).
A fourth cluster is the largest including eight actions, but this cluster represents much lessfrequently included actions in plans ranging in frequency of Type 1-3 combinations of 15.6% to25%. The actions included in this cluster are two household preparedness measures, promotionof personal safety actions during an earthquake and fire suppression techniques. It also includes
SEWI response actions in coordination with several groups or organizations including nongovernmental and welfare entities, neighborhood or community-based groups and business andindustry. It includes actions to stockpile supplies for SEWI alert proactive evacuations, conducting
drills or exercises of plan elements before an alert is issued and actions to be recommended if amajor earthquake does not occur within the time widow of an alert. Cluster 5 is unique in thatType 2 actions (Y/N) outnumber those of type 1 (Y/Y) though the combinations range between
34% and 41% in plan inclusion. These actions all entail evacuations which are more prevalent inwarnings than for advisories. They include identification of vulnerable groups that are advised to31

evacuate, issuance of evacuation instructions, and support for evacuees who will require shelter.
Finally, cluster six consists of actions we identified in the survey as postponements orcancellations of non-essential activities, avoidance of non-earthquake resistant structures (e.g.,buildings, bridges and roads) and closures of some facilities for safety reasons. There were also
actions in cooperation with local colleges and universities which may not be present in most cities
in the region. These actions ranged in frequency from 2% to 10%.
The analytical technique of hierarchical cluster analysis provided us an opportunity toregroup planning actions according to their frequency of adoption rather than a simple groupingaccording to what seemed to be their similarity. It clearly identified actions that will requireemphasis in our planned Year 2 activities as well as those that are already well-established. It also
reveals an understandable tendency for local jurisdictions to more readily include actions overwhich they have control than to seek cooperation and coordination with non-governmental
actors within the community. These more challenging planning elements; however, areparticularly important for small jurisdictions with limited resources and small numbers of
employees who can be mobilized in an emergency. For example, our in-depth interviews as wellas the survey suggest that very small jurisdictions have considerable difficulty with proactive
evacuations due to limited facilities that can be set aside as shelters and an inadequate numberof staff to manage them, even for a short period of time. In these situations, the cooperation fromand coordination with community-based groups and volunteers is of great importance. A related
issue is the apparent low priority given to drills and exercises. If local jurisdictions are to mount a
rapid and efficient response to a warning or advisory, they must assure through practice thatplanned activities can be effectively implemented. This is particularly so when local jurisdictions
must rely on non-governmental entities to carry out their assigned roles in a coordinated manner.

VI.

Discussion

Although the trajectory of earthquake forecasting in Japan spans some four and a half
decades, the Nankai earthquake forecasting system is relatively new and we must acknowledge
that local jurisdictions in the likely impact region are struggling to meet the need forcomprehensive planning in advance of an alert that the short-term risk of a major earthquake has
increased. On the positive side, 84.4% of jurisdictions in our sample reported having plans andwhile some plans are minimal and reveal deficiencies, a small number of jurisdictions haveformulated exceptional plans that, if fully implemented, will serve them well in responding to anadvisory or warning from the JMA. There were, however, very few measures that a majority ofjurisdictions had implemented. These few included: promotion of home preparedness,
mobilization of senior jurisdictional management, establishing a disaster management
headquarters upon the issue of a SEWI message, and recommending that residents understandevacuation routes and sites following a warning and checking and inspecting stockpiles of shelter
supplies. What was surprising (at least to one of the co-authors who spent most of his career as
a disaster manager) was that so few jurisdictions had considered in their plans: how tocommunicate with residents during an advisory or warning; the importance of reiterating
individual home preparedness messages during an advisory or warning, particularly what to do ifthey experienced ground motion from an earthquake; that few had planned for a coordinated32

response with community groups and other organizations within the jurisdictions boundaries;
and, that so few municipalities had conducted drills or exercises for receipt of SEWI messages.
In the judgement of our research team, the OEP program itself as it currently exists inJapan, contains flaws that should be addressed to optimize response on the part of local
jurisdictions. As discovered in our in-depth interviews, the JMA will announce an advisory or
warning by conducting a nationwide news conference. There appears to be no provision in theannouncement protocol for prefectural and municipal governments to be notified of a SEWI alert
significantly in advance of the news conference through secure disaster management
communication channels. This flaw could result in an uneven distribution of vital information anddelays in the implementation of response plans in the affected jurisdictions. Further, the national
government, as stated in the Cabinet Office White Paper of 2019, will provide specificrecommendations for disaster management actions at the point of release of a SEWI alert, andthough commendable, recommendations issued at this stage are unlikely to be effectively
implemented if planning in advance of issuance of a warning or advisory has not taken place.
Finally, while the guidance provided by the national government for local planning for a SEWI
alert has been appropriate, it has not been sufficient to develop comprehensive response plansor provide an adequate understanding of the science behind an OEF among disaster managers or
the residents of the local governments.
Given the state of planning, as revealed in our survey and in-depth interviews, what we
see as significant factors in the future preparedness of the Nankai region include: 1) having bothan adequate understanding of OEF and appropriate guidance to develop comprehensive SEWI
response plans that are consistent with the level of short-term hazard implied in an alert; 2) forsmaller jurisdictions, acquiring the resources or developing compensatory strategies to improveexisting plans or develop plans where plans do not exist; 3) for all jurisdictions (as revealed in
the hierarchical cluster analysis), adopting countermeasures which can be done independently
and internally, but neglecting countermeasures requiring negotiation and cooperation withother stakeholders (reflecting the mindset of municipal disaster managers to adopt measuresover which they have full control, but also reflecting a weakness in planning); and 4) addressing
the planning deficits as identified in our study to achieve comprehensive SEWI plans thatprovide optimal protection for life and property. These will be the objectives of our researchgroup as we transition into the second year and seek to address each as we develop bothplanning guidance materials and conduct local government-oriented planning workshops in the
Nankai region.
In conducting our assessment of SEWI planning among municipal governments in the
Nankai region, we identified 26 separate planning actions that we believe are consistent with alow probability high consequence alert in the form of an earthquake advisory or warning. In
having done so, one might legitimately ask: are some of these actions more important thanothers? We would respond yes. We consider the national government’s special emphasis on
proactive evacuations of vulnerable populations in mapped tsunami inundation zone the highest
priority in local planning. Yet, only about a third of the jurisdictions in our sample have addressed
this set of actions in their plans. Another high priority action is having a plan to provide ongoing33

communication with residents during an alert. Experience and social science research haveconfirmed the importance of providing accurate and authoritative information during hazard
warnings and our survey revealed that only one-fourth to one-third of our sample jurisdictions
have addressed this planning need. For small jurisdictions with limited resources and few staff forplanning and the execution of plans in an alert, mobilization and cooperative engagement with
community-based groups may be the best strategy for overcoming the challenges thesejurisdictions face.
Just below the high priority of evacuation, public communication planning andcoordination with community-based groups, we would place the reinforcement of ongoing efforts
to promote home preparedness by residents of the Nankai region. Of particular importance is forpeople to know how to protect themselves during earthquake shaking and, for those in tsunami
inundation areas, to promptly evacuate to higher ground following a major earthquake. Japan
has the world’s only nationwide earthquake early warning system (Kinkyu Shishin Sokuho) andwhile research indicates that most Japanese people are familiar with this system, reminders that
residents may receive a few seconds to a few tens of seconds warning that an earthquake has
occurred and that they may soon feel shaking, would be wise public policy in the Nankai region.
Other measures such as having a family communication and reunification plan, storing emergency
food, water and supplies and knowing tsunami evacuation routes and safe areas are also welladvised. Finally, we were surprised that so few local governments had conducted drills andexercises of planning elements; fewer than one-quarter had done so. We feel that these drills arevital for orderly and practiced evacuation in locations where timely movement of people to safety
is critical.
We also consider it important to identify the characteristics of jurisdictions withexceptional plans and there were 19 combined plans and among divided plans, 28 for warningand 20 for advisory that had accomplished a great majority of the actions we identified as bestpractices. The survey, however, provided us few, if any, clues as to the factors that made theseplans exceptional. The variables that allowed us to differentiate those with plans from those
without, proved to be non-significant. The in-depth interviews suggested that having an advocate
for SEWI planning was one important factor in the development of comprehensive SEWI plans.
Shizuoka prefecture and Toyohashi City, for example, have well-informed and articulate disastermanagers who are very familiar with SEWI and have affiliations that reinforce their understandingof planning for this contingency and commitment to mitigating the hazards posed by a Nankai
Trough earthquake. In Shizuoka, the recently retired disaster manager is also a geoscientist andmember of national government committees that developed guidelines for local jurisdiction SEWI
planning. The disaster manager from Toyohashi City is affiliated with Nagoya University’s Disaster
Mitigation Research Center and has worked with center faculty in holding workshops to promoteplanning for SEWI.

VII.

Conclusions and Planned Interventions

Japan’s scenario driven OEF system for the Nankai region is relatively new having been
implemented between 2015 and 2021, but the effort to forecast earthquakes dates back to the34late 1970’s with passage of the Large-Scale Earthquake Countermeasures Act and the Tokai
earthquake prediction. So, we regard the present system as a result of evolutionary development
rather than an abrupt change following the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of March
11, 2011. Of course, hindsight is always 20/20, but had the current OEF system been in place in2011, the JMA would have issued an advisory, or perhaps a warning, based on the occurrence ofa magnitude 7.3 earthquake, three magnitude 6 events and multiple slow slip events in theeventual rupture zone beginning on March 9, 2011. Would it have saved lives? We conclude that
it would have had there been plans in place to respond based on an advisory or warning.
Prefectural and municipal governments in the Nankai region have, since that time done much inpreparing for such a contingency, but based on our study, more can and must be done.
We would first recommend some modifications in the OEF system. In addition to anationwide news conference at which the JMA announces the release of a warning or advisory,
prefectural and municipal governments in the defined Nankai region will be notified in advanceof a general announcement through prefectural JMA offices in the 29 prefectures in the Nankai
region. We encourage the JMA to give sufficient advance notification through secure disastermanagement communication channels that will facilitate a mobilization of personnel andinitiation of planned measures within Nankai jurisdictions prior to both external and internal
demands for information and local action. Second, we recommend that the national government
provide more detailed planning guidance materials that are likely to result in comprehensive
plans for response to a JMA issued advisory or warning for Nankai and simple non-technicalinformation designed for residents of the region to help them understand the warning systems
and the events that may increase the probability of a large damaging earthquake in the region.
Finally, given that the JMA will convene scientists to evaluate the occurrence of potential
earthquake precursors in the Nankai Trough which will require about two hours, the JMA should
consider implementing a system similar to the US Geological Survey’s Earthquake Notification
System (ENS). This system provides real-time notification of the occurrence of earthquakes thatcan be tailored to a specific region and range of earthquake magnitudes. With such a system,
disaster managers and residents could become aware of earthquakes that may conform to thescenario earthquakes for advisories or warnings and begin responding before a formal
announcement.
Recommendation: That our research group prepare a memorandum to the Secretary General for
Seismology and Volcanology of the JMA suggesting that the measures identified above beconsidered. We would like to place special emphasis on real-time notification of local jurisdictionsin the Nankai region of earthquakes or other seismic activity that may trigger a warning oradvisory for the region, possibly through a modification of the J -Alert system (Zenkoku Shunji
Keihō Shisutemu).
Our plan for a second year of US-Japan Foundation funding is to develop planningguidelines based on best practices of exemplary OEF planning efforts in Japan and other nations
and conduct workshops in the Nankai region to assist jurisdictions in constructing comprehensive
OEF plans. These guidelines will be based on information obtained in our survey, in-depth
interviews and documents containing response measures specific to a low probability/high35consequence situation. The guidelines will be distributed via multiple channels to prefectural andmunicipal governments in the Nankai region and form the basis for presentations and exercisesthat comprise our regional planning workshops. Smaller jurisdictions are struggling to develop
plans and we will focus on the needs of smaller jurisdictions in both our guidelines and ourworkshops.
Recommendation: Upon conclusion of the first-year assessment of planning among municipal
governments in the Nankai region, develop a set of planning guidelines and model plans, withspecial (though not exclusive) emphasis on the needs, concerns and challenges experienced bysmaller jurisdictions. Distribute the guidelines as published documents to all local jurisdictions in
the Nankai region and utilize them in the workshops that will be conducted to promote planning
for a SEWI alert.
Our assessment identified a number of neglected areas of planning that merit emphasis
and incorporation in SEWI plans. They are: proactive evacuation planning for jurisdictions withmapped tsunami inundation zones including the identification of categories of persons to be
evacuated, shelters or other alternate safe locations where these evacuees will be housed during
a warning or advisory and how these evacuees will be provided with food and other necessities
during the period of evacuation; household preparedness measures, particularly how to protect
oneself in an earthquake, to secure furnishings to avoid injury from non-structural hazards, andplans for family reunification after an earthquake; public communication between local
government and residents during a SEWI alert; coordination and cooperative planning thatinvolves the prefecture in which the municipality resides, private sector organizations, organizedcommunity-based groups, volunteers and other stakeholders; conducting drills and exercises totest and refine plans, particularly evacuation procedures and internal mobilization of municipal
response personnel and consideration of non-essential activities during a warning, in particular.
Recommendation: Highlight these relatively neglected actions in the guidelines, model plans andworkshops that will be held in the region. Within each category, identify specific actions thatshould be considered in planning and provide special emphasis on actions and strategies forjurisdictions challenged by resource and personnel shortfalls in capacity.
We realize that not all jurisdictions will be reached through workshops, so the guidancematerial and workshop videos will be distributed to every jurisdiction in the Nankai region andbe maintained on the webpages of the Disaster Prevention Research Institute for on-goingreference. In addition, the national government in December 2022 expanded the OEF system toinclude virtually all the Pacific Coast of Japan by adding seven prefectures from Chiba to Hokkaido
citing the high probability that a large tsunami-genic earthquake could occur in this region. This
expansion of the OEF system will add 182 municipal governments in Hokkaido, Aomori, Iwate,
Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki and Chiba prefectures.
Recommendation: Consider the possibility of proposing future workshops and planning activities
in the newly designated areas covered by the OEF system. Respond to individual jurisdictionalrequests for advice and assistance as we are able.
36

The OEF planning assessment conducted by our research team identified a number of
deficits in planning for a warning or advisory from the JMA indicating that the short-term
probability of a major earthquake in the Nankai region has increased. It also identified someextraordinary levels of planning for this contingency carried out by dedicated disaster managers
at the municipal government level. There remain challenges that must be overcome if all local
jurisdictions in the Nankai region are to secure an optimal level of seismic safety for theirresidents. We have, to the best of our ability identified the challenges and feel qualified to address
deficits and challenges in the months ahead and to spread best practices to all municipal
governments in the Nankai as well as new jurisdictions added to the OEF system by Japan’snational government. The government has set a goal of significantly reducing catastrophic levelsof damage and the loss of life along the dangerous Japan Trough which in 2011 claimed the livesof 18,000 people, displaced millions and caused one of the world’s worst nuclear accidents. It isto this task we now turn.

VIII. Limitations of the Study
Our methods included multiple sources of data collection from documents, in-depth
interviews and a survey of jurisdictions in the Nankai region. One might reasonably ask, dosurveys really capture the true picture of planning as it will actually be carried out? Is there a gap
between reporting planned actions and the actual implementation of actions when the occasion
arises to implement a plan? We must admit that this is a possibility, though there are constraints
on organizations, particularly government entities that limit, if not prevent, failures to perform
actions that have been established as policies and commitments, particularly for acts that affectpublic safety. These constraints are both legal and normative, thus we have reasonableconfidence that the answers received in our survey are accurate and reflect the intent of thejurisdictions that are represented in the sample.

IX.

References

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Parkfield earthquake prediction scenarios and response plans,
U.S. Geol. Surv. Open‐File Rept. 87‐192.
Bolt, B., 2006. Earthquakes: 2006 centennial update. Macmillan.
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 2015. White Paper, Disaster Management in Japan,
Nankai Trough Earthquake Measures, 85-93.
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 2019. White Paper, Disaster Management in Japan,
Chapter 3 Preparedness for Nankai Trough Major Earthquakes: Research on Disaster Risk
Management for Anomalous Phenomena, 52-60.

37

Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 2021. Summary of “Disaster prevention response study
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Appendix: Survey Questionnaire

Questionnaire Survey on Response Plans Regarding"Nankai Trough Earthquake Extra Information”
1. What is the name of your jurisdiction?
name of your prefecture _____________________________
name of your city/town/village _____________________________ (if you are aprefectural government, please leave here blank)
2. Are there mapped tsunami inundation zones in this jurisdiction that include areas that
may be affected by the largest possible Nankai Trough earthquake (*Level 2)? (*Level 2:
the largest class of earthquake scientifically assumed that is Mw [moment magnitude]
9.1)___ Yes___ No3. Does your jurisdiction have a plan specifically for response to receipt from the JMA of“Nankai Trough Earthquake Extra Information” (hereinafter referred to as “Extra
Information")? In this survey, the “Response Plan” for “Extra Information" includes thedescription of the response to “Extra Information" in the local disaster prevention plan.
(Multiple choices allowed.)___ Yes (We have the “Response Plan” as an independent plan.)___ Yes (We have the “Response Plan” in our local disaster prevention plan.)___ No4. What are your main concerns regarding planning for receipt of “Extra Information” fromthe JMA? Please select top 3 important items.
- Please enter "1" for the most important item, enter “2” for the second most important
item and “3” for the third one.
(Example)_2_ The likelihood of a larger earthquake within a few days is low_ _ We do not wish to disrupt the economy and business activity_1_ We do not want to trigger panic and disturb people’s lives_3_ Scientists do not have sufficient skill to tell whether there will be another large

40

earthquake- If you have only one or two most important item(s), please enter “1” and “2” for those
items. If you don’t have any most important item, please enter “1” for “We have or had noconcerns”.

___ The likelihood of a larger earthquake within a few days is low___ We do not wish to disrupt the economy and business activity___ We do not want to trigger panic and disturb people’s lives___ Scientists do not have sufficient skill to tell whether there will be another large
earthquake___ We do not consider our jurisdiction at risk of damage or casualties in a Nankai
earthquake___ We have not yet had time to complete a plan to respond to “Extra Information”___ We do not have adequate resources and staff to implement a plan___ We have or had no concerns___ Other, please specify:________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
5. Do you feel that the national government has provided adequate support, bothinformation and resources, to prefectural and municipal government to prepare andimplement “Response Plans” for receipt of “Extra Information”?
___ Yes___ Somewhat agree___ I can’t say either way___ Not so much___ Not at all
6. What kind of support does your municipality need or have needed from the government
in order to prepare a “Response Plan” for “Extra Information”? Please select top 3
important items.
- Please enter "1" for the most important item, enter “2” for the second most important
item and “3” for the third one.
- If you have only one or two most important item(s), please enter “1” and “2” for those
items. If you don’t have any most important item, please enter “1” for “We don’t ordidn’t need any additional support”.
___ More detailed guidelines from the national government for municipal governments
to plan41

___ Training for municipal officials on “Extra Information”___ Development and dissemination of planning strategies for small municipalities___ Help from other jurisdictions in securing facilities for proactive evacuation___ Explanatory materials for residents regarding “Extra Information”___ Subsidies for the preparation of “Response Plans”___ More active publicity and dissemination of the “Extra Information” System by thegovernment and mass media___ Establishment of a platform for sharing the issues that each municipality faces in the
proactive evacuation measures, etc.
___ Compensation for financial losses due to disruption of business and commerce___ Create a leave system to encourage evacuation from proactive evacuation areas___ Subsidies for proactive evacuation and living in shelters when “Extra Information” isannounced___ We don’t or didn’t need any additional support___ Other, please specify; _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. If the JMA issues “Extra Information (Major Earthquake Warning)” for an earthquake orseismic activity that may be a foreshock to a major earthquake and tsunami in the
Nankai region, how likely do you think a large earthquake and tsunami will follow receiptof this information?
___ Extremely likely___ Somewhat likely___ Unsure___ Somewhat unlikely___ Extremely unlikely
8. Do you think development of a “Response Plan” will reduce injuries and damage if alarge earthquake occurs following receipt of “Extra Information” from the JMA?
___ Will definitely reduce injuries and damage___ Will probably reduce injuries and damage___ Unsure___ Will have no impact on injuries and damage___ Will probably not reduce injuries and damage

The following Q.9 to Q.14 are for those who answered Yes in Q.3 ( Does your jurisdiction have aplan specifically for response to receipt from the JMA of “Nankai Trough Earth quake Extra

42

Information” (hereinafter referred to as “Extra Information")?
If you answered "No" in Q.3, please go to Q.15.
9. Is your “Response plan” based on information received from the Government of Japan
and/or the prefecture in which your jurisdiction is located? Would you say that your plancontains:___ Only national government recommended actions___ In addition to recommendations from national government, we have included
actions specific to our jurisdiction___ Both national and prefectural recommended actions___ In addition to recommendations from other levels of government, we have included
actions specific to our jurisdiction___ Neither national nor prefectural recommended actions___ Unclear
10. Does your “Response Plan” distinguish between the two cases that are “Extra
Information (Major Earthquake Warning)" and “Extra Information (Major Earthquake
Advisory)"?
___ Yes___ No11. If your municipality's “Response Plan” has established “proactive evacuation areas",
what criteria did you use to establish these areas? Please select the one that best
applies to your situation.
___ The entire tsunami inundation area of the largest possible Nankai Troughearthquake is designated as “proactive evacuation areas".
___ Areas where a tsunami of 30 cm or more in depth is expected to reach within 30
minutes of the largest possible Nankai Trough earthquake are designated as “proactive
evacuation areas".
___ Other than the above (please specify below;__________________________________________________ )___ No “proactive evacuation areas" have been established.
___ Unclear
12. Does your “Response Plan” address any of the following actions? In the table below,
please select all the contents described in the “Response Plan”. Please divide youranswer into two categories: (1) as for the case of “Extra Information (Major Earthquake
Warning)" and (2) as for the case of “Extra Information (Major Earthquake Advisory)". If
both cases are included, please check both (1) and (2).

43

(1) Major Earthquake
Warning(2) Major Earthquake
Advisory

Description regarding the issuance of "Evacuation Instruction"□□

Description regarding the issuance of "Evacuation of the Elderly, Etc."□□

Description regarding support for operation of evacuation shelters forresidents who evacuated proactively□□

Description regarding checking and inspecting stockpiles□□

Description regarding provision of stockpiles for proactive evacuees□□

Description regarding promotion of home preparedness

□

□

-

-

Call for stockpiling of water and food in each household□□

Call for households to reconfirm communication methods andmeeting places□□

Call for households to reconfirm safety actions in the event of anearthquake (e.g., hiding under a desk, getting down, etc.)□□

Call for households to take measures to prevent fires from startingand spreading□□

Call for households to prepare emergency items (food, water,
medicine, flashlights, portable radios, etc.)□□

Call for households to check evacuation sites and routes□□

Description regarding providing information on “Extra Information" andpromotion of communication with residents (appointment of a
spokesperson, explanation of information from the JMA, explanation of
the situation and provision of the latest information to the mass media,
counteracting false information, etc.)□□

Description regarding response actions in cooperation with neighborhood
associations and voluntary disaster prevention organizations□□(The following six items are questions about the existence of specificindividual items regarding home preparedness.)

44Description regarding response actions in cooperation with the JMA,
prefectural governments, etc.

□□

Description regarding response actions in cooperation with business andindustry□□

Description regarding response actions in cooperation with schools andother public facilities□□

Description regarding response actions in cooperation withnongovernmental social welfare facilities□□

Description regarding the gathering system of senior management□□

Description regarding the establishment of disaster response
headquarters□□

Description regarding countermeasures in cooperation with local
universities and researchers□□

Description regarding advance drills regarding response to “Extra
Information"□□

Description regarding suspension of use of roads, bridges and buildings
with low earthquake resistance□□Calls for residents to cancel or postpone non-essential activities□□

Description regarding calls for the postponement of non-essential andnon-urgent socioeconomic activities (e.g., postponement of non-urgent
surgery or temporary suspension of the production of hazardous
materials)□□

Description regarding actions to be taken if no earthquake occurs after acertain period of time after the announcement of the "Extra Information"□□

Other descriptions, please specify.
______________________________□□

Other descriptions, please specify.
______________________________□□

Other descriptions, please specify.
______________________________□□

13. Did your municipality obtain the advice of a consulting firm in developing a “Response
Plan"?
___ Yes___ No___ Don't know
45

14. If your “Response plan” is available on your municipality's web page, what is the URL? (Ifyour local disaster prevention plan includes a “Response Plan”, please provide the URL
where the local disaster prevention plan is posted.)
Please add the link here _______________________________

15. Do you have any additional thoughts or comments about planning for “Extra
Information” that your jurisdiction may receive from the JMA?
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
16. What is your agency and position?
Agency or department: _______________________________________________(Crisis Management Division, Disaster Prevention Division, General Affairs Division, etc.)

Position: ___________________________________________________________(Department Manager, Section Chief, Assistant Section Chief etc. Your name is not
required)17-1. Does your municipality have a department dedicated only to disaster prevention andcrisis management? Please select "No" if your municipality does not have a department
specializing in disaster prevention and crisis management, but has a general affairs
section staff member in charge of disaster prevention in addition to other duties.
___ Yes___ No17-2. We would like to ask municipalities that answered "yes" to Q.17-1. Please indicate thenumber of full-time employees in the department specializing in disasterprevention/crisis management.
If there is more than one department in charge of disaster prevention/crisis
management, please enter the total number of staff in all departments. Please enter the46

number of employees at the time of your response. If you do not know the exact
number, please give an approximate number.
Number of full-time employees:

persons

18. Would you be willing to meet with us for a brief interview if we have additionalquestions about planning for receipt of “Extra Information”?
__ Yes__ No
If yes, please also fill out the followingYour name: ____________________
Email address: __________________
Phone number: ________________
19. Would you like to receive a report summarizing the information provided by eachmunicipality? (The Disaster Prevention Research Institute of Kyoto University will send thisreport to those municipalities that have requested it via email at a later date.)__ Yes (Please enter your email address below)______________________________________ No

Please feel free to write any comments you may have about this survey.
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Thank you for your time and attention, this concludes the survey.

---Note: If a respondent answers “No” to Q.10, Q12 becomes as below.
12. Does your “Response Plan” address any of the following actions? In the table below,
please select all the contents described in the “Response Plan”.
Description regarding the issuance of "Evacuation Instruction"47□

Description regarding the issuance of "Evacuation of the Elderly,
etc."

□

Description regarding support for operation of evacuation shelters
for residents who evacuated proactively□

Description regarding checking and inspecting stockpiles□

Description regarding provision of stockpiles for proactive evacuees□

Description regarding promotion of home preparedness□(The following six items are questions about the existence ofspecific individual items regarding home preparedness.)-

Call for stockpiling of water and food in each household□

Call for households to reconfirm communication methods andmeeting places□

Call for households to reconfirm safety actions in the event of anearthquake (e.g., hiding under a desk, getting down, etc.)□

Call for households to take measures to prevent fires from startingand spreading□

Call for households to prepare emergency items (food, water,
medicine, flashlights, portable radios, etc.)□

Call for households to check evacuation sites and routes□

Description regarding providing information on “Extra Information"and promotion of communication with residents (appointment of a
spokesperson, explanation of information from the JMA,
explanation of the situation and provision of the latest information
to the mass media, counteracting false information, etc.)□

Description regarding response actions in cooperation withneighborhood associations and voluntary disaster prevention
organizations□

Description regarding response actions in cooperation with the
JMA, prefectural governments, etc.

□

Description regarding response actions in cooperation withbusiness and industry□

Description regarding response actions in cooperation with schools
and other public facilities□

Description regarding response actions in cooperation withnongovernmental social welfare facilities□

48

Description regarding the gathering system of senior management□

Description regarding the establishment of disaster response
headquarters□

Description regarding countermeasures in cooperation with local
universities and researchers□

Description regarding advance drills regarding response to “Extra
Information"□

Description regarding suspension of use of roads, bridges andbuildings with low earthquake resistance□Calls for residents to cancel or postpone non-essential activities□

Description regarding calls for the postponement of non-essential
and non-urgent socioeconomic activities (e.g., postponement of
non-urgent surgery or temporary suspension of the production of
hazardous materials)□

Description regarding actions to be taken if no earthquake occurs
after a certain period of time after the announcement of the "Extra
Information"□

Other descriptions, please specify.
______________________________□

Other descriptions, please specify.
______________________________□

Other descriptions, please specify.
______________________________□

49